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01 
 
THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION 
 
 NATURAL AND REVEALED 
 
 TO THE CONSTITUTION AND COURSE 
 
 OF NATURE 
 
 To which are added two brief Dif^ertations 
 
 I. OF PERSONAL IDENTITY 
 
 II. OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE 
 
THE 
 
 ANALOGY OF RELIGION 
 
 NATURAL AND REVEALED 
 TO THE CONSTITUTION AND COURSE 
 
 OF NATURE 
 BY JOSEPH BUTLER LL.D. 
 
 LORD BISHOP OF DURHAM 
 
 WITH ANALYTICAL PREFACE AND INDEX 
 BY THE REV. EDWARD STEERE LL.D. 
 
 LONDON 
 BELL AND DALDY FLEET STREET 
 
Ejus {Analogice) haec vis est, ut id quod dublum est, ad ali- 
 quid simile de quo non quaeritur, referat j ut incerta certis 
 probet. — Slmnt, Inst. Orat. L. I. c. vi. 
 
 CHISWICK PRESS : — PRINTED BY C. WHITTINGHAM, TOOKS COURT, 
 CHANCERY LANE. 
 
INTRODUCTORY PREFACE. 
 
 HERE is, perhaps, no feeling about 
 Bishop Butler's Analogy so general as 
 the convi(5lion that it is very obscure 
 and difficult. For my own part, I 
 cannot now sympathize with that idea ; 
 in h6i, I know few authors whose style and matter 
 seem so well to accord with one another as do Bishop 
 Butler's. It was not so with me always. I had 
 once to get up his three first sermons for a Univer- 
 sity examination. I remember reading on with a 
 sort of dull acquiescence till I had got about half 
 way through them, and then it occurred to me to 
 wonder what all I had been reading might amount 
 to, and I found myself without a single definite idea. 
 I went back and tried to pick out the main points in 
 the argument, and I certainly then thought the 
 writer's style was cruelly difficult and obscure. But 
 I have long since changed my opinion. 
 
 In truth, the greatest beauty of an author's style 
 consists in its appropriatene{^ to expreft his mean- 
 ing. There is a rough likenef^ between the style of 
 the Analogy and that of a legal document, and it 
 goes deeper than might have been expe(fied ; — 
 for what makes a deed obscure to the uninitiated ? 
 Chiefly the attempt on the part of the framer to ex- 
 
«^-' 
 
 vi Introdudory Preface. 
 
 elude all ambiguity. It looks like irony, but it is 
 true, that no written thing, when examined, is clearer 
 than a legal document, and the objec?!:, — the attained 
 objedl, — of all those obscure phrases is to avoid the 
 pof^ibility of being misunderstood. Therefore it is 
 that the more one examines into the pof^ible mean- 
 ings of what seemed clearer exprefsions, the more 
 we shall realize and admire the sound judgment 
 which has preferred what we, at first sight, thought 
 ill-chosen and obscure. Thus it is that careful stu- 
 dents of Butler's works generally come, in the end, 
 to have a sort of relish for his peculiar style. 
 
 It is small comfort, however, to a weary student 
 to be told that what wearies him is a beauty; he 
 will be, no doubt, better pleased to have his labour 
 lightened. I have, therefore, prepared a short ab- 
 stract of the line of argument pursued by our author, 
 which may aisist his memory in retaining the main 
 points of the argument. 
 
 The two great principles by which Butler seems 
 to have accounted to himself for the existence of 
 evils in the world, are, first, that the government of 
 
 I God is carried on by general laws, which, in ex- 
 ceptional cases, seem to need corredlion ; and then, 
 
 I that man is guided by particular affections towards 
 certain obje(5ls and ends, without regard to the mo- 
 ral nature of the means used to obtain them ; and, 
 of course, if men transgref^, they encounter the 
 operation of those other general laws by which right 
 is rewarded and wrong punished. In the control of 
 these particular afFec^tions lies the main part of our 
 probation. We are never impelled by our nature to 
 seek anything intrinsically bad, for its own sake, and 
 the general laws which govern the world are in 
 themselves good. This is probably as near an ac- 
 count of the mode in which evil exists among us, 
 
Introductory Preface. vii 
 
 and of how it is to be reconciled with God's good- 
 neft, as has ever yet been discovered. 
 
 The abstra(5l question is not here formally dis- 
 cuf^ed, but it is shown that, after all pofsible argu- 
 ments have been considered, there is a practical 
 matter-of-facft testimony to the moral chara(9;er of 
 the Author of nature which no speculative difficul- 
 ties can at all unsettle. It is much to be regretted 
 that the arguments of the Analogy are not more in- 
 telligible and interesting to those who need to be 
 convinced by them ; and I would suggest to the 
 reader that he might make them so, if he colledled 
 in the margin of his copy such anecdotes, proverbs, 
 and instances as may occur to him, embodying the 
 principles of condudl; dryly and abstractedly laid 
 down in the text ; then, in preaching or speaking, 
 these illustrations would make the argument much 
 clearer to the multitude than any more exa.6i state- 
 ments could do. I shall now proceed with my ac- 
 count of what the book contains. 
 
 The Introdu(5Hon opens with a short account of 
 the nature of probable evidence as distinguished 
 from demonstration. It is shown that likenef^ to 
 some other and better-known series of events is the 
 material ground of our conclusions in reference to 
 matters of faSi — conclusions upon which we con- 
 stantly and fearleftly a<Si. It is proposed to show that , 
 the doc^^^ines of Religion have such a similarity to/ 1 
 the o rdinary course of ev ents i n everyday life , as to' 
 make it probable that the laws which govern them 
 have a common Author. If this be only shown to 
 be pojlible, the obje(5l of the treatise will have been 
 obtained, and that by reasoning resting exclusively 
 upon fa6is, and therefore irrefragable so long as 
 those fa(9:s remain unchanged. 
 
 It is ai^umed, and this must throughout be borne 
 
viii Introdudory Preface. 
 
 in mind, that there i s some regular g^overnm ent of 
 the universe, — that the world is not a chaos; — in- 
 deed it has been well proved, m other treatises, that 
 there is a supreme God. It is not proposed, in this 
 work, to go into any speculative argument, but simply 
 to investigate the fa6ls of Nature as th ey are, and 
 to c ojnpare them with what natu ral and revealed 
 Religion declare. 
 \ < Ch. I. The first thing to be considered is, whether 
 there is any presumption against the docftrine of 
 our e xistence in a future life , as implied in both na- 
 tural and revealed Religion. But first we must in- 
 quire what there is to live in a future state — what it 
 is that lives now ; in other words, what is the " I," 
 the person about which we are speaking 1 The Dis- 
 sertation on Personal Identity comes in here, in 
 which it is shown not to consist in memory or con- 
 sciousnel^, but in that which pof^eftes them, — a 
 something of _which we know little more thanJ:hat 
 it jnust_exist, because the slightest doubt of it in- 
 volves us in endlef^ pra(5lical absurdities. 
 
 To return to the question about a future life. We 
 have ourselves experienced great changes in form 
 and in capacity. We see many such going on 
 around us, especially in the case of inse(5^s. Con- 
 tinuance is expe(5led on the ground of past existence : 
 and so we all expedl the continuance of our living 
 powers until and unlef^ they end in death. What 
 is death, that it should destroy them ] There does 
 not appear to be any reason in the nature of things 
 why it should, and, as to Analogy, death does no t 
 destroy our material substance s ; it only separate s 
 them; but the individual person, being mseparable, 
 is just as likely to continue as any particular atom 
 of matter may be. It is evident that the body is an 
 instrument of the perso n, not a par t of it ; its dif^o- 
 
Introdudory Preface. ix 
 
 lution, therefore, may leave the person uninjured. 
 The case of brutes is not analogous. We have 
 powers apparently independent of our bodily senses ; 
 these may well be believed to continue unimpaired 
 by the sudden change called death. It is quite pos- j 
 sible that we may by death lose hinderances rather L 
 than capacities. It cannot, therefore, be affirmed! 
 that it is impoftible men should live in a future state ; | 
 it would rather be in accordance with the Analogy 
 of Nature that they should. Thus a prospe^l is 
 opened which must affe(5l the conduct of reason- 
 able men. 
 
 Ch. II. If this probability of a future life should 
 turn out a truth, can we be sure that our actions 
 now will not affe6i our happinei^ then ? How is it 
 in the world ? As a matter of fa(5l, our condu(5l does 
 most materially affe^l our happinel^ afterwards. 
 This {a<Si at once disposes of all speculative difficul- 
 ties about present acftions having future consequences, 
 and, besides^men are guided in their a^lions by thd 
 future good or evil consequences of them, which is; 
 the true idea of being governed by rewards and pu-' 
 nishments.^ Especially in regard to evil conse- 
 quences. — They follow upon carelef^ imprudent ac- 
 tions. They are sometimes long delayed, and often 
 irreparable. Frequently, when men have long 
 seemed to escape, they come suddenly and irresis- 
 tibly, just as the evil consequences of impiety are 
 expe(5led to come by religious persons. What mad- 
 nei^, then, to run the risk of all this misery, which 
 is so far from improbable, that, if only God rules the 
 whole universe as we know that He governs the 
 world, the punishment of some men is morally cer- 
 tain ! 
 
 Ch. III. But will these rewards and punishments 
 certainly be dispensed on moral grounds, as Reli- 
 
X Introdudory Preface. 
 
 gion affirms 1 It is not so much for us to argue about 
 what the world should be, according to our notions of 
 God's nature, as to inquire what its a(51:ual course is. 
 Religion does not affirm that what we see is perfect, 
 but much ratherthat it is as yet faulty and incomplete. 
 
 The Diftertation on Virtue comes in here, and 
 shows that the distinction between virtue and vice 
 is a natural one, and that there is a something in 
 man which connects the idea of punishment with 
 that of vice, and annexes to virtue the hope of re- 
 ward and favour. 
 
 It is a faiSi, that a sense of satisfaction does gene- 
 rally attend virtue, and this is in itself a reward. 
 Certain vices are naturally punished by society, as 
 being destructive to it, and virtue is never punished 
 as such. Wherever harm or advantage follows an 
 action, not as being an action merely, but as having 
 a moral chara(5ter, virtue is always rewarded and vice 
 punished. Consider the effe(5ts, not only on our own 
 peace of mind, but on the good cr ill will of others, 
 both manifested in various ways. The distribution 
 of pain and pleasure, independently of moral cha- 
 racter, does not contradi(5t this, because it is mani- 
 festly not the moral character of men which then 
 produces them. There is an analogy between the 
 power of virtue and that of reason. Reason gives 
 men superiority over unreasoning animals ; but then 
 reason may, for a time, be overborne, and the very 
 want of reason sometimes seems to add to the force 
 and daring of brutes. It is easy to conceive cases 
 analogous to the present prevalence of vice. Then 
 let us consider what would be the effect of the es- 
 tablishment of a perfectly virtuous kingdom. What 
 we know of the government of the world shows that 
 its Governor is not indifferent to virtue and vice, and 
 that, so far as natural tendencies have free course, 
 
Introdudory Preface. xi 
 
 vice Is punished and virtue rewarded. The way is 
 thus opened for the ordinary proofs of a future state 
 of retribution, and the Analogy of Nature shown to 
 be on its side. 
 
 €h. IV. Are we, then, in a state of trial for some 
 future state ] Pleasure and pain being annexed as 
 consequences to our a(5lions, we are, in facft, each 
 day in a state of trial, and good or harm results to 
 us according to our doings. Habits and paf^ions 
 mislead us in regard to our succeO? in the world. 
 Prudence and self-denial are necefkary all through 
 life ; and men are, in spite of experience, volunta- 
 rily extravagant and imprudent, and suffer for it af- 
 terwards. We are, no doubt, not so well off as we 
 might be ; but our own interest is in our hands to 
 spoil or improve. All this is stric^ily analogous to 
 what Religion tells us of our state of probation for a 
 future life, and our conduct under it. 
 
 Ch. V. It may be beyond our faculties to ascer- 
 tain how we came to be placed in this state of trial ; 
 yet we may see, at least, one natural object for it — 
 our improvement in virtue and piety. Every crea- 
 ture is adapted to some particular state of life. All 
 that we are acquainted with are capable of becoming 
 adapted to some new one. We see this in the ef- 
 fe(5ls of pra(9:ice and custom upon ourselves. Va- 
 rious habits of mind and body do affe(5l our capabi- 
 lities, and may change our moral chara(51:er. This 
 capacity for improvement it lies with us to use. 
 Children are gradually educated into a fit state for 
 mature life, though they, in many things, perceive 
 it as little as we do that w^e are being educated for 
 a future state. But in regard to moral improvement, 
 we can see both our want and how it is supplied. 
 Habits of virtue improve our characfter. It would be 
 so with even perfe(5l finite beings ; it is much more 
 
xii Introdudory Preface. 
 
 so with us. The difficuhies we meet with are what 
 strengthen our purposes and habits. Though but 
 few men a(9:ually improve, they are, perhaps, as 
 many in proportion as the well-formed seeds which 
 grow up into healthy plants. Our tempers may 
 very probably be improved by the exercise even of 
 virtues which we may not need hereafter in the same 
 form ; and as it is manifest that we have had a work 
 to do in fitting ourselves to live in the world, can 
 any one say it is improbable that we may now be 
 fitting or unfitting ourselves for some other? 
 
 The world is a theatre of action in regard to men ; 
 our lives may be so in regard to other objec^ts. 
 
 Ch. VI. We have hitherto af^umed the world to 
 be under some government, and it may be suggested 
 that, if that government be by natural necef^ity 
 merely, what we have said of moral government will 
 fall to the ground. The opinion of neceftity is a 
 theory only, but the preceding arguments are all 
 drawn from fa(9:s, and must remain while the fa(5ls 
 are unchanged. The opinion of necef^ity does not 
 exclude deliberation, choice, and a(9;ing for a pur- 
 pose in men. It does not exclude an intelligent 
 agent, but only his a(5i:ing freely. It accounts, by 
 itself, as little for the existence of a universe as for 
 that of a house. Suppose a child educated on fa- 
 talist principles, it could not live in the world with- 
 out abandoning them. In practical matters we all 
 disregard this opinion. As a matter of fa(9;, there 
 is such a thing as a moral characfter in men, and 
 they are, in {'a6i, governed by the hope and fear of 
 rewards and punishments. As a matter of fa(9:, there- 
 fore, the Governor of the universe may have a moral 
 chara(5ler, and the opinion of necefsity must either 
 be consistent with these things, as fa<?is, or be 
 abandoned. The external evidence of Religion also 
 
Introdu6!ory Preface. xiii 
 
 rests upon fa^ls. So that the opinion must be treated 
 as practically false, and, even if it were true, could 
 not be inconsistent with Religion. ^ 
 
 Ch. VII. It was not af^erted that Analogy would 
 give a strict proof of Religion, but only that it would 
 prove it credible, and show it probably true. We 
 know that the natural government of the world is a 
 scheme, or system, of which we see but a small part 
 and understand but a little. If the moral govern- 
 ment is of the same nature, it is probable that we 
 shall understand it as little. Our ignorance, pro- 
 bably, hides from us the solution of many difficulties. 
 Now ignorance is no answer, unlef^ we are ignorant 
 of something materially concerned in our estimate 
 of the matter in question. This is so in regard to 
 objec9;ions against the moral government of the 
 world, which we see to be carried on by good ge- 
 neral laws, and in other matters we daily see strange 
 means bringing about unexpec^led results. This ig- 
 norance is not of equal force against Religion, be- 
 cause our proofs have rested upon facets, which we 
 do know, while the objeclions are based upon as- 
 sumptions, which we can only guef^ at. Analogy 
 shows very clearly that mere ignorance is likely to 
 be the reason why we cannot answer many objec- 
 tions. / 
 
 The Conclusion of the first Part briefly sums up 
 the matters discui^ed and the conclusions arrived at, 
 and applies them as incentives to a virtuous and re- 
 ligious life. 
 
 Part II. In the first Part it was only afsumed that 
 the world was under some regular government. In 
 the second Part it is afsumed, further, that there are 
 such things as virtue and vice, and that the world, 
 and particularly the human race, is under the go- 
 vernment of a wise and good God. The object: of 
 
xiv Introdudory Preface. 
 
 this Part is to show that the dealings of God with 
 us, in respecl of Christianity, are analogous to those 
 in regard of natural Religion, and therefore, by the 
 arguments of the first Part, and sometimes by dire6l 
 comparison, analogous to those in regard of our or- 
 dinary temporal interests. 
 
 Ch. I. There are some who affe^i to think any 
 revelation unnecef^ary. But it is manifest that there 
 was something for a Revelation to effect, and that, 
 if one has been really made, it cannot be safely 
 treated as of no importance. Christianity does, in 
 fa6i, republish, confirm, and provide for the conti- 
 nuous promulgation of the do(A;rines of pure, natural 
 Religion. It also declares a further part of God's 
 moral government, and reveals relations and duties 
 hitherto unperceived by us, but not the left real and 
 of natural moral obligation when declared, — espe- 
 cially in regard to the Redeemer and the San(9;ifier. 
 The bare pojlibility of our standing in such rela- 
 tions ought, in reason, to affeSi our practice. The 
 chapter concludes with an investigation of the dif- 
 ference between moral and positive precepts and 
 duties, with a warning not to prejudge the nature of 
 the Revelation to be expec^ted. 
 
 Ch. II. It is said to be unnatural that there should 
 be a miraculous Revelation. But the more a man 
 knows, the more he feels his ignorance and how 
 much can only be learnt by Revelation. We know 
 not how far Revelation may be in accordance with 
 that general course of Nature in regard to such 
 things of which we can only know this one instance. 
 It may be quite natural that there should be a Re- 
 velation at the creation of a world, and history 
 seems to point to one in regard to ourselves. There 
 is a presumption against everything till it has hap- 
 pened. We know not but that there might be na- 
 
Introdu£!ory Preface. xv 
 
 tural reasons for miracles. We do know that there 
 are moral ones, and there are things commonly 
 known, which, but for being so, would have seemed 
 quite as incredible. 
 
 Ch. III. Reason, noble as it is, and capable of 
 judging of the evidence of Revelation and its general 
 character, is yet no competent judge of the details 
 of a proved Revelation and the manner in which it 
 has been given. Apply it to the details of the or- 
 dinary government of the world, and it will prove 
 itself equally incompetent ; especially consider how 
 men are taught what they ordinarily know. We 
 must thoroughly understand God's purposes before 
 we can judge of what will effect them. Compare 
 human instruction with Revelation, and the use and 
 abuse of natural powers with those recorded of mi- 
 raculous ones, the plainnef^ of ordinary duties, and 
 the application necei^ary to make progrefs in know- 
 ledge in both cases, and the similar hinderances and 
 ignorances. Compare the existence of natural and 
 moral diseases, and the difficulties in discovering 
 and applying their remedies. There are no im- 
 moral precepts in Scripture. In short, objec9:ions 
 against Christianity itself are generally frivolous, be- 
 cause similar ones might be laid against the ordi- 
 nary course of Nature. But we know what could 
 have been expected from enthusiasm and political 
 views, and it goes beyond that. 
 
 Ch. IV. Just as it was before shown that the mo- 
 ral government of the world might be the best sys- 
 tem pofsible, and not appear so to us, the same may 
 be proved of Christianity. It is evidently a vast 
 ^plan, of which but a very small part is declared to 
 us. The fitnef^ of particular means to particular 
 ends we are very bad judges of. The general laws 
 which govern it we can only perceive by some in- 
 
xvi Introdudory Preface. 
 
 dications, as we can in Nature reduce but a part of 
 what we see to known general natural laws. Our 
 redemption was certainly worked out by very slow 
 and succeftive means— so is the bursting of a flower. 
 The deliberation with which natural Providence 
 works, and our liability to mistake the tendency of 
 its operations, are evident in everything around us. 
 Ch. V. Men obje(?l; against the mediation of 
 Christ. But we are all brought into the world and 
 preserved in it by the mediation of others. The 
 consequences which would naturally follow upon our 
 follies and vices, the care of others may save us 
 from. We do not sufficiently realize the present 
 heinousnef^ and disastrous effedls of vice, and there- 
 fore do not sufficiently value the provisions for saving 
 us from those effects. Reformation does not save 
 us without the help of others, and it is to be re- 
 membered that Christianity did not make us need 
 salvation ; it only declared God's goodnef^ towards 
 us in respedl of it. There is nothing unnatural in 
 the do(5lrine of our being in a fallen state. Christ 
 is declared to us in Scripture as Prophet, Priest, and 
 King, the Vidlim and the Offerer. We know so 
 little about the future punishment of sin, that we 
 cannot judge of the expediency or usefulnef^ of the 
 means taken to prevent it. It is said to be contrary 
 to God's nature that the just should suffer for the 
 unjust. But human beings often undergo great la- 
 bour, danger, and sufferings, sometimes death, to 
 deliver their fellow-creatures from the consequences 
 of their faults and mistakes ; — what is this but the 
 vicarious suffering of those who have not offended ? 
 It is the highest presumption, and contrary to all 
 reason and analogy, for us to expecff to understand 
 the whole of the Divine condu^f. Our own duty is 
 taught us clearly ; the moment we go beyond that, 
 we grope in darknef^. 
 
IntroduSory Preface. xvii 
 
 Ch. VI. Some obje(5l that a true Revelation would 
 not have been left upon evidence capable of being 
 doubted, and known to but a part of mankind. But 
 we always have doubtful evidence to a(5l upon in 
 temporal affairs, and no two men have exa6i\y the 
 same advantages. The light of Revelation has been 
 different in different ages and to different individuals ; 
 but we must remember that all are to be Judged ac- 
 cording to what they had. Why were different kinds 
 of beings created ? If the Revelation came alike to 
 all, still all would never derive the same benefit from 
 it. But this doubtfulnel^ may be a part of our pro- 
 bation. It is a moral fault to refuse attention and 
 shut our eyes to doubtful evidence. Speculative dif- 
 ficulties may be no more to be complained of than 
 any other temptations. They may be the great 
 temptations of some men. However, men are often 
 in doubt merely through some evident fault of their 
 own. There seems to be full evidence of their du- 
 ties as Christians accef^ible to men generally. It 
 can be no excuse for negle(5ling these, that they may 
 not be able of themselves, at once, to answer all the 
 objections cleverer men may suggest. Besides, 
 God does not desire us to do this or that external 
 thing, but to cultivate a holy and virtuous frame of 
 mind : doubtful evidence will suflfice for this. Even 
 a sceptic is morally bound not to be openly profane. 
 
 Ch. VII. The evidence of Christianity includes a 
 multitude of details, making up together one great 
 argument ; so does the evidence on which we be- 
 lieve ordinary fa(9;s. The miracles recorded in Scrip- 
 ture are not separable from the other fa.6is of the 
 history. All stand upon the same historical evidence, 
 and that of a very satisfactory kind. St. Paul's 
 Epistles, by themselves, form a very good piece of 
 historical evidence for Christianity and its miracles. 
 b 
 
xviii Introdudory Preface. 
 
 Its reception on the ground of miracles is peculiar 
 to it. The fact of its being so received, and under 
 such circumstances as it was, and even being re- 
 ceived at all, is valid historical testimony to its truth. 
 The suggestion that the first Christians were under 
 the influence of enthusiasm does not destroy this 
 evidence ; nor does the {a6i that men have been 
 strangely deluded by pretended miracles. There 
 must be something in its evidences, or these sug- 
 gestions would never have been made, and there is 
 no counter-evidence to be produced. 
 
 As to the evidence from prophecy, the obscurity 
 of one part does not refute the clearnels of another. 
 The fa(5l that prophecy is applicable proves the pro- 
 priety of its application. The individual prophet is 
 not the true author of his prophecies ; he is not, 
 therefore, any perfe(5l judge of their application. 
 The whole question is, are they applicable to Chris- 
 tianity, or no } 
 
 Upon a general view of the Bible as a history, 
 what an immense scope it offers for criticism, and 
 how many openings for confutation, yet it has never, 
 as a whole, been at all confuted. 
 
 Suppose a person to have picked up the outlines 
 of the prophecies concerning the Jews and the Mes- 
 siah, and their alleged fulfilment : then let him be 
 told, as matters beyond dispute, how much natural 
 Religion is indebted to the belief in this Revelation ; 
 that the history contained in it is confirmed by other 
 records and documents ; that the Jews have been 
 and are what they are ; that a person did certainly 
 arise among them, claiming to be the Meftiah, and 
 did establish a Religion which was received on the 
 evidence of miracles, and does row prevail through- 
 out the world, the state of which seems to point to 
 the fulfilment of other prophecies concerning it ; — 
 
Introductory Preface. xix 
 
 could he doubt that this evidence is of great weight? 
 There undoubtedly is historical evidence for miracles, 
 and there are many instances of conformity between 
 the prophecies and actual events. All these things, 
 when taken together, are of much more force than 
 when taken singly, and the importance of the sub- 
 jecft makes it our duty to weigh every tittle of evi- 
 dence the more carefully. 
 
 Ch. VIII. It is pofsible that the whole course of 
 the foregoing argument may be objected to ; and to 
 meet this it is desirable to remember, i . That it is 
 unreasonable to allege against Revelation, specially, 
 what is equally applicable to natural Religion, and 
 still more whc.t applies as well to ordinary worldly 
 prudence. 2. That we have no right to complain 
 that Religion, which is a pra(9:ical matter, is left 
 doubtful, if it is not more so than other pracftical 
 matters are. 3. That the design of this treatise is 
 not to prove God's goodnef^, but to inquire into 
 man's duty. Objet^ions to the doctrine about God 
 are only considered so far as to show that they are 
 not conclusive, and that the things obje(fted to are, 
 as matters of fa(5l, made probable by being in ac- 
 cordance with the general course of the world. 4. 
 That there is nothing, about which we may not wish 
 for more light. 5. That it is not to be expe(fted 
 that any argument will convince every one, if, as 
 has been shown to be probable, the necef^ity of at- 
 tention, 8cc. to convicftion forms part of our proba- 
 tion. 6. That the proofs of Religion, from the prin- 
 ciples of liberty and moral fitneft, are here altogether 
 paired over, because the aim is not to give the best, 
 but the most pra(5lical proof, and one involving no 
 disputed principles. The whole treatise will there- 
 fore be to some a proof, to others the confirmation 
 of a clearer proof, to all the analogies here traced 
 
XX Introdudory Preface. 
 
 will be of use in support of the fa(9;s implied in Re- 
 ligion. 
 
 In the Conclusion the second Part is recapitu- 
 lated, and the pra(51ical obligations arising from the 
 bare pofsibility of the truth of Christianity are 
 strongly and clearly stated. 
 
 The specific points in which analogies are traced 
 will be found in the Index, under the head of Ana- 
 logy, and the principal obje(5^ions stated in the text 
 under that of OhjeSiions considered. If what is here 
 done to his hand save the student any time and 
 trouble, let him regard that gain as a trust to be laid 
 out in the further prosecution of the glorious work 
 of theological research, the noblest occupation that 
 can engage the mind of man. May he find as much 
 pleasure therein as has fallen to the share of the 
 unworthy student who has written these few pages 
 for his af^istance I 
 
 E. S. 
 
[Original Dedicatiori]. 
 TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE 
 
 CHARLES LORD TALBOT, 
 
 BARON OF HENSOL, 
 Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain, 
 
 The following Treatise is, with all respe(5l, inscribed; 
 in acknowledgment of the highest obligations to the 
 late Lord Bishop of Durham and to himself, 
 
 By His Lordship's 
 most dutiful, 
 
 most devoted, 
 
 and most humble servant, 
 JOSEPH BUTLER. 
 
ADVERTISEMENT. 
 
 F the reader should meet here with 
 any thing, which he had not before 
 attended to, it will not be in the ob- 
 servations upon the constitution and 
 course of Nature, these being all ob- 
 vious ; but in the application of them : In which, 
 though there is nothing but what appears to me of 
 some real weight, and therefore of great importance ; 
 yet he will observe several things, which will ap- 
 pear to him of very little, if he can think things to 
 be of little importance, which are of any real weight 
 at all, upon such a subjecl; as Religion. However, 
 the proper force of the following Treatise lies in the 
 whole general Analog^' considered together. 
 
 It is come, I know not how, to be taken for 
 granted, by many persons, that Christianity is not 
 so much as a subject of inquiry ; but that it is, now 
 at length, discovered to be fictitious. And accord- 
 ingly they treat it, as if, in the present age, this 
 were an agreed point, among all people of discern- 
 ment : and nothing remained, but to set it up as a 
 principal subje(5^ of mirth and ridicule, as it were by 
 way of reprisals, for its having so long interrupted 
 the pleasures of the world. On the contrary, thus 
 much, at least, will be here found, not taken for 
 
xxiv Advertisement. 
 
 granted, but proved, that any reasonable man, who 
 will thoroughly consider the matter, may be as 
 much aftured, as he is of his own beingf, that it is 
 not, however, so clear a case, that there is nothing 
 in it. There is, I think, strong evidence of its truth ! 
 but it is certain no one can, upon principles of rea- 
 son, be satisfied of the contrary. And the prac^tical 
 consequence to be drawn from this is not attended 
 to by every one who is concerned in it. 
 
 May, 1736. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 Page 
 
 Introductiok . . . . . . . I 
 
 PART I. 
 Chap. 
 
 I. Of a Future Life 12 
 
 II. Of the Government of God by Rewards and Pu- 
 
 nishments ; and particularly of the latter . 32 
 
 III. Of the Moral Government of God ... 45 
 
 IV. Of a State of Probation, as implying Trial, Dif- 
 
 ficulties, and Danger .... 72 
 
 V. Of a State of Probation, as intended for Moral 
 
 Discipline and Improvement ... 82 
 VI. Of the Opinion of Necessity, considered as icflu- 
 
 encing Practice 109 
 
 VII. Of the Government of God, considered as a 
 Scheme or Constitution, imperfectly compre- 
 hended 127 
 
 Conclusion . . . . . . . .139 
 
 PART II. 
 Chap. 
 
 I. Of the Importance of Christianity . . . 147 
 
 II. Of the supposed Presumption against a Revela- 
 
 tion, considered as miraculous . . .167 
 
 III. Of our Incapacity of judging, what were to be ex- 
 
 pected in a Revelation ; and the Credibility, 
 from Analogy, that it must contain things ap- 
 pearing liable to Objections . . . 175 
 
xxvi Contents. 
 
 Page 
 192 
 
 IV. Of Christianity, considered as a Scheme or Con- 
 stitution, imperfectly comprehended 
 V. Of the particular System of Christianity ; the 
 Appointment of a Mediator, and the Redemp- 
 tion of the World by him . . . .201 
 VI. Of the Want of Universality in Eevelation : and 
 
 of the supposed Deficiency in the Proof of it 222 
 VII. Of the particular Evidence for Christianity . 244 
 VIII. Of the Objections which may be made against 
 arguing from the Analogy of Nature, to Re- 
 ligion 285 
 
 Conclusion 299 
 
 DISSERTATION I. 
 Of Personal Identity 313 
 
 DISSERTATION II. 
 
 Of the Nature of Virtue 321 
 
 Analytical Index 333 
 
 Note at p. 31 refers to pages 168, 173, 177, &c. 
 
 34 „ 131 
 
 48 „ 118 
 
 72 „ 118 
 
 78 „ 210 
 
 118 „ 326 
 
 252 « 1, 244, 282, &c. 
 
^^i^^ 
 
 THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION 
 
 TO THE CONSTITUTION AND 
 COURSE OF NATURE 
 
 ^^^^^ 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 ROB ABLE Evidence is eftentially dis- 
 tinguishedfrom demonstrative by this, 
 that it admits of degrees ; and of all 
 variety of them, from the highest mo- 
 ral certainty, to the very lowest pre- 
 sumption. We cannot indeed say a thing is proba- 
 bly true upon one very slight presumption for it ; 
 becaufe, as there maybe probabilities on both sides 
 of a question, there may be some against it : and 
 though there be not, yet a slight presumption does 
 not beget that degree of convi(9;ion, which is implied 
 in saying a thing is probably true. But that the 
 slightest pofsible presumption is of the nature of a 
 probability, appears from hence ; that such low pre- 
 sumption often repeated, will amount even to moral 
 certainty. Thus a man's having observed the ebb 
 and flow of the tide to-day, affords some sort of pre- 
 sumption, though the lowest imaginable, that it may 
 happen again to-morrow: But the observation of this 
 event for so many days, and months, and ages to- 
 gether, as it has been observed by mankind, gives 
 us a full af^urance that it will. 
 
 That which chiefly constitutes Probability is ex- 
 
2 Introduction. 
 
 pref^ed in the word Likely, i.e. like some truth,^ or 
 true event ; like it, in itself, in its evidence, in some 
 more or fewer of its circumstances. For when we 
 determine a thing to be probably true, suppose that 
 an event has or will come to paf^, it is from the mind's 
 remarking in it a likenefs to some other event, which 
 we have observed has come to paf^. And this obser- 
 vation forms, in numberlef^ daily instances, a pre- 
 sumption, opinion, or full convi(5lion, that such event 
 has or will come to paft ; according as the observation 
 is, that the like event has sometimes, most commonly, 
 or always so far as our observation reaches, come to 
 paft at like distances of time, or place, or upon like 
 occasions. Hence arises the belief, that a child, if 
 it lives twenty years, will grow up to the stature and 
 strength of a man ; that food will contribute to the 
 preservation of its life, and the want of it for such a 
 number of days, be its certain destrudlion. So like- 
 wise the rule and measure of our hopes and fears 
 concerning the succeft of our pursuits ; our expecta- 
 tions that others will act so and so in such circum- 
 stances; and our judgment that such actions proceed 
 from such principles ; all these rely upon our having 
 observed thelike towhat we hope, fear, expec^t, judge ; 
 I say upon our having observed the like, either with 
 respeift to others or ourselves. And thus, whereas 
 the prince^ who had always lived in a warm climate, 
 naturally concluded in the way of Analogy, that there 
 was no such thing as water's becoming hard; because 
 he had always observed it to be fluid and yielding : 
 We on the contrary, from Analogy conclude, that 
 there is no presumption at all against this : that it is 
 
 ' Verisimile. 
 
 2 The story is told by Mr. Locke in the Chapter of Proba- 
 bility. 
 
Introduction. 3 
 
 supposable, there may be frost in England any given 
 day in January next ; probable that there will on 
 some day of the month ; and that there is a moral 
 certainty, i.e. ground for an expectation without any 
 doubt of it, in some part or other of the winter. 
 
 Probable Evidence, in its very nature, affords but 
 an imperfect kind of information ; and is to be con- 
 sidered as relative only to beings of limited capaci- 
 ties. For nothing which is the pofsibie objecl _o f 
 knowledg^e, whether past, present, or futurgj^ canjbe 
 proEable to an infinite intelligence; since it cannot 
 biif Be discerned absotutely'as it is in itself, certainly 
 true, or certainly false. But to us, probability is the 
 very guide of life . 
 
 From these things it follows, that in questions of 
 difficulty, or such as are thought so, where more sa- 
 tisfactory evidence cannot be had, or is not seen; if 
 the result of examination be, that there appears upon 
 the whole, any the lowest presumption on one side, 
 and none on the other, or a greater presumption on 
 one side, though in the lowest degree greater; this 
 determines the question, even in matters of specu- 
 lation ; and in matters of practice, will lay us under 
 an absolute and formal obligation, in point of pru- 
 dence and of interest, to acl upon that presumption 
 or low probability, though it be so low as to leave the 
 mind in very great doubt which is the truth. For 
 surely a man is as really bound in prudence, to do 
 w^hat upon the whole appears, according to the best 
 of his judgment, to be for his happinef^, as what 
 he certainly knows to be so. Nay further, in ques- 
 tions of great consequence, a reasonable man will 
 think it concerns him to remark lower probabilities 
 and presumptions than these ; such as amount to no 
 more than showing one side of a question to be as 
 supposable and credible as the other : nay such as 
 
4 Introdudion. 
 
 but amount to much left even than this. For num- 
 berleft instances might be mentioned respecting the 
 common pursuits of life, where a man would be 
 thought, in a literal sense, distra(5led, who would 
 not a(?l;, and with great application too, not only upon 
 an even chance, but upon much left, and v^here the 
 probability or chance was greatly against his suc- 
 ceeding.^ 
 
 It is not my design to inquire further into the na- 
 ture, the foundation, and measure of probability ; or 
 whence it proceeds that Likenefs should beget that 
 presumption, opinion, and full convi6lion, which the 
 human mind is formed to receive from it, and which 
 it does neceftarily produce in every one; or to guard 
 against the errors, to which reasoning from Analogy 
 is liable. This belongs to the subject of logic; and 
 is a part of that subje6l which has not yet been tho- 
 roughly considered. Indeed I shall not take upon 
 me to say, how far the extent, compaft, and force, 
 of analogical reasoning, can be reduced to general 
 heads and rules ; and the whole be formed into a 
 system. But though so little in this way has been 
 attempted by those who have treated of our intellec- 
 tual powers, and the exercise of them ; this does not 
 hinder but that we may be, as we unquestionably 
 are, aftured, that Analogy is of weight, in various 
 degrees, towards determining our judgment and our 
 pra(9:ice. Nor does it in any wise cease to be of 
 weight in those cases, because persons, either given 
 to dispute, or who require things to be stated with 
 greater exac^tneft than our faculties appear to admit 
 of in pra^lical matters, may find other cases in which 
 it is not easy to say, whether it be, or be not, of any 
 weight; or instances of seeming Analogies, which 
 are really of none. It is enough to the present pur- 
 
 3 See Chap. vi. Part ii. 
 
Introduflion. 5 
 
 pose to observe, that this general way of arguing is 
 evidently natural, just and conclusive. For there is 
 no man can make a question but that the sun will 
 rise to-morrow ; and be seen, where it is seen at all, 
 in the figure of a circle, and not in that of a square. 
 
 Hence, namelyfrom analogical Reasoning, Origen^ 
 has with singular sagacity observed, that be who be- 
 lieves the Scripture to have proceeded from him who, 
 is the Author of nature ^ may well expeSt to findtbe\ 
 same sort of difficulties in it, as are found in the 
 constitution of nature. And in a like way of re- 
 flec^tion it may be added, that he who denies the 
 Scripture to have been from. God upon account of 
 these difficulties, may, for the very same reason, 
 deny the world to have been formed by him. On 
 the other hand, if there be an Analogy or Likenef^ 
 between that system of things and dispensation of 
 Providence, which Revelation informs us of, and that 
 system of things and dispensation of Providence, 
 which experience together with reason informs us 
 of, i. e. the known course of nature ; this is a pre- 
 sumption, that they have both the same author and 
 cause ; at least so far as to answer obje(9:ions against 
 the former's being from God, drawn from anything 
 which is analogical or similar to what is in the lat- 
 ter, which is acknowledged to be from him : for an 
 author of nature is here supposed. 
 
 Forming our notions of the constitution and gov- 
 ernment of the world upon reasoning, without foun- 
 dation for the principles which we ai^ume, whether 
 from the attributes of God or anything else; is build- 
 ing a world upon hypothesis, like Des Cartes. Form- 
 
 * Xp?) ^I'tv Toi ji. Tov ctTTa? irapadt^aixevov tov KTiaav- 
 TOQ TOV Koayiov tlvai ravraQ tolq ypcKpdg TrtirtXaQai, on 
 oaa TTfpi Ti]q KTicreojQ airavTa ro'igt'tiTOvcn tov Trepi avTrjg 
 X670V, Taiira ku] irtpi Tuiv ■ypa(pu>v. — Philocal. p. 23. Ed. 
 Cant. 
 
A 
 
 ^c 
 
 6 Introdudion, 
 
 ing our notions upon reasoning from principles which 
 are certain, but applied to cases to which we have 
 no ground to apply them, (like those who explain 
 the structure of the human body, and the nature of 
 diseases and medicines from mere mathematics 
 without sufficient data;) is an error much akin to the 
 former: since what is aftumed in order to make the 
 reasoning applicable, is hypothesis. But it must be 
 allowed just, to join abstradl; reasonings with the ob- 
 servation of fa(fts, and argue from such fac^s as are 
 knov/n, to others that are like them; from that part 
 of the Divine Government over intelligent creatures 
 which comes under our view, to that larger and more 
 general government over them, which is beyond it; 
 and from what is present, to colle(^, what is likely, 
 credible, or not incredible, will be hereafter. 
 
 This method then of concluding and determining 
 being practical, and what, if we will a6l at all, we 
 cannot but act upon in the common pursuits of life ; 
 being evidently conclusive, in various degrees, pro- 
 portionable to the degree and exac^nefs of the whole 
 Analogy or Likeneft; and having so great authority 
 for its introduction into the subje(51 of Religion, even 
 revealed Religion ; my design is to apply it to that 
 subjeCl in general, both natural and revealed: taking 
 for proved, that there is an intelligent Author of Na- 
 ture, and natural Governor of the world. For as 
 there is no presumption against this prior to the proof 
 of it: so it has been often proved with accumulated 
 evidence ; from this argument of Analogy and final 
 causes ; from abstract reasonings ; from the most 
 ancient tradition and testimony; and from the gene- 
 ral consent of mankind. Nor does it appear, so far 
 as I can find, to be denied, by the generality of those 
 who profefs themselves dif^atisfied with the Evidence 
 of Religion. 
 
Introdudion. 7 
 
 As there are some, who, instead of thus attending 
 to what is in fact the constitution of nature, form their 
 notions of God's government upon hypothesis : so 
 there are others, who indulge themselves in vain and 
 idle speculations, how the world might pof^ibly have 
 been framed otherwise than it is ; and upon sup- 
 position that things might, in imagining that they 
 should, have been disposed and carried on after a bet- 
 ter model, than what appears in the present disposi- 
 tion and condu(5l of them. Suppose now a person 
 of such a turn of mind, to go on with his reveries, 
 till he had at length fixed upon some particular plan of 
 
 nature, as appearing to him the best. One shall 
 
 scarce be thought guilty of detraction against human 
 understanding, if one should say, even beforehand, 
 that the plan which this speculative person would fix 
 upon, though he were the wisest of the sons of men, 
 probably would not be the very best, even according 
 to his own notions of best ; whether he thought that to 
 be so, which afforded occasions and motives for the 
 exercise of the greatest virtue, or which was produc- 
 tive of the greatest happinefs, or that these two were 
 necefsarily connected, and run up into one and the 
 same plan. However, it may not be amif^ once for 
 all to see, what would be the amount of these em- 
 endations and imaginary improvements upon the 
 system of nature, or how far they would mislead us. 
 And it seems there could be no stopping, till we came^ 
 to some such conclusions as these : That all creature:^ 
 should at first be made as perfect and as happy as 
 they were capable of ever being: That nothing, to 
 be sure, of hazard or danger should be put upon them 
 to do ; some indolent persons would perhaps think 
 nothing at all : Or certainly, that effeclual care should 
 be taken, that they should, whether necefsarily or not, 
 yet eventually and in fa(5l, aK\ ays do what was right 
 
8 Introdudion. 
 
 and most conducive to happineft, which would be 
 thought easy for infinite power to effe6l ; either by 
 not giving them any principles which would endanger 
 their going wrong ; or by laying the right motive 
 of a(ftion in every instance before their minds con- 
 tinually in so strong a manner, as would never fail of 
 inducing them to a6l conformably to it : And that the 
 whole method of government by punishments should 
 be rejected, as absurd ; as an awkward round-about 
 method of carrying things on ; nay as contrary to a 
 
 N principal purpose, for which it would be supposed 
 jcreatures were made, namely happineft. 
 
 Now, without considering what is to be said in 
 particular to the several parts of this train of folly and 
 extravagance ; what has been above intimated is a 
 full dire(?i: general answer to it, namely, that we may 
 see beforehand that we have not faculties for this kind 
 of speculation. For though it be admitted, that from 
 the first Principles ofour nature, we unavoidably judge 
 or determine some ends to be absolutely in them- 
 selves preferable to others, and that the ends now 
 mentioned, or if they run up into one, that this one 
 is absolutely the best; and consequently that we must 
 conclude the ultimate end designed, in the constitu- 
 tion of nature and conduct of Providence, is the most 
 Virtue and Happinel^ pof^ible : yet we are far from 
 being able to judge, what particular disposition of 
 things would be most friendly and aftistant to virtue ; 
 or what means might be absolutely neceftary to pro- 
 duce the most happineft in a system of such extent 
 as our own world may be, taking in all that is past 
 and to come, though we should suppose it detached 
 from the whole of things. Indeed we are so far from 
 being able to judge of this; that we are not judges 
 what may be the neceftary means of raising and con- 
 dueling one person to the highest perfection and 
 
Introduction. 9 
 
 happinef^ of his nature. Nay even in the little affairs 
 of the present life, we find men of different educa- 
 tions and ranks are not competent judges of the con- 
 duct of each other. Our whole nature leads us to 
 ascribe all moral perfection to God, and to deny all 
 imperfection of him. And this will for ever be 
 a practical proof of his moral charaCler, to such 
 as will consider what apra(?tical proof is; because it 
 is the voice of God speaking in us. And from hence 
 we conclude that virtue must be the happinel^, and 
 vice the misery, of every creature ; and that regu- 
 larity and order and right cannot but prevail finally 
 in a universe under his government. But we are in 
 no sort judges, what are the necei^ary means of ac- 
 complishing this end. 
 
 Let us then, instead of that idle and not very 
 innocent employment of forming imaginary models 
 of a world, and schemes of governing it, turn our 
 thoughts to what we experience to be the condu(5l of 
 nature with respeCl to intelligent creatures ; which 
 may be resolved into general laws or rules of admi- 
 nistration, in the same way as many of the laws of 
 nature respecting inanimate matter may be collected 
 from experiments. And let us compare the known 
 constitution and course of things, with what is said to 
 be the moral system of nature ; the acknowledged 
 Dispensations of Providence, or that government 
 which we find ourselves under, with what Religion 
 teaches us to believe and expeCf ; and see whether 
 they are not analogous and of a piece. And upon 
 such a comparison, it will I think be found, that they 
 are very much so : that both may be traced up to 
 the same general laws, and resolved into the same 
 principles of divine conduct. 
 
 The Analogy here proposed to be considered, is 
 of pretty large extent, and consists of several parts ; 
 
10 Introduction. 
 
 in some, more, in others, left, exact. In some few 
 instances perhaps it may amount to a real pra^lical 
 proof; in others not so. Yet in these it is a confir- 
 mation of what is proved other ways. It will unde- 
 niably shew, what too many want to have shewn 
 them, that the system of Religion both natural and 
 revealed, considered only as a system, and prior to 
 the proof of it, is not a subject of ridicule, unlefs that 
 of nature be so too. And it will afford an answer to 
 almost all objections against the system both of na- 
 tural and revealed Religion ; though not perhaps an 
 answer in so great a degree, yet in a very consider- 
 able degree an answer, to the obje(9;ions against the 
 evidence of it : For obje(9;ions against a proof, and 
 obje6^ions against what is said to be proved, the 
 Reader will observe are different things. 
 
 Now the Divine Government of the world, implied 
 in the notion of Religion in general and of Christi- 
 anity, contains in it : That mankind is appointed to 
 live in a future state :^ That there, every one shall 
 be rewarded or punished ; ^ rewarded or punished 
 respectively for all that behaviour here, which we 
 comprehend under the words, virtuous or vicious, 
 morally good or evil : '^ That our present life is a pro- 
 bation, a state of trial,^ and of discipline,^ for that fu- 
 ture one ; notwithstanding the objections which men 
 may fancy they have, from notions of necef^ity, 
 against there being any such moral plan as this at 
 all;^" and whatever objections may appear to lie 
 against the wisdom and goodnef^ of it, as it stands 
 so imperfeClly made known to us at present :^^ That 
 this world being in a state of apostacy and wicked- 
 nef^, and consequently of ruin, and the sense both 
 of their conditio^ and duty being greatly corrupted 
 amongst men, this gave occasion for an additional 
 
 5 Ch. i. 6 ch. ii. 7 Ch. iii. 8 ch. iv. 
 
 9 Ch. V. 1° Ch. vi. 1' Ch. vii. 
 
Introduction. 1 1 
 
 dispensation of Providence ; of the utmost import- 
 ance;'- proved by miracles ;^-^ but containing in it 
 many things appearing to us strange and not to have 
 been expected ;^^ a Dispensation of Providence, which 
 is a scheme or system of things ; ^^ carried on by the 
 Mediation of a Divine Person, the Mefsiah, in order 
 to the recovery of the world ; '^ yet not revealed to 
 all men, nor proved with the strongest pofsible evi- 
 dence to all those to whom it is revealed ; but only 
 to such a part of mankind, and with such particular 
 evidence as the wisdom of God thought fit,^^ The 
 design then of the following Treatise will be to shew, 
 that the several parts principally objected against in 
 this moral and Christian Dispensation, including its 
 scheme, its publication, and the proof which God has 
 afforded us of its truth ; that the particular Parts 
 principally objecled against in this whole Dispensa- 
 tion, are analogous to what is experienced in the con- 
 stitution and course of nature, or Providence ; that 
 the chief objections themselves which are alleged 
 against the former, are no other, than what may be 
 alleged with like justnefs against the latter, where 
 they are found in faSi to be inconclusive ; and that 
 this argument from Analogy is in general, unanswer- 
 able, and undoubtedly of weight on tbe side of Re- 
 ligion,''^ notv.'ithstanding the objections which may 
 seem to lie against it, and the real ground which 
 there may be for difference of opinion, as to the 
 particular degree of weight which is to be laid upon 
 it. This is a general Account of what may be looked 
 for in the following Treatise. And I shall begin it 
 with that which is the foundation of all our hopes and 
 of all our fears ; all our hopes and fears, which are 
 of any consideration ; I mean a Future Life. 
 
 '2 Part. 11. Ch. i. 13 ch. ii. 1^ Ch. iii. '^ Ch. iv. 
 
 »6 Ch. V. 17 Ch. vi. vii. 18 Ch. viii. 
 
THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION TO THE 
 
 CONSTITUTION AND COURSE 
 
 OF NATURE. 
 
 PART I.— Of Natural Religion. 
 CHAP. I.— Of a Future Life. 
 
 TRANGE difficulties have been raised 
 by some concerning- personal identi- 
 ty, or the samenef^ of living agents, 
 implied in the notion of our existing 
 now and hereafter, or in any two suc- 
 cefsive moments ; which whoever thinks it worth 
 while, may se^ considered in the first Difsertation at 
 the end of this Treatise. But without regard to any 
 of them here, let us consider what the Analogy of 
 Nature, and the several changes which we have un- 
 dergone, and those which we know we may undergo 
 without being destroyed, suggest, as to the effect 
 which death may, or may not have upon us ; and 
 whether it be not from thence probable, that we may 
 survive this change, and exist in a future state of life 
 and perception. 
 
 I. From our being born into the present world in 
 the helpleft imperfect state of infancy, and having 
 
Chap. I. Of a Future Life. 13 
 
 arrived from thence to mature age, we find it to be 
 a general Law of Nature in our own species, that the 
 same creatures, the same individuals, should exist in 
 degrees of life and perception, with capacities of 
 a(5lion, of enjoyment and suffering, in one period of 
 their being, greatly different from those appointed 
 them in another period of it. And in other creatures 
 the same law holds. For the difference of their ca- 
 pacities and states of life at their birth (to go no 
 higher) and in maturity ; the change of worms into 
 flies, and the vast enlargement of their locomotive 
 powers by such change : and birds and insects burst- 
 ing the shell their habitation, and by this means en- 
 tering into a new world, furnished with new accom- 
 modations for them, and finding a new sphere of 
 a(9;ion af^igned them; these are Instances of this ge- 
 neral Law of Nature. Thus all the various and won- 
 derful transformations of animals are to be taken into 
 consideration here. But the states of life in which 
 we ourselves existed formerly in the womb and in 
 our infancy, are almost as different from our present 
 in mature age, as it is pof^ible to conceive any two 
 states or degrees of life can be. Therefore, t hat we 
 are to exist hereafter in a^state a^ diifereflt (sup- 
 pose) from our present, as this is from our former, 
 is but according to the Analogy of Nature ; accord- 
 ing to a natural order or appointment of the very 
 same kind, with what we have already experienced. 
 IL We know we are endued with capacities of 
 adlion, of happinei^ and misery : for we are con- 
 scious of a(5ling, of enjoying pleasure and suffering 
 pain. Now that we have these powers and capaci- 
 ties before death, is a presumption that we shall re- 
 tain them through and after death ; indeed a proba- 
 bility of it abundantly sufficient to a(5l upon, unlef^ 
 there be some positive reason to think that death is 
 
14 Of a Future Life. Part i. 
 
 the destruction of those living powers: Because there 
 is in every case a probability, that all things will con- 
 tinue as we experience the}' are, in all respects, ex- 
 cept those in which we have some reason to think 
 they will be altered. This is that kind^ of presump- 
 tion or probability from Analog}^, exprefsed in the 
 ^^very word continuance, which seems our only na- 
 tural reason for believing the course of the world will 
 continue to-morrow, as it has done so far as our ex- 
 perience or knowledge of history can carry us back. 
 Nay it seems our only reason for believing, that any 
 one substance now existing, will continue to exist a 
 moment longer ; the self-existent substance only ex- 
 cepted. Thus if men were afsured that the unknown 
 .^vent, death, was not the destruction of our faculties 
 of perception and of action, there would be no appre- 
 hension, that any other power or event unconne(fted 
 with this of death, would destroy these faculties just 
 at the instant of each creature's death ; and there- 
 fore no doubt but that they would remain after it : 
 which shows the high probability that our living 
 powers will continue after death, unlefs there be 
 some ground to think that death is their destruction.^ 
 For, if it would be in a manner certain that we should 
 survive death, provided it were certain that death 
 would not be our destruiftion, it must be highly pro- 
 bable we shall survive it, if there be no ground to 
 think death will be our destru(51ion. 
 
 ' I say kind of presumption or probability ; for I do not mean 
 to affirm that there is the same degree of convidlion, that our 
 living powers will continue after death, as there is, that our 
 substances will. 
 
 2 Dtstrucrion of U'ving powers is a manner of expreflion un- 
 avoidably ambiguous ; and may signify either the destruBion of 
 a U'ving beings so as that the same U'ving being shaU be incapable 
 of e'ver percei'ving or a&ing again at all : or t/ie destruBion of 
 those means and instruments by nuhich it is capable of its present 
 
Chap. 1. Of a Future Life. 15 
 
 Now though I think it must be acknowledged, that 
 prior to the natural and moral proofs of a future life 
 commonly insisted upon, there would arise a general 
 confused suspicion, that in the great shock and alte- 
 ration which we shall undergo by death, we, i.e. our 
 living powers, might be wholly destroyed ; yet even 
 prior to those proofs, there is really no particular dis- 
 tinct; ground or reason for this apprehension at all, 
 so far as I can find. If there be, it must arise either 
 from the reason of the thing, or from the Analogy of 
 Nature. 
 
 But we cannot argue from the reason of the thing, 
 that death is the destruction of living agents, because 
 we know not at all what death is in itself; but only 
 some of its efFe(9;s, such as the diftolution of flesh, 
 skin, and bones. And these effects do in no w ise ap- 
 pear to imply the destruction of a living agent. And 
 besides, as we are greatl}'^ in the dark, upon what the 
 exercise of our living powers depends, so we are 
 wholly ignorant what the powers themselves depend 
 upon ; the powers themselves as distinguished, not 
 only from their a(5lual exercise, but also from the 
 present capacity of exercising them ; and as opposed 
 to their destru(5lion : For sleep, or however a swoon, 
 shews us, not only that these powers exist when they 
 are not exercised, as the paf^ive power of motion does 
 in inanimate matter ; but shews also that they exist, 
 when there is no present capacity of exercising them : 
 
 life, of its present state of perception and of aFIicn. It is here 
 used in the former sense. When it is used in the latter, the 
 t^^'ithtt present is added. The lofs of a man's eye is a destruc- 
 tion of living powers in the latter sense. But we have no 
 reason to think the destrudlion of living powers, in the former 
 sense, to be poflible. We have no more reason to think a 
 being endued with living powers, ever loses them during its 
 whole existence, than to believe that a stone ever acquires 
 them. 
 
i6 Of a Future Life. Parti. 
 
 or that the capacities of exercising them for the pre- 
 sent, as well as the a(fl;ual exercise of them, may be 
 suspended, and yet the powers themselves remain 
 undestroyed. Since then we know not at all upon 
 what the existence of our living powers depends, this 
 shews further, there can no probability be collecfted 
 from the reason of the thing, that death will be their 
 destru(51ion : because their existence may depend, 
 upon somewhat in no degree aire<9:ed by death; upon 
 somewhat quite out of the reach of this king of ter- 
 rors. So that there is nothing more certain, than 
 that the reason of Ihe thing shews us no connexion 
 between death, and the destru(5lion of living argents. 
 Nor can we find anything throughout the whole 
 Analogy of Nature to afford us even the slightest pre- 
 sumption, that animals ever lose their living powers ; 
 much left, if it were poftible, that they lose them by 
 death : for we have no faculties wherewith to trace 
 any beyond or through it, so as to see what becomes 
 of them. This event removes them from our view. 
 It destroys the sensible proof, which we had before 
 their death, of their being poftefsed of living pow- 
 ers, but does not appear to afford the least reason-to 
 believe that they are, then, or by that event, deprived^ 
 of them. 
 
 And our knowing, that they were pof^ef^ed of 
 these powers, up to the very period to which we have 
 faculties capable of tracing them, is itself a probabi- 
 lity of their retaining them beyond it. And this is 
 confirmed, and a sensible credibility is given to it, by 
 observing the very great and astonishing changes 
 which we have experienced ; so great, that our ex- 
 istence in another state of life, of perception and of 
 a(?l;ion, will be but according to a method of provi- 
 dential condu6l, the like to which has been already 
 exercised even with regard to ourselves ; according 
 
Chap. I. Of a Future Life. 17 
 
 to a course of nature, the like to which, we have al- 
 ready gone through. 
 
 However, as one cannot but be greatly sensible, 
 how difficult it is to silence imagination enough to 
 make the voice of reason even distinctly heard in this 
 case ; as we are accustomed, from our youth up, to 
 indulge that forward, delusive faculty, ever obtruding 
 beyond its sphere ; of some afsistance indeed to ap- 
 prehension, but the author of all error : As we plainly 
 lose ourselves in gro{^ and crude conceptions of 
 things, taking for granted that we are acquainted 
 with, what indeed we are wholly ignorant of; it may 
 be proper to consider the imaginary presumptions,- 
 that death will be our destruction, arising from these 
 kinds of early and lasting prejudices ; and to shew 
 how little they can really amount to, even though w^e 
 cannot wholly divest ourselves of them. And, 
 
 I. All presumption of death's being the destru(?lion 
 of living beings, must go upon supposition that they 
 are compounded ; and so, discerptible. But since 
 consciousnef^ is a single and indivisible power, it 
 should seem that the subjecft in which it resides, 
 must be so too. For were the motion of any par- 
 ticle of matter absolutely one and indivisible, so as 
 that it should imply a contradicftion to suppose part 
 of this motion to exist, and part not to exist, i. e. 
 part of this matter to move, and part to be at rest ; 
 then its power of motion would be indivisible ; and 
 so also would the subje6l in which the power in- 
 heres, namely the particle of matter : for if this could 
 be divided into two, one part might be moved and 
 the other at rest, which is contrary to the suppo- 
 sition. In like manner it has been argued,'^ and, for 
 
 ' See Dr. Clarke's Letter to Mr. Dodivell, and the defences 
 of it. 
 
1 8 Of a Future Life. Part I. 
 
 anything appearing to the contrary, justly, that since 
 the perception or consciousnefs, which we have of 
 our own existence, is indivisible, so as that it is a 
 contradidlion to suppose one part of it should be here 
 and the other there ; the perceptive power, or the 
 power of consciousneft, is indivisible too : and con- 
 sequently the subje(5l in,which it resides, z. e. the 
 conscious being. Now upon supposition that living 
 agent each man calls himself, is thus a single being, 
 which there is at least no more difficulty in conceiv- 
 ing than in conceiving it to be a compound, and of 
 which there is the proof now mentioned ; it follows, 
 that our organized bodies are no more ourselves or 
 part of ourselves, than any other matter around us. 
 And it is as easy to conceive, how matter, which is 
 no part of ourselves, may be appropriated to us in 
 the manner which our present bodies are ; as how 
 we can receive imprefsions from, and have power 
 over any matter. It is as easy to conceive, that we 
 may exist out of bodies, as in them : that we might 
 have animated bodies of any other organs and senses 
 wholly diiferent from these now given us, and that 
 we may hereafter animate these same or new bodies 
 variously modified and organized ; as to conceive how 
 we can animate such bodies as our present. And 
 lastly, the dif^olution of all these several organized 
 bodies, supposing ourselves to have succefsively 
 animated them, would have no more conceivable 
 tendency to destroy the living beings ourselves, or 
 deprive us of living faculties, the faculties of per- 
 ception and of a61ion, than the diftolution of any 
 foreign matter, which we are capable of receiving 
 imprefsions from, and making use of for the com- 
 mon occasions of life. 
 
 II. The simplicity and absolute onenef^ of a living 
 agent cannot indeed, from the nature of the thing, 
 
Chap. I, Of a Future Life. 19 
 
 be properly proved by experimental observations. 
 But as these fall in with the supposition of its unity, 
 so they plainly lead us to conclude certainly, that our ' 
 groft organized bodies, with which we perceive the 
 obje(5ls of sense, and with which we a6l, are no part 
 of ourselves ; and therefore shew us, that we have no 
 reason to believe .thejr destrudlion to be ours : even 
 ^^at^lout determining whether our livingsubstances be 
 material or immaterial. For we see by experience, 
 that men may lose their limbs, their organs of sense, 
 and even the greatest part of these bodies, and yet 
 remain the same living agents. And persons can 
 trace up the existence of themselves to a time, when 
 the bulk of their bodies was extremely small, in com- 
 parison of what it is in mature age : and we cannot 
 but think, that they might then have lost a consider- 
 able part of that small body, and yet have remained 
 the same living agents ; as they may now lose great 
 part of their present body, and remain so. And it 
 is certain, that the bodies of all animals are in a con- 
 stant flux, from that never-ceasing attrition, which 
 there is in every part of them. Now things of this 
 kind unavoidably teach us to distinguish, between 
 these living agents ourselves, and large quantities of 
 matter, in which we are very nearly interested : since 
 these may be alienated, and actually are in a daily 
 course of succefsion, and changing their owners; 
 whilst we are afsured, that each living agent remams 
 one and the same permanent being.^ And this ge- 
 neral observation leads us on to the following ones. 
 First, That we have no way of determining by ex- 
 perience, what is the certain bulk of the living being 
 each man calls himself: and yet, till it be determined 
 that it is larger in bulk than the solid elementary 
 
 * See DiJJertatkn I. 
 
20 Of a Future Life. Part i. 
 
 particles of matter, which there is no ground to think 
 any natural power can diftolve, there is no sort of 
 reason to think death to be the difsolution of it, of 
 the living being, even though it should not be abso- 
 lutely indiscerptible. 
 
 Secondly, From our being so nearly related to and 
 interested in certain systems of matter, suppose our 
 flesh and bones, and afterwards ceasing to be at all 
 related to them, the living agents ourselves remain- 
 ing all this while undestroyed notwithstanding such 
 alienation ; and consequently these systems of mat- 
 ter not being ourselves : it follows further, that we 
 have no ground to conclude any other, suppose in- 
 ternal systems of matter, to be the living agents our- 
 selves ; because we can have no ground to conclude 
 this, but from our relation to and interest in such 
 other systems of matter : and therefore we can have 
 no reason to conclude, what befalls those systems of 
 matter at death, to be the destru(5lion of the living 
 agents. We have already several times over lost a 
 great part or perhaps the whole of our body, accord- 
 ing to certain common established Laws of Nature ; 
 3^et we remain the same living agents : When we 
 shall lose as great a part, or the whole, by another 
 common established Law of Nature, death; why may 
 we not also remain the same? That the alienation 
 has been gradual in one case, and in the other will 
 be more at once, does not prove anything to the 
 contrary. We have pafted undestroyed through 
 those many and great revolutions of matter, so pe- 
 culiarly appropriated to us ourselves ; why should 
 we imagine death will be so fatal to us ] Nor can it 
 be obje(?i:ed, that what is thus alienated or lost, is no 
 part of our original solid body, but only adventitious 
 matter ; because we may lose entire limbs, which 
 must have contained many solid parts and veftels of 
 
Chap. I. Of a Future Life. 21 
 
 the original body : or if this be not admitted, we 
 have no proof, that any of these solid parts are dis- 
 solved or alienated by death. Though, by the way, 
 we are very nearly related to that extraneous or ad- 
 ventitious matter, whilst it continues united to and 
 distending the several parts of our solid body. But 
 after all ; the relation a person bears to those parts 
 of his body, to which he is the most nearly related ; 
 what does it appear to amount to but this, that the 
 living agent, and those parts of the body, mutually 
 affe(5l each other \ And the same thingr, the same 
 thing in kind though not in degree, may be said of 
 all foreign matter, which gives us ideas, and which 
 we have any power over. From these observations 
 the whole ground of the imagination is removed, that 
 the difsolution of any matter, is the destruction of 
 a living agent, from the interest he once had in such 
 matter. 
 
 Thirdly, If we consider our body somewhat more 
 distinctly, as made up of organs and instruments of 
 perception and of motion, it will bring us to the same 
 conclusion. Thus the common optical experiments 
 shew, and even the observation how sight is afsisted 
 by glafses shews, that we see with our eyes in the 
 same sense as we see with glaives. Nor is there 
 any reason to believe, that we see with them in any 
 other sense ; any other, I mean, which would lead 
 us to think the eye itself a percipient. The like is 
 to be said of hearing : and our feeling distant solid 
 matter by means of somewhat in our hand, seems an 
 instance of the like kind, as to the subject we are 
 considering. All these are instances of foreign mat- 
 ter, or such as is no part of our body, being instru- 
 mental in preparing objects for, and conveying them 
 to, the perceiving power, in a manner similar or like 
 to the manner, in which our organs of sense prepare 
 
22 Of a Future Life. Part I. 
 
 and convey them. Both are in a like way instru- 
 ments of our receiving such ideas from external ob- 
 je6ls, as the Author of Nature appointed those exter- 
 nal obje(9:s to be the occasions of exciting in us. 
 However, glafses are evidently instances^ of this; 
 namely of matter, which is no part of our body, pre- 
 paring obje(?i:s for and conveying them towards the 
 perceiving power, in like manner as our bodily or- 
 gans do. And if we see with our eyes only in the 
 same manner as we do with glaives, the like may 
 justly be concluded, from Analogy, of all our other 
 senses. It is not intended, by anything here said, 
 to affirm, that the whole apparatus of vision, or of per- 
 ception by any other of our senses, can be traced, 
 through all its steps, quite up to the living power of 
 seeing, or perceiving: But that so far as it can be 
 traced by experimental observations, so far it ap- 
 pears, that our organs of sense prepare and convey 
 on obje(?i:s, in order to their being perceived, in like 
 manner as foreign matter does, without affording any 
 shadow of appearance, that they themselves per- 
 ceive. And that we have no reason to think our 
 organs of sense percipients, is confirmed by instances 
 of persons losing some of them, the living beings 
 themselves, their former occupiers, remaining un- 
 impaired. It is confirmed also by the experience of 
 dreams ; by which we find we are at present pos- 
 sef^ed of a latent, and, what would otherwise be, an 
 unimagined unknown power of perceiving sensible 
 obje<51s, in as strong and lively a manner without our 
 external organs of sense as with them. 
 
 So also with regard to our power of moving, or 
 dire(5ling motion by will and choice : upon the de- 
 strudlion of a limb, this a(5live power remains, as it 
 evidently seems, unlef^ened ; so as that the living 
 being, who has suffered this loft, would be capable of 
 
Chap. 1. Of a Future Life. 23 
 
 moving as before, if it had another limb to move v^^ith. 
 It can walk by the help of an artificial leg; just as it 
 can make use of a pole or a lever, to reach towards 
 itself and to move things, beyond the length and the 
 power of its natural arm: And this last it does in the 
 same manner as it reaches and moves, with its na- 
 tural arm, things nearer and of lef^ weight. Nor is 
 there so much as any appearance of our limbs being 
 endued with a power of moving or direc^ting them- 
 selves ; though they are adapted, like the several 
 parts of a machine, to be the instruments of motion 
 to each other ; and some parts of the same limb, to 
 be instruments of motion to other parts of it. 
 
 Thus a man determines that he will look at such 
 an obje(5l through a microscope ; or being lame sup- 
 pose, that he will walk to such a place with a staff a 
 week hence. His eyes and his feet no more deter- 
 mine in these cases than the microscope and the 
 staff. Nor is there any ground to think they any 
 more put the determination in pra(5lice ; or that his 
 eyes are the seers or his feet the movers, in any other 
 sense than as the microscope and the staff are. Upon 
 the whole then, our organs of sense and our limbaj 
 are certainly instruments, which the living persons! 
 ourselves make use of to perceive and move with:\ 
 There is not any probability that they are any more ; 
 nor consequently, that we have any other kind of re- 
 lation to them, than what we may have to any other 
 foreign matter formed into instruments of perception 
 and motion, suppose into a microscope or a staff; (I 
 say any other kind of relation, for I am not speaking 
 of the degree of it) nor consequently is there any 
 probability, that the alienation or dif^olution of these 
 instruments is the destruction of the perceiving and 
 moving agent. 
 \ And thus our finding, that the dif^olution of mat- [^ 
 
24 Of a Future Life. Part i. 
 
 f ter, in which living- beings were most nearly inte- 
 ! rested, is not their diftolution ; and that the destruc- 
 ; tion of several of the organs and instruments of per- 
 ception and of motion belonging to them, is not their 
 destruction shews demonstratively, that there is no 
 ground to think that the difsolution of any other mat- 
 ter, or destruction of any other organs and instru- 
 ments, will be the difsolution or destruction of living 
 agents, from the like kind of relation. And we have 
 no reason to think we stand in any other kind of rela- 
 tion to anything which we find difSolved by death. 
 
 But it is said these observations are equally appli- 
 cable to brutes : and it is thought an insuperable dif- 
 ficulty, that they should be immortal, and by conse- 
 quence capable of everlasting happinefS. Now this 
 manner of exprefSion is both invidious and weak : but 
 the thing intended by it, is really no difficulty at all, 
 either in the way of natural or moral consideration. 
 For isf. Suppose the invidious thing, designed in such 
 a manner of expreftion, were really implied, as it is 
 not in the least, in the natural immortality of brutes ; 
 namely, that they must arrive at great attainments, 
 and become rational and moral agents ; even this 
 would be no difficulty : since we know not what la- 
 tent powers and capacities they may be endued with. 
 There was once, prior to experience, as great pre- 
 sumption against human creatures, as there is against 
 the brute creatures, arriving at that degree of under- 
 standing, which we have in mature age. For we can 
 trace up our own existence to the same original with 
 theirs. And we find it to be a general Law of Na- 
 ture, that creatures endued with capacities of virtue 
 and religion should be placed in a condition of being, 
 in which they are altogether without the use of them, 
 for a considerable length of their duration ; as in in- 
 fancy and childhood. And great part of the human 
 
Chap, I. Of a Future Life. 25 
 
 species go out of the present world, before they come 
 to the exercise of these capacities in any degi^ee at 
 all. But then, 2dly. The natural immortality of brutes 
 does not in the least imply that they are endued with 
 any latent capacities of a rational or moral nature. 
 And the economy of the universe might require, that 
 there should be living creatures without any capaci- 
 ties of this kind. And all difficulties as to the man- 
 ner how they are to be disposed of, are so apparently 
 and wholly founded in our ignorance, that it is won- 
 derful they should be insisted upon by any, but such 
 as are weak enough to think they are acquainted with 
 the whole system of things. There is then absolutely 
 nothing at all in this objection, which is so rhetori- 
 cally urged against the greatest part of the natural 
 proofs or presumptions of the immortality of human 
 minds : I say the greatest part ; for it is lefs appli- 
 cable to the following observation, which is more pe- 
 culiar to mankind : 
 
 III. That as it is evident our present powers and 
 capacities of reason, memory, and affection, do not 
 depend upon our groft body in the manner in which 
 perception by our organs of sense does ; so they do 
 not appear to depend upon it at all in any such man- 
 ner, as to give ground to think that the difsolution of 
 this body will be^the^destru(51ion of these our j^resenf 
 powers of refle<5lion, as it will of our powers of sen- 
 sation; or to give ground to conclude, even that it 
 wHTbe so much as a suspension of the former. 
 
 Human creatures exist at present in two states of 
 life and perception, greatly different from each other; 
 each of which has its own peculiar laws, and its own 
 peculiar enjoyments and sufferings. When any of 
 our senses are affecled or appetites gratified with the 
 obje(?i:s of them, we maybe said to exist or Hve in a 
 stateo f sens ati oiu When none of our senses are af- 
 
26 Of a Future Life. Part i. 
 
 fe(51ed or appetites gratified, and yet we perceive and 
 reason and ac?!: ; we may be said to exist or live in a 
 state of reflection. Now it is by no means certain, 
 that anything which is diftolved by death, is any way 
 neceftary to the living being in this its state of re- 
 flection, after ideas are gained. For, though from 
 our present constitution and condition of being, our 
 external organs of sense are necef^ary for conveying 
 in ideas to our reflecting powers, as carriages and 
 levers and scaflblds are in architecture : yet when 
 these ideas are brought in, we are capable of refle(5t- 
 ing in the most intense degree, and of enjoying the 
 greatest pleasure and feeling the greatest pain by 
 means of that refleCtion, without any aftistance from 
 our senses : and without any at all, which we know 
 of, from that body which will be difsolved by death. 
 It does not appear then, that the relation of this groft 
 body to the refleCting being, is, in any degree, neces- 
 . sary to thinking; to ourintelleCtual enjoyments or suf- 
 ^y ferings: nor consequently that the difsolution or alie- 
 nation of the former by death, will be the destruction 
 of those present powers, which render us capable of 
 this state of reflection. Further, there are instances 
 of mortal diseases, which do not at all affeCt our pre- 
 sent intellectual powers ; and this affords a presump- 
 tion, that those diseases will not destroy these pre- 
 i sent powers. Indeed, from the observations made 
 above,^ it appears, that there is no presumption, from 
 their mutually affeCting each other, that the diftolu- 
 tion of the body is the destruction of the living agent. 
 And by the same reasoning, it must appear too, that 
 there is no presumption, from their mutually afleCt- 
 ing each other, that the diftolution of the body is the 
 destruction of our present reflecting powers : But 
 instances of their not affeCting each other, afford a 
 
 * Pp.19, 20, 21. 
 
Chap. I. Of a Future Life. 27 
 
 presumption of the contrary. Instances of mortal 
 diseases not impairing our present reflecting powers, 
 evidently turn our thoughts even from imagining 
 such diseases to be the destruction of them. Several 
 things indeed greatly affec^l all our living powers, 
 and at length suspend the exercise of them ; as for 
 instance drowsinei^, increasing till it ends in sound 
 sleep : and from hence we might have imagined it 
 would destroy them, till we found by experience the 
 weaknefs of this way of judging. But in the diseases 
 now mentioned, there is not so much as this shadow 
 of probability, to lead us to any such conclusion, as 
 to the reflecting powers which we have at present. 
 For in those diseases, persons the moment before 
 death appear to be in the highest vigour of life. They 
 discover apprehension, memory, reason, all entire ; 
 with the utmost force of aflection ; sense of a cha- 
 racter, of shame and honour ; and the highest men- 
 tal enjoyments and sufferings, even to the last gasp ; 
 and these surely prove even greater vigour of life 
 than bodily strength does. Now what pretence is 
 there for thinking, that a progref^ive disease when 
 arrived to such a degree, I mean that degree which 
 is mortal, will destroy those powers, which were not 
 impaired, which were not affe(?ted by it, during its 
 whole progrefs quite up to that degree? And if 
 death by diseases of this kind, is not the destruction of ! 
 our present reflect:ing powers, it will scarce be thought 
 that death by any other means is. 
 
 It is obvious that this general observation may be 
 carried on further : and there appears so little con- 
 nection between our bodily powers of sensation, and 
 our present powers of reflection, that there is no 
 reason to conclude, that death, which destroys the 
 former, does so much as suspend the exercise of 
 the latter, or interrupt our continuing to exist in the 
 
28 Of a Future Life. Part I. 
 
 like state of refle(9;ion which we do now. For sus- 
 pension of reason, memory, and the affec^lions which 
 they excite, is no part of the idea of death, nor is 
 implied in our notion of it. And our daily experi- 
 I encing these powers to be exercised, without any 
 aisistance, that we know of, from those bodies, which 
 will be difsolved by death ; and our finding often, 
 that the exercise of them is so lively to the last ; 
 these things afford a sensible apprehension, that 
 death may not perhaps be so much as a discontinu- 
 ance of the exercise of these powers, nor of the en- 
 joyments and sufferings which it implies^. So that 
 our posthumous life, whatever there may be in it 
 additional to our present, yet may not be entirely 
 beginning anew ; but going on. Death may, in some 
 sort, and in some respe(5ls, answer to our birth ; which 
 is not a suspension of the faculties which we had be- 
 fore it, or a total change of the state of life in which 
 we existed when in the womb ; but a continuation 
 of both, with such and such great alterations. 
 
 Nay, for aught we know of ourselves, of our pre- 
 sent life and of death ; death may immediately, in 
 the natural course of things, put us into a higher and 
 more enlarged state of life, as our birth does' ; a state 
 
 f ^ There are three distinft questions, relating to a future 
 I Life, here considered : Whether death be the destruftion of 
 I living agents j If not, whether it be the destrudtion of their 
 / present powers of refledlion, as it certainly is the destrudlion of 
 their present powers of sensation 5 And if not, whether it be 
 the suspension, or discontinuance of the exercise, of thefe pre- 
 sent refledling powers. Now if there be no reason to believe 
 the last, there will be, if that were pofiible, lels for the next, 
 and lefs still for the first. 
 
 "^ This according to Straho was the opinion of the Brach- 
 mans, vofx'iZ,Hv iiiv yap h) top [xiv tvOads (3iov, ojq av 
 aKjiyjv Kvojxsvoiv ih'ai' top Sk t'oi-aror, ysvfaii/ elg rbv 
 ovTMQ jiiov, Koi rbv ivdaifiova toTq (piKo(ro(pi](yaai. Lib, xv. 
 p. 1039. Ed. Amst. 1707. To which opinion perhaps AntO' 
 
Chap. I. Of a Future Life. 29 
 
 in which our capacities, and sphere of perception and 
 of aclion, may be much greater than at present. For 
 as our relation to our external organs of sense, ren- 
 ders us capable of existing in our present state of 
 sensation ; so it may be the only natural hindrance 
 to our existing, immediately and of course, in a 
 higher state of reflection. The truth is, reason does 
 not at all shew us in what state death naturally 
 leaves us. But were we sure, that it would suspend 
 all our perceptive and a(5live powers ; yet the sus- 
 pension of a power, and the destruction of it, are 
 effecfts so totally different in kind, as we experience 
 from sleep and a swoon, that we cannot in any wise 
 argue from one to the other ; or conclude, even to 
 the lowest degree of probability, that the same kind 
 of force which is sufficient to suspend our faculties, 
 though it be increased ever so much, will be suffi- 
 cient to destroy them. 
 
 These observations together may be sufficient to 
 shew, how little presumption there is that death is the 
 destru(5fion of human creatures. However there is 
 the shadow" of an Analogy, which may lead us to 
 imagine it is ; the supposed likenef^ which is ob- 
 served between the decay of vegetables, and of living 
 creatures. And this likenef^ is indeed sufficient to 
 afford the poets very apt allusions to the flowers of 
 the field, in their pi(5fures of the frailty of our pre- 
 sent life. But in reason, the Analogy is so far from 
 holding, that there appears no ground even for the 
 comparison, as to the present question : because one 
 of the two subjects compared, is wholly void of that, 
 which is the princma^rud^chief thing in.the other, the 
 
 ninus may allude in these words, mq vvv Trfpi/iiiveig, ttots 
 tfijSpvov tK TfJQ yaarpbg tT]q yvvaiKOQ aov t^kXOi], ovrujg 
 tKCSx^'^^^'- ''"'iv iopav iv 7] TO t\jv\a.piov aov tov iXvrpov 
 rovrov eKTrtaarat. Lib. ix. c. 3. 
 
30 Of a Future Life. Part i. 
 
 power of perception and of ac9:ion ; and which is the 
 only thing we are inquiring about the continuance of. 
 So that the destruction of a vegetable is an event not 
 similar or analogous to the destru(5lion of a living 
 agent. 
 
 But if, as was above intimated, leaving off the de- 
 lusive custom of substituting imagination in the room 
 of experience, we would confine ourselves to what 
 we do know and understand; if we would argue only 
 from that, and from that form our expeClations ; it 
 would appear at first sight, that as no probability of 
 living beings ever ceasing to be so, can be concluded 
 from the reason of the thing ; so none can be col- 
 leCled from the Analogy of Nature; because we can- 
 not trace any living beings beyond death. But as 
 we are conscious, that we are endued with capaci- 
 I ties of perception and of aclion, and are living per- 
 I sons ; what we are to go upon is, that we shall con- 
 I tinue so, till we foresee some accident or event, 
 j which will endanger those capacities, or be likely to 
 destroy us : which death does in no wise appear to be. 
 And thus, when we go out of this world, we may 
 paf^ into new scenes, and a new state of life and 
 aClion, just as naturally as we came into the present. 
 And this new state may naturally be a social one. 
 And the advantages of it, advantages of every kind, 
 may naturally be bestowed, according to some fixed 
 fil'eneral laws of wisdom, upon every one in propor- 
 tion to the degrees of his virtue. And though the 
 advantaeres of that future natural state should not 
 be bestowed, as these of the present in some mea- 
 sure are, by the will of the society ; but entirely by 
 his more immediate action, upon whom the whole 
 frame of nature depends : yet this distribution may 
 be just as natural, as their being distributed here by 
 the instrumentality of men. And indeed, though 
 
Chap. I. Of a Future Life. 31 
 
 one were to allow any confused undermined sense, 
 which people please to put upon the word natural, 
 it would be a shortneft of thought scarce credible, 
 to imagine, that no system or course of things can 
 be so, but only what we see at present^ : especially 
 whilst the probability of a Future Life, or the natural 
 immortality of the soul, is admitted upon the evi- 
 dence of reason ; because this is really both admit- 
 ting and denying at once a state of being different 
 from the present to be natural. But the only dis- 
 tinct meaning of that word is stated, fixed, or settled: 
 since what is natural, as much requires and pre- 
 supposes an intelligent agent to render it so, i. e. 
 to effeSi it continually, or at stated times ; as what 
 is supernatural or miraculous does to effect it for 
 once. And from hence it must follow, that persons' 
 notion of what is natural, will be enlarged in pro- 
 portion to their greater knowledge of the works of 
 God, and the dispensations of his Providence. Nor 
 is there any absurdity in supposing, that there may 
 be beings in the universe, whose capacities, and 
 knowledge, and views, may be so extensive, as that 
 the whole Christian dispensation may to them appear 
 natural, i. e. analogous or conformable to God's 
 dealings with other parts of his creation ; as natu- 
 ral as the visible known course of things appears to 
 us. For there seems scarce any other pofsible sense 
 to be put upon the word, but that only in which it is 
 here used ; similar, stated, or uniform. 
 
 This credibility of a Future Life, which has been 
 here insisted upon, how little soever it may satisfy 
 our curiosity, seems to answer all the purposes of 
 Religion, in like manner as a demonstrative proof 
 would. Indeed a proof, even a demonstrative one, 
 
 * See Part ii. Chap, ii, and Part ii. Chap. iv. 
 
32 Of a Future Life. Part i . 
 
 of a Future Life, would not be a proof of Religion. 
 For, that we are to live hereafter, is just jas-J:£jCQ.n- 
 cileable with the scheme of athejsm, and as well to 
 be accounted for by it, as that we are now alive, is: 
 and therefore nothing can be more absurd than to 
 argue from that scheme, that there can be no future 
 state. But as Religion implies a future state, any 
 presumption against such a state is a presumption 
 against Religion. And the foregoing observations re- 
 move all presumptions of that sort, and prove, to a 
 very considerable degree of probability, one funda- 
 mental do(5lrine of Religion; which,if believed, would 
 greatly open and dispose the mind seriously to at- 
 tend to the general evidence of the whole. 
 
 CHAPTER 11.^ 
 
 Of the Government of God by Rewards and Punish- 
 ments ; and particularly of the latter. 
 
 r,HAT which makes the question con- 
 cerning a Future Life to be of so great 
 importance to us, is our capacity of 
 happineftand misery. And that which 
 makes the consideration of it to be of 
 so great importance to us, is the supposition of our 
 happineft and misery hereafter depending upon our 
 a(9:ions here. Without this, indeed, curiosity could 
 not but sometimes bring a subject!, in which we may 
 be so highly interested, to our thoughts; especially 
 upon the mortality of others, or the near prospe(5i: 
 of our own. But reasonable men would not take any 
 farther thought about hereafter, than what should 
 happen thus occasionally to rise in their minds, if it 
 
Chap. 1. Of the Government of God, hz. 33 
 
 were certain, that our future interest no way de- 
 pended upon our present behaviour : Whereas on 
 the contrary, if there be ground, either from Analogy 
 or anything else, to think it does; then there is rea- 
 son also for the most a(fi;ive thought and solicitude, 
 to secure that interest; to behave so as that we may 
 escape that misery, and obtain that happineft in 
 another life, which we not only suppose ourselves 
 capable of, but which we apprehend also is put in our 
 own power. And whether there be ground for this 
 last apprehension, certainly would deserve to be most 
 seriously considered, were there no other proof of a 
 Future Life and interest, than that presumptive one, 
 which the foregoing observations amount to. 
 
 Now in the present state, all which we enjoy, and 
 a great part of what we suffer, is put in our oven 
 power. For pleasure and pain are the consequences 
 of our actions ; and we are endued by the Author of 
 our Nature with capacities of foreseeing these con- 
 sequences. We find by experience he does not so 
 much as preserve our lives, exclusively of our own 
 care and attention, to provide ourselves with, and to 
 make use of, that sustenance, by which he has ap- 
 pointed our lives shall be preserved ; and without 
 which, he has appointed, they shall not be preserved 
 at all. And in general we foresee, that the external 
 things, which are the obje(51s of our various paf^ions, 
 can neither be obtained nor enjoyed, without exert- 
 ing ourselves in such and such manners : But by thus 
 exerting ourselves, we obtain and enjoy these obje(5ls, 
 in which our natural good consists ; or by this means 
 God gives us the pofsef^ion and enjoyment of them. 
 I know not, that we have any one kind or degree of 
 enjoyment, but by the means of our own a<5lions. 
 And by prudence and care, we may, for the most 
 part, pafs our days in tolerable ease and quiet : Or 
 
34 Of the Government of God Paj^t l. 
 
 on the contrary, we may by rashneft, ungoverned 
 pai^ion, wilfulnef^, or even by negligence, make our- 
 selves as miserable as ever we please. And many 
 do please to make themselves extremely miserable, 
 i. e. to do what they know beforehand will render 
 them so. They follow those ways, the fruit of which 
 they know, by instruction, example, experience, will 
 be disgrace and poverty and sicknef^ and untimely 
 death. This every one observes to be the general 
 Scourse of things ; though it is to be allowed, we can- 
 \\o\. find by experience, that all our sufferings are 
 owing to our own follies. 
 
 Why the Author of Nature does not give his crea- 
 tures promiscuously such and such perceptions, with- 
 out regard to their behaviour ; why he does not make 
 them happy without the instrumentality of their own 
 actions, and prevent their bringing any sufferings 
 upon themselves ; is another matter. Perhaps there 
 may be some impoftibilities in the nature of things, 
 which we are unacquainted with.^ Or left happi- 
 neft, it may be, would upon the whole be produced 
 by such a method of conduct:, than is by the present. 
 Or perhaps Divine Goodneft, with which, if I mis- 
 take not, we make very firee in our speculations, may 
 not be a bare single disposition to produce happi- 
 neft ; but a disposition to make the good, the faith- 
 ful, the honest man happy. Perhaps an infinitely 
 perfe(5l Mind may be pleased, with seeing his crea- 
 tures behave suitably to the nature which he has 
 given them ; to the relations which he has placed 
 them in to each other ; and to that, which they stand 
 in to Himself: That relation to himself, which, dur- 
 ing their existence, is even neceftary, and which is 
 the most important one of all : perhaps, 1 say, an in- 
 
 ' Chap. vii. p. 185, &c. 
 
Chap. 2. by Rewards and Punishments. 35 
 
 finitely perfect Mind may be pleased with this m»oral 
 piety of moral agents, in and for itself; as well as 
 upon account of its being efsentially conducive to the 
 happinei^ of his creation. Or the whole end, for 
 which God made, and thus governs the world, may 
 be utterly beyond the reach of our faculties : There 
 may be somewhat in it as impoftible for us to have 
 any conception of, as for a blind man to have a con- 
 ception of colours. But however this be, it is cer- 
 tain matter of universal experience, that the general 
 method of Divine Administration, is, forewarning us, 
 or giving us capacities to foresee, with more or lef^ 
 cleamefs, that if we a(?l: so and so, we shall have such 
 enjoyments, if so and so, such sufferings ; and giving 
 us those enjoyments, and making us feel those suf- 
 ferings, in consequence of our a(5lions. 
 
