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T H S. 
 
 NATURE, EXTENT, AND PROVINCE 
 
 O F 
 
 HUMAN REASON, 
 
 CONSIDERED, 
 
 E< yxp TO ^^us TO £v aoif aKoros $r/, to o-kotos Trosravj 
 
 SOLD 37 
 
 RICHARD EDWARD 
 ^O. 142, BOND-STREET. 
 1792. 
 
DEDICATION. 
 
 T O 
 THE RIGHT REVEREND, 
 
 S A M tf E L, 
 
 LORD BISHOP OF ST. DAVID's. 
 
 / 
 
 MY LORD, 
 
 X, HE appearance of the following 
 pages, in their prefent form, origi- 
 nates from fome incidental conver- 
 fation, in a fmall circle of friends 
 to Revealed Religion^ Philofophic 
 Trutby and Sound Learning j a con- 
 a 2 verfation* 
 
verfation, of which your Lordfliip's 
 late Charge was the vakiable oc- 
 cafion and fource. 
 
 To Minds, whofe attachment to 
 the Sacred Scriptures is fomc- 
 thing rj:iore than national, or profef- 
 fionalj which y^^/, what they ad- 
 mire, and efteem j the departure of 
 the times, from the obvious prin- 
 ciples of divine Revelation, has long 
 been a matter of fincere, and, it is 
 hoped, of benevolent fenfibility ; a 
 fenfibihty, which they would be 
 rtady, and which indeed they ought, 
 to difavow, were they not perfuaded, 
 t' at it is founded on the Veni/f- 
 turn, the Ilonejlum^ the Decorum of 
 things. But, in the manly zeal, in 
 
 the 
 
( V ) 
 
 the liberal firmnefs, in the extenfive 
 erudition, and in the evangelical 
 truths, which they conceive to be 
 difplayed in the above Charge, the 
 ^ almoft defpairing caufe of genu'me^ 
 apoflolical C hrijti unity ^ begins to re- 
 vive. 
 
 Very cheerfully do we fubfcribe to 
 the fentiments of a noble author, 
 when he tells us, that, *' In what 
 form or manner foever Criticiffu 
 may appear among us, or Criticsy 
 chufe to exercife their talents, it 
 can become none, beiides the grofsly 
 fuperftitious or ignorant, to be alarm- 
 ed at this Spirit, fo long as it regards 
 the rules of Decency. For, fro n 
 the confideration of antient, c^s 
 
 well 
 
( vl ) 
 
 well as modern times, it appears, th^ 
 the caufe, and intereft, of Critics, is 
 the fame with that of Wit, Learn- 
 ing, and good Senfe/^ 
 
 Under this convi6lion, we de- 
 precate the feverity of the fl lilidious ^ 
 reader ; we Ibhcit the candour of 
 thofe, whofe purfuit is things, not 
 founds. Our appeal is, to the un- 
 derftanding and the heart. Elegance 
 of eompoiitian, we profefs to ad- 
 mire — Taile, we approve — but 
 l^R UTH is our ultimatum. Let 
 nat be fecure, and let Folly, let 
 Sophiftry, let Falfliood be detected 
 and expofed. 
 
 But, whatever may be the defe- 
 rence and refped moft juftly due, 
 
 and 
 
( vii ) 
 
 and which we are moft willing to 
 render to the united efforts of a 
 fet of gentlemen, who have engaged 
 in the arduous and beneficial office 
 of Reviewers ; whom we may very 
 properly confider as forming a fort 
 of Literary Phala?ix ; and whofe 
 judgments, \ve could wifh, for the 
 fake of Truth and Piety, were as 
 impartial, as they are able, we are 
 ftill of opinion with your Lordfhip,, 
 that, 
 
 '* Religion and Science are very 
 different things ;. and the objects of 
 different faculties. Science is the 
 objed: of natural Reafon ; religious 
 Truth, of Faith. Faith, like the 
 natural faculties, may be improved 
 
 by 
 
( vlii ) 
 
 by exerclfe, but, in its beginning, 
 it is unqueftionably a diftinit gift of 
 God*."— 
 
 If Faith, in the general idea of 
 it, be confidered, as the unreferved 
 fubmiflion or fiirrender of the iinder- 
 ftanding and heart to the revealed 
 Will of God"\X certainly mufl be con- 
 fidered, as a kind of faculty, entirely 
 diftindt from what is univerfally 
 meant by human Reafo?2, Becaufe, 
 it feems to be the peculiar property, 
 the province, it may be a moral ex- 
 cellency of Faith, in its relation to 
 the Divine Being, cordially to re- 
 ceive that, upon the divine tefti- 
 
 * I Cor, ii, Eph, ii, 8. 
 
 mony 
 
( IX } 
 
 mony alone, the reafon of which 
 it cannot at prefent difcover. It 
 may be one of the higheft exercifes 
 of true goodncfs, to fay, in this 
 cafe, of the fupreme Governor of the 
 world, Stat pro rat lone, voluntas; the 
 Will of God being the firfl: ^caufe, 
 and eternal bafis, of all moral obli- 
 gation. 
 
 As to the objedtion, hereafter fuf- 
 ficiently difcuffed, as if, upon this 
 principle, the moral Governor of the 
 univerfe was a mere arbitrary Being 
 — we need only remark in this place, 
 that, ** A Being, oi infinite freedom 
 and independency, mud neceflTarily 
 a6l according to his own fovereiga 
 will and pleafure. If every thing 
 
 received v 
 
( ^ ) 
 
 received its exiftence from him j if 
 every thing, which exifts, be the 
 effedl of his Will, and he can do 
 nothing, but hecaufc he wills it, muft 
 he not be as arbitrary, as he is power^ 
 ful? And, though F/ill d^nA Power, 
 when confidered as blind or imper- 
 fedt faculties in man, may pafs for 
 humour and caprice^ yet, as attributes 
 of God, they muft have \!tiz perfect 
 tion of God. And, if the Will of 
 God be in the higheft ftate of per- 
 feftion, as fuch, then, we have the 
 higheft reafon to love and adore 
 hivn^becaufeht is <7;\i//r^r)-— becaufe 
 he adls according to his own inde^ 
 pende?2t and all-perfcd Will. — 
 
 Nothing 
 
Nothing can be more evident, my 
 Lord, to thofe who are in the habit 
 of reJJeBing, and difcriminating be- 
 tween true and falfe, fpecious and 
 real, than that, as there have been 
 feveral things, which have not had 
 the eflence of Virtue in them, which 
 have neverthelefs been miftaken for 
 virtue— there are feveral things, which 
 have been miftaken for Reafon^ 
 which are as far from the thing itfelf, 
 as Scepticifm is from the moft efta- 
 blillied axioms ; or, as the date of 
 the Chinefe empire, from forty thou- 
 fand years. 
 
 It has been very much the faftiion 
 
 in all our modern producliions, which 
 
 have the moft diftant reference to 
 
 4 Religion, 
 
( xil ) 
 Religion, to denominate the prefent 
 age, The Age of Reafon ; and to pa^ 
 negyrize it, as fuperlatively diftin- 
 guifhable for Liberality of fentiment. 
 That it may be The Age of reafoning 
 Pride, we will not difpute. And, 
 inafmuch as it has been faid, to have 
 the ftrong outline of Liberality of 
 Sentiment, we are perfectly agreed 
 with your Lordfhip, that, in this 
 equivocal and undefinable phrafe, 
 * '■ A profane indijference is made to 
 pafs for an accomplifdment . '* 
 
 Will your Lordfhip permit us, 
 for the fake of good humour, which, 
 we apprehend, is no enemy to true 
 religion, to introduce here a little 
 anecdote, in allufion to your own 
 
 idea ? 
 
idea ? The Polifh hiflorians record, 
 that, after the death of Stephen^ one 
 of the braveft of their kings, there 
 came ambafladors to Poland, from 
 the Cham of Tartary, who was a 
 candidate for the Crown. They had 
 inftrudions to reprefent to the 
 Byet, *' That the Cham was a Prince 
 of great power j and that, as to his 
 perfonal qualities, he was temperate 
 and fober. That, being informed 
 there were differences among them 
 about Religion, he gave them afTu^ 
 ranees, that their Pope Jhould be his 
 Pope, and their Luther he his Lu^ 
 ther, juft as they pleafed to deter- 
 
 mine/* 
 
 T0 
 
( xiv ) 
 
 To Liberality of Sentiment^ very 
 clofely in alliance with this, and \:Ci 
 uncommon pretenfions to fuperior 
 Reafon^ we are much indebted for 
 the repeated and various attempts^ 
 which have been made upon our 
 civil and ecclefiaflical conftitution^ 
 By one of their difciples, who an*- 
 nounces himfelf the humble echo 
 of a modern Herefiarch and reftlefs 
 Sedary, your Lordfhip was, not 
 long fince, addrefled in the follow- 
 ing remarkable ftyle : 
 
 <* I wifli it could be uttered with 
 a voice, that would penetrate every 
 corner of the nation, and that could 
 roufe the people of Britain to rife as 
 «^ne man, to require that the public 
 
 fervice 
 
( XV ) 
 
 fcrvice of Religion be cleanfed from 
 thefe pollutions/* [meaning the doc* 
 t final Articles of our Church] ' * which 
 prefs hard on the confcicnces of the 
 moft worthy among the clergy,— 
 which drive many to infidelity — 
 which render others indifferent to 
 Religion— and which keep from the 
 Church, members, whofe talents, 
 and whofe weight of charadcr, would 
 render it eminent fervice." — When- 
 ever the ftate of the Church fhall 
 rea/fy need their affiftance, it will be 
 very proper, no doubt, to facrificc 
 both for the benefit oi fuch talents, 
 and //ry6 charaders. — Till then, fo 
 long as the Public is infulted with 
 fuch outrageous and inflammatory 
 effufions as thefe, it will be impof- 
 
 flblQ 
 
( xvi } 
 
 fible for them to forget the comic 
 wit of an Hudibras, or the lefs tem- 
 pered fatire of T<he Tale of a Tub, 
 
 We have feen, that, if your Lord- 
 iliip ftep forward to aflcrt the funda- 
 mental principles of Revelation — the 
 ejfoitial Deity of the Saviour — the 
 DoBrine of J tif if cation by Faith-^ 
 and the NeceJJity of the Divine Afijl^ 
 ance of the Holy Spirit y it is afcribed, 
 by a certain defcription of Perfons, 
 to motives the moft difingenuous 
 and irreputable. If your Lordfliip 
 enforce upon your Clergy the expe- 
 diency of an avowedj honef, and 
 fieady adherence to the national 
 Church, it is to be charged with the 
 odious names of Bigotry and Perfe-* 
 rut ion. And, if the effrontery of 
 
 it» 
 
( xvii ) 
 
 its opponents be repelled with the 
 contempt it provokes and deferves, 
 the decent indignation is to be deno- 
 minated ecclefiaflical imperioufnefs 
 and infolence. 
 
 Leaving, however, fuch writers, 
 and fuch writings, to the expofition 
 of their own illiberahty, and to the 
 cenfure, they will be fure to meet with 
 from the moft refpedlable and pious 
 divifion of our Diffenting Brethren ; 
 your Lordihip, we prefume, will 
 recoiled:, it is fomewhere obferved, 
 by the illuftrious and ivcvvaoxi'ABacon^ 
 ** Nobis res falubris videtur, et im- 
 primis utilis, fi Tradatus inftituatur 
 fobrius et diligens, qui de ufu Ra- 
 tionis humanse in Theologicis praeci- 
 
 piat. 
 
( xviii ) 
 
 piat. Ejufmodi traftatum inter de* 
 fiderata ponimus ; et, Sophronerrir 
 five de Icgitimo ufu Rationis hu- 
 manaD in divinis nominamus." 
 
 Since nothing fo complete, as^ 
 what is here infinuated, or propofed, 
 has yet appeared in the republic of 
 letters; your Lordlhip may per- 
 haps, on fome future occafion, throw 
 fuch light on this important fubjedt,. 
 as may ferve the great caufe of re- 
 vealed Truths — and fliew, with a^ 
 more confummate degree of accuracy 
 than has hitherto been done, the 
 €xa<5l line of diftindlion, where Rea^ 
 fon may be faid to end, and Faith to* 
 begin its operations, iti divine fci- 
 ence. In the. mean time, we flat^ 
 
 ter 
 
( xlx ) 
 
 ter ourfelves you will condefcend to 
 take this little Treatife into your pro* 
 tcdion and patronage. 
 
 Your Lordfliip is not addrefled, in 
 ^ thefe lines, with the contemptible 
 voice of adulation — of ecclefiaftical 
 tigotry — or of ignorant fuperftition. 
 We addrefs you, as one of the 
 Fathers of our Church^—whofe pri- 
 tnary objed is, not its emoluments, 
 nor its dignities, nor its political con- 
 fequence in the civil conftitution, 
 but the prefervation of its fundamen- 
 tal truths — the perpetuity of its 
 difciplinc — and the religious charac- 
 ter of its members. As fuch, wc 
 venerate your office — we admire your 
 
 intelledual 
 
( XX ) 
 
 intellectual powers — we refped: your 
 perfon — and we pray for the blef- 
 fing of Keaven upon your indefa- 
 tigable exertions for its honour and 
 fuccefs. 
 
 C. D. 
 
 D. P. T. H. 
 
 W. J. J. C. 
 
 £9 Jrx« i\> £• 
 
THE 
 
 NATURE, EXTENT, AND PROVINCE 
 
 O F 
 
 REASON. 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 Enquiringy whether there he any thing in the 
 nature and condition of man^ to oblige 
 him to think, that he is Jiot to admit of 
 any do5irines or inftitutions, as revealed 
 from God, hut fuch, as his own Reafon 
 can prove to he neceffary fro^n the nature 
 of things. 
 
 1 BEGIN with enquiring, what there 
 is to ohlige a man to hold this opinion ; 
 becaufe, if there be not fome ftrong and 
 plain proof ariling from the nature and 
 condition of man, to oUige him thus to 
 abide by the fole light of his own 
 Reafon ; it may be fo far from being a 
 B duty. 
 
( 2 ) 
 
 duty, which he owes to God, that it may 
 be reckoned amongfl his moil criminal 
 prefumptions. And the pleading for 
 this authority of his own Reafon, may 
 have the guilt of pleading for his 
 greatefl vanity. And \i Jpritual pride he 
 the worfi fort of pride, 2i confident reliance 
 upon our own Reafon, as having a right to 
 determine all matters between God and 
 man, if it fhould prove to be a groundlefs 
 pretenfiony bids fair to be reckoned the 
 higheft inftance of the zvorji kind of the 
 worft of fms. 
 
 Every other inftance of vanity, every 
 degree of perfonal pride, and felf- 
 efteem, may be a pardonable weaknefs 
 in comparifon of this. For, how fmall 
 is that pride, which only makes us pre- 
 fer our perfonal beauty or merit to that 
 of our fellow-creatures, when compared 
 
 with 
 
( 3 ) 
 with a felf-confiding Reafon, which is 
 too haughty to adore any thing in the 
 divine counfels, which it cannot fully 
 comprehend ; or to fubmit to any direc- 
 tions from God, but fuch as its own 
 wifdom could prefcribe, or approve? 
 Thus much is certain, that there can be 
 no Medium in this matter. The claim- 
 ing this authority to our own Reafon, 
 mufl: either be a very great duty, or 
 amongfl the greatefl of fins. 
 
 If it be a Jin, to admit of any Jecrets 
 in divine providence—If it be a crimen 
 to afcribe wifdom and goodnefs to God 
 in things we cannot comprehend — If 
 it be a hajenefs and meannefs of fpirit, to 
 believe that God can teach us better, or 
 more than we can teach ourfelves— if it 
 be ^Jhameful apojiacy from the dignity of 
 our nature, to be humble in the hands 
 
 of 
 
{ 4 ) 
 of God, to fubmit to any myfierious pto^ 
 vidence over us, to comply with ^hy 
 other methods of homage and adoration of 
 him, than fuchas we could of ourfelves 
 contrive and juftify, then it is certainly 
 a great duty to alTert and maintain this 
 authority of our own Reafon. 
 
 On the other hand ; If the profound* 
 eft Humility towards God.h^ thehigheft 
 inftance of piety — If every thing within 
 us and without us, if every thing wc 
 know of God, every thing we know of 
 ourfelves, preach humility to us, as the 
 foundation of every virtue, as the life 
 and foul of all holinefs — 1^ fm had its 
 beginning from prldey and hell be the 
 effcd of it ; if devih are what they are 
 through fpi ritual pride and felf-conceit, 
 then, we have great reafon to believe, 
 that the claiming this authority to our 
 
 Reafon, 
 
( 5 ) 
 
 Reafon, in oppoiition to the revealed 
 wifdom of God, is not a frailty of flejh 
 and bloody but that fame fpiritual pride, 
 \vhich turned Angels into apoftate Spirits. 
 
 Since therefore this appealing to our 
 own Reafon, as the 2ih{o\\x\.t\Y perfe^ mea^ 
 Jure and rule of all that ought to pafs 
 between God and man, has an appear^m 
 ance of a pride of the worft kind, and 
 fuch as unites us both in temper and 
 condudt with the fallen fpirits of the 
 kingdom of darknefs, it highly concerns 
 every pleader on that fide, to coniider 
 what grounds he proceeds upon; and to 
 afk himfdf, what there is in the 7?^/^ and 
 condition of human nature, to oblige him 
 to think that nothing can be divine^ or 
 holy^ or necejjary^ in religion, but what 
 human Reafon didates. 
 
