it^P^M S2a a 03 £^ ,i£iu Q3. '52' OK TllK AT PRINCETON, N. J. SAMUEL AONEW^, OF P JII I. A n E I, P H I A , PA. '/e2. ©^. PTT/tn/i/cJ^ y^r^^-/^^^. ■ ^ -''? "^P !]■ 6Ve.Sf^ Division ...l|^.-- ^: Shelf r ^ ,. f /, ^ Sec ion A I 1 f ^^ X ^^^ ^y^ ■■■:?r-'.:^'' y '-^^'i^ FOUR DISSERTATIONS' I. On providence. 11. On prayer. III. On the Reasons for expe6ling that virtuous^ Men ihali meet after Death in a iState of % 'Happinels. ■ IV. On the Importance of- Christianity, the Nature of Historical Evidence, and Miracles. By RICHARD'^RICE, F.R.S LONDON: Printed for A. Millar and T. Cadell, oppofite to Catherine- Street, in the Strand. / M DCC LXVII. / Publified by the fame Author^ Printed for A. Millar and T. Cadell in the Strand^ A Review of the principal Queftions- and Difficul- ties in Morals ; particularly, thofe relating to the Original of our Ideas of Virtue, its Nature, Foun- dation, Reference to the Deity, Obligation, Subjedl- matter and San6lions. In One Volume 06tavo, Price 65. [ iii j ADVERTISEMENT. THE Author hasibeftowed fo much pains on Ithe Firjl of the following Dijftrtations^ that he hopes it will \^ found worthy of careful attenticb. His view in the Second and T/)rd Dif- feriations is in a great ^eafure PraElical\ and he begs tHs may be remembered, and that futable allowances may be made when they are read. He wi{hes\ear- neftly to be able to contribut to- wards advancing the interei of virtue and rational religion in^he world ; and he will think t^t his life has been fpent to a vali A 2 m ^•>'i»«' "'i^>«"v [ i^ ] ble purpofe, fhould he ever fuc- ceed in this in the fmalleft de- gree- The Fourth DilTertation is de- fio-ried chiefly in anfwer to an ob- ledion againft Chriftianity, on which conflderable ftrefs has been laid. I' is, perhaps, too foreign to the main end of this work* There cannot, however, be any- great impropriety in giving it a place-iere. CO N- [ ?:Vr '] CONTENT S. ypfi DISSEllTATION L On Pro YiJD e;^ CE. Sc6t. I. /^.F the Argumejtts for Providence from the Ferfeclions of the Deity. P- 3 Seft. IT. Of the Arguments for Providence from the gejieral Laws and Conjlitution of the World. ?• 23 Sed. III. Of the Marnier in which Providence is admi?iijlered, p. 60 Sed. IV. Of the Ob] eBions againjl Providence. p. 89 Sea. V. Of the Ufes of tkeDo5lrine of Pro- vidence^ p. 162 D I S S E R. vi C O ^ T E ll T S. DISSERTATION II On Prayer. 3 Secfl. L T'he Nature y Reafonablenefs and Effi* cacy of Prayer explained^ and the Obje5iiont to it anfwered. p. 1 97 Sedt. II. Of the Importance of Prayer as an inftnmental t)uty, the Happinefs of a de* vout Temper and the particular Obligation to Public Worjhip. P- 230 Sedl. III. Of the Manner in 'which Prayer ought to be, performed. p. 276 DISSERTATION III. On the Reafons for expecting that virtuous Men fiall meet after Death in a State of Happinefs. P- 3^1 DISSERTATION IV. Oil the Nature of Hlftorical Evidence and Miracles. Sea. I. IntroduBory Obfervations relating to the Importance of Chrijiianity, its Eviden- ces^ CONTENTS. vii cesy and the ObjeBions which have been made to it. P-S^^ Seft. II. ^he Nature and Grounds of the Regard due to Experience^ and to the Evi^ . ^dence of Tefimonyy fated and compared, p. 384 Seplated with difguft and pain. B 2 T-e 4 0>^ Providence. The dodlrine of Providence, therefore, is plainly of the hioheft importance ; ^nd the v^riter of the following Differ-: tation can v^ant no apology for attempt- ing to aiTift in explaining and defending it, though he fhould fall iliort of his aim, and be able to do no more than ^ew a good intention, and perhaps en- gage a few to join with hini in care- fully reviewing a fubjedt that cannot top often employ our thoughts. What I ihall begin with will be an ac- count of fome of the principal argu- ments that prove an unerring Provi- dence. If it can be proved that the Deity ^dminiil-er$ all the affairs of the world, and extends his care to every created being in fuch a manner that nothing hard or oppreffive, nothing inconfiftent with rectitude and v/ifdom in the go- vernment of events ever comes to pafs y or, in other words, if it can be proved -^ f^ that O.^ Providence. ^ ^* that all the occurrences in nature are ^^ under perfedly wife and good direc- *^ tion /* then the docftrine of Provi- dence, -in the higheft and ftritteil: f^nfc of it, will be eflablifhed. There are two ways of proving this* One, from the conlideration of the Di- vine perfedtions. The other, from what falls under our notice of the frame and conftitution of the world. Let us firft confider the evidence arifing from the former of thefe heads. We have the beft reafons for afcrib- ing to the Deity all poffible excellence ; or for conceiving of the firft caufe as a being abfolutely perfed:. In the idea of abfolute perfedlion is implied infinite power, wifdom, and goodnefs ; and in thefe, fuch a providence over all things as has been mentioned. The Deity can- not be an indifferent fpedator of the fe- fies of events in that world to which he has given being. His goodnefs will as B 3 certainly 6 On Providence. certably. engage him to dircd them a- greeably to the ends of goodnefs, as his wifdomand power enable him to do it in the mofl effedual manner. Thus we muft conclude according to all our ideas of thefe attributes. Could we call that being good who would refufe to do any good which he is able to do without the leajft labour or difficulty ? — God is prefent every where. He fees all that happens -, and it is in his power, with perfeft eafe, to order all for the beft. Can he then poiTefs goodnefs, and at the fame time not do this ? — I am, fjppofe, in afflic- tion.- The author of mj' exiftence, who is almighty and righteous, knows my condition, and fees, what I feel. Would he, if he. fa w that my afflidlion is im- proper, or that- 1 labour under any real grievance, fuffer it for one moment ? 'Tis utterly impoflible. — A God without a Providence is undoubtedly a contradic- tion. Nothing is plainer than that a be- ing of perfect reafon will, in every in- ilaoce, take fuch care of the unlverfe as perfecft On Providence. j pcrfed: reafon requires. That fuprem6 intelligence and love which are prefent to all things, and from w^hence all things fprung, muft govern all occurrences, and exclude from the conftitution of na- ture all real ill and diforder. Thefe eonfiderations, it fhould be ob^ ferved, prove what has been called a particular in oppofition to a general Pro-* vidence. We cannot conceive of any reafons that can influence the Deity to exereife any providence over the world, which are not likewife reafons for ex- tending it to all that happens in the worldi As far as it is confined to gene- rals, or overlooks any individual, or any event, it is incomplete, and therefore unfuitable to the idea of a perfeft Be- ing. A great deal of very foolifh ridicule has been thrown on this fubjedl, and {c-' veral objedtions have been made, which prove no more than the ignorance of B 4. thofe 8 On Providence. thofe who make them. It will be pro- per here diftindly to take notice of fome of thefe. • One common prejudice againft this dodrine arifes from the apprehenfion that it is below the dignity of the Deity to watch over, in the man- ner it implies^ the meaneft beings, and all the minuteft affairs. In anfwer to this it may be obferved, that -a great number of minute affairs, if they are each of them ofyi/;?^ confequence 5 make «p a fum which is oi great confequence |. and that there is no way of taking care ot this fum^,. without taking care of each particular. Whatever events indeed are ^wholly frivolous^ it would be •s.bfurd to fuppofe the Deity to concern himfclf about. Such events want no dlred;ion. They are capable of no di- :re«5lion. But, on the contrar}'', all e- ¥'2nt3, not wholly frivolous, are proper Qbje(5t3 of attention; and what would 'fee really degrading to the univerfal pa- rent is^ not his watching over, but neg- lecting On 'Providence. 9 lefting them. This objection, therefore, under the appearance of honouring God, plainly difhonours him. Nothing is ab- folutely trifling wherein the happinefs of any individual, even the moft iniignifi- cant, is at all concerned : nor is it be- neath a wife and good Being to interpofe in any thing of this kind. To fuppofe the Deity above this, is to fuppofe him above adting up to the full extent of goodnefs and reditude. The fame eternal benevolence that firft engaged him to produce beings, cannot but engage him likewife to exercife a par- ticular providence over them; and the very loweft beings, as well as the high- eft, feem to have a kind of right to his fuperintendency^ from the very ad: of bringing them into exhlence. Every ap- preheniion tliat this is too great a con- defcenfion in him, is founded on the pooreft ideas ; for furely, whatever it was not too great a condefcenfion in him to create, it cannot be too great a 3 conde- lO 0/^ P R O V I D E N C E. condelcenfion in him to take care of ^i It is proper to add, that with refped to God 'Trct^ayoLyzii', co^i kolto, vtAvrct TfOTTov dd^vvcnop (jlH vrpoyont^sLi vToBin ra. i/t' olvth 'PreLpety^^iVTet- Sim. Comment. Cap. 38. Some of the obfervations which have been made above may be found alfo in Plato's well-known lOth Dialogue of Laws. In this dialogue Plato teaches excellently that (fince what is felf- moving is, by its nature, before that which moves only in confe- quence of being moved) mind muft he prior to mat-^ tey\ and the caufeof all its modifications and changes; and that, therefore, there is an univerfal min T-N E C T. Ov^ P R O V 1 D E N C E. 23 SECT. IL Of the arguments for Providence from the general laws and conflitiition cf the %vorld^. TT has been fliewn in the preceding JL fecffcion, that the perfedl charader of the Deity cannot be maintained without allowing an all- dire fting and unerring Providence, It would have been taking much too large a compafs to enter^ on this occaiion, into an account of the evidence for the Divine perfecflions. 'Tis fuffi- cient if it appears that the docftrine of Providence refls on the fame foundation with them, and follows from them. There is, however, one objection here, of which it v/ill be proper to take fome notice. It may be faid *' that our only ^* evidence for the Divine perfedlions is C 4 '' taken 24 On Providence. *' taken from what we oblerve of their " effedls in the frann.e of nature, and that *' therefore to infer from thefe perfec- '^ tions any greater order and wifdom in ** the adminiftration of nature than we *' can adually obferve, is to fappofe ** greater perfedtion in the Deity than *' can be proved, and the fame with firft *' determining the properties of the caufe <* by the efted, and then determining the *' properties of the effedl by the caufe." In anfvver to this I vvould obferve, ill, that it is not true that our whole evidence for the Divine perfedlions is taken from the frame of nature. The difcoveries of reafon, however they may be preceded by obfervation and experience, and take their rife from them., tranicend them in- finitely ; and in many inftances force us to receive truths v/hich they are incapa- ble of fuggeiling ''^\ But, * I am under a neccflity of referring again to the Reviezv of the pnn,.ipal ^lejiions and Dif- ficulties in Morals^ Chap, ifl and loth, where I have endeavoured to prove all that is here aflerted. , The 0/2 P R O V I D E N C B. 25 But, 2dly, fuppofing that our whole knowledge of the Deity muft be derived from w^hat we fee of his works, it will not follow that we ought to afcribe to him only juft that precife degree of the per- fedions we believe him to poflefs, which is equal to what we can comprehend of their effefts in the contrivance and or- The works of creation damnjlrate that the Creator is poflefled of power and intelligence. That he pofTefies them in the highejl pojfible degree^ follows from his na- ture as an uncaujed being. Whatever qualities fuch a being has, he muft have necejfarihj^ and, therefore, in their fource and in infinity. This Is capable of the firidleil: proof, and muft, 1 fancy, appear to every one who has juft views of this fubjecl. l^he perfeSi intelligence of the Deity being in this way difcovered, it will follow that he is poftelTed of pcrfeSi benevoknce and reSiitude ', for thefe are included in perfe6l intel- ligence ; as, I think, is fliewn in the treatife juft re- ferred to. And thus, on the principles maintained in that treatife, the complete idea oi Deity ^ confift- ing of infinite poiuer^ intelligence^ and goodnefs eflen- tially united, will be eftablifhed : and this being e- ftablifhed, the doctrine of an unerring providence guiding all events, or of a perfect order in naturje, will be likewife eftablifoed, as Is fliewn in the prc- (:eding fedion, der 26 On Providence. der of the world. This would impl)% that we ought never to infer from any {lata more than they immediately contain, and therefore would put an end to all reafoning. — The caufe muft always have in himfelf, in a greater degree, tliofe per- fcftions which he communicates. It would be eafy to fhew that from the works of creation we have reafon to infer a much higher degree of power, wifdom, and goodnefs in the Creator than they directly exhibit ^ and there^ fore, it will be right in this cafe, firft to argue upwards from the efFe(ft, as a foundation for proving the perfeffions of the caufe, and then back again from the caufe thus difcovered to the effecfl. Thus, in natural philofophy, by reafon- ing from particular fafts we gain the knowlege of the general laws which ob- tain in nature, and afterwards apply thefe laws to the explanation of other facets which could not otlierwife have been accounted for. For inflance 5 from th^ faili 0/2 P R O V I D E N C E. 27 fiift that gravity is the power which keeps the moon in her orbit, is inferred the general law of gravitation, by the help of which the whole order of the folar fyftem is laid open to us, and all the motions of the bodies that compofe it explained. How abfurd would it be to objed: in this inftance, that no conclu- fion can be drawn from any fadls which will prove any greater degree of regula- rity in nature than thefe fads thcmfelves exhibit, or which can be rightly ufed to explain any other fads, about whicl^ we can make no experiments ? It is proper to add, 3dly, that we adually fee that nature is the efFed of fuch wifdom as furpaffes our higheft con- ceptions. We know this in numberlef^s inftancesi and the fame wifdom that takes place in thefc inftances, we are unavoidably led to apply to other in- ftances w^here it is not (cen, and to the whole adminiilration of events. It will, } hope, appear hereafter that this is an obfer- 28 0/2 Providence. obfervatlon of particular weight on the iubjedl of Providence. In the mean time, it is neceffary that I fliould enter upon fome topics of a different nature. The defign of this fedlion is to give an account of fuch arguments for Provi- dence as may be gathered from confider- ing the general lav^s and conftitution of tlie world. In order to be as explicit as I can on this head, I fhall beg leave to obferve, fidiy that it appears undeniably that there is a plan of nature fettled, which deter- mines m general the couije of events. A particular order of caufes and effedls is maintained regularly and fteadily. Laws have been eftablifhed which operate inva- riably. Many diiferent claiTes of crea- tures have been brought into exiftence, and placed in circumftances adapted to their different natures, and all provided for fuitably to their wants and exigencies. The world, therefore, has not been left to 0;Z P R O V I D E N C E. 29 to fluftuate fortuitoufly. There is a care taken of it, and a diredlion given to its affairs. — But this does not come up to what I have here chiefly in view. — It is evident not only that there is a plan or conflitution of nature by which beings are provided for, and a general direction given to events ; but that there is an influence of the Deity conftantly exerted to maintain this conflitution. — In other words; it may be proved *' that the ** Deity is always prefent and always ** adiive in all places ; and that his e- ** nergy is the ^r/? mover in every mo- ** tion, and the true fource of all the ** powers and laws v/hich take place in " the material world." To this con- clufion all true philofophy leads us ; and it is a point fo clofely connected with the main purpofe of this Differtation, that I fliall make it the fubje(5t of par- ticular examination. Much labour has been employed by fome perfons to account for all the pha^- nomena 30 On V\ O V I D E N C E*' nomena of nature by the powers of me-^ chanifni, or the neceflary laws of mat- ter and motion* But it feems indifpu- tabie tiiat this cannot be done. The pnjnary caufts of things muft, certainly^ be fome powers or principles not me- chanical. For let it be granted that any particular effeft is owing to the im.pulfe of ether matter on that in which the effect is obferved^ it may be aiked, what gives motion to this other mat- ter. If it is anfwered, the impulfe of fome third matter ; it may be again afk- ed> whence this third matter derives its motion. ilnd thus, w^hatever number of intermediate fteps there may be, we muft at laft come to fome matter that cid not receive its motion from the im- pulfe of other matter ; or to fome im- mechanical caufe. This reafoning can no way be evaded, but by either maintaining an endlefs progreffion of motions communicated from matter to matter, without ^ny Jirji J72over -, or by frying, that the firft impelling matter moved On Providence. 31 moved itfelf.— — The former is an abfur- dity too great to be embraced by any one 5 and there is reafon to hope, that the eilential inadlivity of matter is at prefent fo well underftood, that there can be but few who will care to affert the latter. — All our reafonings about bodies and the whole of natural philofophy are founded on the three laws of motion, laid down by Sir Ifaac Newton at the begin- ning of the Principia. Thefe laws ex- prefs the plaineft truths ; but they would have neither evidence nor meaning, were not inadlivity contained in our idea of matter. I know it will be faid, that matter, though naturally inert, may be made to be otherwife by Divine power. But this is the fame with faying, that matter may be made not to be matter. If in- activity belongs to it at all, it muft be- long to it as matter, or folid extenfion, and therefore muft be infeparable from it, 32 On Providence. it *. The natures of things are necef- farily what they are, independently of all power. Matter is figured:, moveable^ difcerptibki inaBroe, and capable of com- municating motion by impulfe to other liiatter, juft as the four fides of a fquare and its diagonal are incommenfurable *y that is, not by W//, but by ejjence. Thefe are' not accidental, but primary qualities of matter. Befides ; matter void of in- aftivity, fuppofmg it poflible, could pro- duce no effefls.' 'Tis only in confe- quence of this property that it is capa- ble of giving motion to other matter, or of anfwering any purpofe. Were, there- fore, the firfl impelling matter before- mentioned diverted of its inertia^ or en- dowed with a principle of felf-motion, it would be utterly unfitted for the end afligned it. What is now afierted will perhaps be evident, and the impofiibility of matter without inertia appear more plainly upon confidering particularly * See the Enquiry into the Nature of the Human Souly Se£l. I. N^ 15, 24, 265 27. what On Providence. 33 what would happen on the collifion of fuch matter with other matter of the fame, or of a different kind. We know nothing of matter, and can determine nothing about it, if it is not true that it muft yield to every impulfe upon it in proportion to the force im- prefled, and that the motion comniiuiicated by every impulfe is always equal to that loft by the impelling body and cannot be either greater or lefs ; or, in other words, that it is endowed with r^Jijlance, and abfolutely and entirely paffive'^. But no- * What I mean here when exprefled more accu- rately is, that a change of J} ate is always produced in the body impelling, equal to that produced in the body impelled. In coinfojltiort of motion, or when one body ftriktrs another body in motion obliquely, there is always motion loll \ bccaufe fome of the force of the impelling body muft be fpent in merely altering the dlre(£i:ion of the other ; though evert here, as well as in the rejolutim of motion where, for the fame reafon, motion is always gained, the general rule holds, that the fum of the motions the fame wav, and the diffcri:nce of the motions cc-ntrarywTi.yay art: always the fame before and affrr coIlifion. D thing j4 On Providence. 'thing like this can be true on the fuppo- fition of active or unrefifting matter. — For let a mafs of fuch matter be con- ceived to ftrike another mafs of inad:ive matter at reft. I alk w^hat would hap- pen ? Not the moving of that at reft. For the impelling body having no refiftance, or no tendency to continue in any ftate of motion or reft, it can have nothing like force, and therefore can. produce no efFeffc. • — Shall it then pafs through or penetrate the body at reft, and go on to move as if nothing ftood in its way ? This alfo is impoffible^ or we have no idea at all of matter as 2tfolid fubftance, or as fomething diftinft from mere extenfion. — 'Tis certain then that its motion muft be ftopped, but without communicating the leaft motion to the body at reft, or having the leaft efFecft upon it. That is, an effed: vi\\\ be produced without a caufe : For the body at reft not having received any alteration of its ftate, it could not have re-aSed or been the means of altering the ftate of the other. There 3 0// Pr O V I D E N C E. 35 There is no way of avoiding thefe con- tradiftions but by laying, what is too ri- diculous to deferve any anfwer ; that the moving body had the fagacity to exert its activity to flop itfelf the very inftant it came into contad: with the other. But again ; let us on the other hand, fuppofe a body of inactive matter, (that is, of fuch matter as we commonly rea- fon about, and is the only fubjedl of the laws of mechanifm) to move towards another body of felf-moving and unre- lifting matter, and to impel it in the very dired:ion in which it tends to move itfelf. Now 'tis certain that having an innate tendency or endeavour to move in this direftlon, it cannot rejift motion in this direftion, and that therefore the firll body without being rc-a(^ted upon, or having its own ftate in any manner altered by the impulfe, would carry it along with the fame velocity with which itfelf moves. Nay, the firft body, though ever fo fmall, would, in D 2 the 36 0/z Providence. the circumftances fuppofed, communi- cate any motion though ever fo great to any mafs or maffes of matter, without lofing any motion itfelf, that is, without meeting with any obJlruBioTty ov afting at all on the matter moved. And thus any effeft may be produced by the moll inadequate caufe, or rather by no caufe at all. Once more; let a collifion be con- ceived to happen between two equal bodies both compofed of matter without incrtiuy moving in contrary directions » As one of them cannot be conceived to penetrate the other, the refult mud be, that both fhall be flopped, but by no- thing ; for both wanting that property on account of which we fay of matter, that when once in motion it will perfevere in motion, unlefs fomething ftops it, or having no power of reliflance, neither of them can be any obftrudion to the mo- tion of the other *. But * The refinance of matter is an exprefTion that muft be ufed in fpeaking on this fubjedl for want of a better ; O// Pr O V I D E N C E. 37 But the impofiibility of all adive qua- lities or tendencies in matter may be proved better ; but there is fome danger of mifunderftandln^'' it. The meaning of it is not that matter makes any oppofition to a change of its ftate, or exerts a force to maintain itfelf in the ftate it is in, as fome have very improperly exprefled themfelves. This would imply that very activity which I have en- deavoured to fhew to be inconfiftent with its na- ture 5 and were it true, a part of the force of every impulfe would be fpent merely in overcoming this oppofition without producing any other eiFe6t ; and therefore the fum of the motions the fame way would be always greater before than after collifion, which is impofTible. The largeft body will be moved by , any t\iz Jlighteft impulfe of the fmalleji ; but then it can be moved only in proportion to the force of the impulfe ; and this is what is chiefly meant by the re- fijlance of matter. " For inftance. A body at red will refijl another which is moving towards it j that is, it will be an ohftruclion to the motion of this other. The latter will be retarded by the former, and will iofe juft as much motion as it communicates. In other words. The r^t^wr^? of matter is that in its nature which makes it require an adequate- foreign caufe of every change of ft ate, or from whence it is wholly pajfwe^ and incapable of receiving any mo- tion from impulfe that is not in a certain fixed pro- 1^ 3 ponioa 38 O/z Providence, proved in a way ftill more dired: and de- cifive. Let it be fuppofed that a body now at reft has an innate tendency to move. This tendency muft produce its efFeft, either by a gradual acceleration in the manner gravity afts j or by inftan^ taneoufly producing that particular degree of motion which fatisiies it, and then ceafing.— -- In the former cafe; the ten- dency to acceleration being the fame with portion to the relative momentum of the impelling bo- dy, and ftrictly equal to the change of flate it fuffers io confequence of the impulfe. In this proportion matter is always moved w//Z>^/:// difficulty \ but beyond this there is not only 2i difficulty but an mpojfibility of inoving it ; and whatever motion it can be fuppofed to receive from any impulfe that is greater than that which the impelling body lofes, it muft derive from yiothing at all. I have fpolcen above of i\\c force of matter and of its a£ling^ at the fame time that I have aficrted it not to be active. An attentive and candid reader cannot think this an iriconfiftency. The adtivity denied to matter is a power of changing its own ftate, not that of acting upon other matter by impulfe. This fort of a£tivity or power follows from and is neceiTa- rily implied in its perfect paflivenefs or inertia. a ten- O/? Pr O V I D E N C E. 39 a tendency to a conftant change of ve- locity, and this being a permanent qua- lity in the body, no particular motion de- rived from it can have the leaft duration^ but muft be given and deftroyed at one and the fame moment, and therefore nothing could be done. — In other words; fuch a tendency is a tendency to an infi- nity of different velocities at once, and therefore is impoffible. Neither can motion be acquired in the latter way ; for motion fo acquired no force could deftroy, becaufe at the very inftant it is dejlroyed it muft be acquired in confe- quence of the fuppofed tendency. No impulfe, therefore, can without a con- tradi(flion be fuppofed to have any eitedt upon the motion of fuch a body r, and though ever fo fmall, it would carry before it all the bodies of the world if in its way, without being itfelf retarded. And were two fuch bodies, moving in contrary diredions, to meet, fince nei- ther could be ftopped, they muft either penetrate one another, or be annihilated. D 4 It 40 O^ P R O V I D E N C E. It is eafy to fee that the fame way of arguing may be ufed to prove, that th^re can be no innate tendency in matter, when in motion, to a ftate of reft. Matter naturally preferves the rnotion once imprefled upon it, juft as it does its figure; and were not ^ this true, it would not be pcfTible that any force (}"iould give it motion, for the effecft of fuch force not being capable of remain- ing any time, it would be loft as foon^ as gained; that is, no effc(ft would be produced, Thefe are obfervations which I am perfuaded, no perfon can duly attend tp without feeling the weight of them. Nothing, furely, can be ir^ore repugnant to our ideas of niatter than fejf-motion ; nor is there any conclufion wdiich there is much rpore reafon to rely upon than that it is not a fubjed: capable of any Jpontcneous powers.^ and therefore muft owe every change that can happen in i,t to fomc J creign influence. This 0;/ Pr O V I D E N C E. 41 This conclufion will be further con- firmed if we confider what naturally offers itfelf in the next place, and what mufl: not be omitted on this ar- gument, that felf-moving matter muft have thought and defign. Whenever matter moves it muft move in fome particular direction, and with fome precife degree of velocity; and there be- ing an infinity of thefe equally poffible, it cannot move itfelf without feleding one of thefe out of the reft, or deterr- ming itfelf to one of them exclufively of all the others, and therefore not without defign. But this is not all. It may be plainly proved that matter cannot be the ultimate caufe of the phenomena of na- ture, or the agent, which, by any pow- ers inherent in itfelf, produces the ge- neral laws of nature, wjthout pcfleffing the higheft degree of knowledge and wifdom. Let us, as a proper inftance to reafon upon here, take the particular law of gravitation. The true account, I fay, ot this law cannot be any innat? propenfitics 4^ O/Z P R O V I D E N C E. propenfities of matter to motion, or Its u- niformly moving itfelf according to ftated rules. For in order to obferve thefe rules, every particle of it muft be able to conform itfelf to all the different fitu- ations it can be in, and therefore muft know the precife diftaiicesy magnitudesy and number of all the furrounding parts of matter; thefe being the circumftances which univerfally determine the force and direction of gravity. Thus; if a particle of matter on the furface of the earth tends towards the earth by its own energy, and without any foreign influ- ence upon it, with that precife degree of velocity, and in that precife diredlion which the law of gravitation requires, it muft, in order to this, know the pre- cife /^wr^' and bulk of the earth, and its fitiiation upon it, fince the fmalleft va- riation in any one of thefe particulars will alter the velocity and direction of its motion. When placed within the furface it muft diminifti its own force at different diftances froin the center, in ihcfmple direct On Providence. 