 " But all this is to be ascribed to the general course 
 of nature." True. This is the very thing which I 
 am observing. It is to be ascribed to the general 
 course of nature : i. e. not surely to the words or 
 ideas, course of nature ; but to him who appointed 
 it, and put things into it : Or to a course of opera- 
 tion, from its uniformity or constancy, called natu- 
 ral p and which necef^arily implies an operating 
 agent. For when men find themselves necefsitated 
 to confefs an Author of Nature, or that God is the 
 natural Governor of the world ; they must not deny 
 this again, because his government is uniform : They 
 must not deny that he does all things at all, because 
 he does them constantly ; because the effects of his 
 a(5ling are permanent, whether his adling be so or 
 not ; though there is no reason to think it is not. In 
 short, every man, in everything he does, naturally 
 a<5ts upon the forethought and apprehension of avoid- 
 
 2 Pp. 43, 44. 
 
36 Of the Government of God Parti, 
 
 ing evil or obtaining good : And if the natural course 
 of things be the appointment of God, and our natural 
 faculties of knowledge and experience, are given us 
 by him ; then the good and bad consequences which 
 follow our acTtions, are his appointment, and our fore- 
 sight of those consequences, is a warning given us by 
 him, how we are to adl. 
 
 " Is the pleasure then, naturally accompanying 
 " every particular gratification of pafsion, intended, 
 " to put us upon gratifying ourselves in every such 
 " particular instance, and as a reward to us for so 
 " doing?" No certainly. Nor is it to be said, that 
 our eyes were naturally intended to give us the sight 
 of each particular object, to which they do or can 
 extend; objects which are destru61ive of them, or 
 which, for any other reason, it may become us to 
 turn our eyes from. Yet there is no doubt, but that 
 our eyes were intended for us to see with. So 
 either is there any doubt, but that the foreseen 
 pleasures and pains belonging to the pafsions, were 
 
 I intended, in general, to induce mankind to a6l in 
 such and such manners. 
 
 Now from this general observation, obvious to 
 every one, that God has given us to understand, he 
 has appointed satisfaction and delight to be the con- 
 sequence of our acting in one manner, and pain and 
 uneasinef^ of our ailing in another, and of our not 
 a(5ling at all ; and that we find the consequences, 
 which we were beforehand informed of, uniformly to 
 follow ; we may learn, that we are at present actu- 
 ally under his government in the strictest and most 
 proper sense ; in such a sense, as that he rewards 
 and punishes us for our actions. An Author of Na- 
 ture being supposed, it is not so much a deduction 
 of reason, as a matter of experience, that we are thus 
 under his government ; under his government, in the 
 
 t 
 
Chap, 2. by Rewards and Punishments. 37 
 
 same sense, as we are under the government of civil 
 magistrates. Because the annexing pleasure to some 
 aclions, and pain to others, in our power to do or for- 
 bear, and giving notice of this appointment before- 
 hand to those whom it concerns, is the proper for- 
 mal notion of government. Whether the pleasure 
 or pain which thus follows upon our behaviour, be 
 owing to the Author of Nature's ailing upon us every 
 moment which we feel it ; or to his having at once 
 contrived and executed his own part in the plan of 
 the world ; makes no alteration as to the matter 
 before us. For if civil magistrates could make the 
 san(5lions of their laws take place, without interpos- 
 ing at all, after they had passed them ; without a 
 trial and the formalities of an execution : If they were 
 able to make their laws execute themselves, or every 
 offender to execute them upon himself; we should 
 be just in the same sense under their government 
 then, as we are now, but in a much higher degree, 
 and more perfe6f mcinner. Vain is the ridicule, with 
 which, one foresees, some persons will divert them- 
 selves, upon finding leaser pains considered as in- 
 stances of Divine punishment. There is no poftibi- 
 lity of answering or evading the general thing here 
 intended, without denying all final causes. For final 
 causes being admitted, the pleasures and pains now 
 mentioned must be admitted too as instances of them. 
 And if they are ; if God annexes delight to some 
 a^fions, and uneasinefs to others, with an apparent 
 design to induce us to a(5l so cind so ; then he not 
 only dispenses happinei^ and misery, but also re- 
 wards and punishes a(?tions. If, for example, the 
 pain which we feel, upon doing what tends to the de- 
 struction of our bodies, suppose upon too near ap- 
 proaches to fire, or upon wounding ourselves, be ap- 
 pointed by the Author of Nature to prevent our doing 
 
38 Of the Government of God Part i. 
 
 what thus tends to our destruction ; this is altogether 
 as much an instance of his punishing our actions, and 
 consequently of our being under his government, as 
 declaring by a voice from heaven, that if we a(5led 
 so, he would infliift such pain upon us, and infli^ling 
 it, whether it be greater or left. 
 
 Thus we find, that the true notion or conception 
 of the Author of Nature, is that of a master or go- 
 vernor, prior to the consideration of his moral attri- 
 butes. The fa(9: of our case, which we find by ex- 
 perience, is, that he actually exercises dominion or 
 government over us at present, by rewarding and 
 punishing us for our actions, in as stri(5l and proper 
 a sense of these words, and even in the same sense, 
 as children, servants, subjects, are rewarded and 
 punished by those who govern them. 
 
 And thus the whole Analogy of Nature, the whole 
 present course of things, most fully shews, that there 
 is nothing incredible in the general do(9:rine of reli- 
 gion ; that God will reward and punish men for their 
 a<5lions hereafter : nothing incredible, I mean, aris- 
 ing out of the notion of rewarding and punishing. 
 For the whole course of nature is a present instance 
 of his exercising that government over us, which im- 
 plies in it rewarding and punishing. 
 
 I|UT as Divine punishment is what men 
 chiefly obj e(?i: against, and are most unwil- 
 ling to allow ; it may be proper to men- 
 tion some circumstances in the natural 
 course of punishments at present, which are analo- 
 gous to what religion teaches us concerning a future 
 state of punishment : Indeed so analogous, that as 
 they add a further credibility to it, so they cannot but 
 raise a most serious apprehension of it in those who 
 will attend to them. 
 
Chap. 2. by Rewards and Punishments. 39 
 
 It has been now observed, that such and such 
 miseries naturally follow such and such a^lions of 
 imprudence and wilfulneft, as well as alliens more 
 commonly and more distin(?i:ly considered as vicious; 
 and that these consequences, when they may be fore- 
 seen, are properly natural punishments annexed to 
 such a(5lions. For the general thing here insisted 
 upon, is, not that we see a great deal of misery in the 
 world, but a great deal which men bring upon them- 
 selves by their own behaviour, which they might 
 have foreseen and avoided. Now the circumstances 
 of these natural punishments, particularly deserving 
 our attention, are such as these: That oftentimes 
 they follow, or are inflicted in consequence of actions, 
 which procure many present advantages, and are 
 accompanied with much present pleasure : for in- 
 stance, sickneft and untimely death is the conse- 
 quence of intemperance, though accompanied with 
 the highest mirth and jollity: That these punish- 
 ments are often much greater than the advantages 
 or pleasures obtained by the ac^tions, of which they 
 are the punishments or consequences : That though 
 we may imagine a constitution of nature, in which 
 these natural punishments, which are in fa6f to fol- 
 low, would follow, immediately upon such a(9;ions 
 being done, or very soon after; we find on the con- 
 trary in our world, that they are often delayed a great 
 while, sometimes even till long after the a(flions oc- 
 casioning them are forgot; so that the constitution 
 of nature is such, that delay of punishment is no sort 
 nor degree of presumption of final impunity : That 
 after such delay, these natural punishments or mise- 
 ries often come, not by degrees, but suddenly, with 
 violence, and at once ; however, the chief misery 
 often does : That as certainty of such distant misery 
 following" such actions, is never afforded persons; 
 
40 Of the Government of God Parti. 
 
 so perhaps during the a(5lions, they have seldom a 
 distinct full expectation of its following-"^: And many 
 times the case is only thus, that they see in general, 
 or may see, the credibility, that intemperance, sup- 
 pose, will bring after it diseases ; civil crimes, civil 
 punishments ; when yet the real probability often is, 
 that they shall escape ; but things notwithstanding 
 take their destined course, and the misery inevitably 
 follows at its appointed time, in very many of these 
 cases. Thus also though youth may be alleged as 
 an excuse for rashneft and folly, as being naturally 
 thoughtlef^, and not clearly foreseeing all the con- 
 sequences of being untraceable and profligate ; this 
 does not hinder, but that these consequences follow, 
 and are grievously felt throughout the whole course 
 of mature life. Habits contracted even in that age, 
 are often utter ruin : and men's succef^ in the world, 
 not only in the common sense of worldly succef^, but 
 their real happinefs and misery, depends, in a great 
 degree, and in various ways, upon the manner in 
 which they paft their youth ; which consequences 
 they for the most part negledl to consider, and per- 
 haps seldom can properly be said to believe, before- 
 hand. It requires also to be mentioned, that in 
 numberleft cases, the natural course of things affords 
 us opportunities for procuring advantages to our- 
 selves at certain times, which we cannot procure 
 when we will ; nor ever recall the opportunities, if 
 we have negle(5led them. Indeed the general course 
 of nature is an example of this. If, during the op- 
 portunity of youth, persons are indocile and self- 
 willed; they inevitably suffer in their future life, for 
 want of those acquirements, which they neglected 
 the natural season of attaining. If the husbandman 
 
 3 See Part ii. Chap. vi. 
 
Chap. 2. by Rewards and Punishments. 41 
 
 lets his seed-time paf^ without sowing, the whole 
 year is lost to him beyond recovery. In like man- 
 ner, though after men have been guilty of folly and 
 extravagance up to a certain degree, it is often in 
 their power, for instance, to retrieve their affairs, to 
 recover their health and character ; at least in good 
 measure : yet real reformation is, in many cases, of 
 no avail at all towards preventing the miseries, po- 
 verty, sickneft, infamy, naturally annexed to folly 
 and extravagance exceeding that degree. There is 
 a certain bound to imprudence and misbehaviour, 
 which being transgrefsed, there remains no place for 
 repentance in the natural course of things. It is 
 further very much to be remarked, that negle(5ls 
 from inconsiderateneft, want of attention"*, not look- 
 ing about us to see what we have to do, are often 
 attended with consequences altogether as dreadful, 
 as any active misbehaviour, from the most extrava- 
 gant paftion. And lastly, civil government being 
 natural, the punishments of it are so too : And some 
 of these punishments are capital ; as the effects of 
 a difkolute course of pleasure are often mortal. So 
 that many natural punishments are final^ to him 
 who incurs them, if considered only in his temporal 
 
 * Part 11. Chap. vi. 
 
 * The general consideration of a future state of punishment, 
 most evidently belongs to the subjedl of natural religion. But 
 if any of these refiedlions should be thought to relate more 
 peculiarly to this dodrine as taught in Scripture j the reader is 
 desired to observe, that Gentile writers, both moralists and 
 poets, speak of the future punishment of the wicked, both as 
 to the duration and degree of it, in a like manner of expreflion 
 and of description, as the Scripture does. So that all which 
 can positively be aflerted to be matter of mere Revelation, with 
 regard to this dodliine, seems to be, that the great distindtlon 
 between the righteous and the wicked, shall be made at the 
 end of this world j that each shall then receive according to his 
 deserts. Reason did, as it well might, conclude that it should. 
 
42 Of the Government of God Part i . 
 
 capacity : and seem infli(5led by natural appointment, 
 either to remove the offender out of the way of being 
 further mischievous; or as an example, though fre- 
 quently a disregarded one, to those who are left 
 behind. 
 
 These things are not, what we call accidental, or 
 to be met with only now and then; but they are things 
 of every day's experience : They proceed from general 
 laws, very general ones, by which God governs the 
 / world, in the natural course of his providence. And 
 ■ they are so analogous to what Religion teaches us 
 concerning the future punishment of the wicked, so 
 much of a piece with it, that both would naturally be 
 expref^ed in the very same words, and manner of de- 
 scription. In the book of Proferfes^', for instance, Wis- 
 dom is introduced, as frequenting the most public 
 places of resort, and as reje(5ted when she offers her- 
 self as the natural appointed guide of human life. 
 How long, speaking to those who are pafsing through 
 it, how long, ye simple ones, will ye love folly, and 
 the scorners delight in their scorning, and fools hate 
 knowledge ? Turn ye at my reproof. Behold I will 
 pour out my spirit upon you, I will make known 
 my words unto you. But upon being neglected. 
 Because I have called,andye refused, I have stretched 
 
 finally and upon the whole, be well with the righteous, and ill 
 with the wicked : But it could not be determined, upon any 
 principles of reason, whether human creatures might not have 
 been appointed to pafs through other states of life and being, 
 before that distributive justice should finally and eft'edlually 
 take place. Revelation teaches us, that the next state of 
 things after the prefent, is appointed for the execution of this 
 justice ; that it shall be no longer delayed : But t/ie mystery of 
 God, the great mystery of his suffering vice and confusion to 
 prevail, s/iail then be fnhhed ; and he will take to him his great 
 poiver andivill reign, by rendering to every one according to his 
 works. 
 6 Chap. i. 
 
Chap. 2. by Rewards and Punishments. 43 
 
 out my hand, and no man regarded ; hut ye have 
 set at nought all my counsel, and would none of my 
 reproof: I also will laugh at your calamity, I will 
 mock when your fear cometh ; when your fear 
 cometh as desolation, and your destru6iion cometh 
 as a whirlwind ; when distrefs and anguish cometh 
 upon you. Then shall they call upon me, hut I will 
 not answer ; they shall seek me early, hut they shall 
 not find me. This pafsage, every one sees, is poeti- 
 cal, and some parts of it are highly figurative ; but 
 their meaning is obvious. And the thing intended 
 is expref^ed more literally in the following words ; 
 For that they hated knowledge, and did not choose the 
 fear of the Lord — therefore shall they eat of the fruit 
 of their own way, and he filled with their own de- 
 vices. For the security of the simple shall slay them, 
 and the prosperity of fools shall destroy them. And 
 the whole paf^age is so equally applicable, to what 
 we experience in the present world, concerning the 
 consequences of men's actions, and to what Religion 
 teaches us is to be expelled in another, that it may 
 be questioned which of the two was principally in- 
 tended. 
 
 Indeed when one has been recolle<?ling the proper 
 proofs of a future state of rewards and punishments, 
 nothing methinks can give one so sensible an appre- 
 hension of the latter, or representation of it to the 
 mind ; as observing, that after the many disregarded 
 checks, admonitions, and warnings, which people meet 
 with in the ways of vice and folly and extravagance ; 
 warnings from their very nature ; from the examples 
 of others ; from the lefser inconveniences which they 
 bring upon themselves ; from the instructions of wise 
 and virtuous men : After these have been long de- 
 spised, scorned, ridiculed : after the chief bad con- 
 sequences, temporal consequences, of their follies, 
 
44 Of the Government of God Parti. 
 
 have been delayed for a great while ; at length they 
 break in irresistibly, like an armed force : Repentance 
 is too late to relieve, and can serve only to aggra- 
 vate, their distreft : the case is become desperate : 
 and poverty and sickneft, remorse and anguish, in- 
 famy and death, the effects of their own doings, 
 overwhelm them, beyond pofsibility of remedy or 
 escape. This is an account of what is in fa(5l the 
 general constitution of nature. 
 
 It is not in any sort meant, that according to what 
 appears at present of the natural course of things, 
 men are always uniformly punished in proportion to 
 their misbehaviour : But that there are very many 
 instances of misbehaviour punished in the several 
 ways now mentioned, and very dreadful instances 
 too ; sufficient to show what the laws of the universe 
 may admit ; and, if thoroughly considered, sufficient 
 fully to answer all obje(5lions against the credibility 
 of a future state of punishments, from any imagina- 
 tions, that the frailty of our nature and external temp- 
 tations, almost annihilate the guilt of human vices: 
 as well as objections of another sort ; from neceftity ; 
 from suppositions, that the will of an infinite Being 
 cannot be contradi<5led, or that he must be incapable 
 of offence and provocation.^ 
 
 Reflections of this kind are not without their ter- 
 rors to serious persons, the most free from enthu- 
 siasm, and of the greatest strength of mind : But it 
 is fit things be stated and considered as they really 
 are. And there is, in the present age, a certain fear- 
 leftneft, with regard to what may be hereafter under 
 the government of God, which, nothing but an uni- 
 versally acknowledged demonstration on the side of 
 atheism, can justify; and which makes it quite ne- 
 
 ^ See Chaps, iv. and vi. 
 
Chap. 2. by Rewards and Punishments. 45 
 
 cef^ary, that men be reminded, and if pof^ible made 
 to feel, that there is no sort of ground for being thus 
 presumptuous, even upon the most sceptical prin- 
 ciples. For may it not be said of any person upon 
 his being born into the world, he may behave so, as 
 to be of no service to it, but by being made an ex- 
 ample of the woeful effec^ts of vice and folly 1 That 
 he may, as any one may, if he will, incur an infa- 
 mous execution, from the hands of civil justice ; or 
 in some other course of extravagance shorten his 
 days : or bring upon himself infamy and diseases 
 worse than death \ So that it had been better for 
 him, even with regard to the present world, that he 
 had never been born. And is there any pretence of 
 reason, for people to think themselves secure, and 
 talk as if they had certain proof, that let them ac^t as 
 licentiously as they will, there can be nothing ana- 
 logous to this, with regard to a future and more ge- 
 neral interest, under the providence and government 
 of the same God \ 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 Of the Moral Government of God. 
 
 S the manifold appearances of design 
 and of final causes, in the constitution 
 of the world, prove it to be the work 
 of an intelligent Mind ; so the parti- 
 cular final causes of pleasure and pain 
 distributed amongst his creatures, prove that they are 
 under his government; what may be called his natu- 
 ral government of creatures endued with sense and 
 reason. This, however, implies somewhat more than 
 
46 Of the Moral Part i. 
 
 seems usually attended to, when we speak of God's 
 natural government of the world. It implies govern- 
 ment of the very same kind with that, which a master 
 exercises over his servants, or a civil magistrate over 
 his subjedls. These latter instances of final causes, 
 as really prove an intelligent Governor of the world, 
 in the sense now mentioned, and before^ distin(5lly 
 treated of; as any other instances of final causes 
 prove an intelligent Maker of it. 
 
 But this alone does not appear at first sight to de- 
 termine anything certainly, concerning the moral 
 chara(fi;er of the Author of Nature, considered in this 
 relation of governor ; does not ascertain his govern- 
 ment to be moral, or prOve that he is the righteous 
 judge of the world. Moral government consists, not 
 j barely in rewarding and punishing men for their 
 a(9;ions, which the most tyrannical person may do : 
 but in rewarding the righteous and punishing the 
 wicked ; in rendering to men according to their ac- 
 tions, considered as good or evil. And the perfec- 
 tion of moral government consists in doing this, with 
 regard to all intelligent creatures, in an exa(5l pro- 
 portion to their personal merits or demerits. 
 
 Some men seem to think the only chara(5lerof the 
 Author of Nature to be that of simple absolute bene- 
 volence. This considered as a principle of action, 
 and infinite in degree, is a disposition to produce the 
 greatest pofsible happinef^, without regard to per- 
 sons' behaviour, otherwise than as such regard would 
 produce higher degrees of it. And supposing this 
 I to be the only chara(?i:er of God, veracity and justice 
 i in him would be nothing but benevolence condu(51:ed 
 ' by wisdom. Now surely this ought not to be af^erted, 
 unleft it can be proved ; for we should speak with 
 
 ' Chap. ii. 
 
Chap. 2' Government of God. 47 
 
 cautious reverence upon such a subject;. And whe- 
 ther it can be proved or no, is not the thing- here to 
 be inquired into ; but whether in the constitution and 
 conducT; of the world, a righteous government be not 
 discernibly planned out : which necefsarily implies a 
 righteous governor. There may pofsibly be in the 
 creation beings, to whom the Author of Nature ma- 
 nifests himself under this most amiable of all charac- 
 ters, this of infinite absolute benevolence ; for it is 
 the most amiable, supposing it not, as perhaps it is 
 not, incompatible with justice: but he manifests him- 
 self to us under the charad^er of a righteous gover- 
 nor. He may, consistently with this, be simply and 
 absolutely benevolent, in the sense now explained : 
 But he is, for he has given us a proof in the consti-f 
 tution and conduct of the world that he is, a governor 
 over servants, as he rewards and punishes us for our 
 actions. And in the constitution and conduct of it, 
 he may also have given, besides the reason of the 
 thing, and the natural presages of conscience, clear 
 and distincft intimations, that his government is right- 
 eous or moral : clear to such as think the nature of 
 it deserving their attention ; and yet not to every 
 carelefs person, who casts a transient reflection upon 
 the subje(5l.^ 
 
 But it is particularly to be observed, that the Di- 
 
 ^ The objeftions against Religion, from the evidence of it 
 not being universal, nor so strong as might polHbly have been, 
 may be urged against natural Religion, as well as against re- 
 vealed. And therefore the consideration of them belongs to 
 the First Part of this Treatise, as well as the Second. But as 
 these objedlions are chiefly urged against revealed Religion, I 
 chose to consider them in the Second Part. And the answer 
 to them there, chap, vi., as urged against Christianity, being 
 almost equally applicable to them as urged against the Religion 
 of Nature J to avoid repetition, the reader is referred to that 
 chapter. 
 
48 Of the Moral Parti. 
 
 vine government, which we experience ourselves 
 under in the present state, taken alone, is allowed not 
 to be the perfe^lion of moral government. And yet 
 this by no means hinders, but that there may be 
 somewhat, be it more or lef^, truly moral in it. A 
 righteous government may plainly appear to be car-; 
 ried on to some degree : enough to give us the ap- 
 prehension that it shall be completed, or carried on 
 to that degree of perfection which religion teaches 
 us it shall ; but which cannot appear, till much more 
 of the Divine administration be seen, than can in the 
 present life. And the design of this chapter is to 
 enquire, how far this is the case : how far, over and 
 above the m.oral nature^ which God has given us, and 
 our natural notion of him as righteous governor of 
 those his creatures, to whom he has given this na- 
 ture f I say how far besides this, the principles and 
 beginnings of a moral government over the world 
 may be discerned, notwithstanding and amidst all the 
 confusion and disorder of it. 
 
 Now one might mention here, what has been often 
 urged with great force, that, in general, left uneasi- 
 neft and more satisfacftion, are the natural conse- 
 quences'^ of a virtuous than of a vicious course of life, 
 in the present state, as an instance of a moral go- 
 vernment established in nature ; an instance of it, 
 colle6led from experience and present matter of fa<51. 
 But it must be owned a thing of difficulty to weigh and 
 balance pleasures and uneasinefses, each amongst 
 themselves, and also against each other, so as to 
 make an estimate, with any exa(9;neft, of the over- 
 plus of happineft on the side of virtue. And it is 
 not impoftible, that, amidst the infinite disorders of 
 
 ' DlJJertation II. ■* Chap, vi. pp. 167, &c. 
 
 ' See Lord Shaftesbury's Inquiry concerning Virtue, Part 11. 
 
Chap. 3. Government of God. 49 
 
 the world, there may be exceptions to the happi- 
 neis of virtue ; even with regard to those persons, 
 whose course of Hfe from their youth up, has been 
 blamelef^ ; and more with regard to those, who have 
 gone on for some time in the ways of vice, and have 
 afterwards reformed. For suppose an instance of 
 the latter case ; a person with his paf^ions inflamed, 
 his natural faculty of self-government impaired by 
 habits of indulgence, and with all his vices about him, 
 like so many harpies, craving for their accustomed 
 gratification: who can say how long it might be, be- 
 fore such a person would find more satisfa(5lion in 
 the reasonableneft and present good consequences 
 of virtue, than difficulties and self-denial in the re- 
 straints of it ? Experience also shews, that men can, 
 to a great degree, get over their sense of shame, so 
 as that by profefsing themselves to be without prin- 
 ciple, and avowing even dire(51 villany, they can sup- 
 port themselves against the infamy of it. But as the 
 ill adiions of any one will probably be more talked 
 of, and oftener thrown in his way, upon his refor- 
 mation ; so the infamy of them will be much more 
 felt, after the natural sense of virtue and of honour 
 is recovered. Uneasineftes of this kind ought indeed 
 to be put to the account of former vices : yet it will 
 be said, they are in part the consequences of refor- 
 mation. Still I am far from allowing it doubtful, 
 whether virtue, upon the whole, be happier than 
 vice in the present world. But if it were, yet the 
 beginnings of a righteous administration may beyond 
 all question be found in nature, if we will attentively 
 inquire after them. And, 
 
 I. In whatever manner the notion of God's moral 
 government over the world might be treated, if it 
 did not appear whether he were in a proper sense 
 our governor at all ; yet when it is certain matter of 
 
 E 
 
50 Of the Moral Parti, 
 
 experience, that he does manifest himself to us under 
 the chara(9;er of a governor, in the sense explained;^ 
 it must deserve to be considered, whether there be 
 not reason to apprehend, that he may be a righteous* 
 or moral governor. Since it appears to be faifl, that 
 God does govern mankind by the method of rewards 
 and punishments, according to some settled rules of 
 distribution; it is surely a question to be asked, What 
 presumption is there against his finally rewarding and 
 punishing them, according to this particular rule, 
 namely, as they a(9; reasonably or unreasonably, vir- 
 tuously or viciously '\ Since rendering men happy 
 or miserable by this rule, certainly falls in, much 
 more falls in, with our natural apprehensions and 
 sense of things, than doing so by any other rule 
 whatever: Since rewarding and punishing a(5lions 
 by any other rule, would appear much harder to be 
 accounted for, by minds formed as he has formed 
 ours. Be the evidence of Religion then more or lef^ 
 clear, the expe(5lation whi^h Jt raises in^us, that the 
 righteous shall^ upon the whole, be happy, and the 
 vdcked miserable, cannotjiowever poftibly be con- 
 sidered as j^b^urd or chimerical ; because it is no 
 more than an expe(5lation, that a method of govern- 
 ment already begun, shall be carried on, the method 
 of rewarding and punishing alliens ; and shall be 
 carried on by a particular rule, which unavoidably 
 appears to us at first sight more natural than any 
 other, the rule which we call distributive justice. 
 Nor, 
 
 II. Ought it to be entirely paired over, that tran- 
 quillity, satisfa(9;ion, and external advantages, being 
 the natural consequences of prudent management of 
 ourselves, and our affairs ; and rashness, profligate 
 
 6 Chap. ii. 
 
Chap. 2' Government of God. 51 
 
 neg-ligence, and wilful folly, bringing after them 
 many inconveniences and sufferings ; these afford 
 instances of a right constitution of nature : as the 
 correc9;ion of children, for their own sakes, and by 
 way of example, when they run into danger or hurt 
 themselves, is a part of right education. And thus, 
 that God governs the world by general fixed laws, 
 that he has endued us with capacities of reflecfiing 
 upon this constitution of things, and foreseeing the 
 good and bad consequences of our behaviour; plainly 
 implies some sort of moral government ; since from 
 such a constitution of things it cannot but follow, that 
 prudence and imprudence, which are of the nature 
 of virtue and vice,' must be, as they are, respectively 
 rewarded and punished. 
 
 III. From the natural course of things, vicious 
 actions are, to a great degree, actually punished as 
 mischievous to society : and besides punishment 
 actually infliCled upon this account, there is also the 
 fear and apprehension of it in those persons, whose 
 crimes have rendered them obnoxious to it, in case 
 of a discovery ; this state of fear being itself often a 
 very considerable punishment. The natural fear and 
 apprehension of it too, which restrains from such 
 crimes, is a declaration of nature against them. It 
 is necefsary to the very being of society, that vices 
 destructive of it, should be punished as being so ; 
 the vices of falsehood, injustice, cruelty : which 
 punishment therefore is as natural as society ; and 
 so is an instance of a kind of moral government, 
 naturally established and aClually taking place. And, 
 since the certain natural course of things, is the con- 
 duCl of Providence or the government of God, 
 though carried on by the instrumentality of men, 
 
 7 See Dlfiert. II. 
 
52 Of the Moral Parti. 
 
 the observation here made amounts to this, that 
 mankind find themselves placed by him in such 
 circumstances, as that they are unavoidably ac- 
 countable for their behaviour, and are often punished, 
 and sometimes rewarded, under his government, in 
 the view of their being mischievous, or eminently 
 beneficial to society. 
 
 If it be objeded that good a(5^ions, and such as 
 are beneficial to society, are often punished, as in 
 the case of persecution and in other cases ; and that 
 ill and mischievous a^lions are often rewarded : it 
 may be answered distinctly; first, that this is in no 
 sort neceftary, and consequently not natural, in the 
 sense in which it is necef^ary, and therefore natural, 
 that ill or mischievous ac^tions should be punished: 
 And in the next place, that good actions are never 
 punished, considered as beneficial to society, nor ill 
 ac^tions rewarded, under the view of their being 
 hurtful to it. So that it stands good, without any 
 thing on the side of vice to be set over against it, 
 that the Author of Nature has as truly dire<5led, that 
 vicious actions considered as mischievous to society, 
 should be punished, and put mankind under a neces- 
 sity of thus punishing them ; as he has directed and 
 necelsitated us to preserve our lives by food. 
 
 IV. In the natural course of things, virtue as such 
 is actually rewarded, and vice as such punished : 
 which seems to afford an instance^or jexample, not 
 only of government, but of morai_g oyern ment, begun 
 and established; moral in the stri(5test sense ; though 
 not in that perfe(?i:ion of degree which Religion 
 teaches us to expert. In order to see this more 
 clearly, we must distinguish between actions them- 
 selves, and that quality ascribed to them, which we 
 call virtuous or vicious. The gratification itself of 
 every natural pafsion, must be attended with delight: 
 
Chap. 3. Government of God. 53 
 
 And acquisitions of fortune, however made, are ac- 
 quisitions of the means, ormaterials, of enjoyment. An 
 action then, by which any natural pafsion is gratified 
 or fortune acquired, procures delight or advantage ; 
 abstra<5led from all consideration of the morality of 
 such a(5lion. Consequently the pleasure or advan- 
 tage in this case, is gained by the action itself, not 
 by the morality, the virtuousnei^ or viciousnefs of it; 
 though it be, perhaps, virtuous or vicious. Thus, to 
 say such an a<fl;ion or course of behaviour, procured 
 such pleasure or advantage, or brought on such in- 
 convenience and pain, is quite a different thing from 
 saying, that such good or bad effecft was owing to 
 the virtue or vice of such action or behaviour. In 
 one case, an acT:ion abstracted from all moral con- 
 sideration, produced its efFe(5l : In the other case, 
 for it will appear that there are such cases, the 
 morality of the action, the a(5lion under a moral con- 
 sideration, i. e. the virtuousnef^ or viciousneft of it, 
 produced the effect. Now I say virtue as such, na- 
 turally procures considerable advantages to the vir- 
 tuous, and vice as such, naturally occasions great 
 inconvenience and even misery to the vicious, in 
 very many instances. The immediate effe(?ts of virtue 
 and vice upon the mind and temper, are to be men- 
 tioned as instances of it. Vice as such is naturally 
 attended with some sort of uneasinef^, and, not un- 
 commonly, with great disturbance and apprehension. 
 That inward feeling, which, respecting lefser mat- 
 ters, and in familiar speech, we call being vexed with 
 oneself, and in matters of importance and in more 
 serious language, remorse ; is an uneasinef^ natu- 
 rally arising from an aCtion of a man's own, refle(5ted 
 upon by himself as wrong, unreasonable, faulty, i. e. 
 vicious in greater or lei^ degrees : and this mani- 
 festly is a different feeling from that uneasinef^ which 
 
54 Of the Moral Part I. 
 
 arises from a sense of mere loft or harm. What is 
 more common, than to hear a man lamenting an ac- 
 cident or event, and adding but however he 
 
 has the satisfa(5lion that he cannot blame himself for 
 it; or, on the contrary, that he has the uneasi- 
 neft of being sensible it was his own doing? Thus 
 also the disturbance and fear, which often follow 
 upon a man's having done an injury, arise from a 
 sense of his being blameworthy ; otherwise there 
 would, in many cases, be no ground of disturbance, 
 nor any reason to fear resentment or shame. On 
 the other hand, inward security and peace, and a 
 mind open to the several gratifications of life, are the 
 natural attendants of innocence and virtue. To 
 which must be added the complacency, satisfaction, 
 and even joy of heart, which accompany the exer- 
 cise, the real exercise, of gratitude, friendship, be- 
 nevolence. 
 
 And here, I think, ought to be mentioned, the 
 fears of future punishment, and peaceful hopes of a 
 better life, in those who fully believe, or have any 
 serious apprehension of Religion : because these 
 hopes and fears are present uneasineft and satis- 
 faction to the mind ; and cannot be got rid of by 
 great part of the world, even by men who have 
 thought most thoroughly upon that subject; of Re- 
 ligion. And no one can say, how considerable this 
 uneasineft and satisfaction may be, or what upon the 
 whole it may amount to. 
 
 In the next place comes in the consideration, that 
 all honest and good men are disposed to befriend 
 honest good men as such, and to discountenance the 
 vicious as such, and do so in some degree; indeed 
 in a considerable degree : from which favour and 
 discouragement cannot but arise considerable ad- 
 vantage and inconvenience. And though the gene- 
 
Chap. 3. Government of God. 55 
 
 rality of the world have little regard to the morality 
 of their own actions, and may be supposed to have 
 lef^ to that of others, when they themselves are not 
 concerned ; yet let any one be known to be a man of 
 virtue, somehow or other he will be favoured, and 
 good offices will be done him, from regard to his 
 chara<5ler without remote views, occasionally, and in 
 some low degree, I think, by the generality of the 
 world, as it happens to come in their way. Public 
 honours too and advantages are the natural conse- 
 quences, are sometimes at least the consequences in 
 fa(5l, of virtuous ac^tions ; of eminent justice, fidelity, 
 charity, love to our country, considered in the view 
 of being virtuous. And sometimes even death itself, 
 often infamy and external inconveniences, are the 
 public consequences of vice as vice. For instance, 
 the sense which mankind have of tyranny, injustice, 
 oppre{^ion, additional to the mere feeling or fear of 
 misery, has doubtleft been instrumental in bringing 
 about revolutions, which make a figure even in the 
 history of the world. For it is plain, men resent 
 injuries as implying faultineft, and retaliate, not 
 merely under the notion of having received harm, 
 but of having received wrong; and they have this re- 
 sentment in behalf of others, as well as of themselves. 
 So likewise even the generality are, in some degree, 
 grateful and disposed to return good offices, not 
 merely because such an one has been the occasion of 
 good to them, but under the view, that such good 
 offices implied kind intention and good desert in the 
 doer. To all this may be added two or three par- 
 ticular things, which many persons will think frivo- 
 lous ; but to me nothing appears so, which at all 
 comes in towards determining a question of such 
 importance, as, whether there be, or be not, a moral 
 institution of government, in the stri(ftest sense 
 
56 Of the Moral Parti. 
 
 moral, visibly established and begun in nature. The 
 particular things are these : That in domestic go- 
 vernment, which is doubtlef^ natural, children and 
 others also are very generally punished for falsehood, 
 and injustice, and ill-behaviour, as such, and rewarded 
 for the contrary ; which are instances where veracity, 
 cind justice, and right behaviour, as such, are natu- 
 rally enforced by rewards and punishments, whether 
 more or left considerable in degree : That, though 
 civil government be supposed to take cognizance of 
 a^lions in no other view than as prejudicial to society, 
 without respe(51: to the immorality of them ; yet as 
 such a(?i:ions are immoral, so the sense which men 
 have of the immorality of them, very greatly contri- 
 butes, in different ways, to bring offenders to justice: 
 And that entire absence of all crime and guilt in the 
 moral sense, when plainly appearing, will almost of 
 course procure, and circumstances of aggravated 
 guilt prevent, a remifsion of the penalties annexed to 
 civil crimes, in many cases, though by no means in all. 
 Upon the whole then, besides the good and bad 
 effects of virtue and vice upon men's own minds, 
 the course of the world does, in some measure, turn 
 upon the approbation and disapprobation of them as 
 such, in others. The sense of well and ill doing, 
 the presages of conscience, the love of good charac- 
 ters and dislike of bad ones; honour, shame, resent- 
 ment, gratitude ; all these, considered in themselves, 
 and in their effe(9:s, do afford manifest real instances 
 of virtue as such naturally favoured, and of vice as 
 such discountenanced, more or lef^, in the daily 
 course of human life ; in every age, in every re- 
 lation, in every general circumstance of it. That 
 God has given us a moral nature^, may most justly 
 
 8 See Difsert. II. 
 
Chap. 2,- Government of God. 57 
 
 be urged as a proof of our being under his moral / , 
 government : But that he has placed us in a con- 
 dition, which gives this nature, as one may speak, 
 scope to operate, and in which it does unavoidably ^ 
 operate ; i. e. influence mankind to a(ft, so as thus to « 
 favour and reward virtue, and discountenance and 
 punish vice ; this is not the same, but a further, 
 additional proof of his moral government : for it is an 
 instance of it. The first is a proof, that he will finally 
 favour and support virtue eflfectually : The second is 
 an example of his favouring and supporting it at 
 present, in some degree. 
 
 If a more distinct inquiry be made, whence it 
 arises, that virtue as such is often rewarded, and vice 
 as such is punished, and this rule never inverted : 
 it will be found to proceed, in part, immediately from 
 the moral nature itself, which God has given us ; 
 and also in part, from his having given us, together 
 with this nature, so great a power over each other's 
 happinef^ and misery. For first, it is certain, that 
 peace and delight, in some degree and upon some 
 occasions, are the necefsary and present effe(5ls 
 of virtuous practice ; effects arising immediately 
 from that constitution of our nature. We are so 
 made, that well-doing as such gives us satisfaction, 
 at least, in some instances ; ill-doing as such, in 7 
 none. And secondly, from our moral nature, joined 
 with God's having put our happinef^ and misery in 
 many respedls in each other's power, it cannot but 
 be, that vice as such, some kinds and instances of it 
 at least, will be infamous, and men will be disposed 
 to punish it as in itself detestable ; and the villain 
 will by no means be able always to avoid feeling that 
 infamy, any more than he will be able to escape this 
 further punishment, which mankind will be disposed 
 to infli^l upon him, under the notion of his deserving 
 
58 Of the Moral Parti, 
 
 it. But there can be nothing on the side of vice, to 
 answer this; because there is nothing in the human 
 mind, contradictory, as the logicians speak, to virtue. 
 For virtue consists in a regard to what is light and 
 reasonable, as being so ; in a regard to veracity, 
 justice, charity, in themselves : and there is surely 
 no such thing, as a like natural regard to falsehood, 
 injustice, cruelty. If it be thought, that there are 
 instances of an approbation of vice, as such, in itself, 
 and for its own sake, (though it does not appear to 
 me, that there is any such thing at all ; but suppos- 
 ing there be,) it is evidently monstrous : as much 
 so, as the most acknowledged perversion of any 
 paftion whatever. Such instances of perversion then 
 being left out, as merely imaginary, or, however, 
 unnatural, it must follow, from the frame of our 
 nature, and from our condition, in the respects now 
 described, that vice cannot at all be, and virtue can- 
 not but be, favoured as such by others, upon some 
 occasions ; and happy in itself, in some degree. For 
 what is here insisted upon, is not the degree in which 
 virtue and vice are thus distinguished, but only the 
 thing itself, that they are so in some degree ; though 
 the whole good and bad effeCl of virtue and vice as 
 such, is not inconsiderable in degree. But that they 
 must be thus distinguished in some degree, is in a 
 manner neceftary : It is matter of fac^ of daily ex- 
 perience, even in the greatest confusion of human 
 affairs. 
 
 It is not pretended, but that in the natural course 
 of things, happineft and misery appear to be dis- 
 tributed by other rules, than only the personal merit 
 and demerit of characters. They may sometimes be 
 distributed by way of mere discipline. There may 
 be the wisest and best reasons, why the world should 
 be governed by general laws, from whence such 
 
Chap. 3. Government of God. 59 
 
 promiscuous distribution perhaps must follow; and 
 also why our happinef^ and misery should be put in 
 each other's power, in the degree which they are. 
 And these things, as in general they contribute to 
 the rewarding virtue and punishing vice, as such : 
 so they often contribute also, not to the inversion of 
 this, which is impoftible ; but to the rendering per- 
 sons prosperous, though wicked; afflicted, though 
 righteous ; and which is worse, to the rewarding 
 some a6iions, though vicious ; and punishing other 
 aSlions, though virtuous. But all this cannot drown 
 the voice of nature in the condu(?i: of Providence, 
 plainly declaring itself for virtue, by way of distinc- 
 tion from vice, and preference to it. For, our being 
 so constituted, as that virtue and vice are thus na- 
 turally favoured and discountenanced, rewarded and 
 punished respe(9:ively as such, is an intuitive proof 
 of the intent of nature, that it should be so : other- 
 wise the constitution of our mind, from which it thus 
 immediately and dire<flly proceeds, would be absurd. 
 But it cannot be said, because virtuous a(51ions are 
 sometimes punished, and vicious a(9:ions rewarded, 
 that nature intended it. For, though this great 
 disorder is brought about, as all acflions are done, 
 by means of some natural pafsion; yet this may be, 
 as it undoubtedly is, brought about by the perver- 
 sion of such paftion, implanted in us for other, 
 and those very good purposes. And indeed these 
 other and good purposes, even of every pafsion, may 
 be clearly seen. 
 
 We have then a declaration, in some degree of 
 present effecfl, from him who is supreme in nature, 
 which side he is of, or what part he takes: a declara- 
 tion for virtue, and against vice. So far therefore 
 as a man is true to virtue, to veracity and justice, to 
 equity and charity, and the right of the case, in 
 
6o Of the Moral Parti. 
 
 whatever he is concerned ; so far he is on the side 
 of the Divine administration, and co-operates with 
 it ; and from hence, to such a man, arises naturally 
 a secret satisfaction and sense of security, and im- 
 plicit hope of somewhat further. And, 
 
 V. This hope is confirmed by the neceftary ten- 
 dencies of virtue, which, though not of present ef- 
 fe(ft, yet are at present discernible in nature; and 
 so afford an instance of somewhat moral in the 
 ef^ential constitution of it. There is, in the nature 
 of things, a tendency in virtue and vice to produce 
 the good and bad effects now mentioned, in a greater 
 degree than they do in fa6l produce them. For 
 instance ; good and bad men would be much more 
 rewarded and punished as such, were it not, that 
 justice is often artificially eluded, that chara61;ers 
 are not known, and many, who would thus favour 
 virtue and discourage vice, are hindered from doing 
 so by accidental causes. These tendencies of virtue 
 and vice are obvious with regard to individuals. 
 But it may require more particularly to be consi- 
 dered, that power in a society, by being under the 
 dire(?tion of virtue, naturally increases, and has a 
 necef^ary tendency to prevail over opposite power, 
 not under the direction of it ; in like manner as 
 power, by being under the dire<9;ion of reason, in- 
 creases, and has a tendency to prevail over brute 
 force. There are several brute creatures of equal, 
 and several of superior strength, to that of men ; and 
 pof^ibly the sum of the whole strength of brutes, 
 may be greater than that of mankind : But reason 
 gives us the advantage and superiority over them ; 
 and thus man is the acknowledged governing animal 
 upon earth. Nor is this superiority considered by 
 any as accidental ; but as what reason has a tendency, 
 in the nature of the thing, to obtain. And yet per- 
 
Chap. 2^. Government of God. 6 1 
 
 haps difficulties may be raised about the meaning, 
 as well as the truth, of the af^ertion, that virtue has 
 the like tendency. 
 
 To obviate these difficulties, let us see more dis- 
 tin6lly, how the case stands with regard to reason ; 
 which is so readily acknowledged to have this ad- 
 vantageous tendency. Suppose then two or three 
 men, of the best and most improved understanding, 
 in a desolate open plain, attacked by ten times the 
 number of beasts of prey : Would their reason se- 
 cure them the vi(ftory in this unequal combat? Power 
 then, though joined with reason, and under its di- 
 re(5lion, cannot be expe(5led to prevail over opposite 
 power, though merely brutal, unleft the one bears 
 some proportion to the other. Again : put the ima- 
 ginary case, that rational and irrational creatures 
 were of like external shape and manner : it is certain, 
 before there were opportunities for the first to dis- 
 tinguish each other, to separate from their adver- 
 saries, and to form an union among themselves, 
 they might be upon a level, or in several respe(5^s 
 upon great disadvantage ; though united they might 
 be vastly superior : Since union is of such efficacy, 
 that ten men united, might be able to accomplish, 
 what ten thousand of the same natural strength and 
 understanding wholly ununited, could not. In this 
 case then, brute force might more than maintain its 
 ground against reason, for want of union among the 
 rational creatures. Or suppose a number of men to 
 land upon an island inhabited only by wild beasts ; 
 a number of men, who, by the regulations of civil 
 government, the inventions of art, and the experi- 
 ence of some years, could they be preserved so long, 
 would be really sufficient, to subdue the wild beasts, 
 and to preserve themselves in security from them : 
 Yet a conjuncflure of accidents might give such ad- 
 
62 Of the Moral Part i. 
 
 vantage to the irrational animals, as that they might 
 at once overpower, and even extirpate, the whole 
 species of rational ones. Length of time then, pro- 
 per scope and opportunities, for reason to exert it- 
 self, may be absolutely neceftary to its prevailing 
 over brute force. Further still : there are many in- 
 stances of brutes succeeding in attempts, which they 
 could not have undertaken, had not their irrational 
 nature rendered them incapable of foreseeing the 
 danger of such attempts, or the fury of paftion hin- 
 dered their attending to it; and there are instances 
 of reason and real prudence preventing men's under- 
 taking what, it hath appeared afterwards, they might 
 have succeeded in by a lucky rashneft. And in 
 certain conjunctures, ignorance and folly, weakneft 
 and discord, may have their advantages. So that 
 rational animals have not neceftarily the superiority 
 over irrational ones : but, how improbable soever it 
 may be, it is evidently pol^ible, that, in some globes, 
 the latter may be superior. And were the former 
 wholly at variance and disunited, by false self-inte- 
 rest and envy, by treachery and injustice, and con- 
 sequent rage and malice against each other, whilst 
 the latter were firmly united among themselves by 
 instin(5l ; this might greatly contribute to the intro- 
 ducing such an inverted order of things. For every 
 one would consider it as inverted : Since reason has, 
 in the nature of it, a tendency to prevail over brute 
 force ; notwithstanding the poftibility it may not 
 prevail, and the necefsity, which there is, of many 
 concurring circumstances to render it prevalent. 
 
 Now I say, virtue in a society has a like tendency 
 to procure superiority and additional power: whether 
 this power be considered as the means of security 
 from opposite power, or of obtaining other advan- 
 tages. And it has this tendency, by rendering pub- 
 
Chap. 3. Government of God. 63 
 
 lie good, an object and end, to every member of 
 the society ; by putting every one upon considera- 
 tion and diligence, recolle^lion and self-government, 
 both in order to see what is the most effectual 
 method, and also in order to perform their proper 
 part, for obtaining and preserving it ; by uniting a 
 society within itself, and so increasing its strength ; 
 and, which is particularly to be mentioned, uniting 
 it by means of veracity and justice. For as these 
 last are principal bonds of union, so benevolence or 
 public spirit, undire^led, unrestrained by them, is no- 
 body knows what. 
 
 And suppose the invisible world, and the invisible 
 dispensations of Providence, to be, in any sort, an- 
 dogous to what appears : or that both together 
 make up one uniform scheme, the two parts of 
 which, the part which we see, and that which is be- 
 yond our observation, are analogous to each other : 
 Then, there must be a like natural tendency in the 
 derived power, throughout the universe, under the 
 dire(9:ion of virtue, to prevail in general over that, 
 which is not under its direcflion ; as there is in rea- 
 son, derived reason in the universe, to prevail over 
 brute force. But then, in order to the prevalence of 
 virtue, or that it may a(5lually produce, what it has 
 a tendency to produce ; the like concurrences are 
 neceftary, as are, to the prevalence of reason. There 
 must be some proportion, between the natural power 
 or force which is, and that which is not, under the 
 dire(5lion of virtue : There must be sufficient length 
 of time; for the complete succei^ of virtue, as of 
 reason, cannot, from the nature of the thing, be 
 otherwise than gradual : There must be, as one may 
 speak, a fair field of trial, a stage large and extensive 
 enough, proper occasions and opportunities, for the 
 virtuous to join together, to exert themselves against 
 
64 Of the Moral Parti. 
 
 lawlef^ force, and to reap the fruit of their united 
 labours. Now, indeed, it is to be hoped, that the dis- 
 proportion between the good and bad, even here on 
 earth, is not so great, but that the former have na- 
 tural power sufficient to their prevailing to a consi- 
 derable degree, if circumstances would permit this 
 power to be united. For, much left, very much lefs, 
 power under the direc^tion of virtue, would prevail 
 over much greater not under the dire(5lion of it. 
 However, good men over the face of the earth can- 
 not unite ; as for other reasons, so because they 
 cannot be sufficiently ascertained of each other's 
 characters. And the known course of human things, 
 the scene we are now pairing through, particularly 
 the shortneft of life, denies to virtue its full scope in 
 several other respects. The natural tendency, which 
 we have been considering, though real, is hindered 
 from being carried into effeCl in the present state : 
 But these hinderances may be removed in a future 
 one. Virtue, to borrow the Christian allusion, is 
 militant here ; and various untoward accidents con- 
 tribute to its being often overborne : But it may com- 
 bat with greater advantage hereafter, and prevail 
 completely, and enjoy its consequent rewards, in 
 some future state. Negle(5led as it is, perhaps un- 
 known, perhaps despised and opprefted, here; there 
 may be scenes in eternity, lasting enough, and in 
 every other way adapted, to afford it a sufficient 
 sphere of a6lion ; and a sufficient sphere for the 
 natural consequences of it to follow in h^. If the 
 soul be naturally immortal, and this state be a pro- 
 greft towards a future one, as childhood is towards 
 mature age ; good men may naturally unite, not 
 only amongst themselves, but also with other orders 
 of virtuous creatures, in that future state. For 
 virtue, from the very nature of it, is a principle 
 
Chap. 3. Government of God. 65 
 
 and bond of union, in some degree, amongst all who 
 are endued with it, and known to each other ; so 
 as that by it, a good man cannot but recommend 
 himself to the favour and protection of all virtuous 
 beings, throughout the whole universe, who can be 
 acquainted with his chara(5ler, and can any way in- 
 terpose in his behalf in any part of his duration. And 
 one might add, that suppose all this advantageous 
 tendency of virtue to become effeCl, amongst one or 
 more orders of creatures, in any distant scenes and 
 periods, and to be seen by any orders of vicious 
 creatures, throughout the universal Kingdom of God; 
 this happy effect: of virtue would have a tendency, by 
 way of example, and poftibly in other ways, to amend 
 those of them who are capable of amendment, and 
 being recovered to a just sense of virtue. If our 
 notions of the plan of Providence were enlarged, in 
 any sort proportionable to what late discoveries have 
 enlarged our views with respedl to the material 
 world ; representations of this kind would not appear 
 absurd or extravagant. However they are not to be 
 taken, as intended for a literal delineation of what is 
 in facft the particular scheme of the universe, which 
 cannot be known without revelation : for suppositions 
 are not to be looked on as true, because not incredible : 
 But they are mentioned to shew, that our finding 
 virtue to be hindered from procuring to itself such 
 superiority and advantages, is no objecftion against 
 its having, in the ef^ential nature of the thing, a ten- 
 dency to procure them. And the suppositions now 
 mentioned do plainly shew this : For they shew that 
 these hinderances are so far from being necei^ary, 
 that we ourselves can easily conceive, how they may 
 be removed in future states, and full scope be granted 
 to virtue. And all these advantageous tendencies of 
 it, are to be considered as declarations of God in its 
 
 F 
 
66 Of the Moral Parti, 
 
 favour. This however is taking a pretty large com- 
 paft : though it is certain, that, as the material world 
 appears to be, in a manner, boundleft and immense ; 
 there must be some scheme of providence vast in 
 proportion to it. 
 
 But let us return to the earth our habitation; and 
 we shall see this happy tendency of virtue, by im- 
 agining an instance not so vast and remote : by 
 supposing a kingdom or society of men upon it, per- 
 fectly virtuous, for a succef^ion of many ages ; to 
 which, if you please,] may be given a situation ad- 
 vantageous for universal monarchy. In such a state, 
 there would be no such thing as faClion : but men 
 of the greatest capacity would of course, all along, 
 have the chief direction of affairs willingly yielded 
 to them ; and they would share it among themselves 
 without envy. Each of these would have the part 
 ai^igned him, to which his genius was peculiarly 
 adapted : and others, who had not any distinguished 
 genius, would be safe, and think themselves very 
 happy, by being under the protedl:ion and guidance 
 of those who had. Public determinations would 
 really be the result of the united wisdom of the 
 community : and they would faithfully be executed, 
 by the united strength of it. Some would in a higher 
 way contribute, but all would in some way con- 
 tribute, to the public prosperity : and in it, each 
 would enjoy the fruits of his own virtue. And 
 as injustice, whether by fraud or force, would be 
 unknown among themselves ; so they would be suf- 
 ficiently secured from it in their neighbours. For 
 cunning and false self-interest, confederacies in 
 injustice, ever slight, and accompanied with fa(5lion 
 and intestine treachery ; these on one hand would 
 be found mere childish folly and weakneft, when set 
 in opposition against wisdom, public spirit, union 
 
Chap. 3. Government of God. 67 
 
 inviolable, and fidelity on the other: allowing both 
 a sufficient length of years to try their force. Add 
 the general influence, which such a kingdom would 
 have over the face of the earth, by way of example 
 particularly, and the reverence which would be paid 
 it. It would plainly be superior to all others, and the 
 world must gradually come under its empire : not 
 by means of lawle{^ violence ; but partly by what 
 must be allowed to be just conquest; and partly by 
 other kingdoms submitting themselves voluntarily 
 to it, throughout a course of ages, and claiming its 
 prote(9;ion, one after another, in succeftive exigencies. 
 The head of it would be an universal monarch, in 
 another sense than any mortal has yet been ; and 
 the eastern style would be literally applicable to him, 
 that all people, nations, and languages should serve 
 him. And though indeed our knowledge of human 
 nature, and the whole history of mankind, shew the 
 impof^ibility, without some miraculous interposition, 
 that a number of men. here on earth, should unite 
 in one society or government, in the fear of God and 
 universal pra6lice of virtue : and that such a govern- 
 ment should continue so united for a succefsion of 
 ages : yet admitting or supposing this, the effe(5l 
 would be as now drawn out. And thus, for instance, 
 the wonderful power and prosperity promised to the 
 Jewish nation in the Scripture, would be, in a great 
 measure, the consequence of what is predicted of 
 them ; that the people should he all righteous and 
 inherit the land for ever^ ; were we to understand 
 the latter phrase of a long continuance only, suffi- 
 cient to give things time to work. The predictions 
 of this kind, for there are many of them, cannot come 
 to pafs, in the present known course of nature ; but 
 
 9 Is. Ix. 21. 
 
68 Of the Moral Parti. 
 
 suppose them come to paft, and then, the dominion 
 and pre-eminence promised must naturally follow, 
 to a very considerable degree. 
 
 Consider now, the general system of Religion : 
 that the government of the world is uniform, and 
 one, and moral ; that virtue and right shall finally 
 have the advantage, and prevail over fraud and law- 
 left force, over the deceits as well as the violence 
 of wickedneft, under the conduct of one supreme 
 governor : And from the observations above made, it 
 will appear, that God has, by our reason, given us 
 to see a peculiar conne(5lion in the several parts of 
 this scheme, and a tendency towards the completion 
 of it arising out of the very nature of virtue : which 
 tendency is to be considered as somewhat moral in 
 the eftential constitution of things. If any one should 
 think all this to be of little importance ; I desire him 
 to consider, what he would think, if vice had, es- 
 sentially, and in its nature, these advantageous ten- 
 dencies ; or if virtue had eftentially the direct con- 
 trary ones. 
 
 But it may be obje<?led, that, notwithstanding all 
 these natural effei^ls and these natural tendencies of 
 virtue ; yet things may be now going on throughout 
 the universe, and may go on hereafter, in the same 
 mixed way as here at present upon earth : virtue 
 sometimes prosperous, sometimes deprefted; vice 
 sometimes punished, sometimes succeftful. The 
 answer to which is, that it is not the purpose of this 
 chapter, nor of this treatise, properly to prove God's 
 perfe(5l moral government over the world, or the truth 
 of religion ; but to observe what there is in the con- 
 stitution and course of nature, to confirm the proper 
 proof of it, supposed to be known : And that the 
 weight of the foregoing observations to this purpose, 
 may be thus distinctly proved. Pleasure and pain 
 
Chap. 3. Government of God. 69 
 
 are indeed to a certain degree, say to a very high 
 degree, distributed amongst us without any apparent 
 regard to the merit or demerit of characfhers. And 
 were there nothing else, concerning this matter, 
 discernible in the constitution and course of Nature ; 
 there would be no ground from the constitution and 
 course of Nature, to hope or to fear, that men would 
 be rewarded or punished hereafter according to their 
 deserts : which how^ever, it is to be remarked, im- 
 plies, that even then there would be no ground from 
 appearances to think, that vice upon the whole would 
 have the advantage, rather than that virtue would. 
 And thus the proof of a future state of retribution, 
 would rest upon the usual known arguments for it : 
 which are I think plainly unansw^erable ; and would 
 be so, though there were no additional confirmation of 
 them from the things above insisted on. But these 
 things are a very strong confirmation of them. For, 
 
 First, They shew, that the Author of nature is not 
 indifferent to virtue and vice. They amount to a 
 declaration from him, determinate and not to be 
 evaded, in favour of one, and against the other : such 
 a declaration, as there is nothing to be set over against 
 or answer, on the part of vice. So that were a man, 
 laying aside the properproof of Religion, to determine 
 from the course of Nature only, whether it were most 
 probable, that the righteous or the wicked, would 
 have the advantage in a future life ; there can be no 
 doubt, but that he would determine the probability 
 to be, that the former would. The course of Nature 
 then, in the view of it now given, furnishes us with 
 a real practical proof of the obligations of Religion. 
 
 Secondly, When, conformably to what Religion 
 teaches us, God shall reward and punish virtue and 
 vice as such, so as that every one shall, upon the 
 whole, have his deserts ; this distributive justice will 
 
70 Of the Moral Parti. 
 
 \^ not be a thing different in kind, but only in degree, 
 \ from what we experience in his present government. 
 It will be that in effeSi, toward which we now see a 
 tendency. It will be no more than the completion 
 of that moral government, the principles and begin- 
 ning of which, have been shewn, beyond all dispute, 
 discernible in the present constitution and course of 
 Nature. And from hence it follows. 
 
 Thirdly, That, as under the natural government of 
 
 God, our experience of those kinds and degrees of 
 
 •happineft and misery, which we do experience atpre- 
 
 I sent, gives just ground to hope for and to fear, higher 
 
 I degrees, and other kinds of both in a future state, sup- 
 
 I posing a future state admitted : so under his moral 
 
 ' government, our experience, that virtue and vice are, 
 
 in the manners above-mentioned, a(51:ually rewarded 
 
 J- and punished at present, in a certain degree, gives 
 
 1 just ground to hope and to fear, that they may be 
 
 \ rewarded and punished in a higher degree hereafter. 
 
 1 It is acknowledged indeed, that this alone is not 
 
 j sufficient ground to think, that they aSiually will be 
 
 \ rewarded and punished in a higher degree, rather 
 
 than in a lower : But then. 
 
 Lastly, There is sufficient ground to think so, from 
 / the good and bad tendencies of virtue and vice. For 
 these tendencies are ef^ential, and founded in the 
 nature of things : whereas the hinderances to their 
 becoming effedl:, are, in numberleft cases, not neces- 
 sary, but artificial only. Now it may be much more 
 strongly argued, that these tendencies, as well as the 
 actual rewards and punishments, of virtue and vice, 
 which arise dire(ftly out of the nature of things, will 
 remain hereafter, than that the accidental hinderances 
 of them will. And if these hinderances do not re- 
 main ; those rewards and punishments cannot but be 
 carried on much further towards the perfec^lion of 
 
Chap. 2' Government of God. 71 
 
 moral government : i. e. the tendencies of virtue and 
 vice will become effe(ft : But when, or where, or in 
 what particular way, cannot be known at all, but by 
 revelation. 
 
 Upon the whole : There is a kind of moral govern- 
 ment implied in God's natural government :^^ virtue 
 and vice are naturally rewarded and punished as be- 
 neficial and mischievous to society ;^^ and rewarded 
 and punished dire(flly as virtue and vice.^^ The 
 notion then of a moral scheme of government, is not 
 fictitious, but natural ; for it is suggested to our 
 thoughts by the constitution and course of Nature: 
 and the execution of this scheme is actually begun, 
 in the instances here mentioned. And these things 
 are to be considered, as a declaration of the Author 
 of nature, for virtue, and against vice : They give a 
 credibility to the supposition of their being rewarded 
 and punished hereafter ; and also ground to hope 
 and to fear, that they may be rewarded and punished 
 in higher degrees than they are here. And all this 
 is confirmed, so the argument for Religion, from the 
 constitution and course of Nature, is carried on far- 
 ther, by observing, that there are natural tendencies, 
 and, in innumerable cases, only artificial hinderances, 
 to this moral scheme's being carried on much farther 
 towards perfe<5lion, than it is at present.^^ The no- 
 tion then of a moral scheme of government, much 
 more perfecl than what is seen, is not a fi(ftitious, 
 but a natural notion : for it is suggested to our 
 thoughts, by the ef^ential tendencies of virtue and 
 vice. And these tendencies are to be considered as 
 intimations, as implicit promises and threatenings, 
 from the Author of nature, of much greater rewards 
 and punishments to follow virtue and vice, than do 
 
 'Op. 51. ''ibid. I2p, ^2, &C. 13p. 6o^&C. 
 
72 
 
 Moral Government of God. Parti 
 
 at present. And indeed, every natural tendency, 
 which is to continue, but which is hindered from be- 
 coming effecl by only accidental causes, affords a 
 presumption, that such tendency will, some time 
 or other, become effe(5l : a presumption in degree 
 proportionable to the length of the duration, through 
 which such tendency will continue. And from these 
 things together, arises a real presumption, that the 
 moral scheme of government established in nature, 
 shall be carried on much farther towards perfe(?iion 
 hereafter ; and, I think, a presumption that it will 
 be absolutely completed. But from these things, 
 joined with the moral nature which God has given 
 us, considered as given us by him, arises a practical 
 proof ^^ that it will be completed: a proof from fadl ; 
 and therefore a distinct one from that, which is 
 deduced from the eternal and unalterable relations, 
 the fitnei^ and unfitnef^ of actions. 
 \ 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 Of a State of Probation, as implying Trial, Diffi- 
 culties and Danger. 
 
 HE general doc^trine of Religion, that 
 our present life is a state of probation 
 for a future one, comprehends under it 
 several particular things, distincl from 
 each other. But the first, and most 
 common meaning of it, seems to be, that our future 
 interest is now depending, and depending upon our- 
 
 ** See this proof drawn out briefly, ch. 
 
Chap. 4. Of a State of Trial. 73 
 
 selves ; that we have scope and opportunities here, 
 for that good and bad behaviour, which God will re- 
 ward and punish hereafter ; together with tempta- 
 tions to one, as well as inducements of reason to the 
 other. And this is, in great measure, the same with 
 saying, that we are under the moral government of 
 God, and to give an account of our ac^tions to him. 
 For the notion of a future account and general 
 righteous judgment, implies some sort of tempta- 
 tions to what is wrong : otherwise there would be no 
 moral pof^ibility of doing wrong, nor ground for 
 judgment, or discrimination. But there is this dif- 
 ference, that the word probation is more distinctly 
 and particularly exprefsive of allurements to wrong, 
 or difficulties in adhering uniformly to what is right, 
 and of the danger of miscarrying by such temp- 
 tations, than the words moral government. A state 
 of probation then, as thus particularly implying in it 
 trial, difficulties and danger, may require to be con- 
 sidered distin(?i:ly by itself. 
 
 And as the moral government of God, which Re- 
 ligion teaches us, implies, that we are in a state of 
 trial with regard to a future world : so also his natural 
 government over us, implies that we are in a state 
 of trial, in the like sense, with regard to the present 
 world. Natural government by rewards and punish- 
 ments, as much implies natural trial, as moral 
 government does moral trial. The natural govern- 
 ment of God here meant,^ consists in his annexing 
 pleasure to some actions, and pain to others, which 
 are in our power to do or forbear, and in giving us 
 notice of such appointment beforehand. This ne- 
 cefsarily implies, that he has made our happinel^ 
 and misery, or our interest, to depend in part upon 
 
 » Chap. ii. 
 
74 Of a State of Trial. Part i . 
 
 ourselves. And so far as men have temptations to 
 any course of a(ftion, which will probably occasion 
 them greater temporal inconvenience and uneasineft, 
 than satisfaction ; so far their temporal interest is in 
 danger from themselves, or they are in a state of 
 trial with respe(5l to it. Now people often blame 
 others, and even themselves, for their miscondu6l 
 in their temporal concerns. And we find many are 
 greatly wanting to themselves, and mifs of that natu- 
 ral happinef^, which they might have obtained in the 
 present life : perhaps every one does in some degree. 
 But many run themselves into great inconvenience, 
 and into extreme distref^ and misery : not through 
 incapacity of knowing better, and doing better for 
 themselves, which would be nothing to the present 
 purpose ; but through their own fault. And these 
 things necef^arily imply temptation, and danger of 
 miscarny'ing, in a greater or lel^ degree, with respedl 
 to our worldly interest or happineft. Every one too, 
 without having Religion in his thoughts, speaks of the 
 hazards which young people run, upon their setting 
 out in the world : hazards from other causes, than 
 merely their ignorance, and unavoidable accidents. 
 And some courses of vice, at least, being contrary to 
 men's worldly interest or good ; temptations to these, 
 must at the same time be temptations to forego our 
 present, and our future interest. Thus in our natural 
 for temporal capacity, we are in a state of trial, i. e. of 
 difficulty and danger, analogous, or like to our moral 
 ^and religious trial. 
 
 This wall more distinClly appear to any one, who 
 thinks it worth while, more distinc^ily, to consider, 
 what it is which constitutes our trial in both capaci- 
 ties, and to observe, how mankind behave under it. 
 
 And that which constitutes this our trial, in both 
 these capacities, must be somewhat either in our ex- 
 
Chap. 4-' Of a State of Trial. 75 
 
 temal circumstances, or in our nature. For, on the 
 one hand, persons may be betrayed into wrong be- 
 haviour upon surprise, or overcome upon any other 
 very singular and extraordinary external occasions ; 
 who would, otherwise, have preserved their cha- 
 racfter of prudence and of virtue : in which cases, 
 every one, in speaking of the wrong behaviour of 
 these persons, would impute it to such particular ex- 
 ternal circumstances. And on the other hand, men 
 who have contra(9;ed habits of vice and folly of any 
 kind, or have some particular paf^ions in exceft, will 
 seek opportunities, and, as it were, go out of their 
 way, to gratify themselves in these respec^ts, at the 
 expense of their wisdom and their virtue ; led to it, 
 as every one would say, not by external temptations, 
 but by such habits and pafsions. And the account 
 of this last case is, that particular pafsions are no 
 more coincident with prudence, or that reasonable 
 self-love, the end of which is our worldly interest, 
 than they are with the principle of virtue and re- 
 ligion ; but often draw contrary ways to one, as 
 well as to the other : and so such particular pafsions 
 are as much temptations, to a6i imprudently with 
 regard to our worldly interest, as to a6{ viciously.^ 
 However, as when we say, men are misled by ex- 
 ternal circumstances of temptation; it cannot but 
 be understood, that there is somewhat within them- 
 selves, to render those circumstances temptations, 
 or to render them susceptible of imprei^ions from 
 them : So when we say, they are misled by pafsions; 
 it is always supposed, that there are occasions, cir- 
 cumstances, and obje(5^s, exciting these pafsions, and 
 affording means for gratifying them. And therefore, 
 
 ' See Sermons preached at the Rolls, 1726. zd, Ed. p. 205, 
 &c. Pref. p. 25, &c, Serm. p. 21, &c. 
 
76 Of a State of Trial. Part i. 
 
 temptations from within, and from without, coincide, 
 Jind mutually imply each other. Now the several 
 external obje(5ls of the appetites, paf^ions, and affec- 
 tions, being present to the senses, or offering them- 
 selves to the mind, and so exciting emotions suitable 
 to their nature ; not only in cases where they can 
 be gratified consistently with innocence and pru- 
 dence, but also in cases where they cannot, and yet 
 can be gratified imprudently and viciously : this as 
 really puts them in danger of voluntarily foregoing 
 their present interest or good, as their future ; and as 
 really renders self-denial necef^ary to secure one, as 
 i the other : i. e. We are in a like state of trial with 
 I respe6l to both, by the very same paf^ions, excited 
 by the very same means. Thus mankind having a 
 temporal interest depending upon themselves, and 
 a prudent course of behaviour being necef^ary to 
 secure it ; paf^ions inordinately excited, whether by 
 means of example, or by any other external circum- 
 stance, towards such objecfts, at such times, or in 
 such degrees, as that they cannot be gratified con- 
 sistently with worldly prudence ; are temptations, 
 dangerous, and too often succef^ful temptations, to 
 forego a greater temporal good for a lef^ ; i. e. to 
 forego what is, upon the whole, our temporal inter- 
 est, for the sake of a present gratification. This is 
 a description of our state of trial in our temporal 
 capacity. Substitute now the word future for tem- 
 poral, and virtue for prudence ; and it will be just 
 as proper a description of our state of trial in our 
 religious capacity : so analogous are they to each 
 other. 
 
 If, from consideration of this our like state of trial 
 in both capacities, we go on to observe farther, how 
 mankind behave under it ; we shall find there are 
 some, who have so little sense of it, that they scarce 
 
Chap. 4-' Of a State of Trial. 77 
 
 look beyond the pacing day : They are so taken up 
 with present gratifications, as to have, in a manner, 
 no feeling of consequences, no regard to their future 
 ease or fortune in this life ; any more than to their 
 happinef^ in another. Some appear to be blinded 
 and deceived by inordinate paf^ion, in their worldly 
 concerns, as much as in religion. Others are, not 
 deceived, but, as it were, forcibly carried away by 
 the like pal^ions, against their better judgment, and 
 feeble resolutions too of a(51;ing better. And there 
 are men, and truly they are not a few, who shame - 
 leftly avow, not their interest, but their mere will 
 and pleasure, to be their law of life : and who, in 
 open defiance of everything that is reasonable, will 
 go on in a course of vicious extravagance, foresee- 
 ing, with no remorse and little fear, that it will be 
 their temporal ruin ; and some of them, under the 
 apprehension of the consequences of wickednef^ in 
 another state. And to speak in the most moderate 
 way, human creatures are not only continually liable 
 to go wrong voluntarily, but we see likewise that they 
 often a(5lually do so, with respedl: to their temporal 
 interests, as well as with respe^l to Religion, 
 
 Thus our difficulties and dangers, or our trials, in 
 our temporal and our religious capacity, as they 
 proceed from the same causes, and have the same 
 effeSi upon men s behaviour, are evidently analogous, 
 and of the same kind. 
 
 It may be added, that as the difficulties and 
 dangers of miscarrying in our religious state of trial, 
 are greatly increased, and one is ready to think, 
 in a manner wholly made, by the ill behaviour of 
 others ; by a wrong education, wrong in a moral 
 sense, sometimes positively vicious ; by general bad 
 example ; by the dishonest artifices, which are got 
 into businef^ of all kinds ; and, in very many parts of 
 
78 Of a State of Trial. Part i. 
 
 the world, by religion's being corrupted into super- 
 stitions, which indulge men in their vices : So in 
 Hke manner, the difficulties of condudliing ourselves 
 prudently in respe(5l to our present interest, and our 
 danger of being led aside from pursuing it, are 
 greatly increased, by a foolish education ; and, after 
 we come to mature age, by the extravagance and 
 careleftneft of others, whom we have intercourse 
 with ; and by mistaken notions, very generally pre- 
 valent, and taken up for common opinion, concerning 
 temporal happineft, and wherein it consists. And 
 persons, by their own negligence and folly in their 
 temporal affairs, no le(^ than by a course of vice, 
 bring themselves into new difficulties ; and, by habits 
 of indulgence, become left qualified to go through 
 them : And one irregularity after another, embar- 
 raf^es things to such a degree, that they know not 
 where about they are ; and often makes the path of 
 conduct so intricate and perplexed, that it is difficult 
 to trace it out ; difficult even to determine what is 
 the prudent or the moral part. Thus, for instance, 
 wrong behaviour in one stage of life, youth ; wrong, 
 I mean, considering ourselves only in our temporal 
 capacity, without taking in Religion ; this, in several 
 ways, increases the difficulties of right behaviour in 
 mature age ; i. e. puts us into a more disadvan- 
 tageous state of trial in our temporal capacity. 
 
 We are an inferior part of the creation of God. 
 There are natural appearances of our being in a state 
 of degradation. 3 And we certainly are in a con- 
 dition, which does not seem, by any means, the most 
 advantageous we could imagine or desire, either in 
 our natural or moral capacity, for securing either our 
 present or future interest. However, this condition, 
 
 ^ Part II. Chap. v. 
 
Chap. 4. Of a State of Trial. 79 
 
 low and careful and uncertain as it is, does not afford 
 any just ground of complaint. For, as men may 
 manage their temporal affairs with prudence, and 
 so paf^ their days here on earth in tolerable ease and 
 satisfatflion, by a moderate degree of care: so like- 
 wise with regard to Religion, there is no more re- 
 quired than what they are well able to do, and what 
 they must be greatly wanting to themselves, if they 
 neglect. And for persons to have that put upon 
 them, which they are well able to go through, and 
 no more, we naturally consider as an equitable thing ; 
 supposing it done by proper authority. Nor have 
 we any more reason to complain of it, with regard 
 to the Author of nature, than of his not having given 
 us other advantages, belonging to other orders of 
 creatures. 
 
 But the thing here insisted upon is, that the state 
 of trial which Religion teaches us we are in, is ren- 
 dered credible, by its being throughout uniform and 
 of a piece with the general condudl of Providence 
 towards us, in all other respecfls within the compaf^ 
 of our knowledge. Indeed if mankind, considered 
 in their natural capacity, as inhabitants of this world 
 only, found themselves, from their birth to their 
 death, in a settled state of security and happinef^, 
 without any solicitude or thought of their own : or if 
 they were in no danger of being brought into in- 
 conveniences and distref^, by carelef^nef^, or the 
 folly of pafsion, through bad example, the treachery 
 of others, or the deceitful appearances of things : 
 Were this our natural condition ; then it might seem 
 strange, and be some presumption against the truth 
 of religion, that it represents our future and more 
 general interest, as not secure of course, but as de- 
 pending upon our behaviour, and requiring recol- 
 le(5lion and self-government to obtain it. For it might 
 
8o Of a State of Trial. Part i . 
 
 be alleged, " What you say is our condition in one 
 " respe(?l;, is not in any wise of a sort with what we 
 " find, by experience, our condition is in another. 
 " Our whole present interest is secured to our hands, 
 " without any solicitude of ours ; and why should 
 "• not our future interest, if we have any such, be 
 " so too ?" ^But since, on the contrary, thought and 
 consideration, the voluntary denying ourselves many 
 things which we desire, and a course of behaviour, far 
 from being always agreeable to us ; are absolutely 
 neceftary to our acting even a common decent, and 
 common prudent part, so as to paft with any satis- 
 faction through the present world, and be received 
 upon any tolerable good terms in it : since this is 
 the case, all presumption against self-denial and 
 attention being neceftary to secure our higher in- 
 terest, is removed. Had we not experience, it might, 
 perhaps speciously, be urged, that it is improbable 
 anything of hazard and danger should be put upon 
 us by an Infinite Being ; when everything which is 
 hazard and danger in our manner of conception, and 
 will end in error, confusion, and misery, is now 
 already certain in his foreknowledge. And indeed, 
 why anything of hazard and danger should be put 
 upon such frail creatures as we are, may well be 
 thought a difficulty in speculation ; and cannot but 
 be so, till we know the whole, or, however, much 
 more of the case. But still the constitution of nature 
 is as it is. Our happineft and misery are trusted to 
 our conduct, and made to depend upon it. Some- 
 what, and, in many circumstances, a great deal too, 
 is put upon us, either to do, or to suffer, as we choose. 
 And all the various miseries of life, which people 
 bring upon themselves by negligence and folly, and 
 might have avoided by proper care, are instances of 
 this : Which miseries are beforehand, just as contin- 
 
Chap. 4. Of a State of Trial. 8 1 
 
 gent and undetermined as their conduct:, and left to 
 be determined by it. 
 
 These observations are an answer to the objeclions 
 against the credibility of a state of trial, as implying 
 temptations, and real danger of miscarrying with 
 regard to our general interest, under the moral 
 government of God : and they shew, that, if we are 
 at all to be considered in such a capacity, and as 
 having such an interest ; the general analogy of 
 Providence must lead us to apprehend ourselves in 
 danger of miscarrying, in different degrees, as to this 
 interest, by our negle(5^ing to adl the proper part 
 belonging to us in that capacity. For we have a 
 present interest, under the government of God which 
 we experience here upon earth. And this interest, 
 as it is not forced upon us, so neither is it offered to 
 our acceptance, but to our acquisition ; in such sort, 
 as that we are in danger of miffing it, by means of 
 temptations to negle(5l, or a(5l contrary to it; and 
 without attention and self-denial, must and do mif^ 
 of it. It is then perfe(5lly credible, that this may 
 be our case, with respect to that chief and final good, 
 which Religion proposes to us. 
 
82 Of a State of Part i. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 Of a State of Probation, as intended for moral 
 Discipline and Improvement. 
 
 ROM the consideration of our being in 
 a probation-state, of so much difficulty 
 and hazard, naturally arises the ques- 
 tion, how we came to be placed in it. 
 But such a general inquiry as this, 
 would be found involved in insuperable difficulties. 
 For, though some of these difficulties would be les- 
 sened by observing, that all wickedneft is voluntary, 
 as is implied in its very notion ; and that many of 
 the miseries of life have apparent good effec^ts : yet, 
 when we consider other circumstances belonging to 
 both, and what must be the consequence of the 
 former in a life to come ; it cannot but be acknow- 
 ledged plain folly and presumption, to pretend to 
 give an account of the whole reasons of this matter : 
 the whole reasons of our being allotted a condition, 
 out of which so much wickedneft and misery, so 
 circumstanced, would in fa^i arise. Whether it be 
 not beyond our faculties, not only to find out, but 
 even to understand, the whole account of this ; or, 
 though we should be supposed capable of under- 
 standing it, yet, whether it would be of service or 
 prejudice to us to be informed of it ; is impoftible to 
 say. But as our present condition can in no wise be 
 shewnlnconsistent with the perfe(5l moral govern- 
 ment of God : so Religion teaches us we were placed 
 in it, that we might qualify ourselves, by the prac- 
 
Chap. 5. Moral Discipline. 83 
 
 tice of virtue, for another state which is to follow 
 it. And this, though but a partial answer, a very 
 partial one indeed, to the inquiry now mentioned ; 
 yet, is a more satisfacftory answer to another, which 
 is of real, and of the utmost importance to us to have 
 answered : the inquiry, What is our busineft hereT", 
 The known end then, why we are placed in a state 1 
 of so much affli6lion, hazard, and difficulty, is, our / 
 improvement in virtue and piety, as the requisite , / 
 qualification for a future state of security and hap- 
 pinei^. — 
 
 Now the beginning of life, considered as an 
 education for mature age in the present world, ap- 
 pears plainly, at first sight, analogous to this our 
 trial for a future one : the former being in our tem- 
 poral capacity, what the latter is in our religious 
 capacity. But some observations common to both 
 of them, and a more distin6l consideration of each, 
 will more distin(51;ly shew the extent and force of the 
 analogy between them ; and the credibility, which 
 arises from hence, as well as from the nature of the 
 thing, that th^4)r£s.Q^ntJ[ife was intended Jo be a state 
 of discipline for a future one. 
 
 I. Every species of creatures is, we see, designed 
 for a particular way of life ; to which, the nature, 
 the capacities, temper, and qualifications, of each 
 species, are as neceftary, as their external circum- 
 stances. Both come into the notion of such state, 
 or particular way of life, and are constituent parts of 
 it. Change a man's capacities or chara6ler to the 
 degree, in wTuch it is conceivable they may be 
 changed ; and he would be altogether incapable of 
 a human course of life, and human happineft : as 
 incapable, as if, his nature continuing unchanged, he 
 were placed in a world, where he had no sphere of 
 a61;ion, nor any obje^ls to answer his appetites, pas- 
 
84 Of a State of Parti. 
 
 sions, and affe(5lions of any sort. One thing is set 
 over against another, as an ancient writer expreftes 
 it. Our nature corresponds to our external condition. 
 Without this correspondence, there would be no pos- 
 sibility of any such thing as human life and human 
 happineft : which life and happineft are, therefore, a 
 result from our nature and condition jointly : mean- 
 ing by human life, not living in the literal sense, but 
 the whole complex notion commonly understood by 
 those words. So that, without determining what 
 will be the employment and happineft, the particular 
 life of good men hereafter ; there must be some de- 
 terminate capacities, some neceftary chara(?i:er and 
 qualifications, without which persons cannot but be 
 utterly incapable of it : in like manner, as there must 
 be some, without which men would be incapable of 
 their present state of life. Now, 
 
 II. The constitution of human creatures, and in- 
 deed of all creatures which come under our notice, 
 is such, as that they are capable of naturally be- 
 coming qualified for states of life, for which they were 
 once wholly unqualified. In imagination we may 
 indeed conceive of creatures, as incapable of having 
 any of their faculties naturally enlarged, or as being 
 unable naturally to acquire any new qualifications : 
 But the faculties of every species known to us, are 
 made for enlargement; for acquirements of expe- 
 rience and habits. We find ourselves in particular 
 indued with capacities, not only of perceiving ideas, 
 and of knowledge or perceiving truth, but also of 
 storing up our ideas and knowledge by memory. 
 We are capable, not only of a(5ling, and of having 
 different momentary impref^ions made upon us ; but 
 of getting a new facility in any kind of a(5lion, and 
 of settled alterations in our temper or character. 
 The power of the two last is the power of habits. 
 
Chap. 5. Moral Discipline. 85 
 
 But neither the perception of ideas, nor knowledge 
 of any sort, are habits ; though absolutely necef^ary 
 to the forming of them. However, apprehension, 
 reason, memory, which are the capacities of acquir- 
 ing knowledge, are greatly improved by exercise. 
 Whether the word habit is applicable to all these 
 improvements, and in particular how far the powers 
 of memory and of habits may be powers of the same 
 nature, I shall not inquire. But that perceptions 
 come into our minds readily and of course, by means 
 of their having been there before, seems a thing of 
 the same sort, as readinef^ in any particular kind of 
 action, proceeding from being accustomed to it. 
 And aptneft to recolledl; practical observations of 
 service in our condu6l, is plainly habit in many cases. 
 There are habits of perception, and habits of adlion. 
 An instance of the former, is our constant and even 
 involuntary readineft, in correcting the imprefsions 
 of our sight concerning magnitudes and distances, so 
 as to substitute judgment in the room of sensation 
 imperceptibly to ourselves. And it seems as if all 
 other afsociations of ideas not naturally connected, 
 might be called paftive habits ; as properly as our 
 readineft in understanding languages, upon sight or 
 hearing of words. And our readinefs in speaking 
 and writing them is an instance of the latter, of active 
 habits. For distinc^nef^, we may consider habits, 
 as belonging to the body, or the mind: and the 
 latter will be explained by the former. Under the 
 former are comprehended all bodily a(5livities or 
 motions whether graceful or unbecoming, which are 
 owing to use : under the latter, general habits of life 
 and conduct; such as those of obedience and sub- 
 mifsion to authority, or to any particular person ; 
 those of veracity, justice, and charity; those of at- 
 tention, industry, self-government, envy, revenge. 
 
86 Ofa State of Parti. 
 
 And habits of this latter kind seem produced by 
 repeated a(fl;s, as well as the former. And in like 
 j manner as habits belonging to the body are produced 
 1 by external ac^ts : so habits of the mind are produced 
 ', by the exertion of inward practical principles, i. e. 
 \ by carrying them into a6i, or a(5ling upon them ; the 
 principles of obedience, of veracity, justice, and 
 charity. Nor can those habits be formed by any 
 external course of allien, otherwise than as it pro- 
 ceeds from these principles : because it is only these 
 inward principles exerted, which are strictly ac^ts of 
 obedience, of veracity, of justice, and of charity. So 
 likewise habits of attention, industry, self-govern- 
 ment, are in the same manner acquired by exercise ; 
 and habits of envy and revenge by indulgence, 
 whether in outward d.6i, or in thought and intention, 
 i.e. inward a6l: for such intention is an a(5l. Reso- 
 lutions also to do well, are properly a.6is. And 
 endeavouring to enforce upon our own minds, a 
 practical sense of virtue, or to beget in others that 
 pra6lical sense of it, which a man really has himself, 
 is a virtuous a6i. All these, therefore, may and will 
 contribute towards forming good habits. But going 
 over the theory of virtue in one's thoughts, talking 
 well, and drawing fine pi(5lures, of it ; this is so far 
 from neceftarily or certainly conducing to form an 
 habit of it, in him who thus employs himself; that 
 it may harden the mind in a contrary course, and 
 render it gradually more insensible, i. e. form an habit 
 of insensibility, to all moral considerations. For, 
 from our very faculty of habits, paftive impreftions, 
 by being repeated, grow weaker. Thoughts, by 
 often paf^ing through the mind, are felt lei^ sensibly : 
 Being accustomed to danger, begets intrepidity, i. e. 
 lef^ens fear ; to distreft, leftens the pai^ion of pity ; 
 to instances of others' mortality, leftens the sensible 
 
Chap. 5. Moral Discipline. 87 
 
 apprehension of our own. And from these two ob- 
 servations together ; that practical habits are formed 
 and strengthened by repeated a6ls, and that paftive 
 impref^ions grow weaker by being repeated upon 
 us ; it must follow, that a(51ive habits may be gra- 
 dually forming and strengthening, by a course of 
 adling upon such and such motives and excitements, 
 whilst these motives and excitements themselves 
 are, by proportionable degrees, growing lef^ sen- 
 sible, i. e. are continually left and left sensibly felt, 
 even as the active habits strengthen. And experience 
 confirms this : For a(51ive principles, at the very time 
 that they are left lively in perception than they were, 
 are found to be, somehow, vv^rought more thoroughly 
 into the temper and chara6ler, and become more 
 effecftual in influencing our pra6lice. The three 
 things just mentioned may afford instances of it. 
 Perception of danger, is a natural excitement of 
 paftive fear, and active caution : And by being 
 inured to danger, habits of the latter are gradually 
 wrought, at the same time that the former gradually 
 leftens. Perception of distreft in others, is a na- 
 tural excitement, paftively to pity, and acftively to 
 relieve it : But let a man set himself to attend to, 
 inquire out, and relieve distrefted persons, and he 
 cannot but grow left and left sensibly affe(5led with 
 the various miseries of life, with which he must 
 become acquainted; when yet, at the same time, 
 benevolence, considered not as a paftion, but as a 
 pracftical principle of a(9:ion, will strengthen : and 
 whilst he paftively compaftionates the distrefted left, 
 he will acquire a greater aptitude actively to aftist 
 and befriend them. So also at the same time that 
 the daily instances of men's dying around us, give us 
 daily a left sensible paftive feeling or apprehension 
 of our own mortality, such instances greatly con- 
 
88 Ofa State of Parti. 
 
 tribute to the strengthening a pra(51ical regard to it 
 in serious men ; i. e. to forming an habit of adling 
 with a constant view to it. And this seems again 
 further to shew, that paftive impreftions made upon 
 our minds by admonition, experience, example, 
 though they may have a remote efficacy, and a very 
 great one, towards forming a(51ive habits, yet, can 
 have this efficacy no otherwise than by inducing us 
 to such a course of ac^tion : and that it is, not being 
 affedled so and so, but ac^ting, which forms those 
 habits : Only it must be always remembered, that 
 real endeavours to enforce good imprel^ions upon 
 ourselves, are a species of virtuous action. Nor do 
 we know how far it is poi^ible, in the nature of things, 
 that effe(5ts should be wrought in us at once, equiva- 
 lent to habits, i. e. what is wrought by use and ex- 
 ercise. However, the thing insisted upon is, not 
 what may be poftible, but what is in fa(ft the appoint- 
 ment of Nature : which is, that active habits are to 
 be formed by exercise. Their progreft may be so 
 gradual, as to be imperceptible of its steps : It may 
 be hard to explain the faculty, by which we are 
 capable of habits, throughout its several parts ; and 
 to trace it up to its original, so as to distinguish it 
 from all others in our mind : And it seems as if con- 
 trary effec^ls were to be ascribed to it. But the thing 
 in general, that our nature is formed to yield, in 
 some such manner as this, to use and exercise, is 
 matter of certain experience. 
 
