'^-^# ■\. ! ' i G»S » '-^ K^^^J "» 'X- A x ^A. /v-2:^>5p>v DISCOURSE Ce^ncerning the Being and j^t tributes of GOT), THE Obligations of Natural Religion, AND THE Truth and Certainty O F T H E Chriftian Revelation. In Anfwer to Mr Hobbs, Spinozat the Author of the Oracles of Reafon^ and other Deniers of Natural and Revealed Religion. Being fixteen SERMONS. Preach'd in the Cathedral- Church of Sc PW, in the Years 1704, and 1705, at the Ledure Founded by the honourable ROBERT B O r L E, Efq; ByS JMUEL CLARKE, D. D. Redor of St. Jameses IVeftminfter, The Seven 1 h Edition, Correded. There ii inferted m : his Edition^, vf-DiscoURSE concer-fWig the Connexmi of the Vrophefes J7i the Old Tejlame7itg and the Amplication of them to Chriji. There is aifo added, ^» ANSWER ^a ^Seventh Letter, concern- ing the Argument i /)nm, in Proof of the Being of GOD. London^ Printed by IV. Bofham, for James and John KnaptoN; at the Croepn in St,Pafti's Church-Yard. M dccxxviii. A DEMONSTRATION OF THE Being and Attributes o F GOD. More Particularly in Anfwer to Mr. HO BBS, ST I NO Z J, And their Followers. Wherein the Notion of L I B E R TT is Stated, and the PofTibility and Certainty of it Proved, in Oppofition to Neceffity and Fate. Being the Subllance of Eight SERMONS, Preach'd in the Cathedral-Church of St. Paul^ intthe Year 1704, at the Ledure Founded by the Honourable ROBERT BOl^'LE, Efq; 5/ S A M U E L C L A R K E, T> . T) , Re^OV of St. JamesV Weftminfter. The Seventh Edition, CorreSed. Rom. i. 20. Tor the invtfible things of Him frotn the Creation of the World are clearly jeen^ being undirflood by the things that are made ; even his Eternal Tower andGodhead : So th^t they are without excufe. London: Printed by W. Botham, for James and John Knapton, at the Crown in St. Paul's Church- Yard. Mdccxxviii. TO THE Moft Reverend Father in God THOMAS Lord Archbifhop of Canterbury ; and Primate of all England : Sir HENRT ASHURST, Baronet; Sir "^OHN KOrHE%^AM> Knight, Serjeant at Law ; JOHN EVELIN. Efquirei Truftees appointed by the Honou- rable RO 5 fJ^T BOTIE. Efquire. This Difcourfe is humbly Pedi- cated* THE PREFACE. THERE being already published ma- ny and good Booksy to prove the Being and Attributes of God^ I have chofen to contraEi what was requifite for me to fay upon this Subje£i, into as nar^ row a Compafs 5 and to exprefs what I had to offer y in as few Words, as I could with Ter^ fpicuity. For which Reafon I have alfo con- fined my felf to One only Method or continu- ed Thread of Arguing 5 which I have endea^ vouredihould be as near to Mathematical, as the Nature of fuch a Difcourfe would allow ^ Omitting fome other Arguments, which I could not difcern to be fo evidently concha five : Becaufe it feems not to be at any time for the real Advantage of Truth, to ufe Ar^ guments in its behalf founded only on fuch Hypothefes, as the Adverfaries apprehend they cannot be compelled to grant. Tet I have not made it my Bufinefs, to oppofe any of The P R E F A C E. of thofe Arguments 5 becaufe I think it is not the beft way for any one to recommend his own Performance^ by endeavouring to difcover the ImperfeBions of Others who are engaged in the fame T)efign with himjelf of promoting the Intereft of true Religion and Virtue, But every Man ought to ufe ftich Arguments only^ as appear to Him to be clear and ftrong 5 and the Readers mttfi judge whether they truly prove the Conclu- fan. THE THE CONTENTS. TH E Introdudlion, concerning the Caufes of Atheifm. Page i P R o p. I. That Something has exiftedfrorn Eternity. 8 Of the Difficulty of Conceiving Eternity. 9 That Difficulties arifing merely from the Nature of Eternity, are not to be regarded j becaufe equal in all Suppofitions. ibid. Prop. II. That thet'e has exified from Eternity fome one ImmutaUe and Independent Being, 1 1 Of the Abfolute Impoffibility of an Eternal Succeffion oi Dependent Beings, exifting with- out any Original Independent Caufe at all. 1 3 Prop. III. That nat Immiitahle and Indepen- dent Beings which has exiftedfrom Eternity^ with- out any External Caufe cf its Exiftence ; 7nuft be Sdf-Exifient^ that is ^ Necejfarily-Exifting, i^ Of the true Idea of Self-Exiftence : That it Is the Idea of a Being, the Suppofition of whofe Non-Exiftence is an exprefs Contradidion. 17 That every Man may be more certain of the Being of a Supreme Independent Caufe, than he can be of any thing elfe beildes his own Exiftence. 1 9 Of the Idea of God, including Self- Exiftence. 20 That the Material World cannot poffibly be the Firft, Original, and Independent Being. 22 The Eor^n of the World, not NecefTary. 23 Nor its Motion, 24 Mr. Poland's, pernicious Opinion, of Motion be- ing eftential to Matter, confuted. ibid. b The The CONTENTS. The Matter of the World not Neceflarily-ex- ifting. . . , 25 \^ A Confutation of Spinoza's Opinion concerning one only Subftance. 26 Concerning the Eternity of the World ; And that the Opinion of the beft Antient Philo- fophers in that Matter, did not at all favour the Sentiments of Modern Atheifls. 29 Prop. IV. ^hat the Suhjlance or Effence of that Beings which is Self-Exiftent or Necejfarily-Exifr- ing^ is ; we have no Idea, neither is it at all poffi- ble for us to comprehend it, 37 Of Infinite Space. 39 Of the Vanity of explaining things by fuch School-Terms, as have really no Significati- on at all. 40 Prop, V. 'That though the Subftance or Effence of the Sdf-Exiftent Beings is it felfabfolutely inco7npri:-' henfible to us : let many of the Effential Attributes of his Nature are ftri^ly Demonftrahle^ as will as his Exiftence, As in the Fir ft Place, that //e, and defaced the Rcafon of their ovv n Minds ; and, inftead of fairly and impartially enquiring into the Rules and Obligations of Na- ture, and the Reafon and Fitnefs of Things, have accuilomed themfelves only to mock and feoff at Religion •, and, being under the Power of Evil Habits, and the Slavery of Unreafonable and In- dulged Lufcs, are refolved not to hearken to any Reafoning which would oblige them to foriake their beloved Vices. Or from Or, nirdly^ Becaufe in the way of SpecuJathe falfe Phi' Rcafoning^ and upon the Principles of Philofophy, bjcj^h'j. ^i^^y pretend that the Arguments ufed Againft the Being or A.rtributes of God, feem to them, after the ftricleil and fullell inquiry, to be more flrong and conclufive, than thofe by v/hich we indeavour to prove thefe great Truths. Thefe feem the only Caufes that can be imagi- ned, of any Man's disbelieving the Being or At- tributes ot God •, and no Man can be fuppofed to be an Atheift, but upon one or other of thefe three A.ccounts. Now to the two former of thefe three forts of Men ; namely, to fuch as are wholly ignorant and flupid, or to fuch as through habi- tual Debauchery have brought themfelves to a Cu- ' flom Being and Attributes of Got)] i Horn of mocking and fcofling at all Religion, and v/ill not hearken to any fair Reafoning ; it is 7Jot my prefent Bufmefs to apply my felf. The One of thefe, wants to be inftruded in the firft Princi- ples of Reafon^ as well as of Religion ; The Other disbelieves only for a prefent fliife Intereft^ and be- caufe he is defirous that the Thing fhould not be true. The One has 7iot 'jet arrived to the ufe ot his natural Faculties : The other has renounced them ; and declares he v/ill not be argued with, as a rational Creature. 'Tis therefore the third fort of Atheifts only (namely thofe who in the v/ay of Speculative Reafoning., and upon the Principles of Philofophy, pretend that the Arguments brought Againft the Being or Attributes of God, do, up- on the ftrideil and fulled Examination, appear to them to be m.ore ftrong and conclufive, than thofe by which thefe great 1 ruths are attempted to be proved -,) Thefe, I fay, are the only Atheiflical Perfons, to vWiom my prefent Difcourfe can be fuppofed to be direded, or indeed wlio are capa- ble of being reafoned with at all. Nov/ before I enter upon the main Argument, I fhall premife feveral Conc'effions^ which thefe Men, upon their own Principles, are unavoidably ohliged to make. And Firf^ They muil of neceffity own, that, T^he -Being fuppofingit cannot be proved to be true, yet zx^f ^^^ :^'^'. leait 'tis a thing very defirable, and which any wife ^^f^^''"'*" Man would wilh to be true, for the great Benefit and Happinefs of Men \ that there was a God, an Intelligent and Wife, a Juft and Good Being, to govern the World. Whatever Hypothefis thefe Men can polTibly framiC -, whatever Argument they can invent, by which they v/ould exclude God and Providence out of the World \ That very Argu- ment or Hypothefis, will of neceiTity lead them to this Concejf.on, If they argue, that our Notion B 2 of ^ A DemonJIration of the of God arilcs not tVoni Nature and Reafon, but from the Art and Contrivance of Politicians -, That Argument itielf forces them to confefs, that 'tis manifelHy for the Intereft of Humane Society, that it Ihould be beheved there is a God. If they fup- pofe that the World was made by Chance^ and is every Moment fubjecl to be defbroyed by Chance ao-ain ; no Man canbefo abfurd as to contend, that 'tis as comfortable and defirable to live in fucli an uncertain State of things, and ♦Maria ac Terras Mumq;- "".lb continually liable to Ruin, Una dies dabit exiiio, mul- without any Hope of Renovati- tolq; per auncs q^ •, as in a World that were un- ^"chmTMundr^''' ''''' ^^^ ^^^ Prefervation and Condudl !