£/e/ 
 
 Section 
 
 
A N r 
 
 ■if 
 
 npartial Enqufey 
 
 ■.T,i,i00' 
 
 Into the EXISTENCE and 
 
 
 NATURE OF GOD: 
 
 Being a Modest Essay towards a 
 
 more Intelligible Account of the 
 
 DIVINE PERFECTIONS. 
 
 With Remarks on feveral A U T H O R S 
 
 both ANCIENT and MODERN; and 
 
 Particularly on fome Paflages in Dr. Clarke's 
 
 DEMONSTRATION OF THE 
 
 BEING AND ATTRIBUTES 
 
 OF GOD. 
 
 In TWO BOOKS. 
 
 With an APPENDIX concerning the Nature of 
 SPACE andDURATION. 
 
 The Third Edition. 
 
 With confiderable Additions and Improvements, made partly 
 
 witii Regard to fome Objedions of the Reverend 
 
 Mr. JACKSON. 
 
 . . - 
 
 By Samuel Collider. 
 
 Sapiejitiam fibi adimuut, qui fine iilh Judicio Inventa Majorum 
 probarit. Sed hcc eos faliir, quod 'Majorum nomine audits^ 
 non putant fieri poJJ'e ut ant ipf. plus fapianty, quia Minores 
 vocantur^ aut illi defipueritity quia Majores no77iinanUu\ 
 
 Laftantius Lib. 2. Divinarum Inft. Cap. 8, 
 
 LONDON: Printed for R. Robinson, at the 
 Golden Lyon in St. Paul's Ckurch-Tard. Mdccx.xxv. 
 
THE 
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 H E general good Recep- 
 tion which this Eflay has 
 met v/ith from Men of 
 Learning and Impartiality, 
 has orivcn Occalion to ano- 
 ther Edition ; in which Care has been 
 taken to make feveral Additions and Im- 
 provements. ........ 
 
 What I have further to fay "By way of 
 Preface, fhall be comprized in few 
 Words. 
 
 If the main Principles contained in 
 this Enquiry are either felf-evident, or 
 elfe fully demonflrated ; if the Hypo- 
 thefes propofed for obviating Objcdlions 
 are agreeable to Reafon, and not difa- 
 A 2 agreeable 
 
i:he P R E F A C E. 
 greeable to Scripture ; if by proceeding 
 upon thofe Principles and Hypothefes, 
 not only the great Truths of Religiou 
 have been eftablifhed, but a Difcovery 
 has been made of the Grand Source of 
 Error, which has for many Ages lain 
 hid, like the Head of the Nile^ and o- 
 verwhelmed the Chriftian World with 
 Difputes and Contentions (as fome are 
 inclined to think) I have fufficiently 
 gain'd my End. 
 
 But if this fhould not be the Cafe, yet 
 'tis hoped this Eflay may ftill be of Ufe, 
 by giving Occafion to fome abler Perfon 
 to undertake the fame moft difficult and 
 important Enquiry with Succefs. 
 
 In the mean time, I enjoy the Satis- 
 faction of having, (in the midfl: of Dif- 
 couragements) contributed my lincereft 
 Endeavours towards promoting the 
 Caufe of Religion in general, without 
 being bigoted to the particular Intereft 
 of any Sed or Party whatever. 
 
 S, COLLIBER. 
 
 THE 
 
'mmM 
 
 THE 
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 OftheFirft BOOK. 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 HE Agreeahlenefs^ natural fenden- 
 cy\ and tiniverfal Concern of this En- 
 quiry. Some Account of the At- 
 tempts "which ha'ue heen formerly 
 madc^ ^tth the Reafons of any ill Succefs they 
 may have had. A Vie^ of the Methods ufed 
 by the Indians, Chaldeans, Perfians, Phoenicians, 
 Ethiopians, Egyptians, Greeks, Romans, Jews 
 and Chriftians. 
 
 CHAP. ir. 
 
 Miftales both of ]c\vs ^;;^ Chriftians, chicfy 
 derived fro?n the Greek Philofophy. Its Fa- 
 ruty and Uncertainty, 'the feilimony ^Cicero. 
 Theprefent Age not free fro?n its ill Influences, 
 two Extre?Hes of "which the Learned of the 
 prefent Age appear to be general^ guilty, the 
 Univerfality of the Idea of a God, no neceffary 
 Proof of its being innate, the Probability of 
 its being derived from tradition. 
 
 A3 CHAP. 
 
r- 
 
 The CONTENTS. 
 
 C H A P, III. 
 
 tradition not to he entirely depended on ^ ^hen 
 a Thing is capable of immediate Proof from 
 Reafon. The two Fundamental Principles of 
 all our other Knowledge. A Demonliration 
 of the Exifience of the Divine Beings from the 
 Conft deration of our own Evidence. Of the 
 'Nature of Ablblute Neceflity, and its Con- 
 neBion with All poflibl^e Perfections. 
 
 c h'^a p.^' iv. 
 
 An Enquiry into the general Idea ofVer^ 
 fe£bion. PerfeBion is Relative and Deter^ 
 minate, 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 A Proof of the Unity of God, derived from 
 the Nature of an ahfolute Necejftty of Ext' 
 Hence, 
 
 C H A P. VI. 
 
 A Lift of our particular Ideas of the <y^- 
 preme or Divine PerfeBions, in fuch Order as 
 they feem mofi naturally deducible from the 
 general Jdea. 
 
 ■}'^^ CHAP. VII. 
 
 AnlExplanation and particular Proof of 
 the Truth of thofe Ideas. Self-adivity pro- 
 ved from the Conjf deration of Motion. An 
 eternal EfeB impojftble. Gravity fto necejfary 
 Property of Matter. IntelligencCj or Self- 
 conlcioufnefs, another Property or Power of 
 
 the 
 
The CONTENT S. 
 
 the ahfohtely necejfary Being. Its Proof. 
 Liberty, or Self-determining Power, a third 
 Property of that Being. Its Proof The Na- 
 ture ^' Guilt, or Obligation to Punifhment. 
 /// fwhat RefpeBs Humane Liberty differs from 
 the Di'vine or mofi perfeB Liberty. Of the 
 Connexion of the moral Attributes of God 
 'with the natural. An Enquiry into the Opi- 
 nion of particular eternal Decrees, and its un- 
 avoidable Confequences, Of Eternal Truths, 
 
 CHAP. VIII. 
 
 Of Spirituality, Conftancy, or Immutabi- 
 lity, Happinefs. 
 
 CHAP. IX 
 
 Cy Omnipotence, or perfect effe£l:ive Power. 
 Its proper ABion tmoo-fold^ v/z. Creation and 
 Suftentation. Cic^ition from Nothing a Poffibi- 
 lity. ObjeBions anfwered. Suftentation a ne- 
 cejfary Confequence of fuch Creation. Omnipo- 
 tence proved from the Nature of Creation and 
 Suftentation. The proper Notion of Annihila- 
 tion. Of Perfect Wifdom. Its Nature and 
 particular Proof (yOmnilcience. How it is 
 to be conceived as effential to the Divine Being. 
 
 CHAP. X. 
 
 CyGoodnefs or Benevolence. Its Notion. 
 
 Whence derived. The Certainty of a proper 
 
 Creation and Suftentation. The Idea of Om- 
 
 niprefence derived from the Suppofttion of Crc- 
 
 A 4 ation 
 
the CONTENTS. 
 
 ftt'fon and Suflentation. RefleBtons on the 
 Fundamental Principles (9/'Spinofa*s Syjtem. 
 
 CHAP. XI. 
 
 Of the Divine Government. Its Idea 
 'whence derived. It includes both the orderly 
 Dijpofition and Regulation of the fever al Parts 
 ef the World, ihe Method of dealing ijoith 
 Atheifls in demonfiratingthe Wifdom of God in 
 the Creation, The prefent Confiitution of the 
 World ahfolutely unaccountable by the Prin- 
 ciples of Ripicmus, Proved infeven Infiances. 
 ObjeBions anfwered. Tuoo Sorts of SubjeBs 
 of the Divine Regulation ; the former governed 
 by InftinB^ the latter by Laws. Brutes not 
 guided by an internal intelleBual Principle^ 
 nor mere Machines. InJtinBs 'what. Govern- 
 tnent by Laws two-fold^ viz. of Particulars 
 and Comfnunities, T'he Foundation^ Rule^ In^ 
 (irument and Reality of this Government. 
 T'he two necefj'ary Salifications of its Sub^ 
 jeBs. I'he immutable Reafon ^ Juftice, and 
 of Rewards and Punfhments in the Exercife 
 of it. The Necef/lty of our being obliged by the 
 bidtates of Reafon as Laws of the Creator. 
 Twelve Propofitions, explaining and vindica- 
 ting the Methods of the Divine Government of 
 Particulars asfuch. Of the Nature of moral 
 Good and Evil: Of Ho line fs and ijufiice ; of 
 Repentance^ fiCc. Six Propofttions relating to 
 the Divine Government of Communities. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
The CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAP. XII. 
 
 Of Providence. Its Notion. How dlftin- 
 gmjh'd from the Notions of Creation, Suften^ 
 tatton, and Government. Opinions of Ph'tlo- 
 fophers concerning a Providence. Its Certain- 
 ty and Univerfality. jHs of Providence with 
 regard to Particulars, of little Weight 'with 
 Men of irreligious Principles. 'The Reafon. 
 Eight remarkable Infiances of a general Pro- 
 vidence. 
 
 The Contents of the Second 
 Book. 
 
 PART the Firft. 
 
 THE general Deftgn of the following Dif- 
 courfe. The moft likely Method of fuc- 
 ceeding in itpropofed. A Divifton of the Jrea- 
 tife. The Weaknefs of certain pretended De- 
 monftrations of the Exiftence of God dete^ed. 
 Notional Truth and Real Truth diftinguijh'd. 
 Of the Perfe^ion of the Divine Idea in our 
 Minds. 
 
 PART the Second. 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 AfL'ort Hi [lory of the /FordlnHnitc, and its 
 Synonyma, as applfd to the Deity, 
 
 CHAP. 
 
The CONTENT S. 
 
 CHAP. IL 
 
 ■>;>f/? Enquiry into the Opinion of an A'bfokte 
 or Pofitive Inlinity. Various Notions of Infi-^ 
 nity. A Search into the Scripture Proofs of an 
 abfolute Infinity, fen Arguments from Rea- 
 fonpropofed and conftdered. 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 Of the Ufefulnefs of the Opinion of an Ahfo- 
 lute or Pofitive Infinity. 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 Of the Confequences of that Opinion. Va- 
 nini'j Defer iption ofQod. 
 
 PART the Third. 
 
 't'wo ufual Methods of conceiving Eternity. 
 fheir Incomj'eniencies. A Medium propofed. 
 Ohje^ions anfwefd. 
 
 The At p e n d i x. 
 
 A N 
 
( II ) 
 
 A N 
 
 Impartial Enquiry 
 
 INTO THE 
 
 Exiftence and Nature of G O 2), 
 
 BOOK the FIRST. 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 H E human Mind is never fo agree- 
 ably employ'd, as when it tries its 
 Strength in Enquiries of this Sort: 
 When it takes a View of the whole 
 Frame of Nature, and difcovers 
 the mighty Spring which fet it In 
 Motion : When it pierces into the 
 inmoft Subftance of Things to that invifible Cement 
 which unites them : When it traces them back to 
 their Original, and from the Nature of the Effefls 
 infers the Perfedlion of the Caufe ; and when from a 
 nearer Acquaintance with the Perfedion of the Firft 
 Caufe, it proceeds to form Rules for its own Condu(5t, 
 
 in 
 
1 2 An ImpartUl Enquiry into the 
 
 in order to a more exaft Conformity to fo noble a 
 Pattern. 
 
 Some Thoufands of Years have been already fpent 
 in thefe Enquiries, and confiderable Difcoveries have 
 been made both from Scripture and Reafon ; fuffici- 
 ent at leaft for the Condud of Life, and perhaps e- 
 nough to have fatisfied any Age lefs curious and phi- 
 lofophlcal than our own. But it has been our Fortune 
 to vifit the World, at a Time wherein as we have feen 
 the Range and Compafs of human Knowledge fo nice- 
 ly adjufted and determined,* fo we fee daily Attempts 
 towards the extending it to'its iitmoft Limits. The 
 Event, it is to be hop'd, may at laft be^ that the 
 great Truths of Religion will be tix'd on their proper 
 and natural Principles, and fetin fo clear a Light, that 
 by a nearer Agreement in Opinion, human Nature may 
 appear with more Uniformity, and Piety may be 
 thought as hecelTary to complete the Charafter o'f a Man 
 of Senfe, as Libertinifm and Immorality have been. 
 
 'Tis, I think, the Right and Duty of every ca- 
 pable Perfon .to improve and employ his Faculties, 
 and to take his own Meafures in the Search of Truth, 
 There muft be a Judgment of Dlfcretion with refe- 
 rcince to the Scriptures, and a Liberty of Reafoning in 
 all other Cafes ; provided they be exercifed with Mo- 
 defly, from a fmcere Defire to difcover and embrace 
 the Truth, and with entire Submiflion to better In- 
 formation. 
 
 I conceive, that whoever will undertake an Enqui- 
 ry of this Nature, can't begin it better, than with an 
 impartial Search into fuch Miflakes and Mifmanage- 
 ments as may have caus'd the ill Succefs of for- 
 mer Enquiries. Several of thefe we may be capable 
 of detecting in the prefent Cafe : Which we fhall 
 briefly mention •, not with Defign to expofe the Fail- 
 ings and Weaknefles of others, bvit purely to form 
 "iiich Cautions as may be of Ufe to ourfelves. 
 
 The 
 
 * See Mr. Locke of Hum. Und. Book 4. Chap. 3. 
 
Nature ^w^ Exiftence of GOT>. 13 
 
 The Occafions of any ill Succcfs that hath attended 
 former Enquiries, we Ihall find to have been cither 
 more general and common to all or moft ot the prer 
 ceeding Ages and Nations, or more particular and 
 peculiar to fome. 
 
 The more general will appear to have been, 
 I. Intercjl and Dcfi^}/. Thefe were efpecially thp 
 Imperfeftions of the Priefts. The firft Lawgivers, 
 or Founders of Civil Government among the Pagans, 
 finding how difficult it was to infufe the Sentiments of 
 Religion and Civility into the ftupid unthinking Vul- 
 gar by Argument and Pcrfuafion, did it moil elTec- 
 tually by a Pretence of divine Enthufiafms and Re- 
 velations. By this Method they wifely ferv'd them- 
 fclves of the Principle of Fear, which is ever the 
 Itrongeft and mod vigorous Spring of Action, and 
 which we ufually find to be moft predominant in 
 thofewho lie Icaftopen to the Methods of Convi6lion. 
 Hius Zavwlxis wrought the rude unpolifh'd Scythians 
 into a Belief that he received the Laws and Precepts 
 of his Religion in a Den, where he faid he conversM 
 with the Gods. Niana, the Founder .of Religion 
 and Civility among the Romans, is faid to have con- 
 ceal'd himfelf in a Wood, pretending to receive In- 
 llrudtions from the Goddefs Jigeria. And Mango 
 Copac, the Introducer of the Peruvian Superftition, 
 is reported to have feign'd himfelf to have been fent 
 on his Errand by his Parent the Sun. 
 
 To carry on the Defign fo fuccefsfully begun, we 
 find that a certain Order of Men was every where 
 inftituted, whofe peculiar F,mployment it was to in- 
 ftrud the People in the Duties of Religion. And to 
 give the greater Reputation and Authority to the 
 Priefthood, we find that Princes themfelves thought it 
 no Difparagement to unite the Mitre with the Crown, 
 nnd at once to rule and teach their Subjecfts. Thus 
 among the ancient Egyptians, the Kings were always 
 inverted with the High-Prieilhoo.d, and entrufted 
 
 with 
 
14 An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 
 with the Myfteries of their Religion as well as Go- 
 vernment. The like is reported of Numa among 
 the Roinans. 
 
 But though the Defign of thofe primitive Law- 
 givers was good, yet fince their Models of Reli- 
 gion were not fufficiently founded on Reafon, but 
 politickly fet together in fuch Manner as was mofl 
 agreeable to the Humour and Relilli of the People to 
 whom they were prefcrib'd, and moft fubfervient to 
 the prefent Intent of the Inftituror ; they, in time, 
 prov'd the Occalions of great Inconveniencies. For 
 the Pretence of Revelation became an effeftual Bar to 
 future Improvements : The Priefts fearing left the 
 Alteration of any Particular fhould tempt the People 
 to fufped: the whole, and call in queftion the preten- 
 ded Revelation on which 'twas founded. And the 
 Priefthood, which at firft was fo noble and ufeful an 
 Inftitution, degenerating by Degrees into a Trade, 
 and being taken up by moft with no other View or 
 Defign but that of Gain, the Priefts foon found it 
 their Intereft to difcourage all fuch Speculations as 
 tended to breed a Diflike of that Superftition which 
 yielded them fuch great fecular Emoluments. 
 
 In fome Countries indeed we read, that the Priefts 
 were Philofophers too. But tho' we may believe that 
 they themfelves, by the Exercife of Reafon, difcover'd 
 the Vanity of divers of thofe Methods of Religion that 
 had been imposed on the People ; yet they induftri- 
 oufly conceal'd their Sentiments as Myfteries not to 
 be imparted to the Vulgar, whofe Ignorance was the 
 chief Support of that profitable Devotion which In- 
 tereft taught them to cherifti and improve. At leaft, 
 they were not perhaps inclinable to be at the Expence 
 of much Pains in Matters of Speculation, while they 
 obferv'd the People might be treated at a far cheaper 
 Rate with trifling Ceremonies and religious Pageantry. 
 This is certain, that we find 'em, in the general, to 
 have been fo far from inftruding the People either in 
 
 better 
 
Nature and Exiftencc of G OT). 15 
 better Principles or Methods of WorAiip, that they 
 rather added to the Impofture, by irequenc Inven- 
 tions of new and more gainful Fopperies. 
 
 2. Another confidcrable Obftruftion to the Incrcafc 
 and Improvement of Divine Knowledge inthe tormer 
 Ages of the World, was Fnde or Vmiiy. This feems 
 toliave been the epidemical Dileafe of the Philofo- 
 ■phers. We may trace its Symptoms as well among 
 the flovenly Cyjiicks of Greece^ or the favage Gyimio- 
 
 jhpbijh of Ethiopia, as among the politer Magi ot Per- 
 fta, or Bracb??ia?]soi' India. This divided them into 
 innumerable Facftions, and often caufed their Philo- 
 fophy to degenerate into big Words and infignificant 
 Sophiftry; while almoft every Man had a more paf- 
 Oonate Concern for the Reputation of his Sed, than 
 for the Intereft of Truth. A remarkable Inftance of 
 this philofophical Pride is to be met with in the Life 
 oi Apollonius Tyancrus j who travelling into India to 
 converfe with the Brachmans, was told by them, that 
 he might propofe what Queftions he pleafed, fince he 
 was come to Men who knew all Things. And for 
 ought appears, by their magical Jugglings, and a 
 few quibbling Replies to his Quellions, they at laft 
 fo far impos'don that Philofopher, as to work him in- 
 to a Belief of this their pretended Omnifcience. And 
 certainly, when Men once arrive either at fuch a Pitch 
 of Diftraflion as to imagine themfelves ignorant ot 
 nothing, or at fuch a Degree of Folly as to believe 
 it concerning others, we need not be furpriz'd if either 
 the former Sort lay afide all Endeavours after further 
 Improvement, or die latter negled all other Methods, 
 and depend entirely on the oracular Dictates of luch 
 Pretenders. 
 
 3. Another Hindrance- to this Sort of Knowledge, 
 was Ignoran!: Zeal. This was the general Unhappi- 
 nefs of the Populace, and was a Tool which their 
 Priefts very well knew how to ufe to their own Ad- 
 vantage. Thus when Socrates had divulg'd fome No- 
 tions 
 
1 6 An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 
 tions tending to mar their Trade, they faird not to 
 fet the People againft him, and never ceas*d till that 
 great Man fell a Sacrifice to their Refentments. 
 This, and divers other Inftances of the like Nature, 
 could not but be a very great Mifchief, either by en- 
 tirely difcouraging Enquiries of this Sort, or at leail 
 by obliging Men to diflemble and difguife their Sen- 
 timents. 
 
 Thefe appear to have been the general Caufes of 
 the little Progrefs of Divine Knowledge in the former 
 Ages of the World. The more particular are to be 
 deriv'd from the peculiar Genius and Conflitutions of 
 the feveral Nations and Sefls which have diftinguiOi'd 
 themfelves in this Sort of Philofophy. Thefe were 
 the Eajlern Pagans^ the Greeks, the Romans, the Jews, 
 and the Chrijlians. 
 
 I . The Eaftern Pagans, fuch were the Indians, 
 Chaldeans, Perfians, Pb^nicians, Elhiopians, and E- 
 gjptians. Thefe appear to have been, in the general, 
 of a light, defultory Wit, impatient of Thought, 
 conceited of their Knowledge, fcorning to borrow 
 from others, and backward to communicate of their 
 own. Their Divine Learning was preferv'd, or ra- 
 ther imprifon'd, by certain particular Orders or So- 
 cieties : Among the Indians by the Bracbmans, a- 
 mong the Chaldeans and Perfians by the Zabii and 
 Magi, among the Ethiopians by the Gymnofophifts, 
 and among the Egyptians by their ArfepedonaptcB or 
 Priefts. It confifled of certain Cabala''?, or Rhapfo- 
 dies of Traditional Opinions, neither clearly exprefs'd, 
 nor, perhaps, well underftood. Thefe they appear 
 to have taken upon Trufb, convinc'd by no other 
 Argument fo much as by the Reputation and Autho- 
 rity of their Brahma, Zoroajler, Hermes, and the o- 
 ther Introducers of their refpeflive Superftitions. The 
 Dictates of thefe they efleem'd as facred and unim- 
 proveable •, and thought they acquitted themfelves 
 fufficiently well, by barely tranfmitting them fafe to 
 
 their 
 
Exigence and Nature of G 0T>, 17 
 
 their Pofterities. Their Reputation for Wifdom in 
 Divine Matters feems to have been owing chiefly to 
 their magical Tricks and myftick Ceremonies and 
 Hieroglyphicks : It being the general Weaknefs of 
 Men moil to admire what they leaft comprehend. 
 
 2. The Greeks. Thefe learn'd the Rudiments of 
 their divine Philofophy from the Egyptians. Orphe- 
 us, who firll imported the Egyptian Myfteries into 
 Greece^ began that Commerce, which was carried on 
 and improv'd by many of the fucceeding Poets and 
 Philofophers •, infomuch that it foon became a com- 
 mon Praftice to travel into other Countries to traf- 
 fick for Notions, and to pick up ftraggling Tradi- 
 tions, which when they came home they drefs'd with 
 a Grecian Air, and vended for their own. Yet thefe 
 were generally the bell of their, Philofophers. For 
 fuch who kept at home, and fpun their Opinions 
 out of their own Brains, (though divers of them Men 
 of great Wit and Induftry) were, for the molt Part, 
 too much troubled with the Itch of Innovation, and 
 the Ambition of feeming confiderable, by fetting 
 themfelves at the Head of new Se(5ls. Hence fprung 
 perpetual Brawls *, and a confus'd Medley of Opi- 
 nions, till their Philofophy ftheir Morality except- 
 ed) either vanifh'd in Scepcicifm, or to a great De- 
 gree degenerated into the moll ridiculous Sophiilry. 
 
 3. The Romans. Thefe were at firil a rude un- 
 polilh'd People, more addi^led to Arms than Arts. 
 'Twas a confiderable Time before they would admit 
 the Greek Philofophy -, partly out of Pride, as fcor- 
 ning to be taught by Interiors -, partly out of Poli- 
 cy, as fearing left it fliould foften and debafe their 
 Spirits. But afterwards, we find they feldom con- 
 quer'd a Country, but they were very careful to in- 
 troduce its Gods into the Pantheon, and its Arts and 
 Sciences into their Academies. The firll of the 
 Grecian Arts that got Atlmifllon at Rome, and made 
 
 B Way 
 
 * Vid. Luciani TImon. 
 
1 8 An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 
 Way for the reft to follow, was Rhetorick. Though 
 nothing feem*d better quahfied to abtain a Welcome 
 among thofe rough Mortals than the Art of Perfua- 
 fton itfelf, yet its Succefs was not fo much the Effe<5b 
 of its own Force, as of another Caufe. Rome was 
 at that time become an Enemy to the Name, as well 
 as to the Power of Kings, and had moulded itfelf 
 into the Form of a Common-wealth. The fupreme 
 Power refided in the People, and fuch as could beft 
 make their Court to them, ftood the faireft Candi- 
 dates on all Eledtions to Places of Honour and Pro- 
 fit. This made all who afpir*d to Commands in the 
 Common-wealth, very fond of that Art which gain- 
 ed them fo great Influence on the People, and taught 
 them to govern their Superiors. Wherefore, we 
 need not wonder that Rhetorick loft nothing, but ra- 
 ther improv'd by being tranfplanted to Rome, where 
 no Culture was wanting to render it more flourifhing 
 than in its native Soil. But as for Philofophyy the 
 Cafe was different. The Philofophers had wrangled 
 themfelves out of much of that Reputation they had 
 formerly gain'd. They found but few Dionyfmffes, 
 or Alexanders, even in Greece. Befides, the Bent ot 
 the Roman Genius was entirely turn'd upon A6lion. 
 A People bred amidft the Noife of Arms, could find 
 but little Convenience for Contemplation. And 
 even afterwards, when Philofophy began to be more 
 faftiionable at Rome, we find but few that made it 
 their Bufinefs. The Generality confider*d it chiefly 
 as an agreeable Amufement in their Retreats from the 
 Service of the Publick ; content to ftrike in with 
 Ibme or other of the Grecian Sedls, without at- 
 tempting either to fet up for themfelves, or to im- 
 prove on the ancient Stock. 
 
 4. The Jews. Their Theology appears to have been 
 entirely founded on Divine Revelation. They reafon- 
 ed but little upon it for a long. Time, having lefs 
 
 Temptation 
 
Exigence and Nature of GOT>. 19 
 Temptation than other Nations, as enjoying that Sa- 
 tisfiidtion by a long Series of Miracles and Predidions, 
 which as efteftually convinced them of the Truth of 
 their Revelation, as the immediate Teftimony of 
 Reafon could have done. Yet when Miracles and 
 Predidlions became lefs frequent, towards the Decli- 
 nation of the JewiJJj State, we find they began 
 to philofophife after the Manner of their Neighbours, 
 cfpecially after their Conqueft by Autiochus Epipba- 
 nes, who erefted an Academy at Jerufakm to in- 
 ftru(ft them in the Pythagorean^ Platonkk^ and Epi- 
 curean Philofophy. Thence fprung divers St&.s, 
 and Variety of abfurd Opinions, which, in a great 
 Degree continu'd, notwithftanding the fevere Pro- 
 hibition of the Greek Philofophy by x.\\t Maccabees. 
 In general, they appear to have been no great Ma- 
 ilers in the Art of Reafoning j both their ancient and 
 modern Philofophy being little elfe but a Medley of 
 ridiculous Apophthegms, and extravagant Conceits 
 concerning their Law and their Traditions, which 
 they prefer before it. 
 
 5. The Chrijlians. Thefe reafoned but little at 
 firft, chiefly from the fame Caufe with the ancient 
 Jeivs^ viz. on account of the frequent Miracles, 
 which were more confirming to themfclves, and con- 
 vi(5tive to their Adverfaries than Arguments. When 
 they began to difpute with the Heathens, they ufu- 
 ally fought them with their own Weapons, and con- 
 futed them from their own Principles : For the moft 
 celebrated Fathers of the primitive Church were bred 
 in Plato's School. Yet though the Platonick Philo- 
 fophy did fome Service againft their Adverfaries, it 
 at laft turnM to the great Prejudice of themfclves ; 
 for fome of its Principles not well fuiting with di- 
 vers ofthe Do(flrines of their Religion, produced 
 endlefs Difputes, which not a little diftratSted their 
 Thoughts, and prevented the Improvement of real 
 Knowledge. In Time Plato's Philofophy grew out 
 B 2 of 
 
20 An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 
 of Reputation, and Arijlotle (firft introduced by 
 Boetius) began to be ador'd. Then Learning was 
 nothing elfe but an Infight into his Opinions, and 
 that was always reputed Truth which he afferted. 
 Soon after the Papal Hierarchy was eftabhfhed, 
 chiefly by Means of the Ignorance and well-manag'd 
 Superftition of the conquering Barbarians. Then 
 Learning, fuch as it was, was confined to the Con- 
 vents, and no Sin fo zealoufly reprov'd and punifli- 
 ed in the People as the Sin of knowing too 7?iuch. 
 Men of Parts were every where lifted to fupport a 
 pretended Infallibility, and Reafon was brib'd to vote 
 in Favour of its two greateft Adverfaries, Igno- 
 rance and implicit Credulity. At laft, the Refor- 
 77iation commenc'd ; Ignorance and Credulity grew 
 out of Reputation, and a generous Senfe of Liberty 
 began to revive. But the curious and inquifitive 
 Part of Mankind, too timorous at firft in the Ufc 
 of the Liberty they had gain'd, inftead of taking 
 their own Meafures in the Search of Truth, were 
 careful only to reftore the ancient Learning, and 
 condemn'd themfelves to dig in the Rubbifh of An- 
 tiquity. By" this Means they gave a Refurreftion 
 to an Infinity of Opinions, which perhaps had bet- 
 ter lain buried as before -, and *tis but of late that 
 People have made an impartial Ufe of their Reafon, 
 and introduc'd a fort of Free Philofophy^ which 
 yields a better Profpedl of Succefs than ever. 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 BY what has been obferved, it appears, that the 
 ill Succefs, both of Jews and Chrijiians, in En- 
 quiries of this Nature, was chiefly owing to their 
 too great Affeftation of fome of the Grecian Sefts j 
 of whofe Methods, though we could have given no 
 Account from Hiftory, yet we might have found 
 
 fuf- 
 
Exiftcncc and Nature of GOT). 21 
 
 fufficient to have producM in us no great Opinion of 
 their Difcoveries by the Idea Cicero gives us of their, 
 divine Philoibphy in his Book !)<? Natura Dsorum. 
 
 'Tis the general Obfervation of that learned Ro- 
 man^ that nothing can be imagined fo filly and ri- 
 diculous which has not found a Patron among thofe 
 Philofophers. And though they managed fome of 
 their Proofs of the Exiftenceof a God with fufficient 
 Evidence, yet when they came to treat of his Na- 
 ture, he affurcs us he found them fo abfurd and va- 
 rious, that he thought it a fruitlefs Labour to reckon 
 up their Opinions. For, it feems, they were many 
 of them fo fond of Variety, that they had too little 
 Regard for Truth or Probability ; and were fo care- 
 ful to difagree from each other, that they fometimes 
 negledbed to be confiftent with themfelves. Which 
 Humour of Novelty and Contradidlion has no lefs 
 difcover'd itfelf on other Occafions, but efpecially in 
 their Difputes concerning the material Principle of 
 the Univerfe, and concerning the fummum Bonum, 
 or fupreme Good. 
 
 How malignant an Influence thofe Diflentions 
 have had on an Age, which is ft ill too generally in- 
 clin'd to limit the utmoft Extent of Science by the 
 Opinions of the Ancients, is evident. Multitudes are 
 tempted to doubt of, and not a few to disbelieve 
 what appears to have been fo little underftood by 
 thofe mighty Pretenders. And even fuch who pro- 
 fefs a confirm'd and fettled Perfuafion of the Exif- 
 tenceof a God, are yet, for the moft Part, difpo- 
 fed to lay afide all Enquiries into the Perfecftions of 
 his Nature, as Things entirely above their Sphere 
 and Capacity. 
 
 Yet, left the Underftandings of Men fliould ap- 
 pear with lefs Variety than in former Ages, we have 
 another Sett of Gentlemen devoted to the Cartefian 
 Metaphyftcks, who would perfuade us, that the Deity. 
 is the plaineft and moft evident Thijig i;i Nature. 
 B 3 That 
 
 / 
 
22 An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 That every Man brings into the World an innate 
 Idea of a God, or a Confutation of Atheifm, as it. 
 were, engraven on his own Mind. And that if 
 we have not from thence a fufficiently clear and di- 
 ftind Knowledge of our Maker, 'tis not for Want 
 of Light and Perfpicuity in the Objecft, but through 
 a wilful Bljndnefs, and the moft culpable Inadver- 
 tency in ourfelves. 
 
 As for the Gentlemen of the former Perfuafion, it 
 would, I conceive, be to little Purpofe to go a- 
 bout to convince them of the Poflibility of a fa- 
 tisfaflory Knowledge of the Deity by Arguments, 
 unlefs we could make the Experiment, and convince 
 them by the Succefs of the following Eflay. 
 
 And as for the latter Sort, I perfuade my ielf, it 
 would be alike impertinent, in this Place, to fpend 
 Time in arguing againft their pretended innate Idea, 
 when the whole fucceeding Difcourfe will, 'tis hoped, 
 be the bed Confutation of it. For if it can be 
 made appear, that God has given us the Ability of 
 ncquiring a fgfficient Knowledge of Himfelf in the 
 Way of Reafoning, it will, 'tis conceiv'd, be abun- 
 dantly clear,how unneceffary it is to fuppofe any fuch 
 Epicurean Prolepfis, or Anticipation of the Ufe of 
 Reafon, as is imply'd by the Opinion of an innate 
 Idea. For as the late excellent Mr. Locke obfer- 
 ved, ^twere impertinent to imagine the Ideas of Co- 
 lours to be innate in any Being to whom God has given 
 Sight, 
 
 Nor ought it to be objefled, that becaufe fo mar 
 ny make fo little Ufe of their Faculties, therefore 
 we muft have Recourfe to an innate Idea, if we prcr 
 tend to account for the Univerfality of the Belief of 
 a God. For admitting the Idea of a Divine Being 
 to be as univerfal as they fuppofe, how fhall we be 
 affur'd, that this fuppos'd Univerfality is not ow- 
 ing to Tradition ? As this Negative is impofTible to 
 be prov'd, fo, on the contrary, it feemsno difficult 
 
 Matter 
 
Exiflcncc ayid Nature of GO D. 25 
 Matter to make appear from the Teftimony of for- 
 mer Ages, that there has acftually been an ancient 
 immemorial Tradition of the Formation of the 
 World by a beneficent, wife, and moil powerful 
 Being : Which Tradition alone was fufficient to dif- 
 fufe the Principles of Religion as univerfally as the 
 pretended innate Idea is conceived to have done. 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 THOUGH the Authority of Tradition, if it 
 appears to have been perpetual and uninter- 
 rupted, will ever have its due Weight with all con- 
 fidering Men, yet when a Thing is capable of other 
 Proof, nothing is fo grateflil and convidlive as the 
 immediate Teftimony of Reafon. Wherefore, tho* 
 by the Means of Education-and Example, we have 
 received a general traditional Notion of the Exiftence 
 and Perfections of the Deity, and of the Precepts 
 and Obligations of Religion, yet 'tis very fit, that: 
 in a Matter of fo great Concern, we fhould make 
 ufe of fuch Afliftance as Reafon is capable of yield- 
 ing us. This is what I (hall now attempt to do. 
 
 Tho* fome too nice * Metaphyficians have of late 
 been teaching us to doubt of the very fundamental 
 Principles of all Certainty, yet I perfuade my felf, 
 none that is not dispos'd to trifle, will expedt great- 
 er Evidence of any thing, than what immediately 
 arifes from the Internal Confcioufnefs which we have 
 of our own Exiftence, and the concurrent Tejlimony 
 of our external Senfes. 
 
 Now the Exiftence of a God, or mofi -perfeul Be- 
 ings is a moft diredl and natural Confequence of 
 that Confcioufnefs which we have of our own Ex- 
 iftence. 
 
 This may appear from the following Reficcflions. 
 B 4 As 
 
 * Des Cartes and his Followers. 
 
2$ An Impartial Enquiry Into the 
 
 As we have infallible Evidence that we ourfelves 
 are, Ip frpm thence we may have no lefs AfTurance 
 that fomething has ever been. For fuppofing that 
 there once was nothing at all exifting, we may be 
 as fure that neither we, nor any other Being, could 
 &t all have been, as either that Nothing could not 
 produce Something, or that Something could not 
 produce itfelf. 
 
 'Twas therefore never doubted by any fober Rea- 
 foner, that fome Being eternally was. The only 
 Queftion has been concerning the Nature of an E- 
 ternal Being •, which to difcovcr will be the chief 
 Pefign of the enfuing Enquiry. 
 
 Now, in the firft Place 'tis evident, that an eter- 
 nal Being was a neceffary Being. The Reafon is, 
 becaufe it was without Beginning. For 'tis as cer- 
 tain, that a Being which was without Beginning 
 vas neceffary, as that there never was any Poffibili- 
 ty of its not having been. 
 
 In the next Place, 'tjs clear not only that an ori- 
 ginal eternal Being was neceffary, or fuch as could 
 not but have.been -, but likewife that it was an ahr 
 (olutely neceffary Being, which by Confequence muff 
 ever continue to be. 
 
 By an ahfolutely necejjary Beings I underftand fuch 
 a Being as ever contain'd a neceffary Reafon of its 
 own Exiftence in it? very Nature, without the ]ea|t 
 Dependence either on the free Eledion of its own 
 Will, or on tjie Caufality of any other Being. 
 
 That there could be no other Being on whofe 
 Caufality fuch an eternal or neceffary Being could 
 depend, is felf-evident. And that the free Elecftioi;! 
 pt its own Will could be no Reafon of its neceffary 
 Exiftence, is no lefs manifeft, Confequently, the 
 Reafon of its neceffary Exiftence muft have been ei- 
 ther included in its very Nature, or elfe there mu(t 
 have been no Reafon of it at all .; which is abfurd. 
 But to include a neceffiyy Reafon of its Exiftence in 
 
 its 
 
Exigence ^w^ Nature of GOD. 25 
 
 its very Nature, without the leaft Dependence ei- 
 ther on its own free Will, or on the Caufalicy of 
 any other Being, is (as we before obfcrv'd) to be 
 abfokitely neccilary. 
 
 'Tis therefore clear, both that there is an eternal 
 independent Being, and that fuch a Being cannot 
 but be abiblutely neceffary. Our next Attempt 
 muft be to gain a more particular Knowledge of 
 fuch a Being. To which End, it is conceiv'd, we 
 need only to confider the Nature and Import of an 
 ahfolute Necejjity of Exijlence. 
 
 In the general, it muft, I think, be confefs'd, 
 that there is fomething in the very Idea of an abfo- 
 luce Necefllty ofExiftence which ftrikes a confiderate 
 Mind, and difpofes it to believe that the Reafon of 
 fuch Necefllty muft be fomewhat very wonderful : 
 Therefore the moft natural, as well as the moft pro- 
 bable Method of acquiring a more particular Know- 
 ledge of an abfolutely neceflary Being, is to make 
 fome Enquiry into that Reafon of neceflliry Exif- 
 ■tence, which we obferv*d it to include and pofTefs : 
 To which End I fliall proceed by Steps. 
 
 Firfiy 'Tis, I conceive, demonftrable, that the 
 Reafon Of an abfolute Necefllty of Exiftence, 
 can import no Icfs than All a5lual Perfe^iion ; or 
 that there is no Kind or Degree of Perfe(flion 
 which is not included in the Nature of an abfolute- 
 ly neccfliliry Being. For though we fliould fuppofe 
 divers abfolutely necefl^hry Beings, yet it would be 
 abfurd to imagine any one of them fhould neceflfarily 
 poflfefs either more or greater Perfedion than ano- 
 ther •, they being equally neceflTary or independent 
 In Exiftence, and therefore not necefiarily unequal 
 in any Refpedl. And if not necefllirily unequal, they 
 could not but be neceflTarily equal. For the Inequali- 
 ty, if any, muft have been abfolutely neceflTary. But 
 it we fuppofe but One abfolutely neceflFary or inde- 
 pendent Being, 'twill he yet more evident, that 
 
 That 
 
26 An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 That Being muft poflefs all adtual Perfedion, whe- 
 ther we conceive it (with the Atheift) to be the 
 only Being, or (with the Theiil) to be the Author 
 of all other Beings. For that the Only Being muft 
 poflefs all aftual Perfedion, is no lefs than felf-evi- 
 dent ; and that the Author of all other Beings can 
 himfelf want nothing of that Perfedlion which he 
 has communicated to his EfFeds, is undeniable. 
 
 Again, 'tis, I conceive, equally certain, that the 
 Reafon of an abfolute Neceffity of Exlftence can 
 import no lefs than all poffihle Perfe5lion ; and by 
 Confequence, that no imaginable Acceflion of any 
 Sort could have render'd an abfolutely neceflfary Be- 
 ing more perfect than it actually is. 
 
 My Argument is this. 
 
 Nothing exifts with an abfolute or independent 
 Neceffity, but fuch a Being whofe Nature abfolute- 
 ly excludes the very Pofiibility of ceafing to be. 
 
 But no Nature can abfolutely exclude the very 
 Poflibility of ceafing to be, unlefs it abfolutely ex- 
 cludes all pofllble Imperfedion, The Reafon is, be- 
 caufe where- ever -any Imperfedion is, there it can 
 be no abfolute Impoflibility (or Contradidlion) for 
 any other (even the utmolt) Imperfeftion to be ; and 
 confequently there may be a Poflibility of ceaflng to 
 be ; which is the utmoft: Imperfedion. 
 
 Therefore, fince the very Nature of an abfolutely 
 neceflfary Being abfolutely excludes the Poflibility of 
 ceafing to be, it can be for no other Reafon, than 
 becaufe it abfolutely excludes all pofllble Imper- 
 fedlion. 
 
 But that Being whofe Nature abfolutely excludes 
 all pofllble Imperfedlion, cannot but poflefs or in- 
 clude all pofllble Perfedion. The Reafon, is, be- 
 caufe the Want or Abfence of any pofllble Perfedion 
 is an Imperfedion. 
 
 Thus, in Oppofition to the Aflfertors of the Eter- 
 nity of Matter or Body, it may be firmly demonftra- 
 
 tcd 
 
Exiftciicc and Nature of GOD. 27 
 
 ted to be and to have been eternally an abfolutc Impof- 
 fibility or Contradidion, that an original eternal 
 Beino- fliould be other than mod perted:, (which 
 Matter, we are lure, is not) from the abfolutc In- 
 confiilence that there is between the abfolutc Ne- 
 cefllty of its Exiftence, and the kail pofTible Imper- 
 fedion. 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 BEING advanced thus far, we may, with the 
 grcateft Aflurance, affirm that there is a God, 
 j. e. an elernaly independent ^ ahfolutely necejjary^ and 
 moji perfect Be'mg. Of this, I think, there can be 
 no doubt, whatever Doubt there may be with Re- 
 ference to fome particular Notions of his Perfec- 
 tion. 
 
 In order to a more particular Difcovery of the 
 Nature of a Being, which we are aflured poffefles the 
 highell pofTible Perfeftion, it will be neceflary care- 
 fully to confider the general Idea of Perfe5iion. For 
 this, though perhaps not ufually confider*d as it de- 
 ferves, is the Standard whereby we are to form our 
 particular Ideas of the Nature of an eternal inde- 
 pendent Being in the enfuing Enquiry. 
 
 The Word Perfecf, was firft ufed with Reference 
 to artificial Things, as fignifying that which was 
 finilh'd, or fully fuiced to the End lor which it was 
 dcfign'd by the Artift. But afterwards, we find it 
 v.'as adopted by the Philofophers, and ufed in more 
 than one Senfe in their Reafonings on Natural and 
 Metaphyfical Subjedls. 
 
 In the general, that is faid by Philofophers to be 
 perfcd:, which contains whatever is included in the 
 Idea which they have of its Nature. They con- 
 (Ltive a Thing to be thus perfed, fometimes in an 
 
 ahfolutCy 
 
2$ An Impartial Enquiry into the " 
 
 chfolute, fometimes in a relative Senfe. In the abfo- 
 lute Senfe, that only, fay they, is perfe^, whofe 
 Nature comprehends an abfolutely infinite Number 
 of Kinds and Degrees of Perfeftion. And in this 
 Senfe an eternal independent Nature is ufually 
 faid to be perfedl. In the relative Senfe, any Being 
 is denominated 'perfe5i^ which wants nothing of that 
 which belongs to its particular Nature. 
 
 But whether there is in reality any fuch Thing as 
 an ahfolute Perfe^ion in the Senfe before explain'd, 
 may well deferve our Enquiry. 
 
 That an eternal independent Nature cannot but 
 have ever been moft abfolute, or exclufive of any 
 proper Caufe, is, it is confefs*d, no lefs than felf- 
 evident. By Confequence, the Perfedlion which 
 is neceflary to fuch a Nature, muft be allow'd to 
 be moft abfolute in the fame Senfe. Yet it is hum- 
 bly conceiv'd, this doth not hinder but that the 
 utmoft pofTible Perfeftion may not be abfolute in 
 the other Senfe ; or that it may not confift in an ab- 
 folutely infinite Number of Kinds and Degrees, but 
 in an immutable'determinate Relation to all capable 
 Objefts. To afTert that it confifts in an abfolutely 
 infinite Number of Kinds and Degrees, is, I con- 
 ceive, to obfcure its Idea by unneccfTary and inex- 
 plicable DifHculries ; for as much as the Idea of 
 the utmoft pofTible Perfeftion cannot pofTibly be 
 fbrm*d with an abfolute Infinity of Number, but 
 may very well be form'd without it. 
 
 This will eafily appear from the Nature of Num- 
 ler. 
 
 If any Number (or Arithmetical Quantity) is ab- 
 folutely or infinitely great, it can be for no other 
 Reafon, than becaufe 'tis abfolutely (or in its very 
 Nature) incapable of Increafe, without an abfolute 
 Contradidlion. But the very Nature of all Quan- 
 tity infers, on the contrary, a Neceffity of Increafe, 
 on the Suppofition of the kaft Addition. For all 
 
 Quan- 
 
Exiftencc and '^t^x.mt of GOT). 29 
 
 Quantities fbeingofthc fame general Nature) muft 
 feverally bear a Proportion to each other. For Ex- 
 ample, That can be no Unit which, by the Addi- 
 tion of one Unit, will not become two. And by 
 Parity of Reafon, that is no Million which, by 
 the Addition but of a fingle Unit, will not increafe 
 to the Greatnefs of a Million and an Unit. For if 
 it be but a Million after the Addition of the Unit, 
 'tis plain, it muft before that Addition, have been 
 lefs than a Million by an Unit. The like may be 
 faid of all Quantity. But of this more at large 
 hereafter. 
 
 Thefe Refledions, which are felf-evident, (or as 
 plain as that three and two make five) are entirely 
 deftrudlive of the Suppofition of an abfolute Per- 
 fedlion confifting in an ahfolutely infifiite Number of 
 Kinds and Degrees. Whereas, on the contrary, 
 nothing can be more eafy and intelligible than the 
 Notion of Perfedion in the relative and determinate 
 Senfe. For in this Senfe,Perfed:ion is plainly the fame 
 with Sufficiency. According to which Notion of it, 
 'tis evident, that as among Inferior Beings, that on- 
 ly can be faid to be perfedt in its Kind, which pof- 
 fefles whatever is ncceflary to qualify it for attaining 
 its particular End •, fo only fuch a Being can poffefs 
 the utmoft poflible Perfedfion as is all-fufficient, or 
 naturally and independently qualified for all fit and 
 fuitable Ends. 
 
 To explain this general Conclufion by particular 
 Inftances. The Perfeftion of effeflive Power may 
 very well confift in its bearing an immutable Rela- 
 tion of Proportionatenefs to all fit and capable Ob- 
 je<fls of fuch Power in general, or in its being inde- 
 pendently fufficient to effect or produce whatever 
 is fit, and implies not a Contradidtion : For to fuch 
 Power, though we fliould imagine farther Degrees 
 to be addible, yet fince they would be in vain, or 
 to no Purpofe, they could not render it more per- 
 
 fed 
 
^o An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 feft by their Acceffion. The like may be faid of 
 IVifdom, Knowledge^ or any other Powers or Pro- 
 perties ; the Eftimate of whofe Perfeftion is, it is 
 conceiv'd, no otherwife to be made than with re- 
 lation to their Objects either aftual or polTible. * 
 
 And as the Perfedlion of Properties or Attributes 
 is to be underftood to confift in a Relation of Pro- 
 portionatenefs to all fuitable and capable Objedts, 
 fo the Perfedlion of Suhfiance, (however we may con- 
 ceive it) mull, it feems, confift in a like Relation 
 to its Properties. And thus, that muft be the moft 
 perfedt Subftance which is the neceflary Subject of 
 the moft excellent and perfed Properties. 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 THE Necefllty with which an original eternal 
 Being exifts, is, it feems^ the Source of all 
 the Knowledge we are diredly capable of acquiring 
 of its Nature. Therefore, fince the Difcovery of 
 one Property of that Necefllty {viz. its Jbfolutenefs) 
 has already led us to the Knowledge of the Su- 
 preme Perfedion or All-fufficiency of fuch a Being, 
 it may not be amifs, before we proceed to a parti- 
 cular Confideration of that Perfedion, to enquire 
 what other Property of original Necefllty is dif- 
 coverable by us. 
 
 When we reflect on the Necefllty with which 
 fomething ever exifted, we find, that next to its 
 Ahfolutenefs^ or Independence, nothing is more ob- 
 vious to our Thoughts than its Unity, 
 
 That the mention'd Necefllty of an original Be- 
 ing was One as well as Abfolute, is certain, becaufe 
 the internal Reafon of it was uniform^ and there- 
 fore not neceflary to more than one Being. 
 
 To 
 * See Mr. Locke in the Beg. of his Chap, of Infimti- 
 
^ Exiftcnce and Nature ofGO^. 31 
 
 To make this appear we need only to refled, that 
 though Something ever exifted without a Caufe, 
 yet Nothing could exill without a Reafon of its 
 Exiftence ; and likewife that the Reafon of the 
 Exiftence and abfolute Neceflity of an eternal un- 
 caus'd Being was ever included in its own Nature : 
 Which Reafon of abfolutely neceflary Exiftence, 
 we have proved to be the utmoft poflible Per- 
 fedlion. 
 
 Now, that Perfecftion, which is the internal Rea- 
 fon of abfolutely neceflary Exiftence, is, and ever 
 was uniform, and capable of exifting in one and 
 the fame Being, and that therefore it could not be 
 the abfolutely neceflary Reafon of the Exiftence 
 of more than one Being as its Subjedl, is certain. 
 For there is no Inconfiftence or Contrariety in 
 Perfediion. Perfedion is only of Good -, of Evil 
 there is no Perfedlion -, for Evil confifts in De- 
 fe6t. Therefore an Oromafdes and Arimanius (which 
 fome have imagined to be two eternal Beings, wha 
 were the neceflTary Principles of Good and Evil^ 
 can hare no Place in the Nature of Things. 
 
 It cannot indeed be denied, that the general No- 
 tion of Perfedion includes Variety of Ideas, fuch as 
 Ji'lfiom, Power, i^c. But then, this Variety, we 
 may be aflur*d, is uniform and confiftent, and 
 confequently could be no abfolutely neceflary Rea- 
 fon of the Exiftence of more than one eternal Be- 
 ing. Therefore to deify an Apollo, and an Hercules, 
 or to make diftindl Deities of Wifdom and Power, 
 was to attempt to divide that Supreme Perfedion, 
 which was ever One and Undivided. 
 
 The Sum of the Argument is this : 
 
 Every Thing that exifts muft have a Reafon (if 
 not a Caufe) of its Exiftence. 
 
 The Reafon of the Exiftence of an eternal, ab- 
 folutely neceflary Being, is contained in its very Na- 
 ture, 
 
3 2 An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 
 ture, and is (as was proved) no lefs than the utiiioft 
 
 pojftble Perfebion. 
 
 Perfeftion is uniform, i, e. all poflible Perfedions 
 agree in one common uniform Nature, or they agree 
 in the general Nature and Notion o^Goodnefs ; which 
 admits of no Inconfillence or Contrariety. 
 
 Since all poflible Perfedions agree in one common 
 Nature, which admits of no Inconfiftence or Con- 
 trariety, they could not neceflarily require more 
 than one original Subject ; (or which is the fame) 
 they could not be an abfolutely neceflary Reafon 
 of the Exiftence of more than one eternal abfolute- 
 ly neceflary Being. 
 
 Therefore to fuppofe more than one eternal ab- 
 folutely neceflfary Beings is to fuppofe abfolute Ne- 
 ceflity of Exiftence, without an abfolutely neceflary 
 Reafon of it : Which is no lefs an Abfurdity, than 
 it would be to fuppofe an Efi^eft without a Caufe. 
 
 The.Refult of the whole is, that there is but one 
 eternal abfolute Necefllty included in and founded 
 on the utmoft Perfeftion, and by Confequence but 
 one eternal abfolutely neceflfary Being, who is the 
 Subjed in which alone all poflible Perfedions and 
 Degrees of Perfection are united, and from which 
 all communicated Perfection flows. 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 
 BY difcovering the Supreme Perfediion of the 
 one eternal independent Being in the general, 
 we have laid a firm Foundation for fome more par- 
 ticular Knowledge of that Super-eminent Nature. 
 For fince eternal abfolute Necefllty, being founded 
 on Perfection, could not but admit of all the Va^ 
 riety included in the Nature of Perfedion ; as we 
 cannot but afcribe to the eternal, and moft perfedfc 
 Being, whatever Excellencies we are acquainted 
 
 with. 
 
Exiftence and Nature of C O T>. 53 
 
 with, fo we are obliged to believe it niay poirefs 
 many others of which we have no Ideas. For cer- 
 tainly we need not imagine either our Natures of 
 our Acquaintance with the World to be fuch, as to 
 render our Ideas the adequate Meafures of the Su- 
 preme Perfecftion. Theutmoflwe are able to do, is 
 to confider what Ideas compofe the general Notion 
 we have of Perfedlion, and in what Manner they arc 
 to be conceiv'd with reference to that Being which 
 we ' are aflured poflefles the utmoft poflible Perfec- 
 tion. 
 
 But before we proceed to produce a Scheme of thfc 
 particular Ideas which make up our general No. 
 tion of Perfedlion, it muft be obferv*d, that Per- 
 fedion or Sufficiency may be confider'd, either 
 with reference to the Being to which it belongs, or 
 with refpedt to other Beings : Which will occafion 
 a twofold Diftribution of our Ideas of the Supreme 
 or Divine Per fed: ion. 
 
 I. Our Ideas of the Divine Perfedion with refe- 
 rence to the Deity Himfelf, for his Self-fufficiency) 
 are of two Sorts, viz. either Primary or Secondary. 
 Of the former Sort are, 
 
 1. Self-aofivily, or Vital Power. 
 
 2. Intelligence, or Self-Confcioufnefs. 
 
 3. Liberty, or a free felf-determining Power with 
 regard to what is term'd External Adion ; in which 
 it is the leading or firft moving Principle. 
 
 Thefe two laft Ideas reprefent Powers which muft 
 be conceiv'd as founded on the vital Power or Sclf- 
 adivity. 
 
 'Tis, I confefs, the ufual Opinion, that the Di- 
 vine EfFedive Power, in its flill Latitude, is nothing 
 elfe but a Power of Willing ; or that to will and to 
 effe£l are, with regard to the Deity , the very fame. 
 But with all due Submiflion, 'tis conceiv'd, that the 
 Power of Willing, as it regards what is call'd Ex- 
 ternal Adion, includes an Ability not only of chu- 
 
 C fing 
 
54 ^n hnpartial Enquiry tnt<y the 
 fing a particular A61, but likewife of determining 
 ibme other Power tq the Execution of it. And 
 though we may, in .certain Gafes, have no other 
 Idea of the Manner of ading diftinft from that of 
 pure Willing or Chufmg, yet Mpdefty will reach 
 us to beiic,ve there may be more and more per- 
 feift Manners of Ading than we ('who derive all our* 
 Jdeas of Power from i.mperfed Agents) are acquain- 
 teci •^ith. ; ^And fp.much the rather, fmce our Ide^ 
 of a rnere Power of Willing or Chufmg is too nar- 
 row to reprefent the Divine Effeftive Power ; and 
 confequently the Ufe of the; Word Will, fo as to fig- 
 m£y either that Povv^er or its Adion, rather obfcures 
 than explains the Matter. For to, us 'ti$ inconceivr 
 Jiple.how a pure A(5t of the WilJ^ q^n immediately 
 .produce or effedt any thing. And accordingly Va- 
 nini reckons it among the Abfurdities, which he f^ys 
 necelTarily attend the Belief of a God, ; that we muft, 
 as ufilal, affert his Will and effedUve. Power to.be th^ 
 i^rae; but to proceed. • 
 
 , .^,'^|i'jrQm thefe three; primary Ideas of the Divine Per- 
 fcftion confider-'d with r^ard to the Deity himfelf, 
 refult three others, which may be term'd Secon^ary^ 
 
 1 . Spirituality. Which is a complex Idea, inclu- 
 ding the three primary ones. , ,!, .. 
 
 2. Confiancy^ or immutability» An Idea reful- 
 ting from that of Spirituality confider*d as Perfect. 
 
 3. Happinefi. An Idea neceffarily refulting frorq 
 the two lail mentioned, and conilituting, together 
 with them> our Idea of the moft perfect Being con- 
 fider'd as he is in Himfelf. 
 
 II. The Divine Berfe^io?i or Sufficiency with re- 
 gard to other Beings^ may likewife be confider'd 
 in a twofold Relp^d^ ; with relation to Beings either 
 merely pojjihle or a^^ually exijlent. In the former 
 Refpe<5l it yields us three other Ideas, viz. 
 
 -x^ ty.i . ' ' -^ . 
 
Exiftcnce and Nature of GO^. 35 
 
 1. Omnipotence or Almighty Power. An Icieareo 
 fulcing chiefly from that ot Self-a5livity. 
 
 2. fVifdom. Which Idea we derive fro'm the Con- 
 fideration of the Divine Intelligence. 
 
 3. Omnifcience, or Perfect Knowledge. An Idea 
 form'd chiefly by the Confideration oi the Divine 
 Liberty. 
 
 All thefe Ideas reprefent fuch Perfeflions as are 
 ufually term'd natural., as oppofcd to moral. 
 
 Correfpondently to thefe three Ideas of the Divine 
 Sufficiency with regard to other Beings confiderM as 
 merely pofllble, there are three others which we 
 derive from our confidering it with regard to othet 
 Beings as adlually exifl:ent, viz. 
 
 1. Goodnefs 01 Benevolence. An Idea chiefly re- 
 fulting from the Confideration of the free Effects of 
 Omnipotence in the Creation and Sujientation of the 
 Univerfe. 
 
 2. Government. An Idea derived from our View 
 both of the beautiful Order of the inanimate Parts 
 of the World, and of the regular Frame and Ma- 
 nagement of the Irrational and Intelligent : Which 
 are particularly confider'd as the Effeds of Divine 
 fVifdom. To this Idea are reducible thofc of Holinefss 
 Mercy^ Jujlice^ and Veracity j as being Ideas deri- 
 ved from the Confideration of the Exercife of the 
 Divine Wifdom in governing the World. 
 
 3. Providence, ftridtly fo call'd. Which Idea we 
 owe moll immediately to the Exercife of Omnifcience. 
 I i;iy mofl: immediately ; for the Wifdom and Pow- 
 er of the Eternal Being will appear to be likewife 
 mofl: brightly difplay'd in all his A(5ls of Provi- 
 dence. 
 
 i.. Thefe three laft: Ideas, with whatever Ideas they 
 
 may include, denote no particular Perfedions of the 
 I Divine Nature, but are Notions form'd in our 
 I Minds by the Confideration of the Exercife of the 
 
 Divine Pcrfe(^ions with regard to the Creatures. 
 
 i:. C 2 And 
 
$6 An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 
 And thefe are the Idsas which reprefent fuch Attri- 
 butes as are ufually called moral ones. 
 , From thefe three Ideas it is that we derive our Idea 
 of the Divine Omniprefence i tho* moft immediately 
 from the firft, viz. that of the Divine Goodnefs in 
 creating and fuilaining the World. 
 
 CHAP. VII. 
 
 HAVING thus taken a View of our Ideas 
 of the Supreme or Divine Perfection in fuch 
 Order as they feem moft naturally either to be com- 
 prehended in or to be deduced from the general Idea 
 of Perfe6lion, we may now proceed to confide r 
 .thcrti diftinCtly, and to the general Demonftration 
 may add the Proofs of each in particular : Which 
 will likewife be fo many additional Proofs of rheEx- 
 iftence of a God. 
 
 I. The fir ft Idea included in our general Notion 
 of Perfection, we obferv d to be Self-a^ivity. Now, 
 that the Eternal Being is vitally and independently 
 aftive, appears not only from the general Notion 
 or Idea of his Perfection, but had we form*d no 
 fuch general Idea, would have been abundantly evi- 
 dent from the Motion we obferve in the World. 
 
 If we believe our Senfes, we cannot doubt of the 
 Reality of Motion. But 'tis undeniable that the 
 Motion we are fenfible of, muft have been either ab- 
 folutely uncam*dy or if caus*d, it muft have been the 
 Effe^ either of eternal Matter, or elfe of fome eter- 
 nal immaterial felf-a6tive Principle. 
 
 If abfolutely uncaus*d^ it muft have been an eter- 
 nal natural Property either of All Matter, or at leaft 
 of fome p.irticular Portion or Portions of Matter. 
 
 If it was the Effe5f of Eternal Matter^ it muft 
 have been either Temporal (or' with Beginning,) or 
 Eternal for without Beginning.) If Temporal^ it 
 
 muft 
 
ExrUcnce and Nature of GOD. 37 
 
 muft have been begun by the A6lion of fome free 
 or indetermin'd elective Principle, eflential either to 
 the whole Mafs of Matter, or at jeaft to fome par- 
 ticular Portion or Portions of it. If Eternal^ it mull: 
 have proceeded either from fome Aclion of Matter 
 bent towards fome particular Point or Points, or 
 elfe from fome Ad ion that was indifferent to every 
 Side. All thefe Hypothefes will be comprehended 
 and explained under the following Proportions. 
 
 I. The Motion we -perceive in the JVorld ivas not 
 ahfolutely uncaused, or an eternal natural Property 
 either of all Matter^ or of any of its Parts. 
 
 By Matter^ or Body, I underftand the Subftance 
 of which all the Parts of the vifible Univerfj confiil:. 
 Thefe we know to be made up of a Multitude of 
 folid, moveable, and divifible Particles, having fas 
 well as the greater Parts) an Aptitude to communi- 
 cate Motion by Impulfe. But whether any other 
 Properties belong either to the Ivhole Mafs of Mat- 
 ter, or to any of its Parts, is difputed. 
 
 As for Motion^ 'tis a fimple Idea, and therefore 
 neither needs nor admits Explanation. 
 
 That Motion was not abfolutely uncaus'd, or an 
 eternal natural Property of All Matter, may appear 
 from the following Reflexions. 
 
 Ftrfly It has been already prov*d, that a Being 
 that was eternal and abfolutely uncaus'd, muft have 
 been abfolutely neceflary, or of fuch a Nature as 
 render'd it an abfolute Contradi(flion for it to ceafe 
 to be. Now 'tis clear, that this both was and is 
 t-qually true of whatever is pofitive and natural to 
 fuch a Being j for as much as it cannot but be with 
 the very finie Neceflity as is the Being to which it 
 belongs. If then both the Motion of Matter and 
 its Diredion were natural to it and abfolutely 
 uncaus'd, it clearly follows that they ever had and 
 ever will have an abfolutely neceflil\ry Connedion 
 with Matter. Whereas on the contrary, though it 
 
 C 3 fl:iOuld 
 
3 8 An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 
 ihould be admicted that not a Pa rticle in the Uni« 
 verfe is abfolutely at Reft, yet *tis certain that Mat- 
 ter and Motion, and Motion and its particular Di- 
 re6lion, have no fuch neceffary or effential Connec- 
 tion with each other, as will be Ihewn under the 
 third Propofition. 
 
 Again, if Motion was abfolutely uncaus'd, or an 
 eternal abfolutely necefifary natural Property of All 
 Matter, it follows that it was neceffary to every 
 Particle of Matter in the fame Degree without 
 any Variety. For fince there is nothing in Nature 
 capable of inferring any Variety in original Necef- 
 fity, but only Perteftion, on which it was founded, 
 and which likewife infers its Unity, 'tis clear that all 
 the Particles of Matter, and their Properties, iffup- 
 pos'd to have been uncaus'd,andto haveexifted by a 
 NeceffiLy not founded on Perfeftion, (which Neceffity 
 muft have been not only One but abfolutely Simple) 
 muft be afferted to hav^ been without the leaft Variety. 
 
 But if Motion was neceffary to every Particle of 
 Matter in the fame Degree without the leaft Variety, 
 'tis clear that-every Particle muft have moved alike. 
 Both comparative Reft and Increafe of Velocity 
 muft have been equally impoffible, A eonftant U- 
 niformity muft have difplay*d itfelf throughout uni- 
 verfal Nature ; and there could have been no Dif- 
 ference between the Motion of a Mote or Duft in 
 the Sun beams and that of a Whirlwind. 
 
 And then as for the latter Part of this Propofi- 
 tion, viz. 'That Motion was no eternal natural Pro^* 
 perty of any -particular Part or Parts of Matter ; 'tis' 
 no lefs manifeft. For fmce original Neceffity, whe- 
 ther conceiv*d as founded on Perfedion or not, 
 muft, as we juft now obferv'd, be fuppos-d to have . 
 been ever one^ it follows,»that if the Parts and Pro- 
 perties of Matter exifted by one and the fame Ne- 
 ceffity, ^tis abfurd to imagine any of thoie Parts to 
 have neceffarily poflefs*d a Property which another 
 
 Paft 
 
Exiflcnce and Nature of GOD. 39 
 Part as neceflariJy wanted. For this is to conceive 
 the one eternal NeccfTity to have been different, 
 even while it is fuppofed to have been the fame. 
 
 2. Motion was not a temporal Effe5l produced by 
 eternal Matter by virtue of any free eleitive Prin- 
 ciple effential either to the whole Mafs of Matter^ or to 
 any of its Parts. 
 
 That fuch a free Principle of Adion fif any fuch^ 
 mull have been effential to all Matter, or an abfo- 
 lutely neceffary Property of the whole Mafs, is ma- 
 nifcft from the Principles already eftablifli'd. For 
 the one abfolute eternal Neceffity (however con- 
 ceiv'd) could admit of no Difference of Properties 
 in different Parts of Matter. This, by the Way, 
 dejftroys the Suppofition of an eternal material Soul 
 of the World. 
 
 But though fome Atheiflical Materialifls have 
 thought fit to beftow the Property of Intelligence 
 either on the whole Mafs of Matter (as did Spinoza^) 
 or on every diftindt Particle of it (as Mr. Hobbes 
 feems to have done, j yet none ever afferted either 
 the Whole or any Partofit, to polTefs an effential 
 Liberty or Freedom of A6l:ion •, without which 
 there could have been no Produiftion or Beginning 
 of Motion. And indeed, as we juft now obferv'd^ 
 had they been inclined to afcribe Freedom of Ac- 
 tion but to any one Part of Matter, they would 
 have been obliged to afcribe the fame Freedom to 
 all : Which had they done, they could not have 
 fail'd of a Confutation from every Man's Exp^ 
 rience, 
 
 3. Motion IV as not an eternal _Effeff cf Matter hy 
 virtue of any AStion bent towards fome paf-tic'ular Poini 
 or Points: 
 
 That an eternal or neceffiry Action (if the Cau(e 
 of Motion) could not but be inoHlbly bent to- 
 wards one particular Point, is clear. For (ince cHe' 
 Power from which th6 A-^ion. is fa p^ofcd ' to hive 
 
 C 4 ccer- 
 
jfo An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 eternally or neceffarily proceeded, could not but 
 ad as well as exift with one and the fame immu- 
 tabje NecefTity, it follows that |ts Ad ion could ad- 
 .mit of no Difference or Change of Diredions. fhis 
 abfolutely deftroys the Chance o^ Epicurus, 
 
 And though any Man fhould fuppofe the imagi- 
 nary eternal Matter to have been intelligent •, yet 
 this coijld have made no Difference. For if both 
 the Action and its Diredion were necefTary or im- 
 mutable, they could not but abfolutely exclude a 
 felf-determining Power (or a Power of differently di- 
 reding the AdtionJ from their Subjed: ; without 
 which, Intelligence could effed nothing. 
 