 Thus, by accustoming ourselves to any course of 
 a(9:ion, we get an aptnef^ to go on, a facility, readi- 
 nei^, and often pleasure, in it. The inclinations which 
 rendered us averse to it grow weaker : the difficul- 
 ties in it, not only the imaginary but the real ones, 
 leften : the reasons for it, offer themselves of course 
 to our thoughts upon all occasions : and the least 
 
Chap, 5. Moral Discipline. 89 
 
 glimpse of them is sufficient to make us go on, in a 
 course of adlion, to which we have been accustomed. 
 And practical principles appear to grow stronger, 
 absolutely in themselves, by exercise ; as well as 
 relatively, with regard to contrary principles ; which, 
 by being accustomed to submit, do so habitually, and 
 of course. And thus a new character, in several 
 respe(?is, may be formed; and many habitudes of 
 life, not given by nature, but which nature directs 
 us to acquire. 
 
 III. Indeed we may be allured, that we should 
 never have had these capacities of improving by 
 experience, acquired knowledge, and habits, had 
 they not been neceftary, aod intended to be made 
 use of. And accordingly we find them so necef^ary, 
 and so much intended, that without them we should 
 be utterly incapable of that, which was the end for 
 which we were made, considered in our temporal 
 capacity only : the employments and satisfactions of 
 our mature state of life. 
 
 Nature does in no wise qualify us wholly, much 
 left at once, for this mature state of life. Even 
 mat urity of uriders tandin^ and bpdily^ stxength, are 
 not only arrived togradually, but are also very much 
 owing to the continued exercise of our powers of 
 body and mind, from infancy. But if we suppose a 
 person brought into the world with both these in 
 maturity, as far as this is conceivable; he would 
 plainly at first be as unqualified for the human life 
 of mature age, as an idiot. He would be in a man- 
 ner distra(5led, with astonishment, and apprehension, 
 and curiosity, and suspense : Nor can one gueft, 
 how long it would be, before he would be familiar- 
 ized to himself and the objects about him enough, 
 even to set himself to anything. It may be ques- 
 tioned too, whether the natural information of his 
 
90 Of a State of Part i. 
 
 sight and hearing, would be of any manner of use 
 at all to him in adling, before experience. And it 
 seems, that men would be strangely headstrong and 
 self-willed, and disposed to exert themselves with an 
 impetuosity, which would render society insupport- 
 able, and the living in it impracticable ; were it not 
 for some acquired moderation and self-government, 
 some aptitude and readinef^ in restraining them- 
 selves, and concealing their sense of things. Want 
 of everything of this kind which is learnt, would 
 render a man as incapable of society, as want of 
 language would: or as his natural ignorance of any 
 of the particular employments of life, would render 
 him incapable of providing himself with the com- 
 mon conveniences, or supplying the necef^ary wants 
 of it. In these respe61:s, and probably in many more, 
 of which we have no particular notion, mankind is 
 left, by nature, an unformed, unfinished creature ; 
 utterly deficient and unqualified, before the acquire- 
 ment of knowledge, experience, and habits, for that 
 mature state of life, which was the end of his crea- 
 tion, considering him as related only to this world. 
 But then, as Nature has endued us with a power 
 of supplying those deficiencies, by acquired know- 
 ledge, experience, and habits : so likewise we are 
 placed in a condition, in infancy, childhood, and 
 youth, fitted for it; fitted for our acquiring those 
 qualifications of all sorts, which we stand in need of 
 in mature age. Hence children, from their very 
 birth, are daily growing acquainted with the objec^ts 
 about them, with the scene in which they are placed, 
 and to have a future part ; and learning somewhat 
 or other, neceftary to the performance of it. The 
 subordinations, to which they are accustomed in 
 domestic life, teach them self-government in com- 
 mon behaviour abroad, and prepare them for sub- 
 
Chap. ^. Moral Discipline. 91 
 
 je(5lion and obedience to civil autliority. WTiat paftes 
 before their eyes, and daily happens to them, gives 
 them experience, caution against treachery and de- 
 ceit, together with numberleft little rules of a<Si\on 
 and condu(5l, which we could not live without ; and 
 which are learnt so insensibly and so perfe(5lly, as to 
 be mistaken perhaps for instin^l : though they are 
 the effecft of long experience and exercise ; as much 
 so as language, or knowledge in particular busineft, 
 or the qualifications and behaviour belonging to the 
 several ranks and profeftions. Thus the beginning^ 
 of our days is adapted to be, and is, a state of 
 education in the theory and practice of mature life. 
 We are much agisted in it by example, instruction, 
 and the care of others ; but a great deal is left to 
 ourselves to do. And of this, as part is done easify 
 and of course ; so part requires diligence and care, 
 the voluntary foregoing many things which we de- 
 sire, and setting ourselves to what we should have 
 no inclination to, but for the neceftity or expedience 
 of it. For, that labour and industry, which the 
 station of so many absolutely requires, they would 
 be greatly unqualified for, in maturity ; as those in 
 other stations would be, for any other sorts of appli- 
 cation ; if both were not accustomed to them in their 
 youth. And according as persons behave them- 
 selves, in the general education which all go through, 
 and in the particular ones adapted to particular em- 
 ployments ; their chara(fi:er is formed, and made 
 appear ; they recommend themselves more or left; 
 and are capable of, and placed in, different stations 
 in the society of mankind. 
 
 The former part of life then, is to be considered f 
 as an important opportunity, which Nature puts into ; 
 our hands ; and which, when lost, is not to be re- \ 
 covered. And our being placed in a state of 
 
92 Of a State of Part i. 
 
 discipline throughout this life, for another world, is 
 a providential disposition of things, exa(5lly of the 
 same kind, as our being placed in a state of disci- 
 pline during childhood, for mature age. Our con- 
 dition in both respe^ls is uniform and of a piece, 
 and comprehended under one and the same general 
 law of Nature. 
 
 And if we were not able at all to discern, how or 
 
 \ in what way the present life could be our prepara- 
 tion for another ; this would be no objection against 
 the credibility of its being so. For we do not discern, 
 how food and sleep contribute to the growth of the 
 body : nor could have any thought that they would, 
 before we had experience. Nor do children at all 
 think, on the one hand, that the sports and exercises, 
 to which they are so much addicfled, contribute to 
 their health and growth ; nor on the other hand, of 
 the neceftity which there is for their being restrained 
 in them : Nor are they capable of understanding the 
 use of many parts of discipline, which neverthelef^ 
 they must be made to go through, in order to qualify 
 them for the busineft of mature age. Were we not 
 able then to discover, in what respects the present 
 life could form us for a future one : yet nothing 
 would be more supposable than that it might, in 
 
 ^^ some respects or other, from the general analogy of 
 Providence. And this, for aught I see, might 
 reasonably be said, even though we should not take 
 in the consideration of God's moral government 
 over the world. But, 
 
 IV. Take in this consideration, and consequently, 
 that the charadler of virtue and piety is a necef^ary 
 qualification for the future state ; and then we may 
 distinctly see, how, and in what respe(9:s the present 
 life may be a preparation for it : since we want, and 
 are capable of, improvement in that charaSier, by 
 
Chap. 5. Moral Discipline. 93 
 
 moral and religious habits ; and the present life is 
 Jit to be a state of discipline for such improvement : 
 In like manner as we have already observed, how, 
 and in what respe6ls, infancy, childhood, and youth, 
 are a neceftary preparation, and a natural state of 
 discipline, for mature age. 
 
 Nothing which we at present see, would lead us 
 to the thought of a solitary ina(5live state hereafter : 
 but, if we judge at all from the analogy of Nature, 
 we must suppose, according to the Scripture account 
 of it, that it will be a community. And there is no 
 shadow of anything unreasonable in conceiving, 
 though there be no analogy for it, that this com- 
 munity will be, as the Scripture represents it, under 
 the more immediate, or, if such an expreftion may 
 be used, the more sensible government of God. Nor 
 is our ignorance, what will be the employments of 
 this happy community, nor our consequent igno- 
 rance, what particular scope or occasion there will 
 be for the exercise of veracity, justice, and charity, 
 amongst the members of it with regard to each other ; 
 any proof, that there will be no sphere of exercise 
 for those virtues. Much left, if that were poftible, 
 is our ignorance any proof, that there will be no 
 occasion for that frame of mind, or chara(9:er, which 
 is formed by the daily prac^lice of those particular 
 virtues here, and which is a result from it. This at 
 least must be owned in general, that, as the govern- 
 ment established in the universe is moral, the cha- 
 racter of virtue and piety must, in some way or other, 
 be the condition of our happineft, or the qualifica- 
 tion for it. 
 
 Now from what is above observed, concerning our 
 natural power of habits, it is easy to see, that we 
 are capable of moral improvement by discipline. 
 And how greatly we want it, need not be proved to 
 
94 Ofa State of Parti. 
 
 any one who is acquainted with the great wickedneft 
 of mankind ; or even with those imperfections, which 
 the best are conscious of But it is not perhaps 
 distinctly attended to by every one, that the occasion 
 which human creatures have for discipHne, to im- 
 prove in them this charaCler of virtue and piety, is 
 to be traced up higher than to exceft in the paftions, 
 by indulgence and habits of vice. Mankind, and 
 perhaps all finite creatures, from the very constitu- 
 tion of their nature, before habits of virtue, are de- 
 ficient, and in danger of deviating from what is right : 
 and therefore stand in need of virtuous habits, for a 
 security against this danger. For, together with the 
 general principle of moral understanding, we have 
 in our inward frame various aifeClions towards par- 
 ticular external obje(5ls. These affeClions are na- 
 turally, and of right, subjeCl to the government of 
 the moral principle, as to the occasions upon which 
 they may be gratified ; as to the times, degrees, and 
 manner, in which the objeCIs of them may be pur- 
 sued : But then the principle of virtue can neither 
 excite them, nor prevent their being excited. On 
 the contrary, they are naturally felt, when the ob- 
 jeCls of them are present to the mind, not only before 
 all consideration, whether they can be obtained by 
 lawful means, but after it is found they cannot. For 
 the natural objeCls of affection continue so; the 
 neceftaries, conveniences, and pleasures of life, re- 
 main naturally desirable ; though they cannot be 
 obtained innocently : nay, though they cannot pofti- 
 bly be obtained at all. And when the objects of any 
 affeClion whatever cannot be obtained without unlaw- 
 ful means ; but may be obtained by them : such af- 
 feClion, though its being excited, and its continuing 
 some time in the mind, be as innocent as it is natural 
 and necef^ary ; yet cannot but be conceived to have 
 
Chap. 5. Moral Discipline. 95 
 
 a tendency to incline persons to venture upon such 
 unlawful means : and therefore must be conceived as 
 putting them in some danger of it. Now what is 
 the general security against this danger, against 
 their actually deviating from right '? As the danger 
 is, so also must the security be, from within : from 
 the practical principle of virtue.^ And the strength- 
 ening or improving this principle, considered as 
 practical, or as a principle of a(ftion, will lef^en the 
 danger, or increase the security against it. And 
 this moral principle is capable of improvement, by 
 proper discipline and exercise : by recollecting the 
 practical impreftions which example and experience 
 have made upon us : and, instead of follow^ing humour 
 and mere inclination, by continually attending to the 
 equity and right of the case, in whatever we are en- 
 gaged, be it in greater or left matters ; and accus- 
 toming ourselves always to a(51; upon it ; as being 
 itself the just and natural motive of a6lion : and as 
 this moral course of behaviour, must neceftarily, 
 
 ' It may be thought, that sense of interest would as effedlu- 
 ally restrain creatures from doing wrong. But if by a sense of 
 interest is meant a speculative convidtion or belief, that such and, 
 such indulgence would occasion them greater uneasinefs, upon . 
 the whole, than satisfadtion j it is contrary to present experience ! 
 to say, that this sense of interest is sulficient to restrain them ! 
 from thus indulging themselves. And if by a sense of interest is'\ 
 meant, a practical regard to what is upon the whole our happi- ] 
 nefs : this is not only coincident with the principle of virtue os-^ 
 moral reftitude, but is a part of the idea itself. And it is evi- 
 dent this reasonable self-love wants to be improved, as really as 
 any principle in our nature. For we daily see it overmatched, 
 not only by the more boisterous pafsions, but by curiosity, fhame, 
 love of imitation, by anything, even indolence : efpecially if the 
 interest, the temporal interest, fuppofe, which is the end of such 
 self-love, be at a distance. So greatly are profligate men mis- 
 taken, when they affirm they are wholly governed by interest- 
 ednefs and felf-love. And fo little caule is there for moralists 
 to disclaim this principle. See pp. 75, 76. 
 
96 Ofa State of Parti, 
 
 under divine government, be our final interest. Thus 
 the principle of virtue, improved into an habit, of 
 which improvement we are thus capable, will plainly 
 be, in proportion to the strength of it, a security 
 against the danger which finite creatures are in, from 
 the very nature ofpropension, or particular affe6lions. 
 This way of putting the matter, supposes particular 
 affe^lions to remain in a future state ; which it is 
 scarce pofsible to avoid supposing. And if they do ; 
 we clearly see, that acquired habits of virtue and 
 self-government may be neceftary for the regulation 
 of them. However, though we were not distinctly 
 to take in this supposition, but to speak only in ge- 
 neral ; the thing really comes to the same. For 
 habits of virtue, thus acquired by discipline, are im- 
 provement in virtue : and improvement in virtue, 
 must be advancement in happineft, if the govern- 
 ment of the universe be moral. 
 
 From these things we may observe, and it will 
 farther shew this our natural and original need of 
 being improved by discipline, how^ it comes to paft, 
 that creatures made upright fall ; and that those who 
 preserve their uprightneft, by so doing, raise them- 
 selves to a more secure state of virtue. To say that 
 the former is accounted for by the nature of liberty, 
 is to say no more, than that an event's ac^tually hap- 
 pening is accounted for by a mere poftibility of its 
 happening. But it seems distindlly conceivable from . 
 the very nature of particular affe(5lions or propen- 
 sions. For, suppose creatures intended for such a 
 particular state of life, for which such propensions 
 were neceftary : suppose them endued with such 
 propensions, together with moral understanding, as 
 well including a pra61ical sense of virtue, as a spe- 
 culative perception of it ; and that all these several 
 principles, both natural and moral, forming an in- 
 
Chap. 5. Moral Discipline. 97 
 
 ward constitution of mind, were in the most exacft 
 proportion pof^ible ; i.e. in a proportion the most 
 exactly adapted to their intended state of life : Such 
 creatures would be made upright, or finitely perfe^l. 
 Now particular propensions, from their very nature, 
 must be felt, the obje(5ls of them being present ; 
 though they cannot be gratified at all, or not with 
 the allowance of the moral principle. But if they 
 can be gratified without its allowance, or by contra- 
 dialing it ; then they must be conceived to have 
 some tendency, in how low a degree soever, yet 
 some tendency, to induce persons to such forbidden 
 gratification. This tendency, in some one particular 
 propension, may be increased, by the greater fi-e- 
 quency of occasions naturally exciting it, than of 
 occasions exciting others. The least voluntary in- 
 dulgence in forbidden circumstances, though but in 
 thought, will increase this wrong tendency ; and may 
 increase it further, till, peculiar conjunctures perhaps 
 conspiring, it becomes effect ; and danger of devi- 
 ating from right, ends in a(9;ual deviation from it : a 
 danger neceftarily arising from the very nature of 
 propension ; and which therefore could not have 
 been prevented, though it might have been escaped, 
 or got innocently through. The case would be, as 
 if we were to suppose a straight path marked out 
 for a person, in which such a degree of attention 
 would keep him steady : but if he would not attend 
 in this degree, any one of a thousand objects, catch- 
 ing his eye, might lead him out of it. Now it is im- 
 po(^ible to say, how much, even the first full overt 
 a6l of irregularity, might disorder the inward con- 
 stitution ; unsettle the adjustments, and alter the 
 proportions, which formed it, and in which the up- 
 rightnef^ of its make consisted : But repetition of 
 irregularities would produce habits. And thus the 
 H 
 
98 , Of a State of Part i. 
 
 constitution would be spoiled ; and creatures made 
 upright, become corrupt and depraved in their settled 
 character, proportionably to their repeated irregula- 
 rities in occasional a(fts. But on the contrary, these 
 creatures might have improved and raised them- 
 selves, to an higher and more secure state of virtue, 
 by the contrary behaviour : by steadily following the 
 moral principle, supposed to be one part of their 
 nature ; and thus withstanding that unavoidable dan- 
 ger of defe(5lion, which neceftarily arose from pro- 
 pension, the other part of it. For, by thus preserv- 
 ing their integrity for some time, their danger would 
 leflen ; since propensions by being inured to submit, 
 would do it more easily and of course : and their 
 security against this leftening danger would increase; 
 since the moral principle would gain additional 
 strength by exercise : both which things are implied 
 in the notion of virtuous habits. Thus then vicious 
 indulgence, is not only criminal in itself, but also 
 depraves the inward constitution and characfter. And 
 virtuous self-government, is not only right in itself, 
 but also improves the inward constitution or cha- 
 racter : and may improve it to such a degree, that 
 though we should suppose it impoftible, for parti- 
 cular affections to be absolutely coincident with the 
 moral principle ; and consequently should allow, that 
 such creatures as have been above supposed, would 
 for ever remain defe(5tible ; yet their danger of ac- 
 tually deviating from right, may be almost infinitely 
 leftened, and they fully fortified against what re- 
 mains of it : if that may be called danger, against 
 which, there is an adequate effe(5lual security. But 
 still this their higher perfection may continue to 
 consist in habits of virtue formed in a state of disci- 
 pline, and this their more complete security remain 
 to proceed from them. And thus it is plainly con- 
 
Chap. 5. Moral Discipline. 99 
 
 ceivable, that creatures without blemish, as they 
 came out of the hands of God, may be in danger of 
 going wrong ; and so may stand in need of the se- 
 curity of virtuous habits, additional to the moral 
 principle wrought into their natures by Him. That 
 which is the ground of their danger, or their want 
 of security, may be considered as a deficiency in 
 them, to which virtuous habits are the natural sup- 
 ply. And as they are naturally capable of being 
 raised and improved by discipline, it may be a thing 
 fit and requisite, that they should be placed in cir- 
 cumst£inces with an eye to it : in circumstances 
 peculiarly fitted to be, to them, a state of discipline 
 for their improvement in virtue. 
 
 But how much more strongly must this hold with 
 respe(5l to those, who have corrupted their natures, 
 are fallen from their original re(5litude, and whose 
 paftions are become excef^ive by repeated violations 
 of their inward constitution ? upright creatures may 
 want to be improved : depraved creatures want to 
 be renewed. Education and discipline, which may 
 be in all degrees and sorts of gentleneft and of se- 
 verity, is expedient for those : but must be absolutely 
 neceftary for these. For these, discipline of the severer 
 sort too, and in the higher degrees of it, must be 
 neceftary, in order to wear out vicious habits ; to 
 recover their primitive strength of self-government, 
 which indulgence must have weakened; to repair, as 
 well as raise into an habit, the moral principle, in 
 order to their arriving at a secure state of virtuous 
 happineft. 
 
 Now whoever will consider the thing, may clearly 
 see, that the present world is peculiarly jit to be a 
 state of discipline for this purpose, to such as will 
 set themselves to mend and improve. For, the 
 various temptations with which we are surrounded ; 
 
100 Ofa State of Parti. 
 
 our experience of the deceits of wickedneft ; having 
 been in many instances led wrong ourselves ; the 
 great viciousnef^ of the world ; the infinite disorders 
 consequent upon it; our being made acquainted 
 with pain and sorrow, either from our own feeling 
 of it, or from the sight of it in others ; these things, 
 though some of them may indeed produce wrong 
 effects upon our minds, yet when duly refle(9:ed 
 upon, have, all of them, a direc?!: tendency to bring 
 us to a settled moderation and reasonableneft of 
 temper : the contrary both to thoughtleft levity, and 
 also to that unrestrained self-will, and violent bent 
 to follow present inclination, which may be observed 
 in undisciplined minds. Such experience, as the 
 present state affords, of the frailty of our nature ; of 
 the boundlef^ extravagance of ungovemed paftion ; 
 of the power which an Infinite Being has over us, 
 by the various capacities of misery which He has 
 given us ; in short, that kind and degree of experi- 
 ence, which the present state affords us, that the 
 constitution of Nature is such as to admit the pof^i- 
 bility, the danger, and the a(5lual event, of creatures 
 losing their innocence and happinef^, and becoming 
 vicious and wretched ; hath a tendency to give us a 
 practical sense of things, very different from a mere 
 speculative knowledge, that we are liable to vice, 
 and capable of misery. And who knows, whether 
 the security of creatures in the highest and most 
 settled state of perfe(51:ion, may not in part arise, 
 from their having had such a sense of things as this, 
 formed, and habitually fixed within them, in some 
 state of probation. And paf^ing through the present 
 world with that moral attention, which is necef^ary 
 to the ailing a right part in it, may leave everlasting 
 impref^ions of this sort upon our minds. But to be 
 a little more distin<5l : allurements to what is wrong ; 
 
Chap. 5. Moral Discipline. 10 1 
 
 difficulties in the discharge of our duty ; our not 
 being able to act an uniform right part without some 
 thought and care; and the opportunities which we 
 have, or imagine we have, of avoiding what we 
 dislike, or obtaining what we desire, by unlawful 
 means, when we either cannot do it at all, or at 
 least not so easily, by lawful ones ; These things, 
 I. e. the snares and temptations of vice, are what 
 render the present world peculiarly fit to be a state 
 of discipline, to those who will preserve their in- 
 tegrity : because they render being upon our guard, 
 resolution, and the denial of our paftions, neceftary 
 in order to that endV And the exercise of such 
 particular recollection, intention of mind, and self- 
 government, in the pracftice of virtue, has, from the 
 make of our nature, a peculiar tendency to form 
 habits of virtue ; as implying, not only a real, but also 
 a more continued, and a more intense exercise 
 of the virtuous principle ; or a more constant and 
 a stronger effort of virtue exerted into a6i. Thus 
 suppose a person to know himself to be in particu- 
 lar danger, for some time, of doing anything wrong, 
 which yet he fully resolves not to do : Continued 
 recolle^lion, and keeping upon his guard, in order 
 to make good his resolution, is a continued exerting 
 of that a<5l of virtue in a high degree, which need 
 have been, and perhaps would have been, only in- 
 stantaneous and weak, had the temptation been so. 
 It is indeed ridiculous to aftert, that self-denial is 
 ei^ential to virtue and piety : But it would have been 
 nearer the truth, though not stridlly the truth itself, 
 to have said, that it is ef^ential to discipline and 
 improvement. For though a<5lions materially vir- 
 tuous, which have no sort of difficulty, but are per- 
 fe(5lly agreeable to our particular inclinations, may 
 pof^ibly be done only from these particular incli- 
 
ioi Of a State of Parti. 
 
 nations, and so may not be any exercise of the 
 principle of virtue, i. e. not be virtuous actions at all; 
 yet on the contrary, they may be an exercise of that 
 principle : and when they are, they have a tendency 
 to form and fix the habit of virtue. But when the 
 . exercise of the virtuous principle is more continued, 
 X^ oftener repeated, and more intense ; as it must be 
 in circumstances of danger, temptation and difficulty, 
 of any kind and in any degree ; this tendency is in- 
 creased proportionably, and a more confirmed habit 
 is the consequence. 
 
 This undoubtedly holds to a certain length ; but 
 how far it may hold, I know not. Neither our intel- 
 lectual powers, nor our bodily strength, can be im- 
 proved beyond such a degree : and both may be 
 over-wrought. Pofsibly there may be somewhat 
 analogous to this, with respect to the moral charac- 
 ter ; which is scarce worth considering. And I 
 mention it only, lest it should come into some per- 
 sons' thoughts, not as an exception to the foregoing 
 observations, which perhaps it is ; but as a confu- 
 tation of them, which it is not. And there may be 
 several other exceptions. Observations of this kind 
 cannot be supposed to hold minutely, and in every 
 case. It is enough that they hold in general. And 
 these plainly hold so far, as that from them may be 
 seen distin(5lly, which is all that is intended by them, 
 ^^ that the present world is peculiarly Jit to be a state 
 / of discipline, for our improvement in virtue and 
 piety : in the same sense as some sciences, by re- 
 quiring and engaging the attention, not to be sure 
 of such persons as will not, but of such as will, set 
 themselves to them ; are fit to form the mind to 
 habits of attention. 
 
 Indeed the present state is so far from proving, 
 in event, a discipline of virtue to the generality of 
 
Chap. 5. Moral Discipline. 103 
 
 men, that, on the contrary, they seem to make it a 
 discipline of vice. And the viciousneft of the world 
 is, in different ways, the great temptation, which 
 renders it a state of virtuous discipline, in the degree 
 it is, to good men. The whole end, and the whole 
 occasion, of mankind's being placed in such a state 
 as the present, is not pretended to be accounted for. 
 That which appears amidst the general corruption, 
 is, that there are some persons, who, having within 
 them the principle of amendment and recovery, 
 attend to and follow the notices of virtue and religion, 
 be they more clear or more obscure, which are 
 afforded them ; and that the present world is, not 
 only an exercise of virtue in these persons, but an 
 exercise of it in ways and degrees, peculiarly apt to 
 improve it : apt to improve it, in some respe(?l;s, even 
 beyond what would be, by the exercise of it required 
 in a perfe(9:ly virtuous society, or in a society of 
 equally imperfe(5l virtue with themselves. But that 
 the present world does not a6lually become a state 
 of moral discipline to many, even to the generality, 
 i. e. that they do not improve or grow better in it,\ 
 cannot be urged as a proof, that it was not intended ' 
 for moral discipline, by any who at all observe the 
 Analogy of Nature. For, of the numerous seeds of 
 vegetables and bodies of animals, which are adapted 
 and put in the way, to improve to such a point or 
 state of natural maturity and perfedlion, we do not 
 see perhaps that one in a million a(9:ually does. Far 
 the greatest part of them decay before they are im- 
 proved to it; and appear to be absolutely destroyed. 
 Yet no one, who does not deny all final causes, will 
 deny, that those seeds and bodies, which do attain 
 to that point of maturity and perfe(9:ion, answer the 
 end for which they were really designed by Nature ; 
 and therefore that Nature designed them for such 
 
104 Of a State of Part i. 
 
 perfe(9:ion. And I cannot forbear adding, though it 
 is not to the present purpose, that the appearance 
 of such an amazing waste in Nature, with respe(?i: to 
 these seeds and bodies, by foreign causes, is to us 
 as unaccountable, as, what is much more terrible, 
 the present and future ruin of so many moral agents 
 by themselves, i. e. by vice. 
 
 Against this whole notion of moral discipline, it 
 may be obje(?ted, in another way ; that so far as a 
 course of behaviour, materially virtuous, proceeds 
 '^ from hope and fear, so far it is only a discipline and 
 strengthening of self-love. But doing what God 
 commands, because he commands it, is obedience, 
 though it proceeds from hope or fear. And a course 
 of such obedience will form habits of it. And a con- 
 stant regard to veracity, justice and charity, may 
 form distin(?l; habits of these particular virtues ; and 
 will certainly form habits of self-government, and of 
 denying our inclinations, whenever veracity, justice 
 or charity require it. Nor is there any foundation 
 for this great nicety, with which some affect to dis- 
 tinguish in this case, in order to depreciate all re- 
 ligion proceeding from hope of fear. For, veracity, 
 justice and charity, regard to God's authority, and 
 to our own chief interest, are not only all three co- 
 incident : but each of them is, in itself, a just and 
 natural motive or principle of action. And he who 
 begins a good life from any one of them, and per- 
 severes in it, as he is already in some degree, so he 
 cannot fail of becoming more and more, of that 
 charadler, which is correspondent to the constitution 
 of Nature as moral ; and to the relation, which God 
 stands in to us as moral Governor of it : nor conse- 
 quently can he fail of obtaining that happineft, which 
 this constitution and relation neceftarily suppose 
 conne^led with that chara(^er. 
 
Chap. 5. Moral Discipline. 105 
 
 These several observations, concerning the a(9;ive 
 principle of virtue and obedience to God's commands, 
 are applicable to paftive submii^ion or resignation 
 to his will : which is another ei^ential part of a right 
 chara(9:er, conne(5led with the former, and very much 
 in our power to form ourselves to. It may be im- 
 agined, that nothing but afflictions can give occasion 
 for, or require this virtue ; that it can have no respe(?l 
 to, nor be any way neceftary to qualify for, a state 
 of perfect; happineft : But it is not experience which 
 can make us think thus. Prosperity itself, whilst 
 anything supposed desirable is not ours, begets ex- 
 travagant and unbounded thoughts. Imagination 
 is altogether as much a source of discontent, as any- 
 thing in our external condition. It is indeed true, 
 that there can be no scope for patience, when sor- 
 row shall be no more : but there may be need of a 
 temper of mind, which shall have been formed by 
 patience. For, though self-love, considered merely 
 as an a(5live principle leading us to pursue our chief 
 interest, cannot but be uniformly coincident with the 
 principle of obedience to^ God's commands, our in- 
 terest being rightly understood ; because this obe- 
 dience, and the pursuit of our own chief interest, 
 must be in every case one and the same thing : yet 
 it may be questioned, whether self-love, considered 
 merely as the desire of our own interest or happi- 
 nef^, can, from its nature, be thus absolutely and 
 uniformly coincident with the will of God ; any more 
 than particular affe(51;ions can^: coincident in such 
 sort, as not to be liable to be excited upon occasions 
 and in degrees, impof^ible to be gratified consistently 
 with the constitution of things, or the divine ap- 
 pointments. So that habits of resignation may, upon 
 
io6 Of a State of Parti, 
 
 this account, be requisite for all creatures ; habits, 
 I say ; which signify what is formed by use. How- 
 ever, in general it is obvious, that both self-love and 
 particular affecflions in human creatures, considered 
 only as paftive feelings, distort and rend the mind ; 
 and therefore stand in need of discipline. Now denial 
 of those particular affe<9:ions, in a course of active 
 virtue and obedience to God's will, has a tendency 
 to moderate them ; and seems also to have a ten- 
 dency to habituate the mind, to be easy and satis- 
 fied with that degree of happinei^ which is allotted 
 us, i. e. to moderate self-love. But the proper 
 discipline for resignation, is afflidlion. For a right 
 behaviour under that trial ; recolleding ourselves so 
 as to consider it in the view,in which Religion teaches 
 us to consider it, as from the hand of God ; receiving 
 it as what he appoints, or thinks proper to permit, 
 in his world and under his government ; this will 
 habituate the mind to a dutiful submiftion. And 
 such submiftion, together with the a(5live principle 
 of obedience, make up the temper and chara<5ler in 
 us, which answers to his sovereignty ; and which 
 absolutely belongs to the condition of our being, as 
 dependent creatures. Nor can it be said, that this 
 is only breaking the mind to a submiftion to mere 
 power ; for mere power may be accidental, and 
 precarious, and usurped : But it is forming within 
 ourselves the temper of resignation to his rightful 
 authority, who is, by nature, supreme over all. 
 
 Upon the whole : such a chara(^er, and such 
 qualifications, are neceftaryfor a mature state of life 
 in the present world, as Nature alone does in no wise 
 bestow ; but has put it upon us, in great part, to 
 acquire, in our progref^ from one stage of life to 
 another, from childhood to mature age : put it upon 
 us to acquire them, by giving us capacities of doing 
 
Chap. 5. Moral Discipline. 107 
 
 it, and by placing us, in the beginning of life, in a 
 condition fit for it. And this is a general Analogy 
 to our condition in the present world, as in a state 
 of moral discipline for another. It is in vain then to 
 object against the credibility of the present life's being 
 intended for this purpose, that all the trouble and 
 the danger, unavoidably accompanying such disci- 
 pline, might have been saved us, by our being made 
 at once the creatures and the chara(fi:ers, which we 
 were to be. For we experience, that what we were 
 to be, was to be the effecft o{what we would do: and 
 that the general condu(5l of Nature is, not to save us 
 trouble or danger, but to make us capable of going 
 through them, and to put it upon us to do so. Ac- 
 quirements of our own, experience and habits, are 
 the natural supply to our deficiencies, and security 
 against our dangers : since it is as plainly natural to set 
 ourselves to acquire the qualifications, as the external 
 things, which we stand in need of. In particular, it 
 is as plainly a general law of Nature, that we should, 
 with regard to our temporal interest, form and cul- 
 tivate practical principles within us, by attention, use 
 and discipline, as anything whatever is a natural law; 
 chiefly in the beginning of life, but also throughout 
 the whole course of it. And the alternative is left 
 to our choice : either to improve ourselves, and better 
 our condition: or, in default of such improvement, 
 to remain deficient and wretched. It is therefore 
 perfectly credible, from the Analogy of Nature, that 
 the same may be our case, with respe(?i: to the hap- 
 pinei^ of a future state, and the qualifications ne- 
 cef^ary for it. 
 
 There is a third thing, which may seem implied 
 in the present world's being a state of probation ; that 
 it is a theatre of action, for the manifestation of 
 persons' characflers, with respe(9: to a future one : 
 
io8 Of a State of Moral Discipline. Part i. 
 
 not to be sure to an All -knowing Being, but to his 
 creation or part of it. This may, perhaps, be only 
 a consequence of our being in a state of probation 
 in the other senses. However, it is not impof^ible, 
 that men's shewing and making manifest, what is in 
 their heart, what their real character is, may have 
 respe(5l to a future life, in ways and manners which 
 we are not acquainted with : particularly it may be 
 a means, for the Author of nature does not appear 
 to do anything without means, of their being dis- 
 posed of suitably to their chara(5lers ; and of its being 
 known to the creation, by way of example, that they 
 are thus disposed of But not to enter upon any 
 conjedlural account of this ; one may just mention, 
 that the manifestation of persons' chara(5lers, contri- 
 butes very much, in various ways, to the carrying 
 on a great part of that general course of Nature, re- 
 specfiing mankind, which comes under our observa- 
 tion at present. I shall only add, that probation, in 
 both these senses, as well as in that treated of in the 
 foregoing chapter, is implied in moral government : 
 since by persons' behaviour under it, their charac- 
 ters cannot but be manifested, and if they behave 
 well, improved. 
 
Chap. 6. Opinion of Ncccjsity, &c. 109 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 Of the Opinion of Necefiity, considered as 
 influencing Pra6iice. 
 
 HROUGHOUT the foregoing treatise 
 it appears, that the condition of man- 
 kind, considered as inhabitants of this 
 world only, and under the govern- 
 ment of God which we experience ; 
 is greatly analogous to our condition, as designed 
 for another world, or under that farther government, 
 which Religion teaches us. If therefore any af^ert, 
 as a fatalist must, that the opinion of universal ne- 
 ceftity is reconcileable with the former ; there im- 
 mediately arises a question in the way of analogy, 
 whether he must not also own it to be reconcileable 
 with the latter, i. e. with the system of Religion 
 itself, and the proof of it. The reader then will 
 observe, that the question now before us is not ab- 
 solute, Whether the opinion of fate be reconcileable 
 with Religion; but hypothetical. Whether, upon sup- 
 position of its being reconcileable with the constitu- 
 tion of Nature, it be not reconcileable with Religion 
 also : Or, what pretence a fatalist, not other persons, 
 but a fatalist, has to conclude from his opinion, that 
 there can be no such thing as Religion. And as the 
 puzzle and obscurity, which must unavoidably arise 
 from arguing upon so absurd a supposition as that 
 of universal neceftity, will, I fear, easily be seen ; it 
 will, I hope, as easily be excused. 
 
no Of the opinion of Neccjsity, Parti. 
 
 But since it has been all along taken for granted, 
 as a thing proved, that there is an intelligent Author 
 of nature, or natural Governor of the world ; and 
 since an obje(5lion may be made against the proof of 
 this, from the opinion of universal neceftity, as it may 
 be supposed, that such necef^ity will itself account 
 for the origin and preservation of all things : it is 
 requisite, that this objet^tion be distinctly answered; 
 or that it be shewn, that a fatality, supposed con- 
 sistent with what we certainly experience, does not 
 destroy the proof of an intelligent Author and Gover- 
 nor of nature ; before we proceed to consider, 
 whether it destroys the proof of a moral Governor 
 of it or of our being in a state of Religion. 
 
 Now, when it is said by a fatalist, that the whole 
 constitution of Nature, and the a(?l:ions of men, that 
 everything, and every mode and circumstance of 
 everything, is neceftary and could not poftibly have 
 been otherwise ; it is to be observed, that this ne- 
 cei^ity does not exclude deliberation, choice, pre- 
 ference, and a(?t;ing from certain principles, and to 
 certain ends : because all this is matter of undoubted 
 experience, acknowledged by all, and what every 
 man may, every moment, be conscious of And from 
 hence it follows, that necef^ity, alone and of itself, is 
 in no sort an account of the constitution of Nature, 
 and how things came to he and to continue as they 
 are; but only an account of this circumstance, relat- 
 ing to their origin and continuance, that they could 
 not have been otherwise, than they are and have 
 been. The aftertion that everything is by neceftity of 
 Nature, is not an answer to the question ; Whether 
 the world came into being as it is, by an intelligent 
 agent forming it thus, or not : But to quite another 
 question ; Whether it came into being as it is, in 
 that way and manner which we call necejlarily, or in 
 
Chap.6. Considered as influencing Pradice. Ill 
 
 that way and manner which we caW freely. For sup- 
 pose farther, that one who was a fatalist, and one 
 who kept to his natural sense of things, and be- 
 lieved himself a free agent, were disputing together, 
 and vindicating their respedlive opinions ; and they 
 should happen to instance in a house ; they would 
 agree, that it w^as built by an architecfi:. Their dif- 
 ference concerning neceftity and freedom, would 
 occasion no difference of judgment concerning this ; 
 but only concerning another matter ; whether the 
 architect built it necei^arily or freely. Suppose then 
 they should proceed to inquire concerning the con- 
 stitution of Nature : in a lax way of speaking, one 
 of them might say, it was by neceftity ; and the 
 other by freedom : But if they had any meaning 
 to their words, as the latter must mean a free agent, 
 so the former must at length be reduced to mean an 
 agent, whether he would say one or more, ailing 
 by neceftity : for abstracfl: notions can do nothing. 
 Indeed we ascribe to God a necefsary existence, 
 uncaused by any agent. For we find within our- 
 selves the idea of infinity, i. e. immensity and eter- 
 nity, impof^ible, even in imagination, to be removed 
 out of being. We seem to discern intuitively, that 
 there must, and cannot but be somewhat, external 
 to ourselves, answering this idea, or the archetype 
 of it. And from hence (for this abstract, as much 
 as any other, implies a concrete) we conclude, that 
 there is and cannot but be, an infinite, and immense 
 Eternal Being existing, prior to all design contri- 
 buting to his existence, and exclusive of it. And 
 from the scantinef^ of language, a manner of speak- 
 ing has been introduced ; that necef^ity is the foun- 
 dation, the reason, the account of the existence of 
 God. But it is not alleged, nor can it be at all in- 
 tended, that everything exists as it does, by this kind 
 
112 Of the Opinion of Necejsity, Parti. 
 
 of neceftity ; a neceftity antecedent in Nature to de- 
 sign : it cannot, I say, be meant that everything ex- 
 ists as it does, by this kind of necef^ity, upon several 
 accounts \ and particularly because it is admitted, 
 that design, in the a(?lions of men, contributes to 
 many alterations in Nature. For if any deny this, 
 I shall not pretend to reason with them. 
 
 From these things it follows ; First, That when 
 a fatalist afterts, that everything is hy necejlity, he 
 must mean, by an agent a6iing necejlarity ; he must 
 I say mean this, for I am very sensible, he would 
 not choose to mean it : And secondly, That the ne- 
 ceftity, by which such an agent is supposed to ac^, 
 does not exclude intelligence and design. So that, 
 were the system of fatality admitted ; it would just 
 as much account for the formation of the world, as 
 the structure of an house, and no more. Neceftity 
 as much requires and supposes a neceftary agent, 
 as freedom requires and supposes a free agent, to 
 be the former of the world. And the appearances 
 of design and of final causes in the constitution of 
 Nature, as really prove this a(5ling agent, to be an 
 intelligent designer, or to 3i6i from choice ; upon 
 the scheme of neceftity, supposed poftible, as upon 
 that of freedom. 
 
 It appearing thus, that the notion of necef^ity does 
 not destroy the proof that there is an intelligent 
 Author of nature and natural Governor of the world; 
 the present question, which the analogy before men- 
 tioned' suggests, and which, I think it will answer, 
 is this : Whether the opinion of necel^ity, supposed 
 consistent with pof^ibility, with the constitution of 
 the world, and the natural government which we 
 experience exercised over it ; destroys all reasonable 
 
 ' p. 109. 
 
Chap. 6. Considered as influencing Pra6!ice. 113 
 
 ground of belief, that we are in a state of Religion: 
 or wliether that opinion be reconcileable with Re- 
 ligion ; with the system, and the proof of it. 
 
 Suppose then a fatalist to educate any one, from 
 his youth up, in his own principles ; that the child 
 should reason upon them, and conclude, that since 
 he cannot pof^ibly behave otherwise than he does, 
 he is not a subject of blame or commendation, nor 
 can deserve to be rewarded or punished : Imagine 
 him to eradicate the very perceptions of blame and 
 commendation out of his mind, by means of this 
 system ; to form his temper, and chara(5ler, and 
 behaviour to it ; and from it to judge of the treatment 
 he w^as to expedl, say, from reasonable men, upon 
 his coming abroad into the world : as the fatalist 
 judges from this system, what he is to expe(5l from 
 the Author of nature, and with regard to a future 
 state. I cannot forbear stopping here to ask, whether 
 any one of common sense w^ould think fit, that a 
 child should be put upon these speculations, and 
 be left to apply them to practice. And a man has 
 little pretence to reason, who is not sensible, that we 
 are all children in speculations of this kind. How^- 
 ever, the child would doubtleft be highly delighted 
 to find himself freed from the restraints of fear and 
 shame, with which his play-fellows were fettered 
 and embarrafsed ; and highly conceited in his su- 
 perior know^ledge, so far beyond his years. But 
 conceit and vanity would be the least bad part of the 
 influence, which these principles must have, when 
 thus reasoned and acted upon, during the course of 
 his education. He must either be allowed to go on 
 and be the plague of all about him, and himself too, 
 even to his own destru(9:ion : or else correction 
 must be continually made use of, to supply the want 
 of those natural perceptions of blame and commen- 
 I 
 
114 Of the Opinion of Necejsity, Parti, 
 
 dation, which we have supposed to be removed ; 
 and to give him a pra(5lical impreftion, of what he 
 had reasoned himself out of the belief of, that he 
 was in fa(5l an accountable child, and to be punished 
 for doing what he was forbid. It is therefore in re- 
 ality impoftible, but that the correction which he 
 must meet with, in the course of his education, must 
 convince him, that if the scheme he was instru6led 
 in were not false ; yet that he reasoned inconclu- 
 sively upon it, and somehow or other misapplied it 
 to practice and common life : As what the fatalist 
 experiences of the condu61: of Providence at present, 
 ought in all reason to convince him, that this scheme 
 is misapplied, when applied to the subject of ReH- 
 gion.^ But supposing the child's temper could re- 
 main still formed to the system, and his expe(5lation 
 of the treatment he was to have in the world be 
 regulated by it ; so as to expecft that no reasonable 
 man would blame or punish him, for anything which 
 he should do, because he could not help doing it : 
 Upon this supposition, it is manifest he would, upon 
 his coming abroad into the world, be insupportable 
 to society, and the treatment which he would receive 
 from it, would render it so to him ; and he could not 
 fail of doing somewhat, very soon, for which he would 
 be delivered over into the hands of civil justice. And 
 thus, in the end, he would be convinced of the ob- 
 ligations he was under to his wise instructor. Or 
 suppose this scheme of fatality, in any other way, 
 applied to pra(5tice, such practical application of it, 
 will be found equally absurd ; equally fallacious in 
 a practical sense : For instance, that if a man be 
 destined to live such a time, he shall live to it, 
 though he take no care of his own preservation ; or 
 
 2 P. 125. 
 
Chap. 6. Considered as influencing Pradice. 115 
 
 if he be destined to die before that time, no care can 
 prevent it : therefore all care about preserving one's 
 life is to be negle(5led : which is the fallacy instanced 
 in by the ancients. But now on the contrary, none 
 of these pra(5lical absurdities can be drawn, from 
 reasoning upon the supposition, that we are free ; 
 but all such reasoning with regard to the common 
 affairs of life, is justified by experience. And there-^ 
 fore, though it were admitted that this opinion of 
 necef^ity were speculatively true ; yet, with regard 
 to pra(5fi<±, it is as if it were false, so far as our ex- 
 perience reaches ; that is, to the whole of our pre- 
 sent life. For, the constitution of the present world, 
 and the condition in which we are actually placed, 
 is, as if we were free. And it may perhaps justly 
 be concluded, that since the whole procef^ of action, 
 through every step of it, suspense, deliberation, in- 
 clining one way, determining, and at last doing as 
 we determine, is as if we were free, therefore we 
 are so. But the thing here insisted upon is, that 
 under the present natural government of the world, 
 we find we are treated and dealt with, as if we 
 were free, prior to all consideration whether we 
 are or not. Were this opinion therefore of necef^ity 
 admitted to be ever so true ; yet such is in facl: our' 
 condition and the natural course of things, that 
 whenever we apply it to life and pra(9:ice, this ap- 
 plication of it, always misleads us, and cannot but 
 mislead us, in a most dreadful manner, with regard 
 to our present interest. And how can people think 
 themselves so very secure then, that the same ap- 
 plication of the same opinion may not mislead them 
 also, in some analogous manner, with respe(5t to a 
 future, a more general and more important interest? 
 For, Rehgion being a practical subje(9;; and the 
 Analogy of Nature shewing us, that we have not 
 
Ii6 Of the Opinion of Necejsity, Parti, 
 
 faculties to apply this opinion, were it a true one, to 
 .pracftical subjects ; whenever we do apply it to the 
 subject of Religion, and thence conclude, that we 
 are free from its obligations, it is plain this conclusion 
 bannot be depended upon. There will still remain 
 just reason to think, whatever appearances are, that 
 we deceive ourselves ; in somewhat of a like man- 
 ner, as when people fancy they can draw contra- 
 dictory conclusions from the idea of infinity. 
 
 From these things together, the attentive reader 
 will see it follows, that if upon supposition of freedom 
 the evidence of Religion be conclusive, it remains so, 
 upon supposition of necei^ity ; because the notion of 
 neceftity is not applicable to pracflical subje(5ls -.i.e. 
 with respe(5l to them, is as if it were not true. Nor 
 does this contain any refle(9:ion upon reason ; but 
 only upon what is unreasonable. For to pretend to 
 act upon reason, in opposition to pra(?i:ical principles, 
 which the Author of our nature gave us to a6l upon ; 
 and to pretend to apply our reason to subjects, with 
 regard to which, our own short views, and even our 
 experience, will shew us, it cannot be depended upon ; 
 and such, at best, the subje(?l; of necefkity must be ; 
 this is vanity, conceit, and unreasonableneft. 
 
 But this is not all. For we find within ourselves 
 a will, and are conscious of a chara(51er. Now if this, 
 in us, be reconcileable with fate, it is reconcileable 
 with it, in the Author of nature. And besides, na- 
 tural government and final causes, imply a character 
 and a will in the Governor and Designer ; ^ a will con- 
 cerning the creatures whom he governs. The Au- 
 thor of nature then being certainly by some cha- 
 
 ^ By iv'dl and charaBer is meant that, which, in fpeaking of 
 men, we should exprefs, not only by these words, but also by 
 the words, temper^ taste, dispositions, pra6iical principles, that ivhole 
 frame ofmind,from'whence ine a£i in one manner rather than another. 
 
Chap,6. Considered as influencing Practice. 117 
 
 ra(?l;er or other, notwithstanding neceftity ; it is evi- 
 dent this nece{^ity is as reconcileable with the parti- 
 cular chara(?ter of benevolence, veracity, and justice 
 in him, which attributes are the foundation of Reli- 
 gion, as with any other charac^ter : since we find this 
 necef^ity no more hinders men from being benevo- 
 lent, than cruel ; true, than faithleft ; just, than un- 
 just ; or if the fatalist pleases, what we call unjust. 
 For it is said indeed, that what, upon supposition of 
 freedom, w^ould be just punishment ; upon supposi- 
 tion of necefsity, becomes manifestly unjust : because 
 it is punishment inflidled for doing that, which per- 
 sons could not avoid doing. As if the necef^ity, which 
 is supposed to destroy the injustice of murder, for 
 instance, would not also destroy the injustice of pun- 
 ishing it. However, as little to the purpose as this 
 objection is in itself, it is very much to the purpose 
 to observe from it, how the notions of justice and in- 
 justice remain, even whilst we endeavour to suppose 
 them removed ; how they force themselves upon the 
 mind, even whilst we are making suppositions de- 
 stru(5tive of them: For there is not, perhaps, a man 
 in the world, but would be ready to make this objec- 
 tion at first thought. 
 
 But though it is most evident, that universal ne- 
 ceftity, if it be reconcileable with anything, is re- 
 concileable with that chara(5ler in the Author of na- 
 ture, which is the foundation of Religion ; '' Yet, does 
 " it not plainly destroy the proof, that he is of that 
 " charadier, and consequently the proof of Religion?" 
 By no means. For we find, that happineft and mi- 
 sery are not our fate, in any such sense as not to be 
 the consequences of our behaviour ; but that they are 
 the consequences of it.'* We find God exercises the 
 same kind of government over us, with that, which 
 
 < Ch. ii. 
 
Ii8 Of the Opinion of Necefsity, Part i. 
 
 a father exercises over his children, and a civil ma- 
 gistrate over his subje^ls. Now, whatever becomes 
 of abstracft questions concerning liberty and neceftity, 
 it evidently appears to us, that veracity and justice 
 must be the natural rule and measure of exercising 
 this authority or government, to a Being, who can 
 have no competitions, or interfering of interests, with 
 his creatures and his subje(51:s. 
 
 But as the do6lrine of liberty, though we experi- 
 ence its truth, may be perplexed with difficulties, 
 which run up into the most abstruse of all specula- 
 tions ; and as the opinion of necefsity seems to be the 
 very basis, upon which infidelity grounds itself; it 
 may be of some use to offer a more particular proof 
 of the obligations of Religion, which may distin(9:ly 
 be shewn not to be destroyed by this opinion. 
 
 The proof from final causes of an intelligent Author 
 of nature, is not affec^ted by the opinion of necefsity ; 
 supposing necefsity a thing poftible in itself, and re- 
 concileable with the constitution of things.^ And it 
 is a matter of fa(5l, independent on this or any other 
 speculation, that he governs the world by the method 
 of rewards and punishments :^ and also that he hath 
 given us a moral faculty, by which we distinguish 
 between a(5lions, and approve some as virtuous and 
 of good-desert, and disapprove others as vicious and 
 of ill-desert.' Now this moral discernment implies, 
 m the notion of it, a rule of a(51ion, and a rule of a 
 very peculiar kind ; for it carries in it authority and 
 a right of direction ; authority in such a sense, as 
 that we cannot depart from it without being self-con- 
 demned.® And that the di<5lates of this moral faculty, 
 which are by nature a rule to us, are moreover the 
 laws of God, laws in a sense including san(5lions ; may 
 
 5 Pp. no, &c. ^ Ch. ii. 7 Difsert. II. 
 
 * Seim. 2. at the Rolls. 
 
Chap.6. Considered as influencing Pradice. 119 
 
 be thus proved. Consciousneft of a rule or guide of 
 a(51ion, in creatures who are capable of considering 
 it as given them by their Maker, not only raises im- 
 mediately a sense of duty, but also a sense of secu- 
 rity in following it, and of danger in deviating from 
 it. A dire(9;ion of the Author of nature, given to 
 creatures capable of looking upon it as such, is plainly 
 a command from him : and a command from him 
 nece{sarily includes in it, at least, an implicit promise 
 in case of obedience, or threatening in case of dis- 
 obedience. But then the sense or perception of good 
 and ill desert,^ which is contained in the moral dis- 
 cernment, renders the san(9;ion explicit, and makes 
 it appear, as one may say, exprefsed. For since his 
 method of government is to reward and punish ac- 
 tions, his having annexed to some adlions an inse- 
 parable sense of good desert, and to others of ill, this 
 surely amounts to declaring, upon whom his pun- 
 ishments shall be inflicted, and his rewards be be- 
 stowed. For he must have given us this discernment 
 and sense of things, as a presentiment of what is to 
 be hereafter : that is, by way of information before- 
 hand, what we are finally to expect in his world. 
 There is then most evident ground to think, that the 
 government of God, upon the whole, will be found to 
 correspond to the nature which he has given us : and 
 that in the upshot and if^ue of things, happineft and 
 misery shall, in fa6i and event, be made to follow vir- 
 tue and vice respe^lively ; as he has already, in so 
 peculiar a manner, aftociated the ideas of them in 
 our minds. And from hence might easily be deduced 
 the obligations of religious worship, were it only to 
 be considered as a means of preserving upon our 
 minds a sense of this moral government of God, and 
 
 " Difsert. II. 
 
120 Of the Opinion of Necefsity, Parti, 
 
 securing our obedience to it : which yet is an ex- 
 tremely imperfect view of that most important duty. 
 Now I say, no objec^tion from neceftity can lie 
 against this general proof of Religion. None against 
 the proposition reasoned upon, that we have such a 
 moral faculty and discernment; because this is a 
 mere matter of facft, a thing of experience, that hu- 
 man kind is thus constituted : None against the con- 
 clusion ; because it is immediate and wholly from this 
 fa6l. For the conclusion, that God will finally reward 
 the righteous and punish the wicked, is not here 
 drawn, from its appearing to us fit,^*^ that He should; 
 but from its appearing, that he has told us, He will. 
 And this he hath certainly told us, in the promise 
 and threatening, which it hath been observed the 
 notion of a command implies, and the sense of good 
 and ill desert which he has given us, more distinctly 
 expreftes. And this reasoning from fa(5l is confirmed, 
 and in some degree even verified, by other fadls ; by 
 the natural tendencies of virtue and of vice ;^^ and 
 
 '" However, I am far from intending to deny, that the will of 
 God is determined, by what is fit, by the ri^ht and reason of the 
 case ; though one chooses to decline matters of such abstract 
 speculation, and to speak with caution when one does speak of 
 them. But if it be intelligible to say, that it is Jit and reasonable 
 for every one to consult his o%vn happinejs^ then,Jitnefs ofa^ion, or the 
 right and reason of the case, is an intelligible manner of speaking. 
 And it seems as inconceivable, to suppose God to approve one 
 course of aftion, or one end, preferably to another, which yet 
 his adling at all from design implies that he does, without sup- 
 posing somewhat prior in that end, to be the ground of the pre- 
 ference J as to suppose him to discern an abstract proposition to 
 be true, without supposing somewhat prior in it, to be the ground 
 of the discernment. It doth not therefore appear, that moral 
 right is any more relative to perception, than abstrad: truth is : 
 orthatitisanymore improper, to speak of the firnefsand rightnefs 
 of anions and ends, as founded in the nature of things, than to 
 speak of abstract truth, as thus founded. 
 
 »> P. 60. 
 
Chap. 6. Considered as influencing Pra6!ice. I2i 
 
 by this, that God, in the natural course of his Pro- 
 vidence, punishes vicious a(5lions as mischievous to 
 society ; and also vicious a(5lions as such in the stri(?i:- 
 est sense. ^■- So that the general proof of Religion is 
 unanswerably real, even upon the wild supposition 
 which we are arguing upon. 
 
 It must likewise be observed farther, that natural 
 Religion hath, besides this, an £X££i2aaL,!LYidepce ; 
 which the doctrine of necefsity, if it could be true, 
 would not affe(5l. For suppose a person, by the ob- 
 servations and reasoning above, or by any other, con- 
 vinced of the truth of Religion ; that there is a God, 
 who made the world, who is the moral Governor and 
 Judge of mankind, and will upon the whole deal with 
 every one according to his works : I say, suppose a 
 person convinced of this by reason; but to know 
 nothing at all of antiquity, or the present state of 
 mankind : it would be natural for such an one to be 
 inquisitive, what was the history of this system of 
 dodfrine ; at what time, and in what manner, it came 
 first into the world ; and whether it were believed by 
 any considerable part of it. And were he upon in- 
 quiry to find, that a particular person, in a late age, 
 first of all proposed it, as a deduc^tion of reason, and 
 that mankind were before wholly ignorant of it : then, 
 though its evidence from reason would remain, there 
 would be no additional probability of its truth, from 
 the account of its discovery. But instead of this 
 being the facl of the case, on the contrary, he would 
 find, what could not but afford him a very strong 
 confirmation of its truth : First, That somewhat of this/ 
 system, with more or fewer additions and alterations/ 
 hath been profefted in all ages and countries, of 
 which we have any certain information relating tp 
 
 '2 Pp. 51, Sec. 
 
 \ 
 
122 Of the Opinion of Necessity, Part i. 
 
 this matter. Secondly, That it is certain historical 
 fac^, so far as we can trace things up, that this whole 
 system of belief, that there is one God, the Creator 
 and moral Governor of the world, and that mankind 
 is in a state of Religion, was received in the first ages. 
 And thirdly, That as there is no hint or intimation in 
 history, that this system was first reasoned out ; so 
 there is no expref^ historical or traditional evidence, 
 as ancient as history, that it was taught first by Re- 
 velation. Now these things must be allowed to be 
 of great weight. The first of them, general consent, 
 shews the system to be conformable to the common 
 sense of mankind. The second, namely, that Reli- 
 gion was believed in the first ages of the world, es- 
 pecially as it does not appear that there were then 
 any superstitious or false additions to it, cannot but 
 be a farther confirmation of its truth. For it is a 
 proof of this alternative : either that it came into the 
 world by Revelation ; or that it is natural, obvious, 
 and forces itself upon the mind. The former of these 
 is the conclusion of learned men. And whoever will 
 consider, how unapt for speculation rude and uncul- 
 tivated minds are, will, perhaps from hence alone, be 
 strongly inclined to believe it the truth. And as it 
 is shewn in the second part^^ of this treatise, that 
 there is nothing of such peculiar presumption against 
 a Revelation in the beginning of the world, as there 
 is supposed to be against subsequent ones : a sceptic 
 could not, I think, give any account, which would 
 appear more probable even to himself, of the early 
 pretences to Revelation ; than by supposing some 
 real original one, from whence they were copied. 
 And the third thing abovementioned, that there is 
 exprei^ historical or traditional evidence as ancient 
 
 13 Chap. ii. 
 
Chap. 6. Considered as influencing Pradice. 123 
 
 as history, of the system of Religion being taught 
 mankind by Revelation ; this must be admitted as 
 some degree of real proof, that it was so taught. 
 For why should not the most ancient tradition be 
 admitted, as some additional proof of a faSi, against 
 which there is no presumption ? And this proof is 
 mentioned here, because it has its weight to shev/, 
 that Religion came into the world by Revelation, prior 
 to all consideration of the proper authority of any 
 book supposed to contain it : and even prior to all 
 consideration, whether the Revelation itself be un- 
 corruptly handed down and related, or mixed and 
 darkened with fables. Thus the historical account, 
 which we have, of the origin of Religion, taking in 
 all circumstances, is a real confirmation of its truth, 
 no way affecfted by the opinion of necef^ity. And 
 the external evidence, even of natural Religion, is by 
 no means inconsiderable. 
 
 But it is carefully to be observed, and ought to be 
 recollected after all proofs of virtue and Religion, 
 which are only general ; that as speculative reason 
 may be negle6led, prejudiced, and deceived : so also 
 may our moral understanding be impaired and per- 
 verted, and the dictates of it not impartially attended 
 to. This indeed proves nothing against the reality 
 of our speculative or pra^lical faculties of perception ; 
 against their being intended by Nature, to inform us 
 in the theory of things, and instruct us how we are 
 to behave, and what we are to expec^t in consequence 
 of our behaviour. Yet our liableneft, in the degree 
 we are liable, to prejudice and perversion, is a most 
 serious admonition to us to be upon our guard, with 
 respe6l to what is of such consequence, as our de- 
 terminations concerning virtue and Religion: And par- 
 ticularly not to take custom, and fashion, and slight 
 notions of honour, or imaginations of present ease, 
 
124 Of the Opinion of Necefsity, Parti, 
 
 use and convenience to mankind, for the only moral 
 rule.i* 
 
 The foregoing observations, drawn from the na- 
 ture of the thing, and the history of Religion, amount, 
 when taken together, to a real prac^hcal proof of it, 
 not to be confuted : Such a proof as, considering the 
 infinite importance of the thing, I apprehend, would 
 be admitted fully sufficient, in reason, to influence 
 the actions of men, who a(5l upon thought and re- 
 fle(51ion ; if it were admitted, that there is no proof 
 of the contrary. But it may be said : " There are 
 " many probabilities, which cannot indeed be con- 
 " futed, i. e. shewn to be no probabilities, and yet may 
 " be overbalanced, by greater probabilities on the 
 " other side ; much more by demonstration. And 
 " there is no occasion to obje^l against particular ar- 
 *' guments alleged for an opinion, when the opinion 
 " itself may be clearly shewn to be false, without 
 " meddling with such arguments at all, but leaving 
 *' them just as they are.^^ Now the method of go- 
 " vernment by rewards and punishments, and espe- 
 '' cially rewarding and punishing good and ill desert 
 '' as such respe^lively, must go upon supposition, 
 " that we are free and not neceftary agents. And it 
 '' is incredible, that the Author of nature should 
 '^ govern us upon a supposition as true, which he 
 '* knows to be false : and therefore absurd to think, 
 " he will reward or punish us for our actions here- 
 " after, especially that he will do it under the notion, 
 " that they are of good or ill desert." Here then 
 the matter is brought to a point. And the answer 
 to all this is full, and not to be evaded : that the whole 
 constitution and course of things, the whole Analogy 
 of Providence, shews beyond pol^ibility of doubt, that 
 
 »4 Difsert. II. '5 Pp. I, 9. 
 
Chap. 6. Considered as influencing Pradice. 125 
 
 the conclusion from this reasoning is false ; wherever 
 the fallacy lies. The doctrine of freedom indeed 
 clearly shews where : in supposing ourselves neces- 
 sary, when in truth we are free agents. But upon 
 the supposition of necef^ity, the fallacy lies in taking 
 for granted, that it is incredible necef^ary agents 
 should be rewarded and punished. But that, some- 
 how or other, the conclusion now mentioned is false, 
 is most certain. For it is fa6i, that God does go- 1 
 vern even brute creatures by the method of rewards 
 and punishments, in the natural course of things. I 
 And men are rewarded and punished for their aclions, 
 punished for actions mischievous to society as being 
 so, punished for vicious actions as such ; by the na- 
 tural instrumentality of each other, under the present 
 condu(5l of Providence. Nay even the affe(5tion of 
 gratitude, and the pafsion of resentment, and the re- 
 wards and punishments following from them, which 
 in general are to be considered as natural, i.e. from 
 the Author of nature ; these rewards and punish- 
 ments, beingnaturally^^ annexed to a(5lions considered 
 as implying good intention and good desert, ill in- 
 tention and ill desert ; these natural rewards and 
 punishments, I say, are as much a contradiction to 
 the conclusion above, and shew its falsehood, as a 
 more exaSi and complete rewarding and punishing 
 of good and ill desert as such. So that if it be in- 
 credible, that necefsary agents should be thus re- 
 warded and punished ; then, men are not neceftary 
 but free : since it is matter of fa6i, that they are thus 
 rewarded and punished. But if, on the contrary, 
 which is the supposition we have been arguing upon, 
 it be insisted, that men are necei^ary agents ; then, 
 there is nothing incredible in the farther supposition 
 
 '6 Serm. 8th, at the Rolls. 
 
126 Of the Opinion of Necefsity, &c. Part i. 
 
 of neceftary agents being- thus rewarded and pun- 
 ished : since we ourselves are thus dealt with. 
 
 From the whole therefore it must follow, that a 
 necefsity supposed poftible, and reconcileable with 
 the constitution of things, does in no sort prove that 
 the Author of nature will not, nor destroy the proof 
 that he will, finally and upon the whole, in his eternal 
 government, render his creatures happy or miserable, 
 by some means or other, as they behave well or ill. 
 Or, to expreft this conclusion in words conformable 
 to the title of the chapter, the Analogy of Nature 
 shews us, that the opinion of necefsity, considered as 
 pra^lical, is false. And if neceftity, upon the sup- 
 position abovementioned, doth not destroy the proof 
 of natural Religion, it evidently makes no alteration 
 in the proof of revealed. 
 
 From these things likewise we may learn, in what 
 sense to understand that general aftertion, that the 
 opinion of necefsity is eftentially destru6live of all 
 Religion. First in a pra(9:ical sense ; that by this no- 
 tion, atheistical men pretend to satisfy and encourage , 
 themselves in vice, and justify to others their disre- 
 gard to all Religion. And secondly, in the stri(51est 
 sense ; that it is a contradiction to the whole consti- 
 tution of Nature, and to what we may every moment 
 experience in ourselves, and so overturns everything. 
 But by no means is this a{^ertion to be understood, 
 as if necefsity, supposing it could pofsibly be recon- 
 ciled with the constitution of things and with what 
 we experience, were not also reconcileable with Re- 
 ligion : for upon this supposition, it demonstrably is 
 so. 
 
Chap. 7. Of the Government of God, &c. 127 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 Of the Government of God, considered as a Scheme 
 or Constitution, imperfe6ily comprehended. 
 
 HOUGH it be, as it cannot but be, ac- 
 knowledged, that the Analogy of Na- 
 ture gives a strong credibility to the 
 general do(5lrine of Religion, and to 
 the several particular things contained 
 in it, considered as so many matters of fa6l ; and 
 likev^ase that it shews this credibility not to be de- 
 stroyed by any notions of necefsity : yet still, objec- 
 tions may be insisted upon, against the wisdom, 
 equity and goodneft of the Divine government im- 
 plied in the notion of Religion, and against the method 
 by which this government is conducted ; to which 
 obje(5lions Analogy can be no dire6l answer. For the 
 credibility, or the certain truth, of a matter of facl, 
 does not immediately prove anything concerning the 
 wisdom or goodnefl of it : and Analogy can do no 
 more, immediately or dire611y, than shew such and 
 such things to be true or credible, considered only 
 as matters of fa6l. But still, if, upon supposition of 
 a moral constitution of Nature and a moral govern- 
 ment over it. Analogy suggests and makes it credible, 
 that this government must be a scheme, system, or 
 constitution of government, as distinguished from a 
 number of single unconne(?l:ed acts of distributive jus- 
 tice and goodnefs ; and likewise, that it must be a 
 scheme, so imperfec'lly comprehended, and of such a 
 sort in other respects, as to afford a dire(?t general 
 answer to all objections against the justice and good- 
 
128 The Government of God, Part i. 
 
 neft of it : then Analogy is, remotely, of great service 
 in answering those obje^lions ; both by suggesting 
 the answer, and shewing it to be a credible one. 
 Now this, upon inquiry, will be found to be the 
 -^-^ case. For,^r5^, upon supposition that God exercises 
 a moral government over the world, the Analogy of 
 his natural government suggests and makes it cre- 
 dible, that his moral government must be a scheme, 
 quite beyond our comprehension :Nand this affords 
 a general answer to all objections against the justice 
 and goodneft of it. And, secondly, a more distin(5l 
 observation of some particular things contained in 
 God's scheme of natural government, the like things 
 being supposed, by Analogy, to be contained in his 
 moral government, will farther shew, how little weight 
 is to be laid upon these obje(9:ions. 
 
 I. Upon supposition that God exercises a moral 
 government over the world, the Analogy of his na- 
 tural government suggests and makes it credible, 
 that his moral government must be a scheme, quite 
 beyond our comprehension : And this affords a ge- 
 neral answer to all obje(?l:ions against the justice and 
 goodnef^ of it. Itjs jnost obvious^ Analogy renders 
 it highly credible, that upon supposition of a moral 
 government, it must be a scheme ; for the world and 
 the whole natural government of it, appears to be so : 
 to be a scheme, system or constitution, whose parts 
 correspond to each other, and to a whole ; as really 
 as any work of art, or as any particular model of a 
 civil constitution and government. In this great 
 scheme of the natural wo rld, individuals-h a ve vari ous 
 peculiar relationsjto other individuals of their ov/n 
 species. And whole species are, we find, variously 
 related to other species, upon this earth. Nor do 
 we know, how much farther these kinds of relations 
 may extend. And, as there is not any acftion or na- 
 
Chap. 7. A Scheme Incomprehensible. 129 
 
 tural event, which we are acquainted with, so single 
 and unconnected, as not to have a respec^t to some 
 other a(9:ions and events : so pofsibly each of them, 
 when it has not an immediate, may yet have a re- 
 mote, natural relation to other actions and^ events, 
 much beyond the compaf^ of this present world. 
 There seems indeed nothing, from whence we can 
 so much as make a conjecture, whether all creatures, 
 a(5lions and events, throughout the whole of Nature, 
 have relations to each other. But, as it is obvious, 
 that all events have future unknown consequences ; 
 so, if we trace any, as far as we can go, into what is 
 connected with it ; we shall find, that if such event 
 were not connected with somewhat farther in Nature 
 unknown to us, somewhat both past and present, such 
 event could not pofsibly have been at all. Nor can 
 we give the whole account of any one thing what- 
 ever : of all its causes, ends, and necefsary adjun(5ls ; 
 those adjuncts, I mean, without which it could not 
 have been. By this most astonishing connexion, 
 these reciprocal correspondencies and mutual rela- 
 tions, everything which we see in the course of Na- 
 ture, is a(5tually brought about. And things seem- 
 ingly the most insignificant imaginable, are perpe- 
 tually observed to be neceftary conditions to other 
 things of the greatest importance : so that any one 
 thing whatever may, for aught we know to the con- 
 trary, be a neceftary condition to any other. The 
 natural world then, ancLjaatur al government ^ it,, 
 being such an incomprehen sible scheme ;so_mcom- 
 prehensible, that a man must, really in the literal 
 sense, knov/ nothing at all, who is not sensible of his 
 ignorance in it: this immediately suggests^^nd 
 strongly shews the credibility, that tHe^nioral world 
 and government of it may be so too^ Indeed the 
 natural and moral constitution and government of the 
 
 K 
 
130 The Government of God, Part i. 
 
 world are so conne(9:ed, as to make up together but 
 ofiF scheme :.and it i s hig^hly p robable^hat the first 
 is formed and carried-on merely in subserviency^^to 
 the latter ; ks the vegetable world is for the animal, 
 and organized~Bodies for minds. ■ But the thing in- 
 tended here, is, without inquiring how far the admi- 
 nistration of the natural world is subordinate to that 
 of the moral, only to observe the credibility, that one 
 should be analo^;ous_pr^milar to the other : that 
 therefore every aiR of Divine justice and goodnef^, 
 may be supposed to look much beyond itself, and its 
 immediate obje(5l ; may have some reference to other 
 parts of God's moral_axiministm^^^ and to a general 
 moral plan : and that every circumstance of this his 
 moral government, may be adjusted beforehand with 
 a view to the whole of it. Thus for example : the 
 determined lengthoftime, and the degrees and ways, 
 in which^virtue is to remain in a state of warfare and 
 discipline, and in vvTiich wickedneft is permitted to 
 have its progreft ; the times appointed for the exe- 
 cution of justice; the appointed instruments of it ; 
 the kinds of rewards and punishments, and the man- 
 ners of their distribution ; all particular instances of 
 Divine justice and goodneft, and every circumstance 
 of them, may have such respects to each other, as 
 to make up altogether a whole, connected and re- 
 lated in all its parts : a scheme or system, which is 
 as properly one as the natural world is, and of the 
 like kind. And supposing this to be the case ; it is 
 most evident, that we are not competent judges of 
 this scheme, from the small parts of it, which come 
 within our view in the present life : and therefore no 
 objections against any of these parts, can be insisted 
 upon by reasonable men. 
 
 This our ignorance, and the consequence here 
 drawn from it, are universally acknowledged, upon 
 
Chap. 7. A Scheme Incomprehensible. 131 
 
 other occasions ; and, though scarce denied, yet are 
 universally forgot_, when jiersons.come^to argue 
 against Religion. And it is not perhaps easy, even 
 for the most reasonable men, always to bear in mind 
 the degree of our i^orance, and make due allow- 
 ances for it. Upon tEese~accouhts, it may not be 
 uselei^ to go on a little farther, in order to shew more 
 distin6lly, how just an answer our ignorance is, to ia...,.., 
 objections against the scheme of Providence.. Sup- 
 pose then a person boldly to af^ert, that t he things 
 complained of, the origin and continuance of evil, 
 might easily have been prevented by repeated inter- 
 positions;^ i nterpos itions so guarded and circum- <^ -— ^- 
 stanced, as would preclude all mischief arising from 
 them : Or, if this were impracticable, that a scheme 
 of government is itself an imperfection ; since more 
 good might have been produced, without any scheme, 
 system, or constitution at all, by continued single — 
 unrelated aCtsof distributive justice and goodnei^ ;j 
 because these v^ould have occasioned no irregula- 
 rities. And farther than this, it is presumed, the 
 obje(5tions will not be carried. Yet the answer is 
 obvious : that were these aftertions true, still the ob- 
 servations above, concerning our ignorance in the 
 scheme of Divine government, and the consequence 
 drawn from it, would hold, in great measure ; enough 
 to vindicate Religion, against all objections from the 
 disorders of the present state. Were these af^er- 
 tions true, yet the government of the world might 
 be just and good notwithstanding ; for, at the most, 
 they_vvould^mfej^nothir^ more than that it rnight 
 have been better. But indeei3~they are mere arbi- 
 trary ai^ertions : no man being sufficiently acquainted 
 with the poftibilities of things, to bring any proof of 
 
 ' Pp. i35> 136. 
 
132 The Government of God, Parti. 
 
 them, to the lowest degree of probability^ For how- 
 ever pof|i ble w hat is a{^erted may seem ; yet many 
 instanceTmay be alleged, in things much lef^ out of 
 our reach, of suppositions absolutely impoftible, and 
 reducible to the most palpable self-contradicftions, 
 which, not every one by any means would perceive 
 to be such, nor perhaps any one at first sight suspedt. 
 From these things, it is easy to see distin(5lly, how 
 our ignorance, as it is the common, is really a satis- 
 factory answer to all objedlions against the justice 
 and goodneft of Providence. If a man contemplat- 
 ing any one providential dispensation, which had no 
 relation to any others, should object;, that he dis- 
 cerned in it a disregard to justice, or a deficiency of 
 goodneft ; Nothing would be lef^ an answer to such 
 obje(9;ion, than our ignorance in other parts of Pro- 
 vidence, or in the poftibilities of things, no way re- 
 lated to what he was contemplating. But when we 
 know not, but the parts objecfled against may be 
 relative to other parts unknown to us ; and when we 
 are unacquainted with what is, in the nature of the 
 thing, pra(5licable in the case before us ; then our 
 ignorance is a satisfactory answer : Because, some 
 unknown relation, or some unknown impof^ibility, 
 may render what is objected against, just and good; 
 nay good in the highest prac^ticable degree. 
 
 II. And how little weight is to be laid upon such 
 obje(9;ions, will farther appear, by a more distin^l 
 observation of some particular things contained in 
 the natural government of God, the like to which 
 may be supposed, from Analogy, to be contained in 
 his moral government. 
 
 First, As in the scheme of the natural world, no 
 ends appear to be accomplished without means : so 
 we find that means very undesirable, often conduce 
 to bring about ends in such a measure desirable, as 
 
Chap. 7. A Scheme Incomprehensible. 133 
 
 greatly to overbalance the disagreeableneft of the 
 means. And in cases where such means are con- 
 ducive to such ends, it is not reason, but experience, 
 which shews us, that they are thus conducive. Ex- 
 perience also shews many means to be conducive 
 and neceftary to accomplish ends, which means, 
 before experience, we should have thought, would 
 have had even a contrary tendency. Now from these 
 observations relating to the natural scheme of the 
 world, the moral being supposed analogous to it, 
 arises a great credibility, that the putting our misery 
 in each other's power to the degree it is, and making 
 men liable to vice to the degree we are ; and in 
 general, that those things, which are objected against 
 the moral scheme of Providence, may be, upon the 
 whole, friendly and aftistant to virtue, and produc- 
 tive of an over-balance of happineft : i. e. the things 
 objected against, may be means, by which an over- 
 balance of good will, in the end, be found produced. 
 And from the same observations, it appears to be no 
 presumption against this, that we do not, if indeed 
 we do not, see those means to have any such ten- 
 dency ; or that they seem to us to have a contrary 
 one. Thus those things, which we call irregularities, 
 may not be so at all : because they may be means 
 of accomplishing wise and good ends more consider- 
 able. And it may be added, as above,^ that they 
 may also be the only means, by which these wise and 
 good ends are capable of being accomplished. 
 
 After these observations it may be proper to add, 
 in order to obviate an absurd and wicked conclusion 
 from any of them, that though the constitution of our 
 nature from whence we are capable of vice and mi- 
 sery, may, as it undoubtedly does, contribute to the 
 
 2 P. 132. 
 
134 The Government of God, Part i. 
 
 perfecftion and happinef^ of the world ; and though 
 the actual permiision of evil may be beneficial to it : 
 (i. e. it would have been more mischievous, not that 
 a wicked person had himself abstained fi"om his own 
 wickednefk, but that any one had forcibly prevented 
 it, than that it was permitted :) Yet notwithstanding, 
 it might have been much better for the world, if this 
 very evil had never been done. Nay, it is most 
 clearly conceivable, that the very commiftion of 
 wickedneft may be beneficial to the world, and yet, 
 that it would be infinitely more beneficial for men to 
 refrain from it. For thus, in the wise and good con- 
 stitution of the natural world, there are disorders 
 which bring their own cures ; diseases, which are 
 themselves remedies. Many a man would have died, 
 had it not been for the gout or a fever ; yet it would 
 be thought madneft to afkert, that sicknef^ is a better 
 or more perfe(5l state than health ; though the like, 
 with regard to the moral world, has been averted. 
 But, 
 
 Secondly, The natural government of the world is 
 carried on by general laws. For this there may be 
 wise and good reasons : the wisest and best, for aught 
 we know to the contrary. And that there are such 
 reasons, is suggested to our thoughts, by the Ana- 
 logy of Nature ; by our being made to experience 
 good ends to be accomplished, as indeed all the good 
 which we enjoy is accomplished, by this means, that 
 the laws, by which the world is governed, are ge- 
 neral. For we have scarce any kind of enjoyments, 
 but what we are, in some way or other, instrumental 
 in procuring ourselves, by acting in a manner which 
 we foresee likely to procure them : Now this fore- 
 sight could not be at all, were not the government 
 of the world carried on by general laws. And though, 
 for aught we know to the contrary, every single case 
 
Chap. 7. A Scheme Incomprehensible. 135 
 
 may be, at length, found to have been provided for 
 even by these : yet to prevent all irregularities, or 
 remedy them as they arise, by the wisest and best 
 general laws, may be impofsible in the nature of 
 things ; as we see it is absolutely impofsible in civil 
 government. But then we are ready to think, that, 
 the constitution of Nature remaining as it is, and the 
 course of things being permitted to go on, in other 
 respecfts, as it does, there might be interpositions to 
 prevent irregularities ; though they could not have 
 been prevented or remedied by any general laws. 
 And there would indeed be reason to wish, which, 
 by the way, is very different from a right to claim, 
 that all irregularities were prevented or remedied by 
 present interpositions, if these interpositions would 
 have no other effe(5f; than this. But it is plain they 
 would have some visible and immediate bad effec^ts : 
 for instance, they would encourage idlenefs and neg- 
 ligence ; and they would render doubtful the na- 
 tural rule of life, which is ascertained by this very 
 thing, that the course of the world is carried on by 
 general laws. And farther, it is certain they would 
 have distant effe(5ls, and very great ones too ; by 
 means ofthe wonderful connedlions before mentioned.^ 
 So that we cannot so much as guefk, what would be 
 the whole result of the interpositions desired. It 
 may be said, any bad result might be prevented by 
 farther interpositions, whenever there was occasion 
 for them : But this again is talking quite at random, 
 and in the dark.^ Upon the whole then, we see wise 
 reasons, why the course of the world should be 
 carried on by general laws, and good ends accom- 
 plished by this means: And, for aught we know, 
 there may be the wisest reasons for it, and the best 
 
 ^ Pp. 128, Scz. •» Pp. 131, 132. 
 
136 The Government of God, Pari 1. 
 
 ends accomplished by it. We have no ground to 
 believe, that all irregularities could be remedied as 
 they arise, or could have been precluded, by general 
 laws. We find that interpositions would produce 
 evil, and prevent good : And, for aught we know, 
 they would produce greater evil than they would 
 prevent ; and prevent greater good than they would 
 produce. And if this be the case, then the not in- 
 terposing is so far from being a ground of complaint, 
 that it is an instance of goodnei^. This is intelligible 
 and sufficient : and going farther, seems beyond the 
 utmost reach of our faculties. 
 
 But it may be said, that " after all, these supposed 
 " impof^ibilities and relations are what we are unac- 
 " quainted with ; and we must judge of Religion, as 
 *' of other things, by what we do know, and look 
 " upon the rest as nothing : Or however, that the 
 " answers here given to what is objecfled against Re- 
 " ligion, may equally be made use of to invalidate 
 " the proof of it ; since their streft lies so very much 
 *' upon our ignorance." But, 
 
 Firsty Though total ignorance in any matter, does 
 indeed equally destroy, or rather preclude, all proof 
 concerning it, and obje(9;ions against it : yet partial 
 ignorance does not. For we may in any degree, be 
 convinced, that a person is of such a character, and 
 consequently will pursue such ends ; though we are 
 greatly ignorant, what is the proper way of a(9:ing, 
 in order, the most effe(51:ually, to obtain those ends : 
 And in this case, objedlions against his manner of 
 a6ling, as seemingly not conducive to obtain them, 
 might be answered by our ignorance ; though the 
 proof that such ends were intended, might not at all 
 be invalidated by it. Thus, the proof of Religion is 
 a proof of the moral character of God, and conse- 
 quently that his government is moral, and that every 
 
Chap. 7. A Scheme Incomprehensible. 137 
 
 one upon the whole shall receive according to his 
 deserts ; a proof that this is the designed end of his 
 government. But we are not competent judges, 
 what is the proper way of a(5ling, in order the most 
 effectually to accomplish this end.^ Therefore our 
 ignorance is an answer to objecftions against the con- 
 du6l of Providence, in permitting irregularities, as 
 seeming contradictory to this end. Now, since it is 
 so obvious, that our ignorance may be a satisfa(5lory 
 answer to objections against a thing, and yet not 
 affeCl the proof of it ; till it can be shewn, it is fri- 
 volous to aftert, that our ignorance invalidates the 
 proof of Religion, as it does the objections against it. 
 Secondly, Suppose unknown impoftibilities, and 
 unknown relations, might justly be urged to invali- 
 date the proof of Religion, as well as to answer ob- 
 jections against it: And that in consequence of this, 
 the proof of it were doubtful. Yet still, let the as- 
 sertion be despised, or let it be ridiculed, it is unde- 
 niably true, that moral obligations would remain 
 certain, though it were not certain what would, upon 
 the whole, be the consequences of observing or vio- 
 lating them. For, these obligations arise immedi- 
 ately and neceftarily from the judgment of our own 
 mind, unleft perverted, which we cannot violate with- 
 out being self-condemned. And they would be cer- 
 tain too, from considerations of interest. For though 
 it were doubtful, what will be the future consequences 
 of virtue and vice ; yet it is, however, credible, that 
 they may have those consequences, which Religion 
 teaches us they will : And this credibility is a certain® 
 obligation in point of prudence, to abstain from all 
 wickedneft, and to live in the conscientious praCtice 
 of all that is good. But, 
 
 5 Pp. 8, 9. ^ P. 3. and Part II. ch. vi. 
 
138 The Government of God, Parti. 
 
 Thirdly, The answers above given to the objec- 
 tions against Religion, cannot equally be made use 
 of to invalidate the proof of it. For, upon supposi- 
 tion that God exercises a moral government over the 
 world. Analogy does most strongly lead us to con- 
 clude, that this moral government must be a scheme, 
 or constitution, beyond our comprehension. And a 
 thousand particular Analogies shew us, that parts of 
 such a scheme, from their relation to other parts, 
 may conduce to accomplish ends, which we should 
 have thought, they had no tendency at all to accom- 
 plish : nay ends, which before experience, we should 
 have thought such parts were contradictory to, and 
 had a tendency to prevent. And therefore all these 
 Analogies shew, that the way of arguing made use 
 of in obje(51ing against Religion, is delusive : because 
 they shew it is not at all incredible, that, could we 
 comprehend the whole, we should find the permis- 
 sion of the disorders objected against, to be consist- 
 ent with justice and goodneft ; and even to be in- 
 stances of them. Now this is not applicable to the 
 proof of Religion, as it is to the objections against it ;' 
 and therefore cannot invalidate that proof, as it does 
 these obje(5lions. 
 
 Lastly, From the observation now made, it is easy 
 to see, that the answers above given to the objections 
 against Providence, though, in a general way of 
 speaking, they may be said to be taken from our 
 ignorance ; yet are by no means taken merely from 
 that, but from somewhat which Analogy shews us 
 concerning it. For Analogy shews us positively, 
 that our ignorance in the pof^ibilities of things, and 
 the various relations in Nature, renders us incom- 
 petent judges, and leads us to false conclusions, in 
 
 "' Serm. at the Rolh, p. 312, 2nd edit. 
 
Chap. 7. A Scheme Incomprehensible. 139 
 
 cases similar to this, in which we pretend to judge 
 and to obje(5l. So that the things above insisted upon, 
 are not mere suppositions of unknown impofsibilities 
 and relations : but they are suggested to our thoughts, 
 and even forced upon the observation of serious men, 
 and rendered credible too, by the Analogy of Nature. 
 And therefore, to take these things into the account, 
 is to judge by experience and what we do know : and 
 it is not judging so, to take no notice of them. 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 HE observations of the last chapter, 
 lead us to consider this little scene 
 of human life, in which we are so bu- 
 sily engaged, as having a reference, 
 
 of some sort or other, to a much 
 
 larger plan of things. Whether we are, any way, 
 related to the more distant parts of the boundleft 
 universe, into which we are brought, is altogether 
 uncertain. But it is evident, that the course of things, 
 which comes within our view, is connected with 
 somewhat past, present, and future, beyond it.^ So 
 that we are placed, as one may speak, in the middle 
 of a scheme, not a fixed but a progref^ive one, every 
 way incomprehensible : incomprehensible, in a man- 
 ner equally, with respect to what has been, what 
 now is, and what shall be hereafter. And this scheme 
 cannot but contain in it somewhat, as wonderful, and 
 as much beyond our thought and conception,- as 
 anything in that of Religion. For, will any man in 
 
 Pp. 
 
 &c. 
 
 See Part II. ch. 
 
140 Conclusion. Part i. 
 
 his senses say, that it is left difficult to conceive, how 
 the world came to be and to continue as it is, with- 
 out, than with, an intelligent Author and Governor 
 of it ? Or, admitting an intelligent Governor of it, 
 that there is some other rule of government, more 
 natural, and of easier conception, than that, which 
 we call moral 'I Indeed, without an intelligent Author 
 and Governor of nature, no account at all can be 
 given, how this universe, or the part of it particu- 
 larly in which we are concerned, came to be, and 
 the course of it to be carried on, as it is : Nor any, 
 of its general end and design, without a moral Go- 
 vernor of it. That there is an intelligent Author of 
 nature, and natural Governor of the world, is a prin- 
 ciple gone upon in the foregoing treatise, as proved, 
 and generally known and confefted to be proved. 
 And the very notion of an intelligent Author of nature, 
 proved by particular final causes, implies a will and 
 a chara(9:er.'^ Now, as our whole nature, the nature 
 which he has given us, leads us to conclude his will 
 and character to be moral, just, and good : so we 
 can scarce in imagination conceive, what it can be 
 otherwise. However, in consequence of this his will 
 and characfter, whatever it be, he formed the universe 
 as it is, and carries on the course of it as he does, 
 rather than in any other manner ; and has aligned 
 to us, and to all living creatures, a part and a lot in 
 it. Irrational creatures a6l this their part, and enjoy 
 and undergo the pleasures and the pains allotted 
 them, without any refledlion. But one would think 
 it impoftible, that creatures endued with reason could 
 avoid reflecting sometimes upon all this : reflecting, 
 if not from whence we came, yet, at least, whither 
 we are going ; and what the mysterious scheme, in 
 
 » P. 116. 
 