 I hope the reader will think this a fair 
 
 ftatc 
 
( 6 ) 
 ftate of the cafe, and that all the light we 
 can have in this matter, muft arife from 
 a thorough confideration of tht Jfatff 
 and condition of man in this world. If, 
 without Revelation, he be free from 
 myfteries as a moral and religious agent, 
 then he has fome plea from \\\s,Jiaie and 
 condition to rejed: rd"i^<f^/^^ myfleries. 
 
 But if, in a (late of natural religion, 
 and mere morality, he cannot ac- 
 knowledge a divine providence, or 
 worihip and adore God without as much 
 implicit faith, and humble fubmillion of 
 his Reafon, as any revealed myfteries re- 
 quire ; then, his ftate and condition in the 
 world will condemn his refufal of any 
 revelation fufficiently atteiled to come 
 from God. 
 
 Had mankind continued in a ftate of 
 
 perfe^ innocence^ without ever failing in 
 
 2 their 
 
( 1 ] 
 
 their duty either to God or man, yet 
 even in fuch a ftate, they could never 
 have known what God would, or would 
 not reveal to them, but by fome exprefs 
 revelation from him. And, as God 
 might intend to raife them to fome 
 higher, and unknown ftate of perfec- 
 tion ; fo he might raife them to it by the 
 revelation of fuch things as their own 
 Reafon, though innocent and uncorrupt, 
 could not have difcovered. 
 
 But if man, in a ftate of innocencey 
 could have no pretence to fet himfelf 
 againft divine Revelation; and make his 
 own Reafon \h^ final judge of what God 
 could, or could not reveal to him ; much 
 lefs has he any pretence for fo doing in 
 his prefent ftate of firiy ignorancey and 
 mifery. His nature and condition are i^o 
 far from furnifhing him with reafons 
 
 againft 
 
( 8 ) 
 
 again fl Revelation, againfl ^nj fupernatu^ 
 ral help from God, that they feem to be 
 inconfolable without it ; and every cir- 
 cumftance of his life prepares him to 
 hope for terms of 7nercy and deliverance 
 from his prefent guilt and mifery, not 
 according to Jchemes of his own contri- 
 vance, not from his ozvn knowledge of the 
 nature, and reajon, and fitnefs of things, 
 but from fome incompreheiifihle depth of 
 divine Goodnefs. 
 
 For, if lin, and mifery, and igno- 
 rance, cannot convince us of our own 
 weaknefs, cannot prepare us to accept of 
 any methods of atoning for our guilt, but 
 fuch as our own difordered Reafon can 
 fuggefl, we arc not far from the harden- 
 ed ftate of thofe miferable fpirits, that 
 make war againft God. 
 
 for, to infift upon the prerogative of 
 
 our 
 
( 9 ) 
 our own nature, as qualifying us to 
 make our own peace with God, and to 
 rejedl the Atonement which he has pro- 
 vided for us, becaufe we efteem it more 
 fit and reafonable, that our ozvn Repen^ 
 iance fhould be fufficient without it, is 
 the fame height of pride and impiety^ as 
 to affirm that we have no need of any 
 repentance at all. 
 
 For as mankind, if they had conti- 
 nued in a ftate of Innocence^ could not 
 have known how their innocence was to 
 be rewarded, or what changes of ftate 
 God intended them for, but as Revelation 
 had difcovered thefe things unto them : 
 fo, after they were fallen into a ilate of 
 guilt and fin, they could never know 
 what effects it was to have upon them ; 
 what mifery it would expofe them to ; 
 ©r when^ or how^ or zvhether they were 
 
 ever 
 
( ^o ) 
 
 ever to be delivered from it, and made 
 as happy as if they had never finned : 
 thefe are things, that nothing but a Re- 
 velation from God could teach them. 
 
 So that, for a Sinner to pretend to 
 appoint the atonement for his own Sins, 
 or to think himfelf able to tell what it 
 might to be, or what effe5l it mufl have 
 with God, is as foolifn and vain a pre^ 
 fumption, as if man in innocence fhould 
 have pretended to appoint his own me- 
 thod of being changed into a Cherub. 
 
 The Writers againft Revelation, ap^ 
 peal to the Reafon and Nature of things, 
 as infallibly difcovering every thing that 
 a Revelation from God can teach us. 
 
 If the relations, fay they, betzveen things ^ 
 and the fitnefs rejulting from thence, be 
 not the fole Rule of God's anions, mufl not 
 Cod be an arbitrary Being F But if God mly 
 
 commands 
 
( rr y 
 
 commands zvhat the nature of things- JBew 
 to be jit, 'tis Jcarce pqffihle that men Jloould 
 mifiake their duty\Jince a Mind that is at^ 
 ientive, can as cafily dijiinguijb fit from 
 unfit y as the Eye can beauty from defor^ 
 *?niiy. 
 
 It is granted, that there is a fitnefs 
 and unfitncfs of adions faundcd in the 
 nature of things, and refulting from the 
 relations that perfons and things bear to 
 one another. It is alfo granted, that the 
 reafonablenefs of mod of the duties of 
 children to their parents, of parents to^ 
 their children, and of men to men, is 
 very apparent, from the relation they 
 bear to one another ; and that feveral 
 of -the duties which we owe to God, 
 plainly appear to us, as foon as we ac- 
 knowledge the relation that is between 
 God and us. 
 
 But 
 
( 12 ) 
 
 But when all this is granted, this zvhole 
 argument proves diredtly the contrary to 
 that which it is intended to prove. 
 * I readily grant, that the Nature, Rea- 
 fon, and Relations of things and per- 
 fons, and the fitnefs of r>8:ions reflilting 
 from thence, is t\\^ fole Rule of God's 
 actions. And I appeal to this one 
 common and confelTed principle, as a 
 fufficient proof that a man cannot thus 
 abide by they^/^ Light oi his own Rea- 
 fon, without contradiding the Nature 
 and Reafon of things, and denying 
 this to be th^ fole Rule of God's ac- 
 tions. 
 
 For, if tht fitnefs of adlions be found- 
 ed in the 77atidre of things and perfons, 
 and this fitnefs be the foie Rule of God's 
 ai^ions, it is certain that the Rule by 
 which he ads, muft in many inftanccs 
 
 be 
 
( 13 ) 
 
 be en lire Jy inconceivable by us, fo as not 
 to be known at ally aiid in no inftances 
 fully known, or perfi^ly comprehended. 
 
 For, if God be to adt according to a 
 jiinefs founded in the nature of things, and 
 nothing can be fit for him to do, but 
 what has its fitnefs founded in his 
 own divinely perfcl and incomprehenfihle 
 nature, mud he not necefParily ad: by a 
 Rule above all human compreheniion ? 
 This argument fuppofes that he cannot 
 do what is fit for him to do, unlefs what 
 he does has its fitnefs founded in his oivn 
 nature ; but if he mud govern his ac- 
 tions by his own nature, he mult adcby 
 a Rule that is juft as incomprehenfible to us 
 as his own nature. 
 
 And we can be no farther competent 
 
 Judges of the fitnefs of the conduct of 
 
 God, than we are competent judges of 
 
 C the 
 
( H ) 
 tlie divine nature ; and can no more tell 
 what is, or is not infinilely wife in God, 
 than we can raife ourfelves to a Jiate of 
 infinite wifdom. 
 
 So that, if the fitnefs of adlions be 
 founded in the particular nature of 
 things and perfons, and the fitnefs 
 of God's actions muft arife from 
 that which is particular to his nature, 
 then we have, from this argument, the 
 uimoji certainty that the Rule or Reojons 
 of God's a(51ions muil in many cafes be 
 entirely inconceivable by us, and in no 
 cafes perfedly and fully apprehended ; 
 and for this very reafon, becaufe he is 
 not an arbitrary Beings that adls by mere 
 Willy but is governed in every thing he 
 does, by the reafon and nature of things. 
 For, if he be not arbitrary, but ads ac- 
 cording to the nature of things, then 
 
 he 
 
( 15 ) 
 lie muff adl according to his ozvn nature. 
 But if his own Nature muPi be the Red" 
 foUy Rule, and Meafure of his actions ; 
 if they be only fit and reafonable, be- 
 caufe they are according Co this Rule and 
 Reafony then it neceffarily follows, that 
 the fitnefs of many of God's adlions 
 muft be incomprehenfible to us, merely 
 for this reafon, becaufe they have their 
 proper fitnefs y fuch a fitnefs as is found- 
 ed in the divine Nature, 
 
 For, fuppofing God to be an arbitra- 
 ry Being, there would then be a bare 
 poilibility of our comprehending the 
 fitnefs of every thing he required of us. 
 For, as he might adl by mere Willy fo he 
 might chule to ad: according to our na- 
 ture, and fuitable to our comprehen- 
 iions, and not according to his own na- 
 ture, and infinite perfedlions. 
 
 But^ 
 
( i6 ) 
 
 But, fuppofing God not to be an ar^ 
 liirary Beings but to adl conflantly, as 
 the perfedions of his own nature make 
 Vi fit and reojonahle for him to a6l, then,, 
 there is an utter impoffibility of our 
 comprehending the reafonablenefs and 
 fitnefs of many of his adions. 
 
 For inftance 5 look at the reajon of 
 things, and the jitnejs of adlions, and 
 tell me how they moved God to create 
 mankind in the flate and condition they 
 are in. Nothing is more above the 
 Reafon of men, than to explain the rea* 
 fonablenefs and infinite wifdom of God's 
 Providence in creating man of fuch a 
 form and condition^ to go through Jiich a 
 ftate of things as human life has fhewn 
 itfelf to be. (i3" No revealed mylleries. 
 can more exceed the Comprehenlion of 
 man, than the flatc of human life itfelf. 
 
 Shew 
 
( 17 ) 
 
 Shew me according to what fitnefs^ 
 founded in the nature of things, God's 
 infinite wifdom was determined to forni 
 you in fuch a manner ; bring you into 
 fuch a world ; and fuffer and preferve 
 * Jiich a fiate of things, as human life is ; 
 and then, you may have fome pretence 
 to believe no revealed dodlrines, but 
 fuch as your own Reafon can deduce 
 from the nature of things, and the fit-» 
 nefs of adlions. 
 
 But^ whilft our own.y2?r;;;, whilft Cre-' 
 at ion and Providence are depths, which 
 you cannot thus. look into, it is ftrangely 
 abfurd to pretend, that God cannot re-- 
 veal any thing to you as a matter of re- 
 ligion, except your own Reafon can fhev/ 
 , its foundation. in the nature and reafon 
 of things. 
 
 foxt 
 
( i8 ) 
 
 For does not your own make^ and con^ 
 JUiutiony the reafonablenefs of God*s pro- 
 vidence, and the jitnefs of the State of 
 human life* as much concern you, as 
 any revealed dodlrines ? Is it not as vmjit 
 for God to create man in fuch a fiate^ 
 fubjeft to fuch a courfe of providence, as 
 he cannot prove to be founded in the 
 jitnefs and reajonahlenejs of things ; as to 
 reveal to him fuch truths, or methods 
 of falvation, as he cannot by any argu- 
 ments of his own prove to be necef- 
 fary? 
 
 Revelation^ you fay, is on your ac- 
 count, and therefore you ought to fee 
 the reafonablenefs and jitnefs of it. — And 
 do not you alfo fay, that God has made 
 you for your own fake ? ought you not 
 therefore to know the reafonablenefs 
 
 and 
 
( 19 ) 
 
 and fitnefs of God*s forming you as you 
 are ? — Do not you fay, that providence 
 is for the fake of Man ? is it not there- 
 fore fit and reafonable, in the nature of 
 things, that there fhould be no myfteries 
 or fecrets in providence, but that man 
 iliould fo fee its methods, as to be able 
 to prove all its fteps to be conftantly fit 
 and reafonable ? 
 
 Do not you fay, that the world is for 
 the fake of man ; is it not therefore fit 
 and reafonable that man fhould fee, that 
 the pafl and prefent fiate of the world 
 has been fuch as the reafon and fitnefs 
 of things required it fiiould be ? 
 
 Now, if the imperfe^l ftate of human 
 nature, the mferies and calamities of this 
 life, the difeafes and mortahty of human 
 bodies, the methods of God's continual 
 providence in governing human affiiirs, 
 
 be 
 
r 20 T 
 
 Be things that as much concern us, and 
 as nearly relate to us^ as any methods 
 of revealed religion; and if thefe be 
 things that we cannot examine or ex- 
 plain, according lo 2iny fitnefs or unjitnefs 
 founded in the nature of things, but 
 muft believe a great deal more of the 
 infinite wifdom of God, than we can fo 
 explain ; have we any reafon to think, 
 that God cannot, or ought not to raife 
 us out of this unhappy ftate of things, 
 help us to an higher order of life, and 
 exalt us to a nearer enjoyment of him- 
 fclf, by any means, but fuch as our own 
 poor Reafon can grope out of the na^. 
 ture and fitnefs of things ? 
 
 Now why is it, that all is thus 
 myfterious and unmeafurable by hu- 
 man Reafon, in thefe matters fo 
 nearly concerning human nature ? It is 
 
 becaufc 
 
C 21 ) 
 
 becaufe God is not an arbitrary Beings 
 but does that, which the incomprehenjible 
 Ferfe5}ions of his own nature, make it 
 jit and reajonable for him to do. Do but 
 ^ grant, that nothing can be // for God 
 to do, but what is according to his own 
 infinite perfe^ions i let but this be the 
 Rule of his adltons, and then you have 
 the /////^ proof, that the fitnefs of his ac- 
 tions muft be above our compreheniion, 
 who can only judge of a //^^ according 
 to our own ferfe^ions ; and then we riiuft 
 be furrounded with myftery, for this 
 very reafon, becaufe God adls accord- 
 ing to a certain RtilCy his own Nature. 
 
 Again : What is the Nature of a hu- 
 man Soul ; upon what iermSy and in 
 what manner it is united to the body ; 
 how far it is different from it ; how far 
 it is Jubjedi to it ; what powers and fa- 
 culties 
 
r " ) 
 
 culties it derives from it, are things, 
 "wherein the Wifdom and Goodnejs of God, 
 and the Happinefi of man> are deeply 
 concerned. Is it not neceffary that thcfe 
 things fnould have their foundation in 
 the reafon and Jitne/s of things ? and yet, 
 who can fnew that this JIate of foul and 
 body is founded in the reafon and fitnefs 
 of things I 
 
 Again ; The Origin of the foul, at 
 what time it enters into the body, whe* 
 ther it be imrnediaiely created at its en- 
 trance into, the body, or comes out of 
 2i pre-exiftent Jiate, are things that can- 
 not be known from any fitnefs or rea-. 
 fonablenefs founded in the nature of 
 things; and yet it is as necelTary to be- 
 lieve this is done according to certain 
 xeajons of wifdom and goodnefs, as to 
 feelieve. there is a God. 
 
{ 23 ) 
 
 Now, who can fay that it is the fame 
 thing, whether human fouls are created 
 immediately for human bodies, or whe^ 
 ther they come into them out of fome 
 pre^exijlent jiate f For aught we know, 
 •^ one of thefe ways may be exceeding 
 fd and wijey and the other as entirely 
 unjuft and unreofonahle \ and yet, when 
 Reafon examines either of thefe ways, it 
 finds itfelf equally perplexed with dif- 
 ficulties, and knov/s not which to chufe : 
 but if fouls be immaterial [as all philo- 
 fophy now proves] it mufl be one of 
 them. 
 
 And perhaps, the reafon why God 
 has revealed fo little of thefe matters in 
 holy Scripture itfelf, is, becaufe any 
 more particular revelation of them, 
 would but have perplexed us with great- 
 er difficulties, as not having capacities or 
 2 ideas 
 
( 24 ) 
 ideas to comprehend fuch things. For, 
 as all our natural knowledge is confined 
 to ideas borrowed from experience^ and 
 the ufe oi our fenfes about human things ^ 
 as Revelation can only teach us things 
 that have fome likenefs to what wc al- 
 ready know ; as our notions of equity 
 and jufbice are very limited, and con- 
 fined to certain adlions between man 
 and man; fo, if God had revealed 
 to us more particularly, the origin of 
 our fouls, and the reqfon of their ftate 
 in human bodies, w^e might perhaps 
 have been expofed to greater difficulties 
 by fuch knowledge, and been lefs able 
 to vindicate the juitice and goodnefs 
 of God, than we are by our prefent igno- 
 rance. 
 
 Again ; the origin of Sin and Evil^ 
 or how it entered into the world con- 
 
 iiftently 
 
^ftently with the infinite wifdom of 
 God, is a myftery of natural religion^ 
 which Reafon cannot unfold. For, who 
 can ilievv from the reofon and nature of 
 things, that it was jit and reajonahle^ for 
 * the Providence of God to fuiFer lin and 
 evil to enter, and continue in the world 
 as they have ? Here therefore, the Man of 
 natural religion muft drop his method 
 of reafoning from the nature and iitnefs 
 of things ; and that, ill an article of the 
 ^ighefl concern to the moral world ; and 
 be as mere a believer, as he that believes 
 the moil incomprehenfible myftery of 
 revealed religion. 
 
