£ flit 5IU‘Dl{l<)iri|/ j. (*’> t * Shelf.. \ PRINCETON, N. J. cJL +*--vC Division . . Z53 S .w? .wl. & Section .,nz>. Number Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2017 with funding from Princeton Theological Seminary Library I https://archive.org/details/historyofafghaniOOmall HISTORY AFGHANISTAN, FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR OF 1878. COLONEL G. B.’MALLESON, C.S.I. AUTHOR OF “ HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE NATIVE STATES OF INDIA,” “ HISTORY OF THE INDIAN MUTINY,” ETC. “ Let us tell persons in high places that cunning is not caution, and that habitual perfidy is not high policy of State.” Mr. Disraeli’s Speech, 11th April 1843. LONDON: W. H. ALLEN- & CO., 13 WATERLOO PLACE, PALL MALL, S.W. PUBLISHERS TO THE INDIA OFFICE. 1878. (All rights reserved.) LONDON : PRINTED BY W. H. ALLEN AND CO., 13, WATERLOO PLACE, PALL MALL, S.W. DEDICATION. To Richard Everard Webster, Esq., Q.C. My Dear Webster, Fifteen years ago I saw you — to me a perfect stranger — win, under most trying circumstances — tiie two mile champion race at Cambridge. Little did I then think that I should one day rank you among my cherished friends. Since we met some years later, I have watched with the keenest interest every stage of your career, and have often been reminded of that day at Cambridge. I believe that the qualities you then displayed have in no small degree enabled you to achieve at so early an age the success which has marked your professional life. IV DEDICATION’. It is, however, not because you have been successful, but because your life has been marked throughout by a generous sympathy with and a clinging to all that is good and true, and by a thorough distaste for all that is the reverse, that I ask you to become sponsor to this my youngest literary offspring on his introduction to the world. He will need a protector, for his name alone will provoke controversy. Always most truly yours, G. B. MALLESON. 27 West Cromwell Road, 1 6th December 1878. INTRODUCTION. In the Preface to my work— “An Historical Sketch of the Native States of India ”• — published in 1875, I stated that the history of the practically independent coun- tries on the borders of India, countries such as Persia, Biluchistan, and Afghanistan, might possibly engage my attention at some future period. For that period, whenever it might be, I had col- lected notes and had drawn up a general sketch containing marginal references to the works necessary to be consulted. These I carefully stowed away, little dreaming that the time was so near at hand when I should be called upon to work them into shape. In the latter half of the month of September last public interest was suddenly excited by the intelligence that a distinguished soldier was about to proceed with VI INTRODUCTION. an escort on a mission to the Court of Kabul. Ques- tions as to the country represented by that court, its history, its people, its kings, began at once to be asked. It was not so easy to answer them. The history of Afghanistan had been so interlaced with the history of Hindustan that there existed no independent record of the actions of its rulers and its people. Two very remarkable books did indeed seem to profess to supply the want. But Elphinstone’s account of the kingdom of Kabul, charming as it is, confines itself mainly to a description of the people and the country as they were at the beginning of the present century — the history of the family of the then reigning dynasty being contained in an appendix : whilst Ferrier’s “ History of the Afghans,” full of detail as it is, contains but a very cursory reference to the Turki, the Grhor, and the Moghol families who preceded, in the government of the country, the Ghilzais and the Abdalis. Under these circumstances, having the materials, the time, and the inclination, I resolved at the very end of September to attempt to supply the existing want. I have worked double tides, grudging no labour which might be required to present to the public a readable account of the antecedents of the country now invaded by our armies. I cannot hope INTRODUCTION. VII that I have entirely succeeded. The mere mechanical labour of writing has been great, and the book has grown far beyond the dimensions contemplated at the outset. Such as it is, I offer it to the public. I know it has many faults ; but I am equally conscious that I have spared no pains to render it an exact record of events which have passed. I have had to consult numberless books of reference. Prominent amongst these I may mention the interest- ing travels of Jonas Hanway, the truth of whose detailed narrative is attested by other contemporary records ; the late Sir Henry Elliot’s History of India, as told by its own historians, edited by Professor Dowson ; Erskine’s Life of Babar and Humayun ; Thomas’s Chronicle of the Pathan Kings of Dehli ; Briggs’s Ferishta; Blochmann’s translation of the Ain-i-Akbari. These are but a few, but they form, it may be said, the basis of the earlier part of my history. For the later period, the references were more plentiful and more easily obtainable. The histories of Elphin- stone, of Ferrier, of Kaye, of Burnes, and the pages of the “ Calcutta Review ” have been repeatedly referred to. The description of the cities of Kabul, of Kandahar, of Jalalabad, and of Ghazni has been taken from the same semi-official source which supplied the appendix to the life of General Nott. Vlll INTRODUCTION. I have found it impossible to describe the events which characterised the expedition of 1839 to Afghanis- tan, or the events which have led to the present in- vasion, without recording my own opinions as to the inexpediency of the one and the wisdom of the other. With regard to the policy which has been pursued towards Afghanistan, subsequently to the annexation of the Panjab, I may observe that there seems to me to be an impassable gulf between the adoption of a principle suited to certain circumstances, and the riding that principle to death when those circumstances have changed. The policy, for instance, of masterly inactivity, admirably well adapted to the circumstances of an Afghanistan standing alone, remote from Russia, and far apparently beyond the zone of Russian ambition, becomes inarticulate folly when applied to an Afghanistan contiguous to and leaning on Russia. Under such circumstances it can only mean the re- signation to Russia of a territory well described by a German writer as “ the glacis of the fortress of Hindustan.” A perusal of the pages of this volume will make it clear that the India of the past was really safe, really powerful, only when she had her troops can- toned beyond the passes of Afghanistan. They were so cantoned in the time of Akbar and of his earlier successors. It was when the later Moghol sovereigns had lost Kandahar that the invasion of Hindustan INTRODUCTION. LX became possible. Not even Nadir Sbah, powerful as be was, dreamt of invading India until be bad secured that important town. Tbe fact tbat Kandahar, gar- risoned by Afghans, delayed bim for more tban twelve months, proves tbe importance of its position, and gives some idea of tbe prominent part it may yet play as an out-work of the British Empire. Tbe pages of this book show tbat tbe real contest for India has always taken place on tbe Helmand. Tbe Helmand once passed and Kandabar once occupied, tbe Indus has never stopped an invader. Tbe quiescent attitude of Hindustan has ever proved an irresistible tempta- tion to an ambitious and powerful people beyond Afghanistan ; but no invasion was ever possible so long as Hindustan kept in her own bands tbe keys of her fortress — tbe valleys beyond tbe passes leading to her fertile plains. It appears to me tbat England has too long acted on tbe principle enunciated by Lord Granville in bis famous despatch — tbe principle of “ not examining too minutely bow far these arrangements were in strict accordance with tbe assurance given in January by Count Schouvaloff.” Happily, times are changed. “ Tbe pulse of the public heart ” beats higher tban it did during tbe ministry of Mr. Gladstone. “ Tbe tone and temper” of this country are more elevated and more brave tban when Lord Granville was foreign X INTRODUCTION. secretary. And England is to be congratulated that she possesses now a First Minister who is not afraid to announce plainly to the great disturber of the peace of the world, that “ cunning is not caution, and that habitual perfidy is not high policy of State.” a. B. MALLESON. 27 West Cromwell Hoad, 16 December 1878. CONTENTS. Page Introduction . . . . . . i CHAPTER I. Descriptive. Description of Afghanistan of Dost Muhammad. . . 1 Rough description of the mountains . . . .2 Ditto of the rivers . . . . .4 Ditto of the city of Kabul . . .6 Ditto of the country about Kabul . . 8 Ditto of the road from Kabul to Jalalabad . 10 Ditto of ditto from Jalalabad to Peshawar . 12 Ditto of Ghazni . . . . .15 Ditto of road from Ghazni to Kabul . . 16 Ditto ditto ditto to Kandahar . . 19 Ditto of the town of Kandahar . . .24 Ditto of Girishk, Farrah, and Sabzwar . . 26 Ditto of Herat . . . . .27 Ditto of road from Kandahar to Quetta . . 31 Ditto of Istalif, and Charikar . . .33 Xll CONTENTS. Page Rough description of the Khaibar pass . . .34 Ditto of other passes . . . .36 Ditto of the tribes and people . . .39 Character of the tribes by Dr. Bellew . . . .51 CHAPTER II. The G-haznivide Period. The Afghans converted to Muhammadanism at the end of the 9th century . . . . . . .53 Afghanistan then an annexe of Bokhara . . .53 The House of Samani . . . . . .53 Founding of a Tiirki slave dynasty at Ghazni . . .54 Sabaktagin ruler of Grhazm . . . . .54 First concussion between Ghazni and India . . .55 Jaipal is twice beaten by the Ghaznivides . . .55 Sabaktagin is succeeded by Mahmud . . . .56 Character of Mahmud . . . . . .57 Defeats his brother Ishmail . . . . .57 Becomes independent ruler of Afghanistan . . .58 Resolves to invade India . . . . .59 Defeats and pursues the Indians . . . .60 Again invades India . . . . . .61 And again . . . . . . .62 Repels an invasion from Turkistan . . . .62 Anandpal, son of Jaipal, forms a league against him . . 63 Desperate battle between Mahmud and Anandpal . . 64 Mahmud gains the battle and sacks Nagarkot . . .65 His army attacked by the Ghilzais . . . .66 Mahmud avenges himself . . . . .66 Again invades India . . . . . .67 Sacks Thanesar . . . . . .68 Invades Kashmir and is foiled at Loh-kot . . .69 CONTENTS. Xlll Page Conquers the kingdom of Khwarizm . . . .69 Again invades India, and marches on Kanaoj . . .70 Rebuilds Ghazni with the proceeds of his conquests . . 71 Marches against Kalinjar. . . . . .72 Again on Kashmir and again on Kalinjar . . .73 Expedition against Somnath . . . . .74 Misfortunes of his retreat . . . . .76 Punishes the Jats . . . . . .77 Defeats the Seljuk Turks . . . . .78 Annexes Persia . . . . . . .78 Dies . . . . . . . .79 Masaud blinds his brother Muhammad, and succeeds him . 80 The Seljuk Turks invade his territories . . .80 Beaten, they renew the invasion . . . .82 Masaud invades and plunders India . . . .83 Is pressed by the Seljuks . . . . .84 Trying to stem their invasion, he is beaten . . .85 Falls back on the Panjab. . . . . .86 Is dethroned by his army . . . . .87 Modud eventually succeeds him . . . .88 The Seljuks again encroach hut are defeated . . .88 The Hindus in vain attempt to recover Lahor . . .89 Modud dies . . . . . . .89 After some murders, Farokzad succeeds him . . .90 His generals defeat the Seljuks . . . .91 Reign of Ibrahim “ the pious ” . . . . .91 Masaud III. rules with wisdom . . . .92 Arslan’s preventive for a disputed succession . . .92 Reign of Bahrain the Ghaznivide . . . . .93 Consequences of his beheading an Afghan chief of Ghor . 93 Vicissitudes of the contest between the House of Ghazni and the House of Ghor . . . . . .94 Alla-u-din Ghori destroys Ghazni . . . .95 Reigns of Khusru and Khusru Malik . . . .96 Fall of the House of Ghazni . . . . .97 XIV CONTENTS. CHAPTER III. The House of Ghor. Page Descent of the House of G-hor . . . . .98 Muhammad G-hori invades India . . . .99 Is defeated in a pitched battle .... 100 Returns to Ghazni and again starts for India . . . 101 Defeats the Hindus on the Sarasvati .... 102 Invades Ajmir ....... 103 Defeats and kills the Raja of Kanaoj .... 104 Establishes an Afghan colony at Biana . . . 105 Re-annexes Herat to his dominions .... 105 Is defeated near Khiva by the Khitan Tartars . . 106 After many vicissitudes establishes himself at Lahor . 107 Is murdered by the Gakk’hars .... 107 His successor, Kutb-u-dm, transfers his seat to Dehli . 108 CHAPTER IV. TRANSITION TO THE MOGHOL. Mahmud, nephew of Muhammad Ghori, rules at Ghor . 109 Afghanistan falls to Muhammad Khan, King of Khwarizm . 109 Rise of Chingiz Khan ...... 110 Overruns all Central Asia ..... 112 Muhammad Khan is driven to die in one of the islands of the Caspian . . . . . . . 113 His son Jalaludin rises against Chingiz Khan . .113 Beaten, he ultimately establishes himself in Persia . ' .114 Afghanistan is enslaved under Chingiz Khan and his suc- cessors till 1251 ...... 114 CONTENTS. XV Page She has no history till 1336 ..... 114 Is governed by princes of Grhor from 1336 to 1383 . . 115 Rise of Tamerlane ...... 115 Prosperity of Herat under the successors of Tamerlane . 116 Afghanistan falls to Ulugh Mirza . . . .116 Rise of Babar . . . . . . .117 He conquers Kabul and Kandahar .... 118 And ultimately India . . . . . .120 CHAPTER V. HUMAYUN AND KAMEAN. Kamran succeeds Babar in Afghanistan and, ultimately, in the Panjab ....... 122 The Persians besiege Kandahar, but are repulsed . . 123 The Uzbeg Turks sack Herat, but are driven by the Persians from Khorasan . . . . . .123 The Shah of Persia besieges and takes Kandahar . . 124 Kamran retakes Kandahar ..... 124 He is summoned into Hindustan to aid Humayun . . 125 Selfish conduct of Kamran ..... 126 Humayun driven from Hindustan flees to Sind . . 127 Hindal Mirza makes a successful raid on Kandahar . .128 Kamran forces him to yield that city, and gives him Jalalabad in jaghir ....... 128 Askari prompts the assassination of Humayun . . 128 Humayun moves against Kandahar .... 129 But is forced to flee to Persia, leaving his son Akbar a captive ....... 129 Power and dominion of Kamran .... 129 CONTENTS. Page The weak points of Kamran’s character . . .130 His hesitation on learning that Kandahar is besieged by Humayun and the Persians ..... 131 Humayun sends Bahrain Khan to seduce the Kabul nobles from their allegiance to Kamran .... 132 Great success attending Bahrain's mission . . . 133 Askari is forced to surrender Kandahar . . . 134 Kamran is deserted by many nobles .... 135 Difficulties between Humayun and his Persian allies . . 135 Humayun extricates himself from his difficulties, and marches on Kabul ...... 136 Kamran rouses himself to oppose him . . .137 But, beaten at all points, takes refuge in Sind . . 138 Humayun is seized with a dangerous illness in Badakhshan . 139 Kamran profits by his brother’s illness to make a successful raid on Ghazni ...... 139 And on Kabul ....... 140 Position and prospects of Humayun .... 140 Humayun, supported by Sulaiman Mirza of Badakhshan, moves towards Kabul ..... 141 His difficulties are so great that many chiefs abandon him . 142 Kamran waits for him in Kabul .... 143 Siege of Kabul by Humayun ..... 143 Kamran, reduced to despair, flees, scantily attended . . 144 He is pursued, and overtaken, but his life is spared, and he is allowed to proceed ..... 145 Humayun gives himself up to ease .... 145 Kamran raises adherents north of the passes . . . 146 He makes progress in Badakhshan .... 147 Forces Humayun to return, baffled, to Kabul . . 148 Karacha Khan deserts Humayun, and joins Kamran . . 149 Humayun once more marches against Kamran . . 150 Kamran defeats Hindal near Talikan . . . .151 But, instead of profiting by his victory, shuts himself up in that town ....... 151 Where he is attacked by Humayun and forced to submit . 152 CONTENTS. XVII Page Humayun exiles Kamran to Mekka, and pardons the revolted nobles ....... 152 Kamran, soliciting pardon, is allowed to return . .154 And is granted the governorship of Kolab . . . 155 Mirza Haidar of Kashmir solicits Humayun to undertake the reconquest of India ...... 156 Humayun is deterred by the attitude of the XJzbegs, and by his suspicions of Kamran ..... 156 Reflections on the [attitude of the XJzbegs and of Kamran . 157 Humayun resolves to drive the Uzbegs across the Oxus . 158 Marches northward and occupies Aibak . . . 159 His suspicions of Kamran detain him at Aibak . . 159 The same suspicions prompt him to retire to Hera Gez . 160 The XJzbegs cause a panic, and Humayun reaches Kabul as a fugitive ....... 161 Kamran takes the opportunity to revolt . . . 162 111 success of Kamran’s plans ..... 163 Treason is working in Kabul in his favour . . .164 Humayun, wounded, flees across the passes, and Kamran recovers Kabul ...... 165 Humayun raises an army to retrieve his fortunes . . 166 His chiefs force him to promise to act according to their advice ....... 167 The armies of the two brothers meet. Humayun offers terms which Kamran rejects . . . .168 Kamran’s astrologer forbids him to fight . . .169 Humayun attacks and defeats Kamran .. . . 169 Kamran in vain seeks a permanent asylum . . .170 He surrenders to Humayun . . . . .171 Humayun has him blinded, and allows him to proceed to Mekka, where he dies . . . . .173 Humayun wishes to march into Kashmir, but is forced by his chiefs to return to Kabul . . . .174 Humayun invades Hindustan . . . . .176 His general, Bahrain Khan, beats Sikandar Shah at Machhi- warah . . . . . . . 177 b XV111 CONTENTS. Page He wins a victory at Sirhind, which virtually gives him India . . . . . . .178 Death of Humayun . . . . . .179 The Afghan people under Humayun and Kamran . .179 CHAPTER VI. FROM MOOHOL TO AFGHAN. Akbar succeeds Humayun in Hindustan and his brother Muhammed Hakim in Kabul .... 181 The Persians conquer Kandahar .... 182 Mah Jujak Begam, mother of Muhammad Hakim, becomes virtual regent of Kabul ..... 182 Previous career of Mir Shah Abul Ma’ali . . . 183 Shah Abul Ma’ali comes to Kabul, gains the confidence of the Begam, marries her daughter, and usurps her government ....... 184 He then murders the Begam ..... 185 Sulaiman, Prince of Badakhshan, attacks and kills him . 186 Sulaiman then ousts Muhammad Hakim from Kabul . 186 Akbar sends an army under Faridun Khan to aid Muhammad Hakim ....... 186 On the advice of Faridun Khan Muhammad Hakim marches against Lahor ...... 187 The rumoured approach of Akbar affects in an extraordinary manner the recovery of Kabul by Muhammad Hakim . 187 Muhammad Hakim again attempts the Panjab, but is baffled 188 Akbar’s sons invade and conquer Kabul . . . 189 Death of Muhammad Hakim ..... 190 Raja Man Singh is appointed Governor of Kabul . . 191 Akbar attempts to subdue the tribes of the passes . . 191 Account of the campaigns of his troops . . . 192 CONTENTS. xix Page The reason why, in the time of Ahbar, the contest was never- ending ....... 195 Successive viceroys of Kabul ..... 196 Akbar recovers Kandahar ..... 197 On the death of Akbar the Persians attempt to regain that city ........ 198 Successful stratagem of the Governor, Shah Beg . . 199 Jahangir places all Afghanistan under one governor . . 199 The Persians attack Kandahar, and, thanks to the swagger of Jahangir, take it . . . . . 200 Treatment of the Ghilzai tribe by the Persian conqueror . 201 Remarkable occurrences connected with the visit of Jahangir to Kabul ....... 202 Shah Jahan regains Kandahar .... 205 Wars with the Uzb^gs in Badakhshan . . . 205 Disastrous retreat of Aurangzib from Balkh . . . 207 Abbas PL, Shah of Persia, besieges Kandahar, at a season when the passes to India were not traversible, and takes it 208 Vain efforts of Aurangzib to recover it 209 And of Dara Shekho ...... 210 The Shah of Persia rouses discontent amongst the Ghilzai tribes ....... 211 The Shah sends Gurghin Khan to repress the discontent . 212 The Ghilzais send a deputation to the Shah, but fruitlessly . 213 Character and position of Mir Vais, chief of the Ghilzais . 213 Gurghin Khan sends the Ghilzai chief a prisoner to Ispahan 214 Contrast between Mir Vais and the nobles of the Court of Ispahan ....... 214 Mir Vais is released and held in honour . . . 215 He seeks to undermine Gurghin Khan . . . 216 He proceeds to Mekka to obtain the sanction of the holy doctors to his projects ..... 218 Consternation produced at Ispahan by the news of the advent of a Russian embassy ..... 219 Mir Vais returns from Mekka and stimulates the excitement 220 He is nominated Kalatar of Kandahar . . 221 XX CONTENTS. Page His reception by Gurghin Khan .... 222 Gurghin Khan demands the Ghilzai chief’s daughter for his harem ....... 222 Cunning conduct of Mir Yais . . . . • 223 Mir Vais causes the bulk of the Georgians to be sent some distance from Kandahar . . . . .224 He invites Gurghin Khan to a banquet, and murders him and all his retinue ...... 225 With death of Gurghin Khan the Persian dominion in Afghanistan ceases ...... 226 CHAPTER VII. THE GHILZAI BULE. Mir Vais calls on the Kandaharis to choose between liberty and servitude ...... 227 The Georgians approach Kandahar .... 228 Driven away, they carry to Persia the news of the revolution 229 The Court of Ispahan endeavours to influence Mir Vais by its ambassadors ...... 230 Failing in this, they despatch an army under Khusru Khan 231 Who defeats Mir Vais and lays siege to Kandahar . . 232 Mir Vais forces the Persians to leave him alone . . 233 Mir Vais dies, and is succeeded by his brother, Mir Abdulla 234 Mir Abdulla is inclined to submit to Persia . . . 235 On which account, his nephew, Mahmud, murders him . 236 The Abdalis of Herat assert their independence of Persia . 237 They defeat the Persian army sent against them . . 239 The Ghilzais beat the Abdalis at Farrah . . . 240 Mahmud, invading Persia, is beaten by Lutf Ali at Kerman . 241 Jealousy of Lutf Ali and his brother the vizier roused in consequence ....... 241 The eyes of the vizier are plucked out, and Lutf Ali is imprisoned . ...... 242 CONTENTS. XXI Page Mahmud again invades Persia .... 243 Details of his march to Ispahan .... 244 Proceedings of a Cabinet Council called by the Shah . . 246 The battle of Gulnabad is won, through the misconduct of the Persian general, by Mahmud .... 247 Mahmud is astonished by his success .... 248 Details of the siege of Ispahan . . . 249 to 253 The Shah resigns his crown to Mahmud . . . 254 The Ghilzai chief as a Persian king .... 255 Effects of Ghilzai rule in Persia .... 256 Kandahar in the absence, and after the death, of Mahmud . 257 Rise and early exploits of Nadir Shah . . 257 to 259 Is crowned Shah of Persia ..... 260 Condition of Kandahar at this period .... 260 Nadir Shah occupies Herat and marches on Kandahar . 261 Incidents of the siege of Kandahar . . . 262 to 264 Nadir Shah takes Kandahar and marches on Kabul . . 265 He occupies Kabul . . , . . . . 266 CHAPTER VIII. THE DURANI RULE. The state of the Abdali Afghans in Herat . . .267 Nadir Shah forms a corps d’armee of the Abdalis and the Ghilzais ....... 268 Their splendid behaviour ..... 269 Nadir Shah and the tribes of the passes . . . 270 Nadir Shah’s career and death .... 271 Ahmad Shah Abdali tries to revenge his death . .273 Kepulsed, Ahmad Shah marches with the Afghan contingent to Kandahar. ...... 274 Where he is elected King of the Afghans . . .275 The principles upon which he established his government . 276 Ahmad Shah conquers Kabul . . . . .278 Invading Hindustan, he is forced to recross the Satlaj . 279 XXII CONTENTS. Page Retrieves the disaster ...... 280 Conquers Herat, but is forced to retire from Nishap6r . 281 Takes Nishapor and again invades, India . . . 282 The occupation of Dehli by Ahmad Shah . . . 283 The Marathas invade the Pan jab and occupy Lahor . . 284 Nasir Khan, chief of Biluchistan, revolts, and defeats the Kabul army ....... 285 Ahmad Shah defeats and besieges him in Kalat . . 286 The Afghans show themselves unfit to act as besiegers . 287 Ahmad Shah compromises with the Bfluch chief . . 287 Invades India ....... 288 Preliminaries to the battle of Panipat . . . 288 The battle of Panipat ...... 290 Last years of Ahmad Shah ..... 291 His death and character ..... 292 Is succeeded, after a contest, by his son Taimur . 293 System of government adopted by Taimur Shah . . 294 The manner in which his peaceful instincts prejudicially affected his empire ...... 295 Especially in the outlying provinces of Khorasan, of Sind, of Afghan Turkistan, of Kashmir . . . 296 to 298 The internal revolts in his reign .... 298 Taimur’s perjured dealings with Arsalah Khan . . 299 Taimur dies without nominating a successor . . . 300 By the influence of the chief of the Barukzyes, and of the Zanana, Zaman Mirza is chosen king . . . 301 He defeats his brother Humayun, and makes an accommoda- tion with Mahmud ...... 302 The system of government adopted by Zaman Shah . . 302 Again defeats and blinds his brother Humayun . . 303 Marching into Sind, is recalled by the revolt of Mahmud, whom he defeats near Girishk .... 304 Tries to recover the Panjab, but is recalled by a Persian invasion ....... 305 Fath Ali, Shah of Persia, invades Northern Khorasan at the instigation of the government of India . . . 306 CONTENTS. XXU 1 Page The invasion has the desired effect of diverting the attention of Zaman Shah from Hindustan .... 306 False basis of Zaman Shah’s prosperity . . . 307 The conspiracy of Payandar Khan, Barukzye . . 308 The plot is revealed by an accomplice, and the conspirators are executed ....... 309 Fathi Khan, son of Payandar Khan, escapes and incites Mahmud to invade Afghanistan .... 310 Mahmud’s invasion ...... 310 False security of Zaman Shah . . . . . 311 The thanes fall from him ..... 312 He takes refuge with an adherent who betrays him . . 313 Is blinded by the order of Mahmud .... 313 Character of Mahmud Shah ..... 314 Shu jah Mirza strikes for the crown, but is defeated by Fathi Khan Barukzye . . . . . .315 Revolt of the Ghilzais, and its suppression . . 315 to 318 Prosperity of Mahmud ..... 318 Instead of aspiring he grovels, and loses his outlying provinces . . . . . . . 319 Conspiracy of Shir Muhammad Khan .... 320 Shir Muhammad provokes an insurrection in Kabul . . 321 Which terminates in the deposition of Mahmud Shah and the accession of Shah Shujah .... 323 Shah Shujah orders Mahmud to be blinded, but is persuaded to spare his eyes ...... 323 System of government adopted by Shah Shujah . . 324 Fathi Khan Barukzye is made an enemy by the want of tact of Shah Shujah ...... 326 Under Fathi Khan’s inspiration Kandahar revolts . . 326 The complications in Kandahar . . . 327 to 329 The ex-Shah, Mahmud, escapes from the Bala Hissar . 330 Vizier Shir Muhammad Khan revolts, but is defeated and slain by Shah Shujah ..... 331 Mr. Mountstuart Elphinstone’s embassy to Shah Shujah . 332 Shah Shujah loses his only army in Kashmir . . 333 XXIV CONTENTS. Page He is defeated by Malimud and Fat hi Khan, and dethroned . 333 Mahmud the restored is still Mahmud the groveller . . 334 Character of Fathi Khan Bariikzye .... 334 Fathi Khan reconquers Kashmir .... 335 His brother, Host Muhammad, is defeated by the Sikhs near Peshawar ....... 336 Herat is again threatened by the Persians . . . 338 Fathi Khan proceeds thither, ousts the Governor, and defeats the Persians ....... 339 Brutal conduct of Host Muhammad in the seraglio of Haji Firuzudm ....... 339 Jealousy of Fathi Khan Bariikzye entertained by Kamran Mirza ....... 340 He makes use of Host Muhammad’s brutal conduct to obtain an order from his father for Fathi Klnin’s death . . 342 He proceeds to Herat and blinds Fathi Khan . . 343 Kevolt of the Barukzyes ..... 343 Host Muhammad marches on Kabul and expels Mahmud’s partisans ....... 344 Flight of Mahmud and Kamran: their brutal murder of Fathi Khan ....... 345 The doom of the Sadozyes ..... 345 CHAPTER IX. THE BARUKZYE PERIOD. Condition of Afghanistan at the time of Mahmud’s expulsion 347 The Bariikzyes coquet with Shiijah .... 348 Shujah, having learned nothing and forgotten nothing, collapses ....... 349 Partial dismemberment of the monarchy . . . 350 Ran j it Singh gains the suzerainty over Peshawar . . 351 Eventual arrangement between the Bariikzye brothers . 352 Shujah again strikes for the crown .... 353 CONTENTS. XXV Pago Fights a battle at Kandahar : has victory in his grasp, and lets it go . . . . . . 355 Dost Muhammad takes the title of Amir . . . 357 Causes which first led to the negotiations between the Barukzyes and Persia ..... 358 Dost Muhammad leans to an English, his Kandahar brothers to a Persian, alliance ..... 359 Lord Auckland deputes Burnes to Kabul . . . 360 Causes of the failure of Burnes’s mission . . 360 to 362 Burnes having failed, the Amir turns to the Russian envoy Yikovitch, who promises everything . . . 363 Causes which influenced the English Government to alter their policy towards the Amir . . . 363 to 365 Reflections on the new policy .... 365 to 366 An English artillery officer, Eldred Pottinger, causes the Persians to raise the siege of Herat. . . . 367 Manifesto of the new policy by the Government of India . 368 Its practical purpose conceded by the retreat of the Persians from before Herat ...... 369 The expedition is nevertheless persevered with . . 369 Composition of the army of the Indus . . . 370 A glance at the unsoundness of the military position. . 371 CHAPTER X. THE BRITISH INVASION. Shah Shujah, and the British envoy, Mr. Macnaghten, start for Shikarpur . . . . . .372 Obstacles offered by the Amirs of Sind to Sir John Keane’s advance ....... 373 The invading army enters Afghanistan by the Bolan and reaches Kandahar . . . . . .374 It pushes on to Ghazni ..... 375 Ghazni taken by a coup-de-main .... 376 What was the Amir doing ? . . . . . 376 C XXVI CONTENTS. Page The enormous moral effect of the capture of Ghazni . .3 77 Dost Muhammad, abandoned by the chiefs, flees towards Bamian ....... 379 The pursuit after him rendered nugatory by the artifices of a “ trimmer ” ...... 380 Wade and Taimur Mirza force the Khaibar pass . . 381 Akbar Khan, hopeless of offering effective resistance, flees beyond Kabul . . . . . .381 The avowed object of the expedition having been accom- plished, why were not the British troops withdrawn ? . 382 Character of Mr. Macnaghten ..... 383 He is anxious for an excuse to retain the troops . . 384 Dr. Lord’s premature alarm affords him the excuse . . 385 He decides to retain one half of the army . . . 386 Position of the Shah and the envoy .... 386 The first clash— Macnaghten gives way . . . 387 The fatal policy adopted of superseding native chiefs by British agents ...... 388 The share of administration left by Macnaghten to the Shah is merely nominal ...... 389 Macnaghten’s policy regarding the tribes of the passes 390-392 The grounds of Macnaghten’s confidence wholly illusory . 393 Captain Abbott’s mission to rescue Russian slaves from slavery the solitary success resulting from the first Afghan war ........ 394 The policy of brute force- — and its results . . . 395 The crime of Kalat, and its results .... 396 The advocacy of British interests beyond the Hindu Kush, and its results ..... 397-9 The escape of Dost Muhammad and the rising of the TJzbegs 399 Desertion of the Afghan levies . . . .399 Dost Muhammad is beaten and flees to the Kohistan . 400 Macnaghten’s position with regard to the Kohistan . . 401 Dost Muhammad beats the English at Parwandarrah . 402 Then suddenly surrenders to Macnaghten . . . 403 Vicious character of Macnaghten’s administrative system . 404 CONTEXTS. xxvn Page Captain Rawlinson in vain reports the intrigues of Shah Shujah ....... 404 Discontent of the Ghilzais ..... 405 Macnaghten resolves to retrench the tribal subsidies . 406 The Ghilzais'resolves to break the communications with India 407 An incident showing the feelings of the Afghans thrown away ....... 407 First mutterings of the storm .... 408 The storm breaks ...... 409 Summary of the result ..... 410 Fate of Shah Shujah and his son .... 411 Return of Dost Muhammad ..... 412 Reflections on the event ..... 413 CHAPTER XI. Afghanistan from 1842 to 1860. Position of the rulers of Kabul, Kandahar, and Herat . 414 Dost Muhammad’s action during the second Sikh war and subsequently ...... 415 He pushes his borders to the Oxus .... 416 State of affairs in Herat and Persian intrigues in that place . 416 Dost Muhammad engages to be the friend of the friends and the enemy of the enemies of England . . .417 The Persian encroachments forcibly stopped by England . 418 Dost Muhammad makes a new convention with the English . 418 Dost Muhammad recovers Herat, and dies . . . 420 The reasons which prompted him to select Shir Ali to succeed him ........ 421 Shir Ali shows an early desire to conciliate the English . 422 Which is not responded to by the Government of India . 422 The policy of masterly inactivity .... 423 His brothers rebel against Shir Ali. Course of the rebellion 424 Final triumph of Shir Ali — and to whom it was due . 430 XXV111 CONTENTS. CHAPTER XII. RUSSIAN AND ENGLISH POLICY IN CENTRAL ASIA. Page Latent plans of the Czar Nicholas .... 431 The failure of the design on Constantinople prompts Alexander II. to attempt the alternative plan of breaking down the barrier of the Caucasus . . . .432 Russia implies that with the capture of Tchemkend and Turkistan her policy of absorption has reached its limit . 433 Notwithstanding her promise, Russia continues to advance towards the Oxus ...... 434 Declaring Afghanistan to be outside the zone of her aims, Russia, in spite of solemn promises to the contrary, annexes Khiva ..... 436 Her satisfaction at the meek attitude of Lord Granville . 437 Shir Ali at Ambala in 1869 ..... 438 Causes which militated against the perfect success of that interview ...... 439 to 443 Alarmed by the capture of Khiva, Shir Ali implores the aid of England ....... 443 The English Government adheres to the policy of masterly inactivity notwithstanding that the reasons which justified that policy have ceased to exist . . . 444 to 448 Change of policy inaugurated by Lord Beaconsfield . . 448 Too late !....... 450 The disclosure of Russia’s designs .... 450 The Amir, with the full consciousness of Russia’s designs against England, receives a Russian envoy . . . 451 The English Government require him to receive a British envoy, but he refuses ..... 451 Real origin of the second Afghan War . . . 452 lUS^l \Stcppe tnMghuy' o Pi ibixak. Akrdbad j Sari-Ash .Sunii. Sauufilak VEartyhnuit tStrdb/ Chafahu >€Mm J .Ionian i rJG la ShikaT (A bmtmk ©Askabad KilaWa 6Nt xuslmrk Sirab , .I1 Ivjl 111 I si I, III r k frk 1. Victor ’ Kclnt-jjJfuJj tfhq/aSa luu-khu SDauhikibad /Mastuj •lit Sultan Tpsh-gounjon Jk \ I jRobaii 13,400 tfamirK I Chaman-iltaidh - [looftairAf Vurnshk Tui'shi/- *5as tyhanCutpisf Jinrain \WubtrL. SRINAGAR l*Attoc r - < - iv. u "J5 hhiiumnla iShahpur , gnnixo Wapxuiwt -Guribiu l'as: rukht-fSulaimar or Salomons Scat Jmheerecx , SobraaTL. rila Sirdar /{ban Gujera. ^Stchoah -Rairaiathx jOringari natulan MdlahKk Ma/ujlvhi ‘ tpiidarxai V--)*sw A(j-6W,o TjmttiM T-J*. ~ .‘ rr TultatooJVi bffiuii/ak J' oco gj OThclIa. or Shawl oT/rlA'/ ; Chuprcr. w k °- & 'r Jhtkkce onTtnh / (hlakecfr ^ j)co>a;V *3 • *•• « .v :-'' ‘.V’ jAf WOO/* SnithJkn iilaliser ■■ tV' •NaUshadiitf Hiiru/ij{Cll RIKANEER Vt 1 . 1 $ '‘irlfatsar ' - > ! \ AFGHANISTAN. CHAPTER I. DESCRIPTIVE. In his work entitled “ Reminiscences of a Bengal Civilian,” Mr. William Edwards, then Assistant- Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, describes the departure of Amir Dost Mahammad, on the termination of the Afghan war in 1841, to resume his position as ruler of Kabul. “ Just before parting,” he writes, “the Amir, addressing the Governor-General in Persian, observed : — ‘ I have seen a great deal of your Government since I came to India. Your forts, your arsenals, your ships, all are admirable. I have been down to Calcutta, and have been astonished with your wealth, your palaces, your marts, and your mint ; but to me the most wonderful thing of all is, that so wise and wealthy a nation could have ever entertained the project of occupying such a country as Kabul, where there is nothing but rocks and stones.’ ” It will be my task to explain, in the pages which follow, the reasons which in past ages 1 2 AFGHANISTAN. have invested, and which in the present hour par- ticularly invest this country of rocks and stones with an importance far beyond its territorial value — an importance so vast that, in the opinion of many, the safety of India depends upon the predominance of British influence in the lands immediately beyond the British frontier. The country inhabited by the Afghans, and known generally as the kingdom of Kabul, is traversed from east to west by the Hindu Kush, and the prolongation to the westward of that mighty range. The moun- tains forming the prolongation branch off from the Koh-i-Baba, a lofty range eighty miles in length, and some eighteen thousand feet high, and itself the western continuation of the Hindu Kush proper. Running westward, the mountains soon break into three parallel ranges — the centre and southernmost known as the Koh-i-Safed and the Koh-i-Siah — but all three com- prehended under the general title of Paropamisan range. A line drawn nearly south from the spot where the northernmost of the three ranges referred to is touched by the Hari-rud river, about seventy miles below Herat, to a point below the Slstan lake, and in- tersecting that lake, forms the western boundary of the country. The southern boundary may be roughly described as starting from the point below the Sistan lake just referred to, skirting the valleys of the Hel- mand and the Lora, and running then along the Shal territory to a point north-west of Dera Ghazi Khan. From this point, as far as Y aziri, the Suliman range ; thence to the northern part of the Peshawar district, DESCRIPTIVE. 3 the mountains overlooking the plains on the west bank of the Indus ; and thence as far as the Hiudu Kush, the wild and rugged country of unknown moun- tain tribes, go to form the eastern boundary. The Hindu Kush, and the Paropamisan range, con- stitute, roughly speaking, the northern boundary of Afghanistan proper. But a portion of the country north of that range is tributary to the Amir of Kabul. This territory stretches from the westernmost spurs of the most northern branch of the Paropamisan range to the Khoja Saleh ferry on the Oxus, along the borders of the Turkoman desert. Thence to the great Pamir range, which constitutes the eastern limit, the Oxus forms the boundary of the tributary tribes. The eastern portion of this territory is known as Badakshan ; the western as Afghan Turkistan. Afghanistan has been well described as “consisting of a star of valleys radiating round the stupendous peaks of the Koh-i-Baba, and everywhere bounded by mountains of a rugged and difficult nature.”* The chiefs of these mountains is the mighty Hindu Kush, whose peaks, yet unexplored, are said to attain twenty thousand or twenty-one thousand feet in height. Of this range, and its prolongations westward, I have spoken. A high ridge branching from the country north of Kabul, crosses Afghanistan by way of Kandahar and Girishk, and connects the great mountain with the Paghman range. The Siiliman range runs from the Safed Koh — a mountain separated from the Hindu Kush by the Kabul river — direct * “ Geographical Magazine,” October, 1878. 1 * 4 AFGHANISTAN. south, and parallel with the British frontier. It has been described as “a mighty mountain barrier, con- taining in its northern section two ranges, which increase in number as they run southwards, till at its southern extremity, where the Suri breaks through, there are no less than twelve distinct ridges ‘ like battalions in columns of companies at quarter distance.’ ”* The principal rivers in Afghanistan are the Kabul, the Helmand, the Hari-rud, the Logar, the Murghab, and the A'rghand-ab. The Kabul river rises in the U'nai pass, in the south-eastern slopes of the Koh-i- Baba, runs past Jalalabad, and through the Khaibar pass to the Indus, into which it falls near A'tak. It traverses a distance of about three hundred miles, receiving the drainage of the southern slopes of the Hindu Kush on the left, and the northern water-shed of the Safed Koh (not to be confounded with the Koh-i-Safed) on the right. Its tributaries are the Logar from the south ; the Bara, which rises in, and flows through, the Afridi hills ; the Swat ; and the Pan j shir, the Alishang, the Kunar, and the Landai from the north. The river Helmand rises also in the south-eastern slopes of the Koh-i-Baba. It flows in a south-westerly direction to about a hundred and ten miles below Girishk. It then suddenly turns to the west, and running in that direction for about seventy miles, changes its course to the north-west, and discharges itself into the Sistan lake. The entire length of its * “ G-eographical Magazine.” DESCRIPTIVE. 5 course exceeds seven hundred miles. Approaching Girishk it attains a breadth of at least a hundred yards, and a depth of three and a half. From this point to the Slstan lake it is considered navigable : it is extensively used for irrigation purposes. The Harl-rud rises in the southern slopes of the Koh-i-Siah, shortly after it breaks away from the Koh-i-Baba, and taking a westerly course runs south of Herat. A short distance below this turn, it takes a turn to the north, quits the Afghan territory at the point where it touches the northernmost branch of the Paropamisan range ; then turning again to the north-west, it ultimately divides into two branches, and empties itself into the To j end swamp. Herat, and the valley in which it lies, are watered by canals drawn from this river. The Logar has been mentioned as one of the tri- butaries of the Kabul river. It plays an important part in the military geography of the country, prior to its junction with that river, more especially where it crosses the Ghazni and Kabul road between Shekhabad and Haidar Khail. The Murghab rises in the Koh-i-Baba range, and runs westerly to the north-west of Merv. It is little more than a mountain stream. More important are the Arghand-ab, a tributary of the Helmand, which rising in the range which runs in a south-westerly direction parallel with the road between Ghazni and Kandahar, flows parallel with that range north of Kandahar, and joins the Helmand some miles below it ; the Tarnak, which follows the 6 AFGHANISTAN. valley from Ghazni to Kandahar, and joins the Ar- ghand-ab before the latter joins the Helmand; the Arghasan, flowing into the same river from the east, and the Dori from the south ; the Lora, another tribu- tary of the same river, one of the heads of which rises in the Shal valley, the other just south of, and close to, Kalat, receiving the drainage of the Mustang valley. More northerly again are the Kash-rud, the Farah- rud, and the Harut-rud, which, rising in the southern slopes of the Koh-i-Siah and flowing into the Sis tan lake, cross the different routes between Herat and Kandahar at various points. Other streams, such as the Zhot, the Gomal, and the Kuram, will be more specially treated of when I come to describe the passes with which they are severally connected. Afghanistan proper may be conveniently treated of as formed of two great parts — the eastern and the western ; the former represented by the towns of Kabul and Ghazni and the valley of which Jalalabad is the central point ; the latter by Kandahar and Herat. From these divisions are excepted the tribes on the eastern frontier, many of whom are independent, and who will be treated separately. To the divisions themselves, or rather to the towns which dominate them, and to the routes which connect them, I shall now turn my attention. The city of Kabul, six thousand five hundred feet above the level of the sea, lies in a triangular gorge formed by two ranges of high and steep hills, which, running north-west and south-west, nearly meet a little to the west of the town, leaving between the DESCRIPTIVE. 7 two angles a narrow entrance traversed by the Kabul river and by the high road from Ghazni. The city is thus encompassed by hills on three sides. On the southern side, indeed, there is only a narrow path between the city wall and the base of the hill. These hills are steep, bare, and rocky, and are crowned with a long line of wall, having round towers at short intervals. This line of wall is carried up the steep sides of the hills, along their summits, and across the narrow entrance which lies between them. Were it in repair, this wall would completely close all entrance from the west, but it is believed to have been allowed to fall into decay. The city itself extends about a mile from east to west, and about half a mile from north to south. It is surrounded by a high but weak mud wall, and has no ditch.. On the top of a rocky eminence, east of the town and separated from it by a ditch, stands the Bala Hissar, and on the slope of this accli- vity are the royal palace and gardens, with an exten- sive bazaar, the whole surrounded by a wall and ditch. The chief bazaars in the city itself run east and west, the largest running nearly through the centre of the town. It forms a spacious broad street of two-storied houses covered by flat roofs extending between their tops. This street is broken into three or four divisions by small squares, which have passes leading out right and left into the adjoining streets. The rest of the town is formed of narrow, dirty, and irregular streets, the houses in which are made of un- burned brick. Burnes computed the population to be 8 AFGHANISTAN. about sixty thousand, and this number is probably not greatly exceeded now. The Kabul river, which enters at the north of the gorge from the west, flows eastward close under the northern wall. The river from August to October is a mere brook, but it is at times so swollen as seriously to endanger the walls of the city. Towards the east of Kabul the country is more open than on the other sides. The two ranges of hills, separating widely to the north and south, have a broad valley lying between them, down which the road to Peshawar runs nearly due east. This valley ex- tends for about twenty-five miles east of Kabul, and there meets a cross chain of rugged rocks. The pass over these, called the Lata Band, is practicable only for man and horse. The valley is about ten miles broad, but at a short distance from the town a low, rocky, and barren ridge runs from west to east for about three miles, dividing the valley into two nearly equal portions. On the northern side of the valley the Kabul river runs through a fertile tract of country. On the southern side, the river Logar, which enters it through a break in the hills, and running for some distance close at their base, crosses the valley from south to north five miles east of Kabul, and falls into the Kabul river. Their united streams pass out of the valley through a narrow opening in the Lata Band pass, already referred to. The country on the south side of the valley on the banks of the Logar is low, marshy, and often under DESCRIPTIVE. 9 water. It is very fertile. So likewise is that on the northern side, where the Kabul river flows. But the centre of the valley, where the rocky range extends, is dry and barren. To the west of Kabul lies a broad valley or plain, separated from the town by the hills through which the narrow entrance to the town passes. This plain, which is about eight miles broad by twelve in length, is a spacious amphitheatre, encircled on all sides by lofty hills, over the tops of which rises a succession of lofty hills, each higher and higher, till the view is terminated by the summits of the Hindu Kush. The panorama is most lovely — -the plain being watered by numerous streamlets brought from the Kabul river, and covered with green fields fringed by rows of the poplar and the willow. Orchards richly stocked with fruit and flower, and vegetable gardens well laid out, diversify the landscape. The Kabul river, its banks shaded with trees, and here and there guarded by forts, runs through it. Villages and hamlets are scattered over the surface of the plain. The country round Kabul is extremely fruitful. Grain and provisions of every kind are in abundance, whilst the most delicious fruits of every description are cheaper even than grain. Jalalabad, formerly considered the chief town of the second district in eastern Afghanistan, is one hundred and five miles from Kabul and ninety-one from Pe- shawar. The line of road to it from Kabul lies for the first ten miles nearly due east, descending steeply the Kabul valley. The next ten miles, leaving the valley, 10 AFGHANISTAN. commence by turning south, and proceed through a long and narrow defile between steep and lofty hills devoid of verdure. Along this defile, which is only a few yards broad, runs a noisy stream, which has to be crossed nearly twenty times. The whole breadth of the pass is covered with a mass of pebbles and boul- ders. At its summit the elevation is seven thousand five hundred feet above the sea. This pass is called Khurd- Kabul. Ten miles beyond it rise the Tazin hills, still higher, having an elevation of eight thousand two hundred feet. Thence is a descent of about one thou- sand eight hundred feet into the small valley of Tazin. Twenty-two miles beyond this valley is the formidable Jagdalak pass. From Jagdalak to Gandamak — as from the entrance of the Khurd Kabul pass to Jagdalak — the road lies through a barren and inhospitable country. It is a wide waste of bare and naked hills encompassed by high and inaccessible mountains. The difficulties of transit are enormous. The road scrambles up and down steep acclivities, over long ranges of bleak hills, and through narrow defiles, bounded on each side by steep rocks. It is covered with large stones, pebbles, and rocks, and often leads the traveller down the bed of a stream. The normal inhabitants of this region are few and far between. Gandamak itself is a great improvement on the country traversed to reach it. It stands four thou- sand six hundred feet above the sea-level. For eight or nine miles after leaving Gandamak the scenery reassumes its unattractive form. The road is DESCRIPTIVE. 11 rough, leading the traveller across rocky beds of rivers, and over stony spurs. Three miles after passing the valley of Niml ah— itself a small oasis in the desert — a great improvement is visible. By a gradual descent the open valley of Fathabad is reached, and here are to be found almost the first symptoms of regular cultivation on this side of Khurd- Kabul. Fathabad is eighteen miles from Gandamak. From Fathabad to Jalalabad the distance is seven- teen miles. The road makes a descent for the first eight or nine miles, over a fair though occasionally very stony country. On reaching the level ground four or five miles from Jalalabad the traveller finds himself in a fertile plain covered with high and lofty trees, under the shadow of which is often a village or a fort. Jalalabad itself stands nearly in the centre of the plain. The plain itself extends from west to east about twenty miles, and has a breadth at its broadest part of ten or twelve miles. The cultivated portion is con- siderably narrower, is much intersected by water cuts from the river, and is extremely swampy. The river is the Kabul river. Here it is a broad, rapid, and clear stream, having a breadth during October of a hundred yards. Its banks are low and wide apart, but during the dry season it is fordable in many places. Numerous villages are scattered along its banks, but the fertility is confined to a very narrow space ; and the river, leaving the plain, soon wanders among low stony hillocks. The town of Jaialabad is in no way remarkable. It probably remains much the same as it was when occupied by the British force in 1841-2. According 12 AFGHANISTAN. to the latest accounts, its fortifications have not been restored. In 1841-2 it was described as being very small, very dirty, and very poor, surrounded by a mud wall, possessing from three to four hundred houses, and a permanent population of about two thousand. The walls, which formed an irregular quadrilateral, were surrounded on all sides by gardens, buildings, and ruins. It is believed that no improve- ment has been effected in this respect of late years, and it is spoken of as having been abandoned as a military post. From Jalalabad to Peshawar is a distance of ninety- one miles. The first forty-two of these, as far as Daka, may be generally described as a tract of hilly country lying between two ranges of mountains, which, running in their length east and west, enclose between them a breadth of about twenty miles from north to south. This intermediate country is in no sense a valley, as it is divided into a series of small plains by cross ranges of hills which pass between the Safed Koh* and the secondary ranges of the Hima- layas. These plains are generally barren and stony, and have a considerable slope from north to south. The river — always the Kabul river — which runs along their northern margin, has to make its way through several narrow passages in the rocks, while the only road in one of these isolated plains leads over the southern skirts of the cross ranges of hills. About forty-four miles from Jalalabad high hills * Not to be confounded with the western Koh-i-Safed, previously referred to. DESCRIPTIVE. 13 shoot up between the Safed Koh and the secondary ranges of the Himalayas, which completely block np, for about thirty miles, the valley called the valley of the Kabul. The river has to force its way through narrow gorges among the rocks, whilst the road penetrates the high hills by a defile called the Lan- dikhana defile, just within the Khaibar pass. The following description of this part of the route is taken from the journal of an officer who traversed it in 1840, Lieut.-General Kaye : — “ 14. — Landikhana, eight and a half miles. — We traversed for some two miles a stony plain, and then entered the mouth of the Khaibar pass. Just before emerging among the hills, the Safed Koh became again visible, but was soon shut out from view. The defile into which we entered was by no means narrow (never less than fifty yards in breadth), and the hills neither steep nor difficult, but at nearly every point accessible by infantry. After about two miles of defile, the passage widened considerably to about six hun- dred yards, and here in the centre we passed an isolated eminence, on the summit of which was a small fort or breastwork, constructed of loose stones, and garrisoned by a company of Jezailchees. After this the pass narrowed again. We ascended considerably, but the road was by no means difficult, though everywhere stony. Stunted trees and bushes throughout the defile. Encamped on uneven ground close to the foot of the ghaut, leading over the summit of the pass. Some cultivated land rising in terraces to the summit of the hill to the south, and some rude fortifications, now dilapidated, are to be seen on the same side of the defile. Looking back, the summits of many mountains visible to the north-west, the most distant partially covered with snow. This I imagine to be the Kuner peak. We travelled towards south-east to-day. “ 15. — From Landikhana, the road led up the side of the hill to the left, passing round two shoulders. The ascent not steep, but the road wound in and out, occasioned by various fissures, or water channels, in the face of the mountain. After rounding the second shoulder, we descended gently into the bed of the stream, which 14 AFGHANISTAN. was previously too confined and rocky to allow of guns passing. This was the case again occasionally, necessitating the road to pass over parts of the hill ; the ascents on those occasions, though short, and not very steep, difficult on account of awkward bends occurring at the very foot. Most of the carriages had to be unlimbered on this account, at three of the ascents. After about four miles we reached the summit of the pass ; the hills receded right and left, and we entered on a broad extensive table-land, sloping gently to- wards the east, well cultivated and sprinkled with forts, hills on all sides, but not very lofty, also a few insulated eminences. The plain sometimes stretched miles across, and here and there valleys branch- ing off right or left. After about five miles the valley narrowed, and the descent became more sensible ; and as we approached Ali Masjfd, we entered into a narrow defile, enclosed by precipitous rocks ; this, however, only continued for about half a mile, when we passed close under the fort of Ali Masjfd, and encamped about a mile lower down the glen. Distance marched to-day, fourteen miles. “ The Khaibar hills, and the defile through which we passed, are tolerably well wooded, but the trees are stunted, indeed, scarce anything more than bushes. On the open land, at the most elevated part of the pass, there are many forts, and much cultivation also in the valleys branching off on either side ; but the forts are the worst I have met with. They have only one tower each, and that very weak. The fort of Ali Masjfd is better built and designed, but its strength consists in its situation, it being on the summit of a lofty hill, insulated and difficult of access, to the south-west of the road. The masjfd, or mosque, is in the valley below. Immediately after passing Ali Masjfd, the hills decrease in altitude and steepness. Our direction of march tortuous to-day, but generally south-east. “ 16. — Jamrud, seven miles. — From our last ground we ascended the hillside on our left by a steep, tortuous road ; there was another road to the left, but we did not know of it, exceedingly easy, so we pulled the guns up the ascent ; after which we proceeded for some distance over undulating ground, an elevated table-land, and passed over one narrow defile by a well-built bridge. We then descended into the bed of a stream by a good road cut in the side of the hill. The remainder of the march lay through low hills, until we debouched into the plain near Jamrud. There is another road DESCRIPTIVE. 15 which continues in the defile, without ascending the hillsides ; hut it is very circuitous. # # * * # “ With the exception of the hills from which we have just emerged, there is nothing to bound our view. There are ranges both north and south, but very far distant, while the plain stretches boundless to the east. Yery few trees to diversify the scenery. We came about S.S.E. to-day. “About four miles above Ali Masji'd, in the pass, there is a ‘ tope,’ said to be Grecian, on a hill by the roadside. “ 17. — To camp near Peshawar, sixteen miles.” I turn now to the third province or division in eastern Afghanistan, that of Ghazni. The town of Ghazni lies seven thousand seven hundred and twenty- six feet above the level of the sea at the top of the valley of the Tarnak, close under the termina- tion of a range of hills, which, running east and west, shut up this valley, and separate it from the Kabul valley. The town is ninety miles south-west by south from Kabul, on the road to Kandahar, from which it is distant about two hundred and twenty-five miles. It is built upon an isolated ridge, on a natural mound, partly rocky and partly composed of earth. On the highest portion of the mound, which has a consider- able elevation, stands the citadel, which is nearly in the centre of town, though touching the wall on the north side. The outer wall has a circuit of about a mile and a quarter. The form of the town is a sort of irregular square, the wall being built so as to suit the outline of the mound on which it rests. The foundation of this wall is little above the level of the surrounding country, and as it winds round 16 AFGHANISTAN. the hill it presents to the traveller a very formid- able appearance. The mound which it encircles resembles, m fact, a fortress of which the citadel is the apex. The town itself, though mean and insig- nificant, contains about three thousand five hundred mud houses. These houses have flat roofs, with small windows in the upper storey, and holes pierced for matchlocks, and are capable of being defended. The streets are narrow. Within the walls is stabling suffi- cient for a brigade of cavalry. In the citadel are houses and squares of a superior order suitable to the rank and position of the sirdars by whom they are ordinarily occupied. Formidable though Ghazni is in appearance, it is not so in reality. The town is com- manded by a low hill near its north-western angle, and although the citadel soars above it, the vicinity of the hill alluded to would almost be fatal to its retention for any length of time. It is proof against escalade, and with ordinary care it could be made strong enough to defy a sudden assault, but it could not stand a pro- tracted siege. The valleys in the vicinity of Ghazni are fertile. Fruits and vegetables are produced in great abundance. The supply of milk and ghee is likewise plentiful. Before descending in a south-westerly direction to Kandahar, I propose to describe the road between Ghazni and Kabul. The distance between the two places is, as already stated, ninety miles. After quit- ting Ghazni, the road, three or four miles east of the town, passes over a defile in the hills which separate the Tarnak valley from that of Kabul. The summit DESCRIPTIVE. 17 of this pass is at least one thousand two hundred feet above Ghazni. Thence is a descent of two or three hundred feet into the Kabul valley. From this point the valley has a general slope down to the city of Kabul. It is, however, blocked up in several places by hills with steep ascents and descents, through the narrow gorges in which the Kabul and Logar rivers make their way to the more open country near Kabul. Besides the slope towards Kabul the country slopes also from east to west, on which side of the valley the river Kabul runs. The upper part of the valley is stony and barren, but fertile tracts are met with along the banks of the rivers. A very beautiful and fertile tract of land, called the valley of Maidan, occupies the Kabul valley twenty- six to thirty miles from the city. It is very rich, lies low, and is surrounded on all sides by high hills, and intersected by numerous streams. The country between Ghazni and Kabul is blocked up with snow during several months in the year. At Ghazni itself the snow has been known to lie long beyond the vernal equinox. The atmosphere in the country between the two towns is most highly charged with electricity. The Logar, a fine, broad, rapid river, crosses the Kabul valley about thirty miles from its head, coming out through a narrow gorge in the hills, and after crossing the valley, leaves it by another gorge. This is the strongest part of the country between Ghazni and Kabul, as the low land could be flooded by the river, and rendered nearly impassable for any but light troops, whilst the ground is high and very strong on 2 18 AFGHANISTAN. the opposite side — that nearest Kabul. This river falls into the Kabul river, but not until the latter has passed the town of Kabul. I here append a table showing the marches and the elevations of the several halting-places between Kabul and Grhazni, with a slight description of the route : — Name of Place. Height above the Sea. Dis- tance in Miles. General Description. Kabul 6508 Arghandi . 7628 • 12 The road for six or seven miles runs through a highly cultivated valley abounding with orchards and fruit trees and cultivation. After leaving the Kabul valley there is an asent over a rough, stony road till within three miles of Arghandi, when there is a gradual descent to that place. Maidan 7747 20 The road at first is hilly and somewhat difficult, keeping along the ridge of the Maidan valley ; it somewhat improves as it nears Maidan. Shekhabad 7473 18 The road rough and stony. After four miles the Kabul river is crossed. The road for many miles skirts the beautiful Maidan valley. Haidar Khail . 7637 10 The road descends into the valley of the river Logar. Here the river runs strongly and ra- pidly, offering an obstacle to an invader from Grhazni. About six miles from Shekhabad, the valley becomes confined and nar- row, with hills rising abruptly on either side. Emerging from this defile, the road runs along the bank of a small river, which is crossed about two miles from Haidar Khail. DESCRIPTIVE. 19 Name of Place. Height above the Sea. Dis- tance in Miles. General Description. Haft Asya 7754 10 A winding road through a narrow valley, well cultivated, and abounding with forts and villages. The country about it is dreary and desolate. Shash G-ao 8500 9 A stony road. G-hazm 7726 14 A steady ascent for three miles to the Sher dahan , or Lion’ s mouth , a formidable pass at an elevation of about nine thousand feet. At . the entrance of this pass is built a substantial guard tower, con- ducting to a level plateau of considerable extent enclosed by hills. The road crosses the cen- tre, and by an abrupt descent conducts across a second, though less extensive plateau, which stretches to Ghazni. During the winter months this pass is blocked up with snow, and communica- tion between Ghazni and Kabu is impossible, except for foot passengers. I propose now to return to Ghazni, and to proceed thence along the valley of the Tarnak to Kandahar. The total distance is two hundred and twenty-five miles, and for the greater part of its length the road takes the traveller in a direction nearly from north-east to south-west. From G-hazni to Kalat-i-Ghilzai (not to be confounded with Kalat), the distance is one hundred and thirty-eight miles of gradual descent. Kalat-i- Ghilzai is a rather strong fortress on the right bank of the Tarnak, five thousand seven hundred and seventy feet above the sea level. The declension from Ghazni 2 * 20 AFGHANISTAN. amounts thus to about two thousand feet. Kandahar lies eighty-seven miles nearly due west of Kalat-i-Ghilzai. On leaving Ghazni, the Tarnak valley is generally narrow, in some places not exceeding half a mile in breadth. As it approaches Kandahar, however, it ex- pands to a breadth of about thirty miles. The height of some of the peaks which hem it in is about five thousand feet. In parts of the valley there is a con- siderable breadth of level country, but in general it is shut in by a series of low, undulating hills rising from the banks of the Tarnak. These hills increase in size as they approach the barrier ranges. They are very bare and uninteresting, having a scanty covering of thyme and low bushes. The open portions of the valley are, however, well cultivated. The higher dis- tricts— those in the upper part of the valley — are espe- cially so, being watered by canals brought at enormous labour from the river. These districts abound, more- over, in villages surrounded by fruit trees and corn- fields. They are protected by small forts, good for defence against predatory bands. The following route from Ghazni to Kandahar, giving the elevations of each halting-place, and such description of each as I have been able to collect, may not be unacceptable at the present time Height Dis- Name of Place. above tance in General Description. the Sea. Miles. Ghazni 7726 _ Described in preceding pages. Yargati 7502 18 The road skirts the hilly tract at the base of the Gal Koh DESCRIPTIVE. 21 Name of Place. Height above the Sea. Dis- tance in Miles. General Description. Karra Bagh 7307 range. The road is good, but the country barren and sandy. Yargati is a barren and dreary place, depending for water on subterranean aqueducts. I have been unable to ascertain Jamrat 7420 — the exact distances from each Oba . 7325 — other of the three first places Muklur 7091 44 mentioned. In the distance to Gh6jan 7068 14 Muklur of forty -two miles from Yargati there is a descent of nearly five hundred feet, most pronounced in the last stage. The road still skirts the hilly tract at the base of the Gal Koh range. The land is still watered by means of aqueducts. The principal crops are corn and madder, and there are fruit trees, such as apples, pears, apricots, almonds, and pome- granates. At Muklur itself the cultiva- tion is more advanced. There are springs in the neighbourhood said to be the source of the river Tamak. The road from Muklur to Cbasma-i-Pan jak 6810 Ghojan leads over a grassy tract with hills on either side. The country round is an open plateau, skirted by low hills. It is well cultivated, and watered from the aqueducts previously mentioned. The road from Ghojan to Chasma-i- Shadi . 6668 — Momin-Kila leads over a wilder- Momin-Kila — 16 ness of an undulating character, traversed with ravines at from four to five miles distance from the right bank of the river Tar- nak, along the course of which are many villages and much cultivation. 22 AFGHANISTAN. Name of Place. Tazf . Sar-i-Asp . Kalat-i-Grhilzi . Jaldak Height Die- above tance in the Sea. Miles. 6321 5973 — 5773 48 5396 14 General Description. From Momin-Kila to Taz i , the road runs on the right hank of the river Tarnak, which, in this part of its course, is a noisy and muddy stream, about fifty or sixty feet wide, with hanks one- third that height. At short in- tervals along the course of the stream, weirs have been thrown across, and the waters above them are led into the adjacent fields by cuttings in the banks. Between Tazf and Kalat-i- Ghilzi the road leaves the river, and leads the traveller across a bleak and barren wilderness, the surface of which is undulating, and which is traversed by num- berless ravines. Throughout this journey of about thirty miles, the traveller is subjected, at sunrise and for an hour or two after, to a bitterly cold wind, coming according to the season from the east or west, and which carries with it particles of sand and gravel, the effects of which are often painful. There is nothing to add to the slight reference already made to Kalat-i-Gfhilzi. The road lies over an undula- ting plain of, for the most part, waste land — a small strip only on either side of the river Tar- nak being occupied by fields and cultivation. i Jaldak lies on a sandy soil, dotted with patches of brush- wood. Midway betweenKalat-i-G-hilzi and Jaldak runs the boundary between the Durani and Gfhilzi DESCRIPTIVE. 23 Name of Place. Height above the Sea. Dis- tance in Miles. General Description. territories. The site is marked by an insignificant masonry bridge over a small rivulet which here crosses the road on its way to the Tarnak. The villages on this march, like those on the Ghazni side of Kalat-i-Grhilzi, are widely se- parated, and for the most part far off the high road. Tirandaz . 4829 17 Before reaching Tirandaz is Shahar-i-Safa . 4618 14 Jaloghi, where Major Lumsden’s mission halted in 1857. The character of the country unal- tered. Khail-i-Akhan . 4418 15 A small hamlet of a few huts. Character of the country much the same. At this place the river Tarnak is almost exhausted, only a small stream trickling through the centre of its stony channel. Fever would seem to prevail here. Mahmaud Kila . 3945 15 The road, soon after leaving Khail-i-Akhan, diverges from the river, and leads across an open plain of great extent, sloping to- wards the west. This is the plain of Kandahar. The water here is supplied from the sub- terranean aqueducts, is brackish, and so strongly impregnated with nitre as to be unwholesome. Kandahar . 3500 10 The road leads across the plain already referred to. Kandahar needs a separate description. The town of Kandahar, situated at the foot of the Tarnak valley, is separated from the river of that name by a short range of hills which divide the lower part 24 AFGHANISTAN. of the valley, and run parallel with the river for about twenty miles. These hills are named the Torkani. Kandahar is encompassed on three sides by high, bare, sharp-pointed rocky mountains, rising abruptly from the plain. The open side is that leading to it along the valley of the Tarnak. A considerable portion of the plain of Kandahar is, in ordinary seasons, fertile and well cultivated. It can boast of rich meadows clothed with green turf, of gardens and orchards filled with fruit trees, of fields of corn, of barley, of lucerne, and of clover, watered by numerous canals conveying through a break in the hills the waters of the Arghand-ab, one of the tribu- taries of the Helmand. These cultivated lands lie chiefly on the south and west sides of the town. Three or four miles from it to the east the traveller encoun- ters a barren and cheerless plain, covered with stones and scantily supplied with water. It is not that there is a deficient supply of this necessity of life. Although, in consequence of the great demand upon them for the purposes of irriga- tion, the rivers near Kandahar dry up during the hot weather, there is no want of water. In the meadow land round the town it lies within two feet of the sur- face, and even two miles to the east it is procurable within sixteen feet. The town of Kandahar is large and populous. Its form is that of an oblong square, two thousand by six- teen hundred yards. Situated on the north side of the extensive plain called after the town, about two miles from the lofty DESCRIPTIVE. 25 mountain called Baba Wali, it is surrounded by a high but thin and weak wall, with numerous bastions. These walls are thirty feet high. The four principal bazaars or streets, leading from a gateway which opens nearly in the centre of each face, meet in the middle of the town in a large circular building covered with a dome about one hundred and twenty feet in diameter, and called the Charsu. This place is surrounded with shops, and it is regarded as the public market-place. The streets which converge in it divide the town into four nearly equal districts. The other streets in the town are mere lanes, formed by the narrow space between high houses — houses far more lofty than those in the principal streets. The climate of Kandahar is very dry, and in every respect superior to that of Hindustan. In the hot weather the wind, which is generally easterly in the morning, comes gradually round to the west by 7 or 8 o’clock, and continues in that quarter during the day. It falls about sunset, and during the night an easterly breeze springs up. In the month of June the hot wind very often continues through the night, but this is rare, and for the most part the nights are cool and the mornings very pleasant. Grain and most of the necessaries of life are dear at Kandahar. Firewood too is very scarce. It is difficult to fix the number of the inhabitants. Mountstuart Elphinstone declined to make the attempt. It seems to be acknowledged, however, that the popu- lation is in excess of that of Herat. If the Heratis may be estimated, as it has been, at forty-five thou- 26 AFGHANISTAN. sand, the Kandaharis may possibly number sixty thousand. This, however, must be regarded merely as an approximation. Herat, the westernmost division of Afghanistan south of the Paropamisan range, is reached from Kandahar by way of Girishk, Parrah, and Sabzwar. The distance is about four hundred miles. Girishk is a fort commanding the ordinary passage and summer ford of the river Helmand, which covers the fort to the east. This river, the normal width of which is about a hundred yards, rises in flood with the melting snow, and in May often attains a breadth of one mile. The village, for town it is not, is small and insignificant. The position of the fort is important, but Captain Marsh, who visited it in 1873, found it in a very dilapidated condition. The distance from Kandahar is about seventy miles. Of these the first sixteen miles lead over a country inundated by un- bridged streams ; the remainder over a stony country in which water is scarce. From Girishk to Farrah is a distance of nearly a hundred and seventy miles. The road is tolerably level, want of water being the chief drawback. Ferrier describes Farrah as “ a strong and important fortress.” It stands in the Sistan basin on the river Farrah, which flows to the westward of it, and which, dry for three parts of the year, attains in spring a width of one hundred and fifty yards. Farrah is enclosed by an earthern rampart, crowned with towers, and sur- rounded by a wide and deep ditch, which can be flooded, and with a covered way. It has the form DESCRIPTIVE. 27 of a parallelogram, running north, and south, and has two gates. As a military position it is important, hut the climate is insalubrious. With a capacity for four thousand five hundred houses, not more than sixty were habit- able when Ferrier was there in 1845. Its dilapidation has increased with each succeeding year. In 1878 Captain Marsh found but twenty huts in the town, “ and those all in ruins.” Sabzwar, the next strategic point on the road to Herat, is seventy-one miles north of Farrah. The inter- mediate country is undulating, “ avast jumble,” writes Captain Marsh, “ of valleys and hills, with small plains, inhabited only by a nomadic people.” It lies in a fork formed of two branches of the river of the same name, but more frequently called the Harut, which, rising in the mountains south-east of Herat, empties itself even- tually in the Sistan lake. The position is excellent, but the place itself is decayed and weak. Attached to the fort is a village containing perhaps one hundred houses. Due north, and at a distance of ninety-three miles from Sabzwar, and severed from it by a country diffi- cult only in the mountainous chain that has to be traversed, lies Herat, in a military sense the most important city in the territories of the Amir. It deserves, therefore, special notice. The following description is condensed from Ferrier’ s History of Afghanistan, published in 1858 : — “ The fortified town of Herat is a quadrangle of three and a half miles long on the north and south sides, and rather more on the east and west. A thick 28 AFGHANISTAN. rampart, constructed of earth brought from the in- terior of the city, surrounds it, and forms its defence. The height of this rampart is not everywhere equal, but the average may be about ninety feet, and it is supported on the inside by counterforts of masonry. Earth also has been taken for a distance of one hun- dred and eight yards beyond the ditch, and used in the construction of this work, and being a pure clay it has become exceedingly solid. The rampart has the appearance of a long hill surrounding the city, and on the crest of it a thick wall has been built about thirty- two feet high, flanked with round towers, which, as well as the curtains which connect them with each other, are loopholed for musketry. It is only in the enormous and massive towers at the angles that cannon can be mounted. “ Generally speaking, the ground from the edge of the ditch towards the country, in a radius of two hun- dred and fifty yards, is of a marshy nature. Water is found at a depth of from eight to ten feet, especially on the southern side of the city, for the general inclination of the ground is from north to south. Streams, which all run east and west, water the en- virons and supply the ditch ; and it flows out on the south side opposite the large tower which forms the angle of the place called Khurj Khakister, or Tower of Cinders. “ About three hundred yards south of the town is a canal with steep banks, supplied with water from the Hari-rud, which is four miles distant from the city. On this canal are a great number of mills. It is fordable DESCRIPTIVE, 29 only at a few points. Little bridges, each of a single arch, have therefore been built at different points. “ There are five gates to the city of Herat.* To the north of it near the Meshed gate are two citadels — the New and the Old — nearly joining each other. The first commands the second, in which is an enormous round tower sometimes used as a viceregal palace. “ On the north side, likewise, parallel to the walls, and about one thousand two hundred and fifty yards from them, rises the long hill of Talabingui forming a ridge on that side. Beyond this hill, at a distance of about one thousand yards, stands one of the most beau- tiful mosques ever built in Asia. It is surmounted by nine minarets, from the summit of which the interior of the town can be seen. Herat is not commanded by any of the hills in the environs ; Talabingui, which is used as a cemetry, is the highest.” So far Ferrier. Eldred Pottinger, who so nobly contributed to the defence of Herat when it was besieged by the Persians in 1837-8, gives a more vivid description of the capabilities of the place and district in his manuscript journal. f He confirms for it the title of “ Gate of India.” Within the country immediately about it all the great roads leading on India converge. By this route alone, he declares, could a well-equipped army make its way to the Indian frontier from the regions of the North-West. * So also writes Captain Marsh, but the author of Lost Among the Afghans, who was present in Herat during its siege by the Persians in 1856-57, states that the number of the gates is seven, and that they are called after the direction to which they point, Kandahar, Maimuna, Kabul, A'rak, Sistan, G-azargar, and Meshed. f Kaye’s “ War in Afghanistan.” 30 AFGHANISTAN. All the materials necessary for the organization of a great army, and for the formation of its depdts, are to be found in its neighbourhood. The plains are well watered and extraordinarily fertile. Its mines supply lead, iron, and sulphur. Saltpetre abounds. The willow and the poplar, which furnish the best charcoal, flourish in every part of the province ; whilst, he adds, the population could supply a number of hardy and docile soldiers to assist an invader. The possession of Herat is in fact necessary to a successful invasion of India. Its possession by the power which rules in India would render any invasion of India dangerous to the invader ; a successful invasion impossible. Captain Marsh confirms in the main this view. After describing the city and the valley in which it lies, he adds, “ as the land is fertile and the climate good, a few years would turn all this desert into a garden.” Vambery, who visited Herat in 1864, is a witness on the same side. He, too, speaks of its political importance, of the fertility of the soil sur- rounding it, of its ruined condition, of the hatred of its inhabitants for the Afghans. Even Afghans, he tells us, who settle there become invariably anti- Afghan in their sympathies. Before dealing with the passes leading to India, I must ask the reader to return with me to Kandahar and examine the country south-east by south of that town, that is the country between Kandahar and Quetta. This route leads straight from Kandahar to the angle made by the Ddri as it bends to the westward, DESCRIPTIVE. 31 follows the course of that river to a point where the road strikes off to Mel Manda : it runs thence along a narrow valley to the Gfatai hills, and, crossing a long barren plain, traverses the Khojak Kotal pass down to the valleys of Kuchak and Pishin ; thence the road to Quetta is easy. The distance is one hundred and fifty miles. The following is the route in detail. Name of Place. Ele- vation. Dis- tance. Description. Kandahar . Mund Hissar 12 The country between Kanda- har and Mund Hissar is tolerably level, fertile, and well populated. The bed of the Tarnak is crossed en route. Maku 16 The route is level, though broken into ravines, and the fertility decreases. The river Arghesan, one of the tributaries of the Helmand, is crossed about midway. Mil Manda 18 The road crosses the Barghana Pass at an elevation of 4,100 feet, and descends into the valley of the Dorf. Here all cultivation ceases. The waters of the river, though abundant, are slightly saline. Its banks are unfertile ; there is no grass, and but little cultivation. The population is scanty. The road leaves the Dorf at Takht-i-Pal, and branches off at right angles across an un- dulating, though rather barren country to Mel Manda. Gatai 14 From Mel Manda to Gatai jis a distance of fourteen miles across a country not dissimilar. The Gatai hills are a low range, covered with stones, extremely barren, and cut up by ravines. 32 AFGHANISTAN. Name of Place. Ele- vation. Dis- tance. Description. Dand-i-Gulah . 4000 6 The road runs across a barren plain ; but here, sweet water, often scarce at Gatai, is to be found. Chaokah . 5600 19 From Dand-i-Gulah the road gradually rises, especially after passing Chaman, across an un- dulating plain to the foot of the bill, Chaokah. Here the tem- perature is very pleasant, and wild plants and fruits abound. From this point to summit of the Khojak Kotal pass is an ascent of one thousand eight hundred and ten feet. The pass, high as it is, is commanded on either side by the Khoja A'mran mountains. I have been assured by a very high authority, who gleaned it on the spot, that the pass can always be turned, pro- vided the waters of the Lora do not run dry. From its summit the descent for the first two miles is very steep, but as the more level country is approached and the villages of the Dehsuri glen are reached the declension becomes much more moderate. At the distauce of some twenty miles from the summit lies the village of Arambi. From this place runs for fifteen miles a tolerably level road across the Lora river to Haikalzai, a prosperous village on a plain of red clay, in the Pishin valley. From Haikalzai a very fair road leads across an easily traversable pass to Kachlak, a distance of eighteen miles. Kachlak is the first village situated DESCRIPTIVE. 33 in Baluchistan proper, in the direct road to Quetta. As to the proper boundary of that country, difference of opinion would seem to prevail ; but if the Tukatu range be within the border line of Baluchistan, the actual boundary will be represented by a line drawn im- mediately north of that hill south-westward by west cutting the road between Haidarzai and Kachlak about midway.* From Kachlak to Quetta the distance must be about twelve miles. Before describing the passes, I may advert for a moment to three other places of some importance, and to which reference will be made in the subsequent part of this book, mainly to mark their situation in the map. Thus, eighteen miles nearly due north of Kabul, in the Koh Daman, lies the town of Istalif, beautifully situated, and having, with the hamlets dependent upon it, a population of eighteen thousand. Twenty miles again north of Istalif, at the north end of the Koh Daman, is Charikar, with five thousand inhabitants, carrying on a brisk trade with Turkistan. Last of all, Bamian, to the north-west of Kabul beyond the Unai pass, the summit of which attains a height of eleven thousand four hundred feet, and under the soaring snow-clad peaks of the Koh-i-Baba, eighteen thousand feet above the level of the sea. The chief passes and routes leading from British India into Afghanistan are the Khaibar, the Kurm, the Gomal, the Sakhi Sarwar, and the Bolan. There are others, smaller, to which it may be necessary to * The country of Balochistan, by A. W. Hughes. 3 34 AFGHANISTAN. refer, but I take these in their order, entering them from British territory. The road from Jalalabad through the Khaibar pass to Peshawar has been described in a previous page. The entrance of the pass from the Panjab is at Kadam, a small village, three miles westward of Jamrud. Between this village and Peshawar is a plain, which takes its name after that place, and makes a gradual ascent of about six hundred feet from it to Jamrud. The distance from Peshawar to Jamrud is about sixteen miles. The latter is a small village, sur- rounded by a mud wall, and having near it the ruins of a fort built by the Sikhs in 1837. It is in no sense profitable as a military position to an invader from India, as it is dependent for its water on the Kabul river, and the supply of it could always be cut off by the hill tribes. Three miles to the west of it is Kadam, the real gate of the pass. The approach to this is extremely formidable. Advancing to it from Jamrud, the mountains on either side gradually close in. After entering the gorge of Kadam, the width of the valley greatly decreases. Little more than half a mile from the entrance it does not exceed four hundred and fifty feet, and it diminishes as further progress is made. The cliffs on either side are in many places steep and precipitous, in others practicable on one side or the other. Approching Ali Mas j id they are not practicable. They rise to a height of about one thousand three hundred feet above the plain. The distance from Jamrud to Ali Masjid is about DESCBIPTIVE. 35 eight miles. The width of the pass contracts greatly in parts, not exceeding forty feet in some places, whilst in others it covers nearly three hundred. It is narrowest in the defile leading to the fort of A'li Masjid. Here the hills are extremely wild and pre- cipitous ; and, as previously stated, are entirely im- practicable. From their sides formidable rocks jut out, commanding the entire glen below them. From that glen the heights may well seem inaccessible. The mosque from which the fortress of A'li Masjid derives its name is in the valley below it. The main fort stands on the summit of a lofty hill, isolated and diffi- cult of access, to the south-west of the road. It is connected by a weak wall with a smaller fort on the same hill. The southern and western faces of both are, however, commanded by two hills higher than that upon which the fortress stands. Even, then, if A'li Masjid could not be turned, it offers no insuperable obstacle to a determined enemy. But, as I shall show presently, the fortress can be turned. Beyond A'li Masjid the nature of the defile remains unaltered. For half a mile its width is but little affected, but then it gradually increases, the hills main- taining their varied character, generally inaccessible, but occasionally easy. At the Latabeg valley, nearly nine miles from A'li Masjid, the average width in- creases to a mile and a half. Half a mile further on, however, it diminishes to ten feet or less, with perpendicular hills on either side ! Half a mile beyond this, the Landikhana pass is traversed. The width of the road at this point is 3 * 36 AFGHANISTAN. one hundred and forty feet ; the hills continuing very steep, especially those on the left. From this point to the opening of the pass at Daka, the width ranges from three hundred to two hundred feet, the hills being steep on either side. The road lies through the bed of the river, and except at the Landikhana pass the gradient is generally easy. Difficult as the Khaibar pass is, it can be turned. For instance, by the Tatara road, which enters the hills about nine miles north of Jamrud, and keeping north of the Khaibar range falls into the Jalalabad road at Daka. The Abkhana road, the Karapa road, the Shah Bagadi road, also avoid A'li Mas j id, and are traversable. To the west of the Khaibar is the route by the Kurm river. Thai, the starting point for this route, is a village in the Kohat district, sixty-six miles south- west of the station of that name, which, again, is thirty-seven miles south of Peshawar. From Banii it lies forty-two miles due north. The distance between Thai and Kabul and Thai and Ghazni are respectively one hundred and sixty-eight and one hundred and ninety-two miles. The road for the first fifty miles to the Kurm fort lies through a fertile though unhealthy country. The fort is strong, but not de- fensible against modern artillery. It is a place of some importance, having been the seat of a provincial government in the time of the Ghorian sovereigns ; and in a military sense it retains that importance still. From the Kurm fort to Haidar Khail, where the route strikes into the Ghazni and Kabul road, the distance DESCRIPTIVE. 