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LIBKARY 
 
 PRIACETOIV, X. J. 
 
 UIINAIIOX OF 
 
 S A M V K 1. A Ct N K W , 
 
 I r V H I 1. \ II E L P H I A . f \ 
 
 Letter 
 
 No. 
 
 
 COLLECTION OF PURITAN AND 
 ENGLISH THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE 
 
 ? 
 
 LIBRARY OF THE THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY 
 PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 
 
 sac. 
 
REMARKS 
 
 UPON 
 
 Mr. CLARK Es Sermons, 
 
 Preached at 
 
 S" P A U Ls 
 
 AGAINST 
 
 HohhySpinozay^nd othtv Atheifls. 
 
 Wherein 'tis Demonftrated : 
 
 I. That Mr. C by the Sceptical Hypothefis he im- 
 ploys , Abfolutely cuts ofl' all Pollible Means of 
 Knowing the Nature, or of Proving the Exiftence 
 of the One Only True God, againft Hohhs, Spi- 
 noza^ or any other Atkeifls whatever. 
 
 II. That in Reference to God, or Spirits, he redu- 
 ces Humay^e Underftanding , to the mod Incurable 
 State of Sceptkifm. 
 
 Thefe Two Particulars are Handl'd and Prov'd 
 GeomitYically, 
 
 III. Tlie Rcafons are produced which convince the 
 Author of this Paper, that thofe Sermons do ra- 
 ther F-flahlijh than Deftroy^ do rather Confirm than 
 Confute Spinoza s Hypothefis. 
 
 L N D }Sf: 
 
 Printed for JonMhun Kohinfm at the Golden Lyon in 
 
 St. Pauls Church- Yard. 1705-. 
 
'^ 
 
 IF the Reader meets with Faults of Iln- 
 preffion in thefe Sheets, he is defired to 
 excufe them; and in Page 9. Line i8, to 
 leave out the Words, invented^ and. 
 
REMARK S 
 
 • u p.tt'icj^ 
 Mr. CLJRkEs Sermons, 
 
 Preached at the 
 
 Cathedral Church of St J^auh , 
 
 AGAINST 
 
 A f HE I S M- 
 
 QI N C E the Edifying Lefture at St. PauFs has 
 been purpofely eftablilhed to Confute Atheifm, 
 and that this truly Gre^t and Good End, is what 
 is^# Mr. Clarke profelTes to aim at in thofe Ser- 
 mons he Preached- in that Cathedral, and late- 
 ly Printed for the Publick Good : I humbly conceive^ 
 whoever proves, that thofe Sermons are lo far from 
 Anfwerlngxh^X. End, that they abfolutdy cut off all poffihle 
 Aleuns of attaining it , and do rather EfiahUfh, than De^ 
 jlroy, what they, apparently undertake to C on f t4te jWiW be 
 looked upon by Mr. C. himfelf, and every body clfe, 
 as One who really intends to concur in his avowed 
 Defign, and to promote the End propofed by the Ho^ 
 nourable Founder of that LeBure. This is the Only End 
 
 aL.^-l at, in the following Sheets. 
 
 B The 
 

 Remarks upon Mr. ClarkeV Sermons 
 
 -~5^he DifcGii*fe-in thofe-S^inons,. "-isjike^ed to- 
 
 ' thar -iorti^-TMyerfirT 3 wko m --th^-iKa^Oifliipsaila- 
 
 tive Reafoning, and upon the Principles of Philo- 
 
 T-* fophy pretend^ thasithe Arguments brought a^jainft 
 
 ^^ the Being of God , appear ftronger a'lw mor^con- 
 
 "'clufive^ Fage 5-. Mr. C. thinks it reafonable and 
 
 *^ necelTary to opppfe thefe Athei^h in their own way, 
 
 Tage 260. And thetefore will make ufe of no fort 
 
 '^ of Authorities^ bu^^qj^lii^e himfelf to the Rules (k 
 
 " ftri<5t^sm4 ;d€ ^[to^ftmiye Wgiimi/itation,, $age 15-. 
 
 I likewife think it\K"^.7/^«^^^ and ^i^'ec^J'^r/ to Jjjlfi 
 
 M. C. in his oivn JVay^ an^ to pmve^. by the Rules of 
 
 /riV'? and dtmonfimivi Jy^gtt'mMdimn : 
 
 'c\^^\Ti^% '^he f jrf^jfWj'If^^l^/; feftabliilied) ^ 
 Mr. Clarke in his Sermons ,, Venders It abfolutely im- 
 poflible for hira to Confute thofe very fame Atheijts he 
 liamesj an(J pretends to ai^gue againft in thofe Ser- 
 mons,, or any other, ^ • 
 
 ySecmMy\ That: Mr. Clarke reduces Human^ Under- 
 ftanding to the poft - incurable State of Sceptlcifm, in 
 Reference to the one only true God; and deprives it of 
 all poffible Means of proving the Exiftence of that: 
 Supreme Being. 
 
 Thirdly^ I flxall produce the Reafons, which Con- 
 'vince me , that thofe Sermons, do rather Efiahlijh 
 th,an D^Jhoy'^: dq rather Co»J&^w tlAza Confute Spinoza'j 
 
 ::J{:iL; 
 
 To the eii.d Mr. G. and the Readfer may fee, that I 
 ihall affift him here, in his o?^;? >'^V/^ ^^^^ ^^^ before 
 him an Idea of his ou-w ^?/5 by fhewing in a few- 
 Wordsj wherein kytowMge, Cermnty, the firiH Rules of ' 
 Argmmi:tatii}n, Or Dem6Kjiraudn^\ do confift. I.fliall af- 
 terwards lay down M-.CV Sceptical Hypothefis, and Spi' 
 nozja'^:Atheifmy aftd then proceed to theLBroof of ths_- 
 abbve-mentibned Particulars. ;^- ^ '^-y- 
 
 We know no Obje<^ biit by the Intervention of its . 
 2dea* Humane Knowledge confifts in the Perception.. 
 
 of> 
 
againfl ATHEISM. j 
 
 of the Agrefement, or Diiagreement of twro or more 
 Ideas; It is 'iwr>fould Iq;tuii;ive and Demonftrative. 
 The former cpnlifts iti an immediate Perception of 
 the Agreement or Difagreement of our Ideas. The' 
 Tetter in a Perception of their Agreement or Dift* 
 greement by the Intervention of a Third Idea. As 
 in IntLiitive, fo in Demonftrative, there muft be an 
 immediate Perception of the intervening Idea, with 
 theJdjBas on both fide?, with the Ideas under adiual 
 Confiderarion , and which we .would con^ipare , and ^ 
 
 then Unite or Dtiunite, according a^AX^e find they -.t."; 
 
 agree or Difagree , by the Intervention of this Third 
 Idea, of this common Meafure. Certainty of Know- 
 ledge confifts ih this very fame Perception of the 
 Agreem^t or Difa greement of pur own Ideas. De- 
 Ijipnftration confiils in annexing Ide^s- to: arti^culate 
 Sounds, Terms, or Words, and in l/nitlpg or J)ffii- 
 niting thofe articulate Sounds in Propoiitions , ac- 
 cording ^s the Idei^s wheieof tbey are Sigiis or Maiks, 
 do Agree or Dif^gree. Whatever Per<ieptitoh, comes ^ fj^y-q^ 
 fliort o^ this rpoken pf 'here, neitherlsu\n(5^^CJ^^' b^e - '"tt "'4 
 
 Knowledge. In that Senfe I fliall 'take th'e Teriji^ ^^ 
 KyiowUdge, in the following Lines ; and oiFer what has 
 been now faid, as a corred Idea of Mr. Cs IVaj, of 
 the /friSL Rules of Argumintation* , '.\ 
 
 I fhall at prefent fet before you Sfmoz.as OpimoK, 
 as quoted and tranflated by . Mr. C. in tlie% Word^ 
 
 ^''^'.^°- :.'':•; 
 
 Spinoza , the mofi celebrated Patron of Atbetfm in our Spinoza's 
 
 Time , wbo taught * there is Opinion 
 
 m diWtrance of Subftancest but ^'^.^ W!irttiamn fotefipro- confuted, 
 
 -z. / iri 11 n °^*^' ^* ""^ fuhftantia. Ethic. 
 
 that the Whole and every Fart pa,f^ j. Vvo^. 6. 
 
 of the Material World is a Ne- Omnis fuhftantia eft necefario 
 
 cejff^irily-exifting Being ; and infinita. ibid. Prop. 8. 
 
 that t there it no other God.but ,. ^'^ ^^.^;i^'^r,iJMmtU fer- 
 
 , ' • r ''"^' exiftere. Ibid. Prop. 7. 
 the Unt'verfe, ^ p,^^^, jD^^^ ^J^^ /^^^. 
 
 'nejuc cmcip foteft fubftantia. Ibid. Prop. 14. 
 B 2 Pray 
 
41 RemarHs upon Mr. Clarke^j Sermons 
 
 .iVriy take notice^ ''by the by, that Sftnoza is quite 
 mlfreprefented and wronged in the E?;^/i/Jj Tr:*n- 
 flacion-; becaufe this is a very material Obfervation, 
 as you fliall fee hereafter. Sfmoxji fays. That befid.-s' 
 God ,. there neither is , nor can be conceived any otba Suh- 
 fiqpce. Let us now hear, what Sort or Kind of Suk^ 
 fiance this One Singh Subfiance is, which he calls by the 
 \ Holy Name- God. Extcnfivn^ lays. he,,' 
 Ixtenfio attribiuum Deiefr, -^ ^^ Attribute of God, err God is an 
 five Deus eft. lesextenfa, rwfi. -, . j i ^l- TTTro^rr rv«a .,«^o.. 
 
 Part. z. Prop, 2. Extended Thing. Everyone under- 
 
 V, '; \^ Hands at firft flghr, what he means ^ 
 
 hy^ 9n^ Extended Thing or Subfiance, to wit, a Ma^ 
 terl^r Suhfiunce. This he owns, this is his Dodrine,. 
 
 Nam fubftantiamcorpoream;' ;^^^5„h« -^^^f^^^^^ ^"« ^^^/> f^*^^ '^• 
 qua non nifi infinita, non nifi , »o Reajon why the Corporeal Subfiance ^ 
 unica, & non nifi indivifibilis 'which cannot be cmceJ'ved, but ai One, 
 poteft concipi .... nulla ratione Indi'viftble and Infinite, Oiould be thought. 
 
 pon^tnr , dummodo «terna & jiandtng n be dtviftbk ^ frorvided 
 mfimvi.concQdL^x\xtt Ethic. P;u,*tir granted fa be Eternal and Infi- 
 SchoL Prop, i^. ' ' ; ''Ttfte. 
 
 You fee, he fays^ there neither is, nor can be, but 
 
 One fingle Subfiance 5 that this One fingle Subfiance, is a 
 Material Subfiance, and that this One fingle Material Subh 
 fiance is God. This def^roys the Nature and Exiftence 
 of the One Only True God. This is the only Fcunda- 
 tion, the very Ground and firft rrijjciple of all the Anci^ 
 ent and Modem Athetfis ', as.the Learned have obferved, 
 and is plain from the. ij:..'f«r5 of the 7v^/«^. This there- 
 fore i^ the Principle which M?, C. niuft Confute in liis 
 Sermons, if he intends to- canf-Lite Spincz,'2 , or any 
 other Athi'ifi. Let- us, 1^0 w read Mr^ Cs Sceptical Hjp;>^ 
 . . thefis , w hi ch is . this,. 
 
 . " What the , Subllance or Effence cf that Being, 
 ^f which is Sslf^Exiftenr, or Necelfarily-Exifting, is^ 
 • '*• we have no Idea , neither is it fojfible for us in cvy.. 
 
 '* Meafitre to cctnprehend. Page 74. Again, What it is,^ 
 " 1 mean as to its Subr^an.e and ElTence, we are in- 
 
 ^■finitely mcble to comprehend, P. 75". With Submiffion, 
 
 L think 
 
agciwft ATHEISM, 
 
 r think Mr. C. fhould fpeak for himfelf , and inftead" 
 of If^'e , fhould fay I; but by what he fays , you fee, 
 he mlthcr hjs ^ nor can h/rv! , any Idea of the Suhfianct 
 ofGcd. Let us hear what he fays concerning the Sub- 
 fiance of ALitter y and it is this. " We are utterly Igno- 
 " rant of the Subfii^nce or Ejjcnce of all other Things;^ 
 " even of tiiofe Things which we converfe mod fe- 
 
 " miliarly with, and think we undderlland beft. 
 
 " All inanimate Beings have their ElTence or Sub- 
 ^' fiance hidden from us in the deepeft and moft im- 
 ••'^ penetrable Obfcurity, Pirge 77. Again, " There is 
 ''^ no Subfianu in the World , of which we know any- 
 ^^ thing further, than only a certain number of its 
 ^* Properties or Accidents, ?age 79. Tho' this Seep* 
 tical Hypthefis is abfolutely falfe, and borrow'd from 
 Mr. L. as other things in thefe Sermons are ^, yet it 
 fhews us, that as Mr. C. neither haty nor can bai/ty any 
 Idea of the Sub/,mce of God, fo likewife, he neither has^ 
 nor can have, any Idea of the Subfiance of Matter. 
 
 We have obferved, that to Confute Spinoica, Mr. c\ 
 muft prove. That the Subfiance of God li not the Sub>- 
 Jlance of Matter, /. e. That God is not Matter or Ma- 
 terial. And I am now to prove, in his own Way, by 
 tlie ftridt Rules of Argumentacion , and from his own 
 Scdptic.1l HypothvjiSy That it is abfolutely Impoflible for . 
 Mr. C. to make out that Great and Fundamental 
 Truth, againft Splncz,^. , againft that Atheifi whom he 
 pretends to Confute in his Sermons, though it can be 
 eafily proved againft him, or againft any other Atheijt 
 whatever. I prove my Charge thusi- 
 
 It is abfolutely ImpoffibU for Mr. C. to- Confute 
 '^^p:nnx.:i, wichoi.t pereei'ving and prcving, That the Sub- 
 ' fiance of God is not^the Subllance of Matter; that 
 God is not Matter, or Material.. This is Sellvevident. . 
 }z is impodible for Mr. C. cither to perceive or prove, 
 that the Subfiance of God, is not the Subftaiace of 
 Matter, but by htniticny or .by Demonjhr.tion. This is - 
 evident from the Definitions of Knowledgey Certainty\y 
 'xndDrrmnjhatidr. s lettled before. Now it.is.irnpoffi- 
 
 ble . 
 
6 Remarks upon Mr, Clarke' j Sermons 
 
 ble for Mr. C. to prove , That the Suhfiance of God, is- 
 i\0l xho. Suhfiance ci Mcitw ^ or, njice 'vcrsA , either by 
 Intuition, or by Demonftration. The two Parts of 
 this Ailertion are to be diftindly and fingly made oir, 
 and lliajl be proved in this manner, beginning with 
 Intuition. 
 