43 dire^ ratio of thefe diftances. When placed without the furface, it muft di- minifh its own force in the inverfe, duplicate ratio of its diftances from the center. When carried to the center of gravity between the moon and the earth, it muft determine itfelf to reft. When carried beyond this, it muft determine its motion towards the moon, and not the earth. Is it poftible that matter fhould vary its own motions in a manner thus wonderful; infomuch that all the diiferent parts of it appear to aft in perfed: concert with one another for producing the order of nature, and bringing about the beft ends ? The following argument will, I believe, fliew that there is not lefs than the evidence of demonftration againft the poffibility of this. Nothing can know or aB where it is not. The prefence and adivity of every particle of matter are confined to that particular part of fpace it fills up. Were it ever fo intel- ligent or adiive it could k?iow nothing, it could 44 On Pro V I DEV CE, could do nothing beyond this. How then can it be fo acquainted with the flate of bodies at the greateft diftance from it, and no way connected with it, as to be able to ad: in concert with them, and to move itfelf in exadl conformity to their fitua(;ion and numbers ? * What has been faid of gravitation might with equal evidence be proved * " It is inconceivable that inanimate brute mat^ '-^ ter fhould, without the mediation of fomething *' elfe, which is not material, operate upon and af- *^ fe(Sl other matter without mutual conta£l, as it *' muft be, if gravitation be eflential and inherent in ** it. And this is is one reafoq why I defired you " would not afcribe innate gravity to me. That " gravity fhould be innate, inhereyit, and cfTential *' to matter, fo that one body may acl upon another " at a diftance through a vacuum, without the me- '' diation of any thing elfe, by and through which *' their aftion and force may be conveyed from one " to another, is to me fo great an abfurdity that I *' believe no man who has in philofophical matters a *5 competent faculty of thinking, can ever fall into *^ it." See the Third of the Four Letters from Sir Ijaac NriVton to Dr, Bcntley^ printed for Mr, Dodflcy, cou- 0/2 Pr O V I D E N C E. 45 concerning any more general caufe, of which poffibly gravitation may be only ah efFedl; fuch as Sir liaac Newton's JEther^ or whatever other mediums or powers may exift, and be the real primal- ry caufes of the phasnomena of the world. The elafticity, for example, of fuch an ather as Sir Ifaac Newton has defcribed, fuppofmg it to exift, muft be derived, not from any powers of felf-motion in the matter of this cether, but from the conftant agency upon it of an intelligent and omniprefent fpirit *. To * '' In our enquiries iRto nature" (fays an excel- lent phllofopher) " we are always meeting with " powers that furpafs mere mechanifm, or the ef- *' fe an unintelligent agent : for what has not wifdom cannot adl wifely, and no power can make that to be, which catinct be. If the Deity can make a caufe that a£ls without knowledge or dcfign to produce regular efFe6i:s ; then it is in the nature of things poilible for fuch a caufe to ^xoAucq fuch efte6ls ; then defign in the caufe is not necefjary to the greateft conceivable order and regularity in the effect, nor can we certainly infer the one from the other : then, in fhort, any thing may produce any thing, and no conclufion with refpecl to the caufe can be drawn, in any cafe, from what we fee in the efi'ecl. ■ The efFc6ls of habits have been very Improperly al- ledged^ as affording inftances of regular action without knowledge or defign. For, what is done by habits, is, I think, always done in confequence of fome volition or dlre6lIon of the mind; and our not being confcious of it is in reality no more than not remembering it, the whole effect of a habit oi\ the executive powers confiding in their more eafy £ and 50 Ov^ P R O V I D E N C E. ** it cannot fubfift of itfelf, or that it *' requires the hand of its maker to be ** always at it to continue its motions ** and order." The full anfwer to this objedion is, that to every machine or perpetual move- ment for anfwering any particular pur- pofe, there always belongs fome Jirjl and ready compliance with the dictates of the mind. But not to infift on this ; let it be granted that re- gular actions are frequently performed in confequence of habits without thought or defign; this, if true, muft be owing to certain powers and laws of the animal oeconomy which muft be accounted for in the fame manner v/ith other powers and laws which obtain in nature, and cannot be made an argument for fuch a blind plaftic force as has been contend- ed for, without begging the queftion. See the truly great and learned Dr. Cudiuorth's IntelleSfual Syfiem^ Book I. Chap. 3. where the opinion on which I have made thefe remarks is particularly explained and defended. See alfo an account of a controverfy which it occafioned between Mr. Bayle and Le Clcrc, in the account of the life and writings of Dr. Cudworth, prefixed to the fecond edition of the Intellectual Syjlem by Dr. Birch. Dr. Henry More and Dr. Grew have likewife maintained this opi- nion. ^ move?'. Oji Providence, 51 mover, fome weight or fpring, or other power which is continually afting upon it, and from which all its motions are derived : Nor, without fuch a power, is it poffible to conceive of any fuch machine. The machine of the univerfe then, like all befides analogous to it of which we have any idea, muft have a frjl mover. Now, it has, I think, been demonftrated, that this firil mover cannot be matter itfelf. It follows, therefore, that this objedion is fo far from being of any force, that it leads us to the very conclufion which it is brought to overthrow. The excellence of a ma- chine by no means depends on its going properly of itfelf, for this is impofllble; but on the fkiH with which its various parts are adjufled to one another, and all its different effeds are derived from the conjtant aution of fome power.- -■■* What would, indeed, make a machine appear imperfedt and deformed is, a^^ ligning a feparate power to every diflin^ft E 2 part. ^ On F R o y I D E N c t. part, Without allowing any place for mechanifm. And, in like manner, what would really make the frame of nature appear imperfetl and deformed is, re- folving phaenomena too foon to the Di- vine agency, or fuppofing it the imme- diate caufe of every particular effed:. But every one mull fee that what I have been pleading for is not this, but Only, that however far mechanifm may be car- ried and the chain of caufes extend in the material univerfe, to the Divine Pov/er exerted continually in all places, every law and every effedt and motion in it muft be at laji refolved.-- This is a concluficn which the modern improve- ments in natural philofophy have abun- dantly confirmed, and which fome of the firft and befh philofophers have re- ceived ; nor can that philofophy be other- wife than little and contemptible which Jiides the Deity from our views, which excludes him from the world, or does not terminate in the acknowledmient and O?! Providence. 53 and adoration of him as the maker, pre- ierver, and ruler of all things '^. The point on which I have been in- filling is of fo much importance that no apology can be neceffary for dwelling fo long upon it. What has been faid has a tendency to give an attentive mind the deepeft fenfe of the dependence of the creation on the Deity j for it iliev»^s * " The philofopher who overlooks the traces of *^ an all-governing Deity in nature, contenting him- " felf with the appearances of the material univerfe <' only, and the mechanical laws of motion, neglects " what is moft excellent; and prefers what is im- '' perfect to w^hat is fupremely perftx% finitude to *^ infinity, what is narrow and weak to what is " unlimited and almighty, and what is perifning to " what endures for ever." Mr. MacklaunrCs Account of Sir Jfaac Newton s Difcoveries^ Book IV. Ch. q, Sed. I. " Sir Ifaac Ncv/ton thought it moft *' unaccountable to exclude the Deity 07ily out of tiic *' univerfe. It appeared to hira much more juft '' and reafonable-to fuppofe that the whole chain of *' caufcs, or the feveral feries of ihem, fliould cen* " ter in him as their fource ^ and the whole fyftem " appear depending on him the only independent <• caufe." Ibid, Sea. 5. E 3 i^^. 54 On Providence, VIS that he is properly the life of it, the irjinitc Spirit by which it is informed and fuftained ; that all material caufes are no more than inftruments in his hand, and that from him their efficacy is derived ; and that, fo far is he from being an idle fpedator of what happens, thatv/ere he, for one inftant, to fufpend his agency, univerfal confufion would take place, and all nature fall to pieces. I need not fay how irrefiftible the evi- dence is which arifes from hence for the dodrine of Providence. What it may be of moil importance to recom- mend to notice in this place is the fol- lowing obfervation. ^It has been prov- ed that the Deity pervades and actuates the whole material world, and that his unremitting energy is the caufe to which every effed: in it muft be traced. Now, the fpiritiial world is, without doubt, of greater confequence. Is his energy then wanting here ? Is there not one atom of tnatter on which he does not ad; and is On Providence. 55 is there then o?2e living being about which he has no concern ? Does not a Jlone fall without him 5 and does then a man fuffer without him ? Are fuch influences as may be necelTary to bring about a juft regulation of events in the moral world, lefs likely than thofe influences w4iich we know to be exerted continually to main- tain the order of the inanimate world? ■The truth is, the inanimate world is of ?2o confequence abftradted from its fubferviency to the animate and rea- fonable world. The former, therefore, muil: be preferved and governed entirely with a view to the latter *. This leads me to a further argument on this fubjed which has, I think, con- fiderable weight, ^nd feems greatly to flrengthen the conclufion I would eftab- * I have not mentioned here the conftant exertion of Divine power in maintaining the fuccefHon of vegetables, and in producing men, and other be- ings, becaufe particular notice of it will be taken hereafter, E 4 lifh. 56 0;^ P R O V I D ^ N C E. lifli. This 'argument has been hinted already, but it is neceffary that it fhould be here brought more particularly to view. It offers itfelf to us upon con- lidering the wifdom manifefted in the flrudlure of every objeft in the inani- mate creation. How beautiful is the form of every vegetable, and how cu- rioufly arranged its parts ? What exqui- fite mechanifm, what nice workmanfl:iip and amazing art appear in every leaf and fpire of grafs r Let us now afk ourfelves; has God, on obje6ls in them- felves fo worthlefs, poured forth fuch a profufion of wifdom and Ikill, and is he fparing of thefe in the concerns of reafonable beings ? or does he lefs regard order and fitnefs in the determination of their flates ? — It is not poffible to imagine this. Whatever appearance the aftairs of men may at prefent make to us, we may be certain that they are directed by the fame wifdom with that which we obferve in the reft of nature 5 that is, ty a wiiuom which we know to bo in- finitely O;^ P R O V I D E N C E. 57 finitely fuperior to ours j by a wifdom which, in the loweft objeds, is exaft and incomprehenfible, and which, there- fore, muft be as much more fo, in higher objefts, as they are of greater value. ' — To this purpofe in a great meafure is the reafoning we find in Matt, vi. 28, &c. Why take ye thought for rai^ 7nent ? Conjider the Mies of the field how they grow. They toil not^ neither do they fpin ; and yet, I fay unto you, that even So-- lomon, in all his glory ^ was not arrayed like one of thefe\ Wherefore, if God fo clothe the grafs of the field, which to-day is, and to-morrow is cafi ijito the oven-, ffjall he not much more clothe you, O ye of little faith ? Behold the fowls of the air, for they fow not, neither do they reap, nor gather into hams ; yet your heavenly father feedeth them. Are not ye much better than they ? There is not indeed any thing which has a much greater tendency to give re- lief to a mind earneftly v/ifhing to be fatisfied 58 0/2 Providence. fatisfied of a wife iuperintendency of all that befalls it, than to contemplate the curious organization of any flower or herb of the field, and the attention beftowed on even its outward figure; and then to confider whether it is probable, that the Being who fo won- derfully wrought fuch a fubftance, can neglecft any intellige?it creature, or be inattentive to any circumftance of his exiftence; whether he who has with perfeft exaftnefs adjufted the parts of dead matter to one another in the moft trifling planfy muft not be proportion- ably exad: in 'what is of infinitely great- er moment, the adjuftment of plea- fure and pain to a human foul.* Or, let fuch a perfon fix his thoughts on the flrudiure of his body, .and con- fider, whether it is credible that he who has fo fearfully made this, and difplayed fuch unfpeakable wifdom in adjufting and regulating every particle of matter that compofes it ; has not difplayed proportionable wifdom in the ftrucSure 0« P R O V I D E N C E, 59 ftrufture of his mind, or is not pro- portionably careful in adapting events to its cafe, and in regulating what- ever it feels.—— To fay no more. If unerring v^ifdom fhews itfelf in the direction and government of corporeal nature, and all its parts are ordered in number, weight, and meafure, fo that the more we know of it, the more we are forced to admire it, if its mean- eft works are finiflied with complete accuracy, and the whole fyftem ap- pears harmonious and grand in the higheft poffible degree ; what harmony, what wifdom and goodnefs may we well reckon upon in the government of the intellectual world ? What care and accuracy in difpofmg the lots of the individuals of it ? How grand muft be its plan, and how perfecft its or- der ? SECT. 60 On F ROY ID EN c^. SECT. III. Qfthe manner in which Provideiice is adminijlered. WHAT has been hitherto faid contains a brief view of the principal arguments for the dodrine of a righteous and all-wife Providence. My defign in this feclion is to offer a few obfervations relating to the mode of adminiftring it. I have frequently in the preceding fcftions fpoken on the fuppofition, that a perfcdl dire6lion of events is brought about by the Divine influence, immedi- ately and conftantly exerted every where for that purpofe. It muft however be remembered that this is a point about which all are not agreed. Many wife and On Providence. 6i and good men are ftrongly prejudiced a- gainft the fuppofition, that there have been any interpofitions of Divine Pow- er fince the creation in directing affairs, as implying an impotence, unfl^ilful- ncfs, and operofenefs unworthy of in- finite wifdom. They, therefore, chufe to conceive of the laws and order of the material world, as having been at firil adjufted in exad: correfpondence to what fhould happen in the moral world, and the whole fcheme including all events as originally defigned and laid in the beft manner, and now continually going on to open and unfold itfelf agreeably to the Divine idea, without any cccafiou for any interpofitions. As far as fuch maintain the fame perfedt diredion of affairs in confequence of an origmal e- ftablifhment, as is commonly fuppofed to be brought about by conJia?2t influences, they maintain all that we have reafon to be anxious about on the prefent fubjedl. And this, indeed, I fhould imagine, it muft be impofiible for any one who has jull 5 62 O;/ P R O V I D E N C E. juft notions of the Divine perfecfllons to avoid maintaining, let him think on this fubjed: in other refpedls as he pleafes. For thus we may argue. — When the Deity at firft fixed the prefent plan of nature, and gave Beings their different powers and affedions, he either had a perfecft forefight of the whole train of events that would arife in confequence of his eflablifhment, or he had not. — If he had this fore-knowledge, the e- vents fore-known were either all of them fuch as he faw it would be properefl to leave as fore-known, or they were noto If the afiirmative is aflerted ; it is all I plead for. Every event in this cafe will be juft fuch as perfeA reftitudeis pleafed either to ??iake it, or to- fuffer it to be. But, on the contrary, if amongft the fore-known events there were any which it was on any account right or proper to exclude ; on this fuppofition, a good theift, who rejefts all occafional interpoji- tions muft of necefhty fay, that the ori- ginal plan would have been fo altered a^ O/^ Providence, 63 as to exclude thefe events, and to pro- duce a complete coincidence of all that ihould happen with the counfels and defigns of infinite wifdom and goodnefs. This cannot be avoided while the exi- ftence of infinite wifdom and goodnefs in nature is believed -, and thus the doc- trine of Providence in its higheft fenfe will ftill be afferted. But if an exad fore-knowledge of all aftions and events, and fuch a perfed: original eftablifhment in confequence of it, as I have mentioned, are thought by any to be impoffible 5 and if, for this reafon, no more is fuppofed than that powers were given to beings, and ge- neral laws fettled, and then events fuf- fered to arife as they would without any particular care or fuperintendency exercifed over them; in this cafe, the dodtrine of Providence will be entirely rejedled : And if fuch fentiments are true, the univerfe is a chaos ; the character of the parent of it is imperfecfl; all truftin him. 64 0/2 P R O V I D E N C E. him and fupplications to him are ab- furd, and no part of practical religion has any good foundation. But after what has been before faid, I hope I may be allowed to take it for granted, that thefe fentiments are not true, and that there Is indeed a perfed: direction of all events. • The point I am now confidering is, in what manner this is accomplifhed ; and it has probably been already feen in fome meafure why I chufe to conceive of it as produced by conftant infiuences> rather than fuch an original eftablifh- ment as I have mentioned. It will appear to fome, that an original eftab-^ lifhment, anfwering this purpofe, implies univerfal fatalifm, and that in events happening amongft reafonable agents, there muft be infinite variations and un- certainties not poffible to be regulated by it. But be this as it will ; it muft, I think, be difficult for an attentive per- fon to perfuade himfelf, that the other method of adminiftring Providence is not the moft capable of bringing about a O/Z Pr O V I D £ N C E. 6^ a perfedl regulation of events. And if this fhould be true ; or, if any purpofes of vvifdom and goodnefs may be anfwered by conftant influences, which could not at all, or not fo well, have been anfwer- ed in any other way, we may be fatisfied that there really are fitch influences : And to afTert the contrary from a prejudice againft them as not regular, or not be- coming the Deity, feems in the higheft degree unreafonable. Can it be irregular to produce the higheft regularity, or unbecoming the Deity to govern the univerfe and its affairs in fuch a manner as is moft agreeable to the ends for which he created it ? Will he facrifice the high- eft, order to theloweft^ or fufFcr events to arife at random in the v/orld, rather than at any time put forth his hand to dired them ? Muft he have been only lookin£( en ever fince the creation ; and is this what is moil becoming him ? Some, probably, are led into miftakes on this fubjed, by thinking of the man- F ncr 66 On Providence. ner in which it is moft becoming the Deity to a(fl, too ftridtly in conformity to that in which men are obliged to adl. They have but little power, and there- fore are obliged to be as frugal of it as poffible. But there is nothing difficult to the Deity, and confequentJy there can be nothing to influence him to chufe one way of a<5ting rather than another, beiides, its being more agreeable to recti- tude, and more conducive to his end. And this likewife is, in reality, the moft beautiful way of adling. Beauty confifts chiefly in the proper and efFedual adap- tation of means to ends. For this rea- fon, thofe means are the m^oft beautiful, and thofe fyftems the beft, which beft anfwer their end. In mere natural or- der, abilraded from all ufe, there is no- thing valuable; and the very reafon why the Deity has chofen to eftablifh a courfe of nature is, the neceffity of it as a means to produce happinefs, and to give his .rcafonable creatures room for a proper exertion 0)1 Providenc e. 67 exertion of their faculties^ and for the praffice of virtue* Thefe obfervations feem to me of im* portance on the prefent fubjed: 5 but, without having recourfe to them, it muft furely be very evident, that influences, confiftent with the free agency of beings and uniformly exerted to exclude every event fit to be excluded, and to produce perfedl order in the adminiftration of the world, are fo far from unbecoming the almighty and omniprefent parent, that we can conceive of nothing more worthy of him, or that can make his charadter ap- pear more amiable. Nor is there any more reafon to be prejudiced againft them, than againft the influence which the con- ilitution of the world allows to every agent over events, in proportion to his power and knowledge. There is no per- fon who does not influence in various ways what paflTes withfn the circle of his friends and acquaintance, and it has never yet been thought that the liberty " F 2 of 68 On P R O V I D E N C E. oi maokindj or their fcope for aftion is afFeded by it. Invifible and fuperior Beings may alfo be frequently employed in directing occurrences among mankind. Now, the influence of Divine Providence is a fadl of the fame kind with thefe, and feems not to be on any account more liable to objecflions. Shall we ac- knowledge the influence of every agent on events, and deny that of the Supreme ? Was it indeed fit that by one original adt he fliould exclude himfelf from all fur- ther concern with his works ; or can it be poflfible to imagine that the Being who is the fountain of all energy, and whofe nature is perfe(3: adlivity and power, fhould be tlie c;^// inadive Being in the univerfe ? Is it not, on the contrary, much more rational to believe, that his influence over events extends as much further than that of any other Being, and is as much more conftant, as the relation in which he (lands to Beinj^s is nearer, and his power and wifdom greater ? Ill Oj7 Pr O V I D E N C E. 69 la (hort; the notion of an ^&//!^/6(y Be- ing, pejfe^l/y benevolent y obferving the afFdirs of his own offspring, and yet never exerting any influence to give them that diredion which he moft approves, muil:, 1 iliould think, appear too inconfiftent and ab- furd not to fliock every attentive and un- prejudiced perfon. — ^ With refpe^:, however, to the analogy I have juft men- tioned between Divine Providence ^d the influence of created agents, 'tis ne- ceffary to obferve, that it ihould be con- fidered with fome caution. We (hall here be in great danger of deceiving our- felves, if we judge of what the Deity fhould do, by v^hat we ought to do. 'Tis our duty to exclude, as far as we can, all vice and fufferings from the world; and becaufe this is not done by the Deity, v/ho has all hearts in his hands, and an unlimited power over events, fome have queftiontd whether he at all direds events, or concerns Himfelf about us. But happy is it for the world that it i? F I 110; yo 0/z Providence. not governed in the manner in which human wifdom v^ould govern it. From what is incumbent on us in our circum- ftances, we cannot by any means infer what, in this inftance, it is proper for the Deity to do as fupreme governor *. We are too -much unacquainted with his counfels and plan to be able to determine this. Undoubted fadt proves that the # A teacher of religion who had the power by his inflrudlions and perfuafions to engage men efFecluaJly to virtue would be inexcufable as far a$ he neglected this. But it fepms that Jefus Chrift could have (o fpoken to men, and i'o influenced their hearts, as to render his rniniflry more fuccefsful than it was. He tells us, that thrre were places where, if he had done the fame works that he did in Judea, the inhabitants would have repented in fackcioth and afhes. Thefe places therefore muft have been denied the rricans which it was known w'ould have brought them to-happinefs. — There are degrees of advantages which, if .men refift or mifimprove, the Deity does not fee fit to grant them more, whatever he may know would be the confequence. gut by what rea- fons or rules particularly his providence ir. guided in this inftancc we cannot fay. 3 original 0/Z Pr O V I D E N C E. 7t original conflitution was fo eftablifhed by him as to admit of vice and fufFer- ings in the prefent ftate, and that there- fore it cannot be a part of his fcheme of Providence entirely to exclude them. We fee that there are numberlefs perfons to whom he does not give all the ad- vantages for virtue and happinefs which they might enjoy, and which, in all probability, would be ^fFeftual. 'Tis fufficient to know that he gives more than enough to all, and does every thing that it is wifeft and beft for him to do, in order to bring about univerfal and in- finite happinefs. But this fubjedl will be more particularly confidered hereafter, when I come to examine the objedions againft Providence, taken from the evil, natural and moral, in the world. Many of thofe who think, that there are no conftant influences of the Deity in directing events, are ready to acknow- ledge, and every one who believes that Chriflianity was proved by miracles and F 4 came ^2 0/2 P R O y I P E N C E. came from God, mufh acknowledge, that there are particular emergencies in which lie does interpofe in the affairs of the world. Now, this conceffion is fuffici- ent to eftablifli what I am plead- ing for. For let it but be allowed that the Deity has ever once interpofed fmce the original eftabliihment of things, and there will remain no tolerable reafon foi: imagining, that he does not interpofe con-^. tinually, as far as there is any occafion. It will, I think, be frivolous to affert, that this account of Providence rnafces it a continued feries of 77iiracles, If all ex- ertions of Divine Power are to be con- fidered as ?.niraailousy this will indeed be trucj nor w^ill there be the lead reafon why it fliould not be admitted. That influence of lupcrior power w4iich is implied in a miracle may, for ought we know, be exerted on numberlefs occa- fion s 5 and what diftinguifhes it from common events may be only that, in the caft of a miracle, the influence of fuperior power On Providence, jn power is rendered obvious and fenfible, by the extraordinary circumftances attending a particular fad. Thus; the removal of a difeafe in the common courfe of things no perfon can look upon as miraculous, whatever he may believe concerning the conftant agency of the Deity in the crea- tion. But if a (Jifeafe is removed inftan- taneouflyat the command of a man, or in any other manner which cannot be accounted for by the ordinary pov/ers of "^ nature ; in this cafe, the interpofition of fuperior power becomes vi/We, and a pro- per miracle happens. But v/hat effedually removes every ob- jedion of this kind, and almofl decides the queflion 1 am confidering, is a point which has been already at large infifled upon ; namely, ^^ That the caufe from '' which the general laws ^ that o-overn ■' e '' thi * It is to be wifhcd, that all who think on the fub- jea of this fedion would confider, what they mean by the word Laivs. It is very ambiguous and indeter- minate 74 O;/ P R O V I D E N C E. " the material world are derived, is the ** immediate power of the Deity exerted " every where." It has, I hope, been fliewn in the laft fed:ion, that we have clear and flrbng evidence for this. — To what was there faid, I will beg leave to add, on the prefent occafion, that it is from this caufe alfo, in particular, muft be derived that conftant fucceffion of ve- getables and animals which is kept up in the world. There is not one fadt in na- ture which can be completely accounted for by the mere pov/ers of mechanifm. Moft certainly then this facl cannot be thus accounted for. 'Tis utterly incon- minate in its fignification, and has been often ftrange- Jy mifapplied and abufed. The prefent queftioji farniihes us with a ftrong proof of this. The gene- ral laws of nature fignify nothing but particular phenomena which are obferved in nature, or particu- lar modes of the operation of fome caufe. When, therefore, the regulation of events, the continuance of the order of the world, or the formation of vegeta- bles and animals is afcribed to Laws eftabliflied at the creation, cither the word Laws has no fenfe at all, like the word Nature when ufed in the fame manner, or it muft fignify the regular and conftant agency of the Creator. celvablcj O// P R O V I D E N C E. 75 ceivable, that works of fuch ftupendous art as the bodies of vegetables and ani- mals, myriads of which are continually- formed about us, fhould be derived from laws planted at the creation in dead mat- ter, which have ever fince executed them- felves. Thofe who fay this, fay they know not what. They make unmeaning words fland for caufes, and attribute to matter infinitely more than it is capable of. Every new vegetable or animal, therefore, I confider as a new produc- tion of Divine Power, ailing conftantly and regularly according to an order or fcheme at firft fixed by his wifdom. But there is particular reafon to think thus with refpedl to the confcious and living principles of animals. 'Tis juft as pof- fible that thefe fhould arife into exiftence, in confequence of laws eftablifhed at the creation, without any immediate exertion of Divine Power, as it is that they fliould arife into exiftence of themfelves without any caufe at all *. On this account, the * I am fenfible that there is room here for recurring to ^6 0>^ P R O V I D E N C E. the prejer^ation of all things appears to be indeed but very- little different from . a con^ to the notion of an original fimultaneous produdioii of all things ; and that fome will not hefltate to af- iert, particularly, concerning the living principles in men and brutes, that they have exifted from the firft formation of this earth, and have ever fmce either lain dormant till united to bodies, or been tranfmigrating from one animal to another; I will not lofe time ih pointing out the abfurdity and extravagance of this notion. How poor are the prejudices which lead perfons to fcek fuch expedients for maintaining the inacStivityof the Deity ? What is it that renders it fo necefTary to confine the exertion of creative power to the firft formation' of a, fyftem^ rather than to con- iider it as going on to exert itfelf, according to a fixed order, during the continuance of a fyftem ? Let this however be allowed. Still, fince fuch an original I'lmalianeous creation as I have mentioned mufl be fuppoicd for every particular fyftem ; and fince, moft probably, ther^ are new fyftems continually brought into being in the boundlefs univerfe ; it will, even in this way, be neceliary to admit the conflant exertion of Divine Power ; nor is it pollible to avoid this con- clufion, without extending the notion now mentioned to the whole of nature, and afierting.that there never has been more than one 2.Qt of Divine Power, and that all the fLicceffions of Beings and worlds fince the commencement of created txiftence, with all theii 3 Oil Providence. 77 a continual creat'm y for was creative power to ceafe operating, the confequence would be, that no more new beings would make their appearance in the world, and that this earth would foon become a wild and horrid defart. The conclufion arifing from thefe ob- fervations is very obvious. Divine Pow- er, we fee, did not ceafe operating at the creation. It appears, on the contrary, that there is a conftant exertion of it through all nature. Can there be any reafon for denying that by it Providence is adminiftered ? Though employed con- tinually in the prefervation of the gene- ral laws of the material world, and the produftion of animate and inanimate Beings, mufl it be fuppofed to have nor their different laws, Have taken place of themfelves, and will for ever continue to do fo, in virtue of that one act, without requiring any immediate diredion from the Creator, or any interpofition of his power. If there is any perfon who is inclined to adopt this opinion, I have nothing to fay to him. thine: 78 0;Z PR O VI DE N C E, thing t( agents ? thing to do with the affairs of moral t) I cannot think of more than one diiEH-^ culty that can here offer itfelf to any perfon's thoughts. It is poifible, that fome who admit thofe general influences of Divine Power by which the world is preferved, may yet imagine that there is an incredibility in that kind of influ- ence which the interpofitions of Provi- dence imply, becaufe, being accommo- dated to particular cafes and occafions, it muft be a particular and occaiional in- iiuence introduced out of courfe, and not reducible to any ftated and uniform mode of operation. It cannot perhaps be ne- cefTary to take much notice of this ob- jection. Since general influences are only a number of particular ones, the diflindion upon which it is founded can- not be of much weight. And, fup- pofing it of weight, it muft be in a great mealure invalidated by fome of the fadls I have mentioned; for among thefe are inftances. On Providencjb. 