Part I. Conclusion. 141 
 
 the midst of which we find ourselves, will, at length, 
 come out, and produce : a scheme in which it is 
 certain we are highly interested, and in which we 
 may be interested even beyond conception. For 
 many things prove it palpably absurd to conclude, 
 that we shall cease to be, at death. Particular Ana- 
 logies do most sensibly shew us, that there is nothing 
 to be thought strange, in our being to exist in ano- 
 ther state of life. And that we are now living beings, 
 affords a strong probability, that we shall continue 
 so ; unlefs there be some positive ground, and there 
 is none from Reason or Analogy, to think death will 
 destroy us. Were a persuasion of this kind ever so 
 well grounded, there would, surely, be little reason 
 to take pleasure in it. But indeed it can have no 
 other ground, than some such imagination, as that 
 of our grof^ bodies being ourselves : which is con- 
 trary to experience. Experience too most clearly 
 shews us the folly of concluding, from the body and the 
 living agent affedling each other mutually, that the 
 dif^olution of the former is the destruction of the 
 latter. And there are remarkable instances of their 
 not affe(9:ing each other, which lead us to a contrary 
 conclusion. The supposition then, which in all rea- 
 son we are to go upon, is, that our living nature will 
 continue after death. And it is infinitely unreason- 
 able to form an institution of life, or to a(5l, upon 
 any other supposition. Now all expecftation of im- 
 mortality, whether more or left certain, opens an 
 unbounded prospect to our hopes and our fears: 
 since we see the constitution of Nature is such, as 
 to admit of misery as well as to be produ(9:ive of 
 happineft, and experience ourselves to partake of 
 both in some degree ; and since we cannot but know, 
 what higher degrees of both we are capable of. And 
 there is no presumption against believing farther, 
 
142 Conclusion. Part i. 
 
 that our future interest depends upon our present 
 behaviour : For we see our present interest doth ; 
 and that the happinei^ and misery, which are natu- 
 rally annexed to our ac^lions, very frequently do not 
 follow, till long after the actions are done, to which 
 they are respe61:ively annexed. So that were spe- 
 culation to leave us uncertain, whether it were likely, 
 that the Author of nature, in giving happineft and 
 misery to his creatures, hath regard to their a(5lions 
 or not : yet, since we find by experience, that he 
 hath such regard, the whole sense of things which 
 he has given us, plainly leads us, at once and with- 
 out any elaborate inquiries, to think, that it may, in- 
 deed must, be to good a(51ions chiefly that he hath 
 annexed happineft, and to bad actions misery ; or 
 that he will, upon the whole, reward those who do 
 well, and punish those who do evil. To confirm this 
 from the constitution of the world, it has been ob- 
 served ; that some sort of moral government is ne- 
 cef^arily implied in that natural government of God, 
 which we experience ourselves under : that good and 
 bad a(9;ions, at present, are naturally rewarded and 
 punished, not only as beneficial and mischievous to 
 society : but also as virtuous and vicious : and that 
 there is, in the very nature of the thing, a tendency 
 to their being rewarded and punished in a much 
 higher degree, than they are at present. And though 
 this higher degree of distributive justice, which Na- 
 ture thus points out and leads towards, is prevented 
 for a time from taking place : it is by obstacles, 
 which the state of this world unhappily throws in its 
 way, and which therefore are in their nature tem- 
 porary. Now, as these things in the natural condu(ft 
 of Providence, are observable on the side of virtue ; 
 so there is nothing to be set against them, on the 
 side of vice. A moral scheme of government then, 
 
Part I. Conclusion. 143 
 
 is visibly established, and, in some degree, carried 
 into execution : And this, together with the eftential 
 tendencies of virtue and vice duly considered, natu- 
 rally raise in us an apprehension, that it will be car- 
 ried on farther towards perfe(5lion, in a future state, 
 and that every one shall there receive according to 
 his deserts. And if this be so, then our future and 
 general interest, under the moral government of God, 
 is appointed to depend upon our behaviour ; not- 
 withstanding the difficulty, which this may occasion, 
 of securing it, and the danger of losing it : just in 
 the same manner as our temporal interest, under his 
 natural government, is appointed to depend upon our 
 behaviour; notwithstanding the like difficulty and 
 danger. For, from our original constitution and that 
 of the world which we inhabit, we are naturally 
 trusted with ourselves; with our own condu(fl: and 
 our ow^n interest. And from the same constitution 
 of Nature, especially joined with that course of things 
 which is owing to men, we have temptations to be 
 unfaithful in this trust ; to forfeit this interest, to neg- 
 lect!: it, and run ourselves into misery and ruin. 
 From these temptations arise, the difficulties of be- 
 having so as to secure our temporal interest, and the 
 hazard of behaving so as to miscarry in it. There 
 is therefore nothing incredible in supposing, there 
 may be the like difficulty and hazard with regard to 
 that chief and final good, which Religion lays before 
 us. Indeed the whole account, how^ it came to paf^, 
 that we w^ere placed in such a condition as this ; 
 must be beyond our comprehension. But it is in 
 part accounted for by what Religion teaches us, that 
 the chara(fler of virtue and piety must be a neceftary 
 qualification for a future state of security and hap- 
 pineft, under the moral government of God ; in like 
 manner, as some certain qualifications or other are 
 
144 Conclusion. Part i. 
 
 neceftary for every particular condition of life, under 
 his natural government : And that the present state 
 was intended to be a school of discipline, for im- 
 proving in ourselves that chara(5ler. Now this in- 
 tention of Nature is rendered highly credible by ob- 
 serving ; that we are plainly made for improvement 
 of all kinds : that it is a general appointment of Pro- 
 vidence, that we cultivate pra(?i:ical principles, and 
 form within ourselves habits of a(51ion, in order to 
 become fit for, what we were wholly unfit for before : 
 that in particular, childhood and youth is naturally 
 appointed to be a state of discipline for mature age : 
 and that the present world is peculiarly fitted for a 
 state of moral discipline. And, whereas objecftions 
 are urged against the whole notion of moral govern- 
 ment and a probation-state, from the opinion of ne- 
 cef^ity ; it has been shewn, that God has given us 
 the evidence, as it were, of experience, that all ob- 
 jections against Religion, on this head, are vain and 
 delusive. He has also, in his natural government, 
 suggested an answer to all our short-sighted objec- 
 tions, against the equity and goodneft of his moral 
 government : And in general he has exemplified to 
 us the latter by the former. 
 
 These things, which, it is to be remembered, are 
 matters of fact, ought, in all common sense, to 
 awaken mankind ; to induce them to consider in ear- 
 nest their condition, and what they have to do. It 
 is absurd, absurd to the degree of being ridiculous, 
 if the subjeCl were not of so serious a kind, for men 
 to think themselves secure in a vicious life ; or even 
 in that immoral thoughtleftneft, which far the great- 
 est part of them are fallen into. And the credibility 
 of Religion arising from experience and fa(9:s here 
 considered, is fully sufficient, in reason, to engage 
 them to live in the general practice of all virtue and 
 
Part I. Conclusion. 145 
 
 piety ; under the serious apprehension, though it 
 should be mixed with some doubt,^ of a righteous 
 administration established in Nature, and a future 
 judgment in consequence of it : Especially when we 
 consider, how very questionable it is, whether any- 
 thing at all can be gained by vice;^ how unques- 
 tionably little, as well as precarious, the pleasures 
 and profits of it are at the best ; and how soon they 
 must be parted with at the longest. For, in the de- 
 liberations of reason, concerning what we are to 
 pursue, and what to avoid, as temptations to anything 
 from mere paf^ion, are supposed out of the case : 
 So inducements to vice, from cool expectations of 
 pleasure and interest so small and uncertain and 
 short, are really so insignificant, as, in the view of 
 reason, to be almost nothing in themselves : And in 
 comparison with the importance of Religion, they 
 quite disappear and are lost. Mere paf^ion indeed 
 may be alleged, though not as a reason, yet as an 
 excuse, for a vicious course of life. And how sorry 
 an excuse it is, will be manifest by observing, that 
 we are placed in a condition, in which we are un- 
 avoidably inured to govern our paf^ions, by being 
 necef^itated to govern them ; and to lay ourselves 
 under the same kind of restraints, and as great ones 
 too, from temporal regards, as virtue and piety, in 
 the ordinary course of things, require. The plea of 
 ungovernable paf^ion then, on the side of vice, is the 
 poorest of all things : for it is no reason, and but a 
 poor excuse. But the proper motives to Religion, 
 are the proper proofs of it, from our moral nature, 
 from the presages of conscience, and our natural 
 apprehension of God under the characfter of a righte- 
 ous Governor and Judge ; a nature and conscience 
 
 * Part II. ch. vi. 5 p^ ^g 
 
146 Coiiclusion. Part i. 
 
 and apprehension given us by him : and from the 
 confirmation of the dictates of reason, by life and 
 immortality brought to light by the Gospel ; and the 
 wrath of God revealed from Heaven, against all un- 
 godlinefs and unrighteousnefi of men. 
 
 The End of the First Part. 
 
THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION TO THE 
 
 CONSTITUTION AND COURSE 
 
 OF NATURE. 
 
 PART II. — Of Revealed Religion. 
 CHAP. I. — Of the Importance of Christianity. 
 
 OME persons, upon pretence of the 
 sufficiency of the light of Nature, 
 avowedly reject all Revelation, as, in 
 its very notion, incredible, and what 
 miist be ficT:itious. And indeed it is 
 certain, no Revelation would have been given, had 
 the light of Nature been sufficient in such a sense, 
 as to render one not wanting and useleft. But no 
 man, in seriousneft and simplicity of mind, can pos- 
 sibly think it so, who considers the state of Religion 
 in the heathen world, before Revelation, and its pre- 
 sent state in those places which have borrowed no 
 light from it : particularly, the doubtfulneft of some 
 of the greatest men, concerning things of the utmost 
 importance, as well as the natural inattention and 
 ignorance of mankind in general. It is impof^ible to 
 say, who would have been able to have reasoned out 
 that whole system, which we call natural Religion, 
 
148 Of the Importance Part 2. 
 
 in its genuine simplicity, clear of superstition : but 
 there is certainly no ground to affirm, that the ge- 
 nerality could. If they could, there is no sort of 
 probability, that they would. Admitting there were, 
 they would highly want a standing admonition, to 
 remind them of it, and inculcate it upon them. And 
 farther still, were they as much disposed to attend 
 to Religion, as the better sort of men are : yet even 
 upon this supposition, there would be various occa- 
 sions for supernatural instru(5lion and aftistance, and 
 the greatest advantages might be afforded by them. 
 So that to say. Revelation is a thing superfluous, 
 what there was no need of, and what can be of no 
 service ; is, I think, to talk quite wildly and at ran- 
 dom. Nor would it be more extravagant to affirm, 
 that mankind is so entirely at ease in the present 
 state, and life so completely happy ; that it is a con- 
 tradi(5lion to suppose our condition capable of being, 
 in any respe61:, better. 
 
 There are other persons, not to be ranked with 
 these, who seem to be getting into a way of neglecft- 
 ing, and, as it were, overlooking Revelation, as of 
 small importance, provided natural Religion be kept 
 to. With little regard, either to the evidence of the 
 former, or to the objec^tions against it, and even upon 
 supposition of its truth ; " the only design of it," say 
 they, " must be, to establish a belief of the moral 
 " system of Nature, and to enforce the pra^lice of 
 " natural piety and virtue. The belief and practice 
 " of these things were, perhaps, much promoted by 
 *' the first publication of Christianity : But whether 
 " they are believed and pra(9:ised, upon the evidence 
 " and motives of Nature or of Revelation, is no great 
 "matter."^ This way of considering Revelation, 
 
 ' Invenis multos propterea nolle fieri Christianos, quia 
 
 quasi sufficiunt sibi de bona vita sua. Bene vivere opus est, ait. 
 
Chap. 1. of Christianity. 149 
 
 though it is not the same with the former, yet bor- 
 ders nearly upon it, and very much, at length, runs up 
 into it : and requires to be particularly considered, 
 with regard to the persons, who seem to be getting 
 into this way. The consideration of it will likewise 
 farther shew the extravagance of the former opinion, 
 and the truth of the observations in answer to it, just 
 mentioned. And an inquiry into the importance of 
 Christianity, cannot be an improper introduction to 
 a treatise concerning the credibility of it. 
 
 Now if God has given a Revelation to mankind, 
 and commanded those things, which are commanded 
 in Christianity ; it is evident, at first sight, that it 
 cannot in any wise be an indifferent matter, whether 
 we obey or disobey those commands : unlef^ we are 
 certainly aftured, that we know all the reasons for 
 them, and that all those reasons are now ceased, 
 with regard to mankind in general, or to ourselves 
 in particular. And it is absolutely impofsible, we 
 can be ai^ured of this. For our ignorance of these 
 reasons proves nothing in the case : since the whole 
 Analogy of Nature shews, what is indeed in itself 
 evident, that there may be infinite reasons for things, 
 with which we are not acquainted. 
 
 But the importance of Christianity will more dis- 
 tin(9;ly appear, by considering it more distindlly : 
 First, as a republication, and external institution, of 
 natural or ef^ential Religion, adapted to the present 
 circumstances of mankind, and intended to promote 
 natural piety and virtue : And secondly, as contain- 
 
 Qt£id mihi praecepturus est Christus ? Ut bene vivam ? Jam bene 
 vivo. Quid mihi necefsarius est Christus ? Nullum homicidium, 
 nullum furtum, nullam rapinam facio, res alienas non concupisco, 
 nullo adulterio contaminor. Nam inveniatur in vita mea aliquid 
 quod reprehenditur, et qui reprehenderit faciat Christianum. — 
 yiug. in Psal. xxxi. 
 
150 Of the Importance Part 2. 
 
 ing an account of a dispensation of things, not dis- 
 coverable by Reason, in consequence of which, se- 
 veral distinct precepts are enjoined us. For though 
 natural Religion is the foundation and principal part 
 of Christianity, it is not in any sense the whole of it. 
 
 I. Christianity is a republication of natural Reli- 
 gion. It instru(5ls mankind in the moral system of 
 the world : that it is the work of an infinitely perfect 
 Being, and under his government ; that virtue is his 
 law ; and that he will finally judge mankind in righte- 
 ousnef^, and render to all according to their works, 
 in a future state. And, which is very material, it 
 teaches natural Religion, in its genuine simplicity ; 
 free from those superstitions, with which it was to- 
 tally corrupted, and under which it was in a manner 
 lost. 
 
 Revelation is farther, an authoritative publication 
 of natural Religion, and so affords the evidence of 
 testimony for the truth of it. Indeed the miracles 
 and prophecies recorded in Scripture, were intended 
 to prove a particular dispensation of Providence, the 
 redemption of the world by the Mef^iah : But this 
 does not hinder, but that they may also prove God's 
 general Providence over the world, as our moral 
 Governor and Judge. And they evidently do prove 
 it ; because this chara(5ter of the Author of nature, 
 is necefsarily connected with and implied in that 
 particular revealed dispensation of things : It is like- 
 wise continually taught exprefsly, and insisted upon, 
 by those persons, who wrought the miracles and 
 delivered the prophecies. So that indeed natural 
 Religion seems as much proved by the Scripture Re- 
 velation, as it would have been, had the design of 
 Revelation been nothing else than to prove it. 
 / But it may pof^ibly be disputed, how far miracles 
 can prove natural Religion ; and notable objections 
 
Chap. I. of Christianity. 151 
 
 may be urged against this proof of it, considered as 
 a matter of speculation : But considered as a prac- 
 tical thing, there can be none. For suppose a per- 
 son *to teach natural Religion to a nation, who had 
 lived in total ignorance or forgetfulnef^ of it ; and 
 to declare he was commii^ioned by God so to do : 
 Suppose him, in proof of his commii^ion, to foretel 
 things future, which no human foresight could have 
 guef^ed at ; to divide the sea with a word ; feed great 
 multitudes with bread from Heaven ; cure all man- 
 ner of diseases ; and raise the dead, even himself, to 
 life : Would not this give additional credibility to his 
 teaching, a credibility beyond what that of a com- 
 mon man would have ; and be an authoritative pub- 
 lication of the Law of Nature, i. e. a new proof of it *? 
 It would be a practical one, of the strongest kind, 
 perhaps, which human creatures are capable of 
 having given them. The law of Moses then, and 
 the Gospel of Christ, are authoritative publications 
 of the Religion of Nature : They afford a proof of 
 God's general Providence, as moral Governor of the 
 world ; as well as of his particular dispensations of 
 Providence towards sinful creatures, revealed in the 
 Law and the Gospel. As they are the only evidence 
 of the latter ; so they are an additional evidence of the 
 former. 
 
 To shew this further, let us suppose a man of the 
 greatest and most improved capacity, who had never 
 heard of Revelation, convinced upon the whole, not- 
 withstanding the disorders of the world, that it was 
 under the direction and moral government of an in- 
 finitely perfe(51 Being; but ready to question, whether 
 he were not got beyond the reach of his faculties : 
 Suppose him brought, by this suspicion, into great 
 danger of being carried away by the universal bad 
 example of almost every one around him, who ap- 
 
152 Of the Importance Part 2. 
 
 peared to have no sense, no pra(5lical sense at least, 
 of these things : And this, perhaps, would be as ad- 
 vantageous a situation with regard to Religion, as 
 Nature alone ever placed any man in. What a con- 
 firmation now must it be to such a person, all at once, 
 to find, that this moral system of things was revealed 
 to mankind, in the name of that infinite Being, whom 
 he had from principles of Reason believed in ; and 
 that the publishers of the Revelation proved their 
 commif^ion from him, by making it appear, that he 
 had intrusted them with a power of suspending and 
 changing the general laws of Nature. 
 
 Nor must it by any means be omitted, for it is a 
 thing of the utmost importance, that life and im- 
 mortality are eminently brought to light by the Gos- 
 pel. The great do(?l:rines of a future state, the danger 
 of a course of wickedneft, and the efficacy of Re- 
 pentance, are not only confirmed in the Gospel, but 
 are taught, especially the last is, with a degree of 
 light, to which that of Nature is but darknefs. 
 
 Farther: As Christianity served these ends and 
 purposes, when it was first published, by the mira- 
 culous publication itself; so it was intended to serve 
 the same purposes, in future ages, by means of the 
 settlement of a visible Church : of a society, distin- 
 guished from common ones, and from the rest of the 
 world, by peculiar religious institutions ; by an insti- 
 tuted method of instruction, and an instituted form 
 of external Religion. Miraculous powers were given 
 to the first preachers of Christianity, in order to their 
 introducing it into the world : A visible Church was 
 established, in order to continue it, and carry it on 
 succef^ively throughout all ages. Had Moses and 
 the Prophets, Christ and his Apostles, only taught, 
 and by miracles proved. Religion to their cotempo- 
 raries ; the benefits of their instru(5lions would have 
 
Chap. I. of Christianity. 153 
 
 reached but to a small part of mankind. Christianity 
 must have been, in a great degree, sunk and forgot 
 in a very few ages. To prevent this, appears to have 
 been one reason, why a visible Church was instituted : 
 to be, like a city upon a hill, a standing memorial to 
 the world of the duty which we owe our Maker : to 
 call men continually, both by example and instruc- 
 tion, to attend to it ; and by the form of Religion 
 ever before their eyes, remind them of the reality : 
 to be the repository of the oracles of God : to hold 
 up the light of Revelation in aid to that of Nature, 
 and propagate it throughout all generations to the 
 end of the world the light of Revelation, consi- 
 dered here in no other view, than as designed to 
 enforce natural Religion. And in proportion as Chris- 
 tianity is profel^ed and taught in the world, Religion, 
 natural or efsential Religion, is thus distin(fHy and 
 advantageously laid before mankind ; and brought 
 again and again to their thoughts, as a matter of in- 
 finite importance. A visible Church has also a farther 
 tendency to promote natural Religion, as being an 
 instituted method of education, originally intended 
 to be of more peculiar advantage to those who would 
 conform to it. For one end of the institution was, 
 that by admonition and reproof, as well as instruc- 
 tion ; by a general regular discipline, and public ex- 
 ercises of Religion ; the body of Christ, as the Scrip- 
 ture speaks, should be edified, i.e. trained up in piety 
 and virtue, for a higher and better state. This set- 
 tlement then appearing thus beneficial ; tending in 
 the nature of the thing to answer, and in some de- 
 gree a(5lually answering, those ends ; it is to be re- 
 membered, that the very notion of it implies positive 
 institutions: for the visibility of the Church consists 
 in them. Take away everything of this kind, and 
 you lose the very notion itself. So that if the things 
 
154 Of the Importance Part 2. 
 
 now mentioned are advantages, the reason and im- 
 portance of positive institutions in general, is most 
 obvious ; since without them, these advantages could 
 not be secured to the world. And it is mere idle 
 wantonnef^, to insist upon knowing the reasons, why 
 such particular ones were fixed upon, rather than 
 others. 
 
 The benefit arising from this supernatural ai^ist- 
 ance, which Christianity affords to natural Religion, 
 is what some persons are very slow in apprehending. 
 And yet it is a thing distinct in itself, and a very 
 plain obvious one. For will any in good earnest 
 really say, that the bulk of mankind in the heathen 
 world, were in as advantageous a situation, with re- 
 gard to natural Religion, as they are now amongst 
 us : That it was laid before them, and enforced upon 
 them, in a manner as distin^l, and as much tending 
 to influence their practice ? 
 
 The objections against all this, from the perversion 
 of Christianity, and from the supposition of its having 
 had but little good influence, however innocently 
 they may be proposed, yet cannot be insisted upon 
 as conclusive, upon any principles, but such as lead 
 to downright Atheism : Because the manifestation 
 of the Law of Nature by Reason, which, upon all 
 principles of Theism, must have been from God, has 
 been perverted and rendered inefle^lual in the same 
 manner. It may indeed, I think, truly be said, that 
 the good effecfts of Christianity have not been small : 
 nor its supposed ill efle(51s, any effed^s at all of it, 
 properly speaking. Perhaps too the things them- 
 selves done, have been aggravated: And if not, 
 Christianity hath been often only a pretence : And the 
 same evils in the main would have been done, upon 
 some other pretence. However, great and shocking 
 as the corruptions and abuses of it have really been, 
 
Chap. 1. of Christianity. 155 
 
 they cannot be insisted upon as arguments against 
 it, upon principles of Theism. For one cannot pro- 
 ceed one step in reasomng upon natural Religion, 
 any more than upon Christianity, without laying it 
 down as a first principle, that the dispensations of 
 Providence are not to be judged of, by their perver- 
 sions, but by their genuine tendencies : not by what 
 they do actually seem to effect:, but by what they 
 would effedl if mankind did their part ; That part 
 which is justly put and left upon them. It is alto- 
 gether as much the language of one, as of the other ; 
 He that is unjust, let him be unjust still : and he that 
 is holy, let him he holy still.- The light of Reason 
 does not, any more than that of Revelation, force 
 men to submit to its authority : Both admonish them 
 of what they ought to do and avoid, together with 
 the consequences of each ; and after this, leave them 
 at full liberty to act just as they please, till the ap- 
 pointed time of judgment. Every moment's ex- 
 perience shews, that this is God's general rule of 
 government. 
 
 To return then : Christianity being a promulga- 
 tion of the Law of Nature ; being moreover an au- 
 thoritative promulgation of it ; with new light, and 
 other circumstances of peculiar advantage, adapted 
 to the wants of mankind ; these things fully shew its 
 importance. And it is to be observed farther, that, 
 as the nature of the case requires, so all Christians 
 are commanded to contribute, by their profef^ion of 
 Christianity, to preserve it in the world, and render 
 it such a promulgation and enforcement of Religion. 
 For it is the very scheme of the Gospel, that each 
 Christian should, in his degree, contribute towards 
 continuing and carrying it on : all by uniting in the 
 
156 Of the Importance Part 2. 
 
 public profef^ion and external pra(9;ice of Christi- 
 anity ; some by instructing-, by having the oversight 
 and taking care of this religious community, the 
 Church of God. Now this farther shews the im- 
 portance of Christianity ; and, which is what I chiefly 
 intend, its importance in a pra(5lical sense : or the 
 high obligations we are under, to take it into our 
 most serious consideration; and the danger there 
 must neceftarily be, not only in treating it despite- 
 fully, which I am not now speaking of, but in disre- 
 garding and neglecting it. For this is neglecting to 
 do what is expreftly enjoined us, for continuing those 
 benefits to the world, and transmitting them down 
 to future times. And all this holds, even though the 
 only thing to be considered in Christianity, were its 
 subserviency to natural Religion. But, 
 
 II. Christianity is to be considered in a further 
 view : as containing an account of a dispensation of 
 things, not at all discoverable by Reason, in conse- 
 quence of which several distinCl precepts are enjoined 
 us. Christianity is not only an external institution 
 of natural Religion, and a new promulgation of God's 
 general Providence, as righteous Governor and Judge 
 of the world ; but it contains also a Revelation of a 
 particular dispensation of Providence, carrying on 
 by his Son and Spirit, for the recovery and salvation 
 of mankind, who are represented, in Scripture, to be 
 in a state of ruin. And in consequence of this Re- 
 velation being made, we are commanded to be bap- 
 tized, not only in the name of the Father, but also, of 
 the Son, and of the Holy Ghost : and other obliga- 
 tions of duty, unknown before, to the Son and the 
 Holy Ghost, are revealed. Now the importance of 
 these duties may be judged of, by observing that they 
 arise, not from positive command merely ; but also 
 from the offices, which appear, from Scripture, to 
 
Chap, I. of Christianity. 157 
 
 belong to those Divine Persons in the Gospel dis- 
 pensation ; or from the relations, which, we are there 
 informed, they stand in to us. By Reason is re- 
 vealed the relation, which God the Father stands in 
 to us. Hence arises the obligation of duty, which 
 we are under to him. In Scripture are revealed the 
 relations, which the Son and Holy Spirit stand in to 
 us. Hence arise the obligations of duty, which we 
 are under to them. The truth of the case, as one 
 may speak, in each of these three respe(5ls being 
 admitted : that God is the Governor of the world, 
 upon the evidence of Reason ; that Christ is the Me- 
 diator between God and man, and the Holy Ghost 
 our Guide and Sanclifier, upon the evidence of Re- 
 velation : the truth of the case, I say, in each of these 
 respe<5ls being admitted ; it is no more a question, 
 why it should be commanded, that we be baptized 
 in the name of the Son and of the Holy Ghost, than 
 that we be baptized in the name of the Father. This 
 matter seems to require to be more fully stated.'^ 
 
 Let it be remembered then, that Religion comes 
 under the twofold consideration of internal and ex- 
 ternal : for the latter is as real a part of Religion, of 
 true Religion, as the former. Now when Religion 
 is considered under the first notion, as an inward 
 principle, to be exerted in such and such inward a<5ls 
 of the mind and heart ; the eftence of natural Reli- 
 gion may be said to consist in religious regards to 
 God the Father Almighty: and the ei^ence of re- 
 vealed Religion, as distinguished from natural, to 
 consist in religious regards to the Son, and to the 
 Holy Ghost. And the obligation we are under, of 
 paying these religious regards to each of these Di- 
 
 ^ See, the nature, obligation, and efficacy, of the Christian 
 Sacraments, &c. and Colliber of Revealed Religion, as there 
 quoted. 
 
158 Of the Importance Part 2. 
 
 vine Persons respec^iively, arises from the respective 
 relations, which they each stand in to us. How these 
 relations are made known, whether by Reason or 
 Revelation, makes no alteration in the case : because 
 the duties arise out of the relations themselves, not 
 out of the manner in which we are informed of them. 
 The Son and Spirit have each his proper office, in 
 that great dispensation of Providence, the redemp- 
 tion of the world : the one our Mediator, the other 
 our Sandlifier. Does not then the duty of religious 
 regards to both these Divine Persons, as immediately 
 arise, to the view of Reason, out of the very nature 
 of these offices and relations ; as the inward good- 
 will and kind intention, which we owe to our fellow- 
 creatures, arise out of the common relations be- 
 tween us and them 1 But it will be asked, " What 
 " are the inward religious regards, appearing thus 
 *' obviously due to the Son and Holy Spirit ; as arising, 
 " not merely from command in Scripture, but from 
 " the very nature of the revealed relations, which 
 " they stand in to us ?" I answer, the religious re- 
 gards of reverence, honour, love, trust, gratitude, 
 fear, hope. In what external manner, this inward 
 worship is to be exprefted, is a matter of pure re- 
 vealed command ; as perhaps the external manner, 
 in which God the Father is to be worshipped, may 
 be more so, than we are ready to think : But the 
 worship, the internal worship itself, to the Son and 
 Holy Ghost, is no farther matter of pure revealed 
 command, than as the relations they stand in to us 
 are matter of pure Revelation : for the relations being 
 known, the obligations to such internal worship are 
 obligations of Reason, arising out of those relations 
 themselves. In short, the history of the Gospel as 
 immediately shews us the reason of these obligations, 
 as it shews us the meaning of the words, Son and 
 Holy Ghost. 
 
Chap. I. of Christianity. 159 
 
 If this account of the Christian Religion be just ; 
 those persons who can speak lightly of it, as of little 
 consequence, provided natural Religion be kept to, 
 plainly forget, that Christianity, even what is pecu- 
 liarly so called, as distinguished from natural Reli- 
 gion, has yet somewhat very important, even of a 
 moral nature. For the office of our Lord being 
 made known, and the relation he stands in to us, the 
 obligation of religious regards to him, is plainly 
 moral ; as much as charity to mankind is ; since this 
 obligation arises, before external command, imme- 
 diately out of that his office and relation itself Those 
 persons appear to forget, that Revelation is to be 
 considered, as informing us of somewhat new, in the 
 state of mankind, and in the government of the 
 world : as acquainting us with some ' relations we 
 stand in, which could not otherwise have been known. 
 And these relations being real, (though before Re- 
 velation we could be under no obligations from them, 
 yet upon their being revealed,) there is no reason 
 to think, but that neglecft of behaving suitably to 
 them, will be attended with the same kind of conse- 
 quences under God's government ; as negleci:ing to 
 behave suitably to any other relations made known 
 to us by Reason. And ignorance, whether unavoid- 
 able or voluntary ; so far as we can poftibly see, will, 
 just as much, and just as little, excuse in one case as 
 in the other : the ignorance being supposed equally 
 unavoidable, or equally voluntary, in both cases. 
 
 If therefore Christ be indeed the Mediator be- 
 tween God and man, i. e. if Christianity be true ; if 
 he be indeed our Lord, our Saviour, and our God ; 
 no one can say, what may follow, not only the ob- 
 stinate, but the careleft disregard to him, in those 
 high relations. Nay no one can say, what may fol- 
 low such disregard, even in the way of natural con- 
 
l6o Of the Importance Part 2. 
 
 sequence.^ For, as the natural consequences of vice 
 in this life, are doubtlef^ to be considered, as judicial 
 punishments infli(5led by God ; so likewise, for aught 
 we know, the judicial punishments of the future life 
 may be, in a like way or a like sense, the natural 
 consequence of vice : ^ of men's violating or disre- 
 garding the relations, which God has placed them 
 in here, and made known to them. 
 
 Again : If mankind are corrupted and depraved 
 in their moral charac^ter, and so are unfit for that 
 state, which Christ is gone to prepare for his dis- 
 ciples ; and if the aftistance of God's Spirit be ne- 
 ceftary to renew their nature, in the degree requi- 
 site to their being qualified for that state ; all which 
 is implied in the exprei^, though figurative declara- 
 tion. Except a man be born of the Spirit, he cannot 
 enter into the kingdom of God :^ Supposing this, is 
 it pofsible any serious person can think it a slight 
 matter, whether or no he makes use of the means, 
 expref^ly commanded by God, for obtaining this Di- 
 vine aftistance f Especially since the whole Analogy 
 of Nature shews, that we are not to expect any be- 
 nefits, without making use of the appointed means 
 for obtaining or enjoying them. Now Reason shews 
 us nothing, of the particular immediate means of 
 obtaining, either temporal or spiritual benefits. This 
 therefore we must learn, either from experience or 
 Revelation. And experience, the present case does 
 not admit of. 
 
 The conclusion from all this evidently is ; that, 
 Christianity being supposed either true or credible, 
 it is unspeakable irreverence, and really the most 
 presumptuous rashnef^, to treat it as a light matter. 
 It can never justly be esteemed of little consequence, 
 
 * Pp. 30, 31. ^ Ch. V. ^ John iii. 5. 
 
Chap. I. of Christianity. l6l 
 
 till it be positively supposed false. Nor do I know 
 a higher and more important obligation which we 
 are under, than that, of examining most seriously 
 into the evidence of it, supposing its credibility ; and 
 of embracing it, upon supposition of its truth. 
 
 The two following dedu(5lions may be proper to 
 be added, in order to illustrate the foregoing obser- 
 vations, and to prevent their being mistaken. 
 
 First, Hence we may clearly see, where lies the 
 distindl;ion between what is positive and what is moral 
 in Religion. Moral precepts are precepts, the rea- 
 sons of which we see : Positive precepts are precepts, 
 the reasons of which we do not see.'' Moral duties 
 arise out of the nature of the case itself, prior to ex- 
 ternal command. Positive duties do not arise out of 
 the nature of the case ; but from external command : 
 Nor would they be duties at all, were it not for such 
 command, received from him whose creatures and 
 subjects we are. But the manner in which the na- 
 ture of the case, or the fa(5l of the relation, is made 
 known, this doth not denominate any duty either 
 positive or moral. That we be baptized in the name 
 of the Father, is as much a positive duty, as that we 
 be baptized in the name of the Son; because both 
 arise equally from revealed command : though the 
 relation which we stand in to God the Father, is 
 made known to us by Reason ; the relation we stand 
 in to Christ, by Revelation only. On the other hand, 
 the dispensation of the Gospel admitted, gratitude 
 
 ' This is the distinftion between moral and positive precepts, 
 considered respeftiveljr as such. But yet, since the latter have 
 somewhat of a moral nature, we may see the reason of them, 
 considered in this view. Moral and positive precepts are, in 
 some respefts alike, in other respedls different. So far as they 
 are like, we discern the reasons of both : So far as they are dif- 
 ferent, we discern the reasons of the former, but not of the 
 latter. See pp. 152, &c. and p. 162. 
 M 
 
i62 Of the Importance Parti, 
 
 as immediately becomes due to Christ, from his being 
 the voluntary Minister of this dispensation ; as it is 
 due to God the Father, from his being the Fountain 
 of all good : though the first is made known to us, 
 by Revelation only ; the second, by Reason. Hence 
 also we may see, and, for distindlneft sake, it may 
 be worth mentioning, that positive institutions eome 
 under a twofold consideration. They are either in- 
 stitutions founded on natural Religion, as baptism in 
 the name of the Father ; though this has also a par- 
 ticular reference to the Gospel -dispensation, for it is 
 in the name of God, as the Father of our Lord Jesus 
 Christ : Or they are external institutions founded on 
 revealed Religion ; as baptism in the name of the 
 Son, and of the Holy Ghost. 
 
 Secondly, From the distindlion between what is 
 moral and what is positive in Religion, appears the 
 ground of that peculiar preference, which the Scrip- 
 ture teaches us to be due to the former. 
 
 The reason of positive institutions in general, is 
 very obvious : though we should not see the reason, 
 why such particular ones are pitched upon, rather 
 than others. Whoever therefore, instead of cavilling 
 at words, will attend to the thing itself, may clearly 
 see, that positive institutions in general, as distin- 
 guished from this or that particular one, have the 
 nature of moral commands : since the reasons of 
 them appear. Thus, for instance, the external wor- 
 ship of God is a moral duty, though no particular 
 mode of it be so. Care then is to be taken, when a 
 comparison is made between positive and moral du- 
 ties, that they be compared, no farther than as they 
 are different : no farther than as the former are po- 
 sitive, or arise out of mere external command, the 
 reasons of which we are not acquainted with ; and 
 as the latter are moral, or arise out of the apparent 
 
Chap. I. of Christianity. 163 
 
 reason of the case, without such external command. 
 Unleft this caution be observed, we shall run into 
 endleft confusion. 
 
 Now this being premised, suppose two standing 
 precepts enjoined by the same authority; that, in 
 certain conjunc^tures, it is impoftible to obey both ; 
 that the former is moral, i. e. a precept of which we 
 see the reasons, and that they hold in the particular 
 case before us ; but that the latter is positive, i. e. a 
 precept of which we do not see the reasons : it is 
 indisputable that our obligations are to obey the 
 former ; because there is an apparent reason for this 
 preference, and none against it. Farther, positive 
 institutions, I suppose all those which Christianity 
 enjoins, are means to a moral end : and the end must 
 be acknowledged more excellent, than the means. 
 Nor is observance of these institutions any religious 
 obedience at all, or of any value, otherwise than as 
 it proceeds from a moral principle. This seems to 
 be the strict, logical way of stating and determining 
 this matter : but will, perhaps, be found lef^ appli- 
 cable to practice, than may be thought at first sight. 
 
 And therefore, in a more practical, though more 
 lax way of consideration, and taking the words, moral 
 law and positive institutions, in the popular sense ; 
 I add, that the whole moral law is as much matter 
 of revealed command, as positive institutions are : 
 for the Scripture enjoins every moral virtue. In this 
 respe<5l then they are both upon a level. But the 
 moral law is, moreover, written upon our hearts ; 
 interwoven into our very nature. And this is a plain 
 intimation of the Author of it, which is to be pre- 
 ferred, when they interfere. 
 
 But there is not altogether so much necef^ity for 
 the determination of this question, as some persons 
 seem to think. Nor are we left to Reason alone to 
 
164 Of the Importance Part 2. 
 
 determine it. For, first, though mankind have, in 
 all ages, been greatly prone to place their Religion 
 in peculiar positive rites, by way of equivalent for 
 obedience to moral precepts ; yet, without making 
 any comparison at all between them, and conse- 
 quently without determining which is to have the 
 preference, the nature of the thing abundantly shews 
 all notions of that kind to be utterly subversive of 
 true Religion : as they are, moreover, contrary to the 
 whole general tenor of Scripture ; and likewise to 
 the most expref^ particular declarations of it, that 
 nothing can render us accepted of God, without 
 moral virtue. Secondly, Upon the occasion of men- 
 tioning together positive and moral duties, the Scrip- 
 ture always puts the streft of Religion upon the latter, 
 and never upon the former : Which, though no sort 
 of allowance to negle(51: the former, when they do not 
 interfere with the latter, yet is a plain intimation, 
 that when they do, the latter are to be preferred. 
 And farther, as mankind are for placing the strei^ of 
 their Religion anywhere, rather than upon virtue ; 
 lest both the reason of the thing, and the general 
 spirit of Christianity, appearing in the intimation now 
 mentioned, should be ineffectual against this preva- 
 lent folly : Our Lord himself, from whose command 
 alone the obligation of positive institutions arises, has 
 taken occasion to make the comparison between 
 them and moral precepts ; when the Pharisees cen- 
 sured him, for eating with publicans and sinners ; 
 and also when they censured his disciples, for pluck- 
 ing the ears of corn on the Sabbath-day. Upon this 
 comparison, he has determined exprefsly, and in 
 form, which shall have the preference when they 
 interfere. And by delivering his authoritative de- 
 termination in a proverbial manner of expreftion, he 
 has made it general : I will have mercy, and not sa- 
 
Chap, I. of Christianity. 165 
 
 crifice.^ The propriety of the word, proverbial, is 
 not the thing insisted upon : though I think the 
 manner of speaking is to be called so. But that the 
 manner of speaking very remarkably renders the 
 determination general, is surely indisputable. For, 
 had it, in the latter case, been said only, that God 
 preferred mercy to the rigid observance of the Sab- 
 bath; even then, by parity of reason, most justly 
 might we have argued, that he preferred mercy like- 
 ^vise, to the observance of other ritual institutions ; 
 and in general, moral duties, to positive ones. And 
 thus the determination would have been general ; 
 though its being so, were inferred and not exprefted. 
 But as the pafsage really stands in the Gospel, it is 
 much stronger. For the sense and the very literal 
 words of our Lord's answer, are as applicable to any 
 other instance of a comparison, between positive and 
 moral duties, as to this upon which they were spoken. 
 And if, in case of competition, mercy is to be pre- 
 ferred to positive institutions, it will scarce bethought, 
 that justice is to give place to them. It is remark- 
 able too, that, as the words are a quotation from the 
 Old Testament, they are introduced, on both the 
 forementioned occasions, with a declaration, that the 
 Pharisees did not understand the meaning of them. 
 This, I say, is very remarkable. For, since it is scarce 
 pofsible, for the most ignorant person, not to under- 
 stand the literal sense of the paftage, in the Prophet ;^ 
 and since understanding the literal sense would not 
 have prevented their condemning the guiltlejl;^^ it 
 can hardly be doubted, that the thing which our 
 Lord really intended in that declaration, was, that 
 the Pharisees had not learnt from it, as they might, 
 wherein the general spirit of Religion consists : that 
 
 ^ Matth. ix. 13, and xii. 7. ^ Hos. vi. 
 
 *° See Matth. xii. 7. 
 
i66 Of the Importance of Christianity. Part 2, 
 
 it consists in moral piety and virtue, as distinguished 
 from forms, and ritual observances. However, it is 
 certain we may learn this from his Divine application 
 of the paf^age, in the Gospel. 
 
 But, as it is one of the peculiar weaknef^es of 
 human nature, when, upon a comparison of two things, 
 one is found to be of greater importance than the 
 other, to consider this other as of scarce any import- 
 ance at all : it is highly neceftary that we remind 
 ourselves, how great presumption it is, to make light 
 of any institutions of Divine appointment ; that our 
 obligations to obey all God's commands whatever, are 
 absolute and indispensable ; And that commands 
 merely positive, admitted to be from him, lay us 
 under a moral obligation to obey them : an obliga- 
 tion moral in the stric^test and most proper sense. 
 
 To these things I cannot forbear adding, that the 
 account now given of Christianity, most strongly 
 shews and enforces upon us the obligation of search- 
 ing the Scriptures, in order to see, what the scheme 
 of Revelation really is ; instead of determining be- 
 forehand, from Reason, what the scheme of it must 
 be.^^ Indeed if in Revelation there be found any 
 parages, the seeming meaning of which, is contrary 
 to natural Religion ; we may most certainly con- 
 clude, such seeming meaning not to be the real one. 
 But it is not any degree of a presumption against an 
 interpretation of Scripture, that such interpretation 
 contains a do6lrine, which the light of Nature cannot 
 discover ; ^^ or a precept, which the law of Nature 
 does not oblige to. 
 
 " Seech, iii. »2 pp, jgg^ ,69. 
 
1 
 
 m 
 
 ML 
 
 1 
 1 
 
 Chap. 2. Of the Supposed Presumption, &c. 167 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 Of the supposed Presumption against a Revelation, 
 considered as miraculous. 
 
 AVING shewn the importance of the 
 Christian Revelation, and the obliga- 
 tions which we are under seriously to 
 attend to it, upon supposition of its 
 truth, or its credibility: The next 
 thing in order, is to consider, the supposed presump- 
 tions against Revelation in general ; which shall be 
 the subjedl of this chapter : and the objecftions against 
 the Christian in particular ; which shall be the sub- 
 ject: of some following ones.^ For it seems the most 
 natural method, to remove these prejudices against 
 Christianity ; before we proceed to the consideration 
 of the positive evidence for it, and the objections 
 against that evidence.^ 
 
 It is, I think, commonly supposed, that there is 
 some peculiar presumption, from the Analogy of 
 Nature, against the Christian scheme of things ; at 
 least against miracles : so as that stronger evidence 
 is necef^ary to prove the truth and reality of them, 
 than would be sufficient to convince us of other events, 
 or matters of fact. Indeed the consideration of this 
 supposed presumption, cannot but be thought very 
 insignificant, by many persons. Yet, as it belongs 
 to the subje(5^ of this treatise ; so it may tend to open 
 the mind, and remove some prejudices ; however 
 needlef^ the consideration of it be, upon its own ac- 
 count. 
 
 * Ch. iii. iv. v. vi. ' Ch. vii. 
 
1 68 Of the Supposed Presumption Part 2. 
 
 I. I find no appearance of a presumption, from 
 the Analogy of Nature, against the general scheme 
 of Christianity, that God created and invisibly governs 
 the world by Jesus Christ ; and by him also will 
 hereafter judge it in righteousneft, i.e. render to 
 every one according to his works : and that good 
 men are under the secret influence of his Spirit. 
 Whether these things are, or are not, to be called 
 miraculous, is, perhaps, only a question about words; 
 or however, is of no moment in the case. If the 
 Analogy of Nature raises any presumption against 
 this general scheme of Christianity, it must be, either 
 because it is not discoverable by reason or experi- 
 ence ; or else, because it is unlike that course of 
 Nature, which is. But Analogy raises no presump- 
 tion against the truth of this scheme, upon either of 
 these accounts. 
 
 First, There is no presumption, from Analogy, 
 against the truth of it, upon account of its not being 
 discoverable by reason or experience. For suppose 
 one who never heard of Revelation, of the most im- 
 proved understanding, and acquainted with our whole 
 system of natural philosophy and natural Religion : 
 such an one could not but be sensible, that it was but 
 a very small part of the natural and moral system of 
 the universe, which he was acquainted with. He 
 could not but be sensible, that there must be innu- 
 merable things, in the dispensations of Providence 
 past, in the invisible government over the world, at 
 present carrying on, and in what is to come ; of 
 which he was wholly ignorant,^ and which could not 
 be discovered without Revelation. Whether the 
 scheme of Nature be, in the strictest sense, infinite 
 or not ; it is evidently vast, even beyond all poftible 
 
 3 P. 129. 
 
Chap, 2. against Miracles. 169 
 
 imagination. And doubtlel^ that part of it, which is 
 opened to our view, is but as a point, in comparison 
 of the whole plan of Providence, reaching- through- 
 out eternity past and future ; in comparison of what 
 is even now going on, in the remote parts of the 
 boundleft universe ; nay in comparison of the whole 
 scheme of this world. And therefore, that things 
 lie beyond the natural reach of our faculties, is no 
 sort of presumption against the truth and reality of 
 them: because it is certain, there are innumerable 
 things, in the constitution and government of the 
 universe, which are thus beyond the natural reach 
 of our faculties. Secondly, Analogy raises no pre- 
 sumption, against any of the things contained in this 
 general do6lrine of Scripture now mentioned, upon 
 account of their being unlike the known course of 
 Nature. For there is no presumption at all from 
 Analogy, that the whole course of things, or Divine 
 government, naturally unknown to us, and everything 
 in it, is like to anything in that which is known ; and 
 therefore no peculiar presumption against any- 
 thing in the former, upon account of its being unlike 
 to anything in the latter. And in the constitution 
 and natural government of the world, as well as in 
 the moral government of it, we see things, in a great 
 degree, unlike one another : and therefore ought not 
 to wonder at such unlikenei^ between things visible 
 and invisible. However, the scheme of Christianity 
 is by no means entirely unlike the scheme of Nature ; 
 as will appear in the following part of this treatise. 
 
 The notion of a miracle, considered as a proof of 
 a Divine million, has been stated with great exa(5l- 
 ne{^ by divines ; and is, I think, sufficiently under- 
 stood by every one. There are also invisible miracles, 
 the incarnation of Christ, for instance, which, being 
 secret, cannot be alleged as a proof of such a mis- 
 
1 70 Of the Supposed Presumption Part 2. 
 
 sion ; but require themselves to be proved by visible 
 miracles. Revelation itself too is miraculous ; and 
 miracles are the proof of it : and the supposed pre- 
 sumption against these, shall presently be considered. 
 All which I have been observing here is, that, whether 
 we choose to call everything in the dispensations of 
 Providence, not discoverable without Revelation, nor 
 like the known course of things, miraculous ; and 
 whether the general Christian dispensation now men- 
 tioned, is to be called so, or not ; the foregoing ob- 
 servations seem certainly to shew, that there is no 
 presumption against it, from the Analogy of Nature. 
 
 II. There is no presumption, from Analogy, against 
 some operations, which, we should now call mira- 
 culous ; particularly none against a Revelation, at 
 the beginning of the world : nothing of such pre- 
 sumption against it, as is supposed to be implied or 
 expref^ed in the word, miraculous. For a miracle, 
 in its very notion, is relative to a course of Nature ; 
 and implies somewhat different from it, considered 
 as being so. Now, either there was no course of 
 Nature at the time which we are speaking of: or if 
 there were, we are not acquainted, what the course 
 of Nature is, upon the first peopling of worlds. And 
 therefore the question, whether mankind had a Re- 
 velation made to them at that tiine, is to be consi- 
 dered, not as a question concerning a miracle, but 
 as a common question of fact. And we have the 
 like reason, be it more or lef^, to admit the report 
 of tradition, concerning this question, and concerning 
 common matters of fa(?t of the same antiquity ; for 
 instance, what part of the earth was first peopled. 
 
 Or thus : When mankind was first placed in this 
 state, there was a power exerted, totally different 
 from the present course of Nature. Now, whether 
 this power, thus wholly different from the present 
 course of Nature, for we cannot properly apply to it 
 
Chap, 2. against Miracles. 1 71 
 
 the word miraculous ; whether this power stopped 
 immediately after it had made man, or went on, and 
 exerted itself farther in giving him a Revelation, is 
 a question of the same kind, as whether an ordinary 
 power exerted itself in such a particular degree and 
 manner, or not. 
 
 Or suppose the power exerted in the formation of 
 the world, be considered as miraculous, or rather, be 
 called by that name ; the case will not be different : 
 since it must be acknowledged, that such a power 
 was exerted. For supposing it acknowledged, that 
 our Saviour spent some years in a course of working 
 miracles : there is no more presumption, worth men- 
 tioning, against his having exerted this miraculous 
 power, in a certain degree greater, than in a certain 
 degree left ; in one or two more instances, than in 
 one or two fewer ; in this, than in another manner. 
 
 It is evident then, that there can be no peculiar 
 presumption, from the Analogy of Nature, against 
 supposing a Revelation, when man was first placed 
 upon the earth. 
 
 Add, that there does not appear the least intima- 
 tion in history or tradition, that Religion was first 
 reasoned out : but the whole of history and tradition 
 makes for the other side, that it came into the world 
 by Revelation. Indeed the state of Religion in the 
 first ages, of which we have any account, seems to 
 suppose and imply, that this was the original of it 
 amongst mankind. And these refle(51;ions together, 
 without taking in the peculiar authority of Scripture, 
 amount to real and a very material degree of evidence, 
 that there was a Revelation at the beginning of the 
 world. Now this, as it is a confirmation of natural 
 Religion, and therefore mentioned in the former part 
 of this treatise ;^ so likewise it has a tendency to re- 
 
 ♦ Pp. 121, &c. 
 
172 Of the Supposed Presumption Part 2. 
 
 move any prejudices against a subsequent Revela- 
 tion. 
 
 III. But still it may be obje(5led, that there is some 
 peculiarpresumption,from Analogy, against miracles; 
 particularly against Revelation, after the settlement 
 and during the continuance of a course of Nature. 
 
 Now with regard to this supposed presumption, it 
 is to be observed in general; that before we can 
 have ground for raising what can, with any propriety, 
 be called an argument from Analogy, for or against 
 Revelation considered as somewhat miraculous, we 
 must be acquainted with a similar or parallel case. 
 But the history of some other world, seemingly in 
 like circumstances with our own, is no more than a 
 parallel case : and therefore nothing short of this, 
 can be so. Yet, could we come at a presumptive 
 proof, for or against a Revelation, from being in- 
 formed, whether such world had one, or not ; such 
 a proof, being drawn from one single instance only, 
 must be infinitely precarious. More particularly : 
 First of all ; There is a very strong presumption 
 against common speculative truths, and against the 
 most ordinary fa(fi:s, before the proof of them ; which 
 yet is overcome by almost any proof. There is a 
 presumption of millions to one, against the story of 
 CcBsar, or of any other man. For suppose a number 
 of common facets so and so circumstanced, of which 
 one had no kind of proof, should happen to come 
 into one's thoughts ; every one would, without any 
 pof^ible doubt, conclude them to be false. And the 
 like may be said of a single common fa6l. And from 
 hence it appears, that the question of importance, as 
 to the matter before us, is, concerning the degree of 
 the peculiar presumption supposed against miracles ; 
 not whether there be any peculiar presumption at 
 all against them. For, if there be the presumption 
 
Chap. 2. against Miracles. 173 
 
 of millions to one, against the most common fa6ls ; 
 What can a small presumption, additional to this, 
 amount to, though it be peculiar ? It cannot be es- 
 timated, and is as nothing. The only material ques- 
 tion is, whether there be any such presumption 
 against miracles, as to render them in any sort in- 
 credible. Secondly, If we leave out the consideration 
 of Religion, we are in such total darkneft, upon what 
 causes, occasions, reasons, or circumstances, the 
 present course of Nature depends ; that there does 
 not appear any improbability for or against suppos- 
 ing, that five or six thousand years may have given 
 scope for causes, occasions, reasons, or circum- 
 stances, from whence miraculous interpositions may 
 have arisen. And from this, joined with the fore- 
 going observation, it will follow, that there must be 
 a presumption, beyond all comparison, greater, 
 against the particular common fa6is just now in- 
 stanced in, than against miracles in general ; before 
 any evidence of either. But, thirdly, take in the 
 consideration of Religion, or the moral system of the 
 world, and then we see distin(5l particular reasons 
 for miracles : to afford mankind instruction additional 
 to that of Nature, and to attest the truth of it. And 
 this gives a real credibility to the supposition, that 
 it might be part of the original plan of things, that 
 there should be miraculous interpositions. Then, 
 lastly, miracles must not be compared to common 
 natural events ; or to events which, though uncom- 
 mon, are similar to what we daily experience : but 
 to the extraordinary phenomena of Nature. And 
 then the comparison will be between the presump- 
 tion against miracles, and the presumption against 
 such uncommon appearances, suppose, as comets, 
 and against there being any such powers in Nature 
 as magnetism and ele(5lricity, so contrary to the pro- 
 
1 74 Of the Supposed Presumption, &c. Part 2. 
 
 perties of other bodies not endued with these powers. 
 And before any one can determine, whether there 
 be any peculiar presumption against miracles, more 
 than against other extraordinary things ; he must 
 consider, what, upon first hearing, would be the pre- 
 sumption against the last-mentioned appearances and 
 powers, to a person acquainted only with the daily, 
 monthly, and annual, course of Nature respe^iing 
 this earth, and with those common powers of matter 
 which we every day see. 
 
 Upon all this I conclude ; That there certainly is 
 no such presumption against miracles, as to render 
 them in any wise incredible : That on the contrary, 
 our being able to discern reasons for them, gives a 
 positive credibility to the history of them, in cases 
 where those reasons hold : And that it is by no means 
 certain, that there is any peculiar presumption at all, 
 from Analogy, even in the lowest degree, against 
 miracles, as distinguished from other extraordinary 
 phenomena : though it is not worth while to perplex 
 the reader, with inquiries into the abstract nature of 
 evidence, in order to determine a question, which, 
 without such inquiries, we see ^ is of no importance. 
 
 ^ P. 172, 
 
Chap, 3. The Credibility, &c. 175 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 0/ our Incapacity of judging, what were to he ex- 
 pelled in a Revelation ; and the Credibility , from 
 Analogy, that it must contain things appearing 
 liable to OhjeStions. 
 
 ESIDES the obje(5lions against the 
 evidence for Christianity, many are 
 alleged against the scheme of it ; 
 against the whole manner in which it 
 is put and left with the world ; as well 
 as against several particular relations in Scripture : 
 Obje(5lions drawn, from the deficiencies of Revela- 
 tion ; from things in it appearing to menfoolishnefi ;^ 
 from its containing matters of offence, which have 
 led, and it must have been foreseen would lead, into 
 strange enthusiasm and superstition^ and be made 
 to serve the purposes of tyranny and wickednefs ; 
 from its not being universal ; and, which is a thing 
 of the same kind, from its evidence not being so 
 convincing and satisfactory as it might have been : 
 for this last is sometimes turned into a positive ar- 
 gument against its truth.- It would be tedious, in- 
 deed impof^ible, to enumerate the several particulars 
 comprehended under the obje cations here referred 
 to ; they being so various, according to the different 
 fancies of men. There are persons, who think it a 
 strong obje(5lion against the authority of Scripture, 
 that it is not composed by rules of art, agreed upon 
 by critics, for polite and correal writing. And the 
 
 » I Cor. i. 28. 2 See ch. vi. 
 
176 The Credibility, that a Revelation Part 2, 
 
 scorn is inexpref^ible, with which some of the pro- 
 phetic parts of Scripture are treated : partly through 
 the rashneft of interpreters ; but very much also, on 
 accountofthe hieroglyphical and figurative language, 
 in which they are left us. Some of the principal 
 things of this sort shall be particularly considered, 
 in following chapters. But my design at present, is 
 to observe in general, with respe^l to this whole way 
 of arguing, that, upon supposition of a Revelation, 
 it is highly credible beforehand, we should be in- 
 competent judges of it, to a great degree : and that 
 it would contain many things appearing to us liable 
 to great objections ; in case we judge of it otherwise, 
 than by the Analogy of Nature. And therefore, 
 though objections against the evidence of Christi- 
 anity are most seriously to be considered ; yet ob- 
 je(5lions against Christianity itself are, in a great 
 measure, frivolous : almost all objections against it, 
 excepting those which are alleged against the parti- 
 cular proofs of its coming from God. I expreft myself 
 with caution, lest I should be mistaken to vilify Rea- 
 son : which is indeed the only faculty we have where- 
 with to judge concerning anything, even Revelation 
 itself: or to be misunderstood to aftert, that a sup- 
 posed Revelation cannot be proved false, from in- 
 ternal chara(5ters. For, it may contain clear immo- 
 ralities or contradictions: and either of these would 
 prove it false. Nor will I take upon me to affirm, 
 that nothing else can pof^ibly render any supposed 
 Revelation incredible. Yet still the observation above 
 is, I think, true beyond doubt ; that objections against 
 Christianity, as distinguished from objections against 
 its evidence, are frivolous. To make out this, is the 
 general design of the present chapter. And with 
 regard to the whole of it, I cannot but particularly 
 wish, that the proofs might be attended to ; rather 
 
Chap. 3. must appear liable to Objedions. 177 
 
 than the aftertions cavilled at, upon account of any 
 unacceptable consequences, whether real or sup- 
 posed, which may be drawn from them. For, after 
 all, that which is true must be admitted, though it 
 should shew us the shortnel^ of our faculties ; and 
 that we are in no wise judges of many things, of 
 which we are apt to think ourselves very competent 
 ones. Nor will this be any objection with reasonable 
 men, at least upon second thought it will not be any 
 objection with such, against the justneft of the fol- 
 lowing observations. 
 
 As God governs the world, and instructs his crea- 
 tures, according to certain laws or rules, in the known 
 course of Nature ; known by reason together with 
 experience : so the Scripture informs us of a scheme 
 of Divine Providence, additional to this. It relates, 
 that God has, by Revelation, instru^led men in things 
 concerning his government, which they could not 
 otherwise have known ; and reminded them of things, 
 which they might otherwise know : and attested the 
 truth of the whole, by miracles. Now if the natural 
 and the revealed dispensation of things are both from 
 God, if they coincide with each other, and together 
 make up one scheme of Providence : our being in- 
 competent judges of one, must render it credible, 
 that we may be incompetent judges also of the other. 
 Since, upon experience, the acknowledged constitu- 
 tion and course of Nature is found to be greatly dif- 
 ferent from what, before experience, would have 
 been expelled; and such as, men fancy, there lie 
 great obje(?i:ions against : this renders it beforehand 
 highly credible, that they may find the revealed dis- 
 pensation likewise, if they judge of it as they do of 
 the constitution of Nature, very different from ex- 
 pe(5lations formed beforehand ; and liable, in appear- 
 ance, to great objections: ObjecHiions against the 
 
 N 
 
178 The Credibility, that a Revelation Part 2. 
 
 scheme itself, and against the degrees and manners 
 of the miraculous interpositions, by which it was at- 
 tested and carried on. Thus suppose a prince to 
 govern his dominions in the wisest manner poftible, 
 by common I^nown laws ; and that upon some exi- 
 gencies he should suspend these laws ; and govern, 
 in several instances, in a different manner : If one 
 of his subje(5ls were not a competent judge before- 
 hand, by what common rules the government should 
 or would be carried on ; it could not be expet^ed, 
 that the same person would be a competent judge, 
 in what exigencies, or in what manner, or to what 
 degree, those laws commonly observed would be 
 suspended or deviated from. If he were not a judge 
 of the wisdom of the ordinary administration; there 
 is no reason to think, he would be a judge of the 
 wisdom of the extraordinary. If he thought he had 
 objections against the former ; doubtlei^, it is highly 
 supposable, he might think also, that he had objec- 
 tions against the latter. And thus, as we fall into 
 infinite follies and mistakes, whenever we pretend, 
 otherwise than from experience and Analogy, to 
 judge of the constitution and course of Nature ; it is 
 evidently supposable beforehand, that we should fall 
 into as great, in pretending to judge, in like manner, 
 concerning Revelation. Nor is there any more 
 ground to expe(5l, that this latter should appear to 
 us clear of obje(5lions, than that the former should. 
 These observations, relating to the whole of Chris- 
 tianity, are applicable to inspiration in particular. 
 As we are in no sort judges beforehand, by what 
 laws or rules, in what degree, or by what means, it 
 were to have been expe(5led, that God would natu- 
 rally instru(5l us : so upon supposition of his afford- 
 ing us light and instru(5lion by Revelation, additional 
 to what he has afforded us by reason and experience. 
 
Chap, 3. must appear liable to Objeclions. 179 
 
 we are in no sort judges, by what methods and in 
 what proportion, it were to be expe(5led, that this 
 supernatural light and instruction would be afforded 
 us. We know not beforehand, what degree or kind 
 of natural information, it were to be expected God 
 would afford men, each by his own reason and ex- 
 perience : nor how far he would enable, and effec- 
 tually dispose them to communicate it, whatever it 
 should be, to each other : nor whether the evidence 
 of it would be, certain, highly probable, or doubtful : 
 nor whether it would be given with equal clearneis 
 and conviction to all. Nor could we gueft, upon 
 any good ground I mean, whether natural know- 
 ledge, or even the faculty itself, by which we are 
 capable of attaining it, reason, would be given us at 
 once, or gradually. In like manner, we are wholly 
 ignorant what degree of new knowledge, it were to 
 be expected, God would give mankind by Revela- 
 tion, upon supposition of his affording one : or how 
 far, or in what way, he would interpose miraculously. 
 to qualify them, to whom he should originally make 
 the Revelation, for communicating the knowledge 
 given by it ; and to secure their doing it to the age 
 in which they should live ; and to secure its being 
 transmitted to posterity. We are equally ignorant, 
 whether the evidence of it would be, certain, or highly 
 probable, or doubtful:'^ or whether all who should 
 have any degree of instruction from it, and any de- 
 gree of evidence of its truth, would have the same: 
 or whether the scheme would be revealed at once, 
 or unfolded gradually. Nay we are not in any sort 
 able to judge, whether it were to have been expected, 
 that the Revelation should have been committed to 
 writing ; or left to be handed down, and subsequently 
 
 ' See ch. vi. 
 
i8o The Credibility, that a Revelation Part 2. 
 
 corrupted by verbal tradition, and at length sunk 
 under it, if mankind so pleased, and during such time 
 as they are permitted, in the degree they evidently 
 are, to a(5l as they will. 
 
 But it may be said, " that a Revelation in some of 
 '' the abovementioned circumstances ; one, for in- 
 " stance, which was not committed to writing, and 
 " thus secured against danger of corruption, would 
 " not have answered its purpose." I ask, what pur- 
 pose ? It would not have answered all the purposes 
 which it has now answered, and in the same degree : 
 but it would have answered others, or the same in 
 different degrees. And which of these were the 
 purposes of God, and best fell in with his general 
 government, we could not at all have determined 
 beforehand. 
 
 Now since it has been shewn, that we have no 
 principles of reason, upon which to judge beforehand, 
 how it were to be expected Revelation should have 
 been left, or what was most suitable to the Divine 
 plan of government, in any of the forementioned re- 
 spects ; it must be quite frivolous to obje(5t afterwards 
 as to any of them, against its being left in one way, 
 rather than another: For this would be to objeCl 
 against things, upon account of their being different 
 from expectations, which have been shewn to be 
 without reason. And thus we see, that the only ques- 
 tion concerning the truth of Christianity, is, whether 
 it be a real Revelation : not whether it be attended 
 with every circumstance which we should have looked 
 for : and concerning the authority of Scripture, whe- 
 ther it be what it claims to be ; not whether it be a 
 book of such sort, and so promulged, as weak men 
 are apt to fancy, a book containing a Divine Reve- 
 lation should. And therefore, neither obscurity, nor 
 seeming inaccuracy of style, nor various readings, 
 
Chap. 3. must appear liable to Objedions. 181 
 
 nor early disputes about the authors of particular 
 parts ; nor any other things of the like kind, though 
 they had been much more considerable in degree 
 than they are, could overthrow the authority of the 
 Scripture : unle{^ the prophets, apostles, or our Lord, 
 had promised, that the book containing the Divine 
 Revelation, should be secure from those things. Nor 
 indeed can any obje(5lions overthrow such a kind of 
 Revelation as the Christian claims to be, since there 
 are no obje(?i:ions against the morality of it,^ but such 
 as can shew, that there is no proof of miracles wrought 
 originally in attestation of it ; no appearance of any- 
 thing miraculous in its obtaining in the world ; nor 
 any of prophecy, that is, of events foretold, which 
 human sagacity could not foresee. If it can be shewn, 
 that the proof alleged for all these, is absolutely none 
 at all, then is Revelation overturned. But were it 
 allowed, that the proof of any one or all of them, is 
 lower than is allowed ; yet, whilst any proof of them 
 remains. Revelation will stand upon much the same 
 foot it does at present, as to all the purposes of life 
 and prac^tice, and ought to have the like influence 
 upon our behaviour. 
 
 From the foregoing observations too, it will follow, 
 and those who will thoroughly examine into Reve- 
 lation, will find it worth remarking ; that there are 
 several ways of arguing, which, though just with re- 
 gard to other writings, are not applicable to Scrip- 
 ture : at least not to the prophetic parts of it. We 
 cannot argue, for instance, that this cannot be the 
 sense or intent of such a parage of Scripture ; for if 
 it had, it would have been exprei^ed more plainly, 
 or have been represented under a more apt figure 
 or hieroglyphic : Yet we may justly argue thus, with 
 
 *P. 189. 
 
1 82 The Credibility, that a Revelation Part 2. 
 
 respe<?i: to common books. And the reason of this 
 difference is very evident : that in Scripture, we are 
 not competent judges, as we are in common books, 
 how plainly it were to have been expe(5^ed, what is 
 the true sense should have been exprel^ed, or under 
 how apt an image figured. The only question is, 
 what appearance there is, that this is the sense ; and 
 scarce at all, how much more determinately or ac- 
 curately it might have been exprefted or figured. 
 
 " But is it not self-evident, that internal improba- 
 '• bilitiesofall kinds, weaken external probable proof?" 
 Doubtlef^. But to what pra(5lical purpose can this 
 be alleged here, when it has been proved before,^ 
 that real internal improbabilities which rise even to 
 moral certainty, are overcome by the most ordinary 
 testimony ; and when it now has been made appear, 
 that we scarce know what are improbabilities, as to 
 the matter we are here considering : as it will farther 
 appear from what follows. 
 
 For though from the observations above made, it 
 is manifest, that we are not in any sort competent 
 judges, what supernatural instruction were to have 
 been expec^ted; and though it is self-evident, that 
 the obje(5^ions of an incompetent judgment must be 
 frivolous : Yet it may be proper to go one step far- 
 ther, and observe ; that if men will be regardlef^ of 
 these things, and pretend to judge of the Scripture 
 by preconceived expe<51ations ; the Analogy of Na- 
 ture shews beforehand not only that it is highly cre- 
 dible they may, but also probable that they will, 
 imagine they have strong obje(?i:ions against it, how- 
 ever really unexceptionable : for so, prior to expe- 
 rience, they would think they had, against the cir- 
 cumstances and degrees and the whole manner of 
 
 * P. 172, 
 
Chap. 3. must appear liable to Objeflions. 183 
 
 that instru(9:ion, which is afforded by the ordinary 
 course of Nature. Were the instruction which God 
 affords to brute creatures by instincts and mere pro- 
 pensions, and to mankind by these together with 
 reason, matter of probable proof, and not of certain 
 observation ; it would be rejected as incredible, in 
 many instances of it, only upon account of the means 
 by which this instruction is given, the seeming dis- 
 proportions, the limitations, necefsary conditions, and 
 circumstances of it. For instance : Would it not 
 have been thought highly improbable, that men 
 should have been so much more capable of discover- 
 ing, even to certainty, the general laws of matter, 
 and the magnitudes, paths and revolutions of the 
 heavenly bodies ; than the occasions and cures of 
 distempers, and many other things, in which human 
 life seems so much more nearly concerned, than in 
 astronomy \ How capricious and irregular a way of 
 information, would it be said, is that of invention, by 
 means of which, Nature instrucls us in matters of 
 science, and in many things, upon which the affairs 
 of the world greatl}'^ depend : That a man should, by 
 this faculty, be made acquainted with a thing in an 
 instant, when perhaps he is thinking of somewhat 
 else, which he has in vain been searching after, it 
 may be, for years. So likewise the imperfections 
 attending the only method, by which Nature enables 
 and directs us to communicate our thoughts to each 
 other, are innumerable. Language is, in its very 
 nature, inadequate, ambiguous, liable to infinite abuse, 
 even from negligence ; and so liable to it from de- 
 sign, that every man can deceive and betray by it. 
 And, to mention but one instance more ; that brutes, 
 without reason, should acl, in many respects, with a 
 sagacity and foresight vastly greater than what men 
 have in those respedls, would be thought impof^ible. 
 
184 The Credibility, that a Revelation Part 2. 
 
 Yet it is certain they do 3(9: with such superior fore- 
 sight : whether it be their own indeed, is another 
 question. From these things it is highly credible 
 beforehand, that upon supposition God should afford 
 men some additional instruction by Revelation, it 
 would be with circumstances, in manners, degrees 
 and respeCls, which we should be apt to fancy we 
 had great obje(fi:ions against the credibility of. Nor 
 are the obje(51;ions against the Scripture, nor against 
 Christianity in general, at all more or greater, than 
 
 the Analogy of Nature would beforehand not 
 
 perhaps give ground to expeCl ; for this Analogy may 
 not be sufficient, in some cases, to ground an ex- 
 pe(fi;ation upon ; but no more nor greater, that Ana- 
 logy would shew it, beforehand, to be supposable 
 and credible, that there might seem to lie against 
 Revelation. 
 
 By applying these general observations to a par- 
 ticular obje<5lion, it will be more distinctly seen, how 
 they are applicable to others of the like kind : and 
 indeed to almost all obje(9;ions against Christianity, 
 as distinguished from objections against its evidence. 
 It appears from Scripture, that, as it was not un- 
 usual in the Apostolic Age, for persons, upon their 
 conversion to Christianity, to be endued with mira- 
 culous gifts; so, some of those persons exercised 
 these gifts in a strangely irregular and disorderly 
 manner: And this is made an obje(51;ion against their 
 being really miraculous. Now the foregoing obser- 
 vations quite remove this objec^tion, how considerable 
 soever it may appear at first sight. For, consider a 
 person endued with any of these gifts ; for instance, 
 that of tongues : It is to be supposed, that he had 
 the same power over this miraculous gift, as he would 
 have had over it, had it been the effect of habit, of 
 study and use, as it ordinarily is ; or the same power 
 
Chap. 3. must appear liable to Objedions. 185 
 
 over it, as he had over any other natural endowment. 
 Consequently, he would use it in the same manner 
 he did any other ; either regularly and upon proper 
 occasions only, or irregularly and upon improper 
 ones : according to his sense of decency, and his 
 chara(5ter of prudence. Where then is the objection? 
 Why, if this miraculous power was indeed given to 
 the world, to propagate Christianity and attest the 
 truth of it, we might, it seems, have expected, that 
 other sort of persons should have been chosen to be 
 invested with it ; or that these should, at the same 
 time, have been endued with prudence ; or that they 
 should have been, continually, restrained and di- 
 rected in the exercise of it : i. e. that God should have 
 miraculously interposed, if at all, in a different manner 
 or higher degree. But from the observations made 
 above, it is undeniably evident, that w^e are not judges, 
 in what degrees and manners, it were to have been 
 expelled, he should miraculously interpose ; upon 
 supposition of his doing it in some degree and man- 
 ner. Nor, in the natural course of Providence, are 
 superior gifts of memory, eloquence, knowledge, and 
 other talents of great influence, conferred only on 
 persons of prudence and decency, or such as are 
 disposed to make the properest use of them. Nor 
 is the instru(5lion and admonition naturally afforded 
 us for the condu(9: of life, particularly in our educa- 
 tion, commonly given in a manner the most suited 
 to recommend it ; but often with circumstances apt 
 to prejudice us against such instru(9;ion. 
 
 One might go on to add, that there is a great re- 
 semblance between the light of Nature and of Re- 
 velation, in several other respe(5ls. Pra(?iical Chris- 
 tianity, or that faith and behaviour which renders a 
 man a Christian, is a plain and obvious thing : like 
 the common rules of condu($l, with respecft to our 
 
1 86 The Credibility, that a Revelation Part 2. 
 
 ordinary temporal affairs. The more distindl and 
 particular knowledge of those things, the study of 
 which the apostle calls going on unto p erf eSiion,^ and 
 of the prophetic parts of Revelation, like many parts 
 of natural and even civil knowledge, may require 
 very exac^t thought, and careful consideration. The 
 hinderances too, of natural, and of supernatural light 
 and knowledge, have been of the same kind. And 
 as, it is owned, the whole scheme of Scripture is not 
 yet understood ; so, if it ever comes to be understood, 
 before the restitution of all things,'' and without mi- 
 raculous interpositions ; it must be in the same way 
 as natural knowledge is come at : by the continuance 
 and progreft of learning and of liberty ; and by par- 
 ticular persons attending to, comparing and pursu- 
 ing, intimations scattered up and down it, which are 
 overlooked and disregarded by the generality of the 
 world. For this is the way, in which all improve- 
 ments are made ; by thoughtful men tracing on ob- 
 scure hints, as it were, dropped us by Nature acci- 
 dentally, or which seem to come into our minds by 
 chance. Nor is it at all incredible, that a book, which 
 has been so long in the pofteftion of mankind, should 
 contain many truths as yet undiscovered. For, all 
 the same phenomena, and the same faculties of in- 
 vestigation, from which such great discoveries in 
 natural knowledge have been made in the present 
 and last age, were equally in the pof^ef^ion of man- 
 kind, several thousand years before. And poftibly 
 it might be intended, that events, as they come to 
 paf^, should open and ascertain the meaning of se- 
 veral parts of Scripture. 
 
 It may be obje(51ed, that this Analogy fails in a 
 material respect:: for that natural knowledge is of 
 
 * Heb. vi. I. ' Afts iii. 21. 
 
Chap. 3. must appear liable to Objedions. 187 
 
 little or no consequence. But I have been speaking 
 of the general instruction, which Nature does or does 
 not afford us. And besides, some parts of natural 
 knowledge, in the more common restrained sense of 
 the words, are of the greatest consequence to the 
 ease and convenience of life. But suppose the Ana- 
 logy did, as it does not, fail in this respe^ ; yet it 
 might be abundantly supplied, from the whole con- 
 stitution and course of Nature : which shews, that 
 God does not dispense his gifts, according to our 
 notions of the advantage and consequence they would 
 be of to us. And this in general, with his method 
 of dispensing knowledge in particular, would together 
 make out an Analogy full to the point before us. 
 
 But it may be objected still farther and more ge- 
 nerally ; '• The Scripture represents the world as in 
 " a state of ruin, and Christianity as an expedient to 
 " recover it, to help in these respe^ls where Nature 
 " fails : in particular, to supply the deficiencies of 
 " natural light. Is it credible then, that so many 
 " ages should have been let pai^, before a matter of 
 " such a sort, of so great and so general im.portance, 
 ''was made known to mankind; and then that it 
 '' should be made known to so small a part of them *? 
 " Is it conceivable, that this supply should be so very 
 "■ deficient, should have the like obscurity and doubt- 
 " fulneft, be liable to the like perversions, in short, 
 " lie open to all the like objections, as the light of 
 " Nature itself?"^ Without determining how far this 
 in fa(^ is so, I answer ; It is by no means incredible, 
 that it might be so, if the light of Nature and of Re- 
 velation be from the same hand. Men are naturally 
 liable to diseases : for which God, in his good Pro- 
 vidence, has provided natural remedies.^ But reme- 
 
 » Ch. vi, 9 See ch. v. 
 
1 88 The Credibility, that a Revelation Part 2. 
 
 dies existing in Nature, have been unknown to man- 
 kind for many ages : are known but to few now : 
 probably many valuable ones are not known yet. 
 Great has been and is the obscurity and difficulty, in 
 the nature and application of them. Circumstances 
 seem often to make them very improper, where they 
 are absolutely necef^ary. It is after long labour and 
 study, and many unsuccefsful endeavours, that they 
 are brought to be as useful, as they are ; after high 
 contempt and absolute reje6lion of the most useful 
 we have ; and after disputes and doubts, which have 
 seemed to be endleft. The best remedies too, when 
 unskilfully, much more if dishonestly applied, may 
 produce new diseases : and with the rightest appli- 
 cation, the succef^ of them is often doubtful. In 
 many cases, they are not at all efFe(9;ual : where they 
 are, it is often very slowly: and the application of 
 them, and the neceftary regimen accompanying it, 
 is, not uncommonly, so disagreeable, that some will 
 not submit to them ; and satisfy themselves with the 
 excuse, that if they would, it is not certain, whether 
 it would be succeftful. And many persons, who 
 labour under diseases, for which there are known 
 natural remedies, are not so happy as to be always, 
 if ever, in the way of them. In a word, the remedies 
 which Nature has provided for diseases, are neither 
 certain, perfecft, nor universal. And indeed the same 
 principles of arguing, which would lead us to con- 
 clude, that they must be so, would lead us likewise 
 to conclude, that there could be no occasion for 
 them ; i. e. that there could be no diseases at all. 
 And therefore, our experience that there are diseases, 
 shews, that it is credible beforehand, upon supposi- 
 tion Nature has provided remedies for them, that 
 these remedies may be, as by experience we find 
 they are, not certain, nor perfe(ft, nor universal ; be- 
 
Chap. 3. must appear liable to Obje6!ions. 189 
 
 cause it shews, that the principles upon which we 
 should expe(ft the contrary, are fallacious. 
 
 And now, what is the just consequence from all 
 these things ? Not that Reason is no judge of what 
 is offered to us as being of Divine Revelation. For 
 this would be to infer, that we are unable to judge 
 of anything, because we are unable to judge of all 
 things. Reason can, and it ought to judge, not only 
 of the meaning, but also of the morality and the 
 evidence, of Revelation. First, It is the province of 
 Reason to judge of the morality of the Scripture ; 
 i.e. not whether it contains things different from what 
 we should have expedled, from a wise, just and good 
 Being; for obje(5lions from hence have been now 
 obviated : but whether it contains things plainly con- 
 tradictory to wisdom, justice or goodneft ; to what 
 the light of Nature teaches us of God. And I know 
 nothing of this sort obje(5led against Scripture, ex- 
 cepting such objections as are formed upon suppo- 
 sitions, which would equally conclude, that the con- 
 stitution of Nature is contradictory to wisdom, justice 
 or goodneft ; which most certainly it is not. Indeed 
 there are some particular precepts in Scripture, given 
 to particular persons, requiring acftions, which would 
 be immoral and vicious, were it not for such precepts. 
 But it is easy to see, that all these are of such a kind, 
 as that the precept changes the whole nature of the 
 case and of the aClion ; and both constitutes, and 
 shews that not to be unjust or immoral, which, prior 
 to the precept, must have appeared and really have 
 been so; which may well be, since none of these 
 precepts are contrary to immutable morality. If it 
 were commanded, to cultivate the principles, and aCl 
 from the spirit of treachery, ingratitude, cruelty ; the 
 command would not alter the nature of the case or 
 of the aClion, in any of these instances. But it is 
 
190 The Credibility, that a Revelation Part 2. 
 
 quite otherwise in precepts, which require only the 
 doing an external a(51ion : for instance, taking away 
 the property or life of any. For men have no right 
 to either life or property, but what arises solely from 
 the grant of God : When this grant is revoked, they 
 cease to have any right at all, in either : And when 
 this revocation is made known, as surely it is pof^ible 
 it may be, it must cease to be unjust to deprive them 
 of either. And though a course of external a6ls, 
 which without command would be immoral, must 
 make an immoral habit ; yet a few detached com- 
 mands have no such natural tendency. I thought 
 proper to say thus much of the few Scripture pre- 
 cepts, which require, not vicious a<5lions, but a(?i;ions 
 which would have been vicious had it not been for 
 such precepts ; because they are sometimes weakly 
 urged as immoral, and great weight is laid upon 
 obje(?tions drawn from them. But to me there seems 
 no difficulty at all in these precepts, but what arises 
 from their being offences : i. e. from their being liable 
 to be perverted, as indeed they are, by wicked de- 
 signing men, to serve the most horrid purposes ; and 
 perhaps, to mislead the weak and enthusiastic. And 
 obje(9:ions from this head, are not objections against 
 Revelation ; but against the whole notion of Religion, 
 as a trial ; and against the general constitution of 
 Nature. Secondly, Reason is able to judge, and must, 
 of the evidence of Revelation, and of the obje(5lions 
 urged against that evidence : which shall be the sub- 
 je6f of a following chapter.^*^ 
 
 But the consequence of the foregoing observations 
 is, that the question, upon which the truth of Chris- 
 tianity depends, is scarce at all, what obje(51ions there 
 are against its scheme, since there are none against 
 
 Ch. 
 
Chap. 3. must appear liable to Objedions. 191 
 
 the morality of it ; but what obje6iions there are 
 against its evidence : or, what proof there remains 
 of it after due allowances made for the ohjeSlions 
 against that proof: Because it has been shewn that 
 the objeSiions against Christianity, as distinguished 
 from objeSlions against its evidence, are frivolous. 
 For surely very little weight, if any at all, is to be 
 laid upon a way of arguing and objecfting, which, 
 when applied to the general constitution of Nature, 
 experience shews not to be conclusive : and such, I 
 think, is the whole way of objecting treated of 
 throughout this chapter. It is resolvable into prin- 
 ciples, and goes upon suppositions, which mislead us 
 to think, that the Author of nature would not a6i, as 
 we experience he does ; or would acl, in such and 
 such cases, as we experience he does not in like 
 cases. But the unreasonablenef^ of this way of ob- 
 je(9;ing, will appear yet more evidently from hence, 
 that the chief things thus objected against, are jus- 
 tified, as shall be farther shewn,'i by distinc't, parti- 
 cular, and full analogies, in the constitution and course 
 of Nature. 
 
 But it is to be remembered, that, as frivolous as 
 obje6^ions of the foregoing sort against Revelation 
 are, yet, when a supposed Revelation is more con- 
 sistent with itself, and has a more general and uni- 
 form tendency to promote virtue, than, all circum- 
 stances considered, could have been expelled from 
 enthusiasm and political views ; this is a presump- 
 tive proof of its not proceeding from them, and so 
 of its truth : because we are competent judges, what 
 might have been expelled from enthusiasm and po- 
 litical views. 
 
 " Ch. iv. latter part, and v. vi. 
 
192 Christianity, a Scheme Part 2. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 Of Christianity, considered as a Scheme or Consti- 
 tution, imperfe6ily comprehended. 
 
 T hath been now shewn ' that the Ana- 
 logy of Nature renders it highly cre- 
 dible beforehand, that supposing a 
 Revelation to be made, it must con- 
 tain many things very different from 
 what we should have expecfted, and such as appear 
 open to great obje(?lions : And that this observation, 
 in good measure, takes off the force of those objec- 
 tions, or rather precludes them. But it may be al- 
 leged, that this is a very partial answer to such ob- 
 jections, or a very unsatisfactory way of obviating 
 them : because it doth not shew at all, that the things 
 objected against can be wise, just, and good; much 
 left, that it is credible they are so. It will therefore 
 be proper to shew this distinctly ; by applying to 
 these objections against the wdsdom, justice, and 
 goodnef^ of Christianity, the answer above ^ given to 
 the like objeCtions against the constitution of Nature : 
 before we consider the particular Analogies in the 
 latter, to the particular things objeCted against in the 
 former. Now that which affords a sufficient answer 
 to objections against the wisdom, justice and good- 
 nef^ of the constitution of Nature, is its being a con- 
 stitution, a system or scheme, imperfeCtly compre- 
 hended ; a scheme, in which means are made use 
 of to accomplish ends ; and which is carried on by 
 
 ' In the foregoing chapter. 
 
 ^ Part I. ch. vii. to which this all along refers. 
 
Chap. 4. imperfectly comprehended. 193 
 
 general laws. For from these things it has been 
 proved, not only to be poftible, but also to be cre- 
 dible, that those things which are objedled against, 
 may be consistent with wisdom, justice and good- 
 nefs ; nay, may be instances of them : and even that 
 the constitution and government of Nature may be 
 perfect in the highest poftible degree. If Christi- 
 anity then be a scheme, and of the like kind ; it is 
 evident, the like obje(5lions against it, must admit of 
 the like answer. And 
 
 I. Christianity is a scheme, quite beyond our com- 
 prehension. The moral government of God is ex- 
 ercised, by gradually condu(5ling things so in the 
 course of his Providence, that every one, at length 
 and upon the whole, shall receive according to his 
 deserts ; and neither fraud nor violence, but truth 
 and right, shall finally prevail. Christianity is a par- 
 ticular scheme under this general plan of Providence, 
 emd a part of it, conducive to its completion, with 
 regard to mankind : consisting itself also of various 
 parts, and a mysterious economy, which has been 
 carrying on from the time the world came into its 
 present wretched state, and is still carrying on, for 
 its recovery, by a Divine Person, the Mefsiah ; who 
 is to gather together in one, the children of God, that 
 are scattered abroad^"" and establish an everlasting 
 kingdom, wherein dnelleth righteousnejl.^ And in 
 order to it ; after various manifestations of things, 
 relating to this great and general scheme of Provi- 
 dence, through a succefsion of many ages : (For the 
 Spirit of Christ which was in the Prophets, testified 
 beforehand his sufferings, and the glory that should 
 follow: Unto whom it ivas revealed, that not unto 
 themselves, but unto us they did minister the things 
 
 ^ Joh. xi. 52. * 2 Pet. ill. 13. 
 
194 Christianity, a Scheme Part 2. 
 
 which are now reported unto us by them that have 
 preached the Gospel ; which things the Angels desire 
 to look into ;^) after various dispensations, look- 
 ing forward, and preparatory, to this final salvation : 
 in the fulnejl of time, when Infinite Wisdom thought 
 fit ; He, being in the form of God, made him- 
 self of no reputation, and took upon him the form 
 of a servant, and was made in the likenefl of men: 
 And being found in fashion as a man, he humbled 
 himself, and became obedient to death, even the death 
 of the crojl: Wherefore God also hath highly^ ex- 
 alted him, and given him a name which is above 
 every name : That at the name of Jesus every knee 
 should bow, of things in heaven, and things in the 
 earth, and things under the earth ; And that every 
 tongue should confefs, that Jesus Christ is Lord, to 
 the glory of God the Father.^ Parts likewise of this 
 economy, are the miraculous mif^ion of the Holy 
 Ghost, and his ordinary aftistances given to good 
 men : the invisible government, which Christ at pre- 
 sent exercises over his Church : That which he him- 
 self refers to in these words. In my Father's house 
 
 are many mansions / go to prepare a place for 
 
 you ;' and his future return to judge the world in 
 righteousnef,, and completely re-establish the king- 
 dom of God. For the Father judgeth no man ; but 
 hath committed all judgment unto the Son : That all 
 men should honour the Son, even as they honour the 
 Father.^ All power is given unto him in heaven and 
 in earth.^ And he must reign, till he hath put all 
 enemies under his feet. Then cometh the end, when 
 he shall have delivered up the kingdom to God, even 
 the Father ; when he shall have put down all rule. 
 
 ^ I Pet. i. II, 12. ^ Phil. ii. 6-11. "^ Joh. xiv. 2. 
 ^ Joh. V. 22, 23. ^ Matth. xxviii. 18. 
 
Chap. 4. imperfedly comprehended. 195 
 
 and all authority and power. And when all things 
 shall he subdued unto him, then shall the Son also 
 himself be subjeSi unto him that put all things under 
 him, that God may be all in alU^ Now little, surely, 
 need be said to shew, that this system, or scheme 
 of things, is but imperfe(511y comprehended by us. 
 The Scripture expreftly ai^erts it to be so. And in- 
 deed one cannot read a paftag-e relating to this great 
 mystery of godlinejl,^^ but what immediately runs 
 up into something which shews us our ignorance in 
 it ; as everything in Nature shews us our ignorance 
 in the constitution of Nature. And whoever will 
 seriously consider that part of the Christian scheme, 
 which is revealed in Scripture, will find so much more 
 unrevealed, as will convince him, that, to all the pur- 
 poses of judging and objecting, we know as little of it, 
 as of the constitution of Nature. Our ignorance, 
 therefore, is as much an answer to our obje(?tions 
 against the perfedlion of one, as against the perfec- 
 tion of the other.'- 
 
 II. It is obvious too, that in the Christian dispen- 
 sation, as much as in the natural scheme of things, 
 means are made use of to accomplish ends. And 
 the observation of this furnishes us with the same 
 answer, to objecftions against the perfection of Chris- 
 tianity, as to objec^tions of the like kind, against the 
 constitution of Nature. It shews the credibility, that 
 the things obje(?i;ed against, ho\N foolish^'' soever they 
 appear to men, may be the very best means of ac- 
 complishing the very best ends. And their appear- 
 ing foolishnejl is no presum.ption against this, in a 
 scheme so greatly beyond our comprehension.^^ 
 
 III. The credibility, that the Christian dispensa- 
 tion may have been, all along, carried on by general 
 
 »" I Cor. XV. 25-28. " I Tim. iii. 16. '=^ Pp. 128, &c. 
 " I Cor. i. '* Pp. 132, 133. 
 