-Didiisdabitiprafidem of a Powerful, Wife, and Good res God. If they argue againft the Forl'.tan,8vgraviterterraruin Being of God, from the Faults Oir^ 'conqu^^^^^^^^ in parvo ^^"^ Defers which they imagine tempore ccmes. they can find in the Frame and Lticrct, Lib. 5. Condi tution of the Vijible and Material World •, this Suppofiti-- on obliges them to acknowledge, that it would have been better the W^orld had been made by an Intelligent and Wife Being, who might have pre- vented all Faults and Imperfections. If they ar- gue againfl Providence, from the P'aultinefs and Inequality which they think they difcover in the Management of the Moral World ; this is a plain ConfclFion, that 'tis a thing more fit and defira- ble in itfelf, that the World fliould be governed by a Juft and Good Being, than by mere Chance \ or Unintelligent Neceflity. Laftly, if they fup- pofc the World to be eternally and necefTarily Self- exiftent \ and confequently that every thing in it, is eftabliflied by a Blind and Eternal Fatahty ; no rational Man can at the fame time deny, but that Liberty and Choice, or a Free Power of Ading, is a more eligible State, than to be determined thus Being and Attributes of Go d, Jf . thus In all our A6lions, as a Stone is to move down- ward, by an abfolute and inevitable Fate. In a word, which way ibever they turn themfelves, and whatever Hypothecs they make, concerning the Original and Frame of Things •, Nothing is lb cer- tain and undeniable, as that Maji^ confidercd with- out the Protedion and Condu(5l of a Superiour Being, is in a far worfe Cafe •, than upon Suppofi- tion of the Being and Government of God, and of Mens being under his peculiar Conduct, Pro- tedion and Favour. Man, of himfelf, is infinite- ly infufficient for his own Happinefs : ^ He is lici'-^^rch-'Bp. hie to mari'j Evils and Miferics^ u;hich he can ;7(?i/krTiHotfon'i prevent nor redrefs : He is full of Wants which ^-^- |ohTxvilt cannot fiippl^y and compajfed about 'ujith Infirmities ^<^^ which he cannot remove^ and ob?toxious to Dangers which he can never fufficientlj provide againft : He is fecure of nothing that he enjoys in this World, and uncertain of every thing that he hopes for : He is apt to grieve for what he cannot help, and eagerly to dc- fire what he is never likely to obtain, &c. Under which evil CircumRances 'tis evident there can be no fuflicient Support, but in the Belief of a Wife and Good God, and in the Flopes which true Re- ligion affords. Whether therefore the Being and Attributes of God can be demo?ifl rated, or not *, it muft at leaft be confelTed by all rational and wife Men, to be a thing very Bcfirable, and which they would heartily ^F///6 to be true, that there v/as a God, an InteHigent and Wile, a Juil and Good Being, to Govern the World, Now the Ufe I defire to make of this ConcefTi- on, is only this : That fmce the Men I am argu- ing with, are unavoidably obliged to confefs, that 'tis a thing very defirable at leaf, that there fhould be a God •, they muft of necefiity, upon their own Principles, be very willing, nay, defirous above all things, to be convinced chat their prefent Opi- B ^ nion '4$ A T>emo7tflration of the nion Is an Errour, and fincerely hope that the contrary may be demonftrated to them to be true; And confequently they are bound with all feriouf- nefs, attention and impartiality, to confider the weight of the Arguments, by which the Being and Attributes of God may be proved to them. sc»fmgat Secondh^ All fuch Perfons as I am fpeaking of, Relijio?i, ^vho profefs themfelves to be Atheifrs, not upon a7;t.\c«,. any prefent Intereil or Luft, but purely upon the Principles of Reafon and Philofophy ; are bound by thefe Principles to acknowledge, that all 7nock'- ing andy?^/f% at Religion, all jeiting and turning Arguments of Reafon into Drollery and Ridicule, is the moft unmanly and unreafonable thing in the World. And confequently they are obliged to exclude out of their Num.ber, as Irrational and Self-condemned Perfons, and unworthy to be ar- gued with, all fuch Sconers at Religion, who de- ride at all adventures without hearing P.eafon ; and who will not ufe the Means, of being con- vinced and fatisHed. Hearing the Reafon of the Cafe with Patience and Unprejudicednefs, is an . Equity which Men owe to every 'Truth that can in any manner concern them ; and which is necef- fary to the Difcovery of every Kind of Errour^ How m.uch m.ore in things of the utmoft Impor- tance ! i-'irtuccind TrJirdh]^ Since the Perfons I am difcourfing to, ^mrs^ayo- ^^^^^^^ t>ut own, that the Suppofition of the Being Utel^ m- ^^ God, is in it felf moil defirable, and for the (ejjarj. benefit of the World, that it fhould be true ; They mud of NecefTity grant further, that, fup- pofmg the Being and Attributes of God to be things not indeed Dem.onftrable to be true, but only Pojlible^ and fuch as cannot be demonftrated to be falfe ; as mofl certainly they cannot ; And much more, fuppofing them once made to ap- pcc\r ProhabL\ and bucniorc likely Co be true than |:ho Being and Attributes of Go d. the contrary Opinion : Nothing is more evident, even upon thefe Suppoficions only, than that Men ought in ah reafon to hve liGuJlj and virtuoKjIy in the World \ and that Vice and Immorahty are, upon all Accounts, and under allHypothefes, the mod abfurd and inexcufable Things in Nature. Thus much being premifed, which no 4^theift who pretends to be a rational and fair Inquirer in- to Things, can poiTibly avoid granting -, (and o- ther Atheiils, I have before faid, are not to be difputed with at all ; as being Enemies to Rea- fon^ no lefs than to Religion^ and therefore abfo- Jutely Self-condemned :) I proceed now to the main Thing I at firil propofed ; namely, to en- deavour to lliow, to fuch confidering Perfons as I have already defcribed, that the Being and At- tributes of God are not only polTible or barely probable in themfelves, but alfo flriddy demonftra- ble to any unprejudiced Mind, from the mioft un- conteilable Principles of Right Reafon. And here, becaufe the Perfons I am at prefent dealing with, muil be funpofed not to believe any Revelation, nor acknowledge any Authority which they will fubmit to, but only the bare force of Reafoning : I fhall not, at this time, draw any Tefcimony from Scripture, nor make ufe of any fort of Authority, nor lay any ftrefs upon any popular Arguments in the Matter before us ; but confine m.y \z\i to the Rules of ftrid and demon- ftrative Argumencation. Nov/ Many Arguments there are, by which the Being and Attributes of God have been underta- ken to be De?notiJh'atcd. And perhaps moft of thofe Arguments, if throughly underftood, right- ly ftated, fully purfued, and duly feparated from the fah'e or uncertain Reafonings which have fometimes been intermix'd with them *, would at length appear to -be fubftantial and concluiive. B 4 But |f A T)emonjlratton of the But becaufe I v/ould endeavour, as far as polTible, to avoid all manner of perplexity and confufion \ therefore I fiiail not at this Time ufe any Variety of Arguments, but endeavour by Ont clear and plain Series of Proportions neeeffarily conne6led and following one from another, to demonilrate the Certainty of the Being of God, and to deduce in order the NecefTary Attributes of his Nature, fo fir as by our Finite Reafon we are enabled to difcover and apprehend them. And becaufe it is not to my prefent purpofe to explain or illu (Irate things to Them that Beheve, but only to convince Unbelievers, and fettle Them that Doubt, by ftrid and undeniable Reafoning *, therefore I fhall not allege any thing, which, however really true and ufeful, niay yet be liable to Gontradi<5Lion or difpute ; but fhall indeavour to urge Such Pro- portions only, as cannot be denied without de- parting from that Reafon, which all Atheids pre- tend to be the Foundation of their Unbelief. On- ly it is abfolutely Necefiary before all Things, that they confent to lay a fide all manner of Frt- judices ; and efpecially fuch, as have been been apt to arife from the too frequent Ufe of 'Tenns af Jlrt^ which have no Ide^.