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BT 1100 .B9 1846 
 
 Butler, Joseph, 1692-1752. 
 
 The analogy of religion 
 
Digitized by the Internet Archive 
 
 in 2009 with funding from 
 
 Princeton Theological Seminary Library 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/analogyofrel1846butl 
 
THE 
 
 ANALOGY OF RELIGION, 
 
 NATURAL AND REVEALED, 
 
 TO THE 
 
 CONSTITUTION AND COURSE OF NATURE. 
 
 TO WHICH ARE ADDKD 
 
 TWO BRIEF DISSERTATIONS : 
 
 I. ON PERSONAL IDENTITY. — II. ON THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. 
 
 B Y 
 
 JOSEPH BUTLER, D.C.L. 
 
 LOKD BISHOP OF DURHAM. 
 
 AND 
 
 DANIEL WILSON, D.D. 
 
 BISHOP OF CALCUTTA. 
 
 Ejus [.\nalogiieJ hasc vis est, ut iil quoil iluWiim est a:l aliquid simile, de quo nou quaeritur, referat 
 ut iiicerta certis probct. — Q,uintii,. I. i. c 6. 
 
 WITH AN ACCOUUT OF THE 
 
 CHARACTER AND WRITINGS OF BISHOP BUTLER, 
 
 B Y 
 
 SAMUEL HALIFAX, D.D. 
 
 LORD BISHOP OF GLOUCESTEB. 
 
 ?fEyv-YORK: 
 
 ROBERT CARTER, 53 CANAL-STREET. 
 PITTSBURG : r^Q MARKET-STREET. 
 
 18 46. 
 
THE 
 
 ANALOGY OF RELIGION, 
 
 NATURAL AND REVEALED 
 
 TO THE 
 
 CONSTITUTION AND COURSE OF NATURE. 
 
 TO WHICH ARE ADDED, 
 
 TWO BRIEF DISSERTATIONS; 
 
 L ON PERSONAL IDENTITY.— II. ON THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. 
 
 BY 
 
 JOSEPH BUTLER, D.C.L 
 
 LATE LORD BISHOP OF DURHAM. 
 
 Ejus [Analogiee] hsc vis est, ut id quod dubium est ad aliquid simile, de quo non queritur, 
 referat ut incerta certis probet. — Q,uintil. 1. i. c. 6. 
 
 WITH 
 AN ACCOUNT OF THE CHAEACTER AND WRITINGS OF THE AUTHOR, 
 
 BY SAMUEL HALIFAX, D.D. 
 
 LATE LORD BISHOP OF GLOUCESTER. 
 
 NEW YORK: 
 
 ROBERT CARTER 58 CANAL STREET, 
 AND PITTSBURG, 56 MARKET STREET. 
 
 1846, 
 
ADVERTISEMENT 
 
 PREFIXED TO THE FIRST EDITION. 
 
 If the reader should meet here with any thing which he 
 tiad not before attended to, it will not be in the observa- 
 tions upon the constitution and course of nature, these 
 being all obvious ; but in the application of them : in 
 which, though there is nothing but what appears to me 
 of some real weight, and therefore of great importance ; 
 yet he will observe several things, which will appear to 
 him of very little, if he can think things to be of little 
 importance, which are of any real weight at all, upon 
 such a subject as rehgion. However, the proper force 
 of the following Treatise hes in the whole general analogy 
 considered together. 
 
 It is come, I know not how, to be taken for granted, 
 by many persons, that Christianity is not so much as a 
 subject of inquiry; but that it is, now at length, dis- 
 covered to be fictitious. And accordingly they treat it, 
 as if, in the present age, this were an agreed point among 
 all people of discernment; and nothing remained, but to 
 set it up as a principal subject of mirth and ridicule, as 
 it were by way of reprisals, for its having so long inter- 
 rupted the pleasures of the world. On the contrary, 
 thus much, at least, will be here found, not taken for 
 granted, but proved, that any reasonable man, who will 
 thoroughly consider the matter, may be as much assured, 
 as he is of his own being, that it is not, however, so clear 
 a case, that there is nothing in it. There is, I think, 
 strong evidence of its truth ; but it is certain no one can, 
 upon principles of reason, be satisfied of the contrary. 
 And the practical consequence to be drawn from this is 
 not attended to by every one who is concerned in it. 
 
 Mcy, 1736. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 Vtigt 
 INTRODUCTION ••«••« 48 
 
 PART I. 
 
 OF NATURAL RELIGION. 
 Chap. I. — Of a Future Lifo . • « . • - 57 
 
 Chap. II. — 'Of the Government of God by Rewards and Punishments; 
 
 and particularly of the latter . . .— , , "^S 
 
 Chap. III. — Of the Moral Government of God .... 83 
 
 Chap. IV. — Of a State of Probation, as implying Trial, Difficulties, 
 
 and Danger 105 
 
 Chap. V. — Of a State of Probation, as intended for moral Disciplin 
 
 and Improvement 112 
 
 Chap. VI. — Of the Opinion of Necessity, considered as influencing 
 
 Practice 184 
 
 Chap. VII. — Of the Gorernment of God, considered as a Scheme or 
 
 Constitution, imperfectly comprehended . . . . 148 
 
 Conclusion •• •«• ••• 168 
 
 PART n. 
 OF REVEALED RELIGION. 
 
 Chap. I.— Of the Importance of Christianity , . . 165 
 
 Chap. II. — Of the supposed Presumption against a Revelation, consid- 
 ered as miraculous . . . . . . . • 181 
 
VI CONTENTS. 
 
 Chap. III. — Of our incapacity of judging, what were to be expected 1:1 
 a Revelation; and the Credibility, from Analogy, that It, must 
 contain Things appearing liable to Objections . . 187 
 
 Chap. IV. — Of Christianity, considered as a Scheme or Constitution, 
 
 imperfectly comprehended 201 
 
 Chap, V. — Of the particular System of Christianity ; the Appointment 
 
 of a Mediator, and the Redemption of the World by him . )iOd 
 
 Chap. VI. — Of the Want of Universality in Revelation: and of the 
 
 supposed Deficiency in the Proof of it . , , . 225 
 
 Chap. VII. — Of the particular Evidence for Christianity , . 242 
 
 Chap. VIII. — Of the Objections which may be made against arguing 
 
 from the Analogy of Nature to Religion . , , , 275 
 
 Conclusion .....,«•,, 286 
 
 Dissertation I. — Of Personal Identity . , ; , S97 
 
 DrssEBTATioN II. — Of the Nature of Virtue • • * 103 
 
TO 
 
 THE REVEREND 
 
 DR THOMAS BALGUY, 
 
 ARCHDEACON ASD PREBENDARY OF AMTICHESTEB, &0. 
 
 Dear Sir, 
 I TRUST you will excuse the liberty I have taken of 
 prefixing your name to the following sheets ; the latter 
 part of which, I am confident, will not be thought 
 undeserving of your approbation ; and of the former part 
 you will commend the intention at least, if not the 
 execution. In vindicating the character of Bishop Butler 
 from the aspersions thrown upon it since his death, I 
 bave but discharged a common duty of humanity, which 
 survivors owe to those who have deserved well of man- 
 kind by their lives or writings, when they are past the 
 power of appearing in their own defence. And if what 
 I have added, by way of opening the general design of 
 the Works of this great Prelate, be of use in exciting the 
 younger class of Students in our Universities to read, and 
 so to read as to understand, the Two Volumes prepared 
 and pablished by the Author himself; I flatter myself I 
 shall have done no inconsiderable service to Morality 
 and Religion. Your time and studies have been long 
 successfully devoted to the support of the same great 
 cause : and in what you have lately given to the world, 
 both as an Author and an Editor, you have largely con- 
 tributed to the defence of our common Christianity, and 
 of what was esteemed by One, who was perfectly com- 
 petent to judge, its best Establishment, the Church of 
 England. In the present pubHcation I consider myself 
 
• •• 
 
 VIU 
 
 as a fellow labourer with you in the same design, and 
 tracing the path you have trod before, but at great 
 distance, and with unequal paces. When, by His 
 Majesty's goodness, I was raised to that station of 
 eminence in the Church, to which you had been first 
 named, and which, on account of the infirmity of your 
 health, you had desired to decline ; it was honour enough 
 for me on such an occasion to have been thought of next 
 to you : and I know of no better rule by which to govern 
 my conduct, so as not to discredit the Royal Hand which 
 conferred on me so signal and unmerited a favour, than 
 in cases of difficulty to put the question to myself, How 
 you would probably have acted in the same situation. 
 You see. Sir, I still look up to you, as I have been wont, 
 both as my Superior and my Example. That I niay long 
 reap the benefit of your advice and friendship; and that 
 such a measure of health and strength may be continued 
 to you, as may enable you to pass the evening of your 
 days with comfort, and enjoy the blessings of the life you 
 love ; is the cordial wish of, 
 
 Dear Sir, 
 
 Your very afi'ectionate 
 
 and faithful Servant, 
 
 S. GLOUCESTER 
 
 Dartmouth Street, Westminster 
 12'Ailf<7y, 1780 
 
PREFACE BY THE EDITOR . 
 
 ** When I consider how light a matter very often subjects the best established 
 characters to the suspicions of posterity, posterity often as malignant to virtue as 
 the age that saw it was envious of its glory ; and how ready a remote age is to catch 
 at a low revived slander, which the times that brought it forth saw despised and 
 forgotten almost in its birth ; I cannot but think it a matter that deserves atten- 
 tion." — Letter to the Editor of the Letters on the Spirit of Patriotism, &c., by Bishop 
 Wabburton. See his Works, vol. vii. p. 547. 
 
 The Charge to the Clergy of the Diocese of Durham 
 was printed and pubhshed in the year 1751, by the 
 learned Prelate whose name it bears ; and, together 
 with the Sermons and Analogy of the same writer, both 
 too well known to need a more particular description, 
 completes the collection of his Works. It has long 
 been considered as a matter of curiosity, on account of 
 its scarceness ; and it is equally curious on other ac- 
 counts — its subject, and the calumny to which it gave 
 occasion, of representing the Author as addicted to super- 
 stition^ as inclined to popery, and as dying in the com- 
 munion of the Church of Rome. The improved edition 
 of the Biographia Britannica, published under the care 
 of Dr Kippis, having unavoidably brought this calumny 
 again into notice, it may not be unseasonable to oifer a 
 few reflections in this place, by way of obviating any 
 impressions that may hence arise to the disadvantage 
 of so great a character as that of the late Bishop Butler ; 
 referring those who desire a more particular account of 
 his hfe, to the third volume of the same entertaining 
 work, printed in 1784. art Butler (Joseph).* 
 
 I. The principal design of the Bishop in his Charge 
 is, to exhort his Clergy to "do their part towards reviv- 
 ing a practical sense of religion amongst the people 
 committed to their care ;" and, as one way of effecting 
 this, to "instruct them in the Importance of External 
 Religion" or the usefulness of outward observances in 
 promoting inward piety. Now, from the compound 
 
 * The account here alluded to is subjoined to this Preface. 
 
X PREFACE 
 
 nature of man, consisting of two parts, the body and the 
 mind, together with the influence which these are found 
 to have on one another, it follows, that the religious re- 
 gards o£ such a creature ought to be so framed, as to be 
 in some way properly accommodated to both. A reli- 
 gion which is purely spiritual, stripped of every thing 
 that may affect the senses, and considered only as a 
 divine philosophy of the mind, if it do not mount up into 
 enthusiasm, as has frequently been the case, often sinks, 
 after a few short fervours, into indifference : an abstracted 
 invisible object, like that which natural religion offers, 
 ceases to move or interest the heart ; and something 
 further is wanting to bring it nearer, and render it more 
 present to our view, than merely an intellectual contem- 
 plation. On the other hand, when, in order to remedy 
 this inconvenience, recourse is had to instituted forms 
 and ritual injunctions, there is always danger lest men 
 be tempted to rest entirely on these, and persuade 
 themselves that a painful attention to such observances 
 will atone for the want of genuine piety and virtue. 
 Yet surely there is a way of steering safely between 
 these two extremes ; of so consulting both the parts of 
 our constitution, that the body and the mind may concur 
 in rendering our religious services acceptable to God, 
 and at the same time useful to ourselves. And what 
 way can this be, but precisely that which is recommend- 
 ed in the Charge ; such a cultivation of outward as well 
 as inward religion, that from both may result, what is 
 the point chiefly to be laboured, and at all events to be 
 secured, a correspondent temper and behaviour ; or, in 
 other words, such an application of the forms of godli- 
 ness, as may be subservient in promoting the power and 
 spirit of it.^ No man, who believes the Scriptures of 
 the Old and New Testament, and understands what he 
 believes, but must know, that external religion is as much 
 enjoined, and constitutes as real a part of revelation, as 
 that which is internal. The many ceremonies in use 
 among the Jews, in consequence of a divine command ; 
 the baptism of water, as an emblem of moral purity ; the 
 eating and drinking of bread and wine, as symbols and 
 representations of the body and blood of Christ, required 
 
BY THE EDITOR. XI 
 
 of Christians, are proofs of this. On comparing these 
 two parts of rehgion together, one, it is immediately 
 seen, is of much greater importance than the other ; and, 
 whenever they happen to interfere, is always to be pre- 
 ferred : but does it follow from hence, that therefore that 
 other is of little or no importance, and, in cases where 
 there is no competition, may entirely be neglected ? Or 
 rather is not the legitimate conclusion directly the re- 
 verse, that nothing is to be looked upon as of little im- 
 portance, which is of any use at all in preserving upon 
 our minds a sense of the Divine authority, which recalls 
 to our remembrance the obligations we are under, and 
 helps to keep us, as the Scripture expresses it, " in the 
 fear of the Lord all the day long?"* If, to adopt the 
 instance mentioned in the Charge, the sight of a church 
 should remind a man of some sentiment of piety ; if, 
 from the view of a material building dedicated, to the 
 service of God, he should be led to regard himself, his 
 own body, as a living "temple of the Holy Ghost,"t and 
 therefore no more than the other to be profaned or dese- 
 crated by any thing that defileth or is impure ; could it 
 be truly said of such a one, that he was superstitious, or 
 mistook the means of religion for the end? If, to use 
 another, and what has been thought a more obnoxious 
 instance, taken from the Bishop's practice, a cross, erect- 
 ed in a place of public worship, f should cause us to re- 
 flect on Him who died on a cross for our salvation, and 
 on the necessity of our " own dying to sin," § and of 
 *' crucifying the flesh with its aff"ection and lusts ;"ll would 
 any worse consequences follow from such sentiments so 
 excited, than if the same sentiments had been excited by 
 the view of a picture, of the crucifixion suppose, such 
 as is commonly placed, and with this very design, in 
 foreign churches, and indeed in many of our own ? Both 
 the instances here adduced, it is very possible, may be 
 
 * Prov. xxiii. 17. t I Cor. vi. 19. 
 
 X Dr Butler, when Bishop of Bristol, put up a cross, a plain piece of marble inlaid, 
 in the chapel of his episcopal house. This, which was intended by the blameless 
 Prelate merely as a sign or memorial, that true Christians are to bear their cross, and 
 not to be ashamed of following a crucified Master, was considered as affording a 
 presumption that he was secretly inclined to Popish forms and ceremonies, and had 
 no great dislike to Popery itself. And, on account of the offence it occasioned, both 
 Rt the time and since, it were to be wisljed, in prudence, it had not been doue. 
 §Roin. vi. 11. II Gal. v. 24. 
 
Xll PREFACE 
 
 far from being approved, even by those who are under 
 the most sincere convictions of the importance of true 
 rehgion : and it is easy to conceive how open to scorn 
 and censure they must be from others, who think they 
 have a talent for ridicule, and have accustomed them- 
 selves to regard all pretensions to piety as hypocritical 
 or superstitious. But " Wisdom is justified of her chil- 
 dren."* Religion is what it is, "whether men will hear, 
 or whether they will forbear;"! and whatever in the 
 smallest degree promotes its interests^ and assists us in 
 performing its commands, whether that assistance be 
 derived from the medium of the body or the mind, ought 
 to be esteemed of great weight, and deserving of our 
 most serious attention. 
 
 However, be the danger of superstition what it may, 
 no one was more sensible of that danger, or more in 
 earnest in maintaining, that external acts of themselves 
 are nothing, and that moral holiness, as distinguished 
 from bodily observances of every kind, is that which 
 constitutes the essence of religion^ than Bishop Butler. 
 Not only the Charge itself, the whole intention of which 
 is plainly nothing more than to enforce the necessity of 
 practical religion, the reality as well as form, is a de- 
 monstration of this, but many passages besides to the 
 same purpose, selected from his other writings. Take 
 the two following as specimens. In his Analogy he ob- 
 serves thus : " Though mankind have, in all ages^ been 
 greatly prone to place their religion in peculiar positive 
 rites, by way of equivalent for obedience to moral pre- 
 cepts; yet, without making any comparison at all be- 
 tween them, and consequently without determining 
 which is to have the preference, the nature of the thing 
 abundantly shows all notions of that kind to be utterly 
 subversive of true religion : as they are, moreover, con- 
 trary to the whole tenor of Scripture ; and likewise to 
 the most express particular declarations of it, that no- 
 thing can render us accepted of God, without moral 
 virtue."! And to the same purpose in his Sermon, 
 preached before the Society for the Propagation of the 
 Gospel, in February, 1738-9. "Indeed, amongst crea- 
 
 * Malt. xi. 19i t Ezek. ii. 5 J Analogy, Part 11. Chap. 1 
 
BY THE EDITOR. Xlll 
 
 tures naturally formed for religion, yet so much under 
 the power of imagination as men are, superstition is an 
 evil, which can never be out of sight. But even against 
 this, true religion is a great security, and the only one. 
 True rehgion takes up that place in the mind, wliich 
 superstition would usurp, and so leaves little room for 
 ti] and likewise lays us under the strongest obligations 
 to oppose it. On the contrary, the danger of supersti- 
 tion cannot but be increased by the prevalence of irre- 
 ligion ; and, by its general prevalence, the evil will be 
 unavoidable. For the common people, wanting a reli- 
 gion, will of course take up with almost any superstition 
 which is thrown in their way: and in process of time, 
 amidst the infinite vicissitudes of the political world, the 
 leaders of parties will certainly be able to serve them- 
 selves of that superstition, whatever it be, which is get- 
 ting ground; and will not fail to carry it to the utmost 
 length their occasions require. The general nature of 
 the thing shows this; and history and fact confirm it. 
 It is therefore wonderful, those people who seem to 
 think there is but one evil in life, that of superstition, 
 should not see that atheism and profaneness must be the 
 introduction of it."* 
 
 He who can think and write in such a manner, can 
 never be said to mistake the nature of real religion : and 
 he, who, after such proofs to the contrary, can persist in 
 asserting of so discreet and learned a person, that he 
 was addicted to superstition, must himself be much a 
 stranger both to truth and charity. 
 
 And here it may be worth our while to observe, that 
 the same excellent Prelate, who bv one set of men was 
 suspected of superstition, on account of his Charge, has 
 by another been represented as leaning to the opposite 
 extreme of enthusiasm, on account of his two discourses 
 On the Love of God. But both opinions are equally 
 without foundation. He was neither superstitious, nor 
 an enthusiast: his mind was much too strong, and his 
 habits of thinking and reasoning much too strict and se- 
 vere, to suffer him to descend to the weaknesses of either 
 character. His piety was at once fervent and rational. 
 
 * Ser. xvi. 
 
XIV PREFACE 
 
 When impressed with a generous concern for the de- 
 clining cause of rehgion, he laboured to revive its dying 
 interests ; nothing he judged would be more effectual to 
 that end, among creatures so much engaged with bodily 
 things, and so apt to be affected with whatever strongly 
 solicits the senses, as men are, than a religion of such a 
 frame as should in its exercise require the joint exertions 
 of the body and the mind. On the other hand, when 
 penetrated with the dignity and importance of "the first 
 and great commandment,"* love to God, he set himself 
 to inquire, what those movements of the heart are, 
 which are due to Him, the Author and Cause of all 
 things ; he found, in the coolest way of consideration, 
 that God is the natural object of the same affections of 
 gratitude, reverence, fear, desire of approbation, trust, 
 and dependence, the same affections in kind, though 
 doubtless in a very disproportionate degree, which any 
 one would feel from contemplating a perfect character 
 in a creature, in which goodness, with wisdom and 
 power, are supposed to be the predominant qualities, 
 Avith the further circumstance, that this creature was 
 also his governor and friend. This subject is manifestly 
 a real one ; there is nothing in it fanciful or unreason- 
 able : this way of being affected towards God is piety, in 
 the strictest sense : this is religion, considered as a habit 
 of mind ; a religion, suited to the nature and condition 
 of man. t 
 
 II. From superstition to Popery, the transition is easy: 
 no wonder then, that, in the progress of detraction, the 
 simple imputation of the former of these, with which the 
 attack on the character of our Author was opened, 
 should be followed by the more aggravated imputation 
 of the latter. Nothing, I think, can fairly be gathered 
 in support of such a suggestion from the Charge, in 
 which Popery is barely mentioned, and occasionally 
 
 ♦ Matt, xxii, 38. 
 ■f- Many of the sentiments, in these Two Discourses of Bishop Butler, containing 
 the sovereign good of man ; the impossibility of procuring it in the present hfe ; the 
 rnsatisfactoriness of earthly enjoyments ; together with the somewhat beyond and 
 above them all, whicli once attained, there will rest nothing furtiier to be wished or 
 hoped ; and which is then only to be expected, when we shall have put off this 
 mortal body, and our union with God shall be complete ; occur in Hooker's Eccle- 
 siastical Polity. Book I. §. 11. 
 
 \ 
 
BY THE EDITOR. XV 
 
 only, and in a sentence or two ; yet even there, it should 
 be remarked, the Bishop takes care to describe the pe- 
 culiar observances required by it, "some as in them- 
 selves wrong and superstitious, and others of them as 
 being made subservient to the purposes of superstition." 
 With respect to his other writings, any one at all con- 
 versant with them needs not to be told, that the matters 
 treated of both in his Sermons and his Analogy did none 
 of them directly lead him to consider, and much less to 
 combat, the opinions, whether relating to faith or wor- 
 ship, which are peculiar to the Church of Rome: it 
 might therefore have happened, yet without any just 
 conclusion arising from thence, of being himself inclined 
 to favour those opinions, that he had never mentioned, 
 so much as incidentally, the subject of Popery at all. 
 But fortunately for the reputation of the Bishop, and to 
 the eternal disgrace of his calumniators, even this poor 
 resource is wanting to support their malevolence. In 
 his Sermon at St Bride's before the Lord Mayor in 
 1740, after having said that "our laws and whole consti- 
 tution go more upon supposition of an equality amongst 
 mankind, than the constitution and laws of other coun- 
 tries;" he goes on to observe, that "this plainly requires, 
 that more particular regard should be had to the educa- 
 tion of the lower people here, than in places where they 
 are born slaves of power, and to be made slaves of su- 
 perstition* meaning evidently in this place, by the gen- 
 eral term superstition, the particular errors of the Ro- 
 manists. This is something: but we have a still plainer 
 indication what his sentiments concerning Popery really 
 were, from another of his additional Sermons, 1 mean 
 that iDefore the House of Lords on June the 11th, 1747, 
 the anniversary of his late Majesty's accession. The 
 passage alluded to is as follows; and my readers will 
 not be displeased that I give it them at length. " The 
 value of our leligious Establishment ought to be very 
 much heightened in our esteem, by considering what it 
 is a security from; I mean that great corruption of 
 Christianity, Popery, which is ever hard at work to bring 
 us again under its yoke. Whoever will consider tlie Po- 
 
 * Sei'in. xvii. 
 
XVI PREFACE 
 
 pish claims, to the disposal of the whole earth, as of 
 divine right, to dispense with the most sacred engage- 
 ments, the claims to supreme absolute authority in reli- 
 gion; in short, the general claims which the Canonists 
 express by the words, plenitude of power — whoever, I 
 say, will consider Popery as it is professed at Rome, 
 may see, that it is manifest, open usurpation of all hu- 
 man and divine authority. But even in those Roman 
 Catholic countries where these monstrous claims are 
 not admitted, and the civil power does, in many respects, 
 restrain the papal; yet persecution is professed, as it is 
 absolutely enjoined by what is acknowledged to be their 
 highest authority, a general council, so called, with the 
 Pope at the head of it ; and is practised in all of them, 
 I think, without exception, where it can be done safely. 
 Thus they go on to substitute force instead of argument; 
 and external profession made by force, instead of rea- 
 sonable conviction. And thus corruptions of the gros- 
 sest sort have been in vogue, for many generations, in 
 many parts of Christendom; and are so still, even where 
 Popery obtains in its least absurd form : and their anti- 
 quity and wide extent are insisted upon as proofs of 
 their truth ; a kind of proof, which at best can only be 
 presumptive, but which loses all its little weight, in pro- 
 portion as the long and large prevalence of such cor- 
 ruptions have been obtained by force,"* In another 
 part of the same Sermon, where he is again speaking of 
 our ecclesiastical constitution, he reminds his audience 
 that it is to be valued, " not because it leaves us at 
 liberty to have as little religion as we please, without 
 being accountable to human judicatories ; but because 
 it exhibits to our view, and enforces upon our con- 
 sciences, genuine Christianity, free from the supersti- 
 tions with which it is defiled in other countries ; which 
 superstitions, he observes, "naturally tend to abate its 
 force." The date of this Sermon should here be attend- 
 ed to. It was preached in June, 1747; that is, four 
 years before the delivery and publication of the Charge, 
 which was in the year 1751; and exactly five years 
 before the Author died, which was in June, 1752. We 
 
 * Scrm. XX. 
 
BY THE EDITOR, X\U 
 
 have then, in the passages now laid before the reader, a 
 clear and unequivocal proof, brought down to within a 
 few years of Bishop Butler's death, that Popery ^vas 
 held by him in the utmost abhorrence, and that he re- 
 garded it in no other light, than as the great corrupt ion 
 of Christianity, and a manifest, open usurpation of all h iiman 
 and divine authority. The argument is decisive ; nor 
 will any thing be of force to invalidate it, unless from 
 some after-ad during the short remainder of the Bishop's 
 life, besides that of delivering and printing his Charge 
 (which, after what I have said here, and in the ?\^ott:s 
 added to this Preface .and to the Charge I must have 
 leave to consider as aifording no evidence at all of his 
 inclination to Papistical doctrines or ceremonies), the 
 contrary shall incontrovertibly appear. 
 
 III. One such after-act, however, has been alleged, 
 which would effectually demolish all that we have urged 
 in behalf of our Prelate, were it true, as is pretended, 
 that he died in the coinmunion of the Church of Rome. 
 Had a story of this sort been invented and propagated 
 by Papists, the wonder might have been less : 
 
 Hoc Ilhacus velit, et magno mercentur Atridce. 
 
 But to the reproach of Protestantism, the fabrication of 
 this calumny, for such we shall find it, originated from 
 among ourselves. It is pretty remarkable, that a cir- 
 cumstance so extraordinary should never have been di- 
 vadged till the year 1767, fifteen years after the Bishop's 
 decease. At that time Dr Thomas Seeker was Arch- 
 bishop of Canterbury ; who of all others v/as the most 
 likely to know the truth or falsehood of the fact asserted, 
 having been educated with our Author in his early youth, 
 and having lived in a constant habit of intimacy with 
 him to the very time of his death. The good Arch- 
 bishop was not silent on this occasion : with a virtuous 
 mdignation he stood forth to protect the posthumous cha- 
 racter of his friend ; and in a public newspaper, under the 
 signature of Blisopseudes, called upon his accuser to sup- 
 port what he had advanced, by whatever proofs he could. 
 No proof, however, nor any thing like a proof, appeared 
 in reply ; and every man of sense and candour at that 
 
Xviii PREFACE 
 
 time was perfectly convinced the assertion was entireif 
 groundless.* As a further confirmation of the rectitude 
 
 * When the first edition of this Preface was published, I had in vain endeavoured 
 to procure a sigiit of the papers, in which Bishop Butler was accused of having died 
 a Piipist, and Archbishop Seeker's replies to them; though I well remembered to 
 have read both, when they first appeared in tlie puljlic prints. But a learned Pro- 
 fessor in the University of Oxford has furnished me with the whole controversy in it? 
 original form ; a brief history of which it may not be unacceptable to offer here to the 
 curious reader. 
 
 The attack was opened in the year 17S7, in an anonymous pamphlet, entitled^ 
 *' The Root of Protestant Errors examined ;" in which the author asserted, that, " by 
 an anecdote lately given him, that same Prelate" (who at the bottom of the page is 
 ealhd B— p of D — m) "is said to have died in the communion of a Church, that 
 makes much use of saints, saints' days, and all the trutiipery of '•aint worahip." When 
 this remarkable fact, now first divulged, came to be generally knovm, it occasioned, 
 ns might be expected, no little alarm ; and intelligence of it was no sooner conveyed 
 to Aiciibishop Seeker, tlian in a short letter, signed Misopsetafes, and printed in the 
 St James's Chronicle of May 9, he called upon the writer to produce his authority 
 for publishii>g " so gross and scandalous a falsehood." To this challenge an ininie- 
 fliate answer was returned by the author of the pamphlet, who, now assuming the 
 name of Philelenitheros, informed Misopseiideg, through the channel of the same paper, 
 tliat " such anecdote had been given him; and that he was yet of opinion, that there 
 was nothing improbable in it, when it is considered that the same Prelate put up tiie 
 Popish insignia of the cross in his chapel, when at Bristol ; and in his last Episcopa) 
 Charge has squinted very much towards tliat superstition." Here we find the accusa- 
 tion not OTily repeated, but supported by reasons, such as they are, of whicli it seemed 
 necessary that some notice should be taken : nor did the Arciibishop conseite it un- 
 becoming his own dignity to stand up on this occasion, as the vindicator of innocence 
 against the calumniator of the helpless dead. Accordingly, in a second letter in the 
 •same newspaper of May 23, and subscribed Misopseudss as before ; after reciting 
 from Bishop Butler's Sermon before the Lords the very passage here priivted in tlie 
 Preface, and observing, that " there are, in the same Sermon, declarations as strong 
 as can he. made against temporal punishments for heresy, schism, or even for idola- 
 try ;" his Grace expresses himself thus: "Now he (Bishop "Butler) was vmiver.-ally 
 esteemed tiiroughout his life, a man of strict piety and honesty, as well as nnconunon 
 aljilities. He gave all the proofs, public and prirate, which his station led him lo 
 give, and they were decisive and daily, of his continuing to the last a sincere member 
 of tile Church of England. Nc?r had ever any of his actjtiaintance, or most iiitimati? 
 friends, nor have they to thfs day, tlie least donlit of it." As to putting np a cross in 
 hiscliapel, the Archbishop frankly owns, that for himself he wishes he hud not ; and 
 thinks that in ro doing the Bishop did amiss. But then he aaks, " Can tiiat be oppos- 
 ed, as any proof of Popery, to all the evidence on the other side; or even to the 
 single (evidence of the above-mentioned Sermon? Most of onr churches have crosses 
 upon them : are they therefore Polish churches? The Lutherans have more than 
 crosses in theirs: are the Lutherans tlierefore Papists?" And as to the Charge, no 
 Papist, his Grace remarks, v/ould have spoken as Bislc^ Buthr thtre does, of the 
 observances peculiar to Roman Catholics, some of which he expressly censures as 
 wrong and superstitious, and others, as made sub-^ervient to the pur, oses of sivpersii- 
 tion, and, on these accounts, abolished at the Reformation. After the ptililication o? 
 this letter PhiU-ladheros replied in a short defence of his own conduct, but wiihouS 
 protlucing any thing new in confirmation of what he had advanced. And here the 
 controversy, so far as the two principals were concerned, seems to have ended. 
 
 But the dispute was not suffered to die away quite so soon. For in the same year, 
 and in the same newspaper of July 21, another letter appeared ; in which the author 
 not only contended that the cross in the Episcopal chapel at Bristol, and the Chai'ge 
 to the Clergy of Durham in 1761, amount to full proof of a strong attaciiment to thp 
 idolatrous communion of the Church of Rome, but, with the reader's leave, he would 
 fiiiu account for the Bishops " tendency this way.' And this hip attempted to do, 
 •' irom the natural melancholy and gloominess of Dr Butler's disposition; from his 
 great fondness for the lives of Romish saints, and their books of mystic piety ; frocn 
 sis drawing his notions of teaching men FeligioK, i:ot from the New Testament, bu! 
 
BY THE EDITOR. XL% 
 
 of this judgment, it may not be amiss to mention, there 
 is yet in existence a strong presumptive argument at least 
 in its favour, drawn from the testimony of those who at- 
 tended our Author in the sickness of which he died. 
 The last days of this excellent Prelate were passed at 
 Bath ; Dr Nathanael Forster, his chaplain, being con- 
 tinually with him ; and for one day, and at the very end 
 of his illness, Dr Martin Benson also, the then Bishop 
 of Gloucester, who shortened his own life in his pious 
 haste to visit his dying friend. Both these persons con- 
 stantly wrote letters to Dr Seeker, then Bishop of Ox- 
 ford, containing accounts of Bishop Butler's declining 
 health, and of the symptoms and progress of his disorder, 
 which, as was conjectured, soon terminated in his death. 
 
 from philosophical and pditical opinions of his own ; and above all, from his transi- 
 tion from a strict Dissenter amongst the Presbyierians to a rigid Churchman, and liis 
 sudden and unexpected elevation to great wealth and dignity in the Church." The 
 attack, thus renewed, excited the Archbishop's attention a second time, and drew 
 from him a fresh answer, subscribed also Misopsendes, in the St James's Chronicle of 
 August 4. In this letter, our excellent Metropolitan, first of all obliquely hinting at 
 the unfairness of sitting in judgment on the character of a man who had been dead 
 fifteen years ; and then reminding his correspondent, that "full proof had been al- 
 ready published, that Bisliop Butler abhorred Popery as a vile corruption of Chris- 
 tianity, and that it might be proved, if needful, that he held the Pope to be Anti- 
 christ;" (to which decisive testimonies of undoubted aversion from the Romish 
 Ciiurcii, anotlier is also added in the Postscript, his taking, wlien promoted to the see 
 ■<jf Durham, fur his domestic Chaplain, Dr Nath. Forster, v/ho had pul)lishwl, not tour 
 years before, a Sermon, entitled, Popery destructive of the Evidence of Christianity ;) 
 .proceeds to observe, " tliat the natunil melancholy of tiie Bisiiop's temper would rather 
 have fixed him amongst his first friends, than prompted him to the cliange he made : 
 that he read books of all sorts, as well as books of mystic piety, and knew hew to 
 pick tlie good tliat was in them out of the bad: that his opinions were exposed with- 
 out reserve in Ills Analogy and his Sermtjas, and if tlie doctrine of either be Popish 
 or unscripLural, the learned world hatli mistakt'fi strangely in admiring both : that, 
 instead of i)eing a strict Dissenter, he never v/as a comniuiiieant in any Dissenting as- 
 sembly ; on the contrary, that he went occasionally, from liis early years, to tlie es- 
 tablished worship, and became a constant conformist to it when he was barely of age, 
 and entered himself, in I7i4, of Oriel College : that iiis elevation to great ilignity in 
 the Church, far from being sudden and unexpeCLed, v.as a gradual and natural rise, 
 through a variety of preferments, and a periud of thirty-two years : that, as Bishop of 
 Durban'., he had very little authority beyond his brethrtn, and in (xiclesiastical mat- 
 Jters, had none beyond them ; a larger income than most of them he had ; but this 
 lie employed, not, as v/as insinuated, in augmenting the pomp of woi'ship ia his ca- 
 thedral, where indeed it is no greater than ia others, b:it for Uie purposes of charity, 
 and in the repairing of his houses." After these remarks, the letter closes with the 
 following words: " Upon the whole, few accusations, so entirely gitiiuidless, have 
 been so pertinaciously, 1 am unwilling to say maliciously, carried on, as the present: 
 and surely it is high time for the authors and abettors of it, in mere common prudence, 
 to show some regard, if not to truth, at least to sl.ame." 
 
 it only remains to be mentioned, that the above letters of Archbishop Seeker had 
 such an effect on a writer, who signed liimself in the St James's Chronicle of August 
 25, A Dissenting Minister, that he declared it as his opinion, that " the author of the 
 pamphlet, called, ' The Root of Protestant Errors examined,' and his I'riends, wera 
 obliged in candour, in justice, and in honour to retract their charge, unless they 
 could establish it on much better grounds than, had hitherto appeared :" and he ex 
 
 132 
 
XX PREFACE 
 
 These letters, -whicli are still preserved in the Lambctli 
 library,* I have read ; and not the slenderest argument 
 can be collected from- them, in justification of the 
 ridiculous slander we are here considering. If at that 
 awful season the Bishop was not known to have ex- 
 pressed any opinion tending to show his dislike to 
 Popery, neither was he known to have said any thing, 
 that could at all be construed in approbation of it ; and 
 the natural presumption is. that whatever sentiments he 
 had formerly entertained concerning that corrupt system 
 of religion, he continued to entertain them to the last. 
 The truth is, neither the word nor the idea of Popery 
 seems once to have occurred either to the Bishop him- 
 self, or to those who watched his parting moments : 
 their thoughts were otherwise engaged. His disorder 
 had reduced him to such debility, as to render him in- 
 capable of speaking much or long on any subject : the 
 few bright intervals that occurred were passed in a state 
 of the utmost tranquillity and composure ; and in that 
 composure he expired. " Mark the perfect man, and 
 behold the upright: for the end of that man is peace."! 
 " Let me die the death of the righteous, and let my last 
 end be like his V't 
 
 Out of pure respect for the virtues of a man, whom I 
 
 pressed his " hopes, that it would be understood that tlie Disspnters in general had 
 jio linjid in tlie accusation, and that it had only been the act of two or three mistaken 
 ni"n." Anotlier person also, " a foreigner by birth," as he says of iiiiuself, who had 
 been long an admirer of Bishop Butler, and had perused with great attention all that 
 had l)een written on both sides in the present controversy, confesses he had been 
 '• wonderfully ])leased \yitli observinc;, witli what candour and temper, as well as 
 ciianiess and solidity, he was vindicated from the aspersions laid aj»-ain>>l him." All 
 tiie adversaries of our Prelate, however, had not tlie virtue or sense to be thus con- 
 viueed ; some of whom still continued, uuier tlie signaturrs of Oli/ Martin, Latimer^ 
 Jh Imvartial Protestant, J'au/inus, Misonothos, to repeat their confuted tiilselioods in 
 the public prints ; as if the curse of cahuuniators liad fallen upon tiiem, and tlieir 
 menioi7, by being long a traitor to trivtli, iiad taken at last a severe revenge, and 
 compelled them to credit their own lie. The first of these gentlemen. Old Martin, 
 who dates from Newcastle, May 2d, horn th»! rancour and malignity with which his 
 letter abounds, and from the particular virulence lie discovers towards the characters 
 of Bishop Butler and his defender, I conjecture to be no other than the very person 
 who iiad already figured in this dispute, so early as the ytar 1752 ; of wiiose work, 
 entitled, " A Serious Inquiry into the Use and ImportJince of External Religion," the 
 reader will find some account in the notes subjoined to the Bishop's Cliarge in the 
 volume of Sermons. 
 
 * The letters, with a sight of which I was indulged by the favour of our present 
 most worthy Metropolitan, are all, as I remeniijer, wrapped together under one 
 cover; on the back of which is written, in Archbishop Seeker's ovn\ liand, the fol- 
 lowing words, or words to this effect : "Presumptive Aiguments that Bishop Butlcf 
 did not die a Papist." 
 
 f Psalm xxxvii. 37. % Numb, xxiii. 10, 
 
BY THE EDITOR, XXI 
 
 had never the happiness of knowing, or even of seeing, 
 but from whose writings I have received tiie greatest 
 benefit and illumination, and which I have reason to be 
 thankful to Providence for having early thrown in my 
 way, I have adventured, in what I have now offered to 
 the public, to step forth in his defence, and to vindicate 
 his honest fame from the attacks of those, who, with the 
 vain hope of bringing down superior characters to their 
 own level, are for ever at work in detracting from their 
 just praise. For the literary reputation of Bishop 
 Butler, it stands too high in the opinion of the world, to 
 incur the danger of any diminution ; but this in truth is 
 the least of his excellences. He was more than a good 
 writer, he was a good man ; and what is an addition 
 even to this eulogy, he was a sincere Christian. His 
 whole study was directed to the knowledge and practice 
 of sound morality and true religion : these he adorned 
 by his life, and has recommended to future ages in his 
 writings ; in which, if my judgment be of any avail, he 
 has done essential service to both, as much, perhaps, as 
 any single person, since the extraordinary gifts of " the 
 word of wisdom and the word of knowledge "* have 
 been withdrawn. 
 
 In what follows I propose to give a short account of 
 the Bishop's moral and religious systems, as these are 
 collected from his Works. 
 
 I. His way of treating the subject of morals is to be 
 gathered from the volume of his Sermons, and particu- 
 larly from the three first, and from the preface to that 
 volume. 
 
 " There is," as our Author with singular sagacity has 
 observed, " a much more exact correspondence betweeii 
 the natural and moral world, than we are apt to take no- 
 tice of."t The inward frame of man answers to his out- 
 ward condition ; the several propensities, passions, and 
 affections, implanted in our hearts by the Author of na- 
 ture, are in a pecuhar manner adapted to the circum- 
 stances of life in which he hath placed us. This gene- 
 ral observation, properly pursued, leads to several im- 
 
 * 1 Cor. xii. 8. t Serin, vi. 
 
XXll PREFACE 
 
 poitant conclusions. The original internal constitution 
 of man, compared with his external condition, enables 
 us to discern what course of action and behaviour that 
 constitution leads to, what is our duty respecting that 
 condition, and furnishes us besides with the most power- 
 ful arguments to the practice of it. 
 
 What the inward frame and constitution of man is, is a 
 question of fact; to be determined, as other facts are,. 
 from experience, from our internal feelings and exter- 
 nal senses, and fi^om the testimony of others. Whether 
 human nature, and the cu'cumstances in which it is plac- 
 ed, might not have been ordered otherwise, is foreign to 
 our inquiry, and none of our concern : our province is^ 
 taking both of these as they are, and viewing the con- 
 nexion between them, frwn that connexion to discover 
 if we can, what course of action is fitted to that nature 
 and those circumstances. From contemplating the bod- 
 ily senses, and the organs or instruments adapted to 
 them, we learn that the eye was given to see with, the 
 ear to hear with. In like manner, from considering our 
 inv>' ard perceptions and the final causes of them, we col- 
 lect tiiptt the feeling of shame, for instance, was given to 
 prevent the doing of things sham.eful ; compassion, to 
 carry us to relieve others in distress; anger, to resist 
 sudden violence offered to ourselves. If, continuing our 
 inquiries in this way, it should at length appear, that the 
 nature, the whole nature, of man leads him to and is fit- 
 ted for that particular course of behaviour which we usu- 
 ally distinguish by the name of virtue, we are authoriz- 
 ed to conclude, that virtue is the law we are born under, 
 that it was so intended by the Author of our being ; and 
 we are bound by the most intimate of all obligations, a 
 regard to our own highest interest and happiness, to 
 conform to it in all situations and events. 
 
 Human nature is not simple and uniform, but made up 
 of several parts ; and we can have no just idea of it cis a 
 system or constitution, unless we take into our view the 
 respects and relations which these parts have to each 
 other. As the body is not one member, but many ; so 
 our inward structure consists of various instincts, appe- 
 tites, and propensions. Thus far there is no difference 
 
EY THE EDITOR. XXlil 
 
 between human creatures and brutes. But besides these 
 common passions and affections, there is another princi- 
 ple, pecuHar to mankind, that of conscience, moral sense, 
 reflection, call it what you please, by which they are en- 
 abled to review their whole conduct, to approve of some 
 actions in themselves, and to disapprove of others. 
 That this principle will of course have some influence on 
 our behaviour, at least at times, will hardly be disputed : 
 but the particular influence which it ought to have, the pre- 
 cise degree of power in the regulating of our internal frame 
 that is assigned it by Him who placed it there, is a point 
 of the utmost consequence in itself, and on the deter- 
 mination of which the very hinge of our Author's Moral 
 System turns. If the faculty here spoken of be, indeed, 
 what it is asserted to be, in nature and kind superior to 
 every other passion and affection ; if it be given, not 
 merely that it may exert its force occasionally, or as our 
 present humour or fancy may dispo ie us, but that it may 
 at all times exercise an uncontrollable authority and go- 
 vernment over all the rest ; it will then follow, that, in or- 
 der to complete the idea of human nature, as a system, 
 we must not only take in each particular bias, propen- 
 sion, instinct, which are seen to belong to it, but we 
 must add besides the principle of conscience, together 
 with the subjection that is due to it from all the other 
 appetites and passions: just as the idea of a civil consti- 
 tution is formed, not barely from enumerating the seve- 
 ral members and ranks of which it is composed, but 
 from these considered as acting in various degrees of 
 subordination to each other, and all under the direction 
 of the same supreme authority, whether that authority 
 be vested in one person or more. 
 
 The view here given of the internal constitution of man, 
 and of the supremacy of conscience, agreeably to the 
 conceptions of Bishop Butler, enables us to comprehend 
 the force of that expression, common to him and the an- 
 cient moralists, that virtue consists in foUoioing nature. 
 The meaning cannot be, that it consists in acting agree- 
 ably to that propensity of our nature which happens to 
 be the strongest; or which propels us towards certain 
 objects, wiiliuiit any regard to the methods by which 
 
XXIV PREFACE 
 
 they are to be obtained : but the meaning must he, thai 
 virtue consists in the due regulation and subjection of alJ 
 the other appetites and affections to the superior faculty 
 of conscience ; from a conformity to which alone our ac- 
 tions are properly natural, or correspondent to the na- 
 ture, to the whole nature, of such an agent as man. 
 From hence too it appears, that the author of our frame 
 is by no means indifferent to virtue and vice, or has left 
 us at liberty to act at random, as humour or appetite 
 may prompt us ; but that every man has the rule of right 
 within him; a rule attended in the very notion of it with 
 authority, and such as has the force of a direction and a 
 command from Him who made us what we are, what 
 course of behaviour is suited to our nature, and which 
 he expects that we should follow. This moral faculty 
 implies also a presentiment and apprehension, that the 
 judgment which it passes on our actions, considered as 
 of good or ill desert, will hereafter be confirmed by the 
 unerring judgment of God; when virtue and happiness, 
 vice and misery, whose ideas are now so closely connect- 
 ed, shall be indissolubly united, and the divine govern- 
 ment be found to correspond in the most exact propor- 
 tion to the nature he has given us. Lastly, this just 
 prerogative or supremacy of conscience it is, which Mr 
 Pope has described in his Universal Prayer, though 
 perhaps he may have expressed it rather too strongl}^ 
 where he says, 
 
 " Wliat conscience dictates to be done, 
 
 Of warns me not to do, 
 This teach me 7nore than hell to shun, 
 
 Tliat more than heaven pursue." 
 
 The reader will observe, that this way of treating the 
 subject of morals, by an appeal to facts, does not at all 
 interfere with that other way, adopted by Dr Samuel 
 Clarke and others, which begins with inquiring into the 
 relations ?indi fitnesses of things, but rather illustrates and 
 confirms it. That there are essential differences in the 
 qualities of human actions, established by nature, and 
 that this natural difference of things, prior to and inde- 
 pendent of all will, creates a natural ^7ne5s in the agent 
 to act agreeably to it, seems as little to be denied, as 
 that there is the moral difference before explained^ from 
 
BY THE EDITOR. XXV 
 
 which we approve and feel a pleasure in what is right, 
 and conceive a distaste to what is wrong. Still, how- 
 ever, when we are endeavouring to establish either this 
 moral or that natural difference, it ought never to be 
 forgotten, or rather it will require to be distinctly shown, 
 that both of these, when traced up to their source, sup- 
 pose an intelligent Author of nature and moral Ruler of 
 the world ; who originally appointed these differences, 
 and by such an appointment has signified his will that 
 we should conform to them, as the only effectual method 
 of securing our happiness on the whole under his govern- 
 ment* And of this consideration our Prelate himself 
 was not unmindful ; as may be collected from many ex- 
 pressions in different parts of his writings, and particu- 
 larly from the following passages in his eleventh Ser- 
 mon. " It may be allowed, without any prejudice to 
 the cause of virtue and religion, that our ideas of happi- 
 ness and misery are of all our ideas the nearest and 
 most important to us ; that they will, nay if you please, 
 they ought to prevail over thoseof order, and beauty, ni d 
 harmony, and proportion, if there should ever be, as it is 
 impossible there ever should be, any inconsistence be- 
 tween them." And again, " Though virtue or moral 
 rectitude does indeed consist in affection to and pursuit 
 of what is right and good, as such ; yet, v/hen we sit 
 down in a cool hour, we can neither justify to ourselves 
 this or any other pursuit, till we are convinced that it 
 will be for our happiness, or at least not contrary to 
 
 It. t 
 
 Besides the general system of morality opened above, 
 our Author in his volume of Sermons has stated with ac- 
 curacy the difference between self-love and benevolence ; 
 
 * " Far be it from me," says the excellent Dr T. Ealguy (Discourse ix.) "to dis- 
 pute the reality of a moral principle in the human htart. \ feel its existence: I 
 eknirly discern its use and importance. But in no respect is it more important, tlian 
 «s it snj^gests the idea of a moral Governor. Let this idea be once effaced, and the 
 principle of conscience will soon be found weak, and ineffectual. Its influence on 
 men's conduct has, indeed, been too much imd rvalued by some philosophical in- 
 «l«irers. But be that influence, while it lasts, more or less, it is not a steady and 
 leri/taxant principle of action. Unhappily we always have it in our power lo lay it 
 asleep. — Neglect alone will suppress and stifle it, and brinp; it almost into a slate ot 
 stupefaction. Nor can any thing, less tlian the terrors of religion, awaken our minds 
 from this dangerous and deadly "sleep. It can never be a matter of indifference to a 
 thinking vm.i\, whether he is to be happy or miserable beyond the grave." 
 
 + Serm. xi. 
 
XXVI PREFACE 
 
 in opposition to those who, on the one hand, make the 
 whole of virtue to consist in benevolence,* and to those 
 who, on the other, assert that every particular affection 
 and action is resolvable into self-love. In combating 
 these opinions, he has shown, I think unansw^erably, 
 that there are the same kind of indications in human 
 nature, that we were made to promote the happiness of 
 others, as that we were made to promote our own : that 
 it is no just objection to this, that we have dispositions 
 to do evil to others as well as good ; for we have also 
 dispositions to do evil as well as good to ourselves, to our 
 own most important interests even in this life, for the 
 sake of gratifying a present passion : that the thing to 
 be lamented is, not that men have too great a regard to 
 their own real good, but that they have not enough : 
 that benevolence is not more at variance with or un- 
 friendly to self-love, than any other particular affection 
 is : and that by consulting the happiness of others a 
 man is so far from lessening his own, that the very en- 
 deavour to do so, though he should fail in the accom- 
 plishment, is a source of the highest satisfaction and 
 peace of mind.t He has also, in passing, animadverted 
 on the philosopher of Malmsbury, who, in his book "Of 
 Human Nature," has advanced, as discoveries in moral 
 science, that benevolence is only the love of power, and 
 compassion the fear of future calamity to ourselves. And 
 this our Author has done, not so much with the design of 
 exposing the false reasoning of Mr Hobbes, but because 
 on so perverse an account of human nature he has rais- 
 ed a system, subversive of all justice and honesty, J 
 
 II. The religious system of Bishop Butler is chiefly 
 to be collected from the treatise, entitled, " The Analogy 
 of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution 
 and Course of Nature." 
 
 "All things are double one against another, and God 
 hath made nothing imperfect."§ On this single observa- 
 tion of the son of Sirach, the whole fabric of our Prelate's 
 defence of religion, in his Analogy, is raised. Instead 
 
 * See the second Dissertation " On the Nature of Virtue," at the end of the 
 Analog. 
 •j" See Serm. i. and xi. and the preface to the volume of Scmions. 
 
 X See the Notes to Serm. i. and v. § Eccles. xlii.' 24. 
 
BY THE EDITOR. XXVU 
 
 of indulging in idle speculations, how the world might 
 possibly have been better than it is; or, forgetful of the 
 difference between hypothesis and fact, attempting to ex- 
 plain the divine economy with respect to intelligent crea- 
 tures, from preconceived notions of his own ; he first in- 
 quires what the constitution of nature, as made known 
 to us in the way of experiment, actually is ; and from 
 this, now seen and acknowledged, he endeavours to form 
 a judgment of that larger constitution, wiiich religion dis- 
 covers to us. If the dispensation of Providence we are 
 now under, considered as inhabitants of this world, and 
 having a temporal interest to secure in it, be found, on 
 examination, to be analogous to, and of a piece with, 
 that further dispensation, which relates to us as designed 
 for another world, in which we have an eternal interest, 
 depending on our behaviour here ; if both may be traced 
 up to the same general laws, and appear to be carried on 
 according to the same plan of administration ; the fair 
 presumption is, that both proceed from one and the same 
 Author. And if the principal parts objected to in this 
 latter dispensation be similar to and of the same kind 
 with what we certainly experience under the former; the 
 objections, being clearly inconclusive in one case, be- 
 cause contradicted by plain fact, must, in all reason, be 
 a-llowed to be inconclusive also in the other. 
 
 This way of arguing from what is acknowledged to 
 what is disputed, from things known to other things that 
 resemble them, from that part of the divine establish- 
 ment which is exposed to our view to that more impor- 
 tant one which lies beyond it, is on all hands confessed 
 to be just. By this method Sir Isaac Newton has un- 
 folded the system of nature ; by the same method Bishop 
 Butler has explained the system of grace ; and thus, to 
 use the words of a writer, whom I quote with pleasure, 
 " has formed and concluded a happy alliance between 
 faith and philosophy."* 
 
 And although the argument from analogy be allowed 
 to be imperfect, and by no means sufficient to solve all 
 difficulties respecting the government of God, and the 
 designs of his Providence with regard to mankind (a 
 
 * Mr Mainwaring's Dissertation, prefixed to his volume of Sermons. 
 
XXVm PREFACE 
 
 degree of knowledge, .vhich we are not turnished with 
 faculties for attaining, at least in the present state) ; yet 
 surely it is of importance to learn from it, that the natu- 
 ral and moral world are intimately connected, and parts 
 of one stupendous whole or system ; and that the chief 
 objections which are brought against religion may be 
 urged with equal force against the constitution and course 
 of nature, where they are certainly false in fact. And 
 this information we may derive from the work before 
 us; the proper design of which, it may be of use to ob- 
 serve, is not to prove the truth of religion, either natural 
 or revealed, but to confirm that proof, already known, 
 by considerations from analogy. 
 
 After this account of the method of reasoning employ- 
 ed by our Author, let us now advert to his manner of 
 applying it, first to the subject of Natural Religion, and 
 secondly to that of Revealed. 
 
 1. The foundation of all our hopes and fears is a fu- 
 ture life; and with this the treatise begins. Neither the 
 reason of the thing, nor the analogy of nature, according 
 to Bishop Butler, give ground for imagining, that the 
 unknown event, death, will be our destruction. The 
 states in which we have formerly existed, in the womb 
 and in infancy, are not more different from each other 
 than from that of mature age in which we now exist : 
 therefore, that we shall continue to exist hereafter, in a 
 state as different from the present as the present is from 
 those through which we have passed already, is a pre- 
 sumption favoured by the analogy of nature. All that 
 we know from reason concerning death, is the effects it 
 has upon animal bodies : and the frequent instances 
 among men of the intellectual powers continuing in high 
 health and vigour, at the very time when a mortal disease 
 is on the point of putting an end to all the powers of 
 sensation, induce us to hope that it may have no effect 
 at all on the human soul, not even so much as to sus- 
 pend the exercise of its faculties ; though, if it have, the 
 suspension of a power by no means implies its ex- 
 tinction, as sleep or a swoon may convince us.* 
 
 The probability of a future state once granted, an im- 
 
 * Part I. chap. i. 
 
Bt THE EDITOR. %%{% 
 
 portant question arises, How best to secure out interest 
 in that state. We find from what passes daily before us, 
 that the constitution of nature admits of misery as well 
 as happiness; that both of these are the consequences of 
 our own actions; and these consequences v/e are enabled 
 to foresee. Therefore, that our happiness or misery in 
 a future world may depend on our own actions also, and 
 that rewards or punishments hereafter may follow our 
 good or ill behaviour here, is but an appointment of the 
 same sort with what we experience under the divine 
 government, according to the regular course of nature.* 
 
 This supposition is confirmed from another circum- 
 stance, that the natural government of God, under which 
 we now live, is also moral; in which rewards and pun- 
 ishments are the consequences of actions, considered as 
 virtuous and vicious. Not that every man is rewarded 
 or punished here in exact proportion to his desert ; for 
 the essential tendencies of virtue and vice, to produce 
 happiness and the contrary, are often hindered from tak- 
 ing effect from accidental causes. However, there are 
 plainly the rudiments and beginnings of a righteous ad- 
 ministration to be discerned in the constitution of nature : 
 from whence we are led to expect, that these accidental 
 hindrances will one day be removed, and the rule of dis- 
 tributive justice obtain completely in a more perfect 
 state. f 
 
 The moral government of God, thus established, im- 
 plies in the notion of it some sort of trial, or a moral 
 possibility of acting wrong as well as right, in those who 
 are the subjects of it. And the doctrine of religion, that 
 the present life is in fact a state of probation for a future 
 one, is rendered credible, from its being analogous 
 throughout to the general conduct of Providence towards 
 us with respect to this world ; in which prudence is ne- 
 cessary to secure our temporal interest, just as we are 
 taught that virtue is necessary to secure our eternal in- 
 terest; and both are trusted to ourselves.t 
 
 But the present life is not merely a state of probation, 
 implying in it difficulties and danger; it is also a state of 
 discipline and improvement; and that both in our tem- 
 
 * Chap. ii. f Chap. iii. $ Chap. iv. 
 
XXX PREFACE 
 
 poral and religious capacity. Thus childhood is a state 
 of discipline for youth; youth for manhood; and that for 
 old age. Strength of body, and maturity of understand- 
 ing, are acquired by degrees ; and neither of them with- 
 out continual exercise and attention on our part, not on- 
 ly in the beginning of hfe, but through the whole course 
 of it. So again with respect to our religious concerns, 
 the present world is fitted to be, and to good men is in 
 event, a state of discipline and improvement for a future 
 one. The several passions and propensions implanted 
 in our hearts incline us, in a multitude of instances, to 
 forbidden pleasures: this inward infirmity is increased 
 by various snares and temptations, perpetually occurring 
 from without: hence arises the necessity of recollection 
 and self-government, of withstanding the calls of appetite, 
 and forming our minds to habits of piety and virtue ; 
 habits, of which we are capable, and which, to creatures 
 in a state of moral imperfection, and fallen from their 
 original integrity, must be of the greatest use, as an. ad- 
 ditional security, over and above the principle of con- 
 science, from the dangers to which we are exposed.* 
 
 Nor is the credibility here given, by the analogy of 
 nature, to the general doctrine of religion, destroyed or 
 weakened by any notions concerning necessity. Of it- 
 self it is a mere word, the sign of an abstract idea ; and 
 as much requires an agent, that is, a necessary agent, in 
 order to effect any thing, as freedom requires a free 
 agent. Admitting it to be speculatively true, if consid- 
 ered as influencing practice, it is the same as false : for it 
 is matter of experience, that, with regard to our present 
 interest, and as inhabitants of this world, we are treated 
 as if we were free ; and therefore the analogy of nature 
 leads us to conclude, that, with regard to our future in- 
 terest, and as designed for another world, we shall be 
 treated as free also. Nor does the opinion of necessity, 
 supposing it possible, at all ai!ect either the general proof 
 of religion, or its external evidence.t 
 
 Still objections may be made against the wisdom and 
 goodness of the divine government, to which analogy, 
 which can only show the truth or credibility of facts, 
 
 * Part I. cha^. 7. f Cliap. vi» 
 
BY tHE EDITOR. XXXi 
 
 affords no answer. Yet even here analogy is of use, it 
 it suggest that the divine government is a scheme or 
 system, and not a number of unconnected acts, and that 
 this system is also above our comprehension. Now the 
 government of the natural world appears to be a system 
 of this kind; with parts, related to each other, and to- 
 gether composing a whole: in which system ends are 
 brought about by the use of means, many of which means, 
 before experience, would have been suspected to have; 
 had a quite contrary tendency ; which is carried on by 
 general laws, similar causes uniformly producing simi- 
 lar effects : the utility of which general laws, and the in- 
 conveniences which would probably arise from the oc- 
 casional or even secret suspension of them, we are in 
 some sort enabled to discern;* but of the whole we are 
 incompetent judges, because of the small part which 
 comes within our view. Reasoning then from what we 
 know, it is highly credible, that the government of the 
 moral world is a system also, carried on by general laws, 
 and in which ends are accomplished by the intervention 
 of means; and that both constitutions, the natural and 
 the moral, are so ccnnectedj as to form together but one 
 scheme. But of this sclieme, as of that of the natural 
 world taken alone, we are not qualified to judge, on ac- 
 count of the mutual respect of the several parts to each 
 other and to the whole, and our own incapacity to sur- 
 vey the whole, or, with accuracy, any single part. All 
 objections therefore to the wisdom and goodness of the 
 divine government may be founded merely on our ig- 
 norance;! and to such objections our ignorance is the 
 proper, and a satisfactory answer.:}: 
 
 2. The chief difficulties concerning Natural Rehgion 
 being now removed, our Author proceeds, in the next 
 place, to that which is Revealed; and as an Introduction 
 to an inquiry into the Credibility of Christianity, begins 
 with the consideration of its Importance. 
 
 * Spe a treatise on Divine Benevol- lire, by Dr Thomas Balguy, part iJ. 
 t The ignorance of man, is a favourite ili>ci,riiie with Bishop Butler, It occurs in 
 the ^•ec()nd Part of the Analogy ; it makes tlie subject of his Fifteenth Sermon ; and 
 we meet with it npain in his Charge. Whether 'sometimes it be not carried ton 
 length whick is excessive, usay admit of doubt. 
 
 % I'art 1. chap. vii. 
 
The importance of Christianity appears in two re* 
 spects. First, in its being a repubiication of Natural Re- 
 ligion, in its native simplicity, with authority, and with 
 circumstances of advantage ; ascertaining in many in- 
 stances of moment, what before was only probable, and 
 particularly confirming the doctrine of a future state of 
 rewards and punishments.* Secondly, as revealing a 
 new dispensation of Providence, originating from the 
 I<ure love and mercy of God, and conducted by the me- 
 diation of his Son, and the guidance of his Spirit for the 
 recovery and salvation of mankind, represented in a 
 state of apostasy and ruin. This account of Christianity 
 being admitted to be just, and the distinct offices of these 
 three divine Persons being once discovered to us, we 
 are as much obliged in point of duty to acknowledge the 
 relations we stand in to the Son and Holv Ghost, as our 
 Mediator and Sanctifier, as we are obhged in point oJ 
 duty to acknowledge the relation we stand in to God the 
 Father; although the two former of these relations be 
 learnt from Revelation onlv, and in the last we are in- 
 structed by the light of nature; the obligation in either 
 case arising from the offices themselves, and not at all 
 depending on the manner in which they are made 
 known to us. t 
 
 The presumptions against Revelation in general are, 
 that it is not discoverable by reason, that it is unlike to 
 wiiat is so discovered, and that it was introduced and 
 supported by miracles. But in a scheme so large as 
 
 * Admirable to this purpose are the words of Br T. Balgiiy, in the Ninth of his 
 Discourse's already referred to, p. xxv. " The doctrine of a ///e to come, some per- 
 sons will say, is a doctrine of ««^/^ra/ religion ; and can never therefore be properly 
 alleged to show the importance of revelation. They Judge perhaps from the frtinie 
 ot the world, that the present system is imperfect; they see designs in it, not yet 
 completed; and they think they have grounds for expecting another state, in which 
 the.^-e designs shrdl he fart/ier ciirried on, and brought to a conclusion, worthy of in 
 finite wisdom. I am not concerned to di^pllte i\\v justness of this reasoning ; nor do 
 I wish to dispute it. But how far will it reach? Will it lead us to the Christiu7i 
 doctrine of a Judgment to come? Will it give us the prospect of an eternity of iiaj'- 
 piness? Nothing of all this. It shows us only, that death is not the end of our be- 
 ing ; that we are likely to pass hereafur into other systems, more favourable than the 
 present to the great ends of God's providence, the virtue and the happiitess of his in- 
 telligent creatures. But into ^vhat systems we are to be removed ; what new scenes 
 are to be presented to us, either of pleasure or jiain ; what new parts we shall have 
 to act, and to what tiials and temptations we may yet be exposed ; on all these sub- 
 jects We know just notliing. That our ji;)ppiness for ever depends on our conduct 
 /i<?re, is a most important proposition, whicn we learn OM/y from rvcdation.': 
 
 + Part II. chap, i. 
 
BY THE EDITOR. XXXUl 
 
 that of tlie miiverse, unbounded in extent and everlast- 
 ing in duration, there must of necessity be numberless 
 circumstances v/liich are beyond the reach of our faculties 
 to discern, and which can only be known by divine illu- 
 mination. And both in the natural and moral govern- 
 ment of the world, under which we live, we find many 
 things unlike one to another, and therefore ought not to 
 wonder if the same unliktness obtain between things 
 visible and invisible ; although it be far from true, that 
 revealed religion is entirely unlike the constitution of 
 nature, as analogy may teach us. Nor is there any thing 
 incredible in Revelation, considered as miraculous ; whe- 
 ther miracles be supposed to have been performed 
 at the besinnins: of the world, or after a course of nature 
 has been established. Not at the beginning of the world; 
 for then there was either no course of nature at all, or a 
 power must have been exerted totally different from 
 what that course is at present : all men and animals can- 
 not have been born, as they are now ; but a pair of each 
 sort must have been produced at first, in a way alto- 
 gether unlike to that in which they have been since pro- 
 duced ; unless we affirm, that men and animals have ex- 
 isted from eternity in an endless succession ; one miracle 
 therefore at least there must have been at the beginning 
 of the world, or at the time of man's creation. Not af- 
 ter the settlement of a course of nature, on account of mir- 
 acles being contrary to that course, or, in other words, 
 contrary to experience; for, in order to know whether 
 miracles, worked in attestation of a divine religion, be 
 contrary to experience or not, we ought to be acquainted 
 with other cases, similar or parallel to those, in which 
 miracles are alleged to have been wrought. But where 
 shall we find such similar or parallel cases .^^ The world 
 which we inhabit affords none: we know of no extraor- 
 dinary revelations from God to man, but those recorded 
 in the Old and New Testament; all of w^hich w^ere es- 
 tablished by miracles ; it cannot therefore be said, that 
 miracles are incredible, because contrary to experience, 
 when all the experience we have is in favour of miracles, 
 and on the side of rehgion.* Besides, in reasoning con- 
 
 • ** In the common affiiirs of life, common experience is sufficient to dii-ect us. Bat 
 
 C 
 
XXXIV PREFACE 
 
 cerning miracles, they ought not to be compared with 
 common natural events, but with uncommon appear- 
 ances, such as comets, magnetism, electricity; which, to 
 one acquainted only with the usual phenomena of nature, 
 and the common powers of matter, must, before proof of 
 
 * their actual existence, be thought incredible.* 
 
 The presumption against Revelation in general being 
 dispatched, objections against the Christian Revelation 
 in particular, against the scheme of it, as distinguished 
 from objections against its evidence, are considered 
 next. Now supposing a revelation to be really given, it 
 is highly probable beforehand, that it must contain ma- 
 ny things appearing to us liable to objections. The ac- 
 knowledged dispensation of nature is very different from 
 vv^hat we should have expected : reasoning then from an- 
 alogy, the revealed dispensation, it is credible, would be 
 also different. Nor are we in any sort judges at what 
 time, or in w'hat degree, or manner, it is fit or expedient 
 for God to instruct us, in things confessedly of the great- 
 est use, either by natural reason, or by supernatural in- 
 formation. Thus, arguing on speculation only, and 
 without experience, it would seem very unlikely that so 
 important a remedy as that provided by Christianity, for 
 the recovery of mankind from ruin, should have been for 
 
 / so many ages withheld; and, when at last vouchsafed, 
 should be imparted to so few ; and, after it has been im- 
 parted, should be attended with obscurity and doubt. 
 And just so we might have argued, before experience, 
 concerning the remedies provided in nature for bodily 
 diseases, to which by nature we are exposed: for many 
 of these were unknown to mankind for a number of ages ; 
 
 will commnri rxperienre sprvf to giiulr ourjtidg'inpnt concpminj; the fn /I am] redewp. 
 tion ofmankiiiti ? From what we si e every i)ay,ciii we «xi.iiaiii the commencement, 
 or foretell the dissolution of the world? To jiuiee of events l;ke these, we shouitj 
 be conversant in the history ot other ]i];)nets; shoukl he <li>tincily iiiforiiieil ol God's 
 various dispen-^ations lo all the differtnt ord<Ts of rcitional beings. Instead then of 
 gronnding- oin- relijjioiis opinions on what we call cvperience, h't us apply to a more 
 certain gnide, let us hearken to the testimorit/ of (iod himself. The credibility of 
 Aumun testimony, and the conduct of hunian agents, are sulij'Cis perfectly within the 
 reach of our natural facidties ; and we oiioht to desire no firmei* foTuidation for oup 
 belitf of religion, than for the judgments \» e form in the eoninion atfairs of life : 
 where we see a little plain testimony easily o'.it\«'eij;hs the most spi cious conjectures, 
 and not si'ldom even strongf j<rr)!i;iliilities." I')r liilgny's Fourth Charge. See also 
 an excellent pamphlet, eniitieil " Rrmark^ nn Mr liiime's F.ssny «)n the KBliiral 
 History of Religion," sect. 5 , and tl >' S x:;i of Vv roiNcUs Discourses., 
 
BY THE EDITOR. XXXV 
 
 are known but to few now; some important ones prob- 
 ably not discovered yet; and those wliich are, neither 
 certain in their apphcation, nor universal in their use: 
 and the same mode of reasoning that would lead us to 
 expect they should have been so, would lead us to ex- 
 pect that the necessity of them should have been super- 
 seded, by there being no diseases ; as the necessity of the 
 Christian scheme, it may be thought, might also have 
 been superseded, by preventing the fall of man, so tliat 
 he should not have stood in need of a Redeemer at all.* 
 
 As to objections against the wisdom and goodness of 
 Christianity, the same answer may be applied to them 
 as was to the like objections against the constitution of 
 nature. For here also, Christianity is a scheme or econ- 
 omy, composed of various parts, forming a whole; in 
 which scheme means are used for the accomplishing of 
 ends; and which is conducted by general laws, of all of 
 which we know as little as we do of the constitution of 
 nature. And the seeming want of wisdom or goodness 
 in this svstem is to be ascribed to the same cause, as the 
 like appearances of defects in the natural system; our 
 inability to discern the whole scheme, and our ignorance 
 of the relation of those parts which are discernible to 
 others beyond our view. 
 
 The objections against Christianity as a matter of fact, 
 and against the wisdom and goodness of it, having been 
 obviated together, the chief of them are now to be con- 
 sidered distinctly. One of these, which is levelled 
 against the entire system itself, is of this sort: the re- 
 storation of mankind, represented in Scripture as the 
 great design of the Gospel, is described as requiring a 
 long series of means, and persons, and dispensations, 
 before it can be brought to its completion; whereas the 
 whole ought to have been effected at once. Now every 
 thing we see in the course of nature shows the folly of 
 this objection. For in the natural course of Providence^ 
 ends are brought about by means, not operating imme- 
 diately and at once, but deliberately, and in'a way of pro- 
 gression; one thing being subservient to another, this to 
 somewhat further. I'he change of seasons, the ripening 
 
 * Clihp. iii. 
 C2 
 
XXXVl PREFACE 
 
 of fruits, the growth of vegetable and animal bodies, are 
 instances of this. And therefore, that the same pro- 
 gressive method should be followed in the dispensation 
 of Christianity, as is observed in the common dispensa- 
 tion of Providence, is a reasonable expectation, justified 
 by the analogy of nature.* 
 
 Another circumstance objected to in the Christian 
 scheme is the appointment of a Mediator, and the sav- 
 ing of the world through him. But the visible govern- 
 ment of God beino; actually administered in this wav, or 
 by the mediation and instrumentality of others, there 
 can be no general presumption against an appointment 
 of this kind, against his invisible government being ex- 
 ercised in the same manner. "We have seen already, 
 that with regard to ourselves this visible government is 
 carried on by rewards and punishments; for happiness 
 and misery are the consequences of our own actions, 
 considered as virtuous and vicious ; and these conse- 
 quences we are enabled to foresee. It might have been 
 imagined, before consulting experience, that after we 
 had rendered ourselves hable to misery by our own ill 
 conduct, sorrow for what was past, and behaving well 
 for the future, would, alone and of themselves, have ex- 
 empted us from deserved punishment, and restored us to 
 the divine favour. But the fact is otherwise; and r^ al 
 reformation is often found to be of no avail, so as to se- 
 cure the criminal from poverty, sickness, infamy, and 
 death, the never-failing attendants on vice and extrava- 
 gance, exceeding a certain degree. By the course of 
 nature then it appears, God does not always pardon a 
 sinner on his repentance. Yet there is provision made, 
 oven in nature, that the miseries, which men bring on 
 themselves by unlawful indulgences, may in many cases 
 be mitigated, and in some removed ; partly by extraor- 
 dinary exertions of the offender himself, but more es- 
 pecially and frequently by the intervention of others, 
 who voluntarily, and from motives of compassion, submit 
 to labour and sorrow, such as produce long and lasting 
 inconveniences to themselves, as the means of rescuing 
 another from the wretched effects of former imprudences. 
 
 * Chap. iv. 
 
BY THE EDITOR. XXXVIl 
 
 Vicarious punishment, therefore, or one person's suffer- 
 ings contributing to the rchef of another, is a providential 
 disposition in tlie economy of nature :*' and it ought not 
 to be matter of surprise, if by a method analogous to this 
 we be redeemed from sin and misery, in the economy 
 of grace. That mankind at present are in a state of de- 
 gradation, different from that in which they were origi-- 
 nally created, is the very ground of the Christian reve- 
 lation, as contained in the Scriptures. Whether we ac- 
 quiesce in the account, that our being placed in such a 
 state is owing to the crime of our first parents, or choose 
 to ascribe it to any other cause, it makes no difference 
 as to our condition: the vice and unhappiness of the 
 world are still there, notwithstanding all our supposi- 
 tions: nor is it Christianity that hath put us into this 
 state. We learn also from the same Scriptures, what 
 experience and the use of expiatory sacrifices from the 
 most early times might have taught us, that repentance 
 alone is not sufficient to prevent the fatal consequences 
 of past transgressions: but that still there is room for 
 mercy, and that repentance shall be available, though 
 not of itself, yet through the mediation of a divine Per- 
 son, the Messiah; who, from the sublimest principles of 
 compassion, when we were dead in trespasses and sins^t 
 suffered and died, the innocent for the guilty, the just for 
 the unjusi^X that we might have redemption through his 
 blood, even the forgiveness of sins.% In what way tha 
 death of Christ was of that efficacy it is said to be, in 
 procuring the reconciliation of sinners, the Scriptures 
 have not explained; it is enough that the doctrine is re- 
 vealed; that it is not contrary to any truths which 
 reason and experience teach us; and that it accords in 
 
 • Dr Artliur Ashley Sykrs, from whose writings some pfood may be coHectrd out oj 
 a mulLiuuV of Uiiiiffs of a coiitriiiy tendency, in what lie is pleased to call "Tin! 
 Scripture Doctrine of Redemption," (see the observations on llie texts cited in liis 
 fiist ciiapler, and aUo in chapters the fifth and s xtii,) opposes what is here advanced 
 by Bishop Butler ; quoting his words, but without mentionin<v his name. If wliat is 
 said above be not tliou<jhL a sufficient answer to the objections of tliis author, the 
 readvr mp.y do well to consult a Chnrge " On the Use and Abuse of Philosophy iii 
 the Study of Reli->ion," by tlie late Dr Powell; who seems to me to have liad the 
 observations ot Dr Sykes in his view, where he is CDrfitir.f.; the lefsoniiif^s of certain 
 philosophizins' Divines against the docuine of the Atom ment. Powell's Discourse, 
 CbargfAU. p. 3i2~'Ua. 
 
 f Epiies ii. 1. i I Pet. iii. 18. $ Colos. i. 14. 
 
XXXVIU PREFACE 
 
 perfect harmony with the usual metliod of the divine 
 conduct in the aovernment of the world.* 
 
 Again, it tiath been said, that if the Christian revela- 
 tion were true, it must have been universal, and could 
 not have been left upon doubtful evidence. Buc God, 
 in his natural providence, dispenses his gifts in great 
 variety, not only among creatures of the same species, 
 Out to the same individuals also at different times. Had 
 the Christian revelation been universal at first, yet, from 
 the diversity of men's abilities, both of mind and body, 
 their various means of improvement, and other external 
 advantages, some persons must soon have been in a si- 
 tuation, with respect to religious knowledge, much supe- 
 rior to that of others, as much perhaps as they are at 
 present : and all men will be equitably dealt with at last ; 
 and to whom little is given, of him little will be required. 
 Then as to the evidence for religion being left doubtful, 
 difficulties of this sort, like difficulties in practice, afford 
 scope and opportunity for a virtuous exercise of the un- 
 derstanding, and dispose the mind to acquiesce and rest 
 satisfied with any evidence that is real. In the daily 
 commerce of life, men are obliged to act upon great un- 
 certainties, with regard to success in their temporal pur- 
 suits : and the case with regard to religion is parallel. 
 However, though religion be not intuitively true, the 
 proofs of it which we have are amply sufficient in reason 
 to induce us to embrace it ; and dissatisfaction with those 
 proofs may possibly be men's own fault, f 
 
 Nothing remains but to attend to the positive evidence 
 there is for the truth of Christianity. Now, besides its di- 
 rect and fundamental proofs, which are miracles and pro- 
 phecies, there are many collateral circumstances, which 
 may be united into one view, and all together niay be con- 
 sidered as making up one argument. In this way o) 
 treating the subject, the revelation, v/hether real or other- 
 wise, may be supposed to be wholly historical : the de- 
 sign of which appears to be, to give* an account of the 
 condition of religion, and its professors, with a concise 
 narration of the pulitical state of things, as far as religion 
 is aftected oy ir, during a great length of time, near six 
 
 * Cliap. V. f Chap. vL 
 
BY THE EDITOR. XXXIX 
 
 thousand years of which are already past. More parti- 
 cularly it comprehends an account of God's entering into 
 covenant with ov.o iiutioD, the Jewp, ft.-it he would be 
 their God, and that they should be his people ; of his 
 often interposing in their affairs; giving t'iiem the pro- 
 mise, and afterwards the possession, of a flourishing 
 country; assuring them of the greatest national prosper- 
 ity, in case of their obedience, and threatening the sever- 
 est national punishment, in case they forsook him, and 
 joined in the idolatry of their Pagan neighbours. It 
 contains also a prediction of a particular person to ap- 
 pear in the fulness of time, in whom all the promises of 
 God to the Jews were to be fulfilled : and it relates, that, 
 at the time expected, a person did actually appear, as- 
 suming to be the Saviour foretold ; that he worked vari- 
 ous miracles among them, in confirmation of his divine 
 authority ; and, as was foretold also, was rejected and 
 put to death by the very people who had long- desired 
 and waited for his coming ; but that his religion, in spite 
 of all opposition, was established in the world by his dis- 
 ciples, invested with supernatural powers for that pur- 
 pose ; of the fate and fortunes of which religion there is 
 a prophetical description, carried down to the end of 
 time. Let any one now, after reading the above history, 
 and not knowing whether the whole were not a fiction, 
 be supposed to ask. Whether all that is here related be 
 true ? and instead of a direct answer, let him be inform- 
 ed of the several acknowledged facts, which are found 
 to correspond to it in real life ; and then let him com- 
 pare the history and facts together, and observe the as- 
 tonishing coincidence of both : such a joint review must 
 appear to him of very great weight, and to amount to 
 evidence somev.iiat more than human. And unless the 
 whole series, and every particular circumstance contained 
 in it, can be thought to have arisen from accident, the 
 truth of Christianity is proved.* 
 
 The view here given of the moral and religious sys- 
 
 * Chap. vii. To tlie Analogy are suhjo;ned two Dis^erlalionr, boHi origiiially in 
 seried in the Ixitly of the work. One On Personal Identity, In which are c-ont'^ineu 
 some striclurcs on Mr Locke, wlio asserts thai consciousness makes or consiiuitcs 
 personal identity ; \vherens, as onr Antl.or oliserves, conscionsn»'Ss makes only per- 
 sonality, or is ntcessary to Llie iiha of a person, /. e. a thinlvui^ intelligent being, but 
 
xl 
 
 pheface by the eoitor. 
 
 terns of BisjJiop Butler, it will immediately be perceived, 
 is chiefly intended for younger students, especially for 
 students in Divinity ; to whom it is hoped it may be of 
 use, so as to encourage them to peruse, with proper dili- 
 gence, the original works of the Author himself. For it 
 may be necessary to observe, that neither of the volumes 
 of this excellent Prelate are addressed to those who 
 read for amusement, or curiosity, or to get rid of time. 
 All subjects are not to be comprehended with the same 
 ease ; and morality and religion, when treated as sciences, 
 each accompanied with ditiiculties of its own, can neither 
 of them be understood as they ought without a very 
 peculiar attention. But morality and religion are not 
 merely to be studied as sciences, or as being speculatively 
 true ; thev are to be regarded in another and higher 
 light, as the rule of life and manners, as containing 
 authoritative directions by which to regulate our faith 
 and practice. And in thi« view, the infinite importance 
 of them, considered, it can never be an indifferent matter 
 whether they be received or rejected. For both claim to 
 be the voice of God; and whether they be so or not, 
 cannot be known, till their claims be impartially examin- 
 ed. If they indeed come from Him, we are bound to 
 conform to them at our peril ; nor is it left to our choice, 
 whether we will submit to the obligations they impose 
 upon us or not ; for submit to them we must, in such a 
 sense, as to incur the punishments denounced by both 
 against wilful disobedience to their irjunctions. 
 
 presupposes, and therefore cannot constitute, per>ona! identity: just ns knowledjje 
 jresiipposes truth, hut does not constitute it. Consciousness of past actions does in- 
 deed siiow us the identity oF ourselves, or gives us a certain assurance tliat u e are 
 liie siuiie persons or livini>' agents now, whicli we were at the time to whicli our re- 
 iiteiidjrauce Ciin [iMk liack : but still we should be the same persons as we wbtp, 
 liiouoh this conscious:!! ss of what is past were wanting, tiiough all that had l)een d-ouo- 
 by us lornii rly were f(.rf,'i)!,tf'ii ; ur.lfss it be true, that no person has existed a single 
 monienl beyond what he can remember. Tiie otiier Dissertation is On the Natun 
 «/■ /'/W«f, which proper]/ htlongs to Llic iirjr^l sy.steiu (;f our Author already ex- 
 plained. 
 
THE 
 
 lalFjfi OF DR BUT1.ER. 
 
 Dr Joseph Butler, a Prelate of the most distinguished 
 character and abiUties, was born at Wantage, in Berk- 
 shire, in the year 1692. His father, Mr Thomas But- 
 Ijr, who was a substantial and reputable shopkeeper in 
 that town, observing in his son Joseph* an excellent 
 genius and inclination for learning, determined to edu- 
 cate him for the ministry, among the Protestant Dissen- 
 ters of the Presbyterian denomination. For this pur- 
 pose, after he had gone through a proper course of 
 grammatical literature, at the free grammar school of his 
 native place, under the care of the Rev. Mr Phihp Bar- 
 ton, a Clergyman of the Church of England, he was sent 
 to a Dissenting academy, then kept at Gloucester, but 
 which was soon afterwards removed to Tewkesbury. 
 The principal tutor of this academy was Mr Jones, a 
 man of uncommon abilities and knowledge, who had the 
 honour of training up several scholars, who became of 
 great eminence, both in the Established Church and 
 among the Dissenters. At Tewkesbury Mr Butler 
 made an extraordinary progress in the study of Divinity ; 
 of which he gave a remarkable proof, in the letters ad- 
 dressed by him, while he resided at Tewkesbury, to Dr 
 Samuel Clarke, laying before him the doubts that had 
 arisen in his mind, concerning the conclusiveness of 
 some arguments in the Doctor's demonstration of the 
 being and attributes of God. The first of these letters 
 was dated the 4th of November, 1713; and the sagacity 
 and depth of thought displayed in it, immediately excit- 
 ed Dr Clarke's particular notice. This condescension 
 encouraged Mr Butler to address the Doctor again upon 
 the same subject, which likewise was answered by him ; 
 and the correspondence being carried on in three other 
 
 ♦ Ke was the youngest of eight children. 
 
Xlii THE LIFE OP 
 
 letters, the whole was annexed to the celebrated treatise 
 before mentioned, and the collection has been retained 
 in all the subsequent editions of that work. The man- 
 agement of ihis correspondence was entrusied by Mr 
 Butler to his friend and fellow-pupil, Mr Seeker, who, 
 in order to conceal the affair, undertook to convey the 
 letters to the post-ofhce at Gloucc ster, and to bring back 
 Dr Clarke's answers. When Mr Butler's name was dis- 
 covered to the Doctor, the candour, modesty, and good 
 sense, with which he had written, immediately procured 
 him the friendship of that eminent and excellent man. 
 Our young student was not, however, during his contin- 
 uance at Tewkesbury, solely employed in metaphysical 
 speculations and inquiries. Another subject of his seri- 
 ous consideration was, the propriety of his becoming a 
 Dissenting minister. Accordingly, he entered into an 
 examination of the principles of non-conformity ; the re- 
 sult of which was, such a dissatisfaction with them, as 
 determined him to conform to the Established Church. 
 This intention was, at first, disagreeable to his father, 
 who endeavoured to divert him from his purpose ; and, 
 with that view, called in the assistance of some eminent 
 Presbyterian Divines ; but finding his son's resolution to 
 be fixed, he at length suffered him to be removed to Ox- 
 ford, where he was admitted a commoner of Oriel Col- 
 lege, on the 17th of March, 1714. At what time he took 
 Orders doth not appear, nor who the Bishop was by 
 whom he was ordained; but it is certain that he entered 
 into the Church soon after his admission at Oxford, if 
 it be true, as is asserted, that he sometimes assisted Mr 
 Edward Talbot in the divine service, at his living of 
 Hendred, near Wantage. With this gentleman, who 
 was the second son of Dr William Talbot, successively 
 Bishop of Oxford, Salisbury, and Durham, Mr Butler 
 formed an intimate friendF;hip at Oriel College ; which 
 friendship laid the foundation of all his subsequent pre- 
 ferments, and procured for him a very honourable situa- 
 tion, when he was only twenty-six years of asre. For it 
 was in 1718 that, at the recommendation of Mr Talbot, 
 in conjunction with that of Dr Clarke, he was appointed 
 by Sir Joseph Jekyll tc be preacher at the Rolls. This 
 
dk butler. xliii 
 
 was three years before he had taken any degree at the 
 University, where he did not go out Bachtlor of Law- 
 till the idth of June, 1721, which, however, was as soon 
 as that degree could suitably be conferred upon him. 
 Mr Buthr continued at the Rolls till 1726 ; in the be- 
 ginning of which year he published, in one volume, oc- 
 tavo, " Fifteen S;:rmons preached at that Chapel." In 
 the mean while, by the patronage of Dr Talbot, Bishop 
 of Durham, to whose notice he had been recommended 
 (together with Mr Benson and Mr Seeker) by Mr Ed- 
 w^ard Talbot, on his death-bed, our Author had been 
 presented first to the rectory of Haughton, near Darlington, 
 and afterwards to that of Stanhope, in the same diocese. 
 The benefice of Haughton was given to him in 1722, and 
 that of Stanhope in 1725. At Haughton there was a 
 necessity for rebuilding a great part of the parsonage- 
 house, and Mr Butler had neither money nor talents for 
 that work. Mr Seeker, therefore, who had always the in- 
 terest of his friends at heart, and had acquired a very con- 
 siderable influence with Bishop Talbot, persuaded that 
 Prelate to give Mr Butler, in exchange for Haughton, 
 the rectory of Stanhope, which was not only free from 
 any such incumbrance, but was likewise of much supe- 
 jior value, being indeed one of the richest parsonages in 
 England. Whilst our Author continued preacher at the 
 Rolls Chapel, he divided his time between his duty in 
 town and country ; but when he quitted the Rolls, he 
 resided during seven years, wholly at Stanhope, in the 
 conscientious discharge of every obligation appertaining 
 to a good parish priest. This retirement, however, was 
 too solitary for his disposition, which had in it a natural 
 cast of gloominess. And though his recluse hours were 
 by no means lost, either to private improvement or pul?- 
 lic utility, yet he felt at times, very painfully, the want 
 of that select society of friends to which he had been ac- 
 customed, and which could inspire him with the greatest 
 cheerfulness. Mr Seeker, therefore, who knew this, was 
 extremely anxious to draw him out into a more active 
 and conspicuous scene, and omitted no opportunity of 
 expressing this desire to such as he thought capable of 
 promoting it. Having himself been appointed King's 
 
Xliv THE LIFE OF 
 
 Chaplain in 1732, he took occasion, in a conversation 
 which he had the honour of holding with Queen Caro- 
 line, to mention to her his friend Mr Butler. The 
 Queen said she thought he had been dead. Mr Seeker 
 assured her he was not. Yet her Majesty afterwards 
 asked Archbishop Blackburn, if he was not dead : his 
 answer was, " No, madam ; but he is buried." Mr Seek- 
 er continuing his purpose of endeavouring to bring his 
 friend out of his retirement, found means, upon Mr 
 Charles Talbot's being made Lord Chancellor, to have 
 Mr Butler recommended to him for his Chaplain. His 
 Lordship accepted, and sent for him ; and this promo- 
 tion calling him to Town, he took Oxford in his wa}^, and 
 was admitted there to the degree of Doctor of Law, on 
 the 8th of December, 1733. The Lord Chancellor, who 
 gave him also a prebend in the church of Rochester, had 
 consented that he should reside at his parish of Stanhope 
 one half of the year. 
 
 Dr Butler being thus brought back into the world, his 
 merit and his talents soon introduced him to particular 
 notice, and paved the way for his rising to those high 
 dignities which he afterwards enjoyed. In 1736 he was 
 appointed Clerk of the Closet to Queen Caroline ; and, 
 in the same year, he presented to her Majesty a copy oi 
 his excellent Treatise, entitled, " The Analogy of Reli- 
 gion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and 
 Course of Nature." His attendance upon his Royal 
 Mistress, by her especial command, was from seven to 
 nine in the evening every day : and though this particu- 
 lar relation to that excellent and learned Queen was soon 
 determined by her death, in 1737, yet he had been so 
 effectually recommended by her, as well as by the late 
 Lord Chancellor Talbot, to his Majesty's favour, that in 
 t!ie next year he was raised to the highest order of the 
 Clmrch, by a nomination to the bishopric of Bristol ; to 
 wliich see he was consecrated on the 3d of Decemler 
 1738. King George II. not being satisfied with this 
 proof of his regard to Dr Butler, promiotcd him, in 1740, 
 to the Deanery of St Paul's, London, into which he was 
 installed on the 24th of May in that year. Finding the 
 demands of this dignity to be incompatible with his pa- 
 
DR BUTLEft. XlV 
 
 risli duty at Stanliope, he immediately resigned that rich 
 benefice. Besides our Prelate's unremitted attention to 
 his peculiar obligations, he was called upon to preach 
 several discourses on public occasions, which were af- 
 terwards separately printed, and have since been annex- 
 ed to the latter editions of the Sermons at the Rolls Cha- 
 pel. In 1746, upon the death of Dr Egerton, Bishop of 
 Hereford, Dr Butler was made Clerk of the Closet to the 
 King ; and, on the 16th of October 1750, he received an- 
 other distinguished mark of his Majesty's favour, by be- 
 ing translated to the see of Durham. This was on the 
 16th of October in that year, upon the decease of Dr Ed- 
 ward Chandler. Our Prelate being thus appointed to 
 preside over a diocese with wliich he had long been con- 
 nected, delivered his first, and indeed his last Charge to 
 his Clergy, at bis primary visitation in 1751. The prin- 
 cipal object of it was " External Religion." The Bishop 
 ha.ving observed, with deep concern, tlie great and grow- 
 ing neglect of serious piety in the kingdom, insisted 
 strongly on the usefulness of outward forms and institu- 
 tions, in fixing and preserving a sense of devotion and 
 duty in the minds of men. In doing this, he was thought 
 by several persons to speak too favourably of Pagan and 
 Popish ceremonies, and to countenance, in a certain de- 
 gree, the cause of superstition. Under that apprehension, 
 an able and spirited writer, who was understood to be a 
 Clergyman of the Church of England, published, in 1752, 
 a pamphlet, entitled, " A Serious Inquiry into the Use 
 and Importance of External Religion ; occasioned by 
 some Passages in the Right Rev. the Lord Bishop of 
 Durham's Charge to the Clergy of that Diocese ; — Hum- 
 bly addressed to his Lordship." Many persons, how- 
 ever, and we believe the greater part of the Clergy of the 
 diocese, did not think our Prelate's Charge so exception- 
 able as it appeared to this author. The Charge, being 
 printed at Durham, and having never been annexed to 
 any of Dr Butler's other works, is now become extreme- 
 ly scarce ; and it is observable, that it is the only one 
 of his publications which ever produced him a direct hter- 
 
 ary antagonist. 
 
 By this promotion, our worthy Bishop was furnished 
 
Xlvi THE LIFE OP 
 
 With ample means of exerting the virtue of charity ; a 
 virtue which emineniiy abounded in him, and the exer- 
 cise of which was his highest dehght. But this gratifica- 
 tion he did not long enjoy. He had been but a short time 
 seated in his new bishopric, when his health began visi- 
 bly to dechne; and having been complimented, during his 
 indisposition, upon account of his great resignation to the 
 Divine will, he is said to have expressed some regret, 
 that he should be taken from the present world so soon 
 after he had been rendered capable of becoming much 
 more useful in it. In his illness he was carried to Bris- 
 tol, to try the waters of that place ; but these proving in- 
 effectual, he removed to Bath, where, being past recovery, 
 he died on the 16th of June, 1752. His corpse was con- 
 veyed to Bristol, and interred in the cathedral there, 
 where a monument, with an inscription, is erected to his 
 memorv. 
 
 On the greatness of Bishop Butler's character we need 
 not enlarge; for his profound knowledge, and the prodi- 
 gious strength of his mind, are amply displayed in his 
 incomparable writings. His piety was of the most seri- 
 ous and fervent, and, perhaps, somewhat of the ascetic 
 kind. His benevolence was warm, generous, and diffu- 
 sive. Whilst he was Bishop of Bristol, he expended, in 
 repairing and improving the episcopal palace, four thou- 
 sand pounds, which is said to have been more than the 
 whole jrevenues of the bishopric amounted to, during his 
 continuance in that see. Besides his private benefactions, 
 he was a contributor to the infirmary at Bristol, and a 
 subscriber to three of the hospitals at London. He was 
 likewise a principal promoter, though not the first found- 
 er, of the infirmary at Newcastle, in Northumberland. # 
 In supporting the hospitahty and dignity of the rich and 
 powerful diocese of Durham, he was desirous of imitating 
 the spirit of his patron. Bishop Talbot. In this spirit he 
 set apart three days every week for the reception and en- 
 tertainment of the principal gentry of the country. Nor 
 were even the Clergy who had the poorest benefices ne- 
 glected by him. He not only occasionally invited them 
 to dine with him, but condescended to visit them at their 
 respective pari.shes. By his will he left five hundred 
 
DR RUTLER. Xlvii 
 
 pounds to the Society for propagating the Gospel in Fo- 
 reign Parts, and some legacies to his friends and domes- 
 tics. His executor and residuary legatee was his chap- 
 lain, the Rev. Or Nachanael Forster, a divme of distm- 
 guished hterature. Bishop Butler 'vvas never married. 
 Soon after his decease, the following hnes, by way of 
 epitaph, were written concerning him; and were printed 
 first, if we recollect aright, in the London Magazine. 
 
 Benf'ath this marble Butler lies entomb'd, 
 Who, Willi a boiil inflamed by love divine, 
 
 His lile in presence olhis God consumed, 
 Like the bright lamps before the holy sliriiie. 
 
 His aspect pleasing, mind with learning fraugiit 
 His eloquence wus like a chain of gold, 
 That the wild passions of mankind controll'd ; 
 
 Merit, wherever to be found, he sought. 
 
 Desire of transient riciies he iiad none ; 
 
 These he, with bounteous liMud, did well dispense; 
 Bent to fulfill the ends of Providence; 
 
 His heart still fix'd on an immortal crown. 
 His heart a mirror was, of |)urest kind, 
 Where the bright imiige of his Maker sliined; 
 
 Reflecting faithful to the tlirone above, 
 
 Th' Irradiant glories of the Mystic Dove. 
 
 The following Epitaph, said to be written by Dr Na- 
 thanaei Forster, is inscribed on a flat marble stone, in the 
 cathedral church of Bristol, placed over the spot where 
 the remains of Bishop Butler are deposited; and which, 
 as it is now ahnost obliterated, it may be worth while here 
 to preserve. 
 
 H. S, 
 
 Revererdus admodum in Christo Pater 
 JOSEPIIUS BUTLER, LL.D. 
 
 nujusce prn:o Dioec seos 
 Deinde Dni.elmensis Ef iscopus. 
 Quali' quantusque Vir erat 
 . Sua lihenlissime agnovit a!tas: 
 Et si quid Prtesuli aut Scrijjton ad fiamam valert 
 Mens altissirr.a, 
 Ingenii pprspicacis et suhacti Vis, 
 4niinusi]ue pins, s:m[ lex, candi Ins, liberalft, 
 Mortui hand (arile evar.escet memoria. 
 Obiit Bathoni.T IG Kalend. Julii, 
 A. P. 1752 
 Annos natus 60. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 Probable eviJonce is essentially distinguished from de- 
 monstrative by tliis, that it admits of degrees ; and of all 
 variety of them, from the highest moral certainty, to the 
 very lowest presumption. We cannot indeed say a thing 
 is probably true upon one very slight presumption for 
 it ; because, as there may be probabilities on both sides 
 of a question, there may be some against it ; and though 
 there be not, yet a slight presumption does not beget 
 that degree of conviction, which is implied in saying a 
 thing is probably true. But that the slightest possible 
 presumption is of the nature of a probability, appears 
 from hence ; that such low presumption often repeated, 
 will amount even to moral certainty. Thus a man's hav- 
 ing observed the ebb and flow of the tide to-day, affords 
 some sort of presumption, though the lowest imaginable, 
 that it may happen again to-morrow : but the observa- 
 tion of this event for so many days, and months, and 
 ages together, as it has been observed by mankind, gives 
 us a full assurance that it will. 
 
 That which chiefly constitutes Probability is expressed 
 in the word Likely, i. e. hkesome truth,* or true event; 
 like it, in itself, in its evidence, in some more or fewer 
 of its circumstances. For w^ien Vv'e determine a thing 
 to be probably true, suppose that an event has or will 
 come to pass, it is from the mind's remarking in it a 
 likeness to some other event, which we have observed 
 has come to pass. And this observation forms, in num- 
 berless daily instances, a presumption, opinion, or full 
 conviction, that such event has or will come to pass ; ac- 
 cording as the observation is, that the like event has 
 sometimes, most commonly, or always, so far as our ob- 
 servation reaches, come to pass at like distances of time, 
 or place, or upon like occasions. Hence arises the be- 
 lief, that a child, if it lives twenty years, will grow up to 
 
 * Ycrisimile. 
 
INTRODUCTION. xllX 
 
 tiie stature and strength of a man ; that food will contri- 
 bute to the preservation of its life, and the want of it for 
 such a number of days, be its certain destruction. So 
 likewise the rule and measure of our hopes and fears 
 concerning the success of our pursuits ; our expectations 
 that others will act so and so in such circumstances ; and 
 our judgment that such actions proceed from such prin- 
 ciples ; all these rely upon our having observed the like 
 to what we hope, fear, expect, judge; I say, upon our 
 having observed the like, either with respect to others 
 or ourselves. And thus, whereas the prince* who had 
 always lived in a warm climate, naturally concluded in 
 the way of analogy, that there was no such thing as 
 water's becoming hard, because he had always observed 
 it to be fluid and yielding : we, on the contrary, from 
 analogy conclude, that there is no presumption at all 
 against this : that it is supposable there may be frost in 
 England any given day in January next ; probable that 
 there will on some day of the month ; and that there is 
 a moral certainty, i. e. ground for an expectation without 
 any doubt of it, in some part or other of the winter. 
 
 Probable evidence, in its very nature, affords but an 
 Imperfect kind of information ; and is to be considered 
 as relative only to beings of limited capacities. For no- 
 thing which is the possible object of knowledge, whether 
 past, present, or future, can be probable to an infinite 
 Intelhgence ; since it cannot but be discerned absolutely 
 as it is in itself, certainly true, or certainly false. But 
 to us, probability is the very guide of life. 
 
 From these things it follows, that m questions of dif- 
 ficulty, or such as are thought so, where more satisfac- 
 tory evidence cannot be had, or is not seen ; if the result 
 of examination be, that there appaars upon the whole, 
 any the lowest presumption on one side, and none on 
 the other, or a greater presumption on one side, though 
 in the lowest degree greater ; this determines the ques- 
 tion, even in m.atters of speculation ; and in matters of 
 practice, will lay us undej- an absolute and formal obli- 
 gation, iii point of prudence and of interest, to act upon 
 that presumption or low proba];iiity, though it be so low 
 
 * The story is told by Mr Locke in the Chapter of Probability. 
 
 li 
 
1 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 as to leave the mind in very great doubt which is the 
 truth, tor sui-ely a man is as really bound in prudence 
 to do what upon the whole appears, according to the 
 best of his judgment, to be for his happiness, as what 
 LUd^ certainly knows to be so. Nay further, in questions 
 of great consequenge, a reasonable man will think it con- 
 cerns him to remark lower probabilities and presump- 
 tions than these ; such as amount to no more than show- 
 ing one side of a question to be as supposable and cred- 
 ible as the other : nay, such as but amount to much less 
 even than this. For numberless instances might be 
 mentioned respecting the common pursuits of life, where 
 a man would be thought, in a literal sense, distracted^ 
 who would not act, and with great application too, not 
 only upon an even chance, but upon much less, and 
 where the probability or chance was greatly against his 
 succeeding.* 
 
 It is not my design to inquire further into the nature, 
 the foundation, and measure of probability ; or whence 
 it proceeds that likeness should beget that presumption, 
 opinion, and full conviction, which the human mind is 
 formed to receive from it, and which it does necessarily 
 produce in every one ; or to guard against the errors, to 
 which reasoning from analogy is liable. This belongs to 
 the subject of Logic ; and is a part of that subject which 
 has not yet been thoroughly considered. Indeed I shal] 
 not take upon me to say, how far the extent, compass, 
 and force, of analogical reasoning, can be reduced to 
 general heads and rules; and the whole be formed into 
 a system. But thou^'h so little in this way has bee!> 
 attempted by those who have treated of our intellectua, 
 powers, and the exercise of them ; this does not hinder 
 but that we may be, as we unquestionably are, assured^, 
 that analogy is of weight, in various degrees, toward* 
 determining our judgment and our practice. Nor does 
 it in any wise cease to be of weight in those cases, because 
 persons, either given to dispute, or w^ho require things 
 to be stated with greater exactness than our faculties ap- 
 pear to admit of in practical matters, may find other 
 cases in which it is not easy to say, whether it be, or be 
 
 * See Part II. Chap. vi. 
 
INTRODUCTION. U 
 
 not, of any weight ; or instances of seeming analogies, 
 which are really of none. It is enough to the present 
 purpose to observe, that this general way of arguing is 
 evidently natural, just, and conclusive. For there is no 
 man can make a question but that the sun will rise to- 
 morrow, and be seen, where it is seen at all, in the figure 
 of a circle, and not in that of a square. 
 
 Hence, namely from analogical reasoning, Origen* has 
 with singular sagacity observed, that he who believes the 
 Scripture to have proceeded from him who is the Author of 
 Nature, may well expect to find the same sort of difficulties 
 in it, as are found in the constitution of Nature. And in 
 a like way of reflection it may be added, that he who 
 denies the Scripture to have been from God upon ac- 
 count of these difficulties, may, for the very same reason, 
 deny the world to have been formed by him. On the 
 other hand, if there be an analogy or likeness between 
 that system of things and dispensation of Providence, 
 which Revelation informs us of, and that system of things 
 and dispensation of Providence, vv-hich Experience to- 
 gether with Reason informs us of, ^. e. the known course 
 of Nature ; this is a presumption, that they have both 
 the same author and Cciuse ; at least so far as to answer 
 objections against the former's being from God, drawn 
 from any thing which is analogical or similar to what is in 
 the latter, which is acknowledged to be from him ; for an 
 Author of Nature is here supposed. 
 
 Forming our notions of the constitution and govern- 
 ment of the world upon reasoning, without foundation 
 for the principles which we assume, whether from the at- 
 tributes of God, or any thing else, is building a world upon 
 hypothesis, like Des Cartes. Forming our notions upon 
 reasoning from principles wliich are certain, but applied 
 to cases to which we have no ground to apply them (like 
 those who explain the structure of the human body, and 
 the nature of diseases and medicines fi'om mere mathe- 
 matics without sufficient data.) is an error much akin to 
 the former : since what is assumed in order to make the 
 
 * Xf^ ft.iy Til <yt rif u-rir^ w«.«a5:?jr/t«!»J» Cti xrar,'^»;"iij Ton xcatitv Mai rmurai rat y»a*«r 
 mirt7rBai, en oVa Ttii rr,; xTiriu; aTaorS raTs ^s\T»vri t»» irtji Kvrn! Xiycf, rxirct «<w 
 fft^t rut y^aipat. Piiilocal. p. 2^. Ed. Cant, 
 
 D2 ^ 
 
Ill INTRODUCTION. 
 
 reasoning applicable, is Hypothesis. But it must be al- 
 lowed just, to join abstract reasonings with the observa- 
 tion of facts, and argue from such facts as are known, to 
 others that are like them ; from that part of the Divine 
 government over intelligent creatures which comes under 
 our view, to that larger and more general government 
 over them which is beyond it ; and from what is present, 
 to collect what is likely, credible, or not incredible, will 
 be hereafter. 
 
 This method then of concluding and determ.ining be- 
 ing practical, and what, if we will act at all, we cannot 
 but act upon in the common pursuits of life ; being evi- 
 dently conclusive, in various degrees, proportionable to 
 the degree and exactness of the whole analogy or like- 
 ness ; and having so great authority for its introduction 
 into the subject of religion, even revealed religion ; my 
 design is to apply it to that subject in general, both na- 
 tural and revealed: taking for proved, that there is an in- 
 telligent Author of Nature, and natural Governor of the 
 world. For as there is no presumption against this prior 
 to the proof of it : so it has been often proved with ac- 
 cumulated evidence ; from this argument of analogy and 
 linal causes ; from abstract reasonings ; from the most 
 ancient tradition and testimony ; and from the general 
 consent of mankind. Nor does it appear, so far as I can 
 find, to be denied by the generality of those who profess 
 themselves dissatisfied with the evidence of religion. 
 