 It is impoflible for him either to perceive or prove. 
 That the Subftance of God is net the Subftanee of 
 Matter, by Intuition ; but by perceiviiig and proving, 
 .an Immediate y Confianty Fijihky Immutahk, Neci.jji.irjy Re~ 
 fugna77Cjf y or Difagreement y -hetwc^n thQ Idea of the 
 Subftance of God , and the Idea of the Subftance of 
 Matter. It is impoflible for him to perceive this Re-, 
 pugnancy or Difagreement, but by bringing together 
 in his own Mind, the two Ideas undei:, CcTj/ideraion, 
 and therein by their immediate Comparifon, Juxttx-^afl- 
 tion or Applicaticn one to another, perceive their ne- 
 ceflary Repugnancy or Difagreement, one with ano- 
 ther. 
 
 Now he declares in his Sceptical Hjpothefis , that he 
 neither has , nor can have , either the Idea of. the 
 one, or of the other ; therefore it is abfolutely im- 
 poflible for him, by Intuition, either to perceive or 
 prove. That the Subftance of God, is not the Sub- 
 ftance of Matter, that God is not Matter, or Material. 
 All this is evident, both in it felf, and from the De- 
 finitions before- mentioned. 
 
 As for Demonftration, it is impoflible for Mr. C. 
 either to perceive, or prove, this WaY> That the Sub- 
 ftance of God, is not the Subftance of Matter, that 
 God is not Matter, or Material , but by the Interven- 
 tion of fome Third Idea. Now, let him pitch upon 
 any Third Idea, or Ideas whatever, either upon the 
 fimple Idea of o»e fingle ^ality cr Vroptrty , or upon a 
 complex Idea , made up of a certain Set or ColUtticn of 
 the fimple Ideas of fingle Qualities cr Properties ; it is im- 
 poflible for him by the Intervention, either of the 
 one, or of the other; either to perceive or prove 
 againft the Atheifi Spinoza^ that the Subftance of God 
 
 is 
 
- ^K not^e §utfence gf Matter, tl-iiac ,.Qbii'i^^5c)t^\if^t- 
 .\ter <)r Material. .... .,■"','. 
 
 ^'''" )X^hateVer Third Idea he fiiall !pitch upon , he can- 
 jior prove chat the Sub Ranee of God is not the Siib- 
 ftance of Matter^ but by perceiving and proving a 
 .^Gonftant, Vilible_, Immutable, Necellary Repugnan- 
 ^i;]fly or JDifagreement^ betwe,en the Subftance of God_,, 
 sand the Subftance of Matter, by the Intervention of 
 this Third Idea. He cannot either perceive or prove 
 thiy, without perceiving and proving the Nec€JJ':rji 
 Agrtomtit or Dif-gr cement of this Third, Idea, with the 
 Ideas on both fides, with the Ideas under debate^ 
 ;^it^i the Two Idea,Sy he would compare together, and 
 "'remove, feparate, or difiinite the one from the other, . 
 ty the Intervention of this common M<iafure of this 
 "Third Idea. Now it, is imfojjible for him, either to per- 
 ceive, or to prove anJmmediate^neceiTary. Agree* 
 ment, or Difagreemcnt of »ny Third Idea whatever, 
 with either of the Ideas under debate , but by bring- 
 ing his Thjrd Idea, and the Ideas uader debate, into 
 his own Mind, and therein by their immediate Com- 
 parifbn, Juxta-pofition,, or Application one to ano- 
 ther, perceive their neceffary Agreement or Difa- 
 greement. Now he declares iA his Sceptical Hjpothefis 
 that he neither has^ nor can have, either the one, or 
 the other of the Two Ideas under debate -, and there- 
 jFore it is abfolutely impofiible for him to bring toge- 
 
 . -Jin his own Mind,, Two Ideas which he neither has, 
 nor can have, and therein to compare them with any.. 
 Third Ideavvhatever. -And fuice it is impoffible for 
 him to compare them with any Third Idea whatever, 
 
 ^.^ 'it is likewife ahfdutely ImpoJJlhh for him, either to per- 
 ceive, or to prove their immediate, necefiTary Agree- 
 ment or Difagreement, with any Third . Idea what- 
 ever. And fmce it is abfolutely Impelfiblc for him, 
 by the Intervention of any Third Idea whatever, 
 either to perceive, or to prove, a conflanc, immuta- 
 ble^ vifible, neceffary Repugnancy or Agree ivicnt be- 
 tween. the Ideas under debate j it is likewif^ ablbh-.te- 
 
 Iv 
 
8 Remarks upon Mr. ClarkeV Sermons 
 
 ly Importible for him by Demonftration , either to 
 
 perceive, or to prove. That the Subftance x)f God is 
 not the Subftance of Matter; that God is not Matter 
 
 ;or Material. 
 
 Now thefe being die only Two Ways pojjihle to 
 perceive, or to prove any Truth ; and it being abfo- 
 lutely Impoflible for Mr, C. either Way, /. e, either 
 
 ' by Intuition, or hy Demonftration, either to perceive 
 or prove. That the Subftance of God is not the Sub- 
 ftance of Matter; that God is not Matter or Mate- 
 rial; it is abfoluteh' Impoflible for Mr. C. to Confute 
 ' Spinoz,a, the very fame Atlieiji he Names, and againft: 
 whom he pretends to Argue in his Sermons. This is 
 
 ^he Firft Particular I promifed tomake out. The Se- 
 cond is -this, 'VIZ.. 
 
 That Mr. C. reduces Human Underftanding to rtie 
 mofi incurable State of Sceftifin in Reference to the One 
 Only True God, and deprives it of all poflible means of 
 Proving the Exigence 01 that Supreme Beh^, 
 . I humbly conceive, that the moft incurable State 
 of Scepticifm, wherein Humane Und^rftancJing can be 
 confidered, or to which it can be reduced, in Refe- 
 Tence to the Objed we fpeak of, is this, 'v-z. To be 
 utterly uncapable , .either of perceiving , or proving, 
 the Nature or Exl fence of the One Only True God ^ ut- 
 terly ujtahle to Difference Or D't ft-'tnguiflj that Supreme Be- 
 ing from the" moft Contemptible of his Creatures , from 
 what the Atheijlical Shopkeeper, SpLnoza , mofi Bhifphe" 
 moujly calls God. In a Word , to be unable to know , 
 "Whether God does, or does not Exift. Now, this is 
 exadly the very fame State to which Mr. C. reduces 
 'Humane Underftanding by his Sceptical Hypothejis. 
 
 For it is abfolurely Impoflible for Humane Under- 
 ftanding, either to perceive, or prove, the Nature or 
 Zxiftence of the One Only True God , or to DifFe- 
 Tcncc or Diftinguifh that Supreme Being, from Spi- 
 ncz.:\ pretended Subftance , but by Intuition, or by 
 .Demonftration. 
 
 ■c:^' 
 ,*^^- 
 
 Now,' 
 
a^ahifl '-A'T H E I S U. 9 
 
 Kc\7, I humbly conceive ^ it has been proved in 
 the prccedirg Lines, even in Mr. C's own xVay, i. e. . 
 by the Wnd: Rules of Argumentation, that accoidinf^ 
 to his Srepcjcil Hyvctbvjis J it is impollible for Humane 
 Unclerftanding, by the N.itural UJc of its Faculties, 
 either to perceive , or to prove, the Nature and Ex- 
 iftence of the One Only True God, or to Difference 
 o*- Biftingi.ifh that Supreme Being ^Ton\\%fmoz^as Ma- 
 terial Subftance. Hence it neceflarily follows , that 
 that Sceptical Hjpothe/is does reduce Humane Under- 
 ftanding, in Reference to the One Only True God, 
 to the mod incurable State of Scefticifm , that it can 
 be confidered in , or reduced to. This is To very 
 plain, that I need not tO infill upon it, more parti- 
 cularly , or to detain yoii any longer upon this Se- 
 cond Point. 
 
 Indeed , that very fame Sceptical Hypothefis has been 
 invented , and of late purpofely improved to deprive 
 us of all poUible Means, either of perceiving or pro- 
 ving, of Differencing or Diftingiiifhing the One On- 
 ly True God from SpirtPz^as Subftance. This Athei- 
 jlical Shopkeeper is the Firft that ever reduced Atheijm 
 into a Syftem, and Mr. Locke is the Second ; with this 
 Difference, that the latter has only copied the. for- 
 mer as to the main, Spimx^a having, as he irhagined, 
 eitablifhed the Exiftence of his One fmgle Subftance, 
 and cut off the Means of perceiving or proving, that 
 there are more than One , puts , 
 
 and Anfwers this Queftion, vtz-l If Si quis autem jam cuxret, 
 any one does ask, by what Si^n there- ?\3"'' ^'"8° ^'8"° diyerfitatem 
 fore p,all we know the Di'vefftty of nof^ere, legat feqnentes Propo- 
 Suhft-ances', let him iread the following fitiones, qiix ollendiint in re- 
 Tropoftlons which prove , that there is "im natura nr-n, nifi iinicam 
 but One SiMnnce in the Whole ^",^/^f "V''^?' ♦ ^'^"^^^ » ^•'»mq"e 
 H orU, and fi>r thuReafon that S'gn propter id figntim frv.ftrl c^xtc- 
 wohuI he m njam (ought for. As for reretur, Ethic, ExrU i. SchoL 
 fthe Subilance it lelf, he Tays, Prap.io. ■■.. i 
 
 C 
 
I o Remarks upon Mr. Clarke*^ Sermons 
 
 _. . :,- Ifive'conHder^tinntity-^ as it is in the 
 
 bi itaaue ad qiiantitatem at- r • ' :• / • / •• r^ j r 
 
 tendirausl, pro m in imaginati- ]^^g'^^'t^^^'^^ . ^f^^f '^ "/^f;^. ^^^ '4- 
 one ell, quod fapa, & facilius ^^^^ «<^^j ^^ '^^''' ^^ /tf««^ ttnite^^ Di- 
 a nobis fit, reperietur finita, 'vijibh y and mack up of Parti 'y hi4t if 
 divifibilis , & ex partibus con- ,^g look upon it ns it is in the Undjr^ 
 flat.i : fi autem ad ipfam, prout n. j- J ri :* ;* • c / 
 
 ;„ ;.L n a n ^ ^ j- fandmZ-> ^•^"' con ider tt as it is a Sttb- 
 
 m iftrelledtus eft, attendimus, ' '^ i ■ i - n vrr i i 
 
 & earn, qimenus lubflantia jF^»ce, TVOich is rmjt dipiettlt, thtJt, as 
 elf, conci^i\x\nSyC^odidi&ci\i<-:.\.lhi*fVsji)e'}i>nalrci]dy, it will hfi fcunU 
 me fir, turn, ut jam fatis de^ Jn/inite , IndiwfiHe , and but One. 
 monllravimusinfinita, imica & you fee that Spinoz..i\ One fiuple Sub. 
 mdivilibilis repenetur, Ethc, ^ . ,' ■ t n i ,i ^ i. 
 
 Bnt. I, Sc/joi. Prop.i^. ' Jtawe IS a Mjitenai bubjtunce ^ an<J- 
 
 that he has endeavoured to de- 
 pi;i-yje/ usrofr the Means , either of perceiving or pro- 
 ving, that itheje is more.than Om^ or a different 
 Subftajitee-^m.. his: Material Subftanc^vj in^iihao 
 World. r^Y'A. ':>;•:.<■-■' 
 
 Mr. L's only Defign in Writing his Effay of Hu- 
 mane Underftanding , was to eftablifh Spinoz^ts Hypo- 
 thefisi . In this the Four Eooks_, that compofe the faid 
 Eifay, do.Unimoufly Center. He eftahlifhed it in 
 that BoQk,and therein endeavoured to prove, that all 
 things differ '.only but in 2. hare different Modification ofths 
 fame Suhftance ', which different Modifications, Quali- 
 ties, or Properties, perceivable in the various Species 
 of Beings, he calls by the new Name, Nominal Ef- 
 fence, which, he fays, is the only, Effence that diffin- 
 gpJbeithQ. different Species of Beings , thQ one from the 
 cm0h ,-Hear his own Words: The real Effences of Suk-': 
 fiances, if different from our abfiraB Ideas, i. e. Nominal 
 Elfences,r^»»o/' be the Offences of the Species we rank things 
 into. For two Sfecies may be one, as rationally oi two dif~ 
 „ , fermt Effences, i. e. the Real and the Nominal Effence, 
 ^tr*'-: ■ h the Effence of one Species, EiTdy, B.3. C.;. S.i 3. That 
 is, -Mr. L. and his Horfe,. and his Dog, may be 0?ie, as 
 rationally , as that they fhould be differenced or difiin- 
 guijhed the one from the other , but by their Nominal 
 Ejfences , i. e. their External ^alities or Modifications.. 
 
 I need not to quote mors out of him , for by 
 
 far 
 
: againfl ATHEISM. ^i 
 
 far the great^fl part of his thiee kfl'i3aoks are ini- 
 ployed in depriving us of the means to difference, or 
 dillinguifli, or prove ^ that there is more than One 
 real Subftance, and to eftablifli Spinoz,a<i Sceptical Hj- 
 ■fothejis ^ whofe Br.fis IS this_, fi''e neither ha'vc , nor care 
 ha've , the Idea of Subfi^ncc by Senfjtion cr RcfefHon^ 
 iiffay B. I. C.4k S^r8. Here he exceeds his Maitcr 
 c^piv'.z^ii a Httle , and Mr. C. furpalTes both of them , 
 •oviien after having affertedy That it is impoflTible for 
 xxi, in any Meafure, to comprehend the Subftance or 
 Effence of the Supreme Being, he adds : We are ut- 
 terly ignorant of the Subfiance or Ejjence of all other th'mgi y 
 Page 76. The next that appears jnay as reafonably 
 fay. That we are perfeAly Blind. I perceive by fe- 
 veral things in. Mr. C's Sermons, that he borrowed his 
 Sceftical Hypothefis from Mr. L. the Original of which 
 Hypothefis being thus traced out, and the Defign oi 
 its Invention thus difcovered ; I proceed to the Third 
 Particular, which I promifed to make out, viz. 
 
 To produce the Reafons which. Convince me, that 
 Mr. C's Sermons do rather Eftabll^i than Defiroy^ do 
 rather Confirm than Confute SpinozaV Atheifm , though 
 I do not affirm, that this was his Intention. 
 
 They fhall be drawn from thefe Four Heads:! ^''':-^ 
 Firfi , Becaufe Mr. C, joyns his EndeaVours with 
 Mr.L's and Spinoza s, to confute the Arguments whid^ ^... ^j^^,, 
 deftroy their Common Hypothefis. - i h? //niS 
 
 Secondly , Becaufe he ufes the fame Terms or Cant , 
 whereby Mr. L. and Spnoz,a, make Thinking and Exten- 
 fon^- Attributes of the fame Subflance. 
 
 Thirdly^ Becaufe he Mifreprefents Spinoz^a andHobbs, 
 undertakes to confute Abfurdities which they pofitive- 
 1)* declare to be none of their Dodiine, and leaves 
 the Hypothefis of ofie Suhfiance , th$ cnly Ground and 
 Foundiition of all Atheifrn. untouched, 
 
 C 2 Fourtkh\ 
 
X 2 Remarks upon Mr. Clarke'i Sermons 
 
 Fourthly, Becaufe he Refiraim and Determines what 
 ■he calls Self- Ext fiing Being, as Mr. L. and Sfmox..^ do, 
 ■viz^, to {land for one fingle Matcrinl Suhjh.nce. 
 