79 inftances, not only of general and ftated exertions of Divine Power in the world, but of fuch as muft be meant by par- ticular and occafional Ones. However, were it at all neceffary, it might very well be granted, without any prejudice to the prefent argument, that the Deity always afts by general influence, and in a ftated courfe. It is eafy to conceive, that the agency by which a particular provi- dence is carried on, may be an agency by laws operating, in given circumstances, invariably and regularly ; for no one can fay, what laws and regulations may be eftablifhed in the univerfe, by which events may be fecretly directed. Dr. Butler * obferves, that fo particular an interpofal * " Thus, that miraculous powers fhould be ex- *' erted at fuch times, upon fuch occafions, in fuch " degrees and manners, and with regajd to fuch ^* perfons rathei^than others; that the affairs of the " world, being permitted to go on in their natural *' courfe fo far, fhould, juft at fuch a point, have *' a new direction given them by miraculous inter- *< pof.tions; that thefe interpofitions fhould be ex- *« aaiy 8q Oji Providence. interpofai of tlie Deity as that in the Chriftian revelation, might have been by general law^s. It is at leaft certain, that there, is one law to vs^hich the whole of divine influence in nature, of whatever kind it is, may be reduced. I mean the {w}pvQmQ\2iV7 oireBitude, When viewed in their reference to this, all the diverfities of operation by which the adminiftra- tion of the world may be condudled;, 2gree, and appear to be only different effed:s of one and the fame principld - acling varioufly, according to the different circumflaiices and characters of moral agents. -r-^- — If any perfoil fhould ftili want fatisfad:ion about the prefent pointy' " aclly in fuch degrees and rcfpedls only ; all this *' rniiv have been bv f;encral laws : Unknown in- *' deed to us : But no more unknown 'than the laws '* from whence it is that fome die as foon as they *' are born, and; others live' to extreme old agef "• that one man is fo fuperior to another in under- " ftacding; with innumerable moPe things, which " we canot reduce to any laws or rules at all, tho' '*■ it is taken for granted they are as much reduceablc *' to general ones, as gravitation." Jnalogy^ Fa.nll. Chap. 4. let 0;2 Pr o V I b £ N c E. Si let him recoiled: an obfervation which has been made at the beginning of this fedlion. Let him confider that there IS no more reafon for being prejudiced againft the influence of mvi/iik agents^ and efpecially the fupreme> over events^ while a courfe of nature is going on, than there is for being prejudiced, on the fame account^ againft the influence which vi/^o/e agents have over the affairs of their Own fpecies, and thofe of the Beings belov\^ them. The latter we know to be, not only conflftent with the courfe of nature, but a part of it ; and the other may be equally fo. This is fo true that, agreeably to Dr. Butler's obfervation, even the interpofition of fuperior power im- plied in a miracle, however unufual or extraordinary, may be entirely natural : That is i ' the conftitution of the v/orld may be fuch as allows of it in certain cafes.—.! know it is common to think, that miracles imply a fnfpajfion or viola^ tion of the laws of nature. But no opi- nion can be more groundlefs. Were u-e G to 82 0/2 P R O V 1 t) E N C £. to fee the motion of water downwards ceafe at once at the word of a man, or a river parted in its courfe, as Jordan was, we {hould fee a miracle. But we could not fay that the law of gravita- tion was fufpended 5 for the water might have gravitated as ufuaU and the true caufe of the event be, the exertion of an adequate fuperior power to controul the effefts of gravitation, in which its fufpen- fion is no more implied, than in a man's preventing a heavy body from falling, by applying his hand to it. Nor could we in this inftance fay, that the event was not agreeable to the conftitution of the univerfe ; for in order to this we (hould be able to difcover what the conftitution of the univerfe is, taking in the vifible and inviiible world, and that it excludes all interpofitions oi fuperior power in human affairs.- -Every one will eafily fee how thefe obfervations are to be applied to the purpofe for which they are mention- ed. Difmiffmg them, therefore, I ihall beg leave to introduce here one fur- ther O;^ P R O V I D E N C £. 83 ther obfervation which feems worth no-^ tice. It ought to be confidcred, that events happen in the world in fuch a manner, as plainly render it not unlikely, that there may be fome fuperior influence concerned in directing them. We are far from, having a perfed knowledge of all the caufes from whence events arife, and therefore cannot fay how far the Divine hand may be among thofe caufes* The uncertainty which attends all human fchemes is continually obferved and felt, and has given rife to the common no- tions of Fortune^ by which many of the antient philofophers feem to have meant the fame with Provide?2ce. The bcfl laid fchemes often fail of fuccefs flrange- ly, and fome of the moft important changes are often derived from incidents in themfelves entirely frivolous, fo that, indeed, it is not poflible for us to imagine what would follow from an alteration of any one circumftance in the general feries Q z of 84 0?2 Providence. of events. What room then Is there fof the influence of invifible agency ? What a command over events would a fuperlor Being have, by only a fecret diredlion of what appears to us moft accidental and trifling ? Such are the moft material obfervations which have occurred to me, on the man- ner in which Providence is adminiftered. —The great enquiry on this fubjecft is, how far it is reafonable to admit the conftant exertion of Divine influence for this purpofe. In anfwer to this enquiry, I have endeavoured to reprefent the folly of thofe prejudices which difpofe men to exclude from the world the influence of the Deity, and to confider him as being what no other agent is; only a mere fpedlator of the laws and order of the world. But more than this has been done. It has, I think, been demon- ftrated that the laws and order of the world are nothing but his uniform agency; and that the notion of a felf-fubfifting world. 0;z Pr O V I D E N C E. 85 world, or of a fcheme eilabliftied at the creation which has been ever lince exe- cuting itfelf without depending on the Creator, Implies an abfolute impoffibility. There is, therefore, a neceffity of acknowledging the conflant exertion of Divine influence in nature. This leads us almoft unavoidably to conceive of Pro- vidence as adminiftered by it. And, in anfwer to a difficulty which might pof- fibly remain with fome, it has been ob- ferved, that it is neither neceffary to con- fider the influence of Providence as an adventitious influence out of the courfe of nature, nor if it was, could any rea- fon be drawn from hence for rejeding it. The queftion I have been difcufiing io, I think, the only queftion on the mode of the adminiftration of Providence, about which there can be much dilpute. It is neceflrary this fhould be obferved, bepaufe fpme probably wilj be inclined G 3 to 86 0?i Providence. to think, that there is another queftion of which notice fliould have been taken ; namely, the queftion how far Providence is carried on by the inftrumentality of fubordinate agents. But it will eafily appear, that the difcuffion of this queftion cannot lead us into any fentiments on the points I have been confidering, diffe-- rent from thofe already explained. 'Tis with me out of doubt, that there is an^ inftrumentality of fubordinate agents in carrying on the deligns of Providence, and it may not perhaps be poftible to conceive how far it reaches i but then, I confider thefe agents as ading in every inftance under the fuperintendency of the Deity, which reduces their inftru- mentality into a perfect coincidence with' that mode of adminiftring Providence, for which I have pleaded. If any one will deny this, and aflert that there is no other diredlicn of affairs than is pro- duced by created Beings, uninfluenced by the Deity, and afting without com- miffion On Providence. 87 miflion from him ; in this cafe, there will plainly be no other Providence than that of thefe Beings, and all things will be left to the effeds of an original eftablifli- ment, without any fubfequent care or government. Several remarks have been already made on this opinion, and there will be occafion to fay fomewhat more about it in the next fedion. I am in hopes, however, that but little need be faid to convince moft confiderate perfons, that the moral world is not thus left to itfelf, or that the feveral orders of reafonable Beings in it are not delivered up in fuch a manner to their influence on one another, as that there is no fiipre?7ie direBion from the Deity. Were there no fuch decifive arguments to be urged as fome that have been propofed, we might well reckon, with confidence, that the Being v/ho is moft nearly related and moft intimately prefent to the world, is alfo the Being who has the moft conftant and adlive concern with it. G 4 But 88 O;? P R O V I D E N C E. Put not to repeat what has been be* fore faid, I fliali now proceed to fome further pomts, which it will be proper to confider on the fuh^c^ of Providence, SECT. On Providence. 8gf S E C T. IV. Of the 0b]e5iions againjl Providence, A Good deal has been faid in anfwer to feveral of the objections which have been made againft the dodlrine of Providence. But there are fome impor- tant ones of which no notice has been tak- en, and my deiign in this feftion is to offer a few obfervations upon them. It would preclude much that has been objefted on this fubje mufl be more liable to deviate than in any fub- fequent period^ and it is certain, that thofe in a lower order muft be more frail ^nd defedible than thpfe in a high- er. What wonder then is it if of thofe in the loweji order, and who confequent- Jy muft be in the greateji danger of de- viation, many lliould adtually deviate, ;ibi]fe their liberty, and lofe the happi- nefs they mi2;ht have fecured ? 'Tis abfurd On Providence. 119 abfurd to afk why was liberty granted them, fince it is eflential to intelligence, and to all rational and moral happinefs. Liberty then^ they mufl have, or not exill at all, and the confequence of liberty, when expofed to temptations and trials, muft fometimes be depravity and wicked- nefs. And why Ibould not a liberty fo circumftanced be communicated, as well as a liberty more favourably circum- ftanced * ? Can it be afferted that all Beings have a right not to be placed in any disadvantageous ftates ? Or, fhould this be allowed, will it be afferted fur- ther, that they ought not even to be ex- pofed to the poffibility of being ever brought into fuch ftates ? As the Deity might not have given exiftence at all, he * It (hould be observed, that T fuppofe that all Beings might have bepn placed in fuch circumftances as that none of them, though poficft of perfecSt natu- ral liberty, fjiould ever be in danger of any deviations or calamities : And the defign of vi'hat is here faid, and of a good deal that follows, is to Ihcvv that we have no fufficient reafon to expert this ; and alfo that, allowing it poflible, it was not heR. I 4 may I20 On Providence. may furely give it on any terms which are confiftent w^ith its being in any de- gree a benefit, or not worfe than non- exiilence.^He cannot, therefore, be under an obligation to give it free from dangers and inconveniencies.-! -Antecedently to the creation of man, as many of the moi^e perfeft orders of creatures might have exifted as can pcffibly be imagined, and the creation of man might make a further addition to the univerfal happi- nefs. Why then iliould he not be creat- ed ? — -Is it not moft reafonable to expedl that Divine goodnefs iTiould difplay itfelf in producing an endlefs variety of effedls, and in giving exiftence to every different order of creatures '^ capable of being happy ? Thefc * What is here fuggefled fhews, that the creation of a variety of orders of creatures is not only con- llilent with goodnefs, but required by it. But there is another obfervation wiiich ihews this in a different manner, and which, though particular ufe will be made of it again, it will not beamifs jufl to mention on this occafion. Had there been no ine* qualities On Providence. 121 Thefe obfervatlons are fufficient to prove, that the perfedions of the Deity by qualities among Beings, there could have been np room for beneficence ; no pofTibility of gratifying the defire of doing good ; no opportunities for exercif- ing virtue in one of its higheft inftances, and that principle in rational Beings, wrhich affords a hap- pinefs the moft worthy of a rational nature, mull have lain for ever dormant and ufelefs. Ses Mr, Ahernethys Sermons^ Vol. II. Serm. III. I cannot forbear adding in this place, that it feems to me very improper to fay, as fome have done, that God chofe this fyftem, in which evil takes place, as the beft of all pofTible fyftems. 'Tis difficult to fay what can be meant by the befl of all poflible fyflems. If it fignifies that which includes t\iz great eft fum of happinefs, it is as inconceivable as the lofigej} of all durations, or the largeji of all numbers. Thofe per- fons muft have low ideas of God's works who can look upon this earth, with its connexions, or even the whole vifible univerfe of fun, planets, and fixed ftars, as at ^11 confiderable, when compared with the reft of the creation. At the time, therefore, this fyftem was produced, there might have been num- berlefs other fyftems, containing brighter difplays of infinite power and goodnefs, not only pojftble but actually ex'iftent. All that we can reafonably expe6l to fee in what falls under our notice of the works and ways of God is, that they are entirely right and good, ^22 On Providence. by no means required that fuch a race ^s ours fhould not exift. When con- iidered by itfelf we fee enough, notwith- flanding the difficulties .that we meet with, to convince us that it is the ef- feft of wifdom and goodnefs : and when confidered in its relation to the whole fyflem of Beings, we know not how important purpofes it may ferve. It is particularly neceffary on this ar- gument to bear in mind, that fufficknt advantages are fuppofed to be granted to all, and that nothing is expelled from any Being which is not equitably proportioned to the light and opportuni- ties he enjoys. — —If fome have fewer advantages than others, all have more than they can claim ; and from all as much lefs will be required, as they have had lefs given them. If fome have a good, and worthy of his perfe£lions. To defire yr.orc, or to expe6t that this fyftem fhould be the beft, the falreft, and happieft poffible, is the fame as to expe£l that there fliould be no Subordination or variety in the Divine vyrorks. fmaller On Providence. 123 imaller chance for happinefs than others, all have Jome chance, and every one might have had none at all, that is, might never have exifted* Happinefs is always a free gift from God, and he may make Beings liable to come (hort of it, in any degree he fees befto Any ca- pacity, any poJIibtlity of happinefs is va- luable for the fame reafon that happinefs Jtfelf is fo, and ought to be received with gratitude. Nay, fuch at prefent are our circumftances, that we have in- deed reafon for the utmoft gratitude. We have before us the profpedl of a ^lejj'ed immortality which we cannot lofe, but through our cv/n fault.* Far then be it from us to accufe our Maker.- - It is in your power to fecure infinite happinefs. All the means nece/Tary for this are given you. Nothing but vo- luntary and inexcufable guilt can hurt you. Praife God, therefore. Improve carefully the advantages you are blefl with ; and be not fo unreafonable as to f omplain becaufe you are not faved the care 124 • ^^ Providence, care and pains you muft ufe in working out your falvation ; for this is a complaint which nothing can fatisfy, befides grant- ing you every poffible advantage, placing you above all labour and hazard, and making you abfolutely indefectible. The argument on which I here infift is, I think, fufficient to teach us a hum- ble and thankful acquiefcence in the condition allotted us. But it would fcarcely be right to omit obferving, that there is a great deal more to be faid in the prefent cafe, and particularly in vindi- cation of Providence, with refpedt to that ftate of labour and danger in which we are placed. I fliall, therefore, beg leave to digrefs fo far as to introduce a few ob- iervations on this fubjedl, not immedi- ately connedled with the main argument which I am purfuing. The fad that our ftate is a ftate of labour and danger is too obvious to be queftioned. There is nothing in human life On Providence. 125 life ftable and certain. There is nothing given us fo freely that we are to ufe no pains to obtain or preferve it. Almofl: all the bleflings of our Being are to be earned by diligence, if we would poffefs them. Such is the Divine eftablifliment, that the lazy and indolent muft be defi- cient and unhappy. But what deferves moft of our notice is, that part of the precarioufnefs of our ftate which iscaufed by its dependence on our fellow-beings. There is not, I think, any fad in the conflitution of the world which is more remarkable than this ; or which, at firft fight, feems to contradift more our ideas of Divine goodnefs. How common is it for one man to have at his command the fates of whole provinces and king- doms ? Even our receiving exiilence, as well as our condition afterwards, is made to depend on the v/ills of our fellow- beings. In the beginning of life we are committed to the care of parents or guar- dians, who can, almofl: as they pleafe, de- termine our ftate in future life, or cut us off 126 On Providence, off entirely from it. What is fimilar to this is true of our ftate as moral agents defigned for exiftence hereafter. As an infant is put in the way to the happinefs of the prefent life, fo is a grown man put in the way to happinefs in another worlds and naturally capable of everlalling im- provement in knowledge and perfection. And as, in our former capacity, it is put into the power of men to caufe us to fail of the happinefs we might have enjoyed in life -, fo likewife, in our latter capacity, it is put into their power, by various means, to deprive us of future happinefs, and to caufe us to mifcarry for ever* What has been already faid is of great ufe to filence the complaints which are apt to rife within us againft this part of the conftitution of nature, andean hardly be too much inculcated. We had na right to exiftence or happinefs at all-? and therefore the Deity may make them dependent and precarious in whatever' manner ' O;^ Pr o V I D E N c E. 127 manner his counfels require. But we need not reft the defence of Providence on any argument of this kind. We arc capable, I think, of perceiving very im-* portant reafons for fuch a conftitution> and of difcovering that it difplays great wifdom and goodnefs. It is abfolutely neceflary, as was oh- ferved page 95, that intelhgent Be- ings fhould have fcope given them for adlion. There is a plain congruity in making their happinefs to arife from the proper exercife of their powers^ and ta be the refult of their own endeavours. This is the only happinefs that can fuit the natures of adlive and free creatures. Had they no command over events; were bhfs forced upon them^, independently of their own choice and endeavours ; or were their ftates fo immutably fixed a& not to be liable to be afFeded by one an- ther, the confequence would be, that they would have nothing to do ; that their faculties would be given them in vain ; 128 On Providence. vain ; that virtue would be totally ex^ eluded from the creation, and an univer- fal ftagnation or quietifm take place in it. But I fliall, on this occafion, defire particular attention to the following ob- fervations, which, I fancy, will ftrength- en fome of thofe already made, and ihew us plainly what unreafonable expedlations we are apt to entertain from the goodnefs of God. Had the natural courfe of things in the prefent ftate been fuch, that when- ever any particular calamities or accidents happened to men, there fhould have been no remedies for them ^ we could have had no juft reafon for complaint, and God would have been good. Nor could any arguments have been taken from this at- tribute to prove that there ought to have been remedies provided, which would not equally have proved that they -ought to be eafy, univerfal and infallible, or rather Oh Providence. 129 rather that there fhould have been no occafion for them, and no fufFerlngs of pains of any kind* But the faft is, that there are remedies provided for the mif- fortunes and calamities of men, and that thus greater goodnefs is in this inftance difplayed in the conftitution of nature, than we could on any fure grounds have antecedently expefted. Men are not left^ as they might have been, to perifh irre- trievably by the calamities that happen to them, but it is put into their power in numberlefs cafes to help one another, and to prevent the fatal efFedls that v/ould follow particular calamities. A provifion is made in the fpontaneous a- gency and benevolence of our fellow^- creatures j for a great addition to the happinefs of iife^ and diminution of its {iifferings. And this itfelf becomes a ftill higher difplay of goodnefs beyond which we cannot eafily enlarge our ideas. For by eftablifliing a plan wherein Beings are thus left to be the voluntary caufes of one K another's 1 30 On Providence. another's happinefs, room is given them for the exercife of beneficence, for gra- tifying the noblell affedtion in their na- tures, and enjoying the moft GodUke bUfs of which they are capable. Had nature been framed agreeably to what relight have appeared, to our narrow views, beft and moft produdive of hap- pinefs, there would probably have been no fuch liablenefs to calamitous events, or dependence of Beings on. one another, as we obferve in it; and, confequently, the higheft kind of happinefs would have been wanting in it, and the very end we meant to fecure would have been de- feated. What has been here faid of the con- ftitution of things in the prefent world, may, I fuppofe, be applicable in a great meafure to the whole plan of Providence and fyftem of being. The welfare of a fpeciesy like that of indlvidiuils among men, may be made dependent on a higher fpecies, and whole orders of reafonable creatures On Providence. 1.3 i creatures may be fo cireumftanced, as to be liable to be brought into very cala- mitous ftates, from v/hich it may not be poffible for them to be faved, according to the general laws of the v^orld, except by the kind affiftance and labours of Be- ings fuperior to them. And from w^hat I have obferved, we fee reafon to believe that fuch a general oeconomy of nature, though the refult in feme inftances may prove abortion and ruin, v/as neceffary to produce the greateft virtue, and the greateft good on the whole. -It is an enquiry of fome importance here how far the dependence of Beings on one another may extend; or within what limits it can be ccnfiftent with reditude, that they fliould be liable to faffcr m con- fequence of one another*s agency. I have already hinted fome obfervations on this head in the preceding fedtion. We may be affiired, in general, that the connex- ions of Beings are under the heft regu- lations, and their powers v/ifely limited : And we may alfo know, in particular, that K 2 their 132 On Providence. their dependence on one another cannot extend fo far as that there Ihall ever happen a failure of adequate retribution^ or that any Beings fhall be hable to be deprived of any of their unalienable rights, or to fuffer any thing which it would be wrong or hard that, as the creatures of the Deity, they fhould fuffer. The pow- ers, therefore, of Beings over one another cannot extend further than to the gifts of bounty y or fuch bleffings as the Deity is not obliged to grant. Of this Idnd are exiftence, its perpetuity, and almoft all its privileges, capacities, and advantages : And therefore, it may be eafily conceiv- ed what degradations and loffes may be fometimes brought upon Beings under the Divine government, in confequence of their mutual agency, confiftently with the moft perfect juflice, and even (if fome of the preceding obfervations are right) as the effed of a conftitutioii formed in the beft manner to produce happinefs. But the queftion, how far the dependence of Beings on one another 3 may On Providence. 133 may extend, wouid carry me beyond my prefent purpofe were I to attempt a pro- per difcuffion of it, nor is there any occafion for now entering into it fur- ther. It is right, I have fald, that the happinefs of intelUgent Beings fhould be made to be the fruit of what they do and deferve. The noblefl: enjoy- ments, or all which pre-fuppofe moral merit, can have no other fource^ and virtue (fince its nature will not ad- mit of its being either created with Be- ings, or taught them) muft always be an acquijition, Thefe confiderations, when applied to the fubjed into which I am enquiring, have a conliderable ten- dency to render it lefs puzzling. It is fcarcely conceivable that an agent, in w^orking out his own happinefs and ac- quiring virtue by attention and care, iliould not be in circumflances of fome hazard ; and if this is true, the enquiry concerning the origin of evil muft be, TiOt, why any Beings have been placed in K 3 a 134 O;^ Providence. a ftate of trial and hazard, but why they have been placed in a ftate of trial and hazard, attended with fuch and fuch circumftances of particular difadvantage and diftrefs. Upon the whole. We may, I think, perceive that it was neceffary that there ihould be a real contingency of events in the creation, and fuch a fubordination of Beings to one another and precm^ioufnefs of their ftates, as could not but fubjedl them in many inflances, and efpecially in the infancy of their exiftence, to the danger of moral defedtion and a failure of happmefs. There could not other- w^ife, it has appeared, have been room for a proper exertion of the powers of Be-f ino-s, or for that ffioral excellence by which they mod: nearly rcfemble the fountain of all perfedion, The right eji and alfo the greatejl happinefs could not have been at- tained in any other way. This appears to mc with ftrong evidence, and the rea- fons that have been afiigned feem to prove it. -But it is time to return tq what On Providence. 135 what I intended here chiefly to infift upon. I was confidering the obje(5lion againft Providence arifing from the difadvantage- ous ftate we are in for virtue, and par- ticularly, from what mufl have been the forefeen confequence of it ; that future Jinallok of a great part of mankind which religion teaches us to expect. I have faid a great part of mankind. How great a part can be known only to that Being who fees through all futurity, and who fearches all hearts. — When I con- fider the general careleffnefs which feems to prevail with refped: to religious vir- tue ; the inexcufable defects of many v/ho are ranked among the better fort of men ; the fcope of the cliriflian doc- trine, and feveral intimations of fcrip- ture ; I am indeed forced to entertain melancholy reflections. Every benevolent mind will, however, endeavour to think on this fubjeft as favourably as poflible. There is enough in the face, as it K 4 mufl ^36 On Providen^ce. muft appear to the largeft charity, to render it in the higheft degree alarming, and to awaken in us the deepeft concern for ourfelves and our fellow-men. Mil- lions of reafonable Beings, naturally imr mortal and capable of infinite improve- ment, bereaved of all their hopes, cut off fronn every bleffing of exiftence, caft away for ever from God and blifs, and funk in irreco.verable dejiruciian I — What pan be imagined mofe Ihocking ?— r But though fuch a fad: cannot but greatly affed an attentive rnind, it furniflies with no juft reafons for cenfuring Providence. God, notwithftanding, appears to he good, infinitely good. No cpnclufion to the contrary could be drawn^ were there ever fo great a difproportion between the number of thofe who fliall be faved, and thofe who will be lofl. One may even venture to affert, that it would have been w^orth while to have create4 this world fof the fake of only orie perfon t9^ be faved out of it, and fitted in it for ^v^rlajiijig happinefs. But thanks be to Divim On Providence. 1-^7 o, Divine love, the virtuous and happy part pf our fpecies, when they fhall hereafter he Jfeparated from the reft of mankind, vs^ill appear to he a great multitude^ which no one can number ^ gathered out of all na^ tions, and kindred, and people, and tongues^. Nay, we cannot tell how much greater a proportion they will, on the whole, bear to the reft of mankind, than the ftate of things hitherto in this world has given us reafon to hope. For it is not impoffible but that, before the end of the prefent ftate, a general reformation may take place, and knowledge, peace, and virtue prevail much more than they have ever yet done f , This many have thought ^ Rev. vii. 9. t It is the opinion of fome that the world has from the firft been gradually improving, and that it will go on to improve 'till fuperftitlon and wicked- nefs fhall be in a great meafure exterminated. The advances and difcoveries made within the three lafl centuries are, indeed, wonderful, and may well lead us to expe6l an approaching general amendment in human affairs. The light which has been lately ftruck 138 On Providence. thought a reafonable objedt of ex- pectation, and it feems to be very plainly foretold in the fcriptures. flruck out will probably increafe ; and the more it in- creafes, the further will free enquiry and generous fentiments fpread ; the harder will it be for eftablifh- ed corruptions to maintain their ground ; and the more the way v/ill be prepared for the downfall of all flavifh hierarchies and governments, and for the in- trodu£l:ion of thofe times, when truth and liberty fhall triumph over all oppofition, when nation fhall no more lift iip a fword againft nation, every falfe re- ligion be deftroyed, and the" kingdoms of this world hecome the k'tngdojns of the Lord and of his Chr'iji. 1 cannot think it neceffary that the world fhould con- tinue for ever divided, as it is. now, into a multitude of independent ftates whofe jarring interefts are al- ways producing war and devaluation. A fcheme of government may be imagined that fhall, by annihi- lating property and reducing mankind to their natu- ral equality, remove moft of the caufes of contention and wickednefs. An account of fuch a fcheme has been given by an ingenious writer in a book intitled, Profpe^s of Nature^ Mankind^ and Providence. It is there obferved, that if a government of this kind fhould be once efcablifhed on any fpot, the advan- tages of it would be fo vifible, and it would flrengthen and extend itfelf fo fafl, that in time it would be very likely to become qniverfal. But On Providenc e,. i 39 But be this as it will ; while all may^ a great number, we cannot doubt, will efcape the fatal effeds of vice, and be brought through the dangers of this world to endlefs blifs, It may be en- quired here, why the circumftances of the world have not been fo ordered, as that this number fhould be greater; and fomc of the principal obje(ftions againft Providence are reducible to this enquiry : But it is one of that fort of enquiries which has been before fhewn to be unreafonable. It is an enquiry which might have been made, though this number had been greater, or though it had been fo great as to include every individual of mankind. For, on this laft fuppofition, the fame general prin- ciple would have led an objecflor to afk ; « Why are not more of mankind brought ^* on the ftage, fince more may ?" [ *' Why is the earth fo thinly flocked ^^ with them, fmce it might have been ^* always full ?" Or, though alv/ays ^' full, Why was it not made larger, or ^^ created 140 On Providence. «' created fooner ?"