37 is one hundred and twenty miles : thence to Ghazni twenty-two miles. The direct road to Kabul strikes off at Kushi, eighty miles from the Kurm fort. The district of Kurm is one of the most fertile in Afghanistan. The Gomal route is the next that deserves attention. This route leads from Dera-Ishmail-Khan to Ghazni and to Kandahar. From Dera-Ishmail-Khan to Tank within our frontier the distance is forty-two miles. The entrance to the Gomal pass is sixteen miles to the westward of Tank. The road through the pass follows the river Gomal, which is believed not to be formid- able, to Arsuk, a village on that river. From Arsiik to Ghazni, by a road skirting the Mahsud Yaziri country, are sixteen marches ; from Arsuk to Kan- dahar, by a south-westerly route, eighteen marches. On both routes provisions are abundant, but the tribes might be hostile. Of the other routes between the Gomal and the Bolan the Sakhi Sarwar seems alone to demand special notice. Sakhi Sarwar lies thirty-five miles south-west from Dera-Ghazni-Khan. From it to the further end of the pass at Rakni the distance is about sixty-seven miles. The pass is narrow and difficult. “No camels, fully laden,” says MacGregor, “ can travel by this route, and it is difficult even for half-laden ones ; no two horsemen can go abreast up the ascent, but have to dismount and lead their beasts. . . . No supplies are procurable from the mouth of the pass until the village of Rakni, in the Khetran country, is reached.” I have been assured, however, 38 AFGHANISTAN. that since this description was penned, a traversable road has been made up the pass by the British autho- rities at Dera Ghazi Khan. A road has also been made up the Charchar pass to the Sham plain, from which table-land the country is open to the head of the Sakhi Sarwar pass. A practicable road from Rajanpur and Mithankot to Tall Chatiali and Pishin is thus available. Although it has never been traversed by Europeans it is highly spoken of by natives. It is worthy to be noted that the whole of the western portion of this route passes through the lands of the Kakar Pathans. The eastern portion traverses the lands of the Laghari BiMchis and the Khetrans — an independent tribe, half Biluchi and half Afghan. I come now to the Bolan. To the entrance to this pass, near Dadar, there are two routes — the one start- ing from Rajanpur, and proceeding by Dera Bibrak and Sangula ; the other from Sakkar by Jacobabad. Of the Bolan pass it need only be stated that it is comparatively open and easy for all arms, and that by the possession of Quetta we command it. Much more might be written on the subject of the minor passes, and of the passes generally. But it is sufficient, I think, to lay before the reader a general view of those routes only which are likely to be tra- versed by a British army. By the possession of Quetta, on the Afghan side of the Bolan, that army possesses a base from which it can operate against the most vulnerable and important portions of the territories of the Amir, the provinces indicated by the names of Kandahar and Herat. DESCRIPTIVE. 39 I turn now to the people of Afghanistan, to the tribes who occupy the country, and who command the passes. The subject has been treated at great length by Mountstuart Elphinstone, by Ferrier — who quotes largely from Abdiillah Khan, of Herat, — by Bellew, and by many others. F olio wing Abdullah Khan and other Afghan writers, Ferrier is disposed to believe that the Afghans repre- sent the lost ten tribes, and to claim for them descent from Saul, King of Israel. Amongst other writers con- curring in this view may be mentioned the honoured name of Sir William Jones. On the other hand, Professor Dorn, of Kharkov, who examined the sub- ject at length, rejects this theory. Mountstuart Elphinstone classes it in the same category as the theory of the descent of the Romans from the Trojans. The objections to Abdullah Khan’s view have been recently expressed, fittingly and forcibly, by Professor Dowson, in a letter to the Times. “ If,” writes that gentleman, “ it were worthy of consideration, it is still inconsistent with the notion that the Afghans are de- scendants of the lost ten tribes. Saul was of the tribe of Benjamin, and that tribe was not one of the lost ten. There remains the question of feature. This, no doubt, has its weight, but cannot prevail against the more important question of language.” Professor Dowson then proceeds to show that the Afghan lan- guage has no trace of Hebrew in it, and concludes by pronouncing the supposition that in the course of time the whole Afghan race could have changed their language as “too incredible.” 40 AFGHANISTAN. The clans forming the Afghan nation proper are very numerous. Including the Pathans — who, though descended from the same stock, speaking the same language, following the same religion, observing the same customs, and inhabiting the same country, are not recognized as pure Afghans by the Afghans — they are said to number two million three hundred and fifty-nine thousand. The Mahomedans who are not Afghans, to be presently referred to, number one million two hundred and fifty thousand ; and the non- Mahomedans perhaps five hundred thousand. These are distinct from the feudatory tribes north of the Hindu Kush, who amount in number nearly to eight hundred thousand. The Afghan genealogies trace the four tribal divi- sions of their nation to Saraban, Ghurghusht, Bitni, and Karleh, the four sons of Kyse Abd-ii-rashld. But Afghan legends are not to be depended upon, and the fact stands out that although the names still figure in the genealogies, the divisions are no longer used. The principal tribes are the Diiranis, the Ghilzais, the Kakars, the Wardaks, the Povindahs, and the Berduranis, all subdivided into many branches. Of these tribes the Diiranis and the Ghilzais are the most powerful — the former from the possession by their clan of the sovereignty; the latter from their considerable numbers and their sturdy independence of character. The Diiranis are supreme in south and south-western Afghanistan. Elphinstone makes five divisions of their territory. These are bounded on the north by DESCRIPTIVE. 41 the Paropamisan range, on the west by a sandy desert separating them from Persia ; on the south-west by Sistan ; on the south by Shorabak and the Khoja Am- ran range ; on the east, without possessing any natural boundary, their territory joins the lands of the Ghilzais. It thus comprises Ferrah and the places between it and Kandahar, including, or partially including, Kandahar itself. Little is known of the earlier history of this tribe. Until the time of Ahmad Shah — of him who fought and gained the third battle of Panipat — they were known as the Abdali, from Abdal, their reputed founder. In consequence, it is said, of a dream, Ahmad Shah changed the name to Durani, taking himself the title of Shah Dun Duran. They are divided into two great branches, the Zirek and the Panjpa, the names of the two grandsons of Abdal. From these branches sprang nine clans, four from Zirek and five from Panjpa. Of these nine clans the Papalzye is the chief ; and it is from the eldest branch of the Papalzye — the Sadozye, that proceeded the legitimate sovereigns who ruled Afghanistan in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It is probable that from the very infancy of the tribe this branch was supreme, for their title to that supremacy was recognized by one of the first of the Safavi kings of Persia. The privileges ac- corded to them by the general consent of the clan were enormous. Their persons were sacred ; no punishment could be inflicted upon them except by a member of the family ; nor could the head of the 42 AFGHANISTAN. Abdali clan himself pass sentence of death upon a Sadozye. But time has lessened these privileges. The clan next in importance to the Sadozyes, and exceeding it in numbers, is the Barukzye. The most distinguished branch of this clan is the Mahomedzye. It was the representative of this branch, Dost Ma- hammad Khan, who supplanted the Sadozyes, and it is its representative, Shir Ali, who now rules in Afghan- istan. The purpose of this book does not allow me to follow the remaining branches and collateral issues of the Duranis. It will suffice to state that they are the most civilized, the most tolerant, and the most popular of all the Afghan tribes ; and the rule of a member of their clan is universally acquiesced in. Next in importance to the Duranis, in some respects even surpassing them in importance, are the Ghilzais. Stubborn, revengeful, jealous of the Duranis, yet faithful to them when warring against a foreign enemy, the Ghilzais have played, and must always continue to play, a great role in the history of their country. The lands they occupy include the cities of Kabul and of Ghazni. They extend from the lofty plateau north of Kandahar eastward to the Sulimani range, and they stretch down the Kabul river to Jala- labad. Roughly speaking, their country may be said to form a parallelogram of which the length is about a hundred and eighty and the breadth about eighty- five miles. Several of the valleys tenanted by them run up to the Hindu-Kush and the Safed-Koh. The Ghilzais have a great past.. In the beginning DESCRIPTIVE. 43 of the last century this tribe conquered Persia, seated a king on the throne of Ispahan, and routed the armies of the Ottoman Porte. The third king of the race was expelled from Persia by Nadir Shah. But they did not resign all hope of ultimate victory. A representative of the clan, Abdurahim Khan, struggled subsequently for the throne. Fortune did not favour him, and with his failure the pent-up feeling of hatred for the Duranis greatly subsided. The rivalry, which formerly extended to the whole tribe, shows itself now merely in outbreaks of personal feeling. Not only is the sovereignty of the representative of the rival clan admitted, but in all matters affecting the independence of the country that representative has had no more devoted followers than the ancient rivals of his own tribe. The Kakars occupy a mountainous range about a hundred miles square in the south-east of the country. They are in appearance and behaviour perfect savages. It is chiefly owing to the extreme wildness and law- lessness of this tribe that the Tall Chatiali route to India has been for so many years closed. They are said to be broken up into small sections, not acknow- ledging any one head, and scarcely recognizing the Amir. The Wardaks dwell in cultivated valleys bounded on three sides by the Gfhilzai country and on the west by the Grhor mountains. They are, by comparison, a quiet, obedient tribe, devoted to agriculture. The Povindahs are a tribe of soldier merchants, numbering about 12,000. Twice every year their 44 AFGHANISTAN. caravans leave Ghazni for Hindustan and return, carrying merchandise, and fighting their way, if neces- sary, through the passes. They carry their trade likewise to the other great centres of central Asia, such as Herat, Kandahar, Kabul, and Bokhara. They are one of the institutions of Afghanistan, their trade having continued now, on the same basis as that on which it now exists, for nearly four hundred years. The Baraichis occupy Shorabak, a country about sixty miles square between the Khojah Amran range and Pishln. They are a simple people, possessing many camels, which they use to draw the plough. Pishln is inhabited by the Tor Tarlns. Their prin- cipal occupation is agriculture, for which they use bullocks, though camels are plentiful. The valley is sixty miles long by thirty, and very fertile. Another tribe of the Tarlns, called the Spin Tarlns, possess the country extending from the vicinity of Pishln to the Sulimani range. This country includes the long valley of Zaloura and the open plains Tall and Chutiali. These people are considered brave and inoffensive. The Hazaras and the Aimaks dwell in the lofty regions of north-western Afghanistan, stretching as far as the country above Herat. The Hazaras are Tartars by descent, simple-hearted, and differ much from the Afghan tribes. In physiognomy they more resemble the Chinese. Although Mahomedans, they belong to the Shiah persuasion, and give but a qualified allegiance to the Amir. The Aimaks are a cognate tribe, of Moghol origin. The women of both tribes have great influence, and go unveiled. DESCRIPTIVE. 45 In addition to these races there dwell in Afghan- istan the Kuzilbashis, a race of Persian descent, generally resident in towns, and constituting as it were the bulk of the more intellectual middle class. They are better educated than the Afghans. Their intelligence is apparent from the fact that the Afghan artillery is principally recruited from their ranks. In a somewhat lower stratum of society are the Hindkis, or men of Hindu descent settled in Afghan- istan ; and in one lower still, are the Jats — probably a Mahomedan branch of the great family of the Getce. Whilst the Kuzilbashis are mostly merchants, traders, and physicians ; and the Hindkis bankers ; the Jats are farm-servants, sweepers, or musicians. I turn now to the tribes inhabiting the north-eastern part of the country, enclosed between Hindu-Kush, the Indus, the Salt Range, and the Sulimani. These tribes are comprehended under the general name of Berdurani, but they are more often spoken of by the distinct names of the clans into which they are divided. I shall deal with them according to the order from east to west in which they occupy the country. I must begin by reminding the reader that, using general terms, our north-west frontier may be de- scribed as an irregular line, following the forms of the mountains which separate the intervening valley from the river Indus. The tribes who occupy the western slopes of those mountains are subject to the Amir of Kabul. Those on the eastern slope, overlooking the Indus valley, are practically independent. The Kagan valley, some twenty miles broad, occu- 46 AFGHANISTAN. pies the space between Kashmir and the independent Kohistani tribes, and forms the easternmost point of our frontier. The tribes located here occupy the Black Mountain, east of the Indus. They are princi- pally the Hasanzai and Kohistanls, with a sprinkling of Chagurzais and Swatls, emigrants from the neigh- bouring hills and valleys. They can collect from two thousand to three thousand fighting men ; but they have shown on two occasions that as warriors they are not formidable. Below Kag'an, but west of the Indus, in the Yusafzai country, directly opposite Hazara, at a corner of the Peshawar valley, is the Mahaban mountain. The dis- trict in which this mountain rises borders on Tanawal, the chief town of which is Amb, on the Indus, and its ruler is tributary to the British Government. On the eastern slopes of Mahaban are the Amazais, counting one thousand two hundred fighting men ; on the northern slopes the Atmanzais, one thousand t^ro hundred strong; and on the southern slopes, over* looking the Gusapzai plain, are the Jaduns, able to muster two thousand five hundred warriors. Immediately north of the Mahaban range is the valley of Chamla. Chamla is politically a part of Buner, to which it is joined by a spur of the Guru mountain. It is accessible from the Yusafzai plain by several passes, but of these the passes of Ambela and Malandara are the easiest. The tribes inhabiting these valleys belong to the great Yusafzai clan. They are estimated to be able to turn out about six thousand fighting men. DESCRIPTIVE. 47 Settled amongst these tribes are the Hindustani fanatics known as the Sitana Wahabis. They occupy the village of Sitana, and are bitterly hostile to the British. It was to punish them that the Ambela cam- paign of 1863 was undertaken. They are said to be able to muster one thousand two hundred fighting men. North of Buner is the extensive valley of Swat, in- habited by branches of the Akozai Yusafzais. The Swat valley has a length of some seventy miles, and a breadth varying from a few hundred yards to ten miles. The south-western portion of it is separated from British territory by a range of hills extending from the Buner border to the Swat river, where it emerges from the hills into the Yusafzai plains. Of the eleven passes by which it is connected with this plain, three only, those of Mora, Shakot, and Mala- khand, are considered easy. “ Swat,” says Dr. Bel- lew,* in a little pamphlet from which I have often quoted, “ Swat is a very important country in con- nection with the approach to India from the north- west. Through it, by Bajawar and the Hinduraj pass into Kiinar, is the main route to Jalalabad and Kabul. Alexander the Great and the Emperor Babar both entered India by this route, and it has also been used by columns of most of the invading armies of the Ghaznivides and Moghols.” The Swat valley numbers a population of about one hundred thousand, and, in- cluding the contiguous tribes of Bajawar and Dir, can turn out eighteen thousand fighting men. * “Our Panjab Frontier,” by a Panjab Official. Calcutta, 1868. 48 AFGHANISTAN. Between the Kabul and Swat rivers, to the north- west of Peshawar, is the country inhabited by the Mohmands. “The low, bare hills lying between those rivers,” says Bellew, “rise towards the north into the lofty Koliimor mountain which forms the boundary between the Mohmands and the Tarkilanis of Bajawar. Towards Kabul these hills open on the Jalalabad plain and the Kunar valley, whilst towards Peshawar they abut on the Doaba plain (in the angle of the junction between the Swat and Kabul rivers), which is British territory. Towards the south the Mohmands occupy a strip of hills on the right bank of the Kabul river, which, in its course through their country, is thus entirely in their hands.” Through their territory runs like- wise the Abkliana and Karappa routes from Peshawar to Jalalabad, referred to in a previous page as routes which turn or avoid the fortress of Ali Masjid. The chief town of the Mohmands is Lalpura, on the left bank of the Kabul river, and opposite the western entrance to the Khaibar pass. They are a very powerful clan. The six tribes into which they are divided are called the Tarakzai, the Halunzai, the Baizai, the Khwazai, the U'tmanzai, and the Dawezai. Their fighting strength has been calculated at from ten to sixteen thousand men. Their alliance, however, can be pur- chased. “ The Mohmands, like all Patlians,” writes Macgregor, “ are very fond of talking about Pathan honour, but they are not the less amenable to golden influences, and there is no doubt they would sell or prostitute any thing, or kill anyone, for gold. As a native official, who knows them well, says, ‘You have DESCRIPTIVE. 49 only to put a rupee in your eye and you may look at any Mohmand, man or woman.’ ” The Mohmands are nominally subject to the Amir, but they pay him no taxes, and are really independent. The extensive hill region between the Kabul river, round the spurs projecting from the eastern end of the Safed-Koli to the Kurm valley, as far as the Pewar pass, is occupied by the Afridis, the Arakzais, and by Zwaimuklits, Afghans, and Toris. The Afridi territory begins from the right bank of the Kabul river, and extends for fifty miles due south in contact with British territory thd whole distance. A tongue of Afridi territory interposes between Peshawar and Kohat, directly interrupting the communication be- tween the two places. This tongue is traversed by the Kohat pass, some fifteen miles in length by four in breadth. We pay the Afridis a subsidy to keep this pass open for us, but the arrangement is a bad one. The Afridis will not allow the road to be improved, and though neither steep nor difficult, it is much obstructed by huge rocks. The connection of the Afridis with the English has caused much bloodshed, and has necessitated many expeditions — the last being that undertaken nearly a year ago against the Jawaki Afridis, who hold the eastern tower on the crest of the pass.* There is a good gun road from the crest of the pass into Kohat. The Afridis can send twenty thousand men into the field. They are the best armed and most warlike of * The centre tower is held by the Bangash tribe : the western by the Sfpahs. 4 50 AFGHANISTAN. all the frontier tribes. They are quite independent of the Anhr. Their neighbours, the Arakzais, are nearly as numerous. They occupy the country south of the Afridis, and spread on to the Kurin valley, along the eastern and southern offshoots from the Safed Koh. They can muster eighteen thousand armed men. They are independent of the Amir, and trade directly with the British. The Zwaimukhts, the Afghans, and the Toris, the next neighbours of the Arakzais, occupy the Kurm valley as far as the Powar pass. They are subject to the Amir. They can bring eight thousand men into the field. The Yaziris, who next demand attention, occupy the country to the west of the trans-Indus frontier from Thai in Miranzai to the Gfomal pass. They hold both sides of this pass, which is the great route by which the trade of Afghanistan and central Asia passes into India. They muster about twenty thousand fighting men. Below the Yaziris are the Shiranis and Ashtaranis. The former occupy the Takht-i-Suliman, or Kaisagarh, and the hills which surround its base. They can turn out about four thousand fighting men. Agriculturists by pursuit, they are likewise plunderers by profession, and are constantly warring on their neighbours. In their country is Zarkani, from which the great cara- vans start for Kandahar. The Ashtaranis occupy the Suliman range from a little south of the Takht-i- Sulim an to the Khuri pass DESCRIPTIVE. 51 on the Dera Ishmail frontier. They are a small tribe numbering about one thousand warriors. The Khuri pass is the southern limit of the independent Pathan tribes. South of this point come the Baluchis, who are partly independent, settled within the British border. Such are the frontier tribes. “ In general terms,” writes Dr. Bellew, whose long and varied service on the frontier invests his opinion with the highest authority, “ in general terms they may be described as utter barbarians (some perhaps less so than others), steeped in the grossest ignorance. By birth they are savages, by profession robbers. Beyond the care of their flocks and fields, they follow no industrial pur- suits. Under no authority at home, they are con- stantly at feud with each other, and at hostility with their neighbours. Murder and robbery are with them mere pastimes ; revenge and plunder the occupation of their lives. The circumstances under which they live have endowed them with the most opposite qualities — an odd mixture of virtues and vices. “ Thus they are hardy, brave, and proud ; at the same time they are faithless, cunning, and treacherous. Frugal in their own habits, they are hospitable to the stranger and charitable to the beggar. The refugee they will protect and defend with their lives, but the innocent wayfarer they will plunder and slay for the pleasure of the act. Patriotic in a high degree, and full of pride in race, yet they will not scruple to betray for gold their most sacred interests or their nearest relations. Professedly they are Mahomme- 4 * 52 AFGHANISTAN. dans, but their knowledge of the religion is very hazy, and they never hesitate to set aside its tenets when they happen to be opposed to their desires or interests. They are nevertheless extremely bigoted, are entirely controlled by their priests, and are at all times ready for a jahad (crusade), be the infidels black or white. “ Secure in the recesses of their mountains, they have from time immemorial defied the authority of all governments (barbarous governments) that have pre- ceded us on this frontier, and, gathering courage from their success, have for centuries been the terror of the peaceful cultivators on the plain, whose crops and cattle, whose maidens and wives, they have looked upon as fair game for plunder. Lastly, disunited by mutual jealousies and clan feuds, they are incapable by themselves of combining in a common enterprise distant from their hills ; but they have never failed, on the passage of invading armies from the west, to swarm down from their mountain retreats to swell the ranks of the plunderers, in the hope of reaping a rich harvest in the plains of India.” Such is the character of the tribes. In the chapter which will be devoted to the review of the action of the Government of India on the frontier, I shall have much to say of their conduct. 53 CHAPTER II. HISTORICAL. — THE GHAZNIVIDE PERIOD. According to Hanway, the oldest European authority who treats of the Afghans, the Abdali tribe, then dwelling in the eastern part of Herat, embraced towards the end of the ninth century the Mahomedan religion, and communicated it to the remainder of the Afghan people. At this period Khorasan and Transoxiana were governed by princes of the house of Samani. Their capital was Bokhara. The sway of this house would seem to have extended over a great part of Central Asia, including the country now known as Afghanistan. It lasted a hundred and twenty years, and it was during that period that we find the territories of which I am about to treat first coming into prominence. Abdulmelek, fifth prince of the house of Samani, had raised to high honours and dignities a Tiirki slave, named Alptegin, and had finally conferred upon him the government of Khorasan. Abdulmelek died in the year 961. On his death the high officers of state assembled to choose a successor from the members of 54 AFGHANISTAN. the royal family. Every chief, with the exception of Alptegin, voted for Mansur. Mansur consequently ascended the throne. He at once showed his sense of Alptegin’ s adverse vote by depriving him of his government. Other persecutions followed this arbitrary act, and Alptegin, finding his life threatened, rebelled. Fol- lowed by some three thousand Turkis he escaped to Ghazni, and proclaiming himself independent, bade defiance to the Samanis. The inhabitants of Herat, of Sistan, and of Balkh, remained faithful to the Samanis ; but those of the eastern parts rallied round Alptegin, and enabled him to bid defiance to his liege lord. For fourteen years he maintained and strengthened his position. On the death of Alptegin, m A.D. 976, a Turk! slave, named Sabaktagin, who, it is said, had married his daughter, succeeded him.* It was in the reign of this prince that the countries now known as Afghan- istan and India came first into contact. Whatever may have been the provocation, the invasion came from the side of India. At that time Jaipal was Raja of the country now known as the Panjab, but then called Lahor. His rule extended from Multan to Kashmir, and from Sirhind to the plain of Peshawar. It would appear that the establishment of an independent Mahomedan kingdom at Ghazni had alarmed this Hindu rider for the * Ferishta states that Isaak, son of Alptegin, was his immediate successor ; hut that he lived only two years, leaving the kingdom to his brother-in-law, Sabaktegin. THE GHAZNIVIDE PERIOD. 55 security of his dominions, and this alarm had been increased by the continued and unchecked raids of his neighbours. He determined, therefore, to anticipate more active proceedings on their part by becoming himself the invader. He crossed the Indus, then, with his army, and moved over the plain which sepa- rates Peshawar from Jamnid. There he was met by Sabaktagin. Before, however, the two armies could engage a furious tempest supervened. This storm so disconcerted Jaipal that he offered to treat for peace. Sabaktagin was at first unwilling, but in the end he agreed to permit his enemy to retire across the Indus, on condition of yielding at once fifty elephants, and paying, on his return to Lahor, a considerable sum for the expenses of the war. Jaipal complied with the first condition, but evaded the second. Indignant at this breach of faith, Sabaktagin, who had returned to Ghazni, resolved to enforce the con- dition. He therefore once again marched towards Peshawar. To meet the coming danger, Jaipal in- voked the aid of the Rajas of Dehli, of Ajmir, of Kalinjar, and of Kanaoj. This aid was readily afforded, and at the head of a large and well-appointed force, Jaipal marched to the Peshawar plain, and took up a position at Laghman. Upon him here encamped Sabaktagin issued from the Khaibar pass. The force of the Ghazni chieftain consisted largely of cavalry. Keeping the enemy’s wings in check with his marks- men, Sabaktagin made repeated and continuous charges with his horse on their centre. When he thought this sufficiently shaken he ordered a general assault along 56 AFGHANISTAN. the whole line. The effect was decisive. The Indian army was beaten ; their camp fell into the hands of the victor, and by him the country up to the banks of the Indus was annexed. A trusted officer, at the head of ten thousand horse, was appointed Governor of Peshawar.* Thus secure on his eastern frontier, Sabaktagin set to work to extend and settle his own dominions. Kandahar was occupied and annexed. Shortly after- wards he was summoned to Bokhara by Ndh, or Noah, the representative of the Samani kings, to quell a re- bellion in that country. By the intervention of Sabak- tagin the rebellion was quelled, and whilst he himself was confirmed by the Samani in his own government, that of Kliorasan was confided to his son Mahmud. Sabaktagin died when returning from this expedition. “ Sabaktagin,” writes Perrier, quoting, as I under- stand, from Abdullah Khan, of Herat, “ may be con- sidered as the first sovereign who reigned over Afghanistan properly so called ; but the Afghans, in consequence of his Tartar origin, looked upon him and his descendants as tyrants and usurpers, and thought little of his good deeds and the benefits he conferred upon them.” The truth of this judgment is borne witness to by the revolt of the Ghilzais occur- ring in the reign of his successor. The natural successor of Sabaktagin was his eldest son Mahmud, then in his thirtieth year. But Mahmud was absent from the capital at his government of * Briggs’s “ Ferishta,” vol. i. THE GHAZNIVIDE PERIOD. 57 Nishapor (in Khorasan) ; and the younger brother, Ishmail, seized the reins of power. The possession of the treasury enabled him to obtain from the leading men of the government oaths of allegiance and promises of support. But Mahmud was a very capable prince : hardy, active, a warrior from his cradle, accustomed to deal with men, and conscious of his own innate power. He offered at first no violent opposition to his brother. He contented himself by pointing out to him that the task of governing the wild tribes who had obeyed his father would be too much for him, but that he might manage Balkh and Khorasan : that if he would yield the remainder he might have those. Ishmail refused ; whereupon Mahmud marched upon Ghazni. Ishmail hastened from Balkh to cover his capital. In the battle which followed Mahmud was the victor. Ishmail, who was taken prisoner, passed the remainder of his days in confinement. His rela- tionship to the conqueror shut him out from any position but a prison or a throne, and he had refused the latter. He was treated in other respects with kindness and consideration. The ruler of Grhazm was still nominally a vassal of the king of Bokhara. On the death of Sabaktagln, the sovereign of that country, Abul Mansur, encou- raged by the contest raging between the two brothers, nominated a creature of his own, Amir Tuzan Beg, to the governorship of Ghazni. Mahmud remonstrated. In reply he was informed that he had already Balkh, Hurmuz, and Herat, and that the favours of his suzerain 58 AFGHANISTAN. must be divided; that, on that account, he had deemed it right to bestow Ghazni upon one who had always been a good and faithful servant to his lord. This conduct on the part of Abul Mansur was fraught with ruin to the house of which he was the representative.* Whilst Mahmud, failing again in a conciliatory policy, raised an army to watch events, treason was busily at work in the camp of his rash and inflated suzerain. The “ good and faithful servant,” Tuzan Beg, to whom he Trad given the government of Ghazni, conspired with the minister against him, put out his eyes, and raised his brother, a minor, to the throne. The conspirators hurried on to Merv, where they were attacked and defeated by Mahmud. This misfortune was not solitary. I'lak Khan, ruler of Kashgar, seized the opportunity to march on Bokhara, slay the boy sovereign, and annex the whole- of Transoxiana. With the boy’s death the house of Samani ceased to exist. Mahmud was now independent ruler of Afghanistan, including the countries now known as Afghan Tur- kistan and Badakshan. His first care was to settle his own territories. He then turned his attention to the country conquered by his father from Baja Jaipal, on the west bank of the Indus. Into these he intro- duced order, strengthening the forts, and placing in them garrisons under trusted soldiers. Beturning then to Ghazni, he cemented a firm alliance with the king of Bokhara by a marriage with his daughter. At # The house of Samdui. THE GHAZNIVIUE PERIOD. 59 the same time lie paid attention to the organization of courts of civil and criminal justice throughout his territories. No sooner had Mahmud arranged these matters to his satisfaction than his soaring spirit began to pant for new fields of glory. Instinctively he turned his thoughts to India. He had served with his father in the campaign against Jaipal. He had wit- nessed the ease with which the vast hosts of the enemy had been overthrown by his hardy troopers : and he believed that those vast hosts, or others not one whit their superior, were the sole defenders of the fabled riches of India. Mahmud was the ruler of the country which was rich only in rocks and stones ; but India boasted of wealthy cities, of fertile plains, of temples piled up with gold and precious stones. Rich in these respects as India then was, the imagina- tion painted her as richer still. What wonder, then, that Mahmud, young, daring, and ambitious, living in an age and in a country when the right of the strongest was recognized as the highest law ; what wonder that he, having settled the affairs of his house and of his country, should resolve to invade that land of bright promise ! He invaded it. In the month of August 1001,* Mahmud set out with ten thousand chosen horse from * Professor Dowson (“ Elliot’s History of India,” Appendix, Note D.) refers to a story, in which he says there is no improbability, that Mahmud made a successful expedition to the frontier towns of India in the year preceding. But the accounts are very vague. 60 AFGHANISTAN. Ghazni. But his father’s old antagonist, Jaipal, had already levied an army and had crossed the Indus. The rivals met on the 27th of November in the plain of Peshawar. The forces were unequal. Jaipal is said to have disposed of thirty thousand infantry, twelve thousand horse, and three hundred elephants. Mahmud had only ten thousand horse. But whilst the latter were proved warriors it is easy to con- jecture that two-thirds of the Indian army were soldiers merely for the occasion. The result was fatal to Jaipal. Not only was he defeated with great slaughter, but he himself, with fifteen of his prin- cipal chiefs, was taken prisoner. Released on the promise of the payment of a yearly tribute, Jaipal returned to Lahor and resigned his crown to his son A'nand-pal. He then placed himself on a funeral pile, and, lighting it with his own hands, perished in the flames. Mahmud pursued his advantage over the Indians, took and plundered Waihind, an important town on the Indus, some fifteen miles above A'tok, and often the seat of the court of the King of Lahor,* and then returned to Ghazni. In November of the year following, 1002, he made a successful expedition to Sis tan. A'nand-pal, meanwhile, continued to pay his tri- bute; but one of his feudatories, the Raja of Bhera, a town on the left bank of the Jailam under the # Professor Dowson effectually disposes of the fable that Mahmud crossed the Satlaj, and marched on Batinda. Waihind is the modern Hund. Vide “Elliot’s History,” Appendix, Note D. THE GHAZNIVIDE PEEIOD. 61 Salt Range, was not so compliant. The walls of Bhera were high; the ditches were deep. Behind these the Raja thought he could safely bid de- fiance to the Turki cavalry. But Mahmud was not the man to brook defiance. He set forth at the head of his troops (1004), and marching by the valley of Banu, and following the course of the Khiiram, crossed the Indus near I'sakhel and the old town of Rori, and, passing the Sind-Sagar Doab, through Mitta Tiwana, reached Bhera by way of Kushab and Shahpur.* The defiant Raja, Bijai Singh by name, was a brave and skilful soldier. He had taken care to fortify and strengthen the outlying posts leading to Bhera, and he had garrisoned them with his bravest soldiers. Mahmud was not accustomed to the warfare thus imposed upon him. His soldiers suffered, and — for the first time — they murmured. For three days the detached forts barred their progress, and strewed the ground with dead. The abandonment of the enter- prise was discussed. But on the fourth day victory crowned the assailants in an attack led by Mahmud in person. Still the town with its high walls and its deep ditch remained. Mahmud appeared before it, and, in spite of every obstacle, succeeded in filling up the ditch. Disheartened, Bijai Singh determined to retire from the town with his main force, leaving only a small detach- ment to defend it. But Mahmud received notice of * Professor Dowson, ut supra. 62 AFGHANIS'!’ \ A . his enemy’s designs. He intercepted the retreat. The enemy’s soldiers, surprised, attempted to escape. The Raja, to avoid being taken prisoner, turned his sword against his breast. The same night the town was stormed, and, with its dependencies, was added to the kingdom of Grhazni. The following year, 1005, the ruler of Multan, Abii-1 Fath Daud, incurred the displeasure of Mahmud by encouraging deviations from the true faith of the Mahommedans. Mahmud at once marched to bring him to reason, On hearing of this, Abu-1 Fath Daud implored the assistance of A'nand-pal, Raja of Labor. A'nand-pal came to his assistance, but, meeting his former conqueror on the fatal plain of Peshawar, was defeated and pursued with great slaughter as far as Sodra, near Wazirabad. Mahmud marched at once on Multan, brought its refractory ruler to terms, and then accorded peace to A'nand-pal on condition of the latter becoming a tributary of Grhazni. Peace had scarcely been concluded when. Mahmud was called away to meet an invasion of Afghan Tur- kistan by Dak Khan, his father-in-law, King of Kash- gar and of Bokhara. Leaving as his vicegerent on the east of the Indus, one Sewakpal, or Siikhpal, a Hindu chief who, taken prisoner in some previous raid, had embraced Mahomedanism, he hastened with the bulk of his army to the north-west, and met his father-in- law about twelve miles from Balkh. A desperate battle ensued, accompanied in its course by varied fortune. But again the star of Mahmud prevailed. The enemy were totally defeated, and so humbled that THE GHAZNIVIDE PERIOD. 63 the baffled Ilak Khan never appeared again in the battle-field during the life of Mahmud. But there was no rest for the conqueror. Hardly had the pursuit of his enemy ended than intelligence reached him that Sewakpal, the renegade whom he had left as his vicegerent in the Panjab, had renounced his new creed and had revolted. Hurrying back by forced marches, Mahmud surprised, defeated, and made prisoner the rebel. The punishment awarded him was a heavy fine and imprisonment for life. Mahmud then returned to Ghazni (1007). Not, however, to remain there. It may have been that the aid given by A'nand-pal to the refractory chief of Multan * rankled in his mind. More probable is it, I think, that having touched only the confines of the treasure-land of India, his soul longed for a more minute examination of that land of promise. This at least is certain, that in the year 1008 the fear of anew invasion from the north spread over India. A'nand-pal at once resolved that this time the Ghazni ruler should encounter no unworthy foe. He sent pressing mes- sages to the Rajput princes of India, telling them that their own fate was at issue ; that the conquest of the borderland of the Panjab would be but a prelude to their own destruction ; that to subdue their enemy he must be met with overwhelming numbers near his own frontier. He finally appealed to their strong love for their religion to incite them to oppose that religion’s greatest enemy. * “ Ferishta.” 64 AFGHANISTAN. The appeal was not in vain. The Rajas responded with their armies — the soldiers animated by a deep enthusiasm. Led on by A'nand-pal they advanced towards the Indus, and encamped on a plain on its left bank. Mahmud crossed to meet them there, but seeing their numbers, and noting their enthusiasm, he covered his position with intrenchments, and en- deavoured by all the means in his power to lure the Hindus to an attack. At last he succeeded. Six thousand archers sent to the front, discharging their arrows and then retiring, drew out the enemy. The battle then joined. But whilst it was yet raging furiously, thirty thousand Gakk’hars* penetrated on two sides into the Grhazm- vide lines, and forcing their way into the midst of the cavalry, cut down men and horse with their swords, daggers, and spears, so that, in a few minutes, they slaughtered three or four thousand of them. They carried their success so far that Mahmud, noticing their fury and the disorder they were spreading, and unable to stop them, thought for a moment of retreat. Never had he been so near defeat. But, at this crisis, fortune befriended him. The elephant upon which A'nand-pal was riding became suddenly un- controllable from the effects of the naphtha balls and arrows discharged at him by the archers, and turning * The Gakk’hars were a people inhabiting the hilly parts of the Rawal Pindi and Jailain districts, from Khanpur, on the borders of the Hazarah district, along the lower range of hills skirting the Tahsils of Rawal Pindf, Kahuta, and Ga j ar Khan, as far as Domeli in the Jailam district. THE GHAZNI VIDE PEKIOD. 65 suddenly, dashed with his rider through the ranks far from the battle-field. The Hindus, noticing the sudden disappearance of their leader, regarded it as a signal for flight. Abandoning then the victory within their grasp they turned and fled. The Gak- khars followed. Mahmud pursued them without delay for two days, killed eight thousand of them, and captured thirty elephants, and booty not to be counted.* Mahmud pushed on to Nagarkot, the modern Kdt Kangra, a strongly fortified place, guarding a temple greatly reputed for its wealth. Nagarkot might easily have been defended by a small force in the days when gunpowder and cannon were unknown. But the movements of Mahmud had been so rapid that the enemy had had no time to throw a garrison into it. Mahmud found it guarded by priests ; and these peaceful recluses were only too happy to come to an arrangement by which their lives should be assured to them. On the third day after Mahmud had appeared before it they surrendered the temple — and its contents. Those contents must have satisfied Mahmud — pos- sibly they whetted his desire to explore further. According to the Persian and Arabic historians the plunder amounted to one thousand four hundred pounds of gold and silver plate, four hundred pounds of golden ingots, four thousand pounds of silver bul- lion, forty pounds weight of pearls, corals, diamonds, * “ Ferishta ” : vide also Professor Dowson, ut supra. 5 66 AFGHANISTAN. and rubies, and specie to the value of three hundred and thirteen thousand three hundred and thirty-three pounds sterling.* With this booty Mahmud returned towards Ghazni (1009). The next exploit in the life of Mahmud is specially worthy of notice, inasmuch as it brings him in contact with the most numerous tribe of Afghans of our own day — the Ghilzais. According to Hanway, the Ghilzais, learning that the troops of Mahmud were returning to Ghazni in detachments, laden with plunder, laid wait for them in the mountain passes and succeeded in cutting off several of them. They had imagined that, winter being at hand, operations against them would be de- layed till the spring, by which time they would be in safety in their haunts in the Glior mountains, north- east of Herat. But they reckoned without — Mahmud. That prince, hearing of the insult, collected a small body of troops, and pushing beyond Kandahar, pursued the rebels without intermission. The season was January, 1010. The severity of the weather denied to the Ghilzais refuge in the mountains. They were forced to descend into the plain. There Mahmud attacked and slaughtered them. Indeed, he killed all on whom he could lay his sword. A few families only succeeded in escaping into the more habit- able recesses of the mountains. For the moment, for years to come, they were utterly crushed. The survivors had lost everything but the power of retri- * Brigg’s “ Ferishta.” The computation is made according to the lowest scale. THE GHAZNIYIDE PERIOD. 67 bution. That, at least, remained to them. And it was, finally, one of their number who gave the death- blow to the house of Mahmud and supplanted it on the throne.* Having crushed the Ghilzais, Mahmud hurried the same year to Multan to crush in the bud the rebellion of the chief he had reduced and restored in 1004- — Abu-1 Fatli Lodi. The insurrection was easily quelled, and Mahmud returned to Ghazni, bringing Abu-1 Fath Lodi as a prisoner. It was probably cupidity alone that induced the next raid of Mahmud into India. The Hindu Rajas were submissive, and paid regularly their tributes. But the wealth of the temple of Nagarkot had but whetted his appetite. The fame of the riches of Thanesar had reached him. He was resolved to clutch them. Thanesar is in the province of Sirhind, on the road between Karnal and Ambala, about oue hundred miles north of Dehli. Mahmud made no secret of his inten- tions. He sent messengers to A'nand-pal, requesting him to arrange for the transit of his army through his territories. The Hindu Prince, unprepared for resis- tance, earnestly pleaded for the sacred temple. He offered, if Mahmud would but spare it, to guarantee to the invader the annual revenues of the town, to give him fifty elephants, and to pay the equivalent of a large sum in jewels. But Mahmud was deaf alike to pro- * This subject is again referred to at the beginning of the third chapter. 68 AFGHANISTAN. mises and to entreaties. He continued liis march, sacked the town, plundered the temple, and returned to Ghazni, says Ferishta, “ with two hundred thousand captives and much wealth ; so that the capital appeared like an Indian city, no soldier of the camp being without wealth or without many slaves.” Mahmud was well aware that during his march on Thanesar, A'nand-pal and the Rajput princes of India were placing their armies on a war footing, with a view to a new confederacy against him. Before, then, he had decided to return from that place to Ghazni, he felt inclined to seize upon Dehli. But his officers repre- sented to him that, with his position in Multan still insecure, and with A'nand-pal on his communications, it would be the height of imprudence to draw upon himself the hostility of all the Rajas of Hindustan. Mahmud accepted the advice, and returned to Ghazni, there to settle his domestic affairs, and to prepare for new conquests. In the years 1013 and 1015, Mahmud made two expeditions into Kashmir. The first was opposed by JaipallL, son of A'nand-pal, who had lately died, but unsuccessfully. Kashmir was conquered, and many of its inhabitants were forcibly converted to Maliome- danism.* The second expedition ended unfavourably for the invader. It was undertaken to reduce some forts in the Kashmir territory, unsubdued in the pre- vious expedition. Prominent amongst these was the * Professor Dowson places this first expedition before the ex- pedition to Thanesar, but it is uncertain. THE GHAZNIVIDE PERIOD. 69 fort of Loh-kot, remarkable for its strength and the inaccessible nature of the ascent to it. All the efforts of Mahmud to reduce this place were unavailing. The summer came and passed ; the autumn followed, and still Loh-kot held out ; at last winter supervened, and Mahmud, with the snows upon him, was forced, for the first time in his life, to abandon an unfinished enterprize. His retreat was disastrous. Misled by guides, his troops became entangled in extensive morasses ; numbers of them perished. Hot dispirited by this disaster, Mahmud turned his arms the following year, 1016, in a new direction. His father-in-law, Ilak Khan, King of Kashgar and Bokhara, had died in 1015. The countries ruled by him became at once a prey to civil war. The aid of Mahmud was invoked by one of the contending parties. He crossed, then, the border, occupied Samarkhand and Bokhara, and conquered the country of Khwarizm.* He remained there some time to regulate the govern- ment of the conquered country. This he bestowed upon Altum Tash, giving him the title of King of Khwarizm. He then returned to Ghazni. The year following, 1017, he undertook his ninthf invasion of India, on a scale far exceeding that of any preceding it. He had levied numbers of men in Turki- stan, in Khorasan, and in Khwarizm, and at the head of these he set out from Ghazni. His aim was Kanaoj, * The country north of Persia, between the eastern shores of the Caspian and the sea of Aral, now known generally as Khiva, f According to some, the twelfth. 70 AFGHANISTAN. distant three months’ march, but then reputed to be the wealthiest and most beautiful city in India. Kanaoj was situated on the Ganges,* in the district now known as Farrakhabad. To reach it, then, it was necessary for Mahmud to penetrate into the very heart of India, exposing his communications and his flanks. But he acted with consummate prudence. Disposing of an army, stated by Ferishta to have numbered one hundred thousand chosen horse and twenty thousand foot, Mahmud marched along the southern slopes of the Himalayas. Then crossing the Jamna, he marched upon and captured Baran, the modern Balandshahr. Moving then in the direction of Mathura, he captured the fort of Mahaban, on the Jamna, and only eight miles distant from Mathura. On that place, the Bethlehem of the Hindus, he next marched. No re- sistance was made to him. But the town was not the less given up to plunder, and the temples were fired. The booty was enormous, alike in gold, in silver, and in precious stones. Re-crossing the Jamna, Mahmud now marched on Kanaoj. According to Ferishta, the Raja of this splendid city, terrified by the arrival of the Mahome- dans, and having no means to oppose them, submitted with himself and family to Mahmud, and obtained the friendship of that monarch. In the TdriJch-i-Yamini ,f on the other hand, it is stated that he took Kanaoj and its seven detached forts. He stayed there three * This river flows now two miles east of the ruins of Kanaoj. f Professor Dowson. THE GHAZNIVIDE PERIOD. 71 days, and marched then to Manj, a town identified by Professor Dowson as the old town of Manjhawan, or Majhawan, the ruins of which are still visible on the Pandu river, ten miles south of Kanhpur. Here the Brahman garrison bravely resisted him for twenty-five days, and not one of them survived the capture of the place. From Majhawan, moving down the Ganges to Asni, he took the fort of Chandar Rao, a Hindu chief. Thence, turning from a point near Fathpur into the Bandal- khand hills, he captured one or two other places, and then marched towards Ghazni, “ loaded with spoil and encumbered with captives.” He reached Ghazni in safety. The booty he is said to have brought into the treasury amounted to close upon four hundred and twenty thousand pounds in specie, besides jewels, pearls, and precious stones. It was not thrown away. Mahmud had some magnificent ideas, and he devoted a great portion of this plunder to carry them into execution, in a manner that should tend to educate his nobles. He built in Ghazni a magnificent mosque of marble and granite. In close vicinity to it he erected a university, and, after sup- plying it with books in various languages, and a fine museum, he endowed it for the benefit of the rising youth of the country. His nobles were not slow to follow his example. Palaces, mosques, fountains, aqueducts, and cisterns, sprung up in every quarter of the city. Mahmud had found Ghazni stone. With the aid of the Indian gold he made it marble. The next year and the year following Mahmud did 72 AFGHANISTAN. not quit his capital, but in 1021 information reached him from India that the Raja of Kanaoj had been de- nounced by his brother Rajas of Hindu blood as a friend and ally of the great enemy of the Hindu faith, and had been attacked in consequence. Mahmud at once set out with an army to his assistance. Before he could arrive, however, the Raja of Kalinjar in Bandalkhand had attacked, defeated, and killed the Raja of Kanaoj. Mahmud resolved then to revenge his fate on the Raja of Kalinjar. The route which he took on this occasion is not known. The Ghaznivide prince is brought direct to the banks of the Jamna, the passage of which was opposed by Jaipal II., son of A'nand-pal. To cross the river in the face of an opposing army was difficult ; but, according to the Mahomedan writers, the daring of a few men averted the danger. The tale is difficult to believe, but there are no Hindu his- torians to controvert it. Eight of the royal guard of Mahmud’s army, says Ferishta — and his account is confirmed by Nizam-ud-Din* — swam across the river, and, entering the enemy’s camp one morning by sur- prise, struck such a panic into his troops, that the Hindus saved themselves by flight. At all events, Mahmud crossed the Jamna. He then marched against the Raja of Kalinjar, and came in sight of his army, numerous, well appointed, and strongly posted. So formidable did it appear from the eminence whence Mahmud viewed it, that # Elliot’s “ History of India,” Appendix D. THE GHAZNTVIDE PERIOD. 73 he quite despaired of beating it. It is probable that on this occasion his fame as a warrior stood him in good stead. Our modern life is full of examples of the effect produced by a reputation not so well founded as was that of Mahmud. But, however this may have been, this at least is certain, that the enemy fled during the night, leaving their camp with all its booty and five hundred and eighty elephants a prey to the Ghaznivide. Mahmud returned at once to his capital. After his return to Ghazni, Mahmud made an ex- pedition to the countries of Swat, Bajaor, and part of Kafiristan, to bring to the true faith the Buddhist inhabitants of those regions. Sending one of his generals against Nur, he first overawed the wild tribes on the banks of the Kabul river, and then marching into Kashmir, made for the second time a demonstra- tion against the fort of Loh-kot. But, finding this impregnable, he marched on Lahor, sacked it, and finally annexed the country of which it was the capital, having there a Mahomedan governor and Mahomedan officers. His general, meanwhile, had taken Nur, and, building a fort there, had carried away captive those of the inhabitants who refused to accept the faith of the Prophet. Mahmud could not remain at rest. In 1023, he again marched from Ghazni to Lahor, and thence into Bandalkhand, his object being to defeat the Raja of Kalinjar. Passing on his way the fortress of Gwaliar, he sat down before it. But the chief holding it having propitiated him by timely presents, Mahmud broke up 74 AFGHANISTAN. and pursued his way to Kalinjar. But the Raja of that place, in consequence, probably, of the success of the policy adopted by the chief of Gwaliar, humbled himself by submission and costly presents. Mahmud, pleased and flattered, confirmed him in his govern- ment, and even added other forts to his domains. The next expedition undertaken by Mahmud was at once the most famous and the most unfortunate of his life. Nearly eight hundred years later, the recol- lection of it, acting on the imagination of a Governor- General of India, induced him to recall the event, in a “ song of triumph,” to the minds of the princes whose temples Mahmud had then despoiled. I mean the expedition to Somnath.* Somnath was a temple in the Kathwar peninsula, famous for its wealth, its sanctity, and the enthusiasm of its countless devotees. In the eyes of a man so covetous of wealth, and so devoutly pious as was Mahmud, these were faults it was necessary to correct. In the month of September 1024, then, he set out from Ghazni with an army of thirty thousand horse, besides volunteers, marching on Multan. Thence to the western peninsula his route lay across the desert country lying between the Satlaj and Rajputana. He took with him then innumerable camels and vast stores of supplies. At last he reached Ajmir. He sacked the town — its Raja having abandoned it — and laid waste the country; but left the fort un- * In the interval between the expedition to Kalinjar, and this now to be recorded, Mahmud proceeded to Balkh to punish the governor of the province for his oppression. THE GHAZNIVIHE PERIOD. 75 molested, fearing that a siege would delay too long his onward progress. He pushed on therefore, taking many forts on his way, marching through desert dis- tricts barren of water, till at last on one Thursday morning he found himself in front of the famous temple. “ Here he saw,” says Ferishta, “ a fortification on a narrow peninsula, washed on three sides by the sea, on the battlements of which appeared a vast host of people in arms, who, making a signal for a herald to approach, proclaimed to him that them great idol, Somnath, had drawn the Mahomedans thither to blast them in a moment, and to avenge the destruction of the gods of India.” Mahmud smiled at the predic- tion, cleared the battlements the following morning with his archers, and then led his men to the assault. The Turki soldiers mounted the walls by escalade, but the Hindus, exhorted by their priests and animated by religious exultation, pushed the assailants down. When the day closed, the latter had made no footing. They returned the next morning to the assault ; but again with the same result. Indeed, the defenders, encouraged by their success of the previous day, fought with greater fury than before. No lodgment was effected. The third day * the assault succeeded. Some state that the Raja of Nehrwala, the capital of Gujrat, came with an army to relieve the place. It is more probable that some of the Hindu garrison, elated with their success in repelling the assailants, had the temerity to * According to Ferishta. Ibn Asir, in his “ Kamilu-i-Tawarikh,” states that the assailants succeeded on the second day. 76 AFGHANISTAN. attack them in the open. Defeated there, the de- fenders on the walls became panic-stricken, and the place was carried. Step by step the garrison was forced back to the gate of the temple. Then followed a terrible slaughter. “ Band after band of the defenders,” says Ibn-Asir, “entered the temple to Somnath, and with their hands clasped round their necks, wept, and passionately entreated him. Then again they issued forth to fight, till they were slain, and but few were left alive. These took to the sea in boats to make their escape, but the Musulmans over- took them, and some were killed and some were drowned.” The treasures found in the temple were priceless. “ The King of Gfhazni,” says Ferishta, “ found in it a greater quantity of jewels or gold than it is thought any royal treasury ever contained before.” Mahmud stayed a year in Gajrat, delighted with its climate. Then, leaving a Hindu prince there as tributary governor, he set out on his return. He found, however, the route by Ajmir barred against him by the Hindu Raja of that country. His army had suffered too much to permit him to count upon a decisive victory against a numerous enemy ; and vic- tory, unless decisive, would be useless. He therefore determined to try a new route by the sands to the east of Sind. But want of forage, want of water, terrific heat, and the perfidy or incompetence of the guides, combined to make this march fatal to great numbers of his army. Their sufferings from thirst and from the sun were terrible. Before Multan was THE GHAZNIVIDE PERIOD. 77 reached, Somnath had indeed been avenged. From Multan to Ghazni the journey was easy. Mahmud arrived there in the earlier part of the year 1026. After a short rest at Ghazni, Mahmud once again set forth to punish the Jats, who had been prominent in molesting his army on its return from Samnath. These Jats are supposed to have been a horde of Tartars of the same stock as the Getae, and who occupied the country now known as Bahawalpur. On the approach of the king, the Jats took refuge in the islands enclosed by the smaller channels of the Indus, and where they believed they would be able to elude attack. But Mahmud had had the foresight to provide himself with boats. Embarking a portion of his army in these, he was able to force the position of the enemy, of whom having made a sufficient example, he returned to Ghazni. He made no more incursions into India. After having been all his life the invader, he was himself to be invaded. Founder of the Ghazni vide monarchy, he was destined not to descend to the tomb without meeting in the field the clan that was ever after to harass and to weaken his own. This enemy was the Seljuk Turks. It seems pro- bable that this horde, separating itself from its Tartar overlord, had emigrated, under their Seljuk chief, to Jaund on the left bank of the Jaxartes. The sons of this leader had accepted the overlordship of Mahmud, and some of the members of the family had even held high office in his army. Indeed, one of them, Amir bin Kadr Seljiiki, had so far gained his confidence that 78 AFGHANISTAN. lie had left him in 1021 in command of a garrison in India. Mahmud had, in fact, fostered the military and aggressive instincts of the horde. But now those instincts turned against himself. The Seljuk crossed the Oxus, invaded his northern provinces, defeated his generals, and plundered his districts. He was compelled to move against them. He came up with them, defeated them, and wrung from them a promise of obedience. During the remainder of his reign they did not molest him. The next conquest of Mahmud was his last, and certainly not the least in importance. Persia, origi- nally forming a portion of the territories ruled over by the Samams, had been severed from the remainder and formed into an independent kingdom by the family of Boya, also called the Dailamites, in the year 932. At the time of Mahmud’s accession, Persia had just fallen under the sway of a woman — the widow of the deceased and the guardian of the minor monarch. During the administration of the widow, Mahmud, touched, it is said, by an appeal she had made to his more generous instincts, respected her dominions. But the rule of her son gave him an opportunity he could not resist. That rule was a long succession of maladministration, brought at last to such a pitch that the interposition of Mahmud was sought for. He at once set out (1027), enticed the ruler into his power, and annexed the county to his already overgrown empire. Nearly two years later, 29th April 1030, Mahmud died, leaving a name which still lives in the veneration THE GHAZNIVIDE PERIOD. 79 of the Mahomedans of Asia. As a mere conqueror, he deserved all the fame which he acquired, for he never was beaten. As an encourager of learning, he deserves to be mentioned with respect, for not only did he employ the treasures brought him by his wars to foster among his nobles a love of art ; to found a university ; to endow seminaries ; to provide scholar- ships ; and to set apart a sum to furnish pensions to learned men ; but he invited all those who were distin- guished for their acquirements to his capital, and did his utmost to form a national literature. As the founder of a dynasty, he was a failure. He failed from the same cause that brought about the failure of his great modern prototype — he failed because he extended the area of his conquests before the ground on which he rested, and which he might have retained, had had time to settle and harden. Even under his immediate successor it began to melt away. Mahmud left two sons, twins, Mahammad and Masaud, the former of a gentle and docile nature, the latter high-spirited, daring, and fond of power. In obedience to the expressed wishes of Mahmud, Maham- mad succeeded to the throne and dignity of his father. His reign did not last long. About fifty days after his accession his household troops, corrupted by Masaud, started off to join that prince, who was hastening from his government of Persia towards Khorasan. Mahammad sent in pursuit of these house- hold troops a body of Hindu cavalry in his service ; but the Hindus, after a desperate contest, in which they inflicted considerable loss upon the rebels, were 80 AFGHANISTAN. repulsed, and their leader was killed. On being re- inforced by the household troops, Masaud despatched to his brother a proposal, which but thinly veiled his claim to supreme power. Mahammad unhesitatingly rejected it, and prepared for war. But Mahammad was not a general. He forgot that to suppress a rebellion a king must act promptly. He lost the confidence of his army by his delays, and when, on a solemn occasion, the crown fell accidentally from his head, the omen decided his generals to bring to an issue projects which had been slowly maturing. On the night of the 26th October 1030, the conspira- tors, composed of his leading nobles, surrounded the king’s tents, possessed themselves of his person, sent him as a prisoner to the fortress of Wall, and then marched to join Prince Masaud at Herat. Masaud was then proclaimed king. One of his first acts was to cause his twin brother to be deprived of his eyesight. Masaud, though not the equal of his father, pos- sessed many of the qualities which had made him the founder of an empire. But it was his fortune to have to encounter trials and difficulties more severe than any which had been imposed upon Mahmud. Mahmud had made the empire. Masaud had to defend it against vast hordes of fierce and barbarous warriors. These warriors were the Seljuki Turks. We have seen how the attempt made by this horde of warriors had been foiled by Mahmud. The death of that prince, and the civil war which followed it, offered to their leader an opportunity which he did not forego. Masaud had scarcely settled matters within THE GHAZNIVIDE PERIOD. 81 his own dominions, and had arrived at Herat from Ghazni, when he was beset by complaints of the ravages inflicted on the inhabitants of his northern frontier by the Seljuks. It happened that just about this time a conflict between claimants to the provinces of Mekran and Kachhi had been decided by the inter- vention of Masaud, but he deemed his presence necessary at Herat to regulate the final settlement. He did not, therefore, go in person against the Seljuks, but sent his general, Abdul Rais, to chas- tise them. But Abdul Rais not only failed in his object : he could not prevent the invaders from possess- ing themselves of the important towns of Samarkhand and Bokhara. Still engaged in the designs regarding Mekran and Kachhi, Masaud refrained from attacking the Seljuks in person, but ordered thither from Khwarizm his best general, Altim Tash, reinforcing his already numerous army with fifteen thousand cavalry from Ghazni. Altim Tash crossed the river Oxus, recovered Bokhara, and marched on Samarkhand. Alitagin Seljuk, the leader of the Seljuks, withdrew his army from the city on the approach of the enemy, and took up a position he had before carefully reconnoitred. The position was extremely strong. His centre occupied a village ; his right was covered by a river and a thick wood ; his left by a lofty mountain. But this was not all. Behind a hill on his left front, and far enough from the battle-field to prevent it from becoming an object of suspicion to the enemy, he had placed in ambush a large body of cavalry. 6 82 AFGHANISTAN. The battle about to ensue was to be remarkable for the valour and the devotion of the Ghaznivide general, and the fierce resolution of his soldiers. Caring little for the strength of the Seljuk position, he boldly- attacked it in front. He had already made a great impression upon it, when he was suddenly assailed in the rear by the cavalry placed in ambush. But he did not falter. Still pressing his attack in front he faced the intruders with another division of his army. The contest was desperate ; he received a mortal wound ; but he put the Seljuks to flight and forced the position. His own wound Altim Tash had con- cealed, as best he could, from his men whilst the con- test was raging. But after the victory had been gained, he assembled his officers, and telling them he had not long to live, counselled peace with the Seljuks. The offer was made and agreed to. Peace was made, but by one of its conditions Samarkhand was severed from the Ghaznivide empire. The following year, 1033, Masaud made an expedi- tion into Kashmir, with the intention of penetrating into Hindustan. It would seem, however, from the meagre accounts of the expedition that remain, that he contented himself with storming the fort of Sarsati, in the Kashmir hills. It is probable that his further progress was stopped by a severe drought and famine which prevailed this year throughout Asia, and especially in Persia and Hindustan. The year following was noteworthy for a renewal of the war with the Seljuks. Once again Masaud, in- stead of marching against them himself, sent his THE GHAZNIVIDE PERIOD. 83 generals, Boghtadi and Husen, to oppose them. When the two armies were in presence, the Seljuks sent a message to the king’s generals to the effect that they were ready to abstain from depredations provided an annual subsidy were assured to them. This message having received a contemptuous reply the Seljuks attacked the Ghaznivide camp. They were, however, repulsed and defeated, with the loss of their camp, their baggage, their wives, and their children. The greatness of the victory having, however, caused the Ghaznivide army to disperse for plunder, a compact body of the Seljuks, who had taken no part in the contest, suddenly attacked them, and changed their victory into an absolute and complete defeat. The Seljuks were then left for a time to continue their depredations unhindered. Leaving them unmolested, Masaud made, in 1036, his first expedition into India. Crossing the Satlaj he moved direct on Hansi, then considered impregnable. On the sixth day of the siege Masaud took it by escalade, and found in it enormous treasures. Thence he marched to Sunpat, fifty-one miles from Dehli, the fort and temples of which, with their trea- sure, fell into his hands. He returned to Ghazni, via Lalior, leaving at that place, as governor of his possessions on the left bank of the Indus, his son I Modud. But the depredations of the Seljuks had been in- creasing ; they were now threatening Balkh and Khorasan. At last, 1037, Masaud resolved to attack them in person. All his nobles urgently pressed this 6 * 84 AFGHANISTAN. step upon liim. One of tliose of Khorasan especially, anxious to show his sense of the fatal result of further temporising, sent him a copy of verses, in which the moral was pointed that “ the Seljuks, who were once but ants, have now become little adders ; and if they are not soon destroyed, they may in a short time become dragons.” Masaud’s first movement against the enemy was unfortunate. He set out from Balkh at the end of the year, crossed the Oxus, and occupied the province of Mawur-ul-Kehr. But an unusually cold winter, accompanied by a more than ordinary snowfall, forced him to retreat to Ghazni — a movement he accomplished only with great difficulty. Meanwhile, one of the Seljuk chiefs, Jakar Beg, had taken advantage of his retrogade movement to threaten Balkh. Masaud, then, had hardly reached Ghazni when be received a messenger from the Governor of Balkh with a pressing demand for reinforcements. The king set out with his army for Balkh. But no sooner had the other Seljuk chief, Toghral Beg, learned his departure from Ghazni, than, making forced marches, he appeared before that place, plundered the suburbs, emptied the king’s stables, and effected great damage before he could be repulsed. Jakar Beg, on his side, did not await the king before Balkh, but retreated to Merv. The distance between the two places is a hundred and eighty miles. The king fol- lowed him thither. On his way the Seljuks offered him terms — to cease from depredations on condition of receiving a tract of territory for their maintenance. THE GHAZNIVIDE PERIOD. 85 The king accepted, and alienated a tract for the purpose. It was like stopping the rapid flow of a river with a mud wall. The Seljuks did not keep their engagements for a single week. On the king’s retrogade march to Herat, they attacked his rear guard and plundered his own baggage, cutting down the soldiers who defended it. Masaud turned, and avenged himself ; then pas- sing through Herat and Nishapor (in Khorasan) he moved on to Tus (near the modern Meshed). At this place the Seljuks again attacked him, and again he defeated them. But no sooner were they defeated in one place than they appeared in another. Masaud passed the following winter in Nishapor. In the spring he marched with a large army in the direc- tion of Merv with the intention of coming to a final settlement with his enemies. The Seljuks were not less willing to bring matters to an issue. They assem- bled a large army, under their most famous leader, Toghral Beg, in the neighbourhood of Merv. Amusing the king by allowing him an easy conquest over some minor chieftains, they enticed him on to Damdunaken, the passes on either side of which they had secured. They then attacked the Ghazni vide army. The shouts of their men, and the number of their horsemen, startled some of the Ghazni vide leaders, and many of them left the field in a panic. The king was not one of these. He fought till all but his own personal guards had fled or been killed. With these he could not hope for victory. He cut his way through the enemy and escaped to Merv. But he had lost his empire. 86 AFGHANISTAN. He felt this, as he rode from Mery to Ghor, and from Ghor to Ghazni. He felt that he had received a blow from which, by the aid only of his empire west of the Indus, he could not rally. But he had India — India the fertile, the prolific, the unexhausted — and as far as the Satlaj India was his own. To India, then, he resolved, on reaching Ghazni, to retreat, there to recruit fresh forces to restore his fortunes. For India, then, after having punished the leaders who had abandoned him, he set out. One son, Modud, he left atBalkh, to offer some resistance to the enemy; another, Madud, he despatched to hold Multan ; a third, Yazidyar, he left at Ghazni, to keep down the Afghans, the Abdalis, and the Ghilzais,* who were showing their head. Taking with him all the valuables he could collect, and loading them on camels, and accompanied by his blind brother, Mahammad, Masaud set out for Lahor. But he had soon to learn by experience that an Oriental army can support neither defeat nor retreat. Arrived on the banks of the river Jailam, his household troops conspired with the camel drivers to distribute the king’s treasure amongst themselves. Masaud, enraged, appealed to the other troops to bring the others to reason. But it is probable that these had been “ squared.” A valid pretext was at hand to justify their disobedience. This was skilfully used. The blind Mahammad was released from confinement, and * This is the first mention in the record of this tribe subsequent to its slaughter by Mahmud in 1009. THE GHAZNIVIDE PERIOD. 87 declared to be tbe lawful ruler. The whole army- welcomed him with shouts. Masaud was seized and brought to the new sovereign for judgment. With a leniency typical of his character, Mahammad permitted him to choose as his residence some fort into which he might retire with his family. Mahammad, considering that his blindness unfitted him for the supervision of affairs, placed the authority in the hands of his son Ahmad, reserving to himself only the regal title. For some time the father and son remained in the Panjab, engaged in organizing their army. Meanwhile, Modud, the son of Masaud, who was governing the province of which Balkh was the capital, had heard of his father’s fate, had hastened to G-hazni, and had been welcomed there as a sovereign. He marched with all convenient speed against his uncle and cousin, met them on the banks of the Indus, and defeated them. Mahammad, and three of his sons, Ahmad, Abdul Rahman, and Abdul Ralum, were taken prisoners, and, with the exception of the last-named, who owed his life to the fact of having showed respect to King Masaud while he was in confinement, were put to death. Another son of Mahammad, who had been appointed by his father governor of Multan, was then attacked, defeated, and slain. But King Masaud had left another son, Madud, and Madrid was then in possession of Labor and its depen- dencies, and refused to acknowledge his brother. The two brothers met, then, near that capital, to decide the question of empire or death. Fortune seemed to avour Madud, for on the eve of the day for which the 88 AFGHANISTAN. battle bad been set, wliole battalions of his brother’s army came over to him. But treachery worked for his brother. The following morning Madud was found dead in his bed. The whole army then followed Modud, who thus became undisputed sovereign of the Ghaznlvide empire. He was called upon almost immediately to deal with the Seljuks. These ever-encroaching barbarians had, after their defeat of Masaud, occupied the pro- vinces of Herat, Ghor, and Slstan, and placed them under a chief of their own race as an independent kingdom. And now another clan of the same horde had captured Balkh, occupied Turkistan (the country now known as Afghan Turkistan), and had forced the Ghaznlvide general to fall back, by way of Kabul, on Ghazni. The following year, 1044, they threatened Ghazni itself, but the Ghaznlvide general, Toghral Beg, defeated them and drove them out of the country. Toghral followed up his victory against the Seljuks by marching on Kandahar, which had been occupied by the Kuzilbashis, and by defeating them. He then put the climax to his services by rebelling against his sovereign. A timely appeal made by Modud to the loyalty of his officers, suppressed, however, the rebellion and the rebel. Complications meanwhile had been occurring in Hindustan. It had happened that the contests be- tween different relations for the Ghaznlvide empire had induced in the minds of many Hindu sovereigns the belief that they could recover the independence of which the power and genius of Mahmud had deprived THE GHAZNJVIDE PERIOD. 89 them. The Raja of Dehli was the first to give the signal. Setting his army in motion, he drove the lieu- tenants of the Ghaznivide from Hansi, from Thanesar, and from their dependencies. He then marched on Kangra and took it. This success incited other dis- possessed Rajas to follow his example. Joining their forces, they marched on Labor. For seven months they sat before that capital, reducing its garrison to extremities. Finding themselves at the end of their resources, the defenders then resolved, as a last re- source, to die fighting valiantly. They accordingly made a sortie, and attacked the besiegers with all the fury of despair. Their efforts succeeded beyond their hopes. The Hindus, surprised and panic stricken, gave way and fled in disorder. It was when the Grhazmvide empire was thus being hemmed in ; when the Seljuks had occupied Persia, Sistan, and the provinces west of Kandahar ; when many towns in India and the Panjab had been lost ; that Modud, on his way to oppose the insatiable Seljuks in the west, suddenly died, leaving behind him a diminished and threatened empire. The death of Modud gave rise to new internal dis- sensions. After a short interval, in the course of which a son of Modud, aged four years, was pro- claimed under the title of Masaud II., only to be at once deposed, the sovereignty was seized by his uncle, Abu-l-Hasan, who endeavoured to fortify his claim by marrying the widow of the deceased monarch. Dis- turbances and insurrection followed this usurpation. Of these, Abu-1- Rashid, a son of Mahmud of Ghazni, 90 AFGHANISTAN. took advantage to raise his own standard and drive Abu-1- Hasan from the throne (1052). The new king at once sent two armies — the one to recover the revolted cities of the Panjab ; the other, under Toghral Hajib, to reconquer Sistan. Both armies succeeded. Toghral Hajib, however, was a strong supporter of the prin- ciple that “ might is right.” No sooner, then, had he succeeded in Sistan than he marched on Ghazni, seized the king, put him to death, and with him all the re- presentatives of the house of Sabaktagin on whom he could lay hand. Three only escaped his vigilant search. Toghral Hajib survived the perpetration of these murders but forty days. He was assassinated as he was ascending the throne to give public audience. His head was then brought out, placed on a pole, and carried round the city. Farokzad, one of the three members of the Sabaktagin line who had escaped, was then chosen by lot to be king. Farokzad was a capable man. But, feeling his want of experience, he appointed as his vizier, Noshtigin Hajib, the general who had recovered the Panjab for Abu-l~Rashid, and sent him to oppose the Seljuks, who, taking advantage of the late disturbances, were again marching on Ghazni. The two armies met not far from the capital. The battle that followed is said to have been unprecedented for the severity with which it was contested. It began with the rising of the sun, and when that orb set it was yet undecided. At last the discipline of the Ghaznivides prevailed, and their victory was assured. THE GHAZXIVIDE PERIOD. 91 Farokzad was encouraged by this great deliverance to attempt to recover the country of Khorasan from the Seljuks. His generals defeated these in a great battle, but the defeat was more than retrieved a little later by the most famous of the Seljuk leaders— the redoubtable Alp Arslan — -so that Khorasan remained permanently alienated. After a reign of six years, Farokzad died. He was peaceably succeeded by his brother Ibrahim, described by the historian, Minhaju-s-Siraj,* as “ a great king — wise, just, good, God-fearing, and kind, a patron of letters, a supporter of religion, and a pious man.” He certainly was the very opposite of his ancestor Mahmud, being a lover of peace and of the pleasures of the harem. The length of his reign is variously estimated at thirty-one and forty-two years. He made peace with the Seljuks by confirming them in all their conquests, and caused his son, Masaud, to marry a Seljuk princess. During his reign an expedition was made to India by one of his generals, and subsequently, it would seem, by the king in person. Accurate details of it are wanting. It is only known that it was successful. Ibrahim died in the year 1098, have begotten thirty- six sons and forty daughters. His son Masaud succeeded him. This prince, known in history as Masaud III., was the worthiest repre- sentative of the Gfhaznivide family. He was a lover of justice, a reformer of the laws, a remitter of taxation. # Tabakat-i-Nasiri. Elliot’s “ History of India,” vol. ii. 92 AFGHANISTAN. His mind seems to have been mainly bent upon securing to bis people a fair and just administration. Like all tbe capable members of bis family, he was firmly resolved to maintain and strengthen bis bold on India. Tbe better to superintend tbe operations of bis generals, be established, for a time, his court at Lahor, become by tbe annexations of tbe Seljuks a central part of bis dominions. His generals are said to have carried bis arms further into Hindustan than any since tbe time of Mahmud, and to have returned laden with booty ; but accurate details of these in- vasions seem altogether wanting. Masaud III. died in 1115, after reigning seventeen years. On tbe death of Masaud III. civil war again super- vened. Arslan, one of bis sons, “ famous,” according to tbe Mabomedan historian of tbe Tabakat-i-Ndsiri, “ for bis magnanimity and energy, courage and bravery,” was yet strongly sensible of the evils likely to arise from a disputed succession. To prevent these evils be seized and confined all bis brothers, and appro- priated to himself tbe crown. Unfortunately for tbe success of bis plan one of bis brothers, Bahram,* escaped. Bahram made bis way, very naturally, to tbe court of bis relative, Sultan Said Sanjar, tbe Seljuk G-overnor of Khorasan. A war ensued — a war tanta- mount to a Seljuk invasion of tbe Ghazni vide territory. After various fluctuations of fortune, it ended in tbe victory of Bahram, who at once secured bis position * “ Ferishta ” calls Bahram the brother of Arslan. Minhaju-s- Siraj speaks of him as his uncle. Other writers agree with Ferishta. THE GHAZNIVIDE PERIOD. 93 by putting Arslan to death. The civil war had lasted two years. Bahrain was a great patron of literature. He en- couraged poets and poetry. The great Persian poet, Nizami, resided at his court, and dedicated to him one of his poems. Ferishta mentions more than one instance of his patronage of literature and the arts. Bahrain made two expeditions into Hindustan to quell rebellion on the part of the Mahomedan viceroy commanding there. He succeeded. Soon after his return to Ghazni, after the success of the second ex- pedition, he committed an act which, by its results, brought about the destruction of the Ghazni vide em- pire. The act is thus stated by Ferishta : “ He soon after publicly executed Kiitb-u-Din Mahammad Ghori, Afghan, to whom he had given his daughter in mar- riage.” This Afghan prince was the brother of the ruler of the Afghan tribe which had ruled in Ghor, and which submitting to Sultan Mahmud, and subsequently to the Seljuks, had recently regained its indepen- dence. The act of Bahrain in beheading a man of so much consideration, so closely allied to himself, and the brother of the ruler of a powerful tribe, must have been caused by some pressing motive. What that motive was has never been clearly established. But the act was fatal to him. The deceased man’s brother, Saif-u-Din Sur, Prince of Ghor, at once marched with an army upon Ghazni. Bahram fled from the city towards the Panjab. Ghazni was then occupied by the Prince of Ghor, and he, preferring to remain there, sent his brother, Alla- 94 AFGHANISTAN. ii-Din Sur to represent him at Ghor. But the people of Ghazni would not have his rule. All his efforts to render himself popular with them were fruitless, and they secretly informed Bahrain as to the opportunities that were likely to offer to re-establish his throne. Profiting by these advices Bahrain suddenly appeared before Ghazni in the winter, at a time when he knew the city to be denuded of Afghan troops. The Ghorian prince, unable to meet Bahrain with his own troops, yielded to the solicitations of the treacherous inhabi- tants of Ghazni to avail himself of their services. At the head of a force composed, then, mainly of Ghazni soldiers, he went out to meet Bahrain. But hardly were the two armies in face than the Ghazni soldiers seized upon the Afghan prince, and made him over to his enemy. Bahrain entered Ghazni as a con- queror. But he tarnished his victory and blasted the prospects of his house by his treatment of the van- quished prince. “ The unhappy captive,” says Ferishta, ec had his forehead blackened, and was seated astride on a bullock, with his face towards the tail. In this manner he was led round the whole city, amid the shouts and insults of the mob ; after which, being put to torture, his head was cut off and sent to Sultan San jar Siilkuki ; while his vizier, Syud Majd-u-Din, was impaled.” Such treatment roused Alla-u-Din to fury. Vow- ing vengeance against the house of Ghazni he set out with an army for that city. In vain did Bahrain attempt to frighten him. “ The threats of Bahrain, he said, “ are as impotent as his arms.” He pressed THE GHAZXIVIDE PERIOD. 95 on, fury in liis heart, towards Ghazni. As he ap- proached the town Bahram led out his army to meet him. He had superior numbers, but the “ morale ” was with the hardy assailants. At last the battle joined. Again and again did the Ghaznivides bear down the Afghans by the weight of their numbers ; again and again did the Afghans rally and return to the onslaught. One charge more desperate than the rest decided the victory. With his own spear, Alla-u- Din transfixed the son of Bahrain. The elephant be- stridden by the latter was killed ; Bahram, however, extricating himself, succeeded in mounting a horse, and fled for his life. Alla-u-Din then entered Ghazni. The city, beauti- fied by Mahmud and his successors, was given up to flame, to slaughter, and to devastation. All the monuments of the Ghaznivide kings were destroyed, and every trace of them effaced — the tombs of Mah- mud, Masaud I., and Ibrahim excepted. For seven days the massacre, the pillage, the burning continued, and “ as if insatiate of revenge,” says Ferislita, “Alla- u-Din, when he left, carried a number of the most venerable and learned men in chains to Firoz-Koh, to adorn his triumph, when he ordered their throats to be cut, tempering earth with their blood, with which he plastered the walls of his native city.” He annexed Ghazni to his principality of Ghor. Bahram died on his way to, or on reaching, Lahor. He was succeeded there by his son Khiisru (1157). Khusru reigned seven years, the greater number of which were occupied by attempts to recover the lost 96 AFGHANISTAN. capital of his fathers. He waited at Lahor until he heard that Alla-u-Din had returned to Ghor. He then marched for Ghazni, hoping for the co-operation of Sultan Sanjar Seljuk. But the Seljiiki empire in northern Asia, so long the persistent enemy of the Ghaznivide power, was tottering to its downfall. The lieutenants of the Seljuk Sultan in Khwarizm had re- volted, and he himself was shortly afterwards defeated and dispossessed by the Turkmans of Ghiza. As these victors at once marched upon and occupied Ghazni, Khusru was forced to return to Lalior. That he made another attempt on Ghazni is improbable. Although the statement is made by Ferishta, the contrary is implied by Minhaju-s-Siraj, and it is certain that after an occupation of Ghazni for two years by the Ghiza Turkmans they were expelled by Said Ghiyas-u-Din Mahammad, the representative of the house of Ghor. Khusru, dying in 1157, was succeeded by his son, Khusru Malik. He was the last of the Ghaznivide kings. Mild, liberal, and fond of pleasure, he was not formed of the stuff that resuscitates an empire. During the whole of his reign, Glnyas-u-Din Ghori made gradual but continued encroachments on the remnants of his dominions. Peshawar fell, then the country between the Indus and the Chinab. At last Lahor itself was attacked (1181). Lahor bought her safety by surrendering the country occupied by the invader, and the son of her king as hostage. It would appear that the Ghorian monarch, under the pretext that the conditions made by Khusru Malik had not been fulfilled, returned subsequently to Lahor, but was THE GHAZNIVIDE PERIOD. 97 repulsed and compelled to withdraw. In his absence, Khusru Malik, making an alliance with the G-akk’hars of the hills, made a raid upon Sialkot, but was re- pulsed. This enterprise demonstrated to the Grhorian monarch the necessity of bringing the whole matter to a prompt conclusion. Feigning a desire to negotiate peace, he enticed Khusru and his army away from Lahor ; then suddenly interposing between him and that city he made prisoner of the one and occupied the other. Khusru and his son were doomed to imprisonment for life, but a little later they were murdered. With the deposition of Khusru terminated the rule of the Grliazmvide dynasty (1187.) 