 But I conceive 'tis fufficiently demonftrable, that 
 - there could be no fuch thing as a proper eternal Ef- 
 fed of any Caufe. For fince whatever was eternal, 
 \yas neceffiry ; and fmce the NecefTity with which 
 an original eternal Being edified was perfedly onp 
 and uniform, it follows that it could not admit of 
 fuch an eternal or necefTary Diftindion as that of 
 Caufe and Effed. For whatever uniform Diftinc- 
 tion or Variety, was included In the Nature of Per- 
 fedion, this we may be affured was not ; both be- 
 caufe Liberty is a Perfedion, and to be an Effed, 
 or to be elTentially dependent, is a great Imperfec- 
 tion. 
 
 Notwithftanding this, fome (virho had no Notion 
 of the Perfedion of the original Being) have not 
 fail'd to make Motion an eternal Effed of a fup- 
 pos?d eternal Adion of Matter immutably bent to 
 defcend, but with Variety of Inclinations or Direcr 
 tions. Such Adion was ih^ Gravitation oHht Epcu- 
 ream : Which we fhall briefly confider. 
 
 *Tis well known to have been the Opinion of E- 
 picurus, and other ancient and modern Material ifls, 
 that every Atom or Particle of Matter neceffarily 
 or immutably pofTefTes a certain . determinate Gra- 
 vity or Weight independent of any other Being ; 
 
 which 
 
Exiftcnce and Nature of GOD. 41 
 
 which Gravity, by its A6lion of Gravitation, they 
 fappofed to have been the eternal or necelTary Caufe 
 ot Motion •, though at the hmt time they abfurdly 
 imagin'd Chance to have been, as it were, the Direc- 
 tor of Motion. 
 
 Concerning thefe Philofophcrs, we may, in the 
 firft place, obferve, that whatever Order they fup- 
 pos'd between Gravitation and Motion as Caufe and 
 Etieit, they yet conceiv'd them to have been both 
 neceflary. Confequently, the Arguments produced 
 under the firft of thefe Proportions, againft the Ne- 
 celTity of Motion, are of equal Force here. But 
 becaufe the Epicurean Hypothefis has formerly met 
 with fome Entertainment in the World, I fhall give 
 it a few Thoughts, and fhall proceed to fhew, in 
 ]he firft Place, that there is no fuch Principle as 
 Gravity immutably and independently inherent in 
 Matter or Bodies. 
 
 'Tis, I take it, paft all Doubt, not only that 
 the Gravitation of Bodies fituate without the Surface 
 of the Earth, decreafes with refpcd: to the Center 
 \n Proportion to the Increafe of their Diftance from 
 the Surface^ but likewife that, on the contrary, the 
 Gravitation of Bodies placed within the Surface^ 
 decreafes, in the fame Refpeft, according to the 
 J)ecreafe of their Diftance from the Center. From 
 which, and divers other Obfervations, it is allow'd 
 to be fjfficjently clear. 
 
 Firjl^ That there is a mutual Gravitation, or 
 Tendency, not only of all the Parts of the Earth, 
 but of the neareft Heavenly Bodies i and by Con- 
 fequence, as far as our Obfervation reaches, of all 
 the Parts of Matter towards each other. 
 
 Secondly, That the Gravitation of Bodies is eirher 
 more or lefs in an exadt Proportion to their own 
 real Quantity, and to the Qa.^ntiry and Diftance of 
 the Bodies toward which they tend. 
 
42 An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 
 How different this Gravitation is from that ne- 
 ceflary Tendency to defcend, which Epicurus beftow'd 
 on each of his Atoms, is evident. 
 
 According to thefe Principles, *tis eafy to con- 
 ceive, that, contrary to the vulgar Opinion, fup- 
 pofmg a Paffage through the Diameter of the 
 Earth, a Stone or other ponderous Body defcen- 
 ding, would lofe of its Velocity, or Swiftnefs, in 
 Proportion to its nearer Approach to the Center. 
 And thus moving ftill (lower, according to the De- 
 creafe of its Gravitation towards the Center, it would 
 at laft remain without any further predominant Ten- 
 dency towards any particular Point j as being fur- 
 rounded by an equal Quantity of Matter on all 
 Sides. The like would happen to any lefler Body 
 moving into the middle Space between two or more 
 fuch Bodies as our Earth, confifting of equal Quan- 
 tities of Matter ; or into the Space between two 
 or more fuch Bodies of unequal Quantities, fixed at 
 a proportionable Inequality of Diftance. 
 
 But if the Gravitation and Motion of Bodies be 
 fo variable through Variety of Situations, this is 
 enough to demonftrate them not to have been 
 eternal or neceffary Effeds of any Principle inde- 
 pendently inherent in every Atom or Particle of 
 Matter (for as much as fuch a Principle could not 
 admit of Variety of Directions, but mull have adted 
 uniformly or alike in all Situations) but to be Ef- 
 fects entirely dependent on fome other Caufe. 
 . But admitting (according to the Epicurean Hy- 
 pothefis) that Gravity was a neceflary independent 
 Property of every Atom ; yet it may be affirmed 
 impoflible it fhould have been the Caufe of that Va- 
 riety of Motions which we experience in Nature. 
 For 'tis demonftrable that the Principle and Laws of 
 Gravitation (whatever they may be) fince they muft 
 be allow'd, if eternal, to be uniform and invariable, 
 could never have been fubje(5t to Chance^ fo as to 
 •»c^. i have 
 
Exiftcnce and Nature of GO D. 4^ 
 
 have become the Caufe of various and contrary Mo- 
 tions •, fuch as may be obferv'd in the prefent Sy- 
 ftem of Things. For Inftance, the projedile Mo- 
 tions of divers of the great Bodies of the Univerfe, 
 tending to defcribe Circles or Ellipfes, and the Cen- 
 tral Motions of their feveral Parts, tending always 
 to Streight Lines. 
 
 4. Motion was not an eternal Effe5i of Matter f re- 
 duced by virtue of any A5lion that was indifferent to 
 every Side. 
 
 That fuch an indifferently determinable eternal' 
 Adlion cannot with Reafon be fuppofed, even tho* 
 Matter fhould be fuppofed to be intelligent, is clear 
 from the Uniformity or Invariablenefs of eternal or 
 neceffary Adion, already proved. 
 
 But fuppofmg fuch an eternal Aflion of Matter as 
 was and is indilterent to every Side, ("and fuppofing 
 the Agent (with the Epicurean Atheift) to have been 
 unintelligent) how could this have been the Caufe 
 of the Motion we experience in the World ? 
 
 If we take a View of the Heavenly Bodies, we 
 ftiall fee with what an exaft and conftant Regularity 
 they perform their refpciflive Revolutions. Even 
 the Motions of Comets^ which, till of late, have 
 feem'd the Extravagancies and Enormities of Na- 
 ture, do now appear to be regular and reducible to 
 fuch an Ellipfis whofe Sides approach very near a 
 Parabola. And the feemingly confusM Pofitions of 
 the Planets may be fufficiently accounted for from 
 the different Widenefs of their Orbits ; in defcribing 
 which they all revolve the fame Way with the 
 greateft Exaftnefs. But among thefe, the Moon, 
 the moft expofed to our View, is particularly re- 
 markable ; whofe Revolutions about the Earth and ' 
 her own Axis are fo nicely adjufted, that they are 
 both performed in the fame Compafs of Time. By 
 which admirable Harmony of the two Motions, ic 
 happens that ibe alv/ays prefents die lame Sid>i to 
 
 our 
 
44- ^n Impartial Enquiry into the 
 our Eyes, while one Motion continually turns her 
 from the Earth, and the other towards it, in the 
 fame Proportion. 
 
 And fhould we confine our Obfervation to the 
 Earth which we inhabit, befides the feveral Motions 
 of the entire Globe (which are no lefs exadl and re- 
 gular) we may obferve its feveral Parts, as if ani- 
 mated by one common Soul, conftantly and uni- 
 formly tending towards one common Center. But 
 f jch Conftancy and fuch Uniformicy are as abfjlutely 
 irreconcileable to the Opinion of a Principle of Motion 
 which is unintelligent, and yet indifferent to every Side, 
 as the former Inllances of Variety and Contrariety 
 (under the laft Propofition) are to that of a Prin- 
 ciple of Motion invariably determin'd to one Side. 
 
 Vi^ after all, any Man fhould objeft, that per- 
 haps Motion was neither abfolutely uncaus*d, nor 
 yet the Effe6t of any adfive Principle eflential to 
 Matter, but a mere Pajfion communicated from 
 one Part of Matter to another in an eternal Circula- 
 tion, as Hohhes and Spinoza imagin*d, this is certain- 
 ly the moll unreafonable Suppofition of any. 
 
 To prove this Aflertion, we Ihall not need to re- 
 peat what we obferv'd when we Ihew'd the Impof- 
 fibility of the Eternity of Motion. 'Twill be fuf- 
 ficient to add this one Obfervation, viz. That in 
 the Cafe of fuch an eternal Circulation, there is nei- 
 ther any external Agent fuppos*d, which might be 
 the proper Caufe of the Motion, nor any intrinfick 
 Reafon of it in the Bodies moved ; but the Bodies 
 are conceiv'd, in a manner purely paflive, to trans- 
 fer that Motion to each other, which none of them 
 in particular either poiTefs'd with an abfolute Ne- 
 celTicy in its own Nature, or derived from the Pow- 
 er of any proper Agent whatfoever, But what is 
 this but to fuppofe Motion to exift without either a 
 proper Caufe, or fo much as a Reafon of its Exif- 
 tence \ vvhich js abfurd to the laft Degree, 
 
 If 
 
Exiftcnce and Nature of GOT). 45 
 
 If then the Motion of Matter be abfolutely un* 
 accountable by any of thefe Hypothefes, (which 
 yet are all that the Enemies of Religion either have 
 propofed or can propofe or imagine) *tis maniteft 
 that Matter is no original felf adive Being, but that 
 its Motion muft kave been begun by fome Principle 
 eflentially diftinft, or by fome immaterial Agent^ who 
 is neceflarily exiftent, and, as fuch, perfectly jelf- 
 a^ive. Of the Notion of an immaterial Being, we 
 Ihall treat particularly in the Appendix. 
 
 II. The next Conception contain'd in the general 
 Idea of the eternal Being, confider*d as He is in Him- 
 fclf, is Intelligence or Self-confcioufnefs. 
 
 This Idea, as llkewife the Idea of Zz^^r/^, or Free 
 felf-determining Power, we are naturally led to by 
 the Confideration of the Idea of Self-a5iivity. For 
 Self-aftivity, or mere vital Power, could be no fuf- 
 ficient Principle of beginning external Adtion with- 
 out Self-confcioufnefs and Self-determination, i. e. 
 without both Intelligence and Liberty. 
 
 By Intelligence, as natural to the eternal Being, 
 and as importing no more than Self-confcioufnefs, 
 is meant a perfe5i Perception or Knowledge of his own 
 mojl perfe5l Nature. 
 
 That the eternal Being was naturally or neceflarily 
 a perceptive or felf-confcious Being, will more fully 
 appear from the following Reafoning. 
 
 If Motion had a Beginning (as has been already 
 demonftrated) *tis evident that the original Caufc 
 of Motion was a thinking perceptive Being j for as 
 much as nothing could immediately qualify him to 
 begin to ad: but a free felf-determining Principle 
 included in his own Nature. For without fuch a 
 felf-determining Principle, if originally in any Re- 
 fpedl una(ftive, he would necefl!arily or eflentially 
 have remained fo. But S'^^lf-determination, which is 
 the Refult of fuch a felf-determining Principle, 
 could not be without a preceding Perception both of 
 
 the 
 
4<5 An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 
 the Power of Ading, and of the Difference of 
 Ads ; fince *cis certain, that no Being can be faid 
 freely (or without Neceffitation) to determine a 
 Power which it knows nothing of, to an Ad: of 
 which it has no Perception. But Perception necef- 
 farily \m^\i<z& Intelligence ov Self-confcioujhefs. 
 
 III. Another Conception included in the general 
 Idea of the Eternal Being in Himfelf confidcr'd, is 
 Liberty : 'By which is meant a perfe^ Freedom of 
 external AElion^ or of fuch Adion as regards other 
 Beings. 
 
 In the general Notion of Liberty is comprehended 
 a Power both of choofing and determining, exempt 
 from all external irrefiftible Force, and internal in- 
 vincible Defeds. 
 
 Our Idea of the Divine Liberty in particular we 
 are direded to form (as was hinted before) by the 
 Gonf. deration of the two preceding Ideas of the 
 Divine Perfedion. For as the Idea of perfed Self- 
 adivity excludes the Influence of all imaginable Force 
 and Defeds, fo that of a perfed Intelligence not only 
 Hicludes a Power'of Perceiving, but infers likewife 
 a Power of Choofing and Determining accordingly : 
 Without which neither Self-adivity nor Intelligence 
 Gould be a fufficient Principle of Adion. 
 
 Thus, the Arguments by which we proved the 
 Self-adivity and Intelligence of the Eternal Being, 
 are no lefs fufficient Proofs of his Liberty : Which 
 will faveus the Pains of adding any thing here upon 
 this Head.;';5I yviltjx/iiia 7^r;;!nif[: 
 
 But becaufe the Idea of Liberty admits of fomc 
 accidental Variety, according to the Diverfity of its 
 Subjeds and their ftveral States ; and becaufe *tis no 
 fmall Difficulty to determine how far its Notion 
 may agree to particular Agents and Ads ; we ffiali 
 here-attempt an Explanation : And in fo doing we 
 ihal], as on other Occafions, with 'all Submiffion, 
 take our own Meafures, without following any 
 
 Track 
 
Exiftcnce and Nature of G 0T>. 47 
 Track but that which we conceive is made by the 
 Footfleps of Truth. 
 
 That we may the better apprehend the Nature 
 of fuch Liberty as is agreeable to the mod perfe<fl 
 of Beings, it cannot be amifs, firfl, to form a No- 
 tion of fuch as may agree to our felves, as far as 
 it regards external Action. To which End it will 
 perhaps be neceffary to diftinguilli the fcveral Adts 
 of our Minds with reference to Liberty of external 
 Adion, in their natural Order. 
 
 Firjt then, We perceive an Objed:, whether it be 
 Thing or Adtion. Then we judge of its Agrce- 
 ablenefs or Difagreeablenefs, Fitnefs or Unfitneis, 
 Thefe are Ads of Underftanding. 
 
 Then we either approve (or acquiefce in) our 
 Judgment of it (i;/z. by an interveening Delibera- 
 tion) or elfe difapprove it. Thefe are mix*d Ads 
 of the Underftanding and Will. 
 
 In the next place, we either Chufe or Reflife, i, e, 
 we either fmgle out the Objed in order to Pradice, 
 orelfe we rejedit. And lajUy, we either determine 
 our Pradice with reference to the Objed, according 
 to this Choice, or elfe we refolve to remain unadive : 
 \yhich are all pure Ads of the Will. 
 * Hence it appears, that tho* every Free Ad in- 
 cludes Choice, yet what we here call Choice, is that 
 particular Ad only whereby we fmgle out the Ob- 
 jed for Pradice. 
 
 By not well diftinguifhing thefe feveral Ads of 
 the Mind, we are apt to bewilder our felves in our 
 Enquiries into human Liberty ; more efpecially by 
 our confidering the Approbation and the Choice of 
 the Objed, as alfo the Choice of the Objed, and 
 the Determination of the Pradice accordingly, as 
 infcparable. 
 
 Thefe Things being premifed, we fliall endea- 
 v,eur an Account of Human Liberty in the follow- 
 ing Propofitions j by which not only ics Reality, 
 
 ../.-i but 
 
4* • An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 
 but its Diftindion from that of the Deity, will, 
 
 'tis conceiv'd, fufficiently appear. 
 
 1. 'Tis plain that no Being can he denominated a 
 Tree Agents hut what is furnijh'd not only with a 
 Power of Perceivings J^^S^f^g-) ^nd C hoofing, hut 
 Ukewife of Determining its confequent A5ls (or Prac- 
 tice) according to its Perception, Judgment, and 
 Choice, 
 
 2. In order to the completing of Liberty or Freedom, 
 'tis neceffary that the Perception, Judgment, and 
 Choice, as well as the confequent A^is, he exempt from 
 the Immediate irrefjUble Influence of any External 
 Force. 
 
 For though a Man can do whatever he wills or 
 thoofes to do, yet is he not compleatly free, uniefs 
 he be as free to will or choofe as he is to pradife. 
 
 3. ^ 'TIS further requiftte to the compleating of Liher^ 
 ty, that the Perception, Judgment, Choice, and confe* 
 qUent A^s, he exempt even from the Mediate, irrejijl- 
 ■ible Influence of any fuch Force. For 'tis certain that' 
 all thefe may be exempt from the immediate Influence 
 of any Force,- and yet may, at the fame Inftant, 
 be neceffitated. Thus, if a Perfon of a deprav'd 
 Imagination chufes to leap into a River, miftaking 
 it for a beautiful Meadow, none, 1 fuppofc, will 
 fay he was compleatly free ; fmce 'tis clear his 
 Perception and Judgment were under the remote 
 Influence of an external Force, viz. of the original 
 Caufe of his Diftemper. And thus, a Malefador, 
 who has feveral Sorts of Death propos'd to his 
 Choice, though his Choice be fo far free as not to 
 be immediately fix'd to any one Sort, yet there is" 
 ftill fuch an external Force, as effedtually, though 
 remotely, determines both his Choice and Practice, 
 
 4. Hufnan Liberty can't yet be complete without a 
 Freedom from the Invincible Byafs of all internal men- 
 tal Defers. For though the Perception, Judgment, ' 
 Choice, and confequent ACts, be exempt from the 
 
 mediate 
 
Exi/lcnce and Nature of G O T). 49 
 
 n^ediatc as well as immediate irrcfiftible Influence of 
 ;iiiy external Force, yet the Choice may be tar 
 Irom being completely free. Thus a Perfon of a 
 mean Capacity, in a Cafe of Difficulty, wherein tlvi 
 apparent Good is clear and evident to Scnfe, but the 
 real Good is the Objeft of Reafon only, and no o- 
 tlierwife to be difcovered than by an accurate Search 
 and laborious Dedudion ; though he be not fub- 
 ii-ct to the Influence of any external Force, and 
 cliough he deliberately choofe and determine his Ac- 
 tion to the apparent Good, yet can't be fiid to 
 have been completely free. For his Incapacity was 
 as eftedual an Impediment as an external Force 
 could have been. 
 
 5. The fevernl Degrees of Liberty already men* 
 lioned, can*i yet render Ilmnan Liberty cbynpletey in 
 our imperfe!^ State and Circumjlafices, without the Ac- 
 cejjion of a Freedom of not A^ing as "well as cfAcfing^ 
 ezrn after the clearejl Perception^ and the mojl delibe- 
 
 :c and unhyafs^d Choice. For wc find by Experi- 
 c.ce, that notwithftanding all the Requifitcs of li- 
 berty, already mentioned, an imperfeil Agent, like 
 our felves, may be in fuch a State that he can't be 
 reputed comp>letely free. Thus a Perfon fuddenly 
 feiz'd with a Paify, and chufing to remain where 
 he is, though his Stay be voluntary, and the Refvjlc 
 of fuch a Perception, Choice, and Self-detefmina- 
 tion, as no Force nor any Impediment influenc'd ; 
 yet 'tis clearj that being Panilytick, he was not free 
 to remove. 
 
 This makes it appear, that a Power o^ Aoling or 
 not Aoiingj even after Choice, (by virtue of another 
 intervening Choice) is that which is moft eflential to 
 human Liberty in our prefent State, which we ihall 
 prove to be a State of IVyal, and that our Liberty 
 does not entirely confilt in a Spontaneity, or Volun' 
 tarinefs, as fome imagin. For what is done volun- 
 tarily (or with Choice) may yet be as neceflTary, as 
 
 D what 
 
^o An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 
 what is done with the greateft Reludlance. The 
 Choice may be irrefiftibly determin'd by an external 
 Force, or efFedlually influenc'd by an internal Im- 
 pediment. And fuppofmg it free, yet it can't alone 
 denominate the Agent free •, whofe confequent Ac- 
 tion may ftill be neceflitated or determin*d by fome 
 external Agent. Nor can a free Choice, join'd 
 with a Liberty of Determining and Executing that 
 only which happens to be in our Power, when the 
 contrary was naturally as much in our Power, de- 
 nominate us free ; for if fo, the Paralytick we late- 
 ly mention'd might as well be reputed free, as a Per- 
 fon who has the Ufe of his Limbs. There muft 
 therefore be a felf-determining Power capable of Ac- 
 ting or not Afting even after the cleareft Perception , 
 and freeft Choice, with reference to Things within the 
 Capacities of Human Nature i i. e. there mufl ftill 
 be a Power of refufmg and chufing anew, capable 
 of determining the Pradlice, either by exerting or 
 not exerting an Ability to ad: according to that Re- , 
 fufal or Choice. I 
 
 6. Though a -previous Deterjninat'ion and NeceJ/ity 
 (as far as they extend) are ever inconfifient with Liber- 
 ty^ yet they are not always inconfifient with P erf e5lion. 
 The Reafon is, becaufe Liberty, or Indetermina- 
 tion, is not, in every Cafe, a Perfedion ; and be- 
 caufe Determination and Neceflity may fometimes 
 proceed from Perfection. For Inftance, though in 
 the Cafes aforementioned, viz. either of an imme- 
 diate or mediate Influence from fomewhat extrinfical, 
 or of internal Hindrance from Defeats, the Deter- 
 mination and NecefTity refulting from thence are 
 Proofs of the Imperfedlion of the Subjeft, yet there 
 is another NecelTity in all intelligent Beings, pro- 
 ceeding from none of thefe Caufes, but purely from 
 the greater or lefTer Perfedtion of their Natures : 
 And by Confequence, an abfolute Freedom from 
 fuch Neceffity (was it pofTible) would be an Imper- 
 fection. 
 
Exiftcncc and Nature of GOT). si 
 Mion. Thus, when I refleft upon whac pafiTcs in 
 my own Mind, I can't but obferve a necelfary In- 
 clination to my own proper Good or Benefit in the 
 general (as the End ot all my Adions ;) and when I 
 let my lei f to confider any Good or Evil in particu- 
 lar, in order to obtain the one, or avoid the other, 
 I find (it" my Capacity and Means of Information be 
 fufScient) I can't but necefiarily judge of it as it is 
 in Reality. 
 
 Thatfuch Neccllity as is included in thefe Inftances 
 is no Imperfedion, but rather a great Perfedion, is, 
 I think, too clear to be doubted. For 'tis the una- 
 voidable Refult of the Exercifc of Realbn ; which is 
 queftionlels a Perfeftion. And notwithftanding fuch 
 NecelTity, yet the antecedent Power we are conlcious 
 we have, in all ordinary Cafes, either of determining 
 or not determining our I'houghts to the Confidera- 
 tion of any particular Objed in order to Praftice, 
 join'd with a fubfequent Power of deliberating, and 
 fometimes varying our Judgment in Cafes not felf- 
 evident, as well as of fufpending and varying our 
 Approbation, Choice and Praftice, even after the 
 cxacleft Deliberation and trueft Judgment, will fut- 
 liciently prove, that our Aftions are under no uni- 
 verfil tatal Determination, either from the Objeds 
 that affe6t us, or from any other Caufe. I fay we 
 are confcious of thefe Powers within ouf felves. For 
 I think I may appeal to any confidering Mail, whe- 
 ther he be not in all ordinary Cafes, fcnfible of an 
 Ability of diu-ting his Thoughts upon any prticular 
 Object, even antecedently to any Deliberation •, and 
 then, whether after Deliberation about particulair 
 Objedts, he can't reafTume his Deliberation, and 
 fometimes vary his Judgment ; and whether, after 
 the cleareft Judgment, and moll deliberate Choice 
 of particular Things or Adions, he be not ftill 
 confcious of a Power of fufpending his Pradice, of 
 reuliuming the Confideration ot the Objeds when- 
 D 2 ever 
 
5 2 An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 
 ever he pleafes, or of immediately chufing and pralc-' 
 tifing the contrary. But we have no clearer Proof, 
 even of our Exiftence, than Confcioufnefs : And I 
 conceive we need not exped greater Evidence of any 
 Thing, than we have of our Exiftence. So that if 
 we duly refiedl, we can't but find enough in our 
 own Minds to convince us, that the proper Spring 
 of Aftion is within our felves, and capable of exert- 
 ing itfelf by its own native Force, though ufually 
 excited and fometimes determined by Things with- 
 out us. 
 
 From what has been obferv'd, it is manifeft, that 
 our Notion of Human Liberty, in the prefent State, . 
 is then only complete, when it includes a fufficient 
 Perception and a Judgment determined only by the 
 Nature and Circumftances of the Objeft, without 
 the irrefiftible Influence either of external Force or . 
 internal Defeds ; preceded by an indetermin'd Abi- I 
 lity of confidering and deliberating, and follow'd by 
 a like indeterminM Ability either of approving or 
 not approving, chufing or not chufing, adting or not 
 acting accordingly. 
 
 This Defcription of human Liberty refiefts fome ^ 
 Light upon the Nature of Guilty or Obligation to J 
 Punifhment, which hereby appears naturally to re- 
 lult from the Abufe of Liberty, either in our neg- 
 ledling the poflible and moft conducive Means in 
 order to our Information, antecedently to our Judg- 
 ment of any A6lion •, or elfe from a like Abufe of 
 Liberty confequent to our Judgment, in approving, 
 chufing, or pradlifmg that or a different Adion ei- 
 ther rafhly or obftinately. For as for the pure Ad 
 of Judging, fince 'tis neceffarily determin'd by the 
 Objedl as it appears to us, 'tis clear we can't be 
 culpable merely on that Account. 
 
 By this it likewife appears, that Human Liberty, 
 in its full Latitude, is not the Attribute of any par- 
 ticular Adt, Power or Faculty, but is the Property 
 
 of 
 
Exiftcncc and Nature of GOT). 53 
 of the Agent or Man, For though the Judgment, 
 Approbation, Choice, and Determination to Ac- 
 tion be exempt from the fatal Influence of any ex- 
 ternal Force or internal Defecfl, yet if the Agent be 
 not capable of Not approving. Not chufing and ex- 
 ecuting even what is really bell, as well as of ap- 
 proving, chufing and executing it, thefe mention'd 
 Degrees of Liberty can be no fufficient Principle of 
 Adion in our Imperfeft State and CircumlUnces, or 
 as we are fubjedt to Laws as Trials of Obedience. , 
 By the Confideration of fuch Liberty as is agree- 
 able to ourfelves in our particular State and Capa- 
 city, we fhall now be the better quality'd to form 
 Ibme Conception of that which is fuitable to the 
 Idea of the eternal Being. In order to which, I 
 think we may lay it down for a Principle, That the 
 Nature of Liberty in all capable Beings is the fame, 
 allowing only for fuch accidental Diverfity as may pro- 
 ceedfrom the different States and Perfe^ion of its Subt 
 
 Now to difcover wherein the Perfeflion and pe-r 
 culiar State of the Eternal Being may have occafion- 
 ed his Liberty to differ from that of our felves, and 
 other imperfe(5l Agents, we may here recolleft what 
 we before obferv'd when we difcours*d of Human 
 Liberty, viz. That all Determination and NecefTity 
 is not inconfiftent with Perfedlion, but that on the 
 contrary, there is ever an immediate Determination 
 both of the Agent to Good in general, and of the 
 Judgment by the Nature and Circumftances of the 
 Objeds when duly perceiv'd (under the Notion of 
 Goodj in particular. To which we may add, what 
 we likewife hinted before, viz. That the more con- 
 flant and uniform the Determination evep of the 
 confequent Adts is to that which is really better, 
 f proceeding from an internal Principle of Perfec- 
 tion, and not from any external Influence) the more 
 
 D 3 per- 
 
54 An Impartial Enqmry into the 
 
 perfp(?t is the Agent's Liberty, as may hereafter 
 appear. 
 
 AgFeeably to this, it will, 'tis conceiv*d, be ma- 
 nifeft, that the Difference between the Liberty of 
 the Eternal Being, and that of ourfelves and other 
 ?mperfe6t Agents, muft chiefly confift in the Conr 
 ftancy and Uniformity of the Determination, not 
 only of his Judgment, but of all his confequent 
 A(^ls, to what is really better. This is the un- 
 doubted Refult of the Supreme Perfedlion of his 
 Nature. For as where the Underftanding is never 
 deceiv'd by falfe Colours and Appearances, there 
 the Judgment can't but be always right •, fo where 
 no irregular PafTions, nor any imaginable Impedi- 
 ments intervene between the Judgment, Choice, and 
 Execution, there all the confequent A6ls can't but 
 jbe perpetually agreeable to the right Judgment. 
 
 The conllant uniform Determination of the Dei- 
 ty with Reference to his confequent A<5tion, mufl be 
 conceiv'd to difcover itfelf in two feveral Refpedts : 
 Both in Refpeft to his Manner cf AEi'ing^ and to 
 certain of his ABs. 
 
 Firjly It can't but difcover itfelf in his Manner of 
 Aofing. For Inftance, the very Nature of the moft 
 perfect of Beings can't but immutably determine 
 him when he ads, to a6l wifely and regularly. 
 When he inclines to external Adlion, (/. e. to A5lion 
 which has a Reference to other Beings) he can no 
 more fail to chufe thebeft End, and to employ the 
 fittefl or mofl conducive Means, than he can to 
 underftand them. For that there is a Fitnefs and 
 Unfitnefs in the Natures or Circumltances of Things 
 and Aftions, will be undeniably clear from whap 
 fhall be obferved hereafter. 
 
 This piakes it appear how the Divine A6lion may, 
 notwithflanding the moft perfecfl Liberty, proceed 
 from a Principle as conftant and uniform as the fup- 
 pos'd Stoical Fate it felf. And this, by Confe- 
 
 quence. 
 
Exiflence and Nature of GO D. 55 
 quence, ihows the neceflfary Connexion of the mo- 
 ral Attributes of the Deity (fuch as Juftice, Mercy, 
 i£c.) with the natural ones (his Self-adtivity, Intel- 
 ligence, Liberty, l£c,) in the prefent State of Things. 
 For though thefe moral Attributes denote no par- 
 ticular Perfeflions of the Divine 7Vrt/;/r^, but only 
 fuch relative Ideas of our Minds as refult from the 
 Confideration of the Divine Atl'wns with Reference 
 to ourfelves and other Beings, as will be fhewn ; yet 
 fince the natural Perfed:ions, which arc the Prin- 
 (fiples of thofe Divine Ads, are immutable both in 
 themfelves and in their Manner of Ading, we may 
 infallibly conclude, that whenever the Deity inclines 
 to ad, his Adionsmult conitantly come under thole 
 Denominations. 
 
 *Tisto be confefs'd, that in an Agent fubjed to 
 Laws, and in a State of Tryal, fuch conitant na- 
 tural Determination to the bed Method of chufino- 
 and pradifmg, would, as we hinted before, be in- 
 confiftent with his State and Circumftances, For 
 fince fuch a State fuppofes a Poflibility of the con- 
 trary Ads, vix. of Obedience and Difobedience, 
 'tis clear that the Liberty which agrees to it muft, e- 
 ven after the Perception of the Obligation and Judo-- 
 ment of the Duty requir'd, ftill include an Indeter- 
 mination with Reference to the confequent Ads. 
 For without this, the Impofition of Laws as Trials 
 of Obedience, would feem impertinent, and Re- 
 wards and Punifliments could have no Place -, fince 
 'tis manifeft, that where-ever Rewards and Punifh- 
 ments take Place, they muft be difpens'd on account 
 of fomewhat which was originally in the Subjed's 
 Power either to do or omit. 
 
 But though fuch an Indetermination, with Refe- 
 rence to Ads confequent on the Judgment, be that 
 whrch is clTential to the Liberty of an Agent fubjed 
 to a Trial of Obedience to the Laws of a fuperior 
 D 4 ^^<^in^? 
 
5<5 An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 Being, yet it is merely accidental to Liberty in gcr 
 neral, and far from being in itfelf a Perledtion. 
 
 Agahiy The conftant uniform Determination of 
 the Deity muft be conceiv'd to difcover itfelf not 
 only with Refped to his Manner of Afling, but 
 with reference to certain of his Jois. Thus for In- 
 llance : Since the Deity could not but be ever con; 
 fcious of the Perfections of his adorable Nature (his 
 Omnipotence, Wifdom, ^c. ) confequently, he 
 could not but know it was fitter thofe Perfections 
 fhould be exercis'd, than that they fiiould eternally 
 remain unemploy'd. Therefore, fince (as was obr 
 ferv'd) his Choice cannot but follow his Perception 
 of what is fitter, and his confequent Adts can- 
 not but be ever agreeable to his Choice ; it plainly 
 tbllo>ys that he could never be indetermin'd with 
 Reference to external Adllon. Yet this could not 
 hinder but that his external A<5tion, though pro- 
 ceeding from fuch Determination, might ilill be ia 
 the moft perfe6l Manner free : Inafmuch as it was 
 no Determination from any external Force nor in- 
 ternal Defedt, but the pure Refult of his own ef- 
 fential Pertedion, and executed when and in fuch 
 Or^er as it plcas'd him. For that the Eternal Be- 
 ing might have created the World Millions of Ages 
 fooner, ( i. e, might have caus'd it to have been of a 
 vaftly longer Duration than ft adtually is) is unde- 
 niable. And that he, who was abfolutely indepen- 
 dent of the Creatures, might have obferv*d a yery 
 different Order in fome Refpedls, and yet in fuffi- 
 cient Confiftence with his great Defign, is not tq 
 t>e doubted •, fince in many Cafes different Methods 
 are equally fuitable and conducive ; ^nd different 
 Species of Creatures niviy be in all Refpe6ts of equal 
 Fitnefs and Capacity. So that, with Reference tq 
 the Beginning, Order, and particular A(fts and 
 Objeds of Cre;ition, the Deity was ('tis humbly 
 copcejv'd) under no origirjal Determination j though 
 
 with 
 
Exiilence tf«^ Nature <?/ GO Z). 57 
 
 with Relpe(^ to the A^l of Creation in general^ he 
 appears to have been ever determin'd by his own 
 eilential Perfeftion. But of this more will be faid 
 aiion. 
 
 Befides, by fome previous Aft that was compleat- 
 ly free, vye may conceive him fometimes to con- 
 tra(ft a confequent immutable Determination to fome 
 particular future A6t. For Example, in the Cafe 
 of an abfolute Promife, tho* the Engagement may 
 be completely free, yet the Performance, with all its 
 natural Confequences, can't but become neceflary to 
 tlie Deity. For that fuch Determination is very 
 confiftent with the divine Liberty, is manileft : Since 
 fo perfe(5tly wife a Being, who is fully acquainted 
 with the Relations and Dependencies of Things, 
 can't be conceiv'd to oblige himfelf to the Perfor- 
 mance of any thing without a particular Regard to 
 all its natural aud neceflary Confequences. Which 
 makes it evident, that in fuch a Cafe, thefe are no 
 lefs the Effedls of his Liberty, than the Engagemenc 
 from whence they proceeded. 
 
 From whfit has been obferv'd, we may now be 
 adiited to form fome Idea of the Divine Perfec- 
 tion with Regard to Liberty^ by concluding, That 
 though the mojl perfeB of Beings luas ever Free^ or un- 
 der no eternal Determination to any particular external 
 A^, {fince neither his 0:1: n Nature^ nor the Influence 
 of any other Being appears to have occajioned Juch De^ 
 termination \ ) yet his ejfential Perfeclion way well he 
 Juppos'd to have ever determined hm to external Ac- 
 tion in general^ and that in the fittefl and ffiofl Juit- 
 able Manner : And not only fo^ but that ^ in the pre - 
 fent Scene of Things, a previous Auf, to which he was 
 in no Refpeol oblig'd or determin'd^ may be conceiv'd 
 f<dmctimes to occafion a confequent Determination and 
 Niceffity with reference to other particular AUs^ with- 
 o^a Prejudice to his Liberty, 
 
 'Tis 
 
5 8 An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 
 'Tis eafy to remark, that this Defcription of the 
 divine Liberty cannot eafily be reconcile with a cer- 
 tain current Opinion ; I mean that of 'particular 
 eternal Decrees. 'Twill therefore be necelTary to 
 give it a few Thoughts. 
 
 I perfuade my {t% *tis a Matter of no great Dif- 
 ficulty to make it appear, that this Opinion has no 
 folid Foundation in Scripture. For as to thofe 
 Texts which are ufually produced to prove the E- 
 ternity of certain particular Decrees, they'll perhaps 
 appear to be infufficient. Thus, the Texts which 
 fpeak of Ele^ion before the Foundation of the World, 
 can be of little weight to fuch who think it no necef- 
 fary Article of Faith to believe that this inferior World 
 was the earlieft Work of the Eternal Omnipotent 
 Being -, and who are convinc'd that either this or any 
 other Part of the Univerfe, might have been of a 
 much ancienter Date than it actually is, without 
 being Eternal. And as for that other Text which 
 is ufually produc'd, 2 ^i;«. i. 9, where Grace is faid 
 to have been given -sre^ ;)^e^r<yj' etWia^, ante Tefnpora 
 Seculoru?n, or before the Times of Ages (as Beza, 
 renders it.) I fuppofe few will doubt, but that the 
 natural Senfe of the Phrafe is that which our Englijh 
 Tranflation afligns it, vit.. before the World began : 
 The Times of Ages being properly no other than 
 the Duration of this inferior World, which confifts 
 of a SuccefTion of Ages and Generations. That this 
 is the genuine Interpretation, may further appear 
 by comparing Kom. xvi. 25. with Col. i. 26. In 
 the former Text the Apoftle fpeakingof the My fie- 
 ry of the Gofpel which was then revealed, informs 
 us that it was hid x^^°'^ amioji, fro?n the Times of 
 Ages, or ftnce the World began, as the Englifh renders 
 it. Agreeably to which Interpretation, the fame 
 Apoftle, in the latter Text, fpeaking of the fame 
 reveal'd Myftery, calls it the Myftery which was 
 kid from Ages and Generations^ i, e. from the Begin- 
 
Exiftcncc and Nature of G O D. 59 
 
 n|ng of Ages and Generations •, or, which is the 
 (ame, fiuce the fi'orld began. Which makes it mofi: 
 evident, that this Prcx)t can import no more to the 
 prefent Purpofe, than the other we coniider'd above. 
 The hke may be faid of that Text, where Mention 
 is made of the Eternal Purpofe of God, Ephef. iii. 
 1 1 . V\f'r>hm 'nfv A\uvuvy or the Purpofe of Ages, as it is 
 in the Original, which may fignify either that ic 
 hath endured ever fmce the World began, or that ic 
 fhall endure as long as the World continues. And 
 when the ApolUe fpeaksof the Blood i^ttt^nMi ctiwU of 
 tbc Covenant of Ages, Heb. xiii. 20. we need nor, 
 perhaps, underftand it in any other Senfe than the 
 former Texts. 
 
 Nor are the Proofs of the Eternity of particular 
 Pccrees borrowed from Reafon of greater Force, tho* 
 of greater Subtilty \ which we fhall briefly con- 
 fider. 
 
 Firfl, Some have attein^pted a Proof of the Eter- 
 nity of particular Decrees, from the fuppos'd Ne- 
 ccflity or Eternity of certain Truths. Which re- 
 puted eternal Truths are of two Sorts. Some are 
 laid to refer to the Effences of Things ; others to 
 their Exijlence and Aftions. Of the former Sort are 
 fuch as thefe in the Mathematicks, A Circle hath 
 equal Diameters, Two and Three are equal to Five ; 
 and in fliort, all Propofitions of any Kind, whofe 
 Predicates are of the Elfence of their Subjeds. Of 
 the latter Sort are all fuch Propofitions as relate to 
 Things or Aflionsnot yet in Being; fuch as thefe. 
 The Sun will esifl, Socrates will difpute. Which 
 Propofitions, fince (as is ufually imagin*d) they ne- 
 ver began to b^ rme, fome are aj)t to conclude, 
 muft have dcriv'd an eternal Verity (or Truth J from 
 certain particular eternal Decrees of God. 
 
 But Ftrjl, as for fuch reputed eternal Truths as 
 concern the Effences of created Things, 'twill per- 
 haps appear, that thefe were no diftind, neceflary 
 
 or 
 
6o An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 or eternal Truths, but only particular contingent 
 Determinations of this one general eternal or necef- 
 fary Truth, (in which they were but virtually in- 
 cludedj viz. T^mt isuhich is the fame is not different y 
 or, Nothing can he diverfe from itfelf. Which gene- 
 ral Truth is the Bafis or Foundation of all Science, 
 and has an immediate Conne<5lion with the Exijlence 
 of the eternal or neceflarily-exiftent Being, without 
 the leaft Dependence on his Decree. For it never 
 was more neceffarily true that the Deity exifled, 
 than it was that he could not be diverfe from Him- 
 felf, 
 
 To prove this, we may firft obferve, that the 
 Senfe of thefe Propofitions, A Circle hath equal Dia- 
 meters, Two and Three are equal to five, and the 
 like, is in itfelf identical ; and they can amount to 
 no more than thefe, A Circle is nothing elfe but a 
 Circle, Two and Three are not different from Two and 
 Three. For fince a Figure with equal Diameters figni- 
 jies the very fame with a Circle, and fi'^e is nothing 
 different from Two and Three, 'tis manifeft, that in 
 thefe and the like Propofitions, there's no real Dif- 
 ference between the Extremes, and by Confequence 
 no proper Relation of Equality between Subjedl and 
 Property, as is ufually imagin'd, but a real and pro- 
 per Identity. For though thefe and the like Pro- 
 portions add to our Knowledge by a clearer Difco- 
 very of the fame Idea, and are therefore very diffe- 
 rent (with refpedt to us) from fuch other identical 
 Propofitions wherein one and the fame Idea is af- 
 firm'd of itfelf without Diftindion of Words, yet 
 Cin themfelves confider'd) they are equally identical : 
 Since the Idea fignify'd by the Predicate is the fame 
 which is fignify'd by the Subje^ ; only with this 
 Difference, that the Predicate expreffes it more clear- 
 ly, or with fome Modification which was not pAf- 
 irly exprefs'd by the Subjed. ' 
 
 So 
 
Exlftence and Nature of GOT). 6i 
 So that this Argument amounts at laft to no more 
 than this, viz. That becaufe in the general it ap- 
 pears that every Being which at any Time exilts, 
 has of Neceflity a peculiar Nature, or is neceflarily 
 the fame with it felf, and diflindl from all others, 
 therefore it was eternally and particularly decreed it 
 fhould be fo. 
 
 But, 1 take it, 'tis a ridiculous Thing to imagine 
 a particular eternal Decree was requifite, in order 
 to beftow a neceflliry or eternal Truth on thefe im- 
 portant Proportions, A Circle is a Circle^ and not a 
 'Triangle, Two and Three are Five, and not an Hun- 
 dred, and the like. For whatever Neceflity belongs 
 to thefe Truths, is plainly no other than what is 
 included in that eternal univerfal Truth we men- 
 tioned before : Which Truth (as we obferv'dj was 
 not deriv'd from any Divine Decree, but had a ne- 
 ceiTary immediate Connexion with the Divine Ex- 
 iftence and Nature itfelf. And as for the particular 
 Determinations or Applications of that eternal uni- 
 verfil Truth by the divine Decrees and productive 
 Power either to the EfTence or to the Exiftence of 
 thofe or any other created Subjedls ; they were noc 
 nccefl^ary, 'tis humbly conceiv*d, but merely con- 
 tingent. For as nothing neceflarily exifted unpro- 
 duc'd but the divine Nature, whofe Non-exiflence 
 was a Contradidion in it felf; fo Nothing can with 
 Reafon be affirmed to have been neceflarily decreed 
 and produc'd, but fuch Beings whofe Non-pro- 
 dudion was a Contradidion to the Divine Nature. 
 But what particular Being or Sort of Beings dare 
 we affirm to be of fuch a Nature, as that it was a 
 Contradiction to the divine Nature not to have 
 decreed and produc'd it, or ('which is the fame) that 
 the Deity could not have been Himfelf, had he not 
 created it ? 'Tis freely confefs'd, that all the Crea- 
 tures of God are in themfelves good. But we know 
 there are Degrees of Perfection among *em ; and 
 
 none 
 
^2 An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 
 none can fay that any exifts with all the Perfedion 
 that Omnipotence could bellow ; or, by Confe- 
 quenee, that any (much lefs every) Creature was the 
 beft or mod perfeft the Deity could produce. Which 
 Reflexion yields us a fenfible Demonftration of the 
 divine Indetermination to particular Adls. For 
 had the Deity been under a natural Determination to 
 the decreeing and producing of every Creature par- 
 ticularly confidcr'd, it mnft have been under the 
 Notion of the Beft or moft Perfect. But then there 
 could have been feen no Creature inferior in Per- 
 fedion to another, and an univerfal Equality muft 
 have appeared throughout the Frame of Nature. 
 
 And then, as for fuch Propofitions as relate to the 
 Exiftence and Adlons of Things not yet in Being, 
 fuch as, The Sun will exiff^ Socrates will difpule, and 
 the like ; they can't, in an ahfoliite Senfe, be affirm'd 
 to have been neceffiirily or eternally true, without 
 begging the Queftion in Debate, or fuppofing thofe 
 very eternal Decrees they were defign'd to prove. 
 For if there were no fuch particular eternal De- 
 crees, 'tis certain thefe Propofitions mil ft, in an 
 abfolute Senfe, have been eternally or neceffarily 
 falfe ; in as much as the Exiftence and Adions of 
 particular Creatures, if not eternally decreed,- muft 
 ot themfelves have been no other than pure Contin- 
 gencies. But the Truth of every affirmative Pro- 
 pofition confiftis in the Conformity of the Predicate 
 or Property with the Nature of the S\ibje(5]: or 
 Thing of which it is affirm'd : Which Conformity 
 could not be, if Neceffity was abfolutely affirm'd 
 of a Thing or, Adion in itfelf contingent or inde- 
 termin'd. 
 
 There is then Nothing in the Nauire of this latter 
 Sort of Propofitions, which can oblige us to aflert 
 ihey were eternally or neceflarily true in an abfolute 
 Senfe^ or to allow that there was (as fome imagin) 
 an abfolute eternal Certainty, of ail Events. But if 
 
 they 
 
Exiftcnce <j«^ Nature ofGOT>. 63 
 they were true only in a Conditional Senfe^ 'tis ma- 
 j^itefl: they were no otherwile true, than as the like 
 Propofitions concerning any particular poflible Sub- 
 jed may be affirmM to have been fo, though ic 
 Ihould never exift. For Example, this Propofition, 
 A Centaur Jhall exi^-i if it pleafe the Deity fo to decree^ 
 was always as true as thefe, "The Sun ivill exiji, or 
 Socrates will difpute^ if God fo pleafes. And it is 
 equally clear, that this conditional Truth proves no 
 particular eternal Decrees, though it proves an eter- 
 nal free Agent, who always polTefs'd a Ibvereign 
 Power of decreeing, creating, and influencing par- 
 ticular Natures if and as he pleafed. 
 
 Upon the whole 'tis eafy to conclude, that the 
 eternal ideal TVorld, in which fome Platonick Gen- 
 tlemen have lately imagin'd themfelves to have made 
 fuch mighty Difcoveries, and which is chiefly fup- 
 ported by Eternal Ejfences and Futurities, is in a 
 more proper Senfe than can be faid of the Earthy 
 founded upon Nothing. 
 
 Another Argument in Favour of particular eternal 
 Decrees, is borrowed from the Opinion of a parti- 
 cular eternal Foreknowledge. This, it feems, waa 
 the Method of the Platonijls, who appear to have 
 been the firfl: Introducers of that Doctrine. For 
 they imagining it to have been eflential to the Per- 
 fc6tion of the Deity, eternally and particularly to 
 foreknow all other Beings and all Events depending 
 on their Exiftence, were probably thence difpofcd 
 to receive the Opinion of particular eternal Decrees 
 as the only fufficient Hypothefis to account for fuch 
 Foreknowledge. 
 
 In Reply to this Argument, we Ihall here only 
 propofe ic to be confider'd, whether it be not more 
 agreeable to the Independence and Liberty of the 
 eternal Being, to fuppofe his own mofl perfect Na- 
 ture to have been the only neceflfary particular Ob- 
 je6t of his Knowledge v or whether the Suppofition 
 
 of 
 
64- An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 of the eternal or abfolutely neceflfary Decrees Snd 
 Foreknowledge of particular Creatul-es and all their 
 AftionSj can be maintain*d, without aflerting not 
 only all the particular Creatures, but all their Ac- 
 tions, to be in their own Natures fuch as the Deity 
 could not have Emitted to decree and foreknow^ 
 without Prejudice to his Perfedion and Happinefs. 
 
 There is yet another Proof of eternal Decrees 
 attempted from the Opinion of an Injlantaneous E- 
 ternity^ and the Ahfolute Immutahility of the divine 
 Adion founded thereon. But the Abfurdity of this 
 pretended Pfobf is generally confefs'd, and will be 
 difplay'd in the Chap, of Eternity, Book II. 
 
 We have the longer infifted on this Opinion of 
 Particular Eternal Decrees, becaufe of the impure 
 Confequences with which it appears to have defiled 
 the Innocence of the Chriftian Religion -, which 
 Confequences, as they depend on it, muft neceffa- 
 rily fall with it. For if there were no eternal par- 
 ticular Decrees of every Creature and Event, then 
 as the abfolute Predefbination or Predetermination 
 of all Perfons and Events from Eternity, muft be 
 rejected ('and no fufficient Reafon will appear for 
 aflerting fuch Predeftination of a later Date) fo that 
 particular immediate determining Concurfe of God 
 to the worft of Aflions, for rendring thofe Decrees 
 efFed:ual, will appear to be an unnecefiary Doc- 
 trine ; and thereby both the Juftice of God, and the 
 Liberty and Accountablenefs of Creatures will obtain 
 a fufficient Vindication. Without fuch a Vindica- 
 tion, what-ever Arguments we may employ to 
 convince Men of Atheiftick Principles, that it is a 
 Thing very defirable there fhould be a God, will, 
 I doubt, be of very little Effect. For certainly, 
 it is not the Idea of a moft intelligent and wife Be- 
 ing, freely determining himfelf to Adsof Goodnefs 
 and Juftice, which frights fuch Perfons -, but much 
 rather that of fuch a Being as thcfe Opinions repre- 
 
 fent 
 
Exigence and N:\auc of G 'T). 6$ 
 
 •fent the Deity to be : Opinions far lefs pious than 
 tfie Opinion of the Stoicks, as obliging their Afler- 
 tors (at leail iWiredtly and by Conkquence) to make 
 the Beft of Bemgs the Author of the worlt Adtions 
 and Events •, which to avoid, thofe Pagans rather 
 chofe to lay the Blame, in fome Degree at Jeaft, on 
 I know not what independent uncontroulable Deftiny. 
 
 CHAP. VIII. 
 
 OU R Secondary Notions of the Perfedion of 
 God, confider'd with Reference to Himfelf, 
 we have obferv'd to be, 
 
 I. Spirituality, Men have generally agreed to 
 exprefs their Idea of the Beft and Nobleft of Beings 
 by the Word Spirit : A Metaphor taken from the 
 ^ir or fFind, than which, by Reafon of its Tenuity, 
 perpetual Agitation, and wide Expanfion, Nothing 
 feem'd more proper to reprefent that invifible Na- 
 ture which pervades, a6tuates, and comprehends all 
 Things. Which invifible Nature, though to No- 
 thing fo fitly refembled as to the Air (which of all 
 the Portions of Matter is the leaft perceiv*d by our 
 Senfes) yet has been ufually conceiv'd as diftindl 
 from the moft refined Matter, and as including the 
 three Properties already demonftrated, of which 
 Matter was generally fuppofed to be dcftitute ; 
 
 1. Self-J^ivity. Thus Thales, Pythagoras, Pla- 
 to, and others, according to the Philofophy of the 
 Eaftern Nations, afiferted Two Principles, the one 
 Aa:ive and Spiritual, the other PafTive and Mate- 
 rial. 
 
 2. Intelligence. Says Poftdonius in Stob. 5 QxU ifi 
 nnZ^A voipaj*, God is an Intelligent Spirit. To fignity 
 this, they were wont to give him the Titles of 
 
 • N?f and <fltff,«i.v, both which import Conjcioufnefs and 
 ' Perception. 
 
 E 3. Liberty, 
 
66 An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 
 3 . Liberty. Some of the Philofophers, I confefs, 
 fuppos'd the Deity to be fubjed to the Influence of 
 Fate. But the *iKvi of Orpheus, the *rM' oi I'hales, 
 the TAK of Pythagoras and Plato, nd the "Atij^pov of 
 Anaxagoras, (by which Terms they ufually fignify'd 
 the material Principle of the Univerfe) are always 
 defcrib'das void of Liberty or felf-determining Pow- 
 er, which thefe Philofophers fuppos'd to be only, in 
 the Nsf , or Mind, who both imprefs'd and regulated 
 their Motions. 
 
 II. Another fecondary Notion of the Perfeclion 
 of God, confider'd with Reference to Himfelf, is 
 Cmfiancy or ImmiitaUlity : Which we conceive is to 
 be affirm'd both of his Nature and A^fion. 
 
 1 . Of his Nature. The Spring of Inconftancy 
 or Mutability, in this Refped, muft be either feme 
 necefTary internal Principle of Corruption, or his 
 own Will, or elfe fome external Caufe. But the 
 firft of thefe is abfolutely inconfiftent with his per- 
 fed: vital Selfadtivity, the fecond with his perfe6t 
 Intelligence, and the third with the Perfedion of 
 his Liberty. 
 
 2. Of his A5fions. In treating of the Divine 
 Adions, we may, it is conceiv'd, lay it down as 
 an infallible Principle, 'That we can be no farther ob- 
 liged to ajfert their Immutability, than as it appears to 
 have a necejfary Connection with the Immutability of the 
 Divine Nature. 
 
 The Divine Adions may be confider'd, either as 
 eflential, or as uneflential. The former, becaufe they 
 flow immediately from the Divine Nature, can't 
 but be immutable in the fame Senfe as the Nature 
 itfelf. The latter, (which 'tis humbly conceiv'd, 
 had no neceflary Connedion with the Divine Na- 
 ture) are of two Sorts, viz. either his particular 
 Decrees, or their Executions. By his Immutability 
 or Conltancy with Reference- to both thefe, 'tis 
 conceiv'd we are to underftand in che general, his 
 
 un- 
 
Exiftcncc and Nature of GOT). 67 
 
 unvariably decreeing Ends fuitable to his Nature, 
 and his lleddy Purl'uit and infallible Attainment of 
 thofe Ends : Both which evidently imply Pertec- 
 tion, and refult from the ablbkite Invariablenefs or 
 Immutability of his Nature. But as for his parti- 
 cular Ads, and his Knowledge confequenc thereup- 
 on, the Immutabihty of his Nature infers no fuch 
 Invariablenefs with Regard to them, but i-ather the 
 quite contrary j for as much as their Variety mull 
 be conceiv'd immediately to proceed from the va- 
 rious Exercife of his Liberty •, which (in all indiffe- 
 rent Cafes) is the Refult of the immutable Perfec- 
 tion of his Nature. 
 
 And as for the Adions of other Beings, and all 
 Events depending on their Exiftence ; they are 
 alike incapable of caufing any Change in the Di- 
 vine Knowledge inconfiftent with the Perfection and 
 Immutability of the Divine Nature. On the con- 
 trary, 'tis manifeftly a Point of Perfedion to know 
 Things as they really are \ which yet can't be with- 
 out fome Variation in the Manner of Knowledge 
 anfwerable to the Variation in the State of its Ob- 
 jeds, 
 
 III. Another fecondary Notion of the* Divine 
 Perfedion, confider'd with Reference to the Deity 
 Himfelf, is Happinefs. Hiis Idea is the neceflary 
 Refult of all our other Conceptions of the eternal 
 and moft per fed Being abfolutely confider'd. For a 
 Being which eflfentially and independently poflcfles a 
 perfed Selfadivity, Intelligence, and Liberty, (to 
 which three Ideas, all our Conceptions ot the Di- 
 vine Internal Attributes appear to be reducible) join'd 
 with a juft Refledion upon, and Valuation ot 'em, 
 can't but be completely happy. 
 
 All real Happinefs arifes from a certain Compla- 
 cence in the PolTefiion, Hope, or Expedation of 
 fome Good : Which Complacence is ever propor- 
 tionate either to the intrinfick Worth, or, at leaft, 
 
 E 2 to 
 
6 8 An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 
 to the Eflimation of that Good in the Mind of its 
 Subjed. From which, 'tis evident, that That only- 
 can be a compleatly happy Being, which both pof- 
 feffes a perfect and permanent Good, and whofe 
 Opinion of it is ever agreeable to its real Worth. 
 
 As it hence appears that the Eternal Being can't | 
 but be a perfectly happy Being .; fo it is no lefs ' 
 clear, that Himfelf is the only Reafon of his Com- 
 placence and Happinefs ; for as much as his own 
 Nature alone comprehends whatever is good and va- 
 luable. For fmce fas will be fnewn hereafter j what- 
 ever elfe exifts, could have no other real Worth but 
 what it deriv'd from the eternal and moft perfe£t 
 Being •, 'tis manifeft that what-ever Good is found in 
 any other Nature, can no otherwife pleafe him than 
 as a Communication from Flimfelf : Which Pleafure 
 can no more increafe his eflential Happinefs, than 
 the Refledion of a Ray can add to the Lullre of the 
 Sun. 
 
 The Eficureans Vftr^ fo far from imagining their 
 Deities could receive any Acceflion to their Happi- 
 nefs by concerning themfelves with Beings of an in- 
 ferior Rank, that they thought it too mean an Em- 
 ployment, and a Fatigue inconfiftent with that Re- 
 pofe or Tranquillity, which they conceiv'd to be 
 the chief Ingredient of Happinefs. Therefore, in 
 pure Civility, they banifh'd 'em out of the World, 
 pretending it yielded no Place worthy of their Refi- 
 dence, and feated them in certain ultramundane Spa- 
 ces, there to live in uninterrupted Pleafure, and 
 neither to trouble themfelves nor others, by a too 
 officious intermedling with human Affairs. Their 
 Seats the Poet thus defcribes. 
 
 ^as neque concutiunt Venti, neque Nuhila Nimbis 
 Afpergunt^ neque Nix acri concreta 'Pruind 
 Cana cadens violate femperqu-e-innuhilus JSiher 
 Intent, et large diffufo Lu?mne ridet, 
 
 -And 
 
Exiftence and Nature of GOT). 69 
 
 — — — And happy Scats, 
 Which Storm or violent Tempefl never beats. 
 Nor Snow invades, but with the pureft Air, 
 And gaudy Light diffus'd, look gay and fair. 
 
 Creech. 
 
 Thus thofe Philofophers were us*d to conceive of 
 their tiditious Deities •, if at leafh it be not a Difpa- 
 ragement to that Honourable Charadler to call fuch 
 Men Philofophers^ who, though we lliould in Cha- 
 rity fuppofe them to have bcliev'd fuch Divine Be- 
 ings, yet, like the Vulgar, fram'd them after their 
 own Model. For though it muft be own'd, that 
 they have rightly placed Happinefs in the 'Tranquil- 
 lity of the Mind, yet in this they were deceiv'd, when 
 they fuppos'd that fuch Tranquillity was abfolutely 
 inconfiitent with Ad:ion in fuch a Being as the Deity. 
 How mean and unphilofophical was it to imagine 
 the moft perfed: Power lliould be fubjed to Fa^ 
 tigue, or that the moft perfeft Underftanding fliould 
 be perplex'd and difcompos'd by too much Appli- 
 cation and Solicitude ! This was, in Eftecft, to min-. 
 gle the two Extremes, and to level the nobleft with 
 the bafeft of Beings : Thofe Natures being ever the 
 leaft perfect which are the leaft capable of and pro^ 
 penfe to Action. 
 
 From all this the general Conclufion is, that as 
 nothing in any of the inferior Beings is capable of 
 making any Addition to the Happinefs of the Deity 
 (which can refultonly h-om the Confcioufnefs of his 
 own eflential Perfections •,) fo his creating fuch Bcr 
 ings, and caring for them when created, could be 
 no Diminution of it. 
 
 E 3 CHAP. 
 
7Q An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 CHAP, IX. 
 
 E now proceed to confider our Ideas of the 
 Divine Perfed:ion or Sufficiency with Re- 
 ference to other Beings as merely pojfihle. 
 
 I. One of thefe we obferv'd to be Omnipotence, 
 or Perfeft Efiedive Power. By this, 'tis conceiv'd, 
 no more can be meant, than an Ahility to do or pro- 
 duce whatever is confijient in it/elf , and agreeable to the 
 Divine Nature. For to extend it farther, would be 
 in EfFedl to afcribe to the Deity a Power of caufing 
 a Thing both to be and not to be at once and in 
 the fame Senfe f for all Contradidlions arc reducible 
 to That) or, which is all one, a Power of producing 
 afuhjiantial Nothing. 
 
 The proper Aftion of perfed effeflive Power, will 
 appear to have a twofold Notion, viz. either of 
 Creation or of Sufientation. 
 
 By Creation, is here meant the Production of a 
 Thing that before was not. By Sujientation, we un- 
 derftand the preferving or continuing a Thing in its| 
 Exiftence or Being. 
 
 In order to prove that the true Idea of the Divine 
 Sufficiency includes what we call Creative Power, we 
 need not here demonflrate that there has adlually been 
 a Creation. 'Twill be enough for our prefent Pur- 
 pofe, to prove Creation a Poffibility. For if this 
 can be fet in a clear Light, 'twill evidently appear, 
 that creative Power can't but belong to the eternal 
 and moft perfedl Being. 
 
 Neither is It neceflary, in order to a Proof of the 
 Poffibility of a Creation, to undertake to explain 
 the Manner of it, or to reduce its Idea to a Level 
 with our Underftandlngs. 'Twill be fufficient to 
 refcue it from the Charge of Contradiftlon and Ab- 
 furdity. For I take it, 'tis uhiverfally agreed, that 
 
 per- 
 
Exiftcnce and Nature of GO D. 71 
 perfedl Power may extend to any thing on this Side 
 a Contradi(flion. 
 
 Though we want not Variety of Proofs of the 
 Formation of the World (fuch as are derived from 
 the Nature of Succeflion, the late Invention of Arts 
 univerfally ufeful, the gradual Increafe of Mankind, 
 and other Animals, ^c.) the Evidence of which was 
 fufficientto oblige fuch Philofophers as preceded A- 
 rijlotle, almoft univerfally to attribute the prefenc 
 Frame of Things either to the Agency of a pow- 
 erful and moft intelligent Being, or elfe to a cafual 
 Hit or lucky Combination of the Parts of Matter ; 
 yet it feems to have been their Opinion, that the 
 Matter o^ y/h\c\\ it was form*d was eternal and inde- 
 pendent. This their Perfwafion appears to have 
 been grounded on the Obfervation of the prefent 
 Courfe of Nature and Art ; according to which, 
 whatever is producM is made out of pre-exiflenc 
 Materials. From hence it was that they concluded 
 it abfurd to imagin any thing fhould (as they wrong- 
 ly exprefs'd it) either fpring out of Nothing, or be 
 reduc'd to Nothing. 
 
 But *tis worth obferving, that many of the Phi- 
 lofophers, who could not, in the Caufe of a Deity, 
 raife their Speculations above the vulgar Level, were, 
 when they came to reafon on the contrary Hypo- 
 thecs, extravagant and fantaftick enough. Thofe 
 very Gentlemen who were fo careful to avoid an 
 Abfurdity (as they would fain have had it account- 
 ed j on the Side of Religion, were not fo fcrupulous 
 in the Defence of Atheifm. For rather than fup- 
 pofe this noble Frame of the World to have been 
 the Creature of a perfectly powerful and intelligent 
 Caufe, they chofe to fiither it on Chance, and to 
 turn the moft ferious Affiiir into a Game at Hazard, 
 Rather than own their Relation to the greatt-ft and 
 beft of Beings, they chofe to level themfelvcs with 
 the Brutes, to imagine that, like Infedis, they were 
 E 4 originally 
 
72 An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 
 originally begotten by the Sun's Heat, and fprung 
 from Pimples and Tumours of the Earth. They 
 could eafily derive Liberty from NecefTity, Beauty 
 from Deformity, Harmony from Difcord, by a 
 piere Chance, or, which -is all one, without any 
 determining Caufe at al], . But to create the minuteft 
 Thing in Nature, muft, in their Opinion, pafs for 
 ?,bfolutely impofiible. And why ? But becaufe 
 they had never feen an Inftance of that Kind. They 
 could fometimes indeed believe as Itrongly as other 
 People ; but here they defired to be excufed, and 
 could not think themfi^lves oblig'd to believe a Crea- 
 tion, becaufe they were not admitted to be Witneffes 
 of the Work ! They never had feen the Birth of the 
 leaft Duft or Atom, how then could they imagine 
 a Generation of the Univerfe * ! They could never 
 obferve an Artificer to make any Piece of Work- 
 manfhip without his Materials^ without his Injfru- 
 ments •, how then could they conceive the vafl Body 
 of the Sun, the innumerable Stars, the maffy Rocks 
 and Mountains, to have been the Effedls of Art ! 
 
 This Method of Reafoning is very like the Ar- 
 guings of a Man bred in the dark, difputing againft 
 the PolTibility of Sight. Should fuch a Perfon be 
 told that there's a Place in the World, where, if he 
 came, he fhould need only to open his Eyes, and be 
 immediately and diftinftly fenfible of an almoft infi- 
 nite Variety of Objedls, each vaflly bigger than him- 
 felf, and many of 'em at very remote Diftances j 
 would not fuch a Story as this appear to him as in- 
 credible, as that of a Creation from Nothing ? 
 Might he not, with equal Reafon, argue againft the 
 Poffibility of fuch a Relation, from the very Prin- 
 ciples thofe Philofophers made ufe of againft fuch a 
 Creation ? As yet, might he fay, I have been fen- 
 fible ot but very few Objects at once, and thofe fuch 
 
 * Ocellus and others contend, that there's no Produdion bu£ 
 by Genpratjcn. 
 
 as 
 
Exiftcnce and Nature of GOD. 75 
 
 as 1 am aflur*d could not exceed the Dimenfions of 
 my own Body, and whole Diftance was, for the 
 moft Part, no greater than the Length of my Arm 
 or Staff. And as for fuch others as I have per- 
 ceiv'd at a remoter Diftance, they have been either 
 fingle, or if more, extremely contus'd and indiftindf. 
 What Magick muil there be in my Eyes, that fo 
 little Members fliould be capable of conveying the 
 diftindl Refemblanccs of fo great Variety of bulky 
 Objedts at once ? If it be reply'd, That the Eyes 
 don't perform this alone, but with the Help of a 
 certain Inftrument call'd Light ; yet what Idea could 
 fuch a Perfon have of Light different from that of 
 his Staff? And what Inducement could fuch an Idea 
 be to him to allow that to be pofTible, which by 
 Arguments deriv'd from his own Experience, he had 
 before reje<5ted as abfurd and incredible ? 
 
 But though fuch a Perfon, if he (with thofe Phi- 
 lofophers) rcfolvc to admit nothing for Truth or 
 Poffibility, but what is agreeable to his own Ex- 
 perience of Things, and upon a Level with the pre- 
 fent Ideas of his own Mind, muft remain under a 
 NecelTity of disbelieving all the Reports he hears of 
 Sight and Colours, and rejecting them as Impoftures, 
 yet we, who have had the Ufe of our Eyes, fhall 
 never, I fuppofe, be perfuaded, to come into his 
 Opinion. 
 
 This ought to convince us, that there may be 
 Pollibilities in the Nature of Things, of which we 
 are as incapable of forming Ideas, as fuch a Perfon 
 would be of forming the Idea of Sight. And why 
 may not Creation be fuch a PofTibility ? Why may 
 not He produce from Nothing, whofc EfTence and 
 Adion depend on Nothing ? If we find ourfelves 
 incapable of conceiving how a Thing which was not 
 fnould begin to be, are we not alike incapable of 
 comprehending how any thing (hould exilt without 
 Beginning? 
 