— — In fliort; had this earth been fo httle.as to be capa- ble of holding only a number of men, equal to thofe who will be formed in it, as it is now, for future happi- nefs, and had all thefe been fo advan- tageoufly circumftanced as that not one of them fliould mifcarry : Had this, I fay, been the cafe, it could fcarcely have been thought that there was room for complaint, or the leaft reafon for que- ilioning the goodnefs of the Deity. But to the views of benevolence there can be no difference between fuch an earth and the prefent, the quantity of happinefs refulting from both being, by fuppofition, the fame. This is true of two fuch ftates, abflrafting from all connexions. What they may be when viewed in the relations they may have to other ilates, or when confidered as parts of a fyftem, it is not pofFible for us to difcover. There may in this cafe be a preference due to the latter 5 or it may be the unavoidable refult of a general plan of government produftive On Providence. 141 produdive, on the whole, of the greatefl abfolute good ^. See page 128 — 132. There * I am fenfible that many perfons will think; that I ought here to have taken notice of the good which may arife out of the evil of the world, and the im- portant ends which the abortive part of mankind may be made to ferve under the Divine government. It has been faid particularly to this purpofe, that the fu- ture puniftiment of wicked men will be the means of difplaying to the creation, in a manner not otherwife pofTible, the dreadful nature of vice and the perfe6l holinefs of the Deity ; that it is owing to them that the prefent ftate is a proper fchool of virtue to that part of mankind who will efcape Xht fecond deaths and that, for this reafon, they anfwer an end like that of dung in a garden which, though itfelf loathfome, helps the growth of fome choice plants, which in proper time are to be removed to a more confpicuous fpot, where they will fhew themfelves in their fi- nifhed form and beauty. Such is the docStrine which fome of the beft writers have taught ; and they have added, that this do<3:rine ought not to have any influence on our notions of the evil of vice, becaufe, whatever good may eventually arife from it in con- fequence of the difpofals of infinite wifdom, its ef- fential malignity is the fame ; it is always fatal to the individuals who pradlife it*; and it ftill continues true, not only that its tendency is to ruin the creation, but that this would be its a^ual effeci were it under no reftraint. 142 On Providence. There is one obfervation more of a particular nature on the prefent fubjedt, which is fo important that it would be inexcufable to omit it. What I have in view is the conformity obferved by Dr. Butler, betv/een that lofs of human creatures which I have been confidering, reftraint. — I leave every one to determine for hlmfelf how far thefe obfervationsare juft. For my own part, I am afraid of talking much in this way; and, per- haps, it will in fome meafure appear from what is above faid, that there is no great occafion for it in order to vindicate Providence in the permiflion of evil. It is right to think of vice as always an enemy to the world, and of the havock it makes among mankind as a real and great calamity. The founder of our religion certainly thought thus, otherwife he would not have ftooped fo low and fufFered fo much, to prevent the efFecis of vice and to fave mankind. This appears likewife from the laws and threatenings of the Deity, and from all that we fee of the order of ^ his government. The wicked may with no lefs truth be confidered as the weeds and briars that choak the plants, than as the manure that helps their growtlu If the temptations and di'nculties of hu- man life are the means fometimes of improving vir- tue, by affording It exercife, they are alfo generally the very caufcs which overwhelm anJ ruin it. and On Prtovidence. 143 and the courfe of nature in other in- ftances. — Vid. Analogy^ Part I. Chap. 5. Alinoil all kinds of vegetables and trees have a vaft profufion of feeds prepared for them, far the greateft part of which is loft y and, in fome inftances, not one of them in many myriads grow up to any thing. The like is very obfervable in th^ animal world ; and were one to enter minutely into this part of natural hiftory, it would be furpriiing to obferve what a fuperfluity of eggs is provided for fome infects, what an inconceivable mul- titude of creatures are loft in embryo, or born only to be deftroyed ; and what great numbers of even thofe that pro- ceed fome way towards a ftate of ma- turity perifti before they arrive at it. Should it be faid here that, as this world is conftituted, a great wafte of this fort could not but happen, which rendered it neceffary that a confiderable overplus fliould be provided ^ and that the greatnefs of the numbers loft cannot be 144 0/2 Providence. be regarded by a Being in whofe eye no- thing is great, to whom the produftion of any one number of any objedls is as cafy as the produdion of any other 5 and who, therefore^ can with no more rea- fon be cenfured for any fueh lofs, than for the non-exiflence of the Beings he has not created : Should this, I fay> be^*K)bje(fled, it would be obvious to an- fwer, that what is in fome degree equi- valent to it, may, with equal reafon,- be applied to the particular cafe under' confideration. In thinking of the analogy of nature in this inftance, we fhould by no means forget the untimely deaths that happen among our own fpecies. Many perifli in the womb ; and the greater part of thofe that fee the light, and are put in the way to the enjoyments and happinefs of grown men in the prefent life, fall fhort of them, and are nipped in their bloom ^ Such fads as thefe have a tendency ta make the deepeft impreffion on every con- On Providence. 145 confiderate perfon. They fhew us that what we are taught to believe with re-* ipedl to the future lot of mankind is en- tirely agreeable to all that we fee of the world *. Nor have we any reafon for fufpefting * I fuppofe it will be eafily feen on what opi- nion of the future punifhment I have all al#>ng argued ; and if, on this opinion, the ways of God can be vindicated, there is no other which any reafonable perfon is likely to embrace, on which they may not be vindicated. The difficulties to be re- moved are evidently much lefs on the fuppofition of the tiliimate rejloratlon of all mankind ; but this opi- nion is by no means reconcileable to the language of fcripture ; and there is reafon to believe, that the confequences of vice will be found far more ter- rible. In order to give a diftin(£ler view of that part of natural hiftory which I have mentioned above, I will recite the following facts. Monfieur Dodarty in a piece communicated to the Royal Aca- demy of Sciences, computes that an elm'"fvery year, at a medium, produces 330,000 feeds, and, therefore, fuppofmg it to live a hundred years, 33 millions dur- ring its whole age. — Fern is vaftly more fruitful in feeds. Hart's tongue, as Dr. Grczv calculates, produces in a year a million of feeds. " There is 146 On Providence. fufpeding that this part of its conftitu- tion is faulty, as, I hope, the preced- ing «' an infinite diverfity between the places that pro- *' duce and nourifh different plants. There are fome *' that 2tre not produced but upon other particular *' plants, of which the trunk, or the bark, or the " roots have alone the juice that is agreeable to " them. What Monfieur Tournefort has heard from *' Mcliieurs Mcry and Lemery is yet more furprifing. ** There are akindofmulhroomswhich grow upon the " bands and plaifters applied to the wounds and fores «' of the Tick men in the hofpital called L'Hotel-Dieu. *' After this nobody will wonder that horfe dung " prepared, as Monfieur Tournefort mentions, fhould *' be a kind of foil or bed, capable of bringing forth " the ordinary mufhrooms. It follows from hence, " that the feeds of mufhrooms muft be fcattercd in *' a pretty large quantity, in an infinite number of " places where they never appear, and indeed over *' all the earth; and by confequence, likewife, the in- " vifible feeds of a great number of other plants. '• It muft be owned that the imagination is fliocked " at firft, wnth the confideration of fuch a prodi- " gious multitude of different feeds fown everywhere " indifferently; and in an infinity of places, in vain " too. And yet, when one comes to weigh the mat- " tcr, one muft allow it. From whence come other- '' wife the marfhy plants that are found in lands ** turned to fens, and which never appeared there " before i On Providence. 147 ing obiervations will prove* It is obvious that the main objedions to it lead us equally *' before ? From whence come thofe new plants that *' other accidents fccm to have produced fometlmes *' in certain places j for inftance, the black poppies " that grow in the burnt grounds of Languedoc, in *' Provence, and in the ifles of the Archipelago, *' and which are feen no more the following ^rears ? *' From whence that great quantity oi Eryfinum lati- ** folium majus glahrum which appeared after the fire of '* London upon more than 200 acres of ground where *' that happened ? Thefe kinds of fads, and many *' others which one might alledge, equally incontefti- *' ble, prove, at the fame time, both the great multi- *' tude of feeds fcattered every where, and the want of *' certain circumftances to make them appear. *' If to this fpeculation on the invifible feeds of plants, *' we join that of the invifible eggs of infecSts, which *' is exactly parallel, the earth will be found full of *' an inconceivable number of vegetables and animals *' already perfe(Sl:ly formed and defigned in miniature, *' and which only (lay for certain favourable accidents " to appear in full length." See the lives cf the Frerjch^ Italian, and German Philofophersy late members of the Royal Academy of Sciences at Paris, together zvith ab- Jiracts offome of the cboiceji pieces communicated by ther-i to that illujirious fodety. By Mr. Chajuherlayne. A fpider lays, as naturalifts tell us, five or fix hundred eggs. As the notion of fpontaneous generation L 2 is 148 On Providence. equally to objeft, in all cafes, to the cre- ation of a fmaller rather than a greater number is now unlverfally exploded, how fhall we account for the infecls that never fail to be bred in particular places, or for the animalcules that are found in certain infufions, after expofing them uncovered to the air, except by fuppofing that the eggs of thefe animals are continually wafted about every where In the air ? What an infinity then of thefe eggs muft be loft for want of falling into favourable fituations ? Some have maintained that the bodies of all living creatures are produced from the animalcules in femine mafcuUno^ which when they happen to find a proper titdus^ are there changed, and for fome time nou- rifhed and enlarged, till at lafl the creature in its complete form is ripened for birth ; juft as all trees and plants proceed from a feed, which is nothing but the tree or plant itfelf in miniature, and which, upon being thrown into a proper foil, is there, not formed, but unfolded, nourifhed and increafed, till it becomes a full grown plant or tree. \i this opi- nion is true, it affords a moft remarkable inftance to the prefent purpofe, there being no reafon to think, confidering the inconceivable number of the animal- cules mentioned, that one out of many millions of them ever find the proper nidus^ or acStually give rife to the animals intended to be produced from them. Erractly parallel to this, is the account given by natur;ilifts of the conftru^tion and ufe of the flower which On Providence. 149 number of Beings. There is nothing like injujiice, or even iinkindnefs, implied in which precedes the fruit, in plants, and trees, and of the manner in which the farina^ or fine duft of flowers fecundifies the germen or feed placed at the bottom of the flower. Mr. Samuel Moreland in Philofophical Tranfaclions, N°. 287, (after giving an account of a well known part of natural philo- fophy, namely, that there is in every feed a feminal plant lodged between the two lobes which confti- tute the bulk of the feed, and are defigned for the firft nourifliment of the plant) mentions it as his opinion, that the feeds which come up in their proper involucra^ are at firft like unimpregnated ova of ani- mals 5 that the farina is a congeries of feminal plants, one of which mufl be conveyed into every ovum before it can become prolific ; that the ptjlil is a tube defigned to convey thefe feminal plants into their nefl:s in the ova ; and that there is fo vaft a pro- vifion made bccaufe of the odds there are, whether one out of a great number fhall ever find its way through fo narrow a conveyance. This theory has been received by Mr. Geoffrey and many others. It fecms now pretty well confirmed, and has bid the foundation of the Linnaan fyflem of botany. How remarkably does it fhew us the analogy that runs through nature ? How furprifing to confider what ar> expence of farina there is to produce one feed, and L 3 what I :;o On Providence. in it to any Being. It is confiftent with an infinite overbalance of good; and, for thefe what an expence of feeds to produce one plant ? — Is it impoffible that what is fimilar to this fhould take place in the formation of reafonable Beings in this world for happinefs hereafter ? — " That the prefent world *' (fays Dr. Butler in the paflage above referred to) <' does not actually become a flate of moral difcipline f ' to many, even the generality, cannot be urged as *' a proof that it was not intended for moral difcip- <' line, by any who at all obferve the analogy of <^ nature. For, of the numerous feeds of vegetables ^' and bodies of animals which are adapted and put ^' in the way to improve to fuch a point or ftate of ^' natural maturity and peife£l:ion, we do not fee <« perhaps one in a million adually to improve to it, *' Far the greateft part of them decay before they are '' improved to it ; and appear to be abfolutely de- ^' ftroyed. 1 cannot forbear adding, that the ap- '' pearance of fuch an amazing wafle in nature, " with refpedl to thefe feeds and bodies, by foreign <* caufes, is to us as unaccountable as what is much ** more terrible, the prefent and future ruin of fo '« many moral agents, by themfelves, /'. e. by vice." There is a further circumflance in the conftitution of nature applicable to the prefent purpofe, which feems to be worthy of notice, and which I will men- tion as briefly as pofiible. — One of the moft remark- able On Provi.dence. 151 thefe reafons, the mere circumftance of its unaccountableneis as occafioning a ivajle able and diftinguifiiing properties of human nature is, its capacity of improvement. What the lower crea- tures were at firft, they are now, and probably ever will be. But this is by no means the cafe with men. Previoully to all advantages from experience and in- ftruaion, they are nearly the favages defcribed by Mr. Roujfeau, {See his Treatife on the Origin of the Inequality among Mankind) or creatures running naked and wild in the woods, without refleaion, without fociety, and without language. Compare them in this ftate with what they are capable of becoming by a due application of their powers, by the invention of 'arts and fciences, and the eftablifhment of the beft fchemes of civil policy; and a difFerence will appear not inferior to that between men and the loweft fpecies of brutes, or between the wifeft perfon on earth and a child juft born.- This natural im- proveablenefs of the human race has never taken its ^ complete effea. The greateft part, of men have, from the beginning of the world, been in a ftate of darknefs and barbarifm. Many ages paft before the difcovery of any of thofe arts, from whence are derived the chief conveniences of life : And though now, in confequence of the acquifitions of fome thoufands of years, human life in a few nationsap- pears in a ftate of confiderable order and dignity, yet ftill it is farther than canbewellimagincd, from having L 4 attained i^fz On V R t) V I D E N C E. ivajie of being (which is the moft that is puzzling in it) cannot be of any great confequence. The feeming wajle may, for ought we know, anfwer important ends, and appear at laft to be the greateft frugality. How hard is it that we fliould be willing to truft the wifdom of nature no further than it keeps within fight ? How inconceivable is it that, in this or any other inftance, a creature of yefter- day and a reptile of the duft fhould be able to fee further, or to contrive attained any where to a ftate fo improved and happy as we fee it to be capable of. ^^This lofs of the ef- fect of human improveablenefs will appear equally remarkable, if we confider the individuals of mankind. — Thoufands of Boyles, CJarks and Newtons have probably been loft to the world, and lived and died in ignorance and meannefs, merely for want of being placed in favourable fituations, and enjoying proper advantages. Such has been the cafe with mankind, confideredas defigned only for exiftence in this world. But they are capable of exifting in a Jiighcr ftate. They are capable of an endl-js future progrefs in knowledge and happinefs. — Can any one fay, that the effe(£l: alfo of their improveablenefs in this refpcft may not fail in numbcrlcfs inftances ? better;^ On Provi-dence. ^^3 better, than that original intelligence irora whence all things fprung ? 1 feel particular fatisfadlion whenever I make fuch reflexions, and therefore I hope I fliall be excufed if I am too often recur- ring to them. ^I have now propofed the thoughts which have appeared to me of moil: confequence, towards reconciling oor minds to our ftate, confidered as a mixed and imperfed: ftate ; a ftate of labour, temptation, and danger ; and a ftate in which many are likely to fail of future happinefs, and to be loft for ever. Some of the obfervations which have been made on the head laft mentioned, have gone on the fuppofition, that the virtuous part of mankind are not only to be equitably diftinguiihed from others in proportion to the difterence of their charaders, but to be rewarded hereafter with an emilefs life in a ftate of ever increafing happi- jiefs. As we have reafon to think this to be the faft, it makes no great diffe- c rence 154 ^^^ Providence, rence with refpecft to the argument on which I have infilled, how^ it comes to be fad: ; whether, for inftance, it is to be confidered as derived from the origi- nal canjiitution of the Deity, or as the effedl of an extraordinary difpenfation of mercy. In juftice, however, to what the Chriftian Revelation has taught us, I cannot difmifs this fubjed: without ob- ferving, that the latter is in reality the truth. The Scriptures are exprefs and clear in reprefenting Chrift as the author of eternal lijcy pr our rejlorer to immor- tality. The account there given feems to be, that we were indeed at firft in- tended for immortality, but that in con- fequence of certain events at the com- inencement of the prefent ftate, we loft it, and were brought into fuch circum- ftances of diftrefs as gave occafion to the interpofition of the Meffiah, by whofe benevolent agency our race has been fo far delivered, that all the truly penitent Ihall efcape the fecond death, and be made happy for ever. As one who believes I Chri- 071 ProvideInce. 155 Chriftianity, I am obliged to think this a true account ; and there are feveral reafons which determine me to think it an account entirely credible. Death has in it all the appearance of being an evil for which fuch creatures as we are might not be originally intended. The beft of us have expofed themfelves to the confe- quences of guilt in many inftances. I cannot conceive, why it fliould be thought unlikely, t\i2itfiich Beings fhould be in a ftate which (though perfectly right con- fidered in its reference to the Divine ad-- miniftration) may yet be a degraded or fallen ftate, and fuch as might have need- ed fuch a Saviour as Jefus Chrift. . I fhould be carried far beyond the pur- pofe of this Differtation were I to fay much more here. I will therefore ad- vance no further than to offer a few hints, in order to fhew what force fome of the arguments already propofed have to vin- dicate Divine Providence, even on the fuppofition that our real ftate is that now mentioned. It 156 071 Providence. It has been proved, I think, that there is no reafon to look upon our prefent ftate as, in any refpefl:, inconfiftent with the perfedions of the Deity "*. Moft cer- tainly then, it is a ftate into which he might have made us liable to be brought in confequence of any connexions proper to be eftablifhed in the univerfe. We fee among the individuals of mankind that, in confequence of their dependence on one another, they are often deprived of benefits which feemed to be intended for them by the conftitution of the Deity, and brought into ftates which, tho' they give no reafon for complaining of Pro- vidence, are yet juftly deemed calamitous. * If any one fliould fufpe£t an inconfiftency in fay- ing that our flatc i$ calamitous, and yet a ftate that difplays God's goodnefs, and in which we might have been originally placed, let him put the cafe of a per- fon fallen from honour, eafe, and wealth, to the cares, and toil, and indigence of low life ; would it TiOt be true, that the condition of fuch a perfon was calamitous ? But might he not, as many actually are, have been horn in it, and yet have abundant rea- fon to be thankful for exiftencc ? How On Providence. 157 How credible is it that there may alfo be events or connexions in nature by which, confidently with perfedt wifdom and goodnefs, the like may happen fometimes to a /pedes ? The enjoyment of whatever is a favour in exiftence, may be made precarious in any degree the creator pleafes, or fuf- pended on any conditions that he fees to be moft conducive to the ends of his go- vernment. The bleffings which the Chriftian fcheme fuppofes mankind had loft, they never had any right to. The Divine perfedlions certainly do not re- quire, that fuch virtue as ours fliould be rewarded with the Chri/ian fahation. Had our Maker intended us only for a temporary exijience, we flipuld have had >no reafon for any other fentiments than grateful ones, provided we enjoyed any degree of happinefs, and received uni- verfally an adequate retribution. But he has been infinitely more kind to us. That very conftitution of his govern- ment 158 On Providenck. ment which made us liable to be brought into that calamitous ftate which Chri*' ftianity fuppofes, made provifion alfo for the pofTibility of our deliverance and re- ftoration to the views of a happy eter- nity ; and thus difplays the higheft wif- dom and goodnefs we can imagine, a- greeably to the obfervations in page 130 — 133- But it is high time to ftop. I feel myfelf in danger of going far beyond my depth. The ways and adminiftration of the Deity muft be unfathomable to us. Were they otherwife, they could not be infinitely wife and good. The origin of evil has been the grand fubjed; ot en- quiry among thoughtful men in all ages, and various have been the fenti- ments about it. What has been now faid on this point is offered with a deep fenfe of imperfediion and blindnefs. Though it fcems to remove fome diffi- culties, it does not, I am fenfible, re- move all. What has been laft infifted on 0;Z F R O V I D E N C E . 1 59 on fliould be particularly attended to. If, according to the fcriptures and ancient tradition, our ftate is indeed a fallen ftate, the dired: folution of the queftion concerning the origin of evil would be a recital of the manner in which we were brought into it, or a diftind ac- count of thofe caufes and events under the Divine government from which it is derived. But fuch an account, fuppof- ing it given us, we may not perhaps be capable of underftanding *. We muft * The account of the Fall in Gene/is is far from being fuch an account as I here mean. It is, per- haps, in fome meafure veiled^ or at leaft partial^ and defigned only to inform us that, whereas we were at firft placed higher in the fcale of being, we were reduced lower and funk into our prefent mortal flats in confequence of fome connexions we had with fu- perior orders of creatures, or of the agency of an evil Being reprefented by the Serpent -, a deliverer be- ing at the fame time promifed, who fhould dejitoy tlse works of the devil, — See the laft eiTliy in a book intitled, CritOy where a good deal tliat deftrves attention, is faid by the ingenious and learned author, on the power of fuperior Beings and the connexions we may have had with them 5 and alfoj on another fubjecl touched in page 141. there- i6o On Providence. therefore be much in the dark -, and while we are fo, while we fee nothing but juft the prefent moment, and know fo little of the hiftory of the univerfe, and its connexions and laws, it cannot but be unreafonable to pretend to be able to form an adequate judgment of our ftate, or completely to account for every circumftance in it. Every one who looks about him muft lament the degeneracy of mankind ; and every one who believes the doctrines of rehgion muft tremble for the danger he is in, and the multitudes who are likely to be loft. Inftead of allowing ourfelves to be very anxious about difcovering the particular caufes that brought us into thefe circumftances, our chief enquiry fhould be, whether, amidft all our darknefs, we do not fee enough to alTure us that God is perfedly righteous in all his ways ; and about this I can entertain no doubts, for the reafons I have endeavoured to explain. But, above all things, it is our bufinefs to take On PROVIt)ENCE. l6t take care of ourfelves, to keep clear of the corruption that is in the v)orld through liift^, to ftrive to fave our own fouls amidft the dreadfiil wreck, and at the fame time to do all we can to fave fome with ourfelves. This is the great ufe which we fliould make of what We have reafon to believe concerning cur itate ; and I wifh I knew how to im- prefs on the mind of the perfon who reads this a due fenfe of its importance. Without doubt every other objedl of concern, compared with it, is entirely- trivial and infignificant. * ^ Pet. i. 4. ^M SECT. 1 62 On Providence. S E C T. V. Of the Vfes of the DoBrine of Providence* IN the preceding fedllons I have con- fidered moft of the queftlons relat- ing to the dodlrine of Providence, which feemed to me of great importance. I have endeavoured to give a juft view of the nature and proofs of it, but have not aimed at difcuffing every queftion that has been ftarted about it, or in- fiftlng on every argument that might have been urged. In ftating, particu- larly, the evidence for Providence, I have avoided entering into fome reafon- ings which have a great effetS on my own mind, becaufe likely to be con- fidered as too abflradted and metaphyfi- cal, and becaufe alfo a full explanation of them could not be properly given in On PROVIDENtEi 163 jn this diiTcrtation *. What has been faid, however, will, I hope, be fuf- ficient * 0{ this fort are the following obfervations, which I will juft mention here, becaufe it is poflible that, without any particular explanation, they may appear to a few as important as they do to myfelf. Since all limitation muftbe an effect of fome limiting caufe, it can have no place In an unorlginated nature. Un- briginated pov/er, wifdom, and goodnefs, therefore, muft be mfinite. Wherever infinite power is, there muft be infinite knowledge^ it being contradidory to fuppofe that the power of any intelligent Being can extend further than his ideas. And, fmce the obliga- tions of moral rectitude are founded in eternal truth and reafon, where there is infinite knotvkdge^ there muft be infinite ^5(7i«£/}. There is, therefore, a ne- cefTary connexion betv/een infinite power, wifdom, and goodnefs. They are eflentially one, and cannot refide in different natures. The fovereignty of the univerfe, therefore, muft be perfectly wife and righteous j and all the order and beauty in the crea- tion are to be traced up to one eternal and immutable principle, of order and beauty, and of all that is ve- nerable and excellent. It deferves particular no- tice, that the necefTary connexion which our own ideas teach us, in the manner juft mentioned j be- tween infinite power, wifdom and goodnefs, and which certainly is the moft agreeable and important of all truths, is exhibited to us in all that we fee of M a the I &4 C>;/ Providence. licient to convince fuch as vv^ill impaf'*' tially attend to it, and nothing now re- mains but that I reprefent the proper improvement of this fubje6t, and con- fider the influence which it ought to have on our tempers and lives. Here, ifl:. It fliould be recollefted that the argument on which I, have prin- cipally infifled in the laft feclion, fur- nifhcs us with a flrong reafon for con- tentment. As this reafon for content-^ ment cannot be too much inculcated, I fhall not fcruple to recall fome of the obfervations before made, in order to give a more diflindl and full account of it. The fadl I (hall go upon is, that hap- pinefs is prevalent in human life. This, I know, has been denied by fome, but the world ; there being no inftance in which the foiver that matle the univerfe has dilplaycd dcfign, which docs not appear to be wife and kind defign. Compare the note in page 24. cer-" On Providence. 165 certainly without any reafon. There is, in reality, no comparifon between the blejjings and the calamiucs of life, or be- tween the number of hours in which we enjoy fome kind of pleafure, and thofe in which we fuffer pain. What in fome meafure deceives us in this matter is, our confidering every ftate in which we are not exempted from all tineajinefs ^ as a ftate of abfolute mifery ; whereas we may be happy, that is, the whole pleafure of exifting may not be deftroyed, un- der confiderable degrees of uneafinefs. — ^ We are, on the contrary, apt to coniider no ftate as happy which is not attended with fome fenfatioris of pofitive joy; and this is true as this word h^ been generally ufed, but is far from being fo if w^e ap- ply it, as I now do, to any ftate or cir- cumftances in which to he is better than not to be. Life, though deftitute of any particular gratifications, is naturally agreeable. Seldom does it happen at the end of a djiy that we have no reafon M 3 to I j66 On Providence. to thank God for it, or that we can fay Avith truth, upon reviewing it, that it has been a miferable day to us. A ftate of fome degree of enjoyment, or of exemption from all fuch diftrelTes as take away, while they laft, all comfort, being our ufual ftate, it is what we look for and reckon upon ; and therefore, what- ever happens to put us out of this ftate, or to render exiftence a real burden, is the more obferved and makes the deeper impreffion. And from hence it comes to pafs, that one fit of ficknefs or difafter engages the attention, and fur- nifties with matter for converfation for months or years, while all the health and pleafures ^ith which common life abounds, are overlooked and difte- garded. Suppofing it then evident that the portion of good allotted to men exceeds the portion of evil, let us next enquire what reafon they can have for difcon- tent. Happy, in foii^e degree, they feci I them- On Providence. 