BL 181 .H85 1897 Humphrey, William, 1839- 1910. His divine majesty il HIS DIVINE MAJESTY. ?9 other Works by Father Humphrey, S.J. The One Mediator. New Edition, revised and enlarged. 5s- The Sacred Scriptures, op the Written Word of God. 5s. The Vicar of Christ. i2mo. 2s. 6d. Christian Marriage. Cheap Edition. Cloth, is.; sewed, 6d.. The Bible and Belief. Cheap Edition, is.; sewed, 6d. Dishonest Controversy. 3d. The Divine Teacher. Seventh Edition. Cloth, 2s. 6d. Mary Magnifying God. May Sermons. Seventh Edition. 2s. 6d. Other Gospels ; or, Lectures on St. Paul's Epistle to the- Galatians. Crown 8vo, cloth, 4s. The Religious State ; a Digest of the Doctrine of Suarez,. contained in his Treatise ''*■ De Statu Religioiiis.'''' 3 vols, pp. 1200. £\ los. Mr. FitzJames Stephen and Cardinal Bellarmine. is. Elements of Religious Life. 5s. Conscience and Law ; or. Principles of Human Conduct. 4s. 6d. nett. Recollections of Scottish Episeopalianism. 2s. d^.. nett. u HIS DIVINE MAJESTY" OR THE LIVING GOD, BY WILLIAM HUMPHREY, SJ. LONDON. THOMAS BAKER, SOHO SQUARE. HIS DIVINE MAJESTY." — man's knowledge of what god is. — the essence and the attributes of god. — the absolute properties of the divine essence. — the negative properties of the divine essence.. — god's knowledge. — god's sincere will of man's SALVATION. — GOD, THE one CREATOR. — GOD, AS THE AUTHOR OF NATURE. — GOD, AS THE AUTHOR OF THE SUPERNATURAL. — THE PARADISE OF GOD'S CREATION. — THE INNER LIFE OF GOD. PREFACE. THE subject of this volume will be of interest not only to Catholics, but to Protestants — and not only to members of the Established Church of England, and to English Nonconformists, but also to members of the Established Church of Scotland, and of the two Presbyterian bodies which are separated from it — and again, not to those only who make profession of the Christian religion, but to Jews, Mahometans, Buddhists, and other Unitarians of all denominations — and €ven to those to whom God is as yet unknown, as a personal God, but who are "seeking God, if haply they may feel after or find Him." I have borrowed the bulk of my material for this work from the lectures of two of my old professors in the (iregorian University of Rome, Father (afterwards Cardinal) Franzelin, and Father Palmieri, both of them of the Society of Jesus. These were the two Professors of Dogmatic Theology in my day, some seven-and-twenty years ago. While I was sitting on the benches of the Collegio Romano, listening to the lectures of those theologians of world-wide renown, in company with fellow students, of many nations, English and Scotch, French and Germans, Spaniards and Italians, Poles and Lombards, Belgians and South Americans, and many more; the Bishops of the world were assembled in Council, with the Vicar of Christ, in the transept of St. Peter's in the Vatican. There were men in those days who went wild over the second Dogmatic Constitution of the Council, which defined the infallil)ility of the Roman Pontiff. The same men had vm PREFACE. given but little heed to the Dogmatic Constitution which pre- ceded it, and by which they might have well been startled. The Catholic Church does not define for the pleasure of defining, but defines then only when necessity arises, and when that necessity is pressing. Doctrinal errors may abound, and, nevertheless, many years may pass away before she lays the errors under her anathema, and defines the truths which those errors contradict. Not till the fourth century did the Church define the personal divinity of Jesus Christ. Not till the eleventh century did she define His real presence in the Blessed Sacrament. The existence of God is contained, as an article of faith, in the Catholic Creeds, but it was reserved to this nineteenth century for the Church to say — If any one shall deny the one true God, the Creator and Lord of the visible and the invisible, Let him be anathema. These words are a startling revelation of a state of affairs which made them necessary. It is true that the Vatican decree on this point is in great part a reproduction of a decree of the Fourth Lateran Council, held in 12 15, but that Decree was directed mainly against a Manichean error of the Albigenses, some at least of whom held that God produced Lucifer and his angels, and that Lucifer after his revolt produced the visible world. In the first Dogmatic Constitution of the Vatican Council^ which is known as the Dei Filius, from the words with which the prologue to it opens, there are two Chapters, and eight Canons, which bear direcUy on our subject. The first chapter is headed— Concerning God, the Creator of all things ; and is as follows— The Holy Catholic Apostolic Roman Church believes and confesses, that there is one true and living God, the Creator and Lord of heaven and earth, almighty, eternal, immense, incomprehensible, infinite in intellect and will, and in every perfection. Who, since He is one, singular, wholly PREFACE. IX simple and unchangeable spiritual substance, is to be pro- claimed as distinct in reality and essence from the world, and to be in Himself and of Himself most blessed, and ineffably exalted above all things which are and can be conceived besides Him. He the only true God, by His goodness and almighty power, not to increase or to acquire His own beatitude, but to manifest His perfection through the goods which He imparts to creatures, in His most free counsel made at once in the beginning of time both creations, the spiritual and the corporeal, that is, the angelic and the earthly, and then the human, as if common and constituted both of spirit and of body. All things which He has made God guards and governs by His providence, which reaches from end to end mightily, and orders all things sweetly. For all things are naked and open to His eyes, and those things also which shall be in the future, through free action of creatures. To this Chapter are appended five Canons, under the same heading— Concerning God, the Creator of all things. I. — If any one shall deny the one true God, the Creator and Lord of the visible and of the invisible, Let him be anathema. 2. — If any one shall dare to affirm that there is nothing besides matter, Let him be anathema. 3. — If any one shall say that the substance or essence of God, and of all things, is one and the same. Let him be anathema. 4. — If any one shall say that finite things, both corporeal and spiritual, or that spiritual things at least, are emanations from the Divine substance — or that the Divine essence, by the manifestation or evolution of itself, becomes all things — or that God is universal or indefinite being which, by determin- ing itself, constitutes the universe of things, and the distinction X PREFACE. of it into genera, species, and individual things, Let him be anathema. 5. — If any one shall not confess that the world, and all things which are contained therein, both spiritual and material, have, in the whole of their substance, been produced by God from nothing — or shall say that God created, not by a will which is free from all necessity, but as necessarily as He necessarily loves Himself — or shall deny that the world was made for tlie glory of God, Let him be anathema. The second Chapter, which is headed — Concerning Revela- tion, is as follows— The same holy mother the Church holds and teaches that God, the principle and end of all things, can with certainty be known by the natural light of human reason, from created things, for the invisible things of Him, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made ; but it has pleased His wisdom and goodness, by another, and that a supernatural, way to reveal Himself, and the eternal decrees of His will, to the human race: as the Apostle says— God, Who at sundry times and in divers manners spoke in times past to the fathers by the prophets, last of all in these days hath spoken to us by His Son. To this Divine revelation, it is indeed to be attributed that those matters which in Divine things are not in themselves impervious to the human reason, may also, in the present <:ondition of the human race, be known by all with expedition, with firm certainty, and without any admixture of error. Revelation is not, however, for this reason, to be said to be absolutely necessary ; but because God, of His infinite good- ness, has ordained man to a supernatural end, that is, to a j)articipation of Divine goods which utterly surpass the under- standing of the human mind, for eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things (lod hath pre])ared for them that love Him. PREFACE. XI To this Chapter are appended three Canons, under the same heading, Concerning Revelation. I. — If any one shall say that the one and true God, our Creator and Lord, cannot be known with certainty by the natural light of human reason, through the things that are made, Let him be anathema. 2. — If any one shall say that it cannot be, or that it is not expedient, that man should be taught through Divine revela- tion concerning Crod, and the worship to be given to Him, Let him be anathema. 3. — If any one shall say that man cannot be Divinely raised to a knowledge and perfection which surpasses that which is natural ; but that of himself he can, and ought, by a perpetual progress, to at last arrive at possession of all the true, and all the good, Let him be anathema. In the Chapters, the Council declares the true doctrine ; while in the Canons, it stigmatizes the heresies which contra- dict that doctrine. Chapters and Canons mutually complete each other, and form one definition in two parts — positive in the Chapters — negative in the Canons — and infallible in both. Chapters are infallible in all that they propound as being the doctrine of the Church ; but the proofs and arguments which they may contain do not enter into the infallible object of the definition. Canons are of great service in determining what is of Catholic faith in the Chapters. Every detail of any truth which directly concerns His Divine Majesty, the one only true and living God, must necessarily be of supreme interest to every thinking man. Many of these details must, necessarily, of the very nature of them, remain abstruse, however popularly they may be treated. Hence, not a few of those who would otherwise be eager to study God, at least as minutely as they are wont to study other objects of knowledge, are repelled by what seems to XII PREFACE. them to be the abstruseness of the argument. They shrink at any rate from uninterrupted reading of the whole of a treatise on the subject. To such persons I would suggest that they should use this volume as a book of reference, to which they may turn for information on particular points. There are many words and phrases in common use, with which they are familiar, but of the precise meaning of which they have not as yet a clear, or at least an adequate idea. They might be glad to know exactly, neither more nor less, what is meant by such words as essence — attributes — substance — being — nature — person — eternal — immense — incomprehensible — natural — supernatural — preternatural — pure, in the sense of a pure spirit, a pure act, pure nature, and the like, which meet them so often in their reading. I have had the benefit of such readers specially in view, along with the convenience of the general reader, in providing a very copious Table of Contents. The title of this volume has been suggested by the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius. His Divine Majesty is a phrase which in that short work the Saint uses no fewer than twenty- four times. The honour and glory of His Divine Majesty — the praise and service of His Divine Majesty — our offering and giving to His Divine Majesty — our being created to the image and likeness of His Divine Majesty— our love and fear of His Divine Majesty — the homage due to His Divine Majesty — the Throne of His Divine Majesty — the pleasing of His Divine Majesty — the offence of His Divine Majesty — giving thanks to His Divine Majesty — merit in sight of His Divine Majesty — disposal by His Divine Majesty, in accordance with His most holy will, of all that we are and have — are examples of the connection and way in which St. Ignatius uses this, his favourite phrase, in speaking of our Creator and Lord. Every thing which is contained within the Spiritual Exer- cises, has been approved, and with a singular approbation, by the Apostolic See. It is impossible, therefore, for any loyal PREFACE. XIII Catholic to take objection to the title His Divine Majesty. It is to all who have been trained in the Spiritual Exercises, " familiar in their ears as household words." No other words could so well express the precise purpose of this Volume. It will not have been written altogether in vain if it serves to render familiar, in the ears of those who read it, a title which crystallises in three words the idea of the infinite sovereignty, and sovereign prerogatives, of that absolute Monarch Who is man's Master, because He is man's Maker. WILLIAM HUMPHREY, S.J. CONTENTS. CHAPTER I. man's knowledge of god's existenxe. Theology — in its wider sense — in its more restricted sense God as \k\Q principal object of theology Philosophy — its place and office ... Direct arguments from reason for God's existence Refiex arguments Philosophical arguments for God's existence God knowable to man, through creatures . . . God's manifestation of Himself Manifestation in ihe physical order JNIanifestation in the historical order First knowledge of God. More finished knowledge Ignorance of God " inexcusable " Natural knowledge of the moral law Connection between knowledge of God, and knowledge of the moral law ... ... ... ." . Rational nature, and the moral order Implanted knowledge. " Innate ideas " Manifestation of God, through the supernatural order Transformation of society wrought through Christianity The cause of it Office of Judaism Reason and Faith. Objective certainty. Evidence Knowledge of God's existence. Belief in it... The Vatican decree on man's knowledge of Gcd's existence ... I 2 3 3 4 5 i6 i6 17 18 19 21 22 22 26 27 28 37 40 Xvi CONTENTS. CHAPTER II. man's knowledge of what god is. PAGE Man's ;/^ If there exists a contingent being, there must also exist a necessary being. A contingent being is a being the existence of which is possible, and the non-existence of which is also possible. A necessary being is a being which must necessarily be, and the nature of which absolutely demands existence. If a necessary being did not exist always, it never could exist. If it did not always exist, it was at some time nothing. If it was at any time nothing, it could not ever be, because nothing can begin from nothingness, nor can a thing begin of itself.- For the beginning of a thing, another thing is required by the principle of causality. A being which must necessarily always be, cannot be contingent. Such a being is an adequate cause why other beings are, or why they may be ; and there cannot be any effect without an adequate cause of it. An adequate cause is that from which Is derived the whole of the reason why the effect should exist. One con- tingent being cannot be the adequate cause of another contingent being. A necessary being, which has in itself the reason of Its own existence, can be the adequate cause of contingent beings. If, therefore, there are contingent beings — and the existence of them is evident, and cannot be dis- man's knowledge of god's existence. 15 puted — there must be a necessary being who is self -existent. Thus again do we come back to the God in whom we Hve, and move, and are, or have our being. A man who has full use of reason cannot for any length of time be ignorant of, or intellectually deny, the existence of God. The means of know- ledge are common to all, and those means are first principles, and the existence of the visible creation. Reflection is indeed required, but reflec- tion cannot be absent for a length of time. The visible objects which present themselves as effects, and the order which evidently obtains among them, excite reflection. There is also in man a natural avidity to know the causes of things. Given reflection, and comparing the principle of, for instance, causality with the fact of the exist- ence of visible things, there must result some knowledge of the existence of a God, under the conception, at least, of a supreme being, from whom all things depend. To Theology it most certainly belongs to give judgment with regard to the value of the demon- stration from reason — and with regard also to the force of human reason which, along with the natural light of reason enables man to know with certainty through his knowledge of God's creatures, that God Himself exists. i6 2. That God Is knowable to man, through man's previous knowledge of God's creatures, Is a truth which is contained in God's written revela- tion. In the Sacred Scriptures God Is declared to be knowable to men In those attributes of His which exhibit Him as distinct from His works, as He is the Supreme Author and Lord of them. God is not only knoivable^ but He is easily know- able, and that without need of any very subtle or far reaching Investigation. God Is knowable by means of the same natural faculty wherewith men form their judgments with regard to the properties of visible nature. God is therefore an object of human knowledge, and there are forces in the human reason which are proportioned In order to man's attainment of this knowledge. The Sacred Scriptures describe also the mode of Cxod's manifestation of Himself, along with the mode of man's knowledge of God through his natural reason, which corresponds to that natural manifestation. An object of knowledge cannot actually be known to human beings unless and except In so far as it manifests itself to their minds. The manifestation is in fact the knowableness of a thing, as made actual to him who is knowing it. An object of knowledge may be made manifest either through itself immediately, or mediately man's knowledge of god's existence. 17 through another object which is already known. God manifests Himself to the human reason through His creatures in such wise as that from a knowledge of the perfections of the visible universe — which are, however, limited by their imperfection — man arrives at a knowledge of God. It is not as if in creatures God were seen in Himself and in His substance. It is from knowledge of an effect, and of the perfection of that effect, that the reason has understanding of the existence of God and, to some extent, of the perfection of God who is the Supreme Cause of every effect. The objectively knowable becomes the subjectively known, when God has rendered Wivci'^^i actually knowable, through His manifest- ation of Himself. The Sacred Scriptures of both Testaments — and notably in the Book of Wisdom, in St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans, and in St. Paul's speeches both at Lystra and at Athens, as these are recorded in the Book of the Acts of the Holy Apostles — set before us a twofold order in the universe of creatures, from consideration of which the human reason has knowledge of the existence of God. There is the physical order — and there is the historical order. The whole of the physical order is a resplen- dent manifestation of God to the rational soul. i8 "his divine majesty." Scripture supposes, by way of foundation, the evidence of the imperfection of the creature — and from this there is understood the fact that the creature derives its being from some other Being distinct and separate from itself. The more fully the perfections also of creatures, as they are effects, are understood, the more clearly is there recog- nized the perfection of the Cause of all creatures. When the question is — Is there a first cause of the universe ? the Scriptures set forward the imperfections and limitations of creatures, to be considered by the human reason. When, on the other hand, the question is — What is this first cause v^^hich does exist ? the same Scriptures set forth the beauty — the order — and the magnificence of the universe of creatures. Both considerations, when taken together, constitute in its entirety the demonstra- tion of the existence of God. Both at Lystra and at Athens St. Paul set forth the historical order of providence as a testimony of God to all nations, from which they might and ought to have had knowledge of Him. He notes the second causes in the physical order, as causes the actions and effects of which are directed by the God of providence for the preservation and benefit of men. Under this aspect the historical argument is in touch with the cosmological argument. MANS KNOWLEDGE OF GOD's EXISTENCE. 1 9 He notes also the history of peoples as divinely directed, among other ends, to this end that men of all nations may recognize a divine providence as well as a human element, in the history of those peoples as it is a whole. He further notes the continual benefits and providence of God in His direction of individual men. " God is," he said to the men of Athens, ''not far from every one of us, for in Him we live, and move, and are." He declares that the relations of human nature towards God, and the dependence of human nature upon God, are both of them such as that in men who have come to use of reason there should, as it were, spontaneously and necessarily, spring up an at first obscure indeed and confused knowledge of a Supreme Being — and that later on, supposing this preconception, they should seek after God, and a more explicit knowledge of God. By means of this wider, deeper, and more clear knowledge, derived from consideration of God's benefits both to men in common and to individuals, they might be able to feel after God and to find Him. The first spontaneous and obscure knowledge — which the Fathers, and not without reason, speak of as Implanted in or engrafted on human nature — St. Paul distinguishes from a more finished knowledge. 20 "his divine majesty." He teaches that Divine deeds are ordained in order to this that, from the known fact of them, there should of itself result in men an impulse to seek after God. In this impulse towards enquiry about God, there is already and necessarily contained some confused and prim- ordial knowledge of God. In this enquiry man can, and ought to cultivate his primitive concep- tion. It remains, however, possible for man, by his own fault, to apply the same primitive idea of God to objects which are not God, and so to pervert that idea. It does not therefore neces- sarily follow from a man's seeking God in some or any sort of way that he will feel after and find God. St. Paul says ''that they should seek God, si forte if perhaps they may feel after him or find Him." Hence we see how it is that the idea of the existence of some divinity is common to all nations, and is almost ineradicable. The perver- sion, however, of the true notion of God was nevertheless nearly as widely spread among the Gentiles. The faculty of understanding through creatures the existence and the perfection of God and, if other aids are absent, the duty of exercising this faculty, are such that, if men taught by God's natural manifestation and testimony, which He has adapted to the congenital light of man's man's knowledge of god's existence. 21 natural reason, do not worship God as the one true God, and a personal God, who is separate and distinct from all and every one of His creatures — and to whom it is due that He should be honoured by His rational creatures with supreme worship — they are, as St. Paul wrote to the Romans, ''inexcusable." 3- St. Paul distinctly teaches that the moral law, with its absolute force to bind the human conscience, is knowable — and was known to the Gentiles, through reason, and apart from positive revelation of that law. This natural knowledge of the obligation of the moral law supposes and includes the natural knowableness, and the natural knowledg^e of God through reason ; apart from positive revelation given by God, and received by man, with regard to God's existence. Some sort of knov/Iedge, however, and at least a confused knowledge of God, comes first in order before man's distinct knowledge of moral obligation. The hinge of the question turns on this, that from the teaching of St. Paul, and so from the revealed word of God, it is demonstrated that a knowledge of moral obligation — or, in other words, of a law which has force to bind the 22 'HIS DIVINE MAJESTY. conscience — is possible to man through his natural reason, without presupposing a positive revelation from which this knowledge is drawn, and on which it rests. From this it further follows — or rather there is included in this the truth — that there can be some knowledge of the existence of God which is merely a result of reason, and is not founded in positive revelation. A knowledge of moral obligation which essen- tially includes some sort of knowledge of God cannot have proceeded from the sources of reason, unless this knowledge of God was essentially in- cluded by way of foundation in that knowledge of moral obligation. The question of the logical connection between knowledge of God's existence and know- ledge of the binding force of the moral law is philosophical rather than theological. The ques- tion is — Is knowledge of the moral law, from which we may arrive at knowledge of God, the knowledge which is first in order ? or. Is it only from the revealed fact of the force of reason to give knowledge of the moral law, that we may conclude that the same force of reason avails to knowledge of God ? It is clear that there cannot be the former knowledge without the latter knowledge. man's knowledge of god's existence. 