 Since 1 cannot ran over every Particular, which 
 Mr. C. has upon thefe feveral Heads, I (hall examine 
 thofe that I handle. To as that you may perceive by 
 ■ what fhall be faid, what might be faid to the other 
 Parts of thofe Sermons which Xhall not be Inoken tty 
 4n: thefe Sheets. I fhall handle them in the fame Or- 
 der wherin they have been now mentioned. 
 I Dcjcartes 2,nd liis Followers have afferted^ and AL'- 
 thtmatlcaUy proired , That the Ejjhce of Alittur conlifts 
 in Length, Breadth, and Defth. That no extended 
 Subitanee, can think ,. nor any thinking Subftance be 
 extended.. . That Extenfion and Thinking are Attri- 
 butes of twO' Subftances , Originally and Eternally , dit^ 
 ferent and diftind the one fi'om the other. Spinoz^a, 
 who would have in all but one lingle Subftance, runs 
 Counter to his Majhr , and alTerts , That thefe Two 
 Attributes, to wit. Thinking and Extenfion, are.buc 
 Two different Modifications of one and the fame 
 Subftance. Hence it is, that he blames Defcartes, for 
 making the ElTence of Matter to confift in Extenfion 
 alone. Here are his own Words. 
 Qt.iod petisj an ex folo Ex- Js^ to what you ask, to Tvit , •whether 
 tenlionis cpncentu rerum varie- y ^ ^^^^ , . ,^^^,„ji,j,. ^i^„, ,y j^f^ 
 tas a prion point demonllrari,. / ^ _./. -' , ^, \ -'. 
 
 credo me jamfatis clare often- t<^^ejj.ce ofThmgs may. ke- proved, a pn- 
 diffe, id impoffibile cffe ; Jdeo- ori, I believe I have alvtady jho-ivn that 
 <]ue materinm a GarwCo male to be impojjihle , and thtrJfore Defcar- 
 rfdiniri per Extenfipuem, &o. ^^^ ,^,^^ ^,^,^^ .^^/^^„ ^^ ^i^,^^^ ^^^ ^jj-^^^^ 
 
 ' of Matter 171 Extenfiofik . % 
 
 ■And though. Mr. L. takes it as a Gonimendation of 
 himfclf to the World, to be the Svhoiar of fo gl^ii# a 
 Mafier as Defcarta , and rnu(i always acknowledge to that 
 'ufily Admired Gc77tkman^ the great Obligation of his firfi 
 deliverance from the unintdligwle Way of Talking of the 
 
 Schools 
 
agciinfi ATHEISM. i j 
 
 Schools in his time y' L. I. B. W. p. loij. yet he joyns 
 with Spincz^a to oppofe Defcartts y when his DoArine 
 <!eftroys the Hypothelis of One Subftance. Mr. L. de- 
 tines Extenfion, and fays _, 'Tis only the Space thnt lies 
 bctwten the Extrewitits of the folid cohtrcttt Pints of Borly , 
 EiVdy, B. 2. C. i;. S. i;. Then, in feveral places ct 
 his Hffay , he Confutes the Curtefiuns for making the 
 Ejjincc of BoJy or ALitt^r to ccnfift in Extenfion, i.e. 
 in the diftancc between the Extreniicies of the I'olid 
 Parts of Matter, according to him. You know tlie 
 Cartcjiam never alTerted that the Effence of BoUy con- 
 lifted in that Space, nor in any thing like it j but this 
 extraordinary piec& of Ingenuity and Gratitude, fhews 
 only. That Me. L. would very willingly, but CQuld 
 not pollibly. Confute his Malhr-^ but ftill, to lecond 
 Spincz^a, he does what he can, and that's only-to Mlf~- 
 reprefent his firji Deli'vcrtr. 
 
 Mr. C. with equal Succefs, feconds thefe Two Au- 
 rhors,and Expofes the Cartefums for making the Eflence 
 of Matter to confiil in Extenfion. He fays, " That 
 " when any one has done his utmoft in endeavouring; 
 '^^ to imagine that an Eternal Infinite Being does not 
 '' Exift, he cannot avoid imagimng an Infinite Nothing. 
 "^ That with this Argument, the Canejians, who fuppo- 
 " fed the Idea of Jmmenfity to be the Idea of meer Mat- 
 " ter, have been mightily perplexed. That they have 
 '^ contradicted themfelves in Words upon this Subject. 
 " That it has been eafier for them to be driven :.to 
 " that ir.nfi intolerable jliftirdlty of 
 
 ""^ alTerting Matter "'^ to be in effect * Mais fentetre q-ue re rai- 
 
 " 2iNecS-y Bmw , than to be able /°"«%'«''^ «-'c ?> e. But per- 
 « to remove o.t1,f their minds the ^^^ :^^^^ 
 
 Idea or IvimLnjiiy, as Exijhng ne- Idea hath to reprefent Exteiifi- 
 "^ CijJ.irily ^nd /mjtprriibly from Et<r- <-^'i (tfiat is, in the Senfe uf the 
 " uity. Page 22, ;;, cfr. You fee ^^'^'fif^^> ^^'^\^^l) ^om^Uom 
 Mr.O. ufes the Term Ir^wa^Ji^y for ^,. S.^is.Mct.^ph^f.UuV.K 
 the lerm Ex/i'wyZ,,/;, ■ and 1.0, with c. 3. 
 him,, thery ^re fynQnymcm, as ap- ,u<i 
 
 pea'rs 
 
1 4 ' Remarks upon Mr, Clarke V Sermons 
 
 pears very ^laitily from his Remark upon the Quota- 
 tion he brings oiit of Regis, where he fays. That Eic- 
 t-en/ton, in the Se-nfe of the Cartefians , is Matter •, and 
 from his faying in the Text, That they fuppofe Im- 
 mmftty to he the Idea of mecr Aintter. With this Obfer- 
 vation , I befeech you to take notice of the Words , 
 Meer Matter ^ for a Reafon you fliall hear after- 
 wards. "^ iii lata .,c,Vi lo 
 
 The Argirnicfft', a§ Mr. C. calls it, which has ?n'igh- 
 tilj perplexed the Cartefians, forced them to contrad^ci 
 themfel'ves y and dri'ven them to that moft: intolerable Ahfur- 
 dity of ajfertif!g Matter to be a necejj'ary Being, is this, viz. 
 That when one kaf done his utmofi in endea'vouring to ima- 
 gine there is no Eterndj Infinite, i. C. Extended Being-, he 
 cannot avoid imagining an Eternal, In finite, i. e. Extended 
 Nothing. Now, this is no Argument at all , 'tis but a 
 bare AlTertion, and with Submiflion, a mofi intolerable 
 Abfurdity, to ufe Mr. C's words. For this, viz. He can- 
 not a'void imagining an Eternal, Infinite, or Extended No- 
 thing , is fo far from being true , That it is ahfolutely 
 ImpnJJible for any one to imagine an Eternal, Infinite No- 
 thing', as impoffible as it is for any one to imagine, a 
 Round, S^ttare, or Cubical Nothing. 
 
 Is not this a ftrange Effort to eftabliih an Eternal, 
 Infinite Extenfion ? Nay, 'tis afferted. That the Cartefi- 
 ans themfelves cannot remove out of their Minds the 
 Idea of Immenfity, i. e. Extenfion, as Exifiing neceffarily 
 and infefarahly from Eternity. Indeed they cannot re- 
 move out of their Minds, what was never in their 
 Minds. To make Extenfion Eternal , is to make 
 fomething Extended Eternal, as Spinoz,a and Mr. L, 
 
 -have done, to which they gave the Holy Name , God. 
 Mr. C. goes on. Which Abfurdity of theirs, (i. e. theCzT- 
 tefian'j Abfurdity in making Matter to be a Necefiary Being) 
 tn refpefl of the Idea of Immenfity, i. e. Extenfion, proves 
 
 it indeed to he necejj'ary and impojfible to be removed, ib. The 
 Cartefians are not guilty of this- intolerable Abfurdity , I 
 
 •believe it will ftick clofe to thofe who attribute it to 
 
 •them. But this intoleraj^e Abfurdity is made to confift 
 
 in 
 
againfl A T H E I S MJ ry 
 
 ?n making Extcnfon neccjj'ary -^ and yet 'tis affeited, 
 thac this intchmble JhfurAity , in refpert of .the Uca of 
 Immctjjity^i.t. Extcnfion, proves ic indeed to be necep."}- 
 rj. Indeed I never heard, that a wo/ intolerable'' Ab-^' 
 (ttrdity proved it felf to be no Jbftirdity at all, before 
 now. Ic follows: 
 
 "But in refped oi Matter, 'tis only a pervcrfe Ap-" 
 ^^ plying an Idea to an Objec^t, whereto h noways ht^*"^ 
 " longs, I^'uf. I am fure a Cartefian would fay. That*- ' 
 this Ajjtrtlon is a mojl intolerable Abfurdity. I am Tur^ ' 
 that even Spinoz,.'i and Mr. L. would fay the fame, and 
 I believe there neither is, nor ever was any body, 
 but would confirm their Sentence befides Mr. C. F ' 
 believe the Reader never heard any one fay, before'*"' 
 now, Thac Exten/ionno "u^ays belongs to Matter., Mr. (?^ 
 goes on, " For thac it is indeed abfolutely ImpolTibley 
 " and ContradiAory to fuppofe Matter necelfariiy^; 
 " Exifting , fhall be demonftrated prefently, IbiJ:'^ 
 This great hafte is to confute fome unknown Cartefi- 
 ans, who make Matter a necejjlury Being. ' Now I aiii''.: 
 fure that this Author cannot produce 0«f, no,not On^^ 
 Cartefian, that ever made Matter to be a Necej[ary-Exi- 
 fiing Being, that ever contradiHed himfelf in Words up-'-' 
 on this Subje<ft, that ever was Mightily, or not mighti-^' 
 ly, or at all perplexed with what Mr. C. calls his Ar- 
 gument; nay, that ever heard of that thing he calls'-^ 
 his Argument.' Why are they thus Mifreprefented and'" 
 Impofed upon ? Spinoz^a promifed he would confider^^ 
 ;. e. Confute their Arguments whereby they prove, that|''^ 
 every Exttnfion is Matter, and nothing elfe but Mitter;'^ 
 i. e. no SubjeBr o{ Thinking, but he never fo much afsr'^ 
 offered to perform his Promife. Mr. L. Mifrcprefents''^ 
 and Iwpdfcs upontheTOj concerning Extenfion, and then'' '- 
 Confiites his own Imaginations , which does not afalF^ 
 touch them. Mr. C. does the lame thing, fave only^ ' 
 that he does Confute nothing, but contents himfelf' 
 with thofe bare AJJertions which we have read , and''; 
 which are io fjigular in their kind, that I believe ybif^'' 
 never heard the like before. ^•'*-- 
 
 I hum-. 
 
1 5- Remarks upon Mr. Clarke^- Sermons 
 
 I humbly defire rhe Reader to be perfwadcd , that 
 I amof no particular Sdt in Matttrs of Vhihfc^hy, that 
 I am only of the ? arty Sji Truth ^v^\{\^h. I embrace hear- 
 tily, -and defend as well as I can^ where-cver I meet 
 with it, or find it oppreiTed. The Modem Athdfis ha- 
 ving endeavoured to confound the Difference of Suh- 
 (lances, and to take away the Ai/irks of DijlinStrnT be- 
 tween thenij would willingly^ but could not pofliblv 
 deprive Extenfion of being a ChnraCitrilf-ic^I Adark of a 
 Suhfiance, different and diJHnct from that which Thmhs ; 
 and hnce the fame Endeavours are made in thofe Ser- 
 mons, the Intereft of Truth , and no other , engaged 
 me to take notice of them, as it does, to olsferve 
 what Mr. C. fays, concerning the Proof drawn by 
 the Cartejians, from the Idea of a Being Infinitely TerfcEty 
 which is the Second Argument that Mr. C. attacks in 
 thefe Sermons , after fome Alodem Jthcifis , though it 
 be the bell Proof that Humane Reafon has yet invented, 
 to make out the Exigence of the One Only True God. I 
 ihall firft fhew you the Model which Mr. C. propofcd 
 in attacking this Argument. 
 
 Mr. L. having borrowed his Notion of the Identity of * 
 the fdmcMan from5;>/wo3SJ,does not allow of a permanent 
 Subflance in Man, which may receive, and conftant- : 
 ly retain an Original Innate Idea of God ; confequentlv 
 he wrote the Firft Book of his Effay , in order to 
 prove, that we have no Innate Ideas, e/pecially of God, ■ 
 The Cartefians havc dewonfirated that we have. In the ■ 
 famous Tenth Chapter of the Fourth Book of his Effay, 
 wherein Mr. L. after Spinoza, has eftabliflied the Exi- 
 ftence of Eternal TInnking Matter, and given the Holy 
 Name of God, to that Chimara, he has thefe Words , 
 Hoiv far the Idea of a mofi Perfeci Being , which 'a Man 
 rnay frame in his own Mind , does , or does not prove the 
 Exifience.of God, I -will not here examine, Ibid. S. 7. And 
 this, even, this, under pretence of Ze.nl for fpreading 
 rhe Knowledge of the Exiftence of God. And yet 
 immediately afterwards3 in the very ftme Sedion, he 
 .adds , Tas evident Jomc Men have no Idea oj God , and 
 - , I -owe 
 
againli ATHEISM. 17 
 
 fame Tiiorfi. tJjAjt Kone , trnd the mofi a 'very indifftrmt. Ill 
 the firft Part of this Quotation, he Mifrcprcfents the 
 .Dc-dlriiie of the Cuvtiji^ns -, in the fecond^ he renders 
 the Argumcrt from the Inn:,tc hka of God ufclcfs , 
 chough, out of his great Zed , he promifed in the be- 
 ginning of. thnt >ect. that l\c would not Examine it ^ 
 in ;rhac,pUice. Thiis is %n /Irt^fice. he n-akcs ufe of 
 dr'CugJiQut his wiiole Fjlay. 
 
 .Mr. C. follows h's Srefs In this, as well as in othet 
 Matters, and cxp relTcs himfel.f in this manner: " Our 
 " hfll Certainty of the Exiftence of God^ arifes not 
 ^^ from this, that in the Idea we frame of him in o'lr 
 ^^ own Minds J {Mr. L'i IVcrds) or rather in the Deft- 
 " nition that we make of the Word, (God) as iigni- 
 " fying a Being of all pollible Perfections, we include 
 '^rSelf-Exiftence , Vage ^j. Out of rel'pe<5t to the 
 Subject , I will not expofe this framing of an Idea in a 
 Dfrlthn. A Definition is only a Sign of our Idea, 
 or. Ideas,- but no Idea or Ideas can be framed in it. It 
 was expedient for Mr. C. to Mifreprefent the Carte- 
 fums J as Mr. L. did. They do not fay. That we 
 Frame that Idea in our Minds, much lefs in a Defini- 
 tion ^ they do not fay , That it depends upon us to 
 include Sclf-Exiflence m that Idea , as Mr. C. inti- 
 mates. They fay, and demonfirati'vely Vrcve , That 
 every Rational Creature has , Origiyially , that Idea 
 in ^is own Mind. That it necffarily includes Self-Exi- 
 jhnce, &C. 
 