 As there are some, Avho, instead of thus attending t! 
 what is in fact the constitution of Nature, form their no- 
 tions of God's government upon hypothesis: so there 
 are others, wiio indulge themselves in vain and idle spec- 
 ulations, how the world might possibly have been framed 
 otherwise than it is ; and upon supposition that things 
 might, in imagining that they should, have been disposed 
 and carried on after a better model, than what appears, 
 in the present disposition and conduct of them. Sup* 
 pose now a person of such a turn of mind, to go on with 
 his r j'^eries, till he had at length fixed upon some parti- 
 cular plan of Nature, as appearing to him the best — 
 C'le shall scarce be thou^rht e;uiltv of detraction against 
 human understanding, if one should" say, even before- 
 
INTRODUCTION. Hu 
 
 hand, that the plan which this speculative person would 
 fix upon, though he were the wisest of the sons of men, 
 probably would not be the very best, even according to 
 his own notions of best ; whether he thought that to be 
 so, which afforded occasions and motives for the exer- 
 cise of the greatest virtue, or which was productive of 
 the greatest happiness, or tliat these two were neces- 
 sarily connected, and run up into one and the same plan. 
 However, it may not be amiss, once for all, to see what 
 would be the amount of these emendations and imagin- 
 ary improvements upon the system of nature, or how far 
 they would mislead us. And it seems there could be no 
 stopping, till we came to some such conclusions as these : 
 that all creatures should at first be made as perfect and 
 as happy as they were capable of ever being: that no- 
 thing, to be sure, of hazard or danger should be put upon 
 them to do ; some indolent persons would perhaps think 
 nothing at all: or certainly, that effectual care should be 
 taken, that they should, whether necessarily or not, yet' 
 eventually and in fact, always do what was right and 
 most conducive to happiness, which would be thought 
 easy for infinite power to effect ; either by not giving 
 them any principles which would endanger their going 
 wrong ; or by laying the right motive of action in every 
 instance before their minds continually in so strong a 
 manner, as would never fail of inducing them to act 
 conformably to it : and that the whole method of govern- 
 ment by punishments should be rejected as absurd; as an 
 awkward round-about method of carrying things on ; 
 nay, as contrary to a principal purpose, for which it 
 would be supposed creatures were made, namely, hap- 
 piness. 
 
 Now, without considering what \s to be said in parti- 
 cular to the several parts of this train of folly and extra- 
 vagance ; what has been above intimated, is a full direct 
 general answer to it, namely, that we may see beforehand 
 that we have not faculties for this kind of speculation. 
 For though it be admitted that, from the first principles 
 of our nature, we unavoidably judge or determine some 
 ends to be absolutely in themselves preferable to others, 
 and that the ends now mentioned, or if they run up 
 
IIv INTRODUCTION. 
 
 into one, that this one is absoUitely the best; and conse- 
 quently that we must conclude the ultimate end design- 
 ed, in the constitution of Nature and conduct of Provi- 
 dence, is the most virtue and happiness possible; yet 
 we are far from being able to judge what particular 
 disposition of things would be most friendly and assist- 
 ant to virtue ; or what means might be absolutely neces - 
 sary to produce the most happiness in a system of such 
 extent as our own world may be, taking in all that is 
 past and to come, though we should suppose it detached 
 from the whole of things. Indeed we are so far from 
 being able to judge of this, that we are not judges what 
 may be the necessary means of raising and conducting 
 one person to the highest perfection and happiness of 
 his nature. Nay, even in the little affairs of the present 
 life, we find men of different educations and ranks are 
 not competent judges of the conduct of each other. Our 
 whole nature leads us to ascribe all moral perfection to 
 God, and to deny all imperfection of him. And this will, 
 for ever be a practical proof of his moral character, to 
 such as will consider what a practical proof is ; because 
 it js the voice of God speaking in us. And from hence 
 we conclude, that virtue must be the happiness, and vice 
 the misery, of every creature; and that regularity and 
 order and right cannot but prevail finally in a universe 
 under his government. But we are in no sort judges, 
 what are the necessary means of accomplishing this end. 
 Let us then, instead of that idle and not very innocent 
 employment of forming imaginary models of a world, 
 and schemes of governing it, turn our thoughts to what 
 we experience to be the conduct of Nature with respect 
 to intelligent creatures ; which may be resolved into 
 general laws or rules of administration, in the same way 
 as many of the lav\^s of Nature respecting inanimate 
 matter may be collected from experiments. And let us 
 compare the known constipation and course of things 
 with what is said to be the moral system of Nature ; 
 the acknowledged dispensations of Providence, or thai 
 government which we find ourselves under, with what 
 religion teaches us to believe and expect; and see whether 
 th^y are not analogous and of a piece. And upon such 
 
INTRODUCTION. Iv 
 
 a comparison it will, I think, be found that they are very 
 much so : that both may be traced up to the same gene- 
 ral laws, and resolved into the same principles of di- 
 vine conduct. 
 
 The analogy here proposed to be considered is of pretty 
 large extent, and consists of several parts ; in some more, 
 in others less exact. In some few instances perhaps 
 it may amount to a real practical proof; in others not so. 
 Yet in these it is a confirmation of what is proved other- 
 wise. It will undeniably show, what too many want to 
 have shown them, that the system of Religion, both 
 natural and revealed, considered only as a system, and 
 prior to the proof of it, is not a subject of ridicule, unless 
 that of Nature be so too. And it will afford an answer to 
 almost all objections against the system both of natural 
 and revealed Religion ; though not perhaps an answer in 
 so great a degree, yet in a very considerable degree an 
 answer to the objections against the evidence of it : for ob- 
 jections against a proof, and objections against what is said 
 to be proved, the reader will observe are different things. 
 
 Now the divine government of the world, implied in 
 the notion of religion in general and of Christianity, con- 
 tains in it ; that mankind is appointed to live in a future 
 state ; * that there every one shall be rewarded or punish- 
 ed;! rewarded or punished respectively for all tha 
 behaviour here, which we comprehend under the words, 
 virtuous or vicious, morally good or evil :+ that our pre- 
 sent life is a probation, a state of trial, § and of disci- 
 pline, II for that future one; notwithstanding the objec- 
 tions, which men may fancy they have, from notions of 
 Necessity, against there being any such moral plan as 
 this at all ; ^ and whatever objections may appear to lie 
 against the wisdom and goodness of it, as it stands so 
 imperfectly made known to us at present;** that this 
 world being in a state of apostasy and wickedness, and 
 consequently of ruin, and the sense both of their condi- 
 tion and duty being greatly corrupted amongst men, this 
 gave occasion for an additional dispensation of Provi- 
 dence ; of the utmost importance ;tt proved by miracles ;++ 
 
 • Ch, i. t Ch. ii ^ Ch. iii. J Ch, iv. || Ch. v. % Ch. vi. 
 »* Ch. vii, ft Part II. Cii. i. U Ch. ii. 
 
/vi 
 
 JNTRODUCTIOV. 
 
 but containing in it many tilings appearing to us strange, 
 and not to have been expected; * a dispensation of Provi- 
 dence, which is a scheme or system of things ;t carried 
 on by the mediation of a divine person, the Messiah, in 
 order to the recovery of the world ; t yet not revealed 
 to all men, nor proved with the strongest possible evi- 
 dence to all those to whom it is revealed ; but only to 
 such a part of mankind, and with such particular evi- 
 dence, as the wisdom of God thought fit. § The design 
 then of the following Treatise will be to show, that the 
 several parts principally objected against in this moral 
 and Christian dispensation, including its scheme, its publi- 
 cation, and the proof which God has affordedus of its truth; 
 that the particular parts principally objected against in this 
 whole dispensation, are analogous to what is experienced 
 in the constitution and course of Nature, or Providence ; 
 that the chief objections themselves which are alleged 
 against the former, are no other than what may be alleged 
 with like justness against the latter, where they are found 
 in fact to be inconclusive ; and that this argument from 
 analogy is in general unanswerable, and undoubtedly of 
 weight on the side of religion, II notwithstanding the 
 abjections which may seem to lie against it, and the real 
 ground which there may be for difference of opinion, as 
 to the particular degree of weight which is to be laid 
 upon it. This is a general account of what may be 
 looked for in the following Treatise. And I shall begin it 
 with that which is the foundation of all our hopes and 
 of all our fears ; all our hopes and fears, which are of 
 anv consideration ; I mean a Future Life. 
 
 * rh. liL ^^ Ch. iv. J: f 'U. v. € Ck vj. ra. H Ch. wL 
 
THE 
 
 ANALOGY OF RELIGION. 
 
 PART 1. 
 OF NATURAL RELIGION. 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 OF A FUTURE LIFE. 
 
 Strange difficulties have been raised by some concern- 
 ing personal identity, or the sameness of living agents, 
 implied in the notion of our existing now and hereafter, or 
 in anv two successive moments: which whoever thinks it 
 worth while, may see considered in the first Dissertation 
 at the end of this Treatise. But without regard to any 
 of them here, let us consider wlmtjlie^ analogy of nature, 
 and the several changes which we have undergone, and 
 those which we know we riiay undergo without being 
 destroyed, suggest, as to the effect which death may^^or 
 may not, have upon us; and whether it be not from 
 thence probable, that we may survive this change, and 
 exist in a future state of life and perception. 
 
 I. From our being born into the present world in the 
 helpless imperfect state of infancy, and having arrived 
 from thence to mature age, we find it to be a general law 
 of nature in our own species, that the same creatures, the 
 same individuals, should exist in degrees of life and per- 
 ception, with capacities of action, of enjoyment and suffer- 
 ing, in one period of their being, greatly different from 
 those appointed them in another period of it. And in 
 other creatures the same law holds. For the difference of 
 tt'eir capacities and states of life at their birth (to go no 
 lii<laer)andin maturity; the change of worms into flies, and 
 the vast enlargement of their locomotive powers by such 
 
i 
 
 58 % OF A FUTURE LIFE. [Tart L 
 
 change : and birds and insects bursting the shell of their 
 habitation, and by this means entering into a new world, 
 furnished with new accommodations for them, and finding 
 a new sphere of action assigned them ; these are instances 
 of this general law of nature. Thus all the various and 
 wonderful transformations of animals are to be taken into 
 consideration here. But the states of life in which we 
 ourselves existed formerly in the womb and in our infancy, 
 are almost as different from our present in mature age, as 
 it is possible to conceive any two states or degrees of hfe r 
 can be. [^Therefore that we are to exist hereafter, in a! 
 
 \ state as different (suppose) from our present, as this is 
 from our former, is but according to the analogy of na- 
 ture ; according to a natural order or appointment of the, 
 very same kind, with what we have already experienced! ) 
 
 II. We know we are endued with capacities of action, 
 of happiness and misery: for we are conscious of acting, of 
 enjoying pleasure and suffering pain. Now that we have 
 these powers and capacities before death, is a presumption 
 that we shall retain them through and after death; indeed a 
 probability of it abundantly sufficient to act upon, unless 
 there be some positive reason to think that death is the 
 destruction of those living powers: because there is in 
 
 bevery case a probability, that all things will continue as 
 we experience they are, in all respects, except those in 
 
 (which we have some reason to think they will be altered. 
 
 I This is that kind* of presumption or probabiUty from ana- 
 logy, expressed in the very word continuance, which seems 
 our only natural reason for believing the course of the world 
 will continue to-morrow, as it has done so far as our expe- 
 rience or knowledge of history can carry us back. Nay 
 it seems our only reason for believing, that any one sub- 
 stance now existmgwill continue to exist a moment longer ; 
 the self-existent substance only excepted. Thus if men 
 were assured that the unknown event, death, was not the 
 destruction of our faculties of perception and of action, 
 there would be no apprehension, that any other power oi 
 event, unconnected with this of death, would destroy these 
 
 * I sny yt?wrf of presumption cr probability ; for 1 do not mean to affirm that there 
 is the same degree of conviction, that our living powers will continue after dtatli, as 
 there is, that our substances will. 
 
Chap. L] OF A FUTURE LIFE. 59 
 
 faculties just at the instant of each creature's death; and 
 therefore no doubt but that they would remain after it ; 
 which shows the high probability that our living powers 
 v.ill continue after death, unless there be some ground to 
 think that death is their destruction.* For, if it would be 
 in a manner certain that we should survive death, pro- 
 vided it were certain that death would not be our destruc- 
 tion, it must be highly probable we shall survive it, if there 
 be no ground to think death will be our destruction. 
 '^Np\y, though I think it must be acknowledged, that 
 prior to the natural and moral proofs of a future life 
 commonly insisted upon, there would arise a general 
 confused susfiicion. that in the great shoc k^nd alteration 
 which we shall unde rgo by death, we, i. e. our living ^ 
 powers, might be wholly jdestroyed ;V yet^ ?j^n prior to 
 those proofs,\|there _is really jiojp articu lar distinct ground 
 or reason fo r this~^^pprehehsioii at all^so Tar as I can" 
 findr Tf there be, it must arise either from the reason 
 \of the tll^jjH) or h'oni the analogy of nature. 
 h . But we cannot argue from the reason of the thing, that 
 /death is the destruction of living agents, because we.rlJ 
 lkjiow_not_at3lJLjd^ but only some 
 
 fof its e ffects , such as the^dissolution of flesh, skin, and 
 bones. And these effects do in no wise appear to imply 
 the destruction of a living agent. And besides, as we f'-rj > 
 are greatly in the dark, upon what the exercise of our 
 living powers depends, so we are wholly ignorant what 
 the powers themselves depend upon;/;the powers them- 
 selves as distinguished, not only from their actual exer- 
 cise, but also from the present capacity of exercising 
 them ; and as opposed to their destruction : for sleep, 
 or however a swoon, shows us, not only that these 
 powers exist when they are not exercised, as the passive 
 power of motion does in inanimate matter ; but shows 
 
 * Destruction of living powers, is a manner of expression unavoidably ambiguous; 
 and may signify either the destruction of a living being, so as that the same living 
 being shall be uncupable of ever perceiving or of/inff ugain at all ; or the destriiction of 
 those means and instruments by which it is vapuoto of its present life, of its present 
 state of perception and of action. It is here used in the former sense. When it is 
 used in tlie latter, the epithet present is added. The loss of a man's eye is a destnio- 
 tion of livinjT powers in the latter sense. But we have no reason to think the de- 
 struction of living powers, in the former sense, to be possible. We liave no more 
 reason to think a being endtied with living powers, ever loses them during its whole 
 CKistence, than to believe that a stone ever acquires them. 
 
60 OF A FUTURE LIFE. |-p.iHT. I. 
 
 also that tuey exist, when there is no present capacity 
 of exercising them : or that the capacities of exercising 
 them for the present, as well as the actual exercise of 
 them, maybe suspended, and yet the powers themselves 
 remain undestroyed. )) Since then we know not at all 
 kipon what the existence of our living powers depends, 
 this shows farther, there can no probability be collected 
 from the reason of the thing, that death will be their 
 destruction : because their existence may depend upon 
 somewhat in no degree affected by death f/ upon some- 
 what quite out of the reach of this king of terrors. So 
 that there is nothing more certain, than that the reason 
 of the thing shows us no connexion between death 
 ^ and the destruction of living agents. Nor can we find 
 any thing throu ghout th e whole ana logy, of nature, to 
 afford us even the slightest presumption, that animals 
 ever lose their living powers; much less if it were pos- 
 sible, that they lose them by death : for we have no 
 faculties wherewith to trace any beyond or through it, 
 so as to see what becomes of them. This event removes 
 them from our view. /( It destroys the sensible proof, 
 I which we had before their death, of their being possessed 
 / of living powers, but does not appear to afford the least 
 reason to believe that they are, then, or by that event, 
 \ deprived of them^i] 
 
 And our knowing, that they w^ere possessed of these 
 powers, up to the very period to which we have faculties 
 capable of tracing them, is itself a probability of their 
 retaining them beyond it. And this is confirmed, and a 
 sensible credibility is given to it, by observing the very 
 great and astonishing changes wliich Ave have experi- 
 enced; so great, that our existence in another state of 
 hfe, of perception and of action, will be but according 
 to a method of providential conduct, the like to which 
 has been already exercised even with regard to our- 
 selves ; according to a course of nature, the like to whicb 
 we have already gone through. 
 
 However, as one cannot but be greatly sensible, how 
 difficult it is to silence imagination enough to make the 
 voice of reason even distinctly heard in this case ; as we 
 are accustomed, from our youth up, to indulge that for- 
 
Chap. I.] OF A FUTURE LIFE. 61 
 
 ward, delusive faculty, ever obtruding beyond its sphere ; 
 of some assistance indeed to apprehension, but the 
 author of all error: as we plainly lose ourselves in gross 
 and crude conceptions of things, taking for granted that 
 we are acquainted with what indeed we are wholly 
 ignorant of: it may be proper to consider the ima ginary 
 presumptions , that death will be our destruction, arising 
 from these^kinds of early^and lastmgprejudices ; and to 
 show how little they can really amount to, even though 
 we cannot wholly divest ourselves of them. And, 
 
 I, All presumption of death's being the destruction 
 of living beings, must go upon supposition that they are 
 compounded; and so, discerptible. VBut since conscious- 
 
 (ness is a single and indivisible power, it should seem 
 that the subject in. which it resides must be so too.K For 
 were the motion of any particle of matter absolutely one 
 and indivisible, so as that it should imply a contradiction 
 to suppose part of this motion to exist, and part not to 
 exist, i. e. part of this matter to move, and part to be at 
 rest ; then its power of motion would be indivisible ; 
 and so also would the subject in which the power inheres, 
 namely, the particle of m.atter: for if this could be de- 
 vided into two, one part might be moved and the other 
 at rest, which is contrary to the supposition. In like 
 manner it has been argued,* and, for any thing appear- 
 ing to the contrary, justly, that since the perception or 
 consciousness, which we have of our own existence, is 
 indivisible, so as th?>.t it is a contradiction to suppose 
 one part of it should be here and the other there; the 
 perceptive power, or the power of consciousness, is in- 
 divisible too: and consequently the subject in which it 
 ^resides; i. e. the conscious Being. //Now upon supposi- 
 tion that living agent each man calls himself, is thus a 
 single being, which there is at least no more difficulty 
 in conceiving than in conceiving it to be a compound, 
 and of which there is the proof now mentioned ; it fol- 
 lows, that our organized bodies are no more ourselves 
 or part of ourselves, than any other matter around us. ^ 
 And it is as easy to conceive, how matter, which is no 
 part of ourselves, may be appropriated to us in the 
 
 * See Dr Clarke's Letter to Mr Dodwell, and the defences of iU 
 
62 OF A FUTURE LIFE. L^art I. 
 
 manner which our present bodies are ; as how we can 
 receive impressions from, and have power over, any 
 matter. It is as easy to conceive, that we may exist 
 out of bodies, as in them ; that we might have animated 
 bodies of any other organs and senses wholly different 
 from these now given us, and that we may hereafter 
 animate these same or new bodies variously modified 
 and organized; as to conceive how we can animate such 
 bodies as our present. And lastly, the dissolution of 
 all these several organized bodies, supposing ourselves 
 to have successively animated them, would have no 
 more conceivable tendency to destroy the living beings 
 ourselves, or deprive us of living faculties, the faculties 
 of perception and of action, than the dissolution of any 
 foreign matter, which we are capable of receiving im- 
 pressions from, and making use of, for the common 
 occasions of life. 
 
 II. The simplicity and absolute oneness of a living 
 agent cannot indeed, from the nature of the thing, be 
 properly proved by experimental observations. But 
 as these fall in with the supposition of its unity, so they 
 plainly lead us to conclude certainly, that our gross 
 organized bodies, with which we perceive the objects of 
 sense, and with which we act, are no part of ourselves ; 
 and therefore show us, that we have no reason to believe 
 their destruction to be ours: even without determining 
 whether our living substances be material or immaterial. 
 For we see by experience, that men may lose their 
 limbs, their organs of sense, and even the greatest part 
 of these bodies, and yet remain the same living agents. 
 And persons can trace up the existence of themselves 
 to a time, when the bulk of their bodies was extremely 
 small, in comparison of what it is in mature age: and 
 we cannot but think, that they might then have lost a 
 considerable part of that small body, and yet have re- 
 mained the same living agents; as they may now lose 
 great part of their present body, and remain so. '/And/ 
 it is certain, that the bodies of all animals are in a con- ^ 
 stant flux, from that never-ceasing attrition, which there 
 is in every part of them. Now things of this kind un- \ 
 avoidably teach us to distinguish, between these living '' 
 
Chap. 1.3 OF A FUTURE LIFE. 63 
 
 \ agents ourselves, and large quantities of matter, in 
 which we are very nearly interested: since these may 
 be alienated, and actually are in a daily course of suc- 
 cession, and changing their owners ; whilst we are 
 assured, that each living agent remains one and the same 
 permanent being. *}J And this general observation leads 
 us on to the following ones. 
 
 Firstj That we have no way of determining by ex- 
 perience, what is the certain bulk of the living being 
 each man calls himself 7 and yet, till it be determined 
 that it is larger in bulk than the solid elementary parti- 
 cles of matter, which there is no ground to think any 
 natural power can dissolve, there is no sort of reason to 
 think death to be the dissolution of it^^of the living being, 
 even though it should not be absolutely indiscerptible. 
 
 Secondly, From our being so nearly related to and 
 interested in certain systems of matter, suppose our 
 flesh and bones, and afterwards ceasing to be at all re- 
 lated to them, the living agents ourselves remaining all 
 this while undestroyed notwithstanding such alienation ; 
 and consequently these systems of matter not being 
 ourselves : it follows further, that we have no ground 
 to conclude any other, suppose internal systems of 
 matter, to be the living agents ourselves ; because we 
 Jean have no ground to conclude this, but from our re- 
 lation to and interest in such other systems of matter : 
 and therefore we can have no reason to conclude, what 
 befalls those systems of matter at death, to be the de- 
 struction of the living agents. We have already several 
 times over lost a great part or perhaps the whole of our 
 body, according to certain common established laws of 
 nature ; yet we remain the same living agents : when j 
 we shall lose as great a part, or the whole, by another | 
 common established law of nature, death ; why may we I 
 not also remain the same ? That the alienation has * 
 been gradual in one case, and in the other will be more 
 at once, does not prove any thing to the contrary. We 
 have passed undestroyed through those many and great 
 revolutions of matter, so peculiarly appropriated to us 
 ourselves ; why should we imagine death will be so 
 
 • See Dissertation I. 
 
64 OF A FUTURE LIFE. [Part I. ' 
 
 fatal to us ? Nor can it be objected, that what is thus 
 aUenated or loSt, is no part of our original solid body, 
 but only adventitious matter ; because we may lose 
 entire limbs, which must have contained many solid 
 parts and vessels of the original body ; or if this be not 
 admitted, we have no proof, that any of these solid parts 
 are di^olved or alienated by death. Though, by the 
 way, we are very nearly related to that extraneous^ or 
 adventitious matter, whilst it continues united to and 
 distending the several parts of our solid body. But 
 after all ; th'^ relation a person bears to those parts of 
 his body, to which he is the most nearly related ; what 
 does it appear to amount to but this, that the living 
 agent, and those parts of the body, mutually affect each 
 other? And the same thing, the same thing in kind 
 though not in degree, may be said of all foreign matter, 
 which gives us ideas, and which we have any power 
 over. From these observations the whole ground of 
 tlie imagination is removed, that the dissolution of any 
 matter, is the destruction of a living agent, from the 
 interest he once had in such matter. 
 
 Thirdly, Jf we consider our body somewhat more 
 distinctly, as made up of organs and instrum ents of 
 perception and of motion, it will bring us to the same 
 conclusion. Thus the common optical experiments 
 show, and even the observation how sight is assisted by 
 glasses shows, that w^e see with our eyes in the same 
 sense as we see with glasses. Nor is there any reason 
 to believe, that we see with them in any other sense ; 
 any other, I mean, w^hich would lead us to think the 
 eye itself a percipient. The like is to be said of hearing • 
 and our feehng distant solid matter by means of some- 
 wdiat in our hand seems an instance of the like kind, 
 as to the subject v/e are considering. All these are in- 
 stances of foreign matter, or such as is no part of our 
 body, being instrumental in preparing objects for, and 
 conveying them to, the perceiving power, in a manner 
 similar or like to the manner in which our organs of 
 sense prepare and convey them. Both are in a like 
 way instruments of our receiving such ideas from ex- 
 ternal objects, as the Author of nature appointed those 
 
Chap. I.] CF A FUTURE LIFE. G5 
 
 external objects to be the occasions cf exciting in us. 
 However, glasses are evidently instances of this ; name 
 ly of matter which is no part of our body, preparing 
 objects for and conveying them towards the perceiving 
 power, in like manner as our bodily organs do. And 
 if we see with our eyes only in the same manner as we 
 do with glasses, the like may justly be concluded, from 
 analogy, of all our other senses. It is not intended, by 
 any thing here said, to affirm, that the whole apparatus 
 of vision, or of perception by any other of our senses, 
 can be traced through all its steps, quite up to the living 
 power of seeing, or perceiving : but that so far as it can 
 be traced by experimental observations, so far it appears, 
 that our organs of sense prepare and convey on objects, 
 in order to their being perceived, in like manner as 
 foreign matter does, without affording any shadow of 
 appearance, that they themselves perceive. And that 
 we have no reason to think our organs of sense perci- 
 pients, is confirmed by instances of personsjosing^-some 
 ojjhem, theTivingBemgs themselves, their former oc- 
 cupiers, remaining unimpaired. It is confirmed also by 
 the experience of dream s ; by which we find we are at 
 present possessed of a latent, and what would otherwise 
 be, an unimagined unknown power of perceiving sensi- 
 ble objects, in as strong and lively a manner without our 
 external organs of sense as with them. 
 
 So also with regard to, our power o f moving, or direct- 
 i ng m otiogJbyLJviil and choice ; upon Uie^destruction of 
 ajimb^this active power remains, as it evidently seems, 
 unlessened ; so as that the living being, who has suffer- 
 ed this loss, would be capable of moving as before, if it 
 had another limb to move with. It can walk by the 
 help of an artificial leg ; just as it can make use of a 
 pole or a lever, to reach towards itself and to move 
 things, beyond the length and the power of its natural 
 arm; and this last it does in the same manner as it 
 reaches and moves, with its natural arm, things nearer 
 and of less weight. Nor is there so much as any ap- 
 pearance of oar limbs being endued with a power of 
 moving or directing themselves ; though they are adapt- 
 ed, hke the several pa: ti; o'i a machine, to be the instru- 
 
 E 
 
66 OF A FUTURE LIFE. [PAax I. , 
 
 merits of motion to each other ; and some parts of the 
 same hmb, to be instruments of motion to other parts 
 of it. 
 
 Thus a man determines, that he will look at such an 
 object through a microscope ; or being lame suppose, 
 that he will walk to such a place with a staif a week 
 hence. His eyes and his feet no more determine in 
 these cases, than the microscope and the staff. Nor is 
 there any ground to think they any more put the deter- 
 mination in practice ; or that his eyes are the seers or 
 his feet the movers, in any other sense than as the mi- 
 croscope and the staff are. Upon the whole then, our 
 organs of sense and our limbs are certainly instruments, 
 which the living persons ourselves make use of to per- 
 ceive and move with : there is not any probability, that 
 they are any more ; nor consequently, that we have any 
 other kind of relation to them, than what we have to any 
 other foreign matter formed into instruments of percep- 
 tion and motion, suppose into a microscope or a staff (I 
 say any other kind of relation, for I am not speaking of 
 the degree of it) ; nor consequently is there any proba- 
 bilitv, that the alienation or dissolution of these instru- 
 ments is the destruction of the perceiving and moving 
 agent. 
 
 And thus our finding, that the dissolution of matter, 
 in which living beings were most nearly interested, is 
 not their dissolution ; and that the destruction of several 
 of the organs and instruments of perception and of mo- 
 tion belonging to them, is not their destruction ; shows 
 demonstratively, that there is no ground to think that 
 the dissohition of any other matter, or destruction of any 
 other organs and instruments, will be the dissolution or 
 destruction of living agents, from the like kind of rela- 
 tion. And we have no reason to think we stand in any 
 other kind of relation to any tiling which we find 
 dissolved by death. 
 
 But it is said these observations are equally applicable 
 to brutes : and it is thought an insuperable difficulty, that 
 they should be immortal, and by consequence capable of 
 everlasting happiness. Now this manner of expression 
 is both invidious and weak : but the thing intended by 
 
Chap. I.] OF A FUTURE LIFE. 67 
 
 it, is really no difficulty at all, either in clie way of na- 
 tural or moral consideration. For 1st, Suppose the in- 
 vidious thing, designed in such a manner of expression, 
 "were really implied, as it is not in the least, in the na- 
 tural immortality of brutes : namely, that they must ar- 
 rive at great attainments, and become rational and 
 moral agents; even this would be no difficulty: since we 
 know not what latent powers and capacities they may 
 be endued with. There was once, prior to experience, 
 as great presumption against human creatures as there 
 is against the brute creatures, arriving at that degree 
 of understanding, w^hich we have in mature age. For 
 we can trace up our own existence to the same original 
 with theirs. And we find it to be a general lav/ of na- 
 ture, that creatures endued w^ith capacities of virtue and 
 religion should be placed in a condition of being, in vrhich 
 they are altogether without the use of them, for a con- 
 siderable length of their duration ; as m infancy and 
 childhood. And great part of the human species go out 
 of the present world, before they come to the exercise of 
 these capacities in any degree at all. But then, 2dly, 
 (he natural immortality of brutes does not in the least 
 imply, that they are endued with any latent capacities of 
 a rational or moral nature. And the economy of the 
 imiverse might require, that there should be living 
 creatures without any capacities of this kind. And all 
 difficulties as to the manner how they are to be disposed 
 of are so apparently and wholly founded in our ignorance, 
 that it is wonderful they should be insisted upon by any, 
 but such as are weak enough to think they are acquainted 
 wdth the whole system of things. There is then absolutely 
 nothing at all in this objection, which is so rhetorically 
 urged, against the greatest part of the natural proofs or 
 presumptions of the immortality of human minds ; I say 
 the greatest part; for it is less applicable to the following 
 observation, which is more peculiar to mankind: 
 
 III. That asjtjs evident omy jjresent powers and ca- 
 j^acities of reason, memory, and^ffection, do not depend 
 upon our gross body in the manner in which perception 
 ^ our organs of sense_doesx^ so they do not appear to 
 depend upon it at all in any such manner, as to give 
 
 E2 
 
68 V . OF A FUTURE LIFE. [Part I. 
 
 ground to think, that the dissolution of this body will be 
 the destruction of these our present powers of reflection, 
 as it will of our powers of sensation ; or to give ground 
 to conclude, even that it will be so much as a suspension 
 of the former. 
 
 Hu man crea tures exist at present m -twQ_states oLIiie 
 and perception, greatly different from each other; each 
 of which has its own peculiar laws and its own peculiar 
 enjoyments and sufferings. When any of our senses 
 are affected or appetites gratified with the objects of 
 them, we may be said to exist or live in a state of s en- 
 sation. When none of our senses are affected or ap- 
 petites gratified, and yet we perceive, and reason, and 
 act; we may be said to exist or live in a state of re - 
 flection. Now it is by no means certain, that any thing 
 which is dissolved by death, is any way necessary to the 
 living being in this its state of reflection, after ideas are 
 gained. For, though, from our present constitution and 
 condition of being, our external organs of sense are ne- 
 cessary for conveying in ideas to our reflecting powers, 
 as carriages, and levers, and scaffolds are in architec- 
 ture : yet when these ideas are brought in, we are capa- 
 ])le of reflecting in the most intense degree, and of en- 
 joying the greatest pleasure, and feeling the greatest 
 pain, by means of that reflection, without any assistance 
 from our senses ; and without any at all, which we know 
 of, from that body which will be dissolved by death. It 
 does not appear then, that the relation of this gross body 
 to the reflecting being is, in any degree, necessary to 
 thinking ; to our intellectual enjoyments or sufferings : 
 nor, consequently, that the dissolution or alienation of 
 the former by death, will be the destruction of those pre- 
 sent powers, which render us capable of this state of re- 
 flection. Further, there are instances of mortal diseases, 
 Vliich do not at all affect our present intellectual powers ; 
 and this affords a presumption, that those diseases will 
 not destroy these present powers. Indeed, from the ob- 
 servations made above, * it appears, that there is no pre- 
 sumption, from their mutuaPy affecting each other, that 
 the dissolution of the body is the destruction of the Uv- 
 
 ♦ Pp. 64,65. 
 
Chap. I.] OF A FUTURE LIFE. 69 
 
 ing agent. And b}^ the same reasoning, it must appear 
 too, that there is no presumption, from their mutually 
 affecting each other, that the dissolution of the body is 
 the destruction of our present reflecting powers : but in- 
 stances of their not affecting each other, afford a pre- 
 sumption of the contrary. Instances of mortal diseases 
 not impairing our present reflecting powers, evidently 
 turn our thoughts even from imagining such diseases to 
 be the destruction of them. Several things indeed 
 greatly affect all our living powers, and at length sus- 
 pend the exercise of them ; as for instance drowsiness, 
 increasing till it ends in sound sleep : and from hence 
 we might have imagined it would destroy them, till we 
 found by experience the weakness of this way of judg- 
 ing. But in the diseases now mentioned, there is not 
 so much as this shadow of probability, to lead us to any 
 such conclusion, as to the reflecting powers which we 
 have at present. For in those diseases, persons the 
 moment before death appear to be in the highest vigour 
 of hfe. They discover apprehension, memory, reason, 
 all entire ; with the utmost force of affection ; sense of a 
 character, of shame and honour ; and the highest mental 
 enjoyments and sufferings, even to the last gasp : and 
 these surely prove even greater vigour of life than bodily 
 strength does. Now what pretence is there for think- 
 ing, that a progressive disease when arrived to such a 
 degree, I mean that degree which is mortal, v/ill destroy 
 those powers, which were not impaired, which were not 
 affected by it, during its whole progress quite up to 
 that degree ? And if death by diseases of this kind 
 is not the destruction of our present reflecting powers, 
 it will scarce be thought that death by any other 
 means is. 
 
 It is obvious that this general observation may be car- 
 ried on further: and there appears so little connexion 
 between our bodily powers of sensation, and our pre- 
 sent powers of reflection, that there is no reason to con- 
 clude, that death/ which destroys the former, does so 
 much as suspend the exercise of the htter, or interrupt 
 our continuing to exist in the like state of reflection which 
 we do now. For suspension of reason, memory, and 
 
70 OF A FUTURE LIFE. [Part I. 
 
 the affections whicli they excite, is no part of the idea of 
 death, nor is irnphed in our notion of it. And our daily- 
 experiencing these powers to be exercised, without any 
 assistance, that we know of, from those bodies, which 
 will be dissolved by death ; and our finding often, that 
 the exercise of them is so lively to the last ; these things 
 afford a sensible apprehension, that death may not per- 
 haps be so much as a discontinuance of the exercise oi 
 these powers, nor of the enjoyments and sufferings which 
 it implies.* So that our posthumous life, whatever there 
 may be in it additional to our present, yet may not be 
 entirely beginning anew ; but going on. Death may, 
 in some sort and in some respects, answer to our 
 birth ; which is not a suspension of the faculties which 
 we had before it, or a total change of the state of 
 life in which w^e existed when in the womb ; but 
 a continuation of both, with such and such great al- 
 terations. 
 
 Nay, for ought we know of ourselves, of our present 
 life and of death ; death may immediately, in the natural 
 course of things, put us into a higher and more enlarged 
 state of life, as our birth does;t a state in which our 
 capacities, and sphere of perception and of action, may 
 be much greater than at present. | For as our relation 
 to our external organs of sense, renders us capable of ex- 
 isjing in our present state of sensation; so it may be the 
 only natural hinderance to our existing, immediately, and 
 of course, in a higher state of reflection.^ The truth is, 
 reason does not at all show us, in what state death na- 
 turally leaves us. But were we sure, that it would sus- 
 pend all our perceptive and active powers; yet the sus- 
 pension of a power and the destruction of it, are effects 
 
 * Thi>re are tliree distinct questions, rclatine- to a future life, here considered: 
 V»''lietiier dtatli be the destnicLion of livini;' jipeiils ; if noi,, Whether it he the 
 deslrnciion of their present powers of reflection, fis it cert;ui,ly is the destruction of 
 tlit'lr present powers of sensation ; and if not, \\'lu'ther it be tlie suspension, or dis- 
 i;ontinui)nce of tlie «'xernise of tliese present n i^efJiin"' pown-s. Now, if there be no 
 reason to believe tlie last, there will be, il lljat were possible, less for the next, &lu^ 
 less still for th(^ first. 
 
 •j- This, according- to Strabo, was the opinion of the Brachmans, vd/lu^uv /itt yk^ Sij 
 
 Toy f/Xv (y^adt /3/9V, ui c» u.M.f/,in xaifiliioiv tiyar Tfly bi Say«iro», ■ji.vty/v ii( to> ivru; jiiov, xai 
 
 Tov tiSa(|K«ya To^i (fiXtrntyc^rt- Lib. XV. p. lOoS, Ed. Amst. 1707. To which opinion 
 perhaps Antoninus may allude in these words, u; »i/y ^i^i/xinis, ■rirs i/^li^uav i» <r?g 
 
 yafTfit cijs yuvxixi; irou t^lX^r,. o'Jras LxiSi^'tre'aj, T»:y aiomv ty ^ to i^t/;^ajio« <rou tov tii/Tg«S» 
 raureu Itc-T'imTTai. Lib, ix. C, u.. 
 
Chap. 1.] OF A FUTURE LIFE. 71 
 
 SO totally different in kind, as we experience from sleep 
 and a swoon, that we cannot in any wise argue from one 
 to the other ; or conclude even to the lowest degree of pro- 
 bability, that the same kind of force which is sufficient 
 to suspend our faculties, though it be increased ever so 
 much, will be sufficient to destroy them. 
 
 These observations together may be sufficient to show, 
 how little presumption there is, that death is the destruc- 
 tion of human creatures. However, there is the shadow 
 of an analogy, which may lead us to imagine it is the 
 supposed likeness^whichis _ observed b etweeiLihe decay 
 of vegetables, and of living cr eatur es. And this likeness 
 is'lndeed sufficient to afford the poets very apt allusions 
 to the flowers of the field, in their pictures of the frailty 
 of our present life. .Butjn reason, the^nalogy is so far 
 from holding, that there appears no ground even for the 
 companson,_as_to Jhe^presen^ because one of 
 
 the two subjecLS^conip^areiLis_jvhplly void of that, which 
 is the principal and chief thing in the other, the power of 
 perception and of ^ction^ and which is the only thing we 
 are inquiring about the continuance of So that the de- 
 struction of a vegetable, is an event not similar or analo- 
 gous to the destruction of a living agent. 
 
 But if, as was above intimated, leaving off the delusive 
 custom of substituting imagination in the room of expe- 
 rience, we would confine ourselves to what we do know 
 and understand ; if we would argue only from that, and 
 from that form our expectations ; it would appear at first 
 sight, that as no probability of living beings ever ceasing 
 to be so, can be concluded from the reason of the thino-; 
 so none can be collected from the analogy of Nature ; 
 because we cannot trace any living beings beyond death. 
 But as we are conscious that we are endued with capaci- 
 ties of perception and of action, and are living persons ; 
 what we are to go upon is, that we shall continue so, till 
 we foresee some accident or event, which will endanoer 
 those capacities, or be likely to destroy us: which death 
 does in no wise appear to be. 
 
 And thus, when we go out of this world, we may 
 pass into new scenes, and a new state of hfe and action, 
 just as naturally as we came into the present. And this 
 
72 OF A FUTURE LIFE. Part I. 
 
 new state may naturally be a social one. And the advan- 
 tages of it, advantages of every kind, may naturally be be- 
 stowed, according to some fixed general laws of wisdom, 
 upon every one in proportion to the degrees of his virtue. 
 And though the advantages of that future natural state 
 should not be bestowed, as these of the present in ^ome 
 measure are, by the will of the society; but entirely by 
 his more immediate action, upon whom the whole frame 
 of nature depends: yet this distribution may be just as 
 natural, as their being distributed here by the instru- 
 mentality of men. And indeed, though one were to al- 
 low any confused undetermined sense, Avhich people 
 please to put upon the word natural, it would be a short- 
 ness of thought scarce credible, to imagine, that no sys- 
 tem or course of things can be so, but only what we see 
 at present:* especially whilst the probability of a future 
 . life, or the natural immortality of the soul, is admitted 
 upon the evidence of reason ; because this is really both 
 admitting and denying at once, a state of being different 
 from the present to be natural. But the only distinct 
 meaning of that word is, stated, fixed, or settled: since 
 tjwhat is natural as much requires and presupposes an 
 [intelligent agent to render it so,^. e. to effect it continual- 
 ly, or at stated times; as what is supernatural or miracu- 
 lous does to effect it for once. |^. And from hence it must 
 follow, that persons' notion of what is natural, will be 
 enlarged in proportion to their greater knowledge of the 
 works of God, and the dispensations of his Providence. 
 Nor is there any absurdity in supposing, that there may 
 be beings in the universe, whose capacities, and know- 
 ledge, and views, may be so extensive, as that the whole 
 Christian dispensation may to them appear natural, i. e, 
 analogous or conformable to God's dealings with other 
 parts of his creation ; as natural as the visible known 
 course of things appears to us. For there seems scarce 
 any other possible sense to be put upon the word, but 
 that only in which it is here used ; similar, stated, or uni- 
 form. 
 
 This credibility of a future life, which has been here in- 
 sisted upon, how little soever it may satisfy our curiosity, 
 
 * See Part 11. Chap. ii. and Part II. Chap. iv. 
 
Chap. I.] OF A FUTURE LIFE. 7^ 
 
 seems to answer all the purposes of religion, in like 
 manner as a demonstrative proof would. Indeed a proof, 
 even a demonstrative one, of a future life, wou^d not be 
 a proof of religion. For, that we are to Jive hereafter, 
 is just as reconcilable with the scheme of atheism, and 
 as well to be accounted for by it, as that we are now ahve 
 is: and therefore nothing can be more absurd than to 
 argue from that scheme, that there can be no future state. 
 But as rehgion implies a future state, any presumption 
 against such a state, is a presumption against religion. 
 And the foregoing ob^rvations remove all presumptions 
 of that sort, and prove, to a very considerable degree of 
 probability, one fundamental doctrine of religion; which, 
 if believed, would greatly open and dispose the mind 
 seriously to attend to the general evidence of the whole. 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD BY REWARDS AND PUNISH- 
 MENTS ; AND PARTICULARLY OF THE LATTER. 
 
 That which makes the question concerning a futurs life 
 to be of so great importance to us, is our capacity of hap- 
 piness and misery. And that which makes the consi- 
 deration of it to be of so great importance to us, is the 
 supposition of our happiness and misery hereafter de- 
 pending upon our actions here. Without this indeed, 
 curiosity could not but sometimes bring a subject, in 
 which we may be so highly interested, to our thoughts; 
 especially upon the mortality of others, or the near pro- 
 spect of our own. But reasonable men would not take 
 any further thought about hereafter, than what should 
 happen thus occasionally to rise in their minds, if it were 
 certain that our future interest no way depended upon 
 our present behaviour ; whereas, on the contrary, if there 
 be ground, either from analogy or any thing else, to think 
 it does ; then there is reason also for the most active 
 thought and solicitude, to secure that interest; to behave 
 so as that we may escape that misery, and obtain that 
 happiness, in another life, which we not only suppose 
 ourselves capable of, but which we apprehend also is 
 
74 ~ OP THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD t^*" ^ 
 
 put in our own power. And whetlier there be ground 
 for this last apprehension, certainly would deserve to be 
 most seriously considered, were there no other proof of 
 a future life and interest, than that presumptive one, 
 which the foregoing observations amount to. 
 
 Now in the present state, all which we enjoy, and a 
 great part of what we suffer, is put in our oion power. 
 For pleasure and pain are the consequences of our ac- 
 tions ; and we are endued by the Author of our nature 
 with capacities of foreseeing these consequences. We 
 find by experience he does not so much as preserve 
 our lives, exclusively of our own care and attention, to 
 provide ourselves with, and to make use of, that suste- 
 nance, by which he has appointed our lives shall be pre- 
 served; and without which, he has appointed, they shall 
 not be preserved at all. And in general we foresee, that 
 the external things, which are the objects of our various 
 passions, can neither be obtained nor enjoyed, without 
 exerting ourselves in such and such manners : but by thus 
 exerting ourselves, we obtain and enjoy these objects, in 
 which our natural good consists ; or by this means God 
 gives us the possession and enjoyment of them. I know 
 not, that we have any one kind or degree of enjoyment, but 
 by the means of our own actions. And by prudence and 
 care, we may, for the most part, pass our days in tolera- 
 ble ease and quiet : or, on the contrary, we may, by rash- 
 ness, ungoverned passion, wilfulness, or even by negli- 
 gence, make ourselves as miserable as ever we please. 
 And many do please to make themselves extremely mis- 
 erable, i. e. to do what they know beforehand will render 
 them so. They follow those ways, the fruit of which 
 they know, by instruction, example, experience, will be 
 disgrace, and poverty, and sickness, and untimely death. 
 This every one observes to be the general course of 
 things ; though it is to be allowed, we cannot find by ex- 
 perience, that all our sufferings are owing to our own 
 follies. 
 
 Why the Author of Nature does not give his crea- 
 tures promiscuously such and such perceptions, without 
 regard to their behaviour ; why he does not make them 
 happy without the iriStrimentality of their own actions, 
 
"Cbap. ILl BY REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS. "' 75 
 
 and prevent their bringing any sufferings upon them- 
 selves ; is another matter. Perhaps there may be some 
 impossibihties in the nature of things, which we are un- 
 acquainted with.* Or less happiness, it may be, would 
 upon the whole be produced by such a method of con- 
 duct, than is by the present. Or perhaps divine good- 
 ness, Avith which, if I mistake not, we make very free in 
 our speculations, may not be a bare single disposition to 
 produce happiness; but a disposition to make the good, 
 the faithful, the honest man happy. Perhaps an infi- 
 nitely perfect Mind may be pleased with seeing his 
 creatures behave suitably to the nature which he has 
 given them ; to the relations which he has placed them 
 m to each other ; and to that which they stand in to 
 himself: that relation to himself, which, during their ex- 
 istence, is even necessarv, and which is the most im- 
 portant one of all : perhaps, I say, an infinitely perfect 
 Mind may be pleased with this moral piety of moral 
 agents, in and for itself; as well as upon account of its 
 being essentially conducive to the happiness of his crea- 
 tion. Or the whole end, for which God made, and thus 
 governs the world, may be utterly beyond the reach of 
 our faculties: there may be somewhat in it as impossible 
 for us to have any conception of, as for a blind man to 
 have a conception of colours. But however this be, it 
 is certain matter of universal experience, that the gene- 
 ral method of divine administration is, forewarning us, 
 or giving us capacities to foresee, with more or less clear- 
 ness, that if we act so and so, we shall have such enjoy- 
 ments, if so and so, such sufferings ; and giving us those 
 enjoyments, and making us feel those sufferings, in con- 
 sequence of our actions. 
 
 " But all this is to be ascribed to the general course 
 of nature." True. This is the very thing which I am 
 observing. It is to be ascribed to the general course of 
 nature : i. e. not surely to the words or ideas, course of 
 nature ; but to him who appointed it, and put things into 
 it: or to a course of operation, from its uniformity or 
 constancy, called natural;! and which necessarily im- 
 plies an operating agent. For when men find them- 
 
 * Part I. CbajB. vii. f P. 72. . „ 
 
76 OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD fP.viiT. I. 
 
 selves necessitated to confess an Author of Nature, or 
 that God is the natural governor of the world; they 
 must not deny this again, because his government is uni- 
 form ; they must not deny that he does things at all, be- 
 cause he does them constantly; because the effects of his 
 acting are permanent, whether his acting be so or not ; 
 though there is no reason to think it is not. In short, 
 every man, in every thing he does, naturally acts upon 
 the forethought and apprehension of avoiding evil or ob- 
 taining good: and if the natural course of things be the 
 appointment of God, and our natural faculties of know- 
 ledge and experience are given us by him; then the 
 good and bad consequences which follow our actions, 
 are his appointment, and our foresight of those conse- 
 quences, is a warning given us by him, how we are to 
 act. 
 
 " Is the pleasure then, naturally accompanying every 
 particular gratification of passion, intended to put us up- 
 on gratifying ourselves in every such particular instance, 
 and as a reward to us for so doing .P" No certainly. 
 Nor is it to be said, that our eyes were naturally intend- 
 ed to give us the sight of each particular object, to which 
 they do or can extend; objects which are destructive of 
 them, or which, for any other reason, it may become us 
 to turn our eyes from. Yet there is no doubt, but that 
 our eyes were intended for us to see with. So neither 
 is there any doubt, but that the foreseen pleasures and 
 pains belonging to tlie passions, were nitended, in general, 
 to induce mankind to act in such and such manners. 
 
 Now from this general observation, obvious to every 
 one, that God has given us to understand, he has appoint- 
 ed satisfaction and delight to be the consequence of our 
 acting in one manner, and pain and uneasiness of our 
 acting in another, and of our not acting at all ; and that 
 we find the consequences, which we were beforehand 
 informed of, uniformly to follow ; we may learn, that we 
 are at present actually under his government in the 
 strictest and most proper sense ; in such a sense, as that 
 he rewards and punishes us for our actions An Author 
 of nature being supposed, it is not so much a deduction 
 of reason, as a matter of experience, that we are thus 
 
chap.h.] by rewards and punishments. 77 
 
 under his government; under his government, in the 
 same sense, as we are under the government of civil 
 magistrates. Because the annexing pleasure to some 
 actions, and pain to others, in our power to do or for- 
 bear, and giving notice of this appointment beforehand 
 vO those whom it concerns; is the proper formal notion 
 of government. Whether the pleasure or pain which 
 thus follows upon our behaviour, be owing to the Author 
 of Nature's acting upon us every moment which we feel 
 it; or to his having at once contrived and executed his 
 own part in the plan of the world; makes no alteration 
 as to the matter before us. For if civil magistrates 
 could make the sanctions of their laws take place, with- 
 out interposing at all, after they had passed them; with- 
 out a trial, and the formalities of an execution: if they 
 were able to make their laws execute themselves, or 
 every offender to execute them upon himself; we should 
 be just in the same sense under their government then, 
 as we are now; but in a much higher degree, and more 
 perfect manner. Vain is the ridicule, with which one 
 foresees some persons will divert themselves, upon find- 
 ing lesser pains considered as instances of divine pun- 
 ishment. There is no possibility of answering or evad- 
 ing the general thing here intended, without denying all 
 final causes. For final causes being admitted, the plea- 
 sures and pains now mentioned must be admitted too 
 as instances of them. And if they are; if God annexes 
 delight to some actions, and uneasiness to others, with 
 an apparent design to induce us to act so and so : then he 
 not only dispenses happiness and misery, but also re- 
 wards and punishes actions. If, for example, the pain 
 which we feel, upon doing what tends to the destruction 
 of our bodies, suppose upon too near approaches to fire, 
 or upon wounding ourselves, be appointed by the Author 
 of Nature to prevent our doing what thus tends to our 
 destruction; this is altogether as much an instance of 
 his punishing our actions, and consequently of our be- 
 ing under his government, as declaring by a voice from 
 heaven, that if wo acted so, he would inflict such pain 
 upon us, and inflicting it, whether it be greater or less. 
 Thus we find, thr.t the true notion ci' c )nccption of 
 
78 OF THE GOVIRNMENT OF GOD [Part I. 
 
 the Author of Nature, is that of a master or governor, 
 prior to the consideration of his moral attributes. The 
 fact of our case, which we find by experience, is, that 
 he actually exercises dominion or government over us 
 at present, by rewarding and punishing us for our ac- 
 tions, in as strict and proper a sense of these words, 
 and even in the same sense, as children, servants, sub- 
 jects, are rewarded and punished by those who govern 
 them. 
 
 1 And thus the whole analogy of Nature, the w^hole pre- 
 sent course of things, most fully shows, that there is 
 nothing incredible in the general doctrine of religion, 
 
 i that God will reward and punish men for their actions 
 hereafter: nothing incredible, I mean, arising out of the 
 notion of rewarding and punishing. For the whole 
 course of nature is a present instance of his exercising 
 that government over us, which implies in it rewarding 
 and punishing. 
 
 But as divine punishment is what men chiefly object 
 against, and are most unwilling to allow; it may be pro- 
 per to mention some circumstances in the natural course 
 of punishments at present, which are analogous to what 
 religion teaches us concerning a future state of punish- 
 ment; indeed so analogous, that as they add a further 
 credibility to it, so they cannot but raise a most serious 
 apprehension of it in those who will attend to them. 
 
 It has been now observed, that such and such mise- 
 ries naturally follow such and such actions of imprudence 
 and wilfulness, as well as actions more commonly and 
 more distinctly considered as vicious; and that these 
 consequences, when they may be foreseen, are properly 
 natural punishments annexed to such actions. For the 
 general thing here insisted upon, is, not that we see a 
 great deal of misery in the world, but a great deal which 
 men bring upon themselves by their own behaviour, 
 which they might have foreseen and avoided. Now the 
 circumstances of these natural punishments, particularly 
 deserving our attention, are such as these ; That often- 
 times they follow, or are inflicted in consequence of, ac- 
 tions whicli procure many present advantages, and are 
 
Obat. II., BY PUNISHMENTS. 79 
 
 accompanied with much present pleasure ; for instance, 
 sickness and untimely death are the consequence of intem- 
 perance, though accompanied with the highest mirth and 
 joIUty: that these punishments are often much greater, 
 than the advantages or pleasures obtained by the actions, 
 of which they are the punishments or consequences : 
 that though we may imagine a constitution of nature, in 
 which these natural punishments, which are in fact to 
 follow, would follow, immediately upon such actions be- 
 ing done, or very soon after ; we find on the contrary in 
 our world, that they are often delayed a great while, 
 sometimes even till long after the actions occasioning 
 them are forgot ; so that the constitution of nature is such, 
 that delay of punishment is no sort nor degree of pre- 
 sumption of final impunity: that after such delay, these 
 natural punishments or miseries often come, not by de- 
 grees, but suddenly, with violence, and at once ; however, 
 the chief misery often does: that as certainty of such dis- 
 tant misery following such actions, is never afforded per- 
 sons ; so perhaps during the actions, they have seldom a 
 distinct, full expectation of its following:* and many times 
 the case is only thus, that they see in general, or may see, 
 the credibility, that intemperance, suppose, will bring 
 after it diseases ; civil crimes, civil punishments ; when yet 
 the real probability often is, that they shall escape; but 
 things notwithstanding take their destined course, and 
 the misery inevitably follows at its appointed time, in very 
 many of these cases. Thus also though youth may be al- 
 leged as an excuse for rashness and folly, as being na- 
 turally thoughtless, and not clearly foreseeing all the con- 
 sequences of being untractable and profligate ; this does 
 not hinder, but that these consequences follow; and are 
 grievously felt, throughout the whole course of mature 
 life. Habits contracted even in that age, are often utter 
 ruin: and men's success in the world, not only in the 
 common sense of worldly success, but their real happi- 
 ness and misery, depends, in a great degree, and in va- 
 rious ways, upon the manner in which they pass their 
 youth ; which consequences they for the most part ne- 
 
 * See Fart IT. Cliap. vi. 
 
80 OF THE GOTERNMENTOF GOD [PartT* 
 
 gleet to consider, and perhaps seldom can properly be 
 said to believe, beforehand. It requires also to be men- 
 tioned, that, in numberless cases, the natural course of 
 things affords us opportunities for procuring advantages 
 to ourselves at certain times, which we cannot procure 
 when we will; nor ever recall the opportunities, if we 
 have neglected them. Indeed the general course of na- 
 ture is an example of this. If, during the opportunity ol 
 youth, persons are indocile and self-willed; they inevita- 
 bly suffer in their future life, for want of those acquire- 
 ments, which they neglected the natural season of attain- 
 ing. If the husbandman lets his seedtime pass without 
 sowing, the whole year is lost to him beyond recovery. 
 In like manner, though after men have been guilty of 
 folly and extravagance up to a certain degree, it is often in 
 their power, for instance, to retrieve their affairs, to recov- 
 er their health and character; at least in good measure; 
 yet real reformation is in many cases, of no avail at all to- 
 wards preventing the miseries, poverty, sickness, in- 
 famy, naturally annexed to folly and extravagance exceed- 
 ing t/icd degree. There is a certain bound to imprudence / 
 and misbehaviour, which being transgressed, there re- I 
 mains no place for repentance in the natural course of 
 things. It is further very much to be remarked, that 
 neglects from inconsiderateness, want of attention,* not 
 looking about us to see what we have to do, are often at- 
 tended with consequences altogether as dreadful, as any 
 active misbehaviour, from the most extravagant passion. 
 And lastly, civil government being natural, the punish- 
 ments of it are so too : and some of these punishments 
 are capital ; as the effects of a dissolute course of pleasure 
 are often mortal. So that many natural punishments are 
 final t to him who incurs them, if considered only in his 
 
 * Part n. Clmp. vi. 
 
 f Thr jjenpml consideration of a future stnte of punishment, most evklently he- 
 louas lo Llie sulijcct of natural Rrligion. But if any of tliese reflections should be 
 tlioiir.lit lo rclaie more peculiarly to tl'is doctrine, as tnuj^ht in Scripture ; the r< ad- 
 rr is desired to observe, that Gentile wriur.s, boih morahsis and poets, speak of ihe 
 fuure punislinient of the wiektd, boih as to tlie duniiion and decree of it, in a Ike 
 •iianniT of exi'ression an(i of descrii'tion, as tlie Scripture does. So that all which 
 can positively l)e ysseried lo l)e n\iilu r of iiit re Revelaiit'u, wilh reji'ard io this <ii c- 
 '.riiie, seems to be, that tin- {jrcaL <lis incli(Mi between tlir rijihtecus and the wickfd, 
 shall bu made at the end of this world ; ihat e-icli shall (Aen receive according to hs 
 
Chap. II.] BY PUNISHMENTS. 81 
 
 temporal capacity: and seem inflicted by natural ap- 
 pointment, either to remove the offender out of the way 
 of being further mischievous ; or as an example, though 
 frequently a disregarded one, to those who are left be- 
 hind. 
 
 These things are not what we call accidental, or to 
 be met with only now and then ; but they are things of 
 every day's experience: they proceed from general laws, 
 very general ones, by which God governs the world, 
 in the natural course of his providence. And they 
 are so analogous, to what Religion teaches us concern- 
 ing the future punishment of the wicked, so much of 
 a piece with it, that both would naturally be expressed in 
 the very same words, and manner of description. In 
 the book of Proverbs,* for instance. Wisdom is intro- 
 duced, as frequenting the most public places of resort, and 
 as rejected when she offers herself as the natural appoint- 
 ed guide of human life. How long, speaking to those who 
 are passing through it, how long, ye simple o-ne^, will ye love 
 folly, and the scorners delight in their scorning, and Jooi^ 
 hate knowledge ? Turn ye at my reproof. Behotd, I will 
 four out my spirit upon you, I will make known my icord.-^ 
 unto you. But upon being neglected, Because I have 
 called, and ye refused, I have stretched out my hand, and 
 710 man i^egarded ; but ye have set at nought all my counsel, 
 and would none of my reproof : I also tcill laugh at your 
 calamity, I will mock ichen your jear cometh ; when your 
 fear cometh as desolation, and your destruction cometh as a 
 whirlwind ; when distress and anguish cometh upon you. 
 Then shall they call upon me, hut I will not ansiver ; theg 
 shall seek me early, hut they shall not find me. This pas- 
 sage, every one sees, is poetical, and some parts of it are 
 highly figurative ; but their meaning is obvious. And 
 
 dpserts. Rpason did, as it well mij^ht, conclude that it slioiild, finally and upon tl.e 
 wholi', be well wiiii the righteous, and ill with the wicked : but it could liot 
 he -deterrniiied upon any principles of reason, whetli<:r human creatures might net 
 \fwe been appointed to pass through other states of life and being, before tliat distri- 
 l)utive justice siiould finally and effectually tiike place. Revelation teaches us, tli;;t 
 t'le next state of things alter the present is appointed for tlie execution of this justice ; 
 (hat it shall be no longer delayed ; but the ivyatery of God, the great mystery of liis 
 suffering vice and confusion to ]irv\-d'A. shall then be Jinishcd ; and he will take to him 
 hit great power and will re!£n by rendering to every one according to his works. 
 
 * Chap. i. 
 F 
 
82 GOVERNMENT OF GOD BY PUNISHMENTS. [PartL 
 
 the thing intended is expressed more literally in the fol- 
 lowing words; For that they hated knowledge, and did not 
 
 choose the fear of the Lord therefore shall they eat of 
 
 the fruit of their own loay, and he filled with their own de- 
 vices. For the security of the simple shall slay them, and 
 the prosperity of fools shall destroy them. And the whole 
 passage is so equally applicable to what we experience 
 in the present world, concerning the consequences of 
 men's actions^ and to what Religion teaches us is to be 
 expected in another, that it may be questioned which of 
 the two was principally intended. 
 
 Indeed when one has been recollecting the proper 
 proofs of a future state of rewards and punishments, no- 
 thing methinks can give one so sensible an apprehen- 
 sion of the latter, or representation of it to the mind; as 
 observing, that after the many disregarded checks, ad- 
 monitions, and warnings, which people meet with in the 
 ways of vice and folly and extravagance : warnings from 
 their very nature; from the examples of others; from the 
 lesser inconveniences W'hich they bring upon themselves ; 
 from the instructions of wise and virtuous men: after 
 these have been long despised, scorned, ridiculed: after 
 the chief bad consequences, temporal consequences, of 
 their follies, have been delayed for a great while; at 
 length they break in irresistibly, like an armed force: re- 
 pentance is too late to relieve, and can serve only to ag- 
 gravate their distress, the case is become desperate: and 
 poverty and sickness, remorse and anguish, infamy and 
 death, the effects of their own doings, overwhelm them 
 beyond possibility of remedy or escape. This is an 
 account of what is in fact the general constitution of na- 
 ture. 
 
 It is not in any sort meant, that, according to what ap- 
 pears at present of the natural course of things, men are 
 always uniformly punished in proportion to their misbe- 
 haviour: but that there are very many instances of mis- 
 behaviour punished in the several ways now mentioned, 
 and very dreadful instances too; sufficient to show what 
 the laws of the universe may admit; and, if thoroughly 
 considered, sufficient fully to answer all objections against 
 the credibility of a future st?.te of punishments, from any 
 
Chi?, hi.] OF THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 83 
 
 imaginations, that the frailty of our nature and external 
 temptations, almost annihilate the guilt of human vices: 
 as well as objections of another sort; from necessity; 
 from suppositions, that the will of an infinite Being can- 
 not be contradicted; or that he must be incapable of of- 
 fence and provocation.* 
 
 Reflections of this kind are not v/ithout their terrors 
 to serious persons, the most free from enthusiasm, and 
 of the greatest strength of mind; but it is fit things be 
 stated and considered as they really are. And there is, 
 in the present age, a certain fearlessness, with regard to 
 what may be hereafter under the government of God, 
 which nothing but an universally acknowledged demon- 
 stration on the side of atheism can justify; and which 
 makes it quite necessary, that men be reminded, and if 
 possible made to feel, "that there is no sort of ground for 
 being thus presumptuous, even upon the most sceptical 
 principles. For, may it not be said of any person upon 
 his being born into the world, he may behave so, as to 
 be of no service to it, but by being made an example of 
 the woeful effects of vice and folly P That he may, as 
 any one may, if he will, incur an infamous execution, 
 from the hands of civil iustice; or in some other course 
 of extravagance shorten his days; or bring upon himself 
 infamy and diseases worse than death .f' So that it had 
 been better for him, even with regard to the present 
 world, that he had never been born. And is there any 
 pretence of reason, for people to think themselves secure, 
 and talk as if they had certain proof, tha4;, let them act as 
 licentiously as they will, there can be nothing analo- 
 gous to this, with regard to a future and more general in- 
 terest, under the providence and government of the same 
 God.P 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 OF THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 
 
 As the manifold appearances of design and of final 
 causes, in the constitution of the world, prove it to be the 
 
 * See Chap. iv. and vi. 
 F 2 
 
84 OF THE MORAL [Part I. 
 
 work of an intelligent Mind ; so the particular final 
 causes of pleasure and pain distributed amongst his crea- 
 tures, prove that they are under his government ; what 
 may be called his natural government of creatures endued 
 with sense and reason. This, however, implies somewhat 
 more than seems usually attended to, when we speak of 
 God's natural government of the world. It implies 
 government of the very same kind with that which a 
 master exercises over his servants, or a civil magistrate 
 over his subjects. These latter instances of final causes, 
 as really prove an intelhgent Governor of the world, in 
 the sense now mentioned, and before* distinctly treated 
 of; as any other instances of final causes prove an 
 intelligent Maker of it. 
 
 But this alone does not appear at first sight to de- 
 termine any thing certainly, concerning the moral cha- 
 racter of the Author of Nature, considered in this relation 
 of governor ; does not ascertain his government to be 
 moral, or prove that he is the righteous judge of the world. 
 JNIoral governm.ent consists, not barely in rewarding and 
 punishing men for their actions, which the most tyranni- 
 cal person may do : but in rewarding the righteous, and 
 punishing the wicked : in rendering to men according 
 to their actions, considered as good or evil. And the 
 perfection of moral government consists in doing this, 
 Avith regard to all intelligent creatures, in an exact 
 proportion to their personal merits or demerits. 
 
 Some men seem to think the only character of the 
 Author of Nature to be that of simple absolute benevo- 
 lence. This, considered as a principle of action and 
 infinite in degree, is a disposition to produce the greatest 
 possible happiness, without regard to persons' behaviour, 
 otherwise than as such regard would produce higher de- 
 grees of it. And supposing this to be the only character 
 of God, veracity and justice in him would be nothing 
 but benevolence conducted bv wisdom. Now surelv this 
 ought not to be asserted, unless it can be proved ; for we 
 should speak with cautious reverence upon such a subject. 
 And whether it can be proved or no, is not the thins 
 tiere to be inquired into ; but whether in the constitution 
 
 * Chap. ii. 
 
Chap. III.] GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 85 
 
 and conduct of the world, a righteous government be 
 not discernibly planned out: which necessarily mipiies a . 
 righteous governor. There may possibly be in the crea- 
 tion beings, to whom the Author of Nature manifests 
 himself under this most amiable of all characters, this 
 of infinite absolute benevolence; for it is the most ami- 
 able, supposing it not, as perhaps it is not, incompatible 
 with justice; but he manifests himself to us under the 
 character of a righteous governor. He may, consistently 
 with this, be simply and absolutely benevolent, in the 
 sense now explained: but he is (for he has given us a 
 proof in the constitution and conduct of the world that he 
 is) a governor over servants, as he rewards and punishes 
 us for our actions. And in the constitution and conduct 
 of it, he may also have given, besides the reason of the 
 thing, and the natural presciges of conscience, clear and 
 distinct intimations, that his government is righteous or 
 moral: clear to such as think the nature of it deserving 
 their attention ; and yet not to every careless person, Avho 
 casts a transient reflection upon the subject.* 
 
 But it is particularly to be observed, that the divine 
 government, which we experience ourselves under in the 
 present state, taken alone, is allowed not to be the perfec- 
 tion of moral government And yet this by no means 
 hinders, but that there may be somewhat, be it more or 
 less, truly moral in it. A righteous government may 
 plainly appear to be carried on to some degree: enough 
 to give us the apprehension that it shall be completed, or 
 carried on to that degree of perfection which religion 
 teaches us it shall; but which cannot appear, till much 
 more of the divine administration be seen, than can in th^ 
 present life. And the design of this Chapter is to inquire 
 how far this is the case : how far, over and above the moral 
 nature t which God has given us, and our natural notion 
 
 * The objections against religion, from the evidence of it not being universal, nor 
 go strong as niiglit possibly have been, may be urged against natural religion, as well 
 as against revealed. And tlierefore the consideration of them belongs to the firsC 
 fjart of this Treatise, as well as tiie second. But as these objections are chiefly urgul 
 against revealetl religion, I choose to consider them in the second part. And the 
 answer to them tliere, Cii. vi.,as urged against Christianity, being almost equally 
 applicable to then> as urged iigainst the Religion of Nature; to avoid repetition, the 
 reader is referred lo tliat chapter. 
 
 f Dissertation II. 
 
86 OF THE MORAL [Part 1. 
 
 of liim as righteous governor of those his creatures, to 
 whom he has given this nature ;* I say how far besides 
 this, the principles and beginnings of a moral government 
 over the world may be discerned, notwithstanding and 
 amidst all the confusion and disorder of it. 
 
 Now one might mention here, what has been often 
 urged with great force, that, in general, less uneasiness 
 and more satisfaction, are the natural consequences! of 
 a virtuous than of a vicious course of life, in the present 
 state, as an instance of a moral government established 
 in nature ; an instance of it collected from experience 
 and present matter of fact. But it must be owned a 
 thing of difficulty to weigh and balance pleasures and 
 uneasinesses, each amongst themselves, and also against 
 each other, so as to make an estimate with any exactness, 
 of the overplus of happiness on the side of virtue. And it 
 is not impossible, that, amidst the infinite disorders of 
 the world, there may be exceptions to the happiness of 
 virtue ; even with regard to those persons, whose course 
 of life from their youth up has been blameless: and 
 more with regard to those who have gone on for some 
 time in the ways of vice, and have afterwards reformed. 
 For suppose an instance of the latter case ; a person with 
 his passions inflamed, his natural faculty of self-govern- 
 ment impaired by habits of indulgence, and with all his 
 vices about him, like so many harpies, craving for their 
 accustomed gratification : who can say how long it might 
 be, before such a person would find more satisfaction 
 in the reasonableness and present good consequences 
 of virtue, than difficulties and self-denial in the restraints 
 of it? Experience also shows, that men can to a great 
 degree, get over their sense of shame, so as that by pro- 
 fessing themselves to be without principle, and avow- 
 ing even direct villany, they can support themselves 
 against the infamy of it. But as the ill actions of any 
 one will probably be more talked of, and oftener thrown 
 in his way, upon his reformation ; so the infamy of them 
 will be much more felt, after the natural sense of virtue 
 and of honour is recovered. Uneasinesses of this kind 
 
 * Chap. vi. 
 f See Lord SIiaftes>bury's Ir.quiry conconrlng Virtue, Part II. 
 
Chap. III.] GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 87 
 
 ought indeed to be Dut to the account of former vices : yet it 
 will be said they are in part the consequences of reforma- 
 tion. Still I am far from allowing it doubtful, whether 
 virtue, upon the whole, be happier than vice in the pre- 
 sent world. But if it were, yet the beginnings of a 
 righteous administration may, beyond all question, be 
 found in nature, if we will attentively inquire after them. 
 "And, 
 
 I. In whatever manner the notion of God's moral 
 government over the world might be treated, if it did 
 not appear, whether he were in a proper sense our 
 governor at all; yet when it is certain matter of experience, 
 that he does manifest himself to us under the character of 
 a governor in the sense explained ;* it must deserve to 
 be considered, whether there be not reason to apprehend, 
 that he may be a righteous or moral governor. Since 
 it appears to be fact, that God does govern mankind 
 by the method of rewards and punishments, according 
 to some settled rules of distribution; it is surely a question 
 to be asked, what presumption is there against his fi- 
 nally rewarding and punishing them according to this 
 particular rule, namely, as they act reasonably, or un- 
 reasonably, virtuously or viciously? since rendering men 
 happy or miserable by this rule, certainly falls in, much 
 more falls in, with our natural apprehensions and sense of 
 things, than doing so by any other rule whatever ; since 
 rewarding and punishing actions by any other rule, would 
 appear much harder to be accounted for, by minds formed 
 as he has formed ours. Be the evidence of religion then 
 more or less clear, the expectation which it raises in us, 
 that the righteous shall, upon the whole, be happy, and 
 the wicked miserable, cannot however possibly be con- 
 sidered as absurd or chimerical ; because it is no more 
 than an expectation, that a method of government already 
 begun, shall be carried on, the method of rewarding and 
 punishing actions; and shall be carried on by a par- 
 ticular rule, which unavoidably appears to us at first 
 sight more natural than any other, the rule which we 
 call distributive justice. Nor, 
 
 II. Ought it to be entirely passed over, that tranquilhty 
 
 * Chap. ii. 
 
88 ■ OF THE MORAL [Part I. 
 
 satisfaction, and external advantages, being the natural 
 consequences of prudent management of ourselves, and 
 our affairs; and rashness, profligate negligence, and wil- 
 ful folly, bringing after them many inconveniences and 
 sufferings ; these afford instances of a right constitution of 
 nature: as the correction of children, for their own sakes, 
 and by way of example, when they run into danger or 
 hurt themselves, is a part of right education ? And thus, 
 that God governs the world by general fixed laws, that 
 he has endued us with capacities of reflecting upon this 
 constitution of things, and foreseeing the good and bad 
 consequences of our behaviour; plainly implies some sort 
 of moral government; since from such a constitution of 
 things it cannot but follow, that prudence and impru- 
 dence, which are of the nature of virtue and vice,* must 
 be, as they are, respectively rewarded and punished. 
 
 III. From the natural course of things, vicious actions 
 are, to a great degree, actually punished as mischievous 
 to society; and besides punishment actually inflicted upon 
 this account, there is also the fear and apprehension of 
 it in those persons, whose crimes have rendered them 
 obnoxious to it, in case of a discovery ; this state of fear 
 being itself often a very considerable punishment. The 
 natural fear and apprehension of it too, which restrains 
 from such crimes, is a declaration of nature against them. 
 It is necessary to the very being of society, that vices, 
 destructive of it, should be punished as being so; the vices 
 of falsehood, injustice, cruelty : which punishment there- 
 fore is as natural as society; and so is an instance of a 
 kind of moral government, naturally established, and ac- 
 tually taking place. And, since the certain natural course 
 of things is the conduct of Providence or the government 
 of God, though carried on by the instrumentality of men; 
 the observation here made amounts to this, that mankind 
 find themselves placed by him in such circumstances, 
 as that they are unavoidably accountable for their beha- 
 viour, and are often punished, and sometimes rewarded, 
 under his government, in the view of their being mis- 
 chievous, or eminently beneficial to society. 
 
 If it be objected that good actions and such as are bene- 
 
 * Stt Dibstrt.. II. 
 
Chap, III.] GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 89 
 
 ficial to society, are often punished, as in the case of per- 
 secution and in other cases ; and that ill and mischievous 
 actions are often rewarded: it may be answered dis- 
 tinctly ; first, that this is in no sort necessary, and conse- 
 quently not natural, in the sense in which it is necessary, 
 and therefore natural, that ill or mischievous actions 
 should be punished: and in the next place, that good 
 actions are never punished, considered as beneficial to 
 society, nor ill actions rewarded, under the view of their 
 being hurtful to it. So that it stands good, without any 
 thing on the side of vice to be set over against it, that 
 the Author of Nature has as truly directed, that vicious 
 actions, considered as mischievous to society, should be 
 punished, and put mankind under a necessity of thus 
 punishing them; as he has directed and necessitated us 
 to preserve our lives by food. 
 
 IV. In the natural course of things, virtue as such is 
 actually rewarded, and vice as such punished: which 
 seems to afford an instance or example, not only of 
 government, but of moral government begun and esta- 
 bhshed; moral in the strictest sense; though not in that 
 perfection of decree, which religion teaches us to expect. 
 In order to see this more clearly, we must distinguish 
 between actions themselves, and that quality ascribed to 
 them, which we call virtuous or vicious. The gratifica- 
 tion itself of every natural passion, must be attended 
 with deiigiit: and acquisitions of fortune, however made, 
 are acquisitions of the means or materials of enjoyment. 
 An action then, by which any natural passion is gratified 
 or fortune acquired, procures delight or advantage; ab- 
 stracted from all consideration of the morality of such 
 action. Consequently, the pleasure or advantage in this 
 case, is gained by the action itself, not by the morality, 
 the virtuousness or viciousness of it ; though it be, per- 
 haps, virtuous or vicious. Thus, to say such an action or 
 course of behaviour, procured such pleasure or advan- 
 tage, or brought on such inconvenience and pain, is quite 
 a different thing from saying, that such good or bad 
 effect was owing to the virtue or vice of such action or 
 behaviour. In one case, an action abstracted from all 
 moral consideration, produced its effect: in the other case, 
 
90 OF THE MORAL [Part I. 
 
 for it will appear that there are such cases, the morality 
 of the action under a moral consideration, i. e. the vir- 
 tuousness or viciousness of it, produced the effect. Now 
 I say virtue as such, naturally procures considerable ad- 
 vantages to the virtuous, and vice as such, naturally oc- 
 casions great inconvenience and even misery to the 
 vicious, in very many instances. The immediate effects 
 of virtue and vice upon the mind and temper, are to 
 be mentioned as instances of it. Vice as such is na- 
 turally attended with some sort of uneasiness, and, not 
 uncommonly, with great disturbance and apprehension. 
 That inward feeling, which, respecting lesser matters, 
 and in familiar speech, we call being vexed with oneself, 
 and in matters of importance and in more serious lan- 
 guage, remorse; is an uneasiness naturally arising from 
 an action of a man's own, reflected upon by himself as 
 wrong, unreasonable, faulty, i. e. vicious in greater or 
 less degrees: and this manifestly is a different feeling 
 from that uneasiness, which arises from a sense of mere 
 loss or harm. What is more common, than to hear a 
 
 man lamenting an accident or event, and adding but 
 
 however he lias the satisfaction that he cannot blame him- 
 self for it; or on the contrary, that he has the uneasiness 
 of being sensible it was his own doing? Thus also the 
 disturbance and fear, which often follow upon a man's 
 having done an injury, arise from a sense of his being 
 blame-worthy ; otherwise there would, in many cases, be 
 no ground of disturbance, nor any reason to fear resent- 
 ment or shame. On the other hand, inward security and 
 peace, and a mind open to the several gratifications of 
 life, are the natural attendants of innocence and virtue. 
 To which must be added the complacency, satisfaction, 
 and even joy of heart, which accompany the exercise, 
 the real exercise of gratitude, friendship, benevolence. 
 
 And here, I think, ought to be mentioned, the fears oi 
 future punishment, and peaceful hopes of a better life, in 
 those who fully believe, or have any serious apprehension 
 of religion: because these hopes and fears are present un- 
 easiness and satisfaction to the mind ; and cannot be got 
 rid of by great part of the world, even by men who have 
 thought most thoroughly upon that subject of religion. 
 
Chap. III.] GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 91 
 
 And no one can say, how consideralble tliis uneasiness 
 and satisfaction may be, or what upon the whole it may 
 amount to. 
 
 In the next place comes in the consideration, that all 
 honest and good men are disposed to befriend honest 
 good men as such, and to discountenance the vicious as 
 such, and do so in some degree ; indeed in a considera- 
 ble degree: from which favour and discouragement can- 
 not but arise considerable advantage and inconvenience. 
 And though the generality of the world have little regard 
 to the morality of their own actions, and may be sup- 
 posed to have less to that of others, when they them- 
 selves are not concerned ; yet let any one be known to 
 be a man of virtue, some how or other he will be favour- 
 ed and good offices will be done him, from regard to his 
 character, without remote views, occasionally, and in 
 some low degree, I think, by the generality of the world, 
 as it happens to come in their way. Public honours too 
 and advantages are the natural consequences, are some- 
 times at least the consequences in fact, of virtuous ac- 
 tions; of eminent justice, fidehty, charity, love to our 
 country, considered in the view of being virtuous. And 
 sometimes even death itself, often infamy and external in- 
 conveniences, are the public consequences of vice as vice. 
 For instance, the sense which mankind have of tyranny, 
 injustice, oppression, additional to the mere feeling or 
 fear of misery, has doubtless been instrumental in bring- 
 ing about revolutions, which make a figure even in the 
 history of the world. For it is plain, men resent inju- 
 ries as implying faultiness, and retaliate, not merely under 
 the notion of having received harm, but of having re- 
 ceived wrong; and they have this resentment in behalf 
 of others, as well as of themselves. So likewise even 
 the generality are, in some degree, grateful and disposed 
 to return good offices, not merely because such a one 
 has been the occasion of good to thehi, but under the 
 view, that such good offices implied kind intention and 
 good desert in the doer. To all this may be added two 
 or three particular things, which many persons will think 
 frivolous; but to me nothing appears so, which at all 
 comes in towards determining a question of such import- 
 
92 OF THE MORAL [Pari I. 
 
 ance, as, whether there be, or be not, a moral institution 
 of government, in the strictest sense moral, visibly esta- 
 blished and begun in nature. The particular tilings are 
 these: That in domestic government, which is doubtless 
 natural, children and others also are very generally pun- 
 ished for falsehood and injustice and ill-behaviour, as 
 such, and rewarded for the contrary: which are instances 
 where veracity and justice and right behaviour, as such, 
 are naturally enforced by rewards and punishments, whe- 
 ther more or less considerable in degree: that, though 
 civil government be supposed to take cognizance of ac- 
 tions in no other view than as prejudicial to society, with- 
 out respe(*t to the immorality of them ; yet as such ac- 
 tions are immoral, so the sense which men have of the 
 immorality of them, very greatly contributes, in different 
 ways, to bring offenders to justice: and that entire ab- 
 sence of all crime and guilt in the moral sense, when 
 plainly appearing, Vvill almost of course procure, and cir- 
 cumstances of aggravated guilt prevent, a remission of 
 the penalties annexed to civil crimes, in many cases, 
 though by no means in all. 
 
 Upon the whole then, besides the good and bad effects 
 of virtue and vice upon men's own m.inds, the course of 
 the world does, in some measure, turn upon the appro- 
 bation and disapprobation of them as such in others. 
 The sense of well and ill doing, the presages of con- 
 science, the love of good characters and dislike of bad 
 ones, honour, shame, resentment, gratitude; all these, 
 considered in themselves, and in their effects, do afford 
 manifest real instances of virtue as such naturally fa- 
 voured, and of vice as such discountenanced, more or 
 less, in the daily course of human life ; in every age, in 
 every relation, in every general circumstance of it. 
 That God has given us a moral nature,* may most justly 
 be urged as a proof of our being under his moral go- 
 vernment: but that he has placed us in a condition, which 
 gives this nature, as one may speak, scope to operate, and 
 in which it does unavoidably operate; i. e. influence man- 
 kind to act, so as thus to favour and reward virtue, and 
 discountenan«fe and punish vice ; this is not the same, but 
 
 *See Dissert. II. 
 
Chap. III.] GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 93 
 
 a further, additional proof of his moral governinent: for 
 it is an instance of it. The first is a proof, that he will 
 finally favour and support virtue eii'ectually: the second 
 is an example of his favouring and supporting it at pre- 
 sent, in some degree. 
 
 If a more distinct inquiry be made, whence it arises, 
 that virtue as such is often rewarded, and vice as such 
 is punished, and this rule never inverted: it will be 
 found to proceed, in part, immediately from the moral 
 nature itself, which God has given us; and also in part, 
 from his having given us, together with this nature, so 
 great a power over each other's happiness and misery. 
 For, first, it is certain, that peace and delight, in some 
 degree and upon some occasions, is the necessary and 
 present effect of virtuous practice; an effect arising 
 immediately from that constitution of our nature. We 
 are so made, that well-doing as such gives us satisfaction, 
 at least, in some instances ; ill-doing as such, in none. 
 And, secondly, from our moral nature, joined with God's 
 having put our happiness and misery in many respects 
 in each other's power, it cannot but be, that vice as such, 
 some kinds and instances of it at least, will be infamous, 
 and men will be disposed to punish it as in itself detest- 
 able; and the villain v/ill by no mtans be able always to 
 avoid feeling that infam.y, any more than he will be able 
 to escape this further punishment, which mankind will 
 be disposed to inflict upon him, under the notion of his 
 deserving it. But tliere can be nothing on the side of 
 vice, to answer this ; because there is nothing in the hu- 
 man mind contradictory, as the logicians speak, to vir- 
 tue. For virtue consists in a regard to what is right 
 and reasonable, as being so ; in a regard to veracity, jus- 
 tice, charity, in themselves: and there is surely no such 
 tiling, as a like natural regard to falsehood, injustice, 
 cruelty. If it be thought, that there are instances of an 
 approbation of vice, as such, in itself, and for its own 
 sake (though it does not appear to me, that there is any 
 such thing at all; but supposing there be)., it is evident- 
 ly monstrous: as much so, as the most acknowledged 
 perversion of any passion whatever. Such instances of 
 perversion then being left out, as merely im.aginary, or, 
 
94 OF THE MORAL • [Part i. 
 
 however, unnatural; it must follow, from the frame of our 
 nature, and from our condition, in the respects now de- 
 scribed, that vice cannot at all be, and virtue cannot but 
 be, favoured as such by others, upon some occasions, 
 and happy in itself, in some degree. For what is here 
 insisted upon, is not the degree in which virtue and vice 
 are thus distinguished, but only the thing itself, that 
 they are so in some degree; though the whole good and 
 bad effect of virtue and vice as such, is not inconsidera- 
 ble in degree. But that they must be thus distinguished 
 in some degree, is in a manner necessary: it is matter of 
 fact of daily experience, even in the greatest confusion 
 of human affairs. >^ < 
 
 It is not pretended but that, in the natural course of 
 things, happiness and misery appear to be distributed by 
 other rules, than only the personal merit and demerit of 
 characters. They may sometimes be distributed by way 
 of mere discipline. There may be the wisest and best 
 reasons, why the world should be governed by general 
 laws, from whence such promiscuous distribution perhaps 
 must follow; and also why our happiness and misery 
 should be put in each other's power, in the degree which 
 they are. And these things, as in general they contri- 
 bute to the rewarding virtue and punishing vice, as such : 
 so they often contribute also, not to the inversion of this, 
 which is impossible; but to the rendering persons pros- 
 perous, though wicked ; afflicted, though righteous ; and, 
 which is worse, to the r'cwarding some actions, though vi- 
 cious, and punishwg other actions, though virtuous. But 
 all this cannot drown the voice of Nature in the conduct 
 of Providence, plainly declaring itself for virtue, by way 
 of distinction from vice, and preference to it. For our 
 being so constituted as that virtue and vice are thus na- 
 turally favoured and discountenanced, rewarded and pun- 
 ished, respectively as such, is an intuitive proof of the in- 
 tent of Nature, that it should be so ; otherwise the con- 
 stitution of our mind, from which it thus immediately and 
 directly proceeds, would be absurd. But it cannot be 
 said, because virtuous actions are sometimes punished, 
 and vicious actions rewarded, that Nature intended it. 
 For, though this great disorder is brought about, as all 
 
Chap. UI.] GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 95 
 
 actions are done, by means of some natural passion ; yet 
 this may be, as it undoubtedly is, brought about by the 
 perversion of such passion, implanted in us for other, 
 and those very good purposes. And indeed these other 
 and good purposes, even of every passion, may be clear- 
 ly seen. 
 
 We have then a declaration, in some degree of pre- 
 sent effect, from Him who is supreme in Nature, which 
 side he is of, or what part he takes ; a declaration for 
 virtue, and against vice. So far therefore as a man is 
 true to virtue, to veracity and justice, to equity and cha- 
 rity, and the right of the case, in whatever he is concern- 
 ed ; so far he is on the side of the divine administration, 
 and co-operates with it: and from hence, to such a man, 
 arises naturally a secret satisfaction and sense of secu- 
 rity, and implicit hope of somewhat further. And, ^ 
 ^ V. This hope is confirmed by the necessary tenden- 
 cies of virtue, which, though not of present effect, yet 
 are at present discernible in nature; and so afford an in- 
 stance of somewhat moral in the essential constitution of 
 it. There is, in the nature of things, a tendency in vir- 
 tue and vice to produce the good and bad effects now 
 mentioned, in a greater degree than they do in fact pro- 
 duce them. For instance ; good and bad men would be 
 much more rewarded and punished as such, were it not, 
 that justice is often artificially eluded, that characters are 
 not known, and many, who would thus favour virtue and 
 discourage vice, are hindered from doing so by acciden- 
 tal causes. These tendencies of virtue and vice are ob- 
 vious with regard to individuals. But it may require 
 more particularly to be considered, that power in a socie- 
 ty, by being under the direction of virtue, naturally 
 increases, and has a necessary tendency to prevail over 
 opposite power, not under the direction of it; in like 
 manner, as power, by being under the direction of reason, 
 increases, and has a tendency to prevail over brute force. 
 There are several brute creatures of equal, and several 
 of superior strength, to that of men; and possibly the 
 sum of the whole strength of brutes may be greater than 
 that of mankind ; but reason gives us the advantage and 
 superiority over them ; and thus man is the acknowledged 
 
96 OF THE MORAL [Part I. 
 
 governing animal npon the earth. Nor is this supe- 
 riority considered by any as accidental ; but as what 
 reason has a tendency, in the nature of the thing, to ob- 
 tain. And yet perhaps difficulties may be raised about 
 the meaning, as well as the truth, of the assertion, that 
 virtue has the like tendency. 
 
 To obviate these difficulties, let us see more distinct- 
 ly, how the case stands with regard to reason ; which is 
 so readily acknowledged to have this advantageous tend- 
 ency. Suppose then two or three men, of the best and 
 most improved understanding, in a desolate open plain, 
 attacked by ten times the number of beasts of prey : 
 would their reason secure them the victory in this une- 
 qual combat ? Power then, though joined with reason, 
 and under its direction, cannot be expected to prevail 
 over opposite power, though merely brutal, unless the 
 one bears some proportion to the other. Again : put 
 the imaginary case, that rational and irrational creatures 
 were of like external shape and manner : it is certain, be- 
 fore there were opportunities for the first to distinguish 
 each other, to separate from their adversaries, and to 
 form a union among themselves, they might be upon a 
 level, or in several respects upon great disadvantage; 
 though united they might be vastly superior ; since union 
 is of such efficacy, that ten men united, might be able to 
 accom.plish, what ttn thousand of the same natural 
 strength and understanding wholly ununited, could not. 
 In this case then, brute force might more than maintain 
 its ground against reason, for want of union among the 
 rational creatures. Or suppose a number of men to 
 land upon an island inhabited only by wild beasts ; a num- 
 ber of men who, by the regulations of civil government, 
 the inventions of art, and the experience of some years, 
 could they be preserved so long, would be really suffi- 
 cient to subdue the wild beasts, and to preserve themselves 
 in security from them: yet a conjuncture of accidents 
 might give such advantage to the irrational animals as 
 that they might at once overpower, and even extirpate, 
 the whole species of rational ones. Length of time then. 
 proper scope and opportunities, for reason to exert it- 
 self, may be absolutely necessary to its prevailing ov 
 
Crap. TII.J GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 97 
 
 brute force. Further still: there are many instances of 
 brutes succeeding in attempts, which they could not have 
 undertaken, had not their irrational nature rendered them 
 incapable of foreseeing the danger of such attempt, or 
 the fury of passion hindered their attending to it: and 
 tliere are instances of reason and real prudence prevent- 
 ing men's undertaking what, it hath appeared afterwards, 
 they might have succeeded in by a lucky rashness. And 
 in certain conjunctures, ignorance and folly, weakness 
 and discord, may have their advantages. So that ration- 
 al animals have not necessarily the superiority over irra- 
 tional ones ; but, how improbable soever it may be, it is 
 evidently possible, that in some globes the latter may 
 be superior. And were the former wholly at variance 
 and disunited, by false self-interest and envy, by treach- 
 ery and injustice, and consequent rage and malice against 
 each other, whilst the latter were firmly united among 
 themselves by instinct ; this might greatly contribute to 
 the introducing such an inverted order of things. For 
 every one would consider it as inverted : since reason 
 has, in the nature of it, a tendency to prevail over brute 
 force ; notwithstanding the possibility it may not prevail, 
 and the necessity, which there is, of many concurring cir- 
 cumstances to render it prevalent. 
 
 Now I say, virtue in a society has a like tendency to 
 procure superiority and additional power: whether this 
 power be considered as the means of security from op- 
 posite power, or of obtaining other advantages. And it 
 has this tendency, by rendering public good, an object 
 and end, to every member of the society; by putting 
 every one upon consideration and diligence, recollection 
 and self-government, both in order to see what is the 
 most effectual method, and also in order to perform their 
 proper part, for obtaining and preserving it ; by uniting 
 a society within itself, and so increasing its strength; and, 
 which is particularly to be mentioned, uniting it by 
 means of veracity and justice. For as these last are 
 principal bonds of union, so benevolence or public spi- 
 rit, undirected, unrestrained by them, is, nobody knows 
 what. 
 
 And suppose the invisible world, and the invisible 
 
 G 
 
98 pF THE MORAL [Part I. 
 
 dispensations of Providence, to be, in any sort, analogous 
 to what appears: or that both together make up one uni- 
 form scheme, the two parts of which, the part which we 
 see, and that which is beyond our observation, are ana- 
 lo2;ous to each other: then, there must be a Uke natural 
 tendency in the derived power, throughout the universe, 
 under the direction of virtue, to prevail in general over 
 that which is not under its direction ; as there is in rea- 
 son, derived reason in the universe, to prevail over brute 
 force. But then, in order to the prevalence of virtue, 
 or that it may actually produce, what it has a tendency 
 to produce; the like concurrences are necessary, as are, 
 to the prevalence of reason. There must be some pro- 
 portion, between the natural power or force which is, and 
 that which is not, under the direction of virtue : there 
 must be sufficient length of time ; for the complete suc- 
 cess of virtue, as of reason, cannot, from the nature of 
 the thing, be otherwise than gradual : there must be, as 
 one may speak, a fair field of trial, a stage large and ex- 
 tensive enough, proper occasions and opportunities, for 
 the virtuous to join together, to exert themselves against 
 lawless force, and to reap the fruit of their imited labours. 
 Now indeed it is to be hoped, that the disproportion be- 
 tween the good and bad, even here on earth, is not so 
 great, but that the former have natural power sufficient 
 to their prevailing to a considerable degree, if circumstan- 
 ces would permit this power to be united. For, much 
 less, very much less, power under the direction of virtue, 
 would prevail over much greater not under the direction 
 of it. However, good men over the face of the earth can- 
 not unite ; as for other reasons, so because they cannot 
 be sufficiently ascertained of each other's characters. 
 And the known course of human things, the scene we 
 are now passing through, particularly the shortness of 
 life, denies to virtue its full scope in several other re- 
 spects. The natural tendency which we have been con* 
 sidering, though real, is hindered from being carried into 
 effect in the present state : but these hinderances may be 
 removed in a future one. Virtue, to borrow the Chris- 
 tian allusion, is militant here ; and various untoward ac- 
 cidents contribute to its being often overborne : but it 
 
Chap. III.] GOVERNMENT OP GOD. 99 
 
 may combat with greater advantage hereafter, and pre- 
 vail completely, and enjoy its consequent rewards, in 
 some future states. Neglected as it is, perhaps unknown, 
 perhaps despised and oppressed here ; there may be 
 scenes in eternity, lasting enough, and in every other 
 way adapted, to afford it a sufficient sphere of action ; 
 and a sufficient sphere for the natural consequences of it 
 to follow in fact. If the soul be naturally immortal, and 
 this state be a progress towards a future one, as child- 
 hood is towards mature age ; good men may naturally 
 unite, not only amongst themselves, but also with other 
 orders of virtuous creatures, in that future state. For 
 virtue, from the very nature of it, is a principle and bond 
 of union, in some degree, amongst all who are endued 
 with it, and known to each other ; so as that by it, a good 
 man cannot but recommend himself to the favour and 
 protection of all virtuous beings, throughout the whole 
 universe, who can be acquainted with his character, and 
 can any way interpose in his behalf in any part of his 
 duration. And one might add, that suppose all this ad- 
 vantageous tendency of virtue to become effect, amongst 
 one or more orders of creatures, in an)^ distant scenes 
 and periods, and to be seen by any orders of vicious 
 creatures, throughout the universal kingdom of God ; 
 this happy effect of virtue would have a tendency, byway 
 of example, and possibly in other ways, to amend those 
 of them who are capable of amendment, and being re- 
 covered to a just sense of virtue. If our notions of the 
 plan of Providence were enlarged in any sort proportion- 
 able to what late discoveries have enlarged our views 
 with respect to the material world ; representatioiis of 
 this kind would not appear absurd or extravagant. How- 
 ever, they are not to be taken as intended for a literal 
 delineation of what is in fact the particular scheme of thx^ 
 universe, which cannot be known without revelation: for 
 suppositions are not to be looked on as true, because net 
 incredible : but they are mentioned to show, that our 
 finding virtue to be hindered from procuring to itself such 
 superiority and advantages, is no objection against its 
 having, in the essential nature of the thing, a tendency 
 to procure them. And tlie suppositions now mentioned 
 
 02 
 
100 OF THE MORAL [Part I. 
 
 do plainly show this : for they show, that these hinder- 
 ances are so far from being necessary, that we ourselves 
 can easily conceive, how they may be removed in future 
 states, and full scope be granted to virtue. And all these 
 advantageous tendencies of it are to be considered as de- 
 clarations of God in its favour. This however is taking 
 a pretty large compass: though it is certain, that, as the 
 material world appears to be, in a manner, boundless and 
 immense ; there must be some scheme of Providence vast 
 in proportion to it. 
 
 But let us return to the earth our habitation ; and we 
 shall see this happy tendency of virtue, by imagining an 
 instance not so vast and remote : by supposing a king- 
 dom or society of men upon it, perfectly virtuous, for a 
 succession of many ages ; to which, if you please, may 
 be given a situation advantageous for universal monar- 
 chy. In such a state, there would be no such thing as 
 faction : but men of the greatest capacity would of course, 
 all along, have the chief direction of affairs willingly 
 yielded to them ; and they would share it among them- 
 selves without envy. Each of these would have the part 
 assigned him, to which his genius was peculiarly adapt- 
 ed : and others, who had not any distinguished genius, 
 would be safe, and think themselves very happy, by be- 
 ing under the protection and guidance of those who had. 
 Public determinations would really be the result of the 
 united wisdom of the community : and they v/ould faith- 
 fully be executed, by the united strength of it. Some 
 would in a higher way contribute, but all Avould in some 
 way contribute, to the public prosperity : and in it, each 
 would enjoy the fruits of his own virtue. And as injus- 
 tice, whether by fraud or force, would be unknown 
 among themselves ; so they would be sufficiently secured 
 from it in their neighbours. For cunning and false self- 
 interest, confederacies in injustice, ever slight, and ac- 
 companied with faction and intestine treachery ; these on 
 one hand would be found mere childish folly and weak- 
 ness, when set in opposition against wisdom, pubHc spi- 
 rit, union inviolable, and fidelity on the other : allowing 
 both a sufficient length of vears to trv their force. Add 
 the general influence, which such a kingdom would have 
 
Chav. III.] GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 101 
 
 over the face of the earth, by way of example particular- 
 ly, and the reverence which would be paid it. It would 
 plainly be superior to all others, and the world must 
 gradually come under its empire ; not by means of law- 
 less violence ; but partly by what must be allowed to be 
 just conquest; and partly by other kingdoms submitting 
 themselves voluntarily to it, throughout a course of ages, 
 and claiming its protection, one after another, in succes- 
 sive exigencies. The head of it would be an universal 
 monarch, in another sense than any mortal has yet been ; 
 and the eastern style would be literally applicable to him, 
 that all people, nations, and languages should serve him. 
 And though indeed our knowledge of human nature, and 
 the whole history of mankind, show the impossibility, 
 without some miraculous interposition, that a number of 
 men, here on earth, should unite in one society or go- 
 vernment, in the fear of God and universal practice of 
 virtue ; and that such a government should continue so 
 united for a succession of ages : yet admitting or sup- 
 posing this, the effect would be as now drawn out. And 
 thus for instance, the wonderful power and prosperity 
 promised to the. Jewish nation in the Scripture, would 
 be, in a great measure, the consequence of what is pre- 
 dicted of them ; that the people should be all righteous, 
 and inherit the land for ever ;* were we to understand 
 the latter phrase of a long continuance only, sufficient 
 to give things time to work. The predictions of this kind, 
 for there are many of them, cannot come to pass, in the 
 present known course of nature ; but suppose them come 
 to pass, and then, the dominion and pre-eminence pro- 
 mised must naturally follow, to a very considerable degree. 
 Consider now the general system of religion; that the 
 government of the world is uniform, and one, and moral; 
 that virtue and right shall finally have the advantage, and 
 prevail over fraud and lawless force, over the deceits as 
 well as the violence of wickedness, under the conduct of 
 one supreme governor : and from the observations above 
 made, it will appear, that God has, by our reason, given 
 us to see a peculiar connexion in the several parts of this 
 scheme, and a tendency towards the completion of it, 
 
 * Isa. he. 21. 
 
102 OF THE 7*I0RAL [PartL 
 
 arising o.it of the very nature of virtue: which tendency 
 is to be considered as somewhat n^orai in the essential 
 constitution of things. If any one should think all this 
 to be of little importance ; I desire him to consider, what 
 tie would think, if vice had, essentially and in its nature^ 
 these advantageous tendencies ; or if virtue had essential- 
 ly the direct contrary ones. 
 
 But it mav be objected, that notwithstanding all these 
 natural effects and these natural tendencies of virtue; yet 
 things may be now going on throughout the universe, 
 and may go on hereafter, in the same mixed way as 
 here at present upon earth: virtue sometimes pros- 
 perous, sometimes depressed ; vice sometimes punished, 
 sometimes successful. The answer to which is, that it 
 is not the purpose of this chapter, nor of this treatise,, 
 properly to prove God's perfect moral government over 
 the w^orld, or the truth of Religion ; but to observe what 
 there is in the constitution and course of nature, to con- 
 firm the proper proof of it, supposed to be known: and 
 that the weight of the foregoing observations to this pur- 
 pose may be thus distinctly proved. Pleasure and pain 
 are indeed to a certain degree, say to a very high degree, 
 distributed amongst us without any apparent regard to 
 *he merit or demerit of characters. And were there no- 
 thing else concerning this matter discernible in the con- 
 stitution and course of nature; there would be no ground 
 from the constitution and course of nature to hope or to 
 fear, that men W'ould be rewarded or punished hereafter 
 according to their deserts : which, however, it is to be 
 remarked, imphes, that even then there would be no 
 ground from appearances to think, that vice upon the 
 whole would have the advantage, rather than that virtue 
 would. And thus the proof of a future state of retribu- 
 tion would rest upon the usual known arguments for it : 
 which are I think plainly unanswerable ; and would be 
 so, though there were no additional confirmation of them 
 from the things above insisted on. But these things are 
 a very strong confirmation of them. For, 
 
 First, They show that the Author of Nature is not 
 indifferent to virtue and vice. They amount to a 
 declaration, from him, determinate and not to be evaded^ 
 
> 
 
 tHAP. Ill,] GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 103 
 
 in favour of one, and against the other; such a declaration, 
 as there is nothing to be set over against or answer, on 
 the part of vice. So that were a man, laying aside the 
 proper proof of Religion, to determine from the course 
 of nature only, whether it were most probable, that the 
 righteous or the wicked would have the advantage in a 
 future life ; there can be no doubt, but that he would 
 determine the probability to be, that the former would. 
 The course of nature then, in the view of it now given 
 furnishes us with a real practical proof of the obligations 
 of Religion. 
 
 Secondly, When, conformably to what Religion teaches 
 us, God shall reward and punish virtue and vice as such, 
 so as that every one shall, upon the whole, have his 
 deserts ; this distributive justice will not be a thing 
 different in kind, but only in degree, from what we ex- 
 perience in his present government. It will be that in 
 effect, toward which we now see a tendency. It will 
 be no more than the completion of that moral govern- 
 ment, the principles and beginning of which have been 
 shown, beyond all dispute, discernible in the present 
 constitution and course of nature. And from hence 
 it follows, 
 
 Thirdly, That, as under the natural government of God, 
 our experience of those kinds and degrees of happiness 
 and misery, which we do experience at present, gives 
 just ground to hope for, and to fear, higher degrees 
 and other kinds of both in a future state, supposing a 
 future state admitted : so under his moral government our 
 experience, that virtue and vice are, in the manners above 
 mentioned, actually rewarded and punished at present, 
 in a certain degree, gives just ground to hope and to 
 fear, that they may be rewarded and punished in a higher 
 degree hereafter. It is acknowledged indeed that this 
 alone is not sufficient ground to think, that they actually 
 will be rewarded and punished in a higher degree, rather 
 than in a lower : but then. 
 
 Lastly, There is sufficient ground to think so, frOm the 
 good and bad tendencies of virtue and vice. For these 
 tendencies are essential, and founded in the nature of 
 things : whereas the hinderances to their becoming effect 
 
104 MOPwAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD. [P^rt 1. 
 
 are, in numberless cases, not necessary, but artificial 
 only. Now it may be much more strongly argued, that 
 these tendencies, as well as the actual rewards and 
 punishments, of virtue and vice, which arise directly out 
 of the nature of things, will remain hereafter, than that 
 Ihe accidental hinderances of them will. And if these 
 ninderances do not remain ; those rewards and punish- 
 ments cannot but be carried on much farther towards the 
 perfection of moral government : i. e. the tendencies of 
 virtue and vice will become effect ; but when, or where, 
 or in what particular way, cannot be known at all, but by 
 revelation. 
 
 Upon the whole : there is a kind of moral government 
 imphed in God's natural government:* virtue and vice 
 are naturally rewarded and punished as beneficial and 
 mischievous to society ;f and rewarded and punished di- 
 rectly as virtue and vice.t The notion then of a moral 
 scheme of government is not fictitious, but natural ; for 
 it is suggested to our thoughts by the constitution and 
 course of nature : and the execution of this scheme is 
 actually begun, in the instances here mentioned. And 
 these things are to be considered as a declaration of the 
 Author of Nature, for virtue, and against vice : they give 
 a credibility to the supposition of their being rewarded 
 and punished hereafter ; and also ground to hope and to 
 fear, that they may be rewarded and punished in higher 
 degrees than they are here. And as all this is confirm- 
 ed, so the argument for Religion, from the constitution 
 and course of nature, is carried on farther, by observing, 
 that there are natural tendencies, and, in innumerable 
 cases, only artificial hinderances, to this moral scheme's 
 being carried on much farther towards perfection, than 
 it is at present. § The notion then of a moral scheme 
 of government, much more perfect than what is seen, is 
 not a fictitious, but a natural notion ; for it is suggested 
 to our thoughts, by the essential tendencies of virtue and 
 vice. And these tendencies are to be considered as in- 
 timations, as implicit promises and threatenings, from the 
 Author of Nature, of much greater rewards and punish- 
 ments to follow virtue and vice, than do at present. And 
 
 * P. 87. t P. 88. % P. 81), &c. J P. 95, he. 
 
Chap. IV.] OF A STATE OF TRIAL. 105 
 
 indeed, every natural tendency, which is to continue, but 
 which is hindered from becoming effect bv only acciden- 
 tal causes, affords a presumption, that such tendency 
 will, some time or other, become effect: a presumption 
 in degree proportionable to the length of the duration, 
 through which such tendency will continue. And from 
 these things together, arises a real presumption, that the 
 moral scheme of government estabUshed in nature, shall 
 be carried on much farther towards perfection hereafter ; 
 and, I think, a presumption that it will be absolutely 
 completed. But from these things, joined with the moral 
 nature which God has given us, considered as given us 
 by him, arises a practical proof* that it will be completed : 
 a proof from fact ; and therefore a distinct one from that 
 which is deduced from the eternal and unalterable rela- 
 tions, the fitness and unfitness of actions. 
 
 CHAP. IV.*^ 
 
 OF A STATE OF PROBATION, AS IMPLYING TRIAL, 
 DIFFICULTIES, AND DANGER. 
 