7 98 AFGHANISTAN. CHAPTER III. HISTORICAL. THE HOUSE OF GHOR. The descent of the house of Chor has been discussed by Professor Dorn, by -Mountstuart Elphinstone, by De Gingues, and by other eminent authorities. The balance of opinion is in favour of their pure Afghan origin, and I cannot but think it most probable that they were descended from the survivors of the tribe which attempted to plunder the soldiers of Mahmud on their return from India, laden with booty, in 1010, and who were attacked and nearly exterminated by that prince “ in the strong country of Ghor,” some months later.* On the disappearance from the scene of the last scion of the Ghaznivide house the Ghorians invaded India. Ghiyas-u-Din Ghori had early associated with himself in the government his brother, Moham- mad Shahab-u-Din, and it was this brother who had * Vide “ Hanway’s Travels,” vol. ii. page 98. Compare Elphin- stone’s “ History of India,” vol. ii. pages 550 and 559, and note. Vide also Brigg’s “ Ferishta,” vol. i. page 161. THE HOUSE OE GHOR. 99 conducted the final operations against Khusru Malik, described in the previous chapter, and who commanded the army ordered to operate in India. As he subse- quently ascended the throne with the title of Ma- hammad Grhori, it will save confusion if I refer to him under that name. The Panjab having been annexed, Mahammad Grhori settled the country, and returned to Ghazni. Two years later (1189) he set out on his first expedition across the Satlaj. He knew that the enemy he would have to encounter was no mean one, that the Raja of all Rajasthan, Prithi Raja, disposed of the troops of Rajputana and of Dehli, and that the kingdom of Kanaoj had recovered its ancient power and splendour. He knew that the Rajputs whom he would have to encounter were better trained, better disciplined, and better commanded than the soldiers who had followed Jaipal and A'nand-pal ; that they had profited by the experience they had had of Mahomedan soldiers, and would be ready to look them in the face. But he was bent on permanent conquest, and he went prepared to enforce it. Crossing the Satlaj, he marched on Bitanda,* in Patiala, then a town of some consideration, occupied it ; advanced to Thanesar, occupied that ; and then marched on Dehli by way of Karnal. The distance between Thanesar and Karnal is twenty-three miles ; * Ferishta states that he first marched into Ajmir, where he took the town of Batanda. But there is no such town in Ajmir, and there is no record that Mahammad Ghori made at this particular time any other conquest in that country. 7 * 100 AFGHANISTAN. the country is a broad plain. At Tiraori, midway between the two places, he was met by the armies of Pritlii Rae, Raja of Rajasthan, of Chawand Rae, Viceroy of Dehli, and of other vassal princes, amount- ing to two hundred thousand men, with three thousand elephants. The army of Mahammad Grhori was smaller m numbers but it was a well-tried and unbeaten force. With it he believed he could effectually put in practice the old Ghaznivide plan of disheartening the enemy by a succession of charges, and then breaking them by one general assault. He tried it on this occasion, sending squadron on squadron in quick succession against the Hindu centre, which appeared weakened by the great length to which the line extended. But its weakness was not real. Behind the first line the Hindu leaders had placed their best infantry, and they had planned that whilst these should offer to the on- slaught of the Moslems a stern and stubborn resistance, their wings should lap over and enclose them. So it happened. The Hindu centre remained firm and solid, proof against repeated attacks. Then the wings, wheeling inwards, took the enemy in flank and rear. The followers of Mahammad Grhori saw that defeat was inevitable and began to flee. He saw that defeat was inevitable but did not flee. Despair added fury to his normal courage. He dashed through the enemy, and came so near to the Viceroy of Dehli that he wounded him in the mouth with his lance. He would have pressed on, but the Viceroy, a brave man, delivered a counter blow which almost drove him to the ground. Some of the few attendants who had followed Ma- THE HOUSE OE GHOR. 101 hammad managed then to mount him upon a horse and carry him from the field. But the rout was com- plete. His army was pursued for forty miles. The remnants, however, collected at Bitanda,* where they were besieged for thirteen months. At the end of that time they were granted terms. Mahammad Ghori proceeded after his defeat to Glior, there to visit his brother. He then returned to Ghazni. The disgrace he had met with rankled in his heart, and, though he devoted some time to pleasure, in the hope of driving it from his memory, it would not leave him. There was but one mode of atoning for it, and that was to avenge it. Accordingly, he raised another army, and, two years after his first defeat, he again set out (1191). The court poet of the day, Hasan Nizami, thus describes him at the moment of his departure : — f “ His standards proclaim victory. Indeed, they are almost prepared to write the book of victory, His ensigns and black umbrella are full of adornment, How beautiful on the face of time are the curls and freckles of the State ! ” He marched, says Ferishta, by way of Peshawar, Multan, and Lahor, and advanced to the river Saras- vati, on the other bank of which the Hindu host was encamped. The Sarasvati is a small river in Sirhind, * The retreat on Batanda, nowhere disputed, and the fact, pre- sently to be recorded, that the next battle was fought on the Sarasvati river, seem clearly to show that the Bitanda referred to was the town of that name in Patiala. f Elliot’s “ History of India,” vol. ii. page 212. 102 AFGHANISTAN. rising in the slopes of the Himalayas, losing itself in the great sandy desert, and, except during the rainy season, is merely “ a small thread of running water.” It is regarded with peculiar veneration by the Hindus. At the time of which I am writing, it was swollen beyond its ordinary depth. The Rajput chiefs were so confident of success that they offered terms to the enemy. Mahammad Ghori replied in such a manner as to induce the belief that he was aware of his own weakness but that he could not act without his brother’s orders. This answer had the effect of causing the Hindu leaders to abate their wonted caution. Mahammad Ghori, who had anticipated this, was thus able to cross the river a little before dawn, and to attack them in their camp. Their great numbers enabled them, however, to hold the Mahomedans in check whilst they were changing their front and forming up. They succeeded in accomplishing this manoeuvre. Mahammad Ghori had, meanwhile, drawn up his men to oppose the new order of the enemy. His plan was still to weary out the enemy by charges of cavalry, but, to prevent himself from being surrounded, the charges were to be made, as it were, in retreat. That is, each division, after charging and firing its arrows, had orders to wheel to the rear, its place being at once taken by the next division, to which similar orders were issued. In this manner he fought the battle till sunset, drawing the enemy on, then checking them, then drawing them on again, always fatiguing them, but never letting them get behind him. -By sunset he THE HOUSE OF GHOE. 103 thought he had sufficiently worn out the Hindus. Placing himself, then, at the head of twelve thousand of his best horsemen, he charged their centre — this time not to let it go. The assault was so tremendous, and his grip was so firm, that it decided the battle. The centre gave way, the wings followed, and in a few minutes the entire Hindu army was fleeing in con- fusion. The Viceroy of Dehli was killed on the field. The King of Rajasthan, Prithi Raj, was taken prisoner, and put to death. The royal tents and camp equipage, and their contents, were taken. Mahammad G-hori marched at once on Ajmir, taking many important places, among others Hansi, on his way. Arriving at Ajmir he put several thousands of the inhabitants to the sword and made slaves of many others. He then laid on the country a heavy tribute, and returned to Ghazni. Behind him he left “his faithful friend and slave,” afterwards his successor, Malik Kutb-u-Din Aibak, who, in his absence, took possession of Mirath, of Aligarh, and of Dehli A But there was another Hindu sovereign yet unsub- dued, the Raja of Kanaoj. This Raja was the greatest in India. According to the Mahomedan historian, Ibn Asir, his territories “ extended lengthways from the borders of China to the province of Malwa, and in breadth from the sea to within ten days journey of Lahor.” Though this is a poetical description it is * It is owing to this circumstance, says “ Ferishta,” that foreign nations say : “ The empire of Dehli was founded by a slave.” 104 AFGHANISTAN. certain that the territories of the Rajas of Kanaoj were very considerable, extending probably from Aligarh to below Banaras, and embracing a consider- able tract to the west of the Jamna. It is probable that this king, who is called Jai Chand, had been con- siderably alarmed for his own safety by the capture of Dehli and Aligarh, for it is asserted* that it was he who collected his forces and became the aggressor. It was to punish this aggression that Mahammad Ghori came down once more with an army from Ghazni. The two armies met at Itawah. The vanguard of the Ghorian army was led by Kutb-u-Din, and the onslaught of that vanguard sufficed to put to flight the Hindu host. But the defeat was not the less crushing because so easily won. The slaughter was immense ; ninety elephants were captured, and the King of Kanaoj f was left dead on the field. As one great consequence of it Banaras fell into the victor’s hands, and saw her temples desecrated, and her treasures carried off “ upon fourteen hundred camels.” Nor was this all. The great kingdom of Kanaoj never recovered from the shock. The Mahomedan dominion was soon to extend beyond even its borders into Bihar. Mahammad Ghori returned to Ghazni, leaving at * Elliot’s “ History of India,” vol. ii. page 251. f The death of this Raja afforded the first known instance of the use of artificial teeth. “ The Hindu king,” writes Ibn Asi'r, “ was slain, and no one would have recognised his corpse but for the fact of his teeth, which were weak at their roots, being fastened in with golden wire.” — Elliot’s “ History of India,” vol. ii. THE HOUSE OF GHOE. 105 Aligarh, Kutb-u-Dm as his viceroy, to complete his work. Some disturbances in Ajmir, quelled without difficulty, afforded to the viceroy the opportunity of penetrating into Gujrat, the scene of Mahmud’s triumph. He was re-called thence by pressing orders from Ghazni. Mahammad Ghori, in fact, was on his way to Hin- dustan, and needed all his forces. This prince, anxious to consolidate his authority in central India, marched on Biana, an important place about fifty miles from Agra, took it, and planted there an Afghan colony, naming Baha-u-Din as its governor. He was about to march against the fortress of Gwaliar — the fortress on the hill still existing— when the outbreak of troubles in Khorasan re-called him to Ghazni. The siege was consequently prosecuted by his lieutenants. Gwaliar fell ; but Kutb-u-Dm advancing far into Ajmir to support the Hindu tributary prince he had placed there on the throne, was assailed in such force by the combined Hindu forces of Gujrat, Nagor, and Mher- wara, that he was forced to retreat on the town. The following year, however, he not only avenged his defeat, but succeeded in taking the forts of Kalin jar and of Kalpi and in conquering Rohilkhand. Meanwhile, Mahammad Ghori had not only quelled the troubles in Khorasan, but had re-annexed to the Ghazni sovereignty Herat and its dependencies. Whilst engaged in making these conquests he had become, by the death of his brother, the sole reigning king. Almost his first act, after he had been crowned, was 106 AFGHANISTAN. to attempt to recover the kingdoms of Khwarizm, — that important appanage that had been severed by the Seljuks from the Grhazmvide monarchy. He advanced into the country, conquered it, and forced its sovereign to take refuge in his capital, the only place remaining to him. Here he besieged him. But the King of Khwarizm defended himself with so much ability and resolution that the besiegers lost many men without gaining any corresponding advantage. The King of Khwarizm had, meanwhile, sent pressing letters to the Khitan Tartars — the same tribe which had, after the overthrow of the Seljuks in Khorasan, momentarily occupied G-hazni — and these were now responding to his call. They advanced in such force, and so suddenly, that Mahammad Grhori, to save himself and his army from absolute destruction, was obliged to fight at a great disadvantage. Never did he display more skill or greater courage — but the odds against him were altogether out of proportion, and he was completely defeated. He fled towards Ghazni, but his retreat was cut off. Of his whole army scarcely more than a hundred clung to him. But with these he made a desperate charge, fairly to be ranked with that made on the overwhelm- ing Hindu force at Tiraori. It had the same success. He cut his way through the enemy with his following, and gained the fort of Andkho.* But in Andkho he was enclosed. There was no * Andkho is now an important place just within the frontier of Afghan Turkistan, not far from Khoja Saleh. THE HOUSE OF GHOR. 107 escape. Resistance was futile. His presence too was required at his capital. He agreed, then, willingly, to purchase his freedom by the payment of a large sum of money. His presence was indeed required at the capital. The total defeat of his army had spread dismay. The report of his death following hard upon the news of his defeat incited disorder. One of his officers seized Multan. His favourite slave proclaimed him- self in Ghazni. Suddenly the released monarch appeared on the scene. Ghazni refused to open her gates to him. He marched, therefore, on Multan, took it, enlisted troops on the Indian borders, and returned to Ghazni, which, as abject now as it had been insolent before, yielded to him without a blow. Concluding, then, a peace with the King of Khwarizm, he marched into the Panjab to punish the Gakk’hars of the hills, who had invaded and plundered that pro- vince. Attacked by the king from the direction of Afghanistan, and by his faithful lieutenant, Kutb-u-Din, from that of India, these marauders were soon subdued. Mahammad Ghori then proceeded to reside at Lahor. Whilst residing here he planned a final expedition to Khwarizm — an expedition which he was resolved to make decisive. He marched then towards Ghazni. He had reached the Indus, and had laid himself to rest on his bed in a tent on the banks of that river, when some Gakk’hars noticing his exposed situation, resolved to make away with him. They crossed the river in the dead of night, entered his tent unopposed, and murdered him as he slept. 108 AFGHANISTAN. The titular successor of Mahammad Ghori, was his nephew, Mahmud ; but the influence and authority of Kutb-u-Din preponderated over the ties of blood. Mahmud himself, seeing how vain would be his opposition to such a man, resigned to him the ensigns of sovereignty at Labor, and returned to his ancestral home in the mountains of Ghor (1206). The real successor then was Kutb-u-Din. But with the accession of Kutb-u-Din, the history of Afghanistan as an independent kingdom temporarily ceases. The slave king elected to be ruler of the Hindustan which he had conquered, and took up his abode at Dehli. With the eclipse of the house of Grhor Ghazni was forgotten. 109 CHAPTER I Y. HISTORICAL. THE TRANSITION TO THE MOGHOL. Kutb-u-Din had transferred the seat of government to Hindustan. Immediately, his father-in-law, Taj-u- Dln Eldoz — the slave who had shut the gates of Ghazni against Mahammad Gliori after his defeat in Khwarizm, and who had been subsequently pardoned by his master — was proclaimed King of Ghazni by Mahmud, Mahmud retaining for himself the mountain throne of Ghor, and with it the overlordship over Afghanistan. The united forces of both princes suc- ceeded in reducing Herat and the country — now forming the western boundary of Afghanistan — between it and Sistan. But here their success ended. At- tempting to recover the northern districts now known as Afghan Turkistan, they were defeated by Maham- mad Khan, King of Khwarizm, and were even forced to yield up Ghazni. In the height of his distress, Taj- u-Din fell back on the post of Kurm.* It would * In the text Kirman. In his “ Chronicles of the Pathan Kings of Dehli,” page 26, Mr. Edward Thomas advances an ingenious argument to show the identity of Kirman with Kurm, the fort on 110 AFGHANISTAN. seem that at this place Taj-u-Din made peace with his conqueror, for he is next heard of as raising troops to attack Lahor and India. He actually penetrated as far as Thanesar ; but there he was defeated and taken prisoner by Shams-u-Dm Altmash, the son-in-law of Kutb-u-Din, and at that time King of Dehli (1215). He died a prisoner. Meanwhile Afghanistan had fallen u-nder the domin- ation of Mahammad Khan, King of Khwarizm. The events of the reigns of this prince and his successor are so completely absorbed in the greater career of the new Attila of the north, the far-famed leader of the Moghols, Chingiz Khan, that I pass over the lesser to deal with the greater subject. For many ages the Tartar tribes in the north of Asia, occupying the wild desert and mountainous country north and north-west of the kingdom of Khwarizm, “ had carried on war with each other, un- known to or unregarded by the conterminous nations, or known to their Chinese and Turki neighbours alone.”* One of these tribes was the Mongol, Mughul, or as it is generally spelt, Moghol. They were an ugly race, with yellow complexions, high cheek-bones, small eyes, and large mouths. But they had in them the stuff out of which were made the devastators of the river of that name. I have not space for that part of the argument which deals with the orthographic question. But I may be permitted to state my opinion that Mr. Thomas has clearly established that the geographical requirements of Kirman are met by the actual position of Kurm. * Erskine’s “ History of India,” Introduction. THE TRANSITION TO THE MOGHOL. Ill the earth, and they only wanted a leader. Suddenly that leader appeared in the person of Chinghiz Khan. Writing being then unknown to the Mogliol race, it is impossible to fix accurately the date of the birth of this conqueror. Historical events sufficiently demonstrate, however, that it occurred about the year 1155. The death of his father, when he had attained the age of thirteen years, brought him into rude contact with the world. He had many rivals with whom to contend, and his first experiences were of the severest. Now buffeted by fortune, now rising superior to all the arts of his enemies, he finally established his supremacy by two acts. The first was the complete defeat of his rivals on the field of battle, with an army counting only one-fourth of the number of theirs ; the second, a deed of atrocious cruelty with which he crowned his victory. It is asserted that having taken many pri- soners, he prepared eighty huge cauldrons, filled them with boiling water, and in them cast his still living captives. Far from alienating the barbarous tribes in the midst of whom he lived, this atrocious act cowed and subdued them. In the perpetrator they recognised their master. The power thus established by cruelty was con- solidated by the display of a force of character, of a capacity to influence men’s minds, to bend them to one resolute will, such as has been rarely surpassed. In the course of a few years, Chinghiz Khan had es- tablished his supremacy over the vast country bordered in the east by China, in the north and west by the Volga and the Caspian. Proclaimed the Great Khan 112 AFGHANISTAN. of the Tartars, having conquered Western China, and penetrated as far as Pekin, Chinghiz Khan found the kingdom of Khwarizm a bar to further conquests to the south. At that time (1219) Mahammad Khan was King of Khwarizm. The dominions of this prince included the countries of Bokhara, Samarkand, Khokand, Kash- gar, Persia, Afghanistan and Beluchistan, down to the Indus. Suddenly, Chinghiz Khan attacked him with three armies. The first, following to a certain point the course of the Jaxartes, descended upon Khiva ; the second, ascending that river, occupied Kliojind, and conquered the country now known as Ferghana ; the third, commanded by Chinghiz Khan in person, crossed the river, and penetrating into the country, took Bokhara and Samarkand. Tn a few days the entire territory north of the Oxus was in the hands of the conqueror. Meanwhile, the king, Mahammad Khan, sensible of his inability to oppose the Moghol horde, had re- treated to Nishapor in Khorasan. Chinghiz Khan, oc- cupied with Samarkand, sent a corps of twenty thou- sand men, under two of his generals, to pursue him. Mahammad Khan fled. The Moghol generals arriving at Nishapor, and finding their prey had escaped, then conceived and executed one of the most daring projects that ever entered into the heart even of a Moghol. They ravaged the whole of Western Persia, conquered Trans-Caucasia, crossed then the range of the Caucasus, occupied Derbend, defeated there an army composed of the various peoples of the countries they THE TRANSITION TO THE MOGHOL. 113 had traversed and were traversing, and drove them beyond the Dnieper. Some of the fugitives even crossed the Danube in their terror. So great and so general was the alarm, that the inhabitants of the Russian provinces of Kief, of Smolensko, and of Tchernigov, dreading lest they too should be attacked in their turn, combined to attempt to drive the enemy from the country he had but just gained. In the battle on the banks of the Dnieper that followed, the allied patriots were defeated. The Moghols then crossed that river, and penetrated into Bulgaria. Thence they returned to rejoin the main army. Meanwhile, Mahammad Khan, despairing of safety on the mainland, had fled for refuge to one of the small islands of the Caspian. There he died (1220). His son and successor, Jalal-u-Din, was a man of very different temper. In Khwarizm when he heard of his father’s death, he at once assembled his adherents, attacked and dispersed the troops sent to oppose him, and leaving in that province a sufficient body of troops under his brothers, pushed on to Nishapor, there to endeavour to recruit a new army. Chin- ghiz Khan, meanwhile, on the first news of the outbreak in Khwarizm, had hastened to that province, had suppressed the rebellion, killing in battle the two brothers of Jalal-u-Din, and had then marched south- ward, capturing in succession Balkh, Merv, Herat, Nishapor, and Tus (near the site of the modern Meshed). An army corps of thirty thousand men which he had sent to watch Jalal-u-Din, was, however, defeated by that prince, who had succeeded in raising 8 114 AFGHANISTAN. double that number. Ckinghiz Khan, indignant at this reverse, dashed at once in pursuit of the victor, who, abandoned by some of his generals, was making the best of his way to India. Chinghiz overtook him at the Indus, totally defeated his army, Jalal-u-Din him- self owing his escape solely to the daring with which he cut through his enemies and swam the river. The Moghol army then ravaged the Panjab, and returned to Tartary (1224). Subsequently Chinghiz completed the conquest of China, and there died (1227). Jalal-u-Din, meanwhile, escaped from the battle- field on the Indus, had, after many adventures, re- established his authority in Persia. But Afghanistan remained until the year 1251 under the rule of Chinghiz Khan and successors. During that period the enslaved country had no history. In that year, Shir Khan, the governor of the Pan- jab for the King of Dehli, Nasir-u-Dm Mahmud, invaded Afghanistan, seized upon Ghazni and Kabul, and annexed them to the Dehli monarchy. It is probable that they were speedily recovered, for not only, in subsequent years, do we find the Moghols making repeated incursions into India, but in the year 1336 traces appear of a new Afghan dynasty seated on the throne of Grhazni, owning subordination to, and acknowledging the suzerainty of, the Moghols of Central Asia. This Afghan dynasty, like that which preceded it, came from Ghor. Probably it was the chief of the Afghan tribe in the Ghor mountains to whom the Moghol suzerain delegated his authority. They ruled THE TRANSITION TO THE MOGHOL. 115 from 1336 to 1383. The first sovereign, Shams-u-Dm Ghori, and his two immediate successors, Rukh-u-Dm, and Fakhrudin Ghori, accepted the position and per- formed the duties assigned to them. The fourth of the race on the throne, Ghiyas-u-Dm Ghori, asserted his independence, and handed it down to his successors, Shams-u-Dm, Malek Hafiz, Moez-u-Din Hasen, and Ghiyas-u-Dm. But in the reign of the last-named prince the dynasty and the independence came alike to an untimely end. Taimur, known also in history as Tamerlane, was born at Kesh, near Samarkand, about the year 1336. His family had been settled there for two hundred years, and had held high positions. Taimur possessed very much the same organising genius as Chinghiz Khan, from whom, in the female line, he was de- scended ; he almost equalled him in ferocity, and sur- passed him in perfidy, whilst his aims, if as vast, were at least as reckless. At an early age he had succeeded in gathering in his own hands the guiding-reins of the Tartar tribes in Central Asia, and finding himself master, he began at once to carry terror and devasta- tion into neighbouring countries. Afghanistan and Persia at once fell before him. He then carried his arms into Circassia, Georgia, Mesopatamia, and the southern parts of Russia. Having laid waste these countries, he prepared to invade India by way of the Hindu Kush, Kabul, Banu, and Dinkot, on the Indus. Into that expedition, little affecting Afghanistan, I do not propose to follow him. It will suffice to state that from the first invasion of Taimur, 1383, until after 8 * 116 AFGHANISTAN. the accession of Babar, Afghanistan had no history of her own. Portions of her territory are occasionally mentioned for some or other specific quality by the historians. Thus, Herat is spoken of during the fifty years prior to the accession of Babar, as haying been the most magnificent city in the East, celebrated not merely for the beauty and splendour of its court, the architectural beauty of its mosques, tombs, colleges, and palaces, but as being the resort of the greatest divines, philosophers, poets, and historians of the age. At this time Herat was the capital of Khorasan, and that province was governed by Husen Mirza, the most powerful of the princes of the House of Taimur.* Kabul and Ghazni were then likewise ruled over by a prince of the same house, Sultan Ulugh Mirza, but of the internal administration of the country, and of the conduct and character of its people, I have been unable to find any trace whatever. With the death of Ulugh Mirza, however, the dry bones of its history suddenly recover their vitality. The vast dominions of Taimur, divided after his death, had been reunited into one kingdom by his great-grandson Abusaid, fourth from him in order of succession. On the death of Abusaid the empire was again partitioned. Whilst the three elder sons divided the countries north of the Oxus, the youngest son, Ulugh Mirza, was allotted Kabul and Ghazni : — the adjoining territory of Khorasan, with Herat as its capital, falling to a more distant relation — the Husen Mirza previously referred to. * “ Er skine’s History of India.” Memoirs of Babar. THE TRANSITION TO THE MOGHOL. 117 Ulugh Mirza, Prince of Ghazni and Kabul, died in the year 1502. His death was the signal for intrigues and assassinations, one usurper following another, when in 1504, Prince Babar, who but three months before had been forced to leave his kingdom of Fer- ghana as a homeless exile, appeared before Kabul and took it. Space will not permit me to do more than give a short summary of the previous career of this extra- ordinary man. The sixth in descent from Taimur, he was born in 1482. At the age of twelve he inherited by the death of his father the kingdom of Ferghana.* He was not yet fifteen when the troubles in Samar- kand induced him to attempt the conquest of that province. He conquered and occupied the capital ; but the task of governing and maintaining the country was beyond the means at his disposal, and after an occupation of little more than three months he was compelled to evacuate it, and fall back on Ferghana. His absence from that province had, however, proved fatal to him. Plots against him had been fomented, and he discovered one morning that he was a king without a kingdom. By the means common in those days, he was able to raise a sufficient force to recover Ferghana, and he was even meditating another raid against Samarkand, when the Uzbeg Tartars invaded Central Asia and forced Babar to seek refuge in the mountains. Here * A rich country on the upper course of the Jaxartes. It is also called Khokand. 118 AFGHANISTAN. lie lived for some years the life of a true adventurer ; now an exile in the desert ; now a monarch on a throne. He gained and lost Samarkand ; he was buoyed up by hopes of Ferghana ; but he was always happy, always joyous, always confident in the future. At length, however, fortune seemed to shut out from him the last hope of success, and in his twenty- third year Babar was forced to cross the Oxus and take refuge in Kunduz, between Balkh and Badakshan, the governor of which was Kushru Sliah. Here he succeeded in raising a force of Moghols. At their head, he marched on Kabul, and took it. At the time that he conquered Kabul that country comprehended the long and narrow plains running nearly from south to north between Gfhazni and the capital ; the whole mountainous territory reaching to the Koh-i-Baba and the Hindu Kush, and thence down to the confines of what is now British territory as far as Fort Kurm. The mountainous tribes were more pre- datory and more independent than they are even at the present day. At the head of an army of freelances Babar felt that his only chance of safety lay in engaging his followers in new adventures. He first led them against Kandahar, which he conquered. Within two hundred and forty miles of Herat, he thought it then advisable to make a journey thither, in order, with his relative, its ruler, to concert measures against their joint enemies, the Uzbeg Turks. During his absence his brother Jahangir revolted and fled to Gfhazni. Then his Moghol soldiers mutinied. No sooner had THE TRANSITION TO THE MOGHOL. 119 Babar, returning to Kabul, put an end to these disor- ders, than a more dangerous outbreak, instigated and abetted by the Moghols he had brought with him, took place. Babar, escaping with difficulty from Kabul, put himself at the head of a few devoted followers, and made head against his enemies. By his courage and his activity he made up for the smallness of his following, and, ever present where he was needed, ever taking advantage of the opportunities that offered, he in the end suppressed the revolt. The Uzbegs, meanwhile, were advancing as the other Turki tribes had advanced before them. They swarmed into Khorasan, occupied Herat, then besieged and took Kandahar. Ghazni and Kabul were now threatened, when, happily for Baber, the King of Persia, alarmed at the conquest of Khorasan, ad- vanced against the Uzbegs, defeated them with great slaughter, and drove them across the Osus. To be safe only, was never with Babar the su- premest good. For him safety meant opportunity for fresh conquests. The defeat of the Uzbegs by the Persians re-awakened then the old longing for Samar- kand. That city had been his first conquest — the scene also of his first rebuff. He must woo her once again. He wooed and won her (1511). But again was Samarkand fickle. She welcomed back his old enemies the Uzbegs, and after a contest ranging over two years, he lost, not only her, but every other possession across the Oxus. Thrown back then on Afghanistan, he recovered 120 AFGHANISTAN. Kandahar. He could not, however, be content with a country of rocks and stones. Opportunely at this moment there came to him a cry for aid from Dadlat Khan, the Afghan viceroy of the Panjab for Ibrahim Lodi Afghan, King of Dehli. Simultaneously the Hand of Chitor sent a messenger to promise his aid if Babar should invade India. The invitation pro- mised too much to allow Babar to refuse it. King of Kabul and Ghazni, he crossed the Indus (1525-26), and advanced unopposed on Lahor, defeated there the army that had been hurriedly raised to oppose him, reduced that city to ashes, and advanced towards Dehli. The rebellion of Daolat Khan, and the news that the Uzbegs had invaded Balkh, recalled him to the north ere he could reach the imperial city. In his absence, however, Daolat Khan was overcome, but his general advancing then incautiously on Dehli, was defeated by its king, Ibrahim Khan Lodi, under its walls. Babar, having driven back the Uzbegs, re- turned to repair this disaster. At the head of twelve thousand men he met Ibrahim, commanding one hun- dred thousand men, at Panipat, a place always favour- able to an invader from the north. A daring and competent general, he found himself opposed to one who was utterly ignorant of war, and who was too self-willed to be led by others. The result was never doubtful. The Indian army was defeated with great slaughter, its king was left dead on the field, Dehli opened its gates, and Babar marched at once on Agra, to be proclaimed there (May 10, 1526) the first Emperor of India, to enter upon a sovereignty which, THE TRANSITION TO THE MOGHOL. 121 as the Great Moghol, he was to transmit to a long series of descendants, and which was destined to remain in one form or other in his family till the great crisis of 1857. 122 AFGHANISTAN. CHAPTER Y. HISTORICAL. HUMAYUN AND KAMRAN. Ba'bar’s rule of four years and a lialf in India belongs to the bistory of that country. During that period Afghanistan remained a province governed under his orders by his second son Kamran. On the death of Babar (December 26, 1530), whilst his eldest son, Humayun, succeeded to the throne of Agra; Kabul, Ghazni, and Kandahar, continued a semi-independent kingdom under the rule of Kamran, the overlordship of Humayun, if existing in theory, not being acknow- ledged in fact. In the course of the two years that followed, the new King of Kabul obtained from the weakness and the necessities of his brother, Humayun, the cession of the Panjab, and with it the country south-east of the Satlaj, as far as the important towns of Hissar and Hansi. Kamran was a man who to a headstrong nature added an ambition which never hesitated at the means to be employed. For three years after the acquisition of the Panjab, however, this master passion seemed to HUMAYUN AND KAMRAN. 123 lay dormant within him. During that period he would appear to have devoted all his energies to the internal administration of his dominions, and to the formation of a well-disciplined army. But in 1535 the Shah of Persia, Shah Tahmasp, had but just succeeded in driving the Uzbeg Turks from Khorasan, and in occupying Herat. He had bestowed the government of this place upon his brother, a man of weak nature, who, first rebelling against the Shah, then endeavoured to obtain a secure place of refuge for himself by besieging Kandahar. Kandahar was defended by Amir Khwaja Kilan, one of the best officers of King Kamran, with a small but well- trained garrison. For eight months he foiled all the efforts of the besiegers. Meanwhile King Kamran, after some delay, marched with an army of twenty thousand men to relieve him. On Kamran’ s approach, the Herat! army raised the siege, and took up a position some ten miles from the city. Kamran effecting then a junction with the governor, Khwaja Kilan, attacked the enemy, and, mainly in consequence of the skill and conduct of his subordinate, totally defeated him. As this defeat seemed to secure his western border, Kamran returned to Lahor. But he was reckoning without the ambition of his neighbour. Another invasion of the Uzbegs — an in- vasion followed almost instantly by the sacking by those barbarians of the beautiful city of Herat — called into Khorasan the Shah of Persia in person. Shah Tahmasp found little difficulty in driving the Uzbegs from Herat ; then looking round for fresh conquests, 124 AFGHANISTAN. he recalled the brother who had rebelled against him, and taking from him the plan which in his hands had miscarried, marched upon Kandahar. Kandahar was unprepared to resist him. She had neither pro- visions, nor stores, nor even a sufficient number of troops. The governor, Amir Khwaja Kilan, resolved under these circumstances, as he could not defend the city, at least to save its palaces from destruction, its people from the horrors of a storm. Placing his palace in the best possible order, arranged for a royal reception, he sent a message to the Shah, to the effect that, unable to defend the place, or to meet him in the field, he had considered that the only courteous and honourable course open to him was to make Kandahar fit for the reception of the guest whom he could not entertain in person. He then retired on Lahor. The Shah entered Kandahar. Kamran could not appreciate the refined conduct of his agent. He complained that at least an attempt at resistance should have been made, and that he might then have been able once more to relieve the place. Now, he had to reconquer it. He set out as soon as possible with an army for that purpose, reached it, and sat down before it. The Shah had returned to Persia, but had left behind a sufficient garrison. The place resisted for some time, but finally surrendered, on the condition of obtaining a free departure for the garrison. Kamran having then restored the fortifica- tions, returned to Lahor. Up to this time the conduct of King Kamran had been wise and prudent. But he had not been tempted. HUMAYUN AND KAMRAN. 125 He was soon to show that it had been based rather on the exigencies of the moment than on a ripe and solid judgment. It happened in the year 1538-9 the empire of his brother Humayun was in imminent danger. At the head of a dispirited army, weakened by sickness, he lay encamped at the village of Chausa, close to the point where the Karamnasa falls into the Granges, shut out from the north-west provinces by the superior army of his competitor, Shir Khan, ad- vantageously posted in an intrenched camp. In the upper provinces, his brother, Hindal, in arms against him, occupied Agra, and was threatening to march on Dehli. Such were the circumstances under which the aid of the King of Kabul was invoked. It was in the power of Kamran to restore Humayun. He entered Hindustan, and marched on Delhi. Find- ing that place holding out for Humayun, under his cousin, he continued his progress to Agra. On his approach, Hindal abandoned the place, renounced the contest, and returned to Mewat, his government. Kamran then advanced against Shir Khan, who con- tinued to lie encamped in front of Humayun’ s army. Kamran had the fate of India in his hands. That knowledge ruined him. Were he to beat Shir Khan — and he felt he could beat him — he would beat him for the advantage of Humayun. Far better, he thought, to allow the two rivals to fight it out, and then to beat the conqueror himself— for himself. So think- ing, he acted — leaving Humayun to his fate, and returning to Agra. There, two months later, he was joined by Humayun — not in the guise of a conqueror 126 AFGHANISTAN. — but a helpless, wounded fugitive, escaped by flight from the surprise and defeat of his army by Shir Khan at Chausa on the 27th of June 1539. Humayun had indeed left to him of his mighty empire only Agra and Delili and the tract between the two cities. He did not retain these long. A good understanding between the two brothers had never existed since Kamran had allowed ambition to over- come his better feelings. And now, though it was patent to him and to all around him that his zealous support of Humayun would sustain the empire founded by his father, he determined to risk its ruin rather than secure the re-establishment of his brother. He could not indeed prevent some of his chiefs, more loyal than himself, from casting in their lot with Humayun. He wasted seven months at Agra. His longing to return, added to the extreme heat of the climate, brought on a severe attack of fever. When the cessation of this enabled him to move, he returned to Lahor, leaving his brother to meet the army with which Shir Khan, after conquering the country below and to the east of Agra, was now advancing against him. The result showed the short-sightedness of pure selfishness. In the contest that followed, Humayun was totally defeated, and fled with a few faithful followers to Lahor. His arrival at that city as a fugitive caused the scales to fall from the eyes of Kamran. Far from lessening his danger by his selfish conduct at Agra, he had increased it tenfold. Shir Khan, he had information, was preparing to follow HAMAYUN AND KAMEAN. 127 Humayun into the Panjab. Instead of as at Agra having against him only a pretender to the empire occupying one of its provinces, and marching against the acknowledged ruler of the remainder — that ruler supported by himself — he had now to contend with the master of Agra and Dehli — the lord of Hindustan ! And on whose behalf was he to combat this invader ? On behalf of a man who, whether victorious or defeated, would use the position of elder brother to claim overlordship over, or to dispossess, himself ! In this position he dreaded Humayun even more than Shir Khan. He loathed his very presence. Thus circumstanced and thus cogitating, he resolved to en- deavour, by the sacrifice of the Panjab, to secure at least his rocky home. He therefore sent a messenger to Shir KMn, now become Shir Shah, to treat for peace, on the condition of his being allowed to retire across the Indus. The condition was accepted, and Kamran retreated to Kabul. Humayun, abandoned, fled by way of Multan to Sind (1540). The other brother, Hindal Mirza, of whom I have already spoken as being in rebellion against Humayun, had, after the advance of Kamran into India, and his occupation of Agra, made his submission, been par- doned, had subsequently commanded the advanced division of his brother’s army in the fatal battle of Kanaoj, and at a later date had joined Humayun in his expedition to Sind. Here he quarrelled with him because, on the occasion of a reception given by his mother, Humayun chose to fall in love with and to betroth himself to a young lady, subsequently the 128 AFGHANISTAN. mother of the illustrious Akbar. Hindal, whose loyalty had previously been lukewarm, quitted his brother, made a raid on Kandahar, and, having gained the governor, Karacha Khan, occupied that fortress (October 1541) without striking a blow. It may well be imagined that this high-handed pro- cedure was by no means acceptable to the King of Kabul. Kamran, on his arrival at his capital, had re- nounced the nominal overlordship of his elder brother, and had subsequently endeavoured by the conquest of Badakshan to recoup himself for the loss of the Panjab. He had just completed his operations in that province, when intelligence reached him that his fortress of Kandahar had surrendered to his brother Hindal. Without any delay he marched against the place and blockaded it for six months. Then Hindal, finding further defence impossible, surrendered it. Kamran bestowed the government of the town on his brother Askari, and took Hindal with him as a prisoner to Kabul, but, subsequently pardoning him, bestowed upon him the district of Jalalabad in jaghir. Meanwhile, Humayun, baffled in all his plans, having suffered privations of every sort in the inhos- pitable deserts of Sind, having had born to him, when a haphazard guest of a border chief, a son to whom he could not offer even a hovel as a home, had resolved to move on Kandahar. He professed to invoke the com- passion of his brothers, but it is probable he desired to tempt the cupidity of Askari. Askari, however, was loyal to Kamran. This loyalty had previously HUMAYUN AND KAMRAN. 129 prompted him to write letters to the Sind chiefs urging the assassination of Humayun. He now marched with a force hoping to surprise that prince. The latter had but just time to mount a horse, and escape with his wife and some forty followers to Herat, then an appanage of Persia. The child, deemed unable to bear the journey, was left to the tender mercies of his uncles. Askari brought him into Kandahar, and treated him with the care becoming his position. The power of Kamran, as King of Kabul, seemed firmly established. It may be said, in general terms, that excepting the territory formed hy a line drawn from the westernmost point of the Herat district to the westernmost point of Sistan, the country called in his time the kingdom of Kabul was similar in extent to the Afghanistan of our own day. Shir Shah had crossed the Indus, and, as do the English now, had occupied the country up to the passes. North of the great range Kamran held Badakshan, and a strip of the southern part of the territory now known as Afghan Turkistan. But Balkh and the northern part were in the hands of theUzbegs. His power seemed confirmed by the fact that his eldest brother was a fugitive, his only son in his hands ; that his two other brothers were serving, carefully watched, under his orders ; and that he had suppressed a rebellion in Badakshan, occa- sioned by his absence at Kandahar, and that the chief of that province was his prisoner. But in those days to have a certain tenure of power it was necessary that the ruler should combine in his 9 130 AFGHANISTAN. own person a great many sterling qualities. To be a good soldier was much, but it was not all. The possession of a genial nature, of a strong and resolute will ; of the power to impress that will upon others, to think clearly, to strike promptly ; of the keen insight which marks on the instant the various currents into which interest, fickleness, lust of power, are apt to drive those around them ; — these are qualities which a man in those days was bound to possess if he wished to be perfectly secure, — which in those countries I believe he is bound to possess now. Kamran did not possess them. Never was he less secure than when apparently at the very height of his power. Satisfied with his position as King of Kabul, he is said from the time of his return from the second ex- pedition to Badakshan to have given himself up en- tirely to pleasure, to have paid little attention to the concerns of government or to the complaints of his subjects. Even such conduct in one whose character commanded respect and affection, might in an Eastern country have been passed over. But Kamran’s was a curious, even a contradictory, character. Adored when in adversity, attracting then men whom he had previously repelled, he commanded, when in the full enjoyment of power, neither respect nor affection. Suspicious, jealous, unsocial, he did not seem to possess then a single personal friend. Personally, his courtiers disliked him ; they felt no pride in him as their king and their lord, and the service they ren- dered was a service inspired by fear and by interest alone. HUMAYUN AND KAMEAN. 131 When, therefore, Kamran, formed by nature as I have described him, relaxed his hold over public affairs to give himself to voluptuous indulgence, he committed one of those acts for which no subsequent vigilance can atone. He must have had some dim consciousness of this when he was awakened from his revels to learn that his brother, Humayun, bringing with him a Persian army, led by the son of Shah Tahmasp, Morad Mirza, was marching on his kingdom. Kamran’s first care was to secure the person of the young prince, Akbar, in his capital. But before this had been accomplished, he learned that Humayun had, after a siege of a few days, captured Bost, a fort at the confluence of the Arghand-ab and Helmand, and that the garrison having joined him, he was pushing on to Kandahar. I have already stated that the Governor of Kan- dahar was Prince Askari, the brother of Kamran. But he was likewise brother of Humayun, and al- though Askari had offended Humayun in the grossest manner, yet the fact that he had so injured him seemed to point to the probability that so valuable a gift as the delivery of Kandahar might be sufficient to atone for the offence. Had Kamran possessed a good army, and had be been certain of his brother Askari, he might, by acting promptly, have conjured the storm. But his attention to pleasure had caused him to neg- lect his war office, and he found himself unable to raise a force which, unsupported, would have a chance of meeting the Persians in the field. But even then, provided Prince Askari would but 9 * 132 AFGHANISTAN. hold out, the game was not up. Kamran had a small force, a force which, so long as Kandahar should hold out, might, well led, inflict great damage on the Per- sians, and possibly compel them to retire. But here came into play the jealous, suspicious temper of which I have spoken : the terrible disadvantage to a man of not having a single friend loving him for himself alone. It was this “ situation ” which ruined Kamran. Sus- pecting everybody, he could not act at all. He adopted the worst possible policy for a man in his position — the policy of the mere watcher of the atmosphere. Boldness would have served him far better. For it happened that when Humayun sat down before Kan- dahar, he found he had a very difficult task before him. The place was well fortified and well garrisoned. Moreover, Prince Askari had made up his mind that true policy counselled him to be faithful to Kamran. He therefore defended the place with skill, with vigour, and with such effect, that it is more than probable that a demonstration on the part of Kamran would have forced Humayun to retreat. But Kamran made no sign. It is certain that this inactivity on his part inspired Humayun, or one of the able men to whom he gave his confidence, with the brilliant idea of sending a special envoy to Kabul, nominally to arrange terms with Kamran, really to corrupt the most influential of his followers. The nobleman selected for this delicate task was the most famous, the most skilful, the most trusted, and the most trustworthy of all the followers of Humayun. His name was Bahram Khan. He was a native of HUMAYUN AND KAMEAN. 133 Badakhshan ; was educated at Balkh ; had entered the army of Humayun at the age of sixteen ; had dis- tinguished himself on many occasions no less by his valour than by his unselfish devotion ; had accom- panied Humayun through Sind and to Persia; had won there the confidence of the Shah, who made him a Khan ; and had now returned with his master to win back the kingdom of Kabul, and with it the empire of Hindustan.* Such was the man sent to Kabul to prepare the way for the coming of Humayun. The dexterity with which he accomplished his mission was the greater, because the object of it was suspected by Kamran. No sooner had he set foot in Kabul, than the king, under pretext of doing him honour, placed confidential persons to watch and to report upon his movements. Considering the surveillance thus organised to be sufficient, Kamran placed no restriction as to the im- portant personages whom the ambassador might desire to visit. Bahram thus had opportunities of seeing the young prince Akbar ; prince Hindal, the brother ; princes Yadgar, Nasir, and Ulugh, the cousins of the king ; prince Suliman and his son, the dispossessed rulers of Badakhshan, and others. He remained at Kabul six weeks, and when he left he carried with him the conviction that the hearts of the nobles of Kabul had been won to his master, and that it needed only * Vide the “ Ain-i-Akbari,” translated from the original Persian, by Professor Blochmann, whose early death in the current year is the severest loss Oriental literature has sustained : “ The conquest of India may justly be ascribed to Bahram,” p. 315. 134 AFGHANISTAN. an important success, such as the capture of Kandah&r, to induce them to declare themselves. During all this time Prince Askari had been true to Kamran. He had repulsed every assault, and he felt confident that it needed but the appearance of that prince to force the besiegers to retire. It is probable that some dim conviction of the pos- sibility of such a result at last forced Kamran to move towards the beleaguered town. Had he set out before Bahram Khan had visited Kabul, he would in all pro- bability have succeeded. But he did not march until after Bahram had assured the former enemies of Humayun of more than pardon, and had raised up against Kamran a most formidable party in his own court. This party manifested itself so openly, that Kamran found himself compelled to retrace his steps a very few days after he had left Kabul. “ The thanes ” were flying from him. Some of their foremost men, amongst them his cousin Ulugh Beg, reached the camp of Humayun, bringing with them letters of adherence from many others. A Hazara chieftain about the same time openly declared for that prince. The end was now approaching. Prince Askari, deprived of all hope of assistance, reduced to his last ration, after gallantly defending Kandahar for five months, was forced to surrender it. He had been loyal to Kamran. But it had been a loyalty based upon a conviction that he had nought to hope for from Humayun. It is probable, then, that the con- sciousness of having deserved well of Kamran did not HUMAYUN AND KAMRAN. 135 support him when, seated after his capture in the presence of Humayun, there were shown to him, by- order of the conqueror, the papers in his own hand- writing which contained the damning instructions to murder him. The capture of Kandahar deprived Kamran of his last adherent. He had been forced to release, and to send back to Badakshan, the governor he had for- merly- dispossessed. His cousin, Yadgar Nasir, es- caped. Last of all, his brother Hindal, after playing to him the part which Prince Gfeorge of Denmark played to James II., professing astonishment at the abandonment one by one of his courtiers, — last of all, Hindal left him to throw himself upon the mercy of Humayun. Then — and then only — was the work of Bahram Khan complete. Still, for a great man in his position, all was not yet lost. He had possession : he had the capital : he had troops. Treason had done much, but he was still ruler in Kabul, lord also of Gfhazni. His rivals, too, la- boured under the enormous disadvantage of having conquered his own country with the aid of foreigners. These foreigners were now becoming clamorous. Humaynn endeavoured to appease them by making over to them the spoils of Kandahar. But they had insisted upon having Kandahar too, and they had occupied it. Humayun with his own personal follow- ing was then in about as bad a position as it is possible to conceive. He had taken a fortified town with the aid of the Persians, and now the Persians had thrust him out of it, and had warned him to betake himself to 136 AFGHANISTAN. a convenient distance from its walls. But lie had nei- ther horses, nor baggage, nor money, nor equipment. His following amounted to not more than five thou- sand men. Under these circumstances the chances of Kamran seemed still to be preferable. So thought, at least, some of the nobles who had deserted him for Humayun, for they went back in increasing numbers. In the councils of Humayun distracting counsels abounded. But they were all the counsels of despair. There seemed no possibility to advance, to retreat, to remain on the ground they then occupied; for the winter was upon them, and nearly all the grain of the country had been consumed. But when things were at their worst, fortune came to befriend the eldest son of Babar. The Persian troops who were garrisoning Herat had sold their horses to some merchants on their way to India. The mer- chants had picketed the horses outside the town. Upon them Humayun made a sudden and successful raid. It was the only possible way of getting them, for he had no money. His sense of justice induced him, however, to give to the complaining merchants an order in full of the value they placed on the horses, payable “when his affairs would permit” — a promise which, if vague and unnegotiable, was, I believe, redeemed in the end. He had now horses. But to every other difficulty previous existing was now added the necessity of pro- viding fodder for those animals. All seemed dark again. But, suddenly, at the very crisis of his fate, the Persian prince who commanded in Kandahar, HUMAYUN AND KAMRAN. 137 Prince Mahammad Morad, died. Tlie presence of this prince, the son of the Shah, had alone prevented Humayun, at an earlier date, from attempting to sur- prise Kandahar. And now this obstacle had disap- peared. He was not the man to forego the opportunity. By means of an ingenious stratagem he procured entrance for some of his soldiers into the town ; then, after a sharp tussle with the Persian garrison, he captured it. Having now a base of operations, he resolved to act as Kamran should long before have acted— to move forward. The route by Kalat-i-Ghilzai and Ghazni wa3 not open to him, those places being held for Kam- ran. But, winter though it was, he followed the course of the Helmand to its source in the Koh-i-Baba. Turning then eastward, he marched on Kabul.* Kamran, rousing himself from his fatal stupor, had repaired the fortifications of the capital, and now at the head of from eighteen to twenty thousand men marched with confidence to annihilate the five thousand his brother was leading against him. He had sent on a party to occupy the Khimar Pass — the approach to Kabul ; but either the detachment was not strong enough, or it was badly commanded, for Humayun not only forced it, but cleared the defile of Khwaja Pushteh. The capture of this strong pass was fatal to Kam- rhn. His nobles began to desert him in shoals. He stood still and let them go. He had, even yet, a chance * By Tm and Yurat Shekh Ali in the territory of Paghman and Arkandi. “ Erskine’s History of India,” vol. ii. p. 322-3. 138 AFGHANISTAN. of victory if he would but attack. But he would not take it. Again his suspicious temper got the better of him. Fearing to trust any one, he sent in abject terms to treat with his brother. But Humayun, suspecting that he only cared to gain time, advanced with seven hundred lancers towards his camp. This bold forward action decided Kamran. Abandoning his army, he promptly retreated into the citadel of Kabul. Then, as soon as night fell, taking with him his son, his wife, and his family, he rode for Ghazni. Refused admittance into that town, he made for Hazara, and ultimately took refuge in Sind. For the moment he had lost a kingdom. Only, however, for the moment. It is true that the entire kingdom of Kabul submitted to Humayun. He and his brother had changed conditions. He was now the crowned monarch ; his brother, the houseless wanderer. But misfortune had not crushed the am- bition that ruled in the heart of Kamran, whilst ad- versity had stimulated his energies. He was still a watcher of the atmosphere, not as before in dread, but in hope. He was watching an opportunity. I have said that he had taken refuge in Sind. There he had been well received by Shah Hus&i Arghun, the ruler of upper and lower Sind, a man of great talent and sagacity, to whose daughter he had been for some time betrothed. He used the occasion of his exile to marry her. It was one of the wisest acts of his life. She was a noble woman, a sound counsellor in prosperity, a faithful friend in adversity. She is known in history as Chuchak Begam. HUMAYUN AND KAMRAN. 139 The opportunity for which Kamran was waiting came sooner than might have been anticipated. Shortly after having been acknowledged lord of Kabul, Humayun had set out for Badakhshan to recover that tributary province, which, during the conflict between himself and Kamran, had been seized by their former ruler, his cousin, Mirza Suliman. Humayun conquered Suliman ; then, the better to consolidate the province and its outlying dependencies, he remained three or four months in the country ; subsequently, to complete his object, he resolved to winter in Kila-Zefer, north of the Koh-i-Baba range. He was approaching that place when he was attacked by a dangerous illness. So serious was the attack, that for four days his life was despaired of. On the fifth the crisis took a favourable turn, and he recovered. This was the opportunity that came to Kamran. His brother’s absence beyond the great range — -his dangerous illness — the chances of his death ! Could fortune have been more kind? By the aid of his father-in-law, he raised a thousand chosen horse, and set out for Ghazni. On his way he plundered some Afghan horse-dealers of their horses, which, by giving to many of his men a led horse in addition to those which they bestrode, enabled them to proceed faster. Sending on trusty agents ahead, he was able to communicate with those well affected to him in Ghazni, and, by their aid, to seize that fortress before the governor had any tidings of his approach. He replaced the governor, whom he killed, by an adherent of his own; then, delaying not an hour, he pushed on for 140 AFGHANISTAN. Kabul. Again, preceding the news of his arrival, he surprised that city, put the governor to death, and captured the citadel. In it he found, with some other members of his brother’s family, the young prince Akbar. Again, then, was Kamran lord of Kabul ! Such was the intelligence which reached Humayun just at the time when, having shaken off his fever, he had been able to resume horse exercise. It was a blow — the heavier for having been totally unexpected and therefore totally unprovided for. Not Humayun alone had left his child and family in the capital. Many of his nobles — the men who had deserted Kamran to join him — had done the same. The love of wife and of child is a passion with almost all races, but more especially with the Oriental. Humayun felt in- stinctively that he had to meet a crisis requiring all his nerve, all his decision — and above all — all his influence with his wild following. Humayun differed in this respect from Kamran, that he possessed under all circumstances the divine power of attaching others to himself — for himself. No man at that epoch had more devoted friends. It was this rather than his moral power — for naturally he was indolent and wanting in energy — which stood him in stead on this occasion. He had the sense to allow himself to be guided by capable men. Under their advice he was equal to the occasion. Notwithstanding the fact that it was winter, that he was severed from Kabul by the snows of the Hindu Kush, he resolved to act at once. Concluding then a HUMAYUN AND KAMRAN. 141 treaty with. Mirza Suliman, in virtue of which Suliman was to hold Badakhshan as his own, recognising only the overlordship of Humayun, he marched at once from Kila-Zefer in the direction of Kabul. On reach- ing Talikan, on the river Ferkhar, he was detained several days by the violence of the rain and snow. When the storm abated, he succeeded in making his way to Kunduz.* Here he experienced the misfortune of being deserted by many of his nobles, those es- pecially whose families were in Kabul, and who pro- bably deemed that the chances were in favour of Kamran. Humayun stayed here for some days, re- freshing and encouraging his troops ; then, casting his future fate on the hazard of the die, risking his all on the success of his advance, he moved forward by way of Chahardar across the passes. The difficulties he experienced were enormous. The roads were blocked up with snow, and it was necessary to ram this down into a hard surface. Even then the energies of man, of horse, of camel, were tried, as they rarely had been tried before. But, as usual, the aphorism, that difficul- ties however enormous are still only obstacles to be overcome, proved its truth. The defiles and the passes of the Kara Koh were conquered, and Humayun found himself and his followers at Saighan, still indeed on the northern side of the Hindu Kush, but in a good position to move on the capital. How had Kamran been employing the long interval? * Kunduz is an important town, due north of Kabul, lying in 36° 50' N. 69° 10' E. It possesses an earthern fort and about 1,500 inhabitants. It is in Afghan Turkistan. 142 AFGHANISTAN. In a military point of view, Kamrdn had done all that man could do. He had raised troops, fortified the passes, and had been unsparing in his attempts to gain over the influential men of the country. He employed but two methods— intimidation and interest. To those who had been false to him before, he showed no mercy. Death in every varied form of cruelty was their lot. But some very considerable men he gained over. Prominent amongst the ablest of his earlier supporters was Shir Ali, a nobleman possessing alike influence and military skill. Between Humayun and the capital by the direct road there now lay the Abdereh defile leading to Zoh&k, thence by a pass through the Koh-i-Baba to Chard^h, Ghorband, and Charikar; from Charikar by way of Istalif to Kabul. To check his advance Kamran sent a force under Shir Ali. Unluckily the force Shir Ali took with him was too small, and the defile was forced in spite of him. But being a capable officer, and well acquainted with the country, he made his way by a circuitous path to the northern entrance of the defile, and passing through it, fell with considerable effect upon the rear of the invaders. Humayun, notwith- standing, pushed on to Charikar. His position even there seemed so hopeless as to cause dismay amongst his followers, and many of them, including a cousin of his own, abandoned him and fled to Kabul. Humayun, in this extremity, held a council of war. The pro- verbial issue was the result of its debates. The council decided not to attack Kabul at once, but to occupy a position below it where supplies would be abundant. HTTMAYUN AND KAMEAN. 143 This plan was about to be put into execution, when Humayun, acting probably on the entreaties of a trusted friend, countermanded it. The avoidance of an immediate attack, and the taking up of a position below Kabul, would, he was assured, induce amongst his followers the impression that he was about to abandon the capital and march on Kandahar, still held for him by the faithful Bahram Khan. He therefore pushed on for Kabul. Kamran was waiting for him within the city. It is difficult to assign a reason for his inaction. In his case boldness would have been prudence, and he might have used his superior force with much advantage in the passes north of the city. But he preferred to wait for his brother. As soon, however, as Humayun’ s forces descended from Istalif, and had reached Deh- Afghanan, one of the outlying suburbs of the city, he sent his best general, Shir Afkan, at the head of his best troops, to attack him. A hard-fought action followed. At first the soldiers of Kamran were successful, but an unexpected attack in their flank at a critical period of the da_y proved fatal, and in the end they fled in disorder. Their leader, after displaying great courage, was taken prisoner, and beheaded on the field of battle. Humayun pressed his advantage, captured the outer inclosure of the city, and planted his artillery on the hill which commanded the town. Kamran made a gallant defence. The fortifications were in good order, his soldiers were well trained, and he knew well that the sword was suspended over his 144 AFGHANISTAN. own head. Several of his sorties were successful ; others failed. Still the besiegers made no progress. As the siege continued, however, scarcity began to prevail. Then — the certain test of the current of public opinion — desertions began to take place. Cruelties perpetrated on both sides embittered the contest. And when Humayun put to death in the presence of both parties the prisoners he had taken from a sallying party, Kamran retaliated by the per- petration of atrocities so horrible that the pen refuses to record them. It is said also that he caused his nephew Akbar, the son of Humayun, to be exposed on the part of the wall where the fire was the hottest. At last even Kamran became convinced that further resistance was becoming impossible. Food was not to be obtained, and the blockade was complete. He sent then the most submissive letters to his brother, im- ploring forgiveness, and full of promises of faithful service for the future. Humayun was inclined to be merciful, to accord to him a frank and free pardon. But his trusted councillors saw too clearly how dan- gerous a subject a forgiven rebel — especially a rebel possessing the selfish and ambitious character of Kam- ran—would become. They worked at the same time upon Kamran — warning him of the danger of trusting to the pardon of his brother, urging him to escape, and promising to ensure his safety. Their artifice produced the effect they desired. Despairing of his future should he fall alive into the hands of Humayun, Kamran, on a very dark night, 27th of April 1547, left the citadel by a breach opened in the wall, tra- HUMAYUN AND KAMEAN. 145 versed the trenches,* and made his way to the moun- tains on foot. He was pursued. Regarding the name of the pur- suer, historians are at variance. Some say his brother Hindal ; others, Haji Mahammad, an old Mogliol nobleman whom he had known in his infancy. All accounts agree in stating that the pursuer overtook the fugitive ascending the mountains overlooking Kabul, and let him go. The most dramatic story is that which affirms that Haji Mahammad was the pursuer. He overtook Kamran, and was about to seize him, when the prince exclaimed : “ Gro and boast to your father that it was I who slew him.” The brave heart of the man who had been a devoted servant of Babar shrank from the implied reproach contained in the speech. He turned at once homewards. Again were the positions of the two brothers re- versed. Humayun was lord of Kabul, Kamran was a fugitive. Humayun’s first act was to give up the city, which had resisted him, for one night to plunder. He likewise punished some of his brother’s more in- fluential adherents. After these preliminaries he began to devote himself to the duties and indulgences of a king in his own capital. But from this pleasant life he was very soon roused, first mildly, if disagreeably ; a little later far more roughly. The indefatigable Kamran was again the cause. * It is said that Humayun’s two trusted councillors, Karacha Khan and Musahib Beg, who had given to Kamran the advice re- corded in the text, had arranged that he should traverse the lines of the besiegers in safety. 10 146 AFGHANISTAN. We left that prince ascending, on a very dark night, a solitary fugitive, the mountains overlooking Kabul. He made his way to the neighbourhood of Istalif to a point where he had desired his most trusted adherents to meet him. But not one of them was to be seen. Un- daunted, he pushed on, attended by but one follower, by the Senjed valley. On his way he was seized by a party of Hazaras. One of them recognising him, took him to their chief, who brought him by way of Zohak to Bamian, and there left him. At Bamian he was joined by some of his trusty adherents, conspicuous among whom were Shir Ali and Mirza Beg, and he soon found himself at the head of a body of a hundred and fifty horse. With this force, small as it was, he hoped to be able to do some business. Accordingly he marched upon Grori — a town lying nearly due south of Kundiiz, and on the road to Badakhshan — and though its governor, who had with him a garrison of a thousand horse and three hundred foot, refused him admittance, Kamran succeeded in enticing him outside the walls, and, by a display of the most daring courage, in defeating him and capturing the town. He found it full of materiel of all sorts. Leaving Shir Ali to guard Gori, Kamran pushed on with a force now con- siderably augmented into Badakhshan, in the hope of persuading the governor, Mirza Suliman, to espouse his quarrel. But rebuffed by him, he turned off to Balkh to implore the aid of the hereditary enemies of his family, the Uzbeg Turks. This was the intelligence which brought the first symptoms of disquietude to Humayun. It did not HUMAYUN AND KAMRAN. 147 much trouble him. It was a movement, he thought, which might be crushed by prompt action on his part. He accordingly sent one of his most trusted chiefs, the Karacha Khan already spoken of, with a sufficient force to drive out the intruder. Karacha Khan acted with promptitude and skill. He marched straight on Gori, and laid siege to it. Shir Ali defended it with great obstinacy for a con- siderable time ; but at last, finding it impossible to prevent it from falling into the enemy’s hands, he sud- denly evacuated it with his whole force, and retired in the direction of Balkh. His protracted defence of Gori had well served his master’s cause. It had given time to Kamran, not only to gain the Uzbeg chiefs, but to induce him to put into the field a powerful force on his behalf. Shir Ali, retreating on Balkh, fell back on this force. With it he returned to Gori. Kamran easily recovered Gori ; then advancing in the direction of Kunduz, took Baghlan and menaced Badakhshan. Prince Hindal was governor of Kunduz. On the first intimation of the movement of the Uzbeg Turks in favour of Kamran, he had effected a junction with Karacha Khan, and this general had been joined by the troops of Badakhshan under Mirza Suliman. But the three united forces were too weak to meet the daily increasing army of Kamran. Hindal, then, threw himself into Kunduz ; Karacha Khan returned to Kabul for reinforcements ; the Mirza withdrew into Badakhshan to defend the passes leading into that province. 10 * 148 AFGHANISTAN. This was the second and more disagreeable awaken- ing of Humayun. It roused him thoroughly. At the very first news of the danger, and before Karacha Khan had returned, he levied his army and marched northwards. He had reached Gfhorband when he met his general and his following in so destitute a condition that it was necessary for them to return to Kabul to refit. Humayun moved his force to the north-east, to Gulbehar in the Kohistan district, to enjoy the pleasures of the chase till Karacha Khan should return. When that event happened the season had advanced too far, and the passes were closed. Humayun at- tempted them, but without success. He returned, baffled, to Kabul, leaving time to Kamran to carry out his operations against Badaklishan. The tide of fortune was now running strongly in favour of that prince. In vain had Mirza Suliman attempted to bar his progress. Kamran had driven him to take refuge in the mountains. This success had brought to him some thousands of his old ad- herents from Kabul. Another event was preparing in that city which would bring him more. Humayun had returned, baffled, to Kabul. He had not been long there before his minister, commander- in-chief, and chief adviser, Karacha Khan, took offence at the refusal of his master to dismiss another minister, who, he conceived, had insulted him. It is probable that had Humayun yielded, even slightly, in the first in- stance, the angry spirit of his chief minister might have been appeased. But Humayun indolently permitted the spark to fan into a flame. Even then he might HUMAYUN AND KAMEAN. 149 have quenched it had he chosen to sacrifice the offending minister. He preferred, however, to steer a middle course, far from honourable to himself, inas- much as he insinuated to Karacha Klian that it would be in his power, as chief minister, to seize an oppor- tunity to call the offender to account at a future period. Prompt dismissal he refused. Upon this Karacha Khan, accompanied by many of the most in- fluential men of the Court, left Kabul at the head of three thousand veteran troops, and seizing the imperial stud at Khwaja Rivaj made for the passes of the eastern Hindu Kush. Humayun, though completely taken by surprise, was not stunned by the blow. He hastily collected all his available troops, and following the rebels, came up with the rearguard at Karabagh. Karacha Khan, however, pushed on, and by favour of the night suc- ceeded in placing the bridge of Ghorband, which he broke down, between himself and the pursuers before daybreak. Humayun then discontinued the pursuit, and Karacha Khan, leaving a force south of the Hindu. Kush in the Panjshir valley to guard the passes and to watch the proceedings of the ruler of Kabul, crossed the mountains, and effected a junction with Kamran in Badakhshan. Kamran at once occupied Talikan, sent a force under his general Shir Ali to endeavour to gain the city of Kunduz, and despatched another force to Andar-ab, a town commanding the northern slopes of the Hindu Kush at the issues of the Girdshah Pass. It would appear that his measures were either not 150 AFGHANISTAN. very well planned, or not very well executed. Fortune certainly was against him. His general, Shir Ali, engaged in operating against Kunduz, was taken prisoner, and at once liberated and entrusted with high command by Humayun. The general he had left in the Panjshir valley to' guard the passes was defeated and slain. Humayun, who had collected a formidable army, and had received promise of co-operation from Mirza Suliman of Badakhshan, had then traversed the Grirdshah pass, and occupied Ander-ab, which Kamrfin’s general had previously evacuated. So far, then, the star of Humayun had seemed to be in the ascendant. But Kamran was very confident. He knew that his brother’s next move must be against the important town of Talikan. He had therefore garrisoned that place with the force brought by Karacha Khan from Kabul, strengthened by some of his own men. He himself lay with his main army at a distance of about fifty miles, ready to act according to circumstances, watching his opportunity. The opportunity soon came. Talikfin stands on the Ferkar river near the point where it joins the Bangi. Humayun, then, conceived the idea of sending one division of his army across the Bangi above the town, so as to cut the communication between it and the army of Kamran, whilst he should attack it on the other side. The execution of this delicate manoeuvre he entrusted to his brother Hindal. The plan, however, had not been kept very secret, for intimation of it reached Karacha Khfin in sufficient time to enable him HUMAYUN AND K AMR AN. 151 to inform Kamran. With the speed of lightning Kamran marched close to the vicinity of Talikan, placed his army in observation whilst Hindal was executing his manoeuvre, and, the instant that general had placed the Bangi between himself and his main army, dashed upon him. The result was never doubt- ful. Hindal and his force were forced back with heavy loss. It seems that Kamran, a man of experience himself, and supported by chieftains of proved conduct in the field, ought to have taken advantage of this victory. But, influenced by circumstances of which I am igno- rant, he preferred to take up a position on a rising ground not far from Talikan, in a certain sense covering that fort. Humayun on this occasion showed the quality of a great leader. He had witnessed from the opposite side of the Bang! the defeat of his detachment. Knowing well the shifting nature of the allegiance of many of his followers, he was burning to wipe out the stain — and to wipe it out at once. He crossed the river, then, immediately, at a ford a mile below the town, and marched straight against the elevated ground occupied by Kamran. Now was Kamran’ s opportunity. He had a strong position close to the fort occupied by his followers, and in the attack the enemy was bound to expose his flank. To resist until Karacha Khan should assault that flank was his clear line of action. A com- plete victory would probably have ridded him of Hu- mayun. A defeat could not have worse consequences than a retreat into a fort which must eventually sur- 152 AFGHANISTAN. render. He ought then to have hailed the chance of decisive action. He did not hail it. It is hard to say why. He did not even stand the assault ; but, hastily breaking up, retired into the town, leaving all his baggage in the hands of the enemy. Humayun at once laid siege to Talikan. Naturally kind-hearted, and certain now of success, he offered terms to Kamran. Kamran refused them. But as day succeeded day, and his hopes became fainter, when the inevitable future pressed itself more and more closely upon his vision, then did he begin to lose heart. A few days more, and the arrows which he directed at his brother’s camp bore with them missives expressive of contrition and of hopes for pardon. These missives touched the heart of Humayun. He agreed to send a confidential agent into the town to arrange the terms of accommodation. The agent arranged the terms. Kamran consented to renounce his independence, to acknowledge the sove- reignty of Humayun, to retire to Mekka, and to yield up the rebel nobles in chains. In justice to Kamrdn, it must be stated that this last condition was agreed to by him on the understanding that the lives of those nobles should be spared. Then Kamran surrendered (August 17, 1548). Allowed to take a few companions with him, he selected, amongst others, Bapus Beg,* one of the * The history of this man affords a curious instance of the morals and manners of that period. Chief minister and confi- dential friend of Kamran in 1545, die had deserted to Humayun HUMAYUN AND K AMR AN. 153 revolted nobles, to whom he said he wished to make reparation for injuries he had inflicted on him. The small party, and it consisted of but a few men, were conducted to the frontier of Turkistan by Haji Mahammad — the same nobleman, it will be recollected, who had overtaken and spared the life of Kamran as he was escaping from Kabul — and were by him then dismissed on their way to exile. At last it would seem that Humayun was master of the kingdom of Kabul. Twice had he completely vanquished his brother ; twice had he dismissed him a fugitive without an armed following ; this time he had won back to himself, by his clemency, the chiefs, who must have been satisfied that Kamran, even with many points in his favour, could not command for- tune. But so strange was the social and political life of those days, that Kamran the exile was still a power capable of striking, and striking hardly, for the throne. Constituted as was society in the sixteenth century in Afghanistan, as it is constituted now — for in our days we have witnessed events not dissimilar — there was on the advance of the prince towards Kabul the same year. When, subsequently, in 1547, Kamran recovered the capital in the manner stated in the text, he, under the plea that Bapus Beg had super- intended the execution of some prisoners taken by Humayun, gave that nobleman’s wife to the rabble in the bazaar, by them to be dishonoured, and killed his three sons, between the ages of three and eight, throwing their bodies over the walls. Notwith- standing this act, we find Bapus, only the following year, deserting to Kamran, moved solely by his sympathy with Karacha Khan. And now we find him willingly accompanying into exile the prince who had insulted him in his deepest affections. 154 AFGHANISTAN. no absolute safety for Humdyun but in the death of his brother. Imprisonment was not sufficient — for he could escape. Even deprivation of sight could not take away the power of the name.* Kamran had scarcely proceeded forty miles from the frontier, when information reached him that Humayun, in full darbar, had pardoned the revolted nobles, and restored them to favour. Hating the idea of exile and of Mekka, it occurred to him that could he but once obtain a footing at his brother’s court, every- thing was yet possible. The clemency shown by his brother to his companions seemed to augur that his heart might relent to him also. It was at least worth his while to try it. Accordingly he sent Bapus Beg to present his humble petition to be received into favour. The answer responded to his fondest hopes. He received permission to return. The ceremony which followed reflected the highest honour on the warm-hearted Humayun. When his brother appeared, he bade him cast away the whip which he had placed on his neck in token of being a criminal. “ What is past is past,” he said, when Kamran, after having been seated, began to make excuses for his conduct. The two brothers then rose, embraced each other, and sobbed on each other’s necks. Humayun then conducted his brother to the highest place of honour next to himself. They then dined and ate salt together amid the rejoicing of the * Look, for instance, at the installation of the blinded Maham- mad after the deposition of Masaud I., page 87. HUMAYUN AND KAMRAN. 155 courtiers. The reconciliation was most complete — in appearance. Before setting out for Kabul, Humayun proceeded to arrange for the government of the several provinces and districts which acknowledged his sovereignty or the overlordship of his house. Badakhshan he re- stored to Mirza Suliman, and added to it the fort and district of Talikan and the district, to the north of it, of Kishem. Prince Hindal received Kunduz, with the towns and districts dependent on it, chief amongst which were Gori and Baghlan; Shir Ali, the old general of Kamran, was appointed his minister. To Kamran himself was assigned the province, or rather district, of Kolab,* across the Oxus — to the north of Kunduz and Badakhshan — lying between Darwaz and Shaghnan, and bordered on the north-east by the small district of Karatighln. This district was given to Prince Askari, who, it may be remembered, had submitted after the capture of Kandahar, and had since remained in disfavour. The policy of posting in such close conjunction to each other the two brothers who had shown the most marked hostility to himself, seems to indicate weakness on the part of Humayun. He was ever too confiding. As their lieutenant, he nominated Chakar Ali Beg, a man of proved fidelity possessing great influence in the district. Humayun then returned to Kabul (5th October * The chief town of the district, Kolab, is in long. 70°, lat. 38°. The district, though north of Badakhshan, and on the other side of the Oxus, used always to he considered as belonging to Badakh- shan. Vide Blochmann’s “ Ain-i-Akbari,” p. 438. 156 AFGHANISTAN. 1548). Before he had left his northern provinces he had meditated an expedition to drive the Uzbeg Turks from Balkh, and to secure the adherence of Kamran he had promised to confide to him the government of the province of which Balkh was the capital. On his arrival at Kabul, the winter and early spring being before him, he set to work to push on with vigour his preparations for this expedition. They were nearly completed when he received an embassy from Mirza Haidar, the enlightened and distinguished ruler of Kashmir. The ambassador was instructed to acknow- ledge the overlordship of Humayun, to invite that prince to Kashmir, and to lay before him the plans matured by Mirza Haidar for undertaking from his mountain-country an invasion of Hindustan and driving thence the family which had supplanted the dynasty of Babar. This was a proposition than which none could be more tempting to Humayun. The project, too, seemed feasible. Mirza Haidar had wrested Kashmir from the son-in-law of Shir Shah, and he had shown him- self the most consummate general of his age; and now he offered to place himself, his troops, his country, at the disposal of Humayun for the recovery of the inheritance of which he had been robbed. It was a most tempting offer — an offer at which, had his hands been free, Humayun would have eagerly clutched. But two circumstances barred his acceptance of it : these were the attitude of the Uzbeg Turks at Balkh, and the attitude of Kamran and Askari in Kolab and Karatighin. HUMAYUN AND KAMRAN. 157 The Uzbeg Turks had, we have seen, assisted Kam- ran in his second contest with Humayun, not from love for Kamran, but from a desire to see the Moghol family weakened by internecine wars. For the same reason, when, subsequently, the two brothers were fighting with apparently even chances near Talikan, the Uzbegs had refused to assist Kamran. After the contest had been decided, both the brothers bore the Uzbegs a grudge — Humayun, because they had at one time assisted his brother ; Kamran, because they had sub- sequently refused that assistance. Besides, the posi- tion of the Uzbegs in the famous city of Balkli, south of the Oxus, could not be regarded but with great disfavour by a Moghol ruler. Humayun had, there- fore, determined to drive them across the Oxus, or at all events out of Balkh. His preparations had been made with that object, and they had been communi- cated to so many people that they could hardly have escaped the penetration of the U zbeg prince, who was allied to Humayun by marriage. The attitude of Kamran was, moreover, not such as to inspire him with confidence. Kamran had ruled a kingdom ; he now governed a district. Kolab was to him what, in later times, Elba was to Napoleon. He chafed at the pettiness of the mountain district. Almost his first act had been to quarrel with Chakar Ali Beg, the nobleman appointed by Humayun to act as his prime minister, and he had refused his brother’s invitation to repair to Kabul to receive there the nomination to another principality. It was evident then to Humayun that Kamran’ s loyalty would scarcely 158 AFGHANISTAN. be proof against the temptation which his own depar- ture for Kashmir and India would offer him. For these reasons Humayun resolved to postpone his acceptance of the tempting offers of Mirza Haidar, and to carry out his plans against Balkh. In the spring of 1549 his preparations were complete. He sent then warnings to his vassal princes and nobles, to Hajl Mahammad of Ghazni, to Mirza Suliman of Badakhshan, to Prince Kamran of Kolab, to Prince Askari of Karatighin, to Prince Hindal of Kunduz, — the first to join him at once, the others to unite with him after he should have traversed the passes. Haji Mahammad joined his sovereign at Yurat Uhalak, near Kabul. There, too, Humayun was met by Mirza Ibrahim, the son of Mirza Suliman of Ba- dakhshan. He then set out by way of Istalif and the Panjshir valley. Here he waited till he heard that the Uzbegs had taken the field; he then traversed the passes and moved by way of Andar-ab to Narin.* From Narin he marched through the Nilbar valley to Baghlan, being joined on his way by Prince Hindal and Mirza Suliman. At Baghlan Humayun had expected the princes Kamran and Askari ; but when he found that, not- withstanding their promises and protestations, they did not appear, he began to fear that they were watching their opportunity to betray him. Still, how- * Erskine says, “ He marched down to Anderab, and thence by Talikan to Narin.” It is difficult to understand why he should have done this, for Ander-ab is south of Narin, and Narin again south of Talikan and on the road to it from Ander-ab. HUMAYUN AND KAMEAN. 