23 St. Paul Instructs the Romans that a knowledge through reason, of moral principles can exist, and actually did exist amongst the Gentiles — apart from positive revelation of the moral law. His scope, throughout the whole of his Epistle, is to refute the error and pride of the Jews in their glorying in the notion that it was sufficient for justice to be Jews by birth, and to belong to the Mosaic economy. God, he argues, does not look to race, and both Jews and Gentiles are judged in accordance with their works, whether good or evil. If the Jews glory in their preroga- tive of the Law and Mosaic economy, this will not free them from destruction. They have not in those privileges any foundation for their pride with reference to the Gentiles, to whom the Law was not revealed. Those who, without belonging to the Law, have sinned will perish — not for transgression of an unknown law, but — for the sins which they have committed against a law which they have known, not from revelation, but from another source. Those who belong to the Law are not thereby already saved, but will on the contrary be judged In accordance with that law which was revealed to them. ''Not the hearers of the Law are just before God, but the doers of the law shall be justified." The law which the Gentiles were said by St. Paul not to have, was not the ceremonial law of 24 "his divine majesty." Moses, for that law was not the law which was "written in their hearts." The law referred to was the moral law which forbids theft, adultery and idolatry. St. Paul is contrasting the form of the law which was manifested to the Jews by a positive revelation — and so far as that form is concerned, the Gentiles had not the law — with the real matter of the law which even the Gentiles did have, although through another mode of mani- festation, that is to say, through their own rational na.ture. Through the light of reason the Gentiles had understanding of moral good and moral evil, and of the obligation to do the one, and to avoid the other. The Apostle further explains the way in which the Gentiles " were to themselves a law." It was not as if their rational nature were itself a law- giving principle. It was inasmuch as that rational nature manifested and, as it y^^v^, promulgated the moral law to them. This promulgation consisted in the knowledge which they had, through the natural light of reason, of moral obligation. The writing of the law in their hearts or intellects, of which he speaks, was not that kind of writing by which revealed law and doctrine is said to be written in human hearts through the more abun- dant internal grace of the New Testament. It was a writing of which the proximate principle was the rational nature of man itself, in contrast man's knowledge of god's existence. 25 with God's writing through Moses on tables, and God's positive revelation. He who by the light of reason has understand- ing of the obligation to avoid moral evil and to do good, has therein knowledge that this obligation avails for every rational creature. It is an absolute obligation which is binding always, everywhere, and under every conceivable hypo- thesis. There cannot be any circumstances whatever in which the obligation of the rational creature to avoid moral evil does not remain in all its vigour. He who has understanding of this obligation as absolute, has therein understanding of his own dependence on a superior to whom, for observance of due order, he is bound to submit himself and obey — and in whose pre-eminence over all creatures this obligation is founded. He has thus at least an obscure and confused know- ledge of a Supreme Lord to whom an absolute homage is due. The same light of reason which gives under- standing of the obligation of a law, necessarily embraces also the existing of a God who is Supreme Lawgiver, and supreme principle of moral obligation ; and without the idea of whom there could not be conceived the notion of that absolute obligation. It is clear that knowledge of absolute obligation cannot be presupposed as a 26 " HIS DIVINE MAJESTY." foundation from which to arrive at the first know- ledge of God, since this knowledge is itself the foundation of that other knowledge. Human reason can, from other divine manifest- ations, ascend by way of analysis to a knowledge of the existence of God and, God's existence once known, can have distinctness in its understanding of the absolute obligation of the moral law. From this more distinct knowledge there can be, as it were, a retracing in order to a more clear and confirmed understanding of God's existence and perfection. A clear knowledge of moral obligation does not necessarily suppose a clear and distinct knowledge of the existence of God ; although it cannot consist with an utter absence of all knowledge of God's existence. Perfect knowledge of absolute obligation is one thing, and some knowledge of the moral order in its wider aspect is another thing. From the very consideration of rational nature, as it is ordained towards the trtte and the good — and from consideration of human society — man can easily arrive at understanding of the necessity and existence of a moral order — of the existence of an ultimate end in the enjoyment of the true and of the good — and of the necessity and the existence of rights and duties. These are essential relations of a rational nature. Without them MAN'S KNOWLEDGE OF GOD'S EXISTENCE. 27 the idea of such a nature would Involve contradic- tion. Such a nature would be as impossible as it is inconceivable. These essential relations would be destitute of all ultimate foundation, if there did not actually exist one Supreme Being, who is a holy and just lawgiver, and supreme judge. As, therefore, from understanding of the //^jk^^^^^/ order the human reason can come to know that God exists ; so from its perception of the essential relations of the 7noral order the human reason ca.n rise to a knowledge of God, as He is the exemplary cause or pattern, and as He is the efficient cause of that moral order. This is the objective process of human thought. Practically, however, and as matter of fact, these notions of the moral order are, as we shall see, a foundation not of first knowledge of God's existence, but of a more finished knowledge of God's perfection and attributes. When the Fathers speak of knowledge of God as being a ''seminal word" which is sown or implanted in, or engrafted on, or congenital to man's nature, they do not mean this in the sense of — to use a phrase of certain moderns — an "innate idea" of God which is created in human nature along with that nature. They mean merely that the rational soul, which is an image of God, has been so made for knowledge of God that, 28 "his divine majesty." with the light of reason which is congenital to that soul, and by an indeliberate exercise of the reasoning faculty which belongs to it, and so by a natural movement it, as it were, spontaneously conceives — from the obvious evidence of the universe, as it is a natural manifestation of God — some knowledge of God. This primitive know- ledge is apart both from philosophical enquiry, and from instruction through positive revelation. The Fathers, in the use of these expressions, are contrasting this obscure or confused know- ledge of God, not with acquired knowledge as such — for this knowledge is itself acquired — but with that more finished knowledge of God which is arrived at through more diligent and subtle consideration — and also and chiefly with that more perfect knowledge of God which is due to revelation. It is the intellectual faculty itself, or man's reason, which they call the " seminal word." They regard the force of reason as being, as it were, a seed of wisdom which is congenital to human nature. 4. Besides God's manifestations of Himself through His works in nature, there is another manifesta- tion which God makes of Himself through His works in the supernatural order. man's knowledge of god's existence. 29 The more perfect any effects, seen to be effects, are, the more manifestly do they demonstrate the existence of the cause of them, and the perfections of that cause. If from the works of nature the existence and attributes of the Creator of nature are so resplen- dent, with what exceeding clearness of splendour must they not shine forth in a manifestation of Himself which He has superadded, and which consists of works of a far higher order. By means of these works God the infinitely mighty, wise, good, and merciful, presents Himself to man's intelligence, as it were, in the midst of rays of refulgent glory. Hence the Fathers comparing the two manifestations — the natural and the supernatural — made by God of Himself, speak of the former, in the light of the latter, as being but a slender shadow seen from afar. God's supernatural manifestation of Himself, in a series of mighty deeds and marvels, constitutes an universe apart. The existence of this universe is an historical fact which is known to us with the utmost certainty. That there is a necessary bond between the existence of this series of historical facts, and the existence of a cause of that series man's reason plainly perceives. With no less certainty do we see by the light of reason that the cause must necessarily be none other than a Being who is entirely distinct and 30 "his divine majesty." separate from one and all of the forces of this visible world — who is infinitely powerful, good, wise, omniscient, provident and, in one word — the God whom the doctrine which is bound up with these supernatural facts announces — and towards whom, in His manifestation of Himself in His infinite perfections to human intelligence, those facts have an intrinsic relation of order. In order that the necessary bond between the existence of the effects, which constitute the manifestation, and the existence of the cause who manifests Himself, should be discerned by means of reason, a bare consideration of the effects, as they are historically known to us, is sufficient. Compare the state and condition of Christian society as we find it constituted in the fourth century and since, with the condition of human society as it was in the generations before the Christian era. From a comparison of the two it is clear that in the interval there has been made a mighty transformation. An universal change in religious principles and ideas, in worship, and in morals has taken place. The change is seen to pervade all institutions, both public and private, and the whole course of thought, of feeling, and of action. We see a human society regarding with hatred and contempt that which the same human society had before regarded with worship as the palladium of its common glory and wellbeing. man's knowledge of god's existence. 31 Learned and unlearned alike are now Imbued with the most sublime of principles. Virtues, the very names of which were at one time unknown, are speculatively appreciated by all, as of the highest value, and are practised with previously unheard of fortitude by not a few. A transformation such as this demands a proportionate cause. No cause of the change Is to be found In the elements of the society which preceded it. The whole idea of heathen life and society, and the whole of this new Idea of Christian life and society are so violently opposed, the one to the other, as to make it manifest that the transformation must be attributed solely to the power of Him to whom the minds and wills of men are subject, and who can superadd to nature forces which are far above it. History, moreover, tells us that every endeavour was made by the heathen world, throughout three long centuries, with as much pertinacity as cruelty, to hinder this effect. We find no human means calculated to produce It ; we find many forces In action which, apart from Divine counteraction were such as to render It impossible. Side by side with all this, a constant and widespread series of miracles, of fulfilments of prophecy, and of supernatural enllghtenlngs and strengthenings of souls, which were apparent In the wonderful effects of them, point towards Him 32 "his divine majesty. as the Author of the transformation, to whom the whole universe, both corporeal and spiritual, is subject. The Christian economy, therefore, regarded universally and as it is a whole, is seen to rest on principles, to be sustained by means, and to shine with external manifestations of internal gifts and perfections of grace, which are such that it must necessarily be the work of Him who is the infinitely good, wise and almighty Creator and Sanctifyer, whom the Christian religion professes to be the Author of that religion. The Christian economy thus presents itself as a supernatural creation of God, and by its very existence it is, and is recognized as being a supernatural manifestation of God. In like manner as the institution and rise of the Christian society exhibits God as the creative cause of it, so is the preservation of that society an enduring manifestation of God, as preserving, protecting, and fostering it by supernatural power. The history of Christianity is intimately con- nected with the history of the "chosen people" of God under the Old Testament; as is the perfec- tion of a thing with the first beginning of that thing. The religious and political life of the Jewish nation, taken as a whole, was during two thousand years utterly different from the religion, the life, and the morals of all the heathen nations. MAN S KNOWLEDGE OF GOD S EXISTENCE. 33 The continuity of this national characteristic, which the Jewish nation preserved amid all its vicissitudes, was bound up with supernatural facts — ^with prophecies uttered and fulfilled — and with appearances of God to men, not merely at intervals, but in a continuous series of them throughout many ages. The complexus of these was not an accidental adjunct. It constituted the foundation, and was an essential element of the religious and political history of the Jewish people, regarded as it forms one historical whole. Apart from these supernatural facts, that history cannot be either understood or explained. The history of the Old Testament is thus one long and continuous manifestation of God, and of His divine attributes. All preceding manifestations of God, as forming a preparation, and all subsequent manifestations, considered as they form an effect and continuation, culminate in the one supreme manifestation of God which was made in the Incarnate God. It is true that the fact of the personal divinity of the visible God was to be learned by men through teaching, and was to be believed by men on authority. It is nevertheless equally true that Jesus Christ, regarded in His life on earth, taken as a whole, and with all its portentous wonders — and regarded at the same time in connection with the history of the Testament before His 34 "his divine majesty. advent, which, taken as a whole, was a preparation for His coming, as for the complement of that Testament — and regarded again in connection with the subsequent history of Christianity, which taken as a whole, depends from Him as from its cause and principle — must necessarily be recog- nized as the crowning pinnacle of God's mani- festation of Himself to man. As therefore the visible universe is rightly called by the Fathers a herald, a proclamation, and a doctrinal utterance of God, inasmuch as it manifests God to man's intelligence ; so also and much more ought the supernatural universe — even if it is regarded objectively only as it is a complexus of facts, and prescinding from the formal revelation of which faith is the correlative — to be called an objective doctrinal utterance by God about Himself. The Divine power, says St. Augustine, speaks by means of facts, and as novel and less common words, interspersed becomingly and with moderation in human speech, add brilliance to it, so in the significance of deeds of marvel is the Divine eloquence in a manner more resplendent. 5. If this objective supernatural manifestation of God, as it is one whole or universe, is considered beyond the immediate scope of it, and in the MAN S KNOWLEDGE OF GODS EXISTENCE. 35 light of tlie idea which properly belongs to it as most its own, it is clear at a glance that it is not merely metaphorically an utterance of God, as it is an objective manuduction to the knowledge of God, but that in a proper sense it constitutes an essential element of God's word and revelation. Those supernatural facts are, as it were, a royal apparel wherewith the words are adorned as they are words of God — they are a seal of divinity wherewith the words are stamped — and whereby the teaching which is conveyed in the words is demonstrated by way of evidence, as a teaching which is credible and to be believed. The divine facts along with the divine words thus constitute one utterance on the part of God. This divine utterance does not as yet exhibit a truth to the intellect in such wise as that the intellect should have understanding of that truth in itself. It exhibits it in order that the intellect should believe in that truth with supernatural faith, on the authority of God who is revealing it. All those things, and those things only form the material object of faith which are enunciated either explicitly or implicitly in the doctrinal utter- ance of God. The doctrine of God's existence is in manifold ways enunciated in the Word of God. It is enunciated directly, and of the intrinsic nature of the utterance, as it is a Divine utterance, in every revelation whatsoever. It is enunciated 36 "his divine majesty." again reflexly, and from the signification of the words, when God reveals Himself as, for instance, eternal, or as necessarily existing, or w^hen it is prescribed in so many words that " he that cometh to God must believe that He is!' Hence it is absolutely certain that the existence of God is a truth which is contained in the revealed Word of God. It is therefore a fact which is ta be believed with supernatural faith. The demonstration from evidence, and conse- quent knowledge of the existence of God thro2igk the light of reason, in no way hinders the intellect — when it is enlightened with the supernatural light of faith, and strengthened by the bidding of a will which is supernaturally moved — from assenting to the self same truth by reason of the authority of God revealing. Although the material object is in this case one and the same, our knowledge of that object is nevertheless twofold. The object has a knowableness from mediate evidence, or the certainty which springs from demonstration. It has a knowableness also on Divine testimony. Through the first, that truth which presents itself to the reason Is related to the reason as a truth to- be tmderstood. Through the second, the same truth Is related to the supernatural habit of faith as a truth to be believed. MANS KNOWLEDGE OF GODS EXISTENCE. 37 It follows that the same material object, under that Idea or aspect of its knowableness in which it is affected by the authority of God revealing — an authority which is extrinsic to it — is objectively certain^ but Is nevertheless not evident. Assent to a truth under this formal idea is therefore a free assent. Under the other idea of Its knowableness, the same truth may be evident, and if so, assent to that truth by the intellect Is a necessary assent, and Independent of all free choosing by the will. Hence we see how an object of faith Is, under its own formal idea, not apparent, and how faith even In things which are evident, but evident from other sources, is a conviction or *' argument of things which appear not." We see also In like manner how it is that a man who has know^ledge from evidence that God exists, and so cannot deny the existence of God, Is nevertheless capable of withholding faith in the existence of God, that Is to say, he can refuse his assent to this truth on the authority of God as speaking. That God has spoken Is objectively most certain, but It Is not so evident as that assent or dissent should not depend on a free command of the will. The assent of the reason may be merely through the light of nature, while the assent of faith is elicited by supernatural forces. The two assents, therefore, as regards both the formal motive of 38 "his divine majesty." them, and the subjective prhiciple which eUcits them, belono; to distinct and different orders. That which is the case with regard to all other of those truths which can be known both by the light of reason and revelation, is equally the case with regard to this truth of God's existence. There occurs however in the case of this primary truth a particular difficulty. The question may be asked — In what way can the existence of God be believed by faith, on the authority of God speaking, since the very foundation of an act of faith is knowledge, and that a supernatural knowledge, which is already possessed, of God's existing? The authority of God speaking, it may be argued, can only in so far move me towards believing as I already knov/ that God exists, and this knowledge of mine must be a supernatural knowledge, in order that the act of faith may be supernatural. When, therefore, I say — I believe that God exists, because God, who is infinitely veracious, has said that He exists — in this very motive which is the formal motive of believing, the existence of God is already affirmed, and it cannot be to me a motive for believing, except so far as in it I embrace the existence of God as already certain. The answer is this. In every act of faith there are comprehended, implicitly at least and virtually, certain elements. Of these elements one is a MAN S KNOWLEDGE OF GOD's EXISTENCE. 39 proposition which is immediately known, either evidently or obscurely, namely, that if God speaks, He is infinitely veracious and cannot either deceive or be deceived. Another is — God has revealed this particular truth. Now, looking to the character and whole mechanism, so to speak, of the motives of credibility wherewith God's utterance presents itself as being in reality a Divine utterance — or, looking to that utterance with all its component parts, or constituent elements, I understand for certaiii although not evideiitly, and so as to take from me my intel- lectual freedom to either assent or dissent — that this is a word of God. The assent, in the case of either proposition, as it is by way of premiss to the act of faith, does not spring from the motive of the authority of God speaking, nor is it given because God has said that He is infallible, and that He has also revealed this particular truth, but both assents when they enter the act of faith are elicited through supernatural forces. These forces are superadded through grace to the in- tellect and the will, so that the firmness of the adhesion should be, as it ought to be, supernatural and supreme. Then it is that, in the third place, there follows an assent to the particular truth itself which has been proposed as a revealed truth, and this assent is on the aiitkorify of God 7'evealing, This is 2i formal act of faith. 40 In this act of faith — The infalHble God has revealed that He exists, and so on His authority, and from reverence thereto, and with a pious affection of faith, I beHeve that God exists — there is a twofold assent to the existence of God. The two assents, however, differ both In mode and in motive. The first assent is Implicit, and does not rest on authority. The second assent which Is a formal act of faith, Is explicit, and It rests on authority. To a truth of which already I have knowledge under one Idea, I assent reflexly under another idea, namely — by reason of the infinite authority of God who speaks. To Him this supreme homage of faith and worship is due from His rational creature. In this debt of homage Is contained the answer to farther questions, such as. What is the scope, the necessity, and the use of faith and an act of faith in the existence of God, when the fact of God's existence Is already known ? * The Vatican Council declared that God can with certainty be known, by the natural light of human reason, from created things ; and those who dispute this truth of revelation, she laid beneath her heaviest censure — If any man shall say that the * For a fuller treatment of this point see 77i£ Sacred Scriptures, or The IVritfen PVord of God, Chapter XIII, Human apprehension of Divine Revelation, p. 253, by William Humphrey, S.J. Loiidoti : Aj-t and Book Co., 1894. man's knowledge of god's existence. 