 The general doctrine of Religion, that our present life is 
 a state of probation for a future one, comprehends under | 
 it several particular things, distinct from each other, | 
 But the first and most common meaning of it seems tc 
 be, that our future interest is now depending, and de- 
 pending upon ourselves ; that we have scope and oppor- "X 
 tunities here, for that good and bad behaviour, which 
 God will reward and punish hereafter ; together with 
 temptations to one, as well as inducements of reason to 
 the other. And this is, in a great measure, the same 
 with saying, that we are under the moral government of 
 God, and to give an account of our actions to him. For 
 the notion of a future account and general righteous 
 judgment, implies some sort of temptations to what is 
 wrong : otherwise there would be no moral possibility of 
 doing wrong, nor ground for judgment, or discrimination. 
 But there is this difference, that the word probation is 
 
 * See this proof drawn out briefly, Ch. vi. 
 
106 OF A STATE OF TRIAL. P>art £ 
 
 more distinctly and particularly expressive of allurements 
 to wrong, or difficulties in adhering uniformly to what is 
 right, and of the danger of miscarrying by such tempta- 
 tions, than the words moral government. A state of pro- 
 bation then, as thus particularly implying in it trial, dif- 
 ficulties, and danger, may require to be considered dis- 
 tinctly by itself. 
 I And as the moral government of God, which Religion 
 I teaches us, implies, that we are in a state of trial with 
 i regard to a future world : so also his natural Jjovernment 
 I over us implies, that we are in a state of trial, in the like 
 \ sense, with regard to the present world. IS^atural go- 
 ' vernment by rewards and punishments, as much implies 
 natural trial, as moral government does moral trial. 
 The natural government of God here meant* consists 
 in his annexing pleasure to some actions, and pain to 
 others, which are in our power to do or forbear, and in 
 tiiving us notice of such appointment beforehand. This 
 necessarily implies, that he has made our happiness and 
 misery, or our interest, to depend in part upon ourselves. 
 And so \Ar as men have temptations to any course of 
 actitm, which will probably occasion them greater tem- 
 poral inconvenience and uneasiness, than satisfaction; 
 so far their temporal interest is in danger from them- 
 selves, or they are in a state of trial with respect to it. 
 Now people often blame others, and even themselves, 
 for their misconduct in their temporal concerns. And 
 we find many are greatly wanting to themselves, and 
 miss of tiiat natural happiness, which they might have 
 obtained in the present life : perhaps every one does in 
 some degree. I3ut many run themselves into great in- 
 convenience, and into extreme distress and misery: not 
 through incapacity of knowing better, and doing better, 
 for themselves, which would be nothing to the present 
 i purpose ; but through their own fault. And these things 
 necessarily imply temptation, and danger of miscarry- 
 ing, in a greater or less degree with respect to oui 
 worldly interest or happiness. Every one too, without 
 having Rehgion in his thoughts, speaks of the hazards 
 which young people run, upon their setting out in the 
 
 * Ch. ii. 
 
Ch^p. IV.] OF A STATE OF TRIAL. ]07 
 
 world : hazards from other causes, than merely their ig- 
 norance, and unavoidable accidents. And some courses 
 of vice, at least, being contrary to men's worldly interest 
 or good; temptations to these must at the same time be 
 temptations to forego our present and our future inter- 
 est. Thus in our natural or temporal capacity, we are 
 in a state of trial, i. e. of difficulty and danger, analo- 
 gous, or like to our moral and religious trial. 
 
 This win more distinctly appear to any one, who 
 thinks it worth while, more distinctly, to consider, what 
 it is which constitutes our trial in both capacities, and to 
 observe, how mankind behave under it. 
 
 And that which constitutes this our trial, in both these 
 capacities, must be somewhat either in our external cir- 
 cumstances, or in our nature. For, on the one hand, 
 persons may be betrayed into wrong behaviour upon sur- 
 prise, or overcome upon any other very singular and ex- 
 traordinary external occasions; who would, otherwise, 
 have preserved their character of prudence and of virtue : 
 in which cases, every one, in speaking of the wrong be- 
 haviour of these persons, would impute it to such parti- 
 cular external circumstances. And on the other hand, 
 men who have contracted habits of vice and folly of any 
 kind, or have some particular passions in excess, will 
 seek opportunities, and, as it were, go out of their way, 
 to gratify themselves in these respects, at the expense of 
 their wisdom and their virtue ; led to it, as every one 
 would say, not by external temptations, but by such 
 habits and passions. And the account of this last case 
 is, that particular passions are no more coincident with 
 orudence, or that reasonable self-love, the end of which 
 is our worldly interest, than they are with the principle 
 of virtue and religion ; but often draw contrary ways to 
 one, as well as to the other: and so such particular pas- 
 sions are as much temptations, to act imprudently with 
 regard to our world'iy interest, as to act viciously.* 
 However, as wlten we say, men are misled by external 
 circumstances of temptation ; it cannot but be understood, 
 that there is somewhat within themselves, to render those 
 
 * See Sennons preached at the Rolls, 1726. 2d ed. p. 205, &c. Pret p, 25. &C 
 Seim, p. 2J , &c. 
 
108 OF A STATE OF TRIAL. [Paut I 
 
 circiimstanc:is temptations, or to render tliem susceptible 
 of impressions from them ; so when we say, they are 
 misled by passions; it is ahvays supposed, that there are 
 occasions, circumstances, and objects, exciting these pas- 
 sions, and affording means for gratifying them. And 
 therefore, temptations from within, and from w^ithout, 
 coincide, and mutually imply each other. Now the se- 
 veral external objects of the appetites, passions, and af- 
 fections, being present to the senses, or offering them- 
 selves to the mind, and so exciting emotions suitable to 
 their nature ; not only in cases where they can be grati- 
 fied consistently with innocence and prudence, but also 
 in cases where they cannot, and yet can be gratified im- 
 prudently and viciously : tliis as really puts them in dan- 
 \ ger of voluntarily foregoing their present interest or 
 good, as their future ; and as really renders self-denial 
 necessary to secure one, as the other : ^. e. we are in a 
 / like state of trial with respect to both, by the very same 
 ' passions, excited by the very same means. Thus man- 
 kind having a temporal interest depending upon them- 
 selves, and a prudent course of behaviour being neces- 
 sary to secure it ; passions inordinately excited, whether 
 by means of example, or by any other external circum- 
 stance, towards such objects, at such times, or in such 
 degrees, as that they cannot be gratified consistently with 
 w^orldly prudence ; are temptations, dangerous, and too 
 often successful temptations, to forego a greater tem- 
 poral good for a less ; i. e. to forego what is, upon the 
 whole, our temporal interest, for the sake of a present 
 gratification. This is a description of our state of trial 
 I in our temporal capacity. Substitute now the word 
 / future for temporal, and virtue for prudence ; and it will 
 ( be just as proper a description of our state of trial in our 
 religious capacity; so analogous are they to each other. 
 If, from consideration of this our like state of trial 
 in both capacities, w^e go on to observe farther, how man- 
 kind behave under it; w'e shall find there are some, who 
 have so little sense of it, that they scarce look beyond 
 the passing day: they are so taken up with present grati- 
 fications, as to have, in a manner, no feeling of conse- 
 quences, no regard to their future case or fortune in this 
 
chap.iv.j of a state of trial. 1C.9 
 
 life ; any more than to their happiness in another. Some 
 appear to be bhnded and deceived by inordinate passion, 
 in their worldly concerns, as much as in Religion. 
 Others are, not deceived, but, as it were, forcibly carried 
 away by the like passions, against their better judgment, 
 and feeble resolutions too of acting better. And there *^ 
 are men, and truly they are not a few, who shamelessly | 
 avow, not their interest, but their mere will and pleasure, / 
 to be their law of life : and who, in open defiance of 
 every thing that is reasonable, will go on in a course of 
 vicious extravagance, foreseeing, with no remorse and 
 little fear, that it will be their temporal ruin ; and some 
 of them, under the apprehension of the consequences of 
 wickedness in another state. And to speak in the most 
 moderate way, human creatures are not only continually 
 liable to go wrong voluntarily, but we see likewise that 
 they often actually do so, with respect to their temporal 
 interests, as well as with respect to Religion. 
 
 Thus our difficulties and dangers, or our trials, in our 
 temporal and our rehgious capacity, as they proceed 
 from the same causes, and have the same effect upon 
 men's behaviour, are evidently analogous, and of the same 
 kind. 
 
 It may be added, that as the difficulties and dangers 
 of miscarrying in our rehgious state of trial, are greatly 
 increased, and one is ready to think, in a manner wholly 
 made, by the ill behaviour of others ; by a wrong educa- 
 tion, wrong in a moral sense, sometimes positively vici- 
 ous ; by general bad example ; by the dishonest artifices 
 which are got into business of all kinds ; and, in very 
 many parts of the world, by religion's being corrupted 
 into superstitions, which indulge men in their vices : so 
 in like manner, the difficulties of conducting ourselves 
 prudently in respect to our present interest, and our dan- 
 ger of being led aside from pursuing it, are greatly in- 
 creased, by a foolish education; and, after we come to 
 mature age, by the extravagance and carelessness of 
 others, whom we have intercourse with : and by mistaken 
 notions, very generally prevalent, and taken up from com- 
 mon opinion, concerning temporal happiness, and where- 
 in it consists. And persons, by their own negligence 
 
J 10 OF A STATE OF TRIAL. [Parti. 
 
 and folly in their temporal affairs, no less than by a course 
 of vice, bring themselves into new difficulties ; and, by 
 habits of indulgence, become less qualified to go through 
 them : and one irregularitv after another, embarrasses 
 things to such a degree, that they know not whereabout 
 they are; and often makes the path of conduct so intri- 
 cate and perplexed, that it is difficult to trace it out; dif- 
 ficult even to determine what is the prudent or the moral 
 part. Thus, for instance, wrong behaviour in one stage 
 of life, youth; wrong, I mean, considering ourselves only 
 in our temporal capacity, without taking in religion; 
 this, in several ways, increases the difficulties of right 
 behaviour in mature age; i.e. puts us into a more dis- 
 advantageous state of trial in our temporal capacity. 
 
 We are an inferior part of the creation of God. There 
 are natural appearances of our being in a state of degra- 
 dation.* And we certainlv are in a condition, which 
 [ does not seem, by any means, the most advantageous we 
 could imagine or desire, either in our natural or moral 
 capacity, for securing either our present or future inter- 
 est. However, this condition, low and careful and un- 
 certain as it is, does not afford any just ground of com- 
 pl-aint. For, as men may manage their temporal affairs 
 with prudence, and so pass their days here on earth in 
 tolerable ease and satisfaction, by a moderate degree of 
 I care: so likewise with regard to religion, there is no 
 1 more required than what they are well able to do, and 
 What they must be greatly wanting to themselves, if they 
 neglect. And for persons to have that put upon them, 
 which they are well able 'to go through, and no more, 
 we naturally consider as an equitable thing ; supposing 
 it done by proper authority. Nor have we any more 
 reason to complain of it, with regard to the Author oi 
 Nature, than of his not having given us other advantages, 
 belonging to other orders of creatures. 
 
 But the thing here insisted upon is, that the state oi 
 trial, which Religion teaches us we are in, is rendered 
 credible, by its being throughout uniform and of a piece 
 with the general conduct of Providence towards us, in all 
 othcF respects within tlie compass of our knowledge. 
 
 Part II. Chap. v. 
 
Chap IV.] '^"^ A STATE OF TRIAL. Ill 
 
 Indeed if mankind, considered in their natural capacity, 
 as inhabitants of this world only, found themselves, from 
 their birth to their death, in a settled state of securitv 
 and happiness, without any solicitude or thought of their 
 own : or if they were in no danger of being brought in- 
 to inconveniences and distress, by carelessness, or the 
 folly of passion, through bad example, the treachery of 
 others, or the deceitful appearances of things : Avere this 
 our natural condition, then it might seem strange, and 
 be some presumption against the truth of Religion, that 
 it represents our future and more general interest, as not 
 secure of course, but as depending upon our behaviour, 
 and requiring recollection and self-government to obtain 
 it. For it might be alleged, " What you say is our con- \ 
 dition, in one respect, is not in any wise of a sort with 
 what we find, by experience, our condition is in another. 
 Our whole present interest is secured to our hands, with- 
 out any solicitude of ours ; and why should not our 
 future interest, if we have any such, be so too ?'' But 
 since, on the contrary, thought and consideration, the 
 voluntary denying ourselves many things which we de- I 
 sire, and a course of behaviour, far from being always j 
 agreeable to us ; are absolutely necessary to our acting 
 even a common decent, and common prudent part, so as 
 to pass with any satisfaction through the present world, 
 and be received upon any tolerable good terms in it: 
 since this is the case, all presumption against self-denial 
 and attention being necessary to secure our higher inter- 
 est, is remioved. Had we not experience, it might, per- 
 haps speciously, be urged, that it is improbable any thing 
 of hazard and danger should be put upon us by an infi- 
 nite Being ; when every thing which is hazard and dan- 
 ger in our manner of conception, and will end in error, 
 confusion, and misery, is now already certain in his fore- 
 knowledge. And indeed, why any thing of hazard and 
 danger should be put upon such frail creatures as we are, 
 may well be thought a difficulty in speculation ; and can- 
 not but be so, till we know the whole, or, however, much 
 more of the case. But still the constitution of nature is 
 as it is. Our happiness and misery are trusted to our 
 conduct, and made to depend upon it. Somewhat, and. 
 
112 OF A STATE ^F [Part I. 
 
 in many circumstances, a great deal too, is put upon us, 
 either to do, or to suffer, as we choose. And all the vari- 
 ous miseries of life, which people bring upon themselves 
 by negligence and folly, and might have avoided by pro- 
 per care, are instances of this : which miseries are be- 
 forehand, just as contingent and undetermined as their 
 conduct, and left to be determined by it 
 I These observations are an answer to the objections 
 lagainst the credibility of a state of trial, as implying 
 [temptations, and real danger of miscarrying with regard 
 to our general interest, under the moral government of 
 God : and they show, that, if we are at all to be consid- 
 ered in such a capacity, and as having such an interest ; 
 the general analogy of Providence must lead us to ap- 
 prehend ourselves in danger of miscarrying, in different 
 degrees, as to this interest, by our neglecting to act the 
 proper part belonging to us in that capacity. For we 
 have a present interest under the government of God, 
 which we experience here upon earth. And this inter- 
 est, as it is not forced upon us, so neither is it offered to 
 our acceptance, but to our acquisition ; in such sort, as 
 that we are in danger of missing it, by means of tempta- 
 tions to neglect, or act contrary to it ; and without atten- 
 tion and self-denial, must and do miss of it. It is then 
 perfectly credible, that this may be our case, with respect 
 to that chief and final good, which Religion proposes 
 to us. 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 OF A STATE OF PROBATION, AS INTENDED FOR MORAL 
 DISCIPLINE AND IMPROVEMENT. « 
 
 From the consideration of our being in a probation-state, 
 of so much difficulty and hazard, naturally arises the 
 question, how we came to be placed in it.f^ But such a 
 general inquiry as this would be found involved in in- 
 superable difficulties. For, though some of these diffi- 
 culties would be lessened by observing, that all wicked- 
 ness is voluntary, as is implied in its very notion ; and 
 that many of the miseries of life have apparent good, 
 
Chap. V.7 MORAL DISCIPLINE. 113 
 
 effects: yet, when we consider other circumstances be- 
 longing to both, and what must be the consequence of 
 the former in a hfe to come ; it cannot but be acknow- 
 ledged plain folly and presumption, to pretend to give an 
 account of the whole reasons of this matter : the whole 
 reasons of our being allotted a condition, out of which so 
 much wickedness and misery, so circumstanced, would 
 in fact arise. Whether it be not beyond our faculties, 
 not only to find out, but even to understand, the whole 
 account of this ; or, though we should be supposed capa- 
 ble of understanding it, yet, whether it would be of ser- 
 vice or prejudice to us to be informed of it, is impossible 
 to say. But as our present condition can in no wise be 
 shown inconsistent with the perfect moral government, 
 of God : so Religion teaches us we were placed in it, ' 
 that we might qualify ourselves, by the practice of virtue, 
 for another state which is to follow it. And this, though 
 but a partial answer, a very partial one indeed, to the in- 
 quiry now mentioned ; yet, is a more satisfactory answer 
 to another, which is of real, and of the utmost importance 
 to us to have answered : the inquiry. What is our busi- 
 ness here ? The known end then, why we are placed 
 in a state of so much affliction, hazard, and difficulty, is, 
 our improvement in virtue and piety, as the requisite 
 qualification for a future state of security and happi- 
 ness. 
 
 Now the beginning of life, considered as an education 
 for mature age in the present world, appears plainly, at 
 first sight, analogous to this our trial for a future one : 
 the former being in our temporal capacity, what the lat- 
 ter is in our religious capacity. But some observations 
 common to both of them, and a more distinct considera- 
 tion of each, will more distinctly show the extent and 
 force of the analogy between them ; and the credibility, 
 which arises from hence, as well as from the nature of 
 the thing, that the present life was intended to be a state 
 of discipline for a future one. 
 
 I. Every species of creatures is, we see, designed for 
 a particular way of life ; to which, the nature, the capa- 
 cities, temper, and qualifications of each species, are as 
 necessary, as their external circumstances. Both come 
 
 H 
 
114 OF A STATE OP [Part I. 
 
 Into the notion of such state, or particular way of life, 
 and are constituent parts of it. Change a man's capaci- 
 ties or character to the degree in which it is conceivable 
 they may be changed ; and he would be altogether inca- 
 pable of a human course of life, and human happiness ; 
 as incapable, as if, his nature continuing unchanged, he 
 were placed in a world, where he had no sphere of ac- 
 tion, nor any objects to answer his appetites, passions, 
 and affections of any sort. One thing is set over against 
 another, as an ancient writer expresses it. Our nature 
 corresponds to our external condition. Without this 
 correspondence, there would be no possibility of any 
 such thing as human life and human happiness : which 
 life and happiness are, therefore, a result from our nature 
 and condition jointly : meaning by human life, not living 
 in the literal sense, but the v/hole complex notion com- 
 monly understood by those words. Sc that, without de- 
 termining what will be the employment and happiness, 
 the particular life, of good men hereafter; there must be 
 [ some determinate capacities, some necessary character 
 I and qualifications, without which persons cannot but be 
 utterly incapable of it : in like manner, as there must be 
 some, without which men would be incapable of their 
 present state of life. Now, 
 
 , II. The constitution of human creatures, and indeed 
 / of all creatures which come under our notice, is such, 
 as that they are capable of naturally becoming qualified 
 for states of life, for which they were once wholly un- 
 \ qualified. In imagination we may indeed conceive of 
 creatures, as incapable of having any of their faculties 
 naturally enlarged, or as being unable naturally to acquire 
 any new qualifications : but the faculties of every species 
 known to us are made for enlargement ; for acquirements 
 \ of experience and habits. We find ourselves in parti- 
 cular endued with capacities, not only of perceiving ideas, 
 and of knowledge or perceiving truth, but also of storing 
 up our ideas and knowledge by memory. We are capa- 
 ble, not only of acting, and of having different momen- 
 ( tary impressions made upon us ; but of getting a new 
 1 facility in any kind of action, and of settled alterations in 
 ) our temper or character. The power of the two last is 
 
Chap, v.] MORAL DISCIPLINE. 115 
 
 the power of habits. But neither the perception of 
 ideas, nor knowledge of any sort, are habits; though 
 absolutely necessary to the forming of them. However, 
 apprehension, reason, memory, which are the capacities \ 
 of acquiring knowledge, are greatly improved by exer- ' 
 cise. Whether the word habit is applicable to all these 
 improvements, and in particular how far the powers of 
 memory and of habits may be powers of the same nature, 
 I shall not inquire. But that perceptions come into our 
 minds readily and of course, by means of their having 
 been there before, seems a thing of the same sort, as 
 readiness in any particular kind of action, proceeding 
 from being accustomed to it. And aptness to recollect 
 practical observations of service in our conduct, is plainly 
 habit in many cases. There are habits of perception, 
 and habits of action. An instance of the former, is our 
 constant and even involuntary readiness, in correcting 
 the impressions of our sight concerning magnitudes and 
 distances, so as to substitute judgment in the room of 
 .sensation imperceptibly to ourselves. And it seems as 
 if all other associations of ideas not naturally connected 
 might be called passive habits ; as properly as our readi- ^ 
 ness in understanding languages upon sight, or hearing i 
 of words. And our readiness in speaking and writing 
 them is an instance of the latter, of active habits. For ' 
 distinctness, we may consider habits, as belonging to the 
 body, or the mind : and the latter will be explained by 
 the former. Under the former are comprehended all 
 bodily activities or motions, whether graceful or unbe- 
 coming, which are owing to use : under the latter, gene- 
 ral habits of life and conduct ; such as those of obedience 
 and submission to authority, or to any particular person ; 
 those of veracity, justice, and charity ; those of attention, 
 industry, self-government, envy, revenge. And habits 
 of this latter kind seem produced by repeated acts, as 
 well as the former. And in like manner as habits be- 
 longing to the body are produced by external acts: so 
 habits of the mind are produced by the exertion of in- 
 ward practical principles ; i. e. by carrying them into act, 
 or acting upon them ; the principles of obedience, of 
 veracity, justice, and charity. Nor can those habits be 
 
 H2 
 
115 OF A STATE OF (Taht L 
 
 formed by any external course of action, otherwise than 
 as it proceeds from these principles : because it is only 
 these inward principles exerted, which are strictly acts 
 of obedience, of veracity, of justice, and of charity. So 
 hkewise habits of attention, industry, self-government, 
 are in the same manner acquired by exercise ; and habits 
 of envy and revenge by indulgence, whether in outward 
 iiot, or in thought and intention; i. e. inward act: for 
 'such intention is an act. Resolutions also to do well are 
 properly acts. And endeavouring to enforce upon our 
 own minds a practical sense of virtue, or to beget in 
 others that practical sense of it, which a man really has 
 himself, is a virtuous act. All these, therefore, may 
 and will contribute towards forming good habits. But 
 going over the theory of virtue in one's thoughts, talking 
 well, and drawing fine pictures, of it ; this is so far from 
 necessarily or certainly conducing to form a habit of it^ 
 in him who thus employs himself, that it may harden the 
 mind in a contrary course, and render it gradually more 
 insensible ; i. e. form a habit of insensibility to all moral 
 considerations. For, from our very faculty of habits, 
 passive impressions, by being repeated, grow weaker. 
 Thoughts, by often passing through the mind, are felt less 
 sensibly : being accustomed to danger, begets intrepidity,. 
 i. e. lessens fear ; to distress, lessens the passion of pity ; 
 to instances of others' mortality, lessens the sensible ap- 
 prehension of our own. And from these two observa- 
 tions together ; that practical habits are formed and 
 strengthened by repeated acts, and that passive impres- 
 sions grow weaker by being repeated upon us ; it must 
 foUov*^, that active habits may be gradually forming and 
 strengthening, by a course of acting upon such and such 
 motives and excitements, whilst these motives and ex- 
 citements themselves are, by proportionable degrees, 
 I growing less sensible ; i. e. are continually less and less 
 / sensibly felt, even as the active habits strengthen. And 
 experience confirms this: for active principles, at the 
 very time that they are less lively in perception than they 
 were, are found to be, somehow, v-^rought more thorough-, 
 ly into the temper and character, and become more effec- 
 tual in influencing our practice. The three things just 
 
Chap, v.] MORAL DISCIPLINE. 117 
 
 mentioned may afford instances of it. Perception of 
 danger is a natural excitement of passive fear, and active 
 caution: and by being inured to danger, habits of the lat- 
 ter are gradually wrought, at the same time that the for- 
 mer gradually lessens. Perception of distress in others 
 is a natural excitement, passively to pit}^, and actively to 
 relieve it : but let a man set himself to attend to, in- 
 quire out, and relieve distressed persons, and he cannot 
 but grow less and less sensibly affected with the various 
 miseries of life, with which he must become acquainted ; 
 when yet, at the same time, benevolence, considered not 
 as a passion, but as a practical principle of action, will 
 strengthen : and whilst he passively compassionates the 
 distressed less, he will acquire a greater aptitude active- 
 ly to assist and befriend them. So also at the same time 
 that the daily instances of men's dying around us give 
 us daily a less sensible passive feeling or apprehension 
 of our own mortality, such instances greatly contribute 
 to the strengthening a practical regard to it in serious 
 men ; i. e. to forming a habit of acting with a constant 
 view to it. And this seems again further to show, that ! 
 passive impressions made upon our minds by admonition, J 
 experience, example, though they may have a remote 
 efficacy, and a very great one, towards forming active 
 habits, yet can have this efficacy no otherwise than by 
 inducing us to such a course of action: and that it is not 
 being affected so and so, but acting, which forms those 
 habits: only it must be always remembered, that real 
 endeavours to enforce good impressions upon ourselves 
 are a species of virtuous action. Nor do we know how 
 far it is possible, in the nature of things, that effects 
 should be wrought in us at once, equivalent to habits ; 
 i. e. what is wrought by use and exercise. However, the 
 thing insisted upon is, not what may be possible, but 
 what is in fact the appointment of nature : which is, 
 that active habits are to be formed by exercise. Their 
 progress may be so gradual, as to be imperceptible in its 
 steps : it may be hard to explain the faculty, by which 
 we are capable of habits, throughout its several parts ; 
 and to trace it up to its original, so as to distinguish it 
 from all others in our mind: and it seems as if contrary 
 
118 OF A STATE OF [Part I. 
 
 effects were to be ascribed to it. But the thing in gene- 
 ral, that our nature is formed to yield, in some s ich man- 
 ner as this, to use and exercise, is matter of certain ex- 
 perience. 
 
 Thus, by accustoming ourselves to any course of ac- 
 tion, we get an aptness to go on, a facility, readiness, and 
 / often pleasure, in it. The inclinations which rendered 
 us averse to it grow weaker : the difficulties in it, not 
 only the imaginary but the real ones, lessen : the reasons 
 for it offer themselves of course to our thoughts upon all 
 occasions : and the least glimpse of them is sufficient to 
 make us go on, in a course of actian, to which we have 
 been accustomed. And practical principles appear to 
 grow stronger, absolutely in themselves, by exercise; 
 as well as relatively, with regard to contrary principles ; 
 which, by being accustomed to submit, do so habitually, 
 ; and of course. And thus a new character, in several 
 j respects, may be formed ; and many habitudes of life, 
 j not given by nature, but which nature directs us to acquire. 
 I III. Indeed we may be assured, that we should never 
 /have had these capacities of improving by experience^ 
 / acquired knowledge, and habits, had they not been he- 
 I cessary, and intended to be made use of And accord- 
 ingly we find them so necessary, and so much intended, 
 that without them we should be utterly incapable of that 
 which was the end for which we were made, considered 
 in our temporal capacity only : the employments and 
 satisfactions of our mature state of life. 
 1 Nature does in nowise qualify us wholly, much less 
 ) at once, for this mature state of life. Even maturity of 
 understanding, and bodily strength, are not only arrived 
 to gradually, but are also very much owing to the con- 
 tinued exercise of our powei*s of body and mind from 
 infancy. But if we suppose a person brought into the 
 world with both these in maturity, as far as this is con- 
 ceivable ; he would plainly at first be as unqualified for 
 the human life of mature age, as an idiot. He would be 
 in a manner distracted, with astonishment, and appre- 
 hension, and ciiriosity, and suspense: nor can one guess, 
 how long it would be, before he would be familiarized to 
 him.self and the ob'ects about him enough, even- to set 
 
Chap. V. MORAL DISCIPLINE. 119 
 
 himself to any thing. It may be questioned too, whether 
 the natural information of his sight and hearing would 
 be of any manner of use at all to him in acting, before 
 experience. And it seems, that men would be strangely 
 headstrong and self-willed, and disposed to exert them- 
 selves with an impetuosity, which would render society 
 insupportable, and the living in it impracticable ; were it 
 not for some acquired moderation and self-government, 
 some aptitude and readiness in restraining themselves, 
 and concealing their sense of things. Want of every 
 thing of this kind which is learnt would render a man as 
 uncapable of society, as want of language would ; or as 
 his natural ignorance of any of the particular employ- 
 ments of life would render him uncapable of providing 
 himself with the common conveniences, or supplying the 
 necessary wants of it. In these respects, and probably 
 in many more of which we have no particular notion, \ 
 mankind is left, by nature, an unformed, unfinished crea- 1 
 ture ; utterly deficient and unqualified, before the ac- 
 quirement of knowledge, experience, and habits, for that ■ 
 mature state of life, which was the end of his creation, ' 
 considering him as related only to this world. 
 
 But then, as nature has endued us with a power of , 
 supplying those de ficiencies, by acquired knowledge, ex- 
 perience, and habits : so likewise we are placed in a con- 
 dition, in infancy, childhood, and youth, fitted for it; fit- i 
 ted for our acquiring those qualifications of all sorts, which 
 we stand in need of in mature age. Hence children, from 
 their very birth, are daily growing acquainted with the 
 objects about them, with the scene in which they are 
 placed, and to have a future part ; and learning some- 
 what or other, necessary to the performance of it. The 
 subordinations, to which they are accustomed in domes- 
 tic life, teach them self-government in common beha- 
 viour abroad, and prepare them for subjection and obe- 
 dience to civil authority. What passes before their eyes, 
 and daily happens to them, ^"ivj.s them experience, cau- 
 tion against treachery and dfceir, together with number- 
 less little rules of action an^l c )nduct, which we could 
 not live without; and whicli are learnt so insensiblv and 
 &o perfectly, as to be mistaken perhaps for instinct : 
 
120 OF A STATE OP ' ' [Part I 
 
 though they are the effect of long experience and exer- 
 cise ; as much so as language, or knowledge in particu- 
 lar business, or the quahfications and behaviour belong- 
 ing to the several ranks and professions. Thus the be- 
 ginning of our days is adapted to be, and is, a state of 
 education in the theory and practice of mature life. We 
 are much assisted in it by example, instruction, and the 
 care of others ; but a great deal is left to ourselves to 
 do. And of this, as part is done easily and of course ; 
 so part requires diligence and car^, the voluntary fore- 
 , going many things which we desire, and setting ourselves 
 1 to what we should have no inclination to, but for the 
 necessity or expedience of it. For that labour and in- 
 dustry, which the station of so many absolutely requires, 
 they would be greatly unqualified for, in maturity, as 
 those in other stations would be for any other sorts of 
 application ; if both were not accustomed to them in their 
 youth. And, according as persons behave themselves, 
 in the general education which all go through, and in the 
 particular ones adapted to particular employments ; their 
 character is formed, and made appear; they recommend 
 themselves more or less ; and are capable of, and placed 
 in, different stations in the society of mankind, 
 j The former part of life, then, is to be considered as 
 ' an important opportunity, which nature puts into our 
 hands; and which, when lost is not to be recovered. 
 : And our being placed in a state of discipline throughout 
 I this life, for another world, is a providential disposition 
 of things, exactly of the same kind, as our being placed 
 in a state of discipline during childhood, for mature age. 
 Our condition in both respects is uniform and of a-piece, 
 and comprehended under one' and the same general law 
 of nature. 
 
 And if we were not able at all to discern, how or in 
 what way the present life could be our preparation for 
 another; this would be no objection against the credibi- 
 lity of its being so. For we do not discern, how food ana 
 sleep contribute to the growth of the body; nor could 
 have any thought that they would, before we had expe- 
 rience. Nor do children at all think, on the one hand, 
 that the sports and exercises, to which they are so much 
 
Chap, v.] MORAL DISCIPLINE. 121 
 
 addicted, contribute to their health and growth ; nor, on 
 the other, of the necessity which there is for their being 
 restrained in them : nor are they capable of understand- 
 ing the use of many parts of discipline, which neverthe- 
 less they must be made to go through, in order to qua- 
 lify them for the business of mature age. Were we not 
 able then to discover, in what respects the present life 
 could form us for a future one; yet nothing would be , 
 more supposable than that it might, in some respects or | 
 other, from the general analogy of Providence. And/ 
 this, for ought I see, might reasonably be said even 
 though we should not take in the consideration of God's 
 moral government over the world. But, 
 
 IV. Take in this consideration, and consequently, that 
 the character of virtue and piety is a necessary qualifica- 
 tion for the future state ; and then we may distinctly see, 
 how, and in what respects, the present life may be a pre- 
 paration for it: since we waiit, and are capable of, im- 
 provement in that character, hy moral and religious habits; 
 and the present life is ft to be a state of discipline for 
 such improvement: in like manner as we have already 
 observed, how, and in what respects, infancy, child- 
 'hood, and youth, are a necessary preparation, and a na- 
 tural state of discipline, for mature age. 
 
 Nothing which we at present see would lead us to the 
 thought of a solitary unactive state hereafter: but, if we 
 judge at all from the analogy of nature, we must suppose, ^ 
 according to the Scripture account of it, that it will be a 
 community. And there is no shadow of any thing un- 
 reasonable in conceiving, though there be no analogy for 
 it, that this community will be, as the Scripture repre- 
 sents it, under the more immediate, or, if such an expres- 
 sion may be used, the more sensible government of God. 
 Nor is our ignorance, what will be the employments of 
 this happy community, nor our consequent ignorance, 
 what particular scope or occasion there will be for the 
 exercise of veracity, justice, and charity, amongst the 
 members of it with regard to each other ; any proof, that 
 there will be no sphere of exercise for those virtues. 
 Much less, if that were possible, is our ignorance any 
 proot^ that there will be no occasion for that frame of 
 
122 OF A STATE OF £P^rt ^ 
 
 mind, or character, which is formed by the daily prac- 
 tice of those particular virtues here, and which is a re- 
 sult from it. This at least must be owned in general, 
 that, as the government established in the universe is mo- 
 ral, the character of virtue and piety must, in some way 
 or other, be the condition of our happiness or the quali- 
 fication for it. 
 
 Now from what is above observed, concerning our na- 
 tural power of habits, it is easy to see, that we are ca- 
 pable of moral improvement by discipline. And how 
 greatly we want it, need not be proved to any one who 
 is acquainted with the great wickedness of mankind; or 
 even with those imperfections, whi(;h the best are con- 
 scious of. But it is not perhaps distinctly attended to by 
 every one, that the occasion which human creatures have 
 for discipline, to improve in them this character of virtue 
 and piety, is to be traced up higher than to excess in the 
 passions, by indulgence and habits of vice. Mankind, 
 and perhaps all finite creatures, from the very constitu- 
 tion of their nature, before habits of virtue, are deficient, 
 and in danger of deviating from what is right; and there- 
 fore stand in need of virtuous habits, for a security against 
 this danger. For, together with the general principle of 
 moral understanding, we have in our inward frame vari- 
 ous affections towards particular external objects. These 
 affections are naturally, and of right, subject to the go- 
 vernment of the moral principle, as to the occasions upon 
 which they may be gratified ; as to the times, degrees, 
 and manner, in which the objects of them may be pur- 
 sued : but then the principle of virtue can neither excite 
 them, nor prevent their being excited. On the contrary, 
 they are naturally felt, when the objects of them are pre- 
 sent to the mind, not only before all consideration whe- 
 ther they can be obtained by lawful means, but after it 
 is found they cannot. For the natural objects of afi"ec- 
 tion continue so ; the necessaries, conveniences, and 
 pleasures of life, remain naturally desirable ; though they 
 cannot be obtained innocently : nay, though they cannot 
 possibly be obtained at all. And when the objects of 
 any affection wnaiever cannot be obtained without un- 
 lawful means ; but m?.Y be obtained bv them : such aifec- 
 
chap.v. moral discipline. 123 
 
 tion, though its being excited, and its continuing some 
 time in the mind, be as innocent as it is natural and ne- 
 cessary ; yet cannot but be conceived to have a ten- 
 dency to incUne persons to venture upon such unlawful 
 means : and therefore must be conceived as putting 
 them in some danger of it. Now what is the general 
 security against this danger, against their actually deviat- 
 ing from right? As the danger is, so also must the se- 
 curity be, from within : from the practical principle of 
 virtue.* And the strengthening or improving this prin- 
 ciple, considered as practical, or as a principle of action, 
 will lessen the danger, or increase the security against it. 
 And this moral principle is capable of improvement, by 
 proper discipline and exercise : by recollecting the prac- 
 tical impressions which example and experience have 
 made upon us: and, instead of following humour and 
 mere inclination, by continually attending to the equity 
 and right of the case, in whatever we are engaged, be it 
 in greater or less matters ; and accustoming ourselves al- 
 ways to act upon it ; as being itself the just and natural 
 motive of action ; and as this moral course of behaviour 
 must necessarily, under the divine government, be our 
 final interest. Thus the principle of virtue, improved into 
 a habit, of which improvement we are thus cajiahle, will 
 plainly he, in proportion to the strength of it, a security 
 against the danger ichich finite creatures are in, from the 
 very nature of propension, or particular affections. This 
 way of putting the matter, supposes particular affections 
 to remain in a future state ; which it is scarce possible 
 to avoid supposing. And if they do ; we clearly see, that 
 
 * It may be thought, that a sense of interest would as effectually restrain crea- 
 tures from doing- wrong. But if i)y a sense of interest is meant a speculative coiivic- 
 tion or belief, tJiat such and sucii indulgence would occasion them greater uneasi- 
 ness, upon tlie whole, than satisfactirHi ; it is contrary to present experience to say, 
 that this sense of interest is suiBcient to restrain them from tlius indulging' them- 
 selves. And if by a sense of interest is meant a practical regard to what is upon the 
 whole our happiness ; this is not only coincident with the principle of virtue or mo- 
 ral rectitude, but is a part of the idea itself. And it is eviilent this reasonable self- 
 love wants to lie improved, as really as any principle in our nature. For we daily 
 see it overmatched, not only by the more boisterous passions, but by curiosity, shame, 
 love of imitation, by any thing, even indolence: especially if the interest, the tem- 
 poral interest, suppose, which is the end of such self love, be at a distance. So 
 greatly are profligate men mistaken, when they affirm they are wholly governed by 
 interestedness and self-love ; and so little cause is there for moralists to disclaim 
 this principle. — See p. 108. 
 
124 OF A STATE OF [Part I. 
 
 acquired habits of virtue and self-government may be 
 necessary for the regulation of them. However, though 
 we were not distinctly to take in this supposition, but to 
 speak only in general ; the thing really comes to the 
 same. For habits of virtue, thus acquired by disciphne, 
 are improvement in virtue : and improvement in virtue 
 must be advancement in happiness, if the government of 
 the universe be moral 
 y From these things we may observe, and it will further 
 show this our natural and original need of being improv- 
 ed by discipline, how^ it comes to pass, that creatures 
 made upright fall ; and that those who preserve their 
 uprightness, by so doing, raise themselves to a more 
 secure state of virtue. To say that the former is account- 
 ed for by the nature of liberty, is to say no more, than 
 that an event's actually happening is accounted for by a 
 mere possibility of its happening. But it seems distinct- 
 ly conceivable from the very nature of particular affec- 
 tions or propensions. For, suppose creatures intended 
 for such a particular state of life, for which such propen- 
 sions were necessary: suppose them endued with such 
 propensions, togetlier with moral understanding, as well 
 including a practical sense of virtue as a speculative per- 
 ception of it ; and that all these several principles, both 
 natural and moral, forming an inward constitution ot 
 mind, w^ere in the most exact proportion possible ; i. e. 
 in a proportion the most exactly adapted to their intend- 
 ed state of life ; such creatures would be made upright, 
 or finitely perfect. Now particular propensions, from 
 their very nature, must be felt, the objects of them being 
 present ; though they cannot be gratified at all, or not 
 with the allowance of the moral principle. But if they 
 can be gratified without its allowance, or by contradict- 
 ing it ; then they must be conceived to have some tend- 
 ency, in how low a degree soever, yet some tendency, to 
 induce persons to such forbidden gratification. Tliis 
 tendency, in some one particular propension, may be in- 
 creased, by the greater frequency of occasions naturally 
 exciting it, than of occasions exciting others. The least 
 voluntary indulgence in forbidden circumstances, though 
 but ill thought, will increase this wrong tendency ;- and may 
 
Chaf. v.] MORAL DISCIPLINE. 125 
 
 increase it further, till, peculiar conjunctures perhaps 
 ccnspiring, it becomes effect ; and danger of deviating 
 from right, ends in actual deviation from it ; a danger 
 necessarily arising from the very nature of propension ; 
 and which therefore could not have been prevented, 
 though it might have been escaped, or got innocently 
 through. The case would be, as if we were to suppose 
 a straight path marked out for a person, in which such a 
 degree of attention would keep him steady : but if he 
 would not attend in this degree, any one of a thousand 
 objects, catching his eye, might lead him out of it. Now 
 it is impossible to say, how much even the first full overt 
 act of irregularity might disorder the inward constitution ; 
 unsettle the adjustments, and alter the proportions, which 
 formed it, and in which the uprightness of its make con- 
 sisted: but repetition of irregularities would produce 
 habits. And thus the constitution would be spoiled ; and 
 creatures made upright, become corrupt and depraved in 
 their settled character, proportionably to their repeated 
 irregularities in occasional acts. But, on the contrary, 
 these creatures might have improved and raised them- 
 selves, to a higher and more secure state of virtue, by the 
 contrary beliaviour: by steadily following the moral 
 principle, supposed to be one part of their nature : and 
 thus withstanding that unavoidable danger of defection, 
 which necessarily arose from propension, the other part 
 of it. For, by thus preserving their integrity for some 
 time, their danger would lessen ; since propensions, by 
 being inured to submit, would do it more easily and of 
 course : and their security against this lessening danger 
 would increase ; since the moral principle would gain 
 additional strength by exercise : both which things are 
 implied in the notion of virtuous habits. Thus then vi- 
 cious indulgence is not only criminal in itself, but also 
 depraves the inward constitution and character. And vir- 
 tuous self-government is not only right in itself, but also 
 improves the inward constitution or character : and may 
 improve it to such a degree, that though we should sup- 
 pose it impossible for particular affections to be absolute- 
 ly coincident with the moral principle ; and consequent- 
 ly should allow, that such creatures as have been above 
 
126 OF A STATE OF [Part 1. 
 
 supposed, would for ever remain defectible; yet their 
 danger of actually deviating from right may be almost 
 infinitely lessened, and they fully fortified against what 
 remains of it ; if that may be called danger, against which 
 there is an adequate, effectual security. But still, this 
 their higher perfection may continue to consist in habits 
 of virtue formed in a state of discipline, and this their 
 more complete security remain to proceed from them. 
 And thus it is plainly conceivable, that creatures without 
 blemish, as they came out of the hands of God, may be 
 in danger of going wrong ; and so may stand in need of 
 the security of virtuous habits, additional to the moral 
 principle wrought into their natures by him. That which 
 is the ground of their danger, or their want of security, 
 may be considered as a deficiency in them, to which vir- 
 tuous habits are the natural supply. And as they are 
 naturally capable of being raised and improved by dis- 
 cipline, it may be a thmg fit and requisite, that they 
 should be placed in circumstances with an eye to it : in 
 circumstances peculiarly fitted to be to them a state of 
 discipline for their improvement in virtue. 
 
 But how much more strongly must this hold with re- 
 spect to those who have corrupted their natures, are 
 fallen from their original rectitude, and whose passions 
 are become excessive by repeated violations of their in- 
 ward constitution? Upright creatures may want to be 
 improved: depraved creatures want to be renewed. 
 Education and discipline, which may be in all degrees 
 and sorts of gentleness and of severity, are expedient for 
 those: but must be absolutely necessary for these. For 
 these, discipline of the severer sort too, and in the high- 
 er degrees of it, must be necessary, in order to wear out 
 vicious habits; to recover their primitive strength of self- 
 government, which indulgence must have weakened ; to 
 repair, as well as raise into a habit, the moral principle, 
 in order to their arriving at a secure state of virtuous 
 happiness. 
 
 Now, whoever will consider the thing may clearly see, 
 that the present world is peculiarly jit to be a state of 
 discipline for this purpose, to such as will set themselves 
 to mend and improve. For, the various temptations with 
 
Chap V.] MORAL DISCIPLINE. l2T 
 
 which we are surrounded ; our experience of the deceits 
 of wickedness ; having been in many instances led wrong 
 ourselves ; the great viciousness of the world ; the infinite 
 disorders consequent upon it ; our being made acquaint- 
 ed with pain and sorrow, either from our own feeling of 
 it, or from the sight of it in others ; these things, though 
 some of them may indeed produce wrong effects upon 
 our minds, yet when duly reflected upon, have, all of 
 them, a direct tendency to bring us to a settled modera- 
 tion and reasonableness of temper : the contrary both 
 to thoughtless levity, and also to that unrestrained 
 self-will, and violent bent to follow present inclina- 
 tion, which may be observed in undisciplined minds. 
 Such experience, as the present state affords, of the 
 frailty of our nature ; of the boundless extravagance of 
 ungoverned passion ; of the power which an infinite 
 Being has over us, by the various capacities of misery 
 which he has given us ; in short, that kind and degree 
 of experience, which the present state affords us, that 
 the constitution of nature is such as to admit the possi- 
 bility, the danger, and the actual event, of creatures los- 
 ing their innocence and happiness, and becoming vicious 
 and wretched ; hath a tendency to give us a practical 
 sense of things very different from a mere speculative 
 knowledge, that we are liable to vice, and capable of 
 misery. And who knows, whether the security of crea- 
 tures in the highest and most settled state of perfection, 
 may not in part arise, from their having had such a sense 
 of things as this, formed, and habitually fixed within them, 
 in some state of probation. And passing through the 
 present world with that moral attention, which is neces- 
 sary to the acting a right part in it, may leave everlast- 
 ing impressions of this sort upon our minds. But to be 
 a little more distinct: allurements to what is wrong ; 
 difficulties in the discharge of our duty ; our not being 
 able to act a uniform right part without some thought and 
 care ; and the opportunities which we have, or imagine 
 we have, of avoiding what we dislike, or obtaining what 
 we desire, by unlawful means, when we either cannot 
 do it at all, or at least not so easily, by lawful ones ; 
 these things, i. e. the snares and temptations of vice, are 
 
/ 
 
 128 OF A STATE OF [Part 1. 
 
 what render the present world pecuharly fit to be a state 
 of disciphne, to those who will preserve their integrity : 
 because they render being upon our guard, resolution, 
 and the denial of our passions, necessary in order to that 
 end. And the exercise of such particular recollection, 
 intention of mind, and self-government, in the practice 
 of virtue, has, from the make of our nature, a peculiar 
 tendency to form habits of virtue ; as implying, not only 
 a real, but also a more continued, and a more intense 
 exercise of the virtuous principle ; or a more constant 
 and a stronger effort of virtue exerted into act. Thus 
 suppose a person to know himself to be in particular 
 danger, for some time, of doing any thing wrong, which 
 yet he fully resolves not to do : continued recollection, 
 and keeping upon his guard, in order to make good his 
 resolution, is a continued exerting of that act of virtue in 
 a high degree, which need have been, and perhaps would 
 have been, only instantaneous and weak, had the tempta- 
 tion been so. It is indeed ridiculous to assert, that self- 
 denial is essential to virtue and piety : but it would have 
 been nearer the truth, though not strictly the truth itself, 
 to have said, that it is essential to discipline and improve- 
 ment. For though actions materially virtuous, which 
 have no sort of difficulty, but are perfectly agreeable to 
 our particular inclinations, may possibly be done only 
 from these particular inclinations, and so may not be any 
 exercise of the principle of virtue, i. e. not be virtuous 
 actions at all ; yet, on the contrary, they may be an ex- 
 ercise of that principle : and when they are, they have a 
 tendency to form and fix the habit of virtue. But when 
 the exercise of the virtuous principle is more continued, 
 oftener repeated, and more intense ; as it must be in cir- 
 cumstances of danger, temptation, and difficulty, of any 
 kind and in any degree ; this tendency is increased pro- 
 portionably, and a more confirmed habit is the conse- 
 quence. 
 
 This undoubtedly holds to a certain length : but how 
 far it may hold, I know not. Neither our intellectual 
 powers, nor our bodily strength can be improved beyond 
 such a degree : and both may be over-wrought. Possi- 
 bly there may be somewhat analogous to this, with re- 
 
Chap. V.] MORAL DISCIPLINE. 129 
 
 spect to the moral character ; which is scarce worth con- 
 sidering. And I mention it only, lest it should come 
 into some persons' thoughts, not as an exception to the 
 foregoing observations, which perhaps it is ; but as a 
 confutation of them, which it is not. And there may be 
 several other exceptions. Observations of this kind can- 
 not be supposed to hold minutely, and in every case. It 
 is enough that they hold in general. And these plainly 
 hold so far, as that from them may be seen distinctly, 
 which is all that is intended by them, that the present 
 world is peculiarly jit to be a state of discipline, for our 
 improvement in virtue and piety : in the same sense as 
 some sciences, by requiring and engaging the attention, 
 not to be sure of such persons as will not, but of such as 
 will, set themselves to them ; are fit to form the mind to 
 habits of attention. 
 
 Indeed the present state is so far from proving, in 
 event, a discipline of virtue to the generality of men, that, 
 on the contrary, they seem to make it a discipline of vice. 
 And the viciousness of the world is, in different ways, 
 the great temptation which renders it a state of virtuous 
 discipline, in the degree it is, to good men. The whole 
 end, and the whole occasion, of mankind's being placed 
 in such a state as the present, is not pretended to be ac- 
 counted for. That which appears amidst the general cor- 
 ruption, is, that there are some persons, who, having 
 within them the principle of amendment and recovery, at- 
 tend to and fol]ov\^ the notices of virtue and religion, be 
 they more clear or more obscure Avhich are afforded them ; 
 and that the present world is, not only an exercise of vir- 
 tue in these persons, but an exercise of it in ways and 
 degrees, peculiarly apt to improve it : apt to improve it, 
 in some respects, even beyond what w^ould be, by the ex- 
 ercise of it, required in a perfectly virtuous society, or in 
 a society of equally imperfect virtue with themselves. But 
 that the present world does not actually become a state 
 of moral discipline to many, even to the generality, ^. e. 
 that they do not improve or grow better in it, cannot be 
 m'ged as a proof, that it was not intended for moral dis- 
 cipline, by any who at all observe the analogy of nature. 
 
 For, of the numerous seeds of vegetables and bodies of 
 
 1 
 
130 OP A STATE OP l?JMiL 
 
 animals, which are adapted and put in the way, to im- 
 / prove to such a point or state of natuTal maturity and per- 
 fection, we do not see perhaps that one in a milhon actu- 
 ally does. Far the greatest part of them decay before 
 they are improved to it; and appear to be absohitely 
 destroyed. Yet no one, who does not deny all final 
 causes, will deny, that those seeds and bodies, which do 
 attain to that point of maturity and perfection, answer 
 the end for which they were really designed by nature; 
 and therefore that nature designed them for such perfec- 
 tion. And I cannot forbear adding, though it is not to 
 the present purpose, that the appearance of such an 
 amazing waste in nature, w^ith respect to these seeds and 
 bodies, by foreign causes, is to us as unaccountable, as, 
 what is much more terrible, the present and future ruin 
 of so many moral agents by themselves, i. e. by vice. 
 
 Against this whole notion of moral discipline, it may 
 be objected, in another way ; that so far as a course of 
 behaviour, materially virtuous, proceeds from hope and 
 fear, so far it is only a discipline and strengthening of 
 self-love. But doing what God commands, because he 
 commands it, is obedience, though it proceeds from hope 
 or fear. And a course of such obedience will form 
 habits of it. And a constant regard to veracity, justice, 
 and charity, may form distinct habits of these particular 
 virtues ; and will certainly form habits of self-govern- 
 ment, and of denying our inclinations, whenever veracity, 
 justice, or charity requires it. Nor is there any founda- 
 tion for this great nicety, with which some affect to dis- 
 tinguish in this case, in order to depreciate all Religion 
 proceeding from hope or fear. For, veracity, justice, and 
 charity, regard to God's authority, and to our own chiel 
 interest, are not only all three coincident ; but each of 
 them is, in itself, a just and natural motive or principle 
 of action. And he who begins a good life from any one 
 of them, and perseveres in it, as he is already in some 
 degree, so he cannot fail of becoming more and more, of 
 that character which is correspondent to the constitution 
 of nature as moral ; and to the relation which God 
 stands in to us as moral governor of it : nor consequent- 
 ly can he fail of obtaining that happiness, which this con.- 
 
C«A!'. v.] MORAL DISCIPLINE. 131 
 
 stiiution and relation necessarily suppose connected with 
 ■ that character. 
 
 These several observations, concerning the active 
 principle of virtue and obedience to God's commands, 
 :ire applicable to passive submission or resignation to his 
 w ill : which is another essential part of a right character, 
 connected with the former, and very much in our power 
 , to form ourselves to. It may be imagined, that nothing 
 but afflictions can give occasion for or require this vir- 
 tue ; that it can have no respect to, nor be any way ne- 
 cessary to qualify for, a state of perfect happiness : but 
 it is not experience which can make us think thus. 
 Prosperity itself, whilst any thing supposed desirable is 
 not ours, begets extravagant and unbounded thoughts. 
 Imagination is altogether as much a source of discontent, 
 as any thing in our external condition. It is indeed true, 
 that there can be no scope for patience, when sorrow 
 shall be no more; but there may be need of a temper of 
 mind, which shall have been formed by patience. For, 
 though self-love, considered merely as an active prin- 
 ciple leading us to pursue our chief interest, cannot but be 
 uniformly coincident with the principle of obedience to 
 God's commands, our interest being rightly understood ; 
 because this obedience, and the pursuit of our own chief 
 interest, must be in every case one and the same thing: 
 yet it may be questioned, whether self-love, considered 
 merely as the desire of our own interest or happiness, 
 can, from its nature, be thus absolutely and uniformly 
 coincident with the will of God ; any more than particu- 
 lar affections can :* coincident in such sort, as not to be 
 liable to be excited upon occasions and in degrees, im- 
 possible to be gratified consistently with the constitution 
 of things, or the divine appointments. So that habits of 
 resignation may, upon this account, be requisite for all 
 creatures : habits, I say ; which signify what is formed 
 by use. However, in general it is obvious that both 
 self-love and particular affection in human creatures con- 
 sidered only as passive feehngs, distort and rend the 
 mind ; and therefore stand in need of discipline. Now 
 denial of those particular affections, in a course of active 
 
 * p. 122, 
 L2 
 
132 OF A STATE OF [Part 1, 
 
 virtue and obedience to God's will, has a tendency to 
 moderate them ; and seems also to have a tendency to 
 habituate the mind, to be easy and satisfied with that 
 degree of happiness which is allotted us, i. e. to moderate 
 self-love. But the proper discipline for resignation is 
 affliction. For a right behaviour under that trial ; recol- 
 lecting ourselves so as to consider it in the view, in which 
 Rehgion teaches us to consider it, as from the hand of 
 God ; receiving it as what he appoints, or thinks proper 
 to permit, in his world and under his government; this 
 will habituate the mind to a dutiful submission. And 
 such submission, together with the active principle of 
 obedience, make up the temper and character in us, 
 which answers to his sovereignty ; and which absolutely 
 belongs to the condition of our being, as dependent crea- 
 tures. Nor can it be said, that this is only breaking the 
 mind to a submission to mere power; for mere power 
 may be accidental, and precarious, and usurped : but it 
 is forming within ourselves the temper of resignation 
 to his rightful authority, who is, by nature, supreme 
 over all. 
 
 Upon the whole : such a character, and such qualifi- 
 cations, are necessary for a mature state of life in the 
 present world, as nature alone does in no wise bestow j 
 but has put it upon us, in great part, to acquire, in our 
 progress from one stage of life to another, from child- 
 hood to mature age ; put it upon us to acquire them, by 
 giving us capacities of doing it, and by placing us, in the 
 beginning of life, in a condition fit for it. And this is a 
 general analogy to our condition in the present world, as 
 in a state of moral discipline for another. It is in vain 
 then to object against the credibility of the present life's 
 being intended for this purpose, that all the trouble and 
 the danger unavoidably accompanying such discipline^ 
 might have been saved us, by our being made at once 
 the creatures and the characters, which we were to be. 
 For we experience, that what we were to be, was to be the 
 effect of what we would do: and that the general conduct 
 of nature is, not to save us trouble or danger, but to 
 make us capable of going through them, and to- put it 
 upon us to do so. Acquirements of our own, experience 
 
Cha?. V.l ?>I0I?AL DISCIPII^JE 133 
 
 and habits, are the natural supply to our deficiencies, and 
 security against our dangers : since it is as plainly natu- 
 ral to set ourselves to arquire the qualifications, as the 
 external things, which we stand in need of. In particu- 
 lar, it is as plainly a general law of nature, that we should 
 with regard to our temporal interest, form and cultivate 
 practical principles within us, by attention, use, and dis- 
 cipline, as any thing whatever is a natural law; chiefly 
 in the beginning of life, but also throughout the whole 
 course of it. And the alternative is left to our choice : 
 either to improve ourselves, and better our condition ; or, 
 in default of such improvement, to remain deficient and 
 wretched. It is therefore perfectly credible, from the 
 analogy of nature, that the same may be our case, with 
 respect to the happiness of a future state, and the qualifi- 
 cations necessary for it. 
 
 There is a third thing, which may seem implied in the 
 present world's being a state of probation; that it is a 
 theatre of action, for the manifestation of persons' cha- 
 racters, with respect to a future one : not, to be sure, to 
 an all-knowing Being, but to his creation or part of it. 
 This may, perhaps, be only a consequence of our being 
 in a state of probation in the other senses. However, it 
 is not impossible, that men's showing and making mani- 
 fest, what is in their heart, what their real character is, 
 may have respect to a future life, in ways and manners 
 which we are not acquainted with: particularly it may 
 be a means, for the Author of Nature does not appear to 
 do any thing without means, of their being disposed of 
 suitably to their characters; and of its being known to 
 the creation, by way of example, that they are thus dis- 
 posed of. But not to enter upon any conjectural account 
 of this ; one may just mention, that the manifestation of 
 persons' characters contributes very much, in various 
 ways, to the carrying on a great part of that general 
 course of nature, respecting mankind, which comes under 
 our observation at present. I shall only add, that pro- 
 bation, in both these senses, as well as in that treated of 
 in the foregoing chapter, is implied in moral government ; 
 since by persons' behaviour under it, their characters can- 
 not but be m.anifested, and if they behave well, improved. 
 
 v^ 
 
334 OF THE OriNlCJ? of XECESSITT, [PartT, 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 
 OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY, CONSIDERED AS 
 INFLUENCING PRACTICE. 
 
 1 Throughout the foregoing Treatise it appears, that the 
 j condition of mankind, considered as inhabitants of this 
 j world only, and under the government of God which we 
 / experience, is greatly analogous to our condition, as de- 
 f signed for another world, or under that farther govern- 
 \ ment, which Religion teaches us. If therefore any assert, 
 as a Fatalist must, that the opinion of universal Necessity 
 is reconcilable with the former ; there immediately arises 
 a question in the way of analogy, whether he must not 
 also own it to be reconcilable Avith the latter, i. e. with 
 the system of Religion itself, and the proof of it. The 
 reader then will observe, that the question now before us 
 is not absolute. Whether the opinion of Fate be recon- 
 cilable with Religion ; but hypothetical, whether, upon 
 supposition of its being reconcilable with the constitu- 
 tion of Nature, it be not reconcilable with Religion also: 
 or, what pretence a Fatalist, not other persons, but a 
 Fatalist, has to conclude from his opinion, that there can 
 be no such thing as Religion. And as the puzzle and 
 obscurity, which must unavoidably arise from arguing 
 upon so absurd a supposition as that of universal Neces- 
 sity, will, I fear, easily be seen ; it will, I hope, as easily 
 be excused. 
 
 But since it has been all along taken for granted, as a 
 thing proved, that there is an intelligent Author of Na- 
 ture, or natural Governor of the world ; and since an 
 objection may be made against the proof of this, from 
 the opinion of universal Necessity, as it may be supposed^ 
 that such Necessity will itself account for the origin and 
 preservation of all things : it is requisite, that this objec- 
 tion be distinctly answered; or that it be shown, that a 
 Fatality supposed consistent with what we certainly ex- 
 perience, does not destroy the proof of an intelligent 
 Author and Governor of Nature; before we proceed to 
 
Chap. VI.] " AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE. 135 
 
 consider, whether it destroys the proof of a moral 
 Governor of it, or of our being in a state of Rehgion. 
 
 Now, when it is said by a Fatahst, that the whole con- 
 stitution of Nature, and the actions of men, that every 
 thing, and every mode and circumstance of every thing, 
 IS necessary, and could not possibly have been otherwise ; 
 it is to be observed, that this Necessity does not exclude 
 deliberation, choice, preference, and acting from certain 
 principles, and to certain ends : because all this is mat- 
 ter of undoubted experience, acknowledged by all, and 
 what every man may, every moment, be conscious of. 
 And from hence it follows, that Necessity, alone and of 
 itself, is in no sort an account of the constitution of Na- 
 ture, and how things came to be and to continue as they 
 are; but only an account of this circumstance relating to 
 their origin and continuance, that they could not have 
 been otherwise, than they are and have been. The as- 
 sertion, that every thing is by Necessity of Nature, is 
 not an answer to the question ; Whether the world can:e 
 into being as it is, by an intelligent Agent forming it thus, 
 or not: but to quite another question; Whether it came 
 into being as it is, in that way and manner which we 
 call necessarily, or in that way and manner which we call 
 freely. For suppose farther, that one who was a Fata- 
 list, and one who kept to his natural sense of things, 
 and believed himself a Free Agent, were disputing toge- 
 ther, and vindicating their respective opinions; and they 
 should happen to instance in a house : they would agree 
 that it was built by an architect. Their difference con- 
 cerning Necessity and Freedom would occasion no dif- 
 ference of judgment concerning this; but only concerning 
 another matter ; whether the architect built it necessa- 
 rily or freely. Suppose then they should proceed to in- 
 quire concerning the constitution of nature : in a lax 
 way of speaking, one of them might say, it was by Ne- 
 cessity; and the other, by Freedom : but if they had any 
 meaning to their v*^ords, as the latter must mean a Free 
 Agent, so the former must at length be reduced to mean 
 an Agent, whether he would say one or more, acting by 
 Necessity : for abstract notions can do nothing. Indeed 
 we ascribe to God a necessary existence, uncaused by 
 
136 OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY, [Part L 
 
 any agent. For we find within ourselves the idea of 
 infinity, i. e. immensity and eternity, impossible, even in 
 imagination, to be removed out of being. We seem to 
 discern intuitively, that there must, and cannot but be, 
 somewhat, external to ourselves, answering this idea, or 
 the archetype of it. And from hence (for this abstract ^ 
 as much as any other, implies a concrete) we conclude, 
 that there is, and cannot but be, an infinite and immense 
 eternal Being existing, prior to all design contributing to 
 his existence, and exclusive of it. And from the scan- 
 tiness of language, a manner of speaking has been intro- 
 duced ; that Necessity is the foundation, the reason, the 
 account of the existence of God. But it is not alleged, 
 nor can it be at all intended, that every thing exists as it 
 does, by this kind of Necessity ; a Necessity antecedent 
 in nature to design : it cannot, I say, be meant that every 
 thing exists as it does, by this kind of Necessity, upon 
 several accounts ; and particularly because it is admitted, 
 that design, in the actions of men, contributes to many 
 alterations in nature. For if any deny this, I shall not 
 pretend to reason with them. 
 
 I From these things it follov/s ; First, That when a Fa- 
 ' talist asserts, that every thing is by Necessity, he must 
 mean, by an Agent acting necessarily ; he must, I say, mean 
 this, for I am very sensible he would not choose t© mean 
 it : and Secondly, That the Necessity, by which such an 
 Agent is supposed to act, does not exclude intelligence 
 and design. So that, were the system of Fatality admit- 
 ted, it would just as much account for the formation of 
 the world, as for the structure of a house, and no more. 
 Necessity as much requires and supposes a Necessary 
 Agent, as Freedom requires and supposes a Free Agent, 
 to be the former of the world. And the appearances of 
 design and oi final causes in the constitution of nature as 
 really prove this acting Agent to be an intelligent designer, 
 or to act from choice; upon the scheme of Necessity, 
 supposed possible, as upon that of Freedom. 
 
 It appearing thus, that the notion of Necessity does 
 not destroy the proof, that there is an intelligent Author 
 of Nature and natural Governor of the world ; the pre- 
 sent question, which the analogy before mentioned sug- 
 
Chap. VI.] AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE. 137 
 
 gests,* and whicli, I think, it will answer, is this : Whether ( 
 the opinion of Necessity, supposed consistent with possi- \ 
 bility, with the constitution of the world, and the natural ■ 
 government which we experience exercised over it, de- 1 
 stroys all reasonable ground of belief, that we are in a ' 
 state of Religion : or whether that opinion be reconcil- 
 able with Religion ; with the system, and the proof of it. 
 Suppose then a Fatahst to educate any one, from his 
 youth up, in his own principles; that the child should 
 reason upon them, and conclude, that since he cannot 
 possibly behave otherwise than he does, he is not a sub- 
 ject of blame or commendation, nor can deserve to be 
 rewarded or punished: imagine him to eradicate the very^ 
 perceptions of blame and commendation out of his mind, 
 by means of this system ; to form his temper, and cha- 
 racter, and behaviour to it ; and from it to judge of the 
 treatment he was to expect, say, from reasonable men, 
 upon his coming abroad into the world : as the Fatalist 
 iudges from this system, what he is to expect from the 
 Author of Nature, and with regard to a future state. I 
 cannot forbear stopping here to ask, whether any one of 
 common sense would think fit, that a child should be put 
 upon these speculations, and be left to apply them to 
 practice. And a man has little pretence to reason, who 
 is not sensible, that we are all children in speculations of 
 this kind. However, the child would doubtless be highly 
 delighted to find himself freed from the restraints of 
 fear and shame, with which his play-fellows were fetter- 
 ed and embarrassed; and highly conceited in his supe- ' 
 rior knowledge, so far beyond his years. But conceit 
 and vanity would be the least bad part of the influence, ' 
 which these principles must have, when thus reasoned 
 and acted upon, during the course of his education. He 
 must either be allowed to go on and be the plague of all 
 about him, and himself too, even to his own destruction: 
 or else correction must be continually made use of, to 
 supply the want of those natural perceptions of blame 
 and commendation, which we have supposed to be re- 
 moved ; and to give him a practical impression, of what 
 he had reasoned himself out of the belief of, that he was 
 
 ♦ r. 184. 
 
138 OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY, [Part I. 
 
 in fact an accountable child, and to be punished for 
 doing what he was forbid. It is therefore in reality im- 
 possible, but that the correction which he must meet 
 with, in the course of his education, must convince him, 
 that if the scheme he was instructed in were not false ; 
 yet that he reasoned inconclusively upon it, and some- 
 how or other misapplied it to practice and common life ; 
 as what the Fatalist experiences of the conduct of Pro- 
 vidence at present, ought in all reason to convince him, 
 that this scheme is misapplied, when applied to the sub- 
 ject of Religion.* But supposing the child's temper 
 could remain still formed to the system, and his expec- 
 tation of the treatment he was to have in the world be 
 regulated by it ; so as to expect that no reasonable man 
 would blame or punish him, for any thing which he 
 should do, because he could not help doing it : upon this 
 supposition it is manifest he would, upon his coming 
 abroad into the world, be insupportable to society, and 
 the treatment which he would receive from it would 
 render it so to him ; and he could not fail of doing some- 
 what, very soon, for which he would be delivered over 
 into the hands of civil justice. And thus, in the end, he 
 would be convinced of the obligations he was under to 
 his wise instructor. Or suppose this scheme of Fatality, 
 in any other way, applied to practice, such practical ap- 
 phcation of it will be found equally absurd; equally falla- 
 cious in a practical sense: for instance, that if a man be 
 destined to live such a time, he shall live to it, though 
 he take no care of his own preservation; or if he be 
 destined to die before that time, no care can prevent it." 
 therefore all care about preserving one's life is to be 
 neglected: which is the fallacv instanced in by the 
 p.ncients. But now, on the contrary, none of these prac- 
 tical absurdities can be drawn from reasoning, upon the 
 supposition that we are free ; but all such reasoning with 
 regard to the common affairs of life is justified by expe- 
 rience. And therefore, though it were admitted that this 
 opinion of Necessity were speculatively true; yet, with 
 re2;ard to practice, it is as if it were false, so far as our 
 experience reaches : that is, to the whole of our present 
 
 * r. 1S6. 
 
Chaf. VI.] AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE. ' 139 
 
 life. For, the constitution of the present world, and the 
 condition in which we are actually placed, is, as if we 
 were free. And it may perhaps justly be concluded, that 
 since the whole process of action, through every step of 
 it, suspense, deliberation, inclining one way, determining, 
 and at last doing as we determine, is as if we were free, 
 therefore we are so. But the thing here insisted upon is, 
 that under the present natural government of the world, 
 we find we are treated and dealt with, as if we were free, 
 prior to all consideration whether we are or not. Were 
 this opinion therefore of Necessity admitted to be ever 
 so true ; yet such is in fact our condition and the natural 
 course of things, that whenever we apply it to life and 
 practice, this application of it always misleads us, and 
 cannot but mislead us, in a most dreadful manner, with 
 regard to our present interest. And how can people 
 think themselves so very secure then, that the same 
 application of the same opinion may not mislead them 
 also, in some analogous manner, with respect to a future, 
 a more general, and more important interest .P For, 
 Religion being a practical subject; and the analogy of 
 nature showing us, that v^^e have not faculties to apply 
 this opinion, were it a true one, to practical subjects; 
 whenever we do apply it to the subject of Religion, and 
 thence conclude, that we are free from its obli2;ations, it 
 is plain this conclusion cannot be depended upon. There \ 
 will still remain just reason to think, whatever appear- 
 ances are, that we deceive ourselves; in somewhat of a 
 like manner, as when people fancy they can draw con- 
 tradictory conclusions from the idea of infinity. 
 
 From these things together, the attentive reader will 
 see it follows, that if upon supposition of Freedom the 
 evidence of Religion be conclusive, it remains so, upon 
 supposition of Necessity, because the notion of Necessity 
 is not applicable to practical subjects: i.e. with respect 
 to them, is as if it were not true. Nor does this contain 
 any reflection upon reason, but only upon what is un- 
 reasonable. For to pretend to act upon reason, in oppo- 
 sition to practical principles, which the Author of our na- 
 ture gave us to act upon ; and to pretend to apply our 
 reason to subjects, with regard to which, our own short 
 
140 OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY, [Part I. 
 
 views, and even our experience, will show us, it cannot be 
 depended upon; and such, at best, the subject of Neces- 
 sity must be; this is vanity, conceit, and unreasonableness. 
 ^ But this is not all. For we tind within ourselves a 
 will, and are conscious of a character. Now if this, in 
 us, be reconcilable with Fate, it is reconcilable with it, 
 in the Author of Nature. And besides, natural govern- 
 ment and final causes imply a character and a will in the 
 Governor and Designer;* a will concerning the creatures 
 whom he governs. The Author of Nature then being 
 certainly of some character or other, notwithstanding 
 Necessity; it is evident this Necessity is as reconcilable 
 with the particular character of benevolence, veracity, 
 and justice, in him, which attributes are the foundation of 
 Religion, as with anv other character : since we find this 
 Necessity no more hinders men from being benevolent, 
 than cruel ; true, than faithless ; just, than unjust ; or, if 
 the Fatalist pleases, what we call unjust. For it is said 
 indeed, that what, upon supposition of Freedom, would- 
 be just punishment ; upon supposition of Necessity, be- 
 comes manifestly unjust: because it is punishment in- 
 flicted for doing that which persons could not avoid 
 doing. As if the Necessity, which is supposed to de- 
 stroy the injustice of murder, for instance, would not 
 also destroy the injustice of punishing it. However, as 
 little to the purpose as this objection is in itself, it is very 
 much to the purpose to observe from it, how the notions 
 of justice and injustice remain, even whilst we endeavour 
 to suppose them removed ; how they force themselves 
 upon the mind, even whilst we are making suppositions 
 destructive of them: for there is not, perhaps, a man in 
 the world, but would be ready to make this objection at 
 first thought. 
 
 But though it is most evident, that universal Neces- 
 sity, if it be reconcilable with any thing, is reconcilable 
 with that character in the Author of Nature, which is the 
 foundation of Religion ; " Yet, does it not plainly destroy 
 the proof, that he is of that character, and consequently 
 
 * By teili and character is meant that which, in spfaking of men, we should ex- 
 press, not only by these words, but also by the words tewper, (aste, dispositions, prac- 
 tical principies : that whole frame of mind, from whence we act in one manner rather 
 than another. 
 
Chap. VI.] AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE. 141 
 
 the proof of Religion ?" By no means. For we find, that 
 happiness and misery are not our fate, in any such sense 
 as not to be the consequences of our behaviour ; but that 
 they are the consequences of it.* We find God exer- 
 cises the same kind of government over us, with that 
 which a father exercises over his children, and a civil 
 magistrate over his subjects. Now, whatever becomes 
 of abstract questions concerning Liberty and Necessity, 
 it evidently appears to us, that veracity and justice must 
 be the natural rule and measure of exercising this autho- 
 rity or government, to a Being who can have no compe- 
 titions, or interfering of interests, with his creatures and 
 his subjects. 
 
 But as the doctrine of Liberty, though we experience 
 its truth, may be perplexed with difficulties, which run 
 up into the most abstruse of all speculations ; and as the 
 opinion of Necessity seems to be the very basis upon 
 which infidelity grounds itself; it may be of some use 
 to offer a more particular proof of the obligations of 
 Religion, which may distinctly be shown not to be de- 
 stroyed by this opinion. 
 
 The proof froin final causes of an intelligent Author 
 of Nature is not affected by the opinion of Necessity ; 
 supposing Necessity a thing possible in itself, and recon- 
 cilable with the constitution of things.t And it is a mat- 
 ter of fact, independent on this or any other speculation, 
 that he governs the world by the method of rewards and 
 punishments :t and also that he hath given us a moral 
 faculty, by which we distinguish between actions, and 
 approve some as virtuous and of good desert, and disap- 
 prove others as vicious and of ill desert.§ Now this 
 moral discernment implies, in the notion of it, a rule of 
 action, and a rule x){ a very peculiar kind : for it carries 
 in it authority and a right of direction ; authority in such 
 a sense, as that we cannot depart from it without being 
 self-condemned. II And that the dictates of this moral 
 faculty, which are by nature a rule to us, are moreover 
 the laws of God, laws in a sense including sanctions ; 
 may be thus proved. Consciousness of a rule or guide of 
 
 * Cliap. if. t P- 134, 8jC. t Chap. ii. 
 
 4 Dissert. II. '.' Serm. 2. at tUe Rollt. 
 
142 OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY, [Part I. 
 
 action, in creatures who are capable of considering it as 
 given them by their Maker, not only raises immediately 
 a sense of duty, but also a sense of security in following 
 it, and of danger in deviating from it. A direction of 
 the Author of Nature, given to creatures capable of look- 
 ing upon it as such, is plainly a command from him : and 
 a command from him necessarily includes in it, at least, 
 an implicit promise in case of obedience, or threatening 
 in case of disobedience. But then the sense or percep- 
 tion of good and ill desert,* which is contained in the 
 moral discernment, renders the sanction explicit, and 
 makes it appear, as one may say, expressed. For since 
 his method of government is to reward and punish 
 actions, his having annexed to some actions an insepa- 
 rable sense of good desert, and to others of ill, this surely 
 amounts to declaring, upon whom his punishments shall 
 be inflicted, and his rewards be bestowed. For he must 
 have given us this discernment and sense of things, as 
 a presentiment of what is to be hereafter: that is, by 
 way of information beforehand, what we are finally to 
 expect in this world. There is then most evident ground 
 to think, that the government of God, upon the whole, 
 will be found to correspond to the nature which he has 
 given us: and that, in the upshot and issue of things, 
 happiness and misery shall, in fact and event, be made 
 to follow virtue and vice respectively; as he has already, 
 in so peculiar a manner, associated the ideas of them in 
 our minds. And from hence might easily be deduced 
 the obligations of religious worship, were it only to be 
 considered as a means of preserving upon our minds a 
 sense of this moral government of God, and securing our 
 obedience to it : which yet is an extremely imperfect 
 view of that most important duty. 
 
 Now, I say, no objection from Necessity can lie against 
 this general proof of Religion. None against the pro- 
 position reasoned upon, that we have such a moral faculty 
 and discernment ; because this is a mere matter of fact, 
 a thing of experience, that human kind is thus oonstitut- 
 ed : none against the conclusion ; because it is imme- 
 diate and wholly from this fact. For the conclusion, that 
 
 * Dissert. II. 
 
Chap. VI.] AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE. ~ 143 
 
 God will finally reward the righteous and punish the 
 wicked, is not here drawn, from its appearing to us fit* 
 that he should ; but from its appearing, that he has told 
 us, he will. And this he hath certainly told us, in the \ 
 promise and threatening, which it hath been observed 
 the notion of a command implies, and the sense of good 
 and ill desert which he has given us, more distinctly ex- 
 presses. And this reasoning from fact is confirmed, and 
 in some degree even verified, by other facts; by the na- 
 tural tendencies of virtue and of vice ;t and by this, that 
 God, in the natural course of his provideilce, punishes 
 vicious actions as mischievous to society ; and also vi- 
 cious actions as such in the strictest sense. + So that the 
 general proof of Religion is unanswerably real, even upon 
 the wild supposition which we are arguing upon. 
 
 It must likewise be observed further, that natural Re- 
 ligion hath, besides this, an external evidence ; which the 
 doctrine of Necessity, if it could be true, would not affect. 
 For suppose a person, by the observations and reasoning 
 above, or by any other, convinced of the truth of Religion ; 
 that there is a God, who made the world, who is the moral 
 Governor and Judge of mankind, and will upon the whole 
 deal with every one according to his works : I say, sup- 
 pose a person convinced of this by reason ; but to know 
 nothing at all of antiquity, or the present state of man- 
 kind: it would be natural for such a one to be inquisitive, 
 what was the history of this system of doctrine ; at what 
 time, and in what manner, it came first into the world ; 
 and whether it were believed by any considerable part 
 of it. And were he upon inquiry to find, that a parti- 
 
 * However, I am far from intending' to deny, that the will of God is determined, 
 by what is fit, by the right and reason of the case ; though one chooses to decline 
 matters of such abstract speculation, and to speak with caution wiien one does speak 
 of ttiem. But if it be intelligible to say, that it is fit and reasonable for every one to 
 consult his oivn happiness, then fitness of action, or the right andreason of the case, is 
 an intelligible manner of speaking. And it seems as inconceivable, to suppose God 
 to approve one course of action, or one end, preferably to another, which yet his 
 acting at all from design implies that he does, without supposing somewhat prior in 
 that end, to be the ground of the preference ; as to suppose him to discern an ab- 
 stract proposition to be true, without supposing somewhat prior in it, to be the ground 
 of the discernment. It doth not therefore appear, that moral right is any more re- 
 lative to perception, than abstract truth is ; or that it is any more improper, to speak 
 of the fitness and Tightness of actions and ends, as founded in the nature of things, 
 than to speak of abstract truth, as thus founded. 
 
 t P. 95. X I*- 88, &c. 
 
144 OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY, [Part I. 
 
 cular person, in a late age, first of all proposed it, as a 
 deduction of reason, and that mankind were before 
 wholly ignorant of it; then, though its evidence from 
 reason would remain, there would be no additional pro- 
 bability of its truth, from the account of its discovery. 
 But instead of this being the fact of the case, on the 
 contrary, he would find, what could not but afford him 
 a very strong confirmation of its truth : First, That %/ 
 somewhat of this system, with more or fewer additions 
 and alterations, hath been professed in all ages and 
 countries, of which we have any certain information 
 relating to this matter. Secondly, That it is certain^ 
 historical fact, so far as we can trace things up, that this 
 v/hole system of belief, that there is one God, the Creator 
 and moral Governor of the world, and that mankind is 
 in a state of Religion, was received in the first ages. 
 And Thirdly, That as there is no hint or intimation in \/ 
 history, that this system was first reasoned out ; so there 
 is express historical or traditional evidence, as ancient 
 as history, that it was taught first by revelation. Now 
 these things must be allowed to be of great weight. The 
 first of them, general consent, shows this system to be 
 conformable to the common sense of mankind. The 
 second, namely, that Religion was believed in the first 
 ages of the world, especially as it does not appear that 
 there were then any superstitious or false additions to it, 
 cannot but be a further confirmation of its truth. For 
 it is a proof of this alternative: either that it came into 
 the world by revelation ; or that it is natural, obvious, 
 and forces itself upon the mind. The former of these 
 is the conclusion of learned men. And whoever will 
 consider, how unapt for speculation rude and uncultivat- 
 ed minds are, will, perhaps from hence alone, be strongly 
 inclined to believe it the truth. And as it is shown in 
 the Second Part* of this Treatise, that there is nothing 
 of such peculiar presumption against a revelation in the 
 beginning of the world, as there is supposed to be against 
 subsequent ones : a sceptic could not, I think, give any 
 account, which would appear more probable even to 
 himself, of the early pretences to revelation; than by 
 
 * Chap. ii. 
 
 TiK tftL 
 
Chap. VI.] AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE. ] 4- 
 
 supposing some real original one, from whence thev 
 were copied. And the third thing above mentioned, 
 that there is express historical or traditional evidence as 
 ancient as history, of the system of Religion being taught 
 mankind by revelation ; this must be admitted as some 
 degree of real proof, that it was so taught. For why 
 should not the most ancient tradition be admitted as 
 some additional proof of a fact, against which there is no 
 presumption ? And this proof is mentioned here, because 
 it has its weight to show, that Religion came into the 
 world by revelation, prior to all consideration of the 
 proper authority of any book supposed to contain it ; 
 and even prior to all consideration, whether the reve- 
 lation itself be uncorruptly handed down, and related, or 
 mixed and darkened with fables. Thus the historical 
 account, which we have of the origin of Religion, taking 
 in all circumstances, is a real confirmation of its truth, 
 no way affected by the opinion of Necessity. And the 
 external evidence, even of natural Religion, is by no 
 means inconsiderable. 
 
 But it is carefully to be observed, and ought to be 
 recollected after all proofs of virtue and religion, which 
 are only general ; that as speculative reason may be 
 neglected, prejudiced, and deceived, so also may our 
 moral understanding be impaired and perverted, and the 
 dictates of it not impartially attended to. This indeed 
 proves nothing against the reality of our speculative or 
 practical faculties of perception ; against their being 
 intended by nature, to inform us in the theory of things, 
 and instruct us how we are to behave, and what we are 
 to expect in consequence of our behaviour. Yet our 
 liableness, in the degree we are liable, to prejudice and 
 perversion, is a most serious admonition to us to be 
 upon our guard, with respect to v/hat is of such conse- 
 quence, as our determinations concerning virtue and 
 religion ; and particularly not to take custom, and 
 fashion, and slight notions of honour, or imaginations of 
 present ease, use, and convenience to mankind, for the 
 only moral rule.* 
 
 The foregoing observations, drawn from the nature of 
 
 * Dissprt, II. 
 K 
 
146 OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY, \Va*tJ, 
 
 the thing, and the history of Rehgion, amount, when 
 taken together, to a real practical proof of it, not to be 
 confuted : such a proof as, considering the infinite im- 
 portance of the thing, I apprehend, would be admitted 
 fully sufficient, in reason, to influence the actions of men, 
 v/ho act upon thought and reflection ; if it were admitted 
 that there is no proof of the contrary. But it may be 
 said; "There are many probabilities, which cannot indeed 
 be confuted, ^. e. shown to be no probabilities, and yet 
 may be overbalanced by greater probabilities on the 
 other side ; much more bv demonstration. And there is 
 no occasion to object against particular arguments alleged 
 for an opinion, when the opinion itself maybe clearly 
 shown to be false, without meddling with such argu- 
 ments at all, but leaving them just as they are.* Now the 
 method of government by rewards and punishments, and 
 especially rewarding and punishing good and ill desert 
 as such respectively, must go upon supposition, that we 
 
 \ are Free and not Necessary Agents. And it is incredi- 
 ble, that the Author of Nature should govern us upon a 
 supposition as true, which he knows to be false ; and 
 therefore absurd to think, he will reward or punish us 
 for our actions hereafter ; especially that he will do it 
 under the notion, that they are of good or ill desert." 
 Here then the matter is brought to a point. And the 
 answer to all this is full, and not to be evaded ; that 
 the whole constitution and course of things, the whole 
 analogy of providence, shows beyond possibility of doubt, 
 
 I that the conclusion from this reasoning is false ; wher- 
 ever the fallacy lies. The doctrine of freedom indeed 
 clearly shows where : in supposing ourselves Neces- 
 sary, when in truth we are Free Agents. But, upon 
 the supposition of Necessity, the fallacy lies in tak- 
 ing for granted, that it is incredible Necessary Agents 
 should be rewarded and punished. But that, somehow 
 or other, the conclusion now mentioned is false, is most 
 certain. For it is fact, that God does govern even brute 
 creatures by the method of rewards and punishments, 
 in the natural course of things. And men are rewarded 
 and punished for their actions, punished for actions 
 
 * p. 49, 62. 
 
Cbap.vi.] as influencing practice. 147 
 
 miscliievous to society as being so, punished for vicious 
 actions as such ; by the natural instrumentahty of each 
 other, under the present conduct of Providence. Nay 
 even the affection of gratitude, and the passion of resent- 
 ment, and the rewards and punishments following from 
 them, which in general are to be considered as natural, 
 t. e. from the Author of Nature ; these rewards and 
 punishments, being naturally* annexed to actions con- 
 sidered as implying good intention and good desert, ill 
 intention and ill desert; these natural rewards and 
 punishments, I say, are as much a contradiction to the 
 conclusion above, and show its falsehood, as a more exact 
 and complete rewarding and punishmg of good and ill 
 desert as such. So that if it be incredible, that Neces- 
 sary Agents should be thus rewarded and punished ; 
 then, men are not necessary but free ; since it is matter 
 of fact, that they are thus rewarded and punished. But 
 if, on the contrary, which is the supposition we have 
 been arguing upon, it be insisted, that men are Neces- 
 sary Agents ; then, there is nothing incredible in the 
 further supposition of Necessary Agents being thus 
 rewarded and punished : since we ourselves are thus 
 dealt with. 
 
 From the whole therefore it must follow, that a Neces- 
 sity supposed possible, and reconcilable with the consti- 
 tution of things, does in no sort prove that the Author oi 
 Nature will not, nor destroy the proof that he will, fi- 
 nally and upon the whole, in his eternal government, 
 render his creatures happy or miserable, by some means 
 or other, as they behave well or ill. Or, to express this 
 conclusion in words conformable to the title of the 
 Chapter, the analogy of nature shows us, that the opinion 
 of Necessity, considered as practical, is false. And if 
 Necessity, upon the supposition above mentioned, doth 
 not destroy the proof of natural Religion, it evidently 
 makes no alteration in the proof of revealed. 
 
 From these things likewise we may learn, in what 
 sense to understand that general assertion, that the 
 opinion of Necessity is essentially destructive of all reli- 
 gion. First, in a practical sense ; that by this notion, 
 
 * Serin. 8th, at the Rolls. 
 HZ 
 
148 THE GOVERNMENT OP GOD, [Part I. 
 
 atheistical men pretend to satisfy and encourage them- 
 selves in vice, and justify to others their disregard to all 
 religion. And secondly, in the strictest sense ; that it 
 is a contradiction to the whole constitution of nature, 
 and to what we may every moment experience in our- 
 selves, and so overturns every thing. But by no means 
 is this assertion to be understood, as if Necessity, sup- 
 posing it could possibly be reconciled with the consti- 
 tution of things and with what we experience, were not 
 also reconcilable with Religion: for upon this supposi- 
 tion, it demonstrably is so. 
 
 CHAP. VII. 
 
 OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD, CONSIDERED AS A SCHEME 
 OR CONSTITUTION, IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED. 
 
 Though it be, as it cannot but be, acknowledged, that 
 the analogy of nature gives a strong credibility to the 
 general doctrine of Religion, and to the several particu- 
 lar things contained in it, considered as so many matters 
 of fact; and likewise that it shows this credibility not to 
 ibe destroyed by any notions of Necessity: yet still, ob- 
 jjections may be insisted upon, against the wisdom, 
 ■equity, and goodness of the divine government implied 
 in the notion of Religion, and against the method by 
 which this government is conducted; to which objections 
 analogy can be no direct answer. For the credibility, 
 or the certain truth, of a matter of fact, does not imme- 
 diately prove any thing concerning the wisdom or good- 
 ness of it: and analogy can do no more, immediately or 
 directly, than show such and such things to be true or 
 credible, considered only as matters of fact. But still, 
 *if, upon supposition of a moral constitution of nature 
 and a moral government over it, analogy suggests and 
 makes it credible, that this government must be a 
 scheme, system, or constitution of government, as dis- 
 tinguished from a number of single unconnected acts of 
 distributive justice and goodness; and likewise, that it 
 must be a scheme, so imperfectly comprehended, and of 
 
Shap. VII.] A SCHEME INCOMPREHENSIBLE. 149 
 
 Buch a sort in other respects, as to aiford a direct gene- 
 ral answer to all objections against the justice and good- 
 ness of it: then analogy is, remotely, of great service in 
 answering those objections ; both by suggesting the an- 
 sAver, and showing it to be a credible one. 
 
 Now this, upon inquiry, will be found to be the case. 
 For, First, Upon supposition that God exercises a mo- 
 ral government over the world, the analogy of his natural 
 government suggests and makes it credible, that his moral 
 government must be a scheme, quite beyond our compre- 
 hension: and this affords a general answer to all objec- 
 tions against the justice and goodness of it. And, Se- 
 condly, A more distinct observation of some particular 
 things contained in God's scheme of natural govern- 
 ment, the like things being supposed, by analogy, to be \ 
 contained in his moral government, will further show, 
 how little weight is to be laid upon these objections. 
 I I. Upon supposition that God exercises a moral go-" 
 vernment over the world, the analogy of his natural go- 
 vernment suggests and makes it credible, that his moral 
 government must be a scheme, quite beyond our com- 
 prehension; and this affords a general answer to all ob- 
 jections against the justice and goodness of it. It is 
 most obvious, analogy renders it highly credible, that, 
 upon supposition of a moral government, it must be a 
 scheme : for the world, and the whole natural govern- 
 ment of it, appears to be so: to be a scheme, system, or 
 constitution, whose parts correspond to each other, and 
 to a whole ; as really as any work of art, or as any par- 
 ticular model of a civil constitution and government. 
 In this great scheme of the natural world, individuals 
 have various peculiar relations to other individuals of 
 their own species. And whole species are, we find, 
 variously related to other species, upon this earth. Noi" 
 do we know, how much further these kinds of relations 
 may extend. And, as there is not any action or natural 
 event, which we are acquainted with, so single and un- 
 connected, as not to have a respect to some other ac- 
 tions and events ; so possibly each of them, when it has 
 not an immediate, may yet have a remote, natural re- 
 lation to other actions and events, much beyond the 
 
150 THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD, [Taw 1. 
 
 compass of this present world. There seems indeed 
 nothing, from whence we can so much as make a conjec- 
 tvu-e, whether all creatures, actions, and events, through- 
 out the Avhole of nature, have relations to each other. 
 But, as it is obvious, that all events have fiiture un- 
 known consequences; so if we trace any, as far as we 
 can go, into what is connected with it, we shall find, 
 that if such event were not connected with somewhat 
 further in nature unknown to us, somewhat both past 
 and present, such event could not possibly have been at 
 all. Nor can we give the whole account of any one 
 thing v/hatever; of all its causes, ends, and necessary ad- 
 juncts; those adjuncts, I mean, without w^hich it could 
 not have been. By this most astonishing connexion, 
 these reciprocal cori'espondences and mutual relations, 
 every thing which we see in the course of nature is ac- 
 tually brought about. And things seemingly the most 
 insignificant imaginable are perpetually observed to be 
 necessary conditions to other things of the greatest im- 
 portance; so that any one thing whatever may, for ought 
 we know to the contrary, be a necessary condition to 
 any other. The natural world then, and natural govern- 
 ment of it, being such an incomprehensible scheme ; so 
 incomprehensible, that a man must, really in the li- 
 teral sense, know nothing at all, who is not sensible of 
 his ignorance in it ; this immediately suggests, and 
 strongly shows the credibility, that the moral world and 
 government of it may be so too. Indeed the natural 
 and moral constitution and government of the world are 
 so connected, as to make up together but one scheme: 
 and it is highly piT)bable, that the first is formed and 
 carried on merely in subserviency to the latter; as the 
 vegetable world is for the animal, and organized bodies 
 for minds. But the thing intended here is, without in- 
 quiring how far the administration of the natural world 
 is subordinate to that of the moral, only to observe the 
 credibility, that one should be analogous or similar to 
 the other: that therefore every act of divine justice and 
 goodness may be supposed to look much beyond itself, 
 and its immediate object; may have some reference to 
 other parts of God's moral administration, and to a ge- 
 
Chap VII.] A SCHEME INCOMPREHENSIBLE. 151 
 
 neral moral plan ; and that every circumstance of this his 
 moral government may be adjusted beforehand with a 
 view to the whole of it. Thus for example : the deter- 
 mined length of time, and the degrees and ways, in 
 which virtue is to remain in a state of warfare and disci- 
 pline, and in which wickedness is permitted to have its 
 progress ; the times appointed for the execution of jus- 
 tice ; the appointed instruments of it; the kinds of re- 
 wards and punishments, and the manners of their distri- 
 bution; all particular instances of divine justice and 
 goodness, and every circumstance of them, may have 
 such respects to each other, as to make up altogether a 
 whole, connected and related in all its parts ; a scheme 
 or system, which is as properly one as the natural world 
 is, and of the like kind. And supposing this to be the 
 case; it is most evident, that we are not competent 
 judges of this scheme, from the small parts of it which 
 come within our view in the present life: and therefore 
 no objections against any of these parts can be insisted 
 upon by reasonable men. 
 
 This our ignorance, and the consequence here drawn 
 from it, are universally acknowledged upon other occa- 
 sions ; and though scarce denied, yet are universally for- 
 got, when persons come to argue against Religion. And 
 it is not perhaps easy, even for the most reasonable men, 
 always to bear in mind the degree of our ignorance, and 
 make due allowances for it. Upon these accounts, it 
 may not be useless to go on a little further, in order to 
 show more distinctly, how just an answer our ignorance 
 is, to objections against the scheme of Providence. 
 Suppose then a person boldly to assert, that the things 
 complained of, the origin and continuance of evil, might 
 easily have been prevented by repeated interpositions ;" 
 interpositions so guarded and circumstanced, as would 
 preclude all mischief arising from them ; or, if this were 
 impracticable, that a scheme of government is itself an 
 imperfection; since more good might have been pro- 
 duced, without any scheme, system, or constitution at all, 
 by continued single unrelated acts of distributive justice 
 and goodness ; because these would have occasioned no 
 
 * p. 154, 155. 
 
152 THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD, [R.^rt I. 
 
 irregularities. And farther than this, it is presumed, the 
 objections will not be carried. Yet the answer is obvi- 
 ous: that were these assertions true, still the observations 
 above, concerning oar ignorance in the scheme of divine 
 government and the consequence drawn from it, would 
 hold, in great measure; enough to vindicate Religion, 
 against all objections from the disorders of the present 
 state. Were these -assertions true, yet the government 
 of the world might be just and good notwithstanding ; for, 
 at the most, they would infer nothing more than that it 
 might have been better. But indeed they are mere 
 arbitrary assertions ; no man being sufficiently acquaint- 
 ed with the possibilities of things, to bring any proof of 
 them to the lowest degree of probability. For however 
 possible what is asserted may seem ; yet many instances 
 may be alleged, in things much less out of our reach, of 
 suppositions absolutely impossible, and reducible to the 
 most palpable self-contradictions, which, not every one 
 by any means would perceive to be such, nor perhaps 
 any one at first sight suspect. From these things, it is 
 easy to see distinctly, how our ignorance, as it is the 
 common, is really a satisfactory answer to all objections 
 against the justice and goodness of Providence. If a 
 man, contemplating any one providential dispensation, 
 which had no relation to any others, should object, that 
 he discerned in it a disregard to justice, or a deficiency 
 of goodness ; nothing would be less an answer to such 
 objection, than our ignorance in other parts of provi- 
 dence, or in the Possibilities of things, no way related 
 to what he was contemplating. But when we know not 
 but the parts objected against may be relative to other 
 parts unknown to us; and when we are unacquainted 
 with what is, in the nature of the thing, practicable in 
 the case before us ; then our ignorance is a satisfactory 
 answer ; because, some unknown relation, or some un- 
 known impossibility, may render what is objected against, 
 just and good; nay good in the highest practicable de- 
 gree. 
 
 II. And how little weight is to be laid upon such ob- 
 jections, will further appear, by a more distinct observa- 
 tion of some particular things contained in the natural 
 
Chap. VII.] A SCHEME INCOMPREHENSIBLE. 153 
 
 government of God, the like to which may be supposed, 
 from analogy, to be contained in his moral government. 
 
 First, As in the scheme of the natural vs^orld, no ends 
 appear to be accomplished without means: so we find 
 that means very undesirable, often conduce to bring 
 about ends in such a measure desirable, as greatly to 
 overbalance the disagreeableness of the means. And in 
 cases where such means are conducive to such ends, it 
 is not reason, but experience, which shows us, that they 
 are thus conducive. Experience also shows many means 
 to be conducive and necessary to accomplish ends, which 
 means, before experience, we should have thought, would 
 have had even a contrary tendency. Now from these 
 observations relating to the natural scheme of the world, 
 the moral being supposed analogous to it, arises a great 
 credibility, that the putting our misery in each other's 
 power to the degree it is, and. making men liable to vice 
 to the degree we are ; and in general, that those things 
 which are objected against the moral scheme of Provi- 
 dence, may be, upon the whole, friendly and assistant to 
 virtue, and productive of an overbalance of happiness : 
 i. e. the things objected against may be means, by which 
 an overbalance of good will, in the end, be found pro- 
 duced. And from the same observations, it appears to 
 be no presumption against this, that we do not, if indeed 
 we do not, see those means to have any such tendency, 
 or that they seem to us to have a contrary one. Thus 
 those things, which we call irregularities, may not be so 
 at all: because they may be means of accomplishing 
 wise and good ends more considerable. And it may be - 
 added, as above, that they may also be the only means, 
 by which these wise and good ends are capable of being 
 accomplished. 
 
 After these observations it may be proper to add, in 
 order to obviate an absurd and wicked conclusion from 
 any of them, that though the constitution of our nature, 
 from whence we are capable of vice and misery, may, as 
 it undoubtedly does, contribute to the perfection and 
 happiness of the world ; and though the actual permission 
 of evil may be beneficial to it : {i. e. it would have been 
 more mischie\T:>u.5, not that a wicked person had himself 
 
154 THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD, [Pabt I. 
 
 abstained from his own wickedness, but that any one 
 had forcibly prevented it, than that it was permitted :) 
 yet notwithstanding, it might have been much better for 
 the world, if this very evil had never been done. Nay 
 it is most clearly conceivable, that the very commission 
 of wickedness may be beneficial to the world, and yet, 
 that it would be infinitely more beneficial for men to re- 
 frain from it. For thus, in the wise and good constitu- 
 tion of the natural world, there are disorders which bring 
 their own cures; diseases, which are themselves reme- 
 dies. Many a man would have died, had it not been for 
 the gout or a fever; yet it would be thought madness to 
 assert, that sickness is a better or more perfect state ihan 
 health; though the like, with regard to the moral world, 
 has been asserted. But, 
 
 Secondly, The natural government of the world is car- 
 ried on by general laws. For this there may be wise 
 and good reasons : the wisest and best, for ought we 
 know to the contrary. And that there are such reasons, 
 is suggested to our thoughts by the analogy of nature: 
 by our being made to experience good ends to be ac- 
 complished, as indeed all the good which we enjoy is 
 accomplished, by this means, that the laws, by which the 
 world is governed, are general. For we have scarce any 
 kind of enjoyments, but what we are, in some way or 
 other, instrumental in procuring ourselves, by acting in 
 a manner which we foresee likely to procure them: now 
 this foresight could not be at all, were not the govern- 
 ment of the world carried on by general laws. And 
 though, for ought we know to the contrary, every single 
 case may be, at length, found to have been provided for 
 even by these: yet to prevent all irregularities, or remedy 
 them as they arise, by the wisest and best general laws, 
 may be impossible in the nature of thmgs ; as we see it 
 is absolutely impossible in civil government. But then 
 we are ready to think, that, the constitution of nature re- 
 maining as it is, and the course of things being permitted 
 to go on, in other respects, as it does, there might be 
 interpositions to prevent irregularities ; though they could 
 not have been prevented, or remedied by any general 
 laws. And there would indeed be reason to wish, which, 
 
Chap. VII.] A SCHEME INCOMPREHENSIBLE. 1.55 
 
 by the way, is very different from a right to claim, that 
 all irregularities were prevented or remedied by present 
 interpositions, if these interpositions would have no other 
 effect than this. But it is plain they would have some 
 visible and immediate bad effects: for instance, thev 
 would encourage idleness and negligence ; and they 
 would render doubtful the natural rule of life, which is 
 ascertained by this very thing, that the course of the 
 world is carried on by general laws. And further, it is 
 certain they would have distant effects, and very great 
 ones too; by means of the wonderful connexions before 
 mentioned.* So that we cannot so much as guess, what 
 would be the whole result of the interpositions desired. 
 It may be said, any bad result might be prevented by 
 further interpositions, whenever there was occasion for 
 them : but this again is talking quite at random, and in 
 the dark.t Upon the whole then, we see wise reasons, 
 why the course of the world should be carried on by 
 general laws, and good ends accomplished by this means : 
 and for ought we know, there may be the wisest rea- 
 sons for it, and the best ends accomplished by it. We 
 have no ground to believe, that all irregularities could be 
 remedied as they arise, or could have been precluded, by 
 general laws. We find that interpositions would pro- 
 duce evil, and prevent good: and, for ought we know, 
 they would produce greater evil than they would prevent; 
 and prevent greater good than they would produce. And 
 if this be the case, then the not interposing is so far from 
 being a ground of complaint, that it is an instance of 
 goodness. This is intelligible and sufficient: and 
 going further, seems beyond the utmost reach of our 
 faculties. 
 
 But it may be said, that "after all, these supposed im- 
 possibilities and relations are what we are unacquainted 
 with ; and we must judge of Religion, as of other things, 
 by what we do know, and look upon the rest as nothing : 
 or however, that the answers here given to what is ob- 
 jected against Rehgion, may equally be made use of to 
 invalidate the proof of it ; since their stress lies so very 
 much upon our ignorance." But, 
 
 * p. 160, &c. f p. 152. 
 
156 THE GOVERNMENT OF GCD, [Part I. 
 
 Firsfy Thongii total i2;norance in an}' matter does in- 
 deed equally destroy, or rather preclude, all proof con- 
 cerning it, and objections against it ; yet partial igno- 
 rance does not. For we may in any degree be convinced, 
 that a person is of such a character, and consequently 
 will pursue such ends ; though we are greatly ignorant, 
 what is the proper way of acting, in order the most 
 effectually to obtain those ends : and in this case, 
 objections against his manner of acting, as seemingly 
 not conducive to obtain them, might be answered by 
 our ignorance ; though the proof that such ends Avere 
 intended, might not at all be invalidated by it. Thus, 
 the proof of Religion is a proof of the moral character 
 of God, and consequently that his government is moral, 
 and that every one upon the whole shall receive accord- 
 ing to his deserts ; a proof that this is the designed end 
 of his government. But we are not competent judges, 
 what is the proper way of acting, in order the most 
 effectually to accomplish this end.* Therefore our ig- 
 norance is an answer to objections against the conduct 
 of Providence, in permitting irregularities, as seeming 
 contradictory to this end. Now, since it is so obvious, 
 that our ignorance may be a satisfactory answer to ob- 
 jections against a thing, and yet not affect the proof of it; 
 till it can be shown, it is frivolous to assert, that our ig- 
 norance invalidates the proof of Religion, as it does the 
 objections against it. 
 
 Secondly, Supfiose unknown impossibilities, and un- 
 known relations, might justly be urged to invalidate the 
 proof of Religion, as well as to answer objections 
 against it : and that, in consequence of this, the proof of 
 it were doubtful. Yet still, let the assertion be despised, 
 or let it be ridiculed, it is undeniably true, that moral 
 obligations would remain certain, though it were not 
 certain what would, upon the whole, be the conse- 
 quences of observing or violating them. For, these 
 obligations arise immediately and necessarily from the 
 judgment of our own mind, unless perverted, which we 
 cannot violate without being self-condemned. And they 
 would be certain too, from considerations of interest. 
 
 * Pp. 63, 54. 
 
Chap. VII.] A SCHEME INCOMPREHENSIBLE. 157 
 
 For though it were doubtful, what will be the future con- 
 sequences of virtue and vice; yet it is, however, credible, 
 that they may have those consequences, which Religion 
 teaches us they will : and this credibility is a certain * 
 obligation in point of prudence, to abstain from all wick- 
 edness, and to live in the conscientious practice of all 
 that is good. But, 
 
 Thirdly, The answers above given to the objections 
 against Religion cannot equally be made use of to inva- 
 lidate the proof of it. For, upon suspicion that' God ex- 
 ercises a moral government over the world, analogy does 
 most strongly lead us to conclude, that this moral govern- 
 ment must be a scheme, or constitution, beyond our 
 comprehension. And a thousand particular analogies 
 show us, that parts of such a scheme, from their relation 
 to other parts, may conduce to accomplish ends, which 
 we should have thought they had no tendency at all to 
 accomplish : nay ends, which before experience, we 
 should have thought such parts were contradictory to, 
 and had a tendency to prevent. And therefore all these 
 analogies show, that the way of arguing made use of in 
 objecting against Religion is delusive : because they 
 show it is not at all incredible, that, could we compre- 
 hend the whole, we should find the permission of the 
 disorders objected against to be consistent with justice 
 and goodness ; and even to be instances of them. Now 
 this is not applicable to the proof of Religion, as it is to 
 the objections against it;t and therefore cannot invali- 
 date that proof, as it does these objections. 
 
 Lastly, From the observation now made, it is easy to 
 see, that the answers above given to the objections 
 against Providence, though, in a general way of speak- 
 ing, they may be said fo be taken from our ignorance ; 
 yet are by no means taken merely from that, but from 
 somewhat which analogy shows us concerning it. For 
 analogy shows us positively, that our ignorance in the 
 possibilities of things, and the various relations in nature, 
 renders us incompetent judges, and leads us to false con- 
 clusions, in cases similar to this, in which we pretend to 
 judge and to object. So that the things above insisted 
 
 • p. 49, and Part II. Chap vi. f Serm. at the Rolls p. 312. 2d. ed. 
 