 Wc 
 
74 -^^ Impartial Enquiry into the 
 
 We need only take a View of ourfelves, to find 
 Inftances of fuch Powers and Manners of Afting as 
 are inconceivable to us. It can't be deny'd that we 
 perceive, we confider and refled, we confute and 
 demonflrate ; yet we may perhaps as well conceive 
 the Creation of the Univerfe, as the Produdtion of 
 a fingle Thought by the Mind. Our Feet pra(5life 
 all the Steps of a Dance, our Fingers readily per- 
 form their Parts at a Mufical Concert ; and yet I 
 doubt, we are no better acquainted with the Power 
 which imprefles and governs their Motions, than 
 with that which regulates the Courfes of the Stars. 
 But if we fo little underftand fuch Powers and Ac- 
 tions of our own as do not come within the imme- 
 'diate Notice of our external Senfes, ought we to 
 think it ftrange that we can't comprehend the Ac- 
 tion of a Being fo much fuperior to ourfelves, and 
 whofe Nature fo vaftly tranfcends the Capacity of 
 our weak and imperfed Minds ? 
 
 We can't comprehend by what Sort of Power 
 God moves Matter ; and need we admire we can 
 form no Idea of the Power by which he created it ? 
 Our Imaginations have no other Materials to work 
 on, in forming an Idea of the original Power, but 
 fuch as they derive from the Objeds we daily con- 
 verfe with. But may not a Perfon who has an I6te- 
 rifm in his Eyes, with as much Reafon contend, 
 there's no other Colour but yellow, as we, who are 
 fo little acquainted with the World, that there's no 
 nobler Manner of Adling, than fuch as our narrow 
 Experience informs us of ? 
 
 But fome will perhaps objed, that a Produdion 
 from Nothing is not only inconceivable to us in our 
 prefent Circumftances, but contradidory, or abfo- 
 lutely inconceivable. 
 
 Before we reply 'twill be fit to premife, that it is 
 a very wrong Notion of Creation, to imagine it to 
 be the Produdion of a Thing from Noching, as from 
 
 a 
 
Exiftcncc and Nature of G O 1). 7 5 
 
 a material Caufe or SuhjcB. Our Definition of it is 
 no other than the Produ^ion of a Thing lohuh was 
 not before. 
 
 This being confider'd, I would ask the Obje(5tors, 
 wherein the Nature of a Contradiftion confifts ? Is 
 it not in at once affirming and denying fomewhat of 
 the fame Subjeft in the fame Manner ? But what is 
 there like this in the Suppofition of fuch a Creation ? 
 I confefs, if any Man could be found fo abfolutely 
 ftupid and void of Underftanding, as to affirm that 
 the Deity, in creating the World, had either pro- 
 duc'd it out of Nothing as out of a pre-exiflent Sub- 
 ject, or had causM it both to Be and not to Be, to 
 be Something and Nothing at the fame Time, fuch 
 a Notion of it might have fome Right to the Cha- 
 rader of a Contradiction. But fince by Creation 
 no more can be meant than the caufing to be what 
 was not before, this is evidently no more a Contra- 
 diction, than what we perceive to be done every 
 Day •, I mean the Production of new Motions by the 
 Mind. Which is likewife a Sort of Production from 
 Nothing. * 
 
 But if the Notion of fuch Creation be no Contra- 
 diction, then the A^ of Creation, how inconceiv- 
 able foever the Manner of it may be to us, can't 
 but be a Poffibility, or it mull ncceffarily come 
 within the Compafs of that Power which we have 
 already prov'd to be perfeCt. For 'tis impoffible a 
 Power fhould be perfeCt, if there be any thing not 
 implying a Contradiction, which it can't do. 
 
 The other Notion of the proper ACtion of fuch ef- 
 fective Power as is included in the Perfection or Suf- 
 ficiency of the~Eternal Being confider'd with Refe- 
 rence to other Beings as poffible, is that of Su^en- 
 tation, by which is meant the continuing a Thing in 
 its Exigence. I take it to be undeniable, that the 
 
 * See more in Free Thoughts concernirg Souls, p. 134. 
 
 mero 
 
76 An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 mere caufing a Thing to Be, can't infer a Neceflity 
 of its Continuance in Being. If the Creation of 
 any thing fliould import a Neceflity of its future 
 Continuance, that Neceflity mufl: either proceed 
 from the Nature of the Creature, or elfe it mufl: flow 
 from either the Nature or the Decree of the Crea- 
 tor. Not from the Nature of the Creature. For 
 then 'twould be impofilble even to that Power to an- 
 nihilate it which at firft produc'd it. Nor from the 
 Nature of the Creator. For no eflfential Perfedion 
 of the eternal omnipotent Being can be imagin'd to 
 infer the Neceflity of a Creature's Continuance to 
 Eternity, but what mufl: be conceiv'd to have e- 
 qually infer'd a Neceflity of its Production from 
 Eternity. Nor, lajtly^ can it proceed merely from 
 the Decree of the Creator. For the Decrees even of 
 the Supreme Being can have no Eficd: unlefs put in 
 Execution. But they can't be put in Execution 
 without Power. And if not without Power, then 
 the Exercife of that Power can be no lefs than what 
 is meant by the Act of Sullentation. 
 
 From the Naturebf Sufl:entation,'tis eafy tocolle6l 
 what mufl be the true Notion of Annihilation. For 
 if a Creature can't be conceiv'd to have any natural 
 Aptitude to continue rather than to ceafe to be, but 
 mufl: be fuppos'd to fubflft entirely by a Dependence 
 on the Power which originally produc'd it ; then 
 there can be no Neceflity to imagine any pofltive 
 Influx of Power to deftroy k. 'Tisfuflicient to fup- 
 pofe a Sufpenfion of that Influence on which it de- 
 pended. 
 
 The A6ts of Creation and Suftentation we terni'd 
 the proper Aois of Omnipotence. For the Power which 
 is capable of thefe, can't but be equally capable of 
 all others on this Side a Contradiction : There be- 
 ing no imaginable Degrees of Power between the 
 producing or continuing a Subftance which was not, 
 
 and 
 
Exlftcnce and Nature of GOT). 77 
 and the caufing a Thing both to Be and not to Be 
 at once. 
 
 II. The next Conception of Sufficiency with Re- 
 ference to pojfible Eileds, is that oi' Wifdo7n •, where- 
 by is ("here) meant a perfc5l Ability to dijpofe and re- 
 gulate in order to the mojl effectual Attainment of the 
 beft Ends. In this Idea is not only included fimple 
 IntelHgence, but whatever other Ideas have a Rela- 
 tion to it •, fuch as Imagination, Memory, and Judg- 
 ment. All which are hereby afferted to belong to 
 the Deity i but in a Manner agreeable to his Pcr- 
 fedion. 
 
 A Being capable of producing no other than a 
 Chaos, or diforderly Heap of Rubbifh, without the 
 Power of contriving or difpofiog it fo as might be 
 conducive to fome valuable End, could have nojuft 
 Claim to the Character of a fufficient Creator. Ef- 
 fedtive Power, fingly confider'd, can fupply only 
 the grofs Materials, and imprefs a rude unbiafs'd 
 Motion. Therefore to conceive a Creator without 
 Contrivance and Defign, is to fink his Character 
 below that of an ordinary Artificer. Such a Be- 
 ing could be no Way fuperior to one of Epicu- 
 rus's infignificant Deities, and might e'en as well fit 
 an idle Spectator of the Dancing Atoms, as be any 
 farther concern'd in the Work. 
 
 Nor could Omnipotence, join'd with Contrivance 
 and Defign, be enough to furnifli the Notion of a 
 perfedt Creator, without the Suppofition of a Su- 
 perintending and Regulating Power : Which there- 
 fore makes the other Part of our Notion of Wifdom. 
 Without fuch a Power, the Creator's Defigns 
 would be fubjedl to the Hazard of a Defeat, and 
 his Creatures might entirely tail of reaching their 
 refpedive Ends ; which would be no Way recon- 
 cilcable to the Idea of Sufficiency or Perfedion. 
 
 But the Divine Wifdom is not only deducible 
 from the general Idea of Perfection or Sufficiency, 
 
 but 
 
78 An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 but may be demonftrated from the particular Per-' 
 fedtions already difcover'd. For fince the Deity 
 was ever a perfedly felf-confcious, free, and omni- 
 potent Being (as was prov'd j he could not but ever 
 fully comprehend not only his own particular Na- 
 ture and Adion, but in the general, the Nature and 
 Adion of whatever was producible. By Confe- 
 quence, he could not but know whatever might at 
 any time become either fit or unfit, agreeable or dif- 
 agreeable, either to his own, or any other Nature or 
 Adion ; and fo could not but poffefs a perfeft Abi- 
 lity both to judge of and to propofe the befl End, 
 and to chufe and employ the moft conducive Means 
 upon all Occafions : Which is the complete Notion 
 of Wifdom. 
 
 III. Another undoubted Perfedlion of the eternal 
 Being with Refpedl to other Beings confider'd as 
 pojfihle^ is that of Omnifcience. The Demonflration 
 of this has been already produc'd in the Proof we 
 juft now gave of the Divine Wifdom. For the 
 Ideas of Wifdom and Knowledge, as elTential to the 
 Deity, have a near Affinity to each other : Wif- 
 dom being no other than his Knowledge confider'd 
 with Reference to Pradlice. Therefore that which 
 Ihall here be added concerning the Attribute of Om- 
 nifcience, will refer only to the Notion, which it's 
 humbly conceiv'd, we ought to form of it as natural 
 to the Deity. 
 
 The general Perfedion or Sufficiency of the Di- 
 vine Nature has taught us, that Omnifcience, as 
 well as all its other particular Perfedtions, ought to 
 be confider'd as natural or elTential to it. But the 
 fame Sufficiency may inftruft us not to conceive any 
 effential Perfedlion of the Deity with a proper De- 
 pendence on other Beings. For that Being can't be 
 fd f-fufficient, whofe ElTence is properly dependent 
 on another. 
 
 It 
 
Exigence and Nature of G OT). 79 
 It feems then to have been fo tar from an Imper- 
 fcdlion in the eternal Being to have been Himfclf 
 the only particular determinate Object of his eflen- 
 tial Perception or Knowledge, that the contrary 
 Suppofition would debafe his Idea, and prove inju- 
 rious to his Perfedlion. The Evidence of this may 
 be fcen even in our felves. If we find our felves im- 
 proved or advantag'd by our Acquaintance with 
 other Beings, this yields an infallible Proof of our 
 natural Poverty and Infufficiency. 'Tis the Depen- 
 dence and Imperfection of our Natures which give^ 
 us an Inclination to feek our Happinefs beyond our 
 felves : Whereas to the moft perfedt of Brings, the 
 Confcioufnefs of his own efTential Properties could 
 not but be an eternal Spring of Complacence and 
 Satisfadiion. To think otherwife, would be, in ef- 
 fed, to fuppofe the Fountain to be fed by its own 
 Streams, or the Sun to be enlightened by its own 
 Rays. 
 
 Thefe Reflexions feem to make it evident, that 
 whoever will form a fuitable Idea of the elTential 
 Omnifcience of the moft perfedl of Beings, ought 
 to confider it without Regard to any particular 
 future Obje(fts. For though fuch a Being as was 
 naturally and perfeftly confcious of his own ellential 
 Activity fthe immediate Source of all other Beings) 
 could not but ever have a moft perfect Knowledge 
 of the utmoft Extent of PoIFibility, yet this might 
 very well be without any necefTary Determination 
 to particular EtFefts. The Knowledge of God, be- 
 ing perfect, was without Difpute eiTentially or ne- 
 celfarily extended to every Poflibility. But the E- 
 lediion or Choice of this or that Poflibilicy in order 
 to its future Exiftcncc, was, it is conceiv'd, entire- 
 ly the Refult of his Liberty and Sovereign Pleafure. 
 For though the Supreme Perfection of his Nature 
 could not but incline him to external A<ition in che 
 general, Cas to what was more lit than a State of 
 
 In- 
 
So An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 Inadivity) yet that Perfedion can't, it's conceiv'd, 
 have necefTarily determin'd him to any external A61 
 in particular, forafmuch as no particular A6t or Ob- 
 jedl can be faid to have been abfolutely beft or fit- 
 teft. But if fuch neceffary Determination could not 
 proceed from his effential Perfedlion, it follows that 
 it could have proceeded from no other Original but 
 Imperfection and Dependence i which the Nature of 
 the Eternal Being, we are aflur'd, could never ad- 
 mit. 
 
 And though the particular Decrees of God, and i 
 the Exiftence and Adions of the Creatures confe- 
 quent thereupon, may be conceiv'd to infer a new 
 Modification of the Divine Knowledge, yet this can 
 import no Dependence ; for as much as it proceeded 
 not originally from the Natures or Exiftence of the 
 Creatures, but purely from the Liberty and Omni- 
 potence of the great Creator Himfelf. 
 
 Much lefs could that Knowledge which the Deity 
 ever had of the future Exiftence of Creatures in ge- 
 neral, infer any Dependence on the Creatures ; fince 
 it miift likewife be conceiv'd as entirely proceeding 
 from his effential Perfe6tion, without the leaft Re- 
 gard to, much lefs Dependence on, any particular 
 determinate Objefts. For notwithftanding fuch 
 Foreknowledge, any particular Being might either 
 have exifted or not exifted, according to his Sove- 
 reign Pleafure. 
 
 CHAP. X. 
 
 WE come now to fuch Ideas of the Divine Per- 
 fedion as we derive from the Confideration 
 of other Beings as a5lually exijlent. Which Ideas 
 denote no particular Perfecftions of the Divine Na- 
 ture, but only thofe of its Aftiohs. 
 
 L The 
 
Exigence ^w^ Nature of G O D. si 
 
 I. The firft of thefc we obferv'd to be Goodhcfs 
 or Benevolence. Which, together with Government 
 and Providence, yields us a more fenfible Proof of 
 the Truth of all our former Ideas of God. 
 
 The Word Goodnefs may be taken either in a Me- 
 
 taphyfical Senfe, viz. as denoting the Hime with the 
 
 general Perfeftion of the Divine Nature, or elfe in a 
 
 [ Moral Senfe, fo as to fignify a Notion of our Minds 
 
 I derived from the Confideration of the Excrcife of 
 
 \ certain particular Perfe6lions of that adorable Nature 
 
 with Reference toother Btrings. And 'tis in this 
 
 latter Senfe we take it here. 
 
 By Goodnefs m this Senfe, we here underlland the 
 free Delerminalion and Exercife of the Diviiie IVifdoin 
 and Power in creating and fufaining or preferving the 
 H^orld for the wifefi and bejl of Ends. 
 
 That Creation and Suftentation, confider'd liitfj 
 Reference to the Deity, are reputed Ads of Goodnefs^ 
 proceeds from hence, that they are concciv'd to have 
 deriv'd from the Perfection of the Divine Nature, 
 without any Couftraint, or the leail Determination 
 from any Thing ExterntiK 
 
 Had the Deity created and fuflained the World by 
 an external Nectjfity, luch as the Stoicks imagin'd, 
 k muft be confefs'd he would have been as far trom 
 ftieriting the Denomination of Good or Benevolent, 
 jls any Inftrument in the Hand of an Architedh 
 
 But if we only fuppofe the Realbns for creating 
 and Hill prcferving a World were ever fuch and fo 
 early perceiv'd by the divine Intelk6l, that the 
 teeity was never indetermin'd in that Rcfpctt, nor 
 luld have omitted it in Confiftenee with the internal 
 Perfe^ions of his own Nature ; the Cafe muft be 
 low'd to be very different. Hy this Supp6fition 
 both the Liberty and Goodnefs of the great Crea- 
 tor are fufficiently fecur'd j as we obfcrv'd when wc 
 treated of Liberty. 
 
 F Now 
 
8 2 An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 
 Now that all the A6ts of the Deity muft needs 
 come under the Notion of Goodnefs, may be firmly 
 demonftrated from pur general Idea of his Perfedion. 
 For being compleatly fufficient and independently 
 happy, he could have no pofTible Temptation to 
 Evil : Since that could only proceed either from 
 natural Imperfedion, or from Depravation ; from 
 both which the felf-fufficient Being was eternally 
 remov'd. To imagine that the great Creator could 
 a6t either for no End at all, or for a chief End that 
 was either Evil, or lefs Good, or Indifferent, would 
 be to fuppofe that the moft perfeft Wifdom could 
 adt Imperfedly, i. e. Unwifely, without the leaft 
 imaginable Byafs or Temptation. 
 
 By what has been obferved, it appears, by the 
 Way, that Goodnejs, as it agrees to the Idea of God, 
 can properly be no other than the free or unconftrain- 
 ed Determination and Exercife of his Wifdom and 
 Power, as regulated by that original Fitnefs which 
 is in the Nature or Circumftances of Things and Ac- 
 tions. For that there is an original Fitnefs and Un- 
 fitnefs in the Ideas and Relations of fome Things 
 and Adions, muft be confefs'd •, unlefs we will fay, 
 that it was as fit for the Deity either to have created 
 no Inhabitants of this noble Structure of the World, 
 or elfe Inhabitants neither capable of relifhing the 
 Pleafure which its Furniture could afford, nor 
 of thanking and praifing him for it, as to have 
 created fuch a Being as Man, a Being equally ca- 
 pable of both. 
 
 To demonftrate that the Deity has indeed a6ted 
 according to the moft perfe6l Notion of Goodnefs, 
 it remains that we diredlly prove there has a(5lually 
 been a Creation, which we before prov'd to be 
 pofTible ; or that thisvaft, orderly, and moft beau-r 
 tiful Scene of Things was the Work of that all-wife, 
 free, and omnipotent Being, who, though indi- 
 
 gent 
 
Fx'iftence and Nature of GOT). %i 
 gent of no other Being, has given E^diftence and a 
 Foflibility ot' riaj^pincfs to Beings innumerable. 
 
 Now this is X necL'lIiiry IiJ^rcncc from our Obfer-k 
 vation of the World, comparM with the rational 
 Principles eftabhfli'd in the Kcginr/mg of this En- 
 quiry. For if we take a confiderate View of Things, 
 we Ihall eafily perceive, that in al] that beautiful 
 and furprizing Variety of Beings with which we arc 
 I acquainted, there's none can lay ajuftClaim to io 
 [high a Privilege as that of an abfolute Nccefiity of 
 Exiflence. The far greater Part are evidently void 
 of Life, Underjlanditigy Liberty, and fuch other 
 Perfedions as we have found ourfelves obliged to 
 afcribe to a Being that thus neceflarily exifls. And 
 as for ourfelves, and fuch others as have fomc faini^ 
 Refemblances of thofe Perfedions, our Mutability 
 alld abfolute Incapacity of fecuring to ourfelves the 
 Poffefiion of them, are infallible Proofs that we can 
 laim no Right to 'em through an abfolute Necef- 
 ity. But if not through an abfolute Neceffity, then 
 C can be only by Vircue of the Caufality of fome 
 )tiginal fuperior Power 5 which^ as we formerly 
 )rov*d, could be no lefs than Omnipotence •, and that 
 X)uld originally refide in none but the Eternal Beings 
 Wiofe Exiftence isabfolutely neceflary, and who, by 
 !^nfequence, poffeffes all pofllble Perfedions. 
 
 And that the Divine Goodnefs has not only dif- 
 
 ;over'd itfelf in the Creation of the Univerfe, but: 
 
 ftill no lefs concern'd in fuftaining or preferving itj 
 
 equally certain. 'Tis clear from what we before 
 
 bferv'd, that a Creature can't fubfift with an abfo- 
 
 ite Independence. To exill thus independently, is 
 
 ) exift neceffiirily in the moil: abfolute Senfe. But 
 
 bfolute NecefTity of Exiftence is by no Means a- 
 
 teeable to the Notion of a Creature. Therefore, 
 
 nee the Creatures continue to exift, it can be only 
 
 y a Dependence on the Goodnefs of that omnipo- 
 
 F 2 tens 
 
84 >^^ Impartial Enquiry into the 
 
 tent and mod beneficent Being which at firft proda*, 
 
 ced them. 
 
 But if the Univerfe was at firft created, and is 
 ftlll fuftain'd or preferv'd by no lefs than an Al- 
 mighty Power, this inftrufts us in the Idea we 
 ought to form of the Greatnefs^ as well as the Good- 
 nejs of that Eternal Nature which is the Subjeft of 
 that Power. For fince Nothing can, without a 
 Contradiction, be faid to adt immediately on what 
 is at a Diftance, 'tis clear that fuch a proper univerfal 
 Suftentation (which could be the original Effe£t of 
 none but the Eternal Being) can't be fuppos'd with- 
 out an univerfal intimate Penetration and Omnipre- 
 fence. 
 
 Nor can the Suppofition of fuch a Penetration be ' 
 reafonably fufpefted to be inconfiftent with that fub- 
 ftantial Diftinftion which is neceflary to be alTerted 
 between the Creator and his Creatures. For the 
 Creatures may, notwithftanding, very well be diffe- , 
 rent Beings and Subftances, in as much as they are^ 
 not only, for the moft Part, entirely deftitute of 
 fiich Perfedions as we have difcover'd in the Eternal, 
 Being, but are, in the general, the ultimate Sub- 
 jedls of fome or other Property, which (as inclu-, 
 ding Imperfeftion) can't birt be unapplicable to^ 
 Him ; fuch as Mobility, Divifibility, Qc. 
 
 If indeed, with Spinoza, we will needs confine"" 
 ourfelves to the ftrideft Notion of Suhjlance, and 
 allow it to agree to nothing but what is abfolutely 
 independent, wc muft then, with Him, banifh all 
 real Dlverfity of Beings out of the World, and af- 
 fert but one Subftance or real Being, and muft, by 
 Confequence, allow that there's no other Deity but 
 the Material Univerfe. But fince, on the contrary, 
 we are afllir'd, that befides the original or inde- 
 pendent Being, there are Subjects of Attributes not 
 only very different, but contrary to His (fuch as 
 were mention'd above) confequently, as we muft,. 
 
 1 • not- 
 
Exigence and Nature of GOT). 85 
 nocwithftanding the moft intimate Penetration, al- 
 fert an immutable Diftindlion between them and the 
 independent Being, io we may in the larger and no 
 lels proper Senfc, allow the Name of Suhjlance to 
 both. For to be the ultimate Subje<fls of peculiar 
 \ Attributes or Properties, is, according to the origi- 
 I nal Signification of the Word, to be dijlin^l Sub- 
 fiances. This makes it clear, that Spinoza does no 
 k[s than beg the whole Quellion in Debate, when as 
 a Foundation for his pretended Demonftrations, he 
 fuppofes lb dogmatically, and without the lead 
 Proof, that Nothing is properly a Subftance but 
 what is abfolutely independent •, or, as he exprefTes 
 I it, ff^bat exijls in itfelf, and is conceived by itfelf^ or 
 whofe Conception does not need nor require the Concept 
 \ tion of any other Thing in order to its being formed * : 
 Which he afterwards explains, when he tells us, *Tis 
 ihe very Nature of Subjlance to cxifl, or its EJfence ne- 
 cejfarily includes Exijlence **. And yet it is on this 
 too ftrait Definition of Subftance, together with the 
 Suppofition of the Abfolute Infinity of Extenfion, and 
 an abfolute material Plenum, (both which, we con- 
 ceive, will be likewife fufficiently confuted in the 
 Second Part of this Enquiry) that the main Articles 
 of Spinoza's Creed are built. 
 
 • Per Subftantiam intelUgo quod in fe eft et per fe concipitur, hoc 
 efly id cujits Concept us non indiget Concept]* alterius re: a qm forma' ■ 
 •i debeat. Spin, in E//^. P. i. De/. ■^. 
 
 ** j^d Naturam Subftantia: pcrtin^t exiftere ; hoc eft, ipftus Ef- 
 (tntia involvit nect-Jfario Exijientiam. Id. Prop. 7. 
 
 CHAP. XL 
 
 HE next Idea of the Divine Sufficiency or 
 
 Perfedlion with Regard to other Beings, as 
 
 i^ually exiftent, is derived from the Vifible Effedls 
 
 of Wifdom CO he obferv'd in the World ; and it 
 
 F 3 may^ 
 
8 6 An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 may, perhaps, noc unfitly be exprefs'd by the Word 
 Government. Under which we fhall crave Liberty 
 to comprehend All the A5is of the Wifdom of the Om- 
 tiiptent Beings as moderating or governing his own Ac- 
 tivity^ both in -propfing his Ends, and in difpofing and 
 managing the feveral Creatures agreeably to their Na- 
 tures, for the moff effeSiual Attainment of them. 
 
 T\\t great End oi the all-wife Creator in the Pro- 
 duftion of the World, we may be aflur'd, was the 
 univerfal Benefit and Happinefs of his Creatures accor- 
 ding to their feveral Capacities. For, as we have al- 
 ready prov*d, that the Perfedion of his Nature was 
 abfolutely inconfiftent with the Propofal of a chief 
 End in the Creation, which was either Evil, or lefs 
 Good, or Indifferent ; fo the fame Perfedlion may 
 convince us, that his End in creating the World, 
 could not be any Good or Advantage to Himfelf, 
 who was indigent of Nothing, and whofe eflential 
 Happinefs was abfolutely incapable of the leail Ac- 
 ceflion. 
 
 The Means which his Wifdom has employ *d for 
 the Attainment of his Ends, will, in the general, 
 appear to be, 
 
 1 . That moft exa6t and orderly Q^nfiitution and 
 Vifpofition of the feveral Parts of the World. And, 
 
 2. That admirably prudent Regulation or Covern- 
 7nent of fuch Parts of it as are furniihed with a Prin-^ 
 cipleofLife and Adion. Of both which in their 
 Order. 
 
 I. In difcourfing on the former of thefe Means, 
 we fhall here omit many of the ufual Inftances of 
 Wifdom and Defign, not only becaufe they have 
 been already fufficiently confider'd by others, but 
 chiefly becaufe, being fuch as were abfolutely necef- 
 iary either to the Whole, or to fuch Parts of the 
 World to which they peculiarly belong ; they feem 
 pot fo fit to be objeded to Men of Atheiftick Prin- 
 ciples as Proofs of the Divine Agency, fince thej^; 
 ^ ■ ^ may 
 
Exigence and Nature of GOD. 87 
 may be eluded as mere neccfTary Pre-requifites to 
 the prefcnt State of Things. For, may an E^ncurean 
 Atheijt fay. We are not fo abfurd as to imagine the 
 Effeils ot Chance to have been fubjed to the rigo- 
 rous Laws ot Mechanifm, or that the eternal felf- 
 motive Matter of the Univerfe combin'd at the firft 
 into none but regular Models. For it is infinitely 
 probable, there have been innumerable Worlds in 
 the boundlefs Extent of Eternity, which, by realbn 
 of their Confufion and Irregularity, fuccefTively dif- 
 folved into their original Atoms, e*rc a World fo 
 regular as this could be compos'd. And even in the 
 prefent Frame of Things, it is not to be imagin'd 
 (in Confidence with our Principles) that the feveral 
 Parts were all at the very firft Hit fowell difpos'd as 
 they now appear to bs : It being equally probable, 
 that innumerable Beings have exifted in it, which, 
 becaufe of fome ellential Defeft in their Conftitu- 
 tion, foon returned to their firft Principles, or elfe 
 wanting a Capacity to propagate their Species, be- 
 came extinft. According to this Scheme, a Perfon 
 of that Charafter will be fir from admitting fuch 
 Regularities as Arguments of Wifdom and Defign ; 
 as conceiving them to have been no more than was 
 neceifary to the Continuance of the few cafual Ef- 
 fects which he fuppofes to have furvived the infi, 
 nite Numbers that have long fince perifhed. 
 
 We fliall therefore not only omit fuch Inftances of 
 Wifdom and Defign, but fhall gratify our Epicurean 
 fo far, as for the prefent, to admit his Principles of 
 necefiary unintelligent Matter and eternal Motion. 
 We'll even fuppofe (what we have likewife proved 
 to be falfe) that this Motion was a capable Principle 
 of Variety. Upon thefe Suppofitions we fhall not, 
 at prefent, deny it to have been pofTible (though in- 
 finitely improbable) that after innumerable fruftra- 
 neous Rencounters and Combinations of the Parts of 
 
 F 4 Mat- 
 
8S An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 
 Matter, fuch a Frame of Things might have chanc'4 
 to refult as fhoiild have had noeffential Defeat orBlun- 
 der in it, but fo much Order and Harmony, at 
 leaft, as was neceffary to the Subfiftence both of the 
 whole, and its feveral Parts \ which is indeed the 
 utmoll the Epicurean Principles are qualified to ac- 
 count for with the leaft Shadow of Reafon. 
 
 In Requital for thefe liberal Conceffions, we fhall 
 only exped:, that our Adverfaries will grant it to be 
 moft realbnable to conclude, that a moft wife and be- 
 nificent Caufe, if any fuch, would, befides what was 
 rieceffary to the bare Subfiftence of his Creatures, have 
 left fome Charafters of his Wifdom and Goodnefs im- 
 prefs*d upon 'em, fufficient to diftinguifh 'em from the 
 wild Effedsof Chance : Andconfequently, that if it 
 can be made appear that the prefent Frame of Things 
 (befidcs the Regularity neceflary to its Subfiftance) 
 has fuch Charadlers of Wifdom and Goodnefs every 
 where legible on it, they'll own it far more reafonable 
 to believe they were the Impreflions and Signatures 
 of fuch a Being, than the random Effeds of unma- 
 nag'd Motion and Impulfe, 
 
 In Expedation of this, we fhall offer a few 
 Things. 
 
 I, Suppofing, that after innumerable Ages, the 
 Matter of the Univerfe, by an internal Principle of 
 Motion, might atlaft, by mere Chance, have com- 
 b)in'd into Somewhat like a World, yet it can't rea- 
 fonably be imagin'd but that this World (though it 
 might have had no fundamental or deftrudive Error 
 in its Conftitution, yet) would have been full of 
 Deformities and Irregularities in Things not eftential 
 to the Subfiftence either of the whole, or of any of 
 its Parts, Men of irreligious Principles might then, 
 without Doubt, have been gratify'd \yith all the 
 various Inftances of Blunder, Deformity, and Irre- 
 gularity that can be imagin'd in Confiftence with the 
 Conftitution of the World, and the Life of Animals. 
 
 But 
 
Exiftcncc and Nature of GOD. 89 
 
 But what Pains mull they (vainly) take to difco- 
 ver one fuch Inftance in the prefcnt Frame of 
 Things ? And how difagrccabk an Employment 
 muft it needs be to an Atheill, who has any Fond- 
 nefs tor his Principles, to be at the Expence of fo 
 much Labour to difcover Defe<5ls and Irregularities 
 In that, which to an unprejudic'd Obfcrver, ftill 
 appears more admirable, and which will never fail 
 to ruggeft new Arguments, ilifficient to mortify 
 liis Pride, and fliock his Infidelity ? 
 
 To inftance only in a few Particulars, which may 
 feem the moft exceptionable. 
 
 If the Cragginefs and outward Deformity of Rocks 
 and Mountains oficnd his Sight, a little Enquiry will 
 be fufficient to convince him, that thefc are not to 
 be attributed to a Defed; of Skill and Contrivance, 
 but are partly owing to accidental Caufes, (fuch as 
 Earthquakes, Tempefts, Inundations, l£c.^ and 
 partly to be afcrib'd to Defign. For they may be 
 confider'd as the Foils of Nature, whofe Deformity 
 is wifely contriv'd to fet oft' the Beauty of her no- 
 bler Parts. 
 
 If the minuter Parts of Nature feem void of 
 Beauty and Regularity, a Microfcope will foon un- 
 deceive him, and raife his Contempt into Wonder 
 and Aftoniiliment. For many of thefe difcover 
 more furprizing Characters and Signatures of the 
 Divine Wifdom, than moft of its larger Produc- 
 tions ; fince in thefe we fee all thofe Miracles in a 
 narrower Compafs, which we ufe to admire in the 
 larger Dimenfions of the more bulky Objects. 
 Thus if we look upon the Seeds of Plants, we fhall 
 find they arc no other than the entire Plants in Mi- 
 niature. So that their Procreation is, in Reality, 
 nothing elfe but Nutrition and Growth of Parts. 
 The fame has bgcn obferved of the firft Rudiments 
 of Animals. 
 
 If 
 
90 An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 
 If certain Species of Animals feem defedlive, their 
 very Defecfls, (which yet are only comparative) will 
 yield an Argument of Contrivance and Defign. For 
 feveral jMembers would have been abfolutely ufelefs 
 in fome Parts^of the World (fuppofe in the Wa- 
 ter, or within the Surface of the Earth) which 
 yet it was not fit fhould want their proper Inhabi- 
 tants. 
 
 If he look beyond the Earth and its neighbouring 
 Planets, and view the wide Spaces of the Heavens, 
 Ihinine with the united Glories of innumerable fix'd 
 Stars, he'll fee little Caufe to objed that thefe are 
 not difpos'd into regular Figures, but feem carelefly 
 fcattered like Seeds upon the Earth. For this feem- 
 ing Diforder may be faid to reprefent fomething 
 more noble and majeftick, and which more fenfibly 
 ilrikes the Fancy than the moft regular Models of 
 human . Art. Befides, 'tis plain, that neither our 
 Station, nor the Imperfedion of our Sight, will 
 permit us to view the Heavens to the beft Advan- 
 tage. 'Tis probably but as a Point, ifcompar'd 
 with the remoter Spaces of the World, which bounds 
 our Profped. From whence we may have as little 
 Reafon to attempt to form an Idea of the whole, as 
 an Ant to judge of the DimenfionsandBeauty of the 
 Earth by what may be obferv'd in a Mole-hill. 
 But how beautifiil an Idea of thofe remoter Spaces 
 would the new Philofophy give him, which, with fo 
 much Reafon, from the Analogy of Nature, con- 
 cludes the fixed Stars to be the Centers of fo many 
 particular Syftems, and as fo many Suns to diftri- 
 bute Light and Heat to their peculiar Planets .? 
 This Hypothefis would reprefent the Univerfe to 
 him as an Aflembly of innumerable Worlds, each 
 full of the Marks of the great Creator's Wifdom, 
 ranged at Diflances the moil regular and convenient 
 that can be nnagin'd. For 'tis notcjQubted but the 
 
 ' Di- 
 
Exiftcnce and Nature of GOD. 91 
 
 Diftancts of the Planets of our Syilem are actually 
 luch. 
 
 The Deformity of fome Things confifls in Ima^ 
 gination only, proceeding from Antipathy or Aver- 
 fion •, fuch as is the Hatred between Men and Ser- 
 pents, ^c. 
 
 The feeming Want of Beauty in others might 
 proceed from Defign. For did the fame Comelinefs 
 difcover itfelf in all the Parts of Nature which is fo 
 remarkable in fome, the Art of Man would have no 
 Subjedt to wor^yupon, or at leaft, could not exert 
 itfelf without me Regret of marring the Work of 
 his Maker. 
 
 Befides, the Difigreeablenefs of fome things may 
 frequently proceed from the peculiar Make of the 
 Senfes, or Complexions and Conllicutionsof our Bo- 
 dies. For it is not unreafonable to think, that a ve- 
 ry exquifite Figure and Contexture of Parts may 
 fometimes caufe none of the moft agreeable Imprcf- 
 fions on our Senfes and Conftirutions. This may 
 appear from the regular Shapes of the minute Parts of 
 Salts •, and from the Effedls of Poyfons, which are 
 found to be very different on different Animals. 
 
 To conclude. The prefent Frame of Things 
 feems fo far from being juftly chargeable with Blun- 
 der, Irregularity, or Deformity, that, to the lefs 
 confiderate, divers Inflances of Regularity and De- 
 fign may appear fuperfluous. Of this Sort are the 
 regular Shapes and the Colours of divers Stones, and 
 particularly the curious Figures of the Leaves of 
 Plants which are found naturally reprefented on 
 Coal-Slate. The wife Author of Nature has noc 
 left even the dark Entrails of the Earth without Te- 
 ftimonies of his divine Skill, to the End that ob- 
 ferving Men might no where want Motives to ad- 
 mire and adore him, 
 
 II. Suppofing it might fo have happen'd, that the 
 Univerfe fhould have yielded no imaginable Inflancc 
 
 ot 
 
92 An Impartial Enquiry info the 
 of Blunder and Deformity, yet, 'tis inconceivable, 
 on the Hypothefis of Epicurus, that every Thing 
 fhould be difpos'd/or the Bejl, as in the prefent Sy- 
 ftem of Things. As, 
 
 I. That Nothing lliould be without its Ufe. The 
 Obfervation of the World long fince oblig'd the. 
 Philofophers fthough, fome of 'em, not very par- 
 tial to the Caufe of a Deity) to confefs and lay it 
 down for a Maxim, That Nature does Nothing in 
 vain. 
 
 'Twere a ridiculous Labour to undertake a Difco- 
 very of the Ufefulnefs of every Thing in Nature, 
 which isfo various and exuberant in her Produftions. 
 It will be enough, if we can manifeft the Ufefulnefs 
 of fuch Things as are fubjedl to common Obferva- 
 tion and Experience. For if none of thefe are with- 
 out their Ufes, we have all the Reafon in the World 
 to conclude the fame of all others. 
 
 We fliall fingle out fuch Inftances as may feeni 
 the moft unaccountable. 
 
 Though the Obliquity of the Earth's Axis may 
 feem irreconcileable to Mathematical Exaclnefs, yet 
 we are to confider, that to this we owe the pleafant 
 and ufeful Variety of Seafons, and the fitteft imagi- 
 nable Proportion of Heat and Cold, Light and 
 Darknefs, that is poflibly confident with the Figure' 
 of the Earth. 
 
 If it be faid, the Other Planets are fet at too great 
 a Diftance from the Earth, and by Confequence, are 
 the lefs capable of fupplying the Abfence of the 
 Sun's Light, we fhall fee Reafon to believe, that 
 this was fo order'd to prevent a greater Inconvenience 
 than that of Darknefs, viz. die Deftrudtion of Plants 
 and Animals by excefHve and diforderly Tides or 
 Elevations of the Sea, which are obferved to depend 
 on the Motions and Neighbourhood of thofe great 
 Bodies. 
 
 To 
 
Exiftcnce and Nature of GOT). 95 
 To die HvM S>lari (though many of them ieem to 
 be made only to twinkle, and appear to be almoft- 
 as infigniiicant Members ot" the World, as cither a 
 Spark or a Glow-worm, yet) we partly owe the Ib- 
 lid Advantages we reap by Navigation •, not to 
 mention the greater Advantages ot Habitation, Con- 
 venience and Delight, which they (or at lealt the 
 Planets, which from the Analogy of Nature, we 
 may probably conclude do attend them) may yield 
 to innumerable nobler Beings than ourfclves. 
 
 To the Mountains^ which fome have mifreprefen- 
 ted as the Wens and Excrefcences of Nature, we 
 owe the molt pleafant Profpedls, the moll delicious 
 Wines, the richeft and moft ufeful Metals, Mine- 
 rals, and other Foffils, and that which is more than 
 all, the Convenience of navigable Rivers and Foun- 
 tains. 
 
 To the Seas we are indebted for thofe vaft Quan- 
 tities of Vapours which refrefh and fructify the Earth, 
 and for our fpeedy and commodious Paflage to 
 the rcmoteft Nations. Both which Bleflings we 
 muft in a very great Degree have wanted, had the 
 Proportion of the Waters to the dry Land been con- 
 fiderably Icfs than at prefent. 
 
 If Poijbns are fometimes dellrudlive, yet when 
 skilfully prepared, they become beneficial, and the 
 Means to preferve Life, when Food is infufHcient to 
 that End. 
 
 To PFhirkvinds and Thunder we owe the Difilpa- 
 tion of Pellilential Steams, and the cleanfmg of the 
 Air, the chief Inftrument of Life. 
 
 In fliort, if the /lir be fometimes the Vehicle of 
 Infedion and Blading i if the IVaters be render'd 
 unfafe by Rocks, Quickfands, and Whirlpools -, if 
 the Fire be prone to Conflagrations ; if the Earth 
 fometimes trembles, and fwallows up its Inhabi- 
 tants i neither are thefe without their Ufes. If ic 
 was fit to implant in us the Principle of Fear, ic 
 
 could 
 
94 An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 could not be amifs to place us among fuch Obje(5ls as 
 are apt fometimes to excite and exercife it. If it be 
 natural to Men, as Creatures, to be defedlible or 
 capable of Degeneracy, then whatever contributes* 
 to retain them within the Bounds of Duty and Al- 
 legiance, and thereby prevents a greater Evil, be- 
 comes itfelf an Advantage. But what could have 
 been a more effe(5lual Curb on Vice, or Spur to 
 Virtue, than that which is apt to remind us how 
 eafily the Elements may be arm'd againft us to our 
 Deftru6tion, and the very Supports of our Lives 
 become the Inftruments of our Maker*s Juftice ? 
 
 2. 'Tis ftill lefs conceivable on the Principles of 
 Epicurus^ how the fame Thing fhould have been dif- 
 pos'd for fuch Variety of particular Ufes as may be 
 obferv'd in the World. To obtain a great Number 
 of Ends by as few Means as may be, is the higheft 
 Point ofWifdom. But nothing can be imagined 
 more admirable in this Refpeft, than the prefent 
 Frame of Things. Thus, though the human Body 
 is compos'd of a great Variety of Parts, yet how 
 much more various and numerous are their Ufes ? 
 How many are the Ufes of the Hand, which, di- 
 reded by Reafon, is inftead of all other Inftru- 
 ments ? How many Advantages do we owe to the 
 Eye, the Ear, and the Tongue ? And, if we take a 
 deeper View, and look into the minuter Parts of 
 which thefe are compounded, what can be more ad- 
 mirable than the Variety of Aims and Intentions 
 that may be obferved in each. The feveral Ufes 
 of the Structure and Pofition of each fingle Mufcle, 
 have been computed by Galen, in his Book De For- 
 matione Fa;tus, to be no lefs than Ten. The like' 
 may be obferv*d with Reference to the Bones and 
 other fimilar Parts •, but efpecially with Refpeft to 
 the Members, and fuch Parts as are heterogeneous 
 or dilTimilar. Yet it is not to be doubted, but that a 
 
 far 
 
Exiftcncc and Nature ofGOT). 9S 
 far lefs Degree of Uft^fulnefs In many of thcfc mighc 
 have been iufficienc to our Subfiflence. 
 
 3. 'Tis lefs accountable by the Epicuyean Prin- 
 ciples, how every thing fhould be adapted 10 its 
 particular Ufes in the fute ft and mojl regular Man- 
 ner, Yet what Inllrument could be better fuited 
 to Vifion than the Eye, to Opcrauon than the Hand, 
 to Motion than the Foot or Wing ? What could 
 have been invented fo convenient as the Diilances, 
 Inclinations and Celerities of the Planets of our Sy- 
 ftcm ? What could be more nice and exad; in the ' 
 general, than the Adjuftment of the Make of the 
 Bodies, and the Degrees of all Senfations of Animals 
 to their common and particular Circumftances ? This 
 whoever has obferv'd, can never enough admire. 
 Yet neither can fuch Exaclnefs in all thefe Refpecfts, 
 be imagined to have been of abfolute Neceflity to 
 the Subfiflence and Prefcrvation of Animals. 
 
 4. 'Tis no lefs unaccountable by the Hypothefis 
 of Epicurus^ tliat fo many different Parts fhould io 
 fitly and harmoniouHy confpire to one common Ufe» 
 How different are the Parts that contribute to Mo- 
 tion and Nutrition in Man and other Animals ? Yet 
 how fit is their Pofition, and how exquifitely regu- 
 lar is their A6lion ? But what is chiefly to be noted, 
 is, that all thele Parts were not abfolutely neceffa- 
 ry to the A(fts themfelves, but only to the Perfec- 
 tion of *em. For had the leafl Part been wanting, 
 the A(fts, though they might have been perform'd, 
 would have been imperfedt or irregular •, and yet 
 fliould others have been added, they could not have 
 been better'd or improv'd. A Man might hava 
 been capable of Nourifhment without the Afliflance 
 of the Tongue or Spittle ; but then it muft have re- 
 quir'd more Time, and been attended with lefs Plea- 
 fure. A Bird might have been capable of Flight 
 without the Direction or Steerage of its Tail •, but 
 then it would have been lefs fteddy and difficultly 
 
 go- 
 
96 An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 govern'd. And by the Addition of thefe fhow in- 
 confiderable foever they may feem in themfelves) the 
 A6ts are render'd fo perfedl, that the Wit of Man is 
 incapable of making the leaft Improvement. 
 
 5. *Tis ftill lefs accountable by the Principles of 
 Epiairifm, that almoft every thing fhouldbe disposed, 
 not only for Ufe, but for Ornament i The Beau- 
 ties of Nature need no Artifice to varnifh and itt 
 them off. 'Tis a fufficient Acknowledgement of 
 this that the moft admir'd Artifts never propofe to 
 excell, but to imitate it. The naked Eye may con- 
 vince us of the exquifite Colours and Proportions of 
 the greater Parts of the World ; and the Micro- 
 fcope will furprize us with the far more admirable 
 Stru6lure and Symmetry of the leffer. But in No- 
 thing is this Beauty more remarkable than in Ani- 
 mals and Vegetables. Yet fure none can be fo ab- 
 furd as to imagin, that mere Colour and Proportiorr 
 in the outward Make of their Bodies was of abfolute 
 Neceffity to their Subfillence. Nor is it a Jot more 
 reafonable to conclude, that the fo curious Embroi- 
 dery of the Veins, Arteries and Fibres, in their in- 
 ward Conftitution, was thus neceffary. For a skilful- 
 Anatomift or Botanift knows how to feparate divers" 
 of thofe Parts without the DeftruCtion of the Sub- 
 je6l. And yet fuch Beauty and Exadtnefs in the 
 outward and inward Make of Plants and Animals, 
 is not only every where to be met with in the 
 World, but both are diverfify'd almoft infinitely and 
 beyond Imagination. 
 
 6. 'Tis equally unaccountable by that Hypothe- 
 fis, that the moft noble and ufeful Parts of Animals 
 Ihould always be either well fecufd^ or elfe double. 
 Thus the Heart and Brain, which 'twas requifite 
 fhouldbe fingle, are lodg*d in the interior Part of the 
 Body, and ftrongly fortified with the Bones of the 
 Head and Breaft. The Lungs and Kidneys, though 
 likewife placed within the Body, yet, becaufe by rea- 
 
 fon 
 
Exigence ^?/^ Nature of G O 1}. 97 
 
 Ibn of their Office more fubjedt to Accidents, ard 
 double -, to the Knd that it by Obftrudions, or any 
 other Mifchief, the one fliould become unfervice- 
 able, the other might be llirticient for the Support 
 of Life. Thus likewife the Eyes, being of Necef- 
 fity plac'd in the exterior Part, are given us by Pairs, 
 and guarded by Eye-brows and Lids fortified with 
 Brillles. And not only fo, but in fome Animals, by 
 whofe Method of living they are more expos'd to 
 Danger, we may obferve a peculiar Provifion for 
 their Security, by Means of a certain horny move- 
 able Membrane, which being tranfparent, hinders 
 not the Sight even at the Time when it guards it 
 from Accidents. This may be obferv'd in Frogs, 
 and, with fome Variety, in divers other Animals. 
 Yet thefe Precautions can't be pretended to have 
 been of abfolute NecefTity to their Subfillcnce» any- 
 more than thofe in the former Inftanccs to our own, 
 7. 'Tis equally unaccountable by the Principles 
 of Epicurus^ that all ufelefs Exfeuce of Members in 
 Animals fhould be 'avoided. As the great Author 
 of Nature has been very bountiful with Refped to 
 the Multiplicity of the Ufcsoffuch Organs or Mem- 
 bers as he has beftow'd, fo he has been no lefs fpa- 
 ring and frugal with Reference to the Organs them- 
 felves. As there is no Part but what has its Ufc in 
 the general, fo there's rone but is fuited to the par- 
 ticular State and Circumftances of the Animal to 
 which it belongs. Thus Animals, whofe peculiar 
 Make or Conllitution has qualified them to be the 
 conftant Inhabitants of the w^atry Element (which is 
 not fo fit for the Conveyance of Sounds) are obferv'd 
 to want the Inftrumcnts proper tor the forming of 
 Sounds. And thus Animals which have Teeth on 
 both Jaws have but one Stomach, fince in them 
 more would have been fuperlluous, and unneceflary 
 to Digcftion. Wjiereas, had the Epicurean Hypo- 
 thtfis been true, we might have exptcftcd to have 
 
 G fccn 
 
9 8 An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 
 feen all imaginable Inftances of Superfluity as well 
 
 as of Defeat. 
 
 But here I apprehend it may be objefted, that 
 
 divers of thefe Inftances of Contrivance and Defign 
 
 are to be obferv'd in fuch Animals as are faid to be 
 
 •bred of Putrefaftion and Moifture. 
 
 But admitting there are fuch Animals, and that 
 
 their Make or Conftitution yields equal Appearances 
 
 of Wifdom and Skill with that of other Beings, 'tis 
 
 evidently moil reafonable to conclude from thence, 
 that they likewife derive their Original from a wife 
 
 or intelligent Caufe : And fo much the rather, be- 
 caufe Wifdom is ever moft illuftrious, when it pro- 
 duces a regular Effe6t from irregular or indifpos'd 
 Materials. At leaft, no Admirer of Epicurus can 
 imagine fuch a conftant Regularity as is obferv'd 
 in thofe Animals, to have been purely cafual in any 
 tolerable Confiftence with his own Principles, which 
 fuppofe fuch innumerable Blunders to have happen'd 
 at the original Coalition of the^Parts of Matter. 
 
 Yet that this Opinion is a great Miftake, is fuf- 
 ficiently clear from the Difcoveries of divers of the 
 Moderns, who have made it appear, that there is 
 no Animal produced in the prefent Courfe of Nature 
 but by Means of fome other Animal from fome pre- 
 txiftent Seed. 
 
 Others will perhaps allow the mentioned Inftances 
 of Wifdom, but will chufc to afcribe them to an 
 eternal material Anima Mundi^ or Soul of the World. 
 But this Notion of a Soul of the World is no other 
 than a corrupt and difparaging Idea of God, and has 
 already been confuted. 
 
 Lajlly^ Others will poflibly have Recourfe, with the 
 
 - Spinoz'ifis^ to that long fince exploded Hypothefis of the 
 Eternity of the prelent Frame and State of Things, 
 and will pretend to reverfe the Edge of our Argu- 
 ment, by producing the Regularity and other Per- 
 fedions of the World to prove it to be that necefla- 
 
 ry 
 
Exiftcncc and Nature of GO 7). 99 
 
 ry Being which wc formerly difcover'd, and not the 
 Effc<5b of Wifdom and final Caufes. But this Con- 
 ceit has likewife been abundantly confuted already, 
 when we demonftrated the Exillence of a Being pof- 
 fefledofall poflible Perfedion, in Oppofition to the 
 Exillence of abfolutely ncceflliry Matter and Mo- 
 tion, and likewife the Pofllbility and Reality of a 
 Creation. And perhaps it needs no better Confu- 
 tation than that of the Epicurean Poet Lucretius 
 himfclf, arguing from the late Beginning of Hiftory 
 and the Invention of Arts and Sciences, 
 
 . — — - Si nulla fuit Genitalis Origo 
 Terr arum et CcoH^ femperq^ue ccterna fuere 
 Cur fupra Bellum 'Thehamim et Funera Trojce 
 Non alias alii quoque Res cecinere Poetcs ? 
 
 But grant the World Eternal, grant it knew 
 No Infancy, and grant it ever new ? 
 Why then no Wars our Poets Songs employ 
 Beyond the Siege of I'bebes, or that of Troy ? 
 
 Creech. 
 
 So that upon the whole, it muft be confefs'd by 
 fuch as ever us'd the leafb Obfervation and Reflec- 
 tion, that the World every where abounds with 
 fuch Chara(flers and ImprelTes of inimitable Wif- 
 dom, as make it infinitely reafonable to conclude it 
 to be the Creature of a perfeftly wife and beneficent: 
 Being. 
 
 II. The other of thofe Means employed by the 
 Divine Wifdom for attainins; its areat Ends in the 
 Creation, we obferved to be that admirable Regu- 
 lation or Government of fuch Parts of the World a^ 
 are furnifhM with a Principle of Life and Adlion, 
 This we may perceive to be different, according to 
 the Diverfity of its Subjects \ which are either rational 
 or irrational, The Government of the former is by 
 
 G 2 Laws^ 
 
I DO An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 
 Laws, of the latter by Injlin5is. We fhall begin 
 with the latter. 
 
 If we view the Adlions of brute Animals in ge- 
 neral, we Ihall perhaps fee little Reafon to believe 
 they proceed either from an innate intelligent Prin- 
 ciple, or from the mere Mechanifm or Texture of 
 their Parts. 
 
 I. Not from an innate intelligent Principle. For 
 tho' divers of thofe Aftions, to which they have a 
 natural Inclination, bear a near Refemblance of Con- 
 trivance and Defign, yet their Invariablenefs fuffici- 
 ently difcovers them not to be the EfFedls of Reafon. 
 The Productions of Reafon are wont to be diverfify'd 
 to an almoft infinite Variety. If all the great Ma- 
 ilers in Architedlure were ordered feverally to com- 
 pofe the moft exquifite Model of a Royal Palace 
 that they could contrive, we fhould find the Models 
 as diftinguifhable as their Authors. Or fhould the 
 moft celebrated Orators in the World undertake to 
 declaim on any particular Subjed, 'tis great Odds 
 whether any two of them would be found exactly to 
 agree in their Methods and Materials. Whereas in 
 the moft admir'd Performances of Brutes the Cafe is 
 very different. Birds of the fame Kind, in the fame 
 Climate, build their Nefts of the fame Materials (if 
 procurable) and in the fame Form. The feveral 
 Communities of Bees, without any preceding In- 
 ftruftion, frame their Habitations in the fame Man- 
 ner, as well as fubmit to the fame Method of Go- 
 vernment. And fwhich is no lefs confiderable to our 
 Purpofe) they are unimproveable as to fuch A6ts as 
 they perform by a natural Propenfion. We may ; 
 perhaps as eafily teach a Stone in its Defcent to de- 
 fcribe Circles, or any other the moft regular Fi- 
 gures, as a Bird to build its Neft, or a Bee to com- 
 pofe its Cells, by a new Model. And though, as to 
 other Ads, towards which they have no natural 
 Propenfion, fomc Brutes are capable of Improve- 
 ment, 
 
Exiftcncc and Nature of GOTy. loi 
 
 ment, yet this is no Proof of an intelligent Prin- 
 ciple, but may be fufficiently accounted for from 
 the Mechanifm of their Bodies. For frequent Ex- 
 ercife producing an Aptitude to particular Ads, we 
 may fitly refemble fuch Tricks of Brutes to the iVIo- 
 tion of the Fingers on a Mufical Inftrument \ whicii 
 frequently is regular enough, though performed 
 without the ufual Attention or Perception. Yer, 
 
 2. Mere Mechanifm, or the Strufture and Orga- 
 nization of their Parts, feems no fufficient Caufe of all 
 the Operations of Brutes. This may ^appear from 
 the Variablenefs of fuchunimprov'd Acftions of theirs 
 as don't proceed from any natural Propenfion. As 
 fome Adlions of Brutes are natural and uniform, fo 
 others are fo flrangely diverfify'd, that they feem 
 near a- kin to fuch as are voluntary. Which Obfer- 
 vation may be made not only with Reference' to 
 fuch Animals as are feemingly more perfetfb, fuch as 
 Apes, Beavers, ^c. but even with Refpedt to fuch 
 as are commonly reputed the meaneft and moft 
 contemptible. If we look upon an Ant-hill, or in- 
 to a Bee-hive, we fliall find thofe little Animals al- 
 moll: as differently employ'd as the Inhabitants of a 
 City : When, at the flime Time, they are every 
 way befet with the fame Objcfts, and, for oughc 
 appears, receive the fame Imprcirions from without, 
 A fufficient Proof that the Diverficy in their Adions 
 ought not to be afcrib'd to any external ImprelTions 
 working on the Mechanifm of their Bodies, bqt ra- 
 ther to fuch an internal vital Principle asdiredlsthe 
 Motions of thofe who perform fuch ftrange A6lion3 
 in their Sleep. 
 
 We may therefore properly enough diflinguifli the 
 
 Principle of brutal A(5lion by the Name of Phanta- 
 
 fy ; fince this, even in ourfelves, is found to be di- 
 
 (tin^t from Reafon, and yet to be a vital Principle 
 
 .fufEciently difting'iilh'd from mere Mechanifm. 
 
 G 3 ' Now 
 
 \ 
 
102 Jn Impartial Enquiry into the 
 
 Now as Reafon is the governing Principle of 
 Man, fo Phantafy is of Brutes. And as the Didates 
 of every Man's Reafon, how different foever in Mat- 
 ters of lefs Concern, or greater Difficulty, are com- 
 monly uniform with Reference to Adlions of the ut- 
 moil Confequence to the general Welfare of Man- 
 kind, and are wont to come under the Notion of 
 Laws -, fo in Brutes, the ImprefTions of Phantafy, 
 how different and variable foever, in Cafes of lefs 
 Concern, may yet be obferv'd to be uniform, when 
 they diredlly tend to the Benefit and Prefervation 
 of their refpedive Kinds •, and they are commonly 
 call'd Inftin^s : Which Inflindls are in fome Refpeds 
 the fame to Brutes, that Laws are to Men and other 
 intelligent Creatures. Such are the Inftinfts of Gra- 
 titude to Benefadtors, of Affociation for mutual De- 
 fence, of Provifion for their young, and the like. 
 
 And herein is the Wifdom of the great Father of 
 the World moll clearly vifible, in that he has im- 
 planted fuch an uniform Principle of Aftion in thofe 
 lefs capable Agents, which fo diredly tends to the 
 Attainment of his moft beneficent End, the univer- 
 fal Welfare of the vital Part of his Creation. 
 
 2. The other Method of Government inftituted 
 by the wife Author of Nature, is by Laws : Which 
 Government is twofold ; either of particular Perfons, 
 or of entire Communities. Its Foundation is the 
 abfolute Propriety of the Creator in his Creatures 
 antecedent to Confent or Contradl. Its original 
 Rule or Standard is the Nature and Will of the 
 Supreme Governour. Its immediate Inflrumcnt is 
 Reafon ; or that Faculty of comparing and con- 
 necfling Truths already known, in order to the Illa- 
 tion and Difcovery of other Truths before un- 
 known. 
 
 The Exiilence or Reality of this Gorernment ap- 
 pears from hence, that there are (as we juft now 
 pbferved) certain uniform- beneficial Dictates of Rea- 
 
Exiftcnce and Nature of G OD. 103 
 fon, with Regard to Matters of the highcft Con- 
 cern to the Welfare and Happinefs of intcUigcnC 
 Creatures, grounded on the natural Relations of Fie 
 and Unfit, difcernable in Things and A6tions, of 
 which every fuch Creature, ading like himfelf, can't 
 be ignorant, fuch as Benefits are to he gratefully ac- 
 knowledged and retalliated ; the general Good is to be 
 indujlrioujly promoted and ?naintain*dy and the like. 
 Thefe Dictates of Reafon are qualified to be a Rule 
 of Action and a Standard of the Conduit of l.,ife. 
 But whatever is qualified to be a Rule, with Refe- 
 rence to the Ad;ions of Creatures, can be no o- 
 ther than a Law with Regard to the Defign of the 
 Creator, whofe immutable Intent fas was prov'd) 
 can't but be the univerfal Good of his Creation. 
 
 In the Subjects of this Government are two prin- 
 cipal Qualifications to be diftinguifh'd, Reafon and 
 Liberty. Without the former they can't be quali- 
 fied for the Knowledge of their Duty -, without the 
 latter they can't duly difcharge it. Where a furlici- 
 ent Degree of either of thefe is wanting, or incapable 
 of due Exercife, there a Government by Laws would 
 be ludicrous and infignificant. Where both concur 
 in the requifite Perfection, they found an immediate 
 Obligation to Obedience ; though poflibly with 
 fome Variety proportionate to the Degree of the 
 Perfedion of each. From this Obligation refults 
 the Suppofition of Rewards and Punilhments, and 
 of Jullice in proportioning and difpenfing them. 
 Which appear to have the lame Foundation and 
 Reafon with Government itfelf, 172;. The ablblute 
 Propriety of the Creator in his Creatures, and the; 
 fupreme Perfection of his Wifdom, which can't but 
 immutably incline him to ad in Conformity to the 
 States and Capacities of his Subjects, and to that 
 original Fitnefs and Unfitnefs which is in the Na- 
 tures and Circumftances of Things and Aclior 
 J3ucof this more will be faid anon. / 
 
 G 4 V 
 
'i04 An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 
 Were there no natural Laws fo univerfally pm- 
 mulgated, Man, the moft noble of inferior Beings, 
 who, by Reafon of his great Capacity, is qualified 
 for fuch excellent Purpofes, would become far more 
 mifchievous than the Brutes. His Wit and Contri- 
 vance, when free from Obligation and Reflraint, 
 would probably foon degenerate into Craft and Cir- 
 cumvention. His Ambition would know no other 
 Limits but thofe of his Power \ and an Ability to 
 hurt would be reputed a fufficient Warrant to do fo. 
 Every thing would be meafur'd by Appetite, and 
 all the Virtues would fhrink into the narrow Prin- 
 ciple of Self-interefl : The Effeds of which would 
 be as various as either the wanton Caprices of Fancy, 
 or the uncertain Fluctuations of the rougher Paffions. 
 All Men would be Tyrants to the inferior Crea- 
 tures ; and each Man (as far as confillent with his 
 Ability and his prefent Notion of Intereft) would be 
 fo to another. And in fhort, every thing would tend 
 to a State of War and Confufion, as far as the pre- 
 dominant Principle of Self-intereft and the natural 
 Inclination to Society would permit. Which makes 
 it evident both how neccffary fuch Government is 
 to the great End of the Creator {vi%. the general 
 Good of his Creatures, j and how unfuitable it would 
 be to his VYifdom (and by Confequence, how im- 
 polTible to him) to grant Men a Difcharge from the 
 Obligations of Reafon. 
 
 In attempting lo make fome Difcovery of th* 
 Methods of the Divine Wifdom in that Govern- 
 ment which is defign'd for the Prevention of thefe 
 Mifchiefs, we fhail firfl endeavour to form an Idea 
 !of it as it regards Particulars, and then add fome- 
 thing with Reference to it as it regards Commu- 
 nities. 
 
 Though the Wifdom of the beneficent Creator 
 In the Government of particular* Perfons as fucb, 
 may well be fuppos'd in a great Degree inicrutable 
 
 by 
 
Exl(\ence mid Nature of GOD. 105 
 by us, yet from the Confi deration of the Pcrfedions 
 of his own Nature, and the Nature and Circum (lan- 
 ces of the Subjeds of this Government, compar'cl 
 with our Experience and the credible Tradition of 
 former Ages, we may, quellionlefs, by the careful 
 Ufe of our Reafon, attain fome tolerable Satisfac- 
 tion. In order to which we fhall proceed by Steps, 
 illultrating the Difcoveries of Reafon by the Confenc 
 and Tellimony of the Scripture Revelation. 
 
 I. 'Tis evident, as isoe before obferv'd, that the 
 great End or Defign of the "wife Governour of the 
 fFbrldy is the univerfal IVelfare and Happinefs of his 
 SubjeBs according to their feveral Capacities. 
 
 From hence we may clearly deduce the moft no- 
 ble Principle of civil Society, viz. That Men are not 
 lorn for themfelves alone, but that in all proper Cafes 
 ihey ought to feek the Benefit and Happinefs of others to 
 the utrnofl of their Power. For it is an indifputable 
 Point, that the higheft Perfedion of Creatures can- 
 not but confift in the neareft poflible Conformity 
 to the natural Perfedions, as well as Will of their 
 Creator, who is the molt perfed of Beings. Buc 
 this Conformity can't be without the Pradice of 
 whatever is good and virtuous, and beneficial. For 
 that the Perfedions of God immutably incline him 
 to ad in the bed Manner, was prov'd when we treat- 
 ed of the Divine Liberty : And that the chief End 
 of all the divine external Ads was the univerfal Good 
 of the Creatures, was Ihewn in the Beginning of this 
 Chapter. 
 
 2. As it is the Property of perfed IVifdom not only to 
 propofe the befl Ends, but to chafe and employ the fiitefi 
 and mcff conducive Means, fo we need not doubt but 
 the wife§l of Beings makes Ufe of fuch Methods of Go- 
 vernment as are mofl conducive to his great End (the 
 general Happinefs of his Creatures) in Confiflence with 
 'the P erf colion of his own Nature, and with the St dies 
 ^nd Capaciiies of his SubjcJJs. 
 
 3. Cofh 
 
io6 An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 
 3. Confeque7itly^ we can't fuppofe his Intention to have 
 leen to expofe the Happinefs of any of his Creatures to a 
 'perpetual Hazard : Since this would he to expofe his own 
 great Defgn to the continual Danger of a Defeat. 
 
 4. TiDerefore^ ftnce intelligent Creatures are under a, 
 fiatural Obligation to the Laws of Reafon, andfince 
 iheir fupre?ne Happinefs could not but depend on their 
 free Obedience to thofe Laws (as was proved ;) and 
 fince the Exercife of Freedom or Liberty in imperfeti 
 jigents could not be without a Poffibility of Difobedience^ 
 it can^'t be fuppos'd to have been the Deftgn of the wife 
 Covernour of the World always to fufpend their fupre?ne 
 Happinefs on fo precarious and hazardous a Condition as 
 that of a Free Obedience. 
 
 5. Tet a total Determination or Neceffitation of intel^ 
 ligent Creatures to A£fs of Obedience^ is abfolutely in^ 
 tonfijient with the very Notion of Government by Laws^ 
 enforc'^d by Rewards and PunifJjments, and confeqiient- 
 ly with the great Creator'' s fVijdom in qualifying them 
 forfuch Government, 
 
 This is agreeable not only to Scripture and Rea- 
 fon, but to Experience, and fufficiently accounts for 
 the Permiffion of Sin in the World. 
 
 6. Confequently, whatever Opinion fuppofes fuch Ne^ 
 ceffitation and is totally dejlru5iive of Liberty^ is alike 
 inconfiftent with the Notion of Government by Law s^ and 
 the Nature of the great and beneficent Creator. 
 
 Such, it is humbly conceiv'd, is the Opinion of 
 an abfolute and particular Foreknowledge, as fup- 
 pos*d to be founded on particular abfolute Decrees 
 of all Events both good and Evil, and an univerfal 
 efficacious Concurfe. For this plainly infers an uni^ 
 verfal external Neceffitation, which can't but be en- 
 tirely deftrudive of that Liberty or Freedom of Ac- 
 tion in the Creatures which is requifite in a State of 
 Tryal. 
 
 As for fuch who fuppofe an' abfolute particular 
 f ternal Foreknowledge of all Events as future with- 
 out 
 
 i 
 
Exlftcncc and Nature of G O D. 1 07 
 out founding it on abfolute Decrees and an efficaci- 
 ous Concurl'e in order to their Accomplifliment i 
 though their Opinion fecms both more pious, and. 
 not lb diredlly deftrudtiveof the Creature's Liberty, 
 yet it is perhaps equally indefenfible. For, (noc 
 again to mention its Inconfiftence with the Divine 
 Abfolute Independence, nor to infift on its being de- 
 Itrudivc ot the Divine Decrees, which by this Sup- 
 pofition feem to be render'd unnccelliiry ; fince ic 
 can't be imagin'd to what End a Thing fhould be 
 decreed, if its future Exiftence would have been 
 certain, and certainly foreknown, though no fuch 
 Decree had been) this at lead is clear, that whatever 
 is certainly or determinately foreknown, is fore- 
 known to be fix'd or determin'd. But 'tis no lefs 
 clear,that all fuch Events as entirely depend on human 
 Liberty, (whofe very Nature in the pre fen t State 
 we have proved to include Indetermination j can have 
 had no fixing or pre-determining Caufe, and by 
 Confequence cannot be affirm'd to have been Ob- 
 je6ts of a certain or determinate Foreknowledge 
 without a Contradidlion. 
 