 Now, as there have been in the feve- 
 ral- ages of the world, fome impatient^ 
 refllejsy diW^ prefuming fpirits, who, be- 
 <:aufe they could not, in thefe points, ex- 
 f>lain the juftice of God's providence, 
 * D have 
 
f 26 ) 
 
 have taken refuge in horrid Aiheijm ; 
 JQ, they made jufl: the fame Joher ufe of 
 their Reafon, as our modern imhelievers^ 
 who, becaufe they cannot comprehend as 
 t-hey would, the fitnefs and neceffity of cer- 
 tain chriftian dodlrines, refign themfelves 
 up to a hardened Infidelity, For, (|^ It 
 is jufl as wife and reafonable to allow of 
 no myfteries in Revelation^ as to allow of 
 no myfteries or fecrets in Creation and 
 Providence, _ 
 
 - To proceed : If the fitnefs of anions 
 he founded in the nature and relations of 
 Beings, tlien nothing can be fit for God 
 to do, but {o far as it is fit for the Go~ 
 vernor of all created heingSy whether on 
 earth, or in any other part of the uni- 
 verfe ; and he cannot ad: fitly towards 
 mankind, but by ading as is fit for the 
 governor of all beings. 
 
 iNow, 
 
( 27 ) 
 
 Now, what is fit for the Governor of 
 fill created nature to 'diO^ in this or that 
 particular part of his creation, is as 
 much above our Reafon to tell^ as it is 
 above our power to govern all beings. 
 And how Mankind ought to be govern- 
 ed, with relation to the whole creation, 
 of which they are fo fmall a part, is a 
 matter equally above our knowledge; 
 becaufe we know not how they are a 
 part of the whole, or what relation they 
 bear to any other part, or how their ftate 
 affedls the whole, or any other part, any 
 more than we know what Beings the 
 whole confifts of. 
 
 Now, there is nothing that we know 
 with more certainty, than that God is 
 Governor of the whole, and that Man- 
 kind are a part of the whole ; and that 
 the uniformity and harmony of divine 
 
 Providence, 
 
( 28 ) 
 
 Providence, mu ft arife from his infinitely 
 wife government of the whole ; and there- 
 fore we have the utmoft certainty, that we 
 -are vajlly inco7?tpetent ]\xdgts of the fitnefs 
 or unfitnefs of any methods, which God 
 ufes in the government of fo fmall a 
 part of the univerfe as mankind are. 
 
 For, if the adlions of God cannot 
 have their proper jitnejsy unlefs they are 
 according to the incofiiprehenfible greatnejs 
 of his own Naturcy and according to his 
 incomprehenfible greatnefs, as Lord and 
 Governor of all created nature ; have we 
 not the moft undeniable certainty, that 
 the fitnefs of the divine Providence over 
 mankind, muft be a fecret only to be- 
 adored, but never comprehended, in this, 
 life?— 
 
 Again, if xht-fiifiefs of acf ions he founded 
 hi the Relations of beings to one another, 
 
 thea 
 
( 29 ) 
 
 then the fitnefs of the adions of God*s 
 providence over mankind, muft be in 
 many inftances altogether myfterioiis and 
 incomprehenfible to us. 
 
 For the relation which God bears to 
 mankind, as their all-perfe^ Creator and 
 continual Prefer-very is a relation that we 
 conceive as imperfedily, and know as 
 little of, as we do of any of the divine 
 attributes. When we compare it to 
 . that of a Father and his children, a 
 Prince and his fubjedls, a Proprietor and 
 his property, we have explained it m the 
 beft manner we can ; but ftill have left 
 it as much a Jecret^ as we do the divine 
 nature, when we fay it is infinitely fupe- 
 ribr to every thing that is finite,. 
 
 We know with certainty, feveral effe^fs 
 of this relation ; as, that it puts us under 
 the care and protedion of a w ife, and 
 
( 30 ) 
 juft, and merciful Providence, and de- 
 mands from us the higheft inflances of 
 humility, duty, adoration and thankf- 
 giving. But, what it is in its own na- 
 ture, what kind of JIaie, or degree of 
 dependency it fignifies ; what it is, to 
 exift in and by God ; what it is, to fee 
 by a light that is his, to adl by a power 
 from him, to live by a ///> in him ; is,. 
 what we conceive as imperfe^ly, as what 
 at is to be in the third heavens^ or to hear 
 words that cannot be uttered. 
 
 But, if this relation conlift in thefe 
 inmiceivalle things, in a communica- 
 tion of lifey light y and pozver ; if thefe 
 be enjoyed in God, and in ourfelves ; 
 our own, and yet his, in a manner not 
 to be explained by any thing that we 
 ever heard, orfaw; then, we muft ne- 
 ceffarily be poor judges of what is fit 
 
 for 
 
( 3r ) 
 
 for God to require of us, becaufe of 
 this relation,- It teaches us nothing, but 
 the fuperficialnefs of our own know- 
 ledge, and the unfathomable depths of 
 the divine perfections.. 
 
 It is becaufe of this incomprehenfible 
 Relation between God and his creatures, 
 that we are unavoidably ignorant of 
 what God may juftly require of us, 
 either in a (late of Innocence or Sin, For, 
 as the fitnefs of actions between Beings 
 Yelatedy muft refult from their refpedtive 
 Natures, fo the incomprehenfibility of 
 the Divine Nature, on which the Rela- 
 tion between God and man is founded, 
 makes it utterly impoflible for us to fay,, 
 what kind of homage y or worjhipy he may 
 fitly require of man in a ftate of inno-- 
 ience I or what different worfhip and ho- 
 mage 
 
( 32 ) 
 mage he may, or mull require of men 
 as finners. 
 
 As to the abligations of moral or fo- 
 cial duties, which have their foundation 
 in the conveniences of this life, and the 
 feveral relations we bear to one another, 
 thefe are the fame in the Hate of Inm^ 
 cence or Sin ; and we know, that we truly 
 adl according to the Divine Will, when 
 we ad according to what thefe relations 
 require of us. 
 
 But the queflion is. What diftindl 
 kind oi Homage y or Servicey or Worjhipy 
 God may require us to render to Him> 
 either in a ftate of hmocence or 8iny on 
 account of that Relation he bears to 
 us as an all-perfed Creator and Go- 
 
 vernor ? 
 
 But this is a queftion, that God alone 
 can refolve. 
 
 Human 
 
( 33 ) 
 
 Human Reafon cannot enter into it ; 
 it has no principle to proceed iipoti 
 in it. For as the neceffity of Divine 
 Worlhip and Flomage, fo the particular 
 matter and manner of it, muft have its 
 iC2i^on in the Divine Nature. 
 
 Sacrifice^ if confidered only as an hu-^ 
 man Invention^ could not be proved to be 
 a reafonable fervice. Yet, confidered as 
 a Divine Injiitutiony it would be the great-^ 
 €fl folly not to receive it as a reafonable 
 fervice. For, as we could fee no reafon 
 for it, if it were of human invention, fa 
 we fliould have the greateft reafon to 
 comply with it, becaufe it was of Divine 
 Appointment. Not as if the Divine Ap- 
 pointment altered the nature and fitnefs 
 of things i but, becaufe nothing has the 
 nature sindfitne/s of Divine Worfhip, but 
 i^cau/e it is of Divine Appointment. . 
 
 Man 
 
f 34 ) 
 Man, therefore, had he continued In a 
 ftate of Innocence, and without Revela- 
 tion, might have lived in an awful fear, 
 and pious regard of God, and obferved 
 every duty both of moral and civil life, 
 as an adl of obedience to him. But he 
 <:Guld have no foundation either to in- 
 vent any particular matter or manner of 
 Divine Worfhip himfelf, or to rejedany 
 that was appointed by God as unnecejjary. 
 It would have been ridiculous to have 
 pleaded his innocence, as having no 
 need of a Divine Worfhip. For who 
 can have greater reafbn, or be fitter 
 to worfhip God, than innocent Beings ? 
 It would have been more abfurd to have 
 objedted the fufficiency and perfedlion 
 of their Reafon ; for why fliould men 
 rejed: a revealed method and 7nanner of Di- 
 vine Worfliip and Service, becaufe God 
 
 had 
 
( 3S ) 
 Lad given them Senfe and Reafon of 
 their own fufficient for the dudes of fo- 
 cial and civil life? 
 
 And as Reafon, in a (late of fuch in- 
 nocence and perfection, could not have 
 any pretence to flate, or appoint, the 
 matter or manner of Divine Worfliip, 
 fo when the ftate of innocence was 
 changed for that of fin, it then became 
 more difficult for bare Reafon to know 
 what kind of homage, or worfliip, 
 could be acceptable to God from Sin- 
 ners. 
 
 For, what the Relatimi betwixt God and 
 Sinners makes it fit and reafonable for 
 God to require or accept of them, can- 
 not be determined by human Reafon. 
 
 This is a new State^ and the founda- 
 tion of a new Relation ; and nothing can 
 be fit for God to do in it, but what has its 
 2 fitnefs 
 
( 36 ) 
 ftftefs refuhing frofu it. We have no« 
 thing to help our conceptions of the 
 forementioned relative cbara^ej^s of God, 
 as our Governor and Preferver^ but what 
 we derive from our idea of human 
 Fathers and Governors. Which idea 
 only helps us to comprehend thefe rela^ 
 iionsy juft as our idea of human power 
 helps us to comprehend the Omnipotence 
 of God. For a father, or governor, no 
 more reprefents the true flat e of God as 
 our Governor and Prefervery than our 
 living in our Father's/^;/?//)', reprefents- 
 the true manner of our living in God. 
 
 Thefe Relations are both very plain, 
 and very myfterious ; they are very plain 
 and certain, as to the r^^//>y of their 
 exiftence ; and highly myfterious and 
 inconceivable, as to the manner of their 
 cxiftence. 
 
 That 
 
( 37 ) 
 
 That which is plain and certain^ in 
 thefe relative charaders of God, clearly 
 fliews our obligations to every inflance 
 of dutyy homage y adoration^ love and gra- 
 iitude. 
 
 And that, which is my ft er ions and in- 
 conceivable in them, is ajuft and folid 
 foundation of that profound humility ^ azv^ 
 ful reverence y internal piety, and irmendous 
 fenfe of the divine Majefty, with which 
 devout and pious perfons think of God, 
 and aflifl at the offices and inftj'tntions of 
 Religion. Which excites in them a 
 higher zeal for doclrines and inflitu- 
 tions of divine Revelation, than for all 
 things human ; which fills them with re- 
 gard and reverence for all things, places, 
 and offices, that are either by divine or 
 human authority appointed, to aflid" 
 K and 
 
( 38 ) 
 and help their defired intercourfe with 
 God. 
 
 And, if fome people, by a long and 
 Jtri& attention to Reafon^ clear ideas ^ the 
 fitnejs and unfit Jiefs of things, have at laft 
 arrived at a demonflrative certainty, that 
 all thefe fentiments of piety and devo- 
 tion are mere bigotry^ fuperftition ^ and en-^ 
 ihufiajm ; 1 ihall only now obferve, that 
 youthful extravagance^ pajfton^ and debau- 
 cheryy by their own natural tendency^ 
 without the afliilance of any other guide, 
 feldom fail of making the fame difco- 
 very. And, though it is not reckoned 
 any refledlion upon great Wits^ when 
 they hit upon the fame thought, yet it 
 may feem fome difparagement of that 
 Reafon and Philofophyy which teaches old 
 men to think and judge the fame of Reli- 
 gion, 
 
( 39 ) 
 gion, as paffion and extravagance teach 
 the young. — 
 
 To return : As there is no (late in 
 human hfe, that can give us a true idea 
 of any of the forementioned relative 
 charadlers of God, fo this relative ftate of 
 God towards iinners is ftiil more remote, 
 and lefs capable of being truly compre- 
 hended by any thing obfervable in the 
 relations betwixt 2^ judge and criminals, 
 ti creditor and his debtors, a phyfician and 
 his patients, 2i father ox prince y and their 
 difobedient children and fubjedis. 
 
 For none of thefe flates feparately, 
 nor all of them jointly conhdered, give 
 us any jufl: idea, either of the nature and 
 guilt of fm, or how God is to deal with 
 fmners, on the account of the relation 
 he bears to them. 
 
 And 
 
And to afk, whether God, in puniih- 
 ing (inners, a<5ts as a -phyfician towards 
 patients, or as a creditor towards debtors, 
 or as a prince towards rebels, or a pdge 
 over criminals, is the fame weaknefs, as 
 to afk, whether God, as our contimial 
 prefervery acts as our parents, from whom 
 V. e have our maintatance^ or as a prince, 
 who only profess us. For, as the inainte^ 
 rofjce and prote^imiy that we receive from 
 cur parents and prince, are not proper 
 and true reprefentations of the naiure 
 and manner of our prefervation in God, 
 but only the properefl words that human 
 language affords us, to fpeak of things 
 not human, but divine and inconceiv- 
 able in their own proper natures : fo a 
 phyfician and his patients, a creditor and 
 his debtors, a prince and his rebels, or a 
 judge over criminals, neither feparately 
 
 nor 
 
C 4r ) 
 nor jointly confidercd, are proper and 
 flricl: reprefentations of the reafons and 
 manner of God's proceedings with fin- 
 ners, but only help us to a more proper 
 language to fpeak about them, than any 
 other flates of human life. 
 
 To afk, whether Sin hath folely the 
 "nature of an offencey againll a prince or 
 a father, and fo is pardonable by 
 mere goodnefs ; whether it be like an 
 error in a road or path, and fo is entirely 
 at an eud, when the right path is 
 taken ; whether its guilt hath the na- 
 ture of a debt, and fo is capable of 
 being difcharged, juft as a d^bt is; 
 whether it affeds the foul, as a -wound 
 or di/ea/e afFedls the body, and fo ought 
 only to move God to a6l as a good 
 phyfician ? all thefe queflions are as vain 
 
 as 
 
( 42 ) 
 
 as to afk. Whether knowledge in God be 
 really ihinkingy or his nature a real fuh- 
 fiance. For as his knowledge and nature 
 cannot be firitJiy defined, but are ca- 
 pable of being lignified by the terms, 
 ihinJchig 2ivA Jul fiance y fo the nature of 
 lin is not firi^ly reprefented under any of 
 thefe charaders, but is capable of re- 
 CQwingfome reprefentation from every one 
 of them. 
 
 When Sin is faid to be an offence againft 
 God, it is to teach us, that we have infi- 
 nitely more reafon to dread it on God's 
 (iccotint,th?d\ to dread any offence againfl 
 our parents, or governors. 
 
 When it is compared to a dcht, it is to 
 lignify, that our fms make us account- 
 able to God, not in thc/ame manner^ but 
 •^ith the fame certainty, as a debtor is 
 
 anfwer- 
 
( 43 ) 
 anfwerable to his creditor; and becaufe 
 it has feme likenefs to a debt, which of 
 ourfelves we are not able to pay. 
 
 When it is compared to a zvound, or 
 ♦ difeafe in the body, it is not to teach 
 us, that it may as ealily be healed as 
 bodily wounds, but, to help us to con- 
 ceive the greatnefs of its evil; that, as 
 difeafes bring death to the body, fo fin 
 brings a worfe kind of death upon the 
 foul. 
 
 Since therefore, the nature and guilt of 
 lin can only fo far be known, as to make 
 it highly to be dreaded^ but not fo known 
 as to be fully underflood, by any thing 
 we can compare it to — 
 
 Since the relation which God bears to 
 finners, can only be fo known, as to make 
 it highly reafonable to proftrate our- 
 felves before him, in every inflance of 
 
 humility 
 
( 44 ) 
 humility and penitence; but not fb 
 fully known, as to teach us how, or in 
 what manner, God mufl deal with us ; it 
 plainly follows, that, if God be not an 
 arbitrary Being, but adls according to a 
 fiinefsy reJiiUing from this relation, then 
 he muft, in this refpedl, acft by a Rule or 
 Reajon known only to himfelf, and fuch 
 as we cannot poffibly ftate from the reafon 
 and ;7^///rd' of things. 
 
 This account is fufficient to Ihew us, 
 with hew little reafon and regard to 
 the nature of things, unbelievers objecfb 
 againit the Atonement for fins by Jefus 
 Chrift. 
 
 Their firlt objedion is, that Repentance 
 tilone is a fufficient atonement for fin. 
 Were they to affirm, that finning Angels 
 might fufficiently regain their former 
 perfcdion by a bare wijby they would 
 
 proceed 
 
( 45 ) 
 proceed as much according to their 
 knowledge of the nature of things, as in 
 affirming, that jinful man can merit the 
 pardon of his fins by his ozvn repentance. 
 \ fay, merits becaufe they, who hold re- 
 pentance to be 2ifufficient title to pardon, 
 can be no farther certain of it, than io 
 far as they are certain^ that it merits it. 
 And, according to this fcheme^ the peni-^ 
 tent, who thinks he has repented, need 
 not beg of God to have compaflion upon 
 him, but demands a due, which the na^ 
 iure of things gives him a right to 
 claim. 
 
 But if the nature of things, and the 
 fitnefs of adlions refulting from their 
 relations, is to be the rule of our Reafon, 
 then Reajon muft be here at a full flop, 
 and can have no more light or know- 
 ledge to proceed upon, in Hating the ;/^-. 
 
 itirey 
 
( 46 ) 
 
 ture^ the ^///, or proper atonement of fin 
 in men, than of fin in Angels. 
 
 For ReafoHy by confulting the nature 
 and jitnejs of things, can no more tell 
 us, what the guilt of fin is j what hu,rt it 
 does us i how far it enters into, and alters 
 our very nature ; what contrariety to, and 
 feparation from God, it necefiarily brings 
 upon us ; or \\\\^tfu per natural means are^ 
 or are not, necefTary to aboUfh it ; our 
 Reafon can no more tell this, than our 
 fenfes can tell us, what is the inward, 
 and what is the outzvard light of An- 
 gels. 
 