41 one and true God, our Creator and Lord, cannot be known with certainty by the natural Hght of human reason, through the things that are made. Let him be Anathema. CHAPTER II. Man's knowledge of what God is. MORTAL men do not see God immediately in His own proper nature. They can have knowledge of Him only by way of conclusion, and by means of His creatures, as through a medium of which they have already knowledge. Even in His revelation God has accommodated Himself to this mode of conception which is con- natural to man. This our mediate mode of knowledge of God, or knowledge through a means which is not God of that which God is, resolves itself, on analysis, into knowledge through affirmation, or ascription to God of perfections which we discern in the works of God — through negation of the existence in God of the imperfections which are found even in the most perfect of his creatures, and are found also even in our own objective ideas of perfections — and finally through the ideas which are con- ceived by conjunction of those affirmations and negations, and which result in a notion of the siipereminence of God's perfection over every perfection which is known to us, or which can be conceived by us. man's knowledge of what god is. 45 When we are directly conceiving the perfection of God affirmatively through ascription to Him of, for instance, wisdom or justice, our notion does not indeed objectively involve limitation and defect, as do other notions — such as the notion of the reasoning faculty. This faculty, as proceed- ing from truth to truth, of the very idea of it implies limitation and therefore imperfection. Sa does the notion of the pote7itial which, of the nature of it, has to be perfected in the actual. We, nevertheless, conceive even such perfections as wisdom or justice in a limited way. We cannot conceive an idea of wisdom which shall exhibit wisdom distinctly and positively as with- out limit. Still less are we capable of conceiving an idea which shall exhibit at once, and in the singleness of one Being, all the perfection which, by reason of the imperfectness of our understand- ings, we conceive piecemeal by many notions, and call by many names. When, therefore, we speak of the wisdom of God, we presuppose that this perfection is in God not as we conceive it, but in a far higher way. The supereminence of God's wisdom we cannot possibly either conceive or express otherwise than either by negation of its being in reality no more than it is in our own apprehension of it ; or by a confused conception of supereminence which we attempt to express by the use of superlatives. All our affirmative 44 "his divine majesty." conceptions, therefore, of God and of His Divine attributes are accompanied by, or rather they implicitly contain, notions which are 7iegative of all the imperfection of limitation, along with notions which suppose supereminence. As two negatives make an affirmative, so are our nega- tions affirmations, as they are negations of negations. In these negations an affirmative notion is supposed by way of foundation, and they include the notion of supereminence. There are not therefore three ways of coming to a knowledge of that which is in God, which are adequately distinct, the one from the other. In each of the three modes all the three are in a manner conjoined. One of the three is always direct, and it includes obliquely the other two. Hence we understand in what sense the Fathers are speaking when they say that — all perfections can be affirmed of God, and all denied — God is of every name, and is of no name — our knowledge of God is then more perfect when we have come to know that God cannot be known. If we were to see and know God by imme- diate intuition — or without the intervention of any created medium of knowledge — and as He is in Himself, and still more, if we were to compre- man's knowledge of what god is. 45 hend God, we should in our conception be penetrating and including the whole of His per- fection. This follows from the fact that there is not in the Divine nature any real distinction. It is one most simple being. We arrive, as we have seen, at our understanding of that which God is, through our previous knowledge of the perfections which we perceive in creatures. These perfections are manifold, and every one of them shadows forth under some one aspect the perfection of its exemplary and efficient cause, that is to say, the perfection of Him who made it, and after the pattern of Whom it was made. Not any one of these perfections is, nor are all of them together, an adequate expression or representation of the Divine perfection. Hence it is that, in accordance with the multiplicity of perfections, the idea of which we abstract from creatures, we form a mental distinction of the Divine perfection into manifold perfections. As the Divine essence is the pattern of all the perfections which can be, or can be conceived to be in creatures ; so does that essence correspond to all the ideas of perfections which our minds can possibly conceive. As, therefore, created perfections are an imperfect objective imitation and shadowing forth of the Divine perfection under various aspects ; so also every one of our ideas is an inadequate and therefore an imperfect 46 "his divine majesty." ■exhibition, under one or other aspect, of the one simple and infinite perfection of God. Although it is one and the self same essence which corresponds to all and to every one of our notions of the Divine perfection, yet that perfection is more imperfectly and more con- fusedly exhibited by the notion of one perfection than it is by the combined notions of several perfections. Hence, by reason of the imperfection of our mode of understanding, we must neces- sarily multiply our notions, if we are to come to some better knowledge of God's infinite per- fection. God as He is in Himself is invisible to the natural capacities and forces of the creature. The rational or intelligent creature can, nevertheless, be raised and, as matter of fact, has been raised through the grace of glory to intuitive vision of God. This is that vision in which the perfect supernatural beatitude, and the ultimate super- natural end, of the intelligent creature is con- stituted. This vision, inasmuch as it is an opera- tion of a created mind, remains y^/^//^. The object of this vision, inasmuch as it is an infinite Being, must remain infinitely knowable. Hence the vision of God by the creature admits of an indefinite number of degrees in the perfection of it. man's knowledge of what god is. 47 It cannot, moreover, ever adequately correspond to the whole of the infinite knowableness of its object. Comprehe7ision of the infinite is proper and possible to an infinite intellect alone. There are four kinds or orders of vision, and these are utterly different one from the other. The four are — the vision of the senses — intellec- tual vision — intuitive vision — and comprehensive vision. Vision of God, who is a spirit, with the eyes of the body, which is the vision of sense, is im- possible, and the imagination of it is absurd. hitellectual vision which is inediate — and is so called because it is arrived at through the medium of creatures in which the Creator is mirrored — is the only vision of God which is possible to men in the natural order. Intuitive or immediate vision of God is proper to the superniatural order, and is possible only in the ultimate perfection of that order. Cojnprekensive vision of God is proper, as it is possible, to God alone. To three perfections which are possible to the intelligent creature, the perfection of nature — the perfection of grace — and the perfection of glory, there correspond three orders of intellectual light, the natural light of reason — the light of faith through grace — and the light of glory^ Of this 48 " HIS DIVINE MAJESTY. threefold light the source is God, as He is Creator, in the order of nature — as He is Sancti- fyer in the order of grace — and as He is Beatifyer in the order of glory. As is every act of understanding, so is also the intuitive vision of God, an immanent act of the mind itself which sees. It is produced by the mind — remains dependent on the mind — and in- fo7'7ns the mind. The light of glory is a supernatural force, or power to understand, which stands high above every natural force, and has been superadded to the intellect of the Blessed. This light informs the mind by way of a habit, and raises the mind to the intuitive vision of God as He is in Himself. It is a supernatural assimilation of the created intellect to the Divine intellect, in the mode in which it has knowledge of the Divine essence. The Blessed, in seeing God as He is, see all God's absolute perfections. Every one of these perfections is in God all perfection, and is God Himself. Hence to behold God as He is, is to behold Him as He is all and every absolute perfection. In like manner, the Blessed, in seeing God as He is, see also the three Divine Persons. The Divine essence, as it is in itself, and in its own intrinsic perfection, is the Father who by His understanding produces the Word, and the Father man's knowledge of what god is. 49 and the Son who by their love produce the Holy Ghost. The Paternal understanduig has of necessity the Filial Word as its intrinsic terminus, while the love of the Father and the Son has of equal necessity the Spirit who proceeds therefrom as its intrinsic terminus. He, therefore, who does not behold these Divine Persons does not behold the Divine essence as it is in itself. The intellect of the Blessed is raised through that supernatural enlightenment of it, which is called the light of glory, to the perfect under- standing and penetration of all facts and truths which, outside God and under God, either now are or in the future may be; so far as this know- ledge befits them, and so far as the state of each of them demands. Hence all the mysteries and all the truths which have been revealed to mortal men, the whole of the economy of revelation and of the supernatural order, which of itself belongs in this life to the object of faith, shall then be the object of intuitive vision without a veil, or of understand- ing without intervention of any medium. To faith, as to a beginning, shall succeed vision, as the perfection and complement of faith. We are not speaking now of those revealed truths of faith which immediately concern God Himself, for these belong to the principal or priruary object of beatific vision. We refer to ^O HIS DIVINE MAJESTY." matters of faith which He outside God, and which are the secondary object of beatific vision. Among these truths of faith are the Incarnation of the Word — the way in which true God is as truly n-ian — the exaltation of man's nature in the Word — the redemption of the human race through the Precious Blood — the mystical Body of Christ which is His Church, as founded, nourished, and fostered by Him, as is a bride by her bridegroom, and as dependent for preservation, government and assistance on the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost — the gifts of grace — the sacraments, and the virtue of the sacraments, which is derived to them from God the Sanctifyer, and through the merits of Jesus Christ — and the Eucharist as it is both sacrament and sacrifice. All these, and other matters which have been revealed by God for us men to believe, shall then lie open without a veil to the intelligence of the Blessed who behold God. The Blessed who in beatific vision behold God in Himself behold Him, nevertheless, with different degrees of clearness, as He is the exemplary cause or eternal pattern of ^all beings every one of which is some shadow and participa- tion of Him who is — as He is the universal, efficient ?ix\d preserving cause, on whom all beings that exist are necessarily dependent, not only for production but also for continuance in being — and MANS KNOWLEDGE OF WHAT GOD IS. 5 1 as He is the final cause to which all beings are, of the nature of them, intrinsically and necessarily ordained. If the Blessed were to behold the Divine essence as adequately as it is knowable, that is to say, if they were to comprehend xh^ Divinq essence, they would also in that essence have perfect comprehension of all things that are possible, and all things that shall at any time exist. Such comprehension, however, belongs to infinite per- fection, and Is therefore proper to God alone. The Blessed, nevertheless, inasmuch as they see the Divine essence as it is in itself, see also the way in which that infinite Being is the pattern and norm of all things which are capable of par- ticipated being ; even if they do not see all and every one of the things themselves the existence of which is possible. The Blessed see likewise the way in which nothing that is not God can actually exist without dependence on that infinite goodness, wisdom and power which is the God whom they behold as He is in Himself. The Blessed see also the way in which all things that exist are necessarily ordained towards that infinite good, as towards their own essential end. It does not, however, follow from this, that the Blessed see all and every one of those beings and facts which have real existence. The light of glory avails, In accordance with 52 "his DIVINE MAJESTY.' the differing degrees of Its perfection, towards knowing with greater or less amplitude the possible beings, truths, and good objects, which have their pattern and foundation in the primal Being, the primal Truth, and the primal Good,, who is beheld by them as He is. In like manner the light of glory avails also to the seeing of things which actually exist ; and which In their existence depend from that first cause and ultimate end of all things. It extends in all the Blessed to the beholding of the whole of the created universe, so far as that universe consists of permanent substances. It extends to- perfect vision of the magnitude, the order, and the beauty of the whole universe ; and of the species and essences of things, so far as Is neces- sary to perfect beholding of the glory of God in the mirror of His created universe. The Blessed see all that Is necessary in order to their seeing, shining forth in the things which are made, the essence, the power, the goodness, the w^isdom and the beauty of God, who Is the pattern, the creator, the preserver, and the final cause or ultimate end of all and of every one of them His creatures. All the Blessed, both angelic and human, belong to the heavenly hierarchy which is divinely ordered in Its various grades. All of them are members of one Church. This, whether triumph- MANS KNOWLEDGE OF WHAT GOD IS. 53 ant 111 Heaven, or suffering In purgatory, or militant here on earth, is the Communion of Saints. Every individual of the Blessed, there- fore, in accordance with his own state and grade in which he has been established in the Kingdom of Heaven, has his own different position in the communion of saints, and his own different rela- tion towards the whole Church. The perfection of the Blessed demands that every one of them should see all things which belong to his own state. All the Blessed see the whole of the Heavenly Jerusalem, in which all are fellow citizens. As concerns all that is being transacted, whether in purgatory or here on earth, and especially in the supernatural order of grace, every one of the Blessed has knowledge of every thing that appertains to his own function and ministry. The Blessed, moreover, have not lost any know- ledge which they had while on earth of human affairs, or of their relations with human beings. As the dead bodies of the Blessed, burled In this earth of ours, have their ordered relation towards their future life and glory in Heaven, so, and with still more reason, do the souls that are living in glory retain their special relations towards human persons and human affairs. 71iis remains with a perfection which bears proportion to the perfection of their charity towards God, and towards men who are to be sanctified and saved by God. 54 "his divine PvIajestv.' 4. Although the Blessed behold God Intuitively In His own essence, God nevertheless remains incomprehensible to every created intellect, or intelliQ:ent creature. The word comprehension Is used In two senses with regard to corporeal things. Comprehension may signify either the apprehension, or laying hold of a thing, or the encircling embrace of that thino- ; In the sense of the full Inclusion of one thing In another which contains It. Following the analogy of this use of the word co7?iprehensio?i In corporeal matters, the same word Is used in spiritual and intellectual matters, and in a twofold sense. Comprehension is sometimes taken, by way of metaphor derived from the runners In a race, to sip'nifv attainment of an end, as when St. Paul says " So run that you may comprehend," that Is to say — reach the goal. In this sense also those who have arrived at their ultimate end are called " Blessed Comprehenders." In the same sense and way, one of the three endowments of a glorified soul is called comprehension. This com- prehension Is the correlative of hope, as vision Is the correlative of faith, and as fruition is the correlative of charity. In a very different sense Is the word compre- hension understood, when It Is used to signify that man's knowledge of what god is. 55 God cannot be comprehended by any created intellect, even in its highest state of supernatural elevation, and that God is absolutely incompre- hensible. The beatific vision is capable of an indefinite number of degrees, so that another and yet another more perfect degree of it remains always possible. In the minds of the Blessed this vision has different degrees of perfection, in accordance with the different degrees of their charity. In the idea of created being, or created per- fection, there is not included a supreme degree, than which there can be no higher degree, or beyond which another degree is not possible. In the idea, therefore, of created vision of God, there is not included a supreme degree of perfection. Supreme vision is infinite as the object of vision is infinite, and is therefore infinitely knowable. Hence supreme vision lies outside and above the whole idea of created vision. Supreme vision is proper to God alone. It is no more communicable to the creature, than is the Divine being itself communicable. Vision which adequately corresponds to the knowableness of an object is properly, and in the strict sense of the word, coiuprchensive vision. That inconipi'ehcnsibility belongs to God is evident from the very notion of the infinity of 56 "his divine majesty." God. God cannot possibly be known In His infinite knowableness, except by an infinite intel- lect. In other words, coinprehension of God is none other than knowledge of God which is adequate to the whole of God's infinite knowable- ness. The created Soul of Jesus Christ beholds its Creator with the very highest perfection of intuitive vision which is possible to any created intelligence. Nevertheless, that Soul, as being a created soul, is a finite soul. Hence even that Soul cannot know the infinitely knowable with other than a finite knowledge. The finite cannot contain the infinite, and the Human Soul of God cannot comprehend God. CHAPTER III. The essence, and the attributes of God. ESSENCE Is a word which Is capable of three meanings, when It is used with regard to created things. The essence of a thing may mean all those things by which some individual thing Is constituted In Its particular being. Given all and every one of these constituents, the thing is. If any one of these constituents is absent, the thing is not that particular thing. In this sense, the essence of a thing consists of all the things which are In that individual thing, except those only which are accidental to it. These may be either present in it, or absent from it, without it ceasing to be that particular thing. This sense of the word essence we dismiss for the present. The use of the word in this sense might, in the subject which we are considering, lead to confusion of thought. The essence of a created thing may. In another sense of the word, be understood as being the complexus of all those things which are neces- sarily common to every single subject of the same order. This is an essence which is abstracted indeed from individual things — and 58 " HIS divinp: majesty." which prescinds therefore from the accidentals, and from the individuating notes of those things — but is constituted by all the essential perfections which are in Individual things of the same order. This is what is called the physical essence of a thing. When we make a mental distinction of those notes In a created thing, which are understood to comprehend in themselves either formally, although confusedly, or at least virtually, all other notes of that thing, we arrive at what Is called the metaphysical essence of the thing. This metaphysical essence contains that which Is comm.on to all subjects of the same order, and to these alone. Hence that which a thing Is In itself, distinguishes it from all things of a different order ; inasmuch as It at least virtually compre- hends all the perfections of the physical essence of that thing. In the metaphysical essence of a thing, all the perfections of that thing have their principle. The perfections of the thing flow forth from the essence of the thing, and In it they have their being. Hence this essence Is that which in a thing is first apprehended by the under- standing, as the fountain and principle of all that is in that thing. It is clear that, if we were capable of conceiving THE ESSENCE AND THE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 59- and were to conceive God, as God really Is m Himself, there would be In our minds no distinc- tion either of physical essence from personal properties, or of any metaphysical essence from other Divine perfections. We, however, conceive the essence and nature of God — which Is In Itself absolutely simple — under a number of Inadequate notions of manifold perfections. We derive our Ideas of perfection from creatures ; and In creatures perfections are distinct, one from the other. In creatures per- fections depend one on another, and flow forth one from another, up to the metaphysical essence which Is the principle of all of them. When, therefore, we conceive perfections In God, we do not Indeed form a judgment that one Divine perfection really flows fo7^th from another Divine perfection ; but It Is at the same time true that the Inadequate Idea which we conceive of a Divine perfection supposes another perfection, from which it seems to us to depend, or which depends from it, as from Its principle. Although in God It is one most simple Being- who is a spirit, who is wise, and who wills, yet we. In aiming at distinctness of conception, cannot conceive a zuill either in Itself, or In Its functions, without in our conception presupposing an intellect — and we cannot conceive an intellect, without In our conception presupposing a spiritnal substance -60 — and a spiritual substance again we cannot con- ceive, without in our conception presupposing the being of that spiritual substance. Although, there- fore, on account of the infinite simplicity of God, it is impossible for us to distinguish in God a metaphysical essence, in that way in which we distinguish a metaphysical essence in creatures, this does not, however, hinder us, in our imperfect mode of understanding, from conceiving, among the manifold ideas under which we come to know to some extent that which God is, one idea which has some similarity to essence. The conception of an essence ought to give the notes which distinguish the thing, whose essence it is, from all other things of a different order. These notes are also understood as constituting the thing. From them, therefore, as first in order other things which are in them may be deduced, while they themselves do not follow from any other previous things. The essence of a thing, therefore, is always a perfection which is siipreme — in the sense of there being no perfection which is previous to it — among all the perfections which constitute a thine in a certain order of beings, and which distinguish that thing from all other things. In created things, therefore, the essence of them cannot be constituted by the being of them. Although being is a supreme perfection, it is not THE ESSENCE AND THE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 62 proper to one order — nor does d6'iuo' distinguish one being from other beings — nor are all the determinate perfections which are in the thing comprehended in the being of the thing, as in their principle. The essejtce must be being as contracted to a determinate perfection. If, however, in any being the idea of bei7ig should be distinct and different from everything which is not being — and if it should be simply the idea of being, not indeed as an indeterminate conception of being, but of being as determinated by fulness of perfection — then, in this case, that idea of being would be a perfection which is. supreme, as coming first in order. It would also distinguish this being from all other things — and it would, moreover, be a principle which con- tained all the perfections, not determinated in reality but determinated in idea only, which could be discerned in it. Such an idea of being would, in comparison with other perfections, be a meta- physical essence. This is the idea of being in God, as God is. absolute Being, and not a being by participation. Negation of participated being, and affirmation of absolute being are both of them expressed, when God is said to be being from itself, or selfexistent bei^ig. There is the very greatest difference between being which is derived through participation of ^2 " HIS DIVINE MAJESTY." >being from another, and being which is from itself, underivecl, and therefore self existent. The being of creatures is not simply being. It is being Vv'hich has been determinated to a certain ^r^^6^ of being. Beino- is therefore found in creatures in a nobler grade, or in a less noble grade ; in proportion as these creatures more nearly imitate or more remotely imitate and shadow forth the Divine being. The more restricted grade of the rational includes, therefore, the more universal grade of life. This again includes the higher grade of beino- ; but not vice versa. Being does not include living ; and living does not include understanding. Being which is f^oni itself, or self existent, is not restricted to any grade. When to those words being from itself there are not added any other words to determinate the meaning of them, they are understood as indicating absolute perfection throughout the whole range of being. Hence, by the words life from itself, or self- existent life, there is not signified a nobler grade of perfection. There is simply expressed a per- fection of a determinated order, which is already comprehended in being from itself. Even if the life in question were to be defined as intellectual life, intellectuality which is selfexistent is itself already comprehended in selfexistent life ; and both intellectuality and selfexistent life are comprehended ultimately in selfexistent being. THE ESSENCE AND THE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 6^ The opposite of this is the case in participated being, which is the being which belongs to every creature. This derived being is always imperfect being. It is, therefore, higher in the scale of being when a perfection has been superadded to it. Selfexistent Being is not, properly speaking, a definition of God ; nor can any other definition of God be given which shall consist of, as logicians say, the proximate genus, and the ultimate differentia. All created things are in some way compounded of that which is common to many, and of that v/hich is proper to themselves. In God — not only as God is in Himself, but as God is con- ceived by us mortal men — there is not anything which is common to beings that are not God, and which is, through addition of a perfection, deter- minated to an idea which is proper to God. On the contrary, the Being of God, and our idea of that being, is in itself absolutely proper to God, and differs utterly from every other idea of being which can possibly be concerned. God's Being is itself all perfection. Nevertheless, since the word beiiig is an ■analogous term, and, while principally applied to God, may also signify being which belongs to others that are not God, it is possible for us to