^^ .Jl^^y^' PRINCETON, N. J. C Section Shelf.. Section . Number. ^s: \^ '■^^. 'v:^ s ^>=^ ^^^ >^ Ik ^ ^^^ ^^. .^^ ^^ ST"-^ 1^-^ ^k>>; Digitized by tine Internet Arciiive in 2011 witii funding from Princeton Tiieoiogicai Seminary Library littp://www.arcliive.org/details/cliristiantheologOOIord Christian Theology FOR The People. BY WILLIS LORD, D.D., LL.D., LATE PRESIDENT OF THE UNIVEKSITY OF WOOSTER. Speaking the Truth in Love. — Eph. iv. 15. NEW YORK: ROBERT CARTER AND BROTHERS, 530 Broadway. 1S75. Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1S74, by ROBERT CARTER AND BROTHERS, In the Office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington. Cambridge : Printed by John Wilson and Son. PREFACE. The author of this volume has hope that it may be of service to Students in Theology, and to some of his Brethren in the Ministry of our Lord. At the same time, he has prepared it with a more direct reference to the body of Christian people ; for their instruction in the Christian faith. He has not, however, on this account, thought it necessary or desirable that his work should be less orderly in its form or elevated in its general character, than it would have been had he written it for the learned. All matter suitable only for scholars has been excluded. When technical terms are used, and words or sentences from foreign tongues, they are at once explained ; so that they will occasion no embarrassment, but rather, it is hoped, may contribute to the interest and advantage of the reader. The Theology of the volume is meant to be that which has its divine expression in Holy Scripture, and its author- ity therefore in God. With respect to the power of reason in the discovery of religious truth, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle were the peers of the mightiest of our race. What then .-• They knew not God. They had not a glimmer of the divine Redemption. No progress of IV PREFACE. Science, physical or metaphysical, has changed this vita! fact. At the end of centuries, it is true as at their begin- ning, that God only can reveal God. " With thee is the fountain of life. In thy light, shall we see light." (Ps. xxxvi. 9.) Chicago, September i, 1874. CONTENTS. CHAPTER I. Religion PAGE 17 1. Its Germ. 2. Its Extent. 3. Etymology. 4. Current Meaning. 5. Essential Parts. CHAPTER 11. Theology 21 1. Relation. 2. Derivation. 3. Definition. 4. Further Meaning 5. Sources. 6. Reason not a Source. 7. Use of Reason in Theology. 8. General Division. 9. Divisions of Revealed Theology. CHAPTER III. God 1. Primary Idea. 2. Origin of the Idea. 3. Result. 4. Can God be defined ? 25 5. What is God? 6. Other Definitions. 7. Biblical Names of God. CHAPTER IV. Arguments of God 34 1. No formal Proof in Scripture. 6. Argument of Anselm. 2. Use of such Proof in Theology. 7. Cartesian Forms. 3. Classes of Argument. 8. Value of these. 4. No a Priori Argument for God. 9. Argument of Dr. S. Clarke. 5. Instances. 10. Thoughts of Newton. VI CONTENTS. CHAPTER V. Arguments of God, continued 1. Arguments a Posteriori. 2. Ground of Validity. 3. A Cause. 4. Classification. 5. Effects. 6. Denial of Causation. 7. iVnswer. S. Specific Arguments. A. The Cosmological. B. The Teleological. C. Moral Argument. D. Historical Argument. . Miracles and Prophecy. . Validity of these Arguments. . The Data all in Man. 41 12. Conclusion. CHAPTER VI. Forms of Belief as to God A. Theism. 1. Deism. 2. Distinctive Position. 3. Herbert's System. 4. Bolingbroke's System. 5. Hume's Pyrrhonism. 6. Result, illogical and credulous. B. Dualism. 1. Foundation. 2. Logical Genesis. 3. Refutation. C. Polytheism. 1. Origin. 2. Extent. D. Atheism. 1. Historic Use of the Term. 2. Classification. 3. Arguments of Atheism. 4. Refutation. 5. Argument of John Foster. 6. Atheism possible .'' 7. Alleged Instances. 8. Logical Results. E. Pantheism. 1. Its Forms. 2. Summation, 56 CHAPTER VII. Revelation . . . I. Revelation possible. 7. The Bible the Word of God. 2. Revelation a Necessity as to Men. 8. The Argument. 3. Historic Proofs. A. Prophecy. 4. Revelation presumable. B. Miracles. 5. Revelation a Fact. C. Moral Argument. 6. Alleged Revelations. 73 CHAPTER VIII. Inspiration L Revelation. I. Modes. IL Inspiration. 1. Terms. 2. Mode of Inspiration. A. Mechanical Theory. B. Dynamic Theory. C. Theory of Degrees. 3. E.vtent of Inspiration. 4. Proof of Inspiration. A. Testimony of Inspired Men. 92 I. The Old Testament. 1. The Pentateuch. 2. The Psalms. 3. The Prophets. 4. The Old Testament Whole. II. The New Testament. 1. The Promises of Christ. 2. Claims of the Apostles. B. The Testimony of God. CONTENTS. Vii CHAPTER IX. Rule of Faith no The Divine Rule. 1. Its Authority. 2. Its Sufficiency. 3. Exposition. 4. Result. The Romish Rule. 1. Statement of it. 2. Cannot be admitted. C. Other Forms of this Rule. I. Rule of Vincent of Lerins. II. Rule of Pius IV. D. The Jewish Rule. CHAPTER X. God 1. Divine Attributes. 2. Their Relations. 3. Terminology. 4. Classification. (a.) Communicable and incommuni- cable. (d.) Positive and negative. [c. ) Active and passive. {d.) Natural and moral. A. Spirituality of God. I. Anthropomorphism. B. Personality of God. C. Unity of God. 1. Rational Proof. 2. Biblical Proof. D. Eternity of God. 1. Rational Proof. 2. Biblical Proof. 3. Mode of Divine Duration. E. Immutability of God. 1. Rational Proof. 2. Biblical Proof. 3. The Divine Repentance. F. Omnipotence of God. 1. Rational Proof. 2. Biblical Proof. 3. Exposition. G. Omnipresence of God. 1. Rational Proof. 120 M 2. Biblical Proof. 3. Exposition. Omniscience of God. 1. Rational Proof. 2. Biblical Proof. 3. Characteristics of God's Knowl- edge. 4. Objects of God's Knowledge. 5. DifSculties. 6. Answer. 7. Divine Wisdom. The Will of God. 1. Why we ascribe Will to God. 2. Scripture Terms for it. 3. Its Properties. 4. Distinctions. Holiness of God. I. Its Proofs. , The Justice of God. 1. Definitions. 2. Proofs. 3. Distinctions. 4. Ground of punitive Justice. The Goodness of God. 1. Its Proofs. 2. Its Forms. . The Truth of God. 1. Its Proofs. 2. Conclusion. CHAPTER XL The Trinity , 152 1. Source of our Knowledge. 2. Analogies. 3. The Word Trinity. 4. Statement of the Doctrine. 5. Meaning of Person. 6. General Proofs. I. The Old Testament. II. The New Testament. Jewish Ideas. Ideas of Plato. Errors as to the Trinity. (a. ) Sabellianism. (6.) Arianism. (c.) Socinianism. Historical Data. Importance of the Doctrine. Vlll CONTENTS. CHAPTER XII. SoNSHiP AND Deity of Christ 165 1. The Father is God. 2. Why God is called Father. 3. Sonship of Jesus Christ. 4. Pre-existence of Christ. 5. Was the Angel Jehovah. 6. His Eternal Generation. 7. The Deity of Jesus Christ. 8. Its Proofs. {a.) The Scriptures give Him the Divine Name. (^. ) Invest Him with the Divine At- tributes. (c.) Ascribe to Him Divine Works and {d.) Accord to Him Divine Honor. CHAPTER XIII. The Holy Spirit 177 1. Relation. 6. Official Subordination. 2. Name. 7. Functions of the Spirit. 3. Its Adjuncts. (a.) Before the Incarnation. 4. The Holy Spirit a Person. {l>.) Since the Incarnation. 5. The Holy Spirit God. 8. Distinctive Properties of the Trinity. CHAPTER XIV. The Decrees of God 190 1. Definition. 2. A Necessity of the Divine Nature. 3. Desirable for Creatures. 4. Taught in Holy Scripture. 5. Their Characteristics. (a.) Eternal. {6. ) Immutable. (c.) Sovereign. (d.) Free. {e.) Efficient. (/. ) Universal. The Scripture View of Election. Meaning of Reprobation. Objections to the Divine Decrees. CHAPTER XV. Creation 2 I. Creation as an Act. III. Natureism. 2. Creation as an Effect. 4. Doctrine of the Bible. 3. Theories. {a. ) Specific Texts. A. Ancient. {i.) General Teaching. I. The Worid Eternal. 5. Mediate Creation. II. The World an Emanation. 6. Date of the Creation. B. Modem. 7. Duration of the creational Work. 1. Pantheism. 8. Order of the Creation. II. Materialism. 9. End of the Creation. CHAPTER XVI. Angels _....'> I. Proof of their Existence. 5. Their Character. 2. When created. 6. Their Employment. 3. Their Nature. 7. Guardian Angels. 4. Their Number. 8. The Archangel. CONTENTS. IX 9. The Cherubim. 10. The Seraphim. 11. Satan and his Angels. 12. Satanic Temptation of Christ. 13. Demoniac Possessions. 14. Why so numerous in the Time of Christ. 15. Relation of the Angels to Re- demption. CHAPTER XVII. Man 1. Man not Eternal. 2. Man created. 3. Relative place of Man. 4. When Man created. 5. The Human Body. 6. The Human Soul. 7. Doctrine of Trichotomy. 8. Doctrine of Materialism. 9. Faculties of the Soul. (a.) The Intellectual. (6.) The Moral. 10. Connection of Body and Soul. 237 13 (a. ) Des Cartes' Theory. (i. ) Theory of Leibnitz. Origin of Souls since Adam. (a.) Theory of Pre-existence. (6.) Theory of Immediate Creation. ('. 11. The Divine Permission of Sin. (a.) Theory of Dualism. (6.) Theory of Optimism. {c. ) Theory of Inability. CHAPTER XIX. The Redeemer ...... T. No Self- Redemption. 2. No Redemption by Creatures. 3. Will God redeem. 4. Why Men, and not Angels. 5. Old Testament Idea of the Messiah. 6. Messiah must have come. 7. Jesus Christ is the Messiah. 8. Incarnation. {a.) Its Biblical Meaning. {i. ) Old Testament Intimations of it. (c.) Necessity of Incarnation. ((/. ) Was realized in Jesus Christ. (e. ) Why Incarnation of the Son. (/) How Incarnation effected. 177 (_§-.) Proof of Christ's Humanity. (//.) His Soul not pre-existent. (i.) Human Appearance of Christ. Errors as to the Person of Christ. (a.) Doctrine of the Docetae. {6.) Doctrine of the Ebionites. (<:. ) Doctrine of Apollinaris. (d.) Doctrine of Nestorius. {e.) Doctrine of Eutyches. (/. ) Monothelitism. [£■. ) Lutheran View. (//.) Socinianism. (i.) Faith of the Church Universal. CONTENTS. CHAPTER XX. The Redeemer, continued 1. The Messiah was to die. 2. The Messiah did die. 3. His Death not for Himself. 4. State of Christ after Death. (a. ) His Body in the Grave. {/>.) His Soul in Hades. (c.) The Romish Doctrine. (if. The Lutheran View. {e. ) View of Beza and others. 5. The Resurrection of Christ. • • • 301 {a. ) The Word Resurrection. {6.) Affirmed of the'Body of Christ. {c. ) Story of the Jews. ((/. ) Hypotheses of Rationalism. 6. Proofs of the Resurrection of Christ. 7. Its Relation to the Claims of Christ. 8. Nature of Christ's risen Body. 9. The Ascension of Christ. 10. Christ at the Right Hand of God. 11. Body of Christ in Heaven. CHAPTER XXI. Mediator and Mediation 3i{ 1. The Word Mediator. 2. Application of it to Christ. 3. Qualifications. 4. These Qualifications in Christ. 5. Objection from Gal. iii. 19. 6. Necessity of Mediation. {a. ) Patristic View. {i.) The Arminian Doctrine. {c.) The Socinian Doctrine. The Romish Doctrine of Mediation. {a.) Christ the Mediator only ac- cording to His Humanity (6.) Angels and Saints are also Mediators. CHAPTER XXII. Christ as a Prophet . . , 1. Meaning of Prophet. 2. Proof of Christ's Office as a Prophet. 3. In what Sense Christ a Prophet. 4. His Fitness for this Office. 5. How He executes it. 6. It extends through the Ages. 7. Its special Sphere. 8. Its Characteristics. 9. Its Execution now. 329 CHAPTER XXni. Christ as a Priest 337 1. Meaning of Priest. 2. The Levitical Priests. 3. Their Consecration. 4. Realized in the Consecration of Christ. 5. The -Sacrifice of Christ and those of the Law. 6. Import of a legal Sacrifice. 7. Origin of the priestly Office of Christ. 8. Proceeds according to a Covenant. 