% PRINCETON, N. J. "& Presented by Mr. Samuel Agnew of Philadelphia, Pa. Agnew- Coll. on Baptism, No. T R &/^ ueJlio?is for examining fuch Youths as learn Mr Lewis'.* Expofition. 209 VI. Letters between Dr Sharp and Mrs Cock- burn, on the Subject of Moral Virtue and Moral Obligation. 259 VII. The Speech made at Farewell-Hall, to the Hon. and Right Rev. Father in God Ri- chard by Divine Providence Lord BiJJjop of Durham, on his Lordfjifs firjl Arrival in his Diocefj on Friday, July 6, 1753. 437 VIII. Difcourfes on Preaching, 443 ERRATA. Vindication of B. Taylor. P. 28. line penult, for mojl read more. Reply to the Proteftant Flail. P. 51.I. 11. for ineerting, read i?ifertitig. P. 112. 1. 7. fot 1 Pet. iii. 1. read 1 Pet. iii. 21. P. 159. I. the lait, in the Margin, for Eccl. iv. 3. read Ecclef. iv. 1 2, P. 47?. I. 3. for judicious, xezdjurficicus. [ I] A VINDICATION of Bifliop Taylor, From the injurious Mifrepre- fentation of him by the Author of the Letter to the Clergy of the Church of England in the County of Northumberland. With a few Remarks upon fome other Passages in that Letter. Firft printed in J733- TH E Letter-writer might have patted unmolested, for any Thing he hath faid himfclf either by Way of Chal- lenge or Advice to the Clergy of Northumber- land, (for They will accept neither from fuch Hands> but equally defpife both) had he not by a falfe and mod unjuft Reprefentation of Bi- fhop Taylor grofly abufed his Readers. For after he hath fpit his own little Venom, being confcious of his own natural Impotence, he hath tacked to his Letter, by Way of Poflfcript, three or four PaiTages from Bifhop Taylor, much to his own Purpofe, but greatly to the Vol. II. B Prejudice A Vindication Prejudice of that learned Man's Character, by an unufal Piece of Fraud in the Manner of Quotation . As the Bifhop's Polemical Works, out of which thefe PafTages are taken, are in the Hands of few People, but his Name and Cha- racter univerfally known, this Cheat, may pof- fibly be attended with ill Confequence j while his Authority is vouched, and bis Teftitnony pro- duced for Doctrines which he never held; and there be very few even of the Clergy of Nor- thumberland Themfelves, who have the Oppor- tunity of Examining how thefe PafTages lie in the Place from whence they are taken, and thereby detecting the Iniquity and falfe Dealing of this their new Correfpondent. The Defign therefore of this Paper is to fet thefe Quotations in a true Light, as well for the Vindication of the good Bifhop, and feafonable Reprehension of the fraudulent Letter-writer j as to prevent the Effects of his thus impoling on his Readers, either by furprifing the more wary and intelli- gent, or deceiving the Weak and unlearned among them : To all whom thofe Quotations muft needs appear mocking, as they (land dif- guifed and unexplained in his Poftfcript. Bifhop of Bifop Taylor. Bifhop Taylor, in his noble Collection of "Po- lemical Difcoiirfes (the third Edition published in Folio, Lend. 1674) hath one intitled, A Difcourfe concerning the Liberty of Prophefying. The eighteenth Section of which is intitled, A particular Conf deration of the Opinions of the Anabaptifis, pag. 1040. And here he treats very largely and fully of their Capital Opinion againft the Baptifm of Infants. He begins with thefe Words. Al- though it be a DoSlrine jitftly condemned by the mojl Sorts of Chrijlians upon great Grounds of Reafon, yet pqfjibly their Defence may be fo great y as to take off much, and rebate the Edge of their Adverfaries Ajjaidt. It will be neither unplea- fant nor unprofitable to draw a fiort Scheme of Plea for each Party, the Rcfult of which poffbly may be, that though they be deceived, yet they have fo great Excufe on their Side, that their Err our is not impudent or vincible. The Baptifm of Infants refls principally and ufu ally upon this Dif- courfe, &c. Then he produces the ieveral Arguments ufually alledged for Infant Bap- tifm, which take up the next nine Paragraphs or Sections. B 2 At A Vindication At the twelfth Section, p. 1042. He begins to repreient what the Anabaptifts have to fay in Oppolition to thofe Arguments before laid down, and in Justification of their own Te- nent. To all this , fays he, the Anabaptifi gives afoft and gentle Anfwer, &c. And fo he goes on to the thirty-fourth Section, p. 1051, per- fonating the Anabaptifi:, and faying a great deal more for their Doctrine, and urging it a great deal better than ever they could do for themfelves. Having acted his Part very dex- troufly, he concludes, Thus far the Anabaptifis may argue ; — They have been encouraged in their Errour more by the accidental Advantages we have given them by our weak Arguings, than by any Excellency of their Wit^ and (much lefs) any Advantage of their Caufe. But becaufe all Men will not underfand my Purpofe (he fpeaks of fuch People as our Letter-writer, who for want of Learning, no more underfland the Ufc of the Figure Profopopteia} than they do the Ufe of the Rite Padobaptifm) or think my Meaning innocent unlefs Ianfwer the Arguments which 1 have made or gathered.' Ihavecho- fen therefore to add fome Animadverfons upon the Anabaptifis Pica, And then he proceeds in J eighteen 1 of Bifiop Taylor. eighteen Pages, folidly confuting the Plea which he had been drawing a Scheme of, and demoliihing that Caftle which he had been building for them in the Air; and in which our wife Letter-writer thinks yet to take Sanc- tuary. See from Page 1051, to Page 1069. The Plea refuted. Now the Reader, who hath not thefe Works of Bifhop Taylor •, and is not acquain- ted with them, is defired to take Notice that all the- PafTages cited as the Bifhop's in the Poftcript above-mentioned, are taken out of this Anabaptifis Plea, as it ftands ingenioufly fupported by his Wit, and agreeably adorned by his Style. They are his own Words and Expreflions ; fo far is true. Nay, the Argu-r ments themfelves are fo far his own, as he hath by the Help of a fine Imagination and a fuperior Fancy, dreft them up in greater Strength and Beauty than the Anabaptifb themfelves could ever do, yet, they are not, as they are reprefented in the Poftfcript, his Senti- ments : Nor could the Letter-writer imagine that they were ; though he hath fhewed but little Judgment or Skill in the Choice of them, for he hath only picked out fuch Paffages as B 3 fuited 6 A Vindication fuited berr. with his own low Tafte, and hath left the more ingenious and fubtile x^rguments behind. Quotations hi the Poll- fcript from Bijkop Taylor, perforating the Anabaptift, Why cannot God (fays Bijkop Taylor) as well do his Mer- cies to Infants now immediately, as he did before the Institution either of Circumcifion orBaptifm? Num. 17. p. 1044. However there is no Danger that Infants Should Quotations out of the fame Difcourfe ofBi- Jhdp Taylor'* where he refutes his own Arguments Jor the Anabaptiils. To the laft Claufe viz. Why cannot God as well do his Mercies to Infants^ Sec. I an- fwer, that I know no Man that fays he can- not -, but yet this was not fufficient to hinder Babes from Circumci- fion, and why then mail it hinder them from Baptifm ? Ad Num. 1 j. p. 1058. This Precept was in all Ages expounded to fignify of Bifiop Taylor. mould perifh for Want of this external Mini- ftry, much lefs for prevaricating Chrift's Precept of Nifi qun renatusfuerit, &c. lb. N. 18. For firfl the Water and Spirit in this Place iignify the fameThing, and by Water is meant the fignify the ordinary Neceffity of Baptifm to all Perfons ; and niji quis can mean In- fants as well as Men of Age : Andbecaufe- it commands a new Birth and a Regene- ration, and implies that a natural Birth cannot intitle us to Heaven ; but the fe- cond Birth mud; In- fants who have as much need and as much Right to Heaven as Men of Years, and yet cannot have it by natural or firft Birth, mud have it by the Second and Spiritual. p. 1059. I reply, that there- fore they do not figni- fy the fame Thing, be- caufe by Water is B 4 meant 8 A Vindication the ErTecl: of" the Spi- rit, cleanfing and pu- rifying the Soul, as appears in its parallel Place of Chrift bapti- fmg with the Spirit and with Fire. The reft of this Quotation anfwered Quotations in the next Paragraph out of Num. 31. p. 1049. meant the ErTedt of the Spirit, unlefs the Effect and the Caufe be the fame thing *, io that here is a Contra- diction in the Parts of the Allegation. 1 fhall not need to con- fider their parallel In- stance. ThisPlace was verified in the Let- ter, and fir ft Significa- tion of it, and fo did relate to the miraculous Defcent of the Holy Ghoft in the Likenefs of Tongues of Fire. But this concerns not all, for all were not fo baptized, &c. Ad Num. 18. Ad Num. 1 3. A 1059. Afwered at Page 1066. Quotation cf Bifiop- Taylor. 9 Quotation out of Page 1050. Quotation out of Num. 32, which is the kft. Thus far Bifhop Taylor, See Poftfcript. Anfwered at Page 1067. Anfwered in Pages 1067 and 1068. I have now confide- \ red all that the Ana- baptifts can with Pro- bability object againft: our Arguments, and have difcovered the Weaknefs of their Exceptions. Ad Num.. I 25. . . To confront everv Sentence that he hath quoted out of the Bifhop's Difcourfe with its refpective Anfwer out of the fame, in Words at length, as is done in the three firft Senten- ces, would take up much room to little Pur- pofe. This ihort Specimen, with the Refe- rences to thofe Places in Bifhop Taylors Book, where any Perfon, who has a Mind to fatisfy himfelf further, will find the feveral Anfwers, may be fufficient to juftify that learned Divine, and to demonftrate the fhameful Want of In-. genuity xo ^Vindication gcnuity and Honefty in the Letter- writer, who could condefcend to fuch a mean Art as this, to give fome Appearance of Authority to his own weak Reafonings ; and draw his Reader by a Cheat into a Perfuafion, into which he could not draw him by his Arguments: And this may fuffice for an Anfwer to his Poftfcript. As to his Letter itfelf, which he hath wrote to rebuke the Clergy of Northumberland for unchrijiianing, as he calls it, the Quakers, he fhould be given to underftand, that the Nor- thumberland Clergy, whatever they may think of thofe of his Se£t, yet do not ufe to call them by any unchriftian Names, (unlefs Quaker itfelf be fuch) or otherwife reproach or injure them 5 but are willing they mould enjoy the Toleration that the Laws have given them, and may reafonably expect from them, in fuch Circumflances, at lead Peace and good Words. But fince nothing will fatisfy him, but a pub- lick Acknowledgement of their Right to be called Chrijliam, which he proclaims in his Title Page, and afferts throughout his Letter, fupports it from Scripture, and from the Doc- trine of the Church of England in her Arti- cles, cf Bijhop Tayl«r. 2r cles, and inveighs againft the Clergy as the People mod forward to rob them of it ; fince this is the Cafe, it will be worth while to fee how he makes this Claim out for his Friends. And truly they will have no Reafon to thank him ; for it follows from his own Arguments that they are no Chrijliatis j which is more per^ haps than the Clergy of Northumberland, if he will but let them alone, would care to call: in their Teeth. His firft Pofition is, That Quakers do believe the Baptifm of Chrijl as fully andfncerely as any Chri/lian ever did. And he Challenges them (viz. the Clergy,) to prove the Contrary, p. 3. And if they were to challenge him to prove that the Quakers dofincerely believe it, he would find it impomble to give them Satisfaction: So that fuch abfurd Challenges are better let alone. They do not, by their own Confeflion, believe that to be the Baptifm of CJjriJl which all other Chriftians hold for fuch. And how fmcerely they do believe what they call His Bap- tifm, will not be known, or credited on their bare Word. Every Body will judge of their fmcerity as he is difpofed. But tz A Vindication But there may be a Fallacy in the Affertion : For they do not allow any to be properly Chri- Jlians but themfelves (as this Writer himfelf infinuates a little further, and is the Confe- quence of his Doctrine, whatever he may have faid in the Beginning of his Letter to the Con- trary.) So that what he fays here, may in this Senfe be true enough, for any Thing we know, viz. that, whatever they mean by the Baptifm of Chrift, it is as fully and fmcerely be- lieved by one as by another of them. And he may fafely Challenge all the World to prove the Contrary. His next ftep is, that fprinkling Infants, and Jigning them ivith the Crofs, are in his Opinion mere Ceremonies, Sec. p. 4. Here too we have only his Word for it : And were he to add his folemn Affirmation, it would not advance his bare Opinion and ^Judgment into an Argument. And befides, what hath Infant Baptifm to do with the Point he has undertaken to make out, viz. That Quakers are Chrijlians ? He has fpent four Pages in condemning the Practice of Bap- tizing Infants : But how doth this help towards proving either the Baptifm, or Chriftianity of Quakers f Why doth he take up the Weapons of of Bijhop Taylor, jg of the AnababliftS) (or Baptiftsi as they call themfelves) and fight in their Caufe, feeming thereby to allow of Dipping, or the Baptifm of Adults (See Fran.Buggs Quakerifm Wither- ingy p. 46. Lond. 1694)5 when at the fame Time he really difallows of that too, and oppo- fes the external Rite, which they ufe to make themfelves Chriftians, as vehemently as he op- pofes the Baptifm of Infants ? He brings no Conclufion for his own Right to Chriftianity either way -, but only a Proof of his own In- fincerity. He would pretend indeed, as a Colour for this Proceeding, that the Clergy do Unchriftian the Quakers for denying Baptifm to Infants. This he repeats over and over, and in Anfwer to it tells them, that if they cannot prove'that Infant Baptifm is the Baptifm ofChrift> then the Foun- dation of their Charge againjl the Quakers isfaife. But this is a mere Pretence j for if this was all the Charge againft them, they would only be reckoned and called Anabaptifts, or Antipcedo- baptifts. But the Charge upon which they are reported no Chriftians^ is of a more grievous Nature, vi%. Ihc renouncing Water-Baptifm in general^ and denying it to all without Diftinftion. So ,£ A Vindication So that this Suggeftion of his is not oniy falfe, but improbable, and can do him no Ser- vice. The fame may be faid of his next Plea, p. 5. That Infant Baptifm is, according to the DocJrine of the Church of England, an Article cf Faith. And that the Quakers are un- chrifiian d for not believing this Article. Be- €aufe (as he fays) it is neither contained in Scrip- itire, nor can be proved thereby ; as every Arti- cle of Faith, according to the Judgment of our Church, ought to be. He hath read our Articles (as he hath done Bilhop Taylor) without underftanding the Sub- ject or Defign of them ; otherwife he would have learned the Difference between ajfenting to a Doclrine, and obeying a Precept, between Belief 'and Profefion, Faith and Baptifm; which are as clearly diftinguifhed in them, as they are in Mark xvi. 16. He that believeth, and is baptized, Jhall be faved. Whereby it appears that Baptifm is neceffary to Salvation, though it be not a necefary Article of Faith. What is faid in the Articles of Infant Baptifm^ is no more than this, that it is in any Wife to be re- tained in the Church, as mofl agreeable with the In/litution of Biftop Taylor. jr Infiitution of Chrift. He is to blame to quar- rel with this, for it is not the Ground and Bottom upon which the Condemnation of Qua- kers ftands. Let him rather try how he will refute that other Pofition which very nearly concerns him and them. Art. 27. Baptifm is ajign of Pro- fejfion, and Mark of Differ encey whereby Chrijl- ians are difcernedfrom others that be not Chrifl- ians.—Cbriftiani a non Chrijlianis, as the Latin is, viz. They who have put on Chrift in Water-Baptifm, from Jews, Turks, Infidels, Quakers, &c. What he fays, p. 6. is founded on the like Miftake. Woidd you think the Quakers did you Juftice, if they fiould pronounce you no Chriftians% becaufe you deny the Dofirine of Tranfubftantia- tion ? He takes this to be a parallel Cafe -, as if any Man's being a Chrifiian depended on his admitting or denying that particular Doctrine. He fhould have put it thus to have made it parallel, Would you thinks 6cc. if they fiould pro- nounce you no Papifts, becaufe you deny Tranfub- fiantiation ? And then both the Anfwer, and the Application would be plain and eafy. For as no Man who denies that Doctrine is a true Papift, A Vindication Papift, fo no Man who denies Baptifm is a true Chriftian. At length he produces his laft and grand Argument againfl Infant Baptifm. He calls upon the mofi wife and learned of the?n, (viz. Northumberland Clergy) to prove Infant Bap* tifm from Scripture, that is (fays he, that they may not miftake his meaning) to prove from Scripture, that fprinkling Infants on their Fore- heads with a little Water ; is the Baptifm of Chrifl infiituted by Him, and praclifed by his Apo- Jlles. Poor Gentlemen, how will they deal with this Man, or fatisfy his Demands ! They will prove to him, that all without Exception who are capable of being admitted into Covenant with God through Chrifl are to be baptized, Mat. xxviii. 19. Mark xvi. 16. John iii. 5. Eph. iv. 5, &c. They will prove little Chil- dren to be as capable of this under the Gofpel, as they were under the Law to be Members of the Covenant in Chrift to come ; and that they are, at that Age, intitled to the Ki?igdom of God, and highly acceptable to our Saviour, Mark x. 14, 15, 16. That they are not to be kept from him, not to be defpifed, but may ferve as of Bifiop Taylor. j7 as a Pattern even to Adults, Matth. xviii. j, 4, 5, 6, io. And they will prove, that if Children be thus capable of AdmiJJion into the Go/pel Covenant, they cannot be excluded from the outward Seal of it. For allowing their Ca- pacity, we have no Controverfy even with the Anabaptifts, concerning this Conclufion. Nay they will give him more direct Scrip- ture Proof of Infant Baptifm, from i Cor. vii. 14. Now are your Children holy. Which cannot be fairly and confidently underftood otherwife than of thofe Children having been baptized, as many of the old Fathers interpreted it, and hath been more particularly fhewn by learned Men of late 3 Dr Hammond on the Place; Dr Wall, Infant Baptifm, Chap. 1 1 . Sccl. 1 1 . and others. But though they will prove all this, as hath been done an hundred Times, and backed with the perpetual Pra&ice of the Church, from the Times of the Apoftles, to the prefent Age, (as Dr Wall hath particularly fhewn in his Hijlory of Infant Baptifm) yet it will not come up to what this Letter- Writer calls for. For there is not a Word in the Bible offprink- ling Infants, or of their Foreheads, or of a Vol. II. C . little 2g A Vindication little Water to be ufed for the Purpofe, which are the Things he muil be fatisfied in. They can prove the Thing, that is, the Right of Chil- dren to Baptifm j that they not only may, but ought to be baptized ; and that pouring Water on their Faces, is as literally and truly wajhing them, as if they were dipped ; and that a little Water may fuffice for little Children. But here is the Misfortune, they cannot (hew to this Man in all the Scripture, the Words Infant Baptifm any more than Infant circumcifwn. But they will tell him, in lieu of it, that if his Way of Arguing be right, it will prove more than he thinks of, and hold as ftrongly againfl the Quakers Baptifm, as Infant Baptifm. For the Baptifm of Chrifl, or Chrif's Bap" iifrn, ( which are his con ftant Terms for exprefT- ing the only true Baptifm, wherewith Quakers are baptized,) are Expreffions not to be met with in the whole Bible. And they will, in his own Words, Defire him to JJjew them where they are, that they may read them ; for they have read both the Old and New Teflament through (much oftner, and to more purpofe, than ever he hath done) and yet they cannot find any fuch Phrafc as he talks of. They read often of the Baptifm of Bifeop Taylor. 19 Baptifm of John, and of the Baptifm of Repeti- tance : But though the Word Baptifm occurs above twenty Times in the New Teftament, yet they could never meet with it fo ufed, viz. Baptifm of Chri/i. Therefore according to his own Argument, He that is not baptized with the Baptifm of Chrifl, is not a true Chriftian> although in JVords he may profefs Chri/i y p. 4. But the Baptifm of Chriji not being to be read in Scripture, any more than Infant Baptfm, the Quakers cannot have it in their own Way of Reafoning; and confequendy are not Chrifiansy though they may in Words profefs Chriji. This is really the nrft fair Deduction or Conclusion that comes out of his boafled Arguments to prove the Quakers to be Chriftians. To omit therefore all the impertinent Infe- rences he draws from his pretended Confuta- on of Infant Baptifm, let us proceed to his next Argument levelled againil Baptifm with Water, He fays, p. 7. That the Baptifm of Chriji cannot be proved from Scripture to be a Water" Baptifm. The Reafon which he gives is, that C 2 in 20 A Vindication in the Inftitution of Baptifm, Matth. xxviii. 19. There is no Mention of Water. No more there is of Chriji. And therefore if Water- Baptifm cannot for this Reafon be proved from thence, no more can the Baptifm of Chriji. But it is as certain that Wafer- Baptifm was here inftituted, as that Chriji did inftitute it. And it is certain that the Apoftles underftood it fo, as appears both by their Practice and Writings. Aftsx. 47, and viii. 36, 38. Eph. v. 26. Heb. x. 22. In all which Places Water is exprefsly mentioned. But all the Mifinterpretations of this Text in Matthew * by the Quakers, are owing, as hath been obferved often, to their Ignorance of the learned Languages, and inability to judge rightly of the Translations. Here, for Inftance, Baptize is a Greek Word, which becoming a technical Term in other Languages to exprefs this Sacrament, is only made BaigUjh by ufage : Otherwife our Tranflators might have render- ed it here, as they have done in other Places, Go, andwaJJj Men in the Name of the Father, &c. And then there would be no Room for this Cavil, or for the Nonfenfe that follows about underilanding the Form, not of the Name, but of Bifiop Taylor. 21 but Power of the Father, Sec. But though our Letter- Writer hath got here, what is pro- perly and truly a Quaker's Argument, yet he doth not care to trufl himfelf with the Manage- ment of it, but calls in the Afliftance of a Friend j and brings in a Quotation from one of the Brotherhood. The {lender Subftance of which having been confuted again and again, fhall only be anfwered here by a Reference to Mr Lejlies Divine Inflitution of Water-Bap- tifm\ Se&. i and 2. And Wall's Defence of his Hijlory of Infant Baptifm. Cap, 3 and 4. And we will proceed to his laft, and only Ar- gument properly fo called, to prove the Qua- kers Chriftians. It is this, p. 10. John, faid Chrijl to his Difcipks, truly baptized with Water ; but ye jhall be baptized with the Holy Ghofl not many Days hence. Here Chrijl plainly dijlinguijhes John's Water- Baptifm from the Baptifm of the Holy Ghojl. John had baptized with Water, but Chrijl tells his Followers that they jhould be bap- tized with the Holy Ghof. Now Mark (fays he) that the Followers of Chrift are to be bap- tized with the Holy Ghof, And now he thinks he has done the Bufmefs compleatly % only, as C 3 he £2 ./f Vindication he adds, it will concent every Body to have this Wi'nefs in themfelves, (as to be fure the Quakers all have it) and then he believes that fuch Ceremonies as Infant fprinkling would die away. And none but Friends would be true Chriftians. But now the mod ignorant Perfon who reads this Argument, may plainly fee that the whole Force of it lies in his dropping the Words, not many Days hence, which would have fpoilcd all, becaufe they reftrain what Chrift faid to his Difciples only, and in his fubftituting Followers inftead of Difciples. For if, where he bid us Mark, we do but mark this filly Fraud of his, we mall find the Con- clufion we are to attend to, is no more than this, that the Difciples of Chrifi were to be bap- tized with the Holy Ghcfl not many Days after. And what is this to the other Followers of Chrift, or Quakers in particular. They have not this Baptijm of the Holy Ghojl, for that was promifed only to thefe Difciples, and they do not pretend to any other 5 therefore they have not the Baptifm of Chrifi in any Senfe : And then, according to his own Rule, as was ob- served of Bijhop Taylor. 23 ferved before, He that is not baptized with the Baptifm of Chriji (which the Quakers are not) is not a true Chrijlian, although in Words he may profefs Chri/l (as the Quakers do.) So that in fhort this poor Man, becaufe he was told the Clergy had faid, that the Quakers were no Chri- ftians, has wrote them a Letter really to prove the Thing which they were reported to have faid. But notwithftanding they have faid Nothing but what he himfelf hath verified in Publick, yet he muft have his Fling at them, for being in other Refpe&s falfe Teachers , p. 12. and re- ceiving, which is mod abominable, both Tithes and Titles from Man. THE Apojlles (faith he, p. 11.) preached Chriji freely without Money or Tithes ; not for filthy Lucre s Sake, asfome now do. They were Men of great Simplicity and Self-denial, fome of them poor Fifiermen to their Trades. They were not hovers of flattering Titles, fuch as my Lord, Doctor of Divinity, Mafler of Arts, &c. which thofe now a- Days, who would be accounted fix Minifl ers of Chriji, receive from Man. Whether the Clergy of the Church of England y or the Quakers (who look upon C 4 them Selves 24 A Vindication themfelves to be the only true Succeffors of the Apoftles) do preach, all Circumftances considered , moil like the Apoftles, is fully ex- amined in a Book intitled, Chrijiianity no En- thitfiafm (in Anfwer to Thomas Elwood) Chap. 3. where the Author proves the Quakers to be very unlike the Apoftles la feveral Inftances. Alio in Francis Bugg his Chrijlian Miniftry of the Church of England, difiinguifhed from the Antkhrijiian Minijlry of the Quakers, being a Reply to their Letter to the Clergy of Norfolk and Suffolk, London 1699, p. 15. 18, where he runs a Comparifon between the Doctrines of the one and of the other j to which the Reader is referred, if he wants Satis- faction. All that {hall be remarked here is, That the only Pretence the Quakers can have of preaching like the Apoftles, rnuft be from two Circumftances, where there is an acciden- tal Similitude, in that they preach the Gofpel .'without Money or Tithes, and without having had any proper Education to fit them for io Great a Work. But it muft be remember'd, that this Semb- lance (ftich as it is) between them, who in all Djher Refpecls are as unlike as pciTible, is no Manner of Bijhop Taylor. 25 of Credit to the Quakers, and at the fame Time no Kind of Difparagement of the Apo- ftles ; whofe Wants were abundantly fupplied by the Churches, and whofe Deficiency in Learning (or other Qualifications necefTary to recommend them to the World) incident to their former Way of Life, was amply made up by fupernatural Gifts and Powers, whereby they, who were but Fijhermen by 'Trade , were enabled to dictate both to the learned Scribe and Philofopher. But how doth it follow from hence, that Weavers, Pedlars, and Wool- combers, who pretending a Call from the Spirit, fet up for Apoftolical Preachers, are SuccefTors of the Apoftles, or like them in their Charac- ters ? To preach Chrift truly, though with Money and Tithes, is much nearer the Apofto- lick Pattern, than to preach him faljly arid ig- norantly without them. And what would become of us, if it were not for thofe Lords, Doctors of Divinity, and Majlers of Arts, who preferve found Learning in the World, and guard Men from the Doctrines of Enthufiafts (who would be accounted the Minijlers of Chrijl) and fup-* port good Senfe, and the true Interpretation of 26 A Vindication of the Scriptures, againft Nonfenfe, and the Chimeras of Ignorance ? How flattering foever thefe Titles may feem to poor Handicraftfmen, who know not why or wherefore they are beftowed, yet they are very confident with the Simplicity and Self-de- nial of the Gofpel, and are Titles ufually born with lefs Pride and Oflentation, than the Quakers feem guilty of in their affected Sin- gularities. In fine, to difmifs the Letter-writer with a little friendly Advice, let him confider, that Times are not now as they were in the Apoftles Days, nor is there any Perfon now living to be compared with them. The heft. Method we can take to be like them, is to obferve punctu- ally their Directions ; one of which, of great Confequence to the Publick, is, That as God hath diftributed to every Man, as he hath called every Man, fo let him walk and abide therein— not intruding into Things which he hath notfeen, vainly puffed up in his flefily Mind — but Jludy- tng to be quiet, and to do his own Bufmefs. For God is not the Author of Confu/ion3 but of Peace. Let cf Bifiop Taylor. 27 Let the Quakers then keep to their Shop- boards, and to their Looms, &c. and mind their feveral Occupations, and not afpire to Things above their Reach, and beyond their Sphere, defiring to be 'Teachers of the Law, and yet neither under ft aiidingwhat they fay, nor where- of they affirm. Let them be juft in their Deal- ings, peaceable in their Lives, and, as much as they pleafe, filent in their Meetings ; for Silence in Matters of Religion is always fafeft, and beft becoming thofe who know the leaft of it. However, let them be filent at leaft cut of their AfTemblies, and not publifh their Folly to the World. Above all, let them not lay Claim to the Privileges of Maflers of Art s^ and Doffors of Divinity, when they difclaim and abhor thofe Titles ; nor pretend a Right to be Teachers in Theology, when they have m Characters of Education upon them, to denote their Capacity of being fo. The Credit of thofe Styles is as much beyond their Attainments, as it is above their Scorn : And they cannot wifh to be farther from the Honour of them, than they are in Reality from deferving them* And as to the Pedlar, who took upon hint to deliver this Letter to fome of the Clergy of z% A Vindication, &c. of Northumberland 3 let him know, that if he burdens his Pack with Arguments and diftinc- tions, or any Kind of Book-leammg^ he will foon make it too heavy for his Shoulders ; he is not fit for this Bufinefs, neither hath he Lz- cenfe to vend fuch Wares. THE AB of Toleration will not authorize him to carry about Challenges in co?itroverted Points of Religion. Let him therefore for the future meddle no further with the Clergy of this County, than only to carry them Holland for their Shirts, and Cambrick for their Bands ; and be content with fuch Bufinefs as he was bred tQ. And let him be more juft and fair in his Pedling-Trade, than his Friend the Let- ter-writer is in his Quotations ; for if he doth not come more honeftly by his Goods, than the other hath done by his PafTages out of Bi- fhop Taylor, and fhould prefume to impofe upon his Cuftomers withjlolen Remnant st as the other hath upon his Readers, if he be not quite fo eafily detected, yet he may be fure, when ever he is found out, to be moft fevere- Iy corrected. A Reply [ 29 ] A Reply to a Pamphlet, entitled, The Protestant Flail; or, A Defence (grounded upon Scripture) of a Letter to the Clergy of Nor- thumberland. In further Vindica- tion of Buriop Taylor \ and in Jufti- fication of certain Re marks upon the faid Letter, formerly Publifh- ed. Firft printed in 1735. THE PREFACE. THE Author of The Protefiant Flail fets forth in his Preface, that " A P 3- " certain Perfon in the North of England, be- " ing convinced in his Judgment, that fprink- " ling Infants with Water, was not the Bap- " tifm of Chrijl, &c. writ and pubiiflied a 11 (hort Letter, addrejfinghimfelf to the Clergy there and here, it becomes hard to difcover which of them was the Principal, or chief Agent, and which an AceefTory, or the Inftru- ment in this Affair. But they fhare the whole Accufation between them, and mull make the C*4iof it. And how well our Author clears ei- ther to the Protestant Flail. 35 ther hirafelf or the other in this Caufe, will be fecn hereafter. ■ , In the .mean time, as to what he fays a lit- tle further, ill his Preface, of the Vindicators having " treated the Letter-writer in an ungen- {£ tleman-Hke manner, and with great Scorn and " Contempt, bidding him, For the future, to " meddle no farther with the Clergy of that ** County, than to carry them Holland for *' their Shirts, and Cambrick for their Bands-a c- and be content with nich Btmnefs as he was " bred to;" had he but likewife added (as he ihould have done merely for Uluflration, fake) that the Letter-writer was a Country Pedlar, the Advice, which was given him as conii- -dered expreflly under that Capacity, might not JW. have feem'd lb unfeafonable, or the Language P *3' fo unbecoming. It cannot, furely, be an un- handfome Treatment of any Man, to advife him to mind his own Trade and Calling, and to take heed left he expofe and hurt himfelf by meddling with fuch Things as are out of his Road. A Pedlar, confidered in his own pro- per Bufinefs, is as far from deferving Contempt, and as far from meeting with it among Men of Senfe and Manners, as any other Perfon. V> z And j6 3 The Preface to tf Reply And yet, a Pedlar in Controverfy, or a Pedlar in Prints may happen to make a very indiffe- rent Figure ; and, confidered as a Writer ', be as low as 'tis poSible for a Man to fink in the Efteem of all fenfible Judges. Nor is there any Way of helping this, if fuch Perfons (whether Pedlars or no) as know not the right Side of an Argument from the wrong Side, will needs fet up for Difputants and Controvertifts. They will not be treated like Gentlemen and Scholars, as our Author feems to expert his Friend mould have been treated ; but they will be ufed, as all fuch Writers are, with that Difefteem which they unneceflarily bring upon themfelves. The kindeft Service that can be done them, when they will not receive Inflec- tion, is to give them fuch friendly Correction, as may be likely to preferve them from all fuch Attempts for the future as will only draw upon them Scorn and Contempt. For, as was faid above, it is impofTible any Writer mould efcape thefe, who will boldly venture to /peak upon Subjects upon which he hath not yet lear- ned to think. The Reafon given at the Conclufion of the T.y.Pre/: Preface* why this Defence of our Author's is entitled / 10» ty of Prophecy in fuch a Light, that it evident- ly appears from thence, that the Paffages in . the Pojifcript, though they are the Bifhop's own Words, yet they were not his Sentiments upon Infant-Baptifm, but the Sentiments of that Sec? which he all along oppofed. In anfwer to this, the Author of the Flail fays, the Vindicators Charge contains one Affer- Flail, p. 4. tion that is not true, and another which the Vin- dicator would be hard fet to prove > were he put to it. The falfe Aflertion is, His faying that the p. 4, ;.' Paffages are taken out of Bijhop Taylor** Pole* mical Works ; whereas neither the Letter-writ er% nor his Friend from whofe Writings the Paffa- ges were taken, ever f aw or heard of thofe Works to their Knowledge, till the Vindicator told them of Bifiop Taylor'* noble Collection of Polemical Difccurfes publified in Folio, Lond. 1674. If indeed the Vindicator had affirmed, that the Paffages - were taken out of that Edition which he himfelf made ufe of, he might have faid a Thing untrue, according to the Account now given. But he afferted no more than that they were taken out of the Bifhofs. Polemical Vind. p. $ Works. 44 A Rz ? ly to the Works. One of which is this very Book that they themfelves own the Pafiages to have been taken from. And it was as much Polemical in the firfl Publication of it, as in the later Editions : equally fo, whether printed in Quar- to, or in Folio. But our learned Author feems to take for granted, it never commenced Pole- mical till it was publifhed in the large Collec- tion of his Controversial Works in 1674. And thus he hath ventured to charge the Vindicator with a Falfhood for want of a little of that Aca- demical Learning which he defpifes, as ufelefs : for had he but known what Polemical meant, he could not have committed fo grofs a Mif- take. He might with as much Juftice have char- ged the Untruth on Account of another Circun> flance which the Vindicator was ignorant of, but which is now difcovered, viz. that theje PaJJ'ages were not taken by the Letter-writer out of any Edition of Bilhop Taylor, but Jrom ?!aiit?.Art]oe Writing* of a Friend -, that Friend who Fref totht ° / , . flatly p. s.promifedy and now undertakes to clear mm Jrom all Afperfwn cnjl upon him on that Account. Flail, p. 5. The other AfTertion, which he thinks the Vindicator would be hard Jet to prove, were he Protestant Flail 45 be put to it, is, that Bijhop Taylor'* Authority ?**?• P- 6«. is pouched, and his Tejlimony produced, for Doc- trines which he never held. But furely the Bifhop's Anfwer, given in his own Perfon and proper Character to thofe Arguments which he had before offered under the Perfonage or fictious Character of an Ana- baptifi, may be juflly deemed to contain his Handing and avowed Sentiments; unlefs we will fuppofe him always to have a Mafk on, and to write under fuch perpetual Difguife, that we cannot know when he fpeaks his own Mind, and when he only acls a Part. But how will the Vindicator prove that Bijhop Flail, p. 5. Taylor did not hold and approve in his Judgment, oj thofe Arguments which he has advanced in Us Plea againfl Infant-Baptifm, when he firjl pub- UJhed them to the World. This is juft like the Letter- writer's Challenge to the Clergy of Northumberland, to prove that the Quakers do not believe the Baptifm of Chrift Lett. p. 3. as fully and fncerely as any Chriftian ever did. Such abfurd Challenges and Queftions de- ferve no Anfwer. Yet our Author mall have all the Satisfaction that can pombly be given him, viz. as ftrong a Proof for the Thing he 4& A R E P L Y / own Judgment, how can this Friend plead for pre/, p. 5. \{imy that he did not imagine that by fo doing he had any 'ways abufed his Readers ? Or that he ivas Protestant Flail. 59 was confcious of his Innocence, and far from de~ fgning any thing that was unfair in the Quota- tion $ Since whoever made thefe Excerpts, with Defign to produce them as Bifhop Taylors Sentiments, (whether the Pedlar, or his Friend, it matters not) couid not but know that he was dealing mjuftly with the Author from whom he took them, and unfairly with the Reader to whom he ofFer'd them j unlefs we fuppofe him neither to read, think, nor write, as other People do. He pleads, in the next Place, that thefe Paf- p 3, fages were barely cited outofBifiop Taylor'j Wri- tings. But this, inftead of being an Excufe, is the very Circumftance of Vnfairnefs and De- ceit in the Quotations which the Author of the Pojlfcript is charged with. 'Tis faid, He Pre/, to the had only cited the Bijhop's own Words, as they are "" ' to be feen in his Book, without any Comment or Paraphrafe upon them, except Thus far Bifhop Taylor, and fays Bifhop Taylor-, which are Words commonly ufed at the Beginning or End of a Quotation. But becaufe there is no Com- ment or Paraphrafe, becaufe no Account, or Hint is given to inform or advertife the Reader under what Character the Bifhop was then writing, 60 if Reply to the writing, therefore his Words are dijguifed in the Citation, by being left unexplained j and therefore, they are not cited as they are to be feen in his Book-, for whoever fees them there, will fee their Meaning j whoever fees them in the Pojlfcript, will be apt to miftake it. Nor is the Matter helped, by faying that the Cita- tion was made in the fame Words that are com- monly nfed at the Beginning or End of a Quota- tion ; for though this is enough where an Au- thor is cited fpeaking his own Sentiments, as is commonly the Cafe j yet where the Cafe is uncommon, it will require an uncommon Diftinction : As, Thus faith Bijhop Taylor, per- fonating an Anabaptift ; or, Thus far Bijhop Taylor, urging the Anabaptifts Arguments* But, by our Author's Rule of fair citing, an Athcift may quote Scripture thus, There is ?io God, fays the Bfalmift. 