 But Mr. C. does not fiy, " That that Argument is 
 "^^ wholly i n con clu five. Podibly, fays he, by a very 
 " nice and accurate Deduction, it may be found to 
 be a fatisfactory Proof. But that it is not a clear 
 and obvious Demonftration , fitted to convince and 
 put the Atheifl to Silence; [Mr. \!s IVords in the 
 fhce before cited'' appears from the endlefs Difputes 
 maintained by Learned Men concerning it, without 
 " being able to fatisfy each other on either fide of the 
 "'■ Queftion , Page 58. . He niifapplies t!ie Term, 
 Learned J in this place, and goes oji , millaking the 
 
 D Men, 
 
^emarKs upon Mr. Clarke'^ Sermons 
 
 Men, the Thing, Pveafoping, and what he would fay, 
 " The Obfcurity, fays he, and Defed of chat Argu-^ 
 " ment feems to Ire in this; that it extends only to 
 ''' the Nominal Idea or Definition of aSelf-Exirting 
 "Beings and does not with a fuffieiendy evident 
 " Connexion refer and apply that Nominal Idea, De- 
 " finltion, or Notion , which we frame in our Mind, 
 "' to the Real Idea of a Being a(9:ually exiting with - 
 *' out us, Il;id. 
 
 Above, Pr./fibljy this Argument^ by a very nice end ac- 
 curate Dedutlion , may be found a fatisf,.cfory Froof of the 
 Exigence of God. This fhews , That Mr. C. does not 
 underftand th^it Argument, thst he does not know, 
 whether it is , or is not a faisfiBory Vroof. For if he 
 knew, it is, he' would be Certain of it, beeaufe Know- 
 hJgt and Certainty is one and the fame thing. If he 
 was Certain, then it would not h&PoJJlbly, but it would' 
 be Certainly, a.fatif:iBory Proof If he was Certain^ 
 that it is not J then it would not be Popbly; but it 
 would be Certainly , 't\s not 2. fatisfaBory Proof And 
 fince he does not underftand it , he fhould not have 
 medled with it, much lefs, prefer an Ahfurdity to it, as 
 you ihall hereafter fee he does. He fays , 'Tis not a 
 clear and obtjiotis Dewonfiration fitted to connyince and put 
 the Atheifi to filence. This is an Artifice borrowed from 
 Mr. L. He Ihould have underftood it, before he pro- 
 nounced this Sentence ', but fince 'tis given without 
 knowing why -, 'tis ipo fa6io Null. And lince 'tis gi- 
 ven in Opfojition to Truth, to the moft Important Truth ^ 
 I fay , and will ftand by what I fay , That that Argu- 
 ment is a fatisfaSfory Proof, is fit to convince, and put 
 the Atheift to filence ; and do hereby Challenge this 
 Author, or any body eife, to prove the contrary, nay 
 to invalidate it in the leaft. 
 
 But Mr, C. fays, Th.jt the Obfcurity and Defect of thai 
 Argument Jeems to lie in this , d^c. The Term , jeems , 
 hcFQ, certainly pews, That the Author does not know 
 where the Obfcurity or Defect of th:it Argument Mqsj or 
 whether it has an)' Obfcurity or DefeB at all, as in rea- 
 lity it has not when rightly underftood. Mr. 
 
againfl A THE I S M. i^ 
 
 ' Mr. C. faid before. That, Vofihly^ by a very nice 
 and lUCHrateDiduUiov , it m y he fcund to be a fatisfaBcry 
 Proof. But here , he perceives 'tis both Obfcure and 
 De/iBivf. If lb, it is impojlible it fliould be lound to 
 be a ftisfcciory Proof hj any D^-uttion -ivhatever. But 
 he tells you, that the Rcafcn of its Ohfcimty and De- 
 fdt} fecms to lit in thisy that it extends only to the Nominal 
 Idea or D^fifnticn of a Self- Exiting Being. I have not 
 time to acquaint you with the Rarities of an Argument ^ 
 which extfnds only to the Definition of what it would 
 frcve. Perhaps you never heard of fach an Argument 
 before now. I am Aire you never heard of a Nominal 
 Idea before now. B'.t, Nominal Idea here, (lands for 
 the fame thing as the Term, Definition, does. So that 
 when Mr. C. faid before , That our certainty of the Ex- 
 iftence of God does not arife from the Idea we frame in our 
 own Mind , or rather in the Definition of the Word , God: 
 By the Term , Definition there , he meant his Nominal 
 idea, and therefore his Senfe was this , -viz.. That our 
 Certainty of the Exiftencc of God does not rife from 
 the Real Idea "^z frame in our Nominal Idea. I am lure 
 a Cartefian would fay. That this is not a Nominal, but 
 a Real Piece oHomQthmg he could name. But, I fay, 
 there neither is, nor can be fuch a thing as a No- 
 minal Idea , i. e. an idea that has but the Name of an 
 Idea. For every Idea is a Real Idea. It is importible to 
 frame an Idea,&ven in a Real Idea, much lefs in a Nomi- 
 nal Idea ; except one had the Faculties of Sanco Panca, 
 who could fee Dulcinea by Hearfay , i. e. a Lady in 
 an articulate Sound, and that too, by his Ears. 
 
 I am likewife certain. That you never heard the 
 Terms, Nomine. I Idea, Definition, and Notion, made to 
 fland for one and the fame thing before now. But 
 in a Second Initance , the Objcurity and DefiB of that 
 Cartefian Argument , [eems to Mr. C. to lie in this , That 
 it dees not with a fujficiently evident Connexion refer and 
 apply that Nominal Idea , Definition , or Notion , which he 
 Jiames in his own Mind , to the Real Idea of a Being attu- 
 allj Exifiinz without him, Page ;8. And wiio can help- 
 
 D 2 Mi. 
 
zo Remarks upon IvU\ Clavke'jf Sermons 
 
 Mr. C. labouring under this Obfcurity and DefeB, which 
 , he perceives , and does not percei-ve in that Carte/tan Ar- 
 ^umeKt. He does percci%>e it, fince he fays (b; and he 
 ^does not perceive it, lince it is irnpcjjihk that what he 
 calls here Obfcurity and Defuf^ (hould he in that,, or in 
 any other ArgumtTJt whatever. For that Ohjcurlty and 
 Defiti confifts- in this, v/^. That the Cdrt'Ji.m Argit- 
 {^ufnent- does not with a Jufficicntly evlcLvt Com/cxion , rcfir 
 and i-'Ppl)' the Dajinition, to the Re^:l Idea of a Being exijFtng 
 ifiithoat Mr.C How i\\^ Cartifi. ns never liiid, Thac 
 their Argument was a Docfor of Sorhcn , or any other 
 Di%>ine, or Philofcp/jer, 0\:.Rcrfo7%nhle Crer.ture ^ to whom 
 alone it belongs , or who alone C2in.Rtfer or Apply a 
 Definition to an Idea ; i. e. who alone can make articu- 
 late Sounds or IFcrdsy Si^rTjs or ALirks. oildeas^ This-O^- 
 feurity and Defici therefore, neither i&, nor can be, in 
 that Cartefian Argument ', but yet fmce Mr. C. perceives 
 it , it mufl be fomewhere , whence he mav remove it 
 when he can. He goes on. 
 
 "^^ For it is not fatisfadory that I have in my Mind 
 '■'^ an Idea of the Propofition ; there Exiils a Being, 
 " endued with all poffible Perfedions^ or there is a.- 
 " Self-exifting Being: But I mufl have alfo an Idea 
 *^ of the 77jingy Page 59. You fee he makes a Diftin- 
 dion between the Idea of the Propojitiony and the 
 Idea of the Thing. It follows, " I muft have an Idea 
 " oi fomething exiiling without, me,* and I muft fee 
 " wherein confifts the abfolute ImpaflibiUty of remo- 
 " ving that Idea, and confequently of fuppofing thp 
 " Non-exiftence of the Thing -^ before I can be fatisfi- 
 '^ ed from that Idea^ that the Thing adually Exifts, lb. 
 And I acquaint Mr. C. that it is abfolutely Jmpoflible 
 for him to fee v>4iereia that aHolute Impcjjihil:ty 
 confids, but from that very JJcw, from: which, he 
 fays, he cannot h& fat^sficd that the Thif?g acimllj Exijh. 
 And if by the Term, Thlvg^ in this place, he means 
 Subjtance^ as he fhould do, I remind him, that accor- 
 ding to Ids Sceptical HjpGtbeJls , 'tis abfolutely impofli- 
 ble for him to have an Idea cf the Thing -y- and confe- 
 quently, 
 
againfl ATH E IS M. ^\ 
 
 quemly, that it is abfolutely Impoflible for him to 
 fee, wherein that abfolate ImfoJJibility conffis. It .fol- 
 lows : ' ' 
 
 " The bare having an Idea- of the Propolltionj there 
 " is a Self-Exifting Bein^^, proves indeed the Thwoj 
 ^^ not to be imf ofiible ^ ( for of an impoirible Propo- 
 " fition there is properly no Idea) but that it adual- 
 ^^ ly is, cannot be proved from the Idea,- unlefs the 
 ^^ certainty of the a<5bual Exiilen je of a Neceffary-ex- 
 '* iiling Being, follows from the poflibiiity of the Ex- 
 •^^ i Hence of fucii a Being, &c. The bare h.i'vwg an 
 Idea of tL.'t Prop'jitUm , does not inrlced pro-vc the 
 Thwg to be fcljibl,! y for it it did_, the bare hu-ving r,n hka 
 of this.P?<y/)rty/;/cv/ , Tliere is no Self-exiftent Eeingj 
 would prove the Thing to be iwpopble. But indeed^ thir 
 bare ha'vbjg the Idea of a PrcpofhioJi , proves nothing ac 
 all^forthe bare Idea of a Propofirion, is the Idea of the 
 articulate Sctwds whereof "tis conipolcdj as was infinua- 
 ted above. There is^ as properly, ^n, Idea of an int- 
 pojjible , as there is of a pojjtbk FrojuJitJQp. Ic fol- 
 lows. .:■ i )f;j-.,r 
 
 " Which that it does^ in this particular Cafe^ ma- 
 " ny Learned Men have iftdeed Thought ; and it is not 
 " eafily to difprove. No Learned Men indeed ever 
 Thought fo , or could Think , that the Certainty of the 
 Actual Exijfence of a NecejJafily-cxiJ}ing Being- does fol- 
 low from the Tojfibility of the Exijience of fuch a B<^ing. 
 
 Firfi, Becaufe the Suppoficion includes a flaring 
 Contradiction. 
 
 Secondly , Becaufc no Learned ALn indeed can Think 
 that tiie Adu^il Exljhnce of any Beings I would (ay, the 
 Gerti'.inty of the Acliud Exifievee does foltow_, froin the 
 Vclfibllity of the ExifieKce-oi iudi _-!^ Bti^ig. And tiic 
 Ccvh dries \,o both may be very eafily j- and ouglit to.b« 
 difprcved. It follows: 
 
 *' Becaufe it muft be confeued_,there is fomethin^; very 
 *^'" fingularinthcM'*/ of nccelTary Exiflencc." Here he- 
 
 chamrcs 
 
'^:ti Remarks upon Mf\ Clarke'i Sermons 
 
 changes thQ77jefiSj^ov before ^Viis Lcmed M^n thought,tha t 
 the Certainty of the Adual Exiftence oFa-Necellary- 
 Exifting Being^does follow from the Puflibility of the' 
 Exiftence of fuch a Being; and the Reafon hs gives 
 for their thinking fo, is this, viz,. That there is fome- 
 thing very fingular in the Idea of Necejjary ExljUnce. 
 That is, by the Idea of Neajjl^ry Exiftcnee they fee the 
 VoJJible Exijftence _, and from the ToJJibk Exifience , con- 
 clude the ABual Exifience, which they knew betc-e in 
 the Necejfary , ■ or in the Idea of Neajjary Exijhncey 
 which no Learned Men indeed have ever done. Mr. C. 
 goes on: 
 
 '^ It being evident. That if Nccejfary Exiftence be (as 
 *' it undeniably is) a Poffible Perfedion, it will con- 
 '■ fequently belong adually to a Being indued with 
 ^^ all poffible Perfedions; and // it acStually belongs 
 "'^ to fuch a Being, it will be abfolutely impoffible that 
 " fuch a Being fhould not Exift ; and from hence it 
 " feems to foUow , that it muft neceflarily be true, 
 " that fuch a Being actually Exifts." J^this Argument 
 was well underftood, the Tremijja would not be preca- 
 rious and conditional yt\\QVQ would be no Ifs made ufe of 
 in them, and the Conclufion would not be, it feem<, 
 it would be , it certainly follows , that fuch a 13eing 
 mult neceflarily Exifts, or adually Exifts. 'Tis added, 
 ^^ This, I fay^ r.s not indeed eafy to dtffrove. " This does 
 not neceflarily conclude akual Exiftence, and fo in- 
 deed , is eaftly to difprove. It follows. " But it is a 
 ^' clearer and more con-vincing way of Arguing , to de- 
 ''^ monftrate that there does adually Exift without us 
 " a Being, whofe Exiftence is neceflary , and of it 
 " felf j from the manifeft ContradiHion contained in the 
 '^■contrary Suppofttion ; (as I have before fliown) and 
 " from the ablolute Impoffibility of deftroying fome 
 *^ Ideas, as of Eternity and Immenftty, i. e. Extenlion, 
 "' which therefore muft needs be the Attributes of a 
 ^^ Necejjary Being aciuaUy Exifting. 
 
 It 
 
againft A T H E I S M; ly^ 
 
 It being a very great Miftake , and of Importance 
 too, in the preientCafe, to altcrt. That the Proof 
 drawn from the manifeftContradidion contained in 
 the contrary Suppofirion, is a clearer and more con- 
 vincing way of Arguing, to demonftrate, that there 
 docs flduallyExift without us^a Beingiwhofe Exigence 
 is cecelfary, and of it felf, than the Camfian Argu- 
 ment, drawn from the Idea of a Being infinitely Per- 
 fect, is^ I fhall help Mr. C. to mend it, by (hewing. 
 That this iris wa)", is To far from being a clearer and 
 more convincing Argument to prove that Truth, than 
 the Ci^nejim Argument is , That it is neither a clear , 
 nor a convincing, nor any Way or Argument at all to 
 prove it. 
 