9. Involved His Incarnation. CHAPTER XXIV. The Priestly Work of Christ . . . 1. Its several Parts. 2. Its special Object. 3. Mode of effecting it. 347 4. Meaning of Atonement. 5. Specific Biblical Views of it. 6. Meaning of Redemption. CONTENTS. XI Active and passive Obedience. Did Clirist suffer tiie Penalty of the Law ? Extent of tlie Atonement. Counter Views. {a.) The Socinian View. (i. ) The Mystical View. (c. ) The Moral View. (d. ) The Governmental View. CHAPTER XXV. Exaltation and KixgdoiM of Christ I. Exaltation of Christ. I 7. Christ also a King. 368 Its successive Stages. Foreshown in the Old Testament. Functions of Christ in Heaven. His continued priestly Work. 6. Mode of Christ's Intercession. His Kingdom. Its Nature. Its Extent. Its Duration. CHAPTER XXVI. Vocation 379 Twofold Distinction. Effectual Calling. (a.) Analysis. (i.) Exposition. (c.) Result. Its efficient Cause. Its ordinary Agents. Its essential Means. Common and sufficient Grace. Is there such Grace ? Efficacious Grace. I. The Gospel. 13 2. Literal Expression of it. 14 3- Figurative Expressions. 4- Right of Men to its Blessings. 5- Grounds of the divine Call. 6. Its verbal Forms. 15 7- Its Nature. 16 8. Its Conditions. 17 9- Its Limitations. 18 10. Universal as to Men. 19 II. Extends to the Non-elect. 20 12. The Sincerity of God. CHAPTER XXVII. I. The Word. 14. Efficient Author. 2. Inspired Terms. 15- Nature of the Divine Agency. 3- Definition. 16. Man active or passive. 4- Physical or Moral Change. 17- Means of Regeneration. 5- Allegation. iS. Office of Truth. 6. Answer. 19. Necessity of Regeneration. 7. Illustration. 20. Its Evidences. 8. Proof of holy Disposition. 21. Historical Differentia. 9- Objection. (ff. ) Arminian View. 10. Result. (d. ) Pelagian View. II. Gradual or instantaneous. (c.) Romish View. 12. 13- Complete or partial. Differentia. (d.) Baptismal Regeneration. 395 Xll CONTENTS. CHAPTER XXVIII. Repentance 414 1. Verbal Forms, 2. Biblical Usage. 3. Definition. 4. Source of Repentance. 5. Confession of Sin. 6. To whom to be made. 7. Essential Characteristics. 8. Romish Doctrine of Repentance. (a.) Contrition. (d.) Attrition. (c. ) Penance. 9. Romish Confession. 10. Absolution. 11. The Evidence of Repentance. CHAPTER XXIX. Faith A I. Its Nature. II. • • • i Historical Faith. 2. Its Grounds. 12. Speculative Faith. 3. The Saxon Word Belief. ij- Evangelical Faith. 4. The Greek Word Pistis. 14. Definition and Analysis. 5. Faith and Knowledge. 15- Fiducia or Trust essential. 6. Their Mutual Relation. 16. The Author of Faith. 7. How to be quahfied. 17- Its Degrees. 8. Historic Data. 18. Faith and Works. 9. Implicit Faith. 19- Is there Salvation without Faith ? 10. Temporary Faith. 425 CHAPTER XXX. Justification 1. Postulates. 2. Terms. 3. Definition and Analysis. 4. How can God justify Sinners? 5. Substitution. 6. Imputation. 7. Proof of Substitution. 8. Proof of Imputation. 9. Office of Faith in Justification. 441 10. Is not meritorious. 11. Necessit}' of Works. 12. When Men justified. 13. Differing Views. (a. ) The Arminian. (6.) The Socinian. (c.) The Romish. (d.) Of Osiander and the Mystics. CHAPTER XXXI. Adoption 454 1. Civil Sense. 2. Biblical Instances. 3. Theological Relation. 4. Defiriition and Analysis. 5. Proof of Adoption. 6. Natural Men the Sons of God. 7. Also Civil Magistrates. 8. Also the Angels. 9. Characteristics of God's Adoption. 10. Its Duties. 11. Its Privileges. CONTENTS, XIU CHAPTER XXXII. Sanctification 462 The Term. Definition and Analysis. Its efficient Cause. Human Co-operation. Means of Sanctification. How Truth sanctifies. How Prayer sanctifies. 8. How Obedience sanctifies. 9. How the Sacraments sanctify. 10. Extent of Sanctification. 11. When complete. 12. Distinctions. i^. Differentia. CHAPTER XXXIII. The Sabbath 476 1. Its Meaning. 2. By whom instituted. 3. When instituted. (a. ) Paley's View. 4. How sanctified. 5. How blessed. 6. Traces of it previous to the Law. 7. Traces of it among the Gentile Nations. 8. The Law of Sinai. 9. The Lawgiver. 10. Change of its Time. (a. ) Authority for the Change. (6. ) Proof of the Change. 11. Importance of the Sabbath to Man. (a.) To his physical Nature and Powers. (^. ) To his intellectual Na^are and Faculties. (c.) To his Well-being as a Citizen. (d.) To all his religious Interests. CHAPTER XXXIV. The Church 1. The English Word Church. 2. The Greek Word Ecclesia. 3. Biblical Characteristics of the Church. 4. Figurative Conceptions. 5. Definitions. 6. Theological Distinctions. 7. No perfect Church on Earth. 8. No Church wholly corrupt. 9. Notes of the Church. A. Protestant. {a. ) Profession of the true Faith. 492 {6.) Due Observance of the Sacra- ments. B. Romish. (a.) Unity. (6.) Sanctity. (c.) Catholicity. (d.) Apostolicity. Rhetoric of Bellarmin. Identity of the Church. (a.) Meaning of its Identity. (d.) Proof of its Identity. CHAPTER XXXV. The Ministry 1. The Head of the Church. 2. What Headship of the Church implies. 3. Ministrj^ of the Patriarchal Period. 4. Ministn,' of the Mosaic Period. (a.) The High Priest. (i.) The Priests. {c. ) The Levites. {d.) The Prophets. 508 , Ministry of the Christian Period. I. Extraordinary Ministry. 1. Apostles. 2. Prophets. 3. Evangelists. II. Ordinary Ministry. I . Presbyters. {a.) Identity of these with Bishops. XIV CONTENTS. (i.) Prelatic Claims. (c.) Distinction of Presbyters. (d. ) Clergy and Laity. (e. ) Plurality of Presbyters. 2. The Deacons. (a. ) Origin of the Diaconate. (,i.) Its Nature. {c. ) Prelatic Changes. CHAPTER XXXVI. The Sacraments .... 1. The Word Sacrament. 2. Its use in Theology. 3. Definitions. 4. Number of the Sacraments. 5. Sacraments of the Jewish Church. 6. These Sacraments superseded. 7. Baptism under the Old Economy. 8. Proselyte Baptism. 534 9. The Baptism of John. 10. Baptism by the Disciples of Christ. 11. Institution of Christian Baptism. 12. Relation of Baptism to Circumcision. 13. Form of Christian Baptism. 14. Necessity of Baptism. 15. Synonymes for Baptism. 16. Patristic Terms. CHAPTER XXXVII. The Sacraments, continued 1. Biblical Words for Baptism. 2. Meaning of the Words. (a.) Position of the Immersionists. I. Bapto. 1. Classical Instances. 2. Biblical Instances. II. Baptize. 1. Usage of the Septuagint. 2. Usage of the Apocrypha. 3. Usage of the New Testament. 4. John's Baptism. 5. Baptism with the Holy Ghost and with Fire. 6. Baptism on the Day of Pen- tecost. 549 7. Baptism of the Eunuch. 8. Baptism of Paul. 9. Baptism of Cornelius. 10. Baptism of the Jailer. 11. Rom. vi. ^-y. . Subjects of Baptism. {a.) The Covenant requires the Appli- cation of its Seal to Children. {l>. ) Christ impliedly commanded this. {c. ) The Apostles must have so under- stood Him. (d.) They taught and practised ac- cordingly. (e.) Also the whole primitive Church. CHAPTER XXXVIII. The Lord's Supper . 1. Its Institution. 2. Its Name. 3. Time of its Observance. 4. Its Relation to the Passover. 5. Its Elements. 6. A permanent Ordinance. 7. How often to be celebrated, 8. Who may partake. 579 Object of the Lord's Supper. The Presence of Christ in the Lord's Supper. (a.) View of Zwingle. {i>. ) View of Calvin. {c.) View of Luther. Romish Doctrine of this Sacrament. CONTENTS. XV CHAPTER XXXIX. ESCHATOLOGY 592 I. Death. 1. Its Phenomena. 2. Biblical Representations. 3. The Soul survives the Body. 4. Is still conscious and active. 5. Place of the Dead, (a.) Romish Doctrine. {&.) No Forgiveness in the World to come. II. The Resurrection. 1. Meaning of Resurrection. 2. Resurrection Bodies. 3. Order of the Resurrection. 4. The Thousand Years. III. The Judgment. I. Scripture Testimony. 2. Moral Ground. 3. Time of the Judgment. 4. Its Extent. 5. The Judge.. 6. Participation of the Saints. 7. Destiny of the Earth. IV. The Future World. 1. Nature of its Awards. 2. Their Degrees. 3. Their Duration. 4. Heaven. (a. ) A Place. ■ (^.) A State. 5. Elements of its Blessedness. CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. CHAPTER I. RELIGION. I. Germ. In its primary form as a conscious feeling, Religion has its germ in man's sense of God ; that God is, and that He is supreme. {a) This sense of God is a necessary product of the rational and moral nature of man, in the circumstances of his existence ; and it involves the further sense of depend- ence and obligation. It may be cherished, enlightened, and trained to be and to act in harmony with truth ; or it may be repressed, perverted, and brought under the sway of error. In the one case, it will become true, and in the other false. Religion. {b^ Max Muller expresses this thought as follows : " As soon as man becomes conscious of himself as distinct from all other things and persons, he at the same time becomes conscious of a higher self ; a power without which he feels that neither he nor any thing else would have any life or reality. "This is the first sense of the Godhead, the 'sensus numinis,' as it has been called ; for it is a sensus, an imme- diate perception ; not the result of reasoning or of gener- alizing, but an intuition as irresistible as the impressions of our senses. In receiving it, we are passive ; at least, as passive as in receiving from above the image of the sun, or any other sensible impression ; whereas, in all our reason- ing processes, we. are active, rather than passive. This 1 8 CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. ' sensiis numinis' is the source of all Religion; it is that without which no Religion, true or false, is possible." (Science of Lan. Sec. Series, p. 145.) 2. Extent. Man, then, is a religious being. His nature and facul- ties not only render him capable of Religion, but they necessitate and originate it within him, in the sense and to the degree thus expressed. In some f»rm, therefore, rudimental or developed, it is and must be universal as man. The fact has been seen and recognized along the ages. Epicurus said : " What nation is there, or what kind of men, who have not, previous to being taught, a certain impression of the Gods.-*" (Nat. Deo. Lib. I. Sec. 16.) Cicero said : " There is no nation so barbarous, no man so savage, as that some apprehension of the Gods has not tinctured his mind. Vicious customs have indeed led men into error concerning them ; but all believe there is a Divine Power." (Tus. Dis. Lib. I.) Maximus Tyrius said : " That there is one God, the Greek and the Barbarian alike affirm ; the islander and the inhabitant of the continent ; the wise and the foolish. If, in all time, there have been a few exceptions, they were senseless men ; as monstrous creatures as a lion would be without courage, or an ox without horns, or a bird without wings ; and, after all, even they testify to God." (Diss. I.) Plutarch said : " Exploring the world, you may possibly find cities without walls, or kings, or coins, or schools, or theatres ; but a city without worship no one ever saw." (Ad Colotem.) M. Thiers says : " Whether true or false, sublime or ridiculous, man must have a Religion. Everywhere, in all ages, in all countries, in ancient as in modern times, in civilized as well as in barbarous nations, we find him a worshipper at some altar." (Consulate and Empire.) M. Saisset says : " It is a great truth, that the root of Religion is indestructible. Societies are born and perish ; sects disappear ; man remains what nature made him, a RELIGION. 