'Let us eat and drink^ for To-morrow we die : Thus far St Paul. p. 3. But he goes on : Had indeed the Author of the Letter taken fome of Bijhop Taylor'* Words , and fupprefjed other s, in order to make the Bijhop fay what he never mea?it. Why ; hath he not done fo ? Hath he not taken fome Paffages, and fupprefTed others which were abfolutely neceflary Protestant Flail. 6i neceffary to give Light to theBifhop's Intention, and this in order to make him feem to fay what he never believed ? And is not this the very thing the Vindicator had reprefented as difhonefl and difingenuous ? He proceeds j P- 5- Or had he put a different Glofs or Co7iflruc~lion upon his ExpreJJions than what they naturally im- port. -Why, hath he not, by putting no Glofs, in Effect put a different Conjlruffion up- on the Expreffions, greatly injurious to the Author of them ? And by a finifter Applica- tion of the common Forms of citjng, I'hus far Bifiop Taylor, and fays BifiopT aylor, made what the Words naturally import, to feem to be the Writer's proper and genuine Sentiments 5 whereas he defignedthem in their natural Im- port only to exprefs the Sentiments of a Seel: which thought differently from himfelf ? And was not the leaving them thus to their natu- ral Force, naked, and without any of their Guards and Fences about them, the very Inju- ry complained of?- Then, fays he, be had?. \- grojly abufed his Readers, by afalfe and mojl un- jujl Reprefentation of Bifiop Taylor. Agreed. This was all the Vindicator had faid, and he faid well, as it feems, fince the Pedlar's great Advocate 62 A R e p 1 y to the Advocate is forced at laft to fall in with him in the Conclufion, though he comes at it by a different Expreffiori of his Premifes. £.4. As to what he adds : But this is not the Cafe, for he has fairly cited the Bifiofs Words as they Jiand in his Book, without putting the leaf Glofs or ConjlruSiion upon them j we fay, and repeat it, that for the Reafons above given, this is the Cafe-, and when our Author has made the befb of it, he will find it to be fo. p. 5. Well j but he has a Referve yet, that he thinks will bring him and his Client quite off: Tofatisfy our Readers, fays he, and confute the Vindicator s AJfertion, we fay the Pajfages were tranfcri bed Verbatim from Bijhop Taylor'.? Dif- courfe of the Liberty of Prophecying, printed in Octavo, Lond. 1709. which, the Reader fees, is above thirty Tears after the Other (viz, the Folio Edition of 1674.) and yet has none of Bijhop Taylor'* Anfwers to his own Arguments, as are in that Folio Edition. The more Shame for the Man that publifhed it fo imperfe&ly. He injured his Author, and fpoiled his Edition by doing fo. But the Reader will alfo fee, that this is no more a Confutation of the Vindicator s AJJertion, than what was pleaded above, that the Protestant Fiail 63 the Paffages were taken out of the Writings of a Fref- P- £• Friend-, or what was charged upon him for an Untruth, in faying they were taken out of bis P- 4« Polemical Works ; which might truly have been faid even of this Octavo Edition, out of which, it is now owned r they were taken. But how was it poffible, fays he, for one who P- £• had purufed no other Edition but that of 1709,. or that of 1647, to know that the Bifiop had re- futed his own Arguments? Yes, he might have known it from other Writers, had he been verfed in this Controverfy of Infant-Baptifm, and efpecially from Dr Wall, from whom he quotes a PafTage, containing an Account ofp-6* this very Thing. And yet, upon that Sup- pofition, iays he, all the Vindicator s falfe Infi- nuations are grounded. But this is a wide Mif- take. For though the Vindicator might reaso- nably fuppofe that the Compiler of the Poji- jcript had feen one or other of thofe Editions where the Bifhop's Anfwers to his own Argu- ments are publiflied, and that he had not wholly followed fo defective an Edition as that of 1709; yet the Charge ftands good notwith- standing, being founded upon another Bottom; zna is not materially affected, much lefs refu- ted, 64 ^ Re-ply rt the ted, by this Diverfity of Editions. For even thofe which have not the Bifhop's Anfwers to his own Arguments, have yet Proof enough of his having been unjuftly treated by the Writer of the Poftfcript j that is, they have his ProfeJJion of writing the Anabaptift's Plea, by Way of Trial how ftrongly thofe Argu- ments might be enforced : They have his De- claration of that Doctrine being erroneous, and they contain his own Arguments on the other Side of the Queftion. And therefore the Poji- fcript is indefenfible even upon this footing, upon which our Author has put it ; unlefs he pleads Privilege with the Anabaptifts, of infi- lling upon what Bifhop Taylor fays in one Place, without minding what he fays in another. For he tells us -from Dr Wall*, That it is a common thing with the Anabaptitts to cite the Pajfages in that Treatife of the Liberty of Pro- phecy that make for them, as if they had been fpoken by the Author from his own "Judgment \ and had never been anfwered by him. Our Author indeed rather befpeaks than directly claims the Benefit of this Prefcription : If he lays hold l See Hill, of Infant Bapt. Part II, Protestant Flail 65 hold of it as his laft Refuge, much good may it do him. And now he thinks he has faid all that is p. 19. nccefary in Defence of the Poffcript of the Letter. And we think, that if he can fay no more for it, he had much better have let the Defence of it quite alone ; for the Vindicators Charge ftands where it did, for any thing he hath yet faid to remove it. Had he but confeiTed a Miftake in the whole Proceeding, had he made any decent Excufe of Inadvertency, and Negligence, and Hafte in making thofe Excerpts ; or been content on any Terms to have fairly given up what his own Arguments give up for him ; the Vindica- tor might have been willing to have retracted fomething from the Severity of his former Animadverfions, and to have made all the Allowances that an ingenuous Acknowledg- ment of an Error could have merited. But inftead of this, our Author defends the Poft- fcript with all his Might ; will not allow Bi- fhop Taylor to have been injured fo much as by Miftake-, nay, perfifts in fuggefting that the Bifhop might have been neverthelefs of that Opinion which the Poffcript lays to him. He Vol. H. F twice 66 A R e p l y to the p 7> »7« twice intimates fomething very obfcurely from a certain Frontifpiece, or Picture, at the begin- ning of the Edition in 1647, where the Apo- flles are portrayed in different Attitudes, with a p. 8. Greek Motto near their Heads : He doth not take upon him to fay what Senfe Jeremy Taylor intended thereby to convey to his Reader, nor what his Sentiments were direclly. To what p. 17. Purpofe then is this Remark concerning the Frontifpiece r" If it hath no Relation in the World to his Sentiments upon Infant-Baptifm, what hath it to do here ? n ~ But this remarkable Cut is in the Edition of P $t 1647, which was publifhed while Bifliop Taylor was yet living, and in which there is no Anfwer to his Plea for the Baptifls, and he hath Je en the Cut in no other Edition. What then ? The fame Cut or the fame Device is the Frontifpiece in the Folio Edition of 1657, which was publiihed while Bifh-op Taylor was yet living, and in which was publiihed his Anfwer to his Plea for the Baptifls. And we have feen it in that Edition, though both our Author and his Friend appear to be Strangers to it. He P 7- Protestant Flail. 67 He tells us likewise of fome learned Men P- 8- who about the Time that BiJJjop Taylor publified his Difccurfe of the Liberty of Prophecying, held certain Opinions fuppofed to be alluded to in the faid Frontifpiece, viz. That every Miniftcr of the G of pel ought to iv ait for the In- fluence of the Holy Spirit to enable him to prophefy cr preach, and that every one fo influenced might fpeak in the Congregation', and thereupon From p. 8. produces a String of Paragraphs, for eight or nine Papcs together, out of a Treatife published in 165 1 by William Dell, a great Enthufiaft 5 which PafTages, if fairly quoted, are as little to that Authors Credit, as thofe in the Poffcript were to Bifhop Taylors. But as they do not touch upon the Subject that our Author is here engaged in, nor help any way towards removing the Complaint that was made of the Injury cone by the Pojlfcript, they are as iniigniricant in this Place as the Defcription of the Frontifpiece j and can be fuppofed to ferve no other End than drawing off the Attention of the Reader from difcover- ing our Author's Diftrefs upon the Point in Debate. We mall therefore pafs them all F 2 over. 68. A R e P l y to the over, as foreign to our prefent Purpofe,^ and draw to a Conclufion of this Chapter. P- 5- We obferve upon the Whole, that our Au- thor, who has undertaken tofaiisfy his Readers with refpeet to. the PafTages tranferibed from Billiop Taylor, has in Effect made no Defence at all ; but inflead of that, has fludied a few Shifts to amufe his Readers withal, and offe- red them a Bundle of inefficient Excufes, with a tacit unwilling Surrender of the Que- ftion to the Vindicator , as of a Poll: not tenable. He hath found indeed fome Employment fcr . his Flail-, he hath beat the Air, and threfhed Chaff; made a Noife, and railed a Duff. ; would feem to have done fomething, and go off with fome Degree of Credit ; yet, in rea- lity, hath nothing more to fupport this Shew of Defence, than only appearing not to be yet convinced, or at leaft not to acknowledge, that he and the Pedlar were in the wrong. It is hoped that both of them will be fo wife as to let the Matter reft at length, and receive a Piece of friendly Counfel 5 which is, that for the future, whenever they are minded to cite Authors, to do it with more Care and Caution ; and, for a Prefervative from Protestant Flail. 69. from running into fuch Difficulties as they have done upon this Occafion, it would be .of great Ufe to them when they make Quo- tations, to fancy the Vindicator at their Elbow, and whifpering in their Ear, Remember Bifiop Taylor. CHAP. II. Reply to Chap. II. Sect. I. ' S ^ H E Author of the Flail proceeds, in JL the fecond Chapter, to examine a cer- tain obnoxious PafTage in the Vindication, &c. which hath given him great Offence, and put him to much Trouble j for he has fpent near 40 Pages, viz. the Remainder of his Pamph- let, in his Remarks upon it. The whole PafTage is this. " He fays, p. 7. that the Baptifm of Chrtft Vind. p. ref Bib. P. P. Tom. IV. And hence came tie Pr^hce amon^ fame of fubjlituting the Baptifm of Fire i/ifead of Water by a Cautery, ivith which they marked the Sign of the Crofs -frpon the Foreheads of thefc nmhom they baptized. Fred. Spanhen.ii Dua. Evangel. Parte Tenia, Vol. II. Dub 39. p. 143. Protestant Flail 79 therefore his Remark hath no Ufe in this Place. In the three next Paragraphs he mews that p. 24, 25; Chrift fulfilled his Promife made tp the Apo- fles, of baptizing them with the Holy Ghoft on the Day of Pentecoji. As to what he fays Arts i. 15; of the one hundred and twenty Difciples being all likewife filled with the Holy Ghoft, and made Partakers of the fame Gifts, it is more than he can prove, if it weredifputed with him. But granting this alfo, ftill here is nothing to difcourage us from underftanding Matt, xxviii. 19. of Water-Baptifm. His laft Obfervation is, that the Prophecy of foel was fulfilled in the extraordinary Gifts Joel H. 28, of the Holy Spirit conferred on the Day of Pentecoji. This alfo is granted. He hath now laid down his Premifes in due p. 25. Order for a Conclufion. Let us obferve him, " "Tis therefore, fays he, mojl clear and evident, " that the pouring out of the Spirit, or bap- " tizing with the Holy Ghojl, is the Seal of the " New Covenant, the Promife of the Father, and, according to the exprefs Declarations QiMalachi and John, the Office of Chrijir If a go A R e p l v to the If he means only in a qualified Senfe, a Seal, a Fromife, an Office, his Conclufion is no more to the Purpofe than his Premifes were. But if he fpeaks of them abfolutely and emphati- cally, as the only Seal, the only Promife, the whole Office, then his Conclufion is not warran- ted by any of his Premifes. But whatever he means, he has proved no- thing yet againft our underftanding Matt. xxviii. 1 9. of Baptifm with Water ; and yet he is in Raptures with the Demonftration which P- 2S- he fancies he hath given againft it. " Is It not " thent fays he, jujily Matter of Admiration " that any Jhould ground their Ufe of Water- " Baptifm upon a Place of 'Scripture where Wa- " ter is not fo much as mentioned '?" But what Relation hath this to the Things he hath been . fpeaking of before ? Or what is there in his Detail of Obfervations to make this appear a Matter of fuch Admiration? He has not given one Reafon yet why Water may not be underftood in a Text where it is not exprefily mentioned. Nay, he hath given a Reafon why it may be underftood. For he tells us of exprefs Declarations of the Office of Chrifl by Malachi and John the Baptift, when he knows that Protestant Flail. Si] that neither of thefe Words, Office or Qbrift, are in the Texts he refers to. And he that can fee an exprefs Declaration of an Office of Chriji in a Text where neither of thefe Words are ufed, need not be in fuch Admiration that others can clearly difcover that Chrift inftitu- ted a Baptifrn with Water in another Text, though neither of thefe Words, Chriji or Water y are expreflly Part of it. But there is another thing, it feems, excites his Wonder j and that is, " that any Jlxuld take ?- 2>- " Chriji to have injiiiuted and ordained fuch an " external Rite after his Refurreflion, andjufl " when he was about to afcend to Heaven'' He is fenlible that he hath faid nothing yet to forbid our making fuch a Supposition ; and therefore he proceeds, in the next Place, to mew us hew improbable it is that (Thrift fhould do any fuch thing. Now let us attend to his Reafoning a^ain.p. zj. " It is declared, fays he, in Scripture that tc Chriji J pake to his Dijciples at that Time [*viztA&s i. 3 . u after his RefurrecYion) of the Things pertain- " ing to the Kingdom of God : Now what Rela- " tion or Congruity is there betwixt the ceremo- " nious Rite of Water- Baptifrn, and the King- Vol. II. G » dom gz A R E p l Y to the Rom. adv. « ^7 ^" Go^/, which, the Apojlle fays, is not " Afotf W Drink ?" He would infinuate here, that Water being "Drink n, can have no Relation to the Kingdom ef God. But why fo ? Though the Kingdom of God be not, or doth not confft in Meat or Drink, yet why may not Meat and Drink con- Jifi with the Kingdom of God t Chrift, after his Refurre&ion, eat and drank with his Difci- ples, as well zsjpakeofhis Kingdom. Belides, as Water is not ufed as Drink in Baptifm, the Application of Rom.xiv. 17. to this Subject, is as much out of the Way, as if it were ap- plied to Circumcifion. It comes therefore now to our Turn to admire that any Perfons fhould defend their Difufe of Water-Baptifm with a Text that hath no RefpeB at all to Bap- tifm, and no nearer Relation to Water than it hath to Milk, or any other thing that is drinkable. He n This is like John Gretton\r Argument, in £/7Treatife of Bap. tifm and the Supper ; where, from the fford Elements, ufeJ in Gal. iv. J, 9% he concludes that Water-Baptifm is one of thofe beggarly Element* that St Paul difparaged and oppefed, becaufe Water is an Element. And G. Keith ulh us, that di-vers others ef the Quaker Teachers ha-ve argued in the fame Manner. Argu- ments of the Quakers, anfy.er'd, Sett. 9, Protestant Flail. 83 He proceeds : How very unlikely is it, that P- z6* when Chriji was /peaking of the Things pertain- i?ig to the Kingdom of God, and putting his Df- ciples in mind of what John had f aid about the Baptifm of the Holy Ghoft, that he then inflitu- ted Water -Baptifm, and commanded them to bap- tize all Natio?is with Water ? A raoft impro- bable Thing indeed, that when he was difcour- ling of his Kingdom, and acquainting his Dif- ciples how they fhould be fufliciently enabled to act as his Minifters in it, he mould further tell them hew they were to make Difciples for him, and admit them into his Kingdom. But perhaps, in this Author's Opinion, the Improbability refts upon what he fays after, viz. that Chrifl mould appoint Water for that End, which, he fays, can neither wajh away?-26- Sin, nor purge the Confcience. But this is no more than his own private Opinion, founded on the Confideration of the natural Powers and Qualities of Water, when it is net confider'd facramentally. But before he can make Room for this Snggeftion of Improbability, he ought to (hew, if he can, that Water adminifter'd in Baptifm to worthy Receivers is not, and cannot be a Means both of wajhing away Sin, and of G 2 purging 84 A R E p l Y to the purging the Confidence. For however unfit it may be in itfelf to ferve to thefe Purpofes, yet if it tendeth in certain Circumftances to pro- duce thefe Effects, as a Means appointed there- unto by Chrijl, then it is in Baptifm fomething more than mere Element) or mere Drink, viz, it is both a Sign, and a Fledge of fome inward and fpiritual Benefit. However, he hath faid enough to fatisfy himfeif, and thereupon comes to his grand p. 26. Concluiion: " We therefore, fays he, infer and Matth. " conclude, that the Words of Chrijl, Go ye, " therefore, teach all Nations, baptizing, &c. " have no Relation to Water-Baptifm, but to " the Baptifm of the Holy Ghofi" To which, all we need fay further, is, that we wiih him happier in his Inferences and Conclufons for the future. Sect. III. E proceeds, p. 26. to make three Ob- fervations; which he fuppofes will ap- pear to be clear andfircng Proofs, that his In- fererice is both jit/I and trite* ■ Firft, Protestant Flail 85 Firjl, fays he, we do not read of all the P- z6- Perfom whom the Apojlles baptized, or command- ed to be baptized, that any one of them was bap- tized in the Name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghoft. Neither do we read, on the other hand, that any of them were not baptized in the Name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghoft. And therefore we conclude, as in all Reafon we ought, that all were baptized with that very Form. For, as he himfelf argues in his very next Words : It cannot reafnably be thought, p. 26. that if the Apojlles had taken Matt, xxviii 19. to have been a Precept of ChriJFs concerning Water-Baptifm, they would in *ny In fiance what - foever have omitted that Form of Words. Here we entirely agree with him ; and as it doth not appear that the Apoftles did, in any one In/lance t omit that Form, we think it wireafonable in the Quakers to charge them with omitting it, pure- ly that it may be inferr'd from fuch Qmijfion that the Apoftles did not Baptize with Water, in Compliance with Chrift's Command in Matt, xxviii. 19. And this is a fufficient Anfwer to the Ob- jection as it ftands in this Paragraph. But G 3 as 86 A R e p l y to the as it is one of their capital Arguments °, and which our Author wonders we are able to refill: the Force of?, and which he repeats no lefs than fix Times \ in his Flail under fome Shape or other, making it every where pafs as a decisive Argument, againft which there is no contending j it may be proper to give it a Confideration here once for all. It is acknowledged, that where mention is made in Scripture of the Apoftles, or Difci- ples baptizing Profelytes, there is no particular Recitation of the whole Form of Baptifm, any more than in other Writers who mention the Baptifm of Converts occasionally and hiftori- cally. But there is generally fome Expreffion or other in thefe Scripture-PalTages to diftin- guiih the Chriflian Baptifm from the Jewijh Baptifms, or Joh?^ Baptifm. As baptizing in the « Vfed by Will. Perm. Defence of Go/pel Truths, p. 76. And by Rob. Barclay. See George K.eitrw Arg. of Quakers snfwered. SeS. 7. P We can but admire that any mould take the Words, Go ye therefore and teach, &c. to be a Precept and Command of Chriji to baptize with Water, when there is no [nftance to be found ?n Scripture where any was baptized with Water in the Name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghof, p. 20, 21. 9 P. 26, 27, 29, 30, 31, 4!, Protestant Flail. 87 the Name of the Lord, or in the Name of the A£isx^ 4*- J J vni. r6. Lor*/ Jefus : Not to fignify that the Form ran in his Name only, but to denote that Baptifm which was inftituted by himfelf, and admini- fter'd by his Authority ; and that the Perfons receiving it were baptized into the Faith and Religion of Jefus Chrift, When the Apo- ^fsJ^g ftles are faid to teach or preach in the Name qfix. 27, 29. Jefus, it is not meant, as this Writer fuggefts in his third Chapter (which fhall be confider'd hereafter) that they taught or preached in the Power of Chrift, but that they taught his Doc- trines or preached his Gofpel1. -In like manner, when they are faid to baptize in the Name of Jefus, the Meaning is, they baptized with his Baptifm, or adminifter'd the Chriftian Baptifm as oppofed and diftinguifhed from all other Baptifms. And it might, with as much Rea- fon, be inferr'd from thofe PafTages where the Apoftles are faid to preach in the Name of the Lord Jefus, or to teach and preach Jefus Chrift, Afls v. 4Z. that they did not teach the Trinity, Father, Son, and Holy Ghoft, though that was the G 4 Foundation * Preached the Things concerning the Kingdom of God and 4 be Name of Jefus Chrift, Acts viii. 12. 8-3 A R e p l y to the Foundation or primary Article of the Chri- ftian Faith ; as it can be inferr'd from thefe ParTages where they are faid to baptize in the Name of Jefus that they did not baptize into the Trinity, Father, Son and Holy Ghoft, though that was the exprefs Form by which our Lord commanded all Believers to be ad- mitted into his ►Church. And although the Expreffions where the Baptifm of Converts is mentioned in Scripture are not precifely the fame (as neither are thofe Expreffions which denote the Preaching of the Gofpel by the Apofcles) yet they are meant of one and the fame Form of Baptifm delivered by Chrift, Mattt. xxviii. 19. And thus the feveral ParTa- ges (which our Author miftakes as denoting different Forms) have been generally interpre- ted by Catholick Writers, with fuch Concur- rence of Sentiments, that not above one or two among the ancient Fathers feem to have had any Doubts about it : And the probable Reafon f of fuch Doubts have been likewife affigned. * See BinghamV Antiquities, Vol. IV. and Dr WaterlandV Sermon on Matt, xxviii 19. Protestant Flail. 89 And now let the particular Objections of our Author to this Interpretation in the feveral Paffages where this Exprefiion occurs, be exa- mined. He tells us, l V f 0 the " <&«. ill account for all the Water-Baptifm nve read of in the A£ls. Query, how it will account for the Baptifm of St Paul by Ananias, Acls ix. 18. Will. Penn therefore thought it the wifeft Way to call in Quefti- On, Whether this Baptifm of St Paul mas nvith Water, or no ; though Ananias faid unto him, Arife therefore, and be baptized, and nvajb aivay thy Sins. George Keith obferves juftly enough, that this Doubt of Will. Penns befpoke as great Inadvertency in him, as when he printed in his Cbrijiian Shaker, that Jefus Chrift ivas bom at Nazareth. Protestant Flail. 95 abbreviate Way of expreffing Baptifm in the Name of the Father, and Son, and Holy Ghoft j and not that it is one and the fame thing whether Baptifm be adminifter'd with or without the Name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghoftj or that it is tantamount to fubfti- tute the Name of Jefus Chrift in the AB of Baptizing^ inftead of the Form delivered Matt, xxviii. And this Mifapprehenfion of their Meaning (for if any of them have fpo- ken fo in the Meaning of our Author, 'viz. that a Change in the Form was actually made, let them defend themfelves) ha9 led him to aik fome Queftions out of the Way j as, Why p. 30. have not all Water-Baptijls Jince the Apoftles Days ufed the fame Form of Words f If he means by Form of Words, in the Name of the Lord Jefus only> the Water-Baptifts have not ufed it, becaufe the Apoftles themfelves did not ufe it, in the Act of Baptizing. But as to the proper Form delivered in Matt, xxviii. 1 9. it hath been from the Apoftles Times in- variably and constantly kept to and obferved by all Catholick Churches ; and alfo by moft Hereticks ; for St Augufiine fays, One might ?no?'e eafily find Heretkks that did not baptize at all, 96 A R e p l y to the all, than fitch as retained Baptifm without tip tig thofe Evangelical Words of which the Creedcon- ffls, and without which Baptifm cannot be con- fecrated. p 3f» He afks again, What Authority have Water- Baptifs to vary from the Form of Words ufed by the Apoflles I We anfwer, they have none, nei- ther have they pretended to any Authority to do fo, neither have they varied from the Form ufed by the Apoflles, but have univerfally kept to it, excepting a few Hereticks j an Account of whom, and of their Variations from the Apo- ftolical Form, may be found in Binghams Antiquities, Vol. IV. and elfewhere. He pro- p. 3 1. ceeds ftill upon the fame erroneous Suppofition : And if the Form of Words ufed by the Apoflles ought to be a Rule and Standard to others, does it not necejfarily follow that all who have bapti- zed with Water in the Name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghojl, have done it without either an ■Apoflolical Precedent, or a Divine Command? Had he not efpoufed an Error in this whole Matter, he mult have known that they who baptize in the Name of Father, Son, and Holy Ghoft, do it upon an Apoflolical Precedent , founded on a Divine Command. And that they who Protestant Flail. 97 who do not practice Water-Baptiirn at all, do neither regard the Apojiolical Precedent ;, nor the Divine Command. Sect. IV. WE come next to the fecond Obfervaticn, which he offers as another ftrong and clear Proof, that Matt, xxviii. 19. hath no Re- lation to Water-Bapiifm, but to the Baptifm of the Holy Ghofl. It is this : " When Peter rehearfed to the Brethren at?- *6. and try how he can reconcile it with the Com- mand of Chrifi to baptize with Water. This is one of the triteft Objections the Quakers have againlt. Water-Baptiiin * And is an y Anfvver to Bapt[fm with Water aJJ~erled, p. 8. and Will. Fesaz Def. of Gofpel-1 'ruths, p 76. Protest. a„n.t Flail. 105 an old. Argument of the Quint'illians revived, and not one jot improved. This Seel: took its Rife from one Quintilla^ a Woman Preacher at Carthage^ a little before Tertul/ians Time,. who made it her Bufincfs to difparage and cry. down Water-Baptifm. Againft which Herefy, TertuMan wrote his Book of Baptifm, to eftab- lilh the Importance of our Lord's Inftitutions : In which Book, c. 14. this very Objection is- conilder'd and refuted. And alfo by St Chry- jujlome, Hom. 3. on the firft Ep. to the Cor- Among the Moderns, by Limborchz, and Dr Forbes a ; and as many others almoft, as have wrote againft the Quakers upon the Subject of Baptifm b. Our Author feems to own he lias looked into Mr Lefie\ Divine Infiitution of Water-Baptifm ; He has a whole Chapter or Section on this particular Objection c. Why has not our Author made fome Reply to him, or taken fome Notice of thofe Things that are urged againft the Quakers Way of Reafoning upon 1 L. 5 cap 67. '- Forbefii Op. Fol. Vol. IT. p. 464. b Geo. Keith's Arg. of the Quakers againft Baptifm and the Lord's Supper refuted, Se.d. 4 Dr Bennet\ Confutation of $htakerifm, Chap 25. « Leflie\ Dit>. Inf. of Wat. Bapt. S.efl. 7. iu.akcrs Inferences from this Paflage. If we prefs him with this Confequence from their Interpretation, How came St Paul to baptize Crifpus and Gaius, &c. as he de- clares he did, if he knew that he had no Com- mand or Commiffion to do fo ? Then he will guard againfl this Queflion with a Dilli notion that the Quakers are wont to ufe when they are thus prefTed, 'viz. that the ApofHes bap- tized by Permzfion, and not by CommiJJion, and put what St Paid did on this Occafion upon the fame footing with his circumcifing Timothy, And then we muft repeat all thofe Arguments which are proper to fhew the Invalidity of this Dift-inction, when thus applied. They will be found in Geo. Keith d and others. Referring therefore to what has been faid upon this Text by former Writers, and more efpecially by the Author of The Defence of Baptifm with Water and Infant- Baptifm affertedy we (hall only defire the ferious Reader to pon- P. z7. der and refleB upon this poftive Declaration of St Paul, that he baptized Crifpus and Gaius, and d Jnfiver to the Quakers Argument:, againfl Baptifm and the Lord's Supper. Seft 4 p. 9. Quarto, Lond. 1698. |08 --A R E P L Y to the and the Houjkold of Stephanus ; and that he gives this. Reafon why he baptized no more, viz. left any Jhoiihl fay that he baptized in his own Name ; and that the whole PafTage necef- farily implies, that all the Believers at Corinth, univerfally, were baptized; the Apoftles not only countenancing fuch Baptifm, but com- manding it, and occasionally performing it themfelves wherever they came -3 let him, we {ay , ferioufy ponder thefe Things, and try if he can fairly reconcile them with that total Neg- lect and Difufe of this Inftitution which the Quakers are guilty of. Sect. VI. TH E Author of the Flail having now done with his clear and ftrong Proofs in Support of hisjift and true Inference, that Matt, xxviii. 19. hath no Relation to Water - Baptifm, proceeds to examine the four Texts that the Vindicator hath referr'd to, in thefe Vind. p. Words : " It is certain, that the Apoftles " underftood it fo (viz. Matt, xxviii. 19. of Water- Baptifm) " as appears both by .their " Practice and Writings, AEii. x. 47. and il viii. Protestant Flail. 109 " viii. 36, 38. Eph. v. 26. Heb. x. 22. In and chiefly from that Text which our Author ought to have quoted at length, inilead of flopping fhort at thefe Words, but this he fpake of the Spirit, for it imme- diately follows, which they that believe on him JJjould receive, for the Holy Ghojl was not yet come. And if it be right to expound this Text of the extraordinary Gifts of the Spirit then it cannot, with any Propriety, be brought I 2 to 1 1 6 A R e p l y to the to interpret another Text, which relates only to the ordinary V/ork and Office of the Holy Ghoft, In fa?iclifylng the Church of Chrift. Again ; fuppofing the figurative living Wa- ter is to be under flood of the ordinary Opera- tions of the Spirit, clean ling and purifying the Souls of Believers, and in that Senfe to be ap- plicable to this Text of St Paul which we are confidering j yet the Application will lie, not where our Author places it upon the Phrafe Wajhing with Water, but on what follows, viz, by the Word, that is to fay, by the Word of his Grace ; for thus fome have SreDr thought it might be confidently interpreted, ' ' and agreeably, to another Expreffion of the fame Apoftle, AMs xx. 32. And now, my Brethren, I commit you to God, and to the Word of his Grace, which is able to build you up, and to give you an Inheritance among all them that are fancllfied. And in this Senfe it is made parallel to another Paffage of the fame Writer, where he fpeaks likewife of Baptifm, calling it the Wafting of Regeneration, and renewing Snt.ui.5 0f the Holy Ghoft. There Protestant Flail. 117 There is indeed another Confrruction of » pr,cj.x1i approved of by good Expofitors, viz. that it means the Form of Baptifm. Which, to be lure, our Author will not hear of. Nor {hail we need to take any Pains with him about it, fince it matters not at prefent which of thcfe Interpretations be the beft. Let the judicious Reader judge of them. But that Expofition which our Author fathers upon their meanefl: Tradeimen, is fuch as we believe cannot be found in any good Commentators, nor perhaps to be met with any where but among the Blue and Leathern-apron'd Divines Well ; but he fays further, •■ We an bold? 3*- " to affirm, in Contradiction to the Vindicator, " that the Water of the Word, which the Apo- " ftk Jpea&s °f is the clean Water which God 11 promifed to fprinkle upon his People, Ezek^ver. 2. " xxxvi." But now, in the firft Place, he is a little too bold in altering the Scripture-Expremon to make it fpeak for him. For the Apoftle ufeth no fuch Phrafe as the Water of the Word 'h, but I 3 the h By comparing this Phrafe, which our Author affects, viz The Water of the Word, with his late References to Texts that mention 1 1 3 A R e p l y to the the Wafting of Water by the Word. This is no accidental Slip of his Pen, for he repeats P 33* it twice again in the next Page j and what is more, he tells the Vindicator , that he might P-31- as well fay, that St Peter {pake of material Milk, v/hen he faid, As new-born. Babes defire the fncere Milk of the Wordy as take St Paul here to be f peaking of material Water. So that he manifeftiy has efpoufed a Notion, that as St Peter fpoke of the Milk of the Word, fo St Paul did of the Water of the Word. But as this latter is his own Text, he himfelf is the propereft Ferfon to comment upon it. xxxvi. 22, as to the Quotation out of Ezekiel\ why 27! ' St Paul fhould rather be thought to allude to this mention living Water, one would be apt to imagine that he had taken up with fome Notions like thofe of the Politicians ol old > who, according to Euthymius [Panopha, Par. 2. Tit 21. p. 48 ) though they really rejecled and defpifed Baptifm with Water, yet they pretended to receive it. But that was only with a de- ceitful Equivocation; for they maintained that the Word of the Gofpel was Baptifm, becaufe our Lord f.iid Ego fum Aqua Vi%-a ; I am the Living W^ter. See Bingham'-' Ant. Bock 4. 1 ver. 25. Then njcill I fprinkle dean Water upon you, and ye Jhall be clean : from all your Filthinefs, end from all your Idols, nvill I cleanfe you. And a netu Heart alfo iniiead of Wafting of Water by the Word. Nor is he more fuccefsfui in his other Ob- fervation upon the fourth and lad Text that the Vindicator had referr'd to, viz. Heb. x. 22. I 4 Having k Numb, viii 7. and xix. 1 3, 1 8. 19, 20, 21. 1 SzzLowtb upon Ezek. xxxvi. ver. 25. And Mr B* Ajjigny% AJyfsery of AnabaptifmXJnmafkd. 8vo. Lond. 1709. p. 95. j2o A R e p l y to the Having our Hearts fprinkled from an evil Con- feience, and our Bodies wafhed with pure Water. Here is a manifefr. Allufion to the Methods appointed in the Mofaical Law for the Purifi- cation of the Unclean from Ceremonial Defile- ments j which were by fprinkling of Blood, and of Water j and bathing or wafhing of the Body with Water, Lev. xvi. Num. xix. By the fprinkling of the Blcod of the Sin-OfTering before the Mercy-Seat, the People were made clean from their Sins, Lev. xvi. 30. To this the Apoftle alludes, Having therefore, Brethren, Boldnefs to enter into the Holiejl by the Blood of Jefus let us draw near having our Hearts fprinkled from an evil Co?ifcie?ice. And he makes the like Allufion in a parallel m PalTage in the Chapter before. And as by the fprinkling of our Hearts the Apoftle exprefTes the inward Sanclification or clean ting of our Souls from Sin by the Blood of Chrift (in which "» Heb. ix. 13, 14. For if the Blood rf Bulls and of Goats and the Alhes of an Heifer fprinkling the Unclean fanttifieih to the purifying of the Flefb, how much more (hall the Blood o^ Chrilt, who through the eternal Spirit offered himfelf without Spot unto God, purge y opr jOonJ cieuce from dead Wotks to ferve the Living God, Protestant Flail. 121 which both the Author of the Flail and the Vindicator do agree) fo by the having our Bo- dies wafted with pure V/ater he exprefTes the outward Means or Sign of that internal Purity, viz. Baptifm and pure Water; pure on Account of the Analogy n, that it may the more fitly reprefent the inward Effects, of which it is the Symbol and the Pledge. No, fays our Author, by pure Water, in this Place, we are?' 34- to under]} and that pure Water ° of Life, clear as Chryftal, which John the Divine faw proceed- vig out of the Throne of God and the Lamb. Surely he could have no other Reafon for this Imagination, than that in all the Scriptures he could not find St Paul's very Exprefiion of pure Water, but iri the Revelations, where St John comes very near it, a pure River of Wa- ter -, which ftruck his Fancy fo ftrongly, that he forgot that St Paul was fpeaking of an Ab- lution pertaining to this Life, St John of a Circumftance of the New Jerufalem ; the one of a thing that was over and parTed, the other of fomething future in the World to come. Yet n See VcJJius de Baptifino, Difp. I. Thefis 4. 0 Rev. xxii. 1. And he jliewed me a. pure River of Water, Ice. Y22 ^ Reply to the Yet he is fo fure of its being a juft Expo- P* 34" fition and a clear Cafe, that he is willing to leave the Dccifion of it to any Clergyman in the County of Northumberland, except the Vindicator. This had been a bold Step indeed, if he had not immediately withdrawn his Appeal, and retracted it by a Provifo, that fuch Clergyman fiall give us his Thoughts and Opinion as fairly and candidly as the Author of the Sermon preach- ed at Derby, Sept. 20. 1730. has done upon this Head. That is, if he will deliver his Opinion in fuch a manner that the Quakers may fancy him to be one of the Brotherhoods and cite him as their Advocate. For fuch doth the Treacher of this Sermon appear to be from thofe Paffages that are cited in the Flail. But knowing what a defperate Hand our Author has at quoting, and being warned by the Fate of Bilhop Taylor, not only to pity all Writers out of whom he makes Excerpts, but to fuf- pend Judgment concerning them, till we are allured he has not mal-traited them, we mall forbear all Cenfure, as well as all Defence of the faid Preacher at Derby, till we have Op- portunity of knowing how his Paffages lie, and whether he be fairly ufed or no. CHAP. Protestant Flail." 123 CHAP. III. Reply to the Remainder of Chap. II. in the Flail, and to Chap. III. in the fame. Sect. L r-|-\ H E Author of the Flail, p. 38. partes JL on to the Vindicators third and laft Paragraph. Where he remarks, that the Vindicator has faid no more than Mr Lejlie had faid before him. However, he is obli- ged to the Vindicator for referring to Mr Lejlie ; otherwife he had not known perhaps that both made ufe of the fame Expofition of the Word Baptize. The more Testimonies one can produce from good Writings, who have agreed in the Interpretation of any Paf- fage, and in their Reafons for it, the greater the Authority of fuch Interpretation, fo far as hu- man Authority goes. And the Vindicator could have (hewn this Expofition that he gave to have been commonly approved by the belt Authors from the earliefl Times of Christi- anity ; and fo of moft, or all the other Texts he hath made ufe of j whereas our Author can 124 ^ R e p l y to the can go no higher for the Arguments and Ex- pofitions which he borrows, than 1650 ; unlefs he have Learning enough to difcover that fome of them are the fame that were urged by the ancient Hereticks that rejected Water-Bap- tifm. His Bufinefs in the Remainder of this fe- cond Chapter, and in that which follows, is to (hew us the true Way of expounding Matt. xxviii. 19. which it feems the Water-Baptifts for want of knowing the Rules of true Inter- pretation and ConfiraBion^ have widely mista- ken. And here we mall fee whether he hath a better hand at building up, than he has in pulling down, p. 38. He lays his Foundation thus : " That the true " Senfe of the Word Baptize in Matt, xxviii. 19. fC is better under/? ood by comparing the fever al " F laces in the Evangelijls where the Word is ufed in a figurative Senfe. How ftrangely have all former Expofitors of Scripture (being deceived, as it feems, and blinded by their Academical Learning) mif- fed the Rules of true Interpretation and Ccrfi ruc- tion ! Come and learn of our Author, all ye who would be Criticks in Language. Sect. II. *41' ]T_¥ I S next Obfervation is, " We think it JL JL li very abfurd and contradictory to found " Senfe to interpret the Words of Chrijl , Mark ce xvi. 1 6. He that believeth and is baptized \ " Jkall be faved, of Water-Baptifm j for then A&s viii. u it r^oidd follow, that Simon the Sorcerer tc was in a State of Salvation, though the Scrip- >c ture affirms, thai his Heart was not Right in H the Sight of God. ' But the E/iptifm which « Chrijl Protestant Flail. 