-s belonging to them ; an^ from the common receiving certain Maidms of Pbilofophy as true, which at the Bottom feem to be only Propofuions zvitbGUj a//y Mean'uig or Siojii- Jic alien at alL ^omctWing I Firftthen, it is Abfolutely and Undeniably ' tnul have ^ • ^i *. c *? • / ■ ,r J c ii j-, Exified ^^^^^^'^^ Xh?X boniest fjing has c>;ijied lro7n ali LterKit\^ /rt'w £;fr- This is fo evident and Undeniable a Propofitiori, ^^^J' that no Atheift in any Age l:as ever pre fumed to affert the contrary ; and therefore there is little need of being particular in the proof of it. For fince Something now \%^ 'tis evident that Sonic- thing always Was : Qtherwife the Things that Now Being and Attributes of Gob, ij Now Are, muil have been produced out of No- thing, abibkitely and without Cauie : Which is a plain Contradi6lion in Terms. For, to fay a Thing is produced^ and yet that there is no Caiffe aC all of that Produ(^lion, is to f-iy that Something is EJft'Lfed^ when it is Effeofedby Nothing ; that is, at the fame time when it is not EffcBed at all. What- ever Exifts, has a Caufe, a Reafon, a Ground of its Exiflence •, (a Foundation, on which its Ex- iflence relies ; a Ground or Reafon why it doth extfl^ rather than not exift ;) either in the NecefTity of its own Nature, and then it mufb have been of it/elf Eternal : Or in the Will of forne Other Being ; and then That Other Being muff, at leail in the order of Nature and Caufality, have Exiil- ed before it. That Something therefore has really Exified from ofiheDif- Eternity^ is one of the certaineft and moft evident ^^"'^^^ ^^ Truths in the World •, acknowledged by all Men, ^^Tcrnu'J and difputed by none, let as to the Manner how- it can be ; there is nothing in Nature more diffi- cult for the Mind of Man to conceive, than this very firfl Plain and Self-evident Truth. For, How any thing can have exifted eternally ; that is. How an Eternal Duration can he now atiualU Pall : is a thing utterly as impolTible for our narrow Under- fliandings to comprehend, as any thing that is not an exprefs ContradicfHon can b^ imagined to be : And yet to deny the Truth of the Propofition, that an Eternal Duration is 7iow acluaily fail ; v;ould be to TiKtxi fomeihing flill far more Unintelli- glhle^ even a real and exprefs Coniradicfion. The Ufe I would make of this Obfervation, hBljfHtdtUs This. That fmce in all Queilions concerning the ^''-fi^Z Nature and Perfections of God, or concerning ^'frlZ%e ny thing to which the Idea of Eternity or Infinity Nature of is joined -, tho' we can indeed-' Demonilrate ctr-^f^''"ify* tain Propofitions to be true,' yet 'tis impoffible for ""'l ^'/'^ us. en. \o 'AT^emoiiflrdtlon of the huaufe e- us to comprehend or frame any adsequatc or com- W '"^'''' pleat Ideas of the Manner How the Things fo de- ""'''"^^^■^'"'- monftrated can Be: Therefore when once any Propofition is clearly dem.onilrated to be true; it ought not" to difturb us, that there be perhaps perplexing Difficulties on the other fide, which merely for want of adequate Ideas of the Man- jier of the Exiftence of the Things dcn:ionPi'rated, arc not eafy to, be cleared. Indeed, were it poifi- ble there fiiould be any Proportion which could equally be Demonftrated on both fides of the Que- llion, or v/hich could on both fides be reduced to im'A^ a ContKadiuion •, (as fom.e have very incon- Iidcrately afferted •,) This, it muft be confefled^ would alter the Cafe. Upon this abfurd Suppo- fition, all Di Terence of True and Falfe, all Thinking and Reafoning, and the Ufe of all our Faculties, would be entirely at an End. But when to Demcnftration on the one fide, there are op- pofed on the other, only Diiliculties- railed from our want of having adcequate Ideas of the Things themfelves \ this ought not to be efteemed an Ob- jection of any real Weight. 'Tis direclly and clearly DemonflrcMc^ (and acknowledged to be fo, even by All Athcifls that ever lived,) that ^oine- thirtg has been from Eternity : All the Objections therefore raifed agfdnit the Eternity of any thing, grounded merely on our want of having an adae- quate Idea of Eternity ; ought to be looked upon as of no real Solidity. Thus in other the like Inilanccs ; 'Tis Def?ionfirable, for example, that Souietblng muft be aulnally Infinite : All the Meta- phyfical Difficulties therefore, w-hich arife ufually from applying the Meafures and Relations of Things Finite, to v/hat is Infinite *, and irom fup- pofing I'lnites to be [Aliquot] Parts of Infinite^ when indeed they are not properly fo, but only AS Mathematical Points to Quantity, which have no Being and Attributes of Go d7 if TioPropprtion at all : (and from, imagining All Infinites to be Equals when in things difparate they manifefdy are not fo ; an infinite Line^ being not. •only not equal to^ but infinitely lefs thdu an infinite Surfaee^ and an infinite Surface than Space infinite in all Bbnenfions :) All Metaphyseal Difficulties, I fay, ariOng from falfe Suppofitions of this Kind, ought to be eileemed vain and of no force. A- gain : 'Tis in like manner Demonflrable^ that ^{antity is infinitely Divifihle : All the Objedions therefore raifed, by fuppofmg the Snins total of . all Infinites to be Equals when in difparate Parts they manifeftly are ;2^/ fo ; and byl comparing the imaginary Equality or Inequality ofi the Number of the Parts of Unequal Quantities, whofe Parts have really no Ntanher at all^ they all having Parts without Nuinher ; ought to be look'd upon as weak and aluogether inconclufive.: To ask whe- ther the Parts of unequal Quantities be equal in Number or not, when they have no Nurhber at all -, being the fame thing as to ask v/heiher tv/o Lines drawn from di-ferently diftant Points, and each of them continued infinitely, be equal in length or not, that is, whether they End together, v/heii neither of them have ^/Z); E/^J ^/^//. There muft II. 'There has Exifted from Eternity^ "f So7ne One have e^iji- Unchangeable and Independent Being. For fmccJ^f^^^^^' Something mufl needs have been from Eternity ; j^fX/>J»- ^ as has been already proved, and is granted on :i\\ dem Being, hands: Either there has always f The Meaning of this Pro- Exifted fome one Unchangeable porition,(andAllthatthe ^r- and Mepndent^cn.^, from which f^ mu"n%3'SwSs all otaer Beings mat are or ever been some independent Bei',^g, v/ere in the Univerfe, have re- ^omto^ieatkafi. To fliow ceiv'd their Orio-inal ; or elfe ^\^^ ^^^^'^ .c^" ^e, no More 1 11 ■ r -^ o rr than One, is not the JJelign there has been an infimte Succeffi- ^^ ^^^^ Propoiition, but of pn of changeable and dependent the seventh. Beings Xi A T)emonJlration of the Beings produced one from another in an endlefs Progreftion, ivithout any Original Caufe at all. Now this latter Suppofition is fo very abfurd, that tho' all Atheifm mufl in its Account of mod things (as fhall be fhewn hereafter) terminate in it, yet I think very few Atheifls ever were fo weak as openly and directly to defend it. For it is plainly impolTible, and contradit:fory to it felf. I ihall not argue againfl it from t\\tfiippofed ImpofTi- bility of Infinite SuccefTion, barely and ahfolutely confidcred in it felf 'y for a Reafon which Hiall be mentioned hereafter. But, if we confider fuch an iniinite ProgrefTion, as One entire Endlefs Series of Dependent Beings •, 'tis plain this "Ji'hole Series of Beings can have no Qiuic frojn without^ of its Ex- iflence •, becaufe in it are fuppofed to be included all things that are or ever were in the Univerfe : And 'tis plain it can have no Reafon zvilhin itfilf, of its Exifrence *, becaufe no one Being in this In- finite SuccefFion is fuppofed to be Self-exiftent or Neeefary, fwhich is the only Ground or Reafon of Exiflence of any thing, that can be imagined ^ovithin the thing it felf ^ as will prefcntly more fully appear,) but every one Dependent on the forego- ing : And where no Fart is neceflary, 'tis manifeft the Whole cannot be neceflary : Abfolute NecefTity of Exiflence, not being an extrlnfick^ relative^ and accidental Denomination ; but an inward and effen- tial Property of the Nature of the Thing which fo Exifts. An infinite SuccelTion therefore of merely Dependent Beings, without any Original Independent. Caufe -, is a Series of Beings, that has neither NecefTity, nor Caufe, nor any Reafon or Ground at all of its Exiflence, cither within it- filf or fro7n zvithcut : That is, 'tis an exprefs Con- tradidion and ImpofTibihty *, 'tis a fuppofing Some- thing to DC cauJedy{bcCcmiQ 'tis granted in every one of its Stages of SuccefTion, not to be necejja- my Being and Attributes /?