158 CONCLUSION. 'v [PabtI. 
 
 upon are not mere suppositions of unknown impossi- 
 bilities and relations : but they are suggested to our 
 thoughts, and even forced upon the observation of seri- 
 ous men, and rendered credible too, by the analogy of 
 nature. And therefore to take these things into the 
 account, is to judge by experience and what we do 
 know : and it is not judging so, to take no notice of them. 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 The observations of the last Chapter lead us to consider 
 this little scene of human life, in which we are so busily 
 engaged, as having a reference, of some sort or other, to 
 a much larger plan of things. Whether we are, any 
 way, related to the more distant parts of the boundless 
 universe, into which we are brought, is altogether uncer- 
 tain. But it is evident, that the course of things, which 
 comes within our view, is connected with somewhat, 
 past, present, and future, beyond it.* So that we are 
 placed, as one may speak, in the middle of a scheme, 
 not a fixed but a progressive one, every Way, incompre- 
 hensible: incomprehensible, in a manner equally, with 
 respect to what has been, what now is, and what shall 
 be hereafter. And this scheme cannot but contain in it 
 somewhat as wonderful, and as much beyond our thought 
 and conception,t as any thing in that of Religion. For, 
 will any man in his senses say, that it is less difficult to 
 conceive, how the world came to be and to continue as 
 it is, without, than with, an intelligent Author and Go- 
 vernor of it ? or, admitting an intelligent Governor of it, 
 that there is some other rule of government more natu- 
 ral, and of easier conception, than that which we call 
 moral? Indeed, without an intelligent Author and 
 Governor of Nature, no account at all can be given, how 
 this universe, or the part of it particularly in which we 
 are concerned, came to be, and the course of it to be 
 carried on, as it is : nor any, of its general end and de- 
 sign, without a moral Governor of it. That there is an 
 intelligent Author of Nature, and natural Governor of 
 
 * p. 149, &c + See Part II. Ch. K. 
 
ohap.-vti.j conclusion, 159 
 
 the world, i? a principle gone upon in the foregoing 
 treatise ; as proved, and generally known and confessed 
 to be proved. And the very notion of an intelligent 
 Author of Nature, proved by particular final causes, im- 
 plies a will and a character.* Now, as our whole nature, 
 the nature which he has given us, leads us to conclude 
 his will and character to be moral, just, and good: so we 
 can scarce in imagination conceive, what it can be other- 
 wise. However, in consequence of this his will and 
 character, whatever it be, he formed the universe as it 
 is, and carries on the course of it as he does, rather than 
 in any other manner ; and has assigned to us, and to all 
 living creatures, a part and a lot in it. Irrational crea- 
 tures act this their part, and enjoy and undergo the plea- 
 sures and the pains allotted them, without any reflection. 
 But one would think it impossible, that creatures endued 
 with reason could avoid reflecting sometimes upon all 
 this ; reflecting, if not from whence we came, yet, at 
 least, whither we are going; and what the mysterious 
 scheme, in the midst of which we find ourselves, will, 
 at length, come out and produce: a scheme in which it 
 is certain we are highly interested, and in which we may 
 be interested even beyond conception. For many things 
 prove it palpably absurd to conclude, that we shall cease 
 to be, at death. Particular analogies do most sensibly 
 show us, that there is nothing to be thought strange, in 
 our being to exist in another state of life. And that we 
 are now living beings, affords a strong probability that 
 we shall continue so ; unless there be some positive 
 ground, and there is none from reason or analogy, to 
 think death will destroy us. Were a persuasion of this 
 kind ever so well grounded, there would, surely, be little 
 reason to take pleasure in it. But indeed it can have 
 no other ground, than some such imagination, as that of 
 our gross bodies being ourselves ; which is contrary to 
 experience. Experience too most clearly shows us the 
 folly of concluding, from the body and the living agent 
 aff'ecting each other mutually, that the dissolution of the 
 former is the destruction of the latter. And there are 
 remarkable instances of their not affecting each other, 
 
 * p. 140. 
 
160 CONCLUSION. P'abtI. 
 
 which lead us to a contrary conclusion. The supposi- 
 tion, then, which in all reason we are to go upon, is, that 
 our livins nature will continue after death. And it is 
 infinitely unreasonable to iorm an institution of life, 
 or to act upon any other supposition. Now all ex- 
 pectation of immortality, whether more or less cer- 
 tain, opens an unbounded prospect to our hopes and 
 our fears : since we see the constitution of nature is such, 
 as to admit of misery, as well as to be productive of 
 happiness, and experience ourselves to partake of both 
 in some degree; and since we cannot but know, what 
 higher degrees of both we are capable of. And there 
 is no presumption against believing further, that our 
 future interest depends upon our present behaviour : for 
 we see our present interest doth; and that the happiness 
 and misery, which are naturally annexed to our actions, 
 very frequently do not follow, till long after the actions 
 are done, to which they are respectively annexed. So 
 that were speculation to leave us uncertain, whether it 
 were likely, that the Author of Nature, in giving happi- 
 ness and misery to his creatures, hath regard to their 
 actions or not: yet, since we find by experience that he 
 hath such regard, the whole sense of things which he 
 has given us, plainly leads us, at once and without any 
 elaborate inquiries, to think, that it may, indeed must, be 
 to good actions chiefly that he hath annexed happiness, 
 and to bad actions misery; or that he will, upon the 
 whole, reward those who do well, and punish those who 
 do evil. To confirm this from the constitution of the 
 world, it has been observed, that some sort of moral go- 
 vernment is necessarily implied in that natural govern- 
 ment of God, which we experience ourselves under ; 
 that good and bad actions, at present, are naturally re- 
 warded and punished, not only as beneficial and mis- 
 chievous to society, but also as virtuous and vicious: and 
 that there is, in the very nature of the thing, a tendency 
 to their being rewarded and punished in a much higher 
 degree than they are at present. And though this high- 
 er degree of distributive justice, which nature thus points 
 out and leads towards, is prevented for a time from tak- 
 ius, place ; it is by obstacles, which the state of this world 
 
Chap. VII.] CONCLUSION. 161 
 
 unhappily throws in its way, and which therefore are in 
 their nature temporary. Now, as these things in the 
 natural conduct of Providence are observable on the side 
 of virtue ; so there is nothing to be set against them on 
 the side of vice. A moral scheme of government then 
 is visibly established, and, in some degree, carried into 
 execution: and this, together with the essential tenden- 
 cies of virtue and vice duly considered, naturally raise 
 in us an apprehension, that it will be carried on further 
 towards perfection in a future state, and that every one 
 shall there receive according to his deserts. And if this 
 be so, then our future and general interest, under the 
 moral government of God, is appointed to depend upon 
 our behaviour ; notwithstanding the difficulty, which 
 this may occasion, of securing it, and the danger of los- 
 ing it : just in the same manner as our temporal interest, 
 under his natural government, is appointed to depend 
 upon our behaviour ; notwithstanding the like difficulty 
 and danger. For, from our original constitution, and 
 that of the world which we inhabit, we are naturally 
 trusted with ourselves ; with our own conduct and our 
 own interest. And from the same constitution of nature, 
 especially joined with that course of things which is 
 owing to men, we have temptations to be unfaithful in 
 this trust ; to forfeit this interest, to neglect it, and run 
 ourselves into misery and ruin. From these temptations 
 arise the difficulties of behaving so as to secure our 
 temporal interest, and the hazard of behaving so as to 
 miscarry in it. There is therefore nothing incredible in 
 supposing there may be the like difficulty and hazard 
 with regard to that chief and final good, which Religion 
 lays before us. Indeed the whole account, how it came 
 to pass that we were placed in such a condition as this, 
 must be beyond our comprehension. But it is in part 
 accounted for by what Religion teaches us, that the 
 character of virtue and piety must be a necessary quali- 
 fication for a future state of security and happiness, 
 under the moral government of God; in like manner, 
 as some certain qualifications or other are necessary 
 for every particular condition of hfe, under his natural 
 government: and that the present state was intended to 
 
 L 
 
162 CONCLUSION. [Part I. 
 
 be a school of discipline, for improving in ourselves that 
 character. Now this intention of nature is rendered 
 highly credible by observing ; that we are plainly made 
 for improvement of all kinds : that it is a general appoint- 
 ment of Providence, that we cultivate practical principles, 
 and form within ourselves habits of action, in order to 
 become fit for what we were wholly unfit for before : that 
 in particular, childhood and youth is naturally appointed 
 to be a state of discipline for mature age : and that the 
 present world is pccuharly fitted for a state of moral dis- 
 cipline. And, whereas objections are urged against the 
 whole notion of moral government and a probationary 
 state, from the opinion of Necessity ; it has been shown, 
 that God has given us the evidence, as it were, of expe- 
 rience, that all objections against Religion, on this head, 
 are vain and delusive. He has also, in his natural go- 
 vernment, suggested an answer to all our short-sighted 
 objections, against the equity and goodness of his moral 
 government ; and in general he has exemplified to us 
 the latter by the former. 
 
 These things, which it is to be remembered, are mat- 
 ters of fact, ought, in all common sense, to awaken man- 
 kind; to induce them to consider in earnest their con- 
 dition, and what they have to do. It is absurd, absurd 
 to the degree of being ridiculous, if the subject were not 
 of so serious a kind, for men to think themselves secure 
 in a vicious life ; or even in that immoral thoughtlessness, 
 which far the greatest part of them are fallen into. And 
 the credibility of Religion, arising from experience and 
 facts here considered, is fully sufficient, in reason, to 
 engage them to live in the general practice of all virtue 
 and piety; under the serious apprehension, though it 
 should be mixed with some doubt,* of a righteous admin- 
 istration established in nature, and a future judgment 
 in consequence of it: especially when we consider, how 
 very questionable it is, whether any thing at all can be 
 gained by vice ;t how unquestionably little as well as 
 precarious, the pleasures and profits of it are at the best, 
 and how soon they must be parted with at the longest. 
 For, ui the deliberations of reason, concerning what we 
 
 ♦ Part II. Ch. vi. t P. 86. 
 
Chap. VII.] CONCLUSION. 163 
 
 are to pursue and what to avoid, as temptations to any- 
 thing from mere passion are supposed out of the case : 
 so inducements to vice, from cool expectations of plea- 
 sure and interest so small and uncertain and short, are 
 really so insignificant, as, in the view of reason to be 
 almost nothing in themselves; and in comparison with 
 the importance of Religion they quite disappear and are 
 lost. Mere passion indeed may be alleged, though not 
 as a reason, yet as an excuse, for a vicious course of life. 
 And how sorry an excuse it is, will be manifest by 
 observing, that we are placed in a condition in which we 
 are unavoidably inured to govern our passions, by being 
 necessitated to govern them: and to lay ourselves under 
 the same kind of restraints, and as great ones too, from 
 temporal regards, as virtue and piety, in the ordinary 
 course of things, require. The plea of ungovernable 
 passion then, on the side of vice, is the poorest of all 
 things ; for it is no reason, and but a poor excuse. But 
 the proper motives to religion are the proper proofs of 
 it, from our moral nature, Irom the presages of conscience, 
 and our natural apprehension of God under the charac- 
 ter of a righteous Governor and Judge : a nature, and 
 conscience, and apprehension, given us by him; and from 
 the confirmation of the dictates of reason, by life and 
 immortality brought to light by the Gospel; and the wrath 
 of God revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and 
 unrighteousness of men. 
 
 END OF THE FIRST PART* 
 
THE 
 
 ANALOGS OF RELIGION. 
 
 PART II. 
 OF REVEALED RELIGION. 
 
 CHAP I. 
 OF THE IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITY. 
 
 Some persons, upon pretence of the sufficiency of the 
 light of nature, avowedly reject all revelation, as, in its 
 very notion, incredible, and what must be fictitious. And 
 indeed it is certain, no revelation would have been given, 
 had the light of nature been sufficient in such a sense, as 
 to render one not wanting and useless. But no man, in 
 seriousness and simplicity of mind, can possibly think it 
 so, who considers the state of Religion in the heathen 
 (vorld before revelation, and its present state in those 
 places which have borrowed no light from it : particu- 
 larly the doubtfulness of some of the greatest men, con- 
 cerning things of the utmost importance, as well as the 
 natural inattention and ignorance of mankind in general. 
 (t is impossible to say, who would have been able to 
 have reasoned out that whole system, which we call 
 natural Religion, in its genuine simplicity, clear of super- 
 stition: but there is certainly no ground to affirm that 
 the generality could. If they could, there is no sort of 
 probability that they would. Admitting there were, they 
 would highly want a standing admonition to remind them 
 of it, and inculcate it upon them. 
 
 And further still, were they as much disposed to attend 
 to Religion, as the better sort of men are ; yet even upon 
 this supposition, there would be various occasions for 
 supernatural instruction and assistance, and the greatest 
 
166 OF THE IMPORTANCE [p^rt U. 
 
 aidvantages might be afforded by them. So that to say 
 revelation is a thing superfluous, what there was no need 
 of, and what can be of no service, is, I think, to talk quite 
 wildly and at random. Nor would it be more extrava- 
 gant to afhrm, that mankind is so entirely at ease in the 
 present state, and life so completely happy, that it is a 
 contradiction to suppose our condition capable of being, 
 in any respect, better. 
 
 There are other persons, not to be ranked with these, 
 who seem to be getting into a way of neglecting, and, as 
 it were, overlooking revelation, as of small importance, 
 provided natural Religion be kept to. With little regard 
 either to the evidence of the former, or to the objections 
 against it, and even upon supposition of its truth; "the 
 only design of it," say they, " must be, to establish a 
 belief of the moral system of nature, and to enforce the 
 practice of natural piety and virtue. The belief and prac- 
 tice of these things were, pei'haps, much promoted by 
 the first publication of Christianity: but whether they 
 are believed and practised, upon the evidence and mo- 
 tives of nature or of revelation, is no great matter."* 
 This way of considering revelation, though it is not the 
 same with the former, yet borders nearly upon it, and 
 very much, at length, runs up into it : and requires to be 
 particularly considered, with regard to the persons who 
 seem to be getting into this way. The consideration of 
 it will likewise further show the extravagance of the for- 
 mer opinion, and the truth of the observations in answ^er 
 to it, just mentioned. And an inquiry into the Impor- 
 tance of Christianity, cannot be an improper introduc- 
 tion to a treatise concerning the credibility of it. 
 
 Now if God has given a revelation to mankind, and 
 commanded those things which are commanded in Chris- 
 tianity ; it is evident, at first sight, that it cannot in any 
 wise be an indifferent matter, whether we obey or dis- 
 obey those commands : unless we are certainly assured, 
 
 * Invenis multos propterea nolle fieri Cliristianos, quia quasi sufficiunt sibi 
 
 de bona vita sua. Bene vivere opus est, ait. Quid niihi praecepturus est Christus ? 
 Ut bene vivam? Jam bene vivo. Quid milii necessarius est Christus; nullum 
 honiicidiuni, nullum furtuni, nuUani rapinam facio, res alienas iion concupisco, nuUo 
 adulterio contaminor ? 'Nnm inveniatur in vita mea aliquid quod repreliendatur, e* 
 qui reprehenderit fe,ciat Cliristianum. ^ug, in Psai. xxxS. 
 
Chap. I.] OF CHRISTIANITY. 157 
 
 that we know all the reasons for them, and that all 
 those reasons are now ceased, with regard to mankind 
 in general, or to ourselves in particular. And it is ab- 
 solutely impossible we can be assured of this. For our 
 ignorance of these reasons proves nothing in the case : 
 since the whole analogy of nature shows, what is indeed 
 in itself evident, that there may be infinite reasons for 
 things, with which we are not acquainted. 
 
 But the importance of Christianity will more distinctly 
 appear, by considering it more distinctly : First, as a re- 
 publication, and external institution, of natural or es- 
 sential Religion, adapted to the present circumstances 
 of mankind, and intended to promote natural piety and 
 virtue : and Secondly, as containing an account of a 
 dispensation of things, not discoverable by reason, in 
 consequence of which several distinct precepts are en- 
 joined us. For though natural Religion is the founda- 
 tion and principal part of Christianity, it is not in any 
 sense the whole of it. 
 
 I. Christianity is a republication of natural Religion. 
 It instructs mankind in the moral system of the world: 
 that it is the work of an infinitely perfect Being, and 
 under his government ; that virtue is his law ; and that 
 he Yvill finally judge mankind in righteousness, and 
 render to all according to their works, in a future state. 
 And, which is very material, it teaches natural Religion 
 in its genuine simplicity ; free from those superstitions, 
 with which it was totally corrupted, and under which it 
 was in a manner lost. 
 
 Revelation is, further, an authoritative publication of 
 natural Religion, and so affords the evidence of testi- 
 mony for the truth of it. Indeed the miracles and 
 prophecies recorded in Scripture, were intended to 
 prove a particular dispensation of Providence, the re- 
 demption of the world by the Messiah : but this does 
 not hinder, but that they may also prove God's general 
 providence over the world, as our moral Governor and 
 Judge. And they evidently do prove it ; because this 
 character of the Author of Nature, is necessarily con- 
 nected witli and implied in that particular revealed 
 dispensation of things : it is likewise continually taught 
 
168 or THE IMPORTANCE [p^rt IL 
 
 expressly, and insisted upon, by those persons who 
 wrought the miracles and delivered the prophecies. So 
 that indeed natural Religion seems as much proved by 
 the Scripture revelation, as it would have been, had the 
 design of revelation been nothing else than to prove it. 
 
 But it may possibly be disputed, how far miracles can 
 prove natural Religion ; and notable objections may be 
 urged against this proof of it, considered as a matter of 
 speculation : but considered as a practical thing, there 
 can be none. For suppose a person to teach natural 
 Religion to a nation, who had lived in total ignorance or 
 forgetfulness of it ; and to declare he was commissioned 
 by God so to do : suppose him, in proof of his commis- 
 sion, to foretell things future, which no human foresight 
 could have guessed at ; to divide the sea with a word ; 
 feed great multitudes with bread from heaven ; cure all 
 manner of diseases ; and raise the dead, even himself, to 
 life ; would not this give additional credibility to his 
 teaching, a credibility beyond what that of a common 
 man would have ; and be an authoritative publication of 
 the law of nature, i. e. a new proof of it ? It would be a 
 practical one, of the strongest kind, perhaps, which 
 human creatures are capable of having given them. 
 The Law of Moses then, and the Gospel of Christ, are 
 authoritative publications of the religion of nature ; they 
 affordaproofof God'sgeneral providence, as moral Gover- 
 nor of the world, as well as of his particular dispensations of 
 providence towards sinful creatures, revealed in the Law 
 and the Gospel. As they are the only evidence of the 
 latter, so they are an additional evidence of the former. 
 
 To show this further, let us suppose a man of the 
 greatest and most improved capacity, who had never 
 heard of revelation, convinced upon the whole, notwith- 
 standing the disorders of the world, that it was under 
 the direction and moral government of an infinitely 
 perfect Being ; but ready to question, whether he were 
 not got beyond the reach of his faculties : suppose him 
 brought, by this suspicion, into great danger of being 
 carried away by the universal bad example of almost every 
 one around hira, who appeared to have no sense, no prac- 
 tical sense at least, of these things : and this, perhaps, 
 
Chap. I.] OF CHRISTIANITY. 1C9 
 
 would be as advantageous a situation with regard to 
 Religion, as nature alone ever placed any man in. 
 What a confirmation now must it be to such a person, 
 all at once, to find, that this moral system of things was 
 revealed to mankind, in the name of that infinite Being, 
 whom he had from principles of reason believed in : and 
 that the publishers of the revelation proved their com- 
 mission from him, by making it appear, that he had 
 entrusted them with a power of suspending and chang- 
 ing the general laws of nature. 
 
 Nor must it by any means be omitted, for it is a thing 
 of the utmost importance, that life and immortality are 
 eminently brought to light by the Gospel. The great 
 doctrines of a future state, the danger of a course of 
 wickedness, and the efficacy of repentance, are not only 
 confirmed in the Gospel, but are taught, especially the 
 last is, with a degree of light, to which that of nature is 
 but darkness. 
 
 Further: As Christianity served these ends and pur- 
 poses, when it was first pubHshed, by the miraculous 
 publication itself ; so it was intended to serve the same 
 purposes in future ages, by means of the settlement of a 
 visible church : of a society, distinguished from common 
 ones, and from the rest of the world, by peculiar reli- 
 gious institutions; by an instituted method of instruction, 
 and an instituted form of external Religion. Miraculous 
 powers were given to the first preachers of Christianity, 
 in order to their introducing it into the world : a visible 
 church was established, in order to continue it, and carry 
 it on successively throughout all ages. Had Moses and 
 the Prophets, Christ and his Apostles, only taught, and 
 by miracles proved, Rehgion to their contemporaries ; 
 the benefits of their instructions would have reached but 
 to a small part of mankind. Christianity must have been, 
 in a great degree, sunk and forgot in a very few ages. 
 To prevent this, appears to have been one reason why 
 a visible church was instituted : to be, like a city upon 
 a hill, a standing memorial to the world of the duty 
 which we owe our Maker: to call men continually, both 
 by example and instruction, to attend to it, and, by the 
 form of Religion, ever before their eyes, remind them of 
 
170 OF THE IMPORTANCE [Part II. 
 
 the reality: to be the repository of the oracles of God: 
 to hold up the light of revelation in aid to that of nature, 
 and propagate it throughout all generations to the end of 
 the world — the light of revelation, considered here in no 
 other view, than as designed to enforce natural Religion. 
 And in proportion as Christianity is professed and taught 
 in the world, Religion, natural or essential Religion, is 
 thus distinctly and advantageously laid before mankind, 
 and brought again and again to their thoughts, as a 
 matter of infinite importance. A visible church has also 
 a further tendency to promote natural Religion, as being 
 an instituted method of education, originally intended to 
 be of more peculiar advantage to those who conform to 
 it. For one end of the institution was, that, by admoni- 
 tion and reproof, as well as instruction ; by a general 
 regular discipline, and public exercises of Religion ; the 
 hody of Christ, as the Scripture speaks, should be edified ; 
 i. e. trained up in piety and virtue for a higher and better 
 state. This settlement, then, appearing thus beneficial; 
 tending in the nature of the thing to answer, and, in 
 some degree, actually answering, those ends ; it is to be 
 remembered, that the very notion of it implies positive 
 institutions ; for the visibihtv of the church consists in 
 them. Take away every thing of this kind, and you 
 lose the very notion itself. So that if the things now 
 mentioned are advantages, the reason and importance of 
 positive institutions in general is most obvious ; since 
 without them these advantages could not be secured to 
 the world. And it is mere idle wantonness, to insist 
 upon knowing the reasons, why such particular ones 
 were fixed upon rather than others. 
 
 The benefit arising from this supernatural assistance, 
 which Christianity aifords to natural Religion, is Avhat 
 some persons are very slow in apprehending. And yet 
 it is a thing distinct in itself, and a very plain obvious 
 one. For will any in good earnest really say, that the 
 bulk of mankind in the heathen world were in as advan- 
 tageous a situation with regard to natural Religion, as 
 they are now amongst us : that it was laid before them, 
 and enforced upon them, in a manner as distinct, and as 
 much tending to influence their practice ? 
 
Chap. I.] OF CHRISTIANITY. 171 
 
 The objections against all this, from the perversion of 
 Christianity, and from the supposition of its having had 
 but little good influence, however innocently they may 
 be proposed, yet cannot be insisted upon as conclusive, 
 upon any principles, but such as lead to downright 
 y\ theism ; because the manifestation of the law of nature 
 by reason, which, upon all principles of Theism, must 
 have been from God, has been perverted and rendered 
 ineffectual in the same manner. It may indeed, I think, 
 truly be said, that the good effects of Christianity have 
 not been small ; nor its supposed ill effects, any effects 
 at all of it, properly speaking. Perhaps, too, the things 
 themselves done have been aggravated ; and if not, 
 Christianity hath been often only a pretence ; and the 
 same evils in the main would have been done upon 
 some other pretence. However, great and shocking as 
 the corruptions and abuses of it have really been, they 
 cannot be insisted upon as arguments against it, upon 
 principles of Theism. For one cannot proceed one step 
 in reasoning upon natural Religion, any more than upon 
 Christianity, without laying it down as a first principle, 
 that the dispensations of Providence are not to be judged 
 of by their perversions, but by their genuine tendencies: 
 not by what they do actually seem to effect, but by what 
 they would effect if mankind did their part ; that part 
 which is justly put and left upon them. It is altogether 
 as much the language of one as of the other : He that is 
 unjust, let him be unjust still : and he thai is holy, let him 
 he holy still* The light of reason does not, any more 
 than that of revelation, force men to submit to its 
 authority; both admonish them of what they ought to 
 do and avoid, together with the consequences of each; 
 and after this, leave them at full liberty to act just as 
 they please, till the appointed time of judgment. Every 
 moment's experience shows, that this is God's general 
 rule of government. 
 
 To return then : Christianity being a promulgation of 
 the law of nature; being moreover an authoritative pro- 
 mulgation of it ; with new light, and other circumstances 
 of pecuhar advantage, adapted to the wants of mankind; 
 
 * Rev. xxii. 1 1. 
 
172 OF THE IMPORTANCE [Part II. 
 
 these things fully show its importance. And it is to be 
 observed further, that as the nature of the case requires, 
 so all Christians are commanded to contribute, by their 
 profession of Christianity, to preserve it in the world, 
 and render it such a promulgation and enforcement of 
 Religion. For it is the very scheme of the Gospel, that 
 each Christian should, in his degree, contribute towards 
 continuing and carrying it on : all by uniting in the 
 public profession and external practice of Christianity ; 
 some by instructing, by having the oversight and taking 
 care of this religious community, the Church of God. 
 Now this further shows the importance of Christianity; 
 and, which is what I chiefly intend, its importance in a 
 practical sense : or the high obligations we are under, to 
 take it into our most serious consideration ; and the 
 danger there must necessarily be, not only in treating it 
 despitefully, which I am not now speaking of, but in 
 disregarding and neglecting it. For this is neglecting to 
 do what is expressly enjoined us, for continuing those 
 benefits to the world, and transmitting them down to 
 future times. And all this holds, even though the only 
 thing to be considered in Christianity, were its subser- 
 viency to natural Religion. But, 
 
 II. Christianity is to be considered in a further view; 
 as containing an account of a dispensation of things, 
 not at all discoverable by reason, in consequence of 
 which several distinct precepts are enjoined us. Chris- 
 tianity is not only an external institution of natural 
 Religion, and a new promulgation of God's general pro- 
 vidence, as righteous Governor and Judge of the world; 
 but it contains also a revelation of a particular dispensa- 
 tion of Providence, carrying on by his Son and Spirit, 
 for the recoverv and salvation of mankind, who are 
 represented in Scripture to be in a state of ruin. And 
 in consequence of this revelation being made, we are 
 commanded to he baptized, not only in the name of the 
 Father, but also, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost : and 
 other obligations of duty, unknown before, to the Son 
 and the Holy Ghost, are revealed. Now the importance 
 of these duties may be judged of, by observing that they 
 arise, not from positive command merely, but also from 
 
Chap. L] OF CHRISTIANITY. 173 
 
 the offices, which appear, from Scripture, to belong to 
 those divine persons in the Gospel dispensation ; or from 
 the relations, which, we are there informed, they stand 
 in to us. By reason is revealed the relation, which God 
 the Father stands in to us. Hence arises the obligation 
 of duty which we are under to him. In Scripture are 
 revealed the relations, which the Son and Holy Spirit 
 stand in to us. Hence arise the obhgations of duty, 
 which we are under to them. The truth of the case, as 
 one may speak, in each of these three respects being 
 admitted: that God is the governor of the world, upon 
 the evidence of reason ; that Christ is the mediator 
 between God and man, and the Holy Ghost our guide 
 and sanctifier, upon the evidence of revelation : the 
 truth of the case, I say, in each of these respects being 
 admitted ; it is no more a question, why it should be 
 commanded, that we be baptized in the name of the 
 Son and of the Holy Ghost, than that we be baptized in 
 the name of the Father. This matter seems to require 
 to be more fully stated.* 
 
 Let it be remembered, then, that Religion comes 
 under the twofold consideration of internal and external : 
 for the latter is as real a part of Religion, of true Reli- 
 gion, as the former. Now when Religion is considered 
 under the first notion, as an inward principle, to be 
 exerted in such and such inward acts of the mind and 
 heart ; the essence of natural Religion may be said to 
 consist in religious regards to God the Father Almighty: 
 and the essence of revealed Religion, as distinguished 
 from natural, to consist in religious regards to the Son, 
 and to the Holy Ghost. And the obligation we are 
 under, of paying these religious regards to each of these 
 divine persons respectively, arises from the respective 
 relations which they each stand in to us. How these rela- 
 tions are made known, whether by reason or revelation, 
 makes no alteration in the case: because the duties arise 
 out of the relations themselves, not out of the manner in 
 which we are informed of them. The Son and Spirit 
 have each his proper office in that great dispensation of 
 
 , ♦ See The Nature, Obligation, and Efficacy, of the Christian Sacraments, fitc., and 
 CoUiber of revealed Religion, as there quoted. 
 
174 OF THE IMPORTANCE [p,i„ jj^ 
 
 Providence, the redemption of the world; the one our 
 mediator, the other our sanctifier. Does not then the 
 duty of rehgious regards to both these divine persons, 
 as immediately arise to the view of reason, out of 
 the very nature of these offices and relations ; as the 
 inward good-will and kind intention, which we owe to 
 our fellow creatures, arises out of the common relations 
 between us and them ? But it will be asked, " What 
 are the inward religious regards, appearing thus ob- 
 viously due to the Son and Holy Spirit; as arising, not 
 merely from command in Scripture, but from the very 
 nature of the revealed relations, which they stand in to 
 us ?" I answer, the religious regards of reverence, 
 honour, love, trust, gratitude, fear, hope. In what 
 external manner this inward worship is to be expressed, 
 is a matter of pure revealed command; as perhaps the 
 external manner, in which God the Father is to be wor- 
 shipped, may be more so, than we are ready to think: 
 but the worship, the internal worship itself, to the Son 
 and Holy Ghost, is no further matter of pure revealed 
 command, than as the relations they stand in to us are 
 matter of pure revelation: for the relations being known, 
 the obligations to such internal worship are obligations 
 of reason, arising out of those relations themselves. In 
 short, the history of the Gospel as immediately shows 
 lis the reason of these obligations, as it shows us the 
 meaning of the words. Son and Holy Ghost. 
 
 If this account of the Christian Religion be just ; those 
 persons who can speak lightly of it, as of little conse- 
 quence, provided natural Religion be kept to, plainly 
 forget, that Christianity, even what is pecuharly so 
 called, as distinguished from natural Religion, has yet 
 somewhat very important, even of a moral nature. For 
 the office of our Lord being made known, and the rela- 
 tion he stands in to us, the obligation of religious 
 regards to him is plainly moral, as much as charity to 
 mankind is; since this obligation arises, before external 
 command, immediately out of that his office and relation 
 itself. Those persons appear to forget, that revelation 
 is to be considered, as informing us of somewhat new, 
 in the state of mankind, and in the government of the 
 
CsAH. L] OF CHRISTIANITY. 175 
 
 world: as acquainting us with some relations we stand 
 in, which could not otherwise have been known. And 
 these relations being real (though before revelation we 
 could be under no obligations from them, yet upon their 
 being revealed), there is no reason to think, but that 
 neglect of behaving suitably to them will be attended with 
 the same kind of consequences under God's government, 
 as neglecting to behave suitably to any other relations 
 made known to us by reason. And ignorance, whether 
 unavoidable or voluntary, so far as we can possibly see, 
 will just as much, and just as little, excuse in one case as 
 in the other : the ignorance being supposed equally 
 unavoidable, or equally voluntary, in both cases. 
 
 If therefore Christ be indeed the mediator between 
 God and man, ^. e. if Christianity be true ; if he be in- 
 deed our Lord, our Saviour, and our God ; no one can 
 say, what may follow, not only the obstinate, but the 
 careless disregard to him, in those high relations. Nay 
 no one can say, what may follow such disregard, even in 
 the way of natural consequence.* For, as the natural 
 consequences of vice in this life are doubtless to be con- 
 sidered as judicial punishments inflicted by God ; so 
 likewise, for aught we know, the judicial punishments of 
 the future life may be, in a like way or a like sense, the 
 natural consequence of vice :t of men's violating or disre- 
 garding the relations which God has placed them in here, 
 and made known to them. 
 
 Again: If mankind are corrupted and depraved in 
 their moral character, and so are unfit for that state, 
 which Christ is gone to prepare for his disciples ; and if 
 the assistance of God's Spirit be necessary to renew their 
 nature, in the degree requisite to their being qualified for 
 that state ; all which is implied in the express, though 
 figurative declaration, Except a man he horn of the Spirit, 
 he cannot enter into the kingdom of God :t supposing this, 
 is it possible any serious person can think it a slight 
 matter, whether or no he makes use of the means, ex- 
 pressly commanded by God, for obtaining this divine 
 assistances^ especially since the whole analogy of nature 
 shows, that we are not to expect any benefits, without 
 
 * p. 72. 73. t Ch. V. J John iii. v. 
 
176 OF THE IMPORTANCE [P^rt IL 
 
 making use of the appointed means for obtaining or 
 enjoying them. Now reason shows us nothing, of the 
 particular immediate means of obtaining either tempo- 
 ral or spiritual benefits. This therefore we must learn, 
 either from experience or revelation. And experience, 
 the present case does not admit of. 
 
 The conclusion from all this evidently is, that, Chris- 
 tianity being supposed either true or credible, it is 
 unspeakable irreverence, and really the most presump- 
 tuous rashness, to treat it as a light matter. It can 
 never justly be esteemed of little consequence, till it be 
 positively supposed false. Nor do I know a higher and 
 more important obligation which we are under, than 
 that of examining most seriously into the evidence of it, 
 supposing its credibility; and of embracing it, upon sup- 
 position of its truth. 
 
 The two following deductions may be proper to be 
 added, in order to illustrate the foregoing observations, 
 and to prevent their being mistaken. 
 
 First, Hence we may clearly see, where lies the dis- 
 tinction between what is positive and what is moral in 
 Religion. Moral precepts are precepts, the reasons of 
 which we see: positive precepts are precepts, the rea- 
 sons of which we do not see.* Moral duties arise out of 
 the nature of the case itself, prior to external command. 
 Positive duties do not arise out of the nature of the case, 
 but from external command ; nor would they be duties 
 at all, were it not for such command, received from him 
 whose creatures and subjects we are. But the manner 
 in which the nature of the case, or the fact of the rela- 
 tion, is made known, this doth not denominate any duty 
 either positive or moral. That we be baptized in the name 
 of the Father is as much a positive duty, as that w^e be 
 I baptized in the name of the Son; because both arise equally 
 from revealed command: though the relation which we 
 stand in to God the Father is made known to us by rea- 
 son; the relation we stand in to Christ, by revelation only. 
 
 * Tliis is the distinction between moral and positive precepts considered respec- 
 tively as such. Rut yet, since the latter have somewhat of a moral nature, we may 
 see the reason of them, considered in this view. Moral and pc* itire precepts are in 
 some respects alike, in other resp<'Cts different. So far as they are alike, we discern 
 the reasons of hoth ; so far as th.ey are different, wc discern tiie reasons of the for 
 mer, bvt not of the latter. See p. JOS, &c., and p. 177. 
 
CtoAP. I<] OF CIiniSTJANITY- 177 
 
 On the other hand, the dispensation of the Gospel 
 admitted, gratitude as immediately becomes due to Christ, 
 from his being the voluntary minister of this dispensation, 
 as it is due to God the Father, from his being the foun- 
 tain of all good ; though the first is made known to us by 
 revelation only, the second by reason. Hence also we 
 may see, and, for distinctness' sake, it may be worth men- 
 tioning, that positive institutions come under a twofold 
 consideration. They are either institutions founded on 
 natural Religion, as baptism in the name of the Father ; 
 though this has also a particular reference to the Gospel 
 dispensation, for it is in the name of God, as the Father 
 of our Lord Jesus Christ : or they are external institu- 
 tions founded on revealed Religion ; as baptism in the 
 name of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. 
 
 Secondly, From the distinction between what is moral 
 and what is positive in Religion, appears the ground of 
 that peculiar preference, which the Scripture teaches us 
 to be due to the former. 
 
 The reason of positive institutions in general is very 
 obvious ; though we should not see the reason, Avhy such 
 particular ones are pitched upon rather than others. 
 Whoever therefore, instead of cavilling at words, will 
 attend to the thing itself, may clearly see, that posi- 
 tive institutions in general, as distinguished from this 
 or that particular one, have the nature of moral com- 
 mands ; since the reasons of them appear. Thus, for 
 instance, the external worship of God is a moral duty, 
 though no particular mode of it be so. Care then is to 
 be taken, when a comparison is made between positive 
 and moral duties, that they be compared no further than 
 as they are different ; no further than as the former are 
 positive, or arise out of mere external command, the 
 reasons of which we are not acquainted with ; and as 
 the latter are moral, or arise out of the apparent reason 
 of the case, without such external command. Unless 
 this caution be observed, we shall run into endless 
 confusion. 
 
 Now this being premised, suppose two standing pre- 
 cepts enjoined by the same authority ; that, in certain 
 conjunctures, it is impossible to obey both ; that the former 
 
 iVi 
 
178 OF 1 HE IMPORTANCE [Part It 
 
 is moral, i. e. a precept of which we see the reasons, 
 and that they hold in the particular case before us ; but 
 that the latter is positive, i. e. a precept of which we do 
 not see the reasons: it is indisputable that our obliga- 
 tions are to obey the former ; because there is an appa- 
 rent reason for this preference, and none against it. 
 Further, positive institutions, I suppose all those which 
 Christianity enjoins, are means to a moral end: and the 
 end must be acknowledged more excellent than the 
 means. Nor is observance of these institutions any 
 religious obedience at all, or of any value, otherwise 
 than as it proceeds from a moral principle. This seems 
 to be the strict logical way of stating and determining 
 this matter; but will, perhaps, be found less applicable 
 to practice, than may be thought at first sight. 
 
 And therefore, in a more practical, though more lax 
 way of consideration, and taking the words, moral law 
 and positive institutions, in the popular sense ; I add, 
 that the whole moral law is as much matter of revealed 
 command, as positive institutions are : for the Scripture 
 enjoins every moral virtue. In this respect then they 
 are both upon a level. But the moral law is, moreover, 
 written upon our hearts ; interwoven into our very 
 nature. And this is a plain intimation of the Author of 
 it, which is to be preferred, wiien they interfere. 
 
 But there is not altogether so much necessity for the 
 determination of this question, as some persons seem to 
 think. Nor are we left to reason alone to determine it. 
 For, First, Though mankind have, in all ages, been 
 greatly prone to place their religion in peculiar positive 
 rites, by way of equivalent for obedience to moral pre- 
 cepts; yet, without making any comparison at all 
 between them, and consequently without determining 
 which is to have the preference, the nature of the thing 
 a])undantly shows all notions of that kind to be utterly 
 subversive of true Religion as they are, moreover, con- 
 trary to the whole general tenor of Scripture ; and like- 
 wise to the most express particular declarations of it, 
 that nothing can render us accepted of God, without 
 moral virtue. Secondly, Upon the occasion of mention- 
 ing together positive and mordl duties, the Scripture 
 
Chap. I.] OP CHRISTIANITY. 179 
 
 always puts the stress of Religion upon the latter, and 
 never upon the former: which, though no sort of allow- 
 ance to neglect the former, when they do not interfere 
 with the latter, yet is a plajn intimation, that when they 
 do, the latter are to be preferred. And further, as 
 mankind are for placing the stress of their rehgion any 
 where, rather than upon virtue; lest both the reason 
 of the thing, and the general spirit of Christianity, 
 appearing in the intimation now mentioned, should be 
 ineffectual against this prevalent folly: our Lord him- 
 self, from whose command alone the obligation of posi- 
 tive institutions arises, has taken occasion to make the 
 comparison between them and moral precepts ; when 
 the Pharisees censured him, for eating with publicans and 
 sinners; and also when they censured his disciples, for 
 plucking the ears of corn on the Sabbath day. Upon this 
 comparison, he has determined expressly, and in form, 
 which shall have the preference when they interfere. 
 And by delivering his authoritative determination in a 
 proverbial manner of expression, he has made it ge- 
 neral: I will have mercy , and not sacrijice,* The pro- 
 priety of the word proverbial, is not the thing insisted 
 upon: ^.hough I think the manner of speaking is to be 
 called so. But that the manner of speaking very 
 remarkably renders the determination general, is surely 
 indisputable. For, had it, in the latter case, been said 
 only, that God preferred mercy to the rigid observance 
 of the Sabbath; even then, by parity of reason, most 
 justly might we have argued, that he preferred mercy 
 likewise, to the observance of other ritual institutions ; 
 and in general, moral duties, to positive ones. And 
 thus the determination would have been general ; though 
 its being so were inferred and not expressed. But as 
 the passage really stands in the Gospel, it is much 
 stronger. For the sense and the very literal words of 
 our Lord's answer are as applicable to any other 
 instance of a comparison, between positive and moral 
 duties, as to this upon which they were spoken. And 
 if, in case of competition, mercy is to be preferred to 
 positive institutions, it will scarce be thought, that 
 
 * Matth. ix. 13, and xii. 7. 
 
180 OF THE IMPORTANCE [PiRT II, 
 
 justice is to give place to them. It is remarkable too, 
 that, as the words are a quotation from the Old Testa- 
 ment, they are introduced, on both the forementioned 
 occasions, with a declaration, that the Pharisees did not 
 understand the meaning of them. This, I say, is very 
 remarkable. For, since it is scarce possible, for the 
 most ignorant person, not to understand the literal sense 
 of the passage, in the Prophet;* and since understanding 
 the literal sense would not have prevented their con- 
 demning the guiUless,\ it can hardly be doubted, that 
 the thing which our Lord really intended in that decla- 
 ration was, that the Pharisees had not learned from it, 
 as they might, wherein the general spirit of Religion 
 consists: that it consists in moral piety and virtue, as 
 distinguished from forms, and ritual observances. How- 
 ever, it is certain we may learn this from his divine 
 application of the passage, in the Gospel. 
 
 But, as it is one of the peculiar weaknesses of human 
 nature, when, upon a comparison of two things, one is 
 found to be of greater importance than the other, to 
 consider this other as of scarce any importance at all : 
 it is highly necessary that we remind ourselves, how 
 great presumption it is, to make hght of any institutions 
 of divine appointment ; that our obligations to obey all 
 God's commands whatever are absolute and indispens- 
 able ; and that commands merely positive, admitted to 
 be from him, lay us under a moral obligation to obey 
 them : an obligation moral in the strictest and most 
 proper sense. 
 
 To these things I cannot forbear adding, that the' 
 account now given of Christianity most strongly shows 
 and enforces upon us the obligation of searching the 
 Scriptures, in order to see, what the scheme of revela- 
 tion really is; instead of determining beforehand, from 
 reason, what the scheme of it must be.+ Indeed if in 
 Revelation there be found any passages, the seeming 
 meaning of which is contrary to natural Religion ; we 
 may most certainly conclude, such seeming meaning 
 not to be the real one. But it is not any degree of a 
 presumption against an interpretation of Scripture, that 
 
 * Hoe. vi. f See Mattli. xii. v;i. % See Chap, iiu 
 
CaAP. II.3 OF CHRISTIANITY. 181 
 
 such interpretation contains a doctrine, which the hght 
 of nature cannot discover;* or a precept, which the law 
 of nature does not obhge to. 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 OF THE SUPPOSED PRESUMPTION AGAINST A REVELATION 
 CONSIDERED AS MIRACULOUS. 
 
 Having shown the importance of the Christian revela- 
 tion, and the obligations which we are under seriously 
 to attend to it, upon supposition of its truth, or its cre- 
 dibility: the next thing in order, is to consider the sup- 
 posed presumptions against revelation in general ; which 
 shall be the subject of this Chapter: and the objections 
 against the Christian in particular; which shall be the 
 subject of some following ones.f For it seems the most 
 natural method, to remove the prejudices against Chris- 
 tianity, before we proceed to the consideration of the 
 positive evidence for it, and the objections against that 
 evidence. J 
 
 It is, I think, commonly supposed, that there is some 
 peculiar presumption, from the analogy of nature, against 
 the Christian scheme of things ; at least against miracles ; 
 so as that stronger evidence is necessary to prove the 
 truth and reality of them, than would be sufficient to con- 
 vince us of other events, or matters of fact, [ndeed the 
 consideration of this supposed presumption cannot but 
 be thought very insignificant, by many persons. Yet, 
 as it belongs to the subject of this Treatise ; so it may 
 tend to open the mind, and remove some prejudices: 
 however needless the consideration of it be, upon its 
 own account 
 
 I. I find no appearance of a presumption, from the 
 analogy of nature, against the general scheme of Chris- 
 tianity, that God created and invisibly governs the world 
 by Jesus Christ; and by him also will hereafter judge it 
 in righteousness, i. e. render to every one according to 
 his works ; and that good men are under the secret 
 
 * p. 181, 182. f Ch. iiL iv, v. vL J Ch. vii. 
 
\ 
 
 182 OF THE SUPPOSED PRESUMPTION [Part I J 
 
 influence of his Spirit. Whether these things are, or 
 are not, to be called miraculous, is, perhaps, only a 
 question about words ; or however, is of no moment in 
 the case. If the analogy of nature raises any presump- 
 tion against this general scheme of Christianity, it must 
 be, either because it is not discoverable by reason or expe- 
 rience; or else, because it is unlike that course of nature, 
 which is. But analogy raises no presumption against 
 the truth of this scheme, upon either of these accounts. 
 
 First, There is no presumption, from analogy, against 
 the truth of it, upon account of its not being discover- 
 able by reason or experience. For suppose one who 
 never heard of revelation, of the most improved under- 
 standing, and acquainted with our whole system of 
 natural philosophy and natural rehgion; such a one 
 could not but be sensible, that it was but a very small 
 part of the natural and moral system of the universe, 
 which he was acquainted with. He could not but be 
 sensible, that there must be innumerable things, in the 
 dispensations of Providence past, in the invisible govern- 
 ment over the world at present carrying on, and in what 
 is to come ; of which he was wholly ignorant,* and which 
 could not be discovered without revelation. Whether 
 the scheme of nature be, in the strictest sense, infinite 
 or not ; it is evidently vast, even beyond all possible 
 imagination. And doubtless that part of it, which is 
 opened to our view, is but as a point, in comparison of 
 the whole plan of Providence, reaching throughout 
 eternity past and future ; in comparison of what is even 
 now going on in the remote parts of the boundless 
 universe; nay, in comparison of the whole scheme of 
 this world. And therefore, that things lie beyond the 
 natural reach of our faculties, is no sort of presumption 
 against the truth and reality of them : because it is cer- 
 tain, there are innumerable things, in the constitution 
 and government of the universe, which are thus beyond 
 the natural reach of our faculties. Secondly, Analogy 
 raises no. presumption against any of the things con- 
 tained in this general doctrine of Scripture now men- 
 tioned, upon account of their being unlike the known 
 
 • F. 149. 
 
CHAP.n.] AGAINST MIRACLES. 1S3 
 
 course of nature. For there is no presumption at all 
 frbin^analogy, that the whole course of things, or divine 
 government, naturally unknown to us, and every thing 
 in it, is like to any thing in that which is known ; and 
 therefore no peculiar presumption against any thing in 
 the former, upon account of its being unlike to any thing 
 in the latter. And in the constitution and natural 
 government of the world, as well as in the moral 
 government of it, we see things, in a great degree, 
 unlike one another: and therefore ought not to wonder 
 at such unlikeness between things visible and invisible. 
 However, the scheme of Christianity is by no means 
 entirely unlike the scheme of nature; as will appear in 
 the following part of this Treatise. 
 
 The notion of a miracle, considered as a proof of a 
 divine mission, has been stated with great exactness by 
 divines ; and is, I think, sufficiently understood by every 
 one. There are also invisible miracles, the Incarnation 
 of Christ, for instance, which, being secret, cannot be 
 alleged as a proof of such a mission ; but require them- 
 selves to be proved by visible miracles. Revelation 
 itself too is miraculous ; and miracles are the proof of it ; 
 and the supposed presumption against these shall pre- 
 sently be considered. All which I have been observing 
 here is, that, whether we choose to call every thing in 
 the dispensations of Providence, not discoverable with- 
 out revelation, nor like the known course of things, 
 miraculous; and whether the general Christian dispensa- 
 tion now mentioned is to be called so, or not ; the fore- 
 going observations seem certainly to show, that there is 
 no presumption against it from the analogy of nature. 
 
 II. There is no presumption, from analogy, against 
 some operations, which we should now call miraculous ; 
 particularly none against a revelation at the beginning of 
 the world: nothing of such presumption against it, as is 
 supposed to be implied or expressed in the word, inira- 
 culous. For a miracle, in its very notion, is relative to a 
 course of nature ; and implies somewhat different from 
 it, considered as being so. Now, either there was no 
 course of nature at the time which we are speaking of; 
 or if there were, we are not acquainted what the course 
 
/ 
 
 184 OF THE SUPPOSED PRESUMPTION fp^BT II- 
 
 of nature is, upon the first peopling of worlds. And 
 therefore the question, whether mankind had a revelation 
 made to them at that time, is to be considered, not as a 
 question concerning a miracle, but as a common question 
 of fact. And we have the like reason, be it more or less, 
 to admit the report of tradition, concerning this question, 
 and concerning common matters of fact of the same 
 antiquity; for instance, what part of the earth was first 
 peopled. 
 
 Or thus: When mankind was first placed in this state, 
 there was a power exerted, totally different from the pre- 
 sent course of nature. Now, whether this power, thus 
 wholly different from the present course of nature, for 
 we cannot properly apply to it the word miraculous ; 
 whr ther this power stopped immediately after it had made 
 man, or went on, and exerted itself further in giving him 
 a revelation, is a question of the same kind, as whether 
 an ordinary power exerted itself in such a particular de- 
 gree and manner, or not. 
 
 Or suppose the power exerted in the formation of the 
 world be considered as miraculous, or rather, be called 
 bv that name ; the case will not be different : since it 
 must be acknowledged, that such a power was exerted. 
 For supposing it acknowledged, that our Saviour spent 
 some years in a course of working miracles : there is no 
 more presumption, worth mentioning, against his having 
 exerted this miraculous power, in a certain degree 
 greater, than in a certain degree less ; in one or two 
 more instances, than in on?, or two fewer; in this, than 
 in another manner. 
 
 It is evident then, that there can be no peculiar pre- 
 sumption, from the analogy of nature, against supposing 
 a revelation, when man was first placed upon earth. 
 
 Add, that there does not appear the least intimation 
 in history or tradition, that Religion was first reasoned 
 out : but the whole of history and tradition makes for 
 the other side, that it came into the world by revelation. 
 Indeed the state of Religion in the first ages, of wliich 
 we have any account, seems to suppose and imply, that 
 this was the original of it amongst mankind. And these 
 reflections together, without taking in the peculiar au^ 
 
Chap. U.] AGAINST MIRACLES. 185 
 
 thority of Scripture, amount to real and a very material 
 degree of evidence, that there was a revelation at the be- 
 ginning of the world. Now this, as it is a confirmation 
 of natural Religion, and therefore mentioned in the 
 for.mer part of this Treatise ;* so hkewise it has a tend- 
 ency to remove any prejudices against a subsequent 
 revelation. 
 
 III. But still it may be objected, that there is some 
 peculiar presumption, from analogy, against miracles; 
 particularly against revelation, after the settlement and 
 during the continuance of a course of nature. 
 
 Now with regard to this supposed presumption, it is 
 to be observed in general, that before we can have 
 ground for raising what can, with any propriety, be called 
 an argument from analogy, for or against revelation con- 
 sidered as somewhat miraculous, we must be acquainted 
 with a similar or parallel case. But the history of some 
 other world, seemingly in like circumstances with our 
 own, is no more than a parallel case: and therefore no- 
 thins; short of this can be so. Yet, could we come at a 
 presumptive proof, for or against a revelation, from being 
 informed, whether such world had one, or not ; such a 
 proof, being drawn from one single instance only, must 
 be infinitely precarious. More particularly: First of all; 
 There is a very strong presumption against common 
 speculative truths, and against the most ordinary facts, 
 before the proof of them; which yet is overcome by 
 almost any proof. There is a presumption of millions 
 to one, against the story of Ceesar, or of any other man. 
 For suppose a number of common facts so and so cir- 
 cumstanced, of which one had no kind of proof, should 
 happen to come into one's thoughts ; every one would, 
 without any possible doubt, conclude them to be false. 
 And the like may be said of a single common fact. And 
 from hence it appears, that the question of importance, 
 as to the matter before us, is, concerning the degree of 
 the peculiar presumption supposed against miracles ; not 
 whether there be any peculiar presumption at all against 
 them. For, if there be the presumption of millions to 
 one, against the most common facts ; what can a small 
 
 *P. 143, &c 
 
186 OF THE SUPPOSED PRESUMPTION [PAai II. 
 
 presumption, additional to this, amount to, though it be 
 peculiar? It cannot be estimated, and is as nothing. 
 The only material question is, whether there be any such 
 presumption against miracles, as to render them in any 
 sort incredible. Secondly, If we leave out the considera- 
 tion of Religion, we are in such total darkness, upon 
 what causes, occasions, reasons, or circumstances, the 
 present course of nature depends; that there does not 
 appear any improbability for or against supposing, that 
 five or six thousand years may have given scope for 
 causes, occasions, reasons, or circumstances, from whence 
 miraculous interpositions may have arisen. And from 
 this, joined with the foregoing observation, it will follow, 
 that there must be a presumption, beyond all comparison, 
 greater, against the jmrticidar common facts just now 
 instanced in, than against miracles in general; before any 
 evidence of either. But, T/m'dly, Take in the consid- 
 eration of Religion, or the moral system of the world, 
 and then we see distinct particular reasons for miracles: 
 to afford mankind instruction additional to that of nature, 
 and to attest the truth of it. And this gives a real credi- 
 bility to the supposition, that it might be part of the 
 original plan of things, that there should be miraculous 
 interpositions. Then, Lastly, Miracles must not be com- 
 pared to common natural events ; or to events which, 
 though uncommon, are similar to what we daily expe- 
 rience : but to the extraordinary phenomena of nature. 
 And then the comparison will be between the presump- 
 tion against miracles, and the presumption against such 
 uncommon appearances, suppose, as comets, and against 
 there being any such powers in nature as magnetism and 
 electricity, so contrary to the properties of other bodies 
 not endued with these powers. And before any one can 
 determine, whether there be any peculiar presumption 
 against miracles, more than against other extraordinary 
 things; he must consider, what, upon first hearing, 
 would be the presumption against the last mentioned 
 appearances and powers, to a person acquainted only 
 with the daily, monthly, and annual course of nature re- 
 specting this earth, and with those common powers of 
 matter which we every da^^ see. 
 
Chap. III.] AGAINST MIRACLES. 187 
 
 Upon all this I conclude ; that there certainly is no 
 such presumption against miracles, as to render them in 
 any wise incredible : that, on the contrary, our being able 
 to discern reasons for them, gives a positive credibility 
 to the history of them, in cases where those reasons hold : 
 and that it is by no means certain, that there is any pecu- 
 liar presumption at all, from analogy, even in the lowest 
 degree, against miracles, as distinguished from other ex- 
 traordinary phenomena : though it is not worth while to 
 perplex the reader with inquiries into the abstract nature 
 of evidence, in order to determine a question, which, 
 without such inquiries, we see* is of no importance. 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 OF OUR INCAPACITY OF JUDGING, WHAT WERE TO BE 
 EXPECTED IN A REVELATION j AND THE CREDIBILITY, 
 FROM ANALOGY, THAT IT MUST CONTAIN THINGS 
 APPEARING LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS. 
 
 Besides the objections against the evidence for Chris- 
 tianity, many are alleged against the scheme of it; 
 against the whole manner in which it is put and left 
 with the Avorld; as well as against several particular 
 relations in Scripture: objections drawn from the defi- 
 ciencies of revelation: from things in it appearing to 
 men foolishness ;'^ from its containing matters of offence, 
 which have led, and it must have been foreseen would 
 lead, into strange enthusiasm and superstition, and be 
 made to serve the purposes of tyranny and wickedness; 
 from its not being universal; and, which is a thing of 
 the same kind, from its evidence not being so convinc- 
 ing and satisfactory as it might have been: for this last 
 is sometimes turned into a positive argument against its 
 truth.t It would be tedious, indeed impossible, to enu- 
 merate the several particulars comprehended under the 
 objections here referred to; they being so various, 
 according to the different fancies of men. There are 
 persons who tliink it a strong objection against the 
 
 * P. 185. t 1 Cor. i. 28. J See Ch. vi. 
 
188 THE CREDIBILITY OF REVELATION [Part II. 
 
 authority of Scripture, that it is not composed by rules of 
 art, agreed upon by critics, for pohte and correct writing. 
 And the scorn is inexpressible, with which some of the 
 prophetic parts of Scripture are treated: partly through 
 the rashness of interpreters; but very much also, on 
 account of the hieroglyphical and figurative language, in 
 which they are left us. Some of the principal things of 
 this sort shall be particularly considered in the following 
 Chapters. But my design at present is to observe in 
 general, with respect to this whole way of arguing, that, 
 upon supposition of a revelation, it is highly credible 
 beforehand, we should be incompetent judges of it to a 
 great degree: and that it would contain many things 
 appearing to us liable to great objections; in case we 
 judge of it otherwise, than by the analogy of nature. 
 And therefore, though objections against the evidence 
 of Christianity are most seriously to be considered ; yet 
 objections against Christianity itself are, in a great mea- 
 sure, frivolous: almost all objections against it, except- 
 ing those which are alleged against the particular proofs 
 of its coming from God. I express myself with caution, 
 lest I should be mistaken to vilify reason ; which is 
 indeed the only faculty we have wherewith to judge 
 concerning any thing, even revelation itself: or be mis- 
 understood to assert, that a supposed revelation cannot 
 be proved false, from internal characters. For, it may 
 contain clear immoralities or contradictions; and eidier 
 of these would prove it false. Nor will I take upon me 
 to affirm, that nothing else can possibly render any sup- 
 posed revelation incredible. Yet still the observation 
 above, is, I think, true beyond doubt ; that objections 
 against Christianity, as distinguished from objections 
 against its evidence, are frivolous. To make out this, 
 is the general design of the present Chapter. And with 
 regard to the w^hole of it, I cannot but particularly wish, 
 that the proofs might be attended to; rather than the 
 assertions cavilled at, upon account of any unacceptable 
 consequences, whether real or supposed, which may be 
 drawn from them. For, after all, that which is true, 
 must be admitted, though it should show us the short- 
 ness of our faculties; and that we are in no wise judges 
 
Chap. III.] LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS. 189 
 
 of many things, of which we are apt to think ourselves 
 very competent ones. Nor will this be any objection 
 with reasonable men, at least upon second thought it 
 will not be any objection with such, against the justness 
 of the following observations. 
 
 As God governs the world and instructs his crea- 
 tures, according to certain laws or rules, in the known 
 course of nature ; known by reason together with ex- 
 perience: so the Scripture informs us of a scheme of 
 divine Providence, additional to this. It relates, that 
 God has, by revelation, instructed men in things con- 
 cerning his government, which they could not otherwise 
 have known ; and reminded them of things, which 
 tliey might otherwise know ; and attested the truth of 
 the whole by miracles. Now if the natural and the re- 
 vealed dispensation of things are both from God, if they 
 coincide with each other, and together make up one 
 scheme of Providence ; our being incompetent judges of 
 one, must render it credible, that we may be incompe- 
 tent judges also of the other. Since, upon experience, 
 the acknowledged constitution and course of nature is 
 found to be greatly different from what, before experi- 
 ence, would have been expected ; and such as, men 
 fancy, there lie great objections against : this renders it 
 beforehand highly credible, that they may find the re- 
 vealed dispensation likewise, if they judge of it as they 
 do of the constitution of nature, very different from 
 expectations formed beforehand ; and liable, in appear- 
 ance, to great objections : objections against the scheme 
 itself, and against the degrees and manners of the mira- 
 culous interpositions, by which it was attested and carried 
 on. Thus, suppose a prince to govern his dominions 
 in the wisest manner possible, by common known laws ; 
 and that upon some exigencies he should suspend these 
 laws ; and govern, in several instances, in a different 
 manner ; if one of his subjects were not a competent 
 judgs beforehand, by what common rules the government 
 should or would be carried on ; it could not be expected, 
 that the same person would be a competent judge, in 
 what exigencies, or in what manner, or to what degree, 
 those laws commonly observed would be suspended or 
 
190 THE CREDIBILITY OF REVELATION. [Part 11. 
 
 deviated from. If he were not a judge of the wisdom of 
 the ordinary administration, there is no reason to think 
 he would be a judge of the wisdom of the extraordinary. 
 If he thought he had objections against the former; 
 doubtless, it is highly supposable, he might think also, 
 that he had objections against the latter. And thus, as 
 we fall into infinite follies and mistakes, whenever we 
 pretend, otherwise than from experience and analogy, to 
 judge of the constitution and course of nature; it is evi- 
 dently supposable beforehand, that we should fall into as 
 great, in pretending to judge, in like manner, concerning 
 revelation. Nor is there any more ground to expect 
 that this latter should appear to us clear of objections, 
 than that the former should. 
 
 These observations, relating to the whole of Chris- 
 tianity, are applicable to inspiration in particular. As 
 we are in no sort judges beforehand, by what laws or 
 rules, in what degree, or by what means, it were to 
 have been expected, that God would naturally instruct 
 us; so upon supposition of his affording us light and 
 instruction by revelation, additional to what he has 
 afforded us by reason and experience, we are in no sprt 
 judges, by what methods, and in what proportion, it 
 were to be expected that this supernatural light and 
 instruction would be afforded us. We know not before- 
 hand, what degree or kind of natural information it were 
 to be expected God would afford men, each by his own 
 reason and experience: nor how far he would enable 
 and effectually dispose them to communicate it, what- 
 ever it should be, to each other; nor whether the evidence 
 of it would be certain, highly probable, or doubtful ; nor 
 whether it would be given with equal clearness and 
 conviction to all. Nor could we guess, upon any 
 good ground I mean, whether natural knowledge, o^ 
 even the faculty itself, by which we are capable o' 
 attaining it, reason, would be given us at once, or gra- 
 dually. In like manner, we are wholly ignorant, what 
 degree of new knowledge, it were to be expected, 
 God would give mankind by revelation, upon supposi- 
 tion of his affording one: or how far, or in what way, 
 he would interpose miraculously, to qualify them, to 
 
PiiAP. HI.] LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS. ^01 
 
 whom he should originally make the revelation, for 
 communicating the knowledge given by it ; and to 
 secure their doing it to the age in which they should live ; 
 and to secure its being transmitted to posterity. We 
 are equally ignorant, whether the evidence of it would 
 be certain or highly probable, or doubtful:* or whether 
 all who should have any degree of instruction from it, 
 and any degree of evidence of its truth, would have the 
 same: or whether the scheme would be revealed at once, 
 or unfolded gradually. Nay we are not in any sort able 
 to judge, whether it were to have been expected, that 
 the revelation should have been committed to writing ; or 
 left to be handed down, and consequently corrupted, by 
 verbal tradition, and at length sunk under it, if mankind 
 so pleased, and during such time as they are permitted, 
 in the degree they evidently are, to act as they will. 
 
 But it may be said, " that a revelation in some of the 
 above mentioned circumstances, one, for instance, which 
 was not committed to writing, and thus secured against 
 danger of corruption, would not have answered its pur- 
 pose." I ask, what purpose ? It would not have answered 
 all the purposes, which it has now answered, and in the 
 same degree: but it would have answered others, or 
 the same in different degrees. And which of these were 
 the purposes of God, and best fell in with his general 
 government, we could not at all have determined before- 
 hand. 
 
 Now since it has been shown, that we have no prin- 
 ciples of reason, upon which to judge beforehand, how it 
 were to be expected revelation should have been left, or 
 what was most suitable to the divine plan of government, 
 in any of the forementioned respects ; it must be quite 
 frivolous to object afterward as to any of them, against 
 its being left in one way, rather than another: for this 
 would be to object against things, upon account of their 
 being different from expectations, which have been shown 
 to be without reason. And thus we see, that the only 
 question concerning the truth of Christianity is, whether 
 it be a real revelation ; not whether it be attended with 
 every circumstance which we should have looked for: 
 
 * See Cbap. vi. 
 
192 THE CREDIBILITY OF REVELATION [Part It 
 
 and concerning the authority of Scripture, whether it 
 be what it claims to be ; not whether it be a book of 
 such sort, and so promulged, as weak men are apt to 
 fancy a book containing a divine revelation should. And 
 therefore, neither obscurity, nor seeming inaccuracy of 
 style, nor various readings, nor early disputes about 
 the authors of particular parts ; nor any other things of 
 the like kind, though they had been much more consid- 
 erable in degree than they are, could overthrow the 
 authority of the Scripture : unless the Prophets, Apostles, 
 or our Lord, had promised, that the book containing the 
 divine revelation should be secure from those things. 
 Nor indeed can any objections overthrow such a kind of 
 revelation as the Christian claims to be, since there are 
 no objections against the morality of it,* but such as can 
 show, that there is no proof of miracles wrought origi- 
 nally in attestation of it ; no appearance of any thing 
 miraculous in its obtaining in the world ; nor any of pro- 
 phecy, that is, of events foretold, which human sagacity 
 could not foresee. If it can be shown, that the proof 
 alleged for all these is absolutely none at all, then is reve- 
 lation overturned. But were it allowed, that the proof 
 of any one or all of them is lower than is allowed ; yet, 
 whilst any proof of them remains, revelation will stand 
 upon much the same foot it does at present, as to all the 
 purposes of life and practice, and ought to have the hke. 
 influence upon our behaviour. 
 
 From the foregoing observations too, it will follow, and 
 those who will thoroughly examine into revelation will 
 find it worth remarking ; that there are several ways ol 
 arguing, which, though just with regard to other writings, 
 are not applicable to Scripture : at least not to the pro- 
 phetic parts of it. We cannot argue, for instance, that 
 this cannot be the sense or intent of such a passage of 
 Scripture ; for, if it had, it would have been expressed 
 more plainly, or have been represented under a more 
 apt figure or hieroglyphic : yet we may justly argue thus, 
 with respect to common books. And the reason of this 
 difference is very evident ; that in Scripture we are not 
 competent judges, as we are in common books, how 
 
 • p. 198. 
 
CHAr. III.] LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS. 193 
 
 plainly it were to have been expected, what is the true 
 sense should have been expressed, or under how apt an 
 image figured. The only question is, what appearance 
 there is, that this is the sense ; and scarce at all, how 
 much more determinately or accurately it might have 
 been expressed or figured. 
 
 "But is it not self-evident, that internal improbabilities 
 of all kinds weaken external probable proof .^" Doubtless. 
 But to what practical purpose can this be alleged here, 
 when it has been proved before,* that real internal im- 
 probabihties, which rise even to moral certainty, are 
 overcome by the most ordinary testimony ; and when it 
 now has been mads appear, that we scarce know what 
 are improbabilities, as to the matter we are here con- 
 sidering : as it will further appear from what follows. 
 
 For though from the observations above made it is 
 manifest, that we are not in any sort competent judges, 
 what supernatural instruction were to have been expected ; 
 and though it is self-evident, that the objections of an 
 incompetent judgment must be frivolous; yet it may be 
 proper to go one step farther, and observe ; that if m.en 
 will be regardless of these things, and pretend to judge 
 of the Scripture by preconceived expectations ; the ana- 
 logy of nature shows beforehand, not only that it is highly 
 ci'edible they may, but also probable that they will, ima- 
 gine they have strong objections against it, however 
 really unexceptionable: for so, prior to experience, they 
 would think theyjiad, against the circumstances, and 
 degrees, and the whole manner of that instruction, which 
 is afforded by the ordinary course of nature. Were the 
 instruction which God affords to brute creatures by in- 
 stincts and mere propensions, and to mankind by these 
 together with reason, matter of probable proof, and not 
 of certain observation ; it v/ould be rejected as incredible, 
 in many instances of it, only upon account of the mean.^ 
 by which this instruction is given, the seeming dispro- 
 portions, the limitations, necessary conditions, and cir- 
 cumstances of it. For instance: would it not have been 
 thought highly improbable, that mm should have been 
 so much more capable of discovering, even to certainly 
 
 * p. 181. 
 
 N 
 
194 THE CREDIBILITY OF REVELATION [PartIL 
 
 the general laws of matter, and the magnitudes, paths, 
 and revolutions, of heavenly bodies ; than the occasions 
 and cures of distempers, and many other things, in which 
 human life seems so much more nearly concerned, than 
 in astronomy? How capricious and irregular a wav of 
 information would it be said, is that of invention, by means 
 of which nature instructs us in matters of science, and in 
 many things, upon which the affairs of the world greatly 
 depend: that a man should, by this faculty, be made ac- 
 quainted with a thing in an instant, when perhaps he is 
 thinking of somewhat else, which he has in vain been 
 searching after, it may be, for years. So likewise the 
 imperfections attending the only method, by which nature 
 enables and directs us to communicate our thoughts to 
 each other, are innumerable. Language is, in its very 
 nature, inadequate, ambiguous, liable to infinite abuse, 
 even from negligence; and so liable to it from design, 
 that every man can deceive and betray by it. And, to 
 mention but one instance more; that brutes, without 
 reason, should act, in many respects, with a sagacity and 
 foresight vastly greater than what men have in those re- 
 spects, would be thought impossible. Yet it is certain 
 they do act with such superior foresight : whether it be 
 their own, indeed, is another question. From these things, 
 it is highly credible beforehand, that upon supposition 
 God should afford men some additional instruction by 
 revelation, it would be with circumstances, in manners, 
 degrees, and respects, which we should be apt to fancy 
 we had great objections against the credibility of Nor 
 are the objections against the Scripture, nor against 
 Christianity in general, at all more or greater, than the 
 analogy of nature would beforehand — not perhaps give 
 ground to expect ; for this analogy may not be sufficient, 
 in some cases, to ground an expectation upon; but no 
 more nor greater, than analogy would show it, before- 
 . hand, to be supposable and credible, that there might 
 seem to lie against revelation. 
 
 By applying these general observations to a particular 
 objection, it will be more distinctly seen, how they are 
 applicable to others of the like kind : and indeed to 
 almost all objections against (,nristianity, as distinguish 
 
Chap.iii.] liable to objections. 195 
 
 from objections against its evidence. It appears from 
 Scripture, that, as it was not unusual in the apostolic age, 
 for persons, upon their conversion to Christianity, to be 
 endued with miraculous gifts; so, some of those persons 
 exercised these gifts in a strangely irregular and disor- 
 derly manner; and this is made an objection against 
 their being really miraculous. Now the foregoing obser- 
 vations quite remove this objection, how considerable 
 soever it may appear at first sight. For, consider a 
 person endued with any of these gifts ; for instance, that 
 of tongues : it is to be supposed, that he had the same 
 power over this miraculous gift, as he would have had 
 over it, had it been the effect of habit, of study and use, 
 as it ordinarily is ; or the same power over it, as he had 
 over any other natural endowment. Consequently, he 
 would use it in the same manner he did any other ; either 
 regularly, and upon proper occasions only, or irregularly, 
 and upon improper ones: according to his sense of de- 
 cency, and his character of prudence. Where then is the 
 objection. ^^ Why, if this miraculous power was indeed 
 given to the world to propagate Christianity, and attest the 
 truth of it, we might, it seems, have expected, that other 
 sort of persons should have been chosen to be invested 
 with it ; or that these should, at the same time, have been 
 endued with prudence; or that they should have been con- 
 tinually restrained and directed in the exercise of it: z. e. 
 that God should have miraculously interposed, if at all, 
 in a different manner, or higher degree. But, from the 
 observations made above, it is undeniably evident, that 
 we are not judges in what degrees and manners it were 
 to have been expected he should miraculously interpose; 
 upon supposition of his doing it in some degree and 
 manner. Nor, in the natural course of Providence, are 
 superior gifts of memory, eloquence, knowledge, and 
 other talents of great influence, conferred only on per- 
 sons of prudence and decency, or such as are disposed 
 to make the properest use of them. Nor is the instruc- 
 tion and admonition naturally afforded us for the conduct 
 of life, particularly in our education, commonly given in a 
 manner the most suited to recommend it; but often with 
 circumstances apt to prejudice us against such instruction. 
 
 V 2 
 
196 THE CREDIBILITY OF REVELATION rp.vBT II. 
 
 One might go on to add, that there is a great resem- 
 blance between the hght of nature and of revelation, in 
 several other respects. Practical Christianity, or that 
 faith and behaviour which renders a man a Christian, is 
 a plain and obvious thing: like the common rules of 
 conduct, with respect to our ordinary temporal affairs. 
 The more distinct and particular knowledge of those 
 things, the study of which the Apostle calls going on unto 
 perfection* and of the prophetic parts of revelation, 
 like many parts of iiatm*al and even civil knowledge, 
 may require very exact thought, and careful considera- 
 tion. The hinderances too, of natural, and of superna- 
 tural light and knowledge, have been of the same kind. 
 And as it is owned the whole scheme of Scripture is 
 not yet understood; so, if it ever comes to be under- 
 stood, before the restitution of all things,'^ and without 
 miraculous interpositions ; it must be in the same way 
 as natural knowledge is come at: by the continuance 
 and progress of learning and of liberty ; and by parti- 
 cular persons attending to, comparing, and pursuing, 
 intimations scattered up and down it, which are over- 
 looked and disregarded by the generality of the world. 
 For this is the way, in which all improvements are 
 made ; by thoughtful men's tracing on obscure hints, as 
 it were, dropped us by nature accidtntaliy, or which 
 seem to come into our minds by chance. Nor is it at 
 all incredible, that a book, which has been so long in 
 the possession of mankind, should contain many truths 
 as yet undiscovered. For, all the same phenomena, 
 and the same faculties of investigation, from which sucli 
 great discoveries in natural knowledge have been made 
 in the present and last age, were equally in the posses- 
 sion of mankind, several thousand years before. And 
 possibly it might be intended, that events, as they come 
 to pass, should open and ascertain the meaning of se- 
 veral parts of Scripture. 
 
 It may be objected, that this analogy fails in a mate- 
 rial respect: for that natural knowledge is of little or no 
 consequence. But I ha\e been speaking of the general 
 instruction which nature does or does not afford us. 
 
 * Heb. vi. I. ■{• Acts iii. 21. 
 
Chap. III.] LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS. 197 
 
 And besides, some parts of natural knowledge, in the 
 more common restrained sense cf the words, are of the 
 greatest consequence to the ease and convenience of 
 life. But suppose the analogy did, as it does not, fail 
 in this respect; yet it might be abundantly supplied, 
 from the whole constitution and course of nature: which 
 shows, that God does not dispense his gifts according to 
 our notions of the advantage and consequence they 
 would be of to us. And this in general, with his 
 method of dispensing knowledge in particular, would 
 together make out an analogy full to the point before us. 
 But it may be objected still further and more gene- 
 rally ; " The Scripture represents the world as in a state 
 of ruin, and Christianity as an expedient to recover it, 
 to help in these respects where nature fails: in particu- 
 lar, to supply the deficiencies of natural light. Is it 
 credible then, that so many ages should have been let 
 pass, before a matter of such a sort, of so great and so 
 general importance, was made known to mankmd; and 
 then that it should be made known to so small a part of 
 them ? Is it conceivable, that this supply should be so 
 very deficient, should have the like obscurity and doubt- 
 fulness, be liable to the like perversions, in short, lie 
 open to all the like objections, as the light of nature 
 itself .P* AVithout determining how far this, in fact, is 
 so, I answer; it is by no means incredible, that it might 
 be so, if the light of nature and of revelation be from 
 the same hand. Men are naturally liable to diseases : 
 for which God, in his good providence, has provided 
 natural remedies, + But remedies existing in nature 
 have been unknown to mankind for many ages : are 
 known but to few now: probably many valuable ones 
 aie not known yet. Great has been and is the obscu- 
 rity and difficulty, in the nature and application of them. 
 Circumstances seem often to make them very improper, 
 where they are absolutely necessary. It is after long 
 labour and stud}', and many unsuccessful endeavours, 
 that they are brought to be as useful as they are ; after 
 high contempt and absolute rejection of the most useful 
 we have; and after disputes and doubts, which have 
 
 • Ciu Ti. t Ch. V. 
 
198 THE CREDIBILITY OF REVELATION [Part II. 
 
 seemed to be endless. The best lemedies too, when 
 unskilfully, much more if dishonestly applied, may pro- 
 duce new diseases; and with the rightest application 
 the success of them is often doubtful. In many cases 
 they are not at all effectual : where they are, it is often 
 very slowly : and the application of them, and the neces- 
 sary regimen accompanying it, is, not uncommonly, so 
 disagreeable, that some will not submit to them.; and 
 satisfy themselves with the excuse, that, if they would, 
 it is not certain whether it would be successful. And 
 many persons, who labour under diseases, for which 
 there are known natural remedies, are not so happy as 
 to be always, if ever, in the way of them. In a word, 
 the remedies which nature has provided for diseases are 
 neither certain, perfect, nor universal. And indeed the 
 same principles of arguing, which would lead us to con- 
 clude, that they must be so, would lead us likewise to 
 conclude, that there could be no occasion for them ; i. e. 
 that there could be no diseases at all. And therefore 
 our experience that there are diseases shows, that it is 
 credible beforehand, upon supposition nature has pro- 
 vided remedies for them, that these remedies may be, 
 as by experience we find they are, not certain, nor per- 
 fect, nor universal; because it shows, that the princi- 
 ples upon which we should expect, the contrary are 
 fallacious. 
 
 And now, wha!: is the just consequence from all these 
 things? Not that reason is no judge of what is offered to 
 us as being of divine revelation. For this would be to 
 infer that we are unable to judge of any thing, because 
 we are unable to judge of all things. Reason can, and 
 it ought to judge, not only of the meaning, but also of 
 the morality and the evidence of revelation. Firsts It is 
 the province of reason to judge of the morality of the 
 Scripture ; i. e. not whether it contains things different 
 from what we should have expected from a wise, just, 
 and good Being ; for objections from hence have been 
 now obviated : but whether it contains things plainly 
 contradictory to wisdom, justice, or goodness; to what the 
 light of nature teaches us of God. And I know nothing 
 of this sort objected against Scripture, excepting such oh 
 
Chap, m.] LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS ■ ' :■ ,. . 199 
 
 jections as are formed upon suppositions^ which would 
 equally conclude, that the constitution of nature is con- 
 tradictory to wisdom, justice or goodness ; which most 
 certainly it is not. Indeed there are some particular 
 precepts in Scripture, given to particular persons, re- 
 quiring actions, which would be immoral and vicious, 
 were it not for such precepts. But it is easy to see, that 
 all these are of such a kind, as that the precept changes 
 the whole nature of the case and of the action ; and both 
 constitutes and shows that not to be unjust or immoral, 
 ■which, prior to the precept, must have appeared and 
 really have been so : which may well be, since none of 
 these precepts are contrary to immutable morality. If 
 it were commanded, to cultivate the principles, and act 
 from the spirit of treachery, ingratitude, cruelty ; the 
 command would not alter the nature of the case or of 
 the action, in any of these instances. But it is quite 
 otherwise in precepts, which require only the doing an 
 external action : for instance, taking away the property, 
 or life of any. For men have no right to either life or 
 property, but what arises solely from the grant of God ; 
 wdien this grant is revoked, they cease to have any right 
 at all in either: and when this revocation is made known, 
 as surely it is possible it may be, it must cease to be 
 unjust to deprive them of either. And though a course 
 of external acts, which without command would be im- 
 moral, must make an immoral habit ; yet a few detached 
 commands have no such natural tendency. I. thought 
 proper to say thus much of the few Scripture precepts, 
 which require, not vicious actions, but actions which 
 would have been vicious, had it not been for such pre- 
 cepts ; because they are sometimes weakly urged as 
 immoral, and great weight is laid upon objections drawn 
 from them. But to me there seems no difficulty at all 
 in these precepts, but what arises from their being of- 
 fences : i. e. from their being liable to be perverted, as 
 indeed they are, by wicked designing men, to serve the 
 most horrid piu-poses ; and, perhaps, to mislead the weak 
 and enthusiastic. And obiections from this head are riot 
 objections agamst revelation ; but agamst the whole 
 iiotion of rehgion, as a trial : and against the general 
 
200 THE CREDIBILITY OF REVELATION, &C. [Part II. 
 
 constitution of nature. Secondly, Reason is aMe to judge, 
 and must, of the evidence of revelation, and of the ob- 
 jections urged against that evidence : which shall be the 
 subject of a following Chapter,* 
 
 But the consequence of the foregoing observations is, 
 that the question upon which the truth of Christianity 
 depends is scarce at all, what objections there are against 
 its scheme, since there are none against the morality of 
 it; hnt ivliat objections there are against its evidence; or, 
 U)hat proof there remains of ity after due allowances made 
 for the objections against that proof: because it has been 
 shown, that the objections against Christianity , as distin- 
 guished from objections against its evidence, are frivolous. 
 For surely very little weight, if any at all, is to be laid 
 upon a way of arguing and objecting, which, when ap- 
 plied to the general constitution of nature, experience 
 shows not to be conclusive: and such, I think, is the 
 whole way of objecting treated of throughout this Chap- 
 ter. It is resolvable into principles, and goes upon sup- 
 positions, which mislead us to think, that the Author of 
 Nature would not act, as we experience he does; or 
 would act, in such and such cases, as we experience he 
 does not in like cases. But the unreasonableness of 
 this way of objecting will appear yet more evidently from 
 hence, that the chief things thus objected against are 
 justified, as shall be further shown,! by distinct, parti- 
 cular, and full analogies, in the constitution and course of 
 nature. 
 
 But it is to be remembered, that, as frivolous as ob- 
 jections of the foregoing sort against revelation are, yet, 
 when a supposed revelation is more consistent with itself, 
 and has a more general and uniform tendency to pro- 
 mote virtue, than, all circumstances considered, could 
 have been expected from enthusiasm and political views ; 
 this is a presumptive proof of its not proceeding from 
 them, and so of its truth: because we are competent 
 judges, what might have been expected from enthusiasm 
 and political views. 
 
 * Cbap. viL f Cb, iv, latter part, and v. vi. 
 
CiL»p, IVJ ■'^'i- CHRISTIANITY A SCHEME, ETC. " - 201 
 
 CHAP. IV, 
 
 OF CHillSTIANITY, CONSIDERED AS A SCHEME OR CONSTI- 
 TUTION, IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED. 
 
 It hath been now shown,* that the analogy of nature 
 renders it highly credible beforehand, that, supposing a 
 revelation to be made, it must contain many things very 
 different from what we sh-ould have expected, and such 
 as appear open to great objections: and that this obser- 
 vation, in good measure, takes off the force of those ob- 
 jections, or rather precludes them. But it may be alleged, 
 that this is a very partial answer to such objections, or a 
 very unsatisfactory way of obviating them : because it 
 doth not show at all, that the things objected against can 
 be wise, just, and good; much less, that it is credible 
 they are so. It will therefore be proper to show this 
 distinctly; by applying to these objections against the 
 wisdom, justice, and goodness of Christianity, the answer 
 abovet given to the like objections against the constitu- 
 tion of Nature: before we consider the particular analo- 
 gies in the latter, to the particular things objected against 
 in the former. Now that which affords a sufficient 
 answer to objections against the wisdom, justice, and 
 goodness of the constitution of Nature, is its being a con- 
 stitution, a system, or scheme, imperfectly comprehended ; 
 a scheme in which means are made use of to accomplish 
 ends ; and which is carried on by general laws. For 
 from these things it has been proved, not only to be 
 possible, but also to be credible, that those things which 
 are objected against may be consistent with wisdom, 
 justice, and goodness ; nay, ma}^ be instances of them : 
 and even that the constitution and government of Nature 
 may be perfect in the highest possible degree. If Chris- 
 tianity then be a scheme, and of the like kind ; it is evi- 
 dent, the like objections against it must admit of the like 
 answer. And, 
 
 * In the forpgoing Chapter. 
 t Part L Ch. vii. to wliich this ail along refen. 
 
202 " ' CHRISTIANITY A SCHEME ' [p^bt U. 
 
 I. Christianity is a scheme, quite beyond our compre- 
 hension. The moral government of God is exercised, 
 by gradually conducting things so in the course of his 
 providence, that every one, at length and upon the 
 whole, shall receive according to his deserts ; and neither 
 fraud nor violence, but truth and right, shall finally pre- 
 vail. Christianity is a particular scheme under this ge- 
 neral plan of Providence, and a part of it, conducive to 
 its completion, with regard to mankind : consisting itself 
 also of various parts, and a mysterious economy, which 
 has been carrying on from the time the world came into 
 its present wretched state, and is still carrying on, for its 
 recovery, by a divine person, the Messiah ; who is to 
 (jather together in one the children of God, that are scatter- 
 ed abroad,^ and establish an everlasting kingdom, wherein 
 dwelleth 7'ighteoicsness.f And in order to it ; after various 
 manifestations of things, relating to this great and gene- 
 ral scheme of Providence, through a succession of many 
 ages: (For the Spirit of Christ which loas in the prophets, 
 testified beforehand his sufferings, and the glory that should 
 follow : unto whom it was revealed, that not unto themselves, 
 but unto us they did minister the things which are now re- 
 ported unto us by them that have preached the Gospel; 
 which things the angels desire to look into .'t) — after various 
 dispensations looking forward and preparatory to, this 
 final salvation; in the fulness of time, when infinite wis- 
 dom thought fit; He, being in the form of God, — made 
 him,self of no reputation, and took upon him the form of a 
 servant, and was made in the likeness of men : and being 
 found in fashion as a man, he humbled himself and became 
 obedient to death, even the death of the cross : wherefore 
 God also hath highly exalted him, and given him a name, 
 which is above every yiame : that at the name of Jesus every 
 knee should bow, of things in heaven, and tilings in the 
 earth, and things under the earth : and that every tongue 
 should confess, that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of 
 God the Father. i Parts likewise of this economy are the 
 miraculous mission of the Holy Ghost, and his ordinary 
 assistances given to good men : the invisible government, 
 which Christ at present exercises over his church : that 
 
 *Johnx3. 52. t 2 Pet. Hi. 13. i 1 Pet. i. 11, 12. § PhiL iu 
 
Chap. IV.] IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED. 203 
 
 which he himself refers to in these Avords ; In my Father s 
 house are many mansions — / go to prepare a place for 
 you ;* and his future return to judge the world in right- 
 eousness, and completely re-establish the kingdom of 
 God. For the Father judgeth no man ; but hath committed 
 all judgment unto the Son: that all men should honour the 
 Son, even as they honour the Father A All power is given 
 unto him in heaven and in earth.X And lie must reign, till 
 he hath put all enemies under his feet. Then cometh the 
 end, when he shall have delivered up the kingdom to God, 
 even the Father ; when he shall have put down all rule, and 
 all authority and power. And lohen all things shall he 
 subdued unto him, then shall the Son also himself be sub- 
 ject unto him that put all things under him, that God may 
 be all in all.§ Now little, surely, need be said to show, 
 that this system, or scheme of things, is but imperfectly 
 comprehended by us. The Scripture expressly asserts it 
 to be so. And indeed one cannot read a passage relat- 
 ing to this great mystery of godliness,\\ but what immedi- 
 ately runs up into something which shows us our igno- 
 rance in it; as every thing in nature shows us our igno- 
 rance in the constitution of nature. And whoever will 
 seriously consider that part of the Christian scheme, 
 which is revealed in Scripture, will find so much more 
 unrevealed, as will convince him, that, to all the pur- 
 poses of judging and objecting, we know as little of it, as 
 of the constitution of nature. Our ignorance, therefore, 
 is as much an answer to our objections against the per- 
 fection of one, as against the perfection of the other.f 
 
 II. It is obvious too, that in the Christian dispen- 
 sation, as much as in the natural scheme of things, 
 means are made use of to accomplish ends. And the 
 observation of this furnishes us with the same answer, 
 to objections against the perfection of Christianity, as to 
 objections of the like kind, against the constitution of 
 nature. It shows the credibility, that the things object- 
 ed against, how foolish** soever they appear to men, 
 may be the very best means of accomplishing the very 
 best ends. And their appearing foolishness is no pre- 
 
 * John xiv. 2. f John v. 22, 23. J Matth. xxviii. 18. 
 
 (I 1 Tim. iii. IG. ^ P. 153, &c. ** 1 Cor. L 
 
204 CHRISTIANITY A SCHEME [Tabi IL 
 
 sumption against this, in a scheme so greatly beyond 
 cm' comprehension.* 
 
 A. 
 
 III. The crcdibihty, that the Christian dispensation 
 may have been, all along, carried on by general laws,f 
 no less than the course of nature, may require to be 
 more distinctly made out. Consider then, upon what 
 ground it is we say, that the whole common course of 
 nature is carried on according to general fore-ordained 
 laws. We know indeed several of the general laws of 
 matter: and a great part of the natural behaviour of liv- 
 ing agents is reducible to general laws. But we know 
 in a manner nothing, by what laws, storms and tem- 
 pests, earthquakes, famine, pestilence, become the 
 instruments of destruction to mankind. And the laws, 
 by which persons born into the world at such a time 
 and place are of such capacities, geniuses, tempers ; the 
 laws, by which thoughts come into our mind, in a mul- 
 titude of cases; and by which innumerable things hap- 
 pen, of the greatest influence upon the affairs and state 
 of the world; these laws are so wholly unknown to us, 
 that we call the events, which come to pass by them, 
 accidental: though all reasonable men know certainly, 
 that there cannot, in reality, be any such thing as chance; 
 and conclude, that the things which have this appear- 
 ance are the result of general laws, and may be reduced 
 into them. It is then but an exceeding little way, and 
 in but a very few respects, that we can trace up the na- 
 tural course of things before us, to general laws. And 
 it is only from analogy, that we conclude the whole of it 
 to be capable of being reduced into them: only from 
 our seeing, that part is so. It is from our finding, that 
 the course of nature, in some respects and so far, goes 
 on by general laws, that we conclude this of the rest. 
 And if that be a just ground for such a conclusion, it is 
 a just ground also, if not to conclude, yet to apprehend, 
 to render it supposable and credible, which is sufficient 
 for answering objections, that God's miraculous inter- 
 positions may have been, all along in like manner, by 
 general laws of wisdom. Thus, that miraculous powers 
 should be exerted, at such times, upon such occasions, 
 
 * p. 156, 157. + P. 158, 159. 
 
Chap. IV.] IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED. 205 
 
 in such degrees and manners, and with regard to such 
 persons, rather than others ; that the affairs of the world, 
 being permitted to go on in their natural course so far, 
 should, just at such a point, have a new direction given 
 them by miraculous interpositions; that these interpo- 
 sitions should be exactly in such degrees and respects 
 only ; all this may have been by general laws. These 
 laws are unknown indeed to us: but no more unknown 
 than the laws from whence it is, that some die as soon 
 as they are born, and others live to extrem ^ old age ; 
 that one man is so superior to another in understanding; 
 with innumerable more things, which, as was before 
 observed, we cannot reduce to any laws or rules at all, 
 though it is taken for granted, they are as much reduci- 
 ble to general ones, as gravitation. Now, if the revealed 
 dispensations of Providence, and miraculous interposi- 
 tions, be by general law«, as well as God's ordinary 
 government in the course of nature, made known by 
 reason and experience; there is no more reason to 
 expect that every exigence, as it arises, should be pro- 
 vided for l)y these general laws or miraculous interposi- 
 tions, than that every exigence in nature should, by the 
 general laws of nature: yet there might be wise and 
 good reasons, that miraculous interpositions should be 
 by general laws; and that these laws should not be 
 broken in upon, or deviated from, by other miracles 
 
 Upon the whole, tlien, the appearance of deficiencies 
 and irregularities in nature is owing to its being a scheme 
 but in part made known, and of such a certain particular 
 kind in other respects. Now we see no more reason 
 why the frame and course of nature should be such a 
 scheme, than why Christianity should. And that the 
 former is such a scheme, renders it credible, that the 
 latter, upon supposition of its truth, may be so too. 
 And as it is manifest, that Christianity is a scheme 
 revealed but in part, and a scheme in which means are 
 made use of to accomplish ends, like to that of nature: 
 so the credibility, that it may have been all along carried 
 on by general laws, no less than the course of nature, 
 has been distinctly proved. And from all this it is 
 beforehand credible that there might, I think probable 
 
206 CHRISTIANITY A SCHEME [P^rt II. 
 
 that there would, be the hke appearance of deficiencies 
 and irregularities in Christianity, as in nature : i. e. that 
 Christianity would be liable to the like objections, as 
 the frame of nature. And these objections are answered 
 by these observations concerning Christianity; as the 
 like objections against the frame of nature are answered 
 by the like observations concerning the frame of nature. 
 
 The objections against Christianity, considered as a 
 matter of fact,* having, in general, been obviated in the 
 preceding Chapter; and the same, considered as made 
 against the wisdom and goodness of it, having been 
 obviated in this : the next thing, according to the method 
 proposed, is to show, that the principal objections, in 
 particular, against Christianity, may be answered, by 
 particular and full analogies in nature. And as one of 
 them is made against the whole scheme of it together, 
 as just now described, I choose to consider it here, 
 rather than in a distinct Chapter by itself. The thing 
 objected against this scheme of the Gospel is, " that it 
 seems to suppose God was reduced to the necessity of a 
 long series of intricate means, in order to accomplish his 
 ends, the recovery and salvation of the world: in like 
 sort as men, for want of understanding or power, not 
 being able to come at their ends directly, are forced to 
 go round-about w^ays, and make use of many perplexed 
 contrivances to arrive at them." Now every thing which 
 we see shows the folly of this, considered as an objection 
 against the truth of Christianity. For, according to our 
 manner of conception, God makes use of variety of 
 means, what Ave often think tedious ones, in the natural 
 course of providence, for the accomplishment of all 
 his ends. Indeed it is certain there is somewhat in 
 this matter quite beyond our comprehension: but the 
 mystery is as great in nature as in Christianity. We 
 know what we ourselves aim at, as final ends : and what 
 courses we take, merely as means conducing to those 
 ends. But we are greatly ignorant how far things are 
 considered by the Author of Nature, under the single 
 notion of means and ends ; so as that it may be said, 
 
 * p. 149, &c. 
 
Chap, -v.] IMPElifECTLY CO:\lPREHEiSDED. 207 
 
 this is merely an end, and that merely means, in his 
 regard. And whether there be not some peculiar absur- 
 dity in our very manner of conception, concerning this 
 matter, somewhat contradictory arising from our ex- 
 tremely imperfect views of things, it is impossible to 
 say. However, thus much is manifest, that the whole 
 natural world and government of it is a scheme or sys- 
 tem ; not a fixed, but a progressive one : a scheme in 
 which the operation of various means takes up a great 
 length of time, before the ends they tend to can be 
 attained. The change of seasons, the ripening of the 
 fruits of the earth, the very history of a flower, is an 
 instance of this : and so is human life. Thus vegetable 
 bodies, and those of animals, though possibly formed at 
 once, yet grow up by degrees to a mature state. And 
 thus rational agents, who animate these latter bodies, are 
 naturally directed to form each his own manners and 
 character, by the gradual gaining of knowledge and ex- 
 perience, and by a long course of action. Our existence 
 is not only successive, as it must be of necessity ; but 
 one state of our life and being is appointed by God, to 
 be a preparation for another ; and that to be the means 
 of attaining to another succeeding one : infancy to child- 
 hood ; childhood to youth ; youth to mature age. Men 
 are impatient, and for precipitating things : but the 
 Author of Nature appears deliberate throughout his ope- 
 rations; accomplishing his natural ends by slow successive 
 steps. And there is a plan of things beforehand laid 
 out, which, from the nature of it, requires various sys- 
 tems of means, as well as length of time, in order to the 
 carrying on its several parts into execution. Thus, in 
 the daily course of natural providence, God operates in 
 the very same manner, as m the dispensation of Chris- 
 tianity ; making one thing subservient to another ; this, 
 to somewhat further ; and soon, through a progressive 
 series of means, which extend, both backward and for- 
 ward, beyond our utmost view. Of this manner of 
 operation, every thing we see in the course of nature is 
 as much an instance, as any part of the Christian 
 dispensation. 
 
208 THE APPOINTMENT OP JVaxtU. 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 OF THE PARTICULAR SYSTEM OF CHRISTIANITY ; THE 
 APPOINTMENT OF A MEDIATOR, AND THE REDEMPTION 
 OF THE WORLD BY HIM. 
 
 There is not, I think, any thing relating to Christi- 
 anity, which has been more objected against, than the 
 mediation of Christ, in some or other of its parts. Yet 
 upon thorough consideration, there seems nothing less 
 justly liable to it. For, 
 
 I. The whole analogy of nature removes all imagined 
 presumption against the general notion of a Mediatoi^ 
 between God and man* For we find all living creatures 
 are brought into the world, and their life in infancy is 
 preserved, by the instrumentality of others: and every 
 satisfaction of it, some way or other, is bestowed by the 
 like means. So that the visible government, which God 
 exercises over the world, is by the instrumentality and 
 mediation of others. And how far his invisible govern- 
 ment be or be not so, it is impossible to determine at all 
 by reason. And the supposition, that part of it is so, 
 appears, to say the least, altogether as credible, as the 
 contrary. There is then no sort of objection, from the 
 light of nature, against the general notion of a mediator 
 between God and man, considered as a doctrine of 
 Christianity, or as an appointment in this dispensation: 
 since we find by experience, that God does appoint medi- 
 ators, to be the instruments of good and evil to us: the 
 instruments of his justice and his mercy. And the ob- 
 jection here referred to is urged, not against mediation 
 in that high, eminent, and peculiar sense, in which Christ 
 is our mediator; but absolutely against the whole notion 
 itself of a mediator at all. 
 
 II. As we must suppose, that the world is under the 
 proper moral government of God, or in a state of religion, 
 before we can enter into consideration of the revealed 
 doctrine, concerning the redemption of it by Christ; so 
 
 * i Tim. ii. 5. 
 
Chap. V.] A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER. 209 
 
 that supposition is here to be distinctly taken notice of. 
 Now the divine moral government which religion teaches 
 us, implies, that the consequence of vice shall be misery, 
 in some future state, by the righteous judgment of God. 
 That such consequent punishment shall take effect by his 
 appointment, is necessarily implied. But, as it is not in 
 any sort to be supposed, that we are made acquainted 
 with all the ends or reasons, for which it is fit future 
 punishments should be inflicted, or why God has ap- 
 pointed such and such consequent misery should follow 
 vice ; and as we are altogether in the dark, how or in 
 what manner it shall follow, by what immediate occa- 
 sions, or by the instrumentality of what means ; there is 
 no absurdity in supposing it may follow in a way analo- 
 gous to that, in v/hich many miseries follow such and 
 such courses of action at present; poverty, sickness, in- 
 famy, untimely death by diseases, death from the hands 
 of civil justice. There is no absurdity in supposing 
 future punishment may follow wickedness of course, as 
 we speak, or in the way of natural consequence from 
 God's orio;inal constitution of the world : from the nature 
 he has given us, and from the condition in which he 
 places us ; or in a like manner, as a person rashly trifling 
 upon a precipice, in the way of natural consequence, fiills 
 down ; in the way of natural consequence, breaks his 
 limbs, suppose; in the way of natural consequence of 
 this, without help, perishes. 
 
 Some good men may perhaps be offended with hear- 
 ing it spoken of as a supposable thing that future punish- 
 ments of wickedness may be in the way of natural con- 
 sequence : as if this were taking the execution of justice 
 out of the hands of God, and giving it to nature. But 
 they should remember, that when things come to pass 
 according to the course of nature, this does not hinder 
 them from being his doing, who is the God of nature : 
 and that the Scripture ascribes those punishments to 
 divine justice, which are known to be natural ; and which 
 must be called so, when distinguished from such as are 
 miraculous. But after all, this supposition, or rather 
 this way of speaking, is here made use of only byway of 
 illustration of the subject before us. For since it must 
 
 o 
 
210 THE APPOINTMENT OF '' n»AM IT, 
 
 be admitted, that the future punishment of wickedness is 
 not a matter of arbitrary appointment, but of reason, 
 equity, and justice ; it comes, for ought I see, to the same 
 thing, whether it is supposed to be inflicted in a way 
 analogous to that, in which the temporal punishments of 
 vice and folly are inflicted, or in any other way. And 
 though there were a diff'erence, it is allowable, in the 
 present case, to make this supposition, plainly not an in- 
 credible one ; that future punishment may follow wicked- 
 ness in the way of natural consequence, or according to 
 some general laws of government already established in 
 the universe. 
 
 III. Upon this supposition, or even without it, we 
 may observe somewhat, much to the present purpose, in 
 the constitution of nature or appointments of Providence: 
 the provision which is made, that all the bad natural 
 consequences of men's actions should not always actually 
 follow ; or that such bad consequences, as, according to 
 the settled course of things, would inevitably have fol- 
 lowed if not prevented, should, in certain degrees, be 
 prevented. We are apt presumptuously to imagine, 
 that the world might have been so constituted, as that 
 there would not have been any such thing as misery or 
 evil. On the contrary we find the Author of Nature 
 permits it: but then he has provided reliefs, and in many 
 cases perfect remedies for it, after some pains and diffi- 
 culties; reliefs and remedies even for that evil, whiOi is 
 the fruit of our own misconduct; and which, in the 
 course of nature, would have continued, and ended in 
 our destruction, but for such remedies. And this is an 
 instance both of severity and of indulgence, in the con- 
 stitution of nature. Thus all the bad consequences, now 
 mentioned, of a man's trifling upon a precipice, might 
 be prevented. And though all were not, yet some of 
 them might, by proper interposition, if not rejected : by 
 another's coming to the rash man's relief, with his own 
 laying hold on that relief, in such sort as the case re- 
 quired. Persons may do a great deal themselves towards 
 preventing the bad consequences of their follies: and 
 more may be done by themselves, together with the 
 assistance of others their fellow creatures ; which assist- 
 
Chap, v.] A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER. 211 
 
 ance nature requires and prompts us to. This is the 
 general constitution of the world. Now suppose it had 
 been so constituted, that after such actions were done, as 
 were foreseen naturally to draw after them misery to the 
 doer, it should have been no more in human power to 
 have prevented that naturally consequent misery, in any 
 instance, than it is in all : no one can say, whether such 
 a more severe constitution of things misht not vet have 
 been really good. But, that, on the contrarv, provision 
 is made by nature, that we may and do, to so great de- 
 gree, prevent the bad natural effects of our follies ; this 
 may be called mercy or compassion in the original con- 
 stitution of the world: compassion, as distinguished from 
 goodness in general. And, the whole known constitu- 
 tion and course of things affording us instances of such 
 compassion, it would be according to the analogy of na- 
 ture, to hope, that, however ruinous the natural conse- 
 quences of vice might be, from the general laws of God's 
 government over the universe ; yet provision might be 
 made, possibly might have been originally made, for 
 preventing those ruinous consequences from inevitably 
 following : at least from following universally, and in all 
 cases. 
 
 Many, I am sensible, will wonder at finding this made 
 a question, or spoken of as in any degree doubtful. The 
 generality of mankind are so far from having that awful 
 sense of things, which the present state of vice and misery 
 and darkness seems to make but reasonable, that they 
 have scarce any apprehension or thought at all about 
 this matter, any w^ay: and some serious persons may 
 have spoken unadvisedly concerning it. But let us ob- 
 serve, what we experience to be, and what, from the 
 very constitution of nature, cannot but be, the conse- 
 quences of irregular and disorderly behaviour : even of 
 such rashness, wilfulness, neglects, as we scarce call vi- 
 cious. Now it is natural to apprehend, that the bad con- 
 sequences of irregularity will be greater, in proportion as 
 the irregularity is so. And there is no comparison be- 
 tween these irregularities, and the greater instances of 
 vice, or a dissolute profligate disregard to all religion ; if 
 there be anv thing at all in religion. For consider wha* 
 
 OS 
 
212 THE APPOINTMENT OF [Part O. 
 
 it is for creatures, moral agents, presumptuously to in- 
 troduce that confusion and miser}^ into the kingdom of 
 God, which mankind have in fact introduced: to blas- 
 pheme the Sovereign Lord of all ; to contemn his autho- 
 rity ; to be injurious, to the degree they are, to their fel- 
 low creatures, the creatures of God. Add that the effects 
 of vice in the present world are often extreme misery, 
 irretrievable ruin, and even death : and upon putting all 
 this together, it will appear, that as no one can say, in 
 what degree fatal the unprevented consequences of vice 
 may be, according to the general rule of divine govern- 
 ment ; so it is by no means intuitively certain, how far 
 these consequences could possibly, in the nature of the 
 thing, be prevented, consistently with the eternal rule of 
 right, or with what is, in fact, the moral constitution of 
 nature. However, there would be large ground to hope, 
 that the universal government was not so severely 
 strict, but that there was room for pardon, or for hav- 
 ing those penal consequences prevented. Yet, 
 
 IV. There seems no probability, that any thing we 
 could do would alone and of itself prevent them : pre- 
 vent their following, or being inflicted. But one would 
 think at least, it were impossible that the contrary should 
 be thought certain. For we are not acquainted with 
 the whole of the case. We are not informed of all the 
 reasons, which render it fit that future punishments 
 should be inflicted: and therefore cannot know, whether 
 any thing we could do would make such an alteration, as 
 to render it fit that they should be remitted. We do not 
 know what the whole natural or appointed consequences 
 of vice are ; nor in what way they would follow, if not 
 prevented : and therefore can in no sort say, whether we 
 could do any thing which would be sufficient to prevent 
 them. Our ignorance being thus manifest, let us recol- 
 lect the analogy of Nature or Providence. For, though 
 this may be but a slight ground to raise a positive opin- 
 ion upon, in this matter ; yet it is sufficient to answer a 
 mere arbitrary assertion, without any kind of evidence, 
 urged by way of objection against a doctrine, the proof 
 of which is not reason, but revelation. Consider then : 
 people ruin their fortunes by extravagance ; they bring 
 
Chap, v.] A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER. 213 
 
 diseases upon themselves by excess; they incur the 
 penalties of civil laws; and surely civil government is 
 natural; will sorrow for these follies j^ilist, and behaving 
 well for the future, alone and of itself prevent the na- 
 tural consequences of them ? On the contrary, men's 
 natural abilities of helping themselves are often impaired; 
 or if not, yet they are forced to be beholden to the 
 assistance of others, upon several accounts, and in dif- 
 ferent ways ; assistance which they would have had no 
 occasion for, had it not been for their misconduct ; but 
 which, in the disadvantageous condition they had reduced 
 themselves to, is absolutely necessary to their recovery, 
 and retrieving their affairs. Now since this is our case, 
 considering ourselves merely as inhabitants of this world, 
 and as having a temporal interest here, under the natural 
 government of God, which however has a great deal 
 moral in it ; why is it not supposable that this may be 
 our case also, in our more important capacity, as under 
 his perfect moral government, and having a more gene- 
 ral and future interest depending? If we have misbe- 
 haved in this higher capacity, and rendered ourselves 
 obnoxious to the future punishment, which God has 
 annexed to vice : it is plainly credible, that behaving well 
 for the time to come may be — not useless, God for- 
 bid — but w^holly insufficient, alone and of itself, to pre- 
 vent that punishment : or to put us in the condition, 
 which w^e should have been in had we preserved our 
 innocence. 
 
 And though we ought to reason with all reverence, 
 whenever we reason concerning the divine conduct : yet 
 it may be added, that it is clearly contrary to all our 
 notions of government, as well as to what is, in fact, the 
 general constitution of nature, to suppose, that doing 
 well for the future should, in all cases, prevent all the 
 judicial bad consequences of having done evil, or all 
 the punishment annexed to disobedience. And we 
 have manifestly nothing from whence to determine, in 
 what degree, and in what cases, reformation would pre- 
 vent this punishment, even supposing that it would in 
 some. Affid though the efficacy of repentance itself 
 alone, to prevent w^hat mankind had rendered themselves 
 
214 THE APPOINTMENT OF [Part II, 
 
 obnoxious to, and recover what they had forfeited, is 
 now insisted upon, in opposition to Christianity ; yet, by 
 the general prevalence of propitiatory sacrifices over the 
 heathen world, this notion of repentance alone being 
 sufficient to expiate guilt, appears to be contrary to the 
 general sense of mankind. 
 