 Pray take notice , that the only Reafon why we 
 certainly know, there actually is a necelTarily Exiljent 
 Being, is this, 'viz.. becaufe we percdve that neceHa- 
 ry Exiftence is adually included in the Idea of an 
 infinitely Perfe(5t Being,- or, which is the fame things 
 becaufe we perceive an Immntabh Connexion or Jgret- 
 mtnt between NeccJJcjry Exifimce and an Eternal, Infinite- 
 ly Perfdi Being. And' whereas we mufl certainly know 
 the Two Trofofitiojis or Suppo/itions themfelves , before 
 we can certainly know , that one of them is a Contra-^ 
 diBory Propofition or Suppofition to the Other: It necelTa- 
 rily follows. That in the prefent Cafe, we muft cer- 
 tainly know this Tropojition or Suppofition, as Mr. C. calls 
 it, 'viz^. That there aBually is a NeceJJarily-Exifit'nt Beings 
 before we can certainly know that this Prupofition or Si(p-- 
 pofitie-a , viz. There is not ABually Exifiing a Necejfarily- 
 Exijhnt hei77g , is , or is not, a manifefi ContradiBion 
 to it. 
 
 Now, when the former is certainly kno-wn, it is im- 
 poflible that the latter fho'j.M be, net only a clearer 
 and more cotrjlncing Proof o^ zhQ former, than the Car- 
 rtfian Argu7nint ^ but even, chat it fliould be any Argu- 
 ment or Proof -Jit all of that Trutl). For the conti-ary Pro- 
 p-fuion or Suppofition , cannot be certainly known to be a 
 ^-)Ji}if'jt Coiitradiciion, nor io much as alTerted, to be a 
 
 manifeil' 
 
2 4 Remarks upon Mr. Clarke'j Sermons 
 
 manifell Contradidion, 'tiUit hs- crn.,inlj knc7f^7/ trteic 
 ,rchf.<juy Exijts a Ncc^JJ'^r'ny-E^jfi(^rit Behg-^ and • when 
 tliis is c^rtawly hiowfJ, to makefile of the ajntniry Si<^ 
 poJltUm , CO prove rhc Exiftence of what wc do^ and 
 -nm{\. ca-fahily know, before we can know, that the 
 confi-iiry Supfofiiic/i is^. or is not, a m.-.iiifi'fi Cr^trcdicl'iov^ 
 is avLmly , 2nd TieiclJ-nily , yibjil^cly UJLLfs and A'jjtird^; 
 and [o far from being a r'/e-^/'tr and more 'co7:^ipchg 
 Way iii Arguing tO (hmo7:Jtr.,te that Trt!thy,t\r3.n the C?r- 
 H'fic'H Argutrnvij that it is neither a dtar, nor a ccn^in- 
 cing, nor any Argu7ntt.t or Vroof at all to make out 
 that Truth ^ as evejy one fees afifirfl: Ught. As for the 
 taft Words of the Period we are upon, to wit. Eternity 
 and Immenfity , ?. f. Extenfion , are thz Attributes of a 
 NeceJ]}<ry Being ; as for this , I fay, it being Spnoz^as 
 and Mr. L's Affertion , I fliall confider it in its proper 
 place. 
 
 Bat before I leave -this c/e<3r and. more convincing Tf^ij 
 of Arguing, 'itis fit you fliould know, that 'tis from 
 that way, Mr. C. concludes, Tku the only True Idea of 
 a Self-exifient or NeceJJarily-exifting Beings is the Idea of 
 a Beings the Suppf^fttion of 'whoje IN on- txi fence is cm exprejs 
 Contradiction , Page 30. Juft as if he Ihould lay, 
 The only True Idea of'a White. Hat y is the Idea of a Hat, 
 the Sirppofiticn of whofe Non-whitcnefs is an cxprefs Con- 
 ■ tradiSHon. Or mor€ properly, 'tis jufi: as if he faid, The 
 only true Idea of a Stlf-ccnfcious Subftance, is the Idea of a 
 Stibfiance, the Suppoftion of 7i^ho[e Non-cc7iJcioufnefs is an ex- 
 prefsContradiclion.Th:M IS, the Idea of -a Self- c&nfciousS libfiance , 
 is the Idea of a Selfcon/cious Subfiance, &C. To confute 
 tlie Argument made ufe of by D. Cudworth againft 
 Atheifs, Mr. C. makes ufe of Spi?ioz.as Reafoning, 
 Tage 72. After having afcribed Infinite Duruticn and 
 Extenfion to God ^ as Mr. L. and Spi7:oz,a do ; he makes 
 ufe of Mr. L's Words, if my Memory fails me not, to 
 fhew the Kmity of the Schoolmens Endeavours to re- 
 move Infinite Duration and Extenfion from God. Why are 
 
 thofe 
 
aoainfi ATHEISM. i^ 
 
 (ho/c Endeavours made to confute^ or invalidate thofc 
 Arguments,vvhich tiie Learned have imploypd to prove, 
 the P^xiftence of God?, Why are thofe Endeavourj 
 HKidc, to take away our land-marks of Diftindion, 
 between an Incogicacive extended , and a Cogitative 
 unextcnded Subilancc ? Why is this Sceptical Hypo- 
 thcljs purpolely improved to deprive us of the Means 
 of proving the Exiftence of (he One Only True 
 God, eftablifhcd in thefc; Spnnons? -This I leave with 
 Mr. C. and the Reader to confidcr, and proceed to the 
 next Point of this Third Particular, wherein I am to 
 fhew , That Mr. C. makes ufe of thofe Terms or Cant , 
 invented by Mr. L. and Spinoz^a-y in order to make 
 Tkinhvg ^nd Exten/ion J Attributes of their One Jln^k 
 ALitcrial Suhjhince. 
 
 That we may underftand this new Gibherijh , wt 
 muft know the Grounds of it, as it is in Spinoz,a, and 
 Tranflated into EngUfli by Mr. L. in his Writings, 
 whence, I believe, Mr. C. borrowed it. Mr. L's EfTay,' 
 in the Main , is but Sfnoz-.i tranflated into, im.proved 
 in the KugU^i Language , and let off more Subtilly 
 under another Dreis and Sett of articulate Sounds or 
 Terms. That you may fee this in one View, and 
 certainly perceive the Truth of what I have faid, do 
 ■and fliall fay, concerning this Matter; I'll fet before 
 .you the very Bdfn of Sfmzas Atheifm , ,^and indeed . . > 
 -iOf..the Atheifm, oi all others, in his ovyn "VVords a-nd-o' 
 in thofe Terms , wherein Mr<^j[,'^ Tranflated it' into " 
 ■Engl'ijh. Thus ^/jiwos:,.? has it : ,- a • • • 
 
 The Thinking^ and Extended Sub- QnKn*„.- 
 jraTtcc, is one and the jame-, whuh ts i;^antiaextenC-iuna,eadeinqueel: 
 /:f.nuivi'd y.noWy imdcr t/je Attrihutc^of .fiii5rt-intia,qUx jnin fub jioc jam 
 .J'/jinkinf , ,^:nd, ^,W. k^ y *tAde^ f^e ■^"^•-^^'i>Attrjbuto.c6%rehendi- 
 ^Attrib,tf<:ofKxfcvJl<^.^^-:jr,A{ ' X: - ''''' ^'^"'' ^•^''^'^'^^olTrop.i, 
 
 •; Here are M'r. L)^'^'\^X!Xy.'Tlie general :Idea ofStihJhnce 
 king the. Jiime e-vtn whe^e , t/je jVlodiJication of Thivkin(r 
 or the Vo-uer of Ihinking jojned to it, makts it a Spirit 
 withvi*P, ewfidnvinQ jit/hat vthvr,Mo4ificatiG?is4i. Uu,. mwln- 
 
 !iil;i 
 
 *-■•:? 
 
a. 
 
 <i 
 
 2 '6 ' Remarks upon' '^Ar. Omkc^s Sermons 
 
 th& ir has-We^ ^A^^di^t-aHhyi- of SolUU/'W iiO.- 'Jil m the 
 t!t%vT'":fidc Sakjldiic^y 'tMfanyHfkMfJ^'jk:ijiion of-'&oliJlty h 
 AMtn'y ^i'fyaMr'' it Bdi thr Modijitinfonof T^inMihg or no: 
 L. i-BiW. Page 66.- -•' "" ' -^^ 
 
 You fee thefe Two Authors fay one and the lams 
 thing J as to t\\h Jingk Ground arid Founcbtion o( .ail 
 Whe'^m: The Tttvh'SpMlpy With Mn 'L: .ftands for 
 the fiil$b'"fliiilg= the Wdrd E^fi^fio^ does AVitb Spinozi.ii 
 Mv.'L.'in- the fwne Lett:eT new- qiio^edj fpeaking of 
 rhe -Si-ibftancG wherein the Prdpei'ties of a Man do in- 
 here^ as he Phrafes it, has thefe- Words : "How that 
 ^^ Sttbfisnce wherein the Properties of Man do inhere. . . 
 '^ IS dijfcrenily 'Modified in'.thvi- dijffnnt Specres of Creu- 
 .turesy fo- as f o have dil^eirent Properties afld,Povvers 
 whereby they are dlfftnguijlr^d ^ that ahb we have 
 very ObfcurC ., or rather hO DilHnd Ideas of at all. 
 Tdge 48." You fee he Imagines^ with Spinoz.^, 'ti^ 
 one ^nd ihc prme Subfianct y differently Modifi^:d , thac is 
 in. Man y and in t]^eothQr Species of Cre^^tures ^ and that 
 they differ onlyy but in a bare different M'oMficatvm'-oC one 
 tltlA thQ fame Subffance. ' . • ■ •; ■:■■;.. 
 
 •: a Though S^i«<?2:^ alferts. That the Subftance which 
 he Blafphemoufly calls God, is Material, or Matter^ 
 yet he fays 'tis Immaterial, or In- 
 J^Omnes qui mtiiramdivi- coi'poreal in thefe Words': -^ M 
 
 funt, Deum effe corpoteum, iie- ^H^ '^ho ha've tn an)f degree confJered 
 
 gaiit. Qiiod etiam optnne'pro-' the Di'vine Nature , deny that God is 
 
 bant ex eo^ qvjpd per coepus in- Corporeal. ■ Which they fr^e <v*ry weUy 
 
 teiligimusquamcumquequanti- y^^^^^r^ ^ j^^^ -a; e under fi and any 
 
 titatem, longam, latam, & pro- /5>^-^77 ; r t 
 
 fundatn, certa aliqua figura ter- ^^''^tity , long , large , and profound, 
 
 minatam, quo- nihil abfurdiiis bound by a certain Figure, -which to 
 
 rie Deo, ehte fcilicet abfolute afcribe to God , viz. a Being abfo- 
 
 infinitodici potdt. Ethic. P. i. i^^^jy j^jinitey nothing can be more Ab- 
 
 SchahPr^p.n. fi,^j^ Henceitis, thatTomeofthe 
 
 few Followers of this 'Atheift, fci^uple not to fay ^ 
 
 That God is an Immaterial SubftancCy meaning, that he 
 
 is not the Grofs Quantity, that Divifible, Senfible^, 
 
 Figured Bulk or Compages, which we call, Body, 
 
 Sfinoz^ 
 
.^a^aiH/i ATHEISM. 27 
 
 S pine Za 2idd^_y Thflt,fViki,ir, as Ji'^dte.r, ^, 
 
 is divpfibh; <^dH^ P,afU','Jcp!irM ^r^, . j ^ Aquan?,,qiftaeniis aqua eft, 
 
 from another ' but thnt^as a arpm-ed ^ividi .oncf^jmus ejufqiie par- 
 
 -'„,,, . . . , /. .,.;, ' r res .'ib- intnce-Vi lepatr^ri ; nt non 
 
 huojttmcc.^_ yl; is mitha- di^'ipbknor Jc- quatenusSubiianria eil coiporeai 
 
 part: hie : That WatiYy of fVtUery is ge- eatenus enim neque fejxaratur, 
 
 'nerated and corrupted ; hut that as n "^que dividitur. Porro aqua, 
 
 urporcd StMance, it is nfither <renm- ' J"^^«""» •-^<5'ia ,' generatur & 
 r -' , ^ -_ ,^. corrumpmirr at qintenus Sub- 
 
 ted nor corrupted . . N^iy, thtr^ li m ,ftftr>t*i4/nec geiieriiiur, nee cor- 
 
 r^afkn why: the extended Suhft-atifCt ^euld) 'r^^nipitui-. .,',:.. v Nttlla rations 
 be.\t/3ougbt Utrworthy the Diving JN^-., \ dicXpoteft^,}^!^*^"^^"^ ^'^ten- 
 ture,' though it he fuppofed di'vifiblh. ^]in^ivina*natur5 indignam 
 prorjidcd, ps granted, po b^. Eternol^ar^d ,. natur, dummodo ceteriu, & in- 
 Injjnite^j-,ir Urj:. l :. , i? ^jfiirii i.c'r'h:!' m ,r finita Goncedatur. Wd. 
 
 :,Yon fee what fenfelefs Garjt tl^i - ,•.. ■ , -^^ 
 Maa i^ forced to make ufe of, /in grder t<>;glve fOiiie 
 CploLir of Confificncy to.bis Hypo.thefis,;.vvnQreby he 
 endeavours to prove , that God is Material, or MatteK 
 Hence it is, that Mr. L. borrowed h'n Jargon oi Bare^ 
 Pw-e, A'fcer Matta-f o{ M^itter, 2% Matter, d^c. -,, :i, ;, 
 ^,.;^ffer having; pre pared th« Means in the rgft of hft 
 ^l^y^he at lenght. compkatly eftablifhed his o\vn:,ajad 
 Spjncz- iS Hjp^thejisjm the Tent'-* Chapter of the Fourth Bo^ 
 oflthejaid Fjj^y. Ill the Ninth SetHoruoi chat Chapt©! 
 be, divides the Beipgs in all the World, that Mail 
 knttivs or conceixres , Into Two Sorts. Fjrft, Tnrely M&-. 
 terialj .as the Clippings of his Beard, which afterwafi^s 
 h^ 9i»U5, B<^r€y Pure , Meer Incogitatiirt Matfef-j, J^tfitr 
 a* Matter y &c. Secondly , Senftbk, Tfjinking, Fffcei^ 
 ving Beings y fuch as we find onr fe lyes to be.. In ^n^jthfiS 
 place he dees not exclude Materiality out of the Jdea for 
 which he makes the Term, Spirit, to jland, ivhen thereby ht 
 ■ii'vuld fignlfy the Thinki?ig Subfhince in iff j anj. he. Uave> 
 hnmateriality out of it. L. i. B. W. Page 6Bi -. That ift, 
 he takes ; the Thinking Subjhnce in us to be Matter or 
 '^ateri^l; and 'tis for this reafon, that he imagiaes 'tis 
 the fame Subftunce that is in Us, and iji the otiicr diffe- 
 rent Species of Crc.'.rures, differently Modtfiid, as yOU have 
 read before. 
 