135 we acknowledge it true : But then we obferve that this makes nothing againft the Buiinefs in hand, which is Water-Baptifm. For we fay, as St Peter did in the other Place cited, that the Baptifm which faveth is not the putting away the Filth of the Flefi, is not the outward Warn- ing or Sign in Baptifm, but the Anfwer of a good Conference towards God. And, confe- quently, we agree with our Author, that the Baptifm which Chrift fpeaks of, Mark xvi. 16. is the fame with that which St Peter fpeaks of in his firft Epiftle, Chap. iii. ver. 21. Neither of them being the Baptifm of the Holy Ghoft Protestant Flail.' 137 Choft promifed by.Chrift, Acts i. 5. but both of them being the fame Baptifm that was in- stituted by Chrift according to Matt, xxviii. 19. How then doth the hiefficacy of Water-? 4«- Baptifm^ to procure any Man or Woman s Sal- nation, appear from either of thefe Texts ? Even the external Ablution, or putting away the Filth of the F/efi u, is fo far efficacious to -the putting both Men and Women into a State of Salvation, as it is necefTary to their Admittance into that Covenant with God, out of which there is no Salvation. They who would give it any other Sort of Efficacy than what may be afcribed to an infiituted Means, made necefTary to the Attainment of an End, go farther than they can warrant. And they who hold it unnecefTary, as a Meansy and re- ject it purely becaufe it is Outward, and hath Refpect unto the Flefh, put from them the A^ *iu. Word of God, and make the Commandment of Mm. xr. Chrifl6' " Upon this Text of St Peter, fee LeJIie's Div. Inft of Wat. Bapt. Seft. 8. G. Keith's Arg. againji Bapt. and the Lord's Sup- fer an fixer ed, Seft. 3. Dr Berne? % Confutation of Quaker ifm c. 24 and others. >38 A Reply /n/je Chrift of none Effecl through their own Tradi- tions x. Our Author has fome more Obfervations in this Hiftory of the Samaritan Converts, which he lays down in order to make a Conclusion from them. The Samaritans had been bap- tized with Water, but they had not received the Holy Ghoft : for as yet he was fallen upon none Acts viii. of them. But the Apoftles coming from Jeru- falem, prayed for them, and laid their Hands on them, and they received the Holy Ghoft. P 42« Now the Receiving the Holy Ghojl was, accor* ding to Peter's Interpretation, a being bapti- zed with the Holy Ghojl, Ads xi. 15. We allow all * " After all their Exceptions againft outward Inftitutions, e< the Quakers do as eagerly promote George Fox's Inftitutions *' about outward Things, as they labour to throw down the " outward Inftitutions of Chrift." George Keith's Arg. pf the Quak. anftuer V, Se£L 6. John Gretton, in one of his Pieces, lays the Foundation of his Argument againft Water-Baptifm in this Text, Heb. vi. i. Leaving the Principles of the Doclrine of Chrift, let us go on to Perfection. From the Word Leaving, he infers, that Water- Baptifm is to be left off, as a firft Principle. And by the fame Way of Arguing the Quakers may get rid of all the Principles of the Chriftian Religion. This Book is entitled, John Baptift decreeing, firft publilhed fome Years fince, but reprinted in 1697. See this Account in, Geo Keith's Arg. of £>uak. AnfiM% Protestant Flail. * 39 all this. What follows ? Why, fays he, from St Peter's Interpretation, as well as jrom the Concern which the Apoflles had tlxit the Sama- ritans might receive the Holy Ghofl, though they were baptized with Water, We conclude the Baptiftn of the Holy Ghofi, and not Water* Baptifm, was that which Chrifi fpake of Matt, xxviii. 19. and Mark xvi. 16. Suppofe we were to anfwer thus (making ufe of the fame Premifes to bring out a quite contrary Corw clufion:) But from St Peter' s Interpretation, as . well as from the Concern that he had that Cor- nelius, and the Gentile Converts with him, might re ceii- e VvTa:er-Baptifm, though they were already baptized with the HJy Ghofi, We conclude that Water-Baptifm, and not the Baptifm of the Holy Ghofi:, was that winch Chrifi fpake of Matt, xxviii. 19. and Mark xvi. 16. This Con- clufion is every whit as good as his. Nay, it is the more warrantable. For St Peter infifts upon the Water-Baptifm after the Holy Ghoffc had fallen upon the Converts, as necejfary, and by all means to be adminifter'd. But in the Cafe of the Samaritan Converts, there doth not appear the like Neceffity that they mould Jbe endowed with the extraordinary Gifts of the 14.0 A R e p l V to the the fpirit. St Peter in the one Cafe commanded Water-Baptifm to be adminifter'd. In the other Cafe he only frayed that they might be endowed with thofe Gifts. The one he did by Authority and Commimon, as a Thing in- difpenfible. The other he fought for by Prayer ■, as a Thing highly expedient, and tending to the Edification of the Church. If Water- Baptifm be therefore the Bapftfm which is ftri&ly and indifpenfibly neceffary, and there >. 57I is but one Baptifm j then Water-Baptifm, and not Baptifm with the Spirit (meaning the ex- traordinary Effufions of it, as all along under- ftood in this Controverfy) is the One Baptifm for all Nations in Matt, xxviii. 19. and the Baptifm by which Believers are faved in Mark xvi. 16. p. 43. " But, fays he, p. 43. by taking Matt, xxviii. " 19. and Mark xvi. 16. to be fpoken of the " Baptifm of the Holy Ghoft, and not Water- " Baptifm, feveral abfurd Confequences are avoi- " ded. " For is it not very fir ange, fays he, anddb- " furd for any to affirm that Chrijl by thefe " Words inflituted Water-Baptifm in the Room Xi of Circumcifion ?" If this indeed mould be affirmed Protestant Flail. 141 affirmed as a neceffary Confequence from thefe Texts alone, it might perhaps feem ftrange. But it is no direct Confequence from them. Neither is it in its felf an abfurd Pofition. For if there be other Reafons y for faying that Water-Baptifm came in the Room of Circum- cifion, or fucceeded it, as many learned Men have expreffed themfelves, why may it not be faid ? or, what has our Author to object againft it? Yes, he thinks it* " firange andp-43-' c4 abfurd that Chrifi fjould abolifi one Ceremony " of no moral Efficacy, and infiitute an ether in c< the Place cf it, that neither rectifies the Mind, " nor purges the Confcience." But here he con- fiders not that Circumcifion had a pofitive Effi- cacy j and he conliders only the Sign in Bap- tifm, or the outward Warning, sbftracted from the internal Effecls of it in all worthy Receivers. And this, we think, is a ftrange and abfurd Way of reprefenting either the one or the other. But he goes on, " How /jp. 43, c£ it pofjible to conceive, that baptizing a P erf on " with Water fhall put him into a State of Sal* *• vation f" Jufl as poflible as to conceive, that y Vide Selden. dt Syne dr lis Vet. Elraerum, 1. I. c. 3. 1 43, A Reply to the that a Perfon wilfully rejecting Baptifm fliall not be put into a State of Salvation ; or that a Man-Child of the Seed of Abraham, who was not circumcifed, fould be cut off from his Cen,xvii. People. But, he adds, " How can it render him " ever the more acceptable to God, who looks on- p. 43. « ly at the Heart and Frame of the Mind ? But the Heart and Frame of the Mind is con- cerned in all Inftances of Obedience or Difo- bedience to the divine Commands. And though the Matter of thofe Commands be ia its own Nature indifferent, yet the Obligation to perform them is moral-, and renders the Per- former the more acceptable in the Sight of God ; and the Negle&er of them the more odious. And thefe now are his fever al abfurd Confe- quences that follow upon Water-Baptifm. p. 43. tc whereas, fays he, if we take thefe Words of " Chrijl, He that believeth and is baptized tc fhall be faved, but he that believeth not fliall " be damned, to be Jpoken of the Baptifm of the " Holy Ghoft, and the purifying Virtue of it, ?79 Abfurdity follows." Yes, furely. 1. The interpreting this Text where baptize may be underftood literally, by another, ABs i. 5. where it is confelledly fi- gurative 0 Protestant Flail.' "14$ gurative. See above, what has been fall in the Beginning of this Chapter, Sect. 1 . 2. The. extending a Promife of Chrift made to the Apoftles, and fulfilled in them, ancl feveral of the firfr. Converts to Chriftianity, to all tfgtth and to all People who mould believe throughout the World : Contrary to Experience and Fact. 3 . The making it requifite to a State of Sal- vation that Men and Women be endowed with the miraculous Gifts of Tongues and Pro- phecy, and difcerning of Spirits, &c. by which no Man alive can be now in a State of Salva- tion. 4. The making this Text in Mark inconii- flent with the parallel Text in Matt, xxviii. by which it is directed, that all Men mould be baptized in the Name of Father, Son> and Holy Ghoft. Which Direction was followed in all the Water-Baptifms of Chriftian Converts that we read of in Scripture, but was no Part of the Baptifm of the Holy Gholt in any one In- fiance there recorded. To thefe we may add one Abfurdity more, in our Author's own Way of Reafoning. He has been pleading hitherto for the Baptifm of the 144 A R e p l y to the the Holy Ghoft, as being the Baptifm mentioned in Matt, xxviii. Markxvi. and explaining it by ABs i. 5. and x. 44. and xi. 15. and viii. 15, 17, 19. where it fignifies the extraordi- nary Gifts of the Holy Ghoft conferr'd upon the Apoftles, and many others whom they converted by their Preaching, or confirmed by their Prayers, or the Impofition of their Hands. But now all of a fudden he fhifts his hand, and muffles another Kind of Baptifm with the Holy Ghoft in the Room of that he had been talking of, and explains it by the pu- rifying Virtue that attends it ; which is none other than the internal Grace and Effect of Wa- ter-Baptifm duly received. And then he adds, P 43* " Certainly he that receiveth the Holy Ghoft, or ii :8. and viii. 16. and x.. 48. and xix. 5. 1 Cor. i. 13. attdh. 15. * Chap. 2. bed 3. 14$ -# R e p l y to the though, as has been juft laid, it is againfr. al Rule to1 interpret Name by Power in any of thefe Texts where it moft naturally bears its primary and literal Senfe ; yet we will further fuppofe, for the prefent, that the Word Name, in all thefe Texts, is capable of his Conftruc- tion, and may indifferently fignify Power, or Name in its firfl and obvious Senfe. But then we fay, that it is highly reafonable to expound the fame Phrafe where ever it occurs in the fame Manner, viz. to expound it always of Power, or never. And that it is highly unrea- fonable to allow the Word Name its proper and literal Meaning in all thefe Paflages but one, and to interpret it by Power in that one only, which is the principal Text to which all the others refer. Let us now examine the Point by this equi- table Rule, and fee how our Author's Argu- ment will turn out. George Fox, whole Writings are the Oracles of all the Quakers, was the Perfon that rather hinted than gave them this Interpretation of Name in Matt, xxviii 19. And it is the only Argument he is faid to have offered againft underftandiug that Place of Water-Baptifm. His Protestant Flail. 149 His Words are thefe, b And doth not that in Matt, xxviii. fay, Baptize into the Name ? and is not that more than in the Name ? Next, Barclay and Penn argue, that tk to ovoy.x, into the Namey muftfignify into the Power of Father, Son, and Holy Ghoft. Will. Penns Reafon is, Since it is to become their Likenefs, and bear their Image, which is Holinefs e. And for this Reafon, according to them, Baptilm in this Text, is the Eaptifm with the Holy Spirit. But if this Obfervation be a iuft one, then it will follow, that the Converts at Samaria who were baptized by Philip, eft to foyu*t into Afts vii^ the Name of the Lord Jefus, were baptized into the Power of the Lord Jefus. But as it hath been already fhewn, that thefe Baptifms in the Name of the Lord Jefus were the very fame in Point of Form, with that commanded in Matt, xxviii. (fee Chap. 2. Seel. 3.) There- fore thefe Samaritans rnuft be underftood to have been baptized into the Power, not of the Lord Jefus only, but of the Father, Son, ntnd L 3 Holy h In his Book, entitled, Something in Anfatr to the Old Commm-Prayer Book. Printed at London. 1660. p. 18. c Defence of Gofpcl-Tmihs, agai?:ft the Bijhop of CorkV Jfc (limouy, Lond. 1698. p. 72. .'150 A K e p l y to the Holy Ghoft. And that is, as they tell us, with the Baptifm of the Holy Spirit. And yet this cannot be, for the Holy Ghoft as yet was fal- len upon none of them, only they were baptized into the Name of the Lord Jefus. Then the 16 $ij!' Apo files laid their Hands on them, and they received the Holy Ghojl. The Cafe was juft the fame as to thofe Con- verts which St Paul found at Ephefus, who A£s'xix. faj nof fQ much as heard of the Holy Ghojl, and confequently had never been baptized with Chriftian Eaptifm. He baptized them & to ver* 5' ovoju«> that is, according to this Interpreta- tion, with the Baptifm of the Holy Ghoft. And yet we are told prefently after, that when he ver. 6. had laid his Hands upon them, the Holy Ghojl came on them, and they fpake with Tongues, and prophecy d. Therefore, either this Interpreta- tion cannot be right, or they were baptized with the Holy Ghoft, ver. 5. in the manner directed, Matt, xxviii. 1 9. And were bapti- zed with the Holy Ghoft again, ver 6. in the manner promifed by Chrift, Acts i. 5. Will our Author agree to this ? And what fhall we make o! thofe PaiTages of St Paul to the Corinthians. Were ye bapti- zed Protestant Flail. 151 zed in the Name of Paul, e« ri tvo^*, ivJo the » Cor »■ 13, 14, 15. Power of Paul ? / thank God that I baplized none of you but Crifpus and Gaius, left any JJoould jay that I had baptized in mine own Nrme ; rig to ltuov tvoy.*, into mine own Power. Had the Corinthians been capable of faying, otfufpe&irfg this, the Apoftle had greater Reafon ftill to thank God that he had baptized fo few of them. And this may fuffice to {hew the Abf .. rdity of this Criticifm upon the Phrafe into the Name d. If our Author (hall think fit to quit this Diftin&ion made by his Brethren, between in and into, and aflert, that skroovey-x means no more than » or hti 7$ wopxli, in the Mams, and iignifles and mould be render'd in the Power (for fo it is he renders it himfelf) or by p. 21, ^ Virtue of the Power-, yet ftill thefe four Paf-*"a 53' (ages above-mentioned, even when thus under- ftood and render'd, will equally overturn his Hypothefis, and remain e£feCGpJe jn Scorn called Quakers, from 1 In a Book, entitled. Seme Principles of the Elef: Pecple tf GV, in Scorn called Quakers, p. 75. Protestant Flail. 163 cc from their trembling at the Power and Word cc of Gody has been to call and invite all Men " to wifnefs with them the Baptifm of the Holy " Spirit^ knowing it to be the Sum of Religion ; o2 A R e p l Y to the Appendix tongue.* And if this Protefiation of his had but been printed juft as he penned it, with the advantage of his orthography, it would have appeared more worthy of him. But he was an hearty Reformer, and zealous for the extirpation even of the very root of Tope" ry. -f So it appears •> for under pretence of reformation he has left nothing remaining of a vifible church, that he could take away. He was not content to lop off the fuperfluous bran- ches, and call away all her corrupt fruits, but he mull pluck her up by the very roots. By this declaration of his the Replier may fee what kind of Reformation it was that appeared in thefe kingdoms in the lafi century \. Fully and fufficiently, infomuch that he defires not to fee or hear of any more fuch. He may fee what effectual work the P rot eft ant Flail can make% when managed by the JkUjul hands of honejl, plain \ dijlnt ere/led ', New-Tefa- Wtnt-taught countrymen. || He hath feen to his for row * Many and remarkable inftances of his not being able to (pell the mo" common words are given by Francis Bugg, in his Hidden things brought to light, whereby the Fox is unhnnePd pugg in Folio, 1712. p. 210. * Jtfendix, p.qz. J P. 97. (j Ibid. to the Protestant Flail. 183 forrow what work it hath made, and continues to make, in fuch hands. Should the Prefacer (continues he) take up that injlruwent, I am apt to think he would not dare to attempt the handling it Jo effectually. * No : God forbid he fliould. Our Author is not very apt to think -y but he has thought here- in very juftly, that the Prefacer would dread to attempt fuch effectual handling as he fpeaks of, to the utter abolition of facraments, rites, ceremonies, orders of minifters, and every outward inftitution of religion whatfoever. And he hath other and better means to deter him from fuch a facrilegious attempt, than what our Author fuggefts in his next words. For the Flail j to ufe his own defcription of if9 is an injlrument which doth of all others require fome art and fkill, &c. -f Nay, if he comes at laft to art andjkill, he has furely got out of his road, and is running into fome blunder upon his own and George Fox's principles. He feemed to be going wrong in his laft fentence but one, when the word Jkilful was imperti- nently tacked to the hands of New-Te/lament- N 4 taught • A^ndix, p. 97. -J- Ibid. 184 i R e ? L y /« the Appendix taught countrymen. And now he has quite loft himfelf in zfimile that the Prefacer had occa- fionally made ufe of to relieve his reader. It had a meaning, and was fcnfe at lead when it was firfl offered to the confideration of the Author of the Flail : But it is now returned • back again upon the Prefacer 's hands with fo little poignancy, and fo like nonfenfe, that he can fcarce acknowledge his own metamorpho- fed offspring. How comes it that art andjkill in interpre- ting the Bible mould at length be confined to thofe who are New-T^ eft anient -taught, and who generally difclaim the very imputation of fuch foreign advantages ? who with their infallible matter deny all colleges, and univerfities, in rdihich minifters are made by tongues, arts, and fchools ? * How come they at laft to claim the privilege of lifijrtg thefe carnal weapons, and excluding thofe from whom they borrow the little they have of them from fharing in the title with them ? It mould not be quite forgotten, that thefe New -Teftame?tt-t aught countrymen owe fomething to academical a c corn- pliftments, * George Fox's Declaration, /. 94. to the P R O T E S T A N T F L 1 I L. 1 85 plifhments, by our Author's own conceffion ; fbf they had not come fo eafy by their New- Teftament-Leaming, if the way had not been opened and cleared to them by the labours of much abler hands, and wifer heads, than their own. But it fecms this art andffcil! in the hands of academics hath done much mifchief*. It hath oppofed the honejl zeal of thefe fine ere -hear- ted Prcteftant Reformers, which might have fpread itfelf more generally to the extirpation of all the matters and things which George Fox declared againft, had not the men of academical literature conj'ulted their own inter eft, in fill re- taining not a few of them. * They did verily confult their own intereft, and the intereft of the whole kingdom, in retaining not only the efTentials of a Church, but fuc'h indifferent things as contributed to order and decency : alio in retaining fchools and colleges, for the attainment of tongues and arts, to prevent in times to come any fuch utter exterpation of All the matters and things which George Fox decla- red againft, as our Appendix IVriter calls thorough * jfppetidL-, p. qj. 1^6 A R v * l y to the Appendix thorough Reformation, and in the zeal of his heart is defirous according to his flender abili- ties to promote. 'Tis therefore (fays he) altogether unequal to ajcribe the whole merit of the Reformation to a fet of men who have been indeed the principal retarders of its progrefs.* What does he mean ? By the ReJormation} we do in common con- fir uction underfland that of this Church and Nation from Popery in the century before the Quakers had a being. But by the progrefs of it being retarded he manifeftly intends theoppo- fition that was given to that thorough Reforma- tion he has been recommending, and which, he fays, appeared in thefe kingdoms in the laji century. Now in this view, it would be, as he fays, altogether unequal to afcribe the whole merit of what was done by Reformers in one generation to thofe that followed in the next. But if this (hall prove not to be his moaning, he muffc tell us what is ; fince his words give us no other that is fenfe. He will fay per- haps it was a fet of thefe academical men thai promoted the former Reformation, and ano- ther £ Jf>pendix, p. 97- to ^Protestant Flail 187 ther fet of them obftructed the latter. Be it fo. To their praife be it fpoken. Without making companions between them, each have a merit to be afcribed to them. They both fought a good fight, though againft adverfaries of different denomination : and both defended the Church ; the former a^ainft thofe that had corrupted her with idolatry and fuperftition 5 and the latter againft thofe who would have reformed her quite out of light, through en- thufiafm and want of knowledge and difcretion ; And both made ufe of the fame kind of wea- pons, which they fitted to them, and learnt the true ufe of in the fchools and academies, viz. fcripture, and reafon, and the writings of the Antients. Thus at length we have gone through the points that our Author boafted of in his Title ; and have found that, inftead of proving what he gave out for the contents of his Appcndix> he hath only ferved up George Fcxs crude Pro- tejlation, garnifhed with a few withered flowers of his own picking, as the laft dim of an infi» pid entertainment. But though he has fallen fhort of his pro- mife in one refpecl, yet he hath exceeded it in l88 A R E P L Y to the Appendix in another ; and hath carried his remarks fur- ther than the Preface, and delivered his opini- on of the Book itfelf in very few words, as a fpecimen of the great judgment wherewith he reads controverfies. As to the controverfy about the Quotations from Bifljop Taylor, itfeems to him that the Au- thor of the Flail has done that great man much more honour than the Replier. How ? By pla- cing his real fentiments on an equality with his •very cogent and convincing arguments againji Padobaptifm.* Was ever a Prelate fo honoured before ? It was with much ado that what he declared to be his real fentiments, was allowed to be fo. And now this being once allowed, they will do him this further favour ; they will put his real fentiments upon an equality with his mere fictions and inventions, or at leafr. what were not his own fentiments. Our Author indeed calls them very cogent and convincing argu- ments againji P&dobaptifm. That is to fay, when the art and fkill which he would be thought to difparage, do but feem to come over * appendix, p. 93. /u/^Protestant Flail i 8g over to his party, though it be only ^feinte^ he is ready to acknowledge and admire them. What Bimop 'Taylor has wrote in great abund- ance as a Divine, as a matter of Scripture and good fenfe, doth by no means hit our Author's delicate fancy : But when the Bifhop only plays a part occafionally, and defignedly acts the fubtile academic, then our deluded Author is charmed with his ingenious difguife, and contrary to his own principles applauds the dif- puter of this world. But the Replier it feems has done no honour to Bifhop Taylor, in debafing his real fentiments to a level with his much lower and weaker pleas for the practice of Pcsdobaptifm. How could he bring them to a level with thofe that were much lower ? But perhaps what is faid of lower and wea-> far pleas, is fpoken of the Replier 's pleas, or fpoken with refpecl only to the Bifhop's argu- ments in profopopaia, to which it is an ho- nour to him to have his real fentiments equalled. Now if this be the meaning, take it either way, the Replier will be under no concern about thefe epithets of comparifon given to the pleas : For he has done the Bifhop juflice how- ever, jj^o A R E P L y to the appendix ever, which is preferable to the honour they would beftow upon him. And1 though the pleas may perhaps appear low ana1 weak in our Author 's fight, when compared with the fights of the Bifliop's fancy, and the Jlrength of his imagination, yet if they be meafuired by ano- ther ftandard, viz. that of truth, they will be found more cogent and convincing than thofe artful flouriuhes which have beguiled our Au- thor to give them undeferved praifes, and fnch as the Bimop himfelf proved afterwards thiey were not entitled to. He goes on. If the Bifiop had been always firm a,nd jleady in his opinion on the fide of Infant- Baptifm, 'tis no fmall difcrcdii to that caujre> that his great abilities could never put bis own fentiments in as advantageous a light as thofe of his adverfaries. * But what if this advantageous light that he fpeaks of, be only zfalfe light? an artful po- sition of his adverfaries arguments to mako them appear to lefs difcerning eyes fomething; which they really were not ? Which caufe- will be moil difcredited by it ? Whatever cre- dit * appendix, p. 97. to the Protestant F t a i l, 191 did arifes from fetting the Anabaptifls tenets in fo plaufible a view, belongs to Biihop Tay- lor, and not to their caufe. And that he did not ufe any fuch method with the Padobaptifts tenets, is to the credit of their caufe, which needed no fuch artful and laboured recommen- dation j but only wanted to be exhibited in its own proper and native light : Which, as the tlifpute is now with a Quaker, may be termed the light within ; whereas the advantageous light he fpeaks of is no more than the light without. He had faid towards the beginning of his 'Appendix, that academical learning was an in- ftrument more apt to defend error, than to difcover truth. * Bifhop Taylor has indeed fhewed him how far it can defend error, even to make it feem to fome people cogent and con" vincing. But he hath alfo difcovered how it can likew'ife fupport and eflablifi truth, and do it effectually. It is true, learning is apt to make the befl of every fubjecl: it is applied to. But why it ihould have any peculiar aptnefs to defend error rather * Jppendix, p. 90. ig2 A Re v l Y to the Appendix rather than truth, can hardly be conceived; For, of all .human means that can be applied ». to, it is the bed prefervative againft error, and the fared: guide to truth. Unleis oar Author means by this odd character he has given of it, that the perfons endowed with it have been more injlrumental in proving what the Quakers deny\ than in' fording any good reafon for what they affirm. For this may be, in his way of thinking, to defend ei-ror, and mifs of truth. But if thefe archis complaints againfh literature, (and it feems moft reafonable to interpret him thus in this place) we mall allow the fact, and have no further conteft with him upon that head. Laftly, he gives his opinion of the fuccefs of the other part of the controverfy, which was JVater-Baptifm. He fays, that the argu- ments advanced by the Author cf the Flail are rather evaded than anfwered by the Replier. t By his leave he would have faid more proper- ly and truly, that the flrokes of the Flail were Evaded. But if he will needs have it that thefe ftrokes were argimcnts, and that fome of them * Appendix, p. 98. /i?/^PROTESTANT F L A I t. I£' them were negle&ed, and not anfwered by the Replier, the true reafon has been, that they were fuch arguments as anfwered themf elves, and re- coiled upon their author's own head j as the Replier had obferved in his Preface was likely to be the cafe, afligning withal the probable caufe of fuch mifchances. He concludes with faying, that it is by no means the defign of his appendix tofavethe'R.z- xAi&vfrom any future flroh.cs of the Flail. * In this verily he is to be believed -, and yet he hath by this very Appendix, contrary to his de- fign, put the Replier out of all fear of them j and taught him by this previous attempt, how to prefage of what is to follow, to that the man with the Flail will have no better fuccefs with his flrokes at the Book, than this Writer hath had with his Remarks on the "Preface. They may therefore threaten as they pleafe, and join forces too, but will never be able to hurt any body. However, it is his defire that nothing f aid in this Appendix fhould prevent the Author of the Flail from improving the many ad- Vol. II. O vantages * Jppendix. p. 98. 194 A Re f ly to the Appendix, &c. vantages that the Reply has put into his hands.* He may make himfelf quite eafy, and reft aflured of all that he defires in this matter; for nothing that he has faid, or perhaps can fay, is capable of preventing any improvements of thefe fuppofed advanta- ges by another hand. * Jp*endix, p. 9?. PREFACE f 195 ] PREFACE to the Fifth and Sixth Volumes of Archbifliop Sharfts Sermons. THE firft volume of Archbifhop Sharfs Sermons was published by himfelf, being a collection of fuch as he had printed tipon ieveral occaiions before the year 1698. The fecond volume was published by his Bookfeller after his death, and takes in the remainder of his Sermons, which were print- ed in his life-time, and his tivo difcourfes upon Confcience> which were formerly publilLed without a name, and make part of the collec- tion of London cafes. And thole two volumes contain all that he himfelf had furTered at any time to go abroad into the world. But his executors were a little -more liberal of his productions; and in 1717, they added to the collections made by himfelij and thea by his Bookfeller, as above-mentioned, two volumes more, confiding of Sermons never before printed. But this ftep neverthelefs was taken by them with due caution, and after ad- O 2 vice 196 Preface to the fifth and fixth Volumes vice had with fome judicious prelates, who had read them after they were tranfcribed, and confirmed the refolution of making them public. And now, after feveral years elapfed, two volumes more have paffed the prefs, being the laft addition that will be made to the collection of his works, fave a fmall referve of Difcour- fes in the Popifh controverfy, which may pof- fibly, fome time or other, be published with other of his papers relating to that controverfy, and penned likewife in thofe times. The firft and principal delign of tranfcrib^ ing thefe, which are now printed, from the original manufcripts in fhort-hand, (for all his Sermons were wrote in characters) was to preferve and refcue them from the danger they were in of being irretrievably loft, by being buried in the cypher, if not extracted thence, ' and brought to light by one who was perfect- ly well acquainted with the characters he ufed, and with his peculiar manner of expreffing and compounding them. The tranfcript was begun fome years fince, and proceeded very leifurely, and with feveral interruptions, under the uncertain view of whether it mould ever be of Archbijhop Sharp'* Sermons. 197 be made public or no, till the year 1730, when the greateft part of it was finifhed, perufed and approved by competent judges, and at length prepared for publication. The reader therefore may be aflured (and it is chiefly for his fatisfaction in this matter that this advertifement is prefixed to the edition) that thefe are the genuine works of the Author, to whom the title page afcribes them ; and that they are not ramly obtruded upon the world, as pofthumous works too often are, but offer- ed after mature deliberation, and under a real conviction of their being as perfect in their kind as any wherewith this laft age hath been prefented. Indeed, the bare avouching them to be ge- nuine > fuperfedes any further recommendation of them . Both the character and writings of the Archbifhop have been generally fo wellefteem- ed, that they ftand in no need of the furTrage of the publifher, but will be able to fupport themfelves (even in an age by no means fa- vourable to good men and good books) fo long as truth can ftand her ground, and found rea- foning with perfpicuity mall be accounted the chief character of perfection in writing, efpecially upon divine and moral fubjects. O 3 Moft ro8 Preface to the fifth and fixth Volumes Moft of the treatifes in this firft volume are? compounded, fome of two, fome of three Ser- mons, joined together in the form of continu- ed difcourfes, which will account for the length of feveral of them, as it alfo gave occa- fion to entitle them Difcourfes rather than Ser~ mons. The defign of this difpofition was to prefsrve the chain of reafoning upon each fubject entire and uninterrupted, without thofe recapitulations, which, though necefTary in- deed under their divifion into diitincl: Sermons, in order to accommodate them to the pulpit, yet are altogether unneceffary to be retain'd for the perufal of the reader, who would ra- ther be incommoded than relieved by fuch unfeafonable breaks in the body of a juft dif- courfe. But however no more liberty was ta- ken with them, than would barely anfwer this end of convenience, by omitting the in- troductions or preambles to the fubfequent Ser- mons, when more than one were formed upon the fame text. And becaufe the fame liberty could not be fo well taken with the four laft Sermons in this volume, which are all iikewne lpon one text, therefore they are pub- limed intir e, as they were found in the copies. The of Archbijhop SharpV Sermons. 199 The other volume confifts wholly of fingle Sermons, publifhed verbatim as they were preached, at leafl without any defigned omif- fion or alteration. Moft of them had been delivered at court, before their late Majefties King William^ Queen Mary, and Queen Anne, as the dates prefixed to them will (hew. And feveral of them were the Sermons which he ufually preached in his diocefe, and elfewhere, in the latter part of his life, as being beft cal- culated, in his own opinion, (fo it may be juftly prefumed) for doing good to mankind, and the difcharge of his own duty, as a mini- ster of the Gofpel. Could thefe meets have carried any impref- fion of that energy and zeal with which the living author of thefe difcourfes addrefled them to his auditors, and to which they owed no fmall ihare of that beauty and influence which they once had from his own mouth, they would have been more welcome and more valuable to the reader. One excellence indeed they cannot be deprived of, which, in fome meafure, will fupply the want of thofe exter- nal and additional graces that accompanied and adorned them in the pulpit, viz. that Spirit O 4 of aoo Preface to the fifth and fixth Volumes, &c. of piety which yet enlivens and breathes through them all, and demonftrates them to be the real iflues of his heart, and the very dictates of his foul, by fuch marks of evidence as are eafy to be difcovered, though difficult to be defcribed, and impoflible to be counterfeited. PREFACE [ 2<» ] PREFACE to the Seventh Volume of Archbifhop Sharp's Sermons. IN the Preface to the two volumes of Arch- bifhop Sharp's Works, which were lately printed, mention is made of a fmall Referve of Difcourfes in the Popijh Controverjy which might pofjibly, fome time or other, be publijhed with other of his Papers relating to that Con- troverfy. When that Preface was wrote, the Edi- tor had not determined with himfelf, whether this Collection mould ever come abroad or no. Much lefs had he any Apprehenfions that he fhould, in fo fhort a Time, commit it to the Prefs. For he looked upon that Difpute as out of Vogue, and little attended toj and alfo confidered, that the Writings of the Pro- teftant Divines in the Reigns of King Charles, and King James II. were very numerous as well as excellent : and therefore that thefe Dif- courfes (though properly enough a Part of the Popijh Controverjy) would feem fuperfluous and unfeafonable. And under thefe Reafons he 202 Preface to the feventh Volume he was difpofed to acquiefce, had not the late Attempts of the Roman Catholicks in and about London) given Occafion to revive the neglected Difpute, and to put Men upon a Review of the Subjects in Debate between the Church of E?ig1and, and the Church of Rome, This he thought a feafonable Juncture for bringing to light the following Treat fes, which have been fupprefled above fifty Years, and perhaps might always have continued fo, if fome fuch Rea- fon as this had not accidentally offered itfelf to ufher them into the World. They are all, or moll of them, defignedly calculated for the Ufe of the unlearned Pro- teftant. The Author of them had the Care of one of the largert Parifhes in London, du- ring the whole Time the late PopiJJj Contro- verjy was on Foot. He was perfectly well acquainted with the Subtilties of the PopifoJDi* vines, and knew by abundant Experience among his own Parifhioners, what were the princi- pal Difficulties that the inferior Sort laboured under, from the fallacious and infidious Per- fuafions and Infinuations of thofe who ftrove to pervert them. What he wrote therefore, and is now publifhed, was purpofely contrived as cf Archbijhop Sharp'* Sermons, 2o£ as a prefent Antidote to the Mifchiefs attempted among his Flock. For which Reafon he en- tered as little as poflible upon the learned or hiftorical Part of the Controverfy (as will be obferved, though he was very capable of dis- charging that Part of it with Succefs) but con- fined himfelf chiefly to thofe Points which were more immediately neceflary to guard the Weak from the Sophiftry of the Jefuits, and to relieve and deliver the Unwary, who were already entangled in their Snares. With this View he hath formed his Argu- ments fo plain, and made his Chain of Rea- foning upon them fo natural and fo familiar, that they appear to be adapted to the Tafle as well as the Capacities of ordinary Chrijlians. Something there is likewife to the Tajle of the Party he oppofes j fuch of them at leaft, as have any Tafte of Beauty and Excellence in wri- ting upon controverted Points j viz. The Calmnefs and Temper wherewith he engages them, and the fpecial Care he always takes, never to calumniate or mifreprefent them. He was wont to fay himfelf, That in his Sermons aga'mjl the Papifls he had always dealt honejl- ly and fairly with them3 charging them with ncihhig ao^. Preface to the feventh Volume nothing but what their Church openly avowed in her Creedy and Councils, and public Offices, Which Candour of Temper and Equity of Conduct, in any Controverfy, though it be not always the readieft Means of working upon the Vulgar, yet cannot fail of having a great Influence upon all ferious and well-meaning People. He was often prefled by his Friends to print thefe Difcourfes himfelf. But he decli- ned it. When he was folicited to do fo about the Time of the Revolution, or foon after it, he gave for an Anfwer, that the Danger was then over, and the Dejign of them was fuper ceded ; and that to publijh them at that Time would only look like making his Court. And it doth not appear that at any Time .afterwards he regarded them, or meddled with them, further than to correct and tran- fcribe one or two of them which he preached at Torky in order to check fome Attempts that the Popifli Priefts were fufpe&ed and reported to have made in that Neighbourhood. One of thefe was that remarkable Sermon which upon the firft Delivery of it inhisParim Church at London, in 1686, had drawn upon him the Difpleafure of King James and his Court, » and of Archbijhop Sharps Sermons. 2o£ and had given Occafion to the Order that was fent to Dr Compton, then Bifhop of London, to fufpend him, which brought on the Trou- bles of that Prelate from the ecclefiajlical Com- mifjion. But whereas in his Tranfcript of this Difcourfe, upon the Revifal of it, that Pajfage which was fuppofed to be moil qffenfve and obnoxious, was entirely left out, (as being a particular Anfwer to a certain Argument that had been flipp'd into his Hand in St Giles's Church, as he fuppofed, by way of Challenge, and which therefore could not pertinently be repeated when he preached the fame Sermon, above twenty Years after, at his own Cathe- dral) therefore recourfe was had for that Pa/fage to the firft or original Copy. And whereas the other Differences between the two Copies did not appear to be material, but to confift rather in Correction of Expreffions and Style, than of the Matter or Arguments, it was judg- ed moil advifable to follow the firft Copy al- together in this Edition j -f both for the Satis- faction ■f- Serm. VI. A Difcujion of the £>ueflion which the Roman Catbolicks mojf injiji upon with the Protc/lants, viz. In ivhicb of the different Communions in Chrijlendom the only true Church of Cbrift is to be found? With a Refutation of a certain Fopijh Ar- gument banded about in M. S. Anno 1686. 