/ G o d 13" W/)' and ofitfdf;) and yec that, in the whole, 'tis caufed ahfolutely by Nolbing. Which every Man knows is aContradi^iion to imagine donei;? ^i7?ie', and, becaule Duration in this Cafe makes no Dif- ference, 'tis equally a Contradiftion to fuppofe it done fro??t Eternity. Andconfequently there muft, on the contrary, of NecelTity have exiifed from Eternity, Jo7ne One Immutable and Independeht Being. To fuppofe an ififihite SuccelJion of changeable and dependent Being* produced one from another in an endlefs Progrellion, zvitbcut any Original Caufe at all •, is only "*• a driving back from one ftep to another,^ * n,^, ^^,^,^ f,^, ^^^^ and (as it were) removing out of veil tlliiftrat£d,by a l^^te able Sio-ht, the Queftion concerninp; ^'^'nter. " Suppole a cha^n the Ground or Reafon of the Ex- W ^ ^"^^ °tf f^^^" litence of Thmgs. ' 1 is in reah- .» Height; and. though Every ty, and in point of Argument, " hnkot it gravitated to ward the very flime Suppofition •, as it " the Earth.and what it hung 1 1 1 ^ r r r\ ,• j "P^n was not vihble, vet would be to luppois One continued «. ,1 ^id not defcend, but Being, of begin ninglefs and endlefs " kept its fituation : And, Duration, neither felf-exiflent " "P^" This, a quellion ** fliould arife, What fup- ** ported or kept up this Chain ? Would it be afufficient Anfvver, to fay, ** that the Fir/t or Lowell Link hung upon the Second, or That next above •• it; lh<^Secohui,ov rather ih^Fir/i a?2d Second rogether^u^onihe Third ; and *' fo on in infirtitmn ? For, IVloat holds up the Whole ? A Chain of «* ten rmkfy would fill down ; unlefs fomething, able to bear it, hin- " dered. One of Tiventy, if not ilaied by fomething of a yet Grea- " tcr Strength, in proportion to the Increafe of Weight. And therefore " One of infinite links, certamly ; if not fudained by Something infi- " nirely llrong, and capable to bear up an infinite Weight. And Thus " it is in a Chain of Caufes nnd Ffetls ; tending, or (as it were) gra- •* vitating, towards fome End. The Lail, or Lowell, depends, or (as *' one may hy^ is jufpcnded upon the Caufe above it. This again, if «' it be not the Firit Caufe, i?^ fufpendcd, as an Elfed, upon Something ** above it ; z>'c. And if they fliould be infinite ; unlefs (agreeably to *' what has been faidj there is fome Caufe, upon which All hang or " depend; they would be but an wfinite ifett, vv'ithout an ifficient, " And to alTert there is any fuch Thing, would be as great m Abfur- " dity as to fay, that a finite or little Weight wants fomething to fullain " it, but an infimte one (or x)x^,GreateJl) does not," ^.^Ugm of Kature Mineatsdt pag. 67. ' " ^ aj^j 14 A l^emonflratiGyi of the and NeceiTary in itfelf, nor having its Exiftence founded in Any Self-exiftent Cauie. Which is direftly ablurd and contradictory. Otherwife, thus. Either there has always ex- illed fome One Unchangeable and Independent Be- ing, from which all other Beings have received their Original -, or elfe there has been an infinite Succefnon of changeable and dependent Beings, produced one from another in an endlefs Pro- greffion, without any Original Caufe all. Ac- cording to this latter Suppofition •, there is No- thing, in the Univerfe, Self-Exiftent or NecelTa- rily-exifting. And if fo •, then it was originally equally pojjible^ that from Eternity there Ihould never have exifted any thing at all -, as that there fhould from Eternity have exiiled a Succefiion of changeable and dependent Beings. Which be- ing fuppofed \ then, What is it that has from E- ternity determined fuch a SuccefTion of Beings to exift, rather than that from Eternity there fhould never have exifted any thing at all ? Neceffity it was not ; becaiife it was equally poffible, in this Suppofiti-on, that they Ihould not have exifted at all. Chance^ is nothing but a mere Word, with- out any fignification. And Other Being 'tis fiip- pofed there was none, to determine the Exiftence of thefe. Their Exiftence -therefore v/as deter- mined by Nothing ; neither by any NecefTity in the nature of the Thihgs themfelves, becaufe 'tis fuppofed that none of them are Self-exiftent ; nor by any other Being, becaufe no other is fuppofed to Exift. That is to fay ; Of two equallypoffwle things, {viz. whether anj thijtg or nothing fhould from Eternity have exifted,) the one is deter- mined, rather than the other, ahfokUelj by No- thing : W^hich is. an exprefs Contradiction. And confequently, as before, there muft on the con- trary, of NecefTity have exifted from Eternity, fome Being and Attributes of God. 15 fome One Immutable and Independent Being. Which, ivhat ic is, remains in the next place to be inquired. III. 'That imchaymahle and independent Beings '^^^^ °^« ^johkh has Exifted from Eternit^j^ zvlthcut any exter- ^^^-^ ' 7ml Caufe of its Exifience -, mufi be Self-Exiftent^ that mufti, is, Necejfarilyexifting. For whatever Exiils, mn?i cejfariiy either have come into Being out of Nothing, ab- ^^^fi^^'g folutely without Caufe ; or it mull have been pro- duced by fome External Caufe ; or it mufl beSelf- Exillent. Now to arife out of Nothing, abfo- lutely without any Caufe ; has been already fliown to be a plain Contradidion. To have been pro- duced by fome External Caufe, cannot pollibly be true of every thing -, but fomething muil have exifted Eternally and Independently ; As has like- vyife been fhov/n already. It remains therefore, that That Being vWiich has exifted Independently Irom Eternity, m.uft of NecefTity be Seif-exiftent. Now to be Self-exijlent^ is not, to be Produced by itfdf \ for that is an exprefs Contradiction. But it is, ("vvhich is the only Idea we can frame of Self- exiftence , and without which, the wend feems to have no Signification at all : ) It is, I fay, to . ex'ifi by an Ahjolute Necejjity originally in the Na- ture of the Thing itfelf And this Necefiity,^ muft be Antecedent ; not indeed in Time, to the Exif- tence of the Being itfelf ; becnufe That is Eter- nal : But it muft be Antecccicnt in the Natural Or- der of our Ideas, to our Suppofition of its Being. That is ; This NecelTity muft not barely be co7tfe~ quent upon our Suppofition of the Exiftence of fuch a Being -, (For then it would not be a Ne- ceftity Abfolutely fuch in it felf, nor be the Ground or Foundation of the Exiftence of any thing, being on the contrary only a Cqnfequent of it ;) But it muft antecedently force it felf upon us, whe- ther we will or no, even when we are indeavour- ene- / ^c, 1 6 " A T>emonJIration of the Ing to fuppofe that rxo fuch Being Exifts. For Example : When v/e are endeavouring to fup- pofe^ that there is no Being in the Univerfe that exiiis Neceflarily ; we always find in our Minds, (befides the foregoing 'Demonilration of Some- fag, II, thing being Sclf-exiftent, from the Lnpofflbility of '^^' ever\ Thing's being dependent •,) We always find in our Minds, I lay, fome Ideas, as of Infinity and Eternity •, which to remove, that is, to fuppofe that there is no Being, no Subftance in the Uni» verfe, _to v/hich thefe Attributes or Modes of Exiilence are neceflarily inherent, is a Contradic- tion in the very Terms. For Modes and Attri- butes exift only by the Exiftence of the Subftance to which they belong. Nov/ he that can fup- pofe Eternity and Immenfity (and confequently the Subftance by whofc Exiftence thefe Modes or Attributes exift,) removed out of the Univerfe -, may, if he pleafe, as eafily remove the Relation of Equality between twice two and four. That to fuppofe Immenfity removed out of the Univerfe, or not neceflarily Eternal^ is an ex- ;prsfs contradiction ; is intuitively evident to every one who attends to his own Ideas., and confiders the EflTential Nature of Things.- * Moveantur Partes Spa- To fuppofe ^ any part of Space tii de Locis fuis, 8c move- removed^ is to fuppofe it removed buntar [f'^ ''"^ ^''^^^fb from and out ./^ itfelf : And to Seipiis. Newton. Fnncip. Lib. J J u . ?. I. IchoL adDefinit. 