196 Christianity, a Scheme Part 2. 
 
 laws/^no lei^ than the course of Nature, may require 
 to be more distinctly made out. Consider then, upon 
 what ground it is we say, that the whole common 
 course of Nature is carried on according to general 
 foreordained laws. We know indeed several of the 
 general laws of matter : and a great part of the na- 
 tural behaviour of living agents, is reducible to ge- 
 neral laws. But we know in a manner nothing, by 
 what laws, storms and tempests, earthquakes, famine, 
 pestilence, become the instruments of destru(9;ion to 
 mankind. And the laws, by which persons born into 
 the world at such a time and place, are of such ca- 
 pacities, geniuses, tempers ; the laws, by which 
 thoughts come into our mind, in a multitude of cases ; 
 and by which innumerable things happen, of the 
 greatest influence upon the affairs and state of the 
 world ; these laws are so wholly unknown to us, that 
 we call the events which come to paf^ by them, ac- 
 cidental : though all reasonable men know certainly, 
 that there cannot, in reality, be any such thing as 
 chance ; and conclude, that the things which have 
 this appearance are the result of general laws, and 
 may be reduced into them. It is then but an ex- 
 ceeding little way, and in but a very few respecfts, 
 that we can trace up the natural course of things 
 before us, to general laws. And it is only from Ana- 
 logy, that we conclude the whole of it to be capable 
 of being reduced into them : only from our seeing, 
 that part is so. It is from our finding, that the course 
 of Nature, in some respedls and so far, goes on by 
 general laws, that we conclude this of the rest. And 
 if that be a just ground for such a conclusion, it is ^ 
 just ground also, if not to conclude, yet to apprehend, 
 to render it supposable and credible, which is suf- 
 
 '5 Pp. 134, 135. 
 
Chap. 4. imperfedly comprehended. 197 
 
 ficient for answering objecftions, that God's miracu- 
 lous interpositions may have been, all along in like 
 manner, by general laws of wisdom. Thus, that mi- 
 raculous powers should be exerted, at such times, 
 upon such occasions, in such degrees and manners, 
 and with regard to such persons, rather than others ; 
 that the affairs of the world, being permitted to go 
 on in their natural course so far, should, just at such 
 a point, have a new dire(9;ion given them by mira- 
 culous interpositions ; that these inteqDOsitions should 
 be exac9;ly in such degrees and respe(?ts only ; all 
 this may have been by general laws. These laws 
 are unknown indeed to us : but no more unknown, 
 than the laws from whence it is, that some die as 
 soon as they are born, and others live to extreme 
 old age ; that one man is so superior to another in 
 understanding ; with innumerable more things, which, 
 as was before observed, we cannot reduce to any 
 laws or rules at all, though it is taken for granted, 
 they are as much reducible to general ones, as gra- 
 vitation. Now, if the revealed dispensations of Pro- 
 vidence, and miraculous inteq^ositions, be by general 
 laws, as well as God's ordinary government in the 
 course of Nature, made known by reason and expe- 
 rience ; there is no more reason to expe6l, that every 
 exigence, as it arises, should be provided for by these 
 general laws of miraculous interpositions, than that 
 every exigence in Nature should, by the general laws 
 of Nature. Yet there might be wise and good rea- 
 sons, that miraculous interpositions should be by ge- 
 neral laws : and that these laws should not be broken 
 in upon, or deviated from, by other miracles. 
 
 Upon the whole then : The appearance of defici- 
 encies and irregularities in Nature, is owing to its 
 being a scheme but in part made known, and of such 
 a certain particular kind in other respe(5ls. Now we 
 
198 Christianity, a Scheme Part 2. 
 
 see no more reason, why the frame and course of 
 Nature should be such a scheme, than why Chris- 
 tianity should. And that the former is such a scheme, 
 renders it credible, that the latter, upon supposition 
 of its truth, may be so too. And as it is manifest, 
 that Christianity is a scheme revealed but in part, 
 and a scheme in which means are made use of to 
 accomplish ends ; like to that of Nature : So the 
 credibility, that it may have been all along carried 
 on by general laws, no lef^ than the course of Na- 
 ture, has been distin(511y proved. And from all this 
 it is beforehand credible that there might, I think 
 probable that there would, be the like appearance of 
 deficiencies and irregularities in Christianity, as in 
 Nature : i. e. that Christianity would be liable to the 
 like obje(51:ions, as the frame of Nature. And these 
 obje(9:ions are answered by these observations con- 
 cerning Christianity ; as the like objections against 
 the frame of Nature, are answered by the like ob- 
 servations concerning the frame of Nature. 
 
 The objedlions against Christianity, considered as 
 a matter of (a.6i/^ having, in general, been obviated 
 in the preceding chapter ; and the same, considered 
 as made against the wisdom and goodneft of it, hav- 
 ing been obviated in this : the next thing, according 
 to the method proposed, is to shew, that the prin- 
 cipal objections, in particular, against Christianity, 
 may be answered, by particular and full Analogies 
 in Nature. And as one of them is made against the 
 whole scheme of it together, as just now described, 
 I choose to consider it here, rather than in a distin(5l 
 chapter by itself. The thing obje(?i:ed against this 
 scheme of the Gospel, is, " that it seems to suppose, 
 
 16 p. 127. 
 
Chap. 4. imperfedly comprehended. 199 
 
 " God was reduced to the necefsity of a long series of 
 " intricate means, in order to accomplish his ends, 
 "the recovery and salvation of the world: In like 
 " sort as men, for want of understanding- or power, 
 " not being able to come at their ends directly, are 
 " forced to go roundabout ways, and make use of 
 " many perplexed contrivances to arrive at them." 
 Now everything which we see, shews the folly of 
 this, considered as an obje(9;ion against the truth of 
 Christianity. For, according to our manner of con- 
 ception, God makes use of variety of means, what 
 we often think tedious ones, in the natural course of 
 Providence, for the accomplishment of all his ends. 
 Indeed it is certain, there is somewhat in this matter 
 quite beyond our comprehension : But the mystery 
 is as great in Nature, as in Christianity. We know 
 what we ourselves aim at, as final ends : and what 
 courses we take, merely as means conducing to those 
 ends. But we are greatly ignorant, how far things 
 are considered by the Author of nature, under the 
 single notion of means and ends ; so as that it may 
 be said. This is merely an end, and that merely 
 means, in his regard. And whether there be not 
 some peculiar absurdity in our very manner of con- 
 ception, concerning this matter, somewhat contra- 
 di(5lory arising from our extremely imperfect!; views 
 of things, it is jmpofsible to say. However, thus 
 much is manifest, that the whole natural world and 
 government of it is a scheme or system ; not a fixed, 
 but a progref^ive one : a scheme, in which the ope- 
 ration of various means takes up a great length of 
 time, before the ends they tend to can be attained. 
 The change of seasons, the ripening of the fruits of 
 the earth, the very history of a flower, is an instance 
 of this : And so is human life. Thus vegetable bodies, 
 and those of animals, though poftibly formed at once, 
 
200 Christianity, a Scheme, &c. Part 2. 
 
 yet grow up by degrees to a mature state. And 
 thus rational agents, who animate these latter bodies, 
 are naturally dire(?l;ed to form, each his own manners 
 and chara^ler, by the gradual gaining of knowledge 
 and experience, and by a long course of a^lion. Our 
 existence is not only succef^ive, as it must be of ne- 
 ceftity ; but one state of our life and being, is ap- 
 pointed by God, to be a preparation for another ; and 
 that, to be the means of attaining to another suc- 
 ceeding one : Infancy to childhood, childhood to 
 youth ; youth to mature age. Men are impatient, 
 and for precipitating things : but the Author of na- 
 ture appears deliberate throughout his operations ; 
 accomplishing his natural ends, by slow succefsive 
 steps. And there is a plan of things beforehand laid 
 out, which, from the nature of it, requires various 
 systems of means, as well as length of time, in order 
 to the carrying on its several parts into execution. 
 Thus, in the daily course of natural Providence, God 
 operates in the very same manner, as in the dispen- 
 sation of Christianity : making one thing subservient 
 to another ; This, to somewhat farther ; and so on, 
 through a progreftive series of means, which extend, 
 both backward and forward, beyond our utmost view. 
 Of this manner of operation, everything we see in 
 the course of Nature, is as much an instance, as any 
 part of the Christian dispensation. 
 
Chap. 5. The Appointment, &c. 201 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 Of the particular System of Christianity ; the Ap- 
 pointment of a Mediator, and the Redemption of 
 the World by him. 
 
 - - /! HERE is not, I think, anything relating 
 ^^} to Christianity, which has been more 
 30\i\ obje(?ted against, than the mediation 
 
 of Christ, in some or other of its parts. 
 
 Yet, upon thorough consideration,there 
 
 seems nothing lef^ justly liable to it. For, 
 
 I. The whole Analogy of Nature removes all ima- 
 gined presumption against the general notion of a 
 Mediator between God and man} For we find all 
 living creatures are brought into the w'orld, and their 
 life in infancy is preserved, by the instrumentality of 
 others : And every satisfa(51ion of it, some way or 
 other, is bestowed by the like means. So that the 
 visible government, which God exercises over the 
 world, is by the instrumentality and mediation of 
 others. And how far his invisible government be or 
 be not so, it is impofsible to determine at all by rea- 
 son. And the supposition, that part of it is so, ap- 
 pears, to say the least, altogether as credible, as the 
 contrary. There is then no sort of objection, from 
 the light of Nature, against the general notion of a 
 Mediator between God and man, considered as a 
 dodlrine of Christianity, or as an appointment in this 
 dispensation : since we find by experience, that God 
 does appoint mediators, to be the instruments of 
 
 ' I Tim. ii. 5. 
 
202 Appointment of a Mediator, Part 2. 
 
 good and evil to us ; the instruments of his justice 
 and his mercy. And the objection here referred to 
 is urged, not against mediation in that high, eminent 
 and peculiar sense, in which Christ is our Mediator ; 
 but absolutely against the whole notion itself of a 
 mediator at all. 
 
 II. As we must suppose, that the world is under 
 the proper moral government of God, or in a state 
 of Religion, before we can enter into consideration 
 of the revealed dodlrine, concerning the redemption 
 of it by Christ ; so that supposition is here to be dis- 
 tinctly taken notice of. Now the Divine moral go- 
 vernment which Religion teaches us, implies, that 
 the consequence of vice shall be misery, in some 
 future state, by the righteous judgment of God. 
 That such consequent punishment shall take effeCl 
 by his appointment, is neceftarily implied. But, as 
 it is not in any sort to be supposed, that we are made 
 acquainted with all the ends or reasons, for which it 
 is fit future punishments should be inflicted, or why 
 God has appointed, such and such consequent misery 
 should follow vice ; and as we are altogether in the 
 dark, how or in what manner it shall follow, by what 
 immediate occasions, or by the instrumentality of 
 what means ; there is no absurdity in supposing, it 
 may follow in a way analogous to that, in which 
 many miseries follow such and such courses of a(5tion 
 at present ; poverty, sicknef^, infamy, untimely death 
 by diseases, death from the hands of civil justice. 
 There is no absurdity in supposing future punish- 
 ment may follow wickedne{^ of course, as we speak, 
 or in the way of natural consequence from God's 
 original constitution of the world ; from the nature 
 he has given us, and from the condition in which he 
 places us : Or in a like manner, as a person rashly 
 trifling upon a precipice, in the way of natural con- 
 
Chap. 5. the Redeemer of the World. 203 
 
 sequence, falls down ; in the way of natural conse- 
 quence, breaks his limbs, suppose ; in the way of 
 natural consequence of this, without help, perishes. 
 
 Some good men may perhaps be offended, with 
 hearing it spoken of as a supposable thing, that the 
 future punishments of wickednefs may be in the way 
 of natural consequence : as if this were taking the 
 execution of justice out of the hands of God, and 
 giving it to Nature. But they should remember, 
 that when things come to paf^ according to the course 
 of Nature, this does not hinder them from being his 
 doing, who is the God of nature : And that the Scrip- 
 ture ascribes those punishments to Divine justice, 
 which are known to be natural ; and which must be 
 called so, when distinguished from such as are mi- 
 raculous. But after all, this supposition, or rather 
 this way of speaking, is here made use of only by 
 way of illustration of the subjedl before us. For 
 since it must be admitted, that the future punish- 
 ment of wickednefs is not a matter of arbitrary ap- 
 pointment, but of reason, equity and justice ; it comes, 
 for aught I see, to the same thing, whether it is sup- 
 posed to be inflicted in a way analogous to that, in 
 which the temporal punishments of vice and folly 
 are inflicted, or in any other way. And though there 
 were a difference, it is allowable, in the present case, 
 to make this supposition, plainly not an incredible 
 one ; that future punishment may follow wickednefs 
 in the way of natural consequence, or according to 
 some general laws of government already established 
 in the universe. 
 
 III. Upon this supposition, or even without it, we 
 may observe somewhat, much to the present pur- 
 pose, in the constitution of Nature or appointments 
 of Providence : the provision which is made, that all 
 the bad natural consequences of men's actions, should 
 
204 Appointment of a Mediator, Part 2. 
 
 not always acflually follow ; or that such bad conse- 
 quences as, according to the settled course of things, 
 would inevitably have follow^ed if not prevented, should 
 in certain degrees, be prevented. We are apt pre- 
 sumptuously to imagine, that the world might have 
 been so constituted, as that there would not have 
 been any such thing as misery or evil. On the con- 
 trary we find the Author of nature permits it : But 
 then he has provided reliefs, and, in many cases, 
 perfect; remedies for it, after some pains and diffi- 
 culties : Reliefs and remedies even for that evil, which 
 is the fruit of our own miscondu6l ; and which, in 
 the course of Nature, would have continued, and 
 ended in our destruction, but for such remedies. 
 And this is an instance both of severity and indul- 
 gence, in the constitution of Nature. Thus all the 
 bad consequences, now mentioned, of a man's trifling 
 upon a precipice, might be prevented. And though 
 all were not, yet some of them might, by proper 
 interposition, if not reje(ffed : by another's coming 
 to the rash man's relief, with his own laying hold on 
 that relief, in such sort as the case required. Per- 
 sons may do a great deal themselves towards pre- 
 venting the bad consequences of their follies : and 
 more may be done by themselves, together with the 
 af^istance of others their fellow-creatures ; which 
 afsistance Nature requires and prompts us to. This 
 is the general constitution of the world. Now sup- 
 pose it had been so constituted, that after such ac- 
 tions were done, as were foreseen naturally to draw 
 after them misery to the doer, it should have been 
 no more in human power to have prevented that 
 naturally consequent misery, in any instance, than it 
 is, in all ; no one can say, whether such a more se- 
 vere constitution of things might not yet have been 
 really good. But, that on the contrary, provision is 
 
Chap. 5. the Redeemer of the World. 205 
 
 made by Nature, that we may and do, to so great 
 degree, prevent the bad natural effe(fi:s of our follies ; 
 this may be called mercy or companion in the ori- 
 ginal constitution of the world : Compafsion, as dis- 
 tinguished from goodnefs in general. And, the whole 
 known constitution and course of things affording us 
 instances of such compafsion, it would be according 
 to the Analogy of Nature, to hope, that, however 
 ruinous the natural consequences of vice might be, 
 from the general laws of God's government over the 
 universe ; ^^et provision might be made, pol^ibly 
 might have been originally made, for preventing 
 those ruinous consequences from inevitably follow- 
 ing : at least from following universally, and in all 
 cases. 
 
 Many, I am sensible, will wonder at finding this 
 made a question, or spoken of as in any degree 
 doubtful. The generality of mankind are so far from 
 having that awful sense of things, which the present 
 state of vice and misery and darknefs seems to make 
 but reasonable, that they have scarce any apprehen- 
 sion or thought at all about this matter, any way : 
 and some serious persons may have spoken unad- 
 visedly concerning it. But let us observe, what we 
 experience to be, and what, from the very constitu- 
 tion of Nature, cannot but be, the consequences of 
 irregular and disorderly behaviour ; even of such 
 rashnefSjwilfulnefs, neglecT:s,as we scarce call vicious. 
 Now it is natural to apprehend, that the bad conse- 
 quences of irregularity will be greater, in proportion 
 as the irregularity is so. And there is no compa- 
 rison between these irregularities, and the greater 
 instances of vice, or a difkolute profligate disregard 
 to all Religion ; if there be anything at all in Reli- 
 gion. For consider what it is for creatures, moral 
 agents, presumptuously to introduce that confusion 
 
2o6 Appointment of a Mediator, Part 2. 
 
 and misery into the kingdom of God, which mankind 
 have in fa(9: introduced ; to blaspheme the sovereign 
 Lord of all ; to contemn his authority ; to be inju- 
 rious, to the degree they are, to their fellow-crea- 
 tures, the creatures of God. Add that the effe(51s 
 of vice in the present world, are often extreme mi- 
 sery, irretrievable ruin, and even death. And upon 
 putting all this together, it will appear, that as no 
 one can say, in what degree fatal, the unprevented 
 consequences of vice may be, according to the ge- 
 neral rule of Divine government ; so it is by no means 
 intuitively certain, how far these consequences could 
 pofsibly, in the nature of the thing, be prevented, 
 consistently with the eternal rule of right, or with 
 what is, in fa(5l, the moral constitution of Nature. 
 However, there would be large ground to hope, that 
 the universal government was not so severely strict, 
 but that there was room for pardon, or for having 
 those penal consequences prevented. Yet, 
 
 IV. There seems no probability, that anything we 
 could do, would alone and of itself prevent them : 
 prevent their following, or being inflicfled. But one 
 would think, at least, it were impofsible, that the 
 contrary should be thought certain. For we are not 
 acquainted with the whole of the case. We are not 
 informed of all the reasons, which render it fit that 
 future punishments should be infli(51ed : and there- 
 fore cannot know, whether anything we could do, 
 would make such an alteration, as to render it fit that 
 they should be remitted. We do not know, what 
 the whole natural or appointed consequences of vice 
 are ; nor in what way they would follow, if not pre- 
 vented : and therefore can in no sort say, whether 
 we could do anything, which would be sufficient to 
 prevent them. Our ignorance being thus manifest, 
 let us recolle(5l the Analogy of Nature or Providence. 
 
Chap. 5. the Redeemer of the World. 207 
 
 For, though this may be but a slight ground to raise 
 a positive opinion upon, in this matter ; yet it is suf- 
 ficient to answer a mere arbitrary aftertion, without 
 any kind of evidence, urged by way of objection 
 against a do(5lrine, the proof of which is not reason, 
 but Revelation. Consider then : People ruin their 
 fortunes by extravagance ; they bring diseases upon 
 themselves by exceft; they incur the penalties of 
 civil laws, and surely civil government is natural : 
 Will sorrow for these follies past, and behaving well 
 for the future alone and of itself, prevent the natural 
 consequences of them ? On the contrary, men's na- 
 tural abilities of helping themselves are often im- 
 pmred : Or if not, yet they are forced to be beholden 
 to the af^istance of others, upon several accounts, 
 and in different ways : Afsistance which they would 
 have had no occasion for, had it not been for their 
 miscondu6l ; but which, in the disadvantageous con- 
 dition they have reduced themselves to, is absolutely 
 neceftary to their recovery, and retrieving their af- 
 fairs. Now since this is our case, considering our- 
 selves merely as inhabitants of this world, and as 
 having a temporal interest here, under the natural 
 government of God, which however has a great deal 
 moral in it : Why is it not supposable, that this may 
 be our case also, in our more important capacity, as 
 under his perfecft moral government, and having a 
 more general and future interest depending \ If we 
 have misbehaved in this higher capacity, and ren- 
 dered ourselves obnoxious to the future punishment, 
 which God has annexed to vice : it is plainly credible, 
 
 that behaving well for the time to come, may be 
 
 not useleft, God forbid but wholly insufficient 
 
 alone and of itself, to prevent that punishment ; or 
 to put us in the condition, which we should have 
 been in, had we preserved our innocence. 
 
2o8 Appointment of a Mediator, Pari 2. 
 
 And though we ought to reason with all reverence, 
 whenever we reason concerning the Divine condudl : 
 yet it may be added, that it is clearly contrary to all 
 our notions of government, as well as to what is, in 
 fa(9:, the general constitution of Nature, to suppose 
 that doing well for the future, should, in all cases, 
 prevent all the judicial bad consequences of having 
 done evil, or all the punishment annexed to disobe- 
 dience. And we have manifestly nothing from whence 
 to determine, in what degree and in what cases, 
 reformation would prevent thjs punishment, even 
 supposing that it would in some. And though the 
 efficacy of repentance itself alone, to prevent what 
 mankind had rendered themselves obnoxious to, and 
 recover what they had forfeited, is now insisted upon, 
 in opposition to Christianity : yet, by the general 
 prevalence of propitiatory sacrifices over the heathen 
 world, this notion, of repentance alone being suffi- 
 cient to expiate guilt, appears to be contrary to the 
 general sense of mankind. 
 
 Upon the whole then : Had the laws, the general 
 laws of God's government been permitted to operate, 
 without any interposition in our behalf, the future 
 punishment, for aught we know to the contrary, or 
 have any reason to think, must inevitably have fol- 
 lowed, notwithstanding anything we could have done 
 to prevent it. Now, 
 
 V. In this darkneft, or this light of Nature, call 
 it which you please, Revelation comes in ; confirms 
 every doubting fear, which could enter into the heart 
 of man, concerning the future unprevented conse- 
 quence of wickednef^ ; supposes the world to be in 
 a state of ruin ; (a supposition which seems the very 
 ground of the Christian dispensation, and which, if 
 not provable by reason, yet is in no wise contrary to 
 it ;) teaches us too, that the rules of Divine govern- 
 
Chap, 5. the Redeemer of the World. 209 
 
 ment are such, as not to admit of pardon immediately 
 and dire(?lly upon repentance, or by the sole efficacy 
 of it: But then teaches at the same time, what Na- 
 ture might justly have hoped, that the moral govern- 
 ment of the universe was not so rigid, but that there 
 was room for an interposition, to avert the fatal con- 
 sequences of vice ; which therefore, by this means, 
 does admit of pardon. Revelation teaches us, that 
 the unknown laws of God's more general govern- 
 ment, no left than the particular laws by which w^e 
 experience he governs us at present, are compas- 
 sionate,- as well as good in the more general notion 
 of goodneft : And that he hath mercifully provided, 
 that there should be an interposition to prevent the 
 destruction of human kind ; whatever that destru6lion 
 unprevented would have been. God so loved the 
 world, that he gave his only-begotten Son, that who- 
 soever helieveth, not, to be sure, in a speculative, but 
 in a pracftical sense, that whosoever believeth in him, 
 should not perish :^ Gave his Son in the same w^ay 
 of goodneft to the world, as he affords particular 
 persons the friendly aftistance of their fellow-crea- 
 tures ; when, without it, their temporal ruin w^ould 
 be the certain consequence of their follies : in the 
 same way of goodneft, I say ; though in a transcend- 
 ent and infinitely higher degree. And the Son of 
 God loved us and gave himself for us, with a love, 
 which he himself compares to that of human friend- 
 ship : though, in this case, all comparisons must fall 
 infinitely short of the thing intended to be illustrated 
 by them. He interposed in such a manner, as was 
 neceftary and efteclual to prevent that execution of 
 justice upon sinners, which God had appointed should 
 otherwise have been executed upon them : Or in 
 
 ' Pp. 203, Sec. 3 Joh^ l\l j6. 
 
210 Appointment of a Mediator, Part 2. 
 
 such a manner, as to prevent that punishment from 
 a(51ually following, which, according to the general 
 laws of Divine government, must have followed the 
 sins of the world, had it not been for such interpo- 
 sition.^ 
 
 If anything here said, should appear, upon first 
 thought, inconsistent with Divine goodnei^ ; a second, 
 I am persuaded, will entirely remove that appear- 
 ance. For were we to suppose the constitution of 
 things to be such, as that the whole creation must 
 have perished, had it not been for somewhat, which 
 God had appointed should be, in order to prevent 
 that ruin : even this supposition would not be incon- 
 sistent, in any degree, with the most absolutely per- 
 fect goodneft. But still it may be thought, that this 
 whole manner of treating the subje(5l before us, sup- 
 
 * It cannot, I suppose, be imagined, even by the most cur- 
 sory reader, that it is, in any sort, affiimed or implied in any- 
 thing said in this chapter, that none can have the benefit of the 
 general redemption, but such as have the advantage of being 
 made acquainted with it in the present life. But it may be 
 needful to mention, that several questions, which have been 
 brought into the subjedl before us, and determined, are not in 
 the least enteied into here : Questions which have been, I fear, 
 rashlydetermined, and perhaps with equal rashnefs contrary ways. 
 For instance, Whether God could have saved the world by other 
 means than the death of Christ, consistently with the general 
 laws of his government. And had not Christ come into the 
 world, what would have been the future condition of the better 
 sort of men ; those just persons over the face of the earth, for 
 whom, Manafses in his prayer afserts, repentance was not ap- 
 pointed. The meaning of the first of these questions is greatly 
 ambiguous. And neither of them can properly be answered, 
 without going upon that infinitely absurd supposition, that we 
 know the whole of the case. And perhaps the very inquiry, 
 What luould hwve foUotved if God had not done as he /las, may have 
 in it some very great impropriety ; and ought not to be carried 
 on any farther, than is necefsary to help our partial and inade- 
 quate conceptions of things. 
 
Chap, 5. the Redeemer of the World. 211 
 
 poses mankind to be naturally in a very strange state. 
 And truly so it does. But it is not Christianity, which 
 has put us into this state. Whoever will consider 
 the manifold miseries, and the extreme wickednef^ 
 of the world: that the best have great wrongneftes 
 within themselves, which they complain of, and en- 
 deavour to amend ; but that the generality grow 
 more profligate and corrupt with age : that heathen 
 moralists thought the present state to be a state of 
 punishment : and, what might be added, that the 
 earth our habitation has the appearances of being a 
 ruin: whoever, I say, will consider all these, and 
 some other obvious things, will think he has little 
 reason to object against the Scripture account, that 
 mankind is in a state of degradation ; against this 
 being the fa(5l : how difficult soever he may think it 
 to account for, or even to form a distincfl: conception 
 of the occasions and circumstances of it. But that 
 the crime of our first parents was the occasion of our 
 being placed in a more disadvantageous condition, is 
 a thing throughout and particularly analogous to 
 what we see, in the daily course of natural Providence ; 
 as the recovery of the world by the interposition of 
 Christ, has been shewn to be so in general. 
 
 VI. The particular manner in which Christ inter- 
 posed in the redemption of the world, or his office 
 as Mediator, in the largest sense, between God and 
 man, is thus represented to us in the Scripture. He 
 is the light of the world ;'^ the Revealer of the will 
 of God in the most eminent sense. He is a propi- 
 tiatory sacrifice ;^ the Lamb of God:"^ and, as he vo- 
 luntarily offered himself up, he is styled our High- 
 
 ^ Joh. i. and vlii. la. 
 
 ^ Rom. iii. 25, and v. 1 1 ; i Cor. v. 7 ; Eph, v. 2 ; I Joh. 
 ii. 2 ; Matth. xxvi. 28. 
 
 ' Joh. i. 29, 36, and throughout the book of Revelation. 
 
212 Appointment of a Mediator, Part 2. 
 
 priest.^ And, which seems of peculiar weight, he 
 is described beforehand in the Old Testament, under 
 the same charac^ters of a priest, and an expiatory 
 vi(?i:im.^ And whereas it is obje^led, that all this is 
 merely by way of allusion to the sacrifices of the 
 Mosaic law, the Apostle on the contrary affirms, that 
 the Law was a shadow of good things to come, and 
 not the very image of the things : ^° and that the 
 priests that offer gifts according to the law — serve 
 unto the example and shadow of heavenly things, as 
 Moses was admonished of God, when he was about 
 to make the tabernacle. For see, saith he, that thou 
 make all things according to the pattern shewed to 
 thee in the mount}^ I. e. the Levitical priesthood was 
 a shadow of the priesthood of Christ ; in like manner 
 as the tabernacle made by Moses, was according to 
 that shewed him in the Mount. The priesthood of 
 Christ, and the tabernacle in the Mount, were the 
 originals : of the former of which, the Levitical priest- 
 hood was a type ; and of the latter, the tabernacle 
 made by Moses was a copy. The do61:rine of this 
 epistle then plainly is, that the legal sacrifices were 
 allusions to the great and final atonement, to be made 
 by the blood of Christ ; and not that this was an al- 
 lusion to those. Nor can anything be more expref^ 
 and determinate, than the following pafsage. It is 
 notpojlible that the blood of bulls and of goats should 
 take away sin. Wherefore when he cometh into the 
 world, he saith. Sacrifice and offering, i.e. of bulls 
 and of goats, thou wouldst not, but a body hast thou 
 
 prepared me Lo, I come to do thy will, O God 
 
 By which will we are sanSiified, through the 
 
 offering of the body of Jesus Christ once for all.^^ 
 
 ® Throughout the Epistle to the Hebrews. 
 
 ^ Ifa. liii ; Dan. ix. 243 Ps. ex. 4. "^ Heb. x, I. 
 
 " Heb. viii. 4, 5. '2 j^^b. x. 4, 5, 7, 9, 10. 
 
Chap. S. the Redeemer of the World. 213 
 
 And to add one paftage more of the like kind : Christ 
 was once offered to bear the sins of many ; and unto 
 them that look for him shall he appear the second 
 time, without sin; i.e. without bearing sin, as he 
 did at his first coming, by being an offering for it ; 
 without having our iniquities again laid upon him, 
 
 without being anymore a sin-offering : unto them 
 
 that look for him shall he appear the second time, 
 without sin, unto salvation}-^ Nor do the inspired 
 WTiters at all confine themselves to this manner of 
 speaking concerning the satisfaction of Christ ; but 
 declare an efficacy in what he did and suffered for 
 us, additional to and beyond mere instruction, ex- 
 ample and government, in great variety of expres- 
 sion : That Jesus should die for that nation the Jews : 
 And not for that nation only, but that also, plainly 
 by the efficacy of his death, he should gather together 
 in one, the children ofGodthatwere scattered abroad :^^ 
 That he suffered for sins, the just for the unjust :^^ 
 That he gave his life, himself, a ransom :^^ That we 
 are bought, bought with a price .-^^ That he redeemed 
 us with his blood; redeemed us from the curse of 
 the law, being made a curse for us:^^ That he is our 
 Advocate, Interceflor and Propitiation:^^ That he 
 was made perfect, or consummate, through suffer- 
 ings : and being thus made perfeSi, he became the 
 author of salvation :-^ That God was in Christ re- 
 conciling the world to himself; by the death of his 
 Son, by the crojl ; not imputing their trespajles unto 
 them :"^ And lastly, that through death he destroyed 
 
 '3 Heb. ix. 28. '< Joh. xi. 51, 52. '^ j p^^. Hi. 18. 
 
 "5 M3tth. XX. 28 ; Mark x. 45 j I Tim. ii. 6. 
 
 ^' 2 Pet. ii. I ; Rev. xiv. 4; i Cor. vi. 20. 
 
 '8 I Pet. i, 19 ; Rev. v. 9 ; Gal. iii. 13. 
 
 '9 Heb. vii. 25 j I Joh. ii. 1,2. -" Ileh. ii, 10, and v. 9. 
 
 2' 2 Cor. V. 19 j Rom. v. 10; Eph. ii. 16. 
 
214 Appointment of a Mediator, Parti. 
 
 him that had the power of death." Christ then having 
 thus humbled himself, and become obedient to death, 
 even the death of the crcjl ; God also hath highly 
 exalted him, and given him a name which is above 
 every name: hath given all things into his hands: 
 hath committed all judgment unto him ; that all men 
 should honour the Son, even as they honour the 
 Father.-'^ For, worthy is the Lamb that was slain, to 
 receive power, and riches, and wisdom, and strength, 
 and honour, and glory, and blefsing. And every 
 creature which is in heaven, and on the earth, heard 
 I, saying, Blefsing, and honour, and glory, and 
 power be unto him that sitteth upon the throne, and 
 unto the Lamb for ever and ever}^ 
 
 These parages of Scripture seem to comprehend 
 and expreft the chief parts of Christ's office, as Me- 
 diator between God and man, so far, I mean, as the 
 nature of this his office is revealed ; and it is usually 
 treated of by divines under three heads. 
 
 First, He was, by way of eminence, the Prophet : 
 That Prophet that should come into the world,^^ to 
 declare the Divine will. He published anew the law 
 of Nature, which men had corrupted ; and the very 
 knowledge of which to some degree, was lost among 
 them. He taught mankind, taught us authoritatively 
 to live soberly, righteously and godly in this present 
 world, in expe(51:ation of the future judgment of God. 
 He confirmed the truth of this moral system of Na- 
 ture, and gave us additional evidence of it ; the evi- 
 dence of testimony .-<' He distin(9;ly revealed, the 
 manner in which God would be worshipped, the 
 efficacy of repentance, and the rewards and punish- 
 
 22 Heb. li. 14. See also a remarkable pafsage in the Book 
 of Job, xxxiii. 24. 
 
 2^ Phil. ii. 8, 9; John iii. 3<;, and v. 22, 23. 
 
 24 Rev. V. 12, 13. '■^ Joh. vi. 14. 26 pp_ j^Q^ 5,j._ 
 
Chap. ^. the Redeemer of the World. 215 
 
 ments of a future life. Thus he was a Prophet in a 
 sense, in which no other ever was. To which is to 
 be added, that he set us a perfecSl example that we 
 should follow his steps. 
 
 Secondly, He has a kingdom which is not of this 
 world. He founded a Church, to be to mankind a 
 standing memorial of Religion, and invitation to it ; 
 which he promised to be with always even to the 
 end. He exercises an invisible government over it, 
 himself, and by his Spirit : Over that part of it, which 
 is militant here on earth, a government of discipline, 
 for the perfecting of the saints, for the edifying his 
 body: till we all come in the unity of the faith, and 
 of the knowledge of the Son of God, unto a perfeSi 
 man, wito the measure of the stature of the fulnefl 
 of Christ.^'' Of this Church, all persons scattered 
 over the world, who live in obedience to his laws, are 
 members. For these he is gone to prepare a place, 
 and will come again to receive them unto himself, 
 that where he is, there they may be also : and reign 
 with him for ever and ever :-^ and likewise to take 
 vengeance on them that know not God, and obey not 
 his gospelP 
 
 Against these parts of Christ's office, I find no 
 objections, but what are fully obviated in the begin- 
 ning of this chapter. 
 
 Lastly, Christ offered himself a propitiatory sa- 
 crifice, and made atonement for the sins of the world : 
 Which is mentioned last, in regard to what is ob- 
 jected against it. Sacrifices of expiation were com- 
 manded the Jews, and obtained amongst most other 
 nations, from tradition, whose original probably was 
 Revelation. And they were continually repeated, 
 both occasionally, and at the returns of stated times ; 
 
 ^' Eph. iv. 12, 13. 
 28 Joh. xiv. 2, 3 ; Pv.ev. iii. 21, and xi. 15. ^ % Th.fs. i. S. 
 
2i6 Appointment of a Mediator, Part 2. 
 
 and made up great part of the external religion of 
 mankind. But now once in the end of the world 
 Christ appeared to put away sin by the sacrifice of 
 himself :^^ And this sacrifice was, in the highest de- 
 gree and with the most extensive influence, of that 
 efficacy for obtaining pardon of sin, which the hea- 
 thens may be supposed to have thought their sacri- 
 fices to have been, and which the Jewish sacrifices 
 really were in some degree, and with regard to some 
 persons. 
 
 How and in what particular way it had this effi- 
 cacy, there are not wanting persons who have en- 
 deavoured to explain : but I do not find that the 
 Scripture has explained it. We seem to be very 
 much in the dark, concerning the manner in which 
 the ancients understood atonement to be made, i. e. 
 pardon to be obtained by sacrifices. And if the Scrip- 
 ture has, as surely it has, left this matter of the sa- 
 tisfaction of Christ mysterious, left somewhat in it 
 unrevealed, all conjeClures about it must be, if not 
 evidently absurd, yet at least uncertain. Nor has 
 any one reason to complain for want of farther in- 
 formation, unle{^ he can shew his claim to it. 
 
 Some have endeavoured to explain the efficacy of 
 what Christ has done and suffered for us, beyond 
 what the Scripture has authorized : Others, pro- 
 bably because they could not explain it, have been 
 for taking it away, and confining his office as Re- 
 deemer of the world, to his instruction, example and 
 government of the Church. Whereas the do<5trine 
 of the Gospel appears to be ; not only that he taught 
 the efficacy of repentance, but rendered it of the ef- 
 ficacy which it is, by what he did and suffered for 
 us : That he obtained for us the benefit of having 
 
 ^ Heb. ix. 26. 
 
Chap, s, the Redeemer of the World. 217 
 
 our repentance accepted unto eternal life : Not only 
 that he revealed to sinners, that they were in a ca- 
 pacity of salvation, and how they might obtain it ; 
 but moreover that he put them into this capacity of 
 salvation, by what he did and suffered for them ; put 
 us into a capacity of escaping future punishment, 
 and obtaining future happineft. And it is our wis- 
 dom thankfully to accept the benefit, by performing 
 the conditions, upon which it is offered, on our part, 
 without disputing how it was procured, on his. For, 
 VII. Since we neither know, by what means pun- 
 ishment in a future state would have followed wick- 
 ednef^ in this ; nor in what manner it would have 
 been inflicted, had it not been prevented ; nor all the 
 reasons why its infii(?i;ion would have been needful ; 
 nor the particular nature of that state of happinef^, 
 which Christ is gone to prepare for his disciples : 
 And since we are ignorant how far anything which we 
 could do, would, alone and of itself, have been effec- 
 tual to prevent that punishment, to which we were 
 obnoxious, and recover that happinef^, which we had 
 forfeited ; it is most evident we are not judges, ante- 
 cedently to Revelation, whether a Mediator, was or 
 was not necefsary, to obtain those ends : to prevent 
 that future punishment, and bring mankind to the 
 final happinef^ of their nature. And for the very 
 same reasons, upon supposition of the necef^ity of a 
 Mediator, we are no more judges, antecedently to 
 Revelation, of the whole nature of his office, or the 
 several parts of which it consists ; of what was fit 
 and requisite to be afkigned him, in order to accom- 
 plish the ends of Divine Providence in the appoint- 
 ment. And from hence it follows, that to obje<9: 
 against the expediency or usefulnef^ of particular 
 things, revealed to have been done or suffered by 
 him, because we do not see how they were conducive 
 
2i8 Appointment of a Mediator, Part 2. 
 
 to those ends ; is highly absurd. Yet nothing- is 
 more common to be met with, than this absurdity. 
 But if it be acknowledged beforehand, that we are 
 not judges in the case, it is evident that no obje6lion 
 can, with any shadow of reason, be urged against 
 any particular part of Christ's mediatorial office re- 
 vealed in Scripture, till it can be shewn positively, 
 not to be requisite or conducive to the ends proposed 
 to be accomplished ; or that it is in itself unreason- 
 able. 
 
 And there is one obje(?i;ion made against the satis- 
 faction of Christ, which looks to be of this positive 
 kind : that the doClrine of his being appointed to 
 suffer for the sins of the world, represents God as 
 being indifferent whether he punished the innocent 
 or the guilty. Now from the foregoing observations 
 we may see the extreme slightnef^ of all such ob- 
 jections ; and (though it is most certain all who make 
 them do not see the consequence) that they conclude 
 altogether as much against God's whole original 
 constitution of Nature, and the whole daily course of 
 Divine Providence in the government of the world, 
 i. e. against the whole scheme of Theism and the 
 whole notion of Religion ; as against Christianity. 
 For the world is a constitution or system, whose 
 parts have a mutual reference to each other : and 
 there is a scheme of things gradually carrying on, 
 called the course of Nature, to the carrying on of 
 which, God has appointed us, in various ways, to 
 contribute. And when, in the daily course of natural 
 Providence, it is appointed that innocent people should 
 suffer for the faults of the guilty, this is liable to the 
 very same objec^tion, as the instance we are now 
 considering. The infinitely greater importance of 
 that appointment of Christianity which is objeClied 
 against, does not hinder but it may be, as it plainly 
 
Chap, 5. the Redeemer of the World. 219 
 
 is, an appointment of the very same kind, with what 
 the world affords us daily examples of. Nay if there 
 were any force at all in the obie(5iion, it would be 
 stronger, in one respe^l, against natural Providence, 
 than against Christianity : because under the former, 
 we are in many cases commanded, and even neces- 
 sitated whether we will or no, to suffer for the faults 
 of others ; w^hereas the sufferings of Christ were 
 voluntary. The world's being under the righteous 
 government of God, does indeed imply, that finally 
 and upon the whole every one shall receive accord- 
 ing to his personal deserts : And the general doc- 
 trine of the whole Scripture is, that this shall be the 
 completion of the Divine government. But during 
 the progrefs, and, for aught we know, even in order 
 to the completion of this moral scheme, vicarious 
 punishments may be fit, and absolutely neceftary. 
 Men by their follies run themselves into extreme 
 distrefs : into difficulties which would be absolutely 
 fatal to them, were it not for the interposition and 
 afsistance of others. God commands by the law of 
 Nature, that we afford them this afsistance, in many 
 cases where we cannot do it without very great pains, 
 and labour, and sufferings to ourselves. And we see 
 in what variety of ways, one person's sufferings con- 
 tribute to the relief of another : and how, or by what 
 particular means, this comes to pa{^ or follow^s, from 
 the constitution and laws of Nature, which come 
 under our notice : and, being familiarized to it, men 
 are not shocked with it. So that the reason of their 
 insisting upon objecT;ions of the foregoing kind against 
 the satisfaction of Christ, is, either that they do not 
 consider God's settled and uniform appointments as 
 his appointments at all : Or else, they forget that 
 vicarious punishment is a providential appointment 
 of every day's experience : And then, from their 
 
220 Appointment of a Mediator, Part 2. 
 
 being- unacquainted with the more general laws of 
 Nature or Divine government over the world, and 
 not seeing how the sufferings of Christ could contri- 
 bute to the redemption of it, unleft by arbitrary and 
 tyrannical will ; they conclude his sufferings could 
 not contribute to it any other way. And yet, what 
 has been often alleged in justification of this do(fi:rine, 
 even from the apparent natural tendency of this 
 method of our redemption ; its tendency to vindicate 
 the authority of God's laws, and deter his creatures 
 from sin ; this has never yet been answered, and is 
 I think plainly unanswerable : though I am far from 
 thinking it an account of the whole of the case. But 
 without taking this into consideration, it abundantly 
 appears, from the observations above made, that this 
 obje^lion is, not an obje^lion against Christianity, 
 but against the whole general constitution of Nature. 
 And if it were to be considered as an obje6lion against 
 Christianity, or considering it as it is, an objection 
 against the constitution of Nature ; it amounts to no 
 more in conclusion than this, that a Divine appoint- 
 ment cannot be necef^ary or expedient, because the 
 obje(51or does not discern it to be so : though he 
 must own that the nature of the case is such, as ren- 
 ders him incapable of judging, whether it be so or 
 not ; or of seeing it to be necef^ary, though it were 
 so. 
 
 It is indeed a matter of great patience to reason- 
 able men, to find people arguing in this manner : 
 objecting against the credibility of such particular 
 things revealed in Scripture, that they do not see 
 the necef^ity or expediency of them. For though 
 it is highly right, and the most pious exercise of our 
 understanding, to inquire with due reverence into 
 the ends and reasons of God's dispensations : Yet 
 when those reasons are concealed, to argue from our 
 
Chap. 5. the Redeemer of the World. 221 
 
 ignorance, that such dispensations cannot be from 
 God, is infinitely absurd. The presumption of this 
 kind of objections, seems almost lost in the folly of 
 them. And the folly of them is yet greater, when 
 they are urged, as usually they are, against things 
 in Christianity analogous or like to those natural dis- 
 pensations of Providence, which are matter of expe- 
 rience. Let reason be kept to : and if any part of 
 the Scripture-account of the redemption of the world 
 by Christ, can be shewn to be really contrary to it, 
 let the Scripture, in the name of God, be given up : 
 But let not such poor creatures as we, go on obje(5l- 
 ing against an infinite scheme, that we do not see 
 the neceftity or usefulnefs of all its parts, and call 
 this reasoning ; And, which still farther heightens 
 the absurdity in the present case, parts which we 
 are not actively concerned in. For it may be worth 
 mentioning. 
 
 Lastly, That not only the reason of the thing, but 
 the whole Analogy of Nature, should teach us, not 
 to expe(?i: to have the like information concerning the 
 Divine condu6l, as concerning our own duty. God 
 instructs us by experience, (for it is not reason, but 
 experience which instructs us,) what good or bad 
 consequences will follow from our acting in such and 
 such manners : and by this he directs us, how we 
 are to behave ourselves. But, though we are suf- 
 ficiently instructed for the common purposes of life : 
 yet it is but an almost infinitely small part of natural 
 Providence, which we are at all let into. The case 
 is the same with regard to Revelation. The doc- 
 trine of a Mediator between God and man, against 
 which it is objected, that the expediency of some 
 things in it is not understood, relates only to what 
 was done on God's part in the appointment, and on 
 the Mediator's in the execution of it. For what is 
 
222 Appointment of a Mediator, &c. Part 2. 
 
 required of us, in consequence of this gracious dis- 
 pensation, is another subje(ft, in which none can 
 complain for want of information. The constitution 
 of the world and God's natural government over it, 
 is all mystery, as much as the Christian dispensation. 
 Yet under the first, he has given men all things per- 
 taining to life ; and under the other, all things per- 
 taining unto godlinei^. And it may be added, that 
 there is nothing hard to be accounted for in any of 
 the common precepts of Christianity : though if there 
 were, surely a Divine command is abundantly suf- 
 ficient to lay us under the strongest obligations to 
 obedience. But the facl is, that the reasons of all 
 the Christian precepts are evident. Positive institu- 
 tions are manifestly necef^ary to keep up and pro- 
 pagate Religion amongst mankind. And our duty 
 to Christ, the internal and external worship of him ; 
 this part of the religion of the Gospel, manifestly 
 arises out of what he has done and suffered, his au- 
 thority and dominion, and the relation, which he is 
 revealed to stand in to us.'^^ 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 Of the Want of Universality in Revelation: and of 
 the supposed Deficiency in the Proof of it. 
 
 T has been thought by some persons, 
 that if the evidence of Revelation ap- 
 pears doubtful, this itself turns into a 
 positive argument against it : because 
 it cannot be supposed, that if it were 
 true, it would be left to subsist upon doubtful evi- 
 3» Pp. 156, &c. 
 
"^jhap. 6. Revelation not universal, &c. 223 
 
 dence. And the obje<51ion against Revelation from 
 its not being universal, is often insisted upon as of 
 great weight. 
 
 Now the weakneft of these opinions may be shewn, 
 by observing the suppositions on which they are 
 founded : Which are really such as these ; that it 
 cannot be thought God would have bestowed any 
 favour at all upon us, unlefs in the degree, which, we 
 think, he might, and which, we imagine, would be 
 most to our particular advantage ; and also that it 
 cannot be thought he would bestow a favour upon 
 any, unlets he bestowed the same upon all : Suppo- 
 sitions which we find contradicfled, not by a few in- 
 stances in God's natural government of the world, 
 but by the general Analogy of Nature together. 
 
 Persons who speak of the evidence of Religion as 
 doubtful, and of this supposed doubtfulneft as a po- 
 sitive argument against it, should be put upon con- 
 sidering, what that evidence indeed is, which they 
 a(5l upon with regard to their temporal interests. 
 For, it is not only extremely difficult, but, in many 
 cases, absolutely impofsible, to balance pleasure and 
 pain, satisfaction and uneasinef^, so as to be able to 
 say, on which side the overplus is. There are the 
 like difficulties and impofsibilities in making the due 
 allowances, for a change of temper and taste, for 
 satiety, disgusts, ill-health: any of which render 
 men incapable of enjoying, after they have obtained, 
 what they most eagerly desired. Numberlel^ too 
 are the accidents, besides that one of untimely death, 
 which may even probably disappoint the best-con- 
 certed schemes : And strong objections are often seen 
 to lie against them, not to be removed or answered, 
 but which seem overbalanced by reasons on the other 
 side ; so as that the certain difficulties and dangers 
 of the pursuit are, by every one, thought justly dis- 
 
224 Revelation not universal, Part 2. 
 
 regarded, upon account of the appearing greater 
 advantages in case of succel^, though there be but 
 little probabiHty of it. Lastly, every one observes 
 our liableneft, if we be not upon our guard, to be 
 deceived by the falsehood of men, and the false ap- 
 pearances of things : And this danger must be greatly 
 increased, if there be a strong bias within, suppose 
 from indulged pafsion, to favour the deceit. Hence 
 arises that great uncertainty and doubtfulnef^ of 
 proof, wherein our temporal interest really consists ; 
 what are the most probable means of attaining it ; 
 and whether those means will eventually be suc- 
 ceftful. And numberlei^ instances there are, in the 
 daily course of life, in which all men think it reason- 
 able to engage in pursuits, though the probability is 
 greatly against succeeding ; and to make such pro- 
 vision for themselves, as it is supposable they may 
 have occasion for, though the plain acknowledged 
 probability is, that they never shall. Then those 
 who think the obje(9;ion against Revelation, from its 
 Hght not being universal, to be of weight, should ob- 
 serve, that the Author of nature, in numberleft in- 
 stances, bestows that upon some, which he does not 
 upon others, who seem equally to stand in need of 
 it. Indeed he appears to bestow all his gifts, with 
 the most promiscuous variety, among creatures of 
 the same species: Health and strength, capacities 
 of prudence and of knowledge, means of improve- 
 ment, riches, and all external advantages. And as 
 there are not any two men found, of exac^tly like 
 shape and features : so it is probable there are not 
 any two, of an exa6lly like constitution, temper and 
 situation, with regard to the goods and evils of life. 
 Yet, notwithstandingthese uncertainties and varieties, 
 God does exercise a natural government over the 
 world : and there is such a thing as a prudent and 
 
Chap. 6. and its Proof supposed deficient. 225 
 
 imprudent institution of life, with regard to our health 
 and our affairs, under that his natural government. 
 As neither the Jewish nor Christian Revelation 
 have been universal ; and as they have been afforded 
 to a greater or lef^ part of the world, at different 
 times : so likewise, at different times, both Revela- 
 tions have had different degrees of evidence. The 
 Jews who lived during the succefsion of Prophets, 
 that is, from Moses till after the captivity, had higher 
 evidence of the truth of their religion, than those 
 had, who lived in the interval between the last-men- 
 tioned period, and the coming of Christ. And the 
 first Christians had higher evidence of the miracles 
 wrought in attestation of Christianity, than what we 
 have now. They had also a strong presumptive 
 proof of the truth of it, perhaps of much greater 
 force, in way of argument, than many think, of which 
 we have very little remaining ; I mean the presump- 
 tive proof of its truth, from the influence which it 
 had upon the lives of the generality of its profefsors. 
 And we, or future ages, may pofsibly have a proof 
 of it, which they could not have, from the confor- 
 mity between the prophetic history, and the state of 
 the world and of Christianity. And farther : If we 
 were to suppose the evidence, which some have of 
 Religion, to amount to little more, than seeing that 
 it may be true ; but that they remain in great doubts 
 and uncertainties about both its evidence and its na- 
 ture, and great perplexities concerning the rule of 
 life: Others to have a full conviction of the truth of 
 Religion, with a distinct kno\\ ledge of their duty : 
 and others severally to have ail the intermediate de- 
 grees of religious light and evidence, which lie be- 
 tween these two If we put the case, that for the 
 
 present it was intended. Revelation should be no 
 more than a small light, in the midst of a world 
 
226 Revelation not universal. Part 2. 
 
 greatly overspread, notwithstanding it, with igno- 
 rance and darknei^ : that certain glimmerings of this 
 light should extend, and be directed, to remote dis- 
 tances, in such a manner as that those who really 
 partook of it, should not discern from whence it ori- 
 ginally came : that some in a nearer situation to it, 
 should have its light obscured, and, in different ways 
 and degrees, intercepted : and that others should be 
 placed within its clearer influence, and be much 
 more enlivened, cheered and directed by it ; but yet 
 that even to these, it should be no more than a light 
 shining in a dark place : All this w ould be perfe^^ly 
 uniform and of a piece with the conduct of Provi- 
 dence, in the distribution of its other biddings. If 
 the fact of the case really were, that some have re- 
 ceived no light at all from the Scripture ; as many 
 ages and countries in the heathen world : that others, 
 though they have, by means of it, had eftential or 
 natural Religion enforced upon their consciences, 
 yet have never had the genuine Scripture-revelation, 
 with its real evidence, proposed to their considera- 
 tion ; and the ancient Persians, and modern Maho- 
 medans, may pofsibly be instances of people in a 
 situation somewhat like to this : that others, though 
 they have had the Scripture laid before them as of 
 Divine Revelation, yet have had it with the system 
 and evidence of Christianity so interpolated, the sys- 
 tem so corrupted, the evidence so blended with false 
 miracles, as to leave the mind in the utmost doubt- 
 fulnef^ and uncertainty about the whole ; which may 
 be the state of some thoughtful men, in most of those 
 nations w^ho call themselves Christian : And lastly, 
 that others have had Christianity offered to them in 
 its genuine simplicity, and with its proper evidence, 
 as persons in countries and churches of civil and of 
 Christian liberty ; but however that even these per- 
 
Chap. 6. and its Proof supposed deficient. 227 
 
 sons are left in great ignorance in many respects, 
 and have by no means light afforded them enough 
 to satisfy their curiosity, but only to regulate their 
 life, to teach them their duty and encourage them 
 in the careful discharge of it : I say, if we were to 
 suppose this somewhat of a general true account of 
 the degrees of moral and religious light and evidence, 
 which were intended to be afforded mankind, and of 
 what has actually been and is their situation, in their 
 moral and religious capacity ; there would be nothing 
 in all this ignorance, doubtfulnef^ and uncertainty, 
 in all these varieties, and supposed disadvantages of 
 some in comparison of others, respecting Religion, 
 but may be parallelled by manifest Analogies in the 
 natural dispensations of Providence at present, and 
 considering ourselves merely in our temporal capa- 
 city. 
 
 Nor is there anything shocking in all this, or which 
 would seem to bear hard upon the moral adminis- 
 tration in Nature, if we would really keep in mind, 
 that every one shall be dealt equitably with : instead 
 of forgetting this, or explaining it away, after it is 
 acknowledged in words. All shadow of injustice, 
 and indeed all harsh appearances, in this various 
 economy of Providence, would be lost; if we would 
 keep in mind, that every merciful allowance shall be 
 made, and no more be required of any one, than 
 what might have been equitably expelled of him, 
 from the circumstances in which he was placed ; and 
 not what might have been expected, had he been 
 placed in other circumstances : i. e. in Scripture lan- 
 guage, that every man shall be accepted according 
 to what he had, not according to what he had not.^ 
 This however doth not by any means imply, that all 
 
 ' 2 Cor. viii. 12. 
 
228 Revelation not universal, Part 2. 
 
 persons' condition here, is equally advantageous with 
 respedl to futurity. And Providence's designing to 
 place some in greater darknel^ with respecft to reli- 
 gious knowledge, is no more a reason why they 
 should not endeavour to get out of that darkneis, and 
 others to bring them out of it ; than why ignorant 
 and slow people, in matters of other knowledge, 
 should not endeavour to learn, or should not be in- 
 strucled. 
 
 It is not unreasonable to suppose, that the same 
 wise and good principle, whatever it was, which dis- 
 posed the Author of nature to make different kinds 
 and orders of creatures, disposed him also to place 
 creatures of like kinds, in different situations : And 
 that the same principle which disposed him to make 
 creatures of different moral capacities, disposed him 
 also to place creatures of like moral capacities, in 
 different religious situations ; and even the same 
 creatures, in different periods of their being. And 
 the account or reason of this, is also most probably 
 the account, why the constitution of things is such, 
 as that creatures of moral natures or capacities, for 
 a considerable part of that duration in which they 
 are living agents, are not at all subje(9:s of morality 
 and Religion ; but grow up to be so, and grow up to 
 be so more and more, gradually from childhood to 
 mature age. 
 
 What, in particular, is the account or reason of 
 these things, we must be greatly in the dark, were 
 it only that we know so very little even of our own 
 case. Our present state may pofsibly be the con- 
 sequence of somewhat past, which we are wholly ig- 
 norant of: as it has a reference to somewhat to come, 
 of which we know scarce any more than is neces- 
 sary for practice. A system or constitution, in its 
 notion, implies variety ; and so complicated an one 
 
Chap. 6. and its Proof supposed deficient. 229 
 
 as this world, very great variety. So that were Re- 
 velation universal, yet from men's different capacities 
 of understanding, from the different lengths of their 
 lives, their different educations and other external 
 circumstances, and from their difference of temper 
 cind bodily constitution; their religious situations 
 would be widely different, and the disadvantage of 
 some in comparison of others, perhaps, altogether as 
 much as at present. And the true account, whatever 
 it be, why mankind or such a part of mankind are 
 placed in this condition of ignorance, must be sup- 
 posed also the true account of our farther ignorance, 
 in not knowing the reasons, why, or whence it is, 
 that they are placed in this condition. But the fol- 
 lowing practical refle(9:ions may deserve the serious 
 consideration of those persons, who think the cir- 
 cumstances of mankind or their own, in the fore- 
 mentioned respe(51;s, a ground of complaint. 
 
 First, The evidence of Religion not appearing ob- 
 vious, may constitute one particular part of some 
 men's trial in the religious sense : as it gives scope, 
 for a virtuous exercise, or vicious neglect of their 
 understanding, in examining or not examining into 
 that evidence. There seems no poftible reason to 
 be given, why we may not be in a state of moral 
 probation, with regard to the exercise of our under- 
 standing upon the subjecl of Religion, as we are with 
 regard to our behaviour in common affairs. The 
 former is as much a thing within our power and 
 choice, as the latter. And I suppose it is to be laid 
 down for certain, that the same charac1;er, the same 
 inward principle, which, after a man is convinced of 
 the truth of Religion, renders him obedient to the 
 precepts of it, would, were he not thus convinced, 
 set him about an examination of it, upon its system 
 and evidence being offered to his thoughts : And that 
 
230 Revelation not universal, Part 2. 
 
 in the latter state, his examination would be with an 
 impartiality, seriousnef^ and solicitude, proportion- 
 able to what his obedience is in the former. And 
 as inattention, negligence, want of all serious con- 
 cern, about a matter of such a nature and such im- 
 portance, when offered to men's consideration, is, 
 before a distin(5^ convic^iion of its truth, as real im- 
 moral depravity and difsolutenefs ; as neglecft of 
 religious pradice after such convidlion : so a6live 
 solicitude about it, and fair impartial consideration of 
 its evidence before such convi(?i;ion, is as really an 
 exercise of a morally right temper ; as is religious 
 pra(9;ice after. Thus, that Religion is not intuitively 
 true, but a matter of deduction and inference ; that 
 a convic^tion of its truth is not forced upon every one, 
 but left to be, by some, collected with heedful at- 
 tention to premises ; this as much constitutes reli- 
 gious probation, as much affords sphere, scope, op- 
 portunity, for right and wrong behaviour, as anything 
 whatever does. And their manner of treating this 
 subje<?l: when laid before them, shows what is in 
 their heart, and is an exertion of it. 
 
 Secondly, It appears to be a thing as evident, 
 though it is not so much attended to, that if upon 
 consideration of Religion, the evidence of it should 
 seem to any persons doubtful, in the highest sup- 
 posable degree ; even this doubtful evidence will, 
 however, put them into a general state of probation 
 in the moral and religious sense. For, suppose a 
 man to be really in doubt, whether such a person 
 had not done him the greatest favour ; or, whether 
 his whole temporal interest did not depend upon 
 that person : No one, who had any sense of grati- 
 tude and of prudence, could poftibly consider him- 
 self in the same situation with regard to such per- 
 son, as if he had no such doubt. In truth, it is as 
 
Chap. 6. and its Proof supposed deficient. 231 
 
 just to say, that certainty and doubt are the same ; 
 as to say, the situations now mentioned, would leave 
 a man as entirely at liberty in point of gratitude or 
 prudence, as he would be, were he certain he had 
 received no favour from such person, or that he no 
 way depended upon him. And thus, though the 
 evidence of Religion which is afforded to some men, 
 should be little more than that they are given to see, 
 the system of Christianity, or Religion in general, to 
 be supposable and credible ; this ought in all reason 
 to beget a serious practical apprehension, that it 
 may be true. And even this will afford matter of 
 exercise, for religious suspense and deliberation, for 
 moral resolution and self-government ; because the 
 apprehension that Religion may be true, does as 
 really lay men under obligations, as a full convic^lion 
 that it is true. It gives occasion and motives to con- 
 sider farther the important subject ; to preserve at- 
 tentively upon their minds, a general implicit sense 
 that they may be under Divine moral government, 
 an awful solicitude about Religion, whether natural 
 or revealed. Such apprehension ought to turn men's 
 eyes to every degree of new light which may be had, 
 from whatever side it comes ; and induce them to 
 refrain, in the mean time, from all immoralities, and 
 live in the conscientious practice of every common 
 virtue. Especially are they bound to keep at the 
 greatest distance from all dif^olute profanenef^ ; for 
 this the very nature of the case forbids ; and to treat 
 with highest reverence a matter, upon which their 
 own whole interest and being, and the fate of Nature 
 depends. This behaviour, and an aclive endeavour 
 to maintain within themselves this temper, is the 
 businef^, the duty and the wisdom of those persons, 
 who complain of the doubtfulnef^ of Religion : is 
 what they are under the most proper obligations to. 
 
232 Revelation not universal, Part 2. 
 
 And such behaviour is an exertion of, and has a ten- 
 dency to improve in them, that charadler, which the 
 pra(5lice of all the several duties of Religion, from a 
 full convic'lion of its truth, is an exertion of, and has 
 a tendency to improve in others : Others, I say, to 
 whom God has afforded such conviciiion. Nay, con- 
 sidering the infinite importance of Religion, revealed 
 as well as natural, I think it may be said in general, 
 that whoever will weigh the matter thoroughly may 
 see, there is not near so much difTerence, as is com- 
 monly imagined, between what ought in reason to 
 be the rule of life, to those persons who are fully 
 convinced of its truth, and to those who have only 
 a serious doubting apprehension, that it may be true. 
 Their hopes and fears and obligations will be in va- 
 rious degrees: But, as the subject-matter of their 
 hopes and fears is the same ; so the subje(5l-matter 
 of their obligations, what they are bound to do and 
 refrain from, is not so very unlike. 
 
 It is to be observed farther, that, from a chara(5^er 
 of understanding, or a situation of influence in the 
 world, some persons have it in their power to do 
 infinitely more harm or good, by setting an example 
 of profanenef^ and avowed disregard to all Religion, 
 or, on the contrary, of a serious, though perhaps 
 doubting, apprehension of its truth, and of a reverend 
 regard to it under this doubtfulnef^ ; than they can 
 do, by acting well or ill in all the common inter- 
 courses amongst mankind. And consequently they 
 are most highly accountable for a behaviour, which, 
 they may easily foresee, is of such importance, and 
 in which there is most plainly a right and a wrong ; 
 even admitting the evidence of Religion to be as 
 doubtful, as is pretended. 
 
 The ground of these observations, and that which 
 renders them just and true, is, that doubting neces- 
 
Chap. 6. and its Proof supposed deficient. 233 
 
 sarily implies some degree of evidence for that, of 
 which we doubt. For no person would be in doubt, 
 concerning the truth of a number of facts so and so 
 circumstanced, which should accidentally come into 
 his thoughts, and of which he had no evidence at 
 all. And though in the case of an even chance, and 
 where consequently we were in doubt, we should in 
 common language say, that we had no evidence at 
 all for either side ; yet that situation of things, which 
 renders it an even chance and no more, that such an 
 event will happen, renders this case equivalent to 
 all others, where there is such evidence on both 
 sides of a question,^ as leaves the mind in doubt 
 concerning the truth. Indeed in all these cases, 
 there is no more evidence on one side, than on the 
 other; but there is (what is equivalent to) much 
 more for either, than for the truth of a number of 
 fa61s which come into one's thoughts at random. 
 And thus in all these cases, doubt as much presup- 
 poses evidence, lower degrees of evidence ; as belief 
 presupposes higher, and certainty higher still. Any 
 one, who will a little attend to the nature of evidence, 
 will easily carry this observation on, and see, that 
 between no evidence at all, and that degree of it 
 which affords ground of doubt, there are as many 
 intermediate degrees ; as there are, between that 
 degree which is the ground of doubt, and demon- 
 stration. And though we have not faculties to dis- 
 tinguish these degrees of evidence, with any sort of 
 exa(9;neft ; yet, in proportion as they are discerned, 
 they ought to influence our pra^lice. For it is as 
 real an imperfe<51ion in the moral character, not to 
 be influenced in pra(51:ice by a lov^'er degree of evi- 
 dence when discerned, as it is, in the understanding, 
 
 ' Introdudion, 
 
234 Revelation not universal, Part 2. 
 
 not to discern it. And as, in all subjecSls which men 
 consider, they discern the lower as well as higher 
 degrees of evidence, proportionably to their capacity 
 of understanding : so, in pra6lical subjecl:s, they are 
 influenced in practice, by the lower as well as higher 
 degrees of it, proportionably to their fairneft and 
 honesty. And as, in proportion to defedls in the 
 understanding, men are unapt to see lower degrees 
 of evidence, are in. danger of overlooking evidence 
 when it is not glaring, and are easily imposed upon 
 in such cases : so, in proportion to the corruption 
 of the heart, they seem capable of satisfying them- 
 selves with having no regard in praclice to evidence 
 acknowledged real, if it be not overbearing. From 
 these things it must follow, that doubting concern- 
 ing Religion implies such a degree of evidence for 
 it, as joined with the consideration of its importance, 
 unquestionably lays men under the obligations be- 
 fore mentioned, to have a dutiful regard to it in all 
 their behaviour. 
 
 Thirdly, The difficulties in which the evidence of 
 Religion is involved, which some complain of, is no 
 more a just ground of complaint, than the external 
 circumstances of temptation, which others are placed 
 in ; or than difficulties in the practice of it, after a 
 full conviction of its truth. Temptations render our 
 state a more improving state of discipline,-^ than it 
 would be otherwise : as they give occasion for a 
 more attentive exercise of the virtuous principle, 
 which confirms and strengthens it more, than an 
 easier or lei^ attentive exercise of it could. Now 
 speculative difficulties are, in this respe(5l, of the 
 very same nature with these external temptations. 
 For the evidence of Religion not appearing obvious, 
 is, to some persons, a temptation to rejedl it, with- 
 
 ^ Part I. ch. V. 
 
Chap. 6. and its Proof supposed deficient. 235 
 
 out any consideration at all ; and therefore requires 
 such an attentive exercise of the virtuous principle, 
 seriously to consider that evidence, as there would 
 be no occasion for, but for such temptation. And 
 the supposed doubtfulnef^ of its evidence, after it has 
 been in some sort considered, affords opportunity to 
 an unfair mind of explaining away, and deceitfully 
 hiding from itself, that evidence which it might see ; 
 and also for men's encouraging themselves in vice 
 from hopes of impunity, though they do clearly see 
 thus much at least, that these hopes are uncertain : 
 In like manner as the common temptation to many 
 instances of folly which end in temporal infamy and 
 ruin, is, the ground for hope of not being detected, 
 and of escaping with impunity ; i. e. the doubtfulnef^ 
 of the proof beforehand, that such foolish behaviour 
 will thus end in infamy and ruin. On the contrary, 
 supposed doubtfulnefs in the evidence of Religion 
 calls for a more careful and attentive exercise of the 
 virtuous principle, in fairly yielding themselves up 
 to the proper influence of any real evidence, though 
 doubtful ; and in practising conscientiously all virtue, 
 though under some uncertainty, whether the govern- 
 ment in the universe may not pofsibly be such, as 
 that vice may escape with impunity. And in gene- 
 ral, temptation, meaning by this word, the lefser 
 allurements, the wrong and difficulties in the dis- 
 charge of our duty, as well as the greater ones ; 
 Temptation, I say, as such and of every kind and 
 degree, as it calls forth some virtuous efforts, addi- 
 tional to what would otherwise have been wanting, 
 cannot but be an additional discipline and improve- 
 ment of virtue, as well as probation of it in the other 
 senses of that word.^ So that the very same ac- 
 
 * Part I. ch. iv. anJ p. 107. 
 
236 Revelation not universal, Part 2. 
 
 count is to be given, why the evidence of Religion 
 should be left in such a manner, as to require, in 
 some, an attentive, solicitous, perhaps painful exer- 
 cise of their understanding about it ; as why others 
 should be placed in such circumstances, as that the 
 practice of its common duties, after a full conviction 
 of the truth of it, should require attention, solicitude 
 and pains : Or, why appearing doubtfulnei^ should 
 be permitted to afford matter of temptation to some ; 
 as why external difficulties and allurements should 
 be permitted to afford matter of temptation to others. 
 The same account also is to be given, why some 
 should be exercised with temptations of both these 
 kinds ; as why others should be exercised with the 
 latter in such very high degrees, as some have been, 
 particularly as the primitive Christians were. 
 
 Nor does there appear any absurdity in supposing, 
 that the speculative difficulties in which the evidence 
 of Religion is involved, may make even the principal 
 part of some person's trial. For, as the chief temp- 
 tations of the generality of the world, are, the ordi- 
 nary motives to injustice or unrestrained pleasure ; 
 or to live in the negle(51; of Religion from that frame 
 of mind, which renders many persons almost with- 
 out feeling as to anything distant, or which is not 
 the object of their senses : So there are other per- 
 sons without this shallownef^ of temper, persons of 
 a deeper sense as to what is invisible and future ; 
 who not only see, but have a general pra<51ical feel- 
 ing, that what is to come will be present, and that 
 things are not lel^ real for their not being the ob- 
 je(51;s of sense ; and who, from their natural consti- 
 tution of body and of temper, and from their external 
 condition, may have small temptations to behave ill, 
 small difficulty in behaving well, in the common 
 course of life. Now when these latter persons have 
 
Chap. 6. and its Proof supposed deficient. 237 
 
 a distin(5l full convit^ion of the truth of Religion, 
 without any pofsible doubts or difficulties, the prac- 
 tice of it is to them unavoidable, unlei^ they will 
 do a constant violence to their own minds ; and Re- 
 ligion is scarce any more a discipline to them, than 
 it is to creatures in a state of perfecT;ion. Yet these 
 persons may poftibly stand in need of moral disci- 
 pline and exercise in a higher degree, than they would 
 have by such an easy practice of Religion. Or it 
 may be requisite, for reasons unknown to us, that 
 they should give some farther manifestation^ what 
 is their moral character, to the creation of God, than 
 such a prac^tice of it would be. Thus in the great 
 variety of religious situations in which men are 
 placed, what constitutes, what chiefly and peculiarly 
 constitutes, the probation, in all senses, of some 
 persons, may be the difficulties in which the evidence 
 of Religion is involved : and their principal and dis- 
 tinguished trial, may be, how they will behave under 
 and with respe6l to these difficulties. Circum- 
 stances in men's situation in their temporal capacity, 
 analogous in good measure to this respecting ReH- 
 gion, are to be observed. We find some persons 
 are placed in such a situation in the world, as that 
 their chief difficulty with regard to conducT:, is not 
 the doing what is prudent when it is known ; for this, 
 in numberlef^ cases, is as easy as the contrary : but 
 to some the principal exercise is, recollection and 
 being upon their guard against deceits, the deceits 
 suppose of those about them ; against false appear- 
 ances of reason and prudence. To persons in some 
 situations, the prinr ipnl exercise with respecft to 
 conduct, is, attention in order to inform themselves 
 what is proper, what is really the reasonable and 
 prudent part to a<5l. 
 
 * P. 107. 
 
238 Revelation not universal, Part 2. 
 
 But as I have hitherto gone upon supposition, 
 that men's diisatisfadlion with the evidence of Reli- 
 gion is not owing to their negle(5ls or prejudices ; it 
 must be added, on the other hand, in all common 
 reason, and as what the truth of the case plainly re- 
 quires should be added, that such difsatisfadlion 
 poftibly may be owing to those, pofsibly may be 
 men's own fault. For, 
 
 If there are any persons, who never set themselves 
 heartily and in earnest to be informed in Religion : 
 if there are any, who secretly wish it may not prove 
 true ; and are left attentive to evidence than to dif- 
 ficulties, and more to objections than to what is said 
 in answer to them: these persons will scarce be 
 thought in a likely way of seeing the evidence of 
 Religion, though it were most certainly true, and 
 capable of being ever so fully proved. If any ac- 
 custom themselves to consider this subject usually 
 in the way of mirth and sport : if they attend to 
 forms and representations and inadequate manners 
 of expref^ion, instead of the real things intended by 
 them : (for signs often can be no more than inade- 
 quately exprefsive of the things signified :) or if they 
 substitute human errors, in the room of Divine truth : 
 Why may not all, or any of these things, hinder 
 some men from seeing that evidence, which really 
 is seen by others ; as a like turn of mind, with re- 
 spect to matters of common speculation and pradliice, 
 does, we find by experience, hinder them from at- 
 taining that knowledge and right understanding, in 
 matters of common speculation and pra(5tice, which 
 more fair and attentive minds attain to ? And the 
 effect will be the same, whether their negle^l of 
 seriously considering the evidence of Religion, and 
 their indirect behaviour with regard to it, proceed 
 from mere carelefsneft, or from the grower vices ; 
 
Chap. 6. and its Proof supposed deficient. 239 
 
 or whether it be owing to this, that forms and figu- 
 rative manners of exprefsion, as well as errors, ad- 
 minister occasions of ridicule, when the things in- 
 tended, and the truth itself, would not. Men may 
 indulge a ludicrous turn so far as to lose all sense 
 of condu6l and prudence in worldly affairs, and even, 
 as it seems, to impair their faculty of reason. And 
 in general, levity, carelefsnef^, pafsion, and preju- 
 dice, do hinder us from being rightly informed, with 
 respect to common things : And they may, in like 
 manner, and perhaps in some farther providential 
 manner, with respecl to moral and religious subjects ; 
 may hinder evidence from being laid before us, and 
 from being seen when it is. The Scripture^ does 
 declare, that every one shall not understand. And 
 it makes no difference, by what providential conduct, 
 this comes to pafs : Whether the evidence of Chris- 
 tianity was, originally and with design, put and left; 
 so, as that those who are desirous of evading moral 
 obligations, should not see it ; and that honest- 
 minded persons should : Or, whether it comes to 
 paft by any other means. 
 
 Farther : The general proof of natural Religion 
 and of Christianity, does, I think, lie level to common 
 men ; even those, the greatest part of whose time, 
 from childhood to old age, is taken up with pro- 
 viding, for themselves and their families, the com- 
 
 ^ Dan. xii. lo. See also Is. xxix. 13, 14; Mat. vi. 23, and 
 xi. 25, and xiii. 11, 125 Joh. iii. 19, and v. 44; i Cor. ii. 
 14, and 2 Cor. iv. 4; 2 Tim. iii. 13, and that affedtionate, as 
 well as authoritative admonition, so very many times incul- 
 cated, He that hath ears to hear^ let him hear. Grctius saw so 
 strongly the thing intended in these and other pafsages of Scrip- 
 ture of the like sense, as to say, that the proof given us of Chris- 
 tianity was lefs than it might have been, for this very purpose : 
 Ut ita Jermo E'vangelU tanquam lapis ejset Lydius ad quern ingenia 
 fanabilia explorarentur. De Ver. R. C. L. 2, towards the end. 
 
240 Revelation not universal, Part 2. 
 
 mon conveniencies perhaps neceftaries of life : those, 
 I mean, of this rank, who ever think at all of asking 
 after proof or attending to it. Common men, were 
 they as much in earnest about Religion, as about 
 their temporal affairs, are capable of being convinced 
 upon real evidence, that there is a God who governs 
 the world : and they feel themselves to be of a moral 
 nature, and accountable creatures. And as Chris- 
 tianity entirely falls in with this their natural sense 
 of things ; so they are capable, not only of being 
 persuaded, but of being made to see, that there is 
 evidence of miracles wrought in attestation of it, and 
 many appearing completions of prophecy. But 
 though this proof is real and conclusive, yet it is liable 
 to objec5}ions, and may be run up into difficulties; 
 which, however, persons who are capable, not only 
 of talking of, but of really seeing, are capable also 
 of seeing through : i. e. not of clearing up and an- 
 swering them, so as to satisfy their curiosity, for of 
 such knowledge we are not capable with respect to 
 any one thing in Nature ; but capable of seeing that 
 the proof is not lost in these difficulties, or destroyed 
 by these obje^ions. But then a thorough exami- 
 nation into Religion, with regard to these objections, 
 which cannot be the businef^ of every man, is a 
 matter of pretty large compaft, and, from the nature 
 of it, requires some knowledge, as well as time and 
 attention ; to see, how the evidence comes out, upon 
 balancing one thing with another, and what, upon 
 the whole, is the amount of it. Now if persons who 
 have picked up these objections from others, and 
 take for granted they are of weight, upon the word 
 of those from whom they received them, or, by often 
 retailing of them, come to see or fancy they see 
 them to be of weight ; will not prepare themselves 
 for such an examination, with a competent degree 
 
Chap. 6. and its Proof supposed deficient. 24.1 
 
 of knowledge ; or will not give that time and atten- 
 tion to the subje(5l, which, from the nature of it, is 
 neceftary for attaining such information : in this case, 
 they must remain in doubtfulneft, ignorance or error ; 
 in the same way as they must, with regard to com- 
 mon sciences and matters of common life, if they 
 negledl the neceftary means of being informed in 
 them. 
 
 But still perhaps it will be objected, that if a prince 
 or common master were to send diredlions to a ser- 
 vant, he would take care, that they should always 
 bear the certain marks, who they came from, and 
 that their sense should be always plain : so as that 
 there should be no pofsible doubt, if he could help 
 it, concerning the authority or meaning of them. 
 Now the proper answer to all this kind of objections 
 is, that, wherever the fallacy lies, it is even certain 
 we cannot argue thus with respeCf to him, who is 
 the Governor of the w^orld : and particularly that he 
 does not afford us such information, with respeCf to 
 our temporal affairs and interest, as experience 
 abundantly shews. However, there is a full answer 
 to this objection, from the very nature of Religion. 
 For the reason why a prince would give his direc- 
 tions in this plain manner, is, that he absolutely de- 
 sires such an external adlion should be done, without 
 concerning himself with the m.otive or principle upon 
 which it is done : i. e. he regards only the external 
 event, or the thing's being done ; and not at all, 
 properly speaking, the doing of it, or the action. 
 Whereas the whole of morality and Religion con- 
 sisting merely in action itself, there is no sort of pa- 
 rallel between the cases. But if the prince be sup- 
 posed to regard only the a(?tion ; i. e. only to desire 
 to exercise, or in any sense prove, the understanding 
 or loyalty of a servant ; he would not always give 
 
 R 
 
242 Revelation not universal, Part 2. 
 
 his orders in such a plain manner. It may be proper 
 to add, that the will of God, respedling morality and 
 Religion, may be considered, either as absolute, or 
 as only conditional. If it be absolute, it can only be 
 thus, that we should ac^ virtuously in such given 
 circumstances ; not that we should be brought to a6l 
 so, by his changing of our circumstances. And if 
 God's will be thus absolute, then it is in our power, 
 in the highest and strictest sense, to do or to con- 
 tradict his will ; which is a most weighty considera- 
 tion. Or his will may be considered only as condi- 
 tional, that if we a(5l so and so, we shall be rewarded ; 
 if otherwise, punished : of which conditional will of 
 the Author of nature, the whole constitution of it 
 affords most certain instances. 
 
 Upon the whole : that we are in a state of Reli- 
 gion neceftarily implies, that we are in a state of. 
 probation : and the credibility of our being at all in 
 such a state being admitted, there seems no pecu- 
 liar difficulty in supposing our probation to be, just 
 as it is, in those respects which are above objected 
 against. There seems no pretence, from the reason 
 of the thing, to say, that the trial cannot equitably 
 be anything, but whether persons will a6l suitably 
 to certain information, or such as admits no room 
 for doubt ; so as that there can be no danger of mis- 
 carriage, but either from their not attending to what 
 they certainly know, or from overbearing paftion 
 hurrying them on to acft contrary to it. For, since 
 ignorance and doubt afford scope for probation in all 
 senses, as really as intuitive convi(9;ion or certainty ; 
 and since the two former are to be put to the same 
 account, as difficulties in pra(5i:ice ; men's moral pro- 
 bation may also be, whether they will take due care 
 to inform themselves by impartial consideration, and 
 afterwards whether they will a6l as the case requires, 
 
Chap, 6. and its Proof supposed deficient. 243 
 
 upon the evidence which they have, however doubt- 
 ful. And this we find by experience, is frequently 
 our probation,'^ in our temporal capacity. For, the 
 information which we want with regard to our 
 worldly interests, is by no means always given us of 
 course, without any care of our own. And we are 
 greatly liable to self-deceit from inward secret pre- 
 judices, and also to the deceits of others. So that 
 to be able to judge what is the prudent part, often 
 requires much and difficult consideration. Then 
 after we have judged the very best we can, the evi- 
 dence upon which we must acft, if we will live and 
 adl at all, is perpetually doubtful to a very high de- 
 gree. And the constitution and course of the world 
 in fact is such, as that want of impartial considera- 
 tion what we have to do, and venturing upon extra- 
 vagant courses because it is doubtful what will be 
 the consequence, are often naturally, i.e. providen- 
 tially, altogether as fatal, as misconduct occasioned 
 by heedlef^ inattention to what we certainly know, 
 or disregarding it from overbearing pafsion. 
 
 Several of the observations here made, may 
 well seem strange, perhaps unintelligible, to many 
 good men, but if the persons for whose sake they 
 are made, think so; persons who object as above, 
 and throw off all regard to Religion under pretence 
 of want of evidence ; I desire them to consider again, 
 whether their thinking so, be owing to anything un- 
 intelligible in these observations, or to their own not 
 having such a sense of Religion and serious solici- 
 tude about it, as even their state of scepticism does 
 in all reason require ? It ought to be forced upon 
 the reflection of these persons, that our nature and 
 condition necefsarily require us, in the daily course 
 
 ' Pp. 40, 234, 237, 238. 
 
244 Revelation not universal, &c. Part 2. 
 
 of life, to acl upon evidence much lower than what 
 is commonly called probable ; to guard, not only 
 against what we fully believe will, but also against 
 what we think it supposable may, happen ; and to 
 engage in pursuits when the probability is greatly 
 against succeft, if it be credible, that poftibly we 
 may succeed in them. 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 Of the particular Evidence for Christianity. 
 
 HE presumptions against Revelation, 
 and obje6lions against the general 
 scheme of Christianity, and particular 
 things relating to it, being removed ; 
 there remains to be considered, what 
 positive evidence we have for the truth of it : chiefly 
 in order to see, what the Analogy of Nature sug- 
 gests with regard to that evidence, and the objec- 
 tions against it : or to see what is, and is allowed to 
 be, the plain natural rule of judgment and of action, 
 in our temporal concerns, in cases where we have 
 the same kind of evidence, and the same kind of 
 objedlions against it, that we have in the case before 
 us. 
 
 Now in the evidence of Christianity, there seem 
 to be several things of great weight, not reducible 
 to the head, either of miracles, or the completion of 
 prophecy, in the common acceptation of the words. 
 But these two are its direcT; and fundamental proofs : 
 And those other things, however considerable they 
 are, yet ought never to be urged apart from its di- 
 
Chap. 7. Of the particular Evidence, &c. 245 
 
 re(9; proofs, but always to be joined with them. 
 Thus the evidence of Christianity will be a long se- 
 ries of things, reaching, as it seems, from the be- 
 ginning of the world to the present time, of great 
 variety and compai^, taking in both the dire(5l, and 
 also the collateral, proofs ; and making up, all of 
 them together, one argument : the con\i(ftion aris- 
 ing from which kind of proof may be compared to 
 what they call the effe6i in archite(5lure or other 
 works of art ; a result from a great numbet of things 
 so and so disposed, and taken into one view. I shall 
 therefore, FIRST, make some observations relating 
 to miracles, and the appearing completions of pro- 
 phecy ; and consider what Analogy suggests, in an- 
 swer to the objections brought against this evidence. 
 And, SECONDLY, I shall endeavour to give some 
 account of the general argument now mentioned, 
 consisting both of the direct and collateral evidence, 
 considered as making up one argument : this being 
 the kind of proof upon which we determine most 
 questions of difficulty, concerning common facls, al- 
 leged to have happened or seeming likely to happen ; 
 especially questions relating to conduct. 
 
 FIRST, I shall make some observations upon the 
 direct proof of Christianity from miracles and pro- 
 phecy, and upon the objections alleged against it. 
 
 I. Now the following observations, relating to the 
 historical evidence of miracles wrought in attestation 
 of Christianity, appear to be of great weight. 
 
 1. The Old Testament affords us the same his- 
 torical evidence of the miracles of Moses and of the 
 prophets, as of the common civil history of Moses 
 and the kings of Israel ; or, as of the affairs of the 
 Jewish nation. And the Gospels and the ASis afford 
 us the same historical evidence of the miracles of 
 Christ and the Apostles, as of the common matters 
 
246 Of the particular Evidence Part 2. 
 
 related in them. This indeed could not have been 
 affirmed by any reasonable man, if the authors of 
 these books, like many other historians, had ap- 
 peared to make an entertaining manner of writing 
 their aim ; though they had interspersed miracles 
 in their works, at proper distances and upon proper 
 occasions. These might have animated a dull re- 
 lation, amused the reader and engaged his attention. 
 And the same account would naturally have been 
 given of them, as, of the speeches and descriptions 
 of such authors : the same account, in a manner, as 
 is to be given, why the poets rra^ce use of wonders 
 and prodigies. But the fa6^s, both miraculous and 
 natural, in Scripture, are related in plain unadorned 
 narratives : and both of them appear, in all respedls, 
 to stand upon the same foot of historical evidence. 
 Farther : Some parts of Scripture, containing an ac- 
 count of miracles fully sufficient to prove the truth 
 of Christianity, are quoted as genuine, from the age 
 in which they are said to be written, down to the 
 present : And no other parts of them, material in the 
 present question, are omitted to be quoted in such 
 manner, as to afford any sort of proof of their not 
 being genuine. And, as common history, when 
 called in question in any instance, may often be 
 greatly confirmed by cotemporary or subsequent 
 events more known and acknowledged ; and as the 
 common Scripture-history ; like many others, is thus 
 confirmed: so likewise is the miraculous history of 
 it, not only in particular instances, but in general. 
 For, the establishment of the Jewish and Christian 
 Religions, which were events cotemporary with the 
 miracles related to be wrought in attestation of both, 
 or subsequent to them, these events are just what 
 we should have expecfled, upon supposition such 
 miracles were really wrought to attest the truth of 
 
Chap. 7. for Christianity. 247 
 
 those Religions. These miracles are a satisfa(5lory 
 account of those events: of which, no other satis- 
 factory account can be given ; nor any account at 
 all, but what is imaginary merely and invented, it 
 is to be added, that the most obvious, the most easy 
 and direct account of this history, how it came to be 
 written and to be received in the world, as a true 
 history ; is, that it really is so : nor can any other 
 account of it be easy and dire(5l. Now, though an 
 account, not at all obvious, but very far-fetched and 
 indire(5^, may indeed be, and often is, the true ac- 
 count of a matter; yet it cannot be admitted on the 
 authority of its being af^erted. Mere guef^, suppo- 
 sition, and pofsibility, when opposed to historical 
 evidence, prove nothing, but that historical evidence 
 is not demonstrative. 
 
 Now the just consequence from all this, I think, 
 is, that the Scripture-history in general is to be ad- 
 mitted as an authentic genuine history, till somewhat 
 positive be alleged sufficient to invalidate it. But no 
 man will deny the consequence to be, that it cannot 
 be rejected, or thrown by as of no authority, till it 
 can be proved to be of none ; even though the evi- 
 dence now mentioned for its authority, were doubt- 
 ful. This evidence may be confronted, by historical 
 evidence on the other side, if there be any : or ge- 
 neral incredibility in the things related, or incon- 
 sistence in the general turn of the history, would 
 prove it to be of no authority. But since, upon the 
 face of the matter, upon a first and general view, the 
 appearance is, that it is an authentic history ; it 
 cannot be determined to be fi«5^itious without some 
 proof, that it is so. And the following observations, 
 in support of these and coincident with them, will 
 greatly confirm the historical evidence for the truth 
 of Christianity. 
 
248 Of the particular Evidence Part 2. 
 
 2. The Epistles of St. Paul, from the nature of 
 epistolary writing, and moreover from several of them 
 being written, not to particular persons, but to 
 Churches ; carry in them evidences of their being 
 genuine, beyond what can be in a mere historical 
 narrative, left to the world at large. This evidence, 
 joined with that which they have in common with 
 the rest of the New Testament, seems not to leave 
 so much as any particular pretence for denying their 
 genuinenefk, considered as an ordinary matter of 
 facl or of criticism : I say particular pretence, for 
 denying it ; because any single fa(9:, of such a kind 
 and such antiquity, may have general doubts raised 
 concerning it, iVom the very nature of human affairs 
 and human testimony. There is also to be men- 
 tioned, a distinct and particular evidence of the ge- 
 nuinenefs of the Epistle chiefly referred to here, the 
 first to the Corinthians ; from the manner in which 
 it is quoted by Clemens Romanus, in an Epistle of 
 his own to that Church.^ Now these Epistles afford 
 a proof of Christianity, detached from all others, 
 which is, I think, a thing of weight ; and also a proof 
 of a nature and kind peculiar to itself. For, 
 
 In them the author declares that he received the 
 Gospel in general, and the institution of the Com- 
 munion in particular, not from the rest of the Apostles, 
 or jointly together with them, but alone, from Christ 
 himself; whom he declares likewise, conformably to 
 the history in the A6is, that he saw after his ascen- 
 sion.^ So that the testimony of St. Paul is to be 
 considered, as detached from that of the rest of the 
 Apostles. 
 