19 religious animal. It follows that a Philosophy which does not explain and cannot satisfy this immortal need of man is a powerless Philosophy ; and that a society from which Religion is banished is an impossible society." (Revue des Deux Mondes, 1850.) 3. Etymology. Our English word Religion is from the Latin Religio. This, however, is variously derived. («.) Some would make its etymon to be Relinquo ^=^ to leave behind, or to forsake! So Clodius. (System. U. R. Doc. Leipsic, 1808.) The ethical idea thus resulting is. Religion is that which leads men to relinquish or to subordinate present and tem- poral things, for the sake of and in order to those things which are future and eternal. This thought is congruous and impressive. The etymology, however, is scarcely ten- able. {b^ Others trace Religio to Religo = to bind, or rebind ; and hence, ethically, to bring one under obligation. So Varro (de Lat. Lin. ; Servius, ad Virg.), Lactantius (Inst. IV. 28), and Augustine (Retract. I. 28). See also Lid- don's Bamp. Lect. p. 5. The phase of thought here is, — Religion is that by which man is brought under obligation to God. This derivation yields a pertinent sense, and may perhaps be defended. Religatio, however, rather than Religio, is the regular derivative from Religo. (c.) Others still maintain that Religio is regularly formed only from Relego = to re-read, or to carefully examine. So Cicero (Nat. Deo. Lib. II. 28), Aul. Gellius (Att. Noc. IV. 9), and Calvin (Inst. I. 12). As distinct from the su- perstitious, " they were called religious," says Cicero, " who diligently considered, and, as it were, re-read and pondered every thing pertaining to the worship of the Gods." According to this view. Religion is that which leads men to be seriously and intelligently observant of those prac- tices and duties by which they may please and honor God. 20 » CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. Perhaps we need not insist on any one of these words, as the true etymon of Religio, to the exckision of the rest. Whether we adopt the one or the other, and though they present specific variations of thought, the ethical re- sults they yield do not essentially differ. They all alike suggest that Religion is that which comprehends our ideas, relations, feelings, and actions as to God. 4. Current Meaning. In the current use of the word Religion, it denotes — {a^ Subjectively, those internal feelings of men which have God for their object, and which we may call Piety ; and then those external acts, corresponding to and prompted by those internal feelings ; and (<5.) Objectively, the various Systems of Belief and Prac- tice, relative to God, which obtain among men. Thus we speak of the Jewish, the Christian, the Papal, the Moham- medan, and the Heathen Religions ; meaning, in each case, the body of doctrines and usages which characterize or constitute each, 5. Essential Parts. In the full conception of Religion, as embracing the internal and the external, it has these three parts ; viz. : — {a) Sentiment = the state and movement of the heart towards God ; {b^ Dogma == the intellectual forms and expressions of Belief concerning Him ; and (r.) Cultus = those outward and solemn acts by which He is fittingly acknowledged, obeyed, and worshipped. THEOLOGY. 21 CHAPTER II. THEOLOGY. I. Relation. Religion is before Theology, and underlies it. Theol- ogy presupposes Religion, and arises out of it. The one formulates or gives scientific arrangement and expression to those truths which inspire and sustain the other. 2. Derivatioji. Our English word Theology is from the Greek Theologia. This is a compound of {a.) Theos =: God ; and {b) Logos =■ a word, or discourse ; i. e., a word or dis- course concerning God. 3. Definition. Theology, then, may be defined as that science which treats of God; and it has this twofold aspect, viz.: — (a.) It treats of God ad intj'a ; i.e., of His internal Being, or His existence and attributes, or of that which He is in Himself. {b) It treats of God ad extra ; i. e., of His external mani- festations in Creation, in Providence, and in Redemption. In its. strict sense, Theology comprehends only the topics which thus pertain to God. 4. Further Meaning. As, however, we pursue the study of Theology, in this primary view of it, we soon find that the. Being and Mani- festations of God originate relations between Him and creatures ; and that these relations involve rights on His part, and duties on their part, in great number, and of great moment ; and thus the consideration of these be- comes, in the broader view, a part of Theology. 22 CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. 5. Sources. The sources of Theology are comprehensively two, viz. : — 1. Nature, and 2. Revelation, A. By Nature, as a Source of Theology, is meant {a) All that expression of Himself which God has made in the works of creation, both of matter and mind, in their origin, structure, qualities, laws, and relations, so far as these can be known by us ; and {b.) All that expression of Himself which He has made, and which He still makes in His preservation and govern- ment of created things ; /. ^., in His Providence. The more full, therefore, the true study and progress of the Physical and Metaphysical Sciences, the more rich and copious the material for the construction of true Theology. B. By Revelation as a source of Theology is meant that definite, supernatural Record contained in or composing the Bible. Every manifestation, indeed, which God has made of Himself at any time, or in any form, natural or supernatural, is a Revelation. Creation is a Revelation. Providence is a Revelation. But, in Theology the term is used exclusively of the Biblical Record. That Record was divinely inspired. Holy men of God wrote it, as they were moved by the Holy Ghost. It has been preserved too, in its essential integrity, from the first, until now ; and supplies us with a knowledge of God ample and un- erring, beyond all the power of Nature to do. Revelation does not supersede Nature, nor disparage Nature. It sup- plements and ennobles Nature. Both, in their true inter- pretation, and with sacred accord, sound out the name and the glory of God. 6. Reason not a Source. By a misuse of the term, or a misconception of the thing, Reason is sometimes spoken of as a source of Truth. Considered, indeed, as a faculty of the human soul. Reason is a part of Nature, and as such it is to be THEOLOGY. 23 Studied with Nature, of which it is a part. Any light it may shed from itself as a faculty, or from its exercises, will belong to the sum of truth. It is, however, not so much a source to be investigated as it is an instrument with which to investigate. It is that by which we explore the realms of truth, and ascertain and take possession of their treas- ures. (a.) Reason, then, cannot originate Truth. It can only seek after and discover it. For, in the last analysis, what is Truth .-• It is the reality of things, in their being, relations, and effects. This definition applies to all truth, whether in the sphere of matter or of spirit. Truth is the reality of things. Whence, then, this reality .-• From Rea- son ? Truth is before Reason. Reason inquires concern- ing it, but has no power to cause it. Like light it can reveal what exists, but it does not give existence. Truth exists before Reason, and existing invites its scrutiny and its homage. 7. Its Use hi Theology. It follows that the office of Reason in Theology is to investigate. With ample intelligence and scrupulous fidel- ity, it must study both Nature and Revelation, and from the data they furnish draw the great conclusions of truth. {a) It is the office of Reason to study Nature in all its forms and through all its extent, — the air, the earth, the ocean, insects, brutes, man, — the whole accessible domain of Matter and Mind, — and thus gain its every testimony rela- tive to God and His creatures, and the relations of each to the other, and then to put upon this testimony an honest interpretation. {b.) It is also the office of Reason, with like care and fidelity, to study Revelation, not only as to its contents, but likewise and first as to its supernatural claims. That Nature is the work, and therefore the record of God all admit, except atheists. There is no necessity, therefore, in connection with it, to raise the question of evidence. The book is open before every eye, and the great name of God shines out from every page. 24 CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. With Revelation the case is different. It claims to be, in its origin, not natural, but supernatural. Such a claim demands investigation. It is the office of Reason to make it. It is most solemnly bound to make it. No man has a right to accept any book as supernaturally coming from God until the evidence in the case meets all the right demands of his reason. When, however, this primary question is decided, and by adequate proofs the Revelation is shown to be from God, then the contents of this Revelation are to Theology pre- cisely what the facts of Nature are to Science. It is the office of Reason to subject them to the most careful and reverent study, using all the necessary means to ascertain their real and full import. Having thus gained the knowl- edge of revealed Truth, it is then the further office of Reason to receive it cordially and without reserve, whether it be so simple as to be understood by a child, or so vast and mysterious as to baffle the powers of seraphs. 8. General Division. The most general division of Theology is that founded on its twofold source ; to wit. Natural and Revealed. {a) Natural Theology comprehends the whole sum of Truth respecting God, which is derivable from Nature by Reason. {(^.) Revealed Theology embraces those additional facts and doctrines which are made known only in the Super- natural Record. 9. Divisions of Revealed Theology. The divisions which have been made in Revealed Theo- logy are various. Perhaps the most obvious and important are the Exegetic, the Didactic, the Polemic, and the His- toric. {a) Exegetic Theology is that which results from the direct and critical study and interpretation of the Scripture Text, and furnishes the genuine material of Didactic The- ology. {b.) Didactic Theology is the material gained by Exegesis GOD. 25 systematized, or put into logical relation and form, and positively expressed, with its proper illustrations and argu- ments. {c) Polemic Theology defends Truth against Error, in all its numerous forms, whether subtle or gross ; and it assails and demolishes Error with the weapons and power of Truth. {d) Historic Theology gives the genesis of doctrines, and traces their course, changes, conflicts, and influence along the progress of the Church. In the study of Theology, the different factors repre- sented by these distinctions should not be considered too much apart and by themselves. As they coalesce in fact, so they should in study, in fit place and due degree, and together form a natural and full exhibit of each successive truth. CHAPTER HI. GOD. I. Primary Idea. In its initial form our idea of God is that of Cause, involv- ing, of course, that also of Power, that something which produced, or brought into being things around us. The mental process which connects personal and divine quali- ties or attributes with this Cause is later than the birth of the elementary idea. The little child asks, " Who made the sun, the moon, the stars .'' Who made every thing .'' " for he instinctively feels that every thing must have been made, or have had a Maker. If you answer, God made every thing, such is his spontaneous and irresistible sense of cause in order to effect, he will at once further ask, " Who made God .'' " The idea, or rather the feeling of cause, is the dominating one. Soon, however, the mind begins to act on the problem ; it begins to reflect and reason. By a logical process it reaches not only the bare idea of cause, but also the further one of first cause. An infinite series of causes, each one 2 26 CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. of which is also an effect as well as cause, it sees to be absurd. There must be a Cause, which is not itself an effect, which therefore must be uncaused, and therefore self-existing, and therefore eternal. But the mind cannot stop with this conclusion. Having gone on from the simple notion of cause, and the inhering one of power, and reached the logical result just expressed, it proceeds in its rational process to invest this great self- existing Efficient with the qualities or attributes which are made known in the effects it has produced. These effects cannot be adequately accounted for by mere power. Many of them imply Intelligence, Volition, Beneficence. The eternal First Cause therefore must be a person. It has Intellect, Will, Wisdom, Goodness, as well as Power ; and so at length is gained the full idea of God. 2. Origiji of the Idea. What, now, is the source of this primary Idea .