8. fuppofe the Whole to be taken a- ivavy is fuppofing it to be taken aivay from itfelf that is, to be taken away while it ftiil rejuains : Which is a Contradiction in T^enns, There is no Obfcurity in This Argument, but what arifes to thofe who think hnmeife Space to be abfolutely Nothing, Which Notion, h itfelf hke- wife an exprefs contradiolion. For Nothings is That which has No Properties or Modes whatfoever. That is to fay \ 'tis That of which nothing can trtt- ^4 Bei72g and Attributes of God. i r Ij he affirmed^ and of which Eve'ry thing can truly he denied. Which is not the Cafe of hunenjity or 8race. From this Third Propcfition it follows^ ijt. That the only true Idea of aSelf-exlftent orjhe^^nr NeceJfarilyExijling Beings is the Idea of a Beings ^^^ ion oF the Sup:poJition_of whofe Not-cxiCting is an exprefs^^^ ^:^-^' ContradiBion. For fince it is abfohately impoffible but there muft be Somewhat Self-exiftent ; thdXpag. li. e^ i.s, which exifls by the Ncceffity of its own Na-^J- ture ; 'Tis pJain that I'hat neceffity cannot be a Neceffity confequent upon any foregoing Suppo- fition,' (becaufe Nothing can be Antecedent to that which is Self-Exiilent, no not its own JVill^ i^o as to be the Caufe or Ground of its own Ex- iflence,) but it mufl be a NecelTity ahfolutely fuch in its own Nature. Now a Neceffity, not rela- tively or confequentially, but ahfolutely fuch in its own Nature -, is nothing elfe, but its being a plain Impofllbihty or Implying a Contradiction to fup- pofe the contrary. For Inftance^ : The Relation of Equality between twice two and four, is an abfolute Neceffity j only becaufe *tis an immedi- ate Contradidion in Terms to fuppofe them une- qual. This is the only Idea we can frame, of an abfolute Neceffity •, and to ufe the word in any other Senfe, feems to be ufmg it without any Signification at all If any One now asks, what fort of Idea the I- dea of that Being is, the Suppofition of whofe Not-Exifting is thus an exprefs Contradidlion : I anfwer, 'tis the Firil and Simplefl Idea we can poffibly frame , an Idea neceffa^ily and effcntially included or prefupppfed,^ as Tifine qua non^ in eve- ry other Idea whatfoever ; an Idea, which (unlefs we forbear thinking at all) we cannot poffibly ex- tirpate or remove out of our Minds ; of ^. moft fi?n- pie Bein^y ahfolutely Eternal and hfjiite^ Original and C Independent, I S A T^emonllration of the Independent; For, that he who fuppofes there is no Original hdependenlBQino^m theUniverfe, fup- pofes a Contradidion -, has been fhown already. And that he who fuppofes there may pofTibly be no Eternal and Infinite Being in the Univerfe, fuppofes likewife a Contradiclion, is evident from hence \ fbefides that thefe two Attributes do neceluirily follow from Self-originate Inde- pendent Exiftence, as fhall be fliown hereaf-. ter ;) that when he has done his utmoll, in in* deavouring to imagine that no fuch Being Exifts ; he cannot avoid imagining an Eternal and Infi- nite t Nothing ; that is, he will t See the Anfwer to z se- imasine Eternity and Immenfitv 'venth Lerrcr, at the End or ^j ^r^uxT* r"' this Book. removed out or the Univerfe, and yet that at the fame time * page i5. {-]-iey fi;]]] continue there. As has been above '^ diftindiy explained. The En or This Argument the Carte/tans, who fuppofed f>fthe Car- tj^e Idea of Lmnenfitj to be the Idea of Matter^ teiians. i^^y^ httn greatly perplexed with. For (howe- ver in f Fords they have contradicted themfelves, yet in Reality) they have more eafily been driven to that mofl intolerable Abfurdity, of afierting Matter ^ to be a Necefiary Be- * Tutoimplicare contradiai' ing j than been able to remove onem, ut Mundus fit finhus : q^^ of their Mlnds the Idea of i;^,aio;;:fo:^:;:!; w:^;: ^'--^^ asExiiiingNecenariiy be Finite, airtef. ififi. 6c,. and infeparabiy from Eternity. p'lm&varus. Which Abfurdity and inextrica- And his Follower Mr R.^y.. ble Perplexity of theirs, inrc^ Mats tent etre (iaith hej que r n ,- i t i r t r, je raifonne -mal, &c. /. e. But n^ect ot the Idea 01 Immenfitx^ perhaps I argue ill, when I fliOV/5 that they found "That m- conclude that the Property ^eed to be NecelTIiry and impof- my Idea hath to repretcnt r^ ^ ^ i t» • Extenfion, ithatis, mthcfenfe ^^^^^ to be removcd ; But, in re- oj the Cartef:ans, MatteKQ {pt(Et of Matter, 'twas only aper- comes from Extenfion it felf, yerfe applyino; an Idea to an Ob- asitsCaufe. For, What hin- • o. \ ^ ^ *=> , , ikrs me from bdievin? that J^^> wheretQ It no wavs belongs. ^ if For. ^emg and Attributes of GK)t>] 19 jFor, that 'tis indeed abfolutely J^ ^^'s Property comes not impoffible and contradiaory to ^'""^ ""^ ^f' >''-''' ^'f. '^ r " '- Ti/T ^* rr- -^ -n^ may comc from lome Spirit luppoie Matter neceiTarny-exifl- ^or Bnng\ Superiour tome, ing, fliall be demonflrated pre- vvhich produces in me rhe fentlVw ^^^^ ^'^ Extcnlion, though ''' Exreniion docs not ad-uaily . . . cxill ? Yet when I conlidcr the thmo; attentively, I find that my Conclufion is good j and that no Spirit [yr^Being'] how excellent foever, can caufe the Idea which I have of Extcnhon, to repreiVnt to me Exreniion rather than any thing elfe, if Extenfion does not actual!/ Exift ; Becaufe if he fhould do fo, the Idea which I f]:ouid then have of Flxrcnfion, would not be a reprefentation of ExtsYifiony but a reprefentation o^ Nothing, Which is impoftible. But it may be I flill deceive my ielf, when Ilay that the Idea I have of Exrerlion, fuppofes an Objea; aftually exifting. For it Teems that I have Ideas, which do not fuppofe any Ohjeft: I have, for Example, the Idea of an Enchanted Caftle ; though no fuch thing really Exifts. Yet when I confider the Difficulty flill more attentively i' I find there is this difference between the Idea of Extenlion, and that of an Enchanted Callle j that the firft being natural, that is, indepei'ident on my V/ill, fuppofes an Objed' which is neceflarily fuch as it reprefentsi whereas the other being artifici- al, fuppofes indeed an Objea:, but 'tis not nccciTary that That Objeft be ab- folutely fuch as the Idea reprefcnts, becaufe mv Will can add to that Obje6t, or diminilh from it, as it pleafesj as I havebefore faid, and as fliall bepro- ved hereafter, when I come to treat of the Origin of Ideas. Rem Metathyf. Lib. I. Par. I. Cap. 3, ^ ^ ^ ^^ idly. From hence it follows ; that there is no Nothing fo Man whatsoever ,^ who makes am ufe of his Reafon^ ccrmn,as 7 J. /* 7 7 J •' J ^ J ' the £">"//£" but may eafity become more certain of the Being of a enceofi Supre??ze Independent Caufe, than he can he of any supreme thing elfe hefides his own Exiflence. For how much ^""^'Pf'-^^f Thought foever it may require to demonflrate the '"^ ^^'''^' Other Attributes of fuch a Being, as it may do to demonflrate the greatefl Mathematical Certain- ties ; (of which more hereafter : ) Yet, as to its Exiflence ; that there Is fbmewhat Eternal, Infi- nite, and Self-cxifling, which mufl be the Caufe and Original of all other Things -, this is one of the Firfl and moft natural Conclufions, that any Man, who thinks at all-, can frame in his Mind : And no Man can any more doubt of this, than he. can doubt whether twice two be equal to four. C % .'Tis 20 A Demonfl ration of the 'Tis polTible indeed a Maii may in foiTie fenfe be. ignorant of this firlt and plain Truth, by being utterly ftupid, and not thinking at all : (For though it is abfolutely impofTible for him to "ima- gine the contrary, yet he may pofTibly negle6b to conceive this : Tho' no Man can pofTibly Think that twice two is not four, yet he may polTibly be ftupid, and never have thought at all whether it be lb or not. J But this I lay : There is no Man, who thinks or reafons at all, but: may eafily become more certain, that there is Some- thing Eternal, Infinite, and Self-exifting •, than he can be certain of any thing elfe. o^'rheidea 3^'h^- tlencc we may obferve, that Our firft ofGo.im-Cerlainty of the Exijlence of God, does not arife cUidmg f-^^Qjj^ ijjir ifj^ii ip^ |-|^g i(^£a ^^;^ Minds frame of hhn, liLme ' (^^ rather in the Definition that zve make of the word, God, as fignf'^ing a Being of all fojfihle Perfeolions,) ive inchfde Self-Exiftence : But fro?n hence, thai 'tis dejnonftraUe both negatively, that neither can all Things poffibly have arifen out of No- thing, nor can they have del ended one on another in an endlefs Succeffion \ and alfo pofitively, that there is Something in the Univerfe, adually exifting v/ith- out us, the Suppofition of whofe Not Exifti?ig, plainly implies a Contradiofion. The Argument which has by Some been drawn from our