 V. 2 Xow, 
 
2 8 Remarks upon hlr, Clarke^j Sermons 
 
 Now_, fince according to him, the T;&/«-^iT;^^ 5*^^^- 
 '^^/^^?^yj?,7!^f<? in us is yU-.'fcYw/^ that in God muft he Ahtett.'il 
 ~fQn ,^,!^. -'top J, /Becaufe'j by that N'pith SeBion , h^ h z Scn/ihiy, 
 :p^%,>,,„.^ Xhnikhg.JBeing J fnch as we cur fdves are. And fince it 
 ' ^-' : \s one and the fame Siibfijnce that is in Uf, and in the 
 ,?^y^^ r.. qxXiqv Crcf.lunri r It VYWX^ be (7^;e and the /-^.'Wf .S'rr^s'/r.Trf rr 
 -cJi'?: zuf't- ^^^^^ in, (^o/Zj (and in the Othet Creatures too^-d'Jflremh 
 -103 -.sit \M(Uji^(l^- ihatris, a-Al/?^frA')/ Suhfi^mce.- ■'ht^\<J3:- grants 
 snohr.T f" that- -the Eternal Cogitative Being niaybe y]/>//'mV'/, 
 ■li^n^ai tt-alls this KmV.;/ Thinkh}^ Matter by the Name, >^ Go^i 
 ^"',^,^ |.'';. teaches his Men of "Matter, that the A/wgr^ and D<- 
 'I •?, ,, r<?/V of this Hypoihep , confifts in forgeting that Etert^^d 
 Matter is CogjtatIi.'e, in eibbliihing the Exidence of an 
 Eternal Spirit, inftru<5ts ihcm li^^W to avoid this Error! 
 I/;/V;5.i^%;anirprecifely dctei'mnies that What he calls!, 
 A'Goel, fj fome'certaift, Syfiem of Fsternal 'Thinking Miitter, 
 duly pM together. Ibid. S. i6. By the Alliltance of Sfi- 
 vox^as-Jargon, he makes a f^tw, and but a bare flieou , 
 of arguing againft this Hypothejls. He fays. That All 
 Matter Cjinnot Thirpk, becaufe in the Terms, All Mat-^ 
 ter^ he includes Matter as Suhfiauce, and Matter, as the 
 Modification of that Suhfianu, to wit. Bare, Tur^, Mcer, 
 Incogitative Mutter, and confequently, all Matter in 
 that Senfe, cannot Think. He fays. That, All Mat- 
 ter^ as Matter, QSinnot'Think ^ becaufe by that RedupU- 
 cktion, -1^6 Retrains and Determines the general Terms, 
 AU Mutter y to ftand for All Matter, as a Modification ^ 
 OT as 'R Fure y Meer , Incogitatfve Matter , which Confc- 
 quelntly cannot Think. ' By this Gihberiflj he eftablifh- 
 edSpinoz,as Hjpothtfisy^tid lb impofed upon fome Rea- 
 ders, that they thought he eftabliflied in that Chapter, 
 what he realfy and defignedly Defiroys in it-, to wit ^ the 
 iExiftence of the One Only True G«d. ■ •• \\\ ^w^ ^*'v/,»vr;i..S'.;v;^; 
 :■ Now, Mr. C- borrowed thi^:. Jargon , asT believe, 
 ;DUt of this famous Tenth Ch^iptfr of the Fourth Book of 
 ' thQ-'EjJc'iy of HiiwantUnderfhndmg : ' At leaft, the Form 
 of his Proof, a good part of his Pvcafoning , and this 
 new Cant he makes ufe of, are in that Chapter. I 
 have not time to cite, much lefs to inrift upon ail the 
 
 places 
 
ag^infi ATHEISM, 29 
 
 places wherein. Mr. C. makes ufe of thcfe E^ul'vocating 
 
 Terms. He has all the Terms of mecr Mutter J?z^q. 70. 
 
 ilfar Ejfcci or Cowpfjuitn of Unintelligent, i. e. Incogica- 
 
 tivc, ' Fig/frc tinti Alotiuji , P;i^e lo^. Aieer UnmtcUigatt, 
 
 i.e. Incoglcative iVf.-f/fr , Page 12^. All Alitter , as- 
 
 Al.trcr , Page 187, cv. Now thcfe Epifhcts and A\'- 
 
 ^nfflicMtiom, would be Vuin, UftWfsy and ^IhJuyJ^ if this 
 
 Author did not imagine with Mr. L. and <Sf>inoz.:i, that 
 
 there is another /<>rf oi Mitter , which is not a iliif?-, 
 
 Hare.jFur.e^lncogitdtii'c M:ft(r. Thefc Terms necetTarilv 
 
 import this Senfe, which will appear more fully from 
 
 my Third Point, wherein 1 am to Ihevv, That 
 
 ■Mr. C. Mifreprefents Sf7iMz,ir and Hohh, I mean in his 
 
 Evglijh Tranflarion of thole Authors, &c. ,f 
 
 ' AVe have oblerved. That he Mifreprefents Splmz't 
 
 in the very firft Quotation he brings out of 
 
 him, P,:ge ^o. Sfino-:^-! lays, as you remember. That 
 
 one Stibjtimce cannot he vroJmed by another , That all Sub- 
 
 fidnte \is\ necejjiiYily Jnf>trt,ey That it belongs to the. N^itHte 
 
 oi( Stibjtiiitce to e^-ij^.\^';\an'd tb^t, bafides God, no Subfi.7m'c , '" ■■ ■- 
 
 either is , or can be cmccl'ued. Which Mr. C, renders --"-^"^ 
 
 thus : Spinoza taught there is no difference of Suhfiances ; .j/ ou'uli^ 
 
 bm that the U'-hole, and every Part of the Mater iaTTForlti- c'-'"'' 
 
 is a Necejfary-Exijiing Beingy and that there is no other' 
 
 God but the Uni'uerfe. You fee Spinoz,a is quite mifrc- 
 
 prefented. Mr. C. adds ^-;That Spinoza exprejly denies, 
 
 that God is a Subjfatfce diflin^ from the Material i^rorld. 
 
 Page ^;. Again, "We may ob- ' 
 
 ''ferve, fays Mr. C. the Vanity^, r.v^'Um ^thftavtiamn^pujl pxo- 
 
 ^^ Folly , and Ifeaknejs ot, Sptnoza, Prop, 6. • . : ■•.-:. ,r- 
 
 '^ who becaufe Self-Exiflent Nature . M Knurjin Sxihjl.vuis per- 
 
 *' muft nccelTarily be but One, thiet ExiftacVioi),-]. 
 
 "concludes from thence, that the i'yfierDeHmmihdMi,vc^ue 
 
 " whole World, and wverv Thing ■ ,..^ i r j < j, i 
 '■' contamed therein , is one Uni- 
 ^^form Subilance, Eternal, Uncreated and Neccffiwy, 
 
 Page 96. ' 
 
 The Terms, Sdf-Exifietit Nature ^ are new, and be- 
 long to Mr, C. as well as hii Tranllation here^ wind 
 
3 D ^Remarks upon Mt\ Clarke'^ Set i?wns 
 
 is quite different from Sfmox^ds Ssnfe.and Words,: as 
 you fe^i Once more: ' ^' : ' ' ■ • . '^"' -rn^ i 
 -' Mr. C. mifreprefenrs S'fincz^t ^ and reduces his Opi- 
 nion, upon this Head, tC> this, 'viz,. That the Material 
 World J and every 'Pint of it, vnib the Order and Manner of 
 Being of eath Tart, is- the only Self-Exifient , or Necejfirilj- 
 EyiJ^jjig Being, Page 5" f. This, he fays, he has conhii" 
 ted, and concludes, that he has demonfirated Spinoza' j- 
 'Opinim to he falfp. Page 5- 7. ' ■ " -i " t, 
 
 Now Spinoz^a never taught this Do(5trine he imputes 
 to him here, and elfevvhere, nay he taught the quite 
 contrary • as you have partly feen already, and fhall 
 more folly perceive, if you pleafe to read what fol- 
 lows. .*i'0 V''^f^^- -^^ -^ior.i 10 ndr^riifiEiTi^^u^^^^^ 
 ■:. ■. '. :':r-^l^--ari^!/7^^y^^;:^y^^^^yfavs Spinoza/ 9i;Z;o 
 Sunt, qi^Deiim.in%:ho*i- .;^ -^.Go^ Ukea'Man, confining of 
 nis corpore, Sc Mexitp confian- _ ^ 1 ^\- 1 1 r 1 ■ a. -r^ J 
 ^em, atqne jruTioribus obnoxi- ^ody and Mmd , and JubjeU to^ VaJJi- 
 um fingunt ; fed quam louge ons • but hoTi/ "Widely th:y Err in this, 
 hi a vera Dei cogitatione aber-. faffciently appears front what has. been 
 rent, fatis ex jam demonllratis ■ dc^on(trnted. But thcfe 1 dijmifs." For 
 conltat. bed uos mitto: nam ,1 1 r 1 ; • j r 
 omnes, our naturam divinam ^llthoje,whohi'vyn any d^gr-- covJJ- 
 
 aliquo modo ' conremplati fiirit, q<:red the Divine Nature, deny tj n 'ror 
 Deum effe coriX)reum , ne-' ^ Corporeal, &C. Yoii fee thit far 
 gant,&c. Ethic. Pr.rt, u-SchpL f^^^j^ jfferting , he plainly anc pre- 
 '°^' ^' ■ ' cifely denies. That Gcd is Corporeal. 
 
 Attairien quod quidam pn- '^ray hear him again: Js for thofi 
 tant , Tra<5atUTn Theologico- >who think my Tbeclogico Political Trea- 
 PoJiticum eo niti, quod Deus, nfeis-l^.ih upon this Suppofition , that 
 8c Natnra (.per quana malTam J. j 1 -..r - /i i- 1 1 1 
 
 quardam, five materiam ci>T\^o- ^^"^ """^ Nnure^ (by which they under- 
 ream intelligunt)unum,&: idem fi^^^ ^ a' certain Mafs , or corporeal 
 fiat, tota errant via. £piji. zi. Matter) are one and the fame Thing; 
 
 . ^ • •■ .'-* thtf are tjuite mijiaken. 
 
 '',a'\''."'- , .''S^/v'^osi^ is equally mifreprefented in the other Part 
 of the Charge, to wit, That he miik^' e'Viry Part of the 
 Matcridl H'crld, -with the Ordtr and manner of Being of each 
 Part to be Sdf-Exiftent , as you may fee by the follow- 
 ing Words: 
 
 ■ >i\ noiiftli no' f «;ff i, <;£ i ; uv; ? ■ Whenever 
 
d^alnji ATHEISM. f^ 
 
 -'IVfycnti'ir -a^c cOJtfiaer th: Effejiw of Qtntiefcttnque nd earnm.i.e. 
 T'hirt^Sy -we jtnd :t ittfs not inclHde, ei- Reruiii, efTcntiim attendimus , 
 t^h'r'Dur.iUffK- or Exif^jncc i and tb'irz- '^'^n^^^n Jiec exiftentiam ntc du- 
 
 r ^ji • fir ^ L 4-' f ../I rationem involvere coiiii>eri- 
 
 /.rfi^jcn- hjj.nce cannot he tot Lane, ^^^. ,^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^ 
 
 tiimr]^- tirnr DitKJtim or hxijt.nct', but neque fiue exiaenti.E, neqiie fas 
 
 Qoii^iijily , to ■jrhoft'WjtHrc alone it he- duradonis potelt ede cauf.i; fed 
 
 llmst-o F.xifh A^aiil, * If yi^c pro- cantum Deus, ad cujus fulam 
 
 t_.^^, T r '■ ' • • // ; .Natur.ua ijeitinetexiileie.fi'//-i<V. 
 
 cibd^ Infm ty, W m.^y mfily <:oncHV p„.^^ ^^ ^^^^^^ ^,,,^^^ 
 
 thXH^iill Hiture is- but one InfhvidUr.l^ *£t fiporro in infinitum per- 
 ii^hfe Parts J that is j nil Bodies do gamus, facile concipimus, totam 
 G^kv^e infinite JFays , v^'ithoitt tiny "^uuram unuiii elVelndiviJuum, 
 
 ,^j r\y fjri 1 "t J- : ] I ■ eujus partes, hoc elL omnia cor— 
 
 tvart^e or tae frbolc Indi'Vidifal. J, •,«,•■ j- 
 
 •^ J pora innnuis. modis variant,. 
 
 .iT^fque iiUa totius Individui Mutatlone. Ethic. Part, z, Schol. Prof. 7, 
 
 From the whole, it is as pl:4in as Print c^h m^kiity. 
 That Sfinoz.:i exprefly teaches -the quite contrary Do- 
 ctrine to that, with which he is charged by. Mr. C. 
 and which this Author confutes. as his Atheifm. We. 
 muft not forget, 'tis by the AlTiftanc#of Sfinoz^as and 
 Mr. L's equivocating Cant, that Mr. C. mifreprelents, 
 and makes a fhow of Arguing againft thofe Authors 
 which he profeiTes to confute, even when he proves 
 nothing but what they aflfert. Of this we have feen 
 Examples already , and therefore 1 fhall now quote. 
 but Two Paffages to this purpofe^ which are the fol- 
 lowing: 
 
 " If Bare Matter bc the Neceflkrily-Exifting Being, 
 " fays Mr. C. then in that Necoflafy-Exiltence there 
 '^ is either included the Power of Gravitation , or 
 *' not, &c. Vnge 48. " YoQ fee 'tis Bare Matter, yfjhxdl 
 he excludes from being the NeceiTarily-Exi fling Be- 
 ing. And you know this Bare Matter is the very Thing 
 which Spinoza, and Mr. L. after him, do exprefly de- 
 prive of Scfjje 5 Perception , and JhottZ,i>t, and exclude 
 from being the Neajfarilf-Exifiing Being. Again ^ he 
 f'ays^ That Hobbs ;j /i/ra j "" to recur .-^ .:':: 
 to that prodiiionjly ahfitrd Suppof/ticn, * $cio .fiaffe PhiMophos ouof- 
 nat all Matter, as Matter , is endued d^amMdemqiie viros dodos qu; 
 net only -ii'itb Figure and Capacity cp eiTe fumnmrunt : nee video,&c. 
 Motion J but aljo with an aHual Stnft Hcbbs Phfic. Cto.2,5. Sc.^.\, 
 
 or 
 
5 z Remarks upon Mr. Chrkc'^s Sermons 
 
 or. Tercepticn^ i. e. Thought, Page i ij. You fee Hoifh 
 has not the Re^lupUcin'mi' oi All Mnter , us^ Mytm^ 
 That Jleiltipiicjticji riflrri'is or (ktermlncs the genejf^l- 
 Terms^ AU Matter, to (land only for Bare, Pm-e, .AiUevy 
 Incogitm've Matter , L e. for Matter as a Modific<it^Q)nj,> 
 which is an impofing piece of Cojitrivance, vv'|:ii<;^-, 
 was not yet invented in Hobbs\ time, and vvherei0f»sj\ 
 believe^ he never thought. Novv this is cxadly w^^^i 
 Spwoza and Mr. L. C^y. They aflert, Tliat ^\\ Al^t^^ 
 ter, ^s Matter y i.e. Bare, Pure, Mecr Alutttr j AlatPsKi 
 af a Modification does not Percleve or Think, and is nOt, 
 their NecejJ'arily-'Exifient Being. 'Tis by this E<jnii;och-:, 
 tittg, Senfelefs Cant , that Mr. L. made "^ jl)ow of Confu^_ 
 ting, and in reality Efiablifhed Spinoza'j Hypothefis. 
 