 A(k Reafon, what effe^^ fin has upon 
 the foul ? and it can tell you no more^ 
 than if you had afked^ what effed 
 the omniprefence of God has upon the 
 foui? 
 
 All?. 
 
( 47 ) 
 
 Afk Reafon, and the nature of things, 
 what is, or ought to be, the true nature 
 of an atonement for fin ; how far it is 
 like paying a dehty reconciling a difference, 
 or healing ?i wound, or how far it is difFe- 
 *rent from them ? and it can tell you no 
 more, than if you had afked, what is 
 the true degree of power that pre/erves\}g 
 in exiftence ; how far it is like that which 
 at firlt created us, and how far it is diffe^ 
 rent from it ? 
 
 All thefe enquiries are, by the nature 
 of things, made impodible to us; and 
 we can only become knowing ?iv\di philo-- 
 fopberSy in thefe matters, by deferting 
 our Reafon, and giving ourfelves up to 
 vijlon and imagination. 
 
 And we have as much authority from 
 the reafon and nature of things, to ap- 
 peal to hunger and thirjl, ^nA/enfual plea^ 
 S Me, 
 
( 48 ) 
 furey to tell us hozv our fouls fhall live in 
 the beatifick prefence of God, as to ap- 
 peal to our Reajon and Logick^ to demon- 
 ftrate how fin is to be atoned^ or the foul 
 altered, prepared^ ^nd purifed, for future 
 happinefs. 
 
 For God has no more given us our 
 Reafon, to feltle the nature of an atone- 
 ment for fin ; or to find out what can, 
 or cannot, take away its guilt, than he 
 has given us fe^ifes and appetites to flate 
 the nature, or difcover the ingredients, 
 of future happinefs. 
 
 And he, who rejeds the atonement for 
 lins made by the Son of God, as need^ 
 lefsy becaufe he cannot prove it to be 
 neceJTary, is as extravagant, as he that 
 fliould deny that God created him by 
 his only Son, becaufe he did not rememher 
 it. For our Memory is as proper a fa- 
 culty 
 
( 49 ) 
 culty to tell us, whether God at firft 
 created us, and ail things, by his only 
 Son, as our Reafon is to tell us, whe- 
 ther we ought to be reftored to God, 
 with, or without the mediation of Jefus 
 thrift. 
 
 This objedion, therefore, againflany 
 Jupernatural means of atoning for fin, 
 taken from the fiiffidency of our own Re- 
 pentance, is as dear and philofophical^ as 
 that knozvledge which is without any ideas ; 
 and as juftly to be relied upon, as that 
 condufwn which has no premifes. — 
 
 But, there are two more objections 
 urged againfl: the atonement for fin, 
 made by Jefus Chrifb. IPirft^ as it is an 
 human Jacrificey tvbidj nature itjelf ab^ 
 hors ; and which was looked upon as the 
 great abomination of idolatrous pagan 
 worfliip. 
 
 F The 
 
{ 50 ) 
 
 The cruelty, injuftice^ and impiety^ of 
 fliedding human blood in the facrifices of 
 the pagan religion, is fully granted : but 
 Reafon cannot thence bring the fmalleft 
 objediion againfh the facrifice of ChrifV, 
 as it was human. 
 
 For how can Reafon be more difre- 
 garded, than in fuch an argument as 
 this ? The Pagans were unjuft, cruel, and 
 impious, in offering human blood to 
 their falfe gods, therefore the true God 
 cannot receive any human facrifice for 
 fin, or allow any perfons to die, as a pu- 
 nifhment for fin. 
 
 For, if no human facrifice can be fit 
 for God to receive, becaufe human facri- 
 fices, as parts of pagan worfhip, were 
 iinjuft and impious; then it would fol- 
 jow, that the moYtaliiy^ to which all 
 mankind are appointed by God, muft 
 
 have 
 
( 51 ) 
 have the fame cruelty and injujikc in it; . 
 Now, that death is a punifhment for fin, 
 and that all mankind are by death offer- 
 ed as ?ifacrijice for fin, is not only a doc- 
 trine of revealed Religion, but the plain 
 didlate of Reafon. For, though it is 
 Revelation alone that can teach us, how 
 God threatened death as the punifhment 
 of a particular fin, yet Reafon muft be 
 obliged to acknowledge, that men die, 
 becaufe they are finners. But if men 
 die, becaufe they are fmners, and Rea- 
 fon itfelf mufb receive this, as the mofl 
 juflifiable caufe of Death; then Reafon 
 mud allow, that the death of all man- 
 kind is appointed by the true God, as 
 a fdcrifice for lin. But, if Reafon mufl 
 acknowledge the death of all mankind 
 as a facrifice for lin, then it can have no 
 
 juft 
 
f 52 ) 
 
 jaft obje<flion againil the facrifice of 
 Chrifl:, becauje it was human. 
 
 Revelation;, therefore, teaches nothing 
 more hard to be believed on this point, 
 than Reafon teaches. For, if it be juf^ 
 and fit in God, to appoint and devote all 
 men to death, as the proper piinijbment 
 of their fins ; how^ can it be proved to 
 be unjuft and unfit in God, to receive 
 the death of Jefus Chrift, for the fame 
 ^nds ? 
 
 I do not pretend to prove the jitnefs 
 and reajonabknefs of God's procedure in 
 the mortality of mankind ; Revelation is 
 juot under any neceflity of proving this ; 
 becaufe it is no difficulty that arifes from 
 Revelation, but equally belongs to natu- 
 ral religion ; and both of them mufl ac- 
 knowledge it to be fit and reafonable ; 
 
 not 
 
( 53 ) 
 not becaufe it can be proved to be fo 
 from the nature of things, but is to be 
 believed to be fo, by faith and piety. 
 
 But, if the neceflary faith and piety 
 of natural religion, will not fuffer us to 
 think it inconfiftent with the juftice and 
 goodnefs of God, to appoint all man- 
 kind vidims to death on the account of 
 lin, then ReafoUy or natural Religion^ can 
 have no objection againft the facrifice of 
 Chrifl, as it is an human facrifice. 
 
 And all that Revelation adds to natural 
 religion, on the point of human facrifices, 
 is only this ; the knowledge of oney that 
 gives merit, effe&y and Jan&ification^ to 
 all the reft. 
 
 Secondly, It is objedled, that the Atone- 
 ment made by Jefus Chrift, reprefents 
 God as punifliing the innocent^ and ac- 
 quitting 
 
( 54 ) 
 quitting the guilty ; or, as purrifliing the 
 innocent injiead of the guilty. 
 
 But this proceeds all upon miflake : 
 for the atonement made by Jefus Chrift, 
 though it procures pardon for the guilty, 
 yet it does not acquit them, or excufe 
 them from any punifhment, or fulfering 
 for lin, which Reafon could impofe upon 
 them. Natural religion calls men to re- 
 pentance for their fins : the atonement 
 made by Jefus Chrift, does not acquit 
 them from it, or pardon them without 
 it ; but calls them to a feverer repen- 
 tance, a higher feif-punifhment and pe- 
 nance, than natural religion, alone, pre- 
 fcribes. So that Reafen cannot accufe 
 this atonement, of acquitting the guilty ; 
 lince it brings them under a necef- 
 fity of doing morCi and performing a 
 4 Jeverer 
 
( ss ) 
 
 feverer repentance than Reafon, alone, 
 can impofe upon them. 
 
 God therefore does not, by this pro- 
 ceeding, as is unreafonably faid, Ihew 
 his di/Iike of the innocent, and his appro^ 
 * hat ion of the wicked. 
 
 For how can God be thought to pu- 
 nifli our blelTed Saviour out of dijlike, if 
 his fufferings be reprefented of fuch in- 
 finite merit with him ? Or, how can he 
 Ihew thereby his approbation of the guilty, 
 whofe repentance is not acceptable to him, 
 till recommended by the infinite merits 
 of Jefus Chrift? 
 
 Reafon therefore has nothing that it 
 can juftly objed: againft the atonement 
 made by our blelTed Lord, either as it 
 was an human facrificey or as freeing the 
 guilty, and punifhing the innocent in 
 their ftead i becaufe this y^xy Sacrifice 
 
 calls 
 
( 56 ) 
 calls people to a higher Ji ate of fufFering 
 and punifhment for fin, than Rea^ 
 foriy alone, could oblige them to un- 
 dergo. 
 
 As to the fitnefs and reafonablenefs 
 of our blelTed Lord's fufferings, as he 
 was God and man ; and the nature and 
 degree of their worth ; Reafon can no 
 more enter into this matter, or di/prove 
 any thing about it, than it can enter 
 into the ilate of the whole creation, and 
 fliew, how it could, or could not, be in 
 the whole, better than it is. 
 
 For you may as well afk any of your 
 fenfes, as afk your Reafon this principal 
 queftion, Whether any Jupernatural mean 
 he necejfary for the atonement of the fins of 
 mankind? Or, fuppoling it necefTary, 
 whether the mediation y deaths and inter^ 
 
 cefjion 
 
( 57 ) 
 erjjion of Jefus Chrift, as God and man, 
 be that true fupernatural mean ? 
 
 For, as the litnefs or unfitnefs o^ any 
 
 Jiipernatural means, for the atonement 
 of lin, muft refult from the incomprehen^ 
 
 Jible relation God bears to finners ^ as it 
 muft have fuch neceffity, worth, and dig-^ 
 nityy as this relation requireSy and be- 
 caufe it requires it; it neceflarily fol- 
 lows, that, if God adl according to this 
 relatiorty the fitnefs of his actions caniiOt 
 be according to our comprehenjion. — 
 
 Again ; Suppofing fome fupernatural 
 means to be necelTary, for defcroying the 
 guilt and power of lin ; or that the me* 
 diation, fufferingSy and interceffiony of the 
 Son of God incarnate, be the true 
 fupernatural means, it neceflarily fol- 
 lows, that a Revelation of fuch, or any 
 oi\iQX fuperiiaiural means, cannot pof- 
 
 fibly 
 
i 58 ) 
 
 fibly be made obvious to our Reafon 
 and Senfes, as the things of human life, 
 or the tranfadiions amongfl: men are ; 
 but can only be fo revealed, as to be- 
 come juft occalions of our faith^ humi-. 
 litjy adoration y and pious refignatio^y to 
 the divine wifdom and goodnefs. 
 
 For, to fay that fuch a thing is fuper^ 
 oiaturaly is only faying, that it is fome- 
 thing, which, by the neceffary flate of 
 our own nature, we are as incapable of 
 knowing, as we are incapable of feeing 
 
 fpirits. 
 
 If therefore fupernatural and divine 
 
 things be ever revealed to us, their na^ 
 
 hire cannot poflibly be revealed to us ; 
 
 that is, they cannot be revealed to us, 
 
 as they are in their own nature : for if 
 
 they could, fuch things would not be 
 
 Jiiperna-^ 
 
( 59 ) 
 fupernaiuraly but fuch as were fuited to 
 our capacities. 
 
 If an Angel could appear to us, as it 
 is in its own nature, then we fhould be 
 naturally capable of feeing angels ; but, 
 *^becaufe our nature is not capable of fuch 
 a fight, and angels are, as to us, Juper^ 
 natural objedls; therefore, when angels 
 appear to men, they muft appear in 
 fome huniatiy or corporeal form, that 
 their appearance may be fuited to our 
 capacities. 
 
 It is jufl thus, when -^Vlj Jupernatural 
 or divine matter is revealed by God : it 
 can no more poffibly be revealed to us, 
 as it is in its ozvn nature, than an Angel 
 can appear to us, or make itfelf vifible 
 by us, as it is in its own nature ; but 
 fuch fupernatural matter can only be 
 revealed to us, by being reprefentcd to 
 
{ 6o ) 
 -US by fomething that we already ytatu* 
 rally know. 
 
 Thus, Revelation teaches us this fu^ 
 pernatural matter ; that Jefus Chrift is 
 making perpetual interceffion for us in hea^ 
 <ven. For Chrift's realfiatCy or manner oi 
 exigence wdth God in heaven, in regard 
 to his Church, cannot, a;s it is in its own 
 nature^ be defcribed to us ; it is in this 
 refped: ineffabky and incomprehenfihle. 
 And therefore, this high and incon- 
 ceivable manner of Chrift's exiftence 
 with God in heaven, in regard to his 
 church, is revealed to us under an idea, 
 which gives us the trueft reprefentation 
 of it, that we are capable of; vi%, the 
 idea of a perpetual intcrcefjion for his 
 church - 
 
 But, if any one Ihould thence infer, 
 that the Son of God mufl therefore 
 
 either 
 
( 6i ) 
 cither be always upon his knees in ads 
 of mental or vocal prayer, or proftrate in 
 feme humble form of a fupplicant, 
 he would make a very weak infe- 
 rence. 
 
 Eccaufc this revealed idea of Chrid, 
 as ja perpetual IntercelTor in heaven, is 
 only a comparative reprefentation of 
 fomething, that cannot be directly and 
 plainly known, as it is in its own nature ; 
 and only teaches us, how to believe 
 fomething, though imperfedlly, yet truly 
 and ujefully of an incomprehenjible mat- 
 ter. 
 
 Juft as our own ideas .of wifdom and 
 goodnefs do not teach us what the divine 
 wifdom and goodnefs are in their own 
 natures J but only help us to believe fome- 
 thing truly and ujefully of thofe perfedli- 
 G ©ns 
 
( 62 ) 
 
 ons of God, which are in themfelvcs in- 
 conceivable by us. 
 
 But then, there is no inferring any 
 thing from thefe ideas, by which divine 
 and fupernatural things are rcprefented 
 to us, only the truth and certainty of 
 that likenefs under which they are rc- 
 prefented. 
 
 Thus, from our own idea of goodnefs 
 in ourfelves, we can infer nothing con- 
 cerning goodnefs, as it is a perfedlion 
 inherent in God, but only this, that 
 there certainly is in God fome inconceiv- 
 ahle^ infinite perfe6lion, truly anjwerahle 
 to that which we call goodnefs m. our- 
 feves, though as infinitely different from 
 it, as Omnipotence is infinitely different 
 from all that we naturally know of 
 ptwer. 
 
 But 
 
{ 63 ) 
 
 But then, vvc can proceed no farther 
 than to the truth and certainty of this 
 likenejs ; we cannot by any farther con- 
 iiderations of the nature and manner of 
 goodnefs, as it is in ourfelves, infer any 
 thing farther, as to the nature and manner 
 of tlie divine goodnefs. This is as im- 
 polTible, as to {late the real nature and 
 manner of Omnipotence ^ by confidering 
 the particulars of human power. 
 
 In like manner, our revealed idea of 
 Jefus Chrift as an Interceffor for us in 
 heaven, gives us the utmoft certainty 
 that he is in heaven for our benefit, in a 
 manner truly a.ndfully anfwerable to that 
 of a powerful Interceffor. But if, from 
 confidering our own ideas oi human Jn^ 
 iercejforsy we Ihould thence pretend to 
 infer the real fupernatural manner of 
 Chrift's exigence in heaven, we fliould 
 
 fall 
 
( 64 ) 
 
 fall into the fame abfiirdity, as if we un- 
 dertook to reprefent the true nature of 
 Omnipotence, by conlidcring what we 
 knew^ of the nature and manner of humsn 
 power. 
 
 Again : When it is revealed to us, 
 that the bleffed Jefus is the one Media^ 
 ior between God and man ; that, he is 
 the Atonement y the Propitiation, and Satis- 
 faSJion for our iins : thefe expreffions 
 only teach us as much about fo great a 
 myftery, as human language can repre- 
 fent. But, they do not teach us the 
 real or perfecJ nature of Chrift's Jate be- 
 tween God and finners. For that, 
 being a divine and Jupernatural matter, 
 cannot be revealed to us as it is in its 
 own Nature, any more than the ejfence of 
 God can be made vifihle to our eyes. 
 
 But 
 
( 65 ) 
 
 But thefe expreflions teach us thus 
 much with certainty, that there is in the 
 ftate of Chrifl between God and linners, 
 fomething infinitely and inconceivably 
 beneficial to us ; and truly anjwerahle to 
 all that we mean by mediatiofiy atonement, 
 propitiation, and Jatisfa5lion. 
 
 And though the realy internal manner, 
 of this mediation and atonement, as it 
 is in its own nature, is incomprehenfible by 
 us, yet this does not lefi^en our know- 
 ledge of the truth and certainty of it; any 
 more than the incoraprehenjibility of the 
 divine nature leffens our certainty of its 
 real exiftence. . 
 
 And as our idea of God, though con- 
 filling of incomprehenfible perfections, 
 helps us to a real and certain knowledge 
 of the divine nature; and, though all 
 myfterious, is yet the folid foundation 
 
 of 
 
( ^^ ) 
 
 of all piety ; fo our idea of Jefus Chrift^ 
 as our mediator and atonement^ though k 
 be incomprehenfible in itfelf, as to 
 its real nature, yet helps us to a cer- 
 tain and real knowledge of Chrift, as 
 our mediator and atonement ;■ and, though 
 full of myftery, is yet full of motives to 
 the higheft degrees of piety, devotion, 
 love, and gratitude unto God. 
 
 All objeclions therefore, raifed from 
 difficulties about the nature o^ atonements^ 
 propitiations y and JatisfaSiionSy as thefe 
 words are ufed to fignify in human life, 
 and common language, are vain, and 
 entirely groundlefs. 
 
 For all thefe objedions proceed upon 
 this fuppofition, thsit atonement, ox Jatis-^ 
 fa^iion, when attributed to Jefus Chrifl, 
 lignify neither more nor lefs^ than when 
 they arc ufed as terms in human laws, or 
 
 in 
 
( 67 ) 
 in civil life. — Take away this fuppa- 
 fition, and all objedlions are entirely re- 
 moved with it. 
 