167 themfelves. If then they are dilTatisfied, it muft be becaufe they are not more happy. But this is perverfenefs and pre- fumption : For if this be a juft reafon for diffatisfadlion, it is, in the nature of things, impoffible they fhould ever be fatisfied. A perfon, fuppofe, in a low ftation and narrow circumftances, finds upon comparing his enjoyments and fufFerings, the former to be greateft, and his exiftence, all things confidered, to be preferable to non-exiftence. Why then is he not contented ? — '^ Becaufe he *' is not ftationed higher in the world/* — -Suppofe this granted him.— —Will not the fame ground of difcontent ftill remain ? And would it not remain tho* he was even raifed to the ftation of an angel * ? It is plain, therefore, that nothing * No perfon of any reflexion can Imagine that this argument implies, that we ought not to ufe proper means to improve our circumftances, or increafe our happinefs. The moft vigorous ufe of fuch means is confiftent with the higheft degree of fubmlirion to the Divine will, nay, is required by it. Whatever hap- M 4 pincfs J 68 On P R O V I D E N C E. nothing can be more abfurd than difeon^ tent. It goes upon a principle which would level the whole univerfe, and fow uneaiinefs among all the inferior orders of Beings. The true language of it is ; *^ I will be at the top of th? creation, ^' I will accept of no happinefs fhort *' of the greatefl that can be communi- ^* cated." -What can equal the ar- rogance of fuch a difpcfitlon of mind ? How entirely does it unfit for exiftence under God's government, where there muil: be fubordinations and diftindlions of all forts and degrees ? How bafe is it to complain of that Being who has given us all wx enjoy, merely becaufe he ha$ not given us 7nore, when, without wrong, he might have given us nothhig? It becomes not :thofe who are obliged for every degree *of good to pure favour, plncfs lies within the reach of the powers given us and we can innocently obtain, ought to be con- fidcred as a part of the happinefs intended us by Pro- vidence ; and it would be, not acquiefcing in its dif- pofals but thwarting them, to deprive ourfelves of jt by iti^ciiyity and negligence, t9 On Providence. 169 to prefcribe how much they fliall have ; or for tliofe who might never have ex- ifted, to determine how perfect and hap- py they fhall be.- We need not doubt but that it is for the beft reafons, that our flate is fuch as we find it. Our duty is to accept humbly that portion of bhfs which falls to our /hare, to ac- quiefce chearfully in our different fta- tions, and to efteem ^s^^xy little which may be granted us a kindnefs that calls for gratitude. Thus fliall we make the moft of what we enjoy, aft fuitably to the relation of creatures, recomm.end ourfelves to our all-wife Governor, and take the certain method to fecure fui> ther favour. It will not be improper to obfcrve here, that though I have argued on the fuppofition that happinefs is prevalent in human life, yet v/e fliould, in reality, have no good reafon for complaint, tho' the contrary were true, provided it v/as the effed: of our own ill condud. From this ijo On Providence. this fource, undoubtedly, proceed our worft evils. Human life, as it is the gift of God, or as we might make it by behaving fliitably to his intentions and ftudying to maintain tranquility, is an unfpeakably greater bleffing than we commonly find it.' This obfervation places the abfurdity of difcontent in a light that cannot but imprefs every in- genuous mind. Is it not fhameful to murmur, on account of evils which we voluntarily bring upon ourfelves, con- trary to plain admonitions and warnings ? Does it not infinitely more become guilty Beings, who are fo much the creators of their own fufferings, to accufe and re- proach themjelves, than to exclaim againft Providence ? I cannot quit thefe reflexions without adding, that the fame argument with that now ufed to fliew the folly of difcontent in general, may be employed to (hew the folly, in particular, of the inclination which many perfons difcover to On Providence, 171 to complain, becaufe greater light and evidence on feveral fpeculative points have not been granted them. Every man has light enough to a6t upon, and to diredl him in his mofl important con- cerns. This is all we can have any right to expedl ; and to indulge difcontent be- caufe v^e have not fo much as wq wifla for, or as is neceflary to fatisfy curiofity, w^ould be tacitly to aflert that we have a right to be omnifcient. It is indeed our duty to ftrive to obtain all the light poffible ; but at the fame time we ihould remember, that it is no fmall part of virtue to acquiefce in that degree of light allotted us by Providence, or which we are able to acquire in the faithful ufe of pur faculties.— But to difmifs this fubjeft. I would further obferve with refpeft to the proper improvement of the dodrine of Providence, that it ought to be always attended to and recognized by us. The care of the Deity, we have feen, extends to / 172 Oh Providence. to all events. Nothing happens with-, out either his appointment or permiffion. It muft be our duty to remember this, and to maintain a deep fenfe of it in our hearts. Nothing can be more reafonable than that we fliould look up continually to the Sovereign Arbiter of nature,, ex- peft fuccefs in our undertakings from him, and acknowledge \am in all our ways. There is within us an unhappy pronenefs to fink into an infenfibility with refpecfl to him , and it is remark- able that the chief caufe of this is the peculiar degree of our dependence upon him, and his being fo much one with our fouls that we overlook him. There is nothing fo near us, and therefore, there is nothing that we are fo apt to dif- regard. He is in every breath we draw and in every thought we think, and for this very reafon he engages not our at- tention y and, becaufe every thing, he be- comes nothing to us. Thus, in par- ticular, his power is as much difplayed m thofc events which are moft com- mon. On Providence. 173 mon, as in thofe which are moft extra- ordinary. But in the former we feldom take notice of it, whereas in the latter it alarms and terrifies us. \Ver6 the bo- dies on the furface of the earth to afcend into the air, or were the planets to fly out of their orbits, our thoughts would be immediately drawn to God's hand ; but it afteds us not in cafes where there is much more reafon to acknowledge it, in the tendency of bodies downwards, and the regular motions of the heavenly bodies. What comes to pafs out of the ufual courfe we are never backward to afcribe to him ; but what is done con- ftantly and regularly, we are ready to confider as coming to pafs of itfelf, and requiring no caufe. We fliould endea- vour to guard our minds againft this weaknefs, and fludy to acquire a habit of carrying up our views to God on all occalions. We may be fure of being right in doing this. The courfe of nature is nothing but his power, exerting itfelf every where according to fixt rules, m order 174 O/^ Providence, order to anfwer the beft ends. The frame of the world muft be in every refped what he has been pleafed to or- dain. By him it fubiifts, and in him we livCf and move, and have our beings *. See Seft. II. page 41 — 54. One cannot think, without concern and furprife, of the inexcufable degree in which fome perfons are guihy of that dif- regard to Providence, on which I am now remarking. They terminate their views in the objeds of fenfe, and forget all fu- perlor and invifible power. They con- fider the Deity as either withdrawn from the world to enjoy repofe in the extra- mundane fpaces; or, if neceflarily prefent to it, as an idle and vaing-lorious Being, who is above concerning himfelf with any thing in it. They look no higher for the fource of any evils they fufFer^ or bleffings they enjoy, than change ^ or fortune^ ox fate ^ and they are generally very well fatisfied if they can point out the immediate caufe of an effed without * Acts xvii. 28, €n- 0;7 Providence. 17^ enquiring any further. This has been too true of even fome who have been diftinguiflied by the name of Philofophers. \ But it is impoffible that they fhould have anyjufk title to that charadler. It has appeared, I beheve, that fuch a w^ay of thinking is no lefs repugnant to true phi- , lofophy, than it is miferably gloomy and difcouraging*. 'Tis worth remember- * " A little philofophy inclineth mens mind to «* atheifm ; but depth in philofophy bringeth mens *< minds about to religion,'* Lord Bacon* s EJfay on " Atheifm » " In the entrance of philofophy, when the fecond *' caufes moft obvious to the fenfes offer themfelves *' to the mind, we are apt to cleave to them, and *« dwell too much upon them, fo as to forget what ** is fuperior in nature. But when we pafs further^ •' and behold the dependency, continuation, and " confederacy of caufes, and the works of Provi- «' dence, then, according to the allegory of the " poets, we ^afily believe that the higheft link of na^ *« ture's chain muft needs be tied to the foot of " Jupiter's chair j or perceive that philofophy, like *' Jacobus vifion, difcovcrs to us a ladder whofe top " reaches up to the footftool of the throne of God/* Mr. Maclaurins Account of Sir Ifaac Newton's Philofo^ phical Difcoveriesy Book I. Chap. 3. 1^6 On Providence. ing, particularly, that the difpofition i6 be fatisfied with difcovermg the im" mediate caufes of efFedls in natural philo- fophy, without carrying our views higher, argues exadly the fame folly with that of a perfon, v/ho fliould imagine that he had fufficiently accounted for the motion of a particular wheel in a machine, by flbewing that it was turned by the wheel next to it, without extending . his views to the fkill of the artift, and to the fpring, on whofe cpnftant aftion all the motions of the machine depended ^ or rather it argues the fame folly with that of the Indian mentioned by Mr. hockey who fatisfieij himfelf with thinking that the world was fupported by an elephant, and the elephant by a tortoife. It fliOuld, however, be obferved here that there is an extreme on the other fide, which ought carefully to be avoided. I mean, the extreme into which thofe perfons run who have rccourfe immc^ diately to Divine power, in order to ac- count for every event, and who are apt to On Providence. 177 to look with horror on all attempts to aflign the natural caufes of events. The former extreme is atheifm. This is fu^ ferjiition 'y and both argue great fliort- fightednefs and ignorance. But the laft is perhaps the moft excufable. We can- not fay how far the dependence of lower caufes on more general ones reaches, or how complicated the me- chanifm of nature may be; but we know that the Maker's agency is the primary caufe which eftabliflied all others, and to which all others owe their force ; and this proves, that there is a juft fenfe in which we may afcribe to him every effect in the material world, and con- fider all that happens as the refult of his will. Thirdly. From the account that has been given of Providence we may learn the reafonablenefs of prayer. Were it true that the Deity does not attend to our affairs, or that the feries of events goes on in one immutable dired:ion in- N dependently ijS On Providence. dependently of him, no help could be expected from him ; nor could we be at all the better for any application of our minds to him, and therefore prayer would be an abfurdity. But it has been fhcwn that the contrary is true. If I have argued right, the feries of events is juft what he fees fit to appoint or al- low. He is intimately prefent with us every moment, obferving all our thoughts, and difpofing all the circumftances of our exiflence. The whole world is in his hand, and by an imperceptible diredlion of the operations of natural caufes and of the thoughts of mankind, he can over-rule whatever comes to pafs^ and grant proper anfwers to prayer. — —The objedion then againfl prayer, taken from the fuppofed unalterablenefs of the courfe of things, and the impoffibility of de- riving any benefit from it, confiftcntly with the fettled order- of the world, is groundlefs. — If there is an all -dire ding Providence, nothing can be more fit than to endeavour to engage it in our favour. I If On P R o V I b E isi c E. 179 If we owe our whole happinefs to God, and the entire fate of our Beings is de- termined by his will, it muft be inex- cufable not to acknowledge and worfhip him. If he governs all created exiftence, and nothing can come to pafs contrary to his counfels, it is reafonable to feek his protection, to fly to him in danger^ to beg his aid in accomplifliing our good defigns, to implore his bleffing on our enjoyments, and to recommend to his care thofe who are dear to us. Nor can any perfon, who has his mind duly impreffed with a fenfe of the abfolute dependence of all things on the Deity, omit thefe ad:s without offering great violence to himfelf. The belief of an omniprefent Deity prompts the human heart, with a force almofl irrefiftible, to direft its defires to him. This tendency difcovers itfelf in all mankind j and as far as it operates, it implies a neceffity of confid^ring prayer as likely to be of avail to procure blefiings iot us. It may be well prefumed that this fentiment of N 2 nature 1 8o On Providence. nature muft be right; and that the Deity does indeed, either by himfelf or fome intermediate agency, follow prayer with fuch bleffings as it may be a juft reafon for communicating. Experience and obfervation prove nothing to the contrary. For, fuppoling the conftltution of the world to be fuch as e/labliflies an availablenefs in prayer, it muft be im- poiiible to diftinguifli the bleffings which have this fource from others. It is enough that we have reafon to conclude that God is a friend to the pious and v^orthy, and that we fee in general their flate to be happier than that of the irreligious and vicious. The opinion that the Deity has limited himfelf to a fettkd courfe of afting, or to general laws from which he never deviates, has very little to do with this point. For let it be allowed to be true ; Is it likewife true of ail thofe fubordinate Beings, who may be the minifters of his Providence? May it not be itfelf a law of his govern- ment, or one part of his fettled courfe of On Providence. iSi of afting, to make a proper difference between thofe who Acknowledge his fu- preme dominion by prayhig to him, and thofe who do not? But v/hat is it informs us that the Deity never adls but by general laws ? The reafon I have men- tioned more than once * for the eftablifli- ment of general laws is far from being any juft foundation for this opinion. Particular influences accommodated to particular occafions, though fuppofed not reducible to any general laws, may yet be agreeable to them, and entirely con- fiflent with their inviolablenefs ; as 13 fliewn in the firfl and third feftions. It is neceffary to add, that were there in truth, on account of the unalterable- nefs of the courfe of nature and the impropriety of adventitious influences, no benefit to be derived from fupplica- tions to the Deity, an inconfiflency would be eftablifhed in the conftitution of the world; for by the frame of our minds * See page 17. N 3 it J 82 On Providence. it would diBate prayer to us, at the fame time that by fixing its unav.ailablenefs it had rendered it vain and impertinent. But this fubjed: will come to be more amply difcuffed in the next DifTertation. In the next place. God's Providence is the proper objeft of abfolute confix dence. We ought to truft in it with firmnefs, and to throw upon it all our cares. The belief of it fhould render us ferene in all feafons, and fupport and en- courage us in the worft extremities. It is impoffible that any event in which our intereft is concerned fliould be neg- leded. We are under the protection of infinite power ; and the charge of fove- reign goodnefs. No perplexing fears, therefore, or defponding folicitude fliould ^t any time enter into our breafts. One truth, however, Jet us carefully at- tend to. Let us ren:>ember that our truft in God's Providence ought to be regu- lated by a regard to the fpotlefs purity of his characfter, and accompanied air wayq On Providence. 183 ways With the pradtice of virtue, and our own utmoft prudence and diligence. Without this our expectations from Pro- vidence are vain, and our truft in it will be prefumption- What it is chiefly em-- ployed in is the adjuftment of events to the different charardlers of moral agents. God is a righteous Being, and he can fa- vour none but the righteous. If we are not of this number we have nothing to expeft from him. His government, which fliould be the joy of the whole creation, ought to be a terror to us ; and it will be a necefTary inftance of its perfe(ft redlitude to confign us over to punifliment. It would be difhonourable to him to exercife goodnefs towards thofe who abufe his goodnefs, and are nufances in his works. It is not fit that rational agents fliould be made happy v/ithout their own a^flive concurrence, and virtu- ous induftry. But thefe fuppofed, there is nothing that fliould difturb us, nor i^ it poffible that we fliould expedl too much from the bounty of our Maker. N 4 After 184 On Providence. After difcharging our duty and making the beft ufe we can of the powers given us, we have nothing to do but to trull our concerns with the Deity, to commit to him our whole exiflence, and wait quietly for the iflue of prefent events, which will prove glorious beyond con- ception to every true friend of righteouf- nefs. In connexion with this it muft be obferved that the dodlrine of Provi- dence is a fource of the higheft joy. Were events under no good di- recftion ; did blind neccfTity or fickle chance govern the world, our condition would indeed be deplorable. We could look at nothing with any complacency. All nature would lofe its beauty, and appear dark and defolate. But this is by no means our flate. The order of nature is wife and good beyond all that we can allc or think. Almighty power, it has been fhewn, united to perfcifl wif- dom and benevolence, is at the head of 1 the On Providence. 185 the univerfe aftuating all its parts, and prefiding over all its events. What feems itioft formidable, therefore, may fit eafy on our minds, and infinitely more may be expefted to take place in nature than the moil benevolent heart can imagine.— How delightful are thefe truths ? With what exultation and triumph fiiould they fill us ?-^ Do you fufFer under any ca- lamity ?-— Remember that the eye of the Deity is upon you, and that you can fufFer nothing but in confequence of the difpofals and counfels of his ever-attentive and unerring Providence. Accept then your fufferings with a zeal becoming his faithful fubjed:. Submit to them with loyal and hearty affection, and never indulge a repining thought. Wherein can your dignity confiil: except in having one will with God ? Can you be difpleaf- ed with what is right ? Would you have the world governed wrong ?— No degree of improper pain, no fufferings inconfiftent with a perfeft order of adininiflration can ever find admiflion into the world. Our i86 On Providence. Our affairs, > and thofe of our friends and of all our fellow-creatures, are, in every particular, under the management of everlafting and omnipotent reafon and love. Is not this what every heart muft wifh for ? Is there any thing that we can poffibly defire beyond it ? What fatisfaciion fhould we feel in exiftence, ,to find ourfelves in a fcene fo glorious, in circumftances fo happy ? Did the uni- verfal order require us to facrifice to it every advantage of exigence, or were the fubordinations eflablifhcd in the crea- tion for producing the greateft good fuch as obliged us to give up all our happi- nefs ; though, in thele circumftances, fuch a fealty of heart to the government of the univerfe as would caufe us to re-- joice^ is not perhaps attainable ; 3^et, if du- ly prevalent, it would certainly produce perfedl acqiiiefcence. But this is a fuppo- lition that we have no reafon for making. No fuch trial is put upon us. Our cir- cumftances are infinitely happier. The univerfal order has already brought us much On Providence. 187 much happinefs ; and we are affured that, if we avoid vice and difcharge our duty, our happinefs fhall not ceafe at death, but be renewed in brighter regions, and there go on increafing and improving tp all eternity. — Oh! ravifhing hope. — Glory for ever be to that inconceivable grace which thu5 bleffes us *. Once more. I cannot help obferv- ing that the account which the fcrip- tures give of the dodlrine of Providence leads us to believe their heavenly ori- ginal. It is not poflible to confider^ without admiration, the elevated defcrip- tions which they give of God as prefiding pver the world, producing all the revo- lutions in it, and working all things after * The wages of fin h death. But the gft of God is eternal Ufe^ through J ejus Chrijl our Lord. Rom. vl. 23. Bleffed he the God and Father of our Lord Jffus Chri/i, who, according to his abundant jnercy, has begotten us again to a lively hope^ by the refurreSiion of Jefus Chrijl from the dead^ to an inheritance incorruptible^ undcfiled^ and that fadeth not away^ rejerved In heaven for Vf^ I Pet. i. 3, 4. the j8S On Providence. the counfel of his own will *. The whole hiftory they contain is one uniform dis- play of the Divine fuperintendency of our affairs, — It is an obfervation no lefs juft than common that there is this remark- able difference between the facred hiftory and all others ; that whereas other hiflo- ries feldom go higher than the paffions of men and the powers of nature for the fources of the events they relate, this always carries our thoughts up to the jirjl caufe, and direds our views to God as the guide and governour of whatever happens. Thus ; of the fwordy or a fa-- miney or a pejl Hence y it fays that Godfent it \ y of every calamity in a cityy that he does it ; of the wind and the lightnifig^ that they, go forth at his word; of the raiuy that he gives it y of the falling of a fparrow to the groundy that it happens 7iot without him ; of what feems moft cafual, that he direfts it, and of the * Eph, i. II. •t If. xlv. 7. Amos Hi. 6. Pfal. cxlviii. — - Ffov. xvi. 33. Matih. x. 29, 30.— Rom. xi. 36. hairs On Providence. c 1[B9 hairs of our heady that they are all niim- ^^;r^/.— Such reprefentations of Divine Providence, fo agreeable to our beft no*- tions, and exceeding all that can be found in other writings, afford an internal evi- dence of confiderable importance in fa- vour of the fcriptures. But further. As the dodlrinc of Pro- vidence, fuppofed previoufly eftablifhed, furnifhes us with an argument for the fcriptures, fo thefe in their turn furnifh us with an argument for Providence.-— We fee here that we have connexions w^ith an inviiible world of fpirits, that there have been interpofitions of fuperior power in our affairs, and that heaven does intereft itfelf about us particularly and wonderfully. — But what I have now chiefly in view is, the argument for Pro- vidence arifing from the completion of the fcripture prophefies. There are in the Old and New Teftament, many pre- diftions of events very diflant from the times when they were delivered, which are 190 On Providence. are reprefented as fure to be verified by Divine Providence. The accomplifli- ment of fuch predictions, when it hap- pens, proves that the predicted events were indeed fubjedt to the fuperinten- dency of Providence, and obhges us to conclude the fame concerning all events. When we find, for inftance, that the prefent ftate of the Jews and the cor- ruption of chriftianity by popery were foretold, and the principal circumftances attending them defcribed, fome thoufands of years ago, we cannot doubt but thefe events have been all along objects of the attention of the Deity, and happen only in confequence of his unfearchable coun- fels.. It is worthy of fpecial notice, that the reprefentation made in thefe prophecies of tht/potlefs * holinefs of the Deity as his moft diftinguifliing attribute, and the chief Ipring of his adions in ^uiding events, proves further that the adminiftration of the world is holy and rig-htcous. In fliort. The Bible gives * Rev iv. 8. — XV. 4. US O// P R O V I D E N C E. 191 US a hiftory of all the great fads in which this earth is concerned from its creation to its diiTolution. A confiderable part of this hiftory muft be prophetical, and what we have feen verified of this part de- monftrates that the writings containing it come from the author and ruler of na- ture. It likewife proves that the world is under a moral government, and that Divine Providence watches over it thro' every period of its duration. And, per- haps, the prophecies which ftill remain to be accompliflied may fome time or o- ther afford a demonflration of thefe truths that will put to flight all infidelity^ and convince and furprife the whole world. It ought not to be forgotten on this occalion that there is one event, im- portant above all others, which the fa- cred writings foretel, and to which, they acquaint us, every prefent difpenfation of Providence refers. I mean the last JUDGMENT; when, we are told, every one Jl:ii!l receive according to bis ivoris, anj %gz On Providence. gnd the Divine moral, government with refpe<^ to the human race fliall be con- fummated ; when the earth ivith all her njuorksjldall he bumf up\ the Son of man appear in poiver and great glory y and all that are in their graves jhall hear his voice ^ andfiall come forth y they that have done good to the refurreBion of Ife^ and they that have done evil to the refurredfion of dajn- nation. What we have i^^w verified of the fcripture prophecies ajjiires us that iiich a time is coming ; and happy are thole who are always thinking of it, and preparing for it. To conclude the whole.' ---Let us labour earneftly to bring our minds into that temper which the dodrine of Pro- vidence requires. Let us follow impli- citly wherever it leads us, and make an abfolute furrender of our wills to God's will, fupprefling all foUicitude about every thing but ading faithfully the part he has affigned us, maintaining inviolably our allegiance to his government, and never On PROVlt>ENCE. 193 never wiftiing to enjoy any advantage \vhich he is pleafed to deny, or to be exempted from any troubles which he can permit to come upon us.- — Thus fhall we be eafed of all unneceffary cares, enjoy that peace of God which pajjeth all imderjlandingy and attain to the higheft dignity and blifs of which rational Beings are capable. Oh ! joyful refledion ! God reigns and all is well. Eternal wifdorh and benevolence are prefent every where, and govern all things. Welcome then every event. Welcome difappoint- ment, ficknefs or death. Let tempefts roar. Let thunder tear the heavens, or earthquakes overturn cities and king- doms. In all we may hear the voice of the prefiding Divinity ail\iring us that we need not fear. Within the embraces of his arms we muft be always fafe. 'Rejoice in the Lord all the earth. Say a?no?ig the heathen that the Lord reigneth. Let the heavens rejoice^ and let the earth be glad. iM the fea roar, and the floods clap their O hands. 194 O// Providence. hands '*. Fraife him all ye his angeh. Praife him fun and moon, Praife hi?n ye Jlars of light, Pratfe him ye dragons and all deeps. Fire and haiU fnow and vapour^ mountains ajid fields^ beafls and all cattle^ creeping things and flying fowls, kings of the earth and all people y Praife the name of the Lord, for his name alone is excellent. -. Let the whole creation join in raifing one fong of praife to him. Praife tha Lord, O my foul, * Pfa!. xcv:»cxlviii» ciii. A jl D I S S E R- DISSERTATION IL O N PRAYER 02 ^' Mt. V VJ DISSERTATION IL O N PRAYER S E C T I O N L ^he Nature^ Reafonabtenefs, and Efficacy of Prayer explained^ and the Objections to it anfwered. ' H AVING in the foregoing differ- tation endeavoured to explain and defend the doftrine of Providence, I fhall now proceed to treat of the duty of Prayer. There is no religious diity a- gainft which more objections have beeri made. It will, therefore, be necefiary to be^in this diflertation with ftatino^ particularly its nature and reafonable- nefs. After vdiich, I /hall give an O 3 account 198 On Prayer. account of the manner in which it ought to be performed, in order to render it acceptable and fuccefsful. Thefe are the two heads under which I fhall throw what I intend to fay on the fub- jeft now before me. By Prayer, I mean a ferious and folemn addrefs of our minds to the Deity, as the fountain of being and happinefs, and the parent and governor of the world. It has been divided into feveral diftind: parts according to the feveral afts of our minds when engaged in it. The chief of thefe parts are the four following. Acknowledgment of our dependence, and of the Divine perfeftions and fovereignty. Thankfulnefs for the mercies we have received. A penitential confeffion of what we have done amifs ; and offering up our defires of favour and happinefs for oiirfelves and others. Nothing is plainer than that the firft of thefe is reafonable. Abfolute per- On P R A Y E il> 1:99. jperfedion of nature and charadler, and complete excellence, muft be the pro^ pereft objedls of acknowledgment and efteem. Worflilp and adoration muft. be due to the Being who made us, and who poffefles infinite power, wifdom,. and goodnefs. He who is fupreme over all beings ought to receive the homage of all. The obligation to the next p^rt of prayer, or thankfgiving for the mercies we enjoy, is as evident as the obligation to gratitude in general. There is no clearer principle of reafon, than that thankfulnefs i& due for benefits received; and if that perfon. adls wropg, who is not grateful to human benefacflors, or who does not ftudy in a proper manner to teftify his gratitude, it is not pofiible that he can be innocent who is void of grati- tude to the Deity ; or who neglefts to offer up thankful acknowledgments to the Be- ing to whom he owes all he />, all he ^as, and all h^ hopes f()r\ A The 200 On P R A Y E The propriety alfo of the third part of prayer, or of a penitential confeilion of our guilt, is very obvious. As far, therefore, as thefe conftitute Prayer there feems no room for queftioning its reafon- ablenefs : And it iliould be remembered that in reality they are very important parts of Prayer. It w^ill, however, be obje6ted pro- bably by fome, that all that feems ne- celTary in thefe inftances is a fenfe of the Divine goodnefs, and of our dependent and guilty ftate^ and that where this fenfe and the proper reverent, grateful, and penitent difpofitions are found, there can be no occafion for what is meant by Prayer. I anfwer ; that it is plainly proper not only that we fhould pollefs thefe difpofi- tionsy but that they fliould be drawa forth into cxerctfey and expreJJ'ed' hy par^ ticular a£ts before the Deity. Good dif- pofitions, when not attended with the adts 0)1 P R A Y E R, 201 ads which are the proper expreffions of them, muft be defed:ive. Gratitude and repentance lead us in all cafes to grateful and penitential acknowledg- ments. When in their due ftrength, they always produce thefe ; and it is plainly fit they fhould. — It is incumbent upon us to teftify our regards to the Deity in the beft manner we can ; but it would be abfurd in any perfon to pre- tend he does this, who refts in con- templation, and avoids all diredl praife and worfhip* The laft part of Prayer I mentioned was, offering up our defires ' of favour and happinefs for ourfelves and others. This is what is mofl: properly ftiled Prayer y and it is what has been mofl: objeded to, and what therefore fhali be now particularly examined. The dif- ficulties which have been raifed about it, would, I believe, have been little regarded had more attention been given to the native and uncorrupted did:ates of the 202 On P R A V E R. the human mind on this fubjeft. What is evident if it be not fo, that what we want from God it is fit we fhould humbly implore from him ? What com- mon and unperverted underftanding can doubt, whether there is a propriety in alking for the bleffings and benefits which we muft owe to his bounty ? Is it pof- fible that, if we negleft this, it fhould be equally fit that we fhould be made happy by him ? Who can help feeing that devout fupplicants are more proper objects of favour than thofe who never pray, though it fliould be fuppofed pof- fible that, in other refpeds, their qua- lifications may be alike ? In fhort i the ad: of addrefling our defires to God for the benefits which are necefTary to our happinefs, implies in it that itXii.Q of our dependence upon him, and that acknow^ ledgment of his dominion which render it felf-evidently proper. The fitnefs of it is i.nmediately perceived by the lowefl as well as the highefl underflanding ; and the force of nature and reafon wiU extort On P R A Y E R. 203 extort It from every mind that poffeffes a juil fenfe of piety. But let us attend to the objections that have been urged. In the firft place; it has been faid, «« that there can be no reafon for Prayer, " becaufe God, being omnifdenf^ needs ** not to be informed of our wants ; *« and being unchangeable y none of our ** fupplications can be the means of " making any alteration in him, or of " obtaining from him any benefits." ;iiip .