determine the word being to signify the Divine Being alone, by the addition to it of the words 64 fi^oin itself or '* selfexistent." This addition we may regard as an ultimate differentia, in the language of logic; as giving expression to the essential difference between Divine Bei^tg and participated being. In this way the words "self- existent being" bear some similarity to a definition. Further, definition is one thing, and description is another. Perfections which are confusedly com^ prehended in the conception of selfexistent being it is possible for us to explain more distinctly, and so to some extent to describe God. We see, therefore, that although God's absolute perfections are not really distinct, one from the other, and so no one of them is prior to another, or is a foundation of other perfections — yet the distinction of idea, which is a necessary conse- quence of our imperfect mode of understanding, suffices for our making a distinction Into essence and properties of essence ; and for In thought placing the proper idea of the Divine essence in this that God is selfexistent Being. When we are treating of distinction of Divine properties and perfections from the Divine essence — and of partition and distribution of those pro- perties into certain, as it were, categories — our distinction can have regard only to that essence THE ESSENCE AND THE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 65 and those perfections in the mode in which they are knoi'on to us. The princi[)le of order must therefore be taken not from God's perfection, as it is in itself, for that is impossible ; but from the objective intrinsic bond between perfections, as this bond exists in our mode of thousfht. In the enquiry as to whether there is a God, the reason — from the limitations of the creature, by means of which the creature is known to be a contingent being, and a being which derives its being from another being — -concludes that there exists a necessary Being, a selfexistent Being. As this limitation of contingency and participa- tion affects all perfections of the creature ; so does the perfection of selfexistent being, and plenitude of being pervade all the perfections of God. Hence both reason and faith, In their answer to the question '' What Is God, regarded abso- lutely ? " do no more than render a confused con- ception of selfexistent being more distinct, by an unfolding of that which Is contained in the idea of selfexistent being. This is, in accordance with our mode of arriving cit knowledge of God by means of creatures, done In two ways. It is done first, by declaring the perfection of selfexistent being, through negation of negation, or negation of the limitation by which the creature is necessarily affected. Of 66 "HIS DIVINE MAJESTY. the very nature of such negations, the negations themselves are conceptions of plenitude of being under various aspects of contrast to limited being. By mukipHcation of these conceptions we come to conceive more distinctly that of which we have a confused perception in selfexistent being. We may consider the limitations which attach to the creature by reason of its origin. As a created being, it is a being which holds its being from another being. Hence formally and in itself a created being is a. finite being. It is capable, therefore, of multiplication and of change. In its relation to time, the endurance of a created being involves succession or, at least, the possibility of succession. In its relation to place, a created being is restricted in its presence, or is circum- scribed by space. In its relation to knowledge, a created being, as it is a finite being, is compre- hensible by a finite intellect, and is knowable as it is in itself. All these limitations we understand as being so many distinct expressions oi participated being, or of being which is derived from another being. In the inverse order, we understand in the very idea of absolute being, that there is comprehended in it a perfection which is above and beyond all these and similar limitations. Since such a perfection has no analogous type corresponding to it in the creature, from which it THE ESSENCE AND THE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 67 can be apprehended, and can receive a name, while on the contrary that which corresponds to it In the creature. Is the imperfection which is opposed to It, we conceive this perfection of absolute being confusedly, and express it by negations. Hence theologians speak of negative attributes in God; such as His being uncreated, and His being Infinite, His being one and simple, and still more. His being incorporeal, unchangeable, eternal, immense. Incomprehensible, invisible and ineffable. We can also, in the second place, come to an understanding of selfexistejit being, and plenitude of being, by conceptions which directly, although confusedly, affirm perfections. This we do bv prescinding from the limitation of the perfections which we apprehend in creatures, or from creatures. This prescinding from limitation can be made in all those perfections, and In those perfections only, of which we can form an uni- versal conception which Is not in itself restricted to limited being; but can be applied both to being which is absolutely selfexistent, and to being which Is participated, or derived from anotheV belng. Among such perfections are. In the first place, those perfections which are transcendental, as transcending every genus, such as being, and the true — and the good. Among such perfections 6S there are also substantial generic degrees, such as a living substance, and an intellectual substance, or a spirit. There are those perfections, likewise, which exclude or, at least, do not include, the imperfection of material things ; such as are intellect, will, power, and all that follows from those faculties. Through exclusion from selfexistent being of every imperfection, dm^ation and presence are really resolved into negations of restriction to time and place, or into the negative attributes of eternity and immensity. The Divine attrikttes are sometimes divided into absolute attributes, and relative attributes. Absolute attributes are Divine attributes con- sidered in themselves, apart from any relation to creatures, as outside God. Relative attributes^ are those which have relation to creatures, as creatures are distinct from God. When God is called by the names of Creator — Lord — the Divine Providence — the Sanctifyer, and the like, the foundation of those names is in God the necessary and eternal perfection of the Divine intellect, will, and power. That which outside God is created, subject, directed, and sanctified, does not add perfection to God. It is from it, however, that these names of God are taken. THE ESSENCE AND THE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 69 The Divine intellect, will, and power, and the perfections which are connected with them are, as regards acts of these, conceived by us as some- thing which concerns the Divine essence, and appears to us as if It were added to that essence. Hence a distribution of God's perfections Into absolute properties, and into attiHbtctes, properly so called, has foundation In that mode which is the only mode in which it is possible for us men here on earth to consider the Divine perfections. The name of God, revealed by God Himself, / am, or / am iv/io am, or He who is — is a name Vv/hlch is proper to God alone. This name signifies immediately the substance of God. The name does not admit of any analogous meaning. It is, therefore, an incommunicable name. It is as incommunicable to the creature, as is the Divine essence which the name signifies. In other names which are given to God in the Sacred Scriptures, such as The First and The Last — The Beginning and The End — The Alpha and The Omega — He who Is, and was, and is to be — ^there Is a declaration, under the form of indefinite time, of a oneness of past, present, and future. This is a negation of succession, and so a supereminence over all relations of time. He who is comprehends the beginning, the yo "his divine MAJESTY." middle, and the end, and all the plenitude of absolute being, and absolute perfection; to which nothing can be added, and from which nothing can be taken. As God alone is He zv/io is, the intrinsically necessary Being, who comprehends the whole plenitude of absolute being, and besides whom there cannot be any absolute being ; so in that absolute perfection of His is found the reason why outside God there is a possibility of the existence of analogous imitations of God, and of beings by participation which derive their being from God. In the free exercise of God's will, and in His infinite power, is found the canse also why such beings actually are. It belongs to the plenitude of absolute being that otitside it there can be nothing of absolute and independent being — for otherwise God would not be that plenitude of being. It belongs also to God's plenitude of absolute being, that at His will there can be imitations of His perfection in creatures, that are in every way dependent on Him. If this were not so, God would not be perfect under all ideas of perfection, and so would not be plenitude of beiitg; or plenitude of absolute perfection. God alone is because He is, and no one besides God, and outside God, can be, or can be conceived as bei7t£- becazise he is. All beings except God THE ESSENCE AND THE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 7 1 can be, only because God is ; and they actually are because God wills them to be. They are fro77i Him, as from the necessary principle of the intrinsic and extrinsic possibility of all things. They are by Him, or tliTOttgh Him, as from the free cause not only of the beginning of their existence, but also of the continuance of the exist- ence of all created things, which are in every way dependent on Him. They are also to Him, as to the End of all things. Whatsoever of perfection there is in actually existing creatures, or can be in creatures the existence of which is possible, is comprehended in God, as in the one absolute and externally imitable perfection of Him who is the pattern of them, and who is also their efficient cause. Hence being and to be are not predicated 2tnivocally of the Divine Being and of beings that are outside God, and that are not God. His Being, and the being of them, cannot be con- numerated. They differ wholly in the very idea of being. It is, nevertheless, not eqttivocally but analogically that being is predicated of creatures, and that because they are truly an imitation and adumbration or shadowing forth of the Divine Being. The application of the term being, as common to both God and His creatures, is there- fore not arbitrary. It is founded in a likeness and relation of the lower to the higher. Hence y2 *'his divine majesty. it is that in the Sacred Scriptures creatures which, regarded simply in themselves, are said to be, are in comparison with the Divine Being, sometimes said not to be. The most universal idea of being which it Is possible for us to conceive, is not a being which is simple and determinate; but is an abstraction of actual being, or of possible being, in which, besides the opposition of it to nothingness or to not being, there is no determination. The Divine Being is, on the other hand, simple and determinate, with a determination beyond which there cannot be any determination which is higher. The abstract Idea of tmive^^sal being, and our idea of the Divine Being, differ in the very mode in which the two ideas are conceived. The one idea we form by way of immediate abstraction from that which is presented to us in creatures, the other idea we form by way of conclusion, so as to arrive at a conception of the pattern Being, who is the principle and fountain of all created and creatable being. The simplicity of tmiversal being is negative, on account of the abstraction of it from all deter- minate perfections. This is a simplicity which neither has nor can have real existence. It exists only in apprehension of the mind. The simplicity of the Divine Being is, on the contrary, positive y THE ESSENCE AND THE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 73 and It necessarily exists, although It Is only most imperfectly and through negations that we arrive at a mental apprehension of It. The fallacy whereby being which Is simple through abstractiort is substituted for Being which Is simple throitgh absolute perfection, is the prin- ciple of Pantheism, and is, as it were, a com- pendium of^ Pantheism in all its various forms. This fallacy lies also at the root of the error of those who fancy that God is objectively and really, to us mortal men on earth, the object of our first intellectual idea, and of immediate intui- tion by us ; although He is not In this life distinctly and reflexly known by us under the Idea of absolute essence. God is not the first object of our knowledge, or the first object which Is knowable by us. It is not through a knowledge of God which Is immediate, that we have our knowledge of creatures. It is through our know- ledge of creatures, that we come to knowledge of God. CHAPTER IV. The absolute properties of the Divine Essence. A PERFECTION which is absolute — as com- prehending in it the whole idea of perfection — cannot be conceived as manifold, or as capable of multiplication. It must be wholly ^;/^. Truth, goodness, wisdom, and every perfection whatso- ever which can be conceived as the whole of perfection, and unlimited by any imperfection, is not a mere absti^act conception. It is, of intrinsic necessity, a real existence. It is not, and it can- not be, only in the sphere of the ideal. In itself it is, and must be, real being. It is, therefore, intrinsically impossible, as involving contradiction, that absolute Divine Being should be multiplied, and that there should be a number of Gods. To speak of two infinites, each of which is the fulness of absolute being, would be to say that one of the two is infinitely perfect, and that to it, nevertheless, is wanting the infinite perfection which is in the other — and that the other is, in like manner, the fulness of the whole of absolute being, and that, nevertheless, to it is wanting the THE ABSOLUTE PROPERTIES OF THE DIVINE ESSENCE. 75 whole fulness of absolute being, which belongs to the other infinite nature which is distinct from it. Of both infinites, the whole fulness of perfection would be at one and the same time affirmed and denied. This is the innermost reason why multiplication of the Divine essence is impossible, as involving contradiction ; and why the oneness of the Divine essence is not the same as oneness of number, but is above that oneness. This argument is either supposed by, or it is implicitly contained in expressions used by the Fathers to demonstrate the oneness of God from the perfection of the Divine essence, as when they say — If there were two or more Gods, there would be no Supreme — Among several Gods there cannot be any difference — Several Gods would be superf^iuous, since one is sufficient. The explanation of the composite is easier than is the explanation of the simple. From the idea of the composite, therefore, we can best unfold the Idea of the simple. In the composite, we observe parts. Whatever has parts is in some way mani- fold. It is not in itself wholly undivided, and still less is it indivisible. That which has no parts, is in itself ttndivided and indivisible. From conjunction of parts Into one whole, the composite 76 "his divine majesty." formally proceeds. The immediate and direct negation of composition is sirnplicity. Oneness in itself and simplicity do not differ in reality. They differ only in the mode of con- sidering them. That which is one in itself is considered in opposition to the ma7iy, of which the composite consists. That which is simple is considered in opposition to the composite, which consists of many. The composite more approaches the idea of the simple, the less the parts of the composite are really distinct, and the more intimately they coalesce into one undivided whole. Besides corporeal substances, in which both the constituent parts and the integrating parts are substantial, there are spirits also in existence. Created spirits are altogether simple. In spirits there cannot be any composition, other than that of qualities, habits, and spiritual acts. These there can be, and these there are, in a substance which has no substantial parts. There are various species of composition, such as — composition of matter and substantial form — composition of integrating parts — composition of substance and accidents — composition of essence and esse — composition of nature and hypostasis — and composition of genus and differentia. By a part we mean a thing which is imperfect, which receives perfection through another thing THE ABSOLUTE PROPERTIES OF THE DIVINE ESSENCE. 77 communicating itself to it, and uniting itself with it. Hence parts, properly so called, always perfect each other through a mutual communica- tion of themselves. The perfection of the com- posite whole springs from the union and mutual communication of all the parts. A part, as a part, is an incomplete being. From the intrinsic idea of parts, we see how compositions are consequences of limitation, and are among the certain signs of limitation. Where there is physical composition of parts which are distinct in the thing itself, whether these parts are substantial parts, or whether one of them is an accident only, the case is clear. When each of the parts, inasmuch as it is a part, is essentially a being which is circumscribed by negation of absolute perfection ; the perfection of the whole, which springs from the mutual communication of finites, cannot possibly be absolute and infinite. The finite and the infinite — and also relative perfection and infinite per- fection — differ, not in degree, but in tl;e whole of the intrinsic idea and essence of each of them. The same Idea of imperfection, which is necessarily included in composition of parts, has place also in metaphysical composition; even if those things which are conceived as parts are ^8 "his divine majesty." not distinct from each other hi the object, as one thing is distinct from another thing. It is not from the fact that the simple has no parts that absolute simpHcity is formally a per- fection. It is from the fact that God's being is all absolute perfection. Nothing, therefore, can be conceived of it, which is limited by defect of any possible ulterior perfection. Simplicity is a perfection, not inasmuch as the simple lias not parts, but inasmuch as the simple cannot be a part or a quasi-part. We suppose, as a truth which is manifest in itself, that there is in God that simplicity which excludes substantial parts, whether as constituting parts, or as integrating parts ; such as are in bodies, or are in those things which have in the composition of them at least some material part. Apart, however, from this crass kind of com- position — the exclusion of which contributes but little in the way of throwing light on the intrinsic idea of the Divine simplicity — there is a more subtle kind of composition, from which no creature whatsoever can be free. It is that composition which is founded in imperfection, with the possibility of ulterior perfection, that is to say — in potentiality for the actual . Every essence which can be conceived outside God includes an objective potentiality towards being, but it THE ABSOLUTE PROPERTIES OF THE DIVINE ESSENEE. 79 does not in its own intrinsic idea include actual being. Hence there can be conceived composition of essence and esse as of the objectively potential and the actual. In like manner, participated being — since it is not absolute being in the, as it were, whole extent and idea of being — does not, inasmuch as it is somewhat of being, include that grade of being which is life, or living being. It is not Y\i<^ of the intrinsic idea of it. It is only a receptive potentiality for life. Hence a living creature is said to have life. It is not said to be life. In the same ysfd^y participated life \^ potential oi the higher grade of intellecttiality. Further, a created living intellectual substance is not absolute intellect, pure and simple. It has intellect in some degree of its perfection ; and so such intellect is potential for acts of understand- ing, and so for formal truth and wisdom. If this potential becomes actual, it can be actual only to some extent, along with a potentiality of farther perfection. It will therefore be actual in some- what, and in somewhat else it will be potential. It cannot be a pui^e act, or in other words, it cannot be absolutely actual Hence a created living intellectual substance will have certain acts of understanding and formal truth and wisdom, to a certain extent ; but it cannot itself be absolute understanding, or absolute truth, or absolute 8o * HIS DIVINE MAJESTY." wisdom. The same Is true of the w///, and of the perfection of the will. There is here some, at least, vietaphysical conipositioii of the potential and the actual — or composition of that which is to be perfected, and that which perfects it. The created intellect remains indefinitely potential of farther perfection. The actual remains in that intellect indissolutely wedded with the potential. The essence which is absolute Being, in the whole plenitude of being, is, formally as it is this essence, a pure act, without any potentiality, whether objective potentiality for being, or recep- tive potentiality for more perfect being. Hence this essence of itself, and without any addition — for to absolute perfection nothing can be added — but in its own substance, and not by reason of any quality which is not that substance, is, as it is Being, life also and intellect, and truth, and wisdom, and charity. It is all these, as these are absolutely actual. Hence, in the inverse order, every one of these perfections, and all of them together, are really that one most simple essence, of which we have inadequate understanding, through the different conceptions which we derive from the perfections of creatures. We cannot, therefore, conceive in God, as we conceive in creatures, essence, or being, or any^ THE ABSOLUTE PROPERTIES OF THE DIVINE ESSENCE. 8 1 perfection by whatsoever names it may be called, as something imperfect, and to be completed by some addition to it. We understand that every one of those perfections is itself the plenitude of absolute Being. It is that plenitude which, on account of the imperfection of our intellect, is conceived by us under different ideas ; as different created perfections correspond to the infinite and absolutely simple pattern of them. That Divine Being who has the singular name of He iv/io is is spoken of in the Sacred Scrip- tures, not only as living, and as having life from Himself, and as having all wisdom and all truth, and as dwelling in inaccessible light, and as being the God of Charity ; but also as deino- Life, as deing- Wisdom, as being Truth, as beiizg Light, and as being Love. The Divine Being is, there- fore, as it were, an infinite /^rw, which of itself, and not through a quality which is distinct from it, is all these. This is negation of all and every composition whatsoever ; and that is the simplicity which, of the intrinsic idea of absolute being, is necessary m God. The doctrine of the absolute simplicity of God is not merely implicitly contained in the Sacred Scriptures. They explicitly set forth the prin- ciples from which the metaphysical demonstration of God's simplicity is constructed. 