2o6 Preface to the feve7ith Volume fa&ion of the Reader, whofe Curiofity would be better gratified with a true and faithful Re- prefentation of the very fame Sermon that pro- duced the Effects abovementioned j and alfo to vindicate the Author of it, from the unjuft Reflections of Father Orleans upon it, who know- ing nothing of the Contents of it, charged it arbitrarily and upon hear-fay; and likewife (for that was another Confideration worth re- garding) to make it of a Piece with all the reft, which are now publimed from the firft Hand, and without Emendation of any kind, fince the Time they were preached in St Giles's Pulpit With this only Exception, that what were two Sermons upon 2 Pet, iii. 16. appear now only as one. And whereas the Sermon upon Auricular Confejfion was connected with others upon the fame Text, which were late- ly printed in the fifth Volume under the Title ©f Confejjion of Sins necejfary to Repentance \ p. 145. it became unavoidable both there and here to omit as much as ferved only to fhew the Connexion between them, and which therefore could have no Place in their pre- fers State of Separation. Thefe of Archbijhop Sharp'* Sermons. 207 Thefe were Liberties which Dr Barker owns he made no Scruple of taking with the Pc/i humous Sermo?is of Arch-Bifiop TiHoffon, whole Authority he alfo pleads for doing fr. The Editor hopes he may be indulged in the fame Liberty, having never ufed it but when he judged it necefTary, and even then with- out altering the Senfe, and with as little Change to the Words as poflible. And now the Reader has all before him that is requilite for his Information concerning thefe Sermons. If he mall not find them fofinifh- ed and correct as thofe already printed, he wili know where to afcribe the Defect. An Impu- tation of Rafhnefs in the Publifher of them, grounded on this Reafon only, will not much affect him, provided his fole Aim in the F ib- Jication be anfwered, which is the preferving fome People, into whofe Hands they may fall, from the Errors of Popery, and eftablifh- ing them more firmly in the Communion of the Church oj England. Once they contributed very much to this good End. And it is not unreafonable to expect they may do fo again. And as it is certain that Dr Sharp owed to them much of his Reputation in the laft Age, fo it is prefumed they may be received with fome 20 8 Preface to the feventh Volume, &c. fome degree of Approbation in the prefent : at leaft it is hoped, that what tended fo emi- nently to advance his Credit then, will not turn to the Difadvantage of his Memory now. The clofmg the Collection of his Works with his earlieft Peformances, is not unprecedented, neither can it feem improper to conclude his Remains with thofe Pieces which firft ferved to raife his Character in the World. As concerning the Papers fubjoined in the Appendix, their Relation to the Subject of the Sermons to which they are annexed muft by which Means, they often fall fliort of their defigned good Effect: But the mod effectual Way of making Children attend to the Explanations they recite, feems to be this, of felecting certain Queftions for them to anfvver out of thofe Explanations. Secpndfyi for examining Children, &c. 217* Secondly y For the Ufe of fuoh Perfons, as have not Opportunity, or Capacity of Learning by Heart, all Mr Lewis's Anfwers and Proofs, but who may notwithstanding, by reading his little Book, be able to furnifh themfelves with fenfible Anfwers to every Particular that is here demanded ; and acquaint themfelves thereby with the moft material Points contained in his Expofition. The Queftions are taken out of his Expofition, rather than any other, becaufe it is one of the Shorteft in its Kind, and moft commonly made ufe of in that Parifh for whofe Benefit this Table of Queftions was particular- ly defigned. It was thought proper to give the foregoing 'Account of the Ufe of this Table, to the End that Parents and others, who have the Charge of feeing Children educated in a religious Way\ might be perfuaded to make Ufe of it, in their own Houfes, and examine thofe Children by its that are committed to their Care. They are hereby enabled to make a good Judgment of the Proficiency of thofe whom they examine : And by ufing this Method frequently with their Child- renM they may do them more real Service ', than their £i8 Preface to a Table of Questions, &c. their Minifier can by his publick Catechizing, It is to be hoped therefore that they, amongfl whom thefe Tables Jhall be diftributed, will exercife thofe young Ones under their Care, according to thefe Rules j and ajjijl them in finding out their An- fwers, (if there be Occafion) that they may the better approve themfehes to their Minifler, when he Catechizes them after this Manner, PART [ 2i9 ] PART I. Of the Baptismal Covenant. -w C AT E C H IS r. THAT is your Chriftian Name ? — — What Jkcu/d this Name pat you in mind of? 2. How came you by this Name ? 3. When did your God-fathers and God- mothers give it you ? Who gave Security to the Churchy for your Chrijlian Education ? 4. What were you made at your Baptifm ? 5. Whofe Member did you then become ? 6. Were you born his Member, or were you made fo ? What were vou then, bv Nature ? i What Body is Chrifl the Head of; or what is that which is celled his Body ? Is it the fame Thing to be a Member of Chrijly and to be a Member of his Church ? What is the Way that Chrifl appointed for admitting Men into his Church ? Do 220 A Table of Qjj estions . Do you think that you now belong to Chrifl ? and are united to him, as the Head of the Church ? 7. Whofe Child were you made, at your Baptifm ? What is it to be a Child of God? — — Why are we f aid in Baptifm to be madi Children of God and Children of Grace % Through whom, are we made fo f Could we net be fo, unlefs we were Members of Chrifl s Church ? 8. What was you made an Inheritor of, when you was baptized ? A. * What do you mean by the Kingdom of Heaven ? Is this Inheritance by Right, or by Promife and upon Condition ? How are we to make fur e the Poffefjion of this Inheritance ? 9. When your God-fathers and God-mothers gave you your Name, what did they do for you befides ? 10. How many Things did they promife and vow ? ii. In whofe Name did they promife thefe Things ? 12. What for examining Children, &c.' 22 i 1 2. What is the nrft Promife they made in your Name ? B. t What is it to renounce any Thing ? 13. Whom are you firft of all to renounce ? What then is meant by renouncing the Devil ? Who is your chief Ghojlly Enemy f • Are there any other wicked Beings Be/ides him, that feek the Ruin of Mankind '? 1 Are you obliged by this Promife > to renounce all thefe too ? r— — Doth Renouncing, oblige us to have 710 Man~ ner of Dealings with them whatfoever ? 14. Whofe Works are you to renounce ? 15. How many of his Works, are you to renounce ? 1 — i — Who was it that finned from the Beginnings and brought Sin into the World ? — -^-What are his Works, and as fuch to be renounced? • -Who was manifefled, that he might defroj the Works of the Devil? 16. What Pomps and Vanities are you to ■ renounce ? C. * What do you mean by the Pomps and Vanities of the World ? m £22 'A "Table of QjJ E s t \ o n s. Wljy are they reckoned among our Spiritual Enemies ? Are we fo to renounce them, as not to dejire them at all, and to do nothing to obtain them f £ What Sort of Defires of Worldly Honours are we to refrain from ? - What Sort of Means of getting Riches arc we to rejeB ? What Cufioms and Fafiions of the World tnujl we refufe to follow t > What Sort of Company are we to avoids 17. What Lufts are you to renounce ? 18. How many of them are you to renounce ? D. * What do you mean by the finful Lujls cftheFlefi? ' *-. To whom are Lufts andfenfual Inclinations of the Flejhy natural f In what Cafes are we obliged to reffi them and fubdue them? * What doth the Apofilc threaten us with if we live after the Flejl: f And what doth he ajfure us of if we through the Spirit^ do mortify the Deeds of 'the Body? 1 9. What was the fecond Promife that was made in your Name ? 20. What for examining Children, &c. 2 2* 20. What Faith is it, whofe Articles you are to believe ? 2 1 . How many of the Articles did they pro- mife you mould believe ? 22. What do you call that in which they are contained ? Hath God made his Faith necejfary to ever- lafiing Life f In whom or in what mnjl we believe to be faved? What doth Chriji threaten to thofe who believe ?iot ? 23. What is the third and laft Promife mad© for you, by your God-fathers and God-mo- thers ? 24. What are you bound by this Promife to keep ? 25. In what are you to walk ? 26. How long are you to walk in them ? - What did Chriji bid his Apofiles go and teach others to obferve ? Unto what are we created in Chriji fefus ? How are we to ferve before Him all the Days of cur Lives ? 27. Do you think that you are obliged to- do this, and whatever elfe was promifed in your Name ? » How 224 ZA Table of Qjj Estions How could your Sureties bind you to do, and believe thus ? i — | — If you do not thus believe and doy what will become of the Blejjings of this State you are admitted i?tto? 28. By whofe Help are you to do thefe things ? 29. What State are you called to by Baptifm ? Is it a State in which you furely may be faved, if you will? Whofe Fault will it be, if you be not faved in this State ? What is it that is able to make us wife unto Salvation ? 30. Who called you to this State of Salva- tion ? 31. When did God become your Heavenly Father ? 32. Through whom did he call you ? 33. What do you do to God for calling you to this bleffed State ? 34. How long do you defire to continue in this State ? 35. Whofe Grace muft you have, that you may continue in it ? What do you trufl the Grace of God will do for you? Of for examining Children, &c. 225 -Of whom is our Sufficiency ? 36. How are you to obtain God's Grace ? What has cur Heavenly Father promifed to them that afk him ? PART II. Of the Creed. CAFE C H I S r. 1 . ITTHAT was tire fecond Thing pro- VV mifed in your Name, at your Baptifm ? E. * What do you mean by Faith ? 2. Say then, what do you believe as a Chriftian ? What doth Creed fignify ? What do you call this Creed ? What do you mean by Articles of Faith ? - Why do you call it the Chrijlian Faith ? Are the moji neceffary 'Things to be known and believed \ contained in this Creed ? • What is the fir -jl Branch of this Creeds What kind of Spirit is God? From whence are his Perfections? What do you mean by his being an infinite Spirit ? Vol. II. Q »* :26 A Table of Qjj estions What was before God ? Can the divine Nature be underfiood by us ? 3. What is it you chiefly learn in this Be- lief? What Diflinftion of Perfons do you obferve in this Creed % ~~ In what Refpeci is there a Samenefs and Equality in thefe three Perfons ? In what Refpeci is there a Diver/ity, or Difference between them f Is there in Scripture plainly a DifincJion of Perfons in the fame divine Nature ? 4. Do you fay that you believe in God as one God, or in Gods as more Gods ? Do you mean then, that God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghoft, in whom you believe, are three Gods, or only one God? 5. How do you diftingui/h the Father, what did he do ? 6. How many Things did he make, befides you ? 7. How do you diftinguim God the Son, what did he do for you ? F. * What do you mean by redeeming ? 8. How many of Mankind, did he redeem ? 9. How do you diftinguifh God the Holy Ghoft, or what doth he for you ? G. * What for examining Children, &c. \- 227 G: * What do you mean by fandtify ? 10. Doth he fanctify none but you ? H. * What do you mean by EleB ? 1 1. How many of the Elect People of God doth he fanctify ? 12. Of the three Perfons of the Holy Tri- nity, which is the lirfl you are taught to be- lieve in ? 13. Why do you call him God the Father, whole Father is he ? * • ' In hew many Refpedls is God a Father ? Whofe Father is he by Creation f — Whofe Father is he by Generation \ or who was begotten of him ? ■ ' ■ Whofe Father is he by Adoption $ 14. What kind of Father is he, with Re- fpec~t to his Power ? 1 5. What was he Maker of ? Doth Heaven and Earth take in the whole World and all that therein is ? •** — Out of what did God make the World? ■* — -By what Power doth the World fubfifl now ? 16. Which of the three Perfons in the Tri- nity was it, that wrought the Redemption of Mankind ? 17. Whole Son is He ? Q_2 18. Hath 228 A Table of Qjj estions 18. Hath God the Father any more fuch Sons? 19. What was the Name of this Son, when he took Man's Nature upon him ? What doth the Name of Jefus fignify ? What doth Chrijl fignify ? To what Offices was fefus anointed ? . By whom was he anointed to thefe Offices ? Who is it that governs and protects the Church ? In which of his Offices doth he at~i in doing this? Who was it that made Atonement for our Sins, by the Sacrifice of himfelf? . In which of his Offices did he ac~i in doing this ? « Who is it that now intercedes for us all? < — 1 — In which of his Offices doth he at~l in this ? In which of his Offices did he acl, in teach- ing Mankind the Will of God ? — — — In which of his Offices did he atl, in gui- ding his Church by his Spirit, Word and Mini" fry? 20. What is Jefus Chrift the only Son of God, with Refpecl to us ? ■ What Power is given unto- him in Heaven end in Earth ? What for examining Children, ccc 229 What State was he in during his Humili- ation ? 2 1 . By whom was he conceived ? 22. Of whom was he born ? Was he then both God and Man ? '——-Did the Divine Nature and Hum an Aj- ture ?nake but one Per/on ? 23. How, or in what Rcfpedt, was his Mo- ther Mary different from other Mothers ? Why did he take upon him the fame Nature, with thoje he died for ? Did he, with our Nature, take upon him tilfo the Corruptions of our Nature $ 24. What became of Him ? 25. Under whom, did he fuffer ? 26. What did he fuffer ? I. * What do you mean, by being crucified? — For what, did our blejjcd Saviour fuffer f 27. What was done with him, when he was dead ? 28. Whither did he then defcend ? Where lay his Body, while his Soul was fe- parated from it ? 29. How long, did he lie in the Grave ? 30. And what did he do then ? On what Day of the Week did Chrift rife again $ Q_ 3 And 230 *—*How is it your Duty to relieve the Poors 44. What is the ninth Commandment ? 45. What kind of Teftimony, or Witnefs, mufl you not bear ? — ■ — -Is an unjuft Accufation upon Oath aJonel here forbidden % 46. Againft whom, mufl you not bear fuch Falfe-witnefs ? ■ ■ What mufl you do for your Neighbour t when you know he is wronged? How mufl you judge of others t 47. What is the tenth Commandment ? - 48. What are you here forbidden to covet I _— — What Dejire of getting other Mens Goods, are you here forbidden f 49. What other Things of your Neigh- bours, are you forbidden to covet ? What then is required of you, in this Com* mandment f How many Tables, are tlxfe Commandments divided into t — - — What doth the flrjl Table contain, and what the fecond f How for examining C tfi t b a e N, &c. 239 How then doth our Saviour fay of the Ten Commandment ls, that they are but Two ? 50. How many Things are you chiefly taught, in thefe Commandments ? 5 1 . Which be they ? 52. What is your Duty to Almighty God ? 53. Say, What are the three firft Duties, you owe to God ? 54. How muft you love God ? $5. How much Truft muft you put, in God? 56. What belonging to God, muft you ho- nour ? 5J. How muft you ferve him ? 5%. How long muft you ferve him ? 59. What are you in Duty bound to, to- wards your Neighbour ? 60. How muft you love your Neighbour ? 61. How muft you do, unto all Men ? 62. What muft you do, unto your Father and Mother ? 63 What to the King, and all in Autho- rity ? 64. What, to your Governors, Teachers, Spiritual Paftors, and Mafters ? 65. What, to all your Betters ? T. * Who are your Spiritual Paftors ? 66. What 340- -A ^able of Qjj estions 66. What are you not to do, to any Body ? 67. What mufl you be, in all your Deal- ings ? 68. What mufl you not bear, in your Heart ? 69. What are you to keep your Hands from ? 70. And what, your Tongue from ? 71. How are you to keep your Body ? 72. How are you to carry yourfelf towards other Mens Goods ? 73. What are you to learn, and labour for ? 74. How are you to labour for it ? 75. In what State of Life, will you labour truly for it ? How many of the Commandments contain your Duty towards God ? Which be they ? And how many of them, contain your Duty towards your Neighbour ? Which be they ? 76. Whom are you to believe in, and fear above all others ? 77. What is it you are to do, with all your Heart, and Mind, and Soul, and Strength ? Are you to fear and love no other God, in this Manner ? In for examining Children, &c. 241 In what Commandment, are you required to believe in, and fear, and love no other God betides him ? 78. Whom alone, are you to worfhip ? 79. What are ye to do to him for all his Benefits ? 80. Whom are you to truft and rely upon, in all Cafes ? 81. What are you to do, to obtain of him fuch Affiftance as you want ? May you not worfhip, or give Thanks to an Idol, or graven Image? May you not truft in, or call upon any Thing made in the Likenefs of Creatures ? In what Commandment then is it required, that you fhould worfhip, and trufl in, and call upon the only true God ? 82. How are you to treat God's holy Name and Word ? What Commandment obliges you to treat his holy Name with Honour ? 83. And what mull you do all the Days of your Life ? 84. What Day in the Week, muftyou re- member particularly to keep holy, and fpend in his Service ? Vol. II. R What 242 A Table of Qjj estions What Commandment obliges you to obferve this? 85. Who is it that you mufl love as your- felf? 86. To how many mufl you do, as you would they fhould do unto you ? 87. Who mud you love, honour, and fuo cour ? 88. Whom mufl you honour and obey ? 89. And whom, befides the King ? 90. To whom mufl you fubmit yourfelf ? 91. To whom mufl you order yourfelflow- ly and reverently ? What Commandment requires you fhould do all thefe Things ? 92. Whom mufl you not hurt, by Word nor Deed ? 93. Where mufl you bear no Malice, nor Hatred ? What Commandment requires all this ? 94. What mufl you keep in Temperance, Sobernefs and Chaflity ? In what Commandment is this required ? 95. In what mufl you be true and jufl ? 96. What mufl you keep from Picking and Stealing ? Which of the Commandments require this ? 97. What for examining Children, &c. 243 97. What muit you keep from Evil-fpeak- ing, Lying, and Slandering ? By which Commandment are you required fo to do ? 98. What are you not to covet nor defire ? 99. What muft you do, to get your own Living ? 100. And what mud: you do in the State of Life, unto which God fhall call you ? By what Commandment are you bound to all thefe ? PART IV. Of Chrijlian Prayer. CATECHIST. I. TV >T Y good Child, are you able of your- -LV JL felf, to ferve God, and walk in his Commandments ? 2. What muft you have to make you able ? 3. By what Means muft it be obtained ? 4. When are you to call upon God for it ? 5. How are you at all Times to call for it ? • -After what Pattern muft you pray ? R 2 6. How 244 A Table of Qu e s t I o N s 6. How call you that Prayer which you are taught to fay to God daily ? Why is itfo called f Where hath Chrifl taught us this Prayer t Which do you call the Preface in this Prayer ? 7. Who do you here pray to ! 8. What Relation doth God bear to us ? Jn what RefpeB may we claim a particular Inter eft in God ? —Why do you fay -, Our Father, and not my Father ? 9. Where is he in a more efpecial Manner prefent ? How many Petitions are in the Lord's Prayer ? 10. What is the firil Petition ? 11. What is it you pray may be hallowed? U. * What do you mean by its being hallow- ed ? By whom is God to be honoured f How are we to promote the Honour of his Name ? 12. What is the fecond Petition ? 33. What do you pray may comet What do you mean By the Kingdom of God t — ■ — Where do you pray that God would rule t What do you pray he would enlarge t _ What for examining Children, &c, 24.5 -What Power mnjl he dejlroy to do fo ? -What kingdom is it you pray he would ha- Jlen ? 14. What is the third Petition ? 1 5. What is it you delire may be done ? 16. Where do you pray it may be done ? What is God's Will on Earth, befides what he hath promifed and commanded in his Word f 17. How ihould God's Will be done on Earth ? By whom is it done in Heaven ? -How are we to ferve him if we would do his Will as it is done in Heaven ? 18. What is the fourth Petition ? 19. How much Bread do we pray for every Day? W. * What do vou mean by daily Bread? At what Times mufi we depend upon God for a Supply of what we want f Is this the Reafcn why we fimdd every Day pray, Give us this Day ? 20. What is the fifth Petition ? 21. What do you here pray to God to for- give ? X * What do you mean by Trejpajfes ? 22. Whofe Trefoafe do you defire God to forgive ? R -9 IIOW '246 A Table of Qjj estions How many of our trefpajfes do we defire t& be forgiven f • What Argument do we ufe to God to for- give us % 23. How do we defire God would forgive us? 24. Whom are we to forgive, if we would be forpiven of God ? What doth this Petition Jhew us the Necef- 25. What is thefixth and laft Petition ? 26. What do you here pray, not to be led into? What Temptation do we here defire God, not to lead us into ? -Doth God ever tempt any Man ? Are all Temptations by his Permifjion ? In what Senfe may he truly grant this Pe- tition s when he fuffers us to be tempted? 27. What do you here pray to be delivered from ? 28. What is the Conclufion of this Prayer ? 29. What do you in this Conclufion ac- knowledge to belong to God ? 30. And how long (hall thefe Things be- long to him ? 31. Tell for examining Children, etc. 247 31. Tell me again, what do you aik in the firft Petition, concerning God's Name ? 32. What do you aik in the fecond Petition concerning his Kingdom ? 33. What do you aik in the third Petition, concerning God's Will ? 34. What do you aik in the fourth Petition, concerning daily Bread ? 35. What do you aik in the fifth Petition concerning your fins ? 36. What do you defire of God, with re- fpecl: to Temptations $ 37. What would you have him to do for you, with refpect to evil ? 38. Say then, in general, what is the Sub- ftance of this Prayer j what defire you of God in it? 30. Who is the giver of Goodnefs ? 40. What Goodnefs is he the Giver of? 41. What do we fir ft pray God to fend ? 42. To whom do ye pray God to fend it ? 43. To what End do you pray God to fend it? * 44. That you may Wdrjhzp him, How is this exprefied in the firft Petition ? 45. That you may Jlrve him : How is this exprefifed in the fecond Petition ? R 4 46. That 24S A Table of Qjj estions 46. That you may obey him : How is this expreffed in the third Petition ? 47. What are the next Things we pray God to fend us 48. What needful Things are thofe we pray him to fend us ! 49. How many of fuch needful Things ? 50. How is this expreffed in the Lord's Prayer in the fourth Petition -? 51. You pray that God would be merciful unto us : Wherein ? 52. How is this expreffed in the fifth Peti- tion ? 53. What do you pray to be faved and de- fended in ? T. * What do you mean by ghoftly Dangers ? 54. What do you pray that God will keep you from ? 55. And from what befides ? Z. * Who is our ghoftly Enemy ? 56. From what do you delire to be kept, befides Sin and the Devil ? $j. How are all thefe Defires expreffed in the laft Petition ? 58. Whence do you expect all thefe good Things ? 59. Through for examining Children, Sec. 249 59. Through whom do you hope to attain them ? 60. And therefore what do you fay in the Conclufion ? 61. What fignifies Amen ? PART V. Of the Sacraments. CATECHISr. H O W many Sacraments are there of ChrifVs ordaining ? 2. Where hath he ordained them to be u- fed and obferved ? 3. Which are thefe two ? 4. Are thefe Sacraments neceffary ? 5. To what End are they neceffary ? 6. Are they neceffary to fome particular Chriftians only, or generally to all ? What Perfons alone may be fuppofed to be excepted, from the Obligation of obferving them ? 7. Are 2 e O -^ 7tf^/ &c. 253 46. Why then are Infants baptized ? ■What Sort of Title to the Blejjings of Bap- tifm, are Infants capable of on God's Part ? And what are they capable of, being obliged by, on their own Parts ? 47. What do Infants promife at their Bap- tifm ? 48. By whom do they promife them both ? How do you otherwife call thefe Sureties that promifed for you at your Baptifm ? 49. Who are bound to perform the Promi- fes made for Infants by their Sureties ? 50. When are they bound to perform them ? Can they be obliged to do, what they did not actually confent to ? What Right have Children ofChrifian Pa- rents to be admitted into Covenant with God ? 51. What is the fecond Sacrament ? ■ Why is the Sacrament called the Lord's Sup- per? 1 1 ■ ■ When did he ordain it ? 52. Why was it ordained ? 53. How many Things are to be remem- bered in this Sacrament ? 54. Say then, what is the firft Thing that we are to remember ? 55. What 2r4 A 'Table of Que st ions 55. What is the Death of Chrift here cal- led ? Why is Chrift' s Death called a Sacrifice f By whom was this Sacrifice offered ? 56. How long muft this Death of Chrift be thus remembered ? What do we fiew forth as often as we eat this Bread, and drink this Cup ? 57. What elfe befides the Sacrifice of Chrift's Death, do we remember in this Sa- crament ? 58. By what do we receive Benefits ? 59. What is the vifible Part in this Sacra- ment ? 60. What do Men outwardly receive in the Lord's Supper ? 6 1 . By whofe Command muft they be re- ceived ? Why are we obliged to receive both ? 62. What is the inward and fpiritual Grace in this Sacrament ? Which of the outward Signs, Bread, or Wine, fignifles Chrift's Body ? Which of them fignifles his Blood ? 63. By whom are the Body and Blood of Chrift taken and received in the Lord's Sup- per ? 64. How for examining Children, Sec. 2 c C 64. How are they taken and received by the Faithful ? What do they who rightly receive this Sa- crament actually partake oj f To what End, did Chriji, by his Death, merit Benefits for Mankind? 65. What are the Advantages we partake of, in receiving the Lord's Supper ? 66. What Part of us, is ftrengthened and refrefhed in the Lord's Supper ? 67. By what are our fouls ftrengthened and refrefhed ? 68. In what Manner are our Souls flrength- ened and refrelhed ? What are we ajfured of by being made Tar- takers of the Sacramental Bread and Wine ? 69. What is it that Perfons ought to do be- fore they come to the Lord's Supper ? 70. What is the firft Particular to be exa- mined ? WIjyt without Repentance, can we have no Hopes of Benefits from this Sacrament ? 71. What are Men to repent of before they come ? How are they to repent of them ? 73. What is further required as a Part of true Repentance ? 74. What 2^6 A Table of Qjj Estions 74. What are they to purpofe ? 75. How are they to purpofe it ? 76. What is the fecond Particular to be ex- amined ? For what Sort of Believers was this Sacra- ment appointed ? -With' whom have they a near Communion in this Sacrament ? How do they feed on him ? yy. What kind of Faith muft they have ? 78. In what muft they have this Faith ? 79. Through whom doth this Faith ex- pect Mercy ? 80. What muft be remembered concerning Chrift in the Lord's Supper ? 81. What kind of Remembrance muft we have of his Death ? What kind of Sacrifice to God is the Lord's Supper ? » 'For what is it offered ? 82. What is the laft Particular to be exa- mined ? 83 . With whom muft they be in Charity when they come to this Sacrament ? What kind ofFeaJl is the Lord's Supper ? What doth this Communion of Chrijlians one with another, fignify, or reprefent ? • Some for examining Ch i t d r e n, Sec. itj » Some feii) Words and ExprcJJiom in the C a- t e c h i s m explained j to which Expla- nations, Reference is made in the forego- ing Table, by a Star, and fome Letter (f the Alphabet fet before certain Que- Jlions* A. * Everlafting Glory and Happinefs in Heaven. B. * To caft off, to abhor, and have nothing to do with. C. * Sinful Greatnefs, and the Pride of Life. D. * Sinful Pleafures, and evil Delires of our corrupted Nature. E. * A firm and ftedfaft Belief, E. * Delivering, or laving us, by paying a Ranfom to God for us. G. * To purify and make holy. H. * Such as God hath called and chofen to be Members of his Church. /. * Nailed Hands and Feet to a Crofs of Wood. K. * The holy Church, throughout all the World. Vol. II. S L. * Holy 2$$ A 'Table of Q^u estions, &c. L. * Holy Men and Women in God's Church. M. * Rifing again from the Grave ? ■N. * One that will not bear we mould ho- nour any other befides him j but will fe- verely revenge himfelf upon us if we do. O. * Uling it profanely, or idly, either in Swearing or otherwife. P. * He will not look upon as innocent, but will punifh. ^ * Set apart, or made holy. R. * Wilful killing of our Neighbour. S. * Defiling our Neighbour's Wife ? T. * The Minifters of God's Word. U. * Treated as holy j that is, reverenced in our Thoughts, praifed in our Words, and glorified in our Actions. W. * All Things neceflary for our Souls and Bodies. X * All Sins and Offences. T. * All Dangers to our Souls. Z. * The Devil, who is the great Enemy to our Souls. LETTERS [ 2S9 ] LETTERS between the Rev. Dr Thomas Sharp, Arch- deacon of Northumberland^ and Prebendary of Durham, and Mrs Cockburn. Dr Sharp to the Rev. Mr Cockburn, when he returned Mrs Cockburn'i MSS Papers. Whitton Tower, Aug.%, 1743. Rev. Sir, ' I ^ H E difcourfes you were pleafed to JL give me the perufal of, were fo en- tertaining and inftructive, that I could fcarce flop till I got through them ; though, I af- fure you, I have not read them negligently, but with the attention which they require and deferve. I doubt not but they will be well received in print ; and I am fo defirous of their publication, that I think no time fhould be loft, and therefore I return them fooner, that I may not in the leaft deprive the public of them, efpecially as I do not fee reafon to S 2 advife 260 Letters upon the Subject advife the lead alteration either in matter or exprelTion. I do not mean by this to fay, that I am ab- folutely and wholly in the fentiments of the ingenious author. As for the fubjects of her curfory Thoughts, they are fo abftrufe and nice, that I can hardly fay, what fentiment I am of : for I am apt to hearken and incline to every fine reafoner upon them ; and it is per- haps for this reafon, (perhaps for a better) that if I were at this very time to declare which of the writers on thefe fubjects I moft approve of, I mould anfwer, Mrs Cockburn. But as to the other and principal Subject of thefe papers, (which I now thankfully return) concerning the foundation of moral virtue and moral obligation, I am not yet fo fatisfied with any of the accounts I have met with as I could wifh to be ; and am ftill apt to think, there are fome diftincYions yet wanting to be hit of, which would reconcile the advocates of Dr Clarke, and Dr Waterland7 with each other. I am, indeed, altogether with the learned lady in what me fays, and oppofes to thofe, who would lay this foundation in fuch low and ungenerous principles as felf-love, and felf- of moral Virtue and moral Obligation, 261 felf-interefl. And I am alfo ready to admit, that the reafon, nature, and fitnefs of things, as they now appear to a moral agent, would be a foundation of obligation. So would the moral fenfe likewife, if they were not both of them refolvable into a nobler principle flill, which can be no other than the will of God. Perhaps in this I come the clofeft to Mr W } though I think our preient author has fairly catched him tripping in one por- tion. Nor do I fee how he can be able to an- fwer her laft query put to him. The things wanting yet to be fettled in this controverfy, are, I conceive, lft, What is meant by the word founda- tion , as it is commonly ufed by the writers in it? 2dly, Whether moral virtue, and moral ob- ligation, muft needs have the fame foundation, and in the fame fenfe ? 3dly, Whether the reafon, nature, and fit- nefs of things, confidered as antecedent to the divine will, do appear under that confederation to be obligatory to morality ? Or thus : Whether rules of acYion, and obligation to action, be not quite diftinct, and may not have diftintt foundations, in like manner as S 3 the 262 Letters upon the Subject the reafon and fitnefs of a law are diftincl: from the authority of a law ? I muft confefs, for my own part, I have fuch an undiftinguifhing head, that I could never tell how to feparate the efTential differen- ces of things (as they now appear to moral agents) from the will of God. All created nature is an expreffion of his will, in thefe ve- , ry efTential differences, and relations, and fit- neiTes flowing from them. And therefore I like, and I adhere to that expreffion of Mrs Ccckburn's ; Thy perfect willjn the ejjential dif- ferences of good and evil. Why may not morality, confidered in the mind of God before creation, like metaphys- eal truths, be ultimately refolved (as your learn- ed lady is pleafed to word it) into the divine jinderftanding ? And morality, confidered in its obligations on rational creatures, be ulti- mately refolved into the divine will ? Is there any inconfiftency in this difiin£tion ? Though morality, as a rule, was eternally in the mind of God, like mathematical pro- portions, yet there could be no obligation to conform to this rule, till it became practicable by the actual fubfiftence of things, exprefting thofe relations and fitneffes ; that is, till God had of moral Virtue and moral Obligation. 263 had exprerTed his own will, as well as his wis- dom, in a fyftem of works, exhibiting ail thofe eternal ratios, &c. Therefore, I am in- clined to conceive, that the foundation of ob- ligation to conform to thefe fitnefTes could not be antecedent to the divine will, whatever the ratios themfelves were. Mrs CockbunVi Anfwer to Dr Sharp. AM much encouraged in the defign of printing my papers, by the favourable opinion of lb good a judge as Dr Sharp-, who, no doubt, upon a thorough confidera- tion, would be much better able than I am, to clear up the difficulties he finds in Dr Clarke $ fcheme. But fince he is fo conde- fcending to my weak attempts, I (ball freely give my Thoughts upon them. It is, I think, a good ftep towards removing them, that he is intirely againft thofe, who would lay the foundation of moral obligation on fuch low principles, as felf-Iove and felf-in- terefi j for, I believe, upon a farther reflec- tion it will appear, that we mud either lay S 4 * it 264 Letters upon the SubjeSf ' it there, or upon the nature, relations, and * fitnefs of things. f As to the word foundation, though me- * taphorically applied to thefe fubje&s, I do ' not find, that there is any ambiguity in the ' ufe of it, or that any mifunderftanding has ■ happened for want of explaining it. When * it is fpoke of moral virtue, it is commonly, * I fuppofe, underflood (at leaft I have always ' taken it) to mean the ground on which mo- * ral virtue folely arifes, or that, without ? which there could be no fuch Thing as vir- c tue. And fuch a foundation, I think, can * be no other than the neceffary relations and * effential differences of things ; for upon thefe f even the virtue of obeying the will of God ' mufl be founded j iince, on a fuppofition ' that there were no effential differences, or * fitneffes refulting from them, there could be 1 no more goodnefs in obedience, than in the c contrary. ■ As to thefecond queftion, whether moral ' virtue and moral obligation mufl have the * fame foundation, arid in the fame fenfe ? it * feems clear to me, that if the nature and « reafon of things is the foundation of moral * virtue, it mull be the foundation of moral e obligation of moral Virtue and moral Obligation, 265 obligation likewife to reafonable beings. Yet not in fuch afenfe as that there can be no other foundation of it. The moral fenfe, and the ivill of God, are both grounds of obligation to moral agents ; though perhaps their be- ing fo may be ultimately refolvable into the eternal rcafon and truth of things, which I take to be the mart noble of all principles, as that, to which the divine will itfelf is al- ways conformed. 