 Upon the whole then ; had the laws, the general laws 
 of God's government been permitted to operate, with- 
 out any interposition in our behalf, the future punish- 
 ment, for ought we know to the contrary, or have any 
 reason to think, must inevitably have followed, notwith- 
 standing any thing we could have done to prevent it. 
 Now, 
 
 V. In this darkness, or this light of nature, call it 
 which you please, revelation comes in ; confirms every 
 doubting fear, which could enter into the heart of man, 
 concerning the future unprevented consequence of wick- 
 edness ; supposes the world to be in a state of ruin (a 
 supposition which seems the very ground of the Chris- 
 tian dispensation, and which, if not provable by reason, 
 yet is in no wise contrary to it;) teaches us too, that the 
 rules of divine government are such, as not to admit of 
 pardon immediately and directly upon repentance, or by 
 the sole efficacy of it: but then teaches at the same time, 
 what nature might justly have hoped, that the moral 
 government of the universe was not so rigid, but that 
 there was room for an interposition, to avert the fatal 
 consequences of vice; which therefore, by this means, 
 does admit of pardon. Revelation teaches us, that the 
 unknown laws of God's more general government, no 
 less than the particular laws by which we experience 
 he governs us at present, are compassionate,* as well as 
 good in the more general notion of goodness: and that 
 he hath mercifully provided, that there should be an 
 interposition to prevent the destruction of human kind ; 
 whatever that destruction unprevented would have been. 
 God so loved the vjorld, that he gave his only begotten Son, 
 that whosoever helievethy not, to be sure, in a speculative, 
 but in a practical sense, that ivhosoever helieveth in hinij, 
 should not perish:'^ gave his Son in the same way of 
 
 * p. 210, &C. t Jofi" »i- 16. 
 
Chap, v.] A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER. 215 
 
 goodness to the world, as he affords particular persons 
 the friendly assistance of their fellow creatures: when, 
 without it, their temporal ruin would be the certain 
 consequence of their follies: in the same way of good- 
 ness, I say; though in a transcendent and infinitely 
 higher degree. And the Son of God loved us, and gave 
 himself for us, with a love, which he himself compares 
 to that of human friendship: though, in this case, all 
 comparisons must fall infinitely short of the thing in- 
 tended to be illustrated by them. He interposed in 
 such a manner as was necessary and effectual to prevent 
 that execution of justice upon sinners, which God had ap- 
 pointed should otherwise have been executed upon them : 
 or in such a manner, as to prevent that punishment 
 from actually following, which, according to the general 
 laws of divine government, must have followed the sins 
 of the world, had it not been for such interposition.* 
 
 If any thing here said should appear, upon first 
 thought, inconsistent with divine goodness; a second, I 
 am persuaded, will entirely remove that appearance. 
 For were we to suppose the constitution of things to be 
 such, as that the whole creation must have perished, 
 had it not been for somewhat, which God had appointed 
 should be, in order to prevent that ruin : even this sup- 
 position would not be inconsistent, in any degree, with 
 the most absolutely perfect goodness. But still it may 
 be thought, that this whole manner of treating the sub- 
 ject before us supposes mankind to be naturally in a 
 very strange state. And truly so it does. But it is not 
 Christianity which has put us into this state. Whoever 
 
 * It cannot, I suppose, be imagined, even by the most cursory render, that it is. in 
 any sort, affirmed or implied in any thing- said in tiiis cliapter, tl.at none can have 
 the benefit of the general reilemption, but such as have the advantage of being made 
 acquainted with it in the present life. But it may be needful to mention, that sevend 
 questions, which have been brougiitinto the subject before us, and determined, ;ire 
 not in the least entered into here : questions which have been, 1 frar, rashly deti r- 
 niined, and perhaps with eqtial rashness coiitrnry ways. For instance, whethtr Gn.l 
 could have saved the world by other means than iJie death of Christ, coiisistenily 
 witii the gei-eral laws of his government. And had not Christ come into tlie world, 
 what would have been the future condition of the better sort of men ; those just 
 persons over the face of the earth, for whom Manasses in his prayer asserts, repi-n- 
 tancfc was not appointed. The meaning of I he first of these questions is jyi-eaily 
 ambiguous: and neither of them can properly be answered, without going ujion that, 
 infinitely absurd supposition, tliat we know (lie whole of the case. And perhaps Uh; 
 very inquiry, JVIwt would have followed, if God had not done as fie hm, may i 'V i i 
 it sODie very great impropriety : and ought not to be carried on any farther iliau i^ 
 Sece&sary ia help our partial and in:;dfipiate conceptions of things^ 
 
216 THE APPOINTMENT OF [Part II, 
 
 will consider the manifold miseries, and the extreme 
 wickedness of the world; that the best have great 
 wrongnesses within themselves, which they complain of, 
 and endeavour to amend ; but that the generality grow 
 more profligate and corrupt with age ; that even mora- 
 lists thought the present state to be a state of punish- 
 ment: and, v.'hat might be added, that the earth our 
 habitation has the appearances of being a ruin : whoever, 
 I say, will consider all these, and some other obvious 
 things, will think he has little reason to object against 
 the Scripture account, that mankind is in a state of 
 degradation; against this being the fact: how difficult 
 soever he may think it to account for, or even to form a 
 distinct conception of the occasions and circumstances 
 of it. But that the crime of our first parents was the 
 occasion of our being placed in a more disadvantageous 
 condition, is a thing throughout and particularly analo- 
 gous to what we see in the daily course of natural pro- 
 vidence; as the recovery of the world by the interposi- 
 tion of Christ has been shown to be so in general, 
 
 VI. The particular manner in which Christ interposed 
 in the redemption of the world, or his office as Mediator, 
 in the largest sense, between God and man, is thus repre- 
 sented to us in the Scripture. He is the light of the 
 world;* the revealer of the will of God in the most 
 eminent sense. He is a propitiatory sacrifice ;t the 
 Lamb of God:X and, as he voluntarily offered himself 
 up, he is styled our High Priest. § And, which seems 
 of peculiar weight, he is described beforehand in the 
 Old Testament, under the same characters of a priest, 
 and an expiatory victim.il And whereas it is objected, 
 that all this is merely by way of allusion to the sacrifices 
 of the Mosaic law, the Apostle on the contrary affirms, 
 that the law was a shadoio of good things to come, and not 
 the very image of the things:^ and that the priests that 
 offer gifts according to the law — serve unto the example 
 iind shadow of heavenly things, as Moses was admonished 
 
 * John i. and viii. 12. 
 
 f Rom. iii. 25. v. 11. 1 Cor. v. 7. Fph. v. 2. 1 John ii. 2. Mat. xxvi. -28. 
 
 j John i, 29, 3(5, ami throughout the l)Ook of Revelation. 
 
 <J Throiiehout the epistle to the Hebrews. 
 
 Ij Ua. lii'i. Diin. ix 2;. P:. ix 4, ^ ^^^' ^- *• ' ' 
 
Shap. v.] A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER. 217 
 
 of God, when he was about to make the tabernacle. For see, 
 saith lie, that thou make all things according to the pattern 
 showed to thee in the mount:* i. e. the Levitical priesthood 
 was a shadow of the priesthood of Christ; in hke manner 
 as the tabernacle made by Moses was according to that 
 showed him in the mount. The priesthood of Christ, 
 and the tabernacle in the mount, were the originals: of 
 the former of which the Levitical priesthood was a type ; 
 and of the latter the tabernacle made by Moses was a 
 copy. The doctrine of this epistle then plainly is, that 
 the legal sacrifices were allusions to the great and final 
 atonement to be made bv the blood of Christ; and not 
 that this was an allusion to those. Nor can any thing 
 be more express or determinate than the following pas- 
 sage. It is not possible that the blood of bulls and of goats 
 should take away sm. Wherefore when he cometh into the 
 world, he saith, Sacrifice and offering, i. e. of bulls and of 
 goats, thou wouldest 7iot, but a body hast thou prepared me. 
 Lo, I come to do thy will, God. By which will we are 
 sanctified, through the offering of the body of Jesus Christ 
 once for all.'t And to add one passage more of the like 
 kind: Christ loas once offered to bear the sins of many ; 
 and unto them that look for him shall he appear the second 
 time, vnthout sin; i, e. without bearing sin, as he did at 
 his first coming, by being an offering for it; without 
 having our iniquities again laid upon him, without being 
 any more a sin-offering: — unto them that look for him shall 
 he appear the second time, without sin, unto salvation.X 
 Nor do the iji spired writers at all confine themselves to 
 this manner of speaking concerning the satisfaction of 
 Christ; but declare an efficacy in what he did and suffered 
 for us, additional to and beyond mere instruction, ex- 
 ample, and government, in great variety of expression: 
 That Jesus .should die for that nation, the Jews : and not 
 for that nation only, but that also, plainly by the efficacy 
 of his death, he should gather together in one the children 
 of God that were scattered abroad. •§ that he suffered for 
 sins, the just for the unjust. •{] that he gave his life, himself 
 a ransom :^ that we are bought, bought with a price:** that 
 
 * Heb. viii. 4, 5. f Heb. x. 4, 5, 7, 9, 10. t Heb, ix. 28. 
 
 § John xi. 51, 52. || I Pet. iii. 18. ^ Matt. xx. 28. Mark x. 45. 1 Tim. ii. 6, 
 
 *• 2 Pet. ii. 1. Rev. xir. 4. 1 Cor. vi. 20. 
 
218 THE APPOINTMENT OF [Part II. 
 
 he redeemed us with his blood: redeemed us from the curse 
 of the law, being made a curse for us :* that he is our 
 advocate, intercessor, and propitiation ;t that he was made^ 
 perfect, or consummate, through sufferings; and being 
 thus made perfect, he became the author of salvation :X 
 that God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself; 
 by the death of his So7i, by the cross; not imputing their 
 trespasses unto them:§ and lastly, that through death he 
 destroyed him that had the power of death.W Christ then 
 having thus humbled himself , and become obedient to death, 
 even the death of the cross; God also hath highly exalted 
 him, and given him a name, which is above every name: 
 hath given all things into his hands: hath committed all 
 judgment unto him; that all men should honour the Son, 
 even as they honour the Father.*^ For, worthy is the 
 Lamb that was slain, to receive power, and riches, and 
 im'sdom, and strength, and honour, and glory, and blessing. 
 And every creature which is in heaven, and on the earth, 
 heard I, saying. Blessing, and honour, and glory, and 
 power, be unto him that sitteth upon the throne, and unto 
 the Lamb for ever and ever** 
 
 These passages of Scripture seem to comprehend and 
 express the chief parts of Christ's office, as Mediator 
 between God and man, so far, I mean, as the nature of 
 this his office is revealed ; and it is usually treated of by 
 divines under three heads. 
 
 First, He was, by way of eminence, the Prophet: that 
 Prophet that should come into the world,\\ to declare the. 
 divine will. He published anew the law of nature, 
 w^hich men had corrupted; and the very knowledge of 
 which, to some degree, was lost among them. He 
 taught mankind, taught us authoritatively, to live soberly, 
 7'ighteously, and godly in this j^resent world, in expectation 
 of the future judgment of God. He confirmed the truth 
 of this moral system of nature, and gave us additional 
 evidence of it; the evidence of testimony. tt He dis- 
 tinctly revealed the manner, in which God would be 
 
 * 1 Pet. i. 19. Rev. v. 9. Gal. iii. 13. f Heb, vii. 25. 1 John ii. 1, 2. 
 
 X Heb. ii. x. v. 9. % 2 Cor. v. 19. Rom. v. 10. Eph. ii. 16. 
 
 II Heb. ii. 14. See also a remarkable passage in tlie book of Job, xxxiii. 24. 
 T[ Phil. ii. 8, 9. Jolui iii. 35. v. 22, 23. ** Rev. v. 12, 13. 
 
 tj- John vi. 14. ttP. 167, &c. 
 
Chap. V.] A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER. 219 
 
 worshipped, the efficacy of repentance, and the rewards 
 and punishments of a future hfe. Thus he was a pro- 
 phet in a sense in which no other evei" was. To which 
 is to be added, that he set us a perfect example, that we 
 sliould follow his steps. 
 
 Secondly, He has a kingdom which is not of this world. 
 He founded a Church, to be to mankind a standing 
 memorial of religion, and invitation to it; which he pro- 
 mised to be with always even to the end. He exercises 
 an invisible government over it, himself, and by his Spirit: 
 over that part of it, which is militant here on earth, a 
 government of discipline, for the perfecting of the saints, 
 for the edifying his body: till we all come in the unity of 
 the faith, and of the knowledge of the Son of God, unto a 
 perfect man, unto the measure of the stature of the fulness 
 of Christ.* Of this Church, all persons scattered over 
 the world, who live in obedience to his laws, are mem- 
 bers. For these he is gone to prepare a place, and will 
 come again to 7'eceive them unto himself, that where he is, 
 there they may he also ; and reign with him for ever and 
 ever:\ and likewise to take vengeance on them that know 
 not God, and obey not his Gospel.t 
 
 Against these parts of Christ's office I find no objec- 
 tions, but what are fully obviated in the beginning of 
 this Chapter. 
 
 Lastly, Christ offered himself a propitiatory sacrifice, 
 and made atonement for the sins of the world ; which is 
 mentioned last, in regard to what is objected against it. 
 Sacrifices of expiation were commanded the Jews, and 
 obtained amongst most other nations, from tradition, 
 whose original probably was revelation. And they were 
 continually repeated, both occasionally, and at the re- 
 turns of stated times : and made up great part of the 
 external religion of mankind. But now once in the end 
 of the world Christ appeared to j)ut away sin by the sacri- 
 fice of himself. § And this sacrifice was, in the highest 
 degree and with the most extensive influence, of that 
 efficacy for obtaining pardon of sin, which the heathens 
 may be supposed to have thought their sacrifices to have 
 
 * Eph. iv. 12, 13. f John xiv. 2, 3. Rev. iii. 21, and xi. 15. 
 
 t 2 Thess. i. 8. § Heb. ix. 26. 
 
220 " THE APPOINTMENT OF [Pjrt II. 
 
 been, and v-hich the Jewish sacrifices really were in 
 some degree, and with regard to some persons. 
 
 How and in what particidar way it had this efficacy, 
 there are not wanting persons who have endeavoured to 
 explain : but I do not find that the Scripture has ex- 
 plained it. We seem to be very much in the dark 
 concerning the manner in which the ancients understood 
 atonement to be made, i. e. pardon to be obtained by 
 sacrifices. And if the Scripture has, as surely it has, 
 left this matter of the satisfaction of Christ mvsterious, 
 left somewhat in it unrevealed, all conjectures about it 
 must be, if not evidently absurd, yet at least uncertain. 
 Nor has any one reason to complain for want of further 
 information, unless he can show his claim to it. 
 
 Some have endeavoured to explain the efficacy of 
 what Christ has done and suffered for us, beyond vvdiat 
 the Scripture has authorized : others, probably because 
 they could not explain it, have been for taking it away, 
 and confining his office as Redeemer of the world to his 
 instruction, exarr)ple, and government of the church. 
 Whereas the doctrine of the Gospel appears to be, not 
 only that he taught the efficacy of repentance, but ren- 
 dered it of the efficacy of which it is, by what he did 
 and suffered for us : that he obtained for us the benefit 
 of having our repentance accepted unto eternal hfe : not 
 only that he revealed to sinners, that they were in a 
 capacity of salvation, and how they might obtain it ; but 
 moreover that he put them into this capacity of salvation, 
 by what he did and suffered for them ; put us into a 
 capacity of escaping future punishment, and obtaining 
 future happiness. And it is our wisdom thankfully to 
 accept the benefit, by performing the conditions, upon 
 which it is offered, on our part, without disputing how 
 it was procured on his. For, 
 
 VII. Since we neither know by what means punish- 
 ment in a future state would have followed wickedness 
 in this: nor in what manner it would have been inflicted, 
 had it not been prevented ; nor all the reasons why its 
 infliction would have been needful, nor the particular 
 •nature of that state of happiness, which Christ is. gone 
 to prepare for his disciples : and since we are ignorant 
 
Chaiv-YO a mediator AND REDEEMER. 221 
 
 how far any thing which we could do, would, alone and 
 of itself, have been effectual to prevent that punishment 
 to which we were obnoxious, and recover that happi- 
 ness, which we had forfeited ; it is most evident we are 
 not judges, antecedently to revelation, whether a me- 
 diator was or was not necessarv, to obtain those ends : to 
 prevent that future punishment, and bring mankind to 
 the final happiness of their nature. And for the very 
 same reasons, upon supposition of the necessity of a 
 mediator, we are no more judges, antecedently to reve- 
 lation, of the whole nature of his office, or the several 
 parts of which it consists ; of what was fit and requisite 
 to be assigned him, in order to accomplish the ends of 
 divine Providence in the appointment. And from 
 hence it follows, that to object against the expediency 
 or usefulness of particular things, revealed to have been 
 done or suffered by him, because we do not see how 
 they were conducive to those ends, is highly absurd. 
 Yet nothing is more common to be met with, than this 
 absurdity. But if it be acknowledged beforehand, that 
 we are not judges in the case, it is evident that no ob- 
 jection can, with any shadow of reason, be urged against 
 any particular part of Christ's mediatorial office revealed 
 in Scripture, till it can be shown positively not to be re- 
 quisite or conducive to the ends proposed to be accom- 
 plished ; or that it is in itself unreasonable. 
 
 And there is one objection made against the satisfac- 
 tion of Christ, which looks to be of this positive kind : 
 that the doctrine of his being appointed to suffer for the 
 sins of the world, represents God as being indifferent 
 whether he punished the innocent or the guilty. Now 
 from the foregoing observations we may see the extreme 
 slightness of all such objections; and (though it is most 
 certain all who make them do not see the consequence) 
 that they conclude altogether as much against God's 
 whole original constitution of nature, and the whole 
 daily course of divine Providence in the government of 
 the world, i. e. against the whole scheme of Theism and 
 the whole notion of Religion, as against Christianity. 
 For the world is a constitution or system, whose parts 
 have a mutual reference to each other : and there is a 
 
222 THE APPOINTMENT OF [Pabt II. 
 
 > 
 
 scheme of things gradually carrying on, called the course 
 of nature, to the carrying on of which God has appointed 
 us, in various ways, to contribute. And when, in the 
 daily course of natural providence, it is appointed that 
 innocent people should suffer for the faults of the guilty, 
 this is liable to the very same objection, as the instance 
 we are now considering. The infinitely greater impor- 
 tance of that appointment of Christianity, which is ob- 
 jected against, does not hinder but it may be, as it plain- 
 ly is, an appointment of the very same kind, with what 
 the world affords us daily examples of. Nay, if there 
 were any force at all in the objection, it would be 
 stronger, in one respect, against natural providence, than 
 against Christianity: because under the former we are 
 in many cases commanded, and even necessitated whe- 
 ther we will or no, to suffer for the faults of others ; 
 whereas the sufferings of Christ were voluntarv. The 
 world's being under the righteous government of God 
 does indeed imply, that finally and upon the whole 
 everyone shall receive according to his personal deserts: 
 and the general doctrine of the whole Scripture is, that 
 this shall be the completion of the divine government. 
 But during the progress, and, for ought we know, even 
 in order to the completion of this moral scheme, vica- 
 rious punishments may be fit, and absolutely necessary. 
 Men by their follies run themselves into extreme dis- 
 tress ; into difficulties which would be absolutely fatal to 
 them, were it not for the interposition and assistance of 
 others. God commands by the law of nature, that we 
 afford them this assistance, in many cases where we 
 cannot do it without very great pains, and labour, and 
 sufferings to ourselves. And we see in what variety of 
 ways one person's sufferings contribute to the relief of 
 another: and how, or by what particular means, this 
 comes to pass, or follows, from the constitution and laws 
 of nature, which came under our notice : and, being fami- 
 liarized to it, men are not shocked with it. So that the 
 reason of their insisting upon objections of the foregoing 
 kind against the satisfaction of Christ is, either that they 
 do not consider God's settled and uniform appointments 
 as his appointments at all ; or else they forget that vica- 
 
CujLP. v.] A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER. 223 
 
 rious punishment is a providential appointment of every 
 day's experience : and then, from their being unac- 
 quainted with the more general laws of nature or divine 
 government over the world, and not seeing how the suf- 
 ferings of Christ could contribute to the redemption of 
 it, unless by arbitrary and tyrannical will ; they conclude 
 his sufferings could not contribute to it any other way. 
 And yet, what has been often alleged in justification of 
 this doctrine, even from the apparent natural tendency 
 of this method of our redemption ; its tendency to vindi- 
 cate the authority of God's laws, and deter his creatures 
 from sin; this has never yet been answered, and is I 
 think plainly unanswerable : though I am far from think- 
 ing it an account of the whole of the case. But, with- 
 out taking this into consideration, it abundantly appears, 
 from the observations above made, that this objection is, 
 not an objection against Christianity, but against the 
 whole general constitution of nature. And if it were to 
 be considered as an objection against Christianity, or 
 considering it as it is, an objection against the constitu- 
 tion of nature ; it amounts to no more in conclusion than 
 this, that a divine appointment cannot be necessary or ex- 
 pedient, because the objector does not discern it to be so: 
 though he must own that the nature of the case is such, 
 as renders him incapable of judging, whether it be so or 
 not ; or of seeing it to be necessary, though it were so. 
 
 It is indeed a matter of great patience to reasonable 
 men, to find people arguing in this manner : objecting 
 against the credibility of such particular things revealed 
 in Scripture, that they do not see the necessity or ex- 
 pediency of them. For though it is highly right, and 
 tlie most pious exercise of our understanding, to inquire 
 v/ith due reverence into the ends and reasons of God's 
 dispensation : yet when those reasons are concealed, to 
 argue from our ignorance, that such dispensations can- 
 not be from God, is infinitely absurd. The presumption 
 of this kind of objections seems almost lost in the folly 
 of them. And the folly of them is yet greater, when 
 they are urged, as usually they are, against things in 
 Christianity analogous or like to those natural dispensa- 
 tions of Providence, which are matter of experience. 
 
224 THE APPOINTMENT OF [Pabt II. 
 
 Let reason be kept to : and if any part of the Scripture 
 account of the redemption of the world by Christ can be 
 shown to be reallv contrary to it, let the Scripture, in 
 the name of God, be given up : but let not such poor 
 creatures as we go on objecting against an infinite 
 scheme, that we do not see the necessity or usefulness 
 of all its parts, and call this reasoning ; and, which still 
 further heightens the absurdity in the present case, parts 
 which we are not actively concerned in. For it may be 
 v.'orth mentioning, 
 
 Lastly, That not only the reason of the thing, but the 
 v/hole analogy of nature, should teach us, not to expect 
 to have the like information concerning the divine con- 
 duct, as concerning our own duty. God instructs us by 
 experience (for it is not reason, but experience which 
 instructs us), what good or bad consequences will 
 follow from our acting in such and such manners : and 
 by this he directs us how we are to behave ourselves. 
 But, though we are sufficiently instructed for the com- 
 mon purposes of life : yet it is but an almost infinitely 
 small part of natural providence, which we are at all let 
 into. The case is the same with regard to revelation. 
 The doctrine of a mediator between God and man, 
 against which it is objected, that the expediency of 
 some things in it is not understood, relates only to what 
 vvas done on God's part in the appointment, and on the 
 Mediator's in the execution of it. For what is required 
 of us, in consequence of this gracious dispensation, is 
 another subject, in which none can complain for want of 
 information. The constitution of the world, and God's 
 natural government over it, is all mystery, as much as 
 the Christian dispensation. Yet under the first he has 
 given men all things pertaining to life; and under the 
 other all things pertaining unto godliness. And it may 
 be added, that there is nothing hard to be accounted for 
 in any of the common precepts of Christianity: though 
 if there were, surely a divine command is abundantly 
 sufficient to lay us under the strongest obligations to 
 obedience. But the fact is, that the reasons of all the 
 Christian precepts are evident. Positive institutions are 
 manifestly necessary to keep up and propagate religion 
 
Chap. VI.] A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER. ' 225 
 
 amongst mankind. And our duty to Christ, the internal 
 and external worship of him ; this part of the religion of 
 the Gospel manifestly arises out of what he has done 
 and suffered, his authority and dominion, and the rela- 
 tion which he is revealed to stand in to us.* 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 
 OF THE WANT OF UNIVERSALITY IN REVELATION ; AND OF 
 THE SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN THE PROOF OF IT. 
 
 It has been thought by some persons, that if the evi- 
 dence of revelation appears doubtful, this itself turns 
 into a positive argument against it: because it cannot be 
 supposed, that, if it were true, it would be left to subsist 
 upon doubtful evidence. And the objection against 
 revelation from its not being universal is often insisted 
 upon as of great weight. 
 
 Now the weakness of these opinions may be shown, 
 by observing the suppositions on which they are found- 
 ed: which are really such as these; that it cannot be 
 thought God would have bestowed any favour at all 
 upon us, unless in the degree, which, we think, he might, 
 and which, we imagine, would be most t? our particular 
 advantage; and also that it cannot be thought he would 
 bestow a favour upon any, unless he bestowed the same 
 upon all ; suppositions, which we find contradicted, not 
 by a few instances in God's natural government of the 
 world, but by the general analogy of nature together. 
 
 Persons who speak of the evidence of religion as 
 doubtful, and of this supposed doubtfulness as a positive 
 argument against it, should be put upon considering, 
 what that evidence indeed is, which they act upon with 
 regard to their temporal interests. For, it is not only 
 extremely difficult, but in many cases absolutely impos- 
 sible, to balance pleasure and pain, satisfaction and 
 uneasiness, so as to be able to say on which side the 
 overplus is. There are the like difficulties and impossi- 
 bilities in making the due allowances for a change of 
 
 • p,ni,&c 
 
226 REVELATION NOT UNIVERSAL: [Part H, 
 
 temper and taste, for satiety, disgusts, ill health: any of 
 which render men incapable of enjoying, after they have 
 obtained what they most eagerly desired. Numberless 
 too are the accidents, besides that one of untimely death, 
 which may even probably disappoint the best concerted 
 schemes: and strong objections are often seen- to lie 
 against them, not to be removed or answered, but which 
 seem overbalanced by reasons on the other side; so as 
 that the certain difficulties and dangers of the pursuit 
 are, by every one, thought justly disregarded, upon 
 account of the appearing greater advantages in case of 
 success, though there be but little probability of it. 
 Lastly, every one observes our liableness, if we be not 
 upon our guard, to be deceived by the falsehood of men, 
 and the false appearances of things: and this danger 
 must be greatly increased, if there be a strong bias 
 within, suppose from indulged passion, to favour the 
 deceit. Hence arises that great uncertainty and doubt- 
 fulness of proof, wherein our temporal interest really 
 consists; what are the most probable means of attaining 
 it; and whether those means will eventually be success- 
 ful. And numberless instances there are, in the daily 
 course of life, in which all men think it reasonable to 
 engage in pursuits, though the probability is greatly 
 against succeeding; and to make such provision for 
 themselves, as it is supposable they may have occasion 
 for, though the plain acknowledged probability is, that 
 they never shall. Then those who think the objection 
 against revelation, from its light not being universal, to 
 be of weight, should observe, that the Author of Nature, 
 in numberless instances, bestows that upon some, which 
 he does not upon others, who seem equally to stand in 
 need of it. Indeed he appears to bestow all his gifts 
 with the most promiscuous variety among creatures of 
 the same species: health and strength, capacities of pru- 
 dence and of knowledge, means of improvement, riches, 
 und all external advantages. And as there are not any 
 two men found, of exactly like shape and features; so 
 it is probable there are not any two, of an exactly like 
 constitution, temper, and situation, with regard to the 
 goods and evils of life. Yet, notwithstanding these 
 
Cbap.vi.j supposed deficiency in its proof. 227 
 
 uncertainties and varieties, God does exercise a natural 
 government over the world ; and there is such a thing 
 as a prudent and imprudent institution of hfe, with re- 
 gard to our health and our affairs, under that his natural 
 government. 
 
 As neither the Jewish nor Christian revelation have 
 been universal ; and as they have been afforded to a 
 greater or less part of the world, at different times ; so 
 likewise at different times, both revelations have had 
 different degrees of evidence. The Jews who lived 
 during the succession of prophets, that is, from Moses 
 till after the Captivity, had higher evidence of the truth 
 of their religion, than those had, who lived in the inter- 
 val between the last mentioned period, and the coming 
 of Christ. And the first Christians had higher evidence 
 of the miracles wrought in attestation of Christianity, 
 than what we have now. They had also a strong pre- 
 sumptive proof of the truth of it, perhaps of much 
 greater force, in way of argument, than many think, of 
 which we have very little remaining ; I mean the pre- 
 sumptive proof of its truth, from the influence which it 
 had upon the lives of the generality of its professors. 
 And we, or future ages, may possibly have a proof of it, 
 which they could not have, from the conformity between 
 the prophetic history, and the state of the world and of 
 Christianity. And further: if we were to suppose the 
 evidence, which some have of religion, to amount to 
 little more than seeing that it may be true; but that 
 they remain in great doubts and uncertainties about 
 both its evidence and its nature, and great perplexities 
 concerning the rule of life: others to have a full con- 
 viction of the truth of rehgion, with a distinct knowledge 
 of their duty ; and others severally to have all the inter- 
 mediate degrees of religious light and evidence, which 
 lie between these two — if we put the case, that for the 
 present, it was intended, revelation should be no more 
 than a small light, in the midst of a world greatly over- 
 spread, notwithstanding it, with ignorance and darkness : 
 that certain glimmerings of this light should extend, and 
 be directed, to remote distances, in such a manner as 
 that those who reallv uartook of it should not discern 
 
 P2 
 
228 REVELATION NOT UNIVERSAL: [Part U. 
 
 from whence it originally came: that some in a nearer 
 situation to it should have its light obscured, and, in dif- 
 ferent ways and degrees, intercepted: and that others 
 should be placed within its clearer influence, and be 
 much more enlivened, cheered, and directed by it ; but 
 yet that even to these it should be no more than a light 
 shining in a dark place : all this would be perfectly uni- 
 form, and of a piece with the conduct of Providence, in 
 the distribution of its other blessings. If the fact of the 
 case really were, that some have received no light at all 
 from the Scripture ; as many ages and countries in the 
 heathen world : that others, though they have, by means 
 of it, had essential or natural religion enforced upon their 
 consciences, yet have never had the genuine Scripture 
 revelation, with its real evidence, proposed to their con- 
 sideration ; and the ancient Persians and modern Maho- 
 metans may possibly be instances of people in a situa- 
 tion somewhat like to this: that others, though thev have 
 had the Scripture laid before them as of divine revelation, 
 yet have had it with the system and evidence of Christi- 
 anity so interpolated, the system so corrupted, the evi- 
 dence so blended with false miracles, as to leave the 
 mind in the utmost doubtfulness and uncertainty about 
 the whole; which may be the state of some thoughtful 
 men, in most of those nations who call themselves Chris- 
 tian : and lastly, that others have had Christianity offered 
 to them in its genuine simplicity, and with its proper 
 evidence, as persons in countries and churches of civil 
 and of Christian liberty; but however that even thesfc 
 persons are left in great ignorance in many respects, and 
 have by no means light afforded them enough to satisfy 
 their curiosity, but only to regulate their life, to teach 
 them their duty, and encourage them in the careful dis- 
 charge of it: I say, if we were to suppose this somewhat 
 (>f a general true account of the degrees of moral and 
 religious light and evidence, which were intended to be 
 aff'orded mankind, and of what has actually been and is 
 their situation, in their moral and religious capacity ; there 
 would be nothing in all this ignorance, doubtfulness, and 
 uncertainty, in all these varieties, and supposed disad- 
 vantages of some in comparison of others, respecting 
 
Chap. VI.] SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN ITS PROOF. 229 
 
 religion, but may be paralleled by manifest analogies in 
 the natural dispensations of Providence at present, and 
 considering ourselves merely in our temporal capacity. 
 
 Nor is there any thing shocking in all this, or which 
 would seem to bear hard upon the moral administration 
 in nature, if we would really keep in mind, that everv 
 one shall be dealt equitably with: instead of forgetting 
 this, or explaining it away, after it is acknowledged in 
 words. All shadow of injustice, and indeed all harsh 
 appearances, in this various economy of Providence, 
 would be lost; if we would keep in mind, that every 
 merciful allowance shall be made, and no more be re- 
 quired of any one, than what might have been equitably 
 expected of him, from the circumstances in which he was 
 placed ; and not what might have been expected, had he 
 been placed in other circumstances : i, e. in Scripture 
 language, that every man shall be accepted according to 
 what he had, not according to what he had not* This how- 
 ever doth not by any means imply, that all persons'con- 
 dition here is equally advantageous with respect to futu- 
 rity. And Providence's designing to place some in 
 greater darkness with respect to religious knowledge, is 
 no more a reason why they should not endeavour to get 
 out of that darkness, and others to bring them out of it; 
 than why ignorant and slow people in matters of other 
 knowledge should not endeavour to learn, or should not 
 be instructed. 
 
 It is not unreasonable to suppose, that the same wise 
 and good principle, whatever it was, which disposed the 
 Author of Nature to make different kinds and orders of 
 creatures, disposed him also to place creatures of like 
 kinds in different situations : and that the same principle 
 which disposed him to make creatures of different moral 
 capacities, disposed him also to place creatures of like 
 moral capacities in different religious situations; and even 
 the same creatures, in different periods of their being. 
 And the account or reason of this is also most probably 
 the account why the constitution of things is such, as 
 that creatures of moral natures or capacities, for a con- 
 sixier-ible part of that duration in which they are living 
 
 * 2 Cor. viii. 12. 
 
230 REVELATICN NOT UNIVERSAL : j-p.^RT IL 
 
 agents, are not at all subjects of morality and religion ; 
 but grow up to be so, and grow up to be so more and 
 more gradually from childhood to mature age. 
 
 What, in particular, is the account or reason of these 
 things, we must be greatly in the dark, were it only that 
 we know so very little even of our own case. Our pre- 
 sent state may possibly be the consequence of somewhat 
 past, which we are wholly ignorant of: as it has a refer- 
 ence to somewhat to come, of which we know scarce any 
 more than is necessary for practice. A system or con- 
 stitution, in its notion, implies variety; and so compli- 
 cated a one as this world, very great variety. So that 
 were revelation universal, yet, from men's different capa- 
 cities of understanding, from the different lengths of their 
 lives, their different educations and other external cir- 
 cumstances, and from their difference of temper and bodily 
 constitution ; their religious situations would be widely 
 different, and the disadvantage of some in comparison 
 of others, perhaps, altogether as much as at presents 
 And the true account, whatever it be, why mankind, or 
 such a part of mankind, are placed in this condition of 
 ignorance, must be supposed aJso the true account of 
 our fur.ther ignorance, in not knowing the reasons why,, 
 or whence it is, that they are placed in this condition. 
 But the following practical reflections may deserve the 
 serious consideration of those persons, who think the 
 circumstances of mankind or their own, in the foremen- 
 tioned respects, a ground of complaint. 
 
 First, The evidence of religion not appearing obvious^ 
 may constitute one particular part of some men's trial in 
 the religious sense : as it gives scope, for a virtuous ex- 
 ercise, or vicious neglect of their understanding, in ex- 
 amining or not examining into that evidence. There 
 seems no possible reason to be given, why we may not 
 be in a state of moral probation, with regard to the ex- 
 ercise of our understanding upon the subject of religion, 
 as we are with regard to our behaviour in common 
 affairs. The former is as much a thing within our power 
 and choice as the latter. And I suppose it is to be laid 
 down for certain, that the same character, the same in- 
 ward principle, which, after a man is convinced of the 
 
CSAP.VL] SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN ITS PROOF. 231 
 
 truth of religion, renders him obedient to the precepts of 
 it, would, were he not thus convinced, set him about an 
 examination of it, upon its system and evidence being 
 offered to his thoughts : and that in the latter state his 
 examination would be with an impartiahty, seriousness, 
 and sohcitude, proportionable to what his obedience is 
 in the former. And as inattention, negligence, want of 
 all serious concern, about a matter of such a nature and 
 such importance, when offered to men's consideration, is, 
 before a distinct conviction of its truth, as real immoral 
 depravity and dissoluteness ; as neglect of religious prac- 
 tice after such conviction : so active solicitude about it, 
 and fair impartial consideration of its evidence before 
 such conviction, is as really an exercise of a morally right 
 temper ; as is religious practice after. Thus, that reli- 
 gion is not intuitively true, but a matter of deduction 
 and inference ; that a conviction of its truth is not forced 
 upon every one, but left to be, by some, collected with 
 heedful attention to premises ; this as much constitutes 
 religious probation, as much affords sphere, scope, oppor- 
 tunity, for right and wrong behaviour, as any thing what- 
 ever does. And their manner of treating this subject, 
 when laid before them, shows what is in their heart, and 
 is an exertion of it. 
 
 Secondly, It appears to be a thing as evident, though 
 it is not so much attended to, that if, upon consideration 
 of religion, the evidence of it should seem to any persons 
 doubtful, in the highest supposable degree; even this 
 doubtful evidence will, however, put them into a general 
 state of probation in the moral and rehgious sense. For, 
 suppose a man to be really in doubt, whether such a 
 person had not done him the greatest favour ; or, whether 
 his whole temporal interest did not depend upon that 
 person : no one. who had any sense of gratitude and of 
 prudence, could possibly consider himself in the same 
 situation, with regard to such person, as if he had no 
 such doubt. In truth, it is as just to say, that certainty 
 and doubt are the same; as to say the situations 
 now mentioned would leave a man as entirely at liberty 
 in point of gratitude or prudence, as he would be, werf; 
 he certain he had received no favour from such person, 
 
232 REVELATION NOT UNIVERSAL [P..«r IF. 
 
 or that he no way depended upon him. And Jlius, 
 though the evidence of reHgion which is afforded to some 
 men should be httle more than they are given to see, the 
 system of Christianity, or rehgion in general, to be sup- 
 posable and credible; this ought in all reason to beget a. 
 serious practical apprehension, that it may be true. And 
 even this will afford matter of exercise for religious 
 suspense and deliberation, for moral resolution and 
 self-government; because the apprehension that religion 
 may be true does as really lay men under obligations, as 
 a full conviction that it is true. It gives occasion and 
 motives to consider further the important subject; to pre- 
 serve attentively upon their minds a general implicit sense 
 that they may be under divine moral government, an awful 
 solicitude about religion, whether natural or revealed. 
 Such apprehension ought to turn men's eyes to every 
 degree of new light which may be had, from whatever 
 side it comes ; and induce them to refrain, in the mean 
 time, from all immoralities, and live in the conscientious 
 practice of every common virtue. Especially are they 
 bound to keep at the greatest distance from all dissolute 
 profaneness ; for this the very nature of the case forbids ; 
 and to treat with highest reverence a matter, upon which 
 their oAvn whole interest and being, and the fate of 
 nature, depend. This behaviour, and an active endeavour 
 to maintain within themselves this temper, is the busi- 
 ness, the duty, and the wisdom of those persons, who 
 complain of the doubtfulness of religion: is what they are 
 under the most proper obhgations to. And such beha- 
 viour is an exertion of, and has a tendency to improve 
 in them, that character, which the practice of all the 
 several duties of religion, from a full conviction of its 
 truth, is an exertion of, and has a tendency to improve 
 in others : others, I say, to whom God has afforded such 
 conviction. Nay, considering the infinite importance of 
 religion, revealed as well as natural, I think it may be 
 said in general, that whoever will weigh the matter 
 thoroughly may see, there is not near so much difference, 
 as is commonly imagined, between what ought in reason 
 to be the rule of life, to those persons who are fully con- 
 vinced of its truth, and to those who have only a serious 
 
Chap. VI.] SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN ITS P'ROOF. 233 
 
 doubting apprehension, that it may be true. Their hopes, 
 and fears, and obhgations, will be in various degrees : but, 
 as the subject matter of their hopes and fears is the same; 
 so the subject matter of their obligations, what they are 
 bound to do and to refrain from, is not so very unlike. 
 
 It is to be observed further, that, from a character of 
 understanding, or a situation of influence in the world, 
 some persons have it in ffieir power to do infinitely more 
 harm or good, by setting an example of profaneness and 
 avowed disregard to all religion, or, on the contrary, of 
 a serious, though perhaps doubting, apprehension of its 
 truth, and of a reverend regard to it under this doubt- 
 fulness ; than they can do, by acting well or ill in all the 
 common intercourses amongst mankind. And conse- 
 quently they are most highly accountable for a behaviour, 
 which, they may easily foresee, is of such importance, 
 and in which there is most plainly a right and a wrong; 
 even admitting the evidence of religion to be as doubtful 
 as is pretended. 
 
 The ground of these observations, and that which 
 renders them just and true, is, that doubting necessarily 
 implies some degree of evidence for that, of which we 
 doubt. For no person would be in doubt concerning 
 the truth of a number of facts so and so circumstanced, 
 which should accidentally come into his thoughts, and of 
 which he had no evidence at all. And though in the 
 case of an even chance, and where consequently we were 
 in doubt, we should in common language say, that we 
 had no evidence at all for either side; yet that situation 
 of things, which renders it an even chance and no more, 
 that such an event will happen, renders this case equiva- 
 lent to all others, where there is such evidence on both 
 sides of a question,* as leaves the mind in doubt con- 
 cerning the truth. Indeed in all these cases, there is no 
 more evidence on one side than on the other ; but there 
 is (what is equivalent to) much more for either, than for 
 the truth of a number of facts, which come into one's 
 thoughts at random. And thus, in all these cases, doubt 
 a.s much presupposes evidence, lower degrees of evi- 
 dence, as belief presupposes higher, and certainty higher 
 
 * Introduction. 
 
234 REVELATION NOT UNIVERSAL: [Pari H. 
 
 still. Any one, who will a little attend to the nature of 
 evidence, will easily carry this observation on, and see, 
 that between no evidence at all, and tliat degree of it 
 which affords ground of doubt, there are as many inter- 
 mediate degrees, as there are, between that degree which 
 is the ground of doubt, and demonstration. And though 
 we have not faculties to dis^guish these degrees of 
 evidence with any sort of exactness ; yet, in proportion 
 as they are discerned, they ought to influence our prac- 
 tice. For it is as n al an imperfection in the moral cha- 
 racter, not to be influenced in practice by a lower degree 
 of evidence when discerned, as it|is in the understanding, 
 not to discern it. And as, in all subjects which men con- 
 sider, they discern the lower as well as higher degrees of 
 evidence, proportionably to their capacity of understand- 
 ing; so, in practical subjects, they are influenced in prac- 
 tice, by the lower as well as higher degrees of it, propor- 
 tionably to their fairness and honesty. And as, in pro- 
 portion to defects in the understanding, men are unapt 
 to see lower degrees of evidence, are in danger of over- 
 looking evidence when it is not glaring, and are easily 
 imposed upon in such cases ; so, in proportion to the 
 corruption of the heart, they seem capable of satisfying 
 themselves with having no regard in practice to evidence 
 acknowledged real, if it be not overbearing. From these 
 things it must follow, that doubting concerning religion 
 imphes such a degree of evidence for it, as, joined with 
 the consideration of its importance, unquestionably lays 
 men under the obligations before mentioned, to have a 
 dutiful regard to it in all their behaviour. 
 
 Thirdly, The difficulties in which the evidence of reli- 
 gion is involved, which some complain of, is no more a 
 just ground of complaint, than the external circumstances 
 of temptation, which others are placed in; or than diffi- 
 culties in the practice of it, after a full conviction of its 
 truth. Temptations render our state a more improving 
 state of discipline,* than it would be otherwise : as they 
 give occasion for a more attentive exercise of the vir- 
 tuous principle, which confirms and strengthens it more, 
 than an easier or less attentive exercise of it could. Now 
 
 * I'iin I. Chap. V. ■ J 
 
Chap. VI.] SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN ITS PROOF. 235 
 
 speculative difficulties are, in this respect, of the very- 
 same nature with these external temptations. For the 
 evidence of religion not appearing obvious, is to some 
 persons a temptation to reject it, without any considera- 
 tion at all; and therefore requires such an attentive ex- 
 ercise of the virtuous principle, seriously to consider that 
 evidence, as there would be no occasion for, but for such 
 temptation. And the supposed doubtfulness of its evi- 
 dence, after it has been in some sort considered, affords 
 opportunity to an unfair mind of explaining away, and 
 deceitfully hiding from itself, that evidence which it might 
 see; and also for men's encouraging themselves in vice, 
 from hopes of impunity, though they do clearly see thus 
 much at least, that these hopes are uncertain : in like 
 manner as the common temptation to many instances of 
 folly, which end in temporal infamy and ruin, is the 
 ground for hope of not being detected, and of escaping 
 with impunity ; i. e. the doubtfulness of the proof before- 
 hand, that such foolish behaviour will thus end in infamy 
 and ruin. On the contrary, supposed doubtfulness in 
 the evidence of religion calls for a more careful and atten- 
 tive exercise of the virtuous principle, in fairly yielding 
 themselves up to the proper influence of any real evi- 
 dence, though doubtful ; and in practising conscientiously 
 all virtue, though under some uncertainty, whether the 
 government in the universe may not possibly be such, as 
 that vice may escape with impunity. And in general, 
 temptation, meaning by this word the lesser allurements 
 to wrong and difficulties in the discharge of our duty, as 
 well as the greater ones ; temptation, I say, as such and 
 of every kind and degree, as it calls forth some virtuous 
 efforts, additional to what would' otherwise have been 
 wanting, cannot but be an additional disciphne and im- 
 provement of virtue, as well as probation of it in the 
 other senses of that word.* So that the very same ac- 
 count is to be given, why the evidence of religion should 
 be left in such a manner, as to require, in some, an 
 attentive, solicitous, perhaps painful exercise of their 
 understanding about it ; as why others should be placed 
 in such circumstances, as that the practice of its comraoii 
 
 * Part 1. Chap. iv. and pp. 133, 134. j 
 
/i36 REVELATION NOT universal: [Part II. 
 
 duties, atlcr a full conviction of the^ truth of it, should 
 require attention, solicitude, and pains : or, why appear- 
 ing doubtfulness should be permitted to alford matter of 
 temptation to some ; as why external difficulties and 
 allurements should be permitted to afford matter of 
 temptation to others. The same account also is to be 
 given, why some should be exercised with temptations 
 of both these kinds ; as why others should be exercised 
 with the latter in such very high degrees, as some have 
 been, particularly as the primitive Christians were. 
 
 Nor does there appear any absurdity in supposing, 
 that the speculative difficulties, in which the evidence of 
 religion is involved, may make even the principal part 
 of some persons' trial. For as the chief temptations of 
 the generality of the world are the ordinary motives to 
 injustice or unrestrained pleasure ; or to live in the ne- 
 glect of religion from that frame of mind, which renders 
 many persons almost without feeling as to any thing dis- 
 tant, or which is not the object of their senses: so there 
 are other persons without this shallowness of temper, 
 persons of a deeper sense as to what is invisible and 
 future ; who not only see, but have a general practical 
 feeling, that what is to come will be present, and that 
 things are not less real for their not being the objects of 
 sense; and who, from their natural constitution of body 
 and of temper, and from their external condition, may 
 have small temptations to behave ill, small difficulty in 
 behaving well, in the common course of life. Now 
 when these latter persons have a distinct full conviction 
 of the truth of religion, without any possible doubts or 
 difficulties, the practice of it is to them unavoidable, un- 
 less they will do a constant violence to their own minds; 
 and religion is scarce any more a discipline to them, 
 than it is to creatures in a state of perfection. Yet 
 these persons may possibly stand in need of moral dis- 
 cipline and exercise in a higher degree, than they would 
 have by such an easy practice of religion. Or it may 
 be requisite, for reasons unknown to us, that they should 
 give some further manifestation* what is their moral 
 character, to the creation of God, than such a practice 
 
 * p. 133, 134. 
 
Chap. VI.J SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN ITS PROOF. 237 
 
 of it would be. Thus in the great variety of religious 
 situations in which men are placed, what constitutes, 
 what chiefly and peculiarly constitutes, the probation, in 
 all senses, of some persons, may be the difficulties in 
 which the evidence of religion is involved: and their 
 principal and distinguished trial may be, how they will 
 behave under and with respect to these difficulties. 
 Circumstances in men's situation in their temporal capa- 
 city, analogous in good measure to this respecting reli- 
 gion, are to be observed. We find some persons are 
 placed in such a situation in the world, as that their 
 chief difficulty with regard to conduct, is not the doing 
 what is prudent when it is known; for this, in number- 
 less cases, is as easy as the contrary: but to some the 
 principal exercise is, recollection and being upon their 
 guard against deceits, the deceits suppose of those about 
 them ; against false appearances of reason and prudence. 
 To persons in some situations, the principal exercise 
 with respect to conduct is, attention in order to inform 
 themselves what is proper, what is really the reasonable 
 and prudent part to act. 
 
 But as I have hitherto gone upon supposition, that 
 men's dissatisfaction with the evidence of religion is not 
 owing to their neglects or prejudices; it must be added, 
 on the other hand, in all common reason, and as what 
 the truth of the case plainly requires should be added, 
 that such dissatisfaction possibly may be owing to those, 
 possibly may be men's own fault. For, 
 
 If there are any persons, who never set themselves 
 heartily and in earnest to be informed in religion; if 
 there are any, who secretly wish it may not prove true ; 
 and are less attentive to evidence than to difficulties, and 
 more to objections than to what is said in answer to 
 them : these persons will scarce be thought in a likely 
 way of seeing the evidence of religion, though it were 
 most certainly true, and capable of being ever so fully 
 proved. If any accustom themselves to consider this 
 subject usually in the way of mirth and sport: if they 
 attend to forms and representations, and inadequate man- 
 ners of expression, instead of the real things intended 
 by them : (for signs often can be no more than inade- 
 
238 REVELATION NOT UNIVERSAL.* [PabtU, 
 
 quately expressive of the things signified:) or if they 
 substitute human errors in the room of divine truth; 
 why may not all, or any of these things, hinder some 
 men from seeing that evidence, which really is seen by 
 others; as a like turn of mind, with respect to matters 
 of* common speculation and practice, does, w^e find by 
 experience, hinder them from attaining that knowledge 
 and right understanding, in matters of common specu- 
 lation and practice, which more fair and attentive minds 
 attain to? And the effect will be the same, whether 
 their neglect of seriously considering the evidence of 
 religion, and their indirect behaviour with regard to it, 
 proceed from mere carelessness, or from the grosser 
 vices ; or whether it be owing to this, that forms and 
 figurative manners of expression, as well as errors, ad- 
 minister occasions of ridicule, when the things intended, 
 and the truth itself, would not. Men may indulge a 
 ludicrous turn so far as to lose all sense of conduct and 
 prudence in worldly affairs, and even, as it seems, to 
 impair their faculty of reason. And in general, levity, 
 carelessness, passion, and prejudice do hinder us from 
 being rightly informed, with respect to common things: 
 and they may, in like manner, and perhaps in some 
 further providential manner, with respect to moral and 
 religious subjects: may hinder evidence from being laid 
 before us, and from being seen when it is. The Scrip- 
 ture* does declare, that every one shall not understand. 
 And it makes no difference, by what providential con- 
 duct this comes to pass: whether the evidence of Chris- 
 tianity was, originally and with design, put and left so, 
 as that those who are desirous of evading moral obliga- 
 tions should not see it; and that honest-minded per- 
 sons should: or, whether it comes to pass by any other 
 means. 
 
 Further : The general proof of natural religion and of 
 
 * Dan. xi>. 10. Soe also Isa. xxix. 13, 14. Matth. vi. 23. and xi. 25. and 
 xiii. 11, 12. John iii. 19. and V. 44. 1 Cor. ii. 14. and 2 Cor. iv. 4. 2 Tim. iii. 13. 
 and that afffctioiiatc as well as authoritative admonition, so very many times incul- 
 cated, He that hath ears to hear, let him hear. Grotius saw so strongly the thing 
 intended in tiiese and oilier passages of Scripture of the like sense, as to say, that the 
 proof given ns of (Christianity was less tlian it nreht have been, for this very pur- 
 pose : Uf ita sermo Evangelii tanouam tapis esset Lydius ad "uem wgeiiia sanabilia, 
 txplorarentur. De Ver. R. C. lib. ii. towards the ad. 
 
Chap. VI.] SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN ITS PROOF. 239 
 
 Christianity does, I think, He level to common men ; even 
 those, the greatest part of whose time, from childhood 
 to old age, is taken up with providing for themselves 
 and their families the common conveniences, perhaps 
 necessaries, of life : those I mean, of this rank, who ever 
 think at all of asking after proof, or attending to it. 
 Common men, were thev as much in earnest about 
 religion, as about their temporal affairs, are capable of 
 being convinced upon real evidence, that there is a God 
 who governs the world : and they feel themselves to be 
 of a moral nature, and accountable creatures. And as 
 Christianity entirely falls in with this their natural sense 
 of things, so they are capable, not only of being persuad- 
 ed, but of being made to see, that there is evidence of 
 miracles wrought in attestation of it, and many appearing 
 completions of prophecy. But though this proof is real 
 and conclusive, yet it is liable to objections, and may be 
 run up into difficulties ; which however persons who are 
 capable not only of talking of, but of really seeing, are 
 capable also of seeing through : i. e, not of clearing up 
 and answerine; them, so as to satisfv their curiositv, for 
 of such knowledge we are not capable with respect to 
 any one thing in nature ; but capable of seeing that the 
 proof is not lost in these difficulties, or destroyed by 
 these objections. But tlien a thorough examination into 
 religion with regard to these objections, which cannot be 
 the business of every man, is a matter of pretty large 
 compass, and, from the nature of it, requires some 
 knowledge, as well as time and attention ; to see, how 
 the evidence comes out, upon balancing one thing witl. 
 another, and what, upon the whole, is the amount of it. 
 Now if persons who have picked up these objections 
 from others, and tak(i for granted they are of weight, 
 upon the word of those from whom they received them, 
 or, by often retailiiig of them, come to see or fancy they 
 see them to be of weight; will not prepare themselves 
 for such an examination, with a competent degree of 
 knowledge ; or will not give that time and attention to 
 the subject, which, from the nature of it, is necessary for 
 attaining such information: in this case, they must remain 
 in doubtfulness, ignorance, or error : in tlie same way as 
 
240 REVELATION NOT universal: {Vart U. 
 
 they must, with regard to common sciences, and matters 
 of common hfe, if they neglect the necessary means of 
 being informed in them. 
 
 But still perhaps it will be objected, that if a prince or 
 common master were to send directions to a servant, he 
 would take care, that they should always bear the certain 
 marks, who they came from, and that their sense should 
 be always plain : so as that there should be no possible 
 doubt if he could help it, concerning the authority or 
 meaning of them. Now the proper answer to all this 
 kind of objections is, that, wherever the fallacy lies, it is 
 even certain we cannot argue thus with respect to Him, 
 who is the governor of the world : and particularly that 
 he does not afford us such information, with respect to 
 our temporal affairs and interests, as experience abun- 
 dantly shows. However, there is a full answer to this 
 objection, from the very nature of rehgion. For, the 
 reason why a prince would give his directions in this 
 plain manner is, that he absolutely desires such an ex- 
 ternal action should be done, without concerning himself 
 with the motive or principle upon which it is done : i. e. 
 he regards only the external event, or the thing's being 
 done ; and not at all, properly speaking, the doing of it, 
 or the action. Whereas the wliole of morality and 
 religion consisting merely in action itself, there is no 
 sort of ])arallel between the cases. But if the prince be 
 supposed to regard only the action ; i. e. only to desire 
 to exercise, or in any sense prove, the understanding or 
 loyalty of a servant ; he would not always give his orders 
 in such a plain manner. It may be proper to add, that 
 the will of God, respecting morality and religion, may 
 be considered either as absolute, or as only conditional. 
 If it be absolute, it can only be thus, that we should act 
 virtuously in such given circumstances ; not that we 
 should be brought to act so, by his changing of our 
 circumstances. And if God's will be thus absolute, 
 then it is in our power, in the highest and strictest sense, 
 to do or to contradict his will ; which is a most weighty 
 consideration. Or his will may be considered only as 
 conditional, that if we act so and so, we shall be reward- 
 ed ; if otherwise, punished : of which conditional will o^ 
 
Chap. VI.] SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN ITS PROOF. 241 
 
 the Author of Nature, the whole constitution of it affords 
 most certain instances. 
 
 Upon the whole: that we are in a state of religion 
 necessarily implies, that we are in a state of probation: 
 and the credibility of our being at all in such a state 
 being admitted, there seems no peculiar difficulty in 
 supposing our probation to be, just as it is, in those 
 respects which are above objected against. There seems 
 no pretence, from the reason of the thing, to say, that the 
 trial cannot equitably be any thing, but whether persor.s 
 will act suitably to certain information, or such as admits 
 no room for doubt ; so as that there can be no danger 
 of miscarriage, but either from their not attending to 
 what they certainly know, or from overbearing passion 
 hurrying them on to act contrary to it. For, since igno- 
 rance and doubt afford scope for probation in all senses, 
 as really as intuitive conviction or certainty; and since 
 the two former are to be put to the same account as 
 difficulties in practice; men's moral probation may also 
 be, whether they will take due care to inform themselves 
 by impartial consideration, and afterwards whether they 
 will act as the case requires, upon the evidence which 
 they have, however doubtful. And this, we find by 
 experience, is frequently our probation,* in our temporal 
 capacity. For, the information which we want with 
 regard to our worldly interests is by no means always 
 given us of course, without any care of our own. And 
 we are greatly liable to self-deceit from inward secret 
 prejudices, and also to the deceits of others. So that to 
 be able to judge what is the prudent part, often requires 
 much and difficult consideration. Then after we have 
 judged the very best we can, the evidence upon which 
 we must act, if we will live and act at all, is perpetually 
 doubtful to a very high degree. And the constitution 
 and course of the world in fact is such, as that want of 
 impartial consideration what we have to do, and ventui 
 ing upon extravagant courses because it is doubtful what 
 will be the consequence, are often naturally, ^. e. provi- 
 dentially, altogether as fatal, as misconduct occasioned 
 
 * p. 78, 234-, &c. 
 Q 
 
'2V2 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [Paxv lU 
 
 by heedless inattention to what we certainly know, or 
 disregarding it from overbearing passion. 
 
 Several of the observations here made may well seem 
 strange, perhaps unintelligible, to many good men. But 
 if the persons for whose sake they are made think so ; 
 persons who object as above, and throw off all regard to 
 rehgion under pretence of want of evidence; I desire 
 them to consider again, whether their thinking so be 
 owing to any thing unintelligible in these observations, 
 or to their own not having such a sense of religion and 
 serious solicitude about it, as even their state of scepti- 
 cism does in all reason require ? It ought to be forced 
 upon the reflection of these persons, that our nature and 
 condition necessarily require us, in the daily course of 
 life, to act upon evidence much lower than what is com- 
 monly called probable : to guard, not only against what 
 we fully believe will, but also against what we tSiink it 
 supposable may, happen; and to engage in pursuits 
 when the probability is greatly against success, if it be 
 credible, that possibly we may succeed in them. 
 
 CHAP. VII. 
 
 OF THE PAUTICULAR EVIDENCE FOR CHRISTIANITY. 
 
 The presumptions against revelation, and objections 
 against the general scheme of Christianity, and particu- 
 lar things relating to it, being removed; there remains 
 to be considered, what positive evidence we have for 
 the truth of it; chiefly in order to see, what the analogy 
 of nature suggests with regard to that evidence, and the 
 objections against it: or to see what is, and is allowed 
 to be, the plain natural rule of judgment and of action, 
 in our temporal concerns, in cases where we have the 
 same kind of evidence, and the same kind of objections 
 against it, that we have in the case before us. 
 
 Now in the evidence of Christianity there seem to be 
 several things of great weight, not reducible to the head, 
 either of miracles, or the completion of prophecy, in the 
 common acceptation of the words. But these two are 
 
CaAP. VII.] FOR CHRISTIANITY. 243 
 
 its direct and faiidamental proofs : and those other things, 
 however considerable they are, yet ought never to be 
 urged apart from its direct proofs, but always to be 
 joined with them. Thus the evidence of Christianity 
 will be a long series of things, reaching, as it seems, from 
 the beginning of the world to the present time, of great 
 variety and compass, taking in both the direct and also the 
 collateral, proofs; and making up, all of them together, 
 one argument: the conviction arising from which kind 
 of proof may be compared to what they call the effect 
 in architecture or other works of art; a result from a 
 great number of things so and so disposed, and taken 
 into one view. I shall therefore, first, make some 
 observations relating to miracles, and the appearing 
 completions of prophecy; and consider what analogy 
 suggests, in answer to the objections brought against 
 this evidence. And, secondly, 1 shall endeavour to give 
 some account of the general argument now mentioned, 
 consisting both of the direct and collateral evidence, 
 considered as making up one argument: this being the 
 kind of proof, upon which we determine most questions 
 of difficulty, concerning common facts, alleged to have 
 happened, or seeming likely to happen; especially ques- 
 tions relating to conduct. 
 
 First, I shall make some observations upon the direct 
 proof of Christianity from miracles and prophecy, and 
 upon the objections alleged against it. 
 
 I. Now the following observations relating to the his- 
 torical evidence of miracles WTought in attestation of 
 Christianity appear to be of great weight. 
 
 1. The Old Testament affords us the same historical 
 evidence of the miracles of Moses and of the prophets, 
 as of the common civil history of Moses and the kings 
 of Israel; or, as of the affairs of the Jewish nation. And 
 the Gospels and the Acts afford us the same historical 
 evidence of the miracles of Christ and the Apostles, as 
 of the common matters related in them. This indeed 
 could not have been affirmed by any reasonable man, if 
 the authors of these books, like many other historians, 
 had appeared to make an entertaining manner of writ- 
 ing their aim; though they had interspersed miracles ir. 
 
 'q2 
 
2i4 OF THE PARTICULAR EV^IDENCE [Part II. 
 
 tlieir works, at proper distances and upon proper oc- 
 casions. These might have animated a dull relation, 
 amused the reader, and engaged his attention. And the 
 same account would naturally have been given of them, 
 as of the speeches and descriptions of such authors: the 
 same account, in a manner, as is to be given, why the 
 poets make use of wonders and prodigies. But the 
 facts, both miraculous and natural, in Scripture, are 
 related in plain unadorned narratives: and both of them 
 appear, in all respects, to stand upon the same foot of 
 historical evidence. Further: some parts of Scripture, 
 containing an account of miracles fully sufficient to prove 
 the truth of Christianity, are quoted as genuine, from 
 the age in which they are said to be written, down to 
 the present: and no other parts of them, material in the 
 present question, are omitted to be quoted in such man- 
 ner, as to afford any sort of proof of their not being 
 genuine. And, as common history, when called in 
 question in any instance, may often be greatly confirmed 
 by contemporary or subsequent events more known and 
 acknowledged; and as the common Scripture histor)^ 
 like many others, is thus confirmed; so likewise is the 
 miraculous history of it, not only in particular instances, 
 but in general. For, the establishment of the Jewish and 
 Christian religions, which were events contemporary with 
 the miracles related to be wrought in attestation of both, 
 or subsequent to them, these events are just what we 
 should have expected, upon supposition such miracles 
 were really wrought to attest the truth of those religions. 
 These miracles are a satisfactory account of those events : 
 of which no other satisfactory account can be given; nor 
 any account at all, but what is imaginary merely, and 
 invented. It is to be added, that the most obvious, the 
 most easy and direct account of this history, how it came 
 to be written and to be received in the world, as a true 
 history, is, that it really is so: nor can any other account 
 of it be easy and direct. Now, though an account, not 
 at all obvious, but very far-fetched and indirect, may 
 indeed be, and often is, the true account of a matter ; 
 yet it cannot be admitted on the authority of its being 
 asserted. Mere guess, supposition, and jpossibilit)', 
 
Chap. VII.] FOR CHRISTIANITY. 245 
 
 when opposed to historical evidence, prove nothing, hut 
 that historical evidence is not demonstrative. 
 
 Now the just consequence from all this, I think, is, 
 that the Scripture-history in general is to be admitted as 
 an authentic genuine history, till somewhat positive be 
 alleged sufficient to invalidate it. But no man will deny 
 the consequence to be, that it cannot be rejected, or 
 thrown by as of no authority, till it can be proved to be 
 of none ; even though the evidence now mentioned for 
 its authority were doubtful. This evidence may be con- 
 fronted by historical evidence on the other side, if there 
 be any : or general incredibility in the things related, or 
 inconsistence in the general turn of the history, would 
 prove it to be of no authority. But since, upon the face 
 of the matter, upon a first and general view, the appear- 
 ance is, that it is an authentic history; it cannot be de- 
 termined to be fictitious without some proof that it is so. 
 And the following observations in support of these, and 
 coincident with them, will greatly confirm the historical 
 evidence for the truth of Christianity. 
 
 2. The Epistles of St Paul, from the nature of episto- 
 lary writing, and moreover from several of them being 
 written, not to particular persons, but to churches, carry 
 in them evidences of their being genuine, beyond what 
 can be in a mere historical narrative, left to the world at 
 large. This evidence, joined with that which they have 
 in common with the rest of the New Testament, seems 
 not to leave so much as any particular pretence for deny- 
 ing their genuineness, considered as an ordinary matter 
 of fact, or of criticism: I say particular pretence, for 
 denying it; because any single fact, of such a kind and 
 such antiquity, may have general doubts raised concern- 
 ing it, from the very nature of human affairs and human 
 testimony. There is also to be mentioned a distinct and 
 particular evidence of the genuineness of the epistle 
 chiefly referred to here, the first to the Corinthians ; from 
 the manner in which it is quoted by Clemens Romanus, 
 in an epistle of his own to that church.* Now these 
 epistles afford a proof of Christianity, detached from ail 
 
 * C:em. Rom. Ep. 1. c. 47. 
 
246 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [Pakt «. 
 
 others, which is, I think, a thing of weight; and also a 
 proof of a nature and kind pecuhar to itself. For, 
 
 In them the author declares, that he received the Gos- 
 pel in general, and the institution of the Communion in 
 particular, not from the rest of the Apostles, or jointly 
 together with them, but alone, from Christ himself; 
 whom he declares likewise, conformably to the history 
 in the Acts, that he saw after his ascension.* So that 
 the testimony of St Paul is to be considered, as detached 
 from that of the rest of the Apostles. 
 
 And he declares further, that he was endued with a 
 power of working miracles, as what was publicly known 
 to those very people, speaks of frequent and great variety 
 of miraculous gifts as then subsisting in those very 
 churches, to which he was writing ; which he was re- 
 proving for several irregularities ; and where he had 
 personal opposers : he mentions these gifts incidentally, 
 in the most easy manner, and without effort ; by way of 
 reproof to those who had them, for their indecent use of 
 them ; and by way of depreciating them, in comparison 
 of moral virtues : in short he speaks to these churches, 
 of these miraculous powers, in the manner, any one 
 would speak to another of a thing, which was as familiar 
 and as much known in common to them both, as any 
 thing in the world.! And this, as hath been observed 
 by several persons, is surely a very considerable thing. 
 
 3. It is an acknowledged historical fact, that Christia- 
 nity offered itself to the world, and demanded to be re- 
 ceived, upon the allegation, i. e. as unbelievers would 
 speak, upon the pretence, of miracles, publicly wrought 
 to attest the truth of it, in such an age ; and that it was 
 actually received by great numbers in that very age, and 
 upon the professed belief of the reality of these miracles. 
 And Christianity, including the dispensation of the Old 
 Testament, seems distinguished by this from all other 
 religions. I mean, that this does not appear to be the 
 case with regard to any other; for surely it will not be 
 supposed to lie upon any person, to prove by positive 
 
 * Gal. i. 1 Cor. xi. 23, &c. 1 Cor. xv. 8. f Rom. xv. 19. 1 ,Cor. xii. 8, £>, 
 
 10—28, &c. and xiii. 1, 2, 8. .wd Uie whole xktli chapter. 2 Cor. xii. 12. la. GaL 
 ui. 2, 5. 
 
Chap. VII.] FOR CHRISTIANITY. 247 
 
 historical evidence, that it was not. It does in no sort 
 appear that Mahometanism was first received in the 
 world upon the foot of supposed miracles,* i. e. public 
 ones: for, as revelation is itself miraculous, all pretence 
 to it must necessarily imply some pretence of miracles. 
 And it is a known fact, that it was immediately, at the 
 very first, propagatod by other means. And as parti- 
 cular institutions, whether in Paganism or Popery, said 
 to be confirmed by miracles after those institutions had 
 obtained, are not to the purpose : so, were there what 
 might be called historical proof, that any of them were 
 introduced by a supposed divine command, believed to 
 be attested by miracles ; these would not be in any wise 
 parallel. For single things of this sort are easy to be 
 accounted for, after parties are formed, and have power 
 in their hands ; and the leaders of them are in veneration 
 with the multitude ; and political interests are blended 
 with religious claims, and religious distinctions. But be- 
 fore any thing of this kind, for a few persons, and those 
 of the lowest rank, all at once, to brinjj; over such great 
 numbers to a new religion, and get it to be received 
 upon the particular evidence of miracles; this is quite 
 another thing. And I think it will be allowed bv anv 
 fair adversary, that the fact now mentioned, taking in all 
 the circumstances of it, is peculiar to the Christian reli- 
 gion. However, the fact itself is allowed, that Christianity 
 obtained, i. e. was professed to be received in the world, 
 upon the belief of miracles, immediately in the age in 
 which it is said those miracles were wrought ; or that 
 this is what its first converts would have alleged, as the 
 reason for their embracing it. Now certainly it is not to 
 be supposed that such numbers of men, in the most dis- 
 tant parts of the world should forsake the religion of 
 their country, in which they had been educated; sepa- 
 rate themselves from their friends, particularly in their 
 festival shows and solemnities, to which the common 
 people are so greatly addicted, and which were of a na- 
 ture to engage them much more, than any thing of that 
 sort amongst us ; and embrace a religion, which could 
 iiot but expose them to many inconveniences, and in- 
 
 * See the Koran, c. xiii. and c. xvii. 
 
248 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [PabtIL 
 
 deed must have been a giving up the world in a great 
 degree, even from the very first, and before the empire 
 engaged in form against them : it cannot be supposed, 
 that such numbers should make so great, and, to say the 
 least, so inconvenient a change in their whole institution 
 of life, unless they were really convinced of the truth of 
 those miracles, upon the knowledge or belief of which 
 they professed to make it. And it will, I suppose, readily 
 be acknowledged, that the generality of the first converts 
 to Christianity must have beheved them : that as by be- 
 coming Christians they declared to the world, they were 
 satisfied of the truth of those miracles ; so this declara- 
 tion was to be credited. And this their testimony is the 
 same kind of evidence for those miracles, as if they had 
 put it in writing, and these writings had come down to 
 us. And it is real evidence, because it is of facts, which 
 they had capacity and full opportunity to inform them- 
 selves of. It is also distinct from the direct or expres? 
 historical evidence, though it is of the same kind: and it 
 would be allowed to be distinct in all cases. For were 
 a fact expressly related by one or more ancient histo- 
 rians, and disputed in after ages ; that this fact is acknow- 
 ledged to have been believed by great numbers of the 
 age in which the historian says it was done, would be 
 allowed an additional proof of such fact, quite distinct 
 from the express testimony of the historian. The cre- 
 dulity of mankind is acknowledged: and the suspicions 
 of mankind ought to be acknowledged too; and their 
 backwardness even to believe, and greater still to prac- 
 tise, what makes against their interest. And it must 
 particularly be remembered, that education, and prejudice, 
 and authority, were against Christianity, in the age I am 
 speaking of. So that the immediate conversion of such 
 numbers is a real presumption of somewhat more than 
 human in this matter: I say presumption, for it is not 
 alleged as a proof alone and by itself. Nor need any one 
 of the things mentioned in this Chapter be considered 
 as a proof by itself: and yet all of them together may be 
 one of the strongest.* 
 
 Upon the whole: as <^here is large historical evidence, 
 
 * p. 273, &c. 
 
CHAr.VILJ FOR CHRISTIANITY. 249 
 
 both direct and circumstantial, of miracles wrought in 
 attestation of Christianity, collected by those who have 
 writ upon the subject ; it lies upon unbelievers to show, 
 why this evidence is not to be credited. This way of 
 speaking is, I think, just; and what persons who write 
 in defence of religion naturally fall into. Yet, in a matter 
 of such unspeakable importance, the proper question is, 
 not whom it lies upon, according to the rules of argu- 
 ment, to maintain or confute objections: but whether 
 there really are any, against this evidence, sufficient, in 
 reason, to destroy the credit of it. However, unbelievers 
 seem to take upon them the part of showing that there 
 are. 
 
 They allege, that numberless enthusiastic people, in 
 different ages and countries, expose themselves to the 
 same difficulties which the primitive Christians did ; and 
 are ready to give up their lives for the most idle follies 
 imaginable. But it is not very clear, to what purpose 
 this objection is brought. For every one, surely, in 
 every case, must distinguish between opinions and facts. 
 And though testimony is no proof of enthusiastic opi- 
 nions, or of any opinions at all ; yet it is allowed, in all 
 other cases, to be a proof of facts. And a person's lay- 
 ing down his life in attestation of facts or of opinions, 
 is the strongest proof of his believing them. And if the 
 Apostles and their contemporaries did believe the facts, 
 in attestation of which they exposed themselves to suf- 
 ferings and death; this their belief, or rather knowledge, 
 must be a proof of those facts : for they were such as 
 came under the observation of their senses. And though 
 it is not of equal weight, yet it is of weight, 4;hat the 
 martyrs of the next age, notwithstanding they were not 
 eye-witnesses of those facts, as were the Apostles and 
 their contemporaries, had, however, full opportunity to 
 inform themselves, whether they were true or not, and 
 gave equal proof of their believing them to be true. 
 
 But enthusiasm, it is said, greatly weakens the evi- 
 dence of testimony even for facts, in matters relating to 
 religion : some seem to think it totally and absolutely 
 destroys the evidence of testimony upon this subject. 
 And indeed the powers of enthusiasm, and of diseases 
 
250 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [Part II. 
 
 too, which operate in a hke manner, are very wonderful, 
 in particular instances. But if great numbers of men, 
 not appearing in any pecuhar degree weak, nor under 
 any pecuhar suspicion of neghgence, affirm that they 
 saw and heard such things plainly with their eyes and 
 their ears, and are admitted to be in earnest; such testi- 
 mony is evidence of the strongest kind we can have, for 
 any matter of fact. Yet possibly it may be overcome, 
 strong as it is, by incredibility in the things thus attest- 
 ed, or by contrary testimony. And in an instance where 
 one thought it was so overcome, it might be just to con- 
 sider, how far such evidence could be accounted for, by 
 enthusiasm; for it seems as if no other imaginable ac- 
 count were to be given of it. But till such incredibility 
 be shown, or contrary testimony produced, it cannot 
 surely be expected, that so far-fetched, so indirect and 
 wonderful an account of such testimony, as that of en- 
 thusiasm must be; an account so strange, that the gene- 
 rality of mankind can scarce be made to understand what 
 is meant by it : it cannot, I say, be expected, that such 
 account will be admitted of such evidence ; when there 
 is this direct, easy, and obvious account of it, that peo- 
 ple really saw and heard a thing not incredible, which 
 they affirm sincerely and with full assurance, they did 
 see and hear. Granting then that enthusiasm is not 
 (strictly speaking) an absurd, but a possible account of 
 such testimony; it is manifest, that the very mention of it 
 goes upon the previous supposition, that the things so 
 attested are incredible: and therefore need not be con- 
 sidered, till they are shown to be so. Much less need it 
 be considered, after the contrary has been proved. And 
 I think it has been proved, to full satisfaction, that there 
 is no incredibility in a revelation, in general ; or in such 
 a one as the Christian, in particular. However, as reli- 
 gion is supposed peculiarly liable to enthusiasm, it may 
 just be observed, that prejudices almost without number, 
 and without name, romance, affectation, humour, a desire 
 to engage attention, or to surprise, the party spirit, custom, 
 little competitions, unaccountable likings and dislikings; 
 these influence men strongly in common matters. And 
 as these prejudices are often scarce known or reflected 
 
Chap. VIL] FOR CHRISTIANITY. ' " 25i 
 
 upon Tby the persons themselves who are influenced by 
 them, they are to be considered as influences of a hke 
 kind to enthusiasm. Yet human testimony in com- 
 mon matters is naturally and justly believed notwith- 
 standins:. 
 
 It is intimated further, in a more refined way of obser- 
 vation, that though it should be proved, that the Apostles 
 and first Christians could not, in some respects, be de- 
 ceived themselves, and, in other respects, cannot be 
 thought to have intended to impose upon the world ; yet 
 it will not follow, that their general testimony is to be 
 believed, though truly handed down to us: because they 
 might still in part, i. e. in other respects, be deceived 
 themselves, and in part also designedly impose upon 
 others ; which, it is added, is a thing very credible, from 
 that mixture of real enthusiasm, and real knavery, to be 
 met with in the same characters. And, I must confess, 
 I think the matter of fact contained in this observation 
 upon mankind is not to be denied ; and that somewhat 
 very much akin to it is often supposed in Scripture as a 
 very common case, and most severely reproved. But it 
 were to have been expected, that persons capable of 
 applying this observation as applied in the objection, 
 might also frequently have met with the like mixed cha- 
 racter, in instances where religion was quite out of the 
 case. The thing plainly is, that mankind are naturally 
 endued with reason, or a capacity of distinguishing be- 
 tween truth and falsehood ; and as naturally they are 
 endued with veracity, or a regard to truth in what they 
 say: but from many occasions they are liable to be pre- 
 judiced and biassed and deceived themselves, and capa- 
 ble of intending to deceive others, in every degree : in- 
 somuch that, as we are all liable to be deceived by pre- 
 judice, so likewise it seems to be not an uncommon thing, 
 for persons, who, from their regard to truth, would not 
 invent a he entirely without any foundation at all, to 
 propagate it with heightening circumstances, after it is 
 once invented and set agoing. And others, though they 
 would not propagate a lie, yet, which is a lower degree 
 of falsehood, will let it pass without contradiction. But, 
 notwithstanding all this, human testimony remains still a 
 
252 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE TPart II. 
 
 natural ground of assent; and this assent a natural prin- 
 ciple of action. 
 
 It is objected further, that however it has happened, 
 the fact is, that mankind have, in different ages, been 
 strangely deluded with pretences to miracles and won- 
 ders. But it is by no means to be admitted, that they 
 have been oftener, or are at all more liable to be deceived 
 by these pretences, than by others. 
 
 It is added, that there is a very considerable degree of 
 historical evidence for miracles, which are, on all hands, 
 acknowledged to be fabulous. But suppose there were 
 even the like historical evidence for these, to w^hat there 
 is for those alleged in proof of Christianity, which yet is 
 in no wise allowed, but suppose this ; the consequence 
 would not be, that the evidence of the latter is not to be 
 admitted. Nor is there a man in the world, who, in 
 common cases, would conclude thus. For what would 
 such a conclusion really amount to but this, that evidence, 
 confuted by contrary evidence, or any way overbalanced, 
 destroys the credibility of other evidence, neither con- 
 futed, nor overbalanced .^^ To argue, that because there 
 is, if there were, like evidence from testimony, for mira- 
 cles acknowledged false, as for those in attestation of 
 Christianity, therefore the evidence in the latter case is 
 not to be credited ; this is the same as to argue, that if 
 two men of equally good reputation had given evidence 
 in different cases no wav connected, and one of them 
 had been convicted of perjury, this confuted the testi- 
 mony of the other. 
 
 Upon the whole then, the general observation, that 
 human creatures are so liable to be deceived, from en- 
 thusiasm in religion, and principles equivalent to enthu- 
 siasm in common matters, and in both from negligence ; 
 and that they are so capable of dishonestly endeavouring 
 to deceive others ; this does indeed weaken the evidence 
 of testimony in all cases, but does not destroy it in any. 
 And these things will appear, to different men, to weaken 
 the evidence of testimony, in different degrees : in de- 
 grees proportionable to the observations they have made, 
 or the notions they have any way taken up, concerning 
 the weakness and negligence and dishonesty of man- 
 
Chap. VII.] FOR CHRISTIA'NITY. 253 
 
 kind ; or concerning the powers of enthusiasm, and pre- 
 judices equivalent to it. But it seems to me, that peo- > 
 pie do not know what they say, who affirm these things 
 to destroy the evidence from testimony, which we have 
 of the truth of Christianity. Nothing can destroy the 
 evidence of testimony in any case, but a proof or pro- 
 bability, that persons are not competent judges of the 
 facts to which they give testimony ; or that they are 
 actually under some indirect influence in giving it, in 
 such particular case. Till this be made out, the natural 
 laws of human actions require, that testimony be ad- 
 mitted. It can never be sufficient to overthrow direct 
 historical evidence, indolently to say, that there are so 
 many principles, from whence men are liable to be de- 
 ceived themselves, and disposed to deceive others, espe- 
 cially in matters of religion, that one knows not what to 
 believe. And it is surprising persons can help reflect- 
 ing, that this very maimer of speaking supposes they 
 are not satisfied that there is nothing in the evidence, 
 of which they speak thus ; or that they can avoid observ- 
 ing, if they do make this reflection, that it is on such a 
 subject, a very material one.* 
 
 And over against all these objections is to be set the 
 importance of Christianity, as what must have engaged 
 the attention of its first converts, so as to have rendered 
 them less liable to be deceived from carelessness, than 
 they would in common matters ; and likewise the strong 
 obligations to veracity, which their religion laid them 
 under: so that the first and most obvious presumption 
 is, that they could not be deceived themselves nor de- 
 ceive others. And this presumption, in this degree, is 
 peculiar to the testimony we have been considering. 
 
 In argument, assertions are nothing in themselves, 
 and have an air of positiveness which sometimes is not 
 very easy: yet they are necessary, and necessar}'^ to be 
 repeated ; in order to connect a discourse, and distinctly 
 to lay before the view of the reader, what is proposed to 
 be proved, and what is left as proved. Now the conclu- 
 sion from the foregoing observations is, I think, beyond 
 all doubt, this : that unbelievers must be forced to admit 
 
 * See the foregoing Clmpter. 
 
254 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE. [Part II. 
 
 the external evidence for Christianity, i. e. the proof of 
 miracles wrought to attest it, to be of real weight and very- 
 considerable ; though they cannot allow it to be sufficient, 
 to convince them of the realitv of those miracles. And 
 as they must, in all reason, admit this ; so it seems to 
 me, that upon consideration they would, in fact, admit 
 it ; those of them, I mean, who know any thing at all of 
 the matter ; in like manner as persons, in many cases, 
 own they see strong evidence from testimony, for the 
 truth of things, which yet they cannot be convinced are 
 true : cases, suppose, where there is contrary testimony ; 
 or things which they think, whether with or without 
 reason, to be incredible. But there is no testimony 
 contrary to that which we have been considering : and 
 it has been fully proved, that there is no incredibility in 
 Christianity in general, or in any part of it. 
 
 II. As to the evidence for Christianity from prophecy, 
 I shall only make some few general observations, which 
 are suggested by the Analogy of Nature ; i. e. by the ac- 
 knowledged natural rules of judging in common matters, 
 concerning evidence of a like kind to this from pro- 
 phecy. 
 
 1. The obscurity or unintelhgibleness of one part of 
 a prophecy does not, in any degree, invalidate the proof 
 of foresight, arising from the appearing completion of 
 those other parts, which are understood. For the case 
 is evidently the same, as if those parts, which are not 
 understood, were lost, or not written at all, or written in 
 an unknown tongue. Whether this observation be com- 
 monly attended to or not, it is so evident, that one can 
 scarce bring oneself to set down an instance in common 
 matters, to exemplify it However, suppose a writing, 
 partly in cipher, and partly in plain words at length ; and 
 that in the part one understood, there appeared mention 
 of several known facts ; it would never come into any 
 man's thoughts to imagine, that if he understood the whole, 
 perhaps lie might find, that those facts were not in reality 
 known by tl^e writer. Indeed, both in this example and 
 the thing intended to be exemplified by it, our not under- 
 standing the whole (the whole, suppose, of a sentence or 
 a paragraph) might sometimes occasion a doubt, whether 
 
Chap. VH.] FOR CHRISTIANITY. ' 255 
 
 one understood the literal meaning of such a part : but 
 this comes under another consideration. 
 
 For the same reason, though a man should be inca- 
 pable, for want of learning, or opportunities of inquiry, or 
 from not having turned his studies this way, even so 
 much as to judge whether particular prophecies have 
 been throughout completely fulfilled ; yet he may see, in 
 general, that they have been fulfilled to such a degree, 
 as, upon very good ground, to be convinced of foresight 
 more than human in such prophecies, and of such 
 events being intended by them. For the same reason 
 also, though, by means of the deficiencies in civil history, 
 and the different accounts of historians, the most learned 
 should not be able to make out to satisfaction, that such 
 parts of the prophetic history have been minutely and 
 throughout fulfilled ; yet a very strong proof of foresight 
 may arise, from that general completion of them, which 
 is made out : as much proof of foresight, perhaps, as the 
 giver of prophecy intended should ever be afforded by 
 such parts of prophecy. 
 
 2. A long series of prophecy being applicable to such 
 and such events, is itself a proof that it was intended 
 of them : as the rules by which we naturally judge and 
 determine, in common cases parallel to this, will show. 
 This observation I make in answer to the common 
 objection against the application of the prophecies, that, 
 considering each of them distinctly by itself, it does not 
 at all appear, that they were intended of those particular 
 events, to which they are applied by Christians ; and 
 therefore it is to be supposed, that, if they meant any 
 thing, they were intended of other events unknown to 
 us, and not of these at all. 
 
 Now there are two kinds of writing, which bear a 
 great resemblance to prophecy, with respect to the mat- 
 ter before us : the mythological, and the satirical, where 
 the satire is, to a certain degree, concealed. And a man 
 might be assured, that he understood what an author 
 intended by a fable or parable related without any appli- 
 cation or moral, merely from seeing it to be easily capa- 
 ble of such application, and that such a moral might 
 naturally be deduced from it. And he might be fully 
 
 / 
 
256 OF THE TARTIxCULAR EVIDENCE [Part 11. 
 
 assured, that such persons and events were intended 
 in a satirical writing, merely from its being applicable 
 to them. And, agreeable to the last observation, he 
 might be in a good measure satisfied of it, though he 
 were not enough informed in affairs, or in the story 
 of such persons to understand half the satire. For, 
 his satisfaction, that he understood the meaning, the 
 intended meaning, of these writings, would be greater 
 or less in proportion as he saw the general turn of 
 them to be capable of such application; and in propor- 
 tion to the number of particular things capable of it. 
 And thus, if a long series of prophecy is applicable to 
 the present state of the church, and to the political situ- 
 ations of the kingdoms of the world, some thousand 
 years after these prophecies were delivered, and a long 
 series of prophecy delivered before the coming of Christ 
 is applicable to him ; these things are in themselves a 
 proof, that the prophetic history was intended of him, 
 and of those events: in proportion as the general turn 
 of it is capable of such application, and to the number 
 and variety of particular prophecies capable of it. And 
 though, in all just way of consideration, the appearing 
 completion of prophecies is to be allowed to be thus 
 explanatory of, and to determine, their meaning ; yet it 
 is to be remembered further, that the ancient Jews ap- 
 plied the prophecies to a Messiah before his coming, in 
 much the same manner as Christians do now : and that 
 the primitive Christians interpreted the prophecies re- 
 specting the state of the church and of the world in the 
 last ages, in the sense which the event seems to confirm 
 and verify. And from these things it may be made 
 appear : 
 
 3. That the showing even to a high probability, if 
 that could be, that the prophets thought of some other 
 events, in such and such predictions, and not those at 
 all which Christians alk^ge to be completions of those 
 predictions ; or that such and such prophecies are capa- 
 ble of being applied to other events than those, to which 
 Christians apply them — that this would not confute or 
 destroy the force of the argument from prophecy, even 
 with regard to those very instances. For, observe how 
 
Chip. VII.] FOR CIIRISTIAMTY. 257 
 
 this matter really is. If one knew such a person to be 
 the sole author of such a book, and was certainly assured, 
 or satisfied to any degree, that one knew the whole of 
 what he intended in it; one should be assured or satis- 
 fied to such degree, that one knew the whole meaning 
 of that book : for the meaning of a book is nothing but 
 the meaning of the author. But if one knew a person 
 to have compiled a book out of memoirs, which he re- 
 ceived from another, of vastly superior knowledge in the 
 subject of it, especially if it were a book full of great 
 intricacies and difficulties; it would in no wise follow, 
 that one knew the whole meaning of the book, from 
 knowing the whole meaning of the compiler: for the 
 original memoirs, i. e. the author of them, might have, 
 and there would be no degree of presumption, in many 
 cases, against supposing him to have, some further 
 meaning than the compiler saw. To say then, that the 
 Scriptures, and the things contained in them, can have 
 ro other or further meaning than those persons thought 
 or had, who first recited or wrote them, is evidenth' 
 saying, that those persons were the original, proper, and 
 sole authors of those books, i. e. that they are not in- 
 spired: which is absurd, whilst the authority of these 
 books is under examination; i. e. till you have deter- 
 mined they are of no divine authority at all. Till this 
 be determined, it must in all reason be supposed, not 
 indeed that they have, for this is taking for granted that 
 they are inspired; but that they may have, some further 
 meaning than what the compilers saw or understood. 
 And, upon this supposition, it is supposable also, that 
 this further meaning may be fulfilled. Now events corre- 
 sponding to prophecies, interpreted in a different meaning 
 from that, in which the prophets are supposed to have 
 understood them ; this affords, in a manner, the same proof, 
 that this different sense was originally intended, as it 
 would have afforded, if the prophets had not understood 
 their predictions in the sense it is supposed they did: 
 because there is no presumption of their sense of them 
 being the whole sense of them. And it has been al- 
 ready shown, that the apparent completions of prophecy 
 must be allowed to be explanatory of its meaning. So 
 
 K 
 
258 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [Part II, 
 
 that the question is, whether a series of prophecy has 
 been fulfilled, in a natural or proper, i. e. in any real 
 sense of the words of it. For such completion is equally 
 a proof of foresight more than human, whether the pro- 
 phets are, or are not, supposed to have understood it in 
 a different sense. I say, supposed: for, though I think 
 it clear, that the prophets did not understand the full 
 meaning of their predictions ; it is another question, how 
 far they thought they did, and in what sense they under- 
 stood them. 
 
 Hence may be seen, to how little purpose those per- 
 sons busy themselves, who endeavour to prove, that the 
 prophetic history is applicable to events of the age in 
 which it was written, or of ages before it. Indeed to 
 have proved this, before there was any appearance of a 
 further completion of it, might have answered some pur- 
 pose; for it might have prevented the expectation of any 
 such further completion. Thus could Porphyry have 
 shown, that some principal parts of the book of Daniel, 
 for instance, the seventh verse of the seventh chapter, 
 which the Christians interpreted of the latter ages, was 
 applicable to events, which happened before or about the 
 age of Antiochus Epiphanes ; this might have prevented 
 them from expecting any further completion of it. And, 
 unless there was then, as I think there must have been, 
 external evidence concerning that book, more than is 
 come down to us ; such a discovery might have been a 
 stumbling-block in the way of Christianity itself: con- 
 sidering the authority which our Saviour has given to 
 the book of Daniel, and how much the general scheme 
 of Christianity presupposes the truth of it. But even 
 this discovery, had there been any such,* would be of 
 very little weight with reasonable men now ; if this 
 passage, thus applicable to events before the age of 
 Porphyry, appears to be applicable also to events, which 
 succeeded the dissolution of the Roman empire. I 
 
 * It appears that, Pnrpliyry did nothing worth montioiiing in tliis way. For Jerome 
 on the place says : Duas posteriores bestias — in nno Macedonum regno ponit. And 
 BS to t!ie ten kinos ; Dcntm regcs emimerat. qui fuenmt swvissimi : ipsosque rege$ 
 non uniits ponit rr^ni, verii gratia, Macedonice, Si/rice, JsieF, et .f^gypli ; sed dt 
 </»w*/.» vegnis vnutn rfficit regum ordinem. And in tliis way of interpretation, any 
 tluiig may he m de of any thing. 
 
Cmap. VII.] FOR CHIIISTIANITY. 259 
 
 mention this, not at all as intendinf^ to insinuate, that 
 the division of this empire into ten parts, for it plainly 
 was divided into about that number, were, alone and by 
 itself, of any moment in verifying the prophetic history: 
 but only as an example of the thing I am speaking of. 
 And thus upon the whole, the matter of inquiry evidently 
 must be, as above put, Whether the prophecies are ap- 
 plicable to Christ, and to the present state of the world, 
 and of the church; a])plicable in such a degree, as to im- 
 ply foresight: not whether thev are capable of anv other 
 apphcation; though I know no pretence for saying the 
 general turn of them is capable of any other. 
 
 These observations are, I think, just; and the evidence 
 referred to in them real: though there may be people 
 who will not accept of such imperfect imformation from 
 Scripture. Some too have not integrity and regard 
 enough to truth, to attend to evidence, which keeps the 
 mind in doubt, perhaps perplexity, and which is much 
 of a different sort from what they expected. And it 
 plainly requires a degree of modesty and fairness, be- 
 yond what every one has, for a man to say, not to the 
 world, but to himself, that there is a real appearance of 
 somewhat of great weight in this matter, though he is 
 not able thoroughly to satisfy himself about it ; but it 
 shall have its influence upon him, in proportion to its 
 appearing reality and weight. It is much more easy, 
 and more falls in with the negligence, presumption, and 
 wilfulness of the generality, to determine at once, with a 
 decisive air. There is nothing in it. The prejudices 
 arising from that absolute contempt and scorn, with 
 which this evidence is treated in the world, I do not 
 mention. For what indeed can be said to persons, who 
 are weak enough hi their understandings to think this 
 any presumption against it; or, if they do not, are yet 
 weak enough in their temper to be influenced by such 
 prejudices, upon such a subject? 
 
 I shall now, Secondly, endeavour to give some account 
 of the general argument for the truth of Christianity, 
 consisting both of the direct and circumstantial evidence 
 considered as making up one argument. Indeed to state 
 and examine this argument fully, would be a work much 
 
 11 '^ 
 
260 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [P.*bt II. 
 
 beyond the compass of this whole treatise; nor is so 
 much as a proper abridgment of it to be expected here. 
 Yet the present subject requires to have some brief ac- 
 count of it given. For it is the kind of evidence, upon 
 which most questions of difficulty, in common practice, 
 are determined: evidence arising from various coinci- 
 dences, which support and confirm each other, and in 
 this manner prove, with more or less certainty, the 
 point under consideration. And I choose to do it also: 
 First, because it seems to be of the greatest importance, 
 and not duly attended to by every one, that the proof of 
 revelation is, not some direct and express things only, 
 but a great variety of circumstantial things also; and that 
 though each of these direct and circumstantial things is 
 indeed to be considered separately, yet they are after- 
 wards to be joined together; for that the proper force of 
 the evidence consists in the result of those several things, 
 considered in their respects to each other, and united 
 into one view: and in the next place, because it seems 
 to me, that the matters of fact here set down, which are 
 acknowledged by unbelievers, must be acknowledged by 
 them also to contain together a degree of evidence of 
 great weight, if they could be brought to lay these several 
 things before themselves distinctly, and then with atten- 
 tion consider them together ; instead of that cursory 
 thought of them, to which we are familiarized. For 
 being familiarized to the cursory thought of things as 
 really hinders the weight of them from being seen, as 
 from having its due influence upon practice. 
 
 The thing asserted, and the truth of which is to be in- 
 quired into, is this: That over and above our reason and 
 affections, which God has given us for the information of 
 our judgment and the conduct of our lives, he has also, 
 by external revelation, given us an account of himself 
 afid his moral government over the world, implying a 
 future state of rewards and punishments ; i. e. hath re- 
 vealed the system of natural religion: for natural religion 
 may be externally* revealed by God, as the ignorant may 
 be taught it by mankind, their fellow creatures — that 
 God, I say, has given us the evidence of revelation, as 
 
 * p. 166, &c. 
 
Chap. VII.] FOR CHRISTIANITY. 261 
 
 well as the evidence of reason, to ascertain this moral 
 system; together with an account of a particular dispen- 
 sation of Providence, which rtason could no way have 
 discovered, and a particular institution of religion founded 
 on it, for the recovery of mankind out of their present 
 wretched condition, and raising them to the perfection 
 and final happiness of their nature. 
 
 This revelation, whether real or supposed, may be 
 considered as wholly historical. For prophecy is nothing 
 but the history of events before they come to pass ; doc- 
 trines also are matters of fact ; and precepts come under 
 the same notion. And the general design of Scripture, 
 which contains in it this revelation, thus considered as 
 historical, may be said to be, to give us an account of 
 the world, in this one single view, as God's world: by 
 which it appears essentially distinguished from all other 
 books, so far as I have found, except such as are copied 
 from it It begins with an account of God's creation of 
 the world, in order to ascertain, and distinguish from all 
 others, who is the object of our worship, by what he has 
 done : in order to ascertain, who he is, concerning whose 
 providence, commands, promises, and threatenings, this 
 sacred book, all along, treats; the Maker and Proprietor 
 of the world, he whose creatures we are, the God of 
 Nature: in order likewise to distinguish him from the 
 idols of the nations, which are either imaginary beings, 
 i. e. no beings at all ; or else part of that creation, the 
 historical relation of which is here given. And St John, 
 not improbably, with an eye to this Mosaic account of 
 the creation, begins his Gospel with an account of our 
 Saviour's pre-existence, and that all things were made by 
 him; and without him was not any thing mude that was 
 made:* agreeably to the doctrine of St Paul, that God 
 created all things by Jesus Christ.\ This being premised, 
 the Scripture, taken together, seems to profess to con- 
 tain a kind of an abridgment of the history of the world, 
 in the view just now mentioned: that is, a general ac- 
 count of the condition of religion and its professors, dur- 
 mg the continuance of that apostasy from God, and state 
 of wickedness, which it every where supposes the world 
 
 * Jolui i. 3. + Ejjh. iii. 9. 
 
262 OF THE .PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [P^rt n. 
 
 to lie in. And this account of the state of religion carries 
 with it some brief account of the political state of things, 
 as religion is affected by it. Revelation indeed considers 
 the common affairs of this world, and what is going on 
 in it, as a mere scene of distraction ; and cannot be sup- 
 posed to concern itself with foretelling at what time Rome, 
 or Babylon, or Greece, or any particular place, should be 
 the most conspicuous seat of that tyranny and dissolute- 
 ness, wiiich all places equally aspire to be ; cannot, I 
 say, be supposed to give any account of this wild scene 
 for its own sake. But it seems to contain some very 
 general accomit of the chief governments of the world, 
 as the general state of religion has been, is, or shall be, 
 affected by them, from the first transgression, and during 
 the whole interval of the world's continuing in its pre- 
 sent state, to a certain future period, spoken of both in 
 the Old and New Testament, very distinctly, and in 
 great variety of expression: The times of the restitution of 
 all things :* when the mystery of God shall be finished, as 
 he hath declared to his servards the prophets .-^ when the 
 God of heaven shall set up a kingdom., which shall never he 
 destroyed : and the kingdom shcdl not he left to other 
 people,\ as it is represented to be during this apostasy, but 
 judgmcid shall he given to the sainfs,§ and they shall 
 reign :\\ and the kingdom and dominion, and the greatness 
 of the kingdom under the whole heaven, shall he given to 
 the people of the saints of the Most High..% 
 
 Upon this general view of the Scripture, I would re- 
 mark, how great a length of time the whole relation 
 takes up, near six thousand years of which are past; and 
 how great a variety of things it treats of; the natural and 
 moral system or history of the world, including the time 
 when it was formed, all contained in the very first book, 
 and evidently written in a rude and unlearned age; and 
 in subsequent books, the various common and prophetic 
 history, and the particular dispensation of Christianity. 
 Now all this together gives the largest scope for criticism ; 
 and for confutation of what is capable of being confuted, 
 either from reason, or from common histoiy, or from any 
 
 * Acts iii. 21. t H.'^v. x. 7- X r>an. ii. 44.. 
 
 § Dan. vii. 22. j ilev. xi. 17, 18. xx. 6. H Dan. vii. 27. 
 
Chap. VII.J FOR CHRISTIANITY. 263 
 
 inconsistence in its several parts. And it is a thing which 
 deserves, I think, to be mentioned, that whereas some 
 imagine the supposed doubtfulness of the evidence for 
 revelation implies a positive argument that it is not true; 
 it appear?, on the contrary, to imply a positive argu- 
 ment that it is true. For, could any common relation of 
 such antiquity, extent, and variety' (for in these things 
 the stress of what I am now observing hes), be proposed 
 to the examination of the world : that it could not, in 
 an age of knowledge and liberty, be confuted, or shown 
 to have nothing in it, to the satisfaction of reasonable 
 men; this would be thought a strong presumptive proof 
 of its truth. And indeed it must be a proof of it, just 
 in proportion to the probability, that if it were false, it- 
 might be shown to be so : and this, I think, is scarce 
 pretended to be shown, but upon principles and in ways 
 of arguing, which have been clearly obviated.* Nor 
 does it at all appear, that any set of men, who believe 
 natural religion, are of the opinion, that Christianity has 
 been thus confuted. But to proceed: 
 
 Together with the moral system of the world, the Old 
 Testament contains a chronological account of the be- 
 ginning of it, and from thence, an unbroken genealogy 
 of mankind for many ages before common history be- 
 gins ; and carried on as much farther as to make up a 
 continued thread of history of the length of between three 
 and four thousand vears. It contains an account of 
 God's making a covenant with a particular nation, that 
 they should be his people, and he would be their God, 
 in a peculiar sense ; of his often interposing miraculously 
 in their affairs ; giving them the promise, and, long after, 
 the possession, of a particular country; assuring them of 
 the greatest national prosperity in it, if they would wor- 
 ship him, in opposition to the idols which the rest of the 
 world worshipped, and obey his commands ; and threat- 
 ening them with unexampled punishments if they dis- 
 obeyed him, and fell into the general idolatry : insomuch 
 that this one nation should continue to be the observa- 
 tion and the wonder of all the world. It declares parti- 
 cularly, that God would scatter them among all 'people, 
 
 * C\\. ii, iii. &c. 
 
264 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [P^rt II. 
 
 -from one end of the earth unto the other ; but that when 
 they should return unto the Lord their God, he would have 
 compassion upon thejn, and gather them from all the nations j 
 tohither he had scattered them : that Israel should he saved 
 in the Lord, with an everlasting salvation; and not he 
 ashamed or confounded world without end. And as some 
 of these promises are conditional, others are as absolute, 
 as any thing can be expressed : that the time should come, 
 when the people should he all righteous, and inherit the 
 land, for ever: that though God would make a full end of 
 all nations whither he had scattered them, yet would he not 
 make a full end of them: that he would bring again the 
 captivity of his people Israel, and plant them upon their 
 land, and they should he no more pulled up out of their 
 land: that the seed of Israel should not cease from heing a 
 nation forever * It foretells, that God would raise them 
 up a particular person, in whom all his promises should 
 finally be fulfilled ; the Messiah, who should be, in a 
 high and eminent sense, their anointed Prince and 
 Saviour. This was foretold in such a manner, as raised 
 a general expectation of such a person in the nation, as 
 appears from the New Testament, and is an acknow- 
 ledged fact ; an expectation of his coming at such a par- 
 ticular time, before any one appeared claiming to be that 
 person, and when there was no ground for such an ex- 
 pectation, but from the prophecies: which expectation, 
 therefore, must in all reason be presumed to be explana- 
 tory of those prophecies, if there were any doubt about 
 their meaning. It seems moreover to foretell, that this 
 person should be rejected by that nation, to whom he 
 had been so long promised, and though he was so much 
 desired by them.t And it expressly foretells, that he 
 should be the Saviour of the Gentiles; and even that 
 the completion of the scheme contained in this book, and 
 then begun, and in its progress, should be somewhat so 
 great, that in comparison with it, the restoration of the 
 Jews alone would be but of small account. It is a light 
 thing that thou shouldest he my servant to raise up the 
 
 • Deut. xxviii. 64. xxx. 2, 3. Is. xlv. 17. Ix. 21. Jer. xxx. 11. xlvi. 28. Aino« 
 far. 14, 15. Jer. xxxi. .S6. 
 ^ Is. viii. 14', 15. xlix. 5. ch. liii. Mai. i. 10, 11. and ch. iit. 
 
Ceap. Vri.] FOR CHRISTIANITY. 265 
 
 tribes of Jacob, and to restore the preserved of Israel : I 
 will also give thee for a light to the Gentiles, that thou 
 may est be for salvation unto the end of the earth. And, In 
 the last days, the mountain of the Lord's house shall be 
 established in the top of the mountains, arid shall be exalted 
 above the hills ; and all nations shall flow into it— for out 
 of Zion shall go forth the law, and the word of the Lord 
 from Jerusalem, And he shall judge among the nations — 
 and the Lord alone shall be exalted in that day, and the 
 idols he shall utterly abolish* The Scripture further con- 
 tains an account, that at the time the Messiah was ex- 
 pected, a person rose up in this nation, claiming to be 
 that Messiah, to be the person whom all the prophecies 
 referred to, and in whom they should centre : that he 
 spent some years in a continued course of miraculous 
 works ; and endued his immediate disciples and followers 
 with a power of doing the same, as a proof of the truth 
 of that religion, which he commissioned them to publish : 
 that, invested with this authority and power, they made 
 numerous converts in the remotest countries, and settled 
 and established his religion in the world ; to the end of 
 which the Scripture professes to give a prophetic account 
 of the state of this religion amongst mankind. 
 
 Let us now suppose a person utterly ignorant of his- 
 tory, to have all this related to him out of the Scripture. 
 Or suppose such a one, having the Scripture put into his 
 hands, to remark these things in it, not knowing but that 
 the whole, even its civil history, as well as the other 
 parts of it, might be, from beginning to end, an entire 
 invention ; and to ask. What truth was in it, and whether 
 the revelation here related was real, or a fiction ? And, 
 instead of a direct answer, suppose him, all at once, to 
 be told the following confessed facts; and then to unite 
 them into one view. 
 
 Let him first be told, in how great a degree the pro- 
 fession and establishment of natural religion, the belief 
 that there is one God to be worshipped, that virtue is his 
 law, and that mankind shall be rewarded and punished 
 
 * Is. xlix. 6. chap. ii. chap. xi. chap. Ivi. 7. Mai. i, 11. To which must be 
 added, the other prophecies of the like kind, several in the New Testament, and 
 very many in the Old : which describe what shall be the completion of the revealed 
 plan of Providence. 
 
266 - OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [Part II. 
 
 hereafter, as they obey and disobey it here ; in how very 
 great a degree, I say, the profession and estabhshment 
 of this moral system in the world is owing to the revela- 
 tion, whether real or supposed, contained in this book : 
 the establishment of this moral system, even in those 
 countries which do not acknowledge the proper autho- 
 rity of the Scripture.* Let him be told also, what num- 
 ber of nations do acknowledge its proper authority. Let 
 him then take in the consideration, of what importance 
 religion is to mankind. And upon these things he might, 
 I think, truly observe, that this supposed revelation's 
 obtaining and being received in the world, with all the 
 circumstances and effects of it, considered together as 
 one event, is the most conspicuous and important event 
 in the history of mankind: that a book of this nature, 
 and thus promulged and recommended to our considera- . 
 tion, demands, as if by a voice from heaven, to have its 
 claims most seriously examined into: and that, before 
 such examination, to treat it with any kind of scoffing 
 and ridicule, is an offence against natural piety. But 
 it is to be remembered, that how much soever the esta- 
 blishment of natural religion in the world is owing to the 
 Scripture revelation, this does not destroy the proof of 
 religion from reason, any more than the proof of Euclid's 
 Elements is destroyed, by a man's knowing or thinking, 
 that he should never have seen the truth of the several 
 propositions contained in it, nor had those propositions 
 come into his thoughts, but for that mathematician. 
 
