MEMBERS  OF  THE  FACULTY 
 
 UNIVERSITY  OF  LONDON  PRESS 
 
BT  10  . L6  1911 
 London  (England). 
 
 University.  Faculty  of 
 London  theological  studies 
 
f 
 
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 in  2019  with  funding  from 
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LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
o<y 
 
 LONDON 
 
 THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 BY  MEMBERS  OF 
 THE  FACULTY  OF  THEOLOGY 
 IN  THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  LONDON 
 
 Xonbon:  ZHm\>ersit£  of  Xonfcon  press 
 
 PUBLISHED  FOR  THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  LONDON  PRESS,  LTD. 
 BY  HODDER  &  STOUGHTON,  WARWICK  SQUARE,  E.C. 
 
 1911 
 
HODDER  AND  STOUGHTON 
 
 PUBLISHERS  TO 
 
 THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  LONDON  PRESS 
 
PREFACE 
 
 In  this  volume  members  of  the  Faculty  of  Theology  of 
 the  University  of  London  offer  some  results  of  their  study 
 and  reflection.  They  are  all  engaged  as  teachers  in  one  or 
 other  of  the  various  departments  of  the  subject,  endeav¬ 
 ouring  at  the  same  time  to  follow  the  sound  principle  that 
 every  teacher  should  himself  continue  to  be  a  student. 
 Although  their  teaching  is  carried  on  in  six  separate  Colleges, 
 the  writers  have  now  for  some  years  worked  together  in 
 the  Faculty  of  Theology  and  on  the  Board  of  Theological 
 Studies  in  the  University  under  the  circumstances  narrated 
 in  the  Introductory  Note.  Opportunity  for  intercourse 
 has,  therefore,  been  provided  by  the  duty  of  advising  the 
 University  as  to  the  curricula  for  the  Divinity  degrees, 
 and  by  the  general  conduct  of  the  business  of  the  University 
 in  this  department.  The  completion  of  ten  years  of  this 
 association  in  work  seemed  to  furnish  an  opportunity  for 
 combining  in  the  publication  of  some  of  their  own  studies. 
 The  examples  set  by  theological  teachers  at  Oxford  and 
 Cambridge,  and  also  at  the  University  of  Manchester, 
 had  some  influence  in  suggesting  this  action  :  in  saying 
 this,  however,  there  is  no  desire  to  challenge  any  compari¬ 
 sons  ;  a  good  example  had  been  set,  and  this  is  an  attempt 
 to  follow  it  in  their  own  way. 
 
 In  this  connection  it  should  be  observed  that  this  design 
 is  not  like  that  of  the  Oxford  volume  Lux  Mundi  (1889), 
 in  which  a  central  theme  was  worked  out  in  different 
 applications  by  the  contributors  :  this  volume  resembles 
 those  which  came  from  Cambridge,  Theological  Essays 
 (1905)  and  Biblical  Essays  (1910),  in  being  a  collection  of 
 independent  studies. 
 
VI 
 
 PREFACE 
 
 It  should  also  be  observed  that  this  is  not  an  official 
 publication  by  the  Faculty:  certain  members  have  united 
 to  produce  it,  and  it  is  hoped  that  at  some  future  time 
 another  group  of  members — there  are  twenty- one  teachers 
 in  the  Faculty — may  be  encouraged  to  engage  in  a  similar 
 enterprise. 
 
 In  the  present  venture  each  of  the  six  Theological 
 Schools  of  the  University  is  represented,  and  each  of  the 
 principal  parts  of  Theological  curriculum  has  some  share 
 of  attention. 
 
 A.  C. 
 
INTRODUCTORY  NOTE 
 
 SKETCH  OF  THE  HISTORY  OF  THE  FACULTY 
 By  S.  W.  Green,  M.A., 
 
 Professor  of  New  Testament  Exegesis,  Regent’s  Park  College. 
 
 The  movement  which  led  to  the  founding  of  a  Univer- 
 sity  in  London  originated  in  an  open  letter  from  the  poet  o^ondon. 
 Campbell  to  Lord  Brougham,  in  1825.  Two  motives  were 
 prominent — the  needs  of  higher  education  in  the  Metropolis, 
 and  the  disabilities  imposed  upon  Nonconformists  by  the 
 older  English  Universities.  Hence  the  poet  pleaded  for  a 
 great  London  University,  for  the  purpose  of  44  effectively 
 and  multifariously  teaching,  examining  and  rewarding 
 with  honours  the  youth  of  London,”  urging  also  the  ad¬ 
 vantages  of  44  cheapness  of  domestic  residence  and  all 
 the  moral  influence  that  results  from  home.” 
 
 The  appeal  was  so  successful  that  within  two  years  the 
 shareholders  in  what  was  technically  a  joint-stock  company 
 subscribed  a  capital  sum  of  £160,000,  and  in  1828  Uni¬ 
 versity  College  opened  its  doors  to  students  in  Arts,  Laws 
 and  Medicine.  In  intelligent  anticipation  of  an  expected 
 Charter  which  would  give  power  to  confer  degrees,  the 
 new  institution  assumed  the  title  of  the  London  University. 
 
 This  ambition,  however,  had  to  reckon  with  the  vested 
 interests  of  other  chartered  corporations,  especially  of 
 the  Universities  of  Oxford  and  Cambridge,  and  for  seven 
 years  the  opposition  prevailed. 
 
 Meanwhile  the  situation  became  complicated  by  the  Kings 
 
 .  College. 
 
 establishment  in  London  of  a  second  educational  institu¬ 
 tion  of  University  rank.  The  crying  needs  of  London  had 
 gained  for  the  former  enterprise  the  support  of  many  who 
 valued  the  connection  of  the  Universities  with  the  Church, 
 but  the  frankly  non-religious  character  of  University 
 
 vii 
 
INTRODUCTORY  NOTE 
 
 Vlll 
 
 College  led  to  a  not  unnatural  reaction.  A  new  College 
 was  proposed,  with  the  purpose — to  quote  from  its  Charter, 
 granted  in  1829 — that  “instruction  in  the  doctrines  and 
 duties  of  Christianity  as  taught  by  the  Church  of  England 
 should  be  for  ever  combined  with  other  branches  of  useful 
 education.”  Under  the  powerful  advocacy  of  the  Duke  of 
 Wellington  the  scheme  prospered,  and  in  1831  King’s 
 College  was  opened,  somewhat  crippled  in  resources  by 
 large  withdrawal  of  support  in  resentment  at  the  Duke’s 
 acceptance  of  the  Catholic  Relief  Bill  of  1829.  Thus 
 within  six  years  from  Campbell’s  letter  London  possessed 
 two  great  Colleges,  but  still  no  University,  and  it  was 
 obvious  that  the  claim  of  University  College  to  become  the 
 teaching  University  for  London  was  seriously  challenged 
 by  the  existence  of  her  powerful  rival. 
 
 In  1834  a  Bill  for  the  abolition  of  Theological  tests  for 
 matriculation  and  graduation  at  Oxford  and  Cambridge 
 passed  the  House  of  Commons  by  large  majorities,  but 
 was  thrown  out  by  the  House  of  Lords.  This  action 
 gave  fresh  impulse  to  the  movement  which  was  to  result 
 in  a  University  of  London,  though  on  other  lines  than  those 
 originally  contemplated.  The  following  year  the  Commons 
 voted  an  Address  to  the  Crown,  praying  that  a  Charter 
 be  granted  to  “  London  University,”  i.  e.  to  University 
 College,  and  on  August  19,  1835,  the  proposals  of  Lord 
 Melbourne’s  Government  were  communicated  to  Lord 
 Somerset,  Chairman  of  the  Council  of  the  College.  In¬ 
 evitably  they  were  of  the  nature  of  a  compromise.  A 
 Charter  of  Incorporation  was  to  be  granted  to  the  soi-disant 
 London  University  under  the  title  of  London  University 
 College,  and  a  further  Charter  to  “  persons  eminent  in 
 literature  and  science,  to  act  as  a  Board  of  Examiners, 
 and  to  perform  all  the  functions  of  the  Examiners  in  the 
 Senate  House  of  Cambridge;  this  body  to  be  termed  the 
 University  of  London.”  To  these  examinations  the 
 students  of  University  and  King’s  Colleges,  and  of  other 
 educational  bodies  to  be  named  from  time  to  time  by  the 
 Crown,  were  to  be  admitted  on  production  of  certificates  of 
 
INTRODUCTORY  NOTE 
 
 IX 
 
 attendance  at  a  satisfactory  course  of  study.  It  was 
 explained  that  the  aim  of  the  Government  was  “  to 
 provide  a  mode  for  granting  Academical  Degrees  in  London 
 to  persons  of  all  religious  persuasions,  without  distinction 
 and  without  the  imposition  of  any  test  or  disqualification 
 whatever.”  The  compromise  was  accepted,  and  on 
 November  28,  1836,  University  College  received  its  Charter 
 of  Incorporation  as  a  College,  and  the  new  University  of 
 London  its  Charter  for  the  conferment  of  degrees  in  Arts, 
 Laws  and  Medicine.  Other  educational  bodies  availed 
 themselves  of  the  privilege  of  “  affiliation  ”  to  the  Univer¬ 
 sity,  which  enabled  them  to  send  their  students  to  its 
 examinations  for  matriculation  and  graduation  :  the  list 
 given  in  the  later  Charter  of  1858  contains,  in  addition  to 
 the  other  British  Universities  and  the  two  original  con¬ 
 stituent  Colleges  in  London,  some  forty  institutions, 
 comprising  a  large  number  of  Theological  Colleges  in 
 London  and  the  provinces. 
 
 The  original  University,  then,  was  an  Examining 
 Board  which  required  from  all  its  candidates  attendance 
 on  courses  of  study  in  recognised  institutions,  which, 
 however,  it  had  no  power  to  regulate,  inspect  or  control. 
 The  slender  link  thus  established  between  examination 
 and  teaching  soon  gave  way.  As  credentials  of  academic 
 discipline  and  instruction  the  certificates  granted  by  the 
 several  affiliated  institutions  had  no  uniform  value,  in 
 some  cases  little  or  none  at  all.  This  fact  of  experience 
 was  recognised  by  the  new  Charter  of  1858,  which  admitted 
 to  matriculation  and  all  degrees  except  in  Medicine  or 
 Surgery  “  persons  not  educated  in  any  of  the  said  institu¬ 
 tions.”  By  pressure  of  circumstance  the  teaching  Uni¬ 
 versity  for  London  originally  contemplated  had  developed 
 into  an  Examining  Board  for  the  British  Empire. 
 
 The  stimulus  of  the  London  degree  in  raising  the 
 standard  of  general  education  for  students  in  training  for 
 the  Christian  ministry  was  immense,  and  the  Theological 
 Colleges  were  not  slow  to  avail  themselves  of  it,  utilising 
 elsewhere,  or  themselves  providing,  the  necessary  instruc- 
 
X 
 
 INTRODUCTORY  NOTE 
 
 The 
 
 Scriptural 
 
 Examina¬ 
 
 tions. 
 
 tion  courses.  The  University  roll  contains  the  names 
 of  many  Nonconformists  who  afterwards  became  eminent 
 as  preachers  or  as  teachers  and  writers  in  Theology. 
 Among  former  Principals  of  Colleges  may  be  mentioned 
 J.  G.  Greenwood,  of  Owens  College,  Manchester;  Samuel 
 Newth  and  R.  Vaughan  Pryce,  of  New  College,  London; 
 Alfred  Cave,  of  Hackney  College;  Henry  Reynolds,  of 
 Cheshunt;  S.  G.  Green  and  T.  G.  Rooke,  of  Rawdon;  J.  B. 
 Paton,  of  the  Congregational  Institute,  Nottingham,  and 
 
 R.  LI.  Roberts,  of  Regent’s  Park.  In  addition  to  these 
 the  present  Principals  of  Rawdon,  Bristol,  Manchester  and 
 Midland  Baptist  Colleges,  Lancashire  Independent  College, 
 Manchester  College,  Oxford,  Cheshunt  College,  Cambridge, 
 at  least,  together  with  many  of  the  teaching  staff  at  these 
 and  similar  institutions,  are  graduates  of  the  University 
 of  London.  Other  names  that  occur  are  those  of  Robert 
 Vaughan,  author  of  Hours  with  the  Mystics;  Eustace 
 Conder ;  R.  W.  Dale ;  R.  H.  Hutton,  of  the  Spectator;  Charles 
 Beard  and  R.  A.  Armstrong,  of  Liverpool ;  W.  F.  Moulton, 
 of  the  New  Testament  Revision  Company,  R.  F.  Weymouth, 
 of  Mill  Hill  School,  author  of  The  New  Testament  in  Modern 
 Speech;  William  Medley,  of  Rawdon;  Alexander  Maclaren, 
 of  Manchester ;  while  among  the  living,  John  Clifford,  G.  G. 
 Findlay,  J.  Scott  Lidgett,  F.  B.  Meyer,  J.  H.  Moulton,  and 
 J.  H.  Shakespeare  are  only  a  representative  few  of  a  great 
 company  in  whose  varied  ministry  to  their  generation 
 what  was  gained  through  the  University  of  London  has 
 been  a  vital  factor.  The  ministry  of  the  Roman  Catholic 
 Church  has  owed  not  a  little  to  the  same  stimulus  :  it 
 may  suffice  to  mention  the  names  of  Father  Rickaby, 
 
 S.  J.,  and  Dr.  Casartelli,  Bishop  of  Salford.  Of  the  Church 
 of  England  clergy,  the  best-known  London  graduate  was 
 Edward  Steere,  first  Bishop  of  Zanzibar. 
 
 But  the  advantages  were  tempered  by  an  obvious  draw¬ 
 back.  The  new  University  had  attained  its  purpose  of  being 
 non-sectarian  only  by  being  entirely  non-theological.  With 
 one  partial  exception,  it  had  no  place  or  recognition  for 
 the  Biblical  and  Theological  studies  which  it  was  the  main 
 
INTRODUCTORY  NOTE 
 
 xi 
 
 business  of  these  Colleges  to  promote.  Students  whose 
 tastes  and  aptitudes  lay  chiefly  in  this  direction  had  nothing 
 to  hope  for  in  the  way  of  University  examinations  or 
 rewards,  while  others  gained  the  degree  in  Arts  largely  at 
 the  expense  of  their  Theology.  The  one  venture  of  the 
 University  into  the  fearsome  territory  of  Theology  did 
 little  to  ease  the  difficulty.  A  “  First  Scriptural  Exami¬ 
 nation  ”  (first  taken  in  1839)  was  open  only  to  those  who 
 had  taken  the  London  B.A.  :  this  might  be  followed  at 
 a  year’s  interval  by  the  “  Further  Scriptural  Examination.” 
 
 Each  comprised  four  papers  only — the  former  in  the 
 Hebrew  text  of  Genesis,  the  Greek  text  of  St.  Luke’s 
 Gospel,  Butler’s  Analogy  and  Paley’s  Evidences,  Scripture 
 History;  the  latter  in  larger  portions  of  the  Hebrew  and 
 Greek  Scriptures,  Christian  Evidences  and  Biblical  History 
 and  Criticism.  Two  subjects  sufficed  for  a  pass  in  the 
 First,  three  in  the  Further  Examination.  The  restricted 
 scope  of  these  post-graduate  examinations  is  further 
 emphasised  in  the  Regulations.  Each  examiner  had  a 
 veto  on  any  question;  no  question  was  to  be  put  on  “any 
 doctrinal  point  disputed  between  Christians  and  Chris¬ 
 tians,”  or  to  require  expression  of  religious  belief  ;  no 
 answer  was  to  be  objected  to  because  of  “  peculiarity  of 
 doctrinal  views.”  Additional  value  was  given  to  these 
 examinations  by  the  award  of  book  prizes  (£5  and  £10) 
 to  all  who  gained  a  first  class.  But  the  University  of 
 London,  great  as  were  its  indirect  benefits  to  the  Theo¬ 
 logical  Colleges,  gave  no  direct  stimulus  to  Theological 
 studies  :  a  better  way  of  freedom  and  unity  was  still  to 
 seek  than  a  compromise  which  had  attained  peace  only 
 by  rigid  exclusion  of  whatever  might  disturb. 
 
 At  King’s  College,  for  some  years  Theological  instruc-  King’s 
 tion  was  given  only  as  a  part  of  the  general  curriculum,  Theological 
 but  in  1847  a  Theological  department  was  founded,  Department* 
 having  for  its  object  the  preparation  of  either  graduates 
 or  non-graduates  for  Holy  Orders  in  the  Church  of 
 England.  The  status  of  “  Associate  in  Theology  ”  was 
 conferred  upon  those  who  took  this  course  satisfactorily 
 
INTRODUCTORY  NOTE 
 
 •  • 
 
 Xll 
 
 to  the  College.  Later  on,  provision  was  made  for  a 
 portion  of  the  study  being  taken  in  Evening  Classes,  but 
 some  attendance  on  the  Day  Classes  was  also  required. 
 Amongst  the  Theologians  who  at  one  time  or  another 
 served  on  the  staff  of  the  Department  were  Maurice, 
 Trench,  Perowne,  Plumptre,  Barry,  and  Ellicott,  and 
 more  recently  Dr.  Wace,  Dr.  Swete,  Dr.  Knowling, 
 Bishop  Collins,  and  Dr.  Beeching.  A  large  number  of 
 students  took  the  Associateship  :  at  the  last  time  of 
 drawing  up  a  record  there  were  over  900  of  the  clergy 
 on  the  roll.  A  few  had  proceeded  later  to  Oxford, 
 Cambridge,  or  Durham,  but  it  was  always  felt  to  be  a 
 hardship  that  no  degree  was  available  for  students  of 
 Theology  resident  in  London. 
 
 In  default  of  any  help  from  the  University  in  raising  the 
 *  standard  of  Theological  education  for  students  preparing  for 
 the  Christian  ministry,  action  towards  that  end  was  taken 
 by  some  of  the  Theological  Colleges  themselves.  This 
 deserves  to  be  chronicled  here,  not  only  for  the  importance 
 to  which  it  grew,  but  because  of  its  close  connection  with 
 the  subsequent  attainment  of  a  Faculty  of  Theology  in 
 the  reconstituted  University  of  1900.  In  May,  1879,  repre¬ 
 sentatives  of  nine  Congregational  Colleges  in  England  and 
 Wales  met  in  London  and  formed  themselves  into  an 
 association  under  the  title  of  the  Senatus  Academicus. 
 Other  similar  institutions  were  invited  to  join,  and  by  the 
 year  1901  the  associated  colleges  numbered  seventeen, 
 with  a  governing  Senate  of  107  teachers  and  other  repre¬ 
 sentatives.  The  aim  was  to  establish  a  yearly  examination, 
 of  University  rank,  comprising  the  main  subjects  of  the 
 College  curricula,  conducted  by  examiners  appointed  by 
 the  Senate  44  from  their  own  number  or  otherwise.”  As 
 the  project  prospered,  such  generous  interpretation  was 
 given  to  that  44  or  otherwise  ”  that  the  examination 
 became  practically  independent  of  the  teaching.  The 
 teachers  had  their  say  in  the  framing  of  the  general  scheme 
 and  detailed  syllabuses  of  the  examination;  for  the  rest, 
 they  were  content  to  submit  their  students  to  the  free 
 
INTRODUCTORY  NOTD 
 
 Xlll 
 
 judgment  of  the  chosen  examiners.  The  choice  of 
 examiners  aimed  high,  and  was  not  disappointed.  Dis¬ 
 tinguished  scholars  of  the  Anglican  Church,  as  well  as  of 
 the  Free  Churches,  readily  gave  their  services,  and  as 
 two  examiners  were  required  year  by  year  for  each  of 
 seven  subjects,  the  demand  on  their  sympathy  was  no 
 light  one.  A  glance  over  the  list  singles  out  many  names 
 of  world-wide  repute  in  Theology  and  Philosophy  among 
 those  who  rendered  help  to  this  voluntary  combination 
 for  the  furtherance  of  Theological  scholarship. 
 
 In  addition  to  this  first  examination,  intended  for 
 College  students  of  not  less  than  two  years’  standing,  the 
 scheme  comprised  a  further  specialised  examination  of 
 Honours  type  in  two  at  least  of  six  appointed  branches  of 
 Theological  study.  Successful  candidates  received  in  the 
 one  an  associate’s  diploma  (A.T.S.),  in  the  other  the 
 diploma  of  a  fellow  (F.T.S.).  So  widely  was  the  scheme 
 adopted  that  between  1880  and  1901  no  fewer  than  511 
 gained  the  A.T.S.  (of  whom  97  qualified  for  Honours  and 
 Prizes)  and  11  the  F.T.S. 
 
 These  results  well  warranted  the  ambition,  expressed 
 in  occasional  discussions  of  the  Senate,  of  securing  in  one 
 way  or  another  University  recognition  for  what  were  to 
 all  intents  and  purposes  University  examinations.  From 
 the  beginning  of  the  protracted  negotiations  which  finally 
 issued  in  the  reconstitution  of  the  University  of  London, 
 representatives  of  the  Associated  Colleges  took  their  full 
 share  in  pressing  the  claims  of  Theological  studies.  One 
 name  calls  for  special  mention — that  of  the  late  Dr.  Alfred 
 Cave,  Principal  of  Hackney  College.  Through  all  the 
 struggle  he  took  a  foremost  part,  sagacious,  enthusiastic, 
 untiring,  till  the  end  was  achieved.  But  it  was  left  for 
 others  to  enter  into  his  labours.  From  the  first  meeting 
 of  the  new  Faculty  of  Theology,  so  eagerly  anticipated, 
 on  November  20,  1900,  Dr.  Cave  was  absent  through 
 illness ;  the  minutes  of  the  third  meeting,  two  months  later, 
 record  the  loss  sustained  by  his  death,  and  the  Faculty’s 
 “  sense  of  the  value  of  the  services  rendered  by  him  during 
 
XIV 
 
 INTRODUCTORY  NOTE 
 
 Tlir  Faculty 
 of  Theology. 
 
 the  period  when  the  reconstitution  of  the  University  was 
 under  public  consideration.” 
 
 The  Report  of  the  Senatus  Academicus  for  1901  notes 
 with  satisfaction  the  completion  of  the  B.D.  scheme  of 
 the  University  of  London,  with  some  consequent  modifi¬ 
 cations  of  its  own  examinations,  adding  “  What  further 
 effect  the  B.D.  degree  may  have  upon  the  Senatus 
 examinations  has  yet  to  be  considered.”  In  the  result 
 the  Senatus  agreed  that  its  work  was  done  and  its  goal 
 reached  in  the  institution  of  a  Theological  degree,  shaped 
 largely  on  the  lines  of  its  own  enterprise,  and  open  to  all 
 comers,  “  without  the  imposition  of  any  test  or  disqualifica¬ 
 tion  whatever.” 
 
 The  Statutes  of  1900,  made  by  the  Commissioners 
 appointed  under  the  London  University  Act  of  1898, 
 constituted  eight  Faculties  in  the  University,  of  which 
 Theology  stands  first.  Seven  Theological  Colleges  in  or 
 near  London  were  named  as  the  first  Divinity  “  Schools  ” 
 of  the  University,  such  of  their  teachers  as  should  be 
 recognised  by  the  Senate  becoming  members  of  the 
 Faculty.  On  the  body  so  constituted  fell  the  whole 
 pioneer  work  of  framing  schemes  of  examination  for  the 
 degrees  of  B.D.  and  D.D.  An  interesting  experiment  ! 
 For  two  of  the  seven  “  Schools  ”  were  Colleges  of  the 
 Established  Church  (King’s  and  St.  John’s  Hall,  Highbury), 
 three  Congregationalist  (Hackney,  New  and  Cheshunt), 
 one  Wesleyan  (Richmond),  and  one  Baptist  (Regent’s 
 Park).  How  far  would  these  diverse  elements  work 
 together  amicably  and  effectively  towards  results  which 
 all  could  accept,  and  which  an  impartial  University  could 
 sanction  ?  If  any  had  misgivings  they  were  quickly 
 allayed.  After  prolonged  deliberation,  marked  by  striking 
 unanimity  of  aim  and  entire  absence  of  friction,  conditions 
 were  shaped  for  the  degrees  of  B.D.  (Pass  and  Honours) 
 and  D.D.  For  this  initial  success,  the  wise  and  tactful 
 guidance  of  the  first  Dean  of  Faculty  and  Chairman  of 
 the  Board  of  Studies — Dr.  Robertson,  then  Principal  of 
 King’s,  now  Bishop  of  Exeter — was  largely  responsible; 
 
INTRODUCTORY  NOTE 
 
 xv 
 
 the  experiment  now  has  the  ampler  justification  of  ten  years 
 of  harmonious  and  fruitful  co-operation  in  all  the  varied 
 work  of  the  Faculty. 
 
 Technically,  the  schemes  of  examination  thus  prepared 
 were  only  for  internal  students,  i.  e.  students  in  the 
 Divinity  Schools  of  the  University,  but  from  the  first  they 
 have  been  adopted  by  the  Council  for  External  Students 
 also.  In  1908  the  Senate  approved  a  plan,  initiated  by 
 the  Faculty  and  recommended  by  both  Councils,  for 
 unifying  the  Internal  and  External  Examinations  for  the 
 degree  of  B.D.  (Pass  and  Honours),  under  one  Board  of 
 Examiners.  The  Faculty  has  also  had  the  satisfaction  of 
 seeing  the  adoption  by  the  University  Extension  Board 
 of  its  suggestions  for  an  examination  for  a  Certificate  in 
 Religious  Knowledge,  open  to  all  without  matriculation. 
 The  hopes  that  this  examination  would  be  of  wide  service 
 to  such  students  of  Theology  as  cannot  study  for  a  degree, 
 and  especially  to  teachers  in  Secondary  Schools  who 
 desire  to  attain  some  qualification  for  taking  the  Scripture 
 lesson,  have  hardly,  as  yet,  been  fulfilled.  The  stress  of 
 the  examination  is  laid  on  four  compulsory  papers  in  the 
 English  Bible  :  to  these  are  added  two  optional  subjects, 
 and  the  examination  may  be  taken  in  two  parts.  It  is 
 greatly  to  be  desired  that  this  opportunity  should  be 
 better  known  and  more  widely  used. 
 
 It  may  be  added  that  between  1903  and  1910  exactly 
 200  passed  the  final  examination  for  the  degree  of  B.D. ; 
 56  internal  students  and  144  external,  of  whom  four  were 
 women.  During  the  same  period  the  degree  of  D.D.,  the 
 qualification  for  which  is  by  thesis,  with  some  relevant 
 examination,  was  conferred  on  one  internal  student  and 
 on  four  external. 
 
 What  all  this  means  for  the  furtherance  of  Theological 
 studies  cannot  by  any  means  be  estimated.  But,  at  least, 
 teachers  of  Theology  in  London  count  it  no  small  gain  to 
 their  work  that  they  have  been  permitted  to  enter  into 
 a  wider  fellowship,  and  so  to  realise  better  that  oneness 
 of  purpose  of  which  this  volume  is  in  some  sort  a  symbol 
 and  a  product. 
 
SUBJECTS  AND  CONTRIBUTORS 
 
 ESSAY 
 
 HISTORICAL  NOTE  ON  THEOLOGY  IN  THE  UNIVER¬ 
 SITY  OF  LONDON . 
 
 Samuel  Walter  vGreen,  M.A.  (Lond.),  Professor  of  New 
 Testament  Exegesis,  Regent’s  Park  College 
 
 I  THE  HISTORICAL  VALUE  OF  THE  OLD  TESTAMENT 
 
 V 
 
 William  Henry  Bennett,  M.A.  (Lond.),  Litt.D.  (Camb.), 
 D.D.  (Aberd.),  Professor  of  Hebrew  and  Old  Testament 
 Exegesis,  Hackney  and  New  Colleges 
 
 II  THE  YALKUT  OF  R.  MACHIR  BAR  ABBA  MARI  ON 
 THE  BOOK  01)  JONAH . 
 
 Albert  William  Greenup,  M.A.  (Camb.),  Litt.D.  (Dub.), 
 D.D.  (Ont. ),  Principal  of  St.  John’s  Hall,  Highbury 
 
 III  THE  SIGNIFICANCE  OF  THE  ESCHATOLOGICAL 
 
 UTTERANCES  OF  JESUS . 
 
 Herbert  Tom  Andrews,  B.A.  (Oxon.),  Professor  of  New 
 Testament  Exegesis,  Hackney  and  New  Colleges 
 
 IV  PROLEGOMENA  TO  THE  STUDY  OF  THEOLOGY  . 
 
 y 
 
 Arthur  Cayley  Headlam,  D.D.  (Oxon.),  Principal  of  King’s 
 College,  London 
 
 V  CHRIST  AND  THE  CHRISTIAN  PRINCIPLE  . 
 
 V 
 
 Peter  Taylor  Forsyth,  M.A.,  D.D.  (Aberd.),  Principal  of 
 Hackney  College 
 
 VI  CONTINUITY  THROUGHOUT  THE  REFORMATION 
 
 James  Pounder  Whitney,  B.D.  (Camb.),  D.C.L.  (Toronto), 
 Professor  of  Ecclesiastical  History,  King’s  College 
 
 VII  THE  AUTHORITY  OF  JESUS  CHRIST  IN  EARLY 
 CHRISTIAN  LITERATURE . 
 
 Herbert  Hayes'* Scullard,  M.A.  (Camb.),  D.D.  (Lond.), 
 Professor  of  Church  History  and  Christian  Ethics,  Hackney 
 and  New  Colleges 
 
 VIII  THE  HOLY  SPIRIT  AND, DIVINE  IMMANENCE  . 
 
 y 
 
 William  Theopiiilus  Davison,  M.A.  (Lond.),  D.D., 
 Principal  of  the  Wesleyan  College,  Richmond 
 
 IX  THE  STUDY  OF  RELIGION . 
 
 Alfred  Ernest  ^Garvie,  M.A.  (Oxon.),  D.D.  (Glasg.), 
 Principal  of  New  College 
 
 X  THE  EMOTIONAL  ELEMENT  IN  RELIGION:  A 
 VINDICATION . 
 
 V' 
 
 Alfred  Caldecott,  D.Lit.  (Lond.),  D.D.  (Camb.),  Professor 
 of  Moral  Philosophy,  King’s  College 
 
 xvi 
 
 PAG  J 
 
 vii 
 
 1 
 
 35 
 
 65 
 
 97 
 
 133 
 
 167 
 
 203 
 
 247 
 
 285 
 
 31 
 
ESSAY  I 
 
 THE  HISTORICAL  VALUE  OF  THE  OLD  TESTAMENT 
 Rev.  Prof.  W.  H.  Bennett,  D.D.,  Litt.D.,  M.A. 
 
 b 
 
SYNOPSIS 
 
 A. — Subjects  only  Referred  to  Briefly 
 
 .  The  subject  is  dealt  with  apart  from  considerations  of  doctrine, 
 without  denying  that  the  science  of  dogmatics  may  have  a  bearing  on  the 
 problem,  more  especially  the  religious  experience  of  to-day  enables  us  to 
 interpret  evidence  as  to  religious  experience  in  the  past.  2,  3.  Literary 
 criticisms,  etc. 
 
 B. — Some  Difficulties  of  the  Problem 
 
 History  differs  from  Physical  Science  :  cannot  use  experiment,  large 
 subjective  elements  in  data  and  methods,  personal  equation  large  and 
 difficult  to  determine. 
 
 History  differs  from  Law  :  witnesses  dead  and  cannot  be  cross-examined  ; 
 documents  ancient ;  existing  documents  not  originals,  but  uncertified 
 copies ;  evidence  often  hearsay.  Lawyer’s  task  simplified  by  rules,  by 
 practical  nature  of  aims,  by  principle  of  maintenance  of  status  quo  which 
 does  not  apply  to  history. 
 
 Serious  difficulties  in  the  study  of  history;  even  statements  of  contem¬ 
 porary  writers  who  might  be  supposed  to  be  well-informed  and  trust¬ 
 worthy  are  often  quite  mistaken.  A  fortiori  imcertainty  in  the  case  of 
 ancient  history  like  that  of  Israel,  where  the  documents  are  few,  and  many 
 of  them  anonymous  and  of  uncertain  date  or  written  centuries  after  the 
 events  they  record. 
 
 C. — Historical  Certainty,  Principles  and  Methods 
 
 Yet  History  has  its  certainties,  though  inferior  to  Physical  Science  in 
 detailed  accuracy. 
 
 Such  certainty  most  assured  when  arrived  at  by  a  combination  of  items 
 of  evidence  of  different  kinds,  dealt  with  according  to  sound  principles  of 
 reasoning.  We  may  obtain  absolute  certainty  where  we  have  (a)  a  number 
 of  good  independent  witnesses,  contemporary  or  otherwise  mutually 
 confirming  each  other;  also  ( b )  a  number  of  related  facts,  affirmed  by 
 different  witnesses,  forming  a  consistent  whole;  and  (c)  a  high  degree  of 
 verisimilitude  in  the  facts  affirmed. 
 
 Certainty  may  also  be  attained  on  slighter  evidence. 
 
 From  a  less  amount  of  cumulative  evidence. 
 
 From  a  single  first-class  witness,  e.  g.  the  Moabite  Stone. 
 
 From  the  relation  of  the  statements  of  comparatively  weak  authorities  to 
 known  facts. 
 
 Or  even  from  the  verisimilitude  of  the  statements  of  a  document  of 
 unknown  value. 
 
 D. — Historical  Certainty,  Scope  and  Limits 
 
 These  principles  applied  to — 
 
 (a)  The  Area  of  Probability. 
 
 Conclusions  of  History  often  only  probable,  and  that  in  varying  degrees. 
 
 (b)  Particular  Events. 
 
 Here  certainty  only  attaches  to  outstanding  facts.  Illustrations. 
 
 (c)  Customs  and  Institutions. 
 
 Here  evidence  even  of  a  single  document  is  usually  conclusive  as  to 
 existence  of  such  customs,  etc.,  at  some  time  or  other. 
 
 (d)  Ideas. 
 
 Statement  of  an  idea  absolute  proof  of  its  existence. 
 
 Conclusion. — Certainty  most  assured  on  what  is  most  important. 
 
THE 
 
 HISTORICAL  VALUE  OF  THE  OLD  TESTAMENT 
 
 NOTES  ON  THE  APPLICATION  OF  THE  PRINCIPLES  OF 
 EVIDENCE  TO  ANCIENT  HISTORY,  WITH  SPECIAL 
 REFERENCE  TO  THE  OLD  TESTAMENT. 
 
 The  wide  range  of  the  general  subject,  and  the  limited 
 space  available  for  this  essay,  compel  us  to  confine  ourselves 
 to  certain  leading  features  of  the  problems  of  Old  Testa¬ 
 ment  History.  But  before  dealing  with  these,  a  few  brief 
 remarks  may  be  made  on  matters  which  cannot  be  treated 
 fully. 
 
 A. — Subjects  only  Referred  to  Briefly 
 
 1.  The  Relation  of  Historical  Criticism  to  Systematic 
 Theology. — For  the  most  part  the  history  of  Israel  and  its 
 religion  will  be  dealt  with  here  on  the  lines  of  strict  histori¬ 
 cal  criticism.  Apart  from  any  theological  affirmation  or 
 denial,  it  is  necessary  to  ask  in  the  first  instance,  What  can 
 we  establish  on  the  same  principles  that  we  should  apply 
 to  any  other  history  ?  Results  thus  obtained  command 
 the  acceptance  of  scholars  generally,  whatever  views  they 
 may  hold  as  to  dogmatics. 
 
 But  the  present  writer  is  not  prepared  to  deny  that  such 
 results  may  be  supplemented  by  the  aid  of  theological 
 consideration,  but  space  only  admits  of  a  few  words  on 
 this  subject. 
 
 There  can,  of  course,  be  no  conflict  between  the  results 
 of  different  sciences.  Scientific  theology — we  are  not 
 speaking  of  ecclesiastical  formulae — cannot  contradict 
 historical  criticism  any  more  than  geology  can  be  at 
 variance  with  astronomy.  If  it  is  alleged  that  a  theo¬ 
 logical  result  is  inconsistent  with  an  historical  result,  it 
 8  2  3 
 
4 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 follows  that  one  or  both  of  the  so-called  “results  ”  are  not 
 results  at  all. 
 
 But  many  of  the  results  of  historical  criticism  are  merely 
 probable.  If,  therefore,  this  science  states  that  as  a  matter 
 of  purely  historical  evidences  there  is  a  degree  of  probability 
 that  a  certain  event  happened,  it  would  be  entirely  in 
 harmony  with  such  a  result  to  add  that  theological  con¬ 
 siderations  make  the  matter  more  probable  or  even  certain. 
 
 As  regards  our  special  subject,  the  Old  Testament,  it  is 
 useful  to  remember  that  historical  criticism  seldom 
 establishes  an  absolute  negation,  particularly  as  regards 
 Ancient  History.  In  most  cases  the  extreme  negative 
 conclusions  of  history  should  be  stated  thus  : — “  There  is 
 no  evidence  that  makes  it  in  the  least  probable  that  such 
 an  event  happened;  therefore  as  a  matter  of  history  we 
 may  entirely  ignore  the  extant  untrustworthy  statements 
 that  such  an  event  did  happen.”  In  such  cases  history 
 has  no  need  and  no  right  to  say  that  the  event  did  not 
 happen.  Some  distinguished  scholars  are  apt,  unfortu¬ 
 nately,  to  acquire  a  dogmatic  habit,  and  to  state  very 
 emphatically  what  did  not  take  place,  when  they  merely 
 mean  that  there  is  no  appreciable  evidence  to  show  that 
 an  event  happened. 
 
 Thus  with  regard  to  many  events  in  the  Scriptures,  all 
 that  history  can  state  is  that  the  available  evidence  does 
 not  establish  their  historical  value  as  a  matter  of  purely 
 historical  criticism ;  it  is  still  open  to  theology  to  supplement 
 the  historical  argument. 
 
 There  will  be  no  attempt,  however,  to  co-ordinate  what 
 follows  with  systematic  theology ;  but  something  must  be 
 said  as  to  the  general  relation  of  religion  and  history. 
 
 It  is  impossible  that  a  Christian  scholar  should  forget 
 that  he  is  a  Christian  when  he  turns  to  the  study  of  history. 
 As  a  Christian  he  has  certain  spiritual  experiences;  he  is 
 convinced  on  good  grounds  that  his  fellows  have  similar 
 experiences.  He  is,  therefore,  prepared  to  find  that  men 
 in  ancient  times  had  such  experiences.  He  knows  that 
 devout  and  earnest  men,  full  of  faith  and  holy  enthusiasm, 
 
HISTORICAL  VALUE  OF  OLD  TESTAMENT  5 
 
 have  been  the  agents  of  moral  and  spiritual  progress — 
 partly  through  the  help  he  has  himself  received  from  such 
 teachers.  He  is,  therefore,  prepared  to  find  inspired 
 personalities,  prophets  and  apostles,  in  ancient  times. 
 He  is  convinced  that  God  has  been  an  element  and  a  power 
 in  his  own  life  and  in  the  lives  of  people  of  modern  times ; 
 hence  he  cannot  help  believing  that  God  was  an  element 
 and  a  power  in  the  lives  of  men  in  ancient  times.  As 
 Paul  Volz  puts  it  in  his  monograph  on  Moses,  “  To  him,” 
 i.  e.  to  the  Christian  scholar,  “  God  and  Revelation  stand 
 at  the  outset  of  all  discussion  and  investigation,  to  him  it 
 is  self-evident  that  the  religion  of  Israel  had  its  origin  in 
 God.” 
 
 Doubtless  many  scholars  hold  that  the  strictly  historical 
 method  should  ignore  any  Divine  working,  because  its 
 Divine  character — according  to  them — is  an  uncertain 
 interpretation  of  obscure  psychical  phenomena.  There  is, 
 moreover,  a  certain  convenience  in  making  a  preliminary 
 study  of  history  apart  from  any  view  of  religion;  but 
 there  may  surely  be  a  stage  in  our  studies  at  which  we  are 
 justified  in  taking  God  into  account.  It  is  not  that  our 
 conclusions  should  be  controlled  by  elaborate  and  rigid 
 dogmas  as  to  the  Godhead,  or  as  to  inspiration  and  revela¬ 
 tion.  We  may  fully  appreciate  the  difficulty  of  estimating 
 the  quality,  extent  and  working  of  the  Divine  forces  which 
 we  often  call  Providence ;  but  however  little  we  can  under¬ 
 stand  or  measure,  there  is  a  Divine  influence  on  history  and 
 a  Divine  communication  to  man.  The  reality  alike  of 
 influence  and  communication  has  been  a  world-wide  con¬ 
 viction,  held  throughout  all  the  ages  by  multitudes  of  men 
 of  all  nations,  of  every  condition  of  life,  of  every  degree 
 of  culture.  The  student  who  shares  this  conviction  is 
 surely  scientific  if  he  allows  it  to  affect  his  interpretation 
 of  history. 
 
 2.  Literary  Criticism. — The  essential  preliminary  to  any 
 historical  criticism  is  textual  and  literary  criticism.  The 
 student  of  history  is  helpless  till  he  has  determined  the 
 nature,  character  and  value  of  his  sources  or  authorities — 
 
6 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 a  process  which  involves  inter  alia  a  determination  of  their 
 date  and  authorship.  It  is  only  after  this  process  has  been 
 accomplished  that  we  can  begin  to  construct  history. 
 Without  the  lower  and  higher  criticism  of  the  Old  Testa¬ 
 ment  we  know  nothing  concerning  the  history  of  Israel 
 and  its  religion.  But  in  this  essay  we  leave  the  criticism 
 of  sources  on  one  side;  we  assume  that  this  part  of  the 
 work  has  been  done,  that  literary  criticism  has  ascertained 
 what  may  be  known  about  our  data,  and  we  merely  discuss 
 the  principles  on  which  history  may  be  constructed  from 
 such  data. 
 
 3.  Various  Classes  of  Evidence. — The  scale  of  this  essay 
 does  not  admit  of  an  exhaustive  treatment  of  all  the  classes 
 and  items  of  evidence.  The  writer  is  chiefly  concerned 
 with  documentary  evidence.  Such  data  as  geographical 
 features,  ancient  relics,  arms,  implements  and  many  other 
 matters  are  either  only  touched  upon  or  have  to  be 
 altogether  passed  over. 
 
 B. — Some  Difficulties  of  the  Problem 
 
 The  peculiar  difficulties  attending  the  study  of  Ancient 
 History  may  be  partly  realised  by  comparing  it  with  other 
 studies. 
 
 History  resembles  other  sciences  in  that  it  is  concerned 
 with  the  observation  and  interpretation  of  phenomena; 
 but  there  are  important  differences.  We  may  make,  for 
 instance, 
 
 1.  A  Comparison  with  Physical  Science. — The  problems 
 and  methods  of  history,  more  especially  of  Ancient  History, 
 differ  widely  from  those  of  physical  science.  Physical 
 science,  no  doubt,  is  the  interpretation  of  personal  experi¬ 
 ence,  but  it  always  does  its  best  to  get  rid  of  the  personal 
 element  in  experience,  to  eliminate  the  personal  equation. 
 Science  is  never  happy  unless  individual  testimony  can  be 
 verified  by  experiments  which  can  be  repeated  indefinitely. 
 The  great  weapon  of  science  is  experiment  interpreted  by 
 the  exact  deductive  processes  of  mathematics.  For  the 
 most  part  the  materials  for  scientific  research  are  the  things 
 
HISTORICAL  VALUE  OF  OLD  TESTAMENT  7 
 
 —  chemical  substances,  plants,  animals,  etc. — whose 
 nature,  relations  and  functions  science  is  investigating. 
 
 But  Ancient  History  cannot  work  thus ;  I  cannot  devise 
 an  experiment  which  will  show  whether  Moses  was  a  man 
 or  a  myth.  History  rests  mainly  on  Testimony  or  Author¬ 
 ity;  for  the  most  part  things  and  persons  with  which 
 Ancient  History  is  concerned  no  longer  exist  to  be  either 
 observed  or  experimented  on.  The  student  can  have  no 
 direct  knowledge  of  Caesar  or  Pompey  or  William  the  Con¬ 
 queror,  or  of  a  Roman  Senate  or  a  Witenagemot ;  he  only 
 knows  what  other  people  can  tell  him  about  these  persons 
 and  institutions,  their  statements  as  to  the  impressions 
 which  phenomena  made  upon  them. 
 
 The  student  of  physical  science  is  mainly  objective ;  by 
 means  of  his  experiments  he  is  able  to  eliminate  and 
 disregard  certain  subjective  features  which  might  affect  his 
 conclusions;  but  the  historian  is  compelled  to  be  sub¬ 
 jective,  or  at  any  rate  to  study  the  subjective  processes 
 of  his  witnesses.  His  evidence  goes  back  to  impressions 
 made  by  things,  persons,  actions,  processes,  etc.,  upon 
 observers.  He  must  consider  how  far  his  witness  was 
 capable  of  receiving  a  correct  impression.  An  observer 
 looks  at  a  motionless  body  and  has  the  impression  that  it 
 is  a  corpse ;  another  watches  a  brigade  of  cavalry  and  has 
 the  impression  that  there  are  3,000  horsemen ;  but  it  is 
 quite  possible  that  the  body  was  alive,  and  that  there  were 
 only  1,000  horsemen. 
 
 But  what  the  historian  has  really  got  is  not  the  witness’s 
 impression,  but,  at  the  best,  his  statement  about  the 
 impression — a  fact  which  forthwith  suggests  a  new  series 
 of  investigations.  When  did  the  witness  make  his  state¬ 
 ment  ?  How  long  a  time  elapsed  between  receiving  the 
 impression  and  making  the  statement  ?  What  had  the 
 witness  been  seeing,  hearing,  saying,  doing,  feeling  and 
 thinking  in  the  interval  ?  My  recollection  of  the  impres¬ 
 sion  I  had  last  week  or  last  year  is  apt  to  be  combined  with, 
 affected  by,  or  confused  with,  impressions  which  I  have 
 received  since. 
 
8 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 Again,  we  have  to  ask  whether  the  witness  had  the  habit 
 of  careful  and  accurate  statement  ?  For  instance,  what — 
 so  to  speak — was  the  quantitative  value  of  language  as 
 used  by  him  ?  Ordinary  colloquial  speech  constantly 
 exaggerates  without  any  intention  to  deceive.  A  man 
 may  say  he  has  not  slept  a  wink,  although  he  has  been 
 dozing  at  intervals  all  through  the  night.  Are  we  dealing 
 with  the  kind  of  statement  which  might  be  made  in  the 
 smoking-room  of  a  club,  or  on  a  political  platform,  or  in 
 a  sermon,  or  with  the  kind  of  statement  which  would  be 
 made  by  an  honest,  careful  witness  in  a  law  court  ?  But, 
 again,  we  have  to  ask — Did  the  witness  mean  to  tell  the 
 truth  ?  He  may  have  been  influenced  by  a  desire  to 
 obtain  royal  or  popular  favour,  or  by  a  desire  to  further 
 the  cause  of  a  party,  or  by  anxiety  to  help  a  friend  or  injure 
 an  enemy. 
 
 Flow  different  these  problems  are  from  those  of  physical 
 science  !  Experiment  is  impossible  in  Ancient  History, 
 and  neither  pure  nor  mixed  mathematics  has  any  calculus 
 to  determine  for  us  how  the  dramatic  instinct,  vanity, 
 hope  or  fear,  hatred  or  affection  will  influence  a  man’s 
 impressions  and  the  statements  he  makes  about  them. 
 
 2.  Comparison  with  Law. — We  may  also  note  that  the 
 task  of  the  student  of  Ancient  History  differs  from  that  of 
 the  judge  or  lawyer.  Both,  no  doubt,  are  concerned 
 with  the  problem  of  testimony,  but  the  lawyer  chiefly 
 depends  on  living  witnesses,  he  has  an  actual  man  before 
 him  and  can  form  some  judgment  as  to  his  character  and 
 intellect,  his  habits  of  thought  and  speech;  he  can  cross- 
 examine  him.  With  all  these  advantages  he  often  finds 
 it  difficult  to  determine  the  meaning  and  value  of  the 
 evidence  of  a  given  witness.  But  the  witnesses  for  Ancient 
 History  are  dead  long  since,  and  we  have  no  Witch  of  Endor 
 to  call  them  back  from  Sheol.  In  many  cases,  as  far  as 
 express  statements  are  concerned,  we  know  absolutely 
 nothing  about  our  witnesses,  not  even  their  names.  We 
 have  simply  anonymous  documents :  we  do  not  know  who 
 wrote  them,  or  when  and  where  they  were  written  In  a 
 
HISTORICAL  VALUE  OF  OLD  TESTAMENT  9 
 
 sense  they  are  less  authenticated  than  the  anonymous 
 letters  sometimes  written  to  a  judge  who  is  trying  a  case — 
 though  they  may  be  of  infinitely  greater  value. 
 
 But,  further,  much  of  our  evidence  is  hearsay ,  second¬ 
 hand,  third-hand,  hand  to  the  nth  evidence.  We  have 
 not  the  statement  of  the  observer  who  received  the  impres¬ 
 sions  ;  but  of  some  one  writing  decades  or  centuries  later. 
 The  original  impression  and  the  statement  which  reaches 
 us  are  connected  by  a  chain  of  witnesses;  A  received  an 
 impression  of  something  he  saw  or  thought  he  saw;  later 
 on  he  told  B  his  recollection  of  this  impression;  later  on 
 still  B  told  C  his  recollection  of  what  he  gathered  from 
 what  he  heard  from  A,  and  so  on  from  C  to  D,  etc.  At 
 last,  somewhere  in  the  chain,  we  arrive  at  our  document — 
 its  author,  say  G,  wrote  down  the  version  of  the  story  as  he 
 remembered  to  have  heard  it  from  F.  At  every  stage 
 there  is  the  possibility  of  mistake  or  well-meant  correction 
 or  wilful  falsification. 
 
 It  is  true  that  the  lawyer  also  makes  use  of  documents ; 
 but  even  here  his  task  is  much  lighter  than  that  of  the 
 student  of  Ancient  History.  Most  of  the  documents  he 
 deals  with  are  comparatively  modern,  and  many  of  them 
 come  to  him  with  an  official  guarantee,  they  are  either 
 original  documents  or  certified  copies ;  he  can  usually 
 obtain  evidence  as  to  their  history  from  living  witnesses. 
 In  our  case  the  documents  are  ancient;  many  of  them  are 
 neither  originals,  nor  certified  copies,  nor  in  any  way 
 guaranteed.  In  the  case  of  the  Old  Testament  the  histori¬ 
 cal  books  were  mostly  compiled  centuries  after  the  events 
 they  describe,  and  the  manuscripts  in  which  the  books  are 
 extant  were  not  written  till  centuries  after  the  books  were 
 compiled. 
 
 In  other  ways,  too,  the  problems  of  the  lawyer  and 
 historian  are  somewhat  different.  The  lawyer’s  real  task 
 is  practical  and  not  scientific ;  he  does  not  actually  decide 
 what  happened  in  the  remote  past  or  even  the  recent  past, 
 but  what  is  to  happen  in  the  immediate  future,  whether 
 a  man  is  to  be  shut  up  in  prison,  or  whether  A  is  to  pay 
 
10 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 £100  to  B.  He  may  justify  his  decision  by  expressing  an 
 opinion  that  the  man  has  committed  a  certain  crime ;  or 
 he  may  simply  say  that  on  the  evidence  before  him  he  feels 
 bound  to  come  to  a  certain  conclusion.  Thus  it  has  been 
 said  that  44  To  the  legal  mind  a  fact  ceases  to  be  a  fact  the 
 moment  a  properly  qualified  court  has  decided  the  other 
 way.”  He  is  guided  in  these  matters  by  definite  positive 
 laws  and  traditions  as  to  evidence.  In  some  ways  the 
 historian’s  task  is  more  difficult,  he  has  no  positive  laws 
 and  traditions  laid  down  by  official  authorities,  and  he 
 could  not  be  content  with  them  if  he  had.  Thus,  even 
 the  great  standards  of  faith  set  up  authoritatively  by  the 
 more  important  churches  have  never  laid  down  any  such 
 canon  as  that  every  statement  in  every  narrative  in  the 
 Bible  is  to  be  accepted  as  exactly  accurate  in  its  literal 
 meaning.  If  any  church  were  to  make  this  rule  an  article 
 of  belief,  stantis  ant  cadentis  ecclesiae,  even  historians  who 
 belonged  to  its  communion  might  find  some  difficulty  in 
 applying  it,  and  no  one  outside  that  particular  church 
 would  recognise  it  as  authoritative.  But  in  other  respects 
 the  historian  has  the  advantage;  he  need  not  come  to  a 
 decision  44  Yes  ”  or  44  No  ” ;  he  may  simply  say  that  in 
 his  opinion  the  evidence  is  inconclusive,  but  that — possibly 
 — the  balance  of  probability  inclines  one  way  or  the 
 other. 
 
 Moreover,  in  some  ways  legal  principles  are  misleading 
 if  applied  to  Ancient  History. 
 
 For  instance,  inasmuch  as  law  deals  with  practical 
 matters  of  its  own  time,  it  has  a  necessary  respect  for  the 
 status  quo.  The  status  quo  must  not  be  disturbed  without 
 conclusive  reasons.  If  a  man  has  the  status  of  an  innocent 
 citizen  he  retains  that  status,  unless  there  is  convincing 
 evidence  of  his  guilt.  If  a  man  is  in  possession  of  an 
 estate  he  continues  to  hold  it,  unless  some  one  else  can 
 fully  establish  a  rival  claim. 
 
 There  is  an  unfortunate  tendency  to  apply  this  principle 
 to  Ancient  History  in  cases  where  it  is  not  valid.  No 
 doubt  there  are  cases  to  which  it  does  apply.  Where  a 
 
HISTORICAL  VALUE  OF  OLD  TESTAMENT  11 
 
 matter  has  been  carefully  investigated,  and  the  historicity 
 of  certain  facts  has  been  accepted  amongst  scholars  by  a 
 consensus  of  opinion,  such  results  will  be  regarded  as 
 established  until  they  are  overthrown  by  equally  weighty 
 authority.  But  the  rights  of  a  status  quo  are  often  claimed 
 without  warrant.  A  story,  say  about  William  Tell  and 
 the  apple,  is  found  in  some  document;  without  criticism 
 or  investigation  it  is  repeated,  copied  and  recopied, 
 handed  down  by  otiose  assent  from  one  writer  to  another. 
 Such  a  chain  of  uncritical  repetition  is  solemnly  described 
 as  an  ancient,  continuous  and  unanimous  tradition.  The 
 story  may  appear  in  popular  text-books,  and  its  position 
 as  a  narrative  currently  accepted  as  genuine  history  is 
 treated  as  kind  of  status  quo  which  must  not  be  disturbed 
 unless  overwhelming  evidence  can  be  produced  that  the 
 alleged  facts  are  unhistorical.  In  such  matters  we  often 
 hear  a  great  deal  about  the  onus  probandi.  When  a 
 statement  has  once  been  made,  it  seems  to  be  supposed 
 that  the  onus  probandi  rests  on  any  one  who  denies  it. 
 Doubtless  it  does,  but  the  onus  probandi  rests  almost 
 equally  on  any  one  who  asserts  that  the  statement  is 
 correct.  It  is  absurd  to  suggest  that  every  statement  by 
 any  one  about  anything  requires  serious  consideration, 
 however  unsatisfactory  the  witness  may  be,  and  however 
 remote  in  time  the  testimony  may  be  from  the  facts  in 
 question.  Obviously  such  a  position  is  not  formally 
 maintained,  but  many  arguments  as  to  the  history  of 
 Israel  practically  assume  such  a  premiss.  Whether  the 
 historian  asserts  or  denies,  he  must  be  prepared  to  give 
 adequate  grounds  for  his  views;  it  is  not  enough — at  any 
 rate  as  a  matter  of  historical  science — to  refer  to  a  verse  in 
 Chronicles  or  Genesis  or  even  Kings;  it  is  necessary  to 
 show  that  the  writer  of  the  witnessing  document  was  a 
 well-informed  trustworthy  witness,  or  else  that  his  state¬ 
 ments  can  be  corroborated  by  other  arguments  and  evi¬ 
 dence.  If  this  cannot  be  done,  the  historian  may  legiti¬ 
 mately  ignore  such  statements.  Practically,  however,  the 
 absence  of  absolute  disproof  often  seems  to  be  regarded 
 
12 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 by  apologetic  writers  as  complete  and  positive  proof  of 
 the  historicity  of  statements  which  are  very  slenderly 
 authenticated. 
 
 As  we  have  already  said,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  historian 1 
 to  show  what  certainly,  or  probably,  or  even  possibly, 
 happened ;  he  is  seldom  called  upon  to  state  what  did  not 
 happen.  Where  he  is  negative  it  is  usually  sufficient  for 
 him  to  ignore  evidence  which  has  no  appreciable  value ;  he 
 need  not  provide  a  formal  and  complete  proof  that  alleged 
 events  did  not  happen.  It  would  be  waste  of  time  to  take 
 the  trouble  to  demolish  the  story  of  Asmodeus  in  Tobit. 
 
 It  does  not  follow  that  the  lawyer,  qua  lawyer,  is  specially 
 fitted  to  weigh  evidence  as  to  Ancient  Llistory.  In  many 
 cases,  doubtless,  legal  studies,  training  and  experience 
 produce  the  judicial  mind  which  may  be  as  much  at 
 home  in  history  as  in  the  law  courts ;  but  as  language 
 itself  implies,  the  lawyer  is  often  the  advocate,  preoccupied 
 in  obtaining  evidence  in  support  of  a  client’s  case  and  in 
 stating  the  case  for  the  client  as  forcibly  as  possible. 
 Such  experience  might  have  been  a  splendid  training  for 
 an  old-fashioned  professor  of  apologetics,  but  is  less  useful 
 to  a  scientific  historian. 
 
 3.  Other  Considerations  on  the  Difficulties  of  Historical 
 Proof. — The  difficulties  mentioned  in  the  previous  sections 
 may  be  more  clearly  realised  by  means  of  a  few  illustra¬ 
 tions.  Forty  or  fifty  years  ago  schoolboys  were  taught  to 
 regard  Cerdic  the  founder  of  Wessex  as  a  solid,  thoroughly 
 well-established  historical  figure.  Now  Professor  Oman  tells 
 us  2  that  “  it  is  safer  to  regard  the  existence  of  any  Cerdic 
 as  founder  of  the  West  Saxon  realm  with  deep  suspicion.” 
 The  narratives  of  the  Saxon  conquest  contain  eponymous 
 figures,  Wihtgar,  who  is  said  to  have  conquered  the  Isle 
 of  Wight,  and  Port,  who  is  said  to  have  landed  at  Ports¬ 
 mouth.  Even  the  maps  of  Roman  Britain  which  used  to 
 delight  our  souls  with  their  neatly  coloured  divisions 
 appear  to  be  a  fraud.  For,  according  to  Professor  Oman,3 
 
 1  Page  4.  2  England  before  the  Norman  Conquest,  p.  255. 
 
 3  Op.  cit.  p.  150. 
 
HISTORICAL  VALUE  OF  OLD  TESTAMENT  13 
 
 ’4  The  boundaries  shown  in  all  old  and  (alas  !)  some  new 
 atlases  are  taken  from  the  ingenious  forgery  of  Professor 
 Bertram,  an  eighteenth-century  Dane,  who  foisted  on  the 
 learned  world  a  catalogue  fathered  on  the  Chronicler, 
 Richard  of  Cirencester,  of  roads,  towns  and  provinces  in 
 Britain  manufactured  by  himself.” 
 
 The  classical  story  about  Sir  Walter  Raleigh — his 
 despair  of  writing  a  history  of  the  World  from  the  Creation, 
 in  view  of  the  fact  that  he  could  only  get  contradictory 
 accounts  of  something  that  had  happened  under  his  prison 
 windows — will  be  familiar  to  all  our  readers. 
 
 But  to  come  down  nearer  our  own  times.  History 
 sometimes  uses  the  evidence  of  contemporary  lyrics, 
 ballads  or  other  poems.  Now  when  the  line-of-battle- 
 ship,  the  Royal  George,  capsized  and  sank  in  harbour, 
 towards  the  end  of  the  eighteenth  century,  Cowper  wrote — 
 
 “ Her  timbers  yet  are  sound. 
 
 And  she  may  float  again  ;  ” 
 
 but  Mr.  Frazer  in  his  History  of  the  Seller  option  says  that  the 
 timbers  of  the  Royal  George  were  so  rotten  that  the  Govern¬ 
 ment  of  the  day  did  not  dare  to  raise  her  for  fear  her 
 condition  should  be  discovered. 
 
 Examples  from  our  own  time  show  the  liability 
 of  contemporary  witnesses  to  fall  into  error.1  Thus 
 M.  Langlois2  writes,  44  Froude  visited  Adelaide,  in  Australia, 
 and  wrote,  4  We  saw  below  us  in  a  basin,  with  a  river 
 winding  through  it,  a  city  of  150,000  inhabitants,  none  of 
 whom  has  ever  known  or  will  ever  know  one  moment’s 
 anxiety  as  to  the  recurring  regularity  of  his  three  meals  a 
 day.’ 
 
 “  Thus  Froude,  now  for  the  facts  :  Adelaide  is  built  on  an 
 eminence;  no  river  runs  through  it ;  when  Froude  visited 
 it  the  population  did  not  exceed  75,000,  and  it  was  suffering 
 from  a  famine  at  the  time.” 
 
 We  are  not  sure  that  M.  Langlois  is  right  about  the 
 
 1  Cf.  p.  7. 
 
 2  Langlois  and  Seignobos,  Introduction  to  the  Study  of  History,  p.  152. 
 
14 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 river  ;  but  in  any  case  the  contradiction  between  two 
 fairly  contemporary  authorities  shows  a  fortiori  how  difficult 
 it  may  be  to  rely  on  ancient  documents. 
 
 Again,  suppose  a  future  historian  wishes  to  know  where 
 George  Eliot  was  buried.  He  would  naturally  regard  as 
 good  authority  memoirs  written  by  a  distinguished 
 literary  man  who  was  at  the  funeral.  In  such  memoirs 
 it  is  stated  that  she  was  buried  at  Kensal  Green ;  but,  as 
 a  matter  of  fact,  her  grave  can  be  seen  in  Highgate 
 Cemetery. 
 
 Turning  to  another  topic,  it  may  be  convenient  to  notice 
 here  the  fallacy  that  the  trustworthiness  of  a  document 
 may  be  determined  by  testing  a  sample  of  its  contents. 
 Ex  uno  disce  omnes  is  sometimes  the  watchword  of  partial 
 or  perfunctory  souls. 
 
 The  accuracy  of  a  document  as  to  certain  facts  is  no  proof 
 that  it  is  correct  throughout.  Scott’s  Anne  of  Geier stein 
 is  accurate  as  to  many  points  of  history,  geography, 
 manners  and  customs;  but  it  is  not  therefore  accurate 
 history  throughout.  And,  on  the  other  hand,  it  does  not 
 follow  that  because  a  document  makes  mistakes  on  some 
 points,  that  therefore  its  testimony  is  worthless  throughout. 
 To  refer  to  our  previous  illustrations :  Cowper,  it  seems,  was 
 wrong  as  to  the  condition  of  the  Royal  George ;  nevertheless, 
 his  poem  is  conclusive  evidence  as  to  the  main  fact,  the 
 loss  of  the  vessel.  The  memoirs  we  spoke  of  contain  much 
 reliable  information ;  a  moment’s  reflection  shows  that  the 
 mistake  about  the  cemetery  might  arise  from  some  cause 
 which  would  not  affect  other  matters.  The  author  of  the 
 memoirs  had  doubtless  attended  many  funerals  at  various 
 cemeteries ;  on  such  occasions  the  mind  is  not  as  a  rule 
 much  occupied  with  locality,  so  that  he  might  easily  be 
 confused  on  this  point  while  perfectly  accurate  on  matters 
 in  which  he  was  more  interested. 
 
 The  principle  of  the  sample  is  specially  inapplicable  to 
 many  ancient  works,  because  they  are  often  a  mosaic  of 
 sections  from  older  works.  More  particularly,  most  of  the 
 historical  books  of  the  Old  Testament  have  been  largely 
 
HISTORICAL  VALUE  OF  OLD  TESTAMENT  15 
 
 compiled  by  more  or  less  verbatim  borrowing  from  earlier 
 documents ;  so  that  two  consecutive  paragraphs  may  have 
 been  originally  written  at  different  times  and  places  by 
 different  people,  and  the  authority  of  the  one  may  be  far 
 superior  to  that  of  the  other. 
 
 Even  apart  from  such  borrowing,  an  author  may  be 
 much  more  reliable  on  some  points  than  on  others.  He 
 may  be  well  informed  as  to  the  kings  of  Edom,  and  quite 
 mistaken  as  to  the  Tower  of  Babel ;  he  may  be  prejudiced 
 in  favour  of  David,  and  against  Saul.  Thus  the  fact  that 
 Ahab  is  known  beyond  doubt  to  be  a  real  personage,  is  not 
 a  strong  ground  for  accepting  the  narrative  about  Elisha 
 and  the  naughty  boys  and  the  bears.  The  account  of 
 Ahab’s  wars  and  the  story  of  the  bears  are  borrowed  from 
 different  sources,  and  the  general  sequence  of  the  history 
 is  in  no  way  affected  by  the  insertion  or  omission  of  such 
 a  story. 
 
 C. — Historical  Certainty,  Principles  and  Methods 
 
 Even  the  preceding  brief  sketch  of  the  difficulties  of  our 
 subject,  with  its  handful  of  illustrations,  may  enable  us 
 to  understand  why  the  writing  of  Ancient  History  some¬ 
 times  seems  an  impossible  task,  and  why  some  serious 
 scholars  have  maintained  that  history  is  not  a  science  at 
 all,  and  that  we  know  nothing  of  ancient  times 1 — a  view 
 which  has  been  summed  up  in  the  epigram,  “L’histoire 
 n’est  qu’une  fable  con  venue.” 
 
 But  common  sense  and  the  scientific  spirit  alike  revolt 
 against  such  extreme  scepticism.  Apart  from  questions 
 of  formal  proof,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  we  are  certain  on  many 
 points  even  in  the  remote  past.  There  is  a  general  con¬ 
 sensus  of  reasonable  men  that  there  are  facts  of  mediaeval 
 and  ancient  history  which  are  as  fully  established  as  any 
 of  the  results  of  science.  For  all  practical  purposes,  at 
 any  rate,  we  are  as  certain  that  William  the  Conqueror 
 defeated  Harold  as  we  are  that  the  earth  is  an  oblate 
 
 1  Bernheim,  Lehrbuch  der  historischen  Methode,  p.  197. 
 
16 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 spheroid,  or  that  water  is  a  compound  of  hydrogen  and 
 oxygen.1 
 
 But  however  plain  the  fact  of  such  certainty  may  be,  its 
 explanation  and  justification  involves  serious  problems. 
 How  is  certainty  attained  ?  What  are  its  limits  ?  How 
 may  we  determine  when  and  how  it  is  justified  ?  Why, 
 for  instance,  are  we  sure  that  there  was  an  actual  historical 
 king  of  Israel  called  David,  but  are  perhaps  a  little 
 uncertain  about  Moses,  and  very  doubtful  about  Abraham  ? 
 Why  are  we  sure  that  Nebuchadnezzar  captured  Jerusalem, 
 but  possibly  not  altogether  convinced  that  David  killed 
 Goliath  ? 
 
 It  may  be  convenient  at  this  point  to  state  four  heads 
 under  which  our  principles  and  methods  may  be  classified, 
 viz.  the  use  of  — 
 
 (a)  The  ordinary  laws  of  deduction,  induction  and 
 analogy. 
 
 (b)  Cumulative  evidence. 
 
 (c)  Trustworthy  contemporary  narratives  written  by 
 persons  with  first-hand  knowledge. 
 
 ( d )  The  verisimilitude  of  narratives  not  otherwise 
 attested. 
 
 Any  adequate  and  assured  certainty  as  to  history  mostly 
 rests  on  a  combination  of  (a)  and  ( b ).  For  such  an  event, 
 for  instance,  as  the  battle  of  Hastings,  we  have  cumulative 
 testimony,  a  number  of  independent  witnesses  and  pieces 
 of  evidence  all  concurring  in  testifying  to  William’s  victory. 
 But  apart  from  these  our  knowledge  of  earlier  and  later 
 times,  and  our  knowledge  of  contemporary  history,  require 
 some  such  event;  from  such  knowledge,  even  if  we  had 
 no  direct  testimony,  we  could  deduce  that  such  an  event 
 must  have  taken  place. 
 
 Thus  there  is  an  interdependence  of  men  and  things  and 
 events  which  guarantees  the  main  lines  of  history.  It  is 
 like  an  arch  whose  stability  is  assured  by  the  mutual 
 relation  of  its  parts.  The  attestation  of  a  given  event 
 is  not  merely  the  direct  evidence  that  refers  to  it,  but  the 
 
 1  Cf.  Bernheim,  op.  cit.,  pp.  189  ff. 
 
HISTORICAL  VALUE  OF  OLD  TESTAMENT  17 
 
 whole  body  of  testimony  which  is  available  for  the  general 
 scheme  of  history  of  which  the  given  event  is  an  integral 
 and  indispensable  part. 
 
 Take,  for  instance,  the  history  of  Israel  in  the  eighth  cen¬ 
 tury  b.c.,  i.  e.  roughly  from  850  b.c.  to  the  death  of  Hezekiah. 
 We  have  a  number  of  witnesses,  the  book  of  Kings,  the 
 prophecies  of  Amos,  Hosea,  Isaiah  and  Micah,  certain 
 portions  of  the  Pentateuch,  the  Moabite  Stone,  Assyrian 
 and  Egyptian  inscriptions.  This  variety  of  independent 
 evidence  absolutely  establishes  the  historicity  of  the 
 leading  persons  and  chief  events  of  the  period.  Apart 
 from  express  corroboration,  Israel  and  Judah  were  ele¬ 
 ments  in  the  general  life  of  the  international  system  com¬ 
 prising  Western  Asia  and  Egypt.  Very  much  that  we  find 
 in  the  Old  Testament  documents  is  consistent  and  con¬ 
 gruous  with  the  total  mass  of  our  extant  information  as 
 to  this  group  of  states.  We  have,  therefore,  further 
 grounds  for  believing  that  the  broad  picture  of  the  period 
 given  in  Kings  and  the  Prophets  is  substantially  correct. 
 But  further  we  have  a  measure  of  knowledge  concerning 
 the  periods  before  and  after  the  eighth  century.  For  the 
 most  part  it  is  true  that  what  we  read  concerning  this 
 century  is,  on  the  one  hand,  an  appropriate  sequel  to  what 
 we  know  of  earlier  times,  and  on  the  other  hand,  the 
 natural  preparation  for  the  events  and  conditions  of  later 
 days.  This  is  a  further  ground  of  certainty.  The  total 
 result  is  overwhelmingly  conclusive. 
 
 A  similar  combination  of  evidence  guarantees  the  history 
 from  700  to  550  b.c. 
 
 (c)  Trustworthy  contemporary  narratives  written  by  persons 
 with  first-hand  knowledge. — Such  combinations  of  evidence 
 as  we  have  been  discussing  will  often  include  writings  of 
 actors  or  witnesses  of  the  events  of  the  period,  e.  g.  those 
 portions  of  the  books  of  the  prophets  which  were  actually 
 composed  by  them.  But  there  are  many  cases  where 
 the  full  combination  of  evidence  is  not  available,  and  we 
 are  limited  to  a  few  or  even  a  single  authority.  We  may 
 still,  however,  be  able  to  come  to  assured  conclusions.  A 
 
18 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 document  may  be  of  such  a  character  that  its  statements 
 may  be  accepted  as  substantially  accurate,  without  any 
 express  confirmation.  One  class  of  such  documents 
 consists  of  contemporary  narratives,  written  by  well- 
 informed  persons,  with  the  intention  of  conveying  accurate 
 information.  These  may  be  called  “  trustworthy  ”  in  an 
 elastic  sense ;  they  are  not  infallible. 
 
 As  we  have  shown  above,1  even  a  contemporary  writer, 
 who  may  be  supposed  to  be  well  informed,  and  who  has 
 every  intention  of  telling  the  truth,  may  yet  make  mistakes ; 
 moreover,  the  contemporary  authority’s  zeal  for  truth  may 
 sometimes  be  limited  by  personal  prejudice,  party  feeling, 
 or  official  expediency.  Nevertheless,  he  can  usually  be 
 trusted  as  to  facts  which  were  publicly  notorious,  and  on 
 some  points  absolutely  certain  conclusions  can  be  drawn 
 from  his  statements. 
 
 Thus  for  the  Old  Testament  we  have  a  number  of 
 Assyrian,  Egyptian  and  other  monuments,  tablets  and 
 papyri  which  have  a  more  or  less  direct  bearing  on  the 
 Sacred  Narrative.  They  are  mostly  official  documents; 
 some  of  them  are  public  monuments  intended  to  com¬ 
 memorate  the  achievements  of  a  king  or  noble ;  others  are 
 state  archives  or  memoranda,  intended  to  communicate 
 or  preserve  information  for  practical  purposes.  Obviously 
 they  are  not  infallible,  their  authors  were  quite  capable 
 of  making  mistakes,  and  were  controlled  by  official  necessi¬ 
 ties  and  conventions.  On  the  face  of  it  one  would  suppose 
 that  a  public  monument,  or  even  a  public  dispatch,  would 
 not  set  forth  what  was  notoriously  and  glaringly  false. 
 But,  unfortunately,  impudent  lies  are  sometimes  solemnly 
 inscribed  on  brass  or  marble.  There  are  epitaphs.  We 
 know  how — 
 
 ec  London’s  column,  pointing  at  the  skies, 
 
 Like  a  tall  bully,  lifts  the  head  and  lies.” 
 
 We  recall  the  shameless  mendacity  of  many  of  Napoleon’s 
 bulletins.  We  are  told  that  Egyptian  kings  sometimes 
 supplemented  the  meagre  roll  of  their  actual  conquests 
 
 1  Page  13. 
 
HISTORICAL  VALUE  OF  OLD  TESTAMENT  19 
 
 by  adding  lists  of  nations  copied  from  the  monuments  of 
 their  predecessors. 
 
 But,  in  spite  of  all  this,  much  accurate  information  can 
 be  got  from  public  monuments  and  documents.  The 
 names  mentioned  on  them  are  the  names  of  real  persons 
 and  places ;  they  may  exaggerate  a  success  or  even  repre¬ 
 sent  a  defeat  as  a  victory,  but  we  may  be  sure  that  at  any 
 rate  there  was  a  battle.  An  epitaph  may  not  be  conclusive 
 evidence  as  to  the  many  virtues  and  achievements  of 
 Sempronius,  but  it  shows  that  there  was  such  a  man,  living 
 at  a  given  date,  cobbler  or  consul  as  the  case  might  be. 
 “  London’s  column  ”  does  not  convict  the  Romanists 
 of  arson,  but  it  shows  that  there  was  a  great  fire.  Napoleon’s 
 bulletins  are  good  evidence  for  the  fact  that  he  carried  on 
 campaigns  in  Russia. 
 
 We  may  take  for  a  more  detailed  illustration  the  cele¬ 
 brated  inscription  of  Mesha  on  the  Moabite  Stone.  Mesha 
 was  a  king  of  Moab,  contemporary  with  Ahab  and  his 
 successors.  This  stone  was  obviously  erected  at  Dibon, 
 Mesha’s  capital,  as  a  permanent  public  monument  in  some 
 conspicuous  place.  It  mentions  Omri  as  king  of  Israel  and 
 names  a  number  of  towns  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Dibon. 
 It  follows  that  Omri  was  king  of  Israel  and  that  such  towns 
 existed.  For  one  thing,  no  one  would  erect  a  monument 
 and  adorn  it  with  the  names  of  imaginary  towns  in  the 
 immediate  neighbourhood.  The  stone  speaks  of  the 
 subjection  of  Moab  to  Israel  and  of  a  successful  revolt, 
 involving  the  capture  of  various  towns;  it  also  mentions 
 certain  public  works  executed  by  Mesha.  Even  apart 
 from  the  parallel  statements  in  Kings,  the  stone  by  itself 
 is  conclusive  evidence  of  the  subjection  and  the  revolt. 
 Mesha  would  hardly  have  invented  the  subjection  in  order 
 to  credit  himself  with  a  successful  assertion  of  independence. 
 There  is  just  a  possibility  of  doubt  as  to  the  public  works. 
 It  is  just  possible,  only  barely  possible,  but  still  not  entirely 
 without  parallel,  that  Mesha  may  have  credited  himself  on 
 the  stone  with  certain  public  works  which  he  had  not  yet 
 executed.  He  may  have  intended,  for  instance,  to  make 
 
20 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 a  road  by  the  Arnon,  and  have  said,  proleptically,  that  he 
 had  done  so,  in  the  expectation  that  the  statement  would 
 very  soon  be  correct ;  and  yet  the  road  may  never  have  been 
 made. 
 
 Then,  too,  there  are  details  as  to  which  the  evidence  of 
 any  single  authority  is  never  absolutely  conclusive.  The 
 stone  gives  the  length  of  certain  periods  as  thirty  and  forty 
 years,  and  the  numbers  of  certain  bodies  of  persons  as 
 two  hundred  and  seven  thousand.  Obviously  these  are 
 not  exactly  accurate,  they  are  round  numbers;  but  we 
 could  not  be  sure  that  they  have  even  the  approximate 
 accuracy  of  round  numbers. 
 
 Similar  considerations  apply  to  the  prophetic  and  other 
 sections  of  the  Old  Testament  which  are  contemporaneous, 
 or  nearly  contemporaneous,  with  the  periods  to  which  they 
 refer.  More  especially  what  they  take  for  granted  or 
 imply  may  usually  be  accepted  without  reserve.1  The 
 prophetic  utterances  were  also  in  their  way  public  mani¬ 
 festoes,  and  we  may  assume  that  what  they  state  or  imply 
 as  to  matter  of  common  knowledge  was  in  accordance  with 
 the  facts. 
 
 (d)  The  verisimilitude  of  narratives  not  otherwise  attested. 
 — The  serious  difficulty  as  to  early  history,  Israelite  and 
 otherwise,  is  that  the  evidence  dwindles  and  deteriorates  as 
 we  get  farther  and  farther  back.  Our  extant  documents  in 
 their  present  form  are  separated  by  centuries  from  some  of 
 the  periods  to  which  they  refer.  It  is  true  that  they  embody 
 extracts  from  much  earlier  documents,  but  we  do  not 
 know  who  wrote  these  older  works,  nor  with  any  exactitude 
 how,  when,  where,  and  under  what  circumstances  they 
 were  written.  They  are  not  supported  by  any  external 
 attestation.  Their  statements  must  stand  or  fall  by  their 
 own  intrinsic  reasonableness  and  probability,  their  veri¬ 
 similitude.  This  “  verisimilitude,”  however,  is  not  wholly 
 a  matter  of  the  internal  character  of  a  narrative,  and  its 
 relation  to  general  laws  of  nature,  life,  character  and 
 conduct.  The  most  isolated  series  of  events  has  points  of 
 
 1  Cf.  below,  p.  30. 
 
HISTORICAL  VALUE  OF  OLD  TESTAMENT  21 
 
 connection  with  the  circumstances  of  its  own  period,  and 
 of  previous  and  later  periods ;  so  that  what  we  have  said 
 as  to  the  evidence  of  such  connection  applies  here.1  A 
 common  test  of  verisimilitude  is  the  correspondence  of  the 
 conditions  implied  by  a  narrative  with  the  actual  conditions 
 of  the  period  with  which  it  deals. 
 
 The  negative  application  of  this  principle  of  verisimilitude 
 or  44  intrinsic  probability  ” 2  is  simple  and  conclusive. 
 When  the  conditions  of  life  implied  by  a  narrative  are 
 clearly  not  those  of  the  period  of  the  events  described,  we 
 may  at  once  conclude  that  our  document  is  not  con¬ 
 temporary,  and  affords  us  no  evidence  that  the  narrative 
 is  based  directly  or  indirectly  on  contemporary  works; 
 by  itself  it  is  worthless  as  evidence,  although  it  is  always 
 possible  that  some  of  the  statements  it  contains  may  be 
 correct.  Thus  some  of  the  sections  of  Chronicles  dealing 
 with  the  reign  of  David  imply  an  ecclesiastical  system 
 which  did  not  exist  till  centuries  later;  these  sections, 
 therefore,  do  not  add  to  our  knowledge  of  David.  But,  of 
 course,  elsewhere,  statements  peculiar  to  Chronicles  may  be 
 correct. 
 
 But  the  positive  application  of  the  principle  of  veri¬ 
 similitude  is  arduous,  complicated  and  precarious.  At  first 
 sight  nothing  seems  easier.  We  read  the  story  of  Jacob 
 and  say,  44  How  true  it  is  to  human  nature,  to  life,  to 
 experience  !  No  one  could  have  invented  that !  ”  In  a 
 sense,  this  is  true,  even  if  the  stories  are  folk-lore ;  no  one 
 could  have  invented  these  charming  touches  of  nature; 
 there  was  no  need  to  try ;  they  are  simply  borrowed  from 
 the  common  experience  of  everyday  life.  Folk-lore 
 naturally  tells  its  stories  largely  in  terms  of  the  life  with 
 which  it  is  familiar.  If  an  artist  paints  an  imaginary  land¬ 
 scape,  it  is  a  composition  made  up  of  elements  from  nature 
 as  it  really  is,  combined  as  nature  might  have  combined 
 them.  An  impressionist  school,  in  what  is  pleased  to 
 call  itself  an  advanced  civilisation,  might  possibly  paint 
 
 1  Cf.  pp.  16  £,  with  regard  to  (a). 
 
 2  “  Innere  Wahrscheinlichkeit,”  Bernheim,  op.  cit.,  p.  533. 
 
22 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 grass  pink  and  the  sun  green;  but  primitive  art  would 
 probably  follow  nature  whether  depicting  the  real  or  the 
 imaginary.  The  perfectly  natural  appearance  of  a  picture 
 is  no  proof  that  it  is  an  accurate  representation  of  a  land¬ 
 scape.  And  so,  most  unfortunately,  the  faithfulness  of  a 
 narrative  to  real  life  is  no  proof  that  it  is  accurate  history ; 
 we  should  always  like  to  believe  that  interesting  and 
 edifying  stories  are  historical ;  but  often  this  natural  desire 
 cannot  be  gratified.  A  first-class  novel  is  often  wonder¬ 
 fully  true  to  life,  much  more  so  than  some  biographies. 
 The  latter  may  be  entirely  composed  of  facts,  but  they 
 are  sometimes  so  selected  as  to  give  an  altogether  false 
 impression  of  the  real  man. 
 
 Valid  tests  of  verisimilitude  are  not  so  simple  and 
 attractive.  They  are  difficult  to  define,  and  indeed  they 
 are  too  various  and  delicate  to  be  stated  in  exact  canons ; 
 and  can  only  be  illustrated  by  a  few  examples.1 
 
 Take,  for  instance,  the  history  of  David.  Substantially 
 all  our  information  is  derived  from  a  single  extant  work, 
 the  Books  of  Samuel.  Criticism,  however,  has  shown 
 that  this  work  includes  extracts  from  three  or  four  earlier 
 documents  dealing  with  the  life  of  David.2 
 
 This  critical  result,  the  composite  nature  of  Samuel, 
 is  important  evidence  for  the  existence  of  David,  and  for 
 the  main  facts  of  his  reign.  But  single  episodes  often  rest 
 on  the  authority  of  one  only  of  those  original  documents. 
 
 Take,  for  instance,  the  incident  of  Uriah  and  Bathsheba. 
 Both  this  particular  narrative  and  the  document 3  in  which 
 
 1  There  is,  of  course,  the  general  principle  implied  above,  that  absence 
 of  correspondence  to  nature  and  human  nature  makes  against  historicity. 
 Therefore  such  correspondence  is  a  preliminary  condition  for  our  “  veri¬ 
 similitude,”  but  of  itself  it  does  not  constitute  the  verisimilitude  that  is  a 
 test  of  historical  accuracy.  A  positive  principle  may  be  stated  thus  :  A 
 narrative  is  probably  historical  if  it  is  true  to  nature,  and  also  is  such  that 
 it  would  not  have  been  invented. 
 
 2  We  ignore  (a)  the  Psalms,  on  account  of  the  difficulty  of  establishing 
 the  Davidic  authorship  of  any  given  Psalm  ;  and  (b)  Chronicles,  because 
 the  author  had  little  or  no  information  derived  from  early  sources  about 
 David  beyond  what  he  found  in  Samuel.  Our  two  Books  of  Samuel  were 
 originally  a  single  work. 
 
 3  2  Sam.  ix.-xx. 
 
HISTORICAL  VALUE  OF  OLD  TESTAMENT  23 
 
 it  is  found  satisfy  generally  the  negative  test  of  verisimili¬ 
 tude,  i.e.  none  of  the  essential  features  are  at  variance  with 
 the  intrinsic  probabilities  of  life  or  with  what  we  know  of 
 the  circumstances  of  the  period.  But,  as  we  have  said, 
 this  is  not  absolutely  conclusive.  The  narrative,  reduced 
 to  a  bare  outline,  is  simply — a  prince  seduces  the  wife 
 of  one  of  his  nobles,  and  has  the  injured  husband 
 murdered.  This  is  clearly  “  common  form,”  an  incident 
 of  a  type,  at  once  familiar  in  real  life  and  yet  striking  and 
 dramatic.  Such  a  type  of  incident  might  very  well  be 
 used  as  a  foundation  for  romantic  stories.  But,  on  the 
 other  hand,  the  currency  of  such  stories  is  no  reason  why 
 the  incident  should  not  have  happened  in  connection  with 
 a  particular  prince,  in  this  case  David.  Moreover,  there  is 
 a  special  element  of  verisimilitude  that  establishes  the 
 general  accuracy  of  the  narrative.  David  was  a  national 
 hero,  and  such  a  story  would  not  have  established  itself 
 as  part  of  the  tradition  of  Israel  if  it  had  not  been  sub¬ 
 stantially  true.  David  had  his  enemies,  and  then,  as  now, 
 there  were  people  eager  to  believe  the  grossest  evil  of 
 sovereigns  and  great  leaders  on  the  flimsiest  apology  for 
 evidence.  But  the  story  is  too  sympathetic  with  David 
 to  be  a  mere  relic  of  malicious  slander.  Further,  the 
 compilers  of  the  various  editions  of  Samuel  regarded  David 
 as  a  saint  and  hero ;  they  would  not  have  preserved  such 
 a  story  if  it  had  not  been  strongly  attested. 
 
 Take  another  feature  of  the  story  of  David,  the  statement 
 that  he  captured  Jerusalem.  This  is  clearly  historical. 
 There  is  abundant  evidence  that  from  the  time  of  David 
 onwards  the  city  was  held  by  the  Israelites;  and  all  that 
 we  know  of  the  earlier  period  implies  that  Jerusalem  was 
 not  in  the  possession  of  Israel  before  the  time  of  David.1 
 There  is  nothing  to  suggest  that  Saul  was  ever  in  possession 
 of  Jerusalem.  Clearly,  therefore,  the  capture  of  the  city 
 falls  early  in  the  reign  of  David. 
 
 1  Judges  i.  8  states  that  the  Judahites  took  Jerusalem,  burnt  the  city, 
 and  massacred  the  inhabitants.  But  such  statements  are  quite  at  variance 
 with  the  “  intrinsic  probabilities  ”  indicated  by  what  we  know  of  the 
 history.  The  verse  is  commonly  regarded  as  a  late  addition. 
 
24 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 Let  us  go  back  to  Moses,  confining  ourselves  to  the  main 
 features  of  his  career — that  he  was  a  real  person,  the  leader 
 of  Israelite  tribes  in  their  escape  from  Egypt,  a  prophet 
 who  brought  about  a  new  departure  in  the  religion  of  Israel 
 by  arousing  devotion  and  enthusiasm  for  Yahweh.  How  far 
 can  we  be  sure  that  such  an  account  of  Moses  is  historical  ? 
 
 Our  information  about  Moses  is  derived  1  from  the  two 
 older  documents  of  the  Pentateuch,  the  Jehovistic  (J) 
 and  Elohistic  (E)  writers.  Neither  of  these  can  be  earlier 
 than  900  b.c.  ;  the  latest  possible  date  for  Moses,  assum¬ 
 ing  him  to  be  an  historical  character,  is  1200  b.c.  Thus, 
 as  far  as  data  at  present  available  are  concerned,  we 
 cannot  show  that  any  of  the  narratives  concerning  Moses 
 were  recorded  in  writing  till  at  least  300  years  after 
 his  death.  The  accuracy  of  their  statements,  therefore, 
 is  a  matter  of  verisimilitude.  Taking  the  bare  outline 
 given  above,  there  is  nothing  improbable.  An  outburst 
 of  religious  fervour  is  often  associated  with  rapid  political 
 and  military  progress,  and  a  prophet  may  be  at  the  same 
 time  a  successful  general  and  administrator,  or,  at  any  rate, 
 war  and  government  may  be  successfully  carried  on  through 
 the  inspiration  and  authority  of  his  religious  prestige. 
 Witness  Mohammed  and  the  various  Mahdis  of  recent  times. 
 The  subsequent  history  of  Israel  implies  some  such  critical 
 period  as  that  associated  with  the  name  of  Moses.  The 
 conquest  of  Canaan  is  most  easily  understood  if  we  believe 
 that  the  Israelite  tribes  had  recently  been  seized  by  an 
 access  of  religious  enthusiasm.  Hence  a  large  and  growing 
 number  of  recent  scholars  accept  the  real  existence  of  Moses 
 as  a  religious  and  political  leader.  But  in  the  present  state 
 of  our  information,  this  conclusion  can  only  be  regarded  as 
 highly  probable. 
 
 Let  us  go  farther  back — to  Abraham.  Our  authorities 
 are  still  the  same  two  documents,  not  earlier  than  900  b.c.2 
 
 1  Practically  altogether,  though  if  we  were  dealing  with  the  matter 
 exhaustively,  there  would  be  other  minor  items  of  evidence  to  he 
 considered. 
 
 2  Gen.  xiv.,  as  a  whole,  has  not  yet  been  proved  to  be  earlier  than 
 the  Exile. 
 
HISTORICAL  VALUE  OF  OLD  TESTAMENT  25 
 
 If  we  assume  Abraham  to  be  an  historical  personage,  we 
 may  fix  his  date,  for  the  purposes  of  this  discussion,  at 
 2000  b.c.  ;  in  such  matters  two  or  three  centuries  more  or 
 less  make  little  difference.  Here,  therefore,  the  written 
 record  is  separated  from  the  period  it  refers  to  by  about 
 1000  years.  How  then  can  we  attain  to  any  certainty 
 about  Abraham  ?  Compare  parallel  cases  elsewhere. 
 According  to  traditional  dates,  Homer  wrote  about  300 
 years  after  the  siege  of  Troy;  Livy  about  700  years  after 
 Romulus  and  Remus;  and  the  authorities  (?)  for  King 
 Arthur  of  the  Round  Table  wrote  within  400  years  of  the 
 time  when  he  is  said  to  have  lived. 
 
 Again,  much  of  Genesis  is  clearly  folk-lore  or  tribal 
 history  in  the  form  of  personal  narrative ;  embedded 
 amongst  these  there  may  be  genuine  reminiscences  of 
 the  actual  doings  of  real  individuals.  But  how  are  we 
 to  disentangle  them  ?  Some  important  criteria  fail  us 
 here.  For  instance,  the  leading  public  acts  of  David  may 
 be  accepted  as  necessary  parts  of  the  chain  of  cause  and 
 effect  which  make  up  the  history  of  Israel  and  of  the 
 Ancient  East.  The  person  and  doings  of  Abraham  cannot 
 be  shown  at  present  to  stand  in  relation  to  the  main  stream 
 of  history.  According  to  many  Eastern  analogies,  Biblical, 
 Arabian  and  others,  the  patriarchal  genealogies  are  an 
 artificial  convention  such  as  is  commonly  used  for  com¬ 
 bining  mythical  personages  into  a  connected  scheme,  and 
 for  expressing  the  political  and  racial  relations  of  tribes. 
 
 There  is,  however,  a  principle  that  may  help  us ;  it  would 
 often,  we  imagine,  be  stated  thus — 
 
 Where  no  other  satisfactory  account  can  be  given  of  the 
 origin  of  a  narrative,  it  may  be  concluded  that  it  is  sub¬ 
 stantially  historical,  because  that  is  the  simplest,  most 
 natural,  and  most  probable  explanation  of  its  existence. 
 
 Some  such  principle,  stated  or  implied,  underlies  a  good 
 deal  of  conservative  reasoning.  A  liberal  application  of 
 it  leads  to  gratifying  results  and  saves  infinite  trouble. 
 Moreover,  there  is  a  measure  of  truth  in  it,  which  might 
 be  put  thus — 
 
26 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 The  absence  of  any  other  satisfactory  account  of  the 
 origin  of  a  narrative  affords  some  ground  for  supposing 
 that  it  has  some  foundation  in  facts. 
 
 It  is  maintained  by  many  critical  scholars  that  none  of 
 the  explanations  of  Abraham  as  other  than  an  historical 
 person  are  satisfactory.  His  name  is  not  used,  like  Jacob 
 or  Israel,  for  the  nation ;  and  there  is  little  to  indicate  that 
 he  was  a  tribal  deity.  Moreover,  the  form  shows  that  the 
 name  is  of  the  type  used  to  denote  persons  and  not  tribes 
 or  deities.  Abram  or  Abraham  is  probably  a  variant  of 
 the  familiar  Abiram,  current  both  in  Israel  and  Babylonia. 
 This  last  fact,  of  course,  is  not  conclusive  by  itself.  To 
 adapt  an  argument  of  Gressmann’s  in  a  recent  article,1 
 Jack  is  a  familiar  personal  name,  but  it  does  not  follow 
 that  Jack  the  Giantkiller  was  a  real  person  or  that  the 
 account  of  his  adventures  is  substantially  historical. 
 Folk-lore  often  attaches  itself  to  imaginary  persons  bearing 
 ordinary  names;  but  there  is  still  some  force  in  the  con¬ 
 tention  that  no  better  explanation  has  been  found  for 
 Abraham  than  his  existence  as  a  real  individual. 
 
 It  is  further  maintained  that  it  is  quite  reasonable  to 
 suppose  that  there  arose  in  earlier  times  an  outstanding 
 personality,  prophet  and  leader,  a  kind  of  earlier  Moses, 
 and  that  the  deep  impression  he  made  upon  the  people 
 secured  the  permanence  of  his  name  and  reputation. 
 
 The  utmost  weight  must  be  given  to  the  judgment  of  a 
 group  of  sound  and  sane  scholars,  of  whom  Dr.  Skinner  is 
 a  leading  representative.  He  expresses  his  view  thus  :2 
 4 4  Nothing  forbids  us  to  see  in  Abraham  the  first  of  that 
 long  series  of  prophets  through  whom  God  has  communi¬ 
 cated  to  mankind  a  saving  knowledge  of  Himself.  ...  As 
 we  read  the  story,  we  may  well  trust  the  instinct  which 
 tells  us  that  here  we  are  face  to  face  with  a  decisive  act 
 of  the  living  God  in  history,  and  an  act  whose  essential 
 significance  was  never  lost  in  Israelite  tradition.” 
 
 But  there  are  difficulties.  To  the  present  writer  there 
 
 1  Zeitschrift  fur  A.  T.  Wissenschaft. 
 
 2  Genesis  Inter.  Crit.  Comm,  xxvii. 
 
HISTORICAL  VALUE  OF  OLD  TESTAMENT  27 
 
 is  a  marked  contrast  between  the  Moses  and  the  Abraham 
 narratives  in  the  earlier  documents.  The  latter  do  not 
 seem  to  ascribe  to  Abraham  national  significance  as  an 
 outstanding  personality  who  moulded  the  political  and 
 religious  future  of  his  people.  His  adventures  are  rather 
 those  of  the  typical  nomad  or  semi-nomad.  For  instance, 
 in  reliance  on  a  divine  oracle  he  leaves  his  camping-ground 
 for  an  unfamiliar  destination;  his  wife  being  barren,  he 
 obtains  issue  from  her  maid ;  but  late  in  life  an  heir  is  born 
 to  him  by  his  wife ;  she  and  the  maid  quarrel,  and  the  latter 
 and  her  son  are  set  adrift ;  his  wife  is  in  danger  of  being 
 taken  from  him  by  a  foreign  king ;  she  dies  and  is  buried ; 
 he  arranges  for  the  marriage  of  his  son.  All  this  seems  to 
 be,  so  to  speak,  domestic  folk-lore  rather  than  reminiscences 
 of  an  epoch-making  prince  and  prophet. 
 
 Again,  the  current  conservative  views  as  to  Abraham 
 are  associated  with  the  synchronism  between  Abraham 
 and  Hammurabi  (c.  2000  or  2100)  and  the  dating  of 
 the  Exodus  about  1250,  under  Menephtah  II.  Neither  the 
 synchronism  nor  the  date  is  certain.  But  for  the  moment, 
 taking  the  general  conservative  position,  we  have  an  in¬ 
 terval  of  at  least  800  years  between  Abraham  and  Moses. 
 We  see  no  evidence  that  there  existed  during  so  long  a 
 period  a  continuous  tribal  organisation,  ultimately  develop¬ 
 ing  into  Israel,  which  could  preserve  and  transmit  the 
 Abrahamic  tradition.  Such  a  view  seems  at  variance  with 
 our  knowledge  of  the  general  life  of  the  times,  and  with  the 
 shifting  circumstances  of  nomadic  life.  It  would  be  easier 
 to  defend  the  existence  of  Abraham  as  an  historical  person 
 if  we  abandoned  the  synchronism  with  Hammurabi  and 
 the  chronological  system  of  the  Pentateuch,  and  supposed 
 that  Genesis  reflects  the  conditions  of  two  or  three  centuries 
 before  the  Exodus,  and  preserves  reminiscences  of  some  of 
 the  outstanding  characters  of  that  period. 
 
 We  are  very  far  from  asserting  dogmatically  that 
 Abraham  was  not  a  real  person ;  but,  as  far  as  our  present 
 information  goes,  we  feel  bound  to  confess  that  we  are 
 driven,  with  great  reluctance,  to  admit  that  the  balance 
 
28 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 of  probability  seems  against  the  presence  of  an  element  of 
 personal  history  in  the  Abraham  narratives. 
 
 D. — Historical  Certainty,  Scope  and  Limits 
 
 (a)  The  Area  of  Pr ob ability. — In  Ancient  History  there 
 are  a  great  many  matters  as  to  which  we  can  only  arrive  at 
 varying  degrees  of  probability.  In  the  earlier  periods,  and 
 in  some  others,  authorities  are  few  and  meagre  and  are 
 separated  by  long  intervals  from  the  events  with  which 
 they  deal ;  so  that  the  dividing  line  between  history  on 
 the  one  hand,  and  folk-lore  and  mythology  can  only  be 
 drawn  with  a  certain  degree  of  probability,  and  it  is  equally 
 difficult  to  distinguish  personal  history  from  tribal  history 
 thrown  into  the  form  of  personal  narrative.  Thus,  in  the 
 previous  section,  we  have  concluded  that  there  is  an 
 important  historical  basis  for  the  narratives  concerning 
 Moses ;  but  that  there  seems  to  be  a  balance  of  probability 
 against  the  presence  of  an  element  of  personal  history  in 
 the  stories  about  Abraham. 
 
 In  some  periods  we  may  be  well  informed  as  to  the 
 general  course  of  events,  and  yet  be  uncertain  as  to  par¬ 
 ticular  episodes.  Take,  for  instance,  the  story  of  Elisha, 
 the  naughty  boys  and  the  bears.  Authorities  differ  as  to 
 the  age  of  the  document  in  which  it  is  found,  it  may  be 
 post-exilic.  It  is  entirely  uncorroborated,  and  has  no 
 necessary  connection  with  any  established  historical 
 facts.  Any  conclusion  as  to  the  historicity  of  such  incidents 
 can  only  be  probable. 
 
 Again,  we  may  accept  a  narrative  as  substantially 
 historical,  and  yet  be  uncertain  as  to  many  of  its  details. 
 Unfortunately  names,  dates,  figures,  the  wording  of 
 speeches,  are  specially  liable  to  alteration  in  the  reporting 
 of  incidents  and  the  transmission  of  records.  The  conversa¬ 
 tion  between  David  and  his  courtiers  after  the  death  of  his 
 first  child  by  Bathsheba 1  occurs  as  part  of  a  narrative 
 which  is  substantially  correct,  in  a  document  of  great 
 
 1  2  Sam.  xii.  21  if. 
 
HISTORICAL  VALUE  OF  OLD  TESTAMENT  29 
 
 historical  value;  the  conversation  bears  marks  of  veri¬ 
 similitude,  David’s  conduct  and  his  explanation  of  it  seem 
 original  and  unexpected.  The  detail  is  probably  historical ; 
 but  we  doubt  whether  we  can  formally  claim  that  it  is 
 certain.  The  idea  of  such  a  development  might  come  by 
 a  flash  of  inspiration  to  a  story-teller  with  the  dramatic 
 gift.  It  is  difficult  to  exclude  altogether  the  bare  possi¬ 
 bility  of  such  an  origin  of  these  details. 
 
 (b)  The  Certainty  of  Particular  Events. — Nevertheless, 
 as  we  have  tried  to  show,  we  can  be  certain  as  to  many  of 
 the  leading  features  of  Old  Testament  history,  the  real 
 existence  of  outstanding  public  personalities,  David, 
 Isaiah,  etc.,  the  reality  of  their  public  acts,  such  as  the 
 capture  of  Jerusalem  and  the  building  of  the  Temple; 
 and,  in  some  instances,  e.g.  David,  Ahab,  Jehoiakim,  etc., 
 the  general  impression  which  such  personalities  made  upon 
 their  friends  or  their  enemies.  In  the  case  of  the  great 
 prophets,  Isaiah,  Jeremiah,  Ezekiel,  we  learn  to  know  the 
 real  man  from  the  self-revelation  of  himself  in  his  preaching. 
 These  general  results  are  not  seriously  affected  by  the 
 uncertainty  of  some  items  of  information.  Details  of 
 action  and  speech  attributed  to  a  man  may  be  inaccurate 
 as  particular  events;  he  may  not  have  done  or  said  just 
 this  thing  on  the  special  occasion  in  question ;  but  they  will 
 as  a  rule  convey  a  true  idea  of  the  way  in  which  he  usually 
 spoke  or  acted.  Similar  considerations  apply  to  important 
 events. 
 
 Thus,  for  long  periods  of  the  history  we  are  practically 
 certain  as  to  the  general  relations  of  Israel  to  its  inter¬ 
 national  environment,  as  to  the  main  course  of  events,  and 
 the  parts  played  by  political  and  religious  leaders.  This 
 is  specially  true  for  the  great  age  of  Revelation  from  Amos 
 to  the  close  of  the  Exile,  and  again,  for  the  time  of  Ezra 
 and  Nehemiah.  We  have  an  assured  framework  into  which 
 we  can  fit  the  various  stages  of  development  of  the  religion. 
 
 (c)  Manners ,  Customs  and  Institutions. — Fortunately 
 the  difficulties  that  exist  as  to  particular  events  are 
 immensely  reduced  when  we  come  to  manners,  customs 
 
30 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 and  institutions.  As  to  these  the  bare  mention  is  usually 
 conclusive  proof  of  their  existence  at  one  time  or  another. 
 More  especially  the  customs,  offices  and  institutions,  etc., 
 which  are  implied  or  taken  for  granted  must  clearly  have 
 existed.  A  casual  reference  is  often  stronger  evidence  than 
 an  elaborate  description,  the  latter  may  be  a  work  of  the 
 imagination.  But  even  in  an  imaginary  narrative  a 
 writer,  especially  an  ancient  writer,  does  not  ^vent  details 
 which  he  takes  for  granted,  and  which  ha/ve  no  special 
 bearing  upon  any  of  the  objects — didactic,  homiletic  or 
 theological — with  which  his  work  is  written.  Thus, 
 whatever  view  we  take  of  the  character  of  some  of  the 
 Elisha  narratives  as  to  particular  events,  they  show  con¬ 
 clusively  that  in  Israel  a  man’s  family  might  be  sold  for 
 his  debts  and  boys  were  sometimes  very  impertinent. 
 
 Laws,  again,  are  mostly  evidence  of  the  prevalence  of 
 the  practices  which  they  forbid,  though  there  are  excep¬ 
 tions  ;  the  presence  in  the  Prayer  Book  of  a  prohibition  of 
 marriage  with  one’s  grandmother  does  not  show  that  such 
 a  practice  was  ever  common.  But  brief  primitive  codes 
 did  not  revel  in  amplifications.  In  many  cases  laws  are 
 clearly  directed  against  actual  abuses,  e.  g.  idolatry,  child- 
 sacrifice,  witchcraft. 
 
 Again,  positive  ordinances  are  often  the  record  and 
 confirmation  of  existing  customs,  the  Book  of  the  Cove¬ 
 nant  1  is  largely  of  this  character,  and  affords  valuable 
 evidence  as  to  the  social  conditions  of  Israel  under  the 
 early  monarchy. 
 
 Here,  too,  there  are  exceptions ;  the  existence  of  a  posi¬ 
 tive  law  does  not  always  show  that  the  practice  it  prescribes 
 was  ever  actually  observed.  Many  laws  are  abortive,  and 
 some  of  those  in  Leviticus  and  Deuteronomy  are  pious 
 ideals ;  possibly  even  their  authors  hardly  expected  them 
 to  be  enforced.  The  law  of  release  in  Deut.  xv.  may  be 
 cited  as  an  example. 
 
 Nevertheless,  there  is  a  considerable  mass  of  legislation 
 which  certainly  corresponds  to  actual  usage. 
 
 1  Exod.  xx.  22-xxiii.  19. 
 
HISTORICAL  VALUE  OF  OLD  TESTAMENT  31 
 
 There  is  another  difficulty  as  to  these  general  circum¬ 
 stances.  It  is  easy  to  prove  their  existence,  but  it  is  not 
 always  easy  to  fix  the  period  when  they  existed;  partly 
 because  the  dates  of  documents  are  sometimes  uncertain ; 
 partly  because  an  author  may  write  the  story  of  the  remote 
 past  in  terms  of  the  manners  and  customs  of  his  own  age. 
 Chronicles,  for  instance,  describes  the  public  worship  of 
 the  monarchy  in  terms  of  the  post-exilic  organisation  of  the 
 Temple  ritual  and  priesthood.  As  a  rule,  our  information 
 as  to  Israel  is  full  enough  to  enable  us  to  determine  a 
 writer’s  method  in  such  matters.  But  here  and  there 
 we  may  be  uncertain;  Kings,  for  instance,  speaks  of  a 
 high  priest  under  the  monarchy ;  we  are  not  sure  whether 
 the  distinctive  office  and  title  existed  before  the  return 
 from  the  Exile. 
 
 A  measure  of  uncertainty  as  to  date  is  often  a  minor 
 matter.  In  the  Ancient  East  customs  remained  un¬ 
 changed  for  centuries  or  even  millenniums.  There  was  an 
 interval  of  more  than  a  thousand  years  between  the  Code  of 
 Hammurabi  and  the  Book  of  the  Covenant,  and  yet  they 
 have  much  in  common.  Some  of  the  customs  referred  to 
 in  the  narratives  of  the  patriarchs  are  said  to  be  still 
 observed  in  the  East.  In  many  cases,  if  we  meet  with  a 
 custom  at  any  one  point  of  the  historical  periods  of  the 
 Old  Testament,  we  may  conclude  that  it  existed  throughout. 
 
 Thus  the  Old  Testament  furnishes  us  with  pictures  of 
 life  in  ancient  Israel  which  we  may  accept  without 
 reserve. 
 
 ( d )  Ideas. — In  the  case  of  ideas  there  is  an  even  more 
 absolute  certainty  than  in  that  of  external  circumstances. 
 Thus  M.  Seignobos  writes,1  44  Every  conception  which  is 
 expressed  in  writing  or  by  illustrative  representation  is 
 in  itself  a  definite  unimpeachable  fact.  That  which  is 
 expressed  must  have  first  been  present  in  the  mind  of 
 some  one — if  not  in  that  of  the  author,  who  may  have 
 reproduced  a  formula  he  did  not  understand,  then  in  the 
 mind  of  the  man  who  originated  the  formula.  The 
 
 1  Langlois  and  Seignobos,  op.  cit.,  p.  191. 
 
32 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 existence  of  a  conception  may  be  learnt  from  a  single 
 instance  and  proved  from  a  single  document.” 
 
 Thus  the  presence  in  the  Old  Testament  of  some  pro¬ 
 found  spiritual  truth  is  absolute  proof  that  some  one  had 
 the  idea.  We  would  venture  to  add  that  it  is  also  certain 
 that  behind  the  expression  of  such  a  truth  lies  a  spiritual 
 experience  of  God  revealing  Himself  to  man. 
 
 The  Higher  Criticism  enables  us  to  date  much  of  the 
 literature  and,  thus,  to  trace  the  development  of  religion, 
 and  the  stages  of  Divine  Revelation  and  human  receptive¬ 
 ness.  But  where  dates  are  uncertain,  the  supreme  fact  of 
 the  existence  of  the  ideas  remain ;  and  in  any  case  they  are 
 pre-Christian  and  form  part  of  the  preparation  for  the 
 Gospel. 
 
 All  this  is  often  cavalierly  brushed  aside  as  obvious,  as 
 if  it  were  therefore  trivial  and  negligible;  whereas  it  is  the 
 thing  that  really  matters.  We  only  care  about  particular 
 events  and  external  circumstances  because  they  are  the 
 setting  of  Revelation.  And  yet  the  public  attention  is 
 distracted  by  a  tempest  of  sound  and  fury  about  com¬ 
 paratively  unimportant  matters  like  the  historical  existence 
 of  Abraham,  or  trivialities  like  Jonah’s  great  fish;  and 
 they  are  seldom  reminded  that  the  great  treasures  of 
 spiritual  truth  are  safe  beyond  all  controversy. 
 
 But,  to  descend  to  details,  it  is  useful  to  remember  that 
 a  narrative  may  not  be  historical,  but  yet  it  will  express 
 moral  and  spiritual  ideas,  and  these  may  be  elements  of 
 revelation.  In  the  same  way  such  ideas  may  be  expressed 
 in  laws  which  are  never  carried  out. 
 
 Moreover,  uncertainty  as  to  date  or  authorship  does  not 
 seriously  affect  the  value  of  this  teaching.  The  truths 
 are  here  because  real  men  believed  in  them;  they  are  a 
 fruit  of  personal  spiritual  experience.  As  we  take  these 
 truths  to  our  hearts  we  enter  into  fellowship  with  men  of 
 old  in  their  most  inspired  moments.  It  does  not  much 
 matter  whether  we  know  their  names  and  the  external 
 circumstances  of  their  lives ;  it  might  be  interesting  to  know 
 these  things,  but  our  ignorance  does  not  make  the  truth 
 
HISTORICAL  VALUE  OE  OLD  TESTAMENT  (33 
 
 less  human  and  personal.  It  would  be  gratifying  if  we 
 could  be  certain  that  David  wrote  the  Twenty-third  Psalm, 
 but,  in  any  case,  it  is  the  record  of  a  great  spiritual  experi¬ 
 ence  of  a  man  who  was  familiar  alike  with  green  pastures 
 and  still  waters,  with  the  shadow  of  death,  and  with  the 
 cruelty  and  malice  of  man,  and  who  discovered  that  a 
 Divine  Presence  was  with  him  under  these  circumstances 
 as  well  as  in  the  Temple.  It  will  always  remain  the 
 classical  expression  of  such  experience. 
 
 The  lines  of  argument  suggested  and  illustrated  in  this 
 essay  point  to  the  conclusion  that  there  is  the  kind  and 
 degree  of  historical  certainty  which  we  need  for  purposes  of 
 edification.  There  is  a  body  of  revealed  truth  coming  to  us 
 through  personal  experience  excited  by  contact  with  the 
 Divine  Spirit,  commending  itself  to  souls  also  responsive 
 to  the  divine  appeal.  Our  intellectual  needs  are  provided 
 for  by  an  adequate  framework  of  historical  facts,  and  by  a 
 sufficiently  full  and  clear  background  of  external  circum¬ 
 stances 
 
 D 
 
ESSAY  II 
 
 THE  YALKUT  OF  R.  MACHIR  BAR  ABBA  MARI  ON 
 
 THE  BOOK  OF  JONAH 
 
 RENDERED  INTO  ENGLISH,  WITH  INTRODUCTION  AND  NOTES 
 Rev.  Prof.  A.  W.  Greenup,  D.D.,  Litt.D.,  M.A. 
 
SYNOPSIS 
 
 I.  Introduction. 
 
 Character  of  the  Yalkut  ha-Makiri. 
 