-' How does it originate ? Is it an Innate Idea .-' Is it an Induc- tion, or a Revelation, or an Intuition .-' (<3:.) Is it an Innate Idea .-' What is an Innate Idea "i The word Innate denotes that which is born with or in us. An Innate Idea, therefore, denotes strictly an idea born with or in the mind, and yet independent of it. This seems to have been the notion of Plato and others of the ancients, both Pagan and Christian, Cicero says (Nat. Deo. Lib. I. 17) : " Our knowledge of the Gods is a necessity, because, insitas eorum vel potius innatas cognitiones habemus," /. e., because we have implanted or rather inborn cognitions of them. Origen says (Ad Celsum, I. 4) : " Men would not be guilty, did they not carry in their minds the notions of morality, innate and written in divine letters." It may indeed be doubted whether these great men intended by such language the existence literally of innate ideas as above defined, though by many this has been supposed to be their meaning. Whether so or not, there are no such ideas. What is an Idea .-' A thought or a combination of thoughts. And what is a thought but the product of that which thinks t GOD. 27 And what is that which thinks but the mind. A thought then, or an idea, is a product of the mind thinking. It cannot exist therefore until the mind acts. It dates conse- quently, not from the birth of the mind, but from the action of the mind. The idea of God then cannot be innate. It is indeed of the essential nature and function of mind to form ideas : they are in it potentially, but they can have no actual existence prior to its exercise, {b) Is then this primary idea of God an Induction of Reason .'' This view some have thought tenable. Certainly, the great proofs of God, that He is, are inductive. We are seeking now, however, not for the arguments of His Being, but for the source or origin of our Idea of Him. And if we say that this idea is an induction from the phenomena or the facts of the universe, how shall we explain it that in numberless cases the idea exists and has an actual and practical power, before there are any conscious logical pro- cesses whatever } Who can recall the time when the idea of God was not a part of his consciousness .'' And yet who has the slightest recollection of any preceding induc- tion by which he gained the idea ? When, indeed, we essay to prove that God exists in fact, whom as yet our minds have cognized only in idea, the inductive method is most available and conclusive. The works of God demon- strate to every sound mind the existence of God. {c.) Does the idea then originate in Revelation } This view has been afifirmed. Ellis (" Knowledge of God," p. y6)^ contends that man has no capacity to derive the idea of God from Nature by Reason ; and even that the exist- ence of God cannot be proved by any induction. His underlying thought is, that no data of the finite can logi- cally put us in possession of the Infinite ; a thought which will claim our attention in another place. Original Reve- lation, he insists, continued among men in the form of Tradition or Instruction, is the only source of divine knowledge, or of the knowledge of divine things. Such a view is obviously an extreme one. As to the first man, indeed, the revelation of God may have been coeval with his intuition of God. It could not have been 28 CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. before it, for that constitution of the mind which makes us capable of intuitions is just that also which makes us capable of revelations ; i. e., of receiving and apprehending them. Doubtless, too, that knowledge of God received by the first man, i. e. Adam, whether by revelation or intuition, or by both, was communicated by him to his descend- ants ; and has been transmitted, with more or less of modification among the nations, along the ages. And in this fact we have a true solution of many a phenomenon in the religious history of the human race. It is, however, asserting what can never be proved, to say that Revelation is the exclusive source of the ideas and truths of Religion, and especially of this primary idea of God. {d.) Is this idea an Intuition .'* What is Intuition } Direct and immediate seeing. The sun shines, and you see. Given the light and the eye, and nothing else is needed in order to clear and instant vision. In the mental sphere, Intuition is the direct and immediate seeing of truth by the mind. There is, at least, no conscious intervention of those data and processes which constitute reasoning. The whole of a thing, you affirm, is equal to the sum of its parts. Of course it is, the mind at once answers, for at once it sees the truth of the proposition. Now is the idea of God intuitive } Why not .'' God has so made man and so placed him that his sense of God is original and inevitable ; and this sense begets the idea, the moment of its own existence. The Scriptures, therefore, never argue the being of God. They calmly assume or assert it, knowing that the human mind must respond to the truth. Hence, too, the fact that the great mass of men do not gain the idea and belief of God by means of logic ; they have it, often without logic, always before it. What, further, are the tests or criteria of Intuitive Truth .'' Are they not Necessity, Self-evidence, and Universality } Does, then, the idea of God meet these criteria .'' Does it break on the mind, as light does on the eye } If not, why do all men have it .-• Why can they not get rid of it .-' How comes it that no degradation of GOD. 2g the reason, no perverseness of the will, no defilement of the conscience, no depth of moral corruption, can utterly efface from human minds the dread thought of God ? Must not that which is so clear, so irresistible, so univer- sal, be intuitive-? ■ The point is not whether we get thus our completed idea of God. Most certainly we do not : that comes from instruction and reasoning. But do we not thus get the primary and germinal thought, out of which a true logic may evolve the full idea ? 3. Result. The true account, then, would seem to be this : We have no innate ideas ; and, therefore, no innate idea of God. We are, however, so constituted that the mind has this idea as soon as it acts. As in the material sphere, when the eye opens, it sees the light; so in the spiritual sphere, when the mind opens, it sees God. There is no conscious process of reasoning. This seeing, therefore, is an intuition. But the sight or idea of God, thus gained, is only initial. It is, alike, too indefinite and too limited. There are needed now the inductions of reason from the facts of the Universe, and the still ampler testimonies of Revelation, to widen out this initial idea to its proper form and fulness, and to clothe the Great First Cause with all the attributes of the Uncreated, Living, Intelligent, Holy, and Infinite God. 4. Can God be defined? Some affirm that God cannot be defined. It is, they say, the very nature and end of a definition to mark off and bound a truth or thing from other truths or things, and so to limit them ; but God cannot be limited, and therefore God cannot be defined. This thought is more specious than solid. It rests on the mere etymological force of the word Definition. In its true view and use, a definition is a brief formula, expressing tersely and inclusively the essential qualities or charac- teristics of that which is defined. If we can frame a com- pact formula that shall contain the essential qualities or 30 CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. characteristics of God, we shall have in that formula a true definition of God ; and such a definition will hold, germinally and logically, the divine Infinity. We cannot, indeed, com- prehend Infinity, for we are finite ; but the true logical reach of our conceptions may, validly and with certainty, go far beyond our power of clear and full comprehension. 5. JV/ial is God? What, then, is God ? How shall we best formulate the infinite ideas which have their reality in Him ? The divines of Westminster answer : " God is a Spirit ; infinite, eternal, and unchangeable in his Being, Wisdom, Power, Holiness, Justice, Goodness, and Truth." (S. Cat. 2, 4.) In L. Cat. (2, 7) and in the Confession of Faith (Ch. II. I, 2), they answer the question in a manner equally ad- mirable and with more of fulness ; so that the idea of God ad intra, or of what He is in Himself, is set forth with unsurpassed excellence. In connection with the genesis of the Westminster answer to the question. What is God ? is reported the following incident : After repeated failures adequately to express the great idea, Gillespie, one of the Commis- sioners from Scotland, and the youngest member of the body, proposed that they should seek divine direction and aid. At once he himself was requested to lead the assembly in prayer. He rose and began, " O God, who art a Spirit, infinite, eternal, and unchangeable in thy Being, Wisdom, Power, Holiness, Justice, Goodness, and Truth." The fitness of his words for the definition they sought was most obvious and impressive. Admirable, however, as this is, it is a description rather than a definition of God. Still more so are the fuller for- mulas of the larger Catechism and the Confession of Faith. Besides which, they all have this defect, that while they set forth with- signal force and beauty what God is in Himself, — in His own infinite being, — they do not touch His essential relation to the Universe. GOD. 31 6. Definitions. Let us, then, glance at some other definitions of God less descriptive and concrete : — (a) God is Absoluta Vita = Absolute Life. Oetinger. {b) The Being who destinates all. Nitzsch. {c) The Being who has the ground of His existence in Himself. Wolfe. {d) The absolutely perfect Being. Cudworth. {e) The most perfect Being, and the cause of all other being. Knapp. (^.) The first three of these definitions rest on some single divine quality or function, and are too condensed to be sufficiently clear. Of the whole number, that of Knapp seems the best : " The human mind, not only by reason, but even by a sort of natural instinct, holds him to be God, who exceeds all and excels all." Recog. Clem. B. IV. Ch. 2. (p) The objection of Kant to the definition of God as the most perfect being, that it does not express His Moral Perfection, is scarcely valid. A description of God should express all His essential qualities, but it is sufficient for a definition clearly to imply them. A possible ambiguity in the formula of Dr. Knapp would be removed by these terms : God is the absolutely Perfect Being, and the origi- nal Cause of all other being. Relative perfection and medi- ate causation may pertain to creatures : absolute perfection and original causation belong only to God, and distin- guish Him from all creatures. The test of analysis or of synthesis will show that this definition contains all we can rightly express or conceive concerning Him. If it includes more than we can fully conceive, we may remem- ber that terse sentence of Albertus Magnus, in Summa Theologias, 2, 13, viz.: " Deus cognosci potest, sed non comprehendi ; " i. e., God can be known, though not com- prehended. 