 Thus, it is thought an unanfwerable 
 difficulty in the prefent cafe, Wo^ fins 
 freely pardonedy could want any expiation 9 
 Or how, after a full equivalent paid, and 
 adequate fatisfaolion given^ all could he 
 mercy and pure forgivenefs ? 
 
 And yet all this difficulty is founded 
 upon this abfurd fuppoiition, that atone- 
 ment and fatisfadlion, when attributed 
 to Jefus Chrift, lignify neither more nor 
 lefs, than atonements and fatisfadlions, 
 when fpoken of in human laws, and hu- 
 man life. 
 
 . Which is full as abfurd, as to fuppofe, 
 that power and ///>, when attributed to 
 God, iignify neither more nor X^^^y than 
 when they are fpoken of men : for there 
 
 is 
 
f 65 ) 
 is no reafon why we fhould think there 
 is any thing nnyfterious and incompre- 
 henfible in power and life, when attri- 
 buted ro God ; but what is the fame 
 reafon for our thinking, that atonement 
 ^nd faiisfa^iony when afcribed to the 
 Son of God, muft be myfterious and 
 incompreheniibfe. 
 
 To return : I have granted this great 
 principle, That the relations of things and 
 ferfonSyandthefitnefs refulting from thence ^ 
 are the fole Rule of God's al^ions : and I 
 have granted it upon this fuppofition, 
 that it muft thence follow, that God 
 muft ad: according to his own Nature ; 
 and therefore nothing could be fit 
 for God to do, or worthy of him, but 
 what had the reafon of its fitnefs in his 
 own nature : and if fo, then the Ride of 
 his adions could not fall within mr Com-* 
 ^ frehenfion. 
 
( 69 ) 
 prehenfion. And confequently, keafon 
 aloncy could not be a competent judge of 
 God's proceedings ; or fay, what God 
 might, or might not, require of us. 
 
 But though I have thus far, and for 
 this reafon, granted the A^^/i^rd* and Rela^ 
 iions of things and beings, to be the 
 Rule of God's actions, becaufe that 
 plainly fuppofes, that therefore his own 
 Nature muft be the rule of his adlions ; 
 yet linceour modern oppofers of reveal- 
 ed dodlrines of religion, hold it in 
 another fenfe, and mean by it, I know 
 not what eternal, immutable reafons and 
 relations of things, independent of any 
 Being, and which are a common ride and 
 law of God and ?nan, I entirely declare 
 againft this, as an erroneous and ground- 
 lefs opinion. 
 
 Thus, 
 
( 70 ) 
 
 Thus, when an objedor fays. If the 
 relations between things, and the fiinefi re^ 
 Julting from thence y he not the fole rule of 
 God's anions y ymiji he not he an arbitrary 
 heing^ as he here means fome eternal^ 
 iramutahle relations, independent of God ; 
 fo, to fmppofe, that God cannot be a 
 loife ancj good being, unlefs fijch eternal, 
 independent relations, be theyc?/^ rule of 
 his adiions, is as erroneous, as to affirm, 
 that God cannot be omnifcient, unlefs 
 mathematical demonflratims be his fok 
 manner of knowing all things. And it 
 is juft as reafonable to fix God's know^ 
 ledge folely in mathematical demonftra- 
 tions, that we may thence be alfured of 
 his infallible knowledge, as to make I know 
 not what independent relations of things, 
 the fole rule of his anions, that we may 
 
 thence 
 
( 7^ ) 
 thence be afliired, he is not an arbitrary^ 
 out a wife and good Being. 
 
 And we have as llrong reafons to be^ 
 lieve God to be, in the highefl degree, 
 ♦ wife and good, without knowing on what 
 his wifdom and goodnefs are founded ; 
 as we have to believe him to be 077ini^ 
 fcienty and etemaly without knowing on 
 what his omnifcience is founded ; or to 
 what his eternity is owing. And we 
 have the fame reafon to hold it a vain 
 and fruitlefs enquiry, to afk, what obliges 
 God to be IVtfe and Good^ as to afk 
 what obliges him to be Omnifcienty or 
 Eternal. 
 
 And, as it would be abfurd to afcribe 
 the Exiftence of God to any Caufey or 
 found it upon any independent Relations 
 of things, fo it is the fame abfurdity, to 
 afcribe the infinite wifdom and good- 
 nefs 
 
( 7^ ) 
 nefs of God to any cauft\ or found them 
 upon any independent relations of things. 
 
 Nor do we any more lofe the notion, 
 or lejfen the certainty of the Divine Wif- 
 dom and Goodnefs, becaufe we cannot 
 fay on what they are founded, or to what 
 they are to be afcribed, than we lofe the 
 notion of God, or render his exiftence 
 uncertainy becaufe it cannot be founded 
 on any thing, or afcribed to any caufe. 
 
 And as, in our account of the exift- 
 ence of things, we are obliged to have 
 recourfe to a Being, whofe exiftence 
 muft not be afcribed to any Caufe ^ becaufe 
 every thing cannot have a caufe, no 
 more than every thing can be created ; 
 fo, in our account of Wfdom and Good-- 
 nefsy there is the fame neceflity of hav- 
 ing recourfe to an infinite Wifdom and 
 Goodnefs, that never began to be, and 
 
 that 
 
( 73 ) 
 that is as different as to its reafm and 
 manner of exigence, from all other wif- 
 dom and goodnefs, which have a begin- 
 ning, as the exifience of God is different 
 from the exifience of the creatures. 
 
 But, if it be neceffary to hold, that 
 there is an infinite wifdom and goodnefs 
 that yiever began to be, then it is as ne- 
 ceffary to afHrm, that fuch wifdom and 
 goodnefs can no more be founded upoii 
 the relations of things, than the unhe-- 
 ginning exifience of God can be founded 
 upon the exifience of things. And to 
 feek for any reafons of a wifdom and 
 goodnefs, that could not begin to be, but 
 were always in the fajne infinite flate, is 
 iik£ feeking the caufc of that, which 
 can have no caufe, or afking, zvbat it is 
 that contains infinity. 
 
 H JBut, 
 
( 74 ) 
 
 But, to derive the wifdom and good- 
 nefs of God from the diredions he re- 
 ceives from the Relations of things, be- 
 caufe our wifdom and goodnefs are di- 
 redted by them, is as weak and vain, as 
 to found his knowledge upon ideas, be- 
 caufe our knowledge is nece£arily founded 
 upon them. 
 
 When therefore it is faid. Infinite wif- 
 dom can have no commands y hut what are 
 founded en the unalterable reofon of things ; 
 it might as juflly have been faid, an in- 
 finite Creator can have no power of creat- 
 ing, but what is founded on the unalter^ 
 chle nature of creatures. 
 
 For the req/on of things, is juft as un- 
 alterable, as the nature of creatures. 
 And if the reafons and relations of things 
 be nothing elfe but their jnamier of ex- 
 igence, 
 
( 75 ) 
 iftencc, or the fla/e of their nature, Gcr- 
 tainly the relations of things mufl have 
 the fame heginningy and the fame alter-^ 
 able or unalterable nature, as the things 
 from whence they flow. Unlefs it can 
 be faid, that a thing may exift mfuch a 
 vianneYy though it docs not exill at all. 
 
 Nothing is more certain, than that 
 the relations of things are only the partis 
 cular ftate of their nature, or manner of 
 exiftence; there can therefore no eter- 
 nal and unalterable relations exift, but 
 of things that eternally and unalterably 
 exift. Unlefs a thing may be faid to 
 exift eternally and unalterably in fuch 
 a* particular jlate of nature, or tnanner 
 of exiftence, and yet have no eternal 
 exiftence. 
 
 When therefore it is faid again, ^be 
 IVill of God is always determined hy the 
 
 nature 
 
( 76 ) 
 ffotare and reafon of things — It is the 
 fame as if it were faid, the Omnipotence 
 of God is always determined by the na^ 
 ture of caiifes and effects. For, as all 
 eaufes and effedls are what they are, and: 
 oive their nature to the omnipotence of 
 God, fo the relations of things are what 
 they are, and owe their nature to the 
 Wifdom and Will of God. 
 
 Nor does this dependance of the rela- 
 tions of things on the IVill of God de- 
 llroy the nature of relations, or make 
 them doubt fut, any more than the ex- 
 igence of things^ deperiding on the 
 Power of God, deftroys the certainty of 
 their exiftence^, or renders it doubtful. 
 For as God cannot make things toexifl, 
 and not to exift at the fame time, 
 though their exiftence depends upon his 
 • Pezzer y fo neither can he make things 
 
 to.' 
 
( 77 ) ' 
 
 to have fuch relations, and yet not to 
 have fuch relations at the fame time, 
 though their relations depend upon his 
 
 • mil. 
 
 So that, the afcribi ng the relations of 
 things to the Will of God, from whence 
 alone they can proceed, brings no un- 
 certainty to thofe duties or rules of life, 
 Mhich flow from fuch relations, but 
 leaves the flate of nature, with all its re- 
 lations, and the duties which flow from 
 them, in the greatefl: certainty, fo long 
 as nature itfelf is continued i and, when 
 that either ceafes entirely y or is only altered, 
 it js not to be wondered at, if all its re- 
 lations ceafe, or are altered with it. — 
 
 But, Dare any one fay, that God's Laws 
 are not founded on the eternal reajon of 
 things ? 
 
 1 dare fay it, with the fame affurance, 
 4 as 
 
( ^-8 ) 
 ^s tliat his Exigence is not founded olt- 
 the eternal exifience of things. And, 
 it is the fame extravagance to fay, that 
 God's laws are founded on the eternal 
 reafons of things, as to fay. that \\\^ poiver 
 is founded on the eternal capacities of 
 things. For the capacities of things 
 have jufl the fame Jolidity and eternity ^ 
 as the relations of things have; and 
 are juil fuch independent realities as they 
 are : and are juft the fame proper ma-- 
 ierials to found the omnipotence of 
 God upon, as the relations of things are 
 to found his infinite wifdom upon. 
 
 And, as we can fay, that the Omnipotence 
 of God, in prefcrving and fupporting th-e 
 'creation, will certainly ad 7////^^/y to its 
 felf, and confident with that omnipotence 
 which firft made things be what they 
 are, and put nature into fuch a fl:ate of 
 
 caufes 
 
r 79 ) 
 
 caufes and effeifls as it is in ; fo ^-e can 
 fay, that the infinite IVifdofn of God^ in 
 giving laws to the world, will ad fuit^ 
 ably to its felf, and conjifiefit with that 
 wifdom which at firfl made the nature 
 and relations of the rational world be 
 what they are. 
 
 But then, as the Omnipotence of God, 
 though it ads fuitably to the laws and 
 flate of the creation, and the nature of 
 caufes and effeds, which it firft ordain- 
 ed, yet cannot be faid to be founded 
 upon the nature of caufes and ef- 
 feds ; becaufe neither caufes nor effeds 
 have any nature, but what they owe to 
 omnipotence ; fo, the infinite IVifdofn of 
 God, though in giving laws to the 
 world, it ads fuitahly to the natures and 
 relations of rational beings, yet cannot 
 be faid to be founded upon fuch rela- 
 tions • 
 
( So ) 
 
 tions; becaufe fuch relations are the 
 e§e6ls of the divine wifdom, and owe 
 their exiflence to it. 
 
 And the reafon or relations of things 
 fliew God's antecedent wifdom, and are 
 elTcifts of it, jufl as the nature of caufes 
 and effefls fhew his antecedent power, and 
 are the efl'edls of it. And as he is in- 
 finitely powerful, but not from the nature 
 of caufes and effeds; fo he is infinitely 
 wife, but not from the reajon and nature 
 of things. 
 
 Again, if God be infinite wi^diomy then 
 his wifdom cannot be founded on the 
 relations of things ; unlefs things finite, 
 and relations that began to be, can be 
 the foundation of that wifdom which is 
 infinite, and could not begin to be. , 
 
 And to afk. What the infinite wifdom 
 of God can be founded upon, if it be not 
 
 founded 
 
( Si ) 
 
 founded upon the natures and relations 
 of things, is the fame abfurdity as to 
 aik, How God's wifdom could be zvitb' 
 cut a beginning, if we cannot tell how it 
 hegan? For if his wifdom be infinite, it 
 can no more be founded upon any things 
 or have any reafon of its exillence^ than 
 it can have any thing before it. 
 
 Therefore to afk, what it is founded 
 upon, when it can have no foundation 
 upon any things is afking, what an inde- 
 pendent Being is dependent upon, or how 
 that began,^^ which could have no be- 
 ginning ? 
 
 And to aflc the reafon or foundation 
 of anyone of the divine attributes, is the 
 fame as afking the reafon or foundation 
 of them all. And to fcek for the rea- 
 fon or foundation of all the divine attri- 
 butes^ 
 
( 82 ) 
 
 butes, is feeking for the Caufe ot God^s 
 exiflence. 
 
 And as we do not come at God's €x- 
 iftence, till we come to the end of caujes^ 
 fo nothing that is .divine^^ can be attri- 
 buted to any caufe. 
 
 Nor is it any more a contradiction to 
 fay, there is fomething whofe nature is 
 without any caufe or foundation of its 
 exifrence, than to fay fomething exifts 
 without ever hegimimg to exifl. For as 
 nothing can have a beginning, but as it 
 proceeds from fome caufe; fo that, 
 which can have no beginning, can have 
 no caufe. If therefore the divine wif- 
 dom ever hegan to be infinite^ and we 
 could know when that beginning was; 
 we fhould have fome pretence to fearch 
 for ihaty upon which its infinity was 
 
 founded i 
 
( 83 ) 
 founded ; but if it never could begin to 
 be, then to feek for its reafon, or foun^ 
 dation, is feeking for its beginning. 
 
 It may be alked. Is there then no rea^ 
 Jon or nature of things ? Yes ; as certainly 
 as there are things. But the nature and 
 reafon of things, confidered independently 
 of the divine Will, or without it, have no 
 more ohligation in them, than a divine 
 wcrjhip confidered independently of, and 
 witliout any regard to the exifience of 
 God. For the Will of God is as abfo- 
 lutely neceffary to found all moral ohli^ 
 gat ion upon, as the exigence of God is 
 neceflary to be the foundation of reli- 
 gious worOiip. And the fitnefs oi moral 
 shh'gaiions, without the Will of God, is 
 only like the fitnefs of a religious worihip 
 without the exifience of God. 
 
 And 
 
( S4 ) 
 
 And it is as juft to fay, that he de* 
 flroys the reqfon of religion and piety, 
 who founds it upon the nature and ex- 
 igence of God, as to fay, he faps the 
 foundation of moral obh'gations, who 
 founds them upon the Will of God, 
 And as religion cannot be juftly or fo« 
 Jidly defended, but by fhewing its con- 
 nexion with, and dependance upon, 
 God*5 exigence ; fo neither can moral 
 obligations be alTerted with flrength and 
 reafon, but by fliewing them to be the 
 Will of God. 
 
 It may again be afked, Can God make 
 that fit m its Jelf\ which is in its felf 
 ahfolutely unfit to be done ? 
 
 This queftion confifts of improper 
 terms. For God's Will no more makes 
 actions to be fit /// ihemfehes, than it 
 
 makes 
 
( 85 ) 
 
 makes things to exift m, or of themf elves » 
 No things, nor any acflions, have an/ 
 ahfolute fitnefs, and in themjelves. 
 
 hgifty a hloWy the making a wound^ 
 
 ^ or Jhedding of ^/<?o^, confldered in them- 
 
 felveSj have no ahjohte fitnefs, but are 
 
 fit or unfit according to any variety of 
 
 incidental circumflances. 
 
 When therefore God, hy his Will, 
 makes any thing fit to be done, he does 
 not make the thing fit in its felf^ which 
 is jufl in the fame ftate confidered in its 
 fefy as it was before ; but, it becomes 
 fit for the perfon to do it, becaufe he 
 can only be happy, or do that which is 
 fit for him to do, by doing the Will of 
 God. 
 
 For inflance, the hare eating a fruit, 
 
 confidered in its f elf ^ is neither fit nor 
 
 Tuifit, If a fruit be appointed by GoJ 
 
 I for 
 
( 86 ) 
 
 for our food and nouriihment, then it is 
 as fit to eat it, as to preferve our lives. 
 If a fruit be poifonous, then it is as un- 
 fit to eat it, as to commit felf-murder. 
 If eating of a fruit be prohibited by an 
 exprefs order of God, then it is as un- 
 fit to eat it, as to eat our own damna- 
 tion. 
 
 But in none of thefe inftances is the 
 eating or not eating, confidered in its 
 Jelfy jit or unfit; but has all its fitnefs, or 
 unfitnefs, from fuch circumflances, as 
 are entirely owing to the Will of God. 
 
 Suppoiing, therefore, God to require 
 a perfon to do fomcthing, which, accord- 
 ing to his prefent circumftanccs, with^ 
 out that command, he ought not to do, 
 God does not make that which is ahjo^ 
 liitely un^t in itfelfy fit to be done; but 
 only adds 7uzv circumftances to an action, 
 
 that 
 
( 87 ) 
 •that is neither fit nor unfit, moral nor 
 immoral in it/elf, but hecaufe of its cir- 
 cumftances. 
 