includ- ing Self-Exiftence in the Idea of God, or our compi-ehending it in the Definition or Notion we frame of him •, has This Obfcurity and Defea in it : that it feems to extend only to the Nominal Idea or fiiere Definition of a Self-Exiftent Being, and does not v/ith a fufBciently evident Connexi- on refer and apply That general Norninal Idea, De- fin-tion, or Notion which we frame in our own Mnd, to any Real particular Being a5fually exift- ing without us. For it is not Satisfaftory, that I have in my Mind an Idea of the Pro^ofttion \ There exifts Being and Attributes of God» 2 1 exifls a Being indued with all poffMe Ferfcuions ; Or, Inhere is a Self-ExiJJent Being. But I muft al- io have fome Idea of the Thing. I mull have an Idea of Something aclually exifling without me. And I mull fee wherein confifls the Abfo- lute ImpolTibihty of removing that Idea, and con- fequently of fuppofing the Non-Exiftence of the Thing ; before I can be iatisned from that Idea, that the thing adtually exifts. The bare having an Idea of the Propohtion, Inhere is a Self- Exiftent Beings proves indeed the Thing not to be impolTible -, (For of an impolTible Propolition, there can be no Idea ;) But that it actually Is, cannot be proved from the Idea ; unlefs the Cer- tainty of the Adual ExiHence of a Neceflanly- exiding Being, follows from the Poffdnlit-j of the Exiilence of fuch a Being : Which that it does in this particular Cafe, many Learned Men have in- deed thought ; and their fubtil Arguings upon this Head, are fufficient to raife a Cloud not very eafy to be feen through. But it is a much Clear- er and ?7iore Convincing way *of Arguing, to de- m^onftrate that there does adually exift without us a Being, whofe Exiilence is neceilary and of it felf ; by Ih owing the evident Contradidion contained in the contrary Suppofition, fas I have^*^^ "* before done •,) and at the fame time the abfolute ^' ImpofTibiiity of deflroying or removing fome l-page \6. deas, as of Eternity and Immenfity, which therefore mufl needs be Modes or Attributes of a necelTary Being aftually Exiiling. For if I have in my Mind an Idea of a Thing, and cannoc pofTibly in my Imagination take away the Idea of that Thing as actually exiiling, any more than I can change or take av/ay the Idea of the Equality ot twice two to four -, the Certainty of the Exift ence of that Thing is the fame, and fbands on the fam$ Foundation;, as the Certainty of the other C 3 Relatkn zz AT)enionftration oj the Relation. For the Relation ot Equality between tv/ice two and four, has no other Certainty but this -, that I cannot, without a Contradiction, change or take away the Idea of that Relation. We are Certain therefore of the Being of a Supreme Independent Caufe ; becaufe 'tis llridly demon- ftrable, that there is fomething in the Univerfe^ a6tually exifting without us,, the Suppofition of whofeNot-exiiling plainly implies a Contradidion. f 5^5 the Some Writers have contended, that 'tis f ^'^^- An{yoer to pQfi^yous to inquire in this manner ^/ ^// into the ifr/'ri G>'ourJ. or ReaP)n of the Exillencc of the Firft ih^Endof Caufe : Becaufe evidently the Firft Caufe can have ihisBoQk. nothing Pn.9r to it, and confequently mufl: needs (they think) exift ahfolutel-j zvithout Any Caufe at all. That the Firft Caufe can have no Other BE- ING prior to it, to be the Caufe of its exiftence. -, is indeed Self-evident. But if originally^ ahfalutely^ and antecedently to all Suppcfiticn of exiftence, there be no neceiTary Ground ox Keafon.^\\Y the firft' Caufe. does exift., rather than not exift ; If the Firft Caufe can rightly and truly be affirmed to exift, abfo- luteiy without Any Ground or Reafon of exiftence at all : It will unavoidably follow, by. the fame Ar- gument, that it may as well Ceafe likewife to ex- ift, without any Ground or Reafon of Ceafing to ex- ift : Which is abfurd. The Truth therefore plain- ly is : Whatever is the True Reafon.^ why the Firft' Caufe can never pofribly Ceafe lo exift- \ the Same IS, and originally and always Vv'as, the 1'rue Rea- fon wdiy it always did and cannot but exift' :. That is^ ^cis the Frue Ground and F^eafon of its Exiftence. That the ^thh, From hence it follov/s, that The Materu Material al V/orld canuot foftihly he the Firft and Original Be- ^^'%7l^r ^'^l^ Uncreated, 'independent., and of it felf EternaL tetkeUf- For lince it hath been already demonftrated, that Lxif.cHt Whatever Being hath Exifted from Eternity, In- Bcsng, dependent, and without any External Caufe of its Being and Attributes of God, 2 ^ its Exiftence, mull be Self-Exiftent -, and th^itP^S- '5- Whatever is Self-Exiftent, muft Exift Necelllirily by an abfolute NecefTity in the Nature of the Thing it felf : It follows evidently, that unlefs the Material World Exifts NeceiTarily by an Abfolute Necefllty in its own Nature, fo as that it muft o- an Exprefs Contradi6lion to fuppofe it not to Ex- ift •, it cannot be Independent, and of itfelf Eter- nal. Now that the Material AVorld does not Ex- ift thus necefllirily, is very Evident. For abfo- lute Neceftity of Exifting, and a Pofiibility of not-Exifting, being contriidiclory Idea's •, 'tis mia- nifeft the Material World cannot Exift Neceflari- ly, if without a Contradidtion v/e can Conceive it either Not to Be^ or to be in any refpe6l other- wife than it Now is. Than which, nothing is m.ore eafy. For whether we confider the Form of the World, with the Difpofition and Motionofils Parts •, or whether we confider the Matter of it, as fuch, without refped: to its prefent Form ; Every Thing in it, both the Whole and every one of its Parts, their Shuation and Motion^ the Form and alfo the Matter^ are the moft Arbitrary and Dependent Tilings, and the fartheft removed from Neceftity, that can poftibly be imagined. A Neceftity in- deed of Fitnep^ that is, a Necelftty that Things fhould be as they are, in order to the JVell-heing of the v/hole, there may be in all thefe Things : But an abfolute Neceftity of Nature m any of them, (which is v/hat the Atheift muft maintain,) there is not the leaft appearance of. If any Man will fay in This fenfe, (as every Atheift muft do,) either that the Foi'-m of the W^orld, or at leaft the Matter and Motion of it, is neceftary *, Nothing can poftibly be invented more Abfurd. If he fays, that the particular Pbr?;^ is '^tct^^.-The For?^ ry •, that is, that the A¥orld, and all 'Things that^^/^-'^ are therein, exift by Neceftity of Nature ; ^^nec?.r»v^ C 4 ' " mx& fiC'O %^ A 'T^emonftration of the muft affirm it to be a Contradidion to fiippofe that any Part of the World can be in any relped: othei-ivifc rhin it now is. It mufl be a Contradidi- on in Terms, to fuppofe more or fciver Stars, more ov feiver Planets, or to fuppofe their Size^ Figure or Motion^ Different from what it now is ; or to, fuppofe rno-rc or fc:u:cr Plants and Animals upon Earth, or the prefent ones of different Shape and Bigfiefs from what they now are. In all which things there is the grcateil Arbitrarinefs, in re- {Y>Qtt of Power and PofTibility, that can be ima- gined •, however neceiiliry any of them may be, in refpecl of Wifdom, and Prefervation of the Beauty and Order of the whole. :ori:,Mo- I^ the x\theif[; will lay, that the Motion in Gene- ral of all Matter is neceffary •,- it follows that it muff be a Contradidion in Terms, to fuppofe a- ny Matter to be at Reft, Which is fo abfurd and ridiculous, that I think hardly any Atheifts, either Antient or Modern, have prefumed dircdlly to fuppofe it. '^ Mr. To- One late ^ Author indeed has ventur'd to afferr, •and, Letr^^nd pretended to prove, that Motion^ (that is, • ' the Conatus to Motion^ the "Tendency to m.ove, the Pov^er or Force that produces adiual Motion,) is effential to all Matter. But how Philofophically, may appear trorn this One Confideration. The effential -Tendency to Motion,^ of every one, or of any one Particle of Matter in this Author's inia- ginary infinite Plenum^ muff be either a Tendency to n^iove fome one determinate way at once, or to move ever\, zvay at once. A Tendency to move fome one determinate way, cannot be effential to any Particle of Matter, but muff arife from fome External Caufc *, becaufe there is nothing ia the pretended neceffary Nature of any Particle, to determine its Motion neceffarily and effentially: hne ivay rather than itnotber^ And a Tendency ox Conatus Being and Attributes of Gov>, if ■ Conatus equally to move every way at once, is ei- ther an ablolute Contradi6tion, or at leafl could produce nothing in Matter, but an Eternal Reji of all and every one of its Parts. If the Atheiil will fuppofe Motion necefiary and eiTentinl to yc?;;^^? Matter, but not to all: The fame Abfurdiry, as to the Dcten?unaiton of Motion, Hill follows : And now he moreover fuppofes an Abfolute Neceflity not Univerfal \ that is, that it ihall be a Con tradition to fuppofe fome certain Matter at Reft, tho' at the lame time fome other Matter adlually be at Reil. If he only affirms bare Matter to be Necefiary : ^or the Then, befides the extreme Folly of attributing^''''''^ •*^^^- Motion and the Form of the World to Chance , (v/hich fenfelefs Opinion I think All Atheifls have now given up ; and therefore I ihall not think my felf obliged to take any Notice of it in the Sequel of this Difcourfe :) it may be demonftrated by ma- ny Arguments drawn from the Nature and Af- fedlions of the Thing it felf, that Af^///^r is not a neccffary Being. For Inftance, thus. If Matter be fuppofed to exiil Necelfarily *, then in that Ne- cefiary Exifiience, there is either included the Power of Gravitation.