159 ever, hoping for the best, he contented himself with detaching a force to cover Badakhshan from any possible attack, and then pushed on to Aibak, a strong fort on the frontiers of the principality of Balkh. Aibak, scantily provided and vigorously assailed, soon surrendered. Had Humayun pushed on at once he would probably have carried Balkh, for the easy capture of Aibak had made a great impression on the Uzbegs. But the inaction of Kamran paralysed him. He still hoped he might come ; he feared the mischief he might effect should he himself be seriously involved with the Uzbegs. A vacillating mind, hovering be- tween two conclusions, almost invariably decides on a middle course, exposing it to the two evils it had wished to avoid. So it was in this case. Humayun dreaded to attack the Uzbegs lest Kamran should act in his rear ; he dreaded to order a hostile move- ment against Kamran lest he should force him into revolt. He therefore sat still and waited. The result was that the two things he most dreaded happened : the Uzbegs forced him to retreat, and Kamran revolted ! It was so, in very deed. Humayun delayed at Aibak so long, that the Uzbegs received reinforcements from beyond the Oxus and resolved to beat up the quarters of their dilatory invader. Just at this time Humayun had made up his mind to advance. As he entered Astaneh the Uzbegs came down on his rearguard and plundered the baggage of his army. He con- tinued, nevertheless, his onward movement, though marching slowly, in the hope that Kamran would 160 AFGHANISTAN. arrive. When at last Balkh was reached, Kamran was still invisible. The part which Kamran designed to play became now quite clear to Humayun, and again the conviction of it paralysed him. His troops drove in, notwith- standing, the advanced force of the U zbegs, and Balkh lay at his mercy. The object for which he had marched from Kabul was within his grasp ; he had but to stretch out his hand and take it. But he feared to stretch out his hand. Why ? Simply because, in pos- session of Balkh, exposed to the hostility of all the tribes of the TTzbegs, an opportunity would be offered to Kamran to slip down on Kabul. He could not make up his mind to run that risk, so — he called a council of war. A council of war never fights. It would seem that not a single voice was raised in favour of an occupa- tion of Balkh. Neither did any member advocate the crushing of Kamran as a preliminary measure. As might have been expected, the middle course — so dear to mediocre minds — was adopted. That was to take up a position at Dera Glez, some twelve miles distant, commanding the entrance to the passes leading to Kabul, and whence, should Kamran prove loyal, it would be easy to return to Balkh. This middle course met with the success it richly deserved. The conjectures of the chiefs regarding Kamran’s possible action had not been kept secret; there was scarcely one section in the army in which the question of his conduct had not been discussed. When, then, Humayun acted on the opinion of the council of HUMAYUN AND KAMEAN. 161 war, and ordered his troops to turn their faces towards Kabul, though only so far as Dera Gez, the rumour spread like wildfire that the army was retiring because certain news had arrived that Kamran had started for a raid on Kabul. Instantly there was a panic and a stampede. The majority of the soldiers had left their wives, their children, their property, in Kabul, and they knew from experience the treatment which those hostages to fortune were likely to receive from the tender mercies of Kamran. Meanwhile, the Uzbegs, noting the retreat of their enemies, had pressed out to harass them. They found instead of an army a disorderly rabble, bent on pressing forward. It is true, that owing to the exertions of Humayun, whose horse was shot under him, a covering party was formed which for a time checked and ulti- mately repulsed the Uzbegs. But the flight was not stopped. Discipline disappeared. Each man pressed on for himself, bent on reaching Kabul. It was like the retreat from Moscow. All cohesion was lost. Humayun, without a horse, almost without a following, had to cross mountains, traverse passes, a prey to hunger, thirst, and fatigue, never knowing where he should pass the morrow. When he reached Kabul it was rather as a fugitive than as a king. What, meanwhile, had Kamran been doing ? That Kamran had throughout this period been watching his opportunity, that he had avoided joining his brother, in order to mar his plans, is clear from his subsequent conduct. But Kamran had made no attempt on Kabul. He had not moved out of Kolab. It would 11 162 AFGHANISTAN. have been better for Humayun, then, had he continued his operations against Balkh. The phantom conjured up to prevent his occupation of that place had been in very deed a phantom. But his disorderly retreat on Kabul, the dispersion of his chiefs and of his soldiers, gave Kamran the chance for which he had been watching. Kamran shone more in politics than in war. In the former he never, in the latter he very often, missed the moment when to strike. And now he struck. Summoning his brother Askari to Kolab, he marched into Badaklishan. Mirza Suliman had found his way to that province after the disastrous retreat from Balkh. But he had no army capable of coping with that of Kamran. He could not, then, prevent the town of Talikan from falling into his hands ; but he threw a garrison into the fortress of Kila-Zefer, and then with his small force occupied a very strong position, guarding the passes, close to the town of Jerm. It formed no part of Kamran’ s plan to waste his time in a mountain warfare with Mirza Suliman. Leaving, then, a garrison under Bapus Beg in Ta- likan, he marched on Kunduz, held by his brother Hindal, who had escaped from the disastrous retreat of the royal army, of which he had commanded, with distinguished gallantry, the rearguard. Kamran used every endeavour to induce Hindal to transfer his alle- giance to himself; but as Hindal refused, he sat down before the place. In his attempt to take Kunduz, Kamran was baffled by the skill and the artifice of Hindal, and he was HUMAYUN AND KAMRAN. 163 already despairing of success when he received intelli- gence that Chakar Ali Beg, the Kolabi minister with whom he had quarrelled, had invaded Kolab, defeated his brother Askari, and had laid siege to the town. He heard also that Mirza Suliman had advanced from the hills, and was threatening to cut him off. He therefore raised the siege of Kunduz, and sending a party to keep Suliman in check, set out to return to Kolab. But the tide of his misfortunes was at its flow. Kamran relieved Kolab, was joined by Askari, and drove away Chakar Ali. Then, marching against Suliman, he reached the banks of the river Kokclia, and encamped near the town of Rostak. When lying there his camp was suddenly set upon and plundered by a large body of Uzbegs who happened to be passing by. There wa,s no time for resistance. The attack was utterly unexpected, the more so as the leader of the Uzbegs, Syad Uzbeg, was in alliance with Kamran. It subsequently appeared that the Uzbegs had not waited to ask to whom the camp belonged before they attacked it. However, the mischief was done. Kam- ran, Askari, and a few others escaped, but the army had disappeared ; there appeared no chance of re- uniting it, for Suliman was now marching, joined by Hindal, against the revolted brothers. This accumulation of disaster was too much for Kamran. He threw up the cards, made the best of his way to Khost, intending to proceed thence by way of Zohak and Bamian into the Hazara country, to act then according to the information which might reach him from his friends in Kabul. 11 * 164 AFGHANISTAN. But though his fortunes seemed at their lowest, a strong tide was already flowing in his favour. The rule of of Humayun in Kabul since his return from Balkh had given great dissatisfaction to some of the great nobles who were the main supports of his throne. Prominent amongst these was Karacha Khan, of whom mention has already been made. But im- portant personage though he was, he was but one of a large number. Cold and stern as they knew Kamran to be, they yet preferred him to the softer nature of the often thoughtless Humayun. No sooner then was it known in Kabul that Kamran was crossing the mountains with but a few followers on his way to Bamian, than the conspirators sent out to him their most solemn professions of devotion to him, accompanied by specific recommendations as to the line of conduct he should pursue. He was advised to dissemble with his brother, by imploring his clemency and promising good conduct for the future. They engaged, on their part, to incense Humayun against him, so as to induce him to send out parties to attack him on lines which he would avoid. Humayun and Kabul would thus be left at his mercy. Kamran followed these directions to the letter, and the conspirators responded as they had promised. His appeals for mercy were rejected. Two considerable parties were sent to capture him : the one towards Zoliak and Bamian ; the other towards Sal-A'lang ; Humayun taking up a position with a small detach- ment near Dera Kipchak. Before the party first in order of mention had HUMAYUN AND KAMRAN. 165 reached its destination, Kamran had passed through Bamian, and had hastened by forced marches and with an increasing following to Dera Kipchak. There, too, treason had been at work for him. His friends were in the closest confidence of his brother ; many of them about his person. Surprised by Kamran, Humayun still had about him adherents sufficient to repulse him, had they been good men and true. But when Kamran arrived within bowshot, they refused to return the fire which he poured upon the group round his brother, and signalled to him to come on. Kamran, somewhat hesitatingly, advanced. His brother’s fol- lowers then dispersed, or fled, or came over to him. One miscreant, a man of Kolab, struck a blow at, and wounded Humayun.* Though severe, it was not mortal, and he was carried in safety to the Sis tan pass, where the following morning he was joined by the faithful Haji Mahammad Khan. Ultimately he made his way, with some difficulty, to Ander-ab. Kamran, noting the flight of the adherents of Humayun, sent out all the troops he could spare to pursue them. He followed with the remainder to Charikar. There he received evidence by the bloody cuirass of Humayun, which had been found on the field, that his brother had been wounded. He sent the cuirass in to Kabul to be shown to the governor, * “ The man had raised his sword to repeat the blow, when Humayun, turning round and looking his assailant sternly in the face, exclaimed, “Wretched rebel!” Babai, from surprise, sus- pended his blow for a moment, when Mehter Sagai interposed, and Babai drew off.” — Erskine. 166 AFGHANISTAN. who had refused to surrender the place. The governor recognised the cuirass and submitted. Kamran was now, for the third time, master of Kabul, and with it of all the treasures of Humayun and of the person of his son. His hopes were high, for he believed that his brother had perished, and, Humayun once dead, there was no one to be feared. Claiming independent sovereignty, he allotted the various provinces or districts of Afghanistan to his adherents. Thus to his brother Askari he gave Jala- labad; to Karacha Khan, Ghazni; to Yasan Daolat, whom he had sent to follow up Hamayun, the northern district of Ghorband. He continued likewise to levy troops and to endeavour to enlist on his behalf the services of the Hazaras and the Afghans, so as to be ready for any event. He was soon to be tried. Three months had not elapsed since he had reoccupied Kabul when informa- tion reached him that Humayun, recovered from his wounds, had broken up from Andar-ab, and was cross- ing the Hindu Kush by the pass leading into the P an j shir valley. It will be recollected that on previous occasions, whether at Kabul or at Talikan, Kamran had always waited to be attacked — and had been defeated. He determined this time to avoid that error. Ko sooner, then, had he heard that Humayun had broken up from Andar-ab, than, collecting all his troops and his Haza- ra auxiliaries ; and having under him as leaders tried men such as Karacha Khan, his brother Prince Askari, and Yasan Daolat, he marched to the P an j shir valley HUMAYUN AND KAMRAN. 167 and took up a strong position on a rising ground over- looking the southern slopes of the mountain, and barring the road by which Humayun must pass. That prince, meanwhile, had collected at Andar-ab all the chiefs who had remained faithful to the legiti- mate sovereign. Before he set out, anxious to bind them to his service, he proposed to them and their followers to take an oath of fidelity to himself under all circumstances. The wild chiefs heard the proposal without astonishment, and were on the point of acting upon it, when one among them, the faithful Haji Mahammad, already twice honourably mentioned in this history, ventured to suggest that when they had taken the oath it might be necessary for Humayun to bind himself also, by a sacred and solemn engagement, to act as his advisers should recommend.*' The bold proposition to limit the authority of the sovereign was startling in that rude age. Prince Hindal, who heard it made, fired with indignation ; but Humayun, who knew himself, and who felt how much depended on the cordial co-operation of his chiefs, yielded promptly and with grace. “ Let it be,” he said, “ as Haji Mahammad and the other chiefs desire. ”t He then made the required declaration. * The words were : “ Whatever we, his well-wishers, recommend with a view to his interest, and deem indispensable for that pur- pose, he will consent to and perform.” — Erskine, vol. ii. p. 388. f Mr. Erskine states that Haji Mahammad’s freedom on this occasion was not grateful to royal ears, and was probably never forgiven. This supposition is well founded. Soon after Huma- yun’s restoration Haji Mahammad was falsely accused of treason 168 AFGHANISTAN. Marching through the passes without difficulty — for it was summer — Humayun suddenly found himself in the presence of his brother’s army, drawn up on a rising ground, and barring his road. He halted his force, and, in pursuance of a predetermined plan, sent to Kamran a messenger proposing terms of accommo- dation. The terms he proposed, considering his right of birth, were fair, even liberal. They were, that Kamran should acknowledge the overlordship of his brother, and should join with him in an attempt to reconquer Hindustan. Kamran did not altogether reject the proposal ; he sent back the messenger notifying his acceptance of it in principle, provided he were allowed to keep Kabul. Humayun replied that he was willing to admit Kamran as his partner in empire, alike over Hindustan and Afghanistan, and that Akbar should be their viceroy in Kabul. Kamran was much inclined to accept these terms, but Karacha Khan, who had obtained great influence over him, dis- suaded him. Kabul, he said, at any cost must be kept.* Bent on fighting, it was surely the policy of Kamran to attack at once. All Eastern nations, except when they are behind walls of stone or of mud, fight better and put to death. He had long previously seen that his ruin was determined upon, but he had always said, with Danton, “ they dare not.” * His words were, “ My head and Kabul,” meaning death or Kabul — words to which the result attached a peculiar interest, his head, after Humayun’s victory, having been placed on one of the gates of Kabul.— Fide Erskine’s “ History of India,” vol. ii. HUMAYUN AND KAMEAN. 169 when they attack. As a man who had seen many a battle-field, Kamran must have known this. But here, at this decisive moment, superstition came to ruin him. The astrologers told him that the day was unfavour- able. He resolved, therefore, not to attack, and, if possible, to avoid an action. But this resolution could not even begin to take effect without disheartening his followers. It had scarcely been announced when some of his chiefs deserted to Humayun, carrying with them the account of the reason of the inaction. Humayun at once determined that the prediction of the astrolo- gers should be true. He advanced, but as he approached the enemy one of his generals recommended that the action should be deferred to the following day. Hamayun, fickle and easily led, agreed; but other chiefs objected, and again he was over-ruled. He advanced again, and when within charging distance he ordered the leading division under Mirza Ibrahim to attack the height on which Kamran was posted, he himself supporting him with the reserves. The attack was well directed and well led, and notwithstanding all Kamran’ s efforts the assailants effected a lodgment and gradually gained ground. At this crisis Karacha Khan, who com- manded the cavalry under Kamran, fell with such fury upon Humayun’s left wing, commanded by Prince Hindal, that he completely broke it and drove it from the field. With the skill of a practised leader, Karacha Khan re-formed his men and led them with fury against the right wing commanded by Mirza Suliman. The battle here was hotly contested, but victory seemed 170 AFGHANISTAN. inclining to Karacha Khan, when a chance shot dis- abled him. He was taken prisoner and killed. The loss of their leader so disheartened the cavalry of Kamran, that the enemy recovering the ground they had lost, and pressing onwards, made a demon- stration against the eminence on which Kamran was still unequally struggling. The left wing too had rallied, and was coming on. It is but bare justice to Kamran to admit that he fought with great determi- nation, nor did he leave the field till his brother Askari had been taken prisoner and many of his foremost chiefs had fallen. Seeing then that all was lost he fled, followed by eight only of his adherents, from the field. The triumph of Humayun was complete. Never again was the star of Kamran in the ascen- dant. Thenceforth the supremacy of Humayun over Kabul and its subordinate provinces was never seriously endangered. Still, so long as a man possess- ing the unconquerable ambition and the daring energy of Kamran was at large, he could not feel in perfect safety. It will be necessary, then, before describing the general affairs of the reign of Humayun, to deal with that particular incident of it relating only to Kamran. Kamran had fled from the field, having lost every- thing except hope. He fled night and day till he reached the country inhabited by the wild aboriginal Afghans. These robbed him and his followers of all they possessed. Disguising himself then as a mendi- cant, he made his way to Mandraor, and discovered himself to the chief, by whom he was hospitably HUMAYUN AND KAMRAN. 171 entertained. He then began to raise forces, and with such effect, that Humayun sent troops to attack him, and these forced him to take refuge with the hill tribes — the Dawezais and Mohmands. The pursuit once re- laxed, Kamran began again to intrigue with his new hosts. So great was the ascendancy he gained over them that they agreed to follow him in his enterprise, and allowed themselves to be led by him into the mountains in the vicinity of the capital. In vain were expeditions sent against him. Too weak to fight, he fled on their approach, only, however, to re-appear in another part of Afghanistan. Sometimes, when his brother pursued him in person, he retaliated by making attacks upon his camp. In one of these, his brother Hindal, fighting for Humayun, was killed, though the attack itself was repulsed. At last Kamran, now having a this disposal a force of fourteen thousand Afghans, allowed his camp to be surprised. This blow was fatal. He fled across the Indus, and threw himself on the protection of Salim Shah, the Pathan King of Dehli. But there was no abiding place for him here. Treated with indignity by his host, he escaped from his camp in the disguise of a woman, and courted the hospitality of two Hindu princes in succession. Driven from their territories by the importunities of Salim Shah, he then fled for protection to the G-akk’hars of the Rawal Pindi districts. It happened that the chief of that race wished to propitiate Humayun. He sent then an embassy to him with the offer to deliver up his brother Kamran. Kamran, cognisant of the nature of the 172 AFGHANISTAN. mission confided to the ambassador, endeavoured to secure terms for himself by sending with it a mes- senger, carrying a letter in which he renewed his prayers for pardon and his promises of amendment. Upon receiving the embassy and the message, Humayun, satisfied that he could never count himself as safe so long as Kamran should be at large, marched with an army across the Indus to receive his prisoner. What was to be his fate ? Was mercy to prevail, or was the cup of evil running over ? Humayun was, by nature, soft-hearted. His father, on his dying bed, had conjured him to be merciful to all, especially to his brothers. Hitherto he had spared them. He had welcomed back Hindal after his revolt, had twice pardoned Askari who would have slain him, had sobbed on the neck of the oft rebelling Kamran. And now Kamran — Kamran who had once betrayed him, who had twice driven him from his capital, who had rejoiced over his supposed death, and who by his unceasing plots had rendered his life a burden to him — now Kamran was in his power. Could he, in safety to him- self, could he spare him once again ? Humayun wavered. It would appear that he rather leaned to mercy. But there were men about him who saw that mercy in the shape of free pardon was im- possible. These men knew too well the unforgiving nature of the prince who, if pardoned, might one day become their master. They therefore presented to Humayun a petition, in which, after dwelling on what Kamran had done, they prayed that capital punish- ment should be inflicted upon him as indispensable to HUMAYUN AND KAMRAN. 173 the public peace. Humayun still refused to give the order for his brother’s death ; but, feeling strongly how necessary it was he should be deprived of the power of action, he gave orders that his eyes should be lanced. The order was carried out. Kamran then asked and obtained permission to proceed to Mekka,* where he died, some four years later. It is difficult to say how Humayun should have dealt his brother. To imprison him would have been useless. Escape sooner or later would, in those days when the sovereign was but the first noble, have been certain. No inland fortress would have held him, and Humayun possessed no St. Helena to which to trans- port him. Free pardon had been tried, and tried in vain. To pardon him again would have been to ensure a further sacrifice of life.* In Europe in those days, and even at a much later period, he # He went first to Tatta, in Sind, where his father-in-law, Shah Husen, allotted him an estate and a residence. He persisted, however, in going on to Mekka. His wife, Chuckak Begam, insisted, in spite of her father’s prohibition, on accompanying him. “You gave me,” she said, “my husband when he was a king and happy, and would take him from me now that he is fallen and blind and miserable. Ho. I will attend and watch him faithfully wherever he goes.” She carried her word and accom- panied him to Mekka. She survived him only seven months. — Erskine’s “ History of India,” vol. ii. p. 419. t “ Oh, my unkind brother, what are you doing ? For every murder that is committed on either side you will have to answer at the Hay of Judgment. Come and make peace, that mankind may no longer be oppressed by our quarrels.” Thus wrote Humayun to Kamran during the siege of Talikan, 1548. — Erskine’s “ His- tory of India.” 174 AFGHANISTAN. would have been tried and executed as a rebel, and it seems to me that Humayun would have been amply justified in dealing out to him that punishment. Kamran was a man of considerable attainments. He was not only thoroughly well read in the poetry of that age, but he was an elegant versifier and an accomplished scholar. To have gained and kept the tender affection of such a woman as the daughter of Sultan Husen he must have possessed some ster- ling qualities. His faults were, the boundless ambition which overleaps itself, undue exaltation and a continued development of a temper naturally suspicious, in times of prosperity. They were faults pertaining, in that age, almost of necessity, to one born in the purple. The removal of Kamran seemed to give to Humayun the opportunity for carrying out his long-cherished wishes regarding Hindustan. He was on the borders of Kashmir. The ruler of that province, Sultan Haidar, had previously invited him, and now invited him again, to repair thither to receive its formal over- lordship. Humayun was anxious to comply. But his generals had two reasons for opposing the expedition. The first, the secret reason, was that they had left their families in Kabul ; the second, and the avowed reason, was that if they were to enter Kashmir it would be in the power of Salim Shah, King of Dehli, to cut off their retreat. For once Humayun was obstinate. He ordered that the army should march into Kashmir by the Bimbar pass. But he found to his indignation, the next morning, that the greater part of HTTMAYTTN AND NAME AN. 175 his army had taken the road to Kabul. Yain were his remonstrances. He was forced to give into the general wish, and to fall back on Peshawar. Here he halted a sufficient time to superintend the erection of a new fort designed to protect the town from the depredations of the hill tribes, and to serve as a point cVappui during his projected invasion of Hindustan. He returned at the end of the year (1554) to Kabul. Although the general wish of the nobles had forced Humayun to desist from his plans with regard to Kashmir, it must not be supposed that the arrange- ment sanctioned by him on the eve of the march from Andar-ab to Kabul in 1550 still existed. The pro- poser of that arrangement, Haji Mahammad, had perished by the hands of the executioner. The brother who had witnessed it, Prince Hindal, was dead. The men in fear of whom it was made, Kainran and Karacha Khan, were no more. Other near relatives and great chiefs had also been removed. Humayun had now neither rival to the throne nor near him a noble so distinguished by his talents and following to cause him alarm. As his prime minister he had se- lected Bahram Khan, a Badakhshani, whose abilities as a diplomatist have been related in a previous page.* Bahram was a man of first-rate talents and of unbounded ambition and self-assertion. It is believed that it was he who brought about the death of Haji Mahammad. But at the time of which I am writing, he had been but recently advanced to the first place * Vide p. 133. 176 AFGHANISTAN. under tlie king. In fact he was the king’s man, de- pendent solely upon him. The daring independence of royal authority, which in later days he was to display, had not then been developed. Humayun, freed then from all anxiety regarding attempts upon Kabul, resolved to invade Hindustan. Fortune singularly favoured him. Salim Shah, the capable son of the Shir Shah who had robbed him of his kingdom, had died in 1553. His death was the signal for disorder in Hindustan. It is true that his son, Firoz Khan, was proclaimed his successor, but three days later he was murdered by his maternal uncle. The murderer, devoid of talent, and possessing none of the qualities of a ruler, usurped the throne only to cause revolts in several portions of his dominions. Into the details of these it is not necessary to enter. It will suffice to say that in 1555 there were five rival claimants to the throne, all belonging to the Afghan family of Sur ; the murderer, Mahammad Shah, who occupied Bihar, Janpur, and a great part of the country east of the Granges ; Ibrahim Sur, his brother-in-law, who after holding Agra and Dehli, had been defeated by Sikandar Shah ; Sikandar Shah himself, now holding Dehli and Agra ; Ahmad Khan Sur, who had the Panjab ; and Shujali, who had Malwa. There was besides a sixth, not related to the others, Taj Khan Kerani, who threatened Bengal. Hindustan’s distraction has always been Kabul’s opportunity. Humayun resolved to use it to his pur- pose. With his utmost endeavours, however, he could only raise an army of fifteen thousand men. At the HUMAYAN AND KAMRAN. 177 head of this force he set out by way of Jalalabad and the Khaibar for Peshawar, accompanied by his son Akbar, then twelve years old,* in December 1554, leaving his kingdom of Kabul to be administered by Munim Khan, the son of Bahrain Khan, and governor of his second son, then about a year old. On reach- ing Peshawar, Humayun was joined by Bahram with a' body of veterans from Kandahar. The next day the army marched for the Indus. On crossing that river Bahram was nominated commander-in-chief of the army. Humayun advanced from the Indus by hurried marches to Labor, which he occupied without a blow. Remaining at Labor to organise fresh forces, he sent on Bahram to the Satlaj. Meanwhile, Sikandar Shah, the member of the house of Sur who occupied Agra and Dehli, hearing of the movements of Hu- mayun, had used every effort to collect an army. To check the enemy till he should form one, he despatched two of his most trusted generals with forty thousand horse to the Satlaj. At Machhiwarali, which then lay immediately on the left bank of that river, f they were met by the Mogliol force led by Bahram. The battle that ensued was obstinately contested. One of the decisive battles of that era — a battle upon the result of which it depended whether Hindustan should be ruled by the Moghol who had planted himself in * Akbar was born the 15th October 1542. — Blochmann’s “ Ain-i-Akbari.” f About seventy years ago the river took a more northerly channel, and now runs four miles from the town. 12 178 AFGHANISTAN. Afghanistan, or by the Afghan who had settled in Delhi — the chiefs on either side used every endeavour to conquer. The far greater number of the Indian force seemed to promise success. But Bahrain was a host in himself, and Bahrain conquered. The defeat was the more complete from the fact that the battle had been so hardly fought. Elephants, baggage, and horses fell into the hands of the conqueror. Bahram sent parties to follow up the fugitives as far as Dehli, waiting himself at Machhiwarah till Humayun should join him. It was time for Humayun to follow, for Sikandar Shah was advancing with an army of seventy thousand men to avenge the defeat of his lieutenants. Bahram sent messenger after messenger to press the advance of Humayun. Meanwhile he moved forward into Sirhind to delay as much as possible the enemy’s approach. At last Humayun joined and took command. Two days later (18th of June 1555) Sikandar Shah offered battle. The challenge was accepted. A despe- rate contest terminated in the victory of Humayun. That victory gave him the throne of Hindustan. It is true that provinces had to be conquered and pacified in detail, but the question of supreme domina- tion was settled. That battle — gained near the town of Sirhind — restored Kabul and its dependencies to the position of a subordinate province, subject to the Moghol who reigned in Dehli. It was difficult to manipulate all at once such immense territories into one distinct shape. Kabul, indeed, ably governed by Munim Khan, remained stedfast, but the wily Mirza HUMAYAN AND KAMRAN. 179 Suliman, the man who had always assisted Humayun against Kamran, renounced his vassalage, and declared Badakhshan independent. Humayun saw the evil, and tried to remedy it. He drew up an elaborate plan for the better government of the divisions of his empire,* but before he had attempted to put it into execution he died. His death resulted from an accident. Descending one evening the narrow marble steps out- side the building in which he was at the moment, his foot became entangled in the skirts of his mantle, and the steps being slippery, he lost his footing and fell headlong over the parapet. He lingered four days in a state of insensibility, and then died in the forty- eighth year of his age (24th of Jannuary 1556), two years and a half after he had blinded Kamran, and twenty-one months before the death of that brother. The history of the reigns of Humayun and Kamran has been little more than a record of the plots of the one to supplant the other, of civil wars, of intrigues, of duplicity, of treachery, and of cruelty. Of the Afghans themselves we hear little. They are spoken of as the wild and uncivilized aboriginal inhabitants of the country, hardy, brave, inured to crime — but as * It is doubtful, the circumstances of the times being con- sidered, whether Humayun’ s plan would have worked. He pro- posed to divide the empire into six provinces, each ruled by a viceroy, with a local capital and board of administration. The local capitals were to be Dehli, Agra, Kanaoj, Janpur, Mandu, and Labor. Each province was to have a separate military force under its own general. Under such a system I cannot but think that the time of the emperor would have been entirely occupied in suppressing the revolts of his viceroys. 12 * 180 AFGHANISTAN. utter savages. The history of the two reigns, if they may so be spoken of, is the history, not of the Afghans, but of the Moghol rule in Afghanistan. Not the less is it a history of the country. As it was the migra- tion to India of the Afghan sovereigns of the house of Grhor that made the rule of the stranger a necessity for Afghanistan, so shall we find that it was the migra- tion of the Moghol to the same more favoured land that paved the way for the uprising of a purely Afghan dynasty in the country of rocks and stones. 181 CHAPTER VI. HISTORICAL. — FROM MOGHOL TO AFGHAN. Humayun was succeeded by bis son Akbar. It was a succession to a disputed inheritance. The Hindu chief Hemu, acting for the representative of the Sur dynasty, on the one side, and another member of that family, Sikandar Sur, on the other, contested the empire. But Akbar, though a boy little over thirteen, had displayed already signal promise, and he had the inestimable advantage of counting among his devoted adherents the greatest general of the age, Bahram Khan, of Badakhshan. On this occasion Bahram displayed his wonted daring and energy. Having driven Sikandar Sur from the Panjab, he turned with vastly inferior forces to meet Hemu. He fought him at Panipat, and after a fiercely contested battle completely defeated him. For the second time the fate of India was decided on that memorable field. Kabul, meanwhile, had been left to the care of Miinim Khan, guardian of Prince Mahammad Hakim, the younger brother of Akbar, then about three 182 AFGHANISTAN . years old. The real government, however, soon came to be exercised by the prince’s mother, Mah Jujak Begam, a lady of very remarkable ability — an ability which was very soon to be tested. The news of Humayun’s death had scarcely reached the northern provinces when his cousin, Prince Suli- man of Badakhshan, clutching at the opportunity, crossed the Hindu Kush, and, for the moment, occupied Kabul. Shah Tahmasp, Shah of Persia, at the same time besieged and took Kandahar, and gave it, with Dawar and Gralmsir, to his nephew, Sultan Husen Mirza. The Persians retained it till 1603.* With the Badakshani it was otherwise. It appeared to him that it would be more to his advantage to have in- dependent possession of one province, the road to which lay through Afghanistan, than to be the ruler of two separated from each other by a lofty range, and one of them bordering on the territories of the Emperor of India. This, at least, is certain, that Prince Suliman very shortly evacuated Kabul and returned to Badakhshan ; further, that for the eight or ten years that followed he continued on terms of amity with the Begam virtually regent of Kabul. With the proceedings of Akbar in Hindustan this * I must beg the reader to bear in mind that whenever, up to the occurrences of the year 1736, the city of Kandahar is men- tioned, the old city of that name is referred to. It will be related, in the course of this history, how in 1737 Nadir Shah founded a new city in the vicinity, called by him Nadirabad, to which the inhabitants of the old city migrated, taking with them also its name. FROM MOGHOL TO AFGHAN. 183 history has connection so far only as those proceedings affected Kabul and the country represented by that name. During the early part of his reign Akbar was merely the nominal overlord* of Afghanistan, and was too busily occupied in settling his affairs south of the Satlaj, and in dealing with the Rajas of Rajputana, to be able to pay the smallest attention to Kabul. An event which happened in that city some four years after the death of Humayun proved this very clearly. Subsequently to the departure of Prince Suliman, the Begam, though she made her authority respected, had had much to suffer from the ambition and usurpations of her ministers. Munim Khan, the son of Bahram, had left Kabul when his father fell into disgrace. His son, whom he left behind him, was greatly wanting in tact. Intrigue followed intrigue, and crime succeeded crime. The Begam had almost begun to despair of impressing her own will upon the turbulent nobles, when there arrived at Kabul a man who seemed at the moment born, as it were, to her hand. This was no other than Mir Shah Abul Ma’ali, a powerful noble fleeing from revolt against Akbar. Abul Ma’ali had been one of Humayun’ s generals, and had been entrusted by that prince with the govern- ment of Lahor after by his victory at Sirhind he had established himself in Dehli. Removed — probably from his friendship with the famous Bahram, who had rebelled — from the government of the Panjab, Abul Ma’ali had made a pilgrimage to Mekka. On his return he found the provinces of Western India in 184 AFGHANISTAN. revolt against Akbar. He joined the rebels, at once took the lead in their councils, and defeated the royal army, commanded by Husen Kuli Khan at Narnol, about eighty- six miles south of Hansi. Pressing on to improve his victory, he was met by another army sent by Akbar, and totally defeated. He then fled to the Panjab, but finding his safety menaced in every corner of the province, he pushed on to Kabul and offered his services to the Begam regent. It is a proof of the independence of even nominal suzerainty enjoyed by Kabul at this epoch that the Begam at once accepted the services of a man who fled to her, a rebel to the brother of her son. He seemed just the man she wanted — a man who, devoted to herself, would yet assert her authority over the nobles who were plotting and intriguing at her court. He married her daughter, Fakhrumissa, and she made him prime minister. Acting in the double capacity of son-in-law and vizier, he put down all opposition. Plotting ceased, intrigue was silent; there was but one will ruling everywhere. For some time the Begam believed that that one will was her will ; that Abul Ma’ali was but the hand which put her resolves into force. But gradually it dawned upon her that his was the will as well as the hand ; that he had done more cleverly that which the nobles whom he had supplanted had attempted in vain ; that he had formed a party prepared to support him to the utmost. The moment this conviction forced itself upon her the Begam struggled — but it was too late. She was not, however, powerless, and Abul Ma’alf, certain of sup- FROM MOGHOL TO AFGHAN. 185 port, resolved to remove her from his path. He accordingly had her assassinated (1563).* The obstacle cleared away, Abiil Ma’ali, by virtue of his relationship by marriage to Mahammad Hakim, at once assumed the regency. In Kabul his claims were allowed, and his authority was submitted to. But it was not so in Badakhshan. The subsequent conduct of the ruler of that country, Prince Suliman, forbids the idea that in the action which he took upon this occasion he was animated by any other feeling but ambition. He had his own designs on Kabul. The young prince, the nominal ruler, was then but eleven years old ; his character unformed. Suliman could well have allowed him to continue for some time under the influence of his mother, Mah Jujak Begam, for he and that lady were bound together by the strong ties of mutual interest. But it did not at all suit him to witness all power and authority in Kabul glide into the hands of a clever adventurer, who, moreover, had fortified his position by marrying the sister of the boy # I have found it most difficult to trace the true account of these transactions and to reconcile the versions of different writers appearing in the same book. Let us take, for instance, the case of Mah Jujak Begam. It is evident (Blochmann’s “ Ain-i-Akbari,” p. 318) that this lady was the mother of Mahammad Hakim, king of Kabul. In the same page of the same book it is recorded that in the eighth year of Akbar’s reign she was alive and in the very height of her power; whereas it is clear, from page 312, that she had been murdered early in that year. Ferishta’s account seems to support the second story. The facts in both are, doubtless, correct, but the dates are inaccurate. It is certain, from page 322 of the same record, that Abul Ma’alf married the daughter of Mah Jujak Begam. 186 AFGHANISTAN. king. Prince Suliman resolved therefore to drive, if he could, the adventurer from Kabul. He at once, then, invaded the country, occupied Kabul after a struggle, and killed Shah Abul Ma’ali.* Intent on his own schemes, he then married his own daughter to Prince Mahammad Hakim, and leaving with him as vizier a Badakhshani noble, U'med Ali, returned to his own country. But it would seem that as the young prince grew up he resented the tutelage of the Badakhshani vizier and dismissed him (1564). Upon this Suliman returned to Kabul, this time with hostile intentions towards the young prince. Unable to oppose him, Mahammad Hakim implored the assistance of his brother, and fled towards the Indus. Akbar, dreading the occupation of Kabul by a possible invader of Hindustan, instructed the governor of Multan, Mahammad Kuli Khan, to advance to the assistance of his brother should Prince Suliman attack Kabul. But before these orders reached Multan, Suliman had occupied Kabul. After establishing himself there he moved on Jalalabad. It was just at this period that King Mahammad Hakim, fleeing towards the Indus, met the advanced guard of the succours sent to him by Akbar, consisting of a body of troops, detached by the Emperor from his own army, under the com- mand of Faridun Khan, a Kabul noble. Faridun Khan was the brother of the Mah Jujak Begam already spoken of, and therefore maternal uncle * Ferishta states merely that Ahul Ma’alf lost his life in the war; but in the “ Ain-i- Akbari ” (Blochmann, p. 312) it is posi- tively affirmed that Suliman had him hanged. FROM MOGHOL TO AFGHAN. 187 to Mahammacl Hakim. When lie met his nephew, all seemed lost in Afghanistan — Kabul had been taken, and Jalalabad was invested. There appeared at the moment no hope of recovering it with the small corps d’armee at the disposal of Faridun Khan. But the uncle was a man fertile in expedients, unscrupulous, ready to grasp the attainable. The re-conquest of Afghanistan was difficult : the seizure of the Panjab was easy. “ Why not,” he counselled his nephew, “ take what you can get. Your brother is engaged in a life and death struggle in Bihar. He has no troops he can detach to oppose you, and I am at your disposal. Seize the Panjab ; after that, expel Suliman from Kabul.” Mahammad Hakim jumped at the idea, and marched straight on Lahor. But his designs had transpired, and the governor of Lahor held out for the Emperor. Meanwhile, news of the invasion had been transmitted to Akbar. That great prince had just arrived at Agra after a successful campaign, the prelude, he hoped, to one which would be decisive. He at once broke up on receiving the intelligence from the Panjab. Fortunately for his brother, the news that Akbar had reached Sirhind on his way to relieve Lahor came to him before Akbar had crossed the Satlaj. Then happened an event which would seem impossible had it not occurred. Mahammad Hakim broke up at once precipitately from before Lahor, and retreated with his cavalry in such haste on Kabul, that he arrived there and occupied the city before it was known that he had crossed the Indus ! Prince 188 AFGHANISTAN. Suliman, apprehending no attack, had gone to Badakhshan. The news of the advance of Akbar had then been to his brother the means of regaining his lost kingdom. His invasion of the Panjab was at once pardoned. For the ten years that followed, Mahammad Hakim remained in undisturbed possession of the kingdom of Kabul. Nor is it probable that he would then have been molested had he remained content with what he had. But an insurrection against Akbar of the Afghan colonists in Bihar and Bengal inspired him with the idea that he might at last realise his hopes regarding the Panjab. That province, he was aware, had been left with but a few troops under Raja Man Singh, son of Raja Bhagwan Das, who had been appointed the preceding year to be its governor.* Mahammad Hakim, then, at the head of a considerable force, crossed the Indus. His advanced guard, con- sisting of about a thousand men, had but just reached the left bank, when Man Singh fell upon it and crushed it. The Hindu Raja was not, however, strong enough to resist the whole force, and he retreated before the invader as far as Fort Rotas on the Jailam. Re- inforcing the garrison of that fortress, he fell back on Lahor, prepared to hold that till he should be relieved. Mahammad Hakim leaving Rotas, followed Man Singh to Lahor, and sat before the place. But Akbar was not deaf to the summons despatched to him by his lieutenant. Embarrassed by his war in Bengal and * “ Ain-i-Akbari ” (Blochmann), p. 333. FROM MOGHOL TO AFGHAN. 189 Bihar, he nevertheless set out without delay for the Panjab. Again did Mahammad Hakim on the first intimation of his approach break up the siege, and, leaving only a small garrison in Peshawar, retreat on Kabul. Arriving there he organised his defences, entrusting his advanced force to the command of his maternal uncle, Faridun Khan, whilst he himself should bring on the supports. Meanwhile, the leading divisions of Akbar’s army, led by his sons, Prince Salim, afterwards the emperor Jahangir, and Prince Murad, the fourth in order of birth, had occupied Peshawar and Jalalabad without a blow.* Salim, or as it will be more convenient to call him, Jahangir, remained there, whilst his brother Murad pushed on towards Kabul. He advanced without sufficient caution, for when engaged in the Shatargardan pass, some thirty miles from Kabul, he was set upon by Faridun Khan, and the whole of his baggage was cut off. It would appear that the misfortune to Prince Murad was not very severe, for a few days later, re- inforced by Man Singh, the prince engaged Maham- mad Hakim with all his forces. For the first time in the records of Afghan history, we find a battle decided by gunpowder. “ Kunwr Man Singh and Tuzak Khan Atka,” writes Ferishta, “ having advanced, the elephant swivels opened a fire. By mere accident an officer of Mahammad Hakim Mirza and three other persons standing near him were killed ; on which he * Jahangir could not then have numbered more than twelve summers, and Murad one less, but Man Singh was the real com- mander. Murad died nineteen years later of delirium tremens. 190 AFGHANISTAN. took to flight, losing many persons of distinction in tlie retreat.” There was no more fighting. Maham- mad Hakim fled to Grhorband, whence he entreated the forgiveness of his brother. This forgiveness Akbar readily accorded, but on the condition that thenceforth the yoke of suzerainty should be enforced.* (March 1579.) During the five years following these events, the authority of Prince Suliman had been gradually undermined in Badaklishan. This was mainly due to the dissensions between him and his grandson, Prince Shahrukh. The restless character of Suliman incited the ambition of his grandson ; they fought with alternate success for some years till at last they were so weakened that Uzbegs stepped in and annexed the country. The grandson then fled to Akbar, by whom he was enrolled as a grandee. Suliman repaired to Kabul, to his son-in-law, and with him he remained till the death of the latter. This event occurred in 1585. The transactions of the last seven years of his life are little known. It is clear that he acted simply as the viceroy of his brother, and that Kabul had been merged into the greater empire. Of the state of the people during the time of his sway I have been unable to gather any account. But the tribes of the passes leading down from the highlands of Kabul to the valley of the Indus were * So conjectures Elphinstone, and it is a conjecture borne out by tbe subsequent history of Kabul during the lifetime of Ma- hammad Hakim. The country was formally annexed to Hin- dustan after his death. — “ Ain-i-Akbari ” (Blochmann), p. 452 FEOM MOGHOL TO AFGHAN. 191 to show the stuff of which they were made a very few months after his decease. When that event happened the Emperor nominated Raja Man Singh to be Governor of Kabul. The Raja at once proceeded to that capital, and possessing him- self of the persons of the sons of the late ruler, the princes Afrasyab and Kaikubad, he rejoined Akbar on the Indus, leaving his son Sakat Singh to manage affairs at Kabul. Akbar, meanwhile, had undertaken and completed the conquest of Kashmir, and had enrolled its king amongst the nobles of Hindustan. But a more diffi- cult task was now before him. This was to compel the submission of the wild tribes who dwelt in the mountains beyond the Indus — the Kohistanis, the Swatis, the Yusuf zais, the Mohmands — in fact, the several large atoms of the tribes known then under the general name of Berduranis, but with whom the English are now better acquainted under the peculiar nomenclature of each. Akbar was the greatest of all the Asiatic sovereigns of India. He had conquered and pacified Hindustan, the Panjab, Kabul, and Kashmir. Opposed by the best generals of the age — by the renowned Hemu, by his master in the art of war, the illustrious Bahrain — he had never lost a battle. In mountain warfare, as on the plains, he had equally triumphed. Nor did it seem to him as even a chance possibility that the savages of the Afghan passes could foil his troops. But these men were the fathers of the warriors who for thirty years have faced and warred with our own 192 AFGHANISTAN. countrymen, and they were not one whit their inferiors. When they heard that Akbar had announced his inten- tion to deal with them they made up their minds that they would deal with Akbar, but in their own manner, and in their own hills. The first army was directed by Akbar against the Y usufzais, then, as now, occupying the country beyond the Mahaban mountain, the Burner and Chagurzai hills, and the country north of the former. His army was commanded by his foster-brother Zain Khan.* It would appear that this general was at first successful. It is recorded by Abulfazl that he “ moved into the district of Waijus (north of Peshawar) and punished the Yusuf zais. Several chiefs asked for pardon. After this he created a fort in Jakdarah, in the middle of the country, and defeated the enemy in twenty-three fights. He had at last to ask for reinforcements, and Akbar sent to him Baja Bir Bar and Hakim Abul Fath with some troops.”! It is clear from the above recital, and from other records of the period, that however successful Zain Klian might have been in his advance into the hills, the Yusufzais then showed so formid- able a front that he was compelled to wait for re- inforcements. The reinforcements were led by Raja * Zain Khan was the ennobled son of one of 'Akbar’ s nurses. At the time of the expedition against the Yusufzais he was a com- mander of two thousand five hundred. — “ Ain-i-Akbari ” (Bloch- mann), p. 344. f “Ain-i-Akbari’ (Blochmann), p. 344. Raja Bir Bar, or Bal, was a Brahman, a poet and diplomatist, and a great friend of Akbar. FROM MOGHOL TO AFGHAN. 193 Bir Bar and Abul Fath to a point which we may suppose to have been near Jakdarah. Then there ensued, unhappily, a difference of opinion between the two chief generals. Bir Bar was in favour of a combined attack on the tribes, to be followed by a prompt retreat. Zain Khan was of opinion that the attack should not be made with the combined forces ; that they should operate on two lines ; that whilst one force held the position he occupied, the other should make a detour and attack the enemy on their flank or in their rear. But he was over-ruled, and it was decided to attack the hillmen, and, penetrating the mountains, to return by another road — by way of Karakar. Bir Bar led the advance, Hakim Abul Fath the centre, and Zain Khan the rear. The pass they had to traverse was long and difficult. Nevertheless, by incredible exertions, Bir Bar reached the summit by sunset. But he had scarcely arrived there, when, from flanks and from the front, the Afghans poured down arrows and stones upon his men, and with such effect that they fled in panic, briskly pursued by the enemy. With great difficulty Bir Bar retreated to the foot of the pass, and effected there, with a portion of his force, a junction with the two other divisions, which, likewise attacked, had with difficulty repulsed the enemy. That night and the following day the Yusufzais continued the attack, inflicting greater and greater loss on the imperialists. As the second night fell the generals held a council of war. Zain Khan was in favour of treating. Bfr Bar would not hear of such a 13 194 AFGHANISTAN. course, but, dreading another night attack, he, without communicating with Zain Khan, drew off in the night through a defile which he believed had been left un- guarded. But the Yusufzais had set a snare for his destruction. Hardly had he reached the gorge at the head of the defile than the mountaineers set upon him, and almost destroyed his force. The slaughter was terrific. “ Nearly eight thousand men, perhaps even more,” writes Badaoni, “ were killed. Bfr Bar also was amongst the slain.” Several men of note fell with him; but, writes the same author, “His Majesty cared for the death of no grandee more than for that of Bir Bar.” Meanwhile Zain Khan and Abul Fath had been furiously attacked. When day broke he began to retreat over the Bilandri, still followed by the enemy. All that day he managed to keep his men together, amidst enormous difficulties ; but when night fell the rumour that the Afghans were upon them produced a panic, and they dispersed in disorder. Great was the slaughter, and it was with but a few men only, and on foot, that Zain Khan and Abul Fath reached the Emperor’s camp at Atok. The Emperor’s first act was to despatch Baja Todar Mall and Baja Man Singh with a force across the Indus, to prevent the advance of the Yusufzais into the plains. Todar Mall having taken up positions to effect this object, Man Singh was sent to Kabul to take up his government there, and by a simultaneous attack from the west to aid Akbar in his design to punish the mountaineers. FROM OGHOL TO AFGHAN. 195 Raja Man Singh, reached Kabul in safety, and pre- pared at once to act on the instructions of his master; but before he arrived there Akbar had entrusted Zain Khan with a second army to act against the Mohmands and Grhoris, who, under their chief Jalaludin Rau- shani, had committed many depredations in the Pesha- war valley. Zain Khan gained no striking victory, but his operations were so far successful that the mountaineers were driven back into their hills. But the following year Raja Man Singh joined in a well- concerted attack made on the hill tribes from the Indus, south of the salt range, and aided in their com- plete defeat. It was, however, a never-ending contest, made so, indeed, by the policy of Akbar. By rigor- ously confining the hill tribes to their mountain ranges, and debarring them from legal access to the plains, he forced them to become robbers for subsistence. Thus the frontier contests continued for fourteen years, until a new turn was given to them by a successful raid made by the Mohmands on the city of Grhazm. They were, it is true, quickly driven out, but they were never subdued. Indeed, it stands out as a re- markable fact the frontier tribes, under all changes of dynasties, have maintained to the present day their independence alike of Kabul and the Panjab. They baffled even Nadir Shah. But to return. At the end of the year 1586 Man Singh had been appointed governor of Kabul. He was the first Hindu to whom the administration of a purely Mahomedan country had been entrusted. The result, in an administrative point of view, can 13 * 196 AFGHANISTAN. hardly be pronounced satisfactory. The Kabulis com- plained that all the offices of state were given to foreigners (Rajputs), and that they were neglected. That there was truth in their complaint is evident, but that Man Singh’s action was natural, even justifiable, may likewise be admitted. It is impossible to reform a state by the aid of unskilled workmen. The Kabulis were better men with the sword than with the pen, and Man Singh was probably forced to employ his own co-religionists. However, the complaints waxed so loud that Akbar recalled him, and sent in his place his foster-brother, Zain Khan (1588). This important viceroyalty seems to have been held in succession by many nobles. Zain Khan’s first administration was principally noticeable for his incessant campaigns, with more rather than less success, against the mountain tribes. During his vice- royalty Akbar visited Kabul, spent two months there, and then replaced Zain Khan by Mahammad Kasim (1589). He was succeeded in 1594 by Kulij Khan, of a distinguished Persian family. Of his rule of three years it is simply recorded that “ it was not success- ful.” One of the preceding governors, Zain Khan, followed him. He was governor of Kabul when the Mohmands, under their chief Jalaludfn Raushanf, made the raid upon Gfhaznf previously alluded to. Zain Khan appears to have displayed great activity on this occasion, for not only did he expel Jalaludfn, but when shortly afterwards that leader attempted to recover the place, he fell upon him, defeated him, and, following with vigour, overtook and slew him. This FROM MOGHOL TO AFGHAN. 197 was his last noticeable act as Governor of Kabul, for Akbar, regarding the pacification of the country assured by the death of Jalaludin, recalled Zain Khan to Lahor (1601). The name of the successor to Zain Khan I have been unable to discover, but it is of little importance. Kabul no more represented a kingdom, not even a province. After the death of Jalaludin, Ghazni was given a separate and distinct administration, and an event was to occur which was to provide in a similar manner for a third division of the ancient kingdom. In a previous page* I have mentioned that shortly after the accession of Akbar the Shah of Persia had taken Kandahar, and bestowed it with other fiefs upon his nephew, Husen Mirza. The place was held for the Shah till the year 1603, when the disturbances which took place on the accession of Shah Abbas gave Akbar the opportunity to recover it without striking a blow. He appointed Shah Beg, a nobleman of the Arghun clan, to be its governor. Akbar died two years later, and was succeeded in all his dominions by his son Jahangir. The change of monarchs had no effect on Afghanistan. The fate of that country indeed is more nearly connected with the career of the nobleman to whom Akbar had given Kandahar. That career I propose briefly to follow. Shah Beg belonged to the Bokhara Arghuni. He had been a faithful servant to Mahammad Hakim, ruler of Kabul. On the death of that prince he had * Vide p. 182. 198 AFGHANISTAN. taken service under Akbar, and bad greatly distin- guished himself in the campaigns against the Yusuf- zais and Mahmands. In the war which ended with the conquest of Sind, he was so marked for his conduct in difficult matters, that Akbar selected him to conduct the delicate negotiations which terminated in the surrender of Kandahar. His administration of Kandahar and the district represented by the town was in every respect so satis- factory, and his repression of the turbulent Kakars — then also answering to the character I have given of them in the first chapter of this book— so complete, that on the recall of Sharif Khan from the governor- ship of Ghazni, that town and district were added to his charge. When Akbar died towards the end of 1605, the two most important districts in Afganistan were held by one man — and that man distinguished alike for his character and for his conduct. The death of a sovereign of a vast Eastern empire was in those days almost invariably the signal for dis- turbances. When, therefore, the news reached Persia that the great Akbar had expired, hope rose buoyant in the breast of Shah Abbas that in the convulsions which must, he thought, ensue, he might be able to recover Kandahar. He transmitted the necessary in- structions to his governor of Herat, Husen Khan Shamlu, and that nobleman, responding, at once marched upon the place. The siege that followed is memorable chiefly for the spirited conduct of the governor, Shah Beg. He knew that he could resist the enemy’s attacks, but FROM MOGHOL TO AFGHAN. 199 he was not proof against the cravings of hunger. Now, his supplies were low. A long blockade would be fatal to him. It was absolutely necessary that he should deceive the enemy. With this view, and in order to induce the Persians to believe that his stores were plentiful, he gave feasts every evening in an open space in the castle overlooked by the enemy. Husen Khan, partly, but only partly deceived, then demanded permission to send in an envoy, nominally to treat for terms, really to look about him. The permission was accorded. But before the gates were opened, every sack of grain in the place had been emptied into the streets the envoy must traverse. The envoy returned satisfied that the garrison was well supplied. It happened, shortly after, that Shah Abbas, finding that the disturbances he had anticipated had not arisen, disavowed his general and raised the siege. Subsequently, in 1606, Jahangir visited Kabul, and before he left, added the city, with the district de- pending on it, to Shah Beg’s government. Shah Beg thus became viceroy of all Afghanistan, the then Per- sian province of Herat excepted. When filling this high office, he was directed to prepare a financial settlement for the whole of the country. As he held power for nine years subsequently, it is to be presumed that the settlement was made. I have, however, been unable to discover any trace of a document which would be one of the most interesting of all the legacies of Moghol rule. Shah Beg received from Jahangir in 1608 the title 200 AFGHANISTAN. of Khan Duran. He resigned the office fie field in 1620 “ on account of tfie fatigues incident to a residence in Kabul, fiorse travelling, and the drizzly state of tfie atmosphere of tfie country.”* Probably the contests he was forced to wage with tfie hill tribes, who, grow- ing fiercer and fiercer, at one time threatened Kabul itself, entailed upon him a more than ordinary amount of fatigue. But he was a great drinker,! and his love of liquor impaired his natural activity. The name of the immediate successor of Shah Beg I have been unable to discover. But two years later (1622) I find Ashraf Khan governor of Kandahar. The famous Khan Jahan Lodi was at the same time governor of Multan. In that year Shah Abbas, Shah of Persia, resuming his old designs, marched an army against Kandahar. Ashraf Khan implored the assist- ance of the Emperor. Khan Jahan was ready to march to his aid from Multan, but was forbidden by Jahangir to stir. “Kings,” wrote that monarch to him, “ should be opposed by kings.” The fatal effect of acting upon such a maxim was soon apparent. Shah Abbas pushed the siege with such vigour, that on the fortieth day the place fell into his hands. No attempt was made in the lifetime of Jahangir to recapture it. His son Shah Jahan was indeed ordered to the north with an army, but he did not go, the # “Ain-i-Akbari ” (Blochmann), pp. 377-8. f “ He was much given, to wine drinking. He drank, in fact, wine, cannabis, opium, and Tcuknar, mixed together, and called his beverage of four ingredients Char Bhugra, which gave rise to his nickname Char Bhugra Khur.” — “Ain-i-Akbari” (Blochmann.) FROM MOGHOL TO AFGHAN. 201 jealousies which prevailed as to the succession keeping him and his brothers in India; and for fifteen years, till 1637, Kandahar remained in the possession of Persia. I may here pause for a moment to refer to the con- dition of the Afghan tribes in the neighbourhood of Kandahar. They were composed mainly of the great clan of the Ghilzais — now appearing once again on the scene. Naturally turbulent, and notwithstanding the fact that their clan had furnished a family the members of which had occupied the thrones of Ghazni and of Dehli, a long course of servitude had disposed the Ghilzais to obey. For many years they had been ruled from Dehli, but it is supposed that, tired of sub- mission to that luxurious court, they had welcomed the approach of an army commanded by a man possessing the character and reputation of Abbas the Great. Kandahar occupied by the Persians, the Afghan tribes in the vicinity willingly, then, transferred their allegiance to the conqueror. But it would seem that the conqueror did not at first appreciate the value of the submission. Abbas himself, generally so careful to overlook none of the minor springs which so often affect the course of great events, had for the moment forgotten to reckon the vast importance to the stability of his rule of contenting the aboriginal inhabitants of a conquered country. Hence it happened that he, or rather the governor appointed by him to rule at Kan- dahar, imposed upon the Afghans vexatious imposts and exactions. These the rude mountaineers found it difficult to bear. They showed their discontent by 202 AFGHANISTAN. murmurs, but as these produced no result they sent a deputation to Ispahan to represent their grievances to Shah Abbas and to request the removal of the governor and the appointment of one of their own tribe as their chief representative, recognised by the Shah and corresponding directly with Ispahan. The request opened the eyes of Shah Abbas to the mistake he had committed. He complied with it at once. Thenceforth an Afghan chief held, by letters patent, the office of Kalantar, or administrator in chief of the internal affairs of the tribes in Kandahar. To resume the course of events. Three years after the loss of Kandahar (1625-6), the Emperor Jahangir visited Kabul. The occasion was a remarkable one. Originally he had intended to march thither to crush the hill tribes, then committing more than their or- dinary ravages. But they were subdued long before he could approach the scene of action. He did not on that account change his destination. He pushed onwards with his force, and was crossing the river Jailam, when his person was forcibly taken possession of by Moliabbat Khan, a native of Kabul, and one of the first noblemen of the empire, but who had incurred the enmity of Nur Jahan, and who knew that his ruin had been decided upon by that famous lady. Mohabbat Khan had been summoned to the Em- peror’s camp to answer charges which had been made against him, but, well aware of the enmity of Nur Jahan, he had taken care to come accompanied by five thousand Rajputs, on whose fidelity he could depend. These men he now placed round the Em- FROM MOGHOL TO AFGHAN. 203 peror, and was prepared to continue the journey to Kabul, when Nur Jahan, who had employed every moment of the time that had elapsed to inspire with resolution the Mahomedan nobles with the army, suddenly attacked him, leading the attack herself. A desperate action ended in the repulse of Nur Jahan. She had displayed great daring and energy. The elephant on which she rode — the object of the Rajput attack — had been severely wounded, and had swum in terror to the opposite bank. The child she carried in her arms had been wounded, and her howdah was stained with blood — and after all she had failed. But she was a woman — and a very clever woman. She had not won by employing force. She determined now to try a more subtle method. She therefore jomed the captive Emperor. Mohabbat Khan now advanced towards the Indus. Schooled by Nur Jahan, Jahangir professed perfect agreement with his views ; warned him against trusting Nur Jahan ; and by his extreme tinesse so blinded him, that long before Kabul bad been reached Mohabbat Khan had the conviction that the emperor was even grateful to him for having rescued him from the thraldom of a woman he feared and of courtiers whom he detested. Meanwhile Nur Jahan continued her plots. Now she stirred up enmity, ending in blood, between the imperial guards and the Rajputs ; now she prepared the Afghans to seize the first opportunity to aid her. But the crowning artifice was that by which she increased her own contingent without exciting to too great an 204 AFGHANISTAN. extent the suspicions of Mohabbat Khan.* When her plans were completed, she by a cunning device brought about the release of Jahangir, and restored to him his freedom of action. Mohabbat Khan being still power- ful, and her son being in his hands, she made terms with him. The Emperor did not stay long in Kabul, and the following year he died (October 28th, 1627). Shah Jahan, his third son, succeeded, after the usual strife among the sons, to all his dominions. For the ten years following his accession the history of Kabul and Grhazm is a blank. It would seem that of that time there is nothing to record beyond the periodical intermitting risings of the hill tribes and their punishment. But in 1637 Shah Abbas of Persia, having been succeeded by Shah Safi, and that prince showing himself a capricious and cruel tyrant, with none of the capacity of his grandfather, Shah Jahan sent an army to capture Kandahar. The Persian * The story is thus tersely told by Elphinstone : — “ She em- ployed agents to enlist fit men in scattered points at a distance, whence some were to straggle into camp as if in quest of service, while the others were to remain at their positions and await her further orders. She next made Jahangir suggest a muster of the troops of all the Jagirdars ; and when she was summoned to pro- duce her contingent she affected to be indignant at being put on a level with an ordinary subject, and said she would take care that her muster should not turn out to her discredit. Accordingly she dressed out her old troops so as to make the smallness of their number conspicuous, entertained new levies as if to complete her contingent, and at the same time directed her recruits in the country to repair by twos and threes to the army.” — “ History of India,” vol. ii. FROM MOGHOL TO AFGHAN. 205 governor of tliat place was a very distinguished noble- man, Ali Mardan Khan. This officer had been one of the most trusted generals of Shah Abbas, and had ever shown himself worthy of his sovereign’s confi- dence. But he possessed great wealth, and Shah Safi coveted it. Other nobles, in equally high position, had been summoned to court by the Shah — only to be murdered. At last the mandate came to Ali Mardan. He knew its meaning. Instead of complying he entered at once into negotiations with Shah Jahan, in virtue of which he surrendered to him Kandahar, and repaired to the court of Dehli. He was received with the greatest distinction, and was at once nominated by the Emperor general of the army he had formed to recover Badakhshan and to conquer Balkli. I have shown in a previous page* how, owing to the dissensions between Mirza Suliman and his grandson, the Uzbegs, then possessing Balkh, had con- quered Badakhshan. That province they had retained. Against these Uzbegs Ali Mardan was sent. Crossing the great northern range of the Hindu Kush he entered Badakhshan. The Uzbegs, then engaged in a civil war, shut themselves up in their towns and their forts, offering no resistance in the field. Before Ali Mardan had had time to capture any considerable place which might have served as a point d’appui near the passes the winter was upon him, and he fell back on Kabul. Leaving there a portion of his troops he repaired to the Emperor’s court at Dehli. * Vide p. 190. 206 AFGHANISTAN. The year following (1645) the Emperor, retaining Ali Mardan at his court, despatched Jaggat Singh, a brother of Mokand Singh, Raja of Kota, to conquer the country. Jaggat Singh had at his disposal the troops left by Ali Mardan in Kabul, aided by a still larger number, no less than fourteen thousand, of Rajputs. But by this time the Uzbegs had composed their internal feuds. When, then, Jaggat Singh entered Badakhshan he met an enemy over whom, notwith- standing the prowess of his Rajput soldiers, he could gain no advantage. He therefore sent urgent demands for aid. A reinforcing army was at once sent, led by Ali Mardan, accompanying whom, to undergo “ the bap- tism of fire,” was Prince Murad, the youngest son of the Emperor. The campaign was successful. Badakh- shan submitted ; Balkh, and with it Afghan Turkistan, surrendered. Both provinces were united to the empire of Hindustan, and Prince Murad was pro- claimed viceroy. But he had hardly taken his seat when the invasion, the dread of which had caused Humayun in 1549 to shrink from the occupation of Balkh, took place. The Uzbegs from Samarkand and Bokhara crossed the Oxus to plunder and destroy. There was no rest from these marauders. Murad, fond of show and pleasure, and shrinking from the ruler’s labour pressed upon him by Ali Mardan, quitted the province without orders. He was at once replaced by the third and most crafty of the sons of Shah Jahan, Prince Aurangzib, whilst Shah Jahan himself FEOM MOGHOL TO AFGHAN. 207 moved on Kabul to support him. Aurangzib’s arrival in Badakhshan was speedily followed by a victory over the Uzbegs. But their numbers were great, their reinforcements constant, and even he, the conqueror, found himself compelled to seek refuge in Balkh. The contest was finally terminated by an arrange- ment between the Emperor and the Uzbeg chief, Nazar Mahammad, which amounted to a virtual renunciation by the former of his rights on Badakh- shan. In pursuance of this compact Aurangzib was directed to surrender Balkh and the strong places, and to retire with his army south of the Hindu Kush. Aurangzib did, indeed, easily surrender Balkh and the strong places, but his retreat across the passes of the Hindu Kush was not accomplished without great difficulty and great loss. When entangled, in the month of November (1647) in those passes, the wild Hazaras set upon his men — not so much to destroy as to plunder. The snow, the frost, the difficult ways, the incessant and galling inroads of an invisible enemy, told their tale on the imperial troops. Aurangzib and a few horsemen did indeed reach Kabul in safety, but the survivors of the main body found their way there in small bodies, without baggage, without horses, often without arms. Nor was this the only reverse which the Moghol arms were to suffer at this period. Shah Safi of Persia had died in 1641. He was succeeded by his son, Shah Abbas II., then only ten years old. This prince, though subsequently given to wine, was not in his youth devoid of noble instincts. One of his earliest 208 AFGHANISTAN. longings was to recover the city of Kandahar.* The details for the accomplishment of this task were over- looked by his ministers. Their preparations were made with great care, and with great secrecy. Every expense incurred was defrayed with ready money ; and to prevent the chance of interruption of the siege operations by the approach of a relieving force, it was arranged that the invasion should not take place till the passes leading to India should be closed by the snow. This programme was carried out to the letter. Shah Abbas II. appeared before Kandahar in the early days of December 1647. The siege lasted ten weeks. It had hardly begun when Shah Jahan sent pressing orders to Aurangzib, then at Lahor, to march to its relief. Then was noticed the wisdom in the choice of seasons displayed by the advisers of the Persian monarch. The passes stopped Aurangzib. He forced his way through them, indeed, but the enormous labour thus entailed on his soldiers disorganized his army. He forced them only to find that Kandahar had just fallen, and that he with a weakened army could do no more than fall back and wait for an opportunity at Kabul. The opportunity seemed to come the following year. The Persian sovereign had left merely a garrison in Kandahar, and returned with his main army to his dominions. In the month of May 1649, Aurangzib appeared before the town with an army strong in men and in munitions of war. Himself a capable and # Hanmer states that the Ghilzaf tribe sent him a pressing invi- tation to relieve them of their Moghol masters. PEOM MOGHOL TO AFGHAN. 209 determined general, he made the capture of Kandahar the one point from which nothing should turn him. He employed all the arts of war then known. Esta- blishing a strict blockade, he tried mining followed by assault— and then mining again. At last Abbas II. sent an army to relieve the place. Still unshaken in his resolve, Aurangzib remained before the town to press the siege, whilst he sent a portion of his army under a capable general to drive back the enemy. The Persians were driven back, but they then took up a position in the passes, which enabled them to intercept all the supplies of the besieging army. Aurangzib was not strong enough to attack them there, and at the same time carry on the siege. At last he was starved into retreating. In September he renounced the task and fell back on Kabul. But the idea was not abandoned. Three years later Aurangzib led another and more perfectly equipped army against the place.* But the result was the same — repulse and raising of the siege. Aurangzib was then sent to the Dekhan, and his eldest brother, Dara Shekho, a gallant soldier, an in- structed prince, too liberal for his epoch, received at his own earnest request the command of a force still more strongly equipped than either of those which had preceded it in the undertaking. Nothing was omitted that could ensure success. He had, it has been stated, # The author of the “ Zabd-ul Tawarikh ” was present in Kan- dahar during these sieges in the double capacity of physician and astrologer. He gives full and minute details of the assaults of the Moghol army. 14 210 AFGHANISTAN. Europeans to point his guns.* But although skill directed, and valour carried out, the plans of the prince ; although he gave an example of bravery and devotion to his men, unsurpassed and unsurpassable ; although he delivered assault after assault, and in the very last of all gained the summit of the rampart, he could not take Kandahar. The valour of the defenders equalled that of the assailants, and their fortune! was greater. After having lost the flower of his army, Prince Dara Shekho was forced to raise the siege. But his misfortunes did not end there. As he fell back in the direction of Kabul, the Persians attacked his rearguard, whilst the Grhilzais harassed his flanks. His losses were great, his discouragement was still greater ; and it was with a force reduced in numbers and broken in spirit that he at length reached Kabul. Kandahar was for ever lost to the Moghol. Shah Abbas II. inaugurated the permanency of his conquest — now assured by the final repulse of the Moghols, — by the distribution of money rewards to the Glhilzai and Abdali chiefs, and by reducing the annual tribute paid by them. These measures were successful. During his lifetime, the Afghan tribes of * Hanmer. Hanmer indeed states that there were Europeans at the second siege, hut as he speaks only of two he must mean the last. It is well known that Prince Dara Shekho had European engineers and artillerymen in his employ. t The physician and astrologer previously referred to claims credit for the result. He withheld, he says, the Persian com- mander from making a sortie in force when the planet Mars was in the south, a circumstance which would have rendered defeat certain. FROM MOGHOL TO AFGHAN. 211 the country round Kandahar remained content with the Persian rule. Shah Abbas II. died in 1666, and was succeeded by Shah Sulaiman. This prince reigned twenty-nine years. Though weak, effeminate, and capricious, his relations with the Afghans remained undisturbed. He treated them as subjects, not as slaves, and so long as they were so treated they remained faithful. It was the happy fate of their country, from the capture of Kandahar to the death of Shall Sulaiman in 1694, that its history was a blank. But the accession of his son, Sultan Husen, in that year was the beginning of a new era. Husen was one of those bigoted ascetics who care for nothing but the ease of their souls ; to whom the material benefit of others is a matter of no import. The measures taken by Shah Abbas the Great, by his successors of the same name, and by Sulaiman, to ensure the content- ment of the Afghan tribes, came gradually to be relaxed under the rule of Sultan Husen, or it would be more proper to say, under the rule of the corrupt priests and eunuchs who governed in the name of Sultan Husen. The tribes, the Ghilzais especially, were not slow to betray their discontent. Though not actually revolting, they made demonstrations so strong, that the terrified Shah and his effete advisers hesitated long as to the measures they should take to meet them. After considerable hesitation they de- cided upon a course, which, like all courses adopted by weak men in a panic, led to a result the very opposite of that they had hoped for. 14 * 212 AFGHANISTAN. It happened that at this time the ablest general in the Persian service was a Georgian, named Gurghin Khan. Born a Christian, this man had endeavoured to establish independence in his native country, but his great military talents had been overborne by the numerical strength sent against him, and he had failed. So powerful was he, however, even in his defeat, that, on the sole condition of his embracing the Mahomedan religion, the Shah had taken him into his service. He had distinguished himself by two qualities — military skill and severity. He was just the man, then, in the eyes of the priestly advisers of Sultan Husen, to deal with the Ghilzais. The Shah accordingly sent him, at the head of a considerable army, to Kandahar, with the title of Governor, and with full powers. Gurghin Khan and his army reached Kandahar. The Ghilzais were not in revolt. They had displayed simply a determination not to submit to oppression — nothing more. When Gurghin Khan entered their country, far from opposing him, their professions of loyalty were all that could be desired ; but this sub- missive attitude did not suit the views of Gurghin Khan. He wished to strike terror into the tribe. He therefore treated their country as though he had con- quered it, and themselves as slaves. Neither rank, nor age, nor sex, found shelter from his tyranny. Among the Afghan tribes, however, there still lived the tradition of the beneficial results which had fol- lowed the personal appeal made to Shah Abbas the Great. Ruthless then as was the conduct of Gurghin Khan, the Ghilzais believed that a proper representa- FROM MOGHOL TO AFGHAN. 213 tion to the Shah would be sufficient to ensure his recall and to obtain redress for themselves. They tried it ; they empowered a deputation to proceed to Ispahan. The deputation reached that capital. But the Shah was not a Shah of the calibre of Abbas. For a long time he refused to see the Grhilzai chiefs ; and when at last they were presented to him he gave them an answer of the character of that which, given by another king in another country, had the effect of driving five-sixths of the people in revolt to their tents. It had not that effect on the Afghans ; their leaders were too prudent. An army of about thirty thousand men, led by the greatest captain of Persia, occupied Kandahar and its environs. Revolt would have been an invitation to slaughter in the present, fruitless of benefit for the future. They resolved to bide their time, hopeful that events would work for them. Prominent among the Grhilzai chiefs was Mir Yais. The head of one of the tribes, endowed with quick intelligence, attractive manners, and great liberality, he was likewise the richest and most influential man in Kandahar. The office of Kalantar, or chief administrator, which he held, gave him a position in which he was able to make his influence felt. Mir Yais had taken a leading part in the events I have just recorded. He had signed the petition which had been sent to the Shah, had kept up the heart of his country- men, and finally, on the unsuccessful return of the deputation, had used all his influence in favour of sub- mission. It is scarcely to be wondered that Gfurghin 214 AFGHANISTAN. Khan should hate him. Mir Vais seemed to stand between him and the passions of a tribe stimulated to revolt, yet not revolting. He was determined to remove him from his path. He had no valid excuse for touching him, but it was easy enough to invent one. Under the pretext, then, that Mir Vais was conspiring against the Government, he arrested him and others of his influential compatriots, and sent them to Ispahan. Having ridded Kandahar of their presence, he deemed himself secure, and allowed the greater part of his army to return to Persia. Mir Vais arrived at Ispahan — a clever, shrewd man of the world brought suddenly into contact with bigoted priests and corrupt eunuchs, leading a weak and effeminate ruler. On the one side was the daring genius, the bold and determined nature of a leader of men ; on the other, power based on corruption, and de- prived of popular sympathy by the cruelty and weak- ness which are always the twin children of bigotry. The result of such contact was never, could never be, doubtful. Mir Vais had been sent to Ispahan, that he might be guarded, watched, tortured, if necessary re- moved by death ; that the one living protester against the oppression of the Afghan tribes might never again cross the path of Gurghin Khan. It was a step fatal to the Georgian governor. The intelligence of Mir Vais detected at once the weakness of the Court of Ispahan. He saw a weak king surrounded and ruled by a corrupt ministry. A trained man of the world, he disguised his contempt, and, assailing the most influential cour- tiers on their weak side, he bought them. He made PROM MOGHOL TO AFGHAN. 215 them his men and enemies of Gfurghm Khan. When he thought the moment had arrived he demanded that the Shah himself should investigate the charges brought against him. The charges were really groundless, but so adroitly had Mir Vais managed, that had they been otherwise the result would scarcely have been different. The Shah publicly acknowledged his innocence, and Mir V ais at once assumed an influential position at the Court. He might now have returned to Kandahar and have bearded G-urghin Khan. But the insight he had obtained into the character of the Shah and of his advisers, into their system of government — based actually on more than an indifference — on a con- tempt— for the feelings of the governed, had inspired him with wider-reaching thoughts. From this moment the independence of his country became the passion of his soul. He had in himself every quality and every qualification likely to form a basis of success. He had position, wealth, influence ; he had talents, character, address. Above all, in the character of the king and his advisers, and in the position in which he stood to both, he had opportunity.* # The condition of Persia at this period, under the rule of Shah Husen, is thus graphically described by Hanway : — “ Merit became an empty sound ; all offices and dignities were given to those who paid the highest price ; money decided everything ; and the immense riches which were accumulated by this means seemed rather to whet than to glut the appetite of those base ministers. Every part of the State felt the effect of this disorder. The troops, discouraged by ill-discipline and worse pay, served with reluctance. Bobbers infested the highways and interrupted com- 216 AFGHANISTAN. Much remained to be accomplished before he could strike his blow. It was not less an object to weaken his enemies than to inspire his friends. Of the first, Gurghln Khan was the chief ; of the second, the Afghan tribes were those who could be most easily moulded. His extraordinary tact and knowledge of character enabled him to work out both ends at the same time. It was not difficult to arouse the suspicions of the weak monarch and his courtiers regarding the ambition of Grurghin Khan. Mir Yais did not openly disparage that nobleman ; he rather spoke respectfully of the vast power that he wielded. He took indeed fitting occasion to express his surprise that a man who had been a rebel should now hold in his hands the govern- ment of the three provinces of Georgia, Kerman, and Kandahar. He sometimes even doubted whether a man who had been a Christian could be an orthodox Musalman in the sense in which orthodoxy was under- stood by the Shah. If he praised his ability and his power, he commented on the manner in which he had once used both against his master, and on the greater means now at his disposal. In short, Mfr Yais used merce. Placemen, impoverished by the purchase of their offices, tyrannised over the people and were rapacious with impunity ; in short, justice was sold in the very capital of the empire.” The same writer thus sketches Shah Husen : — ■“ He had a strong attachment to his religion, and might be denominated an honest man ; but so excessively indolent and immoderately addicted to women and wine as to be utterly incapable of governing. Thus unworthy of being a real, he was only a nominal king.” — “ Han- way’s Travels,” vol. ii. FEOM MOGHOL TO AFGHAN. 217 all his artifice to undermine, whilst seeming to praise, Gurghin Khan. His mysterious language fell on eager ears. The poison, distilled drop by drop, entered into the soul of the Shah. Gradually his mind began to realise the fact that Gurgliin Khan was an ambitious and too powerful subject, who had removed Mir Yais from Kandahar as presenting the one great obstacle to his intrigues against his master. The moment Mir Yais observed that this conviction was entering the minds of the Shah and his advisers, he proceeded to develope the course of action by which he hoped to inspire his own countrymen, the Afghans. Influence with them he had already ; but something more than influence was necessary to secure their earnest and unhesitating co-operation in a revolt. The “ inspiration ” needful for this purpose could be born only of religious excitement. Could he impress their minds with the belief that Persian domination was synonymous with religious persecution, he felt he could bend them entirely to his will. To induce this belief his energies were now directed. The task was not so difficult as it might seem. The Persians were Shiahs — bigoted Shiahs : the Afghans were Sums. At the time of their first coming under the domination of Persia the Ghilzais had made it a condition that they should be unmolested in their belief. That condition had been fulfilled up to the time of Shah Husen. But there had been always something galling to a Suni to be forced to serve a 218 AFGHANISTAN. Shiah; and it was upon this feeling that Mir Vais resolved to work. No sooner had he noticed that the suspicions against Gurghin Khan had become too deeply rooted to be effaced, that they would grow in the hearts of the Shah and his ministers by being fed upon, than he asked leave to proceed on a pilgrimage to Mekka. Such a demand at so sanctimonious a court could not be refused. It was granted at once. Mir Vais proceeded to Mekka. The reader will have surmised that his motives for the journey were not all religious. It is true he consorted with the holy doctors at the sacred shrine, and that after ascer- taining their views he continued his journey to Medina with the avowed purpose of ascertaining whether the opinions of the learned in that place coincided with those of their brethren in the other. When he had ascertained that the views were identical, he obtained from them Fathivas, or religious decrees, embodying the opinions, and returned with those documents to Ispahan. What were the mysterious questions to obtain a reply to which he had made that long and difficult journey? A perusal of the two most important of them in their full length will show the reader their real bearing, and will indicate the object for which they had been propounded. The first question was : “ Is it lawful for Musalmans, oppressed and cramped in the exercise of their religion, to take up arms to free themselves from the yoke ? ” The second : “In the case in which the chief men of FK0M MOGHOL TO AFGHAN. 