 To inftance, in the cafe of Abrahmn rc- 
 ^ quired to facrifice his Ton. The killing 
 of a man is neither good nor bad, con- 
 iidered ahfoluiely in its felf* It was un- 
 lawful for Abraham to kill his fon, be- 
 caufe of the circumftances he was in with 
 regard to his fon. But when the divine 
 Command was given, Abraham was in a 
 new ft ate ; the adlionhad new circumftan- 
 ces ; and then It was as lawful for Abra^ 
 ham to kill his fon, as it was lawful for 
 God to require any man's life, either by 
 Ji chiefs y or any other means he fhould 
 pleafe to appoint. 
 
 And it had been as unlawful for Ahra^ 
 
 ham to have difobeyed God in this 
 
 extraordinary command, as to have 
 
 1 2 curfed 
 
{ S8 ) 
 
 curfed God at any ordinary calamity oi 
 providence. — 
 
 Again, it is objcdled. If there he 7W- 
 Mng right or wrongs good or hady antece- 
 dently and independently of the Will of God, 
 there can he no reafon, why God fhould 
 Willi or command one things rather than 
 another. 
 
 It is anfwered> firft. That all good- 
 nefs, and all poffible perfe6lion, is as 
 eternal as God, and as ejfential to him as 
 his exiftence. And to fay, that they 
 are either antecedent or confequenty depen- 
 dent or independent of his Will, would 
 be equally abfurd. To aik, therefore, 
 whether there be not fomething right 
 and wrong, antecedent to the Will of 
 God, to render his Will capable of being 
 right, is as abfurd, as to afk for fome 
 antecedent caufe of his exiftence, that 
 
 he 
 
( 89 ) 
 he may be proved to exift neceflarily. 
 And to afk, how God can be good, if 
 there be not fomething good indepen- 
 dently of him, is afking how he can be 
 infinite, if there be not fomething infi- 
 nite independently of him. And, to 
 feek for any other fource or reajon of the 
 divine Goodnefs, befidcs the divine Na- 
 ture, is like feeking for fome exter- 
 nal caufe, and help of the divine omni- 
 potence. 
 
 The goodnefs and wifdom, therefore, 
 by which God is wife and good, and to 
 which all his works of wifdom and 
 goodnefs are ovving, are neither antece^ 
 denty nor confequeyit to his Will. — 
 
 Secondly, Nothing is more certain, 
 
 than that all moral Obligations and Duties, 
 
 of creatures towards one another, began 
 
 with the exigence of moral creatures^ 
 
 4 This 
 
( 9^ ) 
 This is as certain, as that all phyficd 
 relations^ and corporeal qualities and 
 effeds began with the exiilence of 
 bodies. 
 
 As therefore nothing has the nature 
 of a caufe or eifedl, nothing has any- 
 quality of any kind in bodies, but w hat 
 is entirely owing to matter fo created 
 and conftituted by the IVilloi God; fo, 
 it is equally certain, that no adions have 
 any moral qualities^ but what are wholly 
 owing to that flate and nature in which 
 they are created by the Will of God. 
 
 Moral obligations, therefore, of crea- 
 tures, have the fame origin^ and xh^Jame 
 reafofiy that natural qualities and effe(5ls 
 iiave in the corporeal world, vi%. the 
 Jole Will of God, And,, as in a different 
 Itate of matter, bodies would have had 
 different qualities and effeBs; fo, in a 
 ' , different 
 
( 91 ) 
 different flate of rational beings, there 
 would be different moral obligations; 
 and nothing could be right or good in 
 their behaviour, but what began then to 
 ^ be right and good, becaufe they then 
 began to exifl in fuch a flate and condi- 
 tion of life. And, as their ftate and con- 
 dition could have no other caufe or rea 
 fon of its exigence, but the fole Will of 
 God, fo the caufe and reafon of rjght 
 and wrong, in fuch a ftate, mud be 
 equally owing to the Will of God. 
 
 The pretended ahjolute independent fiu 
 neJfeSy or mifitnejfes of adlions, therefore, 
 in ihemfeheSy are \2an ahftratiions^ and 
 philofophical jargon; ferving no ends of 
 morality ; but only helping people to 
 wrangle and difpute away that fmcere 
 obedience to God, which is their only 
 happincfs. But, to make thefe imagi^ 
 
 nary 
 
( 92 ) 
 
 nary ahfoluie fitnejfes the common Law both. 
 of God and man, is ftill more extrava- 
 gant. For, if the circumjiances of ac- 
 tions, give them their moral nature , 
 furely God mufl firll be in our circum- 
 ftances, before that, which is a law to 
 us, can be the fame law to him. 
 
 And, if a father may require that of a 
 fon, which hisfon, becaufeof his ^z^- 
 rent ftaie, cannot require of his brother j 
 furely that, which God may require of 
 us, may be as different from that, which 
 a father may require of a fon, as God is 
 different from a father. 
 
 To fay, that the reafon of things is the 
 fame law to God as it is to us, is fay- 
 ing, that God is in the fame ft ate y with 
 regard to the nature of things, as we 
 are. For, as things are a law to us, be- 
 caufe we are in Jach a ftate ; if they be 
 
 the 
 
( 93 ) 
 t\{Qfame lazv to God, it muft be, beclufe 
 God is in the fame (late as we are. 
 
 Again, if God be as much under a 
 law as we are, than he is as much un- 
 der authority i for law can no more be 
 without authority, than without a law- 
 giver. And if God and we are under 
 the fame laWyWe^ mufb be under the 
 fame authority. 
 
 But as God cannot be under any law 
 in common with us, his creatures, any 
 more than he can be of the fame rank or 
 order with us ; fo neither can he be under 
 any law at all, any more than he can be 
 under any authority at all. 
 
 For that, which is the Ruky or Reajon 
 of God^s aciions, is no more different 
 from his own Will, than his power i^ 
 different from his Will, 
 
 3 And 
 
C 94 ) 
 
 And though God is not to be looked 
 upon as an arbitrary Being, in the fenfe of 
 thofe, who will not diliinguiih arbitrary 
 from humour and caprice ; yet, in a bet- 
 ter and only true fenfe of the word, when 
 applied to God, he muft be affirmed to 
 be an arbitrary Being, who acls only from 
 himjelfy from his own Willy and according 
 to his own pleafure. 
 
 And we have no more reafon to be 
 afraid to be left to a God without a law, 
 than to a God that had no beginning ; or 
 to be left to his Will and pleafure, thaa 
 to be left under the proteclion and care 
 of a Being, who is all love, and mercy, 
 and goodnefs. For, as the exiftence of 
 God, as fuch, neceifarily implies the ex- 
 iftence of all perfedion ; fo the Will of 
 God, as fuch, neceifarily implies the 
 
 willing 
 
( 95 ) 
 "jjilling every thing, t\\2it all per fe3lion(:2iVi-> 
 will. 
 
 And as the exiftence of God, becaufe 
 it contains all perfedlion, cannot for that 
 reafon have any external Caufe ; fo the 
 Will of God, becaufe it is all perfeSIioUy 
 cannot, for that reafon, have any exter- 
 nal Rule or dire ^ ion. But his own Will 
 is Wifdom, and his Wifdom is his Will. 
 His Goodnefs is arbitrary, and his Arbi- 
 trarinefs is goodnefs. 
 
 To bring God therefore into a ftate 
 of moral obligation and fjbjedlion to 
 any external Lazv or Ruky as we are, has 
 all the abfurdity of fuppofing him to be 
 a finite, dependant:, temporary^ imper- 
 feci; improveable, governable Being, as 
 we are. 
 
 The truth of the matter is this ; Rea- 
 fon is in God and man, as Power is in 
 
 God 
 
( 96 ) 
 God and man. And, as the divine 
 Power has fome degree of likenefs to 
 human power, yet with an infinite diffe- 
 rence from it ; fo that perfection, which 
 we call Reajon in God, has fome degree 
 of likenefs to reafon as it is in man, yet 
 is infinitely and be}'ond all conception 
 different from it. 
 
 Nor can any one Ihew, that we enjoy 
 Reafon in a higher degree in refped: of 
 God, than we enjoy power ; or that the 
 manner y or light of our Reafon, bears 
 any greater likenefs to the light and 
 knov/ledge of God, than the ?nanner and 
 e.xteni of our power bears to the omni- 
 potence of God. 
 
 And as our enjoyment of power is fo 
 limited, fo imperfedl, fo fuperficial, as 
 to be fcarce fufhcient to tell us, what 
 power is, much lefs what omnipotence 
 
 is; 
 
( 97 ) 
 
 is; fo ^tS'our fliare of Reafon is fo fmall, "^^ 
 and we enjoy it in fo imperfed: a man^ 
 ner, that we can fcarce think or talk in- 
 telligibly of it, or fo much as define our 
 ^own faculties of reafoning. 
 
( 9S ) 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 Shelving^ from the flate ^;/i relation between 
 God and fnaUi that human Reafon cannot 
 poJJibJy he a competent judge of the fitnefs 
 ^;/i reafonablenefs of God's proceedings 
 'with mankind, either as to the time, or 
 matter, or manner, of any external Re^ 
 velation^ 
 
 OINCE it has frequently been laid 
 down as an undeniable Rule of God's 
 adlions, that he mufl, if he be a wife 
 and good being, acl according to the 
 relation he ftands in towards his crea- 
 tures ; I proceed, upon this principte, to 
 prove the incapacity of human Reafon, to 
 
 judge 
 
( 99 ) 
 judge truly of God's proceedings in re* 
 <rard to divine Revelation. 
 
 For^ if the fitnefs of actions refiilt 
 from the nature and relations of beings, 
 ♦ then the jjtnc/s of God's actions, as he is 
 'Sinoinnijlieni Creator and Governor yto whom 
 every thing is eternally foreknowny over 
 beings endued with our freedom of zvill^ 
 niuft be to us very incomprehenfible. 
 
 We are not fo much as capable of 
 comprehending, by our own Reafon, the 
 pojfihiliiy of this relation, or how the 
 foreknowledge of God can conlift with 
 the free agency of creatures. We know 
 that God foreknows all things, with the 
 fame certainty as we know there is a 
 God. And, lifelf-confcioufnefs be an in- 
 fallible proof of our own exiilence, it 
 proves, with the fame certainty, the free- 
 dom of our wiU. And hence it is, that 
 
 we 
 
( ico ) 
 
 "He have a full aflurance of the confiilen- 
 cy of God's fore-knowledge with free- 
 dom of will. 
 
 Now this incomprehenfihle relation be- 
 tween an eternally fore-knowing Creator 
 and Governor y and his free creatures, 15 
 the relation from whence arifes the fitttcfs 
 of God*s providence over us. But if 
 the relation itfelf be incomprehenfible, 
 then thofe adlions that have their fitnefs 
 from it, muft fjrely be incomprehenfi- 
 ble. Nothing can be fit for God to do, 
 either in Creation or Providence^ but what 
 has its fitnefs founded in his own Fore^ 
 knowledge of every .thing that v/ould fol- 
 low, from every kind of creation, and 
 every fuanner of providence. But if no- 
 thing can be fit, but becaufe it is ac- 
 cording to this fore "knowledge of every 
 thing that v/ould folio w^ from every kind 
 
 of 
 
of creation, and every manner of provi- 
 dence; then we have the utmoft certainty, 
 that thtfitnefs of God's adlions, as a fore» 
 knowing Creator and Governor of free 
 ^ agents, muft be founded upon reafons, 
 which we c-xnnot pojfibly know anything 
 of. 
 
 And a Child ^ that has but jufl learned 
 to fpeak, is as well qualified to ftate the 
 fitnefs of the laws of matter and motion^ 
 by which the whole vegetable world is 
 preferved, as the wifcft of men are quali- 
 fied to comprehend, or ftate the fitnefs 
 of the methods, or proceedings, which 
 a fore^knowing Providence preferves over 
 free agents. For every reafon, on which 
 the fitnefs of fuch a Providence is found- 
 ed, is not only unknozvn to us, but by a 
 necefTity of nature impoffible to be known 
 by us. 
 
 Fori 
 
( 102 ) 
 
 For, ifthe j^/n<-/}of God*s ading m 
 this, or that manner, be founded in his 
 fore^knowledge of every thing that would 
 bappeUy from every pqffihle way of adling, 
 ihefiy it is juft as abfohitely impoffible for 
 us to know the reafons, on which the 
 iitnefs of his adlions is founded, as it is 
 impoflible for us to be omnifcient. 
 
 What human Reafon can tell, what 
 kind of beings it is fit and reafonahle for 
 God to create, on the account of his 
 own eternal Fore^know ledge ? And yet, 
 this is as poUible, as for the fame Rea- 
 fon to tell, how God ought to govern 
 beings already created, on the account 
 of his own eternal fore-knowledge : and 
 yet, God can neither create^ nor govern 
 his creatures, as it i^fit and reafonable\it 
 fhould, unlefs he creates and governs 
 them in ibis or that manner, on the ac^ 
 
 count 
 
( 103 ) 
 
 count of his own fore-knowledge. And 
 therefore, if he ad: like himfelf, and wor-^ 
 thy of his own nature, the fitnefs of his 
 proceedings mufl for this very reafon^ 
 hecaufe they are fit, be vaflly ahove our 
 comprehenfion. 
 
 Who can tell what different kinds of 
 rational creatures, diflinguifhcd by va- 
 riety of natures, and faculties, it is fit 
 and reafonable for God to create, be- 
 caufe he eternally for ef aw what would be 
 the effe5i of fuch different creations? 
 Who can explain the jitnejs of that vafl 
 variety there is amongfl rational crea- 
 tures of the fame /pedes y in their rational 
 faculties, or fhew that all their different 
 faculties ought to be as they are ? And 
 yet, the fitnefs of this providence has its 
 certain reafm in the divine fore-know* 
 
 ledge; 
 
( I04 ) 
 
 ledge; and it could not be fit, but be- 
 caufe of it. 
 
 Who can tell what degree of Reafon ra- 
 tional creatures ought to enjoy, becaufe 
 they are rational ; or what degrees of new 
 and revealed knowledge it is fit and rea- 
 fonable for God to give, or not give 
 them, becaufe they feem, or feem not to 
 themfclves to want it? are difpofed, 
 or not difpofed, to receive it ? For, as 
 mankind cannot tell why it was fit and 
 reafmable for God to create them of fuch 
 a kind, and degree, as they are of; fo nei- 
 ther can they tell how God ought, or 
 ought not to add to their natural know- 
 ledge, and make them as differently ac^ 
 CQimtahle for the ufe of revealed rules of 
 life, as for the ufe of their natural fa, 
 cultics. 
 
 And 
 
( 105 ) 
 
 And as the reafon, why God created 
 them of fucb a kiudy and v^'ith fiuh facuU 
 ties, was becaufe of his own fore-know- 
 ledge of the effe^s of fuch a creation ; {03 
 rf ever he do reveal to them any fu^ 
 pernatural knowledge, both the doing it, 
 the tifnCy and mattery and ^nanner of it, 
 mud have its fitnejs in his own eternal 
 Fore-knowledge oixkiQ.t^^di% of fuch a Re- 
 velation. 
 
 The reafbns therefore, on which the 
 jitnejs of this or that Revelation, zvhy^ or 
 wheriy of what mattery in what mannery 
 and to whom it is to be made, muft, from 
 the nature and reafon of things, be as un- 
 fearghable by us, as the reafons of this 
 or that creation of rational beings, at 
 fuch -iktimey of fuch a kindy in fuch a 
 fiaie. 
 
 This may help us to an eafy folution 
 
 af 
 
( io6 ) 
 
 t)f thtfc unreafonahle questions, which are 
 io often propofed — — 
 . If the defign of God in communicating any 
 thing of hinifelf io fuen were their happinefs, 
 would not that defign have obliged him, who 
 at all times alike defres their happinefs^ i& 
 have at all times alike communicated it to 
 ihem f If God always a5l for the good of his 
 creatiireSy what reafon can he affigned, why 
 hefhould not from the heginning have difco^ 
 vertdfuch things as make for their good, but 
 defer the doing ity till the time o/" Tiberius ? 
 Since the fooner this was done^ the greatcv 
 would his goodnefs appear^ 
 
 And again^ How is it confiflent with the 
 notion of God' s being univerfaUy benevolent ^ 
 not to have revealed it to all his children^ when 
 all had equal need of it f JVas it not as eafy 
 
 for 
 
( 107 ) 
 for him io have communicated it to all nations^ 
 as to any one nation or per/on ? Or in all 
 languages, as in one^ 
 
 Now, all this is fully anfwered by one 
 great and fundamental principle — 
 
 For, if the relations between things and 
 perfonSy and the fitnefs refultingfrom thence, 
 he the fole Rule of God's anions ; then, the 
 fdenile or reafon of God's revealing any 
 thing to any man, or men, at any time, 
 muft have its fitnefs refulting from the 
 divine Fore-knowledge of the effeds of 
 fiich a revelation, at ficch a time, and on 
 fucb perfons. If God do not adl thus, 
 he does not ad: according to the relation 
 betwixt a fore-knozving Creator, and his 
 fre'e creatures. But if he do ad: ac- 
 cording to ?i fitnefs refulting from this re- 
 lation, and make or do not make re^ 
 velationc, according to his own fore- 
 knowledge 
 
( io8 ) 
 
 Icnowledgc of the fitnefs of times, and 
 perfons for them ; then, to afk, how a 
 God, always equally good, can make ^ 
 Revelation at any time, and not make 
 the fame at all times, is as abfurd as to 
 afk, how a God, always equally good, 
 can reveal that at one time, becaufe it is 
 a proper time for it, and not reveal it at 
 any other time, though every other time 
 is improper for it ? 
 