^ or not. If not ; then in a World merely Material., and in which yio Intelli- gent Being prefides, there 7iever could have been any Motion \ becaufe Motion, as has been already fiiown, and is now granted in the Queftion, is vioipge i^i necefiary of it felf. But if the Power of Gravi- tation he included in the pretended NecefiTary Ex- ifi:ence of Matter ; then, it following neceiTarily that there mufi: be a Vacuum., (as the incompara- ble Sir Ifaac Newton * has abundantly demonftra-^Piincipid ted that there mufi:, if Gravitation be an Univer- ^^ilo^oph- fal Quality or Affedion of Matter;) it follows'^'^P^"''^ likewife, that Matter is not a Necelfary Being, rdir.fecun- For if a Vacuum adually he^ then 'tis plainly more da, ;. %(>% than 2 6 A T>emo7iJlration of the than pofTible for Matter not to Be. If an Athcill: will yet AlTert, that Matter may be neceffary, though not necelTary tobe^wr); ijohere: lanfwer, this is an exprefs Contradidion. For ahfolute Ne- cefTity, is abfolute NecelTity tver'j where alike. And if it be no Impoffibility for Matter to be ab- fent fi-om one Place, 'tis no ImpofTibility (abfo- lutely in the Nature of the Thing ; For no Rela^ tive or Confequential Neceffity, can have any Room in this Argument :) 'Tis no abfolute Im- poffibility, I fay, in the Nature of the Thing, that Matter fliould be abfent from any other Place, , or from ever^ Place. Spinoza s -^ Opm:on • tuerunt, quamproductofant. aiiiercnt from V/hat It nOV/ IS,, IS :prop. 53. Ex Neceflltare Divina: Natursc, infinita infinitls modis (hoc eft, omnia <^ux fub intelicitum inLaitum cadcre poiiuRt) icqui debent. Prop, 16. becaufe 2r r>} Being and Attributes of Gov. becaufe every thing flov/s from the Necrjfity of the Divine Nature. By v/hich if the unwary Reader underftands, that he means things are therefore NecefTarily fuch as they are, becaufe Infinite Wifdom and Goodnefs could not polfibly make Things but in that Order which is Fitteft and Wi- fell: in the Whole ; he is very much miftaken : For fuch a Neceffity is not a Natural, but only a MonJ,jiaiijConi£C[i^^ Neceflity, and direct- ly contrary to the AutlTor's true Intention. Fur.- ^ ther ; if the Reader hereby underftands, that /2} God was determined, not by a Neceffity of Wif- dom and Goodnefs, but by a mere Natural Ne- ceffity, exclufive of Will and Choice, to tnake all Things juft as they nov/ are ; neither is This the whole of Spinoza's meaning : For This, as abfurd as it is, is flill fuppofing God as a Subftance di- ftina: from the Material World -, Which ^ ¥ictx-*Loc'is fu^ preily denies. Nay further; if any one thinks f^^,"^'^^'-'- his meaning to be, that all Suhfiances in the World, are only Modifications of the Divine Ejjence \ nei- ther is This All \ For thus God may flill be fup- pofed as an Agent, ading upon hiiufelf at lead, and manifefling hi?fifelf in dilferent manners, ac- cording to his own Will : Which t Spinoza exprefly denies. But his true Meaning therefore, however darkly and ambiguoufly he fome- times fpeaks, mufl be this ; and, if he means any thing at all confiftcnt with him • felf, can be no other than this : That, fince 'tis abfolutely "^ impoffible for any thing to be created or produced wtrr r^n. • by another ; and % alio abfolute- produci ab alia fubflantia, ly impoffible for God to have P'^P- ^' caufed any thing to be in any re- ^."^ Resnullo aliomodo neq; fped different from what it now IZZrc^u.^lZZax^^^^^ i3 3 every thing that_exifls, muH i'ro]>. 21. needs ■f Deum non operari ex li- berrate voluntatis. Prop. 52. Carol. I. 5c Scholiu7nn.d Trof, 17- A T>€monJiration of the \ Procter Deum nulla d.r<', needs be fo a Part I of the Divine ncq; concpipoteft lublhnna. Subftance, not as a Modification '^^^'Dtum non operari ex caufed in it by any -^ Will or Libertate voluntatis. ?ro^. Good-Pleafure or Wifdom in the 32. c^ro//. «. whole, but as of Abfolute Ne- + Nu lo alio ModOi neqi ^ • -^ r ir • 1 r n. oZme Sec. ceffity in It ielf, with refped; to the t manner of the Exiftence of each Part, no lefs than with refpedl to the Self- exiftence of the whole. Thus the Opinion of J Spinoza^ when exprefied plainly and confiftently, comes evidently to this : That the Material TVor Id ^ and every Part of it, with the order and manner of Being of each Part, is the only Self-Exiftent, or Necefiarily-ExiiLing Being. And now Confe- quenrly, he muft of NecelFity affirm all the Con- clufions, which I have before fliown to follow demonftrably from that Opinion. He cannot poffibly avoid affirming, that 'tis a Gontradi6tion, (not to the Pe?yeaions of God ; For that's mere fenfelefs Cant and Amufement in Him who miain- rains that there is but One Subftance in the Uni- verfe ; But he muil" affirm that 'tis in it fef and in Therms a Contradiction,) for any thing to be, or to be imagined, in any refped otherwife than it now is. He muft fay 'tis a Contradi6lion, to fuppofe the Nwnher^ or Figure^ or Order of the feveral Parts of the World, could poffibly have been different from what they now are. He muft fay. Motion is necellarily of it felf \ and confe- quently that 'tis a Contradidlion in Terms, to fuppofe any Matter to be at Reft : Or elfe he muft affirm, (which is rather the more abfurd of the two j as may appear from what has been al- •^,r II ready faid in proof of the Second General Head of '^ ^ this Difcourfe : And yet he has -^ * Corpus n-!otun%velquicr- chofen to affi.rm if,) that Mo- cens, adiTiotum vd quierem tion , as a Dependent Being, detcrminari debuit ab^ alio i^,^^ ^^^^^^ eternally com.muni- ' ^- catcd from, one piece of Matter to Being and Attributes of God 2^ to another ; Vv'ithout having at all turn vel quietem determina* any Original Caufe of its Being, ^""J ^X'\t ^^Tr^ '^^"^^^ either withm it lelt or from with- turn. Par. II. Prop, 13. out. Which, with other the like Lemma i. Confequences touching the Neccf- fity of the Exigence of Things ; (the very men- tion of which, is a fufficient Confutation of any Opinion they follow from ;) do, as I have faid, unavoidably follow from the forementioned Opini- on of Spinoza, And confequently That Opinion, "viz. That the Umverfe or Whole JVorld is the Self- exillent or Necejfarthj-exiftijig Being., is demonitra- tcd to be faife. I have in this Attempt to fliow that The Mate- rial World cannot pjjibly he the Firft and Original Being., Uncreated., Independent., and Self-exiftent ; defignedly omitted the Argument ufually drawn from the fuppofed abfolute ImpolTibility, in the Nature of the Thing itfelf, of the World's be- ing Eternal., or having exifted thro' an Infinite SucceJJion of Time. And this I have done for the two following Reafons. ift. Becaufe the Queilion between us and theo/ the o- Atheifls, is not whether the IVorld can poffibly haveP'"'^^ '^^"" been eternal ; but whether it can poffibly be the Ori- ^^j^ '^I ginal^ Independent and Self-exifting Being : "Which the World. is a very diiierent Queftion. For many, who have affirmed the One, have ftill utterly denied the Other. And almoft all the Antient Philofo- phers that held the Eternity of the World, in whofe Authority and Reafons our Modern Athe- ifts do fo greatly boaft and triumph ; defended That their Opinion by fuch Arguments, as fliow plainly that they did by no means thereby intend to aflert, that the Material World was the Origi- nal^ Independent, Self-exifling Being, in Oppofi- tion to the Belief of the Exiitence of a Supreme All- 30 A T)emon(lration of the All-governing Mind^ which is the