219 several tribes have been forced to take the oath of allegiance to a sovereign who was a heretic, are not the members of the tribes released from that oath when the sovereign ceases to observe the convention he had sworn to ? ” The replies given by the learned men at Mekka and at Medina were in the affirmative. Mir Vais, I have said, armed with these important documents, returned to Ispahan. He found there matters very much as he had left them. The pear was gradually softening, but was not yet ripe. Anxious as he was to proceed to Kandahar to make personally the final necessary arrangements, he felt that his departure at that moment would inspire suspicion. It was necessary to wait till the still rising suspicion of Gurghin Khan should attain its fullest development. He therefore stayed at Ispahan, maintaining his posi- tion at the court, his lavish expenditure, his intimacy with the leading ministers, whilst affecting a profound indifference to politics. In reality never had he scanned their action more narrowly. And it was whilst thus eagerly watching the atmosphere that an event occurred which gave him the opportunity for which he had been so eagerly hoping. In the present time — the winter of 1878-9 — when the European and Asiatic world seems to be convulsed by the mysterious movements of Russian agents, it is specially interesting to note that the opportunity of revolt for which Mir Yais had been so long watching came to him by the hands of a Russian ambassador. It happened at this period that an Armenian, a native of Kapan, by name Israel Orii, in the service of 220 AFGHANISTAN. Peter the Great, Czar of Russia, had, in recompense for services rendered to the Czar in Turkey, obtained from that monarch permission to proceed, under the imperial authority, as ambassador to Ispahan. Many privileges, referring especially to the remission of export and import duties, were accorded to the ambas- sador and his suite. The hope of gain by this means attracted to him an unusually large number of fol- lowers, most of them his friends. Before he set out, then, his retinue counted several hundreds, men wild with hope, with excitement, and with love of adven- ture. The news regarding this extraordinary embassy reached Ispahan shortly after Mir Yais had returned from Mekka. It came accompanied by many exagge- rations. The story was spread that the ambassador, Israel Orii, had affirmed his descent from the ancient kings of Armenia. The idle words expressed with respect to their hopes of gain by his retinue were magnified into threats of pillage. Every day some new rumour added to the alarm. In this conjecture the feeble bigots who surrounded the Shah turned to Mir Yais for counsel. How eagerly he seized the opportunity may be imagined. “ It is true,” he said to the Shah and his ministers, “ it is true that the conjuncture is formidable. If the Czar had desired to send a peaceable mission into this country he would not have selected an Armenian as his agent. By sending a man, born a Persian subject, yet of his own faith, and of the ancient royal family of Armenia, his object must be to blow with effect the PROM MOGHOL TO AFGHAN. 221 coals of sedition into the very heart of the kingdom. But,” he added, “ the efforts of Armenia, backed by Russia, would be nothing, could we be sure of Georgia. But it is only recently that the Georgians, under Gurghin Khan, revolted against the Shah. We know that the cousin of Gurghin Khan is now at the court of St. Petersburgh. How can we doubt that as soon as this Armenian Christian has penetrated with his following into Persia, backed by Russia, Gurghin Khan, who was once a Christian, who is probably a Christian in heart now, who is, moreover, the lineal descendant of the ancient kings of Georgia, wno can doubt but that he will turn Georgia, Kerman, and Kandahar against us, and strike a blow at the heart of the empire.” These and similar arguments, plausible, forcibly put, and backed by rumour and probability, had their effect. The fear of provoking Russia prevailed indeed so far as to induce the Shah to authorise Israel Orii and his retinue to proceed to Ispahan. But the sus- picions regarding Gurghin Khan were strengthened and confirmed. The Shah did not indeed remove him from his commands, because he feared to provoke a refusal, and with the refusal revolt. But he did that which suited still better the plans of his astute coun- cillor. Restoring to Mir Yais all his former appoint- ments in Kandahar, he directed him to proceed forth- with to that place, to watch narrowly, and to report, all the proceedings of the Georgian, and, if necessary, to take from him the command. It is tolerably certain that Gurghin Khan had har- 222 AFGHANISTAN. boured no designs whatever against the Persian Gov- ernment. In his administration of Kandahar he had really done no more than carry out the orders he had received. If his proceedings had been harsh it was because the timid and corrupt court he served recog- nised harshness as the one effective mode of ruling. His anger and indignation then, when he saw rein- stated in more than his former authority, and armed with private instructions of which he was left ignorant, the man whom he had sent a disgraced prisoner to Ispahan, may be imagined. However, he could not help himself. His army had been very greatly diminished, and to revolt without a chance of suc- ceeding, was not to be thought of. He received Mir Vais, then, with apparent cordiality, and reinstated him in all his appointments. But the wound he had received rankled too much within him to allow him to remain quiet. His anger deprived him of prudence. He had been forced to reinstate Mir Vais, but he resolved to show him that he was his master, and could yet torture him in the tenderest part. Mir Vais had a daughter to whom rumour assigned the distinction of being the most beautiful lady in the province. Very shortly after his return from Ispahan Gurghin Khan sent him a curt message demanding this lady for his harem. The tenour of the message showed that he wanted her as a slave or as a concubine, not as a wife ; and that he was resolved to have her. The position of Mir Vais was difficult. He was not ready for resistance. The governor, he knew, would give FKOM MOGHOL TO AFGHAN. 223 him little time for reflection. However, he was equal to the occasion. He communicated the insult he had received to the heads of the several tribes, and besought them to come and aid him with their counsel. They met secretly in his tent. Their manner and their words showed him that they were prepared to resent the affront as though it had been offered to themselves. Seeing this, Mir Yais begged them to leave the execu- tion of the design to him, to dissemble for the moment, but to be prepared to act when he should give the signal.* (1708.) Sure now of his countrymen, Mir Vais, to gain time, kept “ the word of promise to the ear, to break it to the hope.” He complied, in appearance, but only in appearance, with the governor’s requisition. He caused a young and good-looking girl of his establish- ment to be magnificently attired, and to be then conducted as his daughter to Gfurghin Khan. The girl kept the secret well, and the governor was taken in. Mir Yais’s apparent yielding in the matter greatly softened him. He admitted him to an interview, and gradually began to unbend before him and to take him into his confidence. All this time Mir Yais was busy in preparing matters * Hanway thus reports his concluding words : — “ The interest of the nation calls on us aloud to he of one common opinion, but there are many ways to attain the same end. Let our dependence he on our courage and sagacity. The serpent that lies awake will overcome the lion when he falls asleep. Let us conceal our swords in beds cf roses ; and if you think highly enough of me to leave the revenge of your cause to my care, this glorious design must he kept an inviolable secret.” — “ Hanway’s Travels,” vol. ii. 224 AFGHANISTAN. for the crisis. The one obstacle to the immediate breaking out of a revolt lay in the fact that Gurghin Khan, when dismissing the Persian troops, had retained the Georgians, and that these guarded his palace and acted as his body-guard. It was necessary that the Georgians should be removed. To accomplish this end Mir Yais had recourse to a very ingenious stratagem. Conspicuous among the tribes occupying the Pishin valley were then, and are now, the Tarins. Being far enough from Kandahar for his purpose, Mir Vais in- cited their chiefs to refuse payment of their ordinary contributions. A man of the character of Gurglnn Khan could not for a moment tolerate conduct amounting to rebellion. He resolved to chastise the Tarins at once, and having no other troops available, he despatched the majority of the Georgians on the errand. Mir V ais meanwhile had arranged with the members of the branch of the Ghilzai tribe, of which he was the chief, to approach within a few miles of Kandahar, and to hold themselves in readiness for immediate action. No sooner had he seen the Georgians well on their way than he hastened to Gurghin Khan, expressed his resentment at the conduct of the Tarins, and his admiration of the prompt action which must soon bring them to submission. When by the warmth of his outspoken zeal he had found his way to the governor’s heart, he experienced no difficulty whatever in persuading him to accept his invitation to a banquet at his country seat, a short distance from the city, and FEOM MOGHOL TO AFGHAN. 225 at which he was anxious to present to him two chiefs of his tribe who had not before visited Kandahar. The banquet had been fixed for the day when the Georgians should be well out of reach, and all the approaches to the town should be occupied by Afghans. The governor, unsuspicious of treachery, left the town attended by his friends and a small retinue. He was received with every demonstration of respect. The banquet was then served. It was perfect of its kind. The meats were succulent and varied ; the wines the choicest that could be procured. Whilst Mir Yais entertained Gurgliin Khan and his personal friends, his followers feasted the retinue. Neither one nor the other spared the wine, pressed upon them with all the unction of pretended affection. After the banquet followed the siesta. The extent of the libations and the potency of the wine turned this into a heavy sleep. This was the opportunity longed for. Every outlet was guarded. Every guest slumbered. At a precon- certed signal given by Mir Yais every slumberer was murdered where he lay ! (1709) Not one escaped. On this wholesale slaughter depended the complete success of the plot. For the murderers were without the walls, and those walls were still guarded by the remnant of the Georgians. But Mir Y ais had thought out every detail of the plot. No sooner had his guests been slain than he ordered them to be stripped. Arraying himself in the clothes of Gurghin Khan, and causing the chiefs next to him- self in rank to put on the clothes of his followers, and the Afghans those of the retinue, he, an hour after 15 226 AFGHANISTAN. sunset, set out for Kandahar, keeping the order usually observed by the governor. Naturally their appearance excited no suspicion. But, no sooner were they ad- mitted within the gates than they turned on the guards, cut them to pieces, and admitted the undisguised Afghans waiting in the rear. The remainder of the garrison was easily mastered. Mir Yais then issued a proclamation assuring the inhabitants of security on the sole condition of their shutting their doors to every Persian or Georgian. The compliance of the populace enabled him to dispose very shortly of every remaining follower of Gurghin Khan. In a previous page I have recorded how contact with the bigoted and corrupt court of Ispahan had inspired Mir Yais with the hope of achieving the in- dependence of his country. I have added to that record an account of the truly Afghan manner by which he accomplished his hope. Kandahar, for many years the prize alternately of the Moghol and the Persian, had now become national and Afghan. 227 CHAPTER VII. HISTORICAL. THE GHILZAI RULE. The day following the success of the conspiracy recorded in the last chapter, Mir Vais assembled the inhabitants of Kandahar and harangued them. He protested that his one object had been to procure their liberty ; that he had no personal views. He declared that liberty was a precious possession worth conspiring for, worth fighting for ; that by the death of Gurghin Khan, Persia had lost the only soldier she possessed : that the Kandahar which had successfully resisted the Moghol in the zenith of his power, could surely repulse troops commanded by the eunuchs of Ispahan. He concluded with these noble words, words worthy of being spoken by a patriot, of being responded to by freemen : “If there are any amongst you,” he said, “ who have not the courage to enjoy this precious gift of liberty now dropped down to you from Heaven, let him declare himself ; no harm shall be done to him : he shall be permitted to go in search of some new tyrant beyond the frontier of this happy state.”* The * “ Hanway’s Travels,” vol. ii. 15 * 228 AFGHANISTAN. reply of the multitude left nothing to be desired. Every soul was animated by the determination to defend the newly found liberty. Mir Yais next assembled the leading men of the tribes, and placed before them clearly the situation. They agreed without a dissentient voice to leave the executive power in his hands, and to support him cordially in all the measures he might think necessary to defend the place and to assure the general freedom. Thus granted unfettered liberty of action, Mir Yais entered upon his task with the energy of an intelligent statesman. He distributed such arms as he had, and set in activity workmen for the manufacture of others ; he hastened the preparation of gunpowder ; repaired the fortifications, and put in order the artillery. Simultaneously he sent messengers to the heads of the different tribes in the mountains, informing them of his success, and urging them to join him without delay. His capacity as a warrior was to be tested sooner than he had anticipated. On the morning of the fourth day after the murder of G-urghm Khan, the sentinels on the walls descried the approach of a con- siderable body of cavalry. These were the Georgians returning from their expedition against the Tarins. They numbered only six hundred, but they were well- disciplined soldiers inured to war. As they were evidently ignorant of the changes which had taken place during their absence, Mir Yais allowed them to approach within musket shot. He then caused the guns to open upon them, whilst he sallied out from THE GHILZAI RULE. 229 a distant gate at the head of five thousand horse to cut off their retreat. But whether he was less skilled in war than in diplomacy, a statesman rather than a soldier, or whether his men were untrained, this at least is certain, that the six hundred Georgians charging his five thousand cut their way through them and gained the passes beyond Girishk. Mir Vais followed them for several days, and though always repulsed, he inflicted considerable loss on them as they retreated. At last, having secured the passes, he returued to Kandahar. Here I shall leave him whilst I record the impression made by his action upon the court of Shah Husen. The retreating Georgians carried with them into Persia the news of the revolution at Kandahar. The effect on a court composed as was that of Ispahan can well be imagined. The truth — that the Afghans longed for freedom — never once dawned on their minds. Adopting the oft misapplied aphorism that history always repeats itself, they believed that because Kandahar had once previously revolted from Persia and called in the Moghols, it would certainly, if it were attacked, follow that course now. Instead, then, of despatching an army to put down the revolt, they sent an ambassador, Jani Khan, to assure Mir Yais that his murder of Gurghin Khan would be forgiven if only he would admit a Persian garrison into Kandahar. At the same time they made warlike preparations to be employed in case the embassy should fail. The ambassador came to Kandahar, delivered his message, — and was cast into prison. In imprisoning 230 AFGHANISTAN. him Mir Vais was animated by two motives. He wished to hinder as long as possible the preparations of Persia, and therefore to delay a reply to the missive of the court ; and he was desirous that she should feel that he would never voluntarily submit, — that the die was cast — for freedom. He judged the Court of Ispahan very correctly. Hearing nothing of Jani Khan, the ministers of the Shah, imagining everything but the actual occurrences, sent another ambassador. Their choice fell upon the governor of Herat, Mahammad Khan, a friend and fellow companion in the pilgrimage to Mekka of Mir Vais. They believed that the Ghilzai chief would be influenced by his friendship for this man. But when liberty is at stake, former friendship will never shake men resolved to be free. The new ambas- sador was informed that but for that former friend- ship he should “never again be in a position to make base proposals to men who are free he was told that the hour of vengeance was at hand ; that the sword which had been drawn would never be sheathed till the King of Persia should be driven from his throne ; that for himself, he should be detained, but detained, from old friendship’s sake, as an honoured guest. The Court of Ispahan at last realised the fact that force alone would bring Mir Vais to subjection. The Shah then directed (1710) the acting-governor of Herat to march on Kandahar. Mir Vais, hearing that his army was composed only of Persians, and having the most supreme contempt for that nation, advanced THE GHILZAI EULE. 231 against the invading army at the head of five thousand horse, and completely defeated it. In the course of the succeeding eighteen months, four other attempts were made against him, and invariably with the same result. In the last, when the Persians, consisting of five thousand men, were commanded by Mahammad Khan, governor of Tabriz, they were completely defeated by five hundred Afghan horsemen, and lost upwards of a thousand men in killed and wounded. Amongst the prisoners were the governor and three of his sons. Exasperated at these defeats, the Court of Ispahan resolved to make an effort on a much larger scale. Of all the dependent portions of the Persian empire, the Georgians had the greatest reputation as warriors. Gurghin Khan had been a Georgian. His successor in the government of his native province had been his nephew, Khusru Khan, a man of very considerable mental power. In the extremity to which it was reduced, the Court of Ispahan, two months after the last defeat recorded in the preceding paragraph, called this man to the head of its armies, entrusted him with the fullest powers, and directed him to march on Kandahar, and at all costs quench the rebellion. Khusru Khan responded eagerly to the call. The blood of his murdered relative called on him for vengeance. Ambitious, active, skilled in the know- ledge of races, he took care to place in the van of his army the tried soldiers of Georgia. Placing himself at the head of his army he advanced as far as Farrah, and there encamped while the scouts he sent out 232 AFGHANISTAN. should acquaint themselves with the proceedings of the enemy. They soon returned. Mir Yais had left the passes unguarded, and had taken up a strong posi- tion not far from Girishk, on the banks of the river Helmand, the passage of which he intended to dispute. Glad to find the passes undefended, Khusru Khan pushed on to attack Mir Vais. His army consisted of thirty thousand Persians and twelve hundred Georgians. The Afghan army was inferior in numbers, but it was flushed with previous success. Of the battle that followed details are wanting. It is simply recorded that the passage of the river was forced and Mir Yais defeated. With the vigour of a good general, Khusru Khan marched at once on Kandahar and invested it. (1711-12.) Mir Yais, meanwhile, though beaten, had kept the field. He believed, like Napoleon in 1814, that did the capital but hold out he would yet be able so to act on the enemy’s communications that they would be glad to beat a retreat. But Kandahar showed herself inclined to serve him as the Paris of 1814 served Napoleon. The men he had left in her to guard her, despairing of successful resistance, offered to treat. Fortunately for him the prudence that counselled the allied generals to grant terms to Marmont was want- ing in the temper of Khusru Khan. Believing the town to be at his mercy, he refused to listen to any terms short of unconditional surrender. The garrison, believing that unconditional surrender implied death, preferred the death of the warrior — and resolved to resist. THE GHILZAI EULE. 233 Meanwhile Mir Yais, hastening to the south, had enlisted a large number of the Biluchis and Tarins. Returning with these he laid waste the country about Kandahar, cut off the enemy’s supplies, and threat- ened his communications. Khusru Khan bore this as long as possible ; he tried assault after assault. Baffled one day he returned to the attack the next. Nor was it until he had lost from the fire of the enemy and sickness two-thirds of his force that he was compelled to raise the siege and retire. But it was then too late. He had hardly com- menced his retreat when Mir Yais, leading sixteen thousand Afghans, fell upon his weakened army. The morale was with the assailants. The Persians scarcely attempted resistance. Khusni Khan himself, then, seeing that all was lost, charged the Afghans at the head of his few remaining Georgians, and found the death he sought for.* (1713.) Another attempt made by the court of Ispahan, by an army commanded by Mahammad Rustam Khan, was rather less than more successful. That is, its operations never had the appearance of a fortunate termination. Defeated in every encounter, the Persian general owed at last the safety of his life to a pre- cipitate abandonment of Aighan territory. (1714.) This was the last effort of the Shah Husen and his advisers. Opportunity then was left to Mir Yais to * Han way states that though Khusru Khan, like his uncle, had abjured Christianity for Mahomedanism, he was still at heart a Christian and a protector of missionaries, one of whom was killed by his side. 234 AFGHANISTAN. consolidate the territories he had reclaimed. These extended in the west nearly as far as Farrah, and comprehended the valleys of the Helmand and the Lora. The name he assigned to them was that of the capital, Kandahar, and of the kingdom of Kandahar he was the first king. All the tribes of the Afghans — the Abdalis of Herat excepted — acknowledged his supremacy, and he succeeded in welding them together in a manner that had never before been attempted. He did not long survive the last and decisive victory of his countrymen. He died at the close of the year (November 1715) following that which had witnessed it, leaving behind him the reputation of being the most able and the most wary politician of his age. Mir Yais left two sons, Mir Mahmud and Mir Husen, the first eighteen, the second a year younger. They were both considered too young to bear the weight of sovereignty. Their father’s brother, Mir Abdulla, was therefore nominated king of Kandahar. If tender years incapacitated the two sons, a weak disposition and a timid nature should have barred the brother. Far from sharing any of the large ideas of his predecessor, he was not only willing, but anxious, to retrace his steps in every particular. Persia, beaten, baffled, and humiliated, was more terrible to him than Persia victorious at the gates of Kandahar had been to his brother. Almost his first act, then, on ascend- ing the throne, was to lay before the heads of the tribes a proposal to invite Persia to resume her sovereignty. In all large bodies of men there are some who are THE GHILZAI EULE. 235 so constitutionally timid that the smallest weight of responsibility unmans them. There were a few of this class among the chiefs — men who loved peace at any price — at the price of honour, of the country’s welfare, of everything save their own ease. These men clutched at the chance of declining to support a cause which, though the cause of freedom, of justice, and of humanity, might in a very distant future bring about an invasion of their country and discomfort to them- selves. These few men, then, voted for prompt submission to Persia. But the majority protested against it ; they denounced a policy which would rob them of the freedom they had gained, and would place them in vassalage to those who had recoiled before them in fair fight. Had Kandahar rejoiced in parliamentary institutions the peace party would not have had a chance ; but the voice of the king was all-powerful, and as the king found in the opinion of a few men of a mental calibre not greater than his own the support which he con- sidered would justify his action, he determined to act. He sent, therefore, an embassy to the Court of Ispahan bearing a conditional offer of submission to Persia. The conditions were these : 1st, that the annual tri- bute paid before the revolt of Mir Yais should not be re-imposed ; 2nd, that no foreign troops should be sent into the province ; 3rd, that the government of the province should be made hereditary in the family of Abdulla. It might be argued now, as it was argued by the Abdulla party then, that these conditio us made no 236 AFGHANISTAN. change in the internal life of Kandahar; that they simply provided the province with a suzerain who would protect it against a foreign enemy. But to the great majority of the Afghans it made the difference between freedom and servitude — a difference which no verbal conditions could efface. In their minds, too, it was alike a needless and a useless servitude, for it was a servitude to an enemy they had beaten, and to a kingdom which was decaying. Among the Afghan chiefs, cognisant of the embassy and of its nature, was the eldest son of Mir Yais, Mir Mahmud. Possessing many manly qualities, daring, generous, impulsive, deterred by no diffi- culties, Mahmud was lost in indignation at an act which would overthrow in a moment the life-work of his father. He at once summoned the chiefs, about forty in number, whom his father had most trusted. Haranguing and taking counsel with these, and find- ing them of one mind with himself, he led them to the palace. Having occupied this without resistance, he entered the room occupied by his uncle, and with his own hand killed him. The perpetration of the deed was hailed with loud applause, and Mahmud was at once proclaimed King of Kandahar. The anti-national and peace party perished with Abdulla. (March 1716.) Mahmud had inherited all the aspirations of his father. Prominent amongst these was the determina- tion to seize the earliest opportunity to strike a deadly blow at the Safi dynasty of Persia. That opportunity soon presented itself. Yery shortly after his accession the Persian governor of Herat, Mahammad Zeman THE GHILZAI RULE. 237 Khan, behaved towards the Abdali Afghans in a man- ner that caused a large number of that tribe to rise in revolt. The Abdalis north of Kandahar had accepted the suzerainty of the Persians, on the conditions granted by Abbas the Great to the Gfhilzais, that their internal affairs should be regulated by their own chiefs without pretext of interference. They were in the enjoyment of this liberty when Mahammad Zeman Khan, with the concurrence of the chief of the tribe, offered to the son of that chief an insult of the most atrocious character. The son, Azadulla Klian, a young man of strong passions and determined will, summoned the leading men to his tent, and, with their ap- proval, avenged himself on the father, who had con- sented to the insult, by depriving him of his life. He was at once proclaimed chief of the tribe. His first act was to march at the head of a few chosen men of his tribe against Zeman Khan, whom he knew to be in the district of Zamindawar. There he surprised, attacked, and defeated him, the Persian leader falling by his hand. He then pushed on for Herat, drove out the Persian garrison, occupied it, and declared it inde- pendent of Persia. (1717.) This was the second severe blow dealt to the Safi dynasty. But it did not come alone. The Uzbegs and the Kurds, having ravaged with impunity the outlying provinces of the empire, waxed bolder in their designs, and penetrated almost as far as Ispahan. Shah Husen and his advisers had witnessed, not without alarm, the gradual disruption of their empire. They had endeavoured to persuade the Persian soldiers 238 AFGHANISTAN. who had fled from Herat to return to reconquer that city ; but the soldiers, not possessing a leader in whom they could confide, had with one voice refused. They were still, in the haphazard manner peculiar to weak men, searching for a general, when the incursions to the vicinity of the capital quickened their action. Not finding him whom they sought in the army, they turned their inquiries into another department, and, rightly judging that a man, to be successful, must be the exact opposite of themselves, they selected for the post of commander-in-chief a nobleman who had resigned the office of lord chief justice because the rectitude with which he had discharged its duties had made him obnoxious to the court and its satellites.* The name of this nobleman was Safi Ku.li Khan. The task assigned to him was to drive back the Uzbegs, then to reconquer Herat and Kandahar. No expense was spared to render the army efficient. In numbers it amounted to thirty thousand men ; its artillery was the newest and best appointed yet seen in the East; its enthusiasm was excited by parades attended by the Shah and his court. The prayers for its success were continuous and fervent. At length the army marched. The Uzbegs, twelve thousand strong, were encountered near the borders. They were soon and easily disposed of. Flushed with this first success, the Persians marched against the Abdalis. Azadulla had left Herat at the head of fifteen thousand troops to meet them. Though inferior in * “ Hanway’s Travels,” vol. ii. p. 125. THE GHILZAI RULE. 239 numbers by one half, and having no guns, he felt that his only chance of success was to attack. He met them near the village of Kariz, in the province of Herat. The battle that followed was most fiercely contested. The Persians had the advantage of numbers, of discipline, of guns. The ex-lord chief justice had developed into an able general, and he had posted his men with skill. In vain did the Afghans make charge after charge ; they were always repulsed. Towards sunset their attacks slackened, and victory was about to pro- nounce in favour of Persia, when an untoward accident upset every calculation. The Afghans, slackening their attacks, had begun to give way. A body of their matchlockmen, who had occupied a rising ground which had formed during the action a prominent target for the Persian artillery, falling back, evacuated that rising ground. Instantly the Persian matchlockmen, pressing on, occupied it. The Persian gunners had not noticed this occurrence, and observing, after sunset, that the ground was more numerously occupied than before, they turned on it, without inquiry, a tremendous fire. The Persians, thus suddenly assailed, and knowing that the Afghans had no guns, could only think of treachery. Their advance was immediately stopped, and, the artillery fire continuing, the men began to disperse in disorder. Azadulla observed the occurrence, and resolved to turn it to good account. Collecting his cavalry, he made a charge along the whole line. It was decisive. The Persian army fled in confusion, and lost their general, their baggage, and eight thousand men in killed and 240 AFGHANISTAN. wounded. The loss of the Afghans was three thou- sand. (1719.) This victory confirmed the Abdalis in the possession of the province of Herat. Azadulla added to its western limits by conquering the whole of Khorasan, excepting its capital, Meshed. He then marched south to Sabzwar, which having occupied, he proceeded to Farrah and besieged it. Leaving him engaged in this operation, I must return to Mahmud at Kandahar. Mahmud had noticed with satisfaction the blows dealt at the empire of the Safis. The defeat of Safi Kuli Khan had been followed by the loss of the de- pendencies of the empire in the Persian Gfulf, and by attacks on its southern coast. The empire seemed distressed on every side. Mahmud resolved to seize the opportunity. But just at this period he heard of the march on Farrah by the Abdalis, to which I have referred. Farrah was garrisoned by the Persians. But at the moment the Persians were not to be dreaded. The case would be different were that place, then a place of strength, occupied by men who, though Afghans, were Abdalis. Before dealing his blow at Persia, he resolved then to march to the relief of Farrah. There he met Azadula, killed him, and defeated his army. From Farrah he took a south-westerly route across the Sistan desert, and then moved towards Kerman. Surmounting great difficulties he reached Kerman, and caused his authority to be acknowledged in the province of which that town was the capital. When the news of the conquest of Kerman reached THE GHILZAI RULE. 241 the Persian general commanding on the southern coast, Lutf Ali Khan, that officer at once directed his march northward from Bandar Abbas. Lutf Ali Khan was brother to the prime minister, Fatli Ali Khan, and therefore a man of considerable influence. He would appear likewise to have possessed a good knowledge of the principles of warfare. He marched straight for the heart of the province, the town of Kerman. Mahmud issued forth to meet him, but, whether he was too greatly outnumbered, or whether Kerman had been a Capua to his soldiers, he was completely defeated. Lutf Ali felt that he would return. He therefore halted at Kerman till that place should be fortified, and then moved with his army to Shiraz, a place whence he could move with ease to any threatened quarter. His army was flushed with victory and eager for fresh opportunities. Affairs seemed to be looking up for Persia, when at this critical moment the cor- rupt clique which governed her plunged a dagger into her heart. It happened in this wise. The fact that the brother of the prime minister had but recently gained a great victory suggested to the idea of the other members of the government that the combination of the civil and military authority in the hands of two men so related might be fatal to the interests and fortunes of the other plunderers of the State. Religion eagerly enlisted itself in a plot then and there formed for their removal. At the head of it were the chief Mullah and the chief physician to the sovereign. 16 242 AFGHANISTAN. These pious men, well supported from without, entered the Shah’s chamber at midnight, and persuaded the weak monarch that the safety of his crown — even of his life — depended upon the prompt execution of rigorous measures against his prime minister and his commander-in-chief. That night the eyes of the prime minister were plucked out. He was then imprisoned, and two years later died a captive. With his brother at the head of an army it was not so easy to deal. How- ever, the means soon presented themselves. The governor of the castle of Shiraz was devoted to the corrupt faction. He was communicated with. In consequence of this communication he invited Lutf Ali to visit him. Unsuspicious, the noble soldier unhesitatingly entered the castle scantily attended. He was at once seized and hurried off to Ispahan. His army, the sole defence of Persia, immediately disbanded itself. (1720.) Mahmud of Kandahar did not immediately take advantage of the undefended state of the country he coveted. It happened that his defeat at Kerman had stirred up the governors of Farrah and of Sistan to excite disturbances in his own dominions. The con- duct of his brother, Mir Husen, had checked, and his own return finally extinguished these disturbances, but he found much to occupy him ere he could attempt a second invasion. The year following his return was a year of strict training. He had seen that he should require an army larger and better disciplined than that which had broken in his hand. THE GHILZAI RULE. 243 He invited, then, alike the Abdalis of Herat and the Biluchis south of his dominions to enlist in his service. The replies were enthusiastic : the wild tribes flocked in numbers to his standard. Nor did he neg'lect to prepare for the possibility of a reverse. He filled the magazines, repaired the fortifications, and laid in abundant supplies. Every day, moreover, brought him news of some new misfortune befalling the empire of the Safis. Confirmed thus in his aggressive ideas he hastened his preparations. At last he was ready, and in January 1722, at the head of an army of twenty- five thousand men, he marched in the direction of Sistan. He pursued the same route across the desert as on the previous occasion, marched on Kerman, and after a slight delay occupied the town. The citadel, how- ever, held out. It had been well fortified by Lutf Ali, and the troops by which it was garrisoned belonged to the army which had beaten Mahmud two years before. Every assault he made was repulsed. He was in despair. He could not retire without acknow- ledging himself beaten, and without discouraging his army. He was relieved from this difficulty by the governor. This man was not enough of a soldier to see that he could keep the place by force. Trained in the prin- ciples of the corrupt clique, he believed absolutely in the purchase power of money. To money, then, rather than to arms, he chose to owe his deliverance. Full of this idea he offered Mahmud six thousand two 16 * 244 AFGHANISTAN. hundred and fifty pounds if he would go away and leave him the citadel. Under any circumstances Mahmud would have been forced to go away. He could not take the place. The gift then of a large sum of money to do that which under any circumstances he would have been forced to do was a gift from heaven. It not only provided him with funds. It was infinitely more valuable in fur- nishing him with a justification, perfectly convincing to his followers, for leaving the citadel untaken and moving towards Ispahan. J htiboii The route he adopted was the direct road by Yezd. Yezd is about two hundred and ten miles from Ker- man, the country between the two places sandy and inhospitable. The town of Yezd was fortified and surrounded by a deep ditch. It boasted, too, of a citadel. The garrison being bent on resistance, Mahmud assaulted the place, but was repulsed. De- termined not to waste his time on a joint only of the empire, he determined to disregard it and push on for the heart. Marching rapidly he soon arrived within a hundred miles of the capital. Here he found a messenger from the prime minister, Mahammad Kuli Khan, the bearer of a letter offering him thirty-seven thousand five hundred pounds if he would proceed no further. Mahammad Kuli Khan, equally with his satrap at Kerman, was a believer in the never-fading purchase power of money. But Mahmud knew that the con- quest of Ispahan meant the conquest of the Persian empire ; even had he been as open to a bribe as the THE GHILZAI RULE. 245 minister believed him, he would have put his price at a considerably higher figure than thirty- seven thousand five hundred pounds. But for the Afghan warrior, the son of Mir Yais, the Persian empire, de- fenceless as he then regarded it, was priceless. He did not even deign a reply, but pursued his march. At last he reached Gulnabad, nine miles from the capital. The panic in that city was now at its height. It was not confined to the population. The Shah, his ministers, his corrupt favourites, were still more under its influence. Ispahan, though surrounded by a wall, was not, in the proper sense of the term, fortified ; neither was it provisioned to stand a siege. But while the number of troops within its walls exceeded fifty thousand, the total population amounted to six hundred thousand. The city, lying on the north bank of the river Zendarud, at that season not fordable, could be entered only over bridges. The only guns possessed by the invaders were a hundred small swivel guns, carried on camels. There seemed then no great reason for the panic. On the contrary, a capable leader, such as Lutf Ali, would have been thankful for the chance thus presented of annihilating the invaders. But Lutf Ali, though in Ispahan at the time, was in disgrace. Men altogether of a different mental calibre were present at the council summoned by the Shah. One of these, the prime minister, Mahammad Kiili Khan, gave, it is true, excellent advice. He recom- mended that the army should be intrenched to cover the town. He pointed out that the Afghans would 246 AFGHANISTAN. not tlien dare to attempt to storm it ; that the soldiers would become inured to fighting, and might be employed to cut off the enemy’s communications. Far different was the advice of the leader of the high nobility, Abdulla Khan, viceroy of Arabia. He was for action, immediate action, for the extermination of dogs and rebels. The religious party was also represented at this council. The leader of this party was one Fath Ali Khan Kajar, a soldier. This nobleman gravely assured the Shah that “ he had heard from an old woman of Astrabad, who was said to be inspired, that two legs of a he-goat boiled with three hundred and twenty-five peapods in water, over which a young virgin had re- peated twelve hundred times “ La illah, Mali la,” made a broth which would render invisible the men who drank it.”* When all had said their say, the Shah decided according to the views of the majority. He directed that broth made in the manner prescribed by Fath Ali Khan should be served out to the troops, and that they should march to meet the enemy. The troops drank the broth, and marched (7th March 1722), more than fifty thousand, with twenty-four guns of large calibre, against twenty thousand with small swivel guns. That day was spent in skirmishing ; but on the following day, the 8th, the two armies engaged. Their appearance presented a remarkable contrast. The Persians were sleek, well-fed, showily * Ferrier’s “ History of the Afghans.” THE GHILZAI RULE. 247 dressed : — the Afghans lean, sunburnt, clothed in rags. One spirit animated their leaders ; discord and jealousy reigned amongst the Persian chiefs. At sunrise the battle joined. The left wing of the Persians bearing down on the right wing of the Afghans forced it back. At the same time the viceroy of Arabia, making a detour with his own troops, turned the left flank of the Afghans, and falling upon their camp, set to work to plunder. This act, it will be seen, lost the day. When he started to engage in the turning operation, the right wing of the Persians attacked the Afghans opposed to them, and drove them back. Mahmud, who watched the battle from an eminence, thought that all was lost, and prepared to flee. All would have been lost had the Viceroy of Arabia not stopped to plunder. But as he did not follow up his advantage, the Afghan general, falling back, drew the enemy within range of the swivel guns fixed on the backs of the camels, kneel- ing in a line, and then opening out his ranks, poured in a volley. This fire not only checked the advance of the Persians, but threw them into inextricable con- fusion. A charge of the Afghans converted this into a complete rout. The victors drove the enemy before them for some distance ; then, wheeling round, captured their cannon, which had been left unpro- tected. These guns were at once turned on the Persians with decisive effect. Their centre was anni- hilated ; their left wing forced back ; the viceroy of Arabia was compelled to leave the greater part of his plunder, and flee into the town. The victory was in 248 AFGHANISTAN. fact decisive. It placed Ispahan in the hands of the Afghan adventurer. Had the Shah been a man, that result would not necessarily have followed. The proof of this is to be found in the doubts which oppressed Mahmud after his victory. Not only did he not follow it up ; he even permitted the Persians to recover some of their lost guns, nor did he rouse himself to vigorous action until intelligence of the terror and perplexity into which Ispahan had been thrown reached him. Stunned by the defeat, Shah Husen called a council of war. After much deliberation, the council resolved to resist. The viceroy of Arabia was nominated governor of the town. Orders were at once issued to repair the walls, to throw up intrenchments, and to raise new levies. The Governor of Laristan, Ali Mardan Khan, was created generalissimo, and directed to form a camp at Khonsar, about fifteen miles north- west of Ispahan. Mahmud, I have said, had been astounded at his own success. He never realised its magnitude. It had been snatched for him out of the fire, first by the inaction at the critical moment of the Viceroy of Arabia ; secondly, by the use made of that inaction by the commandant of his left wing. So utterly un- prepared was he for so great a success, that, as already related, he allowed the Persians to steal back some of their lost guns during the night. On the morrow of the victory he remained motionless. The repulses he had experienced at Kerman and Yezd sat heavy on his soul. Nor did he fully realize his position, until the THE GHILZAI RULE. 249 spies he had sent out returned with the information that the panic of the Persians had been so universal that he might have entered Ispahan with them. Then he roused himself. He marched first on Farrahabad, a palace surrounded by a bastioned wall, three miles from the city. The Persians not defending, he occupied it. He then moved on Jalfa, a town a mile and a half south of Ispahan, and constituting the suburb of that city on the south bank of the Zenda- rud. This place was garrisoned mainly by Armenians who, dreading the Afghans, were ready to defend themselves to the last. The insane policy of the court of Persia deprived the Shah of the assistance of these brave men. Though they repulsed the first attack of Mahmud, many of them were disarmed the next day, and the rest were discouraged. That night a breach was effected in the walls, and the place surrendered.* Notwithstanding the terms of the capitulation, the Afghans extorted enormous sums from the Armenians of Jalfa, staining their conquest with cruelty of the worst kind. Mahmud now occupied the largest suburb • Han way states that the terms of capitulation were the pay- ment to the Afghan sovereign of 175,000Z., and the gift of fifty of the most beautiful virgins of the town, chosen by a commission appointed for the purpose. After stating that some of them were reserved for the harem of Mahmud, and others distributed among his principal officers, he thus records their fate. “ Some of them were so shocked to see themselves abandoned to the enemies of their country that they died of excessive grief. The Afghans, whose hearts were touched, sent home those who were most afflicted ; others were ransomed by their friends : insomuch, that in a few days there remained but a small part of them in slavery.” 250 AFGHANISTAN. of Ispahan, connected witli that city by bridges. He lost no time now in endeavouring to carry the city. His first attack, made on the 21st of March, was re- pulsed. In his second — an attempt to carry the prin- cipal bridge* — he nearly succeeded. He had fought his way to the very centre of the bridge, when some guns were brought to bear upon his men, and forced them back panic stricken. The Persians pursued them, with great slaughter, as far as their intrenchments. These repulses, renewing the recollections of Kerman and Yezd, caused Mahmud to despair of carrying the city. He sent therefore a deputation to the Shah proposing the conditions on which he was willing to retire. These were : 1st, the cession to himself in independent sovereignty of the provinces of Kandahar, Kliorasan, and Kerman ; 2ndly, his marriage with a daughter of the Shah, provided with a portion of one hundred and twenty-five thousand pounds. The Shah, elated by the repulse of the Afghans, refused the conditions. Mahmud then resolved to endeavour to reduce the place by famine. Better for the country had the Shah agreed to the terms, for the ruin effected by the Afghans during the month that followed, was such, that a century later the evils of it were still felt. The * Han-way thus describes this bridge : — “ It is 360 geometrical paces in length and 13 in breadth : the two extremities of it are flanked by four round towers with a covered gallery, which ranges on both sides the length of the bridge, the whole decorated with the richest ornaments of Persian architecture. It is joined by two causeways, made with a gentle descent to a double row of trees above 3,000 paces long.” THE GHILZAI RULE. 251 villages, the canals, the fields, the numberless works built to assist irrigation, were ruthlessly destroyed ; the men were slain, the women were sent into slavery. When Mahmud, by plunder and by devastation, had filled his own magazines and reduced the country to a desert, he began anew his attempts on the city. Learning that the Georgians posted to guard the bridge of Abbasabad had been stupified by drink, he carried that bridge. He succeeded likewise in cutting off two convoys of provisions on their way to the city. Already Ispahan appeared in his grasp, when an event occurred which filled the minds of the besieged with hope. Three miles from Ispahan, on the declivity of a hill, stood the fortified village of Ben-Ispahan. After the battle of Gulnabad many of the Persian soldiers had flocked thither, and from its walls they had made frequent attacks upon straggling Afghan parties. Such chances were constantly offering. At last one exceeding all its predecessors in importance presented itself. Aminulla, an Afghan chief, returning with one of the convoys alluded to in the preceding paragraph, happened to pass near Ben-Ispahan. The men were laden with spoil, and were straggling. The temptation was too great to be resisted. The Persians sallied out and recovered the plunder, and though Mahmud him- self came to the assistance of his men, they repulsed him with heavy loss. Many prisoners were taken, amongst them an uncle, a half brother, and two cousins of the Afghan king. Dreading the fate that might be reserved for them, Mahmud sent a messenger 252 AFGHANISTAN. to the Shah to implore safety for their lives. But before the Shah could interfere, the Persians of Ben- Ispahan had massacred every prisoner they had taken ! Mahmud retaliated by killing all the prisoners in his camp, and by ordering that, for the future, no quarter should be given. But his defeat made him despondent, and after strengthening the outpost at the bridge of Abbasabad he fell back on Farrahabad. He appears to have determined to stay there till starvation should work its effect, slowly but surely. There was still a chance for the Safi dynasty. There were good men in Persia, but they had been persecuted and disgraced. The bad men alone had the confidence of the Shah. The man upon whom at this epoch he most depended was the very viceroy of Arabia who had lost him the battle of Gulnabad, and who, according to the historians of the period, acted throughout the part of a traitor to his sovereign. The soldier who during the siege had rendered the best service was a eunuch named Ahmad Ali. The Arabian, dreading the popularity of this man with the populace, accused him to the Shah. The next morn- ing the eunuch was found dead in his bed. The governor of Georgia, who might have rendered effec- tive aid, had been treated so insolently by the corrupt clique, that he had sworn never to draw his sword for Shah Husen. One man there was still in Ispahan, Lutf Ali Khan, he who, two years before, had driven Mahmud from Kerman. Offered now the command of the army, he refused. The men who had blinded THE GHILZAI RULE. 253 his brother were still the confidants of the Shah, and he himself had experienced how fatal it was, with such pilots guiding the ship, to succeed. From his position at Farrahabad, Mahmud had cut off the last convoy of provisions known to be on its way to the city ; the eldest son of the Shah, Prince Tahmasp, who had escaped to the provinces to raise troops, had just informed his father of the failure of all his efforts for that object ; the Shah, in the hope to save his dynasty, now offered to accept the terms he had previously rejected ; Mahmud spurned the offer. Ispahan was at her last gasp when, suddenly, the spirits of her princes and her people were revived by the intelligence that Malik Mahmud, governor of Sistan, had arrived at Glulnabad with an army of ten thousand men to relieve her. The joy was short lived. The King of Kandahar offered to the Malik the sovereignty of Khorasan if he would leave Ispahan to its fate. The Shah had nothing to promise as a counterpoise. So Malik Mahmud set out for Meshed. The end was now approaching. But Mahmud, with deliberate cruelty, protracted the siege for two months longer. He had only twenty thousand men ; and he still feared the hundred thousand of the great city. He therefore starved them into weakness, misery, and death. At last matters reached a point when further endurance was impossible. Having, on the 22nd of October, empowered his plenipotentiaries to sign a capitulation resigning the empire to his con- queror, the Shah took, on the following day, an affecting 254 AFGHANISTAN. farewell of kis people, and then, accompanied by tbe viceroy of Arabia and the principal lords of his court, and mounted on horses sent for the purpose by Mah- mud, set out for the headquarters of the Afghan king. Arrived within an easy distance of the camp, the Shah was still further humbled by an order to halt, on the pretext that Mahmud was asleep. After the delay of half-an-hour he was permitted to proceed. A few minutes later he was ushered into the hall of the palace of Farrahabad, at the corner of which he saw his conqueror seated, leaning on a cushion of cloth of gold. He had advanced into the centre of the tent, and had pronounced the magic words “ All hail !” ere Mahmud rose to return the salute. The Shah was then conducted to a seat on the left of the Afghan : after a few words of good wishes, he resigned to his conqueror the insignia of authority. With his own hands he was forced — Mahmud having refused to receive the emblem of sovereignty from his vizier — to attach to the turban of the still seated Afghan the royal plume. Having completed this ceremony by uttering the significant words “ Reign in Peace,” the Shah was allowed to resume his seat. Coffee was then served up, and Mahmud, taking in his hand his cup of the fragrant berry, spoke for the first time. “ Such,” he said, addressing the fallen monarch, “ Such is the instability of human grandeur. Gfod disposes of empires as he pleases, and takes from one nation to give them to another. But I pro- mise to consider you always as my own father ; and I will undertake nothing for the future without THE GHILZAI EULE. 255 your advice.”* With these words the ceremony con- cluded. Practically, the dynasty of the Satis had ceased to rule. In this manner the Gfliilzai King of Kandahar became also Shah of Persia. On the throne of the empire he had conquered I must now leave Mahmud. It will be sufficient if I state that pros- perity developed in him a ferocity and a licentiousness which prevented him from becoming the founder of a dynasty. His intellect became deranged, and he died in 1725, less than three years after the surrender of Ispahan. His cousin Ashraff, son of the Abdalla whom he had murdered, succeeded him. Ashraff was a capable man, but the disorder had become too great even for a very capable man to remedy. After nearly five years of ride, characterised by incessant warfare, he was defeated (15th January 1730) in a pitched battle by Tahmas Kuli Khan, afterwards renowned as Nadir Shah. Ashraff escaped from the field, but was killed by a Biluchi when wandering, a fugitive, in the desert. With his death ended the Afghan rule in Persia. * It may be convenient to note in this place the fate of the ex-Shah and his family. Confined with his sons (the eldest, Tahmasp Mirza, excepted) , his uncles, his brothers, and his nephews, in the seraglio at Ispahan, the ex-King became every year a source of greater terror to the relentless Afghan. To such a pitch did that terror arrive, that on the 7th February 1725 Mahmud caused to be murdered in cold blood all the relatives of the deposed monarch — two sons, both under five years of age, being excepted by chance rather than by design. Shah Huse'n, spared for the time, was murdered four years later by the successor of Mahmud. — “ Hanway’s Travels,” vol. ii. pp. 222, 276. 256 AFGHANISTAN. Of the effect of that rule there can be no divided opinion. “ The death and captivity of the whole of the Afghans,” writes Sir John Malcolm, referring to the consequences of the battle of the 15th January 1730, “ was but a slight atonement for the great calamities which they had inflicted upon Persia. Within the short period of seven years nearly a million of her inhabitants had perished, her finest pro- vinces had been rendered desert, and her proudest edifices levelled with the dust, and this by enemies who had neither the force nor the wisdom to maintain the conquest which they had made, and, consequently, never could repair the ruin they had effected.”* Not less precise nor less condemnatory of the Afghans is the summary drawn by Ferrier : — “ During the seven years that the Afghans held Persia that empire lost more than a third of its population ; the soil remained without cultivation, the canals and watercourses for irrigation were dried up, and the greater portion of the public buildings completely destroyed. . . . The Afghans were better qualified to fight than to govern. To appropriate, wherever they went, and without any reason or pretext whatsoever, money or money’s worth, was their practice : revolts and disturbances naturally ensued, and necessitated the employment of a large army. They were in the end weakened by twenty combats, and found it impossible to recruit in Afghanistan, and were therefore obliged to admit foreign soldiers within their ranks, whose fidelity was • Sir John Malcolm’s “ History of Persia,” vol. ii. p. 43. THE GHILZAI RULE. 257 at least doubtful, and who rarely acted with vi- ) J vk. gour. * But it is time now to return to Kandahar. When, in 1722, King Mahmud had set out on his expedition against Persia, he had left behind him as his vicegerent in Kandahar his brother, Mir Husen. This able prince governed the province with success during the lifetime of Mahmud. On his death, in 1725, Husen became the virtual ruler of the country, and although Herat, Sabzwar, and Farrah were successively overrun and conquered, the independence of Kandahar was never imperilled by the wars of the successor of Mahmud on the throne of Persia. Nor, indeed, when Talimasp Kuli Khan overthrew the Afghan rule in that country, in 1731, was Kandahar at the time in the slightest degree affected by the event. But in 1736 things had changed. The five years that had elapsed since the death of Ashraff had been prolific of success for his conqueror. To understand how this success came to affect the Afghans, it may be convenient if I place before the reader a brief sketch of the renowned Nadir Shah. This remarkable adventurer was born in a year famous in English history, 1688, in the province of Khorasan. His father, Imam Kuli, was a Turk of mean family. His youth was a stormy one. Some- times attacking, sometimes attacked by, the Usbegs; now the servant, now the murderer, of a petty chief- tain ; a robber, and a leader of robbers, he passed, * Ferrier’s “ History of the Afghans.” 17 258 AFGHANISTAN. when he was yet young, into the regular service of the governor of Khorasan. Fortune still smiled and frowned. Promoted and rewarded for good service, he was degraded and bastinadoed for insolence. Enraged at this punishment he fled to a place called Kalat, about ten days journey from Meshed, and threw himself upon the generosity of his uncle, who commanded there. He was received well by his uncle, but in a very short time his intrigues procured for him summary dismissal. Again thrown upon his own resources, Tahmasp Kuli, for so he was then called, returned -to his old profession of a robber. He must have been then thirty-four years old. It was just at the period when the dynasty of the Safis was being overthrown by Mahmud, and when the disordered state of the country would be likely to render profitable robbery by pro- fession. Graining a reputation as a daring leader, he speedily attracted to himself a large number of men. His services were soon sought after, and when Mahmud died he had obtained a recognised position in Khorasan as a leader of free-lances. On the death of Mahmud the son of the deposed Shah Husen, Tahmasp Mirza, who had escaped from Ispahan during the siege of 1722, claimed the crown and sought adherents in every direction. Tahmasp Kuli’s uncle, the man who had expelled him for intrigue, now opened negotiations with his nephew to persuade him to join the Mirza. Tahmasp Kuli agreed, provided the Mirza would grant him a free pardon for past offences. The pardon was sent to Kalat, and Tahmasp Kuli pro- THE GHILZAI RULE. 259 ceeded thither to fetch it. Arrived and admitted into the fort, he killed his uncle, seized the place, and having obtained a second pardon from the Mirza, now calling himself Shah Tahmasp, boldly entered his service. The same fortune here followed him; but he was better able now than in his earlier days to bend the blind goddess to his will. Declared, for some miscon- duct, a rebel, he marched to the court, and made his terms. Thenceforth he was virtually master. But he still bore the nominal yoke, and he was still bearing it when he annihilated the Afghans on the 15th January 1731, and raised Shah Tahmasp to the throne of Persia. His reward for this victory was the government of the four finest provinces of the empire, Khorasan, Mazandaran, Sistan, and Kerman. Two years later, after a series of victories which assured his power in every part of the Persian empire, he dethroned Shah Tahmasp, and placed his infant son, Shah Abbas, as nominal sovereign on the throne. He then left Ispahan to attack Bagdad. The Turkish army advancing to the relief of the place, he fought it and was beaten. Far from being dis- couraged, he stimulated and reinforced his troops, and led them again against the Turks, this time victoriously (1733). He then conquered Armenia and Georgia, and forced a peace on the Porte ; then, learning that the child Shah was dead, he marched to the plain of Moghan, near the banks of the Aras, convened an assembly of the nobles, and caused himself to be 17 * 260 AFGHANISTAN. elected to the vacant throne, under the name and title of Nadir Shah. He was crowned on the 26th February 1736. After repressing the Bakhtiaris, a tribe much given to plunder, Nadir Shah marched against Kandahar with an army consisting of from eighty thousand to one hundred thousand men. That place was held, as I have already related, by Mir Husen, the second son of the founder of the Ghilzai dynasty. Mir Husen had been summoned by Nadir Shah to Ispahan to do homage to him as suzerain. But the Afghan chief held, with his father and his brother, that of all the gifts of God to man national liberty is the most pre- cious, and the only reply he had vouchsafed was to strengthen the fortifications of Kandahar. Twenty- six years of freedom had greatly increased the prosperity of that royal city. Her commerce, her population, her wealth had increased with the security which the just rule of the princes of the indigenous tribes had procured for her. The reign of Husen, beginning practically in 1722, had been eminently beneficial. No sooner, then, was it known that Nadir Shah was marching against the place with his hordes, than with one voice the Afghan people applauded the expressed determination of Husen to resist him to the very last. Their hopes, indeed, were high. The city, situated at the foot of a rocky mountain which flanked' it on the north and east, was surrounded by number- less stone towers connected by curtains, and following the sinuosities of the mountain, the summit of which was occupied by a fort believed to be impregnable, and THE GHILZAI RULE. 261 commanding the citadel, half-way between it and the city.* The garrison amounted to thirty thousand men, and supplies had been laid in sufficient to enable the troops and the population to support a very long siege. Nadir Shah advanced on Kandahar by way of Herat and F arrali, both which places he occupied without opposition. The passage of the Helmand at or near Gfirishk was, however, opposed by Mir Husen with some twenty thousand men. The Afghan chief rendered the passage difficult, but he could not make it impossible. He detained the invader on the opposite bank for some days ; then, seeing that he must be turned were he to stay longer, he fell back on the capital, having lost some two thousand men. Nadir then advanced on Kandahar, hoping to occupy it very speedily. This hope disappeared the moment he noted its position, its strength, the zeal of its gar- rison. He had no heavy artillery with him. He deter- mined, then, to blockade it and trust to the operation of famine. Partly to house himself and his troops, partly to assure the Afghans that he was resolved not to leave the spot till Kandahar had been taken, Nadir, at this early period of the siege, caused to be traced out in the vicinity of his camp the lines of a new city, which he called Nadirabad— the abode of Nadir. His com- munications with Persia were placed on a firm and * Ferrier. The reader must always bear in mind that this description applies to the old city of Kandahar, abandoned in 1738. 262 AFGHANISTAN. sure basis, whilst a reinforcement of thirty thousand cavalry enabled him to scour the country in every direc- tion. To render the blockade absolute he surrounded the city with towers connected by small batteries. The intense determination evinced by these prepa- rations, combined with the enormous power displayed by Nadir to humble the pride of Mir Husen and the Afghans. Husen wrote to the invader, offering to submit on conditions. He offered to acknowledge the suzerainty of Nadir Shah, and to pay him homage as a tributary prince, on the sole condition that Nadir would retire to Herat. But these terms were no longer good enough for Nadir. Ten years before, shortly after he had taken service under Tamasp Mirza, he had dreamt a dream of mighty portent. He had seen in a vision a water-fowl and a white fish with four horns ; he dreamt that he shot the bird, and, after all his attendants had failed, had easily captured the fish. When he awoke the astrologers had interpreted to him the dream. The bird he had shot was the reigning dynasty of Persia ; the four horns of the fish were the kingdoms of Persia, Khwarizm, Tartary, and India. The imperial symbols of the bird and the fish showed him that in his hands was to fall the sceptre over these. Such a vision, cherished, firmly believed in, already partly accomplished, was not to be baffled by the in- complete submission of a prince who had once reigned. Kandahar had once defied him. Conquest alone could atone for the defiance. Nadir, then, refused the offer, and continued the blockade. THE GHILZAI RULE. 263 For a whole year he sat before the place. Mean- while his son and his generals conquered the country to the north-east of the place. Balkh and the country now called Afghan Turkistan fell before their arms. His son, Riza Kuli Khan, crossing then the Oxus, totally defeated a superior army of the Uzbegs, and would have taken Bokhara, but that Nadir recalled him, on the plea that he did not desire to extend his conquests beyond the Oxus. Bnt Kandahar still held out, and there were no signs of yielding. Mir Husen and his garrison had dis- played their courage and their conduct in many a sortie, and on one occasion had nearly succeeded in inflicting upon the besiegers an irretrievable defeat. Time was slipping away. Already letters from dis- contented nobles at the court of the Moghol whetted the longing of Nadir to possess himself of the rich heritage of Hindustan. At last his patience was ex- hausted ; he resolved to risk an assault. The prepa- rations for this were of the most formidable descrip- tion. Relays of assaulting columns were prepared, so as to give the defenders no respite. Then the assault was delivered. It continued without cessation for two days. On the first the repulse all along the line was complete ; on the second it promised to be not only complete, but decisive, when the gallantry and devo- tion of a body of men in his service enabled Nadir to realize his expectations. I have mentioned that before marching from Persia, Nadir had found it necessary to repress the Bakhtiaris, a daring tribe infesting the mountains near Ispahan. 264 AFGHANISTAN. He had first chastised, then enlisted them, and they had proved to be his best troops. On the afternoon of the second day of the assault on Kandahar, when the repulse of the assailants seemed assured, these daring soldiers succeeded, by climbing the almost per- pendicular rocks to the north of the town, in reaching a little plateau, where they established themselves, and whence, making it a base of operations, they were enabled to capture several of the towers on that side of the mountain. Into these towers they managed by means of ropes to haul up from below some guns of small calibre, and by means of these they gained by nightfall possession of the remaining towers. The town was now at their mercy. All, however, was not yet over. Mir Husen and his gallant Afghans had still an impregnable position in the fort on the summit of the hill. Thither they retreated, and from this place they made terms with the conqueror. The conditions were generous. Nadir had been greatly struck by the valour displayed by the Afghans, and he knew well how useful they would be to him in his invasion of Hindustan. He agreed therefore to recognize Mir Husen as governor for him of Kandahar, on condition that he should furnish him with a strong corps of his gallant following. (1738.) It deserves here to be recorded, that almost the first act of Mir Husen and the people of Kandahar after the capitulation was to move into the new town, built by Nadir during the siege, of Nadirabad. It kept that name for eight years ; but when, in 1747, Nadir Shah THE GHILZAI RULE. 265 was assassinated, tlie old name, classical * and vene- rated, was restored by acclamation. Kandahar subjected, Nadir marched on Kabul. That city, since the date on which I last mentioned it, had undergone some vicissitudes of fortune. In com- mon with the other provinces subject to Shah Jahan, it had after the usual period of interregnum recog- nized the authority of Aurangzib. In 1670, however, the Afghan tribes in the north-east part of the country completely defeated his lieutenant, and proclaimed their independence under a chief of their own nation. Little more than two years later, January 1673, Aurangzib proceeded to Afghanistan to restore his authority, but soon returned, leaving his generals to complete the work. It was not, however, until the Raja of Jodhpur, Jaswant Singh, had taken up the office of viceroy (1675), that the Emperor’s authority was completely re-established. From that period to the time of which I am now writing, it would seem that Kabul had submitted to the governors nominated by the court of Dehli. In 1738, the Governor of eastern Afghanistan was Nazir Khan ; the commandant of the city of Kabul, Shir Khan. Sending a message to these noblemen that they would find it difficult to oppose the fortune and valour of Nadir Shah, and that they need expect * “ Some historians,” says Hanway, “ think that Kandahar is one of the seven cities founded by Alexander, and that the name of KANDAR, which is given him by the old Persian historians, is an abridgment of that Iskandar by which this conqueror was known to the Eastern nations.” 266 AFGHANISTAN. no aid from Dehli, Nadir marched from Kandahar to Ghazni, harassed but not impeded by the mountain tribes, and thence on to Kabul. Nazir Khan had fled to Peshawar ; but the commandant, Shir Khan, pre- pared to offer a determined resistance. The resistance was determined but useless. The only guns Nadir had with him were the swivel guns borne on camels. Mounting these on eminences near the town, he played on the defences till he had effected a breach. He then stormed the place (June 1738), put the greater part of the defenders to the sword, and leaving a garrison there, marched for Peshawar. 267 CHAPTER VIII. Historical. — The Durani Rule. There are two points in tlie invasion of Hindustan by Nadir Shah which seem, at this time, specially to deserve attention. These are, the behaviour of his Afghan troops, and the difficulties he encountered in forcing the passes. We have already seen how, about the time of the death of Mir Vais, the Abdali Afghans had occupied Herat, had taken Sabzwar, and had subsequently been defeated by Mahmud near Farrah. Their defeat had led to anarchy throughout Khorasan, nor was it until, in 1722, Malik Mahmud concluded with the ruler of Kandahar, then besieging Ispahan, a convention which assured to him the sovereignty of that province, that order was restored there. The death of Mahmud, the Grhilzai Shah of Persia ; the claims to sovereignty of Ashraff and Shah Tahmasp ; and the contests to support those claims, had re-introduced the elements of strife throughout Khorasan and the districts of Herat. During all 268 AFGHANISTAN. this period, however, the Abdali Afghan element had always been predominant in those districts, and when Nadir Shah, on his way to Kandahar in 1736 con- quered Herat and Sabzwar, he conquered them from the Abdali Afghans. We have already noticed, too, how quick was this stern conqueror to appreciate the valour of his enemies. It was by means of his enemies of the eve that he took Kandahar on the morrow. And now, having conquered the Abdalis in Herat, the Ghilzais in Kandahar, and a portion of both of these tribes conjoined with others in Ghazni and Kabul, he set to work to make of these whilom enemies a corps d’armee, sufficiently strong and sufficiently trustworthy to be launched with effect on the decisive point of the field of battle — a reserve, in a word, which should be to him what the Old Guard was, at a later time, to the great Corsican conqueror. The contingent taken from the Afghans amounted to about sixteen thousand men. Of these, twelve thousand were taken from the Abdalis ; four thousand from the Ghilzais. The former being the most numerous, it was indispensable that the chief com- mand should be vested in one of their clan. For this high office Nadir Shah selected Nur Mahammad Khan, Alizye. It will be sufficient to state regarding this contin- gent, of which Nut Mahammad Khan retained the command during the lifetime of Nadir Shah, that they behaved with a valour, a devotion, and a daring such as endeared them to their foreign master. Of all his THE DUEAIS'I RULE. 269 troops he speedily learnt to trust them the most. Of all his troops they rendered him the best service. They were the men upon whose action he could always rely. Daring, they were yet obedient. To them he was a god, whose orders, no matter their nature, were to be implicitly carried out. Nadir was thus able firmly to rely upon his Afghans — even against his own men. They participated in all his triumphs, and, at least on one occasion, saved him from destruction. So much for the Afghan contingent. Their valour was first to be tried in forcing the passes leading to India. “ It was a favourable circumstance to Nadir,” says Hanway, “ that the Indian court had kept the moun- taineers of the passes in arrears for their pay.” In those days as in the present, it was necessary to sub- sidize the border tribes. Had the court of Dehli paid regularly the amounts for which they had covenanted, even Nadir Shah, leading nearly one hundred thousand men, would have found it impossible to emerge into the Peshawar plain with a formidable and well ap- pointed army. As it was — the Mogliol power in a rapid decline, anarchy universal, and the subsidies in arrear — he found the task difficult. Though discontented with reason with the court of Dehli, the tribes of the mountains felt but little inclined to offer a welcome to Nadir Shah. He too disdained them, refused to enter into negotiations with them, and resolved to force his way in spite of them. 270 AFGHANISTAN. He tried to force his way. The tribes baffled him. They cut down trees, blocked up the defiles,* destroyed the roads, and, crowning the heights, annoyed him with constant fire. Now they attacked his rear, now they fell upon his flanks, again they appeared to bar his progress behind the obstructions they had raised. Numbers of his men perished. For nearly a month the tribes stopped him. They would have continued to stop him still longer had Nadir not given in. Learning wisdom from ex- perience he came to terms with the tribes, listened to their demands, and granted them. Then they turned round, became his children, and, entering his * What defiles were these ? Hanmer thus writes : — “ Passing the Behai and the Cou he advanced into the narrow defiles which cover that province. Here several Indian princes ” (by princes he means chiefs of the mountain tribes) “ assembled their troops, cutting down trees, &c. &c.” In a note Hanmer states that the Behat river was known to the ancients as the Cophene, and the Cou as the Choaspe. It is clear that the word Cophenes is identical with the Kophin of Arrian, and the Kophin of Arrian has been accepted as the modern Kabul river. The Choaspe may perhaps be identical with the Kunar or Kama, a tributary of the Kabul river falling into it ten miles east of Jalalabad. If this be correct, it is clear that the defiles referred to were the defiles of the Khaibar pass. Since writing the above my attention has been drawn by an article in the Pall Mall Gazette to Mr. Henry Long’s “Campaign of Alexander in Afghanistan.” If Mr. Long’s argument, that the Cophenes is identical not with the Kabul river but with the Tarnak, be sound, then Nadir Shah must have followed the route he lays down for Alexander, and have mvaded India by the Kojak and the Bolan. It is a pity that a question so important, the solution of which depends on the correct rendering in modern geographical terms of Greek proper names, should still remain unsettled. THE DURANI RULE. 271 service, more than filled the gaps which they them- selves had made in the ranks of his army. It is no part of the plan of this history to follow in detail the marvellous career of Nadir Shah. It will suffice to record that, issuing from the passes, he de- feated the Moghol army on the Peshawar plain, occu- pied in succession Peshawar and Lahor, crossed the Satlaj, defeated the Moghol army at Karnal (13th February 1739) ; received the representative of the Moghol sovereign, Mahammad Shah, in his camp; marched on Dehli and occupied it. The day after his arrival a false report of his death caused the inhabi- tants to attempt the massacre of his soldiers. Nadir, attempting to stop the confusion by showing himself, was himself assailed. Then, and not till then, did he give the order to retaliate. For eight hours the city ran with blood. After a stay of fifty-eight days at Dehli, Nadir, carry- ing with him the far-famed peacock throne, and laden with treasure,* returned to the Indus on his return to Khorasan. But the news of the enormous wealth he was carrying with him had roused the cupidity of the wild tribes. The swollen waters of the Indus hin- dered his passage, near Atok, and gave them time to assemble. Nadir Shah chose rather to negotiate than to run the risk of losing the whole of his plunder. He sent for the chiefs, and induced them, by a bribe * Computed, including coins, jewels, and cloth, at from thirty- five to seventy millions sterling. Amongst the jewels was the famous Koh-i-nur. 272 AFGHANISTAN. of ten lakhs of rupees (£100,000), to grant him a free passage across the Indus.* From Peshawar Nadir marched by way of Kabul to Kandahar. He subsequently asserted his right of suzerainty over Sind, Bokhara, and Khwarizm, and then took up his abode at Meshed, which he made the capital of his empire. His subsequent career is full of gloom. Making an unsuccessful campaign against the Lesgis, he conceived suspicions of his son, Riza Kuli, and put out his eyes.f He then marched into Asia Minor against the Turks, and after a campaign of three years ended the war by a victory near Erivan. Every year now saw him more suspicious and cruel, and it was at Meshed, when harbouring a design to massacre every Persian in his army, that he was mer- cifully assassinated by the nobles of that nation. (June 1747.) The death of Nadir Shah was the Afghan opportu- nity. When that conqueror, after the conquest of Afghanistan, was forming his Afghan contingent, he had sent Ahmad Khan, chief of the Sadozyes, then fourteen years old, under honourable surveillance to Mazandaran. In that province Ahmad Khan had remained until the return of Nadir from Hindustan. He was then summoned to the imperial camp, and intrusted with a high, though not the supreme, command in the Afghan contingent. The men under his orders belonging to his own tribe, his influence * “ Haiiway,” vol. ii. p. 392. f “ It is not my eyes you have put out, but the eyes of Persia,” exclaimed, prophetically, Biza Kuli. THE DU R ANI RULE. 273 over them soon made itself felt. Daring in action, firm in his resolves, true to his word, Ahmad Khan was just the man to win the confidence of the daring men who owed him hereditary homage. Nor was his influence less with Nadir Shah. His prompt execution of orders, his proved fidelity, had won the confidence and the affection of that monarch. If a service more than ordinarily dangerous were required its execution was trusted to Ahmad Klian — and Ahmad Khan never failed. The suspicions and the cruelties which had clouded the last five years of Nadir Shah’s life had not altered the dispositions of Ahmad Khan toward his person. When, therefore, Nadir was assassinated by the Persian lords whose death he himself was contem- plating, the first movement of Ahmad Khan was to avenge the murder. He assembled the men of his clan, and joining the Uzbegs, who had agreed to stand by him, attacked the camp of the conspirators. Find- ing, however, that the whole Persian army was in the plot, and that it would be useless to contend with their vastly superior numbers, he drew off his men and rode with them for Kandahar, all the other chiefs of the Afghan contingent and their following accompanying him. It is said that before leaving Meshed Ahmad Khan managed to take possession of the Koh-i-Nur. Hp to this period the command of the contingent had remained in the hands of Nur Mahammad Khan Alizye. But with the death of Nadir Shah, and the subsequent retreat of all the Afghans upon Kandahar, the position not only of the contingent but of the 18 274 AFGHANISTAN. nation which it represented was entirely changed. A vision of independence opened before them. No longer the hirelings of a foreign prince, they constituted at the moment a national army capable of resisting the heterogeneous masses welded into consistency by the genius of Nadir, but which, his grasp over them loosened, would almost certainly dissolve. As the contingent of a foreign prince the Abdalis and Ghilzais had been not unwilling to serve under the orders of the nominee of the master who had conquered them. But that master’s death had removed the reason for such obedience. Free men, they were not willing to do homage to an Alizye. Almost the first act of the chiefs of the body which from a contingent had become a national army, after their arrival at Kandahar, was to withdraw the command from Nur Mahammad Khan. A few days later the representatives of the wild tribes, the Abdalis, the Ghilzais, the Beluchis, the Hazaras, and the Kizilbashis, met to consider the course which ought to be followed to secure the national independence. It was universally agreed that the connection with Persia should, at any cost, be severed, and that a king should be elected from amongst themselves, wielding the executive power alike in civil and military matters. To choose the king from a number of chiefs, all deeming them- selves worthy, was not so easy. It is said that eight meetings were held, and that at these the claims of every chief, excepting those of Ahmad Khan, were brought forward and discussed. At the ninth, Haji THE DUEANI RULE. 275 Jamal Khan, chief of the Mahammadzyes, united a majority of suffrages, but the minority was strong, and the decision seemed as remote as ever, when a holy man who had been present at all the meetings, and had noticed the dignified reserve of Ahmad Khan, advised the chiefs to break off the conference at once, saying, “ Why all this verbose talk ? Gfod has created Ahmad Khan a much greater man than any of you. He is of the most noble of all the Afghan families. Maintain, therefore, Gfod’s work, for His wrath will weigh heavily upon you if you destroy it.”* Then twisting into the form of a wreath some barley straw from the adjoining field, he placed it on the head of Ahmad Khan. Haji Jamal Khan at once withdrew his pretensions in favour of the youthful chief, and his election was then and there secured. Ahmad Khan was crowned King of the Afghans at Kandahar in October 1747. He was then twenty- three years old. In the midst of the rejoicings follow- ing the coronation, intelligence reached him that a convoy containing specie to the value of two millions sterling — the amount of the customs-duties of the Panjab and Sind due to Nadir Shah — was approach- ing Kandahar. No intelligence could have been more welcome. Money was the one thing wanting to give lustre to his coronation. And now money came into his hands. He seized the convoy, and immediately distributed the contents amongst the officers and men of his army, and the chief employes * Ferrier’s “ History of the Afghans.” 18 * 276 AFGHANISTAN. of his government, showing, says Ferrier, a liberality “ which did more for his future career than all his private virtues and noble origin.” Another circumstance attending on the coronation of Ahmad Khan deserves to be noticed in this place. Like his great predecessor, Ahmad was superstitious. Warned in a dream that if he wished to taste the full splendour of imperial glory the title of his tribe must correspond with his aspirations, he changed their name from Abdali to Durani, and assumed himself the high- sounding title of Shah Duri Duran. Thenceforth he was known as Ahmad Shah Durani. On his accession Ahmad Shah had two great prin- ciples to settle — the organization of the Afghan tribes, and the consolidation of his kingdom. Born an Afghan, bred among the Afghans, possessing a clear head, and having singularly sagacious views, he was well competent to deal with the first question. He solved it in the simple manner eminently character- istic of him. Far from centralising all the springs of power in his own hands, he resolved to rule the tribes through their chiefs. War, he knew, was the natural element of the Afghans, and believing that he could wage successful war, he determined to make it self- supporting. His principle may be briefly summed up : the independence of the tribes under their respective chiefs ; the concentration in his own hands of the ruling power to be exercised in consultation with the great chiefs ; the furnishing by each of those chiefs of a contingent for service in case of war ; the payment to them of a certain fixed sum in acknowledgment of THE DURANI RULE. 277 their service. In a word, it was the feudal system of its entirety. The great offices of State he reserved to chiefs in his own tribe — to Duranis, making those offices, as a rule, hereditary in the family. The privileges of his own clan, the Sadozye, he took every occasion to exalt, with the object of clothing its members with the halo which, in Oriental countries, is supposed to surround kings and royal personages. Above all, he endeavoured to impress upon every act the stamp of nationality. He was king to extend Afghan authority, to found an Afghan nationality, to spread Afghan ideas. In all his dealings with the tribes it was to this spirit that he appealed, and it was this appeal that assured his success. The more certainly to carry the tribes with him in these great ideas, Ahmad Shah made it from the outset a principle of his policy to gain, in the first instance, their chiefs. With this object he ap- pointed a council of nine chiefs with whom to consult in all matters of state. In the first instance he nominated to this council the nobles who had served with him in the army of Nadir Shah. Without their consent he adopted no measure of importance. His ideas being always broad, aggressive, and essentially in the largest sense Afghan, that consent was rarely, if ever, refused. This principle of government was at once the cause of his power and of his success. It will be seen that the reversal of it ruined his grandson. Scarcely had he been crowned than he appealed 278 AFGHANISTAN. to the national spirit. Kabul and Ghazni were yet in Persian hands— -Kabul and Ghazni must be reunited to the parts of the fatherland whence they had been long severed. The governor of Kabul at this period was the very "Nazir Khan who had held the province for the Moghol when it had been invaded by Nadir Shah ; and who, fleeing to Peshawar, had fought and been vanquished by that monarch on the plain bearing the name of the town. Nadir Shah had pardoned and employed him, and when Nadir fell, he was governing the province of Kabul, including Ghazni and Peshawar, in the name of that prince. Summoned by Ahmad Shah to yield the government he held for the sovereign who had been murdered, Nazir Khan replied by proclaiming the Moghol. Hav- ing little to hope for from the feeble Mahammad Shah (of Dehli), Nazir Khan endeavoured to procure recruits from amongst the Hazaras and the Aimaks. But the spirit of nationality was strong within these tribes. They would not fight for the Moghol against the Afghan. Meanwhile Ahmad Shah advanced. At his approach the commandant of Ghazni fled. That fortress was occupied without a shot. Kabul cost but a few lives. After a brief resistance Nazir Khan hastily retreated, and fell back, harassed and molested by the mountain tribes, on Peshawar. Thither Ahmad Shah followed, and thence drove him. The Indus was crossed, Lahor was gained, without resistance. Meanwhile the old Emperor awoke from his lethargy. He had witnessed the THE DURANI RULE. 279 sacking of Dehli by Nadir Shah. The very thought of a repetition of the same fearful scenes quickened his dry bones into action. He sent his best army under his son Ahmad to cover the fords of the Satlaj. But Ahmad Shah outmanoeuvred the young prince. Whilst the latter watched the fords, the Durani, hast- ening higher up, crossed the river in boats, and marching on Sirhind seized the enemy’s baggage which had been deposited there. Ahmad Shah had with him but twelve thousand men ; the Moghols were more numerous, and their army was better appointed. It was their policy to force a battle. The prince who led them, and the vizier who guided the prince, thought so. Facing about they marched down from the Satlaj on the Afghans. But as they approached, .their courage seemed to ooze out at their fingers’ ends. They marched more slowly ; finally they halted. They feared to risk an action. Seeing this Ahmad Shah attacked them. The battle must have been a series of skirmishes, for it lasted ten days. At first Ahmad Shah was hopeful, but he soon found that the Moghol soldiers were better than the vizier who led them, and when a chance shot killed the vizier, his son, Mir Manu, who was a general, handled his troops with such effect that on the tenth day Ahmad Shah was forced to retire, beaten, from the field. Why was he not followed up ? Permitted to retreat, he was able to come again. But a very short time elapsed before he attempted a second invasion. Mahammad Shah died in April of 280 AFGHANISTAN. the same year, and though no internal convulsions fol- lowed that event, it seemed to offer a favourable chance to Ahmad Shah Durani. Turning back then from the Indus, which he had all but reached, he marched on Lahor, now governed by the Mir Manu who had defeated him in Sirhind. Mir Manu might have resisted had hopes of support from Dehli been held out to him. But the new reign had, as anticipated by Ahmad Shah, brought with it increasing distractions. Bankrupt in all save intrigue, the court of Dehli was glad to conclude a peace, by which the Panjab was annexed to the dominions of the Afghan king. Ahmad Shah confirmed Mir Manu in the government as his viceroy. He then visited the frontier towns of the province, regulated their affairs, and returned towards the end of the year to Kandahar. He was yet not satisfied. Herat had been the home of the Abdalis, and the home which an Abdali had lost a Durani was bound to restore. He therefore began preparations to lead thither an army in the spring. But before those preparations had been far advanced, he discovered a plot to assassinate him. The head of this plot was the Nur Mahammad Alizye, who had commanded the Afghan contingent during the wars of Nadir Shah, and had been displaced after the death of that monarch. The preceding pages have teemed with instances of the invariable longing to rule again which tortures a man who has once ruled. To such a man power is a necessity of existence. Not less than the brother of Humayun, the ill-fated Kamran, could Nur Mahammad disregard the all- THE DURANI RULE. 281 powerful impulse. He conspired, and was discovered. For sucli a crime, at such a period, there was in Afghanistan but one punishment possible. Nur Mahammad and his fellow conspirators suffered it. That chief, the chiefs who conspired with him, and ten men from each of the tribes most deeply compromised perished by the hands of the executioner.