 And he declares farther, that he was endued with 
 
 * Clem. Rom. Ep. I. c. 47. 
 
 ' Gal. i j I Cor. xi. 23, &c. j 1 Cor. xv, 8. 
 
Chap. 7. for Christianity. 249 
 
 a power of working miracles, as what was publicly 
 known to those very people, speaks of frequent and 
 great variety of miraculous gifts as then subsisting 
 in those very Churches, to which he was writing ; 
 which he w as reproving for several irregularities ; 
 and where he had personal opposers : He mentions 
 these gifts incidentally, in the most easy manner and 
 without effort ; by way of reproof to those who had 
 them, for their indecent use of them ; and by way 
 of depreciating them, in comparison of moral virtues ; 
 in short he speaks to these Churches, of these mi- 
 raculous powers, in the manner, any one would speak 
 to another of a thing, which was as familiar and as 
 much known in common to them both, as anything 
 in the world.-' And this, as hath been observed by 
 several persons, is surely a very considerable thing. 
 3. It is an acknowledged historical fact, that Chris- 
 tianity offered itself to the world, and demanded to 
 be received, upon the allegation, i. e. as unbelievers 
 would speak, upon the pretence, of miracles, pub- 
 licly wrought to attest the truth of it, in such an 
 age ; and that it was actually received by great 
 numbers in that very age, and upon the profef^ed 
 belief of the reality of these miracles. And Chris- 
 tianity, including the dispensation of the Old Testa- 
 ment, seems distinguished by this from all other 
 Religions. I mean, that this does not appear to be 
 the case with regard to any other : for surely it will 
 not be supposed to lie upon any person, to piove by 
 positive historical evidence, that it was not. It does 
 in no sort appear, that Mahometanism was first re- 
 ceived in the world upon the foot of supposed mi- 
 racles,^ i.e. public ones: for, as Revelation is itself 
 
 5 Rom. XV. 19 ; i Cor. xii. 8, 9, 10-28, &c. and c. xiii. 1, 
 2,8, anJ the wholcxivth ch. 5 2 Cor. xii. 12,13 5 Gal. iii.2, 5. 
 * See the Koran, c. xiii. and c. xvii. 
 
250 Of the particular Evidence Part 2. 
 
 miraculous, all pretence to it must necef^arily imply 
 some pretence of miracles. And it is a known fa(ft, 
 that it was immediately, at the very first, propagated 
 by other means. And as particular institutions, 
 whether in Paganism or Popery, said to be con- 
 firmed by miracles after those institutions had ob- 
 tained, are not to the purpose : So, were there what 
 might be called historical proof, that any of them 
 were introduced by a supposed Divine command, 
 believed to be attested by miracles ; these would not 
 be in any wise parallel. For single things of this 
 sort are easy to be accounted for, after parties are 
 formed, and have power in their hands ; and the 
 leaders of them are in veneration with the multitude ; 
 and political interests are blended with religious 
 claims, and religious distin(5lions. But before any- 
 thing of this kind, for a few persons, and those of the 
 lowest rank, all at once, to bring over such great 
 numbers to a new Religion, and get it to be received 
 upon the particular evidence of miracles ; this is 
 quite another thing. And I think it will be allowed 
 by any fair adversary, that the fa(5l now mentioned, 
 taking in all the circumstances of it, is peculiar to 
 the Christian Religion. However, the fa(ft itself is 
 allowed, that Christianity obtained, i. e. was profef^ed 
 to be received in the w^orld, upon the belief of mi- 
 racles, immediately in the age in which it is said 
 those miracles were WTought : Or that this is what 
 its first converts would have alleged, as the reason 
 for their embracing it. Now certainly it is not to be 
 supposed, that such numbers of men, in the most 
 distant parts of the world, should forsake the Reli- 
 gion of their country, in which they had been edu- 
 cated ; separate themselves from their friends, par- 
 ticularly in their festival shows and solemnities, to 
 which the common people are so greatly addi(5led, 
 
Chap. 7. for Christianity. 251 
 
 and which were of a nature to engage them much 
 more, than anything of that sort amongst us ; and 
 embrace a Religion, which could not but expose 
 them to many inconveniencies, and indeed must have 
 been a givmg up the world in a great degree, even 
 from the very first, and before the Empire engaged 
 in form against them : it cannot be supposed, that 
 such numbers should make so great, and, to say the 
 least, so inconvenient a change in their whole insti- 
 tution of life, unleft they were really convinced of 
 the truth of those miracles, upon the knowledge or 
 belief of which, they profefsed to make it. And it 
 will, I suppose, readily be acknowledged, that the 
 generality of the first converts to Christianity, must 
 have believed them : that as by becoming Christians, 
 they declared to the world, they were satisfied of 
 the truth of those miracles ; so this declaration was 
 to be credited. And this their testimony is the same 
 kind of evidence for those miracles, as if they had 
 put it in writing, and these writings had come down 
 to us. And it is real evidence, because it is of facts, 
 which they had capacity and full opportunity to in- 
 form themselves of. It is also distin(5l from the di- 
 rect or expreft historical evidence, though it is of 
 the same kind : and it would be allowed to be dis- 
 tinct in all cases. For were a fact expret^ly related 
 by one or more ancient historians, and disputed in 
 after ages ; that this facl is acknowledged to have 
 been believed, by great numbers of the age in which 
 the historian says it was done, would be allowed an 
 additional proof of such faCl, quite distinCl from the 
 expref^ testimony of the historian. The credulity of 
 mankind is acknowledged : and the suspicions of 
 mankind ought to be acknowledged too ; and their 
 backwardneft even to believe, and greater still to 
 pra(51ise, what makes against their interest. And it 
 
252 Of the particular Evidence Part 2. 
 
 must particularlybe remembered, that education, and 
 prejudice, and authority, were against Christianity, 
 in the age I am speaking of. So that the immediate 
 conversion of such numbers, is a real presumption 
 of somewhat more than human in this matter : I say 
 presumption, for it is not alleged as a proof alone 
 and by itself Nor need any one of the things men- 
 tioned in this chapter, be considered as a proof by 
 itself: and yet all of them together may be one of 
 the strongest.^ 
 
 Upon the whole : As there is large historical evi- 
 dence, both dire(?t and circumstantial, of miracles 
 wrought in attestation of Christianity, colle(9;ed by 
 those who have writ upon the subje^l ; it lies upon 
 unbelievers to shew, why this evidence is not to be 
 credited. This way of speaking is, I think, just ; 
 and what persons who write in defence of Religion, 
 naturally fall into. Yet, in a matter of such unspeak- 
 able importance, the proper question is, not whom 
 it lies upon, according to the rules of argument, to 
 maintain or confute objecfiions : but, whether there 
 really are any, against this evidence, sufficient, in 
 reason, to destroy the credit of it. However, un- 
 believers seem to take upon them the part of shew- 
 ing that there are. 
 
 They allege, that numberlei^ enthusiastic people, 
 in different ages and countries, expose themselves 
 to the same difficulties which the primitive Chris- 
 tians did ; and are ready to give up their lives, for 
 the most idle follies imaginable. But it is not very 
 clear, to what purpose this obje(?lion is brought. 
 For every one, surel^^, in every case, must distin- 
 guish between opinions and facls. And though tes- 
 timony is no proof of enthusiastic opinions, or of any 
 
 * Pp. 284, &c. 
 
Chap. 7. for Christianity. 253 
 
 opinions at all ; yet it is allowed, in all other cases, 
 to be a proof of facts. And a person's laying down 
 his life in attestation of facets or of opinions, is the 
 strongest proof of his believing them. And if the 
 Apostles and their cotemporaries did believe the fa61s, 
 in attestation of which they exposed themselves to 
 sufferings and death ; this their belief, or rather 
 knowledge, must be a proof of those facts : for they 
 were such as came under the observation of their 
 senses. And though it is not of equal weight, yet 
 it is of weight, that the martyrs of the next age, 
 notwithstanding they were not eye-witnefses of those 
 fa6ls, as were the Apostles and their cotemporaries, 
 had, however, full opportunity to inform themselves, 
 whether they were true or not, and gave equal proof 
 of their believing them to be true. 
 
 But enthusiasm, it is said, greatly weakens the 
 evidence of testimony even for facts, in matters re- 
 lating to Religion : Some seem to think, it totally 
 and absolutely destroys the evidence of testimony 
 upon this subjecl:. And indeed the powers of enthu- 
 siasm, and of diseases too which operate in a like 
 manner, are very wonderful, in particular instances. 
 But if great numbers of men, not appearing in any 
 peculiar degree weak, nor under any peculiar sus- 
 picion of negligence, affirm that they saw and heard 
 such things plainly with their eyes and their ears, 
 and are admitted to be in earnest; such testimony 
 is evidence of the strongest kind we can have, for 
 any matter of facl. Yet pofsibly it may be over- 
 come, strong as it is, by incredibility in the things 
 thus attested, or by contrary testimony. And in an 
 instance where one thought it was so overcome, it 
 might be just to consider, how far such evidence 
 could be accounted for, by enthusiasm : for it seems 
 as if no other imaginable account were to be given 
 
254 Of the particular Evidence Part 2. 
 
 of it. But till such incredibility be shewn, or con- 
 trary testimony produced, it cannot surely be ex- 
 pelled, that so far-fetched, so indire(5t and won- 
 derful an account of such testimony, as that of en- 
 thusiasm must be ; an account so strange, that the 
 generality of mankind can scarce be made to un- 
 derstand what is meant by it : it cannot, I say, be 
 expe(5led ; that such account will be admitted of such 
 evidence ; when there is this direct, easy and ob- 
 vious account of it, that people really saw and heard 
 a thing not incredible, which they affirm sincerely 
 and with full afsurance, they did see and hear. 
 Granting then that enthusiasm is not (strictly speak- 
 ing) an absurd, but a pol^ible account of such testi- 
 mony : it is manifest that the very mention of it, goes 
 upon the previous supposition, that the things so 
 attested are incredible ; and therefore need not be 
 considered, till they are shewn to be so. Much lef^ 
 need it be considered, after the contrary has been 
 proved. And I think it has been proved, to full sa- 
 tisfa(Rion, that there is no incredibility in a Revela- 
 tion, in general ; or in such an one as the Christian, 
 in particular. However ; as Religion is supposed 
 peculiarly liable to enthusiasm, it may just be ob- 
 served, that prejudices almost without number and 
 without name, romance, affectation, humour, a de- 
 sire to engage attention or to surprise, the party- 
 spirit, custom, little competitions, unaccountable 
 likings and dislikings, these influence men strongly 
 in common matters. And as these prejudices are 
 often scarce known or refleCled upon by the persons 
 themselves who are influenced by them, they are to 
 be considered as influences of a like kind to enthu- 
 siasm. Yet human testimony in common matters 
 is naturally and justly believed notwithstanding. 
 It is intimated farther, in a more refined way of 
 
Chap. 7. for Christianity. 255 
 
 observation, that though it should be proved, that 
 the Apostles and first Christians could not, in some 
 respeds, be deceived themselves, and, in other re- 
 spec^ls, cannot be thought to have intended to im- 
 pose upon the world ; yet it will not follow, that their 
 general testimony is to be believed, though truly 
 handed down to us: because they might still in 
 part, I. e. in other respe<?i;s, be deceived themselves, 
 and in part also designedly impose upon others ; 
 which, it is added, is a thing very credible, from that 
 mixture of real enthusiasm, and real knavery, to be 
 met with in the same characters. And, I must con- 
 feft, I think the matter of fa6l contained in this ob- 
 servation upon mankind, is not to be denied; and 
 that somewhat very much akin to it, is often sup- 
 posed in Scripture as a very common case, and most 
 severely reproved. But it were to have been ex- 
 pecTted, that persons capable of applying this obser- 
 vation as applied in the objec^lion, might also fre- 
 quently have met with the like mixed character, in 
 instances where Religion was quite out of the case. 
 The thing plainly is, that mankind are naturally en- 
 dued with reason, or a capacity of distinguishing 
 between truth and falsehood ; and as naturally they 
 are endued with veracity, or a regard to truth in 
 what they say : But from many occasions, they are 
 liable to be prejudiced and biaf^ed and deceived 
 themselves, and capable of intending to deceive 
 others, in every different degree : Insomuch that, 
 as we are all liable to be deceived by prejudice, so 
 likewise it seems to be not an uncommon thing, for 
 persons, who, from their regard to truth, would not 
 invent a lie entirely without any foundation at all, to 
 propagate it with heightening circumstances, after 
 it is once invented and set a-going. And others, 
 though they would not propagate a lie, yet, which 
 
256 Of the particular Evidence Part 2. 
 
 is a lower degree of falsehood, will let it paft without 
 contradiction. But notwithstanding all this, human 
 testimony remains still a natural ground of aftent ; 
 and this afsent, a natural principle of a(?l;ion. 
 
 It is objected farther, that however it has hap- 
 pened, the fa6l is, that mankind have, in different 
 ages, been strangely deluded with pretences to mi- 
 racles and wonders. But it is by no means to be 
 admitted, that they have been oftener, or are at all 
 more liable to be deceived by these pretences, than 
 by others. 
 
 It is added, that there is a very considerable de- 
 gree of historical evidence for miracles, which are, 
 on all hands, acknowledged to be fabulous. But 
 suppose there were even the like historical evidence 
 for these, to what there is for those alleged in proof 
 of Christianity, which yet is in no wise allowed, but 
 suppose this ; the consequence would not be, that 
 the evidence of the latter is not to be admitted. 
 Nor is there a man in the w^orld who, in common 
 cases, would conclude thus. For, what would such 
 a conclusion really amount to but this, that evidence 
 confuted by contrary evidence, or any way over- 
 balanced, destroys the credibility of other evidence, 
 neither confuted, nor overbalanced 1 To argue, that 
 because there is, if there were, like evidence from 
 testimony, for miracles acknowledged false, as for 
 those in attestation of Christianity, therefore the 
 evidence in the latter case is not to be credited ; 
 this is the same as to argue, that if two men of 
 equally good reputation, had given evidence in dif- 
 ferent cases no way conne(5led, and one of them had 
 been convicted of perjury, this confuted the testi- 
 mony of the other. 
 
 Upon the whole then, the general observation that 
 human creatures are so liable to be deceived, from 
 
Chap. 7. for Christianity. 257 
 
 enthusiasm in Religion, and principles equivalent to 
 enthusiasm in common matters, and in both from 
 negligence ; and that they are so capable of disho- 
 nestly endeavouring to deceive others ; this does 
 indeed weaken the evidence of testimony in all cases, 
 but does not destroy it in any. And these things 
 will appear, to different men, to weaken the evidence 
 of testimony, in different degrees : in degrees pro- 
 portionable to the observations they have made, or 
 the notions they have any way taken up, concern- 
 ing the weaknef^ and negligence and dishonesty of 
 mankind ; or concerning the powers of enthusiasm, 
 and prejudices equivalent to it. But it seems to me, 
 that people do not know what they say, who affirm 
 these things to destroy the evidence fi-om testimony, 
 which we have of the truth of Christianity. Nothing 
 can destroy the evidence of testimony in any case, 
 but a proof or probability, that persons are not com- 
 petent judges of the fadls to which they give testi- 
 mony ; or that they are actually under some indirect 
 influence in giving it, in such particular case. Till 
 this be made out, the natural laws of human a6f ions 
 require, that testimony be admitted. It can never 
 be sufficient to overthrow dire6f historical evidence, 
 indolently to say, that there are so many principles, 
 from whence men are liable to be deceived them- 
 selves and disposed to deceive others, especially in 
 matters of Religion, that one knows not what to be- 
 lieve. And it is surprising persons can help reffe^l;- 
 ing, that this very manner of speaking, supposes 
 they are not satisfied that there is nothing in the 
 evidence, of which they speak thus; or that they 
 can avoid observing, if they do make this refle(5f ion, 
 that it is, on such a subje(5f, a very material one.*^ 
 
 ^ See the foregoing chapter. 
 S 
 
258 Of the particular Evidence Part 2. 
 
 And over against all these obje(?i:ions, is to be set, 
 the importance of Christianity, as what must have 
 engaged the attention of its first converts, so as to 
 have rendered them lef^ liable to be deceived from 
 careleftnef^, than they would in common matters ; 
 and likewise the strong obligations to veracity, which 
 their Religion laid them under : So that the first and 
 most obvious presumption is, that they could not be 
 deceived themselves, nor would deceive others. 
 And this presumption in this degree, is peculiar to 
 the testimony we have been considering. 
 
 In argument, aftertions are nothing in themselves, 
 and have an air of positivenefs, which sometimes is 
 not very easy : Yet they are necef^ary, and neces- 
 sary to be repeated ; in order to conne6l a discourse, 
 and distin(9:ly to lay before the view of the reader, 
 what is proposed to be proved, and what is left as 
 proved. Now the conclusion from the foregoing 
 observations is, I think, beyond all doubt, this : That 
 unbelievers must be forced to admit the external 
 evidence for Christianity, i. e. the proof of miracles 
 wrought to attest it, to be of real weight and very 
 considerable ; though they cannot allow it to be suf- 
 ficient, to convince them of the reality of those mi- 
 racles. And as they must, in all reason, admit this ; 
 so it seems to me, that upon consideration they 
 would, in fa(9;, admit it ; those of them, I mean, who 
 know anything at all of the matter : In like manner 
 as persons, in many cases, own, they see strong evi- 
 dence from testimony, for the truth of things, which 
 yet they cannot be convinced are true : Cases, sup- 
 pose, where there is contrary testimony : or things 
 which they think, whether with or without reason, 
 to be incredible. But there is no testimony con- 
 trary to that which we have been considering : and 
 it has been fully proved, that there is no incre- 
 
Chap. 7. for Christianity. 259 
 
 dibility, in Christianity in general, or in any part 
 of it. 
 
 II. As to the evidence for Christianity from pro- 
 phecy, I shall only make some few general obser- 
 vations, which are suggested by the Analogy of Na- 
 ture ; i. e. by the acknowledged natural rules of 
 judging in common matters, concerning evidence of 
 a like kind to this from prophecy. 
 
 1 . The obscurity or unintelligiblenei^ of one part 
 of a prophecy, does not, in any degree, invalidate 
 the proof of foresight, arising from the appearing 
 completion of those other parts which are under- 
 stood. For the case is evidently the same, as if those 
 parts, which are not understood, were lost, or not 
 written at all, or written in an unknown tongue. 
 Whether this observation be commonly attended to 
 or not, it is so evident, that one can scarce bring 
 oneself to set down an instance in common matters, 
 to exemplify it. However, suppose a writing, partly 
 in cypher, and partly in plain words at length ; and 
 that in the part one understood, there appeared 
 mention of several known facts : It would never come 
 into any man's thoughts to imagine, that if he un- 
 derstood, the whole, perhaps he might find, that 
 those fa(5ls were not in reality known by the writer. 
 Indeed, both in this example and the thing intended 
 to be exemplified by it, our not understanding the 
 whole (the whole suppose of a sentence or a para- 
 graph) might sometimes occasion a doubt, whether 
 one understood the literal meaning of such a part ; 
 But this comes under another consideration. 
 
 For the same reason, though a man should be in- 
 capable, for want of learning, or opportunities of in- 
 quiry, or from not having turned his studies this 
 way, even so much as to judge, whether particular 
 prophecies, have been throughout completely ful- 
 
26o Of the particular Evidence Part 2. 
 
 filled ; yet he may see, in general, that they have 
 been fulfilled to such a degree, as, upon very good 
 ground, to be convinced of foresight more than hu- 
 man in such prophecies, and of such events being 
 intended by them. For the same reason also, 
 though, by means of the deficiencies in civil history, 
 and the different accounts of historians, the most 
 learned should not be able to make out to satisfaction, 
 that such parts of the prophetic history have been 
 minutely and throughout fulfilled ; yet a very strong 
 proof of foresight may arise, from that general com- 
 pletion of them, which is made out : As much proof of 
 foresight, perhaps, as the Giver of prophecy intended 
 should ever be afforded by such parts of prophecy. 
 
 2. A long series of prophecy being applicable to 
 such and such events, is itself a proof, that it was 
 intended of them : as the rules, by which we natu- 
 rally judge and determine, in common cases parallel 
 to this, will shew. This observation I make in an- 
 swer to the common objection against the applica- 
 tion of the prophecies, that considering each of them 
 distinctly by itself, it does not at all appear, that they 
 were intended of those particular events to which 
 they are applied by Christians ; and therefore it is 
 to be supposed, that, if they meant anything, they 
 were intended of other events unknown to us, and 
 not of these at all. 
 
 Now there are two kinds of writing, which bear a 
 great resemblance to prophecy, with respe(5l to the 
 matter before us : the mythological, and the satirical 
 where the satire is, to a certain degree, concealed. 
 And a man might be allured, that he understood 
 what an author intended by a fable or parable, re- 
 lated without any application or moral, merely from 
 seeing it to be easily capable of such application, 
 and that such a moral might naturally be deduced 
 
Chap, 7. for Christianity. 261 
 
 from it. And he might be fully aftured, that such 
 persons and events were intended in a satirical 
 writing, merely from its being applicable to them. 
 And, agreeably to the last observation, he might be 
 in a good measure satisfied of it, though he were 
 not enough informed in affairs, or in the story of 
 such persons, to understand half the satire. For, 
 his satisfacftion, that he understood the meaning, the 
 intended meaning, of these writings, would be greater 
 or left, in proportion as he saw the general turn of 
 them to be capable of such application : and in pro- 
 portion to the number of particular things capable of 
 it. And thus, if a long series of prophecy is appli- 
 cable to the present state of the Church, and to the 
 political situations of the kingdoms of the world, 
 some thousand years after these prophecies were 
 delivered, and a long series of prophecy delivered 
 before the coming of Christ is applicable to him ; 
 these things are in themselves a proof, that the pro- 
 phetic history was intended of him, and of those 
 events : in proportion as the general turn of it is 
 capable of such application, and to the number and 
 variety of particular prophecies capable of it. And, 
 though in all just way of consideration, the appear- 
 ing completion of prophecies, is to be allowed to be 
 thus explanatory of, and to determine their mean- 
 ing ; yet it is to be remembered farther, that the 
 ancient Jews applied the prophecies to a Meftiah 
 before his coming, in much the same manner as 
 Christians do now: And that the primitive Chris- 
 tians inteqDreted the prophecies respecting the state 
 of the Church and of the world in the last ages, in 
 the sense, which the event seems to confirm and 
 verify. And from these things, it may be made ap- 
 pear : 
 
 3. That the shewing even to a high probability, if 
 
262 Of the particular Evidence Part 2. 
 
 that could be, that the Prophets thought of some 
 other events, in such and such predications, and not 
 those at all, which Christians allege to be comple- 
 tions of those predictions ; or that such and such 
 prophecies are capable of being applied to other 
 events than those, to which Christians apply them 
 
 that this would not confute or destroy the force 
 
 of the argument from prophecy, even with regard to 
 those very instances. For, observe how this matter 
 really is. If one knew such a person to be the sole 
 author of such a book, and was certainly allured, or 
 satisfied to any degree, that one knew the whole of 
 what he intended in it ; one should be af^ured or 
 satisfied to such degree, that one knew the whole 
 meaning of that book : for the meaning of a book, is 
 nothing but the meaning of the author. But if one 
 knew a person to have compiled a book out of me- 
 moirs, which he received from another, of vastly 
 superior knowledge in the subject!; of it, especially 
 if it were a book full of great intricacies and diffi- 
 culties ; it would in no wise follow, that one knew 
 the whole meaning of the book, from knowing the 
 whole meaning of the compiler: for the original 
 memoirs, i. e. the author of them, might have, and 
 there would be no degree of presumption, in many 
 cases, against supposing him to have, some farther 
 meaning, than the compiler saw. To say then, that 
 the Scriptures and the things contained in them can 
 have no other or farther meaning, than those per- 
 sons thought or had, who first recited or wrote them ; 
 is evidently saying, that those persons were the ori- 
 ginal, proper, and sole authors of those books, i. e. 
 that they are not inspired : which is absurd, whilst 
 the authority of these books is under examination ; 
 i. e. till you have determined they are of no Divine 
 authority at all. Till this be determined, it must in 
 
Chap. 7. for Christianity. 263 
 
 all reason be supposed, not indeed that they have, 
 for this is taking for granted that they are inspired, 
 but that they may have, some farther meaning than 
 what the compilers saw or understood. And upon 
 this supposition, it is supposable also, that this far- 
 ther meaning may be fulfilled. Now events corre- 
 sponding to prophecies, interpreted in a different 
 meaning from that, in which the Prophets are sup- 
 posed to have understood them ; this affords, in a 
 manner, the same proof, that this different sense 
 was originally intended, as it would have afforded, 
 if the Prophets had not understood their prediclions 
 in the sense it is supposed they did : because there 
 is no presumption of their sense of them, being the 
 whole sense of them. And it has been already shewn, 
 that the apparent completions of prophecy, must be 
 allowed to be explanatory of its meaning. So that 
 the question is, whether a series of prophecy has 
 been fulfilled, in a natural or proper, i. e. in any real, 
 sense of the words of it. For such completion is 
 equally a proof of foresight more than human, whe- 
 ther the Prophets are, or are not, supposed, to have 
 understood it in a different sense. I say, supposed : 
 for, though I think it clear, that the Prophets did 
 not understand the full meaning of their predictions ; 
 it is another question, how far they thought they 
 did, and in what sense they understood them. 
 
 Hence may be seen, to how little purpose those 
 persons busy themselves, who endeavour to prove, 
 that the prophetic history is applicable to events, of 
 the age in which it was written, or of ages be- 
 fore it. Indeed to have proved this before there was 
 any appearance of a farther completion of it, might 
 have answered some purpose ; for it might have 
 prevented the expe(5lation of any such farther com- 
 pletion. Thus could Porphyry have shewn, that 
 
264 Of the particular Evidence Part 2. 
 
 some principal parts of the book of Daniel, for in- 
 stance, the seventh verse of the seventh chapter, 
 which the Christians interpreted of the latter ages, 
 was applicable to events, which happened before or 
 about the age of Antiochus Epiphanes ; this might 
 have prevented them from expelling any farther 
 completion of it. And, unlei^ there was then, as I 
 think there must have been, external evidence con- 
 cerning that book, more than is come down to us ; 
 such a discovery might have been a stumblingblock 
 in the way of Christianity itself: considering the au- 
 thority which our Saviour has given to the book of 
 Daniel, and how much the general scheme of Chris- 
 tianity presupposes the truth of it. But even this 
 discovery, had there been any such,' would be of 
 very little weight with reasonable men now ; if this 
 padage, thus applicable to events before the age of 
 Porphyry, appears to be applicable also to events, 
 which succeeded the dif^olution of the Roman em- 
 pire. I mention this, not at all as intending to in- 
 sinuate, that the division of this Empire into ten 
 parts, for it plainly was divided into about that num- 
 ber, were, alone and by itself, of any moment in 
 verifying the prophetic history : but only as an ex- 
 ample of the thing I am speaking of And thus 
 upon the whole, the matter of enquiry evidently 
 must be, as above put. Whether the prophecies are 
 applicable to Christ, and to the present state of the 
 
 ' It appears, that Porphyry did nothing worth mentioning in 
 this way. For Jerom on the place fays : Duas posteriores bestias 
 
 in uno Macedonum regno ponit. And as to the ten kings ; 
 
 Decern reges enumerat, qui fuerunt sce-vifsimi : ipsosque reges nan 
 unius ponit regni, 'verbi gratia, Macedonia, Syria, Ana, et 
 j^gypti ; sed de diver sis regnis unum eff.cit regum ordinem. And 
 in this way of interpretation, anything may be made of any- 
 thing. 
 
Chap, 7. for Christianity. ' 265 
 
 world and of the Church ; applicable in such a de- 
 gree, as to imply foresight: Not whether they are 
 capable of any other application ; though I know no 
 pretence for saying, the general turn of them is ca- 
 pable of any other. 
 
 These observations are, I think, just ; and the 
 evidence referred to in them, real : Though there 
 may be people who will not accept of such imper- 
 fe(5l information from Scripture. Some too have not 
 integrity and regard enough to truth, to attend to 
 evidence, which keeps the mind in doubt, perhaps 
 perplexity, and which is much of a different sort 
 from what they expecfted. And it plainly requires 
 a degree of modesty and faimeft, beyond what every 
 one has, for a man to say, not to the world, but to 
 himself, that there is a real appearance of somewhat 
 of great weight in this matter, though he is not able 
 thoroughly to satisfy himself about it ; but it shall 
 have its influence upon him, in proportion to its ap- 
 pearing reality and weight. It is much more easy, 
 and more falls in with the negligence, presumption, 
 and wilfulneft of the generality, to determine at once, 
 with a decisive air, there is nothing in it. The pre- 
 judices arising from that absolute contempt and 
 scorn, with which this evidence is treated in the 
 w^orld, I do not mention. For what indeed can be 
 said to persons, who are weak enough in their un- 
 derstandings, to think this any presumption against 
 it ; or, if they do not, are yet weak enough in their 
 temper to be influenced, by such prejudices, upon 
 such a subjedl:. 
 
 I shall now, SECONDLY, endeavour to give some 
 account of the general argument for the truth of 
 Christianity, consisting both of the direcft and cir- 
 cumstantial evidence, considered as making up one 
 argument. Indeed to state and examine this argu- 
 
266 Of the particular Evidence Part i. 
 
 ment fully, would be a work much beyond the com- 
 paft of this whole treatise : Nor is so much as a 
 proper abridgment of it to be expeifted here. Yet 
 the present subje(5l requires to have some brief ac- 
 count of it given. For it is the kind of evidence, 
 upon which most questions of difficulty, in common 
 pradlice, are determined : Evidence arising from 
 various coincidences, which support and confirm each 
 other, and in this manner prove, with more or lef^ 
 certainty, the point under consideration. And I 
 choose to do it also : First, because it seems to be 
 of the greatest importance, and not duly attended to 
 by every one, that the proof of Revelation is, not 
 some dire(5l and expreft things only, but a great va- 
 riety of circumstantial things also ; and that though 
 each of these dire(5l and circumstantial things, is 
 indeed to be considered separately, yet they are af- 
 terwards to be joined together ; for that the proper 
 force of the evidence consists in the result of those 
 several things, considered in their respects to each 
 other, and united into one view: And in the next 
 place, because it seems to me, that the matters of 
 fa6l here set down, which are acknowledged by un- 
 believers, must be acknowledged by them also to 
 contain together a degree of evidence of great weight, 
 if they could be brought to lay these several things 
 before themselves distin(9;ly, and then with attention 
 consider them together ; instead of that cursory 
 thought of them, to which we are familiarized. For 
 being familiarized to the cursory thought of things, 
 as really hinders the weight of them from being 
 seen, as from having its due influence upon pra^lice. 
 The thing averted, and the truth of which is to 
 be enquired into, is this : that over and above our 
 reason and affec^lions, which God has given us for 
 the information of our judgment and the condudl of 
 
Chap. 7. for Christianity. 267 
 
 our lives, he has also, by external Revelation, given 
 us an account of himself, and his moral government 
 over the world, implying a future state of rewards 
 and punishments; i.e. hath revealed the system of 
 natural Religion : for natural Religion may be ex- 
 ternally^ revealed by God, as the ignorant may be 
 
 taught it by mankind, their fellow-creatures that 
 
 God, I say, has given us the evidence of Revelation, 
 as well as the evidence of reason, to ascertain this 
 moral system ; together with an account of a parti- 
 cular dispensation of Providence, which reason could 
 no way have discovered, and a particular institution 
 of Religion founded on it, for the recovery of man- 
 kind out of their present wretched condition, and 
 raising them to the perfe(?tion and final happinefs of 
 their nature. 
 
 This Revelation, whether real or supposed, may 
 be considered as wholly historical. For prophecy is 
 nothing but the history of events before they come 
 to pafs : Dodlrines also are matters of fa6l : and pre- 
 cepts come under the same notion. And the gene- 
 ral design of Scripture, which contains in it this Re- 
 velation, thus considered as historical, may be said 
 to be, to give us an account of the world, in this one 
 single view, as God's world : by which it appears 
 eftentially distinguished from all other books, so far 
 as I have found, except such as are copied from it. 
 It begins with an account of God's creation of the 
 world, in order to ascertain, and distinguish from all 
 others, who is the objecT: of our worship, by what he 
 has done : In order to ascertain, who he is, concern- 
 ing whose Providence, commands, promises and 
 threatenings, this sacred book, all along, treats ; the 
 Maker and Proprietor of the world, he whose crea- 
 
 8 Pp. 149, &c. 
 
268 Of the particular Evidence Part 2. 
 
 lures we are, the God of nature : In order likewise 
 to distinguish him from the idols of the nations, which 
 are either imaginary beings, i. e. no beings at all ; 
 or else part of that creation, the historical relation 
 of which is here given. And St. John, not impro- 
 bably, with an eye to this Mosaic account of the 
 Creation, begins his Gospel with an account of our 
 Saviour's pre-existence, and that All things were 
 made by him ; and without him was not anything 
 made that was made :^ agreeably to the do(?trine of 
 St. Paul, that God created all things by Jesus 
 Christ.^^ This being premised, the Scripture, taken 
 together, seems to profeft to contain a kind of an 
 abridgment of the history of the world, in the view 
 just now mentioned : that is, a general account of 
 the condition of Religion and its profeftors, during 
 the continuance of that apostacy from God, and state 
 of wickedneft, which it everywhere supposes the 
 world to lie in. And this account of the state of 
 Religion, carries with it some brief account of the 
 political state of things, as Religion is affected by it. 
 Revelation indeed considers the common affairs of 
 this world, and what is going on in it, as a mere 
 scene of distraction ; and cannot be supposed to con- 
 cern itself with foretelling, at what time, Rome or 
 Babylon or Greece, or any particular place, should 
 be the most conspicuous seat of that tyranny and 
 dif^oluteneft, which all places equally aspire to be ; 
 cannot, I say, be supposed to give any account of 
 this wild scene for its own sake. But it seems to 
 contain some very general account of the chief go- 
 vernments of the world, as the general state of Re- 
 ligion, has been, is, or shall be, affected by them, 
 from the first transgref^ion, and during the whole 
 
 5 John i. 3. 10 Eph. iii. 9. 
 
Chap. 7. for Christianity. 269 
 
 interval of the world's continuing in its present state, 
 to a certain future period, spoken of both in the Old 
 and New Testament, very distinctly, and in great 
 variety of expreftion : The times of the restitution 
 of all things :^^ When the mystery of God shall be 
 finished, as he hath declared to his servants the 
 Prophets :^^ When the God of heaven shall set up a 
 kingdom, which shall never he destroyed : And the 
 kingdom shall not he left to other people,^^ as it is 
 represented to be during this apostacy, but judg- 
 ment shall be given to the saints,^^ and they shall 
 reign :^^ And the kingdom and dominion, and the 
 greatnejl of the kingdom under the whole heaven, 
 shall be given to the people of the saints of the most 
 High}^ 
 
 Upon this general view of the Scripture, I would 
 remark, how great a length of time, the whole re- 
 lation takes up, near six thousand years of which are 
 past: and how great a variety of things it treats of; 
 the natural and moral system or history of the world, 
 including the time when it was formed, all contained 
 in the very first book, and evidently written in a rude 
 and unlearned age ; and in subsequent books, the 
 various common and prophetic history, and the par- 
 ticular dispensation of Christianity. Now all this 
 together gives the largest scope for criticism ; and 
 for confutation of what is capable of being confuted, 
 either from reason or from common history, or from 
 any inconsistence in its several parts. And it is a 
 thing which deserves, I think, to be mentioned, that 
 whereas some imagine, the supposed doubtfulneft of 
 the evidence for Revelation implies a positive argu- 
 ment that it is not true ; it appears, on the contrary, 
 
 " Afts iii. 21. *- Rev. x. 7. ^^ Dan. ii. 44. 
 
 •* Dan. vii. 22. '* Rev. xxii. 5. '^ Dan. vii. 27. 
 
270 Of the particular Evidence Part 2, 
 
 to imply a positive argument that it is true. For, 
 could any common relation, of such antiquity, ex- 
 tent, and variety (for in these things the stref^ of 
 what I am now observing lies) be proposed to the 
 examination of the world: that it could not, in an 
 age of knowledge and liberty, be confuted, or shewn 
 to have nothing in it, to the satisfaction of reasonable 
 men ; this would be thought a strong presumptive 
 proof of its truth. And indeed it must be a proof of 
 it, just in proportion to the probability, that if it were 
 false, it might be shewn to be so : and this, I think, 
 is scarce pretended to be shewn, but upon principles 
 and in ways of arguing, which have been clearly ob- 
 viated.^^ Nor does it at all appear, that any set of 
 men who believe natural Religion, are of the opinion, 
 that Christianity has been thus confuted. But to 
 proceed : 
 
 Together with the moral system of the world, the 
 Old Testament contains a chronological- account of 
 the beginning of it, and from thence, an unbroken 
 genealogy of mankind for many ages before common 
 history begins ; and carried on as much farther, as 
 to make up a continued thread of history of the 
 length of between three and four thousand years. 
 It contains an account of God's making a covenant 
 with a particular nation, that they should be his 
 people, and he would be their God, in a peculiar 
 sense ; of his often interposing miraculously in their 
 affairs ; giving them the promise, and, long after, 
 the pofseftion, of a particular country ; afsuring them 
 of the greatest national prosperity in it, if they would 
 worship him, in opposition to the idols which the 
 rest of the world worshipped, and obey his com- 
 mands; and threatening them with unexampled pun- 
 
 " Chs. ii, iii, &c. 
 
Chap. 7. for Christianity, 271 
 
 ishments, if they disobeyed him, and fell into the 
 general idolatry: insomuch that this one nation 
 should continue to be the observation and the won- 
 der of all the world. It declares particularly, that 
 God would scatter them among all people, from one 
 end of the earth unto the other: but that when they 
 should return unto the Lord their God, he would 
 have compafsion upon them, and gather them from 
 all the nations, whither he had scattered them: that 
 Israel should be saved in the Lord, with an ever- 
 lasting salvation ; and not he ashamed or confounded 
 world without end. And as some of these promises 
 are conditional, others are as absolute, as anything 
 can be expref^ed : That the time should come, when 
 the people should be all righteous, and inherit the 
 land for ever: that though God would make a full 
 end of all nations whither he had scattered them, yet 
 would he not make a full end of them : that he would 
 bring again the captivity of his people Israel, and 
 plant them upon their land, and they should be no 
 more pulled up out of their land: that the seed of 
 Israel should not cease from being a nation for 
 ever.^^ It foretells, that God would raise them up 
 a particular person, in whom all his promises should 
 finally be fulfilled ; the Meftiah, who should be, in 
 an high and eminent sense, their anointed Prince and 
 Saviour. This was foretold in such a manner, as 
 raised a general expectation of such a person in the 
 nation, as appears from the New Testament, and is 
 an acknowledged fa(5f ; an expectation of his coming 
 at such a particular time, before any one appeared 
 claiming to be that person, and when there was no 
 ground for such an expecT:ation but from the pro- 
 
 '8 Deut. xxviii. 64 j xxx. 2, 3; Is. xlv. 17 j Ix. 21 5 Jer. 
 XXX. 1 1 ; xlvi. 28 i Amos ix. 155 Jer. xxxi. 36. 
 
272 Of the particular Evidence Parti. 
 
 phecies : whicli expe(5lation, therefore, must in all 
 reason be presumed to be explanatory of those pro- 
 phecies, if there were any doubt about their mean- 
 ing. It seems moreover to foretell, that this person 
 should be reje(51:ed by that nation, to whom he had 
 been so long promised, and though he was so much 
 desired by them.^^ And it expref^ly foretells, that 
 he should be the Saviour of the Gentiles ; and even 
 that the completion of the scheme, contained in this 
 book, and then begun, and in its progreft, should be 
 somewhat so great, that, in comparison with it, the 
 restoration of the Jews alone would be but of small 
 account. It is a light thing that thou shouldest he 
 my servant to raise up the tribes of Jacob, and to 
 restore the preserved of Israel: I will also give thee 
 for a light to the Gentiles, that thou mayest be for 
 salvation unto the end of the earth. And, In the 
 last days, the mountain of the Lord's house shall be 
 established in the top of the mountains, and shall be 
 exalted above the hills ; and all nations shall flow 
 
 into it for out of Zion shall go forth the law, 
 
 and the word of the Lord from Jerusalem. And he 
 
 shall judge among the nations and the Lord 
 
 alone shall be exalted in that day, and the idols he 
 shall utterly abolish.-^ The Scripture farther con- 
 tains an account, that at the time the Meftiah was 
 expelled, a person rose up, in this nation, claiming 
 to be that Meftiah, to be the Person, whom all the 
 prophecies referred to, and in whom they should 
 
 '9 Is. viii. 14, 15 ; xlix. 5j ch. liii 
 iii. 
 
 20 Is. xlix. 6 5 ch. ii 5 ch. xi ; Ivi. 7 ; Mai. i. 1 1. To which 
 must be added, the other prophecies of the like kind, several 
 in the New Testament, and very many in the Old ; which de- 
 scribe what shall be the completion of the revealed plan of Pro- 
 vidence. 
 
Chap. 7. for Christianity. 273 
 
 centre : that he spent some years in a continued 
 course of miraculous works ; and endued his imme- 
 diate disciples and followers, with a power of doing 
 the same, as a proof of the truth of that Religion, 
 which he commifsioned them to publish : that, in- 
 vested with this authority and power, they made 
 numerous converts in the remotest countries, and 
 settled and established his Religion in the world ; to 
 the end of which, the Scripture profeftes to give a 
 prophetic account of the state of this Religion 
 amongst mankind. 
 
 Let us now suppose a person utterly ignorant of 
 history, to have all this related to him, out of the 
 Scripture. Or suppose such an one, having the 
 Scripture put into his hands, to remark these things 
 in it, not knowing but that the whole, even its civil 
 history, as well as the other parts of it, might be, 
 from beginning to end, an entire invention ; and to 
 ask, what truth was in it, and whether the Revela- 
 tion here related, was real or a fi^lion ? And instead 
 of a 6\ve£i answer, suppose him, all at once, to be 
 told the following confefted facls ; and then to unite 
 them into one view. 
 
 Let him first be told, in how great a degree the 
 profef^ion and establishment of natural Religion, the 
 belief that there is one God to be worshipped, that 
 virtue is his law, and that mankind shall be rewarded 
 and punished hereafter, as they obey and disobey it 
 here ; in how very great a degree, I say, the pro- 
 feftion and establishment of this moral system in the 
 world, is owing to the Revelation, whether real or 
 supposed, contained in this Book : the establishment 
 of this moral system, even in those countries which 
 do not acknowledge the proper authority of the 
 Scripture.^^ Let him be told also, what number of 
 21 P. 226. 
 
 T 
 
274 Of the particular Evidence Part 2. 
 
 nations do acknowledge its proper authorit3\ Let 
 him then take in the consideration, of what im- 
 portance Religion is to mankind. And upon these 
 things, he might, I think, truly observe, that this sup- 
 posed Revelation's obtaining and being received in 
 the world, with all the circumstances and effe(9:s of 
 it, considered together as one event, is the most 
 conspicuous and important event in the story of man- 
 kind : that a book of this nature, and thus promulged 
 and recommended to our consideration, demands, as 
 if by a voice from heaven, to have its claims most 
 seriously examined into : and that, before such ex- 
 amination, to treat it with any kind of scoffing and 
 ridicule, is an offence against natural piety. But it 
 is to be remembered, that how much soever the es- 
 tablishment of natural Religion in the world is owing 
 to the Scripture-Revelation, this does not destroy 
 the proof of Religion from reason ; any more than 
 the proof of Euclid^ s Elements is destroyed, by a 
 man's knowing or thinking, that he should never 
 have seen the truth of the several propositions con- 
 tained in it, nor had those propositions come into his 
 thoughts, but for that mathematician. 
 
 Let such a person as we are speaking of, be, in 
 the next place, informed, of the acknowledged an- 
 tiquity of the first parts of this Book : And that its 
 chronology, its account of the time when the earth, 
 and the several parts of it, were first peopled with 
 human creatures, is no way contradicted, but is really 
 confirmed, by the natural and civil history of the 
 world, colle(5led from common historians, from the 
 state of the earth, and from the late invention of arts 
 and sciences. And as the Scripture contains an un- 
 broken thread of common and civil history, from the 
 Creation to the Captivity, for between three and 
 four thousand years : Let the person we are speak- 
 
Chap. 7. for Christianity. 275 
 
 ing of be told in the next place, that this general 
 history, as it is not contradicted, but is confirmed by 
 profane history as much as there would be reason to 
 expedl, upon supposition of its truth ; so there is 
 nothing in the whole history itself, to give any rea- 
 sonable ground of suspicion, of its not being, in the 
 general, a faithful and literally true genealogy of 
 men, and series of things. I speak here only of the 
 common Scripture -history, or of the course of ordi- 
 nary events related in it ; as distinguished from mi- 
 racles, and from the prophetic history. In all the 
 Scripture -narrations of this kind, following events 
 arise out of foregoing ones, as in all other histories. 
 There appears nothing related as done in any age, 
 not conformable to the manners of that age : nothing 
 in the account of a succeeding age, which, one would 
 say, could not be true, or was improbable, from the 
 account of things in the preceding one. There is 
 nothing in the charadlers, which would raise a thought 
 of their being feigned ; but all the internal marks 
 imaginable of their being real. It is to be added 
 also, that 'mere genealogies, bare narratives of the 
 number of years, which persons called by such and 
 •such names lived, do not carr^' the face of fic^^ion ; 
 perhaps do carry some presumption of veracity : 
 and all unadorned narratives, which have nothing to 
 surprise, may be thought to carry somewhat of the 
 like presumption too. And the domestic and the 
 political history is plainly credible. There may be 
 incidents in Scripture, which taken alone in the naked 
 way they are told, may appear strange ; especially 
 to persons of other manners, temper, education : 
 But there are also incidents of undoubted truth, in 
 many or most persons' lives, which, in the same 
 circumstances, would appear to the full as strange. 
 There may be mistakes of transcribers, there may 
 
276 Of the particular Evidence Part 2. 
 
 be other real or seeming mistakes, not easy to be 
 particularly accounted for : But there are certainly 
 no more things of this kind in the Scripture, than 
 what were to have been expelled in books of such 
 antiquity ; and nothing, in any wise, sufficient to 
 discredit the general narrative. Now, that a history 
 claiming to commence from the Creation, and ex- 
 tending in one continued series, through so great a 
 length of time, and variety of events, should have 
 such appearances of reality and truth in its whole 
 contexture, is surely a very remarkable circumstance 
 in its favour. And as all this is applicable to the 
 common history of the New Testament ; so there is 
 a farther credibility, and a very high one, given to 
 it, by profane authors : many of these writing of the 
 same times, and confirming the truth of customs 
 and events, which are incidentally as well as more 
 purposely mentioned in it. And this credibility of 
 the common Scripture -history, gives some credi- 
 bility to its miraculous history : especially as this is 
 interwoven with the common, so as that they imply 
 each other, and both together make up one relation. 
 Let it then be more particularly observed to this 
 person, that it is an acknowledged matter of fa(9:, 
 which is indeed implied in the foregoing observation, 
 that there was such a nation as the Jews, of the 
 greatest antiquity, whose government and general 
 polity was founded on the Law, here related to be 
 given them by Moses as from heaven : that natural 
 Religion, though with rites additional yet no way 
 contrary to it, was their established Religion, which 
 cannot be said of the Gentile world : and that their 
 very being as a nation, depended upon their acknow- 
 ledgment of one God, the God of the universe. 
 For, suppose in their captivity in Babylon, they had 
 gone over to the Religion of their conquerors, there 
 
Chap, 7. for Christianity. 277 
 
 would have remained no bond of union, to keep them 
 a distinct people. And whilst they were under their 
 own kings, in their own country, a total apostacy 
 from God would have been the diftolution of their 
 whole government. They, in such a sense, nation- 
 ally acknowledged and worshipped the Maker of 
 heaven and earth, when the rest of the world were 
 sunk in idolatry, as rendered them, in fadl, the pe- 
 culiar people of God. And this so remarkable an 
 establishment and preservation of natural Religion 
 amongst them, seems to add some peculiar credi- 
 bility to the historical evidence for the miracles of 
 Moses and the Prophets : Because these miracles 
 are a full satisfa(?l:ory account of this event, which 
 plainly wants to be accounted for, and Ccinnot other- 
 wise. 
 
 Let this person, supposed wholly ignorant of his- 
 tory, be acquainted farther, that One claiming to be 
 the Mef^iah, of Jewish extraction, rose up at the 
 time when this nation, from the prophecies above- 
 mentioned, expe(5led the Meftiah : that he was re- 
 je(5led, as it seemed to have been foretold he should, 
 by the body of the people, under the direction of 
 their rulers : that in the course of a very few years, 
 he was believed on and acknowledged as the pro- 
 mised Meftiah, by great numbers among the Gen- 
 tiles, agreeably to the prophecies of Scripture, yet 
 not upon the evidence of prophecy, but of miracles,^ 
 of which miracles we also have strong historical evi- 
 dence ; (by which I mean here no more than must 
 be acknowledged by unbelievers, for let pious frauds 
 and follies be admitted to weaken, it is absurd to say 
 they destroy, our evidence of miracles wrought in 
 proof of Christianity : ^^) that this Religion approving 
 
 22 Pp. 249, &C. 23 pp, 257, &C. 
 
278 Of the particular Evidence Part 2. 
 
 itself to the reason of mankind, and carrying its own 
 evidence with it, so far as reason is a judge of its 
 system, and being no way contrary to reason, in 
 those parts of it which require to be believed upon 
 the mere authority of its Author ; that this Religion, 
 I say, gradually spread and supported itself, for 
 some hundred years, not only without any aftistance 
 from temporal power, but under constant discou- 
 ragements, and often the bitterest persecutions from 
 it ; and then became the Religion of the world : that 
 in the mean time, the Jewish nation and govern- 
 ment were destroyed, in a very remarkable manner, 
 and the people carried away captive and dispersed 
 through the most distant countries ; in which state 
 of dispersion, they have remained fifteen hundred 
 years : and that they remain a numerous people, 
 united amongst themselves, and distinguished from 
 the rest of the world, as they were in the days of 
 Moses, by the profeftion of his Law ; and everywhere 
 looked upon in a manner, which one scarce knows 
 how distinctly to expreft, but in the words of the 
 prophetic account of it, given so many ages before 
 it came to paft ; Thou shalt become an astonishment, 
 a proverb, and a by -word, among all nations whither 
 the Lord shall lead thee.^^ 
 
 The appearance of a standing miracle, in the Jews 
 remaining a distin<5t people in their dispersion, and 
 the confirmation which this event appears to give to 
 the truth of Revelation ; may be thought to be an- 
 swered, by their Religion's forbidding them inter- 
 marriages with those of any other, and prescribing 
 them a great many peculiarities in their food, by 
 which they are debarred from the means of incor- 
 porating with the people, in whose countries they 
 
 ^* Deut. xxviii. 37. _. 
 
Ckap. J. for Christianity. 279 
 
 live. This is not, I think, a satisfa<5lory account of 
 that which it pretends to account for. But what 
 does it pretend to account for? The correspondence 
 between this event and the prophecies ; or the co- 
 incidence of both, with a long dispensation of Pro- 
 vidence of a peculiar nature, towards that people 
 formerly ? No. It is only the event itself, which is 
 offered to be thus accounted for ; which single event 
 taken alone, abstracted from all such correspondence 
 and coincidence, perhaps would not have appeared 
 miraculous: but that correspondence and coinci- 
 dence may be so, though the event itself be sup- 
 posed not. Thus the concurrence of our Saviour's 
 being born at Bethlehem, with a long foregoing se- 
 ries of prophecy and other coincidences, is doubt- 
 left miraculous, the series of prophecy, and other 
 coincidences, and the event, being admitted : though 
 the event itself, his birth at that place, appears to 
 have been brought about in a natural way ; of which, 
 however, no one can be certain. 
 
 And as several of these events seem, in some de- 
 gree exprefkly, to have verified the prophetic history 
 already : so likewise they may be considered farther, 
 as having a peculiar aspect towards the full comple- 
 tion of it ; as affording some presumption that the 
 whole of it shall, one time or other, be fulfilled. Thus, 
 that the Jews have been so wonderfully preserved 
 in their long and wide dispersion ; which is indeed 
 the dire(5l fulfilling of some prophecies, but is now 
 mentioned only as looking forward to somewhat yet 
 to come : that natural Religion came forth from Ju- 
 dea, and spread, in the degree it has done over the 
 world, before lost in idolatry ; which, together with 
 some other things, have distinguished that very place, 
 in like manner, as the people of it are distinguished : 
 that this great change of Religion over the earth, 
 
28o Of the particular Evidence Part 2. 
 
 was brought about under the profeftion and acknow- 
 ledgment, that Jesus was the promised Meftiah : 
 Things of this kind naturally turn the thoughts of 
 serious men, towards the full completion of the pro- 
 phetic history, concerning the final restoration of 
 that people ; concerning the establishment of the 
 everlasting kingdom among them, the kingdom of 
 the Mefsiah ; and the future state of the world, un- 
 der this sacred government. Such circumstances 
 and events compared with these prophecies, though 
 no completions of them, yet would not, I think, be 
 spoken of as nothing in the argument, by a person 
 upon his first being informed of them. They fall in 
 with the prophetic history of things still future, give 
 it some additional credibility, have the appearance 
 of being somewhat in order to the full completion 
 of it. 
 
 Indeed it requires a good degree of knowledge, 
 and great calmneft and consideration, to be able to 
 judge, thoroughly, of the evidence for the truth of 
 Christianity, from that part of the prophetic history, 
 which relates to the situation of the kingdoms of the 
 world, and to the state of the church, from the es- 
 tablishment of Christianity to the present time. But 
 it appears, fi^om a general view of it, to be very ma- 
 terial. And those persons who have thoroughly ex- 
 amined it, and some of them were men of the coolest 
 tempers, greatest capacities, and least liable to im- 
 putations of prejudice, insist upon it as determinatdy 
 conclusive. 
 
 Suppose now a person quite ignorant of history, 
 first to recollect: the parages abovementioned out 
 of Scripture, without knowing but that the whole 
 was a late fic^tion, then to be informed of the cor- 
 respondent fa(51s now mentioned, and to unite them 
 all into one view ; That the profeftion and establish- 
 
Chap. 'J, for Christianity. 281 
 
 ment of natural Religion in the world, is greatly 
 owing, in different ways, to this Book, and the sup- 
 posed Revelation which it contains ; that it is ac- 
 knowledged to be of the earliest antiquity ; that its 
 chronology and common history are entirely credible ; 
 that this ancient nation, the Jews, of whom it chiefly 
 treats, appear to have been, in fa6t, the people of 
 God, in a distinguished sense ; that, as there was a 
 national expectation amongst them, raised from the 
 prophecies, of a Mefsiah to appear at such a time, 
 so one at this time appeared claiming to be that 
 Meftiah ; that he was reje(5led by this nation ; but 
 received by the Gentiles, not upon the evidence of 
 prophecy, but of miracles ; that the Religion he 
 taught supported itself under the greatest difficul- 
 ties, gained ground, and at length became the Re- 
 ligion of the world ; that in the mean time the Jewish 
 polity was utterly destroyed, and the nation dispersed 
 over the face of the earth ; that notwithstandmg this, 
 they have remained a distinct!: numerous people for 
 so many centuries, even to this day ; which not only 
 appears to be the expreft completion of several pro- 
 phecies concerning them ; but also renders it, as one 
 may speak, a visible and easy pofsibility, that the 
 promises made to them as a nation,* may yet be ful- 
 filled. And to these acknowledged truths, let the 
 person we have been supposing, add, as I think he 
 ought, whether every one will allow it or no, the ob- 
 vious appearances which there are, of the state of 
 the world, in other respects besides what relates to 
 the Jews, and of the Christian Church, having so 
 long answered, and still answering to the prophetic 
 history. Suppose, I say, these fa(5ls set over against 
 the things before-mentioned out of the Scripture, 
 and seriously compared with them ; the joint view 
 of both together, must, I think, appear of very great 
 
282 Of the particular Evidence Part 2. 
 
 weight to a considerate reasonable person : of much 
 greater indeed, upon having them first laid before 
 him, than is easy for us, who are so familiarized to 
 them, to conceive, without some particular attention 
 for that purpose. 
 
 All these things, and the several particulars con- 
 tained under them, require to be distinctly and most 
 thoroughly examined into ; that the weight of each 
 may be judged of, upon such examination, and such 
 conclusion drawn as results from their united force. 
 But this has not been attempted here. I have gone 
 no farther than to show, that the general imperfect: 
 view of them now given, the confei^ed historical evi- 
 dence for miracles, and the many obvious appearing 
 completions of prophecy, together with the collateral 
 things ^^ here mentioned, and there are several others 
 of the like sort ; that all this together, which, being 
 fa(?i;, must be acknowledged by unbelievers, amounts 
 to real evidence of somewhat more than human in 
 this matter : evidence much more important, than 
 careleft men, who have been accustomed only to 
 transient and partial views of it, can imagine ; and 
 indeed abundantly sufficient to a(5l upon. And these 
 things, I apprehend, must be acknowledged by un- 
 beUevers. For'though they may say, that the his- 
 torical evidence of miracles wrought in attestation 
 of Christianity, is not sufficient to convince them that 
 such miracles were really wrought ; they cannot 
 deny, that there is such historical evidence, it being 
 a known matter of fac^t, that there is. They may 
 say, the conformity between the prophecies and 
 events, is by accident : but there are many instances, in 
 
 2* All the particular things mentioned in this chapter, not 
 reducible to the head, of certain miracles, or determinate com- 
 pletions of prophecy. See pp. 244, 245. 
 
Chap. 7. for Christianity. 283 
 
 which such conformity itself cannot be denied. They 
 may say, with regard to such kind of collateral things 
 as those abovementioned, that any odd accidental 
 events, without meaning, will have a meaning found 
 in them by fanciful people : and that such as are fan- 
 ciful in any one certain way, will make out a thou- 
 sand coincidences, which seem to favour their pecu- 
 liar follies. Men, I say, may talk thus : But no one 
 who is serious, can poftibly think these things to be 
 nothing, if he considers the importance of collateral 
 things, and even of lef^er circumstances, in the evi- 
 dence of probability, as distinguished, in nature, from 
 the evidence of demonstration. In many cases in- 
 deed it seems to require the truest judgment, to 
 determine with exa(fine{^ the weight of circumstan- 
 tial evidence : but it is very often altogether as con- 
 vincing, as that, which is the most exprei^ and direct:. 
 This general view of the evidence for Christianity, 
 considered as making one argument, may also serve 
 to recommend to serious persons, to set down every- 
 thing, which they think may be of any real weight 
 at all in proof of it, and particularly the many seem- 
 ing completions of prophecy : and they will find, 
 that, judging by the natural rules, by which we judge 
 of probable evidence in common matters, they amount 
 to a much higher degree of proof, upon such a joint 
 review, than could be supposed upon considering 
 them separately, at different times ; how strong so- 
 ever the proof might before appear to them, upon 
 such separate views of it. For probable proofs, by 
 being added, not only increase the evidence, but 
 multiply it. Nor should I dif^uade any one from 
 setting down, what he thought made for the con- 
 trary side. But then it is to be remembered, not 
 in order to influence his judgment, but his pra(5lice, 
 that a mistake on one side, may be, in its conse- 
 
284 Of the particular evidence Part 2. 
 
 quences, much more dangerous, than a mistake on 
 the other. And what course is most safe, and what 
 most dangerous, is a consideration thought very ma- 
 terial, when we deliberate, not concerning events, 
 but concerning condu^l in our temporal affairs. To 
 be influenced by this consideration in our judgment, 
 to believe or disbelieve upon it, is indeed as much 
 prejudice, as anything whatever. And, like other 
 prejudices, it operates contrary ways, in different 
 men. For some are inclined to believe, what they 
 hope ; and others, what they fear. And it is mani- 
 fest unreasonablenei^, to apply to men's paf^ions in 
 order to gain their af^ent. But in deliberations con- 
 cerning conduct, there is nothing which reason more 
 requires to be taken into the account, than the im- 
 portance of it. For, suppose it doubtful, what would 
 be the consequence of acting in this, or in a contrary 
 manner : still, that taking one side could be attended 
 with little or no bad consequence, and taking the 
 other might be attended with the greatest, must ap- 
 pear, to unprejudiced reason, of the highest moment 
 towards determining, how we are to a(5l. But the 
 truth of our Religion, like the truth of common mat- 
 ters, is to be judged of by all the evidence taken to- 
 gether. And unlef^ the whole series of things which 
 may be alleged in this argument, and every par- 
 ticular thing in it, can reasonably be supposed to 
 have been by accident ; (for here the stref^ of the 
 argument for Christianity lies ;) then is the truth of 
 it proved : In like manner, as if in any common case, 
 numerous events acknowledged, were to be alleged 
 in proof of any other event disputed ; the truth of 
 the disputed event would be proved, not only if any 
 one of the acknowledged ones did of itself clearly 
 imply it, but, though no one of them singly did so, 
 if the whole of the acknowledged events taken to- 
 
Chap. 7. for Christianity. 285 
 
 gether, could not in reason be supposed to have 
 happened, unlei^ the disputed one were true. 
 
 It is obvious, how much advantage, the nature of 
 this evidence gives to those persons, who attack 
 Christianity, especially in conversation. For it is 
 easy to shew, in a short and lively manner, that such 
 and such things are liable to obje(9:ion, that this and 
 another thing, is of little weight in itself; but im- 
 poftible to shew, in like manner, the united force of 
 the whole argument in one view. 
 
 However, lastly, as it has been made appear, that 
 there is no presumption against a Revelation as mi- 
 raculous ; that the general scheme of Christianity, 
 and the principal parts of it, are conformable to the 
 experienced constitution of things, and the whole 
 perfe(5^1y credible : So the account now given of the 
 positive evidence for it, shews, that this evidence is 
 such, as, from the nature of it, cannot be destroyed ; 
 though it should be leftened. 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 Of the Ohje6lions which may he made against ar- 
 guing from the Analogy of Nature, to Religion. 
 
 F every one would consider with such 
 attention as they are bound, even in 
 point of morality, to consider, what 
 they judge and give chara(5lers of; 
 the occasion of this chapter would be, 
 in some good measure at least, superseded. But 
 since this is not to be expe(5ied ; for some we find 
 do not concern themselves to understand even what 
 they write against : Since this treatise, in common 
 
286 Objections against arguing from Part 2. 
 
 with most others, lies open to objections, which may 
 appear very material to thoughtful men at first sight ; 
 And, besides that, seems peculiarly liable to the ob- 
 je(5lions, of such as can judge without thinking, and 
 of such as can censure without judging ; it may not 
 be amif^ to set down the chief of these objections 
 which occur to me, and consider them to their 
 hands. And they are such as these ; 
 
 " That it is a poor thing to solve difficulties in 
 ' Revelation, by saying, that there are the same in 
 ' natural Religion ; when what is wanting is to clear 
 '■ both of them, of these their common, as well as 
 ' other their respective, difficulties : But that it is a 
 ' strange way indeed of convincing men of the ob- 
 ' ligations of Religion, to shew them, that they have 
 ' as little reason for their worldly pursuits : And a 
 ' strange way of vindicating the justice and good- 
 ' nel^ of the Author of nature, and of removing the 
 ' objections against both, to which the system of 
 ' Religion lies open, to shew, that the like objections 
 ' lie against natural Providence ; a way of answer- 
 ' ing objections against Religion, without so much 
 ' as pretending to make out, that the system of it, 
 ' or the particular things in it objeCted against, are 
 
 ' reasonable especially, perhaps some may be 
 
 • inattentive enough to add, must this be thought 
 ' strange, when it is confef^ed that Analogy is no 
 ' answer to such objeCtions : That when this sort of 
 ' reasoning is carried to the utmost length it can be 
 ' imagined capable of, it will yet leave the mind in 
 ' a very unsatisfied state : And that it must be un- 
 ' accountable ignorance of mankind, to imagine they 
 ' will be prevailed with to forego their present in- 
 ' terests and pleasures from regard to Religion, upon 
 ^ doubtful evidence." 
 Now, as plausible as this way of talking may ap- 
 
Chap. 8. Analogy of Nature to Religion. 28-^ 
 
 pear, that appearance will be found in a great mea- 
 sure owing to half-views, which shew but part of an 
 objeci:, yet shew that indistin(5lly ; and to undeter- 
 minate language. By these means weak men are 
 often deceived by others, and ludicrous men, by 
 themselves. And even those, who are serious and 
 considerate, cannot always readily disentangle, and 
 at once clearly see through the perplexities, in which 
 subjecT;s themselves are involved ; and which are 
 heightened by the deficiencies and the abuse of 
 words. To this latter sort of persons, the following 
 reply to each part of this objedlion severally, may be 
 of some afsistance ; as it may also tend a little to 
 stop and silence others. 
 
 First, The thing wanted, i. e. what men require, 
 is to have all difficulties cleared. And this is, or at 
 least for anything we know to the contrary, it may 
 be, the same, as requiring to comprehend the Divine 
 nature, and the whole plan of Providence from ever- 
 lasting to everlasting. But it hath always been al- 
 lowed to argue, from what is acknowledged, to what 
 is disputed. And it is in no other sense a poor 
 thing, to argue from natural Religion to revealed, in 
 the manner found fault with, than it is to argue in 
 numberleft other ways of probable dedu(5lion and 
 inference, in matters of conduct, which we are con- 
 tinually reduced to the necefsity of doing. Indeed 
 the epithet poor, may be applied, I fear as properly, 
 to great part or the whole of human life, as it is to 
 the things mentioned in the objection. Is it not a 
 poor thing, for a physician to have so little know- 
 ledge in the cure of diseases, as even the most emi- 
 nent have ? To a6i upon conje6lure and gueft, where 
 the life of man is concerned ? Undoubtedly it is : 
 but not in comparison of having no skill at all in that 
 useful art, and being obliged to act wholly in the dark. 
 
288 Objeflions against arguing from Part 2. 
 
 Further : since it is as unreasonable, as it is com- 
 mon, to urge objections against Revelation, which 
 are of equal weight against natural Religion ; and 
 those who do this, if they are not confuted them- 
 selves, deal unfairly with others, in making it seem, 
 that they are arguing only against Revelation, or 
 particular docftrines of it, when in reality they are 
 arguing against moral Providence ; it is a thing of 
 consequence to shew, that such objections are as 
 much levelled against natural Religion, as against 
 revealed. And objections, which are equally appli- 
 cable to both, are properly speaking answered, by 
 its being shewn that they are so, provided the former 
 be admitted to be true. And without taking in the 
 consideration how distinctly this is admitted, it is 
 plainly very material to observe, that as the things 
 objected against in natural Religion, are of the same 
 kind with what is certain matter of experience in the 
 course of Providence, and in the information which 
 God affords us concerning our temporal interest 
 under his government; so the objeCtions against the 
 system of Christianity and the evidence of it, are of 
 the very same kind with those which are made 
 against the system and evidence of natural Religion. 
 However, the reader upon review may see, that most 
 of the Analogies insisted upon, even in the latter 
 part of this treatise, do not neceftarily require to 
 have more taken for granted than is in the former ; 
 that there is an Author of nature, or natural Go- 
 vernor of the world : and Christianity is vindicated, 
 not from its Analogy to natural Religion, but chiefly, 
 from its Analogy to the experienced constitution of 
 Nature. 
 
 Secondly, Religion is a praCtical thing, and con- 
 sists in such a determinate course of life ; as being 
 what there is reason to think, is commanded by the 
 
Chap, 8. Analogy of Nature to Religion. 289 
 
 Author of nature, and will, upon the whole, be our 
 happineft under his government. Now if men can 
 be convinced, that they have the like reason to be- 
 lieve this, as to believe, that taking care of their 
 temporal affairs will be to their advantage ; such 
 convi<9:ion cannot but be an argument to them for 
 the pra(51ice of Religion. And if there be really any 
 reason for believing one of these, and endeavouring 
 to preserve life, and secure ourselves the neceftaries 
 and conveniences of it : Then there is reason also for 
 believing the other, and endeavouring to secure the 
 interest it proposes to us. And if the interest, which 
 Religion proposes to us, be infinitely greater than 
 our whole temporal interest; then there must be 
 proportionably greater reason, for endeavouring to 
 secure one, than the other : since, by the supposi- 
 tion, the probability of our securing one, is equal to 
 the probability of our securing the other. This 
 seems plainly unanswerable ; and has a tendency to 
 influence fair minds, who consider what our condi- 
 tion really is, or upon what evidence we are natu- 
 rally appointed to di£i ; and who are disposed to ac- 
 quiesce in the terms upon which we live, and attend 
 to and follow that practical instruction, whatever it 
 be, which is afforded us. 
 
 But the chief and proper force of the argument 
 referred to in the objection, lies in another place. 
 For, it is said that the proof of Religion is involved 
 in such inextricable difficulties, as to render it doubt- 
 ful ; and that it cannot be supposed, that if it were 
 true, it v^ould be left upon doubtful evidence. Here 
 then, over and above the force of each particular 
 difficulty or objection, these difficulties and objec- 
 tions taken together, are turned into a positive ar- 
 gument against the truth of Religion : which argu- 
 ment would stand thus. If Religion were true, it 
 u 
 
ago Obje£lions against arguing from Part 2. 
 
 would not be left doubtful, and open to objec^tions to 
 the degree in which it is : therefore that it is thus 
 left, not only renders the evidence of it weak, and 
 le{^ens its force, in proportion to the weight of such 
 obje(5lions; but also shews it to be false, or is a 
 general presumption of its being so. Now the ob- 
 servation, that from the natural constitution and 
 course of things, we must in our temporal concerns, 
 almost continually, and in matters of great conse- 
 quence, a(5i: upon evidence of a like kind and degree 
 to the evidence of Religion ; is an answer to this ar- 
 gument : because it shews, that it is according to 
 the condu(?t and character of the Author of nature, 
 to appoint we should a(?i: upon evidence like to that, 
 which this argument presumes he cannot be sup- 
 posed to appoint we should a(9; upon : It is an in- 
 stance, a general one made up of numerous parti- 
 cular ones, of somewhat in his dealing with us, 
 similar to what is said to be incredible. And as the 
 force of this answer lies merely in the parallel, which 
 there is between the evidence for Religion and for 
 our temporal condu(5t ; the ansv^er is equally just 
 and conclusive, whether the parallel be made out, 
 by shewing the evidence of the former to be higher, 
 or the evidence of the latter to be lower. 
 
 Thirdly y The design of this treatise is not to vin- 
 dicate the character of God, but to shew the obli- 
 gations of men : It is not to justify his Providence, 
 but to shew what belongs to us to do. These are 
 two subjects, and ought not to be confounded. And 
 though they may at length run up into each other, 
 yet observations may immediately tend to make out 
 the latter, which do not appear, by any immediate 
 connection, to the purpose of the former ; which is 
 lef^ our concern than many seem to think. For, 
 first, it is not necei^ary we should justify the dis- 
 
Chap. 8. Analogy of Nature to Religion. 291 
 
 pensations of Providence against obje^lions, any far- 
 ther than to shew, that the things objected against 
 may, for aught we know, be consistent with justice 
 and goodneft. Suppose then, that there are things 
 in the system of this world, and plan of Providence 
 relating to it, which taken alone would be unjust; 
 yet it has been shewn unanswerably, that if we could 
 take in the reference, which these things may have, 
 to other things present, past and to come ; to the 
 whole scheme, which the things objecfled against are 
 parts of; these very things might, for aught we 
 know, be found to be, not only consistent with jus- 
 tice, but instances of it. Indeed it has been shewn, 
 by the Analogy of what we see, not only poftible 
 that this may be the case, but credible that it is. 
 And thus obje(5lions, drawn from such things, are 
 answered, and Providence is vindicated, as far as 
 Religion makes its vindication nece{^ary. Hence it 
 appears, secondly, that objections against the Divine 
 justice and goodnef^ are not endeavoured to be re- 
 moved, by shewing that the like objec^tions, allowed 
 to be really conclusive, lie against natural Provi- 
 dence : but those objedlions being supposed and 
 shewn not to be conclusive, the things objected 
 against, considered as matters of faCt, are farther 
 shewn to be credible, from their conformity to the 
 constitution of Nature ; for instance, that God will 
 reward and punish men for their a6lions hereafter, 
 from the observation, that he does reward and pun- 
 ish them for their actions here. And this, I appre- 
 hend, is of weight. And I add, thirdly, it would be 
 of weight, even though those objeClions were not 
 answered. For, there being the proof of Religion 
 above set down ; and Religion implying several facets ; 
 for instance, again, the faCt last mentioned, that God 
 will reward and punish men for their adlions here- 
 
292 Objedions against arguing from Part 2. 
 
 after ; the observation that his present method of 
 government is by rewards and punishments, shews 
 that future fa^l not to be incredible : whatever ob- 
 je<5lions men may think they have against it, as un- 
 just or unmerciful, according to their notions of jus- 
 tice and mercy ; or as improbable from their belief 
 of neceftity. I say, as improbable : for it is evident 
 no objection against it, as unjust, can be urged from 
 neceftity ; since this notion as much destroys in- 
 justice, as it does justice. Then, fourthly, though 
 obje(9;ions against the reasonableneft of the system 
 of Religion, cannot indeed be answered without en- 
 tering into consideration of its reasonablenefs ; yet 
 objections against the credibility or truth of it, may. 
 Because the system of it is reducible into what is 
 properly matter of fad : And the truth, the probable 
 truth, of fac^s, may be shewn without consideration 
 of their reasonablenefs. Nor is it neceftary, though, 
 in some cases and respects, it is highly useful and 
 proper, yet it is not neceftary, to give a proof of 
 the reasonablenefs of every precept enjoined us, and 
 of every particular dispensation of Providence, which 
 comes into the system of Religion. Indeed the 
 more thoroughly a person of a right disposition is 
 convinced of the perfe^lion of the Divine nature and 
 condudi, the farther he will advance towards that 
 perfe(?i:ion of Religion, which St. John ^ speaks of. 
 But the general obligations of Religion are fully 
 made out, by proving the reasonablenefs of the prac- 
 tice of it. And that the practice of Religion is rea- 
 sonable, may be shewn, though no more could be 
 proved, than that the system of it may be so, for 
 aught we know to the contrary : and even without 
 entering into the distin(?t consideration of this. And 
 
 ' I John iv. i8. 
 
Chap. 8. Analogy of Nature to Religion. 293 
 
 from hence, fifthly, it is easy to see, that though 
 the Analogy of Nature is not an immediate answer 
 to objections against the wisdom, the justice or good- 
 neft, of any docftrine or precept of Religion : j^et it 
 may be, as it is, an immediate and dire(?l: answer to 
 what is really intended by such obje(ftions ; which is, 
 to shew that the things objected against are incre- 
 dible. 
 
 Fourthly, It is most readily acknowledged, that 
 the foregoing treatise is by no means satisfactory ; 
 very far indeed from it : But so would any natural 
 institution of life appear, if reduced into a system, 
 together with its evidence. Leaving Religion cut 
 of the case, men are divided in their opinions, Whe- 
 ther our pleasures overbalance our pains : And whe- 
 ther it be, or be not, eligible to live in this world. 
 And were all such controversies settled, which per- 
 haps, in speculation, would be found involved in great 
 difficulties ; and were it determined upon the evi- 
 dence of reason, as Nature has determined it to our 
 hands, that life is to be preserved : Yet still, the 
 rules which God has been pleased to afford us, for 
 escaping the miseries of it and obtaining its satis- 
 faClicns, the rules, for instance, of preserving health 
 and recovering it when lost, are not only fallible and 
 precarious, but very far from being exa6l. Nor are 
 we informed by Nature, in future contingencies and 
 accidents, so as to render it at all certain, what is 
 the best method of managing our affairs. What will 
 be the succef^ of our temporal pursuits, in the com- 
 mon sense of the word succeft, is highly doubtful. 
 And what will be the succef^ of them, in the proper 
 sense of the word ; i.e. what happinef^ or enjoy- 
 ment we shall obtain by them, is doubtful in a much 
 higher degree. Indeed the unsatisfa(51:ory nature of 
 the evidence, with which we are obliged to take up, 
 
294 Objedions against arguing from Part 2. 
 
 in the daily course of life, is scarce to be expref^ed. 
 Yet men do not throw away life, or disregard the 
 interests of it, upon account of this doubtfulnef^. 
 The evidence of Religion then being admitted real, 
 those who objec^l: against it, as not satisfactory, i. e. 
 as not being what they wish it, plainly forget the 
 very condition of our being : For satisfa(51icn^ in this 
 sense, does not belong to such a creature as man. 
 And, which is more material, they forget also the 
 very nature of Religion. For, Religion presupposes, 
 in all those who will embrace it, a certain degree of 
 integrity and honesty ; which it was intended to try 
 whether men have or not, and to exercise in such 
 as have it, in order to its improvement. Religion 
 presupposes this as much, and in the same sense, 
 as speaking to a man, presupposes he understands 
 the language in which you speak ; or as warning a 
 man of any danger, presupposes that he hath such 
 a regard to himself, as that he will endeavour to 
 avoid it. And therefore the question is not at all. 
 Whether the evidence of Religion be satisfac^tory : but 
 Whether it be, in reason, sufficient to prove and dis- 
 cipline that virtue, which it presupposes. Now the 
 evidence of it is fully sufficient for all those purposes 
 of probation ; how far soever it is from being satis- 
 fa(5lory, as to the purposes of curiosity, or any other : 
 and indeed it answers the purposes of the former in 
 several respecfts, which it would not do, if it were as 
 overbearing as is required. One might add farther ; 
 that Whether the motives or the evidence for any 
 course of a(5lion be satisfactory, meaning here by 
 that word, what satisfies a man, that such a course 
 of aClion will in event be for his good; this need 
 never be, and I think, strictly speaking, never is, the 
 practical question in common matters. But the 
 praClical question in all cases, is, Whether the evi- 
 
Chap. 8. Analogy of Nature to Religion. 295 
 
 dence for a course of acftion be such, as, taking in 
 all circumstances, makes the faculty within us, which 
 is the guide and judge of conducft,^ determine that 
 course of adlion to be prudent. Indeed satisfa(5lion 
 that it will be for our interest or happineft, abund- 
 antly determines an action to be prudent : But evi- 
 dence almost infinitely lower than this, determines 
 actions to be so too ; even in the condudl of every 
 day. 
 
 Fifthly, As to the obje(5tion concerning the influ- 
 ence which this argument, or any part of it, may or 
 may not, be expected to have upon men ; I observe, 
 as above, that Religion being intended for a trial 
 and exercise of the morality of every person's cha- 
 racter, who is a subject of it ; And there being, as I 
 have shewn, such evidence for it, as is sufficient, in 
 reason, to influence men to embrace it : To object, 
 that it is not to be imagined mankind will be influ- 
 enced by such evidence, is nothing to the purpose 
 of the foregoing treatise. For the purpose of it is 
 not to enquire, what sort of creatures mankind are ; 
 but what, the light and knowledge, which is afforded 
 them, requires they should be : to shew how, in 
 reason, they ought to behave ; not how, in fadl, they 
 will behave. This depends upon themselves, and is 
 their own concern ; the personal concern of each 
 man in particular. And how little regard the gene- 
 rality have to it, experience indeed does too fully 
 shew. But Religion, considered as a probation, has 
 had its end upon all persons, to whom it has been 
 proposed with evidence sufficient in reason to influ- 
 ence their practice : For by this means they have 
 been put into a state of probation ; let them behave 
 as they will in it. And thus, not only Revelation, 
 
 2 See Difsert. II. 
 
296 Obje6!ions against arguing from Part 2. 
 
 but reason also, teaches us, that by the evidence of 
 Religion being laid before men, the designs of Pro- 
 vidence are carrying on, not only with regard to 
 those who will, but likewise with regard to those who 
 will not, be influenced by it. However, lastly, the 
 objection here referred to, allows the things insisted 
 upon in this treatise to be of some weight : And if 
 so, it may be hoped it will have some influence. 
 And if there be a probability that it will have any at 
 all, there is the same reason in kind, though not in 
 degree, to lay it before men, as there would be, if it 
 were likely to have a greater influence. 
 
 And farther, I desire it may be considered, with 
 respect to the whole of the foregoing obje^lions, that 
 in this treatise I have argued upon the principles of 
 others,^ not my own : and have omitted what I think 
 true, and of the utmost importance, because by others 
 thought unintelligible, or not true. Thus I have 
 argued upon the principles of the Fatalists, which I 
 do not believe : and have omitted a thing of the ut- 
 most importance, which I do believe, the moral fit- 
 neft and unfitneft of adlions, prior to all will what- 
 ever ; which I apprehend as certainly to determine 
 the Divine conduct, as speculative truth and falsehood 
 neceftarily determine the Divine judgment. Indeed 
 the principle of liberty and that of moral fitneft so 
 force themselves upon the mind, that moralists, the 
 ancients as well as moderns, have formed their lan- 
 guage upon it. And probably it may appear in 
 mine : though I have endeavoured to avoid it ; and 
 in order to avoid it, have sometimes been obliged to 
 
 ^ By arguing upon the principles of others^ the reader will ob- 
 serve is meant 5 not proving diXiy th\ng from those principles, but 
 notnvithstanding them. Thus Religion is proved, not from the 
 opinion of necefsity ; which is absurd : But, notwithstanding or 
 even though that opinion were admitted to be true. 
 
Chap. 8. Analogy of Nature to Religion. 297 
 
 expreft myself in a manner, which will appear strange 
 to such as do not observe the reason for it : But the 
 general argument here pursued, does not at all sup- 
 pose, or proceed upon, these principles. Now, these 
 two abstra(5l principles of liberty and moral fitnef^ 
 being omitted, Religion can be considered in no 
 other view, than merely as a question of fadt : And 
 in this view, it is here considered. It is obvious, that 
 Christianity, and the proof of it, are both historical. 
 And even natural Religion is, properly, a matter of 
 fa(5l. For, that there is a righteous Governor of the 
 world, is so : And this proposition contains the ge- 
 neral system of natural Religion. But then, several 
 abstra(5l truths, and in particular those two principles, 
 are usually taken into consideration in the proof of 
 it : Whereas it is here treated of only as a matter of 
 fa6l. To explain this : That the three angles of a 
 triangle are equal to two right ones, is an abstradl 
 truth : but that they appear so to our mind, is only 
 a matter of fa(9:. And this last must have been ad- 
 mitted, if anything was, by those ancient sceptics, 
 who would not have admitted the former ; but pre- 
 tended to doubt, WTiether there were any such thing 
 as truth, or WTiether we could certainly depend upon 
 our faculties of understanding for the knowledge of 
 it, in any case. So Hkewise, that there is, in the 
 nature of things, an original standard of right and 
 wrong in actions, independent upon all will, but 
 which unalterably determines the will of God, to 
 exercise that moral government over the world which 
 Religion teaches, i. e. finally and upon the whole to 
 reward and punish men respectively as they acft 
 right or wrong; this af^ertion contains an abstract 
 truth, as well as matter of fadl:. But suppose in the 
 present state, every man, without exception, was re- 
 warded and punished, in exadl proportion, as he 
 
298 Objedions against arguing from Part 2. 
 
 followed ortransgrefted that sense of right and wrong, 
 which God has implanted in the nature of every 
 man : this would not be at all an abstract truth, but 
 only a matter of fa(^. And though this fa(5l were 
 acknowledged by every one ; yet the very same dif- 
 ficulties might be raised, as are now, concerning the 
 abstra(51: questions of liberty and moral fitnef^ : And 
 we should have a proof, even the certain one of ex- 
 perience, that the government of the world was per- 
 fe(?i;lv moral, without taking in the consideration of 
 those questions : and this proof would remain, in 
 what way soever they were determined. And thus, 
 God having given mankind a moral faculty, the ob- 
 je6l of which is actions, and which naturally approves 
 some a(?i;ions as right and of good desert, and con- 
 demns others as wrong, and of ill-desert ; that he 
 will, finally and upon the whole, reward the former 
 and punish the latter, is not an aftertion of an ab- 
 stract truth, but of what is as mere a fa(?l:, as his 
 doing so at present would be. This future fa6l I 
 have, not indeed proved with the force with which 
 it might be proved, from the principles of liberty and 
 moral fitneft ; but without them have given a really 
 conclusive pra(5lical proof of it, which is greatly 
 strengthened by the general Analogy of Nature : a 
 proof, easily cavilled at, easily shewn not to be de- 
 monstrative, for it is not offered as such ; but im- 
 poftible, I think, to be evaded or answered. And 
 thus the obligations of Religion are made out, ex- 
 clusively of the questions concerning liberty and 
 moral fitnei^ ; which have been perplexed v/ith dif- 
 ficulties and abstruse reasonings, as everything may. 
 Hence therefore may be observed distincftly, what 
 is the force of this treatise. It will be, to such as 
 are convinced of Religion upon the proof arising out 
 of the two last-mentioned principles, an additional 
 
Chap. 8. Analogy of Nature to Religion. 299 
 
 proof and a confirmation of it : To such as do not 
 admit those principles, an original proof of it,"* and a 
 confirmation of that proof. Those who believe, will 
 here find the scheme of Christianity cleared of ob- 
 je(flions, and the evidence of it in a peculiar manner 
 strengthened: Those who do not believe, will at 
 least be shewn the absurdity of all attempts to prove 
 Christianity false, the plain undoubted credibility of 
 it ; and, I hope, a good deal more. 
 
 And thus, though some perhaps may seriously 
 think, that Analogy, as here urged, has too great 
 streft laid upon it ; and ridicule, unanswerable ridi- 
 cule, may be applied, to shew the argument from it 
 in a disadvantageous light : yet there can be no 
 question, but that it is a real one. For Religion, 
 both natural and revealed, implying in it numerous 
 fa61:s ; Analogy, being a confirmation of all fa^ls to 
 which it can be applied, as it is the only proof of 
 most, cannot but be admitted by every one to be a 
 material thing, and truly of weight on the side of 
 Religion, both natural and revealed : And it ought 
 to be particularly regarded by such as profeft to 
 follow Nature, and to be left satisfied with abstradl 
 reasonings. 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 HATEVER account may be given, of 
 the strange inattention and disregard, 
 in some ages and countries, to a mat- 
 ter of such importance as Religion ; 
 it would, before experience, be in- 
 credible that there should be the like disregard in 
 
 * Pp. 118, &c. 
 
300 Conclusion. Part 2. 
 
 those, who have had the moral system of the world 
 laid before them, as it is by Christianity, and often 
 inculcated upon them : Because this moral system 
 carries in it a good degree of evidence for its truth, 
 upon its beingbarely proposed to our thoughts. There 
 is no need of abstruse reasonings and distinctions, to 
 convince an unprejudiced understanding, that there 
 is a God who made and governs the world, and will 
 judge it in righteousneft ; though they may be ne- 
 ceftary to answer abstruse difficulties, when once 
 such are raised : When the very meaning of those 
 words, which expref^ most intelligibly the general 
 dodirine of Religion, is pretended to be uncertain ; 
 and the clear truth of the thing itself is obscured, 
 by the intricacies of speculation. But to an unpre- 
 judiced mind, ten thousand thousand instances of 
 design, cannot but prove a designer. And it is in- 
 tuitively manifest, that creatures ought to live under 
 a dutiful sense of their Maker ; and that justice and 
 charity must be his laws, to creatures whom he has 
 made social, and placed in society, hideed the truth 
 of revealed Religion, peculiarly so called, is not self- 
 evident ; but requires external proof, in order to its 
 being received. Yet inattention, among us, to re- 
 vealed Religion, will be found to imply the same 
 dissolute immoral temper of mind, as inattention to 
 natural Religion : because, when both are laid before 
 us, in the manner they are in Christian countries of 
 liberty ; our obligations to enquire into both, and to 
 embrace both upon supposition of their truth, are 
 obligations of the same nature. For, Revelation 
 claims to be the voice of God : and our obligation 
 to attend to his voice, is, surely, moral in all cases. 
 And as it is insisted, that its evidence is conclusive, 
 upon thorough consideration of it ; so, it offers itself 
 to us with manifest obvious appearances of having 
 
Part 2. Conclusion. 301 
 
 something more than human in it, and therefore in 
 all reason requires, to have its claims most seriously 
 examined into. It is to be added, that though light 
 and knowledge, in what manner soever afforded us, 
 is equally from God ; yet a miraculous Revelation 
 has a peculiar tendency, from the first principles of 
 our nature, to awaken mankind, and inspire them 
 with reverence and awe : And this is a peculiar ob- 
 ligation, to attend to what claims to be so with such 
 appearances of truth. It is therefore most certain, 
 that our obligations to enquire seriously into the evi- 
 dence of Christianity, and, upon supposition of its 
 truth, to embrace it; are of the utmost importance, 
 and moral in the highest and most proper sense. 
 Let us then suppose, that the evidence of Religion 
 in general, and of Christianity, has been seriously 
 enquired into, by all reasonable men among us. Yet 
 we find many profefsedly to reje(?i: both, upon spe- 
 culative principles of infidelity. And all of them do 
 not content themselves with a bare neglect; of Re- 
 ligion, and enjoying their imaginary freedom fi-om 
 its restraints. Some go much beyond this. They 
 deride God's moral government over the world. They 
 renounce his protec'tion, and defy his justice. They 
 ridicule and vilify Christianity, and blaspheme the 
 Author of it ; and take all occasions to manifest a 
 scorn and contempt of Revelation. This amounts to 
 an adlive setting themselves against Religion ; to 
 what may be considered as a positive principle of 
 irreligion : which they cultivate within themselves, 
 and, whether they intend this effe6\ or not, render 
 habitual, as a good man does the contrary principle. 
 And others, who are not chargeable with all this pro- 
 fligateneft, yet, are in avowed opposition to Religion, 
 as if discovered to be groundleft. Now admitting, 
 which is the supposition we go upon, that these per- 
 
302 Conclusion. Part 2. 
 
 sons a<5l upon what they think principles of reason, 
 and otherwise they are not to be argued with ; it is 
 really inconceivable, that they should imagine they 
 clearly see the v/hole evidence of it, considered in 
 itself, to be nothing at all : Nor do they pretend this. 
 They are far indeed from having a just notion of its 
 evidence : but they would not say its evidence was 
 nothing, if they thought the system of it, with all its 
 circumstances, were credible, like other matters of 
 science or history. So that their manner of treating 
 it must proceed, either from such kind of obje(5lions 
 against all Religion, as have been answered or ob- 
 viated in the former part of this treatise ; or else from 
 obje(9;ions and difficulties, supposed more peculiar to 
 Christianity. Thus, they entertain prejudices against 
 the whole notion of a Revelation, and miraculous in- 
 terpositions. They find things in Scripture, whe- 
 ther in incidental passages, or in the general scheme 
 of it, which appear to them unreasonable. They take 
 for granted, that if Christianity were true, the light 
 of it must have been more general, and the evidence 
 of it more satisfactory, or rather overbearing : that 
 it must and would have been, in some way, other- 
 wise put and left, than it is. Now this is not imagin- 
 ing they see the evidence itself to be nothing, or in- 
 considerable ; but quite another thing. It is being 
 fortified against the evidence, in some degree ac- 
 knowledged, by thinking they see the system of 
 Christianity, or somewhat which appears to them 
 neceftarily conne(5led with it, to be incredible or 
 false : fortified against that evidence, which might, 
 otherwise, make great impreftion upon them. Or, 
 lastly, if any of these persons are, upon the whole, 
 in doubt concerning the truth of Christianity ; their 
 behaviour seems owing to their taking for granted, 
 through strange inattention, that such doubting is, 
 
Part 2. Conclusion. 303 
 
 in a manner, the same thing, as being certain against 
 it. 
 