 Let sucli a person as we are speaking of be, in the 
 next place, informed of the acknowledged antiquity of 
 the first parts of this book ; and that its chronology, its 
 account of the time when the earth, and the several parts 
 of it, were first peopled with human creatures, is no way 
 contradicted, but is really confirmed, by the natural and 
 civil history of the world, collected from common histo- 
 rians, from the state of the earth, and from the late in- 
 vention of arts and sciences. And as the Scripture con- 
 tains an unbroken thread of common and civil history, 
 from the creation to the captivity, for between three and 
 four thousand years ; let the person we are speaking of 
 
 * p. 25W 
 
Ckai..V:I.] for CHRISTIANITY. 267 
 
 be to!d, in tl>e next place, that this general history, as it 
 is not contradicted, but is confirmed by profane history 
 as much as there would be reason to expect, upon sup- 
 position of its truth ; so there is nothing in the whole 
 history itself, to give any reasonable ground of suspicion 
 of its not being, in the general, a faithful and literally 
 true genealogy of men, and series of things. I speak 
 here only of the common Scripture-history, or of the 
 course of ordinary events related in it, as distinguished 
 from miracles, and from the prophetic history. In all 
 the Scripture-narrations of this kind, following events 
 arise out of foregoing ones, as in all other histories. 
 There appears nothing related as done in any age, not 
 conformable to the manners of that age : nothing in the 
 account of a succeeding age, which, one would say, could 
 not be true, or was improbable, from the account of 
 things in the preceding one. There is nothing in the 
 characters, which would raise a thought of their being 
 feigned ; but all the internal marks imaginable of their 
 being real. It is to be added also, that mere genealogies, 
 bare narratives of the number of years, which persons 
 called by such and such names lived, do not carry the 
 face of fiction; perhaps do carry some presumption of 
 veracity : and all unadorned narratives, which have noth- 
 ing to surprise, may be thought to carry somewhat of the 
 like presumption too. And the domestic and the politi- 
 cal history is plainly credible. There may be incidents 
 in Scripture, which, taken alone in the naked way they 
 are told, may appear strange; especially to persons of 
 other manners, temper, education : but there are also 
 incidents of undoubted truth, in many or most persons' 
 lives, which, in the same circumstances, would appear 
 to the full as strange. There may be mistakes of tran- 
 scribers, there may be other real or seeming mistakes, 
 not easy to be particularly accounted for: but there are 
 certainly no more things of this kind in the Scripture, 
 than what were to have been expected in books of such 
 antiquity; and nothing, in any wise, sufficient to discredit 
 the general narrative. Now, that a history, claiming to 
 commence from the creation, and extending in one con- 
 tinued series, throe.gh so great a length of time, and 
 
268 " OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [P^rt n. 
 
 variety of events, should have such appearances of reality 
 and truth in its whole contexture, is surely a very re- 
 markable circumstance in its favour. And as all this is 
 applicable to the common history of the New Testament, 
 so there is a further credibilit)^ and a very high one, 
 given to it by profane authors : many of these writing o1 
 the same times, and confirming the truth of customs and 
 events, which are incidentally as well as more purposely 
 mentioned in it. And this credibility of the common 
 Scripture-history, gives some credibility to its miracu- 
 lous history: especially as this is interwoven with the 
 common, so as that they imply each other, and both to- 
 gether make up one relation. 
 
 Let it then be more particularly observed to this per- 
 son, that it is an acknowledged matter of fact, which is 
 indeed implied in the foregoing observation, that there 
 was such a nation as the Jews, of the greatest antiquity, 
 whose government and general polity was founded on 
 the law, here related to be given them by Moses as from 
 heaven : that natural religion, though with rites additional 
 yet no way contrary to it, was their established religion, 
 which cannot be said of the Gentile world: and that 
 their very being as a nation, depended upon their ac- 
 knowledgment of one God, the God of the universe. For, 
 suppose in their captivity in Babylon, they had gone over 
 to the religion of their conquerors, there would have re- 
 mained no bond of union, to keep them a distinct people. 
 And whilst they were under their own kings, in their 
 own country, a total apostasy from God would have 
 been the dissolution of their whole government. They 
 in such a sense nationally acknowledged and worshipped 
 the Maker of heaven and earth, when the rest of the 
 world were sunk in idolatry, as rendered them, in fact, 
 the peculiar people of God. And this so remarkable 
 an establishment and preservation of natural religion 
 amongst them, seems to add some peculiar credibility to 
 the historical evidence for the miracles of Moses and 
 the Prophets: because these miracles are a full satisfac- 
 tory account of this event, which plainly wants to be 
 accounted for, and cannot otherwise. 
 
 Let this person, supposed wholly ignorant of history, 
 
Chap. VII.] FOR CHRISTIANITY. 269 
 
 be acquainted further, that one claiming to be the Mes- 
 siah, of Jewish extraction, rose up at the time when this 
 nation, from the prophecies above mentioned, expected 
 the Messiah: that he was rejected, as it seemed to have 
 been foretold he should, by the body of the people, un- 
 der the direction of their rulers: that in the course of 
 a very few years, he was believed on and acknowledged 
 as the promised Messiah, by great numbers among the 
 Gentiles, agreeably to the prophecies of Scripture, yet 
 not upon the evidence of prophecy, but of miracles,* of 
 which miracles we have also strong historical evidence ; 
 (by which I mean here no more than must be acknow- 
 ledged by unbelievers ; for let pious frauds and follies 
 be .admitted to weaken, it is absurd to say they destroy, 
 our evidence of miracles wrought in proof of Chris- 
 tianity :+) that this religion approving itself to the reason 
 of mankind, and carrying its own evidence with it, so 
 far as reason is a judge of its system, and being no way 
 contrary to reason in those parts of it which require to 
 be believed upon the mere authority of its Author; that 
 this religion, I say, gradually spread and supported itself 
 for some hundred years, not only without any assistance 
 from temporal power, but under constant discourage- 
 ments, and often the bitterest persecutions from it; and 
 then became the religion of the world : that in the mean 
 time the Jewish nation and government were destroyed 
 in a very remarkable manner, and the people carried 
 away captive and dispersed through the most distant 
 countries; in which state of dispersion they have re- 
 mained fifteen hundred years: and that they remain a 
 numerous people, united amongst themselves, and dis- 
 tinguished from the rest of the world, as they were in 
 the days of Moses, by the profession of his law; and 
 every where looked upon in a manner, which one scarce 
 knows how distinctly to express, but in the words of the 
 prophetic account of it, given so many ages before it 
 came to pass : Thou shalt become an astonishment^ a pro- 
 verb, and a by-word, among all nations whither the Lord 
 shall lead thee.X 
 
 The appearance of a standing miracle, in the Jews 
 
 ♦ p. 246, &C. + p. 252, &c. X DPut- xxviii. 37. 
 
270 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [Part I L 
 
 remaining a distinct people in their dispersion, and the 
 confirmation which this event appears to give to the 
 truth of revelation, may be thought to be answered, by 
 their religion's forbidding them intermarriages with 
 those of any other, and prescribing them a great many 
 peculiarities in their food, by which they are debarred 
 from the means of incorJDorating with the people in 
 whose countries they live. This is not, I think, a satis- 
 factory account of that which it pretends to account for. 
 But what does it pretend to account for? The cor- 
 respondence between this event and the prophecies; or 
 the coincidence of both, with a long dispensation of 
 Providence, of a peculiar nature, towards that people 
 formerly? No. It is only the event itself, which is 
 offered to be thus accounted for; which single event, 
 taken alone, abstracted from all such correspondence 
 and coincidence, perhaps would not have appeared mira- 
 culous: but that correspondence and coincidence may 
 be so, though the event itself be supposed not. Thus 
 the concurrence of our Saviour's being born at Beth- 
 lehem, with a long foregoing series of prophecy and 
 other coincidences, is doubtless miraculous; the series 
 of prophecy, and other coincidences, and the event, 
 being admitted: though the event itself, his birth at that 
 place, appears to have been brought about in a natural 
 way; of which, however, no one can be certain. 
 
 And as several of these events seem, in some degree 
 expressly, to have verified the prophetic history already ; 
 so likewise they may be considered further, as having a 
 peculiar aspect towards the full completion of it; as af- 
 fording some presumption that the whole of it shall, one 
 time or other, be fulfilled. Thus, that the Jews have 
 been so wonderfully preserved in their long and wide 
 dispersion ; which is indeed the direct fulfilling of some 
 prophecies, but is now mentioned only as looking forward 
 to somewhat yet to come: that natural religion came 
 forth from Judea, and spread, in the degree it has done 
 over the world, before lost in idolatry; which, together 
 with some other things, have distinguished that very 
 place, in like manner as the people of it are distinguished: 
 that tliis great change of religion over the earth was 
 
Chap.VII."" for CHRISTIANITY. 271 
 
 brought about under the profession and acknowledg- 
 ment, that Jesus was the promised Messiah: things of 
 this kind naturally turn the thoughts of serious men 
 towards the full completion of the prophetic history, 
 concerning the final restoration of that people ; concern- 
 ing the establishment of the everlasting kingdom among 
 them, the kingdom of the Messiah; and the future state 
 of the world, under this sacred government. Such cir- 
 cumstances and events, compared with these prophecies, 
 though no completions of them, yet would not, I think, 
 be spoken of as nothing in the argument, by a person 
 upon his first being informed of them. They fall in 
 with the prophetic history of things still future, give it 
 some additional credibility, have the appearance of being 
 somewhat in order to the full completion of it. 
 
 Indeed it requires a good degree of knowledge, and 
 great calmness and consideration, to be able to judge 
 thoroughly of the evidence for the truth of Christianity, 
 from that part of the prophetic history which relates to 
 the situation of the kingdoms of 'the world, and' to the 
 state of the church, from the establishment of Christia- 
 nity to the present time. But it appears from a general 
 view of it, to be very material. And those persons who 
 have thoroughly examined it, and some of them were 
 men of the coolest tempers, greatest capacities, and 
 least liable to imputations of prejudice, insist upon it as 
 determinately conclusive. 
 
 Suppose now a person quite ignorant of history, firs* 
 to recollect the passages above mentioned out of Scrip - 
 ture, without knowing but that the whole was a late fic- 
 tion, then to be informed of the correspondent facts now 
 mentioned, and to unite them all into one view : that the 
 profession and establishment of natural religion in the 
 world is greatly owing, in different ways, to this book, 
 and the supposed revelation which it contains ; that it is 
 acknowledged to be of the earliest antiquity; that its 
 chronology and common history are entirely credible; 
 that this ancient nation, the Jews, of whom it chiefly 
 treats, appear to have been, in fact, the people of God, 
 in a distinguished sense; that, as there was a national 
 expectation amongst them, raised from the prophecies, 
 
272 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [Part TL 
 
 of a Messiah to appear at such a time, so one at this 
 time appeared claiming to be that Messiah; that he was 
 rejected by this nation, but received by the Gentiles, not 
 upon the evidence of prophecy, but of miracles; that the 
 religion he taught supported itself under the greatest 
 difficulties, gained ground, and at length became the 
 religion of the world; that in the mean time the Jewish 
 polity was utterly destroyed, and the nation dispersed 
 over the face of the earth; that notwithstanding this, they 
 have remained a distinct numerous people for so many 
 centuries, even to this day; which not only appears to be 
 the express completion of several prophecies concerning 
 them, but also renders it, as one may speak, a visible 
 and easy possibility that tl\s promises made to them as 
 a nation, may yet be fulfilled. And to these acknow- 
 ledged truths, let the person we have been supposing 
 add, as I think he ought, whether every one will allow 
 it or no, the obvious appearaii',;es which there are, of the 
 state of the world, in other respects besides what relates 
 to the Jews, and of the Christian church, having so long 
 answered, and still answeriiig to the prophetic history. 
 Suppose, I say, these facts set over against the things 
 before mentioned out of the Scripture, and seriously 
 compared with them; the joint view of both together 
 must, I think, app3ir of very graat weight to a conside- 
 rate reasonable person: of nvi?h greater indeed, upon 
 having them first laid before him, than is easy for us, 
 who are so familiarized to them, to conceive, without 
 some particular attention for that purpose. 
 
 All these things, and the several particulars contained 
 under them, require to be distinctly and most thoroughly 
 examined into ; that the weight of each may be judged of, 
 upon such examination, and such conclusion drawn as 
 results from their united force. But this has not been 
 attempted here. I have gone no further than to show, 
 that the general imperfect view of them now given, the 
 confessed historical evidence for miracles, and the many 
 obvious appearing completions of prophecy, together 
 with the collateral things* here mentioned, and there are 
 
 * All the particular thinjjs inrntioned in this chapter, not reducible to the head of 
 ci I'.a .1 iuiriioli!S, or dettrmiuate completions of prophecy. See p. 2i2 
 
Chap. VII.] FOR CHRISTIANITY. 273 
 
 several others of the hke sort; that all this together, 
 which, being fact, must be acknowledged by unbelievers, 
 amounts to real evidence of somewhat more than human 
 in this matter: evidence much more important, than care- 
 less men, who have been accustomed only to transient 
 and partial views of it, can imagine; and indeed abun- 
 dantly sufficient to act upon. And these things, I ap- 
 prehend, must be acknowledged by unbelievers. For 
 though they may say, that the historical evidence of 
 miracles wrought in attestation of Christianity, is not 
 sufficient to convince them, that such miracles were 
 really wrought: they cannot deny, that there is such 
 historical evidence, it being a known matter of fact that 
 there is. They may say, the conformity between the 
 prophecies and events is by accident: but there are 
 many instances in which such conformity itself cannot 
 be denied. They may say, with regard to such kind of 
 collateral things as those above mentioned, that any odd 
 accidental events, without meaning, will have a meaning 
 found in thenl by fanciful people : and that such as are 
 fanciful in any one certain way, will make out a thousand 
 coincidences, which seem to favour their peculiar follies 
 Men, I say, may talk thus: but no one who is serious, 
 can possibly think these things to be nothing, if he con- 
 siders the importance of collateral things, and even of 
 lesser circumstances, in the evidence of probability, as 
 distinguished in nature, from the evidence of demonstra- 
 tion. In many cases indeed it seems to require the 
 truest judgment, to determine with exactness the weight 
 of circumstantial evidence: but it is very often alto- 
 gether as convincing, as that which is the most express 
 and direct. 
 
 This general view of the evidence for Christianity, 
 considered as making one argument, may also serve to 
 recommend to serious persons, to set down every thing 
 which they think may be of any real weight at all in 
 proof of it, and particularly the many seeming comple- 
 tions of prophecy : and they will find, that, judging by 
 the natural rules, by which we judge of probable evi- 
 dence in common matters, they amount to a much higher 
 degree of proof, upon such a joint review, than could be 
 
 s 
 
274 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [PaktII. 
 
 supposed upon considering them separately, at different 
 times ; how strong soever the proof might before appear 
 to them, upon such separate views of it. For probable 
 proofs, by being added, not only increase the evidence, 
 but multiply it. Nor should I dissuade any one from 
 setting down, what he thought made for the contrary 
 side. But then it is to be remembered, not in order to 
 influence his judgment, but his practice, that a mistake 
 on one side may be, in its consequences, much more 
 dangerous, than a mistake on the other. And what 
 course is most safe, and what most dangerous, is a con- 
 sideration thought very material, when we deliberate, 
 not concerning events, but concerning conduct in our 
 temporal affairs. To be influenced by this considera- 
 tion in our judgment, to believe or disbelieve upon it, 
 is indeed as much prejudice, as any thing whatever. 
 And, like other prejudices, it operates contrary ways, 
 in different men ; for some are inclined to believe what 
 they hope, and others what they fear. And it is manifest 
 unreasonableness to apply to men's passions in order to 
 gain their assent. But in deliberations concerning con- 
 duct, there is nothing which reason more requires to 
 be taken into the account, than the importance of it. 
 For, suppose it doubtful, what would be the conse- 
 quence of acting in this, or in a contrary manner : still, 
 that taking one side could be attended with little or no 
 bad consequence, and taking the other might be attended 
 with the greatest, must appear, to unprejudiced reason, 
 of the highest moment towards determining, how we are 
 to act. But the truth of our religion, like the truth of 
 common matters, is to be judged of by all the evidence 
 taken together. And unless the whole series of things 
 which may be alleged in this argument, and every par- 
 ticular thing in it, can reasonably be supposed to have 
 been by accident (for here the stress of the argument 
 for Christianity lies) ; then is the truth of it proved: in 
 like manner, as if in any common case, numerous events 
 acknowledged, were to be alleged in proof of any other 
 event disputed ; the truth of the disputed event would 
 be proved, not only if any one of the acknowlcniged ones 
 did of itself clearly imply it, but, though no one of them 
 
Chap, YIII.] FOR CHRISTIANITY. 275 
 
 singly did so, if the whole of the acknowledged events 
 taken together could not in reason be supposed to have 
 happened, unless the disputed one were true. 
 
 It is obvious, how much advantage the nature of this 
 evidence gives to those persons who attack Christianity, 
 especially in conversation. For it is easy to show, in a 
 short and lively manner, that such arid such things are 
 liable to objection, that this and another thing is of little 
 weight in itself; but impossible to show, in like manner, 
 the united force of the whole argument in one view. 
 
 However, lastly, as it has been made appear, that there 
 is no presumption against a revelation as miraculous ; 
 that the general scheme of Christianity, and the principal 
 parts of it, are conformable to the experienced constitu- 
 tion of things, and tlie whole perfectly credible : so the 
 account now given of the positive evidence for it, shows, 
 that this evidence is such, as, from the nature of it, can- 
 not be destroyed, though it should be lessened. 
 
 CHAP. vni. 
 
 OF THE OBJECTIONS WHICH MAY BE MADE AGAINST 
 ARGUING FROM THE ANALOGY OF NATURE, TO RELI- 
 GION. 
 
 If every one would consider, with such attention as they 
 are bound, even in point of morality, to consider, what 
 they judge and give characters of; the occasion of this 
 chapter would be, in some good measure at least, super- 
 seded. But since this is not to be expected ; for some 
 we find do not concern themselves to understand even 
 what they write against : since this treatise, in common 
 with most others, lies open to objections, which may ap- 
 pear very material to thoughtful men at first sight ; and, 
 besides that, seems peculiarly liable to the objections of 
 such as can judge without thinking, and of such as can 
 censure without judging ; it may not be amiss to set 
 down the chief of these objections which occur to me, 
 and consider them to their hands. And they are such as 
 these : 
 
 S9 
 
276 OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE ANALOGY. [Part II. 
 
 "That it is a poor thing -to solve difficulties in reve- 
 lation, by saying, that there are the same in natural 
 religion ; when what is wanting is to clear both of them 
 of these their common, as well as other their respective, 
 difficulties : but that it is a strange way indeed of con- 
 vincing men of the obligations of religion, to show them, 
 that they have as little reason for their worldly pursuits: 
 and a strange way of vindicating the justice and goodness 
 of the Author of Nature, and of removing the objections 
 against both, to which the system of religion lies open, 
 to show, that the like objections lie against natural 
 providence; a way of answering objections against re- 
 ligion, without so much as pretending to make out, that 
 the system of it, or the particular things in it objected 
 against, are reasonable — especially, perhaps some may be 
 inattentive enough to add. Must this be thought strange, 
 when it is confessed that analogy is no answer to such 
 objections: that when this sort of reasoning is carried to 
 the utmost length it can be imagined capable of, it will 
 yet leave the mind in a very unsatisfied state ; and that 
 it must be unaccountable ignorance of mankind, to ima- 
 gine they will be prevailed with to forego their present 
 interests and pleasures, from regard to religion, upon 
 doubtful evidence." 
 
 Now, as plausible as this way of talking may appear, 
 that appearance will be found in a great measure owing 
 to half views, which show but part of an object, yet show 
 that indistinctly, and to undeterminate language. By 
 these means weak men are often deceived by others, 
 and ludicrous men, by themselves. And even those, 
 who are serious and considerate, cannot always readily 
 disentangle, and at once clearly see through the perplex- 
 ities, in which subjects themselves are involved ; and 
 which are heightened by the deficiencies and the abuse 
 of words. To this latter sort of persons, the following 
 reply to each part of this objection severally, may be of 
 some assistance ; as it may also tend a little to stop and 
 silence others. 
 
 First, The thing wanted, i. e. what men require, is to 
 have all difficulties cleared. And this is, or, at least for 
 any tViing we know to the contrary, it may be, the same. 
 
Chap. VIII.] OF NATURE TO RELIGION. 277 
 
 as requiring to comprehend the Divine nature, and the 
 whole plan of Providence from everlasting to everlast- 
 ing. But it hath alwaj^s been allowed to argue from 
 what is acknowledged, to what is disputed. And it is 
 in no other sense a poor thing, to argue from natural 
 religion to revealed, in the manner found fault with, than 
 it is to argue in numberless other ways of probable de- 
 duction and inference, in matters of conduct, which we 
 are continually reduced to the necessity of doing. In- 
 deed the epithet poor may be applied, I fear as properly, 
 to great part or the whole of human life, as it is to the 
 things mentioned in the objection. Is it not a poor thing, 
 for a physician to have so little knowledge in the cure 
 of diseases, as even the most eminent have ? To act 
 upon conjecture and guess, where the life of man is con- 
 cerned.^ Undoubtedly it is: but not in comparison of 
 having no skill at all in that useful art, and being obliged 
 to act wholly in the dark. 
 
 Further : since it is as unreasonable, as it is common, 
 to urge objections against revelation, which are of equal 
 weight against natural religion ; and those who do this, 
 if they are not confused themselves, deal unfairly with 
 others, in making it seem, that they are arguing only 
 against revelation, or particular doctrines of it, when in 
 reality they are arguing against moral' providence ; it is a 
 thing of consequence to show, that such objections are 
 as much levelled against natural religion, as against re- 
 vealed. And objections, which are equally applicable 
 to both, are properly speaking answered, by its being 
 shown that they are so, provided the former be admitted 
 to be true. And without taking in the consideration 
 how distinctly this is admitted, it is plainly very material 
 to observe, that as the things objected against in natural 
 religion are of the same kind with what is certain mat- 
 ter of experience in the course of providence, and in the 
 information which God affords us concerning our tem- 
 poral interest under his government; so the objections 
 against the system of Christianity, and the evidence of 
 it, are of the very same kind with those which are 
 made against the system and evidence of natural religion, 
 iljvvfcver, the reader upon review may see, that most of 
 
2V8 OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE ANALOGY [P.,Rr II, 
 
 the analogies insisted upon, even in the latter part of 
 this treatise, do not necessarily require to have more 
 taken for granted than is in the former; that there is an 
 Author of nature, or natural Governor of the world: and 
 Christianity is vindicated, not from its analogy to natural 
 religion, but chiefly from its analogy to the experienced 
 constitution of nature. 
 
 Secondly, Religion is a practical thing, and consists in 
 such a determinate course of life, as being what, there is 
 reason to think, is commanded by the Author of nature, 
 and will, upon the whole, be our happiness under his 
 government. Now if men can be convinced, that they 
 have the like reason to believe this, as to believe that 
 taking care of their temporal affairs will be to their ad- 
 vantage ; such conviction cannot but be an argument to 
 them for the practice of religion. And if there be really 
 any reason for believing one of these, and endeavouring 
 to preserve life, and secure ourselves the necessaries and 
 conveniences of it ; then there is reason also for believ- 
 ing the other, and endeavouring to secure the interest it 
 proposes to us. And if the interest, which religion pro- 
 poses to us, be infinitely greater than our whole temporal 
 interest; then there must be proportionably greater reason 
 for endeavouring to secure one, than the other; since, by 
 the supposition, the probability of our securing one is 
 equal to the probability of our securing the other. This 
 seems plainly unanswerable ; and has a tendency to in- 
 fluence fair minds, who consider what our condition really 
 is, or upon what evidence we are naturally appointed to 
 act ; and who are disposed to acquiesce in the terms 
 upon which we live, and attend to and follow that practical 
 instruction, whatever it be, which is afforded us. 
 
 But the chief and proper force of the argument re 
 ferred to in the objection, hes in another place. For, it 
 is said that the proof of religion is involved in such in- 
 extricable difficulties, as to render it doubtful ; and that 
 it cannot be supposed, that, if it were true, it would be 
 left upon doubtful evidence. Here then, over and above 
 the force of each particular difficulty or objection, these 
 difficulties and objections taken t( gether are turned into 
 a positive argument against the truth of religion; which 
 
Cbap. nil.] OF NATURE TO RELIGION. 279 
 
 argument would stand thus. If religion were true, it 
 would not be left doubtful, and open to .objections to the 
 degree in which it is : therefore that it is thus left, not 
 only renders the evidence of it weak, and lessens its 
 force, in proportion to the weight of such objections ; 
 but also shows it to be false, or is a general presumption 
 of its being so. Now the observation, that, from the 
 natural constitution and course of things, we must in our^ 
 temporal concerns, almost continually, and in matters of 
 great consequence, act upon evidence of a like kind and 
 degree to the evidence of religion, is an answer to this 
 argument ; because it shows, that it is according to the 
 conduct and character of the Author of nature to appoint 
 we should act upon evidence like to that, whicli this 
 argument presumes he cannot be supposed io appoint 
 we should act upon : it is an instance, a general one, 
 made up of numerous particular ones, of somewhat in 
 his dealing with us, similar to what is said to be incredi- 
 ble. And as the force of this answer lies merely in the 
 parallel, which there is between the evidence for religion 
 and for our temporal conduct; the answer is equally just 
 and conclusive, whether the parallel be made out, by 
 showing the evidence of the former to be higher, or the 
 evidence of the latter to be lower. 
 
 Thirdly, The design of this treatise is not to vindicate 
 the character of God, but to show the obligations of men: 
 it is not to justify his providence, but to show what be- 
 longs to us to do. These are two subjects, and ought 
 not to be confounded. And though they may at length 
 run up into each other, yet observations may imme- 
 diately tend to make out the latter, which do not appear, 
 by any immediate connexion, to the purpose of the for- 
 mer; which is less our concern, than many seem to 
 think. For, first, it is not necessary we should justify 
 the dispensations of Providence against objections, any 
 farther than to show, that the things objected against 
 may, for ought we know, be consistent with justice and 
 goodness. Suppose then, that there are things in the 
 system of this world, and plan of Providence relating to 
 it, which taken alone would be unjust: yet it has been 
 shown unanswerably, that if we could take in the refer- 
 
280 Objections AGAINST THE ANALOGY [Pabtii. 
 
 ence, which these things may have to other things pre- 
 sent, past, and to come; to the whole scheme, which the 
 things objected against are parts of; these very things 
 might, for ought we know, be found to be, not only con- 
 sistent with justice, but instances of it. Indeed it has 
 been shown, by tho analogy of what we see, not only 
 possible that this may be the case, but credible that it is. 
 And thus objections, drawn from such things, are an- 
 swered, and Providence is vindicated, as far as religion 
 makes its vindication necessary. Hence it appears, 
 secondly, that objections against the Divine justice and 
 goodness are not endeavoured to be removed, by show- 
 ing that the like objections, allowed to be really conclu- 
 sive, lie against natural providence : but those objections 
 being supposed and shown not to be conclusive, the 
 things objected against, considered as matters of fact, are 
 farther shown to be credible, from their conformity to 
 the constitution of nature ; for instance, that God will re- 
 ward and punish men for their actions hereafter, from 
 the observation, that he does reward and punish them 
 for their actions here. And this, I apprehend, is of 
 weight. And I add, thirdly, it would be of weight, even 
 though those objections were not answered. For, there 
 being the proof of religion above set down ; and religion 
 implying several facts ; for instance again, the fact last 
 mentioned, that God will reward and punish men for 
 their actions hereafter; the observation, that his present 
 method of government is by rewards and punishments, 
 shows that future fact not to be incredible: whatever ob- 
 jections men may think they have against it, as unjust or 
 unmerciful, according to their notions of justice and 
 mercy; or as improbable from their belief of necessity. 
 I say, as improhable: for it is evident no objection against 
 it, as unjust, can be urged from necessity ; since this no- 
 tion as much destroys injustice, as it does justice. Then, 
 fourthly. Though objections against the reasonableness 
 of the system of religion cannot indeed be answered with- 
 out entering into consideration of its reasonableness; 
 vet objections against the credibihty or truth of it may. 
 Because the system of it is reducible into what is pro- 
 perly matter of fact : and the truth, the probable truth, 
 
Chap. VIII.] OF NATURE TO RELIGION. * 281 
 
 of facts, may be shown without consideration of their 
 reasonableness. Nor is it necessary, though, in some 
 cases and respects, it is highly useful and proper, yet it 
 is not necessary, to give a proof of the reasonableness of 
 every precept enjoined us, and of every particular dis- 
 pensation of Providence, which comes into the system of 
 religion. Indeed the more thoroughly a person of a 
 right disposition is convinced of the perfection of the 
 Divine nature and conduct, the farther he will advance 
 towards that perfection of religion, which St John* speaks 
 of But the general obligations of religion are fully 
 made out, by proving the reasonableness of the practice 
 of it. And that the practice of religion is reasonable, 
 may be shown, though no more could be proved, than 
 that the system of it may be so, for ought we know to 
 the contrary: and even without entering into the distinct 
 consideration of this. And from hence, fifthly. It is easy 
 to see, that though the analogy of nature is not an imme- 
 diate answer to objections against the wisdom, the jus- 
 tice, or goodness, of any doctrine or precept of religion ; 
 yet it may be, as it is, an immediate and direct answer 
 to what is really intended by such objections ; which 
 is, to show that the things objected against are incre- 
 dible. 
 
 Fourthly, It is most readily acknowledged, that the 
 foregoing treatise is by no means satisfactory ; very far 
 indeed from it : but so would any natural institution of 
 life appear, if reduced into a system, together with its 
 evidence. Leaving religion out of the case, men are 
 divided in their opinions, whether our pleasures over- 
 balance our pains : and whether it be, or be not, eligible 
 to live in this world. And were all such controversies 
 settled, which perhaps, in speculation, would be found 
 involved in great difficulties ; and were it determined 
 upon the evidence of reason, as nature has determined 
 it to our hands, that life is to be preserved: yet still, the 
 rules which God has been pleased to afford us, for escap- 
 ing the miseries of it, and obtaining its satisfactions, the 
 rules, for instance, of preserving health, and recovering 
 it when lost, are not only fallible and precarious, but 
 
 * John iv. 18. ' ^ /, 
 
282 OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE ANALOGY [Part II. 
 
 very far from being exact. Nor are we informed by na- 
 ture, in future contingencies and accidents, so as to ren- 
 der it at all certain, what is the best method of managing 
 our affairs. What will be the success of our temporal 
 pursuits, in the common sense of the word Success, is 
 highly doubtful. And what will be the success of them 
 in the proper sense of the word ; i. e. what happiness or 
 enjoyment we shall obtain by them, is doubtful in a much 
 higher degree. Indeed the unsatisfactory nature of the 
 evidence, with which we are obliged to take up, in the 
 daily course of life, is scarce to be expressed. Yet men 
 do not throw away life, or disregard the interests of it, 
 upon account of this doubtfulness. The evidence of re- 
 ligion then being admitted real, those who object against 
 it, as not satisfactory, i. e. as not being what they wish 
 it, plainly forget the very condition of our being : for 
 satisfaction, in this sense, does not belong to such a 
 creature as man. And, which is more material, they 
 forget also the very nature of religion. For, religion pre- 
 supposes, in all those who will embrace it, a certain de- 
 gree of integrity and honesty; which it was intended to 
 try w^hether men have or not, and to exercise in such as 
 have it, in order to its improvement. Religion presup- 
 poses this as much, and in the same sense, as speaking 
 to a man presupposes he understands the language in 
 which you speak ; or as warning a man of any danger 
 presupposes that he hath such a regard to himself, as 
 that he will endeavour to avoid it. And therefore the 
 question is not at all, Whether the evidence of religion 
 be satisfactory ; but Whether it be, in reason, sufficient 
 to prove and discipline tha't virtue, which it presupposes. 
 Now the evidence of it is fully sufficient for all those 
 purposes of probation ; how far soever it is from being 
 satisfactory, as to the purposes of curiosity, or any other: 
 and indeed it answers the purposes of the former in 
 several respects, which it would not do, if it were as 
 overbearing as is required. One might add farther; that 
 whether the motives or the evidence for any course of 
 action be satisfactory, meaning here, by thait word, what 
 satisfies a man, that such a course of action will in event 
 be for his good ; this need never be, and I think^ strictly 
 
Chap. VIII.] OF NATURE TO RELIGION. 283 
 
 speaking, never is, the practical question in common 
 matters. But the practical question in all cases is, 
 Whether the evidence for a course of action be such as, 
 taking in all circumstances, makes the faculty within us, 
 which is the guide and judge of conduct,* determine that 
 course of action to be prudent. Indeed, satisfaction that 
 it will be foi* our interest or happiness, abundantly deter- 
 mines an action to be prudent : but evidence almost in- 
 finitely lower than this, determines actions to be so too ; 
 even in the conduct of every day. 
 
 Fifthly, As to the objection concerning the influence 
 which this argument, or any part of it, may, or may not 
 be expected to have upon men ; I observe, as above, 
 that religion being intended for a trial and exercise of 
 the morality of every person's character, who is a sub- 
 ject of it ; and there being, as I have shown, such evi- 
 dence for it, as is sufficient, in reason, to influence men 
 to embrace it : to object, that it is not to be imagined 
 mankind will be influenced by such evidence, is nothing 
 to the purpose of the foregoing treatise. For the pur- 
 pose of it is not to inquire, what sort of creatures man- 
 kind are ; but what the light and knowledge, which is 
 afforded them, requires they should be : to show how, in 
 reason, they ought to behave ; not how, in fact, they will 
 behave. This depends upon themselves, and is their 
 own concern ; the personal concern of each man in par- 
 ticular. And how little regard the generality have to it, 
 experience indeed does too fully show. But religion, 
 considered as a probation, has had its end upon all per- 
 sons, to whom it has been proposed w4th evidence suf- 
 ficient in reason to influence their practice: for by this 
 means they have been put into a state of probation ; let 
 tliem behave as they will in it. And thus, not only re- 
 velation, but reason also, teaches us, that by the evidence 
 of religion being laid before men, the designs of Provi- 
 dence are carrying on, not only with regard to those who 
 will, but likewise with regard to those who will not, be 
 influenced by it. However, lastly, the objection here re- 
 ferred to, allows the things insisted upon in this treatise 
 to be of some weight ; and if so, it may be hoped it will 
 
 * See Dissert. II. 
 
284 OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE ANALOGY [PartH, 
 
 have some influence. And if there be a probabihty that 
 it will have any at all, tliere is the same reason in kind, 
 though not in degree, to lay it before men, as there would 
 be, if it were likely to have a greater influence. 
 
 And farther, I desire it may be considered, with re- 
 spect to the whole of the foregoing objections, that in this 
 treatise I have argued upon the principles of others,* not 
 my own : and have omitted what 1 think true, and of the 
 utmost importance, because by others thought unintelli- 
 gible, or not true. Thus I have argued upon the prin- 
 ciples of the Fatalists, which I do not believe : and have 
 omitted a thing of the utmost importance which I do be- 
 lieve, the moral fitness and unfitness of actions, prior to 
 all will whatever; which I apprehend as certainly to 
 determine the Divine conduct, as speculative truth and 
 falsehood necessarily determine the Divine judgment. 
 Indeed the principle of liberty, and that of moral fitness, 
 so force themselves upon the mind, that moralists, the 
 ancients as well as moderns, have formed their language 
 upon it And probably it may appear in mine : though 
 I have endeavoured to avoid it; and, in order to avoid it, 
 have sometimes been obliged to express myself in a 
 manner, which will appear strange to such as do not 
 observe the reason for it: but the general argument here 
 pursued does not at all suppose, or proceed upon these 
 principles. Now, these two abstract principles of liberty 
 and moral fitness being omitted, religion can be consid- 
 ered in no other view, than merely as a question of 
 fact: and in this view it is here considered. It is obvious, 
 that Christianity, and the proof of it, are both historical. 
 And even natural religion is, properly, a matter of fact. 
 For, that there is a righteous Governor of the world, is 
 so: and this proposition contains the general system of 
 natural religion. But then, several abstract truths, and 
 in particular those two principles, are usually taken into 
 consideration in the proof of it: whereas it is here treated 
 of only as a matter of fact. To explain this: that the 
 three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, 
 
 * By arguing vpon the principles of others, the ri'ader will observe is meant, not 
 proving any tiling from those iiriiici},l«'S, hut nctwilhsiajiditig thom. Thus reli{>i(>n 
 is proved, not from the ojiiiiion of iitctssiLy ; wliicli is absurd: but, notwithstanding 
 or eveJ^ though that opinion were admitted to be true. 
 
ch.u'. a'iii.] of nature to religion. 285 
 
 is an abstract truth: but that they appear so to our mind, 
 is only a matter of fact. And this last must have been 
 admitted, if any thing was, by those ancient sceptics, who 
 would not have admitted the former: but pretended to 
 doubt, Whether there were any such thing as truth, or 
 Whether we could certainly depend upon our faculties 
 of understanding for the knowledge of it in any case. 
 So likewise, that there is, in the nature of things, an 
 original standard of right and wrong in actions, indepen- 
 dent upon all will, but which unalterably determines the 
 will of God, to exercise that moral government over the 
 •world, which religion teaches, i. e. finally and upon the 
 whole to reward and punish men respectively as they act 
 right or wrong ; this assertion contains an abstract truth, 
 as well as matter of fact. But suppose, in the present 
 state, every man, without exception, was rewarded and 
 punished, in exact proportion as he followed or trans- 
 gressed that sense of right and wrong, which God has 
 implanted in the nature of every man : this would not be 
 at all an abstract truth, but only a matter of fact. And 
 though this fact were acknowledged by every one ; yet 
 the very same difficulties might be raised as are now, 
 concerning the abstract questions of liberty and moral 
 fitness: and we should have a proof, even the certain 
 one of experience, that the government of the world was 
 perfectly moral, without taking in the consideration of 
 those questions: and this proof would remain, in what 
 way soever they were determined. And thus, God hav- 
 ing given mankind a moral faculty, the object of which 
 is actions, and which natiirally approves some actions as 
 right, and of good desert, and condemns others as wrong, 
 and of ill desert; that he will, finally and upon the whole, 
 reward the former and punish the latter, is not an asser- 
 tion of an abstract truth, but of what is as mere a fact, as 
 his doing so at present w^ould be. This future fact I 
 have not, indeed, proved with the force with which it 
 might be proved, from the principles of liberty and moral 
 fitness; but without them have given a really conclusive 
 practical proof of it, which is greatly strengthened by the 
 general analogy of nature: a proof easily cavilled at, 
 easilv shown not to be demonstrative, for it is not offered 
 
286 CONCLUSION. [PartII 
 
 as such; but impossible, I think, to be evaded, or an- 
 swered. And thus the obhgations of rehgion are made 
 out, exclusively of the questions concerning liberty and 
 moral fitness; which have been perplexed with difficul- 
 ties and abstruse reasonings, as every thing may. 
 
 Hence therefore may be observed distinctly, what is 
 the force of this treatise. It w411 be, to such as are con- 
 vinced of religion upon the proof arising out of the two 
 last mentioned principles, an additional proof and a con- 
 firmation of it: to such as do not admit those principles, 
 an original proof of it,* and a confirmation of that proof. 
 Those who believe will here find the scheme of Chris- 
 tianity cleared of objections, and the evidence of it in a 
 peculiar manner strengthened: those v/ho do not believe 
 will at least be shown the absurdity of all attempts to 
 prove Christianity false, the plain undoubted credibility 
 of it; and, I hope, a good deal more. 
 
 And thus, though some perhaps may seriously think, 
 that analogy, as here urged, has too great stress laid 
 upon it; and ridicule, unanswerable ridicule, may be 
 applied, to show the argument from it in a disadvan- 
 tageous light; yet there can be no question, but that it is 
 a real one. For religion, both natural and revealed, 
 implying in it numerous facts; analogy, being a confir- 
 mation of all facts to which it can be applied, as it is the 
 only proof of most, cannot but be admitted by every one 
 to be a material thing, and truly of weight on the side 
 of religion, both natural and revealed: and it ought to 
 be particularly regarded by such as profess to follow 
 nature, and to be less satisfied with abstract reasonings. 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 Whatever account may be given of the strange inat- 
 tention and disregard, in some ages and countries, to a 
 matter of such importance as Religion; it would, before 
 experience, be incredible, that there should be the like 
 disregard in those, who have had the moral system of 
 the world laid before them, as it is by Christianity, and 
 
 * p. 141, &c. 
 
Partil] conclusion. 287 
 
 often inculcated upon them : because this moral system 
 carries in it a good degree of evidence for its truth, upon 
 its being barely proposed to our thoughts. There is no 
 need of abstruse reasonings and distinctions, to convince 
 an unprejudiced understanding, that there is a God who 
 made and governs the world, and will judge it in right- 
 eousness; though they may be necessary to answer 
 abstruse difficulties, when once such are raised: when 
 the very meaning of those words, which express most 
 intelligibly the general doctrine of religion, is pretended 
 to be uncertain; and the clear truth of the thing itself is 
 obscured by the intricacies of speculation. But to an 
 unprejudiced mhid, ten thousand thousand instinces of 
 design cannot but prove a designer. And it is intui- 
 tively manifest, that creatures ought to live under a duti- 
 ful sense of their Maker; and that justice and charity 
 must be his laws, to creatures whom he has made social, 
 and placed in society. Indeed the truth of revealed 
 religion, peculiarly so called, is not self-evident, but re- 
 quires external proof, in order to its being received. 
 Yet inattention, among us, to revealed religion, will be 
 found to imply the same dissolute immoral temper of 
 iviind, as inattention to natural religion: because, wiien 
 bo h are laid before us, in the manner they are in Chris-^ 
 uan countries of liberty, our obligations to inquire into 
 ooth, and to embrace both upon supposition of their 
 tiuth, are obligations of the same nature. For, revela- 
 tion claims to be the voice of God: and our obligation 
 to attend to his voice is surely moral in all cases. And 
 as it is insisted, that its evidence is conclusive, upon 
 thorough consideration of it; so it offers itself to us with 
 manifest obvious appearances of having something more 
 than human in it, and therefore in all reason requires to 
 have its claims most seriously examined into. It is to 
 be added, that though light and knowledge, in what 
 manner soever afforded us, is equally from God ; yet a 
 miraculous revelation has a peculiar tendency, from the 
 first principles of our nature, to awaken mankind, and 
 mspire them with reverence and awe : and this is a 
 peculiar obligation, to attend to what claims to be so 
 with such appearances of truth. It is therefore most 
 
288 CONCLUSION. [Part II. 
 
 certain, that our obligations to inquire seriously into the 
 evidence of Christianity, and, upon supposition of its 
 truth, to embrace it, are of the utmost importance, and 
 moral in the highest and most proper sense. Let us 
 then suppose, that the evidence of religion in general, 
 and of Christianity, has been seriously inquired into, by 
 all reasonable men among us. Yet we find many pro- 
 fessedly to reject both, upon speculative principles of 
 infidelity. And all of them do not content themselves 
 with a bare neglect of religion, and enjoying their ima- 
 ginary freedom from its restraints. Some go much 
 beyond this. They deride God's moral government 
 over the world. They renounce his protection, and 
 defy his justice. They ridicule and vilify Christianity, 
 and blaspheme the author of it ; and take all occasions 
 to manifest a scorn and contempt of revelation. This 
 amounts to an active setting themselves against religion; 
 to what may be considered as a positive principle of irre- 
 ligion ; which they cultivate within themselves, and, 
 whether they intend this effect or not, render habitual, as a 
 good man does the contrary principle. And others, who 
 are not chargeable with all this profligateness, yet are in 
 avowed opposition to religion, as if discovered to be 
 groundless. Now admitting, which is the supposition 
 we go upon, that these persons act upon what they 
 think principles of reason, and otherwise they are not 
 to be argued with; it is really inconceivable, that they 
 should imagine they clearly see the whole evidence of 
 it, considered in itself, to be nothing at all: nor do they 
 pretend this. They are far indeed from having a just 
 notion of its evidence: but they would not say its evi- 
 dence was nothing, if they thought the system of it, with 
 all its circumstances, were credible, like other matters of 
 science or history. So their manner of treating it must 
 proceed, either from such kind of objections against all 
 rehgion, as have been answered or obviated in the for- 
 mer part of this treatise; or else from objections, and 
 difficulties, supposed more peculiar to Christianity. 
 Thus, they entertain prejudices against the whole no- 
 tion of a revelation, and miraculous interpositions. 
 They find things in Scripture, whether in incidental 
 
partii.1 conclusion. 289 
 
 passages, or in the general scheme of it, which appear 
 to them unreasonable. They take for granted, that if 
 Christianity were true, the light of it must have been 
 more general, and the evidence of it more satisfactory, 
 or rather overbearing : that it must and would have 
 been, in some way, otherwise put and left, than it is. 
 Now this is not imagining they see the evidence itself to 
 be nothing, or inconsiderable ; but quite another thing. 
 It is being fortified against the evidence, in some degree 
 acknowledged, by thinking they see the system of Chris- 
 tianity, or somewhat which appears to them necessarily 
 connected with it, to be incredible or false ; fortified 
 against that evidence, w^hich might, otherwise, make 
 great impression upon them. Or, lastly, if any of these 
 persons are, upon the whole, in doubt concerning the 
 truth of Christianity ; their behaviour seems owing to 
 their taking for granted, through strange inattention, that 
 such doubting is, in a manner, the same thing as being 
 certain against it. 
 
 To these persons, and to this state of opinion con- 
 cerning religion, the foregoing treatise is adapted. For, 
 all the general objections against the moral system of 
 nature having been obviated, it is shown, that there is 
 not any peculiar presumption at all against Christianity, 
 either considered as not discoverable bv reason, or as un- 
 like to what is so discovered ; nor any worth mentioning 
 against it as miraculous, if any at all ; none, certainly, 
 which can render it in the least incredible. It is shown, 
 that, upon supposition of a divine revelation, the analogy 
 of nature renders it beforehand highly credible, I think 
 probable, that many things in it must appear liable to 
 great objections ; and that we must be incompetent judges 
 of it, to a great degree. This observation is, I think, 
 unquestionably true, and of the very utmost importance: 
 but it is urged, as I hope it will be understood, with 
 great caution of not vilifying the faculty of reason, which 
 is the candle of the Lord within us ;* though it can afford 
 no light, where it does not shine ; nor judge, where it 
 has no principles to judge upon. The objections here 
 spoken of, being first answered in the view of objections 
 
 • Prov. xs. 27 
 T 
 
290 CONCLUSION. [PabtIL 
 
 against Christianity as a matter of fact, are in the next 
 place considered as urged more immediately against the 
 wisdom, justice, and goodness of the Christian dispensa- 
 tion. And it is fully made out, that they admit of 
 exactly the like answer, in every respect, to what the 
 like objections against the constitution of nature admit 
 of: that, as partial views give the appearance of wrong 
 to things, which, upon further consideration and know- 
 ledge of their relations to other things, are found just 
 and good ; so it is perfectly credible, that the things 
 objected against the wisdom and goodness of the Chris- 
 tian dispensation, may be rendered instances of wis- 
 dom and goodness, by their reference to other things 
 beyond our view : because Christianity is a scheme as 
 much above our comprehension, as that of nature ; and 
 like that, a scheme in which means are made use of to 
 accomplish ends, and which, as is most credible, may be 
 carried on by general laws. And it ought to be attended 
 to, that this is not an answer taken merely or chiefly 
 from our ignorance ; but from somewhat positive, which 
 our observation shows us. For, to like objections, the like 
 answer is experienced to be just, in numberless parallel 
 cases. The objections against the Christian dispensation, 
 and the method by which it is carried on, having been 
 thus obviated, in general and together ; the chief of them 
 are considered distinctly, and the particular things ob- 
 jected to are shown credible, by their perfect analogy, 
 each apart, to the constitution of nature. Thus, if man be 
 fallen from his primitive state, and to be restored, and in- 
 finite wisdom and power engages in accomplishing our 
 recovery : it were to have been expected, it is said, that 
 this should have been effected at once ; and not by such 
 a long series of means, and such a various economy 
 of persons and things ; one dispensation preparatory to 
 another, this to a further one, and so on through an in- 
 definite number of ages, before the end of the scheme 
 proposed can be completely accomplished ; a scheme 
 conducted by infinite wisdom, and executed by almighty 
 power. But now, on the contrary, our findiiig that 
 every thing in the constitution and course of nature is 
 thus carried on, shows such expectations concerning 
 
Part II.] ' CONCLUSION. 291 
 
 revelation to be highly unreasonable ; and is a satisfac- 
 tory answer to them, when urged as objections against 
 the credibility, that the great scheme of Providence in 
 the redemption of the world may be of this kind, and to 
 be accomplished in this manner. As to the particular 
 method of our redemption, the appointment of a Medi- 
 ator between God and man : this has been shown to be 
 most obviously analogous to the general conduct of na- 
 ture, i e. the God of nature, in appointing others to be 
 the instruments of his mercy, as v/e experience in the 
 daily course of providence. The condition of this world, 
 which the doctrine of our redemption by Christ presup- 
 poses, so much falls in with natural appearances, that 
 heathen moralists inferred it from those appearances : 
 inferred, that human nature was fallen from its original 
 rectitude, and in consequence of this, degraded from its 
 primitive happiness. Or, however this opinion came 
 into the world, these appearances must have kept up 
 the tradition, and confirmed the belief of it. And as it 
 was the general opinion under the light of nature, that 
 repentance and reformation, alone and by itself, was not 
 sufficient to do away sm, and procure a full remission of 
 the penalties annexed to it ; and as the reason of the 
 thing does not at all lead to any such conclusion ; so 
 every day's experience shows us, that reformation is not, 
 in any sort, sufficient to prevent the present disadvan- 
 tages and miseries, which, in the natural course of 
 things, God has annexed to folly and extravagance. 
 Yet there may be ground to think, that the punish- 
 ments, which, by the general laws of divine government, 
 are annexed to vice, may be prevented : that provision 
 may have been, even originally, made, that they should 
 be prevented by some means or other, though they 
 could not by reformation alone. For we have daily in- 
 stances of such mercy ^ in the general conduct of nature : 
 compassion provided for misery,* medicines for diseases, 
 friends against enemies. There is provision made, in 
 the original constitution of the world, that much of the 
 natural bad consequences of our follies, which persons 
 themselves alone cannot prevent, may be prevented by 
 
 * Serm. at the Rolls, p. 106. 
 2 T 
 
r92 CONCL SION. ' [PABtn. 
 
 the assistance of others ; assistance, which nature ena- 
 bles, and disposes, and appoints them to afibrd. By a 
 nit'thod of goodness analogous to this, when the world 
 lay in wickedness, and consequently in ruin, God so loved 
 tlie worlds that he gave his only hegoiten Son to save it : 
 and he being made perfect hi) sufferings became the author 
 of eternal salvation to all them that obey him* Indeed 
 neither reason nor analogy would lead us to think, in 
 particular, that the interposition of Christ, in the manner 
 in which he did interpose, would be of that efficacy for 
 recovery of the world, which the Scripture teaches us it 
 was : but neither would reason nor analogy lead us to 
 think, that other particular means would be of the eflS- 
 cacy, which experience shows they ai-e, in numberless 
 instances. And therefore, as the case before us does not 
 admit of experience ; so, that neither reason nor analogy 
 can show how, or in what particular way, the interposition 
 oF Christ, as revealed in Scripture, is of that efficacy, 
 which it is there represented to be ; this is no kind nor 
 degree of presumption against its being really of that . 
 eiHcacy. Further: the objections against Christianity, 
 fVom the light of it not being universal, nor its evidence 
 so strong as might possibly be given us, have been 
 answered by the general analogy of nature. That God 
 has made such variety of creatures, is indeed an answer 
 to the former : but that he dispenses his gifts in such 
 variety, both of degrees and kinds, amongst creatures cf 
 the same species, and even to the same individuals at 
 different times ; is a more obvious and full answer to it. 
 And it is so far from being; the method of Providence in 
 other cases, to afford us such overbearing evidence, as 
 some require in proof of Christianity; that on the contrary, 
 the evidence upon which we are naturally appointed to 
 act in common matters, throughout a very great part of 
 life, is doubtful in a high degree. And admitting the 
 fact, that God has afforded to some no more than doubtful 
 evidence of religion ; the same account may be given of 
 it, as of difficulties and temptations with regard to prac- 
 tice. But as it is not impossible,! surely, that this alleged 
 doubtfulness may be men's own fault ; it deserves their 
 
 ♦ John iii. 16, Hub. v. 9. f P. 237, &c. 
 
pARrll.] CONCLUSION. 293 
 
 most serious consideration, whether it be not so. How- 
 ever, it is certain, that doubting implies a degree of evi- 
 dence for that of which we doubt : and that this degree 
 of evidence as really lays us under obligations as demon- 
 strative evidence. 
 
 The whole then of religion is throughout credible : nor 
 is there, I think, any thing relating to the revealed dis- 
 pensation of things, more different from the experienced 
 constitution and course of nature, than some parts of the 
 constitution of nature are from other parts of it. And 
 if so, the only question which remains is, what positive 
 evidence can be alleged for the truth of Christianity. 
 This too in general has been considered, and the objec- 
 tions against it estimated. Deduct, therefore, what is to 
 be deducted from that evidence, upon account of any 
 weight which may be thought to remain in these objec- 
 tions, after what the analogy of nature has suggested in 
 answer to them : and then consider, what are the practi- 
 cal consequences from all this, upon the most sceptical 
 principles one can argue upon (for I am writing to per- 
 sons who entertain these principles) : and upon such 
 consideration it will be obvious, that immorality, as little 
 excuse as it admits of in itself, is greatly aggravated, in 
 persons who have been made acquainted with Christia- 
 nity, whether they believe it or not : because the moral 
 system of nature, or natural religion, which Christianity 
 lays before us, approves itself, almost intuitively, to a 
 reasonable mind, upon seeing it proposed. In the next 
 place, with regard to Christianity, it will be observed ; 
 that there is a middle between a full satisfaction of the 
 truth of it, and a satisfaction of the contrary. The 
 middle state of mind between these two consists in a 
 serious apprehension, that it may be true, joined with 
 doubt whether it be so. And this, upon the best judg- 
 ment I am able to make, is as far towards speculative 
 infidelity, as any sceptic can at all be supposed to go, 
 who has had true Christianity, with the proper evidences 
 of it, laid before him, and has in any tolerable measure 
 considered them. For I would not be mistaken to com- 
 prehend all who have ever heard of it : because it seemn 
 evident, that iu many countries called Christian, neither 
 
294 CONCLUSION. [Part II. 
 
 Christianity, nor its evidence, are fairly laid before men 
 And in places where both are, there appear to be some 
 who have very little attended to either, and who reject 
 Christianity with a scorn proportionate to their inatten- 
 tion ; and yet are by no means without understanding 
 in other matters. Now it has been shown, that a serious 
 apprehension that Christianity may be true, lays per- 
 sons under the strictest obligations of a serious regard 
 to it, throughout the whole of their life; a reijard not 
 the same exactly, but m many respects nearly the same 
 with what a full conviction of its truth would lay them 
 under. Lastly, it will appear, that blasphemy and pro- 
 faneness, I mean with regard to Christianity, are ab- 
 solutely without excuse. For there is no temptation to 
 it, but from the wantonness of vanity or mirth; and these, 
 considering the infinite importance of the subject, are 
 no such temptations as to afford any excuse for it.. If 
 this be a just account of things, and yet men can go on 
 to vilify or disregard Christianity, which is to talk and 
 act as if they had a demonstration of its falsehood j 
 there is no reason to think they would alter their be- 
 haviour to any purpose, though there were a demon- 
 stration of its truth. 
 
TWO BRIEF 
 
 DISSERTATIONS. 
 
 I. OP PERSONAL IDENTITY. 
 IL OF THE NATUEE OP VIETUS 
 
DISSERTATION I. 
 
 OF PERSONAL IDENTITY. 
 
 "Whether we are to live in a future state, as it is tLe 
 most important question which can possibly be asked, so 
 it is the most intelligible one which can be expressed in 
 language. Yet strange perplexities have been raised 
 about the meaning of that identity or sameness of per- 
 son, which is implied in the notion of our living now and 
 hereafter, or in any two successive moments. And the 
 solution of these difficulties hath been stranger than the 
 difficulties themselves. For, personal identity has been 
 explained so by some, as to render the inquiry concern- 
 ing a future life of no consequence at all to us the per- 
 sons who are making it. And though few men can be 
 misled by such subtleties ; yet it may be proper a little to 
 consider them. 
 
 Now, when it is asked wherein personal identity con- 
 sists, the answer should be the same, as if it were asked 
 wherein consists similitude, or equality ; that all attempts 
 to define would but perplex it. Yet there is no difficulty 
 at all in ascertaining the idea. For as, upon two triangles 
 being compared or viewed together, there arises to the 
 mind the idea of similitude ; or upon twice two and four, 
 the idea of equality : so likewise, upon comparing the 
 consciousness of one's self, or one's own existence, in 
 any two moments, there as. immediately arises to the 
 mind the idea of personal identity. And as the two for- 
 mer comparisons not only give us the ideas of similitude 
 and equality ; but also show us, that two triangles are 
 alike, and twice two and four are equal : so the latter 
 comparison not only gives us the idea of personal iden- 
 tity, but also shows us the identity of ourselves in those 
 two moments ; the present, suppose, and that immedi- 
 ately past ; or the present, and that a month, a year, or 
 twenty years past. Or in other words, by reflecting upon 
 that which is myself now, and that which was mvself 
 
298 OF PERSONAL IDENTITY. [Diss. I. 
 
 twenty years ago, I discern they are not two, but one and 
 the same self. 
 
 But though consciousness ot what is past does thus 
 ascertain our personal identity to ourselves, yet to say, 
 that it makes personal identity, or is necessary to our 
 being the same persons, is to say, that a person has not 
 existed a single moment, nor done one action, but what 
 he can remember ; indeed none but what he reflects 
 upon. And one should really think it self-evident, that 
 consciousness of personal identity presupposes, and 
 therefore cannot constitute, personal identity ; any more 
 than knowledge, in any other case, can constitute truth, 
 which it presupposes. 
 
 This wonderful mistake may possibly have arisen from 
 hence ; that to be endued with consciousness is insepa- 
 rable from the idea of a person, or intelligent being. For, 
 this might be expressed inaccurately thus, that conscious- 
 ness makes personality : and from hence it might be 
 concluded to make personal identity. But though pre- 
 sent consciousness of what we at present do and feel is 
 necessary to our being the persons we now are ; yet 
 present consciousness of past actions or feelings is not 
 necessary to our being the same persons who performed 
 those actions, or had those feelings. 
 
 The inquiry, what makes vegetables the same in the 
 common acceptation of the word, does not a^%pear to 
 have any relation to this of personal identity : because, 
 the word same, when applied to them and to person, is 
 not only applied to different subjects, but it is also used 
 in different senses. For when a man swears to the same 
 tree, as having stood fifty years in the same place, he 
 means only the same as to all the purposes of property 
 and uses of common life, and not that the tree has been 
 all that time the same in the strict philosophical sense of 
 the word. For he does not know, whether any one 
 particle of the present tree be the same with any one 
 particle of the tree which stood in the same place fifty 
 years ago. And if they have not one common particle 
 of matter, they cannot be the same tree in the proper 
 philosophic sense of the word same : it being evidently a 
 contradiction in terms, to say they are, when no part of 
 
Diss. I.] OF PERSONAL IDENTITY. 299 
 
 their substance, and no one of their properties is the 
 same : no part of their substance, by the supposition ; no 
 one of their properties, because it is allowed, that the 
 same property cannot be transferred from one substance 
 to another. And therefore when we say the identity or 
 sameness of a plant consists in a continuation of the 
 same life, communicated under the same organization, to 
 a number of particles of matter, whether the same or 
 not; the word same, when applied to life and to organi- 
 zation, cannot possibly be understood to signify, what it 
 signifies in this very sentence, when applied to matter. 
 In a loose and popular sense then, the life and the orga- 
 nization and the plant are justly said to be the same, 
 notwithstanding the perpetual change of the parts. But 
 in a strict and philosophical manner of speech, no man, 
 no being, no mode of being, no anything, can be the 
 same with that, with which it has indeed nothing the 
 same. Now sameness is used in this latter sense, when 
 applied to persons. The identity of these^ therefore, 
 cannot subsist with diversity of substance. 
 
 The thing here considered, and demonstratively, as I 
 think, determined, is proposed by Mr Locke in these 
 words. Whether it, i. e. the same self or person, be the 
 same identical substatice? And he has suggested what is 
 a much better answer to the question, than that which 
 he gives it in form. For he defines Person, a tJdnking 
 intelligent being, &c., and personal identity, the sameness 
 of a rational Being * The question then is, whether the 
 same rational being: is the same substance : which needs 
 no answer, because Being and Substance, in this place, 
 stand for the same idea. The ground of the doubt, 
 whether the same person be the same substance, is said 
 to be this ; that the consciousness of our own existence, 
 in youth and in old age, or in any two joint successive 
 moments, is not the same indimdual action,^ i. e. not the 
 same consciousness, but different successive conscious- 
 nesses. Now it is strange that this should have occa- 
 sioned such perplexities. For it is surely conceivable, 
 that a person may have a capacity of knowing some 
 object or other to be the same now, which it was when he 
 
 * Lucke's Works, vol. i. p. 146. f Locke, p. 146, 147. 
 
300 OF PERSONAL IDENTITY. [Diss. I. 
 
 contemplated it formerly : yet in this case, where, by the 
 supposition, the object is perceived to be the same, the 
 perception of it in any two moments cannot be one and 
 the same perception. And thus, though the successive 
 consciousnesses, which we have of our own existence, 
 are not the same, yet are they consciousnesses of one 
 and the same thing or object; of the same person, self, 
 or living agent. The person, of whose existence the 
 consciousness is felt now, and was felt an hour or a year 
 ago, is discerned to bo, not two persons, but one and the 
 same person ; and therefore is one and the same. 
 
 Mr Locke's observations upon this subject appear 
 hasty : and he seems to profess himself dissatisfied with 
 suppositions, which he has made relating to it.* But 
 some of those hasty observations have been carried to a 
 strange length by others ; whose notion, when traced and 
 examined to the bottom, amounts, I think, to this :f 
 ** That Personality is not a permanent, but a transient 
 thing : that it lives and dies, begins and ends continually : 
 that no one can any more remain one and the same per- 
 son two moments together, than two successive moments 
 can be one and the same moment : that our substance is 
 indeed continually changing ; but whether this be so or 
 not, is, it seems, nothing to the purpose ; since it is not 
 substance, but consciousness alone, which constitutes 
 personality : which consciousness, being successive, can- 
 not be the same in any two moments, nor consequently 
 the personality constituted by it." And from hence it 
 must follow, that it is a fallacy upon ourselves, to charge 
 our present selves with any thing we did, or to imagine 
 our present selves interested in any thing which befell 
 us yesterday ; or that our present self will be interested 
 in what will befall us to-morrow : since our present self 
 is not, in reality, the same with the self of yesterday, but 
 another like self or person coming in its room, and mis- 
 taken for it ; to which another self will succeed to-mor- 
 row. This, I say, must follow : for if the self or person 
 of to-day, and that of to-morrow, are not the same, but 
 
 ♦ Locke, p. 1.52. 
 f See an Answer to Dr Clarke's Third Defence of his Letter to Mr DodwclU 
 2d edit. p. 44, 56, &c. 
 
Diss. I.] O PERSONAL IDENTITY. 301 
 
 only like persons ;C the person of to-day is really no more 
 interested in what will befall the person of to-morrow, 
 than in what will befall any other person. It may be 
 thought, perhaps, that this is not a just representation of 
 the opinion we are speaking of: because those who main- 
 tain it allow, that a person is the same as far back as his 
 remembrance reaches. And indeed they do use the 
 words, identity^ and same person. Nor will language per- 
 mit these words to be laid aside ; since if they were, 
 there must be I know not what ridiculous periphrasis 
 substituted in the room of them. But thev cannot con- 
 sistently with themselves, mean, that the person is really 
 the same. For it is self-evident, that the personality 
 cannot be really the same, if, as they expressly assert, 
 that in which it consists is not the same. And as, con- 
 sistently with themselves, they cannot, so, I think it ap- 
 pears, they do not, mean, that the person is really the 
 same, but only that he is so in a fictitious sense : in such 
 a sense only as they assert, for this they do assert, that 
 any number of persons whatever may be the same per- 
 son. The bare unfolding this notion, and laying it thus 
 naked and open, seems the best confutation of it. How- 
 ever, since great stress is said to be put upon it, I add 
 the following things. 
 
 First, This notion is absolutely contradictory to that 
 certain conviction, which necessarily and every moment 
 rises within us, when we turn our thoughts upon our- 
 selves, when we reflect upon what is past, and look for- 
 ward upon what is to come. All imagination of a daily 
 change of that living agent which each man calls himself, 
 for another, or of any such change throughout our whole 
 present life, is entirely borne down by our natural sense 
 of things. Nor is it possible for a person in his wits to 
 alter his conduct, with regard to his health or affairs, 
 from a suspicion, that, though he should live to-morrow, 
 he should not, however, be the same person he is to-day. 
 And yet, if it be reasonable to act, with respect to a 
 future life, upon this notion, that personality is transient ; 
 it is reasonable to act upon it, with respect to the pre- 
 sent. Here then is a notion equally applicable to reli- 
 gion and to our temporal concerns ; and every one sees 
 
802 OF PERSONAL IDENTITY. [Diss. T 
 
 and foels tlic inexpressible absurdity of it in the latter 
 case ; if, therefore, any can take up with it in the former, 
 this cannot proceed from the reason of the thing-, but 
 must be owing to an inward unfairness, and secret cor- 
 ruption of heart. 
 
 Secondb/^ It is not an idea, or abstract notion, or qua- 
 lity, but a being only, which is capable of life and action, 
 of happiness and misery. Now all beings confessedly 
 continue the same, during the whole time of their exis- 
 tence. Consider then a livino; beino^ now existinof, and 
 which has existed for any time aiive : this living being 
 must have done and suffered and enjoyed, what it has 
 done and suffered and enjoyed formerly (this living be- 
 ing, I say, and not another), as really as it does and suf- 
 fers and enjoys, what it does and suffers and enjoys this 
 instant. AH these successive actions, enjoyments, and 
 sufferings, are actions, enjoyments, and sufferings, of the 
 same living being. And they are so, prior to all consi- 
 deration of its remembering or forgetting : since remem- 
 bering or forgetting can make no alteration in the truth 
 of past matter of fact. And suppose this being endued 
 with limited powers of knowledge and memory, there is 
 no more difficulty in conceiving it to have a power of 
 knowing itself to be the same living being which it was 
 some time ago, of remembering some of its actions, suf- 
 ferings, and enjoyments, and forgetting others, than in 
 conceiving it to know or remember or forget any thing 
 else. 
 
 Thirdli/, Every person is conscious, that he is now 
 the same person or self he was as far back as his re- 
 membrance reaches : since when any one reflects upon 
 a past action of his own, he is just as certain of the per-* 
 son who did that action, namely, himself, the person 
 who now reflects upon it, as he is certain that the action 
 was at all done. Nay, very often a person's assurance 
 of an action having been done, of which he is absolutely 
 assured, arises wholly irom the consciousness that he 
 himself did it. And this he, person, or self, must either 
 be a substance, or the propert)?- of some substance. If 
 he, if person, be a substance ; then consciousness that he 
 is the same person is consciousness that he is the same 
 
Diss. II.] OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. 303 
 
 substance. If the person, or he, be the property of a 
 substance, still consciousness that he is the same pro- 
 perty is as certain a proof that his substance remains the 
 same, as consciousness that he remains the same sub- 
 stance would be : since the same property cannot be 
 transferred from one substance to another. 
 
 But though we are thus certain, that we are the same 
 agents, living beings, or substances, now, which we were 
 as far back as our remembrance reaches; yet it is asked, 
 whether we may not possibly be deceived in it? And 
 this question may be asked at the end of any demonstra- 
 tion whatever: because it is a question concerning the 
 truth of perception by memory. And he who can doubt, 
 whether perception by memory can in this case be de- 
 pended upon, may doubt also, whether perception by 
 deduction and reasoning, which also include memory, or 
 indeed whether intuitive perception can. Here then we 
 can go no further. For it is ridiculous to attempt to prove 
 the truth of those perceptions, whose truth we can no 
 otherwise prove, than by other perceptions of exactly 
 the same kind with them, and which there is just the 
 same ground to suspect; or to attempt to prove the truth 
 of our faculties, which can no otherwise be proved, than 
 by the use or means of those very suspected faculties 
 themselves. 
 
 DISSERTATION 11. 
 
 OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. 
 
 • 
 
 That which renders beings capable of moral govern- 
 ment, is their having a moral nature, and moral faculties 
 of perception and of action. Brute creatures are impress- 
 ed and actuated by various instincts and propensions : so 
 also are we. But additional to this, v^e have a capacity 
 of rejecting upon actions and characters, and making 
 them an object to our thousrht: and on doino- this, we 
 Jiaturally and unavoidably approve some actions, under the 
 peculiar view of their beng virtuous and of good desert ; 
 
304 OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. [Diss. H. 
 
 and disapprove others, as vicious and of ill desert. That 
 we have this moral approving and disapproving* faculty, 
 is certain from our experiencing it in ourselves, and recog- 
 nizing it in each other. It appears from our exercising it 
 unavoidably, in the approbation and disapprobation even 
 of feigned characters : from the words right and wrong, 
 odious and amiable, base and worthy, with many others 
 of like signification in all languages applied to actions and 
 characters : from the many written systems of morals 
 which suppose it; since it cannot be imagined, that all 
 these authors, throughout all these treatises, had abso- 
 lutely no meaning at all to their words, or a meaning 
 merely chimerical : from our natural sense of gratitude, 
 which implies a distinction between merely being the 
 instrument of good, and intending it : from the like dis- 
 tinction every one makes between injury and mere harm, 
 which, Hobbes says, is peculiar to mankind ; and between 
 injury and just punishment, a distinction plainly natural, 
 prior to the consideration of human laws. It is manifest 
 great partf of common language, and of common beha- 
 viour over the world, is formed upon supposition of such 
 a moral faculty; whether called conscience, moral reason, 
 moral sense, or divine reason ; whether considered as a 
 sentiment of the understanding, or as a perception of 
 the heart ; or, which seems the truth, as including both. 
 Nor is it at all doubtful in the general, what course of 
 action this faculty, or practical discerning power within 
 us, approves and what it disapproves. For, as much as 
 it has been disputed wherein virtue consists, or whatever 
 ground for doubt there may be about particulars ; yet, in 
 general, there is in reality a universally acknowledged 
 standard of it. It is that, which all ages and all coun- 
 tries have made profession of in public : it is that, which 
 every man you meet puts on the show of: it is that, 
 
 * This way of speakiiiif is taken from Epictetns,f and is made use of as seeming 
 the most full, and least liable to cavil. And the moral faculty may he understood to 
 Lave these two epithets, toKifiairriKri and kir^oKi/tairriKn, upon a double account; be- 
 cause, upon a survey of actions, whether before or after they are done, it determines 
 them to be tfood or evil; and also because it determines ittelf to be the guide of ac- 
 tion and of life, in contradistinction from all other faculties, or natural principles of 
 action ; in the very same manner as speculative reason directly and naturally judi^et 
 of speculative truth and falsehood: and at the same time is attended with a conscious- 
 ness upon rejiection, that the natural right to judge of them belongs to it. 
 
 f Arr. Epict. lib. i. cup. I. 
 
Diss. 11.] O^ THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. 305 
 
 which the primary and fundamental laws of all civil con- 
 stitutions over the face of the earth make it their business 
 and endeavour to enforce the practice of upon mankind : 
 namely justice, veracity, and regard to common good. 
 It being manifest then, in general, that we have such a 
 faculty or discernment as this, it may be of use to remark 
 some things more distinctly concerning it. 
 
 First, It ought to be observed, that the object of this 
 faculty is actions,* comprehending under that name active 
 or practical principles : those principles from which men 
 would act, if occasions and circumstances gave them 
 power; and which, when fixed and habitual in any per- 
 son, we call his character. It does not appear, that 
 brutes have the least reflex sense of actions, as distin- 
 guished from events : or that will and design, which 
 constitute the very nature of actions as such, are at all 
 an object to their perception. But to ours they are: and 
 they are the object, and the only one, of the approving 
 and disapproving faculty. Acting conduct, behaviour, 
 abstracted from all regard to what is in fact and event, 
 the consequence of it, is itself the natural object of the 
 moral discernment ; as speculative truth and falsehood 
 is of speculative reason. Intention of such and such 
 consequences, indeed, is always included; for it is part 
 of the action itself: but though the intended good or bad 
 consequences do not follow, we have exactly the same 
 sense of the action as if they did. In like manner we 
 think well or ill of characters, abstracted from all con- 
 sideration of the good or the evil, which persons of 
 such characters have it actually in their power to do. 
 We never, in the moral way, applaud or blame either 
 ourselves or others, for what we enjoy or what we suffer, 
 or for having impressions made upon us which we con- 
 sider as altogether out of our power: but only for what 
 we do, or would have done, had it been in our power: 
 or for what we leave undone, which we might have 
 done, or would have left undone, though we could have 
 done it. 
 
 Secondly, Our sense or discernment of actions as 
 
 * OuTi h a^irvt ttn) xKKia — l» vi'irti, a,X}LOi tvsfyj/'a, M. AntOD. lib. iX. 16, VirtutiS 
 laus omjiis ii actione consistit. Cic. Off. lib. i. cap. 6. 
 
 U 
 
306 OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. [VtuAL 
 
 morally good or evil, implies in it a sense or discern- 
 ment of them as of good or ill discernment. It may be 
 difficult to explain this perception, so as to answer all 
 the questions which may be asked concerning it: but 
 every one speaks of such and such actions as deserving 
 punishment; and it is not, I suppose, pretended, that 
 they have absolutely no meaning at all to the expres- 
 sion. Now the meaning plainly is not, that we conceive 
 it for the good of society, that the doer of such actions 
 should be made to suffer. For if, unhappily, it were 
 resolved, that a man, who, by some innocent action, 
 was infected with the plague, should be left to perish, 
 lest, by other people's coming near him, the infection 
 should spread ; no one would say he deserved this treat- 
 ment. Innocence and ill desert are inconsistent ideas. 
 Ill desert always supposes guilt: and if one be no part 
 of the other, yet they are evidently and naturally con- 
 nected in our mind. The sight of a man in misery 
 raises our compassion towards him ; and, if this misery be 
 inflicted on him by another, our indignation against the 
 author of it. But when we are informed, that the suf- 
 ferer is a villain, and is punished only for his treachery 
 or cruelty; our compassion exceedingly lessens, and in 
 many instances our indignation wholly subsides. Now 
 what produces this effect is the conception of that in the 
 sufferer, which we call ill desert. Upon considering 
 then, or viewing together, our notion of vice and that of 
 misery, there results a third, that of ill desert. And 
 thus there is in human creatures an association of the 
 two ideas, natural and moral evil, wickedness and 
 punishment. If this association were merely artificial 
 or accidental, it were nothing: but being most unques- 
 tionably natural, it greatly concerns us to attend to it, 
 instead of endeavouring to explain it away. 
 
 It may be observed further, concerning our percep- 
 tion of good and of ill desert, that the former is very 
 weak with respect to common instances of virtue. One 
 reason of which may be, that it does not appear to a 
 spectator, how far such instances of virtue proceed from 
 a virtuous principle, or in what degree this principle is 
 prevalent: since a very weak regard to virtue may be 
 
SBs.n.] OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. 307 
 
 sufficient to make men act well in many common in- 
 stances. And on the other hand, our perception of ill 
 desert in vicious actions lessens, in proportion to the 
 temptations men are thought to have had to such vices. 
 For, vice in human creatures consisting chiefly in the 
 absence or want of the virtuous principle ; though a man 
 be overcome, suppose, by tortures, it does not from 
 thence appear to what degree the virtuous principle was 
 wanting. All that appears is, that he had it not in such 
 a degree, as to prevail over the temptation; but possibly 
 he had it in a degree, w^hich would have rendered him 
 proof against common temptations. 
 
 Thirdly, Our perception of vice and ill desert arises 
 from, and is the result of, a comparison of actions with 
 the nature and capacities of the agent. For the mere 
 neglect of doing what we ought to do, would, in many 
 cases, be determined by all men to be in the highest 
 degree vicious. And this determination must arise from 
 such comparison, and be the result of it; because such 
 neglect would not be vicious in creatures of other na 
 tures and capacities, as brutes. And it is the same 
 also with respect to positive vices, or such as consist in 
 doing what we ought not. For, every one has a dif- 
 ferent sense of harm done by an idiot, madman, or child, 
 and by one of mature and common understanding ; 
 though the action of both, including the intention, which 
 is part of the action, be the same: as it may be, since 
 idiots and madmen, as well as children, are capable not 
 only of doing mischief, but also of intending it. Now 
 this difference must arise from somewhat discerned in 
 the nature or capacities of one, which renders the action 
 vicious; and the want of which, in the other, renders 
 the same action innocent or less vicious : and this plainly 
 supposes a comparison, whether reflected upon or not, 
 between the action and capacities of the agent, previous 
 to our determining an action to be vicious. And hence 
 arises a proper application of the epithets, incongruous, 
 unsuitable, disproportionate, unfit, to actions which our 
 moral faculty determines to be vicious. 
 
 Fourthly, It deserves to be considered, whether men 
 are more at liberty, in point of morals, to make them- 
 
308 OP THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. [Diss.n 
 
 selves miserable without reason, than to make other 
 people so : or dissolutely to neglect their own greater 
 good, for the sake of a present lesser gratification, than 
 they are to neglect the good of others, whom nature has 
 committed to their care. It should seem, that a due 
 concern about our own interest or happiness, and a rea- 
 sonable endeavour to secure and promote it, which is, I 
 think, very much the meaning of the word prudence, in 
 our language ; it should seem, that this is virtue, and the 
 contrary behaviour faulty and blamable; since, in the 
 calmest way of reflection, we approve of the first, and 
 condemn the other conduct, both in ourselves and others. 
 This approbation and disapprobation are altogether dif- 
 ferent from mere desire of our own, or of their happi- 
 ness, and from sorrow upon missing it. For the object 
 or occasion of this last kind of perception is satisfaction 
 or uneasiness: whereas the object of the first is active 
 behaviour. In one case, what our thoughts fix upon 
 is our condition : in the other, our conduct. It is true 
 indeed, that nature has not given us so sensible a dis- 
 approbation of imprudence and folly, either in ourselves 
 or others, as of falsehood, injustice, and cruelty: I sup- 
 pose, because that constant habitual sense of private in- 
 terest and good, which we always carry about with us, 
 renders such sensible disapprobation less necessary, less 
 wanting, to keep us from imprudently neglecting our 
 own happiness, and foolishly injuring ourselves, than it 
 is necessary and wanting to keep us from injuring others, 
 to whose good we cannot have so strong and constant a 
 regard: and also because imprudence and folly, appear- 
 ing to bring its own punishment more immediately and 
 constantly than injurious behaviour, it less needs the ad- 
 ditional punishment, which would be inflicted upon it 
 by others, had they the same sensible indignation 
 against it, as against injustice, and fraud, and cruelty. 
 Besides, unhappiness l)eing in itself the natural object 
 of compassion; the unhappiness which people bring up- 
 on themselves, though it be wilfully, excites in us some 
 pity for them : and this of course lessens our displeasure 
 against them. But still it is matter of experience, that 
 we are formed so as to reflect very severely upon the 
 
Diss. II,] OF THE NATURE Of VIRTUE. 309 
 
 greater instances of imprudent neglect and foolish rash- 
 ness, both in ourselves and others. In instances of this 
 kind, men often say of themselves with remorse, and of 
 others with some indignation, that they deserved to suf- 
 fer such calamities, because they brought them upon 
 themselves, and would not take warning. Particularly 
 when persons come to poverty and distress by a long 
 course of extravagance, and after frequent admonitions, 
 though without falsehood or injustice ; we plainly, do not 
 regard such people as alike objects of compassion with 
 those, who are brought into the same condition by una- 
 voidable accidents. From these things it appears, that 
 prudence is a species of virtue, and folly of vice : mean- 
 ing hy folly, somewhat quite different from mere inca- 
 pacity ; a thoughtless want of that regard and attention 
 to our own happiness, which we had capacity for. And 
 this the word properly includes ; and, as it seems, in its 
 usual acceptation : for we scarcely apply it to brute crea- 
 tures. 
 
 However, if any person be disposed to dispute the 
 matter, I shall very willingly give him up the words 
 Virtue and Vice, as not applicable to prudence and fol- 
 ly: but must beg leave to insist, that the faculty within 
 us, which is the judge of actions, approves of prudent 
 actions, and disapproves imprudent ones: I say prudent 
 and imprudent actions as such, and considered distinctly 
 from the happiness or misery which they occasion. 
 And, by the way, this observation may help to deter- 
 mine what justness there is in that objection against re- 
 ligion, that it teaches us to be interested and selfish. 
 
 Fifthly J Without inquiring how far, and in what sense, 
 virtue is resolvable into benevolence, and vice into the 
 want of it; it may be proper to observe, that benevo- 
 lence, and the want of it, singly considered, are in no 
 sort the whole of virtue and vice. For if this were the 
 case, in the review of one's own character, or that of 
 others, our moral understanding and moral sense would 
 be indifferent to every thing, but the degrees in which 
 benevolence prevailed, and the degrees in which it was 
 wanting. That is, we should neither approve of bene- 
 v^olence to some persons rather than to others, nor dis- 
 
310 OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. pigs. n. 
 
 approve injustice and falsehood upon any other account^, 
 than merely as an overbalance of happiness was fore- 
 seen likely to be produced by the first, and of misery 
 by the second. But now, on the contrary, suppose two 
 men competitors for any thing whatever, which would 
 be of equal advantage to each of them; though nothing 
 indeed would be more impertinent, than for a stranger 
 to busy himself to get one of them preferred to the 
 other; yet such endeavour would be virtue, in behalf of 
 a friend or benefactor, abstracted from all consideration 
 of distant consequence: as that examples of gratitude, 
 and the cultivation of friendship, would be of general 
 good to the world. Again, suppose one man should, 
 by fraud or violence, take from another the fruit of his 
 labour, with intent to give it to a third, who he thought 
 would have as much pleasure from it as would balance 
 the pleasure which the first possessor would have had 
 in the enjoyment, and his vexation in the loss of it; 
 suppose also that no bad consequences would follow: 
 yet such an action would surely be vicious. Nay, 
 further, were treachery, violence, and injustice, no 
 otherwise vicious, than as foreseen likely to produce an 
 overbalance of misery to society; then, if in any case a 
 man could procure to himself as great advantage by an 
 act of injustice, as the whole foreseen inconvenience, 
 likely to be brought upon others by it, would amount 
 to; such a piece of injustice would not be faulty or 
 vicious at all: because it would be no more than, in any 
 other case, for a man to prefer his own satisfaction to 
 another^s in equal degrees- The fact, then, appears to 
 be, that we are constituted so as to condemn falseliood, 
 unprovoked violence, injustice, and to approve of bene- 
 volence to some preferably to others, abstracted from all 
 consideration, which conduct is likeliest to produce an 
 overbalance of happiness or misery. And therefore, 
 were the Author of nature to propose nothing to himself 
 as an end but the production of happiness, were his 
 moral character merely that of benevolence; yet ours is 
 not so. Upon that supposition indeed, the only reason 
 of his giving us the above mentioned approbation of 
 benevolence to some persons rather than others, an<J 
 
OBt.n.] OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. 311 
 
 disapprobation of falsehood, unprovoked violence, and 
 injustice, must be, that he foresaw this constitution of 
 our nature would produce more happiness, than forming 
 us with a temper of mere general benevolence. But 
 still, since this is our constitution; falsehood, violence, 
 injustice, must be vice in us, and benevolence to some, 
 preferably to others, virtue; abstracted from all consi- 
 deration of the overbalance of evil or good, which they 
 may appear likely to produce. 
 
 Now if human creatures are endued with such a moral 
 nature as we have been explaining, or with a moral 
 faculty, the natural object of which is actions: moral 
 government must consist in rendering them happy and 
 unhappy, in rewarding and punishing them, as they 
 follow, neglect, or depart from, the moral rule of action 
 interwoven in their nature, or suggested and enforced 
 by this moral faculty ;* in rewarding and punishing them 
 upon account of their so doing. 
 
 I am not sensible that I have, in this fifth observa- 
 tion, contradicted what any author designed to assert. 
 But some of great and distinguished merit, have, I think, 
 expressed themselves in a manner, which may occasion 
 some danger, to careless readers, of imagining the whole 
 of virtue to consist in singly aiming, according to the 
 best of their judgment, at promoting the happiness of 
 mankind in the present state ; and the whole of vice, in 
 doing what they foresee, or might foresee, is likely to 
 produce an overbalance of unhappiness in it : than which 
 mistakes, none can be conceived more terrible. For it 
 is certain, that some of the most shocking instances of 
 injustice, adultery, murder, perjury, and even of perse- 
 cution, may, in many supposable cases, not have the 
 appearance of being likely to produce an overbalance of 
 misery in the present state; perhaps sometimes may 
 have the contrary appearance. For this reflection might 
 easily be carried on, but I forbear.— The happiness of 
 the world is the concern of him who is the lord and the , 
 proprietor of it: nor do we know what we are about, 
 when we endeavour to promote the good of mankind in 
 any ways, but those which he has directed; that is 
 
 * p. 145. 
 
312 OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. [Dtss.U. 
 
 indeed in all ways not contrary to veracity and justice. 
 I speak thus upon supposition of persons really endea- 
 vouring, in some sort, to do good without regard to 
 these. But the truth seems to be, that such supposed 
 endeavours proceed, almost always, from ambition, the 
 spirit of party, or some indirect principle, concealed 
 perhaps in great measure from persons themselves. 
 And though it is our business and our duty to endea- 
 vour, within the bounds of veracity and justice, to con- 
 tribute to the ease, convenience, and even cheerfulness 
 and diversion of our fellow creatures: yet, from our 
 short views, it is greatly uncertain, whether this endea- 
 vour will, in particular instances, produce an overbalance 
 of happiness upon the whole; since so many and distant 
 things must come into the account. And that which 
 makes it our duty is, that there is some appearance that 
 it will, and no positive appearance sufficient to balance 
 this, on the contrary side ; and also, that such benevolent 
 endeavour is a cultivation of that most excellent of all 
 virtuous principles, the active principle of benevolence. 
 However, though veracity, as well as justice, is to be 
 our rule of life ; it must be added, otherwise a snare will 
 be laid in the way of. some plain men, that the use of 
 common forms of speech, generally understood, cannot be 
 falsehood; and, in general, that there can be no designed 
 falsehood without designing to deceive. It must like- 
 wise be observed, that in numberless cases, a man may 
 be under the strictest obligations to what he foresees 
 will deceive, without his intending it. For it is impos- 
 sible not to foresee, that the words and actions of men, 
 in different ranks and employments, and of different 
 educations, will perpetually be mistaken by each other: 
 and it cannot but be so, whilst they will judge with the 
 utmost carelessness, as they daily do, of what they are 
 not, perhaps, enough informed to be competent judges 
 of, even though they considered it with great attention. 
 
 END OF ANALOGY. 
 
THE 
 
 ANALOGY OF RELIGION 
 
 NATURAL AND REVEALED, 
 
 TO THE 
 
 CONSTITUTION AND COURSE OF NATURE. 
 
 CONSISTING OF 
 
 A CRITICIS 
 
 OF 
 
 BUTLER'S TREATISE ON THE SUBJECT, 
 
 TOGETHEH WITH 
 
 A VIEW OF THE CONNEXION OF THE ARGUMENTS OF THE 
 ANALOGY, WITH THE OTHER MAIN BRANCHES OF 
 THE EVIDENCES OF CHRISTIANITY, NOT 
 NOTICED IN BUTLER'S WORK. 
 
 B Y 
 
 DANIEL WILSON, D.D. 
 
 BISHOP OF CALCUTTA. 
 
 NEW-YORK: 
 
 ROBERT CARTER, 58 CANAL-STREET. 
 PITTSBURG: 56 MARKET-STREET. 
 
ANALOGY OF RELIGION, 
 
 NATURAL AND REVEALED. 
 
 SKETCH OF THE DESIGN OF BISHOP BUTLEr's ANALOGY. 
 
 Bishop Butler is one of those creative geniuses, 
 who give a character to their times. His great work, 
 *' The Analogy of Rehgion," has fixed the admiration 
 of all competent judges for nearly a century, and will 
 continue to be studied so long as the language in which 
 he wrote endures. The mind of a master pervades it. 
 The author chose a theme infinitely important, and he 
 has treated it with a skill, a force, a novelty and talent, 
 which have left little for others to do after him. He 
 opened the mine and exhausted it himself A discre- 
 tion which never oversteps the line of prudence, is in 
 him united with a penetration which nothing can es- 
 cape. There is in his writings a vastness of idea, a 
 reach and generalization of reasoning, a native simpli- 
 city and grandeur of thought, wiiich command and fill 
 the mind. At the same time, his illustrations are so 
 striking and familiar as to instruct as well as persuade. 
 Nothing is violent, nothing far-fetched, nothing pushed 
 beyond its fair limits, nothing fanciful or weak : a mas- 
 culine power of argument runs through the whole. All 
 bespeaks that repose of mind, that tranquillity which 
 springs from a superior understanding, and an intimate 
 acquaintance with every part of his subject. He grasps 
 firmly his topic, and insensibly communicates to his 
 reader the calmness and conviction which he possesses 
 
316 W I L S N ' S A N A L G Y . 
 
 himself. He embraces with equal ease the greatest 
 and the smallest points connected with his argument. 
 He olten throws out, as he goes along, some general 
 principle, which seems to cost him no labour, and yet 
 which opens a whole field of contemplation before the 
 view of the reader. 
 
 Butler was a philosopher, in the true sense of the 
 term. He searches for wisdom wdierever he can dis- 
 cern its traces. He puts forth the keenest sagacity 
 in his pursuit of his great object, and never turns aside 
 till he reaches, and seizes it. Patient, silent, unobtru- 
 sive investigation was his forte. His powers of inven- 
 tion were as fruitful as his judgment was sound. Pro- 
 bably no book in the compass of theology is so full of 
 the seeds of things, to use the expression of a kindred 
 genius, (Lord Bacon,) as the " Analogy." 
 
 He was a man raised up for the age in which he 
 lived. The wits and infidels of the reign of our Sec- 
 ond Charles, (Butler was born in the year 1692,) had 
 deluged the land with the most unfair, and yet plausi- 
 ble writings against Christianity. A certain fearless- 
 ness as to religion seemed to prevail. There was a 
 general decay of piety and zeal. Many persons treat- 
 ed Christianity as if it were an agreed point amongst 
 all people of discernment, that it had been found out 
 to be fictitious. The method taken by these enemies 
 of Christianity, w^as to magnify and urge objections 
 more or less plausible, against particular doctrines or 
 precepts, which were represented as forming a part of 
 it ; and which, to a thoughtless mind, were easily made 
 to appear extravagant, incredible, and irrational. They 
 professed to admit the Being and Attributes of the Al- 
 mighty ; but they maintained that human reason was 
 sufficient for the discovery and establishment of this 
 fundamental truth, as well as for the development of 
 those moral precepts, by which the conduct of life 
 should be regulated ; and they boldly asserted, that so 
 many objections and difficulties might be urged against 
 Christianity, as to exclude it from being admitted as 
 Divine, by any thoughtful and enlightened person. 
 
 These assertions Butler undertook to refute. He 
 
WILSON'S ANALOGY. 317 
 
 was a man formed for such a task. He knew tho- 
 roughly what he was about. He had a mind to weigh 
 objections, and to trace, detect, and silence cavils. 
 Accordingly, he came forward in all the self-possession, 
 and dignity, and meekness of truth, to meet the infidel 
 on his own ground. He takes the admission of the un- 
 believer, that God is the Creator and Ruler of the 
 natural world, as a principle conceded. From this 
 point he sets forward, and pursues a course of argument 
 so cautious, so solid, so forcible ; and yet so diversified, 
 so original, so convincing; as to carry along with him, 
 almost insensibly, those who have once put themselves 
 under his guidance. His insight into the constitution 
 and course of nature is almost intuitive ; and the appli- 
 cation of his knowledge is so surprisingly skilful and 
 forcible, as to silence or to satisfy every fair antagonist. 
 He traces out every objection with a deliberation which 
 nothing can disturb ; and shows the fallacies from 
 whence they spring, with a precision and acuteness 
 which overwhehn and charm the reader. 
 
 Accordingly, students of all descriptions have long 
 united in the praise of Butler. H5 is amongst the few 
 classic authors of the first rank in modern literature. 
 He takes his place with Bacon, and Pascal, and New- 
 ton, those mighty geniuses who opened new sources of 
 information on the most important subjects, and com- 
 manded the love and gratitude of mankind. If his 
 powers were not fully equal to those of these most ex- 
 traordinary men, they were only second to them. He 
 was in his own line, nearly what they were in the in- 
 ventions of science, and the adaptation of mathematics 
 to philosophy foimded on experiment. He was of like 
 powers of mind, of similar calm and penetrating saga- 
 city, of the same patience and perseverance in pursuit, 
 of kindred acuteness and precision in argument, of like 
 force and power in his conclusions. His objects were 
 as great, his mind as simple, his perception of truth as 
 distinct, his comprehension of intellect nearly as vast, 
 his aim as elevated, his success as surprising. 
 
 The "Analogy" was the work of Butler's life. As 
 early as the year 1713, when he was a student of Di- 
 
18 W I L S N ' S A N A L G Y 
 
 vinity at Tewkesbury, and only twenty-one years of 
 age, his powers of mind were already directed to this 
 and kindred subjects. The sagacity and depth of 
 thought displayed in his letters to Dr. S. Clarke, in 
 that year, attracted, though sent anonymously, the 
 Doctor's particular notice, and brought on a friendly 
 but most acute discussion, which has been annexed to 
 all the subsequent editions of Dr. Clarke's " Demon- 
 stration of the Being and Attributes of God." From 
 the year 1718, when he was appointed preacher at the 
 Roll's Chapel, to the year 1726, when he published his 
 Fifteen Sermons, the subject of the " Analogy " was 
 apparently uppermost in his mind. This volume con- 
 tained in fiict the germ of his great work. At length, 
 in the year 1736, when he had attained the age of forty- 
 five, the " Analogy " appeared as the result of his ma- 
 turest reflections during a series of theological studies of 
 between twenty and thirty years. In all his subsequent 
 writings, after his elevation to the Episcopal Bench in 
 1738, till his death in 1752, the like train of thought is 
 observable ; and even in the last of them his charge to 
 the clergy of the diocese of Durham, in 1751, the one 
 commanding subject which had occupied his life is still 
 pursued. Thus a long course of forty years was devo- 
 ted by this surprising man, with a depth of knowledge 
 and a strength of mind which were exactly suited to 
 so great a theme, to the illustration of the truth of 
 Christianity from the course and order of God's natural 
 providence. 
 
 The consequence is, nothing has ever been advanced 
 against his main argument. The infidel has never ven- 
 tured a reply.* It has long been in every one's hands, 
 
 * An atterrpt was made, fifteen years after his death, to fix the charge of su- 
 perstition on Bishop Butler. ]t was even insinuated that he died in the commu- 
 nion of the Church of Rome. These calumnies had no foundation. They were 
 refuted at the time by his friend, Archbisiio]) Seeker, to the satisfaction of every 
 one. And when the accusation and the reply to it were recorded in Butler's 
 Life, in the Bio^raphia Britannica, by Dr. Kippis, Bishop Halifax took occasion 
 to sift the matter again to the bottom, and published the result in his edition of 
 the " Analogy," in 1787. This set the question completely at rest. The deci- 
 ded opposition of Bishop Butler's sentiments to the errors and corruptions of the 
 Church of Rome, is indeed apparent in all his writings ; and it is now notv^'orth 
 while, in fact it would be obviously unjust, to enter into the details of so wretch- 
 ed a misrepresentation. This subject is very properly omitted altogether in the 
 Oxford University edition of 1807 : nor would it have been alluded to here, if 
 
WILSON'S ANALOGY. 319 
 
 and is one of the few works which go into the ele- 
 ments of every well-directed plan of education. 
 
 It has, however, been generally admitted, that his 
 argmnent, clear and convincing as it is to a prepared 
 mind, is not obvious in all its parts to the young reader, 
 whose experience of life being small, and his habits of 
 reflection feeble, has not always the furniture necessary 
 for comprehending at first the thoughts and conclusions 
 of such a mind. The difficulty is increased by a style 
 not always clear and accurate. His language, indeed, 
 interests and delights those who are accustomed to 
 his manner, and seems to have flowed from him without 
 art or contrivance. The familiar expressions and illus- 
 trations which continually occur, are not without their 
 charm. Even the colloquial turn of some of the phrases 
 sits w ell upon the author. Still, as a w hole, the style 
 is too close, too negligent, too obscure to be suitable for 
 the young. It is marked with that carelessness into 
 whicli many writers of the first-rate talents fall, when 
 intent only on their great theme, they pour out their 
 thoughts in the words which first present themselves. 
 More than one attempt has therefore been made to 
 aid the inexperienced reader, by short analysis of But- 
 ler's argument. That prefixed by Bishop Halifax to 
 his edition of 1787, is the most valuable as it is the 
 best known. In the following Essay a more detailed 
 review^, or summary of the work, is attempted, watli a 
 similar design : with what success must be left to the 
 judgment of the public. If it aids in forming some 
 idea of the general reasoning of the Work, it will ac- 
 complish all that was designed. It cannot, indeed; 
 for nothing can give a just impression of Butler, but 
 Butler himself It is not intended to supersede the 
 mighty master, whom it only introduces. 
 
 But besides the obscurity which is found in " The 
 Analogy" by the youthful student, it has been also re- 
 marked, that Bishop Butler's statements of Christianity 
 itself, from whatever cause, are somewhat restricted. 
 The impression is cold. The consolation and life of 
 
 the charge against Bishop Butler as well as its answer, had not been revived 
 since, ia an article of a widely-circulated work. La Biographie Universelle. 
 
320 WILSON'S ANALOGY. 
 
 it are absent. Whether this arises from the nature of 
 his argument, and the class of opponents whom he 
 addressed, or from the turn of the Bishop's mind to 
 retired and contemplative rather than vivid and popular 
 descriptions of truth ; or from somethingof the languor 
 so generally complained of in the Divinity of the era 
 when he wrote, it is not easy to say. Certain it is that 
 there seems some ground for the complaint. The full 
 and exuberant grace and consolation of Christianity in 
 its particular doctrines, and its application to the heart 
 and life, were not, indeed, the topics of our great 
 author ; but the references which frequently occur to 
 the scheme and end of revelation, would undoubtedly 
 have admitted of some observations on these important 
 points, which may now be thought wanting. Will we 
 be forgiven, if we suggest, in the proper place, what 
 we intend by this remark more at length ? The emi- 
 nent station which Butler holds, makes it natural that 
 we should offer without fear, after an interval of nearly 
 a century, such reflections as honestly occur to us. A 
 Classic may always be commented upon. 
 
 In the following pages, therefore, it will be our 
 design — 
 
 I. To state the general argument which Bishop Butler 
 pursues in the Analogy ; and to review the principal 
 steps of his reasoning. 
 
 II. To point out the connexion of the argument of 
 the Analogy, with the other main branches of the Evi- 
 dences of Christianity ; to notice its use and importance ; 
 and to offer some remarks on Butler's particular view 
 of Christianity itself, and on the adaptation of his argu- 
 ment to practical religion in all its extent. Each of 
 these divisions will necessarily draw us into some 
 length. 
 
 We begin with 
 
WILSON'S ANALOGY. 321 
 
 A STATEMENT OF THE GENERAL ARGUMENT OF THE 
 
 ANALOGY. 
 
 The chief design of this great work is to answer 
 objections raised against Rehgion, Natural and Re- 
 vealed, and to confirm the proof of it, by considering 
 the analogy or likeness which that system of religion 
 bears to the constitution and course of the world as 
 ruled by God's ordinary Providence. It compares the 
 known state and progress of things in the natural 
 world, with w hat religion teaches as to the moral world ; 
 the acknoAvledged dispensations of Providence, with 
 the appointments of religion ; that government of God 
 which we actually find ourselves under here, with that 
 government of God which religion binds us to believe 
 and expect hereafter. And it shows that these two 
 schemes are in many, very many respects alike, ^lat 
 they are both vast and incomprehensible as to their 
 whole compass and extent, but that still they may both 
 be traced up to the same general laws, and resolved 
 into the same principles of divine conduct. It takes 
 for granted that there is an Intelligent Governor of the 
 world, a supreme and perfect Author of nature ; anc| 
 then argues from that part of his works and dispensa- 
 tions which is known and acknowledged, to that part 
 which is denied or objected to ; from the world of 
 nature to the world of revelation ; from the confessed 
 order of Providence to the disputed appointments of 
 Grace ; from creation to Christianity. Its proper de- 
 sign is not to prove the truth of natural and revealed 
 religion by their direct evidences of miracles and pro- 
 phecies. The author of the Analogy takes other ground. 
 He supposes all these usual proofs to remain, and remain 
 in all their force ; and he attempts to confirm them in 
 the minds of considerate men, who may have been 
 staggered by objections and difficulties, by taking up 
 the objector on his own admission of the supreme rule 
 of the Almighty in the world, and showing him that his 
 21' 
 
322 WILSON'S ANALOGY, 
 
 objections have no real wei(]^ht, because they might be 
 
 raised against the works of God in his ordinary and 
 
 confessed government of the kingdom of natm'e, just as 
 
 plausibly as against the government of the same God in 
 
 the kingdom of religion. This is his line of argument. 
 
 He reasons from that part of the divine proceedings 
 
 which comes under our view in the daily business of 
 
 life, to that larger and more comprehensive part of 
 
 these proceedings which is beyond our view, and 
 
 which religion reveals. Thus he answers and silences 
 
 objections. God's ordering of the affairs of men by his 
 
 Providence is a fact known and admitted, and present 
 
 before our eyes. Now if it can be shown that God's 
 
 ordering the conduct of men by the laws and motives 
 
 of religion is analagous to this, and liable to no more 
 
 nor other objections, then we have a probable argument, 
 
 in the first instance, and independently of its direct 
 
 evidences, in favour of the truth of Christianity. Thus 
 
 objections are satisfactorily silenced if not removed. 
 
 Tligi acknowledgment of a perfect Creator and Ruler 
 
 of the Universe, connected with the fact that he does 
 
 such and such things, acts by such and such general 
 
 laws, brings about such and such effects, attaches 
 
 such and such consequences to men's actions, deals 
 
 with them in such and such a manner in the daily and 
 
 hourly appointments of his Providence, gives us data to 
 
 proceed upon in answering what is objected against the 
 
 supposed rule of the same God in religion. 
 
 If men, indeed, will indulge in vain and idle specu- 
 lations, and form imaginary models of an universe, and 
 lay down plans for ruling the world in a way which 
 they suppose better than it is at present, there can be 
 no arguing with them. They profess themselves to be 
 wiser than God. They take up with airy notions which 
 have no foundation in facts. Tliis is to deny the natu- 
 ral government of God, which was conceded by the 
 hypothesis. But if men will leave these presumptuous 
 conjectures, and come to facts — to the constitution of 
 nature, as it is actually made known to us by expe- 
 rience, and as confessedly framed by an all-wise and 
 gracious Governor, they will find a surprising analogy 
 
WILSON'S ANALOGY. 323 
 
 "between Nature and Religion ; they will find the pro- 
 bability weigh down strongly on the side of the truth 
 of Christianity, even prior to its direct proofs and evi- 
 dences ; they will fnid, that the system of Christianity 
 is loaded with no greater difficulties than the system 
 of nature is, and that it is no safer to spurn at the 
 scheme of religion, than to ridicule the constitution of 
 the same infinitely glorious God, in his temporal gov- 
 ernment of mankind. In short, our author shows, that 
 the dispensations of Providence, which w^e are under 
 now, as inhabitants of this lower world, and as having 
 a momentary interest to secure in it, are analogous to, 
 and, in fact, of a piece w ith, that further dispensation 
 wdiich relates to us as designed for another w^orld, in 
 which we have an eternal interest. The natural and 
 moral world are thus seen to be intimately connected 
 together, i^id to be parts of one stupendous whole, 
 wdiere our ignorance betrays us the instant we dare to 
 speculate and imagine things of ourselves, but where 
 common sense and common prudence lead us on se- 
 curely, if we are modest, and practical, and sincere. 
 And the chief objections Avhich are urged against reli- 
 gion, are thus shown to be false and frivolous ; because 
 they might have been equally urged before experience 
 had taught us, against the course and constitution of 
 nature, which ore admitted on all hands to have come 
 from the ever-blessed God. If, therefore, they are in- 
 conclusive when raised against the external and obvi- 
 ous, and, as it were, tangible order of things around 
 us, much more are they inconclusive, when raised against 
 the moral, and invisible, and mysterious order of things 
 which Christianity reveals. 
 
 It is true, this whole argument from analogy is only 
 a probable one. It does not amount to demonstration. 
 But then, it is a probable argimient of the highest kind, 
 and fiir stronger than those by which men are every 
 day guided in their most important concerns. There 
 are very few things indeed for which we have, or can 
 have, demonstrative evidence. For such feeble crea- 
 tures as we are, probability is the guide of life. Every 
 thing turns upon it. Even a single, slight, prcsumptioii 
 
324 WILSON'S ANALOGY. 
 
 may not l)e witlioiit its weight; but presumptions, how- 
 ever shght in tliemsclves, if frequently repeated, often 
 amount to a moral certainty. Thus, if we accidentally 
 observe for one day the ebb and flow of the tide, the 
 observation affords only some sort of presumption, and 
 that perhaps the lowest imaginable, that the same may 
 happen again to-morrow ; but the observation of this 
 event for so many days, and months, and ages together, 
 as it has been observed by men in all places and coun- 
 tries, gives us a full assurance that it w ill happen to- 
 morrow. No man in his senses thinks otherAvise. 
 Thus, also, no one doubts but that the sun w ill rise to- 
 morrow, and will be seen, if seen at all, in the figure 
 of a circle, and not in that of a square. So again, we 
 conclude that there is no kind of presumption that 
 there will not be frost in England any given day in 
 January next ; that it is probable that there wall on 
 some day of that month, and that there % almost a 
 moral certainty of it in some part or other of the win- 
 ter. In like manner, when we observe in human af- 
 fairs generally, that any thing does regularly come to 
 pass, we infer that other things which are like to it, or 
 have analogy w ith it, will also come to pass. Human 
 concerns are all carried on by this natural process of 
 reasoning. And yet we have no demonstrative evi- 
 dence in any such cases. Thus we believe that a child, 
 if it lives twenty years, will grow up to the strength 
 and stature of a man ; that food will contribute to the 
 preservation of its life ; and the want of food for a cer- 
 tain number of days be its certain destruction. It is 
 thus men go on continually. They judge and act by 
 what is probable, and never dream of asking for further 
 evidence. The rule of their hopes and fears, of their 
 calculations of success in their pursuits, of their expec- 
 tations how others will act in such circumstances, and 
 of their judgment that such actions proceed from such 
 principles, all these rest on the argument from analogy, 
 that is, on their having observed before the like things 
 with respect to themselves or others. Especially, if 
 any great scheme of things is laid before men claiming 
 to be the plan of such and such a person, and demand- 
 
WILSON'S ANALOGY. 325 
 
 ing certain efforts and duties, they compare this scheme 
 with the acknowledged productions of that person, and 
 judge by analogy whether it is his or not. They com- 
 pare the part of this person's designs which is known 
 and familiar to them, with the new scheme at present 
 unknown, in order to form a probable opinion. If, on 
 consideration, they can trace the same mind in both plans, 
 the same ends, the same sort of means, the same gen- 
 eral laws, the same benevolence and wisdom, the same 
 vastness of comprehension, the same apparent perplex- 
 ity working the same good results, the same moral 
 characteristics and features, and, above all, a depend- 
 ence and connexion between the two ; they conclude 
 that they both proceed from the same author. And if 
 objections should be raised against the new and un- 
 known scheme, which, on calm inquiry, seem to lie 
 equally against the scheme already known and acknow- 
 ledged to come from the same hand, these objections 
 have no weight with them, that is, they are answered by 
 the analogy or likeness which the one constitution and 
 scheme bears to the other. Persons w ho doubt of the 
 force of a probable argument in religion, should con- 
 sider in this way what evidence that is upon which 
 they act every day with regard to their temporal inte- 
 rests. They act in the daily course of life upon evi- 
 dence much lower than what is called probable. In 
 questions of the greatest consequence, a reasonable man 
 marks the lowest probabilities, such as amount to no 
 more than showing that one side of a question is as 
 supposable and credible as the other. And any one 
 would be thought mad who did not do so, in many 
 cases. Men not only guard against what they fully be- 
 lieve will happen, but also against what they think it 
 possible may happen ; they often engage in pursuits 
 when the probability is greatly against success ; they 
 make such provision for themselves as it is supposable 
 that they may have occasion for, though the plain ac- 
 knowledged probability is, that they never will have 
 such occasion. 
 