♦.,»ii# Before I confider this and the other objedlions commonly infifted on againft Prayer, I mufl beg leave to recommend to particular notice, that I affert that there is an immediate propriety or fitnefs in fupplicating the Deity for the blef- fings w^e want. For the truth of this I appeal to every man's confcience. No words can make it plainer than it tnuft appear by its own light. Now the 204 On Prayer. the defign of all juft objedions againft Prayer ought to be, to fhew that there is indeed no fuch immediate propriety in the adt of fupplication ; nor can any objeftions which have not this tendency, or which fuppofe that there is no fuch propriety, be of the leaft confequencCi Keeping this then in remembrance, let us confider the objedlion juft men- tioned. The firft part of it, or the affertion, that God, being omnifcient, needs not to be informed of our wants, is entirely impertinent. For no one ever faid that the defign of Prayer was to in- form the Deity of what he did not know. The plain defign of it is, to obtain for ourfelves the bleflings we pray for. This is what every one niuft mean whenever he prays. 'Tis implied in the very idea of the adlion, that we think it has a tendency to procure for us what we fup- plicate. This tendency is founded on the propriety which I have faid there is in afk- ing for the benefits we want. Hence afk- 4 ing 0/2 P R A Y E R. 205 ing becomes a means of having, and is uni- verfally fo confidered. In other words; afking, in a proper manner, for bleffings from Gpd has a tendency to procure them for us, becaufe it is doing what is fit to be done \ and what, therefore, God cannot but exped and require us to do as a condition of our having them. Let us now confider what regard is due to what is faid in oppofition to this in the latter part of the objedion. *« God, 'tis faid, is unchangeable ; and, ^* therefore, no prayers can be the means f' of making any alteration in him, or <* of caufing him to bellow any bleffings, ** which he would not have beftowed f* without them." 1 anfwer^ 'tis true, indeed, that our prayers can make no alteration in the Deity ; that is, in his nature y charaBery or difpojitions , But they may make an alteration in the ex-* ternaL effedis of his agency, or in his manner of treating us. Nay, they mujl make fuch an alteration if they at all alter 2o6 Ofl P R A Y E K. elter our qualifications ^ or if offering them up is the performance of a duty, or doing what is proper to be done. — The diftinftion between the perfedions of God confidered as piinciples or difpo- fitions in his nature, and the exercife of them in a courfe of outward adlions, tho* an obvious and ufeful diftindtion, many feem entirely to forget. An affertion may be very juft when undcrftood of the lat- ter of thefe, which would be very wrong when underftood of the former. Thus, in the prefent cafe, though it would be improper to fay, that God may be rendered more propitious or favour- able in dijpofition to his creatures by any thing they can do ; yet, furely, he may be rendered more propitious or favour- able in aS to them. That is ; their ailtions may be the means of many effedls of his favour to them. They may avert the confequences of his difpleafurc, and procure bleflings for them which they would other wife never have had. 'Tis On Prayer. 207 , 'Tis worth adding, that as we may thus by our aftions obtain bleffings for our/elves from the Deity, confiftently with his immutabihty ; fo, Hkewife, may we for others. Or, what fome Beings do for their fellow-beings, their benevo- lence, labours, and virtue may influence, though not properly the Divine perfec- tions, yet the exercife of them. They may fupply reafons to infinite wifdom for favouring others, and obtain eflfefts of Divine goodnefs for them which they might elfe have wanted. — — But to re- turn. If it be really proper that wc ihould humbly apply to God for the mercies we need from him, it muft be alfo proper that a regard fhould be paid tofuch applications, and that there fliould be a different treatment of thofe who make them and thofe who do not ; and it muft be exceeding frivolous to objed, that this would imply changeablenefs in the Deity. God's unchangeablenefs, when confidered in relation to the exer- tion of his attributes in the government of 2oS On Prayer. of the world, conlifts, certainly, not in always ading in the fame manner how- ever cafes and circumflances alter; but in always doing what is right, ^nd va- rying his condudl according to the various aftions, charadiers, and difpofitions of Beings. If then prayer makes an altera- tion in the cafe of the fupplicant, as be- ing the difcharge of an indifpenlible du- ty ; what w^culd, in truth, infer change- ablenefs in him, would be, not his re- garding and anfwering it, but his not doing this. , Hence, 'tis eafy to fee that the notice which God may be pleafed to take of our prayers by granting us blefiings in anfwer to them, is not to be coniidered as an yielding to importunity y but ^s one injlance of his ading agreeably to reafon, or his fuiting his dealings with us to our conduft. Nor does it imply that he is backward to do us good, and, therefore, wants to be follicited to it. This is no more implied in the cafe of Prayer, than in On Pray e R; 209 in that of repentance, or any other in- flance of good condiidt, wb.en confidered as obtaining for us bleffings and favour. God is always ready to do us all poiiible good ; but there are certain conditions on the performance of which the effedls of his goodnefs to us are fufpended. There is fomething to be done by us before we can be proper objeds of his favour ^ or before it can be fit for him and confiilent with the meafures of his government to grant us particular bene- fits. We have a part to aft, and duties to difcharge, which, if negledred, can- not but deprive us of his protection, and leave us dellitute and unhappy. But I have, perhaps, beftov/ed too much time on this objedtion. Let us then proceed to another on which great ftrefs has been laid. ** Before we pray *' we are either worthy to receive v/hat " we pray for, or we are not. If we '* are worthy, 'tis needlefs to pray becaufe ** we fhall have v/hat is proper to be P *' given 210 On P RAVER. *' given us, whether we pray for it or *^ not. If we are imworthyy no prayers *' can be of any avail." The weaknefs of this objedtion will be obvious to any one who will apply it to a parallel cafe, and fuppofe it urged againil: repentance, or any other duty, when confidered as a means of procuring bleffings for us. *' Before w^e repent (it " might be faid) it is either fit we ** fl:iould receive bleffings from the Deity, ** or it is not. If it is fit, we fliall re- *' ceive them, whether we repent or not; *^ for God v^ants nothing to engage him *' tO do what is fit. If it is not fit, *^ our repentance can be of no avail."-— -pEvery one will acknowledge the in- tolerable abfurdi ty of fuch a way of ar- guing againil repentance, and fee that the full anfwer to it is, that before re- pentance it may be unfit that we ihould be favoured by the Deity, but that it ] may become fit upo?i repentance. In like manner, the full anfwer to th-e pre*. fent On P R A -i' E R . 2 11 feiit objection againft Prayer is, that be- /ore Prayer we may be unworthy, and that Prayer may be the very thing that makes us worthy. Before v/e pray it may be unfit to beftow particular bleflings up- on us, and it may be therefore fit to be- ftow them becaufe we pray for them. That this is true is undeniable, if there is an immediate reditude in afeing for bleffings from the Deity; for hence, as was before obferved, it becomes itfelf one cojtdition of having, one circumftance in our characters that contributes to ren- der us proper objeds of favour, or one part of condu(fl which cannot be negleft- ed without negleding what is reldbn- able, without negletling virtue and duty, and fo far difqualifying ourfelves for re- ceiving bleffings Suppofe two per^ fons, in other refpeds of like qualifica- tions, one of v/hom makes cOnfcience of frequently and feriouily addreffing his wilhes to the Deity for mercy and hap- pinefs. The other entirely omits this, and never puts up any fuppiications to him* Is it likely that both thefe perfons P 2 ^ will 212 0;2 P R A Y £ R. will be treated alike ? Does not the one do right y and the other do wrong ? Does not the one a/e are concerned, are no lefs natural than fupplications for otirfelves. And are they not alfo rea- foriablc ? What is there in them that is not worthy the mofl exalted benevolence ? May it not be fit that a wife and good Being lliould pay a regard to them ? And may not the regarding and anfwer- 226 0/? P R A Y E R. ing them, and, in general, granting blef- fings to ibme, on account of the virtue of others, be a proper method of en- couraging and honouring virtue, and of rewarding the benevolence of Be- ines to one another ? Perhaps, in- deed, it may not be eafy to conceive how much regard is paid, in the difpofals of Providence, to the benevolent defires and virtue of fome Beings in the treatment of. others. Perhaps, there may not be a better way of encouraging righteoufnefs in the creation, than by making it as much as poffible the caufc of happinefs not only to the agent himfelf, but to all con-t necled vv^ith him. There is no virtuous Being who would not, in many circum- ftances, chufe to be rewarded with a grant of bleflings to his fellow-beings rather than to himfelf. Thefe obfervations feem to me fuffi- cient to defend Prayer for others, and to fliew that it may have an eftedl on their condition. Were it true indeed that On ? R A Y E k. 227 that it could have no fuch effed:, as hav- ing of itfelf no influence on the charac- ters or perfonal quahfications of thofe prayed for, it v^ould be more. difficult to defend it. The immediate viev/ of every one in praying for another, as well as for himfelf, is to obtain v/hat he prays for ; and did any one apprehend that the ad: of fupplicating the Deity for others has no tendency to be of any advantage to them, I cannot fee what could ever lead him to it. No one, I fuppofe, will affert that what we mean by addreffing our defires to the Deity for otkej's is feme benefit to oiirfehes. It muft, therefore, be wrong to reft the whole defence of Prayer on its tendency to promote our moral and religious improvement. This, without doubt, is in the higheft degree true of it ; but it is its cffeB^ not its immediate and direct end. Several queflions, not eafj/ to be an- fwered, may be afl.ed' about the extent of the efficacy of Prayer. But this is Q_2 jiot 228 On Prayer. not a point into which it is necefiary for me to enter. All I plead for is, that it is not abfiird to fuppofe it om thing which the Deity is pleafed to regard in the communication of good to his crea- tures. How far it becomes a(ftually a ground cf favour, or what anfwers to it arc granted in particular inflances, we are not capable of determining. There is here, undoubtedly, room for much folly and fuperftition. Care fhould be taken that neither cur prayers for our- felves or others be too particular, and that we indulge no ether expediation in confequence of them than that, if the fruits of genuine benevolence and piety, th.ey ihall be accepted and heard as far as is confiftent w^ith the order of the world and the purpofes of infinite wifdom* It would be very unreafonable to urge ■on this occafion an objection already con- sidered ; that God is infinitely good, and wants nothinr^ to en^a^-e him to i:^rant any On P R A Y E R. 229 any bleffings to thofe who are not impro- per objects of them. Nothing is plainer than that this may, with ^qual force, be urged againfl any other duty of natural religion. The v/hole queflion is, whe- ther Prayer may not itfelf be a circum- ftance creating propriety and altering a cafe. For my part, I fee no fufScient reafon for denying the poffibility of in- terceiTions or interpofitions which may make an infinite difference in the cafes of particular Beings, and gain the highefl bleffings for them.— But it is time to fi- nifh this part of the defence of Prayer. CLs SEC T. 230 On Prayer S E C T. 11. Of the hnportance of Prayer as an in-- flnimental Duty, the Happinefs of a devout Temper^ and the particular Obligation to public Worflnp, THERE remain fome further ar- guments, for Prayer of great weight which muft not be overlooked. I have hitherto defended it without any regard to its effedls on our tempers and lives ; but it is neceifary that thefe fliould be particularly reprefented, in order more fully to recommend and juftify it. — No- thing, certainly, can tend more to pro- mote a right condudl and temper and to eflablifh within us all good difpofitions, •than this duty properly difcharged. He that makes confcience of frequent 'and ferious Prayer muft live under an habitual fenfe of the prefence, authority, and pro- I videncQ On Prayer. 231 videncc of God, and of his dependence upon him and obligations to him. He muft be continually reminding himfelf of the moft important truths, and ex- citing himfelf to the utmofl care of his life. He muft be always exerciling re- pentance for his tranfgreffions and bene- volence to his fellow-creatures. It is fcarcely poffible for fuch a man to be otherwife than truly virtuous. The in- dulgence of known guilt, and a regu- lar courfe of unafFe() and beft men ; and there are many now in the world, who would not exchange it, for the moft profperous courfe of ir- religion that can be imagined.- — It Is neceffary to obferve here, that at the fame time that we devote fome part of every day to religious duties, there fhould al- ways run thro* the reft of the day pre-^ vailing piety and goodnefs, and a fpirit of love and humility. In othef Words i when not aftually engaged in Pray- er, we fliould keep ourfelves as much as poffible in a difpolition for it, and fpeak and a<5l on every occafion in fuch a manner, as to fhew to all about us that we are often engaged in the beft exercifes. Happy beyond expreffion are thofe who thus walk with God i who ftudy always to live in the fame Ipirit that they pray. I muft add, that there art many mci- dental occafions in life, in which Prayef is peculiarly proper. Such are all occa-* fions in which we have any weighty affairs under coniideration> or are about U engaging 290 On Prayer, engaging in any important undertakings. Nature and reafon then ftrongly prompt us to feek the bleffing of heaven upon our undertakings, and to implore direc- tion and wifdom from that Being who governs all events. Plato, in a palTage which has been often quoted ^", fays, that among the Greeks, no one of any dif- cretion would ever undertake any thing without firft invoking the Deity. — Times' of trouble and affli-flion are likewife pe- culiarly proper for Prayer. There is no relief at fuch times like to that ariling from pouring out cur forrows before our Maker, meditating upon them as what he fees and yet permits, and profeffing before him our hearty acceptance of them as his will. — When we have in any in- flance been drawn into guilt, it become^ VIS particularly to confcfs it in his pre- fence; and to form, under his eye, fo- lemn refolutions to endeavour ia future time to be more careful. Again ; \vhen we have received any extraordina- ry mercies or deliverances, it becomes * /« Timao Jul iHiilo^ On P R A Y E R. ^91 US particularly to acknowledge them. — - When we are tempted to any crime, we ought alfo to fly to Prayer as our very beft fecurity. There are few temp- tations which- would not lofe their force, if, when they come in our way, we would take tiriio to fet ourfelves ferioufly to this duty. A prayer then offered up with attention would place us under the guardiandiip of heaven, and bring our minds in fuch a manner under the im- preffions of the motives to virtue, that it would be fcarcely pofiible for us to deviate from it '^. 4thly, In order to render our prayers fuccefsful, 'tis abfolutely neceffary that they jfhould be accompanied with a holy life, and the diligent ufe of our >own endeavours to acquire what we pray for. The efficacy of Prayer arifes from * See Mr. Amorys Sermon on the Advantage of Pray ^ er \ and alio his Diabgiu; on Devotion. 1 would fur- tl>er beg leave here to rccommcn.l to every head of a family Mr. Pkkard's three difcourfcs on the Religious GjVir7immt of a Fcwiih. .{. • U 2 its 292 07t Prayer. its being the means and fruit of virtue, as well as from its being an immediate aft of virtue, or a due acknowledgment of >our dependence, and the performance of what is in itfelf fit to be performed, Xf therefore we feparate fropi it vir- tuous refolution and right praftice we deflroy its value, and make it much worfe than what fome think it muft alv^ays be, ** a^ infignificant form or :**;!tr ceremony." A wicked mans prayers are an abomination to the Lord, If we regard iniquity in our hearts, it is certain he will not hear us. As a righteous life without Prayer implies a contradiction. Prayer being one eflential part of right pradice '^" : So Prayer without a righte- ous life is , impiety and profanenefs. What an infult, for inftance, on the Deity would it be to alk of him the pardon of thofe offences which we de- * Imo vero auda ferious and iimple. No-* thing can be more contemptible than an men have been juftly called dmne. Ex /xsv rcivui; TOUTS? T» XoytciMiy 0) /jcsvcov, Gskx fjiotpa. Yifjiiv f ai- virai Trapayiyvoixivri » cipsrji cr? 'irctpuyiyvirau — - . To the fame purpofe fpeaks Seneca. Bonus vir fine Deo iumo eji. An poteft aliquis fupra fortunam, nifi ab illo adjuftus, exfurgere ? Ille dat confilia magnifica et ereda. In unoquoquc virorum bono- rum (quis Deus incertum eft) habitat Deus. Epift, 41. '' No perfon is virtuous without God. How *' can any one rife above fortune^ unlels a/lifted by *' him. 'Tis he gives great and noble defigns."——* ha dico^ Luciliy facer intra nos fpiritus bahliat^ bonorum makrumque nojiror'um ohfervator et cujlos. Hie prout a nobii iraSlatm efly ita nos ipfe tra6fat. Ibid. *' There *' dwells within us a holy fpirit who obferves and ** watches our good and bad deeds, and who treats *^ us as he is himfelf treated by us." Multos et noftra civiias et Gracia tulit fmgulares viros ; quorum Keminem, nifi juvante DcOy talem fu'tffe credendum ejf, *' Both our city and Greece, fays Cicero, have pro- '< duced many extraordinary men ; none of whom, " we ought to believe, could be what they " were without God's help." Nemo vir mag- nus fine aliquo Divino cfflatu unquam fuit. De Nat* Deorum, L. II. 66. The fubjcdl of Maximus Tyrius's 2d Diilertation is this qucilion s " whether " a good O^ P R A Y E R. 305 an affefted difplay of eloquence in this duty, quaint phrafes, fludied antithefes, vain ** a good man is fuch in virtue of a Divine communi- ** cation or not." He maintains the affirmative, and obferves that God ought to be much more acknow- ledged the giver of Virtue than of arts and fciences, or any temporal bleflings ; this being the beft and greateft good, and therefore what he muft be moft ready to communicate. Men, he fays, on account of the infirmities of their natures, need the influence of an aflifting and co-operating Deity to lead them to virtue. Asovrat cuvayoivi^a Gm y.ai au}Xi\if\oDo^ Tr)f poxrif x^f ;;^si pa/coy far. The life of Socrates, he fays DifT. 3c. was full of prayer. Hv Bjo? ^oxpars? ^£5-0? €u;;^y}?. But the things he prayed for were not riches and power, but a virtuous mind, a quiet life, unblemifhed manners, and a death full of hope, which are glorious gifts, and fuch as the gods beftow. Aprnv ^^x^^ ^^^ ^o"y* ^»av Bi» -aai Xoi\v afJuiXTrlov %ai iUiXyriv ^avarov ra ^a\j[j.a<^a J^aipa^ ra Gso:? cl^ora « As for " the gods, who has told thee that they cannot help ♦* us in thofe things which they have put in our •« own power ? Whether it be fo or not thou {halt " foon perceive^ if thou wilt but try and pray." Marc, JntonL L. IX. S. 40. " It is the duty of " all who are endowed with reafon to afk all good « things of the gods -, particularly the knowledge X 4« of 3o6 On Prayer. vain tautologies, a redundancy of lan- guage, or impertinent excurfions into matters *' of themfelves, for there is nothing greater that " man can receive or God beftow.'* TicivrcL fxsv ^ii rayaha. rois vouv f^ovra? arrsfOai Trctpa ro)!/* 6€0Dy • iJLaKi<^a Jli th? Trsp: aurcuv S7rrs-y)/xy]j &C, Pluta. de Ifide et Ofiride initio. Some of thefe paflages, at the fame time that they fhew us what the beft antient philofophers thought of our dependence on the Deity for the acquifition of virtue, prove lilcewife that they thought very highly of the reafonablenefs and importance of prayer. But I fhall beg leave to take occafion here to produce a few more pafTages in order to prove this. *' To worftiip the gods and to pray to them, ^' fays PlatOy is above all things fit, decent, beautiful *' and conducive to a happy life." PIc2t. de Leg. L. IV. In the 12th book of laws (Sub fine) he obfsrves, *' that it Is above all things proper, that none but fuch " as underftand and venerate and practice religion *' (hould be chofen magiftrates, or be held in efteem *' on account of their virtue." In another of his Dialogues he obferves to the fame purpofe, that it {hould not be thought, that there is any part of hu- man virtue of greater weight, than religion or piety towards the Deity. Ep'in, Sub fine. C'laro (in Offic, Lib. I. Cap. ult.) places in the firft rank of duties thoic wc owe to God ; And he obferves. that to de- ilroy O;^ P R A Y E R. 307 matters of controverfy and fpeculation, as if our defign was to fhew the Deity- how llroy piety and religion is to introduce confufion into human life, and to fubvert all fecial duties. De Nat, L. I. n. 2. "Marcus Antoninus afierts that the foul of man was made for godlinefs no lefs than for juftice, and that the former is the proper ground and fpring of the latter. De rebus Suis, Lib. XI. S. i8, The chief article of the unwritten law men- tioned by Socrates (in Xenoph. Mem. L. IV. C. IV. S. 19,) is, that the gods ought to be v/orfhipped» This, he fays, is acknowledged every where ; and received by all men as the firft command. Flapet Tracrtv civGpooTroir 'ir^o^rov vo/at^grar, ra^ ©gyr CtCsrv. — '——Piety, fays Hierocles^ is the chief and the pa- rent of all the virtues, and the contempt of piety the caufe of all vice. In Carm. Pythag. Verf. i. 17. — If you fearch the world, fays Plutarch^ you may find cities without walls, without letters, without kings, without money ; but no one ever faw a city without a Deity, without a temple, or without prayers. Plut. adverfus Coloiem. He concludes his trea- tife on fuperftition with obferving, '' that thofe v,'ho, *' forfaking that piety which lies in the middle, run *^ into irreligi on to avoid fuperfition^ adl like a perfcn *' who to avoid a wild beaft, or a fire, {hould run *' among pits and precipices." But there would be no end of quoting pafTages of this kind. X 2 Nothing 308 On Prayer. how finely we can talk, or how much we know. 1 have now in view piib^ lie Prayer only. In private Prayer 'tis not to be fuppofed that any one can fall into thefe abfurdities and indecencies. Here a truly devout heart will often find itfelf above the ufe of words. And in Nothing Is more certain than that religion has been held in the higheft veneration among all civiliz- ed nations, and particularly among the wife Greeks and Romans. " Our city, (fays Valerius Maximns^ ** of Rome. Lib. I. Cap. i.) has always held every <* thing to be of inferior value to religion." — It is im- poflTible to think of this without being furprifed at that difregard to religion which prevails at prefent in this kin'^dom. Has it indeed been difcovered that the vvif- dom of all ages has been deceived in this inflance, and that piety is no part of a good charajSler ? One v/ould think that this muft be the cafe ; for it is not ealy, on any other fuppofuion, to account for that tranquility and fatisfa^lion with which, not merely the vulgar and illiterate, but many fenfible and in other refpei51:s vir- tuous men, fecm to live in ihe ncgle6l of religious du- ties. 'Tis plain, however, th:it the epithet hcathemjh has been very in^properly applied to uich perfons, for it appears that FIfeathens thought and prad^ifed very differently. -^Cl ^fft Ir^ Pno/lO';>. general On Prayer. 309 general It will, perhaps, be right in pri- vate Prayer to fuffer ourfelves to be guided by our feelings and afifeftions, and the prefent ftate of our circum- ftances, without tying ourfelves down to any particular forms. I might go on to give an account of the means of acquiring a true fpirit of devotion, and of improving in it ; and alfo to point out the hindrances ol it. — The principal helps to devotion are, the uninterrupted praftice of it with fin- cerity; clofe and frequent meditation on our own wants, and on the Divine nature and attributes 5 the diligent dif- charge of every othej^ duty of life ; an ardent love of virtue and zeal to grow in it ; and a heart lifted above fenfible objefts, and warmed with benevolent wifiies and worthy fentiments, — ^The chief enemies to devotion are, vanity and diffipation of mind ; the love of pleafure j the deceitfulnefs of riches ; gloomy notions of the Deity ; inatten- X 3 tioa 3IO On Prayer, tion to religious truths ; carelel'snels in cultivating good affections ; and the indulgence of known guilt. A heart filled with the cares of life, and ftrongly attached to v/orldly plea- fures, profits and honours, cannot a^ fcend to heaven, or rife to clear views and a calm contemplation of Spiritual and Divine objeds. The fire of luft, of am.bitio;?, or refentment will foon put out that of devotion. A foul con-r fcious of demerit and deformity, burden- ed with a fenfe of guilt, and unable to refolve upon a prefent and thorough amendment muft be averfe to the Deity, and to all religious duties. 'Tis our duty to labour more and more to remove thefe hindrances of our religious im- provement, to make ufe of every me- thod In our power to cherifh a devout temper, and to throw off all low cares, all irregular defires and perplexing paf-. fions, that our fouls may turn themfelves with greater eafe and alacrity to the au- thor of their exigence and th^ir only 2 l^ap-* On Prayer. 311 happinefs. But after all that vvc can do, innumerable imperfedtions muft cleave to our beft exercifes in the prefent ftate. How reviving is the profped of a better ftate, where we fhall lofe all our prefent infirmities, and nothing damp the exta- fies of our fpirits; where 'wefiallfee God face to face y ferve him without wearinefs, and be happy in him for ever ? To fum up and conclude the whole. Wretched is the man who lives as without God in the world. Let all who would be happy remem- ber what danger they muft be in, not only from crimes they co^nmit, but from any known duties which they ncgleB, Let them confider that according to the reprefentation in Matth, xxvth, many will hereafter be condemned, not for being aBively vicwus, but for being unprofitable *y not for isjafthig their talents, but for not improving them \ not fur any harm they have done, but for good they have not done. Of all the omiffions X A, which 312 0;z Prayer. which we can be guilty of, one of the rnoll: unwarrantable and fatal is the omiffion of devotion. To want piety is to want the fureft foundation of all excel- lent qualities, and to break that which our Lord calls, th.t Jirji and great com- mandment of the law *. No worfe blind-? nefs or calamity can happen to a rational creature.- What fliould we think of a oerfon who fhould never ad- 4refs himfelf, in a way of acknow- ledgment and refpefl-, to another perfon upon whom he was dependent, and to whom he owed all his happinefs ? Would not fuch a one fliew a temr- per void of all gratitude and ingenuity ? — — What an injury is it to our minds to refufe opening them to heavenly light and grace; to (hut out of them the nobleft fentiments ^ and to remain re- * Matt. xxii. 37. Thou JJ)aU love ih Lord th^ God With all thy hearty and ivlth all thy foul. This is ibe Jirji and great commandment. And the fee on d is like unto it ; thou Jh(dt love thy neighbour as ihyfelf. On ihefe two commaudmenis hang all the laiv and the prophets, gardlefs 0/1 P R A Y E R* 31^ gardlefs of the infinite Deity, though always foliciting our attention and work- ing within and without u$; though fur- rounded with his glory, dependent every moment on his power, and maintained by his goodnefs ? Can he- be qualified for the worihip of fuperior Beings in the' manfions of the blefl^ed, who never v/or- fhips here below? Can he poffefs true goodnefs who forgets the fountain of all good, and omits a fundamental part and important means of goodnefs ?