* The selection of ten men from each guilty tribe to suffer for the lapses of that tribe, gives a curious insight into the system of punishment for conspiracy prevalent at that period. By the spring all the military preparations were ready, and at the head of twenty-five thousand men Ahmad Shah marched against Herat. Herat suc- cumbed after a siege of fourteen days, and was united to the Afghan kingdom. The Durani then marched on and occupied Meshed, the ruler of which was the grandson of Nadir Shah. To him Ahmad Shah restored Meshed and marched against Nishapor. Nishapor shut her gates on him. He besieged it, and though the winter set in, the snow fell, and his troops suffered terribly, he still persisted in the siege. At last he attempted an assault — but was repulsed. He continued to persevere until the Khans of Khorasan had had time to act upon his communications. They then made their presence painfully felt, the garrison aiding their efforts by a vigorous sortie. Nothing then remained but a retreat, if retreat were yet possible. Made in terrible weather, and in the * Ferrier’s “ History of the Afghans.” 282 AFGHANISTAN. presence of harassing enemies, it was accomplished, and after incredible difficulties Herat was at last gained. The disaster was repaired in the following year by the capture af Nishapor ; and in 1752 Kashmir was added to dominions of Ahmad Shah. These had now reached the fullest extent he designed for them. The next four years were comparatively tranquil. Only an occasional revolt, of slight import, and easily quelled, came to interfere with the internal administration of his dominions. But in 1756 an event occurred in the Pan jab, which proved to be the cause of new complications with the Moghol. Mir Manu, the governor of that province for Ahmad Shah, died in that year. In accordance with the principle which ruled his policy in Afghanistan, Ahmad Shah confirmed the succession to the governor- ship in the family of the deceased nobleman, although, the son being an infant, that succession devolved for a time on the widow. The court of Dehli, considering the circumstances favourable for the recovery of the Panjab, sent an army to Lahor, occupied it, and left there Adina Beg, a man famous for his power of intrigue, as governor for the Moghol. Ahmad Shah replied to this insult by marching first on Lahor, whence he drove Adina Beg, and thence towards Dehli. Corruption and intrigue had reduced the empire of Akbar to a mere shadow of its former greatness. Its nobles were without shame, without spirit, without honour. When Ahmad Shah had arrived within twenty miles of the capital the prime vizier THE DTJRANI RULE. 283 came to beg and to intrigue for mercy. He brought the widow of Mir Manu to plead for bim. But Abmad Shah demanded a money compensation for the insult he had received and for the expense he had incurred, and when this was refused him, he marched on and occupied Dehli. (1757.) Again did the Moghol capital suffer the terrible misery of occupation by a barbarous enemy. Ahmad Shah wished to spare the city all needless violence ; but the rough soldiers who obeyed his nod on the field slipped from his grasp in the streets and lanes of an enemy’s capital. Dehli, then, suffered as much as though it had been taken by assault. Murder, pillage, and rapine went hand in hand. Those who had escaped the massacre of 1739 had cause to remember the not less terrible occupation of eighteen years later. The miseries of the people did not, however, curtail or affect the festivities of the court. The Afghan conqueror took advantage of the occupation to unite his family to that of the Moghol by marrying, and by causing his son Taimur to marry, princesses of that house. The por- tions conceded were enormous. That bestowed with the bride of Taimur consisted of the provinces of the Panjab and Sind. But the capital did not alone suffer. The fort of Balamgarh was taken by assault and the garrison put to the sword. Mathura, the holy city of the Hindus, was surprised by a corps of Afghans under Haji Jahan Khan, and its inhabitants were ruthlessly slaughtered or carried away into slavery. The same corps — their hands red with slaughter — then marched against Agra. 284 AFGHANISTAN. But the story of their bloody deeds had preceded them, and the Jats who manned the walls repulsed them with heavy loss. The hot season was now far advanced, and as it told very severely on the northern soldiers, Ahmad Shah resolved to retrace his steps. He returned, therefore, to Kandahar, leaving, to guard his interests in India, a brother of the deceased Mir Manu as vizier to the Moghol ; and to protect his new acquisitions east of the Indus, his son Taimur, assisted by Haji Jahan Khan. Ahmad Shah had scarcely recrossed the Indus when the factions he had left in India renewed their conten- tion for the decaying heritage of the Moghols. The intervention of the Marathas from Western India, and the rise of a new sect called the Sikhs, added new elements of discord to the general turmoil. It is no part of this history to do more than refer to the proceedings of these different nationalities, in so far as they influenced the action of Ahmad Shah. It will suffice to state that in the month of May following the return of the Durani to Kandahar the Marathas occupied Lahor, and forced the Afghans to retire across the Indus. Taimur lost for the moment the fairest portion of the dower of his wife. Ahmad Shah was preparing to avenge this insult when an insurrection broke out in Biluchistan. The chief of this province was Nasir Khan — a good soldier, a chivalrous leader, but, like many men more capable than their fellows, full of ambition. Nasir Khan had represented the Biluchi tribe at Kandahar at the time THE DURANI RULE. 285 of the election of Ahmad Sliah. He had given to that election his fullest consent. Subsequently he had fol- lowed his suzerain into the field, had accompanied him in his three invasions of India, and had performed his part loyally and well. Possibly all this time he was watching his opportunity. This at least is certain, that no sooner was it known in Afghanistan that the Marathas had conquered the Panjab than Nasir Khan renounced his fidelity to Ahmad Shah, and declared his independence. The Afghan king was at first unwilling to proceed to extremities against a man whom he regarded as a friend and esteemed as a soldier, and he used every means in his power to induce him to return to his allegiance. The result afforded another proof of the generally accepted maxim that when an Oriental chief, with an armed force at his beck and call, puts the bit between his teeth, soft words only inflate his brain. Nasir Khan not only treated the advances of his late suzerain with contempt, but when the latter sent a force, under his vizier Shah Wali Khan, against his capital, Kalat, he did not await it there, but marched forward to encounter it. The two armies met at a village not far from Mas- tung, a town sixty-nine miles north of Kalat. The battle, obstinately contested at the outset, terminated in the total defeat of the Afghans. They fled from the field in disorder, and did not halt till they had galloped thirty miles. Nasir Khan, instead of following up his victory, encamped at Mastung, the approaches to which were guarded by a large and deep ravine and 286 AFGHANISTAN. by several watercourses. Meanwhile Ahmad Shah had heard of his vizier’s defeat. Dreading the effect which even a slight discomfiture might have upon the tribes, he hastened, at the head of a strong division, to reinforce him, and then moved upon Mastung. Clearing the ravines and the watercourses, he attacked Nasir Khan in his camp, completely defeated him, and followed him, retreating, to Kalat, which he at once invested. Dashing troops, when well led, in the open field, the Afghans have always proved indifferent soldiers when engaged in sieges. It is not the sort of work in which horsemen and mountaineers excel. It proved so on this occasion, as it had proved before and has proved since. After a protracted cannonade breaches were made in the walls, and five different assaults were delivered in succession. They all failed. It has been urged in excuse for the failure that the chiefs serving under Ahmad Shah did not desire to succeed, that Biluchistan had ever served to them the purpose of a Cave of Adullam, to which every discontented chief could retire, and they wished it to remain so. It is probable that this reason did affect some of the chieftains, but the walls were well manned, the citadel was extremely strong, and the defenders were well commanded. The intelligence which from time to time reached Ahmad Shah of the progress made by the Marathas in Hindustan made him more than ordinarily anxious to bring Nasir Khan to reason. But time to reduce Kalat by blockade failed him, and after the fifth un- THE DURANI RULE. 287 successful assault lie became hopeless of storming it. Nasir Khan, on bis part, was tired of an independence which shut him up in his capital. Terms then were proposed and were accepted. By these Nasir Khan agreed to acknowledge the suzerainty of Ahmad Shah, and to furnish a contingent of troops whenever that monarch should wage war out of his own territories. On the other side, Ahmad Shah agreed to furnish a sum of money and a supply of the munitions of war whenever he should require the services of the Biluch contingent. He further renounced his right to demand the services of the contingent for any internal quarrel, and he absolved the Biluch chief from payment of tribute. To make the agreement more binding, Ahmad Shah married a cousin of the Biluchi. This important matter settled, Ahmad Shah turned his attention to Hindustan. He had, whilst engaged before Kalat, despatched a small force, under Nurudin Khan, to observe and hold in check the enemy. This chief had crossed the Indus and advanced with but little opposition to the banks of the Chinab — the main body of the Marathas having fallen back on Delili. Nurudin did not think it prudent to proceed further with his small force, but remained halted at Vazirabad, waiting the orders of his sovereign. Those orders did not arrive so quickly as he had hoped. The revolt of Biluchistan had entailed results which the submission of its chief did not immediately counteract, and Ahmad Shah had found it impossible to leave Kandahar as early as he had hoped. At last, however, he set out, traversed the Bolan pass, then 288 AFGHANISTAN. marched up the Indus to Peshawar, crossed the river at Atok, picked up his lieutenant at Y azirabad ; then, continuing his inarch through the north of the Panjab, crossed the Jarnna near Saharanpur, and halted there. Here he was joined by the Rohilla chiefs whom he had won to his cause. Marching from Saharanpur towards Dehli, Ahmad Shah defeated first a detachment of the Maratlia army under Dataji Sindia, and then a second under Mulhar Rao Holkar. He then marched on Dehli, took it, and, leaving there a small detachment, cantoned his army for the rainy season at Anupshahr, seventy-three miles from the capital. He was at this place when, the rainy season being over, the grand army of the Marathas, estimated at seventy thousand regular troops, aided by countless irregulars and followers, marched on Dehli, took and plundered it ; then, directing their course north- wards, attacked and stormed Kunjpura, sixty miles from the capital, garrisoned hy a small detachment of Afghans. On learning of the taking of Dehli Ahmad Shah pushed northwards, and reached Kunj- pura just in time to witness its fall. It had been quite possible now for a skilful general commanding a large force to reduce the Afghan to extremities, for Ahmad Shah was on the eastern bank of the river, not then fordable, and was much straitened for supplies. The pride of the Marathas in their numbers caused, however, a fatal relaxation of vigilance, and Ahmad Shah, taking advantage of that relaxation and of a sudden fall in the river, effected a passage with but THE DURANI RULE. 289 slight loss, and forced the enemy to fall back on Panipat. There the Marathas intrenched themselves. Ahmad Shah, with a force estimated, inclusive of his Indian allies, at forty thousand men, took up a position which would cut off his enemy’s supplies. Thus the two armies remained watching each other for more than three months, both straitened for food, but the Marathas more so than the Afghans. At last the former could bear it no longer. On the 6th January, 1761, they marched out to attack the invader. The third battle of Panipat has often been described. It fully deserves the attention which has been bestowed upon it. It was one of the decisive battles of the age. Had it been decided against the Afghans, all India would then and there have fallen under Maratha domi- nation, and it is not to be expected that the English settlements in Bengal and in Madras, then just emerging from the childhood of their careers, would have escaped the unsparing hands and the overwhelm- ing power of the marauders. The third battle of Panipat threw back the Maratha power for thirty years ; and when towards the close of the century it had by the exertions of Madhaji Sindia recovered a great portion of its former might, the English had established themselves so firmly as not only to bear the shock of the collision but to make it recoil on their enemy. The battle of Panipat can be clearly described in a few words. The Marathas tried to pierce the Afghan centre. They nearly succeeded, so nearly that many Afghan chiefs considered that the day was lost. So 19 290 AFGHANISTAN. did not think Ahmad Shah. Occupying a position whence he could command the battle-field, Ahmad had witnessed the bold advance of the enemy, and the defeat of his front line, without losing his composure. But when he thought that the Marathas had advanced far enough, he charged them with his reserve, whilst, at the same moment, another chosen body of horse dashed on their flank. It was a critical moment of the fight. The resistance of the Marathas was most gallant. A little more solidity, and they had won the day, — for their left wing was victorious, and their right was maintaining an even combat with the enemy. But, at the very height of the conjuncture, whilst they were still resisting the Afghan charge, their leader, Wiswas Rao, the son of Peshwa, fell mortally wounded. Fighting as they were for empire, the Marathas should still have continued the struggle. But the fall of their chief unnerved them. They renounced the empire of India when it was still within their grasp. Panipat was a very decisive defeat. It placed Hindustan at the feet of the Afghan. But Ahmad Shah saw well what sort of a Hindustan it was — a Hindustan, whose dried-up blood must be revivified by other means than by the sword. To employ those means he had neither training nor leisure. He there- fore made the settlement which appeared to him the wisest, restoring the nominal sovereignty to the Moghol, and returned to Kandahar. But he was not to escape the fate of founders of empires. The growing sect, the Sikhs, forced him by their pretensions to return to the Panjab in 1762. THE DURANI RULE. 291 He drove them for refuge to the hills. He had hardly accomplished this — he was still at Sirhind, which he had taken after a desperate but decisive battle — when intelligence reached him that Kandahar was in revolt. The rainy season had just set in, the rivers were swollen and unbridged, prompt action was necessary. Ahmad Shah saw the difficulties, and determined to overcome them. He marched down the Satlaj to Bhawalpur ; thence via Multan, Dera Ishmail Khan, and the Gomal pass to Ghazni. The heat in the early part, the cold in the later part of his march, inflicted great sufferings on his troops. Many of them died. But with the remainder he had reached Ghazni — and once there he easily stamped out the disturbances at the capital. All these fatigues had told upon the conqueror. His constitution was shaken, when a cancer in the face gave it the final blow. He went, indeed, in 1764, into the field to crush an insurrection of the Aimaks near Herat, and again in 1767 once more to expel the still intrusive Sikhs from the plains of the Panjab. In the following year he was forced to remain inactive whilst his son, Prince Taimur, went to achieve, by the aid of the Shah’s old enemy, Nasir Khan the Biluchi, a com- plete victory over the Persians. But he felt his strength waning day by day. Till 1773, however, he continued to reside at the capital. Feeling then that he had become too weak to bear the burden, he sum- moned the chiefs, caused them to swear fealty to Prince Taimur as his successor ; then, still directing the government, he retired to a palace he had built at 19 * 292 AFGHANISTAN. Toba Mahariif, in the Sulaiman mountains. Here be died in June of the same year. The chief merit to be ascribed to Ahmad Shah is undoubtedly the consolidation of the Afghan tribes. He made of them a nation. The chiefs whom he failed to conciliate he reduced. Forming a council composed of a leading chieftain of each tribe, con- sulting with its members, and often adopting their advice, he was able to concert measures which com- mended themselves to the general body. Gene- rous, affable, and resolute, he won the hearts of his followers, introduced and maintained order where disorder had prevailed, and justified, by his internal administration, the epitaph engraved on his tomb : “ Ahmad Shah Durani was a great king ! Such was the fear of his justice, that the lion and the hind lived peacefully together. The ears of his enemies were in- cessantly deafened by the noise of his conquests.” Taimur Shah was the second of the eight sons of Ahmad Shah. Intelligent, active, and whilst con- ciliatory yet decided, his great fault was indolence. He had been selected by his father as, of all his off- spring, the worthiest to succeed him. In the month of April, Taimur, who governed Herat and Khorasan, as far as Nishapor, having received information that his father was dying, had set out for Toba Mahariif to see him. Before he reached Kandahar, however, Shah Ahmad had sent him positive orders to return at once to his government. Reluctantly Taimur obeyed, and he was at Herat when he received the information that his father had died, nominating him as his successor. THE DUEANI EULE. 293 and that his eldest brother Sulaiman had proclaimed himself king at Kandahar. Sulaiman Mirza had neither the abilities nor the courage of his brother, but he had married the daughter of the chief vizier, Shah Wali Khan, the same who had been defeated by the Biluchi chief, Nasir Khan, near Mastung in 1758. It was owing to the influence of this man, and in spite of the oppo- sition offered by a majority of the council, that Sulaiman had been proclaimed king at Kandahar. His triumph was very short. Taimur, supported by the great majority of the Duranis, the Hazaras, and the Aimaks, marched at once upon Kandahar. The grand vizier attempted to raise an army to sup- port his son-in-law, but, failing, resolved to make a virtue of submission. Accordingly, accompanied by his two sons, and the two Diirani chiefs whose adhe- rence to him had been most conspicuous, he rode into Taimur’s camp at Far rah. To Taimur, the course of action he should adopt towards these repentant rebels — repentant only because they had recognised the im- possibility of succeeding — was never for a moment doubtful. He thoroughly understood those over whom he was called to bear rule, and to inaugurate that rule by forgiveness would be an encouragement to rebel- lion. He determined to speak with no uncertain voice. Refusing, then, to see them, he ordered their heads to be struck off. This act of severity had the desired effect. Taimur Shah entered Kandahar in triumph and was crowned King of the Afghans. The sympathy which had been 294 AFGHANISTAN. shown by the population for his brother Sulaiman had inspired him with a great dislike for the people of that city. In the vicinity too lived those Durani tribes upon whose support his brother had counted. He determined therefore to transfer the title of capital to Kabul, and to move with his court to that city. He carried out this arrangement without delay. Thence- forth, during his reign, he passed eight months of the year at Kabul, the remaining four at Peshawar. Arrived at Kabul, Taimur’s first care was to make secure the foundations of his government. A Durani himself, he distrusted the Duranis. He could not in- deed withdraw from the chiefs of that tribe the offices which his father had made hereditary in their families. He had recourse therefore to another process to accom- plish the same end. Preserving the titles of the old offices, he created others to which he transferred their duties. As his chief councillor he selected Kazi Faizullah of the Daolat Shahi tribe. In this man he placed such implicit confidence that he never did anything without consulting him. This man ; Payandar Khan, chief of the Barukzye tribe ; Dalawar Khan, whom he ap- pointed commander-in-chief ; Abdul Latif Khan, a native of Khorasan, his receiver general of taxes ; Nur Mahammad Khan, president of the court of accounts ; and Iltifat Khan, chief of the eunuchs, chief treasurer and custodian of the crown jewels, formed the leading members of his council. To these ministers his general instructions were to put in action towards every one the principles of justice tempered by mercy. Still dreading the effect of concentrating power in the hands of the THE DHRANI RULE. 295 chiefs of the tribes, he recommended them to employ in administrative positions and as public functionaries of the state men whose want of influence with their tribes would make them obedient servants of the king. His own personal guard he selected from the Isakzyes, one of the smaller Durani tribes, and he raised likewise a body of twelve thousand horsemen from amongst the Kizilbashis. In pursuance of the same line of policy he withdrew as much as possible the government of provinces from the chiefs of tribes. To compensate them he greatly increased their pay. The most formidable of them, especially of the Duranis, he retained, as far as possible, at his court, taking care that they should be accom- panied by but a small retinue. He paid special attention to his finances, placing them upon a well ordered basis. His own expenses were small. The necessary payments were made with extreme punctuality ; and the revenue was as regu- larly collected. The consequence was a treasury full even to overflowing. Taimur had not the same passion for war as his father. It is curious to observe how his peaceful inclinations prejudicially affected his power. It would seem almost to be an oriental law that the kingdom which halts in its acquisitions recedes. Taimur Shah governed his rude country internally as few men have governed it. Yet his peaceful instincts injuriously affected its influence with the outer world. The inner kingdom indeed remained sound ; but the outlying provinces, the provinces annexed from other countries 296 AFGHANISTAN. — feeling no longer tlie heel of the conqueror— began to think they might walk alone. The insurrections and wars of Taimur’ s reign illustrate this assertion. Khorasan was the western annexe of the Afghan kingdom. Since Ahmad Shah had taken Meshed in 1749 and restored it to Prince Shah Rokh, grandson of Nadir Shah, that city and the northern province of Khorasan had acknowledged the suzerainty of the Afghan king. Shah Rokh himself never faltered in his fidelity, but during the greater part of the reign of Taimur the population, led by their native chiefs, had been surging against submission to the Afghan. Two armies, sent in succession, had put down the insur- gents, but the return of each had been a signal for renewed rebellion. A third army went, met 'with determined opposition, but succeeded in asserting the Afghan authority. Nor did it leave Meshed till fur- ther insurrection had been made difficult, if not impossible. Sind was another outlying province of the Afghan kingdom. Here, the slackening of the rein was soon felt, and as a consequence Sind revolted. About the same time Multan was gained by the Sikhs. Against these enemies Shah Taimur moved in person at the head of a well organized army. He defeated the Sikhs near Multan, took that place after a few days’ siege, and then marched on Bahawalpur. Bahawalpur with all its wealth fell into his hands. The easy capture of this place disconcerted the plans of the insurgents, and they made no stand anywhere. But the country was laid waste with fire and the sword. THE DURANI RULE. 297 Taimur returned to Kabul. But lie had not reached that place before the insurrection in Sind broke out with renewed fury. Other affairs prevented him from marching at once to quell it, and it was only five years later, 1786, that he sent his commander-in-chief Dilawar Khan with a small force to suppress it. Dilawar Khan was not so successful as had been his master. The Talpuri chiefs united against him, led him into an ambuscade, and forced him to fall back with loss on Shikarpur. An accommodation was entered into, in virtue of which the chiefship of Sind was vested in a Talpuri noble, Fath Ali Khan, on con- dition of his acknowledging the suzerainty of Taimur Shah and paying him a fixed tribute. Gradually the Talpuri strove to rid himself of both obligations, and at the end of three years he boldly severed the tie. Afghan Turkistan was another of the border pro- vinces. The King of Bokhara, Shah Morad, whose do- minions were separated from this province by the Oxus, had likewise noticed the lighter pressure exercised by Taimur, and he had been, almost ever since the acces- sion of that prince, stealthily endeavouring to attract some of the outlying districts to himself. Taimur, made sensible by the revolt of Balkh and of Akhchah of these stealthy and persistent efforts, at first remon- strated. The remonstrance proving useless, he appealed to arms, and marched towards Kunduz with a large army. Shah Morad crossed the Oxus to oppose him, and the two armies came in face of each other near Akhchah. Had the Afghans then attacked the Usbegs they would almost certainly have gained the day. 298 AFGHANISTAN. Partly through his own indecision, partly through the skill of Morad, a long delay, well employed by the latter to work upon the Afghan chiefs, followed. Then Morad, having made all his preparations, offered to withdraw his forces into Bokhara, and to recognise the authority of Taimur in Balkh and Akhchah, if he would spare the effusion of blood and agree to a peace. The too-easy Taimur agreed. The rival armies with- drew ; but Balkh and Akhchah, though still nominally subject to Kabul, became from that day virtually independent. Another outlying province, Kashmir, feeling like- wise the slackening of the rein, revolted, but was for the time brought back. Slstan, likewise, showed dis- affection, but it was repressed. But the general effect of the foreign policy of Taimur was bad. It lost him Sind and the great towns of Turkistan, and laid the foundation of revolt in Khorasan and Kashmir. Nor was he entirely free from internal rebellion. The first of these revolts, made by a relative, Abdul Halik Khan, in 1774, was easily repressed. Nearly five years later, when Taimur was at Peshawar, an attempt was made to murder him, with the view of seating his brother, Sikandar, his father’s sixth son, on the throne. The conspirators were nearly suc- ceeding ; they had murdered the guards of the palace, and driven Taimur to take refuge in its upper storey, before the royal troops could assemble to attack them. But then, the conspirators were nearly all cut to pieces. In this conspiracy the chief of the Mohmand THE DURAN! RULE. 299 tribe, Arsalah Khan, was implicated, but he managed to flee to his tribe. The fate of this man is remarkable, inasmuch as it illustrates the view taken by the Afghans on the subject of revenge. Admitting, as we may, that with them revenge is a religion, this story shows that that quality indulged in by virtue of a solemn breach of faith, becomes a crime. Arsalah Khan had tried to murder his sovereign, and, failing, had fled to the mountains. The crime he had attempted was one which Taimur never forgave. But Arsalah Khan was beyond his power; he was in passes which his horses could not traverse. Taimur attempted, then, to gain him by wile. He feigned to forgive him. Publicly, privately, he declared he had given him reason to rebel, and that Arsalah was almost justified in his attempt. He even went so far as to send his intended victim a Koran, on a page of which he had inscribed an oath that he would forgive his fault. Arsalah Khan was taken in. He returned to Peshawar and gave himself up. That very same day his throat was cut by order of the king. Hot even the Afghans pardon this treatment of an enemy lured in by an oath inscribed on the Koran. They regard it as the greatest stain on the memory of Taimur.* In the later months of his life Taimur became more cruel, more suspicious, and more morose than he had been before. He survived the last attempt on his life, * I have accepted the account given by Ferrier. Other writers differ as to the mode of his death, hut their version affects neither the principle of the story nor the verdict of the Afghans. 300 AFGHANISTAN. which I have recorded, about thirteen months. Taken ill as he was journeying from Peshawar to Kabul, he died at the latter place on the 20th May 1793. His reign had lasted twenty years. He left behind him twenty-three sons and thirteen daughters, but he died without having made any definite arrangements as to his successor. The eldest son of the deceased monarch, Humayun Mirza, was governor of Kandahar ; the second son, Mahmud Mirza, was governor of Herat. These two princes had an excellent understanding with each other. Mahmud promised to support the pretensions of Humayun. Of the remaining twenty-one sons, the fourth, Abbas Mirza, renowned for his Herculean strength, was the popular favourite ; the fifth, Zaman Mirza, had enlisted on his behalf the all-powerful influence of the zenana. Humayun and Mahmud remained at their respective governments. All the other princes repaired to Kabul to urge their respective claims. Had the election taken place immediately after the death of T aim nr Shah, it is probable that Abbas Mirza would have been chosen. But the chiefs having resolved to defer the great event until after the obsequies had been per- formed, the zenana influence had time to work. To this influence, Payandah Khan, the great chief of the Barukzyes, added his own. The result was that at a meeting held after the interment Zaman Mirza was chosen to succeed his father. The first act of Shah Zaman was to secure the throne to which he had been elected. Recognised as THE DUEANI EULE. 301 king by everyone except by his brothers, he at once placed those of the recusants who were at Kabul in confinement, and fed them for five days on an allow- ance of two to three ounces of bread for each indi- vidual daily. This starvation diet had its effect. On the sixth day the princes, having recognised their brother as their sovereign, were nominally freed from confinement, only however to be lodged, under careful surveillance, in the Bala Hissar. Like his father, Zaman Shah wished to be served by his own men. He therefore pensioned off the old ministers, and replaced them by partisans devoted to himself. He endeavoured by various means to attach to himself those chiefs who had opposed his election. In most cases he succeeded ; but those who had been violent in their opposition, and the few whom he failed to win, he put to death. But the new king was not yet secure. He had, indeed, settled matters in Kabul, but he had yet to deal with Kandahar and Herat, governed by brothers alike older by birth, one of them, Mahmud, formidable from his popularity in the Herat districts. The possession of the capital, and the adhesion of the great chief of the Barukzyes, Payandah Khan, gave Zaman Shah at this conjuncture an advantage of which he speedily availed himself. Having to deal with two enemies, not yet united, he resolved to beat them in detail — to reach Kandahar as an enemy before Mahmud Mirza of Herat could reach it as a friend. As soon, then, as he had settled matters at Kabul, he marched on Kandahar. 302 AFGHANISTAN. Humayun Mirza played into his hands. His clearly marked out policy was to wait behind the walls — to defend the place till his brother should come from Herat. But either from self-confidence, or, as some assert, from the lukewarmness to his cause displayed by the Kandaharis, he would not adopt this course, but went to meet Zaman Shah at Kalat-i-Gfhilzai. A battle ensued, in which Humayun was completely defeated. He fled for refuge to Biluchistan. It is a fact, which subsequent events have made worthy to be recorded, that the Kabuli troops were led into action on this occasion by Shujah Mirza, the only brother alike on the maternal and paternal side of Zaman Shah. This battle settled the fate of Kandahar, but Mahmud had still to be conquered, and Mahmud was in Herat. Zaman Shah was about to continue his march in that direction — when news reached him that the outlying provinces on every side were showing symptoms of intending to test the temper of the new king’s rule. Feeling then that his presence was urgently required at the capital, Zaman Shah patched up an accommodation, insincere on both sides, with his brother Mahmud, and returned to Kabul. Arrived here, he settled his plan of government. The revolts of the outlying provinces in his father’s reign he attributed to his father’s too lenient system. He resolved, unwisely, to proceed to the opposite extreme. To make himself feared he did not recoil from the risk of making himself hated. His system, in a word, was an unconscious imitation of that pro- THE DURANI RULE. 303 mulgated by Rehoboam, son of Solomon. His father had chastised his people with whips, he would chastise them with scorpions. The copy produced the same results as the original. Beginning by taking in hand his nobles, he in- augurated a reign of terror in Kabul. Every man of influence was suspected, watched, and dealt with as occasion might demand. The great chief of the Bardkzyes himself — who had contributed more than anyone else to raise Zaman Shah to the throne — found himself suddenly deprived of all power. Other chiefs, inferior only to him, were arrested, imprisoned, and put to death, in many instances with a refinement of cruelty. These cruelties in the capital were a prelude to others that were to follow in the provinces. The Pan- jab had risen, Kashmir was in revolt, Sind had severed herself, the Uzbegs had crossed the Oxus. Zaman Shah having crushed, as he hoped, the spirit of the great feudal lords, set out with the intention of dealing, on a similar plan, with rebellion. The first province he took in hand was the Panjab. He had reached Peshawar when he heard that his brother Humayun, assisted by the Talpuris of Sind, had seized Kandahar. He turned back to meet him. Humayun, betrayed by the Afghans, fled again to Sind : but attempting to escape thence to Herat, he was taken prisoner by a body of horse sent after him by his brother. Zaman Shah ordered his eyes to be pierced. The Afghan king, turned from his expedition against 304 AFGHANISTAN. Peshawar, resolved to march through the Bolan pass into Sind, at once to punish the Talpuris, and to re- cover the country which had glided out of Afghan power in the latter years of his father’s reign. But he had scarcely entered Sind when he heard that his brother Mahmud was marching on his rear to cut him off from Afghanistan. Foregoing, then, the pleasure of crushing Sind, then hopelessly at his mercy, he compromised the arrears of tribute due to him for one-third of their amount, and confirming the Talpuri chief, Fath Ali Khan, in the government he hastened back to Kandahar. Mahmud Mirza meanwhile was marching from Herat to Kandahar. Suddenly the news reached him of Zaman Shah’s return. He at once took up a position in the Siah-band range, with the intention of remaining there till he should receive exact intelligence regarding his brother’s movements. The moment he heard that Zaman Shah had left Kandahar and was but three marches from him, he broke up and moved into the plains. The two armies met at the village of Gfurak, not far from Giriskh. The battle that followed was most hotly contested. For a long time fortune seemed to favour Mahmud, but towards the close of the day his men gave way. The defeat was decisive. Mahmud fled, first to Farrah, and thence to Herat, where by timely professions of sorrow and possibly by inciting the Uzbegs to attack Turkistan, he obtained his brother’s pardon, and was allowed to continue in his government. Whilst Zaman Shah was engaged with Mahmud the THE DUKANI RULE. 305 Uzbegs, incited by Mahmud, had invaded Turkistan, had defeated there the lieutenant of the Afghan king, and had taken Balkh. They renounced these con- quests, however, when they heard of the victorious return of the Shah to Kabul, and, renewing the treaty made with his father, they recrossed the Oxus. About the same time, or possibly a little earlier, the rebellion in Kashmir was quelled. The surging of the outlying provinces visible at the accession of Zaman Shah had now been quelled. He had regained Sind, but had lost the Panjab east of the Indus. He had made more than one march to Pesha- war wdth the intention of expelling the Sikhs, now very formidable, but some pressing need always called him back. The recovery of that province had now become with him a matter of paramount importance. In 1796 he once more marched to Peshawar, crossed the Indus, and advanced some eighty miles on the road to Lahor, when he was suddenly recalled to Kabul by the intelli- gence that Agha Mahammad, Shah of Persia, had invaded Kliorasan, and had taken and sacked Meshed. Zaman Shah prepared an army to avenge this in- sult, but negotiations having taken place, and Agha Mahammad having retired into his country, the Afghan king moved again with an army to Peshawar. He pushed on as far as Lahor, and was preparing to in- vade India, when the news that Mahmud had revolted and was threatening Kandahar forced him to return. Zaman Shah returned, bought over one of Mahmud’s chief generals, occupied Herat, and forced his half- 20 306 AFGHANISTAN. brother to flee for refuge to Persia. The king then resumed his plans regarding India, again reached Lahor, conciliated the Sikhs, when intelligence that the Persians, under Fath Ali Shah, the successor of Agha Mahammad on the Persian throne, were threatening Khorasan, again called him back to Peshawar, and thence to Herat. (1799.) The action of Fath Ali Shah on this occasion was prompted by the British Government of India. That government had noticed with considerable alarm the preparations made by Zaman Shah to repeat the exploits of his grandfather in Hindustan. As the best mode of counteracting his designs they despatched an embassy to the court of Ispahan. The bait of northern Khorasan was held out to Fath Ali Shah. He con- cluded, then, an alliance with the British, and prepared, by the invasion of that province, to divert the attention of the Afghan monarch .from Hindustan. From some cause or other the Persian invasion col- lapsed. Fath Ali Shah proceeded as far as Sabzwar and then returned. The demonstration, however, had, as far as British interests were conceimed, been entirely successful, for it had called back Zaman Shah to Kandahar for the winter. He was there still in the spring when the indefatigable Mahmud disturbed his repose by invading Herat at the head of ten thousand men raised in the outlying provinces of Persia. It is possible that had Mahmud persevered he might have succeeded. But the circumstance that he had been often betrayed weakened his confidence in his allies and followers. Of this mistrust the prime vizier of THE DTJEANI EULE. 307 Zaman Shall, Wafadar Khan, took advantage to in- sinuate such doubts of his chief supporter, the ruler of Kayn and Birjan, districts of southern Khorasan, that he raised the siege, and fled to Bokhara. Driven thence by the pressing instances of Zaman Shah, he wandered first to Khiva, then to the court of Fath Ali Shah, where he remained some months, a peti- tioner for aid to dethrone his brother. Zaman Shah was now at the zenith of his power. He had not, indeed, recovered the Pan jab, but he had shown that he possessed the power of overrunning the country. His only formidable brother was an exile. Apparently his system of severity had succeeded ; in reality it had undermined the basis of his power. If, in a constitutional monarchy, the great aim of govern- ment is the contentment of the subjects, in a feudal country liiee Afghanistan security can only be assured by the contentment of the feudal chiefs. Ahmad Shah and Taimur Shah had alike based their system of government upon this principle. They had had their council of nobles, without whose consent no important enterprise had been undertaken. The con- sent of the tribes naturally followed that of the chiefs. But almost from the very first, Zaman Shah had adopted a system exactly the reverse of this. He had, indeed, kept the chiefs about his court, but he had taken care that they should be without a following, and he had never consulted them. Kay, more, he had irritated them to the last degree by the steady pur- suance of the system of silent persecution he had in- augurated after his first repression of Humayun Mirza. 20 * 308 AFGHANISTAN. All his confidence Znman Shall reserved for his prime minister, Wafadar Khan Sadozye, an intriguer with soft voice and silky manners, cringing to his supe- riors, overbearing and insolent to all others. Such a man was necessarily a coward, and almost necessarily avaricious and corrupt. Yet this man was the second self of the Afghan king. He encouraged his master in his design of repressing and persecuting the feudal chiefs, the confiscation of whose properties was advan- tageous to his private interests. The discontent caused by this policy had long been fomenting. It came to a head at the close of the year 1799. The leading mind of the conspiracy was the head of the great clan of the Bariikzyes. Asso- ciated with him were the chiefs of the Alizyes and of the Nurzyes, the deputy Munslh Bashi (head of the treasury), the chief of the Kizilbashis, and the chief of the eunuchs. The espionnage exercised by Wafadar Khan was so rigid that it was all bat impossible that five men of such consideration should meet without exciting suspicion. There was, however, one place free from the inquiring eyes of his agents. This was the house of a derwesh of renowned sanctity, accus- tomed to receive visits from chiefs, and to close the door when the number of his visitors had reached six. These meetings excited no suspicion. Could the der- wesh be gained the conspirators could meet at his house and arrange their plans. The conspirators gained him. At his house they met, and the door was closed upon them. They then drew up a set of articles of reform. The main articles were as follows : 1st, that Zaman THE DUE AN I RULE. 309 Shah should be deposed and replaced by his brother, Shujah Mirza; 2nd, that thenceforth the crown should be elective, the chiefs of the tribes alone having a right to vote at such elections ; 3rd, that the sovereigns who should prove unworthy of the trust reposed in them might be deposed by the chiefs. Having fixed a day for carrying the first of these articles into execution, the conspirators separated. Unhappily for the success of their plans the execu- tion of them was delayed. The conspirators met again and again. The suspicions of the prime minister were excited ; but he could glean nothing. But men’s minds are influenced in a different way by the same events. Of the six leading conspirators five were men whose solid nerves were proof against the fear of failure and its consequences. The sixth had the heart of a hare. Safe had he remained quiet, the rustle of the hounds in the covert nearly killed him. To quiet the beatings of his timid heart he went to the minister and confessed all. The minister was equal to the occasion. He showed neither exultation nor alarm : but the following morning, inviting the conspirators, separately, to the palace, he seized and executed them. Prominent amongst his victims was Payandah Khan, the chief of the Barukzyes. But the vengeance of the minister and his sovereign did not stop there. They ordered that all the chiefs of the Mahomedzyes — the chief of the Barukzye clan — should be seized. Prominent amongst these was Fathi Khan, eldest son of Payandah Khan. This chief, how- ever, having receiving timely warning, mounted his 310 AFGHANISTAN. horse and rode straight on end across the mountains to Gririshk, and thence to Tebbes in Khorasan, where he joined Prince Mahmud, who had retired thither hopeless of obtaining aid from the Persian king. The arrival of the Barukzye chief was of immense importance to that prince. Bold, sagacious, resolute, burning to avenge his father’s death, Fathi Khan pressed upon Mahmud the necessity, if he would win, of adopting a daring policy— -of throwing himself on the Afghans and appealing to them to shake off the tyranny under which they were groaning. Mahmud followed his advice, and rode, attended by but eighteen mounted adherents, to Farrah, which had always been devoted to him, and made thence an appeal to the Afghan people. Painting in vivid language the tyranny and cruelties of Zaman Shah and his minister, he announced his intention of placing himself at their head and marching on Kabul. The appeal touched a very sen- sitive chord in the hearts of those to whom it was addressed. The Barukzyes rose en masse and flocked to his standard, and, their example being followed by the other Duran! tribes, Mahmud marched on Kanda- har. The governor of that city, attempting to stop his progress, was driven within its walls, and the place was formally invested. For forty-two days the gar- rison resisted all the efforts of the besiegers, but on the forty-third day intrigue accomplished the task in which force had failed. Fathi Khan managed to gain two of the leading chiefs within the town. These, when the assault was delivered on the forty-third day, aided the assailants in such a manner that further THE DTJRANI RULE. 311 defence became hopeless, and the place surrendered to Mahmud. Meanwhile Zaman Shah, considering himself the safer in consequence of the slaughter of the conspirators, was turning his thoughts to the recovery of Peshawar and of Kashmir, both of which had revolted. With a fatal confidence in the good star which had hitherto guided him, he paid no heed to the rising disturb- ances in the west, to the always threatening move- ments of the Shah of Persia, or to the discontent of the Barukzyes. Careless of these imports, he marched on Peshawar, occupied it, and sent thence an army of fifteen thousand men into Kashmir, under two of his favourites. These so mismanaged the army that the men composing it dispersed before Kashmir had even been entered. Accounts of the movements of Mahmud here reached him. They failed to disquiet him. Mahmud had always been stirring up trouble ; had always been easily put down. Mahmud was not, therefore, to be feared. Instead, then, of marching or sending a force against his rebel brother, he left the bulk of his army, under Shujah Mirza, at Peshawar, and returned by ordinary marches to Kabul. Arrived there, the truth burst upon him in all its gloomy nakedness. He was surrounded by pitfalls. Mahmud was at Kandahar ; the principal tribes had declared for him. He had loved no man but his vizier, and the nerves of his vizier were shaking with fear. The very population of the city scowled upon him. The policy of “ chastising with scorpions ” had landed him in an abyss. His position was indeed deplorable. All that re- 312 AFGHANISTAN. mained to him was the native courage of his race. But not even this permitted him to remain in Kabul. Any moment might announce an outbreak there. Summoning then the chiefs who adhered to him and his and their followers he fell back in the direction of Jalalabad. It is significant of the extent to which fortune had turned, that the King of Afghanistan, the lord of north Khorasan, of Sind, of Kashmir, of Peshawar, could muster to accompany him from his capital only two hundred cavalry and four hundred artillerymen. Only two chiefs followed him ; the trembling Wafadar Khan, and Zaman Khan, chief of the Popolzyes. With these he proceeded to a small fort, not far from Jagdalak, held by Mulla Ashak, a dependent of the vizier, and, halting there, made thence an appeal to the Afghans. The offers of Zaman Shah were so specious, and his promises to pay were so seducing, that in the course of a few days a number of partisans flocked to his standard. Prominent amongst these was Ahmad Khan, chief of the Nurzye clan. His following amounted to not less than fifteen thousand men. The whole force was soon augmented to thirty thousand. At the head of these, Zaman Shah marched to meet Mahmud, who was advancing against him. Of Mah- mud’s army the inspiring genius was Fathi Khan, chief of the Barukzyes. This astute leader saw that could he but gain Ahmad Khan, Zaman Shah would be in his power. By means to which it is un- necessary to refer, he gained him. When the two armies met near Sar-i-asp, Ahmad Khan, who led the THE DURANI RULE. 313 advance of Zaman Shall’ s army, went over with all his following to Mahmud. When Zaman Shah heard of this defection, he re- cognised the full extent of his misfortune. Attended by his vizier and three other tried adherents, he fled at once to a fort belonging to the same Mulla Ashak, still nearer than the other to Jagdalak. Here he was hospitably received. But, before he arrived, news had reached the Mulla that Mahmud had occupied Kabul. His one thought now was to earn the favour of the conqueror. He consequently took measures to detain Zaman Shah whilst he sent to Kabul a speedy messenger to Mahmud. The next day Zaman Shah found that he was a prisoner. In vain did he remonstrate with his trea- cherous host. Recognising, after a short time, the futility of argument, he resigned himself to his fate. That night he secreted in the wall of his room the Koh-i-Nur and other jewels. The day following he was sent under a guard to Kabul. He had not proceeded far before he was met by Asad Khan, Barukzye, a brother of Fathi Khan, accompanied by a surgeon. Had he doubted of his fate before, his doubts disappeared now. The operation of lancing the eyes was performed on the spot, and the blinded ex-king was conveyed a prisoner to the Bala Hissar. His companions, the vizier included, were beheaded a little later. Mahmud now became Shah. It is strange that this prince, who had been a persistent conspirator ever since his father’s death, who had declined more than 314 AFGHANISTAN. once to serve under his brother — even as governor of a province— -who had displayed fortitude in exile and courage on the field — who had entered Afghanistan at the head of eighteen followers to wage war — and, as it had resulted, successful war, against the king of that country- — it is strange that this prince should have sunk at once, on obtaining the object of all his strivings, into indolence and carelessness of the duties attaching to royal station. Prince, he had risked everything to be king. King, he so acted as to render his fall a question only of time. Mahmud was generous and grateful. Proclaimed king in Kabul, he gratified the chiefs who had sup- ported him with high office, their followers with largesses on an extraordinary scale. Fathi Khan, chief of the Bariikzyes, Akram Khan, chief of the Alizyes, became the principal ministers. Abdulla Khan, chief of the Alikiuzye clan, was sent to Kashmir as governor ; and the king’s son, Kamran Mirza, was despatched to Peshawar to take possession of that place, and seize, if possible, Shujah Mirza. This young and ambitious prince had no sooner heard of his brother’s capture and subsequent mis- fortune, than he assumed the royal title, distributed large sums amongst the tribes of the passes, and, having made all his preparations, set out for the capital. Mahmud, too indolent to move, despatched Fathi Khan Barukzye at the head of three thousand men to meet his rival, whose force, though greatly superior in numbers, was composed mainly of hill men. The two THE DUEANI ETTLE. 315 armies met in a narrow plain surrounded by bills, on the banks of the brook Surkhrud. The battle was obstinately contested. It seemed, at first, as though the greater numbers of Shujah would prevail. They gained at the outset a decided advantage. But, having gained that advantage, their habits of plunder could not be restrained. Believing the victory secure, and bound by no ties to their leader, they fell upon the treasure which he had brought with him from Pesha- war. Fathi Khan saw their mistake, and took advan- tage of it. A charge along the whole line converted their incipient victory into a pronounced defeat, and they fled in disorder, carrying Shujah with them. Peshawar was then occupied by the adherents of Mahmud Shah. Even before this matter had been settled Mahmud found himself confronted by an insurrection of an import still more serious. The Ghilzais had risen in revolt. The reader will recollect that the first purely Afghan kingdom was founded at Kandahar by Mir Wais, chief of the Ghilzai tribe ; that it was the second son of that prince who had held old Kandahar for more than a year against the army of Nadir Shah, and in whose hands, after the capitulation of that town, the govern- ment of the district had been continued. On the election to the sovereignty of Ahmad Shah Durani power all over Afghanistan had passed from the hands of the Ghilzais into the hands of the Duranis ; but the respect universally felt for the ruling family of the Ghilzais had caused Ahmad Shah to settle a hereditary 316 AFGHANISTAN. pension on its representative. His successors had respected that settlement, and the family had ever been treated with honour. At the time of the accession of Mahmud Shah, the representative of that family and chief of the Ghilzai tribe was Abdurahim. He was not an ambitious man. But the tribe had long been disaffected, jealous of the supremacy of the Duranis, eager to recover the sceptre passed from their hands. The substitution of Mahmud for Zaman, of an indolent man for a tyrant, they regarded as propitious to their views. At the time of Mahmud’s accession many of the Grhilzai chiefs happened to be in Kabul. They soon detected the weak spots in the new king’s character, reported that the pear was ripe, and at once began to plot to secure the crown for Abdurahim Khan. That chief, though not ambitious, could not refuse the proffered dignity. The tribes, prepared before- hand, broke out at once into revolt ; and their leader, mastering the royal garrison at Kandahar, started up the valley of the Tarnak for Ghazni and Kabul. (October 1801.) Hearing of the advance of the insurgents, the go- vernor of Ghazni left his strong position to meet them in the valley. He was defeated and driven back into the town. Attacked here, he defended himself with such skill and courage that the Ghilzais, leaving a small force to watch the garrison, directed their course by Shilgarh and Zurmal into the Logar valley and ascended this towards Kabul. Mahmud Shah heard for the first time of the in- THE UURANI RULE. 317 surrection of the Ghilzais when he received the news of the attack on Ghazni. He had but few troops at his disposal, and the only capable general in Kabul, Shir Mahammad Khan, was in confinement under suspicion of high treason. Mahmud might have taken the command himself, but he dared not leave the capital. Under these circumstances, forced to act, he released the suspected traitor, placed him at the head of the few Kizilbashis who were available, and sent him to meet the enemy. Shir Mahammad Khan set out by way of Argandi and Maidan, but learning that the Ghilzais had taken the route of the Logar valley he altered his course, crossed into that valley, and met the enemy at the foot of the Sajaon pass. Noting that the Ghilzais were coming on in tumultuous disorder, he drew up his men in three divisions, one in front, the other two support- ing it in half echelon on either flank in the rear, and the whole covered by camel swivels. The Ghilzais advancing in tumultuous mass, the swivels opened fire upon them. But they pressed on, passed the swivels, and threw themselves on the leading division of the Kizilbashis. The weight of the attack and the over- powering numbers of the assailants forced this divi- sion, and the Ghilzais, had they had a general, must have gained the day. But pressing on too far, the two flanking divisions of the Kizilbashis wheeled inwards, and gave time to the first division to rally. Thus attacked on three sides the Ghilzais had to fall back. They retired, in good order, to a fort belong- ing to their tribe, six miles distant, and, receiving 318 AFGHANISTAN. reinforcements during the night, they resumed the march in the morning by another road, and reached Kila Shahi, within a few miles of the capital, the same evening. Had they at once marched on the city they might have taken it. But instead of marching on the city they set to work to plunder the villages in the neighbourhood, thus giving time to Shir Mahammad Khan, to whom they had given the slip, to make a forced march and inter- pose between them and Kabul. The next morning that general attacked and defeated them with great slaughter. The insurrection, though momentarily stemmed, was not finally suppressed till the month of May 1 802 ; nor until the Ghilzais had been de- feated in four pitched battles. The last of these, fought at Mulla Shahi on the lltli May 1802, was decisive. The Ghilzais, from that moment, renounced their aspirations for the supreme authority, and have ever since acknowledged, even cheerfully, the supre- macy of the Duranis. Successful against Shujali Mirza, successful against the Ghilzais, Mahmud was at the same time equally successful against the Uzbegs who, on his accession, had crossed the Oxus. These were completely defeated the same year (1802), near Balkh, and driven across the frontier river. To crown his good fortune, Shujah Mirza, who had again roused to revolt the tribes of the Khaibar, saw his army almost annihilated by Mahmud’s generals. In fact, the month of June 1802, Mahmud had the ball at his feet. He had only to aspire. The great THE DURAN1 RULE. 319 writer wlio now directs tire fortunes of the British empire, has, in his works as well as in his speeches, laid special emphasis on the aphorism that the man who ceases to aspire will grovel. Nothing can be more true. In private and in public life it is a guiding maxim. It is applicable to all positions, especially to the position of a man ruling a warlike, half-civilised race, divided into tribes, those tribes led by chiefs who owe to him only a feudal obedience. On the throne of Kabul, his rivals in exile, every rebel defeated, Mahmud would not look beyond his pleasures. Ceasing to aspire, he grovelled. The effect on his empire was magical. That same year he lost Khorasan. Fath Ali, Shah of Persia, invaded that province, took Meshed, and held it. His successor holds it to this day. The Per- sians were hardly opposed. Under the lax govern- ment of Mahmud every place was left to shift for itself. At the very time the Persians were besieging Meshed, the possession of Herat was disputed between Kamran Mirza, the son, and Kaisar Mirza, the nephew of the Afghan king. In Afghanistan, a king must rule as well as reign. Should he fail to rule, he will soon cease to reign. Mahmud reigned, but did not rule. The chiefs of the Barukzyes and the Alizyes, Fathi Khan and Akram Khan, ruled for him, disputing with each other in the process. At last they separated, Akram Khan remain- ing in Kabul, Fathi Khan taking Kandahar and asserting his authority in Kashmir, at Peshawar, and all along the frontier. With him the assertion of 320 AFGHANISTAN. authority meant the repression of all opposition to himself. He levied money, then, from Kashmir, from Peshawar, and along the frontier — at Kohat, at Banu, at Daman — and, punishing the Vaziris on his way, proceeded to his government at Kandahar. Here he was when Shujah Mirza, who had obtained three lakhs of rupees by the plunder of a caravan of the Povindahs at Quetta, made an attempt on that city, which failed. Meanwhile, Fathi Khan’s rival, the leader of the Alizyes, Akram Khan, died. A formidable applicant for the office of vizier was Shir Mahammad Khan, son of Shah Wali Khan, the vizier of Ahmad Shah, who had made the office hereditary in the family. This Shir Mahammad Khan was a man of ability, of boundless ambition, considerable learning, and enor- mous influence. He it was whom Mahmud had taken from a prison to lead his troops against the Gfhilzais. But Mahmud Shah, far from recognising his claims, reserved the office for Fathi Khan, Barukzye, chief of the Mahammadzyes, then at Kandahar. Meanwhile he ruled by the aid of the chief of the Kizilbashis, who were disliked as Shiahs (heretics). Shir Mahammad Khan, indignant at this treatment, determined to plot against his sovereign. He soon caused it to be whispered that the king was sur- rounding himself with heretics ; that he was becoming addicted to their vices ; that the ruin of the true religion had been discussed and decided upon. The whisper, penetrating every lane, gaining access to every hovel, soon developed into a cry ; the cry pro- THE DURANI RULE. 321 duced a passionate movement. In the agony of the moment, the chief Syud of the mosques was appealed to by the mob. This man, venerated for his age and his learning, combined to an intense hatred to Mahmud Shah a boundless admiration for Shir Mahammad Khan. Standing on the steps of the mosque, he listened to the people, as with tumultuous gestures and passionate words they shouted the fears for their religion that oppressed them, and then, com- manding silence, pronounced the solemn sentence of extermination for all Shiahs. The effect was electric. That day and the next day the Kizilbashis were attacked with ungovernable rage. Seeing themselves marked out to be victims, they resolved to sell their lives dearly. So vigorous a resistance did they offer, that although the Sums from the country flocked in to aid their co-religionists ; although Shir Mahammad Khan and other disaffected lords mixed with their adhe- rents, giving them help and encouragement ; although the chief Syud sprinkled the leaders of the attack with the holy waters of Mekka, and promised them the joys of paradise; — at the end of the second day both parties were so completely exhausted that they agreed to a suspension of arms. The fact was that each party was anxious for delay ; the king to give time for the arrival of Fathi Khan and his army from Kandahar ; Shir Mahammad Khan for the arrival of a prince to replace Mahmud Shah. Of all the surviving sons of Taimur Shah, Shujah Mirza was the only prince — the blinded Zaman ex- cepted— who had displayed energy and capacity. A 21 322 AFGHANISTAN. prince of tlie royal house was necessary for him. He had, therefore, before the disturbances had begun but when they were looming in a proximate future, sent an express to Shujah Mirza. The disturbances had taken place on the 4th and 5th June (1803). For about a month the two parties remained in a state of veiled hostility, each watching and waiting. The truce was broken by Mahmud Shah. The intellect of that prince had not sunk so low but that he had discerned in the insur- rectionary movement the hand of Shir Mahammad Khan. He knew his talent. His military skill had been tried against the Ghilzais. He was an opponent to be feared. Could he but seize him, the conspira- tors would be without a head. Thus reasoning, he attempted to seize him. But Shir Mahammad, wary and watchful, detected the plot, and by a flight from Kabul to the camp of Shujah Mirza, caused it to fail. Before he left he implored the chief Syud to renew the tumults in the city, promising to support him speedily with an army. The tumults were at once renewed. The enforced absence of their leader, far from repressing the populace, added to their fury ; the knowledge that their leader would soon appear with assistance sustained them. After about a week’s fighting, they drove the king and the Kizilbashis who survived into the Bala Hissar, and occupied the city, the heights, and all the approaches to that fortress. Such was the state of affairs when, on the 12th July, Shujah Mirza arrived accompanied by Shir THE DUEANI RULE. 823 Mahammacl Khan. This astute general persuaded the prince not to enter the city — to encamp outside ; and to wait there for Fatlii Khan and his army, now daily expected from Kandahar. Not on his immediate entry into Kabul, but on the issue of the battle between him and Fatlii Khan, depended whether he or Mahmud should wear the crown of Ahmad Shah. On the third day Fathi Khan arrived and the battle joined. A daring, dashing horseman, Fathi Khan carried at first all before him. Had his men remained faithful, he would undoubtedly have gained the day. But the great chiefs had had enough of Mahmud. In the very act of following up his success Fatlii Khan found himself almost alone. The bulk of his followers had gone over to Shujah Mirza. He turned then and fled. The next day Shujah Mirza, now become Shujah Shah, entered Kabul in triumph, amid the acclamations of the populace, Shir Mahammad Khan walking on foot by the side of his horse. They proceeded direct to the Bala Hissar, the gates of which were thrown open as they approached. Mahmud attempted no re- sistance. He anticipated the fate he had pronounced upon Zaman Shah, the brother of his conqueror. It is stated that Shah Shujah did issue the order to lance his brother’s eyes, but, in consequence of the in- tercession of his powerful supporter, Shir Mamammad, he revoked the order, directing that Mahmud should be placed in one of the dungeons of the Bala Hissar.* * On this act of clemency Mountstuart Elphinstone remarks that Shah Shujah had unfortunately sufficient reason to regret it. 21 * 324 AFGHANISTAN. The task which had now devolved upon Shah Shujah was more difficult than that which had fallen to any of his predecessors. Ahmad Shah, elected for his merit, had made the kingdom ; Taimur Shah, chosen by his father as the fittest of his sons to bear the burden of sovereignty, had, by walking in the lines laid down in the preceding reign, succeeded in maintaining his authority over the Afghans ; Zaman Shah, departing from those lines, had lost his throne. Mahmud was welcomed as a possible restorer of the old order. Not only was he not a restorer ; he allowed the guiding- reins of power to drop from his hands, to be seized by the boldest. Shujah now succeeded Mahmud. The first necessity imposed upon him was to gather up the dropped reins, to pull them cautiously but firmly from the hands that held them. What a task ! It might appal the strongest, for the hands that held those reins were the hands of feudal chiefs counting thou- sands of adherents ! Ahmad Shah might have been equal to it. His grandson had neither the intellect to grasp the situation, the skill to use the means available to him, nor the force of will to persevere to the end. Shujah owed his crown to Shir Mahammad Khan. Naturally that nobleman became prime minister. It was his interest to serve well the king he had made, and he showed every disposition to use his great in- fluence to restore order and authority throughout the The whole of this history proves that a prince who had once reigned would never be satisfied with any position short of abso- lute power. THE DURANI RULE. 325 kingdom. To be successful the confidence of the king alone was necessary. Had Shah Shujah been wise he would have given that confidence. He would then have ruled through the minister, and by his means have drawn into his own hands the threads which Mahmud had dropped. But, suspicious by nature, open to flattery, and easily in- fluenced, he from the first withheld it. As time went on, he took even a pleasure in thwarting the measures proposed by Shir Mahammad. The natural conse- quences ensued. The vigour which should have been directed to a common cause — the maintenance of authority and the good of the kingdom — came to be employed by the king and the minister for their own purposes — -the preparing for a struggle which each foresaw. The first act of the king was to release from con- finement his brother, Zaman Shah, and to punish by death the man who had betrayed him. Then, in con- cert with his minister, he prepared for an expedition to recover Kandahar, held by Kamran Mirza, son of Mahmud, aided by Fathi Khan Barukzye. After having been abandoned by his followers when seemingly secure of victory Fathi Khan had fled to Kandahar. Ambitious though he was, and occupying a great position as chief of the Barukzyes, it is not probable that he entertained the idea of supplanting the Sadozyes, or that he aimed at anything beyond the securing for himself and his clan the position which was their due. His conduct at this period entirely supports this view. For when Shah Shujah, accom- 326 AFGHANISTAN. panied by Shir Mahammad, marched on Kandahar, Fathi Khan persuaded Kamran Mirza to abandon the place and flee to Herat whilst he remained to make his submission to the king. A very favourable opportunity now offered to Shah Shujah to gain the adherence of the Barukzyes. A few conciliatory words ; reinstatement into the offices held by his father ; an assurance of confidence in his fidelity for the future ; and Fathi Khan would have been the Shah’s man for ever. Fathi Khan wished such a reception ; he even intrigued for it. It was refused him. The haughty demeanour of the Shah, the frigid tones with which he refused his demands, caused the man who had entered the hall of audience a suppliant to leave it a rebel. A few days later Fathi Khan quitted the court in disgust and retired to his fort at Gfirishk. Shah Shujah entrusted the government of Kandahar to his nephew, Kaisar Mirza, son of Za-man Shah ; no- minating Ahmad Khan Nurzye, the same who had deserted Zaman Shah in his contest with Mahmud, to be prime minister. He then marched with an army, now augmented to thirty thousand men, to Peshawar, with the intention to assert thence his suzerainty over the outlying provinces of Kashmir and Sind. But before he had marched from Peshawar intelligence reached him that Kandahar had revolted. This revolt was the work of Fathi Khan — the Fathi Khan whom Shujah had failed to conciliate. It hap- pened in this wise. I have stated that the Shah’s nephew, Kaisar Mirza, had been appointed governor THE DURANT RULE. 327 of Kandahar, with Ahmad Shah Nurzye as his prime minister, and that Fathi Khan had fled in dudgeon to Girishk. Girishk is not very far from Kandahar ; Kaisar Mirza was weak, ambitious, the son of a king ; Fathi Khan, then, found little difficulty in so working on his mind as to induce him to throw into prison the man who had betrayed his father, and to strike for the crown. This Kaisar Mirza did ; he seized Ahmad Khan, loaded him with chains and insults, and prepared to march on Kabul with Fathi Khan. Yet, strange inconsistency ! when setting out for Kabul he released the insulted prisoner from confinement, and entrusted to him the government of Kandahar ! The natural consequences followed. Ahmad Khan, indignant at the treatment he had received, invited Kamran Mirza, son of Mahmud, from Farrah to Kan- dahar, and made over the place to him. His son posted to Shah Shujah and induced him to return from Kan- dahar to repress the revolt. Shujah returned, defeated Kaisar Mirza, and marched back towards Peshawar, when news reached him that Kaisar Mirza and Fathi Khan had again occupied Kandahar. Once more did he return. This time Kaisar Mirza renounced Fathi Khan, threw himself on the Shah’s mercy, was par- doned, and reintrusted with the government of Kan- dahar. Baulked in his projects, Fathi Khan fled to Herat, and persuaded the governor of that place, Firuz-u-din Mirza, a younger brother, by the same mother, of Mahmud, to rebel. Shah Shujah, however, sending an army against him, that prince, cautious by nature, accepted the terms of semi-independence 328 AFGHANISTAN. offered him and returned to Herat. The whole of the western portion of the Afghan territory was at this time virtually in the hands of the adherents of Mahmud, for whilst his own brother held Herat, his son Kamran governed Farrah, and his adherent Fathi Khan, Barukzye, occupied Girishk. To that place Fathi Khan had now again retired. Matters having been settled in the manner related, Shah Shujah started on his expedition to the outlying provinces. He reduced Sind to obedience and received the arrears due to the Kabul government, of one hundred and seventy thousand pounds. Marching thence along his eastern frontier, he settled the dis- tricts through which he passed, and reached Peshawar in April 1805. The long-deferred expedition against Kashmir was now about to be undertaken, when the intrigues of Fathi Khan again forced Shah Shujah to return to his Afghan dominions. From his castle at Girishk the chief of the Barukzyes had renewed his intrigues with the weak son of Zaman Shah, Kaisar Mirza. Hesitating between the kingdom promised him by Fathi Khan, should he aid to dethrone his uncle, and the certain reward he would receive from that uncle should he possess himself of the person of Fathi Khan, Kaisar Mirza finally resolved to attempt the task which, if it promised the smaller reward, offered the least amount of risk. He resolved to seize Fathi Khan. Becoming, then, prodigal of his pro- mises to that chieftain, he engaged, if he would only come to Kandahar to confer with him, to place him- self entirely in his hands. Fathi Khan, suspecting THE DUEANI RULE. 329 nothing, assented, and accompanied by his younger brother, Dost Mahammad, — a youth whose resolute character already gave promise of the future which awaited him — entered Kandahar, and was graciously received by Kaisar. But as he was leaving the princely presence some of the attendants precipitated them- selves with such violence on the chief of the Barukzyes that he was thrown to the ground, and lost several of his front teeth. He was then gagged and placed in confinement. Dost Mahammad Khan and his followers attempted to rescue him, but failing, they forced their way into the city, summoned the few Barukzyes who were there to join them, and attacked the citadel. They were repulsed, however, and retired to Gtirishk. But Fathi Khan, though in prison, was more than a match for Kaisar Mirza. Enticing him to visit him in his bonds, he painted the delights of ruling in such glowing terms that he gained him over. He was released and sent back to Gririshk to make prepara- tions for a march on Kabul. This was all that Fathi Khan desired. Whilst openly engaging, now with Kaisar Mirza, now with his cousin Kamran, he was really bent on the restora- tion of Mahmud. With this view he had caused to be conveyed to that captive prince tools wherewith to work out his escape, and a warning to trust only to the Kizilbashis. But before escape could be accomplished Kaisar Mirza had returned to his pacific ideas, and Kamran Mirza had raised the standard of revolt. It was this news which summoned Shah Shujah back from Peshawar. 330 AFGHANISTAN. His return was almost simultaneous with the inva- sion of the Herat districts by the Persians. This invasion necessitated the employment in the defence of the western border of the troops commanded by Firu- zudln Mirza, brother of Mahmud Shah. This prince however, was defeated in a pitched battle by the Per- sians, and only saved Herat by the payment of a con- siderable sum of money. But this disturbance on the west enabled Shah Shu j ah to occupy Kandahar un- opposed. That prince was proposing to revenge the insult to the Afghan name when intelligence reached him that the prime vizier, Shir Mahammad Khan, who had with great difficulty reduced Kashmir to obedience, had returned to Kabul, having left his son, Atta Ma- hammad Khan, as governor of that province. Shah Shujah, who had long been jealous of that nobleman, marched at once to Kabul. There he announced to Shir Mahammad his intention to proceed once more to Sind. The vizier protested, pointing out the number- less affairs which required his attention. The discus- sion lasted some days, and while it was going on Mahmud Shah succeeded in effecting his escape from the Bala Hissar, secreted himself for several days in a tomb, and when suspicion had been diverted from Kabul he galloped off, escorted by Dost Mahammad and a band of chosen followers, and, plundering three caravans en route, gained Gfirishk. Careless of any immediate danger from Mahmud, Shah Shujah, despite the opposition of Shir Mahammad Khan, proceeded to Sind. Shir Mahammad, disobey- ing the orders he had received to follow him, remained THE DTTEANI EULE. 331 at Kabul, and took an early opportunity of proclaim- ing the Shah’s nephew, Kaisar Mirza, king. The conspirators then marched upon Peshawar, and occu- pied it. On learning these events Shah Shu. j ah turned back from Sind, and marched along the border towards Peshawar. In the plain bearing the same name he found the rebel army encamped. Negotiations were entered upon, but they were fruitless. Both parties preferred the arbitrament of the sword. On the 3rd March 1808 the two armies joined. Shir Mahammad Khan carried at first all before him, but, attempting with too small a force to seize the king’s person, he was shot dead. His death was fatal to the cause of which he was the life. The partisans of Shah Shujah rallied and gained the day. This victory was followed up with vigour. Kaisar Mirza, vigorously pursued, submitted and was par- doned. Mahmud, who, subsequently to his escape, had, by the aid of the Barukzyes, raised an army and taken Kandahar, was defeated near that city towards the end of 1808. Shah Shujah then returned to Peshawar to receive a British mission conducted from India by Mr. Mounstuart Elphinstone. The Shah had received the first intimation of this mission a few months earlier at Kandahar, and he regarded it with strong prejudice and distrust. He believed that its object could not be less than to demand the cession of a province, and in this belief he was fortified by the representations of Ranjit Singh, king of the Panjab, and of many lords of the court. 332 AFGHANISTAN. But when the real aim of the mission was explained to him, when he was told that its main object was to warn him against the machinations of France and Russia, he thought that he might derive some advan- tage by according it a reception. “ The exaggerated reports he received,” writes Mr. Elphinstone, “of the splendour of the embassy, and of the sumptuous pre- sents by which it was accompanied, seem more than anything to have determined the king to admit the mission and to give it an honourable reception.” The embassy reached Peshawar the 25th February 1809, and stayed there till the 14th June. Its recep- tion was all that could be desired, and Mr. Elphinstone experienced no difficulty in concluding with Shah Shujah — whom he describes as “a handsome man, about thirty years of age, of an olive complexion, with a thick black beard ” — a treaty, the main article of which stipulated that neither the French nor any other foreign Europeans should be permitted to have a footing in his dominions. But whilst the British embassy was at Peshawar grave events were occurring. Shah Shujah had taken advantage of his residence at Peshawar to send his best army, commanded by the new vizier, Akram Khan, into Kashmir, to put down the rebellion of Atta Mahammad Khan. But whilst the embassy was still there, news arrived that Akram Khan had been defeated with great slaughter. This news was the more de- pressing as it had been preceded by intelligence that Mahmud Shah and Fathi Khan had captured Kanda- har,— and the army which had been sent in to Kashmir THE DU RANI RULE. 383 constituted the only available force to check their progress. Shah Shujah used every endeavour to raise troops. By degrees the remnants of the Kashmir army and their leader returned, and by the middle of June the Shah set out for Kabul. But Mahmud Shah andBathi Khan had been beforehand with him. They had marched on Kabul, and had set out thence towards Peshawar. They met Shah Shujah’s army advan- tageously posted near Gandamak. Mahmud attacked it in front, whilst Fathi Khan took it in flank. The result was never doubtful. Akram Khan was killed ; Shah Shujah fled into the mountains, leaving all his jewels (the Koh-i-Kur excepted) and his baggage in the hands of his rival. Thus for a second time did Mahmud become King of Kabul and its dependencies. Shah Shujah continued the struggle for some years longer; but beaten in 1810 at Kandahar — which he had momentarily occu- pied ; — in the same year driven out of Peshawar ; and completely defeated in 1811 at Akora; he was seized by the governor of Atok, and sent a prisoner to Kashmir. In 1812 he was allowed to join his family at Lahor. There he remained, under the surveillance of Ranjit Singh, till 1815, when he escaped, and after making a feeble and fruitless attempt on Kashmir, fled to the British station of Ludhiana — then the residence of his blinded brother, Zaman Shah — and there remained till British policy drew him forth to play a dubious role on the scene of Afghan politics. 334 AFGHANISTAN. Mahmud restored was still Mahmud. He had learned nothing, and forgotten nothing. Neglecting affairs, grovelling in disreputable pleasures, he soon earned the contempt of all. He had been restored by the Barukzyes, and he was content, for the sake of the sensual enjoyments in which he delighted, to leave power and patronage in the hands of the tried chief of that powerful clan, Vizier Fathi Khan. That nobleman, virtual governor, commenced his administration by asserting the right of suzerainty over the outlying provinces of Sind and Biluchistan. He then reduced the rebellious tribes to obedience ; restored order in the provinces ; caused the laws to be respected ; reformed the various departments, and made his strong hand felt in every corner of the king- dom. The effect was most remarkable.' The times of Ahmad and Taimur Shahs returned as if by magic. Everywhere the law was enforced, and a sense of security prevailed. He must have been a very remarkable man who could thus in a few months impress his character upon a people like the Afghans ; and Fathi Khan was a man who would in any age have commanded respect and admiration. “ He united,” says Ferrier, from whom I have taken these details, “ to a superior genius a great aptitude for governing and for war. Not one of his predecessors had been able to reduce rebels to obedience with the same promptitude, or keep them afterwards in the path of duty. He struck hard, but he was generous after the victory had been gained, and shone by liis excessive liberality. Always in the THE DORANI RULE. 335 midst of combats, lie still found time to direct tlie helm of state, and was ready for everything. In activity he had no equal.” A leading principle of this great nobleman’s policy was to be sure of his subordinates. The head of his clan, he was certain of his brothers, of whom he had twenty, all of them men of mark. To these he con- fided the governments of Biluchistan, of Kandahar, of Peshawar, of Grhazni, of Bamian— subsequently, as will be seen, of Kashmir. Of all the great govern- ments, Herat alone remained for the moment under a ruler who was not his close kinsman. But this was a mere question of time. His other brothers assisted him in the administrative affairs of the kingdom. His younger and most capable brother, Dost Mahammad, had charge of his household, and acted as his con- fidential aide-de-camp. The first great project entertained by Fathi Khan, after he had restored order throughout the kingdom, was to recover Kashmir, still held in revolt by Atta Mahammad Khan. To effect this object, he entered into an alliance * with Ranjit Singh, now recognised as King of the Panjab. That prince, on the promise of a subsidy of nine lakhs of rupees to be taken from the revenues of Kashmir, agreed to detach a corps of ten thousand men to aid in the reconquest of that province. The allied army, commanded by Fathi Khan, entered Kashmir by the Bimbar pass, and found * Of course in the name of Mahmud Shah : hut throughout all these transactions Mahmud Shah was a cypher, and was treated as such. 336 AFGHANISTAN. no enemy to oppose it till Sirinagar had been reached. Nor did Sirinagar hold out more than thirteen days. The rebel governor, Atta Mahammad, preferred to make terms with Fathi Klian, rather than stand unsuccessfully a siege. The terms were liberal, and Atta Mahammad, who was a man of great force of character, united him- self to the Barukzyes. Fathi Klian, resisting the soli- citations of Ranjit Singh to make over Kashmir to himself, confided the government of the province to his second brother, Mahammad Azhn Khan, giving him instructions to elude the payment of the covenanted nine lakhs to Ranjit Singh. But the wily Sikh, detecting the plot, had his revenge. Withdrawing his contingent, he seized the fort of Atok with the view of intercepting the Afghans on their return. In carrying out this design he was singularly favoured by fortune. Fathi Klian, as soon as he had heard of the hostile action of Ranjit Singh, sent forward his brother, Dost Mahammad Khan, with two thousand horsemen to clear the way, following himself with the main body. On approaching Atok, Dost Mahammad beheld the Sikh army drawn up on some elevated ground about three miles and a half from that place, covering the Indus. Finding himself with but two thousand men in front of an army eight times as numerous, and some three miles in advance of the main body, Dost Mahammad should have waited. But he fell into the trap laid for all young and ambitious generals. Like Marmont at Salamanca, he wanted to have all the glory to himself. He would not delay so as to be joined by THE DURAN I RULE. 337 the forces hastening on towards him, and commanded by his superiors in rank ; so without waiting for his brother, he charged the Sikh army. The charge, skil- fully led, was so far successful that the enemy’s guns were ridden over, and it required but the support of the main body to secure a decisive victory. But the main body was three miles distant. The Sikhs soon recovered from their first surprise, and opposing greatly superior numbers to their assailant, barred his further progress. Still hoping for victory, Dost Mahammad long maintained his ground, sending mes- senger after messenger to hasten his brother’s advance. None of these messengers reached Fathi Khan. They had been outstripped by some recreant horsemen, who informed him that the attack had been repulsed, his brother killed, and that the Sikhs were marching against him. Instead, then, of succouring his brother, Fathi Khan at once changed his line of march, and taking ground to the right, hastened to cross the Indus. Dost Mahammad, as soon as he found his position no longer tenable, drew his men off, and made a soldierly and successful retreat in the direction taken, as he tardily learned, by the main army. The two years which succeeded the return of Fathi Ali to Kabul were occupied by that chief in regulating the internal affairs of the country. But in 1816 the affairs of Herat imperatively demanded his interference. I have stated in a preceding page that of all the great governorships in the country that of Herat alone 22 338 AFGHANISTAN. liad. been allowed to remain in hands alien to the blood of Fathi Khan. The lord of that province was still Haji Firuzudin, Mahmud Shah’s own brother, a prince who, though he carried prudence to the limits of timidity, might properly be designated as a safe man. This prince had, for some years past, partly by force of arms, partly by the payment of a small sum of money, partly by inciting the Khans of Khorasan to rebel, succeeded in repelling the active aggression of Fath Ali Khan, Shah of Persia. But in the year 1816 he was at his wits’ end. Khorasan was at the feet of Persia, and Persia had assembled an army at Meshed, commanded by the son of her king, to take Herat. Under these circumstances Haji Firuzudin sent to Kabul an earnest appeal for aid. Fathi Khan responded without a moment’s delay. So rapidly did he march that he reached the city of Herat before the Persians — who had delayed to wait the arrival of some heavy guns — had crossed the fron- tier of the province. The arrival of the most ambi- tious nobleman in the kingdom seemed to Haji Firu- zudin a far greater evil than would have been the arrival of the Persians. He refused, therefore, to admit his army into the city. But Fathi Khan was not a man to be thwarted. Permitted access to the city with fifty followers only, he chose as his companions men related to the most influential families in Herat. They were well schooled in the task expected from them, and they proved themselves apt pupils. So completely did they do their work that on the fourth day the keys of the gates of THE DURANI RULE. 339 the city, on the fifth the keys of the gates of the citadel, were handed to Fathi Khan. Fathi Khan at once assumed the government of Herat ; despatched Haji Firuzudin under an honour- able escort to Kabul ; but no sooner had that prince left than Dost Mahammad, acting against the express directions of his brother, plundered the seraglio — in which the treasures of the late Governor had been concealed. Having secured Herat, Fathi Khan marched against the Persians. The two armies met on the plain of Kafir Kilat near the frontier of the two states, some seventy miles from Herat. The Persians fought well, but they could not withstand the repeated charges by divisions of the Afghan horse, and about 4 o’clock in the evening, having lost, it is said, ten thousand men in killed, wounded, and missing, they left the field. An accident alone prevented the victory being decisive for the Afghans. As he was urging on the pursuit, Fathi Khan was struck in the mouth by a spent ball. The shock stunned him, and his followers, believing him to be dead, abandoned the pursuit. Practically, however, the victory was a substantial one, for, for some time to follow, the Persians cared not to mention the name of Herat. Fathi Khan remained at Herat to make prparations to carry the war into Persian territory, and possibly to recover Meshed. These preparations occupied him nearly a year. They were nearly completed, when an event happened which gave a new direction to affairs in Afghanistan, and sealed the fate of the Sadozyes. 