 Indeed it is a real imperfection in the moral charac- 
 ter, not to be influenced in practice by any degree of 
 
326 
 
 WILSON'S ANALOGY. 
 
 evidence, even the lowest, Avlien it is discovered. Men 
 are under a formal and absolute oblie^ation to act in 
 practical matters on tlie side of the least preponderating 
 probabihty. As when we weigh two things in a pair of 
 true scales, the smallest inclination of the beam enables 
 us to see which is the heavier, and binds us to act on 
 the fact that it is so : so, in matters of practice, the 
 smallest degree of weight on one side more than 
 another, enables us to see what is our duty and binds 
 us to act accordingly. 
 
 If, then, the analogy of nature only showed us that 
 there was the lowest presumption of the truth of reli- 
 gion notwithstanding difficulties, men would be formally 
 and absolutely bound to believe and obey it. But if 
 this analogy shows that there is not merely a low pre- 
 sumption, but the highest probability of its truth, and 
 that the very objections to it rest on such matters as 
 are apparently inconclusive, when applied to that sys- 
 tem of things in Providence which is acknowledged to 
 come from an All-wise and Almighty Creator ; nay more, 
 that these very objections may, for anything we know, 
 be really benefits, yea, most important instances, upon 
 the whole, of the Divine goodness, the duty of the 
 obedience to it becomes still more imperative. And 
 when it is considered that, besides this argument from 
 analogy silencing our scruples, the numerous direct 
 evidences of Christianity remain what they were before, 
 unanswered and unanswerable, the obligation to receive 
 the Christian doctrine becomes, in fact, the first and 
 paramount duty of a reasonable and accountable crea- 
 ture ; and the rashness and guilt of rejecting it becomes 
 criminal and absurd, in a degree wliicli no words can 
 express. 
 
 This, then, is the general design of Bishop Butler. 
 He undertakes to show, that men cannot reject Chris- 
 tianity on the footing of objections, without acting 
 against tliose rules of probability by wliicli they have 
 been guided all their lives in all their most important 
 concerns, and by which they are guided continually, 
 and must be guided, however they may act with re- 
 gard to Christianity. Thus our author leaves the un- 
 
WILSON'S ANALOGY. 327 
 
 believer without excuse — condemned by his own 
 conduct on all like occasions — condemned by the 
 universal experience of mankind — and acting in the 
 most important of all subjects in an opposite manner to 
 what common sense and common prudence compel 
 him to do every day of his life, on the most momentous, 
 as well as the slightest occasions. Such is the scope 
 of this celebrated Treatise. If we have dwelt longer 
 than might seem necessary in explaining it, let it be re- 
 membered, that it is the key to all that follows. 
 
328 WILSON'S ANALOGY 
 
 ANALYSIS OF BISHOP BUTLER's ARGUMENT. 
 
 After this sketch of the design of the Analogy, let us 
 now proceed to give an idea, so far as we may be 
 
 ABLE, OF THE SEVERAL STEPS OF OUR AUTHOR's ARGU- 
 MENT. Wc say, so far as w^e may be able ; for it is no 
 easy task to compress and simplify a series of close and 
 profound reasoning. However, some assistance may 
 be given. The reader's patience is requested. Such 
 an author demands and rewards the utmost attention, 
 and cannot be understood without it. 
 
 The whole Treatise is divided into two parts. In 
 the First, the author shows, that the things principally 
 objected against natural religion, are analogous to what 
 is experienced in the course of nature, and, therefore, 
 inconclusive. In the Second, he shows the same as to 
 Christianity or Revealed Religion. In the First Part, 
 he considers, as we shall presently see more at length, 
 by a separate review of each topic, that natural religion 
 teaches, 1. That mankind is to live hereafter in a future 
 state. 2. That there every one shall be rewarded or 
 punished. 3. That these rewards and punishments 
 will be according to men's good or evil behaviour here. 
 4. That our present life is a probation or trial. 5. That 
 it is a state of moral discipline for a future life. 6. That 
 the notion of necessity forms no valid objection against 
 these truths ; and, 7. That as this plan of religion is but 
 very partially made known to us in this world, no ob- 
 jections against its wisdom and goodness are of any 
 real weight. These points we shall consider in seven 
 separate chapters. 
 
 From this view of natural religion, we shall proceed 
 with Butler in the Second Part of his work, to weigh, 
 1. The importance of Christianity ; 2. The objections 
 raised against it, on the ground of its being miraculous; 
 and, 3. Our incapacity of judging what was to be ex- 
 pected in a revelation, and the credibility that it would 
 
WILSON'S ANALOGY. 329 
 
 contain things apparently open to objections. 4. We 
 shall next have to consider, Christianity as a scheme 
 imperfectly comprehended ; then, 5. The particular 
 system itself of Christianity, the appointment of a Medi- 
 ator, and the redemption of the world by him ; and, 6. 
 The want of univ ersality in revelation, and the supposed 
 deficiency in the proof of it. After this, we shall have 
 to notice, 7. The objections against the particular evi- 
 dence for Christianity; and lastly, 8. The objections 
 which may be made generally against thus arguing 
 from the analogy of nature to religion. These will be 
 the heads of eight chapters. The following review will 
 accordingly contain seven chapters in the first division 
 of it, and eight in the second. 
 
 The author begins his Treatise (Part I. Chap. 1.) 
 with that which is the foundation of all our hopes and 
 all our fears ; all our hopes and fears which are of any 
 consideration — a Future Life. He takes for granted \ 
 that there is an Intelligent Author of Nature, whose/ 
 moral will and character is just and good in the very 
 highest degree. This Author of Nature, formed the 
 universe as it is, and carries on the course of it as he 
 does, rather than in any other manner. Men, as rational 
 creatures, cannot but reflect on the mysterious scheme 
 of things in the midst of which they find themselves ; 
 and cannot but inquire whence they came and whither 
 they are going, and what will be the end or issue of 
 the system in which they are placed. Now it will ap- 
 pear, in the first place, from considering the analogy of 
 nature, that there is nothing improbable in what religion 
 teaches, that we are to exist in another life after death. 
 There is, indeed, a confused suspicion, that in the great 
 shock of the unknown event, death, our living powers ' 
 will be destroyed. The sensible proof of our being 
 possessed of these powers is removed. Death is terri- 
 ble to us. Nature shrinks from it. Yet, when we 
 come calmly to consider these apprehensions, we shall 
 find them to be groundless. 
 
 1. For it is clearly a general law of nature, that the [• 
 same creatures should exist here in very different de- 
 grees of life and perception. We see instances of this 
 
oo 
 
 WILSON'SANALOGY. 
 
 law in the surprising change of worms into flies, and in 
 birds and insects bursting their sliell, and entering into 
 a new world furnished with new accommodations for 
 them. The states also in which we ourselves formerly 
 existed in the womb, and in the years of infancy, are 
 widely diiferent from the state of mature age. Nothing 
 can be imagined more different. Therefore, that we 
 are to exist hereafter in a state as dift'erent from our 
 present, as this is from our former one, is only according 
 to the analogy of nature. 
 
 2. There is a probability, in every case, that all 
 things will continue as we now find them, in all re- 
 spects, except those in which we have some positive 
 reason to think they will be altered. This is a general 
 law. Nature goes on as it is. This seems our only 
 reason for believing that the course of the world will 
 continue to-morrow, as it is to-day, and as it has done, 
 so far as experience and history can carry us back. If 
 then our living powers do not continue after death, 
 there must be some positive reason for this, either m 
 death if self, or in the analogy of nature. 
 
 But there is no positive reason in death itself, for we 
 know not what it is ; we only know some of its effects, 
 such as the dissolution of flesh, skin, and bones; 
 and these effects in nowise appear to imply the destruc- 
 tion of the living agent. Sleep, or a swoon, shows us 
 that the living powers may exist when there is no 
 present capacity of exercising them. In fact we know 
 not upon what the existence of our living powers 
 depends. 
 
 Nor does the analogy of nature furnish any positive 
 reason to think that death is our destruction. For we 
 have no faculties wherewith to trace any thing beyond, 
 or through death, to see what becomes of those pow- 
 ers. Men were possessed of these powers up to the 
 period to which we have faculties for tracing them ; it 
 is probable, therefore, that they retain them afterwards. 
 
 3. For our gross bodies are not ourselves, and there- 
 fore the destruction of them may be no destruction of 
 ourselves. We see that men may lose their limbs, 
 their organs of sense, and even the greatest part of 
 
WILSON'S ANALOGY. 331 
 
 their bodies, and yet remain the same Uving agents as 
 before. Our organized bodies are merely large quan- 
 tities of matter which may be alienated, and actually 
 are in a daily course of succession and change, whilst 
 we remain the same living permanent beings notwith- 
 stancting. As, therefore, we have already several times ' 
 
 over lost a great part of our body, or perhaps the whole 
 of it, according to certain common established laws of 
 nature ; so when we shall lose as great a part, or the 
 whole, by another common established law of nature, 
 death, why may we not also remain the same ? That 
 the alienation has been gradual in one case, and will 
 be more at once in the other, proves nothing to the 
 contrary. ^ 
 
 4. But, more particularly, our bodies are clearly only 
 
 organs and instruments of perception and motion. Our V i 
 
 use of common optical instruments shows that we see ^^ 
 
 with our eyes in the same sense, and in no other, as i ^ 
 
 we see with glasses. These glasses, which are no |r 
 
 part of our body, convey objects towards the perceiv- fv'vh' k^ 
 ing power, just as our bodily organs do. And if we • '). r^ 
 see with our eyes only in this manner, the like may be ,^y 
 concluded as to all our other senses. So with regard ' 
 to the power of moving : upon the destruction of a 
 limb, the active power remains ; and we can walk by 
 the help of an artificial leg, just as we can make use 
 of a pole to reach things beyond the length of the na- 
 tural arm. We may therefore have no more relation 
 to our external bodily organs, than we have to a mi- 
 croscope or a staff, or any other foreign matter, which 
 we use as instruments of perception or motion ; and 
 the dissolution of these organs by death may be no 
 destruction of the living agent. 
 
 5. But farther, our powers of reflection do not, even 
 now, depend on our gross body in the same manner 
 as perception by the organs of sense does. In our 
 present condition, the organs of sense are indeed ne- 
 cessary for conveying in ideas to our reflecting powers, 
 as carriages, and levers, and scaffolds are in architec- 
 ture ; but when these ideas are once brought in, and 
 stored up in the mind, w^e are capable of pleasure and 
 
332 WILSON'S ANALOGY. 
 
 pain by reflection, without any further assistance from 
 our senses. Mortal diseases often do not at all affect 
 our intellectual powers, nor even suspend them. We 
 see persons under those diseases, the moment before 
 death, discover apprehension, memory, reason, a^l en- 
 tire — the utmost force of affection, and the highest 
 mental enjoyments and sufferings ; why then should a 
 disease, when come to a certain degree, be thought to 
 destroy those powers, which do not depend on the 
 bodily senses, and which were not affected by that 
 disease quite up to that degree ? 
 
 6. Nay, our future existence may probably be not 
 the beginning, properly speaking, of any thing new, but 
 only the continuance, the going on of our present life as 
 intelligent agents. Death may only answer to our 
 birth, which is not a suspension of the faculties we 
 had before, nor a total change of the state of life in 
 which we existed when in the womb, but a continu- 
 ance of both, with such and such great alterations. 
 And our present relation to our bodily organs may be 
 the only natural hinderance to our existing hereafter in 
 a higher state of being and reflection. 
 
 7. But even if death suspends our living powers, 
 which does not appear, yet a sleep or a swoon may 
 teach us that the suspension of a power and the de- 
 struction of it, are effects totally different 
 
 8. On the whole, the analogy of nature makes it 
 probable, that as Ave are conscious that we are now 
 living agents, so we shall go on to be such, notwith- 
 standing the event of death, which, it is likely, may 
 only serve to bring us into new scenes, and a new 
 state of life and action, just as naturally as we came 
 into the present. This will appear most probable, if 
 we would only leave off the delusive cvistom of sub- 
 stituting imagination in the room of experience, and 
 would confine ourselves to what we really know and 
 understand. 
 
 Chapter II. A future state being once granted, an 
 unbounded prospect is opened to our hopes and fears. 
 The expectation of immortality is not a matter of in- 
 
WILSON'S ANALOGY. 333 
 
 difference, but a subject of the deepest importance. 
 For the whole analogy of nature shows tiiat there is 
 nothing incredible in the supposition that God will re- 
 ward and punish men hereafter for their actions here. 
 And it is infinitely unreasonable in men to act upon 
 any other supposition. 
 
 1. For in the present life, we see that pleasure and 
 pain are the consequences of our actions, and that we 
 are endued with capacities of foreseeing these conse- 
 quences, and acting accordingly. This is the constitu- 
 tion of the Author of Nature. By prudence and care 
 we may pass our days in tolerable quiet ; by rashness, 
 passion, wilfulness, or even by negligence, (which is very 
 observable) we may make ourselves as miserable as 
 we please. This is the general course of things. God's 
 method as the Governor of the universe, is clearly 
 to forewarn us of such and such things, and to give us 
 capacities of foreseeing, that if we act so and so, we 
 shall have such and such enjoyments and sufferings. 
 
 2. It is then a simple matter of fact, that we are 
 under the dominion of God here, just as we are under 
 the dominion and rule of civil magistrates; because 
 the annexing pleasure to some actions, and pain to 
 others, and the giving notice of this beforehand, is the 
 proper formal notion of government. We are thus 
 compelled to admit, that the Author of Nature acts 
 here as a Master or Governor: there can, therefore, be 
 nothing incredible in the general doctrine of religion, 
 that God will act thus hereafter — that is, will reward 
 and punish men for their behaviour. 
 
 3. But as divine punishment is what men chiefly 
 object against, and are most unwilling to allow, it is 
 important to observe, not merely that there is a great 
 deal of misery, in the world, but that there is a great 
 deal, which men bring upon themselves, and which 
 they might have foreseen and avoided. Now the 
 circumstances of these natural punishments are such 
 as these. — They are often the consequences of actions 
 which procure many present advantages, and bring 
 much present pleasure. Again, they are often much 
 greater than the advantages or pleasures of the actions 
 
334 WILSON'S ANALOGY. 
 
 which they follow. They are frequently delayed a 
 great while ; sometnnes till long after the actions 
 occasioning them are forgot. They then come, after 
 such delay, not by degrees, but suddenly, with 
 violence, and at once. They are often not thought of 
 during the actions themselves : yet still they inevitably 
 follow. Thus habits formed in youth are utter ruin for 
 life ; though, for the most part, this consequence is 
 little thought of at the time. 
 
 4. We observe further, that the natural course of 
 things gives us opportunities, which, like the seed-time, 
 cannot be recalled if we once neglect them ; and that, 
 in many cases, real repentance and reformation are of 
 no avail to remedy or prevent the miseries naturally 
 annexed to previous folly ; that neglects from mere 
 inconsiderateness and want of attention, are often as 
 fatal as from any active misconduct ; and that many 
 natural punishments are mortal, and seem inflicted 
 either to remove the offender out of the way of being 
 further mischievous, or as an example to others. 
 
 5. Now these things are not accidental, but are 
 matters of every day's experience, proceeding from 
 general laws by which God obviously is governing 
 the world ; and they are so analogous to what religion 
 teaches us concerning the future punishment of the 
 wicked, that both may be expressed in the very same 
 words. 
 
 6. Especially we see, that after men's neglecting 
 repeated warnings, and many checks, in a course of 
 vice — after these have been Ions: scorned — and after 
 the worst consequences of their follies have been 
 delayed for a great while ; at length their punishment 
 breaks in upon them irresistibly, like an armed force ; 
 repentance is too late to relieve their misery — the case 
 is desperate ; and poverty and sickness, remorse and 
 anguish, infamy and death, overwhelm them, as the 
 effects of their own behaviour, beyond the possibility 
 of remedy or escape. 
 
 7. Not that men are thus uniformly punished here in 
 proportion to their vices, but they often are : very many 
 such cases occur, and dreadful ones too — cases quite 
 
WILSON'S ANALOGY. 335 
 
 sufficient to show what the laws of the universe may 
 admit, and to answer all objections against future pun- 
 ishments, from the vain idea, that the frailty of nature, 
 and the force of temptations (as men sometimes speak) 
 almost annihilate the guilt of human vices. 
 
 8. Thus, on the whole, the particular final causes of 
 pleasure and pain distributed by Almighty God here, 
 prove that we are under his government, in the same 
 way as subjects are under the rule of civil magistrates. 
 And future rewards and punishments are but an ap- 
 pointment, analogous of the same sort with what we 
 thus actually experience in this world, in the regular- 
 course of universal Providence. 
 
 Chap. III. But further; this natural government 
 of God, under which we now find ourselves, is a 
 moral or righteous government. It is not merely a 
 government by rewards and punishments, like that 
 which a master exercises over his servants, which in 
 human affairs is often exercised tyrannically and par- 
 tially, but one which renders to men according to their 
 actions, considered as morally good or evil. This is 
 the next step in removing objections against natural 
 religion. • 
 
 Men have no ground whatever to assert that God is 
 simply and absolutely benevolent — this indeed may be 
 so upon the whole — but he clearly manifests himself 
 unto us as a righteous Governor. This government, 
 indeed, so far as it is seen here, and taken alone, is not 
 complete and perfect ; but still a righteous government 
 is carried on here, quite sufficiently to give us the ap- 
 prehension that it shall be completed in a future life. 
 We see now the clear beginnings, the rudiments of a 
 moral government, notwithstanding all the confusion 
 and disorder of the world. This is enoucfh to answer 
 all objections against the future judgment, which reli- 
 gion teaches us to expect. 
 
 1. For as God is our Governor, no rule of his govern- 
 ment appears to creatures endued with a moral nature 
 as we are, so natural, so unavoidable, considering his 
 infinite perfections, as that of distributive justice. The 
 
336 WILSON'S ANALOGY. 
 
 expectation then of this is not in itself absurd or chi- 
 merical. 
 
 2. Next, as God has endued us with capacities of 
 foreseeini]^ the good and bad consequences of our beha- 
 viour, and rewards and punishes prudence and impru- 
 dence respectively, this plainly implies some sort of 
 moral government. Tranquillity and. satisfaction follow 
 a prudent management of our affairs ; and rashness and 
 negligence bring after them many sufferings. These 
 are instances of a right constitution of things here ; just 
 as the correction of children, when they run into dan- 
 ger, or hurt themselves, is a part of right education. 
 
 3. Again, the Author of Nature has so appointed 
 things, that vicious actions, as falsehood, injustice, cru- 
 elty, &c., must be punished, and are punished as mis- 
 chievous to society. He has put mankind under a 
 necessity of thus punishing them, just as he has put 
 them under a necessity of preserving their lives by 
 food. Thus men are, in some respects, unavoidably 
 under a moral government here, they are punished or 
 rewarded as being mischievous or beneficial to society. 
 
 4. Again, we are so formed that virtue, as such, 
 gives us satisfaction, at least in some instances ; vice, 
 as such, and on its own account, in none. This is a 
 proof not only of government, but of moral government, 
 begun and established — moral in the strictest sense, 
 though not in that perfection of degree, which religion 
 teaches us to expect. The sense of well and ill doing, 
 the presages of conscience, the love which men have to 
 good characters, and the dislike of bad ones; honour, 
 shame, gratitude ; vexation and remorse, arising from 
 reflection on an action done by us, as being wrong ; 
 disturbance and fear, from a sense of being blamewor- 
 thy : and, on the other hand, inward security and 
 peace, complacency and joy of heart, accompanying the 
 exercise of friendship, compassion, benevolence ; — all 
 this shows that we are placed here in a condition, in 
 which our moral nature operates in favouring virtue 
 and punishing vice. Vice cannot at all be, and virtue 
 cannot but be, favoured on some occasions, and for its 
 own sake, by ourselves and others. The one cannot 
 
WILSON'S ANALOGY. ^ 337 
 
 but be miserable ; the other cannot but be happy in 
 itself, in some degree. And though the wicked are at 
 times prosperous, in some respects and externally, and 
 the righteous afflicted, this cannot, and does not, drown 
 the voice of Providence, plainly declaring, in the course 
 of things, for virtue upon the whole. For it is clear 
 that these disorders are brought about by the perver- 
 sion of passions, which were implanted in us for other, 
 and those very good purposes. 
 
 5. Once more, there is, in the natural course of 
 things, a tendency in virtue and vice to produce their 
 good and bad effects in a greater degree than they do 
 in fact produce them. This is a very considerable 
 thing. Good and bad men would be much more 
 rewarded and punished here as such, were not justice 
 eluded by various artifices, were not characters un- 
 known, were not many other hinderances presented by 
 accidental causes. But these hinderances may be 
 removed in a future state, and virtue enjoy its proper 
 and full reward. In the mean time, these tendencies 
 are declarations of God in his natural Providence in 
 favour of virtue. To judge better of the tendency of 
 virtue to produce happiness, let any one consider what 
 a nation would become, if all its citizens were perfectly 
 virtuous ; and that for a succession of ages. Wars 
 would be unknown ; passions w ould be restrained ; 
 crimes, factions, envy, jealousy, injustice would be ban- 
 ished ; laws and j^unishments would be unnecessary ; 
 all would contribute to the public prosperity, and each 
 would enjoy the fruits of his own virtue. United 
 wisdom would plan every thing, and united strength 
 execute it. Such a kingdom would be like heaven upon 
 earth. If any think the tendency of virtue to produce 
 these results to be of little importance, I ask him what 
 he would think if vice had essentially these advanta- 
 geous tendencies. 
 
 6. The notion, then, of a moral righteous govern- 
 ment is suggested by the course of nature, and the 
 execution of it is, as we have seen, actually begun ; and 
 there is ground to believe that virtue and vice may be 
 rewarded and punished hereafter in a higher degree 
 
 22 
 
338 WILSON'S ANALOGY, 
 
 # 
 
 than they are here, because the tendencies, to tlie per- 
 fection of this moral scheme are natural ; whilst the 
 hinderances are only accidental. 
 
 Chap. IV. If this be so — if there be this moral 
 government, then it implies, in the next place, that our 
 present life is a state of probation ; that our future in- 
 terest is appointed to depend on our behaviour, just in 
 the same manner as our temporal interest is appointed 
 to depend on our behaviour. And this state of proba- 
 tion implies, in both cases, difficulty in securing our 
 happiness, and the danger of losing it. 
 
 1. For w^e are clearly at present in a state of trial as; 
 to this world, under God's natural government. So far 
 
 lis men are tempted to any course of action, which will 
 probably occasion them greater inconvenience than 
 satisfaction, they are in a state of trial as to their tem- 
 poral interests, and those interests are in danger from 
 themselves. Now, from the course of things around us, 
 we have innumerable temptations to forfeit and neglect 
 these temporal interests, and to run ourselves into . 
 misery and ruin : thence arises the difficulty of behav- 
 ing so as to secure our temporal interests, and the 
 hazard of behaving so as to miscarry in them. And 
 outward temptations, concurring, as they always do,-,^ 
 with inward habits and passions, as really put men in 
 danger of voluntarily foregoing their temporal interests, 
 as their future ones, and as really render self-denial 
 necessary to secure one as the other : so analogous are 
 our states of trial in our temporal and religious capaci- 
 ties. 
 
 2. Again, as to both states we see that some menv 
 scarcely look beyond the passing day, so much are they 
 taken up with present gratifications ; that others are 
 carried away by passions against their better judg- 
 ment, and their feeble resolutions of acting better ; 
 and that some even avow pleasure to be their rule of / 
 life, and go on in vice, foreseemg that it will be their 
 temporal ruin, and apprehending at times that it may 
 possibly be their future ruin also. Thus the dangers 
 in both states produce the same effects, as they pro- 
 
WILSON'S ANALOGY. 339 
 
 ceed from the same causes ; that is, they are analogous 
 and ahke. 
 
 3. Further, in both states our dangers are increased 
 by the ill behaviour of others, by wrong education, bad 
 example, corruption of religion, mistaken notions con- 
 cerning happiness. 
 
 4. Again, in both, men by negligence and folly bring 
 themselves into new difficulties, no less than by a 
 course of vice ; and by habits of indulgence become 
 less qualified to meet them. For instance, wrong 
 behaviour in youth increases the difficulty of right 
 behaviour in mature age ; that is, puts us in a more 
 disadvantageous state of trial. 
 
 5. In both, also, we are in a condition which does 
 not seem the most advantageous for securing our true 
 interests. There are natural appearances of our being 
 in a state of degradation. Yet we have no ground of 
 complaint; for as meS may manage their temporal 
 affairs by prudence, so as to pass their days in toler- 
 able ease ; so with respect to religion, no more is 
 required than we must be greatly wanting to ourselves 
 if we neglect. 
 
 6. Once more, as thought, and self-denial, and things 
 far from agreeable, are absolutely necessary for secur- 
 ing our temporal interests, all presumption against the 
 same being necessary for securing our higher interests 
 is removed. ^ 
 
 7. Had we not experience as our guide, we might, 
 indeed, in speculation, urge it to be possible that any 
 thing of hazard should be put upon us by an Infinite 
 Being, since every thing which is hazardous in our 
 conception, is noAV already certain in his foreknowledge.. 
 And indeed this may well be thought a difficulty in 
 speculation, and cannot but be so, till we know the 
 whole, or however much more of the case. And if 
 mankind, as inhabitants of this world, really found 
 themselves always in a settled state of security, with- 
 out any solicitude on their part, and in no danger of 
 falling into distresses and miseries, by carelessness or 
 passion, by bad example, or the deceitful appearances 
 of things, — then it would be some presumption against 
 
340 WILSON'S ANALOGY. 
 
 religion, that it represents us in a state of trial and dan- 
 ger as to our future happiness. But now the whole 
 course of nature shows us that we are in a state of ex- 
 treme hazard as to our temporal interests. And this 
 constitution of things is settled by Almighty God as our 
 natural Governor. It is as it is. This is quite clear. 
 And this is sufficient to answer all objections against 
 the credibility of our being in a state of trial and diffi- 
 culty, under the moral government of the same God, 
 as to our future and eternal interests. 
 
 Chapter V. If we go on to ask, how we came to be 
 placed in a probationary state of so much difficulty and 
 hazard, we have already said that we can give no com- 
 plete answer. Possibly it would be beyond our facul- 
 ties, not only to find out, but even to understand the 
 whole reason; and even if we liad faculties, whether 
 it w ould be of service or prejudice to us to be informed 
 of it, it is impossible to say. Still another question 
 may be naturally put, to which a satisfactory reply may 
 be given. If it be asked. What is our main duty here, 
 as placed in this state of trial and difficulty ? analogy 
 w ill help us to answer, Forjnoral discipline, as pyepar- 
 atory to a future state of security and happiness. The 
 beginning of life in the present world, considered as 
 an education for mature age, appears plainly, at first 
 sight, analogous to this trial for a fu||kre one. 
 
 1. For our nature here corresponos to our external 
 condition, and what we call happiness is the result of 
 this nature and this condition. Now as there are some 
 determinate character and qualifications necessary to 
 men's enjoyment of the present life; so analogy leads 
 us to conclude, that there must be some determinate 
 character and qualifications to rendei^Tien capable of 
 the future life of the good hereafter. The one is set 
 over against the other. 
 
 2. In the next place, we see that the constitution 
 and faculties of men are such, that they are capable of 
 naturally becoming qualified for states of life, for which 
 they were at first wholly unqualified. The human 
 faculties are made for gradual enlargement; habit 
 
WILSON'S ANALOGY 341 
 
 gives us new faculties in any kind of action, and pro- 
 duces secret, but settled and fixed alterations in our 
 temper and character. As habits of the body are pro- 
 duced by repeated acts, so habits of the mind are 
 produced by carrying into act inward principles; such 
 as obedience, submission to authority, veracity, justice, 
 charity, attention, industry, self-government. Habit 
 forms men to these virtues ; just as habit forms the 
 archer to skill, the porter to strength of arm, the racer 
 to swiftness, the artizan in every kind of manufacture, 
 to adroitness and precision. Such is the constitution of 
 our nature. By accustoming ourselves to any course 
 of action, we get an aptness to go on m it: the incli- 
 nations which made us averse to it grow weaker; the 
 real difficulties of it lessen; the reasons for it offer 
 themselves of course ; and thus a new character may 
 be formed, not given us by nature, but which nature 
 directs us to acquire. 
 
 3. These capacities of improvement are most impor- 
 tant. Man is left, considered in his relation to this 
 world only, an unformed, weak, unfinished creature, 
 wholly unqualified for the mature state of life to which 
 he is designed. He needs the acquisitions of know-\ 
 ledge, experience, and habits, in order at all to attain^ 
 the ends of his creation. And he is placed, in child- 
 hood and youth, in a condition fitted for supplying his 
 deficiencies. Children from their birth are daily learn- 
 ing something necessary for them in the future scenes 
 of their duty. The first years of life are a course of 
 education for the practice of adult age. We are much 
 assisted in it by example, instruction, and the care of \ 
 others, but a great deal is left to ourselves to do ; and>^ 
 diligence, care, the voluntary foregoing many things 
 which we desire, and the setting ourselves to many 
 things to which we have no inclination, are absolutely 
 necessary to our doing this. All this is clear. We see 
 it every day. In like manner, then, our being placed 
 in a state of moral discipline throughout this life, as a 
 state of education for another world, is a plain provi- 
 dential order of things, exactly of the same kind, and 
 
342 WILSON'S ANALOGY. 
 
 comprehended under one and the same general law of 
 nature. 
 
 4. Nor would it be any objection against this view of 
 things if we were not able to discern in what way the 
 present life could be a preparation for another ; for we 
 actually do not discern how food and sleep bring about 
 the growth of the body ; nor do children at all think 
 that their sports contribute to their health, nor that 
 restraint and discipline are so necessary, as we know 
 they are, to fit them for the business of mature age. 
 
 5. But we are, in fact, able to discern how the pre- 
 sent life is fit to be a state of discipline for another. If 
 we consider that God's government of us is a moral 
 one, and that consequently piety and virtue are neces- 
 sary qualifications for a future state, then we may dis- 
 tinctly see that the present course of things is adapted 
 to improve us in virtue, and prejmre us for a future 
 world, just as childhood is a natural state of discipline, 
 and a necessary preparation for mature age. Now 
 how greatly we want moral improvement by disci- 
 pline is clear, from the great wickedness of the world, 
 and the imperfections of the best men. Tliis every 
 one sees. 
 
 6. But all do not see that mankind, not merely as 
 corrupt, but as finite creatures, need the habits of 
 virtue, which discipline goes to form, to keep them 
 from deviating from what is right. Men, from the very 
 constitution of their nature, before habits of virtue are 
 formed, are in danger. For the natural objects of the 
 affections, continue to be such, whether they can be 
 obtained innocently or not; and such affections have a 
 tendency to incUne us to venture upon unlawful means 
 of obtaining them. The practical principle of virtue is 
 then the security against this danger; and this princi- 
 ple is strengthened by discipline and exercise ; and 
 thus guards against the danger arising from the very 
 nature of particular affections. 
 
 7. If such finite creatures as men, endued with par- 
 ticular affections and moral understanding, had all these 
 several parts upright or finitely perfect, they would 
 still be in danger of falling, and would require expert- 
 
WILSON'S ANALOGY. 343 
 
 ence and habits to improve them, and place them in a 
 secure state. As these habits strengthen, their dan- 
 gers woukl lessen, and their security increase. For 
 virtuous self-government is not only right in itself, but 
 improves the inward constitution and character; just as 
 vicious indulgence is not only criminal in itself, but 
 also weakens and depraves the inw^ard constitution and 
 character. And thus we may conceive how creatures 
 without blemish may be in danger of going wrong, and 
 may need the additional security of virtuous habits. 
 
 8. But how much more strongly must this hold with 
 respect to those who have corrupted their natures. 
 Upright creatures may want to be improved ; depraved 
 creatures want to be renewed. Discipline is expe- 
 dient for the upright ; but absolutely necessary for the 
 depraved — and discipline of the severer sort too. 
 
 9. Now the present world is peculiarly fitted to be 
 a state of discipline for this purpose. Temptation, 
 experience of the deceits of wickedness, our past faults, 
 the vice and disorder of the world — pain, sorrow, 
 disappointment, vexation — all have a tendency to bring 
 us to that moderation of temper w hich is contrary to 
 the violent bent to follow present inclination, which 
 may be observed in undisciplined minds. Such ex- ^ 
 perience gives a practical sense of things. And, 
 possibly, the security of creatures in the highest state 
 of perfection may, in part, arise from their having had 
 such a sense of things as this habitually fixed within 
 them, in a state of probation. Their having passed 
 through the present world Avith that moral attention 
 wdiich a state of discipline requires, may leave ever- 
 lasting impressions of this sort upon their minds. Now 
 when the exercise of the virtuous principle is con- 
 tinued, often repeated and intense, as it must be in 
 circumstances of danger and temptation, the habit of 
 virtue is proportionably increased. Thus the present 
 world is peculiarly fit to be a state of discipline, in the 
 same sense as some sciences, by requiring and engaging 
 the attention, not, to be sure, of such persons as will 
 not, but of such as w ill, set themselves to them ; are 
 
 fit to form the mind to habits of attention. 
 
344 WILSON'S ANALOGY. 
 
 10. Accordingly we find tliere are some persons who 
 follow an inward principle of piety, and to whom the 
 present world is an exercise of virtue peculiarly adapted 
 to improve it — adapted to improve it, in some respects, 
 even beyond what it would be by the exercise of it in 
 a perfectly virtuous society. 
 
 11. That the present world does not actually become 
 a state of moral discipline to the generality, is no proof 
 that it was not intended to be so ; for out of the immense 
 number of seeds of vegetables, and bodies of animals 
 which are adapted to improve to such and such a point 
 of maturity and perfection, we do not see that perhaps 
 one in a thousand does thus improve; yet no one will 
 deny that those seeds and bodies which do so attain 
 to that point of maturity, answer the end for which 
 they were designed by nature, and therefore that 
 nature designed them for that perfection. And such 
 an amazing waste in nature, with respect to these 
 seeds and bodies, by foreign causes, is, to us as unac- 
 countable as, what is much more terrible, the present 
 and future ruin of so many moral agents by themselves, 
 that is, by vice. 
 
 12. Further, these observations on the active prin- 
 ciple of obedience to God, ai'e applicable to passive 
 obedience to his will, or resignation, which is another 
 essential part of a right character. For though we may 
 have no need of patience in a future state, yet we may 
 have need of that temper, which patience has formed ; 
 and the })roper discipline for patience and resignation 
 is affliction. This resignation, together with the active 
 principle of obedience, makes up the temper which 
 answers to God's sovereignty, to his rightful authority, 
 as supreme over all. 
 
 13. It cannot be objected to all this, that the trouble 
 and danger of this discipline might have been spared us 
 by our being made at once the characters which we 
 w^ere to become ; for we see by experience that what 
 we are to become is to depend on what we will do ; 
 andftliartht g^llCTal lliw^of llSlcirff is, not to save us 
 trouble or danger, but to make us capable, of going 
 through it. 
 
WILSON'S ANALOGY. 345 
 
 14. The world, further, is a state of probation, is 
 a theatre of action for the manifestation of persons' 
 characters, as a means of their being disposed of 
 suitably to those characters, and of its being known 
 to the creation by way of example that they are so 
 disposed of 
 
 15. It thus appears clearly, on the whole, that our 
 present state of difficulty and trial is intended to be a 
 school of discipline for acquiring the qualifications 
 necessary for a future state of safety and happiness. 
 
 Chap. VI. Nor does the opinion of necessity weaken 
 the credibility of the general doctrine of religion thus 
 confirmed by Analogy. For if any persons consider 
 the notion of universal necessity or fate to be recon- 
 cileable with the acknowledged condition of men 
 as under God's natural government now, (and to such 
 persons only does this whole treatise address itself) 
 they must also consider it to be reconcileable with the 
 scheme of religion. 
 
 1. For necessity clearly does not exclude delibe- 
 ration, choice, and the acting from certain principles to 
 certain ends, as to the things of this present w orld ; 
 because all this is matter of undoubted experience. 
 For if the instance of a house be taken, the Fatalist as 
 w^ell as others, would agree that it was designed and 
 built by an architect ; and they would only differ upon 
 the question, whether the architect built it in the 
 manner, which we call necessarily, or in the manner 
 which we call freely. The idea of necessity does not, 
 then, at all destroy the proof that there is an intelligent 
 Author and Governor of nature, any more than that the 
 house was built by an architect. 
 
 2. Nor does necessity destroy at all the scheme of 
 religion. For as to the things of this world, suppose a 
 Fatalist to bring up a child in the idea that he is not a 
 subject of blame or praise for his actions, because he 
 cannot help doing what he does. The child would be 
 vain and conceited, and go on following his will and 
 passions till he became first the plague of himself and 
 family, and then insupportable to society ; and thus he 
 
346 WILSON'S ANALOGY. 
 
 would soon do something, for which he would be 
 delivered over into the hands of justice. In this way 
 the correction he would meet with, and the misery 
 consequent upon it, would soon convince him, that 
 either the scheme of necessity, in which he was edu- 
 cated was false, or that he reasoned inconclusively 
 upon it, and somehow or other misapplied it to practice 
 and common life. In like manner, what the Fatalist 
 experiences of the conduct of Providence at present, 
 ought in all reason to convince him, that either his 
 scheme of necessity is false, or that somehow or other 
 it is misapplied, when brought to practical duty and 
 religion in common life. Under the present natural 
 government of the world, we are obviously dealt with 
 as if we were free ; and therefore the analogy of nature 
 answers all objections to our being dealt with as free, 
 with regard to another world. Thus the notion of 
 necessity, whether true or not in speculation, is not 
 applicable to practical subjects. With respect to them 
 it is as if it were not true. 
 
 3. Again, we find, by constant experience, that 
 happiness and misery are not necessary here, in such 
 a sense as not to be the consequences of our behaviour, 
 for they are the clear consequences of it ; and God 
 exercises over us the same kind of government in this 
 world, as a father does over his children, and a civil 
 magistrate over his subjects. These are matters of fact, 
 things of experience, which cannot be affected by the 
 opinion about necessity. In like manner, God's moral 
 government over men, as taught by religion, cannot be 
 affected by that opinion. 
 
 4. Besides, natural religion has an external evidence, 
 a positive foundation in facts and data, which the mere 
 opinion of necessity cannot affect. 
 
 5. And, if men should say that. Necessity being 
 true, it is incredible that God should govern us upon a 
 supposition of freedom which is false : the plain answer 
 is, that there must be a fallacy somewhere in this 
 conclusion, for the whole analogy of nature proves that 
 God does govern us by rewards and punishments as 
 free agents. And the fallacy lies, supposing necessity 
 
WILSON'S ANALOGY. 347 
 
 to be true, in taking it for granted that necessary agents 
 cannot be rewarded and punished for their behaviour. 
 6. Thus, the notion of necessity, supposing it can be 
 reconciled with the constitution of things, and what we 
 experience under God's rule here, is equally and 
 entirely reconcileable with the scheme of religion also. 
 
 Chap. VII. Still objections may be insisted upon 
 against the wisdom, equity, and goodness of the divine 
 government implied in the notion of religion, to which 
 analogy (which can only show that such and such 
 tilings are credible, considered as matters of fact,) can 
 give no direct answer. But if analogy suggests that 
 the divine government is a scheme or system, as dis- 
 tinguished from a number of unconnected acts of 
 justice and goodness, and a scheme imperfectly com- 
 prehended, then this gives a general, though indirect 
 answer to all objections against the justice and goodness 
 of that government. 
 
 1. Now in this present world and the whole natural 
 government of it, there is obviously a scheme or system 
 carried on, whose parts correspond to each other -, so 
 that there is no natural event so single and unconnected 
 as not to have respect to some other actions or events : 
 just as any work of art, or any particular civil con- 
 stitution of government, is a scheme, and has various 
 correspondent parts. Nor can we give the whole 
 account of any one thing whatever in nature — of all 
 its causes, ends, and necessary adjuncts, without which 
 it could not have been. Things seemingly the most 
 insignificant imaginable, are perpetually discovered to 
 be necessary conditions of other things of the greatest 
 importance. 
 
 2. The natural world, then, being such an incompre- 
 hensible scheme, so incomprehensible that a man must 
 really, in the literal sense, know nothing at all, who is 
 not sensible of his ignorance of it ; this strongly shows 
 the credibility that the moral world may be so too. 
 Indeed the natural and moral world are so connected, 
 as probably to make up together but one scheme ; and 
 thus the first may be carried on in subserviency to the 
 
348 WILSON'S ANALOGY. 
 
 second; as the vegetable world is for the animal, and 
 the animal for the rational. 
 
 3. In this way every act of Divine justice and good- 
 ness may look much beyond itself, and may have some 
 reference to a general moral system; yea, may have 
 such respect to all other acts, as to make up altogether 
 a whole, connected and related in all its parts, which 
 is as properly one as the natural world is. And if so, 
 then it is most clear that we are not at all competent 
 judges of this vast scheme, from the small parts of it, 
 which come within our view in the present life, and 
 that objections against any of these parts are utterly 
 unreasonable. Yet this ignorance, which is univer- 
 sally acknowledged on other like occasions, is, if not 
 denied, yet universally forgotten on the subject of reli- 
 gion where it is most strikingly applicable. Even 
 reasonable men do not make allowance enough for it. 
 And this ignorance answers all objections against 
 religion; because if religion be a scheme incompre- 
 hensible to us, some unknown relation, or some un- 
 known impossibility, may render the very things 
 objected to, just and good; nay^ just and good in the 
 highest practicable degree. 
 
 4. But more particularly, we see in the natural 
 world, that as no ends are accomplished without means, 
 so means very undesirable are found to bring about 
 ends so desirable as to overbalance much the previous 
 disagreeableness — means which, before experience, we 
 should have thought to have a contrary tendency. 
 Thus, in the moral world, things which we call irregu- 
 larities may not be so, but may be means of accom- 
 plishing wise and good ends more considerable than 
 the apparent irregularities : yea, the only means by 
 which those ends are capable of being accomplished. 
 
 5. This, however, is no argument to show that it is 
 not infinitely obligatory on us, and beneficial to abstain 
 from what is evil. For thus, in the wise and good con- 
 stitution of the natural world, there are disorders, which 
 bring their own cures; yea, some diseases, which are 
 remedies. As many men would undoubtedly have 
 died had it not been for the gout or a fever ; yet it 
 
WILSON'S ANALOGY. 349 
 
 would be thought madness to say that sickness is a 
 better state than health ; though men have asserted the 
 like absurdity to this, with regard to the moral world 
 and moral evil. 
 
 6. Again, the natural world is carried on by general 
 laws, and not by particular interpositions to prevent or 
 remedy irregularities, as the moral world may also be; 
 and in both there may be the wisest reasons for this 
 scheme, for any thing we know. Perpetual interposi- 
 iion would, for instance, clearly encourage indolence, 
 and render the rule of life dubious, which is now 
 ascertained by this very thing, that the course of the 
 world is carried on by general laws. And if this be 
 the case, then the not interposing on every particular 
 occasion, is so far from being a ground of complaint, 
 that it is an instance of goodness. This is intelligible 
 and sufficient; and going farther seems beyond the 
 utmost reach of our faculties. It is to go on quite at 
 random and in the dark. 
 
 7. Thus our ignorance answers all objections against 
 the scheme of religion, as we have shown ; because it 
 is not a total ignorance, as some have said, of the whole 
 subject, which would preclude equally all proof and all 
 objection, but a partial ignorance, which allows us to 
 u.nderstand that the end of the scheme is moral, but 
 does not allow us to comprehend what means are best 
 to accomplish this end. Therefore, our ignorance is an 
 answer to objections against Providence in permitting 
 irregularities, as seeming contradictory to this end. 
 Analogy shows that it is not at all incredible, that if 
 we could know the wliole, we should find the things 
 objected to consistent with justice and goodness, yea, 
 instances of it. Thus we do not argue from our igno- 
 rance properly speaking, but from something which 
 analogy shows us concerning that ignorance. For 
 analogy positively shows us that our ignorance of the 
 various relations of things in nature, makes us incom- 
 petent judges in cases similar to this of religion, in 
 which we pretend to judge. 
 
 8. Finally, we are thus led to consider this little 
 scene of human life in which we are so busy, as having 
 
350 WILSON'S ANALOGY. 
 
 a reference to a much larger plan of things. Whether 
 we are related to the more distant parts of the bound- 
 less universe, is altogether uncertain. But it is evident 
 that we are placed in the middle of a progressive 
 scheme, incomprehensible with respect to what has 
 been, what now is, and what shall be hereafter. Thus 
 all short-sighted objections against God's moral govern- 
 ment are answered ; and it is absurd — absurd to the 
 degree of being ridiculous, if the subject were not of 
 so serious a kind, for men to lay any stress on these 
 objections, and think themselves secure in a vicious 
 life, or even in that immoral thoughtlessness into which 
 far the greatest part of men are fallen. 
 
 PART II.— Chap. I. The chief difficulties against 
 natural religion, as implying a moral government, and a 
 state of trial and discipline preparatory for a future 
 world, being removed, we proceed to consider Chris- 
 tianity, and the objections raised against it. And we 
 begin by showing the vast importance of Christianity 
 itself 
 
 1. To say that mankind do not want a revelation, is 
 as extravagant as it would be to say, that they are so 
 completely at ease and happy in the present life, that 
 their condition could not be made better. Those who 
 consider the state of reliofion in the heathen world 
 before revelation, and the present state of it where reve- 
 lation is unknown, cannot in seriousness think revela- 
 tion incredible, upon pretence of its being unnecessary. 
 
 2. But many admit Christianity to be true, but object 
 to the importance of it, on the ground, that to act on 
 the principles of natural religion is enough, as Chris- 
 tianity is only designed to enforce the practice of 
 virtue. This is to suppose that it is a matter of indif- 
 ference whether we obey God's commands or not, of 
 which there may be infinite reasons with which we are 
 not acquainted. 
 
 3. But the high importance of Christianity will 
 appear, if we consider, 1st, That it is a republication of 
 natural religion, teaching it in its genuine purity, 
 investing it with the additional evidence and authority 
 
WILSON'S ANALOGY. 351 
 
 arising from miracles and prophecy, affording a proof of 
 God's general providence as Governor of the world, 
 with a degree of force to which that of nature is but 
 mere feebleness, erecting a visible church, as a stand- 
 ing memorial to the world of its duty to its Maker, 
 giving men the written oracles of God, which cast the 
 light of revelation on the darkness of nature, as to the 
 most important subjects ; and establishing a regular 
 education of youth in the principles and habits of piety. 
 
 4. If men object to this, that Christianity has been 
 perverted, and has had but little good influence, we 
 answer, that the law of nature has been perverted and 
 rendered ineffectual in the same manner ; and yet this 
 is allowed to be from God. And it may be truly said, 
 that the good effects of Christianity have not been 
 small ; nor its supposed ill effects, any effects at all of 
 it, properly speaking. Perhaps too, the perversions 
 themselves imputed to it have been aggravated ; and if 
 not, Christianity has often been only a pretence; and 
 the same evils would have been done, in the main, upon 
 some other pretence. However, they are no argu- 
 ments against Christianity. For one cannot proceed a 
 step in reasoning upon natural religion, any more than 
 upon Christianity, without laying it down as a first prin- 
 ciple, that the dispensations of Providence are not to be 
 judged of by their perversions, but by their genuine 
 tendencies : not from what they actually effect, but 
 from what they would effect, if mankind did their part. 
 
 5. Thus Christianity is most important, and the guilt 
 of neglecting it is great, only considered as a superna- 
 tural aid to decayed natural religion, and a new pro- 
 mulgation of God's general providence, as righteous 
 Governor of the world. Especially as this neglect 
 further involves in it the omitting to do what is 
 expressly enjoined us by God, for continuing the bene- 
 fits of it to the world, and transmitting them down to 
 future times. 
 
 6. But, 2dly, Christianity contains besides, an ac- 
 count of a dispensation of things not at all discoverable 
 by reason ; a dispensation carrying on by the Son of 
 God and the Holy Spirit for the recovery of man, whom 
 
352 WILSON'S ANALOGY. 
 
 the Scriptures every where take for granted to be in a 
 state of ruin. In consequence of this, many obliga- 
 tions of duty, unknown before, are revealed ; and these 
 obligations of duty to the Son and Spirit, arise from the 
 offices which belong to these Divine Persons, and from 
 the relations in which they stand to us; and are infi- 
 nitely important. For these reasons, we are com- 
 manded to be baptized in the name of the Father, and 
 of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. By natural reli- 
 gion we know the relation in which God the Father 
 stands to us ; and hence arises the bond of duty which 
 we are under to Him. In Scripture are revealed the 
 relations in which the Son and Spirit stand to us ; and 
 hence arise the bonds of duty which we are under to 
 them. It being once admitted that God is the Gover- 
 nor of the world upon the .evidence of reason, and that 
 Christ is the mediator between God and man, and the 
 Holy Ghost our guide and sanctifier, upon the evidence 
 of revelation, it is no more a question whether it be 
 our duty to obey, and be baptized into the name of the 
 Son, and of the Holy Ghost, than whether it be our 
 duty to obey, and be baptized into the name of the 
 Father. 
 
 7. The essence of natural religion may be said to 
 consist in religious regards to God the Father ; and the 
 essence of revealed religion, in religious regards to the 
 Son and Holy Ghost, to whom reverence, honour, love, 
 trust, gratitude, fear, hope, are due, from the several 
 relations in which they stand to us. Thus Christianity 
 appears most important. It informs us of something 
 wholly new- in the state of the world and in the gov- 
 ernment of it, of some relations in which we stand, 
 which could not otherwise have been known. And 
 these relations being real, the neglect of behaving suita- 
 bly to them will be followed with the same kind of con- 
 sequences under God's government, as neglecting to 
 behave suitably to any other relations. If Christ, then, 
 be our Mediator, our Lord, and our Saviour, the conse- 
 quences not only of an obstinate, but of a careless dis- 
 regard to him in those high relations, may follow in a 
 future world, as surely in a way of judicial punishment, 
 
WILSON'S ANALOGY. 353 
 
 and even of the natural consequences of vice, as those 
 kinds of consequences follow vice in this w^orld. 
 
 8. Again, if the nature of man is corrupt, and needs 
 the assistance of God's Holy Spirit to renew it, it can- 
 not be a slight matter to neglect the means appointed 
 of God for obtaining this assistance. All analogy 
 shows us, that we cannot expect benefits without the 
 use of the commanded means — every thing in God's 
 government being conducted by means. 
 
 9. The conclusion from all this is, that Christianity 
 being supposed credible, it is unspeakable irreverence, 
 and really the most presumptuous rashness to treat it 
 as a light matter, and unimportant. 
 
 10. Before we go on to the next topic, we may stop 
 here to point out the distinction between what is posi- 
 tive and what is moral in religion. Moral precepts are 
 those of which we see the reason — positive, of which 
 we do not : moral arise out of the nature of the case — 
 positive from external command. But the mere man- 
 ner in which the reason of the precept, and the nature 
 of the case are made known to us, makes no diiference 
 in our duty. Gratitude and love are as much due to 
 Christ as moral precepts, as they are due to the 
 Father; though the first are derived from revelation 
 making Christ known to us as our Mediator; the 
 second, from reason teaching us that the Father is our 
 Creator, and the Fountain of all good. 
 
 11. From this distinction between positive and moral 
 precepts, we may observe, that we see the ground of 
 that preference which the Scripture gives to moral pre- 
 cepts over positive, if the two are incompatible. We 
 are to prefer the moral, because we see the reason of 
 them, and because the positive are only means to a 
 moral end, and are of no value, except as proceeding 
 from a moral principle. Men are prone to place their 
 religion in positive rites, as an equivalent for moral 
 duty; and, therefore, the Scriptures always lay the 
 stress on morals, ^ where they are mentioned, together 
 with positive rites; and our Lord expresses the general 
 spirit of religion when he says, * I will have mercy, and 
 not sacrifice.' 
 
 23 
 
354 WILSON'S ANALOGY. 
 
 Still ue are not to omit positive institutions; because, 
 when admitted to come from God, they lay us under 
 a strict moral obi i ration to obey them. 
 
 12. To these remarks should be added, that the 
 view we have thus given of Christianity, teaches us, 
 not to determine beforehand from reason what the 
 scheme of it must be, but to search the Scriptures for it ; 
 for it is no presumption against an interpretation of 
 Scripture, that it contains a doctrine which the light of 
 nature cannot discover, or a precept to which the law 
 of nature does not oblige. 
 
 13. All these considerations serve to heighten the 
 importance of Christianity, as not consisting of positive 
 commands merely, but as revealing new duties resting 
 on new relations, and being in the strictest sense moraL 
 
 Chap. II. The importance of Christianity having 
 been thus shown, let us next inquire what presumptions 
 or objections there appear to be against revelation in 
 general, or at least against miracles, as if they required 
 stronger evidence than other matters of fact do. 
 
 These presumptions must arise either from Chris- 
 tianity not being discoverable by reason and experience, 
 or because it is unlike the course of nature as it now is. 
 
 1. But there is no presumption against it, because 
 not discoverable by reason ; for suppose any one to be 
 acquainted with what is called the system of natural 
 philosophy and natural religion, he would feel that he 
 knew but a small part of them, and that there must be 
 iniuuBerable things of which he was wholly ignorant. 
 The scheme of nature is vast beyond all possible 
 imagination, and what we know of it is but as a point 
 in comparison of the whole. Therefore, that things lie 
 beyond the reach of our faculties in Christianity, is no 
 sort of presumption against it, because it is certain 
 there are innumerable things in nature which do so. 
 
 2. Nor is there any presumption against Christianity, 
 from the present course of nature, for analogy by no 
 means leads us to suppose, that the whole course of 
 things unknown to us, and every thing in it,, is like to 
 any thing in that course of things which is known. 
 
WILSON'S ANALOGY. 355 
 
 Even in the natural course of the world, we see things 
 extremely unlike one another. But the truth is, the 
 scheme ol' Christianity is not wholly unlike the scheme 
 of nature, as we shall show hereafter. 
 
 3. Nor is there any presumption from analogy against 
 some operations wliich we should call miraculous, 
 particularly none against a revelation at the beginning 
 of the world ; for then there had been no course of 
 nature, and therefore the question of a revelation, at 
 that time, is only a common question of fact. Creation 
 was wholly different from the present course of nature ; 
 and whether this power stopped after forming man, or 
 went on and gave him a revelation, is a question of 
 simple fact. 
 
 4. Nor is there any presumption against miracles, 
 after the settlement of the course of nature. For we 
 have no single parallel case of a world Hke our own, 
 to deduce an argument from ; and if we had a case, 
 an argument from the analogy of that single instance 
 would have little weight. We require the history of 
 many similar worlds from which to raise any thing like 
 a presumption. 
 
 5. Besides, we know there is often a presumption 
 against the commonest facts before the proof of them, 
 which yet almost any proof overcomes. And we are in 
 such ignorance, that it is not improbable, that five or six 
 thousand years may have given scope for adequate 
 causes for miracles, even leaving out the consideration 
 of religion. But if we take in the consideration of 
 religion, we then see distinct reasons for miracles, 
 which give a real credibility to them. At all events, 
 miracles must not be compared to common natural 
 circumstances and phenomena, but to the extraor- 
 dinary phenomena of nature, — comets, the powers of 
 electricity, &c. And let any one reflect what would 
 be the presumption, for instance, against the powers 
 of electricity, in the mind of one acquainted only with 
 the common powers of nature. 
 
 6. There is, therefore, no such presumption against 
 miracles as to render them, in any wise incredible ; 
 nay, there is a positive credibility for them, where we 
 
WILSON'S ANALOGY. 356 
 
 discern reasons for them ; and there is no presumption 
 at all from analogy, even in the lowest degree, against 
 them, as distinguished from other extraordinary phe- 
 nomena. 
 
 Chap. III. We come now to consider objections 
 against the Christian revelation in particular, as distinct 
 from objections against miracles — objections drawn 
 from things in it, appearing to men "foolishness;" from 
 its containing matters of ofl'ence, leading, as it is 
 alleged, to enthusiasm, superstition, and tyranny; from 
 its not being universal ; and from its evidence not 
 being so convincing as it might have been. 
 
 1. Now it is credible from analogy that we should be 
 incompetent judges of a revelation to a great degree, 
 and that it would contain many things appearing to us 
 liable to objection. There is no more ground to 
 expect that Christianity should appear free from objec- 
 tions, than that the course of nature should. And the 
 fact is, that men fall into infmite follies and mistakes, 
 when they pretend to judge of the ordinary constitu- 
 tion and course of nature, and of what they should 
 expect it to be. It is therefore probable that men 
 would err much more when they pretend to judge of 
 the extraordinary constitution and scheme of Chris- 
 tianity, and of what they should expect it to be. For 
 if a man, in the things of this present world, is not a 
 competent judge of the ordinary goveniment of a 
 Prince ; much less Avould he be so of any extraordinary 
 exigencies on which that Prince should suspend his 
 known and ordinary laws. Thus objections against 
 Christianity are really frivolous. If men fancy there 
 lie great objections against the scheme of Providence 
 in the ordinary and old laws of nature, much more may 
 they fancy there lie objections against the scheme of 
 Christianity in the extraordinary, and new laws of reli- 
 gion. Both schemes are from the same God. And 
 the objections against Christianity go upon supposi- 
 tions which, when applied to the course of nature, 
 experience shows to be inconclusive. They mislead us 
 to think that the Author of nature would not act, as we 
 
WILSON'S ANALOGY. 357 
 
 find by experience he actually does, or would act in 
 such and such a manner, as we experience, in like 
 cases, he does not. 
 
 2. For instance, we are no sort of judges before- 
 hand, by what laws, in what degree, or by what means 
 it were to have been expected that God would instruct 
 us naturally in his ordinary Providence ; how far he 
 would enable men to communicate it to others ; 
 whether the evidence of it w^ould be certain, highly 
 probable, or doubtful ; whether it would be given with 
 equal clearness to all; whether at once, or gradually. 
 In like manner, supposing God afforded us an addi- 
 tional instruction by a revelation, we must be equally 
 ignorant beforehand whether the evidence of it would 
 be certain, whether all would have the same degree of 
 evidence, whether it would be revealed at once or 
 gradually, &c. 
 
 Now if we are incompetent to judge beforehand of 
 revelation, it is mere folly to object afterwards against 
 its being left in one way rather than another. 
 
 3. The only fair question is, whether Christianity be 
 a real revelation, and whether the book containing it 
 be of divine authority; and scarcely at all whether it 
 be a revelation, and a book of such and such a sort. 
 So that, what men object against the Scriptures as 
 being obscure, as written in an inaccurate style, as 
 having various readings, and being the subject of dis- 
 pute, has no sort of force, unless it can be shown that 
 the sacred authors had promised that the book should 
 be secure from these things. We are no judges 
 whether it were to have been expected that these 
 things should be found in it or not. In human writings 
 we should indeed be judges, but not at all in divine. 
 
 4. However, if men will pretend still to judge of the 
 Scriptures, and of. Christianity, by previous expecta- 
 tion, then the analogy of nature shows, that probably 
 they will imagine they have strong objections against 
 them. For so, prior to experience, they would think 
 they had against the instruction afforded in the ordi- 
 nary course of nature. For instance, it would have 
 been thought incredible that men should have been so 
 
358 W I L S N ' S A N A L G Y. 
 
 much more capable of discovering, even to a certainty, 
 the general laAvs of matter, and the magnitudes and 
 revolutions of the heavenly bodies, than tlie cure of 
 diseases, and many other things in which human life is 
 so much more nearly concerned. The method of 
 invention again, by which men discover things of the 
 greatest moment in an instant, when perhaps they are 
 thinking of something else, which they have in vain 
 been searching after for years, would be thought most 
 n'regular and capricious. So likewise the imperfec- 
 tions attending the only method we have of communi- 
 cating our tlioughts to each other, language, would be 
 judged utterly incredible. It is inadequate, ambiguous, 
 liable to infinite abuse. Now no objections against the 
 manner in which Christianity teaches in the Scriptures, 
 are of greater weight than these, which analogy shows 
 us to have really no force at all. 
 
 5. To apply these remarks to a particular instance. 
 The abuse of miraculous powers is made an objection 
 against their being really miracles ; but we see in the 
 natural course of things daily, that remarkable gifts of 
 memory, eloquence, knowledge, are not always conferred 
 on persons Avho use them with prudence and propriety. 
 
 6. Again, as in natural and civil knowledge, there 
 are common and obvious rules of conduct, and parts 
 requiring very exact thought ; so, in Christianity the 
 necessary matters of laith and practice are a plain and 
 obvious thing ; whilst many other parts demand careful 
 investigation. And as natural knowledge is acquired 
 by particular persons comparing and pursuing obscure 
 hints dropped us by nature, as it were, accidentally, or 
 which seem to come into our minds by chance ; so 
 probably the entire scheme of Christianity in the 
 Scriptures will only be gradually understood, by par- 
 ticular pei-sons attending to intimations scattered up 
 and down in it, and which most persons disregard. 
 Nor is it incredible that a book so long known should 
 contain many truths not yet conq^letely discovered ; 
 for nature has been open to the investigation of man 
 for 7nany thousand yeai's, and yet great discoveries are 
 continually made. 
 
WILSON'S ANALOGY. 359 
 
 7. And if men object against Christianity, that it is 
 not universally known, we reply, that many most 
 valuable remedies for natural diseases were unknown 
 for ages, and are known now but to few ; that proba- 
 bly many are -not known yet; that the application 
 of them, when known, is difficult ; that if used amiss, 
 they often create new diseases ; that they are often 
 not effectual ; and that the regimen required is often 
 so disagreeable that men will not submit to it, but 
 satisfy themselves with the excuse, that if they did 
 submit, it is not certain they should be cured. These 
 natural remedies are neither certain, perfect, nor uni- 
 versal ; and the principles of arguing which would lead 
 us to conclude they must be so, would not only be 
 contrary to fact, but would also lead us to conclude 
 that there would be no diseases at all. It is therefore 
 not at all incredible that the like things should be found 
 in the remedy for moral diseases, Christianity, if it 
 proceeds from the same divine hand as natural reme- 
 dies do. 
 
 Chap. IV. The objections against Christianity are 
 thus merely what we might have expected. But 
 further, these objections receive a full answer from the 
 consideration that Christianity is a scheme imperfectly 
 comprehended, in which a system of means is estab- 
 lished, and which is carried on by general laws ; just as 
 objections against natural religion were shown to be thus 
 silenced. For this shows that the things objected to 
 may, in each case, not only be consistent with wisdom 
 and goodness, but instances of them. 
 
 1- Now Christianity is a scheme quite beyond our 
 comprehension. It is a mysterious economy, still car- 
 rying on for the recovery of the world by a divine 
 person, the Messiali, who, after various preparatory 
 dispensations, became incarnate, and died as a Sacrifice 
 for sin. Parts likewise of this scheme are the miracu- 
 lous and ordinary mission of the Holy Ghost, Christ's 
 invisible government over his church, and his second 
 advent to judgment. Now the Scriptures assert this 
 to be a mystery ; indeed, what is revealed of it, leaves 
 
360 WILSON'S ANALOGY. 
 
 SO much unrevealed, that one cannot read a passag^e 
 but wluit it runs up into something which shows us our 
 ignorance about it ; so that to ail pui'[3(>ses of objecting, 
 we know as little of it, as we know of the vast scheme 
 of the natural world, where every step shows us our 
 ignorance, short-sightedness, and incompetence to 
 judge. 
 
 2. In the Christian scheme, again, as in the course of 
 nature, means which appear foolish, though they may 
 possibly be the very best, are used to accomplish ends ; 
 and their appearing foolish is no presumption against 
 them, in a scheme so greatly beyond our comprehension. 
 
 3. Christianity is also probably carried on by general 
 laws. The course of nature is confessedly so; and 
 yet we know but little of these general laws. We 
 know not by what laws, storms, famine, pestilence, &c., 
 destroy mankind ; nor wdiy men are born in such places 
 and times, and with such talents ; nor how it is that 
 such and such trains of thought enter the mind. We 
 therefore call these things accidental ; tliough all 
 reasonable men believe there is no such thing as 
 accident. We see but a little way ; and it is only from 
 seeing that the part of the course of nature which is 
 known to us, is governed by general laws, that we 
 conclude the whole to be so governed, though the laws 
 of innumerable things are unknown to us. In like 
 manner, that miraculous powers should be exerted at 
 such occasions, for such reasons, before such persons, 
 under such circumstances, &c., may have been also by 
 general laws though unknown to us, as the laws of the 
 things above instanced in natiu'e are unknown to us. 
 And there is no more reason to expect that every 
 exigency as it arises should be provided for by these 
 general laws, than that every exigency in nature 
 should. 
 
 4. In the next place, let us see the force of the 
 common objection raised against the whole scheme of 
 Christianity, as being what some are pleased to call a 
 round-about way, a perplexed contrivance for the 
 salvation of the world, as if God was reduced to the 
 necessity of using a long series of intricate means to 
 
WILSON'S ANALOGY. 361 
 
 accomplish his ends. Now it is obvious, that in the 
 course of nature God uses various means which we think 
 tedious, to arrive at his ends. Indeed there is some- 
 thing in this matter quite beyond our comprehension : 
 but the mystery is as great in nature as in Christianity. 
 Perhaps many things which we call means, may be 
 ends. However, it is clear the whole natural world is 
 a progressive system, in which the operation of means 
 takes up a great length of time. One state of things is 
 a preparation for another, and that state the means of 
 attaining to another succeeding one. Men are for 
 precipitating things; but God in the natural world 
 appears ever deliberate, reaching his ends by slow- 
 steps. The change of seasons, the ripening the fruits 
 of the earth, the growth of a flower, the gradual ad- 
 vances of vegetable and animal bodies, and the progress 
 of knowledge in men with their growing faculties and 
 powers, are instances of this. Thus in nature God 
 operates as he does in Christianity, by making one 
 thing subservient to another, through a series of means 
 wiiich extends backward and forward beyond our 
 utmost view. Objections, therefore, against the whole 
 plan of Christianity, as intricate and round-about, and 
 perplexed, have no sort of force. 
 
 Chap. V. This general objection having been an- 
 swered, let us next consider the particular one most 
 urged, namely, that against the Mediation of Christ. 
 
 1. Now, in the first place, the visible government of 
 God in nature is carried on by the instrumentality and 
 mediation of others. Every comfort of life comes to 
 us in this way. God appoints men as instruments, that 
 is, mediators of good or evil to us. So that there is no 
 presumption from analogy against the general notion of 
 a Mediator. 
 
 2. In the next place, it is suppbsable and credible 
 that the punishments which God inflicts as a moral 
 governor, may be appointed to follow wickedness in 
 the way of natural consequence ; in a like manner as a 
 man trifling upon a precipice, in the way of natural 
 consequence falls down, and, without help, perishes. 
 
o62 WILSON'S ANALOGY. 
 
 3. But it is most important to remark, that, in the 
 course of natural Providence, provision is made that all 
 the natural bad consequences of men's actions sliould 
 not always actually follow. We might, indeed, pre- 
 sumptuously have thought that the world Avould have 
 been so constituted as that there should not have been 
 any such thing as misery or evil. But in fact we find 
 that God permits it ; but that he has provided at the 
 same time relief, and in many cases perfect remedies 
 for it, CA^en for that evil which would have justly ended 
 in our ruin. If, indeed, all the consequences of bad 
 conduct had always followed, no one could have had a 
 right to object ; no one can say whether such a more 
 severe constitution of things might not yet have been 
 really good. But that, instead of this, provision is 
 made by nature to remedy these consequences, may 
 properly be called mercy or compassion in the original 
 constitution of the world, as distinct from goodness in 
 general. It is agreeable, then, to the whole analogy 
 of nature, to hope that provision may have been made 
 for remedying the natural consequences of vice in 
 God's moral government, at least in some cases. There 
 is a union of severity and indulgence in the course of 
 nature ; there may possibly also be a union of justice 
 and compassion in the scheme of religion. 
 
 4. Some will wonder at this being made a question 
 of; for they neglect and despise all ideas of future 
 punishment. But as we actually experience ill conse- 
 quences from wickedness and folly here, so the analogy 
 of the cases teaches us to apprehend worse evil conse- 
 quences hereafter, from disorders committed by moral 
 agents, presumptuously introducing confusion and misery 
 into the kingdom of God, their Sovereign Creator. 
 Nay, it is by no means uituitiv ely certain whether these 
 consequences could, in the nature of the thing, be pre- 
 vented, that is, consistently with the eternal rule of 
 right. The utmost we could hope for is, that there 
 would probably be some way in God's universal gov- 
 ernment for preventing the penal consequences of 
 vice. 
 
 5. Further, it is not probable that any thing we 
 
WILSON'S ANALOGY. 363 
 
 could do of ourselves, would prevent these ill conse- 
 quences. For sorrow and reformation will not of them- 
 selves prevent the natural consequences of our disorders 
 here, and the assistance of others is often indispensa- 
 ble to such prevention. The like then may be the case 
 under God's moral government. In fact, it is contrary 
 to all our notions of government, as well as to the 
 course of nature, to suppose that doing well for the 
 future, should always prevent or remedy the conse- 
 quences annexed to disobedience. And though men 
 in the present day boast of the efficacy of repentance, 
 yet, the prevalence of propitiatory sacrifices over the 
 heathen world, shows that the general sense of man- 
 kiiul is against the idea of repentance being sufficient to 
 expiate guilt. 
 
 6. In this darkness or light of nature, call it which 
 you please, revelation comes in, teaches us our state of 
 guilt, confirms every fear as to the I'uture consequences 
 of sin, declares that God's government will not pardon 
 on mere repentance ; but that still his government is 
 compassionate, and that He has mercifully provided 
 that there should be an interposition to prevent the 
 utter ruin of man. God so loved the ivorld, that he gave 
 his onhj begotten Son, that whosoever helieveth in him should 
 not iierish : gave his Son in the same way of goodness 
 to tlie world, as he affords to particular persons the 
 friendly assistance of their fellow-creatures ; when, 
 without it, their tenq^oral ruin would be the certain 
 consequence of their follies; in the same way of good- 
 ness, I say, though in a transcendent and infinitely 
 higher degree. And the Son of God loved us and gave 
 himself for us, with a love which he compares to that of 
 human friendship ; though in this case, all comparisons 
 must fall infinitely short of the thing intended to be 
 illustrated by them. 
 
 7. Now, if the constitution of things had been such 
 that the whole creation must have perished, but for 
 somewhat which God had appointed should take plaCe 
 to prevent that ruin, this supposition would not be in- 
 consistent in any degree with perfect goodness and 
 compassion, whatever men may object. 
 
364 WILSON'S a'nalogy. 
 
 8. Nor can men object to tlie Scriptures as repre- 
 senting- mankind by tliis whole scheme as in a de^jraded 
 state ; for it is not Christianity which has put us in this 
 state ; and all, even moralists, are Compelled to 
 acknowledge the extreme wickedness and misery 
 which are in the world. And the crime of our first 
 parents bringing us into a more disadvantageous condi- 
 tion, is particularly agreeable to all analogy. 
 
 9. The particular manner of Christ's mediation is by 
 his becoming w^hat the Scripture calls the Prophet of 
 mankind, to declare the Divine will; the King, by 
 founding and governing a church ; and the High Pi'iest, 
 by a propitiatory sacrifice ; which sacrifice, be it well 
 noted,, is not spoken of merely in allusion to the Mosaic 
 sacrifices, but as the original and great sacrifice itself, 
 to wiiich the Mosaic were themselves only allusions, 
 and of which they were types. The Scriptures declare 
 in all sorts of Avays an efficacy in what Christ suffered 
 for us, beyond mere example or instruction. 
 
 10. Further, as we know not by what means future 
 punishment would have been inflicted on men, nor 
 all the reasons why its infliction would have been 
 needful, if it had not been prevented by Christ's 
 sacrifice ; it is most evident w^e are not judges, ante- 
 cedently to revelation, whether a Mediator was or was 
 not necessary to prevent that punishment ; and upon 
 the supposition of a Mediator, we are not judges 
 beforehand of what it was fit to be assigned to him to 
 do, nor of the whole nature of his office. To object, 
 therefore, to any particular parts of this mediation, 
 because w^e do not see the expediency of them is 
 absurd. And yet men commonly do this. 
 
 11. Again ; if men object to the satisfaction of Christ, 
 that it represents God as indifferent whether he punishes 
 the innocent or guilty, we answer, that they might 
 equally object to the daily course of natural Providence, 
 in which innocent people are continually forced to 
 suffer for the faults of the guilty, and do suffer for them 
 in various ways ; w hereas, Christ's sufferings were 
 undertaken by him voluntarily. And though upon the 
 whole, and finally, every one shall receive according to 
 
WILSON'S ANALOGY. 365 
 
 liis deserts, yet during the progress, and in order to 
 the completion, of this moral scheme, punishments 
 endured by the innocent in some way instead of the 
 guilty, that is, vicarious punishments, may, for aught 
 we know, be fit and absolutely necessary. 
 
 12. Besides, there is an apparent tendency in this 
 method of our redemption by the sacrifice of Christ, 
 to vindicate the authority of God's law, and deter men 
 from sin. 
 
 13. Let not, then, such poor creatures as we are, 
 object against an infinite scheme, that we do not see 
 the usefulness and necessity of all its parts. The 
 presumption of this kind of objections seems almost 
 lost in the folly of them. 
 
 14. It heightens the absurdity of these objections, 
 that they are made against those parts of Christ's 
 mediation which we are not actively concerned in. 
 Now the whole analogy of nature teaches us not to 
 expect the like information concerning the Divine 
 conduct, as concerning our duty. The objections are 
 made, as we have seen, to God's appointment of a 
 Mediator, and to the Mediator's execution of his office : 
 not to what is required of man in consequence of this 
 gracious dispensation, which is plain and obvious, and 
 which is all we need to know. Thus, in the natural 
 world, it is almost an infinitely small part of natural 
 Providence which men can understand, and yet they 
 are sufficiently instructed for the common purposes of 
 life. 
 
 Chap. VI. A principal objection against Chris- 
 tianity, further, is, that it is thought to rest on doubtful 
 evidence, and that its benefits are not universal ; which, 
 in other words, is as much as to say, that God would 
 not have bestowed upon us any favour at all, unless in 
 the degree which we imagine best, and that he could 
 not bestow a favour upon any, unless he bestowed the 
 same on all — an objection which the whole analogy of 
 nature contradicts. 
 
 1. For how doubtful is the evidence on which men 
 act in their most important concerns in this world 
 
366 WILSON'S ANALOGY. 
 
 — how difficult to balance nice probabilities, to make 
 due allowances for accidents and disappointments, to 
 see on which side the reasons preponderate. How 
 often do strong- objections lie against their schemes, 
 objections which cannot be removed or answered, but 
 yet which seem overbalanced by reasons on the other 
 side. And how much are men deceived at last by the 
 falsehood of others, by the false appearances of things, 
 and the strong bias from within themselves to favour 
 the deceit. And as to revelation not being universal, 
 we see the Author of nature perpetually bestowing those 
 gifts of health, prudence, knowledge, riches, upon some, 
 which he does not on others. Yet, notwithstanding 
 these uncertainties and varieties, God does exercise a 
 natural government over the world, and there is such a 
 thing as a prudent and imprudent course of conduct. 
 
 2. There have been different degrees of evidence to 
 Jews and Christians. The first Christians had a higher 
 evidence of miracles than we, and a stronger presump- 
 tion in favour of Christianity from the lives of Christians : 
 and we or future ages may have a higher evidence of 
 the fulfilment of prophecy. And the Heathens, Mahom- 
 medans, Papists and Protestants, have now different 
 degrees of evidence of natural and revealed religion, 
 from the faintest glimmering of probability, to the clear 
 light of truth and conviction : but all this most ob- 
 viously resembles the constant order of Providence as 
 to our temporal affairs. And we are to remember, 
 that each one will be judged at last, by what he hath, 
 and not by what he hath not, so that there is no 
 shadow of injustice in this constitution of things, 
 though what is the particular reason of it, we are 
 altogether in the dark about. We know but little even 
 of our own cases ; scarcely any thing more than is 
 just necessary for practice. We are in the greatest 
 ignorance as to what woidd satisfy our curiosity. We 
 have only light to teach us our duty, and encourage us 
 in tlie discharge of it. 
 
 3. Besides, if revelation were universal, men's dif- 
 ferent understandings, educations, tempers, bodily 
 constitutions, lengths ol lives, external advantages, 
 
WILSON'SANALOGY. , 367 
 
 would soon make their situation perhaps as widely 
 different as it is at present. 
 
 4. But ^ye may observe more particularly, that the 
 evidence of religion not appearing certain, may be the 
 especial trial of some men's characters and state of 
 mind. Men may be as much in a state of probation 
 with regard to the exercise of their understanding on 
 the evidence of religion, as they are with regard to 
 their conduct. The same inward principle which leads 
 men to obey religion when convinced of its truth, 
 would lead them to examine it, when they were first 
 presented with its evidences. Negligence about such a 
 serious matter as religion, is as criminal before distinct 
 conviction, as careless practice is after. That religious 
 evidence, then, is not forced upon men, nor intuitively 
 true, but left to be collected by a heedful attention to 
 premises, may as much constitute religious probation as 
 any thing else. 
 
 5. Again, even if Christianity should be supposed 
 to be extremely doubtful to some persons, yet it puts 
 them in a state of probation as to character. For if 
 Christianity be once supposed by them to be possible, 
 this demands religious suspense, moral resolution, self- 
 government, inquiry, abstinence from what would be 
 impediments, readiness to receive fresh light, care of 
 what use they make of their influence and example 
 upon others. For doubting is not a positive argument 
 against religion, but for it ; a doubt presupposes a 
 low'er degree of evidence, just as much as belief 
 does a higher. And in proportion to the corruption of 
 the heart, men acknowledge no evidence, however 
 real, if it be not overbearing. 
 
 6. The difficulties which are said to be found in the 
 evidence of Christianity, is no more a ground of com- 
 plaint, than difficulties from external temptation as to 
 the practice of it. Such speculative difficulties may, 
 to persons of a deep sense, and reflecting minds, and 
 who h.ave small temptations to gross outward sins, 
 constitute the principal part of their trial. For we 
 see, in the things of this world, that the chief trial of 
 some men is not so much the doing what is right when it 
 
368 WILSON'S ANALOGY. 
 
 is known, as the attention, suspense, care, the bein^^ 
 on their guard against false appearances, the weigliing 
 of contrary reasons, and informing themselves of what 
 is really prudent. 
 
 7. In these remarks, we have taken it for granted 
 that men are not neglecting the subject of religion 
 altogether, nor entertaining prejudices against it. For 
 if they never examine it in earnest, if they wish it not 
 to be true, if they attend more to objections than to 
 evidence, if they consider things with levity, if they 
 indulge in ridicule, and put human errors in the place 
 of Divine truth, all this will hinder men from seeing 
 evidence, just as a like turn of mind hinders them 
 from weighing evidence in their temporal capacities. 
 And possibly the evidence of Christianity was left, so 
 as that those who are desirous of evading moral 
 obligation should not see it, whilst fair and candid 
 persons should. 
 
 8. Further, the evidences of Christianity, as they 
 are, may be sufficiently understood by common men, if 
 they will only pay the same sort of attention to religion 
 which they pay to their temporal affairs. But if men 
 will handle objections which they have picked up, and 
 discuss them without the necessary preparation of 
 general knowledge, they must remain in ignorance or 
 doubt, just as men who neglect the means of informa- 
 tion in common life do. 
 
 9. But, perhaps, it will be said, that a prince would 
 take care to give directions to a servant which would 
 be impossible to be misunderstood or disputed. To 
 this we answer, that it is certain we cannot argue thus 
 as to God, because in point of fact he does not afford 
 us such information as to our temporal affairs, as a 
 matter of course, without care of our own. And if a 
 prince wished not merely to have certain acts done, but 
 also to prove the loyalty and obedience of his servant, 
 he might not always give his directions in the plainest 
 possible manner. 
 
 On the whole, the analogy of nature refutes all 
 objections against Christianity as resting upon doubtful 
 evidence, and as not universal. 
 
WILSON'S ANALOGY. 369 
 
 Chap. VII. The objections against the particular 
 scheme of Christianity being removed, it remains that 
 we consider what the analogy of nature suggests as to 
 the positive evidence for it, and as to the objections 
 raised against that evidence. 
 
 Now, the evidence of Christianity embraces a long 
 series of things, reaching from the beginning of the 
 world to the present time, of great variety and compass, 
 and making up one argument, the conviction arising 
 from which is like what we call effect in architecture, 
 a result from a great number of things, so and so 
 disposed, and taken into one view ; and this is the kind 
 of proof on which we determine questions of difficulty, 
 in our most important affairs in this world. 
 
 Let us then, 1st, consider the direct proof of Chris- 
 tianity, from Miracles and Prophecy ; and then 2d, the 
 general argument arising from this proof, together with 
 many collateral things, as making up one argument. 
 
 I. — 1. The Scriptures of the Old and New Testa- 
 ment afford us the same evidence of the miracles 
 wrought in attestation of revelation, as it does of its 
 ordinary history ; for these miracles are not foisted into 
 it, but form a part of it, and are related in the same un- 
 adorned manner as the rest of the narrative, and stand 
 on the same footing of historical evidence. And some 
 parts of Scripture, containing the account of miracles, 
 are quoted as genuine from the Very age in which thev 
 were said to have been written. And the establish- 
 ment of the Jewivsh and Christian religions are just 
 what might have been expected, if such miracles were 
 wrought, and can be accounted for on no other suppo- 
 sition. The Scripture history, then, must be consid- 
 ered as genuine, unless something positive can be 
 alleged to invalidate it. Mere guesses can prove 
 nothing against historical evidence. 
 
 Further, the Epistles of St. Paul, being addressed to 
 particular churches, carry in them a greater evidence of 
 being genuine, than if they had been merely narratives 
 addressed to the world at large. And the first epistle 
 to the Corinthians is quoted by Clemens Romanus, a 
 24 
 
370 WILSON'S ANALOGY. 
 
 contemporary, in a letter to the same clmrcli. And St. 
 Paul mentions, in this epistle, the miraculous gifts, as 
 possessed by the very Christians to whom he wrote ; 
 and he mentions them incidentally, and in order to 
 depreciate them, and to reprove the abuse of them.. 
 He speaks of them in the manner any one would speak 
 of a thing familiar, and known to the persons he is 
 writing to. Against this evidence, general doubts 
 have no force, because any fact of such a kind, and of 
 such antiquity, may have general doubts throw^n out 
 concerning it, from the very nature of human affairs 
 and human testimony. 
 
 Again, Cliristianity presented itself to mankind at 
 first, and was received, on tlie footing of these miracles 
 at the time wiien they were Avrought ; which is the 
 case wdth no other religion, Mahommedanism was 
 propagated by the sword ; and Popish and Mahomme- 
 dan miracles, said to be wrought after parties were 
 formed, and when power and political interests sup- 
 ported them, are easily accounted for. 
 
 Once more, the reception of such a doctrine as 
 Christianity, demanding such a total change of life, by 
 such vast numbers, can only be accounted for on the 
 supposition of their belief in the Christian miracles, 
 which they were fully competent to judge of, as mat- 
 ters of fact. For, credulous as mankind are, they are 
 suspicious, and backward to believe and act against 
 their prejudices, passions, and temporal interest; and 
 education, prejudice, power, habits, laws, authority, 
 were all then against Christianity. 
 
 Enthusiasm, indeed, may give rise to opinions, and 
 to zeal in support of them. But there is a wide 
 difference between opinions and facts ; and testimony, 
 though no proof of enthusiastic opinions, yet is allowed, 
 in all cases, to be a proof of facts; and there is no 
 appearance of enthusiasm in the conduct of the Apostles 
 and first Christians, but quite the contrary. And if 
 great numbers of men of plain understanding affirm, 
 that they saw and heard such and such things with 
 their eyes and ears, such testimony is the strongest 
 evidence we can have for any matter of fact. The 
 
WILSON'S ANALOGY. 371 
 
 mere vague charge of enthusiasm, in such a case, is 
 frivolous. 
 
 However, as religion is supposed to he peculiarlv 
 liable to enthusiasm, let us observe that prejudices, 
 romance, affectation, humour, party spirit, custom, little 
 competitions, &c., influence men in common matters, 
 just as enthusiasm may do ; and yet, human testimony, 
 common matters, is believed and acted on notwith- 
 standing. The fact is, mankind have undoubtedly a 
 capacity of distinguishing truth and falsehood in com- 
 mon matters, and have a regard to truth in what they 
 say, except when prejudiced, biassed, or deceived. 
 And, therefore, human testimony remains a natural 
 ground of assent, and this assent, a natural principle 
 of action, notwithstanding all the error and dishonesty 
 which are in the world. People, therefore, do not 
 know what they say, when they pretend that enthu- 
 siasm destroys the evidence for the truth of Christi- 
 anity. It never can be sufficient to overthrow direct 
 historical testimony, indolently to say. Men are so apt 
 to deceive and be deceived in religion, that we know 
 not what to believe. All analogy shows, that men do 
 not thus act in their temporal affairs. 
 
 Besides, the vast importance of Christianity, and 
 the strong obligations to veracity which it enjoins, 
 strengthen the presumption that the Apostles could 
 not either intend to deceive others, or be deceived 
 themselves. The proof from miracles, therefore, re- 
 mains untouched ; for there is no testimony whatever 
 contradicting it, and strong historical testimony in its 
 favour. 
 
 2. As to the evidence from prophecy, a few remarks 
 may be made. If some parts of it are obscure, this 
 does not lessen the proof of foresight from the fulfil- 
 ment of those parts which are clear. Thus, in a 
 writing, if part of it were in cyphers, and other parts 
 in words at length, and if, in the parts understood, 
 many known facts were related ; no one would ima- 
 gine, that if he could make out the part in cypher, he 
 should find that the writer did not know the plain 
 facts which he had related. 
 
372 WILSON'S ANALOGY. 
 
 Again, if, from the deficiency in civil history, -sve can- 
 not make out the minute fulfihnent of every prophecy, 
 yet a very strong proof of foresiglit may arise from a 
 general completion of })rophecy, as illustrated by civil 
 history; perhaps as much proof as God intended should 
 be afford ed hy such prophecy. 
 
 Further, if a long series of prophecy is naturally 
 applicable to such and such events, this is, of itself, 
 a presumpti\e proof that it was intended of them. 
 Thus, in mythological and satirical writings, we con- 
 clude that we understand their concealed meaning, in 
 proportion to the number of particulars clearly ap- 
 plicable in such and such manner. 
 
 Add to this, that the Jews a])plied the prophecies of 
 Christ to the Messiah before his coming, in much the 
 same manner as Christians do now ; and the primitive 
 Christians, those of the state of the church, and of the 
 world, in the last ages, in much the same Avay as we 
 do now, and as the event seems to verify. This is 
 important. 
 
 Nor is it any argument against all this, if we 
 suppose the prophets to jiave applied some of those 
 prophecies, at the time, to other immediate events ; 
 for they were only amanuenses, not the original authors 
 of their predictions ; that is, they merely wrote as 
 they were moved by the Holy Ghost. 
 
 Thus, the argument from prophecy has great weight, 
 though we should not be able to satisfy ourselves on 
 every point. It is, indeed, very easy to determine at 
 once with a decisive air, and say. There is nothing in 
 it : and this suits the presumption and wilfulness of 
 men. But the true proof of modesty and fiiirness is 
 to say, There is certainly something in it ; and it shall 
 have influence upon us in proportion to its apparent 
 reality and weight. And this all analogy suggests to 
 be the reasonable course. ' 
 
 II. I>et us now consider this direct evidence of 
 miracles and prophecy, in connexion with those circum- 
 stantial and collateral proofs, which go to make up 
 one argument. For thus, in daily life, we judge of 
 things by evidence arising from various coincidences, 
 
WILSON'S ANALOGY. 373 
 
 which confirm each other. And though each of these 
 things, separately, may have Uttle weight, yet when 
 they are considered together, and united in one view, 
 they may have the greatest. The proof of revelation 
 is not some direct and express things only, but a great 
 variety of circumstantial things also, in the result of 
 which the proper force of the evidence consists. 
 
 1. Now revelation may be considered as wholly 
 historical ; for prophecy is anticipated history, and 
 doctrines, and precepts, may be viewed as matters of 
 fact. The general design of this history, is to give us 
 an account of the world, in this one single view, as 
 God's world ; and by this it is essentially distinguished 
 from all other books. After the history of the creation, 
 it gives an account of the world in this view, during 
 that state of apostacy and wickedness which it repre- 
 sents mankind to lie in. It considers the common 
 affairs of men, as a scene of distraction, and only refers 
 to them as they affect religion. 
 
 2. This narrative, comprehending a period of nearly 
 6000 years, gives the utmost scope for objections against 
 it ; from reason, common history, or any inconsistency 
 in its parts. And undoubtedly it must, and would 
 have been confuted, if it had Ijeen false, as all false 
 religions have been over and over again ; and, there- 
 fore, that it has not been confuted, nor pretended to 
 have been confuted, cluring the lapse of so many ages, 
 implies a positive argument that it is true. 
 
 3. Further, the Scriptures contain a particular history 
 of the Jews, God's peculiar people — the promises of 
 the Messiah, as a Saviour for Jews and Gentiles — the 
 narrative of the birth of this Messiah, at the time 
 foretold — and of the propagation of his religion — and 
 of his being rejected by the Jewish people. 
 
 4. Let us now suppose a person to read the Scrip- 
 tures thoroughly, and remark these and other historical 
 facts contained in them, without knowing whether it 
 was a real revelation from Heaven or not. Then let 
 this person be told to look out into the world, and 
 observe if the state of things seem at all to correspond 
 with these facts. Let him be informed how much of 
 
374 WILSON'S ANALOGY. 
 
 natural religion was owing to tliis book, and liow many 
 nations received it as divine, and under wliat circum- 
 stances. Then let him consider of what importance 
 religion is to mankind; and he would see thatthis 
 supposed revelation having had this influence, and 
 havinc; been received in the world as it was, is the most 
 conspicuous event in the history of mankind; and that 
 a book thus recommended demands his attention as by 
 a voice from Heaven. 
 
 5. Let such a person be next informed, that the 
 history and chronology of this book is not contradicted, 
 but confirmed, by profane history — that the narrative 
 contains all the internal marks of truth and simplicity — 
 and that the New Testament in particular, is confirmed 
 in all its chief facts by heathen authors — and that this 
 credibility of the common history in Scripture, gives 
 some credibility to its mii-acles, as they are interwoven 
 and make up one narrative. 
 
 6. Let him next be told that there was such a nation 
 as the Jews, whose existence depended on the law 
 said, in this book, to have been given them by Moses — 
 that at the time when the prophecies had led this 
 people to expect the Messiah, one claiming to be the 
 Messiah appeared, and was rejected by them, as fore- 
 told — that the religion was received by the Gentiles on 
 the authority of miracles, and that the Jews remain as 
 a separate people to this present day, which seems to 
 look forward to other prophecies of their future con- 
 version. 
 
 Let him, I say, first gather his knowledge entirely 
 from Scripture, and then compare it fact by fact with 
 the corresponding history of the world ; and the joint 
 view must appear to him most surprising. 
 
 7. All these points make up an argument from their 
 united, not separated, force. Then add to these, the 
 appearances of the world, as answering still to the 
 prophetic history, and numerous other particulars, and 
 the result of the whole must be allowed to be of the 
 greatest w^eight. 
 
 8. Then we should remember, that a mistake in 
 rejecting Christianity, is much more dangerous in its 
 
WILSON'S ANALOGY. 375 
 
 consequences, than one in favour of it ; and that in 
 temporal affairs, we always consider which side is most 
 safe. 
 
 9. We should also hear in mind that the truth of 
 Christianity is proved, like that of any connnon event, 
 not only if any one of the points adduced clearly imply 
 it, but if the whole taken together do, though no one 
 singly should. No one who is serious, can possibly 
 think these things to be of little weight, if he considers 
 the importance of collateral things, and less circum- 
 stances, in the evidence of probability, as distinguished 
 in nature from the evidence of demonstration. 
 
 10. It should be just observed, that the nature of 
 this evidence gives a great advantage to persons who 
 choose to attack Christianity in a short, lively manner 
 in conversation ; because an objection against particular 
 points is easily shown, whereas the united force of the 
 whole argument, requires much time and thought. 
 
 Chap. VIII. Lastly, some persons may object to this 
 wiiole argument, from the analogy of nature, and say, 
 it is a poor thing to solve difficulties in revelation, by 
 •asserting that there are like difficulties in natural 
 religion. 
 
 1. Now^ men's wanting to have all difficulties cleared 
 in revelation, is the same for any thing they know", as 
 requiring to comprehend the divine nature. And it is 
 no otherwise a poor thing to argue from natural to 
 revealed religion, than it is a poor thing for a physician 
 to have so little knowledge in the cure of diseases; 
 which is yet much better than having no skill at all. 
 Indeed, the epithet poor, may be applied as properly to 
 the whole of hiiman life. 
 
 Further, it is unreasonable for men to urge objec- 
 tions against Christianity which are of equal weight, 
 against natural religion, whilst they profess to admit 
 the truth of natural religion. This is unfair dealing. 
 
 2. But again, religion is a practical thing, and if men 
 have the like reason to believe the truth of it, as they 
 have in what they do in their temporal affairs, then 
 they are so much the more bound to act on it, as the 
 
376 WILSON'S ANALOGY. 
 
 interest is infinitely greater. This is plainly unan- 
 swerable. If they believe that taking care of their 
 temporal interest will be for their advantage, then 
 there is equal reason for believing, that obeying Chris- 
 tianity, and taking care of their futin-e interests, will be 
 for their advantage. It is according to the conduct 
 and character of the Author of nature, that we should 
 act upon such probable evidence. All analogy clearly 
 shows this. 
 
 3. The design of the analogical argimient, is not to 
 vindicate the character of God, but to show the obliga- 
 tions of men. Nor is it necessary to prove the reason- 
 ableness of every thing enjoined us in Christianity ; 
 the reasonableness of the practice of our duty is 
 enough. And though analogy does not pretend imme- 
 diately to answer objections against the wisdom and 
 goodness of the doctrines and precepts of Christianity, 
 yet it does this indirectly, by showing that the things 
 objected against are not incredible. 
 
 4. It is readily acknowledged, that this treatise is 
 not what, is called satisfactory — very for from it — ^l3ut 
 then no natural institution of life would appear so, if 
 reduced into a system together with its proof. The» 
 unsatisfoctory evidence with which we put up in com- 
 mon life, is not to be expressed. Yet men do not 
 throw away life on account of this doubtfulness. And 
 religion pre-supposes, in all avIjo would embrace it, 
 some integrity and honesty, a willingness to follow the 
 probability of things ; just as speaking to a man sup- 
 poses him to understand the language in which you 
 speak. The question then is, not whether the evidence 
 of Christianity be what is called satisfoctory, but 
 whether it be sufficient to prove and discipline that 
 virtue and integrity of mind, which it pre-supposes, 
 though it be not sufficient to remove every objection, or 
 gratify curiosity. 
 
 5. As to the little influence which this whole argu- 
 ]uent ma}^ actually have on men, which is made an 
 ol)jection to it, the true question is, not how men will 
 actually behave, but how they ought to behave. It is 
 no objection to this argument, that it may fail of con- 
 
WILSON'S ANALOGY. 37T 
 
 vincing men. Religion as a probation, has its end on 
 all to whom it has been proposed with sufficient 
 evidence, let them behave as they will concerning it. 
 
 On the whole, the proof of Christianity is greatly- 
 strengthened by these consideratioas from analogy; 
 though it is easy to cavil at them, and to object that 
 they are not demonstrative, which it was never pre- 
 tended they w^ere, nor could be. They are of the 
 nature of probable arguments ; but then they are so 
 forcible and just, that it is impossible to answer them, 
 or evade them fairly. 
 
 Conclusion. In this treatise we have considered 
 Christianity as a matter.of fact merely, and have argued 
 with unbelievers on their own ground. We have, 
 therefore, neither argued from the liberty of man, nor 
 from the moral fitness of things ; both of which would 
 have strengthened my argument, and both of which 
 we believe to be true. But we have taken up things 
 on the lowest ground, and given every advantage we 
 could to our adversary. 
 
 In the first part, a view has been given of natural 
 religion, and the chief difficulties concerning this have 
 been answered by the analogy of God's government of 
 the universe. Thus, the objections against a future 
 life of moral and righteous retribution, wherein God 
 w^ill reward or punish men according to their behaviour 
 here, and for which this world is a state of discipline 
 and preparation, have been silenced, or refuted ; and 
 the general notion of religion has been shown to be 
 throughout agreeable to the obvious course of things in 
 this present world. 
 
 For, indeed, natural religion carries in it much 
 evidence of truth, on barely being proposed to our 
 thoughts. To an unprejudiced mind, ten thousand 
 thousand instances of design, cannot but prove a De- 
 signer. And it is intuitively manifest, that creatures 
 ought to live under a dutiful sense of their Maker ; and 
 that justice and charity must be his laws, to creatures 
 such as we are, whom he has formed social, and placed 
 in society. The neglect, therefore, of men towards it, 
 must arise from objections against all religion generally ; 
 
378 WILSON'S ANALOGY. 
 
 which objections liave been met in tlie first part of this 
 work. Natural religion has been there cleared of its 
 difficulties, and its credibility shown. 
 
 In the second part, the particular scheme of Chris- 
 tianity has been considered ; and the objections against 
 its importance, against the miracles on A^shich its 
 evidence rests, and against its provision of a Mediator, 
 have been proved to be invalid. The difficulties raised 
 concerning it, because it is not universal, and because 
 its evidence is not overbearing, have also been removed, 
 Some observations have, lastly, been made on the 
 objections to the special evidences of Christianity; as 
 consisting of miracles, prophci^ies, and a great 'many 
 other collateral circumstances, united in one argument. 
 I'hus we have endeavoured to strengthen the evi- 
 dences of Christianity to those who believe it to be 
 true ; and to show its probability to those who do not 
 believe it. The treatise is especially addressed to 
 those who imagine that the evidences of natural and 
 revealed religion, if true, would have been stronger 
 than they are, or irresistible ; and who think that 
 doubting about Christianity, is in a manner the same 
 thing as being certain against it. If these persons are 
 not willing to weigh seriously the force of the analogical 
 arguments we have produced, but will still go on to 
 disregard and vilify Christianity, there is no reason to 
 think they would alter their behaviour to any purpose ; 
 though there were a demonstration, instead of what 
 there is, a high probability, and moral certainty of its 
 truth. 
 
 Such are the chief steps in the reasoning of Bishop 
 Butler, in this great work. 
 
WILSON'S ANALOGY. 379 
 
 CONNEXION OF BISHOP BUTLEr's ARGUMENT WITH 
 
 OTHER BRANCHES OF EVIDENCE, THEORETICAL 
 
 AND PRACTICAL. 
 
 Having thus given a general draught of the main 
 argument, as well as of the particular reasoning of the 
 Analogy, we come to the second general division of 
 this Essay, and offer, as was proposed, some observa- 
 tions on THE CONNEXION OF THIS ARGUMENT WITH THE 
 OTHER BRANCHES OF THE CHRISTIAN EVIDENCE, AND ON 
 ITS PECULIAR USE AND IMPORTANCE ; AND ALSO ON OUR 
 author's view of practical CHRISTIANITY, AND ON 
 THE ADAPTATION OF HIS ARGUMENT TO THE CHRISTIAN 
 RELIGION IN ALL ITS EXTENT. 
 
 1. We begin with the connexion of the Analogical 
 argument with the other branches of the Christian evidence, 
 and on its peculiar use and importance. For the argu- 
 ment from analogy does not stand alone. It is rather 
 the completion, and, as it were, the crown of all the 
 other evidences for the truth of Christianity. It comes 
 in to remove objections after the usual proofs have 
 been admitted. For the External, the Internal, 
 and what I may call the Analogical evidences of 
 Christianity, are three distinct divisions of one great 
 argument. The external evidences are those which 
 should be first studied. Indeed they are the only 
 ones that can be considered in the first instance as 
 essential ; because they undertake to show the creden- 
 tials of the messenger who professes to come with a 
 revelation from heaven. Christianity claims a divine 
 origin, I have therefore a right, indeed I am bound, 
 soberly and impartially to inquire, what proofs she 
 brings of this high claim. And when she refers me to 
 the holy Scriptures as containing all her records, I liave 
 a right to ask what evidence there is of the genuine- 
 ness and authenticity of these books, and what footing ■ 
 
380 WILSON'S ANALOGY. 
 
 they place the religion upon, Avhich they wish to incul- 
 cate on mankind. The answer to all these questions 
 is fouml on what we call the External Evidences of 
 Christianity. These show the acknowledged facts on 
 which the religion rests. They prove that the books 
 were written by the persons whose names they bear, 
 and do contain a true and credible* history. They 
 prove that the revelation itself was founded on une- 
 quivocal and numerous miracles ; that it was accom- 
 panied (as it is accompanied still) with the distinct 
 lulhlment of an amazing scheme of prophecy, embracing 
 all the chief events of the world ; and that it was pro- 
 pagated in the face of opposition and difficulty Avith a 
 triumphant success, which nothing but the hand of God 
 could have effected. These evidences also show the 
 positive good effects produced by this heavenly doc- 
 trine, and which are still being produced, in the 
 melioration of society and the advancement of human 
 happiness and virtue in all the nations where it has 
 been received. We have no right to go further than 
 this in the first place. The moment the messenger is 
 sufficiently proved to have divine credentials, we have 
 but one duty left, that of receiving and obeying his 
 message, that of reading and meditating on the revela- 
 tion itself, in order to conform ourselves to it witl\ 
 devout and cheerful submission. We have no right at 
 all to examine the nature of the discoveries, or doc- 
 trines, or precepts of Christianity, with the view of 
 determining whether they seem to us becoming the 
 wisdom of God, and agreeable to the reason of man. 
 It is proved that the revelation is from heaven. This 
 is enough. The infinitely glorious Creator and Sove- 
 reign of the universe has full power to do what he 
 will with his own, and to lay down laws for his 
 creatures. We have no business, strictly speaking, 
 with the contents and tenor of these laws, except to 
 understand them and obey them. 
 
 Great mischief has been done to the Christian cause 
 by taking another method. Men have allowed them- 
 selves to be entangled with discussions on the possi- 
 bility and credibility of a revelation being given to 
 
WILSON'S ANALOGY. 381 
 
 man, on tlie nature and tendency of the Christian 
 doctrine, on the reasonableness of its particular in- 
 junctions — questions every one of them out of place in 
 examining the evidence of a divine religion. Let it 
 fairly be made out to come from God, and it is enough. 
 More than this is injurious. We are sure, indeed, 
 that the contents of it must be most worthy of its 
 perfect Author ; but we are no adequate judges of 
 what is worthy or what is not worthy of an Infmite 
 being. We have no right to call the Almighty Creator 
 to the bar of our feeble reason, and suspend obedience 
 to his commands on the determination whether those 
 commands are in our opinion just and good or not. 
 To receive a revelation on the ground of its proper 
 credentials, and then to trace out with reverence the 
 wisdom and goodness of its contents, is one thing; 
 but to sit in judgment on those contents previously 
 to an examination of its credentials, and in order to 
 , decide whether we shall receive the professed revela- 
 tion or not, is quite another. We are competent to 
 understand the simple and commanding language of 
 the Almighty, attesting by miracles and prophecy, and 
 the extraordinary propagation of the gospel and its 
 visible good effects on mankind, the truth of a super- 
 natural revelation ; and yet are no competent judges 
 'whatever of the particular things the Almighty may see 
 fit to communicate in that revelation. Evidences are 
 level to a candid and fair understanding ; divine doc- 
 trines may not be so. Evidences are addressed to 
 man's reason, and warrant the modest exercise of it; 
 doctrines are addressed to faith, and demand not discus- 
 sion, but obedience. 
 
 The danger of acting in the way which I am now 
 venturing to condemn, is greater, because the door 
 being once opened to such reasoning, it is quite certain 
 that the minds of men will too often employ it amiss. 
 The infidel is the person just the least capable to act 
 aright in such a case. The pious well-trained judg- 
 ment of a sincere Christian, might indeed form a better 
 estimate of the internal character of a revelation from 
 heaven : but the unsubdued mind of an unbeliever can 
 
382 WILSON'S ANALOGY. 
 
 only come to a wrong decision upon it. He wants ali 
 the preparation necessary. 
 
 But although the External proofs of Christianity are 
 thus all that, in the first examination, is required, yet 
 the INTERNAL EVIDENCES may afterwards he profitably, 
 most profital)ly studied. Christianity shrinks from no 
 scrutiny. She courts the light. When the outward 
 credentials of the heavenly messenger have once been 
 investigated, and the message been received on this its 
 proper footing ; then if it be asked, whether the con- 
 tents of the revelation seem to conhrin the proof of its 
 divine original ; whether the sincere believer will find 
 them adapted to his wants ; whether the morals incul- 
 cated, the end proposed, the means enjoined are 
 agreeable to man's best reason and the dictates of an 
 enlightened understanding and conscience, whether 
 the character of Christ be worthy of his religion, 
 whether the influence of grace, said to accompany 
 Christianity, may be obtained by prayer, whether the 
 lives and deaths of Christians as compared with those 
 of professed Infidels, illustrate the excellency of their 
 faith; whether, in short, the promises and blessings of 
 Christianity are verified in those who make a trial of 
 them, by submitting to the means appointed for their 
 attainment: when such questions are put with candour, 
 by those who have embraced Christianity, we answer 
 them by referring to the Internal evidences of Revela- 
 tion. These Internal evidences are now our appro- 
 priate study. They show us the adaptation of the reli- 
 gion to the situation and wants of man, the purity and 
 sublimity of its doctrines and precepts, the character of 
 its founder, the sanctifying and consoling effect of the 
 influence which accompanies it, the holy lives and 
 happy deaths of its genuine followers, and the trial 
 which every one may make of its promises and bles- 
 sings, by fulfilling the terms on which they are 
 proposed. Each of these topics admits of large illus- 
 tration. The whole of the Internal evidences form an 
 argument in favour of Christianity, as complete and 
 satisfactory in its particular province, as the whole of 
 the External. Indeed, they are, in some respects. 
 