- — ^Even the beft men, with all the aid which they derive from religious duties, find it diffi- cult to keep their minds in tolerable or- der, and to maintain themfelves in tran- quility and purity ? What then muft be the condition of thofe who pay no reo-ard to thefe duties? In what confufion muft their minds lie ? Into what a defart muft their charaders run ? How unprepared muft they be for ficknefs and death ? We are often feeing that thofe who have negledled Prayer in life, fly to it with eagernefs in death. They then fend, for minifters 2 314 0/7 P R A Y E R. minifters to pray with them, and expect, perhaps, that encouragement and com- fort fhould be given them. But what comfort can be given them ? He that now paffes his days without Prayer, in vain will he fly to it when he comes to die. The happinefs of another world is promifed to a holy life^ not to a fc- nitent death. Let us then, while in health, apply ourfelves to the moft necef- fary duties, and endeavour always to be: fo devout and diligent as we fhall foon wifh we had been. In a little time this world vnll be no more to us ; the curtain will drop between us and all mor- tal fcenes ; the folemn events which we are often hearing of, and w^hich we are apt to fee at a great diftance, w^ill over- take and amaze us j religion and eternity will appear to us in their juft impor- tance, and nothing will prove of any advantage to us except the good we now do, and the habits of virtue and piety which we pofTefs. Let us take care to bear this in mind amidft all our engage- ments 072 Prayer. 315 ments and purfuits. Let us ftrive to acquire that fpirit of true piety which will affimilate us to the Deity, and ellablifh our fouls in peace and refigna- tion and a fuperiority to defiling paffions^ Let us do all in our power, by our ex- ample and influence, to revive the credit of religion, and to remove the prejudices which prevail againft it. Thefe prejudices, as far as they proceed from the dreadful effefts of the corruptions of religion, are indeed in the highefl degree unreafon- able : for no one can be ignorant, that what is mofl ufeful arid valuable becomes in all cafes the moft pernicious when corrupted. But the inexcufablenefs of thefe preju- dices affords no reafon for being more remifs in endeavouring to remove them,. Did religion appear, in the tempers and lives of all who profefs it, to be that joyful and divine thing which it really is, every objedion to it would vanifh, and it would foon force univerfal reve- rence and admiration. But I feel my- felf in danger of being too tedious. In 3l6 O// PtI A Y E R. In the latter part of this differtation I have endeavoured to fhew in vv^hat man- ner we ought to pray. I have infifted particularly on our obligation to pray with minds duly prepared ; with ferven- cy, frequency and perfeverance ; with univerfal virtue in our lives ; in the faithful ufe of the means for acquiring what we pray for, and as the followers of Jefus Chrift, who through him look for a refurre<5tion from death to the en- joyment of endlefs life and happinefs, • — Kow delightful and improving mufl fuch devotion be ? How mighty its pow^ er to refine and exalt our fouls ? How unutterable the fweetnefs of a life thus fpent ? How noble an acl of mind is a prayer thus offered up with fimplicity and humility, with collected thoughts, pure hearts, affured hope, warm affec- tions, and in the lively exercife of all worthy fentiments ? Does any man lack wjfdomy or any thing good for him ? Let him in this manner ajk it of Gody ivho ^ivcth to all men liberally ^ and it jJmll 0?l P R A Y E R. 317 Jhall be ghen him *. Nothing can hap- pen amifs to fuch a perfon. He has an almighty friend to confide in, who hears liim at all times, is engaged in his defence, and will diftinguifh him eternally and infinitely from the irreli- gious and profane. * James i 5. D I S S E R. DISSERTATION IIL O N The Reafons for expeding that virtuous Men fhall meet after Death in a State of Happinefs. r DISSERTATION IIL O N T^he Reafons for exptEiing that wtuoiLs Men Jloall meet after Death in a State of Happinefs, NO perfon who ever makes any fen-* ous reflexions, can avoid v^ifhing carneftly to be fatisfied. Whether there i$ ^ future flate ? And if there is. What expeftations he ought to entertain w^itli refpeft to it, and by what means his happinefs in It miift be fecured ? »- There are many arguments which lead us to conclude, in anfwer to the firfl of thefe queftions, that we are indeed defigri- ed for another ftate. And there are alfo many which at the fame time prove, that the practice of virtue muft be our beft fecurity in all events, and the moil Y likely 322 The Jiin^ion of vtrtiioiis Men likely method to fecure happinefs through every poflible future period of our dura- tion. True goodnefs is the image of the Deity in our fouls; and it is not conceiveable that it fhould not recommend us to his particular regard, or that thofe who praftife it fliould not be always fafeft and happieft. On the fuppolition of a fviture world, nothing offers itfelf more unavoidably to our thoughts than the no- tion, that it will be a ftate in which pre- fent inequalities will be fet right, and a fuitable diftindion made between good and bad men. It muft however be owned, that this fubjedl, as it appears to the eye of unafifted reafon, is involv- ed in much darknefs. That in the fu- ture ftate all men (hall receive an ade- quate retribution^ we may in general knoWy but, had we nothing to guide us befides natural light, we could not go much further on any fure grounds, or give a fatisfadtory reply to feveral very interefting enquiries. The in the Heavenly State.' 323 The connderation, particularly, of oar- felves as giiihy creatures, would raife doubts in our minds; and thefe doubts would not be leffened but increafed by •reflefling, that under the divine govern- ment^ happinefs is connedied with virtue, and punifhment with vice. The fa(ft, that virtue will be rewarded, does not by any means determine what fuch virtue as ours may expe(fl:. The virtuous among mankind are to be confidered as penitent Jinners, and what peculiar treatment the cafes of fuch may require, or how far re- pentance might avail to break th^ con- nexion eftabhfhed by the divine laws between fm and'mifefy^ would not, I think, be clear to us. Here then the aid of the chriftian revelation comes in moft feafonably, and gives us the moft agreeable information. It furniflies u^ tvith a certain proof from fadt of a fu- ture ilate, and ihews to our fenfes the path of life m the refurredlion and afcen- fion of Jefus Chrift. It afiires us, that repentance will be available to our com- V 2 plete 324 ^^^ Jundiion of ^virtuous Men plete falvation, and that all virtuous men fliall be rewarded with a bleffed and glo- rious Immortality. At the fame time, it teaches us to confider this as the efFedt, not of the ordinary laws of the divine government, but of a particular interpofition in our favour, and a love to man in Jefiis Chrift which pajjh knov)- ledge. But it is not my prefent purpofe to in- fift on thefe things. The reality of a future ftate, as it is difcoverable by rea- fon and as it has been confirmed and explained by the chriftian revelation, muft be now taken for granted. The defign of this difcourfe is only to offer a few thoughts on one particular queftion relating to it, which, though not of the highcjl, is yet ol fome confequence. I mean the queftion, *' How far we have <« reafon to expeft, that we Hiall bereaf- " ter be reftored to an acquaintance with ** one another, or again fee and know ** one another." There in the Heavenly State. 325 There are probably but few who have felt what it is to be deprived by death of perfons they loved, whofe thoughts have not been a good deal employed on this point. What, on fuch occafions, we muft delire chiejiy to know is, that our friends are happy ; but it is unavoidable to inquire further concerning them with fome anxiety, whether we are likely e- ver to fee them again. It would be dif- mal to think of a departed friend or rela- tive, that " He is gone from us for ever, *^ that he exifts no more to us." But virtuous men have no reafon for ^ny fuch apprehenfions : And one of the unfpeak- able comforts attending the belief of a future ftate, arifes from the hope it gives of having our friendfhips perpetuated, and being re-united in happier regions to thofe whom we have loved and ho- noured here. 1 am well fatisfied that this is a very rational hope ; and in or- der to fliew that it is fo, I fliall beg leave to offer the following obfervations, Y3 Let 326 The JunBhn of 'virtuous Men Let it be confidered firft, what efFecfb our future recoUedtion of thofe who are nov/ dear to us, is likely to have uppi^ us.T — ^We have great reafon to believe, that all the fcenes of this life will, in the future life, be prefented to our me-? mories, and that we fhall then recover the greateft part, if not the whole of *our prefent confcioufnefs. The fcrip- tures teach us this in a very ftriking manner. '^ It is not therefore to be doubted, but that we fhall hereafter have a diftinft remembrance of our vir- tuous friends and kindred; and this re- membrance, one w^ould think, muft be attended with fome revival of particular regard, and have a |;endency to draw us to one another, as far as it will be poffiblc Or proper.' -It will, I know, be ob- jefted to this, that our attachments tq relations and friends are derived from inftinfts which have been planted in us to carry on the purpofes of the prefent {late, and which muft ceafe intirely here- after. This 'is, undoubtedly, in fome degree in the Heavenly State. '^ij deo-ree true. Every inftindive determi- nation, which refpefts only the exigen- cies of the prefent life, will ceafe with it. But does it follow from hence, that we are likely hereafter to be left as indif- ferent to thofe who are now our re- lations and friends, as if we had never known them? This would be a very wrong conclufion. The natures of things render it fcarcely conceive able, that the recolledlion of thofe valuable perfons with whom v/e now have connections, (of valuable parents, for example, who had the care of us in our firft years, and have brought us up to virtue and hap- pinefs,) fhould not, in every future pe- riod of our duration, endear their me- mory to us, and give us a particular pre- ference of them, and inclination to feek their fociety. Many of the diftindions, which we make in our regards between fome and others, are derived from reafon and neceffity ; and this feems to be the cafe in the prefent inftance.-- — fWe are, perhaps, apt fometimes to carry our no- Y 4 tions 52S l^he yunSion of virtuous Men tions too far of the difference between what we now are, and what wc raall be. in thene;xt ftage of our being. Ii, would be abfurd to fuppofe, that we ihall here^ /^ after want all particular defires and pro- penfities. Benevolence, curiofity, . felf-r love, the defire of honour, and mcfr of our more noble and generous aff^iilions, . will not decreafe but grow as the per- fection of our intelleftual nature giT^wSvi. And. even ourprefent facial inJiinBs may . ledve effedts on our tempers which n^ay produce an everlafting union of fouls, and lay the foundation of fentiments and de^- iires which flaall never be loft, Buttheie obfervations, lamfenfible, are not direffly to the prefent purpofir Whet affords the plaineft evidence on this fubr, je(fl, is the following confideratioh.'-—- ^ There is great reafon to believe ' tliat ' virtuous men, as beings of the fame fpe- cies who have begun exiftence in the fame circumftances, and been trained up to virtue in the fame ftate of trial and difcipline^j in the Heavenly State. 32^^ difcipline, will be hereafter placed in the fame common manfions of felicity. It is groundlefs and unnatural to imagine, " that after paffing through this Yii^y they ' will be removed to different worlds, or" fcattered into different regions of the uni- verfe. The language of the fcriptures feems plainly and exprefly to determine the contrary. They acquaint us, that man- kind are to be raifed from the dead toge- ther y and to be judged together -, and that the righteous, after the general refurrec- tion and judgment, are to be taken to- gether to the fame heavenly ftate, there • to live and reign with Chrift, and to fhare in his dignity and happinefs. When, in the epiftle to the Hebrews, (chap, xii.- -. ?2, 23, 24.) we ate faid,; in confequencerit of the clear difcoveries made by the gof- -vf^ pel of a future ftate, to be, as it were^T already come to the city of the living God, fa an innumerable company of Angels, to the^i'y general ajfembly and church ofthefirjl-bom^ L and to the fpirit^ of pijl men made pcrfe5l : 1% 330 The JunBion of virtuous Men it is plainly implied, that we are to join the general aflembly of juft men and of angels in the realms of light, and to be fixed in the fame manfions with them. The ftate of future reward is frequent- ly, in the New Teftament, defcribed un- der the notion of a city, that is, a com- munity or fociety. It is likewife very often called a kingdom , the kingdom of God, and the everlajling kingdom of our Lord and Saviour fefus Chrifl. The great end of Chrift's coming into the world w^as to lay the foundation of this kingdom, by faving men from the effedts of guilt, delivering them from death, and uniting the virtuous part of them under one perfedt and everlajfting govern- ment in the heavens. 'Tis faid of the true difciples of Chrift, that * becaufe he lives y they Jhall live alfoy that they fliall hereafter appear with him in glory ^ that he is now entered for them into hearven as their for erun7icr ; that he is there prepar- ing John. in the Heavenly State. 331 ing a place for them^ and that he will foon come again to take them to hlmfelfy that where he is, there they may be alfoy beholding his glory. This account is ut- terly inconfiftent with the fuppofition, that thofe who fhall partake of the fu- ture reward of virtue are to be difperfed into different parts of the univerfe, and fcarcely leaves us any room to doubt on the prefent queftion. For, is it poffible, that we fhould be happy hereafter in the fame feats of joy, under the fame per- feould neceffarily be the caufes of the f?;reateft trouble to one ano- ther. Did they duly attend to their own circumftances, the danger they are in, ihe precarioufnefs of life, and the near* nefs of the time when they fhall be fepa- fated never again to meet, except in that 348 On the JunBion of virtuous Men that world where joy is never known, and hope never comes ; did they, I fay, properly attend to thefe things, they would furely be incapable of bearing one another; their love would be turned into anguifli, and their friendfhip into horror. Let us then avoid, as much as we well can, becoming intimately connedled with any, except the virtuous and wor- thy. Let us refolve to cultivate friend- fliip only with thofe whom we may hope to be happy withy^r ever. In the next place. It is a very obvious ob- fervation on the prefent fubjeft, ihat it af- fords the beft confolation in a time of grief for the death of friends. It is, I think, very credible that death is an event, for which, fuch creatures as we are, might not at firft be defigned. It looks like a break in our exiftence, attended with fuch circumftances, as may well incline us to believe, that it is a calamity in which we have been involved, rather llian a method of tranjition from one ftate of S in the Heavenly State, 349 of exiftence to another, originally ap- pointed by our creator and common un- der his government. This, the fcrip- tures declare plainly to be the real fad: : But then, it fhould be remembered, that the fame fcriptures inform us further, that we have a great deliverer, who came into the world, that we might have * life -, and who, by death has dejiroyed death and him who had the power of deaths and obtain^ edfor us everlajiing redemption. The dark and dreary grave, therefore, has now nothing in it that fliould make it appear terrible. To virtuous men, it is no more than a bed of reft till the morning of a joyful refurredtion. We have, as chrif- tians, fomething better to fupport us under the anguifh produced by the death of friends, than the cold alternative of the an- tient philofophers, that either they are happy, or returned to the fi ate they were in before they were born. We may exult in the expe«ftation of finding them again, ** John X. 10. Heb, ii. 14. ix. 12. and 350 On thejuri^ion of virtuous Men and renewing our friencKhip with them in a better country. The word that death can do, is to caufe a lliort interruption in our intercourfe with tliem ; or to remove them from our fight for a moment : We fliall foon follow them, be raifed up with thetn to a new life, and take pofleffion with them of an inheritance iticorruptible^ ujtde^ filed, and that fadeth not away *. Such are the hopes which the bleffed gofpel gives; and well may they elevate our minds above thefe fcenes of mortality, dry up our tears in every feafon of forrow, and infpire us al- ways with joy iinfpeakablc and full of -f- glory ^ The whole eiFe it will be right to form a <* general refolution^ never to lend any atten' ** tion to accounts of miracles y with 'whate- ** "jer fpecious pretexts they may be covered'^* * See the EJpiy, on Miracles^ in Mr, Hume's phil§^ fo[hical ejjays concerning human underjlanding^ pag, 205. 2d. edition, in the Note. c •* It: md AJi racks, 387 ** It is, fays Mr Hume^j a ?naxim worthy ** of our attentmj, that no tefi'monj is Jliffi- ** cient to ejlablijh a jniracle, unlefs the tejli" y mony he of fuch a kind, that its falfehood " would be more miraculous than the fadt <* which it e7idcavours to eftablifi. And e^ *' ven in that cafe, there is a mutual dejlruc-^ *^ tion of arguments^ and the fuperior only ** gives us an afjiirance fuitable to that degree " rffo^^^^ 'ii/'A/VA remains after deducing the ** inferior. When any one tells me that he ^^ faw a dead man rejiored to life, I immedi^ ** ately confider with my f elf, whether it be ** more probable that the perfon jhould either " deceive or be deceived, or that the faB he ** relates fjould really have happened, I weigh *' the one miracle dgainjl the other, and ac-^ *^ cording to the fuperior ity which I dif cover ^ ** / pronounce my decifion, and always reject " the greater miracle, Ifthejalfehood of his ** tefimony would be fnore miraculous than " the event which he relates^ tben^ and ftot " //// then, can he pretend to command jny C c 2 " belief 388 On WJlorical Evidence^ ** belief or opinion *." For fuch rea* fons as thefe, Mr. Hume afferts, " T^haf " the evidence of tejtimony^ when applied to " a miracle, carries falfehood upon the very *^ face of it, and is more properly a fubje5l " of derifion than of argument -f* > and that ** whoever believes the truth of the chrifti- *' an rehgion, is confcious of a continued mi-- *• rack in his own perfon, which fubverts all ** the principles of his underjlanding, and *• gives him a determination to believe what ** is tnojl contrary to cujlom and experience \y This is the objeflion in its complete force. It has, we fee, a plaulible appearance, and is urged with uncommon confidence. But, it is founded on indifputable fallacies, * lb. p. 182 p. 206. / defire any one to lay his hand on his hearty dnd after ferious confideration declare, whether he thinks, that the falfehood of fuch a hook, (ilie Pentateuch) fuf ported by fuch teftimony^ would he more extraordinary and miraculous than all the miracles it relates \ which is, however^ neceffary to make it he received, according to the meafures of prohahility en. -^06 On Hljlorical Evidence y pen *. For ought we know, there may be occafions on which it will fail, and fecret * In an eflay publifhed in vol. 53d of the Philofo- fhical Trarjfa^iom, what is faid here and in the laft note, is proved by mathematical demonftration, and a method fhewn of determining the exacSl probability of all conclufions founded on indu6tion.— — This is plainly a curious and important problem, and it has fo near a relation to the fubjeiSl: of this diflertation, that it will be proper juft to mention the refuUs of the folution of it in a few particular cafes. Suppofe, i/?, all we know of an event to be, that it has happened ten times without failing, and that it is inquired, what reafon we Ihall have for thinking ourfelves right, if wc judge, that the probability of its happening in a Angle trial, lies fomewhere between jixteen to one and two to one. — The anfwer is, that the chance for being right, would be .5013, or very nearly an equal chance. Take next, the particu- lar cafe mentioned above, and fuppofe, that a folid or dpj of whofe number of fides and conftitution we know nothing, except from experiments made in throwing it, has turned conftantly the fame face in a million of trials. In thefe circumftances, it would be improbable^ that it had lefs than 1,400,000 more of thefe fides or faces than of all others j and it would be alfo improbable, that it had above 1,600,000 more. The chance for the Lttcr is .4647, and for 5 «hc and Miracles. 397 fccret caufes in the frame of things which Jometimes may counteradt thofe by which it is produced. * But the former .4895. There would, therefore, be no reafon for thinking, that it would never turn any o- ther fide. On the contrary, it would be likely that this would happen in 1,600,000 trials. In like manner, with refpecSt to any event in nature, fuppofe the flowing of the tide, if it has flowed at the end of a certain interval a million of times, there would be the probability exprefl^ed by .5105, that the odds for its flowing again at the ufual period was greater than 1,400,000 to I, and the probability exprefled by .5352, that the odds was Icfs than 1,600,000 to one. Such are the conclufions which uniform experience warrants.^— —What follows is ?ifpecimen of the ex- pectations, which it is reafonable to entertain in the cafe of interrupted or variable experience. If we know no more of an event than that it has happened ten times in eleven trials, and failed once, and we fhould conclude from hence, that the probability of its happening in a fingle trial lies between the odds of nine to one and eleven to one, there would be twelve to one againji being right. — if it has happened a hun- dred times, and failed ten times, there would alfo be an odds of near three to one again/} being right in fuch a conclufion. If it has happened a thoufand times and 398 On Hijiorkal Evidence y But to fay no more at prefent of tliis^ Let us, in the next place, confider what is the ground of the regard we pay to human tejlimony, We may, I thinks and failed a hundred, there would be an odds/iT being right of a little more than two to one. And, fuppofing the fame ratio preferved of the number of happenings to the number of failures, and the fame guefs made^ this odds will go on increafmg for ever, as the num-^ ber of trials is increafed. He who would fee this- explained and proved at large may confult the effay in the Philofophical Tranfadtions, to which I have referred ; and alfo the fupplement to it in the 54th vo- lume. The fpecimen now given is enough tcji fhew how very innaccurately we are apt to fpeak and judge on this fubje£t, previoufly to calculation. See Mr Hume's EfTay on miracles, p. 175, 176, ^c, and Dr. Campbell's Eflay, Se£l. 2d. p. 35. — It alfo de- monftrates, that the order of events in nature is de- rived from permanent caufes eflablifhed by an intelli- gent being in the conftitution of nature, 'and not from any of the powers of chance. And it further proves, that fo far is it from being true, that the un- derftanding is not the faculty which teaches us to rely on experience, that it is capable of determining, in all cafes, what conclufions ought to be drawn from it, and \\\\7!itpr£cife degree of eoflfidcnce fhould be placed ill it. fee and Miracles. 399 fee plainly, that it is not experience on- ly j meaning, all along, that kind of experience to which we owe our expedta- tion of natural events, the caufes of "which are unknown to us. Were this the cafe, the regard we ought to pay to teftimony, would be in proportion to the number of inftances, in which we have found, that it has given us right informa- tion, compared with thofe in which it has deceived us 5 and it might be calcu- lated in the fame manner with the re- gard due to any conclufions derived from induftion. But this is by no means the truth. One adlion, or one converfation with a man, may convince us of his in- tegrity and induce us to believe his tefti- mony, though we had never, in a finglc inftance, experienced his veracity. His manner of telling his ftory, its being corroborated by other teftimony, and va- rious particulars in the nature and cir- cumftances of it, may fatisfy us that it muft be true. We feel in ourfelves, that a 400 On Hijlorical E-vidence^ a regard to truth is one principle in hu- man nature ; and we know, that there muft be fuch a principle in every reafona- ble being, and that there is a necelTary re- pugnancy between the perception of moral diftindions and deliberate falfehood. To this, chiefly, is owing the credit we give to human teftimony. And from hence, in particular, muft be derived our belief of veracity in the Diety. It might be fhewn here in many ways, that there is a great difference between the convic- tion produced by teftimony, and the coh- viftion produced by experience. But I will content myfelf with taking notice, how much higher the one is capable of being raifed than the other. When it appears, that a man is not deceived, and does not defign to deceive, we are fo far fure of the truth of the fafts re- lated. But when any events, in the courfe of nature, have often happened, we are fure properly, of nothing but the paft faft. Nor, I think, is there in ge-^ neral;, and Miracles. 401 neral, antecedently to their happening, any comparifon between the alTurance we have that they will happen, and that which we have of many fads the know- ledge of which we derive from teftimo- ny. For example i we are not fo cer- tain that the tide will go on to ebb and flow, and the fun to rife and fet in the manner they have hitherto done, a year longer,, as we are that there has been fiich a man as Alexander y or fuch an em- pire as the Roman *• - * It might have been added here, as another ob- fervatlon of confiderable importance, that the great- eft part of what is commonly called experience is merely the report of teftimony. " Our own expe- ** rience reaches around, and goes back but a little " way ; but the experience of others, on which we «' chiefly depend, is derived to us wholly from tefti- «< mony." Dr. Adams's EJfay on MiracleSy page 5th. In proportion, therefore, as we weaken the evidence of teftimony, we weaken alfo that of expe- rience; and in comparing them we ought in reafon to oppofe to the former, only what remains of the lat- ter after that part of it which is derived from the for- mer, that is, after much the greateft part of it is de- du(^ed» _ D d From 40^ On Uijlorlcal Evidence^ From thefe obfervations It follows, that to ufe tejlimony to prove a mi- racle implies no abfurdity. *Tis not ufing 2i feebler experience to overthrow a- notherof thefame kind, which is Jlronger: But, ufing an argument to eftablifli an event, vi^hich yields a direcft and pofitive proof and is capable of producing the ftrongeft convid:ion, to overthrow ano- ther founded on different principles, and which, at bed, can prove no more than that, previoufly to the event, there would have appeared to us a prefump- tion againfl: its happening. What I now mean will be greatly confirmed by obferving, that a miracle cannot, vl^ith ftridl propriety, be ftyled an event contrary to experience. This is one of .the aflertions which I have men- tioned among the fallacies, on which Mr. Huf27es argument is founded. A mira- cle is more properly an event different from experience than contrary to it. Were I to fee a temped calmed inftan- taneoufly and Miracles. 403 tmcoufly by th^^- ward of a marp, - dL my paft experience would remain the fame 5 and were I to affirm that I faw what wasi contrary to ity I-ioulid- bnly hie.art, that I faw what I never before had a-riy experi-*.. ence of. In like manner ; was I to be af- ^ired by eye witneffes that, 'bii a parti- cular occalion, fome event, different frorrl the lifual coUrfe of things^, 'had happened, teftimony, in this cafe^^'would afford di* reft and peremptory evidence for^ the fa(a; But what infotmatiOn wbUld 'experience give ?*— i— It would only tell me what happened on other occalions, and in o^ ther inilances. Its evidence, therefore, would be entirely hegative^i It Would afford no proper proof that the- event did not happen ; for it can be no part of any 'one's experience, that the courfe of na- ture will continue always the fame. • There cannot then be any tolerable pro- priety in aiferting (as Mr Hume -f does) * See Dr, Adams's EJfay^Yzp 9th and 23d. t EJp^ it follows, that there muft be al- D d 3 ways 4o6 0/; HiJloricaJ Evidence^ ways a great overbalance of evidence a- gainft their reality. He feems to lay it down as a general maxim, that if it is^more improbable that any facjl fhoqld have reaU ly happened, than that m^n fhould either deceive or be deceived, it fhould be re-^ jefted by us. But, it muft be need^ lefs to take any pains to ihew, that the turning point in Mr Hume's argument is that which I have mentioned; or, in other words, the principle, that no tefti-^ rnony fliould engage our belief, except the improbability in the falfehood of it is greater than that in the event which it attefls *, * Let it be well remembered, that the improbabi- lity of event here mentioned, can mean nothing but the improbability which we fhould have feen there was of" its happening independently of any evidence for it, or, previoufly to the evidence of tef^imony inforrn- ing us that it has happened. To fuppofe that any pther improbability is meant, would be to make this objection to the laft degree abfurd ; the whole difpufte being about the improbability that remains after the evidence of teftimony given fpr the event, fa .,<^Y a^td Miracles. 407 In order to make it appear that this is an error, what I defire may be confider- ed is, the degree of improbability which there is againft almofl all the moft com- mon fafts, independently of the evidence of teflimony for them. In many cafes of particular hiftories which are immedi- ately believed upon the flighteft teftimony, there would have appeared to us, previ- Qufly to this teftimony, an improbability of almoft infinity to one againft their rea- lity, as any one muft perceive, who will think how fare he is of the falfehood of all fads that have no evidence to fupport them, or which he has only imagined to himfelf. It is then very common for the flighteft teftimony to overcome an al- moft infinite improbability. To make this more evident : Let us fuppofe, that teftimony informed us right- ly ten times to one in which it deceived us ; and that there was nothing to diredt our judgments concerning the regard due to witnefles, befides the degree of confor-^ D d 4 mity 40 3 On Hiftorical Evidence, mity which we have experienced in paft events tx> their reports. In this cafe, there would be the probability often to one for the reality of every fadt fupported by tef- timony. Suppofe then that it informs me of the fuccefs of a perfon in an affair, againft the fuccefs of which there was the probability of a hundred to one, or of any other event previoufly improbable in this proportion. I afk, What, on this fuppofition, would be, on the whole, the probability that the event really hap- pened? Would the right way of com- puting be, to compare the probability of the truth of the teftimony with the pro- bability that the event would not hap- pen, and to rejed: the event with a con- fidence proportioned to the fuperiority of the latter above the former ? This Mr. Hume diredts ; but certainly contrary to all reafon.< The truth is, that the tef- timony would give the probability of ten to one to the event, unabated by the fup- pofed probability againft it. And one rcafon of this is, that the very experience which and Miracles. 