22 * 340 AFGHANISTAN. In the preceding pages I have mentioned the rivalry for the possession of Kandahar between Kaisar Mirza, son of Zaman Shah, and Kamran Mirza, son of Mahmud Shah. Kaisar was weak, pliable, but generous and good-tempered. Kamran was brutal in his instincts, cruel to the last degree of ferocity, revengeful, and ^perfidious. On the second accession of Mahmud Shah the two princes had made their submission to him, and it had been the intention of Fathi Khan to confide to Kamran, as the son of the reigning sovereign, the government of Kan- dahar. But Kamran having, to revenge an old grudge, assassinated his cousin Kaisar under circum- stances of cowardly atrocity, Fathi Khan declared him to be incapable of public office, and refused him the promised government. This insult rankled in the mind of Kamran, and he longed to avenge it. But his own wishes could only become law when they were supported by his father’s influence. Hence he played with all his skill upon the weaknesses of Mahmud. Despicable as he was, Mahmud was in this matter hard to move. Having Fathi Khan as vizier, Mahmud, in his own way, enjoyed life. He had all that a grovelling mind could wish for. His sensual appetites were more than gratified. He was troubled by no cares of state. When, for a moment, he turned his eyes in a direction other than that affecting his pleasures, he saw a prosperous kingdom and a contented people. And all this, he knew, was the work of Fathi Khan. Contrasting the first period of his rule, with its tumults and its conspiracies THE DU RANI RULE. 341 terminating with the lancet pointed at his eyes and only withdrawn at the intercession of a man whom he had wronged, with the peaceful calm of his present hermaphrodite existence, he was too thank- ful that a Fathi Khan should exist to turn from him all the turmoil, to leave him the dear pleasures of royalty. For these reasons he turned a deaf ear to the solicitations of his son Kamran. Kamran had almost despaired of success, when a circumstance occurred which gave vital force to his entreaties, This was the arrival at Kabul of Mah- mud’s own brother, Haji Firuzudin, late governor of Herat. It may be remembered that Fathi Khan, depriving this prince of his government, had sent him under honourable escort to Kabul ; but that the day after Firuzudin had left Herat, Dost Mahammad, brother of Fathi Khan, had broken into the viceregal harem in search of the treasures there deposited. In that process there can be no doubt that the ladies of the harem had been grievously insulted. With his heart burning with indignation at these proceedings, and longing to revenge them, Haji Firuzudin Mirza was ushered into the presence of Mahmud Shah. If there is one point more than another upon which a Mahomedan is peculiarly susceptible, it is the sanctity of his harem. Even Mahmud was kindled to anger when he heard, in general terms, of the atrocites which had been perpetrated. And when Kamran, to rouse him to the requisite pitch, assured him that the brother of Fathi Khan had, with his own 342 AFGHANISTAN. hands, stripped from Mahmud’s daughter, married to a son of Firuzudin, the last vestment which protected her person from his gaze and from the gaze of his associates, and declared further that this insult to a royal lady was but a prelude to his own deposition, the debased monarch no longer hesitated. He gave the order that the eyes of Fathi Khan should be plucked out. The execution of this order he en- trusted, at the Mirza’s own request, to his son Kamran. Kamran Mirza, having employed every means to keep the order as secret as possible, set out for Herat. He was there received with the greatest honour and respect by Fathi Khan. That nobleman had raised the Afghan kingdom to a level of considera- tion higher than any it had attained since the death of Ahmad Shah. He had no higher personal ambition. As mayor of the palace, he was really sovereign. He was, therefore, undoubtedly sincere when he begged Kamran Mirza to join with him in consolidating the power of the Sadozye dynasty and in maintaining the glory of the Afghan nation. Kamran Mirza played his part well. He affected to place the most implicit confidence in the vizier ; he desired to consult him upon every important public matter. Any suspicion that Fathi Khan might at the outset have felt was quickly disarmed. Since the arrival of Kamran the vizier had waited upon him every day at his place of the Bagh Shah, outside the city, and had been received with respect, and even affec don. But one morning, when he proceeded there THE DURAHI RULE. 343 as usual, attended by about twenty men, be was sud- denly seized, disarmed, and deprived of sight. Such was the reward bestowed, in 1818, by Mahmud Shah Sadozye upon the man who, eight years before, had made him king, who had been the second founder of the Afghan kingdom — a man of singular ability and daring, a born ruler of men — whose failings were the failings of his country and of his education, but whose rare virtues were his own. But the malice of his enemies was not even then exhausted. Retribution speedily followed. Of three brothers of the blinded vizier who were at Herat at the time of the cruel outrage, one, Purdil Khan, was taken pri- soner ; two, Shirdil Khan and Kohandil Khan, suc- ceeded in effecting their escape to the fortified village of Nadali, twenty-three miles from Girishk. Here, whilst rousing the Barukzyes, they were joined by the third brother, Purdil Khan, who some days after their departure had eluded the vigilance of Kamran. Revolt soon spread over the whole province. Another brother, Mahammad Azim Khan, governor of Kashmir, raised the standard, and sent a force under his brother, Dost Mahammad, to march on Kabul. This young nobleman had been disgraced and placed in confinement by his brother, Fathi Khan, for the share he had had in the unfortunate plundering of the harem of Firuzudin at Herat. But the outrage per- petrated on the head of the family blotted out the recollection of former misdeeds. Taken from a prison to lead an army, Dost Mahammad marched by the most direct road on the capital. Mahmud, roused from his 344 AFGHANISTAN. debaucheries, fled to Ghazni, leaving the defence of the capital to his grandson, a son of Kamran. But the grandson of Mahmud was no match for the brother of Fathi Khan. His troops were beaten and Kabul was occupied. A few days later Dost Mahammad was joined here by his brother, Mahammad Azim Khan. Meanwhile Kamran, hearing of the invasion from Kashmir and of the flight to Grhazni, had marched from Herat, with all his available troops, on that for- tress. Arriving there, he gave them a few days to rest, and then set out for the capital with twelve thou- sand men. Mahammad Azim Khan and Dost Maham- mad could only command one third of that number, but they had marched towards Grhazni, and now with their small force they met Kamran and took up a posi- tion to bar his progress. That night, however, all the troops of Kamran passed over to the Barukzye bro- thers. Kamran fled to Ghazni, roused his debauched father, and forced him to evacuate the fortress with his valuables, a few followers, and his prisoner ! That prisoner was the blinded hero Fathi Khan. Hp to this moment that noble man had borne without reply, without a sign of feeling, all the insults and all the taunts which had been freely lavished upon him. In that respect the royal Sadozyes, whom he had served so faithfully, had done their worst ; whatever they might do now, they could harm him no more. But their vengeance was not yet glutted. When they saw the edifice which Fathi Khan had built, and which Fathi Khan had sustained, falling upon them to crush them, because they had rendered Fathi Khan power- THE HURANI RULE. 345 less, they added the last outrage to the many which had preceded it. Halting, as they fled towards Kan- dahar, at the first stage where they deemed themselves momentarily safe from pursuit, the two Sadozyes — the contemptible father and the brutal son — summoned their captive before them, and ordered him to use his influence with his brothers to stop the pursuit, and to calm the storm which they had raised. Then, for the first time, did Fathi Khan break his long silence : “I have nothing more to do,” he said, “with the affairs of this world. In losing my sight I have lost my influence over others.” The wretched Mahmud then gave the signal for his death. Kamran struck at him with his dagger ; the miserable sycophants who still adhered to him followed suit. Then, still living, they flayed him, disjointed his members, and struck off his head . . . His remains, collected in a sack, were subsequently interred at Ghazni. The king, his son, and his brother, then wandered for some time from pillar to post, abandoned by all their followers but eleven, not knowing whom to trust. At last they reached Herat, which, of all the towns in the Afghan territory, had not risen against the Sadozyes. To secure themselves there, they agreed tc acknowledge the suzerainty of the Shah of Persia. Even in the degraded position to which they were thus reduced, the members of the triumvirate were never in accord. At last Haji Firuzudln left them and retired to Meshed. The father and son then disputed, with alternating success, the sovereignty of this corner of what was once their kingdom — now besieging, now 346 AFGHANISTAN. being besieged. Herat and tbe Heratis suffered. These countless struggles and intrigues, and others with chieftains from Khorasan and from the moun- tains, and into which it is not necessary to enter, ter- minated in 1829 by the death of Mahmud, caused, it was said, by his son Kamran. The latter then pro- claimed himself king of Herat, under the suzerainty of the Shah of Persia, and gave himself up to drunken- ness and debauchery. The fate which befell him will be referred to in its proper place. It will suffice to record here that the murder of Fathi Khan set the seal on the fate of the dynasty of the Sadozyes. 347 CHAPTER IX. THE BARUKZYE PERIOD. The break-up of tbe Sadozye monarchy was as com- plete as it was sudden. Of the dominions so ably administered by Fathi Khan, every portion, save Herat, had revolted, and, for the moment, no master spirit had risen to weld together the scattered frag- ments. The next brother in order of birth to Fathi Khan, Maliammad Azim Khan, held 1Kabul; Dost Mahammad held Ghazni ; Purdil Khan held Kan- dahar ; Jabbar Khan was in Kashmir ; Yar Maham- mad Khan at Peshawar. The remaining thirteen brothers of the deceased vizier were in different parts of the country, all striving to restore order, but not influenced by a single and definite aim. Even at this moment the complete supersession of the Sadozyes had not been thought of. They were still regarded as the royal family. In fact, so necessary did it appear to the separated Barukzye brothers to restore the Sadozye dynasty, that each one in his own district 348 AFGHANISTAN. proclaimed one or other member of that family as the legitimate successor to the throne forfeited by Mahmud Shah and his offspring. But not one of the members of the Sadozyes so put forward showed sufficient force of character for the position. Each one therefore was discarded almost as soon as he had been proclaimed . Under these circum- stances the condition of the country became every day more involved and more difficult. The chiefs of one clan — certainly a most important clan — separated from each other, were endeavouring to hold the different portions of the country. To attempt this, without one head and a single definite aim, was to strain the resources of that clan to a point which it could scarcely bear. At last Purdil Khan attempted to solve the diffi- culty. The brother of Zaman Shah, Shujah, was still alive, and Shujah had reigned in Kabul. Of all the surviving Sadozyes, not one equalled him in capacity. Ambitious of power, it was believed that he, more than anyone else, might be able to weld together the severed fragments. Such thoughts occurring to Purdil Khan, he sent his brother, Kohandil Khan, to Shikar- pur, to offer Shujah the support of the Barukzyes if he would strike for the crown. On hearing of the revolution which had deprived Mahmud of the crown, Shah Shujah had repaired to Shikarpur to be ready for any opportunity which might offer. He received Kohandil Khan with un- mixed pleasure. But feeling that his chances would be uncertain unless a pledge of support from all the THE BARUKZTE PERIOD. 349 Barukzye brothers were obtained, he stipulated for an assurance of that nature. The pledge was given. No sooner had Shah Shujah received the required promise than he, too, displayed his qualification to take rank amid those princes who learn nothing and forget nothing. Before any action had been taken to restore him to the throne, he proved to the Barukzye brothers that his intention was to use them : then to cast them away. In vain did Mahammad Azim Khan point out to him the folly of the course upon which he was entering. Like other royal personages before him he considered himself needful. He believed that they must have “ a great elector” at the summit of the edifice, and he was resolved to be more than a great elector — to rule as well as to govern. He refused to give way. The Barukzyes then discarded him, and, after a short splutter of fireworks, Shah Shujah subsided into exiled insignificance at Ludhiana. The Barukzyes then negotiated with another son of Taimur Shah, the fourteenth in order of birth, Ayub Mirza. This prince took a line the very opposite to that followed by his brother, Shujah. “Make me but king,” he said to Mahammad Azim Khan, “ and permit money to be coined in my name, and I shall be content. You can have the power.” These terms were accepted ; Ayub Khan became Shah. His reign, however, was brief. Though he had promised not to reign, he had not promised to abstain from intriguing. Compromising letters written by him to his brothers having been in- tercepted, he was dethroned and driven out of Kabul. 350 AFGHANISTAN. About the same time another son of Taimur Shah, Sultan Ali, was put to death at Kabul, and a third, Mahammad Murad, was killed at Kandahar. They had intrigued and were thus punished. Mahammad Azim Khan was now the chief adminis- trator of the kingdom. But he was neither King nor Amir, and neither did his brothers, nor did the chiefs of the other Afghan tribes, obey him readily. He was too much on their own level. The power of the country had receded very much since the death of Fathi Khan. Not only had Herat been alienated, but Afghan Turkistan and Badakh- shan had disappeared, whilst the great ruler of the Panjab, Ranjit Singh, had been making successive encroachments on the Afghan border. He had con- quered Kashmir, Multan, Hera Gfhazi Khan, and Atok, and he was threatening Peshawar. Mahammad Azim hoped that successful resistance to this powerful in- truder would prove the most efficacious means of con- solidating his power. He therefore assembled an army, and accompanied by his brother, Dost Maham- mad, advanced via Jalalabad and the Karapa pass to Peshawar. The proceedings which followed have been related so differently by the native historians of the period, that it is difficult to ascertain the exact truth. One fact is certain, that in the campaign against Ranjit Singh the Afghans were beaten at Naoshira. By some the defeat is attributed to the treachery or con- nivance of some of the Barukzye brothers, by others to the bad generalship of Mahammad Azim. I am THE BAEUKZYE PERIOD. 351 inclined to believe that both causes contributed to the result. That a battle took place at Naoshira is cer- tain, and that the Afghan army was badly handled is equally clear. It is not necessary, perhaps, to seek for more recondite causes. Of the battle there were two main consequences. The one — the possession by Ran jit Singh of the right banks of the Indus, and the assertion of his suzerainty over Peshawar. One of Maliammad Azim’s brothers, Sultan Mahammad, remained, indeed, governor of that city, but on condition of paying a tribute to Ranjit Singh. The other result was the death of Maham- mad Azim. In weak health previously, the defeat broke his heart. Confiding the command of the army to Dost Mahammad, he took the road to Kabul. But at Lataband his strength failed him, and he died (1823), leaving his wealth, and, could he maintain it, his position, to his son, Habib Ulla Khan. Habib Ulla Khan had more than the failings, none of the good qualities, of his father. The sceptre, un- hallowed by legality, could not long remain in his feeble grasp. Urged by his father, on his death-bed, to wage war against the Sikhs, he neglected this advice to devote himself to the bottle. His power lasted as long as the treasures bequeathed by his father remained undissipated, but no longer. Never was the kingdom founded by Ahmad Shah in a more perilous position. It was evident that the rule would be to the strongest of the Barukzye bro- thers. But the problem, “ who was that strongest,” had neither been solved nor even definitely indicated. 352 AFGHANISTAN. Dost Mahammad was still at Ghazni, Sultan Ma- hammad at Peshawar, Purdil Khan and two of his brothers were at Kandahar. They were all jealous of each other, all watching with anxiety the decline and fall of Habib Ulla Khan, each dreading to make the first move himself or to see another take it. Dost Mahammad was the first to strike. Learning that Habib Ulla was in his last extremities for money, he marched on Kabul, took the city, and invested the citadel. At the first symptom of his movements Habib Ulla had sent a swift messenger to Kandahar to warn the three brothers residing there. The eldest of the three at once despatched a force under Shirdil Khan, a younger brother, to Kabul. Dost Mahammad, beaten, fell back on Jalalabad, and thence retreated into Kohistan. Shirdil Khan then took possession of Kabul, and deposed the chief who had implored his assistance. Then ensued a civil war between the Barukzye bro- thers, into the details of which it does not seem neces- sary to enter. It will suffice to state that after many attempts to settle matters by the assassination of rival chiefs, a compromise was finally arrived at. In virtue of this, whilst Kandahar should remain with the three brothers who had till then held it, Sultan Mahammad was to have Kabul, and Dost Mahammad Ghazni and Kohistan. This arrangement was so little acceptable to Dost Mahammad that he took the very earliest opportunity to modify it. Appearing suddenly with an army be- fore Kabul, he summoned his brother to resign the THE BARUKZYE PERIOD. 353 place to liim and return to Peshawar. Sultan Maliam- mad was forced to comply. Dost Mahammad was now lord of Kabul and of Ghazni. To these he subsequently added Jalalabad. From this time to the year 1834 nothing beyond the repression of an occasional rebellion called him into the field. But in that year an event happened which had a marked effect on his subsequent fortunes. This event was the reappearance in the field of Shah Shiijah. The anticipations of that prince that the very strength of the Barukzyes would prove their weakness, and that the disunion of the brothers would pave the way for his restoration, had not been realised. With growing dismay he had noticed the gradual ascension to a preponderating position of one amongst them, and that one the ablest, the most prescient, the most daring of the family. But, ascending though he still was, Dost Mahammad had not yet reached the summit. That point attained, and he would be un- assailable. Kandahar and western Afghanistan obeyed brothers older than he ; but, though older, those bro- thers did not possess a tithe of the ability of Dost Mahammad. To gain them, or strike them before they should be swallowed up by their brother, became then an article of faith with the exiled Saclozye. He resolved to try both methods. One brother, Jabbar Khan, he gained. The negotia- tions he entered into with the others being responded to less promptly than he had hoped, Shah Shiijah quitted his asylum at Ludhiana in the month of January 1834, raised a small force, crossed the Indus, and seized 23 - 354 AFGHANISTAN. upon Shikarpur, a fief of the Duram empire. Com- pleting, then, his forces to twenty-two thousand men, composed mostly of Hindustanis drilled after the European fashion, and of a few Afghans, he first engaged and beat at Rori the Amirs of Sind, and then, turning westward, traversed the Bolan pass and entered Afghanistan. The three Barukzye brothers at Kandahar had been no inattentive spectators of Shah Shujah’s prepara- tions. They had levied troops, and as soon as they heard that Shah Shujah had left Shikarpur they de- spatched those troops under one of the trio, Kohandil Khan, to stop him at the Khojak Kotal pass. This pass is strong, but it can be turned. It is probable that Shah Shujah, knowing the ways of his country- men, amused them in front whilst a turning force went to take them in rear. It is probable — for on no other ground is the sudden retreat of Kohandil Khan to be accounted for. He hastily retreated on Kandahar : Shah Shujah followed him and laid siege to the city. The Kandahar Barukzyes at once sent pressing messengers to their youm r brother at Kabul, urging him to come to the' istance. In the invasion of Shah Shujah Host Mahammad had seen his oppor- tunity. Anxious, however, to ascertain the exact position of the Sadozye prince, he sent a messenger to the British political agent at Ludhiana to inquire whether Shah Shujah was supported by the British Government. The reply was weak and ambiguous. It was to the effect that the Government of India THE BARUKZYE PERIOD. 355 had taken no part in the expedition, but that Shah Shujah had their best wishes. Asiatics always place a correct interpretation upon ambiguous phrases. Dost Mahammad saw that Shujah would not be supported by the British. He therefore hastened down to Kandahar and attacked him. The battle which ensued would seem to have been most obstinately contested. The Hindustani troops in Shujah’ s army, commanded by an Englishman named Campbell, repulsed every charge, and drove back the enemy in disorder. The phrase, rendered historical from its use on a previous memorable occa- sion, might now have been spoken to Shujah, “ One more charge and the day is your own.” Whether it was spoken may be doubted. Shujah, instead of leading his troops on horseback, was mounted on an elephant. From that elevation he watched the doubt- ful battle, the repeated repulses of the enemy. Then he saw that Dost Mahammad, far from being discon- certed at these repulses, was preparing to renew the attack. But he did not notice that in preparing to renew the attack Dost Mahammad was employing his last reserves. The sight that should have gladdened his heart paralysed his nerves. He might have trusted Campbell to repulse that last attack as he had re- pulsed the others : and then . But the “ then ” was not to be. The preparations for the last charge unmanned him. He turned and fled, carrying the bulk of his army with him. It was but one new expe- rience. He had previously proved that he did not know how to govern ; he showed most completely now that 23 * 356 AFGHANISTAN. lie could not command an army. The Englishman, Campbell, covered with wounds, and resisting to the last, was taken prisoner where he had fought. The unnerved king fled, first to Farrah, whence he opened out negotiations with Kamran at Herat. But finding that Kamran intended treachery he again fled by way of Jawain and Kalat to Shikarpur, and thence to his home at Ludhiana. The “ best wishes ” of the British Government had profited him little. Whilst Dost Mahammad was thus engaged at Kan- dahar, Ran jit Singh, ruler of the Panjab, profiting by the occasion, had pounced upon Peshawar, and annex- ing it, had made the Sikh frontier that which it is at the present day. One intrigue leads to another. The Afghan governor of Peshawar, Sultan Mahammad, dispossessed by Ranjit Singh, fled to Jalalabad. Learn- ing there that Dost Mahammad was at Kandahar, engaged in a contest which might well seem doubtful, Sultan Mahammad, associating with him two of his brothers, resolved to make an attempt on the capital. Before, however, their preparations had been quite completed, the news reached them of the great victory obtained by their brother over Shah Shujah. This news caused them to aban Ion the plot and to prepare to receive Dost Mahammad with every demonstration of joy. But the Dost was not the less acquainted with all that had been intended. The victory achieved at Kandahar by Dost Maham- mad had assured him of that predominance over his brothers which Shujah had so dreaded. Out of the many fragments of the Durani empire he had consoli- THE BAEUKZYE PERIOD. 357 dated one small remnant — small, yet compact — having as its centres the towns of Kabul, of Ghazni, of Jala- labad, of Kandahar — for though Kandahar was still governed by his brothers events had bound them to him by the closest ties of interest. To establish this fact in the eyes of the Afghans and of the world, he resolved formally to assume a sovereign title. The Duranis had called themselves kings — but then they had a kingdom. A practical man, Dost Mahammad con- temned titles indicative of a state of affairs which did not exist. When it was urged upon him to follow the example of the Duranis and to call himself Shah, “ I am too poor,” he replied, “ to support my dignity as a Sirdar ; it would be absurd for me to call myself a king.” At last, after much consideration, he decided, in consultation with the chiefs adhering to him, to assume the modest title of Amir-ul-Momerin, Com- mander of the Faithful. With this title he was invested by the chief priest of Kabul, at a solemn darbar at- tended by all the grandees, early in 1835. This is the title now borne by his son and successor, Shir Ali. Dost Mahammad announced his elevation to the governments of the states bordering his own, the Sikh and the British governments excepted. The first act of the Amir was to remove the various governors and functionaries of whose loyalty he was not absolutely sure, and to replace them by his sons. He ordered likewise that thenceforth the public money should be coined in his name. With a view to inau- gurate his new authority by some striking success, he directed the levying of taxes, in order to pay the 358 AFGHANISTAN. expenses of an army destined for the recovery of Peshawar. The taxes were raised — it has been stated, some- what arbitrarily ; the army was levied ; and it marched on Peshawar. Though Ranjit Singh was alarmed, he was still equal to the occasion. He knew the mili- tary capacity of the Amir, and he believed that the result of a contest was at least uncertain ; but he had money. This money he used. He sent nego- tiators to the camp of the Amir, nominally to treat, really to bribe. He succeeded. In a few days the army of the Amir melted away, and Dost Mahammad was forced to return to Kabul with the loss of his camp and his prestige. Such are the Afghans ! One of the Amir’s brothers, Sultan Mahammad, who had been bought by Ranjit Singh, was made by that prince governor of the fortress of Rotas. The loss of Peshawar continued to fret the Amir. It has been asserted that he even entered into negotiations with Persia and Russia to help him to recover it. But though aid from those powers was asked for by Barukyzes, it was not asked for that purpose, neither was it demanded by the Amir. The history of the transaction is as follows. During 1836 Persia and the Amir were alike making warlike preparations : the former against Herat, the latter against Peshawar. The Amir was first ready, and in the spring of 1837 he detached a force under his son, Akbar Khan, with directions to proceed via the Khaibar pass to the Peshawar plain. Issuing from the Khaibar Akbar Khan found Jamrud strongly THE BARUKZYE PERIOD. 9 occupied by the Sikhs. He laid siege to it. The commander of the Sikh forces at Peshawar, Hari Singh, marched at once to its relief, and offered battle to Akbar. Akbar accepted it, defeated the enemy with the loss of their general, and drove him under the walls of Jamrud. The arrival of large rein- forcements to the Sikhs prevented him from pursuing his advantages, and he was forced to return to Kabul, his mission unaccomplished. The recovery of Peshawar was as distant as ever. Later in the year the Persians entered the Herat territory, captured Gihorian, and laid siege to Herat. Such was the state of affairs when the Amir heard that a new Grovernor-Greneral, Lord Auckland, had arrived in India. The opportunity was too favourable to be lost. By means of a British alliance he might check Persia and recover Peshawar. He accordingly despatched to Lord Auckland a complimentary letter in which, after the compliments, he referred to his grievances against the Sikhs. But the very alliance which he thought would be propitious was regarded by his brothers at Kandahar as fraught with evil to themselves. They sought at once to protect themselves, against the consequences to themselves of a great increase of power to their brother. They did this by sending an embassy to Persia asking for the protection due from a suzerain to a vassal ; and they even sent a letter to the Czar of Russia through the Russian embassy at Teheran. The reply from both was favourable. Persia 360 AFGHANISTAN. promised aid. Russia sent an ambassador, in the person of Captain Vikovitch, to Kandahar. I must now refer, briefly, to the answer sent by the Government of India. In reply to the Amir’s complimentary letter to Lord Auckland, and to the scarcely veiled request for British aid against the Sikhs, that nobleman replied by reciprocating the compliments, by curtly informing the Amir that it was not the practice of the British Government to interfere with the affairs of other independent states, and by notifying his intention shortly to depute some gentlemen to the Amir’s court to discuss commercial topics. Shortly afterwards the gentlemen to be so deputed were selected. They were Captain Alexander Burnes, of the Bombay Infantry — a daring officer and ac- complished diplomatist ; Lieutenant Leech of the Bombay Engineers; Lieutenant Wood, of the Indian Navy; and Dr. Percival Lord, of the Indian Medical Service. In this place I have to do only with the mission of Burnes, for Leech was deputed to Kanda- har, and Wood and Lord were sent further on to Kunduz. Burnes entered the Khaibar pass the 30th August 1837, and after an easy journey reached Kabul on the 20th September. “We were received,” he writes, “ with great pomp and splendour by a fine body of Afghan cavalry, led by the Amir’s son, Akbar Khan. He did me the honour to place me on the same elephant upon which he himself rode, and conducted us to his father’s court, whose reception of us was THE BARUKZYE PERIOD. 361 most cordial.” The next day he was admitted by the Amir to a formal audience and was most graciously received. Three days later, at a private conference, the Amir opened his heart to Burnes. The real purport of his request, veiled as it was by many phrases, was aid against Ranjit Singh. The Sikhs, he said, robbed me of Peshawar when I was engaged in combating Shah Shujah, and they have not, nor had they ever, a right to it. Burnes had no authority to offer any tangible aid ; he could not even promise the “ good wishes ” of the British Government. He could only express a hope that Ranjit Singh might restore Peshawar, not to the Amir, but to his brother, Sultan Mahammad, to be held in vassalage to Lahor. In vain did the Amir, subsequently, by professions of humility, by offering to express contrition to Ranjit Singh, and by engaging, if he would restore Peshawar, to hold it as his vassal, endeavour to engage, through Burnes, the British Government on'his behalf; Burnes could promise nothing. He could only write and wait for an answer. He wrote ; but before the answer could arrive, the Russian agent, Captain Yikovitch, appeared upon the scene. This agent had proceeded in the first instance to Kandahar. Detecting that that city was but a limb whilst Kabul was the heart of the Afghan territory, he pushed on, armed with a letter from the Czar, to that place. The letter, to the address of the Amir, professed to treat only of commercial matters, but that phrase veiled other and more important affairs. 362 AFGHANISTAN. Vikovitch had not been many days in Kabul when Burnes received the replies to his first communications to India. In these Lord Auckland recommended the Amir to waive his claims, and be content with such arrangements as Ranjit Singh might make with Sultan Mahammad. The purport of the Amir’s reply was that he would sooner see the Sikhs at Peshawar than his brother, and that, though fully sensible of the good offices of the British Grovernment, he must decline to renounce his claims to that place. At this time, 26th January, and for nearly a month later, the Amir continued to hope that the representa- tions made by Burnes to the Gfovernor-Gfeneral might elicit a more favourable reply. Unwilling to compro- mise his chances of success by coquetting with the Russian envoy, he throughout this period kept Captain Vikovitch at a distance, conversing with him rarely, and then coldly. But on the 21st February, Burnes received despatches from India, which contained a very plain though a very courteous refusal of the Amir’s demands. The negotiations which followed could not affect this decision. The Amir was grie- vously disappointed. “ I have often written,” he said, “to the British Grovernment about my affairs, and they reply to me about their own.” He had wished earnestly for the alliance, and when Burnes, on the 28th April, quitted Kabul, he carried with him a letter from the Amir to Lord Auckland, imploring him in touching language “ to remedy the grievances of the Afghans, and give them a little encouragement and power.” THE BARUKZYE PERIOD. 363 From the date, 21st February, on which Burnes had received a final refusal from Lord Auckland, the treat- ment of the Russian envoy underwent a change. Profuse in his offers of money and assistance he was now, without a rival, master of the situation. He promised to provide the Amir with money, and to negotiate with Ran jit Singh. Returning then with the Amir’s sanction to Herat and Kandahar he brought to conclusion the contemplated alliance between the Kandahar Barukzye brothers and Persia, by virtue of which that power agreed to aid the Afghans with troops. The treaty containing the Shah’s signature was sent to Kabul for the approval of the Amir. The first consequences of the new alliance quickly showed themselves. Assuming to himself the power of a suzerain over Afghanistan, the Shah commanded Kamran of Herat to make reparation to himself and to the Barukzye chiefs his subjects. This close con- nection between Afghanistan and Persia, with the shadow of Russia in the background ; the avowed determination of the Amir to recover Peshawar by the aid of his new allies ; the cessation of friendship with the Amir, caused partly by the failure of Burnes’s mission, partly by the success of that of Yikovitch, determined the English Government to reconsider the principles of policy which had up to that time guided its relations with the country of the Amir. It may be worth while, at the present moment, to inquire briefly what the dangers were which it appre- hended ; what modes were available to avert them. The danger that the Government of the day saw 364 AFGHANISTAN. was Russia — Russia using Persia and Afghanistan as its pawns, warring with them, encroaching by their means upon the preserves of England. This idea was translated into a certainty by the fact of the credit obtained by the Russian envoy at Kabul, and that it was he who had negotiated the treaty which seemed to bind the Barukzyes to Russia. How should the danger have been averted? By any way certainly rather than by that which was adopted. Granting that Russia was in the background pulling the strings, she was in those days too distant from the scene of action to act with effect, nor was the most powerful of her satellites, Persia, sufficiently strong to strike a blow that the British power would feel. The result showed that Persia could not even take Herat. But granting that she had been strong enough to take Herat, there were means more efficacious and less costly to force her to relax her hold. Grown wiser by experience, we tried those means in 1856. An attack on her seaboard then brought her on her knees. The very threat of such an attack in 1837 would have had a result not less satisfactory. The idea of any danger at that time from the Afghans was too absurd for serious consideration. British India was separated from Afghanistan by the Panjab, occupied by the martial Sikhs, the hereditary enemies of the Afghans. The chief grievance of Dost Mahammad lay in the fact that he could not retake Peshawar from the Sikhs. How could a power so weak be in any sense dangerous to the British ? THE BARUKZYE PERIOD. 365 The whole question was so simple, that with time it would have settled itself. The facts, brought into a small compass, were simply these. The Amir of Kabul had requested the British Government to aid him in the recovery of Peshawar, taken from him by the allies of the British, and the British Grovernment had refused. The Amir had made the same request to the Russian envoy, and that envoy had promised him, on the part of the Czar, money, the restoration of Herat, and the propitiation of the ruler of the Sikhs. As an earnest of the fulfilment of his promises, the Persian army was marching on Ghorian and Herat. This was the question, fraught, in the opinion of the ministers of Great Britain, with danger to our Indian possessions. “ The welfare of our possessions in the East,” they announced by their agent, the Governor- General, “ requires that we should have on our western frontier an ally who is interested in resisting aggres- sion and establishing tranquillity, in the place of chiefs ranging themselves in subservience to a hostile power and seeking to promote schemes of conquest and aggrandisement. ’ ’ The mode they proposed to adopt to bring about this result had the merit or the demerit of being re- markable. They proposed to depose the ruler who, out of the chaos resulting from the expulsion of the Sadozyes, had evoked at least a semblance of order, a form of good government, and, most certainly, a respect for authority ; who had gained, more than any other Afghan since the death of his father, Pathi Khan, the confidence of the people, and to replace 366 AFGHANISTAN. him by a prince belonging to the expelled family — a prince who had already enjoyed, under — for Afghanis- tan— favourable circumstances, the opportunity of ruling, and who had failed ; who, when subsequently treated with as to the conditions of his return by the Barukzye chiefs, had acted in a manner which plainly showed that he had learned nothing and forgotten nothing ; who had twice attempted to force his return, and had twice been driven back ; and who — when at one time, by the aid of foreign mercenaries, victory was in his grasp — had preferred flight to making the effort requisite to gain it. The ministers of England who adopted this re- markable solution of a very slight difficulty were Liberals. Certainly, to dethrone by arms a popular sovereign in order to force upon an unwilling people a prince proved to be incompetent and known to be distasteful, is not a cardinal point of Liberal prin- ciples. No sane man will question the immense benefits which the great Liberal party have rendered to the cause of freedom and good government. Those benefits are visible, palpable ; we feel them every hour of our lives. But there have been periods in our history when that great party has been struck with a blind fatuity. It would seem as though some malig- nant spirit sometimes inspired them not only to deviate from their principles, but to appropriate doc- trines of an opposite character so extreme that even their political opponents reject them. We have seen something of the same sort within the last three years. On each occasion the result has been traceable to a THE BARUKZYE PERIOD. 367 similar cause. On each the great Liberal party has delivered itself bound hand and foot to the prejudices of a man. In 1838 it allowed itself to be led astray by the exaggerated fears of Lord Palmerston. In 1876 it followed blindly the course dictated by the rancorous jealousy of Mr. Gladstone. Will it recover its reason in 1879 ? The siege of Herat by the Persians, in whose ranks were Russian, French, and Italian officers, had begun on the 23rd November 1837, had been continued all the winter of that year, and the spring, summer and autumn of the year succeeding. Owing mainly to the exertions of one English officer within its walls, Eldred Pottinger, of the Bombay artillery, the efforts of the Persians had been entirely baffled. It was Eldred Pottinger who repaired the fortifications, who inspired the garrison, who forced even Shah Kamran and his minister, Yar Mahammad, to play the warriors. It was Eldred Pottinger who, on the 24th June 1838, repulsed the enemy’s attack led by the Russian general, Borowski, and a battalion formed of Russian volun- teers. Finally it was mainly through Eldred Pot- tinger’s exertions and example that, on the 8th Sep- tember 1838, the Persian army raised the siege and retired, beaten, baffled, and humiliated, within its own borders. With the raising of the siege of Herat the main reason for British intervention in the affairs of Afghanistan disappeared. But before the news of this event reached the Governor-General, Lord Auckland had pledged himself to a policy of interference. In a 368 AFGHANISTAN. manifesto, dated the 1st October 1838, that nobleman announced the principles upon which the Liberal ministry he served had based the action he had been directed to carry out. Declaring that the Banikzyes, “ from their dissensions and unpopularity, were un- fitted under any circumstances to be useful allies to the British Government,” he announced the resolve to replace them by a member of the expelled Sadozye clan, Shah Shujah ul Mulk, “ a monarch who, when in power, had cordially acceded to the measures of united resistance to external enmity, which were at that time judged necessary by the British Government, and who, on its empire being usurped by its present rulers, had found an honourable asylum in the British domi- nions.”* The manifesto further announced that in this work of the restoration of Shah Shujah, Ranjit Singh, the ruler of the Panjab, having been guaranteed in his then existing possessions, had bound himself to co-operate. This manifesto had not been published five weeks when the Government of India learned that the basis upon which their policy had been built had dis- appeared. The Persian army, with its forty thousand native troops, its Russian battalion, its foreign officers, * The manifesto did not add that Shah Shujah had twice quitted that honourable asylum to attempt, mainly with the aid of mer- cenaries raised within British limits, to recover the throne from which his brother had driven him, and had been twice beaten by the family whose members, despite their “ dissensions and un- popularity,” had gained the good wishes of the greater portion of their Afghan subjects. THE BARUKZYE PERIOD. 369 and its Shah at the head of them all, had been re- pulsed from Herat, and had retreated across the fron- tier. The Russo-Persian- Afghan alliance had collapsed. The dangers with which it was supposed to be fraught had been proved to be non-existent ; their very shadows had disappeared ! A lieutenant of artillery had made the political situation in western Asia more favourable to England than it had been at the time of Burnes’s mission, for he had caused the Russo-Persian bubble to burst under the very nose of the Amir of Kabul and his brothers ! Surely if ever reason existed for putting a stop to military preparations it existed then. What was there to do ? To replace a Barukzye by a Sadozye — a man loved by a man hated — a man respected by a man de- spised— a brave man by a nerveless man. Yet, not- withstanding the cessation of all real cause for war, the preparations were not abated ; the war was not abandoned. The exile of Ludhiana was, at any cost, to be restored. Such was the mud through which Liberal principles were dragged by the Liberal party in 1838 ! But one change was made by the Government in consequence of the bursting of the Russo-Persian bubble, and that in a point of detail. The strength of the invading army was slightly diminished. But there was another change, not the action of the Grovern- ment. The Commander-in-Chief in India, Sir Henry Fane, had been appointed to command the expedi- tionary army when it was believed that that army would have to deal with the Russo-Persian force ; but 24 370 AFGHANISTAN. when Persia and its Russian battalion disappeared, and it only remained to replace a Barukzye by a Sadozye on the Kabul throne, Sir Henry Fane withdrew from the personal command of the expedition. Sir John Keane, Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay Army, was nominated in his place. The army collected to invade Afghanistan consisted of three distinct bodies. The Bengal force under Sir Willoughby Cotton, numbering seven thousand five hundred men of all arms, assembled at Firozpur ; a contingent of Hindustanis, raised for Shah Shujah, numbering six thousand men, officered by British officers, was to start from a place well known by past experience to the Shah, Shikarpur ; and a third force, called the Bombay column, composed of five thousand five hundred men, under the personal command of Sir John Keane, was to march through Sind and proceed by the Bolan and Khojak Kotal passes. A fourth body of about two thousand five hundred men was likewise formed to keep open the communications with the Bombay Presidency by the occupation of Sind. The whole force to be employed thus amounted in round numbers to twenty-one thousand five hundred men. It must always be remembered that this war for the replacement of a Barukzye by a Sadozye was under- taken in alliance with Ranjit Singh, whose dominions we guaranteed. It seems remarkable, under these circumstances, that our ally should refuse our troops a passage across his territories. But he did refuse. The consequence was that the Bengal column, instead THE BARFKZYE PERIOD. 371 of marching across the Panjab and entering Afghan- istan by the Khaibar pass, was forced to follow the river Satlaj to its junction with the Indus, to follow that river to Rori, and there cross it. A glance at a map of India will show the extreme un- soundness, the danger, of the military position of the in- vading army. Invading one foreign country, Afghanis- tan, from the basis of another foreign country, Sind, and with a third and very powerful foreign country, the Panjab, on its flank, the very existence of the British army really depended on the good will of the Amirs of Sind and the ruler of the Panjab. If it be affirmed that we could command the loyalty of the Amirs of Sind, a similar statement cannot be made regarding the ruler of the Panjab. It cannot be denied that we marched into Afghanistan by the sufferance of Ran jit Singh, then old, worn out, and unadventurous. He died in June 1839. After his death we were in Afghanistan by the sufferance of his successors, who, fortunately, were not ambitious. 24 * 372 AFGHANISTAN. CHAPTER X. HISTORICAL,-— -THE BRITISH INVASION. The plan of my history will not allow me to give more than an outline of the first British invasion of Afghanistan and its consequences. The graphic re- cords of the late Sir Henry Havelock, and the detailed story of the late Sir John Kaye, are available to readers who require more than I have space to give them. Sir John Kaye’s detailed story occupies alone three volumes. I can afford but one chapter. Yet within that chapter can be compressed, I would fain believe, all that is necessary for the information of the historical, in contrast with the military, reader. The details which the latter yearns for might prove uninteresting and tedious to the former. Shah Shujah, with his force of six thousand men, left Firozpur for Shikarpur, by the Satlaj and Indus, early in December 1338. He was accompanied by Mr. Macnaghten, of the Bengal Civil Service, who, in anticipation of success, had been appointed envoy to THE BRITISH INVASLON. 373 his court. A week later, the 10th December, the Bengal column, under Sir Willoughby Cotton, pursued the same route for the same destination. Sir John Keane on his side had entered Sind by the Hajamri mouth of the Indus early in the same month, with the Bombay contingent, and encamped at Yikkar. Leaving the Bengal column and the Shah’s con- tingent, I propose first to march with Sir John Keane from the mouth of the Indus to Gandawa. It was a very difficult undertaking. Sir John Keane found himself with a small number of camels, and with but few supplies. The agents of the Amirs of Sind pro- fessed unbounded friendship and devotion, but threw every possible objection in the way of the movement of the troops. Day followed day, week succeeded week, and still the force could not move. Sir John Keane was naturally an irascible man, and the treatment he received certainly did not improve his temper. The Amirs promised everything and did nothing. At last, by incredible exertion, Sir John Keane moved on his force to Tatta, forty-eight miles from Haidarabad. The Amirs now changed their system. From professions combined with obstruction they proceeded to something approaching open hos- tility. Sir John Keane continuing his march, they cut off his supplies, harassed his communications, inter- cepted his letters, and imprisoned the followers of his camp. This sort of treatment was more to the mind of the English general than the other. He knew now exactly what to do. Sending then a message to Sir Willoughby Cotton, then at Kori, to support him, he 374 AFGHANISTAN. prepared, in the last days of January 1839, to assault the capital. The Amirs observing this, yielded, and promised the Political Agent to agree to all the de- mands the British Government had made upon them. Thenceforth all difficulties disappeared, and, on the 10th February, Sir John Keane resumed his march northwards. On the 23rd of that month one brigade of the Bengal column traversed the Bolan pass and reached Quetta on the 5th March. There a month later it was joined by the Commander-in-Ohief and by Shah Shujah and his levies. The Bombay force entered the Bolan pass on the 9th and 11th April, and pushed on for the same destination. Anxious to secure the Khojak Kotal pass Sir John Keane moved forward from Quetta on the 7th April. This pass presents a succession of steep ascents and descents with narrow gorges where no draught cattle can work with effect. The general was not apparently aware that a path existed by which it could be turned, for he made no attempt to use it. In the manner of the British he marched straight on. Fortunately, perhaps, no attempt was made to utilize the great natural advantages offered by the pass. A handful of the enemy’s horsemen indeed appeared but a few shots sufficed to disperse them. From this point the march to Kandahar was easy and unopposed. The army appeared before that city on the 25th April and at once entered it. “ The Kandahar chiefs,” writes a distinguished soldier, then a young artillery officer of promise, since realized, THE BRITISH INVASION. 375 “ had fled for refuge to Persia without striking a blow, and the inhabitants tendered their reluctant homage to the old monarch who was thus unceremo- niously thrust upon them by foreign bayonets.”* The army stayed at Kandahar till its component parts should be re-united and rested, nor was it till the 27th June — the very day on which Ranjit Singh died — that Sir John Keane, leaving a strong garrison in Kandahar, pursued his way up the valley of the Tarnak towards Ghazni. Judging from the reception he had till then encountered that the opposition would be slight, and knowing from his experience of the Bolan and the Khojak the enormous difficulty of dragging a siege- train over rocks and precipices, Sir John left at Kandahar the heavy guns with which he had been provided to batter Ghazni. This was a mistake which might have cost him dear. Ghazni was reached on the 21st July. The British force consisted of eight thousand men ; the Shah’s contingent of four thousand ; they had in all forty field guns. They found the fortress occupied by Prince Haidar, a son of the Amir, with a garrison of three thousand five hundred men. In the earlier portion of this volume 1 1 have given a slight description of Ghazni. It was in many respects a strong place ; proof, if well commanded, against a coup de main ; but not capable of sustaining a siege. * A retrospect of the Afghan war by Maj. -General Sir V. Eyre, K.C.S.I., C.B. f Pages 15 and 16. 376 AFGHANISTAN. For a siege Sir John Keane had neither the time nor the guns. But he had good troops and skilled engineers, so he resolved on the 23rd to attempt a coup de main. He succeeded. Four officers of the engineers, prominent, amongst whom was Lieutenant, afterwards Sir Henry, Durand, were told off to blow open the Kabul gate, the weakest gate of the fortress, and storming parties were held in readiness to profit by the explosion. The daring scheme succeeded — Ghazni was carried, and her governor was taken prisoner. The sudden fall of Ghazni spread consternation amongst the Barukzyes. Sir John Keane took ad- vantage of this feeling by pressing on at once towards the capital. Leaving Ghazni on the 30th July, he reached Kabul without opposition on the 6th August. The same evening Shah Shujah made his triumphal entrance into the capital, and took up his residence in the Bala Hissar. Where, in the meanwhile, was the Amir, Dost Mahammad, and what had he been doing ? The Amir had been stunned by the first rumours of a British invasion. He had not desired hostility with the British. He had regretted the Russo-Persian alliance brought about by his Kandahar brothers almost in spite of him. That alliance was unpopular with the Afghans, and unpalatable to himself. But what could he do to conjure away the invasion ? He could do nothing. He had shown courtesy to the one British envoy, and he would have given a reception as friendly to any other whom the Government of India THE BRITISH INVASION. 377 might send. But these foreigners wanted only the one thing he could not give them. They wanted his crown, not indeed for themselves, but to bestow it on the brother of the man by whose orders his father had been blinded and murdered. And now they were going to invade his country to pluck that crown from his brow. Unable to avert the invasion, he resolved, with the spirit of a true Barukzye, to resist it. He accordingly repaired the fortifications of the Bala Hissar ; strength- ened those of Ghazni ; sent his son Haidar to command the latter fortress ; his son Afzul with a force to lie in its neighbourhood and fail upon the English when Haidar should repulse them ; his son Akbar to guard the Khaibar, whilst he himself would be prepared to take up a position between Ghazni and Kabul to act according to circumstances. W e have seen how matters went against him ; how Ghazni fell, almost without a blow. Then Afzul, paralysed by the fall of the fortress which was to have given him his opportunity, abandoned his elephants and his camp equipage, and fled to Kabul. What now was the Amir to do ? He still resolved to make the best of it — to treat, yielding all that he could yield. Holding a council of his chiefs, he told them his determination. They approved it. He then despatched his brother, Jabbar Khan, to the British camp, offering to resign every- thing to Shah Shujah, provided that the Shah would confirm him in the office of vizier — an office made hereditary in his family by the founder of the Sadozye dynasty, the grandfather of Shujah, Ahmad Shah. 378 AFGHANISTAN. Jabbar Khan had always been well disposed towards Shah Shujah, and in the selection of him as envoy lay, the Amir hoped, the best chance for a peaceful and satisfactory solution of the question. But the propo- sition was refused — more than refused ; it was received with mockery. In reply he was offered the “ honour- able asylum ” at Ludhiana which Shujah had quitted to assail him. The Amir declined the offer, and resolved, as a last resource, to try the supreme appeal. Not, indeed, that he cherished any hope of victory ; he knew that he was overmatched. But he would at least die with his face to the enemy, fighting for his right. But even this last consolation was denied him. The fall of the strong fortress of Grhazni, and the prompt following up of that success by an immediate march on the capital, had produced on the Afghan chiefs and their followers, on the Kizilbashis, and on the tribes about Kabul, an effect identical with that which had paralysed the courage of Afzul Khan. In the success and its consequences they detected a power greater than that of Shujah. With him they might have dealt; but how were they to oppose these foreigners, whom precipitous mountain passes could not stop, before whom their strongest fortresses were as packs of cards, their soldiers as mountain sheep ? The attitude, the demeanour, the very language of the Afghan lords, showed plainly to their chief that imagination had quenched their courage ; that they were beaten before they had fought ! Yainly did the Amir attempt to rouse them -to a THE BRITISH INVASION. 379 truer conception of tlie actual state of affairs ; in vain did he assure them that these English were, after all, but men like themselves, neither stronger nor braver ; that their force could be met by force'; and that, even if they were beaten, it would be nobler to die fighting than to submit to a prince brought in by the foreigner. Fruitlessly did he point to the position he had taken up near Maidan, naturally strong, and made almost impregnable by art. The spark of patriotism had been completely extinguished, and he could not re- kindle the saturated tinder. Then, and then only, rather than fall into the hands of the invaders, he resolved to flee. He had barely time to get away, for his chiefs and courtiers were fast falling off to pay their obeisance to the rising sun. Deserted by his nobles, left with scarcely two thousand followers, the Amir mounted his horse and galloped off in the direction of Bamian. Twelve hours had not elapsed before the Shah and his allies reached the spot he had quitted. It was soon ascertained from the numerous deserters that the Amir had fled. Amongst the English officers present was Captain James Outram, then in the full promise of a glorious career. He at once volunteered to com- mand any party that might be placed at his disposal to pursue the Amir. Some ten or twelve other officers* volunteered to accompany him. Had the general placed at their disposal a body of English cavalry the # Amongst the survivors of these is General Sir George Law- rence, K.C.S.I. 380 AFGHANISTAN. Amir must inevitably have been captured. But it was unfortunately decided to employ a body of Afghan horse, commanded by one Haji Khan Khakar, a deserter from the Bariikzyes, in the pursuit. This decision was fatal. Haji Khan Khakar, though a deserter, was a trimmer. The one aim of his life was to be always on the winning side. Though the star of the Sadozyes was in the ascendant, there was no reason why he should incur the undying resentment of the Barukzyes by capturing their leader. He accepted, then, the commission to pursue Dost Mahammad, with the intention of saving him from capture. He did save him. He knew the country, the route, the passes. The English officers did not know them. He thus managed to insure that the Amir should be thirty miles beyond Bamian when the pursuers reached that place. Outram had orders not to proceed further than Bamian. The Amir was then able to make his escape to Bokhara. I have now accounted for all the troops and the leaders of troops detailed by the Amir to oppose the invasion of his country, with the exception of one — the division under the command of Akbar Khan detached to the Khaibar pass. It had been decided that whilst two limbs of the triple alliance, the British and Shah Shujah, should invade Afghanistan by the Bolan pass, the third, the Sikhs, accompanied by Taimur Mirza, a son of the Shah, should penetrate into it by the Khaibar. The contingent provided by Kanjit Singh amounted to about five thousand troops, mostly Pathans. THE BRITISH INVASION. 381 Accompanying them as political agent, was Captain Wade, who had as escort a small detachment of native soldiers of the Indian army ; but the man whose rank gave to the expedition its importance was the Taimur Mirza just referred to. The illness of Ranjit Singh, his death, the break in the administration which followed it, delayed this small force an unusually long time at Peshawar, nor was it till the beginning of the fourth week of July that it set out. Naturally, and notwithstanding the presence of the Sadozye prince, the chief direction of the expedition devolved upon the senior English officer present, Captain Wade. Wade entered the Khaibar, and marched cautiously on Ali Masjid. He encountered a fitful but ineffective opposition, and with a loss of 180 in killed and wounded he occupied that fortress on the fifth day (26th July) after leaving Peshawar. All this time Akbar Khan was at the further end of the pass, at Daka. Why did he not come to the relief of Ali Masjid? Why, when Ali Masjid had fallen, did he retreat, without firing a shot, beyond Kabul ? These are questions which are more easily asked than answered. Grhazni fell on the 24th July. Bad news travels quickly, and it is quite possible that the fall of this fortress, which influenced so many other things in the campaign, influenced likewise Akbar Khan. This is certain, that he offered no opposition to Wade’s advance. That officer, accompanied by Prince Taimur and his following, reached Kabul on the 8th Sep- tember. 382 AFGHANISTAN. The object of the expedition was, apparently, now accomplished. The British Government had redeemed one part of their pledge. They had — to use the words employed subsequently by Lord Ellenborough — they had “ expelled from Afghanistan a chief be- lieved to be hostile to British interests, to place upon his throne a sovereign represented to be friendly to those interests and popular with his subjects.” But another part of the programme still remained to be accomplished. In his memorable manifesto of the 1st October 1858, Lord Auckland had promised that “ when once he (Shah Shujah) shall be secured in power, and the independence and integrity of Afganis- tan established, the British army will be withdrawn.” It would seem that the time had arrived to fulfil this pledge. Dost Mahammad and his two sons, Afzul and Akbar, had fled to Bokhara, and had been at once placed there under a surveillance amounting almost to close custody. The submission of the tribes appeared sincere. Indeed the British resident, Mr. Macnaghten, who had accompanied the Shah during his progress to Kabul, had been so struck by the manner in which he had been received, that he recorded his testimony that “ the Afghans have received the Shah with feelings nearly amounting to adoration.” Under these circumstances, why was not the pledge redeemed ? Every argument seemed to speak loudly in favour of such a course. The Shah’s contingent — consisting of troops of the three arms, with the materiel belonging to each — could have garrisoned the towns. A conciliatory demeanour towards the chiefs, THE BRITISH INVASION. and the bestowal upon them of the offices within the gift of the Shah, would have, under ordinary cir- cumstances, secured their loyalty. The halo of suc- cess would be certain to secure to that prince at least some months of peace, and these might be well em- ployed in arranging the internal administration of the country. More than all, the withdrawal of the British troops would have tested, truly and honestly, the soundness of British policy. An opportunity would have been afforded of ascertaining, under circum- stances very favourable to Shah Shujah, whether the Sadozyes were better fitted than their rivals for the control of a warlike, mercenary, contentious, and faithless people. The decision as to the proper time for the redemp- tion of this pledge had been left by Lord Auckland to Mr. Macnaghten and Sir John Keane. The Governor- General had merely stipulated, and prudently stipu- lated, that if troops were to be retained, their number should not be too few. The decision really rested with Mr. Macnaghten. A ripe scholar and a skilful diplomatist, Mr. Mac- naghten was deficient in that rare audacity which fits a man to face a revolution. Like so many men who have risen in a graded service, he feared respon- sibility. Then again, though possessing unquestioned ability he never gave it fair play. He allowed senti- ment— or perhaps, to put it more correctly, the secret impulses of the heart — to override his judgment. The type is not an uncommon one. Thus it happened that though he believed in Shah 384 AFGHANISTAN. Shu jail’s popularity, though his judgment told him that if the British were to remain occupying the high places of the State, the people would come to regard them as intruders, that true policy required that the Shah should be left face to face with his people ; — various minor causes combined to make him wish for an excuse to evade the obligation. His position at Kabul, supported by English troops, the all- powerful representative of England in Central Asia, the visible symbol of the check given to Russian in- trigue— these were matters tangible, and their dis- appearance might, the secret voice told him, act adversely to the policy of the Governor- General. Then the Shah too whispered his secret fear lest the departure of the British should be the signal for the re-appearance of Dost Mahammad. What other causes there may have been, I know not. This at least is certain, that whilst policy and calm judgment com- bined to counsel the immediate withdrawal of the army, the secret impulses of Mr. Macnaghten prompted him to long for an excuse to keep at least a portion of it. The excuse came. The Amir of Bokhara was at this time retaining in confinement Colonel Stoddart, an officer of the British army, who in 1838 had been despatched from Teheran to Bokhara to attempt to obtain the liberation of the Russians pining in cap- tivity in that town. It was known likewise that a Russian force, destined for Khiva, was assembling at Orenberg. Moreover, there had been rumours that Jabbar Khan, the brother of Dost Mahammad, who THE BRITISH INVASION. 385 was at Kulum with the family of the Amir, was rest- less— and his restlessness foreboded no good to Shah Shujah. With a view, then, of making a demonstra- tion which should produce some effect on all these parties, the envoy, soon after the installation of the Shah despatched a small force, consisting of a regiment of Gfurkhas and a troop of Horse Artillery, by the Kulu and Irak passes to Bamian. Dr. Percival Lord was instructed to accompany the force as political agent, and to use it as occasion might require. Dr. Lord has been described as “ a medical officer of rare accomplishments,” but he was an undoubted alarmist. Whilst the force traversed the passes men- tioned, Dr. Lord was allowed to use his discretion as to the route he should pursue. The force took a month to accomplish the short but most difficult jour- ney. Dr. Lord set out later to join it, but he had not ridden thirty-six miles from Kabul when he returned, open-mouthed, to announce that the whole country, within forty miles of the capital, was in open rebellion ; that Dost Mahammad, escaped from Bokhara, had established himself at Kunduz, and that the thanes and the people from all sides were flocking to him ! This intelligence responded to the inner instincts — it might almost be said, to the secret but unwhispered wishes — of Mr. Macnaghten. It gave him the oppor- tunity he wanted. Instantly he wrote to Sir John Keane, telling him that half the army might go, but that the other half must remain. In a few days it turned out that Lord had been duped by his Afghan escort. Unwilling to cross the 25 386 AFGHANISTAN. Hindu Kush at that season, and unable to stop Lord’s progress by any other means, they had invented the story of the rebellion and of the evasion of Dost Ma- hammad. The credulous doctor, too easily believing them, had ridden back to give the alarm. But the story had done its work. The envoy had committed himself to Sir John Keane and the Governor- General, and he had no mind to draw back. One half of the army, lead by Sir John Keane, returned then to India, punishing on their way, by an assault on his fortress, the Khan of Kalat,* for conduct called refractory — but which was really the conduct of an honest, outspoken man — towards the army during its advance. The other moiety, under Sir Willoughby Cotton, remained behind. Shah Shujah had by no means shared the confidence of the envoy as to the stability of his position. Fear of the great chiefs of the tribes haunted him; he dreaded their vigour, their relentless daring, their boundless ambition. He had never forgotten how they had driven him from power in 1812. His pride would not allow him to court them. Alone he could not crush them, but with the aid of the British gar- rison he might grind them to powder. For this reason he had used all his arts with Mr. Macnaghten to induce him to retain a considerable force. He had succeeded. What was his position ? The most miserable that could fall to the lot of any man — a position restricting * The brave old chief died in defending his household gods ; his fort was taken from his son and given to another. THE BRITISH INVASION. the exercise of those qualities dear to the heart of a free man. He was a king supported by foreign bayonets ! Nor was the position of the envoy much better. The master of the foreign bayonets, he became thus a second power in the State ; a power which must draw to itself the hatred of everybody — the hatred of the king who owed to it his crown, the hatred of the people who saw in it alike the support and instrument of a monarch whom they loathed. It was inevitable there should be a clash ! The clash came sooner even than might have been expected. The envoy wanted to house his troops. His engineer reported that in a military point of view it was incumbent that they should occupy the Bala Hissar, the citadel of Kabul. The Shah objected. Macnaghten yielded at first, but upon the urgent re- presentations of the engineer, Lieutenant (afterwards Sir Henry) Durand, he again addressed the Shah on the subject, and wrung from him a reluctant assent that the citadel should be prepared for occupation as a strong military post. The pioneers were at once detailed for the work, and began it. But no sooner did the Shah hear that the work had been begun than he renewed his objections — which were extremely frivolous — with so much pertinacity that Macnaghten yielded. Fatal weakness ! Striking example of the absence of the audacity which knows when to brave a weak nature ! Macnaghten’ s yielding on this occasion caused the Kabul disaster of 1841. For a brief period, indeed, certain rooms in the Bala Hissar were given up 25 * 388 AFGHANISTAN. to be occupied by our troops ; but eventually, at tbe request of the Shah, Macnaghten made over those rooms for the use of the royal harem. I have said that Shah Shujah had wished to retain the British in order that by their aid he might crush rather than conciliate the great Afghan chiefs. Un- happily Macnaghten allowed himself to be swayed to support this policy. He placed virtually at the Shah’s disposal British officers detailed to drill and command corps of Khaibaris, of Jazailchis, of Kohistanis, of Janbaz. These corps became really the janissaries of Shah Shujah. They held the detached forts, collected revenue ; and, quartered often in commanding posi- tions, superseded the authority of the tribal chieftains. The measure was in every sense unsound. Whilst it alienated the chiefs it did not even conciliate the savage mountaineers who received the pay of the Shah. An Afghan will do a great deal for money ; but he abhors discipline, and except in the excitement of battle he does not care to be commanded by one whom he re- gards as an infidel. It was evident that the organisa- tion produced no such tie between the levies and their commanders as that which attaches the native soldier of India to his officer ; that the men regarded it simply as a tie of interest to be broken when convenient. In another point of view it was not less objection- able. In an earlier chapter I have detailed the measures adopted by Ahmad Shah and continued by his successors for the levy and maintenance of a national army. It was the feudal system in its in- tegrity— each tribe obeying the call of its chief sum- THE BEITISH INVASION. 389 moned by the overlord. But this new system of levies under European officers required monthly payments, and monthly payments to a sort of regular army necessitated increased taxation or increased oppression. But although Macnaghten had weakly yielded to the Shah on these two important points, his conduct with reference to the administration of the Government was at least as blameworthy. “ The envoy deemed it possible” — I quote from an admirable essay written nearly thirty years ago upon this subject* — “ to recon- cile the assumption by himself of the main powers of sovereignty with the treatment of Shah Shiijah as an independent monarch, and sought to effect this by leaving the administration of civil and criminal justice, the settlement and collection of the revenue, and its irresponsible appropriation, entirely in the hands of Shah Shiijah, precluding him however from any control in measures concerning the external relations of his government, or those having reference to independent or revolting tribes. Although allowed to make grants to his favourites, and to authorise aggressions and usurpations, when these could be effected without troops, the Shah had no voice in the deciding on the employment of force in support of his own or the envoy’s measures. The Shah had thus much power for evil, and could commit the Government to measures, the odium of supporting which must fall on Macnaghten, who alone ordered expeditions, settled the strength of detachments, gave instructions to their commanders, and pointed out the objects to be at- * “ Calcutta Review,” December 1850. 390 AFGHANISTAN. tained and the mode of accomplishment. It was a vain hope, by thus incurring the opprobrium of all harsh and violent measures, and by leaving to the misrule of the Shah’s greedy favourites the credit of evoking them, to dream of blinding the nobles and the people to the really servile condition of their king. The farce was too broad and too cuttingly insulting. From the first it was pregnant with danger.” Such, in brief, is an outline of the military and political system adopted and pursued for two years by the British envoy at the court of- Shah Shujali. The policy which sanctioned this system had, it must be remembered, nothing in common with the policy advo- cated in later years, of establishing British agents at certain Afghan centres. Those agents were to be pro- hibited from interfering with the administration. The policy of 1839 was essentially a policy of interference with everybody and everything. It superseded local rule and local customs. It devolves upon me now to relate as concisely as possible the results of that policy. In a preceding chapter I have told how under all dynasties and under all circumstances the tribes of the mountains and the passes had maintained their inde- pendence. The great Akbar had tried to subdue them, but in vain. His successors had bought them. Nadir Shah and Ahmad Shah had been reduced to the same course ; and the annual subsidy, fixed by the latter sovereign and continued by his successors of the Sadozye dynasty, is understood to have amounted to not less than eighty thousand rupees per annum. THE BRITISH INVASION. 391 But with the expulsion of Mahmud Shah in 1818, the relations with the Khaibaris changed. For a Ion# time there was no king: in Afghanistan, and when at length Dost Mahammad had felt himself sufficiently secure to assume the title of Amir he reduced the annual subsidy to twelve thousand rupees, and though he raised it subsequently to twenty thousand, this amount fell far short of the expectation of the tribes. In the interval, and even prior to the expulsion of Mahmud Shah, the tribes of the passes had been de- voted to the cause of Shujah. They had fought for him ; they had concealed him ; they had secured his escape. These good offices were not forgotten by the Shah when he was restored by British intervention to his throne. He had authorised his son Taimur to promise the tribes the restoration of their ancient privileges ; and on the safe arrival of his son at Kabul, he had confirmed this promise on the condition that the passes should remain open to the British convoys. Shah Shujah had made this promise without consult- ing the British envoy. Mr. Macnaghten, when he heard of it, took the matter into his own hands to be dealt with after the manner of a modern diplomatist. He offered, then, the tribes an annual subsidy, larger indeed than that bestowed upon them by Dost Ma- hammad, but falling considerably short of the amount which the promises of the Shah had led them to ex- pect. He coupled this offer, moreover, with conditions which neither the Moghols, nor Nadir Shah, nor Ahmad Shah had been so unwise as to propose — for they had for their object entirely to supersede 392 AFGHANISTAN. the authority of the tribes in the passes which they regarded as their own. The result may be anticipated. The tribes refused the subsidy — the proposal to super- sede their authority heated their blood to boiling pitch. An opportunity to show their power was soon afforded them. Sir John Keane returned indeed with his small army through the Khaibar. But he had hardly quitted the defile when the Khaibaris invested Ali Mas j id, and though the British general succeeded in throwing into this fort a sufficient amount of ammunition and provisions, the Khaibaris cut off a battalion of Najibs and captured from four to live hundred camels from the relieving party as it returned to Peshawar. Then, only, were serious negotiations opened with them, — that is to say, negotiations which had some chance of arriving at a satisfactory con- clusion. It is unnecessary to enter into these in detail. It will suffice to state that the Khaibaris ex- torted from the necessities of the British agent the subsidy (eighty thousand rupees) which when pro- mised by Shah Shujah they had gratefully accepted, and they showed their knowledge of their position by attempting to plunder, after the treaty had been signed, every successive detachment of the returning army of Sir John Keane. If the fears of Macnaghten had been roused by the revolt of the Khaibaris, the general aspect of affairs on the conclusion of the agreement just referred to did much to re-establish his composure. He was now indeed, or he seemed to himself to be, master of the situation. And what a situation ! One agent, Dr. THE BRITISH INVASION. 393 Percival Lord, who had, after the scare already re- ferred to, succeeded in reaching Bamian, was engaged in disseminating British principles, and spreading, as he believed, British influence, up to the banks of the Oxus, even beyond the banks of the Oxus. Another agent, Captain d’Arcy Todd, deputed to Herat, had uot only succeeded, he had reason to feel confident, in finally establishing British influence in that city, but had given the most substantial proof of the reality of that influence, by deputing, without credentials, an officer — Captain James Abbott — to Khiva with the avowed object of inducing the Khan of that country to release from the captivity in which he held them the subjects of that nation whose designs upon Central Asia were even then a cause of nightmare to Mac- naghten — the subjects of Russia. To any man less influenced by the secret wishes of his heart than was Macnaghten, the very circum- stances I have referred to would have been a cause of anxiety and dread. The fussy interference by Dr. Percival Lord, backed by a British force, in the affairs of the petty chieftains north of the Hindu Kush, had raised a feeling of alarm and insecurity throughout the country south of the Oxus. Nor had it stopped there. Crossing that river it had pene- trated to Bokhara, had filled the mind of the Amir with alarm, and had induced him to connive at the escape of three men whom he had till then kept under close surveillance — Dost Mahammad, and his sons Akbar and Afzul. Nor, in reality, did the presence of d’Arcy Todd in 394 AFGHANISTAN. Herat spread less real alarm. It is true that d’Arcy Todd himself was a type of the chivalrous soldier, subordinating all to duty ; high-minded, pure hearted ; in the highest sense of the term, noble. It is true that James Abbott was the most loveable, the most esti- mable, the most unselfish of men. It is true that by a considerable expenditure of money, d’Arcy Todd had saved the people of Herat from starvation and misery ; that he had made secure the throne of the infamous Karnran. What was his reward ? The dread of Persia gave place to the dread of the British infidel ; and Karnran, in January 1840, wrote to the Shah — the Shah who had lately threatened his throne and had cansed the misery from which d’Arcy Todd had relieved him — to the effect that he merely tolerated the English envoy from motives of expediency, but that his hopes centred in the favour of the Shah ! The mission of James Abbott, inspired by the noblest motives, and its consequences, deserves more than the passing notice I am able to bestow upon it. I have already stated the nature of the task he had un- dertaken. This task, which in the hands of one less true to the purpose he had in view, less patient, and less single-minded, must have failed, was, despite of extra- ordinary obstacles, carried out by him and by his suc- cessor, Captain Shakespear, to a successful conclusion. It was, indeed, the only real success attaching, from first to last, to the attempt made by the British nation to foist upon an unwilling people a sovereign for whom they had no sympathy. Enough has been shown of the real working of THE BRITISH INVASION. 395 the missions upon whose success Macnaghten was pluming himself, to demonstrate the rottenness of the ground on which he stood. Nevertheless, confident, hopeful, even exulting, he accompanied the Shah in November to spend the winter at Jalalabad. Whilst there, he gave other and more striking examples of the erroneous view he had conceived, not only of his own functions, but of the proper duties of a king of the Afghans. Macnaghten’s negotiations with tne Khaibaris, already noticed, are a type of the general system he had conceived. Backed by the British force, he re- solved to rule with a high hand — to force submission with the sword. How and with what untoward results he had failed with the Khaibaris, we have seen. We have to see now how even more decidedly, and with what more fatal results, he failed with others. When the British force entered Afghanistan, its strength, its prestige, the marvellous conquest it made of Ghazni, produced a striking effect throughout the country. Dost Mahammad and his sons disappeared at once. Chieftains who had carefully cherished then* independence bowed their head. One alone refused — the chief of Kuner. True to his principle of ruling, Macnaghten determined that the chief of Kuner should be deposed, and his place taken by another. A British force was accordingly sent against him. But native chiefs, occupying castles descended to them through a long line of ancestors, object, as a rule, to being deposed. Certainly the chief of Kuner was one of these. He repulsed the English, and 396 AFGHANISTAN. successfully defied tlie enemy. The chief of Bajor followed his example, and with like success, forcing his assailants to abandon a gun. Nor were these the only misfortunes. The Ghilzai tribe — -the men who in earlier days had given so many rulers to the country, occupied in central and western Afghanistan a position somewhat analogous to that of the Khaibaris. Jealous of their independence they lived on transit fees and plunder. To such men civili- sation was death— such civilisation more especially as would organise the great caravan routes independently of their authority. At such civilisation it seemed to them that the foreign infidels, who had made no arrangements with them, were aiming. They accord- ingly took the law into their own hands, and exercised a guerilla warfare on the convoys and detachments of the invaders. To such a length did their exactions proceed, that Colonel Nott sent a force under Major Anderson against them. Anderson beat the Ghilzais ; but it became evident that a tribe which could com- mand forty thousand warriors must be dealt with in another way. Naturally that way was to buy them. Macnaghten yielded. The annual subsidy was thirty thousand rupees. Further south, in Biliichlstan, the more than grave error, the crime, the British had committed in attack- ing and slaying the noble-hearted Khan of Kalat, and in disinheriting his son, was slowly producing its legitimate fruits. These ripened in May. The result was on the whole most unfortunate for the British. They were forced to atone for the crime of THE BRITISH INVASION. 397 their assault on Kalat, by renouncing the protege they had imposed upon it, and by having to witness the tem- porary restoration of the son of the murdered chieftain. They were compelled, too, to hear of the murder of the agents of the British power, of the defeat of detach- ments, of the interruption of communications, caused by the justly infuriated Biluchis before they could be brought under subjection by detachments sent from Kandahar. It is now time to return to Dr. Lord. The officious activity of this officer had contrived, before the spring of 1840 had set in, to embroil the British with the Hazaras and other tribes north of the great range. Disdaining any attempt to conciliate the hardy moun- taineers, Lord relied solely upon force. To anyone less self-confident, the spirit that had been evinced by the people of the country upon more than one occasion would have seemed to necessitate at least caution in dealing with them. But Lord was eager to press onwards, and his eagerness so ran away with his judg- ment that he succeeded in compromising — he almost succeeded in ruining — the British interests in the dis- tricts under his charge. When Dost Mahammad and his two sons had taken refuge in Bokhara, a third son, Jabbar Khan, of whom mention has already been made in these pages, had proceeded with the family of the Amir to Kuliim. The chief of this place, certainly out of no regard for the Amir, but probably because the escorting party under Jabbar Khan was considerable, had extended to them his hospitality. Acting strictly under the orders 398 AFGHANISTAN. of the envoy, Dr. Lord had entered into negotiations with Jabbar Khan, with the view of inducing him to submit himself and his charge to British generosity, and, to quicken his decision, had intimated to him pretty plainly that Kul um was within reach of the British detachment at Bamian. To prove that these were not words only, Lord ordered a small party of troops to march northwards. When the intelligence that British troops were about to move in the direc- tion of Kulum reached the chief of that district, he, to square himself with the agent, offered to place at his disposal the little fort of Bajgah, a place of some repute in the estimation of the natives, situated at the mouth of the defile beyond Kamuncl. A cautious man would have hesitated ere he consented to lock up a portion of his small force in a little fort at a consi- derable distance from his base, the occupation of which could not fail to excite in the minds of the native chiefs suspicions of ulterior proceedings. But Lord was the reverse of a cautious man. He wrote to Kabul, to which place the envoy had now returned, to ask sanction to his proposals, and, having obtained it, pushed forward five companies of Gurkhas to Bajgah, left two at Svghan, and retained one, and three hundred Afghan levies, at Bamian. The first result of this experiment corresponded entirely to the wishes of Lord and Macnaghten. Jabhar Khan brought his charge to Bamian, and sur- rendered. But the occupation of the frontier post made an enemy of every Uzbeg chief in the vicinity. Even the Wali of Kulum, who up to that time had THE BRITISH INVASION. 399 shown a jealous dislike of Dost Mahammad and his family, began to long for the sound of his war-cry. Suddenly it came. In the month of July 1840 Dost Mahammad and his two sons succeeded — probably with the connivance of the king of Bokhara, whose alarm had been greatly stimulated by the advance of the English — in escaping from the veiled captivity in which he had been held. After many adventures they reached Kulum. They found prevailing there a feeling of hatred to the British — a desire at any cost to rid the country of the infidels. The Uzbegs flocked to his standard, and in a few weeks the Amir found himself at the head of five to six thousand fighting men. Space will not permit me to give more than a mere outline of the military events which followed. It will suffice to say that on the 30th August a small detach- ment of Gurkhas, under Sergeant Douglas, on its way from Syghan to Bajgah, was attacked by Afzul Khan, and though the Gurkhas, well commanded, fought splendidly, they were saved only from destruction by the prompt appearance on the field of Lieut. Sturt, of the Engineers, with two companies of their comrades. The result, though full of honour for the Gurkhas, was regarded by the tribes as a triumph. They has- tened, the Amir at their head, seriously to threaten Bajgah. The fort, weak as a military position, could not be held. Our men fell back on Syghan. But on their way to that place, the Afghan levies, trained and led by British officers, deserted and went over to Dost Mahammad. The remainder of the British force retreated on Bamian. 