1 On the third queftion, whether the rea- lon, nature, and fitnefs of things, when con- ridered as antecedent to the divine will, do appear under that confideration to be obliga- tory to morality ? I have largely exprefled my fentimcnts in the papers, but not, it feems, to the judicious Doctor's fatisfaction ; who apprehends, that rules of action, and ob- ligation to action, may be quite dijlinc7t Sec. For my part, I know not how to conceive reafons or rules of action, (I mean eternal and immutable reafons) diftinct from obli- gation to action. The reafons of a law are indeed diftinct from the authority of the law ; and thofe laws, that are founded on tempo- rary and mutable reafons: oblige folely by the authority of the legislator 5 but thole, that * are ft 66 Letters upon the SubjeB < are founded on the neceffary relations and ' ejfential differences of things, have, from « thofe eternal reafons, a right of obliging * moral agents prior to the authority that en- ' forces them. The reafons and authority, ' though diffindt, are, as I conceive, both < proper foundations of obligation j for what « are reafons and rules of action, if they do not * oblige reafonable beings to act conformably ■ to them ? c I would afk, for what end was man en- * dued with a faculty of perceiving the effen- i tiai differences of things ? It is faid by Mr c Warburton and others, that they are the * rule, which God has given his creatures to 1 bring them to a knowledge of his will. Very * good ; it is certainly a rational deduction ' from thofe perceptions^ that it muff, be the ' will of the author of our nature, that we c fhould act fuitably to them j and this difco- c very lays us under an additional obligation. * But by what means do thofe perceptions c bring us to this knowledge ? Is it not by firff * (hewing us our duty, (hewing us what ' courfe of action our nature requires us to * follow, and forcing us to (land felf-con- < demned, if we counteract them ? And mud « not of moral Virtue and moral Obligation, 267 not then the eflential differences be the pri~ mary foundation of moral obligation ? What then can hinder them from continuing to have a right of obliging reafonable beings, even though fuch beings mould flop fhort of confidering them as a rule by which to know the will of Gody either from having falfe no- tions, or no notions at all of a Deity ? Since, notwithstanding this, they will unavoidably approve or condemn their own, and other mens adlions, according to the immutable ?ia- turc of things. And that this brings them under obligation, I the rather infift on, be- caufe I fee not otherwife, how it is poffible to foive the difficulty propofed to Mr War- burton . ' The Do&or inquires, if there is any in- coniiitency in relblving morality, as confider- ed to be in the mind of God before creation^ into the divine undcrjlanding , and morality,, con fide red in its obligations on rational crea- tures, into the divine will? I mould think this a very proper diftinction, if applied to poftive precepts : but if by morality is under- ftood that law, which nccejfarily remits from the nature of fuch a fyftem as mankind ; and which God eternally faw, would be fit * And; 268 Letters upon the SubjecJ € and right for them to pra<5tife, whenever he ' pleafed to determine their exigence; I do * not apprehend, how the obligations to mo- 4 rality thus underftood can, any more than 1 the eternal reafons of them, be ultimately re- 1 folved into the divine will. It is very true, 1 as the Dodtor finely reafons, that obligation * to morality could not take place, till God had ' expreffed his will as well as his wifdom in a * a fyftem of works, exhibiting thofe relations 1 and fitneifes that were eternally in the divine 4 mind. But I fee not how it follows from * thence, that the foundation of obligation to 1 conform to thofe fitnerTes could not be antece- 1 dent to the divine will ; fince the ratios them- { felves are allowed to be fo, according to * which the divine will determined to create * fuch a fyftem ; for it is thofe eternal ratios, ' that are maintained to be the ultimate founda- * tion of moral obligation. The obligation it/elf] 1 indeed, being fubfequent to the creation, 4 though founded on the eternal reafon andna- * ture of things, may perhaps be more properly ' faid to be antecedent to all confederation of the 1 divine will, and to any profpeSl of reward or c punifhment. Whether this diJlinBion might, * in any meafure, contribute to reconcile the c advocates of- moral Virtue and moral Obligation, 269 1 advocates of Dr Clarke and Dr JVaterland, 1 I much doubt, fince the laft feem refolute € to admit of no obligation but what arifes from 1 afuperior will. c But I would afk, if the will of God is fup- * pofed to be the only foundation of moral ob- * ligation, upon what grounds we are obliged * to obey his will ? I can conceive no other, 1 but either his abfolute power to punijh and re- ■ ward-, or the Jitnefs of obedience from a 1 creature to his creator. The firft of thefe * would bring us down, I fear, to thofe low ' principles the Doctor difapproves j and if * that is rejected, the other returns us to that ■ reafon, nature, and eiTential differences of * things, into which, I apprehend, all obliga- ' tion muft at laft be refolved. * The Doctor is pleafed to impute to an wi- ' dijHngniJhing head, that he could never tell 1 how to feparate the eiTential differences of * things (as they now appear to moral agents) 1 from the will of God. But though he can- * not feparatey no doubt he does dijlinguijh ' them. " All created nature (as he juftly " fays) is an expreffion of the will of God *' in thefe very eiTential differences and fit- " neffes 270 Letters upon the Subject " nefles flowing from them." They are in- * deed expremons of his will, that all his c own works, and the free actions of mo- ' ral agents, mould be conformable to them : * But he did not create thofe neceffary and £ eternal truths, according to which the * perfect rectitude of his will determined ' him to act. His will mav therefore be * dijlinguified from thofe eflential truths, ' to which it conformed, though, as they * intirely coincide, I think they ought not to e be feparated. c I do not know, whether there is any 4 thing in thefe reflections, that may deferve c the attention of Dr Sharp j but I hope * he will receive them as inflances of my c refpect, and a deiire of approving my * fentiments to his judgment, being, with c the greateft eileem, His rnojl humble Jervaftt, C. COCKBURN.' Dr Sharp ef moral Virtue and moral Obligation, 271 Dr Sharp to the Rev. Mr Cockburn. Sept. 12, 1743. Rev. Sir, THE paper you put into my hands, when you was laft here, was too great a favour not to be acknowledged in a more particular manner than by a letter of thanks. I have fpent fome hours in compa- ring and adjufting, as far as I could, her fentiments with mine, and in giving her the reafons of my three queftions, rather than defending them. Whether I am right or wrong in what I fugged, it matters not much. My aim is to get at the bottom, or near it, of fuch variety of conclufions made by very learned and ingenious perfons. No one writer among them all treats more diftinct- ly than Mrs Cockburn. And I apprehend, what fhe has faid in her papers defigned for the prefs, will meet with very good accep- tance from all, as it did from me ; though I am not altogether with her in every part of Dr Clarke's 272 Letters upon the Subject Dr Clarke 's reafonings. Pray make my ref- pedts acceptable to her. I am, Sir, Tour affectionate brother, Tho, Sharp; Some further Thoughts offered to the ingenious and judicious Mrs Cockburn, after perufal of her folutions given to three que- Jiions propofed to her, upon the fubjecl of moral virtue and moral obligatio?2, M A D A M, AFTER returning you marly thanks for your kind aftiftance in clearing up my notions upon a fubject, that you are better acquainted with than I am, and that you have iludied more, and to more purpofe than I have j I (hall prefume to repeat a liberty I took once before, and acquaint you freely, how things appear to me upon perufing your very ingenious Remarks, which I have read with all the attention I was capable of. By of moral Virtue and moral Obligation. 273 By the word Foundation, you appre- hend the writers on this fubjecr. commonly un- der/land the ground, on which moral virtue folely arifes. But are they agreed, whether this ground be any one fimple principle, or com- pounded of more principles than one ? If ground in your definition may be explained by principle, then you are clear, that virtue arifes upon one principle only. But a fkilful writer among you, as I remember, makes [ho. ground to confift of three principle?, and is bold to fay, that the making any one lingle principle the fole ground of virtue, is itfelf a funda- mental error in this controverfy, and has been the occalion of much perplexity in it. I do not undertake to fay, whether he is right or wrong in this charge againft the reft ; but I brine it as one inftance ot a difagreement a- mong the writers about the word foundation ; which ought to be adjufted by an unanimous admiffion or exciufion of the term folely in the definition. Again, among thofe, who admit of one principle only for the purpofe, (as I think moffc of you do) may we not difcover fome diffe- rent conceptions of the word foundation ? One feems.to confider it as the ground, from Vol. II. T whence 2~,a Letters upon the SubjeSf whence virtue is directly produced, or to ■which it owes its birth. Another confiders it as a more remote caufe, as the fountain head, from whence virtue derives its origin. They may both perhaps abide by your defi- nition j but then it is not precifely in the fame fenfe of it. One will fay it is the ground, from which (meaning without the intervention of other mediums) */ arifes (meaning from whence it immediately fprings j) another will fay, it is the ground, on which (mediums fuppo- fed) it arifes (but meaning indeed, into which it mud be ultimately and finally refolved.) Now he, who puts it upon any principle, that immediately operates, cannot have the very fame idea of foundation with him, who puts it upon a remote and diftant bottom. I am not now determining to which of thefe the word foundation may be moft properly applied, but only obferving, that even thoie writers, who agree in placing virtue on fome one founda- tion, do not yet agree exactly in their fenfe of foundation. Once more ; you explain your ground fur- ther in thefe words j or, that, without which there could be ?io fuch thing as virtue. But yet this feems not to enter into their notion of foundation, who place it in felf-love and felf- intereft. of moral Virtue and moral Obligation. 275 intereft. For virtue, call it a conformity to the reafbns of things, or to the will of God, in either fenfe, it will be the fame thing it was, though this foundation of theirs lhould be deftroyed, or out of fight. For virtue, even according to them, may be confidered as difmterefted, that is, in- dependently on the fanctions of rewards and punifhments. They will difown indeed any obligation, or any motive to praclife it in this cafe 5 but virtue will ftill be what it was; whereas, without the foundation, which you give it, there can be no fuch thing. When you are pleafed therefore to obferve, that the foundation of moral virtue^ upon further re- feclion, will be found to lie either in the cjjential differences, &c. or in f elf -love and fe If inter ejl -y I would remark, but not in the fame fenfe of foundation, which means, when understood of the one, that, without which there could be no fuch thing as virtue ; but does not mean thif, when underftood of, or applied to the other. It was upon thefe, and the like reflections, that I ventured to fay, that fettling the term foundation feemed to me previoufly necefTary in this controverfy about moral virtue. For fo long as there is any ambiguity in terms, it is likely there will be niifunderftanding of argu- ments. Your explanation of what you yourfelf T 2 mean, 2~,0 Letters upon the Subject meat?, when you uie the word, is ingenuous, and I thank you for it ; and I (hall underftand all your reafonings and conclufions on this tubjecT. the better for this light. But ftill I have doubts, whether you can bring your foundation to anfwer your definition ; efpe- cially in regard of that important word sole- ly ; which excludes every thing elfe from being in any fenie foundations. Yet you feem to apprehend this to be plain enough from this fingle consideration, that your foundation is that, without which there could be no fucb thing as 'moral virtue ; and that on fuppofition there were no ej/ential differences, there could be no more goodnefs in obeying God's will, than in the contrary. But now, in my poor apprehenfion, this fort of reafoning amounts to no more in ftrict- nefs, than this, that moral virtue Hands fo ne- cedari'iv related to thefe effential differences, &c. that it cannot be conlidered even as fub- Jifting independently, or cxclulive of them, by one who couliders virtue in all its relations. The fame may be laid of free will, or of rea- fon in moral agents. Suppoiing them away, and out of the queflion, there is an end of moral agency, an end of all virtue and good- nefr. And yet you would not call thefe foun- dationst of moral Virtue and moral Obligation. 2*77 dattons, at leaft not the file foundation, purely becaufe they are abfolutely neceflary to the very being of virtue. Space is that, without which there could be no fuch thing as matter ; and onfuppofkion there were no /pace, there could be no more matter than there could be matter without extenjion. Yet if you mould conclude, or infer from hence, that fpace was a foundation, and the fole foundation of matter, you would not dis- cover fo fine a genius as you have already done, in what you faid of fpace among your curfory thoughts. Should a company of ingenious florjfls dis- pute with each other concerning the ori- gin or foundation of a flower ; and one mould lay it in the plant producing the flower ; another in the root feeding the plant ; another in the earth nourilhing the root i another in the fpeciflc plaftic form of that plant ; another in the general laws of vegetation, &c. each of them might juftly and pertinently fay for his refpeclive principle, that it is a ground, on which the flower arifes j and without which there had been no fuch flower. Yet it would be hard to prove of any of thefe principles fingly, that it is the ground, on which T 3 the 2~& Letters upon the SubjeSi the flower foleiy arifcs, or without which there could be no flower at all. To give another inftance more appofite to our fubject. Let us take fome art or fci- ence ; muflc for inftance .; and let the query be, what is the true proper foundation of it ? One man conceives it merely as found, of which indeed it is a fpecies, and fo lays the foundation of it in the true and immediate caufe of found, or from whence found arifethy viz. the external motions or vibrations of the medium, through which, or by which, the fenfe of found is raifed in the ear. Another conceives it as a fenfation different from all other fenfations of found, and diflin- guifhable from them by a certain fweetnefs and agreeablenefs, which ftrongly affects the mind, and fometimes enravifhes the foul. Now as there feems no fort of relation or cor- refpondence between the undulations of the air, made by firings or whittles, and this in- ternal grateful fenfation, he places the founda- tion of mufic in the proper internal ftructure of the organ, which receiving the external impulf^s, affects the mind with delight. Hence what we call an Ear, which is indeed properly of moral Virtue and moral Obligation. 279 properly a mufical fenfe, or tafte, in fome mea- fure, common to all, but far more exquifite in fome than in others. And it is to this alone, be it more or lefs, that we muft refer and aicribe all approbation of harmony, and dif- like of difcord. The mufic therefore is in the man, and not in the natural caufes of found, which are the very fame way pro- ductive of all founds, whether mufical or no. A third comes, confiders the matter more deeply and philofophically ; and after acknow- ledging all that is faid of the origin of found, and of the neceflity and delicacy of this mufi- cal fenfe or tafte, concludes notwithstanding, that mufic is of noble birth, and hath its foundation in the nature of things, in certain eternal and eflential proportions and difpropor- tions. He alledges, that from the monochord alone, harmonically divided, arife all the rati- os of muiic ; and though the common practi- tioners, even the beft of them, may be igno- rant of this, or may not regard it j yet ma- thematicians demonftrate it, and build the whole theory of mufic upon it. And laflly, another comes, and fays, it is very wrong to lay the foundation of mufic, as T 4 a 280 Letters upon the Subject a liberal fcience, or practical art ^ in any of the things above mentioned. For it is owing merely to the invention and will of man. Jubal was the father of it, and whatfoever improvements have been made in it from time to time, have been owing to human fldll and induftry, in contriving of inftruments, and facilitating practice upon them. That what- ever Euclid, and other mathemacians might talk in their books of harmonics, yet both the greateft compofers, and the heft performers in this art, quite neglected the theory, and followed their own tafte, and laid down arbi- trary rules of compofition, whereby fome en- tire fpecies of mufic, once in vogue, are now become obfolete and impracticable. And more to the famepurpofe, mewing mufic to depend upon the will of man. Now, there is truth in all thefe allegations, and each of thefe difputants lays a foundation properly and agreeably to that light, in which he views and confiders mufic. Neither will their doctrine be found to interfere in any thing, but in each man's making his moil: be- loved principle the fole foundation of the whole fcience. And till they all (hall agree in fome one notion of mufic, and abide by fome one definition of moral Virtue and moral Obligation. 281 definition of foundation, they may difpute to the world's end, and be never the nearer co- ming to an agreement. Now, why may I not have leave to fufpecl, that foinething analogous to this has happened in the controverfy about the foundation of moral virtue ? That all the writers in it are not yet agreed upon a precife meaning of founda- tion, I have endeavoured to fhew above. And I think they are as little agreed in the defini- tion of virtue itfelf. One confiders it as a con- formity of a reaf enable creature to the will of its creator. He prefers this view as the largeft and moft univerfal, and in which obligation feems the ftrongeft, and is moft apparent. This leads him to lay the foundation folely in God's will. And to fecure it he labours to ap- propriate all obligation to his way of consider- ing virtue. Another confiders it, and with equal truth and juftice, as the conformity of a rcafonable creature to the nature and reafons of things. He prefers this view as the nobleft in his judg- ment, not only from its neceffary connexion with eternal truths, but alfo from including, as he apprehends, the foundation before men- tioned. This leads him to lay his foundation folely 282 Letters upon the Subjetf folely in the effential differences of things and fitneffes refulting from them. Another con- fiders and defines virtue to be titling agreeably to right reafon, viz. fuch as man is endowed with, or capable of ufing ; which includes the boni-form faculty or inftinct. This he prefers as the mofl eafy and natural way of confidering virtue, becaufe thefe are man's proper and innate faculties ; and, without doubt, given to him to be the immediate principles of virtue in him. He muft there- fore fix his foundation here in man's moral fenfe. A fourth comes, and contemplates moral virtue in all thefe different lights and views. And this leads him to found it in three princi- ples, all coinciding and concurring to its fub- fiftance. Now there is truth, and there is propriety in all thefe different ways of confidering vir- tue, and in afcribing to each way of viewing it, a refpective proper foundation. But yet, without firn: determining in which of thefe views or lights moral virtue is mofl properly to be taken and defined, it is in vain to fearch for the only proper and fole foun- dation ; of moral Virtue and moral Obligation. 283 dation ; for one common foundation will not iupport them all. Surely there are words in language, that might exprefs to the utmoft, what every man means by virtue, and the foundation he afcribes to virtue, in whatever light he views it in. Would it not be better to ufe thefe, than hold up a difpute upon terms that are fo liable to be taken in different fenfes by thofe who ufe them ? As to the fecond queftion, Whether moral virtue and moral obligation muft have the fame foundation, and in the fame fenfe j it appears from your anfwer, that I had reafon to make a queftion of it. For though you are clear, that the nature and reafon of things muft be the foundation of both ; yet you add, with refpect to obligation, but not in fuch a fenfe > as that there can be no other foundation of it. So that whereas moral virtue arife s folely upon the nature, reafon, &c. yet moral obligation arifes not folely, but primarily upon it : or, as I think you explain it afterwards, the obli- gation ariling from hence is antecedent to all other obligations, that may arife from other fubfequent foundations of obligation ; and therefore you apprehend, that the eflential dif- ferences, 2§a Letters upon the Subject ferences, &c. are (till the ultimate foundation, o; that, into which all obligation muft at laft be refolved . The truth is, the precife meaning of obli- gation is as little fettled in this part of the en- quiry, as that of the term foundation was in the laft. And it is chiefly owing to the dif- ferent notions of obligation, that we have dif- ferent foundations affigned to it. Take it in a grammatical fenfe, and it implies fomething, that enforces upon rcluBancy j and in this fenfe of it (when ufed in morality) it mould feem moft properly founded in the fanctions of re- wards and puniihments 3 or in the will of him, who has the power to reward or pu- nifh. Take it in a legal fenfe, and it implies an obliger : and there muft be two perfons at leaft, that is, two intelligent agents, or two free wills to create obligation in either of them. And in this view obligation in morals will cer- tainly be founded in the will of God. Take it in a third fenfe, viz. as an unalie- nable right, that truth has to be preferred be- fore falfehood, good before bad, by all ratio- nal creatures that can diftinguim them ; and then its foundation will be in the effential dif- ference of moral Virtue and moral Obligation. 285 ferences of things, and their eternal ratios, fitneffes, &c. Now, I fay, if men do reafon upon three forts of obligation, why may they not be allow- ed to conclude upon three forts of foundations for them ? You yourfelf acknowledge a fecondary ob- ligation, or an additional one. But to this you are willing to affign another ground, di- ftinct from, though coinciding with the ground of your primary foundation. This is right and juft. And I am apt to think, you will all agree in your grounds, fo far as you can all agree what obligation is. I fancy myfelf fomething better prepared, by thefe previous confiderations, to judge of your folution of my third queition, viz. Whe- ther the reafon, nature, and fitnefs of things, confidered as antecedent -othe divine icill, do ap- pear under that confederation, to be obligatory to morality ? Or thus : Whether rides of action, and obligations to action, be not quite diflintf, and may not have diftincl foundations ? It fliould feem plain here, that by rule? of aclion, I mean eternal truths and fitnelfes, and as confidered in the mind of God only, to be future rules ofaclions, when things (hould ex- iir g5 Letters upon the Subject ift with effential differences, &c. And I afk, whether in this view they carry any thing of obligation in them ? You reply, you cannot conceive reafons or rules of action (if they be eternal and immutable reafons) diflinff from obligation to action. But here you fpeak of thefe reafons and rules, as exhibited in the cre- ation of things , and implying obligation in them- fehes, and not as they were propofed to be con- fidered, viz. antecedent to God's will ; and patterns as it were in the divine mind of rul s, that were to be hereafter, carrying obligation with them. You add, that laws founded on the necejfary relations aed differences of things have from thofe eternal reafonsy a right of obli- ging moral agents : but not before they are laws, or before they are promulged> or before thofe neceflary relations and efTential differen- ces do actually exijl. Again, you fay, what are reafons and rules of action^ if they do not oblige reafonable beings to act conformably to them ? But they cannot oblige thus, //// there are reafonable beings to conform to them. Thus it appears, you do not in your anfwer confider them in that fame view, in which I took them, when I afked the queflion. But indeed in another place afterwards, you an- fwer of moral Virtue and moral Obligation. 287 fwer to my queftion fully and directly, viz. It is very true, that obligation could not take place ', till God had exprcffed his will, &c. And again yon fpeak of obligation being fubfequent to the creation. But you add to the firft of thefe conceffions, that neverthelefs the foundation of obligation might be antecedent to the divine will, as the ratios themfelves were allowed to be. And you add to the fecond, that obliga- tion itfelf, as founded on thefe ratios, might perhaps be more properly faid to be antece- dent to all confideration of the divine will. You feem well aware of the drift of my queflion, by throwing in thefe obfervations by way of fecurity to your foundation, and to fill up the breach made by the conceffions. Bui: I hope you will give me leave to make my in- ferences alfo from the point, that is yielded> viz. that obligation itfelf could not take place, till God had exprcffed his will, &c. and was fub- fequent to the creation, And what I would infer from hence is this: That as the eflential reafons of things may be confidered to have been once a rule of action prior to any obligation to action ; and as obli- gation itfelf did not arile or take place, till the difcovery of God's will agreeable to that rule, in 288 Letters upon the Subject in the creation ; there is no impropriety in faying, that the rule of morality is moft natu- rally refolvable into thofe eternal reafons of things, and the obligation to morality into the divine will. But I mud not pafs over what you are plea- fed to obferve, immediately after the concef- fions above-mentioned, viz. that the eternal ratios are, notwithstanding, the foundation of moral obligation, as being themfelves antece- dent to the divine will j and that the obligation to conform to them may perhaps be properly faid to be antecedent to all consideration of the divine will, or to any profpecl: of reward or punimment. When in this argument from the ratios be- ing antecedent^ you foy, they are allowed to he fo-, I ought to explain how far allowed, viz. antecedent to the exercife or difcovery of the divine will in the creation ; bat not antecedent to all confideration of the divine will, which was as eternal, and as immutable, as they. I was putting a query upon your own hypothe- sis, not intending to grant any real or proper antecedence in the ratios to God's will ; but making a fuppofuion of it, to fee whether, upon of moral Virtue and moral Obligation. 289 upon your own principles, any obligation would follow from it. The query was, whether the reafon, nature, and fltnefs of things, token confiJered as antece- dent to the divine will, do appear, under that confederation, to be obligatory to morality. Now it feems upon a difcinTion of this query, it appears, that they are not obligatory them- fehes under this confederation, but they are ne- verthelefs a foundation of obligation. That ob- ligation could not take place, till thefe ratios were exhibited in God's works, is what you allow. And that they are in fome fenfe a foundation of obligation, I will not deny. But if you make them as you do in one place, the primary foundation, and in another the ultimate foundation of obligation, I mufl beg leave to doubt of this. For, as I obferved upon the fecond queftion, they can only be confidered as a foundation of obligation, in one particular fenfe of obliga- tion among three fenfes that it is taken in, viz. the unalienable right that truth has to be pre- ferred before falfhood, by reafonable creatures, that can diftinguim one from the other. Many there are indeed, who will by no means allow Vol. II. U this 290 Letters upon the Subjeft this to be obligation at all. But if they will not allow the word, they will fcarce deny the thing, viz. fuch a claim upon all beings, en- dowed with reafon and free will, as is tanta- mount to what they call obligation. There- fore, I do with you give it the name of obliga- tion alfo , and acknowledge a foundation of this fpecies of obligation, in the eternal ratios. But then as this is neither the principal, nor the moft common and proper fenfe of obliga- tion ; and as there are other foundations for it, (as I think you allow) in thofe other fenfes of it ; you muft not lay too great a ftrefs on this foundation, which is only partial j nor extend it too far. Your argument for its being the primary foundation of obligation from our per- ceptions of duty in the elTential differences, &c. previous to our difcovery, that they are alfo the will of God, is not, I think, fufficient to entitle it to the primacy : which the moral fenfe in that view would claim before it, a§ being the firft foundation of obligation, or the firft principle, that lays men under moral ob- ligations. And this would be refolved eafier into will, than into the efTential differences ; though indeed they both have a neceffary re- m to it* The of moral Virtue and moral Obligation. 291 The fum of all that I mean to advertife you of in thefe reflections, liowever coarieiy and inaccurately thrown together, is this : That the notions of foundations and obliga- tions are not yet fufficiently fettled. That from the beft judgment I can make of the iffue of this controverfy, from the various and differ- ent acceptations thofe terms appear to be ta- ken in, it will be this : That the principal, not the file foundation of moral virtue, are the ef- fential differences of things, and fitnefTes re- fulting neceffarily from them ; but not confi- dered as feparate, or poflibly feparable from the will of God. And that the principal, not the fole founda- tion of moral obligation is the will of God ; but not confidered as feparate, or poflibly fe- parable from the eternal and immutable ratios of things. And that the only proper ultimate foundati- on of moral virtue and moral obligation, is God himfelf; the only true fountain both of wifdom and goodnefs, and every thing that is either perfect, true, or right in phyhes, me- taphyfics, or morals. He is all in allt the firfl caufe, and fole origin of all. U 2 Accept 2^2 Letters upon the Subjeft Accept thefe hints with candor from him who is an admirer of your reafonings and writings. Sept. 1743. T. Sharp. Mrs Cockburn's fecond Letter to the Rev. Dr Thomas Sharp. Oftober 14, 1743. Rev. Sir, * 1. rpHOUGH I fear I am but ill f X qualified to continue a debate ' with you, who appear to have been more ' converfant than I with the writers on the * fubjedts we are enquiring about ; and to have 4 gone into nicer diftinctions, and more re- ' mote views of them, than I have had occa- c fion to confider : yet I beg leave once more to lay before you my plain apprehenfions up- 1 on thofe farther thoughts you have conde- * fcended to favour me with. 1 2. After fetting down what I apprehend * the writers on the fubjec*l of moral virtue I underftand by the word fowidation, viz. * The ef moral Virtue and moral Obligation. 291 ■ The ground on which virtue folely arifes ; you , * are pleafed to afk, but are they agreed, whe- 1 ther this ground be any one fimple principle, or 1 compounded of more principles than one ? To 1 which I anfwer, no certainly. They are far ' from agreeing, whether this ground is the c reafon and nature of things, the will of God, ' the moral fenfe, or all three united • for 1 that is the very matter in difpute. But them ■ Sir, I do not take thefe to be different fenfe s of 1 the word foundation : all thefe writers feem c to me to agree in their general idea of a foun- t dation, and each of :hem to apply that word ' in the very fame fenfe to his own principle, 1 as the ground upon which he thinks virtue c folely arifes. Even yo^ir fkilful writer, I e doubt not, would adhere to this definition, c and apply it to his three principles, without * excluding the term folely. So that I cannot { yet fee, that there is the lead: ambiguity in 1 the word foundation, or that any explication ' of it could at all contribute to adjufr. the dif- c ferent opinions on this fubj eel:. But if you ( could perfuade the maintainers of them to c agree in applying the word foundation to [ feme one or more of the principles contend- U 3 < ed 294 Letters upon the Subjeft 1 ed for, that would indeed effectually end { the difpute j for there the difagreement lies^ 1 which does not, as I conceive, at all affect £ the fenfe or meaning of the word founda- 1 tion. c 3 . As to thofe, whom you fuppofe to have ' different conceptions of that word, becaufe c one confiders it as the ground, from which c virtue immediately arifes, and another confi- * ders it as a more remote ground, on which £ it arifes, by the intervention of feme medi- * urns : I confefs I do not well apprehend the * ufe of mediums for the production of vir- £ tue, if a fufficient ground of it is allowed, * into which it is mod ultimately refolved. ' But as I have had no occafion to confider c thefe nice diftinctions, which have not come c in my way, I may be in danger of blunder- * ing about them, and therefore mall only * fay, that I imagine thefe authors may agree * in their idea of foundation, as a real ground c on which virtue arifes, though one excludes, 1 and another admits the intervention of me- 1 diums, which do not hinder the ground tr from remaining immoveably the fame.. < 4. You of moral Virtue and moral Obligation. 205 f 4. You next objedt to the explanation of * my ground, viz. that, without which, there could 1 be no fuch thing as virtue ; that this feems * not to enter into their notion of foundation, ' who place it in felf-love, and felf-intereil ; * for virtue, you fay, even according to them, * may be confidered as difniterejled. 1 5. Now here again, Sir, you are got ! among authors that I am a ftranger to; * for though I have met with feveral, who * make felf -inter eft the foundation of i?wral ob- ' ligation, I know of none who make it jhe ' foundation of virtue. This thofe writers ■ commonly deduce from the will of God. * But if thofe you fpeak of, found virtue on ' felf-intereft, and yet allow, that it may be con- ■ fidered as difmterefted ; there mud be fuch ' inconfiftencies in their fchemes, and fuch * confufion in their ideas, both of virtue and c foundation, that I will not pretend to anfwer for what they may mean by either. * 6. But on this occafion, Sir, I am obli- c ged to take notice of a miftake you have * made in fetting down as my words, that the foundation of moral virtue, upon further c refledion, will be found to lie, either in the U 4 < effential 296 Letters upon the SubjeB ( eftential differences, &c. or in felf-love and * felf-intereft ; upon which you remark, but ' not in the fame fenfe of foundation. Now, ' Sir, if you pleafe to look once more into my ■ laft paper, you will find, that thofe words ■ were fpoke of moral obligation^ not of mo- * ral 'virtue ; for I had no notion of any one's 1 founding virtue on felf-love and felf-intereft. 1 And as to your remark, there was no occa- 1 lion to confider, in what fenfe foundation * might be applied to thofe principles, fince c my only intention was to engage you on the < fide of the efTential differences, by obferving, c that obligation muft either be founded on c them, or on thofe low principles which you * had before agreed with me in rejecting. * 7. Again, you object to my explaining the c word foundation, by calling it tbafy without 1 which there could be no fuch thing as virtue, 4 that the fame may be faid of free will, or 1 of reafon in moral agents : fuppofing them 4 away, there is an end of moral agency, an 1 end of all virtue. And yet you conclude, I c would not call thefe foundations, at leaft \ not the file foundation, purely becaufe they c are abfolutely nece/Tary to the very being ofvirr- 1 iue% of moral Virtue and moral Obligation. 29^ tue. Reafon and free-will I acknowledge, Sir, to be abfolutely necefTary to moral agen- cy : they are qualifications, without which there could be no fuch thing as the praclice of 'virtue, and may, if you pleafe, be called foundations of virtuous praclice. But that is quite another idea, than the general abJlracJ nature of virtue, the foundation of which we are enquiring about \ and to the confli- cting or production of virtue in this fenfe, I fee not that any thing can be necefTary, or at all contribute, but the immutable rela- tions and eiTential differences of things, from which virtue, confidered in its abJlracJ nature, directly and folely arifes. If this idea were flrictly kept to, as it ought to be in the queftion concerning the origin of vir- tue, there would perhaps have been lefs dis- agreement about it i for I apprehend there has been much ambiguity in the ufe of the term virtue, though I cannot perceive any in that of the word foundation. ' 8. But to go on with your objections, fpace3 you fay, is that without which there could be no fuch thing as matter : yet you fuppofe I would not infer from hence, that Jpace was a foun- \ dation^ 2q$ Letters upon the Subject datlotty and the file foundation of matter. So far from it, Sir, that I cannot confiderfpace as having any thing at all to do with the pro- duction of matter j and therefore I mould rather chufe to fay with refpecl: to them, that the exiftence of matter fuppofed, the exi- gence of fpace muft be like wife admitted. But the dependance of virtue on the efTen- tial differences, &c, is of quite another na- ture, lince it entirely derives its being from them. ' 9. If your ingenious florifts, who difpute about the origin of a flower, or the admirers of munca whofe inquiry into the true foun- dation of it you fo elegantly defcribe, are agreed, that the thing they feek for is, the ground on which the flower, or the mufic fokly arifes, or, that to which either owes its being : then it mould feem plain, that they are all a- greed in the fenfe of the word foundation^ and only differ about the thing to which it may be moll properly applied. And if their error lies in each man's making his beloved principle the file foundation of the flower, or of the mulic ; when various principles contribute to their refpe&ive beings ; then . ' this of moral Virtue and moral Obligation* 299 c this controverfy is not to be decided by the 1 definition of a foundation, the general idea * of which will agree indifferently to one or * more principles ; but till they can convince * each other, either that fome one, or more, c or all the principles together, go to the pro- 1 duction of the flower, or the mufic ; they •* may indeed difpute to the 'world's end, not- 1 withftanding the exacteil: agreement in their 1 idea of foundation. A company of archi- e reels might difpute for ever, whether ftone, ' or brick, or wood, or all together, were i the properefr. foundation for a houfe ; and 4 yet have all the very fame idea of foun- 1 dation, as that on which a houfe is folely eretl- 5 ad. And this, Sir, I apprehend to be pret- c ty nearly a parallel cafe with that of thecon- ' tenders about the foundation of moral vir- ? tue, who, I cannot but think, are gene- c rally agreed in the precife meaning of that * wcrd. * 10. But now, Sir, it is not the fame as to * the term virtue, which you next confider ; e for I am apt to think there is a great deal of * ambiguity in the ufe of that, as I hinted « before. Not but I am perfuaded, that moft f people 'goo Letters upon the Subject people are agreed in their general notion of the nature of virtue ; but when writers come to contend about the foundation of it, they are apt to fubftitute in place of the nature of 'virtue, either our idea of it, or the prac- tice of it by moral agents. And this per- haps may have been fome occafion of their affigning different foundations to virtue ; for our idea of virtue, or our practice of it, may arife from other grounds than that on which the abjlracl nature of virtue is found- ed. And thefe different fenfes of the term virtue may occafion likewife various definiti- ons of it, every one defining it according to the light he has viewed it in, and to the foundation he has given it in that view. For you may be pleafed to obferve, that the fe- veral definitions you have inftanced in, are rather determinations of the foundation of virtue, than explications of its nature. For inftance, to fay that virtue is a conformity of a reafonable creature to the will of its creator, is the fame as to fay, that the will of the creator is the foundation of virtue : but this gives us no manner of light into the nature of 'virtue, till we are informed by other * means of moral Virtue and moral Obligation. 