7. Biblical Names of God. The three principal names of God in Holy Scripture are Elohim and Jehovah in the Hebrew, and Theos in the 32 CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. Greek. Various others, such as Adonai, Elion, El-Shaddai, Despotes, Kurios, are also used, but with less frequency. The former are at the same time the more distinctive, and the more comprehensive. (a.) Elohim is the plural of Eloah ; and this springs from El. Some demur at this, because of a slight irregu- larity in the etymological process. Beyond any reasonable question, however, El is the true root of Eloah and Elohim. The specific idea it presents is that of strength or power. As a name of God, therefore (passing now its intimation of Plurality in Unity), Elohim means the Powerful Being. Accordingly, this name is chiefly used when God appears in His creational and providential acts and relations. Elohim created the Universe. Elohim upholds and gov- erns the Universe. Elohim is the Being, August, Majestic, Almighty ; the object of supreme reverence and awe. Let the whole creation bow before Elohim ! (b.) Jehovah is a composite word, from Havah = to be. According to Bengel, it takes its form from three of the tense forms of the verb from which it comes, the past, present, and future. The specific idea which it contains is that of Existence or Life. As a name of God, therefore, Jehovah means the I am or the Living One. " It is strictly and absolutely the proper name of God, and is never given to any other being, imaginary or real." (Wilkinson, p. 82.) From the tenses blending in its form, it has the special potency brought out in the notable periphrasis of the Apocalypse for Him "which was, which is, and which is to come," or the Being existing from Eternity to Eter- nity. In the usage of the Scriptures, and as compared with Elohim, Jehovah has this distinction that, while Elohim exhibits God in His acts and relations of Creation and Providence, Jehovah is seen especially in the sphere of Grace and Redemption. Jehovah is the God of the Prom- ises and of the Covenant. Jehovah makes known His will to men in the supernatural Revelation. Jehovah comes down to men by a real though ineffable incarna- tion. Not unto men, not unto angels, but unto Jehovah belong the power and glory of salvation. GOD. 33 (c.) The Greek word Theos forms the third principal Scrip- ture name of God. Plato suggested its derivation from the verb Theo = to run ; "because the first Gods were the Sun and Moon always running in the sky." Tertullian (Ad Nationes, II. 4) dismisses this derivation as ingenious but absurd. Before Plato, Herodotus wrote of the Pelasgi : "They called the Gods Theoi = Disposers ; because they had disposed and arranged all things in such a beautiful order." (II. 52.) According to this thought, Theos comes from Tithemi = to place, arrange, or dispose of things, events, and persons. As a name of God, therefore, who is over all, Theos would mean the supreme Arranger or Disposer. This etymological result is so congruous with the Biblical view of God, that one would love to adopt it. But this would seem to be impossible. Theos, though Greek in form, is not so in origin. This same word, with only formal variations, exists in the Greek, Latin, Sanscrit, and perhaps the Old German, as the name for God ; thus, Theos, Deus, Deva, and Tues, or Tuis. Its root, therefore, must be one common to all these languages, existing in that prior tongue from which these arose. Possibly, of this group of sister languages, the Sanscrit may be so much the oldest as itself to furnish the root in question. Some scholars think they find it in an old form, Div ; which, they say, means to be bright or to shine. According to this view, Theos, as a name of God, would mean Him who is Light. None of these principal Scripture names of God point directly, and of their own force, at His moral nature and attributes. Doubtless they imply them. The presence of any one divine factor argues the presence of all. At the same time our full and complete conception of God, the Perfect Being, is to be drawn, not from any single and separate part of either Nature or Revelation, but from their related and aggregate testimonies. To make this induc- tion is one of the great ends of Theology. 34 CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. CHAPTER IV. ARGUMENTS OF GOD. I . No Formal Proof in Scripture. The Scriptures attempt no formal proof that there is a God. Their first sentence assumes it. " In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth." (^.) The immense force and fulness of this initial Scrip- ture are admirably shown by Dr. Murphy on Genesis, as follows : — " It assumes the existence of God, for it is He who in the beginning creates. It assumes His eternity, for He is be- fore all things ; and, as nothing comes from nothing, He Himself must have always been. It implies his Omnipo- tence, for what but this could create .'' It implies His absolute freedom, for He begins a new course of action. It implies His infinite wisdom, for a cosmos, an order of matter and mind, can only come from a Being of absolute intelligence. It implies his essential goodness, for the Sole, Eternal, Almighty, All-Wise, and All-Sufficient Being has no reason, no motive, no capacity for evil. " It denies Atheism ; for it assumes the being of God. It denies Polytheism, and, among its various forms, the doctrine of two Eternal Principles, the one good and the other evil ; for it confesses the one eternal Creator. It denies Materialism ; for it asserts the creation of matter. It denies Pantheism ; for it assumes the existence of God before all things, and apart from them. It denies Fatalism ; for it involves the freedom of the Eternal Being." {b) Why God, in Revelation, should assume rather than prove the one great fact essential to all Religion, we are not informed. It may not have been becoming, certainly it was not necessary, that God should stoop to prove that He exists who is the absolute ground and reason of all ex- istence, as though it could be questioned. Has He not ARGUMENTS OF GOD. 35 already so made man, that his inevitable sense of God pre- cedes all reasoning ; and so that when the fact is asserted or assumed, man's whole nature responds to it as true ? In other words, the proof that there is a God goes before Revelation. It belongs to Nature and Reason. Hence Thomas Aquinas said (Summa Theol., Quest. 2, art. 3) : " The existence of God is known by natural reason, as is said in the first of Romans ; and this, and other truths of the like kind, are not properly so much articles of faith as preambles to them ; our faith presupposing natural knowl- edge, as grace presupposes nature." 2. Use of such Proof in Theology. Why, then, attempt any formal proof of God in Theology.^ Why not follow in this the method of the Bible .-' This question may be answered as follows, viz. : — ((/.) The need of any proof that God exists originates, not in the demands of right reason, but in the aversion and cavils of corrupt hearts ; and while this aversion and these cavils cannot extinguish the sense of God "in any man, they may be asserted so confidently and plausibly as to perplex and embarrass the ignorant. In their case, strength and rest would come from formal proof. {b.) Such proof, also, serves to re-enforce and confirm our intuitional ideas and convictions. Suppose that, having the intuition of God, it were at the same time out of our power, by a rational process, to verify it .'' Would not such a fact cast doubt on the intuition itself .-' And, however clear and strong any intuition, is it not a pleasure and a dignity to have it affirmed by the calm and honest induc- tions of intelligence and reason .-* 3. Classes of Argument. The kinds or classes of argument employed in Theology, to prove the existence of God, are comprehensively two, viz. : — («.) The a priori, and (p) The a posteriori. (a.) The argument a priori, strictly understood, is an $6 CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. argument from that which goes before to that which fol- lows after, from antecedent to consequent, from cause to effect. 4. No a Priori Argument for God. From this definition of terms, it is obvious that there can be no a priori argument for the being of God, since there is absolutely nothing prior to God. He is not only before all actual and possible effects. He is before all other actual and possible causes. There is no fact, no principle, no idea, no any thing, from which we can reason down to God. Those arguments, therefore, for the Divine Existence, which are called a priori, are not such in fact, as an exam- ination of them will show. The attributes of God may be reached by this argument, but not His being. " We first ascend, and prove a posteriori, or from effects, that there must be an eternal Cause ; and then, secondly, prove by argumentation, not intuition, that this Being must be nec- essarily existent ; and thirdly, from the proved necessity of his existence, we may descend, and prove many of His perfections, a priori." (Edwards, VoL H. p. 27.) 