 God's goodnefs, directed by his own 
 fore-knowledge of the flne/s of times, 
 and of the JiaU and anions of free agents, 
 deferred a certain Revelation to the time 
 of Tiberius^ t^caufe \\q forefaw it would 
 then be an ad of the greateft goodnefs, 
 and have its hejl effefls upon the world. 
 To afk therefore, zvbat reajoyi can he affign- 
 edy why fo good and beneficial a Reve- 
 lation was not foonery or even from the 
 4 bigiH'^ 
 
( 1^9 ) 
 leginning made to the world, is a{kii\g> 
 ■What reafon can he affigned, why God i*^ 
 good, and intends the greateft good by 
 what does, or flays for the doing any 
 ijiing, till fuch time as makes it a 
 greater good than if he had done it 
 fooner ; it is aiking, why God fliouid a6^ 
 according to h\s own fore^knowledge of 
 the fiate and a&ions of free agentSy and 
 order all things according to a fitnefs 
 refulting from fuch a fore-knowledge ? 
 
 Now, this appealing to God's Fore- 
 knowledge of the ftate and adions of 
 free agents, as the Gaufe of all that is 
 particular in the time and w^?/;/^r of any 
 revelation, and deducing its Rtnefs from 
 thence, cannot be faid to be Pegging tbi 
 queftim in difpute ; but is rcfolving it 
 dire<5lly according to the Rule, which is 
 laid down for God to adl by, which is 
 Iw this : 
 
( "o ) 
 
 this' : That the relations between things and 
 perfonSy ^nd, the Jit ne/s re/ultingfrom thence, 
 mii/l he the Jole rule of God* s aclionSy unlejs 
 he he an arbitrary being. 
 '. But if this be xki^fole Rule, then God 
 in giving any revelation muft adt, as the 
 relation betwixt a fore-knowing Creator 
 and his free creatures requires ; and his 
 adlions muft have their fit7tefs rejulting 
 from his fore-knowledge of the fate and 
 anions of free agents. But if this be 
 God*s fole rule, made neceflary to him 
 from the nature of things, then to afk 
 why this or /^^/ revelation was given, only 
 at fuch 2l time, is to alk, why God only 
 does that which is fit for him to do? And 
 to a(k, why not the fame revelation at 
 any other time, is afking, why God does 
 not do that, which it is not fit for him 
 to do ? 
 
 A. Bur, 
 
( I" ) 
 
 But, IVas a not as eafy for God to havh 
 communicated it to all nations, as to any one 
 nation orperfon f Or in all language s^ as in 
 any one f — This argument is built upon 
 f^e truth and reafonahlen^fs of this fuppo- 
 fition. That God docs things becaufc 
 they are eafy, or forbears things becaufe 
 they are difficult to be performed. For, 
 it can be no argument, that God ought 
 to have revealed fuch things to all na- 
 tions or perfons, becaufe it was as eafy 
 to him, as to do it to any one nation or 
 perfan ; unlefs it be fuppofed, that the 
 eafinefs of a thing is a reafon why God 
 does it, and the difficulty of a thing a 
 reafon why he does not do it. But, if 
 this fuppofition be very abfurd, then the 
 argument founded upon it mufl be liable 
 to the fame charge. 
 
 It is as eafy to God to make all men 
 
 con-. 
 
( i22 ) 
 
 tonformable to his Will, as to make iree^ 
 and plants grow according to his plea^ 
 jfure.; but though it is as eafy, yet it is^ 
 not as fit and reafonable for God to do all 
 )yj power in the rational world, as he 
 does all by power in the vegetable. It 
 i^ as eafy for God to deftroy all linful 
 natures, a3 to preferve them in being i 
 aixl if he dp one rather than the other, 
 it is not becaufe one is ^tf/^<?r than the 
 other, but becaufe the perfedlions of hi& 
 awn nature move him to it. 
 
 But if God do things, not becaufe 
 they are eafy, but becaufe they are in- 
 finitely good and fit to be done, and 
 founded in the relation of a fore-knowing 
 Creator to his free creatures ; then,, the 
 reafon why God has alibrded different 
 revelations to different ages and perfons 
 is thisj Th^t his manner of revealing 
 
 every 
 
( "3 ) 
 every thing might be worthy of his own 
 fore-knowledge of the effeds of it ; and that 
 everything, which is particular in the time 
 or manner of any revelation, might have 
 its fi.tnefs rcfidtiyig from the relation be- 
 i:wixt a good God and his creatures,whofe 
 changing ftate, different condudl, tempers 
 and actions are all eternally fore-known 
 by him. 
 
 Again ; it is objedled, that a divine 
 Revelation mufl either be the effed: of 
 Juftice, or elfe oi Mercy ?ind free Goodnefs ; 
 but in either of thefe cafes it ought to 
 h^ univerfal ; for juftice muft be done 
 to all. But, if it be the effedl o'f mercy 
 2ind free goodftefs, it is afked, Hozv a being 
 can he denominated merciful and good^ who 
 isfo only to a few, hut cruel and unmerciful 
 to the reft ? 
 
 It is anfwered. That there is neither 
 
 Jiiftice 
 
( ru ) 
 Juftici HiGod without Mercy,. nor Mer^ 
 cy< without Juftice ; and to afcribe a Re^ 
 velation to either of them feparately, in. 
 cmtYodiftinEliou to the other, has no more 
 truth or reafon in it, than to afcribe 
 the Creaiion feparately either to the IVi/^ 
 doniy or Power of God, in contradiftinc- 
 tipn tothe other. 
 
 Secondly y ^^ A divine revelation is 
 Xtot owing to the jufiice or free goodnefs 
 of God, either feparately or jointly con- 
 fid ered ; but to the goodnefs, mercy,, 
 and juftice of God, governed 2indi direQed 
 by his eternal Fore-knowledge of all 
 the effeds of every revelation, at any, or 
 all times. 
 
 God ordains a Revelation in this or 
 that manner, time, and place ; not be- 
 caufe it is a jujlice- that he cannot refufe, 
 
 nor 
 
( Its ) 
 
 nor becaufe it is matter of favour or 
 free Goodnefs, and therefore may be 
 given in any manner at pleafure ; but 
 becaufe he has the whole duration of hu- 
 man things, the whole race of mankind, 
 ^the whole order of human changes and 
 events, the whole combinaiionoidiiX caufes 
 and effedts of human tcmpei^, all the 
 anions of free agents, and all the canfe^ 
 quences of every revelation plainly in his 
 fight ; and according, to this eternal 
 Fore-knowledge, every revelation re- 
 ceives every thing that is particular in 
 it, either as to timey mattery manner yOt 
 place. 
 
 All complaints therefore, about that 
 which is particular or Jeemingly partial in 
 the time and manner of any revelation, 
 are ^try unjuftifiable ; and fhew, that 
 we are difcontent at God's proceedings, 
 
 becaufe 
 
f ri6 ) 
 
 becaufe he a6ls like himfelf, does what 
 is bejl and jittejl to be done, and governs 
 the v/orld, not according to our weak 
 imaginations, but according to his own 
 infinite perfed:ions. 
 
 We will not allow a Providence to be 
 rights uiilefs we can comprehend and ex- 
 plain the reafonablenefs of all its fteps ; 
 and yet it could not pqffibly be right, un- 
 lefs its proceedings were as much above 
 our. comprchenfion, as our wifdom is 
 below that which is infinite. 
 
 For, if the r el atiomo{ things and perfons, 
 and the fitnefs refulting from thence, be 
 the Rule of God's adlions ; then, ail the 
 revelations that come from God, muft 
 have their jitnefs refulting from the 
 relation his Fore-knowledge bears to 
 the various Jlates, coTiditions^ tempers y 
 and a^iions of free agents, and the 
 
 wrioiis 
 
( "7 ) 
 
 various effeSls of every manner of revcw 
 lation. 
 
 But, if God cannot acl worthy of him- 
 felf, in any manner of revelation, unlcfs 
 lae acfls according to a fitnefs refulting 
 from this relation ; then, we have the 
 highefl: certainty, that he mufl ad by a 
 i?;//^ that lies out of our fight ; and that 
 his Providence in this particular mull be 
 incomprehenfble to us, for this very rea^ 
 fon, becaufe it has that very fitnefs, wif- 
 dom, and goodnefs in it, which it ought 
 to have. 
 
( 11^ ) 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 Sheimng, how fur human Riajon is ena^ 
 Ikd to judgis of ihi reafonablenefg^ 
 truth, mid certiunry of divine Rcve* 
 Jation. 
 
 A HE former chapter has plainly 
 ihewn, from the Hate and relation be-- 
 tween God and man, that we mud be 
 ftrangers to the true reafons on which a 
 divine Revelation is founded, both as to 
 its time^ mattery and manner. 
 
 But it is here objedled. If God ^^ hy rea^ 
 fan of his own perfe^Hons, miift he thus my^ 
 ferious and incomprehenfible y both in the- 
 matter and manner of divine Revelation - 
 
( i»9 ) 
 
 bozv can we know what revelations we are 
 to receive as divine f How can we be blamed, 
 for reje5ling this, or receiving thaty if zvt 
 cannot comprehend the reafons on which every 
 Revelation is founded^ both as to its matter 
 and manner? 
 
 Jufl as we may be blamed for fomc 
 notions of God, and commended for 
 others, though we can have no notions 
 of Godi but fuch as are myfterious and 
 ificonceivahle. We are not without fomc 
 natural capacity of judging right of God> 
 of finding out his perfedlions, and prov-* 
 ing what is or is not worthy to be af- 
 cribcd to him. Yet, what the divine 
 perfe6tions are in themfelves, what they 
 impfy and contain in their own nature 
 and manner of exifbence, is altogether 
 myfterious and inconceivable by us, at 
 prefent. If therefore a man may be 
 
 blameable 
 
( 126 ) 
 
 blameable or commendable for his right 
 or wrong beli€f of a God ; then a man 
 may be accountable for a right or wrong 
 belief of fuch matters, as are in their own 
 nature too myfterious for his comprehen- 
 lion. And, though a man knows the rea- 
 fons of a divine Revelation, either as to 
 its matter or manner^ as imperfeiflly as he 
 knows the divine nature ; yet he may be 
 as liable to account for believing falfi 
 revelations^ as for idelatry ; and as full of 
 guilt for rejedting a true Revelation^ as for 
 denying the only true God, 
 
 ■Secondly^ Though we are infuffi- 
 cient for comprehending the reafons, on 
 which the particular ntatter or manner of 
 any divine Revelation is founded ; yet 
 we may be fo far fufficicnt judges of the 
 re-afons ior. receiving or not receiving a re- 
 velation 
 
( 127 ) 
 
 velation as divine, as to make our con- 
 dud: therein juflly accountable to God. 
 
 For, if God can ihew a Revelation to 
 •proceed from him by the fame njideniahle 
 evidence, as he Ihews the Creation to be 
 his work; if he can make himfelf as vi- 
 fible m2i particular extraordinary manner, 
 as he is by his general 2ivA ordinary Frovi^ 
 dence, then, though we are as unqualified 
 to judge of the myfteries of a Revelation, 
 as we are to judge of the myfteries in 
 Creation and Providence ; yet, we may be 
 as fully obliged to receive a Revelation, 
 as to acknowledge the Creation to be the 
 work of God ; and as highly criminal 
 for dilbelieving it, as for denying a ge- 
 neral Providence. 
 
 Adam, Noab, Abraham, and Mofes were 
 
 very incompetent judges of the reafons 
 
 on which the particular Revelations 
 
 M made 
 
( 122 ) 
 
 made to them were founded ; but this 
 =did not hinder their fufficient aflurance, 
 that fuch Revelations came from God ; 
 becaufe, they were proved to come from 
 God in the fame manner, and for the 
 fame reafons, as the Creation is proved 
 to be the Work of God. 
 
 And as Ada7Ji and Noah mufb fee every 
 thing wonderfuly myfterious^ and ahove their 
 comprehenjions in thofe new worlds, into 
 which they were introduced by God ; 
 fo they could no more exped that he 
 fliould require nothing of them, but what 
 they would enjoin themfelves, than that 
 their own frame, the nature of the crea- 
 tion, the providence of God, or ihtftate of 
 human life, Ihould be exadlly as they 
 would have it. 
 
 And if their pofberity will let no mef- 
 /age!> from heaven, no prophecies and mi- 
 racles 
 
( i^a ) 
 
 yade6 perfuade them, that God can cair- 
 them to any duties, but fuch as they mull- 
 enjoin themfelves ; or to the belief of any 
 doclrines, but fuch as their own minds 
 can fugged; nor to any methods of 
 changing their prefent ftate of weakncfs 
 and diforder for a happy immortalit/ 
 but fuch. as fuit their own iajley temper^ 
 and way of reafoning*. it is, becaufe they 
 are grown fenfelefs of the rnyfteries of cre- 
 ation 2iVidi providence y with which they are 
 furrounded, and forget the awful prero- 
 gative of infinite zvi/dom over the weakefl", 
 lowed rank of intelligent beings. 
 
 For the Excellence of a Revelation is 
 to be acknowledged by us, for the fame 
 reafon that we are to acknowledge the 
 excellence of Creation and Providence ; 
 not becaufe they are wholly according 
 to human conception, and have no my- 
 
 deries, 
 
( 124 ) 
 iieries, but becaufe they are proved to 
 be of God. 
 
 And a Revelation is to be received as 
 coming from God, not becaufe of its 
 internal excellence, or becaufe we judge 
 it to be worthy of God 5 but becaufe 
 God has declared it to be his, in as plain 
 and undeniable a manner, as he has de- 
 clared Creation and Providence to be his. 
 F^or, though no Revelation can come 
 from God, but what is truly worthy of 
 him, and fiill of tvtry internal excel- 
 lence -J yet, what is truly worthy of God 
 to be rcvealedy cannot poflibly be known 
 by us, but by a< Revelation fromhimfelf. 
 
 And, as v/e can only know what is 
 worthy of God in Creation, by knowing 
 what he has created ; fo we can no 
 other way pofTibly know what is worthy 
 of God to be revealed, but by a Revela- 
 
 tiona. 
 
( 1^5 ) 
 tlon. And he that pretends, independ- 
 ently of any Revelation, to fliew how^ 
 and in what manner God ought to make 
 a Revelation worthy of himfelf, is as 
 great a Vifionary^ as he that fhould pre- 
 fend, independently of the Creation, or 
 without learning any thing from it, to 
 fhew how God ought to have proceeded 
 in it, to make it worthy of himfelf. For, 
 as God alone knows how to create wor- 
 thy of himfelf, and nothing can poflibly 
 be proved to be worthy to be created 
 by him, but becaufe he has already 
 created it ; fo God alohc knows what is 
 w orthy of himfelf in a Revelation, and 
 nothing can poiTibly be proved worthy 
 to be revealed by him, but becaufe he 
 has already revealed it. 
 
 Were it allowed that a Revelation 
 cannot be divine, if it contain anything 
 
 rnyfie^ 
 
( 126 ) 
 myjferiousy whofe fitnefs and neceffity 
 cannot be explained by human Reafon, 
 then neither Creation nor Providence can 
 be proved to be divine ; for they are both 
 of them moremyJferioHSth^n the Chriftian 
 revelation. And Revelation itfelf is 
 thererfore myfterious, becaufe Creation 
 and Providence cannot be delivered from 
 myflery. And, were it pofUble for man 
 to comprehend the reafons, on which the 
 manner of the Creation and divine Pro- 
 vidence are founded, then Revelation^ 
 might be without myfleries. 
 
 But, if the M)Jleries in Revelation be- 
 owing to that, which is, by the nature of 
 things incompreheniible in Creation and 
 Providence, then, it is very iinreajonahle 
 to rejed Revelation, becaufe it has that 
 which it muft neceffarily have; not from 
 itfelf, but from the jnature and ftate of 
 
 things 
 
f 127 ) 
 
 things. And much worfe is it to deny 
 Revelation to be divine, for fuch a rea- 
 fon, as makes it equally fit to deny 
 Creation and Providence to be of God. 
 
 For, if every thing be arbitrary, whofe 
 fii^iefs and expedience human Reafon can- 
 not prove and explain, then furely an in- 
 vifihle over-ruling Providence^ that orders 
 all things in a mariner, and for reafons 
 known only to its felf ; that fubjedis hu- 
 man life, and human affairs to v/hat 
 changes it pleafes ; that confounds the 
 beft laid defigns, and makes great eifedls 
 arife from folly and imprudence ; that 
 gives the race not to the fwift, nor the 
 battle to the flrong ; that brings good 
 men into afflidion, and makes the wick- 
 ed profpcrous ; furely Juch a Providence 
 muft be highly arbitrary. 
 
 And, therefore, if this argument be to 
 
 be 
 
( 128 ) 
 be admitted, it leads diredlly to Aiheifmj 
 and brings us under a greater neceflity 
 of rejecting this notion of divine Provi* 
 dence, on the account of its myjleries, 
 than of rejeding a Revelation that is 
 myfterious in any of its dodlrines. And 
 if God cannot be faid to deal with us as 
 rational agent, if he requires anything 
 of us, that our Reajon cannot prove to be 
 necefTary, furely he cannot be faid to 
 deal with us as rational and moral agents, 
 if he over-rule our perfons and affairs, and 
 difappoint our counfels ; make weak- 
 nefs profperous, and wifdom unfucceii- 
 ful, in 2ijecret and invifihle manner, and 
 for reafons and ends that we have no 
 means of knowing. 
 