 Extent  of  the  Work. 
 
 Date  and  Nationality  of  the  Compiler. 
 
 Importance  of  the  Work. 
 
 The  MS.  of  the  Yalkut  on  the  Minor  Prophets. 
 
 II.  Translation  of  the  Yalkut  on  the  Book  of  Jonah,  with  notes. 
 
THE  YALKUT  OF  R.  MACH  I R  BAR  ABBA  MARI 
 ON  THE  BOOK  OF  JONAH 
 
 The  Yalkut  ha-Makiri  is  a  work  similar  in  character  and 
 purpose  to  the  well-known  Yalkut  Shimeoni,1  but  does 
 not  cover,  like  the  latter,  all  the  canonical  books  of  the 
 Old  Testament.  The  only  extant  portions  are  those  on 
 the  Psalms  (ed.  Buber,  Berdychev,  1899),  Isaiah  (ed.  Spira, 
 Berlin,  1894),  Proverbs  (ed.  Gruenhut,  Jerusalem,  1902), 
 and  the  Minor  Prophets  (ed.  Greenup,  Hosea  and  Zeehariah, 
 1909,  Amos  to  Habakkuk,  1910);  but  we  learn  from  the 
 compiler’s  preface  that  his  work  extended  to  the  books  of 
 Jeremiah,  Ezekiel  and  Job,  and  possibly  it  was  his  intention 
 to  include  also  the  earlier  and  later  historical  books.  The 
 omission  of  the  Pentateuch  and  the  Megilloth  from  his  plan 
 may  be  accounted  for  by  the  fact  that  the  Midrash 
 Rabbah  already  contained  such  material  as  he  wished 
 to  gather  together  for  the  remaining  books  of  the  Old 
 Testament. 
 
 The  preface  to  his  work  (given  in  the  MSS.  of  Psalms  and 
 Isaiah,  and  doubtless  originally  prefixed  to  the  other 
 books) 2  gives  us  the  reason  for  the  undertaking  of  the  work 
 — the  collection  of  the  haggadic  sentences  which  illustrate 
 the  Scriptures  under  their  appropriate  verses ;  a  list  of  the 
 works  consulted  for  the  purpose ;  and  a  modest  commen¬ 
 dation  of  his  work  to  students  :  but  we  have  no  indication 
 whatever  of  the  date  or  nationality  of  the  compiler.  No 
 light  is  thrown  on  these  from  those  parts  of  the  work 
 extant.  The  name  Abba  Mari  points  to  Provence,  and  the 
 long  line  of  ancestors  given  by  the  compiler,  who  describes 
 
 1  Cf.  the  testimony  of  Azulai  in  Shem  ha-Gedolim ,  ii.  10-57. 
 
 2  A  critical  edition  of  this  may  be  found  in  my  ,*TH3T  “1CD  by  ’H'ODn  v' 
 (London,  1*000),  pp.  4-0. 
 
 37 
 
38 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 himself  as  Machir  b.  Abba  Mari,  b.  Machir,  b.  Todros, 
 b.  Machir,  son  of  R.  Joseph  b.  Abba  Mari,  would  seem  to 
 indicate  that  he  came  of  an  important  family.  Possibly 
 he  is  a  descendant  of  the  Machir  who  came  from  Babylonia 
 to  Narbonne  in  the  time  of  Charlemagne.1 
 
 The  only  clue  to  the  date  lies  in  a  note  to  the  Leyden 
 Codex  containing  Isaiah,  which  states  that  that  MS.  was 
 sold  in  1415.  The  Harleian  Codex  of  the  Minor  Prophets 
 was  written  in  1514,  and  was  evidently  copied  from  an 
 ancient  manuscript,  as  the  copyist  in  two  places  speaks  of 
 missing  leaves  as  having  perished  through  old  age.  Shab- 
 bethai  b.  Joseph  Bass,  the  founder  of  Jewish  bibliography, 
 in  his  SiftS  Yeshenim  (i.  42)  mentions,  from  an  unknown 
 source,  that  44  the  Yalkut  ha-Makiri  was  composed  before 
 the  persecutions  in  Spain ;  ”  so  that  we  may  take  1391  as  a 
 terminus  ad  quern  for  our  work.  The  attempt  of  Dr.  M. 
 G aster  to  claim  a  high  antiquity  for  the  work  and  to 
 make  it  the  source  of  the  second  part  of  the  Yalkut  Shi- 
 meoni  was  refuted  on  cogent  grounds  by  Dr.  A.  Epstein, 
 and  has  not  been  revived  by  any  scholar.2  It  is  certain 
 from  the  fact  that  Exodus  Rabbah  and  Bemidar  Rabbah 
 are  freely  cited  by  Machir,  and  were  unknown  to  the  com¬ 
 piler  of  the  Yalkut  Shimeoni,  that  the  latter  preceded  the 
 former  by  at  least  a  century.  The  question  arises,  Did 
 Machir  know  the  work  of  his  predecessor  ?  To  this  a 
 negative  answer  must  be  given,  since  in  his  introduction 
 Machir  explains  the  title  44  Yalkut  ”  as  if  he  were  the 
 inventor  of  it  and  as  being  a  novelty.3  Our  surprise  at  the 
 Yalkut  Shimeoni  being  unknown  to  him  is  lessened  when 
 we  learn  that  even  the  Pesikta  Rabbathi,  from  which 
 he  could  have  derived  so  much  relevant  material,  was 
 unknown  to  him. 
 
 The  importance  of  the  Yalkut  ha-Makiri,  apart  from  its 
 preservation  of  fragments  of  lost  Midrashim,  lies  in  its 
 value  for  purposes  of  textual  criticism.  This  was  recognised 
 
 1  Neubauer,  Med.  Chron.  i.  82  ;  Jewish  Encycl.  ix.  169. 
 
 2  Revue  des  etudes  Juives ,  xxv.  44  -64,  xxvi.  75-82. 
 
 3  Oil  smon  |D  miN  mtspb  o  nsspn  nw  'nam 
 
YALKUT  OF  R.  MACHIR  BAR  ABBA  MARI  39 
 
 first  by  David  Luria,  who  in  his  great  edition  of  the  Pirqe 
 Rabbi  Eliezer  used  the  manuscript  of  the  Psalms  formerly 
 in  the  possession  of  Straschoun;  and  in  our  own  time  by 
 Theodor  in  his  edition  of  the  Midrash  Bereshith  Rabbalu 
 and  by  Schechter  in  his  Avoth  de  Rabbi  Nathan.  It  is 
 evident  that  of  several  of  the  Midrashim  he  quotes  Machir 
 had  more  than  one  manuscript  and  that  different  recensions 
 of  the  texts  were  represented.  No  one  who  wishes  to  in¬ 
 vestigate  the  textual  problems  of  the  Yalkut  Shimeoni  can 
 afford  to  neglect  the  light  thrown  on  them  by  a  comparison 
 of  texts  with  those  of  the  Machiri.  Of  peculiar  interest 
 are  the  quotations  from  the  lost  Yelammedenu,  which 
 open  up  the  question  of  the  relation  of  this  work  to  the 
 Tanhuma  published  by  Buber  and  that  first  published  at 
 Constantinople  in  1522,  usually  cited  as  “Midrash  Tan¬ 
 huma.”  1 
 
 The  unique  manuscript  of  the  Yalkut  ha-Makiri  on  the 
 Minor  Prophets,  now  in  the  British  Museum,2  dated,  as 
 mentioned  above,  in  1514,  was  written  at  Tivoli  in  Italy 
 for  the  Cardinal  Aegidius,  general  of  the  Augustinians, 
 patron  and  pupil  of  Levita.  Unfortunately  it  is  incom¬ 
 plete;  the  greater  part  of  Hosea  is  missing  and  also  some 
 pages  in  the  later  prophets.  The  colophon  is  of  interest 
 as  containing  the  date  in  the  common  era — a  rare  occur¬ 
 rence  in  Hebrew  colophons,  and  confined  to  Italian  manu¬ 
 scripts — following  the  year  of  the  Creation,  the  reckoning 
 of  the  latter  being  in  the  “  perat  katon  ”  (274). 3 
 
 THE  BOOK  OF  JONAH 
 
 NOW  THE  WORD  OF  THE  LORD  CAME  UNTO  JONAH,  SAYING,  i.  1. 
 
 The  story  of  R.  Levi 4  and  R.  Judah  the  son  of  Simon  Sue.  Jer. 
 (Nahman),  who  received  alternately  two  selas 5  to  go v' 
 
 1  See  Revue  des  etudes  Juives,  xiii.  224  if. ,  xl.  284  ;  Gruenhut,  Proverbs , 
 pp.  9-16. 
 
 2  Margoliouth,  Catalogue,  ii.  pp.  8-5.  3  See  Jewish  Encycl.  viii.  814. 
 
 4  Probably  a  pupil  of  11.  Hana  b.  Hanuia,  many  of  whose  utterances  lie 
 
 quotes. 
 
 6  A  sela  is  a  coin  equivalent  to  one  sacred  or  two  common  shekels, 
 
40 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 around  and  call  the  congregation  together  before  R. 
 Johanan.1  It.  Levi  came  in  and  taught,  Jonah  the  son  of 
 Amittai  was  of  Asher,  for  it  is  written,  “  Asher  did  not  drive 
 out  the  inhabitants  of  Ekron,2  nor  the  inhabitants  of  Zidon  ” 
 (Judges  i.  31) ;  and  it  is  written, “Arise,  get  thee  to  Zarephath, 
 which  belongeth  to  Zidon  ”  (1  Kings  xvii.  19).  R.  Johanan 
 came  in  and  taught,  Jonah  the  son  of  Amittai  was  of  Zebu- 
 lun,  for  it  is  written,  “  And  the  third  lot  came  up  for  the 
 children  of  Zebulun  according  to  their  families  ”  (Joshua 
 xix.  10) ;  and  it  is  written,  “And  from  thence  it  passed  along 
 eastward  to  Gath-hepher,  to  Ethkazin  ”  (ibid.  13) ;  and  it  is 
 written,  “According  to  the  word  of  the  Lord,  the  God  of 
 Israel,  which  he  spake  by  the  hand  of  his  servant  Jonah, 
 the  son  of  Amittai,  which  was  of  Gath-hepher  ”  (2  Kings 
 xiv.  25).  The  following  Sabbath  R.  Levi  said  to  Judah  b. 
 Nahman,  Take  these  selas,  go  around  and  call  the  congre¬ 
 gation  together  before  R.  Johanan.  He  came  in  and  said 
 before  them,  R.  Johanan  has  taught  us  well  that  Jonah’s 
 mother  was  of  Asher,  but  his  father  of  Zebulun  3 — “  and 
 his  border  shall  reach  Zidon  ”  (Gen.  xlix.  13),  that  is,  the 
 side  from  which  he  is  to  issue  will  be  Zidon.4 
 
 Erubin,  96.  Michal,  the  daughter  of  Saul,  was  in  the  habit  of  laying 
 the  tefillin,5  and  the  wise  men  did  not  try  to  prevent  her ; 
 and  the  wife  of  Jonah  was  in  the  habit  of  going  up  to  keep 
 the  three  festivals,0  nor  did  the  wise  men  try  to  prevent  her. 
 And  so  in  Mekilta  ( Ba ,  17).  But  in  the  treatise  Berachoth 
 of  the  Jerusalem  Talmud,  R.  ILezekiah,  in  the  name  of 
 R.  Abhu,  says  that  the  wife  of  Jonah  was  turned  back 
 home,  and  that  the  wise  men  prevented  Michal  wearing  the 
 tefillin. 
 
 1  For  tlie  purpose  of  listening  to  his  lecture. 
 
 2  The  Massoretic  text  has  Acco  (l^p). 
 
 :!  See  Gen.  R.  98.  11  ;  Yaik.  Shim.  Jon.  550. 
 
 4  A  reference  is  found  here  to  the  extraction  of  Jonah. 
 
 5  The  phylacteries  tied  on  the  arm  and  head.  Dent.  vi.  8,  xi.  18.  The 
 
 technical  term  for  putting  them  on  was  “to  lay  them”  ITOnS). 
 
 Women,  slaves  and  children  were  exempt  from  wearing  them  ( Ber .  Jer. 
 §  3) :  also  professional  writers  of  phylacteries  (Sue.  26  a),  on  the  ground 
 that  he  who  is  engaged  on  the  performance  of  one  precept  is  exempt  from 
 the  performance  of  another  ! 
 
 6  Which  it  was  not  incumbent  on  women  to  do. 
 
YALKUT  OF  R.  MACHIR  BAR  ABBA  MARI  41 
 
 R.  Jonah  said,  Jonah  the  son  of  Amittai  (VIES)  was  a  San.  .Ter. 
 
 xi  5 
 
 prophet  of  truth  (HEN),  as  you  find  when  God  said  to 
 him 
 
 Arise,  go  to  Nineveh,  that  great  city. 
 
 He  said,  I  know  that  the  Gentiles  are  on  the  point  of  t  2. 
 repenting.  Lo  !  if  I  go  and  preach  to  them  and  they  repent, 
 the  Holy  One  will  come  and  punish  Israel.1  And  what 
 should  I  do  but  flee  ?  So  we  read,  44  Jonah  rose  up  to  flee 
 to  Tarshish,”  etc. 
 
 R.  Johanan  said,  All  the  prophets  were  rich  men.  Where  Nedar.  38. 
 do  you  find  this  ?  From  Moses,  Samuel,  Amos  and  Jonah. 
 
 See  the  commentary  on  the  verse  in  Amos,  44  And  Amos 
 answered  and  said  to  Amaziah  ”  (Amos  vii.  14),  where  it  is 
 said  that  Jonah  was  rich,  since  it  is  written  of  him,  44  He 
 paid  the  fare  thereof,  and  went  down  into  it  ”  (Jonah  i.  3). 
 
 R.  Johanan  said  that  he  paid  the  full  fare  of  the  ship ;  and 
 R.  Merinos  2  said  that  the  ship’s  fare  was  no  less  than  four 
 thousand  gold  denars. 
 
 44  Lo  !  the  man  is  become  as  one  of  us  ”  (Gen.  iii.  22) — as  Ber  Rab. 
 one  of  the  ministering  angels.  R.  Simeon  b.  Lakish  said, ' 
 
 Like  Jonah,  for  it  is  said,  44  And  one  was  felling  the  beam  ” 
 
 (2  Kings  vi.  5). 3  As  Jonah  was  fleeing  from  obeying  God’s 
 command,  so  also  was  [Adam]  :  as  Jonah’s  glory  did  not 
 abide  with  him,  neither  did  Adam’s.4 
 
 But  Jonah  rose  up  to  flee  unto  Tarshish  from  the  i.  3. 
 
 PRESENCE  OF  THE  LORD. 
 
 Could  he,  then,  flee  from  the  Lord  ?  Is  it  not  already  Mekii.  Ba. 
 said,  44  Whither  shall  I  go  from  thy  spirit  ?  if  I  go  up  into 
 heaven  thou  art  there,”  etc.  (Ps.  cxxxix.  7,  f.).  But  Jonah 
 said,  I  will  get  me  outside  the  Holy  Land  where  the  She- 
 
 1  Lit.  “  haters  of  Israel  ” — a  substituted  expression  O’lPD)  for  “  Israel.” 
 
 “I11  the  printed  text  of  the  Talmud,  Romanos.  See  Hyman,  To/.  Tan. 
 ve  Am.  iii.  1907. 
 
 3  The  argument  ( Gezerah  shawah)  is  based  on  the  use  of  u  one”  in  both 
 passages. 
 
 4  See  Theodor’s  valuable  note  on  Ber.  Rab.  p.  201.  According  to 
 Shah.  Jer.  Adam  was  the  light  of  the  world,  but  sin  deprived  him  of  all 
 glory. 
 
42 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 Sifri,  Shoph. 
 
 Sue.  Jer. 
 v.  1. 
 
 kinah  does  not  rest,  for  it  is  clear  that  the  Gentiles  are  on 
 the  point  of  repentance  that  Israel  be  not  condemned. 
 The  matter  is  like  to  a  priest’s  servant  who,  fleeing  from  his 
 master,  went  to  a  burial-ground  where  he  could  not  be 
 followed.  He  said  to  his  master,  I  have  slaves,  like  you. 
 So  Jonah  said,  I  will  get  me  outside  the  Holy  Land,  where 
 the  Shekinah  is  not  manifested.  God  said  to  him,  I  have 
 many  messengers  like  you;  for  it  is  said,  “  And  the  Lord 
 hurled  a  great  wind  into  the  sea  ”  (Jonah  i.  4).  There  were 
 three  prophets, — one  considered  the  honour  of  the  father 
 and  of  the  son ;  one  that  of  the  father,  but  not  that  of  the 
 son  ;  one  that  of  the  son,  but  not  that  of  the  father.  Jeremiah 
 considered  both,  for  it  is  said,  44  We  have  transgressed  and 
 have  rebelled;  thou  hast  not  pardoned”  (Lam.  iii.  42): 
 therefore  his  prophecy  was  doubled,  for  it  is  said,  4 4  And 
 there  were  added  besides  unto  them  many  like  words  ” 
 (Jer.  xxxvi.  32).  Elijah  considered  that  of  the  father  only, 
 for  it  is  said,  44  I  have  been  very  jealous  for  the  Lord  ” 
 (1  Kings  xix.  10).  Jonah  considered  that  of  the  son  only, 
 for  it  is  said  of  him,  44  And  the  word  of  the  Lord  came  to 
 Jonah  a  second  time  ”  (Jonah  iii.  1)  :  the  Lord  did  not  hold 
 communion  with  him  a  third  time. 
 
 Three  classes  of  men  meet  their  death  by  the  hand  of 
 God  : — he  who  suppresses  his  prophecy,  like  Jonah  the  son 
 of  Amittai ;  he  who  adds  to  the  words  of  a  prophet,  like  the 
 companion  of  Mi  call ;  and  a  prophet  who  transgresses  the 
 words  of  his  own  prophecy,  like  Iddo.1 
 
 44  And  he  went  down  to  Joppa.”  It  would  have  sufficed 
 to  say,  And  he  went  down  to  Acco.2  R.  Jonah  said,  Jonah 
 went  up  to  the  feasts,  and  he  entered  with  the  joyous 
 procession  to  the  well  from  which  the  water  was  drawn 
 for  libation  on  the  Succoth  festival,3  and  the  Holy  Spirit 
 rested  on  him,  to  teach  you  that  the  Holy  Spirit  does  not 
 
 1  See  Sanhed.  89  a. 
 
 2  The  nearest  harbour  to  Zarepliath.  An  allusion  to  Jonah’s  paternal 
 origin  from  Zebulun. 
 
 3  See  Gen.  Hah.  70.  The  pipes  were  played  on  this  occasion,  and  the 
 sages  said,  “ lie  who  has  not  witnessed  the  rejoicings  at  the  water-drawing 
 has  never  in  his  life  known  what  real  rejoicing  is,” 
 
YALKUT  OF  R.  MACHIR  BAR  ABBA  MARI  43 
 
 rest  but  on  a  joyful  heart.  What  is  the  reason  ?  1 — 4 4  And 
 it  came  to  pass,  when  the  minstrel  played,  that  the  Spirit  of 
 the  Lord  came  upon  him  ”  (2  Kings  iii.  15). 
 
 On  the  fifth  day  Jonah  fled  from  before  the  Lord  his  God.  Pirke  r. 
 
 FI  iezfcr  10 
 
 Why  ?  The  first  time  when  God  sent  him  to  restore  (the 
 coast  of)  Israel  his  words  were  confirmed,  for  it  is  said, 
 
 44  He  restored  the  coast  of  Israel  ”  (2  Kings  xiv.  25).  The 
 second  time  He  sent  him  to  Jerusalem  to  destroy  it,  but 
 the  Holy  One,  after  his  great  mercy  and  loving-kindness, 
 repented  him  of  the  evil  and  did  not  destroy  it;  so  Israel 
 called  Jonah  a  lying  prophet.  The  third  time  He  sent  him 
 to  Nineveh  to  destroy  it.  Jonah  argued  with  himself,  I 
 know  that  the  Gentiles  are  on  the  point  of  repenting ;  and 
 if  now  they  repent  God  will  send  his  wrath  on  Israel,  so 
 that  not  only  Israel  but  the  Gentiles  also  will  call  me  a 
 lying  prophet ;  lo !  I  will  flee  from  before  God  to  the  place 
 where  his  glory  is  not.  Shall  I  mount  to  heaven  ?  It  is 
 said,  44  His  glory  is  above  the  heavens  ”  (Ps.  cxiii.  4). 
 
 Shall  I  remain  on  the  earth  ?  How  can  that  be,  for  it  is 
 written,  44  The  whole  earth  is  full  of  his  glory  !  ”  (Isa.  vi.  3). 
 
 Lo  !  I  must  flee  to  the  sea,  for  it  is  not  written  that  his  glory 
 is  there. 
 
 But  the  Lord  hurled  a  great  wind  into  the  sea.  i.  4. 
 
 44  When  he  maketh  a  weight  for  the  wind  ”  (Job  xxviii.  vayyik. 
 25).  R.  Huna  said,  In  three  places  is  it  stated  that  the 
 wind  went  forth  without  restraint  and  nearly  destroyed 
 the  whole  world — once  in  the  days  of  Job,  once  in  those  of 
 Jonah,  and  once  in  those  of  Elijah.  In  the  days  of  Job, 
 for  it  is  said,  44  And  lo  !  there  came  a  great  wind  from  the 
 wilderness  ”  (Job  i.  19) ;  in  those  of  Jonah,  for  it  is  said, 
 
 44  The  Lord  hurled  a  great  wind  into  the  sea  ” ;  in  those  of 
 Elijah,  for  it  is  said,  44  And  lo  !  the  Lord  passed  by,  and  a 
 great  and  strong  wind  rent  the  mountains,  and  brake  in 
 pieces  the  rocks  ”  (1  Kings  xix.  11).  R.  Judan  b.  Shalom 
 said,  The  wind  of  Job  is  the  same  as  that  of  Jonah,  that  of 
 Elijah  the  same  as  that  of  Job  :  that  of  Job  was  on  account 
 
 1  Of  the  law  iu  the  Mishua,  as  to  the  playing-  of  the  pipes. 
 
44 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 i.  5 
 
 Pirke  R. 
 Eliezer,  10. 
 
 i.  12. 
 
 Mekil.  £a. 
 
 i.  15. 
 
 Y  elaraednu 
 iTanft.  Vay- 
 yesh.  3]. 
 
 of  the  house,  that  of  Jonah  on  account  of  a  ship.1  There 
 remains  that  of  Elijah  :  (this  was  universal),  for  it  is  written, 
 44  Go,  and  stand  in  the  mountain.”  2 
 
 .  Then  the  mariners  were  afraid,  and  cried  every  man 
 
 UNTO  HIS  GOD. 
 
 R.  Hanina  said,  There  were  seventy  languages  there  in 
 the  ship,  and  each  man  carried  his  own  idol  and  god  in  his 
 hand;  and  they  said,  The  god  who  shall  answer  and  deliver 
 us  from  this  present  distress,  he  is  the  true  god. 
 
 And  he  said  to  them,  Take  me  up  and  hurl  me  into  the 
 
 SEA. 
 
 R.  Nathan  said,  Jonah  went  only  to  destroy  himself  in 
 the  sea,  for  it  is  said,  44  And  he  said  to  them,  Take  me  up 
 and  hurl  me  into  the  sea.”  And  so  you  find  that  the  fathers 
 and  the  prophets  were  ready  to  give  up  their  lives  for  Israel. 
 Of  Moses  it  is  written,  44  Yet  now,  if  thou  wilt  forgive  their 
 sin  : — and  if  not,  blot  me,  I  pray  thee,  out  of  thy  book  ” 
 (Exod.  xxxii.  32) :  and  again,  44  And  if  thou  deal  thus  with 
 me,  kill  me,  I  pray  thee,  out  of  hand  ”  (Num.  xi.  15).  Of 
 David  it  is  written,  44  Let  thy  hand,  I  pray  thee,  be  against 
 me  and  my  father’s  house  ”  (1  Chron.  xxi.  17).  And  so  you 
 find  everywhere  that  the  fathers  were  ready  to  give  up  their 
 lives  for  Israel. 
 
 So  THEY  TOOK  UP  JONAH  AND  HURLED  HIM  INTO  THE 
 SEA. 
 
 The  Scripture  says, 44  How  great  are  thy  works,  O  Lord  !  ” 
 (Ps.  xcii.  5).  R.  Simeon  b.  Yohai  said,  There  are  creatures 
 which  are  reared  in  the  sea  and  not  on  dry  land,  and  vice 
 versa.  If  those  reared  in  the  sea  are  put  on  dry  land  they 
 will  not  live  :  so  if  those  reared  on  dry  land  are  brought 
 down  into  the  sea  they  will  not  live.  Yet  Jonah  went 
 down  to  the  sea  and  lived,  for  it  is  said,  44  They  took  up 
 
 1  These,  then,  were  not  sent  to  destroy  the  world,  but  were  confined  to 
 places  where  they  had  to  do  their  particular  work  of  destruction. 
 
 2  See  Koheleth  Hub.  i.  6, 
 
YALKUT  OF  R.  MACHIR  BAR  ABBA  MARI  45 
 
 Jonah  and  hurled  him  into  the  sea  ” ;  and  the  fish  went  up 
 to  the  dry  land  and  lived,  for  it  is  said,  “  And  the  Lord 
 spake  unto  the  fish,  and  it  vomited  out  Jonah  upon  the  dry 
 land  ”  (Jonah  ii.  10). 
 
 What  did  they  do  ?  They  took  up  Jonah  and  stood  by  Pirke  R. 
 the  sides  of  the  ship  and  said,  O  eternal  God  !  bring  not  on 
 us  innocent  blood,  for  we  know  not  what  is  the  character 
 of  this  man  who  says,  Because  of  me  has  all  this  evil  befallen 
 you.  Then  they  threw  him  into  the  sea  up  to  his  ankles, 
 and  the  sea  ceased  from  its  raging.  They  took  him  into 
 the  ship  again,  and  the  sea  became  tempestuous.  They 
 again  threw  him  in  up  to  his  navel,  and  the  raging  of  the 
 sea  ceased.  On  their  taking  him  into  the  ship,  the  sea 
 again  became  tempestuous.  At  last  they  threw  him  in 
 altogether,  and  the  raging  of  the  sea  ceased,  as  it  is  written, 
 
 “  So  they  took  up  Jonah  and  hurled  him  into  the  sea,  and 
 the  sea  ceased  from  its  raging.” 
 
 Then  the  men  feared  the  Lord  exceedingly.  i.  ie. 
 
 They  returned  to  Joppa  and  went  up  to  Jerusalem,  where  gjv^zc9^10 
 they  were  circumcised ;  for  it  is  said,  “  And  the  men  feared 
 [the  Lord]  exceedingly,”  etc. 
 
 And  they  offered  a  sacrifice. 
 
 But  did  they  indeed  offer  a  sacrifice,  since  it  is  written 
 that  sacrifices  are  not  received  from  the  Gentiles  ?  1  But 
 they  circumcised  themselves  :  and  the  blood  of  circumcision 
 is  as  good  as  the  blood  of  sacrifice. 
 
 And  they  made  vows. 
 
 They  vowed  and  resolved  to  dedicate  their  children  and 
 all  their  belongings  to  the  God  of  Jonah,  and  of  them  it  is 
 said,  (May  thy  blessing  rest)  on  the  righteous  and  on  true 
 proselytes. 
 
 1  See  Sifru,  p.  98  a  (ed.  Weiss),  and  the  note  in  Friedmann’s  Pesik.  Rab. 
 p.  192  a. 
 
46 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 ii.  1 
 
 Nodar.  51. 
 
 Pirke  R. 
 Eliezer,  10. 
 
 Mid.  Sam¬ 
 uel,  4. 
 
 And  the  Lord  prepared  a  great  fish  to  swallow  up 
 Jonah. 
 
 There  is  a  Baraitha,1 2 *  R.  Simeon  b.  Elazar  said,  If  one 
 says  “  Them  (4  fish,’  singular)  which  I  taste,”  he  is  forbidden 
 to  taste  large  fish  and  permitted  to  taste  small  ones  :  but 
 if  he  says  44  The  nn  (fern,  of  m)  which  I  taste,”  he  is  for¬ 
 bidden  to  taste  small  fish  and  permitted  to  taste  large  ones ; 
 if  he  says  21  and  nm  he  is  forbidden  both  large  and  small. 
 R.  Papa  said  to  Abayi,  How  do  you  know  that  the  fish  (m) 
 which  I  taste  is  a  large  one  ?  Since  it  is  written,  44  And 
 the  Lord  prepared  a  great  fish  (21)  to  swallow  up  Jonah.” 
 But  it  is  also  written,  44  And  Jonah  prayed  unto  the  Lord 
 out  of  the  belly  of  the  fish  (nm).”  There  is  no  difficulty 
 about  this,  since  it  may  be  a  great  fish  vomited  him  and  a 
 small  fish  swallowed  him.  In  another  passage,  44  And  the 
 fish  (nm)  that  was  in  the  river  died”  (Exod.  vii.  21),  is  it 
 necessary  to  suppose  that  the  little  fish  died  but  not  the 
 large  ones,  (since  has  the  meaning  of  “small  fish  ”)  ? 
 Of  course  it  means  that  both  kinds  died.  In  vows,  however, 
 the  ordinary  rules  of  speech  are  followed  (21  of  large,  nm  of 
 small  fish). 
 
 R.  Simeon  said,  That  fish  was  prepared  from  the  six  days 
 of  creation  to  swallow  up  Jonah.  He  went  into  its  mouth 
 as  easily  as  a  man  enters  into  the  Great  Synagogue.12  The 
 two  eyes  of  the  fish  were  like  glass  windows  which  gave  light 
 to  Jonah  like  the  sun  when  it  shineth  at  noon,  so  that  he 
 saw  whatever  was  in  the  sea  and  in  the  depths,  for  it  is  said, 
 44  Light  is  sown  for  the  righteous  ”  (Ps.  xcvii.  11). 
 
 There  is  prayer  which  is  answered  after  a  hundred  years, 
 as  in  the  case  of  Abraham,  44  And  Abraham  was  a  hundred 
 years  old”  (Gen.  xxi.  5);  after  ninety,  as  in  the  case  of 
 Sarah,  “And  shall  Sarah,  that  is  ninety  years  old,  bear  ?  ” 
 (Gen.  xvii.  17) ;  after  eighty,  as  in  the  case  of  Moses,  44  And 
 Moses  was  eighty  years  old  ”  (Exod.  vii.  7);  after  seventy, 
 
 1  A  Baraitha  is  a  taimaite  tradition  not  incorporated  in  the  Mishna. 
 See  note  in  Streane’s  Chagigah,  p.  147. 
 
 2  See  Zohar,  Bishloa\ i,  48,  and  the  note  of  R.  David  Luria  on  P.  R.E. 
 
 in  loc. 
 
YALKUT  OF  R.  MACHIR  BAR  ABBA  MARI  47 
 
 for  it  is  said,  “  After  seventy  years  be  accomplished  for 
 Babylon”  (Jer.  xxix.  10);  after  sixty,  as  in  the  case  of 
 Isaac,  44  And  Isaac  was  sixty  years  old  when  she  bare 
 them  ”  (Gen.  xxv.  26) ;  after  fifty,  as  in  the  case  of  Samuel, 
 
 44  That  he  may  abide  there  for  ever  ”  (1  Sam.  i.  22) — and 
 there  is  no  44  for  ever  ”  of  the  Levites  but  fifty  years,  for  it  is 
 written,  44  And  from  the  age  of  fifty  years  they  shall  cease 
 waiting  upon  the  work  ”  (Num.  viii.  25) ;  the  number  of 
 years  is  really  fifty-two,  but  as  R.  Jose  said,  the  two  years 
 of  weaning  are  not  reckoned.1  There  is  prayer  which  is 
 answered  at  forty  years,  as  in  the  case  of  Isaac,  4 ‘And  Isaac 
 was  forty  years  old  ”  (Gen.  xxv.  20) ;  at  thirty,  as  in  the 
 case  of  Joseph,  44  And  Joseph  was  thirty  years  old  ”  {ibid. 
 xli.  46) ;  at  twenty,  as  in  the  case  of  Jacob,  44  These  twenty 
 years  have  I  been  in  thy  house  ”  {ibid.  xxi.  41);  after  ten 
 days,  as  in  the  case  of  Jeremiah,  44  And  it  came  to  pass  after 
 ten  days  ”  (Jer.  xlii.  7) ;  after  seven  days,  as  in  the  case  of 
 Miriam,  44  And  Miriam  was  shut  up  seven  days  ”  (Num. 
 xii.  15) ;  after  three  days,  as  in  the  case  of  Jonah,  44  And 
 Jonah  was  in  the  belly  of  the  fish  three  days.”  There  is 
 prayer,  too,  which  has  no  opportunity  of  utterance  till  it  is 
 answered,  for  it  is  said,  44  And  the  Lord  said  unto  Moses, 
 Wherefore  criest  thou  unto  me  ?  speak  unto  the  children 
 of  Israel,  that  they  go  forward  ”  (Exod.  xiv.  15). 
 
 44  The  birds  of  the  heavens,  and  the  fish  of  the  sea,  and  Mid.  Timm, 
 whatsoever  passeth  through  the  paths  of  the  seas”  (Ps. 
 viii.  9).  The  birds  of  the  heavens — this  is  Elijah,  who  goes 
 around  the  world  like  a  bird,2  for  it  is  said,  44  And  the 
 ravens  were  bringing  to  him  bread  and  flesh  ”  (1  Kings  xvii. 
 
 10)  :  the  fish  of  the  sea — this  is  Jonah,  for  it  is  said,  44  And 
 Jonah  was  in  the  bowels  of  the  fish  ”  :  whatsoever  passeth 
 through  the  paths  of  the  seas — this  is  Israel,  for  it  is  said, 
 
 44  And  the  children  of  Israel  walked  upon  dry  land  in  the 
 midst  of  the  sea”  (Exod.  xiv.  29). 
 
 44  And  it  came  to  pass  on  the  third  day,  that  Esther  put  Mid.  Bather 
 on  her  royal  apparel  ”  (Esther  v.  1).  The  children  of  Israel 
 
 1  See  Mid.  Sam.  ii.  9  (ed.  Buber). 
 
 2  See  Targum  on  Koh.  x.  20 ;  Bcr.  4  b. 
 
48 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 are  never  given  over  to  distress  for  more  than  three  days. 
 In  the  case  of  Abraham  it  is  written,  “And  it  came  to  pass 
 on  the  third  day  that  Abraham  lifted  up  his  eyes  and  saw 
 the  place  afar  off  ”  (Gen.  xxii.  4);  in  that  of  the  brethren 
 of  Joseph,  “And  he  put  them  in  ward  three  days”  (ibid. 
 xlii.  17);  in  that  of  Jonah,  “  And  Jonah  was  in  the  belly 
 of  the  fish  three  days.” 
 
 ii.  3.  And  he  said,  I  called  out  of  my  affliction  unto  the 
 Loud,  etc. 
 
 Erubin,  19. 
 
 Pirke  R. 
 Eliezer,  10. 
 
 R.  Elazar  said,  There  are  three  gates  to  Gehenna,  one 
 in  the  wilderness,  one  in  the  sea,  and  one  in  Jerusalem. 
 One  in  the  wilderness,  for  it  is  written,  “  And  they  went 
 down,  they  and  all  that  belonged  to  them,  to  Sheol  ”  (Num. 
 xvi.  33) ;  one  in  the  sea,  for  it  is  written,  “  From  the  belly 
 of  Sheol  did  I  cry  ”  ;  and  one  in  Jerusalem,  for  it  is  written, 
 “  Whose  fire  is  in  Zion,  and  his  furnace  in  Jerusalem  ” 
 (Isa.  xxxi.  9).  A  student  of  the  school  of  R.  Ishmael  taught 
 “  Whose  fire  is  in  Zion  ” — this  is  Gehenna;  “  and  his  furnace 
 in  Jerusalem  ” — this  is  the  gate  of  Gehenna. 
 
 R.  Joshua  b.  Levi  said,  Gehenna  has  seven  names,  which 
 are,  Sheol,  Abaddon,  pit  of  corruption,  pit  of  horror,  mire 
 of  clay,  shadow  of  death,  and  the  subterranean  world. 
 Sheol,  for  it  is  written,  “From  the  belly  of  Sheol  did  1 
 cry  ” ;  Abaddon,  for  it  is  said,  “  Thy  faithfulness  in  Abad¬ 
 don  ”  (Ps.  lxxxviii.  12) 1 ;  pit  of  corruption,  for  it  is  said, 
 “  Thou  wilt  not  suffer  thine  holy  one  to  see  corruption  ” 
 (ibid.  xvi.  10);  pit  of  horror  and  mire  of  clay,  for  it  is 
 written,  “  And  he  brought  me  up  out  of  an  horrible  pit, 
 out  of  the  miry  clay  ”  (ibid.  xl.  1) ;  shadow  of  death,  for  it  is 
 written,  “  Those  that  sit  in  darkness  and  the  shadow  of 
 death  ”  (ibid.  cvii.  10) ;  the  subterranean  world — this  name 
 is  a  mere  tradition.  Are  there  no  others  ?  It  is  called  also 
 Gehenna. 
 
 And  he  showed  him  Gehenna,  for  it  is  written,  “  From 
 the  belly  of  Sheol  I  cried  out.” 
 
 1  See  marginal  rendering  of  R.V. 
 
VALKUT  OF  R.  MACHIR  BAR  ABBA  MARI  4!) 
 
 To  the  first 1  he  shall  add,  May  he  who  answered  Abraham  Than.  Jcr. 
 
 ii»  4» 
 
 our  father,  etc.  [answer  you] !  to  the  second,  May  he  who 
 answered  our  fathers,  etc. ;  to  the  third,  May  he  who 
 answered  Joshua,  etc. ;  to  the  fourth,  May  he  who  answered 
 Samuel,  etc. ;  to  the  fifth,  May  he  who  answered  Elijah, 
 etc. ;  to  the  sixth,  May  he  who  answered  Jonah  in  the  bowels 
 of  the  fish  answer  you  and  hearken  to  your  cry  on  this 
 day.  Blessed  art  thou,  O  Lord,  who  answerest  in  the  time 
 of  distress  and  savest.  It  is  written  of  Jonah,  44  I  called 
 out  of  my  affliction,”  etc.  These  additional  prayers  should 
 mention  David  and  Solomon  before  Elijah  and  Jonah ;  but 
 David  and  Solomon  are  mentioned  out  of  chronological 
 order  so  as  to  close  with  the  benediction,  Thou  who  hast 
 compassion  on  the  land  !  To  the  seventh  2  he  shall  add, 
 
 May  he  who  answered  David  and  Solomon  his  son,  etc. 
 [Blessed  art  thou  who  hast  compassion  on  the  land  !] 
 
 Eor  thou  didst  cast  me  into  the  depth,  in  the  heart  a.  4. 
 
 OF  THE  SEAS. 
 
 Jonah  went  down  to  one  depth,  for  it  is  said,  44  Thou 
 didst  cast  me  into  the  depth  (riVm).”  The  Egyptians 
 went  down  into  two,  for  it  is  said,  44  They  went  down  into 
 the  depths  (mVm)  like  a  stone”  (Exod.  xv.  5).  And  there 
 are  no  depths  but  mighty  waters,  for  it  is  said,  44  Thou  didst 
 cast  me  into  the  depth, — the  heart  of  the  seas.” 
 
 When  Hadrian,  king  of  Rome,  had  conquered  the  world, 
 he  went  to  Rome  and  said  to  his  courtiers,  I  wish  you  to 
 make  me  a  god,  for  I  have  conquered  the  world.  They 
 said  to  him,  But  thou  hast  not  yet  ruled  over  God’s  house 
 and  city.  He  went,  and  with  God's  permission,  destroyed 
 the  sanctuary  and  took  Israel  captive.  On  his  return  to 
 Rome  he  said,  Make  me  a  god,  for  I  have  destroyed  God’s 
 house  and  burnt  his  temple-palace  and  have  taken  captive 
 his  people.  R.  Berachiah  said,  He  had  three  philosophers 
 
 Mekilta, 
 Bishloahy  5. 
 
 Yelamednu 
 [TanJiuraa, 
 Bnesh.  71. 
 
 1  On  the  seven  last  fast  days  the  minister  is  directed  to  say  the  eighteen 
 blessings  of  the  daily  prayer  (Amidah),  and  to  add  six  more. 
 
 2  This  blessing  is  called  the  seventh  as  being  the  seventh  in  which 
 additional  matter  is  introduced,  for  the  first  blessing  ending  ^TJ*'  bNU 
 (the  Birkath  ha-Gc’ullah)  is  one  of  the  eighteen  blessings  of  the  Amidah. 
 
 K 
 
 / 
 
50 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 there.  The  first  said  to  him,  No  one  rebels  against  a  king 
 when  he  is  in  his  palace,  but  only  outside  it ;  go  out  from 
 God’s  palaces  and  thou  shalt  be  made  a  god:  He  created  the 
 heavens  and  the  earth ;  go  out  from  them  and  thou  shalt  be 
 made  a  god.  The  second  said  to  him,  You  cannot,  for 
 already  it  is  said,  “  The  gods  that  have  not  made  the  heaven 
 and  the  earth  shall  perish  from  the  earth  and  from  under 
 the  heavens  ”  (Jer.  x.  11).  The  third  said  to  him,  I  pray 
 you  help  me  at  this  time.  He  said,  How  ?  He  answered, 
 I  have  a  ship  three  miles  away  tossing  in  the  sea  and  all  my 
 treasures  are  there.  Hadrian  said,  I  will  send  my  legions 
 and  ships  to  rescue  them.  He  answered,  But  why  trouble  ? 
 send  but  a  little  wind,  and  you  can  rescue  them.  He  said, 
 Whence  have  I  a  wind  to  send  ?  He  answered,  If  you 
 cannot  send  the  wind  (mnn),  how  will  you  make  yourself 
 a  god,  for  it  is  written,  “  Thus  saith  the  Lord,  he  that 
 created  the  heavens  .  .  .  that  giveth  breath  unto  the  people 
 upon  it,  and  spirit  (Pin)  to  them  that  walk  therein  ”  ?  (Isa. 
 xlii.  5).  When  he  returned  to  his  house  angry,  his  wife  said 
 to  him,  These  people  have  deceived  you  into  thinking  you 
 can  be  made  a  god  since  you  are  a  powerful  and  rich  king 
 and  have  everything  in  your  possession.  I  advise  you  to 
 give  back  to  God  his  deposit,  and  so  be  made  a  god.  He 
 said  to  her,  And  what  is  the  deposit  ?  She  answered,  The 
 soul.  He  said,  If  the  soul  go  forth  what  can  I  do  ?  She 
 answered,  You  cannot  rule  the  soul  within  you,  for  it  is 
 written,  “  There  is  no  man  that  hath  power  over  the  spirit 
 to  retain  the  spirit,  neither  hath  he  power  over  the  day  of 
 death  ”  (Eccles.  viii.  8).  How  canst  thou  be  made  a  god, 
 since  you  are  but  a  man  ?  God  said,  I  revive  the  dead; 
 Elijah  revived  the  dead,  yet  he  did  not  say,  I  am  God. 
 God  said,  I  bring  down  rains;  Elijah  brought  down  rains. 
 God  said,  I  restrain  rains;  so  did  Elijah,  for  it  is  said, 
 “  There  shall  be  neither  dew  nor  rain  ”  (1  Kings  xvii.  1). 
 God  said,  I  brought  downfireand  brimstone;  so, too, Elijah, 
 for  it  is  said,  “  If  I  be  a  man  of  God,  let  fire  come  down  from 
 heaven”  (2  Kingsi.10).  Yet,  though  Elijah  made  no  such 
 claim,  thou  sayest,  I  am  God.  But  if  you  say  that  you  have 
 
YALKUT  OF  R.  MACHIR  BAR  ABBA  MARI  51 
 
 lived  long;  Elijah  lives  unto  the  resurrection.  It  is  written 
 of  God,  44  His  throne  was  fiery  flames  ”  (Dan.  vii.  9) ;  and  of 
 Elijah,  44  And  lo  !  a  chariot  of  fire  and  horses  of  fire  ” 
 (2  Kings  ii.  11).  It  is  written  of  God,  44  The  Lord  hath  his 
 way  in  the  whirlwind  and  in  the  storm”  (Nahum  i.  3) ;  Elijah 
 went  up  in  a  whirlwind  to  heaven,  yet  he  requested  that 
 he  might  die.  But  you  say,  44  I  am  a  god,  and  sit  in  the 
 seat  of  God,  in  the  heart  of  the  seas  ”  (Ezek.  xxviii.  2). 
 Jonah  went  down  into  the  sea,  for  it  is  said,  44  Thou  didst 
 cast  me  into  the  depth,  in  the  heart  of  the  seas.”  He 
 returned  and  said,  44  And  now,  0  Lord,  take,  I  beseech 
 thee,  my  life  from  me  ”  (Jonah  iv.  3).  Yet  thou  sayest,  I 
 am  a  god.  .  .  . 
 
 The  fish  said  to  Jonah,  Do  you  not  know  that  I  have 
 come  to  be  devoured  by  Leviathan  ?  Jonah  said,  Take 
 me  to  him,  and  I  will  deliver  both  thee  and  myself.  Im¬ 
 mediately  he  brought  him  to  Leviathan.  He  said  to  him, 
 I  have  come  to  see  thy  dwelling-place  in  the  sea,  and  am 
 about  to  put  a  rope  on  thy  tongue  and  bring  thee  up  to  the 
 great  feast  of  the  righteous.1  Jonah  showed  him  the  seal 
 of  Abraham  our  father,  which  when  Leviathan  saw  he  fled 
 from  Jonah  a  two  days’  journey.  Jonah  said  to  the  fish, 
 I  have  delivered  thee  from  the  mouth  of  Leviathan,  show 
 me  all  that  is  in  the  sea  and  in  the  depths.  So  he  showed 
 him  the  great  river  of  the  waters  of  the  ocean,  for  it  is  said, 
 k4  And  the  flood  was  round  about  me  ” ;  and  also  the  source 
 whence  the  billows  and  waves  of  the  sea  come  forth,  for  it 
 is  said,  44  All  thy  waves  and  thy  billows  passed  over  me.” 
 
 Pii  ke  R. 
 Eliezer,  10. 
 
 The  waters  compassed  me  about,  even  to  the  soul,  u.e. 
 
 ETC. 
 
 Jonah  went  down  to  one  depth,  for  it  is  said,  44  The  depth  Metm*, 
 
 1  Bnhloah ,  5, 
 
 was  round  about  me  :  the  Egyptians  went  down  to  the 
 
 1  The  flesh  of  the  female  Leviathan  originally  created  by  God  was 
 reserved  for  the  feast  of  the  righteous  to  be  given  at  Messiah’s  advent. 
 See  Baba  Bathra,  74  a.  Leviathan  is  prominent  in  liaggadie  literature  in 
 connection  with  Messiah’s  advent.  See  Levit.  Rab.  xiii.  3,  Kohut,  Aruch 
 s-v- 
 
Pirke  H. 
 Eliezer,  10. 
 
 ii.  7 
 
 Pirke  R. 
 Eliezer,  10. 
 
 Tanl.mma, 
 Vai/yafs,  7 
 (Buber). 
 
 52  LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 depths,  for  it  is  said,  “The  deeps  cover  them”  (Exod. 
 
 xv.  5).1 
 
 The  fish  showed  Jonah  the  paths  of  the  sea  (abounding  in 
 seaweed)  through  the  midst  of  which  Israel  had  passed,  for 
 it  is  said,  “  The  weeds  were  wrapped  about  my  head.” 
 
 I  WENT  DOWN  TO  THE  BOTTOMS  OF  THE  MOUNTAINS,  ETC. 
 
 lie  showed  him  under  the  temple  of  God,  for  it  is  written, 
 “  I  went  down  to  the  bottoms  of  the  mountains.”  Whence 
 we  learn  that  Jerusalem  stands  on  seven  hills.  And  he 
 saw  there  “the  stone  of  foundation”2  fixed  in  the  depths, 
 and  the  sons  of  Korah  standing  and  offering  prayer  upon 
 it.  They  said  to  Jonah,  Lo  !  you  are  standing  beneath 
 the  Temple ;  pray  and  you  shall  be  answered.  Immediately 
 he  said  to  the  fish,  Stay  where  you  are,  for  I  desire  to  pray 
 before  God.  He  said,  O  Lord  of  all  the  worlds,  thou  art 
 called  One  who  br ingest  down  to  Sheol  and  bringest  up  ; 3 
 lo  !  I  have  come  down,  bring  thou  me  up.  Thou  art 
 called  One  who  killest  and  makest  alive ;  lo  !  mv  soul  hath 
 reached  to  death,  preserve  me  alive.  But  he  was  not 
 answered  till  he  said,  What  I  have  vowed  I  will  pay  in  the 
 day  of  Israel’s  salvation ;  for  it  is  said,  “  I  will  sacrifice  unto 
 thee  with  the  voice  of  thanksgiving;  I  will  pay  that  which 
 I  have  vowed  :  salvation  is  of  the  Lord  ”  (Jonah  ii.  9). 
 Immediately  God  gave  the  fish  a  sign,  and  it  vomited  up 
 Jonah  on  the  dry  land.  And  the  fish  showed  Jonah  the 
 foundations  of  the  earth  in  their  defined  places,  for  it  is 
 said,  “  The  earth  with  her  bars  was  about  me  for  ever.” 
 He  showed  him  also  the  nethermost  Sheol,  for  it  is  said, 
 “And  thou  didst  bring  up  my  life  from  the  pit,  O  Lord  my 
 God.” 
 
 “  And  he  dreamed,  and  lo  !  a  ladder  set  up  on  the  earth  ” 
 (Gen.  xxviii.  12).  R.  Simeon  b.  Elazar  said,  He  showed 
 it  to  Jonah,  for  it  is  said,  “  I  went  down  to  the  bottoms 
 
 1  See  above  on  ii.  4. 
 
 2  See  Pirke  II.  Eliezer ,  xxxv.  (end) ;  Moses  de  Leon,  Shelf  cl  Hakkodesh 
 (ed.  Greenup),  p.  95. 
 
 3  1  Sam.  ii.  6. 
 
YALKUT  OF  R.  MACHIR  BAR  ABBA  MARI  53 
 
 of  the  mountains;  the  earth  with  her  bars  was  about  me 
 for  ever.”  “  And  the  top  of  it  reached  to  heaven  ”  (ibid.). 
 
 He  showed  it  to  Elijah,  for  it  is  said,  44  And  Elijah  went  up 
 in  the  whirlwind  to  heaven  ”  (2  Kings  ii.  12). 
 
 When  my  soul  fainted  within  me,  etc.  «.  8. 
 
 44  For  the  spirit  (wind)  should  fail  before  me  ”  (Isa.  lvii.  Beresh.Rab. 
 10).  R.  Iiuna  said,  When  the  wind  goes  forth  into  the 
 world,  the  Holy  One  breaks  it  up  amongst  the  mountains 
 and  weakens  its  force  amongst  the  hills,  saying  to  it, 
 
 Take  care  not  to  injure  any  of  my  creatures,  for  it  is 
 written,  44  For  the  spirit  should  fail  before  me.” 
 
 What  does  44  should  fail  ”  mean  ? — the  wind  gets  tired,  as 
 it  is  written,  44  When  my  spirit  fainted  (grew  tired)  within 
 me  ”  (Ps.  cxlii.  3).1 
 
 They  that  regard  lying  vanities  forsake  their  own  u.  o. 
 
 MERCY. 
 
 When  the  sailors  saw  all  the  signs,  wonders  and  miracles  Poke  r. 
 
 &  Eliezer,  10. 
 
 that  God  had  done  to  Jonah  they  cast  away  every  man  his 
 gods,  for  it  is  said,  44  They  that  regard  lying  vanities  forsake 
 their  own  mercy.”  2 
 
 But  I  WILL  SACRIFICE  UNTO  THEE  WITH  THE  VOICE  OF  ii.  10. 
 THANKSGIVING,  ETC. 
 
 44  Let  us  come  before  his  presence  with  thanksgiving  ”  mm.  Tuiim, 
 
 •  xcv.  1 
 
 (Ps.  xcv.  1).  Great  is  the  power  of  thanksgiving,  as  Jonah 
 says,  44  But  I  will  sacrifice  unto  thee  with  the  voice  of 
 thanksgiving,  I  will  pay  that  which  I  have  vowed.”  3 
 
 And  the  Lord  spake  unto  the  fish,  and  it  vomited  out  u.  n. 
 Jonah  upon  the  dry  land. 
 
 44  Who  is  as  the  Lord  our  God  whensoever  we  call  upon  mm.  Tiiiim, 
 
 A  xcv.  2. 
 
 him  ?  ”  (Deut.  iv.  7).  R.  Judan  says,  A  human  being  had 
 a  patron  who  was  told  that  the  son  of  his  house  had  been 
 
 1  See  Berach.  J'er.  ix.  3 ;  Vayyik.  Bab.  15. 
 
 2  IDn  being  interpreted  as  “god.”  See  Kimchi  on  Jonah  ii.  9. 
 
 See  Pirke  R.  Eliezer ,  c.  10,  and  Ya/k.  Mach,  on  Jonah  ii.  7* 
 
54 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 Beresh.Rab. 
 
 v.  5. 
 
 Beresli.Rab. 
 xx.  3. 
 
 seized.  He  said,  I  will  recover  him.  They  said  to  him. 
 He  is  cast  into  the  sea.  Where  is  his  patron  ?  It  is  not 
 so  with  God,  blessed  be  He  !  He  delivered  Jonah  from 
 the  bowels  of  the  fish,  for  it  is  said,  “  And  God  spake  to 
 the  fish,  and  it  vomited  lip  Jonah  upon  the  dry  land.” 
 And  so  it  is  written  in  the  commentary  on  Joel  at  the  verse, 
 44  And  it  shall  come  to  pass,  that  whosoever  shall  call  on  the 
 name  of  the  Lord  shall  be  delivered  ”  (Joel  ii.  23). 
 
 44  Now  the  sea  returned  to  his  strength  when  the  morning 
 appeared”  (Exod.  xiv.  27) — to  the  stipulations  which  God 
 made  with  it.1  R.  Jeremiah  b.  Elazar  said,  Not  with  the 
 sea  alone  did  God  stipulate,  but  with  all  that  He  created  on 
 the  six  days  of  creation.  Thus  we  read,  44  I,  even  my  hands, 
 have  stretched  out  the  heavens,  and  all  their  host  have  I 
 commanded  ”  (Isa.  xlv.  12).  I  commanded  the  sea  to  be 
 divided  before  Israel.  I  commanded  the  sun  and  the  moon 
 to  stand  before  Joshua,  for  it  is  said,  u  Sun,  stand  thou  still 
 upon  Gibeon ;  and  thou,  moon,  in  the  valley  of  Ajalon  ” 
 (Joshua  x.  12).  I  commanded  the  heavens  and  the  earth  to 
 be  silent  before  Moses,  for  it  is  said,  14  Give  ear,  O  heavens, 
 and  I  will  speak,”  etc.  (Deut.  xxxii.  1).  I  commanded 
 the  ravens  to  feed  Elijah,  for  it  is  said,  “  And  the  ravens 
 brought  him  bread  and  flesh  ”  (1  Kings  xvii.  6).  I  com¬ 
 manded  the  furnace  not  to  hurt  Hananiah,  Mishael  and 
 Azariah,  for  it  is  said,  44  And  the  smell  of  fire  had  not  passed 
 on  them  ”  (Dan.  iii.  27).  I  commanded  the  lions  not  to 
 injure  Daniel,  for  it  is  said,  44  My  God  hath  sent  his  angel, 
 and  hath  shut  the  lions’  mouths  ”  (ibid.  vi.  22).  I  com¬ 
 manded  the  heavens  to  open  to  Ezekiel,  for  it  is  said,  44  The 
 heavens  were  opened  and  I  saw  visions  of  God  ”  (Ezek.  i.  1). 
 I  commanded  the  fish  to  vomit  forth  Jonah,  for  it  is  said, 
 44  And  the  Lord  spake  unto  the  fish,  and  it  vomited  out 
 Jonah  upon  the  dry  land.” 
 
 to3  craa  nrat&n  but  three  face  to 
 
 face,  because  the  Shekinah  has  spoken  with  them — man, 
 
 1  The  Midrasli  reads  y&on  for  -(jyN  by  metathesis.  The  stipulation  was 
 said  to  he  made  at  the  Creation  that  the  sea  should  he  divided  before 
 Israel.  See  Exodus  Rob,  c.  21, 
 
YALKUT  OF  R.  MACHIR  BAR  ABBA  MARI  55 
 
 the  serpent,  and  the  fish.  Man — 64  and  unto  the  man  He 
 said  ”  (Gen.  iii.  17) ;  the  serpent — 44  and  the  Lord  said  unto 
 the  serpent  ”  (ibid.  iii.  4);  the  fish — 44  and  the  Lord  spake 
 unto  the  fish.”  1 
 
 R.  Zeirah  b.  R.  Abhu  in  the  name  of  R.  Elieser  said, 
 44  Happy  is  he  that  hath  the  God  of  Jacob  for  his  help, 
 whose  hope  is  in  the  Lord  his  God  ”  (Ps.  cxlvi.  5) ;  and  what 
 comes  after  this  ? — 44  Who  made  heaven  and  earth,  the 
 sea,  and  all  that  in  them  is,  who  keepeth  truth  for  ever.” 
 What  has  this  latter  passage  to  do  with  the  former  ?  A 
 human  being  has  a  patron  who  may  have  power  in  one 
 province  (and  not  in  another) ;  if  you  say,  He  is  lord  of  the 
 world,2  ruling  over  the  dry  land ;  it  does  not  follow  that  he 
 rules  over  the  sea.  God,  however,  rules  both  over  the  dry 
 land  and  over  the  sea  :  he  delivers  in  the  sea  and  on  the  dry 
 land  :  he  delivered  Moses  from  the  sword  of  Pharaoh,  and 
 Jonah  from  the  bowels  of  the  fish,  for  it  is  said,  4k  And  the 
 Lord  spake  to  the  fish,  and  it  vomited  out  Jonah  on  the  dry 
 land.” 
 
 And  the  word  of  the  Lord  came  unto  Jonah  a  second 
 time. 
 
 A  second  time  the  Shekinah  spake  with  him,  but  not  a 
 third.  But  it  is  written,  44  He  restored  the  coast  of  Israel 
 from  the  entering  of  Hamath,  according  to  the  word  of  the 
 Lord,  the  God  of  Israel,  which  he  spake  by  the  hand  of  his 
 servant  Jonah,  the  son  of  Amittai,  the  prophet,  who  was 
 of  Gathhepher  (2  Kings  xiv.  25).  Rabbena  said,  This  verse 
 has  reference  to  the  affairs  of  Nineveh.  R.  Nahman  b. 
 Isaac  said,  It  means  that  just  as  at  Nineveh  by  the  word  of 
 the  Lord  which  he  spake  by  the  hand  of  his  servant  Jonah, 
 the  son  of  Amittai,  the  prophet,  evil  was  changed  to  good, 
 so  in  the  days  of  Jeroboam,  the  son  of  Joash,  was  evil 
 changed  to  good  for  Israel.3 
 
 1  Here  is  inserted  the  piece  from  Yelamednu  identical  with  that  on  i.  15. 
 
 2  YlD'^pIDTIp  ==  Koafj.oKp6.Twp,  a  title  of  the  Roman  emperor. 
 
 3  So  that  ^the  word  of  the  Lord”  in  2  Kings  xiv.  25  has  no  reference 
 to  a  prophecy  given  in  the  days  of  Jeroboam  II. 
 
 Berach. 
 ix.  1. 
 
 iii.  1. 
 
 Yebam. 
 
56 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 i.  2. 
 
 Beresh.Rab. 
 xxxix.  9. 
 
 iii.  3. 
 
 Eleh.  Sh. 
 Bab.  iv.  8. 
 
 Tan  bum  a, 
 Vayyik.  18 
 (Buber). 
 
 Arise,  go  to  Nineveh,  that  great  city,  etc. 
 
 44  To  a  land  which  I  will  show  thee,”  etc.  (Gen.  xii.  1). 
 Why  was  it  not  revealed  to  him  at  once  ?  In  order  to  give 
 him  a  reward  on  each  occasion  of  God’s  speaking  to  him. 
 For,  said  R.  Huna  in  the  name  of  R.  Jose,  God  delays  and 
 holds  a  matter  in  suspense  before  the  eyes  of  the  righteous, 
 as  in  the  commands,  44  To  the  land  which  I  will  show  thee  ”  ; 
 44  Upon  one  of  the  mountains  which  I  will  tell  thee  of  ” 
 (ibid.  xxii.  2). 
 
 So  Jonah  arose,  and  went  to  Nineveh,  according  to 
 
 THE  WORD  OF  THE  LORD. 
 
 44  But  he  is  in  one  mind,  and  who  can  turn  him  ?  ”  (Job 
 xxiii.  13).  Our  teachers  have  said,  What  is  the  meaning  of 
 this  passage.”  If  He  decrees  anything  against  a  man  no 
 one  can  repeal  it.  Balaam  the  wicked  sought  to  curse 
 Israel ;  against  his  will  was  he  restrained,  for  it  is  said, 
 44  How  shall  I  curse  whom  God  hath  not  cursed  ?  ”  (Num. 
 xxiii.  8).  Jeremiah  sought  that  he  might  not  prophesy, 
 but  he  prophesied  against  his  will,  for  it  is  said,  44  To  whom¬ 
 soever  I  shall  send  thee  thou  shaft  go  ”  (Jer.  i.  7).  Moses 
 declined  to  go  with  the  message  of  God,  for  it  is  said, 44  Send, 
 Lord,  I  pray  thee,  by  the  hand  of  him  whom  thou  wilt 
 send  ”  (Exod.  iv.  13) ;  yet  in  the  end  he  went  against  his  will, 
 for  it  is  said,  44  And  Moses  went  ”  (ibid.  iv.  18).  Jonah, 
 who  would  not  at  first  go  with  the  message  of  God,  yet  went 
 at  last  against  his  will,  for  it  is  said,  44  So  Jonah  arose, 
 and  went  to  Nineveh,  according  to  the  word  of  the  Lord.” 
 
 44  If  any  one  shall  sin  through  error  ”  (Lev.  iv.  2).  You 
 find  three  things  which  are  in  a  man’s  power,  and  three 
 which  are  not.  In  his  power  are  the  mouth,  the  hands, 
 and  the  feet.  The  mouth,  for  if  he  wish  to  occupy  himself 
 with  the  words  of  the  Law,  he  may  do  so ;  and  if  he  wish 
 to  curse  and  blaspheme  with  an  evil  tongue,  he  may  do  so. 
 The  hands,  for  he  can  give  alms  with  them,  and  he  can  also 
 steal  with  them.  The  feet,  for  he  can  walk  with  them  to 
 seek  out  the  sick,  comfort  mourners,  bury  the  dead,  and 
 
YALKUT  OF  R.  MACHIR  BAR  ABBA  MARI  57 
 
 do  kindly  deeds;  he  can  also  walk  with  them  to  commit 
 sin,  commit  adultery,  and  to  steal.  The  three  which  are 
 not  in  his  power  are  the  eyes,  the  ears,  and  the  nose.  The 
 eyes,  for  if  a  man  pass  along  the  street  he  sees  against  his 
 will  some  evil  or  repulsive  thing  or  someone  he  disapproves 
 of.  The  nose,  for  as  he  passes  along  he  smells  unclean 
 dishes,  or  incense  offered  to  idols,  or  drains,  which  he  had 
 no  desire  whatever  to  smell.  The  ears,  for  as  he  passes 
 along  he  hears  blasphemy  and  cursing  or  something  he 
 disapproves  of,  and  cannot  help  himself. 
 
 But  when  God  wills  even  those  named  above  which 
 are  in  a  man’s  power  are  removed  from  his  power,  as  we 
 learn  from  the  cases  of  Moses,  Jonah  and  Jeremiah.  Of 
 Moses  R.  Samuel  b.  Nahman  said,  Seven  days  was  God 
 persuading  Moses  at  the  bush,  “  And  now,  come  and  I  will 
 send  thee  to  Pharaoh”  (Exod.  iii.  10),  but  he  returned  answer, 
 44  I  am  not  eloquent,  neither  heretofore,  nor  since  thou 
 hast  spoken  to  thy  servant”  (ibid.  iv.  10)  these  seven  days; 
 and  he  also  said,  44  Send,  I  pray  thee,  by  the  hand  of  him 
 whom  thou  wilt  send  ”  (ibid.  iv.  13).  But  God  said  to 
 him,  Dost  thou  think  thy  feet  are  in  thine  own  power  ? 
 He  rose  and  went  against  his  will.  Of  Jonah  it  is  said, 
 44  God  said  to  him,  Arise  and  go  to  Nineveh  .  .  .  and  he 
 arose  to  flee  to  Tarshish  ”  (Jonah  i.  1,  2).  At  last  God 
 showed  him  all  those  troubles  in  the  sea — the  fish  swallowed 
 him  and  he  prayed  to  God  from  its  bowels,  and  the  hair 
 of  his  head  and  beard  were  plucked  off  through  the  heat 
 he  endured  there.  Yet  after  this  he  went  against  his  will, 
 for  it  is  said,  44  And  Jonah  arose,  and  went,”  etc.  Of 
 Jeremiah  God  said,  44  Before  I  formed  thee  in  the  womb 
 I  knew  thee  ”  (Jer.  i.  5).  He  said,  4 4  Ah,  Lord  God  !  behold 
 I  cannot  speak,  for  I  am  a  child  ”  (ibid.  i.  6).  God  answered 
 him,  44  Say  not,  I  am  a  child;  for  on  whatsoever  errand  I 
 shall  send  thee  thou  shalt  go,  and  whatsoever  I  command 
 thee  thou  shalt  speak  ”  (ibid.  i.  7) — even  against  thy  will 
 thou  shalt  speak. 
 
 And  when  God  wills  even  the  hands  are  not  in  a  man’s 
 power,  as  we  learn  when  Iddo  the  prophet  came  to  Jero- 
 
58 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 Beresh.Ra!) 
 xxxvii.  4. 
 
 iii.  4, 
 
 Sanhed.  89. 
 
 Pesikta 
 Rab  Ka- 
 hana,  Shu- 
 lah. 
 
 boam,  for  it  is  written,  “  And,  behold,  there  came  a  man  of 
 God  out  of  Judah  by  the  word  of  the  Lord  unto  Bethel ; 
 and  Jeroboam  stood  by  the  altar  .  and  his  hand  dried 
 up,”  etc.  (1  Kings  xiii.  1-4). 
 
 Now  Nineveh  was  an  exceeding  great  city. 
 
 “  And  Resen  between  Nineveh  and  Calah  :  the  same  is 
 the  great  city  ”  (Gen.  x.  12).  We  do  not  know  whether 
 Resen  or  Nineveh  is  the  great  city,  but  a  consideration  of 
 this  passage  in  Jonah  seems  to  show  that  the  reference  is 
 to  Nineveh.1 
 
 And  Jonah  began  to  enter  into  the  city  .  .  .  Nineveh 
 
 SHALL  BE  OVERTHROWN. 
 
 A  Tanna  learned  from  R.  Chisda,  He  who  suppresses  his 
 prophecy  incurs  flagellation.  He  said  to  him,  If  one  ate 
 dates  out  of  a  sieve,2  is  he  punished  ?  Now  who  warned 
 Jonah  ?  Abaye  said,  His  companions  the  prophets.  How 
 did  they  know  (that  he  had  a  prophecy  to  announce)  ? 
 Abaye  said,  It  is  written  that  God  does  nothing  without 
 revealing  his  secret  to  the  prophets  (Amos  iii.  7).  But 
 perhaps  the  heavenly  powers  changed  their  opinion  ?  If 
 so,  those  who  knew  would  have  told  him.  But  in  Jonah’s 
 case,  wdiere  there  was  a  change  of  opinion,  it  was  not  made 
 known  to  him ;  for  from  the  first  he  was  told  that  Nineveh 
 would  be  overthrown,  but  whether  for  good  or  evil  he  did 
 not  know.3 
 
 i 
 
 And  he  made  proclamation  .  .  .  let  neither  man  nor 
 
 BEAST  .  .  .  FEED,  ETC. 
 
 R.  Simeon  b.  Lakish  said,  The  Ninevites  made  a  perfect 
 repentance,  What  did  they  do  ?  R.  Hunya  in  the  name 
 of  R.  Simeon  b.  Halaphta  said,  They  put  the  calves  inside 
 and  the  mothers  outside;  so,  too,  with  the  young  asses. 
 
 1  Cf.  Yoma,  10. 
 
 2  /.  e.  did  a  harmless  thing. 
 
 3  Jf  the  inhabitants  repented  the  decree  might  be  averted,  and  yet  the 
 prophecy  be  fulfilled. 
 
YALKUT  OF  R.  MACHIR  BAR  ABBA  MARI  59 
 
 These  began  lowing  on  the  one  side,  and  those  on  the  other. 
 
 They  then  said,  O  Lord  of  the  world  !  if  thou  dost  not  have 
 compassion  on  them  we  will  not.  R.  Aha  said,  They  do 
 like  this  in  Arabia,1  for  it  is  said,  “  How  do  the  beasts 
 groan  !  the  herds  of  cattle  are  perplexed  because  they 
 have  no  pasture  ”  (Joel  i.  18).  And  so  in  Taanith  Taan.  Jer. 
 Jerushalmi,  where  it  is  said  that  the  Ninevites  made  a 
 feigned  repentance. 
 
 Let  them  be  covered  with  sackcloth,  both  man  and  m.  s. 
 
 BEAST. 
 
 They  said  before  him,  O  Lord  of  the  world  !  the  beasts  sieh.  sh. 
 know  nothing,  and  thou  dost  transfer  thy  favour  to  them. 
 Consider  us  as  the  beasts  and  transfer  thy  favour  to  us. 
 
 Why  did  they  cover  themselves  with  sackcloth  ?  R.  Taanith,  ie. 
 Hayya  b.  Abba  said,  Lo  !  we  are  accounted  as  the  beasts 
 before  them. 
 
 And  let  them  cry  mightily  unto  God. 
 
 What  is  the  meaning  of  “mightily”?  R.  Simeon  b.  Taan.  Jer. 
 Halaphta  said,  The  persevering  in  prayer  conquers  even 
 the  bad  man,  so  much  the  more  the  Good  One  of  the 
 world.2 
 
 From  the  violence  that  is  in  tiieir  hands. 
 
 R.  Johanan  said,  What  is  the  meaning  of  44  that  is  in  their 
 hands  ”  ?  What  they  had  in  their  hands  only  they  gave 
 up,  but  not  what  they  had  in  safe,  chest  or  closet. 
 
 And  God  saw  tiieir  works,  etc.  iii>10. 
 
 How  do  they  bring  the  chest 3  out  to  the  open  places  of  Taanith,  ie. 
 the  city,  etc.  ?  The  eldest  among  them  shall  address 
 them  in  heart-stirring  words,  Brethren  !  it  is  not  said  of 
 
 1  On  the  day  of  the  fast. 
 
 2  See  note  in  Buber,  Pesikta  R.  Kahuna,  p.  161.  Ugolinus  renders  this 
 difficult  sentence,  “  Impudentia  superat  rectitudinen  ;  multo  magis  propter 
 bonum  mundi.” 
 
 3  Containing  the  scrolls  of  the  Pentateuch.  The  reference  is  to  its 
 being  brought  out  into  the  city  on  the  feast-days. 
 
60 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 Rofih  hash. 
 16. 
 
 iv.  3. 
 
 Mid.  Tillim, 
 cxvi.  6. 
 
 the  men  of  Nineveh,  And  God  saw  their  sackcloth,  and  their 
 fasting,  but  “  And  God  saw  their  works,  that  they  turned 
 from  their  evil  way.” 
 
 If  there  is  an  old  man  present  he  says  this ;  if  not,  then 
 a  learned  man  says  it;  and  if  there  is  not  a  learned  man 
 there,  then  any  man  of  striking  appearance — Our  brethren  ! 
 sackcloth  and  fasting  do  not  avert  the  evil  decree,  since  we 
 find  in  the  case  of  Nineveh  that  it  is  not  said,  And  God 
 saw  their  sackcloth  and  their  fasting,  but,  “  And  God  saw 
 their  works,  that  they  turned  from  their  evil  way.” 
 
 R.  Isaac  said,  Four  things  cancel  an  evil  decree  passed 
 on  a  man — almsgiving,  prayer,  change  of  name,  and  change 
 of  work.  Prayer,  for  it  is  said,  “  Then  they  cry  unto  the 
 Lord  in  their  trouble,  and  he  bringeth  them  out  of  their 
 distresses  ”  (Ps.  cvii.  28).  Almsgiving,  for  it  is  written, 
 “Alms  (righteousness)  delivereth  from  death”  (Prov.  x.  2). 
 Change  of  name,  for  it  is  written,  “  And  God  said  unto 
 Abraham,  As  for  Sarai  thy  wife,  thou  shalt  not  call  her 
 name  Sarai,  but  Sarah  shall  her  name  be  ”  (Gen.  xvii.  15); 
 and  after  that  it  is  written,  “  And  I  will  bless  her,  and  also 
 will  give  thee  a  son  ”  (ibid.  xvii.  16).  Change  of  work,  for 
 it  is  written,  “  And  God  saw  their  works  that  they  turned 
 from  their  evil  ways,”  and,  “  And  the  Lord  repented  of  the 
 evil  which  he  said  he  would  do  unto  his  people  ”  (Exod.  xxxii. 
 14).  And  some  say  also  change  of  place,  for  it  is  said, 
 
 And  the  Lord  said  unto  Abram,  Get  thee  from  thy  land  ” 
 (Gen.  xii.  I).1 
 
 Therefore  now,  O  Lord,  take,  i  beseech  tiiee,  my  life 
 
 FROM  ME. 
 
 “  Precious  in  the  sight  of  the  Lord  is  the  death  of  his 
 saints  ”  (Ps.  cxvi.  15).  Ten  things  2  are  called  precious  : 
 riches,  for  it  is  said,  “  The  precious  substance  of  men  is  to 
 the  diligent”  (Prov.  xii.  27);  knowledge — “The  lips  of 
 
 1  See  also  Beresh.  Bab.  xliv.  1.5  ;  Koheleth  Bab.  v.  6. 
 
 2  Machir  omits,  or  probably  the  scribe  by  homoioteleuton,  two  of  these — 
 the  Law  (Prov.  iii.  15),  Israel  (Jer.  xxxi.  20).  The  passage  is  also  found  in 
 Vayyik.  Bab.  ii.  ;  Mid.  Samuel,  viii. 
 
YALKUT  OF  R.  MACHIR  BAR  ABBA  MARI  61 
 
 knowledge  are  a  precious  jewel  ”  (ibid.  xx.  15);  prophecy — 
 44  And  the  word  of  the  Lord  was  precious  ”  (1  Sam.  iii.  1) ; 
 understanding — 44  He  who  is  precious  of  spirit 1  is  a  man 
 of  understanding”  (Prov.  xvii.  27);  folly — 44 A  little  folly 
 is  more  precious  than  wisdom  and  honour”  (Eccles.  x.  1); 
 the  righteous — 44  How  precious  are  thy  companions  unto 
 me,  O  God  ”  (Ps.  cxxxix.  17);  mercy — 44  How  precious  is 
 thy  mercy,  O  God  ”  (ibid,  xxxvi.  8)  ;  the  death  of 
 the  righteous — 44  Precious  in  the  sight  of  the  Lord  is  the 
 death  of  his  saints  ”  (ibid.  cxvi.  15).  Like  a  king  who  sent 
 an  officer  to  collect  his  royal  revenue.  He  went  and 
 lodged  with  a  householder  ten  days,  and  every  day 
 deposited  with  him  a  hundred  minas,  in  all  a  hundred 
 thousand  (common  shekels).  When  he  came  to  demand 
 the  royal  treasure  which  he  owed  him,  he  said  that  he  owed 
 but  fifty  minas.  How  can  I  exact  from  him  what  he  owes  ? 
 So  the  Holy  One  said,  It  is  hard  for  me  to  say  to  Abraham 
 that  he  must  die,  for  he  made  me  known  as  possessor  of 
 heaven  and  earth,  and  went  down  to  the  furnace  for  my 
 sake,2  and  sanctified  my  name  in  the  world.  It  was  hard 
 for  me  to  say  to  Moses  that  he  must  die,  for  he  put  his  life 
 in  his  hand,  and  went  down  to  Pharaoh,  who  sought  to  slay 
 him.  And  so  to  David,  for  he  put  his  life  in  his  hand,  and 
 went  down  to  Goliath.  And  so  to  Hananiah,  Mishael  and 
 Azariah,  for  they  threw  themselves  into  the  furnace  of  fire. 
 And  so  to  all  the  righteous.  And  if  the  righteous  had  not 
 called  for  death,  they  would  never  have  died.  Of  Abraham 
 it  is  written,  44  Seeing  I  go  childless  ”  (Gen.  xv.  2) ;  of  Isaac, 
 44  That  I  may  bless  thee  before  the  Lord  before  my  death  ” 
 (ibid,  xxvii.  7);  of  Jacob,  44Now  let  me  die”  (ibid.  xlvi.  30); 
 of  Moses,  44  For  I  must  die  ”  (Deut.  iv.  22);  of  David,  44  1 
 go  the  way  of  all  the  earth”  (1  Kings  ii.  2);  of  Jonah, 
 44  Take,  I  pray  thee,  my  life  from  me.”  And  since  the 
 righteous  themselves  ask  for  death  as  a  favour,  the  Holy 
 One  said,  Let  these  die  on  account  of  their  successors. 
 
 1  Interpreted  by  liaslii  to  mean  “he  who  is  sparing  of  words.”  The 
 A.V.  renders  “of  an  excellent  spirit’’  ;  R.V.  “  of  a  cool  spirit,”  following 
 the  Kthiv. 
 
 2  See  Pcakt.  Rab.  xxxiii.  ;  Erub.  53  a ;  Targ.  Jer.  to  Gen.  xiv.  1. 
 
62 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 iv.  6. 
 
 Shabb.  21. 
 
 iv.  8. 
 
 Gittin.  31. 
 
 iv.  11. 
 Kerith.  6. 
 
 If  Abraham  still  lived  how  could  Isaac  have  succeeded 
 him  ?  And  so  in  the  case  of  the  others  that  have  been 
 mentioned. 
 
 And  the  Lord  prepared  a  gourd  (’p'lpp). 
 
 “  And  not  with  oil  of  kik.”  1  What  is  oil  of  kik  ?  R. 
 Samuel  said,  There  is  a  bird  in  the  sea-towns  and  its  name 
 is  kik.2  R.  Isaac  b.  R.  Judah  said,  It  is  cotton-seed  oil. 
 R.  Simeon  b.  Lakish  said,  It  is  the  gourd  ('j'Ppp)  of  Jonah. 
 R.  Bar  b.  Hanah  said,  I  have  seen  the  gourd  of  Jonah,  and 
 it  resembled  the  ricinus  tree  :  [they  grow  in  dykes  and  they 
 put  them  before] 3  the  shop  doors,  and  from  the  kernels 
 they  produce  oil ;  and  under  the  branches  rest  all  the  sick 
 persons  of  Palestine. 
 
 And  it  came  to  pass,  when  the  sun  arose,  that  God 
 
 PREPARED  A  SULTRY  EAST  WIND 
 
 [Why  mamri  ?]  R.  Jehudah  said,  Because  when  it  blows 
 it  makes  furrows  in  the  sea.4  Rabba  asked  him,  If  that 
 be  so,  how  is  it  said,  “  And  the  sun  beat  upon  the  head  of 
 Jonah,  and  he  fainted  ”  ?  Rabba  answered,  When  the 
 cast  wind  blows  it  quiets  all  the  other  winds. 
 
 And  should  not  I  have  pity  on  Nineveh,  etc.  ? 
 
 “  And  ye  my  sheep,  the  sheep  of  my  pasture,  are  men 
 (CHS)  ”  (Ezek.  xxxiv.  31).  Ye  are  called  “  men  ”  (errs),  but 
 not  so  the  Gentiles.  It  is  written,  “  And  the  persons  (wzi) 
 were  sixteen  thousand  ”  (Num.  xxxi.  40) — this  to  the 
 exclusion  of  the  beasts;  and  it  is  also  written,  “And  should 
 not  I  have  pity  on  Nineveh,  that  great  city,  wherein  are 
 more  than  six  score  thousand  persons,  that  cannot  discern 
 between  their  right  hand  and  their  left;  and  also  much 
 
 1  From  the  Mishiia  ii.  1,  which  forbids  the  use  of  “oil  of  kik”  for 
 the  Sabbath  lights.  Various  explanations  of  the  term  are  given.  See 
 J astro w,  s.v.  pip. 
 
 2  The  Arabic  name  of  the  pelican. 
 
 ■!  The  text  of  the  Yalkut  is  corrupt  in  this  passage. 
 
 4  The  word  JV£?vTI  "sultry”  being  taken  from  the  root  "to 
 
 plough.” 
 
YALKUT  OF  R.  MACHIR  BAR  ABBA  MARI  63 
 
 cattle  ?  ”  This  latter  passage  at  all  events  (whatever  you 
 say  of  the  other)  excludes  the  beasts. 
 
 Also  much  cattle. 
 
 You  can  exchange  one  for  two,  and  two  for  one,  etc.1 
 How  do  we  know  these  things  ?  We  have  learned  in  a 
 Baraitha  2  that  the  Rabbis  have  said  that  since  it  is  said, 
 44  beast  for  beast  ”  (Lev.  xxvii.  10)  you  can  change  one  for 
 two,  two  for  one ;  one  hundred  for  one,  one  for  a  hundred. 
 R.  Simeon  said,  You  can  only  change  one  for  one,  since  it  is 
 said,  4 4  beast  for  beast  ”  not 44  beast  for  beasts,”  nor  44  beasts 
 for  beast.”  They  said  to  him,  We  have  found  44  beast  ” 
 used  as  the  equivalent  of  44  beasts  ”  in  that  passage  in  Jonah 
 where  it  is  said,  44  and  much  cattle  ”  (rara  44  beast  ”). 
 But  R.  Simeon  answered,  The  word  there  is  used,  not  by 
 itself,  but  with  the  adjective  44 much”  (ran). 
 
 44  That  they  may  see  that  they  themselves  are  but  as 
 beasts  ”  (Eccles.  iii.  18).  To  show  to  the  Gentiles  how 
 Israel  follows  after  God  like  a  beast.  As  a  beast  which 
 stretches  forth  its  neck  to  be  slaughtered,  so  are  the 
 righteous,  for  it  is  said,  44  For  thy  sake  are  we  killed  all  the 
 day  long  ”  (Ps.  xliv.  22).  But  you  have  this  tradition, 
 that  every  one  who  does  a  good  deed  nigh  to  his  death  makes 
 it  clear  that  he  is  anxious  to  add  it  to  those  already  done ; 
 and  that,  on  the  contrary,  every  one  who  does  an  evil  deed 
 nigh  to  his  death,  it  tends  to  show  that  he  is  full  of  evil 
 deeds  and  required  but  this  one  to  complete  them.  Both 
 depart  complete  from  the  world,  one  in  the  measure  of  his 
 righteousness,  the  other  in  that  of  his  wickedness. 
 
 The  arguing  spirit  (Gabriel)3  has  authority  to  speak 
 before  God  like  the  mediator  who  speaks  before  the  king. 
 And  so  he  says,  O  Lord  of  the  world  !  all  are  adapted  for 
 death;  Death  visited  Abraham,  Isaac,  Abimelech,  Moses, 
 Pharaoh;  as  Solomon  said,  44  All  go  to  one  place,  all  came 
 
 1  The  treatise  Temurah,  from  which  this  passage  is  taken,  treats  mainly 
 of  the  exchange  of  consecrated  things  (Lev.  xxvii.  10,  33). 
 
 2  See  note  on  ii.  1. 
 
 3  Sunk.  44  b — u  Gabriel  is  surnamed  •ilpDD  because  he  argues  with  the 
 Lord.” 
 
 Temur.  9. 
 
 Koliel.  Rab 
 iii.  18. 
 
 Yelamednu 
 fTanljuma, 
 Berach.  6]. 
 
64 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 from  the  dust  and  all  return  to  the  dust  ”  (Eccles.  iii.  20). 
 Then  what  profit  is  there  to  the  righteous  who  have 
 occupied  themselves  in  this  world  in  the  law  and  good 
 works;  and  how  are  the  wicked  at  a  disadvantage  who 
 have  sinned  in  this  world  and  caused  others  to  sin  ? 
 Solomon  explained  the  matter,  44  Who  knoweth  the  spirit 
 of  the  sons  of  men  that  goeth  upward  ”  (ibid.  iii.  21) — 
 these  are  the  souls  of  the  righteous  which  are  hidden  and 
 placed  under  the  throne  of  glory — 44  and  the  spirit  of  the 
 beast  which  goeth  downward  ” — these  are  the  souls  of  the 
 wicked  which  go  down  to  Gehenna;  and  so  it  is  said,  44  Yet 
 shalt  thou  be  brought  down  to  Sheol  ”  (Isa.  xiv.  15).  And 
 how  do  we  know  that  the  righteous  are  called  men  ?  From 
 what  Jonah  says  at  the  end  of  his  prophecy,  44  And  should 
 not  I  have  pity  upon  Nineveh,  that  great  city,  wherein  arc 
 more  than  six  score  thousand  persons  ” — these  are  the 
 righteous — 44  and  much  cattle” — these  are  the  wicked, 
 whose  deeds  are  as  those  of  cattle.  Therefore  it  is  said, 
 44  Behold,  the  righteous  shall  be  recompensed  in  the  earth; 
 how  much  more  the  wicked  and  the  sinner  !  ”  (Prov. 
 xi.  31). 
 
ESSAY  III 
 
 THE  SIGNIFICANCE  OF  THE  ESCHATOLOGICAL 
 
 UTTERANCES  OF  JESUS 
 
 Rev.  Prof.  H.  T.  Andrews,  B.A. 
 
 it 
 
SYNOPSIS 
 
 Statement  of  the  problem  and  the  method  to  be  pursued. 
 
 I.  The  theory  that  the  eschatological  elements  are  a  later  addition  to 
 the  narrative. 
 
 Arguments  in  support,  (a)  The  atmosphere  of  the  age;  ( b )  only  one 
 definite  prediction  of  the  Parousia  upon  which  the  Synoptics  agree  and  this 
 occurs  in  a  disputed  passage ;  (c)  the  differences  and  variations  in  the  other 
 predictions ;  ( d )  these  elements  are  out  of  harmony  with  other  aspects  of 
 the  teaching  of  Jesus. 
 
 The  reply  to  these  arguments  seriatim. 
 
 Arguments  against,  (a)  Eschatology  is  woven  into  the  tissue  of  the 
 thought  of  Jesus;  (6)  no  grounds  for  assuming  the  existence  of  a  non- 
 eschatological  stage;  the  evidence  of  Mark  and  Q,  on  this  point;  (c)  the 
 presence  of  eschatological  elements  in  every  type  of  New  Testament 
 theology. 
 
 II.  The  theory  that  eschatology  represents  the  survival  of  Judaism  in 
 the  thought  of  Jesus.  The  relation  between  the  eschatology  of  the  Gospel 
 to  Jewish  Apocalyptic  is  obvious.  But  the  objections  to  this  view  are 
 serious  :  (a)  affinity  with  Jewish  thought  does  not  destroy  value ;  (6)  the 
 fact  that  eschatology  belongs  to  the  later  and  not  the  earlier  phase  of  the 
 teaching  of  Jesus;  (c)  the  modifications  introduced  by  Jesus  into  Jewish 
 Apocalyptic  show  that  He  was  not  the  passive  victim  of  contemporary 
 thought ;  ( d )  the  eschatological  elements  are  the  most  solemn  and  sacred 
 utterances  of  Jesus. 
 
 III.  The  theory  that  these  utterances  are  to  be  treated  as  parabolic. 
 The  various  forms  which  this  view  has  assumed.  The  presence  of  a  sym¬ 
 bolic  element  is  undoubted,  but  is  everything  symbolic?  The  argument 
 based  on  Matt.  xxvi.  64.  The  spiritualisation  of  eschatology  in  the 
 fourth  Gospel. 
 
 Objections.  None  of  the  explanations  does  justice  to  the  facts,  and  all 
 are  incompatible  with  the  express  statements  of  Jesus. 
 
 IV.  The  real  significance  of  these  utterances. 
 
 The  true  method  of  studying  the  problem  is  to  study  the  causes  which 
 led  Jesus  into  the  realm  of  eschatology.  The  growth  of  the  conviction 
 that  something  more  than  preaching  was  required — viz.  a  transcendent 
 act  of  redemptive  sacrifice,  which  would  secure  an  immediate  triumph. 
 This  conviction  is  presented  in  terms  of  current  thought.  The  eschato¬ 
 logical  utterances,  when  we  translate  them  into  modern  speech,  signify 
 (1)  faith  in  the  ultimate  triumph  of  good  over  evil;  (2)  this  faith  is  not  an 
 empty  optimism,  but  is  guaranteed  by  the  sacrifice  on  the  cross;  (3)  Jesus 
 is  the  Lord  of  the  Future,  and  from  the  throne  of  God  sways  the  destiny 
 of  the  human  race ;  (4)  the  kingdom  of  God  cannot  be  evolved  from  below, 
 but  must  descend  from  above. 
 
THE  SIGNIFICANCE  OF  THE  ESCHATOLOGICAL 
 
 UTTERANCES  OF  JESUS 
 
 The  most  interesting  and  important  feature  in  recent 
 New  Testament  criticism  is  undoubtedly  to  be  found  in 
 the  increasing  importance  which  is  being  attached  to  the 
 eschatological  side  of  the  teaching  of  Jesus.  Whatever 
 may  be  the  final  verdict  that  will  be  passed  on  the  writings 
 of  Johannes  Weiss  and  Schweitzer,  we  owe  them  an 
 immense  debt  of  gratitude  for  having  compelled  us  to  face 
 a  problem  which  had  been  almost  entirely  neglected  in  the 
 modern  study  of  the  Gospels. 
 
 In  the  present  essay  the  term  “  eschatological  ”  will  be 
 taken  in  its  narrowest  sense,  and  the  discussion  will  be 
 confined  as  far  as  possible  to  the  statements  in  the  Gospels 
 in  which  the  Parousia  is  definitely  predicted.  It  will  be 
 impossible  even  to  approach  the  larger  questions  and 
 wider  issues  which  the  word  suggests.  The  problem  for 
 us  will  be  :  What  did  Jesus  mean  when  He  foretold  His 
 speedy  re-appearance  on  the  clouds  of  heaven  ?  In  what 
 sense  did  He  intend  His  words  to  be  taken  ?  How  far 
 does  the  non-fulfilment  of  the  prophecy  affect  its  value  ? 
 What  is  the  significance  of  these  utterances  for  the  modern 
 mind  ? 
 
 In  dealing  with  this  problem,  there  are  several  separate 
 questions  which  it  will  be  necessary  to  face.  (1)  Are  the 
 eschatological  statements  really  part  of  the  teaching  of 
 Jesus,  or  should  they  be  regarded  as  a  later  addendum  to  the 
 narrative  derived  from  the  atmosphere  of  the  Apostolic 
 Age  ?  (2)  If  they  are  a  genuine  part  of  the  teaching  of 
 Jesus,  are  they  an  essential  part,  or  may  we  say  that  in 
 uttering  these  predictions  Jesus  was  speaking  simply  as  a 
 
 child  of  His  age,  and  that  His  statements  with  regard  to 
 F  2  67 
 
68 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 the  Parousia  must  be  regarded  merely  as  the  unconscious 
 invasion  of  Judaism  into  Llis  thoughts  ?  (3)  If  they  are 
 
 essential  elements  can  they  be  explained  poetically  or 
 allegorically  as  referring  to  the  development  of  the  Church  ? 
 (4)  If  this  poetical  explanation  is  to  be  set  aside,  what  real 
 significance  ought  we  to  attach  to  the  statements  ? 
 
 I 
 
 Our  first  inquiry  must  necessarily  be  an  examination  of 
 the  genuineness  of  the  eschatological  utterances  attributed 
 to  Jesus  in  the  Gospel  narratives. 
 
 There  are  many  scholars  to-day  who  maintain  that  the 
 eschatological  elements  in  the  teaching  of  Jesus  have  been 
 inserted  into  the  records  by  the  influence  of  early  Christian 
 tradition,  and  that  they  reflect,  therefore,  the  views  of 
 the  primitive  Church  rather  than  the  thought  of  Jesus 
 Wellhausen,  for  instance,  says,  “  The  eschatological  Hope 
 acquired  its  intensity  first  through  the  oldest  Christians, 
 who  attached  it  to  the  person  of  Christ,”  and  a  similar 
 position  is  strongly  maintained  by  Haupt  in  his  Die 
 cschatologischen  Aussagen  Jesu.  This  theory  has  a  great 
 attractiveness  about  it  because  it  is  such  a  simple  solution 
 of  the  problem.  At  a  single  stroke  we  are  able  to  cut  the 
 Gordian  knot  by  the  knife  of  criticism,  and  free  the  figure 
 of  Jesus  from  some  of  the  most  serious  difficulties  that 
 enshroud  it.  Moreover,  it  is  not  merely  attractive  in 
 itself  but  a  very  strong  prima  facie  case  can  be  made  out 
 in  its  support.  The  critical  grounds  upon  which  it  rests 
 appear  at  first  sight  to  be  sound  and  convincing. 
 
 We  may  state  the  arguments  thus — 
 
 (1)  There  is  the  clearest  possible  evidence  that  our 
 present  records  have  been  tinged  and  coloured  by  the 
 atmosphere  and  spirit  of  the  early  Church.  The  teaching 
 of  Jesus  remained  in  a  fluid  condition  for  nearly  a  genera¬ 
 tion  before  it  was  stereotyped  in  written  form.  During 
 this  time  it  was  susceptible  to  outside  influences,  and  there 
 was  inevitably  an  unconscious  infiltration  of  extraneous 
 
ESCHATOLOGICAL  UTTERANCES  OF  JESUS  69 
 
 elements.  We  have  only  to  compare  the  different  versions 
 of  the  various  sayings  of  Jesus  to  realise  the  extent  to 
 which  modifications  were  introduced  into  the  original 
 tradition  by  the  action  of  the  Zeitgeist.  It  is  by  no  means 
 beyond  the  bounds  of  possibility  that  the  eschatological 
 ideas  which  were  so  prevalent  in  early  times  may  have 
 forced  themselves  into  the  teaching  of  Jesus  during  the 
 period  of  fluidity.  It  is  only  necessary  to  read  the  opening 
 speeches  in  Acts  or  the  Epistles  of  St.  Paul,  or  the  Book  of 
 Revelation,  to  see  that  there  was  plenty  of  material  in 
 primitive  Christian  thought  to  give  an  eschatological 
 tone  to  part  at  any  rate  of  the  teachings  of  Jesus.  There 
 must  in  the  very  nature  of  the  case  have  been  many 
 sayings  of  Jesus  in  the  common  tradition  which  lent  them¬ 
 selves  to  an  eschatological  interpretation,  and  it  was  the 
 simplest  matter  in  the  world  for  the  Christian  consciousness 
 to  make  explicit  what  it  felt  to  be  implicit  in  the  words  of 
 the  Master. 
 
 (2)  It  is  a  most  significant  fact  that  there  is  only  one 
 definite  prediction  of  the  Parousia  in  the  Synoptics  which 
 
 » 
 
 has  been  transmitted  in  almost  identical  words  in  all  three 
 evangelists,  viz.  the  utterance  found  in  Matt.  xxiv.  30, 
 Mark  xiii.  26,  Luke  xxi.  27.  “  And  they  shall  see  the 
 
 Son  of  Man  coming  on  the  clouds  of  heaven  with  power  and 
 great  glory.”  This  passage,  however,  occurs  in  the 
 Apocalyptic  address  delivered  by  Jesus  just  before  the 
 Crucifixion,  and  it  is  a  well-known  fact  that  verv  con- 
 siderable  doubt  exists  as  to  the  authenticity  and  genuine¬ 
 ness  of  this  address  A  formidable  array  of  scholars  could 
 be  quoted  who  have  accepted  the  theory  of  Colani,  that  a 
 Jewish  Apocalypse  has  been  inserted  into  this  discourse 
 by  Christian  tradition.  The  words  quoted  above  belong 
 to  this  “  Little  Apocalypse,”  as  it  is  called,  and  so  upon 
 this  theory  do  not  represent  the  teaching  of  Jesus  at  all.  We 
 may  dismiss  them,  therefore,  as  a  Jewish  gloss  which  was 
 foisted  upon  the  narrative  by  Jewish- Christian  influences. 
 Moreover,  if  there  is  any  truth  in  this  hypothesis  (and  it  is 
 accepted  to-day  by  such  authorities  as  Pfleiderer,  Weiz- 
 
70 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 siicker  and  Charles),  it  not  only  helps  us  to  explain  the 
 origin  of  a  troublesome  passage,  but  it  affords  us  an 
 excellent  illustration  of  the  process  by  which  eschatological 
 sayings  were  inserted  into  the  records.  If  the  final  dis¬ 
 course  of  Jesus  can  be  clearly  proved  to  have  been  adul¬ 
 terated  by  a  foreign  admixture  of  Jewish  eschatological 
 ideas,  why  should  we  hesitate  in  supposing  that  other 
 similar  elements  in  the  present  records  of  the  teaching  of 
 Jesus  came  from  the  same  source  ? 
 
 (3)  When  we  turn  to  the  other  definite  predictions  of 
 the  Parousia  in  the  Gospels,  we  find  great  variations  in  the 
 text  of  the  various  statements,  and  there  is  no  clear  case 
 where  we  find  the  three  evangelists  in  agreement. 
 Sometimes,  for  instance,  when  we  find  an  unmistakable 
 prediction  of  the  Parousia  in  one  Gospel,  the  parallel 
 passages  in  the  others  are  quite  colourless  and  admit  of  a 
 much  simpler  interpretation.  One  or  two  illustrations 
 may  be  given — 
 
 Matt.  xvi.  28. 
 
 There  are  some  of 
 those  standing  here 
 who  shall  not  taste  of 
 death  until  they  see  the 
 Son  of  Man  coming  in 
 his  kingdom. 
 
 (I) 
 
 Mark  ix.  1. 
 
 There  are  some  of 
 those  standing  here 
 who  shall  not  taste  of 
 death  until  they  see 
 the  kingdom  of  God 
 coming  in  power. 
 
 Luke  ix.  27. 
 
 'Hiere  are  some  of 
 those  standing  here 
 who  shall  not  taste  of 
 death  until  they  see 
 the  kingdom  of  God. 
 
 In  this  passage  Matthew  alone  speaks  of  the  Parousia. 
 Mark  and  Luke  simply  refer  to  the  coming  of  the  kingdom. 
 May  we  not  quite  legitimately  infer  that  Matthew  has 
 coloured  the  saying  which  he  found  in  his  sources  with  his 
 own  particular  views  of  the  second  coming  of  Christ  ? 
 
 Matt.  xxvi.  04. 
 
 Henceforth  ye  shall 
 see  the  Son  of  Man 
 sitting  on  the  right 
 hand  of  the  power,  and 
 coming  on  the  clouds 
 of  heaven. 
 
 (II) 
 
 Mark  xiv.  02. 
 
 And  ye  shall  see  the 
 Son  of  Man  sitting  on 
 the  right  hand  of 
 the  power,  and  coming 
 with  the  clouds  of 
 Heaven. 
 
 Luke  xxii.  09. 
 
 Henceforth  the  Son 
 of  Man  shall  be  sitting 
 on  the  right  hand  of 
 the  power  of  God. 
 
ESCHATOLOGICAL  UTTERANCES  OF  JESUS  71 
 
 Here  it  is  noteworthy  that  while  Matthew  and  Mark 
 agree  in  specifically  including  the  Parousia,  Luke  omits  all 
 reference  to  the  subject. 
 
 These  variations  within  the  documents  show  us  how  easy 
 it  was  to  introduce  the  conception  of  the  Parousia.  The 
 addition  of  a  simple  phrase  was  sufficient  to  give  an 
 entirely  new  meaning  to  the  sentence.  Moreover,  the  fact 
 that  the  three  evangelists  never  seem  (except  in  the 
 eschatological  chapter)  to  agree  in  introducing  the  con¬ 
 ception  in  the  same  way,  or  in  the  same  place,  throws  no 
 little  suspicion  on  the  genuineness  of  the  eschatological 
 utterances  ascribed  to  Jesus. 
 
 (4)  The  eschatological  statements  seem  to  be  out  of 
 harmony  with  some  of  the  most  important  aspects  of  the 
 teaching  of  Jesus.  Over  against  the  conception  of  the 
 kingdom  involved  in  the  eschatological  outlook,  as  a  future 
 entity  which  will  only  be  realised  at  the  Parousia,  we  have 
 another  view  which  regards  the  kingdom  as  already 
 present.  We  have,  for  instance,  such  definite  assertions 
 as  Matt.  xii.  28,  44  If  I  by  the  Spirit  of  God  cast  out  devils, 
 then  is  the  kingdom  of  God  come  upon  you,”  and  Luke 
 xvii.  21,  44  Behold,  the  kingdom  of  God  is  within  you.” 
 Then,  again,  the  two  parables  of  the  mustard  seed  and  the 
 leaven  seem  to  be  absolutely  at  variance  with  the  eschato¬ 
 logical  theory  They  assume  that  the  seed  and  the  leaven 
 have  already  been  given  to  the  world  in  the  teaching  of 
 Jesus,  and  it  is  only  necessary  to  wait  for  this  teaching  to 
 become  operative  to  secure  the  consummation  of  the  great 
 ideal.  Nothing  can  be  more  pointed,  therefore,  than  the 
 contrast  between  the  two  theories  in  the  Gospels.  Accord¬ 
 ing  to  the  eschatological  view,  the  utmost  stress  is  laid 
 upon  the  Parousia  and  the  cataclysmic  advent  of  the 
 kingdom,  while  the  fact  of  the  Incarnation  and  the  ethical 
 teaching  of  Jesus  occupy  a  secondary  position.  According 
 to  the  other  conception,  the  kingdom  has  already  been 
 brought  into  the  world  by  the  teaching  and  personality 
 of  the  historical  Jesus,  and  its  gradual  development  is 
 assured.  In  the  latter  theorv  the  first  advent  is  the 
 
 v 
 
LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 dominant  idea.  The  Messiah  has  already  come.  The 
 gift  of  God  has  been  bestowed  upon  the  world.  On  the 
 former  hypothesis  the  first  advent  is  simply  the  prelude  and 
 the  prophecy  of  the  second.  Jesus  is  the  predestined 
 Messiah,  but  the  Messiahship  will  not  be  realised  till  His 
 return  upon  the  clouds  of  heaven.  In  the  face  of  these 
 irreconcilable  conceptions,  is  it  not  the  most  reasonable 
 conclusion  to  suppose  that  the  eschatological  idea  was 
 superimposed  upon  the  teaching  of  Jesus  by  later 
 influences  ? 
 
 Such  are  the  arguments  which  are  put  forward  by  the 
 critics  who  advocate  the  excision  of  the  eschatological 
 elements  from  the  narrative.  The  case  has  been  stated  as 
 strongly  as  possible  because  there  is  little  doubt  that  this 
 hypothesis  is  rapidly  gaining  popularity,  and  ought  to 
 receive  full  recognition  and  fair  treatment  in  the  discussion 
 of  the  subject. 
 
 Though  at  first  sight  the  proposal  to  detach  the  eschato¬ 
 logical  elements  from  the  teaching  of  Jesus  and  regard 
 them  as  an  alien  addition,  seems  very  attractive,  and 
 though  a  strong  prima  facie  case  can  be  made  out  to  justify 
 this  procedure,  when  we  come  to  look  more  closely  into  the 
 matter  the  arguments  adduced  in  favour  of  this  theory 
 fail  to  carry  conviction  because  thev  do  not  render  full 
 justice  to  all  the  data  at  our  disposal.  Let  us  take  these 
 arguments  seriatim. 
 
 (1)  It  is  quite  true,  of  course,  that  there  was  a  strong 
 eschatological  bias  in  early  Christian  thought.  But  before 
 we  reach  the  decision  that  this  bias  is  sufficient  to  account 
 for  the  predictions  of  the  Parousia  in  the  Gospels  there 
 are  some  considerations  which  must  be  taken  into  account. 
 We  are  bound  to  ask,  for  instance,  What  was  the  origin  of 
 this  eschatological  tendency  ?  Could  these  ideas  have 
 attained  the  strength  and  potency  which  they  undoubtedly 
 possessed  if  they  had  had  no  foundation  in  the  teaching  of 
 Jesus  ?  Is  it  likely  that  these  Apocalyptic  conceptions 
 would  have  draped  themselves  about  the  person  of  Jesus, 
 unless  there  had  been  something  in  his  own  language  to 
 
ESCHATOLOGICAL  UTTERANCES  OF  JESUS  73 
 
 justify  the  process  ?  We  must  remember  that  the  eschato¬ 
 logical  interpretation  of  Christ  dates  back  to  the  first  days 
 of  the  Church’s  history  if  we  are  to  trust  the  records  in 
 Acts.  It  seems  to  have  leapt  from  the  mouth  of  Peter  as 
 if  by  instinct.  There  was  no  slow  and  gradual  evolution. 
 We  cannot  trace  the  stages  of  the  development.  The 
 transformation — if  it  was  a  transformation — was  immediate 
 and  almost  magical.  We  have  absolutely  no  data  which 
 enable  us  to  say  that  there  ever  was  a  non-eschatological 
 stage  in  the  primitive  Christian  Faith.  Moreover,  we 
 must  remember  that,  except  in  one  type  of  Christian 
 thought — the  type  that  culminated  in  the  Apocalypse — 
 there  was  a  distinct  tendency  in  the  very  opposite  direction. 
 Far  from  intensifying  the  eschatological  elements,  we  have 
 clear  evidence  that  Christian  theology  softened  and 
 spiritualised  them.  We  find  unmistakable  proof  of  this 
 when  we  compare  the  earlier  and  later  epistles  of  St.  Paul, 
 and  the  process  of  spiritualisation  reaches  its  climax  in 
 the  fourth  Gospel.  The  probability  is  that  our  synoptic 
 Gospels  have  toned  down  rather  than  exaggerated  the 
 eschatological  statements  which  they  found  in  their 
 sources. 
 
 (2)  The  view  that  we  have  in  the  last  address  of  Jesus, 
 an  intermingling  of  two  different  sources,  may  be  accepted 
 as  the  most  probable  explanation  of  the  form  which  that 
 address  has  assumed  in  our  present  Gospels.  We  must  not 
 forget,  however,  that  the  hypothesis  with  regard  to  the 
 Jewish  origin  of  the  “Little  Apocalypse”  is  not,  and  cannot, 
 be  proved.  There  is  no  tangible  evidence  which  warrants 
 the  conclusion  that  it  could  not  have  been  an  utterance  of 
 Jesus.  The  supposition  that  the  prediction  of  the  Parousia 
 in  Matt.  xxiv.  30  is  of  Jewish  origin  is  a  purely  gratui¬ 
 tous  assumption,  and  cannot  be  substantiated  by  sound 
 argument 
 
 (3)  The  argument  which  is  based  on  the  variation  in 
 the  proof  texts  is  much  less  convincing  when  we  make  a 
 critical  examination  of  the  passages  in  relation  to  their 
 context.  To  take  the  first  illustration  which  was  given 
 
74 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 above.  The  definite  allusion  to  the  Parousia  in  Matt.  xvi. 
 28  is  omitted  in  the  parallel  passages  in  Mark  and  Luke, 
 and  it  is  argued  that  this  fact  proves  that  Matthew  mis¬ 
 interpreted  his  sources.  As  long  as  we  confine  ourselves 
 to  the  particular  text,  the  deduction  is  valid,  though  it  is 
 difficult  to  see  the  reason  which  prompted  Matthew,  writing 
 between  a.d.  70  and  80,  to  intensify  the  Parousia  concep¬ 
 tion,  when  the  fact  of  its  non-fulfilment  was  beginning  to 
 make  that  idea  fade  into  comparative  insignificance.  When, 
 however,  we  read  the  particular  verse  in  question,  in  relation 
 to  its  context  in  the  three  Gospels,  we  see  at  once  how 
 baseless  is  the  argument.  Both  Mark  and  Luke  record  a 
 most  specific  reference  to  the  Parousia  in  the  previous 
 verse — “  The  Son  of  Man  shall  be  ashamed  of  him  when 
 he  cometh  in  the  glory  of  his  Father  with  the  holy 
 angels  ”  (Mark  viii.  38,  Luke  ix.  26).  The  Parousia, 
 therefore,  is  equally  prominent  in  this  passage  in  all  three 
 Synoptics — the  only  difference  being  that  Matthew  inserts 
 it  in  one  clause,  Mark  and  Luke  in  another. 
 
 The  absence  of  the  idea  of  the  Parousia  in  the  Lucan 
 version  of  the  second  illustration  is  quite  as  reasonably 
 explained  by  supposing  that  Luke  intended  to  soften  the 
 eschatological  element,  as  by  arguing  that  Matthew  and 
 Mark  intended  to  intensify  it. 
 
 (4)  The  difficulty  which  is  presented  by  the  two  con¬ 
 flicting  pictures  of  the  kingdom  in  the  teaching  of  Jesus, 
 the  ethical  and  the  eschatological,  must  be  acknowledged 
 to  be  one  of  the  most  serious  problems  connected  with  the 
 gospel  narrative.  There  seems  to  be  a  real  antinomy  in  the 
 thought  of  Jesus.  It  is  just  as  easy,  however,  as  Schweitzer 
 has  shown,  to  resolve  the  ethical  into  the  eschatological 
 as  it  is  to  transmute  the  eschatological  into  the  ethical, 
 and  just  as  uncritical  The  two  strains  of  thought  in  the 
 teaching  of  Jesus  are  about  equally  well  supported,  and 
 neither  of  them  can  be  excised  without  doing  violence  to 
 the  facts.  Some  explanation,  however,  must  be  found  of 
 the  apparent  contradiction.  It  is  inconceivable  that,  in 
 the  thought  of  Jesus,  the  two  ideas  were  in  irreconcilable 
 
ESCHATOLOGICAL  UTTERANCES  OF  JESUS  75 
 
 antagonism.  The  most  probable  explanation  is  to  be 
 found  in  the  theory  that  the  ethical  represents  an  earlier 
 and  the  eschatological  a  later  phase  of  the  teaching  of 
 Jesus.  We  may  take  the  incident  at  Caesarea  Philippi  as 
 the  dividing  point.  Before  this  event  the  eschatological 
 element  is  at  a  minimum.  The  only  two  important 
 passages  where  it  is  found  both  occur  in  Matthew,  who, 
 by  general  admission,  has  the  least  sense  of  historical 
 perspective  of  the  three  synoptic  writers.  One  is  the 
 famous  passage  in  the  Sermon  on  the  Mount :  “  Many  will 
 say  to  me  in  that  day,  Lord,  Lord,  .  .  .  then  will  I  profess 
 unto  them,  I  never  knew  you  ”  (vii.  22-23).  The  parallel 
 passage  in  Luke  xiii.  23-25  is  placed  much  later  than  the 
 confession  at  Caesarea  Philippi.  The  other  reference  is  more 
 important.  “  Ye  shall  not  have  gone  through  the  cities 
 of  Israel  until  the  Son  of  Man  come  ”  (x.  23).  Schweitzer, 
 who  holds  that  the  eschatological  conception  dominated 
 not  only  the  later  but  the  earlier  phase  of  the  teaching  of 
 Jesus,  lays  the  utmost  stress  upon  this  passage.  It  is  a 
 significant  fact,  however,  that  though  these  particular 
 words  have  no  parallel  in  the  other  Gospels,  the  passage 
 which  immediately  precedes  them  is  placed  by  Luke  in  the 
 final  discourse  at  Jerusalem  in  Ch.  xxi.  We  are  justified, 
 therefore,  in  saying  that  Matthew  has  probably  antedated 
 the  eschatological  conception,  which  did  not  come  into 
 prominence  till  after  Caesarea  Philippi. 
 
 The  most  serious  objection  to  this  view  lies  in  the  fact 
 that  the  famous  dictum  of  Jesus,  “  The  kingdom  of  God 
 is  within  you,”  is  placed  by  Luke  at  a  comparatively  late 
 point  in  the  ministry  (xvii.  22).  There  are  indications, 
 however,  that  the  saying  is  out  of  relation  to  the  context 
 in  which  it  is  placed.  Its  connection  with  the  following 
 paragraph  is  of  the  loosest.  There  seems,  therefore,  to  be 
 no  act  of  critical  violence  in  supposing  that  this  saying 
 has  been  transferred  by  the  evangelist  from  its  proper  place 
 in  the  earlier  part  of  the  narrative.  If  this  theory,  which 
 has  the  support  of  Wernle  and  Charles,  can  be  regarded 
 as  true  to  fact,  the  difficulty  involved  in  the  opposition 
 
76 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 between  the  two  conceptions  of  the  kingdom  vanishes  at 
 once.  The  two  conceptions  represent  two  phases,  an 
 earlier  and  a  later,  of  the  teaching  of  Jesus. 
 