82 "his divine majesty.' The Fathers also argue, from the absohite per- fection of God, that God Himself is at once all and every perfection to which we can possibly give name. Hence it follows that the Divine perfections are not distinct either from the Divine essence — or one from another— but ought to be understood as being that one most simple Being who is truly conceived, but, at the same time, inadequately conceived by us, through various notions of per- fections, and whom we call by various names. God is, in a word, that perfection which He is said by us to have. What we conceive as immanent acts in God is really the Divine essence itself. God's Intellect, Will and active Power are not, and cannot be conceived as being faculties which are perfected by subsequent acts of understanding, volition, and efficiency. As the Divine essence or siLb- stance is itself infinite Intellect, infinite Will, and infinite Power ; so also the substantial act which understands, wills, and effects, is itself the same Divine essence, without accession of anything in addition to that essence. Will in God is not a faculty of willing which is at one time actual, and at another time not actual, or which is at one time actually willing this, and at another time actually zmlling that. It is one act of zmlling which is always the same in itself, THE ABSOLUTE PROPERTIES OF THE DIVINE ESSENCE. S$ since it is, in reality, the one Divine essence and substance. This Divine essence is itself infinite, substantial volition. In God, essence and will are not distinct one from the other, as a subject to be perfected is distinct from ih(i/o7^m which perfects it — nor are will and volition distinct, one from the -other, as a facidty is distinct from an act of that faculty. In God, essence, will, and volition are in reality one, and are distinct one from the other only in consideration of the mind. As Divine understanding is infinite actual compile kensiou of the Divine essence and infinite truth, with which that understanding is itself identified, and in which all truth is comprehended — so is Divine will infinite actual love and necessary love of the Divine essence, as of infinite good, with which that love is itself identified. Since the good, in which that love rests in the fulness of essential sufficiency and beatitude, is infinite ; that substantial act does not neces- sarily have for its object any participated good. That same infinite act of volition can, how- ever, have regard to participated goods, so that those goods should have existence from it, and exist throngh it, and be ordained to it as to the infinite good. This relation towards, and termination in finite goods cannot be through a superadded and accidental act of volition. That would involve contradiction. It would be impos- 84 "his divine majesty." sible in volition which is absolute, substantial, and unchangeable. It is the Divine substance itself which, under the formal idea of that substance, as It is infinite will, can Immediately and by Itself — that Is to say, without Interposition of any other act of volition — have relation towards participated good, and, as it were, extend itself to participated good, without any change of itself. In the same way the Divine understanding of the Divine essence, an act which is one. Is extended or extends itself to the understanding of all things which are intelligible. It is clear, therefore, that in God — even as regards a free volition which has Its terminus in an object which Is outside God — there is not both a potentiality of acting, and an act. There Is an act only. Of this act the termination may be in this or In that created object. This does not add anything to the Divine act itself ; but only to the created object, or the object outside God, to which the Divine act Is extended. There cannot, therefore. In short, be conceived In God com- position which Involves both potentiality of acting and a free act. Hence we gather how great the difference is between God's volition and man's volition ; and between the Idea of the Divine freedom and the idea of our freedom, and Indeed of all created freedom. Our volition Is an accident, and a THE ABSOLUTE PROPERTIES OF THE DIVINE ESSENCE 85 modification of a substance. When there Is a determinate act of our will, the termination of the act in an object is intrinsic to it, and is necessary and not free. In so far only, therefore, are we free in will, as the volition is in our own power that it should either be or not be, and that It should either will this, or will that. An act of the Divine will, on the other hand — or Divine volition — Is Itself a substance ; and is not either an accident, or a modification of a substance, and it Is in reality the Divine essence. Divine volition is, therefore, in itself one substantive act of which the existence Is necessary. The termin- ation of this act of volition In Its principal object, that Is to say, in the goodness of the Divine essence, with which It is Itself identified, is indeed absolutely necessary, but the relation of It to a seconctaiy object, or participated good. Is entirely free. The freedom of God, therefore, does not consist in this, that an act of Divine will can either be or not be, or that It can In Itself will this or that. The freedom of God consists In this that infinite substantial volition of Infinite good can, without any change in itself, either be, as It were, extended to goods which are outside God — so that they should exist — or can be not extended to the existence of these, and if so — they will not exist. In other words, the same one Divine act which 86 wills, and which loves the Infinite good of the Divine essence, and which rests In this eood with the fulness of beatitude, necessarily Indeed wills this good in Itself; but It does not necessarily will this good either with Imitation of it. or without imitation of It in participated goods, or creatures. The Divine will freely wills both imitation, and negation of imitation; and it freely wills one degree of Imitation Instead of another degree of imitation. The reason or Idea of the Divine frcedo^n Is In this, that to an infinite model, which is to be imitated, the actual existence or the nonexistence of an analogous Imitation of it does not in the one case add to it anything of perfection; nor does it in the other case take from it anvthlncf of perfection. The reason or idea of the nnchangeo.blencss of the Divine will is In this, that not another act, but one and the selfsame infinite substantial act which wills the Divine essence, wills also either the imitation of that essence, In and through partici- pated goods, that is to say, through creatures, or the negation of that Imitation. This relation to one or to another terminus In the creature, adds nothing to the substantial act. All diversity whatsoever concerns not the substance, but the lerniinus of the one unchangeable act. The freedom of the intelligent creature is his THE ABSOLUTE PROPERTIES OF THE DIVINE ESSENCE. 87 indifference of active will towards an act. This indifference is an accident and not a substance. The freedom of the Creator is indifference of termi7iation in His act of will, which is itself a substance, and which is in itself necessary and unchangeable. An irmnanejit act of will in God is in reality the Divine substance, under the formal idea of that substance, as it is infinite substantial volition, with connotation of the object outside God which is willed by God. This connotation does not add anything to God Himself, or to God's infinite volition. From this connotation, however, it is that the will of God is said to be, for instance, a creating will. Since both that substantial will, or the Divine will as it is a sitbstance, and this connotation of the creature as to be in existence at some point in the future of time, were from eternity ; creative will, or creative action, is in God eternal. There is not formally in God any transient act. All transient action is in the creature. Hence transient action begins in time, or with time. It is not less separate from God than is the creature itself. Relation is an order of one person or thing towards another person or thing. When there 88 "his divine majesty." are two persons or things, which are really ordained towards each other, their relation is a real intcitial relation, such as is that of father to son, and of son to father. When, on the other hand, one of the two persons or things has a real ordination towards the other; while the other has not thence any new ordination of itself, through something real which has been superadded to it, but is only conceived as relative, because the other is Ideally related to it — there is real relation in the one only, and relation of idea in the other. We conceive the relation of idea by reason only of the real relation. Knowledge in a created mind has a real order of relation towards a thing which is actually known. The thing known has only a relation of idea towards him who knows it. There is nothing placed in the thing known, by the fact that it is actually known. The thing known remains the same, whether it is known or whether it is not known. In this way the creature, which is really dependent on God for the whole of its being, has a real relation towards God. God, on the contrary, is only conceived to have relation to the creature, because the creature is related to Him. God does not in any way depend on the creature, nor is there anything placed in God whereby He is ordained towards the creature. Hence, the relation of God towards one and all of THE ABSOLUTE PROPERTIES OF THE DIVINE ESSENCE. 89 His creatures is not a real relation. It is a relation of idea only. 3 We speak of truth, and of the true, in three ways. First, and formally, truth is adequate correspondence of understanding with the thing understood. Secondly, that which is funda- mentally true is the thing itself which is to be understood. Thirdly, the morally t7'ue has place in the signification, or manifestation, or imparting of truth. We may, moreover, make a distinction between veracity and moral truth. When the will, and the act which manifests the will, corres- ponds to the formal truth perceived, or to true knowledge, there is — veracity. In the manifesta- tion itself by, for instance, speech or writing, which corresponds to the formal truth — a mani- festation which has its origin from veracity — there is moral truth. Veracity belongs formally to the will, and materially to the intellect. Tiatth is related to the intellect alone. Hence, if the knowledge to be manifested should be false, there might, nevertheless, be habitual veracity in the will ; that is to say, there might be a constant will to manifest the true. In the act of manifesting the false, veracity can be only relative. There cannot in any w^ay be ti^uth in manifestation of the false. He who says that which is false, but <)o "his divine majesty." which he thinks to be true, is relatively veracious^ but he is not in being veracious saying that which is true. The true as it exists in objects is being, with connotation of an intellect, which either is or can be conformed to the true. Truth is, in this sense, the aptitude of a being for understanding in con- formity with the true — or in conformity with being under the idea of its knowableness. Knoivableness is as extensive as is the idea of being. In this sense St. Augustine says, "The true is that which is!' The greater the perfection oi being, the more ample is the knozvableness of being. The Divine essence is not only infinitely intelli- gible, but it is actually, of its own intrinsic idea, infinitely understood and comprehended. As God's Being is infinitely intelligible, so is God's Being also infinitely intelligent. God is the plenitude of the noble, throughout the length and breadth of being, or in the whole idea of being. The highest nobleness of being which we can conceive is intellectitality. This nobleness of being is in God, however, higher than is any conception of nobleness which we are capable of forming. The Divine essence is so intelligible that it cannot be that that essence should not be com- prehended in the whole of its intelligibility. The Divine essence is the primary object of the Divine understanding. God comprehends in His THE ABSOLUTE PROPERTIES OF THE DIVINE ESSENCE. 9 1 essence all the hnte, by the same act by which He comprehends that essence. Not only does the Divine Being, in its infinite knowableness, adequately correspond to God's infinite under- standing; but the comprehended and the compre- hension, the understanding and the understood, are identical and one. As participated and dependent being is trite, in virtue of its aptitude for conformity of the understanding with it, so absolute, infinite, and necessary Being is itself S2ibstantial Timtli. Of its own intrinsic essence, it is understanding and comprehension of itself. Through consideration of the idea of objective truth, as that truth exists in created beings, we arrive at some understanding of the eminence of Truth in the Divine Being. Truth which is, or which can be conceived, outside God, may be considered in three ways — actual truth, in things which exist — merely ideal truth, in things which are only possible — and formal truth in created intellects. The fountain and the measure of all this truth is the Divine Truth. This is truth in itself, and primal truth. Other truth is participated truth. This truth is derived from primal truth. Things which actually exist are, in their relation of order towards the Divine intellect, in so far ^2 " HIS DIVINE MAJESTY." tnie as they correspond to Divine ideas. Those true things do not determinate the Divine intellect. The Divine intellect which comprehends the Divine essence as imitable, and which, in conjunction with the Divine will, is called the Divine practical intellect — is to created imita- tions of the Divine the cause of their actual existence. It is to them the cause also of their existence in that mode of existence which corres- ponds to the Divine Idea of them. Those created Imitations of the Divine do not give measure to the Divine Intellect. The Divine Intellect gives measure to them. In the Divine Intellect all created things are, as all works of art are In the Intellect of the artificer of them. Hence that which is done, by a creature who is intelligent and free, In accordance with the moral order — the order which corresponds to the Divine Ideas and the Divine goodwill — Is, In the Sacred Scriptures, called a trtith. That which Is done contrary to this moral order, Is therein called and is a lie. As in the Sacred Scriptures It is said that all the commandments of God are trnth — and God's law Is ti'iUli — and all God's ways are truth, as a norm and measure; so are we also therein com- manded to walk In truth — and to do truth. Of the devil, on the other hand, it is said that he stood not in the truth — and that tincth is not In THE ABSOLUTE PROPERTIES OF THE DIVINE ESSENCE. 93 him — and that all those are excluded from the Heavenly Jerusalem who make a lie. The metaphysical and ideal order of things which are merely possible, and all the ti^uth which, properly speaking, is not in them, but may only possibly be at some time in them,, depends on the fact that the Divine essence is imitable outside God in certain w^ays, and in accordance with certain laws. The whole of the' metaphysical order, therefore, is constituted by the necessary laws of essences. These laws are 7iecessary, because the Divine essence demands them. Hence the Divine essence is — not in virtue of free will, but in virtue of its own neces- sary perfection — the fountain and the measure of all tritth, even truth of the metaphysical order. Formal truth Is, in created intellects, a partici- pation of Divine truth. This it Is, either through an immediate Intellectual conjunction with the Divine essence and substantial truth — as in the case of the beatific vision in the light of glory ; or through a supernatural light of another order, derived from the primal truth — a light which there is in all supernatural knowledge, in different modes and degrees ; or through communication of a habit of knowledge, and of ideas — as in the case of the natural knowledge possessed by the 94 "his divine jMAJESTY." angels, and as was the case in the natural know- ledge possessed by the first man — or finally, through that which is the lowest of all communi- cations of light, the intellectual light within us. From the conjunction of this light with the -objective truth which is in existing things, there springs /^rw^/ truth; that is to say, the adequate correspondence of our intellect with the reality of those things. There is a concurrence or conflu- ence of the objective, and the subjective. The one is the counterpart of the other. The two meet and are wedded, and the offspring \s formal truth. The light of reason is itself a participation of the truth and wisdom of God. It is that which the Fathers call the '' seminal word," by which man is constituted an image of God. Finally, from participated y(?r;^^^/ truth, trittli is ■derived to our words, and to the signs by means of which we manifest our meaning. All triUli, therefore, which is, and which can be •conceived as being, outside God, depends from God as He is truth in itself, as from the principle — the pattern or model — and the measure of it. In the same sense in w^hich God is primal Beiiigy is God also primal absolute Truth. THE ABSOLUTE PROPERTIES OF THE DIVINE ESSENCE. 95 4 The notion of the good is the notion of some- thing- /e'r/cr/, which IS desirable. In this definition the perfect is that which is in possession of all things which belong to it. Desire is the tending towards, and the rest of the will m that perfect, or that measure of the perfect, which belongs to him who desires. Every good m itself belongs to some one. Hence good is in itself desirable. Aristotle therefore defines the good 2j$> — that which all desire. This is not to be understood, says St. Thomas, as if every good were desired by all men, but in the sense that whatsoever is desired has in it the idea oi good. The good in creatures may be understood as that which is indeterminately perfect, in accord- ance with the being of creatures. In this sense, the good follows the idea of being. Along with being the good is transcendental. It is not con- tained within any genus, but transcends every genus. In another sense, the good is that which is perfect in a determinate essence. In this sense, likewise, whatever is is good. It is good with a metaphysical goodness. In a third sense, a thing may be good by reason of a perfection which has been superadded to the essence of the thing — whether in the physical order, or in the moral order. Lastly, the good may be understood as being perfection in final rest, and in the state 96 " HIS DIVINE MAJESTY." of an ultimate end, beyond which there is no progress towards any farther good. The good, in its relation to another is that which is good in itself, but as it is a principle of good in another, whether as an cjfLcierit cause — by action ; or as an end — by fruition ; or as a Jorm — by the communication of itself. God is infinite good in itself, and He is the *'Good of goods," that is to say. He is the principle and end of all and every good which outside Himself can exist only by participation, and with absolute dependence on the Good which He is. Being and the good are convertible terms, since beino- includes the idea of the good. Absolute Being is, of its essence, therefore, absolute Goodness. The goodness of God in Himself may, for the sake of greater distinctness of thought, be reo-arded in a threefold order, the ojztological order — the moral order — and the, as it were, order of the Jinal. God is goodness ontologically. Since God is, of the innermost idea of His essence, the actually existing plenitude of the whole of perfection, there cannot accrue to Him any perfection by means of which He should be good. Necessary being is the whole of essential and absolutely THE ABSOLUTE PROPERTIES OF THE DIVINE ESSENCE. 97 necessary being, because it is being itself. God is not, therefore, good with some other goodness, but He is good by His own essence. God is not good within some order or degree, beyond which He is not good. God is absolutely good in the whole idea of goodness. God does not have goodness, as an accident, which cleaves to His substance, but God is the whole of goodness. Transcendental good is really identical with being, even in creatures; but being is itself con- tingent to the creature. It is not necessary with the necessity of an intestinal idea. Hence the essence of the creature is not of itself 2.qX\i'A. It is merely possible. Essence in the state of possi- bility is only a possibility of good. The possi- bility of a thing being good has its only source in the idea of deriveableness from the underived. The underived is the Divine essence. Created essence cannot indeed be actual without its beino- good, with a metaphysical goodness ; but this is a relative goodness, and demands many other goods which belong to it — both in the physical order and, in the case of intellectual creatures, in the moral order — if it is to be simply good within its own order. Creatures are good within some finite degree of being and goodness, as a good spirit, or a good angel, or other good creature. God is good H 98 " HIS DIVINE MAJESTY." throughout the whole idea of the good. He is the *' ofood Good." Goodness in the vioral order is called sanctity or holiness. It is chiefly on account of sanctity that rational creatures are called good. By sanctity alone are they rightly disposed towards the end, in the attainment of which there is the ultimate complement of goodness, beyond which there can be no greater goodness. Sanctity in creatures, considered negatively, is freedom from sin, as from inordinate divergence from the eternal law in habits and acts. Sanctity in creatures, considered positively, is the con- formation and commensuration of habits and acts to the rule of morals. This conformation is ultimately perfected by love of God, and con- junction with God as the Last End. As the law of love is the greatest commandment, from which depends, and towards which is directed, the whole law — so towards love of God, and union with God, every conformation to the law of God is of itself ordained. The Divine essence, as it is the foundation of all order, and of every order, is the foundation of the moral order. The Divine essence, as it is intellect and will, is the principle of eternal law, and the measure of all moral rectitude. God infinitely loves, with a necessary love, the fundamental rectitude which is His own THE ABSOLUTE PROPERTIES OF THE DIVINE ESSENCE. 99 tfsseiice. The same essentially right act, whereby He loves His own essential rectitude, is borne towards creatures who are outside Himself, as the law and norm of rectitude; a law which in part is necessary, and in part is free. Hence it is that every Divine disposition outside God is essentially right. It is as much a contradiction, and therefore impossible, that either a law of God, or a work of God, outside Himself should not fully correspond as the counterpart of essential rectitude — as it is a contradiction and impossible that the essentially right Divine act itself, and the Divine norm of all rectitude, should cease to be right. The same essential love wherewith God In- finitely loves rectitude in His own essence, and wherewith consequently He wills rectitude In His creatures, and loves that rectitude In them ; is on the other hand and necessarily, rebuke imd hatred of sin. Hence we see how not only identically, but also foinnally, so far as our manner of under- standing is concerned, the goodness or sanctity of God, that is, the justice of God in punishing sin, and God's love of goodness, is God's hatred of sin. The distinction of the two is not in this Divine perfection, even as that perfection Is understood by us. The difference is in the objects towards which the one Divine perfection is related. loo . "his divine majesty. The proper idea of the Sanctity of God comes then to this, that, in the first place and positively God is sanctity itself — secondly and negatively, God is sanctity, through essential and absolute opposition to every turning away from the norm of rectitude, which norm He is — thirdly, and from the point of view of cause, all participated or derived sanctity consists in, and is perfected by, love of God, and union with God. God is Himself the love of His own essence; and this love is adequate to the loveableness of its object. The same act of God's love, which loves His own substantial goodness, loves at the same time in that goodness, zvith that goodness, and by reason of that goodness, the participated sanctity and rectitude which exists in creatures. As God has knowledge of all things in His own essence, as in supreme truth ; so does God love all things in His ow^n essence, as in supreme goodness. He loves them in accordance with the different degrees of participated goodness which severally belonor to them. Whatever there is of loveable- ness in creatures is a derivation from God's substantial and essential loveableness. As whatsoever is not God has of necessity its ultimate end In God the Supreme Good, from whom and to whom every good is ; so God, as He is Himself absolute good, rests in Himself, and in His own Infinite plenitude of all good. THE ABSOLUTE PROPERTIES OF THE DIVINE ESSENCE. 