5. Instances. Many of the so-called a priori arguments for the Divine Existence show great ability. That of Lowman (1735) has been thought worthy of republication (1836). That of William Gillespie (1836) is pronounced by Tulloch (The- ism, p. 330) " remarkable." By far, however, the most celebrated of these arguments axe those of Anselm (nth century), and Dr. S. Clarke, in the Boyle Lectures, 1704 and 1705. The argument of Anselm was used to some extent by here and there a schoolman who followed him ; and was at length reproduced, with only a formal difference, by Des Cartes, from whom it is sometimes called the Cartesian. («.) These arguments are also called Ontological, from the present participle on, ontos, of the Greek verb eimi = to be ; and Logos. An ontological argument, therefore, is one derived from being ; and these a priori arguments for the ARGUMENTS OF GOD. 37 Divine Existence are also called ontological, because they are drawn from that existence itself, or from our conception of it, 6. Argument of Ansclni. The germ of Anselm's argument (Proslogium and Mon- ologium) already existed in Augustine (De Lib. Arb. L. II. c. 5, 15) and Boethius (De Con. Phil. L. III.). We discern even the Anselmic form where the great African father says (De Spiritu, 63), " Id est quo nihil majus cogitari po- test ; " /. e., it is that than which nothing greater can be thought. We may formulate the argument of Anselm thus, viz. : — {a) We have the idea of a Perfect Being, than whom no greater being can be conceived. But an actual being is greater than a merely ideal or conceptional one ; that actual Perfect Being, therefore, exists, and is God. Or {b) Thus : We have the idea of a Perfect Being. One of the attributes of a Perfect Being must be self-being ; or, what is the same thing, necessary being. Such a Be- ing, therefore, exists, and is God. According to the one form, perfection of Being is a vital factor ; according to the other, necessity of Being is involved in perfection. In both, real Being is logically evolved from the mere concept. 7. Cartesian Forms, It was peculiar to Des Cartes to make clearness and dis- tinctness the certain criteria of truth. Those criteria give form to the argument in his third Meditation. {a) I am conscious that I exist. I am also conscious that I am imperfect. Imperfection has its antithesis. I, who am an imperfect being, find within me a clear and distinct idea of a perfect One. Whence this idea .-■ Not from myself, nor from the external world. The clear and distinct idea of the Perfect, i. e. the Infinite, cannot come from the imperfect, i. e. the finite. It must come, then, from the perfect Being Himself, who therefore exists. This argument is not a priori. It is drawn from a fact 38 CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. of consciousness, not from the contents of an abstract con- ception. The fact demands a cause. So clear and dis- tinct an idea of God surpasses the power of the soul, and requires God Himself to originate it. {b) Take, then, the truer formula in the fifth Meditation : " To say that an attribute is contained in the nature or in the concept of a thing, is the same as to say that this attribute is true of this thing, and may be affirmed to be in it. But necessary existence is contained in the nature or concept of God. With truth, therefore, it may be said that necessary existence is in God, or that God exists." This is the exact thought and argument of Anselm. The existence of the Perfect Being is proved by the simple concept of such a being. 8. Value of the Argument . Is this argument valid .'' Certainly, if our mental con- ceptions have and must have, in every case, a corresponding objective reahty. But who believes this.'* Anselm did not, nor do they who accept his argument. This corre- spondence of actuality with conception is a necessity, they say, in only this case. The idea of a Perfect Being is unique. In the sphere of thought it stands alone. There can be no other like it, and therefore, though this neces- sarily involves its own outward reality, other ideas do not. In his His. Doc. Vol. I. pp. 231, 232, Dr. Shedd elabo- rates this point, and. by his able exposition and vindication clothes the argument with its whole possible force. It has not gained, however, general assent. According to Leib- nitz, Aquinas thought it a paralogism. (Christian Theism, p. 171.) Leibnitz himself (De la Dem. Cart. p. 177) thought it essentially valid, but requiring, as to form, to be both simplified and perfected. Howe (Liv. Temp. Part I, ch. 2, sec. 8) says " it admits of being managed with de- monstrative evidence." Neander (Vol. VIII. p. 203) pronounces it faulty in form, but with truth at the bottom to this extent, " that to the creaturely reason it is necessary to recognize an Absolute Being." Kant, according to Tenneman (p. 217), " has shown it to be nothing more than ARGUMENTS OF GOD. 39 an assumption of the thing to be proved." In Theism (p. 332), Tulloch says : " Kant has shown, with an acuteness and power of reasoning which it is impossible to resist, that this argument, in passing from the abstract to the concrete, confounds a logical with a real predicate ; or, in other words, stealthily translates a mere relation of thought into a fact of existence, which it does not and cannot contain." 9. Arg2unent of Dj". Clarke. The argument of Dr. Clarke finds its ground in a pos- teriori data, and by the a posteriori method. (<7.) Something now exists. {b) Something, therefore, must always have existed. {c) That which has always existed must be Self-Existent. From this point his process is mainly a priori. Having gained the datum of Self-Existence, he traces out its logical results. He thus shows, not that God is, but what God must be ; what are His nature and attributes. All that is a priori in his argument hangs on its first a posteriori links. By means of these, he reaches divine Being, and then from divine Being deduces divine perfections. Dr. Clarke's argument is a signal specimen of subtle and acute reasoning. Its logical completeness and practical worth are less evident. Reid and Stewart doubted "whether it be as solid as it is sublime." Brown denied its validity. Chalmers charged it with fallacies. Lord Brougham thought that very few men ever had any dis- tinct apprehension of it, or were at all satisfied with it ; while Sir James Mcintosh wrote : " On the whole, his failure may be regarded as proof that such a mode of ar- gument is beyond the faculties of man." 10. TJioiigJits of Newton. Some of the special elements of Clarke's Demonstration not improbably had their source in Sir Isaac Newton's ideas of duration and space, as modes or attributes of the divine Existence. In a notable passage of the Principia (Scholium Generale), that great man wrote : " Eternus est et infinitus ; omnipotens et omnisciens j id est, durat ab 40 CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. eterno in eternum ; et adest, ab infinito in infinitum. Non est eternitas et infinitas, sed eternus et infinitus ; non est duratio et spatium, sed durat et adest. Durat semper, et adest ubique ; et existendo semper et ubi- que, durationem et spatium constituit." This may be translated : God is eternal and infinite ; omnipotent and omniscient ; i. e., He endures from eternity to eternity ; and is present from infinity to infinity. He is not eternity and infinity, but He is eternal and infinite ; He is not duration and space, but He endures and is present. He endures always and is present everywhere ; and by ex- isting always and everywhere constitutes duration and space. With this speculation Newton connected his strange idea of Space as in some way the sensorium of God, as in man the brain is of the soul. Of course, if duration and space are qualities or attributes, they imply a subject whose attributes they are ; and as they are infinite they imply an infinite subject. " Proceeding on these prin- ciples," Stewart says, Phil. B. H. ch. i, "Dr. Clarke argues that Space and Time are only abstract conceptions of an immensity and eternity which force themselves on our belief ; and as immensity and eternity are not substances, they must be the attributes of a Being who is necessarily immense and eternal." Can this be so ? What are Space and Time "i Are they any thing objectively real, or are they wholly subjective and ideal .■* Ask all the greatest of the men called Philoso- phers. How numerous their answers, and how various ! Who can show the thought of Newton to be true .-' Who can show it not to be true .-* What do we know .-' " We know [McCosh, Intuitions, p. i86] that space and time exist We know, on sufificient evidence, that God exists ; but we have no means of knowing how space and time stand related to God." ARGUMENTS OF GOD. 4I CHAPTER V. ARGUMENTS OF GOD, CONTINUED. I. Arguments d. Posteriori. The second class of arguments for the being of God is called a posteriori ; i. e., such as, by a logical process, ascend from .effects to their cause. 2. Grotind of Validity. Every a posteriori argument depends, for its logical va- lidity, on the reality of cause and effect, or on the exist- ence of a real and certain connection between them, so that the one produces and the other is produced. God has so made the human mind that we cannot disbelieve this connection. If, in some cases, men act as though it did not exist, it is against their own imperishable convictions. 3. A Cause. A cause is that which immediately effects any thing, or makes it to be. Various antecedents may concur in bring- ing about any given thing, and so in a general view be its causes ; but that specific and immediate antecedent from which the thing directly comes is properly the cause of that thing. Mere antecedence, however, does not fill up the essen- tial idea of a cause. It not only has antecedence, it also has power. This is its constitutive quality. There is in it, and goes forth from it, an influence or force which orig- inates or produces what we call its effect. " By a cause," says Cicero (De Fato, 15), "we mean that which produces the effect caused ; as a wound is the cause of death ; indi- gestion, of disease : and fire, of heat. Thus we do not un- derstand by a cause a mere antecedent, but an effective antecedent." 42 CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. 4. Classification. Since the time of Aristotle, his fourfold classification of causes has been in general use ; to wit, the Material, the Formal, the Efficient, and the Final. The Exemplary cause of Plato was little, if any thing, more than the For- mal cause just noted. The ideas meant to be expressed by this classification may be clearly seen by analysis. Take something in which the four causes meet, as, for example, a statue. {a.) The Material cause is that of which the statue is made. ip) The Formal cause is the idea or plan of the artist, according to which he works. (c.) The Efficient cause is the artist himself working. {d) The Final cause is the reason or end in view of which he works, or makes the statue. In the argument for the being of God, from effect to cause. Theology seeks the Cause of causes, or the original and uncaused Efficient. 5. Effects. An effect is that which is produced by a cause, or it is the result of power in action. As mere antecedence does not constitute a cause, so mere subsequence does not con- stitute an effect. Day always goes before night ; but who supposes that day originates night .-' Night always follows day ; but who supposes that night is an effect of day .'* The relation between cause and effect is not only chrono- logic, it is also, and chiefly, dynamic ; not one of time only, but also one of power. 