 So  far  we  have  simply  been  criticising  the  arguments 
 brought  forward  by  the  school  of  thought  which  wishes 
 to  exclude  the  eschatological  elements  from  the  Gospels. 
 It  is  necessary  now  to  state  the  positive  grounds  upon 
 which  the  recognition  of  eschatology,  as  a  genuine  element 
 in  the  teaching  of  Jesus,  rests. 
 
 (a)  In  the  first  place,  since  it  is  always  possible  to 
 explain  away  on  critical  grounds  this  or  that  particular 
 proof  text,  we  have  to  ask  ourselves  the  question,  Are 
 there  any  indications,  apart  from  isolated  proof  texts, 
 that  the  eschatological  conception  was  an  integral 
 element  in  the  thought  of  Jesus  ?  The  answer  to  this 
 question  must  be  in  the  affirmative.  The  eschatological 
 element  in  the  Gospels  is  not  confined  to  proof  texts.  It 
 is  the  underlying  idea  which  lies  at  the  root  of  many  of 
 the  most  important  parables  in  the  Gospels.  The  parable 
 of  the  wise  and  foolish  virgins  finds  its  whole  point  in 
 the  phrase:  “  Behold  the  bridegroom  cometh.”  Matthew’s 
 parable  of  the  talents  and  Luke’s  parable  of  the  pounds, 
 imply  an  eschatological  background.  The  parable,  if  it  can 
 be  called  a  parable,  of  the  sheep  and  the  goats,  in  Matt, 
 xxv.  31-46,  is  introduced  by  the  words,  “  When  the  Son 
 of  Man  shall  come  in  his  glory,  and  all  the  angels  with  him, 
 then  shall  he  sit  upon  the  throne  of  his  glory.”  The  parable 
 of  the  man  who  went  into  a  far  country,  in  Mark  xiii.  34-37, 
 concludes  with  the  significant  words,  “  Ye  know  not  when 
 the  master  of  the  house  cometh,  whether  in  the  evening, 
 or  at  midnight,  or  at  cockcrow,  or  early  in  the  morning.” 
 It  is  inconceivable  that  these  parables  do  not  represent 
 genuine  utterances  of  Jesus,  and  it  is  ‘almost  impossible 
 to  suppose  that  they  have  been  misinterpreted.  Then, 
 again,  the  doctrine  of  the  Kingdom  is  undoubtedly  the 
 heart  and  kernel  of  the  teaching  of  Jesus,  and  it  is  quite 
 beyond  the  bounds  of  possibility  to  denude  the  conception 
 of  the  kingdom,  as  it  is  portrayed  by  Jesus,  of  all  eschato- 
 
ESCHATOLOGICAL  UTTERANCES  OF  JESUS  77 
 
 logical  content  If  we  excluded  the  explicit  references  to 
 the  Parousia  from  the  Gospels,  we  should  still  be  left  with 
 an  implicit  eschatology  which  cannot  be  removed  without 
 a  coup  d'etat  of  critical  nihilism. 
 
 ( b )  We  have  no  justification,  as  far  as  our  documentary 
 evidence  goes,  for  assuming  that  in  its  earliest  form  the 
 teaching  of  Jesus  was  devoid  of  eschatological  elements. 
 We  do  not  find,  for  instance,  except  in  a  few  cases,  that 
 eschatology  diminishes  the  farther  we  go  back  in  the 
 history  of  gospel  tradition.  Dobschutz  describes  Mark 
 “  as  the  strongest  supporter  of  eschatological  views  ” 
 (p.  104).  This  may  perhaps  be  an  exaggeration,  but  even 
 if  it  is,  it  indicates  that  the  first  picture  of  Jesus  was  set 
 in  an  eschatological  frame.  And  Mark  is  not  peculiar  in 
 this  respect.  When  we  turn  to  Q  we  find  the  same 
 phenomenon.  Harnack,  who  is  no  advocate  of  the 
 eschatological  interpretation  of  Christ,  speaks  of  “  the 
 dramatic  eschatology  to  which  Q  bears  testimony  ”  ( The 
 Sayings  of  Jesus ,  p.  232).  There  are  at  any  rate  four 
 important  sections  in  Harnack’s  arrangement  of  Q  where 
 the  prediction  of  the  Parousia  is  either  set  forth  with 
 the  utmost  clearness,  or,  at  any  rate,  most  certainly 
 implied,  and  very  possibly,  if  the  original  could  be  dis¬ 
 covered,  the  eschatological  element  would  be  found  to 
 bulk  more  largely  still.  Moreover,  when  we  go  back  behind 
 Mark  and  Q  to  the  “doubly  attested”  sayings  which  are 
 common  to  both,  we  still  find  the  eschatological  element. 
 In  Professor  Burkitt’s  collection  of  thirty-one  sayings, 
 there  are  two  which  definitely  assert  the  Parousia,  and 
 five  others,  which,  as  Dobschutz  thinks,  imply  an  eschato¬ 
 logical  background. 
 
 In  the  face  of  this  evidence,  it  seems  impossible  to  deny 
 that  eschatology  goes  back  to  the  very  earliest  form  of 
 Christian  tradition,  and  that  no  evidence  is,  therefore, 
 available  to  prove  that  a  non-eschatological  stage  ever 
 existed  in  the  transmission  of  the  teaching  of  Christ. 
 
 (c)  Furthermore,  there  is  another  argument  which 
 strongly  militates  against  the  supposition  that  the  teaching 
 
 i 
 
78 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 of  Jesus  was  non-eschatological.  We  have,  in  the  New 
 Testament,  no  less  than  seven  different  representations  of 
 the  faith  of  the  primitive  Christians,  viz.  the  synoptic 
 Gospels  (with  which  Acts  may  also  be  classed),  the  Johan- 
 nine  writings,  the  Epistles  of  St.  Paul,  Hebrews,  James, 
 1  Peter,  the  Book  of  Revelation,  besides  certain  minor 
 documents  of  later  date.  Most  of  these  seem  to  have  an 
 independent  origin.  We  may  take  it  as  a  sure  principle 
 of  criticism  that  the  points  which  are  common  to  all  these 
 types  of  thought  must  go  back  to  the  earliest  times  and 
 be  derived  from  the  teaching  of  Christ.  We  find  that  the 
 belief  in  the  Parousia,  in  one  form  or  another,  is  universal. 
 There  is  no  document  in  the  New  Testament  from  which 
 it  is  absent.  There  is  no  proof,  till  we  come  to  2  Pet.  iii. 
 3-4 — 44  in  the  last  days  mockers  shall  come  with  mockery, 
 walking  after  their  own  lusts,  and  saying,  Where  is  the 
 promise  of  his  coming  ?  ” — that  the  belief  was  ever 
 challenged  even  by  heretics.  Now,  if  there  had  ever  been 
 a  non-eschatological  stage,  we  should  almost  certainly  have 
 found  a  relic  of  it  in  some  form  of  Christian  or  so-called 
 heretical  thought.  It  could  not  have  vanished  away  so 
 completely  without  leaving  the  slightest  mark  upon  the 
 history  of  the  Apostolic  Age.  The  fact  that  belief  in  the 
 Parousia  is  common  to  all  types  of  Christian  thought  and 
 not  the  slightest  trace  of  its  denial  in  the  first  period  has 
 survived,  makes  the  hypothesis  of  a  non-eschatological 
 stage  incredible. 
 
 We  cannot,  therefore,  remove  the  eschatological 
 elements  from  the  Gospels  without  doing  violence  both  to 
 the  facts  at  our  disposal  and  to  the  principles  of  historical 
 criticism. 
 
 II 
 
 We  have  decided  that  the  eschatological  conception  is 
 inseparable  from  the  teaching  of  Jesus.  The  problem  now 
 arises,  What  explanation  are  we  to  give  of  it  ? 
 
 The  suggestion  has  been  made  by  Schwartzkopf  and 
 
ESCHATOLOGICAL  UTTERANCES  OF  JESUS  70 
 
 other  interpreters  of  the  Gospels  that  we  should  regard 
 the  eschatological  side  of  the  teaching  of  Jesus  as  the 
 result  of  the  influence  of  the  current  Apocalyptic  ideas 
 which  were  prevalent  at  the  time  in  Jewish  circles.  Jesus, 
 on  His  human  side  at  any  rate,  must  have  been  the  child 
 of  His  age.  He  could  not  escape  altogether  from  the 
 atmosphere  which  surrounded  Him.  We  know,  for  in¬ 
 stance,  that  He  accepted  the  prevalent  view  with  regard 
 to  the  authorship  of  Ps.  cx.  We  know,  as  Dr.  R.  H. 
 Charles  has  proved,  that  He  was  acquainted  with  the 
 Apocalyptic  literature  of  the  period — with  the  Book  of 
 Enoch ,  for  instance,  and  the  Testaments  of  the  Twelve 
 Patriarchs.  We  know,  too,  that  the  words  which  are  used 
 by  Jesus  in  the  prediction  of  the  Parousia  must  have  been 
 suggested  by  the  famous  passage  in  the  Book  of  Daniel, 
 “  Behold,  there  came  with  the  clouds  of  heaven  one  like 
 unto  a  son  of  man  ”  (vii.  13).  May  we  not  say,  therefore, 
 that  the  eschatological  side  of  the  teaching  of  Jesus 
 represents  the  spirit  of  the  age  rather  than  the  Divine 
 Revelation  ?  Jesus  could  not  entirely  shake  Himself 
 free  from  the  current  categories  of  thought.  Eschatology 
 survives  as  a  relic  of  old  Judaism,  and  must  be  regarded 
 as  an  anachronism  in  the  teaching  of  Jesus. 
 
 Now,  it  must  be  admitted  that  no  doubt  can  exist  that 
 the  form  in  which  Jesus  couched  his  predictions  of  the 
 Parousia  was  borrowed  from  the  Apocalyptic  language 
 current  at  the  time.  The  problem  is :  Does  the  fact  that 
 the  Parousia  utterances  are  in  line  with  certain  prevalent 
 Jewish  conceptions  destroy  their  value  and  compel  us  to 
 regard  them  merely  as  a  survival  of  Jewish  thought  ? 
 Was  Jesus  in  his  eschatological  outlook  simply  the  victim 
 of  the  phantasies  of  the  hour  ? 
 
 This  theory  provides  us  with  an  easy  and  attractive 
 solution  of  the  difficulty.  It  is  not  incompatible  with  the 
 fullest  recognition  of  the  Divine  mission  of  Jesus.  Any 
 doctrine  of  the  Incarnation  which  allows  room  for  the 
 principle  of  Kenosis  might  accept  this  explanation  without 
 any  fear  of  its  ultimate  effect.  In  the  eschatological 
 
80 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 utterances  Jesus  is  speaking  as  a  man  under  the  limitations 
 which  the  very  fact  of  Incarnation  involved,  and  we  need 
 not,  therefore,  attach  to  them  the  same  value  and  import¬ 
 ance  which  belong  to  the  revel ational  element  in  His 
 teaching. 
 
 The  objections  to  this  hypothesis  rest  on  critical  rather 
 than  on  theological  grounds. 
 
 (1)  In  the  lirst  place,  the  fact  that  the  eschatological 
 utterances  present  an  affinity  with  Jewish  thought  does 
 not  of  itself  afford  sufficient  ground  for  their  rejection. 
 If  we  were  to  reject  every  utterance  of  Jesus  which  could 
 be  paralleled  in  Jewish  literature,  and  set  up  originality 
 as  the  supreme  canon  of  value,  we  should  reduce  His 
 teaching  to  very  small  compass.  And  we  must  not  set 
 up  one  standard  for  eschatology  and  another  for  ethics. 
 Why,  for  instance,  should  we  reject  Matt.  xxvi.  64  on  the 
 ground  of  its  likeness  to  Dan.  vii.  13,  and  accept  the 
 teaching  of  Jesus  with  regard  to  forgiveness  in  spite  of  the 
 fact  that  there  is  a  very  clear  parallel  to  it  in  the  Testa¬ 
 ments  of  the  Patriarchs  ?  The  Jewish  character  of  the 
 eschatology  cannot  therefore  be  accepted  as  an  absolutely 
 scientific  criterion  of  rejection. 
 
 (2)  But  the  theory  is  really  wrecked  by  the  fact  that 
 eschatology  represents  the  climax  of  the  teaching  of  Jesus. 
 If  there  had  been  any  truth  in  the  hypothesis,  we  should 
 naturally  have  expected  that  the  Jewish  element  would 
 have  been  most  manifest  in  the  earlier  phases  of  the 
 teaching  of  Jesus,  and  that,  as  His  message  became  clearer 
 and  more  definite,  He  would  gradually  break  away  from 
 the  crippling  bonds  of  contemporary  thought.  As  a 
 matter  of  fact,  however,  the  progress  of  the  teaching  of 
 Jesus  was  in  the  very  reverse  direction.  The  Sermon  on 
 the  Mount  represents  Him  as  the  universal  teacher  of 
 the  human  race,  free  from  all  racial  prejudices  and  national 
 ideals,  speaking  the  common  language  of  the  human 
 heart,  making  His  appeal  not  to  His  own  age  or  His  own 
 countrymen  merely,  but  to  all  the  ages  and  to  all  mankind. 
 The  addresses  at  the  end  of  His  career  represent  Him  no 
 
ESCHATOLOGICAL  UTTERANCES  OF  JESUS  81 
 
 longer  as  a  teacher  who  has  soared  above  the  thought  of 
 His  age  into  the  clear  atmosphere  of  eternity,  but  as  one 
 who  is  enmeshed  and  imprisoned  in  the  mazes  of  Jewish 
 theology,  and  cannot  extricate  Himself  from  its  baneful 
 influence.  If  the  eschatology  had  come  first,  and  the 
 ethico-religious  teaching  had  constituted  the  climax  of 
 the  Gospel  narrative,  an  invincible  case  could  have  been 
 made  out  for  Schwartzkopf’s  position — but  it  seems 
 inconceivable  that  one,  whose  glory  rests  upon  the  fact 
 that  His  teaching  was  “  not  for  an  age,  but  for  all  time,” 
 should,  at  the  end  and  climax  of  His  career,  in  the  moment 
 of  His  supreme  act  of  sacrifice,  have  fallen  a  hopeless 
 victim  to  the  bondage  of  the  letter  of  Judaism.  If  Jesus 
 could  transform  and  transmute  other  Jewish  ideas,  and 
 endow  them  with  a  spiritual  meaning  of  His  own,  why 
 should  He  have  failed  at  the  supreme  moment  of  His  life 
 to  transform  the  Jewish  Apocalyptic  ? 
 
 (3)  As  a  matter  of  fact,  however,  it  is  quite  clear  that 
 Jesus  has  modified  and  purified  the  eschatological  teaching 
 of  Jewish  Apocalyptic  literature.  When  we  read  the 
 Gospels  carefully  we  find  that  Jesus  has  blended  with  the 
 purely  eschatological  outlook  another  conception — the  con¬ 
 ception  of  the  suffering  Servant  derived  from  Deutero- 
 Isaiah.  The  idea  of  the  Parousia  is  constantly  connected 
 with  the  idea  of  the  death  upon  the  cross.  The  two  great 
 strains  of  thought  stand  side  by  side,  for  instance,  in  all 
 the  New  Testament  accounts  of  the  Last  Supper.  The 
 Parousia  is  rendered  possible  through  the  redemptive 
 sacrifice.  This  blending  of  eschatology  and  soteriology 
 constitutes  the  original  contribution  which  Jesus  makes 
 to  the  subject.  Nowhere  in  Jewish  literature  are  the 
 two  lines  of  thought  brought  into  relation  with  each 
 other.  Jesus  was  the  first  to  teach  that  the  eschatological 
 dreams  can  only  be  realised  through  suffering  and  sacrifice. 
 The  fact  that  this  modification  is  introduced  into  the 
 Jewish  conception  proves  that  Jesus  did  something  more 
 than  adopt  the  current  views  upon  the  subject.  He  trails 
 formed  the  conventional  belief  by  infusing  a  new  spirit 
 
 G 
 
82 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 into  it.  His  eschatology,  therefore,  is  not  a  casual  accept¬ 
 ance  of  ideas  that  were  in  the  air  at  the  time.  There  is  a 
 great  gulf  fixed  between  the  common  Jewish  eschatology 
 and  that  of  Jesus,  and  this  divergence  clearly  indicates 
 that  Jesus  was  no  passive  victim  of  the  Zeitgeist ,  when  He 
 spoke  of  His  return  to  the  world. 
 
 (4)  One  further  point  must  be  mentioned,  which  contains 
 what  is  perhaps  the  most  fatal  objection  to  the  hypothesis. 
 The  eschatological  sayings  are  among  the  most  sacred  and 
 solemn  utterances  of  Jesus.  They  never  fall  glibly  from 
 His  lips.  They  do  not  read  like  conventional  remarks 
 to-day,  and  they  were  not  regarded  as  conventional 
 remarks  by  the  disciples.  They  were  uttered  on  days  of 
 crisis — in  the  mood  of  spiritual  ecstasy  that  followed  the 
 Transfiguration,  or  in  the  exalted  moments  that  came 
 after  Peter’s  confession  at  Caesarea  Philippi,  or  during 
 the  tense  and  awe-inspiring  time  that  preceded  the 
 Crucifixion,  when  the  dark  shadow  of  the  cross  was 
 hovering  over  the  Great  Teacher  and  His  little  group  of 
 followers,  or  in  the  judgment-hall  of  Caiaphas,  where  the 
 final  admission  was  wrung  from  the  reluctant  lips  of 
 Jesus  in  the  course  of  a  pitiless  cross-examination.  The 
 place  which  these  utterances  occupy  in  the  Gospel  narra¬ 
 tive — the  sanctity  that  surrounds  the  occasions  on  which 
 they  were  made,  the  sense  of  solemnity  that  enshrouds 
 them — all  go  to  prove  that  Jesus  Himself  regarded 
 them  as  amongst  His  most  important  deliverances.  We 
 cannot  set  them  on  one  side,  without  setting  on  one 
 side  what  Jesus  Himself  regarded  as  being  of  primary 
 significance. 
 
 Ill 
 
 We  have  reached  the  conclusion  that  the  eschatological 
 elements  in  the  Gospels  cannot  be  explained  away  as  a 
 Jater  addition  to  the  narrative,  or  set  aside  as  the  intrusion 
 of  Jewish  ideas  into  the  thought  of  Jesus.  We  come  now 
 to  the  discussion  of  a  third  theory.  This  theory  maintains 
 
ESCHATOLOGICAL  UTTERANCES  OF  JESUS  83 
 
 that  Jesus  used  the  current  Apocalyptic  ideas  of  the  day 
 as  symbols  in  which  to  veil  His  predictions  of  the  future 
 history  of  the  Church.  The  Parousia  utterances  are  merely 
 the  poetical  or  allegorical  form  in  which  He  assures  His 
 disciples  of  His  continued  presence  with  His  followers  after 
 the  Crucifixion.  The  saying  of  Matt.  xxvi.  64  is  only  the 
 symbolic  statement  of  a  truth  which  is  put  into  plainer 
 language  in  xxviii.  20  :  44  Lo,  I  am  with  you  alway,  even 
 unto  the  end  of  the  world.” 
 
 The  theory  has  taken  many  forms.  There  have  been 
 some,  for  instance,  like  Weiffenbach,  who  have  thought  that 
 the  Parousia  utterances  are  only  an  alternative  way  of  pre¬ 
 dicting  the  Resurrection;  others  have  supposed  that  they 
 contain  a  veiled  allusion  to  Pentecost.  44  I  am  inclined  to 
 believe,”  says  Dr.  Sanday,  44  that  the  real  coming  of  the 
 Kingdom — the  fact  corresponding  to  it  in  the  field  of 
 ultimate  realities — is  what  we  are  in  the  habit  of  calling  the 
 work  of  the  Holy  Spirit  from  Pentecost  onwards.”  Others, 
 again,  think  that  the  Parousia  is  a  parable  which  was 
 meant  to  teach  44  the  perpetual  spiritual  advent  of  our 
 Saviour  in  the  perpetual  communication  of  His  presence.” 
 Others,  again,  think  it  contains  a  reference  to  the  historic 
 revelation  of  Christ  in  the  history  of  the  Church.  H.  J. 
 Holtzmann,  for  instance,  says  that  under  the  form  of  the 
 Parousia  Jesus  intends  to  predict  44  a  series  of  manifest 
 historical  deeds  of  power  by  which  He  will  seek  to  show 
 Himself  to  be  the  exalted  Messiah.”  Others,  again,  have 
 urged  that  the  eschatological  form  was  adopted  by  Jesus 
 to  veil  His  social  teaching  and  the  effects  which  that 
 teaching  would  produce  in  the  history  of  the  world’s 
 civilisation. 
 
 Once  again  we  may  admit  that  this  theory,  like  the  others 
 we  have  mentioned,  would  be  a  very  acceptable  solution 
 of  the  problem,  if  it  could  be  squared  with  the  facts. 
 
 We  are  bound  to  acknowledge  on  any  hypothesis  that 
 much  of  the  eschatological  language  of  Jesus  is  symbolic. 
 No  one  supposes,  for  instance,  that  the  coming  on  the  clouds 
 of  heaven  is  meant  to  represent  literal  fact.  Jesus  was 
 
 G  2 
 
84 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 obviously  using  a  poetical  expression  which  had  been 
 consecrated  in  Hebrew  literature.  The  Apocalyptic  idea 
 was  always  expounded  in  figurative  language.  Eschatology 
 had  created  a  style  and  vocabulary  of  its  own.  The 
 Apocalyptic  writers  among  the  Jews  allowed  their  imagina¬ 
 tion  to  run  riot  far  more  than  the  poets.  Jewish  poetry 
 is  for  the  most  part  restrained  and  simple.  Jewish  Apoca¬ 
 lyptic  revels  in  phantasies  and  recognises  no  limitations  to 
 the  play  of  the  imagination.  We  are  bound  to  make  the 
 same  allowance  in  reading  the  eschatological  words  of 
 Jesus  that  we  always  make  in  reading  Hebrew  Apocalyptic. 
 In  eschatology  the  Hebrew  mind  always  orientalised,  and 
 Jesus  was  no  exception  to  the  rule. 
 
 Moreover,  the  advocates  of  this  method  of  interpretation 
 have  discovered  an  utterance  of  Jesus  which  they  think 
 substantiates  their  position  and  indicates  the  real  meaning 
 which  lies  buried  behind  the  symbol.  In  Matt.  xxvi.  64, 
 Jesus  is  reported  to  have  said  to  Caiaphas,  “  Henceforth  ye 
 shall  see  the  Son  of  Man  .  .  .  coming  on  the  clouds  of 
 heaven.”  The  term  44  henceforth  ”  (Matt,  olti  aon ,  Luke 
 and  tov  vvv),  it  is  argued,  when  taken  in  connection  with 
 the  present  participle  44  coming  ”  (igxojuevov),  must  imply 
 a  continuous  advent.  The  phrase  44  coming  on  the  clouds  of 
 heaven  ”  is  parallel  to  44  sitting  at  the  right  hand  of  the 
 Father.”  If  the  one  denotes  44  continuity,”  the  other  must 
 denote  continuity  too. 
 
 Furthermore,  there  is  little  doubt  that  the  Parousia 
 utterances  of  the  Synoptics  have  been  spiritualised  in  the 
 fourth  Gospel  and  made  to  denote  the  coming  of  the  Para¬ 
 clete  and  the  abiding  presence  of  Christ  in  the  heart  of  the 
 believer.  As  Dobschutz  says,  44  The  coming  of  the  Lord 
 promised  by  Himself  as  an  outward  eschatological  act  is 
 changed  into  an  inward  mystical  experience  by  the  Johan- 
 nine  colouring  of  His  words.”  When  we  speak  of  the 
 spiritualisation  of  the  eschatological  utterances  by  St.  John, 
 are  we  quite  sure  that  the  responsibility  for  this  interpre¬ 
 tation  of  the  words  rests  entirely  with  the  author  of  the 
 fourth  Gospel  ?  May  not  this  element  of  mysticism  have 
 
ESCHATOLOGICAL  UTTERANCES  OF  JESUS  85 
 
 had  a  place  in  the  teaching  of  Jesus  ?  Is  it  not  possible 
 that  the  fourth  Gospel  may  have  preserved  an  element  in 
 the  teaching  of  Jesus  which  was  ignored  by  the  synoptists, 
 who  fastened  upon  the  more  concrete  and  omitted  the  more 
 abstract  side  of  His  utterances  ?  And  if  there  was  a 
 mystical  element  in  the  teaching  of  Jesus,  does  not  that 
 mystical  element  afford  us  the  key  to  the  eschatology  ? 
 When  Jesus  spoke  of  the  Messianic  banquet,  may  he  not 
 have  referred  it  in  terms  of  Rev.  iii.  20,  “  Behold,  I  stand  at 
 the  door  and  knock  :  if  any  man  hear  my  voice  and  open  the 
 door,  I  will  come  in  to  him,  and  will  sup  with  him,  and  he  with 
 me,”  and  may  not  the  very  metaphor  at  first  have  killed 
 the  hidden  mystical  meaning  ? 
 
 There  is  an  undeniable  plausibility  about  these  arguments 
 which  gives  them  a  very  wide  appeal  to-day — but  unfortun¬ 
 ately  the  theory  seems  to  win  credence  by  ignoring  one  half 
 of  the  facts  and  putting  a  construction  on  the  other  half 
 which  the  languageof  the  Synoptics  is  scarcely  able  to  bear 
 No  one  can  doubt  for  a  moment  the  symbolism  of  the 
 Parousia  utterances.  The  only  question  is  :  How  much  is 
 intended  to  be  symbol  and  how  much  to  be  fact  ?  If  Jesus 
 intended  his  eschatological  utterances  to  be  a  parable 
 which  was  meant  to  teach  the  truths  of  mysticism  to  His 
 followers  we  are  bound  to  admit  that,  unless  our  present 
 records  have  grossly  erred  in  the  transmission  of  His  words, 
 there  seems  to  have  been  little  relation  between  the  parable 
 itself  and  the  message  which  the  parable  was  intended  to 
 teach  when  properly  interpreted.  No  one  could  maintain 
 for  a  moment  that  the  mystical  idea  is  patent  in  the  parables, 
 or  that  such  a  conception  would  instinctively  leap  into  the 
 mind  of  the  plain  man  when  he  read  them.  If  this  theory  is 
 true  we  shall  have  to  say  that  Jesus  spoke  in  riddles,  and 
 that  the  riddle  was  almost  universally  misinterpreted  till 
 the  author  of  the  fourth  Gospel  found  the  key. 
 
 None  of  the  different  suggestions  seems  to  do  justice  to 
 the  facts.  The  theory  of  Weiffenbach  that  the  Parousia 
 is  an  alternative  mode  of  predicting  the  Resurrection 
 cannot  be  maintained  in  face  of  the  clear  distinction  which 
 
86 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 is  made  between  the  two  events  in  the  Gospel  narrative. 
 The  hypothesis  that  what  is  really  referred  to  in  these 
 utterances  is  the  bestowal  of  the  Spirit  upon  the  Church  at 
 Pentecost  is  equally  difficult  to  justify.  Such  an  interpre¬ 
 tation  was  never  put  upon  these  statements  in  early  times. 
 The  clear  differentiation  which  was  made  between  the  two 
 conceptions  is  well  illustrated  in  the  opening  chapter  of  Acts. 
 In  answer  to  the  question,  Dost  thou  at  this  time  restore 
 the  kingdom  to  Israel  ?  Jesus  replies,  44  It  is  not  for  you 
 to  know  times  or  seasons  which  the  Father  hath  set  in 
 his  own  authority.  But  ye  shall  receive  power  after  that 
 the  Holy  Ghost  is  come  upon  you  ”  (Acts  i.  7-8).  Even 
 in  the  fourth  Gospel  the  Parousiais  kept  quite  distinct  from 
 the  bestowal  of  the  Paraclete,  and  it  is  a  mistake  to  suppose 
 that  the  writer  regarded  them  as  equivalent.  The  last 
 chapter  of  John  could  not  have  been  added  to  the  Gospel 
 by  any  one  who  believed  that  theParousia  promise  had  been 
 fulfilled  at  Pentecost.  Moreover,  the  injunctions  to  watch¬ 
 fulness,  such  as  we  find,  for  instance,  in  the  parable  of  the 
 ten  virgins,  and  the  warning  words  of  Matt.  xxiv.  44,  44  Be 
 ye  also  ready,  for  in  such  an  hour  as  ye  think  not  the  Son  of 
 Man  cometh,”  or  Luke  xxi.  36,  44  Watch  ye  at  every  season, 
 making  supplication,  that  ye  may  prevail  to  escape  all  these 
 things  that  shall  come  to  pass,  and  to  stand  before  the  Son  of 
 Man,”  would  be  otiose  and  meaningless  if  they  were  simply 
 intended  to  refer  to  Pentecost. 
 
 The  explanation  which  suggests  that  the  Parousia 
 utterances  are  intended  to  teach  in  parabolic  form  the 
 continuous  coming  of  Christ  in  the  history  of  the  Church, 
 and  the  faith  of  believers,  or  a  series  of  historical  acts  by 
 which  the  power  of  the  exalted  Messiah  would  be  made 
 manifest,  is  equally  impossible.  The  proof  text  which  is 
 the  mainstay  of  the  theory,  viz  Matt.  xxvi.  64,  is  not  so 
 conclusive  as  at  first  sight  appears.  It  is  only  the  Matthean 
 form  which  can  bear  the  interpretation  of  a  continuous 
 coming.  Mark  omits  the  introductory  phrase  translated 
 44  Henceforth,”  and  Luke  has  no  reference  to  the  44  coming  ” 
 at  alb  And  even  in  Matthew  it  is  quite  possible  that  the 
 
ESCHATOLOGICAL  UTTERANCES  OF  JESUS  87 
 
 idea  of  continuity  may  only  attach  to  the  first  clause, 
 44  Henceforth  ye  shall  see  the  Son  of  Man  sitting  on  the 
 right  hand  of  power,”  the  second  clause  being  only 
 loosely  linked  to  the  principal  sentence.  The  addition  of 
 the  words  44  on  the  clouds  of  heaven  ”  seems  to  rule  out 
 the  possibility  of  the  44  coming  ”  being  a  continuous  pro¬ 
 cess.  A  great  deal  of  licence  is  permitted  to  the  imagina¬ 
 tion  of  the  Jewish  mind  when  it  treats  of  Apocalyptic, 
 but  surely  not  so  much  as  this.  44  The  clouds  of  heaven  ” 
 may  well  be  used  in  a  poetical  sense  of  a  single  advent,  but 
 not  of  a  continuous  44  coming.” 
 
 It  is  unnecessary  to  point  out  that  the  use  of  the 
 present  participle  (ig%6juevov)  does  not  necessarily  imply 
 continuity.  The  title  44  the  coming  one  ”  was  a  technical 
 expression  used  to  denote  the  Messiah,  and  when  so  used 
 only  indicates  a  single  advent.  But  the  fatal  objection 
 to  this  interpretation  of  the  verse  lies  in  the  fact  that  it 
 seems  to  be  completely  at  variance  with  the  rest  of  the 
 facts.  It  is  quite  clear  that  Jesus  did  not  possess  the 
 necessary  historical  perspective  to  predict  a  continuous 
 advent,  spread  over  many  centuries,  in  the  history  of  the 
 Church.  His  words  are  quite  definite.  His  predictions 
 are  to  be  fulfilled  within  the  lifetime  of  some  of  his  followers 
 “  This  generation  shall  not  pass  away  until  all  these  things 
 be  accomplished  ”  (Mark  xiii.  30).  There  is  no  possibility 
 of  explaining  away  this  statement.  It  is  not  a  valid  argu¬ 
 ment  to  say  that  the  words  just  quoted  are  cancelled  by 
 Matt.  xxiv.  36,  44  Of  that  day  and  hour  knoweth  no  one,  not 
 even  the  angels  in  heaven,  neither  the  Son.”  Jesus  is  certain 
 that  the  consummation  will  be  reached  within  the  present 
 generation.  It  is  only  the  particular  day  and  the  particular 
 hour  within  the  limits  of  that  period  to  which  any  uncertainty 
 attaches.  Nor  can  we  say  that  Jesus  predicted  a  continu¬ 
 ous  coming  within  the  first  generation  only.  There  is 
 nothing  apart  from  Pentecost  in  the  history  of  the  early 
 Church  which  can  be  said  to  be  the  fulfilment  of  such  a 
 prediction.  Moreover,  once  again  the  injunctions  to 
 watchfulness  are  quite  out  of  keeping  with  the  idea  involved 
 
88 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 in  the  continuous  Advent.  In  Mark  xiii.  35  we  have  the 
 clear  statement  that  the  lord  of  the  house  may  come  “  at 
 even,  or  at  midnight,  or  at  cockcrowing,  or  in  the  morning,” 
 and  the  hypothesis  that  He  may  come  at  all  four  points 
 of  time,  or  that  He  may  come  even  more  than  once  seems 
 to  be  definitely  excluded. 
 
 We  are  driven,  therefore,  reluctantly  to  the  conclusion 
 that  the  theory  which  makes  the  Parousia  utterances  a 
 veiled  and  parabolic  prediction  of  Pentecost,  or  a  continuous 
 advent  in  history,  fails  to  do  justice  to  the  data  in  the 
 Gospel  narrative. 
 
 IV 
 
 The  three  most  popular  explanations  of  the  Parousia 
 utterances  have  been  dismissed  as  inadequate.  Is  it 
 possible  to  discover  a  more  satisfactory  solution  of  the 
 problem  ? 
 
 The  heart  of  the  problem  lies  here.  The  Parousia  utter¬ 
 ances  are  genuine.  They  cannot  be  set  aside  as  an  intru¬ 
 sion  of  Jewish  ideas  into  the  thought  of  Jesus.  They 
 cannot  be  treated  as  a  parable.  We  are  bound  to  suppose 
 that  Jesus  intended  them  to  be  taken  in  their  literal  sense. 
 And  yet  the  predictions  failed.  The  Parousia  did  not 
 happen.  How  are  we  to  reconcile  the  failure  of  these 
 predictions  with  the  fact  of  Christianity,  to  say  nothing 
 of  the  received  Christology  of  the  Church  ?  Why  was  it 
 that  the  Christian  religion  did  not  collapse  altogether, 
 when  the  supreme  promise  of  its  founder  was  never 
 realised  ?  What  is  the  significance  of  these  unrealised 
 predictions  for  the  modern  mind  ? 
 
 The  surest  method  of  finding  an  answer  of  these  questions 
 will  perhaps  be  by  making  an  inquiry  into  the  reasons 
 (if  we  can  discover  them)  which  led  Jesus  into  the  region 
 of  eschatology.  We  have  already  seen  that  the  eschato¬ 
 logical  outlook  only  becomes  prominent  in  the  teaching 
 of  Jesus  after  Caesarea  Philippi;  why  was  it  introduced 
 at  all,  and  what  purpose  was  it  intended  to  serve  ?  If  we 
 
ESCHATOLOGICAL  UTTERANCES  OF  JESUS  89 
 
 are  to  accept  the  statement  of  Mark,  Jesus  commenced  his 
 public  ministry  as  a  preacher  of  the  kingdom,  “  Let  us  go 
 elsewhere  into  the  next  towns,  that  I  may  preach  there 
 also,  for  to  this  end  came  I  forth  ”  (i.  38).  If  words  mean 
 anything,  this  phrase  clearly  proves  that  at  the  beginning 
 of  his  career  Jesus  looked  upon  preaching  as  the  mission 
 of  His  life.  At  the  outset  the  most  startling  success  at¬ 
 tended  the  new  proclamation  of  the  kingdom.  It  looked 
 as  if  Jesus  would  win  an  instantaneous  triumph.  He 
 leapt,  almost  at  a  single  bound,  into  an  embarrassing 
 popularity.  No  more  graphic  description  of  his  rapid 
 achievements  could  be  given  than  His  own  telling  words, 
 “  The  kingdom  of  heaven  suffereth  violence,  and  men  of 
 violence  take  it  by  storm.”  The  days  of  triumph,  however, 
 were  short-lived.  A  period  of  criticism  followed  which 
 brought  swift  disillusionment.  The  religious  leaders  of 
 the  nation  challenged  point  after  point  in  His  teaching, 
 and  made  it  quite  plain  that  they  at  any  rate  were  not 
 prepared  to  accept  His  proclamation.  Gradually  the  wave 
 of  popular  enthusiasm  which  had  hailed  His  first  appearance 
 began  to  abate  its  force.  Even  as  early  as  the  parable  of 
 the  sower  Jesus  seems  to  have  reached  the  conviction  that 
 three-fourths  of  the  seed  must  necessarily  be  lost  owing  to 
 the  unsuitability  of  the  soil,  and  to  have  sought  an  explana¬ 
 tion  of  His  failure,  where  so  many  others  have  sought  it, 
 in  the  terrible  words  of  Isa.  vi.  9,  10.  The  parables  of 
 the  mustard  seed  and  the  leaven  show  that  the  hope  of 
 instantaneous  success  had  vanished  and  Jesus  was  begin¬ 
 ning  to  feel  that  time  would  be  needed  before  His  influence 
 could  become  paramount.  But  worse  was  to  follow. 
 The  opposition  to  Jesus  grew  in  fierceness,  and  the  criti¬ 
 cism  became  more  bitter  and  malignant.  The  ranks  of 
 His  followers  became  thinned  by  desertion,  till  at  last 
 there  was  wrung  from  Him  the  despairing  question  which 
 He  put  to  His  disciples,  “  Will  ye  also  go  away  ?  ”  The 
 picture  drawn  by  Mark  of  this  epoch  in  His  public  ministry, 
 as  Professor  Burkitt  has  pointed  out,  is  the  picture  of  an 
 exile  “  running  off  with  His  disciples  hither  and  thither,” 
 
90 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 seeking  refuge  in  out-of-the-way  places  from  the  hatred 
 of  Herod  Antipas  and  the  antagonism  of  the  religious 
 leaders  of  the  people.  Gradually  it  seems  to  have  borne 
 in  upon  the  mind  of  Jesus  that  preaching  was  too  weak 
 a  weapon  to  destroy  the  vested  interests  which  were 
 ranged  against  Him,  and  that  the  Kingdom  could  never  be 
 established  by  this  means  alone.  Some  more  powerful 
 agency  was  needed  to  melt  the  hard  hearts  of  His  foes,  and 
 destroy  the  evil  principles  which  closed  the  minds  of  men 
 against  the  Gospel. 
 
 Under  similar  circumstances,  beneath  the  staggering 
 disappointment  of  a  like  failure,  John  the  Baptist  had 
 sought  refuge  and  comfort  in  the  belief  in  the  Advent 
 of  a  “  stronger  one,”  who  would  be  able  to  supply  the 
 dynamic  force  which  his  own  ministry  lacked.  44  There 
 cometh  after  me  he  that  is  mightier  than  I,  the  latchet  of 
 whose  shoes  I  am  not  worthy  to  stoop  down  and  unloose.” 
 But  for  Jesus  no  such  consolation  was  possible.  From  first 
 to  last  He  seems  to  have  been  dominated  by  the  unwavering 
 belief  that  He  Himself  was  to  be  the  Saviour  of  Israel,  and 
 the  greatest  disappointment  could  not  shake  His  confidence 
 in  this  conviction.  But  preaching  had  failed  and  some¬ 
 thing  else  was  needed.  That  something  else  must  be 
 provided  by  Himself.  There  must  be  a  great  redemptive 
 act  which  would  inaugurate  the  triumph  of  the  kingdom. 
 
 Now  in  describing  this  transcendent  act  and  the  glorious 
 triumph  which  was  to  follow  it,  Jesus  seems  to  have  been 
 dependent  upon  the  teaching  of  the  Old  Testament.  It 
 is  a  significant  fact  that  neither  in  the  two  great  passages 
 which  explain  the  import  of  His  death  nor  yet  in  the  pre¬ 
 dictions  of  the  Parousia,  does  Jesus  advance  even  a  single 
 step  beyond  the  consecrated  and  time-honoured  language 
 of  the  Old  Testament.  Almost  every  phrase  which  He 
 employs  could  have  been  derived  from  three  great  verses 
 in  the  Old  Testament,  viz.  Exod.  xxiv.  8,  Dan.  vii.  13, 
 Ps.  ex.  1.  May  we  not  say  that  this  was  absolutely  inevit¬ 
 able  ?  Does  not  the  very  essence  of  the  Incarnation  involve 
 a  self-imposed  limitation  ?  Would  not  the  possession  of 
 
ESCHATOLOGICAL  UTTERANCES  OF  JESUS  91 
 
 unlimited  foreknowledge  by  Jesus  have  destroyed  the 
 real  meaning  of  the  Incarnation,  and  have  justified  the 
 Doketic  theory  ?  Does  not  Jesus  Himself  recognise  the 
 restriction  when  He  says,  “  Of  that  day  and  that  hour 
 knoweth  no  man  .  .  .  not  even  the  Son  ”  ? 
 
 Jesus,  therefore,  was  limited  by  His  Jewish  outlook  and 
 the  current  categories  of  the  day  in  describing  the  character 
 of  the  future  triumph.  He  speaks  on  this  subject  out  of 
 the  depths  of  the  humanity  which  He  had  assumed.  Keen 
 though  His  vision  was,  it  could  not  penetrate  through  the 
 veil  which  hides  the  future  from  mortal  eyes.  As  a  natural 
 consequence,  we  are  bound  to  admit  that  He  phrased  His 
 convictions  in  the  familiar  terms  and  forms  of  Jewish 
 usage,  and  in  these  terms  and  forms  the  confident  pre¬ 
 dictions  were  never  realised.  No  Parousia  happened  or 
 will  happen  in  the  manner  in  which  Jesus  foretold  it. 
 
 Rut  does  not  the  mistake  of  Jesus  (due  to  the  limitation 
 of  foreknowledge  involved  in  the  Incarnation)  with  regard 
 to  the  character  of  the  Parousia,  destroy  the  value  of  the 
 eschatological  utterances  and  impair  the  authority  of 
 His  teaching  ?  If  the  external  form  were  everything,  the 
 answer  to  this  question  would  necessarily  have  to  be  in  the 
 affirmative.  But  the  external  form  is  not  everything,  and 
 it  is  quite  possible  to  strip  off  the  Jewish  dress  in  which 
 Jesus  clothes  His  convictions  and  to  grasp  the  underlying 
 truths  which  He  is  striving  to  teach.  Beneath  the  Jewish 
 categories  and  thought-forms  there  is  a  ding  an  sick,  as 
 Kant  called  it,  which  constitutes  the  essential  reality,  and  it 
 is  only  when  we  have  discovered  this  ding  an  sich  that  we 
 shall  be  able  to  appreciate  the  significance  of  the  escha¬ 
 tological  utterances  for  the  modern  mind. 
 
 What,  then,  are  the  ultimate  truths  involved  in  the 
 Parousia  predictions,  and  how  can  we  translate  them  into 
 terms  of  modern  thought  ? 
 
 (1)  We  may  say  in  the  first  place  with  Professor  Burkitt 
 that  the  eschatological  utterances  are  “  the  natural  way  of 
 expressing  faith  and  hope  in  the  triumph  of  good  over  evil.” 
 The  work  of  Jesus  seemed  to  have  ended  in  dismal  failure* 
 
92 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 The  shadow  of  the  Cross  lay  upon  Him,  and  that  Cross 
 appeared  even  to  His  most  intimate  followers  to  be  the 
 symbol  of  disaster.  And  yet,  in  spite  of  all,  we  find  an 
 invincible  optimism,  which  breaks  out  in  eschatological 
 expression,  dominating  the  later  utterances  of  Jesus.  For 
 Him  failure  is  an  impossibility  ;  the  disaster  of  to-day  is 
 only  the  prelude  of  the  triumph  of  to-morrow.  The  first 
 message  of  the  eschatological  utterances  is  the  message  of 
 Hope  in  the  final  victory  of  the  Gospel. 
 
 (2)  But  we  may  go  further  than  Professor  Burkitt. 
 If  the  eschatological  utterances  are  merely  an  indication 
 that  the  mind  of  Jesus,  as  He  went  to  meet  His  fate,  was 
 buoyed  up  with  a  vague  hope  that  in  some  mysterious  way 
 the  verdict  of  the  Jews  would  be  reversed  by  future 
 generations,  and  His  own  failure  be  transformed  into  a 
 glorious  triumph,  if  they  are  simply  another  reiteration  of 
 the  conviction  “  that  somehow  good  will  be  the  final  goal 
 of  ill,”  they  afford  us  but  little  consolation  after  all.  The 
 heroic  spirit  may  be  kindled  within  us  by  the  contagion 
 of  the  example  of  Jesus.  We  may  catch  a  ray  of  hope 
 perhaps  to  cheer  us  in  our  moments  of  disappointment, 
 but  a  vague  and  indefinite  optimism  can  never  be  a 
 permanent  solution  of  the  religious  problem  or  a  final 
 satisfaction  of  the  cravings  of  the  human  soul.  We  are 
 forced  to  ask,  Upon  what  was  the  confidence  of  Jesus 
 grounded,  and  what  was  it  that  made  Him  so  sure  about  the 
 future  ?  The  answer  to  these  questions  must  surely  be 
 this  :  The  hope  of  Jesus  was  not  merely  based  upon  His 
 faith  in  God,  it  was  based  also  upon  the  consciousness  that 
 His  death  would  consummate  or  at  any  rate  symbolise  the 
 establishment  of  a  new  covenant-relationship  between  man 
 and  God  which  would  be  the  pledge  and  surety  of  the 
 victory  of  good  over  evil.  The  eschatological  utterances 
 cannot  be  separated  from  the  statements  with  regard  to 
 the  death  upon  the  Cross.  They  stand  side  by  side  in  the 
 narrative.  The  one  supplements  the  other.  The  Cross 
 issues  in  the  Parousia — the  Parousia  gains  all  its  mean¬ 
 ing  from  the  Cross.  We  may  say,  therefore,  that  the 
 
ESCHATOLOGICAL  UTTERANCES  OF  JESUS  9 8 
 
 eschatological  elements  express  the  triumph  which  is  to 
 
 follow  the  sacrifice  offered  on  Calvary. 
 
 %/ 
 
 (3)  Furthermore,  these  utterances  claim  that  Jesus  is 
 to  be  the  Lord  of  the  future.  Death  does  not  end  His 
 relationship  to  the  Church  and  to  the  race  :  it  only  en¬ 
 hances  and  enlarges  that  relationship.  From  the  throne  of 
 God  in  heaven  He  is  to  sway  the  destinies  of  mankind. 
 As  the  Apostle  Paul  puts  it,  44  He  must  reign  till  He  has 
 put  all  enemies  under  His  feet.”  This  is  a  tremendous 
 claim  to  make,  and  one  which  lifts  Jesus  out  of  all  human 
 categories  at  once.  There  is  no  hint  in  the  Gospels  of  the 
 possibility  that  Jesus  could  ever  have  a  successor.  In  fact, 
 such  an  idea  is  most  definitely  excluded.  A  Socrates  is 
 followed  by  a  Plato,  an  Aeschylus  by  a  Sophocles,  a  Seneca 
 by  an  Epictetus,  an  Isaiah  by  a  Jeremiah,  but  Jesus  is,  if  the 
 phrase  may  be  allowed,  His  own  successor.  No  earthly 
 teacher  could  ever  take  up  His  work  as  He  had  taken 
 up  the  work  of  John  the  Baptist;  only  the  heavenly 
 Christ  could  carry  to  fulfilment  the  work  of  the  historical 
 Jesus. 
 
 These  eschatological  claims,  unless  we  are  prepared  to 
 doubt  their  authenticity  or  deny  their  value,  effectually 
 prevent  us  from  reducing  Jesus  to  the  rank  of  an  ethical 
 teacher  or  a  religious  reformer.  They  differentiate  Him 
 at  once  from  all  other  prophets  and  leaders,  and  compel  us 
 to  recognise  that  He  is,  sui  generis,  in  a  class  altogether  by 
 Himself  And  more  than  this — they  help  to  bridge  over 
 the  gulf  between  the  synoptic  Gospels  and  the  Epistles 
 of  St.  Paul  There  is  undoubtedly  a  great  contrast  between 
 the  picture  of  the  historical  Jesus  in  the  Synoptics  and 
 the  Pauline  conception  of  Christ,  but  the  Christ  of  the 
 Parousia  utterances  is  practically  identical  with  the  Christ 
 of  St.  Paul. 
 
 (4)  Lastly,  these  utterances  clearly  teach  us  that  the 
 Kingdom  of  God  cannot  come  from  below,  but  must  come 
 from  above.  The  Kingdom  cannot  be  established  by  the 
 mere  evolution  of  human  society.  It  will  never  be  reached 
 simply  by  the  improvement  and  education  of  the  human 
 
94 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 race.  It  can  never  be  attained  by  social  progress  and 
 development  alone.  The  city  of  God  must  descend  from 
 heaven,  it  can  never  be  evolved  from  the  earth.  There 
 must  be  a  Divine  intervention,  an  act  of  God  before  it  can 
 come  into  real  being.  The  death  upon  the  Cross,  which 
 seemed  to  the  disciples  little  less  than  the  wanton  sacrifice 
 of  a  precious  life,  and  which  the  ordinary  sympathetic 
 historian  regards  as  a  splendid  act  of  martyrdom,  not 
 unlike  that  of  Socrates,  was  to  Jesus  Himself  the  essential 
 precondition  which  made  the  advent  of  the  Kingdom 
 possible  and  constituted  its  inauguration.  And  this  was 
 only  the  first  of  a  long  series  of  Divine  interventions  in 
 the  history  of  the  Church.  The  story  of  the  Church  is  one 
 long  illustration  of  the  words  of  the  old  prophet,  “Not 
 by  might,  nor  by  power,  but  by  my  spirit,  saith  the 
 Lord.” 
 
 If  it  be  objected  that  these  statements  do  not  seem  to 
 cover  the  whole  range  of  meaning  which  the  utterances 
 contain,  and  that  they  leave  out  the  points  which  are  most 
 obvious  in  the  sayings  of  Jesus  and  which  riveted  the 
 attention  of  the  Church  from  the  first,  the  answer  is  that 
 every  attempt  to  translate  poetry  into  prose  must  neces¬ 
 sarily  seem  cold  and  ineffectual.  The  sayings  as  they  come 
 from  the  mouth  of  Jesus  are  couched  in  language  which 
 is  a  foreign  tongue  to  modern  ears,  and  it  is  only  when  we 
 strip  off  the  Apocalyptic  dress  in  which  they  are  garbed 
 that  we  can  make  them  intelligible  to  the  modern  mind 
 Unfortunately  it  was  the  poetry  in  these  utterances  that 
 caught  the  imagination  of  the  Church  in  the  early  ages, 
 and  the  first  interpretation  has  maintained  its  ground 
 almost  ever  since  that  time,  except  in  periods  of  criticism 
 when  the  whole  idea  of  the  Parousia  fell  into  neglect. 
 
 Such  is  the  significance  of  the  Parousia  utterances  for  the 
 modern  mind.  They  illustrate  the  indestructibility  of  the 
 Christian  Hope  which  triumphs  over  all  difficulties  and 
 faces  the  future  with  serenity.  They  provide  a  sure  founda¬ 
 tion  and  basis  for  this  Hope  by  resting  it  on  the  sacrifice  of 
 Christ,  and  so  rescue  it  from  the  suspicion  that  it  is  merely 
 
ESCHATOLOGICAL  UTTERANCES  OF  JESUS  95 
 
 a  vague  and  shallow  optimism.  They  imply  a  transcen¬ 
 dental  conception  of  the  Person  of  Christ  by  portraying 
 Him  as  Lord  of  the  future,  seated  at  the  right  hand  of 
 God  and  swaying  the  destinies  of  the  human  race.  And, 
 finally,  they  teach  us  that  the  Kingdom  of  God  must  come 
 from  God  and  cannot  be  evolved  by  man 
 
•• 
 
ESSAY  IV 
 
 PROLEGOMENA  TO  THE  STUDY  OF  THEOLOGY 
 Rev.  Arthur  C.  Head  lam.,  D.D. 
 
 e 
 
SYNOPSIS 
 
 I.  Definition  of  Theology. 
 
 Historical  and  Dogmatic  Theology. 
 
 Religion  and  Theology. 
 
 II.  Sources  of  Theology — Natural  and  Revealed  Religion. 
 
 (1)  Comparative  Religion.  Evolution  of  Religion. 
 
 Development  of  Greek  Religion.  The  Consensus  gentium. 
 
 (2)  Philosophy  of  Religion. 
 
 The  Interpretation  of  Nature.  The  Limits  of  Scientific  Know¬ 
 ledge.  Science  and  Theism.  Evolution. 
 
 The  Interpretation  of  Mind.  Scientific  Psychology.  Relation 
 of  the  Brain  to  Thought. 
 
 The  Interpretation  of  the  Moral  Nature. 
 
 The  Interpretation  of  the  Sense  of  Beauty. 
 
 The  Problem  of  Knowledge.  The  Limits  of  Human  Thought. 
 
 The  Hypothetical  Method. 
 
 Religion  the  Creation  of  Feeling. 
 
 Religion  and  Society. 
 
 III.  The  Psychology  of  Religion.  The  Sub-conscious.  Spiritual  Ex¬ 
 perience.  Religious  and  Scientific  Certitude.  Value  Judgments. 
 Faith.  Mysticism.  Authority. 
 
PROLEGOMENA  TO  THE  STUDY  OF  THEOLOGY 
 
 Theology  is  the  science  which  teaches  us  about  God. 
 The  term  may  be  used  in  a  more  limited  sense  to  mean  the 
 knowledge  of  God  in  Himself,  and  is  thus  distinguished 
 from  other  branches  of  religious  knowledge  such  as  Soteri- 
 ology  or  the  science  of  human  redemption ;  but  more 
 generally  it  is  used  for  the  science  of  God  in  the  widest 
 sense,  so  as  to  mean  not  only  our  knowledge  of  His  being 
 and  nature,  but  also  of  His  relations  to  the  world  and  to 
 man,  of  man’s  relations  to  Him,  and  of  the  relation  of  men 
 to  one  another  as  dependent  upon  their  relation  to  Him.  It 
 therefore  embraces  the  whole  of  human  life  and  experience 
 as  viewed  in  relation  to  God.  In  the  ordinary  usage  of  the 
 word,  Theology  is  concerned  with  the  conception  of  one 
 God.  The  term  might  of  course  be  used  of  the  heathen 
 conceptions  which  imply  the  belief  in  more  than  one  God, 
 but  ordinarily  the  term  Mythology  would  be  so  employed. 
 It  can  be  used  quite  correctly  for  such  monotheistic  con¬ 
 ceptions  as  those  of  Mohammedanism,  and  also  for  the 
 various  theistic  systems  which  have  represented  the  highest 
 attainments  of  human  speculation  or  have  grown  up  as 
 the  indirect  result  of  Christianity.  Ordinarily,  however, 
 it  signifies  Christian  Theology,  which  may  be  defined  as 
 the  science  of  God  as  revealed  in  Christ. 
 
 Theology  may  be  historical  or  dogmatic.  The  former 
 concerns  itself  with  the  history  of  the  various  beliefs  and 
 opinions  which  have  been  held  in  the  past,  or  prevail  at 
 the  present  time :  it  confines  itself  to  a  description  of  belief 
 or  at  most  to  a  systematisation.  Dogmatic  Theology  at¬ 
 tempts  to  define  what  is  true.  It  discusses  the  reasons  for 
 believing  in  God,  the  knowledge  that  can  be  attained  of  His 
 nature,  His  work  in  creation,  what  He  has  done  for  man, 
 
 H  2  99 
 
100 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 and  what  should  be  man’s  attitude  to  Him.  On  all  these 
 and  similar  questions  it  aims  at  arriving  at  correct  opinions, 
 to  discuss  not  what  has  been  believed,  but  what  ought  to 
 be  believed.  A  knowledge  of  historical  development  is  of 
 course  necessary  both  to  understand  the  questions  that  are 
 asked  and  to  supply  the  materials  for  arriving  at  an  answer ; 
 but  in  studying  dogmatic  theology  the  history  should  always 
 be  subordinate.  Its  purpose  is  to  state  with  all  humility 
 and  reverence  what  is  believed  to  be  true  concerning  all 
 the  most  momentous  questions  of  human  life. 
 
 Theology  is  one  side  of  religion.  Religion  in  its  most 
 complete  sense  means  a  disposition  of  the  whole  life  of  man. 
 It  always  implies  a  belief  in  a  power  or  powers  outside  man¬ 
 kind  on  which  man  is  dependent,  and  it  is  perhaps  hardly 
 correct  to  use  the  term  except  in  relation  to  a  personal 
 being  or  beings.  In  any  case  religion  is  a  44  life,”  a  dis¬ 
 position  of  a  man’s  whole  being.  It  implies,  therefore, 
 on  its  intellectual  side,  an  interpretation  of  life,  and  theo¬ 
 logy  is  this  interpretation  of  life  on  the  basis  of  a  belief 
 in  God,  a  belief  which  is  of  course  an  essential  part  of 
 Christianity,  which  seems  to  be  the  characteristic  of  all 
 higher  religious  thought,  and  may  be  represented  as  the 
 goal  to  which  all  earlier  thought  tends.  In  relation  to 
 conduct  religion  gives  the  rule  for  the  conduct  of  life 
 as  a  whole.  And  further,  as  a  necessary  result  of  the 
 attitude  of  dependence  on  an  unseen  power  which  is,  as 
 has  been  suggested,  a  necessary  characteristic  of  religion, 
 one  of  its  essential  features  is  44  worship,”  which  is  often 
 considered  to  be  the  specifically  religious  branch  of  con¬ 
 duct.  It  is,  of  course,  true  that  many  representations  of 
 religion  are  imperfect.  In  some  the  intellectual  side  is 
 dormant,  in  others  the  relation  of  religion  to  moral  conduct 
 is  obscured;  in  some  the  sense  of  worship  may  be  deficient, 
 in  others  it  may  be  exaggerated  and  uncontrolled.  We  are 
 concerned,  however,  with  the  ideas  of  religion  and  theology 
 in  their  higher  developments,  and  we  may  be  satisfied 
 therefore  with  our  definition  that  religion  means  the 
 interpretation  of  life  as  a  whole,  both  as  regards  knowledge 
 
PROLEGOMENA  TO  STUDY  OF  THEOLOGY  101 
 
 and  conduct;  that,  as  the  true  interpretation  of  life  is  that 
 which  represents  man  as  dependent  upon  God,  it  implies 
 a  system  of  human  conduct  deduced  from  this  attitude  of 
 dependence,  and  as  its  intellectual  basis  a  theology  or 
 science  of  God,  of  His  relation  to  the  world,  and  the 
 relation  of  man  to  Him. 
 
 The  primary  question  in  Theology  must  be,  What  is  the 
 source  of  our  knowledge  of  God  ?  Where  can  we  obtain 
 any  knowledge  about  Him  ?  What  is  the  value  of  such 
 knowledge  ?  It  was  an  old-fashioned  custom  to  make  a 
 division  between  natural  and  revealed  religion.  Natural 
 religion  was  that  which  men  were  able  to  attain  by  reason 
 or  other  mental  gifts  with  which  God  had  endowed  them. 
 Revealed  religion  was  that  particular  and  higher  knowledge 
 of  God  given  to  man  in  the  Jewish  and  Christian  reve¬ 
 lations.  There  are  many  now  who  would  refuse  to  make 
 this  distinction.  They  would  argue  that  the  revelation  of 
 Christianity,  however  wonderful  it  might  be,  differed  not  so 
 much  in  character  but  only  in  degree  from  other  revela¬ 
 tions  ;  that  in  fact  all  religions  are  revealed  or  at  any  rate 
 contain  an  element  of  revelation,  that  God  had  spoken 
 “  in  sundry  times  and  in  divers  manners  ”  to  all  nations 
 upon  earth.  The  use  of  the  term  44  revealed  religion,”  there¬ 
 fore,  as  opposed  to  natural  religion,  is  incorrect.  This  may 
 be  true.  Fundamentally  the  distinction  may  be  unsound, 
 but  it  is  a  convenient  one  to  accept.  The  records  of  religious 
 knowledge  can  be  investigated  apart  from  any  direct 
 reference  to  the  Christian  revelation.  We  must  ask  where 
 men  have  found,  or  have  fancied  that  they  have  found, 
 witness  to  the  existence  of  God  and  some  knowledge  of 
 His  being,  His  nature  and  His  work. 
 
 An  investigation  of  the  sources  of  Natural  Religion  means, 
 on  the  one  hand,  a  study  of  the  different  forms  of  religion 
 which  have  actually  existed  or  Comparative  Religion,  and, 
 on  the  other  hand,  an  introspective  analysis  of  our  own 
 religious  consciousness,  so  as  to  discover  what  is  the  method 
 by  which  men  have  been  or  are  able  to  attain  knowledge. 
 
102 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 It  is  by  the  interaction  of  these  two  methods  of  study, 
 by  the  interpretation  of  the  religious  phenomena  of  the 
 world  in  the  light  of  our  own  individual  consciousness, 
 that  the  philosophy  of  religion  has  been  built  up. 
 
 Man  is  essentially  religious.  Whether  or  no  there  are 
 races  of  men  at  the  present  day  so  undeveloped  as  to  be 
 entirely  without  religion,  may  be  a  matter  of  controversy. 
 It  is  now  generally  believed  that  there  are  not.  At  any 
 rate,  the  great  mass  of  the  human  race  is  religious,  and 
 this  is  the  natural  and  inevitable  result  of  the  strange  and 
 enigmatic  position  in  which  man  finds  himself.  He  is  a 
 being  endowed  with  reason  and  consciousness.  For  a 
 brief  period  he  lives  in  a  world  of  the  origin  of  which  he 
 knows  nothing.  Within  the  space  of  a  few  years  this 
 world  will,  for  him,  quite  certainly,  cease  to  be.  He  is 
 endowed  with  visions,  hopes  and  aspirations,  with  feelings, 
 fancies  and  desires.  He  is  exposed  to  varied  fortunes. 
 He  endures  joy  and  sorrow,  pleasure  and  pain.  He  finds 
 himself  surrounded  on  all  sides  by  other  beings  like  himself. 
 Whence  did  he  come  ?  Whither  does  he  go  ?  Why  is  he 
 placed  in  the  world  ?  How  did  the  world  come  to  be  what 
 it  is  ?  All  these  questions  he  inevitably  asks,  so  soon  as 
 he  begins  to  be  conscious  of  himself.  At  first  dimly 
 groping,  gradually,  as  he  thinks  with  increasing  know¬ 
 ledge,  he  makes  his  way  in  the  world.  He  attempts  to 
 interpret  the  life  he  is  living,  to  find  some  guide  to  direct 
 his  conduct,  and  thus  he  builds  up  for  himself  a  religious 
 system.  The  religious  beliefs  that  men  have  thus  acquired 
 vary  immensely  in  character.  They  range  from  the  lowest 
 forms  of  magic  and  fetishism  to  the  loftiest  philosophical 
 doctrines  of  the  greatest  thinkers.  Here  we  have  a 
 phenomenon  of  stupendous  importance.  What  significance 
 can  we  attach  to  it  ? 
 
 The  comparative  study  of  religion  has  assumed  great 
 importance  in  the  present  day,  partly  owing  to  the  fact 
 that  our  increased  knowledge  of  the  world  has  brought  home 
 to  us  the  immense  variety  of  religious  belief,  partly  owing  to 
 the  influence  of  those  theories  which  are  usually  described 
 
PROLEGOMENA  TO  STUDY  OF  THEOLOGY  103 
 
 by  the  somewhat  misleading  term  44  evolutionary,”  and 
 aim  at  tracing  the  development  of  all  human  thoughts  and 
 ideas  from  one  common  source.  A  law  of  progress  which 
 may  present  an  analogy  with  the  discoveries  of  science  is 
 sought.  The  different  stages  of  religious  belief  are  mapped 
 out,  the  development  of  the  higher  from  the  lower  is 
 traced,  and  it  is  contended  that  the  higher  and  more 
 philosophical  forms  have  been  evolved  out  of  the  lower. 
 
 Now  here,  as  elsewhere,  we  shall  find  that  a  good  deal  of 
 confusion  of  thought  has  arisen  from  the  use  of  the  word 
 44  evolution.”  Any  claim  to  have  discovered  an  adequate 
 law  of  the  development  of  religion  is  at  present  entirely 
 invalid,  but  even  if  such  a  theory  had  been  discovered,  it 
 does  not  follow,  as  some  have  imagined,  that  religion  itself 
 has  been  explained  or  that  its  objective  value  and  truth 
 have  been  diminished.  Let  us  take  the  analogy  of  our 
 knowledge  of  the  natural  world.  It  has  advanced  by 
 slow  and  devious  ways  from  very  rudimentary  beginnings 
 to  its  present  position.  Each  generation  has  considered 
 that  the  knowledge  which  it  possessed  constituted  a  more 
 or  less  correct  presentation  of  the  outer  world.  Sub¬ 
 sequent  generations  discover  how  inadequate  or  even 
 erroneous  this  is,  and  none  of  us  can  doubt  that  the 
 knowledge  of  future  generations  will  correct  that  of  the 
 present  day.  There  is  an  evolution  in  Natural  Philosophy, 
 the  interpretation  of  Nature,  just  as  much  as  in  Religion, 
 the  interpretation  of  Life.  But  we  do  not  doubt  Natural 
 science  for  all  that,  we  believe  that  there  is  in  it  a  gradually 
 closer  approximation  to  truth.  So  also,  if  religion  has 
 advanced  by  equally  strange  and  devious  ways,  and  if 
 later  generations  have  learned  to  look  upon  the  beliefs  of 
 their  forefathers  as  erroneous,  it  does  not  follow  therefore 
 that  religion  is  without  value ;  rather  we  may  say  that  if 
 religion  be  the  attempt  to  explain  life  as  a  whole,  the  human 
 intellect  may  in  it  approach  nearer  and  nearer  to  ultimate 
 truth,  just  as  we  believe  it  does  in  regard  to  physical 
 science.  The  fact  of  development,  so  far  from  weakening 
 our  belief  in  the  ultimate  value  of  religion,  shows  us  that 
 
104 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 we  are  dealing  not  with  a  chaotic  and  unmeaning  mass  of 
 facts,  but  with  a  rational  product  of  the  human  mind. 
 
 It  is  probable  that  the  possibility  of  advance  in  religious 
 thought  is  more  obscure  than  in  other  sides  of  human  life, 
 because  of  the  persistency  with  which  older  forms  of  belief 
 live  on  side  by  side  with  higher  forms,  often  intermingling 
 with  them.  It  is  only  occasionally  that  we  can  trace  out 
 a  clear  line  of  development,  and  in  later  times  the  influence 
 of  Christianity  has  left  few  spheres  of  thought  untouched, 
 so  that  a  purely  natural  development  is  hard  to  discover. 
 But  in  this  as  in  other  lines  of  intellectual  development, 
 Greek  thought  presents  us  with  a  clear  and  typical  illus¬ 
 tration.  Here,  from  the  popular  religion  as  represented 
 in  Homer  to  the  philosophic  thought  of  Plato,  we  can 
 see  signs  of  a  clear  and  definite  advance.  Poets  and 
 philosophers  shared  in  the  work.  Commercial  activity 
 and  changed  conditions  of  life  enlarged  the  sphere  of 
 human  experience.  Plato  himself  never  obtained  the 
 clear  vision  of  one  personal  God,  but  he  reached  the 
 threshold  of  it.  His  philosophy  is  religious  in  its  concep¬ 
 tion  and  purpose.  He  summed  up  all  the  best  thought 
 of  his  time,  he  provided  answers  to  its  most  difficult 
 conceptions,  he  represented  the  culmination  of  a  rapid 
 development  of  thought.  But  however  great  his  attain¬ 
 ments  he  shows  us  the  failure  and  limitations  of  religious 
 philosophy.  He  failed  to  create  a  religion.  Pie  had 
 little  influence  except  possibly  for  evil  in  his  own  day.  It 
 was  future  generations  that  he  taught,  and  the  chief  result 
 of  his  speculations  to  the  world  only  came  when  they  were 
 merged  in  Christian  thought,  when  they  became  part  of 
 a  creed  and  life,  as  well  as  a  system  of  philosophy. 
 
 The  comparative  and  historical  study  of  religion,  so  far 
 from  explaining  it  away  or  necessarily  casting  a  doubt  on 
 the  truth  of  Christianity,  suggests  that  here,  as  elsewhere, 
 we  have  that  possibility  of  rational  and  orderly  develop¬ 
 ment  in  human  thought  which  implies  a  real  basis  of  truth 
 to  which  it  is  approaching.  At  any  rate,  we  have  a 
 phenomenon  worthy  of  careful  and  thoughtful  study. 
 
PROLEGOMENA  TO  STUDY  OF  THEOLOGY  105 
 
 In  what  way  does  it  supply  a  source  for  our  theological 
 knowledge  ?  An  attempt  has  been  made,  on  the  supposi¬ 
 tion  (which  is  sufficiently  true  for  our  purpose)  that  all 
 men  are  religious,  to  found  an  argument  for  the  existence 
 of  God.  This  argument  has  been  called  the  consensus 
 gentium.  In  the  form,  however,  in  which  it  has  been 
 customary  to  state  it,  it  is  difficult  to  find  any  very  sub¬ 
 stantial  proof.  It  is  true,  indeed,  that  all,  or  almost  all, 
 men  are  religious,  but  that  does  not  in  itself  give  an  argu¬ 
 ment  in  favour  of  any  one  particular  form  which  religion 
 has  held.  Any  deductions  which  we  make  must  be  some¬ 
 thing  less  definite.  A  study  of  religions  will  show,  in  the 
 first  place,  the  universal  character  of  the  need  for  religion 
 amongst  mankind  as  a  whole.  This  need  might  be 
 further  proved  by  the  fact  that  in  countries  where  the  old 
 established  faith  has  been  for  any  reason  broken  down  or  dis¬ 
 credited,  there  are  inevitably  outbreaks  of  new  and  strange 
 forms  of  religious  activity.  Religious  life  may  appear 
 dormant  for  a  time,  there  are  individuals  who  seem  little 
 touched  by  religious  needs,  there  are  stages  and  periods 
 of  civilisation  during  which  religion  seems  less  powerful 
 than  at  other  times,  but  all  observation  shows  that  religion, 
 in  some  form,  is  a  permanent  need  of  human  life.  Then, 
 next,  we  can  learn  from  comparative  religion  the  different 
 problems  of  life  which  religion  attempts  to  solve,  and  the 
 human  needs  that  require  satisfaction.  However  much 
 religions  may  vary,  we  find  that  they  all  have  certain 
 marked  features.  They  give  an  explanation  of  the  creation 
 of  the  world,  they  define  the  nature  and  origin  of  man, 
 they  tell  him  of  the  nature  of  the  mysterious  powers  that 
 surround  him,  they  attempt  to  explain  the  origin  of  evil, 
 to  give  him  a  rule  of  conduct  and  an  ideal  of  worship,  to 
 provide  him  with  spiritual  aid  and  a  means  of  redemption 
 from  evil,  to  tell  him  of  his  future  beyond  the  grave.  All 
 these  questions  receive  some  sort  of  answer  in  most  reli¬ 
 gious  systems.  Then,  thirdly,  a  study  of  religions  may  give 
 us  the  law  of  religious  development.  If  we  can  find  that 
 law,  if  we  can  discover  the  principles  on  which  religion 
 
106 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 has  advanced  from  its  lower  to  its  higher  forms,  we  may 
 have  some  evidence  of  what  the  true  nature  of  religion  is 
 in  itself. 
 
 A  mere  study,  however,  of  Comparative  Religion  will 
 not  in  itself  advance  us  far  on  the  road  to  discover  what  is 
 true;  and  we  turn  to  the  other  possible  source  of  religious 
 truth,  the  study  of  the  origin  of  religious  thought  and 
 knowledge  in  our  own  mind,  and  the  explanation  of 
 religion  from  our  own  personal  experience.  This  is  what 
 is  usually  known  as  the  Philosophy  of  Religion.  The 
 Philosophy  of  Religion  is  coincident  in  its  scope  with  all 
 philosophical  study,  but  it  approaches  the  same  questions 
 from  a  definite  point  of  view  of  its  own.  Religion  is,  as 
 we  described  it,  the  interpretation  of  life.  It  has  been  an 
 attempt  made  by  man  in  his  corporate  capacity  to  give 
 some  explanation  of  the  environment  in  which  he  finds 
 himself,  and  his  own  origin  and  destiny.  At  first  it  included 
 almost  the  whole  of  life.  Gradually  its  sphere  appears  to 
 have  been  diminished  by  the  work  of  specialised  knowledge 
 in  many  directions,  and  the  building  up  of  all  the  different 
 departments  of  human  activity.  But  this  contraction  of 
 influence  is  more  apparent  than  real.  Every  department 
 of  life  still  comes  in  contact  with  religious  ideas,  and  the 
 ultimate  questions  of  life  with  which  religion  is  concerned, 
 and  to  which  some  answer,  if  only  a  provisional  one,  is 
 necessary  as  a  guide  to  conduct,  are  as  urgent  as  ever.  As 
 society  becomes  more  developed,  and  knowledge  grows 
 wider,  the  higher  questions  are  often  concealed  by  the 
 increasing  complexity,  and  by  the  infinitude  of  detail ;  but 
 their  importance  is  only  obscured,  not  diminished,  and  the 
 religious  instinct,  if  repressed,  will  certainly  reassert  itself. 
 We  have  to  examine,  then,  critically,  all  the  different 
 departments  of  human  experience,  and  inquire  what  ele¬ 
 ments  they  contribute  to  the  knowledge  of  true  religion. 
 
 First  of  all  the  interpretation  of  nature.  Probably  the 
 earliest  question  in  the  dawn  of  human  intelligence  to  which 
 man  desires  an  answer  is  the  source  of  the  natural  pheno- 
 
PROLEGOMENA  TO  STUDY  OF  THEOLOGY  107 
 
 mena  around  him,  and  it  has  long  been  the  conviction  of 
 most  theologians  that  44  the  invisible  things  of  God  from 
 the  creation  of  the  world  are  clearly  seen,  being  understood 
 by  the  things  that  are  made,  even  His  eternal  power  and 
 Godhead.”  It  is,  however,  widely  believed  that  the  great 
 discoveries  of  Natural  Science,  which  have  characterised 
 the  last  three  centuries,  have  weakened  or  destroyed  this 
 argument.  An  opinion  has  become  prevalent — not,  indeed, 
 a  new  one,  for  it  goes  back  to  the  earliest  period  of  Greek 
 philosophy — which  would  interpret  the  universe  as  purely 
 mechanical.  No  doubt  men’s  minds  have  been  bewildered 
 by  the  great  increase  of  knowledge.  The  vision  of  the 
 unity  of  nature,  and  the  marvellous  additions  to  our 
 knowledge  of  the  way  in  which  nature  works,  have  obscured 
 the  limitations  of  the  scientific  interpretations  of  the  world. 
 The  use  of  a  great  deal  of  unscientific  terminology,  the  mis¬ 
 use  of  words  like  44  law  ”  and  44  cause,”  the  construction  of 
 44  philosophies  ”  of  nature,  remarkable  for  their  confused 
 thought,  have  helped  to  conceal  the  fact  that  science 
 gives  no  answer  to  any  of  the  questions  with  which  religion 
 is  concerned.  All  that  science  can  do  is  to  analyse  the 
 processes  of  nature.  From  sources  entirely  outside  the 
 observation  and  experiment  which  are  the  legitimate 
 tools  of  science  there  have  been  interpolated  the  ideas  of 
 Law  and  Cause,  which  are  metaphysical,  not  scientific. 
 All  that  science  discovers  is  that  certain  events  invariably 
 precede  certain  others.  It  discovers  that  if  A  and  B 
 occur,  C  occurs.  It  further  discovers  that  by  combining 
 A  and  B  we  can  produce  C.  In  no  sense,  except  in  the 
 purely  scientific  one  of  being  an  invariable  antecedent,  can 
 we  say  that  A  and  B  cause  C,  as  we  can  say  that  we  cause 
 C  when  we  produce  it  by  artificially  combining  A  and  B. 
 The  idea  of  “  cause  ”  is  something  quite  apart  from  our 
 scientific  investigations,  something  brought  in  by  analogy 
 with  human  actions,  and  for  the  sake  of  clear  thought  it 
 should  be  eliminated  from  any  philosophical  account  of  what 
 science  has  discovered.  So  again,  to  say  that  there  is  a 
 law  that  A  and  B  must  produce  C  may  be  most  misleading. 
 
108 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 We  may,  indeed,  for  the  sake  of  convenience,  use  the  term 
 “law  of  nature”  to  describe  the  generalisations  by  which 
 we  sum  up  the  invariable  successions,  which,  as  a  matter 
 of  fact,  meet  us  everywhere  in  nature,  but  for  the  sake  of 
 clear  thinking  we  must  recognise  that  the  term  44  law,” 
 when  used  by  science,  only  means  a  higher  generalisation. 
 But  the  ordinary  connotation  of  the  term  suggests  a 
 meaning  which  seems  to  imply  the  existence  of  some 
 outside  constraining  influence,  so  that  it  appears  not  only 
 to  describe  phenomena  but  also  to  explain  them.  When 
 we  speak  of  laws  of  gravitation  or  laws  of  motion,  all  we 
 assert  is  that  material  bodies  move  towards  one  another 
 in  a  certain  way  which  can  be  calculated,  but  the 
 use  of  the  misleading  word  44  law  ”  inevitably  suggests 
 the  quite  erroneous  idea  that  we  have  discovered  some 
 external  compelling  force  which  controls  and  regulates 
 these  movements. 
 
 All  that  science  does,  then,  is  to  discover  the  way  in 
 which  things  happen  in  the  world.  It  does  not  answer 
 or  attempt  to  answer  the  question  which  religion  asks — 
 What  are  the  cause  and  purpose  of  the  world  ?  It  has, 
 indeed,  so  far  changed  the  question,  and  purified  the 
 religious  idea  by  showing  that  it  is  not  for  religion  to  ask 
 the  cause  and  purpose  of  each  individual  act,  but  rather 
 the  cause  and  purpose  of  the  world  as  a  whole.  Science 
 has  not  created  any  substitute  for  religion,  or  given  any 
 answer  to  the  questions  which  religion  or  philosophy  ask, 
 but  it  has  helped  in  the  purification  of  the  religious  idea. 
 
 But  it  may  be  asked,  Have  not  the  discoveries  of 
 science  done  much  to  weaken  the  arguments  in  favour 
 of  Theism  which  were  drawn  from  the  constitution  of 
 nature  ?  Science  has  shown,  or  at  any  rate  believes  that  it 
 has  shown,  that  nature  is  one,  that  is,  that  the  whole 
 world  as  we  know  it,  including  man,  is  the  result  of  certain 
 uniform  processes  which  have  continued  through  immense 
 periods  of  time,  by  which  the  universe  has  been  developed 
 from  the  simplest  elements.  Let  us  assume  that  the 
 original  undifferentiated  nebula  has  by  certain  chemical 
 
PROLEGOMENA  TO  STUDY  OF  THEOLOGY  109 
 
 and  physical  processes  come  to  be  the  world  as  we  know 
 it.  This  will,  of  course,  include  human  beings,  for  man¬ 
 kind  must  be  looked  upon  as  a  part  of  the  world.  The 
 proof  of  this  is,  indeed,  by  no  means  complete.  The  theory 
 is  still  largely  hypothetical,  a  construction  of  the  scientific 
 imagination,  but  no  doubt  something  like  it  is  true.  But 
 even  if  we  admit  this,  the  argument  from  the  world  to  the 
 creation  of  the  world  is  not  only  as  cogent  as  it  ever  was, 
 but  probably  somewhat  stronger. 
 
 If  we  reflect  a  moment  it  will  become  obvious  that  the 
 world  might  have  developed  in  an  infinite  number  of  dif¬ 
 ferent  ways.  Why  has  it  developed  in  the  way  that  it 
 has  ?  If  we  discover  that  all  the  different  parts  are  fitted 
 and  adapted  to  one  another,  this  equally  demands  an 
 explanation  just  as  much  if  this  is  the  result  of  develop¬ 
 ment  as  if  it  were  the  result  of  special  creation.  How  did 
 it  come  to  be  that  there  was  a  process  of  development 
 which  produced  a  world  in  which  the  different  parts  are 
 marvellously  adapted  to  each  other  ?  How  has  an 
 irrational  and  fortuitous  collection  of  undifferentiated 
 atoms  come  to  produce  an  entirely  rational  world  ?  We 
 may  not  be  able  to  find  any  solution  of  the  problem,  but  the 
 problem  remains  in  spite  of  all  the  discoveries  of  science, 
 or  rather  the  discoveries  of  science  have  only  intensified 
 the  mystery. 
 
 Setting  aside  the  exceptions  taken  to  this  argument  of 
 quite  another  order,  which  will  meet  us  when  we  consider 
 the  problem  of  knowledge,  it  is  sufficient  for  the  present 
 to  lay  down  that  the  discoveries  of  science  do  not  in  any 
 way  touch  on  the  sphere  of  religion  in  itself.  No  doubt 
 religion,  as  we  have  inherited  it,  has  been  associated  with 
 the  erroneous,  or  at  any  rate  antiquated,  scientific  theories 
 of  previous  generations,  and  there  is  always  a  danger  that 
 we  may  hamper  future  generations  by  associating  it  too 
 closely  with  the  doubtless  imperfect  scientific  conceptions 
 of  the  present  day ;  but  religion  in  itself  is  not  touched  by 
 any  of  these  changes.  Science  should  be  allowed  perfect 
 freedom  for  its  own  work ;  it  may  succeed  in  showing — it 
 
110 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 has  not  done  so  yet — how  life  comes  out  of  matter,  and 
 how  mind  comes  out  of  life.  It  will  still  not  have  touched 
 on  any  of  the  problems  of  religion.  It  will  not  have 
 explained  the  cause  and  purpose  of  the  world.  The  world 
 will  still  present  all  the  features  that  it  has  seemed  to 
 many  to  do  in  the  past  of  a  rational  ordered  whole,  showing 
 clear  and  unmistakable  signs  of  a  purposeful  origin ;  it  may 
 still  be  held  to  show  that  marvellous  adjustment  of  parts 
 which  has  seemed  to  many  to  imply  the  existence  of  an  all- 
 powerful  reason ;  it  will  still  contain  all  those  characteristics 
 which  have  aroused  men’s  wonder  and  admiration,  and 
 have  stirred,  too,  their  deepest  religious  emotions.  From 
 the  point  of  view  of  religion  science  has  only  made  the 
 world  more  wonderful;  it  presents  the  same  problems  as 
 in  the  past,  only  on  a  larger  scale.  The  opposition  which 
 has  prevailed  between  the  two  must  be  solved  by  allowing 
 each  to  be  supreme  within  its  own  sphere. 
 
 Quite  early  in  human  experience  men  learn  to  distinguish 
 between  themselves  and  the  world  outside  them,  and  in 
 themselves  between  their  soul  or  mind  and  their  body. 
 And  while  they  feel  that  the  body  seems  somehow  to  be 
 part  of  the  world,  they  look  upon  their  soul  or  mind  as 
 something  apart  from  it,  and  they  feel  somehow  that  this 
 soul  of  theirs,  which  appears  to  have  an  existence  separate 
 from  the  things  around  it,  bears  witness  to  the  existence 
 of  an  order  of  Being  apart  from,  and  different  from,  the 
 world.  We  need  not  pursue  here  the  steps  by  which  this 
 knowledge  seems  to  have  grown  up,  or  the  form  that  it 
 has  taken ;  we  ask  rather,  now,  what  answer  at  the  present 
 day  we  should  give  to  such  problems.  Now  a  science 
 has  grown  up  with  the  purpose  of  studying  in  a  scientific 
 manner  the  phenomena  of  the  human  mind,  which  bears 
 the  name  of  psychology.  Here  there  are  a  series  of  pheno¬ 
 mena  which  we  can  study  in  two  spheres,  in  the  workings 
 of  our  own  mind,  introspectively,  and  in  the  workings  of  the 
 minds  around  us.  Now  scientific  psychology  would  claim 
 that  the  same  scientific  principles  apply  to  these  phenomena 
 
PROLEGOMENA  TO  STUDY  OF  THEOLOGY  111 
 
 as  to  other  observed  facts  in  the  world.  The  phenomena 
 are  complicated,  it  is  true,  but  are  capable  of  exact  observ¬ 
 ation.  Here,  as  elsewhere  in  nature,  similar  phenomena 
 are  followed  by  similar  results.  Here,  as  in  other  branches 
 of  scientific  investigation,  we  can  make  generalisations,  or, 
 as  we  call  them,  laws.  We  can  within  certain  limits 
 predict  what  will  happen,  and  by  the  use  of  knowledge 
 gained  we  can  produce  results  that  we  desire.  We  can 
 trace  what  appears  to  be  an  upward  development  from  life 
 to  instinct,  and  from  instinct  to  reason.  We  know  that 
 there  is  a  close  and  intimate  connection  between  the 
 phenomena  of  the  mind  and  of  the  body ;  they  act  and  react 
 on  one  another;  the  world  of  thought  and  ideas  is  so 
 intimately  connected  with  the  physical  constitution  of 
 the  brain,  that  an  injury  to  the  brain  hampers  and  perhaps 
 entirely  destroys  the  work  of  the  mind.  Is  it,  then,  really 
 true  that  there  is  any  mind  apart  from  body  ?  Are  not 
 we  merely  dealing  with  certain  functions  of  a  physical 
 brain  ?  Is  not  mind  simply  a  development  of  matter  ? 
 
 There  has  always  been  a  certain  plausibility  about  such 
 a  theory,  but  philosophy  has  always  ultimately  repudiated 
 it,  and  the  advance  made  by  physiology  and  scientific 
 psychology  has  not  really  done  anything  to  change  the 
 problems  which  continue  to  perplex  the  human  reason. 
 It  is  true,  of  course,  that  we  now  know  certainly  that  the 
 brain  is  the  seat  of  thought,  that  we  have  done  a  good  deal 
 to  map  out  the  functions  of  the  different  parts  of  the 
 brain,  that  we  are  studying  accurately  the  physical 
 machinery  of  human  thought,  that  we  can  trace  the  analogy 
 between  the  brain  of  men  and  of  animals.  We  have,  in 
 fact,  substituted  some  measure  of  scientific  accuracy  for 
 the  empirical  generalisation  of  older  days.  A  little 
 reflection,  however,  will  show  us  that  we  have  not  really 
 explained  anything. 
 
 We  may  put  the  problem  in  various  ways.  How  can 
 a  physical  fact  become  a  mental  state  ?  When  I  think, 
 there  is  a  change,  you  say,  in  the  molecules  of  the  brain. 
 Granted.  But  a  change  of  molecules  is  not  a  thought, 
 
112 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 how  can  it  become  one  ?  We  are,  in  fact,  dealing  with 
 two  entirely  different  phenomena,  closely  connected,  it 
 is  true,  in  their  working,  but  entirely  distinct  in  their 
 nature.  The  thoughts,  the  ideas,  the  emotions  of  the 
 human  mind  belong  to  a  different  order  of  phenomena 
 from  the  physical  changes  in  the  structure  of  the  brain, 
 and  no  philosophy  starting  from  a  position  which  seems 
 materialist  has  ever  explained  how  the  one  becomes  the 
 other.  Or,  again,  we  may  put  the  problem  in  another 
 way.  How  do  I  explain  my  consciousness  of  the  world  ? 
 How  can  I,  who  am  clearly  in  one  sense  a  part  of  the  world, 
 get  as  I  seem  to  do  outside  it,  know  it,  act  as  a  cause  of 
 events  which  modify  it,  interfere  with  it,  have  an  existence 
 which  is  separate  from  it.  I  am  conscious  of  myself  apart 
 from  the  world,  and  this  “X”  clearly  has  a  continuous 
 existence.  I  not  only  receive  impressions  from  outside, 
 I  can  remember  them  and  compare  them  with  one  another. 
 Whatever  X  may  be,  at  any  rate  I  have  a  continuity  of 
 existence  as  a  receptacle  of  all  those  impressions  and  ideas 
 which  go  to  make  up  the  world  which  appears  to  be 
 outside  myself.  Clearly,  then,  we  have  facts  to  be  ex¬ 
 plained  which  the  scientific  study  of  things  cannot  explain, 
 and  these  facts  suggest  the  existence  of  a  human  mind 
 which  makes  use  of  the  body,  which  is  conditioned  by  the 
 body,  which  finds  in  the  body  the  machinery  by  which  it 
 works,  but  is  itself  apart  from  the  body.  It  is  questions 
 such  as  these  that  men  have  sought  to  answer  in  their 
 religious  beliefs,  and  that  still  seem  to  demand  a  solution 
 very  different  from  any  which  a  purely  scientific  investi¬ 
 gation  can  give. 
 
 But  we  must  pass  now  to  another  part  of  our  experience. 
 We  discover  ourselves  to  be  moral  beings.  Not  only  do 
 we  know  things,  not  only  do  we  desire  things,  not  only  do 
 we  do  things,  but  we  also  feel  that  there  are  certain  things 
 which  we  ought  to  do,  or  will  or  desire.  We  not  only  say 
 that  a  thing  is,  we  say  that  certain  things  ought  to  be. 
 We  have,  in  fact,  what  we  call  a  moral  life,  and  this  shows 
 
PROLEGOMENA  TO  STUDY  OF  THEOLOGY  118 
 
 itself  not  only  in  the  fact  that  we  make  moral  judgments,  as 
 they  are  called,  but  also  that  we  have  a  conscience,  that 
 we  have  feelings  of  remorse  and  contrition,  and  a  sense  of 
 sin,  as  St.  Paul  describes  it,  “  their  conscience  also  bearing 
 witness,  and  their  thoughts  the  meanwhile  accusing  or 
 else  excusing  one  another.” 
 
 It  will  be  remembered  that  when  we  spoke  of  the  study 
 of  religion,  we  referred  to  the  modern  scientific  and 
 objective  method  of  research.  The  same  method  is  now 
 followed  with  regard  to  moral  questions.  The  moral 
 facts  of  the  world  are  collected,  arranged,  classified. 
 Theories  of  evolution  and  development  are  discussed,  the 
 laws  of  growth  are  investigated,  and  it  is  suggested  that 
 if  we  can  show  how  the  moral  facts  of  the  world  have 
 grown,  we  can  explain  them.  Against  this  it  must  be 
 maintained  that  a  description  of  the  methods  and  cir¬ 
 cumstances  of  growth  is  no  explanation  of  a  fact.  It  is 
 quite  true  that  there  has  been  an  advance  and  a  growth  in 
 moral  judgments,  that  just  as  our  scientific  knowledge  has 
 become  better,  just  as  religion  becomes  more  elevated, 
 so  morality  also  develops.  This  is  undoubtedly  true, 
 although  the  laws  of  advance  are  very  complicated  and 
 here,  more  than  anywhere  else,  progress  is  intermittent. 
 Moral  degeneration  is  as  real  a  fact  in  history  as  moral 
 progress.  But  grant  all  this  scientific  inquiry  and  its 
 results,  it  never  touches  the  real  questions.  It  never 
 explains  why  men  are  moral,  and  why  they  have  a  con¬ 
 science,  and  why  they  are  burdened  with  the  sense  of  sin 
 and  feelings  of  remorse.  It  is  no  explanation  to  say  that 
 these  characteristics  have  been  evolved,  for  that  only  drives 
 us  farther  back  to  the  question  how  it  came  to  be  that 
 men  are  such  that  they  should  evolve  in  this  way.  It  is 
 no  explanation  to  say  that  it  is  society  that  makes  us  moral ; 
 human  society  has  developed  as  it  has  because  man  is 
 moral,  just  as  its  growth  has  been  conditioned  by  the  fact 
 that  men  are  religious.  Religion  demands  an  explanation 
 of  why  things  are  what  they  are,  and  the  problem  of 
 
 morality  is  one  of  those  which  has  to  be  solved, 
 i 
 
114  LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 But  men  pass  not  only  judgments  of  truth,  not  only 
 moral  judgments,  they  also  regard  things  as  beautiful 
 or  the  reverse.  We  are  here  touching  on  a  branch  of 
 thought  which  has  generally  been  neglected,  but  a  little 
 consideration  will,  I  think,  convince  us  that  it  is  a  real 
 field  of  inquiry.  When  we  say  that  a  thing  is  beautiful 
 we  express  a  judgment  quite  different  from  that  which  we 
 make  when  we  say  that  a  thing  is  true;  it  is  certainly 
 also  different  from  what  we  mean  when  we  say  that  an 
 action  is  right.  Moreover,  we  clearly  imply  when  we 
 think  of  44  beauty  ”  that  there  is  some  objective  standard 
 by  which  we  can  judge,  although  here, even  more  than  in  the 
 case  of  morals,  the  influence  of  individual  taste  seems  to 
 obscure  our  judgment.  But  both  the  collective  conscious¬ 
 ness  of  mankind  and  individual  attempts  at  self-improve¬ 
 ment  imply  the  assumption  that  there  is  an  objective 
 standard  of  beautv,  and  that  it  is  beneficial  to  attain  to  it. 
 And  if  there  are  good  reasons  for  looking  upon  the  concep¬ 
 tion  of  the  Beautiful  as  something  which  corresponds  to 
 an  objective  reality,  it  is  certainly  true  that  the  sense  of  the 
 Beautiful  has  had  much  to  do  in  many  minds  with  the 
 growth  of  Religion.  Nor  have  religious  thinkers  failed  to 
 see  the  religious  power  of  the  sense  of  beauty.  “  Suppose,” 
 writes  Plato,  44  it  were  permitted  to  one  to  behold  the 
 Beautiful  itself,  clear  and  pure  and  unalloyed,  not  tainted 
 by  human  flesh,  or  colours  or  any  of  the  manifold  varieties 
 of  mortal  existence,  but  the  divine  Beauty  as  it  really  is 
 in  its  simplicity,  do  you  think  that  it  would  be  an  ignoble 
 life  that  one  should  gaze  thereon,  and  ever  contemplate 
 that  Beauty  and  hold  communion  therewith  ?  Do  you  not 
 rather  believe  that  in  this  communion  only  will  it  be 
 possible  for  a  man,  beholding  the  Beautiful  with  the 
 organ  by  which  alone  it  can  be  seen,  to  beget  not  images 
 of  virtue  but  realities,  for  that  which  he  embraces  is  not  an 
 image  but  the  truth,  and  having  begotten  and  nourished 
 true  virtue  to  become  the  friend  of  God  and  attain  to 
 immortality  if  ever  mortal  has  attained.” 
 
 Philosophers  are  often  very  one-sided  and  partial  in 
 
PROLEGOMENA  TO  STUDY  OF  THEOLOGY  115 
 
 their  outlook  on  life.  They  have  limited  their  field  of 
 
 \ 
 
 inquiry  to  one  or  two  main  problems,  and  they  have 
 ignored  the  question,  What  is  the  meaning  and  idea  of 
 Beauty  ?  But  if  any  one  would  explain  human  life,  it 
 demands  an  answer,  and  the  unconscious  processes  of  the 
 human  mind  which  have  built  up  religions  have  probably 
 been  rightly  influenced  by  this,  as  by  other  and  more  con¬ 
 spicuous  and  perhaps  more  urgent  problems. 
 
 We  have  now  considered  certain  fundamental  questions 
 which  must  be  answered  by  any  scheme  which  would 
 explain  human  life.  How  do  we  account  for  the  world  ? 
 How  do  we  account  for  the  human  soul  ?  How  do  we 
 account  for  its  moral  content,  and  its  sense  of  beauty  ? 
 How,  in  fact,  do  we  account  for  man’s  intellectual  life  ? 
 It  is  these  questions  that  Religion  and  Philosophy  have 
 attempted  to  answer,  and  of  which  we  desire,  if  possible, 
 a  true  and  correct  explanation.  But  when  we  begin  to 
 attempt  to  answer,  we  are  at  once  confronted  with  the 
 question :  What  knowledge  can  man  attain  about  such 
 things;  has  he  the  means,  the  opportunity,  the  equipment 
 to  enable  him  to  approach  these  questions  at  all  ? 
 
 We  have  so  far  followed  certain  lines  of  investiga¬ 
 tion  which  have  engaged  the  attention  of  the  human  mind 
 from  an  early  time,  and  we  have  assumed  its  capacity  to 
 obtain  the  knowledge  that  it  desires.  We  have  followed  cer¬ 
 tain  lines  of  development  and  thought,  but  logically  there 
 is  a  question  which  ought  to  have  preceded  our  investi¬ 
 gations.  What  means  have  we  for  carrying  these  on,  and 
 what  method  have  we  for  discovering  whether  our  results 
 are  correct  ?  We  have  assumed  the  ordinary  view  of 
 the  world.  But  an  analysis  of  the  whole  fabric  of  human 
 knowledge  will  show  us  what  a  very  little  way  it  goes. 
 We  talk  of  the  world,  but  we  find  that  the  world  is  only 
 the  name  that  we  give  for  what  we  assume  to  be  the 
 cause  of  certain  sensations  that  we  experience.  We 
 usually  talk  of  material  things  and  of  matter  as  something 
 that  exists,  but  a  very  little  consideration  is  sufficient  to 
 
116 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 show  us  that  we  have  really  no  knowledge  of  it  at  all. 
 We  find  that  all  the  ideas  which  we  seem  to  get  from  things 
 we  put  into  them.  We  say  that  a  thing  is  red,  but  a  little 
 thought  convinces  us  that  redness  is  not  a  quality  of  a 
 thing  but  a  sensation  of  our  mind  which  is  caused,  we  have 
 reason  to  believe,  by  the  reflection  of  certain  rays  of  light 
 from  an  object.  We  say  a  thing  is  heavy,  but  we  only 
 really  know  that  we  have  a  feeling  caused  by  the  strain  on 
 our  muscles  when  we  hold  it  up.  The  idea  of  extension  in 
 space  means  that  some  things  require  greater  effort  than 
 others  to  reach.  In  fact  what  we  call  the  outer  world 
 is  an  explanation  of  a  complicated  sense  of  sensation  in 
 our  own  minds. 
 
 And,  again,  when  we  examine  certain  more  abstract 
 ideas,  we  find  that  we  do  not  derive  them  from  the  world 
 but  impress  them  upon  it.  We  speak  of  “  cause  ”  in 
 nature,  but  we  do  not  find  “  cause  ”  by  a  scientific  inves¬ 
 tigation  of  the  world,  we  read  the  idea  into  our  own 
 explanations.  We  know  of  ourselves  as  originating  things, 
 and  we  desire  to  find  some  similar  cause  for  other  things. 
 We  habitually  speak  of  the  uniformity  of  nature,  but  is 
 it  an  idea  that  we  have  derived  from  nature  or  read  into 
 nature  ? 
 
 Without  concerning  ourselves  with  a  discussion  of  the 
 different  theories  which  have  been  held  to  explain  our  know¬ 
 ledge,  it  is  sufficient  to  recognise  that  it  may  ultimately  be 
 analysed  into  two  elements,  that  which  appears  to  come 
 from  our  sensations,  and  that  which  the  mind  itself  gives, 
 a  conclusion  which  seems  to  harmonise  with  what  we  have 
 already  maintained  concerning  the  reality  of  the  existence 
 of  the  human  mind.  But  we  have  a  further  question  to 
 ask  :  If  this  be  so,  whence  does  the  mind  get  the  thoughts 
 and  ideas  which  it  contributes  to  knowledge  ?  Has  it 
 some  source  of  knowledge  other  than  sensation  ?  In  old 
 days  there  existed  various  schools  of  thought  which 
 based  their  knowledge  of  things  on  the  intuitions  of  the 
 mind.  A  more  accurate  analysis  has,  it  is  generally 
 agreed,  shown  that  there  are  no  grounds  for  this  belief, 
 
PROLEGOMENA  TO  STUDY  OF  THEOLOGY  117 
 
 and  it  has  been  held  further  that  what  the  mind  itself 
 contributes  to  the  fabric  of  knowledge  is  the  necessary 
 forms  of  thought.  Human  reason,  then,  is  valid  within 
 the  limits  of  experience,  but  what  grounds  have  we  for 
 using  it  of  things  outside  its  experience  ?  The  great 
 questions  that  we  have  asked  take  us  beyond  the  limits 
 of  our  experience;  beyond  the  limits  within  which  we  can 
 prove  the  validity  of  our  reasoning  processes ;  where,  then, 
 is  the  possibility  of  obtaining  an  answer  to  them  ? 
 
 It  is  well  known  that  Kant,  to  whom  we  owe  our  analysis 
 of  knowledge,  and  the  limitation  of  the  sphere  of  the 
 speculative  reason,  found  in  an  appeal  to  the  practical 
 reason  a  provisional  answer  to  these  questions.  We 
 could  not,  he  maintained,  account  for  the  existence  of  a 
 moral  sense  unless  we  presupposed  the  existence  of  God 
 and  certain  dependent  beliefs.  This,  indeed,  has  not 
 been  accepted  as  universally  as  his  more  negative  criti¬ 
 cism,  but  even  the  negative  criticism  is  accepted  by 
 few  in  its  completeness.  And  this  negative  criticism  is 
 itself  a  double-edged  weapon.  It  is  quite  true  that  it 
 may  be  used  to  destroy  the  creations  of  those  who  have 
 built  up  for  us  imposing  dogmatic  constructions,  but  it 
 also  shows  that  such  criticism  has  no  real  validity.  If 
 we  cannot  say  what  morality  is,  we  are  equally  unable  to 
 say  what  it  is  not. 
 
 It  may  be  suggested  that  there  is  a  basis  on  which  a 
 provisional  answer  may  be  made  to  all  such  questions. 
 The  mind  constructs  an  hypothesis  to  explain  the  facts 
 of  life.  It  no  longer  claims  to  prove,  as  the  old  dogmatists 
 claimed  to  prove,  what  must  be :  what  it  does  is  to  con¬ 
 struct  a  system  which  can  give  a  provisional  explanation 
 of  experience.  This  is,  it  seems  to  me,  what  the  religious 
 sense  of  man  has  always  done.  It  has  formulated  certain 
 ideas  which  give  the  most  satisfactory  answer  possible 
 at  the  time  to  the  questions  asked.  As  experience  grows, 
 these  ideas  expand  and  develop.  Ideas  based  on  a  limited 
 experience  are  found  to  be  inadequate  and  false.  They 
 make  way  for  wider  and  more  complete  generalisations. 
 
118 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 We  are  not  satisfied  with  any  theories  which  fail  to 
 explain  the  whole  of  human  nature. 
 
 On  this  basis  we  may  criticise  various  systems  of  religious 
 philosophy  which  have  from  time  to  time  been  constructed. 
 Their  chief  characteristic  is  that  they  have  attempted  to 
 prove  the  existence  of  God.  But  no  such  proof  is  possible, 
 if,  as  we  have  maintained,  our  methods  of  demonstration 
 are  only  valid  within  the  limits  of  experience.  Since  the 
 time  of  Kant  similar  attempts  have  been  made  to  build 
 up  on  a  logical  basis  a  philosophy  of  the  Absolute.  Such 
 systems  also  are  equally  destitute  of  logical  cogency. 
 They  are,  in  fact,  hypotheses,  the  value  of  which  really 
 depends  on  the  degree  in  which  they  adequately  explain 
 life  and  experience.  A  similar  criticism  applies  to  the 
 various  hylozoistic  systems  which  have  become  fashionable 
 as  furnishing  a  basis  for  modern  science.  All  these  systems 
 attempt  to  do  by  a  logical  process  what  cannot  be  so 
 done,  and  therefore  fail.  We  would  suggest  the  following 
 alternative  method.  The  human  mind  demands  an 
 answer  to  all  the  various  questions  which  concern  the 
 meaning  and  purpose  of  life.  That  theory  which  most 
 adequately  explains  life  as  a  whole  will  be  the  one  which 
 carries  most  conviction.  J  Kant,  as  we  have  seen,  admits 
 the  existence  of  God  as  a  postulate  of  the  practical 
 reason.  If  that  hypothesis  helps  further  to  explain 
 the  problem  of  the  existence  of  the  world,  and  of  the 
 human  mind,  if  it  further  gives  a  rational  and  satis¬ 
 fying  account  of  the  ideal  conception  of  beauty,  then  the 
 weight  of  reason  for  believing  it  becomes  increasingly 
 urgent. 
 
 So  far  we  have  been  considering  purely  intellectual 
 questions.  But  it  is  very  doubtful  whether  the  intellect 
 has  been  at  all  the  chief  force  in  creating  religion.  We 
 have  seen  that  religion  is  a  theory  of  life,  it  is  an  inter¬ 
 pretation  of  the  life  of  man  as  a  whole,  and  we  know  that 
 in  the  life  of  men  the  intellect  plays  only  a  small  part. 
 Those  who  have  studied  the  philosophy  of  religion  have,  of 
 
PROLEGOMENA  TO  STUDY  OF  THEOLOGY  119 
 
 course,  been  almost  always  men  of  great  intellectual  power, 
 and  intellectual  questions  have  consciously  played  a  large 
 part  in  their  lives.  But  this  is  not  the  case  with  the 
 great  mass  of  men.  Intellectual  questions  do  not  directly 
 trouble  them  much.  It  is  possible,  indeed,  to  press  this 
 argument  too  far,  because  even  if  men  do  not  consciously 
 ask  questions,  they  are  still  uneasy  if  they  have  not  a 
 satisfactory  guide  or  system  of  life.  Still  life  itself  is  for 
 them  much  more  than  any  theory  about  it.  Their  feelings 
 and  desires,  their  emotions  and  passions  play  by  far  the 
 largest  part  in  their  life.  They  want  a  theory  or  rule  or  sys¬ 
 tem  of  life  which  adequately  responds  to  all  their  complex 
 being.  What  is  the  end  and  meaning  and  purpose  of 
 this  strange  human  life  with  its  high  aspirations  and 
 ideals,  with  its  limited  powers  and  opportunities  of  enjoy¬ 
 ment,  with  its  yearnings  for  beauty  and  goodness  and 
 truth,  with  its  aspirations  after  a  larger  life,  with  its  power 
 of  love,  and  then  at  the  same  time  with  its  degradation, 
 with  its  failure  to  attain  its  ideal,  with  all  its  malice,  and 
 hatred  and  jealousy,  with  its  capacity  for  happiness  which 
 it  always  seems  to  be  marring.  These  represent  human 
 life  as  men  know  it.  A  religion  to  satisfy  them  must 
 realise  and  understand  all  these,  and  that  is  why  the 
 elaborate  constructions  of  great  intellects  have  never 
 been  able  to  satisfy  the  popular  mind.  They  have  had  to 
 make  way  for  more  spontaneous  growths,  which  are  less 
 consistent,  perhaps,  but  truer  to  the  breadth  of  human 
 nature. 
 
 Those,  then,  who  tell  us  that  religion  does  not  con¬ 
 clusively  deal  with  the  intellect  are  no  doubt  right,  but  it 
 is  unfortunate  that  some,  like  Schleiermacher  in  his  revolt 
 from  the  intellectualism  of  Fichte,  have  attempted  to 
 banish  the  intellectual  from  religion.  We  cannot  acquiesce 
 when  he  tells  us  that  religion  44  resigns  at  once  all  claims 
 to  science  or  morality.”  Rather  we  would  say  that 
 religion  sweeps  all  human  experience  into  itself  when  it 
 attempts  to  interpret  human  life.  44  Man,”  says  Paulsen, 
 44  is  not  mere  understanding,  he  is  above  everything  else  a 
 
120 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 willing  and  feeling  being.  And  religion  is  deeply  rooted 
 in  this  side  of  his  nature.  Feelings  of  humility,  reverence, 
 yearnings  after  perfection  with  which  the  heart  is 
 inspired  by  the  contemplation  of  nature  and  history, 
 determine  his  attitude  to  reality  more  immediately  and 
 profoundly  than  the  conception  and  formulas  of  science. 
 Out  of  these  feelings  arise  the  trust  that  the  world  is  not 
 a  meaningless  play  of  blind  forces,  but  the  revelation  of  a 
 great  and  good  being  whom  he  may  acknowledge  as  akin 
 to  his  own  innermost  essence.” 
 
 Religion  must  adequately  satisfy  human  feeling.  Love, 
 Hope,  Reverence,  Aspiration,  Enthusiasm — these  all  de¬ 
 mand  their  satisfaction  in  religion.  But  it  has  also  other 
 problems  to  deal  with.  Life  for  most  people  means  the 
 “  changes  and  chances  of  this  mortal  life.”  In  these  man 
 requires  guidance,  consolation  and  support.  He  has  to 
 choose  his  path  of  life,  he  knows  that  he  will  be  exposed  to 
 varying  chances  of  good  and  bad  fortune,  he  knows  that 
 he  will  have  difficulties  to  surmount.  Such  is  what  life 
 means  for  most  people,  and  it  bids  them  desire  the 
 guidance  that  religion  or  a  philosophy,  or  some  other  rule 
 of  life  may  be  able  to  give  them. 
 
 And  then  there  is  a  further  set  of  problems  connected 
 with  the  complex  phenomena  of  human  society.  Here, 
 again,  there  is  scope  for  scientific  investigation.  We  can 
 investigate  the  laws  and  conditions  which  have  governed 
 its  development,  the  history  of  the  rise  and  fall  of  nations, 
 the  varying  ways  in  which  men  have  combined  together, 
 but  when  all  this  is  done  we  have  not  approached  one  step 
 nearer  to  the  great  fundamental  question,  Is  there  any 
 meaning  in  this  strange  succession  on  the  earth  of  nations 
 and  peoples  ?  Where  scientific  investigation  finds  develop¬ 
 ment,  law,  evolution  or  whatever  name  it  likes  to  employ 
 to  designate  the  succession  of  phenomena  which  it  tabulates 
 and  records,  our  religious  and  philosophic  mind  inevitably 
 asks  is  there  any  purpose  or  plan  in  this  succession. 
 Philosophers  have  produced  their  schemes  of  human 
 
PROLEGOMENA  TO  STUDY  OF  THEOLOGY  121 
 
 progress,  and  a  religious  system,  if  it  is  to  fulfil  at  all 
 adequately  its  functions,  must  tell  us  what  purpose  runs 
 through  this  long  succession  of  the  ages,  and  how  we  can 
 harmonise  the  history  of  the  world  with  the  claims  of  truth 
 and  goodness. 
 
 We  have  enumerated  the  problems  to  which  religion 
 gives  an  answer,  and  have  suggested  the  method  by  which 
 it  works  and  the  logical  basis  of  its  conclusions.  But  what 
 makes  religion,  and  how  has  it  arisen  ?  In  other  words, 
 what  is  the  psychological  origin  of  the  different  religions 
 which  have  existed?  It  is  obvious  that  the  method  of  reli¬ 
 gion  is  quite  different  from  that  of  science  and  philosophy. 
 Science  deliberately  approaches  certain  phenomena,  and 
 by  methods  which  experience  has  made  more  efficient 
 attempts  to  explain  them,  and  has  thus  gradually  built  up 
 a  body  of  truth.  Philosophy  pondering  over  the  various 
 problems  which  meet  it  analyses  our  conceptions  and 
 builds  up  its  hypothesis.  But  no  one  has  ever  produced 
 a  religion  by  deliberately  sitting  down  to  do  so.  If  he 
 attempts  to  do  so  he  fails.  Religion,  whether  it  be  an 
 ethnic  religion,  or  the  work  of  a  personal  founder,  seems 
 always  to  spring  forth  fully  grown  and  armed ;  it  appears 
 to  arise  in  the  human  mind  suddenly,  spontaneously, 
 unconsciously,  Whence  has  it  come  ? 
 