 It can certainly be no Impiety to afiert, that 
 Things can be foreknown only in fuch a Manner as 
 their Natures admit •, particularly, that Effefts can 
 be no otherwife foreknown than in their Caufcs. If 
 the Caufe be necefTary for certainly determin'd to 
 produce Its Effed) then Indeed the ElTcdt may be 
 certainly or determinately foreknown, i. e. it may 
 be foreknown as certain or determin'd to exift. For 
 Inftance, when we fiy an Eclipfe is certainly fore- 
 known, we can only mean that it is determined by 
 the fix'd or eftablifh'd Order and Motions of the 
 Heavenly Bodies. But • if, on the contrary, the 
 Caufe be properly contingent, or fuch as is notfix- 
 c 1, but either may or may not produce an EfTe(ft 
 (fuch a Caufe as is every Man who is completely 
 free or indetermin'd to ad) then the Eifeft buing 
 
 con- 
 
108 ^An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 contingent, indetermin'd, or uncertain, can be no 
 otherwife known than as contingent, indetermin'd, 
 or uncertain. For to fay an indetermin'd or uncer- 
 tain Event was certainly or determinately foreknown, 
 or (which is the fame) was foreknown as certain or 
 determined, is to fay that it was foreknown not as 
 itfelf but as another, i. e. that it was not foreknown 
 at all, even while we intend to affert it to have been 
 foreknown. 
 
 *Tis true, fome are pleas'd to objedl, that a cer- 
 tain abfolute Foreknowledge makes no Necefiity of 
 the Things foreknown. But 'tis conceiv'd, that 
 tho' it does not make, yet it fuppofes NecefTity, and 
 is therefore inconfiflent with human Liberty. For 
 as a certain Knowledge of Things prefent is found- 
 ed on a prefent NeceflTity of their Exiftence (fmce 'tis 
 certain, that what Is, cannot but Be while it Is) 
 fo an abfolutely certain Knowledge of Things fu- 
 ture mull pre-fuppofe and be founded on a Future 
 Neceflity of Things : For there's no other Founda- 
 tion of an abfolute Certainty but Neceflity. Where- 
 fore, a certain abfolute Foreknowledge of all Things 
 and Adlions, if admitted, can't but pre-fuppofe an 
 abfolute future Neceflity of all Things and Anions, 
 and by Confequence, the Suppofition of fuch Fore- 
 knowledge can't be defended, without afl^rting an 
 abfolute and univerfil Fatality •, which, (as Dr. 
 Clarke^ freely con feffes,) " Abfolutely deftroys all 
 " Religion and Morality, and tends more to the 
 ^' Difhonour of God, than the denying him a 
 " Foreknowledge, which (on Suppofltion that fuch 
 *' Foreknowledge and human Liberty are inconfi- 
 *' ftent) would be impofllble, and a Con trad 161 ion to 
 *' conceive him to have ;. and the Denial of which 
 *' would, in fuch Cafe, be no more a Diminution 
 <* gf his Omnifcience, than the denying him the 
 
 ♦ DcmonJiratioUt p. 109. 
 
 *« Power 
 
Exiftence and Nature of GOT). top 
 i<< Power of working Contradicftions, is taking away 
 I ** his Omnipotence. 
 
 I What the Dodor adds concerning the eternal 
 j Certainty even of free Adions, grounded on the 
 eternal or neceflliry Truth of all Propofitions rela- 
 ting even to contingent or indetermin'd Events, has 
 been already confider'd, Chap. vii. where we prov*d, 
 that whatever Truth fuch Propofitions contain'd, 
 could be no other than conditional, and by Confe- 
 quence, no fufficicnt Foundation of an abfolute or 
 certain Foreknowledge. 
 
 Nor can the certain Foreknowledge of contingent 
 or indetermin'd Events, (it's humbly conceiv'dj be 
 prov'd from the Scripture Prophecies. All the Scrip- 
 ture Prophecies may be reduc'd to three Sorts. They 
 are either Revelations of what is adually prefent (for 
 a Prophefy is not always of future Things,) or elfe 
 they are conditional Thrcatnings of Punifhments, or 
 Promifes of Bleflings for certain Adions contingent- 
 ly dependent on Man's free Determination, or elfe 
 they are Declarations of the abfolute Decrees of 
 God. But there's none that can be prov'd to be an 
 abfolute Prophecy of what was purely contingent or 
 indetermin'd to exiil. We are likewife to take No- 
 tice, that fome feeming Prophecies are no more 
 than Declarations of the ufual Courfe of Events. 
 
 Yet I am fenfible, there's a Text or two which 
 may fecm to import a particular certain Foreknow- 
 ledge of contingent Events. One is, Pfal. cxxxix. 
 2. Thou bcholdejl my Thoughts afar off. But this is 
 agreed by the beft Interpreters to be fpoken of 
 the Knowledge of prefent Things, even the mofk 
 fecret, in Oppofition to the Apprchenfions of the 
 Vulgar, who are apt to confider the Deity as fome- 
 what afar off, or at a Diftance from us and our Af- 
 fairs. Thus Montanus and Pag'nimis. And the /Ira- 
 hick and Elhiopick Verfions render the original Word 
 from afar^ and the Syriack, from on high. Accor- 
 dingly 
 
1 lo An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 dingly Mollerus thus paraphrafes it, Deus intelUgit 
 Cogitationes nojlras procul, i^c, God underftandeth 
 our Thoughts afar off, i. e. though he may feem to 
 be far abfent, and to negledl human Affairs, yet he 
 does not fo refide in the Heavens as not to fee what 
 is done upon Earth. By the fame Manner of fpeak- 
 ing he is faid to look down from Heaven and heboid the 
 Sons of Men, 
 
 And then, as for that Challenge made to the falfe 
 Deities, Ifaiah xli. 23. Shew the Things that are to 
 come hereafter^ that we may know that ye are Gods ;■ 
 the moft natural Senfe of the Words in their Con- 
 nexion, appears to be this : By changing the ordinary 
 Courfe of Nature^ and determining and foretelling 
 Things otherwife in themfelves contingent^ give Proof of 
 fiich Sovereignty and a^ual Dofninion in the JVorld, as 
 is the incommmncahle Prerogative of that God on whom 
 all Things depend. So that it feems only to eftablifh 
 God's Sovereignty in decreeing future Things ; noc 
 any natural determinate Foreknowledge of purely 
 contingent Events* This will perhaps appear by 
 confidering the Inftances given in the preceding Ver- 
 fes, fuch as the opening of Rivers in High Places^ and 
 Fountains in the Midsf of the Valleys, &c. which are 
 all fo many Inftances of God's Sovereignty over the' 
 World, and his fole Prerogative of influencing or 
 changing the Order of Nature at his Pleafure. 
 
 7. A Determination to Future Obedience (in a Matt' 
 Tier agreeable to the Nature of an intelligent Creature) 
 confequent on a Free Obedience in a State of Tryal, is 
 'highly conducible to the End^ and therefore moji fuitable j 
 to the Charsuier of the wife and beneficent Governor of 
 the World. 
 
 The Suppofition of fuch a Determination as thiSj 
 not only fecures and promotes the great End of the 
 moil: beneficent Creator, but admits a fufficient Ufe 
 of the Creature's Liberty. And as it is very cori- 
 fonant to Reafon, fo it is exactly agreeable to the 
 
 Chriftiaf! 
 
Exiftcnce and Nature cf G OT). 1 1 1 
 Chriftian Scheme, p or the Scriptures fufBcicntly in- 
 timate, that fuch ofthofe nobler Beings fknown to 
 us by the Name of Angels) who preierv'd their In- 
 nocence in a State of Tryal, were favcur'd with a 
 Confirmation in Obedience and Felicity. And we 
 are alTur'd that this will be the happy Cafe of fuch 
 oihcr intelligent Beings, as fliall make a right Ufe of 
 their Liberty in the Time of their rcfpedive Try- 
 als. 
 
 8. 7is very agreeable to the Wifdom of the Supreme 
 Governotir^ that the State of Tryal jhould he of Jome 
 Latitude^ to yield Roo7n to Repentance and Amendment 
 in Cafe of Tranfgreffion. 
 
 This is fufficiently confident with the Scripture 
 Revelation. For there's no necefiary Reafon to 
 conclude, that the Apofi^ate Spirits ("though in very 
 different Circumftances from our own *) were doom'd 
 to Unhappinefs immediately on their firfl Rebellion. 
 And 'tis manifeftly agreeable to our Experience, 
 whofe whole Life appears to be ordinarily no other 
 than a State of Tryal. For that it is not the final 
 State of Rewards and Punifhments, is mod evident 
 from the prefent unequal Diftribution of Things *, 
 which is in Reality fuch as has given Occafion to 
 fome eithtT to doubt of, or to deny any divine Go- 
 vernment. For the Truth is, there can be no pre- 
 fent Government of the World at all, or at leail in 
 cannot be worthy of God, if there be no equal Re- 
 tribution to be expefted in a future State. But that 
 there really is a Government of the World, and that 
 this Government is worthy of God, has been already 
 prov'd. Therefore fuch a Slate of Retribution is 
 certain. To make this yet more clear, the Defign 
 of God in creating and governing the World was 
 the Good of his Creatures. The Good and Happi- 
 nefs of intelligent Creatures .was plainly conneded 
 
 • Ste7/je Cbrijlian RiligioNfoundid on Rtefon. 
 
 with 
 
! 1 2 An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 with a Pracftice agreeable to the Divine Nature and 
 Will. But fuch Fradlice, in the prefent State, is in 
 many Cafes fo far from rendring Men more happy^ 
 that it rather expofes them to greater Miferies and 
 Infelicities than others. The plain Inference is^ 
 there muft be a future State of Retribution, where 
 the great Creator will fufficiently attain his original 
 End or Defign, and where his intelligent Creatures 
 fhall receive according to their feveral Praflices and 
 Deferts ; and by Confequence the prefent State is the 
 State of Tryal, and not the final State of Rewards 
 and Punifhments. 
 
 This will afiift us in unravelling divers Intricacies 
 in the Condudl of the Divine Government. For if 
 this Life of Men here upon Earth be no other than 
 a State of Tryal, we may ceafe to wonder that ill 
 Men are not always punilh'd here, nor the virtuous 
 rewarded ; or that the impious fo frequently abound 
 with fecular Advantages, while the virtuous are di- 
 llrefs'd and the Objeds of Contempt. For prefent 
 Profperity or Adverfity can't, on that Suppofition, 
 be either good or evil in themfelves, but may be in- 
 differently either the one or the other, according to 
 their Afpe6l and Influence on the future State : 
 Which, as is moll evident, may be very different, 
 as they are either abus'd or improv'd. 
 
 *Tis therefore very confiflent with the Wifdom of 
 the fupreme Governour, to allow his Subje<fts fas he 
 ufually does) the free Ufe of their Faculties, and to 
 fuffer Effeds to follow the Influence of their imme- 
 diate Caufes, without frequently interrupting the efta- 
 blifli'd Order of Nature. *Twas very fit that Riches, 
 
 flonour, and Reputation, fhould ufually be the Ef-» 
 edls of Induflry and prudent Management ; and 
 that the contrary Eflecls fliould proceed from the 
 contrary Caufes, without any peculiar Regard to 
 Perfonsor Circum fiances. For Prudence and Indu- 
 flry are political Virtues, and naturally tend to the 
 
 Good 
 
Exiftence and Nature of G O T>. 1 1 3 
 
 Hood of Society, though they may be fometimes 
 exercis'd by Perlbns morally vicious. But indeed 
 when Indullry degenerates into Rapine and \'io- 
 lence, and Prudence into Craft and Circumvention, 
 then though their PermiflTion is ftill very agreeable 
 to our Notion of the divine Government, (as being 
 the Government of free Agentsj yet it may be fome- 
 times very fui table to the Wifdom of the beneficent 
 (iovernour of the World to interpofe, and to canfe 
 lume Variety in theufual Series of Events. But Ex- 
 juTience afTures us that this does not always happen ; 
 and but very feldom when thefe Vices don't fo im- 
 tncdiately tend to the Dellruflion of Society. For 
 as to the Actions of particular Perfons towards each 
 ether in this prefent Scene of Things, we find 'em, 
 tor the moft Part, to refemble the celebrated Games 
 ; among the Greeks ; wherein every Man was permit- 
 ted to exert his whole Skill and Adivity, and in cafe 
 of Vi(5tory, received his Reward, not according to 
 the Quality of the Peffon, but that of the Perfor- 
 mance. 
 
 9. An Interruption of the State of Try at hy a De- 
 termination to certain ABs^ which the Divine Wifdom 
 may have judg'd fit to he decreed for the general Good 
 either of the whole ^Furld, or of entire Comtmtnities^ is 
 fometimes very fuit able to our Idea of this Divine Go- 
 'Vernment. 
 
 Of this Sort, 'tis humbly conceiv*d, are all fuch 
 human A6tions as may be certainly prov'd to have 
 been abfolutely foretold in Scripture. For though 
 feme of thofe Aftions, confider'd in their immediate 
 Circumftances, without Regard to their remoter 
 Confequences, may feem to have been morally evil, 
 yet, with all due SubmiJTion, it appears to have 
 been in no fort inconfiftent with the Perfecftion of 
 the fupreme Governour to pre-ordain them in order 
 to a much greater Good. P'or though ^we, who arc 
 naturally fubjeft to a fuperior Will 3 we, who have 
 
 M no 
 
1 1 4 An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 
 no Share in the fapreme Government of the World, 
 nor any fufiicient Capacity to judge of or to deter- 
 mine the Tendencies and Confequcnces of A6li- 
 ons in their full Extent, may not ordain an A61, 
 which, confider'd in its immediate Circumftances, 
 appears to be Evil, that Good may come of it ; yet, 
 it's conceiv'd the Cafe is widely different with re- 
 fped to the fupreme Governour. 
 
 This, if it can be fet in a due Light, will perhaps 
 prove no inconfiderable Expedient towards the re- 
 moving of many Difficulties which have call fo 
 thick a Darknefs on divers A6ls of the Divine Go- 
 vernment. To which End I Ihall humbly offer the 
 following Remarks. 
 
 I. 'Tis clear, that the Notion tvtno^ moral ymtu- 
 ral Evil does not confift in its being any real Detri- 
 ment to the great Governour of the World. When 
 therefore we meet with fuch Expreffions in the Scrip- 
 ture Revelation as feem to afcribe to him the Paf- 
 fions of Anger and Revenge, or to intimate that Sin 
 is any Diflurbance to his Repofe and Felicity, 'tis 
 agreed by all fober Reafoners, that they are to be 
 iinderflood as fpoken in Condefcenfion to human Ca- 
 pacities. 
 
 II. 'Tis agreed, that no human Ad: is in itfelf con- 
 fider'd either morally good or evil, but indifferent. 
 Vi therefore any fuch Ad; becomes either good or;-, 
 evil, it muft be on account of its proper Circumftan- 
 ces and natural Confequcnces \ or by reafon of thef j 
 Relations it acquires. Now though the original ; 
 Reafon why the Notion of moral natural Evil be- ' 
 comes affixed to any particular Relations of natural 
 Ad:s, is not the mere arbitrary Pleafure of the Dei- 
 ty, but his very Nature, yet 'tis that Perfedion of 
 his Nature which muft be conceiv'd to have an im- 
 mediate Influence on the Government of the World, 
 and to be the Standard of all moral Evil whatever : 
 Which Perfedion we have obfervM to be hisfFtfdom, 
 
 There- 
 
Exiftcncc and Nature of GOT>. lis 
 Therefore, in forming a Notion of the moral Good 
 or Evil of any particular Adl, we muft, it feems, 
 confider it in all its Relations, or view it in all its 
 proper immediate Circumlbinces, and remoteft na- 
 tural Confeqiiences with reference to this governing 
 Perfection of the great Lord of the World, viz. his 
 Wifdom. According to which Method I conceive. 
 That, 
 
 1. If the A61, both in its proper immediate Cir- 
 cumilances and remoteft natural Confequenccs be a- 
 greeable to the Notion, and conducive to the Ends 
 of the divine or moil perfeft Wifdom, 'tis then 
 in the compleatelt Senfe morally good, or fit to be 
 ordain'd. 
 
 2. If the A(ft be difagrecable in its proper immedi- 
 ate Circumftances to the Notion of the divine Wif- 
 dom, and yet conducive to its Ends in its remoteft 
 natural Confequences, then though it comes not up 
 to the compleat Idea of moral Goodnefs or Fitnefs, 
 yet 'tis not to be reputed morally evil, or abfolutely 
 unfit to be ordain'd by an Agent not fubjedt to any 
 Obligation to the contrary. But, 
 
 3. If in the lalt Place, an A<51 be neither agree- 
 able to the Notion of the Divine Wifdom, nor con- 
 ducive to, but dellrucftive of its great and moft be- 
 neficent Uefigns in the Government of the World, 
 then 'tis morally evil, or abfolutely unfit. 
 
 So that moral Evil appears to have two diftindt 
 Notions ; viz. a DifTimilitude or Difigreeablenels 
 CO the governing Perfedion of the great Lord ot the 
 World (his Wifdom,) and likewife a Tendency to 
 fi^ftrate his moil beneficent Ends in the Exercife of 
 '•■ : Of which only the latter has immutably the 
 cure of moral Evil. 
 
 III. It feems clear to me, that JloUnefs and JuJIIcp 
 Li\o' ufually conceiv'd as diftinft Pertedions elTen- 
 tial to the Idea of God) are not, in Reality, diffe- 
 rent from his M^ifdom diverfly confider'd ; and by 
 H 2 Con- 
 
ii6 An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 
 Confequence are not to be the Standards of out 
 Judgment of moral Evil as diftinguifhed from that. 
 
 If we duly refledl, we fhall perhaps fee Reafon to 
 conclude, that by the divine effential Holinejs, No- 
 thing elfe can be meant but the general indetermin'd 
 Rectitude or Perfection of the Divine Wtfdom, where- 
 by the Deity immutably perceives and inclines to 
 what is beft and fitteft in governing the World. 
 For this is plainly the Reafon of his Abhorrence or 
 Difapprobation of moral Evil^ as being dire^lly 
 contrary to the Ends of his Government : Which 
 Difapprobation is ufually conceiv'd as the immediate 
 Refult of his Holinefs. 
 
 And then as for the Attribute of Jufiia^ it can 
 be no other, it's conceiv'd, than the Divine Wifdom 
 confider^d as particularly determin*d to an equal Re- 
 tribution. For fuch Determination is plainly the 
 Reafon why the great Governour of the World is 
 conceiv'd to be uncapable either of acquitting the 
 impenitently guilty, or of finally punifhing the 
 purely innocent : Which is the compleat Notion of 
 Jujlicey as concern'd in the prefent Argument. 
 
 The confidering Holinefs and Juflice as effential Pro- 
 perties in the Deity diftintft from his Wifdom, has 
 not been without its Inconveniencies. Particularly, 
 this appears to have confirm' d many in the mod ri- 
 gid Predeflinarian Principles. For imagining it to 
 be neceffary that all the Divine Properties or Attri- 
 butes fhould be glorified in the Creatures, and look- 
 ing upon Holinefs and Jufiice as two diftinft eflential 
 Attributes, many fquite contrary to the Tendency 
 of our prefent Argument) have proceeded fo far as 
 %o infer, that 'twas neceffary Sin fhould be ordain'c' 
 for the Glorification of the Holinefs and Juftite of 
 €k)d in punifhing it. * 
 
 From 
 
 * Maccov. Difp. 17. p. li. Locus ' Miferecordia; ct Jujiiti.* 
 mantfeftandje mllns fuijpit futurus, fi Pectamm non extitifet.^ 
 
Exiftcncc ayid Nature of GOT). 117 
 
 From this Account of the Nature o^ 7noral Evil, 
 as well as of Holijiefs and Jujlicty it feems clearly to 
 follow, that though the Supreme Governour can't, 
 in Confidence with his Holinefs and Jujlice,(i. e. with 
 the Pertedlion and Exercife of his Wifdom) pre-or- 
 dain an Aft morally evil, or an Act both in its 
 immediate Circumftances and natural Confequences, 
 Idircdly tending to fruftrate the great Ends of 
 his Wifdom in the Government of the World, yet 
 to fuppofe him to pre-ordain an A61 or Event dif- 
 agreeable in its immediate Circumftances, but, at the 
 fame time conducive to thofe Ends in its remoter na- 
 tural Confequences, is no Way inconfiftent with the 
 Charafler of the moft Jtijl and Holy {i. c. of the ivi- 
 feff) of Beings. 
 
 More particularly, fuch a Pre-ordination can't, 
 'tis conceiv'd, be inconfiftent with the Holinefs of 
 God (or with the indetermin'd Reditude or Perfec- 
 tion of his fFifdom) fince hereby he only ufes the 
 moft conducive Means for the Attainment of the b^ft 
 Ends : Which is fo far from being contrary to his 
 Wifdom, that it yields us the moft perfect Idea 
 of it. 
 
 Nor can this be inconfiftent with his Jujlice for 
 his Wifdom confider'd as determin'd to an equal Re- 
 tribution) fince in cafe of the Pre-ordination of fuch 
 an Aft or Event for the general Good, the particu- 
 lar Inftrument or Inftruments can't merely on that 
 Account be capable of Guilt, or liable to Punifli- 
 inent. 
 
 To clear this, we may fingle out the famous Ex- 
 ample o^ Judas. 
 
 As for the Aft oi Judas in betraying his Mafter, 
 the Scripture fajs, 'twas not barely by the Divine 
 
 Pifcator contra SchafFman, Thef. 34. Falfum eft D cum non opus 
 habere Peccatore, ■ opus eo habet aJ patefaciitidam Gloriam 
 
 fiuim, viz. turn Gloriam 'Juftiticc in eo non rejipifcrftte damr.andu, 
 turn Gloriam Miferecordiie in co rejipifcente fervando, &c . 
 
1 1 S An hnpartial Enquiry into the 
 Permiflion, but hy the determinate Counfel and Fore- 
 knowledge of God. And not only fo, but our Sa- 
 viour is affirmed to have foreknown who fliould be- 
 tray him, and at what Time. But how may we 
 conceive this Predetermination both of the A6t and 
 the Perfon to have been confident with our Notion 
 of the Divine Government ? If we confider the Ad: 
 in its immediate Circumftances and nearer Confe- 
 quences, 'tis certain there could be nothing more dif- 
 agreeable to the Perfedlion of the Divine Wifdom, 
 nor more direftly tending to fruftrate its great Ends 
 in the Government of the World. If then the De- 
 termination of Judas to fuch an A61 was neverthelefs 
 confident with this governing Property of the fu- 
 preme L.awgiver, (as all who believe the Scrip- 
 tures muft allow) it follows that it could be on no 
 other Account than of its remoter Confequences, 
 than which none could be more conducive to the 
 univerfal Good of Mankind, nor confequently to the 
 Attainment of the great Ends of the Divine Wifdom 
 in the Government of the World. 
 
 If it be faid, that this was a moft impious A61 of 
 Judas ', I own it became fo by the accidental Cir- 
 cumftances of Malice and Covetoufnefs, to which he 
 •was remarkably inclin*d ; as the Scripture but too 
 plainly intimates, by ftiling him a Tbief and a De- 
 "vil ; which Circumftances, none, I hope, will ima- 
 gine to have been the Effeds of the Divine Pre-ordi- 
 nation. So that the Cafe of Judas^ in this Refped, 
 appears to have been much the fame with that of the 
 Jfraelites on another Occafion. Thefe God had com- 
 manded to chaftife the people of Judah. Which 
 Commiftion they readily executed ; and in fo doing 
 they can't be faid to have been criminal. Yet *tis 
 plain they became fo by the accidental Mixture of 
 Malice and Revenge in the Execution. According- 
 ly we find they were feverely .reprimanded by the 
 
 Prophet, 
 
Exigence mid Nature of G OD. 119 
 
 jVophet, wlio told tliem, they had dej} toyed their 
 Brethren with a Rage that reached to Heaven. 
 
 And though Judas himfelf, when he brought a- 
 lin the thirty Pieces, faid, / have fimied in that I 
 ve betrayed the innocent Blood ; yet this is no fuf- 
 licient Proof of his being liable to Punifliment mere- 
 ly lor the A61 of Betraying. The Cafe o^ Judas be- 
 ing fo peculiar, we may eafdy conceive he was igno- 
 rant of" his State with Reference to the Divine De- 
 cree. Wherefore finding a great degree of Malice and 
 Covetoufnefs to have accompanied his Adion, he 
 was apt to imagine thefe to have been the Principles 
 from whence it originally proceeded. 
 
 If the Apoftle Peter calls the thirty Pieces the 
 Reward of Iniquity ; this can prove nothing. For 
 being the Reward of an Adtion, attended with fuch 
 Impieties as by Accident rendered it a finful Aft, 
 they might very well be term'd the Reward of Ini- 
 quity. 
 
 But, may fome fay. Is not Sin defin'd by the A- 
 poftle to be the Tranfgrejjion of the haw P And was 
 not the betraying of an innocent Perfon to Death 
 fuch a Tranfgreffion ? I anfwer. The Law was de- 
 fignM as a Rule t6 fuch only as are free Agents •, and 
 confequently, in any Cafe wherein an Agent is una- 
 voidably deprived of Freedom, his Acft can't juilly 
 be reputed a TranfgrefTion. But in this Cafe 7«^^^ 
 feems to have been no free Agent, but a mere In- 
 flrument irrefiftibly ad:uated by an external Influ- 
 ence ; and therefore this could not, fimply confi- 
 der'd, be reputed his own Aft ; nor could he by 
 Confequence, tranfgrefs, or be liable to Punifli- 
 ment merely on this Account. And as for the So- 
 vereign of the World, who appears to have abfolute- 
 ly decreed the Event, and permitted the Tempter 
 to influence the Aft of 7/y^/.7.f, 'twas no Injuftice in 
 him ; fince he had an abfolute Right of Dominion 
 not only over Judas, but over the BlelTcd Jefus as 
 H 4 his 
 
120 An hnpartial Enquiry into the 
 his Creature. Such Pre-ordination was neicher con- 
 trary to the Perfection of God, as proceeding from 
 a moft wife and beneficent Intention -, nor to his re- 
 veal'd Will, which we may well conclude was de- 
 iign*d as a Standard of Aftion in ordinary Cafes on- 
 ly, or fuch wherein the Creatures are alone concer- 
 ned •, not In Cafes fo peculiar as this, wherein the 
 Deity was fo particularly interefted. 
 
 'Tis confefs'd, the Apoftle P^/^r ftiles the A6b ot 
 'Judai a Tranfgrejfion. But this, 'tis humbly con- 
 ceiv'd, can't well be meant of the merely executing 
 that which was pre-determin'd to be done, and to 
 which he was not only pre-ordain'd, but ftrongly 
 influenc'dby the Tempter ; but rather of his execu- 
 ting it in fo criminal a Manner, '•Siz. with a pre- 
 conceiv'd Malice and habituate Covetoufnefs. And 
 the like may perhaps be faid of the Perfons who 
 were chiefly inftrumental to our Saviour's Cruci- 
 fixion, who, as the fame Apoflle l^iys, had by 
 'zvicked Hands crucified and flain him. 
 
 If Judas be term'd the Son of Perdition ^ this may 
 not import his being predeflinated to eternal Perdi- 
 tion merely on account of betraying his Lord -, an 
 A(ft, in refpedt of which he appears not to have 
 been free. On the contrary, if confider'd, in its 
 Connexion, it appears to import no more than his 
 b.^ing prc-ordain'd to perifh, or to be loil out of the 
 Numbv-T of the Difciples, in the fame Senfe as thofe 
 who are lofl out of the Number of Mankind, are 
 laid to perifh from the Earth. 
 
 If our Saviour fays, Luke xxii. 22. 'The Son cf 
 Man goetb as was determined.^ but Woe to that Man 
 ty ivhom he is betrafd, ^c. Yet even this can't 
 necefllirily import the Sinfulnefs and Guilt of the pure 
 Aft of Betraying, but may very well be conceiv'd 
 ^o be fpoken with Reference to thofe concomitant 
 Sinsof Malice and Coyetoufnefs which our Saviour 
 
 faw 
 
 \ 
 
Exiftcncc and Nature of GOD. 121 
 
 faw already harbourM in the Bread of Judas^ whp 
 was then upon the Point of putting it in Execution. 
 To comluiidy If our Saviour, John xix. 11. fpeak- 
 ing to Pilate, tells him, Thou couldejl have no Power 
 'ever me, unlefs it was given thee from above •, there- 
 fore he that delivered tne unto thee hath the greater Sin •, 
 This is agreed by Expofitors to be meant oftheHigii 
 Prieft Caiaphas (who immediately deliver'd Jejus to 
 Pilate) and not of Judas. Which Caiaphas, by ma ■ 
 licioufly delivering him, may well be faid to have 
 had greater Sin than Pilate, who with only a cri- 
 rninal Weaknefs and Compliance, order'd his Exe- 
 cution i efpecially fince Pilate, without the A(ftiori 
 of Caiaphas could have had no Power over him. 
 
 Whoever oppofes this Hypothefis, will find ic 
 difficult to propofe another fo agreeable to our No- 
 tion of Juftice, and fo confident with the Honour 
 of the Chriftian Revelation. 
 
 But though this appears to have been the Cafe of 
 Jufias, and perhaps of the Perfons chiefly concern'd 
 in our Saviour's Crucifixion ; yet a like Pre-determi- 
 nation is not necefiiliry to be fuppofed with Regard 
 to all other Acflions and Events appearing in their 
 immediate Circumftances to be evil, which arc men- 
 tioned in the Scripture Prophecies (much lefs with 
 Regard to all Adlions and Events whatfoever, as 
 fome affcrt) but only in Cafes extraordinary, and of 
 great Importance to Mankind. 
 
 *Tis agreed that the Scripture Prophecies don't 
 always import a determinate Certainty of the Event. 
 A Prophecy, though abfolutely and particularly 
 exprefs'd, may yet include a tacit Condition on 
 which the Event is fufpendcd. Such, for Inftancc, 
 was the Prophecy of Jonah againft Nineveh. And 
 ' fuch was that of the Captivity of the Jezvijh Na- 
 il tion, and the Deftrudion o{ Jerufalem by Nebu' 
 \\ cbadnezzar. Though the Terms were abfolute, yet 
 ij a tacit Condition, \viz. Rcpenunce) is known tq 
 ' have 
 
122 An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 have been implyM. From whence we may Infer it 
 as a good Rule in interpreting Prophecies that fore- 
 tel Impieties and Judgments in all ordinary Cafes, 
 that a Condition is always to be underftood tho* not 
 exprefs'd. 
 
 Some other Prophecies relating to impious Ac- 
 tions, are no more than Revelations of what God, 
 the Searcher of Hearts, knew to be a6lually exiftent. 
 For Example, When David ask'd Counfel of God, 
 whether he fliould go down to Keilah, and whether 
 in that Cafe the Men of the Place would delivei 
 Iiim up to Saul ? God anfwers. They will deliver 
 thee up. This needs not fignify that God had de- 
 creed their delivering him •, but only that he knew 
 their Purpofe, at that Time, was to deliver him up, 
 if he went. So when Ezekiel received his Commif- 
 iion to terrify the Jews from their evil Praflices, 
 God immediately adds, The Hoiife of Ifrael will 7wt 
 hearken to thee, i.e. I know their prefent Refoluti on 
 is obftinately bent not to obey. For if thefe Words 
 muft be underftood to import a Certainty of the E- 
 ventby Virtue of a preceding Decree, then both the 
 Prophet's CommilTion, and thofe moft pathetick 
 Invitations to turn and live, which were afterwards 
 made them in the Name of God, would be fuffici- 
 ently unaccountable. And thus, as to the Prophe- 
 cy of the Rife and Progrefs of Anlichrift, perhaps it 
 does not neceffarily import any more than that the 
 Searcher of Hearts, who knew the My/iery of Iniqui- 
 ty began already to work (as the Apoftle inti- 
 matesj would, partly for a Tryal and Warning to 
 his People, and partly as a Punifliment to the Of- 
 fenders, if they obftinately perfifted, permit the E- 
 vil to proceed till it might meet its appointed Pu- 
 nifliment. Which Sort of Prophetical Threatnings 
 may be confider'd as the Means which the fupreme 
 Governour (as a n-\oft wife Phyfician) fometimes ufes, 
 either for the Prevention or Cure of thofe Difeafes 
 
 • to 
 
Exiftcncc and Nature of G 01) t 23 
 to which the whole political Body, or any Part of 
 it is expos'd : Such Prophetical Threatnings having 
 a more extenfivc Influence than even Miracles •, as 
 tending more elicdually to retain Men in their Duty 
 to the End of the World. And though, in the Re- 
 velations, we have a Declaration of the Methods de- 
 fign'd by the Lord of the World for executing his 
 Judgments on Antichriif and his Followers in a cer- 
 tain Order, according to feveral Periods •, yet this 
 perhaps, as in the former Cafe, may have been only 
 foretold conditionally, (viz. in cafe the Evil fliould 
 fpread and become inveterate •, ) or the Prophecy 
 might not bedefign'd to take Effeft in every Re- 
 fpe(!:l (at lead not with Refpe(R: to the continued 
 Impieties and final Deftrudion of the Offenders) 
 unlcfs their Obftinacy fhould provoke the benefi- 
 cent Deity no otherwife to put a Stop to thofe Im- 
 pieties, than by their Deflruftion at the Time pre- 
 fix'd. For though ic be faid to be a Revelation of 
 Things which mujt Jhortly come to pnfs •, yet thefe 
 Words are not more abfolute than thofe of God by 
 the Prophet Jonah, who denounced Deftruftion to 
 the Nimvifes within forty Bays, in thefe Terms, Ni- 
 neveh fJjall be dejb'oy^d. 
 
 To conclude this Head: As It appears by what 
 has been obferv'd, that an Interruption of the State 
 of Tryal by a Determination «^in fome extraordinary 
 Cafes) to A6ls feeming in their immediate Circum- 
 flances evil, may be fufficiently confiflent with the 
 Wifdomof the Divine Government, fo a like Inter- 
 ruption by a Rellraint froni Aftions really evil, or 
 by a Determination to fuch as are in the completeft 
 Senfe good, may in fome particular Calls be highly 
 worthy of It : Of both which the Scriptures yield 
 fufficient Inftanccs. 
 
 10. An chjliuale and impenitent OJfei:der, in fuch a 
 State of Tryal, can have no fitificicnt Plea againfl the 
 
124 An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 
 Execution of the Penalty which the jujl Governour cf 
 the World may have ordained for his Offence. 
 
 Not the Imperfe^lon of his Nature. For to be per- 
 fect and immutable are the incommynicable Prero- 
 gatives of the independent Being. Jmperfediion is 
 as eflential to Creatures as Dependence : And fhould 
 it be admitted as a Plea againft Punifhment in cafe 
 of Tranfgreflion, it might as well be admitted as an 
 Argument againft all Government by Laws. On 
 the other Side, 'tis manifeft, that a Creature fur- 
 iiifh'd with Reafon, joyn'd with the Knowledge of 
 his Duty, and with Liberty to a6f it, isafufficient- 
 ly perfecft or capable Subject of fuch Government. 
 If fuch a Creature offend, it muft be either through 
 a culpable Inadvertence in a greater or lefTer Degree, 
 or elfe through an unreafonable Obftinacy. But 
 neither of thefe ought to be refolv'd entirely into the 
 Jmperfedlion of his Nature, but chiefly into a wilful 
 Degeneracy and Depravation of it. Yet it muft, I 
 think, be confefs'd, that if a Creature is under the 
 Influence of invincible Ignorance, or if his Reafon 
 and Liberty are otherwife, without his Fault, inca- 
 pable of due Exercife, he appears in thefe Circum- 
 ilances to be no capable Subject of Government by 
 Laws, and by Confequence to be neither capable of 
 Sin, nor liable to Puniftiment. Whoever Ihall af- 
 fert the contrary, muft by unavoidable Confequence, 
 fubjecft the very irrational Beings to the Laws and 
 Duties of Religion. For to have neither Reafon 
 nor Liberty, or having them, to be in any Cafe un- 
 avoidably depriv'd of their due Exercife, are in Ef- 
 fect the fame. 
 
 Nor can a mere Dependence on the Sujlentation of 
 his Maker bejuftly pleaded to excufe a Creature from 
 fuch a Penalty. 'Tis indeed to be confefs'd, that if 
 the Dodtrine of an univerfil Suftentation fliould ar- 
 gue the Deity to be the immediate Principle of all 
 Adlion, and by Confequence ftiould be found to ex- 
 clude 
 
 
Exiftencc and Nature of GOT). iis 
 elude a felf-determining Power in the Creatures, the 
 very Notion of Government by Laws muft cenfe. 
 For it the whole intelligent Creation have no pro- 
 per Adion of their own, but are entirely manag'd 
 and adluated by the Divine Power, then the moft 
 ferious Affairs of the World muft ;be regarded as 
 a mere ludicrous Scene or Dance of Puppets. A Set 
 of Beings capable of the Knowledge of their Duty, 
 but quite deltitute of the Ability to adt it, muft be 
 lefs capable Subjects of Government by Laws, than 
 the intelligent Trees in the flibulous Dodofia's Grove. 
 But if theSuftentationof a Creature's Being fhoald 
 be imagin'd to be inconfiftent with its poflcfllng a 
 felf-determining Power in Order to Aftion, it muft 
 be either on Suppofition that the Deity could iwt 
 produce and preferve fuch a diftinft Power in a 
 Creature in Confiftence with fuch a Suftentation, or 
 elfe that he zvoidd not. As for the former Suppofi- 
 tion, *tis fufficientto obferve, that no good Reafon 
 can be alTign'd why the Produdlion of a diftinfl Few- 
 er fhould be thought lefs pofTible than the Creation 
 of a diftindl 6';//y?rt//f<f. And as the Deity fuftains or 
 preferves the Subjlance of his Creauires fo that it ftill 
 remains (notwithftanding the mofl intimate Pene- 
 tration) fufficicntly diftinguifh'd from his own fas 
 was prov'd •, ) fo by Parity of Reafon, he may as 
 Well be fuppos*d to fuftain or preferve the Power of 
 a Creature fo as that it may ftill retain its Diftindlion 
 and Capacity of becoming a proper Principle of Ac- 
 tion, And as for the latter Suppofition, viz. that 
 tlie Deity would not produce and preferve fuciia felf- 
 determining Power in a Creature ; 'tis a fufficient 
 Confutation only to remark, that it's irreconcileable 
 to the Notion of a perfeftly wife Being (fuch as is 
 the Deity) to fuppofe him to a(5t without any valuable 
 Endor Defign. But to impart a Capacity to know 
 our Duty, without beftowing an Ability to execute 
 itj would have been to impart it for no wife or va- 
 luable 
 
t26 An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 luable End. And can we entertain fo mean an Idea 
 of the wifeftas well as greateft of Beings, as to ima- 
 gin he would raife this glorious Strudhire of the 
 World, only to ferve as a Scene for intelligent 
 Machins to be mov'd and a^uated in, and that for 
 the moft Part fo ridiculoufly, for no other End but 
 to divert himfelf with the trifling Spedacle ! 
 
 11. 'T'o fuppofe that the great Governour of the World 
 Jljould finally punijlj or affli^ the Innocent, or acquit or 
 reward the ohjlinately guilty, is hy no Means recotici- 
 leable ta our Idea of the moff perfe^ Government. 
 
 This we have already obferv'd to be clear, from 
 the Perfedlion of the /F^/?/(?;« of the great Author and 
 Manager of this Government. We may, it's con - 
 fefs'd, (agreeably to what was obfervM under the 
 Ninth Propofition) conceive him, for the Good of 
 the World, to afflift an innocent Subjedl for a 
 Time. Thus the innocent Jefus fufFer'd ; but it 
 was both for the univerfal Good of Mankind, and in 
 Order to a glorious Reward. And thus the Deity 
 is in ahe Scriptures reprefented as fometimes vifiting 
 the Offences of the Fathers on their Pofterity ; but 
 ^tis only by temporal Afflicftions, and in Order to 
 the far greater Good of Mankind in general ; to 
 whom fuch fevere Executions may ferve as a War- 
 ning to avoid the like Offences. 
 
 12. Laftly, 'Tis alike agreeable to the Characler of 
 the fupr erne Governour, both to punifh the finally im-, 
 penitent, and tq pardon and reward the penitent and 
 I'irtuous. 
 
 To make this appear, 'tis conceiv'd, we need do 
 little more than fix the true Rcafon of Rewards and 
 Punifliments. 
 
 That the Rewards beftow'd by the Creator on his 
 Creatures, are not the Refult of any proper Mm/ in 
 them, nor his Punilhments the Efiefts of Pafilon irtf 
 Himfelf, is evident. Our moft perfed Ads of Pie- 
 ty 
 
 i 
 
Exiftence ^w^/ Nature ofGOT). 127 
 ty can't be faid to deferve or to be Equivalents to 
 the Favour of God •, nor can our moll enormous 
 Impieties be any real Detriment to him, or capable 
 of exciting in him paflionate Emotions, or an Ap- 
 petite ot Revenge. For what Benefit or Difadvan- 
 tage can it be to a Prince to be either obey'd or dif- 
 obey'd by an Infeft? But the Difparity between the 
 Creator and the moll noble of his Creatures is incon- 
 ceiveably greater. 
 
 Nor is Jujlice or Equity (as we hinted before) to 
 be conceiv'd as a diftindl eflcntial Property in God, 
 which is the immediate Reafon of Rewards and Pu- 
 nifhments. For if we confider, 'twill appear to be 
 no other than a Notion of our Minds, deriv'd from 
 our Obfervation of the Methods and Efieds of tlie 
 Divine Wifdom in the Government of the rational 
 World. For when the Wifdom of the fupreme Go- 
 vernour is conceiv'd to determin him either to pu- 
 nifh or reward, with a due Regard to the State of 
 his Subjects, we properly give him the Title o^JuJL 
 But if we fay that the Deity was eilentially juft Cbe- 
 forc any Objed of Jullice exiftcd) we fpeak. impro- 
 perly, and can mean no more than that his Wifdom, 
 which inclines him to exert the Acfts to which we 
 give the Denomination of Jull, is eilentially perfecft 
 and uniform, and mull immutably have produc'd 
 Effeifls worthy itfelf. The like may be faid of his 
 FailbfulneJSy which is in Etfecl a Species of Jullice. 
 
 And as for theeflential Holinefs of the Deity, which 
 is ufually rcprefented as the original Reafon of Re- 
 wards and Punilhments, or as that Perfedion of his 
 Nature which determines his Judice to exert its 
 Ad:s, it can (as was likewife obferv'd) fignify no- 
 thing elfe but the general Re<fl:itude or Perfe<5lion of 
 his Wifdom, which cannot but immutably incline 
 him to ad in t'v. irjoR regular Manner. Hence it 
 proceeds, that to air.rt that God, by a mere Ad of 
 Dominion, or wiciiout the leall Regard either to the 
 
 State 
 
12 8 An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 State of particular Perrons,or the Good of the Com- 
 munity, can punifh or afflidt the purely innocent, or 
 acquit and reward the obftinately rebellious, is in- 
 confiftent with the Notion of his Holinefs as well 
 as his Juftice. For this is, in Effefl, to affirm him^ 
 capable of ading irregularly for none of for an un- 
 wife End. 
 
 We may then conclude, that Holinefs and Juftice 
 fas diftinguifhed from the Divine IVifdom) are not 
 the proper Reafons of Rewards and Punifliments. 
 To dlfcover which, we can perhaps ufe no better 
 Method than to confider the great End of the Di- 
 vine Government. 
 
 Now the primary End or Defign of the Deity irt 
 governing the World, we may be affur'd, can be 
 no other than that which he immediately propos'd 
 in its Creation, fzz.. the Exercife of his Wifdom and 
 his other Perfedlions, in Order to the Welfare and 
 Happinefs of his Creatures : Which End may Well 
 be regarded as the Rule of all his confequent A(5is. 
 
 Therefore, in proving the equal Congruity or 
 Fitnefs of Punifhments in Cafe of Tranfgreffion, 
 and of Rewards and Pardon in Cafe of Obedience 
 and Repentance, it feems we have nothing elfe to 
 do^ but to make it appear, that the great End of 
 the all-wife Creator is equally ferved by thefe Means. 
 
 To clear this, we may firft refleft a little upon 
 the Notion of Tranfgreffion, Sin, or moral Evil, 
 and of the Guilt or Obligation to Puniffiment which 
 refults from it. 
 
 We have already obferv'd, that moral Evil can't 
 confifl in being any real Detriment to the all-fuffi- 
 cient Deity ; and by Confequence, that the Reafort' 
 of Puniffiment is not his Senfe of Detriment, or an 
 Appetite of Revenge. 
 
 On the contrary, we have pefceiv'd that it chiefly* 
 confifts in being an extreme Detriment to the Crea- 
 tures j and that in two Refpeds, 'viz. Firft,- By 
 
 rendering 
 
Exigence and Naftim /j/ GO^B. 1 29, 
 
 rendering them moft unlike their Creator (as being a 
 
 JOcviation from thofe wife Rules of Benevolence and 
 
 liquity by which we formerly prov'd him to go- 
 
 1 vern all hi3 Adions) and then confequently, by di- 
 
 ■redly tending to fruftrate the gi-cat Dcfign of his 
 
 AVifdom in the Government i^^jh^, World, wz. their, 
 
 bwn Welfare and Happincfs. 
 
 We ihall now proceed to pgnf^ier moral Evil in 
 its full Latitude, or un,der'bocli tlr.fe Notions of it, 
 to the End we may be Qualified, to make the more 
 certain Eftmiate Qi Its Guilt.-^|.,.^.,^, 
 
 In its former l^Vl^lon, ^/V. , tli^t of a mere Difli- 
 militudeor Unlikenefs to the c^ivjne Perfedion (ab- 
 trading from its ConfequencesJ the Appearance of its 
 £vil and Guilt is, without Difpute, proportjonably 
 ^s, according to the diminilhing Circumftances that 
 apcend it. Our Underftandings are of^pn unavoidably 
 inifinform'd and mifguided.. The Light of Truth, 
 which difcovers our Duty, does not always fhine with 
 equal Vigour in our Minds ; but is often either ob* 
 fcur'd by Clouds of Melancholy, and the thick Duft 
 of Prejudice, or refraded by the Storm and Tumult 
 of PafTion. There's often a great Degree of Igno^ 
 huice and Prejudice in the Minds of the wifeft and 
 Imoft virtuous. For as it is manifcft that the wifeft 
 and beft of Men are not without their Faults, fo 'tis 
 certain, that a rational Nature can't eafily refolve 
 [obftinately to ad in dircd Oppofition to the clear 
 |Evidence of Reafon and Intereft. Which Circum- 
 iftances, as they reprefent the, Ad to be often more 
 [excufable, becaufe lefs free •, fo they can't but caufe 
 the Evil and Guilt to appear proportionably lefs 
 • jWhen fo confider'd. 
 
 || But then, if we confider Sin or moral Evil in its 
 latter Notion^ or with Regard to its Confequences, 
 as having a dired Tendency to fruftrate the great De- 
 fign of God *, as the Evil more clearly appears, fo 
 the Guilt or Obligation to Punilhment can't but ap- 
 
 I pear 
 
130 An Imfariial Enquiry into the 
 
 pear to be greater in Proportion. For as the chief 
 End that perfect Wifdom proposed in the Creation 
 and Government of the World, could not but be 
 the greateft Good, fo that which naturally and di- 
 redlly tends to fruftrate this End, muft by Confer 
 quencc come under the Notion of the greate§t of 
 Evils. 
 
 'Tis a plain Inference from hence, that the Ex- 
 ercife or Admiffion of the proper natural Means ei- 
 ther of prc-w^/i^^ or remedying this greateft of Evils, 
 is become no lefs neceffary to the wife and moft be- 
 neficent Governour of the World, than was the 
 Choice and Propofal of the greateft Good. NoW 
 thefe Means are Rewards and Punijhjnents, Repen- 
 tance and Amendment of Life. '"^ / 
 
 That no natural Means can be iniagin'd more di- 
 redijy to tend to the preventing this greateft of Evils, 
 and by Confequence, to the attaining the chief End 
 of the moft wife and beneficent Governour of the 
 World, than the Allurements of Rewards and the 
 Terrors of Punijhmc'nts^ is, I think, too clear to be 
 doubted. Virtue is indeed, in fome Refpedls, it*s 
 own Reward •, and Vice, fmce it naturally tends to 
 make us unhappy, may be faid to be its own Pu- 
 nifhment. But of this we areufually either very lit- 
 tle fenfible, or poflefs'd with an Opinion of thecon- 
 iiity. ; We find by Experience, that the inward 
 Satisfa^lrion which fprings from Adls of Charity and 
 Humanity, would prove but a faint Encouragement 
 to moft Men, without the Hope of Glory and Ap- 
 f)[aufe, or fome other Recompence. And on the 
 contrary, the Regret that attends an ill or barbarous 
 Aftion, would be very ineffectual to reftrain a Rob- 
 ber or a Murtherer, without the additional Terror 
 of a Wheel or a Gibbet. For which Reafon the 
 Scriptures accommodate themfelves to our Infenfibi- 
 lity, and roufe us from our L^ethargy by all the 
 Charms of Happinefs and Terrors of Mifery. They 
 
 promife 
 
Exiftcnce and Nature of GOT). 15 1 
 
 promlfe us no lefs than an Eternity of Hap-pimfs in a 
 future State as a Reward for our endeavouring to 
 render ourfelvcs and others happy by our Obedi- 
 ence in the prefcnt State. And though we fhould 
 perfwade ourfelves that the Account the Scriptures 
 give of the Severity and endlefs Duration of the State 
 of Mifery, with which they threaten Difcbedietjce, 
 was propofed to us by the moft wife Governour of 
 the World, only for the better fecuring the moft 
 benefiaent Ends of his Government, by ftriking a 
 greater Terror into the lefs fenfible Part of Man- 
 kind ; yet we may not doubt but the Dift'erLnce 
 between thofe two States will be fuch as fliall (at leaft) 
 make the necefifary Compenfation for the prefent 
 unequal Diftribution of Things. Of the Reafona- 
 blenefs of fuch Compenfation the very Heathens were 
 generally convinc'd. Their Metamorphofes and 
 Tranfmigrations were, for the moft Part, no other 
 than Hypothefes invented to falve the Honour of the 
 divine Government by future Retributions. And 
 rtiany of their wifeft Theorifts obferving how faint 
 an ImprelTiion the fevereft Penalties, when under the 
 Notion of future, are wont to make on the Minds of 
 Men,concluded it neceflary to reprefent the Penalties 
 of the Future State to be not only the moft fevere, 
 but endlefs and irremediable. Of this the Epicurean 
 Poet Lucretius is an unexceptionable Witnefs ; who 
 pretends the Fear of eternal Puniftiments to have been 
 the Original of all Religion. 
 
 This is plainly the Cafe with Reference to 
 Rewards and Puniftiments. We Ihall now pro- 
 ceed to confider the Nature of Repentance and A- 
 htendment of Life. And if thefe can be prov'd to 
 have as natural a Tendency to the remedying the Evil 
 of Sin, as Rewards and Puniftiments to the preventing 
 it, it will, it is conceived, fufficiently appear, that 
 they are no lefs conducive to the great End of the 
 divine Government, and by Confequence that they 
 1 2 not 
 
f?3 Ait Impartial Enquiry into the 
 
 not only may, but muft be confider'd as natural Con-* 
 ditions of Pardon. For (as was hinted before) we 
 may beaffur'di that the all-wife Governour of the 
 World can't but admit and encourage the natural 
 Means of remedying that Evil which is direftly op- 
 pofite to and inconfiftent with the chief Good of his' 
 Subje(5ts. To explain this, we fhall again take a View 
 of Sin in both its Notions, and endeavour to Ihew, 
 how naturally Repentance and Amendment of Life 
 tend to the remedying it in both Refpeds. 
 
 We have obferv'd, that the firft Notion of Sin 
 is that of a Dijfimllitude to the Divine Perfe5iion, 
 (This, in the Scripture Stile is fometimes fignify*d 
 by Filth, Pollution^ and Uncleannefs. Thefefore that 
 which naturally tends to remedy its Evil, muft be 
 fomewhat which may be faid to cleanfe and furify «9 
 from the Filth which defaced the divine Image in 
 us, and thereby to reftore us to the Likenefs and 
 Refemblance of the Deity. Tliis Repentance and 
 Amendment moft ceitainly do. Our Refemblance 
 to God in the Government of our Anions (which 
 alone is here to be confider'd) muft confift in our 
 Imiuition of that Perfeftion of his Nature by which 
 all his Aftions are ever govern'd and regulated ; I 
 mean his JVifdom, or (which we have obferv'd to be 
 in EfFed the fame) his Holinefs. And 'tis this Imi- 
 tation of the divine governing Perfeftion (or rather 
 the Habit from which it proceeds) which is chiefly 
 what the Scriptures call the Divine Image. Accor* 
 dingly, the whole of Religious Praftice is in the 
 Scriptures feprefented under the Notion of JVifdo?n ; 
 as is the contrary Courfe under that of Folly. But 
 if Religious Wifdom be the flime with Holinefs, and 
 Sin and Folly be nothing different; and if to deface 
 the divine Image in our Souls, and pollute our Na- 
 -tures, be in the Scripture Stile the fune as -to deviate 
 from, the moft perfed Rule of Wifdom, by which 
 all our Anions ought to be form'd ; it follows, that 
 J j:: as 
 
Exiftcnce and Nature of GOT). 1 3 j 
 as when (by the divine Afllftance) we repent and 
 turn from Sin to Virtue, we do the wifeft Aft that 
 our Nature in thofe Circumftances is capable of •, fo 
 by a fincere Continuance in a virtuous Courfe for the 
 future, we recover our former State with Refpccl to 
 purity, or re-afliime fo much of our Maker's Image 
 as by our Sin and Folly we had loil. 
 
 The other Notion of Sin we obferv*d to be a Con^ 
 trar'iety to the Divuie Perfeulion^ or a Tendency tq 
 ' fruftrate the great End of the Divine Wifdom in the 
 Government of the World. In this Refpefl the 
 Scriptures fometimes llile it Enmity and Hatred. By 
 which Words, in a Tropical Senfe, it's Evil is very 
 well exprefs'd. For though we aflert that no Man 
 can be faid, in a proper Senfe, to hate or to bear aa 
 ' Enmity to God as God, or as having a true Notion 
 ; of him, yet Sin (at le;ifl) confiils in the Commiflion 
 ; of fuch Adions as have a direft Oppofition to his 
 great End or Defign •, fuch as thofe of an Enemy 
 are wont to have. And as Sin produces Guilt, or 
 an Obligation to Punifliment, fo 'tis fometimes in 
 the Scriptures reprefented under the Similitude of 4 
 Debt. Now if we copfidcr Sin in thefe Notions of 
 it, it will appear, that Repentance and Amendment 
 of Life no lefs naturally tend to remedy its Evil, and 
 by Confequence that they are naturally qualified to be 
 Conditions of Pardon. For thefe have evidently a dj- 
 re6l Tendency to the Accomplilhment of the great 
 End of God ; and by inclining Men to A<fts agree- 
 able to the Divine Natute and Will, anc| thus far 
 changing their States with Reference to the great 
 Lawgiver, they may be faid to reconcile them to 
 him, and if not to difcharge their Debt, or dilTolve 
 their Obligation to Punifliment, yet to qualify them 
 for an Interell in tlut SatistaCtion which eftcdlually 
 ifiops it. 
 
 I ^ Buc 
 
134- An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 
 But here ic may be objecfted, that Faith in the Sa- 
 viour of the World is in the Scriptures joyned with 
 Repentance and Amendment of Life, as a Condition 
 of equal NecelTity in Order to Pardon. 
 
 But to this may be reply 'd. That though Faith in ^ 
 Saviour both was and is neceflary to fuch as either heard 
 or do hear the Sound of the Gofpel -Revelation, yet 
 the Cafe of fuch as llv*d before his Incarnation (a ve- 
 ry few excepted) was, it feems, very different : Since 
 Faith in a future Redeemer was, for ought appears, 
 never exprefly requir'd of them as a Condition of 
 Pardon: Whereas on the contrary, Repentance and 
 Amendment were ever fo requir*d both by the natu- 
 ral and revealed Law. We have herc been treating 
 only of the natural Congruity or Fitnefs of Repen- 
 tance and Amendment to qualify for Pardon. But 
 though this Ihould be admitted, 'twill by no Means 
 follow that no other Condition could in any Cafe 
 become nccelfary. For none can juflly doubt but 
 the fupreme Governour was free to fufpend the Be- 
 nefits of our Saviour's Satisfafflon on other Condi- 
 tions befides the natural ones •, efpecially on fo rea- 
 fonable a Condition as that of Faith 'in the great 
 Author of it, when clearly reveal'd. But this does 
 not in the leafl hinder but that the Performance of 
 the natural Conditions may Hill be fufHcient to qua- 
 lify thofe who never heard of that Satisfadlion for a 
 Share in its Benefits. 
 
 Thus much may have been fufiicient with Refe- 
 rence to the Government of particular Perfons as 
 fuch. The Wifdom of God in the Government of 
 Communities, may, 'tis conceiv'd, be abundantly 
 clear'd by the following Propofitions. 
 
 I . God is the Author of Political Society ; as having 
 qualiffdfome Creatures for it, and implanted an Incli' 
 nation to it. 
 
 *Twas the Notion of Mr. Hohhes (deriv'd from 
 the Epicureans) that the natural State was a State of 
 
 IVar \ 
 
Exigence and Nature of G OD. 135 
 frar ; or that there was no Difference nor Notion 
 of Right or Wrong, Juft or Unjuft, antecedently 
 to Compad or Agreement ; and that by Confe- 
 quence Men, as well as Brutes, had not only a Pri- 
 vilege, but a natural Inclination to opprefs and de- 
 flroy each other, in order to engrofs to themfclves 
 whatever was in the Compafs of their Power. 
 
 But the eternal immutable Relations of Fit and 
 Unfit (which we have obferv'd to be in the Nature of 
 Things) according to which not only Reafon but 
 Inftinft is obferv'd to aft ; the innate Principle of 
 Self-love, which inclines not only Men but the very 
 Brutes to confult their own Security, and not to 
 aflault others unlefs for Self-prefervation ; the natu- 
 ral Affection between the Sexes fo ftrongly difpo- 
 fing them to Union j the natural Inclination of ail 
 Animals of the fame Species to each other \ and 
 laftly, the natural Methods of communicating their 
 Inclinations or Affedlions, but efpecially the Faculty 
 of Speech for which Men were fo pecularly fram'd, 
 and by which they are render'd more Ibciable than 
 other Animals, are fufficient Confutations of that 
 Fancy. 
 
 2 . The itnmediate End of political Society is the prefe>it 
 Good. 
 
 As the End of thefupreme Governour .'n his Go- 
 vernment of particular Perfons as fuch, is moft ra- 
 tionally concluded to be chiefly their future Good, 
 and their prefent no otherwife than as ccnnjcive to, 
 or, (at leaft) confident with that ; fo in t' : AlToci- 
 ation and Government of Communities, '. princi- 
 pally their prefent Good. This is cle;n- .. v^-j chg 
 mention'd Principles of Society impl.' 1 in oi:r 
 Natures ; which have all an immediate Tendency 
 either to fhe procuring prefent Advantage, or to 
 the warding off impending Evils. 
 
 Hence it partly proceeds, that though in the Go- 
 vernment of particular Perfons, Rewards andPunilli- 
 I 4 menu 
 
J 35 '^n Impartial Enquiry into the 
 ments are ufually rpferv'd to the Future State; on 
 the contrary, fach Societies as moft induftrioufly pro- 
 mote or oppofe the true Ends of Government, are 
 commonly recompenced in this. As we Ihall have 
 Occafion more particularly to remark hereafter. 
 
 3. From the Complication and Interfering of thefe 
 two Governments, {viz. of Particulars and Communi- 
 ties) dijlinguifh'd hy two fo different Ends as are the 
 Future and the Prefent Good, it neceffarily proceeds, 
 that there muft frequently he foine Variety and feem- 
 ing Irregularity in the Condu^ and Methods of thejii- 
 f rente Governour. ..... 
 
 For fince the chief Defignof tjod mayjuftly be 
 concluded to be the future Good of particular Per- 
 fons asfuch, no Wonder if he fometimes poftpones 
 the (prefent) Good of Communities when in Com- 
 petition, as being in itfelf of far lefs Confequence. 
 
 4. The prefent or future Good of a few particular 
 Perfons or Societies, being of lefs Confideration than the 
 frefent or future Good of the whole Community or entire 
 human Species, mujl ever be conceived to give Place 
 ivhen in Cojnpetition. 
 
 Hence it follows, that the Divine Condu6l in go- 
 verning the World ought not to be meafured by 
 fuch narrow Models as fome are apt to frame •, who 
 (as my Lord Bacon obferves) are wont to thruft 
 themfelves into the Centre of the World, and to 
 imagine that all Lines fliould meet in them and their 
 Fortunes. Every wife Governour propofes certain 
 general Ends which are chiefly to be promoted for 
 the publick Good, and to which all private Interefts 
 muft fubmit. Thus (to give an Inftance in the Di- 
 vine Government of the World : ) Since the ercdling 
 of mighty Monarchies could not but be a general 
 Benefit in the earlier Ages of the World, as tending 
 in the mofl effedual Manner to civilize the rude and 
 barbarous People by the Propagation and Improve- 
 ment of Religion and Arts 5 the fupreme Gover- 
 
 ^ nour. 
 
Exiftence and Nature of GOD. 157 
 
 nour, partly for this Reafon, and partly for a Pu- 
 nifliment of the Vicious, hath frequently either or- 
 dain'd, or permitted the Conquefts of Nations : Ira 
 which, for the moft Part, he has made Ufe of the 
 moftciviliz'd, or, at lead, the moft virtuous Peo- 
 ple as his Inftruments. Thus 'tis obfervable, that 
 the Babylonians^ Egyflians, Perfians, Greeks, Ro- 
 mans^ Getes, Chinefes, Jews and Mexicans, who moft 
 extended their Conquefts in their fevcral Quarters;, 
 were in thofe Times either the moft polite, or the 
 moft virtuous Nations upon Record in Hiftory. And 
 though Enterprizes of this Nature were not ufually 
 atchiev'd without the great Damage and Deftru(5tion 
 of particular Perfons, yet fuch Inconveniencies were', 
 for the moft Part, both lefs confiderable than the Be- 
 nefit that thereby accru'd to the Community, and fell 
 moft heavily on fuch as apparently deferv'd them 
 moft- And though the Good and the Bad have 
 been ever fo mix'd together, as that the former 
 could not fometimes without a Miracle efcape a Share 
 in the Miferies of the latter •, yet the beft of Men 
 being ever more or lefs faulty, there could be no 
 juft Plea againft the Adminiftration of the Divine 
 Government in this Refpedl ; efpecially if it be con- 
 fider'd, that temporal Deftrucftion was to them but 
 a Surprize into Happinefs, at the fame Time that it 
 to the others was a Prelude to future Mifery. 
 
 A certain Nation, Iconfefs, whofebarbarousTreat- 
 ment of the naked defcncelefsyfwmr^w is fo generally 
 detefted,may feem to yield no inconfiderableObjediion 
 againft the Obfervation we juft now made. And 
 this the rather deferves our Notice, becaufe the In- 
 vention of Fire-arms (which ficilitated the Conqueft 
 of that vaft Continent j immediately before its Dif- 
 covery, and the Concurrence of fo many extraordi- 
 nary Circumftances in the Difcovery and Conqueft 
 themfelves, feem to argue the Deity to have had a 
 particular Concern in that Affair. 
 
 Yet 
 
1 3 8 An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 
 Yet admitting all this, 'tis conceivM, the Equity 
 of the Divine Conduft is fufficiently clear. For as 
 on the one Side, 'tis but too evident that thofe A~ 
 tnericans ("like the Canaanites of old) were become 
 impious Wretches, polluted with the Blood of hu- 
 man Sacrifices, and guilty of the grofleft Idolatry 
 and other enormous Vices ; fo on the other Side it; 
 muft be confefs'd, that though their Invaders ex- 
 ceeded their CommifTion, by fuffering their Pride 
 and Avarice to prevail almoft to the Extindion of 
 Humanity (for which their Leaders appear to have 
 received exemplary Punifhmentj yet their Pofterity 
 have difcover'd a very commendable Zeal for th& 
 Converfion and Civilizing of thofe Barbarians. And 
 I think it muft be confels'd, that the Roman Reli- 
 gion (though fufficiently corrupted) was far prefe- 
 rable to that moft abominable Superftition which had 
 blinded thofe unhappy People. And if we refledl 
 upon the Advantages of that Religion in its fo near 
 Refemblance of the Pagan Worfhip of Demons and 
 Inferior Deities, by which it the more eafily infinu- 
 ates itfelf among fuch as have been bred in a Super- 
 ftition fo little different, it may be confider'd as no 
 unfit Introdudlion to a purer Religion in future 
 Ages. 
 
 To this Place may be reduc'd that Method of the 
 Divine Government which fome would reprefent as 
 unaccountable •, I mean the Punifliment of Princes in 
 certain Cafes, by the temporal Lofs and Deftrudlion 
 of their Subjects. For as we may be afTur'd that 
 this is never without fufficient Demerit in the Sub- 
 jeds themfelves, fo (fince the Grandeur of Princes, 
 which is fupported by the Numbers and Riches of 
 their Subjedts, is their moft tender and fenfible Part) 
 it can't be doubted but it tends moft effedtually to 
 their Reclamation on whofe Condud: the Welfare of 
 the whole human Community fo , immediately de- 
 pends. The like may be obferv'd with Reference to 
 
 the 
 
Exiftencc and Nature of GOD. 139 
 the PuniOiment of Parents by the temporal Damage 
 of their Pofterity. 
 
 5. *Twas highly fuitahle to the Divine fVifdom in the 
 Government of the JVorld, both to pre-ordain Jbnie of the 
 principal Events with Reference either to the entire hu- 
 man Community^ or to the more co7ifiderable Parts of 
 it., and to referve to itfelf the Right of interpofmg and 
 influencing particular Agents., more efpecially in ord^r 
 to the Accomplifhment of thofe Events. 
 
 That this has been the Method of the Divine 
 Wifdom, is abundantly clear from the Scripture 
 Prophecies and Hiftories. And that the Divine 
 Wifdom in this Regard difplays itfelf in the moft 
 illuftrious Manner, is certain. For hereby it ap- 
 pears, that the Government of the World is equally 
 opposM to Chance and Defliny. Had the Deity ta- 
 ken no Care of Futurity, but left every Man to the 
 Condudb of his own Inclinations, and natural Ef- 
 fedts in the general to the immediate Influence of 
 their Caufes, without ever interpofmg to direft 'em 
 to the Attainment of his great Pefigns; this woqid 
 have beenalmoft, in Effed, to diveil himfelfof the 
 Government of rational Agents, and to fubjed: 
 their Affairs to Chance, and to the Hazard of the 
 utmofl: Diforder and Confufion. Or had he, on the 
 contrary, abfolutely or fatally decermin'd every E- 
 vent (though this, I confefs, would have been far 
 enough from diverting himfelf of the Government 
 of the World, yet) it would have been a Govern- 
 ment unworthy the Deity, a Government entirely 
 exclufive of all proper Sin and Punifhment, Virtue 
 and Rewards •, wherein himfelf would, in Effeft, 
 have been the only Agent, and all the Creatures 
 ftupid and pafllve. .Whereas on the contrary, by 
 pre-ordaining the moft material Events, and fuf- 
 fering the Creatures freely to exert their Faculties 
 in all cpnvenient Cafes, he appears moft wifely to 
 
 have 
 
140 An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 have chofen the middle Way, and thereby to have 
 equally avoided the Mifchiefs of both Exiremes. 
 