3*1 means what the will of the creator is, and and therefore is no proper definition of it. The fame may be faid of the reft, except- ing only that, which coniiders virtue as the conformity of a reafonable creature to the na- ture and reafon of things 5 for that directly acquaints us with the nature of virtue. It is true, this definition determines likewife the foundation of virtue, which in this con- troverfy is a kind of begging the quejlion : but then it may be faid in excufe of this, (what cannot be faid for any of the others) that it is fcarce poffible to give a juft and proper de- finition of virtue, without exprefling its re- lation to the nature and efiential differences of things. And this too may ferve as a proof, that virtue owes its origin folely to them, fince the confideration of them enters neceflarily into the juft idea of its efTence. And give me leave to fay, that even in the different views, according to which the feve- ral writers have defined virtue, the reafons and immutable nature of things might be (what you think it is in vain to fearch for) a \ common foundation to fupport them all : all * may oo2 Letters upon the Subjeff may eafily be refolved into them, and fe- curely reft upon them. * ii. I agree with you, Sir, that the pre- cife meaning of obligation is as little fettled, as you fuppofe that of the term foundation to be : and yet I cannot think with you, that it is chiefly owing to the different notions of obligation, that we have different foundati- ons afligned to it ; for I have all along allow- ed, that there are feveral grounds of obliga- tion, though I have conftantly kept to one precife meaning of that term. And accord- ing to my apprehenfions of this matter, there can be but one fort of obligation ^ if there were fifty different foundations of it. What you call three forts of obligation feems to me three forts of foundations, upon which obli- gation in one and the fame fenfe may, and does arife. Obligation furely is, or ought to be the fame idea, whatever is fuppofed to be the foundation of it. I acknowledge, that the precife meaning of it has not been fcientifically fettled, and that fome have ob- fcured, and others begged the queftion by defining it j but I do not find, that any mif- \ understandings have happened in the contro- \ verfy of moral Virtue atid moral Obligation, \ verfy from thefe defeats. I believe, Sir, you 1 will allow, that people in common difcourfe f underftand one another well enough, when c they fay they are under an obligation to do £ fuch or fuch a thing, though perhaps they * could not define the word. And fo writers ' on the fubject may be fufficiently agreed in * the general meaning of the word, to talk ' to the purpofe about it without explaining it; * which fome of the beft of thofe on Dr 1 Clarke % fide of the queflion feem to have * thought unnecefiary, by their neglecting to 1 do it. And this has been complained of by r one of their adverfaries, who himfelf defines c obligation to be fuch a necejjity of acJicnt as c is confflent with liberty : which I think does * not make the term more intelligible than it ' was. Others of them tell us, they mean by * it a necejjity of action arifmg from a c profpeB of obtaining happincfs, or avoid- 1 ing mifery. And this I take to be beg- c ging the queflion in favour of their belo-» c ved principle. But the moil accurate and 1 judicious writer on Dr Clarke's fide, that I c have met with, defines obligation to be ajlate * of the mindt into which it is brought by the per- * ception 3°1 ^04 Letters upon the Subject ' ception of a plain reafonfor acting or forbear* 4 ing to ac~i, arifmg from the nature, circwnjlan~ * ces, or relations of perfons or things. Yet I c think this defective, as not explaining what c that ftate of mind is, in which he places ob- c ligation ; befides that it is a kind of determi- * ning the foundation he affigns to it, which is 1 the fubject of debate, and the fault I obfer- * ved in their adverfaries. After fo many great ' names as have engaged in this controverfy, * I have not ventured upon any definition of c obligation in my remarks , nor did any occa- * fion for it offer. But fince we are now up- 7 on the unfettled meaning of that term, I * take the liberty, Sir, to lay before you the * explanation I would chufe to give it, and c leave to your judgment, whether it is lefs ' exceptionable than thofe I have objected a- * gainft. By obligation then I understand, * fuch a perception of an inducement to ac~ty c or to forbear ailing f as 'forces an agent to < f and felf condemned, if he does not conform to * it. This I think exprefles that fate of mind, 1 which my admired author hints at ; and it * determines no particular foundation, though * it may fuit with them all -} and therefore it « might of moral Virtue and mral Obligation. 305 * might be equally received by the maintainers * of each. But I much doubt whether their c agreement in this meaning of obligation c would bring them all to agree in the grounds ' from which it arifes. ' 12. We are now come, Sir, to the laft c and mod important queftion between us, 1 whether the reafon, nature, and fitnefs of f things, confidered as antecedent to the di- * vine will, do appear under that confider ation, 1 to be obligatory to morality ? or whether c rules of action, &c. In my anfwer to this, * it feems, I have not confidered eternal rules * in the fame view in which you took them, ' when you afked the queflion. I confefs, * Sir, I did not confider them in the view you * have now explained them j for I did not ap- c prehend, that you intended to enquire, whe- * ther the eternal reafons of things were obli- 1 gatory before there were any creatures capa- * ble of obligation • or, that you meant by c antecedent to the ivill, antecedent to his will * as txprrffed in the creation. Thefe are remote c views, in which I had never before occalion c to confider things, except with reipect to the * Deity himfelf, who is faid to be eternally obli- Yol.II. X Letters upon the Subject in MS. and which was occafioned, as I ap- prehend, at leaft that part, which explains an* tecedency, by what I had faid in that letter to Mr Cockbum, which accompanied your MS. when I returned it) you are pleafed to fay, that the antecedency Dr Clarke and his followers fpeak of, refpecJs only the explicite declarations of God's will by the command of moral virtues ; And that the will of God, as exprc/l, or rather implied in the creation, is the very fame with that reafon and truth of things, which are faid to be obligatory as fuch, p. 159. And to the lame effect you fpeak in your letter to me. I gladly lay hold of your authority for Dr Clarke's fenfe of antecedency, and I heartily ap- prove your remark, that follows, that God's will as exprejfed, &c. Now as I had no appre- henfion till I read this appendix, and your late letter to me, that this was your fenfe of an* tecedent, &c. you will the more readily ex- cufe, what I needlefsly faid upon another fuppofition. Another thing you have informed me of, in which I was greatly miftaken, viz. that in this enquiry into the true ground of virtue, you do not confider it as in praclice, but in its general abJlraSi of moral Virtue and moral Obligation. %\£ abftratt nature. This diflinction very much alters the queftion from what I conceived it to be. And had I been aware of this before, it would have prevented much of what I faid, on prefumption, that practical virtue (by which I mean virtue in practice) was the thing of which the proper foundation was fought. All that I have further to wifh, is, that every body, who engages in this difpute, would explain as freely and as fully as you have done, what they precifely mean by their terms, and in what particular light they con- fider the fubjecl:, viz. what they include in, or exclude from their confideration of it. By this means, we fhould not only come fooner to every writer's true meaning, but probably find a way opened to bring them to an agreement. For, as each perfon might perhaps be found to argue juflly from his own principles, and upon his own conceptions j fo each perfon's principles and reafonings upon them might perhaps ftand allowed in that fenfe he main- tains them, without overturning, or even clafhing with the principles and conclufions of others, who confider the fame fubjecl: in a different * ! 6 Letters upon the Subjeft different light, and ufe terms in a different fenfe. It was upon this conjecture, that I fuggeft- ed to you in my firft paper, the ufefulnefs of fetting out with an enquiry into the meaning of the firft term in the queftion, foundation^ as it is ufed by the feveral writers in this con- troverfy ; and when thai was determined, I propofed to proceed to another queftion, the folution of which would become more eaiy after the fenfe of the firft term was afcertain- ed. And fo on to a third point. This occafi- oned the agreeable correfpondence I have had with you, wherein you have given me great light into your own refined and juft fenti- ments upon the fubjects in the particular view you hold it in. But I have not yet received all the fatisfaction I wifhed for in my enquiry after the fenfe of foundation in this diipute. You are pleafed indeed to give me your own fenfe of it, which I thank you for, nor have I any right to afk more of you : And you alfo apply it juftlyand properly to your own fenfe of the term virtue, viz. confideredin it s general ab- flrafl nature. But when you fuppofe, that all other writers ufe foundation in the very fame fenfi of moral Virtue and moral Obligation, 31/ fenfe that you do, and would abide by your de- finition of it ; when you fay, that there is no ambiguity in it ; that, no mifapprehenfion has a- rifen from it j that ?io explanation of it could at all contribute to adjujl the different opi?iions on this fubjecl j you do indeed almofr. filence me from the deference I pay to your opinion, as fuch ; but as you have given it me hitherto only as your opinion, without any reafons to fupport it, I am yet at liberty to elicit them, for my own further fatisfaction, if I can. If the words of writers on morality are not al- ways to be taken in the common acceptation, (as Mr E. L* and yourfelf agree *, P. 102, Works of the Learned, 1743) but in the fenfe nioft agreeable to the apparent fcope of their writings ; and if a word, metaphorically u- fed, may be applied to different things, and yet not jujl in the fame fenfe : Why may it not happen, that in the metaphorical ufe of the word foundation, different writers (hall not have the fame precife idea of the term ? What any of them mean by it, may be bed collected, if they do not otherwife explain * Vol. i. p. 402 of the prefent edition, them- *!# Letters upon the Subjeft themfelves, from the things they apply it to. And it is my obfervation of their different ap- plications of it, which creates my fufpicion, that they do not agree, as they mould, in the idea of it. And if I were penetrating enough to difcern where this difagreement lay, I mould hope to contribute not a little towards adj lift- ing their different opinions about the main fub- jecl:. I had offered at a diftindion of foundations, even upon your own definition of that term, into i?nmediate or proximate ', and remote or ori- ginal. You feem to think this can do no fer- vice. My not explaining it by inftances has left it under the appearance of a nice, per- haps an arbitrary and ufelefs diftinction. Is not foundation, when applied to faith, altogether as intelligible and determinate, as when it is applied to virtue ? Yet if I mould fay there is no ambiguity in it, or difference a- bout it, Mr Hooker would admonifh me j who, in a difpute about the foundation of faith, has thefe words. " Let us fee (lays he) what the foundation ct of faith is. If it does import the general ^c ground, whereupon we reft, when we do <* believe $ of moral Virtue and moral Obligation. .3 1 9 « believe ; the writings of the Evangeliils and if the Apoftles are the foundation of the " Chriftian faith. But if the name of foun da- " tion do note the principle thing, which is « believed, then is the foundation of our cc faith, God made manifeft in the flefli." p. 499. Here are two fenfes of foundation very ju- dicioully diftinguifhed ; and the more fo, be- caufe, as I imagine, he grounds this diftin&i- on upon the words of a much greater writer than himfelf, who, comparing the Chriftian church, or the congregation of believers to an edifice, ufes the word foundation, in a fenfe as near the primary and literal, as it is capable of in a figure. " As a wife mafter-builder, I on which virtue folely arifes ; or, that, without which there could be no fuch thing as virtue. And in another, when applied to obligation, of which fhe fuppofes there may be many foundations ; and confequently it cannot be faid of any one of them, that it is the ground, on which obligation folely arifes, or that, without which there could be no fuch thing as obligation. Therefore, till this other fenfe of foundation be alfo explained to us, we muff gather .it as well as we can from the application itfelf, in Vol. II. Y wnich g 2 2 Letters upon the Subject which view I conceive, (he means no more by it than fufficient motive, or reafonable induce- ment, in which fenfe it is very often taken. It is not my intention to uphold any difpute with you, Madam, not even on the main fubject, much lefs upon the fignification of terms, which would not have been worth my mentioning to you at firft, but for a conceit, that fomething more material depended there- on. And as my only aim in what I have fubmitted, and do now fubmit to your better Judgment, is to difcover, if I can, whether too carelefs and lax an ufe of terms has not been one occafion, perhaps a principal one, of dis- agreement among writers ; and confequently, whether the fixing their import with greater exa&nefs and precidon, than the feveral writers have commonly done, may not help very much towards finding out where the truth lies among various fentiments, which yet perhaps are not fo various, if each were rightly under- ftood : as this I fay, is my only fcope, I per- fuade myfelf you will bear with my giving you my own fenfe of the matter more fully. Foundation, although, in its firft proper and literal fenfe, as a ground or bottom, whereon a build- of moral Virtue and moral Obligation. 323 a building is ereffied, or any heavy body Jlands or re/Is, as upon its proper ba/is, it conveys always the fame idea ; yet the figurative ufe of it will be found to be of two forts 5 one more proper, the other lefs proper. The more proper is, when it is figuratively applied to kingdom, empire, city, &c. and fignifies the firff. eftablifhment of fuch civil conftitution : Or to hofpital, college, fchool, or lecture, &c. and fignifies the fettlement of a revenue to fupport fuch particular com- munity or inftitution ; or to hiftory, poem, drama, &c. and fignifies the fubject, matter, groundwork, or plot ; or to reafoning and ar- ment, and fignifies poftulatums, or firft prin- ciples laid down to be argued from, &c. In all which inftances, fomething is conceived to be raifed as a fuperftructure, upon what is called the foundation. And thus authorities, and proofs, upon which any thing can be fi- guratively faid to be built, become figuratively foundations. The lefs proper is when, it is put for the root, or fource, from which any thing has its rife and beginning, or fprings, or is deduced. And in this fenfe it is applied to firft occajions Y 2 and 324 Letters upon the SubjeB and introductions ; &c. confidered as the origins of fome things, and to motives, inducements, Sec. confidered as the fprings of action ; and to defigns and ends, confidered either as the oc- cajions of, or the motives to the doing of fuch things, as are afcribed to fuch views. And we are fo far reconciled by ufe to thefe applications of foundation, though they are the lefs proper, as to prefer them fometimes be- fore the former, or more proper. When we fpeak of the ground or foundation of a quarrel or a difpute, we chufe to underftand it rather of the firft occafion, that brought it on, than of fubject-matter of it, or the difference of fentiments in the contending parties. And here I cannot help remarking, that the words, which literally fignify rife, or beginning in the Latin and Greek Tongues j (viz. prin- cipium and *ex«) are figuratively ufed for foun- dation. So that to lay a beginning in Greek, is to lay a foundation. And both in Latin and in Englijh we hear as much (at leafl among philofophers) of building upon principles, as deducing from them. In a word, I take both principle and foun- dation in its metaphorical ufage. to be terms of of moral Virtue and moral Obligation. 325 of much the fame latitude with caufe, and to admit of as great a variety of diftinctions ; be- caufe there is fcarce any thing that can be called a caufe, which may not be called in fome fenfe or other a principle, or a foundation j having as near a relation, and the fame kind of relation, to that, which is built upon it, or is d^ducible from it, as caufe hath to its effect. It is true, the logicians have found it ne- cefTary, in order to determine certain precife meanings of the general term caufe, and to prevent confufion in the various ufes of it, to diitinguim and fub-diffcinguifh to a very great nicety : Which they have not done, that I know of, with refpec"t to the term foundation. Yet I conceive the fame diftinctions may be made to ferve both, and thereby to ferve a better purpofe, viz. to account in fome mea- fure for mens various opinions about the foun- dation of morality. Give me leave on this occafion to talk a lit- tle in the language of the fchools, for fo much I remember of it, that if a man were to afk me, what was the caufe of virtue and moral obligation (as I think fome of the writers will ufe that expreflion, and chufe it rather than Y 3 fiim- 226 Letters upon the Subject foundation) I mould firft demand what it was he meant by caufe, whether the material, the formal, the efficient ;, or the fnal ; for in every one of thefe fenfes (to omit the feveral fub- divifions) caufe is taken, and in every one of them it may be applied to virtue, as being a a caufe of it. The nature, truth, and relations of things, with their confequent ntnefTes of application, are the material caufe of virtue. They are of the efTence of moral rectitude, fpeculative, or practical. They are the fubjec7-mattert in which we conceive moral virtue ought to be exercifed, and in which, when it is practifed, it really is exercifed. If one fhall chufe to call them the rule, another the foundation of morals, I think there is nothing amifs, pro- vided that their proper place or (hare in morals be afiigned them, and no more, and no lefs : So that he, who calls them the rule of practice, allows them alfo to be the fubject of it ; or he, who lays the foundation in them, means it in no other fenfe, than as a material caufe may be confidered as & foundation of its effect. The formal caufe of virtue is right reafon with liberty. Thefe conftitute moral agency, and of moral Virtue and moral Obligation. 327 and are likewife of the eiTence of virtue ; which, as Mr Warburton juftly obferves, con- fifts in acting agreeably to tbofe relations^ in which we ftand to all beings whatsoever. Thefe give moral acts their quiddity , (if you will bear with that fchooi term ufed in the definition of forms) that is., not only diftin- guifhes them from the acts of brutes, but gives them their proper rank and dignity among human actions, or that peculiar character, from which they are denominated virtue. For the actions even of reafonable creatures, however confonant (of themfelves) to the nature, truth, and relations of things, if done through ne- ceflity, through ignorance, or, in one word^ without moral intention^ cannot be accounted virtue. However they may be faid to come within the matter of it, yet they have not the form of virtue. Reafon and liberty alone can conftitute that. Some indeed will chufe to call thefe the nccejjary qualifications to the prac- tice of virtue ; perhaps alfo, foundations of vir- tuous practices. Yet furely they are a con/li- tuent part of virtue in every idea of it, and are to it, in the divilicn of caufes, moft properly what the formal caufe is to the effect. Y 4 Nor 328 Letters upon the Subject Nor am I making any new diftinctions ori virtue, when I thus confider it materially and formally : For moralifls have fo confidered it long ago, making both this matter and this form requisite to its being. They may not ufe indeed the very terms caufe, or foundation, but (which comes to the fame thing) they fpeak of internal principles of virtue, which they divide into material and for mat, as the efiential ' conftituent parts of it, by which it is con- ceived, and underfiood as it were, a priori. Chauvin, who gives us the fentiments of the generality of the philofophers, fays, that the . material principle of virtue is the nature of things fo far as it is a rule of conformity, or afubjecl of moral pratlice. And upon this all virtue Jlands, fays he, as it were upon its foundation (this expremon will not difpleafe you.) The formal principle is right reafon ; for, adds he, when every thing is confidered and treated, as right reafon teaches it Jhould be confidered and treated, then virtue comes forth in its perfection. Then he proceeds to other principles of vir- tue, which he flyles the complex necellary indeed to the practice of virtue, but not ne- cellary to the knowledge of its nature. Will of moral Virtue and moral Obligation, 329 Will you now bear with me, if I return for a little time to my fchool logic again. The efficient caufe of virtue in this divifion is the intelligent free agent himfelf, conform- ing his will and actions, by the dictates of his reafon, to the nature and relations of things. Perhaps you may look upon him in no other light, than as a fubject capable of virtue, or as an inftrument in the production of it. But you will fcarce find among all the inftances of ejfieient caufes given by the logicians any one more proper, or that comes more clofely up to their definitions, than that of an intelligent free agent, confidered as efficient, in regard to virtue, confidered as efifeB. And laftly the reafonable motive, or the ulti- mate end (whatever it be) by which his will is fo determined, is the. final caufe in this queftion. And fo properly the final, that it not only fully anfwers the ufual definition, viz. of an exter- nal caufe, for the fake of which, or upon account of which the efficient acts, but agrees perfectly with another obfervation of the logicians, viz. that the caufality of final caufes is chiefly to be confidered in created intelligent agents. It alfo anfwers perfectly to their diftinction of finis cujus, ^o0 Letters upon the Subjecl cujus, and finis cut ; the end of whom, and the end to whom. For fuch motives and induce- ments to virtuous actions, as refpecl one's felf are as properly final caufes of our acting, as gain or wealth is that of a merchant's in trade j which they give as a right inftance of finis cu- jus. And fuch motives and inducements to good actions, as refpec~i other beings , are as pro- perly the final caufes of our ftudying and doing good, as the health of others is the final caufe of phyficians in ftudying and practifing phyfic, which they give us as a right inflance of finis cui. I have had indeed hither a particular eye to your own definition of virtue, if I miftake you not, as the conformity of a reafonable creature to the nature and reajons of things. But flill the divifion of its foundation or caufe into four caufes will be equally clear and certain, though we fhould with others fubflitute the will of God in the definition in the place of the nature and reafons of things. For as in my way of con- fidering your definition, the nature and reafon of things, fo far as they are a rule of confor- mity, or the fubject of moral practice, may be confidered as the material principle, or fubjeft- of moral Virtue and moral Obligation. 33 x fubjecl '-matter of 'virtue ; fo the will of God in the definition of others, (if they mean by it bis will as expreffed, or rather implied in the creation) is the very fame material principle ; or fabjefl -matter with your reafon and truth of things. A difference indeed will be found in the form, but none in the matter. Or if they mean by the will of God \ a po/itive appoint 'went, or explicit command, then the thing fo appoint- ed or commanded will be alio the fubjec~t- matter of virtue ; as coming within their rule or law of virtue. Thus again as to the form. In your own definition it muft be reafon, including liberty. For when you fay, a reafonable creature, you muft mean not only a creature, that can un- derftand, and judge of the nature and reafons of things, but who has power like wife to conform to them. But according to thofe, who efpoufe the other definition, the formal caufe will be the knowledge and difcernment of God's will, however attained, whether by reafon or otherwife ; or the power and capa- city of difcerning it, by whatever means it be imparted. And 332 Letters upon the Subjecl And this I take to be Mr War burtons pe- culiar notion of moral, as diftinguimed from rational. From whence he collects, that an Atheift, though a reafonable creature, with refpect to the nature and reafons of things, cannot neverthelefs be a moral creature, fo long as he is abfolutely a flranger to God's will. The term conformity in either of the defi- nitions implies not only a determination of the reafonable and moral creature's will, to con- form to the nature and reafon of things, or to the will of God, but alfo his acting agreeably thereto. And this makes him in either cafe the efficient caufe properly fo called. And as fome kind of motive, or other, mud be fuppofed to determine his will to conform to the one or to the other y becaufe in either de- finition, he is confidered as a reafonable crea- ture, (which he could not be, if he had not fome reafon to induce him to action) this mo- tive or reafon, whatever it be in either con- fideration of the queftion, will be the proper final caufe > which, I mufl confefs, is rather implied than exprelTed in either of the defi- nitions. I might of moral Virtue and moral Obligation, 333 I might proceed to confider and diitinguifh in the fame manner the foundations or caufes of obligation ; either from your own definition of it, or from that of others. But before I trouble you with any more logic, I think it is fitting I mould firft explain to you what ufe I would make of thefe kind of dry diftinclions, that I have borrowed from the fchools ; hop- ing you will notcenfure them, or me, if that mall appear to be to my purpofe. Suppofe then any perfon, inftead of afking me the caufe of virtue, mould afk me, what is the foundation of it , might I not juftly de- mand of him, in the firft place, what it was he meant by foundation ? And if he mould reply, that all do agree in that term, and that there is no fort of ambiguity in it, might I not very justly and pertinently anfwer, that I have good realbn to put this query, becaufe I obferve, that fome very worthy writers do call that the foundation and the file fowzdation of virtue, which, when it comes to be logically confidered, amounts to no more than fome one of the four fpecies, into which caufe is diftin- guifhed ? And if one of them manifeftly lays his foundation in the material caufe, another lavs 334 Letters upon the Subject lays his as evidently in the formal, and another as plainly, though perhaps not fo directly, in the final. Can I think otherwife, than that they have not the fame meaning, when they ufe the term foundation ? Or mull not their meanings be at leait as different, as material, formal, and final caufes are different from each other ? To give examples. Moft of the old philo- fophers reduced the whole of virtue to one fource or head, when they defined it by living according to the dictates of re af on, or living a- greeably to right reafon, or more fully exprefled, reafon from the nature of things, which enjoineth the things, which ought' to be do?ie, and forbiddeth the contrary. This with fome of them was the fole principle of moral virtue, or, in our modern language, the true and proper foun- dation : and yet is truly and properly no more than the formal caufe of it, according to Chau- vins account. Again there are other very learned and ju- dicious perfons, who lay the foundation of virtue, wholly and folely, in the nature, truth, and eternal rcafons of things ; whereas, upon enquiry, this may perhaps be found only a partial of moral Virtue and moral Obligation. 335 partial foundation, and to be equivalent to no- thing more than what the logicians term the material caufe. We have got then a twofold ground for virtue (in the abftract idea) to fland upon, viz. the reafons of things, or ntnefTes ariling from the mutual relations of things to each other ; and reafon of agents, or the faculty of difcern- ing thofe fitnerTes and reafons of things. But virtue or practical morality cannot properly be faid to be founded on either of thefefolely and wholly, but mud arife from the voluntary and actual exercife of the reafon of the agent in the great law of morals, which is of nature's inftitution. Which exercife of the faculty to- wards the producing virtue, being an act of the will of the agent, makes a third principle, or caufe of the praBice of virtue -, (from whence the moral agent is denominated the efficient caufe) and has as good a right to be called a foundation, at leaft of virtuous pra&ice, as ei- ther of the other two. And laftly, when we come to confider the final caufes, or the various inducements, by which the will of the agent is moved, and determined to virtuous practice, a new fcene of 336 Letters upon the Subject of 'foundations is opened, under the article of obligation. For whatever doth oblige to vir- tue, is in fome fenfe a foundation of it. And there are as many caufes or foundations of obligation, as there are juft motives or fuffi- cient inducements to virtuous actions. And we find fome writers, who do not affect the term foundation, talking of caufe of duty, caufe of moral obligation, true caufe of our obligation to virtue, proper and natural caufe, which obliges to the practice of it, &c. And as man is confidered in his rational, focial, or fenfitive nature, fo the final caufes differ. To the ra- tional nature it is faid to be rectitude j in which fenfe I fuppofe it is faid, that virtue itfelf is the ultimate end of a moral agent. To the focial nature it is the good of others, but yet neither of thefe exclufive of the final caufe to the fenfitive nature, which is happinefs prefent or future : pleafure in the act itfelf, or expec- tation of it in confequence. Now as virtue is conceived to arife from fo many caufes, or to have fo many foundations in the lax manner of ufing that term, who can wonder at the difficulties, that mult attend every attempt to reduce it to one foundation, till we of tHoral Virtue and moral Obligation. 337 we come at the fupreme caufe and foundation of all things, in whom a proper ultimate will be found ? And I humbly conceive, that this contro- verfy would be better underftood, and carried on to better effect, if the vfov& foundation were either intirely dropped, or the precife mean- ing of it in the feverai applications of it to dif- ferent parts of the fubject, fully adjufted. That is, let every principle, that goes to the production of virtue in any fenfe, as a caufe logically defned3 be taken into the queftion, and allowed its due weight, viz. its proper effect. And for the better judging of this, let the virtue, of which the caufe or caufes are fought, be fo explained, that the writer's idea of it may be fully underftood, and alfo whe- ther he confiders it in its abftract nature, or in the practice of it by mankind -, and whether it is fpoke of exclufive of the consideration of God's will, as implied in the creation, or ex- preffed in the moral fenfe ; or in conjunction with the confideration of his will in both thefe refpects, and only exclufive of pofitive ap- pointments and commands ; or whether God's will at large, however revealed to mankind be Vol. II„ Z taken 33S Letters upon the SubjeSi taken into the queftion. And laftly, when any caufe of virtue, or of obligation, is affirm* ed or denied, whether it is fo affirmed or de- nied, with regard to man's reafonable, or focial, or fenfitive nature, and withal his cor- rupt nature : in a word, let every part of this complicated and entangled fubjecl: be unravel- led and forted, fo as that one part, which is, and may be confidered as diftincl:, mall not mix with, and run into another, which is, and may be likewife confidered as diftincl:, to the confuiion of ideas in both ; and then, fome- thing, I apprehend may come out, in which all parties mall either agree, or be forced to maintain fuch inconfiftencies, as will prove their confutation in the judgment of all dis- cerning people. And now, Madam, from what has been faid, you will the better perceive my reafons for putting my firfl queries, and of the me- thods I took, and expreffions I ufed, in my reply to your firft paper. Give me leave now to take the feveral paragraphs of your laft let- ter into confideration. The following pafTages fmce collected. The firft, root and foundation of virtue is the fincerc defire of moral Virtue and moral Obligation, 339 defire of knowing the will of God, and im- partially fearching after the truth. Dr Clarke's Sermons, vol. I. fol. p. 464. Freedom of will, which according as it is determined in different circumftances by the reafonablenefs of what is good, or incitements of what is evil, renders the agent morally good or evil. Ibid, and alfo p. 60. Liberty or moral agency muft ever be tho foundation of morality in man, and is the file ground of the accountablenefs of intelligent creatures for all their actions. Bifhop Hoadley's Life of Dr Clarke. The exiftenceof one only God he (Dr Clarke) juftly efteemed as the foundation of all, viz. all true religion. Ibid. His (Dr Clarke s) firft principle was the unity of God, which he efteemed as the bafis of all moral obedience. Ibid. The ftate as well as glory of human nature is free- agency. And from the nature of free- agency man being capable of chufing good, he muft be alio capable of chufing evil. It is this power, and a wife enjoyment of it, that con- ilitutes virtue. Kenn icon's if Dijfertat. p. 33* Z a i. THE 34Q- Letters upon the Subject i- ' I A HE compliment you are pleafed to JL make me in the beginning of your condefcending anfwer to my Remarks, viz. of my having been more converfant than yourfelf, with the writers on thefe fubjects, and having gone into nicer difinflions, and more remote views of them, than you have had occafion to confder, I am bound to acknowledge as a mark of your refpec~l and civility. But really, Ma- dam, I am fo little deferving of it, that no- thing could have juftirled it but your great addrefs, through which you have afcribed to me what was more peculiarly applica- ble to yourfelf, and taken "to yourfelf what feemed mod properly to belong to me. For had not the nice difiinBions been yours, and the plain apprehenfions mine, I mould not fo eafily have fallen into the miftake of fuppoling, that you were eftablifhing the foundation of practical morality, or virtue in moral agents, when (as I now find by your Reply) you meant only the foundation of virtue in its general ab- ftracl nature ; which, as you tell me, is quite another idea than the practice of virtue. And you admit, that the practice of it (as likewife fome of moral Virtue and moral Obligation, 34] fome writers ideas of it) may arifefrom other grounds than that, on which the abfracJ natwe of virtue is founded. So little converfant was I with the writers on thefe fubjects, and fo lit- tle aware of this diftin&ion, that I troubled you with feveral impertinent queries (as they mufl now appear) on a miftaken fuppofition, that you had given me a definition of founda- tion, that might be applied to virtue in prac- tice^ as well as to an abftracted notion of it. For this unneceffary trouble I mufl -therefore aik your pardon , which I am the better in- titled to, becaufe, to the bed: of my remem- brance, you had not explained yourfelf to this purpofe .before. You had mentioned jndeed (Works of the Learned y 1743, p. 139-) an a?n- biguity in applying the term ft in itfelf indiffe- rently: to the foundation of virtue in the abjlra6f} and to the practice of it by. moral' agents. Bu£ that your fole foundation was to be underftood of virtue in the abfratf only, is what, I think, you never declared either in that printed tract, or in the letter you firit. obliged me with, on this fubject. Neither have you thought fit to make ufe of this diftinc'tion in replying to my queries, Z 3 till 34^ Letters upon the Subject till you come to your 7th paragraph, where you anfvver to what I had objected to your definition from the reafon and free-will of moral agents. Therefore till I come to that paragraph, f am a little at a lofs how to carry on my dif- courfe. For what I had advanced on miftake, mould feem beft intirely dropped. Yet as you have been pleafed to reply to my queftkms, fuch as they are, without admoniming me of their impropriety 5 and to defend your Jerfe of foundation, as the fenfe of moft or all other writers, you have obliged me in decency to return you fome anfwer or other. 2. " After Jetting dowft, fay you, what I who make felf -inter eft " the foundation of moral obligation, you know " of none, who make it the foundation of virtue : " that thofe writers commo?ily deduce from the " will of God?' I know all the late ones do -, and I fuppofe that all Theifts, who lay the foundation of obligation in intereft, will de- duce that of virtue from God's will. But you are not in Mr W 's fentiment, that Atheifts are incapable of morality. They may practife virtue, and fome of them on no other prin- ciple, than that of prefent convenience, pri- vate happinefs, or felf-intereit. The old Epi- cureans could fee into no other caufe of virtue in the world, than what I have mentioned. Eafe of body, and pleafure of mind, was all they aimed at in it, or thought it good for. Felicity, of moral Virtue and moral Obligation. 3535 Felicity, or private happinefs, was, they faid, (inithun et finis) the beginning and the end of it, &c. And whereas the Stoics efteemed and praclifed it for its own fake, thefe men efteemed and practifed it only for their own Jake. Now, may not thefe men be properly laid to have placed the foundation of virtue in felf-love and felf-intereft ? And yet they did not deny the virtuous practice of the Stoics to be virtue, though attended with pain in the performance. They only looked upon it as. virtue, without reafon, or any fufficient inducement ; virtue without any proper foundation. Therefore, with an eye to thefe men (and all fuch as are of their principles) I might fay confidently enough, that virtue ; even according to them, might be confidered as difintere/led, efpecially as I added immediately, they will difown indeed any obligation, or any motive to praclife it in this cafe, viz. where private interefl does no way appear to be concerned in it. But you obferve, that " if they, who found " virtue on felf inter efi, can yet allow, that it " may be confidered as difinterefied, there muft " be fuch inconjifiency in their fchemes," &c. Vol. II. A a ' But $54. L e T T E R s upon the Subject But where is the inconfiftency of holding (with the, Epicurean) that private happinefs is the only true and proper foundation of virtue, and yet allowing (with Archdeacon Law's Prelim. Differ t.) " that it is a matter of fact, even when it appears deftructive of it." If foundation, indeed, were conftantly taken in your fenfe of it, then it would be incon- fiftent in any one, who made private happi- nefs that foundation, to allow any thing to be virtue, which was not directly built upon pri- vate happinefs. But if you willpleafe to recollect, thebufinefs we were upon in this part of the enquiry, was to try your definition of foundation by the idea, that others feem to have of that term, and not to expound their notions of it by your defini- tion* And this was all 1 intended in mention- in p- thefe felf-interefled moralifts, or their principles. 6. 1 did you wrong in fetting down as your words, that the 'foundation of 'moral 'virtue ', upon further reflection , will be found to lie either i?i M- of moral Virtue and moral Obligation. 2S$ f elf -love, &c. For your words were not moral virtue, but moral obligation, as I obferved upon looking again into your paper. It was plain- ly my miftake, as you apprehended : and oney no doubt, among many I have been guilty of. But I /hall acknowledge them all, as foon as I mall difcover them. 7. Next comes that pafllige in your letter, that has fo much altered the ftate of the quef- tion, that I apprehended we were upon. I, (till prefuming that the practice cf virtue was not out of the queftion, and obferving, that you had explained foundation by that, without which there could be ?iofuch thing as virtue, and that you had added further, that fuch a foun- dation can be no other than the necejfary relations % &c. of things ; tock occafion from hence to mention the reafon and free-wi 11 of agents, as being alike necefTary to virtue with your elfen- tial differences, &c. And yet I fuppofed, you would fcarce call them for this reafon foun- dations, at leaft not the fole foundation ; which remark has proved of much greater confe- quence than I expected, by being the occafion of your explaining yourfelf to me by this dif- tincYion, that in your definition of foundation, A a 2 you 356 Letters upon the Subject you do not confider virtue in praclice, but ift its ab/IracJ nature. I ihould perhaps have been too pofitive, that the generality of writers in this fubject did always, in their enquiries after the foun- dation of virtue, mean the practice of virtue in the world, had not nay over-fight, with regard to yourfelf,. taught me to be cautious how I venture to affirm this. I mail not there- fore difpute with you, what other writers mean in this article, becaufe, as you exprelly exclude practice from that idea of virtue, to which you have adapted your definition of foundation, I am bound to corriider it as ex- cluded by you ; and have, and do allow, your fole foundation and your definition of it upon that footing, as you would obfcrve from what I faid in the beginning of this letter, though I have endeavoured in following the courfe of your reply, where you made no ufe of this diflinction, to vindicate what I had advanced upon a miflake, as right upon the fuppontion from whence I argued. 