Notion of God. So that the Deniers of the Being of God, have no manner of Advantage from that Opinion of the Eternity of the World, even fuppofmg it could not be difproved. Almoft all the old Fhi- lofophers, I lay, who held the Eternitj of the World, did not thereby mean (at lead their Ar-^ giiments do not tend to prove) that it was Inde- pendent and Self-Exiilent j but their Arguments are wholly levelled, either to prove barely that Something muft needs be Eternal, and that the Uni- verfe could not pofTibly arife out of Nothing ab- folutely and without Caufe -, which is all that Ocel- lus Lucanus^s Arguments amount to : Or elfe that the World is an Eternal and NecelTary Effeof, flowing from the ElTential and Immutable Energy of the Divine Nature -, which feems to have been jffijiotle's Opinion: Or elfe that the World is an Eternal Voluntary Emanation from the All-wife and Suprem^e Caufe •, v/hich was the Opinion of many of Plato's Followers. None of which Opi^ nions or Arguments, will in the leaft help out our Modern Atheifts ; who would exclude Su- preme Mind and Intelligence out of the Uni- verfe. For however the Opinion of tKe Eterni- ty of the World, is really inconfiftent with the Belief of its being Created in time •, yet fo long as the Defenders of that Opinion, either did not think it Inconfiflent with the Behef of the World's being the Effe^I and iVork of an Eternal^ Jll-zvife^ and Jll-Pozverfid Mind ; or at leaft could defend that Opinion by fuch Arguments only^ as did not in the leaft prove the Self-exiftence or Inde^ pendency of the World, but moft of them rather quite the contrary *, 'tis v/ith the greateft Injuftice a-nd Unreafonablenefs in the World, that Modern Atheifts (^to whofe purpofe the Eternity or Non- Eteniit.yof the World would fignifie nothing, '- - unlefs Being and Attributes of Go if. 5 1 \jhlefs at the fame time the Exiftence and So- vereignty of Eternal Intelligence or Mind were likewife difproved,) pretend either the Autho- rity or the Reafons of thefe Men to be on their fide. Ocellus Liicamis^ one of the ancientefl: AfTer- ters of the Eternity of the World ; (whofe Anti- quity and Authority "^ Mr Blunt oppofes to that of Mofes '^) in de- livering his Opinion, fpeaks in- deed like one that believed the Material World to be Self-exiftent ; aiTerting, t that it is utterly incapable either of Generation or Corruption^ of Be- ginning or End ', that it is of it felf Eternal and Perfeof^ and Per^ manent for ever -, and that the Frayne and Parts of the World muft needs he Eternal^ as well as the Sub- flance and Matter of the Whole, But when he comes to produce his Arguments or Reafons for his Opinion ; they are either fo very abfurd and ridiculous, that e- ven any Athcljl in this Age ought to be afliaraed to repeat them •, as when he proves * that the World muft needs he EternaU without Beginning or •*• Oracles ofReafon-y Letter toMrGildon, p. 2.16. ' Avcift^cf }^ UTiXivl'/srov. Koa-fju^ kvrce, i^ iocvr^ cc'i^- yjivajv T tiuvtcc diSva. 'A« 0V7<^ Tit n^fTfJ^a, UVeC'/'- Ksiiov :^ 7U fJ^i^T) ujJtov c-wv- vov, y^p. Sec. Occll. Lucan, lisp* '^'^TTUvTot; emonJIration of the he hys t that the IVorld mtift have been Eternal^ becaufe 'tis a Con- tradiolion for the Uni-verfe to have had a Beginning ; fince if it had a Be ginning fit mufl have been caufed by Some other things and then it is not theJjniverf. '1\) which One Argu- ment, all that he fays in his whole Book, is plainly reducible. So that 'tis evident, all that he really proves, is only this ; that there mull needs be an Eternal Being in the Univerfe : and not, that Mat- ter is Self-Exiilent, in Oppofition to Intelligence and Mind. For, all that he afTerts about the ab- folute NecefTity of the Order and Parts of the World, is confefiedly mofl ridiculous : not at all proved by the Arguments he alleges : And in fome Parages of this very Book, as well as in o- ther Fragments, he himfelf fuppofes, and is for- ced exprefly to confefs, that, however Eternal and NecelTary every thing in the World be ima- gined to be i yet even That NecefTity muft flow from an -^ Eternal and Litellivent Mind^ the neceflary Perfedions of whofe Nature are the Caufe f of the Har7?iony and Beanty of the JForld, and particularly of Mens having I Faculties^ Organs of Senfe. Appetites^ <^c. fitted even to Final Caufes. '■* To cCiixivyiToy S-£?5V fojjy xcH Aoyov i^ov Kcti SjO/f^poy. O- cell. Luc. de Leg. fragm. -j- Hivvi^u Tcv j(9(ri^ov oinu/o- fioc, Toujrviq a oi.noc, o ©£05. Ibid. \. Toce, d'uiccuiiiq Kcn to. ' Op« >^5 svi;c» jy.iy, esAAftf Scc. iJemyTlt^ji r>?? too 7rciVT(3<; (p'jc-ik'q. Jriftotle hkewife, was a great AfTerter indeed of the Eternity of the World : But not in Oppo- fition to the Belief of the Being, or of the Pow- er, Wifdom, or Goodnefs of God. On tl>e con- trary, He for no other Reafon aflerted the World to be Eternal, but becaufe he fancied that fuch an Bwg.invita Arijlct^ ^ 4-75 w-pSrov xtvoyy, oixtvJj©?. Ari flat. Met aph. ^ ^ ^ Being and Attributes, of Gotf. i J. S11 Effed: mull need^ eternally proceed from fuch an Eternal Caufe. And (o far was he from teach- ing, that Matter is the firfl: and Original Caufe of all Things ; that, on the contrary, he every v^here exprefly defcribes God to be an ^ Intelligent Being : t -^^^- corporeal ; \. ne Firft Mover of all Tubings, Himfelf ImtnoveaMe \ and affirms, that "^ if there were 710 thing hut Matter in the IVorld^ there would be no Original Caufe^ hut an Infinite Frogreffion of Cau- fe s ; which is abfurd. As to thofe Philofophers, who taught plainly and exprefly, that Matter was not only Eternal, but alfo Self-Exifient and intirely Independent, Go-exiiling from Eternity with God, indepen- dently, as a Second Principle : I have already fhown the Impoffibility of this Opinion, at the Entrance upon the prefent Head of Difcourfe, where I proved that Matter could not poflibly be/'/r^. if Self-E)cifle?it, And I fliall further demonftrate it to be Falfe, when I come to prove the Unit^ of the Self-e^ciftent Being. Plato^ whatever his Opinion was about the ori- ginal Matter^ very largely and fully declares his Sentiments about the Formation of the World, viz. That it v/as compofed and framed by an In-^ telligent and wife God. And there is no one of all the Antient Philofophers, who does in all his Writings fpeak fo excellently and worthily ^ as He, concerning the Nature and Attributes of God. Yet as to the Tiine of the World's beginning to be Formed, he feems to make it indefinite, when he fays t 'Fhe IVorld mufi needs he an Eternal Refemhlance of the Eter- D nal 'O p^v, ^pccycv, y^ ^£»5, t^ TTUVTCi. 77A iV ypUMM >C, TVi W U'Oa TCj \S^0 j/>j(; oiTTCiVTtS!. i^yot'* c-6i-(^<^' De RepPibl. Lib. lo. -j- Uocarci uvuyKt) rcv^ Plato iu Timaeo. Which H'brds keing 34 A ^emonflratio?! of the leing very Impzrfett in our Co- pies of the Original, are thus rendered by Cicero. ^\ ergo gcnerarus [eft munr^usij ad id effe6tu3 eft, qucd ririone fapientiaq; comprehendirur, atq; immutabili a:rernirate continetur. Ex quo efHcirur, lit fit necejjs hunc quem cemi- mtts mundum, jimulachrti^n dtcrnum effe alichJHs dterni. Cic. deUnivcrf. ■j- N!:t;> 77po ii^Q-yjii ilvcci, h'/, kiTtcv T^TH. Plotinui. Qui autem a Deo qiiidem fadlum fatentur, non t^imea cum volunt Temporis habere, fed fux Creationis initium ; u^, modo quodam vix intelligibiii. Semper hi fadlus. Auguflin. de Civit. Dei. Lib, 1 1. Cap. 4. De mundo, 6<; de his quos in mundo deos a Deo faclos nal Idea. At leaft his Followers afterward fo underftood and ex- plained it, as if, by the Creation of the World, was not to be un- derftood a Creation in ^ime t ; but only an Order of Nature^ Can-- falit^ and Dependence : That is, that the IVill of God, and his Power of A6ling, being necelTa- rily as Eternal as his EiTence ; ^ the Effeds of That Will and Power mighl; he fuppofed coseval to the Will and Power themfelves •, in the fame manner, as Light would eternally proceed from the Sun^ or a Shadow from the inter- pofed Body, or an hnpreffton from an ifnpofed Seal, if the refpe6live Caufes of thefe Effedls were fup- pofed Eternal. fcribit riato, apertiftime dicit COS effe cxpifle, 6c habere inin'um. Verum id quomodo intelHgant, in- venerunt [PJatcnicij] non efte hoc videlicet Tt?nporij, fed SuofiitHiionis ini- tium. li/id.Lib. 10. C-^p. 31. Sed mundum quidem tuilTs Temper, Philofcphia au<5lor eft ;conditore quidemDeo, ^f^^ non ex tempore. Macroh. inSomn. Sap. Lib. 2. Cpp. 10. * Kail ii fiitXii, Traf'UOki'Y^x.ri (re nvi tZv yv&piyjm ^ivay/ia-cj Trpot; ra On^' f^ov