101 111 this sense, God is to Himself His own end, that is to say, 7iegatively, inasmuch as He cannot have an end which is distinct from Himself, but is Himself the end of all — and positively, inasmuch as in Himself He has the plenitude of good, or rather He is Himself that plenitude. As in the perfection to which the intellectual creature attains in its rest in its ultimate end, the beatitude of that creature is placed ; so God, in the plenitude of absolute good which He Himself is, is to Himself i¥/> own infinite beatitude. In short, and to bring these truths to a focus, (l) God is Himself absolute Good, as He is the plenitude of the whole of absolute Being. He is, therefore, goodness by essence. (2) The good- ness to which, as to its model and cause, the perfection, both physical and moral, of creatures corresponds, is in God His essence, and is not a superadded perfection. God is goodness in every order, and so God is sanctity. (3) Finally, the goodness to which there corresponds the ultimate perfection of the creature, in the attainment of its end, is in God ^^^ev///^/ beatitude. God is His own Beatitude. God is selfsufficing in the plenitude of all goodness ; and He is necessarily the end of all, in whom all have, in their several orders, their ultimate perfection. Although God Is In Himself absolute and fully selfsufficing goodness, which cannot either be HIS DIVINE MAJESTY.' increased by any created goods, or diminished by the withdrawal of all of them, yet we mortal men are not capable of fixing the eyes of our minds on this truth by itself alone. In order to estimate the infinite amplitude of God's goodness, we must contemplate that goodness as it is also our supreme good, and the supreme good of every creature. God is the supreme good to all, as He is the exemplary cause, or pattern, as He is the efficient cause, and as He is the preserving cause of all good which is, or which can be, outside the Supreme Good. God's bestowal of good is perpetual and unceasing; for the whole idea of the existence of participated good, or its raisoii d'etre, is derived from that bestowal. If God's bestowal were to cease for one moment, the whole of that which is, from the first elements of matter up to the highest of spiritual beings, and to the Sacred Humanity of Christ itself, would on the instant cease to be. As all of these created things are good, inasmuch as they are participations and imitations of absolute goodness,, and are more and more good, the nearer and nearer they approach to that supereminent good- ness, so is that Divine goodness the measure of all good. As God is the '' Good of goods," inasmuch as He is the principle and cause of all good; so is He also supreme good to all, inasmuch as He is THE ABSOLUTE PROPERTIES OF THE DIVINE ESSENCE. I03 the ultimate end of all. It is as Impossible, as Involving contradiction, that anything should not be to Him, as It Is Impossible that anything should not be frovi Him, " Of Him," says St. Paul to the Romans, " and by Him, and in Him are all things, to Him be glory for ever. Amen." Besides God, the absolute good, there cannot be anything whatsoever which Is good, unless formally as It Is an Imitation and a manifestation of the perfection of God. Hence the supreme eminence of the Divine essence, and the Intes- tinal nature of things, demand that whatsoever Is from God, as from the first principle of It, should be for God, as for Its ultimate end. God would not be acting in accordance with the necessary norm of all rectitude, which Is His essence, and so God would cease to be Holy, if He were to create any participated good which should not be directed tov/ards Himself, as towards Its ultimate end. Denial of this Involves contradiction. It is intestinal to the very nature and essence of participated good, that It is ordained towards absolute good, as towards its own ultimate end — ■ no less than Is its entire dependence, through- out the length and breadth of its being, from that absolute good, as from its principle, essential to It. Hence destination towards God, its ultimate end, may immediately be called the moral essence 104 " HIS DIVINE MAJESTY." of the rational or intelligent creature, the only- creature which is capable of morality. Mediately — or throuofh and because of the rational creature — this destination towards God, as their ultimate end, is the moral essence of all other creatures, and so the moral essence of the entire universe. As the metaphysical essence of a thing Is the reason and principle of all \}ci^ properties of that thing ; so from ordination towards God as the ultimate end, depend and flow forth all other moral relations. Those creatures which have merely sensitive life can only by means of their senses have knowledge, desire, and feeling, and that with regard only to material things. Material things alone can be said to be goods to them. As regards intellectual matters, all creatures which have only sensitive life are In the same case as are things which do not have even sensitive life. Insensate things do not, properly speaking, desire any thing. They only metaphorically desire, and that inasmuch as by the very fact of their being they are ordained towards their own perfection. Hence there cannot be any good for them, as a beatitude. There can only be good in them, as belonging to the nature of them. All irrational creatures, therefore, are ordained towards God, as towards the ultimate end for the sake of which they are. They are not ordained THE ABSOLUTE PROPERTIES OF THE DIVINE ESSENCE. I05 in virtue of knowledge and will — which together constitute rational appetite, or intelligent desire — towards God as towards an end which is reason- ably desired by them, and which, when they have attained to it, they can ratmtally enjoy. The ordination towards God of the irrational creature, through interposition of the rational creature, consists in this, that by man's making use of his irrational fellow creature, that creature helps man in his pursuit of the end for which he was himself created — and also and chiefly in this that, through its very being, the irrational creation is, as it were, a mirror and objective manifestation to the rational creation, of the Divine perfection. This, creatures which are destitute of reason are, not only to us mortal men, but also to the angels, and to the Blessed. We speak not merely of those of them which are actually in existence at this present, but of the whole creation from its first beginning, and throughout eternity; since at the end of time God's creation will not be annihilated, but will be renewed, in new heavens and a new earth, to endure for ever. In a very far different way is God supreme good for the rational creature, as He is the ultimate end of that creature. Rational creatures, in all their perfections — in their natural perfections and also and especially in their supernatural per- fections, up to their supreme perfection in beatific io6 "his divine majesty." vision — are themselves objective manifestations of the Divine perfection. In this way the ordination of rational creatures towards God, as their ultimate end, is a good which is in those creatures. They are at the same time, however, so ordained towards God, as that He who is their ultimate end, and whom they shall enjoy, should be foiv them supreme good. That Is called the S2tpreine good of man, by possession of which man is made blessed, or that for the sake of which other goods are to be desired and pursued ; while that good is itself desired and pursued, not for the sake of something else, but for its own sake solely. Hence that which Is man's sv.preiue good must necessarily be man's tdtiinate end. In it also must man's beatitude consist, since beatitude is none other than possession of supreme good. That Is Itself called supreme good, and the ulti- mate end, by possession and enjoyment of which we are made blessed. Possession and enjoyment of supreme good is also called supreme good. Similarly, beatitude stands for that by union with which we are made blessed; and stands also for that union. The former is called objective beatitude. The latter Is called formal beatitude. God who is in Himself supreme good could, even m a merely natural order of providence, be supreme good for His rational creature, beatifying THE ABSOLUTE PROPERTIES OF THE DIVINE ESSENCE. 107 that creature, through a knowledge and love In correspondence with its natural faculties. In the present supernatural order, God presents- Himself to His rational creature, as the ultimate end, and as the supreme good which will fully l^eatify it, not merely in accordance with the demands of a created rational nature but, beyond all demand of nature, in accordance with His ow^n infinity of good — and in a way which corresponds not with the limitations and deficiency of the creature, but with the infinity of God, who has raised His creature above the level of its nature. God, as the infinite Good which He is, gives Himself to be seen by the intellect, which He has raised above its natural level, throuo-h the lio-ht of glory — to be loved with a love which corresponds to this vision of infinite good — and to be enjoyed with an everlastinor beatitude. This beatitude is the connatural and necessary consequence of the infinite good, which is Divinely communicated through vision and love. God is, therefore, possessed, through vision and love and unending joy, as He is supreme good, and the ultimate end of the rational creature. He is the supreme good of the rational creature, not only causally, as He is the supreme good of the irrational creature also — but by Himself as He is the Good which beatifies. In order to the idea of perfect possession, no io8 "his divine majesty." more is required than that the thing possessed should be in the presence and power of him who possesses it, so that he has power to use it (if it is a means) and power to enjoy it (if it is an end) at his will. Since God is, through the intuitive vision of Him, so made present, and so laid hold on, that he who beholds Him can enjoy Him, and draw from Him at will all manner of delight, the beatific vision of God is a true possession of God. To use an illustration, the hearing of a symphony is a possession of that symphony, since he who hears it can have from it all the pleasure and solace which it can afford. Hence it is false to say that God in Himself is not immediately oui^ good. In two ways God is -said to be our good. He is our good, in the first place, causally or effectively, inasmuch as from Him, as from a source, all the good that comes to us flows forth. Secondly, God is said to be mtr good, as it were, formally , and by Himself. For this there is no need that God should inhere or cleave to us, as 'd.forin inheres in the subject of it. It is sufficient that God should be joined to us through intervention of vision. God's necessary love of His own essential goodness is, by reason of this goodness, as it is worthy of infinite glorification, freely extended to willing the representation of the same goodness, THE ABSOLUTE PROPERTIES OF THE DIVINE ESSENCE. I09 and the recognition of it by His rational creature.. In this consists the external glory of God, both objective and formal. The external glory of God, both objective and formal, but chiefly cX'^ forvial, has its ultimate completeness in the beatitude of His rational creation. In the perfection of the Blessed, and in the whole of the heavenly City of God, there is a supreme expression and likeness of the infinite perfection of God. This represen- tation constitutes God's objective external glory. The most perfect and unending state of vision,, love, joy, adoration, and praise, of all the Blessed, constitutes the formal external glory of God, in the ultimate term of it. To this term God ulti- mately directs all His external operations, the whole order of creation and sanctification, of nature and grace, of natural and of supernatural providence. In short — God, in His own infinite essential goodness, is the ultimate end for the sake of which, and to which, are all things. The glorifica- tion of God is the ultimate end which is to be obtained. This glorification is completed by the exaltation and beatitude of All Saints. God is not, and God cannot be, to any one formal good, in the sense of His communicating Himself to, and uniting Himself w^ith, the creature as if He were a for 771 properly so called. Alf informing, in the proper sense of the word,. no "his divine majesty." implies the essential imperfection of the form, A form both perfects and is also itself perfected. It has, therefore, the idea of 2. part, and as such jt is in a manner dependent on the whole, of which it is a part. God, nevertheless, in a supernatural and marvel- lous way, so communicates Himself to, and so unites Himself with, His intellectual creature as, — =by this communication of Himself after the manner of a forfual cause, apart from all its imperfections — to raise His creature to that most sublime state and dignity, to which the Fathers give the name of Deification. The highest of all such communications of Himself by God to His rational creature, after the fashion of a formal caitse, is that in which a created human nature was made to be the Eternal Word's own nature ; and so much a nature of His that the man Jesus Christ was and is true God. Although this good, which is of an infinite dignity, belongs immediately and formally to the human nature of Christ, and to that nature alone, yet mo7^ally and by extension, if we may say so. it belongs to every creature which has in Christ, who is the Firstborn of every creature, been raised above the level of its nature. It thus belongs to the intelligent or rational creation, ano-elic and human, of which He the Firstborn Is THE ABSOLUTE PROPERTIES OF THE DIVINE ESSENCE. Ill Head. Most of all does it belong to human nature, and so belongs to human nature as that this mystery is the fountain and origin of all the subministration from the Head to the members of Him from whose plenitude we all receive, and grace for grace. Consequently, and with, as it were, a still farther extension, this dignity belongs also and lastly even to the irrational creation; which is related towards the rational creation, as is a means towards its proximate end. There ought also to be considered the marvel- lous exaltation of corporeal nature in the Body of Christ, which is the Body of a Divine Person — and by reason of His Body, in the bodies of all the just, which are called by St. Paul '' temples of the Holy Ghost," and are bodies which are one day to be reformed, and made like to Christ's Body of glory. We ought not, moreover, to lose sight of the ^.^levation of corporeal nature to be instrumentally tiflicacious of sanctification in sacraments, or of the consecration of corporeal nature, in its widest range, in instruments and aids of Divine worship. Finally, there is the deliverance of the creature from the bondage of corruption, into the freedom of the glory of the sons of God. Up to the day of that deliverance, every creature groaneth and is in travail. H2 'HIS DIVINE MAJESTY. All these are consequences of the mystery, and flow forth from the mystery, that the Word was. made flesh — that God appeared In flesh — and that the flesh of a virgin became the flesh of the Son of God. We discern a second, as it were, formal com- munication of supreme good to the creature, in the beatific vision. Through its will, a soul which is Blessed is borne, with an impetus of the whole of its being, towards the good which its intellect conceives, so as to unite itself thereto In a new way by love, and to be, as it were, transformed into it. Through those two powers, the intellect and the will, the soul enters into divinity, and divinity enters into it; and there is made, so to speak, a mutual penetration, and intimate vital union between the soul and God. A third, in a manner, formal communication of God, the supreme good, is found in all the just. Although the just are not formally fust with the justice of God, wherewith He is just, but are formally just with the justice, charity, and sanctity^ which, shed abroad in their hearts by the Holy Ghost, inheres or cleaves to them ; yet this inhering gift of sanctifying grace is, as it were» a spiritual bond, whereby those souls are in a singular manner united to God their Sanctifyer THE ABSOLUTE PROPERTIES OF THE DIVINE ESSENCE. II3 through the Holy Ghost who is given to them, who dwells in them, and who remains in them. 5. With the true and the good, the bcaiiiiful is in intimate connection. As God is essential Truth, and essential Goodness, so is God also essential Beauty. The beautiful is defined by St. Thomas, from its effect, when he says — "Those things are called Ijeautiful which please, when seen." This state- ment does not declare what the heaiitifid is in itself. It does not give the intestinal idea and essence of beazity. Things are not beautiful because they delight, but they delight because they are beautiful. The elements of beauty are unity and variety. It consists in the oneness of the manifold, with conformity to an intellectual type. Manifoldness, or variety, is by way of 7?iatter, and oneness is the fomi of beauty. The greater the variety or manifoldness is, so long as there is a correspond- ing intensity of oneness, the greater will be the beauty. Where oneness and proportion are absent, there will be an absence of the forr,ia! idea of beauty. There are several kinds of beauty. There is the physical beauty which is an object of the senses. There is the physical beauty which 114 belongs to spiritual beings. There Is also moral beauty. Since in creatures beauty Is finite, one beauty can be greater or more perfect than Is another beauty. The excellence of one beauty over another may be either in the nature of things, or from the pleasure which It produces In him who beholds it. Hence, as regards this relative beauty, that may be more pleasing, or may be regarded as more beautiful, which Is not in itself more really beautiful. Since we are much affected by means of the senses, and have a very vivid perception of the objects of the senses ; the beauty of the senses appears to many men, who do not abstract from sense, to be greater than is moral beauty. Looking to the nature of things, the beauty is there more excellent, where the elements of beauty are not only more perfect in themselves, but there is between them a more perfect harmony and oneness. The intrinsic beauty of God may be demon- strated, both from its effects, and from analysis of the Divine essence. Looking to the effects of the Divine beauty, all the beauty in creatures, whether material or spiritual, along with the moral beauty to be seen in free Intelligences, is a beauty which is not selfexistent, any more than is finite being. The ultimate reason or idea of THE ABSOLUTE PROPERTIES OF THE DIVINE ESSENCE. II5 created beauty is in God. God is the efficient cause of it. God is also the exemplary cause, or pattern of it. The first cause of all order acts through His understanding. Hence supereminent types of all and every beauty exist in the Divine mind. Those t)-pes of created beauty, which are fovjually in the Divine intellect, viytitally exist supereminently in the Divine essence, by reason of which created beauties are possible, and of which those beauties are a created participation. Inasmuch as God virtually contains in His Divine essence all possible beings in a supereminent manner. He is Supreme Being, and the most perfect of all beings, in the idea of being. Similarly, inasmuch as God virtually contains in His Divine essence all possible beauties. He is to be said to be supremely and most perfectly beautiful. His beauty is infinite, and it is self- existent. God not merely has beauty, but God Himself is His own beauty. Apart from effects, the Divine beauty is evident on analysis of the Divine essence. Therein we find an infinite variety of perfections, as we con- ceive them, along with the utmost oneness. This supreme oneness includes that perfection which is proper to the order which is free from all imperfection. There is there the greatest one- ness with the greatest virtual variety. God's beauty is also such as it ought to be \\\ ii6 accordance with the conception of the most perfect essence ; and this Divine essence the Divine intellect apprehends. To the Divine intellect which contemplates this variety in unity- it must be pleasing. If it is proper to God-given reason to take delight in perfect unity in variety ; most of all must this delight belong to God s contemplation of that beauty in Himself. This is that physical beauty of God, of which we find imitations and objective manifestations in God's creatures which, all of them, in their measure and degree, are made after the model, and to the pattern of Him who is not only the efficient, but the exemplary cause of them. The beauty which delights the senses Is only analogous to that beauty which enchains the mind. There is an intellectual beauty in those abstract truths of the intellectual order which, when beheld in their marvellous connection, and in the unity and simplicity of their principles, cind in the variety and concord of their conse- quences, fill the mind with the purest of delight. We discern the oneness of the manifold, and in it that beauty which appeals to the mind. In all life and living things. From created life, and as effects and harbingers of its interior beauty, there present themselves to the senses, the most beauti- ful phenomena in animal bodies, and in vegetative structures. THE ABSOLUTE PROPERTIES OF THE DIVINE ESSENCE, uy From this we pass to better understanding- of how far more noble is the beauty in a rational soul, and how more noble still is the beauty in a pure spirit. In pure spirits there is the greatest oneness, and the simplicity of the most noble of substances ; and along with it a wondrous variety of faculties, of forces, and of powers. Through its intellect, the soul conceives the whole world, and paints in itself invisible pictures of all objects. Through its memory, the soul preserves these pictures, and on occasion produces them for use. Through its will, the soul has power to employ them, or to enjoy them, at its pleasure. A rational soul is a substance of such marvellous beauty and perfection, that if it were clearly and fully known in itself, and as it really Is, there would be discerned in It a divinity, and the con- templation of it would flood the mind with delight in its beauty. The most sublime of all created beauties Is that of a soul or spirit which has been raised to the supernatural order, through sanctifying grace, through the habits and virtues which have been Divinely Infused Into It, and through Its participa- tion of the Divine nature. This Is that beauty which will attain to its completeness, in the final •consummation In beatific glory. All these created beauties are, singly and together, but as shadows, or as a feeble Image ii8 "his divixk majesty." in the dark, as compared with the beauty that is in God. God's one and most simple essence compre* bends in its sImpHcIty all the ideas of all perfec- tions, which it is possible for our minds to- conceive. The Divine essence comprehends also' all the ideas of all things, not only of those which exist, but of those likewise which are only possible. It comprehends In one Infinite cogi- tation, which is Itself the Divine substance, all the ideas of all the true. It comprehends in one substantial volition, all the Ideas of all the good. This Is God's physical beauty. We may reason in the same way with regard to- God's moral beauty. It consists in Gods justice and sanctity. God Is Infinitely upright and holy, not as If He conformed Himself to an extrinsic rule of rightness ; but as He is Himself the sub- sisting rule or norm of all moral order. By reason of His Beauty, both physical and moral, which He not merely has but is, God is infinitely loveable, and Is Infinitely to be desired. CHAPTER Y. The negative properties of the Divine Essence. IF we were to conceive eternity simply as duration without beginning and without end, we should not have a true idea of the eternity which is proper to God, as belonging to Him alone. It is possible to conceive duration, taken as a whole, as without end to the continuance of it, although there is an end in the various successive parts, of which it consists. There might be an indefinite series of years, although every one of those years had its end. A duration which consists of parts could not possibly be without a beginning ; but it is possible for a duration which consists of parts, to be without an end, or without cessation of the continuous succession, by which time is constituted. Duration of this kind falls very far short of absolute perfection. In it that which is actual would be always very small, while the rest of it would either no longer be, or would as yet not be at all. Such duration would never form one simultaneous whole. I20 "HIS DIVINE MAJESTY." There is no permanence which is of the intestinal essence of a finite being. As a finite being has beginning through creation, so the duration of the existence of a finite being is due to the preserving power of God. If that were to cease, the existence of the finite being would come to an end. All this betokens imperfection. We derive our understanding of the Divine duration, from- the perfection of the Divine essence. That essence Is, of the very Idea of it, not contingent, but necessary. It not only, therefore, has no beginning and no end — no first terminus and no last terminus — but it is as essential to It that it should be without either terminus, as it Is essential to it to be from itself, or to be self- existent. It is as impossible, as involving contra- diction, that there should be in the Divine essence beginning or end ; as it is impossible and contradictory that the Divine essence should not necessarily exist. The Divine being Is, of the innermost essence of It, the plenitude of absolute being. This Divine being must consequently be always actnal, without any potentiality, or possibility of farther perfection. In the absolutely and necessarily actual, there cannot be any succession. There cannot be anything which is not always, and always in the same manner of being. There cannot be anything- which is more, or anything THE NEGATIVE TROPERTIES OF THE DIVINE ESSENCE. 121 which is not yet. There cannot be before or after. All is perpetual noiv. The whole pleni- tude of being is there, at o?ice and ahvays. To the Divine being; as it is in the perfection •of the actual, we may give the name of /i/e — as it is [permanence, it may be called possession — as it has no terminus, or either beginning or end, it is possession of limitless life — as there is no succession in its actuality, it is a simultaneoiis whole — and as succession in it, as it is a pure act or entirely actual, involves contradiction, and so is absolutely impossible, it may be called perfect possession. lliis is the absolute and perfect eternity, which Boethius rightly defines when he says — Eternity is the simultaneous whole and perfect possession of limitless life. The character which is proper to the Divine •eternity, regarded formally, is the perfection which of its own idea excludes possibility of succession. This is a neg-ative perfection, as excluding imper- fection. Moreover, God is His own eternity. The eternity of God, says St. Augustine, is the substance of God. In it is nothinof chanofeable. In it there is nothing past, which no longer is, and nothing future, as if it were not yet. What- ever is there, it is. When there was as yet no creation, and con- sequently no time, there was what is called The heginniug^ that is to say, there was duration 122 • "his divine majesty." which was not preceded by anything. In this Beginning — God was. Whithersoever thought may carry Itself, there cannot be conceived any- thing which Is more first, If we may use the term, than is perpetual beginning, and in this Beginning God already was, and therefore always was. 2. Whatsoever begins to exist, and whatsoever does exist with time, and in time, necessarily co-exists with the eternity or eternal duration of God. This eternity, alongside of which lies time, is His Divine being, as it Is, changelessly and endlessly, one simultaneous whole. An object in time, regarded from the point of view of its actual existence, co-exists with the eternal being, or eternal duration of God, for that time only in which its existence in time endures. It co-exists- either permanendy or successively, as its duration is itself either permanent or successive. Successive co-existence is not to be understood as if it implied succession In the eternal duration, but only as there is succession in the co-exlsting tlme. The several parts of Its duration co-exist in actual reality with the eternal duration, for that time only in which they actually exist. As regards actual reality, those things which now at this present exist, co-exist with the eternity of God. Those things which have passed THE NEGATIVE PROPERTIES OF THE DIVINE ESSENCE. 