8. There was no great matter indeed in my next remark about fpace. I could not ima- gine any more than you do, that fpace bad any thing of morel Virtue and moral Obligation. 3 $J thing at all to do with the production of matter : Yet it is neverthelefs true, that as extenfion is of the effence of matter, there could be no fitch thing as matter without [pace ; which was all I faid 5 and I think you allow the fame, when you fay, that the exijlence of matter fup- pojed, the exijlence of j pace inufi be Ukewife ad- mitted. But, as. neither you, nor any body elfe, would for this reafon, call fpace a foun- dation of matter, I concluded (and it was all I concluded) that your explanation of a foun- dation, by that without which there could be no fuch thing as virtue, was not full enough and fumcient to give the proper idea of that term, becaufe this amounts to no more than a re- qui/ite. You do indeed, in your anfwer now before me, fully fupply this deficiency, by dropping the former expreffion, againff which I had excepted, and fubftituting another more defenfible in the room of k, viz. that virtue ifitirely derives its being from the eiTential differences, &c. Had you given this at firfl, as your fecond explanation of the term foun- dation, inftead of what you offered as above, you had prevented many of my objections, which, you cannot but obferve, were levelled A a 3 purely 358 Letters upon the Subject purely at your words, without which there can be nofuch thing, 9. Again, when you come to the florifts in the next paragraph, you fay, if they are a- greed, that the thing they feek for is the ground* on which the flower or the mufic folely arifes ; or that to which either owes its being, &c. here you change your terms again. You mould have faid, agreeably to your definition, (to which you may obferve I ftricUy kept) or, that without which > there could be nofuch flower or mujic. Now thefe differ from each other, juft as widely as a caufe does from a condition or a requiftte. I would only obferve, that this change of your cxpreffions gives you an advantage in your re- ply, which you was not ftridHy intitled to, considering, that our difpute here, was mere- ly about the propriety of a definition, which you yourfelf had given ; and which you think more proper to amend than to defend. All the ufe I would make of this obfervation is, that it is not quite fo eafy, as you feemed to imagine, to give the true idea of foundation in the metaphorical ufe of it in thefe fubjects. But of moral Virtue and moral Obligation. 359, But, notwithftanding this amendment, I do not fee; that you have fet afide, or even impaired, the relation and fimilitude, that my illuftrations, taken from fuppofed difputes a- bout the foundation of a flower, or of rnu(ic, bear to the difoutes about the foundation of moral virtue. In the firfl place, you are pleafed to fay of my florifts, that if they are agreed, that the thing they feek for, is the ground^ on which the floiL rr or the 7?:ufc folely arifet ; or (to take your definition, as it ftands amended) that to which either owes its being ; then it flmdd feem plain ^ that they are. ail agreed in the fenfe of the word fou?idatioj7.. To be fure, if they are already agreed to underfland the word as you do, they will have no difputes about the fenfe of it, but only differ, if they differ at all, about the application of it. But is not this fomethins: like beesine of O DO O the queftion, that is at prefent between us ■? I am endeavouring to fhew you, from their way of applying the word foundation, that they are not agreed rightly in the (cnk of it ; becaufe the word in your ienfe is- not appli- cable to the foundations they fix upon ; though yet each of their foundations are properly fuch in, another fenfe, though not in your fenfe. A a 4 For ;6o Letters upon the Subject For each of my difputants finds aground, on which the Jiower or the mufic arifes ; which, I think, is the moil obvious and common no- tion of a foundation. But none of them finds a foundation, of which it may be faid, that it is the ground, on which the Jiower or mufic folely arifes y or that to which cither owes its being ; or, in your other phrafe, from which it en- tirely derives its being. Which now is moft likely, that they fhould all agree in your fen{e of the word, and all agree to mifapply the word ; or, that they fhould all ufe the word in an obvious figura- tive fenfe, though in a fenfe fomething diffe- rent from yours ? \ou proceed : ifl their error lies in each mari s making his beloved principle the fole foundation of the flower or mufic % when various principles contribute to their refpcclive beings (let us allow their error to lie here, viz. in applying fole to a foundation or principle, where it is not ap- plicable) then this contr overfly is not to be decided by the definition of a foundation \ I cannot fay the controverfy will be decided by fuch definition j but I conceive, it will not be decided without it ; becaufe the error juft now ef moral Virtue and moral Obligation. 361 now fuppofed will not be feen into without it. The mod: likely way to (hew thefe dif- putants their miftake, is to enquire of them, what it is they mean by foundation, when they ufe it in this difpute about flowers and mufie, viz. whether they underfland by it a ground en which the flower or mufic a'rifes 5 which is the more obvious and general explanation of it, or the ground on which they folely arifet and from which they entirely ■ derive their being* What each of them calls a foundation, will anfwer to one of thefe explanations, but not to the other. If, they fay, they take founda- tion in the latter fenfe (which you fuppofe the fenfe of moft writers) let but each difputant join the definition of foundation, inftead of the term to his beloved principle, and he will foon difcover his miftake, at lead his error Will be detected, whether he cares to own it or not. One florid affirms, that the ftalk is the proper foundation of the flower (in a tulip fuppofe,) let him only give the fenfe inftead of the word thus, the ftalk of the tulip is the ground on which the flower folely arifes, and to which it entirely owes its being -, and then let him fay whether he will abide by this affertion. But 3 6z Letters upon the Subject But on the other hand, if the faid difpu- tants do really mean no more by foundation (and by their application of it they feem to in- tend no more) than a ground on which the flower or miific arifes ; then what each difpu- tant fays is true (as will be found by inferting the definition in like manner in the propofi- tion) and the controverfy among them will be fo far cleared up, and underflood by them all. You obferve juftly, and I grant it, that the general idea of foundation will agree indifferent- ly to one or more principles. And I beg your leave further to obferve, that it will agree to any common ground, of thofe principles them- felves, as an ulterior principle ftill, till it be carried up to the firft caufe of all things, or Ultimate foundation of all beings ; of which obfervation I would make this ufe, that when we confider two or more principles, on which any thing arifes, or ftands, without taking in the common ground or fupport of thofe principles, we may more properly call them foundations in the plural, than foundation. But when we apply file to a complex founda- tion of two or more principles, then we ought to cf moral Virtue and moral Obligation, 363 to take in the common ground of thofe prin- ciples j and this makes it, in many cafes, dif- ficult to know where to ftop, for the idea of foundation is ever enlarging itfelf to fome ul- terior principle ftiil, till we come to a proper ultimate. You conceive lallly of the aforefaid floriffe and muficians, that, till they can convince each other, 1 t hat fome one, or more, or all the princi- ples together \ go to the product ion of the flower or the muflc, they may indeed difpute to the world's end, notwithfianding the exaBefl agreement in their idea of foundation. But this is ftill pre- fuppofing their exact agreement in the term, without offering at a folution of their difagree- ment in the application of it to different things. Whereas, I would pre-fuppofe nothing either way ; but I only collect, I think rationally, from the manifeftly different applications they make of the term, that they do not rightly a- gree in the meaning of it. Becaufe, if they all underflood it (as you do for inffance) it muff end their controverfy, fince each man's error would then be difcovered to be an undue application of fole ground to a principle, that apparently is not fo. Let us fuppofe again, that - 364 Letters -upon the Subject that they agree exactly in the other more ge- general idea of a ground on which any thing arifes : this mould, in all reafon, end their difpute too ; for foundation in this fenfe being applicable to each of their beloved principles, they mull: all go to the production of the flower or mufic. And nothing would be left to them to difpute upon, unlefs it were, which of their principles had the greatefr. fhare in the production ; which is another queflion from that we are now upon. You conclude this paragraph with obliging me with an illuftration on your part, from a company of architecfs, who might difpute for ever, whether Jlone or brick, or wood, or alto- gether, were the proper eft foundation for an honfc, and yet have all the fame idea of foundation. This I mud readily grant 5 and alio, that the comparifon is exceedingly well adapted to your fentiment, as expreffed throughout this paragraph. But when you apprehend this to be pretty nearly a parallel cafe with that of the contenders about the foundation of moral virtue \ it looks as if you thought it as well adapted to their cafe, as it is to your own fentiment. But as to the parallel, I have two exceptions. Firft, of moral Virtue and moral Obligation. 36^ Firft, that you here pre-fuppofe thefe architects agreed in the precife meaning of foundation ; which, you know, I apprehend the moralifts are not. Secondly, you are here fpeaking of foundation in its primary and literal fenfe, which mull: be one and the fame in all archi- tects minds, and indeed in all people's minds whatfoever. Whereas, to make the cafe pa- rallel, you mould have inilanced, (as I did in the cafe of florifts and muiicians) in iome Jigu~ rative application of the term, which is the way, in which the contenders about the foun- dation of moral virtue always ufe it. Afk your architects, for inftance, after the foundation of their own art or fcience, and they probably may differ as much in their fentiments about it, as the moralifts do, when it is applied to virtue : not for want of knowing of all, that is requiiite to be known by mailers of the fcience, all that ordinarily goes to the perfec- tion of it as an art : but for want of aeree- ing in fome certain fenfe of that general and vague term foundation, in the metaphorical ufe of it. If one of them mould affign the elements of geometry, as the firft principles of architecture ; another invention, the common parent £6*6'. Letters upon the Sidy erf parent of arts and fciences ; another utility or neceffity, the mother of invention 5 another looking back for its original, mould fix upon the tower of Babel, or Noah's ark, or Setb's pillars, as the firft inftances of building in the world, we could not wonder, becaufe it was not previoully agreed and fettled among them, what it was, that foundation, when figura^ tively applied to architecture, meant. Where- as, if they can be fuppofed to agree exactly in their idea of it, when it is thus metaphorically ufed, as they do in the idea of a foundation, on which an houfe is erected, there can be no reafon to believe, but that they would all likewife agree in their anfwer to the queftion. 10. You are pleafed to own with me a great deal of ambiguity in the ufe of the term 'virtue. But how comes this ambiguity to be fo readily acknowledged, while none is fuppofed in the other term foundation ? I prefume this is the reafon, viz. becaufe the feveral writers having commonly defined what they meant by virtue, it hath evidently appeared from thence, that they do not agree exactly in the fame mean- ing of the word. Perhaps therefore, when 1 they fhall in like manner define each of them his of moral Virtue and moral Obligation. 36 J his meaning of the other word foundation, the like ambiguity may be found and acknow- ledged in that term too ; though, for the prefent, as they have not defined it, you may prefume (nor can I fo eafily obviate fuch pre- emption) on the exactefl agreement of their ideas of it. Admitting this prefumption, you have given as rational and as probable an account (in this paragraph) of their different ways of defining virtue, as can poftibly be thought of. Yet if this pojtulatum, that they are all agreed in the- fame precije meaning of foundation^ not allow- ed you, then this account of yours, ingenious as it is, will feem to ftand upon a very preca- rious foundation itfelf. You are perfuaded> that mofi people are agreed, in their general notion of the nature of virtue. I am perfuaded fo too, if you mean by this no ??2orei than that mofr. people feem to make the fame diftinction between actions, that are virtuous, and thofethat are otherwife. But if you mean by nature of virtue, that abftraSf ideacfits ?taturey which is quite another idea than the -braBice of virtue ^ and excludes reafon and free w7/from having any fhare in its production 5 then 3 68 Letters upon the Subject then I imagine there are hut few people, vizi the refined reafoners only, that have the idea $ and even they have it more or lefs perfect, ac- cording to their capacities of diftinguifhing, and of abftracting. The writers however upon virtue, (for to thofe only your next obfervation relates,) may be allowed to be all agreed in the abflracl: idea of its nature. But when they come, as you obferve, to contend about the foundation of it, they are apt tofubftitute in place of the nature of virtue, either our idea of it, or the practice of it by moral agents. Such change of the idea will, I confefs, occafion their contention about the foundation, be they never fo well agreed in the meaning of that term. But flill we want fomething to account for this change of ideas, efpecially in perfons, whole fuecefs in their reafoning upon virtue depends fo much on their retaining the fame idea of it in their minds. Is there no room to fufpect, that the want of an exact agreement in the notion of a foundation (though, as they have not defined it, they are not aware of it) may be the true reafon of their difagreeing about what virtue itfelf is ? For, by your own account, till thefe writers of moral Virtue md moral Obligation. 36*9' writers began to contend about the foundation^ they were mojlly agreed in their notion of the na" ture of virtue. And had they been moftly agreed in their notion of foundation too, it is very unaccountable, how the conlideration of it, or enquiry after it, mould have admini- ftered fuch a variety of fpeculations about vir- tue itfelf. And this (fubftitution of our idea or virtue* Or the practice of it, in the place of the nature of it,) may perhaps, you fay, have been fome occafion (I make no doubt a great occafion) of their aj/igning different foundations to virtue. So that this attempt to difcover, and fix the true foundation, has proved doubly unfortu- nate : Firft, in fetting them at variance about virtue itfelf, in the nature of which they were moftly agreed before ; and next, in fetting them at variance about the ground, on which it arifes, or ftands ; though, according to you, they are all agreed in what they mean by a foun- dation. I dare not fay you are miftaken in this : it becomes me not to fay fo. But you will give me leave in the firft place to wim they had not meddled with this unlucky term foundation, which has been of bad confe- Vol. II B b quence 2^o Letters upon the ZubjcB quence to them, by your own account ; and Secondly, to fuggeil to you, with all defe- rence, my account of this confequence as the more probable, viz. that a real, though un- perceived difagreement in their ideas of foun- dation, when figuratively applied to virtue, has had its full mare in introducing the variety of fentiments among them, efpecially as to the alignment of proper grounds tor foundations. For, you lay, in your very next words, our idea of virtue, or our praBice of it, may arifefrom other grounds, than that on which the ahfiraci nature of virtue is founded. Here you admit of feveral real and true foundations of virtue, as that term (lands undefined. We are indeed both of us agreed, that thefe foundations are applied to virtue; only in Tome particular lio-ht or view, in which it is coniidered ; and that they are real and true foundations of it in that particular light only, and in no other. But then here we differ : you apprehend the notion, as well as name of foundation is the fame in all thefe feveral applications of it to virtue in different lights and views j whereas, lapptehend, that though the fame term in- deed V. indifferently ufed, yet the notion of it varies of moral Virtue and moral Obligation, 371 varies in all or mod of thefe feveral applica- tions of it. And therefore, that it oufght to be as carefully defined in each of thefe appli- cations of it, that we may know in what fenfe it is taken, as the virtue, to which it is applied, ought to be defined, that we may know in what particular light it is viewed. For as the general term virtue, till it be made more par- ticular or fpecial, will fhnd for diftincl: and different ideas of virtue 3 fo the general term foundation, till it be more particular and fpe- cial, will ftand for diftinct and different ideas of foundation. Some of which (hall be juftly applicable to virtue in fome lights and views of it, but not fo in other lights or views of it. None of the writers, except yourfelf, have hitherto, fo far as I know, offered their de- finitions of foundation , but fo far as may be collected from fome occafional explanations, that they have given of their meaning, as Mr Warburton and Mr Hutchinfon have done, there are at lead: two or three different fenfes of foundation in this controverfy. And I de- fire no better proof of writers not exactly a- greeing with each other in the ufe of that term, than their difagreein^ in their accounts £ b 2 of 572 Letters upon the Subject of it, fo far as they have thought fit to explain themfelves. In fome lights, in which virtue is confidered, the moral fenfe is faid to be the foundation. But how ? As the difcernment of good and evil with approbation and diflike feems thefkfi and mo/l univerfal fpring of vir- tuous actions, or the earltejl and mojl immediate motive to them, or as the firfl inlet into the ade- quate ideas of morality. You cannot juftly fay thefe things of any other principle, that is call- ed a foundation of virtue j neither can you deny this to be a foundation in the common general acceptation of the word, feeing that it is a ground^ on which virtue arifcth. But this no way excludes a more remote ground, from which virtue arifes alfo, but not in the fame (enfc ; for if you afk in what the moral fenfe is founded, whether the anfwer be from Mr Warburton, viz. the real effential differences cf human aclions ejt'ablifhed by nature > or from others, the will of God, who gave mankind this faculty or difcernment, &c. it is a foun- dation, as it is aground, from which virtue a- rifes, and yet it is neither a fpring, nor a motive, nor an inlet into the moral fenfe, but muft be expounded by a neccjfary antecedent in the firfl anfwer. of moral Virtue and moral Obligation. 37 anfwer, and by a caufe freely producing in the other anfwer. Now if thefe explanations or the fame term in different applications of it are not to the fame fenfe, although the term un- defined, or defined loofely and generally, will indifferently fuit with them all 3 then we mufr not take for granted, that writers, when they do not define the term, have always the fame invariable meaning in it. You obferve, that the different fenfes of the term virtue may occafion likewife various defini- tions of it ; every one defining it according to the light he has viewed it in. Now thus far there is no harm. Definitions, that are far from being perfect, may yet be true, as far as they go j in which cafe they may all ftand. And confequently, difputes arifing from fuch definitions, or rather the partial and private explanations of the feveral writers, may be ac- commodated (if they will but retain their candors and attention) becaufe truth is always confiftent with itfelf. But you further obferve, and I think juftly too, that they are apt, eve- ry one, to define virtue, not only according to the light he has viewed it in, but alio ac- cording to the foundation he has given it in thai B b ^ viewt •» £74 Letters upon the Subject mew. From whence it appears, that fome of their definitions of virtue are rather determina- tions of the foundation of it, than explications cf its nature. I do not fay, but you may have reafon enough for this remark : all I would infer from it is this ; that if they make the idea of virtue itfelf to depend any way on the ground, which they affign for its foundation, (and in many cafes -the idea will unavoidably follow the ground) the greater reafon have we (till to complain of their not defining foundation, and precifely fixing their meaning in it. Becaufe if they apply it improperly, (as by making that a principle of virtue, which is more properly a confequence of it) the idea of virtue itfelf may be impaired or fufFer there- by. Nor will it be eafy, while all are fup- pofed to have juft and true notions of founda- tion, and to agree perfectly in them, to mew how, or wherein the term is unduly applied. But furely the true way to bring this contro- verfy to fome good iffue, is to poitpone the difpute about foundation of virtue, till it be firft agreed, what that virtue is, the founda- tion of which is fought after. And then when foundations come to be enquired into, to admit of fnoral Virtue and moral Obligation. 27$ admit of as many foundations, as can juftly and properly be called fo, though in different fenfes of the word, as being applied to virtue in all the different lights and views, in which it may juftly and properly be coniidered, and to give each of them its due weight and no more. Virtue in every true light will be amiable, and will have a proper ground in that view, fufficient to fupport it under that particular confideration. But in fome lights it may appear far more excellent than in others; and the grounds, on which it will be difco- vered to Hand in thofe views, will be in pro- portion more noble, as well as more ftedfaft and immoveable. Here you take an opportunity of remarking the peculiar propriety of that definition, which confiders virtue as the conformity of a reafonable creature to the nature and reajbns of things, be- catife this direclly acquaints us with the nature of virtue. But here by the nature of virtue, you mufl be underftood to mean no more, than its nature according to their idea of it, who give this definition. For certainly, that other definition, which you quote from me, and which confjders virtue as a conformity of a B b 4. rea» 376 Letters upon the Subject reafonable creature to the will of the creator, doth as directly acquaint us with the nature of virtue, according to their idea of its nature , who give this definition. And the fame may be faid of the third definition I mentioned, which is the old one, moil common among the An- cients, which confiders virtue to be acting a- greeably to right reafon3 viz. fuch as man is endowed with, and is capable of ufing. For this does alfo as directly acquaint us with the nature of virtue ', according to their idea of its nature, who gave this definition. Still pleafe to remember, that I am not en- deavouring here to eftablifh one definition more than another, but only {hewing, that I fear your remark will not anfwer the purpofc you here intend to ferve by it. The truth and propriety of either definition, which you have been pleafed to compare with each other on this occafion, entirely depends upon what the true nature of vjrtue is. If it arifes folely from this nature and reafon of things, then the de- finition you efpoufe is the only true one, and the only one, that can with truth be faid to acquaint us directly with the nature of virtue. *But if it arifes folely from the will of the creator, the of moral Virtue and moral Obligation, 377 the very fame thing may be faid of that too, with refpect to determining virtue's nature. For, according to this definition, the very e fence of virtue is the will of the creator, and not the fitnefs of things confidered in itfelf. For nothing, according to this, is good or evil in its own nature, till made fo by his ap- pointment. When therefore you object againft this laft definition, that it gives us no manner of light into the nature of virtue, till we are informed by other means what' the will of the creator is, and therefore is no proper definition of it, will not they, who adhere to this definition, reply, that till fuch information of the creator's will is obtained, by fome means or other, virtue hath no nature, properly fpeaking ; every thing is indifferent in itfelf? And will not Mr }V himfelf reply, that till the law of a fuperior appear, there is no obligation arifeth, nor any thing that can eonftitute morality in actions ? The firft of thefe may fay of the de- finition you recommend, that it gives no light into the nature of virtue, till we are informed, that the will of the creator is confonant to the nature and reafons of things. And Mr W— — • him- 378 Letters upon the Subject himfelf may fay, that it gives no light into the morality properly fo called of actions, till we are informed, that virtue is the injunction of a fuperior will j which will could not be found, till the being and attributes of God were dif- covered. I do not apprehend, that any excufe need be made for either definition, becaufe they both determine hkewife the foundation of virtue, which in this controverfy is a kind of begging the quef- tion. For definitions of things ought to take in whatfoever neceffarily enters into a jufl: idea of their effence j and confequently mull de- termine their foundation in many cafes un- avoidably. But when you plead further in excufe for the definition you approve, that it is fcarce pojjible to give ajuji and proper defini- tion of virtue, without exprejjing its relation to the nature and ejfential differences of things ; the advocates for the propriety of the other defi- nition will give that, as an inftance of one, wherein the nature and efTential differences of things are not expreffed. And if you fhould reply, that although they are not expreffed, they are neverthelefs implied ; they will an- fwer, that the creator's will is juft as much of moral Virtue and moral Obligation, 379 implied in that definition, which exprejfes only the nature and reafcns of things ; and further, that it is fcarce pojjible to give ajull and proper definition of virtue, without exprejjing its rela- tion to the creator s will. And they will alio think, that they have as good a right as you have to fay further in your words, that this may ferve as a proof, that virtue owes its ori- gin folely to the creator's will, fnce the confede- ration of that enters necejjarily into the juf idea of its ejjcnce j and they will alfo beg leave to fay further, that even in the different views, according to which the fever al writers have de- fined virtue, the will of God, might be a com- mon foundation to fupport them all. All may eafily be refolved into that, and fecurely reft upon it. But though you greatly prefer one of thefe definitions before the other, yet I do not find, that you have given it, or allowed it as your own, as the definition, that you take to be the moil juft and proper. My only reafon for making a doubt, whether you will warrant it or not, is, becaufe it will not well fuit with that abflract idea of the nature of virtue, which you fpeak of in your 7th paragraph as a quite :jre- 3 So Letters upon the SubjecJ different idee from that of the practice of virtue \ and doth not include the reafon and free-will of moral agents. But now this definition, viz. a conformity of a reafonable creature to the na- ture and reafon of things, doth include the rea- fon and free-will of moral agents. For the reafon of the creature is as abfolutely neceiTary to the idea as the reafon of things ; and con- formity relates as clofely and indifpenfably to that, which conforms to, as to that, which is conformed to. Perhaps this may be thought a proper definition of moral agency, or the practice of virtue ; for you own, thzX free-will and reafon are abfolutely neceffary to moral agency. And in another place you fay, where there is no choice or free' agency, no morality can arife. But where thefe are, morality doth arije from the effects of an action made the objeSi of choice. [Works of the Learned, 1743, p. 154.) From comparing all thefe paffages together it feems to me, that you will readily admit the defini- tion above mentioned, as ajuftand proper one of moral agency ; but cannot admit it as a juft definition of virtue in its ab/lracl nature, ft rip- ped of every thing but its neceflary relation to the of moral Virtue and moral Obligation. 38 f the nature of things, which how you will exprefs in a definition I know not. Continuation of the anfiver to Mrs CockburnV Letter, viz. on obligation, &c. 1 1 . "\7" O U will be pleafed to remember JL what it was, that gave occafion to the favour you did me in communicating your thoughts on obligation : it was this query, which I had put, viz. whether ?noral virtue and moral obligation mujl needs have the fame foundation, and in the fame fen fe ? It appeared to me from your firfl reflection on this query in your former paper, to which I refer you, that you allowed to moral obli- gation (what you had denied to moral virtue) more foundations than one ; and alfo that you fpake of obligation as a term, that had no am- biguity in it. Therefore in hopes I might tempt you to clear up the notion of obligation, and at the fame time, that I might mew you I had fome reafon for my query, I propofed to you three notions of obligation, arifing, as I conceived, from. 3&2 Letters upon the Subject from three different grounds, or built on three different foundations. I had called thefe three forts of obligations, as well as three forts of foundations. To which your anfwer in the nth paragraph of your lafl: letter is, that you have conftantly kept to one precife meaning of obligation, and you apprehend there can be but one fort of it, though there were fifty different foundations of it : and that what I call three forts of obligation, feem to you three forts of foundations, upon 'which obligation \ in one and the fame fenfe, may, and does arife. And as yon are {o good as to define like- wife this one fenfe of obligation, to which you constantly adhere, you have done all, that can be defired of you, and have enabled me to fee more clearly, wherein the difference lies between your fentiments and mine on this branch of the fubjecl. You have confidered obligation only, as it is in the mind of the moral agent, who is under it : as appears from your definition of it, viz. fuch a perception of an inducement to ac7, or to forbear acling, as forces an agent to fiandfelf- condemned, if he does not conform to it. Whereas j con- of moral Virtue and moral Obligation, $2$ I confidered it, as others have done before me, more at large, as being obligation in an ex- ternal as well as internal fenfe. When I faid, for inftance, that it was (in one fenfe of it) the unalienable right, that truth has to be pre- ferred before falfhood, good before bad, by all reafonable creatures that can di/linguifh between them, I meant by this, that every creature, who is capable of making thefe diftinctions, is under obligation, to prefer the one before the other, whether he hath that perception, which ycu define obligation by, or not. For his neglecting to make ufe of his faculties, or his undue ufe of them, will not releafe him from the obligation he lies under from the nature and truth of things. No matter how they are forgotten, denied, miftaken by care- lefs, fenfual, pofitive perfons : they neverthe- lefs ftand in their full force of obligation, as that fignifies their univerfal and unalienable right to be a rule of action to moral agents. Now your definition does not take in obli- gation in this light, at leafl only partially, and fo far as it is actually perceived by particular agents ; and it takes in another kind of obli- gation, (viz. that of a miftaken judgment) which 384 Letters upon the Subjefi which fhall bind a particular agent, to act even contrary to obligation in the fenfejuft now mentioned. I am not objecting to your definition on this account. So far from it that I think it the fulleft, the cleared the moft unexceptionable definition of a fenfe of obligation, that I have ever met with* It beft defcribes an agent's ftate of mind under this fenfe, determines no particular foundation, yet fuits with all, even miflaken and fancied foundations, from which neverthelefs real obligations do fometimes arife ; and it has an immediate and clofe connexion with practice 3 for our judgment or perfuafion of the good- nefs or evil of actions, however gained, muft be our prefent guide in all our conduct. Now let it be obferved here, before we go any further, ift, that in your enquiry after the foundation of virtue, you confidered vir- tue, not as it was pradtifed by particular agents, but in its general abftract nature ; in which view you give it one only foundation. When you come now to enquire into the foundations of obligation, you do not confider it as a ge- neral abflracted notion (as others have done, whofe definitions you give me) but as a prac- tical of moral Virtue and moral Obligation. 38^ tical principle in each particular moral agent, which makes him accountable for his conduct, and which forces him to condemn himfelf for his mifconduct. And to obligation in this fenfe you allow feveral foundations. So far then granted to the purpofe of my query, firfl: prbpofed to you j that moral virtue and moral obligation may not have the fame foundation, and in the fame fenfe. 2dly, Your definition of obligation is diffe- rent from all others, that I have heard of. It is hot indeed the worfe for that, nor do I efteem it the le(s. But however, it is a fur- ther proof to me, that the precife meaning of it is as little fettled in this part of the enquiry, as that of the term foundation and virtue were in the lajl. This I had ventured to fay in my Reply to you. And your Anpwer to it is, that " you acknowledge the precife meaning of it ct has not been fcientifically fettled, and that y foundation of obliga- tion, only becaufe they did not appear to me to be the foundation of the rlrft motives or in- ducements to virtuous actions in mankind • in which light you had reprefented them to prove their obligation antecedent to that found- ed on God's will. To which I replied " your " argument for their being the primary foun- u dation of obligation from our perceptions " of duty in the effential differences, &c. I' previous to our difcovcry, that they are « alfo of moral Virtue and moral Obligation. 399 " alfo the will of God, is not, I think, fuffi- " cient to intitle them to the primacy, which " the moral fenfe, in that view, would claim " before them, as being the firft foundation " of obligation, or the fir (I principle, that «* lays men under moral obligations." 14. This indeed, you think, may admit of a doubt, but neverthelefs you are willing to exchange primary for prior to the difcovery of the will of God, in which fenfe, I readily come into your fentiment. 15. Then as for ultimate, you know I ac- knowledge no ultimate in this fubject, but God himfelf. In which, I think, you at length agree with me, viz. that the only pro* per ultimate foundation of ?noral virtue, and mo- ral obligation, is God himfelf. In which con- clufion whofoever concurs, may inofFenfively retain any particular notions of his own, con- cerning foundations of them in a fubordinate or fecondary fenfe. And now, Madam, I have gone through every part of your laft obliging letter, not out of any humour of railing objections againft what you have wrote, but with a defire to fee, how far the three queries, which I firft of all put ^oo h EffE RS upon the Subject . put to you, deferve to be attended to on this fubject But as I, have hitherto given no pai^ ticular account of my own fentiments, further than they may be guefled at, or gathered from the queries themfelves j and what I have fince faid, to jqftify my putting them to you, and more particularly in the conclufion of my lad letter, where I hinted three points, which I apprtii ended might prove the hTue of the controv'trfy -, you may pofiibly think, I am not fo fair and ingenuous with you, as you have been with me ; and expect, that I ihould give you, with the fame unrefervednefs and freedom that you have ufed with me, my whole fenfe of the matter in difpute. Now I acknowledge, it is but reafonable and juft, that I mould do fo. The extraordinery length of this letter will be my fufficient excufe for not offering to do it at prefent j but if I get leifure for it hereafter, and have your per- miffion to trouble you again with another let- ler on this fubjecl, I will lay before you my whole fenfe of the controverfy, as far as it hath come to my knowledge from the writers in it, which it hath been my hap to look into. In bf moral Virtue and moral Obligation, 4° * In the mean time I remain, with the greatefl efteem, lour mojl obliged, humble Servant, Tko. Sharp. Mrs Cockburn's lafl letter to Dr Sharp on the fubjeSl of moral virtue. October 2, 1747. Rev. Sir, 4 ¥ Hope yoa will excufe my keeping the ' A MS. fo long, which yoa favoured me ' with. I was defirous to accompany it with € fome thoughts of mine upon it, which I 1 have not been able to do fooner. < I make no doubt, Sir, that the term ■ foundation, as it is figuratively ufed, may * have different fignifications, when applied * to different things ; but you will think me * very tenacious of my opinion, when I fay, ■ that I (till think mo ft writers mean by it « the ground, on which that, which they c apply it to, ftands, or from which it arifes ; £ nor do I think, that their different' applica- Vol. II. D d ' tiens 4© 2 Letters upon the SubjeB 1 tions of it is any jufl ground of fufpicion, ' that they do not agree in their idea of it. ' For my own cafe in particular, I am pretty * fure I have the fame idea of it, and ufe it in 4 the fame fenfe, when I apply it to virtue ' and obligation ; and though I fay of one,. 1 that it zriksfolely from the nature of things, £ and of the other, that it may arife from fe- c veral grounds, this I apprehend to make no * difference in the fenfe of the term founda- * tion, when applied to bcth ; but only to ex- c prefs a difference in the nature of the things, ' to which I apply it, to exprefs my opinion, * that it is of the nature of virtue in the ab- ' {tract, to arife from no other foundation ' than that which I have aftlgned it ; but that * obligation, though ariiing from the fame c foundation, may, by the nature of it, arife * likewife from feveral other grounds, all * equally foundations in the very fame fenfe, * as grounds on which it arifes ; for I cannot ' fee, that affigning one or more foundations * to a thing makes any difference in the fenfe * of the term. And indeed, Sir, it feems to * me, that thofe other infcances you have *. given for different fenfes of foundation, c are cf moral Virtue and moral Obligation* 403, are not really fuch, except that from Mr War bur ton. The orderly introduction to a Thejis is, I believe, a very different fenfe from what is commonly underftood by the term foundation, and I think, I mould not have chofe it on that occadon j but no doubt, he is a much better judge of the propriety of it than I can be. Mr Hookers manner of expreffion looks, I own, like two fenfes cf foundation ; but, perhaps, if his fenfe is attended to, diftinct from his expreffion, he will appear to be enquiring after two fenfes o? faith, rather than of foundation. This is, I think, his fenfe. If by faith is meant our belief in general of the Chriflian religion, then the writings of the Evangeli/ls, &c. are the foundation of it : but, if by faith is meant the principal thing which is believed, then God, manifest in the fieih, is that prin- cipal point, the foundation of all the reft. Here are plainly two different fenfes of faith ; but the term foundation feems to me to be applied to both, in the (enfc of a ground on ichich fomethiug is built, the idea I have al- ways affixed to it. And furely the apoftle gives us the fame idea, when he lays, no D d 2 « other jo.