 Again, If the Deity had left Men in every Cafe 
 to the Exercife of their Liberty, he could have given 
 no Proof of his Government of human Adions ; 
 and had he quite excluded Liberty by fatally deter- 
 mining every Event, the Creatures could have given 
 no Proof of their Subjedion and Obedience. Where- 
 as by determining fome Events, and referving tq 
 l^imfeif a Liberty of interpofmg in all others, as he 
 gives his intelligent Creatures fufficient Capacity and 
 Opportunity, in all convenient Cafes, to evidence 
 their Allegiance to him, fo he procures to himfelf 
 the Opportunity of making fenfible Difcoveries of 
 his Sovereignty, and adlual Dominion over them and 
 their Affairs •, and at the fame Time of ftriking a 
 deep Senfe of that- Reverence and Duty which they 
 owe him. This we find he has fometimes done by 
 'foretelling future Events, and fometimes by his pal.- 
 pable Interpofition in the Affairs of the World by 
 Miracles or fupernatural Effects : By both which 
 Methods, how much the Interefts of Religion, and 
 by Confequence his great Defign in the Creation and 
 Government of the World, have been advanc'd, may 
 in fome Meafure be conceiv'd by fuch as confider 
 how much greater Impreffion miraculous or extraorr 
 dinary Effects are apt to make on the Minds of 
 Men, than the comiTton jjnd daily Refults of natu- 
 ral Caufes ; and how ' flrongly mod Men are bent 
 to fearch into Futurity, even fometimes to the Neg- 
 !e<5i: of their prefent Interefts. For which Reafon, 
 we find the Wifdom of the great Creator, in this 
 Refpecl:, has often been imitated (^whether by De- 
 jrnons or deigning Prjefts we need not here deter? 
 mine) in the Pagan Oracles, as likewife in their Au- 
 guries and Divinations ; by which bold and inqui- 
 sitive Men have endeavour'd to penetrate into thofe 
 .Secrets >yhich none but the Deity could difclofe. 
 
Exiftence md Nature of GOTf. Hi' 
 8. If^ notwHhjlandin^ thefe imjl prudent Methods of 
 thefupreme Governour his great End and Defign f//^' 
 miverfal Gcod of his Creatures) does not appear to hi' 
 advanced Jo conjlantly and umjonnly as might he expee^ 
 ted -where the mofl perfd^ mfdom has the Management^ 
 and Direction •, it deferves to be remembered, that it iV 
 the Gcvernment of free Jgents, wl.v are, in jnoji Ca-' 
 fes, to be the Determiners of their A^Aons. 
 
 There's no compelling Men to be virtuous, noi* 
 confequently to be happy. For where there's Force 
 of any Kind, the very Notion of Virtue ceafes. The 
 Wifdom therefore of the Divine Condu(5t in tlie Go- 
 vernment of the World, could not, in Matters 
 purely moral, confift in a conftant necefTitating In- 
 fluence on the Minds of Men, and an entire Banifh- 
 ment of Evil out of the World ; but muft have dif- 
 cover'ditfelf either in making a prudent Provifiori 
 againft fuch crofs Events as might proceed from their 
 Perverfenefs and Folly, or elfe in rendering particu- 
 lar Evils (as far as is confident with the Government 
 of Free Agents) conducive to the common Good. 
 Both which Defigns he evidently purfues by the Me- 
 thods before obferv'd. 
 
 CHAP. XII. 
 
 ni. /^ U R laft Idea of the Divine Perfedion or 
 \J Sufficiency, as it refers to other Beings as 
 adually exiftent, is that of Providence. 
 
 Our Idea of Providence ive der'tve frdtn the Conft^ 
 deration of thofe A5ls of the Divine Wifdom and Bene- 
 volence, proceeding from an exa^i Kncivledge of the fi- 
 veral States or Conditions of the Creatures, whereby 
 the Deity has always 7nore immediately provided for 
 their Prefervation or Subftflence. 
 
 That God perfeftly knows whatever is in the 
 World, is plain, becaufe he created and ilill fulbins 
 
 what- 
 
't42 An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 whatever is in the World. For 'tis equally abfurd 
 to fay, either that he knew not what he created, 
 or that he knows not what he tiow fuftains or conti- 
 nues in Being. 
 
 As the Ads of Creation and Suftentation refer 
 fimply to the Exiftence of the Creatures, and thofe 
 of Government to their State and Adlions, fo thofe 
 of Providence, as here Underftood, refer to their 
 Suhfijlence and Prefervation, 
 
 It has, I confefs, been ufual to conceive Provi- 
 dence in a larger Senfe, as including all the Adls of 
 God towards his Creatures confequent on their Cre- 
 ation. But as this is a very general Notion, and 
 contains a Complication of many and very different 
 Ideas, which are thereby apt to be confus'd and in- 
 diftindl, fo both the original Signification of the 
 Word, and its common Ufe, both among Ancients 
 and Moderns, will favour a more feftrain'd and li- 
 mited Senfe. 
 
 Some'' Philofophers,"'under Colour of raifing our 
 Conceptions of the Divine Greatnefs and Majefty, 
 have abfolutely excluded a Providence in the larger 
 Senfe of the Word. Others, conceiving the King of 
 the World under the degrading Character of an 
 Earthly Prince, have imagin'd that he ever com- 
 mits the Care of his Subjeds to his Minifters or De- 
 puties. Others have limited it to the nobler Parts 
 of the Creation, and abandoned the inferior to 
 Chance, or the unmanag'd Influence of fecond 
 Caufes. 
 
 But as our Reafon will not fuffer us to doubt but 
 that the Knowledge of God is perfed, and extends 
 to the meaneft of his Creatures, and his Power Al- 
 mighty and incapable of Fatigue ; fo 'twill affure 
 us, that Nothing is by his Wildom judg'd unworthy 
 his Care and^-Protedion, which by the fame Wif- 
 dom was judg'd not unworthy his Creation. 
 
 Nor 
 
Exiftence and Nature ofGOT). 145 
 
 Nor will our Experience fuffer us to doubt of the 
 Reality and Univerfality of a Providence. We 
 Jhall in (lance in a few Particulars ; and in fo doing 
 we (hall omit all fuch Effc(fts of it as may with any 
 PlaufibiJity be fufped:ed to be the necefifary Refuks 
 either of the original Strucfture of the World, or of 
 that of particular Beings ; to the End there may be 
 no juft Pretence to elude the Evidence they may 
 yield us of the prefent and more immediate Efficiency 
 of fuch an omnipotent and moil beneficent Being as 
 we before difcover'd. 
 
 'Twere endlefs to enumerate fuch probable Inflan- 
 ces of a Providence with Reference to particular 
 Perfons and Things, as both our own Experience 
 and the Hillories ot all Ages abound with -, and we 
 fhall wholly omit them ; both becaufe Men are apt 
 to be very incredulous in Matters of this Nature, 
 and becaufe there's no perfed: or conflant Unifor- 
 mity to be pretended Cfor Reafons eafily to be col- 
 lefted from what was obferv*d when we difcours'd of 
 the Methods of the Divine Government) but what- 
 ever In fiances can be produc*d as Proofs of fuch a 
 particular Providence, may perhaps be confronted 
 by others which feem to import the contrary. 
 
 We fhall therefore fingle out fuch Inftances only, 
 in which we are either univerfally concerned, or with. 
 Reference to which there can be no colourable Plea 
 for Incredulity. Such we humbly conceive to be, 
 
 I . The Continuation of the Gravitation of the Parts 
 which compofe the feveral greater Bodies of the Uni- 
 njerfe towards their refpe^ive Centres, and of that of 
 the Bodies themfelves towards each other. 
 
 For this we formerly provM to be no EfFedl of 
 any intrinfick Property of Matter, but to be either 
 a mediate or immediate ImprefTion of the Divine 
 Power. But Gravity is the only Cement which 
 holds the Parts of the World together : Without 
 which, that very Motion we obferve in fome of thofc 
 
 vaft 
 
144- An impartial Enquiry into the 
 vaft Bodies (at prefent fo neceflary to the Subfifteilce' 
 of Animals and Vegetables) would foon fhatter and 
 reduce them to a Chaos of Confufiori and Defor- 
 mity. 
 
 ^ 2; ^s Continuation of the nice Adjujiment of that 
 Troje^ile Motion of the Planets of our Syjientr to the 
 Force of their Gravitation towards each other and the 
 Sun. 
 
 How great an Inftance this yields us of a Provi- 
 idence, will eafily appear to fuch as fhall confider, that 
 without it all things (as in the former Cafe) would by- 
 Degrees come to Confufion. The Moon and the 
 Earth, Jupiter and its Satellites, would either meet^ 
 or elfe fly off from each other to the utmoft Spaces 
 of the Heavens* In fhort, the whole Planetary 
 Chorus would foon either fink into the Sun, and lie 
 broiling in that vaft Ocean of Fire, or elfe de- 
 fert him, and like Comets, pay an unwelcome Vi- 
 fit to the remoter Parts of the World ; to the Da- 
 mage, and perhaps Deftruftion of the neighbouring. 
 Syftems. 
 
 • 3. The Continuation of the Oblique Pofition of the 
 EartFs Ams, by preventing fuch Alteration therein as 
 might have happened either by the too near Approach 
 qf Comets, or the Influence of any other Caufe. 
 r- Without this, the ufeful and neceffary Variety 
 t>f Seafons would ce^k. The Sun's Heat would no 
 where increafe by thofe juft Degrees neceffary for 
 the ripening of Fruits. The greateft Part of the 
 Earth would be expos'd to the Rigours of a perpe- 
 tual Winter^ while the others would be parch'dand 
 burnt up by an Excefs of Heat. 
 
 4. The Regulation of the Winds is another Proof of 
 a Provident Deity* The frequent Variations of the 
 Winds in moft Parts of the Earthy demonftrate that 
 they proceed from no uniform mechanical Caufes. 
 Yet thefe are the grand Inflruments of Nature, on 
 which the Prefervation or DeftruiLlion of Animals 
 
 and 
 
Exiftence ^w^ Nature of G O T>. 145 
 
 and Vegetables more immediately depends. Whicb. 
 makes it neceflary to conclude, that a perfeftly wife 
 and beneficent Deity (if any fuchj would not leave 
 them entirely to Chance, or the ungoverned Influ- 
 ence of their immediate Caufes, and thereby abandon 
 his Creation to fo manifefl a Hazard. And we may 
 be affur'd from Experience that he does not. For 
 did not fome fuperior Principle fometimes excite 
 and regulate their Motions, 'tis reaibnable to be- 
 lieve the Earth would foon be reduc'd to an inani- 
 mate Heap and hideous Solitude. The Air wonld 
 foon become a valt Receptacle of Infe<flion and 
 Blafting. The Sea would be no other than a Sink 
 gf Poifon and Noifomenefs. The Land would ei- 
 ther become barren for want of Moifture, or be laid 
 wafte by repeated Inundations. 
 
 Whereas, on the contrary, we find the Seafons of 
 the Year are fufficiently diftinguifli'd. The pefti- 
 lential Steams of the Earth are difllpated. The Seas 
 are preferv'd wholfome by Storms and Tempefts. 
 And the Air is refrefli'd with feafonable Breezes. 
 
 This makes even the Variation of the Winds, a con- 
 fiderable Proof of the Superintendence of an intelli- 
 gent Caufe. For were they every where uniform 
 and periodical (like the Trade-Winds that blow be- 
 tween the Tropicks) fuch Regularity, and whatfo- 
 ever good Effeds it might produce, would, with 
 fome Colour of Reafon, be fufpecfted to proceed from 
 the neceflary Conilitution of the World, and confe- 
 quently would yitld no fufficient or convincing 
 Proof of the Agency of an intellecflual Caufe. 
 
 It mufl: beovvn'd, that the A(flsof the Divine Go- 
 vernment do fometimes interfere, and caufe a Varie- 
 ty in the ufual Courfe of Providence. The Winds 
 have not always been fo regulated as to prevent In- 
 undations, Peftilence, or Sterility. But then the 
 Divine Government, as it makes, fo it folves the 
 Difficulty. The credible Tr.idition of former Ages 
 
 K (hot 
 
146 An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 
 (not to mention the fupposM Effefts and Reli^ls that 
 are ftiii vifiblej will not fufFer us to doubt of the Re- 
 ality of the univerfal Deluge. For this we have the 
 concurrent Teftimonies of the Chaldeans^ Egyptians^ 
 Pbcenicians, Greeks, and even of the Americans, as 
 well as of the Jews. But this both Jews and Pa- 
 gans agree to have been the juft Demerit of a dege- 
 nerate World. And even then, 'twas no inconfide- 
 rable Inftance of a Providence, that in the Midfl of 
 the general Defolation there fhould any efcape to re- 
 furnifli the Earth with Inhabitants. And that the 
 Lot fhould be caft on the Virtuous, while the Wa- 
 ters were every where triumphant over the Impious. 
 Thus, (if we will not believe Mofes) Ovid, from the 
 Tradition of former Ages, afTures us of Deucalion, 
 (which appears to be but another Name for Noah)^ 
 and his Wife Pyrrha, that, 
 
 Non illo 7nelior quif^uam nee amantior mqui 
 Virfuit, aut illd reverentior ulla Deorum. 
 
 Ne*er liv'd a better, jufter Man than He ; 
 Nor Hv'd a Woman more devout than She. 
 
 And as for the reft of that Age, we have the Tc- 
 flimony of Hiftorians, as well Profane as Sacred, to 
 aflure us, that they were extremely degenerate and 
 vicious. 
 
 It muft likewife be own'd, that we fometimes hear 
 of Famine and Peftilence. But then thefe feldom 
 happen, are of fmall Extent, and are ufually appro- 
 priated to the Circumftances either of the Country or 
 its Inhabitants. So that they are fo far from yield' 
 ing an Argument againft the Reality of a Provi- 
 dence, that they fometimes furnifh a Proof of the 
 Equity of the divine Government. 
 
 Thefe are the more general Proofs of the Exif- 
 tence of a Provident Deity. Some of the lefs gene- 
 ral are, 'tis humbly conceiv'd, i. 
 
Exigence and Nature of GOT). T47 
 
 1 . The due Proportion between the Nwnhers of the 
 different Sexes of Animals. 
 
 This is very remarkable in Man, in whom it was 
 moft neccfTary. The Proportion has been obkrv'd 
 to be commonly either as Fourteen to Thirteen, or 
 as Sixteen to Fifteen. The fmall Surplufage is fo far 
 from weakening this Proof of a Providence, that it 
 rather ftrengthens and confirms it j for by this, Pro- 
 vifion is made againfb the Accidents to which the 
 Males are chiefly expos'd. By thefe Methods in all 
 Ages fo great an Equality has been prefer ved be- 
 tween the Sexes, as would have been abfolutely un- 
 accountable without the Suppofition of a Provi- 
 dence. For had not a Providence conccrn'd iifelf 
 in this Affair, (whether we conceive the Rudiments 
 of the human Body to be originally contained in the 
 Egg, as are thofe of Plants in their Seeds ; or whe- 
 ther we fuppofe it to proceed from fome Animalcule 
 of the Male Sperm, as is moft likely, yet) fmce the 
 Ovary of the Female muft be conceiv'd to contain 
 Numbers of Eggs of either Sort •, andfince the Ani- 
 malcules of the Male Sperm are obfcrv'd to be fo 
 numerous, *twas very polTible, in either Cafe, that 
 the Difproportion between the Males and Females 
 might, at fome Time or other, have been fo great, 
 as very much to diminifli, if not entirely to extin- 
 guifh the Species. 
 
 2. The Prevention of the Confufion of Species hy un- 
 natural Mixtures^ is another Proof of a Provident 
 Deity. Without this the Face of Nature might, 
 by Degrees, have been almoft entirely changed ; 
 and many of thofe Signatures of Divine Wifdom, 
 which at prefent difcover themfelres in the regular 
 Frame and Conftitution of Animals, effac'd. The 
 World might have been filled with Mtnotaurs, Har- 
 piesy and Chitnera's : And thefe might have been 
 infinitely blended together into all the Shapes of hi- 
 deous Deformity. The Man and the Brute might 
 
 K 2 have 
 
14^ An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 have been no longer diftinguifhable ; and Reafon 
 might have been impair'd, if not entirely loll, in 
 the unequal Mixture. For we find no fuch ftrong 
 and uniform Inclination in Animals of the fame Spe- 
 cies to each other, or Averfion to thofe of a different 
 one, as wholly to prevent promifcuous Copulation. 
 We are aflur'd, that in Africa efpecially, where the 
 exceffive Heats oblige Beafts of different Kinds 
 to meet at Watering-places, they by Degrees be- 
 come familiar, and often produce Monfters ; for 
 which Africa was ever remarkable. But thefe, 
 like Meteors, foon difappear : The divine Provi- 
 dence fo ordering, that they want the Means of pro- 
 pagating their anamolous Kinds ; which are ever 
 extindt in the Individual. Of this Mules are a known 
 Inftance. 
 
 3. 'The Invariatenefs of Seeds, is another no lefs 
 confiderable Initanceof a Providence. This is ufu- 
 ally feen in Animals when the ordinary Courfe of 
 Nature is obferv'd. But 'tis mofl remarkable in 
 Plants, where more neceflary. Otherwife, what 
 was wholfome Food or Phyfick in one Age, might 
 have become Poifon in another : Whereas on the 
 contrary, fuch Defcriptions of the Virtues and Pro- 
 perties of Plants as have been left us by the Ancients, 
 are found exadly agreeable to the Experience of the 
 prefent Age. And yet, the flight Texture of the 
 innumerable Parts of Seeds, the Difference of Soils, 
 and the Variety of Accidents to which they are ex- 
 pos'd, may well render fuch an Agreement unac- 
 countable without the Suppofition of a Providence. 
 
 4. To add no more. The due Proportion of the Num- 
 hers of Animals and Vegetables, by the equal Prevention 
 of their too great Increafe and TbefiruEiion, is an Ar- 
 gument of a Providence. Thus, notwithftanding 
 the great Confumption by Wars and other Acci- 
 dents, the Number of Mankind in every Age not 
 only equals, but exceeds that of the former. And, 
 
 • - . - . which 
 
Exiftcnce and Nature of GOT). 149 
 whrch is more remarkable, the Increafe is In fuch a 
 Gradation as bears a Proportion to the gradual In- 
 vention of Arts and Sciences, and the Improvement: 
 of the Methods of Living. 
 
 And ajs for other Animals, their Propagation is 
 obferv*d to be ever proportionable both to the 
 Length of their Lives, and to the Accidents to 
 which they are more peculiarly fubjed. Thus, the 
 Doe, which lives long, breeds^ after eight Months 
 Pregnancy, but one, or, at the moft, but two ; 
 whereas the Fox, which lives but ordinarily Six or 
 Eight Yearsi breeds four in a much fhorter Time. 
 The like may be obferv'd of the fevcral Sorts of 
 Vegetables. And in the general, it may be remark- 
 ed, that Beafls multiply more than Men j Fowls 
 than Beafls ; Fifhes than Fowls ; Infefts and Vege- 
 tables than Fifhes : Which they feverally do in a fit 
 Proportion to their Decay and Confumption. By 
 which uniform Courfe of Providence both the Spe- 
 cies are preferv'd, and yet the World is not over- 
 ftock'd with Inhabitants. 
 
 
 K 3 AN 
 
A N 
 
 Impartial Enquiry 
 
 Into the EXISTENCE and 
 
 NATURE OF G O D-- 
 
 feeing a Modest Essay towards a 
 
 more Intelligible Account of the 
 
 DIVINE PERFECTIONS. 
 
 With Remarks on feveral AUTHORS 
 both ANCIENT and MODERN. 
 
 BOOK the SECOND. 
 
 By Samuel Colliber. 
 
 Dedii omnibus Deus pro virili portione Sapientiam^ ut 
 et inaudita invejiigare pjjent et audita pe?-pendere. 
 
 Ladlancius Lib. 2. Divinarum Inft. Cap. 8, 
 
 LONDON: Printed for R. R o b i n s o n, at the 
 Golden Lyon in St. Paul's Church-Yard. Mdcc>:xxv. 
 
( 153 ) 
 
 A N 
 
 Impartial Enquiry 
 
 INTO THE 
 
 Exiftence and Nature of CO 2). 
 
 BOOK the SECOND. 
 
 PART the FIRST. 
 Of the Exiftence of GOT), 
 
 N the former Book we made It our En- 
 deavour to difcovcr fuch Principles of 
 Reafon as might yield Convidion to 
 ourfelves, without being very folicitous 
 about the Sentiments of others. In this 
 Difcourfe we fhall proceed to make fome Enquiry 
 into tlie commonly receiv'd Opinions, to the End 
 that hiving clearly comprehended the Agreement or 
 Difagreement, we may be the better qualified to 
 
 decermiiie upon the Parallel. 
 
 Which 
 
154 An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 
 Which we perhaps fhall fuccefsflilly do, if we ^ 
 ^gree equally to fufped fuch Opinions as fhall tempt 
 us either to think meanly of the Deity, or elfe to 
 afFedt an abftrufe and unintelligible Sublimity. The 
 latter of which appears to be the more dangerous 
 Extreme. For few Men find themfelvcs inclined to 
 receive little degrading Ideas of the beft and nobleft 
 of Beings -, whereas on the contrary, the Profped: of 
 fo glorious an Objed fo vehemently ftrikes the Spi- 
 rits, that it is apt to unfix the moft fedate Minds, 
 and to diffolve our Reafon, into Rapture and En- 
 thufiafm. 
 
 We fhall reduce our Enquiry to Three General 
 iDivifions. In the Firfl we fhall treat of the Exif- 
 tence of God. In the Second^ of the Infinity or Im- 
 menfity of his EJfence. And in the Third, we fhall 
 treat of what is ufually called the Infinity of his 
 Duration, Under thefe Three Divifions may be 
 comprehended whatever fhall appear neceflary to be 
 -added on this important Subjedt. 
 
 To begin with the Exifience of God. This, we 
 humbly conceive, has been fo firmly demonflrated 
 in the former Book, as to admit of no reafonable 
 Doubt. Wherefore the Caufe being already fuffi- 
 ciently fecur'd, 'twill be no DIfadvantage, but a 
 confiderable Service to it, to deteft the Fallacy and 
 Weaknefs of fome other pretended Proofs that have 
 been employed to fupport it. 
 
 Epicurus having rejedled all other Arguments for 
 the Exifience of a God, and, in EfFeft, retain'd on- 
 ly the Name of God in his Philofophy, was yet wil- 
 ling to admit one Proof, viz. the Proof deriv'd from 
 the Univerfality of his Idea. For he pretended, that 
 even antecedently to Inftru<5lion and the Exercife of 
 Reafon, by a Sort of Anticipation of the Ufe of his 
 Faculties, pvery Man had ia his Mind an Idea of 
 fomethins Divine, 
 
 t 
 
Exlfteiice and Nature of GOD. 155 
 I confefs, I have always thought we had Reafon 
 CO fufpeft the Gifts of Enemies •, who if they can 
 once pcrfuade us to caft away our Weapons, and to 
 defend ourfelves with fuch others as they pleafe ta 
 beftow upon us, will not eafily fail of Vidory. For 
 whatever Buftle has of late been made with this 
 Argument of Epicurus, it feems to me to be capa- 
 ble of yielding very little AfTiftance to the Caufe of 
 a Deity. 
 
 Had Epicurus look'd upon the Idea of God as a 
 Refult of Reafoning and Enquiry, 'tis to be own*d 
 he might have drawn a probable Argument from its 
 Univerfality to prove his Exiftence ; that being, 
 without Difpute, mofl highly reafonable to be be- 
 liev*d, which in all Ages and Nations has been be- 
 lieved by the moft wary and difinterefled Reafoners 
 as well as others. But this was none of his Mean- 
 ing. For *tis agreed that he fuppos'd this Idea as 
 Innate or Con- natural, not as the pure Refult of 
 Reafon. 
 
 Or had he been capable of proving but the Rea- 
 lity of fuch an innate Idea, it might have been ad- 
 mitted as a good Argument by fuch as aflert either 
 a Creation or Formation of the World by a provi- 
 dent or beneficent Caufe. For fuppofing fuch an 
 univerfal Idea to be real, it would on their Principles 
 be altogether unaccountable from whence it fhould 
 have proceeded, unlefs from the Author of Nature. 
 But ftill it could have been no Proof upon the Prin- 
 ciples of Epicurus y who conceivM it no otherwifc 
 than as the Effed of ftupid unintelligent Matter 
 and fortuitous Motion, and whofe Idea of a God, 
 included no fuch Attributes as Providence and Be- 
 neficence. 
 
 From whence *tis clear, that fince this Argument 
 could have no rational Effed upon Epicurus, it fol-. 
 lows, that when he faid he admitted a God or God* 
 becaufe of the Univerfality of the Idea of fomcthing. 
 
 Divine, 
 
1S6 An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 Divine, he could in EfFedl mean no other, than that 
 he fuppos'd the Exiftcnce of fome Divine Being or 
 Beings, only becaufe the Suppofition was fafhion- 
 able and popular, and becaufe the contrary might 
 have expos'd him to Cenfure and Punifhment. 
 
 But that there is really fuch an Idea in the Mind , 
 of any Man antecedently to Inftrudion and Reafon- 
 ing, does neither appear by our Experience of our- 
 felves, nor is capable of Proof from our Obfervation 
 of others ; which yet are the only poflible Ways of 
 proving it. For Tradition and Inftrudtion ufually 
 make fuch early Imprellions, as to prevent the leaft 
 Refledion upon any fuch innate Idea. And as it 
 admits of no Proof from Experience, fo 'tis fuffici- 
 ently confuted by it. For we find that fuch as re- 
 ceive either none, or but fome imperfed Notices of 
 a Deity from Tradition or Reafoning, have either 
 Jio Idea of him at all, or but fuch a corrupt and im- 
 pct-fed one as fufHciently correfponds to their Means 
 of Information. And this, I take it, is abundantly 
 clear from the credible Accounts of Travellers. 
 
 Dss Cartes^ after the Example, though I will not 
 fay withtheDefign of £/?zVz^r«j, having equally dif- 
 carded all the ufual Proofs of the Divine Exiflence, 
 thinks he has fufficiently fupply'd their Room by 
 two Demonltrations derived from the Nature of the 
 fame fuppos'd innate Idea. And this Topick has 
 fmce become fruitful of Arguments. 
 
 One Demonftration of Des Cartes is to this Effedl. 
 An Attribute which we clearly and diflindlly per- 
 ceive to be included in the Idea of a Thing may be 
 truly affirm'd of that Thing. But the Idea which 
 we find implanted in our Minds of a Deity or mofl 
 perfedt Being, plainly includes Neceffity of Emjlence : 
 For this being without Doubt a Perfe(5lion, can't 
 but be contain'd in the Idea of that Being which is 
 conceiv'd to pofTefs all Perfections. Confequently^ 
 we may truly affirm, that God, or a moll Perfeifit 
 
 ^eing. 
 
Exiftcncc and Nature of GOT). 1 57 
 Being, neceflarily exifts : Ic being a Propofition 
 which is felf evident. 
 
 It were to be wifh'd that this pretended Demon- 
 ftration was as folid as 'tis fpecious and furprizing ; 
 but I fear it never yet had the proper Effed: of De- 
 monflration on any confidering Man, by entirely 
 removing all Doubts and Scruples on this great Point. 
 We fliall give it a few Thoughts, 
 
 And in the firfl Place we may obferve, that there 
 are many Propofitions which are felf-evident and in- 
 difputable, viz. All fuch whofe Terms are neceflarily 
 conneded or jointly fignify the very fame Idea ei- 
 ther in whole or in Part. So this Propofition, A 
 Man is a rational Beings is felf-evident. For there's 
 none who underftands the Terms but mufl immedi- 
 ately aflent to its Truth ; fmce thefe Terms, A Man 
 and a Rational Being (in the flrideft Senfe) fignify 
 the very fame Idea. 
 
 Again, The Truth of fuch Propofitions may be 
 obferv'd not to depend on the Exiftence of the Sub- 
 jefts or Things of which they are affirm'd. For if 
 the Idea jointly fignify 'd by the Terms or Words 
 was fix'd, then the Words were neceflarily connedled, 
 and by Confequence the Propofition they compofe 
 was necefTarily true, though the Thing fignify*d by 
 the Idea had no Exifl:ence -, which Sort of Truth 
 we may properly enough diflinguifh by the Name 
 of ideal or notional Truth, becaufe not founded on the 
 Exiftence of the Thing fignify'd by the Idea, but 
 merely on the Exiftence of the Idea in the Mind of 
 fome intelleclual Being, and on the fix'd Conformity 
 of the Terms or Words to that Idea. 
 
 In the next Place it may be obferv'd, that as 
 there's a notional or ideal Truth of Propofitions, con* 
 fifting in " the fix'd Conformity of the Terms to the 
 Idea exifting in the Mind, fo there's a real Truth of 
 Ideas, confifting in the Conformity of the Idea to the 
 Thing fignify 'd or rcprefented by it. This Truth is 
 
 Qf 
 
1 5 S Ah Impartial Enquiry into the 
 of a quite different Kind from the Notional Truth 5 
 and the notional Truth may ('as we before obferv'd) 
 be very well without it. For Example, This Pro- 
 pofition, A Man is a Rational Being, might be no- 
 tional ly true, i. €. the Terms might be fix*d and 
 determin'd to fignify the Notion or Idea of a Man in 
 the Mind of fome other intelledual Being, and by 
 Confequence, the Conformity between thefe Terms 
 and fuch an Idea of a Man, might caufe this Propo- 
 fition to be true, though no fuch Creature as a Man 
 reprefented by that Idea were exiftent in Nature. 
 Thefe Things, I take it, are fo clear as not to need 
 any further lUuftration . 
 
 To apply this to the prefent Cafe. 
 
 We grant that the Propofition, God necejfarily ex- 
 j/?j, or, which is all one, God is necejfarily exiftent, 
 is a felf-evident Propofition, like the former. For 
 there's none who has an Idea of a God or moft perfe^ 
 Being, and of necejfary Exiftence, but muft immedi- 
 ately perceive the Conformity and Conne6lion of 
 thefe Terms ; fmce the Term necejfary Exiftence, 
 fignifying a Perfection, can't but be conneded with 
 the Term God, which fignifies a Complication of all 
 Perfections. 
 
 It muft therefore be own'd, that this Propofition 
 has a neceflary notional Truth, i. e. fmce the No- 
 tion or Idea of God neceflarily includes the Idea of 
 necejfary Exiftence, (which is by Confequence a Part 
 of the fame Ideaj therefore the Terms or Words, 
 while determin'd to fignify thofe Ideas, muft necef- 
 farily have a fix'd Conformity and Connexion with 
 each other. 
 
 But then it may be obferv'd, that this notional or 
 ideal Truth (which is all that can be inferr'd from 
 one Term's being connefled with another) does not 
 by any Means demonftrate the real Truth or the Ex- 
 iftence of an Objed: or Thing conformable to the 
 
 Idea 
 
Exigence and Nature ofGOT>. I59 
 Jdca or Ideas fignify'd by thofe TeriTiS. As appears 
 by the former Inllance. 
 
 From hence 'tis manifcft, that the firft and main 
 Propofition of Ties Cart€i\ Demonflration, {y'rx^ 
 An Attribute whicli was clearly and diftinctly per- 
 ceiv'd to be included in an Idea, may be truly af- 
 firmed of the Thing fignifyM by that Idea) is falfe. 
 For an Attribute may be clearly included in an Idea, 
 and may by Confcqucnce be truly affirm'd of the 
 Idea which includes it, when yet it can*t be affirm'd 
 of any thing fignified by that Idea. For as the Idea 
 (if a complex one, and capable pf being form'd or 
 compos'd by the Imagination) may well be without 
 the Thing which it is fuppos'd to fignify, fo many 
 Propofitions may be true of the Idea which are not 
 true of the Thing. Confequenlly, though I find 
 NecefTity of Exiftence included in my complex Idea 
 of a God or mod perfed Being, and though I can 
 clearly perceive its unalterable Connexion with that 
 Klea, yet it does not for that Reafon follow that I 
 may affirm it of any real Being, unlefs I was ante- 
 cedently convinc'd (which mull have been by fomC 
 other Argument than this) that there adlually isfuch 
 a Being as is conformable to my Idea : No morq 
 than it follows that I may affirm Power or Wifdom 
 of him antecedently to fuch Convi(ftion : For thefe 
 are equally included in that Idea. This Argument 
 therefore can't prove the ExiRence of a God, but 
 only a certain Mode of his Exiftence already prov'd, 
 v'l'z.. NeceJJiiy. 
 
 The other Demonftration of Des Cartes is deriv'd 
 from the Perfedlion of the fuppos'd innate Idea of a 
 God ; and is to this Effed:. 
 
 The Idea of an infinitely perfcfl Being, which I 
 am confcious of in my Mind, has greater Perfe<ftion 
 than any finite Being was capable of caufing it to 
 reprefent. By Confequcnce, 'tis impoffible I ffiould 
 perceive any fuch Idea in my Mind, unlefs there be 
 
1 60 An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 a Caufe of that Idea poflefling as much Perfecftion as 
 is reprefented by it. Therefore a God, or a Being 
 of infinite Perfection exifts, who is the Caufe of that 
 Idea which reprefents infinite Perfection. 
 
 This pretended Demonftration is weaker, if pof- 
 fible, than the former ; and it feems unaccountable, 
 that the Meditations of that Philofopher Ihould gain 
 fuch Credit in the World, which had fo little befides 
 the Novelty of the Method to recommend them. 
 
 What Perfection is there in the Idea even of an 
 infinitely perfedl Being, as it exifts in the Mind, 
 more than what the Mind may be fuppos'd to hav^ 
 given it ? If we refledt, we fhall foon perceive, with 
 the excellent Mr. Locke, that we have no pofitive 
 Idea of any thing as Infinite. We can't receive nor 
 form in our Minds any Idea fo great as will admit 
 of no farther Addition or Increafe. Whatever Idea 
 "we perceive at any one Time is plainly limited -, and 
 the moft we can do to qualify an Idea to reprefent 
 fomething of Infinity, is only in a negative Wa^f, 
 by not fixing any Period to the repeated Additions 
 in our Minds. And whatever Materials we employ 
 in forming or reprefenting fuch an Idea, are plain- 
 ly no other than what we have deriv'd from the Fi- 
 nite Objects we daily converfe with. But the uni- 
 ting of borrowed Ideas of particular Kinds and De- 
 grees of Perfe(5lion, without determining any Limits 
 of the Progreffion, is certainly no fuch Effect as 
 Ihould necelTarily require an infinitely perfedl: Caufe. 
 This we are fenfible is fufficiently within the Power 
 of our own Imaginations. We can form the Idea 
 of a Mountain without limiting any particular Height, 
 by heaping Pelion upon Ojja, and imitating the fa- 
 mous Labour of the Giants, though we ourfelves 
 don't equal the Bulk of the leaftof thofe Mountains. 
 And by Parity of Reafon, we may form a like ne- 
 gative Idea of an univerfal, unbounded, or infinite 
 Perfeftion, without having any infinite Perfection 
 in ourfelves. Another 
 
^TLiUcncc and Nature of GOU. i6t 
 - Another Argument for the Exiftence of God, 
 which fome derive from the Nature of his fuppos'd 
 innate Idea in our Minds, is to this Effe6t. 
 
 The Exiftence of a God, fay they, is poflible, 
 becaufe there's nothing contradictory in our Idea or 
 Notion of him. But if it be poflTible, it follows 
 that it is likewife neceflary. For, fuppofing there 
 is now no God, *Lis impofTible there ever fliould be 
 any : Since Eternity, which is included in our Idea 
 of him, can have no Beginning. His Exiftence 
 muft therefore either be impolTible, (which yet we 
 clearly perceive it is not) or elfe he mull now ne- 
 ceiTarily exid. 
 
 This is another plaufible Argument. But we do 
 jiot want it j having fo many others which have 
 Strength as well as Plaufibility. 
 
 To fhew its Weaknefs, it will perhaps be fuffi- 
 cient to produce a parallel Inftance. 
 
 if this Way of Arguing was good, the follow- 
 ing Argument would be no lefs a Demonftration. I 
 have an Idea or Notion of a Firjl Man with IVmgs ; 
 and i find Nothing impoflible or con trad iflory in 
 this Idea. If then *tis a poffible Idea, I conclude 
 the Thing is neceflarily fo. For if he does not now 
 exifl: with Wings, then Cfince the Firfl Man can'c 
 be produc'd after any other) it follows that he can 
 never exift with them. Confequently, a polTible 
 Being would be impoffible. 
 
 But this being manifeftly a fallacious Argument, 
 the former mull be fo too. For they are, I think, 
 exaftly parallel. 
 
 So uncertain is it to argue from the Notional Pof- 
 fibility to the real Exiftence -, and much more to the 
 Neceflity of that Exiftence. For an Objed: may be 
 poflible in its abftradt Idea (?". e, there may be No- 
 thing contradictory in the Idea of a Thing in our 
 Mincls) when yet, on Account of fome external 
 Confideration, it may be incapable of exifting. 
 I- Tha: 
 
i6i ^ Ah Impartial Enquiry into the 
 That then which made the former Argument for 
 plaufible, was its confounding an external Cotifide- 
 ration, viz. the Want of Beginning j with the in- 
 ternal Attributes of the Divine Nature. For a Re- 
 lation to the I*arts and Periods of Duration is fbme- 
 \ilrhat merely e?rti-infical. But the abftrad Idea of a 
 God, which was firft cdnfider'd as poflible in that 
 Argument, included no fuch Relation. And there* 
 fore if the Deity could be fuppos*d not to exift, yet 
 his abftrad Idea Would ftill be a Poflibility for would 
 include no Repugnance, in its felf confider'd) tho* 
 on Account of that external Confideration, he could 
 never exift. 
 
 ' Spinoza gives this Argument a different Turn in 
 his Opera pojlhuma^ P' Z^ i • Says he. Si tale Ens non 
 exift eret, i^c. i. e. *' If fuch a Being (wz. an abfo- 
 *' lutely infinite onej did not exift, it could never be 
 " produc'd •■, and fo it would follow, that our Minds 
 *' could conceive more than Nature could perform j 
 *• which he thinks abfurd. 
 
 But this Argument is founded on the Suppolition 
 t)f our having a pofitivie Idea of fuch an Infinite ; 
 Which that it is a vain &ippiofition, has been partly 
 ihewn both in this and the former Book, and mOr& 
 will be faid in the following Part.. 
 
 PART the Second. 
 
 Of the Infinity of the divine Nature. 
 G H A P. I. 
 
 TH E Opinion of the pofitive of abfolufe In^ 
 nity of the Divine Nature has fo long and fo 
 generally prevail'd, that forne, we find, take k fof 
 a Natural Notion^ and tell us we need only fead 
 
 ©ver 
 
Exirtcnce and Nature of OOD. 16 i 
 
 Over the Catalogue of our Innate Ideas to obtain Sa- 
 tisfa(5lion about it. 
 
 But becaufe all Men are not as yet agreed, whe- 
 ther there be any fuch Thing as innate Ideas, much 
 lefs, whether this be of the Number ; and becaufe 
 'lis very poffible that Prejudices of Education may 
 have crept into the Lift, 'twill perhaps be conve- 
 nient to make it the Subje(fl of our Impartial En- 
 quiry. 
 
 As for the EngliJIj Word Infinite, every one knows 
 *tis a Negative Term deriv'd from the halin injinuusy 
 ivhich Word, as the Learned will inform U3, was 
 firft coin'd to exprefs the Senfe of the Greek ct-sreif©-* 
 which properly fignifies fomewhat either without End 
 or Limits in itfelf, or without Bounds from other Be- 
 ings : Of which Senfes the former is Absolute, the 
 latter Relative. 
 
 The Word Finite admits of the fame Difference of 
 Senfes -, fince a Thing may fometimes be confider'd 
 as having Limits in itfelf, (which is to be Finite in 
 the abfolute Senfe,) and fometimes as bounded by 
 Other Beings, (which is to be Finite in a Relative 
 Senfe. 
 
 In our Enquiry into the Hiftory of the Word ////- 
 kite, and its Synotiyma, it will be needlefs to make a 
 laborious Search into the Opinions of the Eafiern Na- 
 tions ; both becaufe we have no certain or complete 
 Account of their Philofophy, and becaufe their Senti- 
 ments could have no other Influence on the prefent 
 Age, than by Means of the Greeks, by whom they 
 ^ere ufually borrow'd and tranfmitted to Poftcriiy. 
 
 Yet I can't omit the famous Paradox afcrib'd to 
 Hermes Trifmegijius, who is faid to have taught, that 
 Deus e^ Sphcsra cujus Centrum eft uhique, cujus Peri- 
 ;pheria nufqudm, i. e. God is a Sphere ix;hofe Centre is 
 every where, hut his Circumference no where. But 
 fmce the Learned are not agreed, whether there was 
 ever fuch a Perfon as this Egyptian Hermes:, much 
 
 L 2 i«ft 
 
1 64 -^ Impart tat Enquiry into the 
 tefs whether thofe Remains which are attributed to 
 him be genuine, we may, it is conceiv'd, be ex- 
 cus'd from taking any further Notice of it. 
 
 Therefore, the Firft (for ought with any Cer- 
 tainty appears) who aflerted an ahfolute Infinity 
 was Anaximander. This Philofopher, with his 
 f'olloWets, held 79 "A-areiptK, of Infinity, tO have 
 been the Principal or Original of all Things •, yet 
 this Infinity of theirs (on Enquiry) we fhall find to 
 have been no Deity, but a confus'd Heap or Chao: 
 cf inanimate Matter^ front the cafual Mixture or 
 Coalition of which they fanicyM the Univerfe with 
 all its Beauty and Regularity to have proceeded. 
 
 This Method of Philofophy Was afterwards revi- 
 ved by Vemocritiis ahd Epicurus^ who undertook 
 to improve the groflet Atheifm of Anaximander^ 
 land to difguife the Monfter in a more fpecious andi 
 philofophical Drefs. 
 
 What Succefs thofe wife Projeflors met with in fo 
 hopeful an Undertaking may eafily be imagined. 
 Having banifh'd all Contrivance and Defign, and left 
 all to the Management of Chance, no Wonder if 
 they made but bungling Work on't. Let us a little 
 obferve their Method. 
 
 And, in the firft Place, thefe Builders of Worlds 
 having prudently fuppos*d the neceflary Exiftence or 
 Eternity of Matter -, their next Care was to fet it a 
 moving. This We may conceive was but a fmall 
 Difficulty to fuch mighty Undertakers. *Twas but 
 tofuppofe Motion to have been alike neceflary, and 
 the Atoms (without the Toil or Fatigue of any Dei- 
 ty j could move as nimbly as the Stones of the Tro^ 
 jan JFdll at the Melody of Apollo^s Harp. Having 
 thus fet every Dufl of Atom in Motion, and begun 
 the imaginary Dance, their next Care was to provide 
 them fufficient Room. And left they ftiould have 
 wanted Scope to exert their eternal A6Vivity, they 
 "IbOn agreed, at the Expence of another Suj^pofition^ 
 
 ■ . to 
 
IxMcnc^ ^and Nature of G OD. i6$ 
 
 to accommodate them with no lefs than an abfoltittly 
 vifinite Space. But having once llippos'd fudl an in- 
 finite or endlefs Space, they foon found themfelves 
 oblig'd tofuppofe alike Infinity of their Atoms i fincc 
 otherwile they couid have born no Proportion to the 
 Space, and confequently could not lb commodioufly 
 have been imagin'd to coalefce into Worlds. Thus 
 thefe three Principles of Eternal Motion^ hfinite Spac^y 
 and Infinite M-atter^ being once admitted, they foon 
 loft and bewildet-'d themCelves among their infinite 
 Worlds, whfere we ihall leave them, and proceed. 
 
 By what has already been difcover'd, it appears, 
 that an ahfolute Infinity was firft intfoduc'd among 
 the Greeh by Anaxipiander, and his Followers the 
 Atheiftkal Atomifis^ and made tl\e Attribute of Mat- 
 ter. Our next Bufinefs will be to enquire when and 
 by whom it was firft confecrated or fct apart for the 
 Deity. 
 
 And we need not go far to make the Difcovery. 
 For Anaxagorasy the next Succefibr but one to A- 
 naximaniiery having, it feems, taken a mofe confi- 
 derate View of the wonderful Frame of the World, 
 and obferv'd thofe Signatures of Wifdom and De- 
 fign which appear in the Order and Beauty of its 
 feveral Parts, was foon inclin'd to recall that Deity 
 v.'hom his Mafter had banifliM, and to own him for 
 the Author of fo noble a Work. For thus he began 
 his Philofophy with UavIa xffif/.ct7u bS of^n, &c. i.e. 
 Al{ Things were at firjl mingled and blended together ^ 
 till the Mind nevj madeWd and difpos*d them into an 
 orderly and beautiful Frame. To this Mind AnOsXa- 
 goras is fiid to have given the Title ol "kTni^n^ or 7«« 
 finite. For being ftili in other Refpefts a Follower 
 of Anaximander^ and confequently an Aflertor of 
 the abfoluce Infinity of Mutter^ he found himfelf ob- 
 lig'd to attribute a like Infinity to the Mind or De- 
 ity i finceotherwife it could have born no Propor- 
 tion to the Matter on which it was conceiv'd tc ad:. 
 L ^ And 
 
iiS6 An Impartial Enquiry^ inta the 
 
 And thus the Notion of an abfolutely infinite Deiiy* 
 was der^'d from that of abfolutely infinite Matter. 
 
 Though feyeral other Philofophers, efpecially of 
 the Ionic St&ii. became Patrons of this Opinion, yet 
 wefhall find that the firft confiderable Promoter of 
 it was Plato. That this Philofopher was an Aiier- 
 tor of an abfolutely infinite Deity, is, ^hat I con- 
 ceive, not likely to be deny'd. Therefore, inflead 
 of proving it from his Writings, let us proceed to 
 confider his Charader i it being that which may be 
 of fome Ufe to us in forming a Jud^rnent of his 
 Opinions. And this we may borrow from the ju- 
 dicious and impartial Monf. Rapin, who in his Re^.' 
 flexions on the Ancient and Modern Philofophy^ neap 
 the Beginning, informs us, " That though riatOf 
 *' js indeed a very florid and ingenious Author, yet 
 f* he writes with little Coherence or Method, de- 
 " cides but little in his Difcourfes, and eftablifhes 
 " almoft Nothing at all. That through his too 
 *' great Defire to be pleafing, he's too much for 
 '^ telling of Wonders, and thence it is that the moft 
 *' Part of his Difcourfes are nothing elfe but Fables, 
 "' Metaphors, and continual Allegories. That he 
 *' often afFefts to be myfterious in what he fays, 
 " and that 'tis commonly by Lying that he under- 
 f' takes to perfuade Truth. 
 
 To this Charader we may add the general Ob- 
 fervation, that Myftical Divinity was firil introdu- 
 ced arnong Chriftians by Derivation from the Plato- 
 jiick Philofophy, On which Account the Learned 
 Meric Cafiuibon^ in his Treatife of Enthufiafm, was 
 led to make this Refledion, p. 69. " That how- 
 t' ever fome of the Fathers have imagin'd the Phi- 
 *' lofophy of Plato to have been ferviceable tp 
 " Chriftianity, yet it has been the Occafion of 
 *' many Flerefies among Chriftians, and that to this 
 " very Day 'tis the common Refuge of contempla- 
 
 " tive 
 
Exiftencc and Nature of GO'D. 167 
 *« tive Men who have run themfelves belide theii 
 Wits. 
 
 But if we examine farther into the Matter, we fliaU 
 find, that though Plaio was the firft confiderable 
 J^romoter of this Opinion, yet the chief Advancer 
 and Propagator of it was Ariftotle ; a Pcrfon indeed 
 of an admirable Genius, but too guilty of an affec- 
 ted Singularity in his Opinions, and a perpetual Hur 
 mour of contradicting others ; as | think his greateft 
 Admirers muft confcfs. 
 
 But to make good this Charader, we need no o- 
 ther Proof but the Matter before us : For we muf^ 
 obferve, that this his Opinion of the divine abfolute 
 Infinity was neither entertained, by him as a Didlatc 
 of his Matter Plato, (whom he feems ^o take a pe- 
 culiar Pleafure to contradidl and expofe,) nor as the 
 Refult of free and impartial Reafoning, but was a 
 Notion which he rather appears to have taken up 
 through the fame Humour of Contradicflion. For 
 having aflTcrted that odd Opinion of the Eternity of 
 the World in its prefent Form j not perhaps becaufe 
 it appear'd to him to be the moft rational, but be- 
 caufe all the Philofophers who went before him had 
 held the contrary (as himfelf would perfuade us in 
 his Book i/^ Calo, c. 10.) and being content to ad- 
 mit a Deity into his Hypothefis (probably to avoid 
 the Fate of Protagoras and other reputed Aiheifts^ 
 )ie coneeiv'd himfdf oblig'd to alfert his abfolute In- 
 anity as a neceflary Confequence of that Eternicy he 
 had attributed to the World. For fince he had dc- 
 riv'd an eternal World by \yay of Emanation from 
 the Deity, and had thereby made him the Author 
 of the eternal Motion which he concciv'd in that e- 
 ternal World i and fince he fuppos'd that Nothing 
 lefs than an abfolutely infinite Power could be the 
 Caufe and Prefervation of fuch an infinite (or eter- 
 nal) Motion, he thought himfclf oblig'd to affert an 
 abfolutely infinite Deity as the only capable Subjeft 
 
1 68 An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 
 of that infinite Power. For this is his own Method 
 of Arguing. 
 
 From hence then it appears that this Opinion, 
 firfl taught by Anaxagoras^^ and afterwards fpread 
 and propagated by Artjlotle, was taken up by both 
 on the Credit of falfe Principles ; if th^ ahfolute In- 
 finity of Matter, and the Eternity of the^^orld, may 
 deferve that Charafter. However, finch the bare 
 Derivation of an Opinion from a falfe P^rinciple is 
 no neceffary Argument of its being its fel^ falfe, wc 
 ought not from thence to take Advantage againft it, 
 but to be entirely determin*d by the rlvidence of 
 Scripture and Reafon. 
 
 This Opinion being thus entertained by Plato, and 
 his celebrated Scholar Arijlotle, who befides their 
 great Wits had fo many other Advantages above moft 
 rhilofophers to make themfelves believ'd and fol- 
 lowed j no Wonder if it foon over fpread the learned 
 World. Yet how many foever its Profelytes were 
 among the more modern Philofophers, 'tis certain its 
 Succefs among the more Primitive Chriflian Fathers 
 was very different. Thefe we find were fo far from 
 -thinking it any Part of their Creed, that they rejec- 
 ted it as an Impofture of vain Philofofhy. So did 
 Jnflin Martyr*, who for his Learning was ftilM the 
 ■Philofopher, and writ immediately after the firft Cen- 
 tury. The fame did T'^/f^w %, Clemens AJexandri- 
 ims **, and Tertuliian -f, the three other moft cele- 
 brated Fathers of the firft and pureft Ages of Chri- 
 ftianity : And thefe have fince been follow*d by Sco- 
 tus*f, the moft fubtile of the Schoolmen, the lear- 
 ned Prince of Mirandola -f-f, and others. 
 
 And though it muft be confefs'd that the Argu- 
 ments which the mentioned pious Fathers produ"c*d 
 
 * Contra Tryph. p. 2S3. et 357- »* In Lib. adv. Gentes. 
 
 ** InPar/eit. -f- Ik Lib. adv. Orig. c. 7. et f.ohtra Marcien. 
 lib. z. c. 16.^ ^t Lib. 3 . )^nisnt, Dipn£t. 1 . ff Jokan. Pi- 
 
 (u: in PofttisnioHS: 
 
 ■ . for 
 
Exigence and Nature of G 0T>. 1 69 
 
 for their private Opinion, in Oppofition to this Doc- 
 trine of the Pagan Philofophers, prove Nothing in 
 a pofitive Way fo much as the Strength of their Pre- 
 judice againft it ; yet it can*t be deny*d that they 
 conclude fo far in the Negative, as fufficiently to de- 
 monftrate, that an abfolutely infinite Deity was no 
 Objecfb of the Primitive Chriftian Worfhip. 
 
 But it was not long e*er the Scene was chang'd. 
 For now the Church emerging from under the De- 
 luge of Perfecution, the fublime and myftical Di- 
 vinity of Plato was thought more fuitable to the 
 Splendor and Magnificence of the Chriftian Temples 
 tlian the Primitive Apoftolical Simplicity. And the 
 Age of Miracles being at an End, no other Me- 
 thod was judg'd fo likely to reconcile Chriftianity to 
 the Reliih of the learned Heathens, as the endea- 
 vouring an Accommodation between the Church and 
 the Academy. 
 
 Yet after the Interval of a few Centuries, the ab- 
 folute Authority of Plato became fomewhat limited, 
 and Arijlotle was admitted to a Copartnerlhip in the 
 JEmpire of Science. However, though the Method 
 of Arijlotle was chiefly follow'd in the Phyfical and 
 Elen^ical Philofophy, the Divine Plato ftill held his 
 Reputation in Theology. 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 THUS have we brought down the Hiftory of 
 the Word Infinite within the View of our own 
 Times -, till which, in this Refped, Matters have 
 continued much the fame. 
 
 Our next Task will be to make an impartial En- 
 quiry into the Opinion of Infinity itfelf, as *tis now 
 generally entertain'd among us. 
 
 And Firft, we muft obferve, that as Perfed:ion, 
 abftrai^tedly confider'd, is a general Mode of thp 
 
 divine 
 
wo An Impartial Enquiry intQ the ' 
 
 divine Nature, fo Infinity is conce4vM as a Modi? 
 of its Perfe(5tion. So that abfoluU Infinity is in ^fFed 
 the fame with that ahfolute PerfeSion of which we 
 j^e^^:ed in the former Book. 
 
 .'. tThere's none who is but moderately skill'd in Phi- 
 {pfophy, but knows there is a twofold Notion of 
 Infinity^ and likewife of ImmenfUy. 
 
 The firil Notion imports fomething purely negative 
 or relative, or denotes a Thing's being endlefs no o- 
 therwife than with Reference to other 3eings : Which 
 negative or relative Infinity may be underflood as 
 either a£iual or potential. In the former Senfe, the 
 univerfal Space or Expanfion may be faid to be inr 
 finite j both becaufe by thinking we can never arrive 
 ^t any fjxM End or Limits, and becaufe there is 
 jio other Space to bound it. In the latter Senfe^ 
 any given Line or Number is fometimes faid to be 
 infinite, inafmuch as we can never imagine either to 
 be fo far increased as to ren<^er it an abfolute Con- 
 tradition that flili more fliould be conceiv'd to be 
 added in infinitum. And Mathematicians by Infinite 
 fometimes mean fuch Quantity as is indefinite^ or 
 which either is not or cannot be defined or limited 
 by us ; as alfo fuch Quantity to which a lefTer Quan- 
 tity bears no fenfible Proportion : Which lafi is a 
 very improper Senfe of the Word. 
 
 The other Notion imports fomething pofttive or 
 ahfolute, or denotes a Thing's beipg in its very Na- 
 ture incapable of End. 'Tis in this Senfe that the 
 Deity is ufually faid to be Infinite, And the ancient 
 Atondfis, with fome modern Cartefians, have thought 
 ^t to attribute the fame Infinity to Space and Mat- 
 ter.' 
 
 Now 'tis a Maxim among Philofophers, that all 
 the Attiibutes of an Infinite are infinite in the fame 
 Senfe : And accordingly it has been ufual to afcribe 
 an. abfolute Infinity of Kinds and Degrees of Perfec- 
 tion 
 
Exiftcnce and Nature ofGQD. 171 
 t^on to die Deity. This Infinity, wlien confider*d- 
 \vith Reference to the divine Effence in general, is 
 ftilM abfolute Immenfity i when with Reference to his 
 Power in particular, 'tis abfolute Omnipotence -y whqn 
 with Refpe(5t to his Knowlege, 'tis ahfoluie Omui^ 
 filence, &c. 
 
 And here we mufl be fo jufl as to obferve, that 
 this Opinion of an abfolute pr pofitive Infinity rC'- 
 commends itfelf by a certain Air of Piety, and 
 feems at the firft Sight to be very agreeable to the 
 Idea we find ourfelves difposM to entertain of the 
 Greatnefs and Majefty of the Supreme Being. Bu; 
 fincc Religion does not confiil in an ignorant Admi- 
 ration and blind Obedience, but in a Belief upon 
 Conviction, and in a reafonable Service ; and fmce 
 we cannot be too wary how we receive any Notion 
 of the Obje(^ of our Religion without fufficient War-r 
 rant ; it can be no Want of Piety nor of Modefty 
 to make it the Subjed of our Impartial Enquiry. 
 
 And therefore, our prefent Bufinefs being chiefly 
 with fuch Chriftians who profefs to own the Scripr 
 tures as the only fufficient Rule of Faith, let us firft 
 confider whether this Opinion may juftly plead aoy 
 Countenance or Authority from them. 
 
 The Word Infinite, in our EngliJJj Tranflation, 
 though as apply'd to other Things it may be met 
 with feveral Times, viz. in Job xxii, 5. Nah. ii. 49, 
 and iii. 9, yet as it refers to God it occurs but in one 
 Place, viz. Pfal. cxlvii. 5. where his Underjianding 
 is faid to be infinite. But if we confult the original 
 Hebrew, we lliall obferve that the Word which is 
 jiere tranflated infinite, properly fignifies Without 
 Number. And therefore, in the Judgnient of any 
 unprejudic'd Man, it can't here be conceiv'd to de^ 
 note the abfolute Infinity of the divine UnderRan- 
 ding (which none will aflert to be infinite in Num- 
 ber) but mud neceflarily be expounded (as by th« 
 
172 An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 beft Expofitors it is wont to be *) with Reference to 
 rts Obje^s, or its Effe^s : Which are hereby aflerted ' 
 to be fo numerous as either to furpafs, or not eafily 
 to come within the Compafs of human Reckoning. 
 For thus we read of Camels without Number, Judges 
 vi. 15. People without Number, 2 Chron. xii. 3. 
 Catterpiilars without Number, Pfal. cv. i2. Virgim 
 without Number, Cantic. vi. 8. &c. JBy which Ex- 
 prefllons, I am perfuaded, none ever underflood an 
 abfolute Infinity. 
 
 ]But though the Scriptures do not exprefly teach it 
 us, yet are there not fome Texts which at leaft in- 
 fer or imply it ? What elfe can be meant by i Kings 
 viii. 27. where we rczd. That the Heave?7s, yea, the 
 Heaven cf Heavens, cannot contain the EJfenee of their 
 Creator. KnA Pfal cxxxix. 7. &c. Whither fhall I 
 flee from thy Prefence, &c. ? But \ think it muft be 
 Gonfefs'd, if we lay afide Prejudice, that neither of 
 thefe can amount to a fufficient Proof. For though 
 the Heaven of Heavens (or the utmoft Heaven, as the 
 Hebraifm imports) cannot contain the Effence of the 
 Deity, does it therefore follow, that it is abfolutely 
 infinite? Certainly no more than if it had been faid, 
 the Earth or Air cannot contain it. For fince the 
 Heavens are by thofe very Words aflerted to be of a 
 finite Extent, (which, by the Way, is no weak Ar- 
 gument to prove the Finitenefs of the material Uni- 
 verfe-,) 'tis evident that they can bear no greater 
 Proportion to an abfolutely infinite Being than the 
 Earth or Air, or even the mlnuteft Particle of Dull. 
 And therefore to infer the abfolute Infinity of the 
 divine Eflence from a Comparifon with the Heavens 
 (though the great^ft and moft capacious of created 
 Beings) would be no lefs impertinent, than to make 
 the lame Inference from a Comparifon with the moft 
 
 * Saplevtia ejus ncn eft nuJverus ; i. e. R^rum (luanim Intelli- 
 gfntiam habct. Sic. Muis. Fel orurit ^it^ japienter fecit. Ut Ge- 
 jer. "Camp. Mpller. Ifc. 
 
 di- 
 
Exiftenee and Nature of GOI). 17? 
 diminutive Thing in Nature -, fince the greateft and 
 the leaft of finite Beings muft bear an equal Difpro- 
 portion to fuch an Infinite. And as for the latter 
 Text, it can't neceflariiy in>port any more than the 
 former. For it proves nothing but the divine Oin- 
 tiiprefence, which may very well be admitted <vithouc 
 the Suppofition of a pofitive or abfolute Infinity 
 with Refped to Space : As may be fully Ihewn 
 hereafter. 
 
 But whatever is not read, or may 7iot he proved by 
 the Scriptures, is not to be required of any Man that 
 it Jhould be helievW as an Article of Faith ; ac- 
 cording to the Fourth Article of the Church of 
 England. 
 
 And as this Opinion is neither fupported by Scrip- 
 ture, nor authorized by the Articles of our Church, 
 fo it feems to have no folid Foundation in Reafon* 
 'Tis freely confefs'd, that nothing can be more evi- 
 dent fi*om Reafon (as 'tis hop'd we have elfewhere 
 made appear^ than that the Eternal Being is the 
 neceffary Subje(5t of all polTible Perfedions. But this* 
 'tis conceiv'd, he may very well be, though this 
 Opinion ihould not be admitted. For certainly that 
 Being poffefles the greateft pofTible Perfedion with' 
 Refpedt to Space, which adually includes all Space, 
 fo as to be every where eflencially prefent ; or whofe 
 Eflence furpafles all Things, and beyond which no- 
 thing either is or can be. That Being is moft per- 
 fed with Refpect to effeBive Power, whofe Ability 
 extends to whatever i$ an Objedt of fach Power. 
 That Being can't but be moft perfect; with Refpedt 
 to Knowledge, which fully comprehends or Icnows 
 whatever is a capable Object of Knowledge. And 
 in fhort, the utmoft pofTible Perfecftion may very 
 well exift without any abfolute Infinity of any Sort ; 
 as hath been already fhewn in the former Book, and 
 will, it's hop'd, more fullv appear hereafter. 
 
 But 
 
ff4 An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 . But as it can't be fupposM that an Opinion which 
 has fo long prevailed among the Learned, ftiould 
 want the Support of fpecious Arguments, we fliall 
 now proceed to confider their Force. 
 
 Arg. I. The great Argument which of late has 
 been us'd as little lefs than a Demonftration of the 
 abfolute Infinity as well as Exiftence of the Deity^ 
 is deriv'd from that innate Idea of an abfolutely infi- 
 nite Being, which is faid to be in every Man. This- 
 (as we before obferved) is the Argument of Monf. 
 Des Cartes. For that ingenious Author having fd 
 far proceeded in his Doubts, in the Beginning of 
 his Meditations^ as to queftion the Reality of his Sen-i 
 fes, and all his Ideas deriv'd from fenfible Objeds,- 
 and having thereby excluded all fuch Proofs of the 
 Exiftence of a God, whofe Credit depended on the 
 Veracity of their Teftimony, he found himfelf ob- 
 lig'd to fearch out fome other Proof from what he 
 could difcover within his own Mind, by the Helpi' 
 of which he might demonftrate the Exiftence of a 
 Deity, and thereby lay a Foundation for Certainty 
 in other Matters* 
 
 Wherefore, in Purfuance of his Defign, having 
 laid it down for a Principle, that (though all the In-* 
 formations of his external Senfes might poffibly prove 
 falfe and delufive, yet) whatever he clearly and di^ 
 fiinSlly perceived in his own Mind, without Derivation 
 from external Obje^ls, muft of Necejfity he true ; and 
 then difcovering, as he thought, an Idea of an ab- 
 folutely infinite Eyeing imprefs'd on his Mind, which 
 contain'd greater Perfedtion than it could derive ei*- 
 ther from the immediate Inftrumentallity of his ex- 
 ternal Senfes, or from the Power of his own Imagi- 
 nation, he thence proceeded to conclude, that fuch 
 an infinite Being exifted •, fmce nothing lefs than fuch 
 an infinite Being could be a fuffieient Caufe of that 
 Idea* 
 
 This 
 
Exlftcrtce and Nature of GO^l). rfj 
 
 This Argument phiinly fuppofcs Two Things* 
 
 1. It fuppofes that wehavt fuch an Idea of a Be- 
 ing infinite in all Peffe(^ions, as coukl not be deriv'd 
 from the Power of our own Imaginations working 
 on the Ideas tranfmitted from fenfible Objedb j slnd 
 therefore, 
 
 2. That It was innate, or Iwrn with U9» ■^■ 
 As for the former Siippofition •, it ha« Already 
 
 been obferv*d, that whatever Idea we may be fa id 
 to have of an Infinite, it can in Reality be no other 
 than a Neg;itive one, ahd confequently no fufficient 
 Reafon can be affign'd, why the Perfcftion of tha« 
 Idea fhould be fupposM to be fuch as to exceed tht 
 Caufality of cuf own Imaginations. 
 
 And as for the latter Suppofitionj viz. That the 
 Idea \^e are faid to have of a pofitively or abfolute- 
 ly infinite Being is innate ; 'twas confider'd irt 
 the Beginning of this and the former Book, and 
 has been refuted at large by the late judicious Mr. 
 Locke. 
 
 Arg. II. Another Argument made ufe of as i 
 Proof of theabfolute or pofitive Infinity of the Di^ 
 vine Being, is deriv'd from the Attribute of Ahfolute 
 Independefice, and is to this Effedt. If the Deity be 
 not thus Infinite, it mufl be either becaufe he was 
 limited by Himfelf or by another. That he was 
 not limited by Himfelf is evident. For no wife Be* 
 ing can be fuppos*d willing to abridge Himfelf, but 
 rather the contrary. And that he was not limited 
 by another, is no lefs evident. For no other Being 
 was capable of fo doing. 
 
 This Argument, as commonly underflood, fap* 
 Jjofes Two Things. 
 
 I. It fuppofes, that whatever Being is finite, mufl 
 have been made fo by a proper Cauf^ility. Thus 
 the learned Dr. Scot (according to the Senfe of the 
 Platonifti) explains its Meaning*; " God*s Inde- 
 
 • Chrijiinrt Life, Part. 2. p. 19J. 
 
 ' "" ** pendencc 
 
17^ An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 *' pendence (fays he) or his not being from ano- 
 *' ther, neceflariJy infers his Immenfity {viz, in the 
 *' abfolute Senfe.) For that which limits or makes- 
 *' Beings finite, is only the Will or Power of their 
 « Caufes. 
 
 But certainly, if we judge impartially, that can'c 
 be reputed the proper eledlive Caufe of Finitenefs, 
 even in created Beings, which could not have been 
 the Caufe of Infinity. For no Caufe can properly- 
 be faid to abridge its Effeft of that which it could 
 not have beftow'd. But if no Being can beftow an 
 abfolute Infinity on its Effed, and if what can't be- 
 ftow it can't with any Propriety be faid to refufe or 
 withhold it, or to chufe to produce the contrary by 
 a pofitive Caufality j it feems that the Reafon why 
 an Effe6l is finite could not be the Will or Power 
 of its Caufe, but an abfolute Neceflity in the Na- 
 ture of Things. 
 
 2. This Argument fuppofes that the Deity's be- 
 ing fuch as he is, proceeded from his own Pleafurc 
 or Choice. Thus the learned Monf Le Clerc un- 
 riddles it's Meaning ; fays he *, ^ando cogitamus 
 Deum ab omm Mternitate extitijfe nee qiddquam eorum 
 quce hahet ab alio accepijfe^ fed ■per fe et Naturd fud 
 fe?nper habuijfe, eo facile devenimus ut ejus Proprieta- 
 tes effe Infmtas agnofcamus. Etenim qui tantce Pre- 
 flanticB ejl ut Duratione infinitd e§l pr^Bditus at^ue nihil 
 ab ullo Ente acceperit, nullos e(ia?n Proprietatum ter- 
 minos habere potef, Proprietates Fi?ntas ecs Natura 
 habent qu(E eas ab alia ipfis Fines ftatuente accepermit ; 
 mnqucB fibi ipfa^fi it a loqui licet ^ pro Arbitrio quavoluit 
 dedit. i. e. *' When we confider that God exilled 
 *' from all Eternity, and naturally and independentr 
 ** ly enjoy 'd whatever he poflefles, without being 
 ^' Debtor to any other, thence we areeafily indu- 
 »' ced to acknowledge his Perfedlion to be Infinite. 
 •' For fo excellent a Nature as was of infinite Du- 
 
 * Pnewnat, p- 172. 173. 
 
 ** ration. 
 
Exiftence and Nature of GOD. 177 
 ** ration, and was no way indebted to any other, 
 *' can confcqucntly have no Bounds of its Properties. 
 '* For fuch Natures only have finite Properties, 
 " which received them from fomc limiting Caule ; 
 *' not fuch an one as (if I may fo fpeakj confcr'd 
 " on itfclf whatever Perfc(5lions it ple;is'd. 
 