123- away, and are now no more in existence, did co-exist with the same changeless eternity, at that time when they were in existence. Those things, which are not yet in actual existence, but which will one day exist, will then co-exist with the same eternity; In that day when they shall begin to exist, and so long: as thev continue to exist In their actual being. It Is not as If the past co-existed with one part,, and as If the present co-existed with another part,, while the future co-existed with yet another part of the eternal duration. The Divine eternity does not consist of parts. If we regard a created being, which exists In time, in its relation to the Divine vision and knowledo-e of it ; that knowledo-e, from the verv fact of its being eternal, and of Its having In It no succession whatsoever, Is always the same. The Divine knowledge is always the same, whether the created being is as yet in the future, or whether It Is actually existing In the present, or whether it is already In the past, and exists no longer. All things, therefore, which at any time exist, co-exist, so far as the actual being of them is concerned, with the whole of the Divine eternity, although not fi^om eternity. The know- ableness of them Is, however, present to the gaze of God frofn eternity. It is not because things in 124 "^^^ DIVINE MAJEST\ r » the future of time are eternally seen, that they will at some time be. It is because they will at some time be, that they are seen from eternity. As the Divine eternity is to time, so is the Divine iinmensity to place and space. As with everything that endures, time can co- exist, and as it is possible for time to co-exist indefinitely with the eternal ; so also with every- thing that exists, it is possible for another thing to co-exist, with that relation to it, to which we give the name of presence. Hence to one who is without limit in his presence, it is possible for others to be present ; or, conversely, he who is without limit to his presence, can be present to others, and that in- definitely. He to whom such a mode of presence belongs is rightlv called unmeasured, or immense. As the first and obvious notion of eternity is conceived by comparison with co-existing time without limit; so is the notion of immensity which first presents itself to the mind, conceived as — presence without limit of place and space. The presence of a spirit is not, in the manner of it, the same as is the natural presence of a body. Those things in which there are parts outside parts, and which, in order to signify this, are called extended thino-s, can be naturally THE NEGATIVE PROPERTIES Ol- THE DIVINE ESSENCE. 1 25 present to other " extended " things, in this way only, that part should correspond to part, and the whole to the whole, in that space which is consti- tuted by the ''extension" of the corporeal or material thing. If a man falls flat on plastic clay, the impression which he leaves upon it is that of his head in one place, and his body in another place, and the several members of his body In the places which correspond to them, in the clay on which he has fallen, and of which *' extended " clay, his "extended" body has displaced a portion. A spirit, on the other hand, in which there are no parts, can be present to several wholes simul- taneously. It can be present also to extended objects and spaces, in such a way as to be at once as a whole in the whole, and as a whole also in every one of the several parts of that whole. This force of presence In a spirit is, without doubt, a perfection. The perfection is, moreover, greater, the greater the number of objects to which this force of presence reaches. In a finite spirit, this force of presence cannot possibly be without its limit. It must necessarily have its limits. It may not always, perhaps, be actual in the whole of Its efficacy, and may to some extent be potential only. All such limitations are abso- lutely impossible, as involving contradiction, in an Infinite spirit. God could not be an infinitely perfect spiritual 326 "hls divine majesty." substance, without His being- able to be present to other existences. In God there cannot be con- ceived a force or power of presence, which is partly actual, and pardy potential. The whole of that power is always actual, since it is in reality none other than the absolutely perfect intellectual substance which, whatever it is, is always in act. Power of presence cannot in God be restricted to any limits whatsoever, beyond which God is not actually present. Immensity, so conceived as that God is in- trinsically determinated to intimate presence indefinitely in all existences, is a perfection which is included in the perfection of God, as that perfection is absolute perfection. Omnipresence is a relative attribute ; w^iich connotes and has relation to actually existing creatures. Omnipresence is a necessary conse- quence of absolute perfection of being. Presence, as it is an absolute perfection in God, is the absolute Divine being itself, which is limit- less in presence. This Divine presence presents itself to the mind, through the thought of the indefinite possibility of the co-existence with it of creatures. No creature is possible, and so no place and no space is possible, with which, if it were to exist, God would not be intimately present, and that without any change in God Himself. THE NEGATIVE PROPERTIES OF THE DIVINE ESSENCE. 127 We are not to conceive the Divine im7nensity as if it were Infinite extension or diffusion — any more than we are to conceive the Divine eternity as if it were infinite time and infinite succession. When we think of objective truth \\\ the meta- physical order, or, w^hat comes to the same thln^-, when we think of the absolutely necessary iazvs to which Is subject, and by which is ruled, whatever is or can be ; we see at once that those truths and laws are ontoloi^ncally prior to, and independent •of, all relations of place and space. Where there is no place and no space, nothing can be said to be heir or tke?r. When we think of place or space, we cannot conceive either of them as existing anywhere, without that objective trutli which is God, being also there. God does not begin to be there, where He was not before. The change from the not present, to the present occurs in the thing created, in the place or in the space, which before was not in being. Before place and space were m existence, there was no either here or there. They cannot, however, begin to be, except in God, and ivith God. God, therefore, is not anywhere locally, by limitation to anywhere beyond which He is not, but He is everywhere, 4. When we say that God is in all things by essence, we are abstracting from His operations 128 111 His creatures, from the mode In which He manifests Himself, from the gifts which He bestows, and the Hke ; and we are looking simpl)^ and solely to the existence of His essence in itself. From this point of view God is necessarily both everywhere, and everywhere in the same manner. With God's existence in all things by essence, is bound up His being in all things by poiver — since all things, in the whole of their being, in their every perfection, and in their every act, are dependent on the Divine preservation and action. From God's existence in all things by essence^ it follows that He should be in all things by presence. He is present, both generally as He is the beholder of all things, and specially through the singular presence, whereby He exhibits Him- self as present, through singular manifestations and gifts. Hence we say that God is present everywhere,. and everywhere in the same manner by essence, but we do not say that God is present everywhere in the same manner by presence, and by power. When God, who is necessarily present every- where, is nevertheless said to come to, and to depart from His creatures; this refers to presence not simply through His essence, but through His operations in those creatures. THE NEGATIVE PROPERTIES OF THE DIVINE ESSENCE. 1 29 5- That which Is called imaginary space, and imaginary time, has no reality outside conception of the mind. We form the conception of imaginary space, negatively, when we abstract from the existence of bodies, or rather from the real existence of any creature which is limited in the mode of its presence; and yN\v^xi positively, we con- ceive the possibility of bodies, or other ''extended" creatures, existing in indefinite number. As God is not subject to any limitations of real place or space, so neither is He subject to the limits of things, the existence of which Is only possible. God Is not present to anything where nothing exists. Similarly, we form a conception of imaginary time, negatively, by abstracting from all reallv existing successions of time; and positively, by conceiving the possibility of continuous succes- sions of time in indefinite number. Hence we see the absurdity of imagining the Divine immensity, as If It were Indefinite presence in imaginary space — and the similar absurdity In imagining the Divine eternity, as if it were indefinite duration in imaginary time. Immensity Is absolute perfection In the order of presence, in its utmost simplicity, and always the same, whereby God is exempt from all local limitations. 130 "HIS DIVINE MAJESTY. Eternity is absolute permanence, In its utmost simplicity, which Is without any possibility of succession, and Is always the same. Spaces and places to which God, as He is immense, would be present, and successions of time which would co-exist with the eternal God, mlo-ht be multiplied indefinitely, without ever arrlvinof at an ultimate end. CHAPTER VI. God's Knowledge. TD Y the word spirit, we mean a substance which ^ has no real parts, which either constitute that substance, or complete it in its entirety. A spirit is simple, and one in itself. Simplicity in a spirit, however, is to be understood not merely 7iegatively, as simplicity is negation of parts — but 2\.so positively, as simplicity is an essential nobility of being. This nobility of being, in a spirit infinitely, in a sense at least, exceeds the grade of being which belongs to substances which have their perfection in composition, ox from the composition of their parts. That perfection in those substances, in whatever degree it may exist, cannot possibly attain to the natural perfection, in nobility of being, which essentially belongs to a spirit. The perfection is of a different order. A spirit is an immaterial substance. Ncoa- lively, a spirit is not inert, nor does a spirit act only outside itself, nor is its action restricted as is that of composite beings. Positively, a spirit has in itself intellectual life. Of its own essence, a spiritual being has been so constituted as, by a 132 "his divine majesty." vital act, to understand the tinte, and to have within it formal truth — and also by a vital act, to tend towards good which is recognized by it, or comes before it under the idea of the good — to embrace the good with love — and in the good to find its blessedness. In all these most interior vital acts, a spirit has at the same time an intimate and vivid conscious- ness of their being its own acts; and a conscious- ness also of itself, as the substantial principle of them, that is to say, as the substance which is the source of those acts. From the simplicity, nobility, and intellectuality of its being and life, a spirit is, of its own nature, immortal. A spirit is changeless in the substance of It. As regards place, a spirit is exempt from, and Is superior to those modes of existing, to which bodies are subject In space. The more perfect the simplicity and the Intellectuality of a spirit is, the more perfect Is Its nature as It Is a spirit. God Is, as we have seen, a most '' pure act," or absohitely achtal, and in God, by reason of His essential perfection, not only physical composition of real parts, but also metaphysical composition of ideal parts, Is absolutely excluded, as in Him involving contradiction. God is not only an intellectual substance, which has the faculty of embracing the true and the GODS KNOWLEDGE. 1 33 good, by vital acts of its own, but He is essentially one substantive act. This act is at once and identically both the absolute trite, and infinite tuiderstanding of the true — both absolute good, and infinite love of the good — and so in Himself, and in the plenitude of His own perfection, God is absolute infinite Blessedness. As God is absolute changeless truth, goodness, substantial active power, an.d purely actual, with- out any mingling of the potential; so is all succession of time — and all limitation of presence — in absolute contradiction with God's perfection. God is Himself His own Eternity. God is Him- self His own Immensity. This life of infinite understanding, of infinite will, and of infinite blessedness. Is not only an intimate act of the Divine substance. It Is Itself the eternal and Immense Divine substance. Hence the Divine understanding, along with the Divine will, Is not only independent of all things which are, or which can be excogitated as being, outside itself; but it is the principle, and pattern, and cause on which is dependent all the true, all the good, all life, all understanding, all love of good, and all beatitude. God is therefore an infinite spirit, because He is intellectual life of Infinite perfection. He Is a Spirit in a supereminent sense. Of Him created spirits are only Images and likenesses. 134 Hence, the nearer creatures are to the image and Hkeness of God, the more properly are they spirits. In the Sacred Scriptures the human soul in view of its intellectual faculties, is called a spirit. In view of its sensitive faculties, whereby the selfsame substance informs and animates the human body which it tenants, it is called a soitl. Hence again, those intellectual substances which are not ordained to inform and animate a body, through sensitive faculties, belong to a more noble order, and are pure spirits. There is nothing material in their being, they are purely spiritual. Further, a soul which has been raised to the supernatural order, through supernatural gifts, which are called and are spiritual gifts, is itself called spiritual\ in comparison with its merely natural condition, in Vvhich that soul is called carnal. The human bodies also which shall be transformed in the Resurrection, are, on account of the supernatural properties w^hich shall then belong to them, called by St. Paul spiritual bodies. God is called and is a Spirit, in the most proper of all senses, although as regards the name "spirit," that name was lirst applied by us to creatures, and is then from them transferred to God ; as in the case of nearly all other names by which we designate Divine perfections. GODS KNOWLEDGE. 1 35 Since God Is a perfect Spirit, He Is a sitbstance, the life of which is understanding. Since God is most s'nnplc, His understanding is itself the Divine sttbstance. Further, God neither is, nor can He be conceived as being, in any way potential. He Is always and necessarily actually intellectual. Since, however, the conception of essence is one thing, and the conception of tmderstanding is another thing, essence and understanding are in idea distinct one from the other. Absolute being has, besides understanding, the idea of a knoiuable object. Since absolute being is being of infinite perfection, it is infinite also In the idea of the knowable, or of the t7-ue. To an infinite knowable it is only infinite understanding that can be per- fectly adequate. The Divine act which understands is as equally infinite as is the infinite object of Divine under- standing. It is itself the Divine essence. The Divine act of understanding is, therefore, in perfect proportion with its own infinite object, or that which it understands. Since tmderstanding is adequate corres[)ondence of the intellect with its object, where infinite actual understanding is identical with an infinite object, under every idea of its infinite knowableness, 136 " HIS DIVINE MAJESTY." there is there a perfectly adequate correspondence of the intellect with the object, as the object is knowable. This adequate correspondence is called and is comprehension. God, as He is an act of infinite understanding, which is adequate to Himself, as to the infinitely knowable true, is perfect comprehension of Himself. Since this act of understanding is itself the Divine substance, it is substantial coinprehension by God, of God Himself. We apply to God abstract names, which serve in a manner to express the Divine perfections, both in order to signify plenitude of perfection — and in order to set forth God's simplicity. Thus God is called Wisdom — because in God wisdom is not restricted to any degree or limited extent of wisdom, but is the whole idea of absolute wisdom — and because wisdom in God is not, as in created beings, something which is superadded to substance and essence. God's essence itself, of the intestinal idea of it, is wisdom. In the same way we apply to God those abstract names which, in creatures, denote im- manent action. Thus God is Infinite understand- ing, infinite volition, and infinite efficiency. We signify by these names, intellect and will, and omnipotence, in the perfection of the actual — and not by way of a faculty, which proceeds to an act GODS KNOWLEDGE. 137 of understanding, of willing, or of effecting. When God, therefore, is said to be substantial i-omprchension of His own essence, it is meant that the Divine Essence is the Divine Intellect — and that the Divine Intellect is essentially in the perfection of the actital—^wdi is therefore ever actually understanding. Hence it is that infinite Divine understanding adequately corresponds to the infinite Divine essence. Divine understanding, considered as distinct \\\ idea from Its object, which is the Divine essence, may, by way of analogy with our knowledge, be compared to direct knowledge. If, on the other hand. Divine understanding is regarded as it is the Divine essence, and so as being to itself its own object ; there analogically corresponds to it the rcficx knowledge wherewith we recognize our own act of knowing, or know that we know. 3- The Divine essence, in its relation to the true, and to understanding of the true, may be regarded in three ways. In the first place, the Divine essence Is absolute being, and it is the absolute true, from which all things whatsoever, which have the Idea of being, and of the true, depend. By analogical participation of that essence those things are. When absolute being — which is the absolute 138 "his divine majesty." true — is understood with perfect comprehension, then necessarily, through that comprehension, all things are understood which, in dependence on the absolute, either actually are, or possibly may be. God, in comprehending His own essence as absolute Being, and the primal True, from which all participated being — and all the participated true — is dependent, does necessarily, by the same act of understanding, comprehend all the trite. The Divine essence may, secondly, be con- sidered more expressly, as it is an idea and pattern which is imitable outside God, and this throughout all the degrees, ideas, and relations of participated being, and participated objective truth. This Divine pattern may be considered from the point of view of the shadows of it outside God, which are not as yet in actual existence, but are only possible. It is evident that compre- hension of the pattern is at the same time comprehension of all the possible shadows of that pattern — or comprehension of the whole ot participated being in the metaphysical order, and in the region of the ideal. This iniitableness of the Divine essence, an imitableness the actuality of which is possible, is as necessary as is that essence. The tender standing of this imitableness, and of the whole of the beino; through which the god's knowledge. 139 Divine essence Is Imltable, Is also necessary. It is necessary, because the termiims of Divine understanding is a necessary terminus. If the Divine pattern is, on the other hand, regarded from the point of view, not of the possible, but of the actual, the actual imitation of that pattern outside God Is not necessary. It is contingent. The Divine understanding cannot, however, comprehend the Divine pattern — from which the created imitation depends with a real, continual, and essential dependence — without at the same time comprehending all the actual expressions and imitations of it, which are In dependence upon It. The Divine essence is, In the third place, infinite also as It Is an ideal representation of the true, or of the wisdom which, after the manner of an objective idea, represents the true. It would not be an Infinite representation, unless there shone and were represented in it all the objec- tively true, both In the order of essences, or Ideal order of the possible, and in the order of exist- ences, or actual order of the whole of participated All that which God knows besides Himself is a terminus, indeed, of the Divine knowledge; but that which God knows does not ejfect knowledge T40 "his divine majesty.' in God by any real inflow. It does not determine the Divine knowledge, as If It were a cause or principle. Although God would not, for Instance, know the world as existing, unless the world did at some time really exist, because God has the objectively true as the terminus of His know- ledge ; yet the existing world does not exercise any action or inflow on God. The Divine knowledge is only terminated, as by all the irue, by this true, as Included therein. Of Its own Intestinal perfection, the Divine knowledge is determinated to comprehension of all the true. Form and matter are properly spoken of in connection with composite substances. In these the form Is that which gives the essential perfec- tion of order and species ; and so constitutes an order or species as distinct and different from other orders or species. The matter, on the other hand, does not give specific perfection, or perfection which distinguishes from other orders. The matter Is common to many, or rather to all <3rders of material substances. These names — matter and form — are trans- ferred from their original meaning, to the object of knowledge, or that which is known, when we speak of the material object, and of the formal GODS KNOWLEDGE. 141 object of knowledge. In accordance with this analogy of matter and form, the formal object of knowledge is that by which the proper perfection of a knowledge is constituted, as distinct and different from that of other orders of knowledge. From this that the object gives to a knowledge the perfection which is proper to It, the object determines it ; and that knowledge Is known by Itself, and by reason of Itself, and not by reason of something else. The material object, on the other hand, Is subject to a knowledge which, not from It, but otherwise, has its own proper perfec- tion ; and a perfection which is different from that of other orders of knowledge. The material object does not therefore determinate the know- ledge, and the perfection of it ; although the knowledge, through its perfection otherwise deter- minated, has this knowledge also for a termin7is of It. The material object therefore is known not by Itself, and by reason of itself, as a motive of knowledge, but through something else, and by reason of something else. From these the proper ideas of the fonnal object and the material object, it follows that the formal object, In comparison with the material objects which are subordinated to It, Is at the same time the piHncipal object of knowledge, while the material objects are secondary objects of knowledge. 142 "his divine majesty." The Divine knowledge and understanding is in reality the Divine substance and essence. The Divine knowledge has therefore from the Divine substance, that is from itself, a perfection which is proper to it — and it differs from every knowledge whatsoever of another order. This is the proper idea and perfection of the Divine knowledge and understanding, that the infinite act which understands is the Divine substance, and infinite substantial truth, to which nothing of perfection can possibly be added. If we distinguish in idea the infinite true from the infinite act of understanding, that infinite true is not only knowable but, of its own innermost idea, it demands that it should be actually known by the infinite understanding. It is therefore with a foundation in reality, that we conceive the infinite true, or the Divine being as determining the Divine intellect to the comprehension of itself. The substantial act of understanding — or, in other words, the act of understanding which is itself a substance, being itself the Divine substance or essence — in the comprehension of the Divine essence, is determinated so as at once in the Divine essence, as in absolute being — and as in an infinite pattern, or as in an actual representa- tion of all the true — to comprehend whatever has the idea of the true. The Divine essence is, therefore, the formal (}ODS KNOWLEDGE. I43 idea under which God comprehends the true, wherever the true exists. An object of know- ledge which is distinct from God, does not act on the Divine intellect, nor does it induce any modification of that intellect, l^his would be utterly subversive of that substantial act which is God's understanding. Hence an object which is distinct from God neither perfects God's know- ledge, nor determines God's knowledge. It is through His essence, and in His essence, as through a formal object, that God is determinated to knowledge of all the true, even when the objectively true is distinct from Himself. It is most clear then that the formal and principal object of Divine understanding, whereby it has the perfection which is proper to it, whereby it is determinated, whereby and in which it knows all the true, is the essence of God. Every true whatsoever, on the other hand, which is distinct from God, is a secondary and material object of one and the same act of God, whereby He understands Himself. This object does not give to that Divine act the perfection which is proper to it. The secondary and material object is known in another, and through another, that is to say. It is known through the principal and formal object. Hence we see how faith, and theology, and 144 mystical contemplation, and much more how the beatific vision, are imitations of the Divine knowledge ; while all created things, and every truth, are considered In God, the supreme Truth, as in their cause, as in their principle, and as in their end. In like manner we see how Divine understand- ing is the only adequate Theology, In the most sublime meaning of that word. As the faith, and exposition, unfolding, and understanding of the faith by mortal men, which constitutes our theology on earth, corresponds to the theology of the Blessed, as does a beginning to a consumma- tion ; and corresponds to the infinite Theology of God Himself, as does a shadow to its archetype ; so is God the principal object of Divine under- standing, to which all other objects, considered in their relation to God, are subordinate, and hold the second place. If God were to know the being of things, only as those things are " eminently " (as theologians say) In God, He would not be knowing created being itself, or possible being itself. He would be knowing only His own essence In which that being is mirrored. This " eminent " being in God is not the created or possible being itself, but Is the Divine essence. If God were not perfectly to know the being god's knowledge. 