 It  is  probably  one  of  the  most  important  psychological 
 advances  of  modern  times  to  have  drawn  our  attention 
 to  the  sub-conscious  action  of  the  human  mind.  Only  a 
 small  part  of  the  furniture  of  the  mind  can  be  actually 
 present  to  our  consciousness  at  any  one  time.  Further, 
 only  a  small  part  of  the  working  of  the  mind  is  conscious. 
 We  know  this  as  a  matter  of  experience.  We  know  that 
 if  after  devoting  our  mind  ineffectually  to  some  problem 
 for  a  time,  we  lay  it  aside,  it  is  probable  that  when  we 
 return  to  it  the  solution  will  present  itself  easily  and  rapidly 
 and  the  tangled  mass  of  our  thought  will  present  itself 
 in  an  orderly  and  systematic  way.  We  know  in  our  own 
 experience  how  a  time  comes,  especially  when  we  are 
 
122 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 stirred  by  some  strong  emotion  or  interest,  when  there 
 wells  forth  from  the  unconsciousness  of  the  brain  a  rush 
 of  ideas,  thoughts,  images  which  have  lain  dormant  or 
 hidden.  It  is  probable  that  in  all  the  constructive  work 
 of  the  human  mind  the  area  of  sub-consciousness  plays 
 a  great  part.  The  thoughts,  ideas,  experiences,  emotions 
 of  life  are  all  harmonised  there,  the  gradual  impressions  of 
 years  are  accumulated,  and  then  when  some  great  impulse 
 stirs  our  consciousness  they  come  forth  with  a  sudden 
 burst  and  modify  our  whole  life.  It  happens  equally  in 
 individuals  and  nations.  If  we  ask  why  it  is  that  the 
 phenomena  of  conversion  arise,  we  answer  that  it  comes 
 from  the  sudden  upheaval  of  the  impressions  which  have 
 been  lying  hidden  in  the  mind.  The  conscious  mind  has 
 had  its  own  range  of  thought  with  which  it  has  been  pre¬ 
 occupied,  it  has  had  nothing  to  give  to  religion,  or  the 
 emotions,  or  the  passions,  they  have  been  hidden  under 
 the  discipline  and  system  of  life.  But  a  time  comes  when 
 powers  that  have  been  latent  assert  themselves.  This  will 
 explain  also  the  great  movements  of  popular  feeling.  Latent 
 in  every  man  is  his  patriotism,  in  ordinary  times  it  is  hidden 
 under  the  necessities  of  self-interest.  From  time  to  time 
 there  pass  over  the  country,  aroused  by  some  particular 
 incident  or  incidents,  waves  of  patriotic  feeling  which 
 come  from  the  liberation  of  this  force.  So  it  is  in  religion. 
 A  period  of  material  prosperity  and  exclusive  devotion  to 
 worldly  things  obscures  the  religious  instinct.  Suddenly, 
 sometimes  after  a  period  of  material  misfortune,  or  from 
 the  growth  of  deeper  and  purer  ideals,  or  from  the  influence 
 of  a  great  religious  teacher,  latent  aspirations  are  roused 
 and  the  balance  of  life  is  restored.  Religion  in  a  new 
 aspect  is  created  in  the  mind  corresponding  to  the  accu¬ 
 mulated  impressions  which  have  been  gradually  forming, 
 a  desire  is  being  prepared,  influenced  by  the  new  thought 
 and  conditions  of  life,  and  finds  its  gratification  in  the  new 
 teaching. 
 
 It  is,  then,  in  the  sub-conscious  mind  that  religion  is 
 matured.  Now  this  has  recently  been  claimed  as  implying 
 
PROLEGOMENA  TO  STUDY  OF  THEOLOGY  123 
 
 more  than  we  have  so  far  suggested.  Professor  William 
 James,  to  whom  we  owe  so  much  of  the  modern  progress  in 
 psychology,  wrote  :  “  I  think  it  may  be  asserted  that  there 
 are  religious  experiences  of  a  specific  nature,  not  deducible 
 by  analogy  or  psychological  reasoning  from  our  other 
 roots  of  experience,  which  point  with  reasonable  proba¬ 
 bility  to  the  continuity  of  our  consciousness  with  a  wider 
 spiritual  environment  from  which  the  ordinary  prudential 
 man  is  shut  off.  The  believer  finds  that  the  tenderer  parts 
 of  his  personal  life  are  continuous  with  a  source  of  the 
 same  quality  which  is  operative  in  the  universe  outside  of 
 him.”  “  In  a  word,  the  believer  is  continuous  in  his  own 
 consciousness  at  any  rate  with  a  wider  self  from  which 
 saving  experience  flows  in.  Those  who  have  such  experi¬ 
 ences  distinctly  enough,  and  often  enough  to  live  in  the 
 light  of  them,  remain  quite  unmoved  by  criticism,  from 
 whatever  quarter  it  may  come,  be  it  academic  and 
 scientific,  or  be  it  merely  the  voice  of  logical  common 
 sense.  They  have  had  their  vision  and  they  know — 
 that  is  enough — that  we  inhabit  an  invisible  spiritual 
 environment  from  which  help  comes,  our  whole  being 
 mysteriously  one  with  a  larger  soul  whose  instrument  we 
 are.” 
 
 The  problem  we  are  approaching  is  a  difficult  one,  for 
 we  are  attempting  to  give  an  explanation  which  will  satisfy 
 our  philosophical  principles  of  a  question  which  has  been 
 ignored  by  philosophy,  although  well  known  to  religion. 
 The  problem  of  religion  is  what  gives  us  religious  certainty. 
 Why  do  people  believe  such  different  and  antagonistic 
 creeds  with  such  a  consensus  of  certitude  ?  At  the  time 
 of  the  Reformation  Catholic  and  Protestant  were  both 
 alike  prepared  to  die  for  their  faith.  But  a  critic  would 
 remember  that  they  were  both  equally  certain  that  they 
 were  right,  although  they  differed  fundamentally  in  their 
 opinions.  They  had  apparently  no  rational  ground  for 
 this  certainty.  Yet  they  were  certain.  But  one  or  other 
 must  have  been  wrong,  and  if  we  see  people  with  such 
 varying  opinions  equally  certain,  are  we  not  inclined  to 
 
124 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 conclude  not  only  that  all  fanatics  are  deluded  but  that 
 all  beliefs  are  delusions  ?  Here  is  the  problem. 
 
 Now  we  ask  first :  Are  there  any  reasons  to  think  that 
 normally  through  any  44  spiritual  ”  medium,  apart  from  our 
 experience,  direct  information  comes  from  a  “spiritual” 
 world.  Putting  aside  for  the  present  any  particular 
 questions  about  revealed  religion,  is  there  any  reason  for 
 thinking  that  there  is  some  non-natural  source  from  which 
 religious  ideas  may  come  to  us.  Is  there,  in  fact,  anything 
 in  the  religious  knowledge  of  the  world  which  could  not 
 have  been  built  up  by  the  human  mind  working  on  the 
 materials  w|th  which  experience,  in  the  widest  sense,  has 
 supplied  it.  It  may  be  pointed  out  that  Christianity 
 teaches  us  that  44  God  is  a  spirit  ”  and  that  the  44  Holy 
 Spirit  ”  has  always  been  teaching  men.  But  that  does 
 not  necessarily  answer  our  question,  because  the  teaching 
 may  have  been  through  the  normal  powers  of  man,  and 
 not  in  the  way  that  we  have  described  above.  The 
 question  we  are  asking  is  whether  any  real  knowledge  or 
 inspiration  has  come  to  men  through  any  source  other 
 than  the  normal  operations  of  the  human  mind,  and  our 
 answer  must  be,  so  far  as  we  can  judge,  no.  The  content 
 of  the  religious  knowledge  of  each  individual  or  race  seems 
 in  all  cases  to  have  been  derived  from  sources  which  may 
 be  described  as  natural.  We  have  not  any  reason  for 
 thinking  that  there  comes  to  the  individual  inspiration  for 
 his  spiritual  life  which  is  not  derived  in  some  way  from  his 
 experience.  In  that  sense  religion  is  a  natural  product — 
 of  the  human  mind.  But  the  answer  so  far  given  does 
 not  exhaust  the  meaning  of  the  spiritual,  or  touch  on  what 
 we  have  described  as  the  real  problem — the  consciousness 
 of  religious  certitude — why  do  we  hold  our  religious 
 beliefs  with  such  certainty  ?  Why  are  we  so  certain 
 about  them  in  spite  of  the  fact  which  is  obvious  that 
 when  there  are  so  many  conflicting  opinions,  it  is  very 
 unlikely  that  any  of  them  may  claim  for  itself  absolute 
 truth  ? 
 
 Let  us  examine  for  a  moment  the  reasons  which  we  give 
 
PROLEGOMENA  TO  STUDY  OF  THEOLOGY  125 
 
 for  scientific  generalisations.  It  is  sometimes  said  that 
 science  is  built  up  on  the  basis  of  observation  and  experi¬ 
 ment.  That  is  true  in  theory,  but  in  actual  fact  in  the 
 science  which  we  know,  a  third  element,  that  of  hypothesis, 
 plays  a  large  part.  Much  of  the  fabric  of  science  is  simply 
 the  best  explanation  that  can  be  framed  to  explain  a  large 
 body  of  facts,  and  so  far  from  there  being  any  certitude  we 
 are  continually  seeing  accepted  theories  making  way  for 
 newer  and  as  we  believe  truer  generalisations  as  our 
 knowledge  of  facts  increases  and  as  our  observations 
 become  more  accurate.  It  is  quite  true,  of  course,  that  a 
 large  number  of  the  commonly  accepted  facts  of  science 
 have  gained  a  right  to  exist,  which  makes  them  seem 
 certain.  But  in  no  case  do  they  really  represent  more  than 
 an  approximation  to  the  truth.  It  is  true  again  that  we 
 are  able  to  experiment  and  to  make  the  conclusions  of 
 science  of  practical  use  in  life,  but  here  in  nearly  all  cases 
 there  is  little  certainty.  Take  medical  science.  How 
 completely  the  theories  about  disease  have  changed  even 
 within  our  own  memory,  and  how  changed  has  often  been 
 the  method  of  treatment !  Yet  we  find  that  supreme 
 confidence  has  prevailed  in  the  past  with  regard  to  remedies 
 which  we  now  look  upon  as  barbarous.  Why,  then,  have 
 we  such  complete  confidence  in  the  remedies  and  opinions 
 of  our  own  day  ? 
 
 Now  let  us  look  at  religion.  Religion  is  a  life.  We 
 believe  in  it  because  it  offers  the  most  adequate  explanation 
 of  the  facts  of  life  as  a  whole,  because  it  gives  a  sufficient 
 rule  of  conduct  and  because  it  corresponds  to  our  higher 
 aspirations  and  feelings.  So  soon  as  it  ceases  to  be  an 
 adequate  explanation  and  does  not  respond  to  our  aspira¬ 
 tions,  it  ceases  to  have  the  same  hold  upon  us,  and  unless 
 it  changes  to  suit  the  altered  circumstances,  men  cease  to 
 accept  it  as  true.  There  has  always  been  a  slow  process  of 
 adjustment  going  on.  But  is  this  the  only  claim  that 
 religion  has  to  be  considered  true  ?  In  religion,  as  in 
 science,  there  is  the  continuous  verification  by  experience. 
 We  believe  religion  because  we  find  it  a  valuable  guide  to 
 
126 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 life  and  conduct,  because  we  prove  it.  Objectively  we 
 observe  that  religion  is  beneficial  to  the  State ;  that  a 
 country  without  a  genuine  religious  belief  begins  to  fail  in 
 its  higher  moral  qualities ;  that  an  inadequate  or  false 
 religion  drags  a  nation  down.  Although  the  facts  of 
 religion  are  more  difficult  to  observe  than  the  facts  of 
 science,  the  method  is  in  both  cases  really  the  same. 
 
 This  is  the  underlying  truth  in  the  theory  which  is  being 
 put  forward  at  present  that  judgments  in  religion  and  moral 
 matters  must  be  tested  not  by  their  absolute  truth,  about 
 which  it  is  difficult  to  obtain  any  certainty,  but  by  their 
 value  for  life.  For  instance,  if  the  belief  in  a  God  is  found 
 to  be  conducive  to  the  well-being  of  mankind,  it  is  a  true 
 judgment  of  value.  We  ought  to  believe  in  God,  not  so 
 much  because  we  have  proof  that  He  exists,  but  because 
 the  belief  is  valuable  for  life. 
 
 Now  such  a  theory  if  baldly  stated  would  be  disastrous. 
 It  would  be  always  used  to  bolster  up  any  form  of  super- 
 stitution  which  might  be  supposed  to  have  value.  It 
 would  be  a  weapon  against  all  religious  reform  and  it 
 would  take  away  all  sincerity  from  religious  life.  It  is  a 
 theory  which  ought  never  to  be  accepted,  but  like  all  errors 
 it  contains  an  element  of  truth,  and  that  element  is  that  we 
 continually  test  our  religious  beliefs  by  their  conformity 
 to  experience.  We  believe  in  religion  because  it  corresponds 
 to  life,  because  it  gives  an  explanation  of  the  facts  of 
 life  which  satisfies  our  reason.  So  soon  as  it  ceases  to 
 do  this  we  will  begin  to  question  it.  Just  as  our  belief 
 in  the  conclusions  of  science  is  tested  and  strengthened 
 by  experiments  and  the  application  to  life,  so  our 
 belief  in  religion  is  strengthened  and  tested  by  our  expe¬ 
 rience  in  all  its  forms.  “  By  their  fruits  ye  shall  know 
 them.” 
 
 Yet  there  is  an  element  which  whether  in  the  case  of 
 science  or  religion  we  have  left  out.  If  we  ask  what 
 makes  a  man  believe  with  intensity,  we  are  told  it  is 
 faith.  When  we  find  this  intensity  growing  stronger, 
 
PROLEGOMENA  TO  STUDY  OF  THEOLOGY  127 
 
 we  call  it  an  increase  of  faith.  It  is  natural  to  ask  :  What 
 do  we  mean  by  faith  ?  We  shall  find  it  somewhat  difficult 
 at  first  to  answer  this,  for  faith  is  after  all  one  of  those 
 primal  facts  of  life  which  in  a  sense  defy  analysis,  but  we 
 can  learn  something  about  it.  We  shall  find,  to  begin  with, 
 that  faith  as  a  principle  of  action  plays  a  very  large  part 
 in  life.  We  rule  our  own  life  not  by  experience  nor  by 
 knowledge,  but  by  faith  in  our  career.  Every  enterprise 
 we  undertake  has  a  measure  of  faith  in  it.  Unless  we  have 
 faith  we  cannot  accomplish  anything  worth  doing.  Unless 
 we  have  faith  in  our  country  we  shall  not  care  to  die  for  it. 
 Unless  we  have  faith  in  the  possibilities  of  science  we 
 shall  not  work  for  it.  Unless  we  have  faith  in  moral 
 principles,  we  shall  not  be  willing  to  sacrifice  our  interests 
 to  higher  motives.  Unless  men  had  had  faith,  they  could 
 not  have  held  their  religion  with  such  certainty  as  to  be 
 willing  to  die  for  it. 
 
 What,  then,  is  faith  ?  Faith,  it  may  be  suggested,  is  a 
 belief  in  the  spiritual  reality  of  the  universe ;  a  belief  that 
 its  purpose  will  not  deceive  us,  and  it  is  just  the  possession 
 of  this  faith  that  gives  an  element  of  certitude  to  our  beliefs. 
 Faith  is  not  a  principle  opposed  to  reason,  for  it  is  always 
 reason  that  ultimately  tells  us  what  should  be  our  beliefs, 
 while  it  is  faith  that  gives  us  the  courage  to  accept  them. 
 Faith  can  never  provide  the  matter  of  belief.  It  may  be, 
 of  course,  that  the  subject  of  our  faith  comes  to  us  from  an 
 authority,  and  we  believe  it  because  we  have  faith  in  that 
 authority,  but  there  must  lie  concealed  somewhere  in  our 
 minds  a  rational  cause  for  our  belief  in  that  authority. 
 The  cause  why  in  a  good  many  cases  we  do  not  accept  the 
 higher  teaching  of  science  or  philosophy  or  morality  or 
 religion  is  that  reason  is  by  itself  powerless  against  the 
 influence  of  self-interest  or  pleasure,  or  the  apparent  testi¬ 
 mony  of  the  senses.  It  is  in  all  cases  faith  alone  that  makes 
 us  strong  enough  to  accept  such  positions.  Faith  is  the 
 powder  which  lifts  us  up,  and  the  man  who  has  faith  in 
 whatsoever  sphere  he  may  exercise  it  is  the  man  who  raises 
 the  human  race  a  step  upwards. 
 
128  LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 But  what  is  faith  ?  We  quoted  a  short  time  ago  a 
 passage  from  the  writings  of  William  James,  in  which 
 he  suggested  that  there  was  evidence  of  the  possibility  of 
 some  direct  relation  between  the  human  mind  and  the 
 spiritual  element  outside.  We  might,  of  course,  have  added 
 from  religious  writers  a  large  amount  of  testimony  to  the 
 same  effect.  We  saw  that  this  could  not  be  considered  to 
 provide  a  source  of  knowledge,  for  the  religious  knowledge 
 of  each  person  is  dependent  upon  his  experience,  and  would 
 vary  according  to  his  experience.  May  we  not  believe  that 
 the  faith  which  makes  a  man  strong  is  just  this  relationship 
 between  man  and  the  spiritual  world  of  which  he  forms  a 
 part  ?  We  have  not  been  concerned  in  this  investigation 
 with  attempting  to  construct  a  religious  system,  it  has  been 
 our  purpose  to  discuss  the  sources  of  religious  knowledge, 
 that  is  the  basis  on  which  we  can  build  up  a  Theology. 
 But  the  drift  of  our  argument  throughout  has  been  that  to 
 provide  an  answer  to  the  many  questions  that  we  have 
 suggested  and  an  adequate  explanation  of  the  facts  of 
 human  life  would  not  be  possible  without  a  belief  in  a 
 spiritual  principle,  however  we  might  define  it.  If,  then, 
 our  rational  convictions  demand  a  belief  in  spiritual 
 forces,  if  that  is  an  hypothesis  necessary  to  explain  the  uni¬ 
 verse,  and  if  on  the  other  hand  psychological  investigation 
 as  well  as  religious  experience  suggest  that  there  is  some 
 relation  beyond  our  minds  and  those  forces,  does  not 
 this  suggest  the  explanation  of  what  we  have  called 
 faith  ? 
 
 Then  an  explanation  becomes  possible  of  the  fact  that 
 intensity  of  faith  can  be  combined  with  such  very  different 
 objects  of  faith.  Our  faith  is  strong  because  we  have  a 
 strong  hold  on  the  reality  of  the  spiritual  life  and  purpose 
 of  the  universe.  The  faith  of  different  persons  varies  in  its 
 objects  of  belief  because  their  experience  in  the  light  of 
 which  they  have  interpreted  the  world  is  varied.  We  need 
 not  believe  that  the  aspect  of  truth  as  we  know  it  represents 
 absolute  truth,  but  we  know  that  it  is  true  for  us,  as  an 
 adequate  although  imperfect  representation  of  the  truth 
 
PROLEGOMENA  TO  STUDY  OF  THEOLOGY  129 
 
 which  is  absolute.  Just  as  in  science  a  man  of  science  does 
 not  necessarily  believe  that  all  that  he  holds  is  true,  but 
 merely  that  it  is  the  nearest  approximation  to  truth  that  he 
 can  attain  and  that  he  can  advance  nearer  to  the  truth  by 
 pursuing  the  right  methods  of  investigation,  so  in  religion 
 we  believe  that  what  is  true  for  us  is  an  adequate  repre¬ 
 sentation  of  the  absolute  truth,  and  that  all  effort  at  attain¬ 
 ing  religious  knowledge  is  valuable  because  we  and  the 
 world  with  us  are  gradually  approaching  nearer  and  nearer 
 to  the  truth.  “  Now  we  see  in  a  glass  darkly,  and  then  face 
 to  face.” 
 
 And  this  brings  us  to  another  point  :  Mysticism.  Mysti¬ 
 cism  is  an  attempt  to  escape  from  the  toils  of  a  too  rigorous 
 and  critical  philosophy  by  building  up  religion  on  the  basis 
 of  belief  in  the  religious  instincts  of  man.  It  believes  in 
 some  direct  contact  of  the  mind  and  spiritual  things. 
 Now  if  we  study  the  history  of  Mysticism  we  shall  see  that 
 what  we  have  enunciated  above  receives  corroboration. 
 There  have  been  in  all  mystical  movements  two  elements. 
 There  has  been  a  return  from  a  sceptical  and  rationalistic 
 philosophy  or  an  over-dogmatic  theology  to  the  religious 
 instincts  of  the  mind.  This  has  been  in  almost  all  cases  a 
 healthy  movement.  Whether  it  says  to  the  unbelieving 
 critic,  “  The  time  has  gone  by  for  troubling  about  all  the 
 clever  reasons  you  give  me  for  disbelief  in  my  own  soul ; 
 my  soul  demands  religion  and  tells  me  that  religion  is 
 true,”  or  whether  it  says  to  the  dogmatic  theologian,  “My 
 soul  is  weary  of  your  syllogisms,  your  disputations  and 
 arguments,  it  wants  some  response  to  its  religious 
 instincts ;  ”  in  either  case  it  represents  a  sound  and  healthy 
 movement :  but  there  is  another  side  of  Mysticism  when  it 
 becomes  fantastic,  unreal  and  even  immoral,  when  it  gives 
 vent  to  its  imagination,  and  mistakes  its  imaginings  for 
 reality,  when  it  believes  that  it  has  a  direct  insight  into 
 the  divine  mind,  and  that  its  dreams  are  true,  when  it 
 forgets  the  work  of  reason  in  testing  belief ;  then  it  speedily 
 becomes  an  unhealthy  movement.  Does  not  this  corre¬ 
 spond  with  what  we  have  suggested  above  ?  Faith  does 
 
 K 
 
130 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 not  give  us  in  any  case  the  content  of  a  religious  belief. 
 It  is  not  a  gift  given  us  to  save  us  from  the  trouble  of 
 using  our  reason.  It  is  that  principle  in  us  akin  to  the 
 spiritual  principles  beyond  us  which  assures  us  that  the 
 highest  intellectual  and  spiritual  aspirations  are  real,  and 
 that  we  are  not  deceived  in  accepting  the  testimony 
 which  our  reason  gives  us  to  the  purpose  and  reality  of 
 life. 
 
 There  is  one  more  element  which  demands  consideration  : 
 the  place  of  authority  in  religion.  We  have  so  far  looked 
 upon  religion  as  the  creation  of  the  human  mind,  but  it  has 
 another  and  a  higher  function.  It  is  not  the  creation  of 
 life,  it  creates  life.  For  most  of  us  it  fashions  our  lives,  and 
 we  owe  our  knowledge  of  what  is  true  and  our  rule  for  the 
 highest  part  of  life  to  it.  We  do  not  accept  it  because  it 
 suits  us,  but  we  make  ourselves  suit  it.  How  does  this 
 arise  ?  The  religion  which  the  Church  or  nation  fashions 
 becomes  the  depository  of  all  the  beliefs  of  its  members. 
 To  each  individual  it  appeals  with  the  authority  of  the 
 Church  or  nation.  They  must  conform  to  it  to  be  true 
 members ;  they  are  educated  in  it  to  attain  the  ideals  of 
 the  nation.  It  comes  first  as  an  authority ;  but  it  will  not 
 be  accepted  ultimately  unless  it  commends  itself  to  reason 
 and  is  found  true  in  experience.  As  the  nation  or  Church 
 grows  it  may  need  adjustments.  A  time  comes  when  it 
 no  longer  seems  satisfactory,  and  it  needs  a  reformation,  or 
 is  replaced  by  another  religion.  For  it  is  one  of  the 
 phenomena  of  religion  that  it  educates  people  to  be  dis¬ 
 satisfied  with  itself.  Religion,  in  fact,  comes  in  all  cases 
 at  first  as  an  authority.  Its  value  consists  in  the  authority 
 with  which  it  comes  compelling  people  to  fashion  their 
 lives  to  it,  but  this  authority  cannot  ultimately  live  unless 
 what  it  teaches  commends  itself  to  reason  and  is  found 
 true  in  experience. 
 
 It  has  been  the  purpose  of  this  investigation,  setting 
 aside  so  far  as  possible  the  idea  of  a  revelation,  to  discuss 
 religion  as  a  natural  development  of  the  mind,  to  discover 
 
PROLEGOMENA  TO  STUDY  OF  THEOLOGY  131 
 
 the  sources  from  which  it  has  been  built  up,  to  consider  the 
 reason  for  looking  upon  our  belief  as  true  and  the  method 
 of  testing  it.  It  will  remain  as  a  sequel  to  this  to  estimate 
 so  far  as  we  can  the  sources  of  revealed  religion  and  then 
 ask  what  are  the  relation  of  the  two  sources  of  religious 
 knowledge. 
 
ESSAY  V 
 
 CHRIST  AND  THE  CHRISTIAN  PRINCIPLE 
 Rev.  Prof.  P.  T.  Forsyth,  M.A.,  D.D. 
 
SYNOPSIS 
 
 The  question — Its  genesis,  statement  and  dimensions. 
 
 Its  origin  with  Lessing  for  modern  times — his  twofold  principle  that 
 both  the  actual  condition  and  the  essential  nature  of  historical  truth 
 forbid  us  to  associate  with  it  absoluteness  or  finality. 
 
 Examination  of  this  position.  Its  modification  by  the  modern  religious 
 historical  school,  which  is  more  ideal  and  sympathetic.  Troeltsch — 
 correction  of  Hegel. 
 
 Its  ethical  emphasis  on  personality,  and  its  democratic  jealousy  of  any 
 single  person. 
 
 The  truth  and  value  of  this  school.  Its  defect.  It  simply  substitutes 
 one  principle  for  another — it  does  not  adjust  principle  to  personality ;  and 
 it  substitutes  moral  process  for  moral  action,  so  that  personality  is  over¬ 
 ridden,  and  history  is  more  of  a  movement  than  a  drama. 
 
 A  principle  cannot  do  the  things  morally  distinctive  of  a  person, 
 and  especially  things  essential  to  religion ;  which  is  not  simply  relation 
 to  God  but  communion. 
 
 The  tendency  is  to  Monism,  with  its  defective  ethic,  whenever  the 
 spiritual  principle  is  not  identified  with  a  person.  When  Christ  is  called 
 the  guarantee  of  the  Christian  principle  this  really  concedes  His  identity 
 with  it. 
 
 The  effect  of  the  theory  of  historical  evolution  on  religion  summarised. 
 
 False  forms  of  Christianity  provoke  and  necessitate  protest — which 
 however  is  but  partially,  and  often  but  poorly,  true.  The  real  issue  at 
 this  moment. 
 
 N.B. — It  may  be  an  aid  to  clearness  if  it  is  explained  here  that  by 
 Christ  is  meant  the  historic  Jesus  as  the  Eternal  and  Only  Begotten 
 Son  of  God,  and  by  the  Christian  principle  the  idea  of  sonship  taken 
 religiously  as  the  sonship  of  Humanity,  native  and  inalienable  however 
 man  may  behave,  and  not  secured  by  a  moral  redemption  in  Christ 
 alone  and  for  ever.  The  principle  of  personality  is  not  essential  to  it, 
 and  not  necessarily  Eternal  for  individuals.  In  the  one  case  Man  is 
 God’s  son  in  his  freeborn  right,  in  the  other  for  Christ’s  sake  alone. 
 
CHRIST  AND  THE  CHRISTIAN  PRINCIPLE 
 
 Can  an  historical  person  be  the  object  of  an  absolute 
 faith  ?  Can  a  human  personality  at  once  express  absolute 
 Godhead  and  exercise  a  true  Humanity  ?  In  one  form  or 
 another  that  is  the  modern  question  which  it  is  vital  to 
 Christianity  to  answer,  and  to  answer  positively  and 
 securely. 
 
 It  is  a  question  which  arises  partly  from  our  modern 
 interest  in  Humanity  as  one,  partly  from  our  new  concern 
 with  its  several  stages ;  partly,  that  is,  from  our  new  sense  of 
 the  Idea,  and  partly  from  the  evolutionary  tendency  to  judge 
 everything  relatively  to  the  standard  of  its  own  age  alone. 
 We  do  not  want  to  judge,  indeed  we  shrink  from  going  be¬ 
 yond  explanation.  The  same  motive  as  makes  us  tender 
 with  the  vices  of  a  mediaeval  monarch,  because  he  must 
 be  measured  by  his  contemporary  standard  and  not  ours, 
 makes  us  also  sceptical  about  the  holy  finality  of  Jesus 
 Christ.  The  same  tendency  as  whitewashes  the  sinners 
 takes  the  glory  from  the  saints.  As  the  world  cools,  things 
 tend  to  an  equalisation  of  temperature.  The  historic 
 mind,  it  is  said,  which  does  not  allow  us  to  apply  a  modern 
 code  of  ethics  to  a  cruder  time,  forbids  us  also  to  find  in 
 any  age  what  would  entirely  satisfy  modern  needs,  to  say 
 nothing  of  dominating  all  possible  ideals.  History,  it  is 
 said,  not  only  carries  home  to  us,  with  the  eighteenth  cen¬ 
 tury,  the  vast  organic  unity  of  Humanity,  but,  with  the 
 nineteenth,  reveals  the  action  of  evolution  as  ruling  all 
 that  takes  place ;  and  it  is  therefore  impossible  to  fix  upon 
 >  any  one  point  in  the  past,  and  so  to  isolate  it  from  the  great 
 stream  as  to  give  it  an  absolute  value  for  every  age  of  a 
 
 race  so  vast.  The  twofold  idea  of  the  unity  of  history  and 
 
 135 
 
136 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 of  its  movement  as  evolution  affects  religion  far  more  than 
 the  once  dreaded  uniformity  of  nature. 
 
 Especially  is  this  so,  it  is  urged,  with  one  like  Jesus.  He 
 belongs  to  the  past  (it  is  said)  in  everything  except  influence ; 
 for  the  present  He  has  not  final  authority ;  and  He  may  be 
 surpassed  in  the  future.^  We  can  no  more  deify  an  historic 
 person  than  we  can  crystallise  an  historic  stage,  or  stereo¬ 
 type  an  historic  creed.  No  man,  indeed,  it  is  allowed,  has  had 
 such  an  influence  on  posterity  as  Jesus ;  but  He  has  created 
 a  Frankenstein  Humanity,  which  now  escapes  from  His 
 control,  and  turns  to  question,  and  even  to  dissect,  its 
 creator.  Jesus  had  not  to  deal  with  an  age  like  ours,  an 
 age  with  our  knowledge  of  the  past,  and  our  rights  over 
 it.  He  belongs  to  the  past  which  we  command,  and  He 
 must  accept  the  same  criticism  as  all  the  rest  of  the  past 
 from  the  age  of  historical  science.  We  cannot  allow  Him 
 absolute  authority  in  any  region,  sensitive  though  we  have 
 grown  to  His  spell.  We  may  feel  Christ  more,  but  we  worship 
 Him  less.  And  we  contemplate  with  calm  a  remote  future 
 when  His  influence  will  cease,  because  it  will  have  done  its 
 work  and  been  replaced  by  other  influences  giving  us  all 
 His  best  and  more.  We  are  told  that  if  Christianity  is 
 to  continue  to  be  a  religion  when  that  time  comes,  it  must 
 be  detached  from  all  control  by  the  past,  though,  of  course, 
 not  from  its  causation,  or  even  inspiration.  It  must  be 
 detached  from  Christ  in  the  sense  of  being  made  inde¬ 
 pendent  of  Him,  except  as  He  may  be  considered  the  prophet 
 or  symbol  either  of  Humanity  or  of  a  long  stage  in  the 
 human  career.  The  ideal  Christ  must  be  loosed  and  let 
 go  from  the  historic.  Time,  which  was  once  His  home,  is 
 now  His  tomb.  We  must,  indeed,  for  long  (till  Nietzsche 
 supersedes  Llim)  continue  to  hold  the  Christian  principle 
 of  our  sonship,  but  that  is  independent  of  its  temporary 
 connection  with  the  personality  of  Christ.  Most  Christians 
 now  admit  that  a  distinction  has  to  be  made  between  the 
 passing  and  the  permanent  elements  in  traditional  faith. 
 The  question  is  where  the  line  must  be  drawn.  And 
 among  the  passing  elements,  it  is  said,  among  the 
 
CHRIST  AND  THE  CHRISTIAN  PRINCIPLE  137 
 
 beneficent  but  terminable  illusions,  we  must  include  the 
 deity  of  Christ,  and  the  absolute,  final,  decisive  value 
 of  His  person  and  work  for  our  relation  to  God  and  our 
 eternal  destiny. 
 
 Now  it  should  be  realised  at  the  outset  how  far  this 
 deposition  goes.  With  a  supernatural  and  final  Christ 
 goes  a  permanent  Church,  and  all  its  intimate  involution 
 in  history.  The  Church  has  meaning  only  if  the  Christian 
 principle  is  inseparable  from  the  eternal  person  of  Christ. 
 The  Church  exists  and  endures  in  the  faith  that  the  principle 
 if  detached  from  the  work  and  person  of  such  a  Christ 
 would  not  have  power  to  keep  afloat  in  such  a  world; 
 that  Christ  was  not  the  organ  or  crystallisation  of  a  prin¬ 
 ciple,  but  that  the  principle  is  the  explication  of  His  person 
 and  the  result  of  His  work;  that  Christ  did  not  regard 
 Himself  or  His  work  relatively  (for  with  all  His  humility 
 He  never  contemplated  being  superseded) ;  nor  was  that 
 how  He  has  been  construed  by  whose  who  knew  Him  best, 
 whether  at  the  first  or  in  the  long  history  of  the  soul.  On 
 that  the  Church  stands.  And  when  the  Church  passes, 
 the  note  of  spiritual  religion  must  alter.  Its  great  manner 
 of  mastery  over  fate,  chance,  and  change,  will  pass.  Its 
 attitude  towards  the  world  will  be  different ;  it  will  be  less 
 secure.  The  religious  principle  of  man’s  divine  sonship  will 
 not  give  that  certainty  of  the  Father  which  the  Church’s 
 faith  in  the  Son  does.  It  may  be  noted  also,  that  as  the 
 faith  in  Christ  retires  the  44  religion  of  Jesus”  retires  too. 
 For  the  very  historical  reality  of  Jesus  is  now  denied  by  the 
 untrammelled  evolution  of  criticism,  to  say  nothing  of  His 
 personal  religion;  and  a  totally  different  religion,  fitted 
 with  all  modern  appliances  and  conveniences,  takes  its 
 place  as  the  religion  of  Monism.  Christ  comes  to  be  viewed 
 as  the  mythical  symbol  of  a  priceless  idea,  which  is  the 
 real  inspiration  of  religion.  But  in  its  own  account  of 
 itself  Christianity  is  not  the  expression  of  an  idea.  It 
 did  not  so  enter  history.  It  does  not  condense  and  point 
 a  natural  process  in  the  spiritual  region.  It  does  not  even 
 
138 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 incarnate  the  idea  of  the  unity  of  the  divine  and  human 
 natures.  Philosophemes  like  that  cannot  make  a  religion. 
 They  did  not  exude  Christianity  as  a  popular  metaphysic. 
 That  Hegelian  version  of  Christianity  has  served  its  day 
 and  fallen  on  sleep.  And  one  reason  why  we  think  the 
 Christian  principle  inadequate  without  the  person  of 
 Christ  is  that  the  old  life  and  work  is  found  at  last  to  ebb 
 and  fade  without  the  old  faith.  We  do  not  continue  to  get 
 the  Christian  ethic  or  the  Christian  philanthropy  without  the 
 Christian  creed.  A  religion  of  Christian  principle  is  inade¬ 
 quate,  after  a  generation  or  two,  to  the  work  done  in  Christ, 
 and  needing  always  to  be  done,  for  such  a  world  as  this — 
 the  work  of  its  Redemption,  even  from  fate,  to  say  nothing 
 of  sin.  It  might  explain  well  enough  the  power  of  the 
 God-consciousness  in  Christ  as  an  individual  saint,  or  among 
 certain  of  His  fellow-Christians.  It  would  explain  Christ 
 as  the  filial  completion  of  man’s  sense  of  God.  It  might  even 
 explain  Him  as  a  healer  of  souls.  But  it  would  not  explain 
 Him  as  Saviour.  It  would  place  Him  among  those  whom  the 
 action  of  the  principle  saved,  among  His  fellow  sinners  and 
 pensioners  of  God’s  grace.  But  it  does  not  meet  the  moral 
 case  of  the  world,  or  pacify  the  conscience  really  quickened 
 and  grieved.  It  would  explain  redemption  as  the  action 
 of  an  idea  or  an  influence,  or  view  it  as  the  completion  of 
 Humanity  when  it  bursts  into  flower  and  takes  the  full  air 
 of  heaven ;  but  it  would  not  treat  it  as  God’s  work,  as  a 
 moral  achievement  and  historic  victory  of  a  crucial  kind 
 in  the  region  of  man’s  prime  need,  on  the  scale  of  the  race’s 
 experience  and  guilt.  The  meaning  of  guilt  it  always 
 minimises.  It  protests,  with  a  modern  scholar,  of  singular 
 eminence  in  the  American  Church,  against  the  idea  that 
 “  because  one  man  feels  his  need  of  divine  grace  therefore 
 all  men  must  need  it.”  But  the  New  Testament  surely 
 regards  this  as  the  prime,  universal,  and  eternal  need  which 
 Christ  came  to  meet.  And  that  intimately  personal  saving 
 work  is  possible  to  a  person  alone.  Here,  as  often,  we  see 
 how  indispensable  the  work  of  Christ  is  for  approach  to 
 any  true  interpretation  of  His  person. 
 
CHRIST  AND  THE  CHRISTIAN  PRINCIPLE  139 
 
 Few  thinkers  are  so  luminous  in  their  treatment  of 
 Christian  theology  as  Ed.  von  Hartmann,  and  none  more 
 thoroughly  destroy  its  foundations  than  he  does  with  his 
 deification  of  the  Unconscious.  But  this  is  what  he  says  , 
 on  the  subject  in  hand  :  “  Christianity  stands  or  falls  with 
 faith  in  the  foundation  of  a  new  cosmopolitan  religion  of 
 redemption  by  Jesus,  and  in  the  identity  of  this  historic 
 Jesus  with  the  later  idea  of  a  Christ,  i.  e.  with  the  divine 
 principle  of  redemption.  None  who  view  these  as  historic 
 fictions  have  any  further  right  to  the  Christian  name  ” 
 (Preface  to  10th  edition  of  Die  Philosophic  des  Unbewussteri). 
 
 The  principle  of  Lessing,  that  historical  truth  has  nothing 
 final,  and  affords  no  warrant  for  absolute  truth,  has  sunk 
 so  deep  into  the  modern  mind  that  it  is  worth  while  to 
 examine  it  somewhat  closely.  Historical  truth,  Lessing 
 and  his  school  said,  cannot  prove  the  supreme  truths  of 
 Christianity  for  two  reasons.  First,  because  the  Christian 
 record  is  not  complete.  Even  as  history  it  is  defective. 
 The  evidence  would  not  satisfy  a  jury  of  historical  experts. 
 At  some  of  the  most  crucial  points  the  data  are  lacking. 
 We  have  nothing  directly  from  Jesus  Himself.  We  have 
 from  no  eye-witness  firsthand  and  tested  evidence  of 
 an  act  so  central  as  the  Resurrection.  We  are  also  unable 
 to  reconstruct  with  complete  confidence  and  modern 
 effect  the  psychology  of  Christ,  the  pragmatism  of  His 
 action,  the  motivation,  or  even  the  sequence,  of  His  pro¬ 
 ceedings,  or  the  context  of  His  sayings.  But,  second 
 (they  said),  if  the  record  were  complete  yet  it  would  not  be 
 effective  for  the  purpose  in  hand,  because  the  two  kinds 
 of  truth  are  disparate.  Historical  truth  is,  by  its  nature, 
 relative  and  accidental ;  whereas  the  final  truth  of  religion 
 must  be  absolute.  Mere  probability,  which  is  all  that 
 history  can  reach,  cannot  be  the  basis  of  absolute  religious 
 faith.  The  soul  cannot  stake  its  eternal  destiny,  or  cherish 
 a  complete  and  final  certainty,  on  anything  which  is  only 
 settled  by  a  balance  of  evidence,  as  history  must  be.  An 
 absolute  faith  cannot  rest  on  a  probable  base.  A  faith 
 
140 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 which  rests  but  on  the  probable  has  a  root  of  sceptical 
 bitterness  which  is  sure  to  trouble  it  at  last ;  and  it  is  by 
 so  much  the  less  faith.  To  faith’s  demand  for  absolute 
 certainty  history  can  offer  but  the  probable.  The  only 
 correlate  of  faith  is  God  (when  we  use  care  about  words), 
 and  faith  in  Christ  must  therefore  mean  that  Christ  is 
 God.  But  a  probable  God  is  no  God.  Yet  a  probable 
 God  is  the  most  that  mere  history  permits  in  connection 
 with  Jesus.  There  is,  therefore,  a  great  gulf  fixed  between 
 an  historic  figure  and  an  absolute  faith,  so  that  none  can 
 pass  to  and  fro.  Hence  the  penchant  of  our  critic-racked 
 age  for  a  mystic  religion,  or  an  ideal  Christ,  interior  and 
 superior  to  history  and  its  sceptics.  “  Spernit  Humum 
 fugiente  penna  ” — as  Ferrier  quotes  and  puns. 
 
 It  is  worth  while,  perhaps,  to  cross-examine  the  chief 
 witness.  The  exact  words  of  Lessing  are  these  :  “  Acci¬ 
 dental  truths  of  history  can  never  be  proof  of  necessary 
 truths  of  reason.”  First,  it  may  be  observed  how  awkward, 
 how  ambiguous,  how  archaic  is  the  expression  “  truths  of 
 history.”  It  is  not  the  truths  of  history  that  we  have 
 chiefly  to  do  with  now  but  its  facts,  and  especially  their 
 nature.  But  Lessing  belongs  to  a  bygone  day  of  noetic 
 and  propositional  religion.  Its  orthodoxy  was  but  the 
 intellectualism  of  the  right,  its  heresy  the  intellectualism 
 of  the  left.  Christianity  was  to  him  and  his  age  a  matter 
 of  truth  more  than  of  life,  act,  or  power,  and  facts  were  but 
 empirical ;  none  could  be  super-historic,  none  sacramental. 
 He  belonged  to  the  time  when  Rationalism,  with  a  negative 
 doxy,  was  attacking  the  positive  orthodoxy  in  what  is 
 really  a  family  quarrel.  t\  Both  were  entangled  in  the  error 
 that  revelation  was  a  matter  of  belief  rather  than  of 
 personal  relation  in  living  faith.,  But  for  us  now,  with  our 
 wider  knowledge  and  deeper  grasp  of  all  religions,  Christian¬ 
 ity  is  not  a  complex  of  truths,  either  accidental  or  neces¬ 
 sary,  about  God ;  it  is  a  new  and  vital  relation  toward  God, 
 effected  bv  Himself.  v 
 
 The  second  fallacy  in  Lessing’s  words  is  that  history,  by 
 its  very  nature,  contains  only  the  accidental  and  probable. 
 
CHRIST  AND  THE  CHRISTIAN  PRINCIPLE  141 
 
 On  the  contrary,  history  is  now  seen  to  be  in  its  nature 
 sacramental,  if  only  sacramental  of  an  Eternal  making  for 
 righteousness.  Its  facts  are  consecrated  elements.  They 
 are  conductors  of  the  Eternal.  At  least  for  the  psychology 
 of  religion  it  is  so ;  and  religion  is  now  allowed  to  speak  for 
 itself,  without  a  rational  editor  or  chaperon.  Such  religion 
 finds  the  core  of  history  to  be  an  act  of  God  which  is 
 anything  but  accidental.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  rightly  or 
 wrongly,  history  has  yielded  to  the  soul  a  God  in  an 
 historic  act  which  is  in  its  nature  eternal.  And  with  that 
 tremendous  faith  running  through  history  and  spreading 
 over  it,  it  is  not  enough  that  criticism  should  declare  the 
 sources  incapable  of  producing  it,  and  write  it  off  as  an 
 illusion  with  a  stroke.  Rigid  historical  science  cannot 
 extract  all  that  history  has  to  yield,  any  more  than  physical 
 science  can  be  the  complete  hierophant  of  Nature.  The 
 scientific  critic  dogmatises  if  he  says  it  yields  no  more  than 
 he  finds,  or  no  other  dimension.  His  methods  apply  only 
 to  the  accidental,  empirical,  relative  element,  which  is  not 
 the  whole  of  history.  His  machine  only  extracts  the  tin 
 and  leaves  the  radium  in  the  debris.  The  words  of  both 
 Lessing  and  Kant  on  this  subject  reveal  them  as 
 antagonists  only  to  an  outgrown  conception  of  religion, 
 to  a  view  of  Christianity  which  regards  it  as  a  scientific 
 system  of  truth  made  statutory  for  subsequent  generations, 
 and  made  also,  in  that  form,  a  condition  of  future  happi¬ 
 ness.  It  all  smacks  of  an  age  and  a  mood  which  is  bygone, 
 except  in  those  marts  where  men  deal  in  the  cast-off  clothing 
 of  generations  ago,  or  those  paths  where  the  ghosts  of 
 dead  ages  walk  the  dim  purlieus  of  the  living  mind.  The 
 sympathetic  study  of  all  religions  shows  that  there  are 
 parts  of  the  past  so  timeless  in  their  inner  nature  that  they 
 can  become  parts  also  of  our  own  personal  consciousness. 
 
 .  It  is  so,  at  least,  that  the  Christian  learns  Christ.1 
 
 1  To  be  quite  just,  I  admit  this  represents  but  one  side,  the  conscious 
 side,  whether  of  Lessing  or  of  Kant.  They  have  another,  which  however 
 becomes  explicit  chietly  in  their  successors.  Both  represent  the  great 
 transition  from  the  dogmatic  to  the  critical  era.  But  it  was  to  a  criticism 
 that  had  in  it  the  conditions  of  a  new  dogmatic,  with  a  moral  instead 
 
142 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 But  Lessing’s  theme  tends  to  recur  in  a  new  setting  at  the 
 hands  of  the  current  religious-historical  school,  led  so  bril¬ 
 liantly  and  sympathetically  by  Troeltsch,  with  his  principle 
 of  the  relative  absoluteness  of  Christianity.  Historical 
 religion,  he  says,  does  give  us  the  absolute,  but  in  each 
 faith  only  in  a  relative  way,  which  is  fatal  to  any  unique 
 position  for  it.  In  many  quarters  it  is  held  almost  needless 
 to  prove  a  principle  so  evident  as  the  relativism  of  history. 
 Nor,  it  is  said,  should  we  wish  it  otherwise.  For  it  is  even 
 asserted  that  the  effect  of  the  application  of  the  relative 
 principle  to  religion  is  not  only  to  make  religion  more 
 rational,  but  more  rich  in  its  truth,  more  ethical,  more 
 human,  more  intimate,  and  more  religious  really,  because 
 nearer  our  actual  case.  The  relativist  principle  in  this  more 
 sympathetic  form  is  held  and  pressed  by  men  who  yet  cherish 
 a  deep  reverence  for  Christ’s  person  as  the  first,  and  still 
 the  classic,  case  of  the  true  religion  of  divine  fatherhood 
 and  human  sonship.  Hegel  went  so  far  as  to  say  that  in 
 Jesus  and  His  results  the  absolute  became  conscious  of 
 itself.  We  are  bound  to  recognise  at  this  point  the 
 unprecedented  insight  we  have  gained  into  the  character 
 
 of  an  intellectual  foundation,  and,  with  a  place  at  once  more  modest  and 
 more  powerful  in  Humanity.  Lessing  is,  perhaps,  the  supreme  type  still 
 of  the  creative  critic.  He  was,  indeed,  limited  by  the  then  state  of 
 historic  study  and  the  then  analysis  of  moral  and  theological  ideas.  But 
 he  did  grasp,  as  none  before,  the  essence  of  Humanity;  and  he  grasped 
 that  essence  as  action.  He  prepared  the  way  for  Kant,  and,  through  him, 
 for  the  moral,  instead  of  the  mystical — or  the  noetic — escape  from  the  con¬ 
 fusion  caused  by  historical  criticism.  In  so  doing  they  threw  the  accent  on 
 the  personal  side  as  distinct  from  the  principle,  and  they  opened  a  new  career 
 for  evangelical  Christianity  delivered  from  Orthodoxy  and  from  Pietism.  In 
 viewing  the  work  of  Christ  as  the  supreme  and  compendious  moral  act  in 
 history,  thought  places  it  at  the  creative  centre  of  the  new  Humanity; 
 and  by  making  the  true  Christianity  to  be  communion  with  this  moral 
 Re-creator  it  saves  mysticism  from  the  aesthetic  for  the  moral  experience. 
 The  result  of  this  changed  method  upon  the  central  doctrines  of  Christian¬ 
 ity,  and  their  restoration  to  the  conscience,  and  so  to  the  race,  I  have  tried 
 to  express  in  certain  volumes  upon  The  Person  of  Christ ,  The  Work  of 
 Christ ,  and  The  Cruciality  of  the  Cross  (Hodder  &  Stoughton).  They 
 represent  an  attempt  to  place  evangelical  belief,  which  has  been  accused 
 of  violating  morals,  upon  an  impregnable  moral  basis ;  inasmuch  as  Kant’s 
 moral  principle,  that  supreme  action  is  doing  the  right  for  right’s  sake 
 alone,  appears  in  the  crowning  work  of  Christ  as  the  self-oblation  of  the 
 Holy  One  to  His  own  holiness. 
 
CHRIST  AND  THE  CHRISTIAN  PRINCIPLE  143 
 
 of  Jesus  and  the  doctrines  of  the  Church  from  the  sym¬ 
 pathetic  labour  and  the  divining  scholarship  of  many  power¬ 
 ful  men,  who  yet  cut  the  ground  from  the  Christian  Church 
 and  faith  by  resting  them  ultimately,  not  upon  Jesus,  but 
 upon  the  ideas  and  principles  for  which  Jesus  stood  either 
 as  sponsor,  or  as  symbol.  The  sonship  of  man  and  the 
 fatherhood  of  God,  they  hold,  are  permanent  intuitions, 
 which  are  only  historically  connected  with  Jesus.  And  this 
 historical  connection  with  His  person  is  irrelevant  at  last 
 to  final  conviction  on  the  principle ;  so  that  the  conviction 
 would  grow  and  flourish  now,  with  the  historic  “  way  ” 
 it  has  accumulated,  even  if  Jesus  were  forgotten.  The 
 spiritual  truth  itself  would  spread  among  men  by  its  own 
 appeal  to  human  nature,  apart  from  Him  who  historically 
 introduced  it,  who  first  realised  it  completely  in  His  human 
 experience,  and  who  fixed  it  for  ever  in  the  religious  con¬ 
 sciousness  of  the  race.  Christ  was  indeed  the  way,  but  we 
 may  forget  the  road  when  we  reach  home.  It  is  even  said 
 that  He  Himself,  in  His  old  humility,  would  wish  it  so 
 thought  if  He  were  among  us  now.  He  would  not  care 
 whether  He  were  remembered  or  not,  so  long  as  the  object 
 of  His  life  was  won — man’s  filial  trust  of  a  living  Father 
 in  an  Eternal  Kingdom.  The  certainty  that  the  Great 
 Power  is  Father  is  declared  to  be  a  matter  of  the  spiritual 
 experience  and  its  intuitional  witness,  which,  when  it  is  as 
 real  and  clear  as  Christianity  can  make  it,  may  always  be 
 trusted  to  report  the  same  Father  as  Jesus  so  clearly  and 
 surely  realised  in  the  name  of  Humanity  at  its  best.  If 
 He  had  not  done  so,  some  other  would.  The  Christian 
 principle  can  now  hold  its  own,  whatever  we  may  come 
 to  think  of  the  person  of  Christ  or  His  work. 
 
 The  weakness  of  such  a  position  is  that  it  must  rest  on 
 a  certain  psychological  interpretation  of  our  spiritual 
 experience,  and  it  has  against  its  forecast  of  the  future  the 
 whole  experience  of  the  Church  of  the  past  (i.  e.  of  the 
 initiates  and  experts  of  the  soul) ;  and  especially  the  pro¬ 
 found  psychology  of  conscience  and  sin  by  the  great 
 Reformers,  who,  however  they  parted  from  the  rest  of  the 
 
144 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 Church  as  to  the  remedy,  were  at  one  with  it  in  the 
 diagnosis  of  the  case,  because  they  were  legatees  of  the 
 Church’s  long  penitential  tradition. 
 
 Of  late  years  the  Hegelian  line  of  thought  has  not  seemed 
 so  sure  in  the  land  of  its  origin  as  it  did  two  generations 
 ago.  With  the  decay  of  the  philosophy  of  speculative 
 Idealism  there  has  come  a  distrust  of  the  great  truths  of 
 the  reason,  or  at  least  of  their  power  to  shine  by  their  own 
 light.  God,  Freedom,  Immortality  are,  of  course,  secure 
 enough  in  aesthetic  or  sentimental  circles,  and  in  the  region 
 of  the  domestic  pieties,  where  the  heart  rises  dramatically, 
 like  a  man  in  wrath,  against  the  reason’s  colder  part,  ends 
 the  case,  and  crushes  the  critic  with  4 4 1  have  felt.”  This 
 shows  how  subjective,  how  individual,  how  dilettantist  the 
 current  conception  of  the  problem  is,  how  little  it  is  con¬ 
 ceived  as  the  problem  of  the  world.  But  where  there  is  a 
 more  serious  and  more  historic  grasp  of  the  situation,  with  a 
 more  adequate  sense  of  the  difficulties  involved,  where  there 
 is  a  due  knowledge  of  problems,  and  especially  a  grasp  of 
 the  world  problem,  then  the  happier  intuitions  of  a  literary 
 and  pectoral  theology  are  not  found  sufficient  for  the  race’s 
 eternal  committal,  and  for  an  absolute  faith  that  nothing 
 possible  can  shake.  And,  if  we  turn  to  the  philosophers, 
 whereas  the  ideas  used  to  be  their  own  assurance,  by  what 
 Hegel  calls  “  the  intuition  of  thought  ”  at  the  cost  of 
 personality,  the  tendency  of  recent  thinking  has  been  to 
 recall  personality  and  its  moral  effect  to  a  much  more 
 important  place.  Personality  has  come,  even  for  philo¬ 
 sophy,  to  mean  more  than  it  did  when  it  was  treated  but 
 as  the  vehicle  of  ideas  in  a  mere  accidental  and  detachable 
 way,  as  the  pipe  conveys  the  water,  or  the  “  sacred  pen¬ 
 man  ”  the  inspiration.  The  personality  is  now  coupled 
 up  with  the  principle,  not  as  its  duct,  or  its  penman,  but 
 as  its  prophet.  They  interpenetrate  in  a  far  more  organic 
 way,  as  the  current  suffuses  the  wire,  or  the  fire  lives  on  the 
 fuel,  or  the  mind  in  the  brain.  This  change  has  come  about 
 as  thought  has  grown  more  ethical,  more  psychological, 
 more  sympathetic,  and  less  intellectualist,  as  Kant  has 
 
CHRIST  AND  THE  CHRISTIAN  PRINCIPLE  145 
 
 discrowned  Aristotle  in  the  realm  of  mind.  We  begin  to 
 hope  that  a  personal  Idealism  is  about  to  restore  the  king¬ 
 dom  to  Israel,  as  far  as  any  philosophy  can  contribute  to 
 that  end,  and  to  help  the  recovery  of  our  old  faith  in  the 
 personal  finality  of  Christ. 
 
 But  just  at  this  point  thought  swerves,  under  the 
 influence  of  a  cross-current  which  is  also  modern,  and,  for 
 some,  final — the  final  formula,  they  think,  at  last — the 
 doctrine  (or  rather  the  dogma)  of  evolution.  Just  as 
 personality  seemed  about  to  step  back  to  the  throne  of 
 things  its  supremacy  is  challenged  (or  qualified  at  least)  by 
 Evolutionary  Relativism.  If  the  parable  may  be  indulged, 
 this  mighty  angel,  with  one  foot  on  the  earth  and  another 
 on  the  sea,  commanding  all  nature,  proclaims  his  profound 
 respect  for  the  dynasty  of  Personality  as  hereditary 
 suzerain  of  the  cosmos,  but  his  inability,  at  the  same  time, 
 to  allow  any  single  member  of  it  to  mount  the  throne 
 in  perpetuity.  No  single  personality  must  have  eternal 
 monopoly,  no  single  king  live  for  ever.  Even  were  person¬ 
 ality  immortal,  no  single  representative  of  it  must  be  secured 
 in  eternal  reign.  For  that  would  not  consist  with  the 
 relative  principle.  Immortal  as  the  principle  of  personality 
 or  kingship  might  be,  no  particular  personality  of  history 
 could  be  absolute  or  final.  He  could  be  no  more  than 
 a  terminal  president.  And  whoever  for  the  hour  took 
 the  throne  must  give  constitutional  guarantee  that,  as 
 his  resources  began  to  fail,  or  when  a  greater  personality 
 arose,  he  would  abdicate,  consent  to  be  superseded 
 by  a  more  spiritual  right,  and  pass  from  the  scene, 
 or  gladly  take  his  place  among  the  subjects  of  the  larger 
 lord.  If  it  was  Jesus  that  was  placed  upon  the  throne, 
 the  noble  champion  avowed  with  earnest  tones  his  deep 
 reverence  and  loyalty  to  His  moral  Majesty;  but  in  the 
 greatest  of  interests  he  could  consent  to  His  royal  place 
 only  with  a  proviso  which  relativists  could  not  forgo.  It 
 could  not  be  allowed  that  He  was  an  eternal  King,  or  a  King 
 of  all  possible  kings.  For  there  were  constitutional 
 
 L 
 
146 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 principles,  bound  up  with  the  very  existence  of  the  realm 
 of  human  nature,  which  were  not  dependent  on  any  single 
 personality  (nay,  they  were  imperilled  by  it),  deeply  as 
 they  were  entwined  with  the  personal  or  regal  idea.  Re¬ 
 demption  as  a  process,  for  instance,  was  of  more  range  and 
 moment  than  any  redeemer  could  be,  and  the  particular 
 monarch  was  otiose  to  the  constitution. 
 
 The  form  of  thought  that  I  have  ventured  to  describe 
 in  this  parable  is  much  more  attractive  than  the  line 
 pursued  by  the  old  rationalists  of  the  association  school. 
 It  allows  to  personality  a  function  higher  than  merely  to 
 convey  the  idea ;  and  it  finds  personality  more  interesting 
 than  the  idea.  We  are  attracted  also  by  the  prospect 
 of  finding  some  means,  however  inadequate,  of  coupling 
 them  closer,  and  having  the  benefit  of  both.  But  really 
 the  new  line  is  little  more  satisfactory  than  the  old.  For, 
 if  we  do  not  concentrate  on  a  single  absolute  person,  are 
 we  not  dissolving  with  one  hand  the  connection  we  would 
 cement  with  the  other  ?  To  return  to  our  metaphor,  if  it  is 
 only  the  dynasty  we  enthrone,  the  category  of  personality, 
 and  not  a  particular  person,  what  are  we  doing  but  restoring 
 the  supremacy  of  the  personal  principle,  of  the  idea  of  per¬ 
 sonality,  and  making  a  particular  personality  indifferent  ? 
 We  have  only  replaced  a  principle  by  a  principle,  a  prin¬ 
 ciple  which  is  associated  with  personality  by  the  principle 
 of  personality  itself.  And  the  result  for  faith,  for  religion, 
 is  not  very  different  in  the  long  run.  What  we  come 
 out  with  at  last  is  the  worship  of  ideal  Humanity 
 and  the  spiritual  principle  it  embodies.  We  postpone 
 personality  and  its  moral  action  to  a  monistic  power  and  its 
 processes.  We  find  movements  promoted  which,  with  the 
 aid  of  extreme  criticism,  throw  Jesus  into  a  secondary  place, 
 and  promise  practically  to  dispense  with  Him,  or  historically 
 to  dissolve  Him,  on  the  ground  that  the  great  Christian  ideas, 
 like  Incarnation,  Atonement,  Resurrection,  Ascension, 
 Regeneration,  are  not  specific  acts  of  God  in  history 
 but  movements  intrinsic  to  collective  Humanity,  valuable 
 indeed,  but  well  assured  to  us  as  processes  of  man’s  native 
 
CHRIST  AND  THE  CHRISTIAN  PRINCIPLE  147 
 
 and  inalienable  spirituality  at  its  best.  Man  makes  his 
 own  atonement,  and  Christ  but  illustrated  the  fact.  Man 
 does  not  rise  by  the  Spirit  that  raised  Christ,  but  Christ 
 rose  by  the  spirit  that  elevates  man.  These  ideas,  these 
 experiences,  are  the  necessary  movements,  phases,  or  effects 
 of  our  spiritual  evolution,  which  cannot  be  holden  of  death ; 
 they  are  not  the  contents  of  an  historic  revelation  and  act 
 in  Christ,  on  which  alone  our  reborn  spirituality  must 
 revolve.  It  may  be  questioned  (in  passing),  and  with  some 
 force,  whether  it  is  quite  fair  to  use  the  New  Testament 
 words  and  ideas  in  this  bleached  and  emptied  sense.  It 
 may  be  said,  with  some  truth,  that  a  change  from  being 
 theocentric  to  being  anthropocentric  means  a  new  religion. 
 It  is,  indeed,  engaging  and  enlarging  to  the  mind  to  mark 
 these  processes  in  human  nature,  as  the  premonitions  of 
 that  which  Christ  fulfilled,  and  which  He  secured  in  final 
 victory;  just  as  it  interests  and  expands  us  to  mark  the 
 same  thing  in  the  convergence  upon  Him  of  other  religions, 
 and  especially  of  those  gnostic  mythologies  which  lay  round 
 the  cradle  of  Christianity.  They  were  prayers  that  called  for 
 Christ,  rather  than  powers  that  produced  Him,  and  they  are 
 much  truer  as  prayers  than  as  powers.  They  were  prayers 
 that  He  had  to  answer  rather  than  principles  which  He  had 
 to  serve.  They  were,  and  are,  impotent  without  Him. 
 We  may  prize  them  as  prophecies.  But  it  is  another  thing 
 to  make  them  the  prime  movers,  with  Christ  and  His  action 
 but  their  classic  case.  That  is  not  Christianity.  At  least 
 it  is  not  apostolic  Christianity.  It  is  certainly  not  the  faith 
 that  made  the  Church.  And  it  is  practically  another 
 religion.  Would  it  not  be  much  more  fair  and  fertile 
 plainly  to  recognise  this,  and  then  go  on  to  ask  which  of 
 the  two  religions  better  met  the  facts  of  history,  the  record 
 of  experience,  and  the  needs  of  the  soul.  Neither  old  truth 
 nor  new  has  anything  to  gain  from  confusing  the  issue. 
 
 Let  us  not  refuse  the  truth  which  is  so  luminous  to  many 
 of  those  teachers  that  it  seems  to  them  final.  Let  us  not 
 discard  the  spell  of  their  ideal  Christ,  or  deny  the  composite 
 
148 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 nature  of  some  of  His  early  theological  photographs.  Let 
 us  not  despise  their  reverence  for  Humanity,  even  if  we 
 cannot  adopt  their  faith  in  it.  (For  reverence  is  one  thing 
 and  faith  quite  another.)  The  ideal  yet  human  Christ  of 
 the  modern  age  is,  in  its  place,  a  real  contribution  to  the 
 enlargement  of  our  thought  of  Christ,  if  the  thought  of  Him 
 were  all.  It  corresponds  to  the  step  taken  when,  through  the 
 Reformation,  a  near  God  replaced  a  far ;  when  God’s  relation 
 to  the  world  began  to  be  something  more  than  accidental, 
 when  it  became  organic;  when  the  world  ceased  to  be 
 thought  of  as  one  of  several  possible  to  God,  when  it  became 
 His  form  instead  of  even  His  garment,  and  a  theology 
 of  immanence  began  to  supplement  and  enlarge  the  medi¬ 
 aeval  theology  of  transcendence  alone.  Let  us  consent  to 
 learn  from  all  we  are  told  about  the  greatness  of  the  Chris¬ 
 tian  principle,  and  its  supremacy  to  every  other  spiritual 
 principle  found  up  to  now  in  the  soul  of  man.  We  may 
 then  gain  some  hope  of  a  fundamentally  Christian  ethic 
 replacing  a  pagan  in  our  chief  centres  of  education.  Let  us, 
 moreover,  recognise  the  contributions  that  may  have  been 
 made  to  the  form  of  the  first  Christian  theology  by  the 
 theologoumena  of  either  Judaism  or  Gnosticism.  St.  Paul 
 incorporated  several  of  these  into  his  thought  of  the  riches 
 of  Christ,  adopting  even  some  of  the  technical  phraseology 
 of  these  schools,  as  every  reader  of  Colossians  knows  if  he 
 continues  to  assign  it  to  St.  Paul.  I  see  no  reason  why,  if  it 
 were  proved,  we  should  not  recognise  that  St.  Paul  had  a 
 Christology  before  he  was  a  Christian,  and  might  even  have 
 believed  in  a  Messiah  pre-existent  in  the  heavens.  He  did 
 believe  in  a  celestial  Jerusalem,  pre-existent  as  the  Temple, 
 the  Law,  or  the  Memra  was  also  thought  to  be ;  and  He 
 might  have  shared  a  like  belief  as  to  the  Messiah,  if  such 
 a  belief  had  existed.  Which,  however,  both  Bousset  and 
 Dalman  seem  to  doubt.  As  they  well  might;  for  to  a 
 Monotheist  Jew  the  pre-existence  beside  the  one  God  of  a 
 person  like  Messiah  would  be  a  far  more  serious  matter 
 than  the  pre-existence  either  of  law,  angel,  temple,  or  city 
 of  God.  But,  speaking  generally,  I  see  no  reason  why 
 
CHRIST  AND  THE  CHRISTIAN  PRINCIPLE  149 
 
 Paul  should  not  have  utilised  the  ideas  of  other  religions 
 than  either  Judaism  or  Christianity,  to  fill  out  and  express 
 what  he  found  in  Christ.  But  they  did  not  base  his  faith, 
 or  produce  it.  In  Christ  they  all  fell  into  place,  and  were 
 gathered  together  in  one.  Christ  was  the  answer  to  their 
 prayers.  He  stored  in  advance  all  possible  treasures  of 
 wisdom  and  knowledge.  In  Christ  all  high  ideals  and 
 moving  principles  were  from  eternity  real  and  effectual. 
 In  Him  they  came  back  to  their  home.  And  therefore 
 in  Him  they  became  not  only  powers  in  history  but,  what 
 is  the  real  point,  they  became  the  powers.  They  were  put 
 once  for  all  in  eternal  command  of  history  and  man.  Their 
 final,  visible  victory,  in  due  course,  was  secure,  because 
 they  shared  his  secure  place  in  God.  They  became  invin¬ 
 cible  as  the  Kingdom  of  God.  The  aeonial  issue  of  light 
 and  darkness,  life  and  death,  good  and  evil,  grace  and 
 sin,  was  settled  for  ever  in  principle  on  the  battlefield  of 
 Christ’s  person.  And  final  omnipotence  was  secured, 
 by  that  person,  for  a  redeeming  principle  which,  however 
 divine  we  may  now  call  it,  but  for  this  victory  might,  for 
 all  we  knew,  have  succumbed  to  some  stronger  malignant 
 power  ere  all  was  done  and  the  long  historic  strife  closed. 
 Fixed  in  that  faith,  we  need  be  no  more  unsympathetic  to 
 the  ideals  of  our  age  than  Paul  the  aged  was  to  those  of 
 his.  Unless,  indeed,  they  aspire  to  thrust  the  living  Christ 
 from  His  throne  and  sit  there.  Then  they  threaten  the 
 Church’s  life,  as  the  old  Gnosticism  did.  It  becomes  a 
 struggle  for  existence.  And  our  attitude  might  have  to 
 become  that  of  John  rather  than  Paul,  because  it  is  John’s 
 situation  and  not  Paul’s  that  we  face. 
 
 The  chief  practical  objection  to  putting  a  principle  in  front 
 of  a  person  is  that  the  religious  life  thereby  becomes  a 
 one-sided  process  rather  than  a  mutual  act,  an  evolution 
 rather  than  a  communion ;  and  thus  it  loses  its 
 ethical  value,  and  is  relegated  to  the  pensive  and  passive 
 side  of  our  nature.  And  when  religion  does  that  it 
 practically  goes  out  of  life.  The  difference  between  a 
 
150 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 principle  and  a  person  is  the  difference  between  a  process 
 and  an  act,  between  a  man  that  is  carried  and  a  man  that 
 goes.  It  is  that  the  person  has  will  and  purpose  towards 
 some  conscious  act  and  end,  while  the  principle  moves  but 
 in  a  current  which  may  be  blind  (because  it  does  not  certify 
 its  own  goal),  which  bears  us  along  on  its  course,  and  tends 
 to  submerge  moral  action  and  choice.  Our  very  choice 
 of  a  principle  becomes  then  but  part  of  the  action  of  the 
 principle,  and  our  freedom  is  gone  in  a  determinism  the 
 more  fatal  as  it  is  subtle,  and  even  religious.  It  is  true 
 our  best  faith  is  not  of  ourselves,  it  is  the  gift  of  GodA  But 
 it  is  His  gift,  not  in  the  crude  sense  that  we  are  flooded, 
 overborne  and  carried  along  on  the  current  of  something 
 infused  into  our  nature,  but  in  the  sense  that  it  is  the 
 destined,  yet  not  fated,  response  of  our  free  will  and  con¬ 
 science  to  the  gift  of  God  in  a  personal  Christ  who  is  morally 
 calculated  to  affect  us  so  since  we  were  created  in  Him.  x- 
 The  Eternal  Life  is  not  an  infusion  whereby  we  are  coupled 
 to  a  source  and  charged  anew.  That  is  a  psychology  of 
 it  which  leads  to  magical  religion,  and  the  whole  Roman 
 theory  of  the  sacraments ;  and  it  means  a  religion  that  turns 
 upon  something  else  than  moral  personal  relations  direct 
 and  reciprocal.  But  Grace  is  a  relation  of  divine  mercy, 
 and  not  a  process  of  high  natural  magic  spiritualised. 
 The  new  life  is  ours  by  a  moral  action  and  reaction, 
 our  moral  reaction  to  the  prior,  moral,  and  gracious 
 action  of  a  God  whose  will  is  our  peace.  ^  So  that  it  is 
 more  exact  to  say  that  the  gift  of  God  is  not  the  faith 
 directly  but  that  Christ  who  stirs  the  faith.  It  is 
 '  the  faith  only  indirectly,  in  the  sense  of  our  personal 
 response  to  a  Person’s  gift  of  Himself  in  a  Person.  If 
 the  principle  be  the  main  thing,  then  mutual  personal 
 action  falls  to  a  second  place,  and  communion  in  the  true 
 Christian  sense  too  easily  sinks  to  be  fusion  in  the  mystic 
 sense.  Regeneration  becomes  at  best  a  mere  awaking  to 
 feel  that  we  are  partakers  of  a  divine  nature.  And  it  is  a 
 process  through  which  Christ  Himself  must  also  have  gone. 
 He  becomes  the  greatest  of  all  regenerates.  Redemption, 
 
CHRIST  AND  THE  CHRISTIAN  PRINCIPLE  151 
 
 which  has  Christian  meaning  only  as  an  act,  becomes  a 
 process  of  increasingly  pantheistic  and  Buddhistic  character, 
 including  and  blessing  the  Redeemer  Himself.  It  is  the 
 release  of  the  infinite  from  the  finite,  the  process  of  absorp¬ 
 tion  in  the  larger  ideal,  mere  delivery  from  the  limitations, 
 causations,  and  controls  of  a  hampering  world ;  instead  of 
 being  God’s  destruction  of  guilt  by  forgiveness,  His  new 
 creation  and  restoration  of  us  to  moral  communion  with  His 
 holy  Self.  History  becomes  but  movement,  hardly  action, 
 and  not  at  all  a  drama.  It  is  a  mere  procession  to  a  grand 
 final  panorama ;  unless  indeed  it  ends  in  the  redemption  and 
 release  of  the  Absolute  Being  Himself,  through  the  aid  of 
 man’s  ascetic  sacrifice,  from  that  most  original  fall  wherein 
 “  He  darkly  blundered  on  man’s  suffering  soul.”  And 
 with  all  this  the  conception  of  sin  accords.  It  becomes 
 merely  the  most  unfortunate  form  of  our  limitation,  but 
 it  need  not  carry  with  it  guilt.  It  is  a  back-water  of  the 
 great  current  of  process;  it  is  not  an  act  of  the  will’s 
 hostility  or  alienation  towards  a  holy  God.  And  the 
 effect  at  last  is  that  the  principle,  being  detached  from  the 
 person  (except  historically),  sinks :  it  sinks  either  to  truth 
 of  a  divine  kind,  so  that  its  revelation,  as  the  communica¬ 
 tion  of  divine  doctrines,  is  some  kind  of  orthodoxy — a  notion 
 of  revelation  now  well  outgrown — or  else  it  falls  lower  still 
 and  becomes  but  the  manifestation  of  a  fine  sort  of  cosmic 
 force,  the  flood  of  a  stream  of  living  water,  clear  as  crystal, 
 proceeding  from  the  throne  of  whatever  rules  as  God,  and 
 carrying  us  on  its  bosom,  almost  without  action  of  ours 
 (however  much  motion),  to  be  lost  in  the  infinite  sea.  In 
 either  case  the  dominant  type  of  religion  acquires  a  panthe¬ 
 istic  and  non-ethical  cast  rather  than  a  theistic  and  moral. 
 The  principle  may  employ  personality  or  drop  it.  It  may 
 appear  and  act  as  a  personality,  but  always  so  that  the 
 person  returns  to  be  merged  in  it.  And  a  person  not 
 identical  with  the  principle  could  even  preach  it  in  a  most 
 powerful  way  and  yet  find  his  real  personality  satisfied 
 elsewhere ;  or  he  might  renounce  it  at  a  later  date,  and  go 
 on  to  another,  and  even  contrary  principle.  But  what  we 
 
152 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 need  is  not  a  principle  any  more  than  it  is  a  dogma. 
 Principle-worship  is  but  the  modern  form  of  dogma-worship. 
 What  we  want  is  life  from  a  life,  conscience  with  conscience* 
 and  soul  to  soul.  But  what  we  get  in  a  speculative  system 
 of  interacting  ideas  and  principles  is  a  result  like  this. 
 “  The  fathomless  wealth  of  God’s  thought  and  act  is  reduced 
 to  the  monotonous  echo  of  an  ontological  machine  in  systole 
 and  diastole,  pulse  and  counterpulse,  thrill  and  chill.” 
 
 We  may,  perhaps,  put  it  thus  :  Religion  must  be  not  only 
 subjectively  sincere  but  objectively  real.  That  is  to  say 
 it  must  rest  on  a  real  objective,  and  one  possessing  the 
 initiative  to  which  faith  responds.  Religion  is  meaningless 
 without  something  in  the  nature  of  revelation.  There  can 
 be  no  real  religion  on  man’s  side  towards  anything  which  is 
 but  the  projection,  or  the  consummation,  of  Humanity  itself. 
 The  object  of  religion  must  approach  its  subject  creatively. 
 But  if  that  objective  be  construed  as  a  mere  immanent 
 principle,  patent  only  as  the  various  spiritual  processes 
 subjective  to  Humanity,  like  incarnation,  atonement  or 
 regeneration,  where  does  a  real  objective  for  the  race  and 
 its  religion  lie  ?  What  is  really  initiative  and  creative  ? 
 Of  course,  if  Humanity  is  regarded,  in  the  positivist  way, 
 as  itself  the  divine  reality,  it  has,  collectively,  no  object 
 of  religion.  Religion  becomes  but  one  of  its  subjective 
 phases.  Its  initiative  is  in  itself.  Believing  Humanity 
 is  its  own  object  of  faith.  It  is  the  object  of  its  own 
 worship.  And  the  religion  of  individual  altruism  is  a 
 collective  egoism  on  the  vastest  scale.  Or  if,  pantheisti- 
 cally,  Humanity  be  regarded  as  part  or  phase  of  a  more 
 cosmic  reality,  its  experiences  are  still  not  more  than 
 phases.  They,  too,  are  but  phases  or  processes  of  reality, 
 they  are  not  responses  to  it.  They  are  parts  of  its  huge 
 subjectivity.  And  religion,  then,  is  not  the  relation  of 
 Humanity  to  anything  real,  but  a  mere  phenomenon  on 
 the  face  of  reality,  having  no  necessary  or  eternal  con¬ 
 nection  with  its  nature.  The  principle  asserts  or  expresses 
 itself  in  many  forms,  but  it  meets  with  response  not  at  all. 
 
CHRIST  AND  THE  CHRISTIAN  PRINCIPLE  153 
 
 Humanity  is  a  phase  of  reality,  it  does  not  greet  reality. 
 There  is  no  revelation,  and  therefore  no  religion  is  possible. 
 
 But  how,  then,  shall  we  secure  a  religious  reality  behind 
 these  experiences,  processes,  or  ideas  of  ours  ?  How  shall 
 we  know  they  correspond  to  anything  in  reality,  anything 
 ultimate,  and  supreme,  and  victorious  ?  How  shall  we  get 
 moral,  holy,  footing  in  the  region  behind  good  and  bad  ? 
 How  shall  we  know  that  love  or  goodness  in  man  mean  the 
 same  thing  in  the  region  of  the  last  reality  ?  Is  moral  differ¬ 
 ence  rooted  in  the  Eternal  ?  It  has  no  religious,  no  eternal, 
 value  unless  it  is.  Now  there  are  various  philosophical  ways 
 of  answering  this  question,  turning  on  theories  of  know¬ 
 ledge  ;  but  the  theological  answer  is  this — that  the  historic 
 revelation  in  Christ  is  that  the  real  is  what  we  know  as 
 the  transcendently  moral,  the  holy.  That  is  the  meaning  of 
 the  Incarnation.  How  the  Church  reaches  that  certainty 
 opens  two  very  great  questions,  as  to  the  value  of  inspiration 
 and  the  value  of  Christian  experience.  They  are  questions 
 that  evoke  powerful  answers,  but  they  cannot  be  discussed 
 here.  The  real,  we  say,  is  the  moral,  the  historic.  But 
 now,  if  we  work  from  the  other  end,  and  apart  from  such 
 a  revelation,  can  we  say  that  the  moral  is  the  real, 
 that  the  loving,  the  sacrificing  is  the  real  and  eternal  ? 
 Can  we  be  sure  that  these  moral  idealisms  or  principles 
 in  history  are  upon  the  rock  of  permanent  being  ?  Can 
 we  be  quite  sure  that  moral  excellence,  which  is  at  present 
 the  crown  of  things,  will  be  permanent,  victorious  and 
 eternal,  apart  from  its  establishment  and  re-establishment 
 by  a  Personality,  Holy  and  Almighty  ?  Can  a  principle 
 secure  itself  or  prove  itself  to  be  Eternal  ?  And  if 
 it  cannot,  can  it  be  a  base  for  religion  in  the  great  last 
 sense  of  the  word — a  stay  in  the  crash  of  a  cosmos,  or 
 amid  the  collapse  of  our  own  self-satisfaction  in  guilt  ? 
 Can  a  principle  really  reveal  itself  in  any  such  way  that  a 
 whole  person  can  respond,  and  can  respond  with  himself  ? 
 We  can  respond  as  persons  to  a  person,  and  we  can  dis¬ 
 cover  a  principle,  or  be  taught  it  by  a  person,  and  we  can 
 acknowledge  it ;  but  can  a  principle  act  on  us  ?  Can  a 
 
154 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 principle  act  in  the  moral  sense  of  the  word  ?  Has  it  in  it 
 what  constitutes  the  essence  of  personality  ?  Can  it  create  ? 
 Has  it  the  power  of  self-determination  ?  Has  a  supreme 
 principle  necessarily  the  power  of  absolute  self-deter¬ 
 mination  ?  Many  minds  are  embarrassed,  when  the 
 question  of  an  absolute  personality  arises,  by  the 
 fallacy  that  the  essential  feature  of  personality  is 
 limitation,  that  personality  is  no  more  than  indivi¬ 
 duality — something  marked  off  by  a  circumference  from 
 all  else.  ■’  Whereas  the  essence  of  personality  is  not  that  it 
 is  a  closed  circle,  but  that  it  is  a  radiative  centre  of  power, 
 of  moral  power,  and  especially  in  the  way  of  self-command. 
 A  personality  is  a  power  that  is  lord  of  itself.  It  is  not  a 
 power  made  personal  by  its  limitations,  whether  in  its 
 volume,  or  in  its  spiritual  energies,  but  a  power  that  has 
 in  itself  the  secret  of  its  own  control.  It  is  a  power  with 
 self-determination  and  self-sufficiency.  From  this  point 
 of  view  there  is  nothing  unthinkable  in  an  absolute  per¬ 
 sonality.  With  us  personality  is  never  a  finished  thing, 
 but  a  thing  in  constant  growth ;  and  it  is  an  error  to  treat 
 it  as  a  complete,  limited,  and  standard  thing,  and  then 
 proceed  to  declare  an  infinite  personality  impossible.  It 
 is  really  the  only  form  in  which  we  can  conceive  intelligence 
 or  spiritual  life — infinite  self-knowledge,  self-sufficiency,  and 
 self-determination.  But  a  principle  can  have  none  of  these. 
 Its  action  is  not  self-determined,  and  therefore  it  is  not 
 moral.  Therefore  it  cannot  really  act  in  the  way  of  self- 
 bestowal,  self-revelation.  It  cannot  reveal  itself  in  any  such 
 way  as  to  appeal  to  our  moral  personality  and  master  it. 
 
 A  person  can  by  free  action  give  or  reveal  himself  to  a 
 person,  and  to  a  person  he  can  also  reveal  a  principle.  But 
 can  a  principle  reveal  itself  to  a  person,  if  we  really  grasp 
 what  is  deeply  meant  by  revelation  ?  Can  there  be  any 
 self-determined  and  free  self-revelation  on  the  part  of  a 
 principle  to  evoke  all  that  is  free  in  our  personality  ?  Has 
 it  such  initiative  ?  Self-revelation,  beginning  as  it  must  in 
 free  self-determination,  is  an  act,  a  personal  act ;  but  is  a 
 principle  capable  of  anything  beyond  movement  in  a 
 
CHRIST  AND  THE  CHRISTIAN  PRINCIPLE  155 
 
 process  ?  It  can  assert  itself,  establish  itself,  absorb, 
 overbear,  organise,  or  submerge  all  else,  like  other  forces — 
 but  can  it  reveal  itself,  bestow  itself,  open  its  inmost  self 
 and  final  purpose  ?  It  can  develop  itself,  but  can  it  save  ? 
 It  can  produce  resignation,  can  it  win  reconciliation  ?  Can 
 it  provide  a  worship  for  man,  who,  as  a  conscience, 
 needs  forgiveness  more  than  evolution  ?  If  it  is  but 
 a  principle  that  we  have  to  do  with  at  last  can  we 
 speak  of  revelation,  at  least  in  any  such  sense  of 
 saving  self-donation  as  Christ  has  taught  us  to  associate 
 with  revelation  ?  j  A  person  can  reveal  a  principle,  but 
 not  a  principle  a  person.  Is  it  not  debasing  a  person, 
 and  robbing  it  of  personality,  to  make  it  explicable  as  the 
 vortex  of  a  principle,  as  an  atom  might  be  a  knot  of 
 ether  ?  For  a  principle  is  not  free  in  any  moral  sense. 
 Moral  freedom  vanishes  if  it  is  treated  but  as  a  kink  in 
 a  principle.  A  principle  does  not  carry  in  itself  its  own  origin 
 or  explanation.  It  may  be  a  cause,  an  essence,  the  unity  of 
 a  system,  a  uniformity  of  procedure,  a  universal,  an  idea, 
 a  notional  ultimate,  a  logical  solution — one  of  many  things, 
 which  are  all  below  a  free  and  originating  person  in 
 moral  dignity  and  worth  for  life.  It  may  explain  much, 
 but  it  initiates  nothing.  It  organises,  but  it  does  not 
 create.  It  is  more  of  a  terminus  for  thought  than  a  source 
 of  life.  It  may  order  a  world,  but  it  does  not  love,  nor  is 
 it  loved.  It  may  be  owned,  but  neither  obeyed  nor 
 worshipped.  It  cannot  keep  religion  the  personal  thing 
 it  must  be.  And  it  can  never  effect  what  is  the  Christian 
 relation  to  God,  personal  communion.  Than  this  there 
 can  be  nothing  higher;  and  nothing  less  than  this  is  the 
 fulness  of  Christianity;  which  is  not  contact  with  God, 
 impression  from  Him,  or  influence  either  from  a  God  or  a 
 principle;  but  life-communion  with  the  Eternal.  This  is 
 only  possible  with  a  living  person.  And  the  faith  that 
 effects  it  is  absolute  and  final. 
 
 No  such  mere  principle  can  be  the  ground  of  a 
 religion  adequate  to  the  highest  practical  purposes  of 
 a  world  of  living  men,  or  to  the  actual  moral  situation 
 
156 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 of  such  a  world.  It  is  not  equal  to  the  great  tragedies, 
 resolves,  actions  or  consciences  of  a  race  of  loving,  acting, 
 suffering,  struggling,  failing,  conquering  souls.  It  must 
 have  its  sponsor  and  guarantee  in  a  revelation  by  a  moral 
 person  who  holds  of  the  last  reality,  and  who  is  secured 
 in  a  final  moral  conquest  of  such  life  and  fate.  For  a  world 
 of  men  a  man  is  the  only  fitting  form  of  revelation. 
 And  the  only  question,  then,  is  whether  a  man  is  a 
 possible  form  of  revelation  for  God ;  whether  the  great  last 
 Reality  is  so  moral  in  His  nature  as  to  exist  in  nuce  in  a 
 perfect  moral  manhood. 
 
 It  may  here  be  noted  that  the  tendency  to  detach  the 
 principle  from  the  person  mostly  goes  with  a  tendency  to 
 reduce  to  something  monistic  the  essence  of  God  as  well  as 
 of  Christianity.  And  at  its  root  is  an  easy  confusion  between 
 the  idea  of  immanence  and  that  of  incarnation;  as  if  the 
 divine  Incarnation  in  Christ  were  but  the  luminous  summit 
 of  an  intrinsic  divine  immanence,  ejusdem  generis ,  in  the 
 constitution  of  Humanity;  as  if  Humanity  were  the  real 
 Son  of  God,  with  Christ  as  its  most  conspicuous  individual 
 case.  But  the  Christian  principle  is  not  immanence, 
 which  is  a  philosopheme  with  little  direct  value  for  personal 
 religion.  It  does  not  become  religious  till  we  are  clearly 
 sure  that  we  mean  the  immanence  of  the  transcendent.  The 
 principle  of  Christ’s  relation  to  man  is  not  a  natural 
 identity  by  constitution.  We  can  say  little  about  that. 
 But  it  is  a  self-identification  by  will,  by  Christ’s  eternal  act 
 of  self-emptying  and  self-bestowal.  A  Christ  who  was  the 
 culmination  of  a  divine  immanence  in  Humanity  might  com¬ 
 plete  a  process  of  divine  self-realisation,  but  He  would  not 
 perform  an  act  of  divine  self-renunciation — meaning  by 
 divine  such  an  act  on  the  part  of  God.  Principles  may 
 realise  themselves,  but  persons  alone  can  renounce  them¬ 
 selves.  A  self-realising  Christ  would  not  carry  self- 
 sacrifice  into  God,  as  the  act  does  which  brought  Christ 
 here;  which  also  underlies  all  the  detailed  acts  of  self- 
 sacrifice  in  His  earthly  career,  and  which  makes  man’s  self- 
 
CHRIST  AND  THE  CHRISTIAN  PRINCIPLE  157 
 
 sacrifice  in  union  with  Him  to  be  not  merely  Godlike,  but 
 really  divine,  “  I  live,  yet  not  I  but  Christ  in  me.” 
 
 Hence  it  is  a  defective  ethic  that  works  out  of  imma- 
 nential  theories  even  when  Christian.  They  identify  sin 
 with  selfishness  in  a  one-sided  and  negative  way.  They 
 ignore  its  positive  aspect  of  hostility  to  God  and 
 aggression  on  Him.  They  invite  sacrifice  for  others, 
 but  they  give  collective  Humanity  no  eternal  principle 
 for  its  sacrifice,  none  to  make  sacrifice  divine  and 
 not  foolish  and  wasted.  They  may  lay  much  stress  on 
 sacrifice  to  God,  but  they  cannot  carry  home  sacrifice  by 
 God.  They  set  up  in  Christ  less  an  act  of  salvation 
 through  self-sacrifice  by  God  than  a  process  of  self-realisa¬ 
 tion  through  the  sacrificial  principle  of  Humanity,  which, 
 however,  cannot  be  guaranteed  as  pleasing  to  God  because 
 it  cannot  be  carried  into  the  divine  nature  itself.  The  cross, 
 that  is,  becomes  but  functional  in  Christ,  it  is  not  organic, 
 nor  constituent  of  His  appearance  among  men;  it  is  the 
 effect  of  an  epiphany,  but  not  the  principle  of  an  Incarna¬ 
 tion.  And  selfishness  can  never  be  extinguished  by  an  ethic 
 of  sacrifice  so  long  as  sacrifice  is  not  placed  at  the  core 
 of  religion  by  its  revelation  at  the  heart  of  the  object  of 
 religion.  Nothing  can  continue  to  evoke  self-sacrifice 
 in  Humanity  which  does  not  find  in  Christ  the  self-sacrifice 
 of  a  holy  God,  and  therefore  the  supreme  moral  reality. 
 For  nothing  can  be  conceived  ethically  higher  than  that 
 God  should  sacrifice  Himself  to  His  own  holiness  for  love  of 
 man.  The  act  of  the  cross  is  the  very  nature  of  God’s  self¬ 
 revelation,  which  is  His  self-donation ;  it  is  not  simply  one 
 form  of  revelation,  far  less  one  phase  of  a  moral  ideal.  The 
 object  of  worship  in  Christ’s  person  is  there  among  us  by 
 an  act  of  self-sacrifice ;  He  does  not  simply  perform  such  an 
 act  upon  occasion  when  He  has  come  there.  His  connection 
 with  Humanity  is  not  one  of  continuous  self-realisation,  as 
 if  He  crowned  the  great  human  process,  and  used  sacrifice 
 as  a  means  on  due  occasion ;  it  is  one  of  self-identification, 
 by  an  initial  and  a  compendious  act  of  sacrifice  possible 
 only  to  a  Person  who  has  the  absolute  disposal  of  Himself. 
 
158 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 Christ  was  God  giving  Himself  far  more  than  man  finding 
 himself.  The  Incarnation  is  a  moral  act  of  this  kind  far 
 more  than  a  spiritual  process.  Therefore  it  cannot  be 
 monistic  in  its  nature;  for  monism  may  stand  many 
 scientific  tests,  but  it  breaks  down  on  the  moral.  Morality 
 may  undergo  a  process,  but  a  process  per  se  has  nothing 
 moral  in  it.  Nor  can  man’s  response  to  the  Incarnation 
 be  a  mere  mystic  or  subliminal  spirituality,  but  it  must 
 be  a  faith  as  historic  and  ethical  in  its  heart  and  genius  as 
 the  revelation  which  stirs  it ;  it  must  be  a  faith  in  that 
 which  once  for  all  re-creates  the  conscience;  and  that  a 
 social  and  evangelical  creed  alone  can  be. 
 
 I  have  recognised  that  the  old  way  of  putting  the 
 rationalist  position  differed  from  the  new.  It  said  that  the 
 principle  and  its  prophet  had  no  necessary  connection,  but 
 only  one  external,  passing,  and  at  bottom  accidental ;  that 
 the  aqueduct  did  not  necessarily  guarantee  the  water; 
 that  the  person  might  be  most  sincere  and  true  but  the 
 principle  wrong  and  false ;  and  the  person  might  even  con¬ 
 ceivably  live,  as  St.  Paul  did,  to  promote  a  later  principle 
 quite  antagonistic  to  his  first.  That  view  marked  the 
 early  days  of  the  narrower  rationalism,  when  both  revela¬ 
 tion  and  its  critics  were  preoccupied  with  stateable  truth 
 more  than  cognisable  reality,  and  when  the  work  of  the 
 person  as  prophet  was  to  convey  truths  and  doctrines, 
 supernatural  or  natural,  as  the  critics’  work  was  to  dissolve 
 them.  Everything,  orthodox  or  heterodox,  was  a  matter 
 of  truths.  All  was  in  the  propositional  region. 
 
 But  we  have  changed  that.  The  new  way  of  putting 
 Lessing’s  position  abolishes  that  comparative  indifference 
 of  the  principle  to  the  person.  It  couples  up  the  connection 
 and  makes  it  necessary.  The  person  is  not  charged  with 
 truth  so  much  as  with  reality,  action,  life,  and  power.  The 
 charge  is  cognate,  the  vocation  identical,  with  the  person. 
 The  person  is  not  the  medium  but  the  incarnation  of  the 
 principle ;  whose  first  adequate  realisation  was  in  a  person 
 with  a  central  place  in  history.  The  redemptive  principle 
 
CHRIST  AND  THE  CHRISTIAN  PRINCIPLE  159 
 
 henceforth  acted  from  Him,  not  as  its  expositor  merely, 
 but  as  its  one  vital  historical  source;  and  He  became  not 
 simply  its  prophet  but  “  both  its  pattern  and  its  Guarantee .” 
 The  phrase  is  from  Biedermann,  one  of  the  most  powerful 
 and  pious  of  those  who  postpone  the  person  to  the  principle 
 of  Christ. 
 
 But  now  may  we  stop  a  little  on  that  word 44  guarantee  ”  ? 
 I  have  had  to  use  it  myself  already.  And  the  ablest 
 champions  of  the  Christian  principle  as  superior  to  Christ’s 
 person  (like  Biedermann)  are  driven  by  the  depth  of  their 
 Christian  experience  to  use  it  too.  But  why  ?  Is  it  not 
 because,  with  their  true  religious  feeling,  and  their  masterly 
 knowledge  of  religious  history,  both  Christian  and  other, 
 they  do  realise  that  the  very  element  which  distinguishes 
 a  guarantee  from  a  prophet,  a  pattern,  or  a  classic  case, 
 is  for  religion  the  one  thing  needful  ?  What  is  the  meaning 
 of  the  word  guarantee  ?  Why  must  we  speak  of  Christ 
 as  our  Surety,  with  the  old  divines  and  these  new  thinkers  ? 
 What  have  we  in  the  expression  that  we  have  not  in  speaking 
 of  Christ  as  the  type,  prophet  or  promoter  of  the  principle  ? 
 Have  we  not  in  the  use  of  such  a  word  the  surrender  of  the 
 whole  case,  and  the  identification  of  the  principle  with  the 
 person  ?  Is  it  not  a  confession  that,  however  it  may  be 
 with  philosophy,  yet  for  religion,  for  the  soul’s  life,  the 
 person  of  Christ  is  the  principle  of  Christianity  and  of  the 
 spiritual  world  ?  Could  anything  less  serve  the  purpose 
 of  religion,  and  plant  the  soul  upon  eternal  reality  ? 
 Could  a  person,  as  a  phase  assumed  by  the  principle, 
 guarantee  either  its  Universality  or  Eternity  ?  If  the 
 supreme  principle  is  to  be  guaranteed  by  a  supreme  person 
 it  must  be  identical  with  it.  For  a  person  not  identified 
 and  co-eternal  with  the  principle,  but  merely  its  exemplary 
 symbol  in  life,  word  and  deed,  could  only  utter  in  a  most 
 impressive  way,  even  in  his  martyr  death,  his  own  life-deep 
 conviction  of  the  principle.  Further  he  could  not  go. 
 The  thing  he  could  not  do  is  to  guarantee  that  what  was 
 such  a  conviction  for  Him  is  the  eternal  life,  power,  and 
 master  of  the  world  and  the  race.  He  could  not  assure  the 
 
160 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 man  of  to-day  that  the  principle  for  which  He  died  is 
 always  as  mighty  for  the  last  reality  of  things,  for  God  and 
 Eternity,  as  it  was  for  His  own  soul.  That  could  only  be 
 if  His  soul  and  person  were  absolutely  identified  with  that 
 last  reality  and  principle ;  if  Jesus  of  Nazareth  were  living 
 eternal  Godhead.  To  speak  of  Christ  as  the  Guarantee  of 
 an  eternal  principle,  as  Biedermann’s  religion  makes  him 
 do,  is  to  identify  Him  with  it,  as  his  theology  does  not. 
 
 An  ultimate  can  only  be  guaranteed  by  itself.  That  is 
 the  basis  of  the  certainty,  supremacy,  and  autonomy  of 
 religion  in  the  soul.  God  swears  by  Himself  because  there 
 is  none  greater.  Our  final  authority  must  be  God  Himself 
 in  direct  contact  with  Humanity,  i.  e.  with  History.  He 
 cannot  be  proved,  because  there  is  nothing  more  real  and 
 certain  to  which  we  can  bring  Him  for  sanction.  And  if 
 the  principle  be  that  of  sonship  to  a  Father-God — that  is 
 surely  a  personal  relation,  if  it  have  any  meaning  at  all ; 
 and  it  can  guarantee  itself  only  as  a  person  :  not  by  assuming 
 the  passing  form  of  a  person  for  an  historic  purpose,  but 
 by  existing  as  an  historic  but  universal  person  in  whom 
 the  relation  is  realised  germinally,1  perfectly,  and  for 
 ever,  by  existing  as  the  King  of  all  personal  sons  and 
 the  ground  of  all  sonship.  If  the  word  guarantee  must  be 
 used  (as  those  who  are  thinkers,  and  not  historians  simply, 
 feel  it  must  be  for  the  effective  base  of  a  real  religion),  it 
 can  be  used  only  to  mean  that  in  the  historic  person  we 
 have  not  the  effect,  nor  the  avatar,  nor  the  intuition  of  the 
 principle,  but  the  principle  itself.  It  can  be  used  only  in 
 the  sense  that  the  person  is  the  principle.  And  we  are 
 then  left  to  choose  whether  the  power  identical  with 
 that  person  is  the  principle  of  Humanity,  moving  in  fine 
 spiritual  processes,  or  a  personal  God  bestowing  Himself 
 in  a  moral  act.  The  person  of  Christ  is  an  incarnation 
 either  upwards  of  the  principle  of  Humanity,  which  is  a 
 Christianised  positivism,  or  downwards  of  personal  Godhead, 
 which  is  positive  Christianity.  And  between  the  visualisa¬ 
 tion  of  a  principle  deeply  immanent  and  the  incarnation  of  a 
 1  God  appears  in  Christ  in  mice,  not  in  extenso. — Rotfie. 
 
CHRIST  AND  THE  CHRISTIAN  PRINCIPLE  161 
 
 holy  God,  religion  will  not  find  it  hard  to  choose,  if  it 
 rise  to  the  ethical  level  of  Christian  faith.  The  key  to 
 the  person  of  Christ  is  to  be  found  not  in  an  intellectual 
 conviction,  philosophic  or  theologic,  nor  in  a  romantic 
 piety,  part  mystical  part  wise,  but  in  a  positive 
 religious  experience  of  Him  and  a  crucial  moral  decision 
 behind  which  we  cannot  go  in  the  quest  for  life’s  reality. 
 It  is  not  a  theory  of  Atonement  that  is  the  deep  need  of  the 
 hour,  but  the  experience  of  it,  the  atoned  soul.  We  need 
 most,  not  a  theology  of  religion,  but  a  theology  which  is 
 religion;  not  a  theology  of  religion  but  of  God  ;  not  a 
 speculative  theology,  which  has  always  broken  down,  but  a 
 soteriological  and  experimental,  which  actually  solves  the 
 moral  crisis  of  the  world.  All  that  speculation  can  do  for 
 a  Christology  is  but  in  the  way  of  prolegomena.  It  may 
 survey  the  ground,  and  even  build  the  house  and  staff  it, 
 but  the  tenant  does  not  arrive.  It  may  trace  a  general 
 process,  cosmic  or  rational,  and  mark  it  emerging  in  the 
 history  of  man’s  progressive  elevation  and  sanctity.  It 
 may  note  in  the  course  of  that  history  the  powerful  part 
 played  by  various  providential  personalities,  and  even 
 religions,  that  yet  but  stand  and  wait.  Such  geniuses 
 may  be  as  far  above  common  men  as  these  are  above 
 molluscs.  Rut  whether  the  principle  of  their  service  ever 
 appears  as  a  single  person  with  the  sole  right  to  sign 
 God’s  autograph  to  all  their  witness — that  no  speculative 
 treatment  of  the  world  can  guarantee ;  at  least  not  power¬ 
 fully  enough  for  practical  life  and  eternal  committal  in  such 
 a  world  as  this  is.  It  is  a  matter  for  a  theology  which  is 
 not  speculative  but  dogmatic,  on  the  basis  of  an  historic 
 experience  by  the  conscience  that  He  has  come  as 
 God’s  gift  of  Himself.  Speculation  has  its  great  uses 
 (so  long  as  it  is  schooled  and  competent,  and  not  amateur 
 speculation).1  But  at  its  best  it  has  no  gospel,  it  is  not 
 
 1  Till,  for  instance,  a  passage  like  this  (from  Trelierne,  before  German 
 philosophy  was  heard  of)  seems  something  else  than  absurd.  “  For  His 
 very  perfection  God  needs  what  is  not  God.  An  energy  working  outwards 
 He  must  possess.  Pie  must  think  his  non-ego.  And  considering  what 
 thought  is  for  God,  He  must  posit  the  non-ego.  But  the  non-ego  is  a 
 
162 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 propagandist,  it  is  indifferent  to  success,  and  it  is  not 
 for  the  pulpit,  or  the  people,  or  history.  Idealism  founds 
 no  Society.  Not  that  it  is  for  that  reason  futile,  or  even 
 inferior.  It  is  simply  different.  It  has  a  different  work. 
 It  can  neither  be  a  religion  nor  infringe  upon  the  indepen¬ 
 dence  of  religion.  But  when  we  have  found  our  soul  in  an 
 historic  salvation  then  speculation  may  richly  enter,  and 
 metaphysic  may  amply  deduce  from  a  Saviour’s  action 
 for  God  a  content  of  God  in  His  nature  and  work.  If  for 
 our  faith  Christ  have  the  value  of  God  we  cannot  help 
 assigning  to  Him  in  our  thought  the  nature  of  God.  But 
 the  thought  that  affects  faith  is  one  thing,  and  that  which 
 takes  the  place  of  faith  is  another.  The  phenomenon  of 
 Christ  is  ultimate,  and  the  faith  that  grasps  it  is  the  same. 
 He  is  a  final  fact  that  cannot  be  constructed,  and  He  can 
 be  construed  but  a  little  way,  while  He  is  received  and 
 trusted  for  eternity. 
 
 The  effect,  then,  of  the  theory  of  historical  development 
 on  religion  is  twofold. 
 
 1.  Either  it  denies  that  any  final  revelation  of  the  abso-C' 
 lute  and  eternal  is  possible  in  history.  All  is  in  evolution, 
 all  is  relative,  all  is  temporary,  and  the  generations  must 
 live  from  hand  to  mouth. 
 
 To  which  the  answer  is  an  old  one,  and  a  double — 
 the  identity  of  ground  and  goal.  What  is  it  that  develops  ? 
 And  to  what  end  does  it  move,  so  that  we  may  know 
 whether  the  movement  is  development,  and  the  evolution 
 is  progress  ?  What  develops  ?  How  is  it  possible  to 
 think  of  development  unless  there  be  something  that 
 develops  ?  And  if  a  something  be  admitted,  but  a 
 revelation  of  its  nature  and  object  be  denied,  then  how 
 
 negation,  a  limitation  of  God.  And  it  would  destroy  His  absoluteness,  if 
 that  were  not  necessarily  restored  by  His  absorption  of  the  non-ego  as 
 such,  and  His  recovery  of  Himself  in  the  Creation.  Distinguish  the  two 
 timeless  functions — the  positing  of  the  non-ego,  or  its  counterpositing,  in 
 Creation,  and  the  absorption  or  surmounting  of  the  antithesis,  or  its 
 Repositing,  in  a  Reconciliation.” 
 
 That  may  be  true,  or  it  may  not  be  true  ;  but  it  cannot  be  dismissed 
 as  unmeaning. 
 
CHRIST  AND  THE  CHRISTIAN  PRINCIPLE  163 
 
 are  we  to  tell  if  its  movement  be  development,  i.e.  if 
 its  action  be  giving  fuller  effect  to  its  nature  ?  We  can¬ 
 not,  unless  we  have  some  means,  religious  or  philosophic, 
 of  convincing  ourselves  that  the  God  of  history  is  also  its 
 ground,  and  the  person  the  principle.  It  is  impossible  to 
 speak  of  all  being  in  evolution,  all  relative,  unless  there 
 be  an  absolute  to  evolve  and  to  make  relation  possible 
 and  measurable.  Two  things,  two  stages,  could  be  in  no 
 kind  of  relation  except  by  virtue  of  a  unity  which  made 
 them  comparable.  There  could  be  no  relative  without 
 an  absolute,  nothing  temporal  without  the  Eternal.  So 
 far  from  evolution  excluding  an  absolute,  therefore,  it 
 demands  it  for  its  existence ;  and  Time  is  only  intelligible 
 on  a  foundation  of  Eternity. 
 
 2.  Or,  admitting  an  absolute  reality  brought  within 
 our  cognisance  by  revelation  in  an  evolutionary  history, 
 one  may  go  on,  as  we  have  seen,  to  deny  the  possibility  of 
 its  complete  and  final  revelation  at  any  one  point  of  time. 
 And  this  is  the  view  which  practically  carries  most  danger 
 to  Christianity.  Practically  it  is  most  dangerous,  because 
 to  the  generous  amateur  it  seems  religious  and  broad.  It 
 appears  Christian  by  acknowledging  a  revelation,  only  it 
 spreads  it  over  Humanity.  And  it  seems  to  promise  an 
 intimate  spirituality  by  an  experience  of  God  in  the  depth 
 of  each  soul  which  is  a  revelation  to  us  in  the  same  sense 
 in  which  it  was  to  Jesus.  Which  leaves  most  men  to  a  . 
 subjectivity  without  a  compass  or  a  pole. 
 
 If  the  possibility  of  the  absolute  and  final  in  a  person 
 
 be  conceded  it  may  still  be  said,  as  by  Strauss,  that  such  a 
 
 person  could  not  appear  at  the  beginning  of  a  series  but 
 
 only  at  its  close.  And  to  that  the  answer  would  be  on 
 
 lines  like  these.  The  statement  is  one  drawn  from  physical 
 
 evolution  rather  than  psychical  or  historic.  For  all  history 
 
 shows  some  of  the  greatest  triumphs  of  poetic  genius,  and 
 
 especially  religious  genius,  in  very  early  stages  of  society. 
 
 Moreover,  we  have  to  make  our  most  crucial  decisions  early 
 
 in  life.  And  it  is,  still  further,  a  statement  too  obviously 
 
 bound  up  with  the  Hegelianism  Strauss  represented,  viz. 
 m  2 
 
164 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 that  creation  took  its  origin,  not  from  a  personal  absolute 
 at  the  beginning  of  the  series,  but  from  an  idea  of  some 
 monistic  kind  which  only  acquired  the  self-consciousness 
 of  personality  at  the  end  of  the  series  as  Man.  Finally, 
 if  a  revelation  of  the  absolute  is  essential  for  faith,  and  it 
 cannot  come  till  the  close,  then  for  history  it  cannot  be  a 
 factor  at  all.  It  would  be  history’s  last  product,  and  one 
 dissociated  from  faith  (which  there  was  nothing  to  create). 
 And  to  dissociate  history  from  faith  is  to  non-moralise  it ; 
 it  is  to  reduce  all  to  an  ideal  process,  concerning  which  we 
 could  have  no  certainty  that  any  ethical  revelation  was 
 to  be  more  sure  at  the  goal  than  it  had  been  active  in  the 
 course. 
 
 But  it  may  be  worth  while  before  leaving  the  subject  to 
 ask  here  what  it  is  that  is  really  objected  to  bv  many  who 
 refuse  a  unique  finality  to  Christ’s  experience  and  person. 
 It  is  often  the  notion  that  the  whole  metaphysical 
 being  of  God  with  all  His  divine  attributes  was  identical 
 with  the  human  personality,  Jesus.  Now  that  is  a  state¬ 
 ment  that  may  mark  certain  crude  Christologies  at  certain 
 levels  in  the  history  of  Christianity,  but  it  is  not  the  thing 
 that  is  asserted  by  Christian  faith ;  and  it  has  no  more 
 sense  than  the  new  dogma  at  the  other  extreme  which  savs 
 that  Christ  was  identical  with  Humanity. 
 
 What  faith  has  to  do  with  is  the  personal  unity  in  an 
 equal  Godhead  of  Son  and  Father,  a  unity  which  is  moral, 
 because  holy,  in  its  nature,  though  it  is  much  more  than 
 -  moral  harmony ;  a  unity  also  on  the  great  moral  principle 
 that  subordination  does  not  imply  inferiority.  There  must 
 be  a  metaphvsic  of  it,  indeed,  but  that  is  deductive  from 
 the  experience  of  faith,  and  not  primary  in  producing 
 faith,  and  not  fixed  in  its  form.  Dogma,  and  especially 
 metaphysical  dogma,  does  not  produce  faith.  It  is  only 
 a  temporary  register  of  it.  The  function  of  dogma  is  to 
 express  the  mind  of  the  believing  Church,  not  to  prescribe 
 to  the  inquiring  world.  The  person  of  Jesus,  however 
 it  may  be  metaphysically  explained,  has  its  first  value 
 
CHRIST  AND  THE  CHRISTIAN  PRINCIPLE  165 
 
 as  an  actual  and  complete  manifestation  of  the  absolute 
 personality  as  holy  love.  The  necessities  and  implicates 
 of  such  a  revelation  made  to  experience  form  the  only 
 sure  foundation  of  a  doctrine  of  the  Trinity.  For  Christ 
 could  not  be  such  a  manifestation  to  the  soul  without 
 sharing  in  that  absoluteness  in  the  way  of  entire  and 
 eternal  continuity  of  life.  He  shares  in  that  absolute  life 
 as  a  constituent  person ;  He  does  not  receive  it  into  His 
 person  as  a  great  unit  of  Humanity  might,  whose  relative 
 personality  formed  but  a  fit  receptacle  for  the  absolute 
 Spirit.  Nor  is  it  as  if  other  men  were  robbed  of  the  divinity 
 concentrated  in  Christ.  For  the  greater  a  moral  personality 
 is  the  more  room  it  has  for  others,  whom  it  does  not 
 impoverish,  but  enrich  and  realise.  And  Christ  makes  real 
 for  those  who  enter  communion  with  Him  what  without 
 Him  were  a  mere  possibility,  a  mere  bias  to  God.  He  is 
 that  which  in  them  is  only  a  destiny.  He  is  the  gracious 
 destiny  of  all.  He  is  the  will  and  purpose  of  God  for  which 
 they  were  but  planned,  but  for  which  they  are  only  in  Him 
 empowered.  God  truly  was  in  Humanity  before  Christ 
 was  born,  but  as  a  presence  and  a  power  in  contact,  and  not 
 in  communion;  by  His  Spirit,  but  not,  as  He  is  in  His 
 Church,  by  His  Holy  Spirit.  And  He  was  in  a  created 
 Humanity,  moving  always  to  an  increate  but  historic 
 Christ  as  at  once  its  ground  and  its  destiny ;  in  a  Humanity 
 created  from  the  beginning  with  a  view  to  that  Christ  as 
 its  free  consummation ;  created  as  it  were  round  Christ,  yea 
 by  Christ,  and  not  merely  so  as  to  eventuate  in  a  Christ  at 
 some  far  end,  which  was  to  be  remotely  divined  rather 
 than  trusted  as  near,  and  which  closed  a  series  it  did  not 
 produce.  The  end  was  in  the  beginning;  the  goal  of  the 
 Church  is  also  its  ground.  That  is  what  is  meant  by  a 
 Christ  the  same  yesterday,  to-day  and  for  ever. 
 
 We  cannot  grasp  too  clearly  the  real  issue  of  the  present 
 time.  Since  the  death  of  Agnosticism  it  no  more  concerns 
 the  possibility  or  the  reality  of  a  revelation,  but  it  concerns 
 the  finalitv  of  the  revelation  in  Jesus  Christ.  The  conflict 
 
166 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 s 
 
 is  no  more  between  religion  and  science,  but  between  two 
 forms  of  religion.  The  revelation  is  admitted  both  in 
 Humanity  and  in  Christ,  and  therefore  religion  is  admitted, 
 and  a  certain  kind  of  faith  has  its  due  place.  The  Cosmos 
 grows  sacramental  even  for  science.  What  is  not  admitted 
 is  the  absoluteness,  the  finality,  the  cruciality  for  the  soul’s 
 eternity,  of  the  historic  Christ  as  the  saving  revelation. 
 By  which  again  is  not  meant  the  existence  in  Him  of  all 
 possible  knowledge;  for  religion  is  not  a  matter  of  know¬ 
 ledge,  but  rather  of  the  heart’s  conscience.  Nor  is  it 
 meant  that  we  have  no  indication  outside  Him  of  God’s 
 thought ;  but  indication  is  not  revelation,  which  means 
 certainty,  and  concerns  not  God’s  movements  but  His  final 
 purpose.  It  is  meant  that  in  Him  we  have  that  new 
 moral  departure  which  all  the  sequel  can  only  unfold 
 and  enrich ;  we  have  a  new  Creation,  the  new  Humanity 
 round  which  the  old  dies  like  a  corn  of  wheat ;  we  have  the 
 turning-point  of  human  destiny  for  all  Eternity  :  we  have 
 the  presence  and  act  of  God  decisive  for  that  purpose, 
 a  final  salvation  but  not  a  final  science  of  saving  truth,  a 
 final  faith  but  not  a  final  theology. 
 