 This, we fee, is confefs'd to be theSenfe and Im- 
 port of the prefent Argument : By which it appears, 
 that none can become its Profelyte till he be brought 
 to fpeak fcrioufly in the Style o^ Plato* andD^j Car^ 
 tes**, and to aflert the. Deity produc'd himfelf by 
 a proper Caufality : Which Aflcrtion, it is con- 
 ceiv'd, can need no Confutation •, but muft on the 
 contrary, be allowed to be a fufficient Confutation 
 of any Principle from which it clearly and natural- 
 ly derives. Yet in this Plato is imitated by La£ian- 
 tius, when he fays, Deus feipfiim fecit ; I'he Deity 
 produc'dHimfelf •, and that therefore he i^Talis quahn 
 Seipfum ejfe voluit, fuch as he will'd Himfelf to be. 
 And Plothius, one of Plato's Difciplcs, calls the De- 
 ity it-nov ittvfiy his oivn Caiifc. . And he tells us, that 
 fince an abfolute Simplicity is reckoned among the 
 Attributes of the Firft Being, (which Simplicity, 
 fays he, requires that his Will and his Eflence be 
 reputed one and the fame j) confequently his EfTence 
 muft be from Himfelf, for as much as his Will 
 is fo. 
 
 But of Abfolute Simplicity we fhall difcourfe here- 
 after, when we treat of the Confequences of this O- 
 pinion of an Abfolute Infinity. 
 
 Some, I know, have endeavour'd to foften thofc 
 harfh Expreflions, and have inform'd us, that by 
 the Deity's being ihe. Caufe of Himfelf no more is 
 meant, than that he contains in Himfelf a necef- 
 fary Reafon of his own Exiftence. But though fuch 
 Language may be capable of a Icfs offenfivc Senfe 
 
 * D( Rtpub. Lib.i%. ** Medii.p. 57, j8. 
 
 M in 
 
178 An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 
 in the Mouths of others, yet *tis clear, that thi 
 Propofers of this Argument (if they intend to prove 
 any thing) are reduc'd to the Neceflity of ufmg it 
 in the moil abfurd and indefenfible Senfe. For a 
 Being's not abridging or limiting itfelf is fomewhat 
 purely negative, and therefore can't alone infer fuch 
 an Infinity ; which, though conceiv'd in a negative 
 Manner, and exprefs'd by a negative Word, is af- 
 ferted to be mod highly pofitive in itfelf, and not only 
 not to exclude, but actually to include an endlefs 
 Progreflion of Kinds and Degrees of Perfe6lion. 
 
 jdrg. III. Again, 'tis ufual with the Affertors of a 
 pofitive or abfolute Infinity, to borrow a Proof 
 from the Nature of Creation. Since nothing lefs, 
 lay they, than an abfolutely infinite Power was fuf- 
 ficient to pafs over the infinite Diflance between not 
 being and being in the Produdlion of a Thing from 
 Nothing, it follows that there never could have been 
 a Creation, had there not been fome abfolutely infi- 
 nite Being who was the Subjed of fuch Power. 
 
 E're we confider this Argument, it may not be 
 impertinent to obferve, what Pains have been taken 
 by the Introducers of this 0{)inion of an abfolutely 
 infinite Power (if I may fo fay) to chriftianize it, and 
 fuit it to the Analogy of Faith. For whereas yfri- 
 Jiotk made it an Inference from his Opinion of the 
 World's Eternity by way of Emanation, thefe Gen- 
 tlemen, by a flrange Logical Dexterity, beftow'd 
 on it a Relation to a very different Principle, and 
 infer'd it as a Confequence of the World's Crea- 
 tion. 
 
 But perhaps, 'tis no di/Hcult Matter to manifefl 
 the Weaknefs and Infufficiency of this Argument. 
 For if to pafs over a Diftance be to prove it finite, 
 (as it moft certainly is,) it follows that the Diflance 
 between Not being and Being was not infinite ; fmce 
 it has been aftually palTed over in the Wk of 
 Creation, 
 
 What- 
 
^xii\cntc an^ "N^utc of G O D. 179 
 Whatever fome may imagine, it fcems to mc, 
 that the Diftancc between Not being and Being, ii 
 no other than fiich as is between Not thinking and 
 Thinking, Not moving and Moving : For thelb 
 are Terms equally Gontradi(ftory 'i between Which 
 and the like Terms, if we liippok ibmetiiing ana- 
 logous to an inHiiite Dillance, it can, itisconcei"J''d, 
 be for noothcr Reafon, than becaqfe contradi<5tory 
 Terms can nevd-r be brought together or rcconcil'd. 
 But though thefe Terms can never be brought toge- 
 ther fo as CO' render onf and the fame Subfe^)' both 
 Thinking and Not thinking. Moving and Not mo« 
 ving at once and in the fame Scnfe j yet the pairing 
 from one of thefe Terms tO the other (fo as is ac- 
 tually done when a Thing which was in any Refpc<ft 
 unthinking or without Motion begins to think or 
 move) is, I fuppofe^ no pafling of an infinite 
 Diftance •, fmce 'tis what we fee done every Day 
 even by finite Agents. If in the Creation the divine 
 Power had fo palVd the Diftance between Not be- 
 ing and Being as to have brought together or recon- 
 cil'd thefe two contradidlory Terms, by cauiing the 
 "World both to Be and Not to be, to be at once 
 both Something and Nothing, this would, it is con- 
 fefs'd, have yielded fomewhat like a Proof. But 
 tJiat the Siippofition of a Creation obliges no Man 10 
 believe fuch Abfurdities as thefe, has alfeady been 
 obferv'd in the former Book. ' '^^ ' 
 
 Befides, the Degrees of Diftance between Not 
 being and Being, Nothing and Something, can't 
 be more in Number than the Degrees of Entity or 
 Perfedion in the minuteft created B^ing. But cer- 
 tainly thefe can't be aflerted to be abfolutely infinito, 
 unlefs we will attribute an abfolute Infinity of Per- 
 fedion to the leaft and mcaneft of Creatures. 
 
 Notwithftanding what has been fuid, 1 think none 
 will deny that the Aft of Creation furnifties a fuffi- 
 cient Demonftration of the Divine Omnipteme •, fince 
 
 M 2 No- 
 
i<8o. An Impartial Entfuiry into the 
 Nothing on this Side a Contradi6lion can be inia- 
 gin'd lefs poflible than a Produflioa from Nothing. 
 For that a Power may be properly Omnipotent or 
 Almighty without being abfolutely infinite, may 
 appear by what Ihall be faid under the Ninth Ar- 
 gument, j; 
 
 Arg. IV. Another Argument may be formM, by^ 
 comparing the Opinion of an abfolute Infinity with 
 the vulgar Notion of Eternity. For may it be faid. 
 Since we eafily admit Eternity as a genuine Attribute 
 of the Deity, though it is confefsM it furpaffes our 
 Imaginations to conceive an ahfolutely infinite Dura^ 
 tion ', why fhould any Man be backward to believe 
 an abfolute Jmmenfity, for no other Reafon, than be*- 
 eaufe he can't comprehend an ahfolutely infinite Sub- 
 fiance ? And this is, perhaps, the Argument which 
 has feem'd of greateft Weight to moft confidering 
 Men. i 
 
 But to this, 'tis humbly conceiv'd, may be re- 
 plyM, 
 
 1. That the Reafon why any intelligent Man ei- 
 ther doubts of or disbelieves an abfolute Im?nenfity\ 
 is not merely becaufe he can't comprehend it. For 
 fuch a Perfon can't but be fenfible that many things 
 may be incomprehcnfible to us, that are not Incon- 
 fiftent with the clear Ideas which he has in his Mind. 
 But it muft chiefly be becaufe of the fuppos'd Ab- 
 furdity of that Opinion, or its Inconfiftence with his 
 clear and diftin6t Ideas. 
 
 2. That fuppofmg the Comparifon between any 
 two Opinions to be juft with Reference to fome Ana- 
 logy or Similitude that we may conceive, yet if they 
 don't appear to be equally founded on Reafon, the 
 bare Similitude between their Notions can't be fuf- 
 ficient to oblige us to entertain them with the fame 
 Degree of Aflent. But that there's no little Diffe- 
 rence between thefe two Opinions in this Refpedl, 
 is too evident to be deny'd. To disbelieve the Ex- 
 
 iftence 
 
Exiftcnce and Nature of G 0Z>. i $ t 
 
 ilience of an eternal Being, is to fuppofe the grofTclt 
 of Contradi(flions, viz, the Production of tiic Firll 
 Caufe. For which Reafon, (as we dfewhcre obferv'd) 
 there never was a Philofopher in his right Wits but 
 he aflerted fomewhat that was Eternal. Anaximan- 
 der^ though he deny'd the Exiftence of a God, yet 
 attributed Eternity to Matter and Motion. And if 
 he likewife aflerted an Immcnfity of Space in the ab- 
 folute Senfe, *twas not merely for its own Sake, but 
 chiefly perhaps on Account of its Connexion with 
 the Eternity of Motion which he found himfelf ob- 
 lig'd to fuppofe. But we have already mentioned 
 divers, and might have added more, who liave rc- 
 je6ted the Opinion of the Divine Abfoliite hnmenfity. 
 A fufficient Argument that the Attributes oi Eter- 
 nity and Immenjity in tbe abfolute Senfe, are very dif7 
 ferent either in Point of Reafon, oratleafl:, ofEvir 
 dence. 
 
 I confefs, Des Cartes, and a certain learned Wri- 
 ter of our own *, have been pleas'd to afiirm, that 
 to aflert an End of Space,, is to aflert a Contradiction. 
 Their Meaning is. That if the univerfal Space be 
 finite, it mufl: be bounded by fomewhat which likc7 
 wife is Space. And indeed if this were a necefliry 
 Confequence, the Con tradition would be too evi- 
 dent to be denied. Eut, 'tis humbly conceiv'd, the 
 Ends of Things are abfolute or independent on theif 
 being bounded or encompaflTed by any Thing with- 
 out them •, being in Reality nothing diftindt from 
 the Things themfelves. For what is it to have Ends, 
 but to have Extremities ? If it was not fo, then the 
 immediate Reafon of a Thing's being finite, would 
 be no other than the Neighbourhood ot the furround- 
 ing Beings. But who will aflert the furrounding 
 Air to be the immediate Reafon that the Globe of 
 phe Earth is of a finite Extent ? If none will aflert 
 
 * Dr. Clarke, in hit Reply tv the 6th letUr, p. 38. 
 
 M 3 it 
 
r82 An Impartial Enquiry inU the 
 
 It, then the immediate Reafon of its being of Jinite 
 Bxteiit is phinly this •, viz. hecaufe it hath Extremi- 
 ties or a Superficies ; which (thoilgh as Mr. Jackfon 
 fbmewhel-e objtfb, it' lis a Part of itfelf) furrounds 
 its Subftatice, and termihates or limits it on, every 
 Sic^e. 
 
 But fome will fliy. What Idea can we have of a 
 l^hing beyond which there's no Space or Extenfion? 
 I reply, Though it fhould be granted that we can 
 form no Idea of it, will it purely from thence fol- 
 low that 'tis in itfelf inconceivcable ? Will the Af- 
 fertors of an ahfolute Lifinity affirm oicr Ideas to be the 
 neteffa'ry Standards of Heality ? Will they allow no- 
 thing to be poflible but what's conceivable by us ? 
 
 'Tis confefs'd, we can form no Idea of an End of the 
 univerlal Space or Extenfion. But does it follow that 
 there can be Nothing in Nature but what enters into 
 our Imaginations ? 'Tis, I think, clear^ there can be 
 nb abfomte Contradiftion in fuppofing there is an End 
 of any Extenfiori whatever : For whatever Extenfion 
 we conceive at any one Time in our Minds is finite j 
 and if we cannot notwithftanding attain an Idea of 
 the uniVerfal Space or Extenfion as finite, yet fincc 
 this is as Well 3pace or Extenfion as any other, it 
 can dertainly be no Repugnance in the Nature of the 
 Thing thut it ihould be conceivable as finite too ; 
 atid by^COnfequence,, '^uEnd of Space or Extenfion 
 may be Conceivable to fome other Being, though not 
 to us. i^oT that it is not the Napure of the Idea it- 
 fejf, xaft "Our' O'V^ri peculiar Circuniflances, and the 
 ^anhei-' of Our acquiring it, which objige us to confi-, 
 der the IThing -as endlefs, may farther appear from" 
 ht'Ctie. • When \ve axteinpt to form thciargefl ima- 
 ginnfeleWea of §pace or Extenfion, we confider its 
 Idea in/fuch Manner as it is tranfmitted to us by our 
 5^r. • 5ut our Sight reprefentsit as a vaft Congeries 
 of innumerable Beings feverally furrounded by others. 
 So that according tO this Manner of conceiving, Space 
 
 ^ ■■ ■ ■ ■ and 
 
Exiftencc and Nature of GOTi. 183 
 
 xxv\ the Neighbourhood ofTurrounding Beings (wliich 
 likewife induce Space^ Icem to be neceiranly c©n- 
 ne<fted and infcparable. I'hcre is therefore no Jimi- 
 ting the Excurfions of our Thoughts by any con- 
 ceivable End of Space \ for ftill the fume Scene is re- 
 prefented to our View without End. 
 
 This is that Idea of bifinity of Space which is faid 
 to force itfcif upon us. But let us now fuppofe wc had 
 no other Idea of Space or Extenfjon but what we re- 
 ceiv'd by our Scnfe of I'eelingy in a State of Reft. 
 'Tis manifefl that in this Cafe, our Ideas of Feeling 
 and Space would be always connc(fted and commen- 
 furate ; and by Confequence, we fliould be fo far 
 troni being under a Neceffity of conceiving Space as 
 infimte or efidlefs, that we fliould perhaps find it dif- 
 ficult, if not impofiible, to conceive it to exceed the 
 Limits of our own Bodies. 
 
 'Tis known to be the Method of the Carte/tans 
 fomctimes to run counter in their Reafonings, and to 
 argue, not that the Idea is true becaufe it agrees with 
 the Thing ; but on the contrary, that the Thing 
 mud- therefore be fo and fo, becaufe the Idea in our 
 Minds is fo. Hence it proceeds, that having dif- 
 cover'd the Negative Infinity or Immenfity of our 
 Idea of Space or Extenfion^ they make no Difficulty 
 of concluding that the Thing it reprefents is ablb- 
 lutely or pofitiyely Infimte. But this Sort of Reafo- 
 ning becomes none ^yho allows that Things may be 
 otherwife in Nature than they fometimes i^ppear to 
 be in our Phantafies, and that it's the Office of our 
 Reafon to examine the Truth of oi^r Ideas by com- 
 paring them with the Things they reprefent. Eor 
 though 'tis confefs'd we find ourfelvcs under an Ina- 
 bility of conceiving the univerfal Space with End or 
 Limits, yet this is not an Argument of the Impoffi- 
 bility of an End of Space lutficient to be oppos'd to 
 the plain Demonftrations which may, and liercaftcr 
 fhall be produc'd from Reafon to evince the contra- 
 ^'I 4 ry : 
 
iS4 jin Impartial Enquiry into the 
 ^y : No more than a blind Man's Inability to form 
 an Idea of Light and Colours, is fit to be admitted 
 as a Proof that our Eyes perpetually deceive us. 
 This Inability ought rather to be refolv'd into the 
 Influence our State and Circumftances have on our 
 Minds. For being ourfelves every Way furrounded 
 by extended Objefts, and finding (as we juft now 
 obferv'd) that all thofe Objeds are feverally fur- 
 rounded by others ; we are apt to forget, or per- 
 haps not well to apprehend, that the Limits of 
 Things are nothing elfe but their own Extremities ; 
 to argue, with Spinofa, that whatever is finite is 
 bounded by fome other Thing ; and confequently 
 to conclude, that the univerfal Space or Extenfion, 
 fince there is nothing beyond it by which it can be 
 bounded, is abfolutely Infinite or without Limits. 
 
 *Tis therefore, I humbly conceive, mofl: reafo- 
 nable to conclude, that though the fimple pofitive 
 Ideas which we perceive in our Minds proceed im- 
 mediately from fomething real without us ; (fince 
 the Mind can*t form any materially new Idea ; ) yet 
 compound and negative Ideas yield no fuch infallible 
 -Proofs of the Exiftence of any external Objefts 
 from whence they immediately proceed. For we 
 experience i-n ourfelves a Power both of uniting the 
 Ideas of Things that never were united in Nature, 
 and of forming Negations arbitrarily and at Plea- 
 fure : Or it not form'd by our own Will and Plea- 
 •fure, they may be unavoidably deriv'd from the 
 ' Nature of our State and Circumftances. Thus, be- 
 caufe we have an Idea of Space or Extenfion^ we may 
 be aflur'd there's fomething in Nature from which 
 the Idea immediately proceeds ; for this is a fimple 
 pofitive Idea. And that there's fomething external 
 which immediately caufes in us the Idea ot End or 
 Limits we are fure for the fame Reafon, fince even 
 our Idea of the End of any Thing is pofitive. But 
 that there's any real external Caufe of our Idea of 
 
 the 
 
Exiftence and Nature of G O T). 185 
 
 ;;he EndleJJiiefs of Space or Extenfion we can'c be 
 aflurM merely from the Idea itfeli, fince that Idea is 
 purely negative, and therefore reprefents no Being as 
 pofitively or abfolutely infinite *, and confequcntly, 
 may have been deriv'd, if not from our own Will, 
 yet from our particular and unavoidable Circumllan- 
 ces, in fuch Manner as was Ihewn. But to pro- 
 ceed. 
 
 3. If wefhould add, that the Attributes of Eter- 
 nity and abfolute Immenfity have as little Similitude 
 or Agreement in their Natures as either in Realbn or 
 Evidence, we fhould not perhaps want fufficienc 
 Proof. For though it fliould be admitted that the 
 Nature of Eternity is well reprefented by the Idea of 
 Duratiofi^ yet 'tis mipolTible to conceive how Eter- 
 nity can be wdj an abfolutely infinite Duration. 
 For fhould we fix on any imaginable Point of it, yet 
 (whatever Boet'ms in his Vulgar Definition may 
 pretend to the contrary^ there would be an inex- 
 hauftible Duration ftill to come. This alone mud 
 make the Cafe of Eternity quite different from that 
 of an abfolute Immenfity \ which neceflarily ex- 
 cludes the very Pofiibility of the leall Addition or 
 Increafe. But 'tis, I think mod evident, that 
 neither the Idea of Duration is fuited to reprefent 
 the Nature of Eternity, nor is neceflliry Exiftence 
 capable of the Denomination of Infinite, as will be 
 /liewn hereafter. 
 
 Arg. V. Another Proof of the Attribute of ab- 
 folute Infinity, is ufually attempted from the fup- 
 pos'd Immenfity or Infinity of Extention, or (which 
 with many of our modern Philofophers is the very 
 id.mt)oi Matter. To this Effeft M. Le Clerc ex- 
 prefles himklf -, lliys he, hnmenfitas Dei inde colligi- 
 tiir quod Materia videatur immenfa. Abfurdum enim 
 (ffet Deum, qui multo plures Proprietates habet quam 
 
 * $ee Mr. LockeV EJfay of Hum. Underji. part i.e. 17. 5^c7.i 3. 
 
 Ma- 
 
1 8 6 An Impartial Enquiry into the. 
 Materia^ qui earn pgram et immotam agit prout vuU^ 
 ed iiafuperariy ut Partes materics ultra RoienticB Di~ 
 'oinez Limites porrigerentur ; quod tamen^ nift Beus 
 ejfet immenfus^ feu pojjet per fe agere per immenfani 
 MatericB Extenftonem, Jlatueretur^ &c. i. e. ^* The 
 " Immenfity (or Infinity) of God is infer*d from the 
 " feeming Immenfity of Matter. For it would be 
 *' abfurd to imagine that the Deity, who poflefles 
 *' many more Properties than Matter^ who moves 
 *' and actuates the ftupid Heap as he pleafes, fhould 
 *' be fo far excelled by it, that the Parts of Matter 
 *' fhould be extended beyond the Limits of his Pow- 
 *' er. Which yet we muft either affert, or elfe muft 
 " confefs that he is immenfe, or capable of adling 
 " immediately in all Parts of the infinite material 
 ** Extenfion, ^c. 
 
 This Argument is grounded on that Inability be- 
 fore fpoken of, which we experience wlien we fee 
 ourfelves to limit the Excurfions of Imagination 
 with regard to our Idea of the univerfal Extenfion. 
 For 'tis the relative Infinity of the Idea that lies at 
 the Bottom of the moft plaufible Arguments for the 
 abfolute Infinity of the Thing. *Tis upon this Ba- 
 lis aione that fome have raised their Perpendiculars 
 of infinite Lines and Superficies. Take away but 
 the Power of Imagination, and thofe Notions have 
 nothing left to fupport them in the Nature of Things. 
 
 But fince by the Confeffion of all Men, Nothing: 
 js more apt to deceive us than Imagination, *tis a 
 Thing unworthy a Philofopher to fufier himfelf to 
 be entirely determin'd by That, without confulting 
 his Reafon, whofe Office it is to curb and corred it. 
 ■ Yet fonle (I mean Des Cartes and his Followers) 
 eonfounding the Ideas of Extenfion and Matter, have 
 by this Error of Imagination been led to affert the 
 abfolute Infinity even of the material Univerfe ; 
 though they could not but at the fame Time be fen- 
 
 iible, tliat their Opinion in fome Senfe render'd Mat- 
 
 ■<'- ~ ■ ■ ■ I ■ ■ .,.•-■■■•■ ^gj. 
 
Exiftcnce ^»^/ Nature of GOT). 187 
 ter a neceflary Being, by deprivina die Deity both 
 of a Power ot creating a finite Whole at the firll, 
 and of afterwards annihilating any Part. I call this 
 an Error of Imagination ; for that Reafon (or Intel- 
 led) does not concur with Imagination in the pre- 
 fcTit Cafe, is, I think, nioft certain. For, 
 
 I . Reafon will afturc us, that fince any affignable 
 Portion of Geometrical i^<antily (or Extenfiou) hath 
 certain particular Dimenfions, by Confcquence an 
 abfolutely infinite or immcnfe l\xtcnfion (if really 
 cxiltent) muft: a6tually contain an abfolute Infinity 
 of diftinguifliable Dimenfions -, or fuch a Number 
 as, by Reafon of its Vallnefs, abfolutely excludes the 
 very PofTibility of the leaft Addition and Increafe. 
 But 'tis humbly conceiv'd, that fuch an abfolutely 
 infinite Arithmetical Quantity (or Number) is a pure 
 Impofllbility, For after Millions of Ages fjXMit in 
 adding Millions of Millions together, 'tis evident 
 that the Number will be no lefs finite than it was ac 
 the firft. And fo there will dill be the fame PolTibi- 
 Jiry of adding on and increafing for ever. If any 
 Man will deny this, he ought to aflTign a Reafon, 
 why, after having afriv'd at any particular Number, 
 it fhould then become an abfolute ImpofTibility or 
 Con tradition for it to increafe rather than before. 
 But there is no pofilble Number but may be produ- 
 ced by Addition and Increafe -, otherwife Number 
 mud ceak to be Number. 
 
 Thus the very Method by which our Minds attain 
 their negative Idea of the Infinity of Space or Ex- 
 tcnfion (which is by repeated Additions of Dimen- 
 fions without End) ferves as a Demonftration of the 
 abfolute ImpofTibility of a pofirive or abfolute Infi- 
 nity of Space or Extenfion in Nature. For if an ab- 
 folutely infinite Increafe of Number by Addition be 
 therefore impofTible, becaufe 'tis the very Nature of 
 Infinity never to. be replete ; 'tis manifcft that an 
 abfolutely infinite Extenfion or Space for an abfo- 
 lutely 
 
1 8 8 An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 
 iutely infinite Number of Dimenfions) muft be equal- 
 ly impoflible for the fame Reafon. 
 
 This Way of Arguing, Mr. Locke thinks fuffi- 
 cient to prove the Impoflibilty of a pofiitive Idea of 
 Infinity in our Minds. And *tis difficult to imagine 
 why it fhould not equally prove the Impoflibility of 
 a pofitive Infinity in Nature. For different Dimen- 
 fions are as diftinguilhable in Nature as in our Ima- 
 ginations. A pofitive or abfolute Infinity of Num- 
 bers of Dimenfions, if it be abfurd in itfelf, and 
 therefore impoffible in Idea, can*t but be equally im- 
 poflible in Nature. Not that our Ideas are the ade- 
 quate Meafures of Reality •, but becaufe what is ab- 
 furd or inconfiftent in itfelf, can't but be impoflible 
 both in Idea and Reality. 
 
 But here the Spinofijls will tell us, that Diftin6lion 
 and Number of Parts and Dimenfions are mere Non- 
 entities or Chimera's, and therefore not to be confi- 
 der'd in the prefent Argument. For, fay they, 
 whatever Divifion or Diftinftion of Subftance we are 
 apt to believe, is no other than a Mifreport of our 
 $enfes ; which are eafily deceived by Appearances, 
 and can't penetrate into the true Nature of Sub- 
 ftance, which though reprefented to them under, 
 innumerable Modifications, is yet in Reality, but 
 one and indivifible *. 
 
 I reply. Though according to the Syftem ofSpi- 
 mfa, who defines Suhjlance in Terms which import 
 an abfolute Self-Subfiftence or Independence, it 
 would follow that it's but one Being : yet it could 
 not follow even from thence, that there's no Di- 
 flinftion in that peing. But fince befides the origi- 
 nal or independent Subftance or Being, there's ano- 
 ther Sort of Beings, (which as was proy'd in the for- 
 n)er Book) derjv'd their Exiftence from him, and 
 ^yhich, as being the real ultimate Subjeds of pecu- 
 
 f Spinofa in Ep. 21. 
 
 Jiar 
 
Exiftcnce and Nature of GOl^, 189 
 
 liar Attributes, may (as was obfcrv'dj very properly 
 come under the Notion of Subjlance too, there can 
 be no Colour of Rcafon to doubt of the Reality of 
 that DiftindVion and Variety, which we perceive 
 among thofe inferior dependent Beings. For 'tis 
 plain, there's Nothing in their Natures inconfiftent 
 with the Notion even of a real Divifion. And con- 
 fequently, we may and muft confider Diftinftion 
 and Number of Parts and Dimenfions as real Attri- 
 butes of fuch Beings. But in the prcfent Argument, 
 we need not fuppofe any real Divifibility. 'Tis e- 
 rough for our Purpofe to have only fuppos'd F.v- 
 tenfion to be mentally divifible, ;". e. diitinguilh- 
 able. For Dlftinflion in Nature yields as real a 
 Foundation of Number as a proper Divifion. 
 
 Others, on the contrary, will perhaps objeft, 
 that Matter, as llich, is infinitely divifible, and that 
 an infinite Divifibility can imply no lefs than an ac- 
 tual Infinity of Parts and Dimenfions. That by 
 Confequence, 'tis unreafonable to deny the PolTibi- 
 lity of an abfolutely infinite Extenfion on Account 
 of the fuppos'd Abfurdity of its containing an ac- 
 tually infinite Number of Parts, when at the famf 
 Time we are obliged to own fuch an aftuaj Infinity' 
 of Parts in the lealt imaginable Portion of it. Ba'j 
 this Objedlion will be found to have no Weight in 
 the Reply to the following Argument. 
 
 2. Reafon will afTure us, that as an abfolutc No- 
 thing can bear no Proportion to any real Quantity ; 
 fo on the contrary, all real Quantity, how minute 
 foever, muft of NcceflTity bear fome Proportion to 
 all other Quantity of the fame Kind. For this 
 Proportionatenefs refulting from the very Nature of 
 Quantity confider'd abfolutely or in itfelf, can't 
 poflTibly be taken away by any merely relative Con- 
 fideration whatfoever. Therefore, fince we are Wit- 
 nefles of the a6lual Exiftence of a great Variety ot 
 quantitative Parts, it would follow, that if the whole 
 
 was 
 
ipQ An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 was abfolutely infinite, thefe finite Parts mufl fe- 
 verally bear a real (though not a fenfiblej Propor- 
 tion to an abfolutely infinite Whole. But if lb, then 
 fuch an infinite Quantity, by the Subllradion or An- 
 nihilation but of a fingle Particle, would become 
 finite. Confequently , the Difference between finite 
 and ahfolutely infinite-, would confift in a fingle quan- 
 titative Part ; and abfolute Infinity would be the 
 Attribute of a certain determin*d or limited Quan- 
 tity ; than which nothing can be more abfurd. For 
 abfolute Infinity, in its full Latitude, can't but ex- 
 clude all Limitation. This Reafoning is clearly 
 founded on the very Nature of Quantity, and can- 
 not be deflroy*d without deftroying Quantity itfelf. 
 
 This will appear beyond Contradiction, by the 
 very Evafion made ufe of by fome, who tell us, 
 that finite Quantities are not to be conceiv*d as ali- 
 quot or proportionate Parts of an Infinite, but as 
 mere Mathematical Points that bear no Proportion 
 at all *. For fince Mathematical Points are mere 
 Nothings or Creatures of Imagination (as well as 
 infinite Lines and Superficies) 'tis in Etieft to fay, 
 we itiuft repute the feveral Parts of Geometrical or 
 extended Quantity, when confider'd with Relation 
 to the whole, as mere Nothings, deprived at once 
 of Extenfion and Exiflence. Wherefore this Eva- 
 fion is fo far from helping the Difficulty, or weaken- 
 ing our Argument, that, in the Judgment of any 
 unprejudiced Man, it flrongly confutes the Suppo- 
 iition of an abfolutely infinite Extenfion. For hence 
 it appears, that fuch an Infinity can't be defended 
 any otherwife than by depriving Extenfion, as much 
 as in us lies, of its very Nature, or by denying it 
 to be really proportionate, which is all one as to 
 
 * Dr. Clarke, in his Difcourfe of the Being and Attributes of 
 Ood, p. 37. 
 
 Mr. ]zf:k(QXifiti,his DefefKii f.<)j. 
 
Exiftencc afid Nature of GOT). 191 
 tkny it to have Dimenfions. I fay, in general, *ti^ 
 to deprive Extenfion of its very Nature ; fince for 
 the fame Reafon that we deny any conceivable Part 
 of Extenfion to be thus proportionate, we fhall be 
 equally obligM to deny all others to be fo. Ycc 
 fuch Abfurdities we fhall be reduc'd to, if we will 
 not allow the Opinion of an abiblutely infinite Ex- 
 tenfion to be itldf an Abfurdity. For the Difficul- 
 ties appear to be equal, whether we fuppofe Finites 
 to bear a real Proportion to the imagin'd abfolutely 
 infinite Whole, or not to bear any Projx)rtion at 
 all. There is therefore an abfolutc Inconfillence 
 between Extenfion (which can't but have Dimen- 
 fions) and fuch Infinity or Immenfity (which excludes 
 all Dimenfions.) 
 
 The invincible Evidence of thefe or the like Re- 
 fle(ftions had fuch- influence on yfrijlotie, that having 
 at the End of his Phyficks concluded, that the Dei- 
 ty was not of finite Magnitude, (as thinking it to 
 be inconfiftent with his Notion of an eternal Mover) 
 he adds, that he neither could be of an abfolutely 
 infinite Magnitude, becaufe fuch an infinite Mag- 
 nitude was abfurd and impoflible ; and therefore 
 upon the whole, he concludes him to be of no Mag- 
 nitude at all. Accordingly GaJJendus^ the moft lear- 
 ned Reviver of the Epicurean Philofophy, (who was 
 one of the greateft Mathematicians of his Age) af- 
 ferts Space to be infinite only in a Negative or Re- 
 lative Senfe. And even Des Cartes^ too timorous ac 
 firft to alTert an abfolute Infinity of Extenfion, chofe 
 rather to aflert it to be indgfinite * (i. e. negativeh or 
 relatively hfimte.) And if he afterwards aflertcd its 
 Infinity in the abfolute Senfe, it was, it feems, No- 
 thing but the necelTary Refult of his particular Ptin- 
 ciples. 
 
 Thefe two Arguments, founded on the .Nature of 
 Things, and not on our Imaginatioiis, clearly dc- 
 
 * Cartejii Princi^ia, p. 7. 
 
 monftrate 
 
i9^ An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 monftrate an abfolute Incdnfiftence between ahfolutd 
 Infinity (which if it^e at all in a proper Senfe, 
 muft be an Attribute of Quantity j and all ^antity 
 whatfoever. For there is no real Quantity but what 
 is reducible either to Number or Extenfion. 
 
 But fome will here objeft the Demonftrations of 
 Abftrad Geometry as Proofs of an abfolutely in- 
 finite Space or Extenfion. For Inftance, 'tis plain, 
 fay they, from the Elements of Euclid, that to any 
 given Point of a Circle's Circumference a Tangent 
 may be drawn, of which only one Point falls on the 
 Circle, and the reft falls without it. 
 
 But to this it may be reply'd, that Abftradt Ge- 
 ometry confiflers Things only as they are in Idea : 
 Therefore the utmoft that this and the like Demon- 
 ftrations (or rather Poftulata) can prove, is no more 
 than this, viz. That no Space or Extenfion can by 
 us be imagined fo great, but that greater and ftill 
 greater may be conceiv'd in infinitum. But fince 
 Things may appear otherwife in Idea than they are 
 in themfelves, it does not neceflarily follow, that 
 what is true of the abftradl Idea in our Minds, is 
 true of the Thing as it exifts in Nature. And tho' 
 this and the like Demonftrations muft be confefs'd 
 to hold with Reference to any particular Portions of 
 real Space, as well as with Refped to the beft Idea 
 we can form of Space in general, yet they cannot 
 hold with Reference to the real univerfal Space or Ex- 
 tenfion beyond which whatever Space we conceive is 
 purely imaginary, i. e. an abfolute Nothing. 
 
 It can, I conceive, be to little Purpofe to obje6V, 
 That if the univerfal Space or Extenfion is bounded 
 or limited by Nothing, it muft be abfolutely with- 
 out Limits, or Infinite. For the immediate Limits 
 of Things are (as we elfewhere obferv'd j Nothing 
 elfe but their own Extremities. Which renders the 
 Idea of Limits no lefs pofitive in the Univerfe be- 
 yond which Nothing exifts, than in a Being fur- 
 rounded 
 
Exiftciicc ifw^ Nature of COD. ipj 
 rounded by the Indefmitely or infinitely extended Vor- 
 tices of Des CarUs's Vifionary World. So far is the 
 Notion Spinofa gives us of fitutefiefs in his fecond De- 
 finition and its Explication from being true, by 
 which he allows that only to be finite which is limi- 
 ted by another Being of the fame Nature. Confe- 
 qucntly, the Inference he draws from thence, viz» 
 That therefore the univerfal Subftance is abfolutely 
 immenfe or infinite (bicaufc it's impofTible there 
 fhould be a Subftance of the fame Kind or Nature* 
 and yet di{lin(fl from, it by which it might be limi* 
 ted) is of no Weight. 
 
 But fome perhaps will dill objecfl, that admitting 
 fuch a pure Nothings yet fince Bodies may exiil where 
 there's nothing to exclude them, it follows, thac 
 •even 'That Nothing muft flill imply a Capacity of 
 receiving Bodies, and confequently mufl come under 
 the Notion of Space. But to this I reply, Thac 
 where no Being is, there can be no Space, and a pure 
 Nothing can have no real Attributes •■, whereas a Ca- 
 pacity of receiving Bodies being an Attribute which 
 implies Space, can't but be a great Reality. For 
 whatever arbitrary Diftindlion fome have made be- 
 tween Exte)ifion and Space^ they import Notions e- 
 qually real and abfoluie i as will be fhewn here- 
 after. 
 
 Before we difmifs this Subje<5l, I can't but take 
 Notice of an Argument that may be form'd from 
 the Principles of Sir Ifaac Newton^ to prove the ab- 
 folute Infinity of the material Univerfe. The greater 
 Bodies of our Syflem are by him demonltrated to 
 incline towards each other by a mutual Gravitation. 
 And we have Reafon to believe the flime of the remo- 
 ter Bodies of the Univerfe. Now if thofe Bodies are 
 finite in Number and Extent, the terminating Bodies 
 can have no Gr.avitation or Tendency towards any 
 Thing beyond themfelvcs ; and confequently, ha- 
 ving no contrary Tendency to balance their Gravi- 
 N ution 
 
fP4 An Impartial Enquiry 'm 9 the 
 
 tation towards the interior Bodies, they rttufi: bc 
 continually approaching nearer to the common Cen- 
 tre of the Univerfe. But this, in Time, muft oc- 
 eafion no fmall Confufion in the World, and muft 
 very much refleft on the Wifdom of its great Crea- 
 tor, for having eftablifh'd Laws fo directly tending 
 to the Dellrudion of his Work. 
 
 Bat to this, I fuppofe, we may reply, That if, 
 with the ancient Epicureans, we conceived Gravity 
 to be a neceiliiry or independent Property of Mat- 
 •ter^ and uniform or alike in all its Parts ; or if, 
 with the Carte/tans, we thought ourfelves oblig'd to 
 account for every thing by uniform mechanical 
 Principles, We fhould then be inclin*d to grant the 
 Confequence, and aflert the abfolute Infinity of the 
 Material Univerfe* But fince, in the former Bookg 
 'We have from Sir Jfaac Newton^s own Principles de*» 
 inofiilrated, that Gravitation is no eternal ellential 
 Property of any one partide of Matter, and there- 
 'fbre in Effect no other than an immediate continued 
 ImprefTion of the Deity, who being a free Agent, 
 was capable of fuiting its Degrees and Conditions to 
 the various States of the feveral Parts of his Crea- 
 tion ♦, we can be under no NecefTity (by virtue of the 
 fame Principles) to fuppofe the great Bodies in the 
 Extremities of the univerfal Syftem to be fubjed: to 
 the lame Degrees and Laws of Gravitation with 
 thofe in the interior Spaces : Which being duly con- 
 fider'd, the Difficulty vanifhes. 
 
 Ar<^. VI. As fome are us'd to argue from the fup- 
 
 pos'd infinite Bulk of the World, fo are others apt 
 
 . to do fo from a very different Principle, viz. Infinite 
 
 Svmlinefs. Says Monf Abbadie-, in the Firft Part of 
 
 ■-his Dijconrfe of the Chrijlian Religion, p. lOi. " Tho' 
 
 :** we could not prove M^^;«///^<? to be infinite, yet 
 
 «* the Demonftrations of Geo??ietry will oblige us to 
 
 ** own an Infinity in Smallnefs.** This he fpeaks with 
 
 Reference to the infinite Divifibility of lV^4ter, and 
 
 '* . the 
 
Exigence and Nature of CdD. 19 j 
 
 the a(5tual Infinity of Parts from which it may ht 
 iupposM to re fu If. 
 
 But to this, 'tis conceiv'd, the following Re- 
 fle(5lions may yield a fufficient Reply. 
 
 T\iiz Matter is infinitely divifible, netids no Proof 
 from the Demonftralions oi Gcomrtry, bting abun- 
 dantly clear from this one Confideration. Nothing 
 is more plain, than that mere Divifion can never 
 efied the Annihilation of any Thing. But if 
 not, then there will always remain fomething ca- 
 pable of further Divifion. For fincc the minurell 
 imaginable Parts of Matter have upper and under 
 and Sides, it can nevfer be prov'd a Contradicflion 
 that what is above fliould be divided or fcparated 
 from that which 13 under, nor that any one of the 
 Sides fliould be fevcr'd from its oppofite. But if it 
 be no Contradidion, then it can't be affirm'd to 
 be impofTible to that Being to whom every thing 
 not implying a Contradiiflion, is pofTible. 
 
 But what can we conclude from this to the prcfent 
 •Purpofe ? Shall we fay, that becaufe Matter is infi- 
 nitely divifible, therefore it contains an abfolutely 
 infinite Number of Parts ? But this, with Submif- 
 Jfion, is a ftrange Method of arguing, how fpecioirs 
 ^focver it may appear. For though any particu- 
 lar Portion of Matter fhotild be eternally divi- 
 xled by the Divine Power, yet the Number of fe- 
 Jjarate Parts refulting from the Divifion mull ever 
 ilemain finite. And the Reafon of its infinite or e- 
 TiCrnal Divifibility is not becaufe every particular 
 -Portion of Matter contains an abfolutely infinite 
 ■Number of co-exiiknt Parts, but on the contrary, 
 rbecaufe it is impofTible that fuch an abfolutely infi- 
 iftite Number fhould even cxift. For could it at any 
 -Time (even by the Adion of Omnipotence) exift, 
 then there could be no further Divifibility ; unlefs 
 •We can fuppofe a Number greater than abfolutely 
 "infinice. This infinite or eternal Divifibility of Mat- 
 U N 2 K« 
 
1 9<5 An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 ter is therefore fo far from being a Proof of the ac- 
 tual Exiftcnceofan abfolute Infinity of Parts, that 
 at effedually confutes it. 
 
 Befides, though it would be difficult, as well as 
 needlefs, to reply to all the Subtil ties that might be 
 objected, 'tis, I think moft certain, that there can 
 be no dbfoliite Lifinity of Parts in a Subject that is 
 not of an ahfolutely infinite Bulk. For if fo, then 
 the Addition but of the leaft imaginable Particle 
 (fince all Quantity is eflentially proportionate) would 
 render ic more than abfolutely infinite ; which is ab- 
 furd. 
 
 Again, if both the whole material Univerfe, and 
 every particular Portion of it, confifted feverally oJ 
 an adual or abfolute Infinity of co-exiftent Parts, 
 'twould follow that there's an abfolute Infinity of 
 abfolurely infinite Numbers of co-exiftent JParts in 
 the World, each of which contains as many real 
 co-exiftent Parts as the whole which they compofe. 
 For abfolute Infinity, in its full Latitude, admits not 
 of more or lefs. An abfolute Infinity of Millions, if al- 
 low'd to be poIIible,would, I confefs,import more than 
 an Infinity of Units, and an infinite Superficies might 
 be demonftrated to be greater than an infinite Line, if 
 the Exiitence of an abfolutely infinite Superficies could 
 be proved. But thefe are pure Imaginations. 
 
 As for the Demonftrations of Abjha^ Geometry^ 
 they may Indeed prove the Infinite Divifibility of Mat- 
 ter^ already granted, but can never evince an actual 
 abfolute Infinity of co-exiltent Parts in Matter or 
 Space ; and by Confequence, they can prove no- 
 thing to theprefent Purpofe. When the Space be- 
 tween the Afymttote of fome Hyperholoids and a Line 
 parallel thereto is demonftrated to be infinite, this 
 can only mean, that thofe Proportions being incom- 
 menfurable, can never meet, though drawn out to an 
 infinite, or rather indefinite Length in Imagination ; 
 but can never demonftrate that the Reafon of their 
 
 not 
 
 \ 
 
Exigence and Nature of G OD, 197 
 
 not being capable of meeting in Nature, is tlic ac- 
 tual Infinity of the Parts ot Space between them. If 
 fuch an aftual Infinity of Parts cxiftcd in every Por- 
 tion of Space, it would as cHedually hinder the 
 meeting of any other Lines whatever. And thus 
 even Zefio^s Argument againfl the Poffibility of Mo- 
 tion^ grounded on the fameSuppofitiun of an acftual 
 Infinity of Parts in Matter and Space, would be no 
 lefs a Demonftration. 
 
 Yet fome, I apprehend, may objc(5l, that fuppo- 
 fing the infinite Divifibility of Matter will not infer 
 fuch an aftual Infinity of Parts, yet fince it at leaft 
 infers an infinite or eternal Inexhaullibility of Siib- 
 ftance, it may ferve to demonftrate that there's an 
 infinite Diftance between Matter and Nothing -, and 
 by Confequence, that the^JPowcr which created it, 
 is no lefs thanabfolutely infinite. 
 
 I reply. That there was no infinite Diftance be- 
 tween Nothing and Matter (as was fupposM in a for- 
 mer Argument) is as certain as that there has been a 
 Creation : And that there's no infinite Diilance be- 
 tween Matter and Nothing (as this Objcdion fup- 
 pofes) is as clear as that tiiere may be an Annihila- 
 tion. Confequently, the Reafon oi Matter'* s infinite 
 Divifibility^ is not becaufe it has an infinite Inex- 
 hauftibility of Subftance, or becaufe it is at an in- 
 finite Diftance from Nothing i but 'tis becaufe Di- 
 vifion (as we before obferv'd) is not a proper Means 
 of exhaufting it or reducing it to Nothing, 'lis 
 certain, Matter lofes nothing of its Nature by mere 
 Divifion ; and by Confequence, though eternally 
 divided, 'twould Hill be at an equal Diftance from 
 Nothing. But 'tis no lefs certain (on the Principles 
 of our former DifcourfeJ that the bare Sufpenfion ot 
 the Divine Influence but for a Moment would er- 
 hauft or reduce it to the Nothing from whence it 
 fprung. 'Tis fuch a Sufpenfion of the Divine \\\- 
 N 3 fiuencc 
 
1 9 8 An Impartial Efiquiry into the 
 
 flucnce which is the proper Means of Annihilation ! ' 
 But Diviiion can contribute nothing towards'it. 
 
 Therefore for fuch efpecially who believe that 
 Matter was created and is annihilable, to argue that 
 there's an abfolutely infinite Diftance between it and 
 Nothing, only becaufe it can't be exhaufted or re- 
 duc'd to nothing by mere Divifion, appears to be 
 very unreafonable. 'Tis as if a Philofopher who has 
 leen Ice congeal'd from Water by the Cold, and 
 knows that it is reducible to Water by the Means 
 of Heat, fhould neverthelefs contend that there is 
 fuch an infinite Diftance between Ice and Water ; 
 for no other Reafon, than becaufe it can never be 
 reduc'd to Water by a bare Divifion or Separation 
 of its Parts. For Ice merely by Divifion can no 
 more become Water, than Matter, by the fame 
 Means, can become nothing. 
 
 As this infinite Divifibility of Matter is no way 
 ferviceable to the Caufe in which 'tis ufually enga- 
 ged, fo it may eafily be turn'd againft it. For 
 hereby it appears undeniably, that the Ideas of Great 
 and Little are not abfolute, but purely relative. For 
 as there is no Extenfion abfolutely or infinitely little, 
 or fuch as to render it a Contradi<5tion that there 
 fhould be a Lefs and ftill a Lefs fuppos'd to Eter- 
 nity ; fo there's a Parity of Reafon to conclude, 
 that there's no Extenfion abfolutely or infinitely 
 great, or of fuch a Nature as to render it an abfo- 
 lute Contradiftion to fuppofe a greater and yec 
 greater in an eternal ProgrefTion. 
 
 Yet at the fame Time, I think, it mufl: be con- 
 fefs'd, that there may be an Extenfion (or Expan- 
 ^^on) which, not merely on Account of its own ab- 
 ftrafted Nature as Extenfion, but for fome other 
 Reafon, may be affirm'd incapable of any real In- 
 creafe : For in judging of the Natures of Things, 
 we are not to confider them according to their ab- 
 ftraft Ideas only, but as cloath'd with ?\i\ their 
 
 known 
 
•Exiflcnce and Nature of GOT>. 199 
 known Properties, But limple Extcnfion abftradlcd 
 from all Properties exifts no where without the Ima- 
 gination. And the univerfal Extenfion, as it exifts 
 in Nature, fince its State is fo peculiar, may wcli 
 be allow'd to have Torn© peculiar Properties diftin6t 
 from thofe of any particular Extenfion whatevf:r \ 
 which Properties can only be difcernable by the Kyj 
 of Reafon ; for as much as the univerfal Extenfion, 
 as fuch, is not the Objed of our external Senfes. 
 But of this more may be faid in the Reply to the 
 following Argument- 
 
 Again, The very fame Reafon which obliges u$ 
 to allow an infinite Divifibility of Matter, will, 'ti» 
 conceiv'd, no lefs oblige us to deny an abfolutc Infir 
 nity of Extenfion or Space. For the Reafon why 
 we allow an infinite Divifibility of Matter, is not 
 becaufe we can form an Idea of fuch Divifion, or 
 conceive in our Minds a Particle to become lefs and 
 ft ill lefs m infinitum, 'Tis true, Matter \% rdmetimes 
 faid to be mentally divifible in infinitum \ but, as I 
 think, improperly. For when a Particle is by men- 
 tal Divifion reduc'd to the Smallnefs of the leaft vi- 
 fible Duft, it foon efcapes the Eyes of the Mind as 
 well as that of the Body. The chief Reafon then of 
 our allowing the infinite Divifibility of A/c3//tr, is im- 
 mediately deriv'd from the Nature of Matter^ which 
 we hereby fuppofe to be in its very Nature quantitative 
 or proportionate. From whence it neccfiTarily follows, 
 that the leaft imaginable Particle of it having ftill 
 Dimenfions which bear a Proportion to each other 
 (as Upper, Under, Sides, and Middle) wcHnd our- 
 felves oblig'd to conclude, that it's no abfolute Con- 
 tradi(ftion or Impofilbility for thefe to be feparated. 
 But the fame neccirary Proportionatcncfs which cfta- 
 blifl:ies the infinite or eternal Divifibility of Matter, 
 is- (as may appear from an Argument we lately pro- 
 pos'd) inconfiftent with the abfolute Infiniiy or Im- 
 •i '. •■ ' N 4v . : ■«*•■ . . mcnfiiy 
 
200 An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 menfity not only of Matter, but of all ^antity 
 whatever. 
 
 In fine, From this infinite Divifibility of Matter it 
 appears, that the Notion of an abfolute Infinity is 
 unapplicable to any real Being. For one Reafon 
 why any thing is infinitely divifible (or inexhauftible 
 by Divifionj is becaufe (as we obferv*d) the Parts 
 which are feparated can never become adtually infi- 
 nite in Number. But if (even by the Adlion of Om- 
 nipotence itfelfj they can never become thus infinite 
 in a State of Separation, fo neither may they be 
 luppos*d to be fo in a State of Union. The Rea- 
 fon why the Parts which are feparated can never be- 
 come adually infinite, is plain, becaufe as it is the 
 very Nature of Number to be ever increafeable, fo 
 'tis the very Nature of Infinity never to be com- 
 plete •, which, I take it, amounts to a demonftra- 
 live Proof, that the Suppofition of an abfolute or 
 pofitive Infinity (whether it be confider'd as aSlualy 
 or only as fojfihlc) has no Foundation in Nature. 
 
 This even Ahjiotle, e're he was aware, feems 
 plainly to intimate in his Definition of Infinite. For 
 whereas the more ancient Philofophers generally and 
 with Reafon contented themfelves with faying, 
 'That is infinite beyond which Nothing is ••, he thinks 
 fit to correct them by faying, That only is infinite 
 ivhich has always fomething heyoid it. Which, I 
 take it, can import no lefs, than that it's the ve- 
 ry Nature of a proper Infinity never to be com- 
 plete. 
 
 Yet I find a certain ingenious Author * is not 
 only confident in the general, that every Particle 
 of Matter confifts of an actual Infinity of infinitely 
 fmall Parts (than which, according to him, no- 
 thing lefs is fufficient to fill the leaft finite Space) 
 ^DUt pretends particularly to prove, that the Number 
 
 * Z>r. Chcyne, inhis ?hihfi?nn.of Nat. Relig. p. i8. 
 
 of 
 
Exigence <2«^ Nature of G O 1). 201 
 
 of organical Parts in Animals is thus infinite. *' This, 
 fays he, *' is clear both from the Nature of Scnfii- 
 " tion and Nutrition. For firfl:, with Reference 
 " to Senfation -, there is not the lead imaginable fo- 
 *' lid Part of the Veflels or Mufcles but what is fen- 
 '* fible i and therefore, fays he, the Organs in Ani- 
 " mals which convey this Senfation are infinite in 
 ** Number. 
 
 Bat this Confequence is not only built on the Sup- 
 pofition that the Parts of the Veflels and Mufcles 
 are therefore abfolutely infinite, becaufe infinitely 
 divifible, (which, 'tis conceivM, we have already 
 fhewn to be no very conclufive Method of Arguing,) 
 but it fuppofes too, that each of thofe imagin'd in- 
 finite Parts is fenfible. But this is what I fuppofc 
 could never be prov'd, though fuch an Infinity of 
 Parts were true. For the contrary is moft apparent 
 from the following Reafons. 
 
 Firfl, We know that our Senfe of Feeling is pro- 
 portion'd to our Circumftances ; being chiefly de- 
 iign'd for our Prefervarion. Therefore it is fufficient 
 to fuppofe it to be diffused in fuch a Manner thro* 
 our Bodies as to be capable of informing us of fiich 
 ill Impreflions from the furrounding Bodies as may 
 be prejudicial to us. But the infinitely fmall Parts 
 of the neighbouring Bodies (if any fuch Parts fliould 
 be admitted) are not fingly capable of making fuch 
 ill Impreflions •, and confcquently, an infinitely fmall 
 Senfation is unneceflliry. 
 
 Again, 'Tis not only unneceflary, but contrary 
 to Experience. For we find that the minuter Parts 
 of Matter are capable of exciting little or no Senfa- 
 tion even in the mofl: fenfible Parts of our Bodies. 
 What Senfation may we then fuppofe an infinitely 
 fmall Part to be capable of exciting ? Yet if there 
 be an abfolute Infinity of fenfible Parts in any 
 Member, e.ich of thefe may be afledled by the Im- 
 
 preffion 
 
202 An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 preflfcn of an infinitely fmall Part of the furroun- 
 ding Matter. 
 
 And then as for Nutrition^ fays he, " Since there 
 *' is no Part of the Body that may not be increas'd 
 " or diminifhM (as is evident from the Cure of 
 *« Wounds in all Parts through which the neceffary 
 *' Fluids of the Body can pafs) 'tis plain that every 
 <' individual Point of the Animal's Body is the 
 *« Termination of an Organ through which the Nu- 
 *' trition may be convey*d. 
 
 But though every perceptible Part of an Animal 
 be thus capable of Increafe by Nutrition (as being 
 iubjed to Wounds and Decays, and therefore re- 
 quiring the Means of Reparation) will it therefore 
 follow, that every infinitely imperceptible Part of 
 it, though not liable to any Wounds or Decays, 
 and by Confequence needing no immediate Convey- 
 ance of Nourilhment to repair it, is thus immedi- 
 ately capable of Increafe by Nutrition ? 
 
 But this Gentleman adds, " Moreover, feeing 
 ** the Canals of the Body themfelves do increafe in 
 *' Bulk, may decay and be impair'd, every aflign- 
 *' able Part of thefe Canals muft be the Termina- 
 *' tion of fome fecretory Dudl feparating a Fluid fit 
 *' to increafe their Dimenfions, or repair their Lof- 
 ** ksy and fo on in infinitum. 
 
 But /uch Argumentation as this, few, I believe, 
 will be'difpos'd to admit, without the utmoft Ne- 
 ceffity. And to make it appear that there is fuch a 
 Neceflity to admit it, this Gentleman, it is con- 
 ceiv'd, was bound to prove, that the mod wife and 
 powerful Author of Nature either could not or would 
 not difcover and make ufe of any other Method of 
 nourjfning the more minute Parts of thofe Vefiels, 
 but that which he makes ufe of in nourifhing thfc 
 greater Parts, viz, by proper Duds and VefTels. 
 Till this be prov'd, his Argument for fuch a Pkq- 
 
Exigence and Nature ofGO^. 205 
 grejfus in infinitujn in Nutrition will be far from De- 
 monftration. 
 
 Arg. VII. Another Argument for the Exiftcncc 
 of an abfolutely immcnfe or infinite Being, is deri' 
 ved from the Nature of an ahjolute NeceJJity of Ex- 
 iftcnce : To this Eflcdt. A Neccflity which is ab- 
 folute in itfcif, or not depending on any outward 
 Caufc, muft be abfolutely unlimited. For a Ne- 
 ccflity which is not every where the fame, is a con- 
 fequential Neceflity depending on fome external 
 Caufc. But a NeceflTity abfolutely fuch, has no Re- 
 lation to Place or any Thing elfe. Whatever there- 
 for exiils by an abfolute NeceflTity in its own Na- 
 ture, mud needs be abfolutely infinite or immenfe. » 
 
 This is an Argument Utely adopted by a very 
 Jearned Divine *. The Sum of it appears to be this. 
 If a Thing exifts by a Neceflity that was indepen- 
 dent on any outward Caufe, or (which is thefame) 
 \^ abfolutely neceflliry, it follows that it is ab- 
 folutely immenfe or infinite ; becaufe Finitenefs 
 could only proceed from a Limitation of Neceflity 
 by fome external Caufc ; which yet could have na 
 Influence on that Neccflity which had no Depen-. 
 dance on any Caufc. 
 
 Before we reply, it will be convenient to give 
 fome Account of the Principles on which the learned 
 Author proceeds. 
 
 Firfl:, He efl:abliflies a NeceflTity, which (becaufe 
 abfolutely independent on any outward Caufe) he in- 
 fers to be abfolutely unlimited, and from thenca 
 concludes, that the other Perfe(n:ions of the Divina 
 Being (which he, in Order of Nature, conceives as 
 pofterior to that Neceflity **) are fo too. 
 
 But this, with due Submifllon, is, we conceive, 
 to ufe ahjolute Necejfity in too large a Scnfe, fo as to 
 
 • Dr. Clarke, in his Dimonft. p, 4:;. 
 ** See bis Anfivcn to Let ten, p. 36, I7, 
 
 import 
 
204- An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 
 import a Neceflity independent on a fundamental 
 Reafon, as well as on any outward Caufe. 
 
 On the contrary, the Principles eftablifh'd in our 
 former Book may be conceiv'd to be to this EfFedt. 
 Some Perfedlion or Property of the Eternal Being 
 (having an intimate Connexion with all other Per- 
 iedions) muft be fuppofed to have been in its very 
 Nature a Foundation or Support of Exiftcnce, or 
 to have effentially included Neceflity, This parti- 
 cular fiindamental Perfedlion is the Reafon of the 
 abfolutely neceflTary Exiftence of the Divine Being 
 which poflefles all Perfedions : So that the abfolute 
 Exiftence of that adorable Nature, is, according to 
 our Manner of conceiving, founded on its Perfec- 
 tion -, i. e. becaufe the Divine Being poflefTes a fun- 
 damental Perfedion fufficient to infer all other Per- 
 fc(ftions (which it even virtually includes) therefore 
 that moft excellent of Beings exifts with (not by) an 
 abfolute NecefTity. 
 
 The particular Perfedlion, which I humbly con- 
 ceive to have virtually included all, other Perfec- 
 tions, and to have been the Reafon, Ground, or 
 Suppori of the Divine Exiftence, is that of Vital 
 Tower. For as nothing can be fuppos'd to exift 
 without fome Sort of Power (which being conceiv*d 
 to be taken away, all vanifhes with itj fo nothing 
 can be fuppofed to exift with a Neceflity that is ab- 
 folute, without a perlecft Power in itfelf And as we 
 cannot help asking. What was the Reafon and Sup- 
 port even of original Neceflity ; fo on the contrary, 
 it would be extremely impertinent to ask, What 
 was the Support of original Power ? The Neceflity 
 of the Exiftence of original Power was plainly of 
 the Efllence of the Power, or, which is the fame, 
 was efi^ntially included in and founded on it. For 
 perfedl Power not only exifted becaufe it was necef- 
 lary, but it was neceftary becaufe it exifted ; which 
 makes its Cafe different from that of any other Per- 
 fection. 
 
Exigence and Nature of GOT). 205 
 
 fe(flion. And co fuppofe a NecefTity antecedent to 
 the original Power, is in Effeft to fuppofe anothef 
 Power before the firll Power : Which is abfurd. 
 
 How perfed Power lies, as it were, at the Bottom 
 of all other Perfections, and as a Root, fpreads Per- 
 fedlion and Neceflity, may appear from the follow- 
 ing Reafoning. 
 
 'Tis clear, that Impcrfedion can no otherwife in- 
 fer a PolTibility of ceafing to Be, than as it pre- 
 fuppofes Impotence. From whence 'tis obvious to 
 conclude, that where there never was any PofTibility 
 of ceafing to Be, (i. e. where there was an abfolutc 
 Necellky of Exiilcncc) there could be no Kind nor 
 Degree of Impotence, or there muft have been Om- 
 nipotence or the moft perfedt Power •, and likewile 
 that where there was Omnipotence there could be no 
 lmperfe(ftion -, or, which is the fame, there muft of 
 NecefTity have been all pofTible Perfections. So that 
 the Neceflity of the Divine Being muft be conceived as 
 founded on perfect Power, which was, as it were, the 
 necefTary Source and Support of all other Perfections. 
 Here we may obferve by the Way, that perfeft 
 Power (which is the Reafon and Support of all other 
 Perfections) could be no necelTary Reafon of an ab- 
 folute Infinity with Regard to Space. For, as will 
 be fhewn in the following Chapter, the Eftimate of 
 the Perfection of Power, as fuch, is not to be made 
 with Regard to Extent of Space, but with Relation 
 to the Objects of Power ; which ObjeCts cannot be 
 abfolutely infinite either in Extent or Number. 
 
 The Doctor and his acute Vindicator infift*, that 
 pure Neceflity is ihe Reafon and Support of the Di- 
 vine Exiftence, becaufe it doth not pre-fuppofe but 
 infer Exiftence, or becaufe 'tis firft in the Order of 
 our Ideas. 
 
 But I anfwer, If we confider Neceflity as an" in- 
 fluential Principle of Exiftence, (which is in EffcCt: 
 
 to 
 
 • AV. Jackfon, in his Dcftr.ce, p. 194. 
 
106 An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 to conceive it under the Notion of a difi'tn^ Power,} 
 then indeed *tis firft in the Order of our Ideas. But 
 if we Gonfider it as a Mode or Manner of Exiflence 
 ellentially included in and founded on Power (which 
 feems to be the genuine Conception of it) then it 
 cannot be conceiv'd before the Power on which it is 
 founded. For as the external conditional Neceffity 
 of the Exiftence of dependent Beings is originally 
 included in -and founded on the Power or Will of 
 their external Caufes, and is therefore antecedent to 
 their Exiftence, fo the internal abfolute Neceffity of 
 the Exiftence of the independent Being muft (if I 
 may fo fay) be originally included in and immedi- 
 ately founded on an internal Power, and therefore 
 ought not to be conceiv*d as antecedent to the Di- 
 vine Exiftence. 
 
 To ftiew that thefe are no needlefs Subtilties, I 
 ftiall conclude with recommending it to be confider'd, 
 whether by fuppofing a Sort of antecedent Neceffity 
 of the Divine Nature, which is abfolutely unlimited, 
 we fliall not at laft be reduced fwith Spinofa, who ar- 
 gues from the fame unlimited Neceffity) to affert 
 one only Being or Subftance, becaufe abfolutely 
 infinite ; and likewife, whether we ftiall not be ob- 
 liged with him, to extend that Neceffity to the 
 Divine (and even to Human) Adion, by fuppofing 
 an univerfal Fatality. For as, by the E>odor's own 
 Confeffion, it cannot be explain'd how pure abfolute 
 Neceffity could infer Liberty *, fo neither can it be 
 explain'd how Neceffiiiy can be abfolutely unlimited, 
 if it doth not extend to all Adlion as well as Ex- 
 iftence. For, as the Do6lor himfelf exprefies it. 
 NeceJJtly abfolutely fuch has no Relation tv Place nor 
 my thing elfe, or (as both the Words and the Nature 
 of the Thing (eem to import) is every where and m 
 every Cafe the fame. 
 
 * Dcmo^Jiration, p. 52, 53, ^c. 
 
 But 
 
Exlftence and Natilre of GOT>. 207 
 But to proceed to the learned DocStor's Argu- 
 gument. 1 iinrwer. 
 
 I. That though there was no external Caufe to 
 limit the original Necefllty, yet it doth not Ibllovv, 
 that either it or its Subjeift is abfolutely unlimited, 
 merely becaufe the abilra<!:t Idea of Neceffity hath no 
 Relation to Place or Limits. To give an Inftance 
 of the fame Nature, The abftraft Idea of Necef- 
 fity in our Minds, which has ho more Relation to 
 Variety than to Place or Limits, but is abfolutely 
 fimple and uniform, would (if confider'd as the 
 Reafon or Ground of the Divine Exiftence) infer 
 that the Divine Nature mud exift without the leaft 
 Variety of any Sort. But this would be diredtly 
 contrary to Reafon. For even Reafon (to fay no- 
 thing here of Revelation^ allures us, that the moft 
 perfeft Nature includes a real Diverfity of elTential 
 Properties (fuch as Intelligence and effective Power) 
 whofe Notions cannot with any tolerable Senfe be 
 confounded. For though even real abfolute Necef- 
 fity (if not fuppos'd to be founded on Perfection) 
 could admit of no Variety of any Sort (as we obfer- 
 ved when we difputed againft the abfolute Necef- 
 fity of Motion) yet (if fiippofed to be fo founded^ 
 though ftill it be but one, or agreeable to no more 
 Beings than one, it cannot but admit of all the Va- 
 riety in that one Being that is included in the gene- 
 ral Idea of Perfeftion. 
 
 This fhews the Vanity of Arguing merely from 
 abllra6t Ideas. For the Properties of Things muft 
 t)e confider'd relatively, or in their Connexion as 
 they exift in Nature, not abfolutely and abdrac- 
 tedly as they cxift in our Imaginations only. Thus, 
 as to know fomewhat of the Nature of the Divine 
 Perfe<ftion, we mult (as in the former Bookj confider 
 the Nature and Import of neceflary Exiftence, fo if 
 we would acquire a more complete Notion of Ne- 
 ceffity of Exiftence, we muft, it feems, confider it 
 
208 An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 in its Relation to Perfedlion. For though the Necef'-« 
 (ity of the Divine Exiftence was fo far abfolute, as 
 it was not dependent on any proper Caufe, yet it 
 was ever founded on Perfe<5lion, and therefore was 
 luch as the Nature of Perfeftion required. But the 
 Nature of Perfedion not only required Variety of 
 Properties, but was relative and determinate ; as was 
 fhewn elfewhere. 
 
 2 . There is abundant Reafon to aflert (as we have 
 done) that Finitenefs, in the abfolute Senfe for as 
 importing a Thing's being complete, or having a 
 determinate Effence) is no proper Effedl of any 
 Caufe. *Tis true, the particular Modifications of iE 
 may properly enough be faid to be caus'd, or a 
 Caufe may have the Power of producing its Effedt 
 either with more or lefs Limitation according to its 
 Pleafure. But we cannot fay, in the general, that 
 the Will or Power of any Caufe was the Reafon af 
 the Finitenefs of its EfFedl. 
 
 3. Finitenefs in the abfolute Senfe (i. e. Complete* 
 7iefs of EJjence) feems plainly to be the Refult of a 
 Neceflity in the very Nature of Things. For every 
 real Being mufl- have a complete and pofitive Effence, 
 by which it determinately is what it is : Whereas our 
 Notion even of what we call an abfolute or pofitive 
 Infinity is, on the contrary, negative, incomplete, 
 and indetermin'd, and therefore unapplicable to any 
 real Being. We fpeak indeed of Infinity as offome^ 
 thing pofitive ; but this is to join Words whofcldeas 
 can never be join*d by us, nor fo much as prov'd to 
 be confident with each other. For if Finitenefs be 
 pofitive (as was fhewn) Infinity mull needs be ne- 
 gative. 
 
 But if every Being, as fuch, is of a pofitive, com- 
 plete and determinate Effence, then how abfolute 
 foevcr the Neceffity is with v/hich any Being exifts, 
 that Neceffity and its SubjecV cannot but be deter- 
 min'd or limited by its internal Reafon, though noc 
 
 limited 
 
Exiftence /iw^ Nature ^ C0/>. 209^ 
 limited by any external Caufe : 'Which Sort of LU 
 rriitation by an internal Reafon, is lb far from an 
 Imperfecftion, that it is the utmoft Perfecftion or Com- 
 pletion of Being. This, as I humbly conceive, ap- 
 pears moft plainly from the Dodlrinc of the 'Trinity in 
 the divine Nature i which, however underftood or 
 cxplain*d, implies a Limitation with Rcfpedt to 
 Number, included "in the very Nature of Perfec- 
 tion (the internal Rt-afon of the divine Exiftencej 
 which Limitation conftitutes or completes the divine 
 Eflence, by excluding all Imperfedion *. And everi 
 in Beings that derive their Exigence from a propci; 
 Caufe, there is a Sort of peculiar Limitation which 
 fixes and completes their particuhir Natures, and gives 
 them the Perfe6lion of their feveral Species. 
 