145 itself of things as they are in themselves, or as they may one day be ; He would not be compre- hending His own essence, as it is the cause and pattern of all things. Perfect comprehension of the cause includes knowledge of effects, whether possible effects, or actually existing effects, as they are in themselves. Although, therefore, God does not know the secondaiy objects of His knowledge in themselves as in a cause which determinates and perfects His knowledge ; yet God does know them, not only as they are ''eminently" in the Divine essence, but also as they are now, or may one day be, formally in themselves, 5. If, therefore, we consider knowledge from the point of view of the termini which it connotes, and which are subject to it ; there is not only a foundation, but a necessity, in accordance with our inadequate conceptions, for making a dis- tinction of several different ideas in one and the same knowledge. Although Divine understanding is in itself so simple, and beyond all multiplication of acts and forms ; yet the objects of Divine understanding — and the attitudes of these objects to the Divine un- derstanding — are not of one and the same idea with that understanding, but are of a very different idea. 146 *' HIS DIVINE MAJESTY." It Is possible for us to distribute the secondary objects of the Divine knowledge, so as to consider it either as comprehending actual existences, or as comprehending the essences of things, in the mere possibility of those things. The Divine know- ledge under the first of those two aspects is called — knowledge of vision. The name is taken from our knowledge of things through the sense of vision. By vision we have knowledge only of actual existences, since these alone can possibly be seen by the eye of the body. The Divine knowledge under its second aspect, as the knowledge of the essences of things, In the mere possibility of those things, is, to distinguish it from knowledge of vision, called — knowledge of simple understanding. Things which do not exist may be considered either as in a state of mere possibility — and In this case they are the object of simple tender- standing — or in the existence which they do not have as yet, but which they Infallibly will have, If a certain condition Is verified. In this second sense, the object is not known as at some time really existing ; but neither is It known only as an essence, or mere possibility of existence. Rightly, therefore, and by reason of the diversity of objects, there is made a third distinc- tion. It Is that of God's knowledge of thIno\s which tmder condition ivill be. GODS KNOWLEDGE. 1 47 This knowledge agrees with the knowledge of simple tiuderstanding in this, that the object is not beheld absolutely as in actual existence. It differs in this, that it is related not only to necessary essence, but to contingent existence ; or existence which, given fulfilment of a condition, will infallibly have place. In an inverse order, this knowledge of contin- gent existence so far agrees with knowledge of vision, that it is related to existence, and not only to necessary essence. It differs in this, that it does not regard an existence which absolutely will actually be. This object of knowledge, therefore, stands midivay between the object of vision, and the object of simple understanding. With both it agrees in somewhat, and in somewhat it differs from both of them. Hence theologians, since the sixteenth century, have given to this know^- ledge a name, derived from the properties of its object, and called it — mediate knozv ledge. It is intermediate between the other two. The essences of things in the state of possi- bility, and the objective truth of essences, consist in this alone, that the Divine essence is in this way imitable in analogous beings and perfections, and in their mutual relations. This imitability is natural to God, it is necessary, and it is independ- 148 "HIS DIVINE MAJESTY." ent of free will. It is in reality none other than the essence of God itself, under the idea of primal and absolute being — under the idea of the absolute t^^Q — and under the Idea of it, as \h& pattern of all perfection. Hence the objective trtttk of essences in the state of possibility, is an absolutely necessary truth. Divine understanding necessarily comprehends all truth. God's knowledge of simple under st abid- ing is therefore absolutely necessary, throughout the whole of its object. Existence, on the other hand, is necessary in God alone. Every created existence is con- tingent. The actual existence of all things which, besides God, at any time exist. Is an objective truth; In such wise as that absolutely the non-existence of them might also have been true. That they should actually exist depends on the free will of God, either as operating by itself alone, or as operating through a creature. It may depend on the Divine free will, and on, at the same time, a free created will. There are some things of which God is the whole cause, such as those things which are created — some things of which the creature, or the creature's will, is the sole cause, such as defects and sins — and some things of which God and His creature are simultaneously the cause, or are con-causes, god's knowledge. 149 such as natural and moral operations, since in these operations God co-operates. l:\i^ principal object, therefore, of God's know- ledge of vision is absolutely necessary, as it is the necessarily existing essence of God. A secondary object of His knowledge of vision might possibly not be. If, however, it actually is, it is neces- sarily subject to the Divine intuition. The same knowledge which, looking to the existence or the non-existence of its objects, is distinguished in the threefold division which we have given ; is, looking to the necessity or to the contingence of the same objects, righdy distributed into absolutely necessary knowledge, and only hypo- thetically necessary knowledge. God's knowledge of simple understanding may be regarded, either as it is simple knowledge of an objective truth ; or as it comprehends the natures, ends, goodness, order, and relations of all things, formally as those things are such that it is fitting that they should receive from God existence. God's knowledge, considered in this second way, follows the idea of those objects which are made in the exercise of an art. It is not merely theoretical knowledge of essences, and of objec- tive truth. It is the practical knowledge of an artificer, who has knowledge of that which he is to make, before he makes it. It is as having the 150 "his divine majesty." Divine Will along with It, that this Divine know- ledge Is the cause of things. With the Divine will, the Divine knowledge is effective, directive, and creative. Approbation, and disapprobation, belong pro- perly not to knowledge, but to the will. That which is called God's knowledge of approbation is His knowledge of good objects, which are pleasing to the Divine Will. God's knowledge of disapprobation is His knowledge of evil objects, which are displeasing to the Divine Will. All God's /r^r//r^/ knowledge is knowledge of appro- bation, since God's works cannot be otherwise than good. Since evil is privation of good, and since God knows every good, and the measure of every good. He knows also every evil. As it is nega- tion of knowledge of approbation, God's know- ledge of disapprobation is sometimes called in the Sacred Scriptures — an Ignorance, or Ignoring. **I never knew you." " I know you not whence you are, depart from Me, all ye workers of iniquity." No evil actions are predefined by God, in the proper sense of the word ; not only as regards the moral depravity in them, but even as regards the physical being of the acts. That which God forbids, under threatening of His wrath and god's knowledge. 151 eternal punishment, Is a physical act; although the reason why He forbids it, Is the moral depravity which Is Inseparable from that act, either In Itself, or under the circumstances of it. It involves contradiction, that there should be In God a will of complacence that this act should be done— or that God should will to effect that a man should determinate himself to such an act. The signer himself does not will the moral de- pravity of his action, except in so far as he wills the act f-om which the depravity is inseparable. God nevertheless permits sins ; and with pre- vision of sins He wills certain effects of sins. His permission is not an antecedent will that the action in which there Is the depravity of sin should be done. Positively, God preserves in being the natural faculties, and the freedom, of His creature ; and He extends His concurrence and iiT^flow — on which every second cause is depen- dent in its acting — to all the actions to which the freedom of the creature extends. God, at the same time, does not will, but, on the contrary, forbids the created will to choose an action in which there is moral perversity. God offers also and gives sufficient aids — whether of the natural order, or of the supernatural order — so that His creature, by availing himself of these aids, has power, at least here and now, not to sin. Nega- tively, if the creature will not make use of those 152 "HIS DIVINE MAJESTY." aids, God may not give other aids ; either on account of previous demerits — or because His wise and well-ordered providence does not de- mand other aids — or because He is not bound, in the distribution of His graces, to accommodate Himself to the wickedness of His creatures. While God sees, and although God sees. His creatures in their freedom willing to abuse His natural gifts of preservation of their faculties, of their freedom, and of the Divine concurrence, on which the natural action of all creatures is depen- dent — He, nevertheless, wills not to withdraw these gifts ; although He may will at :he same time not to grant other aids. This is His decree oi permission of sin. In this decree God is not regarding sin. While He has knowledge of a future act of sin, in the objective truth of that act, He decrees not to hinder it, and, what comes to the same thing, to permit it. Consequently to His knowledge of the act, in the objective truth of it, God does indeed absolutely will lo permit it; but this permission is not at variance with His not willing it, or with His forbidding it. Very different is the idea of good acts, and especially of supernatural acts. These acts God wills, with His will of approbation, to be done by His free creature. With His will of efficiency god's knowledge. 153 God anticipates, and by His grace so aids His creature, that he will be able to do, and will do such acts. Hence, as St. Augustine says, God foreknows both good and evil actions ; while He predestines not evil actions, but good actions. The order of thought in this matter is as follows. First, there is the objective truth of the possibility that, if to such and such a free creature there should be granted such and such a pre- venient grace, that creature would have the power, through the forces of grace which he has received, to determinate his will to a particular good act ; while he would at the same time have power, with his own natural forces, to resist the grace, and to sin. Here w^e have God's know- ledge of simple ttnderstanding of all things which are possible. Secondly, there is the objective truth of a hypothetical fact. The free creature, among all the acts to which it is possible for him to determinate himself, would choose such and such a good act, with the forces of such and such a grace, if that grace should be given to him. Here we have God's mediate knowledge of the objective truth of this hypothetical fact. Thirdly, there is the will in God, or God's decree, really to bestow the grace in question. Fourthly, there is the objective truth of an absolute fact, when the creature, out of the number of all acts which are possible to him, chooses, and determinates his will, 154 with this aid of grace, to the doing of that particular good act. Here we have God's know- ledge of vision of this absolute fact of the future. It Is true, therefore, to say that God predefines all the good free acts of His creatures, In this sense that, first, He by an antecedent will wills those acts to be done, If the free creature, In the exercise of his freedom, does not resist. Secondly, by this will God bestows the aids, with which He knows that His creature will freely consent. Thirdly, foreseeing the consent of the creature, God, not with a merely conditional will but, on the condition being verified by the creature, with an absolute will, wills those acts to be done. Thus we see how very different Is predefinition of g*ood acts, from permission of evil acts. Acts which are morally evil are not foreseen in a cause which antecedently determinates them ; the terminus of the Divine prevision is — the free acts, in themselves, as at some time In exist- ence. A free act, when it Is actually done, Is In itself, and in the objective trtttli of it, a terminals of God's knowledge of vision. Of the very Idea of eternity, God's knowledge and vision does not begin to be otherwise In time, than It was before time ; but remains always the same In the manner of it. Hence God has knowledge of an act of the future, before it Is god's knowledge. 155^ done, in the objective truth of the existence of it,, as distinguished from the esse^ice or possibiHty of it. Moreover, the Divine essence would not be the infinite pattern and representation of all the time — nor would the Divine knowledge be an infinite act — unless the Divine essence should re- present to the Divine intellect all the objectively true, and the Divine intellect comprehend all the true. Although, therefore, an act, in the real existence of it, begins In time, it nevertheless constitutes a foundation of its eternal knowable- ness, in the case of infinite knowledge. Things of the future are present to the eternal gaze. The objective tritth of an act of the future comes first in idea ; while the termination of God's knowledge in that act, Is subsequent in Idea to the knowableness of the act. The whole of the difficulty in reconciling the freedom of intelligent creatures, with the infalli- bility of the Divine foreknowledge, has its origin in the imperfection of the way in which we con- ceive God's eternal knowledge. We ourselves do not have knowledge of the future, except in an antecedent disposition of causes which Is present to us. Hence we have knowledge of the future with certainty, only inasmuch as we have 556 *'his divine majesty." understanding of causes which have been deter- minated in one direction. We always, therefore, conceive an act which is infalHbly foreknown, as if that act had been antecedently determinated in the cause of it ; and consequently as if that act were not free. We can have intuition of an act itself, when it is in the present ; but we cannot have intuition of an act itself when it is as yet in the future. We find no difficulty in reconciling the freedom of an act, which we see being done in the present, with the infallibility of our own vision of it. The reason is, because we under- stand that our vision is not the cause of that act. There would be no greater difficulty about fore- knowledge of the future, than there is about knowledge of the present ; if we could distinctly conceive vision of the future, as if it were vision of the present. Prevision is no more the cause of a future act, than is vision the cause of a present act. When we see a man stealing, our seeing him steal does not make him steal ; it is not a cause of his stealing. In the same way, God's foreseeing a man stealing does not make him steal, or determinate his will to steal. The objective truth of the existence of a free act, which is at some time done, is prior in idea, and it is presupposed as a terminus of the Divine vision. The action is present to the eternal gaze as if being done, in the same way in which it is god's knowledge. 157 actually done in time. Prevision of the act is not the cause why the act is done ; nay, our free determination of our wills, in the doing of the act, is the reason why God should foresee this particular action rather than another action. Infallible knowledge, which supposes as the terminus of it the free determination of the created will, does not hinder freedom ; nay, the more infallible that knowledge is, the more certainly is it a sign and proof of freedom. The infallible foreknowledge of God supposes the free determination of the created will, as a terminus of that knowledge; and so it not only does not interfere with freedom but, as it is foreknowledge of free acts, confirms freedom. As man's memory does not effect facts of the past, so neither does- God's foreknowledge effect facts of the future. 7. Among things which only lender condition shall: one day be, absolutely necessary objective truths cannot be numbered. There can only be contin- gent truths. There cannot be the essences of things, regarded in themselves. There can only be the existences of contingent things. Contin- gent existence is not in the sphere of the merely possible, for that belongs to the idea of essence. Contingent existence is not in the sphere of the already actual. It is that which will infallibly T158 "his divine majesty." one day be actual, if something else shall be .actual. This, on account of the bond between the one as antecedent, and the other as consequent, is what is called a condition. If there is no such bond, there will not be either condition or con- ditioned. In that case w^e cannot speak of a thing as to be in the future iinder condition, since there is in reality no condition. If the bond is something which itself is neces- sary, then knowledge of the conditioned is reduced to knowledge of simple nnder standing. Knowledge of the existence of free acts of a created will, acts wdiich under condition will be in the future — with this bond that, given that con- dition, the acts will be done, and failing that condition, the acts will not be done — but without a 7tecessary bond, or a bond which in its results is infallible, of the very nature of the condition itself, so that the act cannot, given the condition, not be — is the kind of knowledge which we are now- considering. That under such a condition the act will be, rather than not be, is not infallible otherwise than as it is true, that the will under such a condition will determinate itself to this act, rather than to other acts ; although it is equally in the power of that will not to determinate itself to this act, and to determinate itself to other acts. Hence, not only is the condition, under which the act will be, god's knowledge. 159 something which is ontolog'ically contingent ; but the bond between the existence of the act and the condition is also contingent. There is here no necessity of existence of the act, other than that which is consequent, not only to supposition of the cause, but to supposition also of the fact of existence. That comes to this, that an act which is, cannot at the same time not be, 8. To re-state the same truths in different words, and from another point of view, may serve to make more clear a subject which, of the very nature of it, is somewhat abstruse. God s knowledge is an act, and an act which is necessary in God. Knowledge is a simple per- fection, and every simple perfection is necessary to God. Moreover, God is theyfr^^ cause of all thino^s ; and the first cause must be an intellis'ent cause. The first cause cannot be necessitated^ but must be free. A cause which is necessitated is not independent in its action. Given due condi- tions, it necessarily acts. It is, therefore, depen- dent on those conditions. Again, a necessitated cause either acts to the full extent of its power — or it is determinated by its adjuncts to the doing of this, rather than to the doing of that — or it determinates itself. If the first cause were to act to the full extent of its power, all things would i6o "his divine majesty." at once actually exist. If the first cause were determinated by its adjuncts, there would not be in it the tdtwiate 7'eason, and the adequate reason of the existence of its effects. This reason should include the existence of those adjuncts, on which the existence of its effects is dependent. Those adjuncts are, however, supposed by a necessitated cause ; and so that cause would not be the cause of all things that are, and would, therefore, not be the first cause. If, on the other hand, a cause determinates itself y it is 2. free cause, and cannot be a neces- sitated cause. A free cause is an intellige^it cause, and the first cause must be an intelligent cause. This intelligent cause must also be ever actually understanding. Were it otherwise, it could never actually know ; because it is changeless, and incapable of change. God's knowledge is not distinct from God's essence, because in God there is no physical com- position. A being who 7iecessarily exists, is self- existent and independent. Every compound being is a dependent being, since it depends on the parts of which it consists. Every compound being is of itself a contingent being ; because, since it consists of parts, it can be dissolved, and then it thereby ceases to be. A being who necessarily exists is an infinite god's knowledge. i6i being, and an Infinite being cannot emerge from finite beings. God's knowledge not only is an act, or ever actual, but that act is itself a sttbstance. An act of knowledge may be either accidental or substantial. An accidental act of knowledge — whether it is something which is really distinct from the substance of him who knows, or whether it is a modification of that substance, it matters not — is an act which can be either present or absent ; and nevertheless the whole substance of him who knows remains in its entirety. An accidental act of knowledge is not therefore of the intrinsic idea of him who knows ; and the presence of it involves some at least metaphysical composition. It will be remembered that meta- physical composition (see pages 58, yj) which is called composition after the analogy of physical composition, consists of ideas which, although not parts as in physical composition, are conceived after the manner of parts ; and, like parts, those ideas perfect each other. A substantial act of knowledge, on the other hand, is an act which is so identified with the substance of him who knows, that it cannot be separated from that substance. It is so much of the intrinsic idea of that substance, as to exclude even metaphysical composition. Such is God's knowledge, as that knowledge is a substantial act. It is a necessary perfection of infinite being i62 "his divine majesty." that it cannot be conceived as capable of perfec- tion, through another perfection. The Divine knoivledge is essentially the Divine substance. God's being is God's knowledge. The Divine knowledge is an infinite act, that is to say, the capacity of that knowledge has no limits. If the Divine knowledge had limits, it would be finite. Since it is the Divine essence, that essence would also and necessarily be finite. The idea of this is absurd. The Divine knowledge is an independent act. God, as a selfexistent being, is an unproduced act, and cannot have in another any reason of His being. The Divine knowledge is, finally, one act alone. It cannot consist of several acts, whether these are simultaneous, or whether they are successive. A plurality of simultaneous acts would involve composition in God. A plurality of successive acts would imply some change in God. If there w^ere a plurality of acts, either simultaneous or successive, God's knowledge would not be infinite. The infinite is incapable of multiplication. God's knowledge cannot be conceived as pro- ceeding from ^facjilty of knowledge. This would again imply composition, and dependence, in God. Not even in idea can there be distinguished in God a faculty of knowledge ; as if that faculty were a potentiality, with knowledge as an act of GOD'S KNOWLEDGE. 163 that potentiality. In God there Is nothing of the potential, all is ever actual. A potentiality of knowing is, moreover, distinct from an act of knowledge; and indicates imperfection. A poten- tiality is, of the nature of it, perfectable. It is perfected by the act which Issues from it. When an act is selfexistent and independent, 110 possibility is left of conceiving a faculty for eliciting it. Where there Is reasoning, there is a plurality of acts ; and a knowledge which is begotten by reasoning is a knowledge which is dependent on previous knowledge. It does not follow that in God there should be no act of judgment. Whatever we apprehend through several Ideas, God apprehends by one act of knowledge; and with this an act of judgment Is identified. His one act of judgment both appre- hends and judges. It supereminently contains every perfection which is contained in our appre- hension, and in our judgment. Divine judg- ment comes to this that it is — knowledge with certainty. The Divine knowledge Is necessarily compre- hension of every object of knowledge. If the object of knowledge is infinite, the Divine know- ledge is also infinite. As infinite, it is adequate to the knowledge of an infinite object. If the