6. Denial of Causation. In the conflicts of scepticism with philosophic and reli- gious truth, the reality of cause and effect has been denied. A few writers before Mr. Hume expressed thoughts of this import, but it was reserved for him, in the name of philoso- phy, directly to assail the law and the fact of causation. What the human race from the beginning had conceived of ARGUMENTS OF GOD. 43 as cause and effect, he affirmed to be simply antecedent and subsequent. It is true that we constantly see events in this relation. We are thus led to associate them in our thought, and to imagine some potential nexus between them, by virtue of which one produces the other. But this is not the case. All we can know or affirm is the order of relation. This goes before, that follows after. So brilliant a metaphysician as Dr. Thomas Brown accepted this sceptical folly, only, he added, this relation of prior and posterior is invariable. Certain antecedents will be inva- riably followed by certain subsequents, though there is nothing in themselves which originates or secures the certainty. (a.) Of course, if there is no such law or fact as causa- tion, no such relation between things or events as that which men express by the terms cause and effect, the argument for the being of God on this ground fails. We cannot prove that He exists. But neither can we prove any thing else. This notion of Mr. Hume, if it be con- ceded to be true, is absolutely fatal to all reasoning. It not only undermines truth as to God, which, perhaps, was its primary aim, but it undermines all truth. The whole idea, structure, and method of universal logic proceed on the reality and certainty of cause and effect, not that there is between things and events a mere relation or order of succession, but also a relation which contains the ground and reason of the succession. 7. Anstuer. Mr. Hume's dogma cannot be true. The idea of cause and effect is what Reid calls one of " common sense," or an instinct of the intellect ; Cousin, "a primary truth ; " and Kant, " one of the a priori forms by which the human mind necessarily views the connection of external things." To deny it is to deny the instinctive and universal conviction of the human race. God has so made men — such are the nature, structure, and laws of mind — that they do and must believe in causation ; that nothing can begin to be, and no change occur, without an adequate cause. This idea per- 44 CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. vades all language, all law, all coherent thought, all rational action. Mr. Hume not only had it, but believed it to be true. He gave the most conclusive proof of this belief in his uniform conduct. He ate to satisfy hunger ; he drank to quench thirst ; he called a physician and took medicine when he was sick ; he avoided the fire lest it should burn him ; and the deep water lest it should drown him. He was never known to throw himself from a precipice that he might show the truth of his doctrine. Always and every- where, he acted just as if he believed his own assertion on this point to be utterly false, and the idea he assailed to be thoroughly true. 8. Specific Argnvicnts. The arguments for the being of God, founded on causa- tion, besides the generic designation of a posteriori, take special names from the sources whence they are drawn. A nomenclature sufficiently accurate and expressive is as fol- lows, viz. : — A. The Cosmological Argument. B. The Teleological Argument. C. The Moral Argument. D. The Historical Argument. The essential character of each one of these arguments is indicated by its name. A. The Cosmological. The word Cosmological comes from the Greek Kosmos = world, and Logos. Etymologically, therefore, it denotes an argument for the existence of God, drawn from the exist- ence of the world. {a) In its true conception, indeed. Cosmos is the an- tithesis of Chaos. Chaos denotes confusion, or wild dis- order ; Cosmos, the world as an organism ; having, therefore, order, adaptation, utility, beauty. In this argument, how- ever. Cosmos stands for the world in its total sum, as an effect. This effect requires an adequate cause. It has such a cause only in God. ARGUMENTS OF GOD. 45 (a.) Statement. The Cosmos exists. We see it, hear it, feel it. In some form it is recognized and attested by all our senses. Either, then, it must have existed from eternity, or it must have been produced in time. If it was produced in time, it must have been produced by a cause external to itself, for the thought of its self-origination is absurd. It did not, how- ever, exist from eternity, as can be shown by various argu- ments. It must, therefore, have been produced in time, by a cause external to itself, which cause is God. (b) Exposition. The term in this formula, which requires proof before the conclusion can be logically valid, is that which asserts the non-eternity of the world. By the world must be meant either — I. The Organized World, /. e. the true Cosmos ; or II. The Inorganic Elements from which the Cosmos arose. I. That the Organized or Cosmic World has not existed from eternity may be shown as follows, viz. : — {a}j Those who accept the Biblical account of the origin of the world will note that the first and immediate result of the divine action was the Tohu vau Bohu, or the inorganic and chaotic mass. Organization came afterwards. The cosmical world, therefore, is not eternal. {b) The organized world, in all the materials and all the relations of it, so far as we know them, is subject to contingency, succession, change. The idea, therefore, of its eternity requires the supposition of an eternal series of changes, each one of which had a beginning, or was not eternal, which is absurd, since the whole of a series can- not possibly be eternal, each separate link of which is not eternal. The atheistic assertion of an infinite series of men and things, as accounting for their existence, has been dissected and exposed, with great intellectual acumen and power, by Drs, Clarke and Bentley, and shown to be utterly irrational. 46 CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. Every conceivable series, whether of men or things, must, from its very nature, be made up of units, or individual links, each of which has a beginning. We see therefore, intuitively, that the whole must have a beginning, since no possible number of beginnings can become un- beginning. (c.) Geology demonstrates that the Cosmos is not eter- nal. It shows that the great mass of existing matter has undergone numerous and immense changes as to composi- tion, relation, and form, that new conditions and new orders of being have followed each other, and that the present cos- mical arrangement and human period of the world are com- paratively recent. II. That the Inorganic Elements out of which the Cos- mos was organized are not eternal may also be shown. With these data, the atheistic proposition must be, mere matter is eternal. But, if mere matter is eternal, then it is uncaused ; it has, therefore, the ground and reason of its existence in itself, i. e. it is self-existent. Of course, if it is self-existent, it depends on nothing else, i. e. it is inde- pendent. We have, then, this logical result : mere matter is eternal, self-existent, and independent. Now {«.) This conclusion contravenes Holy Scripture. Be- sides those passages which represent God as the Creator of all things, there are others which as explicitly assert that He is the Upholder of all things, and that by Him all things consist, /. e. stand up and are held together. But, if matter is self-existent, it stands up and is kept together by itself. It does not depend on God, nor consist by Him. {b) This conclusion also contravenes right reason. Mat- ter, it says, is self-existent. But whatever is self-existent is necessarily existent, i. e. it exists by the necessity of its own nature ; so that to suppose it not to exist, or to exist otherwise than it does, involves a contradiction. That which necessarily is must not only be, but it must also be immutable. We are, however, conscious of no contradic- tion in supposing matter not to be, and certainly we see it in a constant process 'of change. It does not exist, there- ARGUMENTS OF GOD. 47 fore, by any necessity of its own nature, and existing it is not immutable. It cannot, therefore, be self-existent. (c.) This notion of the eternity of matter, if it were sup- posed to be true, would furnish no solution of the facts of the Universe. Mere matter is inert. It has no intelligence, no will, no causative or formative power in itself. To act, it must first be acted on. Should we, therefore, concede that inorganic matter might be eternal, the phenomena of the Universe, both of matter and mind, would compel us to the doctrine of God. B. T/ie Teleological. The word Teleological comes from the Greek Telos = an end, and Logos. In the technics of Philosophy the noun Teleology is used to denote the doctrine or science of Final Causes. In Theology its reach is wider. The Teleological argument for the being of God is drawn from the countless and wonderful adaptations of the Universe in all its parts, of one part to another, of each to all, and of all to each, with reference to the intermediate and final ends of the immense creation, — adaptations which show not only a Creator, but a Creator of Supreme Intelligence. This argument differs from the Cosmological, not in its nature, but only in its source. That is an argument from effect simply ; this is one from effects of a specific kind. (rt.) Statement. The Teleological argument for the being of God may be formulated as follows, viz. : — Design implies intelligence, and therefore an intelligent Designer ; but the Universe, in every part of it, from atoms to planets, and from insects to angels, is full of design, minute, vast, perfect. The Universe therefore had an intel- ligent and perfect Designer, and that Designer is God. {b) Exposition by Kant. "The present world," says Kant (Crit. P. Reason, pp. 473, 474), "opens to us so immense a spectacle of diversity, 48 CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. order, fitness, and beauty, whether we pursue these in the infinity of space or in its unhmited divisions, that, even according to the knowledge which our weak reason has been enabled to acquire of the same, all language fails in expression as to so many and great wonders, all number in measuring their power ; so that our judgment of the whole must terminate in a speechless but so much the more eloquent astonishment. Everywhere we see a chain of effects and causes, of means and ends, regularity in origin and disappearance ; and, since nothing has come of itself into the state in which it is, it always thus indicates farther back another thing as its cause, which renders necessary exactly the same further inquiry ; so that in such a way the great whole must sink into the abyss of nothing, if we do not admit of something existing in itself, originally and independently extended to this great contingent, which maintains it, and, as the cause of its origin, at the same time secures its duration." In another place Kant says : " This proof is the oldest, the clearest, and the most adapted to ordinary human reason." (c.) Value. Notwithstanding the powerful passage just quoted from Kant, the character of his Philosophy required him to put this argument in the category of invalid, or at least insuf- ficient. Sir William Hamilton's doctrine of the uncondi- tioned led him to the same result. Some speculative scientists, moreover, who would evolve the universe from some primordial monad, by laws and forces of Nature itself, have found it convenient to impair the deep impression made on men by these wonderful cosmic forms and adap- tations. But neither the Subjective Philosophy nor Spec- ulative Science can subvert our mental constitution or the facts of heaven and earth. " That which may be known of God," says a profound thinker (Rom. i. 19, 20), "is manifest in them," — i. e., in the