 To these persons, and to this state of opinion con- 
 cerning Religion, the foregoing treatise is adapted. 
 For, all the general obje(?i:ions against the moral 
 system of Nature having been obviated, it is shewn, 
 that there is not any peculiar presumption at all 
 against Christianity, either considered as not dis- 
 coverable by reason, or as unlike to what is so dis- 
 covered ; nor any worth mentioning, against it as 
 miraculous, if any at all ; none certainly, which can 
 render it in the least incredible. It is shewn, that 
 upon supposition of a Divine Revelation, the Analogy 
 of Nature renders it beforehand highly credible, I 
 think probable, that many things in it must appear 
 liable to great obje(5lions ; and that we must be in- 
 competent judges of it, to a great degree. This 
 observation is, I think, unquestionably true, and of 
 the very utmost importance : But it is urged, as I 
 hope it will be understood, with great caution of not 
 vilifying the faculty of reason, which is the candle of 
 the Lord within us ;^ though it can afford no light 
 where it does not shine ; nor judge, where it has no 
 principles tojudge upon. The objections here spoken 
 of, being first answered in the view of objections 
 against Christianity as a matter of fa(ft, are in the 
 next place considered as urged, more immediately, 
 against the wisdom, justice and goodneft of the 
 Christian Dispensation. And it is fully made out, 
 that they admit of exa(ftly the like answer, in every 
 respe(ft, to what the like obje(5lions against the con- 
 stitution of Nature admit of: That, as partial views 
 give the appearance of wrong to things, which, upon 
 farther consideration and knowledge of their rela- 
 
 ' Prov. XX, 27. 
 
304 Conclusion. Part 2. 
 
 tions to other things, are found just and good ; so 
 it is perfectly credible, that the things objedled, 
 against the wisdom and goodneft of the Christian 
 Dispensation, may be rendered instances of wisdom 
 and goodnei^, by their reference to other things be- 
 yond our view : Because Christianity is a scheme 
 as much above our comprehension, as that of Na- 
 ture ; and like that, a scheme in which means are 
 made use of to accomplish ends, and which, as is 
 most credible, may be carried on by general laws. 
 And it ought to be attended to, that this is not an 
 answer taken, merely or chiefly, from our ignorance ; 
 but from somewhat positive, which our observation 
 shews us. For, to like obje(51:ions, the like answer 
 is experienced to be jufl, in numberlefs parallel cases. 
 The obje(?i;ions against the Christian Dispensation, 
 and the method by which it is carried on, having 
 been thus obviated, in general and together ; the 
 chief of them are considered distin<?l:ly, and the par- 
 ticular things obje(5^ed to are shewn credible, by 
 their perfect Analogy, each apart, to the constitu- 
 tion of Nature. Thus ; If man be fallen from his 
 primitive state, and to be restored, and infinite wis- 
 dom and power engages in accomplishing our re- 
 covery : it were to have been expelled it is said, 
 that this should have been effected at once ; and 
 not by such a long series of means, and such a va- 
 rious economy of persons and things ; one dispen- 
 sation preparatory to another, this to a farther one, 
 and so on through an indefinite number of ages, 
 before the end of the scheme proposed can be com- 
 pletely accomplished : a scheme conducted by in- 
 finite wisdom, and executed by almighty power. 
 But now on the contrary, our finding that every- 
 thing in the constitution and course of Nature is 
 thus carried on, shews such expectations concerning 
 
Part 2. Conclusion. 305 
 
 Revelation to be highly unreasonable ; and is a satis- 
 facflory answer to them, when urged as obje(5lions 
 against the credibility, that the great scheme of 
 Providence in the redemption of the world may be 
 of this kind, and to be accomplished in this manner. 
 As to the particular method of our redemption, the 
 appointment of a Mediator between God and man : 
 this has been shewn to be most obviously analogous 
 to the general condu^l of Nature, i. e. the God of 
 Nature, in appointing others to be the instruments 
 of his mercy, as we experience in the daily course 
 of Providence. The condition of this world, which 
 the do(5lrine of our redemption by Christ presup- 
 poses, so much falls in with natural appearances, that 
 heathen moralists inferred it from those appearances : 
 inferred, that human nature was fallen from its ori- 
 ginal re(5^itude, and, in consequence of this, degraded 
 from its primitive happineft. Or, however this opin- 
 ion came into the world, these appearances must 
 have kept up the tradition, and confirmed the belief 
 of it. And as it was the general opinion under the 
 light of Nature, that repentance and reformation, 
 alone and by itself, was not sufficient to do away sin, 
 and procure a full remiftion of the penalties annexed 
 to it ; and as the reason of the thing does not at all 
 lead to any such conclusion : So every day's expe- 
 rience shews us, that reformation is not, in any sort, 
 sufficient to prevent the present disadvantages and 
 miseries, which, in the natural course of things, God 
 has annexed to folly and extravagance. Yet there 
 may be ground to think, that the punishments, which, 
 by the general laws of Divine government, are an- 
 nexed to vice, may be prevented : that provision 
 may have been, even originally, made, that they 
 should be prevented by some means or other, though 
 they could not by reformation alone. For we have 
 
 X 
 
3o6 Conclusion. Part 2. 
 
 daily instances of such mercy, in the general condu(5l 
 of Nature : Compaf^ion provided for misery ,2 medi- 
 cines for diseases, friends against enemies. There 
 is provision made, in the original constitution of the 
 world, that much of the natural bad consequences 
 of our follies, which persons themselves alone cannot 
 prevent,may be prevented by the aftistance of others ; 
 aftistance, which Nature enables, and disposes, and 
 appoints them to afford. By a method of goodnei^ 
 analogous to this, when the world lay in wickednei^ 
 and consequently ruin, God so loved the world, that 
 he gave his only-begotten Son to save it: And he 
 being made perfeSi by suffering, became the author 
 of eternal salvation to all them that obey him.^ In- 
 deed neither reason nor Analogy would lead us to 
 think, in particular, that the interposition of Christ, 
 in the manner in which he did interpose, would be 
 of that efficacy for recovery of the world, which the 
 Scripture teaches us it was : But neither would rea- 
 son nor Analogy lead us to think, that other parti- 
 cular means would be of the efficacy, which expe- 
 rience shews they are, in numberlef^ instances. 
 And therefore, as the case before us does not admit 
 of experience ; so, that neither reason nor Analogy 
 can shew, how or in what particular way, the inter- 
 position of Christ, as revealed in Scripture, is of that 
 efficacy, which it is there represented to be ; this is 
 no kind nor degree of presumption against its being 
 really of that efficacy. Farther: The objections 
 against Christianity, from the light of it not being 
 universal, nor its evidence so strong as might pos- 
 sibly be given us, have been answered by the general 
 Analogy of Nature. That God has made such va- 
 
 2 Serm. at the Rolls, p. io6. 
 ' John iii. i6 j Heb. v. 9. 
 
Part 2. Conclusion. 307 
 
 riety of creatures, is indeed an answer to the former : 
 But that he dispenses his gifts in such variety, both 
 of degrees and kinds, amongst creatures, of the same 
 species, and even to the same individuals at different 
 times ; is a more obvious and full cinsvver to it. And 
 it is so far from being the method of Providence in 
 other cases, to afford us such overbearing evidence, 
 as some require in proof of Christianity ; that on the 
 contrary, the evidence upon which we are naturally 
 appointed to acl in common matters, throughout a 
 very great part of life, is doubtful in a high degree. 
 And admitting the facl, that God has afforded to 
 some, no more than doubtful evidence, of Religion ; 
 the same account may be given of it, as of difficul- 
 ties and temptations with regard to pra(5lice. But 
 as it is not impof^ible,^ surely, that this alleged 
 doubtfulnef^ may be men's own fault; it deserves 
 their most serious consideration, whether it be not 
 so. However, it is certain, that doubting implies a 
 degree of evidence for that, of which we doubt : and 
 that this degree of evidence, as really lays us under 
 obligations, as demonstrative evidence. 
 
 The whole then of Religion is throughout credible : 
 Nor is there, I think, anything relating to the re- 
 vealed dispensation of things, more different from 
 the experienced constitution and course of Nature, 
 than some parts of the constitution of Nature are 
 from other parts of it. And if so, the only question 
 which remains, is, what positive evidence can be 
 alleged for the truth of Christianity. This too in 
 general has been considered, and the obje(5lions 
 against it estimated. Deducl: therefore what is to be 
 dedudled from that evidence, upon account of any 
 weight which may be thought to remain in these 
 
 « Pp. 238, &c. 
 
3o8 Conclusion. Part 2. 
 
 objections, after what the Analogy of Nature has 
 suggested in answer to them: and then consider, 
 what are the practical consequences from all this, 
 upon the most sceptical principles, one can argue 
 upon: (for I am writing to persons who entertain 
 these principles :) And upon such consideration, it 
 will be obvious, that immorality, as little excuse as 
 it admits of in itself, is greatly aggravated, in persons 
 who have been made acquainted with Christianity, 
 whether they believe it, or not : Because the moral 
 system of Nature, or natural Religion, which Chris- 
 tianity lays before us, approves itself, almost intui- 
 tively, to a reasonable mind upon seeing it proposed. 
 In the next place, with regard to Christianity, it will 
 be observed ; that there is a middle, between a full 
 satisfaction of the truth of it, and a satisfaction of the 
 contrary. The middle state of mind between these 
 two, consists in a serious apprehension, that it may 
 be true ; joined with doubt, whether it be so. And 
 this, upon the best judgment I am able to make, is 
 as far towards speculative infidelity, as any sceptic, 
 can at all be supposed to go, who has had true 
 Christianity, with the proper evidence of it, laid be- 
 fore him, and has in any tolerable measure consi- 
 dered them. For I would not be mistaken to com- 
 prehend all, who have ever heard of it : Because it 
 seems evident that in many countries, called Chris- 
 tian, neither Christianity, nor its evidence are fairly 
 laid before men. And in places where both are, 
 there appear to be some, who have very little at- 
 tended to either, and who reject Christianity with a 
 scorn proportionate to their inattention ; and yet are 
 by no means without understanding in other matters. 
 Now it has been shewn, that a serious apprehension 
 that Christianity may be true, lays persons under 
 the strictest obligations of a serious regard to it. 
 
Part 2. Conclusion. 309 
 
 throughout the whole of their life : a regard not the 
 same exactly, but in many respects nearly the same, 
 with what a full convi(5lion of its truth would lay 
 them under. Lastly, it will appear, that blasphemy 
 and profanenef^, I mean with regard to Christianity, 
 are absolutely without excuse. For there is no temp- 
 tation to it, but from the wantonnef^ of vanity or 
 mirth : And these, considering the infinite import- 
 cince of the subje(?l:, are no such temptations as to 
 afford any excuse for it. If this be a just account of 
 things, and yet men can go on to vilify or disregard 
 Christianity, which is to talk and a(5l, as if they had 
 a demonstration of its falsehood ; there is no reason 
 to think they would alter their behaviour to any 
 purpose, though there were a demonstration of its 
 truth. 
 
 The End of the Second Part, 
 
TWO BRIEF DISSERTATIONS. 
 
 I. OF PERSONAL IDENTITY. 
 II. OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. 
 
ADVERTISEMENT. 
 
 In the first copy of these papers ^ I had inserted the 
 two following Dijlertations into the chapters Of a 
 Future Life, and. Of the Moral Government of God, 
 with which they are closely conneSied. But as they 
 do not direSily fall under the title of the foregoing 
 treatise, and would have kept the subje6i of it too 
 long out of sight ; it seemed more proper to place 
 them by themselves. 
 
DISSERTATION I. 
 
 Of personal Identity. 
 
 HETHER we are to live in a future 
 state, as it is the most important ques- 
 tion which can pof^ibly be asked, so 
 it is the most intelligible one which 
 can be exprefted in lan^age. Yet 
 strange perplexities have been raised about the 
 meaning of that identity or samenei^ of person, which 
 is implied in the notion of our living now and here- 
 after, or in any two succef^ive moments. And the 
 solution of these difficulties hath been stranger, than 
 the difficulties themselves. For, personal identity 
 has been explained so by some, as to render the en- 
 quiry concerning a future life, of no consequence at 
 all to us the persons who are making it. And though 
 few men can be misled by such subtleties ; yet it 
 may be proper a little to consider them. 
 
 Now when it is asked, Wherein personal identity 
 consists, the answer should be the same, as if it were 
 asked, wherein consists similitude or equality ; that 
 all attempts to define, would but perplex it. Yet 
 there is no difficulty at all in ascertaining the idea. 
 For as, upon two triangles being compared or viewed 
 together, there arises to the mind the idea of simi- 
 
314 Of personal Identity. D'lfs. i. 
 
 litude ; or upon twice two and four, the idea of 
 equality : so likewise, upon comparing the conscious- 
 neftes of one's self or one's own existence in any two 
 moments, there as immediately arises to the mind 
 the idea of personal identity. And as the two former 
 comparisons not only give us the ideas of similitude 
 and equality ; but also shew us, that two triangles 
 are alike, and twice two and four are equal : so the 
 latter comparison not only gives us the idea of per- 
 sonal identity, but also shews us the identity of our- 
 selves in those two moments ; the present, suppose, 
 and that immediately past ; or the present, and that, 
 a month, a year, or twenty years past. Or in other 
 words, by refle(^ing upon that, which is myself now, 
 and that, which was myself twenty years ago, I dis- 
 cern they are not two, but one and the same self. 
 
 But though consciousneft of what is past does 
 thus ascertain our personal identity to ourselves, yet 
 to say, that it makes personal identity, or is neces- 
 sary to our being the same persons, is to say, that a 
 person has not existed a single moment, nor done 
 one action, but what he can remember ; indeed none 
 but what he refle(5ls upon. And one should really 
 think it self-evident, that consciousneft of personal 
 identity presupposes, and therefore cannot consti- 
 tute, personal identity ; any more than knowledge, 
 in any other case, can constitute truth, which it pre- 
 supposes. 
 
 This wonderful mistake may poftibly have arisen 
 from hence, that to be endued with consciousnei^, 
 is inseparable from the idea of a person, or intelligent 
 being. For, this might be exprefted inaccurately 
 thus, that consciousnef^ makes personality : And 
 from hence it might be concluded to make personal 
 identity. But though present consciousnei^ of what 
 we at present do and feel, is neceftary to our being 
 
Difs. I. Of personal Identity. 315 
 
 the persons we now are ; yet present consciousneft 
 of past actions or feelings, is not neceftary to our 
 being the same persons who performed those acftions 
 or had those feelings. 
 
 The enquiry, what makes vegetables the same in 
 the common acceptation of the word, does not ap- 
 pear to have any relation to this of personal identity : 
 because the word, same, when applied to them and 
 to person, is not only applied to different subjects, 
 but it is also used in different senses. For when a 
 man swears to the same tree, as having stood fifty 
 years in the same place, he means only the same as 
 to all the purposes of property and uses of common 
 life, and not that the tree has been all that time the 
 same in the stricft philosophical sense of the word. 
 For he does not know, whether any one particle of 
 the present tree, be the same with any one particle 
 of the tree which stood in the same place fifty years 
 ago. And if they have not one common particle of 
 matter, they cannot be the same tree in the proper 
 philosophic sense of the word same: it being evi- 
 dently a contradi(5lion in terms, to say they are, when 
 no part of their substance, and no one of their pro- 
 perties is the same : no part of their substance, by 
 the supposition : no one of their properties, because 
 it is allowed, that the same property cannot be trans- 
 ferred from one substance to another. And there- 
 fore, when we say the identity or samenef^ of a plant 
 consists in a continuation of the same life, commu- 
 nicated under the same organization, to a number of 
 particles of matter, whether the same or not ; the 
 word same, when applied to life and to organization, 
 cannot pofsibly be understood to signify, what it sig- 
 nifies in this very sentence, when applied to matter. 
 In a loose and popular sense then, the life and the 
 organization and the plant are justly said to be the 
 
3i6 Of personal Identity. D'lfs, i. 
 
 same, notwithstanding- the perpetual change of the 
 parts. But in a stri^l and philosophical manner of 
 speech, no man, no being, no mode of being, no 
 anything, can be the same with that, with which it 
 hath indeed nothing the same. Now samenef^ is 
 used in this latter sense when applied to persons. 
 The identity of these, therefore, cannot subsist with 
 diversity of substance. 
 
 The thing here considered, and, demonstratively, 
 as I think, determined, is proposed by Mr. Locke in 
 these words, Whether it, i.e. the same self or per- 
 son, he the same identical substance? And he has 
 suggested what is a much better answer to the ques- 
 tion, than that which he gives it in form. For he 
 defines person, a thinking intelligent being, &c. and 
 personal identity, the samenejl of a rational being,^ 
 The question then is, whether the same rational 
 being is the same substance : which needs no an- 
 swer, because being and substance, in this place, 
 stand for the same idea. The ground of the doubt, 
 whether the same person be the same substance, is 
 said to be this ; that the consciousneft of our own 
 existence, in youth and in old age, or in any two 
 joint succe{^ive moments, is not the same individual 
 a6iion,~ i.e. not the same consciousnef^, but different 
 succeftive consciousneftes. Now it is strange that 
 this should have occasioned such perplexities. For 
 it is surely conceivable, that a person may have a 
 capacity of knowing some object or other to be the 
 same now, which it was when he contemplated it 
 formerly : Yet in this case, where, by the supposi- 
 tion, the obje6l is perceived to be the same, the per- 
 ception of it in any two moments cannot be one and 
 the same perception. And thus, though the suc- 
 
 ' Locke's Works, vol. I. p. 146. ' Locke ^ pp. 146, 147. 
 
Difs. I, Of personal Identity. 317 
 
 ceftive consciousneftes which we have of our own 
 existence are not the same, yet are they conscious- 
 neftes of one and the same thing or object ; of the 
 same person, self, or living agent. The person, of 
 whose existence the consciousneft is felt now, and 
 was felt an hour or a year ago, is discerned to be, 
 not two persons, but one and the same person ; and 
 therefore is one and the same. 
 
 Mr. Locke's observations upon this subject: appear 
 hasty : and he seems to profeft himself difsatisfied 
 with suppositions, which he has made relating to it.^ 
 But some of those hasty observations have been car- 
 ried to a strange length by others, whose notion, 
 when traced and examined to the bottom, amounts, 
 I think, to this :^ " That personality is not a perma- 
 *^ nent, but a transient thing : That it lives and dies, 
 " begins and ends continually : That no one can any 
 "^ more remain one and the same person two mo- 
 " ments together, than two succef^ive moments can 
 " be one and the same moment : That our substance 
 " is indeed continually changing ; but whether this 
 " be so or not, is, it seems, nothing to the purpose ; 
 " since it is not substance, but consciousneft alone, 
 " which constitutes personality ; which conscious- 
 " neft, being succeftive, cannot be the same in any 
 " two moments, nor consequently the personality 
 " constituted by it." And from hence it must fol- 
 low, that it is a fallacy upon ourselves, to charge our 
 present selves with anything we did, or to imagine 
 our present selves interested in anything which be- 
 fell us, yesterday ; or that our present self will be 
 interested in what will befall us to-morrow: since 
 our present self is not, in reality, the same with the 
 
 ^ Locke, p. 152. 
 
 * See an Answer to Dr. Clarke's Third Defence of his Letter 
 to Mr. Dodivell, 2nd edit. pp. 44, 56, &c. 
 
3i8 Of personal Identity. Difs. i. 
 
 self of yesterday, but another like self or person 
 coming in its room, and mistaken for it ; to which 
 another self will succeed to-morrow. This, I say, 
 must follow : for if the self or person of to-day, and 
 that of to-morrow, are not the same, but only like 
 persons ; the person of to-day, is really no more in- 
 terested in what will befall the person of to-morrow, 
 than in what will befall any other person. It may 
 be thought perhaps, that this is not a just represen- 
 tation of the opinion we are speaking of: because 
 those who maintain it allow, that a person is the 
 same as far back as his remembrance reaches. And 
 indeed they do use the words, identity and same 
 person. Nor will language permit these words to 
 be laid aside : since if they were, there must be, I 
 know not what ridiculous periphrasis, substituted in 
 the room of them. But they cannot, consistently 
 with themselves, mean, that the person is really the 
 same. For, it is self-evident, that the personality 
 cannot be really the same, if, as they expreftly as- 
 sert, that in which it consists, is not the same. And 
 as, consistently with themselves, they cannot, so, I 
 think it appears, they do not, mean, that the person 
 is really the same, but only that he is so in a fic- 
 titious sense : in such a sense only as they aftert, 
 for this they do af^ert, that any number of persons 
 whatever may be the same person. The bare un- 
 folding this notion, and laying it thus naked and open, 
 seems the best confutation of it. However, since 
 great streft is said to be put upon it, I add the fol- 
 lowing things. 
 
 First, This notion is absolutely contradi(fl:ory to 
 that certain conviction, which neceftarily and every 
 moment rises within us, when we turn our thoughts 
 upon ourselves, when we reflect upon what is past, 
 and look forward upon what is to come. All imagi- 
 
Difs. I. Of personal Identity. 319 
 
 nation of a daily change of that living- agent which 
 each man calls himself, for another, or of any such 
 change throughout our whole present life, is entirely 
 borne down by our natural sense of things. Nor is 
 it poftible for a person in his wits, to alter his con- 
 ducfl;, with regard to his health or affairs, from a sus- 
 picion, that though he should live to-morrow, he 
 should not however, be the same person he is to-day. 
 And yet, if it be reasonable to ac^, with respedl to a 
 future life, upon this notion that personality is tran- 
 sient ; it is reasonable to a(9; upon it, with respecl to 
 the present. Here then is a notion equally applicable 
 to Religion and to our temporal concerns : And every 
 one sees and feels the inexpreftible absurdity of it in 
 the latter case. If therefore any can take up with 
 it in the former, this cannot proceed from the reason 
 of the thing, but must be owing to an inward un- 
 faimeft, and secret corruption of heart. 
 
 Secondly, It is not an idea, or abstract notion, or 
 quality, but a being only, which is capable of life 
 and a^lion, of happineft and misery. Now all beings 
 confeftedly continue the same, during the whole 
 time of their existence. Consider then a living being 
 now existing, and which has existed for any time 
 alive : this living being must have done and suffered 
 and enjoyed, what it has done and suffered and en- 
 joyed formerly, (this living being, I say, and not 
 another,) as really as it does and suffers and enjoys, 
 what it does and suffers and enjoys this instant. All 
 these succef^ive ad^ions, enjoyments, and sufferings, 
 are acflions, enjoyments, and sufferings, of the same 
 living being. And they are so, prior to all consi- 
 deration of its remembering or forgetting : since re- 
 membering or forgetting can make no alteration in 
 the truth of past matter of fact. And suppose this 
 being endued with limited powers of knowledge and 
 
320 Of personal Identity. Difs. i, 
 
 memory, there is no more difficulty in conceiving it 
 to have a power, of knowing itself to be the same 
 living being which it was some time ago, of remem- 
 bering some of its a(5lions, sufferings, and enjoy- 
 ments, and forgetting others, than in conceiving it to 
 know or remember or forget anything else. 
 
 Thirdly, Every person is conscious, that he is now 
 the same person or self he was, as far back as his 
 remembrance reaches : since when any one refle<?ts 
 upon a past action of his own, he is just as certain 
 of the person who did that ac^tion, namely, himself, 
 the person who now reflects upon it, as he is certain 
 that the a<$l;ion was at all done. Nay, very often a 
 person's afturance of an acflion having been done, of 
 which he is absolutely aftured, arises wholly from 
 the consciousneft that he himself did it. And this 
 he, person, or self, must either be a substance, or 
 the property of some substance. If he, if person, 
 be a substance ; then consciousneft that he is the 
 same person, is consciousnef^ that he is the same 
 substance. If the person, or he, be the property of 
 a substance ; still consciousnef^ that he is the same 
 property is as certain a proof that his substance re- 
 mains the same, as consciousnef^ that he remains the 
 same substance would be : since the same property 
 cannot be transferred from one substance to another. 
 
 But though we are thus certain, that we are the 
 same agents, living beings, or substances, now, which 
 we were as far back as our remembrance reaches ; 
 yet it is asked. Whether we may not pof^ibly be de- 
 ceived in it ? And this question may be asked at the 
 end of any demonstration whatever : because it is a 
 question concerning the truth of perception by me- 
 mory. And he who can doubt, whether perception 
 by memory can in this case be depended upon, may 
 doubt also, whether perception by dedud^ion and 
 
Difs. I. Of personal Identity. 321 
 
 reasoning, which also include memory, or indeed 
 whether intuitive perception can. Here then we 
 can go no farther. For it is ridiculous to attempt to 
 prove the truth of those perceptions, whose truth we 
 can no otherwise prove, than by other perceptions 
 of exacflly the same kind with them, and which there 
 is just the same ground to suspect ; or to attempt 
 to prove the truth of our faculties, which can no 
 otherwise be proved, than by the use or means of 
 those very suspedled faculties themselves. 
 
 DISSERTATION II. 
 
 Of the Nature of Virtue. 
 
 7, HAT which renders beings capable of 
 moral government, is their having a 
 moral nature, and moral faculties of 
 perception and of adlion. Brute crea- 
 tures are imprefsed and a6^uated by 
 
 various instinc9;s and propensions : so also are we. 
 But additional to this, we have a capacity of refle(5l- 
 ing upon a(51ions and characfiers, and making them 
 an objecl to our thought : And on doing this, we 
 naturally and unavoidably approve some a(5lions, 
 under the peculiar view of their being virtuous and 
 of good desert ; and disapprove others, as vicious 
 and of ill-desert. That we have this moral approv- 
 ing and disapproving' faculty, is certain from our 
 
 * This way of speaking is taken from EpiBetus (Arr. Epift. 
 L. I. c. i), and is made use of as seeming the most full, and 
 least liable to cavil. And the moral faculty may be understood 
 to have these two epithets, t^o/cz/yaoTtic^ and a.7ro£oKifxa(TTiKri, 
 upon a double account: Because, upon a survey of adtions, 
 Y 
 
322 Of the Nature of Virtue. Difs. 2, 
 
 experiencing it in ourselves, and recognizing it in 
 each other. It appears from our exercising it un- 
 avoidably, in the approbation and disapprobation 
 even of feigned characfters : From the words, right 
 and w^rong, odious and amiable, base and worthy, 
 with many others of like signification in all lan- 
 guages, applied to a(51:ions and characters : From 
 the many written systems of morals which suppose 
 it ; since it cannot be imagined, that all these authors, 
 throughout all these treatises, had absolutely no 
 meaning at all to their words, or a meaning merely 
 chimerical : From our natural sense of gratitude, 
 which implies a distin(51;ion between merely being 
 the instrument of good, and intending it : From the 
 like distin(5lion, every one makes, between injury 
 and mere harm, which, Hobbs says, is peculiar to 
 mankind ; and between injury and just punishment, 
 a distin(?lion plainly natural, prior to the considera- 
 tion of human laws. It is manifest great part of 
 common language, and of common behaviour over 
 the world, is formed upon supposition of such a mo- 
 ral faculty ; whether called conscience, moral rea- 
 son, moral sense, or Divine reason ; whether consi- 
 dered as a sentiment of the understanding, or as a 
 perception of the heart, or, vvhich seems the truth, 
 as including both. Nor is it at all doubtful in the ge- 
 neral, what course of a(9:ion this faculty, or pra6lical 
 discerning power within us, approves, and what it 
 
 whether before or after they are done, it determines them to be 
 good or evil j and also because it determines itself to be the 
 guide of adtion and of life, in contradistinftion from all other 
 faculties, or natural principles of adlion : in the very same man- 
 ner, as speculative reason dire^lly and naturally judges of spe- 
 culative truth and falsehood j and, at the same time, is attended 
 with a consciousnefs upon refieBion, that the natural right to 
 judge of them belongs to it. 
 
Dtfs.2. Of the Nature of Virtue. 323 
 
 disapproves. For, as much as it has been disputed 
 wherein virtue consists, or whatever ground for 
 doubt there may be about particulars ; yet, in ge- 
 neral, there is in reality an universally acknowledged 
 standard of it. It is that, which all ages and all 
 countries have made profef^ion of in public : it is 
 that, which every man you meet, puts on the show 
 of: it is that, which the primary and fundamental 
 laws of all civil constitutions, over the face of the 
 earth, make it their businei^ and endeavour to en- 
 force the pra(5lice of upon mankind : namely, justice, 
 veracity, and regard to common good. It being 
 manifest then, in general, that we have such a faculty 
 or discernment as this ; it may be of use to remark 
 some things, more distinctly, concerning it. 
 
 Firsts It ought to be observed, that the obje(5l of 
 thiis faculty is actions,'- comprehending under that 
 name a(Sii\e or practical principles : those principles 
 from which men would a<fl:, if occasions and circum- 
 stances gave them power; and which, when fixed 
 and habitual in any person, we call, his characfter. 
 It does not appear, that brutes have the least reflex 
 sense of a(5lions, as distinguished from events : or 
 that will and design, which constitute the very na- 
 ture of a(5lions as such, are at all an objedl to their 
 perception. But to ours they are : And they are 
 the object:, and the only one, of the approving and 
 disapproving faculty. A(Si\ng, condu(fi:, behaviour, 
 abstratfled from all regard to what is, in fa6l and 
 event, the consequence of it, is itself the natural ob- 
 ject of the moral discernment ; as speculative truth 
 and falsehood is, of speculative reason. Intention of 
 such and such consequences, indeed, is always in- 
 
 M. Auton. L. 9, 16. Virtutis laus omnis in adlione consibtic. 
 Cic. Off. L. I. c. 6. 
 
324 Of the Nature of Virtue. Difs. 2. 
 
 eluded ; for it is part of the a(?i;ion itself: but though 
 the intended good or bad consequences do not fol- 
 low, we have exa(5lly the same sense of the action 
 as if they did. In like manner we think well or ill 
 of characflers, abstracted from all consideration of the 
 good or the evil, which persons of such chara(5lers 
 have it a(?i:ually in their power to do. We never, in 
 the moral way, applaud or blame either ourselves or 
 others, for what we enjoy or what we suffer, or for 
 having impreftions made upon us which we consider 
 as altogether out of our power : but only for what 
 we do, or would have done had it been in our power ; 
 or for what we leave undone which we might have 
 done, or would have left undone though we could 
 have done it. 
 
 Secondly, Our sense or discernment of a(9;ions as 
 morally good or evil, implies in it a sense or dis- 
 cernment of them as of good or ill desert. It may 
 be difficult to explain this perception, so as to answer 
 all the questions which may be asked concerning it : 
 But every one speaks of such and such a6lions as 
 deserving punishment ; and it is not, I suppose, pre- 
 tended that they have absolutely no meaning at all 
 to the expreftion. Now the meaning plainly is not, 
 that we conceive it for the good of society, that the 
 doer of such a(5lions should be made to suffer. For 
 if unhappily it were resolved, that a man who, by 
 some innocent a(?l:ion, was infected with the plague, 
 should be left to perish, lest, by other peoples' com- 
 ing near him, the infection should spread : no one 
 would say, he deserved this treatment. Innocence 
 and ill-desert, are inconsistent ideas. Ill-desert al- 
 ways supposes guilt : and if one be not part of the 
 other, yet they are evidently and naturally connecfled 
 in our mind. The sight of a man in misery raises 
 our companion towards him ; and, if this misery be 
 
D'ifs.1. Of the Nature of Virtue. 3^5 
 
 infli(fi:ed on him by another, our indignation against 
 the author of it. But when we are informed, that 
 the sufferer is a villain, and is punished only for his 
 treachery or cruelty ; our compafsion exceedingly 
 lei^ens, and, in many instances, our indignation 
 wholly subsides. Now what produces this effe(5l, is 
 the conception of that in the sufferer, which we call 
 ill-desert. Upon considering then, or viewing to- 
 gether, our notion of vice and that of misery, there 
 results a third, that of ill-desert. And thus there is 
 in human creatures an afsociation of the two ideas, 
 natural and moral evil, wickednef^ and punishment. 
 If this afsociation were merely artificial or accidental, 
 it were nothing : but being most unquestionably na- 
 tural, it greatly concerns us to attend to it, instead 
 of endeavouring to explain it away. 
 
 It may be observed farther, concerning our per- 
 ception of good and of ill-desert, that the former is 
 very weak with respe6^ to common instances of virtue. 
 One reason of which may be, that it does not appear 
 to a speculator, how far such instances of virtue pro- 
 ceed from a virtuous principle, or in what degree 
 this principle is prevalent : since a very weak regard 
 to virtue may be sufficient to make men acl well in 
 many common instances. And on the other hand, 
 our perception of ill-desert in vicious actions lef^ens, 
 in proportion to the temptations men are thought 
 to have had to such vices. For, vice in human crea- 
 tures consisting chiefly in the absence or want of the 
 virtuous principle ; though a man be overcome, sup- 
 pose, by tortures, it does not from thence appear, 
 to what degree the virtuous principle was wanting. 
 Ail that appears is, that he had it not in such a de- 
 gree, as to prevail over the temptation : But pol^ibly 
 he had it in a degree, which would have rendered 
 him proof against common temptations. 
 
326 Of the Nature of Virtue. D'tfs. 1. 
 
 Thirdly, Our perception of vice and ill-desert 
 arises from, and is the result of, a comparison of ac- 
 tions with the nature and capacities of the agent. 
 For, the mere neglect; of doing what we ought to 
 do, would, in many cases, be determined by all men 
 to be in the highest degree vicious. And this de- 
 termination must arise from such comparison, and 
 be the result of it ; because such neglecfl would not 
 be vicious in creatures of other natures and capa- 
 cities, as brutes. And it is the same also with re- 
 spect; to positive vices, or such as consist in doing 
 what we ought not. For, every one has a different 
 sense of harm done by an idiot, madman or child, 
 and by one of mature and common understanding ; 
 though the a61ion of both, including the intention 
 which is part of the a(?i;ion, be the same : as it may 
 be, since idiots and madmen, as well as children, are 
 capable not only of doing mischief, but also of intend- 
 ing it. Now this difference must arise fiom some- 
 what discerned in the nature or capacities of one, 
 which renders the a(fl:ion vicious ; and the want of 
 which in the other, renders the same a^lion innocent 
 or lef^ vicious : And this plainly supposes a com- 
 parison, whether reflected upon or not, between the 
 a<9;ion and capacities of the agent, previous to our 
 determining an a(?i;ion to be vicious. And hence 
 arises a proper application of the epithets, incon- 
 gruous, unsuitable, disproportionate, unfit, to ac^tions 
 which our moral faculty determines to be vicious. 
 
 Fourthly, It deserves to be considered, whether 
 men are more at liberty, in point of morals, to make 
 themselves miserable without reason, than to make 
 other people so : or difsolutely to neglecfl their own 
 greater good, for the sake of a present lef^er grati- 
 fication, than they are to negle(fl; the good of others, 
 whom Nature has committed to their care. It should 
 
Difs,2. Of the Nature of Virtue. 327 
 
 seem, that a due concern about our own interest or 
 happineft, and a reasonable endeavour to secure and 
 promote it, which is, I think very much the mean- 
 ing of the word, prudence, in our language ; it should 
 seem, that this is virtue, and the contrary behaviour 
 faulty and blameable : Since, in the calmest way of 
 refle(fi:ion, we approve of the first, and condemn the 
 other conduct:, both in ourselves and others. This 
 approbation and disapprobation are altogether dif- 
 ferent from mere desire of our own or of their hap- 
 pineft, and from sorrow upon mifsing it. For the 
 obje(51; or occasion of this last kind of perception, is 
 satisfaction, or uneasinefs : whereas the object of the 
 first is a(?live behaviour. In one case, what our 
 thoughts fix upon, is our condition : in the other, 
 our condu(?t:. It is true indeed, that Nature has not 
 given us so sensible a disapprobation of imprudence 
 and folly, either in ourselves or others, as of false- 
 hood, injustice and cruelty : I suppose, because that 
 constant habitual sense of private interest and good, 
 which we alwaj's carry about with us, render such 
 sensible disapprobation lef^ necefsary, left wanting, 
 to keep us from imprudently neglecting our own 
 happineft, and foolishly injuring ourselves, than it is 
 neceftary and wanting to keep us from injuring 
 others, to whose good we cannot have so strong and 
 constant a regard : And also because imprudence 
 and folly, appearing to bring its own punishment 
 more immediately and constantly than injurious be- 
 haviour, it left needs the additional punishment, 
 which would be inflic-led upon it by others, had they 
 the same sensible indignation against it, as against 
 injustice and fraud and cruelty. Besides, unhappi- 
 neft being in itself the natural object of compaftion ; 
 the unhappineft whicli people bring upon themselves, 
 though it be wilfully, excites in us some pity for 
 
328 Of the Nature of Virtue. Difs.i. 
 
 them : and this of course leftens our displeasure 
 against them. But still it is matter of experience, 
 that we are formed so, as to refle61 very severely 
 upon the greater instances of imprudent negle<5ls 
 and foolish rashnefs, both in ourselves and others. 
 In instances of this kind, men often say of them- 
 selves with remorse, and of others with some indig- 
 nation, that they deserved to suffer such calamities, 
 because they brought them upon themselves, and 
 would not take warning. Particularly when persons 
 come to poverty and distref^ by a long course of ex- 
 travagance, and after frequent admonitions, though 
 without falsehood or injustice ; we plainly do not 
 regard such people as alike obje^ls of compafsion 
 with those, who are brought into the same condition 
 by unavoidable accidents. From these things it 
 appears, that prudence is a species of virtue, and 
 folly of vice : meaning hy folly, somewhat quite dif- 
 ferent from mere incapacity ; a thoughtlef^ want of 
 that regard and attention to our own happineft, which 
 we had capacity for. And this the word properly 
 includes ; and, as it seems, in its usual acceptation ; 
 for we scarce apply it to brute creatures. 
 
 However, if any person be disposed to dispute 
 the matter, I shall very willingly give him up the 
 words virtue and vice, as not applicable to prudence 
 and folly ; but must beg leave to insist, that the fa- 
 culty within us, which is the judge of actions, ap- 
 proves of prudent a(5iions, and disapproves imprudent 
 ones ; I say prudent and imprudent afiions as such, 
 and considered distin(9:ly from the happinef^ or mi- 
 sery which the^?^ occasion. And by the way, this 
 observation may help to determine, what justneft 
 there is in that obje(5lion against Religion, that it 
 teaches us to be interested and selfish. 
 
 Fifthly, Without enquiring how far, and in what 
 
Difs. 2. Of the Nature of Virtue. 329 
 
 sense, virtue is resolvable into benevolence, and vice 
 into the want of it ; it may be proper to observe, 
 that benevolence and the want of it, singly consi- 
 dered, are in no sort the whole of virtue and vice. 
 For if this were the case, in the review of one's own 
 character or that of others, our moral understanding 
 and moral sense would be indifferent to everything, 
 but the degrees in which benevolence prevailed, and 
 the degrees in which it was wanting. That is, we 
 should neither approve of benevolence to some per- 
 sons rather than to others, nor disapprove injustice 
 and falsehood upon any other account, than merely 
 as an overbalance of happinef^ was foreseen likely to 
 be produced by the first, and of misery by the se- 
 cond. But now, on the contrary, suppose two men 
 competitors for anything whatever, which would be 
 of equal advantage to each of them : Though no- 
 thing indeed would be more impertinent, than for a 
 stranger to busy himself to get one of them preferred 
 to the other ; yet such endeavour would be virtue, 
 in behalf of a friend or benefactor, abstracted from 
 all consideration of distant consequences : as that 
 examples of gratitude, and the cultivation of friend- 
 ship, would be of general good to the world. Again, 
 suppose one man should, by fraud or violence, take 
 from another the fruit of his labour, with intent to 
 give it to a third, who, he thought, would have as 
 much pleasure from it, as would balance the pleasure 
 which the first pof^efsor would have had in the en- 
 joyment, and his vexation in the lof^ of it ; suppose 
 also that no bad consequences would follow : yet such 
 an action would surely be vicious. Nay, farther, 
 were treachery, violence and injustice, no otherwise 
 vicious, than as foreseen likely to produce an over- 
 balance of misery to society ; then, if in any case a 
 man could procure to himself as great advantage by 
 
330 Of the Nature of Virtue. Difs.i. 
 
 an a(5t of injustice, as the whole foreseen inconve- 
 nience, likely to be brought upon others by it, would 
 amount to ; such a piece of injustice would not be 
 faulty or vicious at all : Because it would be no more 
 than, in any other case, for a man to prefer his own 
 satisfaction to another's in equal degrees. The fadl 
 then appears to be, that we are constituted so as to 
 condemn falsehood, unprovoked violence, injustice, 
 and to approve of benevolence to some preferably to 
 others, abstracted from all consideration, which con- 
 duct is likeliest to produce an overbalance of happi- 
 nei^ or misery. And therefore, were the Author of 
 nature to propose nothing to himself as an end but 
 the produ(5lion of happinef^, were his moral charac^ter 
 merely that of benevolence ; yet ours is not so. 
 Upon that supposition indeed, the only reason of his 
 giving us the abovementioned approbation of bene- 
 volence to some persons rather than others, and dis- 
 approbation of falsehood, unprovoked violence, and 
 injustice, must be, that he foresaw, this constitution 
 of our nature would produce more happinef^, than 
 forming us with a temper of mere general benevo- 
 lence. But still, since this is our constitution ; false- 
 hood, violence, injustice, must be vice in us, and 
 benevolence to some preferably to others, virtue ; 
 abstra(51ed from all consideration of the overbalance 
 of evil or good, which they may appear likely to 
 produce. 
 
 Now if human creatures are endued with such a 
 moral nature as we have been explaining, or with a 
 moral faculty, the natural object of which is a(51ions : 
 moral government must consist, in rendering them 
 happy and unhappy, in rewarding and punishing 
 them, as they follow, neglecft, or depart from, the 
 moral rule of adiion interwoven in their nature, or 
 
Difs. 2. Of the Nature of Virtue. 331 
 
 suggested and enforced by this moral faculty;^ in 
 rewarding and punishing them upon account of their 
 so doing. 
 
 I am not sensible, that I have, in this fifth obser- 
 vation, contradicted what any author designed to as- 
 sert. But some of great and distinguished merit, 
 have, I think, exprei^ed themselves in a manner, 
 which may occasion some danger to careleft readers, 
 of imagining the whole of virtue to consist in singly 
 aiming, according to the best of their judgment, at 
 promoting the happinef^ of mankind in the present 
 state ; and the whole of vice, in doing what they 
 foresee, or might foresee, is likely to produce an 
 overbalance of unhappineft in it : than which mis- 
 takes, none can be conceived more terrible. For it 
 is certain, that some of the most shocking instances 
 of injustice, adultery, murder, perjury, and even of 
 persecution, may, in many supposable cases, not 
 have the appearance of being likely to produce an 
 overbalance of misery in the present state : perhaps 
 sometimes may have the contrary appearance. For 
 this reflecftion might easily be carried on, but I for- 
 bear The happineft of the world is the concern 
 
 of him, who is the Lord and the Proprietor of it : 
 Nor do we know what we are about, \\hen we en- 
 deavour to promote the good of mankind in any 
 ways, but those which he has directed ; that is in- 
 deed in all ways, not contrary to veracity and justice. 
 I speak thus upon supposition of persons really en- 
 deavouring, in some sort, to do good without regard 
 to these. But the truth seems to be, that such sup- 
 posed endeavours proceed, almost always, from am- 
 bition, the spirit of party, or some indirecfl: principle, 
 concealed perhaps in great measure from persons 
 
 3 P. 124. 
 
332 Of the Nature of Virtue. Difs. 2. 
 
 themselves. And though it is our businef^ and our 
 duty to endeavour, within the bounds of veracity and 
 justice, to contribute to the ease, convenience, and 
 even cheerfulnef^ and diversion of our fellow-crea- 
 tures: yet from our short views, it is greatly uncer- 
 tain, whether this endeavour will, in particular in- 
 stances, produce an overbalance of happineft upon 
 the whole ; since so many and distant things must 
 come into the account. And that which makes it 
 our duty, is, that there is some appearance that it 
 will, and no positive appearance sufficient to balance 
 this, on the contrary side ; and also, that such be- 
 nevolent endeavour is a cultivation of that most ex- 
 cellent of all virtuous principles, the a^ive principle 
 of benevolence. 
 
 However, though veracity, as well as justice, is to 
 be our rule of life ; it must be added, otherwise a 
 snare will be laid in the way of some plain men, that 
 the use of common forms of speech generally un- 
 derstood, cannot be falsehood ; and, in general, that 
 there can be no designed falsehood v^ithout design- 
 ing to deceive. It must likewise be observed, that 
 in numberlef^ cases, a man may be under the stri(5l- 
 est obligations to what he foresees will deceive, with- 
 out his intending it. For it is impofsible not to fore- 
 see, that the words and ac^tions of men in different 
 ranks and employments, and of different educations, 
 will perpetually be mistaken by each other : And it 
 cannot but be so, whilst they will judge with the ut- 
 most careleftnei^, as they daily do, of what they are 
 not, perhaps, enough informed to be competent 
 judges^of, even though they considered it with great 
 attention. 
 
INDEX OF WORDS AND THINGS. 
 
 BSTRACT 
 NOTIONS must be applied to practical sub- 
 jects with great caution,' 115. 
 KEASONiNG iiiust be joined with the obser- 
 vation of facts, 6. 
 TRUTHS, how distinguished from matters of 
 fact, 297. 
 Abstracts imply concretes, 111. 
 
 Abstruse reasonings necessary chiefly to answer abstruse ob- 
 jections, 300. 
 ACCIDENTAL. See Chance. 
 what we call accidental, 42. 
 
 events of which we know not, the laws are called so, 196. 
 the punishments of vice are not accidental, 42. 
 the hinderances to the prevalence of virtue are so, 64, 70. 
 accidental hinderances are not likelv always to continue, 
 72. 
 Account, we cannot give the whole account of anything, 129. 
 Acquirements, the natural supply of our deficiencies, 107. 
 ACTION. See Habits. 
 
 the whole of morality and religion consists in action 
 
 merely, 241. 
 this world a theatre of it, 107. 
 manifests our character, 107. 
 effects of a course of action, 88. 
 ACTIONS. See Endeavours, Resolution. 
 
 will and design distinguish actions from events, 323. 
 the intention but not the actual consequences included 
 
 in our sense of an action, 323-4. 
 the object of the moral faculty, 323. 
 what the name comprises in moral questions, 323. 
 
334 Index of Words and Things. 
 
 ACTIONS (cojithuied). 
 
 when they have a tendency to fonn and fix the habit of 
 
 vh-tue/l02. 
 our own are the sources of our pleasures and great part 
 
 of our pains, 33. 
 they are rewarded and punished, 37. 
 are to be distinguished from tlieir moral qualities, 52. 
 every action and event has relations with others, we 
 
 know not how many, 129. 
 Affections. See Particular affections. 
 
 AFFLICTION. See Hazard. 
 
 the end of our being placed in a state of affliction, &c. is 
 moral improvement, 83. 
 
 it is the proper discipline for resignation, 106. 
 Allurements to wrong. See Temptations. 
 
 AMENDMENT. See Repentance. 
 
 b}'- itself does not prevent punishment, 207. 
 
 may be proinoted by seeing the success of virtue, 65. 
 
 ANALOGICAL REASONING. ^q& Probability, Coincidences, 
 Continuance. • 
 
 not thoroughh' considered by writers on logic, 4. 
 
 cSiia.not perfectly satisfy men, 286. 
 
 cannot give a direct answer to all objections, 127. 
 
 can only directly prove things true or credible as facts, 
 127. 
 
 is the ground of probability in various degrees, 2. 
 
 is of weight in determining our judgment and practice, 4. 
 though perhaps not in all cases, 4. 
 
 ought to be particularly attended to by those who pro- 
 fess to follow nature, 299. 
 
 is a confirmation of all, the only proof of most facts, 299. 
 
 is practical and conclusive, 6. 
 
 Origen's application of it, 5. 
 
 how the author means to apply it, 6. 
 
 there can be no argument from analogy without a pa- 
 rallel case, 172, 29. 
 
 of objections against arguing from the analogy of nature 
 to religion, Pt. II. Ch. VIII., 285. 
 
 ANALOGY. 
 
 of the difficulties in nature to those in Holy Scripture, 5. 
 of the changes we have undergone and those of insects, 
 
 &c. to our entry on a future life, 12, 13. 
 there is none to show that we lose our living powers at 
 
 death, 16. 
 
Index of Words and Things, 335 
 
 ANALOGY (continued). 
 
 confirms the proof of our indiscerptibility, 19. 
 
 of the case of brutes no objection to our immortality, 24. 
 
 of death to birth, possible, 28. 
 
 of vegetables in their decay does not hold, 29, 315. 
 
 the end of our creation may be to us as colour to a blind 
 
 man, 35. 
 bet^veen God's government and that of civil magistrates, 
 
 37. 
 of God's temporal to His future rewards and punish- 
 ments, 32-8, 125. 
 
 of His punishments in detail, 38-45. 
 of the proofs of the Ci'eator's intelligence to those of His 
 
 goodness, 46. 
 of the increase of power given by reason to that given 
 
 by goodness, 60, &c. 
 of our state of trial in this world to that for another, 73. 
 
 considered in detail, 74-9. 
 of youth as a state of discipline for mature age to this 
 
 world as one for a future life, 84, &c., 106, ckc. 
 leads us to suppose the future life a communit}', 93. 
 of our limited capacity for improvement in body and 
 
 mind, to that in our moral characters, 102. 
 of some sciences Avhich form habits of attention to the 
 
 world as a state of discipline, 102. 
 of the waste of seeds to the loss of souls, 103-4. 
 of the inapplicability of the opinion of necessity in com- 
 mon life to its effect on the proofs, &c. of religion, 
 
 111, &c. 
 of our speculative to our moral understandings, 123. 
 of the incomprehensibility of the natural to that of the 
 
 moral government of the world, 128. 
 of the use of strange and apparently undesirable means 
 
 in the natural to the same in the moral world, 132, 
 
 &c., 138. 
 of the government by general laws in the natural to the 
 
 same in the moral world, 134 
 between diseases and moral evil, 134, 187, 287. 
 of our knowledge of a person's character but ignorance of 
 
 his proper mode of acting to what we know of God, 136. 
 shows that God's moral government may be a scheme 
 
 with parts misunderstood, 138. 
 of our ignorance of the reasons of things in nature to the 
 
 same in Christianity, 149. 
 of the perversions of reason to those of Christianity, 154. 
 
33^ Index of Words and Things. 
 
 ANALOGY {conthmcd). 
 
 of the judicial punishments inflicted by God in the pre- 
 sent world to those to come hereafter, 160, 43. 
 
 of our ignorance of how to obtain temporal to the same 
 of spiritual benefits, 160. 
 
 raises no presumption against" the general scheme of 
 Christianity, 168. 
 
 none arises from its not being discoverable by rea- 
 son, 168. 
 
 raises no presumption that everything in the whole course 
 of things is like anything known to us, 169. 
 
 raises no presumption against miracles at the first peo- 
 pling of a world, 170. 
 
 nor against a revelation considered as miraculous at 
 any time, 171. 
 
 of the presumptions against the story of Ca;sar to those 
 against miracles, 172. 
 
 of miracles to the extraordinary pha^nomena of nature, 
 173. 
 
 shows Christianity likely to contain things apparently 
 liable to great objections, 176 
 
 of what reason and experience tell ixs of the government 
 of the world to what revelation declares of its scheme, 
 177. 
 
 of a prince governing ordinarily bv general laws to GoD, 
 178. 
 
 of our instruction by reason, &c., to that by inspiration, 
 178. 
 
 of the ways in which the meaning of other books is to 
 be ascertained cannot be applied to Scripture, 181, 186. 
 
 of the objections men might make against the instruc- 
 tion given in the course of nature to those made against 
 the Scriptures, 182-4. 
 
 of the abuse of miraculous gifts to that of natural gifts, 
 &c., 184. 
 
 of the light of nature to that of revelation in their ef- 
 fects, hinderances, and our possible improvement in 
 knowledge by them, 185-7. 
 
 of the light of revelation to the remedies for diseases, 
 187, 287. 
 
 of the existence of diseases to the imperfections of their 
 
 remedies, 188. 
 of the constitution of nature as a system to that of Chris- 
 tianity, 192. 
 
 in theuse of means and those gradual, 195, 199-200. 
 in their being carried on by general laws, 196. 
 
Index of Words and Things. 337 
 
 ANALOGY (^cojitinued'). 
 
 shows that the world is governed by general laws, 196. 
 
 of the intervention of others for our temporal benefit to 
 that of a Mediator for our salvation', 201. 
 
 of tlie present ill effects of vice to its mode of future pun- 
 ishment, possible, 202, 205. 
 
 of a man's trifling on the edge of a precipice to his being- 
 careless about religion, 202, 204. 
 
 of the inefficacy of repentance in temporal to the same 
 in religious matters, 206-8. 
 
 of the effects of the Fall to what we see daily, 211. 
 
 of the sacrifices of Jews and heathens to that of Christ, 
 215-6. 
 
 of Christ's sufi'ering for the guilty to what we see dailv, 
 218, cScc. 
 
 teaches us not to expect the same information concern- 
 ing the Divine conduct and our OAvn duty, 221. 
 
 of the mysteriousness of nature to that of Christianity, 222. 
 
 of the evidence we usually act upon to what we have of 
 Christianity, 223, 242, 290, 293. 
 
 of the varieties of natural gifts to the different degrees 
 of light from revelation, 224-7, 228. 
 
 of the duty of learning and teaching common things to 
 the same concerning Christianity, 228. 
 
 of some men's ignorance of revelation to ours of why 
 they are ignorant, 229. 
 
 of probation by defect of evidence to that in common 
 behaviour, 285, &c., 236, &c. 
 
 of defects in understanding to moral corruption, 233. 
 
 of speculative difficulties to external temptations, 234. 
 
 of the effects of levity, &c. in common matters to the 
 same in estimating the evidence of revelation, 238. 
 
 of the picking up of objections by incompetent persons 
 in science to the same in religion, 240. 
 
 of a prince's directions to his servants to God's revela- 
 tion, will not always hold, 241 . 
 
 of the conviction produced by the evidence of Christi- 
 anity to the effect in architecture, &c., 245. 
 
 of the mode in Avhich St. Paul speaks of miracles to ours 
 in speaking of common things, 249. 
 
 of the first Christian miracles to those of paganism and 
 popery, and those known to be fabulous, will not hold, 
 250, 256. 
 
 of enthusiasm to ordinary prejudices, 254. 
 and of their effects, 255. 
 
338 Index of Words and Things. 
 
 ANALOGY {continued). 
 
 of the obscure parts of prophecy to parts of a document 
 written in cypher, 259. 
 
 of the prophetical to the mythological and satiric styles 
 of writing, 260. 
 
 of the prophets to the compilers of memoirs from older 
 documents, 262. 
 
 of the revelation of natural religion to the ordinary 
 teaching of the ignorant, 267. 
 
 of a common relation of similar antiquity, &c. to the 
 Scriptures, 270. 
 
 of the proof of natm*al religion by revelation to that of 
 geometrical truth b}'^ Euclid's elements, 274. 
 
 of the effect of hope and fear upon the belief of Christi- 
 anity to the same in other matters, 284. 
 
 of the practical question in common matters to that in 
 religion, 294. 
 
 of the idea of equality to that of personal identity, 313. 
 
 of consciousness to other knowledge, 314, 316. 
 
 of the unreasonablenes of acting on the idea that per- 
 sonal identity is fleeting in the present to the same in 
 regard to a future life, 319. 
 Antiochus Epiphanes, 264. 
 ANTIQUITY. See History. 
 
 or RELIGION one of its evidences, 121. 
 
 OP SCRIPTURE, 122, 270. 
 Antoninus, 31. cited 28, n. 323, n. 
 
 Apostles and 3Iartt/rs, their death in attestation of facts, evi- 
 dence of them, 253. 
 APPREHENSION. See Fear. 
 
 effects of a serious apprehension that Christianity may 
 be true, 231, 308. 
 APPROBATION. See 3Ioral Faculty, Virtue. 
 
 course of nature turns in some degree on our approba 
 tion of actions, 56. 
 
 moral approving and disapproving faculty, 321. 
 
 approbation and disapprobation of prudence and follv, 
 .327. 
 Assertions in argument, nothing in themselves but sometimes 
 
 necessar}', 258. 
 ASSISTANCE OF OTHERS. See Vicarious, Mediator. 
 
 of much use in our youth, 91, 
 
 may help to obviate the consequences of our folly, 204. 
 
 allowed by the constitution of the world to have a good 
 effect, 204. 
 
Index of Words and Things. 339 
 
 ASSISTANCE OF OTHERS {continued). 
 
 absolutely necessary to some men's recovery, 207. 
 
 perhaps the constitution of the world would not have 
 been good without allowing it, 204. 
 Association of ideas, sometimes passive habits, 85. 
 
 ASTRONOMY. 
 
 discoveries in it, 65. 
 
 wonderful that it should be more easily known than me- 
 dicine, 183. 
 
 ATHEISM. See Scepticism. 
 
 as consistent with a futui'e life as with this, 32. 
 
 a demonstration of it necessary to justify fearlessness, 44. 
 Atoms, materia.], 19-20. 
 
 ATONEMENT. See Christ, Sacrifice. 
 
 we are greatly in the dark how the ancients supposed it 
 made, 216. 
 
 ATTENTION. See Consideration. 
 
 in considering doubtful evidence part of our probation, 
 235. 
 
 necessary in considering the evidence of Christianitv, 
 266, 283. 
 
 moral attention how improved by the present state of 
 the world, 100. 
 
 practical principles formed by attention, use and disci- 
 pline, 107. 
 
 some sciences form the mind to habits of it, 102. 
 Augustine, S., cited 148, n. 
 
 AUTHOR OP NATURE. See God. 
 
 to be assumed, 6. 
 
 without an intelligent Author and Governor no account 
 can be given of the world, 140. 
 
 the opinion of necessity does not deny the proof of His 
 intelligence, 110. 
 
 the true notion of Him is that of a moral Governor, 38. 
 
 uses means, 108. 
 
 is deliberate throughout His operations, 200. 
 
 has a will and character, 116. 
 
 His character proved by revelation, 150. 
 
 has declared on the side of virtue, 69. 
 
 has put mankind under the necessity of punishing vi- 
 cious actions, 52. 
 
 a direction from Him implies a promise and a threat, 119. 
 
 were His own character that of mere benevolence. He 
 has not made om'S so, 330. 
 
34-0 Index of Words and Things. 
 
 BABYLON. 268, 276. 
 Baptism, form of, 156. 
 
 BEINGS- See Living beings. 
 
 beings only, not ideas, abstract notions, or qualities are 
 
 capable of life, happiness, &c., 319. 
 Benefits not to be expected without the use of the appointed 
 
 means of obtaining them, 160. 
 
 BENE VOL EXCE. See Goodness. 
 
 benevolence and the want of it in no sense the whole of 
 
 virtue and vice, 329. 
 active principle of it the most excellent of all virtuous 
 principles, 332. 
 
 strengthened by relieving distress, 87. 
 absolute benevolence the most amiable of all characters 
 
 so far as compatible with justice, 47. 
 God may manifest Himself under this character to some 
 
 beings, 47. 
 true benevolence implies a regard to veracity and justice, 
 63, 330. 
 Bethlehem, 279. 
 
 Birds, the hatching of their eggs goes to prove a law of pro- 
 gress in nature, 13. 
 
 BIRTH, 
 
 continuance of the life we had in the womb, 28. 
 death may resemble it, 28. 
 
 BLAMEWORTHINESS. See Desert. 
 
 sense of it produces a peculiar kind of uneasiness, 53-4. 
 Blasphemy and profaneness, inexcusable, 309. 
 
 BODY. See 3Iatter, Organs of sense. 
 
 made up of organs and instruments of perception and 
 
 motion, 21. 
 our existence may be considered without it, 18. 
 reason and memory independent of it, 25. 
 seemingly not necessary to our intellectual enjoyments 
 
 and sufierings, 26. 
 our organized bodies not ourselves or part of ourselves, 
 
 18, &c. 
 our [supposed] original solid body no part of ourselves, 20. 
 dissolution of it has no conceivable tendency to destroy 
 
 ourselves, 18, 20. 
 foreign matter has the same relation to us [in kind], 21. 
 the bodies of all animals in a constant flux, 19. 
 Book, when we knov/ the meaning of a book, 262. 
 
Index of Words and Things. 341 
 
 BOUXDS. 
 
 to the impunity of imprudence, 41, 43. 
 
 to the possibility of recovery, 41, 43. 
 
 to improvement, 102. 
 Brurhmaus, their opinion concerning death, 28, n. 
 
 BRUTES. 
 
 instructed by instincts and propensions, 183. 
 
 act in many respects Avith more sagacity than men, 183. 
 
 stronger perhaps than men and why overcome, 60. 
 
 succeed sometimes in what they could not have at- 
 tempted if rational, 62. 
 
 it does not appear that they have any reflex sense of ac- 
 tions, or of will and design, 323. 
 
 their suggested immortality no objection to the immor- 
 tality of man, 24. 
 
 CJESAR, story of, its antecedent improbability, 172. 
 CAPACITY. See Faculties. 
 of happiness and misery, 32. 
 for improving intended to be made use of, 89. 
 
 CERTAINTY. 
 
 what is meant by moral certainty, 3. 
 
 the highest degree of probable evidence, 1 . 
 
 CHANCE. See Accidental. 
 
 there cannot be any such thing as chance, 196. 
 Chanc/es, Avhich we ma}' undergo without destruction, 12. 
 
 CHARACTER. 
 
 of the Author of nature, 46. 
 
 of God, not designed to be vindicated in this treatise, 290. 
 being known, our ignorance answers objections to His 
 mode of Avorking, 136. 
 
 will and character defined, 116, ii. .323. 
 
 why we think well or ill of characters, 324. 
 
 we are bound to consider attentively what we give cha- 
 racters of, 285. 
 
 it is formed and shown b}' our conduct, 91. 
 
 its manifestation implied in probation, and may have 
 reference to a future life, 107. 
 
 contributes to the carrying on of the course of na- 
 ture, 108. 
 
 how that of upright beings might become depraved, 97. 
 
 that which makes a man obedient to religion would set 
 him to examine it duly, 229. 
 
342 Index of Words and Things. 
 
 CHARACTER (continued). 
 
 may be known by those ignorant of its propex* mode of 
 
 working, 136. 
 Childhood, See Infancy. 
 CHRIST. See Mediator, Messiah. 
 
 our Lord, our Saviour and our GoD, 159. 
 
 His preexistence taught by St. John and St. Paul, 268. 
 
 His office of Mediator how represented in Scripture, 
 
 211-14. 
 Prophet, 214. 
 
 King over His Church, 215. 
 His government over His Church, 194. 
 Priest offering Himself a propitiatory Sacrifice, 211-215. 
 way in which this sacrifice had its effect nn-sterious, 216. 
 objections on this ground absurd, 218, 220. 
 voluntary, and therefore not so strange as many things 
 
 in nature, 219. 
 why men object against the sacrifice of Christ, 219. 
 His satisfaction has an efficacy beyond mere example, 
 
 213, 216. 
 apparent natural tendency of^His sufferings, 220. 
 on what ground acknowledged by the Gentiles, 277. 
 Ch-istian Dispensation may seem natural to some order of be- 
 ings, 31, 195-6. 
 CHRISTIANITY. See Gospel, Revelation, Evidence. 
 Its importance, Pt. II. Ch. I. 147. 
 Considered as a scheme imperfectly comprehended, Pt. 
 
 II. Ch. IV., 192. 
 the particular evidence for it, Pt. II. Ch. VII., 244, 
 Practical Christianity a plain thing, 185. 
 the general proof of it lies level to common men, 239. 
 it cannot be unimportant if it come from God, 149. 
 a republication of natural religion, 149. 
 
 supplies new means for its preservation, 152. 
 does that now by the Church which it did at first by 
 
 miracles, 152. 
 without the Church might have been sunk and forgot,! 53. 
 its good effects manifest, its bad small or none, 154. 
 corruptions of it not arguments against it, 155. 
 Christians are bound to contribute to preserve it in the 
 
 world, 155. 
 the profession and duties of Christians are important to 
 
 natural religion, 156. 
 is a revelation of a particular scheme carried on by the 
 
 Son and Holy Spirit, 156. 
 
Index of Words and Things. 343 
 
 CHRISTIANITY (continued). 
 
 as distinguished from natural religion has somewhat of 
 moral importance, 159. 
 
 unspeakable irreverence and rashness to treat it as a light 
 matter, 160. 
 
 a statement of its general scheme, 168, a fuller one, 193. 
 
 the question is whether it be a real revelation, not whe- 
 ther it be so attended as Ave expected, 180. 
 
 a particular scheme under the general plan of Provi- 
 dence, 193. 
 
 a mysterious economy for the recovery of the world b}' 
 a Divine Person, 193. 
 
 part of a scheme not entirely revealed in Scripture, 195. 
 
 God works by slow and successive means in nature as 
 well as in it, 200. 
 
 different degrees of evidence for, and light from it, 225. 
 
 its establishment confirms the miraculous history of the 
 Scripture, 246. 
 
 offered itself and was received upon the evidence of mi- 
 racles, 249. 
 
 this peculiar to it, 249. 
 
 persons alleging the power of enthusiasm admit that it 
 has some evidence, 258. 
 
 its nature supports the testimony of its witnesses, 258. 
 
 unbelievers must admit its external evidence considerable, 
 258. 
 
 a general argument for its truth, 265, &c. 
 
 advantage Avhich the nature of its evidence gives to those 
 who attack it, 285. 
 
 we are under a moral obligation to inquire into its truth, 
 and embrace it if true, 300. 
 
 no reason to expect men to behave better were it demon- 
 strated, 309. 
 CHURCH, visible. 
 
 what it is, 152. 
 
 what uses it seizes, 152. 
 
 is an instituted method of education, 153. 
 
 it is the duty of all to become members of it, 156. 
 Cicero, cited, 323, n. 
 CIVIL GOVERNMENTS. 
 
 natural, 51, 207. 
 
 punish actions prejudicial to society, 51. 
 
 and this not without regard to their moral character, 56, 
 CLARKE, Dr. S., cited, 17^ n. 
 
 answer to his third defence of his letter to Dodwell re- 
 ferred to, 317. 
 
•344 Index of Words and Things. 
 
 CItmens Romunus, cited, 248. 
 COIXCIDENCES. 
 
 evidence arising from them often determines practice, 266. 
 fanciful men apt to malie tliem out to fa%^our their follies, 
 283. 
 Colliber, S. Of revealed religion, pp. 154-5, cited, 157, n. 
 Colour may be as intelligible to the blind as the end of our 
 
 creation to us, 35. 
 Convminion, the institution of it, 248. 
 COMPASSION. 
 
 vmhappiness its natural object, 327. 
 
 less to the guilty than to the innocent, 325. 
 
 lessened, by imprudent neglect and foolish rashness, 328. 
 
 lessened, as a sentiment, by being used to see suffering, 
 
 87. 
 its existence in the constitution of the world, 205. 
 and in the laws of God's government declared by reve- 
 lation, 209. 
 Complacency, attends the exercise of virtue, 54. 
 CONSCIENCE. See 3Ioral Faculty. 
 a name of the moral faculty, 322. 
 its presages declare God's government moral, 47. 
 a real instance of virtue favoured and vice discounte- 
 nanced, 56. 
 consciousness of a rule of action given by our Maker 
 raises a sense of security in following and danger in 
 deviating from it, 119. 
 
 CONSCIOUSNESS. See Personal Identity. 
 
 single and indivisible, and proves its subject to be so, 17. 
 
 does not make personal identity, but presupposes it, 314. 
 
 successive consciousnesses not the same but of the same, 31 6. 
 
 of a rule of action. See Conscience. 
 CONSEQUENCES. See Tendencies. 
 
 those of actions ai-e rewards and punishments, 35. 
 
 those of vice, judicial punishments inflicted by GoD, 160. 
 
 those of foolish actions are like those of vicious actions 
 as declared by religion, 42. 
 
 some men disregard them as much in temporal as in re- 
 ligious matters, 76. 
 
 possible consequences of one overt act of irregularity, 97. 
 
 unacceptable consequences no reason to cavil at truths, 1 7 7 . 
 
 future punishments may be by way of natural conse- 
 quence, 202. 
 
 natural consequences of vice and folly sometimes pre- 
 vented, 204. 
 
Index of Words and Things. 345 
 
 Consideration, often necessary, and eftects of the want of it, 
 243. 
 
 COXSTITUTIOX. See Scheme, World. 
 
 the notion of a constitution implies variety, 228. 
 
 the inward constitution of a finitely perfect being, 96. 
 
 how far one overt act might disoi"der it, 97. 
 of the -world all mystery, 222. 
 
 and its government may be perfect in the highest 
 
 degree, 193. 
 severity and indulgence in it, 204. 
 Continuance, as expected for the future, a probability from 
 
 analogy, 14. 
 Conviction, raised by probability, 1, 4. 
 Corruption of heart makes men disregard evidence, 234. 
 
 COURSE OF NATURE. See Law of Nature, Nature. 
 
 the ground of all analogy, 2. 
 
 implies an operating agent, 35, 203. 
 
 what comes to pass in it is God's work, 203. 
 
 is an instance of government by rewards and punish- 
 ments, 38. 
 
 the whole of it may not be like what is known to us, 169. 
 
 upon the first peopling of worlds, what ? 170. 
 
 creation of mankind totally different from the present, 170. 
 
 so dark without revelation that it might give occasion to 
 miraculous interpositions, 173. 
 
 governed by general laws, and how we conclude this, 196. 
 Avith respect to intelligent creatures, 9, 134, 196. 
 Creation of the world, why the Scriptures commence with an 
 
 account of it, 267. 
 CREATURES. See Finite Creatures, Hitman Creatures. 
 
 upright creatures need improvement, and depraved crea- 
 tvu-es renewal, 99. 
 
 of moral natures, not subjects of morality during part of 
 their lives, 228. 
 
 ought to live under a dutiful sense of their Maker, 309. 
 
 submission and obedience make up our proper character 
 as such, 106. 
 
 all creatures may require habits of resignation, 10.5-6. 
 
 their awful presumption in bringing confusion, &c., into 
 the world, 205-6. 
 Credibility merely, of religion produces an obligation in pru- 
 dence, 137, 144, 230. 
 Cunning, false self-interest, &c. essentially weaker than wis- 
 dom, public spirit, Sec, 66. 
 
34^ Index of Words and Things. 
 
 Curiosity, concerning a future life, 32. 
 
 Cursory thought of tilings, Avlien familiar, hinders our seeing 
 
 their 'weight, 266. 
 Cypher, half understood prophecies are like a writing partly 
 
 in it, 259. 
 
 DANGER. See Hazard, Affliction.. 
 perception of it a natural incitement to passive fear, 
 and active caution, 87. 
 consciousness of a danger of doing wrong may improve 
 
 virtue, 101. 
 of actually deviating from right may be infinitely les- 
 sened, 98. 
 dangers of our miscarrving in our religious state of trial, 
 77. 
 
 analogous to those that affect our temporal success, 
 80, 78. 
 DANIEL, THE BOOK of. 
 
 authority given to it \>j Christ, 264. 
 
 presupposed true by the general scheme of Christianitv, 
 
 264. 
 how impeached by Porphyry, 263-4 and n. 
 had more external evidence once than we have now of 
 it, 264. 
 
 DEATH, 13, &c. See Future Life, Living Beings, Brachmans. 
 a gi'eat shock, or alteration, 15. 
 our substances will continue after it, 14, n. 
 we do not know Avhat it is in itself, but only some effects 
 
 of it, 15. 
 no ground to think it the destruction of living agents, 24. 
 no reason to think it the destruction, or suspension of our 
 
 reflecting powers, 27. 
 reason does not at all show us in what state it leaves us, 
 
 29. 
 may be analogous to birth, 28. 
 imagination likely to mislead us concerning it, 17. 
 Deceit. See Falsehood. 
 Definitions, attempts to give them sometimes onlv perplex, 
 
 313. 
 Degradation of mankind, the Scripture account of it confirmed 
 
 by the state of the world, 211. See Fall of Man, 
 Degrees of evidence, 233, 225. 
 
 Demonstration, how it differs from probable evidence, 1 . 
 Destruction oi living powers, what this means, 14, n. 
 
Index of Words and Things. 347 
 
 Delay of Punisliment, 39, 43. 
 
 Des Cartes, built a -world ou hypothesis, 5. 
 
 DESERT. See Shame, Resentment, Gratitude. 
 
 deserving punishment does not merely mean that such 
 
 suffering is for the good of Society, 324. 
 ill desert ahvays supposes guilt, 324. 
 perception of good and ill desert contained in moral dis- 
 cernment, 118. 
 
 unavoidable and natural, 321. 
 
 of good desert, why very weak in common instances 
 
 of virtue, 325. 
 of ill desert, lessens in proportion to the force of 
 
 temptation, 325. 
 arises from a comparison of the action with the ca- 
 pacity of the agent, 326. 
 arising from the perception of imprudence and follv, 
 328. 
 DESIGN. See Final Causes. 
 appearances of, 45, 300. 
 
 not excluded by the opinion of necessity. 111. 
 ten thousand instances of it must prove a designer, 300. 
 Differeyice of vieii's situation in religious matters, 224. 
 would continue under a universal revelation, 229. 
 
 DIFFICULTIES. See Temptations, Objections. 
 
 analogy between those in Scripture and those in the 
 world, 5. 
 
 actions materially virtuous, which have no diificulty, 
 may not be really virtuous at all, 101. 
 
 speculative difficulties are of the same nature with ex- 
 ternal temptations, 236. 
 
 may make the larger part of some persons' trial, 236. 
 
 seeing through difficulties, 240. 
 
 difficulties and objections wrongly turned into positive 
 arguments against religion, 289. 
 
 to clear them all it may be necessary to comprehend the 
 Divine nature, &c,, 287. 
 
 those concerning personal identity and their strange so- 
 lutions, 313. 
 DISCIPLINE. See Temptations. 
 
 state of Probation as intended for Moral Discipline, Pt. 
 I. Ch. v., 82. 
 
 happiness and misery may be distributed by way of mere 
 discipline, 58. 
 
 need of it may be traced higher than to excess of pas- 
 sion, &c., 94. 
 
348 
 
 Index of Words and Things. 
 
 DISCIPLINE (continued). 
 
 upright creatures may be improved by it, 99. 
 depraved creatures need the severer and higher, 99. 
 the present workl peculiarly tit to be a state of it, 99, 102, 
 234. 
 
 though made by mau}^ a discipline of vice, 103. 
 speculati\e difficulties may be necessarv to put some men 
 in a state of sutBcient discipline, 236. 
 Discoveries in natural knowledge, 65, 187. 
 DISEASES. 
 
 their very existence raises a presumption that their re- 
 medies would not be certain, perfect and universal, 188. 
 they are not so in fact, 188. 
 
 this refutes an objection against Christianity, 187. 
 some diseases are themselves remedies, 134. 
 some mortal diseases do not affect our mental powers, 27. 
 some operate like enthusiasm, 253. 
 Disorders, their permission may be consistent with justice and 
 
 goodness, 138. 
 Dissatisfaction with the evidence of religion, often owing to 
 
 men's own fault, 238. 
 Dissolution of organized bodies has no tendency to destroy the 
 
 living being, 18. 
 DISTRESS. See Compassion, Happiness. 
 
 the perception of it arouses passive pity and active bene- 
 volence, 87. 
 DIVIXE GOVERNMENT. See God, Moral Governor, &c. 
 wbat is implied in the notion of it, 10. 
 not perfectly moral as we see it, 48. 
 DOMESTIC. 
 
 GOVERNMENT, analogous to the moral government of the 
 
 universe, 56. 
 LIFE teaches us self-government, &c., 90. 
 DOUBTFULNESS, See Scepticism, General Douhts, Evi- 
 dence. 
 doubting implies some degree of evidence, 232, 269-70. 
 not so much difference between the duties arising from 
 
 conviction and serious doubt, 232. 
 the duty of those who complain of the doubtfulness of 
 
 religion, 231. 
 of i-eligion calls for a more careful exercise of the vir- 
 tuous principle, 235. 
 
 puts men in a general 'State of probation, 230. 
 of the best mode of preserving life, and attaining tem- 
 poral success, 293, 243. 
 
Index of Words r.nd Things. 349 
 
 Dreams show that we can have a lively perception of external 
 
 objects, without the use of our organs of sense, 22. 
 Drowsiness. See Sleep. 
 DUTIES. See 3Ioral duties, Doiihtfulness. 
 
 arise out of relations, however made known, 158. 
 
 the reasons of Christian duties evident, 222. 
 
 EARTH, the Earth has the appearance of being a ruin, 
 210. 
 EDUCATION. See Instriiction, Assistance. 
 
 its power for evil, 77. 
 Effect, in architecture, &c., 245. 
 Effects. See Consequences. 
 ENDS. See Final Causes, Means. 
 
 for which the world may have been constituted, 7. 
 
 these may be beyond our faculties, 35. 
 of creation, as regards this world, a mature state of life, 
 
 90. 
 the whole end of man's being placed here not pretended 
 
 to be accounted for, 103. 
 we unavoidably judge certain ends preferable to others, 8. 
 we are not competent judges as to the mode of bringing 
 
 about the ends of God's government, 137. 
 it is doubtful whether the Author of nature sees things 
 as ends and means, 199. 
 Endeavours to enforce upon ourselves and others good im- 
 pressions are virtuous acts, 86, 88. 
 ENTHUSIASM. 
 
 its effects strange, 253. 
 often mixed with deceit, 255. 
 prejudices of like effects to it, common, 255. 
 does not destroy the evidence of testimony, 253. 
 cannot be alleged as destroying the evidence of Christi- 
 anity, 257. 
 not to be considered till the matter in dispute is proved 
 
 incredible, 254. 
 Christianity has more consistency and a greater tendency 
 to promote virtue, than could have been expected from 
 enthusiasm, &c., 191. 
 Epictetus, cited, 321, n, 
 Euclid's Elements, 274. 
 Events have always unknown future consequences, 129. 
 
 EVIDENCE. See Probable, Historical, Testimony, Christi- 
 anity. 
 
350 Index of Words and Things. 
 
 EVIDENCE (continued). 
 
 which leaves room for doubt should influence practice, 3, 
 
 234, 289, 290. 
 perceived degrees of it should have proportionate weight, 
 
 234. 
 on which we act as regards our temporal interests, 223. 
 conviction arising from many items of it is like the effect 
 
 in architecture, &c., 245. 
 cannot be trulv judged of without careful consideration, 
 
 266. 
 circumstantial evidence often as convincing as direct, 283. 
 degrees of it not distinguishable with perfect exactitude, 
 
 233. 
 confuted in one case, may be sufficient in another, 256. 
 which keeps the mind in doubt, is not acknowledged 
 
 without modesty and fairness, 265. 
 we are obliged ordinarilj^ to take up with extremely un- 
 satisfactory evidence, 293. 
 the practical question concerning it in ordinary matters, 
 
 294-5. 
 overbearing evidence is not according to the method of 
 
 Providence, 307. 
 OF Religion must be judged of by reason, 190. 
 
 may be designedly left by God less than it might 
 
 have been, 241. 
 liable to objections which those who can see, can 
 
 see through, 240. 
 even when doubtful should beget a serious appre- 
 hension that it may be true, 231. 
 dissatisfaction with it may be men's own fault, 238. 
 less than it might have been, to serve as a proba- 
 tion, 239, n. 
 sufficient for purposes of probation, 294. 
 of natural religion, the external not affected by the opi- 
 nion of necessity, 121. 
 of revelation, different in different ages, 225. 
 
 not appearing obvious may be part of some men's 
 trial, 229. 
 OF Christianity considered in its particular nature, Pt. 
 II. Ch. VII., 244. 
 
 such as in the nature of it cannot be destroyed, 
 
 however lessened, 285. 
 consists of miracles and prophecy and other things, 
 
 making up a long series, 244. 
 the fact of converts having believed its miracles, 
 
Index of Words and Things. 351 
 
 EVIDEXCE OF Christianity (^continued). 
 
 testimony distinct from the mere historical evi- 
 dence, 251. 
 how unbelievers pretend to refute it, 252. 
 its weight impaired by our being familiarized with 
 it, 282. 
 EVILs See Wickedness, 3Iisery. 
 
 our ignorance an answer to objections drawn from its 
 
 existence, 131. 
 though it may effect good, possibly more good might 
 
 have been effected without it, 134. 
 presumptuous to imagine that the world might have 
 
 been so constituted a^ to exclude it, 204. 
 reliefs and remedies even for voluntary evil, provided by 
 
 the Author of nature, 204. 
 mankind naturally connect natural and moral evil, 325. 
 
 EXAMPLE. See Education. 
 
 tendency and influence of virtue byway of example, 65, 
 
 67. 
 bad example a temptation, 77. 
 
 those who are doubtful about religion, responsible for the 
 example they set, 232. 
 Existence. See Necessary, Present. 
 
 EXPERIENCE. See Freedom, Instinct. 
 
 how it confirms the unity of the mind, 19. 
 
 it is doubtful whether our natm-al faculties would be of 
 
 use without it, 89. 
 it and revelation alone show us how to obtain any kind 
 
 of benefits, 160. 
 teaches us the good and bad consequences of our actions, 
 
 221. 
 EXTERNAL. 
 
 as really a part of religion as the internal, 157. 
 3IANNER of WORSHIP, matter of revelation, 158. 
 WORSHIP of GOD a moral duty, 162. 
 
 EYES. 
 
 are passive instruments, like glasses, not percipients, 21. 
 given us for what pui-poses, 36. 
 
 FACT. See Matters of fact. 
 there is the strongest presumption against the most 
 ordinary facts, before the proof of them, 172. 
 Faction, impossible in a virtuous kingdom, or society, 66. 
 
352 Index of Words and Things. 
 
 FACULTIES. See 3Ioral Faculty, Capacihj, Powers. 
 
 our want of, for speculation upon the constitution of 
 
 the world, 8. 
 natural faculties not given at once, 89. 
 their truth only proved by means of themselves, 321-2. 
 
 FALL or MAN. See Goodness, 3IanMnd. 
 
 it may be accounted for by the existence of particular 
 
 affections, 94, 96. 
 possible consequences of one sin, 97. 
 makes more and severer discipline necessary, 99. 
 our state not to be complained of, 79, 210. 
 Christianity supposes the world in a state of ruin, 208. 
 there are natural appearances of our being in a state of 
 
 degradation, 78, 305. 
 and the earth has the appearance of being a ruin, 211- 
 
 305. 
 It is not Christianity that has put us in this state, 211. 
 heathen moralists thought this a place of punishment, 
 
 211,305. 
 it is likely that the sin of our first parents should change 
 our state for the worse, 211. 
 FALSEHOOD. See Veracity. 
 
 naturally disapproved by us, 330. 
 
 men deal differently with different degrees of it, 255. 
 
 the use of common forms of speech commonly understood 
 
 is not falsehood, 332. 
 no designed fiilsehood without intention to deceive, 332. 
 a man may be obliged to what he foresees will deceive, 
 without intending it, 332. 
 FATALIST. See Necessity. 
 
 what he asserts, and must assert, 109-12. 
 could not educate a child on his own principles, 113-14. 
 Fate. See Necessity. 
 
 Faulty, nature and effects of feeling ones self so, 53. 
 FEAR. See Immortality. 
 
 a punishment in itself, 51. 
 
 of future punishment cannot be got rid of by a great 
 
 part of the world, 54. 
 the impression of it Aveakened by repetition, 86. 
 hope and fear proper motives to religious obedience, 104. 
 have various effects on men's opinions, 284. 
 Fearlessness with regard to futurity unreasonable, 44. 
 FINAL CAUSES. See Design, Ends. 
 
 appearance of them proves an intelligent designer of the 
 world. 45. 
 
Index of Words and Things. 353 
 
 FINAL CAUSES {continued). 
 
 even under the opinion of necessity, 112, 118. 
 and in spite of partial ignorance, 134-72. 
 pleasures and pains, instances of them, 37. 
 the notion of them does not always suppose the end an- 
 swered, 103. 
 Final and irremediable punishments, instances of, 41, 43. 
 FINITE CREATURES. 
 
 perhaps uecessai-ily defectible, 94, 96. 
 how the danger of defection may be diminished, perhaps 
 removed, 98. 
 
 FITNESS OF ACTIONS. 
 
 founded in the nature of things, 120, n. 
 
 whether and in Avhat sense it may determine the Will 
 
 of God, 369, 120, n. 
 supplies a proper proof of God's moral government, 72, 
 
 298. 
 the language of moralists fomied upon it, 296. 
 how applied to moral actions, 326. 
 believed in by Butler, 296. 
 the argument given by him independent of it, 296-9. 
 
 FOLLY and Foolish Rashness. See Imprudence, Negligence. 
 a vice, 328. 
 
 somewhat quite different from mere incapacity, 328. 
 whv not so sensibly disapproved by nature as falsehood, 
 
 &c., 327. 
 as to present and futm-e interests, compared, 77, 42. 
 
 FOOLISHNESS. 
 
 of the Gospel, 175, 195. 
 
 of the means used in the Christian dispensation, 195. 
 Force of this treatise, 298. 
 FORESIGHT. See Prophecy. 
 
 a warning, 33, 37. 
 
 impossible without general laws, 134. 
 
 of brutes, 183. 
 
 superhuman, proved by the fulfilment of predictions, 263. 
 FREEDOM. See Liberty. 
 
 the principle of it forces itself upon the mind, 296. 
 
 believed in by Butler though not used in his argument, 
 296. 
 
 the opinion that we are free, supported by experience, 
 115. 
 
 the world is constituted as though we were free, 115. 
 
 A A 
 
354 Index of Words and Things. 
 
 FREEDOM {continued). 
 
 if necessary agents cannot be punished, we must be free, 
 
 125-6. 
 the principle of liberty makes a fall only possible, 96. 
 in the creation of the world not necessary to the proof 
 of an intelligent Creator, 110. 
 Frost, expected on analogical reasoning only, 3. 
 
 FUTURE LIFE. See Atheism, Punishincnt, Personal Iden- 
 tity, Particular Affections, Death. 
 
 its probability considered, Ft. I. Ch. I., 12. 
 
 this life a state of Discipline for it, Ft. I. Ch. V., 82. 
 
 the qiiestions concerning it, 28, n. 
 
 what makes the question concerning it of so great im- 
 portance to us, 32. 
 
 opens an unbounded prospect to our hopes and fears, 141 . 
 
 foundation of all our hopes and fears, 11, 32. 
 
 implied in religion, 32. 
 
 proof of it does not prove religion, 32. 
 
 belief of it greatly disposes the mind to attend to the 
 evidence of religion, 32. 
 
 its credibility of equal practical effect with a demonstra- 
 tion of it, 31, 32. 
 
 taught by the Gospel, 152. 
 
 what revelation alone teaches us concerning it, 41, n. 
 
 some determinate capacities and qualifications must be 
 necessary for it, 84. 
 
 analogy as to the conditions of our happiness in it, 107. 
 
 men's showing Avhat is in their hearts may have respect 
 to it, 108. 
 
 probably not a solitary state, but a communit}', 93. 
 Future Judgment implies some sort of temptation, 73. 
 Future period looked forward to throughout Scripture, 269. 
 Future Punishment. See Punishment. 
 