WILSON'S ANALOGY. 383 
 
 more persuasive, though they come after them and are 
 secondary to them. The External evidences enforce 
 conviction, the Internal induce to love. The External 
 bring to light the potent remedy, the Internal apply it 
 to the sufferer, and produce the actual cure. The first 
 require an exercise of the understanding on plain 
 facts stated, the second the submission of the affections 
 to a benefit conferred. By the one we know religion 
 to be true, by the other we feel it to be good. The 
 External evidences awaken attention to a new doc- 
 trine, the Internal attract the heart to an incalculable 
 blessing. 
 
 Accordingly, no class of persons is excluded from 
 that conviction of the truth of Christianity which 
 springs from a perception of its effects in themselves 
 and others. The External evidences indeed are simple 
 as they are majestic ; but to the unpractised and uned- 
 ucated mind, they necessarily lose much of their force. 
 The great body of mankind must be indebted to their 
 instructors in a large measure, for their f^iith in the 
 historical evidences of religion; but they can feel it in 
 its sacred fruits as keenly, and perhaps even more 
 keenly, than any other description of persons. They 
 are incapable of following a train of reasoning, or of 
 judging of distant and remote facts ; but they are quite 
 capable of perceiving the blessedness of obeying Chris- 
 tianity, and of relying on its promises. Thus a source 
 of faith is opened to them, abundant in proportion as 
 they advance in piety and virtue. And though, as we 
 have already observed, the unbeliever has no right to 
 sit in judgment on the internal character of Chris- 
 tianity, but should, and must, in all reason, be con- 
 tented at first Avith the proper external evidences that 
 it really comes from God ; yet when he has once 
 received the Christian doctrine aright, and has begun 
 to be moulded into its form, and take its impression, 
 he will discover to his surprise new traces of a divine 
 hand daily in all its parts, he will feel that it is salutary 
 in all its doctrines and in all its precepts, in all its 
 bearings and all its tendencies, in all its discoveries 
 and declarations, in all its effects and fruits. Like the 
 
384 WILSON'S ANALOGY. 
 
 li^ht of the sun, it will speak its author and source. 
 The conlirmation which the faith of the sincere believ er 
 thus receives is indescribable. He has now entered 
 the temple, of Avhich he had before sun-eyed, from 
 without, the proportions and magnificence. He has 
 now partaken of the feast, of which he had before 
 heard the tidings and listened to the invitation. He 
 has now experienced the skill and tenderness of the 
 Physician, of whose fame and powers he had before 
 been convinced only by testimony. He has now 
 shared the unspeakable gift which had before been 
 offered to him. He was well persuaded, on first 
 embracing Christianity on its due external authority, 
 that every thing taught by it would be found most 
 agreeable to the attributes and glory of its divine 
 author. But he has now a conviction resulting from 
 the benefits conferred, of a kind higher in its degree, 
 and more consoling in its effects, than any external 
 proof could communicate, and which, though incapable 
 of being known, from the nature of the case, previ- 
 ously to experience, yet when once known sways and 
 bears away the heart. 
 
 The two branches of evidence thus concurring to 
 one result, the External proving the truth of the mes- 
 senger, and the Internal confirming afterwards that 
 truth by an experience of the excellency and suitable- 
 ness of the message itself, the Christian believer has 
 a continually growing conviction of the firm grounds of 
 his faith. 
 
 He is now prepared for considering, to the best 
 advantage, the third branch of the evidences in favour 
 of Christianity — that arising from the analogy be- 
 tween THIS RELIGION, AND THE CONSTITUTION AND 
 
 COURSE OF NATURE. Tliis briusfs us to the immediate 
 subject of Butler's treatise, of which we have already 
 given a review. We have no right, indeed, (for the 
 idea is too important not to be repeated,) to call for this 
 species of proof, any more than we have a right to call, 
 in the first instance, for an examination of the internal 
 character of Christianity, or rather to call for. it at all. 
 All we have any fair right to ask for, is the credentials 
 
WILSON'S ANALOGY. 385 
 
 of the ambassador who professes to come to us in the 
 name of our absent, though ever-present, Sovereign 
 and Lord. It is perfectly true, that the analogy of 
 mature, as formed by the same hand, will have traces of 
 the same system and scheme of Christianity, just as it 
 is true, that a revelation from heaven will possess every 
 internal mark of holiness and goodness and truth ; but 
 we have no right to stop, and pretend to follow out all 
 these matters, before w^e receive the Christian doctrine 
 as divine. Christianity does not submit to plead at 
 such a bar. The capacity of receiving advantage from 
 these auxiliary evidences, depends on our first admit- 
 ting, on the plain grounds of its miracles, and prophe- 
 cies, and propagation, and mighty effects, the truth of 
 the revelation by which these additional proofs are to 
 be created and communicated, and without which 
 they cannot be employed to any purpose. 
 
 Still, after we have sincerely embraced the gospel, 
 we may humbly inquire, whether the difficulties which 
 are raised against it by unbelievers, or which occur to 
 our own minds, may be relieved by an appeal to the 
 works of God in nature, and His order and government 
 therein. This is the argument from Analogy, which 
 rises still a step above the two preceding branches of 
 the subject, not as in itself necessary to the first recep- 
 tion of Christianity, but as furnishing the subsequent 
 confirmation of it, and removing scruples and objections 
 arising from the ignorance and presumption of man. It 
 is, indeed, a glorious thing thus to discern the harmony 
 between Christianity, the greatest of the Almighty's 
 works, and all the other known productions of the 
 same divine Architect. To see that the natural and 
 moral government of God are parts of one stupendous 
 wdiole, sums up, and finishes, and absolves the subject. 
 Nothing more can be said. All this, what we might 
 be sure it would be, complete and adequate. The 
 force of External evidences is to compel assent ; the 
 effect of the Internal to produce love ; the chief efficacy 
 of the Analogical to silence objections. By the first, a 
 message is proved to come from heaven ; by the 
 second, the salutary effects of this message are felt and 
 
386 WILSON'S ANALOGY, 
 
 understood ; by the third, it is shown to be, in itself, 
 most agreeable to all the known dispensations of the 
 divine Author. The first is the proper evidence which 
 such a case indispensably demands; the next confirms, 
 by actual experience, this satisfactory ground of belief; 
 the last excludes all contradictory assertions, and 
 creates a silence and repose of mind, when objections 
 are urged by others, or arise in our own thoughts. 
 External evidences, by their simple majesty, address 
 the reason of mankind, and overwhelmn objections and 
 surmises ; Internal, by the influences of truth on the 
 heart, indispose men to listen to those objections; 
 Analogical, by showing that such objections lie equally 
 against the constitution and course of nature, deprive 
 them of all their force, and turn them into proofs of 
 divine goodness and power. 
 
 In thus assigning to the three branches of evidence 
 a particular position, we are far from insinuating that 
 they may not be considered in a different order. We 
 merely wish to claim for the external evidences the 
 rank to which they are entitled in fair argument, and 
 to protest against the additional and auxiliary evidences 
 being improperly resorted to, in the first instance, to 
 the neglect of the palpable credentials of the Christian 
 message. To maintain this is a matter of real moment. 
 It places the various branches of the inquiry in their 
 true and natural light. Still we object not to any part 
 of them being separately considered, according to the 
 disposition, age, talents, information, and circumstances 
 of men. The Christian evidence in each division, and 
 each subdivision of it, is so clear and convincing to a 
 fair and sincere inquirer, as to admit of a distinct dis- 
 cussion and exhibition, if it be conducted with good 
 faith. But if men wish to seize what seems to them a 
 feeble part of the Internal or Analogical argument, and 
 press this out of its place, disregarding the plain and 
 direct proofs of Christianity from miracles, prophecy, 
 &c., we then recall them to the consideration of the 
 real state of the argument. We tell them they 
 are no adequate judges of what a divine revelation 
 should contain. We appeal to the proper and unan- 
 
WILSON'S ANALOGY. 387 
 
 swerable proofs of a divine religion, in the extraordinary 
 manifestations of Almighty God in its favour. And we 
 bid them postpone the examination of the subsidiary 
 CA^dences, till they have weighed the primary ones, 
 and received the religion which they attest. Thus to 
 a serious candid mind, we are willing to open at once 
 any part of the Avide subject of the evidences of Chris- 
 tianity ; whilst to a captious and unreasonable inquirer, 
 we propose the strict rules of debate, and demand the -^ 
 orderly examination of the credentials of the religion. 
 
 If, however, after all, men will unreasonably demand 
 an exposition of the internal character of Christianity 
 in the first place, or will dwell on objections raised 
 against its particular constitution, we descend on the 
 ground they have chosen, and without relinquishing 
 our right to assume a higher position and to insist only 
 on the direct proofs of it, we meet them where they 
 stand, and show them the inward excellencv of our 
 religion from the Internal evidences, or the weakness 
 and inconclusiveness of their objections from the Ana- 
 logical. Thus Christianity stoops, so far as it can, to the 
 fancies of men, and argues with them on their own 
 principles. This is particularly the case with the 
 evidence from analogy. 
 
 It is indeed one of the most valuable branches of the 
 whole Christian argument, because objections are the 
 ground commonly taken by unbelievers. For weak, 
 and inconclusive, as these objections are, they are 
 sufficient, when listened to, to steel the heart against 
 the force of truth, and bar up the first entrance to the 
 Christian doctrine. The young and inexperienced are 
 thus ofraduallv seduced and hardened. It is not that 
 men have found out that the External Evidences of 
 Christianity are insufficient, for they have never studied 
 them — it is not that they have discovered the fallacy 
 of the Internal Evidences, for they have never been in 
 a situation to judge of them. But they have heard bold 
 things flippantly said against Christianity ; things which 
 they were not sufficiently informed on the subject to 
 answer ; these have sunk into their memories, and 
 acquired force by lapse of time ; and thus their minds . 
 
388 WILSON'S ANALOGY. 
 
 became gradu.illy tainted and poisoned. Their pas- 
 sions, impatient of the restraints of Christianity, aided 
 the delusion. Their pride of intellect, ambitious of 
 forsaking the common track, listened to the flattering 
 tale. The opinions and example of others, as little 
 competent to judge as themselves, attracted them 
 onwards. Ridicule, unanswerable ridicule, came in to 
 their overthrow. The love of novelty was not without 
 its force. They had no inclination to the patient 
 inquiry which such a subject as religion demands ; 
 whereas an objection was seized at once. Thus, 
 insensibly, the impressions of a pious education were 
 effaced, and the unhappy youth entered on the mazes 
 of infidelity, and came, at last, to scoff at the very 
 religion which he once reverenced, if he did not obey. 
 Here, then, the argument from analogy may be of 
 the greatest service. We insist not with such a youth, 
 on an examination of the External Evidences of reli- 
 gion, to which we see he would not attend, and we 
 come at once to his objections. We show him, in the 
 manner of the preceding treatise, that we may well 
 expect to find the same sort of character in a revela- 
 tion, proceeding from the Author of nature, as is found 
 in the constitution and order of nature itself; that our 
 ignorance, with respect to natural things, is such, that 
 we cannot go on a single step, except as facts and 
 experiments lead us by the hand ; and, that as this 
 ignorance is the proper answer to presumptions and 
 difficulties, derived from our opinion of things before- 
 hand, so is this much more the case in religion, where 
 we find only the same kind of difficulties which meet 
 us perpetually in the works of the same hantl in the 
 course of nature. So that, in short, he that rejects 
 Christianity, on account of these difficulties, may for the 
 very same reason, deny the world to have been formed 
 by an intelligent Creator. Thus all objections against 
 the Scriptures, drawn from what is similar or analogous 
 in the order of the world, which is acknowledged by 
 the objector himself to proceed from an Almighty 
 Governor, are satisfactorily silenced; and the mind, 
 freed from harassing and frivolous objections, is at 
 
WILSON'S ANALOGY. 389 
 
 liberty to weigh impartially the direct proof of Chris- 
 tianity, and then to seek the best confirmation of a 
 wavering faith, in its salutary effects in pardoning guilt, 
 tranquillizing conscience, sutjduing pride, regulating the 
 affections and appetites, and changing the whole 
 character from that of a discontented, captious, selfish, 
 creature, to that of a patient, docile, thankful, benevo- 
 lent one. 
 
 Thus all the several branches of the Evidences of 
 Christianity are ultimately studied, though not in the 
 order which the strict rules of the case would lay 
 down. The great object is gained if the unbeliever is 
 convinced: but if, on the contrary, he refuses to listen 
 to our argument from analogy, or professes himself dis- 
 satisfied with it, we are still at liberty to remind him, 
 that the only proofs which he can claim in the first 
 instance, are the direct and proper credentials of 
 miracles and prophecy, and other External Evidences ; 
 and that this paramount duty is to submit to the reve- 
 lation thus attested, and not yield to objections and 
 difficulties resting on mere conceptions and opinions. 
 
 But the use and importance of the argument from 
 analogy may be frequently observed in the case of the 
 sincere Christian. How often is the thoughtful believer 
 harassed by objections. The best men are still weak 
 and defective ; and notwithstanding the clearest deduc- 
 tions of reason, and the avowed subjection of the heart 
 to the Gospel, doubts, and embarrassments, and appre- 
 hensions, will haunt the mind. There are few who 
 have not felt this. The imagination roves on forbidden 
 topics — thoughts the most unwelcome intrude — argu- 
 ments fail to satisfy — exploded objections recur. Espe- 
 cially if circumstances require a Christian to treat with 
 infidels, and examine and refute their arguments, the 
 infirmity of his faith will sometimes be an occasion 
 of surprise and distress to him. In such seasons, no 
 source of relief is more plenteous than that springing 
 from the clear and striking similarity between the 
 objections raised against revelation, and those which 
 may be raised against the government and order 
 of God in natural providence. When the External 
 
390 WILSON'S ANALOGY. 
 
 and Internal Evidences of Christianity seem cold, and 
 ineffective, and barren, the Analogical precisely meet 
 his feelings. The full and adequate repose which they 
 inspire,' is a calm after a storm. The relief is more 
 sensible from being unexpected. For, somehow or 
 other, the mind, at times, appears quite hedged in with 
 fears and specidations. The state of misery in which 
 the world lies — the prevalence of moral evil — the 
 immense majority of the human race, sunk in Pagan 
 ignorance — the trials of good men — the prosperity of the 
 wicked — the slow progress of truth and reason ; these, 
 and a thousand like matters, perplex, too frequently, 
 the benevolent and reflecting mind of the Christian. 
 He is quite astonished that an all-vvise and all-gracious 
 Creator should leave a revelation with so little efficacy 
 attending it. He thinks that he can never obtain satis- 
 faction upon these questions. He has forgotten the 
 arguments which formerly silenced his scruples, and his 
 faith is ready to fail him. The analogical argument 
 then occurs to his distracted thoughts — he reads it as if 
 he had never read it before — it seems new, forcible, 
 conclusive — his proud reasonings sink — faith resumes 
 her sw^ay — humility acknowledges the ignorance and 
 littleness of man, before the incomprehensible plans of 
 the infinite God — his state of probation and discipline, 
 forces itself upon his notice — the traces of the same 
 divine Governor, in the natural and moral world, are 
 again seen and recognized — and the satisfaction he 
 thus regains is more than can be expressed. In 
 proportion as the difficulties appeared insuperable, is 
 the removal of them consoling and vivifying. 
 
 There is this further to be noticed, as to the impor- 
 tance of the ai-gument from analogy, that it is capable 
 of indefinite ramification. The fruitfulness of it is 
 such, that each Christian, throughout the whole course 
 of life, may multiply his observations without exhaust- 
 ing the inquiry. There is an inherent freshness and 
 life in it, which makes it always new and interesting. 
 
 Indeed, we must observe, before we quit this topic, 
 that the variety of the Christian argument generally, 
 is one striking confirmation of its truth. The evidences 
 
WILSON'S ANALOGY. 391 
 
 for revelation may be truly said to be diversified, and 
 extensive beyond any thing that could have been 
 conceived, we do not say, on a like subject, but on any 
 subject whatever. If a man were allowed to point out 
 beforehand, the proofs of a divine religion to be ad- 
 dressed to a reasonable and accountable being, lie 
 could not name any different in kind from those whicJi 
 we possess. For what could a man demand, but either 
 the conspicuous display of a clearly miraculous power 
 in attestation of it, or the incontrovertible fulfilment of 
 prophecy — or the triumplmnt and supernatural spread 
 of the doctrine itself — or the visible and mighty effects 
 on all who receive it ? And where the revelation is 
 admitted and obeyed, what internal confirmation of its 
 truth could he desire, beyond tlie adaptation of it to the 
 state and wants of man — the purity and sublimity of 
 its doctrines and precepts — the untainted benevolence 
 of its founder — the attendant influence of grace — and 
 the actual accomplishment of its promises to all who 
 apply duly for them ? And if objections be afterwards 
 raised against this scheme, what could he wish further, 
 than to see them extinguished by considerations de- 
 rived from the ignorance of man, and tlie incomprehen- 
 sibility of God ? In this diversity of proof all the 
 attributes of the Almighty are pledged, as it were, 
 to the sincere believer. The miracles give him the 
 pledge of the sovereign power of God — the prophecies, 
 of his Omniscience — the supernatural propagation of 
 the Gospel, of his supreme providence — the effects 
 produced, of his fidelity — the adaptation to the state 
 of man, of his wisdom — the purity of the doctrine and 
 morals, of his holiness — the character of Christ, of his 
 condescension — the accompanying influence, of his 
 grace and goodness — the fulfilment of the promises, of 
 his A^eracity. Thus the evidences of Christianity have 
 an impression of the divine glory irradiating them.* 
 
 But it is not merely the diversity of these topics, but 
 the DISSIMILARITY of them from each other, which 
 
 *We are indebted for some thoughts in this part of the Essay, to Mr. 
 Davidson's admirable Warburtonian Lectures — a work of deep research, and full 
 of fine reflectious ; especially on the structure of prophecy. 
 
C92 TVILSON'S ANALOGY. 
 
 gives tiiein ilicir inconipamble weight. Tliey are not 
 all of a kind. The impostor who could be imagined 
 to feign one brancli of them, would be incapacitated 
 by that very attempt from feigning the rest. They 
 would each demand a separate scheme, distinct powers, 
 a new reach of intellect, different combinations. The 
 independence of these different evidences upon each 
 other, indescribably augments their force. In fact, the 
 annals of mankind never exhibited such a religion as 
 Christianity surrounded with her credentials, nor any 
 thino- like it. The svstems of Heathenism and Mahom- 
 medanism reflect a glory on revelation by the contrast 
 which they exhibit in these respects, as well iis iti 
 every other. 
 
 And yet the simplicity of these different evidences 
 of our religion is as remarkable as their number and 
 diversity. For they are level to every understanding. 
 They address themselves to the faculty of judgment 
 with ^^diich we are endowed. The reader of history, 
 the student of nature, the scholar, the contemplative 
 philosopher, the uneducated incpiirer, the candid mind 
 of every class, may fmd obvious and satisfactory proofs 
 adapted to his habits and capacities, if there is no 
 bad faith, every one that investigates this great ques- 
 tion, will hnd the satisflictioii he seeks for. 
 
 We only observe, further, that the proper force and 
 strength of these evidences, lies in the union of all the 
 parts of the argument. This Bishop Butler has pointed 
 out, chiefly in respect of the analogical argument ; but 
 it is important to be applied to the entire subject. 
 One point may more forcibly strike the conviction of 
 one inquirer, and another point of another ; a separate 
 argument may be weakly stated by the Christian 
 advocate; mistakes may be made in deducing a par- 
 ticular historical proof, or alleging a particular fact. 
 But the cause of Christianity does not rest on any one 
 division of the subject, but on the whole. Each separate 
 branch is, indeed, firm enough to sustain the entire 
 edifice ; but we are not allowed to let it rest there. 
 We must remind the sincere inquirer that it is the 
 combined effect of the various topics, which he is called 
 
WILSON'S ANALOGY. 393 
 
 on to observe. And if this be done, we fear not to 
 assert that no such inquirer shall fail of all the satis- 
 faction which a moral certainty can produce. The 
 infidel attacks Christianity generally on some single 
 isolated point of evidence ; and if he can contrive to 
 obscure the brightness of this, triumphs as if he had 
 proved the religion to be fictitious. And not only so, 
 but if he can onlv raise a doubt about the truth of this 
 single, and perhaps subordinate point, he turns this 
 doubt into what he calls a positive argument against 
 Christianity. But this is unfair and disingenuous. 
 Christianity reposes on the entire structure of her 
 evidences — a structure which has never, as yet, been 
 fairly assailed, much less weakened or destroyed ; and 
 which rears its front in undiminished stability and 
 g]ory, mocking at its feeble and discomfited opponents. 
 
 Having thus given a view of the connexion of the 
 Analogical argument, with the other branches of the 
 Christian evidence, and of its particular use and impor- 
 tance, we now proceed, 2dly, To offer some remarks on 
 Butler's particular view of Christianitij , and on the 
 adaptation of his argument to practical religion in all its 
 extent. 
 
 For the reader will have observed, that the great 
 argument of the analogy is designed rather to silence 
 objections, than to expound or defend the minute and 
 interior topics of Christianity, on which the life and 
 influence of piety, as a practical principle, very much 
 depend. Indeed the end of all treatises on the Evi- 
 dences of religion, must be the establishment of the 
 truth of it generally, and not the particular develop- 
 ment of its parts. Such treatises meet the unbeliever, 
 as much as possible on his own ground, and attempt to 
 gain his assent to the credentials of the divine doctrine, 
 leaving the details of that doctrine to the ordinary 
 teachers of Christianity, or the various practical works, 
 which treat professedly of them. The general features, 
 therefore, of the Christian religion are all that it falls 
 within the province of the writer on Evidences to 
 delineate fully ; taking care that his allusions to the 
 inward grace and power of it be calculated to lead the 
 
394 WILSON'S ANALOGY. 
 
 reader on to ade([uate views of the whole. These 
 features Bisliop Butler has seized with a master's eye. 
 The moral goverunieut of God by rewards and punish- 
 ments, the state of discipline which this world is for a 
 future one; the corruption of man, the guilt of sin, the 
 mediation of Christ, the propitiatory Sacrifice of his 
 death, and his invisible government of his church ; the 
 assistance and grace of the Holy Spirit ; the second 
 advent of our Lord to judgment ; the seriousness of 
 mind which the subject of religion demands — these 
 commanding truths are the first elements and charac- 
 teristics of Christianity, and are nobly defended and 
 cleared from objections by our Author. 
 
 At the same time, it cannot, and need not be con- 
 cealed, that the occasional hints which fall from him, 
 on the particular grace of the Christian religion, and its 
 operation on the heart, are far from being so explicit. 
 His references to the precise nature of our justification 
 before God — to the extent of the fall and ruin of man 
 by sin — to the work of the Holy Spirit in regeneration 
 and sanctifi cation — and to the consolatory, cheering, 
 vivifying effects of peace of conscience, and commu- 
 nion with God, and hope of rest and joy in heaven, do 
 not correspond with the largeness of the case. They 
 are partial and defective. They might and should have 
 embraced, incidentally at least, some intimations of the 
 peculiar structure and design of spiritual religion. The 
 powerful argument in hand should at times have been 
 carried out to its consequences. The inexperienced 
 theological student would not then have been in 
 danger of drawing erroneous conclusions, on some prac- 
 tical points of great importance. 
 
 It is therefore to guard the youtliful reader from error 
 as to the nature of practical Christianity, that the fol- 
 lowing reflections are offered, some of which will only 
 go to explain what may be misapprehended in our 
 Author's language and argument; others will attempt 
 to suggest some additional thoughts on topics which 
 may appear deficient. Some notice will then be taken 
 of the easy adaptation of his argument to the .practice 
 and experience of religion in all its extent. 
 
WILSON'S ANALOGY. 395 
 
 1. Let us first suggest a hint on the 'nature and impor- 
 tance of Natural Religion as stated by Bisho]? Butler. 
 Various mistakes have arisen, both as to what is meant 
 by this term, and as to its efficacy, independently of 
 Christianity. Nor have there been wanting those who 
 have denied altogether its existence, and its subser- 
 viency to the Christian doctrine. 
 
 By Natural Religion, Bishop Butler understands 
 religion generally, as distinguished from those modifi- 
 cations of it which revelation superinduced. Natural 
 Religion is that service, and those religious regards to 
 Almighty God, which men owe to Him, as their 
 Creator and Benefactor, and which arise out of the 
 relations in which they stand to Him, as the rational 
 and accountable beings whom he formed for his glory, 
 and governs by his law. These primitive obligations 
 may plainly be distinguished from Christianity, Avhich 
 is an additional dispensation, revealing the divine and 
 stupendous scheme of the recovery of man from his 
 state of ruin and guilt, by the Son and Spirit of God. 
 Indeed Natural Religion is, properly speaking, distinct 
 from those anticipations of the Christian redemption, 
 wdiich the early revelations to our first parents, to the 
 patriarchs and to the Jewish people comprised. The 
 traditions, it is true, of these early revelations, mingled 
 with the faint traces of man's moral nature which have 
 survived the fall, constitute the religion of nature, as 
 now seen in the various heathen nations, where the 
 bright light of the last revelation, the Christian, has 
 not reached. But Butler, usually restrains the meaning 
 of the term to the doctrine of a future state, where 
 every one shall be rewarded or punished according to 
 his deserts ; and to those duties which man owes to 
 God, as his moral and righteous Creator and Governor. 
 
 This religion was originally impressed on the heart 
 of man, as " created in righteousness and true hohness," 
 and consists of those habits and acts of subjection, 
 obedience, reverence, love, adoration, gratitude, trust, 
 prayer, communion, resignation, and praise, which an 
 upright, but finite and dependant being, owed to its 
 Sovereign and its Benefactor, and the reward conse- 
 
396 WILSON'S ANALOGY. 
 
 quent on which was to be eternal life. This divine 
 impression on the heart was eilliced by the fall ; and 
 now these habits and affections are only to be acquired 
 by the li^ht and grace of Christianity. It is this reve- 
 lation which has repaired the ruins of the fall, brought 
 in a remedy for the apostacy and wickedness of man- 
 kind, restored the enfeebled, and almost extinguished 
 powers of natural religion, added surprising discoveries 
 of divine wisdom and mercy, in the sacrifice of the 
 Son of God, and the mission of the Holy Spirit, 
 enjoined important correspondent duties and obliga- 
 tions ; and thus modified the original scheme of reli- 
 gion by these new characteristics. 
 
 It is, therefore, very fair for a Christian writer, like 
 our Bishop, to distinguish, in his course of reasoning, 
 the two series of habits and feelings ; those which con- 
 stitute religion as springing from our relation to God, 
 as our heavenly Creator and Lord, and those which 
 constitute religion, as springing from our relation to 
 Christ, as our Mediator, and to the Holy Spirit, as our 
 Sanctifier, and to our heavenly Father, as being the 
 Father of mercies, and the God of all consolation. It 
 is thus the apostle Paul speaks of the Gentiles, which 
 *' have not the law, being a law unto themselves, which 
 show the work of the law written in their hearts." It 
 is thus the same apostle expounds the chief truths to 
 be learned from the law, to be " God's eternal power 
 and Godhead, wdiich might be clearly seen by the 
 things which were made ;" and charges the heathens 
 with " not liking to retain God in their knowledge," 
 and with " becoming fools, while professing themselves 
 to be wise ;" and, indeed, with committing, and glory- 
 ing in those vices, and crimes, and passions, which 
 " they knew were, by the judgment of God, worthy of 
 death." The same apostle's argument at Athens, and 
 his discourse to the Lacaonians, proceed on this suppo- 
 sition, that there was such a thing as the light and reli- 
 gion of nature, independently, not of revelation, in the 
 first instance, but of the Christian, or last revelation by 
 the Gospel. 
 
 Accordingly, in the present age, as well as in all pre- 
 
WILSON'S ANALOGY. 397 
 
 ceclini^ ones, the vestiges of natural conscience may be 
 traced, however corrupted. Some notion of a Supreme 
 Being, and of worship being due to him — some glim- 
 merinos of the doctrine of a future state — some idea of 
 the efficacv of sacrifices — some acknowledgment of the 
 obligations of veracity and justice — some remains, in 
 short, of a moral sense, are discovered, in greater or 
 less force, amidst the scattered fragments of the Pagan 
 superstitions. There is every where in man, the capa- 
 city of being restored to all that Christianity designs 
 and promises. 
 
 All this is clear and unembarrassed ground. The 
 disputed territory lies beyond. For when we come to 
 inquire, whether men, since the fall, ever discovered 
 these natural truths originally, or regained them when 
 lost, or acted upon them efficiently in their conduct, we 
 have a host of assailants to contend with. And yet, 
 vSurely, no doubt can be fairly said to rest on these 
 questions. All experience declares, that natural reli- 
 gion, unless illuminated and guided by the light of 
 Christianity, is impotent and helpless. All experience 
 declares, that men, destitute of Christianity, grow 
 worse and worse. No example has been ever pro- 
 duced, either of a Pagan nation acting up to the scat- 
 tered notices of religion which it possessed, or recover- 
 ing the purity of it when once lost by the lapse of time, 
 or the progress of vice. And the high probability is, 
 setting aside, for the sake of argument, the testimony 
 of Scripture, that the flint light which nature possesses, 
 was an irradiation from the first revelation of God to 
 man. 
 
 Butler is decidedly of opinion that this is the case. 
 He says, " As there is no hint or intimation in history, 
 that this system (of iiutural religion) was first reasoned 
 out ; so there is express historical, or traditional evi- 
 dence as ancient as history, that it was taught first by 
 revelation." He seems likewise, to hold strongly, that 
 such faint traces of this original revelation as remain, 
 aided by the fragments of man's moral nature, are so 
 inefficient, from the want of essential parts, from the 
 absence of authority and sanction, and from the inter- 
 
398 WILSON'S ANALOGY. 
 
 mixture of gross errors and idolatries,, as rather to 
 strengthen than curb, much less subdue, tlie passions 
 and vices of mankind. Those relics of truth, therefore, 
 being thus impotent of themselves, and being unac- 
 companied by any assurance of pardon, or any promises 
 of grace and assistance, only demonstrate, in every 
 age, and in every quarter of the world, by the state in 
 vrhich they leave men, the indispensable necessity and 
 infinite importance of Christianity. 
 
 On the whole, there appears no objection to the term 
 Natural Religion in the sense explained. Whether 
 any better, and more distinctive expression could 
 have been devised to convey the idea of essential and 
 primitive religion, as different from revealed and super- 
 induced religion, is scarcely worth the inquiry. The 
 use of the present term has prevailed ; and it needs 
 only to be employed aright, in order to stand free from 
 just exception. 
 
 Natural religion, in subserviency to Christianity, is 
 of great importance. It is everywhere taken for 
 granted in Scripture, and confirmed and strengthened 
 by the manner in which truth is addressed to man. 
 All the evidences of revealed religion appeal to our 
 moral nature, and meet precisely the faculty of judging 
 which we still possess ; and would have no medium of 
 proof — and, therefore, no authority to convince — if this 
 moral sense should be denied. Moreover, it becomes 
 yet more important, in proportion as the light of Chris- 
 tianity, diffused around it, illuminates, in some faint 
 degree, its grosser darkness, and dispels its baser cor- 
 ruptions and superstitions. In Christian countries, men 
 wdio reject Christianity insensibly repair the decayed 
 and dilapidated temple of nature with the materials 
 which it supplies. And it is with natural religion, in 
 this form, that we have chiefly to treat in this country. 
 It then serves to show men, that their consciences are 
 bound, not only by the law of Christianity which they 
 spurn and reject, but by the law of nature, of which 
 they cannot divest themselves ; not only by the infinite 
 benefits and stupendous discoveries of the revelation of 
 the Gospel, to which they ought to bow, but by the 
 
WILSON'S ANALOGY. 399 
 
 truths impre.ssed originally on the nature of man, and 
 sanctioned and enlarged in the primitive revelations of 
 the Creator to him — revelations, of which every glim- 
 mering ray of knowledge, every feeble emotion of con- 
 science, every remaining barrier between virtue and 
 vice, every impression of the responsibility of man, 
 every anticipation of future judgment, every relic and 
 trace of an immortal and accountable spirit, are proofs 
 and consequences. Thus men are reminded, that they 
 do not escape from moral government by rejecting 
 Christianity, but fall back on a ruined and unaided 
 principle, which leaves them just as responsible to God, 
 the Creator and Judge, as before — only with the accu- 
 mulated guilt of having spurned the only way of pardon 
 and grace which the infinite mercy of God had provided 
 for them. 
 
 The consideration of natural religion is also valuable, 
 as it points out the grounds of those exhortations, 
 warnings, reproofs, invitations, and commands which 
 constitute so very large a proportion of the whole 
 Scriptures, and on which revealed religion proceeds, 
 and by which it works. The duty of man remains un- 
 altered, notwithstanding his sinfulness and moral impo- 
 tency ; his capacity of receiving instruction, and being 
 the subject of persuasion and alarm remains the same, 
 though he has liilien from his original rectitude; his 
 guilt in rejecting the invitations of mercy, and the 
 remonstrances of conscience, remain undiminished, 
 though his power of complying with them must be 
 sought for from above. Further, the use of all the 
 means of grace as adapted to his reasonable and moral 
 nature — the exhibition and application of all the terrors 
 of the law, and of ail the grace of the Gospel, as the 
 proper object of his aflfections, together with the earn- 
 estness and importunity with which these topics should 
 be enforced — all rest on the plain footing, that some 
 remains of feeling, and conscience, and light, rest with 
 man, by which it pleases God to work in the dispen- 
 sation of his Spirit. 
 
 Nor is the religion of nature less important, as fixing, 
 in some measure, the ends, and guiding the course, of 
 
400 WILSON'S ANALOGY. 
 
 that which is revealed. All the chief ahiises of the 
 scheme of grace in the Gospel would be guarded 
 against, if not excluded, if natural religion were allowed 
 its subordinate influence. Such abuses spring from the 
 desire, often laudable in its apparent object, of carrying 
 the doctrines of the Gospel to their full measure, and 
 applying them to the heart in their exuberant consola- 
 tion. Hence men come first to deny natural religion — 
 then to object to the practical exhortations of the 
 Gospel; next to assert, that the state of death in 
 trespasses and sins in which men lie, makes all pre- 
 cepts contradictory, and all warnings fruitless; and, 
 lastly, to spurn the authority and obligation of the 
 moral law of God, aud reject all the doctrines of Chris- 
 tian morals and Christian obedience. Thus an opening- 
 is made, insensibly, to the worst abuses of the Divine 
 mercy and grace — abuses which a more implicit regard 
 to the Scriptures, on the subject of the essential nature 
 of religion, would have prevented. The end of Chris- 
 tianity is to make us holy — to bring us back to the purity 
 from Avhich we fell — to make natural religion practica- 
 ble, possible, delightful ; to infuse into it the humility 
 which becomes a fallen condition — the faith in an atone- 
 ment Avhich the sacrifice of the cross demands — the 
 gratitude and love Avhich the benefits of that cross 
 require — the dependance on the blessed Spirit which 
 our feebleness makes indispensable — the joy which the 
 hope of heaven warrants and bestows. Thus Chris- 
 tianity modifies, indeed, the essential religion first 
 taught in the original revelation to man, and impressed 
 on his heart ; but never contradicts it — never swerves 
 from the same end — never releases from its main obli- 
 gations — never violates its primary principles and 
 dictates. Man is only bound more strongly, by all the 
 benefits of Christianity to the obedience Avliich he was, 
 by nature, formed and designed to render to his God ; 
 and the moment he views those benefits in a manner to 
 loosen, instead of confirming, the bonds of this obedi- 
 ence, he may conclude he is mistaking the whole end 
 and object of the Christian revelation. 
 
 2. But this leads us to make an observation on some 
 
WILSON'S ANALOGY. 401 
 
 of our great Author's expressions and sentiments, on the 
 remains of Natural Religion, and on the grounds of our 
 justification and acceptance ivith God, which seem open to 
 exception. For whilst we thus claim for natural reli- 
 gion, what the Scriptures clearly imply, or rather incul- 
 cate, and defend Butler on this point, we must cautiously 
 avoid the dangerous error of attributing to it a power, 
 which, in the fallen state of man, it does not and cannot 
 possess, and which may militate against what the same 
 Scriptures teach of the extent of man's depravity, and 
 the necessity of divine grace, in order to his doing any 
 thing spiritually good. And, therefore, the language 
 which occurs in some parts of the Analogy, on the 
 nature and powers of man, may appear to be too 
 strong, too general, too unqualified. We speak here 
 with hesitation, because, considering the line of argu- 
 ment pursued by this most able writer, and the class 
 of persons he addressed, it may be doubted whether 
 this remark is applicable in fairness or not. Still we 
 cannot but think, that he sometimes attributes too 
 much to the unaided nature of man, allows too much to 
 his moral sense and feeling, dwells too largely on his 
 tendencies to virtue and goodness, and speaks too 
 ambiguously on the ground of his justification before 
 God. Such expressions as the following, considering 
 the connexion in which they stand, are open to abuse : 
 " Moral nature given us by God " — " falling in with our 
 natural apprehension and sense of things " — " There is 
 nothing in the human mind contradictory to virtue " — 
 *' The moral law is interwoven in our nature " — " Men 
 may curb their passions for temporal motives in as great 
 a degree as piety commonly requires " — " Natural reli- 
 gion is the foundation and principal part of Chris- 
 tianity" — "Men's happiness and virtue are left to 
 themselves, are put in their own power " — " Religion 
 requires nothing which men are not well able to per- 
 form " — " The relation in which we stand to God the 
 Father, is made known to us by reason." Such lan- 
 guage continually occurring, together with the terms, 
 "virtue, vice, honest man, satisfaction of virtue, vicioiLS- 
 ness of the world," &c. (instead of the scriptural terms, 
 26 
 
402 WILSON'S ANALOGY, 
 
 "holiness, sin, renewed man, peace of conscience, 
 corruption and wickedness of the Avorld,") may have 
 the tendency to exalt too highly the present fiillen and 
 corrupted powers of man, and prevent that deep and 
 thorough humiliation which are necessary to a due 
 appreciation and reception of the grace of the gospel. 
 They tend also to lessen the guilt of man hefore God, 
 and lower the standard of that holiness which the Chris- 
 tian doctrine requires and produces. Some most 
 excellent observations and statements are indeed made, 
 in the course of the work, on the mediation of Christ, 
 and the influences of the Spirit, which go to correct 
 the misapprehension to which I am referring ; but these 
 parts of the work bear but a small proportion to the 
 whole treatise; whereas the expressions in question 
 occur perpetually, and in every variety of form, and 
 under each division of the argiunent. They form 
 the staple, and enter into the contexture, and give 
 the colour, to the entire fabric. And thence arises 
 the danger which we venture to point out. We do 
 not dwell here on the fact, that this light of nature is 
 in Christian countries reflected from Christianity, and 
 is never found where Christianity is unknown. Nor 
 do we stop to suggest, that natural religion, in its best 
 and oldest times, confessed its weakness, and sought 
 for help and aid. We are content to take things in 
 their most favourable construction ; and we still profess 
 our conviction, that all language is reprehensible, 
 which, by fair inference, leads men to think they can 
 repent, and turn from sin to God, without his special 
 and effectual grace. And in this view, we would 
 caution the student against affixing too strong a sense 
 to the expressions which we have cited. 
 
 In connexion with this remark, we must unequivo- 
 cally declare our apprehension, that the language used 
 by our Author, in speaking of the Almighty finally ren- 
 dering to every one according to his works, and estab- 
 lishing the entire rights of distributive justice, is open 
 to objection. Perhaps, if taken alone, it might admit 
 of a favourable interpretation; but, when joined with 
 the overstatements already noticed, on the powers of 
 
WILSON'S ANALOGY., 403 
 
 man and the remains of natural religion, it becomes 
 decidedly dangerous. Tlie great doctrine of our justi- 
 fication before God, "not by our own works and de- 
 servings, but only for the merits of our Lord Jesus 
 Christ," is too fundamental, and too important, to be 
 undermined, even incidentally. We refer to such ex- 
 pressions as the following : "The advantages of Christi- 
 anity will be bestowed upon every one, in proportion 
 to the degrees of his virtue " — " Divine goodness may be 
 a disposition to make the good, the faithful, the honest 
 man happy" — " We have scope and opportunities here, 
 for that good and bad behaviour which God will reward 
 and punish hereafter " — "Religion teaches us, that we 
 are placed here, to qualify us, by the practice of virtue, 
 for another state which is to follow it " — " Our repent- 
 ance is accepted to eternal life." These, and similar 
 statements, occur throughout the w ork. In the second 
 part, where the leading features of revealed religion 
 are delineated, they ought, by all means, to have been 
 accompanied with those modiiications which the super- 
 induced scheme of the gospel, and the necessities of 
 man, and the glory of the cross of Christ, and the ends 
 of self-knowledge and humility require. We say they 
 should have been accompanied by such modiiications, 
 because they are so accompanied in the Holy Scriptures. 
 The doctrine, that " every one shall receive the things 
 done in the body," that "they that have done good shall 
 rise to the resurrection of life, and they that have done 
 evil to the re.surrection of damnation," is most true, and 
 most important. But the doctrines which accompany 
 and modify this fundamental truth, should never be 
 wdiolly lost sight of even in a treatise on Evidences, 
 wdien any reference is made to the subject. We are 
 taught in Ihe New Testament, that these works must 
 spring from faith and love to our Saviour Christ, and 
 must be renounced in point of merit, on account of the 
 inherent evil which defiles the very best of them, and 
 must be accepted only through that Sacrifice vvhich is 
 the real footing of a sinner's dealings with a holy God, 
 and must be regarded by those who perform them, with 
 that deep humility, and almost unconsciousness of having 
 
404 WILSON'S ANALOGY, 
 
 done them, which is sostroui^^ly marked in the conduct 
 of the riijhteous, in our Lord's account of the last dav. 
 Now, these modifications are so essential, that the lan- 
 guage of our author, however undesignedly, becomes 
 really dangerous when stripped of them. And man is 
 so prone to pride, self-coniidence, reliance on his own 
 merits, and presumptuous ignorance of his failings ; and 
 the Apostle Paul insists so warmly on the immense im- 
 portance of the doctrine of justification without Avorks, 
 that too much caution cannot be used in the most inci- 
 dental representations given on such subjects. 
 
 It is the more necessary to guard against a false re- 
 liance on our own works and deservings, because a 
 mistake here pervades and corrupts every other part 
 of religion. The good works of the pious Christian, 
 whose mind is duly imbued with a becoming sense of 
 his fall and corruption, of his unutterable obligations to 
 the great propitiation, and his entire dependance on 
 the influences of the Holy Spirit, are very different from 
 the partial, external, w'orldly, selfish, proud perform- 
 ances of the nominal professor of Christianity. The 
 morality of the nominal Christian rises very little higher 
 than that of the unbeliever ; his rule is fashion ; his limit, 
 convenience ; his aim, to do as little as possible in reli- 
 gion. He performs some actions, indeed, which agree, 
 as to their form and external appearance, with the law 
 of God ; but, in truth, spring from habit, ambition, the 
 love of reputation, the regard to society, the remon- 
 strances of conscience. He soon fills up what he con- 
 cludes to be intended by a pious and virtuous life. He 
 soon attains to his own definition of a faithful honest 
 man. He soon satisfies himself that his virtues surpass 
 and overbalance his vices, and that, as he is to be judged 
 according to his works, he has nothing to fear before 
 the tribunal of Christ. In the mean time, his heart is 
 alienated from God and true obedience to him; faith 
 and love never visit his breast; and his religion consists 
 with prejudice, perhaps hatred and exasperation, against 
 the real system of the gospel. 
 
 The truly devout Christian, on the contrary, aims at 
 holiness, and not merely what the world calls virtue ; 
 
WILSON'S ANALOGY. 405 
 
 endeavours to subdue his passions, as well as regulate 
 his conduct ; labours to serve God, and adorn Christi- 
 anity, and do good to others, to the very utmost of his 
 power ; spends much time and care in watching over 
 his motives, and cultivating the inward principles of 
 piety ; devotes a portion of the day to the reading of the 
 Scriptures, to the public and private calls of devotion, 
 to self-examination, thanksgiving, and religious regards 
 towards the ever blessed God, and his Saviour and 
 Redeemer Christ. And after he has done all, he ac- 
 counts himself an unprofitable servant, renounces all 
 merit in his own works, attributes every good in them 
 to the divine grace, and places all his trust in the vica- 
 rious sacrifice of the Son of God. He is the publican 
 smiting on his breast, and saying, *' God be merciful to 
 me a sinner ;" whilst all other men, however pure in the 
 eyes of the world, are, in fiict, like the Pharisee, swollen 
 with conceit and arrogance, dwelling, fondly on their 
 own performances ; looking perhaps, with contempt on 
 others, and placing no real trust in the mercy of God. 
 Thus, even if all the separate expressions above advert- 
 ed to, could be defended, yet would they still lead to 
 a wrong end, because unattended with these explana- 
 tions which the Scriptures carefully supply. We are 
 to be *' judged according to our works," and shall be 
 rewarded or punished "according to the deeds done in 
 the body ;" but in a high and transcendent sense in the 
 case of the righteous, as their w^orks spring from faith, 
 are the effects of grace, and are accompanied with hu- 
 mility and self-renunciation. 
 
 3. These observations lead me to notice a general 
 defect, as it seems to me, in our Author's representation of 
 the stupendous recovery of man provided in the Gospel. 
 For if any doubt could be raised on the inexpediency 
 of the above language, all such^ doubt would be 
 removed, when we find, on further examination, that 
 our Bishop's allusions to the whole doctrine of redemp- 
 tion and salvation, as revealed in the New Testament, 
 are not sufficiently clear and comprehensive to agree 
 fully with the Scriptural statements of our natural cor- 
 luption, and of the operations of grace as adapted to it. 
 
406 WILSON'S ANALOGY. 
 
 Let us not be misunderstood. Bishop Butler is far 
 from omitting altogether the pecuHar scheme of the 
 gospel. He states distinctly the insufficiency of repent- 
 ance alone to restore us to God's favour. He speaks 
 with admirable clearness on the Mediation and. Sacri- 
 fice of Christ. He quotes the passages in Scripture, 
 ■which teach the vicarious nature of Christ's sufferings, 
 and insists on the benefit of those sufferings being 
 something much beyond mere instruction or example. 
 On these subjects, at least on some parts of them, no 
 complaint can be alleged against his brief statements ; 
 they are luminous and adequate, for an elementary 
 treatise. Still the general idea of the scheme of the 
 gospel as a dispensation of grace, which would be 
 gathered from the whole of his representations and 
 suggestions, would be erroneous. He calls Chris- 
 tianity " a moral system;" he speaks of it as teaching us 
 chiefly "new duties, and new relations in which we 
 stand;" he describes it as " an additional order of 
 Providence." These expressions are cold and inade- 
 quate. But we object most of all to the following pas- 
 sage : " The doctrine of the gospel appears to be, not 
 only that Christ taught the efficacy of repentance, but 
 rendered it of the efficacy which it is, by what he did 
 and suffered for us ; that he obtained for us the benefit 
 of having our repentance accepted unto eternal life ; 
 not only that he revealed to sinners, that they were in 
 a capacity of salvation, and how they might obtain it ; 
 but moreover, that he put tliem into this capacity of 
 salvation, by what he did and suffered for them ; put 
 us into a capacity of escaping future punishment, and 
 obtaining future happiness. And it is our wisdom, 
 thankfully to accept the benefit, by performing the con- 
 ditions upon which it is offered, on our part, without 
 disputing how it was procured on his." (Part H. 
 Chap. V. § vi.) Surely this is plainly deficient. Surely 
 the salvation of Christ proceeds on a different footing, 
 and includes much more than this. Surely the great 
 Sacrifice of the cross not only obtained for the sincere 
 believer, that his " repentance should be accepted to 
 eternal life," (a phrase unscriptural in its very term*,^ 
 
WILSON'S ANALOGY. 407 
 
 not only put him in a capacity of salvation, not only pro- 
 posed certain conditions to be performed on bis part — 
 all wbicb places the stress of salvation upon ourselves, 
 makes the reception and application of it to depend on 
 our own efforts, and leaves to our Lord merely the 
 office of removing external hinderances affording us some 
 aid by his Spirit, and supplying deficiencies — but pur- 
 chased also salvation itself, in all the amplitude of that 
 mighty blessing ; procured pardon, reconciliation, jus- 
 tification, adoption, acceptance, the gift of the Holy 
 Spirit, and the promise of everlasting life. Surely sal- 
 vation brings men from darkness unto light, reverses 
 the sentence of condemnation, and makes them " the 
 righteousness of God in Christ ;" it places them under 
 a new covenant, and confers the grace necessary for 
 " repentance towards God, and faith towards our Lord 
 Jesus Christ ;" it puts them on the footing, not of the 
 law, but of the gospel, not of works, but of grace ; not 
 of obtaining acceptance for their repentance, but of 
 receiving " the gift of God, which is eternal life." Let 
 Butler's summary of the benefits of Christ's death be 
 compared with such summaries as the Apostle gives : — 
 *' We have redemption through his blood, even the 
 forgiveness of sins " — " By grace are ye saved, through 
 faith ; and that not of yourselves, it is the gift of God ; 
 not of works, lest any man should boast ; for we are 
 his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus unto good 
 works, which God hath before ordained, that we should 
 walk in them." 
 
 With this defective view of the fruits of our Lord's 
 Propitiation, is allied a correspondent defect as to the 
 nature and importance of faith, by which the benefits 
 of that propitiation are received and applied. The ten- 
 dency of some of Butler's summary statements, Jiowever 
 undesigned, and arising perhaps, in some measure, from 
 his coldness in pressing the particular course of his ar- 
 gument, is to lead the reader to suppose that the eflfects 
 of Christ's redemption are enjoyed by all who profess 
 the Christian religion, and live a moral life ; that is, by 
 all who have that general belief in the doctrine of 
 Christianity, which springs from education and rational 
 
408 WILSON'S ANALOGY. 
 
 conviction, if they are free from gross sin, cultivate vir- 
 tue, and set a good example to others, by a decent re- 
 putable conduct. All these things are indeed included 
 in the acts and fruits of a true and lively faith, but they 
 reach not those peculiar effects and properties of it 
 which prove it to be spiritual and salutary. Faith is 
 "the substance of things hoped for, and the evidence 
 of things not seen." It is a secret, cordial, holy exer- 
 cise of the understanding and aifections, in receiving 
 God's testimony concerning Christ, and in reposing all 
 the trust and coniidence of the soul on the merits of 
 that Saviour for everlasting life. It is not merely a ge- 
 neral, cold, historical assent to certain truths ; but a 
 particular affectionate, living, practical behef of them, 
 on the authority of God, and an acting fully upon them, 
 as infinitely good and important. It is not simply a 
 notion, a creed, an established hereditary sentiment ; 
 but a holy principle, springing from a personal sense of 
 our lost condition, and apprehending for ourselves 
 the blessings of Christ, and relying upon them for 
 everlasting salvation. Faith is tlie eye which looks 
 to Christ, as the brazen serpent which Moses raised ; it 
 is the foot which flies to Him, as the man-slayer fled to 
 the city of refuge, that he might escape the avenger of 
 blood ; it is the hand which receives, as a needy beggar, 
 the inestimable gift of God, freely offered to him ; it is 
 the ear which hears, with eager solicitude, the voice 
 and invitation of mercy, that it may live ; it is the ap- 
 petite wdiich " hungers and thirsts" after Christy and 
 feeds on his flesh "and drinks his blood," that it may 
 have eternal life. Faith, like Noah, prepares the ark, 
 and enters it for rescue ; fixith builds on Christ the sure 
 foundation, fiiith puts on Christ, as the robe of righteous- 
 ness, and the garment of salvation. Accordingly, its 
 effects correspond with its divine origin, and the match- 
 less benefits it receives. It " works by love," it " over- 
 comes the world," it "sees Iliin who is invisible," it 
 "glories in tribulation," it "piu-ifies the heart," it anti- 
 cipates heaven, it " quenches the fiery darts of the 
 wicked one," it produces uniform, spiritual, cheerful, 
 willing obedience. Let any one read what the Scnjv 
 
WILSON'S ANALOGY. 409 
 
 tures assert of faith, what they ascribe to it, and the 
 earnestness with which they enforce its necessity, and 
 he will be convinced, that it is totally different from 
 that dead, speculative assent to the Christian scheme, 
 which is often confounded with it. Faith includes, 
 besides the general reception of Christianity, a particu- 
 lar conviction of our own sins, a particular apprehension 
 of our own lost estate, a personal application for our- 
 selves of the offered blessings of the gospel, and a 
 distinct and spiritual reliance for our own salvation, 
 on the death and merits of our Saviour Christ; — and 
 some reference should have been made to all this by 
 our Author; at least, no expression, however brief, 
 should have been inconsistent with it. 
 
 4. All main defects in our views of practical Christi- 
 anity hang together. The same kind of inadequate state- 
 ments, therefore, seem to us to he chargeable on our author's 
 remarks on the doctrine of the Holy Ghost. Indeed we 
 are not sure if serious omissions are not to be found 
 here — more serious than on most of the preceding topics. 
 Bishop Butler allows indeed distinctly, that the Holy 
 Spirit is our Sanctifier, and that the recovery of man- 
 kind is a scheme carried on by the Son and Spirit of 
 God. He speaks frequently of the aid which the Spirit 
 affords to good men. He acknowledges that man is a de- 
 praved creature, and wants not merely to be improved, 
 iDut to be renewed ; and he quotes the striking text, 
 " Except a man be born of the Spirit, he cannot enter 
 into the kingdom of God." We would wish to give 
 the full benefit of these admissions in favour of the 
 Bishop, and against what we are about to state. Nor do 
 we doubt, that this remarkable man implored the ope- 
 rations of the Spirit in his own case ; experienced his 
 consolations, and ascribed every thing to his grace. 
 Still we conceive, his general language in his Analogy, 
 on this fundamental subject, does not come up to the 
 Scriptural standard. He does not give even that pro- 
 minence to it Avhich he does to the mediation of Christ. 
 He speaks of the Spirit as aiding, but scarcely at all, 
 as creating anew ; he describes his assistances, but 
 hardly ever his mighty operations in changing the whole 
 
410 WILSON'S ANALOGY. 
 
 heart ; he talks of his presence with good men, but sel- 
 dom, if at all, of his regeneration and conversion of the 
 wicked; he alloAVs co-operating, but not preventing 
 grace — at least, not clearly and distinctly, as the Scrip- 
 tures teach, and as the importance of the case requires ; 
 he dwells on the help of the Spirit, in subduing our 
 passions, and qualifying us for heaven, but passes over 
 slightly the illuminating influences of the Spirit, in 
 opening the understanding, and his transforming power, 
 in " taking away the heart of stone, and giving an heart 
 of flesh." We read little or nothing in our author of 
 the Holy Spirit's work in awakening men, like those 
 asleep; quickening them, as those dead in sin ; deliver- 
 ing them from the power of Satan, as those enslaved ; 
 convincing them of sin, as those ignorant and proud ; 
 creating in them a new and contrite heart, as those 
 obdurate and perverse; and implanting in them the first 
 seeds of repentance, faith, love, and obedience, as those 
 needing a new and heavenly birth. All this is of the 
 greatest importance, because if the foundations of true 
 obedience are not laid in the Scriptural doctrine of an 
 entire renewal of the fallen heart, the subsequent build- 
 ing must be slight and insecure. If men are not taught 
 the necessity of a new creation in Christ Jesus, in con- 
 sequence of the blindness of their understanding, as 
 w^ell as the disorder of their affections, they must, and 
 will begin, and we find, in fact, they do begin, their 
 religion in a proud, self-dependent temper ; in ignorance 
 of their own wants, and of the mighty change which 
 must take place in them. 
 
 The illumination of the Spirit is especially important 
 in this view. It is a doctrine humiliating, indeed, to 
 the proud reason of man, but essential to any real 
 knowledge of the Gospel of Christ, Our Lord places 
 the gift of the Spirit at the very entrance of the Chris- 
 tian Hfe, and directs men to pray for it, as the key and 
 summary of all other blessings, " Ask and ye shall 
 receive ; seek and ye shall find ; knock and it shall be 
 opened to you. If ye, being evil, know how to give 
 good gifts unto your children, how nmch more shall 
 your Father which is in heaven, give his Holy Spirit to 
 
WILSON'S ANALOGY. 411 
 
 tliem that ask him ?" It might have pleased God, for 
 any thing we know, to have given us a revelation so 
 framed as to be intelligible to us in all its parts, with- 
 out further aid ; or it might have pleased him to have 
 made the understanding of it, in all its parts, plainly 
 above our powers of mind, and capacities of compre- 
 hension. In either case we should then have had no 
 need of the illumination of the Spirit; in the first, 
 because the revelation would have been wholly level 
 to our natural powers ; in the second, because it would 
 have been wholly out of the reach of them. But it has 
 pleased God to give us a revelation, containing much 
 that is plain, in its history, its facts, its external duties, 
 its sacraments, its morals ; and much that is mysterious 
 and incomprehensible, in its vast scheme, in the 
 purpose and will of its divine Author, in the attributes 
 and glory of the persons of the Godhead, in the miracu- 
 lous conception and incarnation of our Lord, in the 
 wonders of the cross, and the operations of grace. 
 And at the same time, much also that is of a mixed 
 nature, being neither so plain as to be level to our un- 
 aided understanding, nor so elevated as to be wholly 
 placed above their compass and capacity ; but requiring 
 the special guidance and illumination of the Holy Spirit, 
 to be rightly apprehended and employed: — such is the 
 ruined state of man, the evil of sin, the nature of true 
 conversion to God, of faith, of love, of peace, of joy, of 
 communion with God, of new obedience ; all, in short, 
 that regards the application and use of truth. These 
 things cannot be understood by man in his natural 
 state, but must be learned by the teaching of the Holy 
 Spirit. And thus the plan of Christianity is, in this 
 view, a further test of men's characters. Thev must 
 stoop at the very threshold, and sue for a heavenly 
 light, and take other measures of sin, and themselves, 
 and God, and repentance, and faith, and conversion, 
 and obedience, than nature can give, or they will fatally 
 err. The ignorance and prejudices of the " evil heart 
 of unbelief," will infallibly betray them. Either no 
 sense will be put on the parts of the Scripture, relating 
 to these subjects, or a forced, low, insulTicient sense 
 
412 WILSON'S ANALOGY". 
 
 which evades, and explains away, instead of implicitly 
 receivin^^, the real meaning. Not that we claim ati 
 illumination of the Spirit Avhich supersedes at all the 
 use of the human faculties in studyino: the Bible, or 
 requires a new sense to be put on ordinary language 
 and construction, or communicates new truths, not 
 already revealed in the written word of God ; or 
 encourages or warrants enthusiasm and human fancies; 
 or intrenches on the miraculous powers conferred on 
 the apostles ; or alters the rule of duty, and the obliga- 
 tions of man to obey it ; or acts in a way of force 
 and compulsion inconsistent with our reasonable and 
 accountable nature. What we maintain, is the neces- 
 sity of the secret and imperceptible influence of the 
 Holy Spirit upon the understanding, sought by diligent 
 prayer, and communicated gradually, in the use of 
 rational means; by which the mind is freed from pre- 
 judice and aversion against truth, and is opened to 
 receive the instructions of the written word of God, in 
 their full and natural signification and use. 
 
 But we pause. This is not the place to enter on a 
 discussion of the work of the Holy Ghost in man's 
 sanctification. We have said enough, if we have con- 
 vinced the theological student that the impression 
 which Butler gives of this subject is far too slight and 
 superficial. Let it be well remembered, that God has 
 given us a revelation of his will, with the additional 
 promise of his Spirit, to make it effectual to its high 
 purposes. The light of heaven is not more necessary 
 to our discernment of natural objects and beauties, 
 than the light of the Spirit to our discernment of 
 spiritual objects and fitnesses. The characteristic of 
 the New Dispensation, is the promise of the Spirit. 
 And with this persuasion, we cannot dissemble our 
 fears, that the language of Bishop Butler may lead to 
 dangerous mistakes. 
 
 5. But, in truth, all these deficiencies, if we are right in 
 (Mr judgment about them, spring from an inadequate vieio 
 of the fallen state of man. We know the controversies 
 on this mysterious subject. We allow that statements 
 have too often been made, which go to annihilate man's 
 
WILSON'S ANALOGY. 413 
 
 moral nature, and his capacity of restoration ; which 
 weaken his responsibility and unnerve the exhortations 
 and invitations which the Scriptures address to him; 
 which extinguish the faint hght of natural conscience, 
 and repress effort and watchfulness. But we cannot 
 but know, at the same time, that the errors on the side 
 of extenuating and lessening the Scriptural account of 
 man's spiritual state since the fall, are equally danger- 
 ous, and more prevalent. We cannot therefore con- 
 ceal our conviction, that Butler's view of human 
 depravity does not fully meet the truth of the case, as 
 delineated in the inspired writings, and confirmed by 
 uniform experience. He speaks, we allow, occasion- 
 ally of men " having corrupted their natures," having 
 lost their " original rectitude," and as having permitted 
 " their passions to become excessive by repeated viola- 
 tions of their inward constitution." He avows that 
 mankind is in " a state of degradation, however difficult 
 it may be to account for it; and that the crime of our 
 first parents was the occasion of our being placed in a 
 more disadvantageous condition." "Yet, notwith- 
 standing these expressions, the sincerity and impor- 
 tance of which, so far as they go, we do not for a 
 moment call in question, he dwells, in the course of his 
 work, so copiously on -man's powers and capacities — on 
 his " fiwouring virtue " — on his " having within him the 
 principle of amendment " — on " its being in his own 
 power to take the path of life " — on " virtue being 
 agreeable to his nature " — on " vice never being chosen 
 for its own sake ;" that we cannot but consider the 
 result as dangerous. If these expressions were quali- 
 fied, as they are in Scripture, by other and explanatory 
 statements, the danger would be less ; but standing as 
 they do, they convey the idea, that man is not that 
 inconsistent, weak, corrupt, perverse, depraved, impo- 
 tent creature which the Word of God teaches us he 
 is. The consequence of slight impressions of this great 
 truth infallibly is, that men, not being duly instructed 
 in their real state before God, cannot ffeel that humility, 
 nor exercise that penitence, nor sue for that renewal, 
 which all depend on the primary fact of a total moral 
 
414 WILSON'S ANALOGY. 
 
 t 
 
 ruin ; and which form the adaptation between tlie real 
 grace of the Gospel, and the actual wants of man. 
 Thus all the great ends of Christianity are missed, and 
 inferior benefits only are derived from it. Neither 
 conversion on the one hand, nor real obedience fo God 
 on the other, can be attained; and the arch, deprived 
 of its key-stone, as it were, loses both its beauty and 
 its streni^th. 
 
 The Scriptural account of man is, that " he is born in 
 sin and shapen in iniquity " — that " in him dwelleth no 
 ffood thini,^" — that "his heart is deceitful above all 
 things, and desperately wicked " — that "the very ima- 
 ginations of the thoughts of his heart are only evil con- 
 tinually" — that "he cannot, of himself, think any thing 
 that is good " — that " he is dead in trespasses and 
 sins " — that " he is by nature a child of wrath," — lost, 
 enslaved, miserable, ignorant, corrupt ; — his heart " at 
 enmity wdth God " — his passions and affections set on 
 " divers lusts and pleasures " — his w hole moral nature 
 " alienated from the life of God." This strong language 
 is not contradictory to what the Scriptures, from which 
 it is taken, teach of man's responsibility — his remain- 
 ing sense of right and wrong — his conscience — his 
 fears of judgment — ^his duty and his obligations ; but 
 it plainly instructs us, that these relics and fragments 
 of a former rectitude, are relics and fragments, and 
 nothing more ; and that as to any effective love of holi- 
 ness — as to any real return to God — as to any positive 
 efforts to recover or restore himself, he can do nothing, 
 except as God " worketh in him to will and to do of 
 his good pleasure. The edifice is decayed throughout;, 
 it must be taken down and re-erected by the Divine^ 
 Architect. The leprosy has infected every part; it 
 must be levelled with the ground and built anew. 
 Let this fundamental doctrine be understood, and pro- 
 duce its due effects, and all will be easy and intelligi- 
 ble in the Christian scheme of redemption ; every 
 thing will occupy its due place. The apostacy and fall 
 of man will prepare for salvation by grace — for a free 
 justification by the merits of Christ — for an entire 
 renovation by the blessed Spirit — for a sincere and un- 
 
WILSON'S ANALOGY. 415 
 
 reserved obedience. And not only for obedience, but 
 for love to God and man — cheerful dedication to the 
 service of Christ — a temper of compassion and kind- 
 ness towards others — a disinterested, amiable, and 
 active benevolence — -a zeal for the glory of God, and 
 the good of men, and a watchfulness over the first 
 risings of sinful passions and appetites. All this will be 
 connected with a " peace of God which passeth under- 
 standing " — "joy in the Holy Ghost" — "patience in 
 tribulation " — delight in prayer, meditation, and the 
 contempLition of God and heaven — a sense of happi- 
 ness and tranquillity, in spiritual things — a moderation 
 as to all earthly concerns, and a victory over the 
 applause and frown of the world. 
 
 6. For this is the next thing w^e shall presume to 
 mention, as defective in the allusions and statements 
 of our Author, — his standard of the effects of Christianity, 
 in the holy, happy lives of real Christians, is far too low. 
 It could not indeed be otherwise. The spiritual life is 
 a whole. If the glory of the Saviour, and the opera- 
 tions of his spirit, and the total ruin of man, as requiring 
 both, are not first understood, it is impossible that the 
 blessed fruits of all this, in the new life and happiness 
 of the renovated, pardoned, and sanctified heart, should 
 be produced. There is, however, such a thing as " the 
 love of Christ constraining a man to live no longer to 
 himself, but to Him that died for him and rose again ;" 
 there is such a thing as the inward experience of the 
 grace of Clu'istianity — there is such a thing as a holy, 
 happy, spiritual life, which differs as much from a 
 merely rational and moral one, as the rational life dif- 
 fers from the animal, and the animal from the vegeta- 
 ble. Not to have seized this idea, is to have missed 
 one peculiar feature of true Christianity. 
 
 7. In short the whole of what we would advance 
 amounts to this, the standard of Christianity, as applied 
 to the heart and life of man, which the readers of Butler 
 iDOuld form from his general language, is far helaiu what 
 we conceive to he the standard of the Sacred Scriptures. 
 In our view of the Scriptural standard, we may be 
 wrong ; but we think every reader will perceive that 
 
416 WILSON'S ANALOGY. 
 
 the several points on which we have offered remarks, 
 hang- together. If the view we take of the extent of 
 the fall be in the main correct, then the view of justifi- 
 cation, of the grace of the Gospel, of faith, of the work 
 of the Holy Ghost, of the peace and consolation of the 
 Christian's heart, and of the zeal and spirituality of his 
 obedience, are probably correct .also. They are links 
 of one chain. The connection is indispensable. They 
 rise or fall together. — AH we entreat of the reader, is 
 an impartial examination of the entire question. We 
 beg only that it may not be determined by matters 
 irrelevant — by fashion, prejudice, the spirit of party, 
 temporal and subordinate interests. We beg only that 
 the introduction of tenets which we do not hold, or 
 of consequences which we abhor, may not be mixed 
 up with the discussion. The simple question is. Is 
 the system \\'hich the language we have been con- 
 demning seems to favour, or the system which we have 
 suggested in its stead, the true system of the New 
 Testament? Which comes nearest to the Bible? 
 Which has the apparent sanction of the inspired 
 oracles of God? Which suits the expressions and 
 sentiments of the sacred writers in all their parts ? 
 Which takes in naturally and without effort, not 
 only the historical parts of the Bible, not only the 
 moral, not only the prophetical, not only the devotional 
 — for there is here no dispute — but the doctrinal and 
 experimental ? It is no sufficient proof of the truth of 
 the system Ave are opposing, that parts of it agree with 
 the Scriptures; for it could not be otherwise. It would 
 not be a convincing proof of it, even if the whole of its 
 detached parts were to be found separately in that 
 perfect code. The question is, docs it take in all that 
 Scripture teaches, on the several subjects ; does it adopt 
 in their obvious and unadulterated meaning, all the 
 language and statements of the Bible on the fall of man, 
 on justification, and on the other points in controversy ? 
 And here we boldly and fearlessly appeal to facts. 
 Those who preach and write in the temper and on 
 the scheme which we are opposing, do not use natu- 
 rally and habitually the language of St. Paul and the 
 
WILSON'S ANALOGY. 417 
 
 Other Apostles. This language does not suit and fall 
 in with their system, does not express what they mean ; 
 and, therefore, except when compelled by circum- 
 stances, their theological scheme avoids the Scriptural 
 phraseology, and is formed in a different school. Our 
 objection to Bishop Butler's language, is, that it is not 
 Scriptural. He substitutes weaker and more ambigu- 
 ous expressions. He lowers every thing. Tliis one 
 point goes far to decide the question with any candid 
 mind. The system which admits with ease, and reposes 
 upon, the very language and sentiments of the inspired 
 waiters in all their instructions and exhortations, must, 
 in all probability, be the nearest to the truth. It is 
 thus men judge in every similar case. And it is to be 
 remembered, that the higher and more spiritual system 
 of Christianity, takes in and embraces the lower one ; 
 whilst this lower one rises not to the other, and thus 
 reaches not the extent and end of the Divine Revela- 
 tion. 
 
 Again, we appeal to the hearts and consciences, to 
 the trials and conflicts, to the feelings and wants of the 
 most devout and sincere Christians, and we ask which 
 view of truth comes nearest to their cases, their neces- 
 sities, their indigence ? Which view of the state of 
 man is best descriptive of their own state ? Which 
 view of the scheme of pardon most adequately supplies 
 their importunate need? Which view of the doctrines 
 of the Holy Ghost affords the mighty aid which they 
 are conscious they require ? Which view of the grace 
 of Christianity corresponds most exactly with their 
 extreme misery ? Which view of the spiritual obedi- 
 ence and love of the Christian hfe is most closely alUed 
 to the objects at which they aim ? But we will not 
 press these questions. The confessions of the very 
 best and most holy men, are the liveliest comment on 
 the language of the divine writers. And the misgivings 
 and penitential acknowledgments, as death and eternity 
 approach, of many, who during life, espoused the lower 
 interpretation, speak loudly enough on this subject. 
 
 We rather go on to ask this question — Which system 
 of divinity produces in the largest measure those fruits 
 27' 
 
418 WILSON'S ANALOGY. 
 
 and effects, which are ascribed to the Gospel in the 
 New Testament? Now it will be conceded on all 
 hands, that " by their fruits we are to know" the true 
 teachers, and distinguish them from the fjilse. Does, 
 then, the lowering doctrines of modern times on the 
 fall and ruin of man, and the redemption and grace of 
 Christ, and the kindred topics, awaken -the souls of 
 sinners, reclaim the ungodly, arouse the careless, revive 
 religion where it has decayed, and preserve it where 
 it flourishes ? Does it not, on the contrary, first leave 
 those who preach it cold and inactive, and then fall 
 without eflicacy on the ears of the hearers ? Does it 
 not prove insufficient for converting the heart, turning 
 it from the power of sin, and raising it to the love and 
 obedience of God ? Does it not fail in comforting the 
 afflicted conscience, and inspiring a hope of heaven ? 
 Does it not stop short of all the mighty ends which 
 primitive Christianity produced ? And is there not a 
 constant tendency in it to deteriorate and sink lower 
 and lower, till the grace of the gospel is almost excluded, 
 and little remains beyond a tame morality and an ex- 
 ternal form of religion ? And does not the decay of 
 spiritual religion go on, till, by the mercy of God, a 
 revival of the great doctrines of salvation by grace in 
 the plain language and spirit of the Scriptures, takes 
 place, and recalls man to the true standard of iaith 
 and practice ? 
 
 The fact plainly is, as these inquiries are designed 
 to describe it. On the contrary, the simple preaching- 
 of " Christ crucified," is still the " power of God and 
 the wisdom of God." Wherever the high standard of 
 really evangelical truth is raised, and the Saviour is 
 preached to a lost world, and the regenerating and 
 sanctifying operations of the Spirit are avowed, and 
 the full consolation and joy of faith expounded, and the 
 elevated rule of Christian morals sustained; there, 
 under whatever incidental defects or disadvantages, 
 the effects of conversion, love, and obedience are copi- 
 ously produced ; man is indeed turned from sin unto 
 God, the breast of the rebel is subdued and softened, 
 his whole character is changed, and the seal of God is 
 
WILSON'S ANALOGY. 419 
 
 impressed upon the declaration of his own truth, by the 
 displays of his own efficient grace and mercy. 
 
 It strongly confirms the conclusion we thus come to, 
 to consider that the Universa Church of Christ has held 
 these great truths which are now so much opposed. 
 Look to the early Fathers of the Church, and you find 
 the doctrines of man's total apostacy, and his salvation 
 by grace only, to be the life of all their instructions. 
 As those mighty truths were corrupted by human phi- 
 losophy, or overwhelmed by superstition, the power of 
 religion sunk, her glory in the conversion of men was 
 lost, and she fell back into a cold controversial spirit, 
 which brought on the ages of darkness and spiritual 
 tyranny. What, we ask, was the doctrine of Cyprian 
 in the third century, of Ambrose in the fourth, and 
 Augustine in the fifth ? What gave life to their exhor- 
 tations, and influence to their labours ? Was it not the 
 pure evangelical light, which, notwithstanding many 
 subordinate errors and much superstition, shone forth 
 in their laborious discourses and writings 1 Even to 
 the time of Bernard, the last of the Fathers, the name 
 and grace of Christ in the full efficacy of his mercy, 
 pervaded the theology, and sanctified the hearts of them. 
 It was only as this healing doctrine was utterly lost 
 under the accumulation of superstition and idolatry, 
 that the melancholy desertion and apostacy of the visi- 
 ble Church in the West, took place. In the midst of 
 this thick darkness, however, it was the same truth of 
 grace wliich preserved, among the Albigenses and 
 Waldenses, the life and influence of the Gospel. And 
 at the Reformation, what was it which Luther, and 
 Melancthon, and Cramer, and Zuingle, and Calvin, 
 and Beza, and Knox taught? Did they not revive 
 the old Scriptural doctrines of original sin, justification 
 by faith, salvation by grace, regeneration and com- 
 munion with God by the Holy Spirit, and spiritual 
 obedience, as the fruit of all this in the temper and life ? 
 Some of these truths, indeed, were held in a general 
 and loose manner by the Church of Rome, but they 
 were enervated by distinctions and refinements, and 
 overwhelmed by superstitious usages and rites. The 
 
420 WILSON'S ANALOGY. 
 
 reformers boldly api)eale(l from tlie erroneous opinions 
 of men, to the inliillible word of God. They set forth 
 the ruin of the fall in all its extent, they insisted on the 
 preventing grace of the Spirit, as necessary to all true 
 repentance, they gloried only in the cross of the Lord 
 Jesus Christ, and in justification by his merits ; they 
 called men off from works of external mortification and 
 unauthorized penance, to the good deeds, and virtuous 
 habits, and divine principles taught by the sacred 
 writers. And what was the effect ? In most of the 
 nations of Europe, thousands and thousands w^ere really 
 converted to the service and love of God. The re- 
 formed doctrines spread with the rapidity of lightning; 
 a pure form of Christianity was establised in many 
 states, and the Papacy was shaken to its base. 
 
 Let any one impartially read the confessions and 
 Articles of the Reformed churches, and those of our 
 own church, amongst the very first; and he will see 
 that the high standard of sentiment and practice which 
 we espouse, was universally maintained. What is the 
 lansfuaffe of these noble documents 1 Does it resemble 
 the enfeebled and dubious strain of modern theology ; 
 or does it not rather take the plain and strong ground 
 of the ancient doctrine of the entire apostacy of man, 
 and the efficacious grace of God ? And in all the Pro- 
 testant churches since the Reformation, mark the pro- 
 gress or decline of real piety and holiness, and you 
 will find them uniformly to bear a relation to the pure 
 doctrines of grace upheld or denied. Where these 
 doctrines have flourished, the presence and mercy of 
 God in the conversion of men has attested the truth : 
 where a decay has taken place, and human morals, or a 
 low system of divinity, has usurped the place of the 
 unadulterated gospel, every thing has fallen in pro- 
 portion — men have remained dead and unmoved in 
 their sins ; the form has extinguished the power of 
 godliness; cold and proud pretensions to orthodoxy 
 have been united with a w orldly life ; the clergy have 
 deserted the lofty function of being heralds of salvation 
 and examples to their people, and have been lost in 
 secular politics, in human attachments to an established 
 
WILSON'S ANALOGY. 421 
 
 creed, and angry controversies with those who point 
 out to them " a more excellent way." Thus things 
 have grown worse and worse, till God has granted a 
 revival, by the secret guidance of his Spirit. Then the 
 old and forgotten tenets of human guilt and impotency, 
 and divine mercy and power, have been raised up 
 again as from the grave, the old standard of truth again 
 erected ; public opinion has been gradually changed ; 
 the former state of decline admitted and deplored ; and 
 the wonted efficacy of Christian doctrine seen once 
 more, in its proper fruits of conversion, holiness, and 
 love. 
 
 But we are indulging ourselves in reflections which 
 calrry us too far from our immediate design. The 
 Analogy is a Treatise of Evidences, and could only be 
 expected to allude generally to these momentous topics. 
 We would not assume the truth of the evengelical 
 system of which we speak. We invite only to inquiry ; 
 we appeal boldly to every kind of testimony which 
 such a case admits ; and we leave the result with con- 
 fidence to the judgment of every unbiassed and 
 enlightened theological student.. One reason of our 
 venturing to dwell on these topics is the well-fixed 
 persuasion, that our writers on Evidences have griev- 
 ously mistaken their own duty as advocates of Chris- 
 tianity, as well as the interests of truth and religion 
 generally, in not presenting the fair and adequate 
 account of the doctrines and morals of the Gospel. 
 We do not mean that they should involve themselves 
 in controversy, nor even enter on the details of Chris- 
 tian doctrines and morals. Let them keep to their 
 own province, the defence and establishment of Chris- 
 tianity generally ; but let the references to the contents 
 and tenor of that religion be, so far as they go, just and 
 complete. Let the little they do say, be accurate. 
 Let what is given to their readers convey an idea of 
 what the spirit and design of the whole system is. 
 Let the parts touched on, connect naturally with all the 
 rest which are not specifically treated. This conduct 
 becomes the magnitude and importance of the subject. 
 It prepares the reader of evidences to submit to the 
 
422 WILSON'S ANALOGY. 
 
 yoke of Christ. It exhibits religion attractive, efTica- 
 cioiis, entire. It meets the feelings and wants of the 
 sincere and humble inquirer. It shuts out a thousand 
 misapprehensions and errors. It insures the blessing 
 of God in a larger measure, upon the triumphant evi- 
 dences of our faith. It is the most simple, upright, 
 straight forward course.* 
 
 Still we are far, very far from undervaluing the 
 labours of the Apologists and Defenders of Chris- 
 tianity. They have performed excellent service. Their 
 acuteness and skill, their penetrating obser\^ation, their 
 indefatigable researches, the force of their reasonings, 
 and the depth of their knowledge, liave deserved 
 highly of the sacred cause. The External Evidences 
 have naturally been most adequately unfolded, because 
 the interior virtues and properties of the Christian 
 scheme came less within their scope. But we adhere, 
 notwithstanding, to our conviction, that all the sum- 
 maries of the revealed doctrines, which even the argu- 
 ment from external evidences require, should be a part 
 and parcel, as it were, of the entire possession, should 
 resemble the apostolic examples, and be expressed as 
 nearly as possible in the apostolic language. We do 
 not stop to say how much more this should be the case 
 in Treatises on the Internal Evidences. We rather go 
 on to observe, that in the case immediately before us, 
 the argument from Analogy, a similar fidelity to the full 
 demands of the Christian scheme, would have had the 
 very best effect. That we do not depreciate the 
 talents and labours of Bishop Butler, must have been 
 obvious to every reader of these pages. We have 
 even expressed the hope, the rational hope, springing 
 from a judgment of charity, that in his own mind he 
 followed the true doctrine, and that he was far from in^ 
 tending to produce those consequences to which his 
 language may lead. We have also fully admitted his 
 correct and powerful defence of the scheme of Chris- 
 
 ♦ We cannot here withhold our tribute of admiration from the work of Mr. 
 Sumner on the " Evidence of Cliristianity, as derived from its reception, and 
 from the nature of its doctrine." Tliis masterly treatise forms an era in the 
 history of writings in defence of our faith. 
 
WILSON'S ANALOGY. 423 
 
 tianity to a certain extent. It is this very thing which 
 makes us the more regret, that he had not carried his 
 views on, and given a more full and accurate idea, so 
 far as his plan of argument allowed, of all the efficacy 
 and consolation of the gospel. His work is cold. He 
 seems rather like a man forced to be a Christian, than 
 one rejoicing in its blessings. It is impossible to calcu- 
 late the additional good which the Analogy would have 
 effected, if its unnumbered readers had been instructed 
 more adequately by it in the spiritual death and ruin of 
 man in all his powers by the fall, in the inestimable 
 constitution of special grace established by the gospel, 
 in the gratuitous justification of the sincere believer in 
 the sacrifice of Christ, in the divine nature and proper- 
 ties of true faith, in the mighty operations of the Holy 
 Ghost in illuminating and sanctifying man, and in the 
 consolation and universal obedience which are the 
 fruits of faith. Probably there is no student in divin- 
 ity, during the last half century or more, who has not 
 read, and read with admiration and profit, this aston- 
 ishing work. How many of these have been con- 
 firmed in a defective theology, strengthened in preju- 
 dices against truth, and persuaded to adopt a low" 
 system of doctrine in the instruction of others, from the 
 incidental language, and hazardous expressions which 
 occur in it ! But so it is. There are in human life few 
 things complete. What we meet with in one writer, 
 we miss in another. The union of rare and exquisite 
 talent with the hiojhest tone of sacred feelinir and doc- 
 trme, was perhaps rarely ever witnessed as it was in 
 Pascal. And the good which his masterly work, 
 though posthumous, and the writing of a Roman Cath- 
 oHc, has produced, has been correspondent both in 
 extent and in quality. The unexampled effects of his 
 " Thoughts on Religion," attest the solidity of the main 
 points to which we are now adverting. Pascal sur- 
 passes all other writers on Evidences, because he con- 
 joins the most lively and acute genius, and the finest 
 powers of reasoning, with the full admission of the 
 great fundamental tenets of the Christianity which he 
 defends. The single doctrine of the entire corruption 
 
424 WILSON'S ANALOGY. 
 
 of man by the fall, sheds a light on all his arguments, 
 and meets the state and feelings of every pious reader, 
 whilst it tends to instruct those who are as yet unac- 
 quainted with this most important truth. It is thus 
 that Pascal's great work, though not free from many of 
 the errors of his church, remains unrivalled in its class. 
 And the work of Bishop Butler would have been little 
 inferior to it, if it had united, with its profound and 
 just views of the order of God in his natural govern- 
 ment, and the correspondence of his moral and religious 
 order in revelation, the fiill view of human depravity 
 and of divine grace, which that revelation opened 
 before him. It is impossible not to see with what 
 ease a writer who has proceeded so far, and conducted 
 us so securely to a certain point, would have gone on 
 in the course he was pursuing, till he had embraced the 
 vast compass of experimental and practical religion, and 
 had thus left behind him a monument, not only of 
 triumph over objections against the general scheme of 
 Christianity, but of victory over those prejudices, and 
 that tame acquiescence which too often obscure the real 
 doctrine of our recovery, as we have ventured to delin- 
 eate it. 
 
 8. For this is the last topic on which we shall 
 presume to offer any remarks. We observe, there- 
 fore, that the very same argutnents from the analogy of 
 nature ivhich silence the objections raised against Chris- 
 tianity, as expounded by our author in a very mitigated 
 sense, icoiild have served to meet the objections 7'aised against 
 it, in its full Scriptural extent. 
 
 I. For instance, the doctrine of the fall of our nature 
 might have been defended in its genuine form, quite 
 as triumphantly as it now is. The following is the 
 conclusion of Butler's argument : — " Whoever con- 
 siders all these, and some other obvious things, will 
 think he has little reason to object against the Scrip- 
 ture account, that mankind is in a state of degrada- 
 tion ; against this being the lact, how difficult soever 
 he may think it to account for, or even to form a dis- 
 tinct conception of the occasion and circumstances of 
 it. But that the crime of our first parents was the 
 
WILSON'S ANALOGY. 425 
 
 occasion of our being placed in a more disadvantageous 
 condition, is a thing throughout, and particularly anal- 
 ogous to what we see in the daily course of natural 
 Providence." Part II. c. v. sec. 5. Surely, if the 
 expressions used by the inspired writers were substi- 
 tuted for the defective ones of this passage, the argu- 
 ment would hold equally good. Nay, it would have 
 more force, from more exactly corresponding with the 
 facts of the case. For men, alas! are not merely in 
 " a state of degradation " but of alienation from the life 
 of God, through tlie ignorance that is in them, because 
 of the blindness of their hearts;" mankind were not 
 only " placed in a more disadvantageous condition by 
 the crime of our first parents," but " by one man sin 
 entered into the world, and death by sin ; and so death 
 passed upon all men, for that all have sinned ;" as the 
 inspired apostle declares. 
 
 II. Again, the argument of our author, from our con- 
 fessed ignorance of what a revelation might be expected 
 to contain, and of what particular offices and duties 
 might be assigned to a Divine Mediator, is just as valid 
 when applied to the true view of the mediatorial grace 
 of Christ, as we conceive it to be revealed in Scripture 
 (always supposing we are right in that view) as to the 
 limited view to which he actually applies it. The 
 hope which the order of Providence suggests of the 
 moral consequences of sin being in some way remedied 
 under God's government, remains as it does. The in- 
 efficacy of mere repentance and reformation, as apparent 
 from the course of natural things, remains as it does. 
 The intervention of Christ as the great Mediator, by 
 his one vicarious propitiation and atonement, remains 
 as it does. If, then, the effects of this mighty sacrifice 
 are not merely the "procuring our repentance to be 
 accepted, and the putting us in a capacity of salvation," 
 but the actual gift of pardon, justification, and a title to 
 eternal life, by faith only — the inference is as firm, and 
 the analogy as clear, as in the present case. The 
 reasoning is even more close, if the facts, as we con- 
 tend they do — that is, the real state of man, the 
 positive benefits received by the sincere believer, and 
 
426 WILSON'S ANALOGY. 
 
 the decisive testimony of Scripture on the subject — 
 bear us out. 
 
 III. Nor can we discern any gap in the argument, 
 concerning faith being the instrument of receiving 
 Jesus Christ as the greatest gift of God — if faith be 
 interpreted in that higher and transcendent sense in 
 which we have put it. The reasoning stands just as it 
 does. Only at present it appUes to a general indis- 
 criminate behef in the truths of revelation ; and, in the 
 case as we would propose it, it would embrace a parti- 
 cular, personal, holy, aifcctionate obedience of the heart 
 to the testimony of God to his Son, and to life in Him. 
 If objections are invalid or frivolous against the first, 
 much more must they be so against the second. 
 
 IV. In like manner, the admirable reasoning of our 
 author, from the clear and particular analogy of nature, 
 that a moral government is going on in the world, and 
 will be completed in a future life — a government in 
 which every one shall be punished or rewarded accord- 
 ing to his works — loses no part of its force, if the grace 
 of God, and the fruits of faith flowing from it, are 
 included in the notion of the deeds of the righteous to 
 which the reward of endless life shall be assigned. 
 All depends on the primary question. What is the real 
 doctrine of Scripture on the point ? Assuming this, 
 which we are obliged to do for the sake of argument, 
 we must say, we can see no different, or stronger 
 objections against a moral and righteous government 
 under the Christian dispensation being now carrying on, 
 if the true view of the character, and works, and piety, 
 and humility, and other attendant virtues of the believer 
 in Christ be taken into the account of his general good 
 deeds, than if the historical faith, and feeble penitence, 
 and defective motives, and partial morality of the exter- 
 nal Christian be mainly regarded. On the contrary, 
 the argument gains incomparably in strength and exact- 
 ness, if the Scriptural hypothesis be adhered to. 
 
 V. Again, the full doctrine of the operations of the 
 Holy Ghost, in the sense we have given to it, is just 
 as reconcilable with all we see in the order of nature 
 and just as free from any valid objections, as that aid 
 
WILSON'S ANALOGY. 427 
 
 and assistance to good men is, to which our author 
 chiefly restricts it. It is no more contrary to any con- 
 ceptions or expectations we might have formed of 
 Christianity, to find in it a provision for restoring our 
 corrupted nature by an effectual renewal, than to aid 
 it only by less supplies of light, and strength, and con- 
 solation. The mystery of the Spirit's operations is the 
 same in both cases — the danger of enthusiastic preten- 
 sions the same — the manner of recovering man by the 
 revelation of a Divine Sanctifier, the same— the obliga- 
 tions we owe to the Holy Spirit, in the relation he 
 stands in to us, the same. We mean the same in kind 
 — open to no other objections ; proceeding on the same 
 sort of scheme. Indeed Butler actually uses, at times, 
 as we have had occasion to state, the strongest lan- 
 guage that could be required, and quotes once the 
 expression of our Saviour, '' Except a man be born of 
 the Spirit, he cannot see the kingdom of heaven." 
 He needed only to have pursued out these admissions, 
 and incorporated them into his digest of the Christian 
 code, in order to have discharged the entire measure of 
 his duty of a theological instructer. 
 
 VI. The observations also, excellently acute as they 
 are, which Butler makes on the system of means work- 
 ing to various high ends, and on the moral discipline 
 and probation which the state of things in this world 
 constitutes to the Christian, would retain all their fitness, 
 and would conclude as strongly, if the spiritual nature 
 of real obedience and love to God, and of the peace 
 and consolation inspired, as we conceive, by the Gos- 
 pel, had been in his view, as they do now. The force 
 of habits, the progress men make from one degree of 
 character, and one capacity of excellence to another — 
 the discipline arising from the wickedness of the world, 
 and the trials to which piety and virtue are exposed — 
 the attainment of states of mind, and measures of know- 
 ledge and goodness by these means, which could 
 scarcely have been conceived of in the first stages of 
 the progress — the preparation for future happiness and 
 security thus gradually made — the influence of our 
 present trials on our future condition, in a way of 
 
428 WILSON'S ANALOGY. 
 
 natural consequence — these, and many other of our 
 author's finest remarks will stand, whichever system 
 of morals and consolation we adopt. They , apply, 
 however with double propriety, if we retain the higher 
 standard of love, obedience, self-denial, watchfulness 
 and peace. Their force is thus augmented. The 
 occasions for them are more striking; whilst the diffi- 
 culties remain for substance the same. 
 
 VII. The only plausible objection which we can sup- 
 pose to be offered to the view of the Christian scheme, 
 as a scheme of grace is, that it presents the Almighty 
 as unequal in the distribution of his gifts. For, undoubt- 
 edly, if the real corruption and disorder of mankind by 
 the fall be what we have stated — if the remaining 
 powers of natural religion be so feeble and inefficient — 
 if the operations of the Holy Ghost be so mighty and 
 distinguishing — if the blessings flowing from the media- 
 tion and sacrifice of Christ be so exuberant — if, finally, 
 the standard of Christian love and holiness be so high — 
 then it follows that man does not, in fact, begin Avith 
 God, in the application and reception of the blessings 
 of Christ, but God begins with man ; then it follows, 
 that salvation is wholly of grace, and not of human 
 eifort and choice in any degree : and we thus arrive at 
 the necessary confession, that there is, in the Gospel, 
 a special gift and collation of effectual grace, previous 
 to any saving effects being derived from the death of 
 Christ. And this confession we scruple not to make. 
 There is such a thing as the special and effectual grace 
 of God. We do ascribe to Almighty God all the will 
 and the power which we have to do any thing that is 
 good. We do acknowledge, that not only the means 
 of salvation in the sacrifice of Christ, are of God ; that 
 not only the offers of salvation in the doctrine of the 
 Gospel are of God ; but that also the grace to accept 
 these offers — the grace which illuminates, and per- 
 suades, and converts, and sanctifies, and consoles — is 
 of God. A mystery this, which we attempt not to 
 fathom ; but the practical use of which we may clearly 
 discern. For, as this doctrine is never so stated as to 
 lessen the responsibility of man, supersede the use of 
 
WILSON'S ANALOGY. 429 
 
 means, weaken the duty of every one who hears the 
 gospel, to repent and obey it ; or excuse, in the slightest 
 measure, the guilt of impenitence and disobedience ; so 
 it manifestly tends to deep humility of mind under a 
 sense of our helplessness and misery; to entire renun- 
 ciation of our own presumptuous and unaided efforts, 
 and to simple dependance on the influences of grace, 
 to enable us to comply with the calls of the Gospel as 
 addressed to us. That is, it puts us in the attitude of 
 suppliants. It makes our feelings correspond with our 
 real situation. It guards us against false refuges, and 
 directs us to the true one. And it teaches us to ascribe 
 the glory of all we do, where alone it is becoming, to 
 the gracious will and mercy of our compassionate God 
 and Father. 
 
 And surely the objection raised against this inequality 
 of the Divine gifts, may be moderated at least, and 
 silenced, by the very same arguments which our author 
 so solidly employs on similar subjects. We obviously 
 see, in the order of natural Providence, this inequality ; 
 that is, some men have advantages, opportunities, in- 
 structions, means of attaining benefits, endowments of 
 mind and body, facilities in their moral trial and proba- 
 tion, which others have not. The diversity of cases is 
 infinite. The general laws by which they are pro- 
 duced, are to us unknown. The speculative difficulties 
 of comprehending the scheme of things in which they 
 are found, are insuperable. Still things are as they 
 are ; and all thoughts of harshness and severity are 
 excluded by recollecting, that every one shall be 
 judged at last by an infinitely gracious Creator, who 
 will not require of any, more than what was committed 
 to his trust. " Shall not the Judge of all the earth do 
 right," is the question applicable to the more profound 
 mystery involved in the Scriptural account of our 
 salvation, as well as to the ordinary irregularities of 
 the gifts of Providence, as defended by our author. We 
 cannot reasonably expect the same measure of informa- 
 tion concerning God's proceedings, as concerning our 
 own duty. The reasons of the collation of grace are 
 with God; the duty of seeking that grace, on the 
 
430 WILSON'S ANALOGY. 
 
 assured promise that we shall obtain it, is with us. The 
 inequalities in the Divine gifts is a secret of the 
 Almighty; the improvement and right use of the 
 abundant measure of these gifts which we severally 
 possess, is the obvious province of man. If the state- 
 ment of the Christian scheme, which we are defend- 
 ing, be Scriptural, the argument from analogy moderates 
 and silences all objections which are made against it, 
 to every fair and considerate mind. We say moderates 
 and silences them ; for it does not undertake to answer 
 them. The case, for any thing we know, admits not of 
 a satisfactory explanation to finite creatures like us, at 
 least in the very small part of it as yet revealed. 
 
 VIII. Nay, further, if the profound and incomprehen- 
 sible subject of the Divine prescience and predestina- 
 tion should be considered as springing from the topic 
 which we have just been noticing, as it undoubtedly 
 does in one form or other, and as the articles of the 
 Reformed Churches explicitly make it to do; the very 
 same arguments which Butler employs to guard against 
 the fatal consequences deduced from the doctrine of 
 philosophical necessity, are applicable to any dangerous 
 consequences which might be drawn from it. The 
 Scriptural doctrine af predestination (without deter- 
 mining, too minutely, what that doctrine is, for which 
 this is not the place) no more excludes or weakens 
 deliberation on our part, choice, the use of means, the 
 acting from certain principles to certain ends, than the 
 opinion of necessity does. If the argument of analogy, 
 from the facts of God's natural providence and govern- 
 ment, silences the difficulties or abuses, call them 
 which you please, which spring from the scheme of 
 necessity ; much more does it silence the difficulties 
 which are sometimes linked on the doctrine of predes- 
 tination — a doctrine, on all interpretations of it, essen- 
 tially milder and more intelligible than necessity, and 
 resting on totally different principles. If, for example, 
 a child who should be educated by a Necessarian to 
 imagine that he was not a subject of praise or blame, 
 because he could not act otherwise than he did, is 
 refuted by matter of fact, by the inconveniences he 
 
WILSON'S ANALOGY. 431 
 
 brings on himself and occasions others ; and is thus 
 taught hy experience, that his applying this scheme of 
 necessity to practice and common life, is reasoning in- 
 conclusively from his principles, even supposing them 
 to be true ; how much more ought the man who should 
 deduce the hke pernicious inferences from the doctrine 
 of predestination, to consider himself as refuted by 
 matter of fact, and be tauglit that he reasoned incon- 
 clusively in applying his principles to common life? 
 For the Divine predestination, as revealed in the 
 Scriptures, is not a blind fate, or necessity ; but the 
 prescience and foreordination of events, according to 
 the infinite wisdom, goodness, mercy, and power of the 
 Sovereign Lord and Father of all. The truth is, that on 
 either scheme the application of the rule of the divine 
 will, to our duties in Ufe, is false, dangerous, and con- 
 trary to the whole analogy of God's government over 
 us, as reasonable and accountable beings. On either 
 scheme, or notwithstanding either scheme, it remains, 
 as our author well observes, a fixed and fundamental 
 truth, that " God will finally, and upon the whole, in 
 his eternal government, render his creatures happy or 
 miserable, by some means or other, as they behave 
 well or ill." 
 
 IX. The practical difficulties which still remain, and 
 which must remain, on these and similar points, are, 
 lastly, capable of being entirely relieved or silenced, 
 by carrying on the admirable arguments of the bishop 
 on the ignorance of man, and the incomprehensibility 
 of the vast scheme of the divine government to him, 
 in his present state. Christianity is obviously a plan 
 only partially, very partially revealed. We see but a 
 small part of God's ways in his^natural providence, and 
 we see still less of them in his supernatural and stupen- 
 dous revelation of grace. The very things which we 
 think irregularities and defects, may, for aught we know, 
 be instances of surprising goodness and wisdom. The 
 relations of each circumstance which now puzzles us, 
 may stretch beyond us infinitely, and be connected 
 with events, past, present and future, in an endless 
 series. The difficulties which press upon religion, 
 
432 v;iLS0N's analogy. 
 
 arise chiefly from our presumption in wishing to under- 
 stand and reconcile God's acts and will; not from our 
 inability to discern the path of our own duty. Our 
 obligations are clearly set before us ; it is the divine 
 government and purposes which are not clear to us. 
 And surely the deplorable and pitiable ignorance in 
 wliich we find ourselves, as to the order of things in 
 the natural world, may reconcile us to the consequences 
 of the same ignorance, as to the order of things in re- 
 ligion. It is one chief act of faith, thus to bow before 
 the majesty of God ; and it is one distinct test of humility, 
 to be willing so to do. They offend equally against 
 both these Christian graces, who, on the one hand, 
 deny or explain away the divine prescience and fore- 
 ordination, under the notion of preserving man's free- 
 agency and responsibility ; or who, on the other, weaken 
 or undermine man's reasonable and accountable nature, 
 on the plea of magnifying the grace of God. They 
 offend equally against faith and humility, who either 
 wholly conceal the mysteries of religion, with the view 
 of preventing the abuse of them, or who obtrude and 
 overstate them, on the pretence of discharging the calls 
 of gratitude, and abating the confidence of man. The 
 depth of human ignorance should be ever impressed 
 on our minds, when we advance a step, either in main- 
 taining or impugning any doctrines which relate peculi- 
 arly to the ever-blessed God. The rule of Scripture — 
 its terms, its spirit ; the proportion in which different 
 truths are stated, the bearings and relations of them 
 to each other ; the consequences deduced from them ; 
 the manner in which they represent man ; and the 
 character and attributes which they ascribe to Almighty 
 God, should all be scrupulously adhered to. Our 
 ignorance enjoins this implicit submission. And in 
 this temper the scheme of Christianity, as we conceive 
 of it, is open to no more difficulties than the scheme 
 of it, as stated by Bishop Butler. The argument from 
 analogy covers either. And the only question that 
 fairly remains, is, wliich approaches the nearest to the 
 Holy Scriptures ? And on this question we, cannot 
 think any doubt would long harass a candid mind, if 
 
WILSON'S ANALOGY. 433 
 
 prejudice and prepossession were laid aside, and the 
 study of the human heart, and prayer for divine ilhimi- 
 nation, were connected with the examination of the 
 Sacred Vohime. 
 
 But it is time for us to draw to a close this too much 
 extended Essay. We are far from flattering- ourselves 
 that we shall succeed in persuading our readers, gene- 
 rally of the truth of all we have advanced. In tlie first 
 division of the Essay, indeed, we can anticipate but 
 one opinion. The admiration of the genius of Butler 
 is a national sentiment ; and if we have at ail succeeded 
 in expressing, in a shorter compass, his main arguments, 
 we shall not be thought to have written unnecessarily, 
 at least for the young. On the connexion, also, of 
 the argument from analogy with the other branches 
 of the Christian evidence, we have advanced nothing 
 which will be thought open to controversy. It is in 
 the latter part of the Essay where we express our dif- 
 ference of opinion from our great author, on the scheme 
 and bearing of Christianity, that we must expect op- 
 ponents. The case cannot be otherwise. Indeed, fair 
 and manly discussion in the temper which Christianity 
 inspires, is far from being unfriendly to the interests of 
 truth, A calm and unmeaning acquiescence is much 
 more so. Torpor precedes death. We are exhorted 
 to " contend earnestly for the faith once delivered to 
 the saints ;" and this exhortation implies material differ- 
 ences of judgment amongst professed Christians. Let 
 me only earnestly recommend that charity on questions 
 really doubtful, and that zeal and fervour on points of 
 fundamental import, which the whole tendency of the 
 work, which we have been endeavouring to illustrate, 
 strongly enforces. We are placed in this world in a 
 mysterious and progressive state of things. Darkness 
 and ignorance hang over much of our path. Charity 
 is therefore our peculiar duty in such circumstances, even 
 the truths most directly practical and fundamental touch 
 on others which are less clearly revealed. To attain 
 uniformity of opinion on all subordinate points, is a 
 hopeless pursuit. The education of different men, their 
 prejudices, their various talents and advantages — the 
 
434 WILSON'S ANALOGY. 
 
 party spirit, the unfavourable habits, and the defective 
 measures of religious attainments which are found 
 amongst them — the mere ambiguity of language will con- 
 stantly occasion a diversity, a great diversity of judg- 
 ments. The only healing measures in the midst of these 
 disorders, is the spirit of love — love which rejoices to 
 hope the best of others, which interprets favourably 
 doubtful matters, which seeks the real welfare and 
 happiness of all — -love which bears and forbears, which 
 reconciles and softens, which unites and binds together, 
 which consoles and blesses the hearts where it reigns. 
 It is by this divine principle that we shall most dispose 
 persons of various sentii^ients to act in concert with us. 
 It is this which neutralizes and disarms opposition. It 
 is this which tends both to lessen the amount of our 
 differences, and to take away almost all the evil of 
 those which remain. Persons who cannot altogether 
 think alike, may join in mutual love and good-will — 
 may act as one in points out of controversy — may grant 
 cheerfully the freedom of judgment which they them- 
 selves require — may aim at narrowing, instead of 
 extending and widening the grounds of separation; 
 and may believe others to be guided by a similar con- 
 viction with themselves. It is surprising how rapidly 
 controversies would die aw^ay, if this course were 
 pursued ! The questions on which real Christians sub- 
 stantially agree, are infinitely more important to them, 
 and more clear in themselves, than those on which they 
 ditfer. Let us then reserve our zeal and fervour for 
 these uncontested matters. They demand all our con- 
 cern — all our time — all our care. It is the magnifying 
 of other points, beyond all reason, and beyond Scrip- 
 ture, which has occasioned the divisions in the church. 
 Let it be one effect of the study of Bishop Butler, to 
 moderate our opinion of our own knowledge and 
 attainments, and to direct our efforts and zeal into 
 their only safe channel. Humility is the proper effect 
 of reading such an author. We shall thus present the 
 fairer face of Christianity to such as doubt of its truth. 
 The eloquence of a consistent, bencA^olent teriiper and 
 Ufe is never without its effect. If, indeed, Christianity 
 
WILSON'S ANALOGY. 435 
 
 is robbed of its characteristic glories, and its doctrines 
 and morals are gradually reduced to the standard of a 
 corrupt world, there is nothing left to contend about. 
 No charity can hope well of such a religion. But when 
 the peculiar truths of revelation are sincerely retained, 
 and the main doctrines and duties flowing from the 
 sacrifice of our Lord Jesus Christ and the influences of 
 his Spirit, are insisted on, then it is that the corres- 
 pondent temper and behaviour are naturally required, 
 and become so incomparably important. The most 
 formidable objection against religion, practically speak- 
 ing, is the defective conduct of those who profess it. 
 The light of a holy example shines around. The 
 infidel must be at times struck with the contrast 
 between the obvious benevolence and friendliness, the 
 self-denial and activity of the true Christian, and the 
 selfishness, pride, and indolence of a worldly person. 
 The amiableness and usefulness of the one, is in deep 
 contrast with the repulsive and self-indulgent tone of 
 the other. The effect of this contrast is unavoidable. 
 The infidel and sceptic know the human passions too 
 well, not to estimate in some measure what must be 
 the force of the principles which can overcome them. 
 In this peaceful victory of holiness and truth let us per- 
 severe. The acknowledged excellence of our conduct 
 will add incomparably to the evidences which we 
 gather from Butler, or other writers, when we are 
 called on to state them in argument. The spirit of 
 love will dispose an adversary to listen to a calm 
 defence of our faith. All arrogance — all airs of superi- 
 ority — all harshness of manner — all over-statements 
 will be banished from our friendly and affectionate 
 efforts, and the path of truth be smoothed and rendered 
 inviting. Indeed all the stupendous doctrines of Chris- 
 tianity are designed to form us to that temper of grati- 
 tude to God, and of benevolence to man, from which 
 the conduct we are recommending immediately flows. 
 And it is one main recommendation of those doctrines, 
 in their simple and native vigour, as we have endea- 
 voured to state them, that they, and they only, produce 
 the uniform Christian temper. Without this seal and 
 
436 WILSON'S ANALOGY. 
 
 confirmation of the truth, all our reasonings, however 
 conchisive, will fsiil of convincing. With it, the weakest 
 and most defective statement of the grounds of our 
 faith, will often succeed. Religion is not so much a 
 matter of intellectual effort, as of the obedience of the 
 heart and affections. Christianity, in all its discove- 
 ries, and duties, and promises, is so adapted to the state 
 and wants of man, that it can only be rejected when 
 there is an inward aversion to goodness. The form of 
 argument which that aversion may assume, has been 
 sufficiently refuted a thousand times. The last resources 
 of it are cut off by the process of analogical reasoning 
 so admirably adopted by Butler. Let this alienation 
 of mind be overcome, and man falls prostrate in adora- 
 tion at the foot of the cross. The doctrines of the 
 Gospel suit and meet his feelings and necessities. The 
 evidences of it are admitted to have their true force. 
 The fruits of holiness and consolation soon begin to 
 appear; and these fruits in the convert to the faith, 
 being in harmony with the same effects in the temper 
 and spirit of his instructer, attest the identity of reli- 
 gion, and increase in both of them the happy assurance 
 that they have found the supreme good of man — tlie 
 real spring of truth and felicity — the undoubted reve- 
 lation of the divine will — the exuberant source of 
 pardon, peace, and holiness — the most amazing dis- 
 covery of the mercy and grace of God — ^the corres- 
 pondent parts of that vast scheme which is impressed 
 with the same features in the works of nature and of 
 grace, and which are the pledge and guide to the 
 eternal rest and joy of heaven. 
 
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