40^ which teaches us to give credit to tefti- mony, is an experience by which we have found, that it has informed us right-^ ly concerning fadls, in which there would have appeared to us, previoufly, a great improbability. But to be yet more explicit ; Let us fuppofe the event reported by teftimony to be, that a particular fide of a die was thrown twice in two trials, and that the teftimony is of fuch a nature that it has as often informed us wrong as right. In this cafe, there would plainly be an e- qual chance for the reality of the event, though, previoufly, there was the pro- bability of thirty-five to one againft it : And every one would fee, that it would be abfurd to fay, that there being fo con- iiderable a probability againft the event, and no probability at all for the truth of the teftimony ; or, that having had much more frequent experience that two trials Jiave not turned up the fame face of a die, than of the conformity of fads to the ? 41 o, On Hijlorical Evidence^ the fuppofed teftimony, therefore, no regard is due to the teftimony.. An e- vidence that is often conneded with truth, though not ojtner than with falfehood, is real evidence, and deferves regard. To rejed fuch evidence would be to fall of- ten into error, whatever improbabilities may attend the events to which it is ap- plied ; and to affert the contrary, would be to affert a manifefl contradicSion. But let us take a higher cafe of thi$ kind. The improbability of drawing a . lottery in any particular affigned manner, independently of the evidence of teftimo- ny, or of our own fenfes, acquainting us that it has been drawn in that manner, is fuch as exceeds all conception *, And yet "*■ Thi3 Improbability is as the number of difFerent ways which there are of drawing the lottery ; or, as the number of permutations which a number of things, equal to that of the tickets in the lottery, ad- mits of. In a lottery, therefore, of 50,000 tickets, this improbability is exprciTed by the proportion of i.X2x3X4X5x6&c. continued to 50jOOO. to one. Or, it is and Miracles. 411 yet the teftimony of a news-paper, or of any common man, is fufficient to put us out of doubt about it. Suppofe here a perfon was to rejedl the evidence offered him on the pretence, that the improbabi- lity of the falfehood of it is almoft: infi- nitely lefs than that of the event *; or, fuppofe, is the fame with that of drawing fuch a lottery exa(5lly in the order of the numbers, firft i, then 2, and fo on to the laft. Moft perfons will fcarcely be able to per- fuade themfelves, that this is not an abfolute impof- fibilityj and yet in truth, it is equally poffible, and was beforehand equally probable with that very way in which, after drawing the lottery, we believe it has been drawn : And what is fimilar to this is true of almoft every thing that can be offered to our affent, independently of any evidence for it ; and particularly, of numberlefs fa6ls which are the obje<£ls of teftimony, and which are continually believed, without the leaft iiefitation, upon its authority. * Dr. Campbell feems not to have attended to the fallacy in this method of reafoning. If he had, he would perhaps have expreffed himfelf differently in fome parts of the tirft and fixth fedlions of the firft part of his very judicious differtation before mentioned. — In the cafe he fuppofes, of the Jpfs of a paffage boat which A 412 0?i Hijiorical Evidence, fuppofe, that univerfally a perfon wa$ to rejedt all accounts which he reads or hears of fa6ts which are more uncom- mon, than it is that he ihould read or hear what is falfe : What would be thought of fuch a perfon ? How foon would he be made to fee and acknow- ledge his own folly ? iB^hich had croffed a river two ihoufand times fafely ; it is plain, that an evidence of much lefs weight than the probability, that an experiment which had fuc- ceeded two thoufand times will fucceed the next time, would be fufficient to convince us of the reality of the event. Any report that has been oftner fouiid to be true than falfe Would engage belief, though the con- vi(Slion we fhould have had, fuppofing no fuch report, that the event did not happen, would have been much ftronger than any that the report itfelf is capable of producing. I have above afligned the reafon of this ; and indeed the fophifm I have endeavoured to point out feems to me fo glaring, that did not fo fagacious » writer as Mr. Hume and fome others appear to have been deceived by it, I fhould have thought it very unnecefTary to fay much about it. SECT. mid Miracles^ 413 ' SECT, in. Of the Credibility of Miracles, and the Force of Tejlimony when employed to prove tbem^ TH E application of what has been faid, in the laft fedlion, to the parti- cular cafe of miracles, is fb obvious, that it need not be much infifted on. It has plainly appeared how little the credit of teftimony is,< in general, affedted by the previous improbability of events, and howjuftly it has been obferved to be wrong to make this improbability a proof agcunjl a fad;, deflroying, in propor- tion to its force, the proof from teftimo- ny yi?r it. I mull add what deferves particular notice, that it alfo (hews us, that Mr. IJume% argument would prove nothing, even 414 0;2 Hijlorical Ei)idencei even though the principle before oppofed were granted, namely, that we derive our regard to teftimony from experience, in the fame manner with our aiTurance of the laws or courfe of nature. 'Tis here natural to afk, " Is there *' not then a regard due to the im- ** pjobability of events, in confidering the ** evidence of teftimony for them ? " " Is ** there not good reafon for believing '* fafts more or lefs eafily, as they appear ** to us more or lefs conformable to ex- " perience ? '' I anfwer ; that, though this muft undoubtedly be in general ac- knowledged, it is by no means true in the fenfe and degree in which it has been fometimes infifted on. There areinftan^ ces in which, when the improbability of an event goos beyond a certain pitch, we necelTarily hefitate in receiving the evi- dence of teftimony, at the fame time that, in other inftances, we fliould give eafy credit to the fame teftimony, with- out and Miracles. ""^ 41 r out being afFedled 'by equal or greater ^ improbabilities. It is not, perhaps, fuf- ficiently underftood by what reafons and principles our affent is governed in thefe cafes. I fhould be carried much too far, were I to attempt a difcuflion of this fub- jed; nor is it in the leaft neceiSary to my prefeht purpofe. It is enough that it has been proved, that the influence of the im- probabilities of events on hiftorical evi- dence is not fuch as Mr. Hume afTerts, or fuch as aiFords any folid argument againft miracles. — We have feen, that teftimony is continually overcoming much greater im- ' probabilities than thofe of its own falfe- hood, and that it is even its nature to do ^d ^hc objedion, therefore, founded on the fuppofed abfurdity of trufting a feebkr experience in oppofition to a 'ftronger> or, of believing teftimony when it reports fadls which are more extraor- dinary than falfehood and deception, is fa- lacious. If, in common cafes, teftimo- ny overcomes fuch improbabilities as have •'^•^ been 41 6 On Hlporkal Evidence ^ been reprefented, there can be nothing unreafonable in fuppofing, that it may overcome thofe attending the moft un- common cafes* But the particular improbability attend- ing miracles has been a good deal mag- nified, and my principal bufinefs in what remains will be to prove this, in order to ihevv w^ith what propriety and efFed: tef- timony may be employed to gain credit to a miracle.— —With this view I (hall propofe the following obfervations. There are many events, not miraculous^ which yet have a previous incredibility in them fimilar to that of miracles, and by no means inferior to it. The events I mean, are all fuch phenomena in na- ture as arc quite new and ftrange to us. No one can doubt whether thefe are ca- pable of full proof by teftimony, 1 could,, for inflance, engage by my own fingle teftimony to convince any reafon- Able perfon, that I have known one of the the human fpecies, neither deformed noj:.- an ideot, and only thirty inches high, who arrived at his moft mature ftate at feyen years of age, and weighed then eighteen pounds ; but from that time gradually de- clined, and died at feventeen weigh- ing only twelve pounds, and with almoft every mark of old age upon him. Now, according to Mr. Hume's argu- ment, no teftimony can prove fuch a fad j for it might be faid, that nothing being piore common than the falfehood of tefti- mony, nor more uncojmnon than fuch ^ fad, it mud; be contrary to all reafon to believe it on the evidence of teftimony. It deferves particular notice here, that in judging from experience concerning the probability of events, we ftould always take rare to fatisfy ourfelves, that there is no- thing wanting to render the cafes, from whv^h we 'c.ieue,perfedly alike. Our know- ledge that ra^ :vent has alwa' : generally happened in certain cip ' .:es, gives no reafon for believing. ,x...:. jhe fame e- vent will happen, wben thcfe cireumftan- E e ces 41 8 On Hijlorical Evidence, ces are alte;-ed : And, in truth, we are fo ignorant of the conftitution of the world and of the fprings'of events, that it is feldom poflible for us to know what different pkcenomena may take place, on any the leaft change in the fituation of nature, or the circumftances of objefts. It was inattention to this that occafioned the niiftake of that king of Siam, men- tioned by Mr. Lock, who rejected, as utterly incredible, the account which was given him of the effeds of cold upon water in Europe. His unbelief was plains ly the effedl of ignorance. And this in- deed is almoft as often the cafe with un- belief, as with its contrary. Give to a common man an account of the moft re- markable experiments in natural philofo- phy : Tell him that you C2Ln freeze him to death by blowing warm air upon him before a gooAJire-y or that you often divert yourfelf with bottling up lightning and difcharg- ing it through the bodies of your acquain- tance ; and he will perhaps look upon you as crazy, or, at leaft, he will think himfelf fure and Miracles. 419 fure that you mean to deceive him. Could we fuppofe him pofleft of Mv, Hume's genius and eloquence, he might fay, ** That what " you acquaint him with is contrary to *' uniform experience, that he cannot be- ** lieve you without quitting a guide that *^ has never deceived him, to foilow one ** which is continually deceiving him ; '* and that, therefore, fuch fads, when ** reported by teftimony, are more pro- ** perly fubjeds of derijlon than argirmentJ* But, how obvious would be the weaknefs of his reafoning ? — A perfon in fuch circumftances, who thought juftly, would confider how complicated and ex- tenfive the frame of nature is, and how little a way his obfervations have reached. This would fhew him that he can be no competent judge of the powers of nature, and lead him to expefl to find in it things ftrange and wonderful, and confequently to enquire what regard is due to the tef- timony which informs him of fuch fads, rather than haftily to rejed them.^— One E e 2 cannot 420 On liijhrical Evidence ^ cannot help being greatly difgufted with the inclination which fhews itfelf in many perfons, to treat with contempt what- ever they hear, be it ever fo well attefted, if it happens that they are not able to ac- count for it, or that it does not coincide with their experience^ juft as if they knew all that can take place in nature, or, as if their experience was the ftandard of truth tind the mcafure of poffibilityi This is really no lefs filly, than it is vain and prefumptuous. It is barring their minds againft improvement, and giving them^ ■felves up to the influence of a principle Avhich has a tendency to render them unfit for fociety. If we would be truly wife, we ought, at the fame time that we are upon our guard againft deception, to avoid carefully an arrogant fcepticifm, preferving opennefs with refpeft to ^?iy evidence that can be offered to us on every fubjedl, from a fenfe of our own ignorance and narrow views. But to come more diredly to the fubjedl under con- lideration. There end Miracles, 421 There is, I have faid, no greater in- credibiUty in a miracle, than in fuch -facts as thofe I have mentioned. It has been aire idy (hewn, p 393, &c. that the moft uniform experience aftbrds no reafon for concluding, that the courfc of nature will never be interrupted,* or that any na- tural event which has hitherto happened, will always happen. It has appeared, on the contrary, that there muft be always reafon againjl this conclufion. There may, I have faid, be fecret caufes which will fometimes countera(fl thofe by which the courfe of nature is carried on. We are under no more neceffity of thinking that it muft be the fame in all ages than in 2\\ climates. During the continuance of a world, there may be periods and emer- gencies in which its affairs may take a new turn, and very extraordinary events happen. In particular, there are, for ought we know, fuperior beings who may fometimes interpofe in our affairs, and over-rule the ufual operations of na- E e 3 tural 422 On Hijlorical Evidence y tural caufes ^. We are fo far from hav- ing any reafon to deny this, that if any end worthy of fuch an interpolition ap- pears, nothing is more credible. ^ There was, undoubtedly, a time when thi^ earth was reduced into its prefent habitable ftate * and form. This muft have been a time of miracles, or of the exertion of fupernatural power. Why muft this power have then fo entirely withdrawn itfelf, as never to appear af- terwards ? The vanifhing of old ftars, and the appearance of new ones, is pro- bably owing to the deftrudiion of old worlds, and the creation of new worlds. It is reafonable to believe that events of this kind are continually happening in the immenfe univerfe ; and it is certain, that they muft be brought about under * Sure it is, that Mr Hume at lead, cannot dif- pute the credibility of this, who has faid of the mon- ftrous fyftem of pagan mythology, that it feems more than probable that, fomewhere or other in the univerfe, it is r'-^ally carried into execution. Natural Ht/^ory of Riliglojty SQ^i. nth. the and Miracles, 423 the direaion of Ibme fuperlor power. There is, therefore, the conflant exertion of fuch power in the univerfe. Why mull it be thought that, in the lapfe of fix thoufmd years, there have been no occa* fions on which it has been exerted on our globe ? What I am now faying is true on the fuppofition that a miracle, according to the common opinion, implies a violation ov fufpenfion of the laws of nature. But, in reality, this is by no means neceiiari- ly included in the idea of a miracle. A fenfible and extraordinary effedl produced hyfuperior power ^ no more implies that a law of nature is violated^ than any com- mon effect produced by human power. This has been explained in the difTertation on Providence, p. 81,82. and it has a con- fiderable tendency to render the admiffion of a miracle more eafy. Thefe obfervations demonflrate, that there is nothing of the improbability in E e 4 miracles 424 On Ilijhrkal Evidence y miracles which fomc have imagined. I may even venture to fay, that they have in them a much lefs degree of improbabihty, than there w^as, antecedently to obferva- lions and experiments, in fuch phcenomena as comets y or fuch powers as thofe of mag-^ netifm and ele6lricity. My reafon for this affertion is, that it is far more Hkely that the courfe of nature fhould fome time or other fail, than that any particular povyers or efFedls {hould exifl in nature, which we could before-hand guefs, A due attention to thefe arguments will neceflarily difpofe a candid enquirer to give a patient hearing to any teftimo- ny which affures him, that there adlually have been miracles. It appears that to decline this, under the pretence that no- thing different from the common courfe of things can be proved by teftimony, is the moft inexcufable folly and prcfumption. The miracles of the New Teflament, in particular, have many circumftances attending them which recommend them Arongly and Miracles. 425 ftrongly to our good opinion, and which lay us under indiipenfable obligations to give the evidence for them a fair and pa- tient examination. Such is the ftate of mankind, that there is nothing more credible, than that our affairs have not always beeii fuffered to go on entirely of themfelves. A revelation to inftrud: and reform a fmful and degenerate world is fo far from implying any abfurdity, that it is an effed of divine goodnefs which might very reafonably be hoped for. There appears to have been great need of it ; and it feems to be certain, that there muft have been a revelation at the begin- ning of the world. If we rejedl the mi- racles mentioneed in the New Tcftament, it will not be poflible to give any tolera- ble accoiint of the eftabliiliment of fuch a religion as the chriftian among man- kind, by a few perfons of no education or learning, in oppofition to all the pre- judices and powers of the world. The excellence of the end for which they were ^vrought; the myriads of mankind which they I 426 On Hiflor'ual E'Vidence^ they brought over to piety and goodnefs, and the amazing turn they gave to the ftate of religion by deftroying, in a few years, a fyftem of idolatry which had been the work of a2:es, and eftablifliino: on its ruins the knowledge and wor(hip of the one true God; thefe, and various other undeniable fadls which might be enumerated, give them a I'igh credibility. We fee here an occafion worthy of the ufe of fuch means, and a probability that, if ever fmce the creation there has been any interpofition of fuperior power, this was the time. CONCLUSION. Enough has been now faid in anfwer to the objeftion which has been the chief fubjecft of this diflertation *. The neceffary con- clufion * Some of the principal obfervations which I have made, may be found in the chapter of Bifbop Butler's Analogy on i\\Gfuppofed prcfumption againji a Revelation confjdered ai miraculous. Had I remembered this, it IS probable I (hould not have thought of drawing up this and Miracles. 4^7 clufion from it is, that the main bufinefs of thofe who oppofe chriilianity fliould be this differtation. The greateft prirt of the pafTage I refer to I (hall here give, in order to fave the reader the trouble of turning to it, and alfo to enable him to judge how far what I have writ, fhould it anfwer no other end, may be of ufe to illuftrate and ftrengthen what this excellent author has faid. « Firft of all, there is a very ftrong prefumption a- <« gainft common fpeculative truths, and againft the « moft ordinary fa^s before the proof of them, '< which yet is overcome by almoft any proof. There « is a prefumption of millions to one againft the fiory <« of CxHir, or any other man. For, fuppofe a num- « ber of common fa^s fo and fo circumftanced, of << which one had no kind of proof, fhould happen to " come into one's thoughts, every one would, without «« any poflible doubt, conclude them to be falfe. And *« the like may be faid of a fingle common facl. And « from hence it appears, that the queftion of impor- ts tance, as to the matter before us, is concerning the « degree of the peculiar prefumption fuppofed againft « miracles ; not whether there be any prefumption « at all againft them. For, if there be the prefumption *' of millions to one againft the moft common fads; " what can a fmall prefumption, additional to this, a- <« mount to, though it be peculiar? It cannot be efti- cif^ mated, and is as nothing. The only material *' queftion "^28 On Hijlorical 'Evidence ^ be, to invalidate the dirc5i evidence for it. Every attempt of this kind would de*- ferye ** queftion is, whether there be any fuch prcfumption ** againft miracles, as to render them in any fort incre^ " dible. Secondly^ If we leave out the confideration of " religion, we are in fuch total darknefs upon what ^' caufes, occafions, reafons or circumflances the " prefcnt courfe of nature depends 5 that there does not '' appear any improbability for or againft fuppofing, *' that five or fix thoufand years may have given fcope " for caufes, occafions, reafons or circumftances, *' from whence miraculous interpofitions may have «' arifen. And from this, joined with the foregoing " obfervation, it will follow, that there muft be a "prcfumption, beyond all comparifon greater,, a- *' gainft t\\Q particular common facls juft: now inftan- ,*' ced in, than againft miracles in general^ before any ^" evidence of either. But, thirdlyy take in the confi- ** deration of religion, or the moral fyftem of the ** vvorld, and then we fee diftinc^: particular reafons " for miracles; to afford mankind inftru^lion, addi- .f< tioJial to that of nature, and tp atteft the truth of " it. Lajlly^ Miracles muft not be compared to '' common natural events, but to the extraordinary *' phenomena of nature. And then the comparifon '< will be between the prefumption againft miracles, •' and the prefumption againft fuch uncommon ap- '• pearances, fuppofe, as comets, and, againft there " being and Miracles, 429 ferve the mofl: ferious regard; and, it is vain to think of overthrowing chriftianity ill any other way. As far as there is reafon to believe, that the apoflles wxre neither de- ceived nor intended to deceive, we are under a neceflity of receiving the fads they witnefled though miraculous. Let then unbelievers prove, if it be poffible, that there is no fufficient reafon to believe this. Let them fliew, that Chrift and his apoftles were either enthiiftajis or hnpojiors, and ac- count for their conduit and writings on one of thofe fuppofitlons, taking along with them the confideration, how nvild and frantick " being any fuch powers in nature as magnetifm and ^« ekaricity, {o contrary to he properties of other « bodies, not endued with thefe powers. Upon «' all this, I conclude, that there is certainly no fuch '« prefumption againft miracles as to render them in <« any wife incredible. That, on the contrary, our ^« being able to difcern reafons for them gives a pofi- « tive credibility to the hiftory of them, in cafes where « thofe reafons hold : And that it is by no means cer- " tain, that there is any peculiar prefumption at all, *« from analogy, againft miracles, as diftinguifhed " from other extraordinary phsenomena.'* Analogy of ^Rd\gm^ 6cc. p. 243, 5:c, they 4j.-3b On WJlorkal 'Evidencey they muft have been if the former, and how profane and abandoned if the latter. But let them not pretend that they are able to prove a priori^ that no accounts of mira- cles ca7i be true ; or fatisfy themfelves with faying lazily, that deceit and falfehood are very common, and miracles very extraordina- ry 5 and that, therefore, the whole quefti- on is decided, and there can be no occafion for any further examination. A perfon who fliould reafon in this manner, in other inftances, would be quite ridiculous. Tefti* mony is an evidence which admits of an in- finite variety of degrees, and which, fome- times, is fcarcely fliort of demonflration. Though it often deceives, yet there are fome kinds of it that have never decei ed, and that cannot deceive. It is one of the principal fources of all our information and know- ledge. To argue, therefore, againft chriC« tianity from the general topick of the com- monnefs of falfe teftimony, is trifling and unjuft, unlcfs it can be (hewn, that it has been common ioxfiich teftimony as that of the and Miracles. 431 the apoftles to be falfe *. Hiftorical evi- dence being of all degrees, what is true of other * It may be worth while to obferve here, that the ob- jection I have been confidering is apph'cable to fa6ls for which we have the evidence of fenfe^ as well as thoCe which depend on the evidence of teft-imony. Were we to be eye witnefTes to any thing quite new to us» and out of the ufual courfe of nature, it might be faid, that what we perceive being contradictory to uniform experience, but deceptions of our fenfes common ; therefore, it muft be wrong to beheve the reality of it ; becaufe, this would be trufting a feebler experience in oppofition to a ftronger, or, receiving a faCl upon an evidence, the falfehood of which would be lefs uncommon than the faClitfelf. He, therefore, that will guide himfelf by the principles which are the foundation of this objection, and balance oppofite ex- periences in the manner it requires, muft have been an unbeliever, though he hady^^w the miracles related in the New Teftament. Though our fenfes have often deceived us, we cannot help relying, in general, without diffidence on their information. There are innumerable circumftances and inftances in which ihey have never deceived us : And, tharefore, when in a- ny particular inftance they convey to us any informa- tion, it is trifling to objeC^, that they have informed us wrong in fome other inftances, except thofe other inftances were of a fimilar nature. And even fuppo- 2 432 On Hlflorkal Evidence y o^/6(^r hifloncal evidence is nothing to thih If the facfls are extraordinary, there may be peculiar circumftances attending them tak- ing off all improbability from them on this account ; and it may be even lefs wonderful that they fliould be true, than that the tefti- mony reporting them fhould be falfe. It has been fliewn indeed, that, in order to our reception of the chriftian miracles, it is by no means neceffary to prove this. A great deal, however, has been faid to prove it with much ftrength of reafon, by the de- fenders of Chriftianity *. Why ihould not fome fing this fimilarity, the objection will be of little weight, unlefs the number of fuch ihftances in which they have deceived us, is nearly equal to or greater than thofe in which they have not deceived iis.< — It appears from what is faid above, that thcfeob- fervations are applicable, with like propriety and force, to the information we receive from teftimonv. * See Dr. Adams's EfTay on Miracles, When Mr. Hunic, in a pafiage before quoted, p. 387. lays it down as a maxima '' That no teflimony is fufficient to *' cftablidi a miracle, unlefs the falfehood of it is more " miraculous than the fadt it endeavours to eftablifti ;" tis meaning, I fliould think, muft be that as, accor- ding end Miracles. 433 fome notice be taken of the arguments they offer? Why Ihould not thofe who rejea chriftlanity and for the fortitude with which the apof- tles, in giving their teftimony, facrificed every worldly intereft and at laft laid down their lives ? Why, inftead of making any attempts of this kind, do they, in general, infifl: on topicks which atfedt not the dire^ evidence, or found their objedions on the adulterations of chriftiahity by human in- ventions and civil eftablifhments, without taking pains to difcover what it is as it lies in the New Teftament ? If the chriftian religion is true we have clear information on points the mofl intereding^ A vicious man has every thing to fear, and a virtuous man every thing to hope. The queftion, therefore, whether it is of divine original, is, as I obferved at the beginning of this differtation, of unfpeakable impor- tance. 'Tis inexcufable to treat it with in- done good to the refurreSlion of Ufe^ and ihey that hare dene f*i)il to the rejurrtclion of damnation, John xi. 25. • * V* 28, 29. F f 2 difference ; 436 On Hijlorical Evidence^ difference; or, with conceited half-thinkr ers, to fuffer ourfelves to be led into infir delity by a few fpecious difficulties, without critically examining the original code itfelii and confidering carefully the joint force of all the evidences internal^ external and./>r^r fumptive taken together. If, after fuch an examination, any perfon {hould judge, that the whole amount of the evidence is inade- quate to the proof of the fads on which chriflianity is founded, he ought next to con- fider how far it goes towards proving them. That it goes fome way towards this is abfo* lutely certain. The furtheft that any enquir- er can go in his rejection of chriflianity is, to think that the objedions out-weigh the evidence ; but he cannot poffibly think that there is no evidence. I fhould imagine in- deed, that he cannot poffibly avoid feeing, that there is very confiderable and ftriking evidence, though he may judge it infiiffici- ent. It is not conceivable, that any one can read the New Teftament, and obferve with what a force and purity, before unknown, it teaches morality and natural religion; the , ♦;!,.. fiiblimc and Mir^cleim ^yj fublime and Angular charadterit has dpawft, without the leaft appearance of art Or effort, in the hiftory it gives of the life, difcourfes and miracles of Jefus Chrift j and the fpirit of piety, goodnefs, love and heavenly mind'- cdnefs which breathes through all its parts : It is not, I fay, conceivable, that any pefJ- fon, after fuch a perufal of the New Tefta- ment, can be able eaiily to perfuade him- felf, that the writers of it were fuch mra- cles of madnefs or profligacy as they muft have been, if the fads to which they bor^ teftimony were falfe, and the religion they taught an impofition on mankind. But not to dwell on this. For the reafon which has been affigned it is certain, that no infi- dels, who are inquifitive and candid, can go beyond a ftate of doubt. They muft ac- knowledge that, at leafl, there is evidence enough to give a chance for the truth of chriflianity; and they ought toconfider feri- oufly to what this chance amounts, and what obligations, in refped of pradtice, their own flate of doubt lays tliem under. Would they do this, they could never make chrif- tianity 2 '4jS On HiJIdrical Evidence^ Tlianity a- fabjeft of ridicule or contempt. -Though not convinced of its truth, they would live linderthe apprehenfion that it may pof- fibly pi'ov'e true. ■ Thofe who do not ad thus xannotreafonably complain of the threatnings denounced in the fcriptures againft iilfidelity. -Thefe'' threatnings 'certainly (hould not be applied^ nor were they ever intended to be -applied to any honeft enquirers, be their doubts vvhat^ they^wilL There is nothing fundamental^ but a fincere defire to know and do the will of God, Speculative errors can be no further criminal than they {hew, that this does not prevail in the charader, or proceed from criminal difpofitions, and are made fanduaries for vice. That this is one of the fources- of modern as well as antient infidelity, appears too plainly. The purity and piety required/by chriftianity, though the moft irrefiftible recommendation of it to a good mind, muft create flrong prejudices againft it among the licentious and diflb- lute, and all whofe hearts arc not governed by the love of God and virtue.. *JIe that belkveth not h condemned already^ becaufe ht 5 r^^' aJid Miracles. 429 he hath not believed in the name of the only begotten Son of God. And this is the con- demnation, the reafon of the condemnation, that light is come into the world, and men love darknefs rather than light, becaufe their deeds are evil. For every one who doth evil hateth the light, neither cometh to the light leaft his deeds fioould be reproved "^ . * John iii. iS, 19. THE END. ADVERTISEMENT. AFTER thefe DifTertations were printed ofF I happened to look into an Eilay, entitled, ^- marh on the Laws of Motion a?id the Inertia of Matter^ by Dr. Stewart, ProfeJJor of Natural Phihjophy at Edin- burgh, publifhcd in the nrft volume of the Edinburgh Phyfical Ellays. The conformity which 1 have found between the obfcrvations contained in that ex- cellent paper, and lome of thofe made in the iecond fcdion of the Diflcrtation on Providence, has agreeably furprized me ; but at the fame time it has given mc fome pain becaufe difcovered fo late. I cannot help, therefore, taking notice of it in this manner, left I fhould appear to be guilty in any inflance of writing after others without makin^^ proper acknowlcd;;- ments. ^mim -tM :i* .<