Gentiles who had no supernatural revelation, — "for God hath showed it to them. For the invisible things of Him from the creation are clearly seen, being understood by the things which are made, even ARGUMENTS OF GOD. 49 His eternal power and Godhead ; so that they are without excuse." " I feel profoundly convinced," says Sir William Thomp- son, in his address before the British Association, 1871, " that the argument of design has been greatly too much lost sight of in recent zoological speculations. Overwhelmingly strong proofs of intelligent and benevolent design lie all around us ; and if ever perplexities, whether metaphysical or scientific, turn us away from them for a time, they come back upon us with irresistible force ; showing to us, through Nature, the influence of a free will, and teaching us that all living beings depend on one ever-acting Creator and Ruler." {d.) Materials. The materials for this argument, both constitutive and illustrative, are of course drawn from the creation in its boundless extent, including matter in all its forms, quali- ties, and relations, and mind in all its attributes and mani- festations. Among the most available works, in which these materials are treated with special intelligence and ability, are Paley's and Brougham's Natural Theologies, the Bridgewater Treatises, and McCosh on Typical Forms and Special Ends in Creation. C. Moral Argument. The moral argument for the being of God is estimated and stated variously, according to the different ways men have of viewing the same thing. The opinion of Kant and of Sir William Hamilton may be inferred from what has already been stated. With Kant the existence of God is not an induction of our reason in any form of the argument, but a postulate of our moral nature. Hamilton says (Phil. Dis. p. 595), "The only valid arguments for the existence of God, and for the immortality of the human soul, rest on the ground of man's moral nature." This conclusion is an error, and untenable. The other forms of the a posteriori argument have a true logical validity, though a special power and value attach to this. By his subtle metaphysical 3 D 50 CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. and dialectical distinctions and processes, an atheist may more or less embarrass and confuse all such presentations as are addressed solely to the intellect ; but those internal and conscious data on which the moral argument proceeds, and the instinctive judgments which they originate and compel, no atheistic acumen or power can set aside. (a.) Source and Statemeiit. This argument may be founded on the moral nature of man as a whole, or on any one of its separate parts. It is simpler, and for the general mind it has a more obvious and irresistible force, to found it on that part of our moral nature which we call the Conscience, that something in every man which bids him to be and to do right, and which forbids him to be and to do wrong. The apostle Paul likens it to a law written by the finger of God, not on stone, but on the hearts of men. Cicero says : " It is that from which neither senate nor people can free us, not one thing at Rome, and another at Athens, not this to-day, and that to-morrow ; but one and the same for all nations and through all time, eternal and immortal." We may formulate the argument on this ground as fol- lows, viz. : The moral nature or constitution of every man is such that, willing or unwilling, he has the sense of right and wrong, of responsibility and obligation ; and he ap- proves or condemns himself, according as he regards or disregards this moral sense, recognizing thus, willing or unwilling, his amenability to moral law, which necessarily implies a competent moral Lawgiver, which Lawgiver is God. ((5.) An Indnctio7t. It is debated whether the result thus gained is an Induc- tion or an Intuition. Dr. Chalmers .says (Nat. Theol. Vol. I. pp. 331, 332) : "The felt presence of a judge within the breast powerfully and immediately suggests the notion of a supreme Judge and Sovereign who placed it there. Upon this question, the mind does not stop short at mere abstraction ; but, passing at once from the abstract to the ARGUMENTS OF GOD. 5 1 concrete, from the law of the heart it makes the rapid inference of the lawgiver. The sense of a governing prin- ciple within begets in all men the sentiment of a living governor without and above them ; and it does so with all the speed of an instantaneous feeling, and yet it is not an impression : it is an inference notwithstanding, and as much as any inference from that which is seen to that which is unseen." (c.) Or an hitidtion. Others, however, conceive of this matter differently. The conscience, they think (Theism, p. 313), does not con- tain in itself the power by which it rules us, but only reveals to us that power which belongs to another ; /. e., to God. The power we are conscious of in its actings is not the power of conscience itself, but the power of God in and by the conscience. We do not therefore infer from the power of conscience to the higher power of God. We are really and directly in the presence of that higher power. The voice of conscience is the voice of God. This speculation has some interest as a speculation. It is of no practical moment, however, as to the present ar- gument. Whether reached by induction or intuition, the result is the same, and no man can set it aside, until he can destroy or subvert his moral nature. In tones articulate as speech, and that vibrate through man's being, con- science affirms God. {d) Dijferentia. The difference between this argument and the two pre- ceding is not generic, but specific. Like the Cosmological and the Teleological, it is a posteriori, from effect to cause ; but the effect reasoned from is peculiar. {a.) In the Cosmological argument, we reason from the world in its totality as simply an effect, requiring, there- fore, an adequate producing cause. We reach thus effi- cient power. {b.) In the Teleological argument, we reason from the world, not in its totality, and as an effect simply, but as 52 CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. having on it and in it indications of thought, reason, judg- ment, and will, which are indeed effects, like the Cosmos itself, but effects of a peculiar kind, requiring a spiritual and intelligent cause. We reach thus, not only efficient power, but also designing intelligence. (c.) In the Moral argument, we reason, not from the external world at all, but from an effect wholly unique, existing within man as an integral part of himself, and whose existence requires not only a producing power and intelligent designer, but also those higher qualities which regulate power and ennoble intelligence, and which we call moral. We thus reach the right, the good, the holy. D. Historical Argument. The Historical argument for the being of God is that which is drawn from the consensus gentium ; i.e.., the con- sent of the nations, or the universal conviction and confes- sion of men. Cicero (Nat. Deo. Lib. I. 17) appeals to this, or rather Velleius who is the speaker there, though later, in Sec. 23, Cotta denies both the fact and the conclusion drawn from it. As to the fact, it cannot be truly denied. The few in- stances cited by Cotta in proof of his denial, as Diagoras, Theodorus, and Protagoras, and those also alleged in later times, granting them real, which probably they were not, do not appreciably affect the great and incontestable truth, that the immense mass of men, the world over and time through, have had the idea and the belief of God ; and this idea and belief have been, not only universal, but so deep- seated and strong that the few reputed atheists have been commonly regarded, as Maximus Tyrius (Diss. I.) said, " monsters rather than men." {a) Solntion. Now this fact can be truly accounted for in only three ways, viz. : it is either 1. An Intuition, or 2. An Original Revelation, or ARGUMENTS OF GOD. 53 3, An Induction of Reason ; and on any of these suppo- sitions the argument for God is valid : for 1. If this universal belief is an intuition, it is, of course, true ; or if 2. It is an original revelation, the result is the same, since the very idea of such a revelation implies God as the Revealer ; or if 3. This universal belief is an induction of reason, then the universality and intensity of the induction show the mind of man to be so constituted that the belief of God is a necessary belief, and therefore true. 9. Miracles and Prophecy. To these arguments, some would add that drawn from miracles and prophecy. This belongs, however, not to natural, but to revealed Religion. It can avail only with those who admit the recorded facts of Holy Scripture, or that miracles and prophecy are real. On this admission the argument is plain and valid, and may be framed thus, viz. : — (a) A Miracle is an effect of supernatural power : it must be wrought, therefore, by one who is above nature, and who, therefore, is God. Or (^.) A Prophecy is an effect of supernatural knowledge : a knowledge, therefore, above that of creatures ; knowledge, therefore, of a Creator, who is God. 10. Validity of these Ai'giiments. Such, in a condensed form, are the a posteriori arguments for the divine Existence, the arguments from effects to their cause. Are they indeed valid .-' Do they fairly carry us up to God .'' Conceding them to be valid, as far as'they go, do they in fact go to the extent of our great con- clusion ? {a) Objection. The judgment of Kant and Hamilton, with the reasons of it, has already been noted. Many other intelligent and firm theists hold a similar view. All our logical pro 54 CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. cesses, they affirm, however far they may carry us towards God, fail in the end, because their data are not broad enough for the vast concUision. We cannot from the finite infer the Infinite. But all effects are finite ; and though every effect must have a cause, a finite effect does not logically argue an infinite cause. From the highest possible reach of the finite, there is still an immeasurable distance to the Infinite. That distance we cross, not by a logical inference, but by a mental necessity. {b) Answer. What makes this necessity .-* If all the demands of reason are met by the finite, why does the mind need more .'' or can a mental necessity be other than a rational one .'' Instead of a mental necessity, Kant and Hamilton resort to a moral postulate. Does this postulate rest on reason .'' or is it without reason ? Test the objection thus, viz. : — First Test. . {a) It is granted there can be no more in an effect than there is in its cause. {b.) It is equally certain, however, that there may be less in an effect than there is in its cause. An infinite cause, therefore, may produce a finite effect. Existing finite effects, therefore, may have had an infinite cause. But (c.) Can existing finite effects be ultimately referred, by a true logical process, to any finite cause ? If so, what and where is that cause .-' If not so, are we not logically compelled to a cause not finite, i. e. infinite .<* • Second Test. (a.) Do not the facts of the Universe compel us, by a clear and strict logic, through all secondary causes to a First Cause .'' {b.) Is it not, moreover, an obvious and necessary logi- cal induction that the First Cause must itself be uncaused }