 As for Spinox,as rnaln Pttrpoje , thus Mr. C. mifrcpre- 
 fents it. ^* If Spinoz^as Definition of Sttbfiame be true, 
 ^^ then neither Matter , nor Spirit , nor any Firnte Be^ 
 " ing whatfoever, is in that Senfe prc^rly a Sub^ 
 "fiance, but (th« 5 uv) the Self-Ei:iftetit Being alone, 
 " and ib it will prove Nothing to tiis main Purpcje , 
 " which was to make us believe that there is no luch 
 ^' Thing as Power or Liberty in the Univerfe, &c. P. 99. 
 Mr. C. could not know what Spino:iSs main PurpQJr. 
 was , but by what he wrote. It is evident from hif 
 Writings, That. his main Purpofe vyas to eftablifh his 
 Hypothcfis of Ojie fir/gle extended Subfiance, the very Bafif 
 of his," and of all Atheifm. It feems Mr.,C. knev*^: this, 
 when he faid in this v^rf Period, That if SpinozaV 
 Definition of Subfi^nce is falfe, then his vhole DotJrine biiih 
 upon it, falls at once to the Ground. Therefore his Hy- 
 potheHs of One Subftance is the Foundation of his 
 O^'hole DcHrine built upon it. Therefore his main Purpojii 
 was to eftabliili that Foundation. Befides, Power ■^ndi'Li^ 
 herty, or no Pov'cr or Lihaty, being Confequents up- 
 on, and Attributes agreeing or difagreeing to the Na- 
 ture of the Subllance which ..S/'iwoss* intended to ella- 
 bliflr; it is evident, That his uniting them to , or his 
 fej-arating them from the faid Subftance, neither was, 
 norcouldingbe his main Purpofe. .Here, as well as iu 
 other places of thofo beriA^ns, tl>e Accelfqr)- Is made 
 
 the 
 
^^^/V;/? ATHEISM. 33 
 
 -the Effentlil, and the mifrpprefented Acccllory argued 
 agaiaft, whilft the Effentiai Hypothefis is left in its full 
 -force, to fpeak it fcftly. 
 
 Indeed what Mr. C. aifcrts here, is very furprizing, to 
 wit, TLrt if accerdhtg to Spinoza'j Ofjr.ion, neither Matter, 
 nor Spirit, nor any Finite Being, was properly a Subftance ', that 
 if there was no other Sahfiance but his (o «V) his Sdf-Exiftent 
 'Being alone ', yet this, even this , wculd prove Nothing to^ his 
 main Pttrpofe. This, I fay, is furprizing beyond. Expreflion. 
 For it is intuitively Evident and Certain , Tliat his Self- 
 Exificnt Being alone admitted, the Exiftence of the One Only 
 True God is utterly Deftroy'd, Atheifm Eftablifhed, and all 
 the Religion and Revelation which- we either pradice or be- 
 lieve, ftntenced to be nothing elfe but a fuperflitious Frcnz,y,'^nd 
 the Heats of difordered Imagiftraions. For Spinoz,a's Self-Exi- 
 fient Being is an Eternal, Infinitely Extended, i. e. Material Sub- 
 fiance , as every one knows. Now this alone admitted, 
 not only Spinoza's, but even the main Turpcfe of all the A- 
 theifis that are, or ever fhall be in the World, is compleatly 
 cftablifhcd , as every one fees at firft fight. But to return 
 from this amazing AlTertion to what we were upon, Spi- 
 ytoz^a is mifreprefented even in reference to this Accelfory ; 
 for 'tis faid. That by the Isecefiity oftheDivine Nature, he weans 
 an Ahfclute and firiBly Natural Neccjfity , Page 128. And 
 makes his God to be a Caufe or Agent in no other Senfe , than at 
 if a Man Jhould fay, that a Stone by the necefiity of its Nature is 
 the Caufe of its own filling a?fd firiki?2g the Ground, Page 129, 
 So that lie does not AH, but is AHed upon. Page 128. 
 
 Now Spinoza is fo far from reducing what he calls, God, 
 to this Abfolute and firiHly Natural Necefiity defcribed by 
 Mr. C. that on the contrary he fays, 
 
 * That God Acls by the Laws of his * Deus ex fol is fus naturae k- 
 own Nature , and without being forced Ethic. Part. r. Trot, in 
 by any, and infers. Secondly, That Sequitur'll! folum lieum em- 
 Go J /ilone is a free Caufe. 'Tis a thing caufani liberam. Corol. z. Prop. 
 abfolutely impoffible according to ^^"^ '^"^* 
 Spinoz..as Hypothefis , that what he Blafphemoufly calls 
 God, fhould be Acted upon. For if there be in the' World 
 but one fingle extended Subftance, as he erroneoufly pre- 
 tends, and that all things are but different Modifications 
 
 E of 
 
J 4' Remarks upon Mr, Clarke' j Sermons 
 
 of that fingle Subftance, as he fays; it is impofTible it 
 
 ftiould be Adltd upon by any other Agent, CmcQ according 
 
 to th?t Hypothefis^ there neither is^ nor can be anv other 
 
 * Nulla rations dici poteft, ^geKt. Nay^ Spinoz.-z himfelf allerts 
 
 Deum ab alio pari, £//j/f.i^irM. more than once, '*^ TTjat God ccm by 
 
 Schol. Prop.i^. ^Q means he A^ed upon. 
 
 Indeed^ I think, 'tis Air. C. that is guilty of what he 
 groundlefsly imputes to Sp>in{)z.a in the Paffages quoted 
 above. Here are his Words : " Thre is a Fitmfs or Smtabk- 
 " nefs of certain Circuniuances to certain Peribns^ and an 
 " unfuitabienefs to others , founded in the Nature of 
 " Things, and the Qualifications of Perfons, Antecedent to 
 ^'^ Willy and to All Arbitrary or Vcjiti've Appointment whatfb- 
 " ever, 234. Again, " There is therefore fuch a thing 
 ^^' as Fitnefs and U?2ftnefs , Eternalfy, NeceJJarilj , and Un- 
 ^'^ changtably in the Nature and Reafon 0^ Tidings, Page 2:55-/' 
 He adds , That this Fitmfs er Unfitnefs , Eternally, NectjJ'arily , 
 and Unchangeably in the Nature of Things, Antecedently to Will, 
 and to all Fojiti-ve or Arbitrary Appointment jvhatfoever ', ^^ does 
 ^' always and Neceffarily Determine the Will of God, 
 " Tage 256. " I think Spinoz^a does not, nor cannot, ac- 
 cording to his Hypothefis, reduce what he calls Self-Exi- 
 fient Being , to a more abfolute and jlriHly Natural Neceffity , 
 than Mr. C. does, what he calls Self-Exijient Being, by thofe 
 groundlefs and pofitive Aflertions, and which plainly im- 
 port the Eternal NecelTary Co-exiftence of all things, &c. 
 Mr. L. indeed fays the fame thing that Mr. C. fays, and 
 that in the following W^oi-ds : Thus the Idea of a right-lined 
 Triangle necejfarily carries with it an Ec^uality of its Jungles to 
 fwo right ones. Nor can we cencei've this Relation, this Connexi- 
 on of thefe two Ideas to be fojfibly Mutable, or to depend upon any 
 Arbitrary Power which of Choice made it thus , or could maki' it 
 otherwife. ElTay, B. 4. C. ;. S. 29. This amounts to what 
 Mr. C. fays -, but Spinoz^a argi jng againft the -Liberty ordi- 
 ..V narily afcribed to God, fpeaks mora 
 
 Sed hoc idem eii, ac fi dice- within compafs in thefe Terms: But 
 rent, quod Deus potetl efficere, ^^-^ -^ ^^ ^^^ j^ ^^ -r^^ j-^-j ^y^^ (..^,^. 
 lit ex natura trianeuh Hon le- r • n 11 r v r 
 
 qtiatur, eju? ties .- ngulos jequa- ^^'^ cauje it Jbeuld not fodow from tm 
 \t5 effe duubus redis, &c. Ethk, Nature of a Triangle,that its three Angles 
 Vaift, I. SiloL Fro p. 17. flwuld be equal to two rip-ht ones, &c. 
 
againfl ATHEISM. 35 
 
 I fliall hereafter confider the Nature and Circumftances 
 of thofe Mifreprefir^tations , and before I quit this Third 
 Point, lliew y^u, what Mr. C. (ays concerning In,r^>iter,al 
 Subjhnce in the manner following. 
 
 " From hence we may oblcrve 
 " the vTnity, Folly, and Veaknefs TJ. Error of Spmoza. 
 " of Svinoz.a : who becaufe Stlf-Exi- 
 '^fient Nature muft neceffarily be but one, concludes from 
 « thence, that the mde World, and cverv thing coritained 
 "therein, is One Uniform Subftance, Eternal, Uncrea- 
 <^ted andNeceffary: Whereas, jufl ^1^ ^^,^^J^!'''^7^ ,^^ 
 « oueht to have concluded, that becaufe a I Things m. the 
 « World are diftinguiflied one from the other by a Uiver- 
 « fity, not only of Modes, but alfo of Eilential Attributes 
 « and confequently (if we have any knowledge at all ot 
 " them) of their Subftances themfelves alio, &c, Vagep, 
 
 We have already obferved. That Spmoz^a is mirreprelen- 
 ted in the beginning of this Quotation ^ and I think the 
 Words, Self Jxlfient Nature 2i-.t new Terms in the £«^/# 
 Language, and have fome Affinity with Spnox^as Nature 
 
 Naturing, and Nature Natured. ^ p^rJnr? 
 
 YouTee that by the Terms, Things in this ^ Per od 
 Mr. C. underllands Subfimces ^ and though he la>s, that 
 they are diftinguiihed , not only by a ^^f-f ^;f^f;f;^ 
 but even of Ejjential Attributes , yet I muft ^^^J^ ^f Tf '^ 
 remind him, that he neither does nor can know any thing 
 atlall of the matter,according to the Scemcal ^^^3^^^^ 
 blifiied in his Sermons. For as it would be ^^f^^y "?" 
 poffible for a Man that neither has nor can have, the 
 Ideas of a right-lined Triangle and of a Paralellogram, 
 either to percdve or prove, either mediately or immedi- 
 ately that to have its three Angles equal to two ri^ht 
 ones is an EjJ.ntud Property or Attribute of a nght-lined Tri- 
 anelC and not of a Paralellogram : So, hkewife, it is ab- 
 foluteiy impoillble for Mr. C. who neither has, nor can 
 have the Idea of this, or that, or of any real Subftance 
 whatever, either to know, perceive, or proves either me- 
 . diately or immediately, that this or ^^at or t other P..- 
 perty or Attribute, is an Efntial Property or Attribute ot th s 
 or that, or t'ther real Subftance whiii^wQi' , even upon the 
 ' F 2 SuppohtioH 
 
^ 5 Remarks upon Mr. Clarke^jf Sermons 
 
 Suppofition of the Plurality of Subftances, wBichthis 
 equivocating Cant of Bare, Aleer^^C. M^.tter, difproves. This 
 Mr. C, knew, as it appears by his adding the Parenthefis,. 
 (if we ha've any knoii-^ledge at all of them) upon which de- 
 • pends Mr. C's Knowledge and Certainty of what he fays 
 before and after it. Now that Parenthefis being conditi- 
 onal, Mr. C's Knowledge or Certainty of its Truth, de- 
 pends upon his Knowledge or Certainty of the Truth of 
 the conditional Particle If, with which it begins. And 
 that we may plainly perceive Mr. C's meaning in this" 
 place, let us form an Argument, and compofe its two hrft 
 Proportions of his own Words, in the following manner. 
 
 If we ha'oe any knowledge at all of Suhfiances, they are difiin- 
 gu'i^Kd by a Di'vsrfty , not ovly.of Modes, hut alfo ofEjJential 
 Attributes, Page 97. 
 
 But we ale Utterly Ignorant of the Suhfiance or Ejfence, even of~ 
 thofe Things we con'vsrj'e mofi faniliarly with, and think we un- 
 derfiand bcfi. Page 76 and 77. 
 
 Therefore we are Utterly Jgmrmt whether they are didin- 
 guifhed by a Diverfity of Ejjh^tial Attributes; and confe- 
 quently, whether there are m.ore Subftances than One in . 
 the Whole World. 
 
 This is Mr. C's Cafe, according to his own Hypothefis,, 
 as has been already proved , in his own W^ay. The Rea- 
 foning \-\QTt,isSsofhifiical. Inftead of proving,that Subfl-ances 
 are Ejfcntially different , or that there are more than One^ 
 it alferts, that we know nothing at all of the matter. It 
 is imployed more than once in thofe Sermons, as namely, 
 Tage 16^, wherin Mr. C. proves there are Immaterial Sub- 
 ftances, by fuch an Ai-gument, as that we have now feen. 
 But fince he alferts eliewhere ; That Thinking and IVilUng 
 are nccfjarily Bowers or Faculties of Immaterial Subfiances, Pag, 
 189. and that the Limits I am confined to, vyill not per- 
 mit me to infift particularly upon what he fays concerning 
 thofe Subftances ; I fiiall only remind you, that Spinoz^a- 
 and Mr. /.. fay. That the Subftance which they call, God, 
 is an Immaterial Subftance, and that it is a Material Subftance. 
 Imm:terial,*^s not being their Bare Incogitative Matter, 
 the it Mntter, as a Modification. .Material, as being their 
 Matter-, . as ^Suhftmce. This is the Senfe wherein they take 
 rv,.i;'V:./'jj,:^ the 
 
againfl ATHEISM. 37 
 
 tWt Term, hnn^r^tntal y and wivjrein every one that makes 
 ufe of the Equivocating Cane of Bare Inccgtmtive Mutter, &,c, 
 muft take it. One would be i^pt to think, that this is the 
 Senfe wiicrcin Mr. C. takes the word Immaterial y even by 
 what he fays ill the fame Paragraph , Page 118, Having 
 fufficientlyinullcd upon the Mifreprefentations I purpo- 
 fed to fi-eak t<j in this Third Point, and prockxed fome 
 Inftances of Mr. C'3 Arguments againft the Hypothefis of 
 One Subftance ; I now proceed to my Founh and Laft 
 Particular , wherein J am to fiiew. That Mr. C. reftrains 
 and determines what he culls S:lf-Exiftent Being, as Mr.L. 
 and Sph:cza do, what they call by that Name, whereby 
 we fhall come better acquainted with what he call.v/ww4- 
 tiri,:l Suh(L.i2sss. In order to fct what fliall be faid in a due 
 Light, let us take tlie following Method. 
 
 Mr. L. implo)'S the firft Twehe SetTtons of jht Tenth Chaf- 
 ter ofthi Femth Booh of his Effay, to piove. That there is an 
 Eternaly all Po-wnftdy Perceivmgy Cogitati've Behg. 
 
 Air. C. in his Twelve Proportions afferts. That there is 
 an Eterncily Infinite y Intdligtnty Powerful, &c. Being, 
 
 Spinoza fays, There is an Infinitely PerfeB Being. 
 
 And the IVcrthy and ExcJIent Prelate, Edward, late Lord 
 Bifhop of TVorcefier, in his Writings againft Mr. L. aflerts. 
 That there is an Eternal Infinitely Perfi^l Being. 
 