 Here I cannot omit the Teflinhony of a late learn- 
 ed and dignified Prelate of the Church of E?iglancL 
 " The Truth is (fays he) this Word Lifimte con- 
 *' founds our Notion of God, and makes the moll 
 " perfed and excellent Being the mod perfedly un- 
 *' known to us. For Infinite is only a Negative 
 «' Term, and fignifies (in the abfolute Senfe) that 
 *' which hath no End, and therefore ho pofitive or 
 " determined Nature -, and therefore is Nothing. 
 " An fabfolutely) infinite Being, had not Ufe and 
 " Cuflom reconciled us to that ExprefTion, wouldi 
 *' be thought Nonfenfe and Con trad id ion. For 
 " every real Being has a certain and determin'd Na- 
 *' ture, and therefore is not infinite in this Senfe i 
 " which is fo far from being a Perfecftioh, that it 
 *' fignifies nothing real**. J| 
 
 4. Though the original Necefllty doth not ap- 
 pear to be abfolutely indetermin'd or unlimited in it- 
 felf, it might notwithftanding be fufficiently abfo- 
 lute, and by Confequence, fuch as render'd it equal- 
 
 * See the Chrijiian Religion founded on Rea/on, ^.<j(). 
 ■ *•*• Difc.(^ the 'Trinity i "f. 77. 
 
zio An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 ly impoflible fi>r its Subjeft either not to be, or to 
 be other than it Is. That it could not but be fuf- 
 ficicntly abfolute, is clear, in as n:iuch as it was no5 
 in the lead dependent on or determin*d by any pro- 
 per Caufe, And that its Subjed could not but ex- 
 ift fuch as it a(5lually docs, is no lels clear ; becaufe 
 (as we have already feen) Necelfity was abfolutcly 
 connected with and included in Perfeftion, and like- 
 wife becaufe Perfedtion is in its very Nature fix*d 
 and determin'd. 
 
 But, fays the learned Do6lor, " To fuppofea fi- 
 *' nite Being to be felf-exillent, is to fuppofe it is a 
 *' ContradiSion for that Being to exift, the Abfcnce 
 *' of which may be conceiv'd without a Contradic- 
 *' tion. For if a Being can without a Contradiction 
 " be abfent from one Place, it may without Con- 
 ** tradition be abfent from another Place, and from 
 " all Places. 
 
 I anfwer. It has been already fhewn, that a Being 
 may poflefs all Space, or fill all Places, and by Con- 
 fequence be omniprefent, without being ftridly or 
 abfolutely infinite or immenfe. Therefore this Ar- 
 guing doth not diredly afFed fuch a Being. But 
 fince the Doftor feems to make our Conceptions the 
 Standards of the Neceffity of Things, by faying, 
 that what we can conceive to be abfent in Part may 
 be wholly abfent. I reply farther by aflerting, that 
 a Thing may be fo necel]^ry as to render it a Con- 
 tradiction in Nature for it not to exift, though its 
 Abfence may be conceiv'd without any Contradiction 
 to our Ideas j or there may be a Contradiftion in 
 Nature that doth not appear to be fuch to us. 
 
 We Ihall vainly amufe ourfelves with abftraCt Ideas, 
 and ihall eafily t)e deceived, if in every Cafe we will 
 argue from them, which are the Creatures of the 
 Mind, to the Things as they exift in Nature. The 
 neceflary Exiftence of a Thing may not be the lefs 
 certain, though the abftra<^ Idea of it in our Ima- 
 ginations 
 
Exiftence and Nature of GOD. 211 
 ginations may not include any Necemcy of Exif- 
 tence : Or a Thing may be neceflary in its real Com- 
 nedion with other Things,thou^h ic may not appear 
 to be fo, conficier'd fingly or in itfclf. Thus for Ejc- 
 ample. Though the Attribute pf Intelligence doth 
 not include ^ny Neceffity of Exiftence in its abftraft 
 Idea, yet being ncccfiarily conne<5ted with the other 
 divine Perfedions, we are aflured it could not but 
 cxill. 
 
 Again, An abftraft Idea may, on the contrary, 
 feem to include Neceffity of Exiftence, when the 
 Thing it reprefents we are affur'd could never have 
 exiftcd abftraaly, or without Conneftion with fome- 
 thing elfe. Thus Space or EfcUnfm (though its Idea 
 feems to include Neceffity of Exiftence) could never 
 have exifted fingly, or without Connexion with 
 fomething which is not Extenfion. For abfolutc 
 Neceffity of Exiftence (as was provM) fuppofcs in Us 
 Subjed a Connexion of whatever Attributes im,- 
 port Perfection. Therefore as we ought not to con- 
 fider That as neceffarily exiftent alone,tho' feemmg- 
 Jy neceflary in Idea, which could never have exiftc4 
 thus alone in Nature i fo, it feems, we ought not to 
 confider any thing as incapable of exifting necelia- 
 rily in its Connexion in Nature, merely becaufe if. 
 includes no fuch Neceffity in its abftrad Idea. 
 
 The Queftion therefore (when we difpute abouC 
 the capable Subjed of an abfolute Neceffity ot Ex- 
 iftence; is not concerning either IViflom, or Powe7\ or 
 Space, or any other fmglePerfedion, but *tis concern- 
 ing Perfedion in general. *Tis not either Poiver, or 
 mfdom, or Space, or any other particular Attribute 
 orPerfedion (withoutConnedion with any other Per- 
 fedion) but 'tis the Deity whopofleflesall Pertedions, 
 who is capable of exifting with an ablolute Necefii- 
 ty, or without Dependence on our Conceptions, or 
 any thing elfe. . 
 
 O 2 ^'a' 
 
1 1 2 'j^n Impartial Enquiry into the^ 
 
 Jrg. VIII. Another Argument deriv*d from th6 
 fame ahfolute NeceJJity of Exijience, is thus delivered 
 by the learned Dr. Scoti*, " In conceiving of God, 
 ", we mull afcribe to Him infinite Fulnefs of Beings 
 " by which he is fo infinitely removed from Not 
 *' being, that he cannot but Be ; and in thus con- 
 *' ceiving of him, we attribute to him neceflary Ex- 
 " iftence. hxtiilj; , 
 
 But this, *tis humbly conceiv'd, may admit of the 
 following Reply. 
 
 I. That Fulnefs of Being (or Fulnefs of Perfec- 
 tion) may very well be without an abfolute Infinity, 
 has been already fhewn in the former Book **. 
 * 2. Such Fulnefs of Perfedion as we then attribu- 
 ted to the Eternal Being (fince it as effeftually ex- 
 cludes all Imperfection as even the Notion of Infi- 
 nity itfelf ) may be well conceiv'd as a fufficient Foun- 
 dation of neceflary Exiflence. For fince (as was 
 then obferv'dj a PoflibiJity of ceafing to Be can no 
 where be found without Imperfe6lion, we may in 
 the general be aflur*d, that where no Imperfedion 
 is, there can be no Poflibility of ceafing to Be j or 
 there muft needs be neceflary Exiftence. 
 
 3. An infinite Diftance or Remotenefs from Not 
 being, is an improper Manner of fpeaking. 'Tis 
 true, the irreconcileable Oppofition between two 
 contradi6tory Terms, makes us apt to imagine a 
 Soft of Space or Diftance between them, to which 
 we are us'd to give the Title of Infinite. But 'tis 
 plain, that to talk of fuch an infinite Diftance, is to 
 fpeak improperly, and to expofe ourfelves to the 
 Danger of being amus'd with Words inftead of 
 Things. Befides, that there's no Need of any real 
 Infinity of Perfeflion to found fuch an infinite 
 Diftance appears from the Confeflion of the AflTer- 
 
 ♦ Chriftian Life, Part. II. Vol. I. Chap. 6. 
 ♦* See Ch. 4. B. i. 
 
 tors 
 
Exiflcnce and Nature of G OD. 2U, 
 tors of an ablblute Infinity chcinrelvcs. ■ For tl^cfe. 
 (as appears by a former Argunjent) fuppofe a lik,e 
 infinite Diftance between the -Not being and Being 
 even of Creatures ; without attril?,uting to-^hqm any: 
 Infinity of Perfedlion. .. ; .. 
 
 Arg. IX. Not only the Nature of NccefBjyvbuiL, 
 that of PoJfibiUtyy has furnifhed an Argument of fia: 
 abfolutely infinite Being. Fo^ I find ^ late judicious 
 Writer arguing to this Effed *, '' God, fays he, 
 *' as he is the a(flual Caufe of whatever is, fo he Is. 
 " the polTible Caufe of whatever is polTible to be.. 
 " Wherefore fince it is evident that no Limits can* 
 " be fet by our Thoughts to the Number and F.X-. 
 " tent of Poflibilities, but that more may be coa- 
 *' ceiv'd to be produc'd, and I\ill more without End 
 " or Bounds i confequently the Divine Power mult 
 " be own'd to have an adual Infinity in Proppr-, 
 «' tion to this pofTible one, u.^,, 
 
 To this I reply, 'Tis manifefl that Pombilities 
 in general can no other wife be fuppos'd capable of 
 the Denomination of Infinite, than as any particular 
 Line or Number which we may conceive m our 
 Minds, may.be faid to be fo, viz. in as' much .as 
 we can't in our Imaginations arrive at any fix'd End 
 or Limits of Progreffion in adding other Poflibili- 
 ties to thofc we firfl: imagin'd. Thus we muft con- 
 ceive of the Infinity of poflible Eftefts -, unlefs we 
 will be guilty of the Trifling of the Schools, and 
 talk of Poflibilities as of real Beings, 
 
 But though we experience fuch an endlefs Liberty 
 qf thus adding in our Minds, yet 'tis humbly con- 
 ceived, there's no arguing from Imagination to Re- 
 ality, nor concluding that it muft be in every Rcfpej^k 
 in Nature as in our Phantafies. 
 
 When we conceive an infinite or unlimited IncreaU? 
 of co-exiftent Effeas, we pnfider it only as to it^ 
 
 ♦ How, /« bis Living Temple, Part 1. p l6l, 163. 
 
 O 3 ^*- 
 
It 4- An linpartial Enquiry into the 
 
 I^tidfial PoJJibiiity^ 6r to that Non-repugnance which 
 we teftceive in the Idea of art infinite or endlefs In- 
 crcafc <Df Number ahd Extenfion confider'd abftradiy 
 of ift itfelf. But an dhjif^aSlsd or ahfolute Pojfthility is 
 a very improper ExpreQion. For PolTibility, in a 
 proper Senfe, has a neceflary Relation to Power -^ 
 ahd nothing can ptoperly be faid to be pofilble but 
 what is producible, or within the Power of fome 
 real Agent. If therefore we attempt to determine 
 any thing cbncerning the Real Pojfibility of fuch an 
 infinite or eternal I ncreafe, we muft, it feems, con- 
 flder it hot only dbfolutely, or as not repugnant in 
 its own Idea, but relatively^ or as agreeable to the 
 Idea of fome Power of whofe real Exiftence we were 
 antecedently convinc'd. If we firft could demon- 
 ftrate the Exiftence of an abfolutely immenfe Being 
 who is the Subje<5l of a Power thus infinitely exten- 
 ded with Reference to Space, we might then fafely 
 conclude, that there's a proportionable infinite Pof- 
 Ilbility. But 'tis humbly conceiv'd we can't, on the 
 cbrttrary, argue fas in the prefent Cafe) from the 
 niefe abftraft Notion of an infinite Poflibility In our 
 Imaginations, to the real Exiftence of fuch a Power 
 and PolTibility in Nature, 
 
 To explain this by a parallel Inftance. If a Per- 
 fon, having firft prov'd the Exiftence of a Power 
 that is perfeft, and made it appear that perfect 
 Power can*t but extend to whatever is a capable 
 Objed: of Power (or to whatever includes not a Con- 
 tradidion) fhould then proceed to prove that the 
 A<51 of Creation implies no Contradi(ftion, and at 
 laft Ihould conclude that therefore Creation is a Pof • 
 ffbilityff. ^. effe(5tible by the Exercife of that perfed 
 or Almighty Power whofe Exiftence he had before 
 demonftrated -,) I conceive there could be no reafon- 
 able Obje<flion againft fuch a Method of arguing. 
 But if, on the contrary, he fhould fay, I plainly 
 perceive there's no Contradicftion in the Suppofition 
 
 of 
 
Exigence and Nature of GO^. 21 '5 
 of a Creation or Produdion of a Thing that was not, 
 and lliould from thence immediately infer that a 
 Power capable of Creation ex ifts i this would be a 
 very prepofterous Way of demonftrating ; which 
 yet is the very fame Method with that oftheprcfenc 
 Argument. 
 
 Nor is the Perfe6tion of Power, as fuch, to be 
 rneafur'd by the Extent of its A(fl:ivity j but to be 
 conceivM in a Relation to its Objedls confider'd in 
 themfelves, 'Tis, for In (la nee, as great a Demon- 
 ftration of the Perfedlion of Power to produce two 
 fuch Beings as the Earth and Moon, whofe Dillance 
 is comparatively fo fmall, as to produce two others 
 as diftint as the Earth ^nd fixed Stars. Thefe Ads 
 are equally perfeft in themfelves > and Vi the latter 
 feems to excel, 'tis not bccaufe it argues a greater 
 Perfection of Power in the Agent, but only becaufe 
 it in^ports a larger Sphere of Adivity ; which yet is 
 fomething extrinfical to Power, and can by Confe- 
 quence, add nothing to the Perfcdtion of it as 
 fuch. 
 
 But if the prefent Argument can't afilire us of 
 the Exiftence of a Power extenfively infinite or im- 
 menfe, much lefs can it prove a Powe^ intenfively fo, 
 i, e. infinite in Degree. For if (as we humbly con- 
 ceive was elfewhere fhewn) the mere Produftion of 
 a Thing from Nothing is no fufficient Proof of an 
 infinite Degree of Power, neither could the fuccefTive 
 Production of any imaginable Number of any af- 
 fignable Perfection amount to a Proof of a Power 
 infinite in Degree. For every capable EffcCl is e- 
 qually producible by a Power which is perfcdt. And 
 by Confequence, an eternal Repetition of the Aft 
 could not, in the prefent Cafe, yield a greater Ar- 
 gument of Po\yer than a fingle ACt. The Being 
 that can produce a Sand or a Drop from Nothing, 
 can, by the fame Degree of Power, fucceflively pro- 
 duce a M ountain or an Ocean. I confefs, the con- 
 O 4 tinurd 
 
21 6 An Irnpartial Enqtfiry into the 
 
 tinued pr frequent Repetition of the fame A(ft (ef^ 
 peciajly if in any Degree laborious) argues the greater 
 Degree of Power, in created or imperfed Agents. 
 "But the Cafe 'muft be own'd to be different withRe- 
 jpeft to the Creator of the World ; unlefs we ima- 
 gine him capable of Fatigue, and fwith the abfurd 
 Anthropoinorphites) interpret his Reft after the Crea- 
 tion in a proper. and literal Senfe. 
 
 Arg. X. Another Argument which I find ufed by 
 Spinofa^s a Proof of an abfolutely infinite Being, is 
 as follows.. Says he, " To be capable of not exifl- 
 '*' ing is a Sign of Impotence ; and on the contrary, 
 ** to be able to exift, is a Token of Power j if then 
 " whatever actually exifts is finite, it follows that 
 '* Finites are more powerful than an abfolutely In- 
 " finite; which, fays he, is abfurd. Therefore, 
 /^' either Nothing at all exifts, or elfe there is fuch a 
 <'=^, Thing as an abfolutely infinite Being *, 
 
 This Argument, for ought I know, might prove 
 fomething, if any Man could make appear that the 
 Notions of a finite and fuch an infinite Being arip 
 equally poffible or confiftent. But 'tis humbly con- 
 ceiv'd, the contrary will be fufficiently evident to 
 any that fliall confider v/hat has been already faid, 
 iand what rnay be further obferv'd in the following 
 ^jChapters. ' ' / l^I^l; 1^/ 
 
 There's -yet Vnother Proof attempted from the 
 infinite Defires and Appetites of the Soul after the fur 
 ■premeGood. ]E|Ut this rather feems a Rhetorical flou- 
 rifh than an Argument q^ Weight. Not to infift 
 upon the RefiecTtion it feems to caft upon the Wifdom 
 of the great Creator, by fuppofing him to have im- 
 planted in us Appetites abfolutely difproportion'd to 
 our Capacities, and whicl) by Confcquence can never 
 be fatisfied. 
 
 ■Li 
 
 * Syinoi^ in Erh. Part. i. Prop. u. 
 
 CHAR 
 
Exjftence <2«^ Nature of G D. ^17 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 THUS have we finifhed the Hiftory and Proof^ 
 of this Opinion both from Scripture and Rea- 
 fon. We ihall next proceed to confidcr its Ufefulnejs 
 or Significancy to the Ends of ReHgion and Mo- 
 rality. 
 
 In the former Book we difcover'd abundant Rea- 
 fon to attribute Nothing to the Deity but what is 
 tnoft perfecft in its Kind. For being neceflarily ex- 
 iftent, and the Fountain from which ail other Natures 
 derived, we have invincible Evidence that he pof- 
 fefles the higheft PerfecStion that either is, or is pof- 
 fible to be. We can therefore have no Room to 
 doubt, but that the genuine Notion of the Deity is; 
 that of the mojl ferfe'ct Being, or that Being whofc 
 very Nature includes whatever belongs to the true 
 Idea of Perfedion. Our prefent Task will be to 
 enquire a little more particularly whether a pofitivc 
 or abfolute Infinity be a necefTary Ingredient of that 
 Idea. 
 
 Now this, it is conceiv'd, may be beft detcrmin'd 
 by the Confideration of fame of the principal Ideas 
 which are allow'd to compofc it : By which we may 
 judge of the reft. 
 
 I . As to the Idea of ejfeolhe Power. I fuppofe, 
 whofoever fhall confider the Divine Power (as we 
 have done in the former Book) under the Notion of 
 an Ability to do ivhatjoever implies not a Contra- 
 ijiolion, will be allow'd to conceive it in the moft 
 fuitable and perfed Manner : Since this is to extend 
 it, to every Objecft of Power. For as for Contra- 
 di(5tions or Abfurdities, they are pure Nothings ; 
 and by Confequence no Objeds of Power. If a Con- 
 tradiction can by any Power be caufed to exill, ic 
 inuft be by the Conjunflion of two Terms which arc 
 abfolutely dcftructive of each other ; fo as that if 
 
 . the 
 
2 1 1 An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 the former be caus'd, the latter can*t be caus*d withr 
 out the Deftrudlion of the former. For Example ^ 
 A Being that is entirely Man, and entirely Horfe^ 
 is fuch a Contradi(flion in the Nature of Thjngs ; 
 fince the entire Nature of a Man abfolutely excludes 
 or deftroys that of a Horfe ; and fo on the contrary. 
 But when two Things abfolutely exclude or deftroy 
 e^ch other, their Conjundtion muft be (as was faid) 
 a pure Nothing ; and by Confequence no Objefk of 
 IPower. Po<ver may therefore be perfeft without 
 an Ability to effed Contradidions ; fmce without 
 ihat it may extend to every Objcfl of Power. And 
 though perfeft Power could not but require a Sphere 
 of A(flion vaftly furpafling our narrow Conceptions, 
 yet in making an Eftimate of the Perfedion of 
 Power, we muft conlider it without any Regard to a 
 the Extent of Space. The Produ<fbion of a Duft \ 
 from Nothing appears to bs as great an Inftance of 
 the Perfedtion of efiedtive Power, as fuch, as the 
 Production of the entire Globe of the Earth. The 
 Degree, and confequently the Perfedtion of Power, 
 is in both Cafes the fame. And if the latter Adl 
 includes fomething more magnificent in its Idea, it 
 is purely pn Account of fomewhat extrinfical to 
 Power •, as was elfewhere obferv'd. 
 
 This then is that Idea of effetftive Power which is 
 moft agreeable to the Nature of the perfed Being, 
 Whatever Conception comes Ihort of this, is evi- 
 dently too mean and unworthy of the eternal Nature, 
 and whatever exceeds it is abfurd and unneceflary. 
 
 But one muft be very ignorant not to know how 
 diffei-ent this Idea is from that which the Opinion of 
 an abfolute Infinity has oblig'd feme to entertain. 
 ' Twas that Opinion which induc*d the ingenious Des 
 Caries to attempt the Subverfion of the only folid 
 Foundation of Truth aftd Certainty, which (as \yas 
 obferv'd in the former Book) lies in the immutable 
 Nature of God, by extending the Divine Power to 
 
 ■ ■ ■ th« 
 
Exiftcnce and Nature of G O^. 219 
 the reconciling of Con trad i<flions •, thereby making 
 Truth to have depended entirely on the imletennin*d 
 H^tll of God. Of which more anon. And 'twas 
 partly that Opinion of an abfolutely infinite Power, 
 which tempted fo many others (at leaft by plain and 
 inevitable Conlequence) to (hake the fundamental 
 Principles of Religion, by deriving the worfl: Events 
 and Adtions from the Divine Caufality. And tho* 
 the molt judicious Divines, confidering the Extra- 
 vagance and Abfurdity of thcfe Notions, are wont 
 to explain the Infinity of the Divine Power in fuch a 
 limited Senfeas includes no more than is contain'd in 
 the former Dcfcription ; yet(fince the Idea of an abfo- 
 lute Infinity, both exccnfive and intcnfive, admits 
 no fuch Reilriiflion or Limitation) this amounts, at 
 leail, to a ConfefTion, that when the Word Infinity 
 in the abfolute Senfe is applied to the Attribute of 
 Power, ^tis wholly ufelefs and infignificant. 
 
 2. Let us confider the Idea o^ Knowledge. This 
 being an undoubted Attribute of the fame moft 
 perfeft Nature, Reafon will aflure us, that it ought 
 to be conceiv'd in the fame moft perfect Manner. 
 To which End, it is humbly fuppos'd, we need not 
 imagine \i to be abfolutely infinite. *Tis perhaps 
 fijfficient to conceive it to extend to whatever is a 
 fit and capable Object. This we have obferv'd 
 fome of the Patrons of an abfolure Infinity freely to 
 own with Reference to the Attribute of Power •, and 
 'tis difficult to imagine what (hould make them fa 
 unwilling to do fo in the prefent Cafe. If there be 
 fome Actions which our Reafon afllires us are unfit, 
 and therefore incapable Efi'edts of the Deity's more 
 i?nmediate Caufality •, are there not fome Events too, 
 which it equally afiures us arc no lefs incapable Ob- 
 je6ls of his remote Caufality (I mean his particular 
 efficacious Decreej and confequcntly of his particu- 
 lar determinate infallible Foreknowledge ? For that 
 the Decrees of God are to be fuppos'd as the Foun- 
 dation 
 
220 An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 
 dation of his Knowledge of Things as future, may, - 
 we conceive, appear from this one Obfervation. 
 Whatever was no Obje<5t of the divine particular 
 efficacious Decree was abfolutely indetermined to ex- 
 ift, or was a pure Contingence. But properly fpeak- 
 ing, a pure Contingence, with Regard to Foreknow- 
 ledge, is a pure Nothing ; as having Nothing po- 
 • fitive, fix'd, or determined in its Idea. Therefore it 
 is no more an Objed of Foreknowledge than a Con- 
 tradidlion is of Power. By Confequence, the Di- 
 vine Knowledge may extend to all Things without 
 being extended to Contingences, or being abfolutely 
 infinite. But of this more particularly in the fol^ . 
 lowing Chapter. 
 
 3. To conclude with the Idea o^ Perfe^lion with 
 Regard to Space. 
 
 Whoever fhall conceive the Deity to be that abfo- 
 lutely neceffary Being, in which and hy which all 
 Things live and move and have their Beings^ and be- 
 yond which there neither is nor can he any Thing ; 
 or that Being which pervades, fuftains, and furpafTes 
 all others -, mufl, 'tis humbly conceiv'd, be allow'd 
 to think as pioufly and magnificently of his Perfec- 
 tion as either the Scripture or Reafon requires or 
 warrants. That Being whofe Nature poffefTes, or 
 rather induces, the utmoft poITible Space, is mofl 
 certainly perfecft with Refped: to Space. Such a 
 Being is likewife properly and incomprehenfibly infi- 
 nite or immenfe ; in as much as no Being can mea- 
 fure or circumfcribe it, nor even human Imagina- 
 tion itfelf. This negative or relative Infinity of the 
 eternal, independent, and mofl perfe6t Being, nei- 
 ther Scripture nor Reafon, I think, will fuffer us to 
 deny. But whatever is more than this, though it 
 may ferve to raife Wonder and Aflonifhment in the 
 ignorant at the Divulgers of fuch fublime and my- 
 fterious Notions, yet, we humbly conceive, it is un- 
 neceffary, ^nd can in Reality add Nothing either 
 
 to 
 
Exiftence and Nature of GOi). 221 
 
 to the Perfe6t:ion of the Divine Idea, or to that 
 high Veneration with which it ftrikcs the Minds olf 
 all ferious and confidering Men. 
 
 But if we will needs be more particular in our 
 Enquiries, we forget the Modefty that fo well be- 
 comes the Impcrfedion of our Nature and Circum- 
 ftances. 'Tis fufficient that we are affured in the 
 general, that the eternal Being is in all Refpecfts fuch 
 as the Nature of Perfecflion required. And certainly 
 we ought not to wonder that the Imperfection of our 
 Nature will not permit us to difcover how the Per- 
 fection of his Nature is the Reafon of his exifting fo 
 and no otherwife with RefpeCt to Space, no more 
 than that it will not admit of a Difcovery of the 
 Reafon why his effential Properties are fo and no 
 otherwife with Regard to Number. 
 
 Upon the whole, from what has been here and 
 elfewhere obferved, 'tis natural to refledt on that 
 bold and magifterial Method of Speculation intro- 
 duced by the Platonijls and Schoolmen, who, as Dr. 
 More obferv'd, were wont to fpread out every At- 
 tribute of God to as infinite Excefs as they could, for- 
 getting that one necejfary Meajure of all his Attributes^ 
 viz. That they be no farther apply* d to him than as they 
 imply Perfe5lion. 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 WHoever has prov'd an Opinion to be both 
 groundlefs and ufelefs, needs proceed but one 
 Step further and prove it pernicious. Our next En- 
 quiry therefore fliall be into the Effedts or Confe- 
 quences of this Opinion of an abfolute Infinity. 
 
 Thefe we fhall perceive to regard the Deity under 
 a twofold Notion, viz. as confider'd either as He 
 is in Himfelf, or with Reference to us. Of the for- 
 mer Sort isj 
 
 I. The 
 
22 2 An Impart idl Enquiry into the 
 
 I. Thle Opinion of Imb Inextentiorij as it is ufualiy 
 exprefs'd, or his being abfolutely without Macrni- 
 tude or Dihienfions. This we have obfervM no left 
 a Man than Arijlotle to have infer*d as a plain and 
 immediate Confequence of that Principle. For Di- 
 menfions whofe very Notion includes End or Lj- 
 'mits, could not, as he rightly infer'dj belong to i 
 Being abfolutely infinite and immenfe : Since it is 
 denionftrable, that no poflible Mumber of Finites can 
 conflitute fuchan Infinite; 
 
 This Opinion of his Inextention being once enter- 
 tain'd, 'tis fcarce conceivable what a Train of Rid- 
 dles and Paradoxes it drew after it. For thence the 
 later Platonijis^ as well as the Arijlotelidns^ were wont 
 to infer what is ufualiy callM his Indifiance. Foi- Di- 
 ftaBce being only a relative Conception of Space^ 
 cohfequently it could not, as they rightly concluded^ 
 be conceiv'd in a Being who was, aS they imagin'di 
 abfolutely without Amplitude and DimenfionS. 
 
 Thus fat- they proceeded in Abfiirdlty : Their 
 next Seep was Impiety. For fmce they found it 
 impoflible to conceive a Being without Arfiiplitude or 
 Dimenfions any btherwife than as a mere indivifible 
 Point -, they began tb fpeak of the Deity in the like 
 diminutive Terms* and in Effed, impHfon'd the 
 great Creator within the fmalleft Dufl 6^ his Cre- 
 ation. 
 
 But fearing left this Confequence of theil- Zeal for 
 the divine abfolute Infinity iKould be thought to de- 
 flroy it, they quickly folv'd the Difficulty with a 
 pretended Myftery, and gravely concluded that it 
 Was no Impoffibility for fuch an infinite Being to ex- 
 i(t fehtire, though in a certain atomical or indivifible 
 Manner, not only in one, but in every irtdividual 
 Particle of the Univerfe at once. For this worthy 
 Difcovery we are particularly indebted to Plotinus, 
 one of Plato's Difciples, who oblig'd tlie World with 
 two whole Books, tending to demonftrate, that one 
 
 and 
 
Exiftence and Nature of GOD. 22 ^ 
 and the fame Being may be all of it entirely in each 
 diftinguifhable Part ot the Univerfe. 
 
 This Philofopher, it feems, had found the Secret 
 of producing more Deities out of one than the fruit- 
 ful Fancies of all the Poets in their Theogonies could 
 ever make. And *tis to this Difcovcry oflus that 
 we chiefly owe the moft plaufible Argument to fup- 
 port Tranfuhftantiation^ which implies that the Body 
 of Chrift is in many Places at once. 
 
 But fearing, good Man, left this Difcovery of his 
 fhould be thought inconfiftent with the Unity o^Godi 
 he made bold to ftrctch the Myftery a little farther, 
 by concluding not only that it is the Property and 
 Privilege of the abfolutely infinite Being to exift whole 
 in every Particle of the World, but that he has an 
 undoubted Privilege of exifting whole in the Whole 
 of it too ; fo as to be one individual innumerable uni" 
 verfal Deity. All which Platonical Myfteries were 
 afterwards receiv'd as Articles of Faith by the School- 
 men^ and are comprifed In that vulgar Maxim of 
 theirs, vix. Deus eji Totus in TotOf et Totiis in qualibet 
 Parte Mundiy i. e. God is Whole in the Whole, and 
 W^hole in every Part of the World : Myfteries thac 
 require a Degree of Faith beyond that of Miracles ; 
 a Faith which can transform Contradi(ftions into Ar- 
 guments with a Credo quia impojfibile efl *. 
 
 Though it is next to impoffible to fpeak of fuch 
 Extravagancies as thefe, and at the fame time to pr&- 
 ferve that Gravity which is fo neceflary in Difcourfes 
 g/ this Nature, yet I conceive it could not be amifs 
 to obferve thus much, to the End it may be ftiewn 
 how ftrangely the Names of Learning and Orthodoxy 
 have been mifapply'd to Whimfies of this Kind, and 
 how profanely even the facred Name of God has beert 
 abus*d to confecrate the moft egregious Abfurdkies.- 
 
 • i. e. I belifve it btcau/e 'tis impoJJiUt : Th« Saying of a cer- 
 tain Father. 
 
 Thai 
 
^24 ^n Impartial Enquiry into the 
 
 That thefe Opinions found no Entertainment ai- 
 mong many of the Primitive Chf iftians, may appeal' 
 /rom divers Paflages in 'Tertullian. Thus in Lib. 2. 
 contra Marcion, fays he, tVho {viz. among the Chri- 
 ftians of that Age) will deny that God is a Body [ Cor- 
 pus ] though he is likewife a Spirit ? Where, by Body'ii 
 probably meant no rnore than what has fome Sort 
 of Amplitude. For we read of fome Philofophers iri 
 Laertitis, who call'd Space tafxA''Av\ov, or an imfna- 
 terial Body. 'Tis therefore likely that in Tertullian*s 
 Time, the Word Body was generally us*d, at lead 
 ^mong the Chriftians, in fuch a Senfe : Though af- 
 terwards, in the Time of St. Auftin, it appears to' 
 have been difus'd with Refpedl to the Deity. For, 
 fays he, ^olle omiie Corpus^ Conceive not God as a" 
 Body. 
 
 And as thefe Opinions gain'd no Credit with the 
 more primitive Chriftians, fo they have found many 
 Oppofef s in the latter Ages of Chriftianity, and have 
 prov'd no fmall Occafion of Scandal to Atheiftical 
 Wits. Mr. Hohhe's rliay fervc for an Inftance •, who 
 m\iis, 'Book de Ho7nine'^ -p. fji. tells- us. That thbugh 
 the Scriptures acknoivledge Spirits, jet they no where 
 fay that they are without Dinlenfions. And in the 
 preceeding Page, fays he, Suhftance without Dimen- 
 Jions are JVords which flatly contradiol each other. 
 
 Thefe are Confequences of the divine abfolute In- 
 finity and Inextenfion which have been generally con- 
 fefs'd and vindicated. But there's another which, 
 (though it was never fo fortunate as to obtain this 
 Decree of a General Council in its Favour, yet) may 
 perhaps claim as true a Relation to thofe Principles 
 as any other : And that is the Opinion of the T^ul- 
 libifts. 
 
 •'Tis well known, that tVeigelius was the Reviver 
 of this Extravagance among Chriftians. For one 
 Aflertiori of his (among divers others flowing from^ 
 the Height of Enthufiafm and Diftra^ion) was that 
 ''"■^ fpi- 
 
Exigence and Nature of GOT). lis 
 
 ricual Beings (fince conceiv*d to be unextendcd or 
 without Dimenfions) are no where and yet every 'where. 
 But the chief Patron of this profound Myllery of 
 NulLih'ifm was Bes Cartes ; a Thilofopher who has 
 render'd himfclf remarkable for thefe three confident 
 Aflertions, liz. That zvhatever Thinks is ahfolutely im- 
 material -, That whatever is Extended^ or has Bime?i- 
 fions^ is material \ and that whatever is unextended^ or 
 without Dimenfions., is no zvhere. Which laft Afier- 
 tion (perhaps the trueft) is in EfFedl no other than a 
 frank ConfefTion of what the Schools labour'd to 
 conceal under an infignificant and arbitrary Dillinc- 
 tion between the Locus of a Body and the C/i/i ot a 
 Spirit J which Diftinclion, it feems, the lefs Meta- 
 physeal Cartefians find themfelves unable to com- 
 prehend. 
 
 From this Conceit that the Deity is no where fub- 
 ftantially, there foon fprung another, viz. the Opi- 
 nion that his Omniprefence and Ojnnipotence are the 
 fame •, or that he is no otherwife prefcnt with his 
 Creatures than by his Power and Efficacy : The 
 like to which is by fome aflerted of all other fpiri- 
 tual Beings. And this is that Notion of a Spirit 
 which defervedly gave fuch Offence to Mr. Cildon *, 
 For indeed a Power without a Subjects is in plain 
 ■Englijh, a powerful Nothing. 
 
 A late Author having fpent many Pages in difpu- 
 ting againft the vulgar Opinion of unextended Sub- 
 fiance., at laft very confidently advances this of a fe- 
 parateiy-exijiing Power in its Stead ; in which he does 
 but a(fl over \he Hime Part in Difguife, which he 
 before had hifs'd and exploded as too ridiculous for a 
 Man of Senfe. For after all, this Opinion will be 
 found to be no other in Ef^e^l than the fame unex- 
 tended Subjlance, which he fo much condemns. 
 
 For though he fuppofes the Divine Power adiially 
 to reach every Part of the Univerie, yet that he af- 
 
 p firms 
 
 * See Oraclis ofRtafon, p. 187. 
 
22(5 y^ Impartial Enquiry into the 
 firms It fo to do without any proper Extenfionof its 
 own, muft be confeiVd ; unlefs it fhould be aflertedj 
 that mere Power is meafurable by Inches and Feet. 
 And that this feparately-exiftent unextended Power 
 to which he gives the Name of Deity, /null, accor- 
 ding to him, be underftood to be a Suhjlance in the 
 very fame Senfe wherein the Deity has been ufually 
 afierted to be fo, is equally manifeft ; both becaufe 
 he aflerts it tofuhfid by iifeif, or without any Subjedt^ 
 and becaufe he allows it to fuppori or fuftain whatever 
 clfc exifls i which, if I miftake not, is the complete 
 Notion of Subftance as vulgarly attributed to the 
 Deity. 
 
 But let us briefly confider his Proofs of fuch a fe- 
 parately-exiftent Power. 
 
 This he, firft of all, attempts to prove from the 
 Nature of Motmi, which, fays he, " * hath a di- 
 *' ftind Elfence from the Matter in which it is ; 
 *' though we can hardly find Words to exprefs its 
 «' giddily, i. e. (as he afterwards explains his Mean- 
 " ing) though it is neither Subftance nor Accident. 
 
 But admitting Motion to be as much a Reality as 
 he plealcs, yec 'tis conceiv'd, that unlefs he can 
 prove the PofTibility of its Separate Exiftence with- 
 out any Subjed, it can be of no Advantage to him 
 in the prefent Cafe. For the Queftion is not con- 
 cerning the Reality of Power, but concerning its Se- 
 parability. But what a ftrange Motion muft that 
 needs be which is the Motion of Nothing ! 
 
 But he proceeds to Scripture Proofs. And parti- 
 cularly he quotes thofe Texts wherein God is faid 
 to have taken of the Spirit (or Power, as he ex- 
 plains it) and transfer'd it to another Subj eft -, and 
 wherein Virtue (or Power) is faid to have gone forth 
 from our Saviour on the Woman's touching him. 
 From whence he concludes, that Power can't be aa 
 
 * Grand E [fay, p. 4. 
 
 Ac-. 
 
Exiftcnce and Nature of GOD. 227 
 Accident ; becaufe an Accident can't pafs from one 
 Subjed to another witliout Inhefion in the Con- 
 veyance. 
 
 But fince Nothing is more certain than that the 
 Scriptures are not always to be underftood in the li- 
 teral Senfe, how (hall we be afllir'd that thefe Ex- 
 prefTions are not tropical ? 
 
 This he afterwards feems to think a reafonable 
 Objeflion ; and therefore he adds, that thouo-h ic 
 Ihould be fuppofed that thefe Scripture Phrafcs are. 
 not to be underftood in a proper or literal Senfe, yec 
 he conceives that when Power is faid to pafs from 
 one Perfon to another, it muft, at leaft, import 
 fome new real Power fuperadded. And this he ima- 
 gines will be fufficient for his Purpofe. 
 
 But again. How Ihall we be afiur'd, that among 
 all the improper or tropical Methods of Speech 10 
 be met with in Scripture, thefe Exprefiions are not 
 of that Sort which we call Metonymical^ or that the 
 Caufe is not here put for the Effed ; the Spirit, Vir- 
 tue, or Power, for the Refult of its Operation ? For 
 if fo, (as it's moft rational to fuppofe) they can't fo 
 much as be allow'd to import either the Tranfition 
 or Infufion of any new Power, but only the Produc- 
 tion of a new EtFe(5t by the fame original divine 
 Power. Thus, when God is faid to have taken of 
 the Spirit which was upon Mvfes^ and to have put it 
 on the Seventy Elders, no more can neceffarily be 
 jnfer'd to the prefent Purpofe, than that the Effects 
 of the fame divine Power which had aflifted and ac- 
 tuated Mo[es in the Difcharge of his Office, did after- 
 wards difcover chemfelvcs in a lefler Degree in his 
 Coadjutors. And when Virtue is faid to have gone 
 out of our Saviour, no more needs be underftood, 
 than that the miraculous Effeft which was then 
 wrought proceeded from the Divine Power which 
 a6ted in and by the Blefled Je[us, 
 
 P 2 By 
 
228 An Impartial Enquhy info the 
 ^^ By this Time the Gentleman thinks fit to lay afide 
 the Bible, and again to betake himfelf to Reafon. 
 Says he, p. lys. T'he original Power canU but have a 
 jgparate Exiji'ence ; for it gave Being to itfelf and to 
 every Thing elfe. 
 
 . This is a Touch of the Platonick and Cartefian Di- 
 vinity of which we difcoLirs'd before, and, as I take 
 it, needs no Confutation. 
 
 But fays he, It is a ContradiBion to affirm that the 
 original Power inheres in a Suhje5i : For this would bey 
 in Effe^j to deny its being the original Power ; in as 
 much as the Subje^i muji have a Priority of Exijience. 
 
 But could he need to be inform'd that neceflary 
 Exiftence admits of no real Priority or Pofteriority ? 
 Can any Man need a Demonftration to convince him 
 that the Cafe is very different between the Creator of 
 the World and the Effedls of human Art ? 
 
 Yet to give this Hypothefis its due, it muft, I 
 think, beconfefs'd, that it is at leaft as ingenious as 
 that of the Indian Philofopher of whom Mr. Locke 
 fpeaks. For Power without a Subjeft may, for 
 ought I know, yield as good a Support to the World 
 as. the Elephant and Tortoife. And could any of 
 cur Proje<^ors fo far improve on this Notion as to 
 difcover the Secret of extracting Power from its Sub- 
 jed;, he might gratify the Age with the Method of 
 building Callles in the Air, without the Help of 
 Mfop\ groffer Invention of Eagles and Baskets. 
 
 To be more ferious in a Matter of this Concern. 
 Did not this Gentleman profefs fo fairly in fome Pla- 
 ces of his Book, his Management would almoft in- 
 cline one to fufped; his Deity to be no other than the 
 Power or Adivity which he fuppofes to be in Matter, 
 ^or while he h^^ows felf-a^ive Power on all Mat- 
 ter, he contends that the Deity is nothing elfe but 
 Pow^r. And while he denies the Deity to be an 
 immaterial Subflance, and chufes rather to call him 
 •ail immaterial Being, he pretends to prove that the 
 
 Power 
 
Exiftcnce and Nature of GOT>. 229 
 Power of Matter is a diftindl Being from its Subjedl, 
 thoucrh no Subftance ; which he conceives to be a 
 Titk agreeable only to Matter. And that which 
 will poffibly render him yet more fufpe^ed with 
 fome, is what he fubjoyns concerning the Inconcciv- 
 ablenefs of a Power's exifting without any Subjcd: : 
 Which feems to imply, that whatever he had before 
 aflerted with Reference to the feparate Exiftence of a 
 Divine Power was nothing elfe but I^retcxt and Ar^ 
 
 1 would not be underftood to infinuate this to have 
 been his real Opinion. But, however that may have 
 been, 'tis certain, we can't be too much aware of 
 fuch fupcr-refin'd Notions as thele, left they be 
 found to leave us Nothing but the Name and Sha- 
 dow of a Deity. But to proceed. , ^ , , 
 
 From the Opinion of the Deity's being abfolutely 
 void of Extenlion our new Cartefuim have infcr'd, 
 that he is nothing elfe but Cogitation. And thus his 
 Omniprefence is by them explained by an Umverfal 
 Cogitation, i.^.they affert that he is for no other 
 Reafon every where, than becaufe he thinks and is 
 confcious every where. Thus fay Poiret, Roeh 
 &c who in this have chofen to deiert their Mafter 
 Des Cartes*, and to- follow the Sentiments of fome 
 of the Schoolmen, who probably deriy'd this Opi- 
 nion, together with that of his Inextenfion from the 
 Notion of his abfolute Infinity, Againft thefe SchooU 
 men Aquinas difputes, in Sum. p. i. q. 54» 55' _ 
 
 2 Another Opinion which has been entertain d as 
 a Confequenceof that of an abfolute Infinity, is the 
 Notion of the abfolute Simplicity o^ God. By which 
 is meant the real Identity of all the Divine Pericc* 
 tions with each other, and with the D*vine Nature. 
 
 • See Cartef. Refp. ad Objed. 3. nvhrt he aJJ-,rts thsrs can ht 
 no JJf v.'!(hout a SubjUl. 
 
 P 3 
 
 That 
 
2$p An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 
 That it was not without great Appearance of Rea- 
 fon that this was reputed a genuine Conlequence df 
 that Principle, is certain. For fuppofing the abfo- 
 lute Infinity of the Divine Nature, fhould we admit 
 a real Diverfity of its Attributes or Properties, it 
 might, not impertinently, be queried, whether each 
 of thofe Properties fmgly contained an ahjolutely infi- 
 nite Perfe5fion ? If it fhould be affirm'd, 'twould fol- 
 low that an abfolutely Infinite confided of many (or, 
 as is ufually aflerted, infinite) Infinites in the fame 
 Senfe. If deny'd, 'twould follow, that an abfolute- 
 ly Infinite confifted of Finites. For that which doth 
 not fmgly contain an abfolutely infinite Perfe^ion, mufl 
 be finite or limited. 
 
 That the Opinion of an abfolute Infinity is the on- 
 ly Principle that can be fuppos'd to infer fuch an ab- 
 folute Simplicity, is, I think, clear. For though 
 the Argument which fome derive from the general 
 Perfection of the Divine Nature, is fufficient to de- 
 monftrate the ImpofTibility of its being the Subjedt 
 of a proper Compofition, yet it excludes not all Di- 
 verfity ; fince no Diverfity or Difliindtion can with 
 Reafon be reputed an Imperfe^ion, but fuch as is the 
 Refult of a proper Compofition importing a Depen- 
 dence on fome external Caufe. On the contrary. 
 Perfection necefl^arily infers a Diverfity of efifential 
 Properties or Powers united in one Being •, fuch as 
 Self- activity ^ Intelligence, and Liberty, which can't 
 but co-exift in a Being that is perfed, with an abfo- 
 lute independent Neceflity. But an abfolutely necef- 
 fary Diverfity of thefe Properties can^t but be the 
 greateft Diverfity, as their abfolutely necelTary U~ 
 nion in the fame Subje6l can't but be the ftridteil and 
 moftindiflfoluble Union^. 
 
 This Opinion of the abfolute Simplicity of the Di- 
 vine Nature, how innocent foever it may appear, 
 
 f See the Chrifiian Religion founded on Reafon , p. lOi. 
 
 has 
 
Exiftcnce and Nature of GOD. 231 
 
 has been the Occafion of great Inconveniencies. For 
 hence Spinofa and others have argued for the Necefllty 
 of the Divine A(ftion. Say they, the Nature of the 
 Deity being abfolutely fimple, his Decrees and Ideas 
 can't but be the fame with his Eflence. But his Ef- 
 fence is confelfedly neceflary j cliercfore thefe muft be 
 fo too. But iffo, *tis well known how deltrudlivc 
 to Religion the Confequences mult be. And 'tis 
 this fame Opinion which has inclined fome to con- 
 found the Duration of the Deity with his ElTence, 
 and from thence to infer, that fincc his Eflence is 
 fimultaneous or unextended, therefore his Duration is 
 fo too : Thereby involving the Notion of the Eter- 
 nal Being in needlefs and inextricable Difficulties. 
 
 3. Another Opinion by fome entertain'd as a 
 Confequence of this Principle of an ahfolute Infimty^ 
 is that of the divine ahfolute Omnipotence. We have, 
 I confefs, obferv'd the Patrons of the divine ahfolute 
 Infinity, for the mofl part, to affert Omnipotence in 
 a fomewhat limited Senfe, by extending it only to. 
 fuch Ads as are judged to imply no Contradidion. 
 But there are or have been others, who, confidering 
 the Nature ot an abfoluce Infinity, have conceiv'd 
 it to be no lefs than Prefumption and Impiety to li- 
 mit or confine that Power, in any Sort, in our narrow 
 Minds which is ufually aflerted to be abfolutely infi- 
 nite or unlimited in itfelf. ThisinducM the ingenious 
 J)es Cartes to aflert, that how grofs a Contradidion 
 foever we may imagine a Thing to be, yet we ought 
 not to affirm *tis impoffible to God, for as much as 
 our Underftandings, being finite, can'c be preten- 
 ded to be the Meafures of his abfolutely infinite 
 Power. 
 
 This Method of Reafoning feenis to have greater 
 Weight than is commonly allqw'd it. For what is 
 it |efs than an abridging or limiting the divine infinite 
 Power to aflert it can do nothing but what is agree- 
 able and reconcileable even to the nioll pcrfed Ideas 
 
 P 4 O^" 
 
2 3 2 ^n Impartial Enquiry into the 
 
 of Finite Beings ? Since the Deity, as ^bfolutely in- | 
 
 finite, is fuppos'd to he what is abfolutely incon- 
 ceivable to any finite Underftanding, ought we not 
 by Confeqaence to admit that he can do what is ab- 
 folutely inconceivable to finite Minds ? It was there- 
 fore, it feems, not without Reafon, on thefe Princi^ 
 ■pies, that the Philofopher we juft now mentioned 
 laid it down for his Opinion *, That all Truth origi- 
 nally depended on the Will or fovereign 'Determination of 
 God •, which, according to him, was the only Caufe 
 of the Truth of this Propofition, That the tJjree An- 
 gles of a Triangle are equal to two Right Angles \ and 
 that he might, had he fo pleas'd, by Virtue of his 
 abfolutely infinite Power, have caus'd the contrary j 
 to be true : An Opinion which tends to lay a Foun- "^ 
 dation for the Belief of the groffeft Abfurdities where- 
 ever the Divine Power is fuppofed to be immediate- 
 ly concern'd. 
 
 4. Another Confequence of the Divine Abfolute 
 Infinity is that of Abfolute 07nnlfclence. 
 
 That the Deity abfolutely forefees all Events, 
 however conditionate in their Natures, and necefia- 
 rily and determinately foreknows all the Aftions e- 
 ven of his intelligent Creatures, though free or in- 
 determin'd in their Principles, are Paradoxes not 
 likely to have been believ'd for their own Sakes, but 
 rather appear to have been entertain'd on the Credit 
 of fome other more plaufible Opinion. For fure no 
 wife or good Man could be very forward to counte- 
 nance Notions which (as commonly underflood and 
 afierted) feem fo inconfiftent both with the Juflice 
 of God and his own Liberty, did he not conceive 
 them to be the neceflary Confequences of fome more 
 fpecious and innocent Principle. That this Principle 
 Was originally no other than that of an abfolute In- 
 finity, will, 'tis conceived, be fufficiently clear froni 
 
 * Ses Cart. Et>. 6. F, 2, 
 
 the 
 
Exiftence /7w^ Nature ofGOT>. 233 
 th6 immediate Connedlion between thefe Opinions. 
 For fince that can't be abfoluteiy infinite or un- 
 bounded Knowledge which is not equally extended 
 to all future as well as paft and prefent Events •, it 
 follows that if the Divine Knowledge be aflerted to 
 be thus infinite, it muft of Necefllty be under- 
 ftood to be thus extended. And this indeed is the 
 principal Reafon which is ufually affjgn'd of fuch 
 Foreknowledge. 
 
 With Refped to this univerflil abfolute Infallible 
 Foreknowledge of the Deity, 'tis the Obfcrvation of 
 the excellent Mr. Boyle *, " That the greateft Wits 
 " that have labbur'd to reconcile it with the Liber- 
 " ty of Man's Will, have been rcduc'd to maintain 
 " fomething or other that thwarts fome acknow- 
 " ledg'd Truth or Didlate of Reafon. 
 
 From this Suppofition of an eternal abfolute and 
 univerfal Foreknowledge, the natural and immediate 
 Confequence was that of eternal abfolute Decrees of 
 all Anions and Events. For fince the Dofbrine of 
 Eternal Decrees was taught by Plato, it can't be 
 pretended to have taken its Original from fuch Ex- 
 prefTions as are commonly thought to favour it in 
 the New Tejlament. And as for the Old Tejtament^ 
 (whatever the Opinion of fome of the lefs ancient 
 Jews might be) it yields the leaft Colour in the 
 World for fuch a Notion. But that it was admitted 
 by Plato as a Confequence of his Doftrine of an ab' 
 folute univerfal Foreknowledge, feems very clear from 
 the natural Connexion between thefe two Opinions. 
 For 'tis felf-evident fas we elfewhere obferv'dj that 
 whatever is the Objed; of an abfolute infallible Fore- 
 knowledge, mud be fomewhat that is already fix'd 
 and determin'd. But whatever isdetermin'd to be, 
 muft plainly either have been determin'd in its own 
 Nature, or elfe it muft have been determined by 
 
 * DifcQurfe of Things above Reafon. p. I 3. and 78. 
 
 virtue 
 
234 An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 virtue of fome immutable Order of Things indepen- 
 dent on the Deity i or Laflly, it mufl have been dc- 
 termin'd by fome particular divine Decree. That it 
 could not be fo determin'd in its own Nature is clear. 
 Forfmce no particular Event can be affirmM to come 
 to pafs by an abfolute independent Neceflity in itfelf, 
 nothing is more manifeft than that all Events, in 
 themfelves confiderM, are abfolutely indifferent ei- 
 ther to be or not to be. That it could not be thus 
 determin*d by virtue of any immutable independent 
 Order of Things is alike clear. For *tis not only un- 
 accountable how fuch an immutable Order -fhould 
 eilablifh itfelf without the divine Ordination, but 
 this would render the true Deity (like the Jupiter of 
 the Stokks and other Pagans) a very infignificant Be- 
 ing, incapable of any free Aftion, and unable to 
 foreknow any thing without firft confulting the my- 
 fterious Book o^ Fate. It therefore remains, that as 
 nothing could be fufficient eternally to determine the 
 Exiftence of any particular Event but fome eternal 
 abfolute Decree of that fovereign Will on which all 
 Things depend, fo Nothing lefs than fuch eternal 
 Decrees could be a fufficient Foundation of fuch an 
 univerfal infallible Foreknowledge as is ufually attri- 
 buted to the Deity. 
 
 But of the Eternity of the Divine Decrees, and its 
 Inconveniencies, we have difcours'd in the former 
 Book, And as for the Opinion of the Univerfility 
 and Abfolurenefs of thofe Decrees, 'twas generally 
 rcje<5led by the Ancients who preceded St. yfujlw, 
 (who unanimoufly alTerted that the Non-ele6^ lay 
 under no abfolute neceflita ting Decree of Dan:nation) 
 and though it was zealoufly defended by St. Aujlin, 
 (who having oimiltd. xhc. ManicheanStti, began to 
 derive from the Deity all that Evil and Fatality, 
 "^^hich thofe Hereticks imputed to their evil Prin- 
 ciple) yet it was rcjecled by many even at that Time, 
 por was it ever confirmed by any Synod. And tho* 
 
 it 
 
Exiftence and Nature of GOT). 235 
 it was indeed defended by the mofl noted Writers of 
 the Weftern Church in Imitation of him, yet it was 
 much mollified by fome in the Point o^ ReprobatioKy 
 or Fredefiination to eternal Punijhment. 
 
 The Confcquence of univerfal abfolute Decrees was 
 the Opinion of the univerjal Agency of God, and the 
 abfolute Paffivenefe of his Creatures, and (which ap- 
 pears to be but little better than the fame Opinion in 
 Difguife) the Dodrine of univerfal immediate Con- 
 €urfe. 
 
 That not only fuch as are defervedly reputed Fa- 
 naticks or Enthufiafts, but Men of Learning and 
 Sobriety have been AfTertors of thefc Opinions, there's 
 none, I fuppofe, will deny, who knows the former 
 to have been the Dodtrine of divers of the School- 
 men *, and that the latter is ftill one dillinguifhing 
 Principle of fome who claim th-;; Title oi Orthodox 
 for their peculiar Charadler. 
 
 Iconfefs the Abfurdity and Impiety of the former 
 Opinion are fo undifguis'd and barefac'd, that at 
 prefent it finds little Entertainment with any but 
 fuel* whofe giddy enthufiaftick Minds render them 
 both incapable and unworthy of Difpute. But fince 
 the latter has been fo fortunate as to engage fo many 
 learned Advocates in its Defence, whofe Pens for fo 
 many Ages have been employ'd in calling its ill 
 Features into Shades, and reprefenting it with an 
 Air of Piety, it will perhaps be neceflary to give 
 That a few Thoughts. 
 
 If we look into their Writings, we fhall find, that 
 as in order to the eftablifhing an univerial abfolute 
 Foreknowledge, they affcrt abfolute efficacious De- 
 crees of all Anions and Events, lb they fuppofe a 
 proportionable Influx of the Divine Power on all the 
 Creatures, not only exciting them to ad, but irrefif- 
 tibly diredling and govenung their feveral Adtions 
 
 * ne/e luere ixiont to teach that it tins not Fire that burnt, but 
 that Gad burnt ad prifentiam Ignis. 
 
 in 
 
2$6 An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 in order to the fulfilling thofe Decrees. They main- 
 tain that it IS a great Indignity and Affront to the ab- 
 folutely infinite Deity, to imagine him to be no more 
 than either the remote or the partial Caufe of all 
 Action. They afTert that he arts not only with but 
 in his Creatures \ who are as abfolutely unable to adt 
 of themfelves as they were either to create or to pre- 
 fcrve themfelves. But how all this is confiflent with 
 the Liberty of the Creatures, and by Confequence 
 with any thing that may deferve the Name of Reli- 
 gion, muft, I think, be own*d to be abfolutely in* 
 comprehenfible. 
 
 It is not, I conceive, fufficient to fay, inJDefence 
 of this Opinion, that God influences and actuates 
 the Creatures in a Manner agreeable to their refpec- 
 tive Natures, fiz. NecefTary Agents necelTarily, but 
 free Agents in a Way confiftent with and perfedive 
 of their Liberty. For this is to fay what they can 
 never explain or reconcile in any tolerable Degree with 
 the Di6i:ates of Reafon ; forafmuch as fuch an irre^ 
 fillible Force (or Influx, as they chufe to call itl ab- 
 folutely fubverts the Difl:in6tion of Necejfary and 
 Free with Regard to the Creatures, and reduces all 
 to the fame Level, leaving no imaginable Difference 
 with Refped: to Liberty between the Aflion of an 
 Angel and that of a Brute or Clock. Befides, that 
 Ad: which by inevitably bending the Will or cau- 
 fing us to commit what is really evil voluntarily, 
 (which is all that fome People mean by Freely) is in 
 Reality more deftruftive of Liberty, and more deep- 
 ly concerned in the Evil committed, than that which 
 forces us to commit it only by immediately conr 
 ftraining our Fradtice. 
 
 Nor is it to better Purpofe to afHrm, that God 
 plfeds only the Matter and not the Form of fln- 
 ful Adions. For this appears to be abfolutely irre- 
 concileable to their own Principles. For if he efFeds 
 pnly the Matter or Phyfical Part of the Act, then 
 ' ' the 
 
Exiftcncc and Nature of GOT). 237 
 the Form, or moral Part, is by Confequence entire* 
 ly the Effe(5t of the Creature's Power. For Inftance, 
 a Pcrlbn is guilty of Flatred to his Father, In this 
 Aftion two Things are to be diftinguifh'd, viz. the 
 Matter of the Adt, or Flatred in general, which is 
 neither good nor evil, but indiflercnt: and the Ftruiy 
 or the Diredion or particular Determination of that 
 Hatred towards an unlawful Object. Now if it be 
 faid that God effefls only the Matter of the Adt (or 
 Hatred in general) without the Icafl Direcftion of ic 
 to any particular Objed, then he cannot be (aid to 
 concur to the whole Adion, much lefs is he the 
 total Caufe of it. For the Diredion of the Hatred 
 towards fuch a particular Objed (to which he does 
 not concur j is moll certainly fomething pofitive, and 
 deferves the Name of Adion as well as the Hatred 
 itfeif. But if they fay (as according to their Prin- 
 ciples, which make the Deity the total Caufe of all 
 Adion, they are bound to do) that God not only 
 effeds the Adion of Hatred, but irrefiftibly governs 
 anddiredsit, then it feems to be abfolutely incon* 
 ceivlble how there fliould be any proper Concurfe or 
 Liberty of the Creature in that Adion, or how God 
 fliould not be the Author of the Evil,fince he is affir- 
 med to be the total Caufe of the Action : Which in» 
 deed is what Beza him felf owns to be inexplicable *. 
 Nor can it be to better Purpofe to fcek Refuge 
 in their ufual Diftindions of Necejfity ; for if the Ne- 
 ceflity refulting from the Decree and Influence of the 
 Almighty be abfolute and irrefillible, 'tis, we con- 
 ceive, but little Odds, whether it be call'd a Necef- 
 fity of Coa^ion or of Immutability ; only as the latter 
 (though ufually conceiv'd to be the lelfcr, yet) is in 
 Reality the greater Necefllty of the two; fince ic 
 not only influences the Pradice, but the very Will, 
 whereas a NeccfTity of Coadion (as we lately obfer- 
 ved) only con lira ins the Pradice. 
 
 * In Librt aJverJ, Cafld, dg Pradejiinationt. 
 
 And 
 
23 8 An Impart iaJ Enquiry into the 
 
 And whereas in Juftification of thefe Opinions 'ti3 
 pretended, that the alcribing a felf-determining Pow- 
 er to a Creature would be to render it independent of 
 the Creator, 'tis humbly conceiv'd we fufficiently 
 fecure the Dependence of rational Agents on the firft 
 and fupreme Caufe, if we affert that as they at 
 firft deriv'd their Power from Him, fo they ftill 
 owe to Him the Prefervation of it, and are continu- 
 ally liable to his Interpofition and Influence, accor- 
 ding to his fovereign Pleafure. 
 
 Nor is fuch a Power of determining ou'r Adions 
 in any Refpeft inconfiftent with the divine Suftenta- 
 tion. For Suftentation has a Reference only to the 
 preferving our Beings and fuch Powers as we pdflefs ; 
 and is very different from an univerfal immediate 
 Concurfe, which refers to the Excitation, Govern- 
 ment, and Direftion of thofe Powers in all our Ac- 
 tions. And as the Deity fuftains our Beings without 
 any Confufion of Subftance, fo he may very well be 
 fupposM to fuftain fuch Powers as belong to our 
 Beings, without having any Part in the Adlions 
 which proceed from them. • 
 
 And certainly it appears to be much more for 
 the Honour o^ the great Creator, to fuppofe that he 
 has produc'd Creatures capable of determining their 
 Actions, than that he has made mere Machines, in- 
 capable of effecting any thing without being firft 
 mov'd and aded themfelves. As he who hascon- 
 triv'd a Watch or a Clock, which by Means of the 
 Spring and Wheels within itfelf points at the Hours, 
 muft be own'd to have given a greater Proof of his 
 Skill, than he who has made a Cart or a Plough, 
 which can do nothing unlcfs dragg'd by a continual 
 Application of external Force. 
 
 5. As the Opinion of an abfolute Infinity has 
 tempted feme to aiTert God's doing all Things, fo 
 it has given Occafion to others to hold his being aU 
 
 Things. 
 
 'Tis 
 
Exiftence and Nature of GO^. 2^9 
 
 'Tis fufficiently known to have been and Hill to 
 be the Perfuafion of many, that God is the All or 
 entire Umverfe, and that particular Beings are but fo 
 many different Modifications of his Effence. 
 
 This was the Aflertion of Spifwfa, who by at- 
 tempting to prove that Every Thing is God, has in 
 Effect deny'd that there's any God at all. 
 
 That which firft tempted him to undertake his 
 pretended Demonftration of Atheifm, appears to 
 have been no other than the Cartefian Principles, 
 ^hat Matter and Extenfion are the fame^ and thac 
 Matter is in its very Nature infinite. For thefe being 
 once admitted, he thought it not impoflible, in the 
 firft Place, to perfuade the World, that infinite 
 Matter could not but belong to the divine or necef- 
 farily-exiftent Nature. For thus he affirms Subflatt' 
 tiam corporeafn, qucB non nift infifiita co?icipi potejl, nuU 
 la ratione Natura Divina indignant eJJ'e did pojfe, i. e. 
 ** That bodily (or material) Subftance, which can 
 *' no otherwise be conceiv'd than as infinite, can in 
 •' no Refpe6tbe laid to be unworthy the Divine Na- 
 ** ture.'* His next Step was to prove that his preten- 
 ded Deity was the All, or that it included not only 
 Matter, but All Being in itfelf. Thus in his Explica- 
 tion of his Sixth Definition, fays he, ^od ahfolute 
 infinitum efi: ad ejus EJfentiam pertinet quicquid EJfen- 
 tiam exprimit et Negationem millam irroolvit, i. c. 
 ** That Being which is abfolutely infinite compre- 
 *' hends in ics own Eflence whatever is pofitive or 
 *' expreffive of Effence. 
 
 And his Followers are us*d to argue to this Ef- 
 fed:. An abfolutely infinite Nature can't but in- 
 clude and properly and formally poffefs all Being, or 
 muft needs be the univerfal Subftance, For where- 
 cver there is any Being or Subftance which is no 
 Part of it, there it muft of Neceffity be bounded, 
 and confequently it can't, on that Suppofition, be 
 allow'd to be that abfolutely infinite Nature which 
 
 wc 
 
240 An Impartial^ Enquiry into the 
 we conclude to exift. There is then, fay they, ei- 
 ther no abfolutely infinite Nature, or elfe it muft 
 formally include whatever is real and fubftantial. 
 
 This Method of Arguing will pofiibiy be found 
 more conclufive than fome are willing to apprehend* 
 And whoever undertakes to confute it, will have 
 perhaps as much Difficulty to make appear how 
 there can be another Being or Subftance diilindl 
 from that which is fuppofed to be abfolutely infinite; 
 (with an Infinity of Fulnefs as well as of Immenfity^ 
 as Dr. Clarke and others exprefs it) as how there can 
 be another Matter diftincfl from an abfolutely infinite 
 Matter. Fox as 'tis undeniable that an abfolutely 
 infinite Matter (if exiftent) muft be all Matter, fo 
 'tis perhaps impoffible to apprehend how an abfo- 
 lutely infinite Subftance (if any fuch) ftiould be any 
 other than all Being, or a Being which formally 
 includes all Reality, all Entity in itfclf. As a Be- 
 ing which is fuppos'd to be ftri^lly infinite with Re- 
 fpe6t to Extent only (fuch as Matter by fome Car- 
 tefians is afierted to be) muft necelTarily be conceiv'd 
 to exclude any other Extenfion of the fame Sotx^ fo 
 it feems clear, that a Being which is both extenfively 
 and intenfively infinite, or is ftridlly infinite in all 
 Refpeds, ffuch as the Deity is ufually afferted to 
 be) muft needs be allow'd (as containing in its own 
 Efience not only every fpecifical but every numeri- 
 cal Perfedion or Reality) to exclude any other Be- 
 ing whatfoever* 
 
 And not only the Spinq/ifls^ but forhe of a very 
 difl^erent Charader, are wont to infer, that all Be- 
 ings are Parts of .the Deity from this very Principle 
 of his abfolute Infinity. Thus do many of the my- 
 ftical Divines, and particularly Benedi£}us Anglus in 
 his Regiila Ferfeolmiis^ which had the Approbation 
 of many of the Popiih Dodors : Who defcribes his 
 fiipr -eminent Life as chiefly confifting in our believ- 
 ing that there's nothing diftinct from God and living 
 
Exigence and Nature of GOD. 241 
 accordingly. For he maintains that Nothing in the 
 Univerfe is any otherwife dill:inguifhM from the Dei- 
 ty than as the Sun- beams are from the Sun ; which 
 yet are in Effed: the llime Thing. For, fay thofd 
 Men, God being abfolutcly infinite, there can, by 
 Confequencc, be no other Being but liimlelf : Since 
 God and the minuteft Being diltincl from him would 
 be more Entity than God aJone. But Infinity in the 
 abfolute Senfe admits not of more or lefs. 
 
 Thefe, 'tis conceiv'd, are fome of tiie ill Confe- 
 quences of this Opinion of an abfolute Infinity with re- 
 ference to the Deity confider'd in Himfelf Wc 
 Ihall conclude with fuch as have a Reference more 
 efpccially to us. Thefe appear to have been, 
 
 1. Its difcouraging Enquiries into his Nature. 
 
 2. Its raifing Prejudices againft his Exijlence. 
 
 I. It appears to have had this ill Etfed, that it has 
 in a very great Degree difcourag'd Enquiries into the 
 Nature and Perfections of God. 
 
 As God is the Objed of Religion, fo Religion cart 
 have no other folid Foundation but a rational Ap- 
 prehenfion of the divine Nature. It mult needs be a 
 vain Thing to inform a Man of Reafon that he ought 
 to believe in an eternal, omniprefent and omnipotent 
 Being, the Creator and Governor of all Things, unlefs 
 he be firft mftrudled in the Grounds of that Belief,and 
 affur'd of the Confidence of thofe Ideas. To difcourle 
 of the Nature of Virtue and Vicej or the Punifliments 
 and Rewards of a future State, whatever ImprefTioii 
 it may make on weak and timorous Spirits, will have 
 none at all on manly and generous Minds, till they 
 are firft convinc'd, that there is indeed a Being, who 
 by Right of Creation has an abfolute Authority to 
 govern and difpofe of us, and wno not only takes 
 Notice of our Actions, but will render to every Man 
 according to his Deeds. Without fuch a previous 
 Convidlion as this, the mod artificial and pAtlutical 
 Difcourfc will feem Cant and Enthufiafm to I'uch 
 Q^ Per- 
 
242 An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 
 Perfons, and will prove in EfFeft but declaiming tO 
 ihe Winds. 
 