 G^ ENERAL doubts may be raised concerning any fact, 
 r 248. 
 
 GENERAL LAWS. See Foresight. 
 
 our knowledge and our ignorance concerning them, 196. 
 the government of the world is carried on by them, 51, 
 134, 196. 
 this is proved by analogy, 196. 
 there may be the wisest and best reasons for it, 58, 
 134. 
 interference with them would produce some bad effects, 
 135. 
 
Index of Words and Things. 355 
 
 GENERAL LAWS {contimied). 
 
 the Christian dispensation may have been carried on 
 
 mider them, 31, 197. 
 miracles may be possible under them, 197. 
 future punishments may follow wickedness under them, 
 
 203. . ' 
 
 GENTILES. 
 
 Our Lord, their Saviour, 271. 
 
 on what evidence they received Him, 277. 
 Gifts, miraculous. See Miracles, God. 
 Glasses, prepare objects for the sight, as eyes do, 21. 
 
 GOD. See Author of nature, Character, Christ, Goodness, 
 Governor, Government, Moral, Infinite intelliqence. Love, 
 Will, Design. 
 our duties to God the Father, 157. 
 
 to His Son and Spirit, 158. 
 His existence should be admitted by a Fatalist, 110. 
 has necessary existence, 111. 
 has a character and will, 116. 
 is all perfect, 9. 
 
 may be simply and absolutely benevolent, 47. 
 our whole nature leads us to ascribe all moral perfection 
 
 to Him, 9. 
 thorough conviction of His perfection leads to perfection 
 
 in Religion, 292. 
 His government by rewards and punishments, Pt. I 
 
 Ch. XL, 32. 
 is the natural Governor of the world, 35. 
 the end for which He made and governs the world may 
 
 be utterly beyond our faculties, 35. 
 He gives us pleasures and pains by showing us how to 
 
 obtain them, 33. 
 His general providence proved by miracles and pro- 
 phecy, 150. 
 is a moral Governor, 50. 
 dictates of the moral faculty His laws, 118. 
 regard to His authority coincident with justice and our 
 
 own chief interest, 104. 
 the absence of interpositions may be an instance of His 
 
 goodness, 136. 
 does not dispense His gifts according to our notion of 
 
 the advantage they Avould be to us, 187. 
 we must not expect the same information concerning 
 
 His conduct, as concerning our duties, 221. 
 
35^ Index of Words and Things. 
 
 GOD (^continued). 
 
 how He has given us all things necessary to life and 
 
 godliness, 222. 
 we do not know in what manner He would be likely to 
 
 instruct us, 179. 
 does instruct us by experience, 221. 
 
 and invention, 183. 
 objections to His scheme of a Mediator obscure, but our 
 
 duties plain, 221. 
 His visible government carried on by the mediation of 
 
 others, 51, 201. 
 makes use of a variety of means, 199. 
 uses a progressive series of means, 200. 
 is the original Author of prophecy, 262. 
 His covenant with a particular nation, 270. 
 GOOD ACTIONS. See Virtue. 
 
 never punished as beneficial to society, 52. 
 not natural that they should be punished, 52. 
 GOOD MEN. 
 
 disposed to befriend good men as such, 54. 
 how hindered from union in this life, 64. 
 
 GOODNESS. See Virtue, Benevolence, Interpositions. 
 What the Divine goodness may consist in, 34. 
 it is consistent with perfect goodness that all creation 
 might have been in a state to perish, but for what 
 God had appointed to prevent it, 210. 
 GOSPEL. See Foolishness, Christianity. 
 an evidence of natural religion, 151. 
 light and immortality brought to light by it, 146, 152. 
 GOVERNMENT. See Civil, Domestic, Divine, Moral, 3Iu- 
 gistrates, Natural. 
 the formal notion of it, 37. 
 or THE WORLD, proof of it, 45, 36. 
 
 is a scheme, or system, 128. 
 OF God, a scheme incomprehensible, Pt. I. Ch. VII., 127. 
 a scheme, system, or constitution, 127. 
 coiu-se of nature another name for it, 35, 51. 
 uniformity of it no reason to deny it, 35. 
 veracity and justice its natural rule, 118. 
 reason to think it will be found to correspond to 
 
 our nature, 119. 
 we are not competent judges of its scheme, 130. 
 may be just and good notwithstanding the exist- 
 ence of evil, 131. 
 
Index of Words and Things. 357 
 
 GOVERXOR OF THE WORLD. See Moral, God, Govern- 
 ment. 
 
 to be assumed, 6. 
 
 the opinion of necessity does not destroy the proof of 
 His intelligence, 110. 
 
 GRATITUDE. 
 
 due to Christ the moment the Gospel is believed, 161-2. 
 implies a distinction between being the mere instrument 
 
 of good and having a good intention, 322. 
 contradicts the objection to religion on the opinion of 
 necessity, 125. 
 Greece, 268. 
 Grotius, cited, 239, n. 
 
 GUILT. 
 
 not annihilated by frailty and temptations, 44. 
 taken into account in civil tribunals, 56. 
 the idea of it always associated with that of ill desert, 
 324. 
 
 H 
 
 ABITS. — Of Resignation, Virtue, SiC. See Improve- 
 ment. 
 
 of the body and mind, 85. 
 of perception and of action, 85. 
 passive habits, 85. 
 faculty of acquiring them, 84. 
 are the means by which Ave are prepared in one state for 
 
 another, 84. 
 we get by them aptness, readiness, and often pleasure in 
 
 a course of action, 88. 
 thev are produced bv repeated acts, 86, and by acts onlv, 
 
 88. 
 active habits grow more powerful as the motives are by 
 
 repetition less felt, 87. 
 we know not how far similar effects might be wrought 
 
 in us at once, 88. 
 nature puts us in a position to acquire them, 90. 
 
 and this opportunity must not be lost, 91. 
 an immoral habit is not raised by obedience to a few 
 
 detached commands, 190. 
 Half views, a source of error, 287. 
 
 HAPPINESS. See Interest, Pleasure, Prosperitij. 
 
 AND MISERY, not always distributed according to per- 
 sonal merit, 58. 
 
358 Index of Words and Things. 
 
 HAPPINESS AND MISERY (continued). 
 
 are not our fate so as not to depend upon our ac- 
 tions, 117. 
 ours as men are very much in one another's power, 57. 
 hereafter may depend upon our actions here, 32. 
 results from our nature and condition jointly, 84. 
 our present enjoyments are very much in our own power, 
 
 33. 
 possible reasons why we are not made happy without 
 
 our own actions, 34. 
 improvement in virtue improvement in happiness, 96. 
 virtue produces it, 48-58. 
 
 and tends to produce it in a higher degree, 60. 
 a necessary qualification for a future state of it, 92, 
 the balance of it now, not always perhaps on the side of 
 
 virtue, 48-9. 
 a due concern for it is the same as prudence, 327. 
 HAZARD. See Banger. 
 
 Hazard and danger being put upon us is a speculative 
 difficulty, 80. 
 He that hath ears to hear, let him hear, 239. 
 HEATHEN. See Atonement. 
 
 not in so advantageous a position in regard to natural 
 
 religion as we, 152, 154. 
 some may have had natural religion specially enforced 
 upon them in consequence of the existence of revela- 
 tion, 225. 
 Hebrews, doctrine of the Epistle to the Hebrews, 212. 
 HINDERANCES. 
 
 to justice accidental, 65. 
 
 accidental hinderances and natural tendencies in respect 
 
 to virtue, 65, 71. 
 those to natural and supernatural light of the same kind, 
 
 186. 
 levity, carelessness, passion and prejudice hinderances to 
 right information, 239. 
 HISTORICAL EVIDENCE. See Testimony, Christianity. 
 not demonstrative, 246. 
 not destroyed by saying that men may deceive or be 
 
 deceived, 257. 
 of the miracles the same as of the common facts in Scrip- 
 ture, 246. 
 HISTORY. See Scripture. 
 
 its account of religion in the first ages, 122. 
 
Index of Words and Things. 359 
 
 HISTORY (continued). 
 
 tends to show that religion was first introduced by rev- 
 elation, 171, 122. 
 may be confirmed by cotemporaiy or subsequent events, 
 
 246. 
 Scripture history is so confirmed, 246. 
 
 testimony of profane history to it, 276, 275. 
 a sketch of it, 267. 
 
 how much of profane history appears in it, 268. 
 that it cannot be clearly disproved an evidence of 
 its truth, 269. 
 Christianity and the proof of it are both historical, 297. 
 prophecy is the history of things before they come to 
 pass, 267. 
 Hobbes. Leviathan, c. 17, p. 87, cited, 322. 
 
 HOLY SPIRIT. 
 
 our Guide and Sanctifier, 157. 
 His miraculous mission, &c., 194. 
 
 our duties to Him moral, and obligations of reason, 156-8. 
 Hope and Fear. See Fear. 
 
 HUMAX. See Mankind. 
 
 Creatures perpetually liable to go wi-ong, and actually 
 doing so, 77. 
 
 capable of becoming qualified for new states of life, 
 84. 
 Life, part of a much larger plan of things, 139. 
 
 and human happiness require fitting capacities and 
 circumstances, 84. 
 Nature prone to think the less important of two things 
 of no value, 166. 
 
 HYPOTHESIS. 
 
 building a world on it, 5. 
 applying reasoning by it, 6. 
 
 ICE, its existence disbelieved before experience, 2. 
 Identity. See Personal Ideyitity. 
 
 IGNORANCE. 
 
 how this life is the preparation for another no reason 
 against the fact, 92. 
 
 of the employments of a future life, no ground to expect 
 a virtuous character unnecessar}', 93. 
 
 ours of the natural should lead us to expect not to un- 
 derstand the moral world, 127, 
 
360 Index of Words and Things. 
 
 IGNORANCE (continued). 
 
 ours concerning the relations of things to one another 
 and to ourselves, 128-30. 
 
 answers objections against God's Providence, 131. 
 
 not easy for any one always to bear in mind its extent, 
 and make due allowance for it, 131. 
 
 ■what it is not an answer to, 132. 
 
 may answer objections to a thing without aflfecting its 
 proof, 137. 
 
 •when an argument from it is valid, 136-9. 
 
 different effects of total and partial ignorance, 136. 
 
 total ignorance would not destro}^ moral obligations, 137. 
 
 the answers to objections against Providence are taken 
 not from it, but from something analogv tells us of it, 
 138. 
 
 as much and as little an excuse for neglecting the obli- 
 gations shown by revelation as those shown by rea- 
 son, 159. 
 
 those Avho know most ignorant of many things, 168. 
 
 ours of the course of nature so deep that we know not 
 whether it may include miracles, 172-4. 
 
 objections against Christianity mostly refuted by it, 175. 
 
 we are in no wise judges of many things we are apt to 
 think ourselves very competent judges of, 177. 
 
 ours, how it might be expected that natural and super- 
 natural knowledge should be given, 179. 
 
 concerning the laws of miracles, not greater than 
 
 concerning many natural occurrences, 197. 
 concerning the reason and extent of natural punish- 
 ment, 206. 
 
 we are not judges whether a Mediator were necessary, 
 or of the nature, or parts of His office, 217. 
 
 absurd to argue that dispensations cannot be from God, 
 because we do not discern the reasons of them, 220. 
 
 in matters of religion, often owing to men's own fault, 
 238. 
 Ill behaviour punished as such, 56. 
 
 IMAGINATION. 
 
 author of all error, 17. 
 
 a source of discontent, 105. 
 
 difficultv of silencing it, and reasons of that difficulty, 
 
 17, 29-30. 
 likely to mislead us concerning the effect of death, 17. 
 must not be substituted for experience, 30. 
 
Index of Words and Things. 361 
 
 IMMORALITY. 
 
 ■would prove a pretended revelation false, 176. 
 
 falsely objected to some precepts in Scripture, 189. 
 
 its heinousness greatly increased by becoming acquainted 
 with Christianity, 308. 
 Immortality. See Future life, Gospel. 
 
 IMPOSSIBILITIES. 
 
 many unknown to us, 34. 
 
 real, are not always apparent, 131. 
 
 IMPROBABLE. 
 
 improbable events to be considered in action, 3, 223. 
 internal inipi-obabilities do not weigh against external 
 probable proof, 182. 
 
 IMPROVEMENT. See Virtue, Capacity, Habits. 
 
 in virtue and piety, the end of our being placed here, 83. 
 
 in understanding and natural faculties, gradual, 89. 
 
 gained by exercise, 89. 
 
 wisdom of this, 89. 
 
 we are capable of moral improvement, and want it, 93. 
 
 moral and religious habits, the instruments of it, 92-3. 
 
 of the principle of virtue by habit, a defence against the 
 
 dangers incident to finite creatures, 96. 
 in virtue, advancement in happiness, 96. 
 the capacity of it limited in respect of our intellectual 
 
 and bodily, perhaps also of our moral powers, 102. 
 
 IMPRUDENCE. See Folly, Prudence. 
 naturally punished, 39, 327. 
 why not so strongly condemned by conscience as other 
 
 vices, 327-8. 
 beyond a certain bound, cannot escape punishment, 41. 
 
 INCONSIDERATENESS. See Folly. 
 
 often punished as much as any active vice, 41, 238. 
 Indivisible powers imply indivisible subjects, 17. 
 
 INDULGENCE. 
 
 the least in forbidden circumstances increases the tend- 
 ency to wrong, 97. 
 vicious indulgences not only criminal but depraving, 98. 
 
 INFANCY. 
 
 the proper state for acquiring what is necessary in man- 
 hood, 90. 
 
 passing from it to manhood proves a law of progress, 12- 
 13. 
 
362 Index of Words and Things. 
 
 Infamy, a punishment of vice, 57. 
 
 INFINITE INTELLIGENCE. See God. 
 
 no object of knowledge can be to it the subject of prob- 
 able evidence, 3. 
 
 Information needed in temporal matters, not always given us, 
 242. 
 
 INJURY. 
 
 always distinguished from mere harm, and just punish- 
 ment, 322. 
 Hobbes says that this is peculiar to mankind, 322. 
 Innocent people daily suffer for the guilty, 218. 
 Insects, their changes prove a law of progress in states of 
 being, 13. 
 
 INSPIRATION. See Prophecy. 
 
 we are no judges by what laws GoD would give it, 178. 
 
 makes a difference in the rules of interpretation, 166, 
 181, 262-5. 
 Instruction, not commonly given in the manner best suited to 
 
 recommend it, 185, 183. 
 Instrumentality of others. See Assistance, Mediator. 
 Intellectual powers noi affected by some mortal diseases, there- 
 fore probably not destroyed by death, 27. 
 Intemperance, its consequences, 39. 
 
 INTENTION. 
 
 of such and such consequences, part of the action itself, 
 
 323-4. 
 madmen and idiots capable of the intention of doing 
 
 harm, 326. 
 
 INTEREST. See Self-love, Temporal 
 
 a moral course of behaviour must be our final interest, 95. 
 our own chief interest a just and natural principle of 
 
 action, 104. 
 SENSE OF INTEREST, not sufficient to restrain us, 95, n. 
 needs improvement, 95, n. 
 in Avhat sense part of the idea of virtue, 95, n. 
 our present interest, not forced upon us, 80. 
 
 not to be secured Avithout danger and difficulty, 74. 
 origin of doubtfulness concerning our temporal interest, 
 
 223. 
 due concern for it the same as prudence, 327. 
 
 INTERPOSITIONS. See General laws, Miracles, 
 might have bad effects, 133. 
 
Index of Words and Things. 363 
 
 INTERPOSITIOXS {continued). 
 
 God's not interposing may be an instance of His good- 
 ness, 136. 
 to save man from destruction, possible, 209. 
 Invention seems a capricious mode of instruction, 183. 
 IRREGULAEITY. 
 
 irregular behaviour, its ill consequences, 205. 
 
 what we call irregularities may not really be so, 133-196. 
 
 it may be impossible to prevent them by general laws, 
 
 135. 
 unreasonable to wish them remedied by special interpo- 
 sitions, 135. 
 lERELIGION. 
 
 one of the greatest instances of vice, 205. 
 
 especially in persons of influence or with a character for 
 
 understanding, 232. 
 not justified by the doubtfulness of the evidence for re- 
 ligion, 234. 
 a positive principle of irreligion, 301. 
 
 JEROM'S account of Porphyrin's explanation of Daniel, 
 264, n. 
 
 JEWS. 
 
 their promised prosperity, naturally connected with their 
 
 predicted holiness, 67. 
 the establishment of their religion confirms the miracu- 
 lous history of the Scriptures, 246. 
 their sacrifices of expiation ended in Christ, 215. 
 a statement of their scriptural histoiy, 270-3. 
 which is confirmed by known facts, 276. 
 seems only to be accounted for by the truth of the 
 miracles recorded, 277. 
 their dispersion a fulfilment of prophecy, 278. 
 their continuance a standing miracle, 278. 
 
 not accounted for by the natm-e of their religion, 
 279. 
 their ultimate restoration made probable by present 
 
 facts, 280. 
 their histoiy, as gathered from profane writers, 281. 
 S. JOHN. 
 
 to what he probably alludes in the first words of his 
 
 Gospel, 268. 
 his doctrine of Christ's preexistence confirmed by S. 
 
 Paul, 268. 
 his description of perfect religion (1 John iv. 18), 292. 
 
364 Index of Words and Things. 
 
 JUDGMENT. See Future judgment. 
 
 involuntarily substituted for sensation in several cases, 
 85. 
 Just persons, their future condition, 210, n. 
 
 JUSTICE. See Virtue, Veracity. 
 
 a natural rule of government, 50. 
 
 often artificially eluded, 60. 
 
 a special means of uniting society, 63. 
 
 the doctrine of distributive justice only the completion of 
 
 what we now see, 69-70. 
 coincident with our own chief interest, and a regard to 
 
 God's authoritj^ 104. 
 notions of justice and injustice remain even while we are 
 
 making suppositions inconsistent with them, 117. 
 not to be sacrificed to supposed benevolence, 330-2. 
 justice and veracity our rule of life, 332. 
 
 KINGDOM. 
 of Christ how described in Scripture, 215. 
 the Church His Kingdom, 215. 
 the hypothesis of one perfectly virtuous and its conse- 
 quences, 66. 
 
 KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 in the Sci-iptures to be acquired like natural knowledge 
 and how, 186. 
 
 with time and attention necessary to examine into reli- 
 gion and its evidences, 240. 
 
 cannot constitute truth but presupposes it, 314. 
 Koran, referred to, 249. 
 
 LABOUR and industry absolutely necessary to us, 91. 
 LANGUAGE. See Words. 
 its inherent defects, 183. 
 learnt by long experience and exercise, 91. 
 of the prophecies, figurative and hieroglyphical, 176. 
 of moralists, 296. 
 Law of Moses an authoritative republication of natural reli- 
 gion, 151. 
 
 LAWS OF NATURE. See Course of Nature, Providence, 
 Analogy^ Natural Laws. 
 that the same being should exist in different states, 13. 
 that by which we may lose part of the body, 19. 
 that one state is a state of discipline for another, 92. 
 
Index of Words and Things. 365 
 
 LAWS or NATURE (continued). 
 
 that we should form practical principles by attention, 
 
 use and discipline, 107. 
 many of them unknown to us, 196. 
 Levity, carelessness, passion and prejudice hinder our being 
 
 rightly informed in anything, 239, 308. 
 LIBERTY. See Freedom. 
 
 necessary to the progress of knowledge, 186. 
 Lies, persons who would not invent will propagate, and some 
 
 who would not propagate will let them pass, 255. 
 LIFE. See Future life, Gospel, Human. 
 
 everv- species of creature is adapted to its own state of 
 
 life, 83. 
 creatures genei-ally capable of becoming adapted to a 
 
 new state of life, 84. 
 our human life a result of our nature and condition 
 
 jointly, 84. 
 two states of life in which men live, 25. 
 whether life is desirable or no, sometimes questioned, 293. 
 it is not preserved to us without our care and attention, 
 
 33. 
 justice and veracity our rule of life, 332. 
 probability to us the guide of life, 3. 
 LIGHT OF NATURE. See Natural religion, Reason. 
 has a great resemblance to revelation, 185. 
 not so sufficient as to make revelation superfluous, 147. 
 only warns men, leaving them to act as they please till 
 the time of judgment, 155. 
 Likely, its meaning and how attained, 2. 
 Likeness begets in every one presumption, opinion and full 
 
 conviction, 2-5. 
 Limbs have no power of moving themselves, 23. 
 Living agents, no reason to think any system of matter essen- 
 tial to them, 20. 
 LIVING BEINGS. See Personal Identity, Death. 
 not discerptible or compounded, 17. 
 must have greater size than a material atom, or be in- 
 capable of dissolution, 19-20. 
 organs of sense, no part of them, 22. 
 no probability of their ever ceasing to be, 30. 
 their sameness independent of their memory, 319. 
 LIVING POWERS. 
 
 what, 13, their destruction, 14, n., 16. 
 
 no ground to think them destroyed by death, 16. 
 
366 Index of Words and Things. 
 
 LIVING POWERS {continued). 
 
 nothing but death can be supposed to destroy them, 14. 
 we know not on what they depend, 15. 
 may exist though suspended, 15. 
 
 LOCKE, J. 
 
 his story of the Prince of Siam, 2. 
 on person and personal identity, 316. 
 
 his observations on them hasty, 317. 
 Locomotive powers, to what part of us they belong, 22. 
 Logic, the examination of the force of analogy belongs to it, 4. 
 Love, all comparisons must fall short of God's love, 209. 
 Ludicrous turn may be indulged in till we lose all sense of 
 prudence and conduct, 238. 
 
 MA GISTRATES, their government analogous to God's 
 government, 37. 
 3Iahometanism, not offered on the foot of public miracles, 249. 
 3Iahometans, how probably affected by the light of revelation, 
 
 226. 
 Manifestation of Character. See Character. 
 
 MANKIND. See Full of 3Ian, Human creatures, &c., Mer- 
 ciful. 
 
 their whole nature leads them to ascribe all moral per- 
 fection to God, 9. 
 - unavoidably accountable for their behaviour, 52. 
 
 why they prevail over the brutes, 60. 
 
 an inferior part of the creation of God, 78. 
 
 their natural condition one of trial and difficulty, 79. 
 
 left by nature unformed and unfinished creatures, 90. 
 
 creatures who are fallen from their original rectitude, 99. 
 
 before the formation of habits of virtue deficient and in 
 danger of falling, 94. 
 
 are evidently permitted to act as they will, 180. 
 
 prone to place religion in peculiar positive rites, 164. 
 
 have no right to life and property but by the gift of 
 God, 190. 
 
 their life is not only successive but progressive, 199-200. 
 
 impatient, 200. 
 
 generally do not realize the present awful consequences 
 of vice, &c., 205. 
 
 naturally in a very strange state, 211. 
 
 no two men exactly alike, 224. 
 
 their suspicions should be acknowledged as well as their 
 credulity, 251. 
 
 naturally endowed with a regard to truth, 255. 
 
Index of Words and Things. 367 
 
 MARTYRS. See Apostles. 
 
 objections to their testimony insufficient, 252, &c. 
 Ilaterial world, in a manner boundless and immense, 66. 
 MATTER. See Bodi/. 
 
 when proved indivisible, 1 7. 
 
 solid elementary particles of it, 19. 
 
 our matter does not cease to exist by death, 14, n. 
 
 foreign matter has the same relation to us as our mate- 
 rial body, 21. 
 
 MATTERS OF FACT. 
 
 in this treatise Christianity, &c., are so regarded, 297. 
 
 distinction between them and abstract truths, 297. 
 
 their credibility or truth proves nothing of their wisdom 
 or goodness, 127. 
 
 analogy can only prove things true or credible as mat- 
 ters of fact, 127. 
 
 analogy is the only proof of most and a confirmation of 
 all matters of fact to which it can be applied, 299, 
 
 the proof of religion as a matter of fact cannot be aftected 
 by the opinion of necessity, 117, &c. 
 
 MATURITY or UNDERSTANDING. 
 
 not given at once, 89. 
 
 might not be useful if so given, 89. 
 MEANS. See Ends. 
 
 are used in Christianity as in nature, 195. 
 
 experience and not reason is the judge of their effects, 
 133. 
 
 undesirable means often conduce to desirable ends, 132. 
 
 their apparent may be contrary to their real tendency, 
 133. 
 
 those bv which instruction is given to brutes and men, 
 183." 
 
 why God makes use of those he does, a mystery in na- 
 ture as well as in revelation, 199. 
 
 MEDIATOR. See Assistance, Christ. 
 
 the appointment of a Mediator considered, Pt. II. Ch. 
 v., 201. 
 
 we are brought into the world and receive its satisfac- 
 tions by the mediation of others, 201. 
 
 one between God and man, agreeable to the course of 
 nature, 201. 
 
 Christ's office of Mediator how represented in Scripture, 
 211. 
 
368 Index of Words and Things. 
 
 Memory, enables us to store up our ideas and knowledge, 84. 
 
 Merciful alloicances will be made for man, 227. 
 
 Mercy, in the constitution of the world, 205. 
 
 Merit and demerit, not always the measm-e of happiness and 
 
 misery, 58. 
 MESSIAH. See C/aist 
 
 His office, 193. 
 
 prophecies concerning Him, 271. 
 
 facts concerning Him from profane history, 277. 
 
 METHOD. 
 
 of providential conduct. See Law of Nature, Course of 
 Nature, Providence. 
 
 of the argument of this treatise, 9, 
 ^Horoscope, used in the same way that the eye is, 23. 
 Militant, virtue is militant here, 64. 
 MIRACLES. See Particular Institutions. 
 
 supposed presumptions against them, Ft. II. Ch. 11., 
 167. 
 
 miracle a relative term, 31, 170. 
 
 may be natural to other beings, 31. 
 
 may happen in obedience to general laws, 197. 
 
 their design, 150. 
 
 natural religion may be proved by them, 150. 
 
 the notion of them, 169. 
 
 visible and invisible, 169. 
 
 no presumption against them at the beginning of the 
 world, 170. 
 
 no presumption against the more or less of its exercise, 
 when once a miraculous power is admitted, 171. 
 
 no argument from analogy for, or against them, in 
 themselves, 172. 
 
 the presumptions against them after the settlement of [a 
 course of nature considered, 172, &c. 
 
 the state of religion in the first ages seems to imply a 
 miraculous origin, 171, 122. 
 
 religion and the moral system of the universe give dis- 
 tinct reasons for miracles, 173. 
 
 must be compared with the extraordinary phsenomena of 
 nature, 173. 
 
 occasions for them might arise in the long lapse of ages, 
 173. 
 
 our seeing reasons for them makes them credible, 174. 
 
 miraculous gifts not unusual in apostolic times, and ir- 
 regularly u^ed then, 184. 
 
Index of Words and Things. 369 
 
 MIRACLES (continued). 
 
 observations upon the evidence of miracles, 245. 
 
 the evidence of the miracles in scripture, the same as of 
 
 the common facts, 245. 
 Christianity alone propounded as proved by public mi- 
 racles, 249. 
 the fact that it was embraced on that ground proves 
 
 their truth, 250. 
 their truth necessary to account for the establishment of 
 
 Judaism and Christianity, 246. 
 St. Paul speaks of them as matters of course, 249. 
 pagan and popish miracles do not stand on the same 
 
 basis, 250. 
 the Jews a standing miracle, 278. 
 events apparently natural may by relation be miraculous, 
 
 279. 
 MISERY. See Happiness. 
 
 much misery brought by men upon themselves, 39. 
 various miseries of life, contingent upon our actions, 80. 
 we mav make ourselves as miserable as ever we please, 
 
 34. ' 
 the sight of it produces compassion and indignation, 
 
 upon Avhat conditions, 324-5. 
 
 MODERATION. See Self-government. 
 
 the state of the world has a tendency to produce it, 100. 
 MORAL. 
 
 Duties. See Duties. 
 
 take precedence of positive ones, 163. 
 
 our Lord declares expressly for them before positive 
 
 ones, 164. 
 duties resulting from revealed relations are moral, 
 156-7. 
 Faculty. See Conscience. 
 
 "we have a moral approving and disapproving fa- 
 culty, 321. 
 different appellations of it, 322, 321, n. 
 implies a rule of action, 118. 
 carries authority with it, 118, 321, n. 
 the guide of action and life, 321, n. 
 its dictates are the laws of GoD in a sense including 
 
 sanctions, 118, 56. 
 proofs of its existence, 321-3. 
 its object is actions and practical principles, 323, 
 321, n. 
 
 B B 
 
370 Index of Words and Things. 
 
 MORAL Faculty (^continued). 
 
 deals, not with what we enjoy or suffer, but with 
 what we do or might have done, 324. 
 Good and evil, imply good and ill desert, 324. 
 Government. See God. 
 
 God's moral government, Pt. I., Ch. III., 45. 
 Government, a practical proof of it, 65-70. 
 what makes us capable of it, 321. 
 what it consists in, 46, 330. 
 probation implied in it, 108. 
 an instance of it, 56. 
 
 implied in God's natural government, 71, 
 scheme of it not fictitious but natural, 71. 
 differences between what is implied in it, and in a 
 
 state of Probation, 73. 
 our present condition cannot be shown inconsistent 
 
 with it, 82. 
 the moral and natural government of the world 
 
 make up one scheme, 129-30. 
 how it is exercised, 193. 
 is not perfect as we see it now, 48. 
 may be perfect in the highest degree, 193. 
 has a tendency to perfection, 60. 
 Law, as much a matter of revealed command as positive 
 institutions are, 163. 
 written in our hearts, 163. 
 Nature, has scope to act in us, this an instance of moral 
 government, 57. 
 it is itself a proof that God will support virtue, 57, 
 
 72. 
 our having it makes us capable of moral govern- 
 ment, 321. 
 Precepts and duties, what they are, 161. 
 
 in some respects resemble positive precepts, 161, n. 
 Principle rightly controls but does not originate par- 
 ticular affections, 94. 
 Understanding, 96. 
 
 may be perverted, 123. 
 Virtue, nothing can make us acceptable to GOD with- 
 out it, 164. 
 MORALITY OF ACTIONS. See Htness. 
 
 depends partly on the intention of the agent, 323. 
 partly on a comparison between them and His nature 
 
 and capacities, 326. 
 is immutable, 189. 
 
'• Index of Words and Things. 371 
 
 Moses, his miracles, 245, 277. 
 Motives, to religion, 145. 
 MYSTERIES. 
 
 in Christianity, 195. 
 
 as great in nature as in Christianity, 196, &c., 217-22. 
 
 Mystery of God, 42, n. 
 of godliness, 195. 
 
 NATURE. See Author, Course, Law, Light, Government, 
 Mankind, World. 
 its scheme, evidently vast beyond all imagination, 168. 
 we see but as a point in it, 169. 
 gives us power to supply our natural deficiencies, 90. 
 intent of nature that virtue should be rewarded, &c. 59. 
 its necessary tendencies show something moral in it, 60. 
 severity and indulgence in its constitution, 204, 
 man's nature leads him to ascribe all moral perfection to 
 
 God, 9. 
 our nature corresponds to om* external condition, 84. 
 what position nature places us in as to the knowledge of 
 
 religion, 152. 
 no presumption that everything in the whole course of 
 nature is like what is knoAvn to us, 169. 
 NATURAL. 
 
 meaning of the word, 31. 
 Government of the world. See World. 
 in what it consists, 73. 
 
 we are dealt with under it, as if Ave were free, 115. 
 makes up one scheme with its moral government, 
 129-30. 
 Laws of human actions require that testimony be ad- 
 mitted, 257. 
 Religion. See Religion. 
 
 future punishments belong to it, 41, n. 
 
 proved by history and general consent, 121. 
 
 its external evidence by no means inconsiderable, 
 
 123. 
 scarcely any one could have reasoned out its system, 
 
 147, 274. 
 ought not to be the sole object of our regard, 148. 
 taught by Christianity in its genuine simplicity, and 
 
 authoritativeh', 150. 
 the profession and establishment of it, much owing 
 to the Scriptures, 273, 226. 
 "^ its proof from reason is not thereby destroyed, 274. 
 
372 Index of Words and Things. 
 
 NATURAL Religion {continued). 
 
 may be proved by prophecy and miracles, 151. 
 
 what it contains, 122, 273.*^ 
 
 its essence, in one sense, religious regards to GoD the 
 
 Father, 157. 
 may be revealed and is so, 267. 
 objections to it answered from analogy, 10. 
 promoted by the establishment of the Church, 153. 
 general proof of it level to common men, 239. 
 
 approves itself almost intuitively to a reasonable 
 
 mind, 308. 
 its analogy to Revelation, a good ground of argu- 
 ment, 286. 
 Necessary existence of GOD, 111. 
 
 NECESSITY, OPINION of. See Fatalist, Freedom. 
 
 practically considered, Ft. I., Ch. VI., 109. 
 
 does not exclude deliberation, choice, preference, and 
 acting from certain principles to certain ends, 110. 
 
 in itself no account of the constitution of nature, but 
 only of a circumstance of it, 110. 
 
 does not exclude an agent, but only a free agent, 111. 
 
 effects of educating a child in this opinion, 113. 
 
 misapplied, when applied to the subject of religion, 114. 
 
 all practical applications of it practically fallacious, 114. 
 
 how reconcileable with benevolence, veracity, and jus- 
 tice in the Author of nature, 117. 
 
 neeessary agents may be rewarded and punished, 125. 
 
 how it destroys religion, 126. 
 
 does not make punishment unjust, even if improbable, 
 125, 292. 
 
 NEGLIGENCE. See FoIIi/. 
 
 may make us as miserable as we please, 34. 
 
 no more excusable in revealed than in natural religion, 
 
 156, 300. 
 a source of dissatisfaction with the evidence of religion, 
 
 238. 
 
 OBEDIENCE not the less real, because proceeding 
 from hope, or fear, 104. 
 OBJECTIONS. 
 
 Revelation likely to seem liable to them, Pt. II., Ch. III., 
 
 175. 
 those against arguing from the analogy of nature to re- 
 ligion, Pt. II., Ch. VIII., 285. 
 
index of Words and Things. 373 
 
 OBJECTIONS (continued). 
 
 those against a proof, none against the thing proved, 10. 
 some may be seen through, though not cleared up, 240. 
 in matters of importance, the question is, not upon whom 
 it lies to support them, but whether they have any 
 real existence, 252. 
 men will probably fancy they have strong ones against 
 
 what is really unexceptionable, 182. 
 those who pick them up without qualifying themselves 
 for their examination are in doubt by their own fault, 
 240. 
 what qualifications are necessary in examining them, 
 
 240. 
 some may be urged not directly answerable by analogy, 
 
 127. 
 they need not alwaj's be removed, 291. 
 how far analogy answers them, 10. 
 those from ignorance, when particularly absurd, 221. 
 those to the scheme of Providence, generally mere arbi- 
 trary assertions, 131. 
 those against divine justice are first shown inconclusive, 
 
 and then its credibility is established, 291. 
 nature of those urged against Christianity, 302. 
 
 they are not valid unless they overthrow all that 
 
 is miraculous in it, 181. 
 not greater than analogy would lead us to expect, 
 
 184. 
 those against its evidence, most important, 175. 
 those against itself, generally frivolous, 168, 175- 
 
 91. 
 unreasonable way of objecting against it, 191. 
 
 OBJECTIONS CONSIDERED. 
 
 against arguing from the analogy of nature to religion, 
 Pt. II., Ch. VIII., 285. 
 
 that it is a poor thing to show the same difficulties 
 
 in natural and revealed religion, 286. 
 that it does not clear up difficulties, 287. 
 that it does not show the evidence of religion not 
 
 to be doubtful, 289. 
 that it does not vindicate God's character, 290. 
 that it is not satisfactory, 293. 
 that it is not likely to have influence, 295. 
 against the constitution of the world as imperfect, 7. 
 against our natural immortalitv from the case of brutes, 
 24. 
 
374 Index of Words and Things. 
 
 OBJECTIOXS CONSIDERED {continued). 
 from that of vegetables, 29, 315. 
 
 that the pleasure attached to all gratifications of the 
 passions is intended as a reward, 36. 
 
 against the credibility of future punishments, 38. 
 
 against religion that its evidence is not so strong as it 
 might be, 47, n. 
 
 that things may go on for ever as they are, without any 
 triumph of virtue, 68. 
 
 against this world's being a state of trial, 81. 
 
 that we cannot discern how thi^ life is a preparation for 
 another, 92. 
 
 that our powers of improvement may be limited, 102. 
 
 that this world is in fact a discipline of vice, 103. 
 
 that \artuous habits proceeding from hope and fear only 
 strengthen self-love, 104. 
 
 against rewards and punishments on the opinion of ne- 
 cessity, 124, 292. 
 
 against religion on the same opinion, 117. 
 
 against the justice and goodness of Providence, 132. 
 from seeming irregularities, 133. 
 
 that evil might easily have been prevented by repeated 
 interpositions, 131. 
 
 that our ignorance may be objected against the proof of 
 religion, as well as against the objections to it, 136. 
 
 that revelation is of little importance, if natural religion 
 be kept to, 148. 
 
 that natural religion cannot be proved by miracles, 150. 
 
 that the analogy between natural and revealed know- 
 ledge fails, on account of the impoi-tance of the last, 
 186-7. 
 
 against miraculous gifts from their iiTegular use, 184. 
 
 against the analogy between the methods of natural and 
 revealed instruction, 187. 
 
 against the notion of a Mediator at all, 202. 
 
 that the nature of the Jewish religion kept the Jews dis- 
 tinct, 278. 
 
 that religion teaches us to be interested and selfish, 328, 
 104, 95, n. 
 
 against Scripture, that it is not written according to the 
 rules of art, 175, 180. 
 
 that it contains immoral precepts, 189. 
 
 against Christianity generally, 181. 
 
 from the sufiiciency of the light of nature, 147. 
 from the supposed incredibility of miracles, 167. 
 
Index of Words and Things. 375 
 
 OBJECTIONS CONSIDERED ^continued). 
 
 especially after the settlement of a course of na- 
 ture, 172. 
 from the unequal distribution of religious know- 
 ledge, 185. 
 from its complex contrivances and slow develop- 
 ments, 187, 199. 
 to its wisdom, justice, and goodness, 192. 
 from its disappointing anticipations, 182, 192. 
 from its mysteriousness, 193, 220. 
 from its want of universality, 223. 
 from its being perverted and having little influence, 
 
 154. 
 from its supposed deficiency of proof, 229, 258. 
 from its lateness, partiality, and obscurity, 187. 
 that it supposes God obliged to use roundabout 
 
 means, 199. 
 that Christ's suffering for the guilty makes GoD 
 indifferent whether he punish the innocent or the 
 guilty, 218. 
 that a master would give clear directions to his ser- 
 vants, 241. 
 that there have been enthusiastic people in all ages, 
 
 252. 
 that the apostles might partly deceive, partly be 
 
 deceived, 254. 
 that in fact men have been strangel}' deluded by 
 
 pretended miracles, 255. 
 from the obscurity of some parts of prophecy, 259. 
 from the difficulty of showing its exact fulklnient, 
 
 260. 
 from the suppositions that the prophets intended 
 something else, 261-2. 
 OBLIGATIONS. See Duties. 
 
 raised in practical matters by the slightest balance of 
 probability, 3. 
 
 nay, even by the smallest presumption alone, 3. 
 those of religion practically proved by the course of na- 
 ture, 69. 
 those of religious worship, 119. 
 moral obligations remain, though religion be not proved, 
 
 137. 
 arise from the bare credibility of religion, 137, 230,243-4. 
 the mere credibility of the consequences of virtue and 
 vice raises some, 137. 
 
376 Index of Words and Things. 
 
 OBLIGATIONS (continued). 
 
 those of duty to the Son and Holy Spirit, revealed by 
 Christianity, 157. 
 
 arise naturally from our relations to them, 157. 
 those of a command remain until we knoiv that the rea- 
 son of it has ceased, 149. 
 Obscurity of the Scripture does not overthrow its authority, 
 
 180. 
 Observation in like cases, a common ground of conclusion, 2. 
 Omission, when vicious, 324. 
 
 ONENESS. See Sameness, Personal Identity. 
 
 the absolute oneness of a living agent cannot be proved 
 by experiment, 18, 19. 
 
 how it may be proved, 17, 18. 
 OPPORTUNITIES. 
 
 may be lost for ever, 40. 
 
 for deceiving ourselves, 235. 
 
 ORGANS OF SENSE. See Body. 
 
 not percipients but instruments, 21, 23. 
 our connection with them may be a hinderance to a 
 higher life, 28. 
 Origen, his hint concerning analogy, 5. 
 
 Outward circumstances may be changed so as to ensure the 
 triumph of virtue, 71. 
 
 PA GANIS3I, its miracles, 250. See Heathen. 
 Pain. See Pleasure, Punishment, Misery. 
 Pardon, grounds for hoping there may be room for it, 207. 
 PARTICULAR AFFECTIONS, 94. 
 involuntarily excited, 94. 
 
 tend to incline to unlawful means of gratification, 95. 
 the practical principle of virtue, our only safeguard 
 
 against this, 95. 
 they may remain in a future state, 96. 
 show how the fall and improvement of finite creatures 
 
 may take place, 96. 
 stand in need of discipline, 106. 
 Particular Institutions, their having been brought in and con- 
 firmed by miracles, not analogous to the case of Chris- 
 tianity, 250. 
 
 PASSIONS. See Particular Affections, Levity. 
 particular gratifications of them, 36. 
 all actions are done by means of some natural passion, 59. 
 
Index of Words and Things. 377 
 
 PASSIONS {continued). 
 
 good purposes of every natural passion may be seen, 59. 
 particular passions not more consistent with self-love, 
 
 than with virtue, 75. 
 no excuse for a vicious life, 145. 
 
 PASSIVE. 
 
 Habits. See Habits. 
 
 Impressions, grow weaker by repetition, 86. 
 
 only effective as they tend to produce active habits, 
 87-8. 
 SuB>nssiON. See Resignation. 
 Patience, a matter of gi-eat patience to reasonable men, 220. 
 
 S. PAUL. 
 
 his epistles carry with them evidence of their genuine- 
 ness, 248. 
 
 prove the truth of Christianity, 248, &c. 
 He teaches Christ's pre-existence, 268. 
 
 PERCEPTION. See Sensation, Judgment. 
 
 our powers of perception distinct from our organs of 
 
 sense, 21. 
 dreams prove a latent power of perception, 22. 
 the truth of perceptions cannot \)Q proved, 321. 
 difficult fully to explain our perceptions of good and ill 
 
 desert, 324. 
 
 PERFECTION. 
 
 of finite creatures, 96. 
 
 their higher perfection may consist in habits of vir- 
 tue, 98. 
 going on unto perfection, 186. 
 of religion, 292. 
 of moral government, 46. 
 Persecution, considered as an objection to God's moral go- 
 vernment, 52. 
 Persians, perhaps influenced by revelation, 226. 
 Person, Locke's definition, 316. 
 
 PERSONAL IDENTITY. See Sameness, Oneness. 
 Dissertation upon it, 313. 
 
 personality a permanent, not a transient thing, 317-21. 
 the sameness of living agents, 12, 316. 
 cannot be defined, 313. 
 the body no part of it, 19. 
 ascertained by consciousness, 314. 
 organs of sense not essential to it, 22. 
 
37^ Index of Words and Things. 
 
 PERSONAL IDENTITY (contmued). 
 
 " consciousness makes personality " false, probable origin 
 
 of it, 314. 
 Locke's definition, 316. 
 absurd consequences of the opinion, that it is constituted 
 
 by consciousness, 317. 
 consciousness proves the sameness of our substance, 320. 
 Pious frauds may weaken, but cannot destroy our evidence 
 
 of miracles, 277. 
 PLEASURE. See Happiness. 
 
 or advantage of actions sometimes independent of their 
 
 morality, .53. 
 and pain consequences of our actions, 33. 
 
 in some degree distributed without regard to cha- 
 racter, 69. 
 this would not even alone disprove moral govern- 
 ment, 69. 
 how far intended to put us upon gratifying our passions, 
 
 36. 
 annexing it to some actions and pain to others is our 
 
 proper notion of government, 37. 
 when a reward, 45, 53. 
 
 whether our pleasures overbalance our pains ? 293. 
 Political state of things, incidentally referred to in Scripture, 
 
 268. 
 Poor (as an epithet), 287. 
 Popery, its miracles, 250. 
 Porphyry, his objections to the book of Daniel, 263-4, and n. 
 
 POSITIVE. 
 
 Precepts and duties. See Moral. 
 what they are, 161. 
 
 danger of being misled in comparing them with 
 moral, 166. 
 Institutions, reasonable and important, 153. 
 come under a twofold distinction, 162. 
 have the nature of moral commands, 162, 166. 
 their observation only valuable, as it proceeds from 
 
 a moral principle, 163. 
 great presumption of making light of them, 166. 
 Rites, mankind always prone to place religion in them, 
 164. 
 Possibilities of things unknown to any man, 131. 
 POWERS. See Living, Reflecting. 
 limit to their improvement, 102. 
 
Index of Words and Things. 379 
 
 PRACTICAL. See Religion. 
 
 PRINCIPLE of Yirtue. See Virtue. 
 QUESTION concerning conduct, 294-5. 
 
 PRACTICE. See Actions. 
 
 in matters of practice, their importance is always to be 
 
 considered, 284. 
 differently influenced by different degrees of evidence, 
 234. 
 Precepts change the nature of some acts in Scripture, 189. 
 Precipice, effects of trifling on the edge of one, 202, 204. 
 Preexistence of our Saviour, 268. 
 
 PRESENT EXISTENCE. See Life. 
 
 aftbrds a presumption of continuance, 13. 
 
 as gi-eat a difiicult}' to atheism as a future state, 32. 
 Present state of man may be a consequence of somewhat past, 
 
 228. 
 
 PRESUMPTIONS. See Probability. 
 
 the lowest preponderance on one side, acted on, 3. 
 presumptions against revelation, 167. 
 there are strong ones against common truths and ordinary 
 facts, 172. 
 
 PRESUMPTUOUSNESS. 
 
 not justified by scepticism, 45. 
 implied in sin, 205. 
 
 PRIESTHOOD. 
 
 of Christ, 215. 
 
 the Levitical, a shadow of Christ's, 212. 
 Primitive Christians, purity of their lives, 225. 
 
 PRINCIPLES. 
 
 of the Author, not here argued upon, 296. 
 Avhat is meant by arguing on the principles of others, 
 296, n. 
 
 PROBABLE EVIDENCE and pkobabilitt. See Evidence, 
 Analogical reasoning. 
 admit of degrees, 1. 
 
 there may be probabilities on both sides, 1, 233, 
 the slightest possible presumption is of this nature, 1. 
 lowest presumption often repeated produces conviction, 1 . 
 chiefl)' constituted by likeness — likelihood, 2. 
 rule of our hopes, fears, expectations, and judgments, 2. 
 peculiar to beings of a limited capacity, 3. 
 to them the very guide of life, 3. 
 
380 Index of Words and Things. 
 
 PROBABLE EVIDENCE {continued). 
 
 extremely small probabilities acted on, 4, 223, 244. 
 importance of collateral things in probable evidence, 283. 
 the addition of probable proofs multiplies the evidence, 
 
 283. 
 PROBATION, STATE OF. See Trial. 
 
 as implying trial, &c. Pt. I., Ch. IV., 72. 
 
 as intended for discipline and improvement, Pt. I., Ch. 
 
 v., 82. 
 as implying a theatre of action, 107. 
 religion as a Probation has its end on all, 295. 
 how it differs from moral government, 73. 
 general doctrine of religion concerning it, 73. 
 how we come to be placed in it involves unanswerable 
 
 difficulties, 82. 
 we may be in one as to the use of our understanding in 
 
 religious matters, 229. 
 religious probation, 230. 
 doubtfulness of the evidence of religioa puts us in a 
 
 general one, 230. 
 PROFANENESS. 
 
 to be shunned by those, who are not certain that religion 
 
 cannot be true, 231. 
 especially if in an influential position, 232. 
 
 PROOF. See Evide?ice. 
 
 of God's perfect moral government and of the truth of 
 
 religion, not to be sought in this work, 68. 
 of the future completion of a moral scheme of govern- 
 ment, 72. 
 when very slight, overcomes innumerable presumptions, 
 
 172. 
 Propensions. See Particular Affections, Brutes. 
 PROPHECY. See 3Iiracles, Jeivs. 
 
 intended to prove a particular dispensation of Providence, 
 
 150. 
 proves God's general Providence, &c., 150. 
 the obscurity of one part does not defeat the evidence of 
 
 another, 259. 
 may give proof of foresight to those, who cannot make 
 
 out its exact fulfilment, 260. 
 expressed in figurative and hieroglyphical language, 175. 
 prophetical parts of Scripture treated with scorn, 175. 
 its applicability proves the propriety of its application, 
 
 260. 
 
Index of Words and Things. 381 
 
 PROPHECY (continued). 
 
 its applicatii)n to an expected event proves the propriety 
 of its apjjlication to that event, when it has happened, 
 261. 
 
 as in the case of the Messiah, and of the last ages 
 of the world, 261. 
 
 not inapplicable because the Prophets understood it 
 otherwise, 262, 
 
 its applicability to some events, no proof of its inappli- 
 cability to others, 263. 
 
 resembles a compilation from memoirs, not fully under- 
 stood, 262. 
 
 is the history of things before they come to pass, 267. 
 
 summary of it, 268-9, 270-3. 
 
 concerning the kingdoms of the world and state of the 
 Church, 280. 
 
 tendency of things towards the future completion of it, 
 279. 
 
 qualifications necessary to judge thoroughly the force of 
 its evidence, 280. 
 
 the conformity between prophecy and events not to be 
 lightly set aside, 282-3. 
 
 PROPHET. 
 
 Christ a Prophet, 214. 
 
 Prophets not the sole authors of what they wrote, 262. 
 
 PROSPERITY. See Happmess. 
 
 in a virtuous kingdom all would contribute to it, 66. 
 
 naturall}' connected with virtue, 67. 
 
 begets unbounded and extravagant thoughts, 105. 
 
 PROVIDENCE, See God. 
 
 how our ignorance is an answer to objections against its 
 
 scheme, 131. 
 how far it is necessary to vindicate it, 291. 
 there must be some scheme of Providence in a manner 
 
 boundless, 66. 
 
 PRUDENCE. See Folly. 
 
 meaning of the word, 327. 
 
 there is such a thing notwithstanding the uncertainties 
 
 and variety of things, 224. 
 how a virtue, 326-7. 
 
 requires often very much and difficult consideration, 243. 
 may oblige us to act on verv slight presumptions, 3, 223, 
 
 244, 295. 
 
382 Index of Words and Things, 
 
 PRUDENCE {continued). 
 
 capacities of it, the gift of God, 224. 
 
 what determines actions to be prudent, 295. 
 Public Spirit, the true notion of it includes veracity and jus- 
 tice, 63. 
 
 PUNISHMENT. See Consequences, Vicarious, Pardon. 
 government by it, 8. 
 
 the government of God by it, Pt. I., Ch. II., 32, 38. 
 its injustice destroyed by the opinion of necessity, 117, 
 
 292. 
 we do not know all the ends and reasons of future punish- 
 ment, 202. 
 means of it, unknown to us, 202. 
 may be by way of natural consequence, 202-3. 
 to be ascribed to God's justice, 203. 
 not a matter of arbitrary appointment, 203. 
 repentance does not necessarily prevent it, 207. 
 contrary to nature that future doing well should prevent 
 
 the consequences of past evil, 208, 40. 
 natural provisions for saving men from it, 207. 
 Son of God interposed to prevent that appointed to our 
 
 sin, 209. 
 wickedness and punishment, naturally connected, 325. 
 heathen moralists thought this life a state of it, 211. 
 natural, analogous to that taught by religion as future, 
 38. 
 
 in being often long delayed, 39, 43, 
 often much greater than the pleasures gained by in- 
 curring it, 39. 
 uncertain, 39. 
 sudden, 39. 
 
 not escaped by the excuse of youth, &c., 40. 
 sometimes final and irremediable, 41, 43. 
 the offices of reason and revelation concerning future 
 
 punishment, 41, n. 
 Gentile writers speak of it as the Scriptures do, 41, n. 
 of vice as folly, 51. 
 
 as hurtful to society, 51. 
 as such, 52. 
 
 in ourselves and by others, 54. 
 virtue never punished as such, 53, 
 incompleteness and seeming doubtfulness of evidence may 
 be a punishment, 238. 
 
" Index of Words and Things. 383 
 
 REASON. See Experience, IgnorancCy Abstruse, Abstract, 
 Analogical. 
 
 is the candle of the Lord within us, 303. 
 
 the only fticulty whereby we can judge anj^thing, 176. 
 
 must judge of the morality of Scripture, 189. 
 
 and of the evidence of revelation and the objections to it, 
 190. 
 
 Scripture if really contrary to it must be given up, 22 1 . 
 
 power under its directiou does prevail over brute force, 
 60. 
 
 conditions of this, 61. 
 
 it has a natural tendency to prevail over brute force, 62. 
 
 shows us a general connection in the system of religion 
 and a tendency to its completion, 68. 
 
 to pretend to act upon it against plain practical princi- 
 ples is unreasonable, 116. 
 
 its light does not force men to obey it, 155. 
 
 may be impaired by the indulgence of a ludicrous turn, 
 239. 
 
 cannot judge where it has no principles to judge upon, 
 303. 
 
 teaches a certain doctrine of a future state, 41, n.- 
 
 might not have discovered natural religion, 147. 
 
 could not have discovered Christianity, 156. 
 
 this is no objection against Christianity, 168. 
 
 gives us no principles by which to judge of how revela- 
 tion should have been left in the world, 180. 
 
 shows us nothing of the immediate means of obtaining 
 benefits, Avhether spiritual, or temporal, 160. 
 
 absurd reasoning against Christianity, 221. 
 
 unreasonable objections to Christiauit}', 302. 
 
 it is highly useful and proper to show the reasonableness 
 of all God's dealings, 292, 220. 
 Reason to wish, different from a right to claim, 135. 
 
 REASONS. 
 
 of a Divine command must be known, and known to 
 
 have ceased, before the obligation ceases, 149. 
 reasons why God made different creatures, and why he 
 
 put similar creatures in different positions, unknown 
 
 to us, but probably similar, 228. 
 inquiring into the reasons of God's dispensations, right 
 
 and pious, 220, 292. 
 RecoUtction and being on their guard against deceits, the greatest 
 
 difficulty to some, 237. 
 
384 Index of Words and Things. 
 
 Recovery, only possible up to a certain degree, 40, 43. 
 
 Rectitude. See Virtue. 
 
 REDEMPTION, See Christ, Mediator, Assistance. 
 
 the i-edemptiou of the world by a Mediator, Pt. II., Ch. 
 v., 201. 
 
 Scripture account of it, 211-16. 
 
 analogous to the use of natural remedies, 204. 
 
 may extend to those who have never heard of it in this 
 fife, 210, n. 
 
 moral tendency of the scriptural doctrine, 220. 
 
 how it makes the innocent suffer for the guilty, 218. 
 
 REFLECTION. See Intellectual powers. Moral faculty. 
 a STATE of reflection, 26. 
 
 POWERS of reflection may not be destroyed by death, 26. 
 or even suspended, 26. 
 it may improve them, 28. 
 
 REFORMATION. See Repentance, Amendment. 
 the uneasiness attending it, 49. 
 
 to be put to the account of the former vice, 49. 
 not sufficient to hinder the effect of past vice, 305. 
 RELATIONS. See Duties. 
 
 exist between the individuals, species, &c., in the world, 
 
 128. 
 revealed, as well as natural, give rise to obligations, 157. 
 relations of moral action, &c., may be infinite, 129. 
 eternal and unalterable relations of things, 72. 
 to us of the Son and Spirit of GoD, revealed in Scripture, 
 
 157. 
 to us of God the Father, revealed by reason, 157. 
 
 RELIGION. See Natural, Revelation, Christianity, GoD, Mi- 
 racles, Obligations. 
 
 requires no more than we are well able to do, 79, 227. 
 
 proof of a future life no proof of it, 32. 
 
 what the notion of it contains, 10. 
 
 is here considered as a question of fact, 297. 
 
 its general system, &c., shows a tendency to its comple- 
 tion, 68. 
 
 teaches that we are in a state of probation, 72. 
 
 whether the opinion of fate be consistent with it, 109, &c. 
 
 a practical subject, therefore the opinion of necessity is 
 inapplicable to it, 116. 
 
 a proof of it as a matter of fact, 117. 
 
 how destroyed by the opinion of necessity, 126. 
 
Index of Words and Things. 385 
 
 RELIGION (continued). 
 
 what position nature places us in regard to a knowledge 
 
 of it, 152. 
 twofold, internal and external, 157. 
 distinction between the moral and positive in it, 161. 
 moral piety and virtue its general spirit, as distinguished 
 
 from ritual observances, 166. 
 indifference about it, real immoral depravity, 230. 
 its practice, to whom unavoidable, 237. 
 does not regard the thing done, but the mode of doing it, 
 
 241. 
 a practical thing, consisting in a course of life agreeable 
 
 to the Avill of God, 288. 
 presupposes integrity and honesty, and in what sense, 294. 
 the incredible inattention to it, 299. 
 its origin according to history and tradition, 122. 
 apparently pure in the first ages of the world, 122. 
 probably introduced at first by revelation, 122, 171. 
 its general truth proved by a dilemma as to its origin, 
 
 122. 
 state of it in the heathen world, 147. 
 unreasonableness of the opposition to it, 301-2. 
 its great importance, 145. 
 its evidence not appearing obvious may be some men's 
 
 trial, 229. 
 the temper, which would cause obedience to it, would 
 
 lead a man to examine its evidence, 229, 
 degrees of acquaintance with it, not a subject of com- 
 plaint, 227. 
 proper motives to it, 145. 
 a practical and the proper proof of it, 69-72. 
 it implies, a future life, 32. 
 
 God's government by rewards and punishments, 38, 
 
 292. 
 God's peifect moral government, 68. 
 founded in the moral character of the Author of nature, 
 
 117. 
 its perfection is that perfect love, which casteth out fear, 
 
 292. 
 common men may be convinced of it on real evidence, 
 
 239. 
 Does it teach us to be selfish? 95, n., 104, 328. 
 KEMEDIES. See Diseases, Assistance, Compassion, 
 
 FOR DISEASES, long unknowu, and known now to but 
 few, 188. 
 
 c c 
 
386 Index of Words and Things. 
 
 REMEDIES FOR Diseases (continued). 
 
 neither certain, perfect, nor universal, 188. 
 analogous to Chi-istianity, viewed as a remedy, 
 187-90. 
 FOR the MISERY and evil in the world, 204. 
 exhibit both severity and indulgence, 204. 
 Remorse, follows vice only, 53. 
 
 REPENTANCE. See Pardon, Reformation. 
 
 does not seem sufficient to expiate guilt, 206-8. 
 pardon, not admissible by the sole efficacy of it, 209. 
 made acceptable through Christ, 216. 
 
 its efficacy taught by the Gospel, 216, 152. 
 who are said in the prayer of Manasses not to need it, 
 210, n. 
 
 RESENTMENT. 
 
 roused by a perception of faultiness, not of mere harm, 55. 
 contradicts the objection to religion on the opinion of 
 necessity, 125. 
 
 RESIGNATION. 
 
 the same reasoning applicable to this as to active virtues, 
 
 105. 
 habits of it may be requisite to all creatures, 105-6. 
 
 how formed, 106. 
 affliction, the proper discipline for it, 106. 
 moderates our passions, and tends to make us easy and 
 satisfied, 106. 
 Resolutions to do well are properly acts, 86. 
 Restitution of all things, 186. 
 
 REVELATION. See Religion, Christianitg, Evidence, Scrip- 
 ture. 
 
 likely to contain things liable to objections, Pt. II., Ch. 
 III., 175. 
 
 want of universalitv and deficiencies in the proof of it, 
 Pt. II., Ch. VI., 222. 
 
 what is implied in the scheme of it, 10-11, 156-60. 
 
 particular scheme of the universe cannot be known with- 
 out it, 65. 
 
 determines the time only of future punishment, &c., 41, n. 
 
 time at which the hinderances of justice will be removed 
 cannot be known without it, 71. 
 
 that natural religion came into the world by it, 122, 171. 
 
 a real one may be concluded from the existence of pre- 
 tended ones, 122. 
 
Index of Words and Things. 387 
 
 REVELATION {continued). 
 
 opinion of necessity does not destroy the proof of re- 
 vealed religion, 126. 
 
 light of nature, no reason against it, 147. 
 
 not to be considered of small importance provided natural 
 religion be followed, 148. 
 
 teaches natural religion purely and authoritatively, 150. 
 
 of the relations in which we stand to the Son and Holy 
 Spirit raises obligations of duty, 156. 
 
 the essence of revealed religion in one aspect con- 
 sists in these, 157. 
 
 to be considered as teaching us new facts and new rela- 
 tions raising duties, 158. 
 
 alone shows us how to obtain spiritual benefits, 160. 
 
 scheme of it to be searched for in the Scriptures, not de- 
 termined beforehand by reason, 166. 
 
 is not contrary to natural religion, 166. 
 
 no presumption against it, that it contains things not 
 discoverable by the light of natm-e, 166. 
 
 there must be innumerable things not to be discovered 
 without it, 168. 
 
 no presumption against supposing one, when man was 
 first placed on the earth, 171. 
 
 we are incompetent judges of it, 176. 
 
 supposed revelations may be proved false by internal 
 evidence, 176. 
 
 our being incompetent judges of the course of nature 
 makes our being so of revelation likely, 177. 
 
 we are no judges beforehand how it should be com- 
 municated, 179. 
 
 we cannot say that any particular form of it would not 
 have answered God's purposes, 180. 
 
 raises a practical duty so long as any proof at all re- 
 mains of it, 181. 
 
 what reason can judge concerning it, 189. 
 
 its nature may be compared with what Ave should have 
 expected from enthusiasm, &c., 191. 
 
 has a greater tendency to promote virtue, &c., than 
 could have been expected from them, 191. 
 
 probably gave origin to sacrifices, 215. 
 
 a light shining in a dark place, 226. 
 
 if it were universal men would still be in diff"ereut re- 
 ligious situations, 229. 
 
 is itself miraculous, 249-50, 171. 
 
 its evidence circumstantial as well as direct, 265. 
 
388 Index of Words and Things. 
 
 REVELATION {continued). 
 
 may be considered as wholly historical, 267. 
 
 the doubtfulness of its evidence under the circumstances 
 proves its truth, 269-70. 
 
 its reception, &c., one of the most important events in 
 the history of mankind, 274. 
 
 " it is a poor thing to clear it by showing the same diffi- 
 culties in natural religion," 286. 
 
 it is unreasonable to urge against it alone, what is of 
 equal weight against natural religion, 288. 
 
 inattention to it immoral, 300. 
 Revolutions, sometimes brought about by the sense of injustice, 
 55. 
 
 REWARDS. See Punishments, Goverjiment, Moral, General 
 laws, Virtue. 
 government bv rewards and punishments, Pt. I., Ch, II., 
 
 32. 
 even brutes are governed by them, 125. 
 natural rewards of virtue, 53-8. 
 when given to vicious actions, are not according to the 
 
 intent of nature, 59. 
 some grounds for the hope of them in the virtuous, 60, 
 
 &c. 
 what are real rewards and punishments, 37. 
 hope of them, a proper motive to obedience, 104. 
 RIDICULE. See Levitt/, Ludicrous, Scorn. 
 
 religion no more subject to it than nature, 10. 
 of the notion of smaller pains being punishments, 37. 
 may be occasioned by expressions, though not by the 
 thing expressed, 239. 
 
 this ridicule may hinder the perception of truth, 238. 
 unanswerable, 299. 
 
 of Scripture, before serious examination, an offence 
 against natural piety, 274. 
 Roman Empire, plainly was divided into about ten parts as 
 
 foretold by Daniel, 264. 
 Rom,e, Greece, and Babylon, how noticed in prophecy, 268. 
 
 SACRIFICE. See Christ, Mediator, Vicarious. 
 its prevalence disproves the idea of the sufficiency 
 of repentance, 208. 
 heathen sacrifices traditional probably from a revelation, 
 215. 
 
 thought efficacious, but the manner is not clear, 216. 
 
Index of Words and Things. 389 
 
 SACRIFICE (continued). 
 
 commanded to the Jews, 215. 
 
 Levitical, a shadow of Christ's, 212. 
 efficacious in some degree, 216. 
 Safety, an important consideration in matters of action, 284. 
 
 SAMENESS. See Personal Identity. 
 
 same, not applied to vegetables as it is to persons, 315. 
 
 SANCTIONS. See Punishment. 
 
 of civil and divine government, 37. 
 
 of the dictates of the moral faculty, 119. 
 Satirical writing, has some analogy to the prophetic, 260. 
 
 SATISFACTION. 
 
 of Christ, 216. See Sacrifice, Atonement. 
 
 is a consequence of virtue, 36, 48, 54. 
 
 [perfect] satisfaction does not belong to man, 294. 
 
 no natural institution of life is satisfactory, 293. 
 
 SCEPTICISM. See Doubtfulness, Obligations. 
 no justification of fearlessness in religion, 44. 
 
 requires men to have some solicitude about it, 243. 
 immorality and irreligion not excused by it, 308. 
 what the ancient sceptics must have admitted, 297. 
 how far a man can go towards speculative infidelity, 308. 
 
 SCHEME. ^QQ Nature, Course of Nature. 
 
 The government of Gob a scheme incomprehensible, Pt. 
 
 I., Ch. VII., 127. 
 Christianity a scheme imperfectly comprehended, Pt. 
 
 II., Ch. IV., 192. 
 a scheme, or system implies variety, 228. 
 
 SCOPvN. See Ridicule. 
 
 part of the prophetical writings treated with scorn, 176. 
 great weakness to be influenced by it, 265. 
 scorn and contempt of revelation in some persons, 301. 
 proportioned to their inattention, 308. 
 
 SCRIPTURE. See Revelation, Christianity, Evidence. 
 
 its design is to give an account of the world as God's 
 world, 267. 
 
 this distinguishes it from all other books, 267. 
 in what its notices terminate, 269. 
 antiquit}' of its first parts, 269. 
 
 mistakes of transcribers, inc., not gi-eater than its anti- 
 quity makes probable, 275-6. 
 profession of natural religion may be owing to it, 226. 
 
390 Index of Words and Things. 
 
 SCRIPTURE (continued). 
 
 reason must judge of its morality and evidence, 189, 190, 
 
 221. 
 mode of discovering its meaning, 186. 
 maj^ contain things not yet discovered, 186. 
 duty of searching it, 166. 
 where we may determine its seeming meaning not the 
 
 true one, 166. 
 Origen's observation concerning difficulties in it, 5. 
 future punishments spoken of by heathens as by it, 
 
 41, n. 
 its account of our state hereafter, 93. 
 proves natural religion, 150. 
 always puts the stress on moral, rather than on positive 
 
 duties, 164. 
 Scripture, not reason, shows what Christianity is, 166. 
 its stj'le objected against, 175 
 what' it tells us, verv briefly stated, 177, at more length, 
 
 267-9. -See 211-15. 
 its authority not overthrown by certain objections, 181. 
 modes of arguing applicable to other books, not so to this, 
 
 326, 181. 
 our understanding of it may be increased as our natural 
 
 knowledge is, 186. 
 events may ascertain its meaning, 186. 
 precepts recorded in it justify actions otherwise vicious, 
 
 190. 
 ascribes natural punishments to God's justice, 203. 
 its account that mankind is in a state of degradation, 
 
 confirmed by observation, 211. 
 declares that every one shall not understand, 239. 
 relates miracles as part of its history, 246. 
 its miraculous history, confirmed by the establishment of 
 
 the Jewish and Christian religions, 246. 
 cannot be rejected till proved of no authority, 247. 
 may have a greater meaning than its compilers perceived, 
 
 262. 
 its extent and structure afford the largest scope for criti- 
 cism, 269. 
 civil history no way confutes, but rather confirms it, 274. 
 nothing in its history gives ground of suspicion against 
 
 its truth, 275. 
 wh}' it begins with an account of the creation, 267. 
 SECURITY. See Safeti/. 
 
 sense of it arises from being true to virtue, 60. 
 
Index of Words and Things. 39 1 
 
 SECURITY {continued). 
 
 of finite creatures may depend upon their having habits 
 
 of virtue, 98. 
 of highest state may depend upon the practical sense of 
 things obtained in a state of probation, 100. 
 Seeds, how few come to maturity, 103. 
 Self. See Personal Identity. 
 
 Self-deceit concerning the evidence of Christianity, 235. 
 SELF-DENIAL. 
 
 not essential to virtue and piety [in themselves], 101. 
 highly conducive to discipline and improvement, 101. 
 as necessary to secure our worldly, as our eternal in- 
 terest, 76, 80. 
 how required in upright creatures, 97. 
 productive of resignation to God's will, 106. 
 SELF-GOVERNMENT. See Domestic Life, Recollection. 
 recollection and self-government necessary to temporal 
 
 prosperity, 80. 
 virtuous self-government improving as well as right, 98. 
 SELF-LOVE. See Interest. 
 reasonable, 75, 95, n. 
 the passions opposed to it, 75. 
 
 coincident with the will of God and part of the idea of 
 virtue, 95, n., 105. 
 
 not perhaps always, however, 105. 
 in what sense it needs strengthening, 95, n. 
 a proper motive of action, 105. 
 is moderated by active virtue and obedience, 106. 
 how far, and to Avhat purpose, moral discipline strengthens 
 
 it, 104-6. 
 with particular affections, distorts and rends the mind, 
 106. 
 Selfish, in what sense religion teaches us to be so, 104, 328. 
 Sensation, a state of, 25. See Judgment. 
 Sense of Interest. See Interest. 
 Sermons preached at the Rolls, referred to, 75, 118, 125, 138, 
 
 306. 
 Shaftesbury, Lord, cited, 48. 
 
 Shame, arises from a sense of blameworthiness, 54. 
 Simplicity. See Oneness. 
 SLEEP. 
 
 shows that our living powers may exist unexercised, 15, 
 
 29. 
 shown by experience only not to destroy them, 27. 
 
392 Index of Words and Things. 
 
 SOCIETY. See Civil Government. 
 
 natural, 51. 
 
 its power increased by being under the direction of 
 virtue, 60. 
 
 the future state may be one of society, 93. 
 SON OF GOD. See Christ, Moral duties,^SiC. 
 
 Mediator between God and man, 1.57, &c. 
 Speculations concerning the constitution of the world, 7. 
 Staff, used in the same way that our limbs are, 23. 
 Strabo, cited, 28, n. 
 
 STRANGE. 
 
 EVENTS occur in most persons' lives, 275. 
 EXPRESSIONS in this treatise, how accounted for, 297. 
 
 STYLE OF THE SCRIPTURES, 305. 
 
 its inaccuracy does not overthrow their authority, 180, 
 175. 
 Success in temporal pursuits, doubtful both in its common and 
 in its true sense, 293. 
 
 SUMMARY. 
 
 of the whole work, 10-11. 
 
 of the first part, 141-4. 
 
 of the second part, 303-7. 
 
 of revealed religion considered as historical, 267-9, 270-3. 
 
 of Christianity, 193-5. 
 
 of the doctrines of Scripture concerning Christ as a Me- 
 diator, 211-16. 
 Swoons prove the same things as sleep more strongly. See 
 
 Sleep. 
 System. See Scheme, 
 
 TEMPORAL Interest, -vf^xerv in danger from ourselves, 74. 
 TEMPTATION. See Particular Affections, Fall, Trial, 
 
 Difficulties. 
 no moral possibility of doing wrong without it, 73. 
 external and internal how connected, 75. 
 with respect to our worldly interest, 74-7. 
 to forego a greater temporal good for a less, 76. 
 viciousness of the world, the great temptation, 77, 103. 
 what are the chief temptations of the generality of the 
 
 world, 236. 
 makes this an improving state of discipline, 99, 234, &c, 
 makes this present world peculiarly fit to be a state of 
 
 discipline, 99, &c. 
 to reject religion without any consideration of it at all, 
 
 234-5. 
 
Index of Words and Things. 393 
 
 TEMPTATION {continued). 
 
 implied in the ideas of a general righteous judgment, 73. 
 of moral government, 73. 
 but especially of probation, 73. 
 its greatness diminishes our perception of ill desert, 325. 
 
 TENDENCIES. See Consequences, Means. 
 
 when natural may be expected to prevail over accidental 
 
 hinderances, 72. 
 to Avrong are inherent in particular affections, 97. 
 means may seem to tend to the contrary end to that they 
 
 bring about, 133. 
 tendencies of the manner of our redemption, 220. 
 
 TESTIMONY. See Evidence. 
 
 the strongest evidence we can have for many facts, 254. 
 
 may possibly be overcome, 253. 
 
 enthusiasm not so easy an account of it, as its truth, 254. 
 
 its force, not destroyed by confuting like testimony in 
 other cases, 256. 
 
 human testimony, a natural ground of assent, 256. 
 
 natural laws of human actions require its admission, 257. 
 
 that men are liable to enthusiasm and capable of deceit 
 weakens, but does not destroy it, 256. 
 
 what destroys its evidence, 257. 
 
 that of the early Christians declared by their conversion, 
 the same as if it had been written, 251. 
 
 of S. Paul to the truth of Christianity, 248. 
 Theory of Virtue, going over and talking of it tends to pro- 
 duce practical indifference, 86. 
 7'trfe,howwe are assured that it will ebb and flow to-morrow, 1. 
 
 TRIAL. See Temptation, Probation, Discipline, Difficulties. 
 a state of Probation as implying it, Pt. I., Ch. IV., 72. 
 our state of temporal trial how constituted, 74. 
 how men act under it, 76. 
 
 our difficulties increased by the misconduct of our- 
 selves, and others under it, 77. 
 affords no just ground of complaint, 79. 
 thedeficiency of evidence may be part of some men's, 229. 
 may be as to whether we will take care to inform our- 
 selves impartially, 242. 
 our being placed in a state of trial, how rendered credi- 
 ble, 79. 
 speculative difficulties may make the larger part of some 
 men's, 236. 
 
394 Index of Words and Things. 
 
 TTNBELIEVERS. See Scepticism. 
 
 KJ what they must acknowledge, 266, 282. 
 
 how they endeavour to show the evidence of Christianity 
 insufficient, 252. 
 
 must admit it to be considerable, 258. 
 
 UNDERSTANDING. See Maturity, Moral. 
 its most pious exercise, 220. 
 our probation in respect of it, 234. 
 
 UNION. 
 
 its vast force, 61. 
 
 of good men with other orders of virtuous beings possi- 
 ble, 64. 
 the union of good men now prevented, 64. 
 Universal monarch, the head of a perfectly virtuous society 
 
 would become so, 67. 
 TTniversality, objections to Christianity from the want of it, 
 Pt. II., Ch. VI., 222. 
 
 UNIVERSE. See World, 3Iaterial. 
 
 the scheme of it cannot be known without revelation, 65. 
 
 UNREASONABLE. See Reason. 
 
 unreasonable actions ground of remorse, 53. 
 
 USE AND EXERCISE. See Habits. 
 naturally yielded to, 88. 
 
 VARIOUS readings in the Scripture do not overthrow its 
 authority, 180. 
 
 VEGETABLES. 
 
 their decay not exactly analogous to our death, 29. 
 vegetable world, subservient to the animal, 130. 
 what same means when applied to them, 315. 
 
 VERACITY. See Falsehood, Jtistice, Public Spirit. 
 
 a special means of uniting society, 63. 
 
 with justice, the natural rule of conduct in a supreme 
 Being, 118. 
 
 mankind naturally endued with it, 255. 
 
 our natural regard to it, 330. 
 
 should be our rule of life, 332. 
 
 only violated b}^ intentional deceit, 332. 
 
 not by the use of common forms of speech, 332. 
 Verisimile, 2, n. 
 Vexed, being vexed with oneself, a result of faultiness, 53. 
 
Index of Words and Things. 395 
 
 VICARIOUS PUNISHMENTS. See Assistance, Mediator, 
 Christ. 
 considered by way of Analog}-, 203-20. 
 may be fit and absolutely necessary, 219. 
 
 VICE. See Evil, Folly, Indulgence, Moral, Punishment. 
 
 does not consist merely in the intention or tendency to 
 
 produce unhappiness, 330. 
 manner in which a habit of it is formed, 97. 
 this life is to some a discipline of it, 103. 
 passion a poor excuse for it, 145. 
 its natural bad consequences, judicial punishments, 37, 
 
 203. 
 
 those in a future life maybe by way of natural con- 
 sequence, 160. 
 private vices may have good effects and yet have been 
 
 better avoided, 134. 
 hinderances to its complete punishment accidental, 64, 70. 
 it must be the misery of every creature, 9. 
 considerations showing its enormity, 205. 
 imprudent wilfulness as well as actual vice, punished, 39. 
 vice punished as such, 52. 
 
 whence this proceeds, 57. 
 discountenanced as such, 56. 
 infamous and why, 57. 
 punished as mischievous to society, 51, 71. 
 some actions though vicious, rewarded by the operation 
 
 of general laws, 59. 
 ridiculous for men to think themselves secure in it, 144, 
 how, incongruous, unsuitable, disproportionate and unfit, 
 
 326. 
 approbation of it for its own sake monstrous, 58. 
 Avhat if it had the same effects as virtue ? 68. 
 no such declaration in its favour as in that of virtue, 69. 
 its snares render this world peculiarly fit for a state of 
 
 discipline, 101. 
 it is uncertain whether anything can be gained by it, 
 
 certain that little can, 145. 
 provision may have been made against its ruinous con- 
 sequences always following, 205. 
 its awful effects in this present world, 206. 
 consists chiefly in the want of the virtuous principle, 325. 
 
 VIRTUE. See Self-government, See, Justice, Moral, Pru- 
 dence, Goodness. 
 Dissertation on its nature, 321. 
 
39^ Index of Words and Things. 
 
 VIRTUE (continued). 
 
 what it consists in, 58, 323. 
 
 has regard to actions, 323, n. 
 
 inconsistent with the idea of ill desert, 324. 
 
 common instances of it produce a very weak feeling of 
 good desert, 325. 
 
 does not consist Avholly in benevolence, 329. 
 
 going over its theory, may harden the heart, 86. 
 
 habit of it how formed, 85-6. 
 
 its improvement progressive, 98. 
 
 improved by temptation, 99, &c. 
 
 how secured, 95. 
 
 self-denial not essential to it [in itself], 101. 
 
 has a natural tendency to prevail over vice, 60, 64, 70. 
 this tendenc}^ hindered, 64. 
 the hinderances to it accidental, 64-72. 
 
 its final triumph, credible and likely, 60-72. 
 
 the practice of it includes a reference to revelation, 149, 
 156, 274, 300. 
 
 is generallv attended with more satisfaction than vice, 
 48, 49, 57. 
 
 yet there may be exceptions, 49. 
 
 rewarded as such, 52, 71. 
 
 as beneficial to society, 51-71. 
 
 conciliates good offices, 54-5. 
 
 public honours and advancements its natural rewards, 55. 
 
 favoured as such, 56. 
 
 peace and delight sometimes arise necessarily from it, 57. 
 
 nothing in the human mind contradictory to it, 58. 
 
 necessarily distinguished from vice, 58. 
 
 some actions though virtuous punished by the operation 
 of general laws, 59. 
 
 so far as a man is true to it he is on the side of the Di- 
 vine administration, 59-60. 
 
 being true to it gives rise to a sense of security, secret 
 satisfaction, and implied hope, 60. 
 
 it and vice tend to produce their good and bad effects in 
 a greater degree than they do, 60. 
 
 tends to increase the power of a society directed by it 
 and how, 62. 
 
 conditions of the prevalence of power directed by it, 63. 
 
 much less power under its direction would prevail over 
 much more not so, 64. 
 
 existence of this tendency, not refuted by its being hin- 
 dered, 65. 
 
Index of Words and Things. 397 
 
 VIRTUE icoyitinued). 
 
 to see it work out its effects in one order of beings may 
 
 be very useful to others, 65. 
 it and vice will probably be rewarded and punished in a 
 
 higher degree hereafter, 70, 
 improvement in virtue and piety the end of our being 
 
 placed here, 83. 
 we need improvement in it, and for that this life is a fit 
 
 state of discipline, 92. 
 reasonable self-love, part of the idea of it, 404, 95, n., 
 
 104. 
 practical principle of it, how strengthened, 95. 
 habits of it, improvement in it, and this is advancement 
 
 in happiness, 96. 
 
 necessary to all, even to perfect creatures, 94. 
 how necessary in a future state, 96. 
 the necessary exercise of moral attention, &c., implies an 
 
 effort of virtue more real, constant, &c., 101. 
 it may be promoted by what seems opposed to it, 133. 
 moral virtue alone makes us acceptable to God, 164. 
 in general there is a universally acknowledged standard 
 
 of it, 323. 
 profession of it universal, 323. 
 Voice of Nature m the conduct of Providence declares for vir- 
 tue, 59. 
 
 TT/'ARXIXGS. See Consequences. 
 \ V against the consequences of vice, &c., 36, 43. 
 
 fearful effect of disregarding them, 43-4. 
 Waste apparent in nature to us unaccountable, 104. 
 Waterland, his tract on the nature, obligation, and efficacy of 
 
 the Christian Sacraments, cited, 157, n. 
 llliat we were to he, the effect of what we would do, 107. 
 
 WICKEDNESS. 
 
 voluntary, 82. 
 
 the danger of it taught by the Gospel, 152. 
 Wilfulness has the effects of vice, 39. 
 
 WILL. See Character, GOD. 
 
 of God, may be regarded as absolute, or conditional, 242. 
 
 our sin and its effects in these two views, 242. 
 how determined. See Fitness, 120, n. 
 Wisdom, in the book of Proverbs, 42. 
 
 Words show the existence of something they were meant to 
 represent, 322. 
 
398 Index of Words and Things. 
 
 WORLD. See Material, Universe, Earth, Nature. 
 
 how we ought to form our notions of its government and 
 
 constitution, 5-6. 
 peculiarly fit to be a state of discipline for depraved 
 
 creatures, 99. 
 its viciousness makes it a state of virtuous discipline to 
 
 good men, 103. 
 is a theatre of action, 107. 
 
 the natural world and its government, a progressive 
 scheme, or system, 199. 
 
 probably intended to be subordinate to the moral, 
 
 130. 
 both alike incomprehensible, 129-30. 
 its histor}', how given in Scripture, 267. 
 no account of its origin can be given without an intel- 
 ligent Author, nor of its general design without a 
 moral Governor, 140. 
 
 WRONG. See Injury. 
 
 sense of it, implied in remorse, 53. 
 and in resentment, 322. 
 
 YO UNG people, their hazards in temporal matters, 74. 
 YOUTH. See Infancy. 
 effects of misbehaviour in it, 78. 
 
 the state for acquiring what is necessary in manhood, 90. 
 no sufficient excuse for rashness and folly, 40. 
 an opportunity which may be lost for ever, 91. 
 
IXDEX OF TEXTS CITED OR 
 REFEERED TO. 
 
 
 Page 
 
 
 Page 
 
 Genesis i. 
 
 267. 
 
 Malachi I. 11, 
 
 272. 
 
 Beut. xxviii. 37, 
 
 278. 
 
 III. 
 
 272. 
 
 64, 
 
 271. 
 
 Ecclns. XLii. 24, 25, 
 
 84. 
 
 XXX. 2, 3, 
 
 271. 
 
 3Ianasses' Prayer, 
 
 210, n. 
 
 Job XXXIII. 24, 
 
 214. 
 
 Matt. VI. 23, 
 
 239, n. 
 
 Psalm ex. 4, 
 
 212. 
 
 IX. 11, 13, 
 
 164. 
 
 Proverbs I. 
 
 42-3. 
 
 XI. 25, 
 
 239, n. 
 
 XX. 27, 
 
 303. 
 
 XII. 1, 7, 
 
 164, 165. 
 
 
 
 XIII. 11, 12, 
 
 239, 11. 
 
 Isaiah ii. 
 
 272. 
 
 XX. 28, 
 
 213. 
 
 VIII. 14, 15, 
 
 272. 
 
 XXVI. 28, 
 
 211. 
 
 XI. 
 
 272. 
 
 XXVIII. 18, 
 
 194. 
 
 XXTX. 13, 14, 
 
 239, n. 
 
 19, 
 
 156. 
 
 XLV. 17, 
 
 271. 
 
 
 
 XLIX. 5, 
 
 272. 
 
 3Iark X. 45, 
 
 213. 
 
 6, 
 
 272. 
 
 John I. 3, 
 
 268. 
 
 LIII. 
 
 212,272. 
 
 9, 
 
 211. 
 
 LVI. 7, 
 
 272. 
 
 29, 36, 
 
 211. 
 
 LX. 21, 
 
 67,271. 
 
 III. 5, 
 
 160. 
 
 Jer. XXX. 11, 
 
 271. 
 
 16, 
 
 209,306. 
 
 XXXI. 36, 
 
 271. 
 
 19, 
 
 239,11. 
 
 XL VI. 28, 
 
 271. 
 
 35, 
 
 214. 
 
 
 
 V. 22, 23, 
 
 194,214. 
 
 Daniel, 
 
 264. 
 
 44, 
 
 239, u. 
 
 II. 44, 
 
 269. 
 
 VI. 14, 
 
 214. 
 
 VII. 7, 
 
 264. 
 
 VIII. 12, 
 
 211. 
 
 14, 22, 
 
 67,269. 
 
 XI. 51, 52, 
 
 213. 
 
 27, 
 
 269. 
 
 52, 
 
 193. 
 
 IX. 24, 
 
 212. 
 
 XIV. 2, 
 
 194. 
 
 XII. 10, 
 
 239, n. 
 
 2, 3, 
 
 215. 
 
 Hosea VI. 6, 
 
 165. 
 
 xviii. 36, 
 
 215. 
 
 Amos IX. 15, 
 
 271. 
 
 Acts, 
 III. 21, 
 
 248. 
 186, 269 
 
 Malachii. 10, 11, 
 
 272. 
 
 xvii. 31, 
 
 194. 
 
400 
 
 Index of Texts cited. 
 
 Romans l. 18, 
 III. 25, 
 
 Page 
 146. 
 211. 
 
 2 Tim. I. 10, 
 lu. 13, 
 
 
 Page 
 146,152 
 239, n. 
 
 V. 10, 
 
 213. 
 
 Titus 11. 12, 
 
 
 214. 
 
 11, 
 XV. 19, 
 
 211. 
 249. 
 
 Hebreivs, 
 
 II. 10, 
 
 
 212, n. 
 213. 
 
 1 Cor. I. 27, 
 
 175,195. 
 
 14, 
 
 
 214. 
 
 II. 14, 
 
 239,n. 
 
 V. 9, 
 
 
 213, 306 
 
 V. 7, 
 
 211. 
 
 VI. 1, 
 
 
 186. 
 
 VI. 20, 
 
 213. 
 
 vn. 25, 
 
 
 213. 
 
 XI. 23, &c. 
 
 248. 
 
 VIII. 4, 
 
 5, 
 
 212. 
 
 XII. 8-28, 
 
 249. 
 
 IX. 26, 
 
 
 216. 
 
 XIII. 1, 2, 8, 
 
 249. 
 
 28, 
 
 
 21.3. 
 
 XIV. 
 
 249. 
 
 X. 1, 
 
 
 212. 
 
 XV. 8, 
 
 248. 
 
 4,5 
 
 ,9, 
 
 10, 212. 
 
 25-8, 
 
 2 Cor. IV. 4, 
 V. 19, 
 VIII. 12, 
 XII. 12, 13, 
 
 Galat. I. 
 
 III. 2, 5, 
 13, 
 
 194-5. 
 
 239, 11. 
 213. 
 
 227. 
 249. 
 
 248. 
 249. 
 213. 
 
 1 Peter 1. 11, 
 
 19, 
 
 11. 21, 
 
 III. 18, 
 
 2 Peter I. 19, 
 
 II. 1, 
 III. 13, 
 
 12, 
 
 194. 
 213. 
 215. 
 213. 
 
 226. 
 213. 
 193. 
 
 IV. 4, 
 
 194. 
 
 1 John 11. 1, 
 
 2, 
 
 213. 
 
 Ephes. II. 16, 
 III. 9, 
 
 213. 
 
 268. 
 
 2, 
 IV. 18, 
 
 
 211. 
 292. 
 
 IV. 12, 
 
 12, 13, 
 V. 2, 
 
 1.53. 
 215. 
 209,211. 
 
 Revelation, 
 
 III. 21, 
 V. 9, 
 
 
 211,n. 
 
 215. 
 
 213. 
 
 Philip. II. 6-11, 
 8, 9, 
 2 Thess. I. 8, 
 
 194. 
 214. 
 
 215. 
 
 12, 
 
 X. 7, 
 
 XI. 15, 
 
 17, 
 
 13, 
 
 214. 
 269. 
 215. 
 
 42, n. 
 
 1 Tim. II. 5, 
 
 201,211. 
 
 XIV. 4, 
 
 
 21.3. 
 
 6, 
 
 213. 
 
 XXII. 5, 
 
 
 269. 
 
 III. 16, 
 
 195. 
 
 11» 
 
 
 255. 
 
 
 THE 
 
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