400 AFGHANISTAN. Meanwhile, the envoy, on hearing of the escape of the Amir from Bokhara, had reinforced the garrison at Bamian by a regiment of native infantry under Colonel Dennie, a very capable officer. Dennie, on learning the misfortune near Syghan, marched towards that place to meet the Amir, who was pressing on, flushed with anticipations of victory, towards Bamian. The rival forces joined battle on the 18th September. Dennie had only two guns, but they were sufficient to win the battle. Such was the effect of their fire, and so firm was the countenance of the sepoys, that the hill men fairly turned and fled, carrying the Amir and his two sons with them, and leaving their camp equipage, their kettledrums, their ammunition, and their only gun on the field. Dost Mahammad fled into the Kohistan, there, as will presently be seen, to excite new troubles. For the moment, however, the country north of the Hindu Kush had been quieted. Some valuable experience, too, had been gained — the most important, and in the eyes of the envoy the most alarming, being, that the Afghan levies were not to be trusted. The desertion of the Afghan levies must indeed have been a very rude awakening to Mr. Macnaghten. It would seem that for the first time the extreme false- ness of the position of the British presented itself to him in its real light. His communications with India depended upon the fidelity of the mountain tribes. Between the Afghan frontier and the Indian frontier — the Indus and the Satlaj — lay the warlike nation of the Sikhs, no longer restrained by the firm hand of Banjit THE BRITISH INVASION. 401 Singli, but boastful and aggressive. But Mr. Mac- naghten, though he recognised the danger of his position, was far from divining either the real evil or the true remedy. The policy which at this period he pressed upon Lord Auckland proves clearly how little he comprehended the real situation. To send him more troops — to declare war against the Sikhs ; this was his policy — a policy which, if carried out, would probably have lost India. Some allowance ought perhaps to be made for a man in the position Macnaghten then found himself. Desperate situations require desperate remedies ; and certainly Macnaghten’ s situation might well have ap- peared desperate. On the one side Dost Mahammad was in the Kohistan ; the chiefs in that mountainous district had given him a cordial reception and assured him of their sympathy and support. Expressions of goodwill and affection were sent to the Amir from the city of Kabul itself. These matters were hidden neither from the envoy nor from the Shah. On the other side, the Sikhs, always jealous of the British, perfectly cognisant of the utterly false military posi- tion of their rivals, were doing their utmost to raise the country between Peshawar and Kabul, so as to sever them from their supports. Keenly sensitive now to the fact that the popularity he had hitherto ascribed to the Shah had been unreal, Macnaghten saw that he had only British bayonets to rely upon. He therefore recalled Dennie from Bamian, and sent a force under Sale into the Kohistan to make head against Dost Mahammad and his turbulent sym- 26 402 AFGHANISTAN. pathisers. Dost Mahammad led Sale a dance. During the entire month of October he flitted about from one place to another, appearing now in the Ghorband valley, now at Nijrao, now in the vicinity of the capital. At last, on the 2nd November, the British force came in sight of him at Parwandarrah. So certain was Sale that he had him, that he lined the hills to prevent his escape. The battle joined. It is needless here to enter into details. Suffice it to say that the swarthy troopers of the 2nd Bengal Cavalry, failing their officers at a critical moment, permitted the Amir to gain a victory so decisive that Sir Alexander Burnes, who was present, wrote from the field of battle to Macnaghten to the effect that there was nothing left for the British force but to fall back on Kabul, and that it was absolutely necessary to concentrate there all the troops that were available ! What Macnaghten would have done had Dost Ma- hammad used his victory to the utmost can be con- jectured from the manner in which at a later date he met the crisis caused by Akbar Khan. This time he was spared the pain of arriving at a decision. The reasons which prompted Dost Mahammad to yield on the morrow of his victory can only be conjectured. It may have been, as Sir John Kaye believes, that, fore- seeing his ultimate defeat, he preferred to fall vic- torious. Possibly, knowing well the nature of the Afghans, and aware that the country, though seething, was not yet wound up to the pitch of revolt, he preferred to await in captivity the summons which he saw looming in the future. The fact remains, that on THE BBITJSH INVASION. 403 the evening of the day after the battle, as Mr. Mac- naghten was returning from his evening ride, an Afghan approached him and told him abruptly that the Amir was at hand. “What Amir?” asked Macnaghten. “Dost Mahammad Khan,” was the reply, and im- mediately afterwards Dost Mahammad, who had ridden from the field of battle with this one attendant, stood before him. The surrender was complete. Dost Mahammad, courteously received, wrote to his sons exhorting them to follow his example. A week later he was conducted under a strong escort to honourable exile in India. Again were the hopes of Macnaghten in the as- cendant. Once more was the choice offered him of pursuing the course which policy demanded. The Sadozye prince was on the throne ; the Barukzye leader was an exile. What need was there of British bayonets unless to support on the throne a prince unacceptable to the people ? Unhappily the system adopted by Macnaghten — the system of concentrating in his own hands all the power of the state— had alienated from the govern- ment of Shah Shujah all the great feudal chiefs of the land. Even the Duranis, the kinsfolk and tribesmen of the Shah, had revolted against a policy which ex- cluded them from power and influence. That power, that influence, and all the patronage belonging thereto, were virtually exercised by the infidel strangers. Not for this had the great clans asserted their freedom under Ahmad Shah. Not for this had they blinded Zaman and expelled Mahmud— not, that under the 26 * 404 AFGHANISTAN. nominal rule of a puppet they might become the servants of the infidel. The surrender and deportation of Dost Mahammad did not then really affect the vital points at issue. The fact that, subsequent to the surrender and the depor- tation, the discontent spread more widely and rooted itself more deeply in the hearts of the people, ought to have satisfied Macnaghten that something more than a dynastic question was involved. To fairly test the original British policy the British should have left Afghanistan with Dost Mahammad. It was the last chance afforded them of leaving it with honour. The first event to disturb the tranquillity which, it was fondly hoped, had been secured by the deportation of Dost Mahammad, was a rising in Zamindawar, headed by one Aktar Khan, and secretly fomented, it was said, by the Shah, with the view of shaking himself free from the British yoke. This, after a first show of success, was only suppressed by a detachment of British troops sent from Kandahar. It happened that at this time there was a man at Kandahar whose great abilities and keen insight into character had enabled him to form a just view of the situation. This was Captain (now Sir Henry) Raw- linson. The duties which devolved upon him had satisfied him as to the false position occupied by the British. Evidence was in his hands that the distur- bance referred to in the preceding paragraph had been fomented by Shah Shujah himself. He wrote his con- victions, and he enclosed the evidence, to Macnaghten. Macnaghten showed them to the Shah. Shah Shujah THE BRITISH INVASION. 405 feigned indignation and hoodwinked Macnaghten. The only consequence of the remonstrance was the re- moval of certain officials, and a promise made by the Shah that he would visit Kandahar in the autumn. The year 1841 dawned ominously for the British. The Khaibaris wrnre murmuring, and the Ghilzais showed symptoms that they were tired of infidel rule. An expedition to repress the former was actually being organized by Colonel Shelton. Macnaghten knew this, yet so blinded was his judgment by the minor instincts to which I have more than once referred, that he actually wrote at this period (February 1841), “ All things considered, the present tranquillity of the country is, to my mind, perfectly marvellous.” I must hurry over the proofs which time was to give of the existence of this marvellous tranquillity. Shelton suppressed the revolt in the Nazian valley. But the rising of the Ghilzais was more serious. Embittered by the capture, for an alleged insult to a British officer, of a small fort belonging to them within two miles of Kalat-i-Ghilzai, and of the slaughter of its chief and fifteen of his followers, they rose en masse, attacked the British force sent against them under Colonel Wymer, and only gave way at 10 p.m. after a very severe contest. Defeated, they were far from being subdued, and to aid them, Aktar Khan — the former rebel of Zamindawar — again rose with a following of six thousand men, in the neigh- bourhood of Girishk. Thanks to the energy of Nott and his lieutenants, both these rebellions were suppressed ; and on the 406 AFGHANISTAN. 2nd August following, Macnaghten, cheery and con- fident, recorded his opinion that the British “ pros- pects are most cheering; and, with the materials we have, there ought to be little or no difficulty in the management of the country.” This opinion, con- curred in by many of his subordinates, was not shared by the wiser portion. Rawlinson opposed it; Nott even denounced it; D’Arcy Todd, perceiving that British protection was more dreaded by the rulers of Herat than Persian domination, had withdrawn his mission from Herat rather than continue to pay large sums which he knew to be diverted to aims subversive of the views of his Government.* Cheering as the prospects were, in the eyes of Macnaghten, yet even Macnaghten must have been conscious that in dealing with a country like Afghan- istan, and with a people like the Afghans, a very small matter suffices to produce a storm. Disregard- ing, if not forgetting, the symptoms displayed by the tribes of the passes in 1839-40, the envoy, in the autumn of 1841, determined, in deference to the urgent calls made upon him by the Home Government and the Government of India to retrench his expen- diture, to curtail the annual subsidies guaranteed to the tribes, guardians of the passes. For this purpose he summoned the chiefs of those tribes to Kabul, and informed them that the necessities of the state re- quired that their annual stipends should be reduced. * For thus withdrawing his mission Todd was disavowed and removed from political employment. THE BRITISH INVASION. 407 The chiefs received the announcement without a murmur, but they did not the less act as though they regarded it as an infringement of a solemn compact. They immediately passed the word to their adherents that the communications with India were to be interrupted. It is impossible to palliate or even to explain the fatuity which directed so costly an economy. D’Arcy Tod had been removed from political employ, because he had protested against the payment to the infamous Kamran of a sum used mainly by him to subsidize our enemies. Economy being necessary, it would have been far wiser to withdraw that annual payment, than to endanger our communications at a very time when the maintenance of our position in Afghanistan de- pended on our army, and on our army alone. Yet at the very moment when the tribes of the passes were alienated, the northern parts of Afghanis- tan were again in commotion. Akbar Khan was on the Bamian frontier ; disaffection was rife in the Kohistan, in Zurmut, in Kabul itself. And now to these hostile indications were added the gathering of the Ghilzais on the Kabul river. An incident which occurred at this period, less than a month before the outbreak of the storm, ought to have warned the envoy and his assistants of the fate they had prepared for themselves. On the 3rd October, Burnes, knowing that the passes were blocked up, wrote to an officer, Captain Gray, who was about to return with a small detachment to India, and advised him to join himself to a chief who, with four hundred 408 AFGHANISTAN. men, was about to march to Laghman. Gray marched with the chief, Mahammad Uzin Khan, and he owed it to his chivalrous assistance that he made his journey in safety. Mahammad Uzin saved Gray and his detach- ment, but, in the frankness of friendship, he informed his English comrade that “ all Afghanistan was deter- mined to get rid of the Feringhis, and that the whole country was ready to break out.” Gray sent the infor- mation to Burnes, and Burnes received it. Still, matters were allowed to go on as if the situa- tion were secure. But there soon came warnings of the storm. On the night of the 9th October the 35th Native Infantry, commanded by Colonel Monteath, and encamped at Butkak, nine miles from Kabul, was sud- denly attacked in force. The attack was repulsed, and Sale, marching from Kabul, cleared the passes. The 35th Native Infantry, remaining encamped and isolated at Butkak, was again attacked, and again repulsed the enemy, on the 17th. Sale, aware now of the error he had committed in leaving that regiment isolated, joined it on the 20th with the rest of his brigade, and began his march for the Tazin valley. On entering the valley on the 22nd there ensued with the Ghilzais a skirmish, which, though badly managed by the British general, who was non-efficient from a wound, impressed the Afghan leaders with the idea of their enemy’s power. They therefore determined to avoid by a ruse the punishment they had evoked, and they actually succeeded in beguiling the political officer with Sale’s force, Captain Macgregor, to persuade the general to accept their submission, on THE BEITISH INVASION. 409 condition that their fort should be spared. The oppor- tunity of inflicting a blow where it was most neces- sary to strike was thus lost by the political officer. When it offered again it was lost by the commander. Sale, though one of the most gallant of men, was no general. In the march from the Tazin valley to Glan- damak more than one splendid opportunity was offered him to strike a deadly blow at the Glhilzais — a blow which would annihilate them. He missed them all, not because he did not wish to strike — for since the transaction related in the preceding paragraph he had become convinced of the perfidy of the Afghans — but because the opportunities were invisible to him. He reached Grandamak on the 30th October. On the 2nd November the storm burst in its full fury on Macnaghten and the English. The tale has often been told, and I can find no space for it here. It found its victims totally unprepared. The envoy had denuded Kabul of his best troops. The remainder were commanded by a worn-out invalid, incapable of forming a firm resolution, equally incapable of act- ing upon one formed for him by another. What sort of a man the envoy was these pages have shown. Possessing considerable ability, he had, nevertheless, trained his intellect to believe that to be true which he wished to be true ; and he persisted to the last, despite of the most glaring evidence of bad faith, in trusting the Afghans. The natural results followed. With division every- where and self-reliance nowhere, it was impossible to effect great things. There was, in fact, no command. 410 AFGHANISTAN. The measures which had been resolved upon one moment were cancelled an hour later; and this inde- cision, commencing in the tent of the general, had a fatal effect upon the officers and men. Credulity con- tinued to the very last. The most open marks of hostility on the part of the Afghans served but to induce the British leaders to pretend a greater confi- dence in their good faith. This confidence was dis- turbed neither by the murder of Burnes within the city, nor by the assassination of the envoy at a con- ference by Akbar Khan. Notwithstanding these un- doubted proofs, and others scarcely less significant, of determined hostility, the leaders of the British force — a force numbering, all told, nearly five thousand* men — suffered themselves to be beguiled to trusting to the promises of the Afghans rather than to the bayonets of their soldiers. To use the emphatic lan- guage of an officer who, young then, had already dis- played signs of the ability which he brought to such ripe results in later years— the late Sir Henry Have- lock, himself one of those who had accompanied Sale to Grandamak, — “ they credulously confided in Afghan faith, moved in the power and at the dictation of Akbar Khan, took up the positions he pointed out, forbore to fire on the partisans he had arrayed to destroy them ; and, as much to the last the dupes of intrigue and treachery as the victims of the sword, cold, hunger and fatigue, were engulfed in the eastern Grhilzai moun- * The force consisted of 4,500 fighting men, of whom 700 were Europeans. There were besides the wives and children of the officers and men, and 12,000 native camp followers. THE BRITISH INVASION. 411 tains.” In the first month of 1842 there survived of the entire British force only the prisoners and hostages taken by Akbar Khan, and one man, Dr. Brydon, who had escaped to Jalalabad. Thus ended, practically, the attempt of the British Government to foist upon an independent people a king previously rejected by that people, governing by means of British agents, and supported on his throne by British bayonets. It is true that the British did not lose entire hold of the country. They kept Jala- labad and Kandahar against all the forces which the Afghans could bring against them. A few months later Kabul was reoccupied, and the captives and hostages were recovered by the avenging armies of Nott and Pollock. It would be foreign to my purpose to enter into the military details of these events. The British soldiers met with no real difficulty in re- occupying the country, but they evacuated it after they had vindicated their prestige and shown their power. The unhappy Shah Shujah did not long survive the destruction of the supports upon which he had so long rested. Enticed out of his palace, on the 4th April, by the fierce feudal chiefs raised by the successful insurrection to the summit of affairs, he was waylaid and shot dead. Until the 15th September following — the date on which Kabul was reoccupied by the avenging army of Pollock — anarchy was so far ram- pant that the supreme authority was held in abeyance. Accompanying General Pollock’s force was the second son of Shah Shujah, Fathi Jang — a young man who, escaping from Kabul at the time of his father’s assassi- 412 AFGHANISTAN. nation, had deemed himself happy in being able to join, clothed in tatters, the British force at Gandamak, on the 1st September. This unhappy prince was now placed by the British authorities on the throne of Kabul, but he was, at the same time, emphatically warned that he was to expect no assistance, neither in money, nor in men, nor in arms, from the British Government. On these terms Fathi Jang accepted his father’s throne. A little later he shared his father’s fate. Meanwhile Dost Mahammad, awarded an annual income of two lakhs of rupees, had lionised India. He had been shown our arsenals, our ships, our industries, our courts of justice, and our troops. He had wit- nessed the order, the contentment, the just adminis- tration, prevailing throughout Hindustan. He had lived in Calcutta, but, the climate not agreeing with him, he had proceeded to the hill station of Misuri. Thence he was summoned, 25th October 1842, by the order of Lord Ellenborough, to return, so soon as the armies of Pollock and Nott should have recrossed the Indus, to his native country. He returned ; was received by Shir Singh, King of Lahor, with respect ; then prosecuting his journey to Kabul, entered that city, and quietly and unostenta- tiously resumed the office of which, nearly three years previously, the British had deprived him. No attempt had been made, during his absence, to occupy his seat. It had been reserved specially for him. He returned the elect of the people, the chosen leader, to whom alone they were prepared to tender homage. THE BRITISH INVASION. 413 Such was the closing scene of the premature and ill-conducted attempt of the British upon Afghanistan. It failed, and it deserved to fail. It failed because, first, it had for its principle the foisting upon the Afghan people of a king whom they did not want ; secondly, because the English agents sent with that king concentrated in their own hands the government of the country, making him appear a cypher to his subjects ; and, thirdly, though to a less degree, be- cause the danger to combat which the expedition was undertaken, was distant, intangible, and imaginary. Time has changed many things since that stirring period. Extreme caution has taken the place of recklessness in our councils ; the danger which was then distant, intangible, and imaginary, is now close at hand, real, threatening. That that danger must be met all are agreed. I am much mistaken if an appli- cation of the sounder portion of our past policy to the improved territorial position we have acquired since 1842 fail to indicate clearly the method by which we may influence the Afghan people to become, in very deed, “ the friends of our friends and the enemies of our enemies.” 414 AFGHANISTAN. CHAPTER XI. HISTORICAL. AFGHANISTAN FROM 1842 TO 1869. The first seven years following tlie return of the Amir may be described as politically uneventful. His brothers resumed their rule at Kandahar. His father’s murderer, the infamous Kamran of Herat, was him- self murdered that same year (1842), by his not less infamous minister, Yar Mahammad. The territories now known as Afghan Turkistan and Badakhshan were virtually independent. The Amir had returned only to the position which he had left, the sovereignty over Kabul up to the Hindu Kush, and of Grhazni. The natural tendency of the rulers of Kandahar and Herat was still to place their dependence upon Persia. The conquest of Sindh by the British in 1843, by bringing that people near his frontier, very much weakened the power for intrigue possessed till then by Kohandil Khan, the representative Barukzye at Kan- dahar ; and the annexation by the same people of the Panjab in 1849, had upon him a not less sobering influence. from 1842 to 1869. 415 That annexation Dost Mahammad had striven his utmost to prevent. During the life and death struggle between the British and the Sikhs in 1848-49, he had, at the head of a body of troops, traversed the Khaibar pass, occupied the Peshawar valley, and had detached two thousand of his best horsemen, commanded by one of his sons, to aid the Sikh chieftains, then hoping much in consequence of the indecisive battle they had fought at Chilianwala. Those horsemen took part in the battle of Gujrat, but though, it is said, they attempted to imitate a manoeuvre they had learned from the English, by making a detour, and then dash- ing down with a swoop on the English general and his staff, their plans were detected and foiled by the British cavalry, notably by the Sindh horse, and they were driven from the field. Pursued without inter- mission by Sir Walter Gilbert, they did not halt even at Jamrud, but galloped helter-skelter into the Khaibar, whither the Amir had preceded them, beaten, baffled, and humiliated. The annexation of the Panjab, in spite of himself and his horsemen, the exchange of a neighbour falling to pieces, for one united, powerful, and civilised, by no means tended to decrease the enmity of the Amir towards the British. Neighbours as they had become for some years, he avoided all in- tercourse with his former enemy, and throughout that period he never ceased to incite the tribes of the passes to annoy the British by perpetual hostilities. The year following the annexation of the Pan jab by the British, the Amir crossed the Hindu Kush to re- assert Afghan authority in the provinces south of the 416 AFGHANISTAN. Oxus. In this expedition he entirely succeeded, and thenceforth he could reckon Afghan Turkistan and Badakhshan as integral portions of his dominions. Herat and Kandahar still continued, however, to give him annoyance. The intrigues of Persia were constantly directed to the recovery of the important district represented by the former, and in these in- trigues she was well served by the nobles, who seemed to live only to struggle there for supremacy. Yar Mahammad, the assassin of Kamran, was in his turn murdered. His son, Synd Mahammad Khan, suc- ceeded him, but shortly went mad. The nominal successor of this prince was Mahammad Yusuf ; but having selected as his vizier a man, Esau Khan, cleverer than himself, he was soon dethroned. His place was naturally occupied by Esau Khan, and under the sway of this astute intriguer the suzerainty of Persia would have become almost an accomplished fact, but for the warnings which the British Govern- ment of the day caused to be communicated and repeated to that power. But though the warnings of the British Govern- ment checked the actual movements, they failed to stop the intrigues of Persia alike with Herat and Kandahar. These in the end so affected Dost Maham- mad that they caused him to forget his enmity to the British, and opening negotiations with them, he agreed, in 1854, to detach his son, Gholam Haidar Khan, to Peshawar, to conclude a treaty of alliance with his ancient enemies. Gholam Haidar came to Peshawar. The Govern- from 1842 to 1869. 417 ment of India was represented by the Chief Commis- sioner of the Panjab, Mr., now Lord, Lawrence. The articles of this treaty were but three in number. The first provided for “perpetual peace and friendship” between the Amir of Kabul and his heirs on one side and the East India Company on the other. By the second, the said Company engaged to respect the Afghan territory, and never to interfere therein. By the third, the Amir entered into a like engagement with respect to the territory of the Company, and promised in addition “to be the friend of the friends and enemy of the enemies of the Honourable East India Company.” This treaty marks a sensible departure from the position of isolation maintained up to that time by the Amir of Kabul. It shows that he felt, and felt acutely, that which all the Moghol rulers of Kabul had felt before him, that Afghanistan and Hindustan had need of each other. On this occasion the need was felt by Afghanistan, or rather by the northern and eastern parts of Afghanistan, and the need was felt in con- sequence of the stealthy endeavours of a neighbour to attract to herself the really fertile and valuable portions of the rocky country. If the Amir had hoped that his alliance with England would put an immediate stop to Persian intrigues he was disappointed. Those intrigues continued, and culminated in the march of a Persian army to Herat, and by the surrender of the city to that army in October 1856. But the British alliance was not useless. On the 27 418 AFGHANISTAN. 1st November following, the English Government declared war against Persia, and followed up that declaration by the despatch of a fleet and army to the Persian gulf. Into the operations of that fleet and of that army it is not necessary to enter. It will suffice to state that they were successful ; that Persia, beaten on her own territory, was humiliated ; and that on the 4th March 1857 the representative of the Shah signed, at Paris, an agreement by which the Shah pledged him- self to renounce all claim of sovereignty over Herat and over Afghanistan. Before that agreement had been signed, but not before the issue of the war with Persia had been made certain, the Chief Commissioner of the Panjab, Sir John Lawrence, and Colonel Herbert Edwardes, had met the Amir, Dost Mahammad, at Peshawar, and had conferred with him regarding the most practicable method of cementing a strong alliance and a good understanding between British India and Afghanistan. Lord Lawrence has since stated that the Amir objected very strongly to the idea which had been mooted of sending a British officer to Kabul to act there as agent for his government. But by the fourth article of the treaty the Amir agreed, under the actual circumstances, to the deputation of British officers, with suitable native establishments, to Kabul, or Kandahar, or Balkh, or all three places, or wherever an Afghan army might be assembled to act against the Persians. The fourth article then proceeded as follows : “It will be their duty to see generally that the subsidy granted to feom 1842 to 1869. 419 the Amir be devoted to the military purposes for which it is given, and to keep their own government informed of all affairs. They will have nothing to do with the payment of the troops, or advising the Kabul government ; and they will not interfere in anyway in the internal administration of the country. The Amir will be responsible for their safety and honourable treatment while in his country, and for keeping them acquainted with all military and political matters con- nected with the war.” The first of the articles of the treaty, thirteen in number, provided that as the Shah of Persia had, con- trary to his engagement with the British Government, taken Herat, and had manifested an intention to inter- fere with the other possessions of the Amir, therefore, the British Government, being at war with Persia, would aid the Amir to defend his possessions, and would grant him for that purpose a monthly allowance of ten thousand pounds. The second and third articles related to mere de- tails. The fourth I have already quoted. The fifth provided for the appointment by the Amir of a vakil to reside at Peshawar. The sixth and seventh pro- vided that the monthly allowance should cease with the war, or at the pleasure of the Indian Government ; that on its cessation the British officers should be withdrawn from Afghanistan ; but that a native vakil, not a British officer, might remain at Kabul. The remaining six articles related to matters in no way material. In consequence of the fourth article of this treaty a 27 * 420 AFGHANISTAN. mission composed of three British officers was deputed to Kandahar early in 1857. These officers were in Kandahar when the news that a mutiny had broken out in India reached that place. Grholam Haidar Khan the governor of the city, sent a message, then, to the Amir, telling him that news had arrived that all the English in India had been murdered, adding : “ Had I not better cut the throats of these three ? ” The reply of the Amir showed that his exile in Hin- dustan had not been without some advantage to him. “ It is useless,” he answered ; “ I know these English well. It may be true that all those in India have been murdered, but they will come in thousands from beyond the sea, and reconquer the country. Better leave these three alone.” They were accordingly permitted to remain and to return in safety. The city and districts of Herat had devolved after the Persian war on Ahmad Khan, a nephew of the Amir, nominally as an independent holding. But Persia, though beaten in 1857, had not renounced her love of intrigue ; and Ahmad Khan, to protect himself against the Amir, had virtually agreed to recognise the Shah of Persia as his suzerain. The Amir was not at all inclined to tolerate this intrusion, and he finally settled matters by marching with an army against Herat and storming it, thus re-uuiting western and eastern Afghanistan — for Kandahar and Glirishk had previously acknowledged him — under the rule of one man. Nine days after the Amir had entered Herat as a conqueror — 9th June 1863 — he died. Of the sons who survived Dost Mahammad, the five from 1842 to 1869. 421 eldest, ranking in the order in which I have placed them, were Afzul Khan, Azim Khan, sons of one mother, and Shir Ali Khan, Sharif Khan, and Amin Khan, likewise maternally related. Besides these were Aslam Khan and Husen Khan, to be presently referred to. Gholam Haidar, who had been designated as heir of the Amir, had died in 1858, and the Amir had then notified to the Government of India that he had nominated Shir Ali to be his successor. This notification was received and the nomination was recognised by the government of Lord Canning. The reasons for the selection of Shir Ali, in prefer- ence to Afzul and Azim, were patent. What Afzul Khan was, preceding pages of this history have in- dicated.* Dost Mahammad had judged him from his behaviour after the fall of Ghazni and in the country round Bamian in 1839-40. Azim Khan stood, certainly not higher, m his opinion. Morally he was regarded as vile, even in Afghanistan. Neither possessed the force of character necessary to keep together, to con- trol, a people like the Afghans. Shir Ali, though pos- sibly not equal to either Akbar Khan or Gholam Haidar, as they had been, was still superior to the elder survivors. Though cruel, ungrateful, and self- seeking, he possessed tenacity of purpose and cool courage. If, therefore, a son of Dost Mahammad were to succeed his father, it was inevitable that that son should be Shir Ali. Shir Ali at once notified his accession to the office of * Vide pp. 377 to 400. 422 AFGHANISTAN. Amir to the government of India, expressing his in- tention of “ following the laudable example of his father in maintaining the strong ties of amity and friendship subsisting between the British Government and the Afghan state.” Lord Elgin was then Governor- General. Simultaneously with Shir Ali’s notification came rumours — but only rumours — that the discarded brothers were preparing to contest his claims. These rumours, which had but slight founda- tion at the time, caused Lord Elgin to hesitate. He determined “ to wait further information before taking a formal step in acknowledgment of Shir Ali.” Taking into consideration the fact that Shir Ali was then de facto ruler ; that no outbreak had actually oc- curred, and that any such outbreak would have been rebellion ; that the message of Shir Ali was courteous and friendly ; the reticence of the Indian Government cannot be too greatly deplored. We have seen how, step by step, Dost Mahammad had shaken off his mis- trust of the British government until at last a cordial friendship had been cemented. The first advances of his successor were met by a rebuff. The silence of Lord Elgin could only have been regarded by Shir Ali as a warning that the British did not intend to continue to him the cordial friendship they had promised to his father. Lord Elgin died in the autumn of 1863, and his place was temporarily taken by Sir William Denison. Meanwhile no disturbance amounting to rebellion had broken out in Afghanistan. Sir William Denison, then, six months after the receipt of Shir Ali’s letter, from 1842 to 1869. 423 acknowledged it — not in the warm and friendly terms employed by Shir Ali, but in the stilted language of cold officialism. On receiving the acknowledgment the Amir once again evinced the importance he attached to the friendship of the British by requesting the Viceroy, in a friendly way, to supply him with six thousand muskets of which he had need. He asked likewise that his eldest son, Mahammad Ali, might receive in official correspondence his title of heir apparent ; and he further solicited pardon for the brother of one of the chief functionaries at the Court of Kabul— that brother having been sentenced in Calcutta to seven years’ transportation for receiving stolen property. At the time that these requests were received, Sir John, now Lord, Lawrence had taken up the office of Viceroy. Lord Lawrence granted pardon to the offending brother ; agreed to recognise Mahammad Ali as heir apparent ; but refused the muskets. When, three months later, April 1864, the two brothers, Afzul Khan and Azim Khan, broke out into rebellion, the government of India refused to regard their outbreak in any other light than as civil war — to be fought to the bitter end between the brothers. They announced in fact that they were prepared to recognise, and to treat with, as ruler of Afghanistan, any one of the brothers who should establish himself on the throne of that country. This was the policy to which was accorded the name of masterly inactivity. In pursuing this policy, Lord Lawrence had the sup- port of the able men by whom he was surrounded in 424 AFGHANISTAN. India. From an English point of view, and narrow- ing the transaction to a dealing between England and Afghanistan, there was at the time much to be said in its favour. But it is impossible not to see that Shir Ali must have regarded it as selfish and unfriendly, as indicating a determination of the English to side only with the members of his family who for the time should be the strongest. The question may be asked, how should the English have acted ? An armed intervention was out of the question. There was no certainty that Shir Ali would gain the day. By helping him, the English would have made an enemy of his rivals. And if his rivals had won ? There is but one natural reply to these questions. The only support that could be given to Shir Ali was moral support — support to him as the ruler we had recognised ; compliance with his demands, so far as such compliance did not involve us in actual hostilities ; and refusal to recognise his rivals until he should have been absolutely effaced. The actual policy pursued may be stated in a few words. In the course of the nearly five years’ contest which followed the rebellion of April 1864, the ad- vances made by Shir Ali to the India Government were uniformly received with coldness; whilst his brothers, on obtaining temporary occupation of the capital and its environs, were successively recognised as de facto rulers of that portion of the country. The actual course of the events of the rebellion may be thus briefly sketched. At the time of the from 1842 to 1869. 425 death of the Amir Dost Mahammad, his son Afzul Khan was at Balkh, governing Afghan Turkistan ; Afzul’ s brother, Azhn, was at Fort Kurin, governing the districts of Kost and Kurin, adjoining the British frontier ; Sharif Khan, brother by the same mother to Shir Ali, governed Farrah and Girishk ; whilst the fourth, Amin Khan, similarly related to the Amir, governed Kandahar. At first none of these four brothers showed any in- clination to question their dead father’s will. But at the end of August 1863, the Amir heard, when at Ghazni, that all was not right in Kurm. He accord- ingly turned his course into that country, and forced Azim Khan to swear fealty to him. During the re- maining months of 1863 order remained undisturbed throughout the country. In April of the following year, both Afzul and Azim rebelled. The Amir boldly met them, crushed, by means of one of his generals, Mahammad Rafik, the insurrection of Azim, whom he forced to take refuge in British territory ; and, crossing himself the Hindu Kush, marched upon Afzul. The advance guard of the Amir’s army engaged in- decisively the advance guard of Afzul Khan’s army at Bajgah — the Bajgah so famous in 1840. Two days later, Mahammad Rafik joined the Amir, and Afzul sued for peace. The Amir was merciful — too merciful — for he not only granted Afzul peace, but restored him to his government. But whilst the Amir yet remained in Afghan Tur- kistan, on good terms with Afzul, intelligence reached 426 AFGHANISTAN. him that the son of Afzul, Abdul Rahman, whom he had summoned to his court, had fled across the Oxus to Bokhara. Suspecting this evasion to be part of a preconcerted plot, he instantly caused Afzul Khan to be seized and fettered. In his place he nominated his nephew, Fathi Mahammad, to be governor of the districts south of the Oxus. The Amir was now apparently triumphant. But the insult offered to his father rankled in the mind of Abdul Rahman, and he incited the Amir of Bokhara to espouse his cause. Before the winter snows of 1864-65 had melted in the passes of the Hindu Kush, Shir Ali knew that the coming spring was pregnant with danger. The danger came, first from the side of Kandahar, caused by the revolt of Sharif Khan. The tribes of the Kiirm country were at the same time roused by Azina Khan, who, on a sign from the conspirators, had crossed the British border. Again did the Amir boldly face the danger. Maham- mad Rafik cleared Kiirm whilst he marched on Kan- dahar. The rebels, led by two of his brothers, Sharif and Amin, and a nephew, Jalal-u-din, met him at Kujbaz, near Kalat-i-Grhilzai. The battle that fol- lowed was most hotly contested. In the height of the conflict the Amir’s eldest son, Mahammad Ali, fell by the hand of his uncle, Amin Khan. Instantly the uncle paid for the bloody deed with his life, and the rebel army, disconcerted, fled in disorder. This victory, great as it was, decisive as it might have been made, was more than tarnished, in the eyes feom 1842 to 1869. 427 of the Amir, by the death of his son. “ It clouded all his joys;” it plunged him into a state of melancholy almost akin to madness. For months he paid no attention to affairs. In this state he remained, at Kandahar, indifferent to all around him, not roused to action even by the intelligence that the rebels, gather- ing heart, and reinforced by levies from Turkistan and Bokhara, were marching upon Kabul, and that his own friends were falling from him. But at last, when his lethargy had seemed to attain the condition of con- firmed lunacy, the news of the occupation of Kabul by the rebels roused him to action. He then set out to meet them. Who were these rebels ? The victory of Kiijbaz had been decisive enough to break up the conspiracy. On its morrow Sharif Khan sued for pardon, Azhn Khan had fled to plot renewed treason in British territory. The Amir, despite of his bitter grief, had been merciful — he had pardoned the revolters. But, during his lethargy, Abdul Rahman, the exile at Bokhara, had been active. Aided by the Amir of that country, he raised levies, crossed the Oxus, cor- rupted the lieutenants of Shir Ali in Afghan Tur- kistan, drew over to himself the Amir’s best general, Mahammad Rafik, and, joined by the plotter Azim Khan, from his asylum in British territory, entered Kabul, 2nd March 1865. This was the intelligence which roused the Amir from his stupor. With a force of about fourteen thou- sand men, five thousand of whom were horsemen, and twenty-five guns, he marched by way of Ghazni on the 428 AFGHANISTAN. capital, and on the 9th May came up with the rebel army, strongly intrenched at Shekhabad. The rebels had the advantage of numbers, of posi- tion, of fighting behind intrenchments. Shir Ali had in his favour the inspiration which attack always con- fers. He led his troops against the intrenchments with a valour not to be surpassed. Thrice repulsed, he charged a fourth time with so much vigour that the position was almost forced, when, at a critical moment, the levies he had raised at Kandahar went over to the rebels. This desertion lost the Amir the battle. He fled from the field, followed by only five hundred horsemen. Up to this time his half-brother Afzul had been a prisoner — latterly in Grhazni. The commandant of that fortress, shutting its gates in the face of the defeated Amir, released the prisoner and restored him to his son, Abdul Rahman. From that moment Afzul Khan assumed his position as chief of the triumphant conspirators. Entering Kabul, he usurped the dignity and office of Amir. The Munshi, who then represented the Gfovernment of India at Kabul, received, shortly afterwards, instructions to present himself to the usurper and offer him the usual congratulations. Meanwhile Shir Ali, collecting his partisans at a place beyond Grhazni, had assured them that, whilst under no circumstances would he renounce the office of Amir, he left them free to follow their inclinations. He then continued his flight to Turkistan, raised there a second army, and marched with it towards Kabul. From the capital, to meet him, issued Abdul Rahman, prom 1842 to 1869. 429 son of the usurper Afzul. This chief manoeuvred with so much ability that he managed to interpose between the two corps into which the Amir had divided his army, fell upon that not led by the Amir, at Kila Alladad, on the 13th September 1867, and totally defeated it. The Amir, disheartened by this fatal mishap, hastily retreated through the passes. Three weeks after this battle the usurper, on whose behalf it had been fought, died. Before his death the British Government had informed him that whilst they could not recognise him as ruler of provinces, such as those of Kandahar and Herat, still in the possession of Shir Ali, they would be glad to have him as a friend if he were able to consolidate his power in the country.* Afzul Khan was succeeded in his usurpation by his brother Azina Khan, whose accession was likewise re- cognised by the Government of India. But his tenure of Kabul did not last long. In January 1868, the Amir left Turkistan for Herat, and advanced on Kan- dahar in the month of June following. There he was received as a deliverer. His generals, marching thence on the capital, took the Bala Hissar by storm. He * The concluding words of the British despatch are : “ My friend ! the relations of this Government are with the actual rulers of Afghanistan. If your Highness is able to consolidate your Highness’s power in Kabul, and is sincerely desirous of being a friend and ally of the British Government, I shall be ready to accept your Highness as such, but I cannot break the existing engagements with Amir Shir Ali Khan, and must continue to treat him as the ruler of that portion of Afghanistan over which he retains control. Sincerity and fair dealing induce me to write thus plainly and openly to your Highness.” 430 AFGHANISTAN. followed thither shortly after, forced the usurper* to seek refuge once more in British territory, inflicted upon Abdul Rahman, in January 1869, a crushing and decisive defeat, and recovered all the dominions be- queathed to him by his father. The credit for the success of the Amir in this victorious campaign was due mainly to three of his nearest relatives ; to his son Yakub Khan ; to his brother Aslam Khan ; and to his nephew Ishmail, son of Amin Khan. Thus, without external assistance, in spite of the recognition by the British of his rivals in the hour of their temporary success, did Shir Ali vindicate the prescience of his father and win by the sword the throne to which he had succeeded by right — as right is known to the Afghans. In 1869 he was undisputed Amir of Afghanistan — a ruler stronger, more to be dreaded as an enemy or courted as an ally, than had been the Shir Ah of 1863. With the triumph of 1868 closes the first troubled period of Shir All's reign. To understand the re- mainder it will be necessary to devote a chapter to the consideration of Russian policy in Central Asia from the year 1854 to the present time. * He, Azfm Khan, died subsequently in exile. 431 CHAPTER XII. HISTORICAL. RUSSIAN AND ENGLISH POLICY IN CENTRAL ASIA. In a previous chapter of this history I have stated that it was the phantom of Russian aggression which caused the expedition to Kabul in 1839. Whatever ideas the Czar may have entertained on the subject of an eastern extension of his empire prior to that period, his fron- tiers were too remote, the intermediate distance to be traversed by his legions was too great, to necessitate action on the part of the British, politically premature, and in a military point of view unsound. It must always be recollected, when referring to the policy of 1838-41, that Afghanistan was then separated from India by three powerful and independent states : by the Panjab, by Sind, and by Biluchistan. Granting, too, as I am prepared to grant, that the idea of the conquest of Central Asia had taken in the mind of the Czar the form of a project to be accomplished in a distant future, it is certain that he never entertained the idea of immediate action, deeming the possession 432 AFGHANISTAN. of Constantinople or the breaking- down of the bar- riers of the Caucasus an indispensable preliminary to its execution. The Czar struck his blow for Constantinople in 1854, failed, and died. The idea did not die with him. But the road to Constantinople being temporarily barred, his successor, the present Czar, the inheritor of all his father’s projects, made a determined effort to overthrow the barrier which shut from him the plains and the deserts, the cities and the rivers, of Central Asia. Hurling, in 1856, one hundred and fifty thou- sand troops against the passes of the Caucasus, the Czar resolved that this time there should be no playing at soldiers. The consequence was that less than three years after the signature of the Peace of Paris, Schamyl Khan was a prisoner ; the strongholds of the Caucasus had been stormed ; and the mountaineers, who for long preceding years had successfully defied Russia, had abandoned their native fastnesses to seek shelter in the dominions of the Sultan. Nor, whilst thus engaged in breaking down the mountain barrier, had Russia been unmindful of the ulterior issues. For some years previously she had been working her way across the low undulating plains which lie between the Alatan range and the Jaxartes. The moment that she had succeeded in pacifying the conquered Caucasus she made the long-considered move in advance. Up to 1863 she had contented her- self with creeping along the banks of the Jaxartes. In that year she made her spring across that river. The Khanate of Khokand, with a population of three RUSSIAN AND ENGLISH POLICY IN CENTRAL ASIA. 433 millions, was the first object of her attack. The cap- ture of the important city of Tchemkend brought her into collision with the troops of Bokhara — a collision which resulted in the defeat of the Amir of that place and the capture of the town of Turkistan. This sudden aggressive move on the part of Russia caused considerable anxiety to the governments of England and India, and the Russian government was addressed on the subject. The reply of Prince Gortschakoff, in the form of a manifesto, may be styled, judged by the light of later events, as truly Russian. The capture of Tchemkend and Turkistan the Prince justified, in that document, on the plea that such a measure had been necessitated by the nomadic and predatory character of the populations on the Russian frontier. Prince Gortschakoff proceeded to imply that the point up to which necessity had forced Russia to advance had been reached. Russia was now, he said, “ in the presence of a more solid and compact, less unsettled and better organised social state ; fixing for us with geographical precision the limit up to which we are bound to advance and at which we must halt.” This State paper doubtless afforded, as it certainly was intended to afford, great satisfaction to the British Government of the day. If the reader will bear in mind its date, November 1864, and will recollect that at that time the Amir, Shir Ali, was on the eve of the great internecine struggle which lost him for a time his kingdom, he will see additional reason for the intense satisfaction with which the British Govern- 28 434 AFGHANISTAN. ment received tlie assurances of the Russian Chan- cellor. “ But,” as Sir Henry Rawlinson has truly recorded, “ the ink was hardly dry with which this manifesto was written, before its pacific promises were completely stultified.” The Russians, on the pretext that certain Russian officers, sent to Bokhara to negotiate, had been detained in that city, renewed hostihties with the Amir with greater bitterness than ever. By June 1865 they had conquered Tashkend. Again declaring (September 1865) that the Czar had no desire to add further to his dominions, they resumed hostilities in 1866, captured Khojend, the key of the Jaxartes, and overrunning Khokand, at once annexed one half of that province to their empire, placing the remaining moiety in the hands of a native chief, Khudyar Khan, to be administered by him on terms which made him a vassal of Russia. Forgetting, or choosing not to remember, his Chancellor’s famous manifesto of November 1864, the Czar, by a ukase dated July 1867 — a period, be it remembered, when Shir Ali was still struggling for his kingdom, — formally annexed the newly conquered territories to the Russian empire. Russia had now become the nearest neigbour to Bokhara. Under the pretext of protecting his re- cently acquired territories, the new Russian com- mander, General Kaufmann, established a fortified post at a point almost within reach of Samarkand. This constituted a challenge which the Amir of Bokhara could not refuse without sacrificing his inde- pendence. He accepted it, and was beaten. The con- RUSSIAN AND ENGLISH POLICY IN CENTRAL ASIA. 435 sequence was that Samarkand was occupied by Russian troops, and as the occupation of that place affected the supply of water to Bokhara, the Amir of that place found himself forced to agree to become a tributary of the Czar. I have now brought the historical sketch of the proceedings of Russia in Central Asia to the time (18th January 1869) when the Amir of Kabul, haying vanquished, unaided, all his rivals, had established himself as undisputed ruler of Afghanistan. The four to five years occupied by him in repressing rebellion within his borders had been spent by the Russians in making the phantom of 1838 a reality, in bringing their borders within very easy distance of the river covering the Amir’s northern frontier, — the Oxus. The proximity between the Russian frontier and the frontier of the country which has ever been the out- work of Hindustan, in 1869, would seem to have roused the attention of the British Government, for it was in that year that Lord Clarendon suggested to the Russian Chancellor his famous plan of constituting Afghanistan a neutral zone. Prince Gortschakoff received the idea with enthusiasm, and declared that his master, the Czar, “ looks upon Afghanistan as completely outside the sphere within which Russia may be called upon to exercise her influence.” The Government of India having objected, and wisely objected, to an arrangement which removed Afghan- istan completely from the sphere of British influence, the negotiations on the subject were prolonged for two years, the Russian Government continuing to 28 * 436 AFGHANISTAN. protest, by the mouth of its Chancellor, that “ Russia had no intention of going further south,” and that “ extension of territory was extension of weakness.” Ultimately, Russia agreed to accept the line of the Upper Oxus as the boundary of Afghanistan. It has since transpired, that whilst Russia was making these and similar protestations, she was plan- ning an expedition against Khiva. Charged with the fact, she denied it over and over again. So explicit in his denial was the Russian Chancellor, that he imposed on the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg. But the truth gradually eked out. In 1872 Lord A. Loftus informed the British Government that he had gained the conviction that such an expedition had been decided upon, and would take place as soon as weather and circumstances would permit. Still the government of the Czar, and the Russian ambassador in London, con- tinued to evade and to deny. Forced at last to admit that there was to be an expedition, they pleaded pathetically that it was to be a very little one. It was to consist of “but four and a half battalions to punish acts of brigandage.” “Not only,” added the Russian ambassador, “ was it far from the intention of the Emperor to take possession of Khiva, but positive orders had been prepared to prevent it.” What was the actual result ? A few months later, 10th June 1873, Khiva fell ; the whole of its territory on the right bank of the Oxus was annexed ; the suzerainty of Russia was forced, and an enormous indemnity was imposed, upon the Khan ! So much for the solemn promises of Russia ! I must beg the reader to bear RUSSIAN AND ENGLISH POLICY IN CENTRAL ASIA. 437 in mind that it was the fall of this place, and the means by which it fell, that impelled Shir Ali, terrified for his own country, to implore the close alliance of the Viceroy of India, Lord Northbrook, in 1873 ! The manner in which the virtual annexation of Khiva, despite the solemn assurances of Russia, was received by the British Government of the day, is astounding. The Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Lord Granville, not only declined to examine “ too minutely how far these arrangements were in strict accordance with the assurances given in January by Count Schou- valoff,” but, hopeful still, he again addressed the Russian Chancellor on the subject of a clear and frank understanding between the two governments regard- ing their respective positions in Central Asia. The people of England, knowing what they know now, will not be at all surprised to learn that Prince Gortschakoff expressed in reply his “entire satisfaction” at the “just view Lord Granville had taken.” Having now reviewed the Russian policy in Central Asia up to the crucial year of 1873, I propose to inquire the steps which the Government of India had taken during that period to meet the insidious approach of their country’s rival. I have called the year 1873 a “crucial” year not only because it witnessed the capture of Khiva by Russia, but because, also, it roused the keen apprehensions of our ally, Amir Shir Ali, to the danger which was threatening his territories. In the preceding chapter I have brought the history of Shir Ali up to the year 1868. In the autumn of 438 AFGHANISTAN. that year the Amir, haying firmly established himself in Afghanistan, requested the Lieutenant Governor of the Panjab to inform the Viceroy that, with a view to cement a good understanding between the two Govern- ments, it would be a satisfaction te himself if the Viceroy of India would consent to a personal inter- view with him on the frontier, or at Peshawar. Lord Lawrence was willing to grant the interview, but before his reply to that effect could reach Kabul, the throne of the Amir was again jeopardised by the last invasion of Abdul Rahman. It was the Amir, then, who was forced by the necessities of his position to decline, for the moment, the interview he had requested. Only, however, for the moment. The Amir drove Abdul Rahman across the Oxus, and in the spring of 1869 he cordially accepted an invitation, transmitted to him by the new Viceroy, the late Earl of Mayo, to meet him at Ambala. Lord Mayo was, in every respect, a worthy repre- sentative of the Queen. To a noble presence, a dig- nified bearing, an irresistible charm of manner, he added a tact that was perfect, and a judgment of character rarely at fault. He received the Amir at Ambala, and, though unable to guarantee the cordial reciprocity desired by his guest, he won his regard and convinced him of his good will. It was unfortunate that before Lord Mayo had set foot in India the ministry which selected him had been displaced. He was therefore in the position of a Tory agent of Liberal masters. The result was that though he accomplished RUSSIAN AND ENGLISH POLICY IN CENTRAL ASIA. 439 all that, Tinder the circumstances, could have been accomplished, the actual results fell short of the hopes which the Amir had allowed himself to entertain.* The consequences of that interview and the restraints by which it was accompanied have been clearly set forth by the highest living authority on the Central Asian question. “ The visit of Shir Ali to Ambala in 1869,” writes Sir Henry Rawlinson,f “ on the in- vitation of the Viceroy, forms an important epoch in the Afghan drama. Had our appreciation of the gravity of the crisis been as matured at that time as it is at the present, the epoch might have been a decisive one ; for Shir Ali, though still brooding over his supposed wrongs, was not by any means alienated. He had conceived certain definite hopes and fears, not unreasonable in themselves, and a frank and full ac- ceptance of the position on our part might have won his confidence for ever. Had we been prepared, indeed, in 1869, to undertake the same responsibilities, with a view to retaining a dominant influence at the court of the Amir, to which we have become reconciled * In his despatch dated May 14, 1869, the Duke of Argyll was even inclined to view “ not without some concern ” “ the ex- pressions used in certain paragraphs of your Excellency’s letter to the Amir, which, in so far they stand alone and apart from the verbal explanations I have referred to, may some day be construed by the Amir or by his successors as meaning more than, with those explanations, they were intended to convey.” Although the reply of the Earl of Mayo was considered by the Duke to be satisfactory, the fact that the point was raised shows how narrowly his com- munications with Shir Ali were watched by the Liberal Govern- ment. f “ The Nineteenth Century,” December 1868. 440 AFGHANISTAN. by later events — bad the same terms indeed been offered to Shir Ali at Ambala that have been recently offered at Peshawar — there can be no doubt that we should have heard nothing of Russian interference in Kabul for the present generation at any rate ; but public feeling at that time had not been educated up to the point required, and our statesmen, as usual, waited upon public feeling, adhering in the meantime to the old principle of reducing our liability to inter- vene to the lowest possible limit. The result accord- ingly of the conference at Ambala, though successful in its main features — inasmuch as Shir Ali, strongly impressed with the magnificence and cordiality of his reception — returned to Kabul a firm and true personal friend of the Viceroy’s — cannot be said to have satisfied either one party or the other. The British Govern- ment having learned from experience that it was impossible to maintain close relations with the Afghans, or even to acquire due information of what was passing in the country, except through the agency of its own officers, would have willingly revived with such modifi- cations as the lapse of time rendered necessary, the fourth article of the treaty of 1857 with Dost Maham- mad, which provided for the establishment of British officers at Kabul, Kandahar, and Balkh ; and communi- cations in this spirit were accordingly opened with Shir Ah’s confidential advisers at Ambala. But although the proposition, which was of far more practical importance to us than any amount of mere friendly profession, appears to have been acquiesced in to the extent of admitting British officers anywhere but at Kabul, still RUSSIAN AND ENGLISH POLICY IN CENTRAL ASIA. 441 no definite engagement was taken ; and ultimately Lord Mayo, finding that the measure was not par- ticularly agreeable either to Shir Ali or his ministers, desisted from its further discussion. Nor did Shir Ali meet with better success in pressing his own personal objects. He had come to Ambala intent on forming an offensive and defensive alliance with the British Government. He expected, on the one hand, to be assured of full urotection against Russian aggression which he saw looming in the distance, and, on the other, to be guaranteed against a renewal of his domestic troubles; but on both these heads he was disappointed. All that he could obtain was a vague and general assurance of support. He was told, firstly, that any attempt on the part of his rivals to disturb his position would be viewed by the British Government with ‘ severe displeasure ’ ; and he was told, secondly, with regard to the risk of external pressure that, ‘ he would be strengthened from time to time as circumstances would seem to require,’ and his applications for assistance would always be received ‘ with consideration and respect.’ And it may be added, as a proof how completely up to this time the home authorities had failed to realise the importance of the Afghan alliance, that even this modified promise of support, barely sufficing as it did to prevent a break-down of the Ambala conference, was very coldly received in England — the Viceroy indeed being directed to discourage any possible expectation of our armed intervention in Shir Ali’s favour.” It had been possible at that period, had Lord Mayo’s 442 AFGHANISTAN. hands been free, to do much with Shir Ali. I have already stated that he owed the recovery of his throne mainly to three of his closest relatives : to his son, Yakub Khan ; to his brother, Aslam Khan ; and to his nephew, Ishmail Khan. But already, standing in British territory, the suspicion had crept over the mind of Shir Ali, that it was in the power of men who had done so much for him to work as effectually against him. Not at Ambala, not at Peshawar, not at the entrance to the Khaibar pass, did he feel abso- lutely certain that he would be permitted to return to his rocky throne. His conduct, when having mustered the necessary resolution, he proceeded to and reached Kabul, betrayed the doubts which had tormented him when in British territory. How did he then treat the three close relatives who had restored him to his throne ? Yakub Khan he enticed, under the most solemn promises of safety, from Herat to Kabul, and then threw him into the dungeon, in which he still lingers. Aslam Khan he caused to be strangled.* Ishmail Khan, he drove an outlaw to Lahor, where * The murder of this noble was attended with circumstances of marked brutality. On a sign from the Amir two of his relatives, Kasim Khan and Hasan Khan, proceeded to the dungeon, carrying a rope. As they entered, Aslam Khan, seeing that his hour was come, prepared, in the manner of the Mahomedans, to meet his fate with dignity. The two noble ruffians immediately turned the rope once round his neck, then, each taking an end, they began to pull at it. But in the process their nerves forsook them, their strength failed them, and leaving their work half-done, they went out to procure assistance. A little later, with the aid of two semi-Chinese executioners, they accomplished the horrible deed. RUSSIAN AND ENGLISH POLICY IN CENTRAL ASIA. 443 he died. Another brother, Husen Khan, share the fate of Aslam. Had the Viceroy been then authorised to guarantee to the Amir and to his dynasty his throne, it is certain that his mind would not have been incited to commit these crimes ; and it is not impossible that, uncertain of his throne as he then was, he might have been in- duced in return for the guarantee, to accept the over- lordship of the British Government. Still, although neither the Government of India nor Shir Ali obtained all the concessions that either re- quired, the Ambala conference was so far a success that it did obliterate from the mind of the Amir the more bitter recollection of his grievances, and it did induce him to lean upon the British as the power whose interest it was to accord him support. This was clearly proved when, on the capture of Khiva by the Russians in 1873, he instinctively stretched out his hand to the Viceroy and implored him for' aid should he too be invaded. Lord Northbrook was then Viceroy of India — a Liberal serving a Liberal Government. The tele- graphic correspondence between the two shows clearly how the situation was appreciated by either. The following were the messages exchanged : — “ Telegram from Viceroy to Secretary of State. — Simla, dated 2 6th July 1873. — Ameer of Cabul alarmed at Russian progress, dissatisfied with general assurance, and anxious to know how far he may rely on our help if invaded. I propose assuring him that if he unreservedly accepts and acts on our advice in all external relations we wdl help him with money, arms, and troops, if 444 AFGHANISTAN. necessary, to expel unprovoked invasion. We to be the judge of the necessity. Answer by telegraph quickly.” “ Telegram from Secretary of State to the Viceroy. — India Office, dated 2 6th July 1873. — Cabinet thinks you should inform Ameer that we do not at all share his alarm, and consider there is no cause for it ; but you may assure him we shall maintain our settled policy in favour of Afghanistan if he abides by our advice in external affairs.” In his distress the Amir despatched a special envoy to the Viceroy. Lord Northbrook held a first inter- view with this envoy on the 12th July, and a second on the 30th. The result of these interviews was that the Amir was informed by letter that the Viceroy did “ not entertain any apprehensions to your Highness’s territories from without,” but that “the British Go- vernment will endeavour from time to time, by such means as circumstances may require, to strengthen the Government of your Highness, to enable you to exercise with equity and justice your rightful rule, and to transmit to your descendants all the dignities and honours of which you are the lawful possessor.” In the same letter the Amir was reminded of the assu- rances previously given by Russia as to his country being completely out of the zone of her influence. In his report of these proceedings to the Secretary of State, Lord Northbrook stated that the envoy of the Amir had been informed that “ if, in the event of any aggres- sion from without, British influence were invoked, and failed by negotiation to effect a satisfactory settlement, it was probable that the British Government would afford the Amir material assistance in repelling an invader, but that such assistance would be conditional RUSSIAN AND ENGLISH POLICY IN CENTRAL ASIA. 445 on tlie Amir following the advice of the British Govern- ment, and having himself abstained from aggression.” Further, that “as the subject is one of great impor- tance, and the envoy appeared to doubt how far his instructions justified him in committing himself to any definite arrangement, we considered it advisable to postpone the settlement of it to a more favourable opportunity.” Such was the cold comfort given to the Amir in his extremity ! Such the solace to the alarm caused in his mind by the capture of Khiva by the Russians ! What did the reply of England amount to ? To a virtual profession of belief in the assurances of Russia — to a vague promise, not of relief itself, but of the probability of relief ! To paint exactly the effect of this reply on the mind of the Amir, I must again quote from Sir Henry Raw- linson. The Amir “ foresaw,” says that high authority, “ that there must ultimately be a collision between England and Russia in Central Asia ; that he must, therefore, make his election between the opposing forces, and cast in his lot either with the assailants or the defence. Our hinted support would not meet the exigency of the case. An unlimited support we were not prepared to grant, and, moreover, to accept such support, administered as it must have been by British officers, would be to sacrifice his independence and to sink for ever to the level of the vassal princes of India. To connect himself, on the other hand, with Russia would be to secure the safeguard of a European guarantee against further pressure from England, 446 AFGHANISTAN. whilst the distance and comparative weakness of the guaranteeing power would leave him free from any real control ; and there would also be the prospect of a share in the spoils, and even of an increase of terri- tory, in the event of a successful descent on India by the allies. Shir Aii may not have jumped to this con- clusion at once, nor, indeed, have been exclusively influenced by such considerations in determining his future course ; but it would certainly appear that his studied and sustained discourtesy to us from the time of the Simla conference was the result of deliberation and not of accident, and was as much due to encourage- ment held out to him from beyond the Oxus as to pique and disappointment at the treatment he had received from England. At this time, indeed, com- menced that interchange of friendly communication, both by letter and agents, between Tashkend and Kabul, which, in spite of the official assurances five times repeated at St. Petersburg, that Afghanistan was altogether beyond the scope of Russia’s Asiatic relations, was ever afterwards actively maintained, and which has recently culminated in the establishment of a Russian mission at the court of the Amir.” In describing, then, the year 1873 as a crucial year for the relations between the British power and Afghanistan I am fully justified by the facts of the case. In that year Russia, in despite of her solemn promises to the contrary, seized Khiva. The British Govern- ment, by the hand of Lord Granville— by the hand which had written that he saw “ no practical advan- tage in examining too minutely how far these arrange- RUSSIAN AND ENGLISH POLICY fN CENTRAL ASIA. 447 merits ” — the annexation by Russia of a moiety of the Khivan territory and her suzerainty over the remainder — “ were in strict accordance with the assurances given in January by Count Schouvaloff,” condoned that breach of a solemn promise. The British cabinet and its agents in India, appealed to by the Amir to aid him against Russia, replied to him in a manner so half- hearted and so uncertain, pretending confidence in Russia which he knew to be undeserved, that it severed the last link which still bound him to the English alliance, and caused him to drift, partly in despair, partly in desperation, towards the rival who was courting him. Many circumstances, prominent amongst them his contemptuous rejection of offered subsidies, soon occurred to prove that from the date of the return of his envoy in 1873, Shir Ali regarded the alliance with England as dissolved. It is scarcely necessary to enumerate the various instances in which this senti- ment showed itself. It betrayed itself in acts, in writings, and in words. “ Under this circumstance of the case,” he wrote to Lord Northbrook in Novem- ber 1873, in reply to that Lord’s assurance that he would maintain the policy of Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo, “ under this circumstance of the case, it was not necessary to hold all these conversations with Syud Nur Mahammad Shah at Simla.” “ I am deter- mined,” he said on another occasion, “ to receive no more favours from the British.” In the beginning of 1874 a Tory ministry succeeded the Government under whose administration the Amir 448 AFGHANISTAN. had been allowed to drift into the arms of Russia. The new ministry lost no time in endeavouring to heal the breach made by their predecessors, but their efforts were rendered unavailing by the opposition offered to their schemes by the Government of India. Notwithstanding the well-ascertained fact that an active correspondence was going on between the Go- vernor of Russian Turkistan and the Amir, in spite of the knowledge that the political position of Afghan- istan had been wholly changed since the period when the policy of “ masterly inactivity ” had been initiated, Lord Northbrook and his Council still clung with the obstinacy of doctrinaires to the last rag of a worn-out system. Russia, then, during the two years which succeeded the crucial period of 1873, enjoyed opportunity to work without opposition on the mind of Shir Ali. She used that opportunity to the utmost, at the same time that, under the pretence of sending out expeditions “ to explore the old bed of the Oxus,” she despatched a Cossack force to ensure the submission of the tribes occupying the territory between the Atrek and the Sumbar. In the spring of 1876 Lord Northbrook was suc- ceeded as Viceroy by Lord Lytton. The month of February of that year had witnessed the absorption by Russia of the remaining moiety of Khokand — the principality of Karatighin alone being permitted to retain a condition of semi-independence. The Eng- lish Government, more than ever anxious regarding the fate of a country which has been well described as the glacis of the fortress of Hindustan, em- RUSSIAN AND ENGLISH POLICY IN CENTRAL ASIA. 449 powered the new Viceroy to offer to Amir Shir Ali the active countenance and protection which he had previously solicited at the hands of the British Government.* But before the native aide-de-camp selected by Lord Lytton to carry this message of reconciliation could reach Kabul — before even, I may say, Lord Lytton had set foot in India — the fatal rebuff of 1873 — coinciding with an adverse decision, pronounced by British officers, on the subject of the Amir’s dispute with Persia regarding Sistan ; and with the urgent pleadings of the Government of India on behalf of Yakub Khan — had driven Shir Ali into a condition of irreconcileable hostility towards England. * Lord Cranbrook’s despatch to Lord Lytton, 18th November 1878, para. 10 : — “ Accordingly, on your Excellency’s departure from England to assume the Viceroyalty, her Majesty’s Goverument instructed you to offer to Shere Ali that same active countenance and pro- tection which he had previously solicited at the hands of the Indian Government. It was clearly impossible, however, to enter into any formal engagement in this sense without requiring from the Ameer some substantial proof of his unity of interests with the British Government. Whilst her Majesty’s Government, there- fore, authorised your Excellency to concede to his Highness substantial pecuniary aid, a formal recognition of his dynasty, so far as it would not involve active interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, and an explicit pledge of material support in case of unprovoked foreign aggression, you were directed not to incur these heavy reponsibilities unless Shere Ali, on his part, were prepared to allow a British agent, or agents, access to positions in his territories (other than at Cabul itself), where, without prejudicing the personal authority of the ruler, they could acquire trustworthy information of events likely to threaten the tranquillity or independence of Afghanistan.” 29 450 AFGHANISTAN. He was no longer capable of listening to reason. He refused, then, the offer of the Viceroy, and declined to receive an envoy. And though the conciliatory language of the Viceroy induced him to assume politeness so far as to depute an envoy to meet a British officer at Peshawar, he gave to that envoy instructions fatal to the success of his mission. The interview which took place in the early part of the year 1877, between Sir Lewis Pelly and the Afghan envoy, made it abundantly clear that the time had gone by when any cordial co-operation could be hoped for on the part of the Amir. His language and conduct, so long dubious, became at this period so openly hostile, that the Viceroy wisely took ad- vantage of the death of the Kabul envoy to discontinue negotiations, the bases of which had been rejected. From that moment the Government of India re- solved, in accordance with instructions from England, “ to maintain an attitude of vigilant reserve until such time as the Amir might better realise his own position and interests.” This policy was persevered in for twenty months. During that time the aggressive action of Russia continued to develop itself. It is a well authenticated fact, that had the negotiations of the summer of 1878 terminated in a rupture between England and Russia, the latter power was prepared to follow in the footsteps of Nadir Shah — to threaten from the base of a friendly Afghanistan the empire of Hindustan. Under these circumstances, and with the intentions of Russia in its possession, it was impossible RUSSIAN AND ENGLISH POLIO? IN CENTRAL ASIA. 4H that the British Government should remain tranquil when — a breach between England and Russia seeming to be a question not of days but of hours — the Amir received with remarkable ostentation an embassy despatched to him by the Czar. Yet though it was impossible that the British Government should allow to pass without notice an act which constituted a breach of the engagement existing between the two powers — an engagement, accepted by the Amir on his accession and con- firmed by him at Ambala — which bound him to be the friend of the friends and the enemy of the enemies of England — the notice which the Vice- roy did take of it was remarkable for its moderate scope. He simply required that the Amir, having re- ceived an embassy from the Czar, should welcome to his capital an envoy from himself. The Amir was in- formed at the same time that his refusal would be construed as an act of hostility. The conduct of the Amir on the receipt of this friendly letter from the Viceroy was more than dis- courteous. It was hostile. Leaving unanswered the letter of the Viceroy, he directed the officer commanding his advance posts to refuse admission to the English envoy, and, if necessary, to repel him by force. The envoy attempting to enter the Kliaibar pass was refused admission — and returned. Still reluctant to proceed to extremities, the British Government, carrying moderation to a limit which, among Eastern nations, is not generally regarded as a sign of conscious strength, decided, before proceeding 452 AFGHANISTAN. to hostilities, to allow the Amir time to return to his right mind. The Viceroy, therefore, under instruc- tions from England, addressed to Shir Ali, in tem- perate language, a demand for a full and suitable apology within a given time for the affront he had offered to the British Government within his terri- tories. The Amir was likewise informed that unless a clear and satisfactory reply were received by the 20th November, his intentions would be regarded as hostile, and he would be treated as an enemy. The date, the 20th November, fixed for the receipt of the reply, allowed the Amir six clear days to consider and to reflect, before arriving at a decision. By allowing that time to pass by he accepted the alternative, and declared himself an enemy of England.* Such was the origin of the second Afghan war. A hard and unelastic principle of policy, designed in its origin to deal with an Afghanistan bounded on the north and north-west by wild and independent tribes, had been rigorously applied to an Afghanistan watching with beating heart the steady and gradual absorption of those independent tribes by the perfidious disturber of the peace of the world. In her agony Afghanistan appealed, and appealed fruitlessly, to the Liberal Cabinet which governed England. In vain did she point to the fact that the great kingdom on her north- * Subsequently the Amir sent a reply dated the 19th. It reached the Viceroy several days after hostilities had commenced, and was neither clear nor satisfactory. RUSSIAN AND ENGLISH POLICY IN CENTRAL ASIA. 45 west border had been swallowed up ; that, virtually, she was threatened; that already the head of the monster was turned in her direction. The doctrinaires who governed England and India at that period, fascinated by a principle which allowed the foreign policy of their country to slide, declared their utter disbelief in the absorbing tendencies of Russia, their determination not to scan too closely the means by which, despite of her plighted word, she had swallowed up Khiva. They answered then the entreaties of Afghanistan by evading compliance with her de- mands ; by citing the promises of Russia — promises analogous to those which she had often made, and as often violated. Baffled in her hopes of real help from England, it appeared to Afghanistan that the only chance of safety remaining to her was to ally herself with the encroaching disturber whom, it was clear to her, England feared. In cementing this alliance she deliberately defied her former protector, for she placed the glacis of the fortress of Hindustan virtually in the hands of the enemy of England. It is true that many excuses existed for her conduct. It is true that England had repelled her, and that she acted as she did act because she believed that, equally with her- self, England dreaded the absorbing monster on her frontier. When, in 1876, England, better counselled, endeavoured to re-cement the broken friendship, Afghanistan had committed herself too far. The rebuff of 1873 had been too keenly felt. She had been driven to become Russian. Thenceforward there was but one course to pursue ; 454 AFGHANISTAN. and the Government of Lord Beaconsfield pursued it. The occupation of the salient angles of the outwork will be England’s practical demonstration to Russia and to the world, that “ cunning is not caution, and that habitual perfidy is not high policy of State.” APPENDIX. The Rev. T. P. Hughes, of the Church Missionary Society’s Mission to the Afghans at Peshawar, now on a visit to England, has assured me that I have erred in stating, at page 39, that the Pathans are not Afghans. Mr. Hughes, than whom it would be difficult to find a higher authority on all that relates to the Afghan people, writes to me on the subject as follows : — “ The national appellation of the people of Afghan- istan is either Afghan, Pathdn, Pashtun, or Pulchtun. The word Afghan is said to be derived from Afghanah, the supposed ancestor of the Afghan people, although according to Akhund Darweza, a celebrated local authority, it is from the Persian fighdn, a complaint, or lamentation, as indicating the turbulent character of the people. It may, however, be derived from fighdn (pi. of fugh ) idols, i.e. idolaters. The origin of the word Puthdn, according to the Persian history of Ni’amat Ullah, is as follows : — Abdur Rashid, or Kais (the first descendant of Afghanah who embraced Islam), put seventy of the Koraishites to death, and the 456 APPENDIX. Prophet predicted that God would make his issue so numerous, that they, with respect to the establishment of the faith, would outvie all other peoples ; and that they would be in strength like the wood upon which they lay the keel of a ship when in course of construc- tion, and which is called Pathdn. The Prophet there- fore conferred on Abdur Rashid the title of Pathan. Pashtun, or as it is pronounced in Eastern Afghanistan Pulchtun, is said by native historians to be derived from a place in hills called Pasht or Pusht, although it seems more probable that the word can be traced to the Persian Pushta, a hill, i.e. the dwellers in hills, for in India the Afghans are still called Rohillah, or the people from Roh, the name given to the mountains between Peshawar and Cabul.” LONDON : PRINTED BT W. H. ALLEN AND CO., 13 WATERLOO PLACE, S.W. ERRATA. Throughout the Book. For Badakhshan read Badakhshan. For Mahammad read Muhammad. For Samarkhand read Samarkand. For Suliman read Sulaiman. WORKS BY THE SAME AUTHOR. In one Volume, in 8 vo., with Six Maps, Price 15s. THE NATIVE STATES OF INDIA IN SUB- SIDIARY ALLIANCE WITH THE BRITISH GOVERN- MENT ; an Historical Sketch. With a Notice of the Mediatised and Minor States. By Colonel G. B. Malle- son, C.S.I. 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[ Dr. Forties's Works are used as Class Books in the Colleges and Schools in India .] Forbes’s Hindustani-Englisk Dictionary in the Persian Character, with the Hindi words in Nagari also; and an English Hindustani Dictionary in the English Character ; both in one volume. By Dun- can Fobbes, LL.D. Royal 8vo. 42s. Forbes’s Hindustani Grammar, with Specimens of Writing in the Persian and Nagari Characters, Reading Lessons, and Vocabulary. 8vo. 10s. 6d. Forbes’s Hindustani Manual, containing a Compendious Gram- mar, Exercises for Translation, Dialogues, and Vocabulary, in the Roman Character. New Edition, entirely revised. By J. T. Platts. 18mo. 3s. 6d. Forbes’s Bagh o Bahar, in the Persian Character, with a complete Vocabulary. Royal 8vo. 12s. 6d. Forbes’s Bagh o Bahar in English, with Explanatory Notes, illustrative of Eastern Character. 8vo. 8s. East wick (Edward B.) The Bagh-o-Bahar — literally translated into English, with copious explanatory notes. 8vo. 10s. 6d. 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Forbes’s Smaller Dictionary, Hindustani and English, in the English Character. 12s. Forbes’s Bagh o Bahar, with Yocaby., English Character. 5s. Singliasan Battisi. Translated into Hindi from the Sanscrit. A New Edition. Revised, Corrected, and Accompanied with Copious Notes. By Syed Abdoolah. Royal 8vo, 12s. 6d. Robertson’s Hindustani Vocabulary. 8s. 6d. Eastwick’s Prem Sagur. 4 to. 80s. Akhlaki Hindi, translated into Urdu, with an Introduction and Notes. By Syed Abdoolah. Royal 8vo. 12s. 6d. Sakuntala. Translated into Hindi from the Sanskrit, hy Eeederic Pincott. 4to. 12s. 6d. SANSCRIT. Haughton’s Sanscrit and Bengali Dictionary, in the Bengali Character, with Index, serving as a reversed dictionary. 4to. 30s. Williams’s English-Sanscrit Dictionary. 4to., cloth. £3. 3s. Williams’s Sanskrit-English Dictionary. 4 to. £4 14s. 6d. Wilkin’s (Sir Charles) Sanscrit Grammar. 4 to. 15s. Williams’s (Monier) Sanscrit Grammar. 8vo. 15s. 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PAET I. — A concise Grammar oe the Language, with Exer- cises on its more Prominent Peculiarities, together with a Selection of Useful Phrases, Dialogues, and Subjects for Translation into Persian. PAET II. — A Vocabulary oe Useeul Words, English and Persian, showing at the same time the difference of idiom between the two Languages. 18mo. 7s. 6d. A Translation of Robinson Crusoe into the Persian Language. Eoman Character. Edited by T. W. H. Tolbort, Bengal Civil Service. 34 Wm. H. Allen & Co., BENGALI. Haughton’s Bengali, Sanscrit, and English Dictionary, adapted for Students in either language ; to which is added an Index, serving as a reversed dictionary. 4to. 30s. Forbes’s Bengali Grammar, with Phrasesand dialogues. Royal 8vo. 12s. 6d. Forbes’s Bengali Reader, with a Translation and Vocabulary Royal 8vo. 12s. 6d. Nabo Nari. 12mo. 7s. ARABIC. Richardson’s Arabic, Persian and English Dictionary. Edition of 1852. By F. Johnson. 4to., cloth. £4. 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Showing, at one view, all the principal nations, governments, and empires which have existed in that country from the earliest times to the suppression of the Great Mutiny, A.D. 1858, with the date of each historical event according to the various eras used in India. BY ARTHUR ALLEN DURTNALL, Of the High Court of Justice in England. By this Chart, any person, however ignorant of the subject, may, by an hour’s attention, obtain a clear view of the broad lines of Indian History, and of the evolutions which have resulted in the dominion of Her Majesty as EMPRESS OF INDIA. It will be found invaluable for Educational Pukj-oses, especially in Colleges and Schools, where an Indian career is in contemplation. It will also be found of permanent UTILITY in all Libraries and Offices as a work of ready reference for the connection of events and dates. Besides the History of India, it includes the contemporaneous histories of Afghanistan, Central Asia, and Europe. A RELIEVO MAP OF INDIA. BY HENRY F. BRION. In Frame, 21s. A map of this kind brings before us such a picture of the surface of a given country as no ordinary map could ever do. To the mind’s eye of the average Englishman, India consists of ‘ the plains ’ and ‘the hills,’ chiefly of the former, the hills being limited to the Himalayas and the Nilgiris. The new map will at least enable him to correct his notions of Indian geography. It combines the usual features of a good pilain map of the country on a scale of 150 miles to the inch, with a faithful representation of all the uneven surfaces, modelled on a scale thirty-two times the hoiizontal one ; thus bringing out into clear relief the com- parative heights and outlines of all the hill-ranges, and showing broad tracts of uneven ground, of intermingled hill and valley, which a common map of the same size would hardly indicate, except to a very practised eye. 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