 Now it is an indifputable Principle, that if there 
 be a moll wife and beneficent Being, who created and 
 governs the World, he either created foch Beings as 
 t^fere capable of a competent Knowledge of Himfelf, 
 or tMt he never defign'd to fufpend their Happinefs 
 oh that Obedience, which, without fuch a competent 
 Knowledge, was either not likely to be performed, 
 Or, if performed, could have nothing to recommend 
 it to his Acceptance. For to believe and to pradife 
 without fufScient Convidlion is no Virtue, but a 
 Shame and Difparagement to any capable Being. 
 
 But if fuch a Knowledge of God be neceflary, if it 
 be attainable, 'tis an evident Confequence, that what- 
 ever Opinion renders his Idea impoffible in itfelf, and 
 by baffling the Enquiries of fo many Ages, has pro- 
 ved the Occafion of fo great Difcouragement to fur- 
 ther Attempts, can't be the genuine Conception of 
 his Nature, but is equally groundlefs and pernicious. 
 
 This, 'tis humbly conceiv'd, has been the Cafe of 
 the Opinion of an abfolute Infinity. For from hence 
 many have been apt to infer -^xih. Philalethes in Mr. 
 Guildon''s Manual^ p- 5 ' • Suppofing the Exiftence of a 
 firfi Caufe, of what Import would it he to us, unlefs we 
 were better acquainted with his divine and infinite Na - 
 ture than confifts with a Being fo finite as Man, which 
 can tiever comprehend an Infinite ? And if we can't 
 comprehend his Ncttufe^ neither can we comprehend his 
 
 mil, &c. 
 
 This Reafoning can by no Means affefl the true 
 Notion of the divine Eternity (as fome will poflibly 
 objed:.) For as the Exiftence of an eternal Being isf 
 one of the moft evident Truths in Nature, fo the 
 iDifficulties which it includes (tho' in fome Refpeds 
 above bur Conception, yet) admit of an Hypothefis 
 fufficienCj it is conceiv*dj to yield Satisfaction to all 
 
 fobeif^ 
 
Exiftence and Nature of G O ^. 243 
 fobcr and ingenuous Minds. To make this appear 
 will be the Defien of the Third Part of this Book. 
 
 2. The Opinion of an ahjolule Infinity has been the 
 great Occafion of Prejudice againft the Exiftence of 
 God. Though Men of Atheiftick Principles have 
 not always deny'd the Exiftence of an abfolutcly im- 
 menfe or infinite Being, but were, for ought with 
 any Certainty appears, the very firll AfTertors of it •, 
 yet their fuppos'd Infinity (which was no other than 
 that of Matter and Space) was evidently of fuch a 
 Nature as excluded thofe Confequences which have 
 iince been drawn from the Opinion of the divine ab- 
 folute Infinity, and which have prov'd the Occafion 
 of fo much Scandal to People of that Character. 
 But notwithftanding this, and notwithftanding what 
 the Spinoftjis have fince held, *tis notorious that ma- 
 ny others of the Clan have deny*d the Pofllbility ot 
 a Being ahfolutely infinite in all PerfeEiions. For what 
 Objection has been more frequent in the Mouths of 
 Infidels and Libertines than this, that the Attributes 
 Gi infinite Fower^ Knowledge ^^z. as commonly af- 
 cribed to the Deity, fignify no Idea or Conception 
 of Men's Minds, but are only ExprelTions of their ig- 
 norant Admiration and Aftonifhment -, and confe- 
 quently, that the Deity is nothing elfe in Effec^t but^ 
 a Complication of high founding Words, withoui 
 the lead Signification or Reality ? * 
 
 For the Satisfaftion of the Curious, I fhan't think 
 it a Trouble to tranfcribe Vanim\ Defcription of 
 God in his Amphitheatrum Providentics Divines ; 
 wherein he fums up all the aforementioned Confe- 
 quences of the Opinion of abfolute Infinity with De- 
 fign, as it feems, to prejudice Men againft the Exif- 
 tence of a divine Being. This Vanihi is known to 
 have dy*d a Martyr for the Caufe of Atheifm, being 
 burnt at Tholoufe^ and this his Defcription may well 
 
 *SteDr. CndiVi, Jr.tel.SyJ}.^. 640,641. and 6^2, 653. 
 
 0^1 be 
 
244 An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 be reputed as an Abftra6t of his Reafons for his In- 
 fidelity. Says he, Dens eft fui ipfius et Principimn et 
 Finis ; utmifque carens, neutrius egens, utriufque Pa- 
 rens atque Autor. Semper eft fine tempore^ cm Prceteri" 
 turn non abii nee feibit Futurum. Regnat uhique fine lo- 
 co ; i?nfmbilis abfque Statu ; Pernix fiine Motu ; extra 
 omnia omnis, intra omnia, fed non includitur in ipfis ; 
 extra omnia, fed non ah ipfiis excluditur. Bonus fine 
 ^mlitate, fine ^antitate magnus. 1'otus fine Par- 
 iihus. hmnutahilis cum altera mutat. Cujus Velle 
 Potentia, cui Opus Voluntas. Simplex eft in quo nihil in 
 Potentia, fed inA5lu omnia j imo Ipfepurus, primus me- 
 dius et ultimus A^us. Denique, eft omnia, fuper omnia, 
 extra omnia, intra omnia, prceter omnia, ante omnia, 
 et poft omnia Omnis. That is (to make it fpeak as 
 good Englifh as it will bear) " God is both the Ori- 
 *' ginal and the End of his own Exiftence ; or want- 
 " ing either without being indigent of either he is 
 *' (yet) the Caufe and Author of both. He is al- 
 " ways without Time, without any Viciflitude of 
 *' paft and future. He reigns every where without 
 " Place ; is immoveable without Station, fwifc 
 " without Motion, He is whole without the Uni- 
 *' verfe, and yet not excluded j whole within it, 
 *' and yet not included. Good without Quality ; 
 *' great without Quantity ; whole without Parts i 
 " unchangeable, though Author of Change in o- 
 *' ther Beings. Whofe Will is not only his Power 
 " but his very Work. He is fo fimple, that in 
 '' him nothing is in a State of Poflibility but eve- 
 " ry Thing in Adt •, being himfelf the only pure, 
 " firft, middle, and laft Ad:. To conclude, He is 
 " all Things, above all Things, without all Things, 
 " within all Things, befides all Things, before all 
 *' Things, and after all Things. 
 
 PARX 
 
Exiftence and Nature of GO^. 245 
 PART the Third. 
 
 V O/ETERNITT, 
 
 FROM the firfl Philofophers recorded in Hi- 
 ftory down to the Age of Pla/o, it appears 
 that fuch as concerned themfelves with Speculations 
 of this Nature, were us'd for the moil Part, to con- 
 ceive Eternity under the Notion of a continued Sue- 
 cejfwn. This indeed was the moft natural and obvi- 
 ous Conception, and the moft agreeable to the In- 
 fancy of Philofophy. Thofe ruder Reafoners, con- 
 fidering that the Life of Man, confifted of a Series 
 or Succeflion of Days, and Months, and Years, and 
 was (as it were) meafur'd out by the Revolutions 
 of the Heavenly Bodies, were eafily induc'd 10 con- 
 ceive the like of the eternal Being. 
 
 But when the Wits of Men began to be more re- 
 fin'd and metaphyfical, another Hypothefis foon be- 
 came fafhionable. For Plato and a few of his Pre- 
 decefTors, having adopted Anaxagoras's, Notion of an 
 nbfolute Infinity of the Divine Efifence, thought 
 themfelves oblig'd, by Confequence, to aflert an 
 unfucccjftve or fimultaneous Eternity. Forfince the Q- 
 pinion of the divine abfolute Simplicity (which we 
 have obierv*d to be a Confequ-rnce of that Princi- 
 ple) requires that nothing be affirm'd to belong to 
 the Deity but what is the Deity himfelf ; they there- 
 fore conceiv'd it neceffiry (as we before obferv'd) to 
 affert the Identity of the Duration and EfTence of 
 the eternal Being. And inafmnch as they had con- 
 cluded the Elfence ot God to be abfolutely fmiplc, 
 they infer*d his Duration to be fo too. 
 
 This Opinion of a fimultaneous or unfucccfllve 
 Eternity, being conceiv'd to have fo necciTary ^ 
 Connedlion with that of an abfolute Infinity, has 
 ever been an Attendant on it. Thus it has been 
 
 CL3 P^Q- 
 
24*5 A^ Impartial Enquiry, into the 
 propagated from the Time of Tlato through the 
 Times of the Schools even till the Reformation ; when 
 fome having rejcded the Doflrine of an alfolute In- 
 finity^ exchanged this Notion of a fimijkaneous Eter- 
 nity for the more ancient Opinion bfafucceflive one. 
 'Tis between thefe two Opinions that the prefent 
 Age is divided. But if we confider and judge im- 
 partially, perhaps neither will be found to be defen- 
 fible. For, 
 
 ■ I. As to xhz unfuccejfive or Jimultaneous 'Eternity 
 of Plato. What can be more extravagant and def- 
 perate than to affert, that the Duration of innume- 
 rable Ages is acftually fumm'd up and comprehended 
 iin afmgle indivifible Moment! That Eternity, which 
 is more than equivalent to all the Periods and Vicif- 
 fitudes of Time, is itfelf an Inflant ! That the Dei- 
 ty, who created the World near 6000 Years ago, is 
 ftill pronouncing the Almighty Fiaf ; and that tho' 
 all things yet remain as they were from the Begin- 
 ning-, he has adually kindled the univerfal Confla- 
 gration ! Ai^<^ not only fo, but that he deflroy'd the 
 World the very Moment wherein he created it, and 
 yet both has been and ilill is eternally creating and 
 deftroying it ! 
 
 'Tis, I confefs, a Sabje6t which has exhaufted the 
 Leifure and Subtil ty of the Schools to explain the Na- 
 ture of the imaginary fimultaneous Duration of the 
 eternal Being, and the Manner of its Co-exiflence 
 with that of fuccefTiye Beings. But how fuhiile and 
 'profound foever they may have been on this Point, I 
 perfuade my felf their Attempt has been as fruitlefs 
 as that of fquaring the Circle : and the voluminous 
 Labours of thofe great Mafters of Quibbling and 
 Soph'iftry have in the I0ue been no lefs ridiculous 
 ihan the Birth of the Mountains. But, 
 
 2. As for the other Notion, ^iz. that of a juC" 
 cejfive Eternity. Is that in any Degree more intelli- 
 gible than the former Opinion ? What Senfe can 
 
 we 
 
Exiftence and Nature of GOT). 247 
 we poflibly make of a Succeflion without Beginning? 
 Can there have been a Second, or Fifth, or Tenth 
 without a Firft ? Befides, is it polTible a really fuc- 
 ceflive Duration fliould be adiually infinite ? Can that 
 Number to which new Additions both are and will 
 be made for ever, become at any Time fo great as 
 not to admit of Increafe by thofe Additions ? May 
 we not as eafily conceive an Infant gradually to ar- 
 rive at old Age without pafllng through Childhood 
 and Youth, as a Succeflion without Beginning ? 
 And may we not as well fuppofe an actually infinite 
 growing Line, or a Cube or Triangle without Sides 
 and Dimenfions, as an adlually infinite and yet ever 
 increafing Succeflion or Number ? For certainly to 
 fay that a Number of Ages actually palt is fl:ri<flly 
 infinite, and therefore cannot be increas'd by the 
 Addition of Millions of Ages to Eternity, is not 
 only begging the Quefl:ion with Regard to the Num- 
 ber fuppos*d to be pafl:, but 'tis flying in the very 
 Face of Reafon, 
 
 But if neither of the vulgar Methods be dcfen- 
 fible, it follows that eiiher we mufl: be content ftill 
 to fpeak Contradictions about it, or mufl: look out 
 for fome better or more confiilent Hypotbefis. 
 
 To which End it may not be amifs to confidcr 
 the Nature of Duration and Time. For having once 
 got a true Notion of thefe, we fhall thereby the 
 more eafily be infl;rud:ed to form fome Conception 
 of Eternity. 
 
 Duration and Time are both of them Notions of 
 pur Minds refulting from the Confideration of the 
 Exiftence of Beings with Reference either to a real 
 or an imaginary Succeflion. Yet in this they are 
 made to differ ; that whereas Duration is ufually 
 (though perhaps erroneoufly) laid to be a neceflary 
 Appendage of all Beings, Time is conceiv'd to agree 
 to Creatures only, or Beings whofe Exift:encc is pure- 
 ly contingent. Time therefore in its ufual Accep- 
 
 Q 4 tuioo 
 
24* An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 tation imports Contingence ; and may perhaps not 
 unfitly be exprefs'd by contingent Exijlence. 
 
 This then being the proper Notion of Time^ and 
 Time being opposed to Eternity, it follows, that as 
 Time, (or temporal Exiftence) is contingent Exif- 
 tence^ (or that particular Sort of Exiftence which a- 
 grees to Creatures, as djftinguifh'd from that which 
 is peculiar to the Deity \) fo eternal Exiflence or E- 
 ternity ^however fome may conceive itj is no o- 
 therwife to be confider'd than as necejjary Exijlence-^ 
 without any necefTary Priority or Pofteriority. 
 
 If we keep to this Notion of Eternity, as we fhall 
 have the mofl proper and genuine Conception of it, 
 fo we fliall eafily difengage ourfelves from the Per- 
 plexities which unavoidably fpring from our con- 
 ceiving it entirely under the Notion of Duration. 
 For I believe whoever confiders the Nature of the 
 Idea of Duration (which is a Sort of imaginary Space 
 in Exiftence) and how impofTible it is in any Cafe, 
 to feparate it from the Ideas of SuccefTion, Parts, 
 Beginning, Priority and Pofteriority (as the Schools 
 in vain attempted to do) will foon be fenfible, that 
 ©ur conceiving Eternity under that Notion, has been 
 the original of moft of the Difficulties which ufually 
 pofe and perplex our Minds. Let this one Quota- 
 tion ferve for a Proof. " How any thing can have 
 " exifted eternally, i e. how an eternal (or infinite) 
 *' Duration can now be adtually paft, is a Thing 
 *' utterly as impofTible for our narrow Underftan- 
 " dings to comprehend, as any thing that is not an 
 *' exprefs Contradiction can be imagined to be (fays 
 *' Dr. Clarke in Wis Dej?ionJl. p. lo.) Yet (fays he) 
 *' to deny the Truth of the Propofition, That an e- 
 '* ternal or infinite Duration is now a^uallypaft y would 
 *' be to afTert fomething ftill far more unintelligible, 
 U even a real and exprefs Con tradition, {vix. that 
 ?' there is no eternal Being, (as I conceive his Mean- 
 ?f ing to be : '*) Which imports that Eternity and a 
 -* yeai 
 
Exiftence and Native of GOD. 249 
 
 real SuccefTion and Duration were, in his Opinion, 
 as infeparable as incomprehcnfible. 
 
 Yet notwithilanding this, 'tis humbly conceived 
 that die Idea o^neceffary Exijlence will, in a great 
 Degree, prevent thel'c incomprehenfible Difficulties in 
 our Conception o^ Eternity. For being us*d to think 
 of the Deity as of a Being that ncceflarily is, as this 
 will effedlually diflinguifh him from all other Be- 
 ings, fo it will difpofe us to receive Ideas of him ve- 
 ry different from thole ot his Creatures. And fincc 
 this Conception of £/<^m/y neither admits tlie Idea 
 o^ Finite nor Infinite, neither neceflarily includes any 
 real SuccefTion, nor abfolutely excludes it ; 'twill 
 perhaps not only prevent fuch Difficulties as were 
 apt to arife in our Minds from the vulgar Idea, but 
 will admit of a rational and fatisfadory Hypothefis 
 with Refpecft to the Thing itfeif. 
 
 It has already been obferv'd, that the Methods 
 which have hitherto been us'd in conceiving Eternity, 
 cither as entirely fiiccejjive or unfuccejfive, are atten- 
 ded with inextricable Difficulties. The former, be- 
 caufe it fuppofes a continual Addition without ei- 
 ther Beginning or Increafe ; The latter, bccaufe it 
 fuppofes an Injlant not only commenfurate to. all the 
 Periods and VicifTitudes of Time, but even of fuch 
 a Latitude as abfolutely to exclude the Poffibility of 
 the leaft Addition. Let us therefore, in the next 
 Place, confider whether any Medium can be difco- 
 ver'd between thefe two Extremes. 
 
 To which End we may recall to Mind two Prin- 
 ciples already eftablifhed in the former Book. 
 
 The firll is, That the eternal Being is a perfedly 
 free Agent. 
 
 The fecond is. That the Suppofition of particu- 
 lar eternal Decrees is inconfillent with our Notion 
 of the perfed Liberty or abfolute Independence of 
 the divine Aftjon, 
 
 From 
 
zso An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 
 From thefe Principles, 'tis conceivM, it may 
 not be unreafonable to conclude, that though the 
 eternal Being had no neceffary Succeffion in his Na- 
 ture, yet being perfe6lly felf-a6tive and free, thence 
 it proceeded that the Exercife of his Freedom in de- 
 creeing and producing the Creatures, in fuch Man- 
 ner and Order as was judg'd fit by his moft perfect 
 Wifdom, became the Original of whatever real Sue- 
 cefTion has been in Nature : ^ And that fuch Succef- 
 fion as we are apt to conceive to have preceded, is 
 no other than imaginary. 
 
 Againft which Account I can think of no Object 
 tlon but what will admit of a fatisfadory Solu- 
 tion. As, 'aiq ^(h;'> V;f; 
 
 I. If it be urg'd. That to fllppofe the Decrees 
 and Produdion of the particular Creatures to have 
 been the Original of Succefllon, and neither of 
 them to have been eternal, is inconfiftent with the 
 Notion of an eternal intelligent Deity ; inafmuch as 
 we experience that Intelligence and Thought necef- 
 farily include Succeffion : I conceive it may be re- 
 ply'd. 
 
 That the Reafons why Intelligence and Thought 
 are join'd with Succefllon in ourfelves, are not ne- 
 ceffary but purely accidental ; proceeding either from 
 the Imperfedlion of our Nature, or from the Peculi- 
 arity of our State and Circum fiances. 
 
 I. One Reafon is, the Imperfedion of our Na- 
 ture. Our Minds are naturally in a Manner empty 
 and unfurnifh'd of Ideas. We are originally, in a 
 great Degree, ignorant even of ourfelves. So that 
 in order to an Acquaintance with our own Natures 
 we are oblig'd to proceed by Steps, and to make ufe 
 of a Train or Succeffion of Ideas as we can acquire 
 them. Whereas, on the contrary, we have already 
 |bbferv*d, that a perfed Self-confcioufnefs is an ef- 
 fcntial Property of the eternal Bdng. 
 
 2. The 
 
Exlftcnce and Nature of G O T>. 251 
 2, The Peculiarity of our Circumftances is ano- 
 ther Caufe of our fucceflive Perception and Thought. 
 We find ourfclves bcfet on all Sides with a great 
 Variety of Objefts, which are continually making 
 Impreilions on our Senfes. But thefe ImprefTions 
 can't be diftindtly attended to, viev/*d and compa- 
 red, without a Succeflion of Ideas. But the Cafe of 
 the eternal Being was widely different. For it is 
 conceived we have already prov'd it an injurious Sup- 
 pofition to imagin him to have had any other parti- 
 cular neceflary Objedl of his Perception or Know- 
 ledge but himfelf. 
 
 From both thefe Confiderations, *tjs, I take it, 
 fufficicntly clear, that the Deity might very well be 
 a moft intelligent Being, without any fuch Succef- 
 fion of Ideas as we experience in ourfclves. For 
 Perception or Intelligence does not neceflarily in - 
 elude SuccefTion ; but if it be fucceflive, 'tis only by 
 Accident, and only to be fuppos'd in the Cafes we 
 juft now mentioned. 
 
 The eflential Perception of the eternal Being if 
 therefore, it feems, no otherwife to be conceived, 
 than as his complacential Confcioufnefs of his own 
 moft perfect Nature, and as terminated on none but 
 himfelf. For that it ever had the leaft Reference 
 to any other particular Being, proceeded entirely 
 jfrom his free Determination, as was elfewhere obferv'd. 
 'Tis to be confefs*d, that the Idea of SuccelTion fo 
 infinuates itfclf into our Idea of Exiftencc, that we 
 find it almoft impoflible to conceive the eternal Ex- 
 iftence of the Deity any otherwife than as an eter- 
 nal continued Series or Succeflion. But Imagina- 
 tion, as was elfewhere obferv*d, ought not to be 
 heard in Contradicflion to the Verdid of Reafon. 
 And there needs but little Attention to difcover the 
 Original of this Notion of an eternal Succeflion : 
 Which will appear to be no Reality, but to proceed 
 from the fame Error of Imagination that inclines 
 
 us 
 
25^ An Impartial Enquiry into the 
 us to confider Extenfion as abfolutely infinite. For 
 fince we immediately converfe with almoft nothing 
 but what includes both Succeflion and Extenfion in 
 its Idea, thence it happens that our Imaginations are 
 fo fill'd with thefe two Notions, that we find our- 
 felves equally unable to conceive any End of the one, 
 or Beginning of the other. Juft as a Mole can con- 
 ceive tne Univerfe no otherwife than as a Heap of 
 Earth ; having no other Idea whereby to repre- 
 fcnt it. 
 
 - 2. Some will pofiibly Gbje(^, that if there was 
 cnce no real Succeffion in Nature, *twill follow that 
 the divine Exiitence was then at leaft (as 'tis ufually 
 faid to be) injtantaneous. 
 
 But to this it may be reply 'd, That Exiftence is 
 nothing as diftinguifh'd from the Being which ex- 
 ifts. Confequently, there can no real Quantity be-- 
 long to it as fo diftinguifh'd. Therefore it cannot 
 properly be denominated either finite or infinite, fuc- 
 cefTive or inflantaneous. For thefe are Attributes 
 which have a Relation to Quantity, and can no 
 more agree to Exiftence, which is but a modal 
 Conception of Being, than they can to Necefilty or 
 Contingence, which are concciv'd as Modes of Ex- 
 iftence. To define neceflfary Exiftence by Infinity 
 or the Negation of Limits, feems to be no lefs im- 
 pertinent than to define Virtue by the Negation of 
 Red or Blue. For Exiftence (which, hath no Quan- 
 tity and Dimenfionsj hath no more Analogy to Ex- 
 tenfion and Limits, than Virtue (which hath no Co- 
 lour J hath to Red or Blue. And for the fame Rea- 
 fbn, 'tis no lefs improper to define it to be inftan- 
 taneous ; fince even an Inftant (aslikewifean Atom) 
 is conceiv'd as Quantity, though the minuteft ima- 
 ginable. But if it can't properly be denominated 
 inftantaneous, much lefs can it properly be term'd 
 f^ccefliye, or be fuppos'd to include any real Sue • 
 
 ceflion J 
 
Exiftcnce and Nature of GOT). 2 5 j 
 
 ccfTion i fince that would be more plainly to fuppofc 
 it to be quantitative. 
 
 What has here been obferv'd, (if I miftake not) 
 fufficiently confutes fuch as from the Notion of E- 
 ternity, confider'd as an ablblutcly infinite Duration, 
 are wont to infer the ablolute Infinity of all the other 
 divine Attributes. 
 
 3. Lajlly, Some may yet objc(ft, that admitting 
 the neceflary Being not to have been eternally the 
 Subjedl of any real SuccefTion, 'twill follow that 
 he could never have become fo in Confiftencc with 
 his Immutability. 
 
 To this I reply, That no fufHcient Reafon can 
 be given, why fuch Change as is the Refult of the 
 Exercifeof Liberty fliould bejudg'd to be injurious 
 to the Perfedtion of the divine Nature. On the 
 contrary, 'tis evident, that to be abfolutely inca- 
 pable of fuch Change as is included in the free De- 
 termination of Aflion, is the greateft of Imper- 
 fections. 
 
 If ifbe faid that the eternal Being is neceflarily 
 what he is, and confequcntly mud be abfolutely 
 incapable of Change ; I freely grant it to be the 
 indifputable Prerogative of that adorable Being to 
 be abfolutely incapable of Change with Reference 
 to his Nature or Effence (which, I take it, is the on- 
 ly Unchangeablenefs or NecelTity that is confident 
 with his PerfeflionJ and thence I conclude, that he 
 is neceflarily or unchangeably a free Agent. But if 
 Freedom, or an independent Power of Self-determi- 
 nation, be a neceflary or eflcntial Perfe6tion of God, 
 its Exercife can be no Imperfection. Either thefe or 
 the like Confiderations oblig'd fome of the School- 
 men, and after them, Cla?-a, in his fourth Problem, 
 to conclude, that Deus potejl velle aliqu'id novum fine 
 7ntitatione fui \ i. e. The Deity may decree a new 
 Thing without any Change injurious to the Per- 
 fedion of his Nauirc. 
 
 TWO 
 
TWO 
 
 DISCOURSES 
 
 Concerning the 
 
 Nature of S P A C E 
 
 AND 
 
 DURATION. 
 
 L Of STAGE, 
 
 A Competent Knowledge of the Nature of 
 Space and Duration^ being of abfolute Ne- 
 ceflicy to the more perfefl underftanding 
 of what has been advanc'd concerning the Attributes 
 of Immenfity and Eternity j I Ihall here fubjoin 
 what appears moft reafonable to be faid on both thefe 
 Subjedts. 
 
 Though I am fatisfied that the Words Space^ Bfk- 
 tenfwn^ Amplitude^ and Expanfion^ are nothing dif- 
 ferent, neither in their genuine Signification, nor in 
 their original Ufe, and that whatever Diftindlion is 
 ^OTW. to be aflign'd is merely arbitrary : yet to avoid 
 
 Con- 
 
i5<5 Two T>ifcourfes concerning the 
 
 Confufion, I fhall here, for the moft Part, ufe th<S 
 Word Extenfion with Reference to Matter or Body^ 
 and the other Terms fhall be us*d to fignify what I 
 humbly conceive to be immaterial. For that there's 
 a real Space or Expanfion diftinft from Matter may 
 appear from what will be faid. 
 
 Dijlance is a relative Idea of Space and Ejttenlion 
 confider'd as a Line between two feparate Points. 
 For though the Ideas of Space and Extention can't 
 be form*d without that of Diftance, yet they are 
 never call*d Diftance, but with an immediate Refe- 
 rence to two fuch Points. 
 
 As the Idea of Diftance Is in Reality nothing dif- 
 ferent from thofe of Space and Extenfion, confider'd 
 with Relation to two feparate Points ; fo that of Fi- 
 gure is no other than either of thefe Ideas, con- 
 fider'd with Reference to three or more Points, whe- 
 ther real or imaginary. 
 
 Hence it appears, that the Ideas of Space and 
 Extenfion are abfolute, but thofe of Diftance and 
 Figure are relative and modal. 
 
 As nothing is fo eafily conceiv'd as Space and 
 Extenfion in the general, fo nothing is fo difficultly 
 exprefs'd : Which is a farther Evidence of the Ab- 
 folutenefs and Simplicity of their general Nature, 
 For though fuch Notions as are compos'd of different 
 Ideas (as are all Relations) will admit of a Defcrip- 
 tion by Words, yet where there is no fuch Compo- 
 fition of Ideas, there can be no fuch Defcription 5 
 fmce different Words, being the Signs of different 
 Ideas, can't jointly exprefs a Notion void of all 
 Difference or Variety. 
 
 That the general Notion in which Space and Exten- 
 fiih agree, IS of fo fimple and abfolute a Nature^ as to 
 admit of no proper Defcription by Words, will evi* 
 dently appear by confidering the reputed Defcrip- 
 tions which are ufually given : Which we (hall find 
 to be no better in efted, than if we ftiould fay S^acn 
 
 U 
 
Nature of Spzcc anc/ Dum'ion. 257 
 
 is Space, Extenfwn is Extenfion. Thus if we either 
 fay they are Length, or Breadth, or Depth, or all 
 thefe together, yet thefe are evidently but different 
 Words for Space and Extenfion diverfly confider'd. 
 And fuppofing we knew not what Space and Ex- 
 tenfion were before, we might with as much Rea- 
 fon enquire what Length, or Breadth, or Depth 
 are. Or if, as ufual, we define Extenfion to be 
 that which hath Partes extra Partes, or Parts be- 
 yond each other ; yet fince no Extenfion can con- 
 fift of unextended Parts, *tis in effedt no more than 
 to lay, that Extenfion confijis of Extenfwns. A Dj- 
 fcription that looks rather like Banter than Inftruc- 
 tion. 
 
 There's fcarce any thing in Nature, whofe parti- 
 cular Contemplation is attended with greater Diffi- 
 culties than thofe of Extenfion and Space. For here 
 we have not only the proper Abftrufity of the Things 
 themfelves, but the Detedls and Mifreports of our 
 Faculties to encounter ; which, for the mod Part, 
 we find almoft as difficult to difcover and confefs as 
 to rectify. 
 
 If we impartially refle*.^, we fliall, perhaps, ob- 
 ferve three grand Prejudices by which we are apt to 
 be perplcx'd and miffed in thefe Inquiries. 
 
 1. Since our external Senfories (and efpecially our 
 Organs of Sight) every where receive the Idea of 
 Extenfion, thence it proceeds that as we can fet 
 no Limits to it in our Imaginations, fo we are 
 fl:rongly difpos'd to conclude, that it is abfolutely 
 infinite or unlimited in itfelf. 
 
 2. Becaufe we immediately converfe with Nothing 
 but Matter or Bodies, thence it proceeds that we 
 are apt to conclude there's no real Space or Expan- 
 fion difl:in(5t from the Extenfion of Matter. 
 
 3. Confequently, fince we can't but fee great 
 Reafon to believe the Exiffence of fomewhat that is 
 immaterial, and therefore (as we are inclin'd to lup- 
 
 R pofw) 
 
25 8 Two IDifcourfes concerning the 
 pofe) unextended or without Dimenfions, thence we 
 are eafily perfuaded, that Extenfion or Expanfion 
 is merely accidental to Being in general, and that 
 Suhjlance is a more reclufe and hidden Thing equal- 
 ly remote from our Senfes and Conceptions. 
 
 The firft of thefe Prejudices has, it is humbly 
 conceived, been fufficiently detected in 5. 2. Ch. 2. 
 I fhall here only remark a few Things with Reference 
 to the two laft. 
 
 The Poffibility and Reality of a Space fpecifical- 
 ly diltind from Matter, has been fo fully demon- 
 Itrated by Sir Ifaac Newton^ Mr. Locke, Dr. Bent- 
 ley, and others of the firft Rank for Learning, that 
 it may feem wholly fuperfluous to fay any thing in 
 fo clear a Cafe. But that I may not be fufpedled 
 to fuppofe any Principle without fufficient Proof, 
 fomething fhall be added on that Head. 
 
 1 . As to the PoJJibility. That a Space or Expan- 
 fion diftind; from Matter or Body muft be reputed 
 poffible, is clear from the very Notion of Matter ; 
 which is not fimple, but comprehends feveral Ideas, 
 fuch as Expanfion, Mobility, and Divifibility. Be- 
 tween thefe (though all neceflary to the Notion of 
 Matter, and efpecially the firft, which may be re- 
 puted the Foundation of all its Properties) there ap- 
 pears to be no abfolutely neceffary Connexion in 
 Nature : But an Expanfion may, for ought we 
 know, exift without either Mobility or real Divifi- 
 bility. If then we can fee no Repugnance in the 
 Notion of an immoveable and indivifible Expanfion, 
 it follows that an immaterial Expanfion, or Space 
 void of Bodies, muft be allow'd fat leaft as far as 
 we are capable of judging) to be a Poffibility. 
 
 2. As to the Reality or actual Exiftence of an 
 immaterial Expanfion or Space. This, 'tis hum- 
 bly conceiv'd, is moft clear with Reference to the 
 Spaces between the Heavenly Bodies. That thofe 
 wide Spaces contain but a very inconfiderable Por- 
 tion 
 
Nature of Space and Duration.' 259 
 
 tion of Matter (and that without any Vortical Mo- 
 tion, as Des Cartes dreamt^ may be concluded from 
 the free Paflage which they give to the Tails of Co- 
 mets -, though thefe move in Planes at all imagi- 
 nable Angles of Inclination with one anoiher, and 
 with that of the Ecliptick, and are composM of 
 Vapours fo thin and diffipablc as to admit the Rays 
 of the fixed Stars quite through iheir entire Column, 
 though ufually fas hath been calculated) of above 
 400,000 Miles Diameter. 
 
 And that even the grolTeft and firmefl Bodies of 
 our Earth ffuch as Steel and Adamant) have their 
 Vacuities or Spaces void of Matter, may be con* 
 eluded from the following Reflexions. 
 
 That fuch Bodies have their Fores is undeniable. 
 Now, thefe Pores muft be either entirely void of 
 Matter, or elfe furnifli'd with fome fuch fubtile 
 Matter, as the Cartefians fuppofe. But admitting 
 fuch a fubtile Matter, admitting too that it has no 
 Pores of its own, and is by Confequence mofl: nicely 
 qualified to fill up the Pores of the grofl~er Bodies, 
 yet it may be enquir'd, whence it is that it is more 
 fubtile than the Steel or Adamant which is fuppos'd 
 to contain it, feeing its Particles are much more 
 clofely compared and wedg'd together ? If it be faid 
 that its Subtility is the Refult of the Motion of its 
 Particles ; how is fuch a Motion pofiible, when the 
 Particles are fuppos'd to be fo compacted and con- 
 tiguous, that there's not the lead Interval into which 
 the Particles fituate in the Extremities may re- 
 treat ? If it be reply'd, that thefe Particles are not 
 confin'd or pent in by the Superficies of the Steel or 
 Adamant, but have a Communication by Motion 
 with others of the fime Kind fituate without ; ycc 
 this is only to fhift the Scene, not to remove the Dif- 
 ficulty •, fince the World is by them conceiv'd to 
 be infinite, and to be every where alike full of Mat- 
 ter. If they have Recourfe to their laft Refuge,- 
 
 R 2 and 
 
260 Two T^tfcourfes concerning the 
 and with Des Cartes^ inform us that this Motion of 
 the fubtile Matter is circular, each Particle fucceed- 
 ing in the other's Place fo clofely, that not the leaft 
 Hiatus or Vacuity can intervene -, this feems to be 
 the moft extravagant Suppofition in the World. 
 For how can a Body moving in a ftreight Line de- 
 termine another Body to move in a Circle ? Befides, 
 whatever Figure they pleafc to give to thofe fubtile 
 Particles, (except they fuppofe them to be angular, 
 which yet would be a very unfit Figure in fuch a 
 circular Motion) they muft fuppofe fome other 
 Particles of different Figures to fill up the Spaces 
 between them. But this will put them upon a yet 
 greater Difficulty, w'z. to conceive how any particular 
 Round or Wheel of Particles fhould fo fwiftly drag 
 thofe others of a different Make without rubbing a- 
 gainft the neighbouring Wheels, and moving the 
 whole Mafs of Matter at once : Which Inconve- 
 nience, if not well provided againft, would expofe 
 the whole material Univerfe to the utmoft Confu- 
 fion upon the Motion of the moft inconfiderable 
 Gnat or Fly. 
 
 A further Proof of the adual Exiftence of a 
 Space void of Matter, may be deriv'd from the 
 Nature of Gravitation. If there be no Portion of 
 Matter either abfolutely light or lefs heavy in its 
 own Nature, (as the Ariftotelians and others have, 
 without fufficient Reafon fuppos'd) but every Par- 
 ticle gravitates in a juft Proportion to its real Bulk 
 (as is now generally agreed ; ) then it follows that 
 every greater Portion of Matter muft gravitate in a 
 iuft Proportion to the Number and Size of the Par- 
 ticles which compofe it. From which Principles it 
 is manifeft, that no fufficient Reafon can be given, 
 why any two Bodies of equal Superficies fhould gra- 
 vitate differently (or be of different Weight) but on- 
 ly this, viz. that the one has either more or greater 
 Pores, and contains lefs Matter than the other. 
 
 But 
 
Katnre of Space ^k^ Duration. 261 
 
 But if the grofler and more compadl Bodies have 
 their Pores or Intervals which contain nothing ma- 
 terial, how much greater Intervals muft we fuppofe 
 in the Water and the Atmofphere which lurrounds 
 our Earth ? 
 
 Yet that thefe Intervals (though they contain no- 
 thing that is material) are not abfolutely empty, is 
 manifeft. For it has all the Evidence of a Firft 
 Principle, that a mere Nothing can't be the Foun- 
 dation of Diftance, or that two Bodies between 
 which there's no real Space or Expanfion, muft of 
 Neceflity coalefce and unite. 
 
 And that this Expanfion, which is fo neceflliry to 
 be fuppos'd as the Foundation of the Diftance be- 
 tween the Parts of Matter, is not only fomething, 
 but a very great Reality, is no lefs certain. For 
 it is Expanfion which we are aflured is the greateft 
 Reality that belongs to the Nature of Matter, as 
 being the Foundation of all its Properties. And it 
 is that which (under the Name of Ex ten/ton) is by 
 fome Philofophers afferted to be the very Eflence of 
 Matter. And certainly there's no fufficient Reafon 
 to imagine that the Expanfion (or Extenfion) of 
 Matter, which is cloath'd with thofc imperfed Pro- 
 perties of Divifibility, Mobility, &c. fhould be either 
 a greater, or even fo great a Reality as that imma- 
 terial Expanfion, which without thole Imperfedions 
 pervades and contains it. 
 
 For that the immaterial Expanfion not only rc- 
 plenifhes the Pores or Intervals, but even penetrates 
 and pervades the Parts of Matter, appears from 
 hence, that it gives no Hindrance to the Motion of 
 Matter, and is neither increas'd nor diminifh'd by its 
 Accefs or Recefs : Than which there can be no furer 
 Proofs of a Penetration. 
 
 This Hypothefis of an immaterial Expanfion, 
 
 which pervades and replcnilhes the material Uni- 
 
 vcrfe, as it is the moft natural, lb it is the moftan- 
 
 K. :? cicnt 
 
26z Two ^'tfcourfes concerning the 
 cient Method of Philofophy. For it appears to 
 have been the Opinion of the ancient Egyptians and 
 others, and to have prevaiied among the Learned 
 long before Democritus and Epicurus debauch'd it to 
 ferve the Ends of Atheifm : To which it is fo far 
 from being really fubfcrvient, that by fo firmly e- 
 ftablifhing two different Sorts of Extenfion or Ex- 
 panfion, (or two difiin5i Suhjlances) it appears to be 
 the beft fuited to deftroy the moft fafliionable Hy- 
 pothefis of Atheifm (I mean that of Spimfa) which 
 is built on the Principles of an abfolute material 
 Plenum and one Suhjlance, 
 
 But fome will here enquire. What is this imma- 
 terial Expanfion, or what Rank does it hold among 
 the other Beings of the Univerfe ? As to this there 
 are two Opinions. 
 
 1. Some are inclin'd to .think it a peculiar Sort of 
 Being (diftindl both from Matter and Spirit.) This 
 was the Opinion of the Epicureans^ and has fince 
 been adopted by feveral great Men of the prefent 
 Age. But, with Submifllon, this Opinion feems 
 juftly chargeable with the Fault of multiplying Be- 
 ings without NecelTity. And though it was con- 
 fident enough with the Principles of a.n Epicurean, 
 who in effecfl deny'd a Deity, yet it lefs fuits the 
 Faith of a Cbrijiian, who believes in an eternal omni- 
 frefent Spirit^ in whom we all live and move^ and have 
 our Being. Therefore, 
 
 2. They feem to fpeak both more like Philofo- 
 phers and Chriftians, as well as more agreeably to 
 the Senfe of the Ancients, who think it the peculiar 
 Prerogative of the Deity to pervade and compre- 
 hend, as well as to fuftain the Univerfe. For that 
 the Deity fuftains the entire Syftem of Things, and 
 fuftains it no otherwife than as prefent to its feveral 
 Parts, is agreed by all fober Reafoners. His Om- 
 niprefence and univerfal Penetration are indifputably 
 
 certain 
 
Nature qfSp^ce and Duration. 263 
 certain both from Scripture and Reafon. The only 
 Controverfy is concerning the Manner of it. 
 
 Now, fince in all Cafes wherein the Learned dif- 
 feri *tis not to be expec^Vod that cither of the Sides 
 fhould want its Difficulties •, 'tis the Part of a pru- 
 dent Perfon to incline to that Side, which upon an 
 impartial Eftimate fhall appear to have the leaft and 
 feweft. *Tis evident there can be but two Methods 
 in the general, of explaining the Manner of the Di- 
 vine Omniprefcnce and Penetration of Matter, viz. 
 either as with or without Amplitude or Dimenfions. 
 The infuperable Difficulties which attend the latter 
 Method have been already detected. It remains 
 that we here proceed to confider what may with any 
 Plaufibility be obje<5ted againft the former. 
 
 And fliall we fay, in Oppofition to this, that a 
 Penetration of one Dimenfion by another is impof- 
 fible ? But It has been already proved to Be, and 
 tlierefore not to be impoffible. Nor can this, I per- 
 fuade my felf, be furprizing to any Man who ffiall 
 confider the vaft Difparity between a Penetration of 
 Matter by Matter, and the Penetration of Matter 
 by a Being that is immaterial. 
 
 One Reafon of the Abfurdity and Impoffibility 
 of a Penetration of Matter by Matter is plainly this. 
 Two equal Portions of Matter, being of the fame 
 fpecifical Nature, have no other Diflindtion but 
 fuch as proceeds from their feparate Exiflence joyn'd 
 with the various Figures and Contexture of their 
 Parts. Could we therefore fuppofe either fo to pe- 
 netrate the other, as that they fhould co-exift in the 
 fame Space, with the fame Figure and Texture of 
 Parts, 'tis clear, that on this Suppofition, they 
 could no longer retain their Diflincflion, but mufl 
 become numerically as well as fpecifically the fame. 
 Confequently, to fuppofe a Penetration and Co-ex- 
 iftence of two Bodies or Portions of Matter, would 
 be no lefs abfurd than to fuppofe two Beings ftill 
 R 4 rc- 
 
264 Two T>lfcourfes concerning the 
 retaining their individual Diftinftion to become nu- 
 merically one ; than which, 1 confefs, nothing can 
 be more extravagant. But in the Suppofition of a 
 Penetration of Matter by a Nature fpecifically dif- 
 ferent, the Cafe is quite otherwilJe. For when Na- 
 tures are fo oppofite as to be abfolutely incapable of 
 a proper Coalition, the mofl intimate Penetration 
 can't abate the Diftinftion, nor hinder their retain- 
 ing their/efpedive Properties and Dimenfions. And 
 certainty, was it poflible for two Bodies to penetrate 
 fo as not to coaleice or ceafe to be diflinft, whoever 
 fhould meafure their common Superficies, would as 
 really meafure two equal Bulks, as he would have 
 done had he meafur'd each of them fmgly or apart. 
 For from their being both meafurable at once, we 
 could no more infer that their Extenfion was nume- 
 rically the fame, than we can conclude two equal 
 feparate Bodies to have the fame individual Dimen- 
 fions becaufe fuccelTively meafurable by the fame In- 
 ilrument. 
 
 In Confidence with this, *tis obfervable, that the 
 firft Philofophers, who fo much infiftcd on the Im- 
 pofTibility of a Penetration of Dimenfions, liz. the 
 ^tomijlsy meant no more by it, than that one Atom 
 or Particle of Matter could not penetrate another. 
 (A Suppofition without which they could never have 
 form'd their Worlds.) For though they defin'd 
 Matter to be ^dt,<^tOv av-nni'Sfoy^ or a 'Thing impejieira- 
 My extended, yet nothing is more certain than that 
 they flill fuppos'd a Penetration of their Atoms by 
 the void or immaterial Expanfion which they fas 
 likewife the Pythagoreans) fuppos'd to be a real Be- 
 ing, though intangible. 
 
 A fecond ileafon of the Impoffibility of the Pene- 
 tration of one Body by another is the Equality of 
 their Natures. Every Particle of Matter has an e- 
 qual Reality, and none has any effential Pre-emi- 
 nence above another. But the Cafe is quite diffe- 
 rent. 
 
Nature of SpSiCe ^w^ Duration. 265 
 
 rent, (if we may be allowed to make a Comparilbn) 
 between Matter and the eternal immaterial Being. 
 The latter, as being Telf-exiltent, pollclVes the uc- 
 moft Reality •, but the former is abfolutely contin- 
 gent, and in EfFecfl, but a Heap ot Dufts at one 
 Remove from Nothing. And mull we yet make 
 the one the Standard of our Conceptions with Rc- 
 fpe6t to the other ? Becaufe we perceive a Penetra- 
 tion of Beings by others whofe Natures are equal to 
 be abfurd and impoflible, muft we prefently con- 
 clude it is impoflible that the eternal Nature, which 
 poiTefles the higheft Perfedion of Being, lliould per- 
 vade a Being fo imperfeft as Matter, a Being which 
 poireffes fo inconfiderable a Share of Reality ? Muft 
 we needs imagin That which fo lately was Nothing, 
 to be on a fudden become fuch a mighty Something, 
 as to exclude even the Subftance of its Maker •, ia 
 Comparifon of whom we may be aflur'd, that what- 
 ever we are apt to imagine to be the moft folid and 
 impenetrable, is little more than a Shadow ! 
 
 Thus if we form but a true Notion of Matter, as 
 a created dependent Being, thofe mighty Difficul- 
 ties will eafily vanifli. And, on the contrary, ic 
 will appear, that the immaterial Expanfion which 
 our weak and vitiated Minds arc fo apt to regard 
 as a mere Nothing, is the chief and original Rea- 
 lity, and in effcd, the only firm and durable Be- 
 ing. 
 
 But it may be further objecfted, that Cogitation 
 and Expanfion are inconfiftent. This is an Objec- 
 tion, which no Doubt, will feem of Weight to 
 Tome People. But what Proof have thefe Objedtors 
 pro^iuc'd of this confident Aflcrcion ? 
 
 Firjl, fay they, the Idea of Expanfion or Exten- 
 fion does not include that of Cogitation, nor the I- 
 dea of Cogitation that of Extenfion. This, I con- 
 feky is true, and from thence I conclude them to be 
 diftinft. But what Rule of arguing will allow us 
 
 CO 
 
266 TwoH^ifcourfes concern'tng the 
 to infer an abfolute Inconfiftence from a bare Di- 
 ftind:ion ? Though we fhould grant that we can- 
 not conceive how an extended Being can be capable 
 of Thought, yet fince (even at the firft View) it 
 feems fo plain that all Beings rnuft be in fome Sort 
 extended, does it not feem far more rational to con- 
 clude from thence, that Cogitation (or Thought) is 
 confident with Extenfion in its Subje6t, than from 
 our Inability to conceive how it can be thus con- 
 liftent to infer that it is abfolutely inconfiftent ? This 
 we ought the rather to do, becaufe Bodies themfelves 
 have unextended Properties, fuch as Solidity, Mo- 
 bility, i^c, which cannot be meafuredany more than 
 Thought. 
 
 Again, a cogitative or thinking Being, fay they, 
 mull needs be orae and indivifible. For if compoun- 
 ded, as Bodies are, nothing in the Compound could 
 be faid fingly to perceive any whole Objed, but one 
 Part of it would perceive One, and Another ano- 
 ther Part of the Objed; : Which they imagine to be 
 inconfiftent with the Nature of a Thinking Being. 
 Yet whatever Force this Arguing may have to prove 
 Body or Matter to be incapable of Thought, 'tis 
 clear, it proves nothing againft the Poffibility of a 
 thinking Being which is immaterial^ fince it confifts 
 not of any proper divifible Parts, but is uncompoun- 
 ded and naturally indivifible. In the Cafe of fuch a 
 Being, why may not Cogitation be conceiv'd to be 
 as individual an Adlion, as the Re-adlion of Mat- 
 ter (which Mr. Hohbes conceives to be nothing diffe- 
 rent from it) is allow'd to be ? 
 
 • But it feems, there's a Method of demonftrating 
 all immaterial Beings to be nothing elfe but pure Co- 
 gitation or Thinkings and by Confequence, to be void 
 of all Extenfion. For becaufe the lirft thing that a 
 Cartefian^ after his univerfal Doubting,perceives in his 
 own Mind, is Cogitation or Thought, thence he 
 
 concludes 
 
Nature of Space and Duration. 267 
 
 coiictudes that his Mind, and (whatevtr elfe is imma- 
 terial) can be no other than pure Thought. 
 
 But though the Idea of Cogitation or Thought 
 fliould be own'd to be our firfl Idea of an immate- 
 rial Being, would it therefore follow that it is the 
 only one .^ This would be in effedl to affert, that 
 our firft Notions] of Things are always pcrfccl, 
 and that becaufe we ufually at firft difcover but one 
 Property of an Objeft, we ought to reft fatisfied, 
 and fpare ourfelves the Pains of attempting any fur- 
 ther Difcovery. 
 
 But omitting the Weaknefs of tliC Proofs, let us 
 confider the Thing itfelf. What Scnfe can we pof- 
 fibly make of a Being that's nothing but pure Think- 
 ing ? Can there be an A6t without a Subject, with- 
 out an Agent ? Can there be an Adl which is the 
 A a of Nothing .? 
 
 I know very well that the New Cartefians, to e- 
 vade this Objedion, ufe fomctimes to call fuch a 
 Being fuhjlantial Thinking, or a general Thinking 
 indifferent to any particular Thought •, and they tell 
 us, that the Will is the Caufe of particular Thoughts, 
 by determining the general Thinking to particular 
 Objefts : Which fuppofes a general indeterminate 
 Cogitation or Thinking to be, as it were, the Sub- 
 ject of particular Thoughts. But how there can be 
 fuch a general Thinking, rather than a general Mo- 
 tion without any particular Direction, may deferve 
 fome Confideration. 
 
 I confefs, this Cartefian Account of the Subje<ft 
 of Cogitation is fo far from fatisfying my felf, that 
 I'm the more ftrongly confirm'd by it in the Opi- 
 nion, that Cogitation can't be without fome Sort 
 of Extenfionor Expanfion as its immediate Subject. 
 Brfides, having no other Notion of Cogitation than 
 as by Ideas, it appears to me impofTible that any 
 Being fliould receive Ideas (or Images) of extended 
 Things, in Cafe its own Nature admits of nothing 
 
 like 
 
268 Two T>ifcourfes concerning the 
 
 like Extenfion. This Method of Arguing, Male- 
 hranch, (Tpeaking of the human Mind) thought to 
 carry fo much Weight with it, that it obliged him 
 to have Recourfe to his wonderful Hypothecs of 
 our fieing all Things in God. For, fays he in his 
 Search^ Vol, I. B. 3. It is impojjible we Jhouldhe able, 
 hy ourfelves, to -perceive material Things, hecaufe they 
 being extended, and our Souls not, there* s no Propor- 
 tion between them. And thence he concludes, that 
 fince we do perceive them, we perceive them no o- 
 therwife than by the divine Ideas. But whether this 
 Argument will not extend farther, and prove as 
 well the Impoflibility of the Perception of extended 
 Objects by any other Being, which, like our Minds, 
 is fuppos'd to be void of all Extenfion or Expanfion, 
 may likewife deferve fome Confideration. 
 
 If we may credit Ariftotle, it was a Maxim of 
 Plato and others, that Like is known by Like ; which 
 imports, that a Subjedt abfolutely void of Exten- 
 fion, can have no Ideas of extended Things. 
 
 There's yet another more vulgar Maxim, which 
 will furnifh us with a fecond Argument to the pre- 
 fent Purpofe ; and that is, Nil dat quod in fe non ha~ 
 let, or. Nothing can bellow what it hath not in it 
 felf. For though we can't reafonably infer from 
 hence, that the Creator of the material Univerfe 
 h himfelf Matter (becaufe the Imperfedion of Mat- 
 ter has been fhewn to be inconfiftent with the Per- 
 fe6lion of the eternal Being •,) yet we may, 'tis hum- 
 bly conceiv'd,very fairly conclude, that fince he has 
 created the material Expanfion, therefore his Na- 
 ture does not abfolutely exclude fuch Amplitude or 
 Expanfion as is free from the mentioned Imperfec- 
 tions of Matter. Juft as we infer his lVtfdo7n or 
 Qoodnefs from the like Properties of his Creatures. Be- 
 fides, whatever Property is free from Imperfediion, 
 cannot but be a Perfedlion. Confequently, the eternal 
 Be^g could neither be in all Refpecfts perfect with- 
 out 
 
Nature of Space and Duration. 269 
 
 out it ; nor can he be fuppos'd to have bcftow'd 
 that Perfedion on others which he wanted Him- 
 felf. 
 
 But whether thefe Reafonings be conclufive or 
 not (which yet I perfwade mylclf none will ever be 
 able to dil prove) *tis enough for our prefent Pur- 
 pofe, that Cogitation and Expanfion can't (as was 
 before obferv'd) be prov'd inconfiftenc : Which 
 Refleflion fecures (at lead as far as we can determine) 
 the Poflibility o( cogitative expanded Beings. 
 
 And in this we have the Concurrence of the moft 
 judicious Mr. Locke., who in his EJpiy of Human Un- 
 derjianding, makes no Difficulty of affirming. That 
 we can have no JJJurance of the Inconfijlence of Ex- 
 panfion and Thought. 
 
 Laflly., Some will perhaps objed, that it is by no 
 Means fafe to attribute any Sort of Expanfion to 
 the Deity, becaufe ic feems neceffarily to imply 
 Parts and Divifibility -, which would be inconfiftenc 
 with his Perfedion. 
 
 But this is no real Difficulty. For fince by Parti 
 is here meant what may be parted or divided, (which 
 indeed is the only Notion of Parts that can with 
 Reafon be pretended to be inconfiftent with Perfec- 
 tion) *tis certain there can be no fuch Parts in the 
 original Expanfion which has been prov'd to per- 
 vade and contain the created Univerfe ; it being 
 moll perfedly indivifible. For feeing there can be 
 no real Divifion or Separation without Diftance, nor 
 Diilance without Space, 'tis clear, that where there 
 is no Space independent on that Space or Expanfion 
 of wliofe Divifibility we are difcourfing, capable of 
 being the Foundation of Diftance between the Parts 
 which might refult from the Divifion, there can be 
 no real Divifion neither. But 'tis evident, that to 
 fuppofe a real Divifion of the original Expanfion 
 which pervades and fuftains all other Beings, is to 
 fuppofe Diftance without Space, ('or which is in ef- 
 
 fccT: 
 
%7^ Two T^ifcourfes concerning the 
 
 fed the fame) Space without Space : Than which 
 
 there can be nothing more abfurd. 
 
 Though from what has beenobferv'd it mayjuftly 
 be concluded, that the Exiftence of an Expanfion 
 diftindl from Matter, and the Reality of a Penetra- 
 tion of Matter by that immaterial Expanfion are 
 abundantly clear from Reafon ; yet that thefe Afler- 
 tions may yet more fully appear to be neither novel 
 nor dangerous, I fhall add fome Teflimonies both 
 ancient and modern. 
 
 To this Purpofe, that Sentence of Pythagoras, 
 Father of the Italick Se(ft of Philofophers, as recor- 
 ded by Cicero, is very remarkable, which (accor- 
 ding to the Doiftrine of the ancient Egyptians) af- 
 ferts, Deum ejfe Animum per Naturam Rerutn omni- 
 um intentum et commeantem, i. e. That God is a Mind 
 inwardly co- expanded with and pervading the Na- 
 ture of all Things. And it has been ufual with 
 the Rabins to give to the Deity the Denomination 
 of Place, to fignify that he pervades and compre- 
 hends tlie Univerfe. 
 
 As for the Moderns ; the Opinion of Dr. //. 
 More, Derodvn, and others of their Time, is well 
 known. And for later Writers, the learned Dr. 
 Cudworth, p. 14. of the Preface to his Intelle5fual 
 Syflem, hath thefe Words, " Whether the Divine 
 '• Subftance be altogether unextended, or extended 
 " other wife than Bodies, we fhall leave to every 
 " Man's own Judgment to determine, without 
 " dogmatically afferting any thing in a Cafe which 
 " is no Article of Faith." And again, p. 833. of 
 the IntelL Syjle?n. he adds, " Whatever the Truth 
 " of the Cafe be, it mull be acknowledged, that 
 " the Hypothefis of an extended (or expanded j 
 " Deity, may be very ufeful and ferviceable to 
 " retain fome in Theifm who can by no Means ad- 
 ** mit of a Deity or any thing elfe unextended. 
 
 This, 
 
Nature of Space and Duration. 271 
 This, it feems, was the Judgment of the learned 
 Dodtor. And I take it indeed to be the mod cf-^ 
 fe(5lual Method of dealing with Men of AtheiRical 
 Principles, who generally laugh at the Opinion of 
 unextended Beings as the moft abfurd Notion in the 
 World ; and who having rejecfled that, and by Con- 
 fequence concluded, that whatever Is is extended, 
 are wont to make but one Step more, by aflerting 
 with Des Cartes^ that whatever is extended or ex- 
 panded, is material ; and fo they think they have 
 gained their Point. Whereas by tliis Method of 
 proving an Expanfion elTentially didindt from Mat- 
 ter, they may, 'tis hop'd, be led to fee their Rea- 
 foning is* inconclufive, and that though there lliould 
 be no fuch thing as an timxtended Suhjtance^ yet there 
 certainly is an immaterial Deity, who is the Creator 
 and Suflainer of Matter. 
 
 But it ought not to be forgotten, that the moft 
 judicious Mr. Locke gives no obfcure Intimation of 
 his Opinion in the prefent Cafe. Says he, p. 87. of 
 his EJfay of Human Underjlanding, *' Whether any 
 *' one will take Space to be only a Relation reful- 
 " ting from the Exiftence of Things at a Diftance, 
 " or whether they will think the Words of the moll 
 *• knowing King 6*0/0^0;?, The Heaven and the He a- 
 *' ven of Heavens cannot contain thee ; or thofe more 
 " emphatical ones of the infpir'd Philofopher St. 
 " Paul, In Hun we live, and move, and have our 
 *' Beuig, are to be undcrftood in a literal Senfe, I 
 " leave every one to confider : Only our Idea of 
 *' Space is, I think, fuch as I have mention'd, and 
 *' diftind from that of Body.'* He likewife eUe- 
 whcre exprefly afcribes boundlefs Expanfwn to the 
 Deity. 
 
 After the Teftimonies of thefe great Men, I fliall 
 add but one more, and that is of the ingenious Dr. 
 Cheyne, in his Philofophical Principles of Natural 
 Religion, Chap. iv. p. 19. Says he, '* I don't here 
 
 " determine. 
 
272 Two ^ifcourfes concerning the 
 " determine, whether infinite Extenfiort may be 
 " the Innmenfity of the firft great Being, though 
 " perhaps there may be abundance of Reafon to 
 " lead one to think (b. 
 
 Upon the whole, I conceive it will fufficiently 
 appear, that contrary to the third and laft grand 
 Prejudice, mention'd in the Beginning of this Dif- 
 courfe, Expanfion, in the larger Senfe of the Word, 
 ought not to be reputed (as ufual) to be merely ac- 
 cidental to Being in general, but that it is to be 
 efteem'd to be Subftance itfelf. For that muft cer- 
 tainly be reputed the Subftance of all Beings, with- 
 out which no imaginable Properties can be conceived 
 to exift, and which may itfelf be conceiv*d or ima- 
 gined to exift with the Abfence of any particular 
 Property whatever : Which is certainly the Cafe of 
 Expanfion. 
 
 Some * indeed tell us, that we have no more 
 Reafon to fuppofe Extenfion or Expanfion to be 
 the Subftance of Beings, than we have to fuppofe 
 either Duration or Exiftence to be \o. But as for 
 Duration, this appears to be no more than a No- 
 tion of a certain external accidental Appendage of 
 Beings. And Exiftence is likewife nothing but a 
 Notion of our Minds derived from the Beings them- 
 felves. But the Cafe of Extenfion or Expanfion is 
 quite different. 
 
 Here I can't but take Notice of what I conceive 
 to be a great Miftake offome very tcute Writers, 
 who frequently confound Ejjence with Stihftance ; 
 whereas Efience is properly a Complication of fe- 
 veral Attributes, whereby one Clafs of Beings is 
 diftinguiflied from all others : But what is meant 
 by Subftance appears to be a fimple Thing, com- 
 mon to whatever exifts. That Extenfion was the Sub- 
 fiance of all Bodies, the Cartejlans might have rightly 
 
 * See Dr. Clarke's Demonft. /. 83. 
 
 enough 
 
Nature of Spticc and Dumtlonl ijt 
 
 enough concluded from its being the Suhjlratum or 
 Subjedof ail their known Properties. But by cul- 
 ling it, not the Subftance, but the EJfence of Mat- 
 ter, and thereby denying it to other Beings, {viz, 
 to fuch as are immaterial) they not only confoun- 
 ded very different Notions, viz. thofe of Matter 
 and Extenfion, but depriv'd us (as the Schoolmen 
 had done before themj of all PoITibility of attaining 
 any Knowledge of Suhjlance^ according to their Prin- 
 ciples. For if Extenfion (or Expanfion) be not the 
 Suhjlratum to the Properties of all Beings, it feems 
 abfolutely impofiible there fliould be any Notion 
 of Subftance at all. If Extenfion be an Attribute 
 or Property, then, for ought I can perceive, Sub- 
 ftance muft be reputed a mere Chimera, and we 
 * muft be fo abfurd as to allow Nothing to exift buc 
 Properties or Accidents, all fubfifting by them- 
 felves, and each in the other. At leaft, 'tis vain 
 for us ever to talk of Subftance^ fincc we can have nd 
 Idea of it but what is inconfiftent in itfelf. For it: 
 feems not to have been without fufficient Reafon that 
 Mr. Hobhes and others have contended, that Suhjlance 
 'void of Extetifion is a Contradiction in Terms. And 
 on the contrary, had the fime Cartefians concluded 
 Cogitation in its different Notions to be the EJfence 
 only of Spirits^ it might have partly been admitted, 
 fince 'tis that which chiefly diftinguifties them from 
 other Beings. But by affirming it to be the very 
 Subjlance of Spirit, tliey involv'd themfelvesin inex- 
 tricable Difficulties : As we have already feen. 
 
 Here it is obvious to every one to obferve, that 
 Mr. Locke's Story of the Elephant and Tortoife ve- 
 ry well expofes thofe who will not allow Extenfion 
 or Expanfion to bt; Subjlance, but regard it as fomc- 
 thing peculiar to a certain Sett of Beings. For if any 
 of thofe ftiould be ask'd, what is the Subjed in 
 which Colour or Weight, or any other Property of 
 Bodies inheres, he could have nothing to reply, but 
 
 S diac 
 
274 T''<^o T>ifconrles concerning the 
 that it is the extended Parts. And if it were fur- 
 ther demanded, wherein Extenfion inheres, he 
 would find himfelf fooncr nonplufs'd than the In- 
 dian Philofopher, who, faying that the World was 
 fupported by a great Elephant, and being asked 
 what the Elephant refled on, reply'd, 'twas a great 
 Tortoife ; but being again prefs'd to explain what 
 gave Support to the broad-back'd Tortoife, faid, 
 "cwas Something he knew not what. From which 
 Story the only natural Inference I conceive to be 
 this •, either that Extenfion muft be allow'd to be 
 Subjiance, or the Subjed of Properties, or elfe that 
 we muft own an unfurmountable Ignorance. 
 
 2. Of D U R A T I O N. 
 
 U R A T I O N feems to me to be no other 
 
 than a Phantafm of Space or Expanfion. We 
 
 get the Notion by reflefting on the Succeflion of I- 
 deas in our Minds ; which we are apt to conceive as 
 a Chain drawn out in Length, of which the parti- 
 cular Ideas are confider'd as the Links. For fmce 
 we find the Idea of local Motion to be always con- 
 nefted with that of Space, thence we come to fan- 
 cy a Sort of Space or Expanfion in our Exiftence 
 and in that of other Beings, to which the SuccefTion 
 of oiir Ideas (being conceiv'd as a continu'd Mo- 
 tion) is imagin*d to be commenfurate. 
 
 To this Phantafm of Space we have given the 
 Name of Duration. Whereas, had we but one in- 
 variate Perception without any fuch SuccefTion of I' 
 deas in our Minds, we could have no fuch Notion as 
 this of Duration, but that of pure Exiftence only. 
 For we find that when the Train or SuccefTion of 
 our Ideas is interrupted, (as fometimes happens iri 
 our Sleep) our Notion of Duration ceafcs, and up- 
 
Nature of Space and Duration. 27^ 
 
 on our waking we are infenfible of any thing like 
 Space that intcrven'd. 
 
 Though Succeflion includes a real Quantity which 
 is abfolute or independent on our Imaginations, yet 
 Exfflence (as was oblervM in the Chapter of Eternity) 
 includes no Quantity but what is purely imaginary. 
 Whatever Quantity we therefore attribute to Dura- 
 tion, agrees to it not as it fignifics Exiftence, but 
 merely as it connotes fome real Succeflion. Thus, 
 if we fay there was a real Diftance between the Firft 
 and the Tenth Olympiads, this is for no other Rea- 
 fon true, than becaufe there was a real continued 
 SuccefTion between thofe two Periods. 
 
 So well, it feems, had Arijlotle comprehended the 
 Nature of Duration, (though he gave it the Name 
 o^ Time) when he defin'd it to be the Meafure of 
 Motion. Which implies, that if there had never 
 been any Motion (or Succeflion at leaft) there could, 
 in his Opinion, have been no proper Duration. And 
 therefore, if he fupposM Duration to have been eter- 
 nal, 'twas only on Account of his fupposM eternal 
 Motion. 
 
 It muft yet be confefs*d, that we can no more a- 
 void conceiving Eternity for the divine Exiftence) 
 ' even before any real Succeflion began, under the No- 
 tion of a continu'd Succeflion, than we can avoid 
 conceiving a Space even beyond the utmoft Limits 
 of the Univerfe. But this (as we elfewhere obferv'd) 
 muft, in both Cafes, be refolv'd into the Peculiarity 
 pf our Nature and Circumftances. 
 
 We can have no Idea of an unfucceflive Duration, 
 for, as was fliewn, our Idea of Duration has a necef- 
 fary Conneflion with Succeflion. There may indeed 
 be a Nature which does not neceflTarily include any 
 real Succeflion (as was obferv'd in the Chapter of £- 
 ternity) but if we attribute a necefl^ary Duration to 
 luch a Being, we lofe the genuine Conception of Du- 
 ration. 
 
 An 
 
276 Two l^ifcourfeSy 5cc. 
 
 An eternal Duration is therefore as unintelligibk 
 as an ejernal Succeflion was impoflible. For if a ne- 
 ceflary Siicceffion be ("as was prov'd) inconfif- 
 tent with the Nature of Eternity, *tis manifefl that 
 an eternal or neceliary Duration is a Connedion of 
 Words whofe Ideas are abfolutely incompatible. 
 
 Confequently, as we before obferv'd, the true 
 Conception of Eternity can be no other than that of 
 Tiecejfary Exijience. For fince Duration adds nothing 
 to the Idea of Exiflence but only a Relation to Suc- 
 ceflion, it follows, that if in any Cafe we abftrad: 
 SuccelTion from any particular Being, (as we have 
 fecn Reafon to do in a certain Cafe or State, with 
 Reference to the eternal Being) our Idea of its Du- 
 ration will, in that Cafe, be reducM to that of fim* 
 pie Exiftence : To which if we add NecefTityi we 
 have all that's contained in the proper Notion of 
 Eternity. 
 
 To concUide. It muft ftill |be remember'd, that 
 both the Eternity and Omniprefence of God are 
 certain; and though we knew nothing of the Man- 
 ner, they would be never the lefs fo. But the na- 
 tural Curiofity of Man, and his Unwillingnefs to 
 believe any thing which he can't in fome Meafure 
 account for, have render*d fuch Difcourfes as thefe 
 neceffaryi And indeed the Scandal which the ufual 
 Accounts of thofe important Articles of Natural 
 Religion have occafioned, will alone yield a fuffici- 
 ent Apology for any modeft Attempt of this Na- 
 ture. 
 
 FINIS. 
 
 ERRATA, 
 
 Page 178. Line 37. read IFork. p. 19^. 1. 34- for evsfi 
 read ever. p. 199. 1. 23. for Eyei read Eye. p. 209. 
 ]. 17. for Prelate Tt2id Divine, p. 244. 1. 3. read fc?r;% 
 t{Jve (drenif 
 
*