}- Letters upon the Subject 4 other foundation of the Chrijiian church can 4 be laid, but Jefus Cbrifi j and yet afterwards 1 fays, it is built on the foundation of the apofties 4 and prophets. They are both foundations in 4 the fenfe I underiland that term, the one 1 principal indeed, and the other jubordinate ; * and if you pleafe to call thefe different fenfes, 4 1 (hall not difpute it, but I think fuch a dif- ' ference can caufe no confuflon or mifcakes. * The paffages collected at the end of your * papers all relate to the practice of virtue, 4 which may, as well as obligation, have fe- 4 veral foundations ; and, I think, that term, 4 dees in all of them fignify a ground, from * which the thing they apply it to arifes. 4 However, fuppofing ail the foregoing to 4 be different fenfes, you are pleafed to alk 4 me, " if there is no room for any diftinc- " tions of this kind in the difpute about the *' foundations of virtue." I cannot fav, Sir, 4 what room there may be for it, but have 4 expreiled my opinion, (perhaps a little too 4 pofitively) that no mifapprehenfion has arifen 4 on this fubject, on account of fuch diftinc- 4 tions, or could be removed by any expla- 4 nation of that term. And I now beg leave 4 to of moral Virtue and moral Obligation. 40 ; c to give you my reafon for this opinion. I ' have endeavoured to find out Tome different « fenfe of foundation, which might alter the * flate of the queftion between the writers on 1 that fubjed, or fet it in a different light, but ' have not been able, to difcover any j and, * what is much more confiderable, Dr Sharp 1 himfelf (as much as he is inclined to fufpecl, 1 that thofe writers do not agree in their idea * of the term foundation) has not difcovered ' where their difagreement lies j who, I make c no doubt, is penetrating enough to difcern ' it, if there was really any fuch thing. And « therefore, when he can point out fuch a < difagreement, as, when explained, would 1 help to adjuft the matters in debate, I mail J readily give up my opinion. Till then, he 1 will excufe me for thinking, that the term c foundation is not capable of the fame diftinc- « tions and divifions, as the term caufe\ and 1 therefore fitter to be retained in this con- 4 troverfy. ' Will you forgive me, Sir, if I tell you, * that I have always thought thofe logical ' diftindYions fit only for the fchcols ; and « that they rather puzzle and perplex, than D d 3 • clear 406 Letters upon the Subject clear up an argument to readers, who are not ufed to their language ? Nay, that the intention of their divifions may be rather more intelligibly exprefTed, without taking notice of them, Dr Rutherforth having ufed the term caufe, gave me the fitteft occafion to put him in mind, that in the logical di- vifion of caufes, he had confidered only the final caufe : But what would my argument have gained by this ? He afferts, that no efential differences, no perception of the rela- tions of things, no moral fienfe, Sec. can be a caufe of obligation to practife virtue j no- thing, in fhort, but a view to a man's own hanpinefs j and this as effectually excludes a material and formal caufe, as if he had ex- preffed them. On the other fide, when I affirm, that thofe principles direct us to vir- tue, make us ftand felf-condemned, if we counteract them, &c. and that therefore they arc true and proper caufes or grounds of obligations ; I believe the reafoning is as good, and at lead: as intelligible, as if I had called them material and formal caufes. 1 Then, Sir, as to the difference between Mr t JVarburton and me, you know he allows,. that 1 virtue of moral Virtue and moral Obligation. 40 y virtue is founded on the effential difference, nature, &c. of things j and yet he main- tains, that nothing but ivill, or the law of a fuperior, can conftitute the morality of ac- tions. I on the other hand affert, that act- ing agreeably to the effential difference, na- ture, and fitnefs of things, is moral virtue ; and that the free choice of an agent, judg- ing his action to be right or wrong, though without reference to any will, properly con- Jlitutes the morality of it. Here are, I think, included three of the logical divisions of caufes, viz, the material, the formal, and the efficient : But how the ufe of thofe terms, or any explanation of foundation can help to adjufl this difference of fentiments, I confefs I do not fee. ' Or, in the cafe of thofe, who differ from us both, by maintaining, that the will of God is the fole foundation or caufe of vir- tue ; that nothing is good or evil in its own nature, till made fo by his appointment : * What diflinclions or explanations can pofii- ' bly be found out to reconcile this difference? 4 You fay, Sir, that the nature and eternal * reafons of things may perhaps be found D d 4 * only -j|.o8 Letters upon the Sub] e El only a partial foundation, equivalent to no- thing more, than what the logicians term a material caufe. But what mall we gain by this difcovery, if the truth is, as I think it is, that the abflraff nature of virtue cannot poffibly arife from any other caufe or foun- dation ? The reafon, and the free will of agents, may indeed, be confidered as the formal and efficient caufes of the practice of virtue ; and thefe I have not neglected to take notice of, though I have not made ufe of thofe terms. * However, Sir, I perfectly agree with you, that it would be much to the advantage of this controverfy, if all the writers in it would explain their terms, particularly in what fenfe they fpeak of virtue, and in what they place the nature of it -, and if they would declare themfelves on all thofe dis- tinctions you have pointed at towards the end of your papers. It were to be wimed too, that they would affirm or deny no point in debate with regard to man, confidered Jblely as a rational, a focial, or a fenfible na- ture, but, as he truly is, a compound of all together. The error of fuch a partial con- 1 fideratiorj of moral Virtue and moral Obligation. 40.0 fideration of man I took notice of in my former remarks; and I had thoughts, on occafion of Mr Seed's Sermons, to fay fome- thing of the indeterminate ufe of terms -y for he has given us two or three different defi- nitions of virtue in the fame difcourfe : But my ill health did not allow me to do this time enough for an appendix to the Remarks on Dr Rutherforth, fo it was dropped. There feems likewife fome explanation wanted of the terms ufed by Dr Clarke's followers, eternal truths, immutable nature, and relations of things, &c. Thefe have been much miflaken, or mifreprefented by their oppo- fers. But I think I have done my part on thefe fubjects, and need not trouble the world or you any more with the reflections of, SIR, Tour obliged humble fervanty C. COCKBURN. Off. 2, 1747. ' I am much difappointed, Sir, in not having the fatisfaction of feeing you on your return, as we expected. I defigned then to 1 have 4I0 Letters upon the SubjeB ' have enquired after a fecond part of your c MS, which it feems to promife ; and to < have exprefled my fmcere thanks for your 1 condefcenfion, in beflovving fo much pains ? on mine. When I am able to revife it, I c fhall make the befl ufe I can of your judi- * cious obfervations. * If you have done with Wifdom the firfl 1 fpring of a&ion in the Deity, be pieafed to * fend it when you have an opportunity, and 1 I fhould be glad to know whether it anfwer- { ed your expectation. My refpects to your i Lady.' Dr Sharp'5 Anfiver to Mrs Cockburn'i. Letter of October 2. 1747* Madam, "B" Thank you for the favour of your late JL letter ; and aiTure you, that I have perufed it attentively ; and that every thing, that you write, makes an impreffion upon me, and puts me upon review of my own fentiments. I am quite afhamcd to harp fo long upon the firft firing in the difpute foundation. I fhall now make of moral Virtue and moral Obligation, 4 1 \ make my dying fpeech upon it, refolving ne- ver to trouble you with it more. No doubt, Madam, cc mojl writers mean by 1 c foundation the ground on which that, which £C they apply it to, Jlands, or from which it " arifes." Becaufe what will not anfvver to one or other of thefe explanations can be in no fenfe any foundation at all. For the idea taken from the fkft and literal meaning muft in courfe be carried through all the metapho- rical ufes of it, more or lefs diftinctly. But then mofl writers do likewife leave it ambi- guous, in which of thefe two fenfes it .muft be taken : for though you feem indeed to re- prefent it as one fenfe, or one idea, of which you give it two explanations, yet in truth each of your explanations conveys a diftinct idea, viz. the one not precifely the fame with the other, but varying from the other fufficiently to make a perceptible difference, and to caufe confufion in a difpute depending upon clear- nefs of ideas. You may remember I had obferved to you in my enquiry after the various ufages of the term, that the figurative ufes of it, eftablifhed by cuftom, were of two forts, or might be thrown 4i2 Letters upon the Subject thrown into two claries ; one more proper, be- ing the firft remove from the primary or lite- ral fenfe, viz. a ground on which any thing /lands, refts, is fupported or eftablifhed ; and the other lefs proper, being a further tranfla- tion of the term to ftand for the idea of a fonrce, or beginning from whence any thing takes its rije, or fprings, or is deduced. This is the metaphor in a further remove j and comes to the fame fenfe with thofe other me- taphors, root and fountain, which give not the fame idea, that is carried through the for- mer clafs. Now then I grant there is no one of the writers, but affigns a foundation for virtue, and for obligation in one or other of thefe ge- neral metaphorical fenfes : nor can the term in this large and extenlive acceptation of it, be faid to be mifufed by any of them in their applications of it. Yet how can they be faid to be agreed in the idea of it, when they apply it, in this queflion about virtue, fometimes in one of thefe fenfes, and fometimes in the other ? Making it fland indifcriminately (for fo it mud ftand, till it is explained and den\- ned) not only for eflential, neceflary,. and immu- of moral Virtue and moral Obligation. 413 immutable principles, but for motives, in- ducements, ends, &c. and when they apply it to the fubjecl, of which the foundation is fought in one of thefe fenfes, by inquiring upon what bottom virtuefiands, or is eftablifhed, and then proceed to arhgn that foundation in the other fenfe -> by refolving that enquiry into fomething, from whence virtue confefTedly arifes orjprings, but doth not ftand, or is not eftablifhed upon it. The controverfy is, as I take it, what is the foundation of moral virtue ? Now there are many alignments made of grounds, which are all of them foundations of it, in the general idea of grounds on which it Jiandst or from which it arifeth. Either therefore, they are all foun- dations of virtue, (and if this idea be one and the fame ', as you fay, in all writers minds ^ they are all equally foundations ,) or if they be not, we mud have a more determinate idea of what ought to be reputed, and called the foundation, in the application of that term to this fubject, before the queftion can be refolved. For lince the term hath different Jignijicat ions } when ap- plied to different thi?2gsi (which you alio ac- knowledge) and is of more than ordinary impof- jlia Letters upon the SitijeB importance, to be rightly underftood, wheii it is applied to virtue and obligation, efpecially when fo great a ftrefs feems to be laid upon it in this debate ; I mould apprehend the true meaning of the enquiry to be* which, among all the different fignifications of foundation, in the figurative ufe of the word, is that, which fuits bell with fo complex an idea, as that of moral virtue is : and confequently, whether this, or that, alignment of a founda- tion be the mofb proper in this cafe. Perhaps it were better to let fo uncertain and vague a word be wholly dropp'd in thefe difputes : but if the controverfy mull be carried on upon the moulders of this term, I know of no me- thod fo effectual in profecuting .it, as examin- ing carefully the whole metaphorical ufage of the word, and judging from thence, of the propriety or impropriety, of the feveral appli- cations of it, to this fubject, without refting on that general meaning, which it neceffarily carries through all the figurative ufes of it. For though that meaning be all that neceffa- rily goes to the idea of a foundation in general ; yet it is not all, that goes to the notion of the foundations in this fpecial application of the term. of moral Virtue and moral Obligation, 415 term. Which had it been better attended to, we mould fcarce have feen. principal motives, or the fir ft apparent fprings of actions, repre- fented as the grounds, on which virtue ftands eftabliihed, nor fubordinate foundations fub- ftituted in the room of the principal, nor ad- ventitious taken in the place of original. Though therefore, I would not be thought tenacious, any more than yourfelf, (having lefs reafon, I am fure, to be fo than you have) yet I cannot give up my fufpicions, that moft of the writers in this controverfy, though they have agreed to ufe the term indefinitely, are not agreed in any one precife meaning of it, but ufe it in fenfes not the fame. And that it is too delufory a word, while it ftands unex- plained by them, to bear the ftrefs and weigh!; of fo delicate a difpute, as hath arifen from it. When I fomething more than hinted, at- your taking foundation in two different fenfes yourfelf, in one, when applied to the abftrac! klea of virtue, and in the other, when applied to obligation ; (which I perceive you have taken notice of, and are applied to) I gave you the reafon of my apprehenfion, which was this. You had given me your fenfe of foun- jl(> Letters upon the Subject foundation, in the beginning of your cor* refpondence ; viz. the ground on which moral virtue ; (viz. virtue in it's abflracl nature, as you afterwards explained it) folely arifes, on that, without which, there could be nofucb thing as virtue. Now it appear 'd to me, that you could not intend foundation in this fenfe, when you applied it to the many grounds, from which you faid obligation might arife. Be- caufe it could not be faid of any one of them, that it is the ground, on which obligation folely arifes, or that without which there could be no fuch thing as obligation. Therefore I inferred from the manner of your applying the term to obliga- tion, that you meant no more by it, when fo applied, than a fuffcient motive or a reafonable inducement. A fenfe, which the word carries, though it be different from the fenfe of it, when applied by you to the abflract idea of virtue. Now you have neither (hewed me, that I judged wrong in thinking thefe were two different fenfes of foundation ; nor that the word in either of thefe fenfes may be indiffe- rently applied, either to the idea of virtue in the abft racl, or to obligation ; but you have only apprifed me, that you have the fame idea of of moral Virtue and moral Obligation. 41; 'of it, and ufe it in the fame fenfe, ivben you ap- ply it to virtue and to obligation. This fame idea, and fame fenfe, I may prefume, is that fame, which mojl other 'writers have and fcneair, viz. the ground on which that "which they apply it to, Jlauds, Or from which it arifes ; which yon look upon as one idea, or one fenfe only. Be it fo ; you are allowed to have this fenfe and idea of foundations in both applications ; becaufe, if this had been wanting in either of them, they could not have been called foundations at all. But then, although this is the mod you may mean by the terra, and though you mean al- ways to ufe it in the fame fenfe ; doth it follow, that there is no ambiguity in the term itfelf, which, in one of theis applications, might have fignirled (and fo you once did expound it yourfelf ) the ground, on which any thing fo wholly arifes, as that, without it, there could be nofuch thing ; and in the other, may only iignify fimply, a ground on which any thing arifes, but yet not elTential to its production, or neceflary to its being. Surely here is a diilinclion between foun- dations (and a remarkable one too), which in Vol. II. E e vour 4i 8 Letters upon the SubjeB your one idea, and one fenfe of the term (as you now explain them) you do not reach. And, if moji writers mean no more by it than you do (which yet will be a queftion, till they tell us fo) I cannot poffibly difcover, what you are contending about, under this term founda- tion, rather than any other term ; fince none of you (according to your prefent account) mean any thing more by it, than what is equally true in every application, that every one of you makes of it. I fhall not allow this diftinclion between foundations, in this fubjec"t, to be called either unneceffary or fricf, till they are given up for fuch, in the following inflance. A certain author had laid the foundation of obligation in rewards and punimments ; conceiving, that obligation arofe folely from a profpecl of them. He went too far indeed in faying fokly, fince there are other grounds of obligation : But, however, he ufes foundation rightly, fince that means only a ground on which any thing arifeth y in which fenfe, or according to which idea, foundation is juftly applied to the prof- pecl: of rewards and punifhments. Hereupon, he is advertifed, by a very judicious adverfary, that of moral Virtue and moral Obligation, 4 1 9 that thefe cannot be the foundation of obligation t though he fuppofes all Obligation to arifefolely from a prof peel of them. They are only a new motive to the performance of duty, but no new fcuJidation of it. [Works of the Learned, Au- gufi 1743. p. 120.] Now would it be fuffi- cient for the author abovementioned, to reply to thefe juft and necelTary diftinclions, that they are all equally foundations in the very fame fenfo as groimds on which obligation arifes -, and that afjigning one or more foundations to a thing makes no difference in the fenfe of the term ? and that rewards and punifhments, whether the fole foundation or not, would at leaft be a new foundation of obligation ? and as properly fo, as any other thing, fince there is but one idea, one fenfe of the word in this difpute ? I do not fee how you could obviate fuch a reply, upon the footing on which, you have now put the whole meaning of foundation in this controverfy. You would find it neceiTary, to have recourfe to your former diflinclions, between that, from which any thing derives, or to which it ewes its being, or without which there could be no fuch thijig j and that, which is no more than a fuperinduced motive, or E e 2 ground 420 Letters upon the Subjedi g\ ound of an additional obligation, or a further enforcement of the true and genuine prin- ciple. But thefe are distinctions, which the term foundation in the one idea and one fen fe, that you are pleafed to confine it to at prefent, can never reach ; and therefore till it be more particularly and fpeciiically defined, it cannot but have, and retain a perplexing ambiguity in thefe fubjects. You may indeed intend no more, by your applying foundation, as one to virtue in the abftract, and as ?v.any to obligation, than to cxprefs a difference in the nature of the things, to which you apply it. But you do really, at the fame time, dkprefs a difference in the ienfes of foundation. Nay, you will find in due attention to your ether writings, that you really make a difference in the fenfes of foun- dation, when applied to obligation only ; tho' you may not always exprefs this difference in direct words. When you fey here, that obligation, though arifing from the fame foun- dation, with virtue in the abftract, may by the nature of it arife likewife from fever al other grounds all equally foundations, in the very fame fenfe, as grounds on which it arifes -, you mutt mean of moral Virtue and moral Obligation. 4-ZJ mean a iamenefs of fenfe in this refpeft only, that it may be equally faid of them all, that thev are grounds on which it arifes ; which is true indeed, but not to the purpofe of my en- quiry, nor fufliciently expreffive of your own whole fenfe of the matter. For when you fpeak your opinion fully, thefe other grounds, from which likewife obligation, by the nature of it, arifes, are only new motives ; they are not new foundations. They all refer to that true original ground of moral obligation, ah-. L which (you fay in another place, Works cf the Learned, p. 125.) this controversy is; that be- ing the only legitimate one in nature. They introduce no new moral obligation, in the ufual fenfe of the word, and cannot therefore be the foundation of obligation, viz. in that fenfe of the word, about which the contro- verfy is ; and confequently, if I infer rightly, not in the very fame fenfe ; neither are they ail equally foundations. You are pleafed to conjecture, that Mr Hooker, in the parTage I cited fr6m him, is enquiring after two fenfes of faith, rather than that of foundation. Give me leave to repeat and review the paflage. His fubject E e 3 is 422 Letters upon the Subject is not the nature of faith, but the foundation of it. " Let us fee, fays he, what the foundation bring- A Second Difcourfe on Preaching. 467 bringing up the Rear of Motives and Per- fuafives to Practice. When we come, for Inftance, to enforce a natural Obligation, or a plain Scripture Duty with fpecial Inducements from Reafon and Experience, then we may range freely through all the Topics of Invention, and ranfack the Magazines of the Orators to find proper Matter for our Purpofe. And indeed were we to go on no further than the three common logical Topics, Cur, quomodo & quando, for Reafon s V/hy a Tiling is to be done, and for Directions How and When it is to be done, they will amply fur- nifh us with Matter on mod Subjects, and efpecially the practical ones. Upon which I would juft take Notice of how great Confe- quence to Edification the Topic Quomodo is, or the inftructing People How any Duty is to be performed : This being a far more ufeful Leffon to them, and perhaps a more difficult Tafo for us, than the fatisfying them why or wherefore a Thing ought to be done : And therefore of all the Loci Communes, to which we have recourfe, there is none in which we can more profitably employ ourfelves than _ H h 2 in 463 A Second Difcourfe on V reaching. in this. Every ferious and good Man will be apt to gather fomething on this Topic from his own Experience, and will be able to ex- plain the How from his own Feelings, and from Reflections on his own private Condufr, more ufefully to others, and more fatisfaclo- rily to himfelf, than by any other Method, of Invention. And happy is he whofe Heart and Confcience can furnifh. him with a Pro- batum of the Prefcripiion that he gives to others. And to thefe Common-places which are call- ed the Logical, let me fubjoin VI. In the fixth Place a Sacred Topic, peculiarly ufeful to thofe who compofe for the Pulpit, viz. Scripture Examples. Of which great Benefit may be made, when they are oroperly felected, and difcreetly accommo- dated to the Buiinefs in Hand. They weigh much with the Vulgar, and are eafily re- member'd. But one of the largeft Funds of Invention, is that of VII. Similitudes, Comparifons, Emblems, &c. Which are greatly recommended by our Saviour's Manner of inftructing the common People, A Second Difcoure on Preaching. 46 £ People, by Parables, by Allufions to natural Phccnomena, by fundry Images taken from Things of daily Ufe in Life, and even by Proverbs and vulgar Sayings. All which he made beautifully fubfervient to the illuftra- tion of his Doctines. Only let it be obferved on this Article of Si- miles, that there ought to be a due Share of Dif- cernment to diftinguifh what are proper for a Sermon, and what are not (o. For as Fancy is boundlefs, fo are fanciful Comparifons. As I remember we had at the Univerfity a peculiar Term for extravagant Conceits of this Kind in the Compofitions of Preachers. I think we called them White Bears, mean- ing thereby fuch E?}iblcms or Siniiiies as were too bold and finking to be eafily forgotten ; and yet, from fome ftrange Impropriety or Oddnefs in them, could not be remembered but with Difcredit to the Brains that form'd them. Nevertheless Similitudes prudently choicn and fparingly interfperfed are not only greaf Ornaments to a Difcourfe, but have ipecial Effects both in illuiTrating a Doctrine, and imprinting it on the Mind. II h ; And '470 A Second Difcourfe on Preaching. And thefe I apprehend are the moft ma- terial Advices concerning Invention. Indulge me now in a Word or two upon Method. Every Man, you will fay, mull: take his own. True. True alio that no one Method of Com- pofition whatfoever can be prefcribed that will fuit with all Subjects and all Occafions. Yet, on the other Hand, it is no lefs true that there are fome general Rides from which we muft never depart, if we would have our Compbfitions pafs for Methodical. I. As Firfc. To abide by the Subject, what- ever it be, and not to ftray or wander from it into Points that are not allied to it. This is commonly called keeping clofe to the Text. Of which good Rule fome Preachers are fo little obfervant that whatever Text they fet out with, they will neverthelefs run their Chafe through the Bible, as if they thought nothing was out of Method that was but in Scripture, from Gehefis even to the Revelations. Such Ramblers from their afTumed Sub* jedt are ililed, and not improperly, TJni- verfal A Second Difcourfe on Preaching. 47 1 vetfdl Preachers : Of which Sort generally Speaking are the extempore Men 5 and for a very obvious Reafon : More obvious than any that is to be given for the like Digreflions in thofe who pen their Difcourfes, and have Time to weigh and fort their Materials, and to difpefe them into fuch Form and Order that the feveral Parts of the Compofition may be adjufted to each other, and every Part may be made to contribute to the Strength of the Whole. II. But Secondly, It is hardly confident with Method, never with good Method, to make Excurfions into Branches even of the fame Subject, if the Confideration of thofe Branches be not authorized by the Text itfelf. For as Difcourfes are to be confined to the Subjects that are treated of in them, fo Sub- jects themfelves are to be limited by the Texts that are taken for them : Unle'fs perchance the Subject itfelf happens to be fpme Modern Argument, State Topic, or other occajional The/is, to which no Text in Scripture hath any direct or immediate Reference : In all which extraordinary Cafes, as we muft never think to make any Text fpeak what was not ori- H h 4 ginally 472 A Second Difcoitrje on Preaching. ginally intended in it, we muft content oui> felves with fuch Touches upon it, or Allu- fions to it, as may preferve an Idea of Rela- tion, though perhaps not a clofe one, between the Sermon and the Text. But III. Of feveral Methods that may be ufed, That will always appear to be the beft, whereby the Subject contained in the Text may be the eafieft underftood, and. the Dif- courfe made upon it the eaiieft. remembered. And it matters not whether this Difpo- fition. be made by regular and formal Divi- fions into Heads, or by any other artificial Difpofition of the feveral Arguments for the better engaging the Attention at prefent, and the better helping the Memory afterwards. Some Preachers too fancifully adhere to a Method of fplitting into Heads, and into a certain Number of them too, on mofl Occa- fions. I do not mean hereby to blame them, for what is in Method and due Order is, ge- nerally fpeaking, well. But yet this Rule of fplitting may oftentimes be changed into a better ; And efpecially on thofe Occafions where the Preacher takes upon himfelf the Part of an Orator : Under which Character the A Second Difcourfe en Preaching. 473 the Concealment of Method often proves an Advantage to the Addrefs. For a Difcourfe, we know, may be full of Art and Contri- vance, and even elegantly methodical^ and yet mall feem, at leaft to the Unlearned, to have no Traces of Skill difcoverable in it. But the Victories of Eloquence are fometimes obtain- ed, like thofe of great Captains, by playing off the concealed Batteries ; whereby the Au- dience is more fuccefsfully fmitten, than when the whole Tire of Artillery is difcovered be- forehand. You will ftill remember that I am only giving You fome general Hints of Points which may be purfued at leifure by as many of You as are yet employed in Compofitions, and are not already furnifhed with a Stock of Difcourfes fuflicient for the Demands of Your Stations and Cures. To work by Rule, when we do work, is much better than fol- lowing Fancy and Imagination : Nay much better than endeavouring merely to imitate Others, though they be Writers of the great- eft Credit and Renown : Bccaufe unlefs we kpow, and mind, and apply to thofe fame Rules which they followed, and which make their 474 -A Second Difcoitrfe on Preaching, their Writings appear to fuch Advantage, we may indeed imitate them, but really without any Refemblance j and feem to ourfelves to follow them clofe, and yet without coming any Thing the nearer to them. I have not hitherto faid any Thing on a Point which the French Writers on Chrijiian Eloquence never fail to mention. They fpeak of it under the higheft Characters ; ftiling it UOnBion. (for which we have no Word in Englijh) : And as they make a diflincl Article of it, it hath not fallen, fo far as it relates to Compojitiojj, under any of the fore- going Heads. They mean by it, as I take it, A truly religious Spirit that reigns throughout the whole Compofiiion^ enlivens and fanctifles it, and betokens the Compofer himfelf to be a iincere good Man ; One that has a true Senfe of what he fays ; who talks not merely from j\ift Ideas, but from a feafon'd Heart ; evi- dencing by the whole Turn of his Expref- fions that he not only does firmly believe all that he advances, but earneflly deiires his whole Audience may be alio convinced of the fame. But A Second Difcourfe on V reaching. 475 But indeed this Unffiion (if one may fo render the French) is as difcernible in that other Branch of the Preacher's Character, Pronunciation, as it is in Compofition ; nay, perhaps fometimes it may be thought more fo. You will fee what is meant by it, when it is fpoken in Regard to Delivery, in my next Difcourfe, mould it pleafe God to give me another Opportunity of going through with my Preaching Rules, at our Meeting together on a like Occafion. VI SI- [ 476 ] VISITATION CHARGE, Anno 1757. DISCOURSE III. "Reverend Brethren, O U may well expect I mould at length make an End of a Subject on which I have already twice addrelTed you. And tho' I am fenfible of my own Inabilities to do it Juftice, and treat it as worthily as it defervesj yet as you have been pleafed to attend to my Advices, fuch as they be, on a Subject fo extremely well fuited to thefe Occafions, I had rather make a third Experiment of your Candour, than fail in fulfilling my Part on a Point of fuch Confequence to us all. I mall therefore now proceed to give you the Remainder of thofe Rules for Preaching, which I thought, and I hope from what you have heard of them already, you think too, not to be undeferving your Confideration. My firft: Difcourfe you may recollect was wholly taken up in fetting forth in feveral Par- A Third Difconrfe on Preaching. 477 Particulars, How cur Stile may be beji adjujled and acco?nmcdated to the Ufe of the Pulpit. In my laft, this Time twelve Months, I treated on Invention and Method, and of their fngular Ufe in framing and drawing up Ser- mons. And under one or other of thefe Heads I laid before you, as I think, all the appro- ved Rules for Compofition. And the Point that comes now to be fpoke to by way of Conclulion is the Manner of difcharging ourfehes in the Pulpit, or, what we commonly call Delivery ; Which is the Art of happily executing with the Tongue, what is previoufly fchemed and prepared with the Pen. And indeed this, when you confider it well, will be found a moft marterial Article in our Subject. For what is Stile ? what is Invention ? what is Method? if there be want- ing that which alone can fet off and give Life and Grace to them all, viz. A proper Elocution, or zju/i Delivery? And this as I once before took the Liberty of intimating to you is that Part of the pub- lick Service which our Englif; Clergy, — pardon 478 A Third Difcourfe on Preachi?2g. pardon the Suggeftion — do not fo thoroughly fludy as might be wifhed. The late jndicious Bifhop of London, Dr Gibfon, who underftood the Laws of the Pulpit as well as any other of Ecclefiaftical Denomination, was very fenfible of this De- fect in many of our Order : And in one of his Charges reminds his Clergy of what De- mofihenes is reported to have faid, when he was afked what was the Jirfl Qualification of a good Orator f He anfwered, Pronuncia- tion. — When afked again, what was the fe- cond ? — He anfwer'd again, Pronunciation. — What the third ? {till Pronunciation : As if without that, no Oration could be worth attending to. It is true that Pronunciation among the Ancients included the whole Action of the Speaker, or the Co-operation of all his Mem- bers with his Tongue, the more vigoroufly to imprefs his Sentiments on the Hearers. Which combined Arts of Addrefs, in the Greek and Ro?nan Orators, were indeed to great Purpofe in their Days, confidering the Arguments they had to treat upon, the Cuf- toms and Privileges of the Courts in which they A Third Difcourfe on Preaching, arfq they pleaded, and the Temper and Tafte of their Auditors. And it is as true that with us the Cafe is far different, and that our Sub- jects though they afford Light and Life much beyond theirs, yet would be injured by be- ing handled with Contention and Vehemence: For they are of a more delicate Nature, and are befl fet off in foletnn Compofure, or what we may more properly call, in Oppofition to the practiled Movements of the Ancients A majefiic Tranquillity. For Agitations of the Body or Theatrical Geftures are a kind of Gafconade in the Pulpit, which we readily refign to a neighbouring Nation. Our Peo- ple would not be pleafed with fuch fcenical Reprefentations, or enthufiaitic Behaviours; neither, if they would, ought we to encou- rage them in fo falfe a Taite. But then feeing we are in a Manner obliged to lay afide the Ufe and Study of that Part or Mode of Pronunciation, which con- fifted in Action, how much greater Reafon have we to cultivate and improve all the Powers of the Tongue, and to exercife our- felves in a]] the porTible Graces of Elocution -3 in 480 A Third Difcourfe on Preaching. in which the whole Art of our Pronuncia- tion or Delivery mutt now confift. A few general Advices on this Head will be fufficient, and, I will prefume, not un- acceptable. I. In the firft Place, I believe, you will readily agree with me, that the Ufe of Notes, which is a very valuable Privilege, and in many Refpe&s beneficial, was never defigned to deftroy the Energy, deaden the Vivacity, or even in any wife reftrain the Force and Effects of a Difcourfe upon the Audience. How greatly then is this Advantage abufed, when it tempts us to read with Apathy, what ought to be fpoken with as much Life and Spirit as if it flowed unpremeditated ! Hence comes the unlucky Diftinction be- tween Preachers and Readers of their own Sermons. The one fpeak or deliver them- felves like Advocates at the Bar : But the other more like the Clerk of the Court reading the Indictment behind the Table. Towards the Remedy of which Mifufe of Notes let it be obferved, fecondly, II. That we foould endeavour to preach in the Manner we talk, provided we do it loud enougn A Third Difconrfe on Preachi?ig. 47 1 enough to be heard, and leifurely enough to be heard diftinctly. This is in fome Meafure intimated in the very Terms we ufe for this Part of our Mi- niftration. Homilies from the Greek Word : Sermons from the Latin : Difccurfes Englifi. All of them importing an eafy familiar kind of Addrefs to the People. And whereas there is foniethihg in every Man's Talk which is peculiar to himfelf, it is further advifeable for every one id preach- ing to keep to his peculiar or ufual Manner of Elocution. For what is moft natural is generally moft becoming ; and the taking Pains to alter our C'uftomary Mode of Pro- nunciation feldom turns to good Account : Befides that what is got by Art, or by imi- tating others is ever apt to be attended more or lefs with a Spice of Affectation. And this Rule being mentioned leads us directly to another, which is III. To avoid in preaching as tde do in com- mon Life, fameneft of Tone, and farnenefs 0) Cadence. Vol. II. I i A Mu- 472 A Third Difcoarfe on F reaching. A Mufkian that plays only on one Stringy or always in the fame Keyy will never make good Mufick. The Voice is capable of infinite Modular tions, and ought to be exercifed in all that Variety that is requifite for expreffing both the Force and Beauty of every Sentiment that is conveyed by it to the Audience. But where this ftudy is quite over-looked, and this Care totally neglected, ill Cuftoms: take Place, and being continued become at length invetei-ate. There are fome who yet retain the Cant they got at School : And what is more ftrange they retain it only in the Reading Defk and in the Pulpit : And being Men in Senfey Learning, and Argument, arc ftjli Boys in Delivery ; repeating their Ser- mons, with their Books in their Hands* at Severity, as they did their LefTons at Seven, But how well foever the Tone and Cadencies may be adjufted for making the Difcourfe pafs off agreeably, yet there is fomething further necelTary to a good Delivery , namely IV. That we Jhould obferve Time and Mea- Jure in what we fay, fo as not to be always in the A Third Bifcoarfe on Preaching. 473 the fame Strain, either uniformly rapid or uniformly flow. For as Compofitions are not all of a Piece, that is, of one and the fame Kind of Stuff and Texture throughout, but confift of Parts which have a different Structure and Caft, fo neither mould one and the fame Meafure of Recital be ufed with them from the Be- ginning to the End. Some Paffages require a fwifter Execu- tion : Others a more deliberate. Our Fluency fliould be like that of the Streams, which haften over the Shallows, but move flowly in deep Places. Indeed a continued Rapidity, belides its being waftful and unthrifty by expending much Matter in a little Time, hath other unfriendly Confequences. For it doth in Appearance put all Topics upon the Level; And makes a Man teem to treat even Myfte- ries in Religion with the fame Hafte and Unconcern, as if he was talking about in- different Things. You may have known perhaps fome for- mal Peribns who would in their common Converfation fpeak as gravely and folemnly I i 2 upon 474 that even a Stop or a Paitfe properly made, and on fome Occafions, mall be equi- valent to a Sentence. And a fhort Sentence, that is big with Matter, and well prepared, being alfo em- phatically fpoken, mall be fometimes as Sig- nificant in its Effects as a whole Period, or any labour'd Tour of Words. And a Period, delivered by One who is Matter of Pronunciation, mail be better re- member'd, and do more good, than a whole Sermon from the Mouth of another who is regardlefs of his Delivery. FINIS. ' Vk "~-^