ESSAY  VI 
 
 CONTINUITY  THROUGHOUT  THE  REFORMATION 
 
 Rev.  Prof.  Whitney 
 
SYNOPSIS 
 
 Changes  in  study  of  history;  in  method;  origins;  material.  In 
 Reformation  period  much  still  to  be  done ;  a  gulf  between  scholars  and 
 public ;  neglect  of  continuity ;  the  period  studied  in  fragments.  Neglect 
 of  the  Middle  Ages. 
 
 The  Reformation — the  outcome  of  the  Middle  Ages ;  hence  best  to  study 
 its  “  origins  ”;  incidental  advantages.  A  view  of  the  Middle  Ages;  forces 
 at  work ;  the  Renaissance ;  Monastic  revivals ;  Brethren  of  the  Common 
 Life;  Erasmus;  Luther;  Denifle’s  work ;  Justification  by  faith. 
 
 The  Middle  Ages  laid  stress  on  corporate  life ;  the  new  emergence  of 
 individualism.  The  mediaeval  disregard  of  individuality  illustrated  from 
 literature;  mediaeval  education  a  link  between  the  old  and  new  ages; 
 mystic  theology  another  link;  political  thought. 
 
 The  Reformation  writers  were  mediaeval  in  method ;  Hugo  Grotius ; 
 popular  writers. 
 
 Importance  of  the  third  quarter  of  the  sixteenth  century;  settling  down. 
 Political  efforts  after  unity;  the  mediating  theologians.  The  Council  of 
 Trent;  later  Lutheranism;  sketch  of  Papal  history;  the  feudal  Papacy — 
 the  Tridentine  Papacy  a  reassertion  of  the  mediaeval  feudalism;  its  antagon¬ 
 ism  to  episcopal  power,  and  to  individualism. 
 
 True  aspect  of  the  Reformation,  a  process  more  than  a  crisis.  Signifi¬ 
 cance  of  this  view  for  the  future. 
 
CONTINUITY  THROUGHOUT  THE  REFORMATION 
 
 The  study  of  history  both  in  its  method  and  in  its 
 matter  has  undergone  great  changes.  In  its  method 
 greater  stress  is  laid  now  upon  “  origins  ”  and  upon  the 
 tracing  out  of  gradual  growths  :  sudden  revolutions, 
 social  upheavals,  meteoric  personalities,  are  more  rarely 
 assumed,  and,  when  they  are  said  to  be  found,  the  state¬ 
 ment  only  leads  us  to  distrust  our  guides.  Natural  Science 
 has  taught  us  to  look  for  the  gradual  work  of  lesser 
 agencies,  for  the  earthworm  with  its  fourteen  years  of 
 patient  work,  rather  than  for  the  plough  with  its  com¬ 
 pressed  energy  of  a  single  day.  We  are  told  that  the 
 human  system  always  holds  within  itself  the  germs  of 
 many  diseases  which  are  only  held  at  bay  by  the  power  of 
 resistance,  and  that,  when  some  subtle  cause  lessens  that 
 power,  the  waiting  germs  make  themselves  effectively  felt. 
 Any  age  or  any  crisis  may  in  much  the  same  way  be  held 
 in  solution,  as  it  were,  in  the  age  which  precedes  it.  To 
 understand  the  one  we  must  know  the  other. 
 
 And  again,  as  Lord  Acton  has  pointed  out,  the  accu¬ 
 mulation  of  historic  material  has  made  the  work  of  the 
 modern  historian  more  difficult,  and  given  him  fresh 
 responsibilities.  With  the  presence  of  new  witnesses  to  be 
 cross-examined,  with  a  more  stringent  law  of  evidence, 
 old  verdicts  must  be  revised,  and  old  prejudices  put  aside. 
 When  this  has  been  done,  passions  that  have  been  built 
 up  with  age  will  lose  their  foundations,  although  the 
 essential  principles  are  left  behind. 
 
 In  most  fields  of  historic  study  this  twofold  task  has 
 been  either  wrought  roughly  to  an  end  or  else  been  much 
 more  than  well  begun.  But  when  we  come  to  the 
 
 m 
 
170 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 Reformation  we  find  a  gulf,  unbridged  and  untunnelled, 
 separating  critical  scholars  and  the  multitude  of  the 
 unlearned.  Nowhere  has  the  gathering  of  materials, 
 national,  political,  economic,  theological,  liturgical,  and 
 biographical,  been  more  extensive  or  more  many  sided. 
 And  yet  when  leaving  that  inner,  and  too  often  secluded, 
 room  in  which  the  scholars  work,  we  pass  into  the  general 
 reading-room  of  the  inquiring  public,  we  find  old  verdicts 
 still  repeated  with  an  unshaken  confidence,  old  prejudices 
 still  at  their  strongest  and  their  worst. 
 
 It  would  be  too  much,  of  course,  to  expect  that  even  the 
 scholars  themselves  should  be  at  one  :  it  is  much  if  they 
 are  even  at  peace  amid  their  differences  among  themselves. 
 A  few  of  them  may  still  keep  a  violence  of  expression  or  an 
 intolerance  of  mind  that  should  belong  only  to  intellects 
 less  trained  and  passions  less  controlled.  But  there  has 
 been  naturally  a  great  improvement,  and  that  in  spite  of 
 some  lapses  in  taste.  The  marvellous  scholarship  and 
 accurate  knowledge  of  Denifle  makes  us  regret  more  deeply 
 the  anger  which  disfigures  his  great  posthumous  work  upon 
 Luther  and  Lutheranism,  and  it  would  be  easy  to  take 
 examples  of  the  same  failing  from  the  other  side,  since  sides 
 there  must  be.  Yet  after  all  there  has  been  a  great  advance. 
 Thus  although  the  Papacy  has  often  been  treated  with  an 
 admiration  too  blind  or  a  hatred  too  fierce,  even  here  there 
 is  substantial  agreement  between,  for  instance,  Creighton 
 and  Pastor;  each  reaches  to  impartiality  and  balance, 
 even  if  the  one  seems  to  do  it  more  through  his  knowledge 
 of  the  world,  and  the  other  through  his  love  of  research. 
 And  to  speak  of  those  manuals  which  are  more  summary 
 and  bibliographical,  we  are  able  to  pass  from  the  Catholic 
 Funk  to  the  Protestant  Moeller  revised  by  Kawerau 
 without  disturbance. 
 
 It  is  easy  to  see  why  there  has  been  imperfect  filtration 
 from  the  level  of  scholars  to  the  level  of  the  ordinary 
 reader.  The  Reformation  has  its  Napoleonic  legends  of 
 many  different  Napoleons  in  one  camp  or  another.  And 
 these  legends  must  be  handled  delicately  lest  they  should 
 
CONTINUITY  THROUGHOUT  REFORMATION  171 
 
 perish,  and  weaken  Empires  by  their  fall.  Because  the 
 Reformation  saw  the  beginnings  of  many  systems  and 
 policies  that  separate  us  to-day,  we  are  too  apt  to  assume 
 sudden  creative  forces  at  its  birth,  to  ascribe  finality  to  its 
 judgments.  Romanist,  Anglican,  Lutheran,  Protestant 
 are  all  guilty  in  this  way,  although  they  may  label  the  forces 
 differently  or  choose  different  judgments  for  approval. 
 
 We  may  also  neglect  continuity  or  again  forget  the  axiom 
 that  history  should  be  studied  always  as  a  process,  not 
 as  a  picture;  and  we  thus  often  hide  the  true  view  of  the 
 Reformation.  It  has  been  studied,  for  instance,  too  much 
 in  detail,  in  single  scenes,  apart  from  its  continuity  as  a 
 whole.  Thus  in  English  history  it  has  been  too  much  the 
 fashion  to  take  the  reign  of  Henry  VIII  apart  :  as  a  result 
 some  threads  of  interest  have  seemed  to  hang  quite  loosely, 
 the  significance  of  some  things  has  been  lost,  and  incident¬ 
 ally  surprise  has  been  caused  that  the  king,  reforming  so 
 far,  did  not  reform  much  further.  In  German  history  in 
 the  same  way  the  period  up  to  1529  has  drawn  so  much 
 notice  to  itself  that  the  significant  features  of  the  later 
 history  are  obscured  :  the  activity  of  Melanchthon,  the 
 Concord  of  Wittenberg,  the  many  attempts  at  union 
 among  Protestants,  the  significant  labours  of  Gropper, 
 Pflug  and  the  other  “mediating”  theologians,  the  pre¬ 
 parations  for  a  Council,  and  the  negotiations  at  Trent,  the 
 activity  of  the  Jesuit  Canisius  at  the  court  of  Ferdinand  I  : 
 all  these  are  essential  parts  of  the  history,  and  the  more 
 critical  earlier  years  are  easily  misunderstood  if  these  are 
 left  out  of  account.  We  gain  but  an  imperfect  view  of  a 
 man  and  his  character  from  a  study  of  one  crisis  in  his  life  : 
 in  the  same  way  movements  must  be  studied  as  a  whole, 
 and  the  history  of  Lutheranism — to  take  one  instance — 
 is  only  made  intelligible  by  a  study  of  the  later  sixteenth 
 century.  English  religious  history  suffers  from  the  same 
 restricted  view.  Puritanism,  for  instance,  is  a  continuous 
 development  of  one  factor  in  the  earlier  Reformation  : 
 from  Tindal  through  Hooper  and  Cartwright  to  the 
 Millenary  petition  is  an  unbroken  history;  on  the  other 
 
172 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 hand,  the  school  of  Laud  represents  an  earlier  school  that 
 had  been  dominant  under  Henry  VIII.  When  we  give 
 these  later  days  their  true  place  in  the  history,  the  whole 
 becomes  consistent  :  like  the  spires  of  Wren’s  city  churches, 
 isolated  periods  blend  together,  and  we  understand  each 
 separate  one  the  better  for  its  fellows.  The  true  lower 
 limit  of  the  Reformation  period  for  the  Continent  falls 
 somewhere  about  1648,  for  England  about  1660. 
 
 But  it  is  even  more  necessary  to  begin  our  study  of 
 the  Reformation  by  understanding  the  Middle  Ages.  We 
 still  hear  mediaeval  used  as  roughly  equivalent  to  dark  and 
 ignorant;  the  beauty  of  the  Franciscan  ideal,  the  glory  of 
 mediaeval  architecture,  are  held  to  be  things  strangely  out 
 of  keeping  with  their  surroundings,  odd  manifestations 
 like  a  hardened  criminal’s  love  for  his  mother.  Too  often 
 the  Reformation  is  summed  up  as  an  attack  upon  mediaeval 
 abuses  :  this  is  a  double  injustice — it  is  unjust  to  the 
 Reformation,  for  it  ignores  the  positive  side  of  the  move¬ 
 ment;  it  is  unjust  to  the  Middle  Ages,  for  in  practice  it 
 seems  to  assume  their  principal  activity  to  have  been  the 
 production  of  abuses.  We  gain  a  truer  view  of  the  case  if 
 we  regard  the  Reformation  as  the  outcome  of  the  Middle 
 Ages,  not  merely  as  a  matter  of  chronology  but  of  spiritual 
 descent.  And  there  is  one  great  gain  from  the  study  of 
 origins.”  We  start,  often  unconsciously,  with  the  ideas 
 of  our  own  times ;  we  view  the  past  from  our  own  standpoint; 
 we  see  too  plainly  the  lie  of  the  roads  that  lead  to  us,  the 
 trend  of  the  watershed  that  slopes  towards  us;  there  are 
 other  roads  that  would  appear  just  as  plainly  from  another 
 standpoint,  but  them  we  cannot  see;  there  are  streams 
 and  valleys  that  are  hidden  from  our  sight.  Our  stand¬ 
 point  fixes  the  details  for  our  view:  we  become  more  self- 
 centred:  our  own  ideas  are  driven  more  firmly  into  our 
 being.  We  miss  the  larger  revelation  that  comes  from  a 
 study  of  a  larger  world,  the  revelation  of  a  purpose  wider 
 than  our  own.  But  when  we  study  44  origins  ”  everything 
 is  different :  we  must  see  side  by  side  the  pregnant  possi¬ 
 bilities  which  have  made  ourselves  on  the  one  hand,  and, 
 
CONTINUITY  THROUGHOUT  REFORMATION  173 
 
 on  the  other  hand,  have  formed  people  very  different  from 
 ourselves ;  we  retrace  the  path  of  the  ages,  and  we  learn 
 many  things  as  we  come  to  know  the  road.  This  process 
 brings  with  it  a  state  of  mind  very  different  from  that  which 
 dwells  mainly  in  the  present,  one  which  is  calmer  and  more 
 scientific.  There  is  between  the  two  states  of  mind  some¬ 
 thing  of  the  difference  that  there  is  between  the  thinker 
 who  studies  the  electrical  theory  of  matter  and  the  highly 
 trained  electrical  engineer ;  the  latter  seems  for  the  moment 
 much  nearer  the  actual  world  of  life,  but  the  former  in 
 reality  does  much  more  for  the  growth  of  science  and  the 
 progress  of  mankind.  To  look  closely  at  origins  lets  fresh 
 oxygen  into  the  heated  chamber  of  present  discussions. 
 The  study  of  early  Gaul,  for  instance,  has  done  something 
 to  allay  animosity  between  Germans  and  French  ;  the 
 study  of  early  Germanic  institutions  has  done  something 
 to  bring  together  the  ardent  democrat  and  the  stubborn 
 monarchist.  To  him  who  seeks  the  truth  first  of  all  there 
 is  alwavs  something  added  that  he  did  not  seek.  This  is  the 
 great  advantage  in  studying  origins,  and  when  we  stand 
 beside  the  cradle  from  which  great  principles  have  grown, 
 we  learn  to  distinguish  them  from  the  passions  in  which  we 
 have  clothed  them. 
 
 If  any  age  needs  to  be  studied  in  this  way  it  is  the  age 
 of  the  Reformation ;  and  yet  not  only  the  popular  taste,  but 
 even  more  serious  study,  has  mainly  chosen  other  methods. 
 It  is  well  to  be  reminded  (as  we  are  by  Dr.  Kidd  in  the 
 preface  to  his  excellent  Documents  illustrative  of  the 
 Continental  Deformation)  that  “  origins  are  common 
 ground.  Developments  mark  the  points  of  divergence.” 
 Differences,  therefore,  are  best  studied  in  that  common 
 ground,  and  not  in  their  more  crystallised  form.  To  do 
 this  is  not — and  this  truth  must  be  emphasised — to  ignore 
 principles  or  to  minimise  them.  It  is  rather  to  study  prin¬ 
 ciples  where  their  real  importance,  their  substance  apart 
 from  their  accidents,  is  best  to  be  understood.  No 
 historian  has  done  more  for  the  Reformation  period  than 
 Maurenbrecher,  and  he  was  always  searching  for  origins 
 
174 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 in  the  history  of  thought;  the  delimitation  of  principles, 
 it  sounds  a  truism  to  say  it,  is  best  done  on  the  border  line 
 itself;  diplomatists  in  official  capitals  are  apt  to  grasp  too 
 widely  and  to  yield  too  lightly.  Where  our  period  has 
 been  studied  in  this  way,  the  results  have  been  most  fruit¬ 
 ful.  In  the  preparation  for  the  period  too,  how  much  is  to 
 be  learnt  from  the  history  of  local  efforts  at  reformation : 
 from  a  better  knowledge  of  reformers  before  the  Reforma¬ 
 tion;  from  the  history  of  the  great  Councils;  from  the  study 
 of  the  influences  moulding  various  reformers.  What  a  new 
 light  is  thrown  upon  later  issues  when  we  see  the  future 
 Cardinal  Pole  approaching  Melanchthon  in  his  views  of 
 justification,  or  find  Caraffa,  the  future  Paul  IV,  a  practical 
 reformer  of  the  Erasmian  type.  To  know  men  before 
 they  diverged  is  often  to  grasp  the  secret  of  their  divergen¬ 
 cies.  Hence  it  is  needful  for  the  sake  of  understanding 
 the  Reformation  to  study  its  origins  in  the  Middle  Ages  and 
 to  study  its  characters  not  where  they  diverged  most 
 widely,  but  at  moments  when  they  approached  most 
 closely. 
 
 Centuries  seem  to  vary  in  their  energies  as  well  as  in  their 
 aims.  Thus  the  thirteenth  century  is  the  greatest  of 
 mediaeval  centuries,  great  in  its  characters,  in  its  institu¬ 
 tions,  in  its  movements.  After  its  glow  and  rich  variety 
 the  fourteenth  century  seems  dull  and  drab.  But  that,  too, 
 has  its  movements  of  beginning  life;  the  Conciliar  struggles 
 lead  to  new  discussions  of  ecclesiastical  polity,  just  as  the 
 strife  between  Emperor  and  Pope  had  led  to  discussions 
 of  Sovereignty,  of  Church  and  State.  When  great  questions 
 such  as  these  were  raised,  thought  was  stimulated  and  the 
 fresh  theories  which  were  formulated  became  in  their  turn 
 ground  for  new  discussion.  Thus  thought  gained  a  new 
 vigour  and  a  fresh  variety  before  the  Middle  Ages  closed — 
 a  vigour  which  was  specially  felt  in  the  Universities, 
 above  all  at  Paris.  This  tradition  of  thought  was  handed 
 down  to  the  later  Gallicans,  connected  on  the  side  of 
 politics  with  the  French  monarchy,  on  the  side  of  learning 
 with  a  long  line  of  illustrious  scholars. 
 
CONTINUITY  THROUGHOUT  REFORMATION  175 
 
 If  we  were  to  confine  our  attention  to  France,  the 
 transition  from  the  Middle  Ages  to  the  age  of  Louis  XIV 
 seems  gradual  and  smooth ;  there  is  little  internal  response 
 to  the  external  thunderstorm  caused  by  the  clash  of  Papal 
 claims  and  Protestant  individualism.  It  is  true  France 
 did  show  herself  alive  to  the  charm  of  the  Renaissance,  and 
 of  that  movement  more  must  be  said.  Here  it  is  enough  to 
 sa>  that  the  Renaissance  should  be  regarded  as  a  movement 
 within  the  Middle  Ages,  not  as  an  accidental  disturbance 
 from  outside.  It  had  begun  before  the  taking  of  Con¬ 
 stantinople  by  the  Turks  in  1453;  Greek  had  been  taught 
 in  Europe  before  that  date  and  had  found  many  devotees; 
 men  who  lived  after  its  4 4  abolition  ”  now  began  to  long  for 
 its  restoration.  The  future  Cardinal  Bessarion  with  his 
 much-noticed  beard  represented  the  Eastern  Church  at  the 
 Council  of  Florence  (1439),  and  by  his  continued  sojourn 
 in  the  West  became  one  of  the  many  channels  along 
 which  Greek  culture  spread.  The  flight  of  scholars  from 
 Constantinople  to  Europe  was  less  important  than  the 
 scattering  of  manuscripts  that  followed  the  fall  of  New 
 Rome,  but  neither  of  them  caused,  even  if  they  did  slightly 
 quicken,  the  movement  which  in  many  ways  recalled  the 
 other  and  earlier  Renaissance  of  the  thirteenth  century. 
 
 A  sign  of  the  new  life  which  stirred  the  world  in  the 
 Renaissance  is  to  be  seen  in  the  many  monastic  and  semi- 
 monastic  revivals  of  the  fifteenth  and  early  sixteenth 
 centuries.  Again  and  again  monastic  reformers  had  re¬ 
 vived  the  old  ideal  and  founded  new  orders  or  strengthened 
 the  old;  then  again  and  again  the  impetus  had  died  away 
 and  a  fresh  reform  had  been  needed.  The  process  was 
 unbroken,  and  in  the  series  the  reorganisation  of  the  Lower 
 Saxon  Benedictines  by  John  Busch  takes  its  place.  The 
 Augustinian  Friars  followed  with  a  reform  of  a  deeply 
 spiritual  type,  the  movement  that  gave  us  Staupitz  and 
 influenced  Luther.  A  little  later  Italy  felt  the  same 
 impulse  to  monastic  reform,  spreading  with  a  closer  grasp 
 of  the  Renaissance  and  of  practical  life  into  the  Theatines 
 of  Caraffa — afterwards  Paul  IV.  If  Spain  only  felt  the 
 
176 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 impulse  later,  it  produced  in  the  Society  of  the  Jesuits  an 
 example  whose  success  has  claimed  them  from  the  mediaeval 
 for  the  modern  world.  Here,  too,  we  have  a  continuous 
 history  which  bears  throughout  the  same  impress,  mediaeval 
 in  its  type. 
 
 But  more  striking  still  is  the  history  of  the  Brethren  of 
 the  Common  Life  (1380).  They  were  semi-monastic,  for 
 they  lived  a  common  life  even  if  they  were  not  monks ; 
 their  work  was  practical  and  thoroughly  Christian  in  tone, 
 education  was  one  great  part  of  it,  and  from  them  the 
 Renaissance  in  Germany  seems  to  have  inherited  this  char¬ 
 acteristic.  Their  schools  spread  from  the  Netherlands  into 
 north-west  Germany,  and  wherever  they  went  they  carried 
 the  love  of  the  classics,  a  taste  for  copying  manuscripts, 
 and  a  devotion  to  St.  Jerome.  Under  these  brethren 
 Erasmus  began  his  education.  His  earlier  letters,  which 
 England  can  now  study  either  in  the  fine  Latin  edition  of 
 Mr.  S.  P.  Allen,  or  the  excellent  English  of  Mr.  Nichols, 
 make  it  plain  that  before  he  knew  Colet  he  had  devoted 
 himself  to  44  sound  learning,”  and  had  already  taken  St. 
 Jerome  for  his  model.  By  44  sound  learning  ”  he  meant 
 that  solid  theology,  founded  upon  the  Bible  of  the  Fathers, 
 upon  which  he  placed  his  hopes  for  the  world  and  the 
 Church.  Had  this  been  encouraged  always,  abuses  would 
 not  have  grown  up  so  readily  and  so  widely  :  in  its  en¬ 
 couragement  and  its  further  growth  he  saw  the  best  path 
 to  a  possible  reformation.  His  letters  to  his  early  friends 
 (notably  to  Cornelius)  show  that  under  these  earlier  in¬ 
 fluences  Erasmus  had  learnt  what  true  theology  was,  and 
 how,  as  with  St.  Jerome,  theology  and  scholarship  could 
 be  united.  Critics  to-day  may  doubt — as  Erasmus  himself, 
 indeed,  doubted  at  times — what  was  his  exact  share  in  the 
 Reformation.  But  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  any  history 
 of  it  would  be  incomplete  which  did  not  take  in  his  name. 
 Such  a  history,  however,  might,  on  the  other  hand,  begin 
 with  him  and  do  so  with  but  little  sacrifice  of  completeness. 
 
 And  yet  a  history  of  mediaeval  thought  and  scholarship, 
 which  only  looked  backwards  and  left  the  Reformation 
 
CONTINUITY  THROUGHOUT  REFORMATION  177 
 
 altogether  out  of  sight,  might  well  take  him  as  a  type  of 
 what  the  thoroughly  mediaeval  Brethren  of  the  Common 
 Life  aimed  at  in  their  education.  Hence  in  the  case  of 
 Erasmus — so  often  called  (possibly  with  an  undue  de¬ 
 preciation  of  Aeneas  Sylvius)  the  first  of  the  moderns — 
 it  is  easy  to  bridge  over  the  gap  between  two  distinct 
 periods.  It  may  be  worth  while  to  come  back  later  to  his 
 44  modernity.”  But  if  the  modern  world  may  claim  him, 
 so  surely  may  the  mediaeval. 
 
 The  personality  of  Luther  has  always  seemed  to  the 
 common  man  easy  to  understand,  and  to  the  scholar  hard 
 to  explain.  Wherein  lay  the  secret  of  his  power  ?  44  What 
 made  Luther  ”  Lord  Acton  thought  to  be  an  enigma  not 
 yet  fitly  answered.  Behind  his  vigorous  manhood  lay  the 
 peasant  life  of  the  countryside  and  the  burgher  life  of  the 
 town,  two  things  that  passed  with  changes  gradual  and 
 small  from  the  fourteenth  to  the  sixteenth  centuries. 
 There  was  also  another  part  of  his  background  a  little  more 
 modern  in  its  colouring — that  outburst  of  University  life 
 reaching  from  the  foundation  of  Erfurt  (1392)  to  that  of 
 Wittenberg  (1502).  Erfurt  from  the  first  was  marked  by 
 its  devotion  to  Biblical  studies,  never  wholly  neglected  in 
 Universities  but  enforced  from  time  to  time,  as  when  Grosse¬ 
 teste  at  Oxford  ordered  the  first  morning  lecture  to  be  on 
 the  Bible.  Wittenberg  was  the  great  home  of  Renaissance 
 learning  with  its  new  and  daring  research.  The  one 
 University  made  Luther,  and  the  other  he  helped  to  make. 
 The  life  of  the  peasantry,  of  the  city  and  of  the  University 
 were  varied  parts  in  the  background  of  Luther’s  life,  and 
 along  with  them  mingled  the  earnestness,  the  deep  personal 
 piety,  that  marked  the  Augustinian  revival.  But  back¬ 
 grounds  and  influences  do  not,  of  course,  wholly  explain  a 
 man,  either  in  his  life  or  his  influence. 
 
 Since  the  appearance  of  Denifle’s  work  upon  Luther, 
 controversy  has  been  busy.  The  bitterness  of  theological 
 prejudices — always  sensitive  with  the  sensitiveness  that 
 knows  itself  not  quite  in  the  right,  and  must  therefore 
 cloak  prejudices  as  principles — has  been  keen  ;  we  have 
 
 N 
 
178 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 been  carried  backwards  into  other  days  more  robust  (may 
 we  call  it  ?)  in  their  methods.  But  it  has  also  been  pleasant 
 to  see  how  scholars  have  passed  behind  the  smoke  of  battle 
 to  mark  out  exactly  what  ground  has  been  gained  or  lost. 
 The  most  solid  part  of  Denifle’s  work  is  his  treatment  of 
 44  justification,”  and  by  his  continuous  exposition  of  it 
 from  the  writings  of  mediaeval  theologians  one  thing  is 
 certainly  proved.  It  will  be  remembered  how  Luther 
 describes  the  joy  he  felt  upon  reaching  the  true  explanation 
 of  44  the  righteousness”  or  “justice  of  God”  (Rom.  i.  17). 
 He  had  believed,  so  he  said,  that  the  justice  meant  God’s 
 44  active  justice,”  that  by  which  he  judged  mankind,  but 
 suddenly  it  flashed  upon  him  that  the  44  justice  ”  was  the 
 44  passive  justice  ”  by  which  God  attributed  His  own 
 righteousness  to  mankind.  By  this  revelation  he  was  lifted 
 from  despair  to  joy.  But  Denifle  has  shown  that  this 
 interpretation  so  far  from  being  novel  was  traditional ;  that 
 Luther  himself  must  have  known  this  earlier  exegesis,  and 
 had  indeed  given  it  in  his  lectures  upon  Romans  delivered 
 before,  according  to  his  later  narrative,  the  new  light  had 
 dawned  upon  him.  There  is  no  need  to  suppose  intentional 
 deceit,  for  change  of  interests  produces  inexactness.  It  is 
 never  easy  to  retrace  one’s  mental  growth,  and  natures 
 such  as  Luther’s  ahvays  find  it  hard  to  be  either  just 
 or  exact  in  descriptions  of  their  former  mental  states. 
 44  Confessions,”  even  if  poured  forth  by  a  St.  Augustine, 
 are  given  to  exaggeration,  to  shades  too  dark  and  contrasts 
 too  sharp. 
 
 But  the  special  truth  which  stands  out,  and  which  must 
 be  admitted  in  any  future  estimates  of  Luther,  is  that  here, 
 where  his  cardinal  doctrine  of  44  justification  by  faith  ”  was 
 concerned,  he  was  more  mediaeval  than  we  are  apt  to  think. 
 To  put  it  in  other  words,  the  break  in  the  history  of  doctrine 
 was  not  even  in  the  case  of  Luther  so  abrupt  as  has  been 
 thought.  The  mediaeval  treatment  of  the  doctrine  con¬ 
 tained,  in  germ  if  we  like,  many  possible  growths  ;  there 
 were  many  elements  in  the  treatment,  and  by  alteration 
 of  the  emphasis  laid  upon  some  of  these,  a  different  result 
 
CONTINUITY  THROUGHOUT  REFORMATION  179 
 
 might  be  gained.  Ritschl’s  masterly  treatment  of  the 
 mediaeval  theologians  has  illustrated  the  existence  of  these 
 diverse  elements.  Denifie  has  shown  the  exact  mediaeval 
 teaching  in  one  essential  matter  where  the  break  between  it 
 and  Luther  was  held  to  be  most  abrupt.  The  new  light 
 which  changed  the  life  of  Luther  had  shone  throughout  the 
 ages  of  darkness.  So  far  as  this  one  matter  was  concerned, 
 there  was  no  great  revolution,  although  there  was  a  change 
 in  proportion  and  a  shifting  of  emphasis.  For  there  were 
 different  elements  in  the  mediaeval  doctrine,  and  the 
 omission  of  any  one  of  these  would  naturally  alter  the 
 proportions  or  even  the  nature  of  the  whole.  Thus 
 Gardiner  found  fault  with  Cranmer  not  for  the  emphasis  he 
 placed  upon  44  faith  ”  but  for  his  neglect  of  44  charity.” 
 
 It  is  significant  to  notice  the  direction  in  which  a  differ¬ 
 ence  between  Luther’s  teaching  and  the  mediaeval  teaching 
 must  be  sought,  and  may  be  found.  The  mediaeval  doctrine 
 always  kept  in  view  the  fact  that  life  was  lived  within  the 
 Church,  that  the  processes  of  salvation  were  not  purely 
 individual.  It  was  within  the  sphere  of  corporate  life 
 that  salvation  was  wrought  and  gained.  With  Luther, 
 on  the  other  hand,  the  individual  was  chiefly  thought  of, 
 and  the  process  was  personal,  mainly  or  even  altogether;  it 
 was  the  sinner’s  conviction  of  his  salvation  which  really 
 was  his  salvation.  A  man  stood  face  to  face  with  God,  and 
 in  the  intensity  of  that  personal  and  individual  meeting, 
 the  corporate  life,  as  the  sphere  of  faith,  ceased  to  have  its 
 former  importance.  This  element  had  not  been  lacking 
 in  the  older  view,  but  it  had  been  qualified  and  modified  by 
 the  other  element  of  the  corporate  life.  In  the  same  way 
 Luther’s  attack  on  Indulgences  was  made  in  the  interest  of 
 the  individual  life,  which  in  this  respect  was  being  sacrificed 
 to  the  supposed  interests  of  the  corporate  body.  So,  too, 
 the  refusal  to  accept  Papal  authority  to  which  he  was 
 gradually  pushed  in  the  Leipzig  Disputation  was  an 
 assertion  of  individual  freedom.  Prierias  had  said  (and 
 Eck  agreed  with  him)  the  Church  was  the  Pope,  and  what 
 the  Pope  sanctioned  Avas  right :  against  this  Luther  asserted 
 
 N  2 
 
180 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 the  claims  of  conscience.  The  whole  tendency  of  mediaeval 
 thought,  indeed,  everywhere  and  in  everything  was  to 
 place  the  society  above  the  individual,  the  school  above 
 its  isolated  member. 
 
 From  this  leading  fact  of  mediaeval  life  there  arises 
 
 the  great  difficulty  of  discussing  mediaeval  authorship. 
 
 No  man  thought  or  wrote  for  himself  :  he  preferred 
 
 to  take  the  verv  words  of  other  authors  and  he  held 
 
 «/ 
 
 himself  perfectly  at  liberty  to  do  so.  The  continuous 
 chronicle  built  up  by  life  after  life,  handed  on  from  genera¬ 
 tion  to  generation,  was  the  type  of  mediaeval  work.  Even 
 the  Imitatio  Christi  is  a  composite  work,  and  it  is  most 
 probable  that  Thomas  a  Kempis  was  rather  editor  or  even 
 scribe  than  an  author  for  whom  we  must  probably  search 
 in  Italy.  Such  a  writer  merged  himself  in  the  band  of 
 other  writers  who  had  worked  before,  and  he  lost  himself 
 in  the  line  of  those  who  came  alter.  From  something  of 
 the  same  cause  come  the  many  difficulties  which  meet  the 
 student  of  Wvclif.  It  is  very  difficult  to  say  how  much 
 “  editing  ”  his  English  works  may  have  undergone  : 
 indications  of  different  dates  exist  side  by  side  in  the  same 
 work,  and  the  same  difficulty  appears,  although  to  a  lower 
 degree,  in  the  Latin  works.  Outside  Wvclif’s  own  work, 
 too,  there  was  a  more  popular  Lollard  literature  shaped  and 
 reshaped  and  then  shaped  again,  about  which  it  is  difficult 
 to  say  anything  as  to  authorship  :  individual  writers  were 
 merged  in  the  school,  and  at  last — to  take  the  crowning 
 example  which  Loserth  has  shown  us — Hus  copied  word  for 
 word,  save  with  the  substitution  of  Bohemia  for  Anglia, 
 long  passages  of  Wyclif’s  work.  There  was  no  law  of 
 copyright  in  the  Middle  Ages,  and  men  liked  to  repeat 
 ideas  in  the  very  phrase  of  their  original  expression.  There 
 are,  again,  mediaeval  works,  such  as  the  Prick  of  Conscience , 
 ascribed  to  Rolle  of  Hampole,  which  have  no  personal 
 touch,  and  where  the  personal  note  is  altogether  wanting. 
 One  must  not  expect  to  find  the  rights  of  ownership  written 
 plainly  on  the  surface  or  even  revealed  beneath  it.  The 
 ascription  to  a  special  writer,  even  the  fact  that  a  work  may 
 
CONTINUITY  THROUGHOUT  REFORMATION  181 
 
 be  claimed  for  him,  makes  no  difference.  It  is  easy  to  prove 
 the  absence  of  such  evidence  of  ownership,  but  it  is  not 
 possible  to  go  further  and  state  that  because  of  its  absence 
 the  claim  to  authorship  understood  in  the  mediaeval  sense 
 is  unfounded.  There  is,  just  because  of  their  method,  an 
 elusiveness  about  mediaeval  writers  which  makes  investi¬ 
 gation  into  authorship  often  very  difficult,  and  often 
 almost  useless.  There  is  little  of  the  individual,  there  is 
 much  of  the  school,  to  be  found  in  the  work.  This  is  so, 
 simply  because  the  individual  was  little  thought  of,  and 
 thought  little  of  himself,  while  the  school  was  placed 
 above  him.  It  is  a  commonplace  that  this  preference  for 
 the  society  above  the  individual  shows  itself  in  every 
 part  of  mediaeval  life,  political  and  economic,  as  well  as 
 religious. 
 
 But  in  modern  times  all  is  changed.  The  individual 
 now  bulks  more  largely  :  he  is  even  apt  sometimes  to 
 take  his  projection  upon  the  Brocken  of  his  age  as  giving 
 his  real  dimensions.  But  the  change — which  is  seen  most 
 clearly  in  the  realm  of  art — has  its  gain  as  well  as  its  loss. 
 The  individual  misses  something  of  discipline,  the  world 
 loses  something  of  coherency,  but  there  is  a  gain  in  variety 
 and  personal  energy.  In  art,  for  instance,  the  earlier 
 mediaeval  painters  (as  Mr.  Grant  Allen  has  so  well  shown), 
 dealing  with  sacred  scenes  such  as  the  “  Annunciation  ” 
 or  the  traditional  marriage  of  the  Virgin,  had  reproduced 
 the  same  characters  much  in  the  same  situations  :  they 
 looked  at  the  pictures  of  their  forerunners  as  types  which 
 they  must  follow  closely ;  departures  from  traditional 
 treatment  were  common  only  in  the  backgrounds,  such  as 
 those  in  the  beautiful  inset  landscapes  of  Lorenzo  di  Credi. 
 At  length  we  come  to  later  days  when  painters  relied 
 more  upon  themselves,  and  gave  their  individual  tastes 
 larger  scope  in  composition  and  selection.  Apart  from 
 the  natural  growth  in  technical  skill  we  gain  in  variety 
 and  richness  of  thought,  although  there  is  a  loss,  probably 
 inevitable  with  the  growth  of  Art,  in  religious  sympathy 
 and  reverence.  But  the  marked  change  in  Art  as  the 
 
182 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 Middle  Ages  come  to  an  end  illustrates  the  general  change 
 which  is  also  found  elsewhere. 
 
 In  this  emergence  of  the  individual  lay  the  great  secret, 
 and  the  great  power,  of  the  sixteenth  century.  Its  great 
 men  are  those  who  show  individual  power  by  a  revolt 
 against  the  force  of  society,  not  as  in  some  other  ages  by 
 their  support  of  society.  Years  of  a  many-sided  education 
 in  the  discipline  of  a  many-sided  corporate  life  had  done 
 its  work,  and  the  individual  was  sometimes  educated 
 enough,  sometimes  merely  thought  himself  educated 
 enough,  to  take  his  place  as  an  individual,  not  merely  as 
 a  member  of  a  society.  Side  by  side  with  the  ready 
 acceptance  of  a  corporate  life  there  had  been  frequent 
 murmurings  against  its  restrictions,  or  its  occasional 
 tyranny.  The  mediaeval  heretic  had  made  his  protest, 
 but  he  was  for  the  most  part  of  little  significance  for  the 
 history  of  thought,  as  the  great  mediaeval  thinkers  were 
 rather  on  the  side  of  society  and  of  system.  But  as  the 
 break-up  of  the  Middle  Ages  drew  near  these  murmurings 
 had  become  louder  and  commoner.  They  are  heard, 
 perhaps,  most  of  all  in  the  field  of  economics  :  the  manor, 
 the  guild,  give  place — although  but  gradually — to  in¬ 
 dividuals  in  competition,  and  to  the  recognised  sovereignty 
 of  the  slowly-shaped  national  state.  Old  customs,  old 
 privileges,  little  by  little  lose  their  force.  Money-rents, 
 a  wage-earning  class,  long  growths  of  distant  beginning, 
 become  fixed  parts  of  social  and  economic  arrange¬ 
 ments.  All  these  are  regulated  by  barter  and  bargain, 
 by  the  play  of  individual  wishes  and  interests  rather 
 than  by  the  older  rules  of  corporate  life  and  corporate 
 interests.  The  Revolt  of  the  Peasants  in  England  (1381), 
 the  long-delayed  Peasants’  War  in  Germany  (1524)  are  parts 
 of  the  general  process.  A  general  rise  of  a  new  nobility, 
 the  growth  of  a  richer  merchant  class,  are  both  part  of 
 the  same  movement.  There  was  a  general  impatience  of 
 old  restraints ;  there  was  a  new  feeling  of  individual 
 power,  a  longing  to  risk  individual  actions  and  to  further 
 individual  interests.  For  reasons  of  this  kind,  too,  the 
 
CONTINUITY  THROUGHOUT  REFORMATION  183 
 
 monastic  life  had  begun  to  lose  its  attraction.  Founders 
 of  monasteries  were  rarer,  and  inmates  of  monasteries 
 were  fewer.  This  result  was,  of  course,  intensified  by  the 
 corruptions  which  were  to  be  found  in  some  cases,  by  the 
 comparative  uselessness  of  a  monastic  life  compared  with 
 its  activity  in  older  days,  and  by  the  loss  of  a  sufficiently 
 high  ideal,  testified  to  by  the  frequent  attempts  at  reform 
 already  mentioned. 
 
 Towards  the  close  of  the  Middle  Ages  there  was,  then, 
 an  outburst  of  individualism.  We  have  lately  learned 
 what  boundless  energy  works  in  the  motion  of  the  tiny 
 parts  of  a  body  apparently  at  rest,  and  what  manifestation 
 of  energy  results  from  the  disturbance  of  their  equilibrium. 
 Something  of  the  same  kind  happened  with  mediaeval 
 society  :  its  individual  parts  seemed  released  from  coher¬ 
 ence,  and  there  was  a  great  display  of  individual  energy. 
 There  was,  therefore,  power  to  be  utilised,  but  there  was 
 also  power  that  might  be  misused.  There  was  a  need  of 
 instruction  and  guidance,  and  thus  fresh  responsibility 
 was  placed  on  those  who  ought  to  give  them.  At  the 
 very  time  when  the  Church  and  its  leaders  were  suffering 
 from  past  neglects  and  present  defects,  a  new  and  pressing 
 responsibility  was  brought  upon  it  and  them.  It  was 
 this  which  made  the  real  crisis  of  the  Reformation.  It  was 
 the  mishandling  of  this  crisis  which  made  the  tragedy. 
 
 In  this  individualism  is  to  be  found  that  which  separates 
 the  mediaeval  from  the  modern  world.  We  may  return  for  a 
 moment  to  the  common  description  of  Erasmus  as  the  first  of 
 the  moderns.  This  is  true  so  far  as  his  way  of  looking  at 
 things  and  his  wit  is  concerned,  with  the  one  qualification 
 that  Aeneas  Sylvius  (Pius  II)  was  almost  as  modern  in  his 
 humour.  In  Erasmus  there  is  an  openness  about  himself 
 and  his  feelings,  almost  a  display  of  himself  :  the  personal 
 touch  transfigures  everything  :  he  goes  his  own  way  and 
 he  judges  everything  from  his  own  point  of  view.  He 
 laughs  at  himself,  at  his  weaknesses  and  his  adventures, 
 he  expects  others  to  laugh  with  him  and  be  interested  in 
 him.  A  truly  mediaeval  writer  would  never  expect  others 
 
184 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 to  be  interested  in  him  for  himself  :  he  would  enlarge  in¬ 
 stead  upon  his  monastery  or  his  home.  Erasmus  is  always, 
 first  and  foremost,  an  individual,  and  even  strives  to 
 be  a  personality.  It  is  here  that  his  modern  spirit 
 is  to  be  found.  The  absence  or  the  presence  of  the 
 individual  element  is  something  of  a  test  by  which  we 
 distinguish  between  mediaeval  and  modern  times. 
 
 But  it  is  true,  on  the  other  hand,  that  both  Erasmus 
 and  Luther  give  us  an  unfavourable  description  of  the 
 system  under  which  they  were  brought  up.  In  the  case 
 of  Erasmus  his  letters  to  his  early  friends  serve  to  correct 
 the  impression  which  might  be  taken  from  passages  of 
 description.  There  are  few  writers  but  could  find  faults  in 
 their  schools,  or  at  any  rate  in  the  methods  of  education 
 followed  there.  When  Erasmus,  moreover,  spoke  of  the 
 system  that  had  produced  him,  he  was  trying  to  raise 
 the  tone  of  education,  or  he  was  making  out  a  ease  for 
 himself ;  he  was  dealing  with  his  facts  more  as  a  literary 
 man  than  as  an  historian.  But  it  is  clear  that  in  spite 
 of  faults  easy  to  find,  and  of  mistakes  easy  to  see,  the 
 teachers  among  the  Brethren  of  the  Common  Life  had  some¬ 
 thing  at  any  rate  of  a  great  ideal;  they  did  aim,  although 
 possibly  with  some  deviation,  at  a  sound  classical  and  theo¬ 
 logical  education.  The  somewhat  dark  picture  Erasmus 
 draws  when  it  is  his  object  to  draw  a  dark  picture,  has  to 
 be  combined  with  others  if  we  would  have  the  absolute 
 truth. 
 
 Something  the  same  is  the  case  when  Luther,  in  his 
 later  years,  turns  to  describe  his  own  past.  Here,  again, 
 Denifle’s  argument  supplies  some  corrections.  Luther,  in 
 writing  nearer  the  years  he  depicted,  spoke  more  favour¬ 
 ably  of  his  own  monastic  training.  When  in  later  years 
 he  looked  at  that  past  life  through  the  smoke  and  dust 
 of  many  controversies,  some  arising  out  of  the  monastic 
 life  and  vows,  he  deepened  the  shades  and  dwelt  only  upon 
 the  darker  features.  At  any  rate  the  figure  of  Staupitz 
 with  his  real  halo  of  piety,  the  traditions  of  Erfurt  with 
 its  Biblical  studies,  remain  untouched,  and  the  impression 
 
CONTINUITY  THROUGHOUT  REFORMATION  185 
 
 they  give  us  is  confirmed  by  Luther’s  own  earlier 
 words.  The  unfavourable  words  used  both  bv  Erasmus 
 and  Luther,  when  they  deal  with  the  mediaeval  system 
 under  which  they  began  to  learn,  do  not  justify  the  con¬ 
 clusion  that  they  owed  little  to  that  system.  In  both 
 cases  the  personal  equation  of  the  observer  is  unusually 
 large,  and  something  must  be  deducted  to  gain  a  true 
 observation. 
 
 If  other  links  are  sought  between  the  Middle  Ages  and 
 the  Reformation,  we  might  turn  to  the  mystic  theologians. 
 They  were  strong  in  their  reception  of  individual  experi¬ 
 ences,  strong  in  their  close,  personal  relations  with  God. 
 In  Rolle  of  Hampole,  to  take  a  typical  case,  there  was  no 
 repudiation  of  the  Church  system  of  the  time,  of  the  claims 
 of  authority,  or  of  the  brotherhood  of  others.  These  were 
 all  accepted  as  part  of  the  furniture  of  life.  But  while 
 many  mediaeval  theologians  made  the  individual  sub¬ 
 ordinate  to  the  Church,  to  be  trained  and  disciplined  by 
 it  in  his  individual  life,  the  mystic  theologians  sometimes 
 placed  the  individual  above  the  corporate  life,  sometimes 
 lost  sight  of  the  latter  altogether.  Tauler’s  sermons  had 
 an  immense  attraction  for  Luther  :  the  44  Deutsche  Theo- 
 logie  ” — which  he  ascribed  not  only  to  Tauler’s  school, 
 but  to  Tauler  himself — appealed  to  him  with  the  same  force. 
 It  is  this  assertion  of  the  inner  and  individual  side  of 
 religious  life  which  makes  so  many  mystic  theologians 
 seem  not  only  out  of  touch  with  their  day,  but  almost  in 
 rebellion  against  it ;  it  is  in  this  sense,  and  in  no  other, 
 that  they  can  be  called  44  forerunners  of  the  Reformation.” 
 
 Another  outcome  of  the  Middle  Ages  can  only  be 
 mentioned  here — and  that  is  its  political  thought.  Here, 
 again,  the  result  of  closer  study  has  been  to  show  mediaeval 
 political  thought  as  a  really  coherent  and  solid  system. 
 Nothing  could  be  more  modern  than  the  theories  of 
 Marsilio  of  Padua.  The  long  contests  of  Pope  and  Emperor 
 — beginning  with  the  struggle  upon  Investitures — had 
 raised  the  question  of  Church  and  State,  and  in  a  later  phase 
 of  sovereignty.  The  limits  of  ecclesiastical  power,  both 
 
186 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 against  the  State  and  within  the  ecclesiastical  body  itself, 
 were  discussed  first  in  the  course  of  the  same  struggle, 
 and  again  in  the  period  of  the  Great  Councils  of  the  West. 
 The  expression  of  thought  was  perhaps  sometimes  fan¬ 
 tastic,  but  the  thought  itself  was  often  significant.  When 
 Wyclif,  for  instance,  expressed  his  theory  of  dominion 
 (borrowed  as  it  was  from  FitzRalph  of  Armagh)  in  the 
 statements  that  “  all  dominion  was  founded  in  grace,”  and 
 that  “  dominion  was  lost  by  mortal  sin,”  the  doctrine 
 seems  strange.  It  makes  all  authority,  from  sovereignty 
 down  to  the  control  of  land,  depend  upon  personal  right¬ 
 eousness,  and  thus  it  leads  to  anarchy.  His  qualification 
 of  the  theory  by  the  assertion  that  “  God  must  submit 
 to  the  Devil,”  sounds  more  fantastic  still.  But  it  was 
 meant  to  limit  the  theory  to  ideal  conditions,  and  to  say 
 that  under  present  circumstances  the  best  of  men  must 
 submit  to  the  worst — in  a  word,  that  power  did  not  depend 
 upon  righteousness  but  on  social  facts,  and  the  theory 
 itself  was  meant  to  enforce  the  lesson  that  for  all  power 
 and  its  exercise  the  holder  had  to  answer  before  God.  To 
 say  this  was  to  enforce  responsibility,  to  represent  all 
 power  as  a  sacred  trust.  This  truth  was  as  necessary 
 as  the  form  of  its  expression  was  fantastic. 
 
 It  was  to  speculations  such  as  these  that  sixteent  h - 
 century  political  thinkers  went  back  as  soon  as  they  felt 
 bound  to  formulate  a  system.  The  outstanding  fact  of 
 their  day  was  the  formation  of  great  states  with  strong 
 monarchies.  The  mediaeval  theory  of  sovereignty  came 
 in  usefully  here;  the  mediaeval  theorists  had  incidentally 
 made  large  use  of  Roman  law  and  of  classical  examples ; 
 this  use  fitted  in  naturally  with  the  revival  of  the  classical 
 languages.  But  the  freshness  of  thought  in  the  later  age 
 has  been  over-estimated ;  for  the  first  half  of  the  century 
 there  are  few  signs  of  freshness — if  we  except  Machiavelli, 
 a  product  of  politics  in  Italy  where  every  man  strove 
 for  himself,  and  an  exponent  of  the  ethics  of  selfishness ; 
 only  in  the  latter  half  of  the  century  do  the  new  con¬ 
 ditions  of  life  show  themselves  in  a  new  freshness  of 
 
CONTINUITY  THROUGHOUT  REFORMATION  187 
 
 thought.  The  more  the  mediaeval  thinkers  are  studied,  the 
 less  violent  the  break  appears ;  Bartolus,  as  Maitland  and 
 Dr.  Figgis  have  shown  us,  bridges  over  an  apparent  gulf. 
 The  vast  body  of  mediaeval  political  literature  was  not 
 buried  out  of  sight,  and  one  significant  link  of  thought 
 may  be  noted.  Hus  in  his  Latin  works  largely  copied 
 Wyclif,  as  we  noted  before.  At  the  crisis  of  the  Leipzig 
 Disputation  (1519)  a  printed  volume  of  Hus’s  writings 
 was  placed  in  Luther’s  hands,  and  thus  some  of  Wyclif’s 
 characteristic  teaching  upon  questions  between  Church 
 and  State  filtered  through  to  Luther.  If  in  some  ways 
 he  was  ready  to  confess  himself  a  Husite,  the  truer  name 
 when  we  bear  everything  in  mind  would  seem  to  have  been 
 a  Wyclifite.  The  duty  of  the  State  to  reform  the  Church 
 had  been  a  favourite  doctrine  with  the  mediaeval  reformer. 
 It  was  preached  more  effectively  and  in  a  more  original 
 way  by  Luther  to  the  many  German  princes.  There  was, 
 further,  a  large  amount  of  anti -papal  literature  handed 
 down  by  the  Middle  Ages  :  the  Confutatio  Primatus  Papae, 
 probably  by  the  Erfurt  Franciscan  Matthias  Doring 
 and  written  about  1442-44,  is  an  example ;  it  largely 
 follows  Marsilio  of  Padua  and  has  some  links  with  other 
 works  resulting  from  the  Council  of  Basel — the  Squalores 
 Romanae  Curiae ,  the  Speculum  Aureum ,  among  them  :  it 
 discusses  and  rejects  the  Wyclifite  attack  upon  clerical 
 property,  but  it  decides  strongly  against  ecclesiastics 
 holding  sovereignty — a  distinction  which  carries  us  back 
 to  the  celebrated  Compromise  of  Paschal  II  in  the  Investi¬ 
 ture  contest.  Doring  at  Erfurt  was  one  of  these  writers ; 
 others  had  a  centre  at  Prague  ;  Matthias  of  Cracow,  another 
 of  them,  died  as  Bishop  of  Worms.  There  was  here  a 
 tradition  which  had  not  wholly  died  out,  and  the  works 
 themselves  remained  to  be  a  storehouse  for  later  arguments. 
 
 Between  mediaeval  and  Reformation  literature  the  break 
 is  in  some  other  ways  not  so  marked  as  might  be  supposed. 
 If  we  turn  to  treatises  such  as  the  Loci  Communes  of 
 Peter  Martyr,  or  Theodore  Beza’s  Tractiones  Theologicae , 
 and  select  one  special  topic  such  as  marriage  and  divorce, 
 
188 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 we  find  the  historical  treatment  to  be  mediaeval  in  type  : 
 precedents  of  ancient  peoples,  of  Old  Testament  times, 
 of  the  later  Roman  Empire,  are  collected  much  as  in 
 mediaeval  writers,  and  it  is  easy  to  see  that  they  are  held 
 to  have  a  special  value  as  precedents  irrespective  of  their 
 historical  setting  or  of  any  principle  behind  them  :  we 
 might  be  reading  mediaeval  writers.  There  is  nothing  of 
 the  modern  spirit  in  treating  of  the  past.  The  same  holds 
 good — to  take  another  example- — of  the  earlier  writers 
 upon  international  law.  Hugo  Grotius  in  his  celebrated 
 work,  De  Jure  Belli  et  Pads ,  handles  his  classical  examples, 
 makes  his  deductions  from  Imperial  Law,  in  a  thoroughly 
 mediaeval  way.  One  is  reminded  of  the  controversy  upon 
 the  sources  of  the  Nile  between  Aeneas  Sylvius  and 
 Gregory  of  Heimburg,  where  the  question  is  settled  mainly 
 by  references  to  ancient  writers.  This  characteristic  of 
 the  great  work  of  Grotius  is  sometimes  explained  as  due 
 to  the  revival  of  classical  studies,  but  it  is  really  a  character¬ 
 istic  of  mediaeval  writers  also  :  parallels  from  the  works  of 
 Wyclif  or  any  voluminous  mediaeval  writer  might  easily  be 
 found.  It  is  true,  of  course,  that  learning  became  wider 
 and  the  collected  instances  therefore  more  numerous  as 
 time  went  on,  but  the  method  of  treatment  is  the  same 
 and  is  essentially  mediaeval. 
 
 And  yet  there  are  in  these  writers  features  which  would 
 often  be  called  modern.  The  appeal  to  Scripture  is  at 
 first  sight  one  of  these,  but  the  words  of  Schubert  (in 
 his  Outlines  of  Church  History)  state  the  truth  :  “  What 
 is  known  as  the  Scripture  principle  appeared  long  before 
 the  Reformation — in  some  cases,  as  in  that  of  Marsilius, 
 in  a  very  crude  form ;  and  the  learned  Bible  studies,  which 
 reached  their  height  in  the  works  of  Erasmus  and  Reuchlin, 
 are  based  on  a  study  of  the  original  language  and  run 
 counter  to  tradition,  were  not  a  product  of  the  Reforma¬ 
 tion,  but  a  pre-condition  of  it.” 
 
 A  comparison  of  sixteenth-century  with  earlier  writers 
 shows  us  not  so  much  a  sudden  change  as  a  rearrange¬ 
 ment  of  ideas  and  material,  a  process  spreading  over  many 
 
CONTINUITY  THROUGHOUT  REFORMATION  189 
 
 years  and,  in  the  end,  giving  us  something  very  unlike 
 what  was  there  to  begin  with.  Rut  it  takes  some  time 
 before  the  change  either  in  style  or  thought  is  marked. 
 The  earlier  Reformers  write  in  the  style  of  their  scholastic 
 predecessors,  and  the  transition  from  the  scholastic  writers 
 is  a  much  more  gradual  process  than  we  are  apt  to  assume. 
 Something  the  same  holds  good,  too,  with  more  popular 
 literature.  The  exact  connection  between  Lollard  and 
 early  sixteenth-century  tracts  has  yet  to  be  investigated ; 
 there  are  curious  likenesses  which  may  be  nothing  more. 
 Tindal  has  a  ring  of  Purvey,  there  is  much  common  to  them 
 in  disposition,  but  it  is  impossible  to  prove  a  literary  con¬ 
 nection.  Nevertheless,  Lollard  tracts  were  reprinted  and 
 adapted — especially  about  the  period  1530-60 — and  the 
 object  of  re-issue  was  to  show  that  the  opinions  of  the 
 Reformers  were  not  novel.  So  far  were  the  revolutionists 
 of  the  age  from  wishing  to  appear  revolutionary.  But 
 save  for  the  claim,  in  some  cases  only  the  pretensions, 
 to  scholarship  there  is  no  abrupt  change  as  we  pass  from 
 the  tracts  of  the  one  age  to  those  of  the  other. 
 
 The  control  of  Lutheranism  soon  passed  from  the  theo¬ 
 logians  to  the  princes.  Zwinglianism — a  much  more 
 radical  force — had  shown  itself,  but  after  the  second 
 peace  of  Kappel  (1531)  had  lost  its  power;  it  had  aimed 
 at  large  political  combinations  and  failed.  Lutheranism 
 and  the  Catholic  reaction  divided  Switzerland  between 
 them  until  the  appearance  of  Calvinism.  Calvin  cared 
 little  about  the  practice  of  States  or  the  force  of  tradi¬ 
 tion  :  he  cared  much  for  what  he  knew  to  be  the  law  of 
 God ;  he  had  no  doubt  about  the  right  of  the  Christian 
 Church  to  dictate  and  to  legislate.  It  is  needless  here 
 to  discuss  the  differences  between  French  and  Scottish 
 Calvinism;  it  is  enough  to  note  that  Calvin’s  theories 
 and  legislation  have  a  clearness  and  consistency  lacking 
 to  Luther’s.  The  appeal  to  Scripture,  the  appeal  to  the 
 individual  conscience,  become  clearer,  they  are  disen¬ 
 tangled  from  the  reaction  against  existing  usage  which 
 directed  Zwinglianism,  and  from  the  submission  to  the 
 
190  LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 civil  power  which  dominated  Lutheranism.  When  the 
 first  half  of  the  sixteenth  century  is  over  the  religious  and 
 political  situations  are  clearer. 
 
 Up  to  that  time  it  is  easy  to  see  what  forces  are  work¬ 
 ing,  but  it  is  hard  to  say  what  their  final  effect  will  be. 
 When  we  reach  the  time  after  the  last  sessions  of  the 
 Council  of  Trent  this  is  easier  to  foretell.  Men  and  things 
 are  settling  down,  and  settling  down  apart  from  each 
 other.  The  earlier  years  of  the  century  upon  which  so 
 much  stress  is  often  laid  are  not  then  those  in  which  the 
 broad  lines  are  permanently  laid  down.  They  are  followed 
 by  a  period  of  interaction,  of  years  in  which  men  modify 
 their  views  in  one  direction  or  another,  as  did  some  lead¬ 
 ing  Humanists,  and  sometimes  pass  from  one  roughly 
 marked  off  group  to  another  group  of  the  same  kind. 
 They  are  years  in  which  permanent  division  is  not  a 
 certainty ;  rearrangement  and  compromise  are  in  the 
 air.  Then,  roughly  about  the  year  1570,  conditions  change, 
 the  atmosphere  clears,  and  the  divisions,  tentatively  and 
 hesitatingly  formed,  become  sharply  marked,  inevitable 
 and  apparently  permanent.  We  have  finally  reached  a 
 new  age. 
 
 The  third,  not  the  first,  quarter,  then,  of  the  sixteenth 
 century  is  that  in  which  lasting  divisions  are  finally  made. 
 In  one  of  his  earlier  essays,  Ranke  asserted  that  until 
 somewhere  about  1560-70  there  was  a  possibility  of 
 religious  unity,  that  the  divisions  and  separations  begun 
 and  threatened  before  that  time  were  not  held  by  men 
 to  be  irreparable  and  permanent.  And  Ranke  did  not 
 suffer  from  this  assertion  as  the  great  scholar  Schomann 
 did  from  one  of  his  earlier  theories  about  the  Athenian 
 Constitution.  He  had  changed  his  mind  and  come 
 to  condemn  his  earlier  belief.  Rut  fifty  years  later  he 
 still  found  men  repeating  his  earlier  opinions  in  spite  of 
 his  own  recantation.  Ranke  never  needed  to  change 
 his  opinion,  and  all  investigation  has  shown,  as  happened 
 often  with  his  trained  conjectures,  how  true  and  enlight¬ 
 ening  his  opinion  was. 
 
CONTINUITY  THROUGHOUT  REFORMATION  19 1 
 
 Political  conditions  throughout  the  century  had  great 
 effect  both  for  and  against  unity.  Both  the  Imperial  and 
 Habsburg  interests  demanded  internal  unity  in  Germany. 
 This  had  been  seen  by  Charles  V,  and  he  had  striven  to 
 reach  it  first  by  the  assembly  of  a  council,  national  if  not 
 ecumenical,  and  then  at  a  later  stage  (1547)  by  the  use 
 of  force.  He,  like  Elizabeth  of  England,  had  thrust  upon 
 him  the  task  of  gaining  unity  and  sought  to  gain  it  in  ways 
 like  hers.  The  essentials  of  unity  were  a  reform  of  abuses 
 and  some  measure  of  agreement  in  doctrine.  The  latter 
 was  the  more  difficult  to  bring  about,  but  even  here 
 something  was  done,  especially  in  the  discussions  which 
 preceded  the  Diet  at  Regensburg  (April  1541).  We  may 
 pass  over  the  details,  interesting  as  they  are  in  connection 
 with  the  history  of  doctrine,  and  significant  as  they  are 
 of  tendencies  easily  overlooked.  It  was  possible  to  take 
 very  different  views  upon  the  doctrine  of  justification 
 by  faith,  around  which  lay  the  most  formidable  of  the 
 obstacles  to  be  overcome.  There  had  been  many  elements 
 in  the  mediaeval  view,  and  what  was  now  needed  was  a 
 broad  comprehensive  statement  combining  the  varied 
 truths  which  theologians  saw  singly  and  sometimes 
 alone,  a  definition  aiming  at  truth  by  inclusion  of  what¬ 
 ever  was  partly  true,  and  not  by  exclusion  of  whatever 
 was  partly  mistaken.  This  was  the  task  which  the  medi¬ 
 ating  school  of  theologians  had  set  themselves.  They 
 could  justify  themselves  by  the  discussions  of  the  past; 
 their  difficulties  lay  with  the  present.  It  was  the  same 
 task  which  the  great  Cappadocian  Fathers  had  set  them¬ 
 selves  in  the  age  after  Nicjea,  and  they  approached  it 
 somewhat  in  the  same  spirit. 
 
 The  general  Lutheran  view  laid  stress  upon  individual 
 salvation,  upon  the  grace  of  Christ;  the  risk  of  this  view 
 lay  in  separating  spiritual  belief  from  holiness  of  life. 
 Upon  the  other  side  it  was  easy  to  lay  stress  upon  the 
 interests  of  practical  holiness  and  upon  man’s  own  work. 
 If  this  were  done  too  exclusively  the  work  of  Christ  might 
 be  depreciated,  and  here  was  the  risk  upon  this  side. 
 
192 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 Gropper,  who  prepared  the  Liber  Ratisbonensis  for  a 
 basis  of  discussion,  strongly  asserted  justification  by 
 faith,  even  by  faith  alone  :  the  righteousness  of  Christ  was 
 imputed  to  man,  and  on  this  platform  he  reached  a  new 
 and  inherent  righteousness  which  worked  itself  out  in 
 charity.”  The  need  of  divine  grace,  and  the  need  of 
 a  holy  life,  were  thus  combined — and  this  twofold  justi¬ 
 fication  became  the  definition  of  the  mediating  Catholics. 
 Eck,  although  he  finally  signed  the  definition,  and  Luther, 
 who  was  consulted,  thought  it  utterly  bad.  But  the 
 view  of  Luther  was  different  from  that  of  Melanchthon. 
 Melanchthon  had  indeed  shaped  the  definition,  and  he  was 
 satisfied  with  the  superior  place  given  to  faith  over  merit. 
 But  Luther  had  by  this  time  become  hopeless  of  unity, 
 and  indeed  was  convinced  that  the  Pope  was  Antichrist. 
 The  Legate  Contarini  represented  the  reforming  Italian 
 school,  and  he,  too,  had  long  been  a  supporter  of  justi¬ 
 fication  by  faith ;  his  own  views  have  been  variously 
 interpreted  but  might  be  reconciled  with  those  of 
 Aquinas.  The  new  definition  was,  he  thought,  capable 
 of  a  Catholic  interpretation,  and  indeed,  like  most  de¬ 
 finitions,  much  depended  upon  the  prepossessions  of 
 those  who  examined  it. 
 
 The  Consistory  at  Rome,  however,  was  not  satisfied 
 as  easily  as  Contarini,  and  the  compromise  was  rejected. 
 At  the  Council  of  Trent  (Sixth  Session,  January  1547)  the 
 same  doctrine  Avas  defined  in  a  decree  which  Harnack 
 calls  “  a  product  of  art,  remarkably  well  constructed,” 
 and  which,  had  it  been  formulated  earlier,  might  have 
 prevented  the  divisions  of  the  Reformation.  This  decree 
 was  shaped  largely  by  the  influence  of  the  Jesuits,  Laynez 
 and  Salmcron ;  against  them  Seripando,  General  of  the 
 Augustinian  friars,  agreed  almost  alone  Avith  the  Regens¬ 
 burg  definition.  He  represented  the  Augustinian  revival 
 in  Germany,  Avhich  had  changed  the  friars  of  that  order, 
 and  Avas  really  based  upon  the  study  of  their  patron  saint. 
 But  he  found  few  folloAvers  at  Trent,  Avhere  there  were 
 many  theologians  more  concerned  Avith  the  approval  of 
 
CONTINUITY  THROUGHOUT  REFORMATION  193 
 
 what  existed  and  the  condemnation  of  heresies  than  with 
 the  prospects  of  peace.  No  sketch,  however,  of  Reforma¬ 
 tion  doctrine — needed  as  it  is  for  Reformation  history — is 
 adequate  if  it  overlooks  the  work  of  the  “  mediating 
 theologians.”  Their  historical  significance  was  great 
 even  if  their  effectiveness  was  small.  But  until  they 
 had  made  their  attempt  and  failed,  it  cannot  be  said  that 
 the  issues  of  the  Reformation  were  clear.  Men  of  their 
 day,  at  any  rate  these  theologians  themselves,  were  not 
 sure  that  reforming  doctrines,  even  those  upon  justifica¬ 
 tion,  must  lead  to  a  lasting  division  or  would  justify  its 
 rightfulness.  Here  again  we  can  only  judge  truly  if  we 
 take  our  stand  late  on  in  the  century. 
 
 If  the  external  history  of  the  Lutherans,  and  the  general 
 sweep  of  Reformation  history  suffer  from  the  neglect  of 
 the  events  and  tendencies  just  noticed,  it  is  also  true  that 
 the  internal  history  suffers  likewise.  Zwinglians,  looking 
 back  to  a  leader  who  represented  the  Renaissance  and 
 rationalism;  Calvinists,  sprung  from  the  French  Biblical 
 movement,  and  the  influence  of  a  great  systematic  theo¬ 
 logian;  and  Lutherans,  were  discordant.  The  Lutherans 
 always  asserted  that  they  had  made  no  break  with 
 Catholic  doctrine  :  the  attempt  to  prove  this  coloured  the 
 Confession  of  Augsburg — the  first  draft  of  which  was  called 
 an  Apology,  and  which  Luther  spoke  of  by  that  name. 
 The  object  was  to  make  the  new  departure  in  doctrine 
 seem  as  slight  as  possible.  The  Zwinglians,  upon  the 
 other  hand,  were  not  disturbed  by  accusations  of  a  new 
 departure,  and  the  Calvinists — the  growing  body — relied 
 more  on  theological  system  and  the  Bible  than  upon 
 the  consent  of  the  past.  The  Augsburg  Confession  ex¬ 
 cluded  the  Zwinglians,  and  sacramental  doctrine  *  threat¬ 
 ened  permanently  to  divide  the  new  bodies  among  them¬ 
 selves.  The  Wittenberg  Concord  (1535)  was  a  sign  of 
 growing  unity;  the  followers  of  the  Augsburg  Confession 
 and  the  ministers  in  the  Oberland  under  Bucer  (who  was 
 restless  unless  he  was  engaged  in  diplomacy)  drew  together, 
 
 and  the  process  went  on.  From  the  side  of  the  State 
 o 
 
194 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 the  Augsburg  and  Leipzig  Interims — provisional  arrange¬ 
 ments  of  a  kind  both  in  worship  and  doctrine  which  it 
 was  hoped  all  might  accept — had  the  same  intention.  The 
 real  strength  of  Melanchthon,  too,  lay  in  what  is  so  often 
 held  his  weakness — namely,  his  readiness  to  seek  peace 
 and  ensue  it.  There  had  been  (as  Humbert  points  out  in 
 his  Les  Origines  de  la  Thgologie  Moderne,  just  lately  placed 
 upon  the  Index)  from  the  first  a  difference  between  him 
 and  Luther  :  he  had  been  an  admirer  of  St.  Jerome  rather 
 than  of  St.  Augustine,  at  heart  a  follower  of  Erasmus 
 (or  at  any  rate  of  his  own  kinsman  Reuchlin)  as  much 
 as  of  Luther.  The  debate  on  the  Adiaphora  was  one  that 
 would  hardly  have  suggested  itself  to  Luther,  and  he  would 
 never  in  his  later  years  have  been  ready  with  Melanchthon 
 to  accept  a  limited  papal  supremacy.  The  Formula  of  Con¬ 
 cord  (1577)  was  not  in  itself  an  ending  of  strife,  for  if  it 
 bound  together  many,  it  shut  out  all  others,  and  bitter  con¬ 
 troversies  also  arose  as  to  its  meaning.  But  it  was  the  end 
 of  a  long  process,  during  which  tendencies  towards  union 
 and  towards  distinction  had  become  less  confused.  After 
 its  appearance  it  was  possible  to  tell  more  exactly  what 
 Lutheranism  stood  for,  and  where  it  stood. 
 
 The  history  which  begins  with  Luther’s  95  Theses  is  only 
 consistent  and  complete  if  it  is  carried  up  to  the  Formula 
 of  Concord.  For  that  sums  up  the  history  of  Lutheran¬ 
 ism,  and  it  further  expresses  the  fact  that  Calvinism, 
 “  the  Reformed  ”  religion,  stood  over  against  it.  There 
 was,  as  Lord  Acton  pointed  out,  this  difference  between 
 them :  44  Lutheranism  was  governed,  not  by  the  spiritual 
 but  by  the  temporal  power  in  agreement  with  the  high 
 conception  of  the  State  which  Luther  derived  from  the 
 long  conflict  of  the  Middle  Ages.”  This  gave  it  a  hold 
 upon  Germany  where  the  civil  power  was  strong,  and  the 
 States  were  many.  But  44  by  its  lack  of  independence 
 and  flexibility  it  was  unfitted  to  succeed  where  governments 
 were  hostile,  or  to  make  its  way  by  voluntary  effort.” 
 Politicians  utilised  and  controlled  the  Reformation  move¬ 
 ment  in  Germany  much  as  they  tried  to  do  in  England, 
 
CONTINUITY  THROUGHOUT  REFORMATION  195 
 
 until  the  school  of  Laud  on  the  one  hand  and  the  Puritans 
 on  the  other  proved  too  strong.  Then  Calvinism,  strong 
 in  organisation  where  Lutheranism  was  weak,  arose, 
 and,  with  the  spread  of  Calvinism  in  the  second  half  of 
 the  sixteenth  century,  the  Reformation  took  its  final 
 course. 
 
 But  the  final  shape  of  the  Reformation  was  moulded 
 as  much  from  the  papal  side  as  from  the  other.  Looking 
 at  the  Papacy  solely  from  the  historic  side,  it  represents 
 a  purely  Western  growth.  It  comes  forth  from  the  dim 
 background  of  early  Church  organisation  as  the  heir  of 
 Imperial  traditions,  and  as  a  centre  of  unity  for  the 
 barbarian  conquerors.  After  the  fall  of  the  Empire  in 
 the  West  there  comes  the  long  reign  of  Feudalism — a 
 time  in  which  the  Teutonic  peoples  partly  preserved, 
 partly  recovered,  the  spiritual  and  intellectual  heritage 
 of  the  ancient  world.  The  feudal  society  as  it  grew  was  a 
 framework  to  protect  the  ideas  of  the  past;  in  law  and  in 
 politics  the  principles  of  Roman  Law  and  of  Imperialism 
 were  thus  kept  or  recovered.  There  has  been  in  England, 
 since  Bryce  on  the  one  hand  first  taught  us  the  per¬ 
 manence  of  the  Empire,  and  his  friend  Freeman  first  taught 
 us  on  the  other  hand  not  to  blush  for  our  Teutonic  fore¬ 
 fathers,  a  tendency  to  keep  the  Roman  and  the  Teutonic 
 elements  apart  from  each  other  in  our  minds.  But  the  days 
 of  feudalism  were  the  days  in  which  under  the  solvent 
 power  of  the  atmosphere  they  were  welded  together.  The 
 same  process  was  needed,  the  same  process  went  on,  in 
 the  Church.  We  are  a  little  apt  to  smile  at  the  records 
 of  wholesale  conversions,  whole  tribes,  whole  nations, 
 bending  themselves  before  the  Cross,  not  always  with 
 a  clear  conviction  of  what  it  meant  or  what  they  did. 
 But  what  happened  at  any  rate  was  this,  that  they  placed 
 themselves  under  Christianity  as  a  system,  as  a  tutor 
 from  whom  they  were  to  learn.  The  centuries  that 
 follow  from  the  sixth  to  the  eleventh  are  those  in  which 
 their  Teutonic  ideas  and  the  teaching  of  Christianity  are 
 qeing  welded  together.  There  were  dangers  in  the 
 
196 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 process ;  the  kings,  who  sometimes  like  Chlodwig  patron¬ 
 ised  Christianity,  sometimes  like  Henry  III  of  Germany 
 were  devoted  to  Christianity,  were  apt  to  use  this  great 
 influence  for  their  political  or  personal  ends.  There  was  a 
 danger  of  the  “  Germanisation  ”  of  Christianity — a  danger, 
 that  is,  of  the  Germanic  States  and  nobility  using  its  in¬ 
 fluence  for  their  own  secular  ends.  This  was  the  meaning 
 of  the  secularising  and  worldly  influences  which  threatened 
 to  transform  the  Church  in  the  tenth  century.  In  the 
 eleventh  century  came  the  reaction ;  it  took  the  form  of 
 a  campaign  against  simony  and  lay  influence — culminating 
 in  the  struggle  upon  Investitures  :  it  was  an  assertion  of 
 primitive  principles  of  Church  organisation,  of  the  Church’s 
 right  to  self-government,  and  in  a  feudal  age  it  took  the 
 form  of  a  feudal  organisation,  although  it  was  able  to 
 appeal  to  primitive  precedents  of  varying  value.  This 
 was  what  lay  behind  the  Papacy  of  Gregory  VII ;  it  set  up 
 a  feudal  form  of  authority  in  the  Church  but  it  was  an 
 expression  in  feudal  language  of  permanent  principles. 
 Here  we  have  the  feudal  stage  of  Western  Christianity; 
 and  just  as  feudalism  preserved  in  politics  principles  that 
 were  of  first-rate  importance  which  without  feudalism 
 might  have  been  forgotten,  so  the  feudal  stage  of  Western 
 Christianity  preserved  for  the  world  the  principles  of 
 spiritual  freedom  and  Christian  unity  which  without  their 
 assertion  in  a  feudalised  form  might  have  been  completely 
 lost.  This  is  what  the  mediaeval  Papacy  had  stood  for, 
 with  many  exaggerations  and  many  mistakes ;  but  what 
 was  to  happen  when  the  feudal  period  passed  away  ? 
 
 Not  all  critics  of  the  Papacy  and  of  the  abuses  which 
 clustered  round  it  had  demanded  the  abolition  of  the 
 Papacy,  or  had  seen  in  its  destruction  an  essential  of  re¬ 
 form.  Even  Wyclif  in  his  final  criticisms  of  the  Papacy, 
 although  he  held  its  workings  Antichristian,  would  have 
 preferred  a  local  headship  for  the  Church,  although  not 
 of  necessity  fixed  at  Rome — since  there  was  no  reason 
 for  the  choice  of  that  special  seat.  But  the  holder  of 
 this  headship  must  be  a  spiritually  minded  man,  a  sue- 
 
CONTINUITY  THROUGHOUT  REFORMATION  197 
 
 cessor  of  St.  Peter  in  life  and  character.  This  conception 
 of  the  Papacy  was  something  like  that  put  forth  in  the 
 days  of  the  Councils,  with  their  talk  of  reformation  in  head 
 and  members  alike.  At  Constance,  where  the  forces  of 
 Nationalism  met  the  discredited  upholders  of  a  divided 
 Papacy,  the  three  theories  of  a  Papacy  governed  by  the 
 Imperial  power,  of  a  Papacy  really  governing  the  Church, 
 and  of  a  limited  Papacy  administering  with  a  council,  all 
 found  supporters.  The  result  of  the  Councils  was  small 
 whether  in  curbing  the  Papacy  or  in  furthering  reform, 
 but  programmes  had  been  laid  down.  There  was  thus  a 
 fluctuating  mass  of  fluid  opinion  which  might  easily 
 crystallise  under  changed  conditions  of  atmosphere. 
 
 At  the  outset  of  the  Reformation  the  Papacy  scarcely 
 took  its  religious  position  seriously;  political  interests, 
 especially  those  concerned  with  Italy,  outweighed  religions. 
 The  short  Papacy  of  Adrian  VI  was,  however,  a  prophecy 
 of  what  might  happen,  and  there  was  a  gradual  deepening 
 of  religious  interest  at  the  papal  court  as  the  century 
 went  on.  Into  the  history  of  that  deepening  it  is  not 
 necessary  to  enter,  but  the  result  was  that  by  the  reign 
 of  Paul  IV  the  moral  tone  of  the  Papacy  was  raised,  and 
 although  the  Curia  was  still  led  by  political  considerations 
 and  still  jealous  of  its  power,  there  was  a  real  wish  to 
 reform  abuses.  But  at  the  same  time  in  matters  of 
 doctrine  and  worship  the  Curia  moved  on  the  whole  away 
 from  the  mediating  party.  At  the  courts  of  the  Empire 
 and  of  France  there  was,  however,  a  readiness  for  some 
 approach  to  the  discontented ;  the  concession  of  the  Chalice 
 to  the  laity,  of  clerical  marriage,  and  of  the  Mass  in  the 
 vulgar  tongue  were  put  forward  as  making  towards  peace. 
 Even  at  the  third  assembly  of  the  Council  of  Trent  these 
 proposals  were  in  the  air,  and  this  fact  is  only  one  of  many 
 showing  a  state  of  opinion  less  fixed  or  sharply  divided 
 than  we  might  suppose.  The  cleavage  of  opinion  was 
 not  complete  or  final  until  after  the  Council  of  Trent. 
 That  not  only  determined  doctrine  in  a  sense  hostile  to 
 the  Reformation,  but  it  left  the  authority  of  the  Papacy 
 
198 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 stronger  than  before.  The  Pope  had  asserted  his  mastery 
 over  the  Council ;  upon  points  where  his  power  was  con¬ 
 cerned  decision  had  been  avoided,  and  many  difficult 
 matters  were  left  to  him  for  discussion.  The  help  of  the 
 new  Jesuit  body  had  done  great  things,  and  the  process 
 by  which  the  Papacy  had  drawn  to  itself  the  powers  of 
 the  Episcopate  was  quickened.  From  the  Council  of 
 Trent  to  the  Council  of  the  Vatican  in  1870  was  a  step 
 easy  to  take  in  logic  even  if  not  necessary  in  doctrine. 
 This  was  the  final  answer  of  the  Roman  Church  to  the 
 new  age ;  a  reassertion  in  an  enlarged  form  of  that  feudal 
 conception  the  mediaeval  Papacy.  The  reassertion  brought 
 along  with  it  antagonism  to  the  new  force  of  individualism  ; 
 this  was  henceforth  to  be  combated  and  not  controlled, 
 to  be  suppressed  rather  than  utilised. 
 
 Another  battle  which  was  really  fought  out  at  Trent, 
 although  nominally  left  drawn,  was  that  between  the  Epis¬ 
 copate  and  the  Papacy.  The  Spanish  bishops  especially 
 had  wished  to  put  on  record  the  Episcopal  claim,  and  with 
 the  help  of  others  from  time  to  time,  they  had  shown  some 
 independence.  But  at  Trent  a  further  step  was  taken  along 
 that  path  by  which  the  Papacy,  in  great  matters  of  state 
 and  in  smaller  things  like  indulgences,  was  drawing  to  itself 
 the  powers  of  the  Episcopate  with  its  primitive  claims 
 and  its  national  or  local  sympathies.  There  was  a  flicker 
 of  the  old  flame  (1763)  in  the  incident  of  Febronius  (which 
 the  Danish  historian  Nielsen  has  so  well  described)  and  in 
 the  Punctation  of  Ems ;  in  later  days,  and  even  at  the 
 Council  of  the  Vatican  in  1870,  there  were  murmurs  of 
 the  same  storm,  which  like  other  storms  has  now  made  its 
 journey  across  the  Atlantic.  The  two  chief  stumbling-blocks 
 of  the  Papacy  to-day  are  the  treatment  of  the  national 
 Episcopates  under  its  obedience  and  of  individualism. 
 Now  and  again  there  are  difficulties  such  as  have  arisen 
 of  late  in  France,  where  an  Episcopate,  less  fettered  and 
 more  independent,  might  have  been  of  more  service  to 
 Church  and  State.  Now  and  again  there  have  been, 
 above  all  in  the  spheres  of  criticism,  of  social  movements 
 
CONTINUITY  THROUGHOUT  REFORMATION  199 
 
 and  of  politics,  cases  in  which  the  Papacy  has  shown  its 
 old  dread  of  individualism.  The  problems  of  reconciling 
 local  liberty  and  central  unity,  corporate  life  and  in¬ 
 dividual  freedom,  are  by  no  means  new.  The  Papal 
 solution  reached  in  the  sixteenth  century  and  put  on  record 
 at  Trent,  was  the  suppression  so  far  as  was  possible  of  one 
 element  in  each  case ;  since  then  the  repetition  of  the  same 
 formula  whether  by  Pope  or  by  Council  has  possibly  made 
 for  strength  but  at  the  cost  of  freedom. 
 
 But  the  full  meaning  of  these  decisions  is  not  seen  if 
 the  Counter-Reformation  be  viewed  simply  as  a  reaction 
 against  the  Reformation  :  it  was  rather  a  manifestation 
 within  the  Church  of  that  new  life  and  vigour  which  had 
 begun  to  stir  in  the  Middle  Ages,  and  which  outside  the 
 Church  or  in  opposition  to  it  had  resulted  in  the  Protestant 
 movement.  After  Trent  the  Roman  Church  had  a  higher 
 ideal  and  greater  efficiency,  and  the  success  of  the  Counter- 
 Reformation  was  partly  a  sign  of  the  inherent  strength 
 of  the  Papacy,  partly  a  sign  of  the  new  vigour  of  religious 
 life.  To  judge  of  the  movement  as  a  whole  we  have  to 
 take  the  sixteenth  century  into  one  broad  view,  and  it  is 
 only  when  we  reach  its  last  quarter  that  we  are  conscious 
 of  the  change  in  atmosphere,  and  can  feel  the  power  of 
 forces  which  had  begun  their  work  more  than  a  century 
 before.  This  is  the  significance  of  the  rise  of  the  Jesuits. 
 Here  again  we  have  to  trace  a  growth  rather  than  search 
 for  a  sudden  creation.  The  creative  energy  of  Loyola 
 was  no  doubt  great,  but  the  inner  history  of  his  society 
 reveals  perhaps  as  much  the  skill  of  his  successor  Laynez 
 as  it  does  the  conception  of  the  founder;  the  one, 
 however,  is  often  passed  over,  while  the  other  is  possibly 
 exaggerated.  This  is  inevitable  if  we  limit  ourselves  too 
 closely  to  the  earlier  years  of  the  century.  Once  more 
 the  importance  of  its  later  years  is  borne  upon  us.  There 
 are  few  histories  more  fascinating  than  that  of  the  great 
 society  which  reconquered  so  much  of  the  world  for  the 
 Papacy,  and  almost  conquered  the  Papacy  itself.  With 
 wonderful  skill  it  trained  and  disciplined  individuals  to 
 
200 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 be  at  the  disposal  of  an  impersonal  system;  it  seized  the 
 benefits  and  it  escaped  the  risks  of  the  new  force  which 
 had  begun  to  change  the  world.  In  one  sense  it  was  an 
 adaptation  of  what  was  new,  of  individualism  and  of  the 
 new  educational  .theories  of  the  Renaissance ;  in  another 
 sense  the  society  itself  was  formed  on  the  lines  of  the 
 past  and  was  an  outcome  of  the  older  world.  If  we  wish, 
 then,  to  understand  the  sixteenth  century  it  must  even  in 
 this  case  be  looked  at  more  as  a  whole ;  it  must  be  looked 
 at  more  as  moulded  and  inspired  by  the  age  before  it.  In 
 the  case  of  England  we  have  come,  thanks  to  many 
 teachers,  to  see  in  the  reign  of  Elizabeth  the  years  of 
 settlement,  the  time  when  the  religious  forces  have  taken 
 their  final  form,  and  chosen  their  true  directions.  The 
 historical  problem  is  not,  of  course,  solved  when  those 
 are  seen,  but  its  conditions  and  nature  can  be  known. 
 The  Reformation  becomes  for  us  a  process,  and  not  a 
 crisis :  a  stage  in  the  gradual  growth  of  man,  neither  an 
 interruption  as  some  would  have  it,  nor  a  new  creation 
 as  others  would  call  it. 
 
 This  is  the  historical  view  of  the  Reformation  for  which 
 we  must  plead.  When  we  take  it  as  a  study  in  origins, 
 as  a  study  in  forces  and  movements,  we  escape  something 
 of  the  bitterness,  even  if  we  lose  something  of  the 
 certainty,  which  is  bound  up  with  parties,  and  the 
 names  of  leaders.  We  cannot,  if  we  take  this  view,  agree 
 with  the  judgment  of  the  great  master  Harnack — that 
 the  history  of  doctrine  ends  with  Luther.  We  can  judge 
 more  calmly  what  it  was  he  stood  for,  and  we  can  realise 
 what  has  been  sometimes  gained,  sometimes  lost,  since  he 
 made  himself  the  symbol  of  the  individual  conscience, 
 the  symbol  of  a  nation’s  cause.  We  think  we  can  see 
 what  he  saw  so  clearly,  and  that  we  can  also  see  things 
 that  he  overlooked.  To  do  this  makes  for  calmness,  and 
 it  makes  for  growth. 
 
 To  gain  these  it  is  not  needful  to  lessen  in  any  way  the 
 greatness  of  the  Reformation,  to  over-estimate  or  to  under¬ 
 estimate  the  gains  that  it  made  and  the  risks  that  it  ran. 
 
CONTINUITY  THROUGHOUT  REFORMATION  201 
 
 But  as  we  study  the  forces  that  shaped  it,  and  see  the 
 incidents,  sometimes  the  accidents,  above  all  the  never- 
 ceasing  influences  of  politics,  that  forced  or  that  blocked 
 its  path,  we  must  ask  ourselves  if  its  absolute  finality  is 
 not  sometimes  asserted  too  emphatically.  It  was  the  out¬ 
 come  of  the  Middle  Ages ;  it  was  the  beginning  of  systems 
 under  which  we  live.  But  there  are  signs  that  mediaeval 
 views  of  life,  formerly  shut  out  too  hastily,  have  a  charm 
 for  us  to-day,  and  may  have  a  real  power  for  the  men  of 
 to-morrow.  St.  Francis  has  begun  to  live  for  us  again, 
 when  the  merchants  who  elbowed  him  aside  are  leaving 
 something  more  of  life  to  the  common  man  :  we  under¬ 
 stand  the  mediaeval  love  for  the  corporate  life  although 
 we  can  never  forget  the  Reformation’s  lesson  of  individual 
 power.  In  the  history  of  Christianity  the  obvious  has 
 a  way  of  disappearing,  assumptions  change  their  dress, 
 and  opposites  merge  themselves  in  a  larger  truth.  To 
 foretell  the  future  is  happily  impossible,  but  to  know  truly 
 and  see  fully  the  past  with  all  its  forces  and  all  its  life,  is  to 
 be  ready  for  any  future  that  God  in  His  mercy  may  send 
 us.  It  may  be  the  fortune  of  that  future  to  place  together 
 principles  of  life,  fragments  of  truth,  which  the  actors  in 
 the  Reformation  thought  it  impossible  to  join,  which 
 even  to  us  seem  far  apart.  The  process  of  history  is  the 
 working  of  God. 
 
ESSAY  VII 
 
 THE  AUTHORITY  OF  JESUS  CHRIST  IN  EARLY 
 CHRISTIAN  LITERATURE 
 
 Riifv.  Prof.  H.  H.  Scullard,  M.A.,  D.D. 
 
SYNOPSIS 
 
 The  Lordship  of  Jesus  Christ  the  central  fact  in  Christianity — How 
 conceived  in  the  New  Testament — Purpose  of  the  essay  to  show  how  far 
 that  authority  was  confessed,  interpreted,  or  obscured  by  Church  writers 
 in  the  second  century — The  testimony  of  Eastern  writers. 
 
 I.  J ewish  Christian. 
 
 The  Didache.  “  Want  of  interest  in  our  Lord’s  humanity  ” — The 
 authority  of  the  prophet — The  deepest  appeal  to  conscience  wanting. 
 
 The  Odes  of  Solomon.  Mystical  devotion  to  an  incarnate  Lord — Yet 
 the  name  of  Jesus  never  mentioned. 
 
 The  Clementine  Recognitions.  The  eternal  Christ — The  atonement 
 ignored — Jesus  as  prophet — Function  of  reason — Authority  of  tradition. 
 
 II.  Syrian. 
 
 Ignatius.  Pauline  and  un-Pauline  elements — Meaning  of  Christian 
 discipleship — The  Sacraments  and  the  Church — The  authority  of  the  bishop 
 — Interim  legislation — The  work  of  the  Holy  Spirit. 
 
 Theophilus.  Confused  view  of  inspiration — Defective  notions  concern¬ 
 ing  the  Holy  Spirit — No  reference  to  the  Incarnation  and  work  of  Jesus 
 Christ. 
 
 III.  Greece  and  Asia  Minor. 
 
 The  Athenian  Apologists.  Quadratus.  “  The  father  of  the  historical 
 method  in  Christian  evidences.”  Aristides.  Authority  of  Jesus  Christ 
 attested  by  “  the  holy  gospel  writing  ”  and  the  lives  of  Christians.  Epistle 
 to  Diognetus.  The  Deity  of  Christ  and  His  atoning  work  emphasised,  but 
 not  His  humanity.  Athenagoras.  Crude  theological  statements — Mechan¬ 
 ical  views  of  inspiration — The  Gospel  facts  ignored — Teaching  of  the  Logos 
 not  confined  to  the  Scriptures. 
 
 The  Corinthian  writers.  Dionysius — Second  Epistle  of  Clement. 
 
 Papias.  Traditionalist  and  literalist. 
 
 Polycarp.  Does  not  claim  apostolic  authority — No  reference  to  the 
 Holy  Spirit — Testimony  to  the  facts  of  the  Gospel — The  words  and  example 
 and  truth  of  the  Lord — Authority  of  Christ  rested  upon  His  Person  and 
 Work — No  mention  of  bishops. 
 
 Melito.  Deity  and  humanity  of  Christ  confessed,  but  the  appeal  of  the 
 Incarnation  not  sufficiently  ethical. 
 
 Justin  Martyr.  Authority  of  Jesus  Christ  as  Teacher — The  Word — 
 The  final  Law — Reference  to  the  earthly  life  of  Jesus — Influence  of  Greek 
 thought — Contrasted  with  his  disciple  Tatian. 
 
 IV.  Alexandria. 
 
 Epistle  of  Barnabas.  The  Deity  of  Jesus  Christ,  and  His  atonement 
 central — Humanity  of  Jesus  not  clearly  taught — The  teaching  of  the  Lord 
 in  the  Church — Gnosis  and  faith.  Epistle  to  Diognetus.  The  Word  still 
 teaches  men — The  true  knowledge  witnessed  to  by  life.  Clement.  The 
 Word  revealed  (a)  in  heathen  literature ;  (6)  in  Scripture ;  (c)  in  the  Church ; 
 Clement’s  view  of  the  Church  and  ministry ;  (d)  in  the-individual  Christian. 
 The  Word  recognised  by  faith — Was  Clement  a  rationalist  or  pragmatist? — 
 The  justification  of  obedience — The  evangelical  appeal — Defects  in  Cle¬ 
 ment’s  teaching — Gnosticism  and  Montanism — “Nothing  visible  is  eternal.” 
 
THE  AUTHORITY  OF  JESUS  CHRIST  IN  EARLY 
 
 CHRISTIAN  LITERATURE 
 
 It  is  the  object  of  this  essay  not  so  much  to  discuss 
 the  important  question  of  our  Lord’s  authority  in  early 
 Christian  writings,  as  to  allow  the  writers  to  speak  for  them¬ 
 selves,  and  to  suggest  some  points  of  view  from  which  the 
 evidence  may  be  regarded.  In  order  to  do  this,  it  will 
 be  necessary  to  leave  unsaid  many  things,  which  possibly 
 the  reader  will  think  ought  to  have  been  added,  and  which 
 certainly  the  writer  would  have  been  disposed  to  say,  if 
 it  had  been  his  purpose  either  to  adopt  a  position  or  to  meet 
 an  objector.  The  chief  aim,  then,  will  be  to  pass  in  review 
 the  testimonies  of  various  second-century  writers  to  the 
 authority  of  Jesus  Christ,  in  order  to  indicate  as  far  as  may 
 be  possible  the  ways  in  which  that  authority  was  confessed, 
 interpreted,  or  obscured.  To  do  this  at  all  fairly  within 
 the  limits  of  this  essay,  it  has  seemed  necessary  to  make 
 a  selection,  and  we  shall  confine  attention  to  the  various 
 Eastern  groups.  It  is  interesting  to  see  what  contribution 
 or  contributions  were  made  by  the  East  to  this  subject, 
 though  for  a  full  discussion  of  the  problems  raised  the 
 extremely  important  witness  of  Clement  of  Rome,  Irenaeus 
 and  Tertullian,  among  others,  would  be  essential.  Ter- 
 tullian,  in  particular,  is  specially  interesting  as  furnishing 
 in  himself  an  epitome  of  second-century  modes  of  thought. 
 Almost  all  tendencies  meet  in  him.  His  own  impressionable 
 and  versatile  mind  enabled  him  to  reflect,  though  not  to 
 harmonise,  conflicting  points  of  view.  Those  who  plead 
 the  authority  of  nature  and  those  who  look  upon  its  dictates 
 with  cynical  contempt  may  find  something  to  support 
 
 their  positions  in  Tertullian’s  works.  Those  who  disparage 
 
 205 
 
206 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 reason  and  philosophy  will  find  an  ally  in  him,  but  so  also 
 will  those  who  deny  that  sin  has  quenched  the  light  of 
 reason  and  that  Stoicism  contained  no  fragments  of  the 
 truth.  Those  who  attach  great  weight  to  the  authority 
 of  tradition  will  find  a  stalwart  champion  of  their  views  in 
 Tertullian,  but  so  also  will  those  who  believe  that  one  good 
 custom  may  corrupt  the  world.  No  one  did  more  in  his 
 day  to  support  the  authority  of  the  Church,  so  that  his 
 uncritical  disciple  Cyprian,  concentrating  attention  only 
 on  one  side  of  his  teaching,  was  delighted  to  call  him 
 44  Master  ” ;  but  no  man  more  successfully  undermined  the 
 ground  upon  which  the  disciple  took  his  stand.  Materialist 
 and  spiritualist,  Catholic  and  Montanist,  rationalist  and 
 simple  believer,  sticklers  for  precedent  and  bold  adventur¬ 
 ous  spirits,  legalists  and  44  new  prophets,”  may  all  adorn 
 their  arguments  with  pithy  quotations  from  the  writings 
 of  the  fiery  Carthaginian.  But  it  is  hardly  possible  to  do 
 justice  to  the  Eastern  writers  if  we  include  within  these 
 narrow  limits  a  survey  also  of  the  West.1 
 
 Most  readers  of  the  New  Testament  will,  I  think,  agree 
 that  the  essence  of  Christianity  in  the  first  age  consisted, 
 according  to  its  exponents,  in  a  sincere,  intelligent  and 
 practical  acknowledgment  of  the  Lordship  of  Jesus  Christ. 
 Nothing  appears  to  have  impressed  the  hearers  of  Jesus 
 more  than  the  authority  with  which  He  spoke  and  acted ; 
 and  both  in  the  Synoptic  Gospels  and  in  the  fourth  Gospel 
 Jesus' is  represented  as  laying  claim  to  authority  of  a  most 
 remarkable  and  absolute  character.  That  authority  was 
 felt  from  the  first,  and  was  due  to  the  indefinable  influence 
 of  the  divinely-human  personality  of  Jesus;  but  it  pro¬ 
 duced  a  sufficiently  intelligent  and  established  conviction 
 only  through  the  facts  of  the  Gospel  and  the  illumination 
 of  the  Holy  Spirit.  The  Spirit  was  promised  by  Jesus, 
 according  to  the  fourth  Gospel,  as  an  abiding  possession 
 to  lead  all  Christians  into  the  truth,  and  to  make  His 
 presence  and  authority  a  constant,  living  and  operative 
 
 1  I  am  the  more  disposed  to  select  the  East  as  I  have  incidentally  dealt 
 with  Western  opinion  in  Christian  Ethics  in  the  West. 
 
EARLY  CHRISTIAN  LITERATURE 
 
 207 
 
 fact.1  The  Acts  of  the  Apostles  shows  us  how  perfectly 
 that  promise  was  fulfilled ;  the  Holy  Spirit  not  simply  in¬ 
 dicating  in  general  how  the  Christian’s  life  might  be  ruled 
 by  the  principles  of  Jesus,  but  also  giving  specific  guidance 
 to  individuals  and  communities  with  a  view  to  particular 
 emergencies.  In  the  Epistles  we  have  the  grounds  of  the 
 authority  of  Jesus  Christ  over  the  conscience  still  more 
 fully  revealed,  the  chief  stress  being  laid  upon  the  death 
 and  resurrection  of  Jesus  as  introducing  the  Christian  into 
 a  new  relation  to  God  in  which  every  thought  is  to  be 
 brought  into  captivity  to  the  obedience  of  Jesus  Christ, 
 and,  paradoxical  as  it  may  sound,  perfect  freedom  secured. 
 This  life  in  the  Spirit  is  the  Christian  life.  There  is  no  such 
 thing  as  law  in  the  sense  of  external  or  legal  restraint.  The 
 “  immediacy  and  independence  of  the  religious  life,”  to 
 use  Weinel’s  expression,  was  secured  through  4 4  strict 
 subjection  ”  to  the  authority  of  Jesus.  Every  Christian 
 was  made  to  participate  in  the  same  spirit,  and  every 
 Christian  was  answerable  to  Jesus  Christ  alone.  The 
 rise  of  the  Christian  Churches  as  external  institutions  or 
 groups  of  institutions  threatened  to  alter  the  whole  char¬ 
 acter  of  Christian  obedience,  and  though  some  place  the 
 beginnings  of  this  transformation  within  the  apostolic 
 period,  the  Gospel  which  the  Apostle  Paul  and  others 
 preached  supplied  the  corrective.2  The  authority  even  of 
 an  apostle  was  conditioned  by  the  testimony  of  the  Spirit 
 to  the  individual  and  to  the  society.  The  collective  action 
 of  a  church  possessed  only  so  much  authority  as  the 
 manifest  presence  of  Christ  or  the  consentient  witness  of  the 
 Spirit  gave  it.  Even  in  the  case  of  the  establishment  of 
 the  Corinthian  tribunal  we  need  not  resort  to  the  explana¬ 
 tion  of  Clement  of  Alexandria  to  meet  the  argument  of  the 
 legalist.3  It  was  an  appeal  to  conscience  through  the 
 
 1  (C  For  the  whole  Christian  society,”  Swete,  The  Holy  Spirit  in  the  New 
 Testament ,  p  315  ;  not  merely  for  the  successors  of  the  apostles,  whether 
 in  the  sense  of  Irenaeus  or  of  Clement  of  Alexandria. 
 
 2  Sohm  seems  to  me  to  represent  the  New  Testament  position  more 
 accurately  than  Harnack. 
 
 3  Strom,  vii.  14. 
 
208 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 Holy  Spirit  rather  than  the  exercise  of  an  external  and 
 social  restraint.  There  can  be  no  element  of  legality  in  the 
 decisions  of  the  Spirit  of  God,  even  though  they  find  expres¬ 
 sion  through  the  corporate  life  of  an  external  society,  for 
 that  Spirit  takes  of  the  things  of  Christ  and  reveals  them  to 
 the  believer.  The  relation  is  always  one  of  grace  and  of 
 faith.  The  constraint  of  Christ  is  the  only  perfectly  human, 
 moral  and  rational  interference  with  the  decisions  of  a  man’s 
 own  conscience,  because  the  man  knows  in  the  moment  of 
 acting  that  the  constraint  enables  him  to  express  the  nature 
 which  is  most  truly  his  own. 
 
 We  need  constantly  to  remember  the  kind  of  authority 
 exercised  by  Jesus  Christ,  if  we  are  to  keep  clear  of  the 
 physical,  mechanical  and  heathen  notions  which  so  soon 
 invaded  the  Churches.  Even  Aristotle  and  Plato  are  of 
 little  service  here,  and  Dr.  Illingworth’s  interesting  attempt 
 to  interpret  the  Divine  authority  in  terms  of  Greek  philo¬ 
 sophy  appears  to  the  present  writer  a  serious  misinterpre¬ 
 tation,  both  of  the  Old  Testament  and  New  Testament 
 ideas  of  transcendence.1  It  would  be  very  strange  if  Plato, 
 who  never  raised  the  question  of  the  Divine  personality, 
 and  Aristotle,  whose  discussions  are  so  largely  on  the 
 naturalist  plane,  were  to  prove  trustworthy  guides  in  the 
 interpretation  of  the  grace  of  our  Lord  Jesus  Christ. 
 
 The  whole  question  of  44  delegated  ”  authority  is  too 
 controversial  to  be  discussed  in  a  few  words.  But  what¬ 
 ever  may  be  meant  by  it,  and  if  it  can  in  any  sense  be 
 considered  a  New  Testament  idea,  the  nature  of  that 
 authority,  of  its  expression  and  transmission  must  surely 
 be  made  to  harmonise  with  what  is  known  regarding  the 
 authority  of  the  Lord.  The  authority  of  Jesus  was  not  the 
 authority  of  the  scribe ;  it  was  not  the  authority  of  the 
 great  ones  of  the  earth;  still  less  was  it  the  authority  of 
 mere  physical  force.  It  was  the  appeal  of  truth  to  the 
 conscience,  of  the  perfect,  i.  e.  divine,  personality  to  the 
 imperfect ;  of  the  perfectly  human  to  the  imperfectly 
 human ;  of  the  grace  of  the  Lord  to  the  trust  and  love  and 
 
 1  Divine  Transcendence ,  p.  166, 
 
EARLY  CHRISTIAN  LITERATURE 
 
 209 
 
 gratitude  and  honour  of  the  servant.  To  suppose  that 
 that  authority  can  be  44  delegated  ”  to,  and  transmitted 
 through  men  of  immoral  lives  and  ungracious  spirit  appears 
 to  reduce  Christianity  not  simply  to  an  immoral  but  an 
 irrational  religion,  and  the  present  writer  at  least  can  find 
 no  trace  of  any  such  teaching  in  the  New  Testament.  It 
 is  only  those  in  whom  God  is  pleased  to  reveal  His  Son  who 
 can  in  any  way  express  and  interpret  the  mysteries  of  the 
 Divine  Grace,  or  truly  fulfil  the  office  of  minister,  whether 
 of  bishop,  priest  or  deacon,  or  any  other  office  which 
 depends  upon  the  endowment  of  the  Spirit.  No  man  can 
 act  with  the  authority  of  Christ  unless  he  is  possessed  with 
 the  Spirit  of  Christ.  It  is  not  by  the  episcopate  that 
 44  God’s  authoritative  hold  upon  the  world  through  Christ  ” 
 has  been  made  possible  or  actual,1  but  by  the  Spirit  who  has 
 distributed  to  every  man  severally  as  He  will.  This  at 
 least  is  what  I  find  in  the  New  Testament.  And  it  is  simply 
 stated  here  by  way  of  introduction  to  the  facts  and  testi¬ 
 monies  which  follow. 
 
 Only  one  word  more  of  preface  perhaps  is  necessary.  It 
 is  not  from  the  literature  alone  that  a  conviction  of  the 
 reality  of  Christ’s  authority  over  the  men  of  the  second 
 century  is  to  be  gained.  The  testimony  of  the  life  was 
 sometimes  better  than  the  testimony  of  the  lips.  Not 
 every  one  that  saith,  Lord,  Lord,  but  he  that  doeth  the  will 
 of  the  Father  is  the  true  Christian.  Judged  by  that  test 
 the  influence  of  Jesus  Christ  over  the  lives  of  men  was 
 considerable,  and  I  am  in  hearty  agreement  with  those  who, 
 like  Mr.  Edghill  in  his  recent  little  book  on  the  second 
 century,  delight  to  point  out  the  many  bright  features  in 
 the  life  of  the  Christian  communities.'2  My  own  opinion 
 is  that  we  make  a  great  mistake  if  we  judge  any  age  solely 
 by  its  literary  men,  or  even  by  its  ecclesiastical  leaders. 
 
 I.  Jewish  Christianity. 
 
 The  dialogue  between  Jason  and  Papiscus  contained  the 
 definite  statement  that  Jesus  is  the  Son  of  God  and  the 
 
 1  Illingworth,  p.  103.  Yet  contrast  p.  52.  2  The  Spirit  of  Power. 
 
 P 
 
210 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 creator  of  the  world,  and  if  written  by  Aristo  of  Pella  may 
 claim  to  have  been  the  purest  specimen  of  Jewish-Christian 
 literature,  but  in  the  absence  of  the  treatise  we  must  turn 
 to  other  works,  which  may  be  called  in  a  more  general 
 sense  Jewish-Christian. 
 
 The  Didache. 
 
 According  to  a  widely-accepted  theory  the  Didache  was 
 an  adaptation  of  a  Jewish  manual,  and  there  seems  no  good 
 reason  to  doubt  that  it  is  one  of  the  earliest  of  non-canonical 
 Christian  books.  Dr.  Bigg,  who  held  a  singular  theory  with 
 regard  to  its  date,  doubted  also  its  genuinely  Christian 
 character ;  that  is  to  say,  it  seemed  to  him  doubtful  whether 
 it  could  pass  the  simple  test  which  the  Apostle  John  wished 
 to  be  applied  to  the  spirits — the  confession  that  Jesus  Christ 
 is  come  in  the  flesh.  The  divinity  of  our  Lord  was  in  some 
 sense  acknowledged,  but  the  substitution  of  “  Hosanna  to 
 the  God  of  David  ”  for  “  Hosanna  to  the  son  of  David  ” 
 seemed  to  him  to  show  a  want  of  interest  in  our  Lord’s 
 humanity.1  This  “  want  of  interest  in  our  Lord’s 
 humanity  ”  meets  us  again  and  again  in  the  literature  of  the 
 second  century,  and  it  is  in  a  sense  natural  to  find  it  in  those 
 quarters  where  the  opposition  to  Judaism  as  such  was 
 keenest.  To  many,  however,  it  will  no  doubt  seem  better 
 to  interpret  the  expressions  “  Jesus  Christ  ”  and  “  Thy 
 servant  Jesus  ”  2  as  involving  the  humanity  as  well  as 
 in  some  sense  the  divinity  of  our  Lord.  But  in  the  absence 
 of  clearer  evidence  we  should  perhaps  be  right  in  concluding 
 that  the  Lordship  of  Jesus  Christ  was  made  to  rest  upon  His 
 divinity,  and  that  the  humanity  was  not  regarded  as  con¬ 
 tributing  anything  essential  to  His  authority  over  the 
 hearts  and  consciences  of  men. 
 
 But  the  Lordship,  however  interpreted,  was  central  in 
 the  writer’s  view  of  religion,  and  he  by  whom  the  Lordship 
 was  spoken  of  was  deserving  of  special  honour  and  remem¬ 
 brance,  for  within  him  was  the  Lord  Himself.3  The 
 
 1  The  Doctrine  of  the  Twelve  Apostles,  pp.  67,  65. 
 
 2  E.  g.  ix.  4,  x.  1.  3  iv.  1. 
 
EARLY  CHRISTIAN  LITERATURE 
 
 211 
 
 indwelling  of  the  Lord  gave  to  the  prophet  peculiar  import¬ 
 ance.  He  was  the  high-priest  of  the  Christian  community, 
 and  to  disobey  him  was  the  unpardonable  sin.1  Yet  the 
 Didache  is  far  from  giving  to  the  prophet  an  absolute 
 authority.  The  responsibility  of  deciding  between  the 
 spirits  is  still  left  to  the  hearers.  Not  all  those  who  speak 
 in  the  spirit  are  true  prophets,  but  those  only  who  have 
 44  the  manners  of  the  Lord.”  2  It  is  only  when  a  man  has 
 applied  certain  moral  and  spiritual  tests  and  found  that 
 the  speaker  fulfils  them,  that  he  is  required  to  give  un¬ 
 hesitating  obedience.  And  is  this  necessarily  anything 
 more  than  that  yielding  to  the  clearly  revealed  will  of  God 
 which  every  Christian  believes  to  be  right  ?  At  any  rate 
 blind  obedience  to  a  merely  professional  prophet  is  far 
 enough  from  the  writer’s  thought. 
 
 But  though  it  may  not  be  fair  to  regard  the  prophet’s 
 claims  as  violating  either  the  authority  of  the  Lord  or  the 
 rights  of  the  individual  conscience,  the  Didache  does  appear 
 to  be  open  to  another  kind  of  objection.  When  we 
 remember  that  it  is  a  manual  for  Christian  people,  and  that 
 we  have  a  detailed  account  of  the  Lord’s  Supper  and 
 references  to  other  acts  of  Christian  worship,  we  cannot 
 overlook  the  fact  that  there  is  no  mention  of  the  remission 
 of  sins  through  the  death  of  Christ.  The  deepest  appeal  to 
 the  Christian  conscience  is  left  out.  One  wonders  whether 
 any  of  the  twelve  Apostles,  e.  g.  Peter  or  John,  would 
 have  allowed  their  names  to  be  associated  with  a  work  of 
 this  kind,  or  whether  they  would  even  have  recognised  its 
 Christian  character. 
 
 The  Odes  of  Solomon. 
 
 Important  questions  with  respect  to  this  recently  dis¬ 
 covered  work  are  still  under  discussion,  but  we  may  follow 
 Dr.  Rendel  Harris  in  regarding  it  as  in  some  sense  Jewish- 
 Christian.  In  an  able  article  in  the  Church  Quarterly 3 
 Dr.  Headlam  speaks  of  it  as  “  not  unorthodox,”  but  main¬ 
 tains  that  4  4  it  cannot  be  made  to  support  any  orthodox 
 
 1  xiii.  3,  xi.  7.  2  xi.  8.  3  January  1911. 
 
 P  2 
 
212 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 doctrine.”  44  It  represents  religious  experience  and 
 devotion,  not  history,  or  controversy,  or  theology.”  It 
 is  on  this  account  extremely  interesting  as  a  spontaneous 
 witness  to  the  authority  of  Christ  over  the  heart  and 
 conscience.  The  writer  has  no  theory  to  maintain  or 
 philosophy  to  advocate.  It  may  be  true  that  for  him 
 “  the  Incarnate  Messiah  is  still  the  maker  and  sustainer  of 
 all  things,”  1  but  his  interest  in  the  fact  is  devotional  rather 
 than  speculative.  He  is  filled  with  feelings  of  adoration 
 and  thanksgiving  and  joyous  confidence,  because  One  who 
 was  divine  became  like  himself  in  order  that  he  44  might 
 put  Him  on,”  and  44  learn  Him,”  and  persevere  in  following 
 Him.2  At  the  vision  of  this  divinely-human  Saviour  all 
 fear  had  vanished.  The  divine  gentleness  had  brought 
 salvation  within  his  reach. 
 