 Now the General, Vague, Lofe, Undetermined Term, 
 Being, in all thofe Propolitions fignifies no more but fome- 
 thing, and that fomething ftands for the Suhfiance to which 
 the Attributes named in thofe Propofitions are afcribed. And 
 Jince the Impitdtnt Felly of Athafm has brought an Eternal 
 Chimerical Something or Suhftance , in Competition with the 
 Real, Eternal Something or Subftance', the Quefton is to know 
 precifely, which of thefe two Infinitely different Somethings 
 or Subftances is meant by each of thoie Authors, when he 
 exprell^s ht:iifelf in thofe, now Equivocal Terms : There is 
 
 an Eternal, CCC Being. 
 
 Spinoza determines and reftrains. his Vague Sumahing, by 
 afcribing Infinite Extenfon , Space, Place , &C. to it. In a 
 word, by faying, * That Exienfion is ^ ,- r * -i. t^ 
 
 an Attribute of God, or that God is an efl, r,^ peus eft res exteul,^ 
 extended Thing or Something; and COn- Ethic. Part. z. Prop. 
 
 fequeritlv 
 
3 8 Remarks upon Mr, Clarke'j Sermons 
 
 fequently he declares that the Subftance he calls by the 
 Name, God, is A^aterial or Matter. Mr. L. reftrains and de- 
 termines his loofe Sctncthingyhy afcribing Infinite Duration^ 
 Space, Place, Expanjioa, i. e. Extcnfion, to it, as Spinoz<i has 
 done. " He imagines 'tis by repeating our Ideas of Dl~ 
 "fiance or Space, that vve get the Idea o( Iwwenfitj." ElTay, 
 B. 2. C. 15. S. 4. And then. " leaves it to every one to 
 ^' confider, vrhether he will think the Words of the moft 
 ^ knowing King Solomon , The Heaven, and the Hea'uen of 
 " Hea'vens camict ccniain Thee; or thofe more emphatical ones 
 " of the infpiied Philofopher St. Taul , In him -we li've y 
 " move, and have our Being, are to be underftood in a lite- 
 " ral Senfe, Ihid.^. 26." This he learnt from his Mafter 
 M. r^ . . . r^ ^ Spinoza, who fays more than once : 
 
 firaio. Epijt. 21. ^^"^ ^» God, and move m God. By the 
 
 Term, God, you know, he under- 
 flands. Matter, as Suhfiance ; which is th.Q God, wherein 
 he imagines we Live and Move. This too, is what Mr. L, 
 means by his Literal Senfe, in the foregoing Paffage. 
 
 Mr. L. derives the word Duration from Darare , and This 
 from Durum ejfie. EfTay, B. 2. C. i f. S. 4. He (ays, " 'Tis 
 " the very Nature both of Duration and Expanfion to confift 
 " of Parts, Ibid, S. 9. but that the Ideas of Length he has of 
 " Expanfion, are turned everj Way, and fo make Figure, and 
 " Breadth and Tbicknefs, Ibid. S. 1 1 ". Hereby you fee, that 
 by the Term, Expanfion, he means exadly the fame thing 
 that others do, by the Word, Extenfton, to wit. Matter. He 
 continues; " Expanfion and Duration do mutually imbrace, 
 ^^ and comprehend each other ^ .every Part oi Space, (i. e. 
 ^^ Expanfion) being in every Part of Duration; and every 
 " Part oi Duration in every Part of Expanfion, Ibid. S. 12. 
 " Duration and Expanfion in their full Extent, (i.'e. Infinite) 
 " belong only to the Deity, Ibid. S. 18." Thus Mr. £. after 
 Spinoz^a, reftrains and determines his Eternal' Something, and 
 confequently alferts it to be Material or Matter , in the 
 Chapter and Sedions I dired:ed to before. 
 
 The Lerrned and Excellent Prelate before-mentioned, with 
 all Ghriftians and truly Reafonable Men, reftrains and de- 
 •rermines his Eternal Being , or Something , to ftand : For a , 
 
agahft ATHEISM; 39 
 
 wc/? Sfiritud and Infinite Suhjh. nee. Jjs r I., to the B. of /^ 
 Tagc 86. M-fi Sfiritual, fays thij really Great Mar ! where- 
 by wc fee that he thought Words could not Hifficicntly 
 exprefs the Infinite Diltance between his Idea of the bub^ 
 ftance he calls God, and any fort of MiJttir vvhatevei. 
 Mr. C. fpeaks upon this Subje<5t as Mr. Z,. does, favint; 
 that the former puts tlie Coach before the Horibs in tha 
 immediately following Period: " Infinite Space is Nothing 
 " Elfe but an abftra(5t Idea oi Immenfity or Infinity ;■ even as 
 *^ Infinite Dio-rtlon is of Eternity. Indeed Eternity and 7>/j- 
 " menfiry, i. e. Extenfion, feeni both to be but Attributes of 
 ^' an Elience Incomprehenfible to us , /, e. of th: Divine 
 " Efftnccy P.jge 9-'," He afcribss Eternal Duration to his 
 Self-Exiftent~ Being in the following Words : " How an 
 " Eternal Duration can be new aBually Tafi , is a Thing 
 " utterly Impofiible for our narrow Underftanding to com- 
 " prehend^ and yet to deny the Truth of the Propofition, 
 " would be to aflert fcmethlng fiiU far more untntelllgihk. Page 
 " 19." You know it is utterly Impojfible to alTert foivethlng 
 filll far more Unintelligible , than a Thing utterly Impojfihk for 
 our Underftanding to comprehend i but Nothing can be 
 more Unintelligible than to afTert, That an Eternal Duration 
 is now aHually Tafi. 'Tis a Contradidion. 'Tis faid ^ 
 ^^ That the Cartefians cannot remove out of their Minds the 
 '^ Idea Qilmmenfity ^ i. e. Extenfion, as Exljilng NeceJJ'arlly ^ 
 '^ and Infeparably from Eternity , Page 5:;." Again, "The 
 *^ Infinity of the Self-Exlfilng Being , muft be an Infinity of 
 " Fulnefs as well as oilmmenfity , \. e. Extenfionj Page ^^^ 
 Thus Mr. C. after Mr. L. reftrains and determines his Eter- 
 nil Being Or Something , by afcribing Infinite Duration ^ Space^ 
 Ph'.ce, Fulnefs, Immevfny, i. e. Extenfion, &c. to it. 
 • Now the Men argued againft in thofe Sermons^ finding 
 therein that Scepti al Hypothefis made ufe of, which has 
 been of late fo induilrioufly Improved^ in order to cut off 
 all poflible Means of proving zh^- Difference oi Real Sub- 
 fl.mcesj of perceiving or proving th?^ Exigence of the One 
 Only True God , or that he is different from their own 
 pretended One Only Eternal Infinitely Extended^ /. e. Ma- 
 terial "l lib ftance \ they will be apt to conclude, thar This is 
 the Reafon why that Hypcthefis is eftablifhed in thefc Ser- 
 mons. 
 
40 lR.emarks upon Mr. ClarkeV Sermons 
 
 nions. Finding therein^ that Spinoza is made to alfeit, Tlat 
 the Material iPhrldj and every/Part nf it^ 'with the O^der and 
 Marmn of Being of each Tarty is the Only Self-Exifient Being j 
 and that this is reprefented and confuted as his Hypothefis 
 which he plainly denies to belong to him^ nay, to which 
 he precifely teaches a Do<5lrine quite contrary in every 
 Part of it, and that by this Means , his Real Hypothefis and 
 Atheifm is over-look'd ; they will be -apt to conclude. That 
 this is an Artifice purpofely contrived to make a fhew of 
 Arguing againft him , and fo elude Confuting his Real 
 Hypothefis, which is one Way to eftablifti it. Finding 
 therein, that even when his Real Hypothefis, i. e. his De- 
 finition and Dodrine of Subftance, is Hated j 'tis faid on- 
 ly. That if it be true, it will ferve nothing to his main Pur^ofej 
 (which yet, if true., will compleatly ferve his, and tne 
 main Purpofe of all Atheifis that are , or ever fliall be) and 
 then,that here again, a mifreprefented Acceflbry is argued 
 againft, and his main Hypothefis left in its full force^ they 
 will be apt to conclude as before. Finding therein , the 
 conftant Ufe, or rather Abufe , that is made of the Equi- 
 vocating Jargon, of Bare, Pure, Mecr Incogitative Matter, &C. 
 whereby Hol?h and Sfmoza -are mifreprefented j they will 
 take hold of it more ways than one. They will fay. That 
 in a continued Series of Difcourfe, one would no more 
 make ufe of the Words, Bare, Pure, Mecr Incogitative Mat- 
 ter, &c. if he did not imagine with Mr. L. and Spinoz,a, 
 that there is another fort.^f Matter, which is not a Bare , 
 Pure, Meer^ Incogitati-ve 'Matter-, than he would of the 
 Terms, Bare, Pure, Meer Incogitative Mufick, Rofe or Tulips 
 if he did not fancy there is a fort of Mufick, Rofe or Tulip, 
 which is not Barely , Purely , Mcerly Incogitative. They 
 know that whoever allows this Chimaerical DiftincStion of 
 Matter, rnuft admit Spinoza s and Mr. L's Hypothefis. That 
 when he mentions an Immaterial Suhfance fingly, he muft 
 mean with thofe Authors a Material Suhfrance , that is not 
 his Bare , M-.&r Incogitative Matter, his Matter as a Modi f ca- 
 tion , but his Mitter as Subftance , in which Senfe, they 
 take the Term Immaterial. And that whoever admits this 
 Difrindion, and the Sceptical Hypothefis in thofe Ser- 
 mons, when he mentions more SuMances. than One, as dif- 
 ferent 
 
againfl ATHEISM. 41 
 
 ferent f articular SuhJlavceSj whether Material, or ImntJteYinl ^ 
 he mr.fl: mean with Mr. L. different Nomhhd Si4/?<^vccs, i.e, 
 the different Cclle<5lions of Properties or Qualities percei- . 
 vable in tlvafe Beings commonly called Matcriiil and Im- 
 m.iteriid Siibjlnnces , but not different Ro.z! Suhficmces , as we 
 fliall fee prefcntly, if we have room enough. To this 
 they will add the Efforts made in thofc Sermons^ to con- 
 fute and invalidate a\rguments made i:fe of by the bed 
 Philofophcrs and Divines, to fix the Difference of Red 
 Subjhnccs , and to prove the Exiftence of the One Only 
 True God ; and to fubllitutc in their place, Mr. 7.'s Argu- 
 ment, which does not, nor cannot, nor was intended by 
 him to prove any thing elfc, but the Exiftence of Spi7rcz.ys 
 One Subjh'.tjce ; and then, from every Part of the Whole,, 
 they will be apt to conclude fingly , and propcrt'onably^ 
 as before; efpecially when they reHect, that this very fame 
 Defign, upon this lame Subject, in this fame Equivocating 
 Cant, and by the help of this fame Sceptical Hypothecs * 
 has been already carried on with feme Succcfs^ by one 
 who dreamed the fame things they imagine. 
 
 When to all this they fhall add, That in thofe Sermons 
 there is not one Argument offer'd, ^o prove againft Sphio- 
 z,a y that God is a Spirit, or an Infinitely Terfeti and ferfid- 
 ly Immaterid Unextended Subfiance, &C. That their whole 
 Proof, like that of the Twelve firft Sections of the Tenth 
 Chapter of the Fourth Book of Mr. L's EUay^ is conceived 
 in General, y/jgiie, Lo/s, Undetermiticd, E^nivocul Terms, inch 
 2S.Siipnr/ii: Caufe, Sclf-Exijient N.nure, NecrjJ'.mly-Exifimt Be- 
 ing, &c. all which may be made to f^and for Spinoz^as One 
 Siihil.,r.ce^ as well as for the O;;." Only Trm God; and that to 
 ll-x and fettle the precife m.eaning of that Und-.tcnninid Bc- 
 ifig, Something or Suhjiancc ; 'tis R'fir.zined and Dcterrnipcd by 
 ciie Attributes of Etcrn.il Injinite Duration, hnm:nfrj, i. e. Ex-: 
 tenfion, Sp^e , Jiacc, Fnlmfs, &c. They wili concli-de_, 
 that th.\i Sclf-Exificnt Bei::g , Sotnething OX Stibfii^nce , V: the 
 very ^fa.me with Spi>jcz,:\ and Mr. L's Self- Ex: jr. nt Being , 
 Somtthing or Sifbjl'-'- ^'' And 'tis in order th'.n Mr. C. fiiould 
 limelyiprevent :hcm , to Second his avowccl Defign in 
 thofe Seinions, ynd that of the Religious, and in our Days, 
 clpecially , A:foJl Ufeful Lecture at St. Vatuh, that 1 have; 
 
 G- • new 
 
41 Remarks n'pon Mr, Clarke'i Sermons^ &c. 
 
 flow laid before you thofe Reafons which my 'prefcribed 
 Time allowed me to produce , and which perfwade me^ 
 • that thofe Sermons do nither 'Efiahlifi than Dejlroy , do ra- 
 ther Confirm than Confute SpinozaV Hypcthcjis. Yet I liave 
 not faid^ and am far from faying here, That Mr. C. in- 
 tended to Favour^ much lefs to Efi.ibl/p that Hjpothejis. 'Tis 
 likely he has been impofed upon by Mr. L's Sophifms and 
 Equivocations. But when the End we Aim at in Writing, 
 is the Glory of God, and the Improvement of our Know- 
 ledge of Him y this fame Motive , upon the Difcovery of 
 a Miftake in what we affert concerning Him , will en- 
 gage us to Corred it. St. Jugu/lin has left us a Whole 
 Book of Retradations. The Religious and Learned 
 Mr. Grak in his Irevaus, B. 5. Page 220. has given us an 
 Example of this kind. 
 
 A perfed Knowledge of Mr. L's Hypothefis would en- 
 gage any one to forfake it ; here is what he i:iys in his 
 Third Letter to the Bifhop of Worcefier, P^jze i j i . ^^ It re- 
 '^^ quires fome skill for any one to reprefent mc as your 
 " Lordfliip does here, as one Ignorant or Doubtful , whe- 
 *^ ther Matter may not thinhj to that degree , that I am not 
 ^^ certain y or do not believe that there ts a PTincipk above 
 ^* Matter and Motio?i in the fVorldj and confeijiiently all Revela" 
 '^ tion may he nothing but 'the EjfcBs of an exalted Fancy , or the ' 
 '^ Heats of a dlfordered Imagination ^ as Spinoza a-jjirm'd. Ne- 
 ver was any Man more exadly Reprefented, more like him- 
 felf, more to the Life than Mr. L. thus Reprefented by that 
 Great Prelate. This can be Mathematically demonftra- 
 ted, as alfo, That Mr. L, did- not know what he faid,' 
 That he was Unreafonable, that he Reafoned him- 
 fi:lf out of Reafon it felf, in his Endeavours to Reafon our 
 Great God out of Being, and to Eftablilh Spimz,i's Hypo- 
 tiiefis^ and all this, by his own Principles. The Tenor 
 of thefe Sheets is fubmitted to the Judgment of«thofe, who 
 , have a Natural Right to Judge of Tracts of this kind. 
 
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