 Though  it  was  only  in  vision  that  this  Christian  mystic 
 had  seen  his  Lord,  he  had  plainly  overcome  any  aversion 
 he  felt  to  the  idea  of  the  Incarnation.  Opinions  may  differ 
 as  to  how  far  the  idea  of  the  Incarnation  was  associated 
 in  the  mind  of  the  seer  with  the  actual  historical  advent  of 
 Jesus,  and  some  connection  seems  to  be  implied.  Yet  the 
 name  of  Jesus  is  never  used.  44  To  have  used  the  name  of 
 Jesus  would  have  been  contrary  to  all  the  conventions.”  3 
 That  may  be  so ;  but  still  the  significant  fact  remains,  that 
 under  the  influence  of  conventions,  Jewish  or  Gnostic, 
 literary  or  social,  the  name  was  suppressed.  The  writer 
 lived  in  a  very  different  world  from  that  of  the  Apostles, 
 to  whom  the  name  Jesus  was  the  name  above  every  name, 
 and  which  they  would  never  have  suppressed  at  the  bidding 
 of  any  convention. 
 
 The  Clementine  Recognitions. 
 
 The  heterogeneous  character  of  the  Christian  interpola¬ 
 tions  in  the  Testaments  of  the  Twelve  Patriarchs ,  and  the 
 uncertainty  of  the  dates,  must  be  the  excuse  for  omitting 
 them  here.4  But  the  Clementine  literature  is  so  extensive 
 
 1  Harris,  Odes  of  Solomon,  p.  99. 
 
 2  Ode  7.  3  Headlam,  op.  cit. 
 
 4  Hegesippus  too  might  be  added,  but  our  knowledge  of  him  is  small. 
 
EARLY  CHRISTIAN  LITERATURE 
 
 213 
 
 and  important  that  some  reference  should  be  made  to  it. 
 It  cannot  indeed  be  said  either  of  the  Recognitions  or 
 Homilies  that  in  their  present  form  they  belong  to  the 
 second  century.  But  they  originated  in  the  second  century 
 and  represent  in  some  degree  phases  of  second-century 
 thought,  especially  in  the  East.  The  Recognitions  are 
 selected  as  being  much  nearer  to  the  main  lines  of  ecclesi¬ 
 astical  development  than  the  Homilies.  In  the  latter 
 Judaism  is  hardly  distinguishable  from  Christianity,  and 
 Jesus  is  simply  the  last  incarnation  of  the  true  Prophet; 
 but  in  the  Recognitions  we  find  a  much  more  exalted  con¬ 
 ception  of  the  Person  and  work  of  our  Lord.1  It  has, 
 indeed,  been  maintained  recently  that  even  in  the  Recog¬ 
 nitions  the  difference  between  Judaism  and  Christianity 
 is  to  be  found  simply  in  the  acceptance  of  Jesus  as  a 
 prophet.2  But  what  the  Clementine  writer  says  is  that  the 
 only  point  on  which  believers  in  Jesus  and  the  unbelieving 
 Jews  seem  to  differ,  is  as  to  “  whether  He  were  the  prophet 
 whom  Moses  foretold,  who  is  the  eternal  Christ.”  3  Jesus, 
 then,  is  the  eternal  Christ,  and  no  mere  prophet.  He  is  the 
 One  who  knows  all  hearts,  and  who  alone  is  able  to  declare 
 the  mysteries  of  God.4  But  He  is  more  than  that.  He  is 
 to  be  honoured  as  the  Son,  who  alone  knows  God  and  His 
 will.  He  is  Law  and  Lawgiver,  the  righteous  Judge,  and 
 Lord  of  all.5  In  one  very  notable  respect,  however,  the 
 writer  does  fall  far  short  of  the  apostolic  position.  44  Of 
 anything  like  an  atonement,”  said  Dr.  Hort,  44  there  is 
 not  the  faintest  trace.”  6  Baptism  seems  to  take  the  place 
 of  sacrifice,  and  the  Cross  is  ignored.7  Jesus  came  down 
 from  heaven,  it  is  true,  that  men  might  believe  in  Him  and 
 be  saved  through  Him,  and  it  was  the  peculiar  gift  bestowed 
 upon  the  Gentiles  that  they  should  love  Jesus  just  as  it  was 
 given  to  the  Jews  to  believe  Moses.  But  it  was  by  revealing 
 to  men  a  perfect  medicine  for  body  and  soul  that  the 
 
 1  Salmon,  D.C.B.I.  p.  574. 
 
 2  Hall,  Hist,  of  Ethics  within  Organised  Christianity ,  p.  140. 
 
 3  i.  43.  4  i.  16,  v.  2,  8,  10,  ix.  1. 
 
 6  x.  47.  6  Clementine  Recognitions,  p.  139. 
 
 7  Cf.  Salmon,  as  above. 
 
214 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 salvation  was  effected  :  1  and  this  is  very  far  from  the 
 New  Testament  idea  of  atonement. 
 
 Though  Christ,  then,  was  regarded  as  something  more 
 than  a  prophet,  it  was  His  prophetic  work  that  appealed  to 
 the  writer,  and  concerning  this  he  spoke  both  with  truth  and 
 eloquence.  The  knowledge  of  divine  things  depends  upon 
 moral  and  spiritual  conditions.  Covetousness  and  evils  of 
 other  kinds  have  filled  the  house  of  the  world  with  smoke, 
 so  that  men  cannot  see  God  and  recognise  His  will.  But 
 if  they  earnestly  cry  to  Him  for  help,  He  will  open  the  door 
 of  the  house,  and  the  smoke  will  be  dispersed.2  The  search 
 for  the  truth  is  not  hopeless.  God  has  not  buried  it  deep 
 in  the  earth,  and  heaped  the  mountains  upon  it,  so  that 
 those  only  who  are  able  to  dig  into  the  depths  can  find  it. 
 He  has  simply  veiled  it  with  the  curtain  of  His  love,  that  he 
 alone  may  reach  it  who  has  first  knocked  at  the  gate  of 
 divine  love.3  The  True  Prophet  will  both  dissipate  the 
 smoke  and  enlighten  the  souls  of  men.  For  He  is  within 
 the  mind  of  each  of  us.  In  the  case  of  those,  however,  who 
 have  no  desire  for  the  knowledge  of  God  and  His  righteous¬ 
 ness  He  is  inoperative,  kindling  the  light  of  knowledge  in 
 those  only  who  seek  after  what  is  profitable  to  their 
 souls.4 
 
 The  knowledge  imparted  by  the  Prophet  is  not  only 
 reliable  but  sufficient.  He  has  delivered  to  us  the  informa¬ 
 tion,  which  He  judged  to  be  sufficient;  and  if  men  would 
 only  be  content  with  His  teaching,  useless  speculation  would 
 be  avoided  and  44  all  this  forest  of  words  cut  down.”  5  The 
 writer  does  not,  however,  advocate  an  unreasoning  accept¬ 
 ance  of  the  authority  of  the  Prophet,  though  to  receive 
 44  another  teacher  than  Christ  ”  is  sin.  A  man  must  still 
 use  his  own  reason  and  judgment.  It  is  not  safe  to 
 commit  the  heavenly  truth  to  bare  faith  without  reason, 
 and  the  more  anxious  a  man  is  in  requiring  a  reason,  the 
 
 1  iv.  5,  x.  70.  2  i.  15. 
 
 3  iii.  58.  Here  and  in  many  other  instances  I  follow  pretty  closely  the 
 
 renderings  in  the  Ante-Nicene  Library  (T.  &  T.  Clark). 
 
 4  viii.  59.  6  x.  14,  i.  25. 
 
EARLY  CHRISTIAN  LITERATURE 
 
 215 
 
 firmer  and  more  enduring  will  be  his  faith.1  Elsewhere  he 
 says  that,  as  the  friends  of  God,  men  were  not  only  to 
 acquiesce  in  His  will,  but  also  to  judge  for  themselves  what 
 is  right.”  2  It  seems  hardly  fair  to  say  regarding  this 
 teaching  that  “  all  sense  of  moral  relativity  is  thus  lost,  and 
 all  moral  independence  is  undermined.”  3 
 
 The  undermining  may,  however,  take  place  in  another 
 way.  The  authority  of  the  true  Prophet  who  resides  in 
 every  man  may  be  eminently  reasonable;  but  some  other 
 authority  may  interfere  with  the  action  of  Him  who  alone 
 can  open  the  eyes  of  the  understanding.  Tradition,  instead 
 of  being  merely  a  guide,  may  become  a  gaoler.  Scripture, 
 instead  of  being  allowed  to  witness  for  itself,  may  be  sub¬ 
 jected  to  authorised  interpretations,  and  even  transformed 
 into  a  rule.  The  bishop,  instead  of  being  simply  a  pastor 
 or  instructor,  may  become  an  authority.  All  these  things 
 no  doubt  were  happening  in  the  world  to  which  the  Clemen¬ 
 tine  writer  belonged.  So  we  read  that  no  teacher  must  be 
 believed,  unless  he  brings  from  Jerusalem  the  testimonial 
 of  James  the  Lord’s  brother,  or  of  any  one  who  may  come 
 after  him.4  One  ought  to  learn  the  meaning  of  Scripture 
 from  him  who  keeps  it  according  to  the  truth  handed  down 
 to  him  from  his  fathers,  so  that  he  can  authoritatively 
 declare  what  he  has  received.  Rut  when  one  has  received 
 the  entire  and  firm  rule  of  faith  from  the  Scriptures  then  he 
 may  apply  himself  to  liberal  studies.5  Scripture  supplies 
 the  rule  of  faith,  but  the  bishop  must  interpret  it.  Bishop 
 Zacchseus  is  to  be  honoured  as  holding  the  place  of  Christ, 
 and  the  doctrine  of  faith  is  to  be  received  from  him.6  The 
 legal  mind  of  the  Jews  was  not  able  to  remain  faithful  to  the 
 conception  of  the  true  Prophet  kindling  within  the  minds 
 of  all  who  desire  it  the  knowledge  of  heavenly  mysteries 
 and  of  earthly  duties.  An  external  authority  must  take 
 the  place  of  the  voice  of  the  Living  Spirit. 
 
 2  iii.  71.  See  also  v.  2  and  viii.  60. 
 
 4  iv.  35.  6  x.  43.  6  iii.  66. 
 
 1  ii.  72. 
 
 3  Hall,  p.  140. 
 
216 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 II.  Syrian. 
 
 [gnatius. 
 
 Ignatius,  the  most  notable  representative  of  Christianity 
 in  Syria,  is  regarded  by  Pfleiderer  as  belonging  to  the 
 Pauline  school;  and  that  perhaps  is  the  way  in  which 
 Ignatius  himself  would  like  to  have  been  regarded,  for  he 
 expressed  the  wish  that,  when  he  had  attained  to  God,  he 
 might  be  found  at  the  feet  of  Paul.1  There  can,  indeed, 
 be  no  doubt  that  the  two  had  much  in  common.  Ignatius 
 possessed  something  of  the  great  apostle’s  devotion  to  Jesus 
 Christ  his  Lord.  Those  who  did  not  speak  concerning  Jesus 
 Christ  were  but  as  the  sepulchres  of  the  dead,  over  which 
 were  written  only  the  names  of  men.2  To  become  a  disciple 
 of  Him  who  gave  Himself  an  offering  for  us  3  was  his  one 
 consuming  passion.  Jesus  Christ  is  our  inseparable  life.4 
 To  continue  to  live  after  the  Jewish  law  is  to  acknowledge 
 that  we  have  not  received  grace.5  Jesus  Christ  was  to  him 
 instead  of  everything  ancient  :  His  cross  and  death  and 
 resurrection  and  the  faith  which  comes  from  Him  were  the 
 undefiled  monuments  of  antiquity.6  And  many  other 
 resemblances  might  be  noted.  But  Ignatius  was  no  mere 
 imitator.  Though  he  did  not  profess  to  be  some  great 
 person,7  and  though  he  did  not  venture  to  issue  orders  as  an 
 apostle,8  he  was  a  man  of  originality  and  force.  He  was 
 certainly  not  the  man  to  be  bound  by  precedent,  or  to 
 reproduce  with  exactness  any  man’s  teaching.  Bishop 
 Westcott  pointed  out  that  there  were  44  apparently  only  half 
 as  many  references  to  Scripture  in  the  shorter  recension  of 
 the  epistles  as  in  the  remains  of  Polycarp,  though  in  bulk 
 the  former  are  perhaps  ten  times  as  great  as  the  latter  ” 9; 
 and  it  is  certainly  noteworthy,  considering  his  veneration 
 for  the  apostle,  that  there  should  not  be  more  than  two  or 
 three  undoubted  quotations  from  the  Pauline  epistles. 
 We  have  no  reason,  then,  to  be  surprised  if  we  find  many 
 
 1  Eph.  12.  2  Philad.  6.  3  Eph.  1. 
 
 4  Eph.  3.  5  Magn.  8.  6  Philad.  8. 
 
 7  Eph.  3.  8  Trallians  3.  9  Introd.  p.  420. 
 
EARLY  CHRISTIAN  LITERATURE 
 
 217 
 
 departures  from  apostolic  sentiment  and  teaching.  Ignatius 
 had  neither  the  narrowness  of  the  mere  traditionalist,  nor 
 the  well-balanced  judgment  of  an  apostle. 
 
 The  difference  is  apparent  in  so  fundamental  a  matter  as 
 the  meaning  of  Christian  discipleship.  The  apostle  looked 
 back  to  the  sacrifice  of  Christ  as  the  explanation  of  his 
 discipleship;  Ignatius  looked  forward  to  his  own  sacrifice 
 as  the  beginning  of  his.1  Paul  knew  that  he  had  been 
 already  crucified  with  Christ ;  Ignatius  simply  wished  to 
 be.  In  the  one  case  self-will  had  been  destroyed  through  a 
 profound  realisation  of  the  meaning  of  the  Saviour’s  Cross ; 
 in  the  other  self-will  was  still  seeking  to  destroy  itself 
 through  the  martyrdom  of  the  body.  And  so,  according  to 
 his  own  estimate  of  himself,  Ignatius  was  neither  truly  a 
 disciple  nor  truly  a  teacher.  As  Professor  Ramsay  says,  “The 
 teacher  is  the  person  or  Church  which  has  gone  through 
 most  suffering,  and  thus  shown  true  discipleship,  and 
 Ignatius  distinguishes  Ephesus  and  Rome  as  his  teachers.”  2 
 This  craving  for  martyrdom  reveals  a  radical  weakness  in 
 Ignatius’s  apprehension  of  the  Gospel,  and  a  grave  defect 
 in  his  own  Christian  character.  We  wish  we  could  explain 
 it  otherwise.  But  the  facts  seem  to  be  against  a  more 
 generous  interpretation  : 3  the  whole  tone  of  the  letters 
 is  against  it.  We  agree  with  the  sentiment  expressed  by 
 the  Church  of  Smyrna  in  the  earliest  of  the  Martyria,  “  We 
 do  not  commend  those  who  give  themselves  up,  seeing  the 
 Gospel  does  not  so  teach.  .  .  .  For  it  is  part  of  a  true  and 
 well-grounded  love  not  only  to  wish  oneself  to  be  saved,  but 
 also  all  the  brethren.”  4 
 
 The  same  kind  of  discrepancy  meets  us  in  the  teaching 
 of  Ignatius  regarding  the  sacraments.  No  one  who  reads 
 such  words  as  these  :  “  Christ  was  born  and  baptised,  that 
 by  His  passion  He  might  purify  the  water,”  5  or  the  de¬ 
 scription  of  the  bread  of  the  Eucharist  as  “  the  medicine 
 
 1  Eph.  1,  Rom.  3,  4,  5. 
 
 2  Quoted  by  Spence  Jones,  Early  Christians  in  Rome ,  p.  173. 
 
 3  E.  q.  Scott  Holland,  Apostolic  Fathers,  p.  118. 
 
 4  c.  1.  5  Eph.  18 
 
218 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 of  immortality,”  1  will  feel  inclined  to  accuse  Ignatius  of 
 slavish  adherence  to  the  letter  of  Scripture.  But  do  such 
 words  retain  the  essential  teaching  of  the  New  Testament  ? 
 Do  they  not  rather  add  something  which  is  quite  alien  to 
 its  teaching  ?  In  the  light  of  subsequent  history  it  is  easy 
 to  see  how  such  statements  might  be  used  in  the  interests 
 of  non-moral  and  physical  views  of  our  Lord’s  influence; 
 but  Ignatius  was  not  the  kind  of  man  to  stop  and  consider 
 the  probable  results  of  his  words  on  future  generations. 
 
 His  view  of  the  Church  is  open  to  the  same  objection. 
 The  writer  of  this  essay  has  often  tried  to  persuade  himself 
 that  Ignatius  wavered  between  the  two  conceptions  of  the 
 Church  mystical  and  the  Church  visible.  That  there  was  a 
 mystical  vein  in  Ignatius  would  perhaps  be  allowed,  but  it 
 is  not  usual  to  suppose  that  it  affected  his  doctrine  of  the 
 Church.  If  then  the  Church  of  Ignatius  is  a  visible  insti¬ 
 tution,  one  can  only  turn  back  to  the  epistles  to  the  Hebrews 
 and  Ephesians,  and  marvel  how  soon  the  glowing  vision 
 was  lost  and  the  empirical  substituted  for  the  real.  But 
 we  remember  also  that  it  was  Ignatius  himself  who  said 
 “  Nothing  visible  is  eternal.”  2 
 
 The  tendency,  however,  to  substitute  the  external  for 
 the  internal,  the  sign  for  the  thing  signified,  the  physical 
 for  the  spiritual  was  the  besetting  sin  of  Ignatius,  and  finds 
 its  crowning  illustration  in  his  view  of  the  episcopate. 
 When  Ignatius  lamented  that  his  deserted  Church  at 
 Antioch  would  soon  have  only  Christ  for  its  bishop,3  he 
 expressed  himself  in  a  very  unfortunate  way.  But  there 
 is  too  much  of  that  unguarded  and  irreverent  mode  of 
 speech.  If  we  were  to  take  some  of  his  statements  literally, 
 we  should  conclude  that  in  the  opinion  of  Ignatius  the 
 bishop  stood  to  the  local  Church  in  the  same  relation  that 
 Jesus  Christ  stood  to  the  Catholic  Church.4  As  it  is,  one 
 cannot  help  feeling  that  the  authority  of  the  Head  of  the 
 Church  and  the  Lord  of  each  individual  member  was 
 seriously  endangered. 
 
 1  Eph.  20.  2  Rom.  3. 
 
 3  So  “God  for  its  Shepherd  instead  of  me,”  Rom.  9.  4  Smyrn.  8,  etc. 
 
EARLY  CHRISTIAN  LITERATURE 
 
 219 
 
 One  would  like  to  know  what  exactly  Ignatius  understood 
 by  the  proclamation  to  which  he  felt  himself  prompted  by 
 the  Spirit,  44  Do  nothing  without  the  bishop.”  1  Does  it 
 mean  simply,  nothing  which  related  to  public  worship  as 
 “  to  baptise  or  celebrate  a  love-feast  ”  ?  2  Or  does  it 
 include  all  questions  of  private  morals,  and  make  the 
 bishop  a  veritable  father-confessor  ?  Or  is  it  something 
 between  the  two,  and  if  so  what  ?  Regarding  marriage, 
 which  may  be  considered  a  test  question,  the  approval  of 
 the  bishop  seems  to  be  necessary  “  that  their  marriage  may 
 be  according  to  God  and  not  after  their  own  lust.”  3  The 
 apostolic  44  in  the  Lord  ”  becomes  equivalent  to  44  with  the 
 consent  of  the  bishop.”  But  again  we  can  hardly  credit 
 Ignatius  with  such  a  usurpation  or  restriction  of  the  Lord’s 
 authority.  We  must  allow  much  for  his  impulsive  Syrian 
 temper,  and  not  take  him  too  seriously.  In  the  case  of  the 
 martyr  Church  of  Ephesus,  at  least,  the  rights  of  the 
 individual  and  of  the  Christian  community  are  not  alto¬ 
 gether  overlooked.  Indeed,  what  he  says  to  the  Ephesians 
 is  really  fatal  to  any  exaggerated  notions  of  episcopal 
 authority.4 
 
 But  more  characteristic  still  is  the  way  in  which  Ignatius 
 tells  us  he  had  come  to  see  the  necessity  for  a  military  type 
 of  Church  government.  There  was  no  actual  mutiny  before 
 the  orders  were  given,5  but  he  must  have  had  pretty  strong 
 presentiments  of  coming  trouble.  Insubordination  was  a 
 great  evil,  and  must  be  met  by  the  establishment  of  a  strong 
 central  authority  in  each  local  community  of  Christians. 
 Believing  that  the  end  of  all  things  was  at  hand,6  and  urged 
 on  by  his  quick  imaginative  temperament,  Ignatius  very 
 naturally  preferred  the  sanctions  of  a  visible  order  to  the 
 slower  methods  of  the  Spirit.  Like  so  many  other  re¬ 
 formers,  he  could  not  wait.  The  visible  might  not  be  the 
 eternal ;  but  it  was  just  the  visible  that  seemed  now  to  be 
 needed  as  a  temporary  expedient  to  tide  over  the  interval 
 
 1  Philad.  7.  2>  Smyrn.  8. 
 
 3  Polyc.  5.  4  Especially  Eph.  3  and  15. 
 
 5  Philad.  7.  6  Eph.  11. 
 
220 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 before  the  coming  of  the  Lord.  The  interim  legislation 
 which  some,  as  it  seems  to  me  wrongly,  find  in  the  Gospels, 
 is  to  be  found  here.  It  is  Ignatius,  and  not  Jesus  of  Naza¬ 
 reth,  who  is  the  reformer,  the  opportunist,  the  advocate  of 
 temporary  expedients  and  external  sanctions.  So  firmly 
 convinced  was  Ignatius  of  the  necessity  of  his  policy  that 
 notwithstanding  all  protestations  of  his  unworthiness  as  a 
 disciple  and  teacher,  he  adopts  the  role  of  a  prophet.  It 
 was  the  Spirit  who  proclaimed  to  him  these  words  :  “  Do 
 nothing  without  the  bishop.”  1  The  happy  thought  came 
 to  him  with  all  the  force  of  a  divine  revelation.  There  is 
 no  appeal  to  antiquity.  There  is  no  appeal  to  apostolic 
 authority.  The  appeal  is  to  a  direct  revelation  vouchsafed 
 to  Ignatius  himself. 
 
 This  claim  of  Ignatius  to  be  the  mouthpiece  of  the  Spirit 
 can  hardly  be  discussed  without  a  reference  to  first  prin¬ 
 ciples.  Had  he  “  the  manners  of  the  Lord  ”  ?  How  is  it 
 to  be  harmonised  with  his  emphatic  disclaimer  of  authority? 
 What  is  the  bearing  of  this  revelation,  if  authentic,  on  other 
 forms  of  Church  government  then  in  existence  and  after¬ 
 wards  to  be  created  ?  If  the  claim  of  Ignatius  to  a  divine 
 communication  is  allowed,  why  not  Tertullian’s,  which 
 in  effect  was  the  opposite  ?  These  questions  must  be  passed 
 over.  But  there  is  one  still  more  important  question  of 
 fact  which  they  suggest.  Had  Ignatius  any  practical  belief 
 in  the  work  of  the  Holy  Spirit  in  the  Christian  society  ? 
 Considering  the  occasion  of  the  letters  there  is  surprisingly 
 little  reference  to  the  present  work  of  the  Holy  Spirit.  In 
 three  of  the  letters  there  is  no  explicit  reference  to  the 
 Spirit  at  all,  and  in  the  other  four  there  is  practically  only 
 one  allusion  to  the  teaching  and  guiding  of  the  Spirit,  and 
 that  is  the  communication  given  to  Ignatius  himself  to 
 “  do  nothing  without  the  bishop.”  2  The  compiler  of  the 
 longer  recension  seems  to  have  noticed  the  meagre  recog¬ 
 nition  given  by  Ignatius  to  this  essential  part  of  Christian 
 
 1  Philad.  7- 
 
 2  Eph.  9  and  18  ;  Magn.  9,  13  and  15  ;  Philad.  Intro,  and  7  ;  Smyrn. 
 Intro,  and  Conclus. 
 
EARLY  CHRISTIAN  LITERATURE 
 
 221 
 
 doctrine ;  and  the  most  noticeable  difference  between  the 
 shorter  and  longer  recensions  is  just  in  this  particular. 
 Not  only  is  the  number  of  allusions  multiplied  by  four  or 
 five,  but  a  much  more  adequate  expression  is  given  both  to 
 the  practical  and  theoretical  aspects  of  the  subject.  The 
 compiler,  to  take  a  few  out  of  the  many  additions,  corrects 
 the  mistake  of  Ignatius  in  identifying  the  Holy  Spirit  with 
 Christ  ;4  he  includes  among  the  things  which  Ignatius  says  he 
 knows  a  clause  referring  to  the  Spirit ; 2  he  speaks  of  the 
 true  Christian  being  a  disciple  of  the  Holy  Spirit ; 3  the 
 Holy  Spirit  is  the  Spirit  of  truth ; 4  the  brethren  are  under 
 the  guidance  of  the  Comforter  whose  mission  it  is  to  speak 
 of  the  things  of  Christ ;  6  he  expresses  the  hope  that  the 
 Holy  Spirit  will  teach  both  himself  and  other  Christians ; G 
 he  definitely  ascribes  the  desire  of  Ignatius  for  martyrdom 
 to  the  Spirit ; 7  other  bishops  also  act  with  the  co-operation 
 of  the  Spirit.8 
 
 Theophilus  of  Antioch. 
 
 Next  but  one  to  Ignatius  in  the  Episcopal  succession  at 
 Antioch  was  Theophilus,  whose  writings  present  a  striking 
 contrast  to  those  of  his  predecessor,  a  contrast  which  cannot 
 be  fully  explained  by  the  differences  in  the  audience 
 addressed.  In  the  fourth  century  Theophilus  had  the 
 reputation  of  having  been  a  champion  of  orthodoxy  against 
 Marcion  and  Hermogenes,  and  also  a  commentator  on  the 
 Gospels.  One  would  therefore  infer  that  he  was  a  well- 
 informed  and  honoured  representative  of  what  was  con¬ 
 sidered  true  doctrine.  Rut  when  we  turn  to  the  only  book 
 which  has  come  down  to  us,  a  work  of  considerable  length 
 and  merit,  written  to  enlighten  and  persuade  an  unbeliever, 
 we  find  nothing  distinctly  Christian  in  it.  Whatever  may 
 have  been  the  motive  of  Theophilus  in  attempting  to 
 defend  Christianity  without  once  mentioning  the  name  of 
 
 1  Magn.  15.  2  Trallians  5.  3  Philad.  6.  4  Philad.  4. 
 
 6  Eph.  20.  6  Eph.  15.  7  Rom.  8. 
 
 8  Trallians  1.  Other  allusions,  Eph.  4,  8,  9,  15,  21  ;  Magn.  3,  9; 
 Trallians  Intro,  and  6  ;  Rom.  Introd. ;  Philad.  4,  5,  6,  7  ;  Smyrn.  Introd. 
 and  Conclus. 
 
222 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 Jesus  Christ  or  referring  to  the  Incarnation  or  sacrifice  or 
 resurrection  of  Jesus  Christ,  the  fact  of  his  silence  remains. 
 Here  is  a  prominent  bishop  in  the  second  century  trying 
 to  commend  Christianity  to  his  heathen  friend  Autolycus 
 by  omitting  all  that  is  most  characteristic  of  it.  That 
 phenomenon,  whatever  explanation  may  be  given,  is  a  very 
 remarkable  one,  and  presents  a  complete  contrast  to  what 
 we  know  of  apostolic  methods.  We  are  reminded  of  the 
 similar  instance  of  a  Western  apologist  who  in  the  next 
 century  (some  say  in  this)  wrote  a  dialogue  in  which  the 
 merits  of  Christianity  were  discussed  without  reference 
 to  the  characteristic  facts  of  the  Christian  Gospel.  But 
 Minucius  Felix  was  a  man  of  letters,  and  not  a  bishop.  It 
 is  quite  conceivable  that  Christianity  appeared  to  him 
 simply  in  the  light  of  a  monotheistic  religion  of  high  and 
 austere  morality.  But  one  would  hesitate  before  coming 
 to  the  conclusion  that  a  well-known  bishop  of  Antioch 
 dismissed  the  fact  of  the  Incarnation  as  non-essential  or 
 even  subordinate.  We  are  bound,  however,  in  justice  to 
 let  him  speak  for  himself.  It  is  the  Christian  or  non- 
 Christian  character  of  his  writings  that  concerns  us  here, 
 not  the  character  of  his  personal  faith,  whatever  that  may 
 have  been. 
 
 One  of  the  notable  features  in  the  teaching  of  Theophilus, 
 in  addition  to  his  appreciation  of  some  points  of  Christian 
 morality,  is  found  in  his  view  of  inspiration,  which  he  con¬ 
 nects  with  the  holiness  and  righteousness  of  the  prophet, 
 in  opposition  to  the  ecstatic  view  of  Athenagoras  and  the 
 Montanists.1  But  even  on  this  subject  his  teaching  is 
 confused.  The  Hebrew  prophets  and  the  Sibyl  were  truly 
 inspired,  but  when  Homer  and  Hesiod  spoke  the  truth 
 they  did  not  speak  with  a  pure  but  an  erring  spirit.2  Poets 
 and  philosophers  clearly  taught  men  concerning  righteous¬ 
 ness  and  judgment  and  punishment,  and  also  concerning 
 God’s  care  for  the  living  and  the  dead,  for  had  not  one  of 
 the  Greek  poets  said,  44  The  dead  are  pitied  by  a  loving 
 God  ” ;  yet  they  did  so  unwillingly  and  inspired  by  demons.3 
 
 1  Ad  Autol.  ii.  9.  2  ii.  8.  3  ii.  38. 
 
EARLY  CHRISTIAN  LITERATURE 
 
 223 
 
 Theophilus  had  evidently  not  thought  out  the  subject  of 
 inspiration  very  carefully.  And,  what  strikes  us  as  still 
 more  remarkable,  he  does  not  connect  the  work  of  the 
 prophets  with  the  advent  of  Jesus.  The  prophets  were  to 
 be  commended  because  they  had  said  ten  thousand  things 
 consistently  and  harmoniously,  because  they  had  spoken  of 
 the  unity  of  God,  the  creation,  the  conflagration  of  the  world, 
 had  enjoined  holiness  of  life,  and  enunciated  the  Golden 
 Rule  in  a  negative  form.1  But,  so  far  as  Theophilus  informs 
 his  friend,  they  had  not  foretold  the  coming  of  Jesus.  Can 
 we  imagine  that  if  Theophilus  himself  had  been  led  to  Jesus 
 Christ  by  the  prophets  he  could  have  kept  the  good  news  so 
 long  from  Autolycus  ?  2 
 
 If  from  the  general  subject  of  inspiration  we  turn  to  the 
 doctrine  or  work  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  we  find  the  same  defects. 
 Theologically,  and  judged  by  later  standards,  his  view  of 
 the  Person  of  the  Spirit  is  erroneous,  for  he  identified  the 
 Spirit  of  God  with  the  Word.3  And  with  regard  to  the  work 
 of  the  Spirit,  there  is  no  recognition  of  the  Holy  Spirit  as 
 the  Guide  Jesus  gave  to  His  Church.  Christians  are  taught 
 by  the  Holy  Spirit,  but  it  is  only  mediately  through  the 
 Old  Testament  prophets.4 
 
 So  the  work  of  Jesus  Christ  is  not  referred  to.  The 
 Physician  is  God,  who  heals  and  makes  alive  by  His  word 
 and  wisdom,  which  hardly  goes  beyond  pre-Christian 
 teaching  : 5  or  sin  is  expiated  by  punishment  :  6  or  any 
 one  who  keeps  the  law  and  holy  commandments  can  be 
 saved  : 7  or  sin  is  regarded,  as  it  was  later  by  Methodius, 
 as  a  kind  of  physical  substance  which  somehow  drops  out 
 when  the  elements  of  the  body  are  dissolved.8  The  re¬ 
 surrection  of  Jesus  is  not  referred  to,  but  Theophilus 
 tells  us  he  was  converted  to  a  belief  in  the  resurrection 
 by  arguments  from  physical  analogy  and  from  the  pre¬ 
 dictions  of  the  prophets.9 
 
 1  ii.  38.  Is  Tobit  also  among  tlie  prophets ! 
 
 2  We  should  remember  that  Theophilus  gave  his  hearer  three  lessons. 
 Minucius,  after  one  discourse,  hoped  to  continue  his  instruction. 
 
 3  ii.  10.  4  ii.  33 ;  iii.  17.  5  i.  7. 
 
 6  ii.  26.  7  ii.  27.  8  Ibid.  9  i.  14. 
 
224 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 It  is  quite  in  line  with  this  general  method  of  procedure 
 that  Theophilus,  even  when  alluding,  as  he  does  three 
 times,  to  passages  in  the  Sermon  on  the  Mount,  avoids 
 using  the  name  of  Jesus,  and  introduces  his  quotations 
 quite  impersonally — “  the  voice  of  the  Gospel  teaches  ” — 
 “  the  Gospel  says  ” — “  it  says.”  1  So,  too,  when  explain¬ 
 ing  the  meaning  of  the  word  Christian,  he  does  not  say 
 that  Christians  are  the  followers  of  Jesus  Christ,  but  with 
 a  play  upon  the  word,  calls  them  44  Euchrestoi,”  service¬ 
 able  to  God;  or  44  anointed,”  yet  not  as  Jesus  was,  but  as 
 one  might  anoint  a  ship  or  a  house  or  an  ornament.2 
 
 Theophilus,  however,  does  not  hesitate  at  times  to  use 
 ecclesiastical  and  theological  language.  There  is  a  refer¬ 
 ence  to  baptism,  though  not  to  specifically  Christian 
 baptism ;  3  and  to  the  Logos  ivdidQexog  and  nQocpoqixog ;  4 
 and  to  a  saying  from  the  fourth  Gospel,  which  he  quotes 
 as  from  44  one  of  the  spirit-bearing  men,”  but  without  the 
 Christian  part  of  the  passage,  the  doctrine  that  the  Word 
 became  flesh.5  He  even  refers  to  an  incarnation,  but  it 
 is  not  to  the  Incarnation  of  God  in  Jesus  Christ.6  So 
 there  is  an  allusion  to  a  Trinity  or  Triad,  of  God,  His 
 Word,  and  His  Wisdom ; 7  but  it  is  unreal,  for  in  one  place 
 the  Word  is  identified  with  the  Son  and  in  another  with 
 Wisdom.8  And  what  is  to  be  said  of  the  remarkable 
 statement  that  the  Word  assumed  the  person  of  the 
 Father  ? 9  Why  should  Theophilus  go  out  of  his  way 
 to  make  these  theological  and  ecclesiastical  allusions, 
 crude  and  imperfect  as  they  are,  in  discussing  Christianity 
 with  a  heathen,  and  leave  out  the  essential  truths  of 
 Christianity  ?  We  could  have  understood  it  better  if 
 he  had  tried  to  meet  the  heathen  on  his  own  ground, 
 as  Minucius  Felix  more  or  less  did.  And  the  difficulty 
 becomes  all  the  greater  if  Autolycus  is  only  an  imaginary 
 person.  Whatever  may  be  the  cause,  we  are  face  to  face 
 with  the  remarkable  fact  that  the  first  ecclesiastical  writer 
 
 1  iii.  13,  14.  2  i.  1,  i.  12  ;  cf.  iii.  4.  3  ii.  16. 
 
 4  ii.  10,  ii.  22.  5  ii.  22.  6  Ibid.,  or  at  least  theophany. 
 
 7  ii.  15.  8  ii.  22.  9  Ibid. 
 
EARLY  CHRISTIAN  LITERATURE 
 
 225 
 
 who  quotes  from  John’s  Gospel  by  name,  adopted  a  method 
 of  presenting  Christianity  the  very  opposite  of  that  of  the 
 apostle,  for  to  John  the  confession  that  Jesus  Christ  is 
 come  in  the  flesh  was  the  essence  of  Christianity. 
 
 III.  Greece  and  Asia  Minor. 
 
 The  Athenian  Apologists. 
 
 The  first  of  the  four  writers  generally  associated  with 
 Athens  is  little  more  than  a  name,  only  one  sentence  of 
 his  Apology  having  come  down  to  us.  On  the  strength  of 
 that  sentence  Quadratus  has  been  called  44  the  father  of 
 the  historical  method  in  Christian  evidences.”  1  He  re¬ 
 ferred  to  those  who  had  been  healed  by  Christ  as  the 
 living  witnesses  of  His  power.  But  naturally  it  soon 
 became  impossible  to  find  surviving  witnesses  and  recipients 
 of  the  healing  power  of  Jesus ;  so  the  next  apologist, 
 Aristides,  while  still  keeping  close  to  historical  fact, 
 finds  attestation  of  the  authority  of  Christ  in  44  the  holy 
 Gospel  writing,”  and  in  the  lives  of  Christians.  He  shows, 
 too,  how  they  trace  their  origin  back  to  the  Lord  Jesus 
 Christ,  who  came  from  heaven  for  the  salvation  of  men, 
 and  by  a  voluntary  death  fulfilled  an  august  dispensation. 
 After  three  days  He  came  to  life  again  and  ascended  into 
 heaven.  His  twelve  disciples  went  into  the  world  to 
 proclaim  His  greatness,  and  those  who  observe  the  right¬ 
 eousness  they  preached  are  called  Christians.  The  com¬ 
 mands  of  Jesus  are  engraved  upon  their  hearts,  and  they 
 are  willing  to  sacrifice  their  lives  for  His  sake.  They  are 
 confident  that  more  than  all  the  nations  of  the  earth 
 they  have  found  the  truth.2  The  bright  picture  Aristides 
 gives  us  of  the  joyous  self-denying  lives  of  the  Christians 
 is  the  most  eloquent  testimony  to  the  authority  of  their 
 Lord. 
 
 The  unknown  author  of  the  first  part  of  the  Letter  to 
 Diognetus  points  to  the  wonderful  growth  of  the  Christian 
 
 1  Waterman,  Post-Apostolic  Age,  p.  121. 
 
 'z  Apology,  c.  15,  16. 
 
 Q 
 
226 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 society  as  a  proof  of  the  authority  of  Christ.1  He  delights 
 also  in  looking  back  to  the  advent  of  the  Lord.  He  came 
 in  meekness  to  save  men,  and  will  come  again  for  judg¬ 
 ment.2  The  “  holy  and  incomprehensible  Word  ”  is 
 placed  also  in  the  hearts  of  men.3  So  this  writer,  too, 
 keeps  in  close  touch  with  historic  fact  and  Christian 
 experience.  He  has  also  a  vivid  sense  of  the  majesty 
 and  divinity  of  the  Lord.  He  was  the  Son  of  God  who 
 came  to  reveal  God,  and  to  cover  our  sins  with  His  right¬ 
 eousness.1  He  was  the  Almighty  Creator  of  the  universe, 
 the  invisible  God  from  heaven,  who  planted  among  men 
 the  truth.5  It  was  as  God  that  He  was  sent.0  But  did 
 He  come  as  man  ?  Was  the  advent  of  the  Lord  merely 
 a  theophany,  or  was  it  a  real  incarnation  ?  It  is  so  easy 
 to  read  into  the  letter  more  than  we  actually  find,  and 
 translate  one  notable  passage,  “  the  iniquity  of  many 
 shall  be  concealed  in  One  Righteous  Man,”  though  there 
 is  no  word  for  man  in  the  text.7  But  is  this  justifiable  ? 
 There  seems  to  be  no  reference  of  any  kind  throughout 
 the  letter  to  the  humanity  of  the  Saviour.  So  far  as  the 
 writer  has  expressed  himself,  the  mediator  between  God 
 and  man  is  not  the  man  Christ  Jesus.  Even  the  meekness 
 of  the  Saviour  is  a  sign  of  His  deity,  and  not  of  His 
 humanity.8  It  was  as  God  that  He  came. 
 
 But  though  the  interest  of  the  author  seems  centred 
 exclusively  in  the  deity  of  Christ,  he  has  given  us  one  of 
 the  most  human  conceptions  of  God  to  be  found  in  Eastern 
 writers.  Not  only  was  man  created  in  the  image  of  God, 
 but  he  becomes  an  imitator  of  God  through  the  practice 
 of  beneficence  :  he  may  even  become  a  God  to  those  who 
 receive  his  benefits.  Further,  the  authority  of  Christ, 
 just  because  it  is  divine,  is  the  constraint  of  love.  We 
 love  Him,  who  first  loved  us.9 
 
 In  Athenagoras,  whom  many  regard  as  an  Athenian 
 Apologist,  we  have  similar  characteristics  to  those  which 
 met  us  in  Theophilus  of  Antioch.  He  represents  the 
 
 1  c.  7.  2  Ibid .  3  c.  5.  4  c.  8,  9.  5  c.  7. 
 
 6  Ibid.  7  As  Walford  does,  p.  48.  8  c.  10.  y  c.  10. 
 
EARLY  CHRISTIAN  LITERATURE 
 
 227 
 
 ecstatic  and  less  moral  view  of  inspiration,1  but  otherwise 
 his  general  position  is  very  much  the  same.  He  shows 
 the  same  want  of  interest  in  the  Incarnation  and  death 
 of  Jesus  Christ,  and  can  even  write  a  book  on  the  re¬ 
 surrection  without  referring  to  the  resurrection  of  his  Lord. 
 Immortality  is  to  him  the  greatest  good,  though  one  must 
 arrive  at  it  pure  from  all  wrongdoing.  Knowledge  is  the 
 way  thither,  a  correct  knowledge  of  the  mysteries  of  the 
 Trinity.  It  is  necessary  to  know  God  and  His  Logos, 
 that  the  Logos  proceeds  from  the  one  God,  and  that  the 
 spirit  is  an  effluence  from  God.2  One  must  know  what  is 
 the  communion  of  the  Father  with  the  Son,  what  is  the 
 Spirit,  and  what  is  the  unity  of  these  three.3  The  work 
 of  the  Spirit  in  the  material  universe  is  referred  to,  and 
 a  theory  of  inspiration  propounded.4  The  teaching  of 
 the  Logos  is  not  confined  to  our  Scriptures,  for  the  Logos 
 says  to  us,  44  If  any  one  kiss  a  second  time,  because  it  has 
 given  him  pleasure  (he  sins).”  5  Yet  with  all  this  interest 
 in  theology  and  zeal  for  an  austere  morality  Athenagoras 
 practically  ignores  the  Gospel  facts,  and  the  words  of 
 Jesus  are  introduced  simply  by  the  phrase,  44  He  saith.”  6 
 
 The  Corinthian  Writers. 
 
 Concerning  Corinth  there  is  little  to  be  said.  Diony¬ 
 sius,  one  of  the  great  letter-writers  of  the  age,  gives  us 
 information  of  the  observance  of  the  Lord’s  day,  and  of 
 the  reading  of  letters  in  Church  along  with  the  dominical 
 Scriptures;  of  the  practice  also  of  44  the  apostles  of  the 
 devil  ”  in  falsifying  documents,  canonical  and  uncanonical ; 
 of  the  milder  methods  he  advocated  in  dealing  with 
 apostates  and  heretics ;  and  of  some  other  matters.  But 
 these  have  only  an  indirect  bearing  on  our  subject. 
 
 The  so-called  Second  Epistle  of  Clement  was  as¬ 
 signed  by  Bishop  Lightfoot  to  Corinth.  Though  falling 
 short  in  ability  of  some  of  the  previous  works,  it  is  not 
 
 1  Apol.  c.  9.  2  c.  10,  18,  24.  3  c.  12. 
 
 4  c.  6,  9,  24.  5  c.  32.  6  c.  33. 
 
 Q  2 
 
228 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 without  importance  as  a  witness  to  the  authority  of  Jesus 
 Christ.  We  should  think  of  Jesus  Christ,  the  preacher  tells 
 us,  as  of  God  and  the  Judge  of  the  living  and  the  dead.1 
 He,  who  was  a  spirit,  became  flesh  and  suffered  for  us. 
 What  return  then  shall  we  make  to  Him  ? 2  But  the 
 sermon  does  not  maintain  the  same  level  throughout. 
 Eternal  life  is  looked  upon  as  the  reward  of  good  works 
 and  repentance.3  We  love  in  order  that  we  may  attain 
 to  the  kingdom  of  God.4  The  obedience  of  the  Christian 
 does  not  rest  firmly  enough  upon  the  grace  of  the  Lord 
 Jesus  Christ.  The  point  of  view  is  external  and  utilitarian. 
 Another  fact  of  importance  to  note  is  that  the  writer 
 quotes  as  the  Lord’s  words  that  are  not  found  in  Scripture. 
 The  canonical  Gospels  “  are  not  regarded  as  the  sole  record 
 of  the  teaching  of  the  Lord.”  5 
 
 Papias  the  Phrygian. 
 
 Papias  was  a  hearer  of  John  and  a  companion  of  Poly¬ 
 carp.  The  title  of  his  work,  Expositions  of  Oracles  of 
 the  Lord ,  reveals  at  once  his  reverential  regard  for  the 
 authentic  sayings  of  Jesus  Christ.  He  tells  us  that  he  did 
 not  want  to  hear  about  “  foreign  commandments,”  but 
 only  of  those  “  derived  from  the  Truth  itself.”  For  him 
 the  guarantee  of  the  genuineness  of  the  oracle  was  not 
 the  testimony  of  the  Spirit,  nor  the  reasonableness  of 
 the  teaching,  nor  its  practical  fruits,  but  the  testimony 
 of  the  living  voice  of  those  who  had  consorted  with 
 apostles  and  apostolic  men.  He  was  pre-eminently  a 
 traditionalist  and  a  literalist. 
 
 Poly carp  of  Smyrna. 
 
 Less  original  than  Ignatius,  of  sounder  judgment  than 
 Papias,  the  “  essentially  commonplace  ” 6  but  faithful 
 Polycarp  is  no  doubt  a  good  representative  of  the  “  average 
 Christian  belief  of  the  first  half  of  the  second  century.”  7 
 Like  Ignatius  he  does  not  claim  the  authority  of  an 
 
 1  c-  1-  2  c.  1,  9.  ;5  c.  8,  9.  4  c.  9. 
 
 0  VVestcott,  Canon,  p.  186.  6  Lightfoot,  Apostolic  Fathers-,  i.  p.  581. 
 
 7  Pfleiderer,  Primitive  Christianity,  iii.  p.  366. 
 
EARLY  CHRISTIAN  LITERATURE 
 
 229 
 
 apostle,1  but  unlike  Ignatius,  he  does  not  profess  to  have 
 received  a  communication  from  the  Spirit  of  God.  The 
 Holy  Spirit  is  not  once  mentioned  in  his  letter.  He  almost 
 apologises  for  writing  to  the  Philippians.  He  had  only 
 done  so  at  their  invitation.2  And  when  he  ventures  to 
 counsel  them  in  the  case  of  the  straying  members  of  the 
 flock,  it  is  that  they  should  use  moderation.3  Yet  humble 
 as  Polycarp  was  in  personal  claims,  and  sympathetic  as 
 he  was  towards  the  erring  members  of  the  Church,  his 
 indignation  was  roused  to  white  heat  by  any  attempt  to 
 tamper  with  the  archives.  Marcion  was  the  first-born  of 
 Satan.4  So,  too,  were  the  men  who  perverted  the  oracles 
 of  the  Lord  by  denying  a  resurrection  or  judgment.5  Any 
 one  who  denied  that  Jesus  Christ  had  come  in  the  flesh 
 was  anti-Christ.  Similar  language  is  also  used  regarding 
 those  who  denied  the  testimony  of  the  Cross  to  the  true 
 humanity  of  Jesus  Christ.6 
 
 Polycarp’s  life-long  loyalty  in  his  Master’s  service, 
 culminating  in  the  martyr’s  death,  gives  impressiveness  to 
 his  way  of  regarding  the  Lord’s  authority.  We  are  to 
 serve  Him  as  He  commanded  us.7  We  are  to  be  mindful 
 of  what  He  formerly  said  in  His  teaching.8  We  are  to 
 follow  the  example  of  the  Lord  in  faith  and  love  and  meek¬ 
 ness  and  truth.9  We  are  to  walk  according  to  the  truth 
 of  the  Lord  who  was  servant  of  all.10  The  words  and 
 example  and  truth  of  the  Lord  were  the  standards  to  which 
 Polycarp  wished  to  conform.  The  authority  of  Christ 
 rested,  for  Poly  carp,  both  on  His  Person  and  Work.  He 
 is  the  Lord,  the  eternal  High  Priest  and  Saviour,  who  for 
 our  sins  suffered  even  unto  death.11  He  is  the  Judge  of 
 living  and  dead.12  In  addition,  the  Christians  of  Philippi 
 were  exhorted  to  be  subject  to  the  presbyters  and  deacons, 
 the  bishop  not  being  mentioned,  as  unto  God  and  Christ.13 
 
 1  c.  3.  2  Ibid.  3  c.  11. 
 
 4  Eusebius,  H.  E.  iv.  14.  5  c.  7- 
 
 0  c.  3.  So  Lightfoot ;  but  Zalm,  “denying  the  testimony  of  the 
 Church  to  the  Crucifixion.' * 
 
 7  c.  6.  8  c.  2.  9  c.  10.  10  c.  5, 
 
 11  c,  1.  12  c,  2,  13  c.  5, 
 
230 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 The  nature  and  scope  of  that  authority  are  not,  however, 
 defined ;  and  it  was  not  to  them,  but  to  Jesus  Christ  Him¬ 
 self  and  the  apostles  and  prophets,  that  the  Philippians 
 were  to  look  for  an  interpretation  of  the  Christian  life. 
 
 “  Let  us  then  serve  Him  as  He  Himself  has  commanded 
 us,  and  as  the  apostles  who  preached  the  Gospel  unto  us, 
 and  as  the  prophets  who  proclaimed  beforehand  the  coming 
 of  the  Lord.”  1 
 
 Melito  of  Sardis. 
 
 Melito  was  one  of  the  most  voluminous  writers  of  the 
 second  century,  but  of  his  works  we  have  only  the  titles 
 and  some  small  fragments.  Confining  ourselves  to  the 
 Greek  fragments,  we  notice  that  Melito  refers  to  Christian¬ 
 ity  as  a  philosophy,  which  grew  up  side  by  side  with  the 
 Empire,  of  which  at  that  time  Marcus  Aurelius  was  the 
 head.  There  was  no  necessary  conflict  between  the  claims 
 of  Christ  and  of  Ciesar.  But  though  speaking  of  Chris¬ 
 tianity  as  a  philosophy,  Melito  did  not  regard  it  exclusively 
 from  that  point  of  view.  The  mere  titles  of  the  books 
 show  his  wide  range  of  interests,  theological,  ecclesiastical 
 and  practical,  as  well  as  philosophical.  He  speaks  with 
 no  uncertain  sound  concerning  the  deity  of  Jesus  Christ, 
 who  was  truly  God  the  Word,  true  God  existing  before 
 all  ages.  Still  more  carefully  he  attempts  to  guard  the 
 humanity  of  Jesus  Christ.  Our  Lord  Jesus  Christ  the 
 Saviour  suffered.  He  was  possessed  of  soul  and  body, 
 having  a  human  nature  like  our  own.  So  emphatic  was 
 Melito  upon  the  question  of  the  real  humanity  of  our  Lord, 
 that  Origen  seems  to  have  taken  offence  at  his  plain 
 speaking.  But  the  fragments  show  no  attempt  to  bring 
 the  authority  of  Jesus  Christ  into  connection  with  His 
 true  humanity.  The  proofs  of  His  humanity  were  given 
 prior  to  His  baptism,  of  His  deity  by  His  miracles  during 
 the  three  years  of  His  ministry.  The  appeal  of  the  In¬ 
 carnation  is  not  sufficiently  ethical. 
 
 1  e.  0, 
 
EARLY  CHRISTIAN  LITERATURE 
 
 231 
 
 Polycrates  of  Ephesus  tells  us  that  Melito  was  one  of 
 the  great  luminaries  of  Asia,  that  he  was  a  eunuch,  and 
 that  all  his  actions  were  under  the  influence  of  the  Lloly 
 Spirit.  We  wish  that  there  was  sufficient  information  to 
 enable  us  to  add  Polycrates  to  this  list  of  Asiatic  worthies, 
 for  the  man  who  defied  Victor  of  Rome  had  the  courage 
 of  strong  convictions.  44  I  who  have  lived  sixty-five  years 
 in  the  Lord,  and  have  met  with  brethren  throughout  the 
 world,  and  have  gone  through  every  holy  Scripture,  am  not 
 affrighted  by  terrifying  words.  For  those  greater  than 
 I  have  said,  4  We  ought  to  obey  God  rather  than  man.’  ”  1 
 
 Justin  Martyr. 
 
 Adopting  the  geographical  arrangement  of  authors, 
 Justin  Martyr,  like  Irenaeus,  may  be  relegated  to  the 
 West,  for,  though  born  as  he  himself  tells  u£  in  Samaria, 
 all  else  is  uncertain,  except  that  he  lived  some  time,  and 
 died,  in  Rome.  In  the  form  of  his  teaching,  however, 
 he  is  Eastern  rather  than  Western,  and  his  importance 
 gives  him  a  right  to  a  large  place  in  any  survey  of  second- 
 century  thought.  But  as  so  much  that  is  characteristic 
 of  Justin’s  teaching  will  meet  us  in  Clement  of  Alexandria, 
 we  must  pass  over  it  very  briefly  here.  No  writer  grasped 
 more  firmly  the  idea  of  the  absoluteness  of  Christ’s  author¬ 
 ity  as  a  teacher.  Again  and  again  he  says,  44  Our  teacher 
 of  these  things  is  Jesus  Christ.”  2  To  live  according  to 
 the  good  precepts  of  Christ  is  the  Christian’s  prayer.3 
 Our  doctrines  appear  to  be  greater  than  all  human  teach¬ 
 ing,  because  Christ,  who  appeared  for  our  sake,  became 
 the  whole  rational  being,  both  body  and  reason  and  soul. 
 Philosophers  and  others  were  taught  by  the  Word,  but  they 
 did  not  know  the  whole  of  the  Word,  which  is  Christ,  and 
 so  often  contradicted  themselves.  Christ  is  the  power 
 of  the  ineffable  Father,  and  not  the  mere  instrument  of 
 human  reason.4  Only  the  Son  lived  perfectly  the  life 
 according  to  Nature.5  He  is  the  blameless  and  in  all 
 
 1  Euseb.,  H.  E.  v.  24.  2  2  Apol.  8  ;  1  Apol.  8,  13,  15,  16,  17- 
 
 3  1  Apol.  14,  4  2  Apol,  10,  5  Fray,  from  Leontius, 
 
232 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 things  irreproachable  Christ  Jesus.1  So  whatever  the 
 Word  forbids  us  to  choose,  the  sensible  man  will  not  choose.2 
 We  choose  the  things  which  please  Him,  choosing  them 
 by  reason  of  the  rational  faculties  He  has  Himself  en¬ 
 dowed  us  with ;  so  He  both  persuades  us  and  leads  us  on 
 to  faith.5  The  gates  of  light  are  opened  only  by  God  and 
 His  Christ.4  Christ  is  also  the  new,  eternal  and  final 
 law,r>  and  everlasting  covenant.6 
 
 As  a  philosopher,  Justin  is  chiefly  interested  in  Christ 
 as  the  revealer  of  truth  and  the  revealer  of  God.  But  he 
 is  intensely  interested  also  in  the  facts  of  the  life  and 
 death  of  Jesus.  The  humanity  of  Jesus  and  His  redeem¬ 
 ing  work  are  not  forgotten.  “  Say  no  evil  thing,  my 
 brothers,  against  Him  that  was  crucified,  and  treat  not 
 scornfully  the  stripes  wherewith  all  may  be  healed  even  as 
 we  are  healed.”  7  Justin  valued  the  memoirs  too  well, 
 and  had  too  deep  an  experience  of  the  grace  of  Christ  to 
 allow  “  the  compelling  personality  of  Jesus  to  recede 
 behind  the  vague  figure  of  the  Christ  of  prophecy,”  8  still 
 less  of  the  Gnostic  Christ ;  but  the  influence  of  Greek 
 philosophy  and  of  the  Greek  Mysteries  had  much  to  do  in 
 shaping  the  outward  expression  of  his  faith. 
 
 Tati  an. 
 
 Tatian,  the  Assyrian,  was  a  disciple  of  Justin  Martyr’s 
 at  Rome,  but  represents  a  very  different  position  from 
 that  of  his  master.  He  was  the  champion  of  “  barbaric  ” 
 wisdom  and  the  prophets,  being  much  more  akin  to 
 Theophilus  of  Antioch,  who  sprang  from  the  same  region 
 of  the  Euphrates.  Harnack  considers  that  Tatian’s 
 Encratism  was  an  attempt  to  imitate  the  poor  life  of 
 Jesus.9 
 
 1  Trypho,  35.  2  1  Apol.  12.  3  Ibid.  10. 
 
 4  Trypho,  7,  8,  82,  92.  6  Ihid.  11. 
 
 0  Ibid.  43.  7  Ibid.  p.  137. 
 
 *  Glover,  Conflict  of  Religions  in  the  Early  Roman  Empire,  p.  194. 
 
 y  Hist,  of  Dogma,  vol.  i.  p.  2-58. 
 
EARLY  CHRISTIAN  LITERATURE 
 
 233 
 
 Alexandria. 
 
 Epistle  of  Barnabas. 
 
 The  author  of  this  epistle  gives  to  “  our  Lord  Jesus 
 Christ  ”  the  central  position  in  his  theology,  and  lays  great 
 stress  upon  His  divinity  and  atoning  work.  “  For  to  this 
 end  the  Lord  endured  to  deliver  up  His  flesh  to  corruption, 
 that  we  might  be  sanctified  through  the  remission  of 
 sins,  which  is  effected  by  His  blood  of  sprinkling.”  1  Being 
 the  Lord  of  all  the  world,  He  endured  to  suffer  for  us.2 
 The  Son  of  God  came  to  the  flesh,  that  He  might  bring  to 
 a  head  the  sins  of  those  who  persecuted  the  prophets.3 
 It  behoved  Him  to  appear  in  the  flesh  that  He  might 
 abolish  death.4  The  writer,  too,  does  not  shrink  from  using 
 the  name  Jesus.  He  speaks  of  the  covenant  of  the 
 beloved  Jesus,5  and  of  the  new  law  of  our  Lord  Jesus 
 Christ,  which  is  without  the  yoke  of  necessity.0  And  yet 
 we  can  see  how  strong  was  the  tendency  to  think  of  the 
 advent  of  Jesus  as  a  theophany  rather  than  an  incarna¬ 
 tion.  He  appeared  in  the  flesh;7  He  came  to  the  flesh;8 
 He  willed  to  suffer ; 9  He  could  not  have  suffered  except 
 for  our  sakes ; 10  but  the  writer  just  seems  to  stop  short 
 of  the  apostolic  “  became  flesh.”  The  true  humanity 
 seems  hardly  grasped.  It  is  even  said  that  Jesus,  who  was 
 manifested  both  by  type  and  in  the  flesh,  was  not  the  Son 
 of  Man,  but  the  Son  of  God.11 
 
 But  the  authority  of  Christ  is  supreme.  Having  re¬ 
 ceived  the  forgiveness  of  sins  and  placed  our  trust  in  the 
 name  of  the  Lord,  we  have  become  new  creatures.  .  .  . 
 His  statutes  and  doctrine  dwell  in  us,  He  Himself  prophesy¬ 
 ing  in  us.12  The  Christian  community  is  also  still  under 
 the  direct  teaching  of  the  Lord.  “  I  truly  perceive  in 
 you  the  spirit  poured  forth  from  the  rich  Lord  of  love.”  13 
 “  I  beseech  you  be  good  law-givers  to  one  another  .  .  . 
 and  be  ye  taught  of  God,  inquiring  diligently  what  the 
 
 1  c.  5.  2  Ibid.  Ibid.  4  Ibid.  5  c.  4. 
 
 6  c.  2.  7  c.  5.  8  Ibid.  9  Ibid,  10  c.  7- 
 
 11  c.  12.  12  c,  16.  c.  L 
 
234 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 Lord  asks  from  you.”1  Yet  this  is  to  be  done  with  due 
 regard  to  the  traditional  faith.2  And  in  this  connection 
 we  remember  how  in  this  epistle  we  have  the  first  quota¬ 
 tion  from  the  New  Testament  introduced  by  the  phrase 
 “  It  is  written.”3 
 
 The  author  also  lays  great  stress  on  the  intellectual 
 virtues,  wisdom,  understanding,  science  and  knowledge.4 
 Knowledge  is  not  inconsistent  with  faith ;  on  the  contrary 
 Gnosis  says,  “  Trust  in  Him  who  is  to  be  manifested  to 
 vou  in  the  flesh,  renewed  bv  the  remission  of  sins,  made 
 after  another  pattern.”5  The  writer’s  own  incursions 
 into  the  region  of  speculation  and  advanced  knowledge 
 were  not,  however,  very  happy.  He  failed  to  realise  the 
 progressive  character  of  revelation,  thought  that  the 
 Mosaic  law  was  never  intended  to  be  literally  kept,  in¬ 
 dulged  in  allegory,  and  asserted  that  no  one  had  been 
 admitted  to  a  “  more  excellent  piece  of  knowledge  ”  than 
 the  great  secret  he  disclosed  to  those  who  were  worthy 
 to  receive  it — that  the  three  hundred  and  eighteen  members 
 of  Abraham’s  household  represent  the  Saviour  and  His 
 Cross.5 
 
 Epistle  to  Diognetus.  Part  II. 
 
 The  author  of  the  second  part  of  this  epistle  in  all 
 probability  belonged  to  Alexandria.  He  was  a  disciple 
 of  the  apostles  and  a  teacher  of  the  Gentiles.  He  respected 
 tradition,  ministering  the  things  delivered  to  him  by  those 
 disciples  who  were  worthy  of  the  truth.  But  it  is  the 
 everlasting  Son,  who  enriches  the  Church,  giving  grace 
 and  understanding,  respecting  the  limits  of  the  faith  and 
 the  boundaries  set  by  the  fathers ;  so  that  the  fear  of  the 
 law,  the  grace  of  the  prophets,  the  faith  of  the  Gospels, 
 and  the  tradition  of  the  apostles,  are  seen  to  be  harmonious. 
 And  the  Word  still  teaches  men,  by  whom,  and  when  He 
 pleases.  This  is  He  who  was  from  the  beginning,  who 
 
 1  C.  21.  2  c.  19.  3  c.  4.  4  C.  2.  5  c.  6. 
 
 c  c.  9.  1  =  10,  H  =  8,  the  initial  letters  of  ’It? aovs,  and  T  =  300  = 
 
 the  Cross, 
 
EARLY  CHRISTIAN  LITERATURE 
 
 235 
 
 appeared  as  if  new  and  was  found  old,  and  yet  who  is 
 ever  born  afresh  in  the  hearts  of  the  saints.  The  true 
 knowledge  is  that  which  is  witnessed  to  by  life.1  Though 
 there  are  no  direct  references  to  the  Gospels,  nor  any 
 allusions  to  our  Lord’s  discourses,  Bishop  Westcott  thought 
 that  “  the  influence  of  the  Word  on  the  Christian  was 
 made  to  flow  from  His  historical  revelation  to  mankind.”  2 
 This  may  be  so  in  the  wide  sense  of  the  word  historical ; 
 but  the  uniqueness  of  the  life  and  work  of  Jesus  of  Nazareth 
 does  not  appear  to  be  recognised  or  safeguarded.  It  is 
 the  authority  of  the  Word  rather  than  of  Jesus  Christ, 
 or  of  the  Spirit  whom  He  sent,  that  is  emphasised. 
 
 Clement  of  Alexandria. 
 
 The  central  thought  of  Clement,  as  of  others  of  the 
 Apologists,  was  that  of  the  Word  or  Logos.  He  who  ex¬ 
 horts  the  heathen,  instructs  the  catechumens,  and  teaches 
 the  more  advanced  or  Gnostic  Christians,  is  not  Jesus 
 Christ  or  the  Holy  Spirit  whom  He  promised  to  send  to 
 the  disciples  to  lead  them  into  all  truth,  but  rather  the 
 Word,  who  in  all  ages  had  been  speaking  to  men.  Clement 
 felt  the  necessity,  as  others  before  him  had  felt,  of  main¬ 
 taining  at  all  costs  the  antiquity  rather  than  the  novelty 
 of  Christianity.  This  conception  of  the  Logos  enabled 
 Clement  to  dispose  of  his  captious  critics,  and  gave  a 
 magnificent  range  to  the  Divine  Teacher.  All  men  were 
 in  fact,  though  in  very  varying  degrees,  His  pupils. 
 
 (a)  The  authority  of  the  Word  was  revealed  in  heathen 
 literature.  So  manifold  is  the  wisdom  of  God  and  so 
 widely  diffused  that  all  sects  whether  of  barbarian  or 
 Hellenic  philosophy  have  been  enlightened  by  it,  and 
 their  teachings  may  be  regarded  as  fragments  from  the 
 theology  of  the  ever-living  Word.3  Under  His  influence 
 the  tragic  poets  uttered  injunctions  of  righteousness,4 
 and  the  comic  poets  said  things  profitable  for  salvation.5 
 But  it  was  specially  in  Greek  philosophy  that  the  Word 
 
 1  c.  11.  2  Canon,  pp.  91,  93.  3  Strom,  i.  13. 
 
 4  Paed.  iii.  12.  5  Ibid.  2, 
 
236 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 spoke.  Philosophy  was  a  work  of  divine  Providence, 
 and  a  school -master  to  bring  the  Greeks  to  Christ.1 
 Prophecy  was  given  to  the  philosophers,  from  which  they 
 created  dogmas  which  were  sometimes  true.2  Men  may 
 be  justified  by  philosophy.3  But  Clement  proceeds  to 
 qualify  his  appreciation.  The  whole  of  the  Hellenic 
 philosophy  like  nuts  is  not  eatable.4  He  must  be  allowed 
 to  choose  from  among  the  philosophers  what  has  been 
 well  said.  The  Socratic  teaching,  as  given  in  Plato,  is 
 apparently  altogether  edible.  At  least  Clement  “  never 
 criticises  ”  Plato,  “  even  where  he  does  not  follow  him.”  5 
 The  truth-loving  Plato  spoke  as  if  divinely  inspired,0 
 and  through  inspiration  of  God.7  Clement  finds  the  Holy 
 Spirit  and  even  the  Holy  Trinity  in  the  Timaeus .8  Yet 
 though  preparatory  to  the  truly  royal  teaching,  philosophy 
 is  partial  and  powerless.9  It  is  light  artificially  stolen 
 from  the  sun,  like  the  torch  of  wick.10  The  philosophers 
 were  thieves  and  robbers,  stealing  from  the  Hebrew 
 prophets.11  The  teaching  which  is  according  to  the  Saviour 
 is  complete  in  itself,  and  Hellenic  philosophy  does  not 
 make  the  truth  more  powerful.12  On  the  contrary,  philo¬ 
 sophers  are  children  unless  they  have  been  made  men 
 by  Christ.13 
 
 (b)  But  it  is  specially  in  Scripture  that  the  authoritative 
 voice  of  the  Word  is  heard,  the  varied  and  unfading 
 Scriptures,14  the  oracles  of  God,  resplendent  with  the  rays 
 of  truth.  They  are  valid  from  their  omnipotent  autho¬ 
 rity,15  a  short  road  to  salvation,10  and  by  them  one  is  helped 
 to  faith,  another  to  morality,  and  a  third  is  liberated  from 
 superstition  by  the  knowledge  of  things.17  A  liberal 
 interpretation,  however,  is  given  to  the  word  “  Scripture,” 
 for  not  only  are  Apocryphal  books,  like  Ecclesiasticus  and 
 the  Preaching  of  Peter,  quoted  as  Scripture,  but  quotations 
 
 1  Strom,  i.  1,  i.  5.  2  Ibid.  v.  1.  3  Ibid.  i.  4. 
 
 4  Ibid.  1.  5  Gwatkin,  The  Knowledge  of  God ,  ii.  p.  Do. 
 
 9  Strom,  i.  8.  7  Protrep.  6.  6  Strom,  v.  14. 
 
 9  Ibid.  i.  0.  10  Ibid.  v.  5.  11  Ibid.  i.  17. 
 
 12  Ibid.  20.  13  Ibid.  11.  14  Paed.  ii.  11. 
 
 15  Strom,  iv,  2,  16  Probe.  8,  17  Proph.  Script.  28, 
 
EARLY  CHRISTIAN  LITERATUTE 
 
 237 
 
 from  other  works,  not  known  to  us,  are  given  as  from 
 Scripture.1  But  Scripture,  however  defined,  is  the  supreme 
 revelation.  The  fragmentary  utterances  of  the  Word  in 
 Greek  philosophy  are  brought  to  the  test  of  Scripture. 
 All  that  Clement  himself  teaches  he  confesses  derives 
 its  breath  and  life  from  Scripture.2  The  other  means  of 
 acquiring  knowledge  of  the  Word  are  also  subordinated 
 to  Scripture. 
 
 (c)  But  how  far  is  the  authority  of  Christ  expressed 
 by  or  in  the  Church  ?  Clement  has  comparatively  little 
 to  say  about  the  Church.  The  Churches  and  the  shepherds 
 who  preside  over  them  are  referred  to.8  There  is  a  heavenly 
 Church,  and  there  is  an  earthly  Church,  the  latter  being 
 the  image  of  the  former.4  But  it  is  not  always  clear  to 
 which  Clement  is  referring.  It  is  enclosed  in  the  grasp 
 of  faith ;  5  the  holy  mountain  on  which  the  people  of  God 
 are  fed.6  It  binds  Christians  together  as  a  garland  for 
 Christ.7  It  persists  to  all  generations  through  the  en¬ 
 durance  of  its  members.8  Once  the  Church  is  the  virgin 
 mother,0  once  simply  the  good  mother,10  and  once  the 
 title  mother  is  denied  her  and  given  to  the  Divine  Wisdom.11 
 It  is  by  translating  us  into  the  Church  that  the  Word 
 unites  us  to  Himself.12  The  Church  is  regulated  by  the 
 Word.18  It  stands  at  another  time  for  the  disciples,  whom 
 the  Gnostic  Christian  has  begotten  in  faith.14  Within 
 the  external  communion  of  the  Church  of  the  Lord  there 
 are  those  who  do  not  live  in  accordance  with  the  Word, 
 and  these  constitute  the  fleshy  parts  of  the  holy  Church, 
 which  is  itself  a  spiritual  body.15  The  sacrifice  of  the 
 Church  is  a  purely  spiritual  sacrifice.16  It  is  only  when  we 
 come  to  such  expressions  as  “  the  true  church,”  44  the 
 one  church,”  “  the  ancient  and  universal  church,”  44  the 
 rule  of  faith,”  “  the  canon  of  the  church,”  44  the  apostolic 
 
 1  Ibid.  58  ;  Paed.  iii.  12  ;  Strom,  i.  8. 
 
 3  Paed.  i.  6. 
 
 6  Paed.  i.  9. 
 
 9  Ibid.  6. 
 
 2  Strom,  vii.  1. 
 *  Ibid.  ii.  12. 
 
 8  Ibid.  i.  5. 
 
 11  Strom,  vi.  16. 
 14  Ibid.  vii.  9. 
 
 12  Paed.  iii.  12. 
 16  Ibid.  14. 
 
 4  Strom,  iv.  8. 
 
 7  Ibid.  ii.  8. 
 
 10  Ibid.  iii.  12. 
 
 13  Strom,  iv.  26. 
 1(5  Ibid,  6. 
 
238 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 and  ecclesiastical  orthodoxy,”  which  are  almost  entirely 
 confined  to  a  single  book  of  the  Miscellanies  in  which 
 Clement  is  vindicating  the  true  tradition  against  heretics, 
 that  we  seem  to  be  in  an  ecclesiastical  atmosphere.  We 
 should,  however,  do  Clement  an  injustice  if  we  interpreted 
 these  expressions  in  the  light  of  later  usage,  rather  than 
 in  connection  with  his  own  system  of  thought.  We  may 
 notice,  then,  that  according  to  Clement  the  Church  may 
 sing,  but  she  may  not  teach.  It  is  the  Bridegroom,  the 
 Word  Himself,  who  is  alone  the  Teacher.1  And  what  is 
 the  ecclesiastical  canon  but  the  harmony  of  the  law  and 
 the  prophets  in  the  covenant  delivered  at  the  coming  of 
 the  Lord  ?  2  As  a  vindicator  of  apostolic  tradition  and 
 orthodoxy,  as  he  understood  it,  Clement  was  the  liberal 
 churchman  of  his  day.  He  wished  to  be  inclusive,  not 
 exclusive.  His  canon  of  Scripture  was  wider  than  that 
 of  Marcion.  Heretics  were  rejected,  not  for  their  breadth, 
 but  because  they  did  not  find  room  for  all  the  elements 
 of  truth  handed  down  from  the  apostles.  And  even  in 
 this  matter  of  apostolic  tradition  Clement  was  certainly 
 not  the  narrow  ecclesiastic.  The  tradition  was  a  common 
 one,:l  and  before  that  common  tradition  there  was  the 
 venerable  canon  of  tradition  from  the  creation  of  the 
 world,  to  which  the  Churches  could  lay  no  exclusive  claim.4 
 In  so  far  as  there  was  any  apostolic  tradition  known  only 
 to  a  fewr,  it  had  no  authority  independent  of  Scripture, 
 and  it  was  preserved  not  by  the  bishops  or  other 
 ecclesiastical  officers,  but  by  the  Gnostic  Christian.  For 
 nothing  is  more  noticeable  in  Clement’s  treatment  of  the 
 Church  than  the  shadowy  place  assigned  to  the  bishops. 
 It  is  not  they,  but  the  Gnostic  Christians,  who  are  the 
 successors  of  the  apostles.  Once  he  refers  to  the  three 
 ranks  of  deacons,  presbyters  and  bishops,  but  only  in  the 
 same  paragraph  to  let  the  bishops  drop  out ; 5  and  when 
 characterising  the  work  of  the  officers  of  the  Church, 
 
 1  Paed.  iii.  12.  2  Strom,  vi.  15.  3  Ibid.  vii.  17. 
 
 4  Ibid.  i.  1.  6  Ibid.  vi.  13. 
 
EARLY  CHRISTIAN  LITERATURE 
 
 239 
 
 he  only  distinguishes  the  diaconal  and  the  presbyteral.1 
 The  apostolic  tradition  had  not  apparently  come  to 
 him  through  the  bishops,  but  through  men  of  apostolic 
 spirit,  and  by  men  of  apostolic  spirit  it  was  to  be 
 handed  down.  Only  the  true  Gnostic,  who  had  received 
 and  understood  by  reason  of  the  fixed  disposition  of 
 his  soul  the  tradition  of  the  Lord,  could  take  the 
 place  of  the  apostles.  The  qualifications  were  purely 
 spiritual.  This  is  all  the  more  noteworthy  because  of  the 
 exalted  notion  Clement  had  of  the  apostles.  Not  only 
 were  they  noble,  inspired,  blessed,  holy  and  divine,  but 
 they  were  perfected  in  all  gifts.2  They  were  not  liable 
 even  to  such  movements  of  feeling  as  courage,  joy  or 
 desire.3  Together  with  the  Lord  they  suffered  for  our 
 sins,  while  other  men  suffer  for  their  own.4  In  one  pas¬ 
 sage  Clement  says  that  an  apostle  could  alter  Scripture; 
 but  perhaps  the  phrase  ought  not  to  be  pressed.5  The 
 man  who  has  lived  gnostically  may  be  enrolled  in  the 
 chosen  body  of  the  apostles.  Such  a  one  is  really  a 
 presbyter  of  the  Church  and  a  true  minister  of  the  Will 
 of  God,  if  he  do  and  teach  what  is  the  Lord’s,  not  as  being 
 ordained  by  men.0  The  Gnostic  has  a  priestly  work  to 
 do.7  Never  falling  into  sins,8  he  can  make  up  for  the 
 absence  of  the  apostles  by  the  rectitude  of  his  life,  the 
 accuracy  of  his  knowledge,  and  even  by  removing  the 
 sins  of  his  neighbours.9  Such  a  one  passing  through 
 the  spiritual  essences  and  all  rule  and  authority  touches 
 the  highest  thrones.10 
 
 ( d )  From  what  has  been  said  it  is  evident  that  Clement 
 safeguarded  the  rights  of  the  individual  against  any  form  of 
 external  constraint.  The  authoritative  voice  of  the  Word 
 may  be  heard  in  the  soul  of  each  individual.  Men  and 
 women  are  alike  pupils  of  the  Word.11  Under  the  tuition 
 
 1  Strom,  vii.  1.  “So,  the  Lord  who  spake  formerly  by  the  prophets 
 speaks  now  by  the  apostles  and  teachers.  For  the  Church  is  the  minister 
 of  the  Lord’s  power.” — Proph.  Script.  23.  2  I  hid.  iv.  21. 
 
 s  Ibid.  vi.  9.  4  Ibid.  iv.  12.  6  Paed.  ii.  3. 
 
 6  Strom,  vi.  13.  7  Ibid.  vii.  7.  s  Ibid.  12. 
 
 »  Ibid.  7.  10  Ibid.  13.  11  Paed.  i.  4. 
 
240 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 of  the  Word  the  humblest  Christian  may  become  wiser 
 than  all  his  teachers.  Indeed,  he  must  call  no  man  teacher 
 or  master  upon  earth.  Every  one  has  a  witness  inborn 
 and  competent,  namely  faith,  which  of  itself  from  its  own 
 resources  chooses  at  once  what  is  best  instead  of  painfully 
 inquiring.1  Examples  are  not  to  be  despised,  nor  the 
 guidance  which  others  may  give.  Clement  does  not 
 neglect  the  social  side  of  religion.  But  the  stress  is  laid 
 upon  the  individual.  One’s  own  conscience  is  best  for 
 choosing  accurately  or  shunning."  Almost  all  of  us  with¬ 
 out  training  in  arts  and  sciences  and  the  Hellenic  philosophy 
 have  through  faith  received  the  word  concerning  God, 
 trained  by  self-operating  reason.8 
 
 But  how  is  the  authoritative  teaching  of  the  Word  to 
 be  recognised  ?  This  question  is  not  easily  answered, 
 for  Clement’s  eclecticism  prevents  his  being  content  with 
 a  single  answer.  The  quotation,  given  above,  which 
 speaks  of  the  witness,  inborn  and  competent,  might  seem 
 to  solve  the  problem.  In  the  same  address  to  the  Greeks 
 Clement  urges  that  all  men  have  within  them  a  certain 
 divine  effluence,  by  which  they  are  brought  to  confess, 
 though  reluctantly,  that  God  is  one.  May  we  say,  then, 
 that  nothing  beyond  man’s  natural  endowments  are  re¬ 
 quired  to  discern  the  truth  of  the  authoritative  Word  ? 
 We  may  turn  first  to  a  remarkable  description  of  man’s 
 powers  given  in  connection  with  an  exposition  of  the  ten 
 commandments.  There  it  is  said  that  there  is  a  ten  also 
 in  man.  The  first  seven  of  these  powers  are  the  five 
 senses,  the  power  of  speech,  and  that  of  reproduction ;  the 
 last  three  are  the  spiritual  principle  imparted  at  creation, 
 the  ruling  faculty  of  the  soul,  and  the  distinctive  character¬ 
 istic  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  which  comes  through  faith.  By 
 the  spiritual  principle  is  meant  the  vital  sense,  through 
 which  the  body  becomes  the  subject  of  sensations.  This 
 is  irrational,  but  is  followed  by  the  ruling  faculty  or  power 
 of  choice  in  which  investigation  and  study  and  knowledge 
 reside.  What  the  characteristic  is  which  comes  through 
 
 1  Protr.  10.  2  Strom,  i.  1.  3  Ibid.  20. 
 
EARLY  CHRISTIAN  LITERATURE 
 
 241 
 
 faith  is  not  further  defined,  but  apart  from  this  the 
 primacy  seems  to  be  given  to  volition  as  the  principle  in 
 which  knowledge  resides.1  This  pragmatic  position  is 
 more  fully  stated  elsewhere,  and  the  precedence  given  to 
 volition ;  the  intellectual  powers  being  regarded  as 
 ministers  of  the  will.2  Unswerving  choice  gives  consider¬ 
 able  momentum  in  the  direction  of  knowledge.3  Else¬ 
 where  reason  is  called  the  governing  principle  or  pilot 
 of  the  soul,4  and  knowledge  is  said  to  come  first  and  im¬ 
 pulse  second,  both  being  excited  by  objects  already  ex¬ 
 isting.1  Are  we,  then,  to  consider  Clement  as  endeavouring 
 to  unite  the  views  of  Plato  and  the  Cynics,  and  go  back  to 
 the  unresolved  dualism  of  Socrates  with  the  emphasis  on 
 knowledge  ?  This  would  be  quite  in  harmony  with  his 
 eclectic  spirit ;  but  Clement  was  a  Christian  as  well  as  a 
 philosopher,  and  he  seeks  through  the  notion  of  faith 
 to  solve  the  unsolved  problem  of  philosophy.  Faith  is 
 allied  on  the  one  hand  with  volition,  and  is  the  result  of 
 free  choice,  and  on  the  other  hand  with  knowledge.15  As 
 the  inborn  and  competent  witness  it  chooses ;  but  by  a 
 kind  of  divine,  mutual  and  reciprocal  correspondence  it 
 becomes  characterised  by  knowledge.7  It  is  at  the  same 
 time  both  practical  and  theoretical.  It  is  natural,  and  it 
 is  divine.  It  is  a  power  of  God,  being  the  strength  of  the 
 truth.8  Whether  founded  in  love  or  in  fear,  it  is  something 
 divine,  and  not  a  mere  human  habit.9  But  it  is  also 
 ratiocinative,  a  grace  which  from  what  is  indemonstrable 
 conducts  to  what  is  universal  and  simple.10 
 
 Faith,  then,  though  allied  with  man’s  natural  powers  of 
 volition  and  knowledge,  is  a  divine  gift  or  grace.  It  is  not 
 simply  an  act  of  the  will  or  a  movement  of  the  reason. 
 It  is  due  to  the  action  of  God  upon  man.  It  implies  a 
 Revealer,  as  well  as  one  who  receives  the  revelation.  The 
 Word  is  the  living  Word,  self-revealing,  self-authenticating. 
 It  is  by  divine  grace  and  the  Word  alone  that  we  come 
 
 1  Strom,  vi.  16.  2  Ibid.  ii.  17.  Ibid.  2.  4  Ibid.  17. 
 
 3  Ibid.  vi.  8.  6  Ibid.  ii.  .3.  7  Ibid.  4.  8  Ibid.  11. 
 
 9  Ibid.  6.  10  Ibid.  4. 
 
 R 
 
242 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 to  know.1  He  is  the  Sun  of  the  soul  by  whom  alone, 
 when  He  arises  in  the  depths  of  the  soul,  the  eye  of  the  soul 
 itself  is  irradiated.2  Again  and  again  in  glowing  terms 
 Clement  ascribes  to  the  living  Word  the  power  of  dissipat¬ 
 ing  a  darkness  too  dense  for  the  unaided  intellect  or  will 
 of  man  to  pierce.  In  the  last  resort  he  is  neither  a  prag¬ 
 matist  nor  a  rationalist,  still  less  an  emotionalist,  but 
 simply  a  Christian.  Faith  does  not  require  demonstration. 
 It  brings  with  it  its  own  authentication.  By  its  very 
 nature  it  implies  the  presence  of  the  Word,  and  as  He 
 speaks  to  the  soul  there  is  a  demonstration  which  cannot 
 be  impugned.3  Believe  God  through  His  voice,  he  says, 
 and  rest  in  the  infallible  criterion  of  faith.4  The  followers 
 of  the  Samian  Pythagoras  regarded  the  ipse  dixit  of  their 
 teacher  as  sufficient,  why  further  test  the  utterances  of 
 our  trustworthy  Teacher  God,  the  only  Saviour  ? 5  Is 
 this  obscurantism,  and  an  insufficient  support  for  morality  ? 
 Clement  thought  it  was  neither.  The  faith  which  obeyed 
 the  Word  was  obedience  to  reason,  and  the  efficacious 
 cause  of  duty.6  With  that  kind  of  faith  in  his  heart,  and 
 with  its  handbook,  at  once  rude  and  divine,  called  love, 
 in  his  hand,  the  most  unlettered  believer  would  find  it  in 
 his  power  to  listen  to  divine  wisdom,  and  to  frame  his 
 life  in  accordance  with  it ;  7  and  having  attained  a  fixed 
 moral  disposition,  then  and  not  till  then,  would  scientific 
 knowledge  be  possible.8 
 
 Finally,  Clement  has  reasons  to  give  in  justification  of 
 obedience  to  the  authority  of  the  Word,  as  thus  revealed 
 and  recognised.  Man  is  the  image  of  the  Word,  as  the 
 Word  is  the  image  of  God.  Obedience  to  the  Word  is  there¬ 
 fore  the  fulfilment  of  our  own  nature.  We  are  also  the 
 creatures,  the  rational  creatures  of  the  Word,  and  there- 
 
 1  Strom,  v.  11,  12.  2  Protr.  (5,  11.  3  Strom,  ii.  2. 
 
 4  Ibid.  4.  5  Ibid.  5.  6  Food.  i.  13.  7  Ibid.  iii.  11. 
 
 8  Strom,  vi.  1).  Bigg  says  that  “the  great  Platonic  maxim”  of  Clement, 
 “  that  nothing  is  to  be  believed  which  is  unworthy  of  God  makes  reason 
 a  judge  of  revelation.” — Christian  Platonists  of  Alex.,  p.  51.  “  It  is 
 
 balanced,”  says  Mayor,  “by  another  maxim,  viz.  respect  due  to  Church 
 or  apostolic  tradition.  ” — Cl.  of  Alex.  Miscellanies,  p.  xxxvii.  In  the  light 
 of  the  foregoing  citations  this  hardly  seems  a  complete  statement. 
 
EARLY  CHRISTIAN  LITERATURE  243 
 
 fore  owe  allegiance  to  Him.1  It  is  monstrous  that  those 
 who  are  God’s  handiwork  should  be  subject  to  another 
 Master  instead  of  to  their  rightful  King.2  The  divine 
 Instructor  has  authority,  because  He  has  created  us  in 
 His  image,  that  we  may  attain  to  His  likeness.3  But 
 the  evangelical  appeal  is  not  wanting.  The  Word  is  not 
 simply  the  Instructor  and  Creator,  but  the  Physician  who 
 healed  the  bodies  and  souls  of  men.4  He  is  the  expiator 
 of  sin; 5  the  forgiver  of  sins,0  who  died  for  those  enslaved.7 
 The  blessedness  of  sin  forgiven  came  on  those  who  had 
 been  chosen  by  God  through  Jesus  Christ  our  Lord.8 
 We  have  as  a  limit  the  cross  of  the  Lord,  by  which  we  are 
 fenced  and  hedged  about  from  our  former  sins.9  The 
 Word  forgives  our  sins,  and  trains  us  not  to  sin.  It  is 
 incumbent  on  us  therefore  to  return  His  love.10  And 
 other  passages  of  this  kind  might  be  adduced.  Occasionally 
 we  find  even  Clement  succumbing  to  the  tendency  of  the 
 natural  man  to  limit  the  fulness  of  the  Redeemer’s  grace, 
 as  when  the  distinction  is  made  between  the  sins  forgiven 
 by  Christ  and  those  purged  away  by  suffering.  But 
 Clement  speaks  quite  clearly  regarding  the  absolute 
 authority  of  the  Word  as  Redeemer.  “  I  regenerated  thee, 
 I  emancipated,  healed,  ransomed  thee.  Follow  thou 
 me.  I  am  He  who  feeds  thee,  giving  Myself  as  bread.  .  .  . 
 For  thee  I  contended  with  death,  and  paid  thy  debt, 
 which  thou  owedst  for  thy  former  sins  and  thy  unbelief 
 toward  God.”  11 
 
 So  many-sided  is  Clement’s  treatment  of  this  great 
 theme,  that  one  hesitates  to  speak  of  defects.  Probably 
 no  early  ecclesiastical  writer  has  done  such  ample  justice 
 to  the  question  of  our  Lord’s  authority.  But  even  Clement 
 had  his  limitations.  Though  he  was  a  Christian,  he  was 
 also  a  Platonist,  and  a  perfect  harmony  between  the 
 Platonic  conception  of  God  and  that  contained  in  the 
 Gospels  is  impossible.  The  Platonic  principle  that  the 
 
 1  Protr.  1.  2  Ibid.  10.  3  Paed.  i.  11.  4  Quis  Dives,  29. 
 
 5  Protr.  10.  G  Paed,  i.  8.  7  Prot.  10.  8  Strom,  ii.  15. 
 
 9  Paed.  iii.  12.  10  Ibid,  i.  3.  11  Quis  Dives,  23. 
 
 R  2 
 
244 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 Divine  and  human  will  not  blend  makes  a  real  incarnation 
 inconceivable.  So  Clement  says  that  God  is  in  essence 
 remote,  though  His  power  is  always  present.1  We  are  in 
 no  respects  related  to  Him  in  essence,  or  nature,  or  in  the 
 peculiar  energy  of  our  essence,  but  only  in  our  being  the 
 work  of  His  will.2  As  adopted  sons,  we  are  only  like  Him, 
 as  being  made  immortal  and  conversant  with  the  con¬ 
 templation  of  realities.3  As  a  philosopher,  Clement  never 
 realises  the  proper  significance  of  the  Incarnation.  He,  of 
 course,  accepts  the  fundamental  truth  of  the  Word  made 
 flesh.4  For  our  sakes  He  became  man.5  Though  mani¬ 
 fest  deity  He  is  yet  the  fellow-champion  with  the  creature.0 
 Under  the  influence  of  Scripture  quotations  he  can  say, 
 When  He  might  have  been  Lord,  He  wished  to  be  a 
 brother  man,  and  so  good  was  He,  that  He  died  for  us.7 
 But  as  a  philosopher  he  speaks  of  the  holy  God  Jesus,8 
 the  mystic  angel  Jesus  and  of  the  Word  Incarnate  as  in¬ 
 tellectual  light.9  We  cease  to  live  after  the  flesh  by  ceasing 
 to  sin,  Jesus  Christ  did  so  by  ceasing  to  be  subject  to 
 natural  affection.10  Clement  is  under  the  influence  of 
 Plato  and  the  Stoics  in  his  way  of  regarding  the  affections. 
 The  model  for  man,  the  divine  Word,  is  intellectual.11  The 
 image  of  God  is  the  divine  and  royal  Word,  the  impassible 
 man,  and  the  image  of  the  image  is  the  human  mind.12 
 Though  in  speaking  to  catechumens  he  says  that  body 
 and  soul  are  the  proper  man,11  he  tells  the  advanced  Christian 
 that  he  is  no  longer  to  make  use  of  his  body.14  Jesus  Christ, 
 though  He  received  a  body  like  our  own,  trained  it  to  a 
 condition  of  impassibility,  so  that  He  had  no  longer  any 
 need  to  eat  and  drink.15  Often,  under  the  influence  of  the 
 Gospel,  Clement  seems  to  be  ridding  himself  of  this  Platonic 
 incubus ;  but  it  comes  back  again,  and  once  at  least  drops 
 him  into  the  abyss  of  Neo-Platonic  mysticism.  The 
 perfect  Christian,  he  tells  us,  enters  so  nearly  into  a  state 
 
 1  Strom,  ii.  1.  2  Ibkl,  10.  3  Ibid.  17. 
 
 4  Paed.  i.  3.  5  Ibid.  8.  c  Protr.  10. 
 
 Paed.  i.  9.  8  Ibid.  7.  9  Fray,  from  Nicetas. 
 
 10  Frag.  11  Strom,  vi.  9.  12  Ibid.  v.  14. 
 
 13  Paed.  iii.  12.  14  Strom,  vi.  9.  13  Ibid.  9. 
 
EARLY  CHRISTIAN  LITERATURE 
 
 245 
 
 of  impassible  identity,  as  no  longer  to  have  science 
 and  possess  knowledge,  but  to  be  science  and  knowledge. 
 Divesting  himself  of  his  complete  humanity  he  may  be¬ 
 come  like  God  in  contemplation  and  immortality;  he  may 
 even  become  God.1 
 
 Not  unconnected  with  this  failure  to  appreciate  to  the 
 full  the  complete  humanity  of  our  Lord,  and  its  essential 
 connection  with  His  authority  over  men,  is  the  prevailing 
 character  of  Clement’s  references  to  the  Holy  Spirit.  He 
 tells  us  that  in  other  works,  which  have  not  come  down  to 
 us,  he  wished  to  treat  more  fully  regarding  the  Holy  Spirit, 
 showing  both  what  the  Holy  Spirit  is  and  in  what  way 
 it  resides  in  each  of  us.'2  We  have,  however,  some  scores 
 of  allusions  to  the  Spirit  in  his  extant  writings.  Many 
 of  these  are  merely  incidental  :  many  more  are  simply 
 quotations,  and  it  is  difficult  to  determine  how  far  Clement 
 had  himself  assimilated  the  Scriptural  teaching  on  this 
 subject.  There  are  occasions  when  Clement  seems  to  be 
 reproducing  apostolic  truths.3  Rut  his  misquotation  of 
 1  Cor.  ii.  10  is  characteristic.4  And,  in  general,  we  may 
 say  that  the  work  of  the  Spirit  is  conceived  in  too 
 physical  and  gnostic  a  manner.5  Even  illumination  of 
 the  Spirit  is  not  so  much  with  a  view  to  practical  guidance, 
 or  to  a  fuller  knowledge  of  the  things  of  Jesus  Christ,  as 
 to  make  the  Christian  impassible,  and  lead  to  a  knowledge 
 of  real  existences.6  In  the  midst  of  much  that  is  scriptural, 
 we  seem  to  miss  that  profound  conviction  of  the  essential 
 connection  of  the  work  of  the  Spirit  with  the  facts  of  an 
 actual  historical  redemption,  which  is  so  marked  a  feature 
 of  New  Testament  teaching.  The  Logos  rather  than  the 
 Holy  Spirit,  who  was  sent  by  Jesus  Christ  from  the  Father, 
 is  the  Christian’s  guide.  The  change  is  not  simply  one  of 
 terminology  or  theology,  but  also  of  serious  practical 
 moment.  The  historical  significance  of  the  Spirit’s  mission 
 
 1  Strom,  vi.  6.  2  Ibid.  v.  13. 
 
 3  E.  g.  Protr.  9  ;  Paed.  iii.  11  ;  Strom,  iv.  7,  3  and  9  ;  vii.  2,  14  ;  Proph. 
 Script.  13,  45  ;  Fragments  from  Cassiodorw.  4  Strom,  ii.  2. 
 
 6  E.  g.  Paed.  i.  12  ;  ii.  2  ;  iii.  3  ;  Strom,  vi.  15,  16.  li  Strom,  vi.  16. 
 
246 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 is  faintly  apprehended.  That  means,  as  compared  both 
 with  Pauline  and  Johannine  teaching,  defective  views  of 
 sin,  atonement  and  human  perfection.  It  also  means 
 that,  valuable  as  Clement’s  teaching  may  have  been  as  a 
 via  media  between  Gnostic  doctrine  on  the  one  hand  and 
 apostolic  teaching  on  the  other,  it  was  insufficient  both 
 as  against  Gnosticism  and  Montanism. 
 
 The  limits  of  space  prevent  further  reference  to  the 
 Gnostic  writers  and  Montanist  prophets.  There  were 
 Christian  elements  in  their  teaching,  just  as  there  were 
 heathen  elements  in  the  more  Catholic  writers ;  and  the 
 authority  of  our  Lord  was  in  varying  degrees  acknow¬ 
 ledged.  But  in  spite  of  resemblances  in  phraseology  and 
 idea,  the  “  God  Lord  Jesus  Christ  ”  of  the  Acts  of  John  is 
 more  like  the  Saviour-Gods  of  the  Mysteries  than  the 
 divinely-human  Saviour  of  the  apostolic  writings ;  and  the 
 ecstatic  and  legalistic  aspects  of  Montanism  prevent  us 
 from  regarding  it  as  a  genuine  revival  of  apostolic  Chris¬ 
 tianity.  But  Montanism  was  a  much-needed  protest 
 against  intellectual! sm  on  the  one  hand  and  ecclesiasticism 
 on  the  other  :  and  who  shall  say  that  it  misrepresented 
 the  Gospel  to  a  greater  extent  than  the  other  movements  ? 
 Ought  we  not  rather  to  see  in  all  three,  honest,  if  in  part 
 misguided,  attempts  to  make  real  the  authority  of  Jesus 
 Christ  among  men  ?  And  may  we  not  still  believe  that 
 the  Spirit  of  Truth  is  guiding  men  into  all  truth,  even 
 through  the  partial  successes  and  disastrous  failures  of 
 the  past  ?  Infallibility  belongs  to  nothing  that  is  human. 
 The  more  perfect  interpretation  and  application  of  the 
 faith  once  delivered  to  the  saints  is  the  task  awaiting 
 every  generation.  “  Nothing  visible  is  eternal.”  Creeds 
 and  ministries  and  institutions  will  change,  but  there  is 
 a  Word  which  liveth  and  abideth,  and  a  Church  against 
 which  the  gates  even  of  an  unseen  world  shall  not  prevail. 
 And  the  hope  burns  yet  more  brightly  that  in  the  name  of 
 Jesus  every  knee  shall  bow,  and  every  tongue  confess  that 
 He  is  Lord  to  the  glory  of  God  the  Father, 
 
ESSAY  VIII 
 
 THE  HOLY  SPIRIT  AND  DIVINE  IMMANENCE 
 Rev.  Prof.  W.  T.  Davison,  M.A.,  D.D. 
 
SYNOPSIS 
 
 Different  interpretations  of  the  word  “  God  ”  and  of  His  relation  to 
 the  world.  The  Problem  of  Divine  Immanence — is  it  solved  by  the 
 Christian  Doctrine  of  the  Holy  Spirit  ? 
 
 I.  Current  uses  of  the  doctrine  of  Immanence  as  excluding  Tran¬ 
 scendence.  Spinoza,  Hegel,  and  their  influence  on  modern  thinkers. 
 
 II.  The  Neo-Hegelian  School;  views  of  the  brothers  Caird  and  T.  H. 
 Green  stated  and  criticised.  Eucken ;  the  Modernists ;  tendency  to  merge 
 transcendence  in  immanence. 
 
 III.  Monism,  ambiguity  of  the  term,  Sir  O.  Lodge’s  definition.  Ideal¬ 
 istic  Monism,  is  it  compatible  with  Theism  ?  W.  James,  Pluralism  and 
 Pragmatism.  No  real  unity  for  the  universe  in  strict  Monism. 
 
 IV.  Theistic  doctrine  combines  transcendence  and  immanence,  but 
 the  former  comes  first.  Human  personality  must  be  preserved.  The 
 Personality  of  God,  limiting  Himself  in  Creation.  All  things  in  God,  or 
 God  in  all  things  ?  True  Theistic  doctrine. 
 
 V.  The  Bible  ;  teaching  of  the  Old  Testament.  St.  John  and  the  Logos. 
 Relation  of  God  to  the  world  implied  in  the  Incarnation  and  the  Cross. 
 Climax  in  the  Christian  doctrine  of  the  Holy  Spirit.  Light  shed  by  it 
 on  various  aspects  of  Immanence.  Problem  of  Evil ;  the  true  Indwelling 
 yet  to  come. 
 
 VI.  Bearings  of  the  subject  on  current  Theology.  An  adequate 
 doctrine  of  Immanence  would  rejuvenate  Theism.  Bearing  on  the 
 questions  of  the  Supernatural,  Providence,  Revelation  and  Atonement. 
 Emerson’s  “  Over-Soul  ”  contrasted  with  Augustine’s  Christian  Mysticism. 
 The  “  mystery  ”  of  the  doctrine  no  impenetrable  abyss,  but  an  open  secret. 
 The  lifting  of  the  veil. 
 
THE  HOLY  SPIRIT  AND  DIVINE  IMMANENCE 
 
 One  of  the  most  discriminating  of  the  Gifford  lecturers 
 points  out  that  44  the  question  which  is  at  the  root  of  the 
 theological  embarrassment  of  the  present  day  is,  What 
 does  the  word  4  God  5  mean  ?  ”  1  The  rapidly  multiplying 
 series  of  lectures  on  the  Gifford  foundation — including 
 the  work  of  thinkers  so  various  as  Max  Muller,  Edward  and 
 John  Caird,  Pfleiderer,  Tiele,  Royce  and  Gwatkin — form 
 an  appropriate  commentary  on  Dr.  Fraser’s  text.  It 
 may  be  a  strange,  it  is  certainly  an  instructive,  fact  that 
 in  the  twentieth  century  a.d.  the  one  sacred  Name  should 
 be  so  differently  interpreted,  not  only  by  philosophers, 
 but  by  Theistic  and  even  nominally  Christian  teachers. 
 
 It  cannot  be  matter  of  surprise  if  the  exact  place  and 
 function  in  the  universe  of  the  Homeric  44  gods  ”  is  open 
 to  question ;  if  scholars  still  debate  whether  Plato’s  Idea 
 of  the  Good,  which  is  the  source  of  all  knowledge  and  of 
 all  existence,  stands  as  a  philosophical  conception  of  44  God  ” 
 and  howr  it  is  related  to  the  44  Maker  and  Father  of  all  ” 
 in  the  Timceus.  Nor  can  Ave  wonder  if  contradictions 
 are  to  be  found  even  in  Aristotle,  who  at  one  time  uses  the 
 term  44  gods  ”  as  if  he  shared  the  polytheism  of  the  multi¬ 
 tude,  at  another  employs  vaguely  deistic  language  con¬ 
 cerning  design  in  nature,  and  again  at  another  gathers 
 the  ultimate  principles  of  knowledge  and  existence  into 
 one  dimly  pantheistic  whole,  as  robots  vofjoecog ,  absolute 
 self-consciousness.  It  has  often  been  pointed  out  how 
 misleading  is  the  name  God  in  the  Stoic  philosophy,  and 
 that  Stoicism  can  never  be  understood  unless  it  be  borne 
 in  mind  that  the  God  of  whom  Seneca,  M.  Aurelius  and 
 
 Philosophy  of  Theism.  By  A.  C.  Fraser,  LL.l).,  p.  33  (2nd  edition), 
 
 249 
 
 i 
 
250 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 Epictetus  write  in  tones  of  almost  devotional  fervour  is 
 no  more  than  Eternal  Substance  in  a  materialistically 
 pantheistic  sense.  The  Stoic  Deity  is  indeed  dynamic, 
 not  mechanical,  it  is  an  active  principle  of  existence; 
 but  it  is  not  far  removed  from  the  “  Substance  ”  of  Hack  el, 
 who  on  one  page  rules  out  the  central  doctrines  of  God, 
 Freedom  and  Immortality  as  incredible  and  mischievous 
 lies,  and  on  another  defines  God,  “  the  infinite  sum  of  all 
 natural  forces,  the  sum  of  all  atomic  forces  and  ether 
 vibrations,”  as  the  only  idea  of  the  Divine  compatible 
 with  our  present  knowledge  of  nature. 
 
 But  it  might  well  be  supposed  that  amongst  Theists — 
 not  to  say  Christians — of  our  own  day  the  fundamental 
 connotation  of  the  term  “  God  ”  could  hardly  give  rise 
 to  serious  difference  of  opinion.  Certain  definitions  of 
 God,  derived  from  mediaeval  philosophy  and  embodied 
 in  orthodox  catechisms,  might  be  challenged  without 
 serious  departure  from  fundamental  conceptions.  But 
 the  Theism  of  the  present  age  would  seem  to  be  of  a  very 
 uncertain  type,  varying  from  a  firm  belief  in  the  ultimate 
 Principle  of  Existence  as  spiritual  and  personal,  to  ideas 
 which  fade  away  into  a  nebulous  mist  of  Pantheism 
 hardly  distinguishable  from  atheistic  Naturalism.  There 
 is  a  suggestive  passage  in  one  of  William  James’s  later 
 books,  in  which  he  describes  the  God  of  ordinary  religious 
 men  as  “  the  ideal  tendency  in  things,  believed  in  as  a 
 superhuman  person,”  adding  that  whilst  there  are  those 
 who  are  persuaded  that  God  cannot  be  finite,  “  I  believe 
 that  the  only  God  worthy  of  the  name  must  be  finite.” 
 
 These  underlying,  and  often  undetected,  diversities 
 of  meaning  attaching  to  the  name  God,  are  closely  con¬ 
 nected  with,  and  indeed  depend  upon,  a  fundamental 
 uncertainty  as  to  His  relation  to  the  world.  The  very 
 idea  of  God  implies  some  conception  of  His  relation  to 
 the  universe.  Of  the  unconditioned  and  unrelated  we 
 can  know  nothing.  An  adequate  definition  of  the  Divine 
 Essence  must  describe  the  way  in  which  it  is  related  to 
 the  Cosmos  of  which  man  forms  a  part.  In  this  con¬ 
 nection  the  emergence  and  rapid  adoption  of  the  word 
 
THE  HOLY  SPIRIT 
 
 251 
 
 Immanence  is  noteworthy.  To  its  use,  or  abuse,  may  be 
 traced  much  of  the  confusion  now  beclouding  some  regions 
 of  the  theological  world.  There  are  reasons  enough  in 
 the  discoveries  and  changes  in  the  last  half-century  to 
 account  for  serious  modifications  in  men’s  ideas  as  to  the 
 relation  of  the  universe  to  God.  But  it  is  exceedingly 
 desirable  that  these,  whatever  they  are,  should  be  clearly 
 understood  and  not  be  allowed  to  float  unobserved  in  the 
 atmosphere  of  religious  conceptions,  which  may  be  practi- 
 callv  revolutionised  before  men  are  conscious  of  the  fact. 
 
 The  stress  now  laid  upon  the  Divine  Immanence  in 
 the  universe  is  in  the  main  an  encouraging  sign  of  health 
 and  progress.  If  a  living  belief  in  a  living  God  is  to  be 
 maintained,  rather  than  a  tacit  acceptance  of  a  catalogue 
 of  abstract  categories,  it  must  be  through  a  realisation 
 of  His  present,  intimate,  indwelling  energy.  But  the 
 progress  of  human  thought  is  too  often  one  of  evolution 
 by  antagonism.  The  pendulum  swings  from  extreme 
 to  extreme  and  refuses  to  stand  still  at  the  middle  point 
 of  vibration.  A  hard  Deism  provokes  a  recoil  into  loose 
 Pantheism.  And  on  this  most  momentous  of  all  subjects,  the 
 nature  of  God  and  His  relation  to  the  world,  it  is  well  that 
 the  restless  process  of  widening  and  deepening  the  thoughts 
 of  men  should  be  watched  in  all  its  steps  and  stages. 
 Christian  theists  claim  to  combine  the  transcendence  of 
 God  demanded  by  religion  with  His  immanence  in  nature 
 as  demanded  by  science  and  philosophy.  But  the  com¬ 
 bination  is  not  easy,  and  it  has  been  attempted  in  some 
 quarters  with  very  questionable  success.  Is  it  true  that 
 the  Christian  doctrine  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  when  rightly 
 understood,  indicates  a  middle  path  between  erroneous 
 extremes  ?  Or  rather  that  it  furnishes  the  central  verity 
 which  comprehends  and  combines  truths  lying  at  the 
 heart  of  opposing  errors  ?  It  is  the  object  of  this  paper 
 to  indicate  some  lines  along  which  an  affirmative  answer 
 may  be  rendered  to  that  vitally  important  question.  It 
 will  be  necessary  first  to  discriminate  between  a  truly 
 Theistic  and  other  doctrines  of  Divine  Immanence,  !and 
 then  to  show  that  the  Christian  doctrine  of  God — and 
 
252 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 especially  of  the  Holy  Spirit — makes  it  easier  to  accept 
 and  maintain  the  teaching  of  Theism. 
 
 I 
 
 Immanence  is  properly  a  philosophical  term,  and  the 
 word  is  rare  in  English  literature.  The  Oxford  Dictionary 
 adduces  no  example  of  it  earlier  than  S.  T.  Coleridge, 
 whose  freedom  in  coining  words  is  well  known.  The 
 adjective  14  immanent  ”  is  more  familiar.  As  a  quality 
 of  actions  it  is  opposed  (following  Aristotle)  to  transitive  ; 
 and  in  rendering  Kant  it  is  opposed  to  transcendental. 
 So  far  as  its  associations  are  concerned,  the  term  44  imma¬ 
 nent  philosophy  ”  is  understood  to  mean  either  the  ex¬ 
 clusive  indwelling  of  God  in  nature  and  in  man  in  a  natur¬ 
 alistic  or  pantheistic  sense,  or  else  the  doctrine  that  all 
 reality  may  be  reduced  to  elements  abiding  within  con¬ 
 sciousness.  From  the  times  of  the  Stoics  to  Alexander 
 Pope  an  44  immanent  God  ”  has  been  understood  to  be 
 one  who 
 
 c<  Breathes  in  our  soul,  informs  our  mortal  part. 
 
 As  full,  as  perfect,  in  a  hair  as  heart  : 
 
 As  full,  as  perfect,  in  vile  man  that  mourns. 
 
 As  the  rapt  seraph  that  adores  and  burns  : 
 
 To  Him  no  high,  no  low,  no  great,  no  small  : 
 
 He  fills.  He  bounds,  connects,  and  equals  all.” 
 
 Within  the  last  few  years  in  this  country  the  word  44  imma¬ 
 nence  ”  has  come  rapidly  into  use,  almost  supplanting 
 44  omnipresence  ”  as  an  attribute  of  God.  But  it  has 
 been  substituted  without  being  defined,  and  under  cover 
 of  it  views  of  the  Divine  Being  and  His  relation  to  the 
 world  have  been  inculcated  which  the  older  word  would 
 not  cover.  For  the  most  part  this  is  pure  gain.  Believers 
 in  God  desired  to  say  not  only  that  He  is  present  every¬ 
 where,  but  how  He  is  present ;  that  His  action  upon  the 
 universe  is  from  within  rather  than  from  without,  or  from 
 within  as  well  as  from  without ;  that  such  informing  and 
 inhabiting  of  all  nature  is  continuous,  not  transient ;  and 
 that  it  is  all-pervasive  and  intimately  interpenetrative 
 in  a  sense  hardly  hitherto  realised.  The  strong  tendency 
 to  emphasise  these  aspects  of  God’s  relation  to  the  world 
 
THE  HOLY  SPIRIT 
 
 253 
 
 is  due  to  many  causes,  prominent  among  which  is  the 
 prevalence  of  theories  of  evolution.  But  it  is  necessary 
 to  ask  exactly  what  the  tendency  means,  and  how  far  it 
 may  legitimately  be  carried  by  those  who  still  claim  to 
 be  Theists. 
 
 For  it  is  quite  certain  that  in  the  hands  of  its  great 
 representative  advocates  the  doctrine  of  Divine  Immanence 
 has  excluded  transcendence  and  has  practically  spelled 
 Pantheism.  A  standard  illustration  is  found  in  Spinoza, 
 upon  whose  system  it  would  be  unnecessary  to  touch, 
 were  it  not  that  he  is  the  intellectual  ancestor  of  types 
 of  theory  now  prevalent  that  are  called  theistic.  Defenders 
 of  Spinoza,  in  repelling  the  charge  of  Atheism  made  against 
 him,  have  fairly  replied  that  he  was  rather  an  Acosmist ; 
 but  they  have  failed  to  see  that  to  deny  the  existence  of 
 the  universe  by  giving  it  the  name  of  God  is  equivalent 
 to  denying  God  by  identifying  Him  with  the  universe. 
 According  to  Spinoza,  44  whatever  is,  is  in  God,  and  without 
 God  nothing  can  be  conceived.”  There  is,  and  can  be, 
 only  one  Substance,  44  that  which  is  in  itself  and  is  con¬ 
 ceived  through  itself.”  God,  who  is  the  one  Substance, 
 is  44  a  Being  single  and  infinite,  which  is  the  totality  of 
 being  and  beyond  which  there  is  no  being.”  This  whole 
 includes  and  determines  all  individual  existences,  and 
 their  substantial  reality  therefore  disappears.  God  is 
 omne  esse ,  He  is  44  not  the  transient,  but  the  immanent 
 cause  of  the  world.”  He  is  causa  sui  and  causa  omnium 
 rerum ,  the  one  substance  which  is  both  self-differentiating 
 and  self-integrating.  The  differentiation  is  traced  out 
 in  infinite  attributes,  of  which  two  are  known  to  us — 
 thought  and  extension.  These  are  two  sides  of  the  same 
 thing,  the  two  ways  in  which  we,  by  the  very  form  of 
 our  intelligence,  think  of  God;  necessary  categories  under 
 which  the  human  mind  represents  Him.  The  further 
 differentiation  of  these  two  attributes  into  finite  and 
 infinite  modes  is  then  pursued,  but  the  relation  of  modes 
 to  attributes  is  not  made  entirely  clear,  for  it  would  seem 
 that  individual  finite  things  have  only  a  fictitious  existence. 
 Whether  Spinoza  meant  to  teach  that  God  is  all  and  the 
 
254 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 world  is  nothing,  or  that  God  is  the  one  Being  that  expands 
 into  an  infinite  number  of  individual  modifications,  is 
 still  matter  of  debate.  The  philosopher  himself  may  not 
 have  clearly  distinguished  between  the  two  ways  of  regard¬ 
 ing  the  relation  of  the  One  and  the  many,  both  of  them 
 Pantheistic — the  former  of  an  Eastern,  the  latter  of  a 
 Western  type.  One  thing,  however,  is  clear,  that  for 
 Spinoza  no  transcendence  on  the  part  of  the  Deity  is 
 possible,  immanence  is  complete  and  sufficient.  And  all 
 modern  doctrines  of  immanence  which  reproduce  Spinoza’s 
 fundamental  principles,  though  they  are  not  worked  out 
 with  his  logical  and  mathematical  precision,  must  come 
 under  the  condemnation  that  for  them  immanence  means 
 identification. 
 
 The  fascination  of  so  lofty  and  all-embracing  a  philo¬ 
 sophy  has  always  been  felt  by  certain  types  of  mind,  but 
 it  was  probably  more  manifest  in  the  latter  part  of  the 
 nineteenth  century  than  at  any  period  since  Spinoza’s 
 death.  Side  by  side  with  his  influence  there  was  operative 
 that  of  another  master  thinker,  who  from  his  own  stand¬ 
 point  undertook  to  set  forth  “  the  glory  of  the  sum  of 
 things  ” — Hegel.  For  him  the  rational  is  the  real,  the 
 real  is  the  rational.  “  All  reality  is  the  expression  of 
 reason,  and  all  being  the  realisation  of  thought.”  The 
 concrete  universe  in  all  its  history  is  a  development  of  the 
 Absolute,  a  process  of  the  Self-manifestation  of  God.  The 
 Absolute  exists  first  as  pure  Idea,  but  by  the  dialectic 
 which  obtains  throughout  all  existence — the  law  of  develop¬ 
 ment  which  proceeds  by  thesis,  antithesis  and  synthesis 
 — it  becomes  the  Universe  in  continuous  evolution.  All 
 reality  is  a  synthesis  of  opposites.  Only  the  whole  is  real; 
 all  things  else  that  can  be  named  are  partial  abstractions. 
 Ildvza  Q8i — all  things  fleet  away,  the  river  of  existence  is 
 never  still.  The  partial  is  not  only  fleeting,  but  false. 
 Truth,  reality,  is  the  organic  unity  of  opposites.  God,  the 
 one  Reality,  reproduces  Himself  or  realises  Himself  in 
 nature,  in  history,  in  mind.  Himself  Spirit,  His  potential 
 being  becomes  actual  in  the  universe,  coming  to  self-con¬ 
 sciousness  in  mind  and  returning  to  Himself  in  Spirit  again. 
 
THE  HOLY  SPIRIT 
 
 255 
 
 For  Hegel  as  for  Spinoza,  the  process  of  transition  by 
 which  the  One  realises  itself  in  the  many  presented  a 
 problem  which  both  sought  to  illuminate,  but  which 
 neither  succeeded  in  making  clear.  Kant  by  his  theory  of 
 knowledge  had  shown  that  self-consciousness  is  the  ultimate 
 reality  of  things ;  Hegel  sought  by  means  of  the  same 
 principle  to  explain  the  phenomenal  world.  Neither 
 things  nor  thoughts,  he  said,  are  independent  existences, 
 they  exist  only  as  elements,  moments,  factors,  in  one 
 organic  whole.  The  universum  of  Spinoza  is  an  abstract 
 infinity,  in  which  all  differences  are  lost ;  that  of  Hegel  is 
 a  concrete  whole,  under  which  all  conceivable  differences  are 
 subsumed.  Doubtless  with  Hegel  the  principle  of  unity 
 was  spiritual,  it  underlies  all  antagonisms  and  fulfils  itself 
 in  and  through  them.  Doubtless  also  he  taught  that  as 
 Absolute  Spirit  comes  to  consciousness  in  the  facts  of 
 history,  so  the  highest  idea  of  God  is  found  in  the  Christian 
 religion.  In  it  God  goes  out  of  Himself  in  Incarnation  and 
 returns  to  Himself  in  Eternal  Spirit.  But  the  bearing  of 
 his  fundamental  principles  upon  religion  has  been  differ¬ 
 ently  understood  by  his  followers.  Interpreters  of  Hegel 
 still  discuss  whether  they  are  consistent  with  true  Chris¬ 
 tianity,  or  even  with  Theism  in  any  form.  The  affinities 
 of  his  system  are  unquestionably  pantheistic,  but  a  great 
 philosopher,  like  a  great  poet,  refuses  to  be  classified  and 
 labelled  after  the  nomenclature  of  the  schools.  Hegel 
 was  one  of  the  masters  of  those  who  know;  his  influence 
 has  been  felt  in  every  department  of  thought — philosophy, 
 science,  art,  religion.  He  has  done  more  perhaps  than  any 
 other  thinker  to  imbue  the  few,  who  in  turn  have  sought 
 to  influence  the  many,  with  the  central  doctrine  of  the 
 Immanence  of  God  in  the  world.  But  with  him  also 
 immanence  amounted  to  identification,  dynamically  though 
 not  statically,  by  process  of  becoming,  not  by  actuality 
 of  being.  We  cannot  be  surprised,  therefore,  to  find  that 
 the  modern  doctrine  of  immanence,  as  emphasised  by  many 
 professed  theists,  is  stamped  with  Hegel’s  impress  and 
 carries  its  advocates  to  conclusions  which  are  theistic  only 
 in  name. 
 
256 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 II 
 
 It  is  not  the  object  of  this  paper  to  illustrate  this  fact 
 in  detail.  But  the  neo-Hegelian  school  of  thought  in  this 
 country,  as  represented  by  the  distinguished  trio,  the 
 brothers  Caird  and  T.  H.  Green,  has  influenced  religion 
 even  more  than  philosophy,  and  it  may  perhaps  not 
 unfairly  be  said  that  they  have  sought  to  find  adequate 
 intellectual  expression  for  devout  feeling  and  ethical 
 principles  to  guide  moral  action,  on  the  basis  of  a  philo¬ 
 sophical  system,  which,  if  consistently  carried  out,  would 
 make  both  ethics  and  religion  unreal.  Happily  the  rigidity 
 of  a  philosophical  system  is  apt  to  give  way  at  critical 
 points  under  the  pressure  of  felt  spiritual  needs.  These 
 able  writers  have  exercised  a  potent  influence  for  good,  not 
 only  in  resisting  materialism,  but  in  purifying  and  elevating 
 current  ideas  of  God.  But  as  the  doctrine  of  Divine 
 Immanence  has  been  largely  disseminated  through  their 
 influence  it  is  important  to  ask  in  what  exact  form  they  have 
 maintained  it. 
 
 The  late  Master  of  Balliol  in  his  earlier  series  of  Gifford 
 Lectures  lays  it  down  that  we  are  now  shut  up  to  the 
 alternative,  either  that  there  is  no  God,  or  that  the  revela¬ 
 tion  of  God  must  be  sought  in  the  whole  process  of  nature 
 and  history,  regarded  as  a  development  which  finds  its 
 culminating  expression  in  the  life  of  man  as  spiritual 
 being.  For  him  God  is  a  self -revealing  Spirit,  whose 
 revelation  reaches  its  culmination  in  the  intellectual  and 
 moral  life  of  man.  As  rational  beings,  our  life  is  circum¬ 
 scribed  by  three  ideas — that  of  self  or  the  subject,  that 
 of  the  not-self  or  the  object,  and  that  of  44  the  unity  which 
 is  pre-supposed  in  the  difference  of  the  self  and  the  not-self, 
 and  within  which  they  act  and  re -act  on  each  other — in 
 other  words,  the  idea  of  God.”  The  true  idea  of  the 
 infinite,  we  are  told,  is  that  of  the  unity  which  reveals 
 itself  in  all  the  differences  of  the  finite,  and  which  through 
 all  these  differences  remains  in  unity  with  itself.  It  is 
 impossible,  says  Dr.  Edward  Caird,  for  moderns  to  recall 
 the  attitude  of  the  pure  monotheist.  44  We  cannot  think 
 
THE  HOLY  SPIRIT 
 
 257 
 
 of  the  infinite  Being  as  external  to  that  which  it  has  made. 
 We  cannot  think  of  Him  as  external  to  anything,  least  of 
 all  to  the  spiritual  beings  who  as  such  live,  move  and  have 
 their  being  in  Him.  This  idea  of  the  immanence  of  God 
 underlies  the  Christian  conception.  .  .  .  We  may  reject 
 religion,  or  we  may  accept  it,  but  we  cannot  accept  it 
 except  in  this  form.”  1  The  form,  that  is,  of  a  God  who 
 is  the  unity  of  all  finite  differences — selves  and  not-selves, 
 good  and  evil — which  is  4 4  not  external  to  anything  ”  and 
 to  which  nothing  is  external.  A  theist  will  surely  hesitate 
 before  accepting  such  definitions  as  these  as  furnishing 
 44  the  only  religion  possible  for  the  modern  mind.” 
 
 Dr.  John  Caird,  in  his  Introduction  to  the  Philosophy  of 
 Religion,  urges  the  necessity  of  religion  in  the  sense  that 
 there  is  that  in  man  as  an  intelligent  being  which  forces 
 him  to  rise  above  the  material  and  finite  and  to  rest  no¬ 
 where  short  of  44  an  Infinite,  all-comprehending  Mind.” 
 This  does  not  mean,  however,  an  Almighty  Creator,  or  an 
 All-wise  Designer  and  Governor  of  the  world,  for  such 
 a  conception  is  44  essentially  dualistic.”  Instead  of  this 
 44  lower  conception  ”  of  God,  he  presents  the  idea  of  44  a 
 Thought  or  Self-consciousness  which  is  beyond  all  indivi¬ 
 dual  selves,  which  is  the  unity  of  all  individual  selves  and 
 their  objects,  of  all  thinkers  and  of  all  objects  of  thought.” 
 Such  terms  as  Maker,  Father,  Ruler,  Judge,  when  used  of 
 God,  are  not  exact  equivalents  of  spiritual  realities,  they 
 only  44  suggest,  or  in  the  way  of  imaginative  indication 
 awaken  in  us,  the  conception  of  spiritual  things.”  The 
 writer  rejects  Pantheism  as  he  understands  it  because  it 
 reduces  nature,  man  and  God  to  a  blank  colourless  identity. 
 What  is  needed,  he  says,  is  44  a  principle  in  the  light  of 
 which  we  can  see  that  God  is  all  in  all  without  denying 
 reality  to  the  finite  world  and  to  every  individual  human 
 spirit,  or  without  denying  it  except  in  so  far  as  it  involves 
 a  life  apart  from  God — a  spurious  independence  which  is 
 not  the  protection,  but  the  destruction  of  all  spiritual 
 life.”  2  The  crucial  phrase  evidently  here  is  44  apart  from 
 
 1  The  Evolution  of  Religion,  vol.  i.  p.  196. 
 
 2  Op.  cit.,  p.  221.  See  also  pp.  80,  81 ;  149  ;  175,  176. 
 
 S 
 
258 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 God.”  What  is  meant  by  God  being  “  the  unity  of  all 
 individual  selves  and  their  objects  ?  ”  Or  by  rejecting  the 
 terms  Maker,  Father,  Judge,  in  favour  of  one  which  makes 
 God  even  now  to  be  44  all  in  all  ”  in  a  world  full  of  dis¬ 
 obedience  and  sin  ?  The  treatment  adopted  by  Dr.  John 
 Caird  in  another  series  of  lectures  on  the  44  Fundamental 
 Ideas  of  Christianity,”  in  which  the  problem  of  evil  is 
 dealt  with,  gives  but  a  halting  answer  to  these  questions. 
 Moral  life  is  represented  as  the  renunciation  of  the  private 
 or  exclusive  self  and  the  identification  of  our  life  with  an 
 ever-widening  sphere  of  spiritual  life  beyond  us.  What 
 is  called  evil  is  but  the  passing  shadow  of  44  the  finite  unduly 
 concentrated  upon  itself,  instead  of  losing  itself  inthe  infinite 
 life  which  is  seeking  to  realise  itself  in  us.”  From  such  im¬ 
 manence  transcendence  is  virtually  excluded,  and  God  as 
 the  unity  of  all  individual  selves  and  their  objects  takes  up 
 into  Himself  the  transient  evil,  as  well  as  the  permanent 
 good.  But  this  aspect  of  the  subject  will  meet  us  again  later. 
 
 The  influence  of  T.  H.  Green  at  Oxford  a  generation  ago 
 was  that  of  a  noble  personality  and  an  inspiring  teacher. 
 By  his  vigorous  protest  against  naturalism  in  philosophy 
 and  utilitarianism  in  ethics  he  left  his  mark  on  the  thought 
 of  this  country  during  the  last  decades  of  the  nineteenth 
 century.  But  his  religious  teaching  was  vague  and 
 indefinite  at  the  very  point  where  clearness  is  most  neces¬ 
 sary.  His  analysis  of  voluntary  action  and  the  operation 
 of  motives  in  morals  is  illuminating,  but  when  he  describes 
 the  relation  of  human  selves  to  that  Eternal  Self-conscious¬ 
 ness  which  is  central  to  his  system,  it  is  difficult  to  follow 
 him.  We  read  for  example  of  44  a  consciousness  for  which 
 the  relations  of  fact  that  form  the  object  of  our  gradually 
 attained  knowledge  already  eternally  exist ;  and  the  grow¬ 
 ing  knowledge  of  the  individual  is  a  progress  towards  this 
 consciousness.”  Again,  we  are  asked  to  conceive  of  44  a 
 consciousness  which  is  operative  throughout  the  succession 
 of  all  things  .  .  .  and  which  at  the  same  time  realises  itself 
 through  them,”  and  44  the  conditions  under  which  the 
 eternal  consciousness  reproduces  itself  in  our  knowledge.”  1 
 
 1  Prolegomena  to  Ethics,  pp.  75,  77. 
 
THE  HOLY  SPIRIT 
 
 259 
 
 If  we  ask  what  is  meant  by  the  Eternal  Self  realising  itself 
 in  the  individual  human  spirit,  it  is  not  very  helpful  to 
 read,  44  To  say  that  God  is  the  final  cause  of  the  moral  life, 
 the  ideal  self  which  no  one  as  a  moral  agent  is,  but  which 
 every  one  as  such  an  agent  is  seeking  (however  blindly)  to 
 become,  is  not  to  make  Him  unreal.  ...  It  is  in  a  sense 
 to  identify  Him  with  man.  .  .  .  The  identity  claimed  for 
 man  with  God  is  an  identity  of  self  with  self.  .  .  .  God 
 is  identical  with  the  self  of  every  man  in  the  sense  of  being 
 the  realisation  of  its  determinate  possibilities  .  .  .  the 
 final  reality  to  which  all  our  possibilities  are  relative.”  1 
 The  idea  expressed  here  is  not  very  easy  to  grasp,  but 
 probably  the  author’s  approving  description  of  Hegel’s 
 position  practically  describes  his  own.  44  That  there  is 
 one  self-conscious  being,  of  which  all  that  is  real  is  the 
 activity  or  expression ;  that  we  are  related  to  this  spiritual 
 being,  not  merely  as  parts  of  the  world  which  is  its  expres¬ 
 sion,  not  as  partakers  in  some  inchoate  measure  of  the  self- 
 consciousness  through  which  it  at  once  constitutes  and  dis¬ 
 tinguishes  it  from  the  world ;  that  this  participation  is  the 
 source  of  morality  and  religion;  this  we  take  to  be  the 
 vital  truth  which  Hegel  had  to  teach.”  2  That  this  is  a 
 doctrine  of  Divine  Immanence  is  obvious,  whether  it  can 
 be  made  consistent  with  Theism  is  questionable.  The 
 self-consciousness  here  described  is  both  human  and  divine, 
 the  finite  consciousness  partaking  44  in  some  inchoate 
 measure  ”  with  the  eternal.  If  the  divine  consciousness 
 is  explained  wholly  in  terms  of  the  human,  we  are  brought 
 to  practical  atheism;  if  the  human  is  explained  in  terms 
 of  the  divine,  the  result  is  virtual  Pantheism.  Green 
 attempts  to  avoid  both  horns  of  the  dilemma.  He  held 
 that  44  the  world  is  as  necessary  to  God  as  God  is  to 
 the  world.”  3  But  his  speculative  idealism,  like  that  of 
 John  and  Edward  Caird,  shelves  the  difficulty  only  by  a 
 confusion  of  thought  as  to  the  relation  between  the  finite 
 and  the  Eternal  self-consciousness  which  has  never  been 
 satisfactorily  removed. 
 
 1  Works,  vol.  iii.  pp.  225,  226,  227.  2  Ibid.,  p.  246. 
 
 3  See  Rashdall,  Philosophy  and  Religion,  p.  30. 
 
260 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 The  tendency  here  manifested  to  sacrifice  transcendence 
 to  immanence,  to  merge  the  divine  in  the  human,  to  pro¬ 
 claim  the  doctrine  of  “  the  divinity  of  man  and  the  humanity 
 of  God,”  might  be  illustrated  from  other  diverse  quarters. 
 Eucken  can  hardly  be  placed  in  this  category.  He  has 
 rendered  immense  service  in  Germany  to  the  cause  of 
 spiritual  religion.  His  opposition  to  bare  Intellectualism, 
 his  insistence  upon  the  life  of  the  human  spirit  as  one 
 whole  in  its  long  history  of  toiling,  suffering,  believing, 
 energising  effort,  his  contention  that  the  Eternal  is  here 
 within  the  temporal,  that  the  divine  is  present  within 
 human  existence,  have  opened  new  doors  of  religious  faith 
 and  hope  for  many.  He  admits  certain  main  character¬ 
 istics  of  Christianity  as  features  of  abiding  religion.  But 
 it  is  a  new  Christianity  that  he  seeks,  one  that  has  cast  off 
 the  old,  narrow  44  anthropomorphic  and  mythological  ” 
 methods  and  that  is  broad  enough  to  embrace  the  whole 
 of  life.  Eucken  sympathises  with  certain  tentative 
 Pantheistic  movements  of  to-day  and  could  not  accept 
 a  Christianity  which  did  not  display  a  similar  breadth  of 
 outlook.  It  is  here  that  he  is  least  clear  and  his  teaching 
 begins  to  be  dubious.  He  recognises  that  the  mystery  of 
 life  implies  two  powers,  God  and  man,  but  in  his  Activism 
 the  relation  between  the  two  is  too  vaguely  characterised. 
 
 Another  illustration  may  be  taken  from  a  different 
 movement  in  Continental  religious  thought.  The  Modernist 
 school  in  the  Roman  Catholic  Church  were  accused  in 
 the  Encyclical  Pascendi  Gregis  of  teaching  the  doctrine 
 of  44  religious  immanence,”  resolving  religion  entirely 
 into  a  movement  of  the  human  spirit  God  wards.  The 
 charge  was  unfairly  presented  and  pressed,  but  in  the 
 reply  put  forward  by  representative  men  in  the  44  Pro¬ 
 gramme  of  Modernism,”  it  is  to  a  certain  extent  admitted 
 and  44  the  immanental  tendency  ”  is  accepted  as  a  funda¬ 
 mental  tenet  of  Modernist  philosophy.  Some  leading 
 Modernists  assert  the  principle  in  such  a  fashion  as  to  de¬ 
 stroy  the  very  foundations  of  authority  in  religion.  But  it 
 is  not  fair  to  attribute  to  Modernism  as  a  whole  the  char¬ 
 acteristics  of  some  Modernists,  the  movement  known  by 
 
THE  HOLY  SPIRIT 
 
 261 
 
 this  name  being  as  yet  inchoate  and  indeterminate,  its 
 leaders  professing  to  do  no  more  than  grope  their  way 
 towards  a  synthesis  for  which  the  time  is  not  yet  ripe. 
 
 Another  example  of  the  way  in  which  the  idea  of  Divine 
 immanence  may  be  carried  so  far  as  to  pervert  the  idea  of 
 religion  is  found  in  a  writer  who  practically  resolves  the 
 idea  of  Deity  into  social  order.  He  is  but  putting  in  plain 
 terms  what  many  half-consciously  hold.  “  A  person’s 
 idea  of  God  may  be  taken  as  comprehending  the  highest 
 ideal  interests  known  or  felt  by  him.  .  .  .  The  idea  of 
 God,  when  seriously  employed,  seems  to  generalise  and  to 
 idealise  all  the  values  one  knows.”  For  the  plain  man, 
 “  God  is  the  biggest  word  he  knows.  The  reality  answer¬ 
 ing  to  the  idea  of  God  must  include  at  its  best  all  that  is 
 involved  in  the  deep  instinctive  historical  and  social 
 consciousness  of  the  race.”  1  Immanence  without  tran¬ 
 scendence  must  end  thus.  The  “  Eternal  Consciousness  ” 
 which  only  realises  itself  in  finite  self-consciousness  soon 
 becomes  only  a  name  for  the  collective  ideals  of  the  indivi¬ 
 dual  and  of  the  race ;  and,  as  Dr.  Ames’s  book  abundantly 
 proves,  on  this  hypothesis  the  very  name  and  idea  of  God 
 becomes  superfluous  and  need  seldom  be,  as  he  expresses 
 it,  “  seriously  employed.” 
 
 Ill 
 
 The  issues  thus  raised  are  clearly  bound  up  with  those 
 which  concern  the  exact  meaning  and  the  truth  of  Monism. 
 Some  forms  of  Monism  are  distinctly  antitheistic,  or  at 
 best  agnostic,  but  the  word  and  the  idea  of  unity  for  which 
 it  stands  evidently  exercise  a  fascination  for  some  theistic 
 thinkers.  Science,  we  are  told,  demands  Monism ;  philo¬ 
 sophy  cannot  dispense  with  it.  “  A  Monism  of  some  sort 
 is  inevitable,”  we  read;  if  theism  is  not  monistic,  it  is 
 doomed.  A  discussion  of  the  meaning  of  the  word  Monism, 
 therefore,  is  clearly  not  a  mere  logomachy.  Its  frequent 
 use  appears  to  us  unfortunate  because  it  is  so  ambiguous. 
 It  covers  views  which  differ  as  widely  as  those  of  Hegel, 
 
 1  K  Scribner  Ames,  The  Psychology  of  Religious  Experience,  pp.  31-3,  318. 
 
262 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 Hackel  and  Huxley.  It  is  now  being  adopted  by  some 
 sincere  Theists  in  a  sense  which  would  be  repudiated  by 
 Idealist,  Materialist  and  Agnostic  alike.  Professor  James 
 Ward  says,  “  Once  Materialism  is  abandoned  and  Dualism 
 found  untenable,  a  spiritualistic  Monism  remains  the  one 
 stable  position.”  1  But  what  is  meant  by  44  Dualism  ” 
 here  ?  for  Dr.  Ward  admits  “duality.”  And  what  precisely 
 is  meant  by  Monism  ?  One  only  Substance,  or  one  Being, 
 or  one  Cause,  or  one  Will,  or  one  Purpose  ?  All  the  varied 
 phenomena  of  the  universe  are  to  be  deduced  from  one 
 single  principle,  but  everything  depends  on  the  meaning 
 of  “  principle.”  The  materialist  understands  by  it  one 
 substance,  which  he  terms  matter,  but  finds  it  impossible 
 to  define,  or  defend  as  the  source  and  origin  of  mind. 
 Naturalism  improves  upon  this  position  by  assuming  one 
 44  substance  ”  with  two  44  aspects,”  material  and  spiritual. 
 Neither  of  these  can  be  resolved  into  the  other,  but  by  the 
 aid  of  a  principle  of  44  psycho-physical  parallelism  ”  the 
 advocate  of  naturalism  rejoices  to  style  himself  a  Monist. 
 Matter,  he  says,  is  extended  substance,  spirit  is  sensitive 
 and  thinking  substance,  but  these  are  only  two  attributes 
 of  one  all-embracing  substance,  which  is  self-explanatory, 
 self-contained  and  self-sufficing,  the  all-embracing  essence 
 of  the  world.  John  Caird  as  a  representative  of  idealistic 
 Monism  urges  that  no  philosophy  can  be  44  dualistic,” 
 that  all  true  philosophy  rests  on  the  pre-supposition  that 
 44  there  is  in  the  universe  no  absolute  or  irreconcilable 
 division,  no  breach  of  continuity,  no  element  which  in 
 its  hard  irreducible  independence  is  incapable  of  being 
 embraced  in  the  intelligible  system  of  things.”  Such 
 Monism  rests  upon  the  idea  of  one  system — a  very 
 different  thing  from  one  substance.  Dr.  Schurman  in 
 his  Belief  in  God  speaks  of  44  the  unity  and  universal 
 inner  connection  of  all  reality;  ”  and  surely  no  sane 
 man  will  deny  the  existence  of  such  unity,  however  it  is 
 explained.  Sir  Oliver  Lodge,  pointing  out  that  the  idea 
 of  Monism  is  as  old  as  Parmenides,  says  that  the  name 
 should  be  understood  of  44  any  system  which  seeks  to 
 1  Naturalism  and  Agnosticism,  Pref.  p.  x. 
 
THE  HOLY  SPIRIT 
 
 263 
 
 exhibit  all  the  complexities  of  existence,  both  material  and 
 mental — the  whole  of  phenomena,  both  objective  and 
 subjective — as  modes  of  manifestation  of  one  fundamental 
 reality”  1  We  have  italicised  one  clause,  because  on  the 
 exact  interpretation  of  these  words  everything  depends. 
 As  they  stand,  they  are  almost  self-condemned,  but  later 
 we  read  that  all  philosophy  aims  at  being  monistic  in  the 
 sense  that  no  careful  thinker  can  be  contented  with  “  a 
 permanent  antinomy — a  universe  compounded  of  two  or 
 more  irreconcilable  and  entirely  disparate  and  disconnected 
 agencies — a  kind  of  permanent  Manichaeism.”  In  that 
 form  the  assertion  of  the  unity  of  the  universe  is  to-day 
 almost  a  truism.  Are  the  two  alternatives — a  Dualism 
 which  posits  two  irreconcilable  and  entirely  disconnected 
 agencies,  and  a  Monism  which  makes  all  phenomena  to  be 
 mere  modes  of  manifestation  of  one  fundamental  reality — 
 exhaustive  ?  Does  either  adequately  represent  the  facts 
 of  experience  ?  It  is  the  old  problem  of  the  One  and  the 
 many  re-appearing  in  another  form ;  does  Monism,  in  any 
 strictly  interpreted  sense  of  the  word,  solve  it  ? 
 
 Naturalistic  Monism  has  been  condemned  by  Professor 
 Ward  and  others  on  just  grounds.  Matter  and  motion, 
 if  allowed  to  be  eternal  existences,  do  not  account  for  the 
 present  cosmos  :  they  cannot  explain  the  origin  of  mind 
 and  consciousness ;  or  the  emergence  of  the  living  from  the 
 non-living ;  the  mechanical  explanation  of  nature  has  been 
 weighed  and  found  wanting.  Only  rational  spirit  can 
 account  for  the  ordered  universe.  But  is  idealistic  Monism 
 tenable  ?  Mind  cannot  be  resolved  into  matter,  can 
 matter  be  resolved  into  mind  ?  Doubtless  science  is 
 approaching  that  position ;  “  matter  ”  is  now,  for  the 
 
 scientific  man,  only  the  name  of  a  form  of  energy,  and 
 energy  is  best  known  to  man  as  mind.  But  the  chasm, 
 though  narrow,  has  not  been,  and  may  never  be,  bridged. 
 For  human  thought  the  relative  dualism  holds  of  mind  and 
 matter,  subject  and  object,  self  and  the  world,  self  and  other 
 selves,  self  and  God,  good  and  evil.  In  each  pair  the  two 
 elements  must  be  kept  distinct,  though  they  may  not  be 
 
 1  Life  and  Matter,  p.  7. 
 
264 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 separate,  and  they  may,  or  may  not,  be  opposed  to  one 
 another.  As  Dr.  James  Ward  says,  in  the  Cartesian 
 philosophy  mind  and  matter  were  not  only  disparate,  but 
 absolutely  separate  and  mutually  independent.  Such 
 dualism  is  incredible  to-day,  no  such  impassable  gulf  is 
 fixed,  dividing  one  part  of  experience  from  another.  But 
 distinctness  must  be  preserved ;  idealistic  Monism,  implying 
 an  Absolute  Mind  that  makes  the  partial  facts  by  thinking 
 them,  is  inadequate  to  explain  experience.  Relative  Dual¬ 
 ism  must  not  be  explained  away,  and  if  Dr.  Ward  would 
 establish  a  “  spiritual  Monism  ”  passing  from  “  a  world  of 
 spirits  to  a  Supreme  Spirit  as  a  possible  step,”  he  must 
 carefully  explain  how  that  one  step  is  to  be  taken,  for  all 
 religion  and  nearly  all  morality  may  depend  upon  his  answer. 
 
 Nature  is  one  organic  whole ;  no  one  is  likely  to  contest 
 that  position.  It  presupposes  one  Ground  of  existence; 
 few  will  hesitate  to  admit  so  much.  Theists  believe 
 that  the  universe  necessarily  implies  one  Cause,  one 
 supreme  Intelligence,  one  originating  and  all-controlling 
 Mind,  and  if  Monism  is  understood  to  mean  no  more 
 than  this,  all  theists  are  spiritual  Monists.  But  in  using 
 the  terms  one  substance,  one  pervading  essence,  mani¬ 
 festations  of  one  abiding  reality,  another  region  of 
 speculation  is  entered.  Theism  is  in  no  danger  to-day 
 from  Deism  or  Dualism,  though  some  popular  forms  of 
 speech  may  still  preserve  anthropomorphic  ideas  that 
 imply  both.  But  in  the  recoil  from  the  44  Carpenter- 
 theory,”  from  the  idea  of  God  as  a  mere  Divine 
 Artificer,  the  perils  of  contemporary  theism  lie  in  an 
 opposite  direction.  A  44  spiritual  Monism  ”  is  put  forward 
 which  finds  in  the  phenomenal  world  44  one  sole  element 
 revealed  in  two  aspects,  material  and  spiritual.”  The 
 material  side  is  simply  the  expression  of  spirit,  and  in  the 
 universe  as  a  whole  the  unifying  principle  is  the  44  Divine 
 Mind  that  is  in  some  measure  expressing  itself  in  every¬ 
 thing.”  1  The  whole  problem  lies  in  the  interpretation  of 
 
 1  See  W.  L.  Walker,  Christian  Theism  and  a  Spiritual  Monism,  p.  203 
 — a  thoughtful  and  valuable  book,  with  the  general  tenor  of  which  the 
 writer  is  in  hearty  sympathy. 
 
THE  HOLY  SPIRIT 
 
 265 
 
 the  phrase  “  in  some  measure.”  Unless  the  distinction 
 between  God  and  the  universe  be  carefully  preserved,  the 
 distinction  between  finite  selves — between  a  Jesus  and  a 
 Judas,  as  Bowne  expresses  it — above  all,  the  distinction 
 between  good  and  evil,  so  that  evil  be  not  explained  away, 
 or  resolved  into  the  shadow  of  good,  moral  and  spiritual 
 confusion  become  inevitable.  The  term  Monism  lends 
 itself  to  this  confusion.  When  the  transcendence  of  God 
 in  relation  to  the  universe  is  ignored,  or  merged  in  a 
 doctrine  of  Immanence,  Monism  may  be  triumphant,  but 
 a  cardinal  doctrine  of  theism  has  disappeared  and  the 
 submergence  of  true  religion  cannot  be  far  distant. 
 
 The  Pluralism  of  William  James  and  others  is  best 
 understood  as  a  protest  against  Absolute  Idealism  and 
 the  prevalent  tendency  to  Monism.  It  is  hardly  likely  to 
 make  much  headway  on  its  own  merits.  The  view  of  the 
 universe  that  ultimate  reality  consists  of  an  eternal  system 
 of  many  selves  or  minds,  independent  and  co-ordinate, 
 with  no  absolute  unity  realised  either  in  the  origin,  or  the 
 course,  of  things,  seems  too  preposterous  to  be  seriously 
 held.  It  has  arisen,  and  is  now  put  forward,  by  a  few 
 responsible  and  able  thinkers,  in  strong  reaction  against 
 the  monistic  habits  of  thought  which  distort  reality  by 
 engulfing  important  distinctions.  Some  scientific  men 
 reach  Monism  by  disregarding  all  aspects  of  reality  except 
 their  own  (very  useful)  abstract  formulae,  termed  laws  of 
 nature.  Philosophers  rebuke  this  narrowness,  and  rightly 
 point  to  a  whole  world  of  facts  and  ideas  which  physical 
 science  cannot  reach,  because  they  do  not  come  within  the 
 scope  of  her  method.  But  philosophy  is  apt,  in  turn,  to 
 become  narrow  and  dogmatic,  because  it  is  predominantly 
 intellectualistic,  and  idealistic  philosophers  need  to  be 
 reminded  of  fundamental  facts  in  the  experience  of  reality 
 which  their  unifying  principle  has  either  neglected,  or 
 stretched  out  of  all  shape  on  a  Procrustes’  bed  of  monistic 
 theory.  Hence  the  appearance  and  temporary  popularity 
 of  Pragmatism  and  Pluralism.  It  is  Life  with  which 
 human  thought  is  concerned,  life  in  all  its  vastness,  com¬ 
 plexity,  variety  and  beauty;  not  a  system  of  mechanical 
 
266 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 forces  alone,  nor  a  system  of  mere  manifestations  of  one 
 underlying  substance,  but  the  whole  world  of  nature  and 
 a  whole  inconceivably  vast  world  of  finite  spirits,  each  with 
 its  own  measure  of  self-determination,  self-direction,  and 
 self-control.  True  unity  is  never  gained  by  denying,  or 
 ignoring,  real  distinctions,  but  by  preserving  and  transcend¬ 
 ing  them.  He  who  begins  with  44  God’s  all,  man’s  nought,” 
 must  go  on  to  recognise  that  the  God  44  whose  pleasure 
 brought  man  into  being,  stands  away 
 
 “  As  it  were  a  handbreadth  off,  to  give 
 Room  for  the  neAvly  made  to  live.” 
 
 No  true  unity  for  the  universe  is  to  be  found  in  Divine 
 Immanence,  if  the  phrase  be  understood  either  in  a  quasi- 
 Pantheistic,  or  strictly  Monistic  sense.  A  God  who  is  not 
 distinct  from  the  universe,  as  well  as  present  in  the  universe, 
 is  no  God  at  all. 
 
 IV 
 
 Theism  does  not  seek  arbitrarily  to  combine  immanence 
 and  transcendence.  It  asserts  that,  rightly  understood, 
 these  two  words  must  be  combined  to  describe  God’s 
 relation  to  the  universe,  that  they  are  mutually  implied, 
 mutually  necessary,  if  the  names  “  God  ”  and  “  Universe  ” 
 are  to  be  maintained  in  their  proper  meaning.  But 
 Transcendence  comes  first.  In  the  idea  of  God  this 
 characteristic  is  paramount,  supreme.  Every  sound  argu¬ 
 ment  for  the  existence  of  God  points  to  His  incomparable 
 excellence,  by  which  He  surpasses  all  finite  things  and 
 persons,  and  all  of  these  collectively.  The  so-called 
 44  proofs  ”  of  the  existence  of  God  do  not  demonstrate  His 
 being,  but  their  value  lies  in  their  power  to  point  towards 
 a  transcendent  deity.  Whether  we  take  the  idea  of  Cause, 
 or  of  Thought,  or  of  Order,  or  of  Purpose,  or  of  Truth,  or 
 of  Goodness,  the  phenomena  of  the  Universe  as  we  know 
 it  imply  and  demand,  if  they  do  not  actually  demonstrate, 
 the  existence  of  a  Being  who  is  above  and  beyond  the 
 finite,  the  imperfect,  the  temporal  and  transient.  The 
 logic  which  teaches  that  the  very  perception  of  limits 
 implies  a  power  in  thought  to  transcend  them  and  enables 
 
THE  HOLY  SPIRIT 
 
 267 
 
 us  from  a  knowledge  of  time  to  infer  eternity,  from  a 
 knowledge  of  finite  and  relative  good  to  gain  a  positive 
 conception  of  God  Infinite  and  Absolute,  teaches  the 
 transcendence  of  God,  if  it  teaches  anything.  A  God 
 who  is  wholly  in  the  universe  is  lost  in  the  universe,  and  the 
 name  Deity  becomes  superfluous. 
 
 It  is  perfectly  true  that  in  these  relations  there  is  more 
 than  we  can  explain,  in  the  usual  sense  of  that  word. 
 Ultimates  cannot  be  44  explained.”  But  man’s  experience 
 of  his  own  relation  to  the  world  around  him  should  enable 
 him  to  find  this  double  relation  of  God  to  the  world  con¬ 
 ceivable  and  rational.  Each  man’s  spirit  dwells  in,  yet 
 immeasurably  surpasses,  the  body  it  inhabits,  each  man’s 
 own  consciousness  enables  him  at  the  same  time  to  under¬ 
 stand  and  to  transcend  the  cosmos  around  him.  The  very 
 meaning  of  a  Self — understood  by  all,  yet  inexplicable  in 
 words — implies  a  will  or  mind  entering  into  the  order  of 
 which  it  forms  a  part,  while  at  the  same  time  immeasurably 
 above  it.  And,  though  this  familiar  but  wonderful  fact 
 of  human  experience  furnishes  but  a  faint  analogy  of  the 
 relation  between  God  and  the  universe,  it  makes  possible 
 the  conception  which  is  urged  upon  us  from  a  thousand 
 sides  of  a  Being  who  infinitely  transcends  the  universe,  all 
 the  forms  and  forces  and  changes  of  which  He  directs  and 
 controls,  and  every  part  of  which  He  informs  and  inhabits. 
 God  as  identical  with  nature,  God  as  severed  from  nature, 
 are  two  opposed  ideas,  equally  incredible,  if  there  be  a 
 living  God  at  all. 
 
 The  infinity  which  the  Theist  asserts  of  God  does  not 
 absorb  the  finite.  A  Pantheist  cannot  declare  himself 
 to  be  a  Pantheist  without  a  measure  of  contradiction,  for 
 the  thinker  remains  outside  his  own  theory  of  existence. 
 If  he  denies  this,  he  is,  as  Martineau  has  expressed  it, 
 like  44  a  fire-worshipper  putting  out  his  eyes  to  glorify  the 
 light.”  Every  kind  of  Monism  which  suppresses  human 
 personality  is  to  be  distrusted.  Whether  it  be  viewed  as  a 
 mode  of  the  Absolute,  which  44  expresses  itself  ”  in  finite 
 consciousness ;  or  whether,  with  Malebranche,  man  so  sees 
 all  things  in  God  that  his  consciousness  is  but  a  part  of 
 
268 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 God’s  consciousness  of  Himself  :  or  whether,  with  Theodore 
 Parker,  it  is  held  that  God  works  immediately  in  the 
 faculties  of  every  man;  in  every  case  the  true  nature  of 
 human  personality — its  knowledge,  affection,  will  and 
 activity — is  lost,  and  the  relation  between  God  and  the 
 creature  misinterpreted. 
 
 But  the  true  relation  can  only  be  set  forth  by  those 
 who  believe  in  the  personality  of  God,  and  it  is  said 
 that  to  ascribe  personality  to  the  Infinite  is  to  limit  it.  The 
 fallacy  of  the  last  statement  has  often  been  exposed.  The 
 God  of  the  Theist  is  not  the  Infinite  or  the  Absolute  of 
 those  metaphysicians  for  whom  the  Infinite  is  unlimited 
 because  indeterminate,  an  infinite  and  absolute  Blank. 
 Neither  is  the  God  of  the  Theist  personal  with  the 
 imperfections  of  human  personality.  He  is  not  the 
 “  magnified  non-natural  man  ”  of  Matthew  Arnold, 
 but  the  only  true,  that  is  the  only  Infinite,  Person¬ 
 ality  in  existence,  possessing  in  absolute  perfection  the 
 powers  of  knowing,  willing,  loving,  which  men  in  their 
 infinitesimal  degree  possess  and  understand.  Is  God 
 finite  ?  If  it  be  limiting  God  to  say  that  He  is  not  all 
 things  that  are  not  He,  that  He  cannot  be  distinguished 
 in  thought  from  other  beings,  then  He  is  finite.  To 
 describe  Him  as  infinite  for  the  sake  of  multiplying  predi¬ 
 cates  concerning  Him,  whatever  their  character,  would 
 be  to  degrade  the  infinite  indeed.  God  is  viewed  as  per¬ 
 sonal  because  that  is  the  highest  kind  of  being  we  know. 
 This  implies  the  limitation,  if  so  it  must  be  called,  of  not 
 being  impersonal,  or  of  not  being  supra-personal  in  any 
 sense  that  would  rob  Him  of  the  characteristics  of  person¬ 
 ality  in  all  its  perfection. 
 
 God  is  infinite.  But  He  is  finite  in  the  sense  of  being 
 self-limited;  and  in  the  moral  world  self-limitation,  when 
 it  takes  place  for  worthy  ends,  is  unspeakably  higher  than 
 unlimited  self-expression.  God  has  brought  the  universe 
 into  existence,  and  He  is  limited  in  the  sense  that  He  is 
 not  the  universe  and  the  universe  is  not  He,  though  it  is 
 utterly  and  always  dependent  on  Him.  He  is  limited  in 
 the  sense  that  He  has  brought  finite  personalities  into 
 
THE  HOLY  SPIRIT 
 
 269 
 
 existence,  whose  personality  He  respects  as  possessed  of  a 
 relative  independence  of  will,  with  which  He  has  endowed 
 them.  It  is  God’s  own  will  that  thus  it  should  be,  and  He 
 is  not  bound,  not  limited,  by  anything  outside  His  own 
 will.  He  knows,  sustains,  directs,  controls  all  finite  wills, 
 yet  leaves  them  within  their  own  limits  to  realise  and 
 develop  their  own  being.  He  is  infinite,  not  only  in  the 
 sense  that  He  is  perfect  in  power,  in  knowledge,  in  holiness, 
 in  love,  but  in  His  own  essential  being  He  unspeakably 
 transcends  the  Universe — to  us  so  inconceivably  vast — 
 which  He  has  called  into  existence.  And  because  He 
 transcends,  He  at  the  same  time  surrounds,  upholds,  per¬ 
 vades  His  own  universe,  yet  so  as  to  preserve  to  every  part 
 of  it  the  essential  characteristics  which  He  has  bestowed 
 on  each,  including  the  distinctness  from  Himself  and  the 
 relative  independence  of  will  and  action  with  which  He  has 
 endowed  all  finite  spirits.  There  is  no  contradiction  here. 
 Only  a  right  understanding  of  the  way  in  which  God 
 surpasses  creation  makes  it  possible  to  conceive  of  His 
 informing  and  inhabiting  the  whole.  Only  a  transcendent 
 God  can  be  immanent,  in  the  fullest  and  richest  sense, 
 throughout  the  whole  of  such  a  Universe  as  is  being  slowly 
 and  imperfectly  unfolded  to  human  ken. 
 
 If  these  things  be  so,  whether  were  it  truer,  to  say 
 that  all  things  are  in  God,  or  that  God  is  in  all  things  ? 
 Roth  these  are  modes  of  setting  forth  an  absolutely  unique 
 relation,  and  either  may  be  regarded  as  true,  or  as  mis¬ 
 leading,  according  to  the  meaning  given  to  it.  The  name 
 Panentheism,  originated  by  Krause,  which  expresses  the 
 idea  that  all  things  are  in  God,  has  never  gained  currency. 
 Dr.  Inge  would  revive  the  word,  holding  that  the  doctrine 
 44  in  its  true  form  is  an  integral  part  of  Christian  philosophy 
 and,  indeed,  of  all  rational  theology.”  It  is  best  expressed 
 in  the  words  of  St.  Paul,  44  in  Him  we  live  and  move  and 
 have  our  being.”  But  the  meaning  of  the  word  44  in  ” 
 needs  to  be  defined  and  not  all  would  agree  with  Dr. 
 Weymouth’s  paraphrase  of  it, 44  in  closest  union  with  Him.” 
 St.  Paul  says  elsewhere,  44  Of  Him  and  through  and  unto 
 Him  are  all  things  ” — a  great  saying  in  which  transcend- 
 
270 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 ence  and  immanence  are  not  only  combined,  but  the 
 meaning  of  their  combination  is  shown.  “  God  in  us  ” 
 may  lead  to  a  kind  of  absurd  self-deification,  which  Mr. 
 Chesterton  has  rather  brutally,  but  not  unfairly,  cari¬ 
 catured,  by  saying  that  it  means  “  Jones  worshipping 
 Jones.”  All  things  are  in  God  may  mean,  as  it  was 
 interpreted  by  some  Christian  Fathers,  bathed  in  an  ocean, 
 as  a  net  in  the  sea,  upborne  by  an  atmosphere,  without 
 which  we  could  not  breathe  or  move.  Sir  Oliver  Lodge 
 varies  the  figure — “We  are  the  white  corpuscles  in  the  blood 
 of  the  Cosmos,  we  do  serve,  and  form  part  of,  an  immanent 
 Deity.”  But  these  physical  analogies  are  for  the  most 
 part  misleading.  The  relation  of  the  Supreme  Spirit  to 
 finite  spirits  can  be  but  dimly  set  forth  by  modes  of  speech 
 derived  from  a  world  of  space  and  from  relations  perceived 
 and  defined  by  the  senses.  Crude  ideas  of  God  as  plastic 
 substance,  as  ground  or  basis  of  existence,  as  a  fount  of 
 emanations,  as  a  self -transforming  energy,  must  be  surren¬ 
 dered  when  men  are  wondering  how  “  spirit  with  spirit 
 can  meet.”  Reality  consists,  as  Lotze  has  said,  in  the 
 living  spirit  of  God  and  the  world  of  personal  spirits  that 
 He  has  created — we  may  add,  and  in  the  world  of  nature, 
 however  constituted,  which  is  a  medium  of  communication 
 between  spirits.  Man  is  not  “  in  God,”  nor  is  God  “  in 
 man,”  as  those  phrases  are  sometimes  understood.  Wor¬ 
 ship  implies  two  beings,  communion  implies  a  relation 
 between  two ;  love,  trust,  and  obedience  are  not  to  be 
 explained  away  as  anthropomorphic.  But  the  Infinite 
 embraces  the  finite,  not  the  finite  the  Infinite.  The  Power 
 which  brought  the  universe  into  being  and  sustains  it, 
 both  in  its  several  parts  and  as  one  organic  indissoluble 
 whole,  encompasses  all,  not  merely  from  without,  but  from 
 within.  The  universe  is  not  absorbed  by  the  Deity,  but 
 upheld  by  Him,  as  the  infinitely  Transcendent  Being  ever 
 maintains  that  to  which  He  has  granted  distinct,  though 
 not  independent,  existence. 
 
 Such  a  view  is  truly  theistic.  It  better  explains  the 
 facts  of  human  experience  and  more  fully  satisfies  the 
 religious  needs  of  man  than  theories  which  seek  to 
 
THE  HOLY  SPIRIT 
 
 271 
 
 “  simplify  ”  existence  by  omitting  many  of  its  essential 
 features. 
 
 Y 
 
 The  Bible  is  not  a  book  of  philosophy,  or  of  science, 
 but  of  religion.  As  such  it  occupies  a  place  of  its  own, 
 and  those  who  receive  it  as  a  revelation  of  religious 
 truth  are  not  bound  to  accept  any  particular  system  of 
 scientific  or  philosophical  belief.  But  the  Bible  sheds 
 the  light  of  religion  on  all  subjects.  A  W eltanss chaining, 
 a  certain  characteristic  view  of  God  and  the  world, 
 forms  a  background  to  the  teaching  of  Christianity,  and 
 the  adequacy  of  this  to  account  for  human  experience 
 and  to  meet  the  highest  and  deepest  spiritual  needs  of 
 men  forms  one  of  the  claims  of  that  religion  upon 
 human  allegiance.  Undoubtedly  progress  is  discernible 
 in  the  history  of  revelation  recorded  in  the  Bible,  and 
 earlier  views  of  God  held  by  Israel  passed  away  like 
 shadows  at  the  dawning  of  the  fuller  light.  But  these, 
 though  in  some  respects  crude,  did  their  own  work  of 
 preparation,  and  they  are  still  not  without  significance, 
 teaching  many  lessons  of  history  to  subsequent  generations. 
 
 The  Biblical  view  of  the  world  rests  on  a  basis  of  Theism. 
 The  existence  of  God  is  assumed,  not  proved  or  debated. 
 “In  the  beginning — God”  is  the  exordium  of  the  whole, 
 whatever  chapter  was  written  first  and  whatever  its 
 immediate  subject.  The  marked  anthropomorphisms 
 which  characterise  the  earlier,  and  to  some  extent  the 
 later,  narratives  seldom  degrade  the  majesty  of  the  Divine 
 Presence,  while  they  enhance  its  reality  and  significance. 
 Especially  does  the  general  cast  of  the  narratives  lay  stress 
 on  the  transcendence  of  God.  Rightly  so,  for  He  is  the 
 I  AM,  the  first  and  the  last,  holy  is  He.  The  very  meaning 
 of  these  simply  sublime  words  was  not  at  first  discerned, 
 but  the  revelation  which  so  markedly  emphasised  the 
 transcendence  of  Deity  taught  also  His  immanence  in  the 
 world  and  among  men.  The  Old  Testament,  by  its 
 lessons  concerning  Divine  communion,  mediation,  and  those 
 various  manifestations  in  which  God  drew  near  to  men  and 
 
272 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 drew  men  near  to  Him,  prepared  the  way  for  the  fuller 
 light  of  a  new  covenant  and  for  the  distinctive  teaching 
 concerning  God  which  is  characteristic  of  Christianity. 
 
 It  is  not  necessary  to  dwell  upon  this  preparation  in 
 detail.  The  doctrine  of  the  Trinity  does  not  in  any  sense 
 belong  to  the  Old  Covenant.  No  indication  of  any  belief 
 in  interior  distinctions  in  the  Godhead  appears  in  the  Old 
 Testament.  The  Spirit  of  God  is  not  distinguished  from 
 God ;  the  expression  simply  means  God  at  work  in  the  world. 
 As  the  eye  and  the  hand  of  God  are  Himself  beholding  and 
 guiding,  so  the  breath  of  His  energy  moves  both  upon  and 
 within  nature  and  man,  in  creation  and  preservation,  in 
 art  and  government,  in  inspiration  and  moral  elevation. 
 “  There  is  a  spirit  in  man  and  the  breath  of  the  Almighty 
 giveth  him  understanding.”  The  Divine  Wisdom  is  the 
 master-workman,  in  and  through  whom  God  established 
 the  heavens  and  laid  the  foundations  of  the  earth,  who 
 rejoiced  in  Llis  habitable  earth  and  whose  delight  was  with 
 the  sons  of  men.  The  Divine  Word  was  the  living  power 
 by  which  the  will  of  the  Almighty  was  expressed  and 
 operated.  “  By  the  word  of  the  Lord  were  the  heavens 
 made  and  all  the  host  of  them  by  the  breath  of  His  mouth.” 
 The  time  came  when  both  the  Word  and  the  Wisdom  of 
 God  acquired  a  fuller  meaning.  Philo  blends  the  living, 
 speaking  Word  of  God,  as  Israel  understood  it,  with  the 
 eternal  Reason  immanent  in  the  world  familiar  to  Greek 
 thought.  It  was  not  by  accident  that  one  word,  koyog, 
 combined  the  meanings  “  reason  ”  and  “  speech,”  and  it 
 became  easy  to  think  of  such  reason  as  both  ivdiadezog, 
 immanent,  and  nQocpoQixog,  proceeding.  The  idea  of  the 
 latter  distinction  is  present  in  Philo,  though  not  the  actual 
 words  which  express  it. 
 
 Christianity  is  not  a  philosophy,  nor  is  it  based  on  any 
 philosophical  system.  It  is  a  religion,  based  on  historical 
 facts  and  on  faith  in  an  interpretation  of  those  facts  as  of 
 eternal  significance  and  value.  It  was  not  the  metaphysic 
 of  Philo  which  taught  St.  John  how  to  write  the  prologue 
 of  his  Gospel,  though  the  Evangelist  uses  the  phrase  of  the 
 Alexandrian  Jew  as  if  it  were  familiar  to  his  readers.  It 
 
THE  HOLY  SPIRIT 
 
 273 
 
 was  the  glory  of  the  only-begotten  Son,  full  of  grace  and 
 truth,  beheld  and  adored,  which  impelled  him  to  describe 
 how  the  Eternal  Word  was  made  flesh  and  tabernacled 
 among  men.  A  doctrine  of  Divine  Immanence,  as  held 
 by  Christians,  begins  with  the  Incarnation.  Here  is  an  In¬ 
 dwelling  of  God  in  history  which  sheds  light  both  upon  past 
 and  future.  It  was  the  Eternal  Word  of  God,  the  Eternal 
 Son  of  God,  who  took  mortal  flesh.  It  was  the  same  Word, 
 through  whom  all  things  were  made,  who  turned  the  shadow 
 of  death  into  morning,  whose  light  shone  on  through  the 
 darkness  in  the  breast  of  every  man,  whose  life  was  the 
 light  of  men  and  the  darkness  overcame  it  not ; — the  same 
 God,  who  never  left  Himself  without  witness,  but  who  in 
 and  through  things  visible  made  manifest  the  invisible, 
 even  His  everlasting  power  and  Godhead ; — the  same  God 
 who  had  always  been  unspeakably  near  to  men  whilst 
 they  were  dimly  feeling  after  Him  if  haply  they  might  find 
 Him; — the  same  God  who  in  Christ  took  up  His  abode 
 among  men  as  had  never  been  possible  before. 
 
 To  the  Christian,  immanence  without  incarnation  is 
 utterly  inadequate.  God  cannot  be  personally  immanent 
 in  stars  and  suns,  in  rocks  and  streams,  in  trees  and  flowers, 
 in  leviathan  and  behemoth — these  are  His  works,  His 
 robe,  not  Himself.  A  holy  God  could  not  be  personally 
 immanent  in  sinful  men,  though  even  these  were  never 
 left  without  the  strivings,  the  drawings,  the  leadings  of 
 His  Spirit.  Another  kind  of  manifestation,  another  kind 
 of  indwelling,  than  had  hitherto  been  known,  must  be 
 granted  if  God  is  to  dwell  with  men  in  very  deed.  And 
 so,  if  men  would  see  God  as  He  is  in  man  and  for  man, 
 they  must  turn  to  the  Word  made  flesh,  for  here  dwells 
 the  nhrjQcojua  of  the  Godhead  bodily.  There  is  no  room 
 for  the  “fulness”  of  His  personal  presence  in  “  nature  ” 
 around  us.  But  to  man  nature  is  empty  indeed  if  it  contain 
 no  message  concerning  the  divine  mind  and  heart,  God’s 
 will  and  purpose  for  men,  if  there  be  no  voice  crying  “  O 
 heart  I  made,  a  heart  beats  here  !  ”  Men  had  longed  for 
 such  an  articulate  voice  and  in  Christ  it  is  heard.  As 
 much  of  the  glory  of  God  as  could  inhabit  the  seas  and  the 
 
 T 
 
274 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 mountains,  and  as  much  as  the  heart  and  history  of  man¬ 
 kind  could  contain,  had  been  dwelling  in  them  through  the 
 ages,  but  in  the  Son  of  Man  that  more  complete  imman¬ 
 ence  is  realised  which  is  only  possible  in  ideal  manhood. 
 
 “  God  may  have  other  words  for  other  worlds, 
 
 But  for  this  world  the  Word  of  God  is  Christ.” 
 
 More  than  this.  Ideal  manhood  cannot  save.  An 
 example  cannot  atone,  nor  a  picture  of  excellence  purify. 
 Such  a  race  as  mankind,  with  its  sins  and  struggles  and 
 sorrows,  needs  a  divine  indwelling  of  a  closer  and  deeper 
 kind.  A  Christ  without  the  Cross  ceases  to  be  a  Saviour. 
 He  touches  the  surface,  not  the  quick  of  the  wound;  the 
 fringe,  not  the  core  of  man’s  actual  state  and  needs.  Holy 
 love  in  uttermost  self-sacrifice  for  the  highest  spiritual 
 ends — no  more  lofty  note  than  this  has  ever  been  struck, 
 or  can  be  struck,  in  human  history.  If  this  is  the  very 
 heart  of  God,  to  bring  it  home  to  men  were  indeed  an 
 everlasting  Gospel.  This  is  done  in  Christ  and  in  Him 
 alone,  and  the  very  fact  makes  Him  to  be  the  centre  and 
 pivot  of  history,  the  focus  in  which  all  the  rays  of  divine 
 glory  converge.  He  it  is  who  makes  it  possible  for  men  to 
 believe  in,  and  realise,  a  closer  indwelling  still. 
 
 Such  closer  abiding  was  promised  by  Christ,  and  His 
 promises  have  been  realised  beyond  all  possible  expecta¬ 
 tion  at  the  time  when  they  were  spoken.  God  in  nature 
 and  conscience  and  history,  God  manifest  in  perfect  man¬ 
 hood,  God  in  self-sacrifice  for  human  redemption — these 
 stages  of  revelation  were  to  prepare  the  way  for  the  full 
 realisation  of  God  in  men  by  the  Holy  Spirit.  The  teach¬ 
 ing  of  the  New  Testament  concerning  the  Holy  Spirit  is 
 very  familiar,  some  of  its  phrases  have  been  so  well  worn 
 that  they  have  lost  their  significance  for  many  ears,  but 
 the  Church  of  Christ  has  never  yet  completely  assimilated 
 this  doctrine.  Largely  perhaps,  because  appropriation 
 in  this  case  can  only  come  through  experience,  not 
 through  intellectual  acceptance.  Yet  all  that  is  meant 
 by  divine  indwelling  finds  its  climax  in  the  doctrine  of 
 the  Holy  Spirit  fully  present  in  the  hearts  of  the  Church 
 
THE  HOLY  SPIRIT 
 
 275 
 
 and  potentially  of  all  mankind.  The  Spirit  was  not  fully 
 given  before  Christ’s  work  was  done,  because  only  then 
 could  the  real  meaning  and  method  of  the  divine  presence 
 be  understood,  only  then  could  the  fulness  of  the  divine 
 power  be  realised.  To  the  philosopher  dealing  only  with 
 intellectual  categories  this  doctrine  may  be  a  stumbling- 
 block;  to  men  and  women  who  know  actual  life  and  are 
 anxious  to  realise  “  life  indeed,”  it  is  salvation. 
 
 What  light  is  shed  by  the  Christian  doctrine  of  the  Holy 
 Spirit  upon  the  problems  of  the  transcendence  and  imman¬ 
 ence  of  God  ?  It  might  be  shown,  though  the  expansion 
 of  the  arguments  cannot  be  attempted  here,  (1)  that  the 
 doctrine  of  the  Trinity  makes  it  possible  to  avoid  both  the 
 severance  of  the  Deity  from  the  universe  which  is  character¬ 
 istic  of  Deism  and  the  merging  of  the  Deity  in  the  universe 
 which  is  avowed  in  Pantheism  and  implied  in  many  systems 
 that  do  not  bear  the  name.  (2)  The  doctrine  of  the  Holy 
 Spirit  admits  of  those  varying  measures  of  Divine  Imman¬ 
 ence  in  the  world  and  in  men  which  philosophy  disdains 
 to  recognise,  but  which  the  facts  of  life  demand.  Imman¬ 
 ence  as  taught  by  philosophy  explains  away  sin,  regards 
 evil  as  necessary  to  good,  and  even  so,  provides  no  means 
 for  the  removal  of  such  measure  of  evil  as  exists.  (3) 
 Christianity  teaches  that,  so  far  as  man  is  concerned, 
 real  Divine  indwelling  is  yet  to  come  and  that  the  Spirit 
 of  Christ  alone  can  bring  it  to  pass.  In  the  heart  of  the 
 believer  when  it  is  completely  penetrated  by  Divine  grace, 
 in  a  purified  Church  when  it  is  filled  with  the  Spirit,  in  a 
 renewed  world  when  the  Kingdom  of  Christ  has  fully  come 
 — Divine  44  immanence  ”  will  be  realised  in  a  deeper  than 
 the  philosophical  sense.  (4)  Indefinite  room  is  left  for 
 the  fuller  development  because  the  very  presence  of  the 
 Holy  Spirit  implies  the  possibility  of  endless  progress  of 
 thought  and  achievement  along  the  lines  which  Christ 
 laid  down.  Christ’s  work  was  but  begun  when  He  left 
 the  earth ;  even  after  two  thousand  years  it  would  seem  to 
 be  but  in  its  infancy.  44  He  shall  glorify  Me,”  44  He  shall 
 guide  you  into  all  the  truth,”  44  He  shall  be  with  you  and 
 be  in  you,”  were  the  words  with  which  our  Lord  indicated 
 
 T  2 
 
276 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 the  closer  and  more  intijmate  “  tabernacling  ”  of  God  with 
 men  which  was  to  begin  when  His  own  sojourn  on  earth 
 was  ended.  The  world  still  awaits  44  the  Christ  that  is  to 
 be,”  when  the  Holy  Spirit  shall  have  consummated  that 
 work  of  continuing  the  Incarnation  which  it  is  His  function 
 to  accomplish. 
 
 Such  thoughts  as  these  it  would  require  a  treatise  to 
 develop.  But  it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  God  of 
 the  Christian  is  not  a  bare  numerical  unit;  His  Unity  is 
 enriched  by  the  mutual  relations  of  three  subsistences, 
 distinct  yet  not  separate,  and  this  threefoldness  makes 
 it  easier  to  conceive  of  His  relations  with  the  universe  and 
 especially  with  mankind.  The  Christian  God,  to  use  an 
 expression  of  Dr.  Fairbairn’s,  is  44  a  unity  which  is  the  home 
 of  distinctions,  the  distinction  not  dissolving  the  unity, 
 nor  the  unity  cancelling  the  distinctions.”  Hence  God 
 is  related  to  the  universe,  not  as  an  abstraction  but  as  a 
 Person ;  a  Person,  however,  that  is  not  a  single,  atomistic, 
 undifferentiated  entity,  but  is  Himself  the  organic  union 
 of  internal  distinctions  and  relations,  which  make  varied 
 relations  to  the  universe  possible.  God  as  Will,  as  Wisdom, 
 as  Love,  cannot  be  regarded  as  an  abstraction,  neither  can 
 He  be  viewed  as  dependent  upon  the  universe  which  He  has 
 brought  into  being.  A  personal,  ethical  God  cannot  be 
 regarded  as  a  mere  Ground  of  existence,  a  Basis  on  which 
 to  rest  the  structure  of  a  complex  cosmos,  or  a  mere  Eternal 
 Thinker  of  an  eternally  realised  thought.  If  a  living  God 
 is  to  inform  and  inhabit  all  orders  of  being  as  these  are 
 becoming  increasingly  known  to  us,  it  must  be  because 
 His  own  nature  is  rich  and  various  as  the  Christian  religion, 
 not  as  idealistic  philosophy,  unfolds  it. 
 
 The  Immanence  of  the  Divine  Spirit  in  a  world  of  spirits 
 must  be  marked  by  various  grades  and  measures.  A  fixed, 
 uniform,  undiscriminating  relationship  such  as  philosophy 
 contemplates  becomes  meaningless  where  moral  and 
 spiritual  life  is  concerned.  In  logic,  in  mathematics,  in 
 physical  science,  in  metaphysics,  we  are  moving  in  the  region 
 of  abstractions;  man  has  to  do  with  life.  Distinctions 
 need  to  be  made  in  the  use  of  such  a  word  as  immanence, 
 
THE  HOLY  SPIRIT 
 
 277 
 
 if  it  is  to  be  employed  in  religion  and  the  doctrine  of  the 
 Holy  Spirit  enables  us  to  make  them.  God’s  relation  to 
 inorganic  existence  has  become  increasingly  clear,  as  we 
 have  learned  the  essential  spirituality  of  what  is  called 
 matter  and  discern  it  to  be  a  vehicle  of  self-expression,  a 
 medium  of  communication  between  minds.  The  nearer 
 relation  of  the  Divine  Being  to  organic  life  through  a  long 
 biological  history  is  described  by  Browning,  as  only  a  poet 
 could  describe  it,  in  a  well-known  passage  of  his  Paracelsus , 
 which  we  must  not  quote.  He  tells  how  God  “  tastes  an 
 infinite  joy  in  infinite  ways  ”  through  all  the  ascending  scale 
 of  sentient  being;  how  He  “  dwells  in  all,  from  life’s 
 beginnings  up  at  last  to  man,”  seeking  through  all  stages  of 
 creation  “  some  point  where  all  those  scattered  rays  should 
 meet  ”  and  He  finds  them  “  convergent  in  the  faculties  of 
 man.” 
 
 But  it  is  here  that  the  difficulties  are  greatest.  It  is  just 
 because  man  is  highest  in  capacity  that  he  is  most  in  danger 
 of  abusing  his  powers ;  it  is  because  he  is  trusted  above 
 all  creatures  with  the  power  of  self-determination,  that 
 the  direst  consequences  attend  unfaithfulness.  Corruptio 
 optimi  pessima.  Here  the  problem  of  evil  raises  riddles 
 to  which  all  the  philosophies  find  no  answer.  “  Will  God 
 in  very  deed  dwell  with  man  upon  the  earth  ?  ”  is  a  question 
 which  receives  new  import  if  it  implies  :  Can  and  will  the 
 Most  Holy  One  abide  in  the  hearts  of  creatures  who  have 
 sinned  and  who  have  no  power  of  self-restoration,  perhaps 
 little  desire  for  it  ?  Christianity  gives  the  only  possible 
 answer.  God  can  only  be  immanent  in  such  a  world  in 
 proportion  as  He  redeems  it ;  that  is,  in  holiest  love  and 
 uttermost  self-sacrifice  judges  the  sin  and  saves  the  sinner. 
 Then — 0  jelix  culpa  ! — the  closest  indwelling  of  all  becomes 
 possible  for  one  who  has  opened  his  whole  nature  to  the 
 Redeeming  God  and  enjoyed  the  fulness  of  His  redemption. 
 For  man  as  conscious  being  there  is  a  light  that  lighteth 
 all,  and  God  is  not  far  from  every  one  of  us.  But  for  man 
 redeemed  by  Christ,  the  body  of  each  is  to  become  a  temple 
 of  the  Holy  Ghost  and  the  Church  as  a  whole  is  builded 
 together  for  a  habitation  of  God  through  the  Spirit. 
 
278 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 The  highest  conceivable  possibilities  for  man  are  thus, 
 and  thus  only,  to  be  realised.  Each  man  becomes  his 
 own  highest  self  in  proportion  as  he  yields  himself  to  the 
 indwelling  Spirit  of  God,  who  is  also  the  Spirit  of  Christ. 
 Of  that  ineffable  union  Dr.  Moberly  has  well  said,  “  The 
 Spirit  is  not  a  mere  presence  in  me,  over-ruling,  displacing, 
 controlling.  What  He  in  me  does,  I  do.  What  He  in  me 
 wills,  I  will.  What  He  in  me  loves,  I  love.  Never  am  I, 
 as  I,  so  capable,  so  personal,  so  real,  as  when  by  the  in¬ 
 dwelling  Spirit  of  God  I  enter  into  the  realisation  of  myself 
 ...  as  when  in  Him  and  by  Him  I  am  at  last  a  true, 
 willing,  personal  response  to  the  very  Being  of  God.”  1 
 When  heart  and  mind  and  soul,  redeemed  in  Christ  and 
 renewed  by  the  Holy  Spirit,  are  freely,  gladly,  entirely 
 yielded  to  the  Divine  Indwelling,  this  is  Immanence  indeed. 
 
 VI 
 
 The  full  bearings  of  an  acceptance  of  the  doctrine  of 
 Divine  Immanence  cannot  as  yet  be  discerned.  The  idea 
 itself  needs  to  be  more  closely  defined,  and  a  prevailing 
 tendency  to  exaggerate  its  significance  and  to  under¬ 
 estimate  the  meaning  of  transcendence  needs  to  be  modified 
 and  restrained.  But  the  effect  of  a  thorough  assimilation 
 of  such  teaching  upon  all  departments  of  theology  must  be 
 wholesome  and  inspiring,  and  may  amount  to  a  complete 
 rejuvenation  of  its  energies.  The  Church  of  Christ  has 
 never  yet  done  justice  to  her  own  doctrine  of  the  Holy 
 Spirit;  she  has  not  realised  in  her  general  teaching  and 
 practice  what  that  doctrine  implies  and  entails.  Theism 
 has  not  fully  emancipated  itself  from  the  deistic  and 
 dualistic  tendencies  of  a  hundred  years  ago,  and  the  newer 
 thoughts  of  God’s  nearness,  indwelling  and  immediate 
 operation  may  well  fructify  theological  thinking  all  along 
 the  line. 
 
 Creation  cannot  now  be  regarded  as  an  act  “  at  a  point 
 of  time,”  a  making  “  out  of  nothing  ”  as  if  an  artificer 
 were  at  work  producing  an  elaborate  structure  without 
 
 1  Atonement  and  Personality ,  p.  252. 
 
THE  HOLY  SPIRIT 
 
 279 
 
 materials,  beginning  at  a  given  epoch  and  ceasing  when 
 the  work  was  done.  Christian  thought  has  been  too  largely 
 determined  by  the  phraseology  of  the  first  chapter  of 
 Genesis  literally  interpreted  and  too  little  by  its  Master’s 
 words,  46  My  Father  worketh  up  till  now.”  The  essential 
 idea  of  creation  needs  to  be  retained,  but  its  periods  and 
 methods  are  beyond  our  ken.  Creation  is  an  outflow  of 
 Divine  energy,  springing  from  the  very  nature  of  God 
 Himself,  not  to  be  limited  by  human  conceptions  and 
 boundary  lines. 
 
 The  line  of  demarcation  between  natural  and  super¬ 
 natural  will  have  to  be  drawn  afresh,  where  it  needs  to  be 
 drawn  at  all.  Widening  knowledge  of  the  universe  and 
 deepening  knowledge  of  God  have  made  thoughtful  men 
 impatient  of  too  sharp  a  contrast  between  44  nature  ”  and 
 that  which  is  above  nature,  especially  when  the  very  con¬ 
 ceptions  of  nature  are  being  continually  enlarged.  Men’s 
 eyes  have  of  late  been  opened  to  understand  the  natural- 
 supernatural  and  the  supernatural-natural.  They  can  no 
 longer  bear  the  intolerable  antithesis,  44  Here  is  nature, 
 where  is  God  ?  ”  If  the  doctrine  of  Divine  Immanence 
 means  anything  it  means  that  neither  nature,  law,  force, 
 established  order — 44  nor  any  other  creature,”  as  St. 
 Paul  would  have  said — shall  be  permitted  to  come  between 
 the  living  God  and  His  own  universe.  44  Not  only  is  it 
 true  that  He  made  it,  He  is  making  it.  God  is  making 
 stars  and  suns  to-day  and  44  nature  ”  is  fresh  every  moment 
 from  the  touch  of  His  wonder-working  hand.  God  has 
 various  modes  of  working,  it  is  true;  various  modes  of 
 communication  have  been  set  up  between  the  Divine 
 Spirit  and  the  world  of  creature  spirits  through  this 
 fine  fabric  spun  out  of  ether.  Some  of  these  modes  of 
 working  are  regularly  repeated,  others  are  rare  and 
 occasional,  while  from  time  to  time  He  utters  a  voice 
 that  is  unique  of  its  kind.  But  44  if  He  thunder  by 
 law,  the  thunder  is  still  His  voice.”  And  often  when 
 those  who  stand  by  say  that  it  thunders,  in  reality  a 
 message  from  heaven  has  been  given  which  they  had  not 
 ears  to  hear.  44  System  of  Nature  !  ”  breaks  out  Carlyle 
 
280 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 in  his  impetuous  way — 44  To  the  wisest  man,  wide  as  is 
 his  vision,  nature  remains  of  quite  infinite  depth,  of  quite 
 infinite  expansion;  and  all  experience  thereof  limits  itself 
 to  some  few  computed  centuries  and  measured  square 
 miles.”  The  numbers  of  the  centuries  and  the  square 
 miles  computed  have  increased  indefinitely  since  those 
 words  were  written,  now  nearly  a  century  ago.  But  they 
 have  added  to,  not  subtracted  from,  the  sense  of  infinitude 
 in  the  Cosmos.  And  what  science  suggests  religion  con¬ 
 firms  and  emphasises,  that  the  infinitude  is  due  to  the  in¬ 
 dwelling  and  inworking  of  the  infinite  God. 
 
 It  is  not  so  easy  to  trace  the  Divine  handwriting  on  the 
 pages  of  human  history  and  of  Providence.  The  very 
 alphabet  of  the  language  in  which  it  is  written  is  hard 
 to  learn,  and  of  those  who  can  read  it,  few  have  got  beyond 
 words  of  one  syllable.  But  at  least  men  ought  to  know 
 whether  the  lines  are  to  be  read  from  right  to  left,  or  from 
 left  to  right.  At  least  they  may  learn,  and  are  learning- 
 not  to  look  for  God  only  in  cataclysms  and  sudden  inter, 
 ventions.  They  may  unlearn  the  doctrine  of  a  blind, 
 relentless  fate,  or  of  a  hard,  mechanical  law,  without 
 recoiling  into  fond  notions  of  an  absentee  Deity,  who 
 occasionally  wakes  from  a  sleep  to  smite  His  enemies,  or 
 deliver  His  favourites.  The  transcendence  of  God  so 
 mightily  enforced  by  the  Calvinist  is  not  the  whole  truth, 
 but  whether  the  theists  of  to-day  can  blend  with  it  the 
 realisation  of  His  immanence,  the  truth  that  lies  at  the 
 heart  of  Pantheism,  without  losing  their  balance  on  the 
 edge  of  a  dangerous  abyss,  is  not  yet  perfectly  clear. 
 
 Again,  what  is  meant  by  Revelation  ?  It  must  certainly 
 come  44  from  without  ”  and  44  from  above  ”  if  it  is  to  be 
 revelation  indeed;  men  are  lost  if  they  are  left  entirely 
 to  their  own  unaided  gropings  after  light  and  knowledge. 
 Some  measure  of  truth  they  can  discover,  man  is  so  consti¬ 
 tuted  that  some  discoveries  will  never  be  made  if  he  does 
 not  set  to  work  to  make  them  for  himself.  But  he  needs 
 guidance  and  cannot  go  far  without  it.  The  Divine 
 method  of  leading  men,  however,  is  not  easily  understood, 
 and  we  are  learning  more  fully  how  His  guidance  is  given 
 
THE  HOLY  SPIRIT 
 
 281 
 
 from  within.  One  chief  channel  of  communication  is  found 
 in  those  loftiest  souls  that  Alp-like  catch  the  earliest  rays 
 of  dawn,  men  in  whom  the  Divine  and  the  human  meet  and 
 who  give  God’s  message  to  their  fellows  so  that  the  words 
 “  within  ”  and  44  without  ”  are  both  out  of  place.  But 
 the  doctrine  of  immanence  is  teaching  the  world  afresh 
 that  divine  messages  are  vibrating  in  the  air  when  there 
 are  no  wires  of  communication  visible,  only  the  receiver 
 must  be  in  tune  with  the  transmitter,  or  the  precious  words 
 will  be  lost  because  there  is  none  to  understand  them. 
 Special  messages  are  given,  at  special  times,  by  specially 
 prepared  men,  who  are  not  without  their  own  special 
 credentials,  but  these  are  sent  that  it  may  be  the  easier 
 to  hear  the  ceaseless  music  of  the  divine  voice,  whose 
 undertones  are  so  near  and  so  constant  that  men  too  often 
 become  deaf  to  their  meaning. 
 
 Atonement,  sacrifice,  salvation,  life  and  death,  heaven 
 and  hell — which  of  the  great  words  of  religion  does  not 
 become  fraught  with  new  meaning  and  clothed  with  new 
 power,  when  men  understand  the  intimate  dwelling  in 
 their  midst  of  the  very  God  who  is  inconceivably  above 
 and  beyond  them,  as  He  is  above  and  beyond  the  apparently 
 infinite  universe  of  which  they  form  an  infinitesimal  part  ? 
 Of  all  the  words  of  Christ  which  His  followers  at  the  time 
 and  since  have  failed  to  understand,  one  of  the  most 
 notable  is  this — 44  The  Kingdom  of  God  is  ivxog  v/ucbv,  in 
 your  midst  and  within  you.”  In  proportion  to  the  deepen¬ 
 ing  sense  of  religion  in  any  generation,  those  words  stand 
 out  in  letters  of  fire.  But  the  lines  of  light  die  down  and 
 the  words  become  illegible  except  in  so  far  as  the  indwelling 
 Spirit  of  God  is  allowed  to  do  His  own  work  of  making 
 them  plain. 
 
 The  personality  of  the  personal  Spirit  of  God,  who  is 
 above  men  as  well  as  within  them,  and  distinct  from  them 
 even  when  nearest  to  them,  must  above  all  be  preserved 
 in  thought  if  the  doctrine  of  Divine  Immanence  is  not 
 to  lose  its  distinctive  character  and  power.  Emerson’s 
 much  vaunted  doctrine  of  the  Over-soul  is  flat  and  feeble 
 in  comparison.  In  one  place  it  is  thus  expounded.  44  In 
 
282 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 all  conversation  between  two  persons  tacit  reference  is 
 made,  as  to  a  third  party,  a  common  nature.  That  third 
 party,  or  common  nature,  is  not  social ;  it  is  impersonal ;  it 
 is  God.  .  .  .  The  simplest  person  who  in  his  integrity 
 worships  God,  becomes  God.” 1  God  is  an  impersonal 
 Being  who  is  to  be  worshipped,  and  the  worshipper  himself 
 is  to  enjoy  apotheosis  ! 
 
 Let  Augustine  the  Christian  saint,  rather  than  Emerson 
 the  New  England  philosopher,  explain  the  meaning  of 
 immanence — the  man  who  writes  down  the  details  of  his 
 life  as  if  he  were  in  closest  conversation  with  Another, 
 who  is  not  himself,  but  who  is  nearer  to  him  than  his  very 
 self.  44  Without  Thee  nothing  that  is  could  be.  Why,  then, 
 do  I  pray  that  Thou  shouldest  enter  into  me,  seeing  that 
 I  also  am.  For  I  should  not  be,  if  Thou  wert  not  in  me. 
 Or  rather,  I  should  not  be  if  I  were  not  in  Thee,  of  whom  are 
 all  things,  through  whom  are  all  things.  .  .  .  What  art  thou, 
 then,  my  God,  what,  I  ask,  save  the  Lord  God  ?  Highest, 
 best,  most  mighty,  most  merciful,  most  just;  fairest  yet 
 strongest ;  fixed,  yet  incomprehensible ;  unchangeable,  yet 
 changing  all  things ;  never  new,  yet  never  aged ;  renewing 
 all,  yet  bringing  the  haughty  into  decrepitude  and  they 
 know  it  not.  Ever  busy,  yet  ever  at  rest ;  gathering,  yet 
 never  needing ;  bearing,  filling,  guarding ;  creating,  nourish¬ 
 ing,  perfecting;  seeking,  though  thou  hast  no  lack.  .  .  . 
 What  can  any  one  say  when  he  speaks  of  Thee  ?  And 
 woe  to  them  that  praise  Thee  not,  since  they  who  praise 
 Thee  most  are  no  better  than  dumb.” 2 
 
 To  say  that  the  relation  between  God  and  the  world, 
 between  God  and  man,  is  a  mystery,  and  that  men  should 
 therefore  cease  to  inquire  into  it,  is  to  utter  a  truism  and  a 
 falsehood  in  a  breath.  A  mystery  does  not,  or  should  not, 
 mean  an  unintelligible  incredibility ;  it  does  not  imply  any 
 self-contradiction  or  any  undue  strain  upon  reason  or  faith. 
 Omnia  exeunt  in  mysterium  ;  all  thoughts  and  things,  all 
 truths  and  facts,  all  histories  and  processes,  issue  in  that 
 which  is  inadequately  comprehended,  though  it  may  be 
 
 1  Essays,  pp.  227.,  239,  Eversley  edition. 
 
 2  Confessions,  Book  1,  chap.  2,  3,  4,  Translated  by  Dr.  Bigg. 
 
THE  HOLY  SPIRIT 
 
 283 
 
 most  truly  apprehended.  The  flower  in  the  crannied 
 wall  cannot  be  understood,  “root  and  all,  and  all  in  all,” 
 except  by  Him  who  alone  knows  “  what  God  and  man  is.” 
 But  the  great  central  mystery  of  the  relation  between  the 
 living  God  and  the  living  men  whom  He  has  made  to  know 
 Him,  is  no  impenetrable  abyss,  but  an  open  secret,  of 
 which  all  men  know  something  and  the  wisest  are  learning 
 to  know  more  every  day.  It  is  the  goal  of  knowledge  to 
 which  all  roads  lead  and  from  which  all  roads  stretch  out 
 to  infinity.  Men  of  science  are  every  hour  contributing 
 stores  of  knowledge  which  the  theologian  should  rejoice 
 to  accept  and  use.  The  help  of  the  philosopher  can  never 
 be  dispensed  with.  But  the  deepest  truths  are  still  often 
 withheld  from  the  wise  and  prudent  and  revealed  to  babes. 
 Some  of  the  hardest  questions  can  only  be  solved  by 
 experience,  and  for  the  solution  of  some  problems — para¬ 
 doxical  as  it  sounds — study  and  speculation  are  not  a  help, 
 but  a  hindrance.  “  Veil  after  veil,”  said  Sir  William 
 Crookes  several  years  ago  at  the  close  of  his  inaugural 
 address  as  president  of  the  British  Association,  “has  been 
 lifted,  and  the  face  of  nature  grows  more  beautiful,  august 
 and  wonderful  with  every  barrier  that  is  withdrawn.” 
 The  lifting  of  the  veils  reveals  not  only  the  face  of  nature, 
 but  the  presence  of  God.  Other  veils  need  also  to  be 
 removed,  and  One  only  has  appeared  among  men  who  can 
 guide  to  a  perfect  vision  of  the  Father  God.  In  pro¬ 
 portion  as  the  light  of  the  knowledge  of  the  glory  of  God 
 in  the  face  of  Jesus  Christ  shines  clear,  it  is  possible  to 
 believe  in  a  God  over  all  and  through  all  and  in  all  here 
 and  now;  and  when  the  Spirit’s  work  is  completely  done 
 and  Christ’s  kingdom  fully  come,  Divine  Immanence  shall 
 be  'realised  at  last,  and  God  shall  be  all  in  all. 
 
ESSAY  IX 
 
 THE  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 
 Rev.  Principal  A.  E.  Garvie,  M.A.,  D.D. 
 
SYNOPSIS 
 
 I.  Introductory. 
 
 (1)  The  proper  attitude  of  study. 
 
 (2)  The  standpoint  of  this  essay  determined  by  the  writer’3  personal 
 
 conviction. 
 
 (3)  Two  additional  reasons  for  a  sympathetic  attitude — the  uni¬ 
 
 versality  and  the  necessity  of  religion. 
 
 (4)  The  questions  to  be  answered. 
 
 (5)  The  threefold  method  of  study. 
 
 II.  The  Problems  of  Method. 
 
 (1)  Religions  with  or  without  history  and  literature. 
 
 (2)  Religions  national  and  universal. 
 
 (3)  The  unity  of  religion  as  shown  in  the  genealogy  of  religions. 
 
 (4)  Anthropology  as  comparative  in  its  method. 
 
 (5)  The  unwarranted  assumption  that  the  religion  of  savages  is 
 
 identical  with  primitive  religion. 
 
 (6)  Distinction  of  the  anthropological  and  the  psychological  question 
 
 of  the  origin  of  religion. 
 
 (7)  The  psychological  method  :  (i)  The  study  of  the  savage;  (ii)  the 
 
 study  of  the  child ;  (iii)  the  study  of  one’s  own  religious  con¬ 
 sciousness  ;  (iv)  the  influence  of  language  on  religious  ideas. 
 
 (8)  The  value  of  religion  as  a  function  in  the  individual  and  society. 
 
 (9)  The  validity  of  religion  as  corresponding  to  objective  reality. 
 
 III.  Answers  to  the  Questions  Suggested. 
 
 (1)  Need  of  defining  method  before  stating  conclusions  of  any 
 
 inquiry. 
 
 (2)  The  three  kinds  of  definition  possible. 
 
 (3)  The  growing  agreement  regarding  the  practical  purpose  of 
 
 religion. 
 
 (4)  Special  evidence  of  this  agreement. 
 
 (5)  The  psychological  factors  in  religion  :  (i)  intellectual;  (ii)  emo¬ 
 
 tional  ;  (iii)  volitional ;  (iv)  the  means  used  for  the  ends  of 
 religion. 
 
 (6)  The  progress  of  religion. 
 
 (7)  Estimate  of  the  value  of  religion. 
 
 (8)  Proof  of  the  validity  of  the  interpretation  of  the  Universe  given 
 
 by  religion. 
 
THE  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 
 
 I 
 
 (1)  It  is  only  within  the  last  century  that  the  subject  of 
 religion  has  been  studied,  as  it  deserves  to  be,  impartially, 
 accurately  and  extensively.  Partisanship  for  or  against 
 religion  generally,  or  one  particular  religion,  was  only  too 
 common ;  and  even  where  there  was  no  bias,  speculation 
 was  indulged  in  rather  than  observation,  classification 
 and  generalisation  pursued.  One  religion  was  regarded 
 as  true  and  all  others  as  false,  or  religion  itself  was  treated 
 as  a  delusion  or  an  invention.  We  must  not  flatter  our¬ 
 selves,  however,  that  even  to-day  all  prejudice  has  been 
 overcome.  The  supposition  that  religion  was  devised  either 
 by  rulers  to  secure  a  divine  sanction  for  their  laws,  or  by 
 priests  to  exploit  the  hopes  and  fears  of  men  for  their  own 
 profit,  may  be  regarded  as  out  of  date.  But  still  there  are 
 inquirers  who  regard  the  religion  of  the  civilised  man  as 
 but  an  evolution  of  the  superstition  of  the  savage,  and 
 as  having  no  title  to  be  regarded  as  in  any  closer  corre¬ 
 spondence  with  reality;  the  god  is  but  the  ghost  ration¬ 
 alised  and  moralised,  and  religious  rites  are  only  funeral 
 ceremonies  in  disguise. 
 
 (2)  The  standpoint  of  the  writer  of  this  essay  may,  at 
 the  outset,  be  frankly  stated.  Because,  as  a  Christian 
 believer,  he  is  convinced  that  by  his  faith  in  Christ  he 
 reaches  and  lays  hold  of  divine  reality,  he  feels  assured  that 
 wherever  religion  has  been  genuine,  there  has  been  a  real 
 contact  with  that  same  divine  reality  however  crudely 
 conceived  or  poorly  experienced.  Nor  can  he  regard  this 
 
 standpoint  as  a  prejudice.  The  necessity  of  a  rational 
 
 287 
 
288 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 justification  is  fully  recognised,  and  in  a  subsequent 
 stage  of  this  discussion  will  be  further  dealt  with.  At  this 
 point  the  consideration  must  be  urged,  that  in  religion, 
 as  in  morality,  art  and  philosophy,  some  appreciation 
 of  worth  is  a  necessary  condition  of  any  apprehension 
 of  truth.  The  inquirer  who  approaches  the  investigation  of 
 religion  with  a  hostile  bias  is  much  less  likely  to  discover 
 its  secret  than  he  who  deals  with  it  sympathetically.  If 
 a  man’s  religion  requires,  as  Christianity  does,  intellectual 
 honesty  and  moral  sincerity  as  indispensable  virtues,  he 
 will  at  least  be  constantly  on  his  guard  against  error,  and 
 will  spare  no  pains  to  reach  the  truth.  It  is  possible  that 
 he  will  be  unconsciously  and  involuntarily  influenced  by 
 his  personal  faith,  but  it  is  probable  that  such  influence 
 will  be  less  hurtful  than  would  be  that  of  personal  unbelief. 
 
 (3)  Besides  such  personal  conviction  two  additional 
 reasons  for  such  a  sympathetic  attitude  can  be  offered. 
 In  the  first  place,  it  is  now  generally  admitted  that  religion 
 is  universal.  In  his  book,  Anti-Theistic  Theories,  Lecture 
 VII,  the  late  Professor  Flint  asks  and  answers  the  question, 
 44  Are  there  tribes  of  Atheists  ?  ”  He  starts  with  this 
 admission  :  “  The  belief  to  which,  in  ancient  times,  Cicero 
 and  Plutarch  in  well-known  passages  gave  eloquent 
 expression — the  belief  that  wherever  men  exist  they  have 
 some  form  of  religion — can  no  longer  be  taken  for  granted ; 
 for  many  now  assert,  and  some  have  laboured  to  prove, 
 that  there  are  peoples  who  have  neither  religious  ideas, 
 nor  gods,  nor  any  kind  of  worship  ”  (p.  250).  He  ends, 
 however,  with  the  conclusion,  “  An  impartial  examination 
 of  the  relevant  facts,  it  appears  to  me,  shows  that  religion 
 is  virtually  universal.  The  world  has  been  so  framed,  and 
 the  mind  so  constituted,  that  man,  even  in  his  lowest 
 estate,  and  over  all  the  world,  gives  evidence  of  possessing 
 religious  perceptions  and  emotions  ”  (p.  288).  A  more 
 recent  writer  states  this  conclusion  even  more  confidently. 
 44  This  point,”  says  Principal  Jevons, 44  we  have  no  intention 
 of  discussing,  because,  as  every  anthropologist  knows,  it 
 has  now  gone  to  the  limbo  of  dead  controversies.  Writers 
 approaching  the  subject  from  such  different  points  of  view 
 
THE  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 
 
 289 
 
 as  Professor  Tylor,  Max  Muller,  Ratzel,  de  Quatrefages, 
 Tiele,  Waitz,  Gerland,  Peschel,  all  agree  that  there  are  no 
 races,  however  rude,  which  are  destitute  of  all  idea  of 
 religion  ”  (Introduction  to  the  History  of  Religion ,  p.  7). 
 Secondly,  the  universality  involves  the  necessity  of  religion, 
 as  Professor  Flint’s  statement  indicates.  Man  being  what 
 he  is  and  his  world  as  it  is,  spontaneously  he  is  religious. 
 44  Religion,”  says  Runtze,  44  has  not  arisen  out  of  these 
 or  those  occasions  or  causes,  accidentally  or  necessarily ; 
 it  is  there  and  will  always  be  there,  as  certainly  as  only 
 unreason  could  derive  from  man’s  history  hitherto  the 
 assumption,  that  there  will  ever  be  a  religionless  humanity, 
 which,  nevertheless,  could  still  make  claim  to  the  name 
 of  the  human.  What  Tertullian  says  of  the  Christian 
 religion  :  anima  naturaliter  Christiana ,  that  Homer  has 
 said  generally  of  the  belief  in  the  divine  :  n&vxeq  de  decor 
 Xazeovo ’  avOgconoc  ”  (Religionsphilosophie,  p.  96).  If  religion 
 is  not  only  universal  in  mankind,  but  if  this  also  involves 
 that  it  is  natural  to  manhood,  we  have  surely  a  double 
 reason  for  giving  to  it  an  appreciative  study. 
 
 (4)  There  are  four  questions  about  religion  which  we 
 may  ask  ourselves,  the  nature,  the  origin  and  development, 
 the  value,  and  the  validity  of  religion.  We  must  first  of 
 all  attempt  to  define  what  religion  is;  we  must  then  try 
 to  discover  its  beginning  and  its  course  in  human  history ; 
 our  next  task  is  to  show  the  service  that  it  has  rendered 
 to  mankind ;  and  our  last  endeavour  must  be  to  prove  that 
 it  does  not  involve  a  misinterpretation  of  self  and  the 
 world  and  what  is  beyond  both,  but  that  in  its  evolution 
 there  is  an  increasing  correspondence,  theoretical  and 
 practical,  in  belief  and  in  life,  with  reality.  While  the 
 pragmatist  might  be  content  with  showing  the  value  of 
 religion,  the  writer  at  least  feels  the  rational  necessity  of 
 proving  in  this  sense  its  validity. 
 
 (5)  Before  offering  an  answer  to  these  questions,  we 
 must  consider  by  what  method  or  methods  we  are  to  study 
 religion  in  order  to  know  and  understand  the  subject. 
 We  must  start  with  the  descriptive ,  go  on  to  the  comparative , 
 
 and  end  with  the  genetic  method  of  study  in  what  we  may 
 u 
 
290 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 call  the  scientific  treatment  of  the  subject.  Here  we  are 
 concerned  with  facts,  laws,  causes.  Anthropology  and 
 the  history  of  religions  give  us  the  facts ;  the  compara¬ 
 tive  study  of  religion  shows  the  laws,  the  uniformities  of 
 belief,  rite,  custom;  and  religious  psychology  tries  to 
 trace  the  causes  of  these  facts,  in  the  constitution  of  man 
 as  affected  by  the  world  around  him.  But  science  cannot 
 answer  all  our  questions  about  religion.  Its  value  and 
 validity  must  be  dealt  with  by  philosophy.  Here  the 
 writer  ventures  to  suggest  a  distinction  which  has  hitherto 
 not  found  adequate  recognition.  It  appears  to  him  that 
 the  philosophy  of  religion  should  deal  especially  with  the 
 value  of  religion  to  the  life  of  man,  its  varied  functions  in 
 human  society,  and  that  the  philosophy  of  theism  should 
 be  the  complement  to  this  in  showing  that  the  object  of 
 religion — the  divine — is  real,  and  that  the  world  is  most 
 rationally  explained,  when  it  is  interpreted  theistically. 
 One  other  method  of  study  may  be  suggested.  The  view 
 of  God,  self,  and  world,  held  as  true  in  any  religion  is  its 
 theology ;  and  so  the  study  of  any  religion  from  the  stand¬ 
 point  of  one  who  professes  it  may  be  called  the  theological. 
 
 II 
 
 (1)  One  of  the  first  distinctions  among  religions  which 
 forces  itself  upon  our  notice  is  that  between  religions  which 
 have  a  history  and  a  literature,  and  those  that  have  no 
 record  of  their  past  and  no  writings  regarded  as  sacred. 
 The  former  are  found,  as  might  be  expected,  in  civilised, 
 the  latter  in  savage  races.  The  branch  of  study  known 
 as  the  history  of  religions  is  concerned  with  the  first,  the 
 second  class  of  religions  has  to  be  dealt  with  by  anthro¬ 
 pology.  The  religions  of  Egypt,  Assyria  and  Babylonia, 
 Mexico  and  Peru,  have  left  records  behind.  Indian, 
 Chinese,  Japanese  and  Hebrew  religions  have  their  sacred 
 scriptures.  Zoroastrianism,  Buddhism,  Christianity,  Islam, 
 trace  their  history  back  to  a  personal  founder.  Thus 
 emerge  two  further  distinctions  among  religions — some 
 religions  are  “  book  ”  religions,  others  claim  no  sacred 
 
THE  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 
 
 291 
 
 scriptures;  some  religions  have  a  personal  founder,  others 
 show  no  such  influence.  But  as  regards  the  first  class, 
 it  must  be  remembered  that  the  religion  of  the  literature 
 and  the  religion  in  life  do  not  entirely  correspond,  for 
 the  sacred  scriptures  show  the  religion  better  than  it  is 
 in  actuality.  And  as  regards  the  second  class  it  has  to 
 be  noted  that  the  intention  of  the  founder  has  not  had  its 
 full  effect  in  the  religious  community  which  calls  itself 
 after  him ;  there  is,  for  instance,  contrast  rather  than 
 connection  between  the  Buddhism  of  Thibet,  China,  Japan, 
 and  the  teaching  of  Gautama  the  Buddha,  and  it  is  one 
 of  the  tasks  of  the  history  of  religion  to  show  by  what 
 process  each  religion  has  come  to  be  what  it  now  is. 
 
 (2)  One  other  distinction  among  religions  needs  to  be 
 made.  The  earliest  form  of  religion  is  tribal,  and  some 
 religions  never  develop  beyond  the  national  type,  for  they 
 are  bound  up  with  the  life  of  the  people  to  which  they 
 belong  so  closely  that  they  cannot  bear  transplantation 
 from  this  their  native  soil.  A  few  religions  are,  however, 
 universal  in  intention,  and  therefore  missionarv  in  method. 
 Buddhism,  Christianity  and  Islam,  all  seek  to  be  world¬ 
 wide  religions.  How  far  the  claim  of  each  to  this  distinc¬ 
 tion  is  justified  is  a  judgment  of  value  which  belongs  to 
 philosophy  rather  than  science.  But  the  missionary  effort 
 of  these  religions  introduces  a  factor  into  the  history  of 
 religions  which  is  of  the  utmost  significance.  The  dis¬ 
 tinctive  character  of  each  religion  is  thrown  into  greater 
 prominence  when  it  is  engaged  in  conflict  with  a  religion 
 that  would  supplant  it.  The  contact  of  religions,  however, 
 evokes  no  less  the  latent  affinities,  their  attractions  for 
 as  well  as  their  repulsions  from  one  another.  Religions 
 thus  thrown  together  mutually  modify  one  another. 
 Buddhism  in  China  and  Japan  has  not  only  modified,  but 
 been  itself  modified  by  the  religions  it  found  there.  Islam, 
 rigid  as  it  appears  in  doctrine  and  practice,  has  been 
 essentially  altered  in  Persia,  and  a  similar  process  is  said 
 to  be  going  on  to-day  where  animistic  tribes  are  being 
 converted.  If  Christianity  has  been  occidentalised  in  the 
 
 past,  in  the  future  it  may  again  be  orientalised.  The  story 
 
 u  2 
 
292 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 of  missions  can  thus  be  clearly  shown  to  be  a  subsidiary 
 study  to  the  history  of  religions. 
 
 (3)  So  far  we  have  been  noting  differences  among 
 religions,  but  we  must  not  rest  there ;  we  must  try  to  dis¬ 
 cover  the  unity  of  religion.  This  is  ultimately  a  psycho¬ 
 logical  question,  but  the  history  of  religions  can  prepare 
 us  for  the  answer,  by  dealing  with  the  genealogy  of  religions. 
 Although  we  have  not  any  historical  evidence  of  the  unity 
 of  the  human  race,  and  the  data  fail  us  for  tracing  back  all 
 religions  to  one  common  ancestor,  yet  there  have  been  his¬ 
 torical  connections,  and  there  are  proofs  of  racial  affinities 
 among  the  religions  of  the  world.  There  is  a  Semitic  and 
 an  Aryan  type  of  religion,  and  each  national  religion  in 
 these  two  branches  of  the  human  family  preserves  traces 
 of  a  common  descent.  How  far,  and  in  what  ways  the 
 Hebrew  religion  was  derived  from  the  religion  of  Assyria 
 and  Babylonia,  whether  these  religions  were  in  any  degree 
 affected  by  that  of  Egypt,  if  Jewish  and  then  Christian 
 angelology,  demonology,  eschatology,  were  borrowed  from 
 Zoroastrianism,  these  are  questions  which  the  history  of 
 religions  must  attempt  to  answer.  Christianity  is  some¬ 
 times  represented  as  a  syncretism,  in  which  Buddhist, 
 Zoroastrian,  and  many  other  elements  are  blended  to¬ 
 gether  :  and  the  Christian  theologian  is  compelled  to  face 
 the  issue  whether  this  be  a  true  account  of  its  origin  or 
 not.  While  on  the  one  hand  historical  connections  must 
 not  be  too  hastily  assumed,  yet  on  the  other  in  the  history 
 of  religions  the  constant  endeavour  must  be  to  leave  no 
 religion  isolated,  but  to  correlate  it,  as  far  as  the  data  will 
 allow,  with  all  other  religions. 
 
 (4)  Anthropology,  in  dealing  with  the  religions  of  savage 
 races,  is  not  merely  descriptive ,  as  is  the  history  of  religion, 
 but  is  usually  comparative  in  its  method.  It  does  not 
 describe  the  beliefs,  rites  and  customs  of  each  tribe  or 
 people  separately,  but  compares  these  with  one  another 
 in  order  to  show  their  resemblances.  Similarities  in  the 
 religions  of  civilised  nations  who  are  known  to  have  had 
 actual  contact  with  one  another,  or  who  may  have  had 
 such  intercourse  even  although  we  have  no  present  evidences 
 
THE  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 
 
 293 
 
 of  it,  are  not  so  impressive  as  these  resemblances  in  beliefs, 
 rites  and  customs  among  savage  peoples  all  over  the  earth, 
 between  whom  any  connection  is  in  the  highest  degree 
 improbable.  Mankind  is  one;  its  manhood  the  same; 
 and  so  in  the  religions  of  the  world  there  are  many  common 
 features.  These  are  much  more  easily  detected  in  the  savage 
 than  in  the  civilised  man,  yet  even  in  the  most  developed 
 historical  religion  the  common  elements  of  religion  can  be 
 discovered.  In  this  method  of  comparison  there  is  one 
 danger,  however,  which  must  be  carefully  guarded  against ; 
 it  is  what  in  biblical  study  would  be  censured  as  neglect  of 
 the  context.  Similar  beliefs  and  customs  may  have  a  very 
 different  significance  and  value  owing  to  their  associations. 
 Circumcision  means  something  very  different  to  the  Jew 
 and  to  the  Kaffir.  The  sacrifice  in  a  totemistic  religion 
 means  a  great  deal  more  than  in  one  in  which  it  is  but  a  gift 
 offered  to  please  a  god,  for  here  the  deity  and  the  wor¬ 
 shipper  partake  of  their  common  life.  Generalisations 
 based  on  data  gathered  together  from  the  ends  of  the  earth 
 may  be  premature  and  precarious,  unless  the  resemblance 
 is  essential  and  not  apparent  merely.  When  one  reads 
 some  modern  books  on  the  subject  one  seems  to  get  dizzy 
 from  being  transported  hither  and  thither  from  one  conti¬ 
 nent  to  another  in  a  headlong  flight.  In  dealing  with  the 
 complexity  of  human  life  uniformities  are  often  deceptive, 
 for  the  variety  of  human  development  is  no  less  a  fact  than 
 the  unity  of  human  nature.  While  fully  recognising  the 
 value  of  this  comparative  study  of  religion,  the  writer  must 
 insist  that  human  beings  are  not  atoms,  electrons,  elements, 
 the  behaviour  of  which  can  be  exactly  compared. 
 
 (5)  There  is  a  common  assertion  of  anthropologists, 
 which  is  accepted  by  many  historians  of  religion,  and  it  is 
 this,  that  we  can  discover  the  one  primitive  religion  of  man¬ 
 kind  from  the  religion  of  savages.  But  we  must  be  careful 
 not  to  make  too  hasty  an  assumption.  To  admit  that  all 
 the  religions  of  civilised  peoples  have  passed  through  a 
 stage  the  main  features  of  which  are  preserved  in  the 
 religion  of  savages  is  not  the  same  as  to  assert  that  in  the 
 religion  of  savages  there  are  no  elements  of  deterioration 
 
294 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 which  were  probably  absent  from  that  earlier  stage,  or  that 
 the  savage  religions  alone  have  preserved  the  primitive 
 religion.  We  may  conjecture  that  the  religion  of  the 
 ancestors  of  the  civilised  races  had,  as  the  explanation  of 
 its  progress,  some  higher  elements  which  the  religion  of 
 savages  has  lost,  and  that  in  the  religion  of  the  savage  races 
 on  account  of  stagnation,  or  even  deterioration,  lower 
 elements  have  emerged.  Hence,  we  are  not  entitled  to 
 affirm  confidently  that  primitive  religion  must  have 
 been  what  the  religion  of  savages  now  is.  This  general 
 assumption  was  stated  without  adequate  qualification  by 
 Tiele :  “  The  belief  that  the  religions  of  savages,  known  to 
 us  from  the  past  or  still  existing,  are  the  remains  of  the 
 religion  which  prevailed  among  mankind  before  the  earliest 
 civilisation  flourished,  and  are  thus  best  fitted  to  give  us 
 an  idea  of  it,  rests  on  the  following  grounds  : — (1)  The 
 most  recent  investigations  indicate  that  the  general  civili¬ 
 sation  had  then  reached  no  higher  stage  than  that  of  the 
 present  savages,  nay,  it  had  not  even  advanced  so  far; 
 and  in  such  a  civilisation  no  purer  religious  beliefs,  ideas 
 and  usages  are  possible  than  those  which  we  find  among 
 existing  communities.  (2)  The  civilised  religions  whose 
 history  ascends  to  the  remotest  ages,  such  as  the  Egyptian, 
 the  Akkadian,  the  Chinese,  still  show  more  clearly  than 
 later  religions  the  influence  of  animistic  conceptions.  (3) 
 Almost  the  whole  of  the  mythology  and  theology  of  civilised 
 nations  may  be  traced,  without  arrangement  or  co-ordina¬ 
 tion,  except  in  forms  that  are  undeveloped  and  original  rather 
 than  degenerate,  in  the  traditions  and  ideas  of  savages. 
 (4)  Lastly,  the  numerous  traces  of  animistic  spirit-worship 
 in  higher  religions  are  best  explained  as  the  survival  and 
 revival  of  older  elements.  We  must  not,  however,  forget 
 that  the  present  polydaemonistic  religions  only  imperfectly 
 reproduce  those  of  prehistoric  times ;  since  even  they  have 
 not  stood  still,  but  have  to  some  extent  outgrown  their 
 earlier  form,  which  has  consequently  not  been  preserved 
 unimpaired  ”  ( Outlines  of  the  History  of  Religion ,  pp.  8-9). 
 If  in  the  savage  there  has  not  been  any  standing  still, 
 deterioration  as  well  as  progress  is  a  possibility.  If  the 
 
THE  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 
 
 295 
 
 earlier  stage  of  all  civilised  religions  was  the  same  as  savage 
 religion,  how  was  there  progress  in  the  one,  stagnation,  or 
 even  deterioration  in  the  other  ?  These  questions  need  to 
 be  answered  if  the  assumption  is  to  be  justified.  That  we 
 can  get  back  to  the  primitive  man  from  the  savage  alone  is 
 doubtful,  for  had  not  the  remote  ancestors  of  the  race  the 
 promise  and  potency  in  them  of  civilisation  as  well  as 
 of  savagery  ? 
 
 (6)  Without  pursuing  these  questions  any  further,  the 
 writer  feels  it  necessary  to  urge  that  we  should  be  careful 
 not  to  confuse  two  distinct  inquiries,  the  one  anthropo¬ 
 logical,  the  other  psychological.  What  is  the  earliest  form 
 of  religion  ?  is  not  the  same  question  as,  What  is  the  origin 
 of  religion  ?  although  we  must  take  due  account  of  the  one 
 in  seeking  to  give  an  answer  to  the  other.  To  discover  the 
 origin  of  religion,  its  subjective  source  in  man’s  mental, 
 emotional  and  volitional  nature,  and  its  objective  source  in 
 the  action  of  the  world  upon  him  and  his  reaction  upon  it,  is 
 a  larger  and  deeper  question  than  to  show  what  were  the 
 beliefs,  the  rites  and  the  customs  of  the  earliest  stage  of 
 human  development,  which  by  evidence  or  inference  we 
 can  possibly  reach.  For  to  discuss  the  origin  of  religion 
 we  must  take  into  account  what  religion  has  become  as 
 well  as  what  it  once  was.  Animism,  the  belief  in  spirits, 
 or  animatism,  the  belief  in  the  world  as  alive,  may  be  the 
 earliest  kind  of  religious  belief,  but  beyond  the  belief  is  the 
 life,  from  which  the  belief  sprang,  and  the  ends  of  which 
 it  served.  As  is  now  being  more  fully  recognised  an  account 
 of  religious  ideas  is  not  an  explanation  of  religion,  which  is 
 practical,  and  not  theoretical  primarily.  In  this  life  of  the 
 soul  was  the  promise  and  the  potency  of  not  only  the  begin¬ 
 ning,  but  also  the  course  of  religion  in  human  history,  and 
 so  we  are  far  from  having  said  the  last  word  as  to  the  origin 
 and  development  of  religion,  when  we  have  compared  and 
 described  its  earliest  and  its  successive  later  forms.  The 
 comparative  study  of  religion  attempts  the  morphology  of 
 religion ,  the  description  of  the  phases  it  has  successively 
 assumed,  such  as  animatism,  animism,  fetichism,  poly- 
 dsemonism,  totemism,  polytheism,  henotheism,  syncretism. 
 
296 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 Nevertheless,  while  it  may  be  assumed  that  all  religions  have 
 passed  through  certain  stages  of  development,  it  is  not  so 
 certain  that  each  religion  has  passed  through  all  the  phases 
 known  to  us.  Dr.  Jevons  maintains,  for  instance,  that 
 fetichism  is  a  by-path,  and  not  on  the  main  road  of  religion, 
 and  that  we  must  not  suppose  every  religion  to  have  had  a 
 fetichist  stage.  Again,  totemism  cannot  be  shown  to  be  a 
 necessary  stage  in  the  evolution  of  religious  belief.  Here, 
 too,  allowance  must  be  made  for  difference  along  with 
 insistence  on  resemblance. 
 
 (7)  The  descriptive  and  comparative  study  of  religions 
 leads  on  to  the  genetic.  Llere  we  pass  into  the  region  of 
 religious  psychology.  Beliefs,  rites  and  customs  are  all 
 the  expression  of  the  life  of  the  soul ;  while  in  the  de¬ 
 scription  of  these  we  are  concerned  with  the  outer  side  of 
 religion,  we  get  to  the  inner  side  only  when  we  discover  what 
 are  the  mental,  emotional  and  volitional  processes  which 
 are  their  source.  So  long  as  we  are  observers  merely  of 
 the  objective  facts  of  religion  we  have  not  got  its  secret; 
 we  must  become  experients  ourselves,  subjects  of  the 
 thoughts,  feelings  and  wishes,  which  give  meaning  and 
 worth  to  these  objective  facts.  We  want  to  retrace  the 
 development  of  the  religious  consciousness  from  its  begin¬ 
 nings  through  its  age-long  course  to  its  highest  present 
 stages.  Can  we  so  rethink  the  past  religious  life  of 
 mankind  ? 
 
 (i)  As  has  just  been  insisted  on,  we  cannot  without 
 qualification  assume  that  the  savage  of  to-day  represents 
 the  primitive  man.  Even  if  the  assumption  were  justified, 
 it  is  not  so  easy  as  it  might  appear  to  get  inside  the  savage’s 
 mind.  He  is  usually  very  suspicious  of  the  traveller  and 
 the  missionary,  and  inquiries  about  his  religion  especially 
 are  most  likely  to  intensify  this  attitude.  Sometimes  he 
 is  “  knowing  ”  enough  to  give  the  answer  that  he  thinks 
 is  expected  from  him.  He  does  not  feel  under  any  obli¬ 
 gation  to  speak  the  truth  and  nothing  but  the  truth. 
 But  even  if  he  desires  to  be  honest  and  communicative,  his 
 self-consciousness  is  not  so  developed  that  he  can  with 
 accuracy  describe  his  own  inner  conditions.  If  he  is  being 
 
THE  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 
 
 297 
 
 won  as  a  convert  to  Christianity,  such  a  change  has  already 
 begun  in  him  as  makes  it  difficult  for  him  to  give  a  true 
 account  of  his  former  belief.  It  is  not  maintained  that  we 
 cannot  learn  much  from  the  savage,  but  that  the  inquiry 
 must  be  pursued  with  great  caution.  Can  we  call  to  our 
 aid  any  other  method  ? 
 
 (ii)  In  recent  years  increasing  attention  has  been  given 
 to  the  personal  development  of  the  child,  as  in  his  growth, 
 it  is  believed,  the  soul  will  disclose  its  secret.  We  may 
 hope,  therefore,  that  as  we  trace  the  beginnings  of  the  life 
 of  the  soul  in  the  individual,  we  may  get  on  the  track  of  the 
 development  of  the  religious  consciousness  of  mankind. 
 4 4  A  recently  developed  side  of  psychological  inquiry,  the 
 study  of  the  mind  of  the  child,  is  peculiarly  well  adapted 
 to  the  solution  of  primitive  mental  problems.  It  is  not  to 
 be  assumed,  as  it  often  is,  that  the  savage  and  his  primitive 
 predecessor  are  overgrown  children.  Nor,  again,  is  it  likely 
 that  the  unscientific  doctrine  that  the  child  in  his  individual 
 development  passes  through  all  the  stages  of  the  mental 
 evolution  of  the  race,  will  survive  any  addition  to  our 
 psychological  and  biological  knowledge.  But  the  perma¬ 
 nent  value  of  the  study  of  the  consciousness  of  children  rests 
 on  the  fact  that  in  them  we  can  observe  the  soul  at  liberty. 
 It  is  as  yet  free,  spontaneous  and  unspotted  from  the 
 world  ”  (Crawley,  The  Idea  of  the  Soul,  p.  24).  The  last 
 sentence  in  this  quotation  requires  some  qualification.  It 
 is  being  more  and  more  insisted  on  that  the  child  is  more 
 potently  influenced  by  his  environment  than  by  his  heredity. 
 And  we  must,  therefore,  recognise  that  the  child  growing 
 up  in  a  moral  and  religious  environment  will  be,  and  cannot 
 but  be,  in  this  development,  affected  by  that  environment. 
 We  must  allow  for  the  imitative  as  well  as  the  spontaneous 
 in  the  child’s  mind.  And,  further,  we  must  never  forget  that 
 it  is  our  own  interpretation  that  we  are  putting  upon  the 
 child’s  words  and  actions,  and  we  must  be  prepared  to  find 
 that  we  often  just  miss  the  child’s  own  point  of  view.  How 
 often  must  the  grown-ups  appear  44  stupid  ”  to  the  child 
 who  fails  to  be  understood.  Desire  shapes  the  child’s 
 world ;  what  he  wants  he  believes.  Spontaneous  imagina- 
 
298 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 tion  is  active  before  there  is  accurate  knowledge.  There  is, 
 however,  growing  curiosity.  Wee  Macgreegor’s  44  whit 
 wey  ”  is  characteristic  of  any  child.  Parents  and  teachers 
 are  often  puzzled  by  the  questions  regarding  the  cause,  the 
 nature,  and  the  purpose  of  the  world,  put  by  children.  Last 
 of  all  in  the  development  comes  the  recognition  of  a  moral 
 law  to  be  accepted.  It  is  not  improbable  that  this  order  of 
 growth  in  the  child  recapitulates,  in  some  measure  at  least, 
 the  course  of  human  development. 
 
 (iii)  It  is  evident,  however,  that  both  savage  and  child 
 need  to  be  interpreted,  and  that,  therefore,  the  interpreter 
 must  have  asked  himself  the  questions  for  which  he  seeks 
 an  answer.  There  must  be  in  the  last  resort  introspection, 
 self-analysis.  The  thinker  must  be  able  to  break  up  his  ideas 
 into  their  simpler  elements ;  he  must  endeavour  to  rethink 
 his  own  religious  history.  While  it  may  be  possible  for  a 
 man  sympathetically  and  appreciatively  to  analyse  and 
 estimate  opinions  and  feelings  that  he  does  not  share,  and 
 we  may  gratefully  recognise  all  that  has  been  done  for  the 
 study  of  religion  by  those  for  whom  it  is  even  at  its  best 
 misinterpretation  of  reality,  yet  the  writer  at  least  cannot 
 escape  the  conviction  that  a  man  to  do  full  justice  to 
 religion  as  an  objective  fact  must  himself  know  it  as  a 
 subjective  feeling  and  force.  In  the  psychology  of  religion 
 when  we  come  to  deal  with  this  last  question  which  we  have 
 to  ask  about  it,  its  nature,  origin  and  development,  we  are 
 passing,  whether  we  will  or  not,  from  the  standpoint  of 
 science  to  that  of  philosophy,  and  a  recognition  of  this  fact 
 should  be  insisted  on,  especially  in  regard  to  the  solution  of 
 the  problem  by  those  whose  attitude  to  religion  generally, 
 or  to  a  particular  religion,  is  indifferent,  if  not  hostile. 
 
 (iv)  Attention  has  been  called  by  Runtze  to  the  influ¬ 
 ence  of  language,  if  not  directly  on  the  religious  life  itself 
 yet  on  the  representations  of  the  religious  consciousness. 
 “  Religion,  the  sphere  of  the  holy,  is  most  completely  re¬ 
 flected  in  speech.  Only  when  the  name  for  God  has  been 
 found,  does  the  consciousness  of  God  become  clear  and 
 unmixed ;  and  to  proclaim  ‘  the  word  of  God  ’  is  the  chief 
 task  of  the  founder  of  a  religion,  the  prophet,  the  preacher, 
 
THE  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 
 
 299 
 
 who  is  convinced  that  he  is  proclaiming  God  Himself,  in  the 
 word,  in  the  verbal  representation  ”  ( Religionsphilosophie , 
 p.  105).  Language  in  expressing  the  religious  conscious¬ 
 ness  inevitably  reacts  upon  it.  This  we  must  admit,  even 
 if  we  stop  short  of  Max  Muller’s  view  of  the  identity  of 
 Language  and  Thought.  An  illustration  from  his  account 
 of  44  the  primitive  expression  of  the  early  Aryan  speakers  ” 
 may  be  fitly  inserted  here.  “  When  we  should  say,  the  moon 
 exists,  the  sun  is  there,  or  it  blows,  it  rains,  they  would  only 
 think  and  say  the  sun  breathes  (sdryo  asti ),  the  moon 
 grows  (mu  bhavati),  the  earth  dwells  (bhdr  vasati ),  the 
 wind  or  the  blower  blows  (vdyur  vdti ),  the  rain  rains  ( indr  a 
 unatti ,  or  vrishd  varshati ,  or  somah  sunoti )  ”  ( The  Hibbert 
 Lectures ,  p.  193).  While  he  denies  that  at  this  stage 
 of  thought  there  was  any  44  animating,  personifying  or 
 humanising  ”  of  these  objects  (p.  194),  an  opinion  in  which 
 he  would  now  find  few  supporters,  yet  he  recognises 
 that  “the  comprehension  determined  the  expression;  the 
 various  expressions,  in  becoming  traditional,  reacted  on 
 the  comprehension;  the  action  and  reaction  produced  by 
 necessity  ancient  mythology  ”  (p.  193).  So  inevitable  does 
 this  process  appear,  that  it  seems  hardly  just  to  describe 
 mythology  as  44  a  disease  of  language.”  Metaphor,  personi¬ 
 fication,  hyperbole,  and  other  figures  of  speech,  have 
 played  their  part  in  giving  content  to  the  religious  con¬ 
 sciousness  in  its  representation  and  explanation  of  the 
 world,  in  its  conception  of  the  divine;  but  it  would  be  an 
 entire  mistake  on  that  account  to  suppose  that  man  in 
 his  religion  is  not  conscious  of  contact  with  reality  and 
 even  ultimate  reality. 
 
 (8)  It  is  evident  that  it  is  quite  impossible  for  us  to 
 isolate  religion  from  the  whole  life  of  man,  and  treat  it 
 adequately  in  such  isolation.  It  is  one  of  many  functions 
 of  the  soul,  affecting  and  being  affected  by  all  these;  and 
 it  determines  his  relation  to  the  world  around  him.  What 
 is  its  value  subjectively,  what  is  its  validity  objectively  ? 
 These  are  questions  that  we  must  ask  ourselves.  But  it 
 is  certain  that  science  by  its  methods  of  observation,  classi¬ 
 fication,  generalisation,  cannot  answer  them.  We  must 
 
300 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 pass  from  science  to  philosophy.  The  writer  has  not  found 
 in  the  treatment  of  the  subject  hitherto,  that  the  dis¬ 
 tinction  between  the  two  questions  has  been  made  sharply 
 enough.  That  we  should  now  insist  upon  it  is  a  tribute  to 
 the  influence  of  the  pragmatist  philosophy  which  may  be 
 offered  even  by  those  who  deny  its  adequacy.  A  philo¬ 
 sophy  of  religion  may  first  ask  itself  the  question,  What  is 
 the  worth  of  religion  in  relation  to  morality,  society,  art, 
 literature,  science  and  philosophy  ?  In  regard  to  morality 
 we  may  ask,  Not  only  can  it  be  autonomous,  as  Kant 
 insisted,  but  has  it  been  autonomous  ?  It  has  sometimes 
 been  maintained  that  morality  and  religion  are  inde¬ 
 pendent  of  one  another,  and  that  sometimes  even  religion 
 at  a  lower  stage  of  development  may  come  into  conflict 
 with  morality  at  a  higher  stage.  How  often  have  the 
 lines  of  Lucretius  been  repeated :  “  Tantum  religio  potuit 
 suadere  malorum  !  ”  (1. 102).  Yet  it  is  certain,  on  the  other 
 hand,  that  the  tribal  deity  was  the  guardian  and  vindi¬ 
 cator  of  the  tribal  customs,  in  which  we  can  discern  the 
 beginnings  of  morality.  Significant  is  the  fact  that  the 
 positivist  insists  that  morality  must  be  transferred  from 
 a  theocratic  to  a  sociocratic  basis,  for  this  is  a  recognition 
 of  the  dependence  in  the  past  at  least  of  morality  on 
 religion.  The  Code  of  Hammurabi  is  theocratic,  as  is 
 the  Decalogue.  While  it  may  appear  to  us  impossible  to 
 accept  the  opposition  between  reason  and  religion  on 
 which  Mr.  Benjamin  Kidd  insists  in  his  book  on  Social 
 Evolution ,  yet  he  does  assert  “  the  function  of  religious 
 beliefs  in  the  evolution  of  society.”  While  his  view  of 
 religion  is  one-sided,  as  its  influence  on  morality  does 
 not  exhaust  its  significance,  yet  he  calls  our  attention  to 
 one  service  which  must  be  fully  recognised  in  estimating 
 its  value.  From  the  standpoint  of  even  a  higher  morality 
 can  we  adequately  measure  the  inspiration  to  moral 
 aspiration  and  endeavour  which  is  afforded  by  the  con¬ 
 viction  that  the  moral  ideal  is  eternal  reality  in  God  ? 
 Again,  how  much  of  the  world’s  greatest  art  has  been  in¬ 
 spired  by  religion  !  The  temple  and  the  idol  have  not  been 
 without  an  influence  on  the  development  of  architecture 
 
THE  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 
 
 301 
 
 and  sculpture.  The  ancient  literature  which  has  been 
 preserved  throughout  the  generations  is  for  the  most  part 
 sacred  scripture;  and  how  potently  has  all  the  serious 
 literature  of  the  world  been  affected  by  religion  !  Science 
 and  religion  are  often  regarded  as  antagonists;  and  it 
 must  be  admitted  that  they  do  come  into  conflict  when 
 religion  attempts  to  impose  its  world-view  on  science, 
 and  challenges  the  explanation  of  phenomena  which 
 science  alone  can  give,  but  also  when  science  attempts  to 
 transform  its  explanation  of  phenomena  into  a  world¬ 
 view  such  as  it  is  not  within  its  competence  to  construct. 
 The  philosophy  of  religion  must  seek  to  fix  the  boundaries. 
 A  world-view  is  the  province  of  philosophy,  and  in  this 
 it  will  come  into  contact  with  religion.  While  it  is  note¬ 
 worthy  that  the  majority  of  the  philosophical  systems  of 
 the  past  have  been  theistic,  yet  the  conception  of  the 
 divine  reached  along  the  path  of  the  speculative  interpre¬ 
 tation  of  the  world  is  often  one  which  does  not  satisfy  the 
 religious  consciousness.  Absolute  idealism  is  in  the  judg¬ 
 ment  of  many  Christian  thinkers  antagonistic  to  Christian 
 faith.  Here  the  philosophy  of  religion  must  attempt 
 to  mediate.  It  must  seek  to  show,  on  the  one  hand,  how 
 far  religious  conceptions  are  inadequate,  or,  on  the  other, 
 how  far  philosophy  has  neglected  any  data  in  the  religious 
 life  which  it  should  have  considered  more  fully  and  esti¬ 
 mated  more  highly.  But  we  are  here  already  passing  from 
 the  philosophy  of  religion  to  the  philosophy  of  theism ,  from 
 the  problem  of  value  to  the  problem  of  validity.  Even  if 
 it  could  be  shown  that  religion  stimulated  and  sustained 
 all  the  manifold  interests  and  activities  of  man,  that  it 
 was  of  the  greatest  service  in  enriching  the  life  of  man, 
 only  in  a  very  limited  degree  can  we  affirm  its  worth 
 unless  we  can  go  on  to  show  its  truth .  If  there  be  no 
 objective  reality  corresponding  to  the  conception  of  the 
 divine,  if  faith,  worship,  obedience,  are  but  a  self -projection 
 of  man  into  the  void,  then,  as  an  illusion  and  mockery  of 
 man,  religion  loses  its  worth.  So  great  are  the  interests 
 here  involved,  that  a  man  must  seek  and  strive  to  get 
 beyond  conjecture  to  certainty. 
 
302 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 (9)  It  is  doubtful,  however,  whether  philosophy  can 
 give  man  this  certainty.  However  rational  the  reality, 
 as  interpreted  by  a  system,  may  appear  to  its  advocates, 
 religious  assurance  comes  not  from  intellectual  demon¬ 
 stration.  The  ultimate  basis  of  this  certainty  is  personal 
 experience,  the  religious  consciousness  of  contact  and 
 communion  with  divine  reality.  Man  assumes  that  the 
 divine  he  seeks  does  disclose  itself  to  him.  Religion 
 would  indeed  be  like  the  child  “  crying  in  the  night,  and 
 with  no  language  but  a  cry,”  were  there  not  the  assurance 
 of  revelation.  The  gods  show  their  favour  or  displeasure, 
 they  answer  prayers,  they  accept  offerings,  they  grant 
 forgiveness,  they  bestow  boons.  The  conception  of  the 
 divine  may  be  crude,  and  the  expectations  of  the  wor¬ 
 shippers  low ;  but  there  is,  in  spite  of  all  such  imperfection 
 of  form,  a  real  contact  of  the  divine  and  the  human,  unless 
 religion  be  the  most  tragic  illusion  humanity  practises 
 on  itself.  When  the  reality  of  this  contact  of  the  divine 
 with  the  human  in  religion  is  not  only  speculatively  re¬ 
 cognised  but  practically  experienced,  when  the  world  and 
 life  are  viewed  in  the  light  of  this  relationship  to  God, 
 it  seems  desirable  to  insist  that  we  have  passed  from  the 
 philosophical  to  the  theological  standpoint,  for  philosophy 
 is  concerned  with  the  interpretation  of  the  world,  even 
 though  it  may  interpret  it  theistically,  but  theology  is 
 concerned  primarily  with  man’s  knowledge  of  God  in  God’s 
 self-disclosure  in  the  world  and  in  life,  and  it  is  only 
 here  that  the  study  of  religion  can  be  said  at  last  to  have 
 reached  its  goal. 
 
 Ill 
 
 (1)  The  writer  has  dwelt  so  long  on  the  problems  of 
 method  before  attempting  to  offer  an  answer  to  the  four 
 questions  we  ask  about  religion,  because  it  seems  to  him 
 that  many  wrong  answers  have  in  the  past  been  given 
 because  the  problems  of  method  have  not  been  adequately 
 considered.  Some  illustrations  of  unjustified  assumptions 
 have  already  been  offered.  Further,  the  danger  to-day 
 
THE  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 
 
 308 
 
 is  over-specialisation,  and  the  duty  of  a  University  should 
 be  to  correct  such  tendency. 
 
 The  worker  in  one  part  of  the  field  should  have  before 
 him  a  plan  of  the  whole,  to  correct  his  inclination  to  think 
 that  there  is  nothing  beyond  his  small  corner.  To  draw 
 up  an  adequate  programme  for  the  study  of  any  subject 
 is  to  give  needed  guidance  in  dealing  with  its  minutiae. 
 Christian  theology,  it  must  be  confessed,  has  not  always 
 set  its  interpretation  of  the  Christian  faith  in  this  wider 
 context  of  the  religions  of  the  world,  although  it  can  gain 
 only  by  the  evidence  offered  that  religion  is  a  universal 
 necessity  of  humanity,  and  that  by  comparison  with 
 other  religions  its  supremacy  is  made  only  more  manifest. 
 But,  on  the  other  hand,  the  study  of  religion  generally  has 
 been  pursued  too  often  apart  from,  and  even  in  antagonism 
 to,  Christian  theology,  and  so  emphasis  has  often  fallen 
 on  the  lower  elements  of  religion,  on  its  earlier  stages, 
 and  it  has  not  been  judged  as  it  ought  to  be  judged  by 
 what  may  in  an  unprejudiced  comparison  be  regarded  as 
 its  higher  features  and  later  developments.  On  these  two 
 grounds  the  writer  would  justify  what  may  appear  an 
 abstract  discussion. 
 
 (2)  So  many  definitions  of  religion  have  been  given,  and 
 so  greatly  have  these  differed,  that  one  may  ask  the  question, 
 Can  we  give  a  definition  ?  and,  what  in  religion  are  we  to 
 define  ?  Can  we  in  all  beliefs,  rites  and  customs  we  call  reli¬ 
 gious  discover  a  common  element,  which  our  definition  must 
 fix  as  accurately  as  words  can  do  ?  Or  is  that  common 
 element  so  vague  an  abstraction  that  we  cannot  invest 
 it  with  any  definite  meaning  ?  Kaftan  asserts,  Ritschl 
 denies,  the  possibility  of  defining  the  common  element  in 
 all  religions.  44  Language,”  says  Ritschl,  44  can  furnish 
 no  terms  sufficiently  neutral  and  indeterminate  to  express 
 the  general  conception  of  religion  desired  ”  ( Justification 
 and  Reconciliation,  p.  195).  Kaftan  justifies  the  attempt 
 to  give  a  definition.  44  I  cannot  find,”  he  says,  44  that  the 
 necessary  indefiniteness  and  generality  decreases  its  value 
 for  knowledge,  but  hold  the  opinion  that  on  the  contrary 
 it  is  definite  enough  to  bring  to  expression  an  essential 
 
304 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 and  distinguishing  peculiarity  of  religion  ”  (Das  Wesen 
 der  Christlichen  Religion ,  p.  94).  Ritschl  seeks  to  avoid 
 the  error  which  has  been  only  too  common  of  substituting 
 for  a  definition  of  the  common  element  of  all  religions  an 
 exposition  of  the  ideal  of  religion,  which  the  individual 
 thinker  may  have  himself  conceived.  An  illustration  of 
 this  tendency  to  substitute  a  subjective  impression  of  re¬ 
 ligion  for  the  objective  apprehension  is  furnished  by  the 
 three  great  thinkers,  Kant,  Hegel  and  Schleiermacher. 
 For  Kant,  religion  is  the  apprehension  of  moral  obligations 
 as  divine  commands ;  for  Hegel  it  is  the  less  adequate 
 representation  (V orstellung)  of  ultimate  reality  or  spirit, 
 of  which  philosophy  alone  has  the  more  accurate  conception 
 ( Begriff ) ;  for  Schleiermacher,  who  revolts  alike  against 
 moralism  and  intellectualism  and  inclines  to  mysticism, 
 it  is  the  feeling  of  dependence  on  God,  whether  conceived 
 personally  or  impersonally.  The  Christian  believer,  re¬ 
 garding  Christianity  as  the  ^realisation  of  the  ideal  of 
 religion,  is  prone  to  make  it  the  standard  of  judgment  of 
 what  is  and  what  is  not  to  be  recognised  as  genuinely 
 religious  in  other  faiths.  The  missionary,  seeing  no 
 resemblance  between  the  beliefs  and  rites  of  the  savage 
 whom  he  is  seeking  to  convert  and  the  Gospel  of 
 Christ,  has  sometimes  hastily  declared  that  he  has 
 discovered  no  trace  of  religion,  only  superstition.  If 
 we  cannot  get  our  definition  of  religion  either  by  dis¬ 
 covering  the  common  element  of  all  religions,  or  by 
 determining  the  ideal  of  all  religion,  what  remains  to 
 us  ?  Ritschl  suggests  a  middle  course.  We  may  seek 
 for  the  tendency  in  all  religions,  which  finds  its  full  ex¬ 
 pression  first  of  all  in  Christianity.  We  are  thus  led  to 
 the  most  recent  form  of  the  question  :  What  is  it  that 
 man  seeks  in  his  religion  ?  This  is  the  decisive  issue. 
 For  although  there  is  an  intellectual  aspect  of  religion — 
 a  theology  more  or  less  developed,  and  an  emotional — a 
 piety  more  or  less  cultivated,  the  primary  is  the  practical 
 — the  end  sought  by  man,  an  end  which  is  differently 
 conceived  at  different  stages  of  evolution. 
 
 (3)  We  may  assert  as  the  result  of  the  discussion  of  the 
 
THE  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 
 
 305 
 
 problem  of  the  nature  of  religion  in  the  last  few  years  that 
 there  is  a  growing  agreement  regarding  this  practical 
 purpose  of  religion,  although  there  is  still  a  great  differ¬ 
 ence  of  opinion  regarding  the  good  for  himself  that  man 
 seeks.  We  may  suppose,  however,  that  such  difference  of 
 opinion  about  religion  does  reflect  an  inevitable  difference 
 of  desire  in  religion  itself.  Granted  that  man  seeks  the 
 highest  good  in  religion,  he  will  conceive  it  according  to 
 his  culture  and  character.  But  it  may  be  said  that  man 
 seeks  his  good  in  industry,  society,  morality ;  what  distin¬ 
 guishes  his  method  of  search  in  religion  is  this.  It  is  not 
 by  his  own  effort,  or  by  the  assistance  of  his  fellow-men, 
 that  man  wishes,  hopes  and  believes  to  reach  his  goal 
 in  religion.  It  is  by  means  of  the  divine,  the  supersensible, 
 superhuman,  even  supernatural  power  or  powers  that  he 
 seeks  his  good  in  religion.  Some  conception  of  the  divine, 
 however  crude,  is  essential  to  religion.  Buddhism  and 
 Positivism  are  not  exceptions  to  this  statement ;  for  Buddh¬ 
 ism  in  its  original  historical  form  was  a  method  by  which 
 man  sought  to  save  himself  from  the  misery  of  the  world, 
 and  so  was  implicitly  a  negation  of  religion,  and  its  later 
 developments,  in  which  the  Buddhas  are  practically 
 deified,  show  that  man  cannot  find  rest  in  this  negation. 
 And  Positivism  is  so  transparently  artificial  a  device  to 
 get  a  substitute  for  the  divine  in  Humanity,  that  its 
 theoretical  unreality  and  its  practical  ineffectiveness 
 negatively  witness  to  the  necessity  of  the  belief  in  God 
 for  man.  Some  relation  to  the  divine,  however  rude,  is 
 equally  essential  to  religion.  Man’s  feeling  towards  the 
 divine  is  pain  or  pleasure,  fear  or  hope,  as  he  seeks  to  avert 
 the  anger  or  to  secure  the  favour  of  the  gods  or  God  in  whom 
 he  believes,  by  prayers,  sacrifices  and  gifts.  There  are  the 
 following  elements  in  religion  to  be  reckoned  with  in  any 
 definition  we  may  attempt,  and  as  we  determine  each  of 
 these  elements,  so  will  our  definition  be ;  an  end  for  life 
 sought,  an  idea  of  the  divine  held,  an  emotion  felt,  and  an 
 effort  made. 
 
 (4)  In  proof  of  this  statement  that  there  is  a  growing 
 
 agreement  amid  still  surviving  differences,  Mayer’s  article 
 x 
 
306 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 on  44  The  Position  of  the  Question  regarding  the  Nature  of 
 Religion  ”  in  the  Theologische  Rundschau ,  1910,  may  be 
 quoted.  44  Gradually  the  old  quarrel  is  being  settled 
 between  the  view  that  religion  corresponds  to  a  theoretical 
 necessity  and  the  view  that  it  corresponds  to  a  practical. 
 Very  characteristic  in  this  respect  are  the  advances  in  the 
 anthropological  school.  Wundt  has  in  his  Volker psycho¬ 
 logic  ( Ethnical  Psychology)  expressed  the  observation  that 
 the  theologians — he  thinks,  manifestly,  of  those  of  the  pre¬ 
 sent  day — incline  more  to  the  voluntarist  interpretation  of 
 religion,  the  anthropologists  more  to  the  intellectual^.’ ’ 
 Mayer,  however,  then  goes  on  to  show  that  the  anthropo¬ 
 logical  position  is  being  modified  in  spite  of  the  dominant 
 tradition  in  the  school  that  “religion  is  a  primitive  and 
 unfortunate  [or  ineffectual,  missgluckter]  attempt  to  explain 
 the  world”  (p.  46).  He  concludes,  44  One  must  not  allow 
 oneself  to  be  led  astray  regarding  the  identity  of  the 
 fundamental  ideas  by  the  multiplicity  of  expression. 
 Whether  one  says  with  Boutroux  that  religion  corresponds 
 to  a  4  postulate  of  life,’  or  with  Hoffding  that  it  is  based  on 
 the  fundamental  principle  of  the  preservation  of  values,  or 
 with  Siebeck,  numerous  Ritschlians  and  others,  that  it 
 serves  the  assertion  of  personality  or  the  morally  directed 
 personality,  life  or  specially  moral  life,  or  with  Sabatier, 
 that  it  makes  possible  the  self-maintenance  of  the  self- 
 consciousness  over  against  the  pressure  of  the  world,  or 
 with  Leuba  that  it  is  a  definite  relation  to  the  satisfaction 
 of  wishes,  or  with  A.  Reville,  that  it  has  as  its  ground  4  le 
 hesoin  de  vivre ,’  or  even  also,  that  it  means  the  synthesis 
 between  Ego  and  Non-ego,  or  whichever  of  the  current 
 expressions  one  may  make  use  of,  the  sense  of  the  language 
 always  issues  in  this,  that  it  is  goods  of  life,  of  one  kind  or 
 another,  that  the  pious  man  seeks  of  the  gods;  and 
 accordingly  scientific  knowledge  can  actually  play  a  part 
 in  religious  experience  only  in  so  far,  but  indeed  also  play 
 a  real  part  in  so  far,  as  it  might  be  itself  a  good  of  life,  or 
 an  essential  part  thereof.  This  is  the  explicit  anti-intel- 
 lectualist  theory.  It  has  become  the  predominant  one  ” 
 (pp.  51-52).  In  view  of  so  general  an  agreement  previous 
 
THE  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 
 
 307 
 
 definitions  which  do  not  recognise  the  practical  purpose  of 
 religion  may  now  be  regarded  as  antiquated. 
 
 (5)  We  may  look  a  little  more  closely  at  the  psychological 
 factors  in  religion,  (i)  There  is  an  intellectual  factor,  a 
 conception  of  the  divine,  and  of  the  world  and  self  in 
 relation  thereto.  But  it  must  be  insisted  that  the  primary 
 interest  is  not  the  explanation  of  the  world;  for  here 
 thought  is  the  servant  of  life.  When  we  trace  the 
 development  of  the  conception  of  the  divine  from  ani- 
 matism  or  animism,  or  whatever  mav  have  been  the 
 earliest  form  of  thought,  to  monotheism  or  pantheism, 
 whichever  we  may  regard  as  higher,  we  are  dealing  with 
 only  one  factor  in  religious  evolution,  and  must  avoid  the 
 common  error  of  supposing  that  we  are  dealing  with 
 religion  as  a  whole.  Accordingly  we  must  not  confuse 
 religion  and  mythology,  for  in  mythology  we  may  recognise 
 three  other  motives  besides  the  religious,  viz.  the  scientific 
 or  philosophical,  the  aesthetic  and  the  linguistic.  The 
 explanation  of  the  world,  or  the  telling  of  a  story,  or  the 
 making  explicit  the  ideas  implicit  in  words,  is  not  religion. 
 Neither  does  mythology  exhaust  the  intellectual  content 
 of  religion.  There  is  a  sense  of  the  infinite  and  eternal, 
 which  refuses  imprisonment  in  the  definite  ideas  and  images 
 of  mythology,  which  essentially  belongs  to  religion.  Mytho¬ 
 logy  is  an  expression  of  the  thought  of  religion,  inevitable 
 at,  and  appropriate  to,  a  stage  of  man’s  intellectual  evolu¬ 
 tion  ;  and  to  show  that  science  has  superseded  mythology 
 as  an  explanation  of  the  world  is  not  to  disprove  the  truth 
 of  religion,  which  can  adapt  itself  to  all  the  changes  of 
 man’s  mental  outlook. 
 
 (ii)  There  is  in  religion  also  an  emotional  element. 
 Epicurus  and  Lucretius  regarded  fear  as  the  source  of 
 religion.  Primus  in  orbe  deos  fecit  timor ,  said  Petronius 
 This  view  through  Hobbes  and  Hume  has  come  down 
 to,  and  been  commonly  accepted  in,  the  anthropological 
 school.  But  even  here  another  tendency  has  shown  itself. 
 Roskoff  has  insisted  on  trust  and  even  love  as  characteristic 
 of  religion.  Jevons  has  contended  that  love  and  not  fear 
 marks  religion.  u  We  may  confidently  assert  that  there 
 x  2 
 
308  LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 is  no  tribe  existing  whose  attitude  towards  the  super¬ 
 natural  is  one  of  hostility,  pure  and  simple  ”  ( Introduction 
 to  the  History  of  Religion ,  p.  42).  “  Whether  man’s  attitude 
 
 towards  the  supernatural  has  or  has  not  ever  at  any  period 
 been  one  of  complete  hostility,  at  any  rate  there  came  a  time 
 when  he  established  friendly  relations  with  some  of  the 
 supernatural  powers  by  which  he  was  surrounded  ”  (p.  43). 
 The  anthropologists  and  the  Christian  theologians  are 
 approaching  one  another  in  their  view  of  the  character¬ 
 istically  religious  emotion.  It  may  be  pointed  out  that 
 the  religious  emotion  of  any  man  will  depend  on  his  circum¬ 
 stances.  If  his  life  be  one  of  peril,  hardship  and  suffering, 
 he  is  likely  to  fear  unfriendly  gods ;  if  all  go  well,  he  is  prone 
 to  rejoice  in  their  favour.  Yet  even  in  a  religion  which 
 is  for  the  most  part  a  propitiation  of  evil  spirits,  there  is 
 the  assumption  that  their  hostility  may  be  averted  by  the 
 proper  rites,  and  so  dread  can  pass  into  trust. 
 
 (iii)  The  volitional  element  in  religion  is  to  be  recognised 
 both  in  the  end  sought  by  religion,  and  in  the  means 
 adopted  to  gain  the  end.  In  what  have  been  called  the 
 natural  religions,  the  end  sought  is  the  goods  of  the  bodily 
 life,  the  provision  of  the  needs  of  the  body,  and  the  protec¬ 
 tion  of  life  itself  from  danger.  At  this  stage  of  religious 
 development  the  gods  are  conceived  as  in  some  way 
 controlling  the  processes  of  nature,  and  thus  man  seeks 
 their  help  for  the  comfort  and  safety  of  his  natural  life. 
 Wherever  the  social  consciousness  and  the  moral  conscience 
 are  developed,  tribal  custom,  the  soil  out  of  which  grows 
 moral  obligation,  is  regarded  as  the  will  of  the  tribal  deity, 
 and  thus  religion  becomes  in  some  measure  ethical.  Dis¬ 
 aster  is  conceived  as  penalty,  and  deliverance  is  sought  by 
 the  recovery  of  the  favour  of  the  off  ended  god.  Even  if 
 ceremonial  offences  and  moral  transgressions  are  confused, 
 yet  here  a  moral  end  emerges  in  religion.  A  moral  good 
 is  gradually  substituted  for  material  goods ;  and  the 
 worshipper  seeks  forgiveness  and  holiness,  and  not  merely 
 happiness.  But  there  is  a  stage  of  development  even 
 beyond  this,  when  the  spiritual  blessing  of  communion 
 with  God  Himself  is  sought  for  itself,  and  not  only  the  moral 
 
THE  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 
 
 309 
 
 good  or  the  material  goods.  Till  that  stage  is  reached  God 
 is  subordinated  as  a  means  to  man’s  end;  but  here  God 
 Himself,  and  personal  relation  to  Him,  becomes  the  end. 
 May  we  not  maintain  even  that  it  is  in  this  last  stage 
 that  the  essence  of  religion  is  disclosed?  Fecisti  nos  ad 
 Te,  et  inquietum  est  cor  nostrum ,  donee  requiescat  in  Te , 
 says  Augustine  ( Confessions ,  i.  1).  44  Man’s  chief  end  is 
 
 to  glorify  God,  and  to  enjoy  him  for  ever,”  is  the  answer 
 to  the  first  question  in  the  Shorter  Catechism  of  the  West¬ 
 minster  Assembly.  It  is  not  the  earliest  form  of  religion 
 which  shows  us  its  nature,  but  that  form  which  is  the 
 result  of  the  age-long  process.  Religion  can  thus  be  defined 
 as  the  soul’s  search  for  God  until  it  find  its  satisfaction  in 
 Him.  But  this  aspiration  for  the  divine  must  be  kept  in 
 relation  to  the  whole  of  life,  as  the  enriching  of  all  its  gains, 
 and  the  hallowing  of  all  its  endeavours.  And  mysticism 
 must  be  regarded  as  a  one-sided  development  of  religion, 
 a  by-path  rather  than  its  main  road,  in  so  far  as  it  sub¬ 
 jectively  asserts  a  separate  organ  for  religion  detached  from 
 the  ordinary  exercise  of  man’s  personality  as  thinking, 
 feeling  and  willing,  and  objectively  opposes  God  in  Him¬ 
 self  to  His  manifestations  and  operations  in  nature  and 
 history.  There  is  a  real  contact  with  the  reality  of  God 
 Himself  as  the  goal  of  all  religion — this  is  the  truth  of 
 mysticism.  But  God  reveals  this  reality  in  nature  and 
 history,  and  man  gains  this  real  contact  not  by  the  sup¬ 
 pression,  but  by  the  exercise  and  development  of  his  full 
 personality — this  is  the  correction  of  the  error  of  mysticism. 
 Looking  backward  from  this  last  stage  of  the  religious 
 development,  we  may  see  that  the  moving  force  of  man’s 
 call  for  the  help  of  the  gods  or  God  was  his  need  of  God 
 Himself. 
 
 (iv)  Turning  now  from  the  end  of  religion  to  the  means 
 used,  we  may,  without  entering  into  details,  bring  them 
 all  under  the  categories  of  prayer  and  sacrifice — a  plea 
 urged  with,  or  a  gift  offered  to,  the  gods.  In  religion  man 
 is  conscious  of  his  dependence  on  the  divine  and  its  claim 
 to  his  submission.  He  seeks  to  avert  displeasure  and  to 
 secure  favour  by  word  or  by  deed.  It  is  not  necessary 
 
310 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 for  the  present  purpose  to  discuss  the  much  debated 
 question  of  the  origin  of  sacrifice.  Sufficient  is  it  to  point 
 out  that  in  sacrifice  man  by  deed,  as  in  prayer  by  word, 
 seeks  to  use  the  gods  for  himself.  In  both  he  appeals  to 
 the  gods  to  be  gracious.  Here  lies  the  distinction  between 
 religion  and  magic.  Some  scholars  have  contended  that 
 magic  is  older  than  religion,  and  that  it  was  only  when  man 
 failed  to  achieve  his  purpose  by  magic  that  he  turned  to 
 religion,  or  that  even  religion  itself  in  its  beginnings  was 
 magic,  that  is,  prayer  and  sacrifice  were  both  conceived 
 as  not  an  appeal  to  the  gods,  but  rather  as  a  mysterious 
 power  which  compelled  even  the  gods  to  fulfil  the  wishes 
 of  man.  That  religion  has  only  too  often  sunk  to  magic 
 in  the  superstitious  belief  in  the  necessary  efficacy  of  its 
 rites  must  be  frankly  conceded;  but  we  must  not  only 
 maintain  the  distinction  of  magic  and  religion,  but  must 
 also  deny  that  religion  is  a  substitute  for  magic,  or  has  no 
 more  root  in  reality  than  magic,  and  so  will  itself  be  one 
 day  superseded  by  science.  We  may  agree  with  Dr.  Frazer 
 {The  Golden  Bough)  when  he  insists  on  the  distinction, 
 but  must  dissent  from  him  in  this  consequent  contention. 
 Dr.  Jevons  insists  that  magic  is  the  savage’s  crude  applied 
 science,  and  that  in  using  it  he  does  not  suppose  himself 
 to  be  exercising  supernatural  power.  It  is,  therefore, 
 entirely  distinct  from  religion,  which  ascribes  to  the  gods 
 the  exercise  of  such  supernatural  power.  He  maintains 
 that  religion  has  not  developed  out  of  magic,  but  that 
 44  religion  and  magic  had  different  origins  and  were  always 
 essentially  distinct  from  one  another,  that  the  belief  in  the 
 supernatural  was  prior  to  the  belief  in  magic,  and  that  the 
 latter,  whenever  it  sprang  up,  was  a  degradation  or  lapse 
 in  the  evolution  of  religion  ”  {Introduction  to  the  History 
 of  Religion ,  p.  25). 
 
 (6)  In  religion  the  whole  personality  is  exercised,  and  with 
 the  development  of  the  personality  in  culture  and  civilisa¬ 
 tion  there  is  progress  in  religion.  The  conception  of  the 
 divine  advances ;  the  imagination  gives  place  to  the  intellect 
 in  apprehending  the  gods,  mythology  passes  into  philosophy 
 and  theology;  unity  is  substituted  for  multiplicity;  moral 
 
THE  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 
 
 311 
 
 perfection  is  added  to  supernatural  power.  The  emotion 
 towards  the  divine  also  changes ;  love,  as  it  grows  perfect, 
 casts  out  fear.  The  end  sought  comes  more  and  more 
 to  be  life  in  God  instead  of  the  means  of  bodily  life  by  aid 
 of  the  gods.  Prayer  becomes  more  thankful  and  trustful, 
 as  creaturely  dependence  passes  into  childlike  submission. 
 Sacrifice  is  no  longer  an  offering  of  gifts  to  win  divine  favours 
 or  turn  away  divine  displeasure,  but  repentance  of  sin  and 
 consecration  unto  God.  As  religion  develops  the  secret 
 of  its  nature  is  disclosed,  and  its  origin  is  shown  to  be  what 
 is  highest,  and  not  lowest,  in  manhood. 
 
 (7)  It  is  only  as  we  survey  the  history  of  religion  as  a 
 whole  that  we  can  estimate  its  value.  To  discredit 
 religion  by  exposing  the  superstitions  of  savages  is  as 
 unfair  as  it  would  be  to  depreciate  science  because  the 
 savage’s  views  of  nature  are  exhibited  in  his  magic.  Just 
 as  religion  has  shown  the  capacity  to  make  progress  along 
 with  man’s  general  evolution,  even  though  at  times 
 theology  has  unwisely  lagged  behind  scientific  knowledge 
 and  philosophical  thought  in  clinging  to  antiquated  ideas, 
 so  we  may  anticipate  that  it  will  continue  to  adapt  itself 
 to  new  situations,  and  not  be  superseded  by  science  in  the 
 theoretical  and  by  philanthropy  in  the  practical  sphere. 
 It  would  require  a  far  more  detailed  discussion  than  the 
 limits  of  space  here  allow  to  show  that  religion  has  not 
 only  made  progress  in  man’s  evolution,  but  that  it  has 
 itself  been  a  potent  factor  of  progress  in  that  evolution. 
 One  general  consideration  in  regard  to  the  value  of  religion 
 may  be  here  advanced.  Man  in  all  his  activities  of  the 
 higher  order  is  guided  and  inspired  by  an  ideal  of  truth, 
 beauty,  blessedness,  holiness,  love.  What  religion  does 
 is  to  give  man  the  certainty  in  his  contact  and  communion 
 with  the  divine  that  these  ideals  are  not  an  imagination,  a 
 self-exaltation  of  man  beyond  his  human  limits,  but  an 
 apprehension  of  the  reality  of  God.  If  in  all  other  en¬ 
 deavours  man  is  viator ,  moving  towards  a  distant  and  not 
 distinctly  perceived  goal,  in  religion  he  is  comprehensor , 
 one  who  already  rests  at  the  goal  as  having  his  inmost  life 
 in  the  God  who  is  the  reality  of  all  his  ideals. 
 
312 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 (8)  Such  an  argument  for  the  value  of  religion  as  giving 
 worth  to  the  whole  life  of  man  needs  to  be  supplemented 
 by  the  proof  of  the  validity  of  the  interpretation  of  the 
 Universe  which  religion  gives.  For  religion,  the  divine  is 
 the  explanation  of  the  world.  Can  this  explanation  be 
 justified  from  the  wider  standpoint  of  human  knowledge 
 and  thought  generally  ?  Is  the  theistic  interpretation  of 
 the  Universe  the  more  rational  ?  There  has  been  a 
 tendency  generally  to  abandon  this  quest,  and  Christian 
 believers  even  have  confessed  themselves  agnostic  in  head, 
 though  Christian  in  heart.  The  writer  cannot  acquiesce 
 in  such  a  dualism.  Nor  can  he  be  content  with  the 
 pragmatist  position.  He  believes  that  man  is  not  mocked 
 with  the  semblance  of  knowledge,  but  can  so  interpret 
 the  Universe  as  to  apprehend  its  ultimate  course,  final 
 purpose,  and  essential  reality.  While  science  by  its  methods 
 cannot  answer  these  questions,  philosophy,  if  it  does  justice 
 not  only  to  the  speculative  intellect,  but  also  to  the  moral 
 conscience  and  the  religious  consciousness  of  mankind, 
 cannot  but  be  led,  in  his  judgment,  to  personal  spirit 
 as  the  highest  category  of  thought.  Not  that  he  as  a 
 Christian  believer  bases  his  personal  certainty  on  such  a 
 philosophic  conclusion,  as  he  has  the  witness  in  his  own 
 experience  of  God  in  Christ,  but  that  he  holds  that 
 the  Christian  experience  specifically,  and  the  religious 
 consciousness  generally,  should  not  be  left  an  isolated, 
 inexplicable  fact,  but  can  be  set  in  the  context,  not 
 contradictory,  but  confirmatory,  of  a  theistic  interpre¬ 
 tation  which  is  rationally  valid,  because  more  intelligible 
 than  any  other  solution  of  the  riddle  of  the  Universe. 
 
ESSAY  X 
 
 THE  EMOTIONAL  ELEMENT  IN  RELIGION 
 
 A  VINDICATION 
 
 Rev.  Prof.  Caldecott,  D.D.,  D.Lit. 
 
SYNOPSIS 
 
 The  distrust  of  the  Emotional  life  by  philosophy  of  Religion.  Some 
 principal  objections  would  be  removed  if  it  could  be  shown  that  Order  in 
 the  realm  of  Feeling  is  attainable  and  has  been  attained. 
 
 I.  The  experience  of  a  central  Emotion  or  Sentiment  at  the  summit  of 
 mental  life. 
 
 The  stages  of  the  intellectual  life ;  suggested  parallel  in  the  emotional 
 sphere. 
 
 (a)  Evidence  from  some  philosophers.  Aristotle ;  Feeling  not  entirely 
 disallowed  in  his  Ideal.  Spinoza ;  the  Intellectual  love  of  God.  Kant ; 
 Reverence  for  Reason.  Hegel ;  Dr.  McTaggart  on  Love  as  alone  satisfying 
 the  highest  criterion. 
 
 ( b )  Evidence  from  some  English  writers  on  Religion. 
 
 The  three  stages  of  Mysticism.  False  Mysticism.  Christian  Mysticism. 
 Richard  Rolle ;  Juliana  of  Norwich;  John  Smith,  Cambridge  Platonist; 
 Bishop  Butler;  Jonathan  Edwards;  Newman;  Seeley. 
 
 II.  The  organisation  effected  by  this  central  Emotion.  Not  the 
 suppression  of  the  Feelings  but  their  preservation  and  good  ordering  the 
 true  ideal. 
 
 Indication  of  the  organising  function  of  the  highest  Feeling  in  Aristotle, 
 Spinoza,  Kant,  Hegel;  further  evidence  fi*om  John  Smith,  Butler,  Edwards, 
 Newman. 
 
 Sacramentalism  and  Symbolism  applicable  to  the  relation  between 
 lower  and  higher  Feelings. 
 
 An  Oriental  view  :  P.  Ramanathan. 
 
 III.  Application  to  some  principal  grounds  for  the  distrust  of  Feeling. 
 
 (i)  Total  depreciation  of  Feeling ;  to  be  met  only  by  counter-assertion. 
 
 (ii)  Significance  of  the  possibility  of  injurious  feelings;  reference  to  the 
 whole  system  required.  Examination  of  typical  depreciation  by  John 
 Caird. 
 
 (iii)  Alleged  subjectivity  and  individuality ;  not  true  of  the  supreme  love 
 of  God,  and  its  consequential  universal  love  of  goodness. 
 
 Conclusion. — The  unity  sought  for  the  Intellectual  life  should  be  sought 
 for  Feeling  also ;  success  in  the  one  search  supports  the  other.  Intellectual 
 Theism  and  the  Love  of  God. 
 
THE  EMOTIONAL  ELEMENT  IN  RELIGION: 
 
 A  VINDICATION 
 
 Taking  Emotionality  in  all  its  phases  as  emotions, 
 affections,  inclinations,  desires — the  whole  range  of  joys, 
 griefs,  delights,  aspirations,  sympathies,  and  the  like — 
 we  find  that  in  the  history  of  ethics  and  of  the  philosophy 
 of  religion  there  is  a  prevalent  tendency  to  treat  this 
 factor  of  our  life  with  suspicion  and  distrust  amounting 
 frequently  to  disallowance  and  opposition.  As  a  principal 
 ground  for  this  hostility  it  is  alleged  that  even  within  their 
 own  range  the  emotions  are  disorderly,  a  manifold  without 
 a  plan.  Hence  the  entry  of  any  one  of  them  may  disturb 
 the  peace  of  the  soul,  whilst  quite  often  they  are  an  unruly 
 crowd,  clamouring  and  discordant  even  among  themselves  ; 
 they  plunge  us  into  commotion  and  tumult,  and  are  rightly 
 called  perturbations.  Further,  even  when  some  kind  of 
 order  appears,  there  is  no  inherent  guarantee  that  it  is 
 a  healthy  order  :  certain  emotions  may  have  assumed 
 prominence  for  which  they  have  no  qualifications  except 
 their  own  forcefulness ;  e.  g.  sordid  ambition  or  implacable 
 resentment  may  be  in  command  whilst  generous  philan¬ 
 thropy  or  kindly  forgivingness  are  kept  in  low  place 
 or  even  suppressed.  Self-condemned  in  this  way,  the 
 inference  is  that  Emotionality  must  either  be  subjected 
 to  other  faculties  of  the  soul  for  regulation  or  else  be 
 disallowed  altogether. 
 
 For  the  vindication  of  Emotionality,  therefore,  it  is 
 necessary  to  deal  with  this  serious  objection,  and  it  is 
 the  principal  purpose  of  this  paper  to  face  it.  I  propose 
 to  maintain  the  position  that  in  our  feelings,  as  elsewhere, 
 we  are  called  upon  to  look  for  “system”  as  the  ideal,  the 
 
 true  norm,  and  to  be  confident  that  the  emotional  mani- 
 
 315 
 
316 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 fold  can  be  unified  :  that  affections  and  desires,  varied 
 as  they  are,  can  be  organised  into  a  stable  and  healthy 
 polity. 
 
 In  pursuit  of  system  there  is  one  very  obvious  method  : 
 to  endeavour  to  secure  the  dominance  of  a  single  emotion. 
 Democracy  has  its  attractions,  but  monarchy  is  the  simpler 
 conception,  and  Sociology  shows  that  in  the  sphere  of 
 society  at  least  it  is  the  easier  to  attain.  On  the  whole, 
 this  method  is  approved  by  the  majority  of  philosophies, 
 and  it  is  supported  by  the  independently  formed  opinion 
 of  the  important  strain  of  religious  reflection  now  widely 
 recognised  under  the  term  Mysticism.  In  this  essay 
 accordingly  I  wish  to  show  that  Emotionality  is  vindicated 
 as  a  proper  and  a  beneficial  range  of  mental  life  :  (i)  by 
 those  who  hold  that  experience  discloses  the  possibility 
 of  an  emotion  entitled  to  be  regarded  as  central  and 
 pre-eminent ;  and  (ii)  that  the  value  of  this  central  emotion 
 is  emphatically  demonstrated  by  those  in  whose  experi¬ 
 ence  it  has  proved  itself  able  to  undertake  the  function 
 of  a  sovereign  by  bringing  into  order  and  system  the 
 whole  compass  of  the  emotional  life. 
 
 It  may  be  claimed  that  such  a  unification  is  effected  by  the 
 many  who  seek  self-satisfaction  in  some  single  passion,  e.  g. 
 the  pursuit  of  wealth  or  of  reputation ;  and  on  a  higher  level 
 that  utilitarian  ethics  commends  the  definite  setting  up  of 
 the  sentiment  of  philanthropy  in  this  way.  This  is  true.  But 
 as  these  aims  are  manifestly  finite  on  their  objective  side, 
 so  on  their  emotional  side  the  testimonies  in  their  favour 
 do  not  amount  to  establishing  their  capacity  for  giving 
 full  and  abiding  emotional  satisfaction.  The  testimonies 
 to  which  I  am  about  to  appeal  are  those  of  philosophers 
 and  religious  men  who  have  moved  upward  in  the 
 emotional  ascensus  until  they  reached  its  height;  until 
 they  came  to  experience  an  elevated  feeling  which,  under 
 various  names,  I  take  to  have  been  in  essence  the  love 
 of  perfect  and  universal  being  and  goodness.  They  had 
 had  experience  of  feelings  on  the  lower  levels  and  could 
 assign  excellence  to  the  various  emotions  in  order  of  merit, 
 and  they  ascribe  supreme  excellence  to  this  consummatory 
 
EMOTIONALITY:  A  VINDICATION  317 
 
 passion.  They  were  no  weaklings  in  the  ordinary  experi¬ 
 ences  of  mankind,  but  men  and  women  of  strong  natures, 
 as  full  of  affections  as  their  neighbours,  to  say  the  least : 
 and  in  the  moral  sphere  they  could  challenge  com¬ 
 parison  with  those  who  speak  from  that  sphere  only  : 
 and  when  they  declare  that  above  those  levels  they  found 
 a  quality  of  feeling  more  excellent  still,  their  witness  is 
 entitled  to  be  heard. 
 
 I 
 
 The  possibility  of  a  central  emotion  or  sentiment  at 
 the  summit  of  mental  life. 
 
 We  know  how  the  stages  of  intellectuality  are  set  out 
 by  common  consent  :  the  senses,  the  understanding, 
 reason  or  intuition.  Is  Emotionality  to  be  left  behind 
 when  we  rise  above  the  sensory  level  ?  or,  at  most,  is  it 
 to  be  carried  no  higher  than  the  middle  level  ?  or,  may 
 it  not  also  be  expected  and  recognised  with  welcome  at 
 the  highest  range  also  ?  May  we  not  expect  that  it  will 
 be  found  as  a  companion  on  each  level  ?  and,  by  parity 
 of  reasoning,  regard  it  as  advancing  in  worth  in  corre¬ 
 spondence  with  the  advances  in  intelligence  ?  This  seems 
 a  reasonable  expectation;  but,  we  may  also  ask,  may  it 
 not  be  that  Emotionality  has  its  own  course  of  progressive 
 elevation  in  values  ?  a  course  which  may  be  briefly  sum¬ 
 marised  in  a  similar  threefold  graduation  ?  And  may 
 it  not  be  that  the  emotional  life  is  itself  so  inherently 
 powerful  as  to  go  in  advance  of  intellect,  and  so  to  operate 
 upon  intelligence  as  to  compel  it  to  keep  pace  by  becoming 
 imaginative  in  a  creative  way  ? 
 
 (a)  Let  us  first  call  some  philosophers. 
 
 Time  need  not  be  occupied  with  claiming  that  Emotion¬ 
 ality  is  found  at  the  summit  of  life  by  Plato  and  the  Plato- 
 nists.  By  them  all  the  resources  of  eloquence  are  drawn 
 upon  to  express  the  high  emotional  experience  which  finds 
 the  true  to  be  also  very  good  and  very  beautiful :  in  every 
 way  noble  and  to  be  admired,  the  source  of  joy  and  love 
 in  him  who  finds  it :  inspiring  man  to  the  elevation  of  his 
 
318 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 own  character  towards  a  perfection  in  which,  and  in  which 
 alone,  real  happiness  is  an  integral  part. 
 
 Aristotle . — When  Aristotle  arrives  at  his  summit  he 
 finds  the  highest  excellence  of  human  life  to  be  contem¬ 
 plation.  But  he  is  unwilling  to  disallow  emotionality  : 
 44  Pleasure  ought  to  be  one  of  the  ingredients  of  (the 
 highest)  happiness.”  Indeed,  his  principle  that  pleasure 
 or  enjoyment  though  not  an  ivegyeia  assists  ivegyeia 
 compels  him  to  look  for  it :  and  he  may  be  said  to  testify 
 that  the  very  rejoicing  in  the  truth  intensifies  the  power 
 of  knowing  it.  Activity  is  stimulated  by  enjoyment, 
 at  its  height  as  everywhere  else.  When  we  have  reached 
 the  supreme  form  of  activity  we  have  an  enjoyment 
 which  Aristotle  declares  to  be  incomparable  among  enjoy¬ 
 ments,  and  he  commends  it  as  such  to  all  seekers  for  the 
 true  evdcufiovla.  I  share  the  impression  made  upon 
 John  Hutchison  Stirling  that  when  Aristotle  stood  upon 
 his  summit  of  vision  he  felt  deeply ;  and  I  accept  even  for 
 his  metaphysical  exposition  of  the  culmination  of  being  in 
 the  First  Mover  the  title  so  finely  assigned  to  it  by  Stirling, 
 the  44  Hymn  of  Aristotle.” 
 
 Spinoza . — Spinoza  sets  up  the  usual  ladder  of  knowledge, 
 and  claims  for  man  access  to  the  third  level,  the  knowledge 
 of  Substance  in  its  infinite  and  eternal  essence.  And 
 though  he  had  described  our  life  in  the  emotions  as  a 
 44  bondage  ”  we  can  see  that  it  was  by  an  over-estimate 
 of  their  passivity  that  he  had  depreciated  them  :  they  arose 
 when  we  could  not  obtain  adequate  ideas,  when  substantial 
 reality  and  goodness  were  confused  and  clouded  over ;  we 
 were  like  school  children,  dull  and  half -taught  in  compari¬ 
 son  with  bright  and  well-instructed  scholars.  But  "when 
 we  arrive  at  the  highest  level  we  find  ourselves  at  last 
 in  possession  of  adequate  ideas,  and  a  malign  influence 
 from  emotion  is  no  longer  to  be  dreaded.  And  so  we  find 
 our  severely  intellectualist  guide  withdrawing  his  ban  upon 
 emotionality  and  telling  us  that  knowledge  of  God  begets 
 a  love  of  God.  He  does  not,  indeed,  acknowledge  that 
 emotion  has  its  own  legitimate  course;  he  regards  it  as 
 attendant  upon  intellect :  but  he  sees  that  it  does  actually 
 
EMOTIONALITY:  A  VINDICATION 
 
 319 
 
 reappear  at  the  end,  and  we  can  call  him  as  a  witness  on 
 our  side.  True,  he  speaks  of  the  “  intellectual  love  ” 
 of  God,  and  many  commentators  insist  on  taking  it 
 that  he  accepts  emotion  only  metaphorically ;  but  I 
 must  disagree  with  them  :  I  believe  that  Spinoza  is  giving 
 us  his  own  experience  at  the  cost  of  embarrassing  his 
 previous  predominantly  anti-emotional  treatment.  The 
 idea  of  Eternal  Substance,  he  acknowledges,  “  fills  the 
 mind  with  joy.”  This  emotion  is  indeed  beyond  compare  : 
 it  is  timeless  as  the  Object  which  begets  it  in  us.  Hence 
 it  is  stability  itself  so  long  as  we  can  sustain  ourselves 
 at  the  highest  level  of  contemplation.  Still,  as  a  fact 
 of  experience  it  is  rare,  though  with  increasing  frequency 
 for  the  seeking  mind.  To  this  his  own  life  bore  eloquent 
 witness. 
 
 Kant. — Kant  may  be  said  not  only  to  acknowledge 
 the  presence  of  a  central  emotion,  but  to  demonstrate 
 a  priori  that  it  arises  of  necessity.  Allowing  that  man 
 is  not  wholly  intellectual,  and  that  activity  is  bound 
 up  with  sensory  influence,  he  expressly  considers  the 
 sensory  “  interest  ”  which  accompanies  Reason.  He  shows 
 that  the  very  claim  of  Reason  to  prescribe  rules  of 
 action  causes  a  restriction,  a  thwarting,  in  the  sensory 
 region  of  impulses,  which  gives  rise  to  a  reactionary 
 feeling,  a  sentiment  of  Respect  or  Reverence.  I  am  not 
 clear  that  Kant  fully  accepts  a  positive  feeling  beyond 
 this  negatively  produced  respect :  such  a  positive  feeling 
 of  real  delight  in  reasonableness  as  such,  as  Sidgwick, 
 for  example,  declared  to  be  within  his  own  experience. 
 Kant  seems  to  be  afraid  to  allow  so  much  value  as  this 
 to  what  he  regarded  as  an  inferior  order  of  mentality  : 
 and  he  certainly  declined  to  consider  it  to  be  applicable 
 in  the  sphere  of  Divine  Reason. 
 
 Hegel. — In  dealing  with  Hegel  I  may  be  permitted, 
 instead  of  going  to  Hegel  himself,  to  call  attention  to  the 
 position  to  which  Dr.  McTaggart  conducts,  if  not  Hegel, 
 the  principles  of  Hegelianism.  This  position  Dr.  McTag¬ 
 gart,  with  some  trepidation,  confesses  “  may  fairly  be 
 called  mystical.”  The  point  for  us  is  that  at  the  highest 
 
y 
 
 320  LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 level  of  experience  emotionality  is  retained,  beyond 
 knowledge  and  beyond  volition.  Now  we  know  that 
 Hegel  himself  regarded  “Feeling”  as  a  lower  category, 
 and  gave  as  his  reasons  (1)  that  it  may  be  either  good  or 
 bad,  (2)  that  it  is  too  individualistic,  and  (3)  that  it  is 
 of  lower  value  than  thinking.  But  Dr.  McTaggart  has 
 endeavoured  to  refine  Feeling  so  as  to  free  it  from  these 
 objections,  and  we  find  that  when  he  stands  in  face  of  the 
 Absolute  (as  he  conceives  it)  the  three  conditions,  which 
 he  specifies,  with  which  consciousness  must  comply  are 
 not  satisfied  by  either  volition  or  knowledge,  but  only 
 by  love.  Love,  therefore,  is  the  only  state  of  consciousness 
 in  which  “  the  absolute  can  be  perfectly  manifested.” 
 Of  course  all  Hegelians  may  not  accept  this  conclusion  : 
 but  the  exposition  of  Dr.  McTaggart  is  conducted  with 
 so  much  power,  both  critical  and  constructive,  that  we 
 may  at  any  rate  estimate  it  as  one  of  the  principal  issues 
 latent  in  Hegelian  thought. 
 
 (b)  Evidence  from  some  English  writers  in  religion. 
 
 After  the  copious  outflow  of  writings  upon  Mysticism 
 within  the  last  fifteen  years,  there  is  no  need  for  me  to 
 explain  that  I  am  not  about  to  appeal  to  evidence  from 
 abnormally  psycho-physical  sources,  but  only  to  consider 
 the  experience  of  such  persons  as  are  recognised  to  have 
 been  eminently  sane  both  physically  and  mentally. 
 
 It  is  the  general  view  of  Mysticism  that  the  way  upward 
 in  life  has  three  viae  or  stages  ;  regarded  as  stages  of  know¬ 
 ledge.  In  the  first  the  things  of  sense  occupy  the  mind; 
 in  the  second  we  are  absorbed  in  endeavouring  to  under¬ 
 stand  the  world;  in  the  third  the  manifold  exhibited  by 
 the  understanding  is  replaced  by  the  direct  vision  of  unity. 
 In  the  first  stage  the  emotional  life  is  regarded  as  a  source 
 of  disturbance  from  which  it  is  indispensable  that  the  ad¬ 
 vancing  soul  should  shake  itself  free ;  when  the  second  stage 
 has  been  entered  upon,  emotionality  has  become  unimport¬ 
 ant  and  often  escapes  notice  altogether ;  but  that  at  the 
 third  stage  it  reappears  is  the  significant  fact  which  I  wish 
 to  bring  into  evidence.  We  have  also  abundant  records 
 of  Mystics,  less  intellectually  disposed,  by  whom  closer 
 
EMOTIONALITY:  A  VINDICATION 
 
 321 
 
 attention  was  given  to  the  emotional  progress,  and  by 
 these  a  more  continuous  advance  in  the  life  of  Feeling 
 is  described.  In  the  first  stage  there  is  the  strife  with  the 
 lower  emotions  and  impulses,  then  follows  emergence  from 
 their  thrall  into  the  calmer  influence  of  a  few  tranquil 
 emotions,  and  finally  there  comes  the  attainment  of  a 
 single  dominant  emotion  at  the  summit,  the  love  of  God. 
 
 I  would  here  interpose  a  caution  as  to  the  interpretation 
 of  these  three  stages.  They  need  not  be  taken  to  mean  that 
 the  soul  is  at  any  time  occupied  in  one  of  these  stages 
 separately,  passing  in  its  integrity  from  the  first  to  the 
 second,  and  from  the  second  to  the  third;  like  Comte’s 
 Law  of  the  Three  Stages  in  thought,  these  are  phases  which 
 coexist,  the  mind  being  at  any  point  of  its  history  occupied 
 with  all  three  in  different  proportions.  They  represent  a 
 schema  of  merit,  of  course,  and  point  out  the  pathway  of 
 progress ;  but  it  is  only  in  rare  cases,  even  if  in  any,  that 
 absorption  in  first  one  and  then  the  other  has  been  attained. 
 The  tremendous  experiences  of  those  who  have  plunged  so 
 deeply  into  the  purgation  of  the  first  stage  as  to  have  been 
 stripped  bare  of  emotionality,  and  to  have  lived  for  months 
 or  years  in  emptiness  and  gloom  and  then  have  attained  a 
 period  of  life  in  the  illuminative  but  emotionally  dry  light 
 of  the  understanding,  have  been  numerous  in  various 
 times  and  with  various  temperaments.  But  none  have 
 claimed  a  complete  passage  from  the  second  stage  to  the 
 third  except  for  some  exceedingly  rare  and  brief  moments 
 when  there  was  enjoyment  of  the  unitive  vision  of  Reality 
 in  its  simplicity  and  universality.  But  what  is  meant  is 
 that  in  all  souls  there  should  be  a  constant  change  in  the 
 proportion  in  which  the  sensory,  the  intellectual  and  the 
 intuitive  kinds  of  knowledge  are  found,  in  favour  of  a 
 continuous  advance  towards  the  predominance  of  the 
 higher  over  the  lower.  And  the  same  interpretation  is 
 required  for  the  records  of  advance  on  the  emotional  side ; 
 the  lowest  order  of  feelings  should  gradually  diminish  in 
 relative  influence,  the  highest  should  increase  in  fre¬ 
 quency  and  duration  and  power. 
 
 Allowing  for  this  interpretation,  what  is  the  testimony 
 
 Y 
 
322 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 of  Mystics  as  to  the  presence  of  Emotionality  at  the  highest 
 conceivable  level  of  the  soul  ?  Has  the  exclusion  of  the 
 feelings  of  the  lowest  level  meant  that  this  side  of  life  has 
 been  irrevocably  cut  away  ?  On  the  highest  level  are  we 
 to  conceive  ourselves  as  occupied  with  purely  intellectual 
 contemplation,  so  entirely  absorbed  in  knowledge  of  the 
 highest  Reality  that  the  experience  is  adequately  designated 
 the  Vision  of  God  ?  We  have  seen  that  even  leaders  of 
 intellectualism  in  philosophy,  when  arrived  at  the  summit, 
 have  acknowledged  the  presence  of  emotion ;  it  would  be 
 surprising  if  pilgrims  of  the  upward  way  who  are  not 
 predisposed  to  overrate  the  function  of  intellect  should  give 
 a  different  testimony.  Yet  there  are  many  Mystics  who 
 have  set  the  highest  level  before  themselves  as  a  state  of 
 soul  from  which  Emotionality  has  disappeared.  But  their 
 motive  for  this  is  the  desire  to  lose  the  sense  of  selfhood 
 altogether.  Their  aim  is  the  absorption  of  the  finite  in 
 the  Infinite,  the  complete  surrender  of  human  personality  ; 
 will,  thought,  feeling,  all  together.  For  Christian  Mysticism 
 this  is,  of  course,  a  false  conception,  but  it  has  widely 
 obtained  outside  the  Christian  range,  and  has  not  infre¬ 
 quently  intruded  within  it  also.  It  seems  to  be  the  normal 
 conception  of  Hindu  religion ;  and  it  marks  as  non-Christian 
 not  a  few  of  the  expressions  in  writings  of  Christian  Mystics, 
 the  Theologia  Germanica,  for  example.  But  for  English 
 Mysticism  we  may  claim  practical  unanimity  in  tenaciously 
 holding  that  human  personality  is  a  Divine  gift,  and  that, 
 high  as  thought  and  adoration  may  soar,  there  is  no  ground 
 whatever  for  supposing  that  it  is  within  the  Divine  purpose 
 to  recall  the  gift.  On  the  contrary,  He  is  regarded  as 
 most  honoured  by  the  retention  of  His  own  creation, 
 provided  that  it  is  brought  into  perfect  union  with  Himself. 
 It  is  to  those  who  speak  of  experience  of  such  union  that 
 we  turn  to  ask  whether  in  it  Emotionality  persists.  I 
 submit  some  testimonies,  either  from  religious  men  and 
 women  usually  known  only  as  Mystics,  or  from  others  not 
 usually  classed  as  such,  but  in  whom  the  Mystical  element 
 is  present  in  an  eminent  degree. 
 
 To  Richard  Rolle  of  Hampole  the  love  of  God,  when  at 
 
EMOTIONALITY:  A  VINDICATION 
 
 325 
 
 that  height  where  it  has  become  “  Singular  and  without 
 a  fear,”  is  marked  with  a  44  sweetness  so  comforting,  so 
 burning  and  gladdening  ...  so  delectable  and  wonderful 
 that  I  cannot  tell  it.”  For  Juliana  of  Norwich  the  thought 
 of  the  soul  dwelling  in  God  is  44  a  sight  full  sweet  and 
 marvellous  to  behold,  peaceful  and  restful,  sure  and 
 delectable.”  Her  rejoicing  is  such  that  44  sometimes  for 
 plenteousness  it  breaketh  out  into  voice  and  saith  :  Good 
 Lord  !  great  thanks  be  to  Thee  :  blessed  mote  Thou  be.” 
 John  Smith,  the  Cambridge  Platonist ,  finds  the  summit  to 
 be  44  a  happy  union  of  souls  with  God  ” ;  the  knowledge 
 we  attain  makes  us  amorous  of  divine  beauty,  and  love 
 44  reciprocally  exalts  ”  knowledge.  The  whole  of  his  com¬ 
 mendation  of  true  religion  at  its  height  is  suffused  with 
 deep  feeling ;  there  is  an  intense  delight,  a  pure  affection ; 
 a  sense  of  gratitude  for  the  goodness  and  the  glory  of  the 
 Eternal  animates  him  beyond  the  resources  of  even  his 
 copious  command  of  language  to  express. 
 
 In  minds  such  as  these,  whose  fame  rests  on  their  Mysti¬ 
 cism,  the  emphasis  on  Emotionality  is  taken  as  a  matter  of 
 course  and  examples  need  not  be  multiplied.  Let  us  turn 
 to  some  men  who  gained  their  fame  in  other  ways.  From 
 Bishop  Butler  the  evidence  is  similar,  and  all  the  more 
 emphatic  when  considered  in  relation  to  the  grave  and 
 melancholic  temperament  with  which  he  surveys  life  at 
 its  ordinary  levels.  In  his  ethical  writings  we  have  the 
 famous  vindication  of  Conscience ;  but  this  amounts  only 
 to  a  bare  statement  that  there  is  a  44  principle  ”  which  has, 
 or  should  have,  controlling  power  over  the  particular 
 passions  and  affections ;  if  this  were  all,  man  would  be  ruled 
 by  a  power  in  his  own  nature  of  which  he  can  give  no 
 account  to  himself.  But  when  we  pass  to  the  sermons  on 
 the  Love  of  our  Neighbour ,  and  still  more  to  those  upon  the 
 Love  of  God ,  we  see  that  Butler  means  much  more  than 
 the  bare  vindication  of  Conscience  as  a  ruling  power. 
 Here  he  gives  us  a  vindication  of  emotionality  as  against 
 a  bare  claim  for  authority  and  as  against  dictates  of  pure 
 reason.  He  describes  the  privilege  of  man  in  being  capable 
 
 of  loving  God,  and  inscribes  over  these  sermons  the  invita- 
 y  2 
 
324 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 tory  injunction  of  the  Gospel  to  love  Him  with  heart  and 
 mind  and  soul.  44  The  perception  of  God’s  presence  in  a 
 nearer  and  stricter  way  ” — i.  e.  by  intuition,  no  longer  by 
 reasoning — gives  “joy  of  heart  ”  ;  its  influence  “  cheers  and 
 enlivens.”  He  is  not  only  the  supreme  object  of  knowledge 
 but  “  the  last  end  and  object  of  our  affections.”  Amongst 
 all  our  delights  in  the  state  in  which  He  has  placed  us  it 
 is  Himself  who  is  our  happiness.  And  conscious  of  his 
 own  lack  of  facility  in  the  language  of  elevated  emotion, 
 Butler  closes  his  appeal  to  the  lawyers  of  the  Rolls  Chapel 
 by  a  full  quotation  of  one  of  the  most  impassioned  of  the 
 Psalms,  giving  as  his  final  note  that  glowing  saying,  In 
 Thy  presence  is  the  f nines s  of  joy  ;  at  Thy  right  hand  there  is 
 pleasure  for  evermore. 
 
 One  of  the  most  remarkable  studies  of  emotional  life  in 
 the  English  language  is  the  book  on  The  Religious  Affec¬ 
 tions  by  Jonathan  Edwards,  protagonist  of  the  Calvinistic 
 theology  of  New  England  as  he  was.  It  would  have  been 
 more  widely  known  but  for  the  circumstance  of  its  being 
 the  work  of  an  enthusiast  who  was  seriously  concerned 
 with  a  surrounding  prevalence  of  revivalists  and  claimants 
 of  inner  light,  and  was  as  much  impressed  with  the  need 
 of  setting  aside  the  counterfeit  as  of  proclaiming  the 
 genuine.  The  result  is  confusing  to  the  reader;  a  deeper 
 impression  would  have  been  made  if  his  own  positive  treat¬ 
 ment  had  been  clearly  set  before  the  mind  separately 
 and  then  the  contrast  with  the  counterfeit  established. 
 Jonathan  Edwards  is  a  witness  for  Emotionality  as  I  am 
 looking  for  it.  His  main  thesis  is  that  44  true  religion  con¬ 
 sists  in  great  part  in  holy  affections.”  “  There  is,”  he  says, 
 “a  distinction  to  be  made  between  a  mere  notional  under¬ 
 standing,  wherein  the  mind  only  beholds  things  in  the 
 exercise  of  a  speculative  faculty,  and  the  sense  of  the  heart, 
 wherein  the  mind  does  not  only  speculate  and  behold,  but 
 relishes  and  feels.”  At  the  highest  point,  44  Spiritual 
 understanding  consists  primarily  in  a  sense  of  spiritual 
 beauty.”  For  this  we  go  direct  to  Perfection — 44  the  first 
 foundation  of  a  true  love  of  God  is  that  whereby  He  is  in 
 Himself  lovely  or  worthy  to  be  loved,  or  the  supreme  love- 
 
EMOTIONALITY:  A  VINDICATION 
 
 S25 
 
 liness  of  His  nature.”  It  is  not  that  44  men  first  see  that 
 God  loves  them,  blit  they  first  see  that  God  is  lovely,  and 
 their  hearts  are  captivated  with  this  view.”  This  tran¬ 
 scendent  emotion  is  not  a  new  44  faculty,”  for  wc  have 
 already  loved  on  a  lower  level ;  yet  it  is  in  some  ways  new, 
 he  says  :  as  perception  of  a  simple  idea  is,  on  the  Lockian 
 principles  of  knowledge  which  he  largely  follows,  new  to 
 the  understanding  or  general  faculty  of  ideas,  so  is  the  love 
 of  the  Divine  new  in  our  general  capacity  for  the  affection 
 of  love.  It  cannot  be  generated  from  other  forms  of  love  : 
 self-love  cannot  be  its  source,  but  can  only  lead  towards  it, 
 and  must  give  way  and  retire  if  the  true  affection  for  the 
 Highest  is  to  be  felt.  This  testimony  comes  from  a  man 
 who  on  the  intellectual  side  was  one  of  the  hardest  thinkers 
 of  the  English  race. 
 
 We  have  learnt  when  we  think  of  Newman  to  penetrate 
 beyond  the  subtle  controversialist  on  religious  problems  of 
 the  middle  level,  and  to  see  the  deep  vein  of  Mysticism 
 which  lay  below,  not  difficult  to  trace  now  that  we  know 
 that  we  ought  to  look  for  it.  One  or  two  references  must 
 suffice  here.  In  his  sermon,  The  Thought  of  God  the  Stay 
 of  the  Soul ,  he  first  justifies  Emotionality  generally  :  44  Our 
 real  and  true  bliss  is  not  to  know,  or  to  affect,  or  to  pursue ; 
 but  to  love,  to  hope,  to  joy,  to  admire,  to  revere,  to  adore.” 
 He  shows  how  partiality,  temporariness,  and  other  defects 
 in  finite  objects  prevent  affections  from  being  anything  else 
 than  imperfect,  whilst  a  full  and  complete  outflow  of  our 
 emotional  capacity  requires  that  we  enter  into  the  presence 
 of  our  Creator  and  our  Father.  44  Our  happiness  consists 
 in  the  contemplation  of  God  ” ;  44  the  feeling  attendant 
 upon  this  contemplation  ”  is,  in  the  minds  of  religious  men, 
 the  substratum  of  the  feeling  of  a  good  conscience.  Man 
 seeks  God  in  thought,  but  he  does  so  because  he  is  44  quick¬ 
 ened  by  love,”  and  in  the  measure  in  which  he  experiences 
 the  joy  of  communion  he  is  quickened  to  seek  Him  more. 
 And  in  his  Sermon  on  Religion  pleasant  to  the  Religious  he 
 appeals,  in  his  own  intense  way,  for  approach  to  God  on 
 the  very  ground  of  the  immeasurable  superiority  of  the 
 pleasure,  the  happiness,  the  joy,  of  the  religious  life. 
 
326 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 A  powerful  vindication  of  Emotionality  is  given  by 
 Seeley  in  the  volume  entitled  Natural  Religion ,  a  book 
 which  has,  somehow,  failed  to  win  the  attention  that  it 
 merits.  Seeley  is,  indeed,  so  strongly  in  its  favour  that 
 he  tends  to  place  the  criterion  of  religion  in  our  capacity 
 for  raising  feelings  and  affections  to  the  height  of  enthu¬ 
 siasm.  The  objects  may  be  various  :  the  scientific  man’s 
 enthusiasm  for  knowledge  is  religious,  as  is  the  ardour  of 
 the  poet  and  the  artist,  and  the  zeal  of  the  philanthropist. 
 These  he  acclaims  as  of  the  right  quality,  himself  passing 
 beyond  them  to  enthusiasm  for  an  ultimate  Personality 
 which  he  nobly  describes  as  44  The  Inspirer  of  kings,  the 
 Revealer  of  laws,  the  Reconciler  of  nations,  the  Redeemer 
 of  labour,  the  Queller  of  tyrants,  the  Reformer  of  churches, 
 the  Guide  of  the  human  race  towards  an  unknown  goal.” 
 This  vision  makes  men  happy,  filling  them  with  an  affection 
 which  is  supreme.  On  the  other  hand,  the  absence  of 
 the  sense  of  supreme  excellence  and  the  happiness  which 
 belongs  to  it  gives  a  more  important  meaning  to  the  term 
 “  Atheism  ”  than  comes  from  any  mere  deficiency  in  the 
 object  of  thought,  in  Seeley’s  judgment  :  44  Atheism  is 
 another  name  for  feebleness  of  high  emotion  ”  ;  44  Irreligion 
 is  life  without  worship.”  Awe,  admiration,  love:  these 
 are  the  three  primary  feelings  which,  when  raised  to  their 
 utmost  level,  constitute  Religious  emotion  :  in  so  far  as 
 these  are  permanent  and  habitual  we  have  attained  our 
 height  of  life. 
 
 II 
 
 But  it  is  not  sufficient  to  assure  ourselves  that  a  pure 
 and  elevated  Emotion  and  Affection  has  been  found  at 
 the  summit  of  human  life  by  those  who  have  scaled  its 
 farthest  heights.  We  want  to  know  what  this  Emotion 
 can  do  in  the  way  of  introducing  order  over  the  range  of 
 emotions,  affections,  and  desires.1 
 
 1  In  the  treatment  of  organisation  we  have  at  hand  great  assistance  from 
 the  method  of  Mr.  Shand  and  Dr.  McDougall.  In  respect  of  the  Religious 
 sentiment.  Dr.  McDougall  sets  it  out  as  a  “  complex  emotion.”  Wonder, 
 Admiration,  Awe,  Tender  Emotion,  and  Gratitude,  are  all  there  :  I 
 should  add  Trust  and  Self-respect  also.  But  I  differ  from  him  fundament- 
 
EMOTIONALITY:  A  VINDICATION  327 
 
 If  we  rest  satisfied  with  evidence  for  the  attainment 
 of  the  summit  we  do  not  get  beyond  the  tranquillity  with 
 which  Philosophy  is  usually  supposed  to  rest  content,  and 
 the  form  of  Religion  known  as  Quietism.  But  this  has  not 
 been  the  final  ideal  either  of  the  great  philosophers  of 
 Europe  or  of  the  religious  leaders  of  Christendom.  Taking 
 the  philosophers  to  whom  I  have  appealed,  it  is  only  if  we 
 take  their  principal  formal  treatises  that  they  seem  to 
 conduct  us  to  a  solitary  height  and  leave  us  there.  Aristotle 
 does  not,  indeed,  explicitly  proceed  to  show  how  the 
 supreme  happiness  of  Contemplation  proceeds  to  organise 
 its  fellow  emotions.  But  he  acknowledges  the  need  for 
 this  by  his  acknowledgment  of  the  rarity  of  the  experience 
 of  such  Contemplation,  and  therefore  of  this  highest 
 emotion  :  Novg  is  but  tCo  dyxcg  jtuxgog  in  the  compass  of 
 intellectual  life.  But  I  agree  with  Dr.  Stewart  that 
 Aristotle  does  not  consider  that  the  aim  for  a  man  is  to  be 
 solely  Qecogrjuxog  :  it  is  sufficient  if  we  attribute  excellence 
 in  proportion  to  the  extent  in  which  a  life  attains  to  this 
 height  from  time  to  time,  and  then  enjoys  the  benefit  of 
 the  elevation  of  tone  when  he  returns  to  lower  levels.  It  is 
 quite  within  Aristotle’s  method,  I  take  it,  to  dip  down  again 
 and  trace  the  influence  of  the  highest  in  the  lower  levels, 
 as,  in  fact,  we  find  him  implicitly  doing  in  his  subsequent 
 treatment  of  the  life  of  the  citizen  and  in  his  treatment 
 of  the  emotions  in  the  Rhetoric  and  Poetic.  Spinoza’s 
 method  is  more  linear  and  leaves  him  on  the  summit  as 
 one  who  has  escaped  from  a  bondage,  but  we  can  turn  back 
 for  ourselves  and  review  his  study  of  the  passions  in  the 
 light  of  his  44  intellectual  love  of  God,”  and  we  find  no 
 inconsiderable  material  in  his  own  treatment  of  concrete 
 life  in  the  Politico-theological  Treatise.  Kant  himself  opens 
 the  way  for  a  study  of  the  effects  of  44  Respect  ”  for  Reason  : 
 
 ally  because  lie  does  not  allow  the  unique  central  feeling  on  which  I  have 
 dwelt — the  love  of  Perfection.  The  complex  religious  emotion  varies 
 much  in  different  minds :  the  analysis  of  it  yields  different  con¬ 
 stituents  for  George  Herbert  as  compared  with  Bunyan,  for  Cowper  as 
 compared  with  Emerson  ;  but  we  could  scarcely  call  the  Sentiment  the 
 same  were  it  not  for  the  innermost  fibre  which  I  hold  to  have  been  identical 
 in  all. 
 
328 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 he  expressly  declares  that  for  man  the  life  of  virtue  is 
 not  victory  but  warfare,  that  absolutely  pure  moral  reason 
 is  not  within  our  attainment.  And  he  says  that  to  claim 
 that  the  Moral  emotion  is  the  whole  of  Emotionality 
 would  be  formalism  of  the  same  kind  as  that  would  look 
 for  the  whole  content  of  Morality  in  its  single  ultimate 
 principle.  Here  the  Stoics  had  gone  wrong,  he  says.  In 
 his  own  Anthropology  we  can  see  how  Kant  considers  such 
 organising  of  the  concrete  life  to  proceed.  In  the 
 voluminous  writings  of  Hegel  there  is  abundant  material 
 for  tracing  the  efficacy  of  fundamental  emotion  in  the 
 various  levels  of  emotional  life. 
 
 But  within  a  narrowly  limited  space  it  is  easier  to 
 illustrate  the  entry  of  the  principal  emotion  upon  ascend¬ 
 ancy  and  control  from  the  writings  of  those  who  have 
 made  the  religious  life  their  special  concern.  It  is  a  fact 
 that  Christian  Mysticism  of  the  best  kind  has  never  rested 
 content  with  Quietism  :  on  the  contrary,  many  even  of 
 those  most  famous  as  Mystics  gave  express  attention 
 to  the  effect  of  the  love  of  God  in  bringing  harmony  over 
 the  whole  range  of  life. 
 
 “  When  once  the  soul  has  become  so  firmly  established 
 in  the  habit  of  union  with  God,  which  is  its  sovereign  good, 
 all  its  powers  are  transformed,”  is  the  teaching  of  even  so 
 extreme  a  Mystic  as  St.  John  of  the  Cross. 
 
 It  is  upon  the  love  of  God  that  the  love  of  neighbour  is 
 “  built  as  upon  a  basis  or  pillar,”  as  Sir  Thomas  Browne 
 says  :  Affections  are  “  shows  and  dreams,  without  reality, 
 truth  or  constancy;  mere  stories  out  of  Pliny,  tales  of 
 Boccace,  apparitions  or  neat  delusions,”  when  not  so 
 founded  and  assured  of  substantiality. 
 
 “  Command  thyself  in  chief  : 
 
 He  life’s  war  knows 
 
 Whom  all  his  passions  follow  as  he  goes ;  ” 
 
 so  wrote  George  Herbert.  John  Smith  delights  in  tracing 
 far  and  wide  the  beneficent  power  of  the  dominant  emotion. 
 Three-fourths  of  his  principal  discourse  is  occupied  with 
 expounding  “  the  properties  and  effects  ”  of  religion,  in 
 
EMOTIONALITY:  A  VINDICATION 
 
 329 
 
 widening,  enlarging  and  controlling  the  powers  of  the  soul, 
 in  which  the  feelings  are  all  along  included.  44  The  spirit 
 of  religion  is  always  spreading  itself  through  the  whole 
 essence  of  the  soul,  .  .  .  the  acquisition  of  true  goodness 
 brings  a  constant  revenue  of  solid  and  substantial  satisfac¬ 
 tion  to  the  spirit  of  a  good  man,  delighting  always  to  sit 
 by  those  eternal  springs  that  feed  it.”  Not  suppressing 
 or  dispersing,  but  collecting  and  concentrating,  is  his 
 conception  of  the  function  of  the  central  emotion  in  the 
 soul.  From  Butler  we  have  not  sufficient  work  extant — 
 it  is  well  known  how  we  have  only,  in  practical  divinity, 
 a  handful  of  sermons  rescued  by  his  chaplain — to  show 
 whether  he  occupied  himself  in  tracing  the  function  of  the 
 love  of  God  over  the  field  of  life.  Possibly  he  did  not  give 
 much  attention  to  this  :  his  method  was  rather  statical, 
 and  except  for  his  treatment  of  habit  he  concerned  himself 
 principally  with  analysis  of  the  soul  in  its  maturity  rather 
 than  with  genetic  studies. 
 
 In  Jonathan  Edwards  there  is  ample  material.  He  sets 
 out  to  seek  in  life  the  presence  of  “  a  beautiful  symmetry 
 and  proportion,”  and  in  the  love  of  God  he  sees  the  source 
 from  which  they  can  arise.  From  it  as  from  a  fountain 
 flow  out  admirable  affections.  Unworthy  ones  cannot 
 stand  against  its  repelling  force  :  or  rather,  they  remain, 
 but  are  brought  into  the  system,  turned  into  weapons 
 of  attack  against  evil  things ;  fear,  dread,  sorrow,  even 
 hatred  and  abhorrence  remain,  but  they  are  directed 
 against  the  things  which  offend  the  object  of  the  sovereign 
 affection.  On  the  other  hand,  this  takes  up  to  itself 
 gratitude,  joy,  hope  :  it  draws  into  its  own  circle  what 
 there  was  of  love  of  men,  and  itself  incites  it  anew,  correct¬ 
 ing,  as  Edwards  specially  notes,  its  44  perturbations.” 
 The  general  result  is  a  44  change  of  nature.”  And  emotion¬ 
 ality  is  all  the  while  regarded  as  influencing  activity, 
 vigorously  impelling  the  will  to  practice  :  there  is  no 
 Quietism  here ;  the  peace  which  is  enjoyed  is  based  upon 
 the  44  beautiful  symmetry  and  proportion.”  Transformed 
 from  perturbing  influences  into  gracious  affections  the 
 emotions  form  a  system,  stable,  constant,  habitual. 
 
330 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 Against  this  compact  order  the  counterfeits  of  imperfect  and 
 misguided  enthusiasms  cannot  stand  in  comparison.  And 
 yet  withal  it  is  progressive;  Edwards’s  view  of  life  is 
 thoroughly  dynamical;  the  higher  the  affections  are 
 raised,  the  more  is  44  a  spiritual  appetite  and  longing  of  the 
 soul  ”  increased;  it  is  only  false  affections  which  deceive 
 us  into  resting  satisfied;  the  stream  of  the  harmonised 
 feelings  is  a  tide  flowing  wide  and  deep.  Newman,  though 
 not  so  systematic  as  Edwards,  was  very  fond  of  little 
 excursions  into  genetic  psychology,  and  he  gives  us  many  a 
 glimpse  into  the  formation  of  mental  complexes,  intellectual, 
 volitional  and  emotional.  A  good  example  for  our  purpose 
 is  his  sermon  on  The  Moral  Effects  of  Communion  with 
 God.  He  shows  religious  emotion  exercising  a  44  natural 
 effect  ”  in  spiritualising  and  elevating  the  range  of  feelings, 
 44  gradually,  imperceptibly,  in  a  most  subtle  way”;  it 
 pervades  our  44  tastes,  our  likings  and  our  motives  ” ;  it 
 checks  sudden  likings  and  dislikings,  it  tempers  and  calms 
 unsettling  and  dissatisfying  feelings,  it  moderates  desires 
 of  praise  and  fears  of  blame ;  it  assists  to  settle  and  assure 
 the  hold  of  the  moral  feelings,  and  offers  a  ground  of 
 stability  upon  which  they  may  become  fixed. 
 
 For  Seeley  it  must  suffice  to  note  that  he  ascribes  to  the 
 enthusiasm  which  he  calls  religious,  the  power  to  transform 
 legal  morality  into  the  morality  of  freedom,  and  to  infuse 
 social  life  with  a  great  civilising  power.1 
 
 This  ordering  function  of  the  supreme  sentiment  is 
 exhibited  in  a  comprehensive  way  wherever  Sacramen- 
 talism  and  Symbolism  are  found.  These  are,  indeed,  most 
 frequently  employed  in  the  sphere  of  knowledge  :  ideas 
 of  lower  grade  are  made  vehicles  for  the  manifestation  of 
 higher  ideas,  from  the  bottom  of  the  scale  to  the  very 
 summit.  The  recent  writings  of  Dr.  Bigg  illustrate  this 
 very  clearly,  and  Dr.  Inge  closes  his  first  excursion  into 
 the  study  of  Christian  Mysticism  with  a  fine  chapter  on 
 
 1  I  cannot  refrain  from  appealing  here  to  the  testimony  of  Browning, 
 who,  in  his  splendid  early  poem,  Paracelsus ,  finally  traces  downwards  the 
 ramifications  of  the  love  which  has  secured  victory  over  both  power  and 
 kpowledge. 
 
EMOTIONALITY:  A  VINDICATION 
 
 331 
 
 Symbolism.  Quite  parallel,  I  suggest,  is  the  way  in  which 
 feelings  of  the  humblest  order  may  be  attached  to  those  of 
 more  refinement,  scattered  feelings  may  be  dignified  by 
 being  made  signs  of  great  complexes,  and  the  whole  range  of 
 desires  and  affections  may  be  made  to  contribute  in  full  and 
 harmonious  flow  to  the  richness  of  the  soul’s  life  under  the 
 dominance  of  the  love  of  God.  The  hopes  and  fears,  the 
 joys  and  sorrows  that  might  have  been,  in  Isaac  Williams’ 
 words,  the  bearers  of  our  bier  to  the  grave,  now  bear  us  into 
 the  region  of  peace  and  light. 
 
 Before  concluding  it  may  be  useful  to  turn  for  a  moment 
 from  our  Western  world  to  the  testimony  of  the  Eastern 
 mind.  There,  indeed,  we  shall  find  the  straining  for 
 unity  carried  to  such  an  intensity  that  we  are  at  first 
 inclined  to  think  that  we  can  learn  from  it  nothing  for  our 
 purpose.  Thought  seems  to  over-reach  itself  when  it 
 takes  the  form  of  the  annihilation  of  plurality  in  an  un¬ 
 differentiated  whole,  and  Emotionality  is  carried  away 
 with  it  when  not  only  all  differences  of  desire  are  swept 
 away  but  even  desire  itself.  But  a  more  interesting 
 phase  is  now  being  opened  out  by  the  contact  of  the  Eastern 
 mind  with  the  mind  of  the  West.  The  claims  of  concrete 
 life  are  being  respected  and  brought  into  place.  In  a 
 volume  of  essays  entitled  Culture  of  the  Soul  among 
 Western  Nations  by  Mr.  P.  Ramanathan,  Solicitor-General 
 of  Ceylon,  there  is  some  hesitancy  between  remitting  the 
 supreme  experience  of  religion  to  solitary  dignity  and 
 vindicating  it  as  the  source  of  order  over  the  whole  emo¬ 
 tional  field.  For  example,  we  are  told  that  the  man  who 
 has  attained  knowledge  of  eternal  truth  “  is  found  most  in 
 secluded  places,  from  Cashmere  to  Cape  Comorin,  living 
 in  the  utmost  simplicity,”  and  thus  without  opportunity 
 for  further  experience  of  other  emotions  and  affections ; 
 that  one  of  the  psalms  on  the  lips  of  every  cultured  Tamil 
 of  the  present  day  speaks  of  the  man  of  religion  as  “  become 
 like  the  dead,  void  of  all  thought,  knowing  no  further 
 change  that  in  spiritual  communion  differentiation  has 
 ceased :  so  that  only  one  emotion  remains,  infinite  love, 
 “  irrespective  of  all  objects,”  single  and  alone.  But  in 
 
332 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 other  places  Mr.  Raman  athan  seems  glad  to  trace  beneficent 
 properties  and  effects  of  the  supreme  emotion  in  the  lower 
 levels  :  he  commends  the  long-suffering  humility  of  the 
 Jnanis,  their  love  of  all  things  great  and  small,  good  and 
 bad ;  the  disappearance  of  hate  and  resentment ;  a  con¬ 
 stant  sense  of  thankfulness.  He  claims  that  they  make  the 
 best  of  fathers,  husbands,  brothers  and  citizens — we  note 
 with  sadness  that  no  mention  is  made  of  mothers,  wives 
 and  sisters — and  states  that  as  matter  of  fact  the  largest 
 number  of  Jnanis  isolate  themselves  only  for  a  few  hours 
 each  day,  and  not  necessarily  every  day,  and  agrees  that 
 these  are  the  saints  most  useful  to  the  world  because  of 
 their  “amazing  fruitfulness”  in  service  to  others.  Do  we 
 not  here  see  the  ideals  of  the  East  and  West  in  conflict  in  a 
 deeply  reflective  mind  ?  Impressed  strongly  with  his  racial 
 tendency  to  Quietism  he  declares  that  “  rest  is  absolutely 
 good,  and  all  forms  of  unrest,  from  the  highest  to  the 
 lowest,  are  bad  in  relation  to  rest,”  and  yet  as  an  active 
 and  distinguished  Civil  Servant  he  cannot  suppress  the 
 conviction  that  well-ordered  activity,  with  all  the  emotions 
 and  affections  that  it  involves,  cannot  really  be  refused 
 admittance  into  the  ideal  of  the  normal  and  healthy  life 
 of  men. 
 
 Ill 
 
 If  these  witnesses  enable  us  to  regard  the  attainment  of 
 order  in  the  life  of  Feeling  as  not  only  possible  but  as  at 
 times  experienced,  and  as  suggesting  the  universal  ideal, 
 we  can  draw  out  some  applications  which  will  enable  us 
 to  deal  with  some  of  the  objections  taken  to  the  legitimacy 
 of  the  emotional  factor  of  life. 
 
 (i)  It  is  maintained  that  there  is  no  inherent  source  of 
 value  in  the  emotions ;  that  they  are  of  themselves  neither 
 good  nor  bad.  All  our  feelings  are  marked  by  passivity, 
 it  is  urged;  naOrj  is  the  Greek  term.  They  rise  up  in  us 
 unbidden  by  the  principal  and  central  soul  :  some  are 
 stirred  by  external  influences  upon  us  which  are  beyond 
 our  control ;  some  are  most  unwelcome,  others  are  in- 
 
EMOTIONALITY:  A  VINDICATION 
 
 333 
 
 different ;  while  the  rest  may  indeed  be  pleasant,  but  they 
 are  uninvited  guests.  Their  presence  prevents  us  from 
 being  masters  in  our  own  house  :  the  rational  self  is 
 deprived  of  the  guidance  of  our  life. 
 
 In  so  far  as  this  objection  implies  a  total  depreciation  of 
 feeling  and  a  claim  for  reason  and  knowledge  alone  as  the 
 proper  governor  of  activity,  an  age-long  controversy  is 
 raised;  from  the  dispute  between  the  Stoic  anaOeia  and 
 the  Peripatetic  advocacy  of  regulation  downwards  through 
 European  history.  It  can  only  be  met  by  the  counter¬ 
 assertion  of  the  legitimacy  of  feeling  :  we  can  only  affirm 
 that  for  us  feeling  is  a  natural  and  proper  mode  of 
 mental  life,  a  legitimate  constituent  of  the  Good.  Feeling 
 in  some  form  is  always  present;  each  several  affection 
 has  its  natural  origin  and  appropriate  function;  “every 
 desire  is  for  good,”  as  St.  Thomas  says;  and  further, 
 feeling  is  not  merely  an  attendant  upon  intellectual 
 perceptions  and  judgments,  it  has  its  value  in  itself. 
 And  the  changes  of  feeling  arise  as  naturally  as,  say,  the 
 crystallisation  or  the  evaporation  of  water  at  the  proper 
 temperatures. 
 
 (ii)  But  it  is  urged  that  particular  feelings  are  capable 
 of  mischievous  excess,  and  that  therefore  Feeling  cannot 
 be  inherently  good. 
 
 In  the  establishment  of  a  central  feeling,  and  a  conse¬ 
 quential  system  grouped  around  it,  I  hold  that  we  have  the 
 clue  to  the  answer  to  this  objection.  The  badness  of  an 
 excess  of  feeling  in  general  is  not  due  to  the  intensity  of  the 
 feeling  itself;  capacity  for  height  and  depth  of  emotion 
 is  surely  better  for  us  than  shallowness,  stolidity,  and 
 callousness,  as  Seeley  urged.  The  badness  arises  in  refer¬ 
 ence  to  the  whole  mental  economy :  when  general  absorp¬ 
 tion  in  emotion  draws  off  mental  force  from  activity  and 
 thinking ;  when  it  so  inhibits  thinking  that  we  act  only  by 
 impulses  unilluminated  by  intellectual  light  upon  objects, 
 or  when  we  direct  our  attention  upon  the  emotionality, 
 as  such,  to  a  degree  which  cannot  be  attained  without 
 calling  off  attention  from  activity  and  we  remain  quiescent, 
 absorbed  in  the  enjoyment  of  feeling  alone.  And  similarly 
 
334 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 for  particular  emotions.  Each  is  natural  and  has  its 
 function ;  but  it  may  rise  to  a  height  which  impoverishes 
 the  rest  of  the  field ;  it  may  perturb  as  the  usurpation  of 
 a  tyrant  perturbs  the  State.  A  single  emotion  must  not 
 suppress  the  rights  of  more  complex  ones,  nor  a  complex 
 one  the  rights  of  a  still  more  complex;  if  the  right  of  a 
 single  factor  is  asserted  against  the  counter-rights  of  a 
 comprehensive  collection  of  factors  we  have  usurpation 
 and  disorder,  and  we  call  the  feeling  in  this  situation  bad. 
 
 By  way  of  illustration  let  us  examine  this  statement 
 of  John  Caird  (Philosophy  oj  Religion ,  c.  vi.):  “Within 
 the  sphere  of  Feeling  the  rapture  of  the  sensualist  and 
 the  devout  elevation  of  the  saint  are  precisely  on  a  level ; 
 the  one  has  as  much  justification  as  the  other.”  This 
 melancholy  opinion — which  we  must  suppose  so  highly 
 gifted  a  mind  as  John  Caird’s  to  have  written  down  with 
 some  pain — is  due  to  his  taking  account  only  of  intensity 
 and  pleasantness ;  even  stability  is  not  mentioned.  But, 
 surely,  very  little  analysis  is  required  for  seeing  that  the 
 constituents  of  sensualist  rapture  are  very  few  and  of  very 
 lowly  origin  in  comparison  with  the  rich  content  of  the 
 religious  sentiment ;  that  the  totals  of  momentary  intensity 
 and  pleasantness,  to  say  nothing  of  stability  over  a  period 
 of  time,  are  very  different.  While,  further,  the  inhibitory 
 action  of  the  one  and  the  comprehensive  attractiveness  of 
 the  other  leave  the  one  in  isolated  solitude  wrhile  the  other 
 sends  its  influence  vibrating  through  the  whole  emotional 
 system.  True,  each  individual  may  be  absorbed,  the 
 sensualist  as  much  as  the  saint;  but  the  range  of  indivi¬ 
 duality  is  very  different  in  the  two  cases.  The  intolerable 
 conclusion  as  to  equality  is  fallacious;  the  “  justification  ” 
 is  very  far  from  being  equal  for  both. 
 
 Again,  the  same  writer  says  that  wonder  and  joy  and 
 rapture  are  found  in  all  religions  alike,  nay,  they  appear 
 “  in  the  more  sensuous  and  materialistic  religions  with  even 
 greater  force  than  in  the  more  rational  and  spiritual.” 
 This  would  be  sad  indeed ;  but  only  Caird’s  overmastering 
 intellectualism  could  have  led  him  to  suppose  it  to  be 
 true.  The  excited  feelings  of  the  participants  in  a  pagan 
 
EMOTIONALITY  :  A  VINDICATION 
 
 335 
 
 orgy  take  more  violent  expression — and  perhaps  William 
 James  would  have  been  obliged  to  agree  with  Caird  in  this 
 account — but  really  a  very  small  area  of  feeling  is  con¬ 
 cerned;  the  greater  portion  of  the  field  lies  dormant  in 
 the  undeveloped  natures  of  the  devotees  of  “  sensuous  and 
 naturalistic  ”  religions.  In  comparison  with  the  excitement 
 in  such  narrow  and  such  shallow  vessels  the  apparently 
 quiet  but  really  far-ranging  and  deeply-penetrating 
 emotion  of  a  “rational  and  spiritual”  worshipper  contains 
 an  incomparably  greater  total  of  emotional  force.  For 
 the  man  of  high  rationality  and  spirituality  who  has 
 “  flung  open  the  gates  of  the  other  world,”  to  use  an  ex¬ 
 pression  of  Maeterlinck’s,  and  learnt  to  love  what  there 
 he  sees,  and  has  thereafter  learnt  to  love  his  neighbour 
 for  what  is  eternal  in  him,  and  following  on  this  to  embrace 
 the  whole  range  of  being  as  he  brings  it  into  the  light,  the 
 range  of  emotion  that  is  enjoyed  stands  beyond  challenge 
 of  comparison. 
 
 This  is  so  within  the  range  of  Emotionality  itself.  And 
 when  we  look  outside  and  take  account  of  the  influence 
 upon  activity  and  thinking,  we  can  see  how  injurious  is 
 absorption  in  a  few  simple  and  solitary  feelings.  It  is 
 impossible  that  the  guidance  of  such  a  complex  as  the 
 total  health  of  the  soul  can  be  efficiently  discharged  by 
 an  isolated  member  of  so  varied  a  system,  of  which  each 
 constituent  has  some  beneficial  influence  which  it  is  entitled 
 to  exercise.  I  see  no  reason  for  disallowing  the  venerable 
 claim  that  merit  may  be  assigned  to  emotion  according  to 
 the  activity  which  it  accompanies ;  the  higher  the  quality 
 of  the  evegyeia  the  more  excellent  the  emotion  both  as 
 to  intensity  and  stability  and  pleasantness.  This  is 
 agreed  to  by  all  good  Platonists  and  Aristotelians ;  it  has 
 recommended  itself  generally,  and  modern  psychology 
 is  now  bringing  fresh  evidence  in  its  support.  The  main¬ 
 tenance  of  the  position  that  there  are  qualities  in  pleasure, 
 and  the  clue  to  the  assignment  of  different  qualities  is 
 usually  accepted  and  justified  by  this  method.  What  I 
 have  been  urging  above  welcomes  this  guidance,  but  it 
 goes  further  in  endeavouring  to  show  that  within  emotion- 
 
336 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 ality  we  can  by  reference  to  fitness  for  place  in  a  system 
 covering  the  whole  field  see  the  cause  and  ground  of  order 
 of  excellence  among  emotions,  in  reference  to  gradations 
 of  quality  of  pleasantness,  to  total  intensity,  and  to  stability 
 alike. 
 
 (iii)  The  other  great  objection  to  allowing  independent 
 value  to  the  emotional  side  of  life  is  that  it  is  separative ; 
 Emotionality  is  infected  with  subjectivity,  it  is  urged;  it 
 belongs  to  the  privacy  of  the  individual  soul  and  does  not 
 enter  into  the  universal  life  of  the  world  to  which  Reason, 
 and  Reason  alone,  admits  all  rational  beings.  This  is  a 
 large  issue;  only  a  few  observations  can  be  offered  in  a 
 summary  way.  In  this  central  and  dominant  emotion 
 for  which  we  have  contended,  what  have  we  found  ? 
 Have  we  not  seen  that  it  is  itself  an  outgoing  affection  ? 
 it  is  a  desire  for  a  perfection  which  is  not  in  the  seeker ; 
 a  joy  in  an  object  which  is  not  the  soul  which  is  rejoicing, 
 but  greater  than  it,  better  in  every  possible  constituent 
 of  being,  and  loved  expressly  for  that  non-subjective 
 perfection’s  sake.  Upon  nothing  is  the  affection  more 
 insistent  than  upon  the  disallowance  and  rejection  of  the 
 sufficiency  of  self  as  the  principal  object  of  interest,  upon 
 the  necessity  for  a  turning  away  from  self  if  the  initial 
 step  in  the  course  of  loving  is  to  be  taken.  True,  the 
 self  will  be  recovered,  but  it  will  then  find  in  itself  only 
 a  reflected  interest;  the  true  and  legitimate  self-feeling, 
 enjoyable  without  reserve,  is  strictly  and  properly  con¬ 
 sequential  upon  the  soul’s  love  for  God  and  the  perception 
 that  His  love  directs  itself  towards  us.  Nor  is  the  self 
 left  in  solitude  in  this  high  state  of  honour;  all  similar 
 selves  stand  with  it;  our  neighbour  is  seen  by  us  in 
 the  light  that  flows  from  God,  and  is  enveloped  with  the 
 all-embracing  love  which  we  feel  for  Him.  The  com¬ 
 plexity  of  social  feelings  is  brought  into  the  same  gracious 
 honour ;  in  the  life  of  the  spiritual  community  alone  can 
 the  self  find  its  own  true  life  even  in  the  enjoyment  of 
 the  divine  love.  Self-love  and  social  love  are  particular 
 forms  which  are  taken  up  and  brought  into  congenial 
 order  by  the  dominating  love  of  God.  In  this  way  the 
 
EMOTIONALITY:  A  VINDICATION 
 
 337 
 
 objective  order  disclosed  by  reason  and  activity  finds 
 support  from  its  correspondence  with  the  order  of  the 
 feelings  and  desires  of  the  soul  which  has  attained  the 
 summit  of  philosophical  and  religious  aspiration,  and  has 
 then  made  progress  in  the  establishment  of  system  over 
 the  whole  field.  Subjective  even  this  ordered  Emotionality 
 is,  of  course ;  because  it  is  the  life  of  the  subject,  but  it  is 
 not  44  individual  ”  in  the  depreciatory  sense,  for  it  is  not 
 possible  for  a  mind  that  is  shut  up  in  an  individuality  which 
 begins  and  ends  with  its  own  interests.  In  short,  such  a 
 developed  Emotionality  is  not  possible  for  those  who  have 
 not  attained  to  4 4  personality,”  and  thereby  entered  upon 
 community  with  others,  reaching  upwards  towards  com¬ 
 munion  with  the  eternal  and  perfect  Personality.  It  is 
 not  the  love  which  remains  an  objectless  love,  a  yearning 
 or  an  aspiration ;  this  may  be  the  goal  of  the  Hindu  Jnani 
 — 44  an  infinite  love  irrespective  of  objects  of  love”;  the 
 testimonies  to  which  I  have  appealed  bear  witness  to  a  love 
 which  is  directed  to  an  object,  and  which,  apart  from 
 belief  in  that  object,  would  evaporate  instead  of  working 
 in  the  soul  as  a  solidifying  force ;  would  fill  it  with  uneasi¬ 
 ness  and  sorrow  instead  of  the  repose  and  joy  which  we 
 have  seen  to  have  fallen  within  the  experiences  of  these 
 highly  spiritual  minds.  In  them  love  was  a  life  in  which 
 the  loving  and  the  loved  were  joined  together. 
 
 CONCLUSION 
 
 At  the  present  time  many  minds  are  filled  with  in¬ 
 tellectual  doubts  and  difficulties  44  for  the  lack  of  a  single 
 supreme  truth,”  as  Eucken  says;  a  situation  for  which 
 Theistic  faith  offers  itself  as  a  way  of  deliverance.  This 
 faith  seeks  to  establish  itself  along  various  paths  of  mental 
 striving.  The  study  of  the  Emotional  phase  of  life  comes 
 with  an  offer  of  confirmation  if  it,  too,  can  establish  in  its 
 own  field  the  supremacy  of  a  single  emotion,  the  love  of 
 
338 
 
 LONDON  THEOLOGICAL  STUDIES 
 
 God,  with  power  to  dominate  and  unify  the  whole  range 
 of  the  feelings  and  desires.  Success  in  this  region  will 
 encourage  Reason  to  go  onward  in  its  own  quest  for  unity 
 and  order;  to  rely  upon  the  suggestions  and  indications, 
 if  not  the  absolute  proofs,  of  the  existence  and  dominion 
 of  the  Perfect  Spirituality  whom  religion  names  God.  On 
 the  other  hand,  it  ought  to  be  a  disturbing  thought  if 
 Reason  were  to  make  great  progress  in  its  own  search  at 
 the  expense  of  leaving  the  whole  of  the  life  of  emotion 
 behind;  either  remitted  to  subjectivity  and  individuality, 
 or  else  abandoned  as  in  hopeless  disorder  and  perturbation, 
 with  here  and  there,  indeed,  some  admirable  and  welcome 
 elements,  but  incapable  either  of  unity  in  itself  or  of  cor¬ 
 relation  with  the  rational  life. 
 
 The  purpose  of  this  essay  has  been  to  call  witnesses  for 
 the  unification  that  is  possible  in  the  life  of  feeling.  We  have 
 learnt  that  in  feelings  men  can  pass  from  grade  to  grade 
 of  excellence,  ever  unfilled,  until  they  are  able  to  ap¬ 
 preciate  the  purity  of  the  contemplative  love  of  perfection, 
 the  joy  of  being  in  the  presence  of  Eternal  Goodness,  the 
 beatitude  which  corresponds  to  the  vision  of  God.  And 
 when  from  that  height  men  descend  they  carry  in  their 
 hearts  a  dominant  emotion  which  is  both  purificatory  and 
 attractive,  and  enables  them  to  bring  order  and  rule  into 
 the  varied  affections  and  desires;  any  high  jealousy  on 
 behalf  of  truth,  as  if  it  were  inconsistent  with  the  life  of 
 feeling,  is  dispelled,  love  of  truth  is  attached,  and  the  ardour 
 for  activity  which  moral  goodness  and  rightness  evoke  is 
 similarly  attracted  into  alliance.  Incurable  or  unruly 
 sources  of  disintegration  and  turmoil  on  the  one  hand  are 
 inhibited,  and  by  drawing  to  itself  all  the  affections  that 
 are  susceptible  of  subordination,  co-ordination,  and  har¬ 
 mony — and  which  are  not  ? — we  find  that  feelings  may  be 
 rendered  wholly  good  and  contributory  to  the  total  health 
 of  our  mental  life. 
 
 If  we  are  ourselves  strongly  Intellectualist  we  are  re¬ 
 lieved  if  it  can  be  shown  that  the  powerful  current  of 
 Feeling  can  be  directed  into  a  course  parallel  with  the 
 gradations  of  intelligence ;  that  it  need  no  longer  be  dreaded 
 
EMOTIONALITY:  A  VINDICATION 
 
 339 
 
 as  a  turbulent  stream  of  influence  obscuring  intellectual 
 vision  and  thwarting  intellectual  processes.  As  we  shall 
 move  freely  if  we  can  be  assured  that  there  is  a  substratum 
 of  philosophical  ideas  under  the  conceptions  of  science, 
 so  we  shall  lift  up  our  hearts  if  there  is  a  possibility  of  a 
 love  of  perfection,  a  sentiment  of  religion,  which  can  act 
 as  a  dominant  source  of  unification  and  order  in  the  accom¬ 
 panying  emotional  life.  If  we  are  among  those  whose 
 psychology  of  belief  leads  them  always  to  assign  to  the 
 feelings  important  and  legitimate  influence  as  well  in  their 
 own  sphere  as  in  the  direction  of  intellectual  processes, 
 we  shall  even  more  gladly  welcome  evidence  for  the 
 capability  of  the  feelings  for  being  brought  into  order. 
 The  possibility  of  this  relieves  us  from  such  a  chilling 
 forecast  as  that  of  Ribot  ( Psychology  of  the  Emotions ),  that 
 the  advance  of  the  mind’s  intellectual  powers  involves  the 
 “  weakening  of  Emotionality.”  On  the  contrary,  we  hold 
 that  the  Non  stupor,  sect  Amor  of  the  Christian  Ethic  is  as 
 far  removed  from  either  Hindu  suppression  or  Intellectual  - 
 ist  fading  away  as  it  is  from  mere  hysterical  stupefaction. 
 We  find  in  Emotion  a  function  so  highly  beneficial,  so 
 indispensable  for  full  vitality,  that  we  confidently  include 
 in  our  ideal  of  human  character  a  permanent  and  un¬ 
 measurable  richness  of  emotional  sensibility;  not  indeed 
 as  yet  thoroughly  brought  into  complete  order,  but  moving 
 in  that  direction  and  full  of  promise  that  progress  will  be 
 continual.  The  soul  in  which  the  love  of  God  reigns  is 
 rich  in  generous  and  noble  affections  almost  infinite  in 
 variety,  which  are  by  its  gracious  influence  constituted 
 into  a  harmony  in  which  place  is  found  for  a  derivative 
 and  subordinated  love  of  all  created  things.  Love  redeems 
 from  bondage  and  purifies  from  evil  by  itself  entering  into 
 the  heart  of  every  desire  and  every  affection,  and  by  its 
 own  essential  goodness  it  transforms  them  into  constituents 
 of  that  unified  manifold  in  which  the  soul  finds  the  fulness 
 of  life 
 
PRINTED  FOR  THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  LONDON  PRESS,  LTD.,  BY 
 RICHARD  CLAY  AND  SONS,  LIMITED, 
 
 LONDON  AND  BUNGAY. 
 
Princeton 
 
 heological  Seminary  Libraries 
 
 012  01236  2648 
 
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