 And, if it may be faid, To what pur- 
 pofe has he given us Reafon, if that be 
 not folely to give laws to us ? furely it 
 
 may 
 
f 129 ) 
 
 may better be faid,To what purpofe has^ ' 
 he given us Reafon to take care of our- 
 felves, to provide for our happinefs, ta * 
 prepare proper means for certain ends, ' 
 if there be an over^ruling Providence, that ♦ 
 changes the natural courfe of things ; that ' 
 confounds the beft laid deiigns; and dif^ ' 
 appoints the wifeft counfels ? 
 
 ^0^ There is nothing therefore half 
 Jo rnyfterious in the Qorifiian revelation^ 
 confidered in itfelf, as there is in that 
 invifible Providence, which all muft hoId> 
 who believe a God. And though there 
 is enough plain in Providence, to excite 
 the admiration of humble and pious 
 minds, ytt it has often been a rock of 
 Atheijm to thofe, who make their own 
 Reafon the meafure of wifdom. 
 
 Again, Though the Cr^^/Z^?;? plainly de- 
 clares the glory, and wifdom, and good^ 
 
 nefs 
 
( 13° ) 
 ncfs of God ; yet it has more myjteries iix. 
 it, more things whofe fitnefs, expedience,, 
 and reafonablenefs, human Reafon can- 
 not comprehend, than are, to be found 
 in Scripture. 
 
 If therefore he reafon right, whofaysr^ 
 If there inay hefome things in a true Reli-^ 
 gioriy zvhofe jitnefs and expedience we cannot 
 Jeey why not others f Nay,, why not the whole? 
 fince that would 77iake God's lazvs all of a 
 piece. Andy if the having of thefe things he 
 710 proof of its falfJjQody how can any things 
 jit and expedient [which no Religion is with-^ 
 out] be a proof of the truth of any one Reli-^ 
 gionf If I fay, this be right reafoning, 
 then it may be faid. If there he things in 
 the Creation, whofe fitnefs we cannot fee, 
 why not others ? Nay, why not the whole' ^ 
 fmce that would make all God's works of a 
 piece, An4 if the being of fuch things as 
 
 thefe 
 
{ 131 ) 
 
 thefe in the Creation he not a proof of its 
 7iot being divine, how can the fitnefs and 
 expedience of any Creation prove, that it 
 is the zvork of God F 
 ^ Thus does this argument tend wholly 
 to Atheifm, and concludes with the 
 fame force againfl Creation and Provi^ 
 dence, as it does againfl Revelation. 
 
 The true grounds and reafons,cn which 
 we are to believe a Revelation to be di- 
 vine, are fuch external marks and figns 
 of God's acflion and operation, as are a 
 fufficient proof of it. And if God have 
 no ways of ading that are peculiar and 
 particular to himfelf, and fuch as fuffi- 
 ciently prove his adlion and operation, 
 then Revelation can have no fufficient 
 proof that it comes from God. 
 
 And if a Revelation had no other 
 
 proof of its Divinity, but fuch an in- 
 
 5 ternal 
 
( ^32 ) 
 tcrnal excellency and fitnefs of its doc- 
 trines, as is fully known and approved 
 by human Reafon / fuch an internal ex- 
 cellency would be fo far from being a 
 fufficient proof of its Divinity, that it 
 ■would be a probable objedlion againft it. 
 For it has an appearance of great proba- 
 bility, that God would not make an ex- 
 ternal Revelation of that only, which 
 ^NVi^fuffidenilydiTidi fully known without it. 
 Although, therefore, no Revelation can 
 come from God, whofe dodlrines have 
 not an interndi excellency^ and the highejt 
 fitnefs ; yet the non-appearance of fuch 
 excellency and fitnefs to our Reafon, can- 
 not be a difproof of its Divinity ; be- 
 caufc, it is our ignorance of fuch mat- 
 ters, without Revelation, which is the true 
 'grmndand reafon of God's revealing any 
 thing to us. 
 
 The 
 
( 133 ) 
 
 The Credibility, therefore, of divine 
 Revelation refts chiefly upon fuch exter^ 
 ^al evidence, as is a fufticient proof of 
 the divine operation, or interpofition. If 
 there be no fuch external evidence pol^ 
 fible ; if God has no ways of adling fb 
 peculiar to himfelf, as to be a fufficient 
 proof of his adion, then a Revelation 
 cannot be fufficientl)' proved^to be divine. 
 
 I appeal therefore to the Miracles and 
 Prophecies, on which Chriftianity is 
 founded, as 2i/ufficient proof it is a divine 
 Revelation. And fliall here conlider, 
 what is obje(^ed againft the fufficiency 
 -of this kind of proof. 
 
 I.' It isobjedled. That Miracles can- 
 not prove a falfiy or i^ad docflrine, to be 
 Irue and good^- therefore miracles, as/ucb, 
 cannot prove the truth of any Revelation. 
 N But 
 
( 134 ) 
 
 Buf, though miracles cannot prove 
 falfe to be true, or bad to be good ; yet 
 they may prove, that we ought to "re- 
 ceive fuch dodlrincs, both as true and 
 good^ "which we could not know to be 
 true and good without fuch miracles. 
 
 Not becaufe the miracles have any 
 influence upon the things revealed, but 
 becaufe they teflify the credibility of the 
 Revealer, as having God's teftimony to 
 the truth of that which he reveals. 
 
 If therefore miracles can be a fuffici- 
 ent proof of God's fending any perfons 
 to fpeak in his nam.e, and under his 
 authority ; then they may be a fufficienr 
 proof of the truth and divinity of a Re- 
 v<^lation, though they cannot prove that 
 which is falfe to be true. 
 
 But, If evil beings can imprejs notions in 
 
 men's minds as fircngly as good beings, and 
 
 J ciiufe 
 
( J35 ) 
 
 caufe miracles to he done in confirmation of 
 them ; is there any way to know to which of 
 the- tzvo, notionSy thus imprejjedy are owin^, 
 hut from their nature and tendency ^ or in^ 
 ipjial marks of zvifdom and goodnefs ?• -* 
 Ayid if foy Can external proofs carry us any 
 farther than the internal proofs do ? 
 
 This objedtionfuppofes, that no mi- 
 racles, as fuchy can be a fufficient proof 
 of the divinity of a revelation ; for this 
 reafon, bccaufe we do not know the ex- 
 tent of that power, which evil fpirita 
 have, of doing miracles. But this ob- 
 jection is groundlefs. For, granting 
 that we do not know the nature and ex- 
 tent of that power which evil fpirits may 
 have ; yet, if we know enough of it to af^ 
 firm, that the Creation is not the work of 
 evil fpirits ; if we can fecurely appeal to 
 the Creation, as vl fufficient proof oi Go&s 
 
 adion 
 
( '36 ) 
 
 adion and operation ; then we are fully 
 fecure in appealing to miracles, as a 
 fufficient proof of a divine revelation. 
 
 For, if the Creation mufl of 'neceflity 
 be allowed to be the work of God, not- 
 with {landing any unknown degree of pow- 
 er in evil fpirits ; if we can as certainly 
 afcribe it to God, as if we really knew 
 there were no fuch fpirits ; then miracles 
 may be as full a proof of the operation, 
 or interpofition of God, as if we really 
 knew there were no fuch fpirits in be- 
 ing, 
 
 I do not aik. Whether thtfame divine 
 perfciflion is neceffary to foretel fuch 
 things as are foretold in Scripture, and 
 work fuch miracles as are there related, 
 as is neceilary to create. I do not afk. 
 Whether any power lefs than divine can 
 do fuch things ? I only afk. Whether 
 
 there 
 
( 137 ) 
 there be any certainty, that the Creation 
 is the work of God ? Whether we can 
 befure of the divine operation, from the 
 exigence of that creation, which we arc 
 acquainted with ? Or, Whether we are 
 in any doubt or uncertainty about it, be- 
 caufe we do not know the true nature or 
 degree of power, that may belong to 
 evil fpirits ? 
 
 For, if it can be affirmed with certain- 
 ty, that the Creation is the work of God, 
 notwithilanding our uncertainty about 
 the degree of power that may belong to 
 evil fpirits ; then we have the fame cer- 
 tainty, that the Prophecies and Miracles 
 recorded in Scripture are to be afcribed 
 to God, as his doing, notwithftunding 
 our uncertainty of the power of evil 
 fpirits. 
 
 And this is affirmed, not becaufe Fro^ 
 
 ^becies 
 
( 138 ) 
 
 fhecies and Miracles require the fame de^ 
 gree of divine power, as to create ex nihU 
 loy [for that would be affirming we know 
 not what] but it is affirmed, becaufe the 
 Creation cannot be a better^ farther, or 
 different proof of the action or operation 
 of God, than fuch miracles and prophe- 
 cies are. 
 
 For, every reafon for afcribing the 
 creation to God, is the fame reafon for 
 afcribing fuch miracles and prophe- 
 cies to' God ; and every argument againft 
 the certainty of thofe miracles and pro- 
 phecies coming from God, is the fame 
 argument againft the certainty of the 
 Creation's being the work of God ; for 
 there cannot be more or lefs certainty in 
 one cafe than in the other. 
 
 For, if evil fpirits have fo the creation 
 in their hands, that by reafon of their 
 
 power 
 
( ^39 J 
 power over h, no miracles can prove rhor 
 operation of God, then the operation of 
 God cannot be proved from the Creation 
 itfelf. 
 
 * For the Creation cannot be proved to 
 be the operation of God, unlefs it can bQ 
 proved that God ftill prefides over it. 
 
 And if tf// that, which is extraordinary 
 and miraculous, may be accounted for 
 without the interpofition of God ; thea 
 nothing that is ordinary and common, ac- 
 cording to the courfe of nature, can be 
 a proof of the ad:ion of God, For 
 there can be no reafon afligned, why 
 that which is ordinary fhould be afcribed 
 to God, if all that is, or has, or can be 
 miraculous^ may be afcribed to evil 
 fpirits. 
 
 Either therefore it muft be faid, that 
 there are or may be miracles, which can- 
 not 
 
( Uo ) 
 jriot be the efFedls of evil fpirits ; or elfe^ 
 nothing that is ordinary and common 
 can be a proof of the operation of God. 
 For, if nothing miraculous can be an un- 
 deniable proof of God's adlion, nothing 
 created can be a proof of it. 
 
 The matter, therefore, flands thus : 
 There are, and may be. Miracles, that 
 cannot be afcribed to evil fpirits, with- 
 out afcribing the Creation to them ; and 
 which can no more be doubted to come 
 from God, than we can doubt of his be- 
 ing the Creator of the world. There 
 may be miracles therefore, which, as 
 Juchy and, conlidered in ihemfeheSy are as 
 full a proof of the truth of that which- 
 they atteft, as the Creation is of the fit- 
 nejs of that which is created. 
 
 And though the matter of a Revela- 
 tion is to be attended to, that we may 
 
 fully 
 
( m ) 
 
 fully underftand it, and be rightly af- 
 fected with it ; yet the reafon of our re- 
 ceiving it as divine, muft reft upon that 
 external authority^ which flicws it to be- 
 of God. 
 
 And the authority of Miracles, fuffi- 
 ciently plain and apparent, are of them- 
 felves a full and neceflary reafon for re- 
 ceiving a Revelation, which, both as to 
 its matter and manner^ would not be ap- 
 proved by us without them. 
 
 It feems therefore, to be a needlefsy and 
 too great a conceflion, which fome learned 
 divines make in this matter, when they 
 grant, that we muft firft examine the 
 Dodtrines revealed by Miracles, and fee 
 whether they contain any thing in them 
 abfurd, or unworthy of God, before we 
 can receive the Miracles as divine. For^ 
 
 I. Where 
 
( 142 ) 
 
 I . Where there can be nothinst doubts 
 cd, nor any more required, to make the 
 Miracles fuflicientjy plain and evident^ 
 there can be no doubt about the truth 
 and goodnefs of the Do6lrine they atteft. 
 Miracles, in fuch a flate as this, are the 
 lad refort j they determine for them- 
 felves, and cannot be tried by any thing 
 farther. 
 
 And as the exifience of things is the 
 higheft and utmoft evidence of God'5 
 having created them, and is not to be 
 tried by our judgments about the reafona- 
 blenefs and ends of their creation ; fo a 
 courfe of plain undeniable Miracles, at* 
 tefting the truth of a Revelation, is the 
 higheft and uimoft evidence of its coming 
 from God, and is not to be tried by our 
 judgments about the rea/dnablenefs or ne^ 
 cejfify of its dodlrines. 
 
 And 
 
( 143 ) 
 
 And this is to be affirmed, not becaufc 
 God is too good to fuffer ns tn be brought 
 into fuch a fnare, but becaufe we can 
 know nothing of God, if fuch a courfc 
 of Miracles be not a fufficient proof of 
 his adlion and interpofition. For if Doc- 
 trines, revealed by fuch an undeniable 
 change in the natural courfe of things, 
 have not thence a fufficient proof, that 
 they are divine doctrines ; then no Laivs^ 
 that are according to the natural ftate 
 of things, can have thence any proof, that 
 they are divine laws. 
 
 For if no courfe of miracles can be of its 
 Jelfdi fufficient proof, that that which is 
 attefted by them, is atcefted by God 5 
 then t\o fettled y ordinary ftate of things 
 can of its f elf be a proof, that that which 
 is required by the natural ftate of things, 
 is required by God. 
 
 2. To 
 
( U4 ) 
 
 1. To try Miracles, fufficiently plain 
 an<^ evident, by nur judgments of the rea- 
 fonablenefs of the doctrines revealed by 
 them, feems to be beginning at the wrong 
 end. For the Dodlrines had not been 
 revealed, but becaufc of our ignorance 
 of the nature and reajonahlenefs of them ; 
 nor had the Miracles been wrought, but 
 to -prevent our acquiefcing in our own 
 judgments about the worth and value of 
 them, 
 
 3. To fay. That no Miracles, however 
 plain and evident, are to be received as 
 divine, if they attell any Doctrine that 
 appears to human Reafon to be abfurd, 
 or unworthy of God, is very unreafon- 
 able. For what is it that can be called 
 human Reafon in this refped:? Is it any 
 thing clfe than human opinion ? And is 
 
 there 
 
( U5 ) 
 there any thing that mankind are ill 
 greater uncertainty, or more contrary to 
 one another, than in their opinions about 
 what is abfurd, or unworthy of God in 
 rehgion ? And is it not the very end and 
 dcfign of a divine Revelation, to help us 
 to a Rule that may put an end to the di- 
 vifions of human Reafon, and furnifh us 
 with an authority for believing fuch 
 things, as we fhould not think it reafon- 
 able to believe without it. 
 
 And how weak and -ufelcfs muft that 
 Revelation be, which has not fufficient 
 authority to teach us nezv notions of reli- 
 gion, and perfuade us to believe that to 
 be reafonable and worthy of God, which 
 we co'uld not believe to be fo upon a lefs 
 authority. 
 
 But if this be the cafe, as it feems 
 
 •clearly to be, then we are not to try plain 
 
 O and 
 
( H6 ) 
 
 tind evident Miracles of the highefl kind, 
 hy our judgjnents of the reafonablenefs of 
 the dodlrines revealed by them ; but Mi- 
 racles are to be received, as of fufncient 
 authority to form and govern our opi- 
 nions about the reafonablenefs of the 
 dodlrinea. 
 
 It may perhaps be faid, though the 
 authority of Miracles is fufficient to go- 
 vern our opinions in dodlrines that are 
 only myfterious, and above the compre- 
 henfion of our Reafon, yet that which 
 is plainly and groOy abfurd, or unworthy 
 of God, cannot, nor ought to be receiv- 
 ed upon any authority of the grcatefl: 
 Miracles. 
 
 This objection is vain and abfurd ; it 
 is vain, becaufe it relates to a cafe, that 
 never was the cafe of Miracles ; and it is 
 abfurd, becaufe it is providing againfb a 
 
 cafe 
 
( ni ) 
 
 cafe that never can happen to Miracles. 
 Fot to fuppofe any thing in its own na- 
 ture grofly abfurd, or unworthy of 
 God, to be attefled with the highelt 
 eyidence of miracles, is as impoilible 
 and contradiclory a fiippofition, as to 
 fiippofe God to create rational beings 
 wicked in their nature, that they might 
 thereby be of fervice to the devil. 
 Thefe two fiippofitions have not the 
 fmalleft difference, either in abfurdity^or 
 impoflibility. 
 
 Again, The hiflory of magical won- 
 ders, and extraordinary things done by 
 evil fpiritSi is no objedion againft the 
 flifficiency of that proof that arifes from 
 Miracles. For, the queftion is not, 
 whether nothing that is extraordinary 
 can be done by evil fpirits; in any cir- 
 ojmftancesybut whethernothing that is^^^ 
 
 miraculous 
 
( 148 ) 
 miraculous can, as fuch, be a proof of 
 its being done by God. For thefe two 
 cafes are very confiflent ; it may be 
 very poffible for evil fpirits to do things 
 extraordinary in fome circumfl:ances,as 
 where people enter into contracts with 
 them, and refign themfelvesup to their 
 power, and yet thatMiracles may, in other 
 drcumjlmces^merely as Miracles, be a fuf- 
 iicient proof of their being done by God. 
 Thus the cafe of the Egyptian magici^ 
 mis, is fo far from abating the weight of 
 miracles, that it is a great proof of their 
 authority, confidered in themfelves. For 
 the Magicians could proceed but a little 
 way in their contention with Mqfes ;, 
 they were foon made to feel his fuperior 
 power in the fame mann-er, as the reft 
 of the Egyptians did, and to confefs that 
 his Miracles were done by the Finger of 
 
 God.. 
 
( '49 ) 
 God. This very inflaiice therefore fully, 
 lliews, that Miracles, as f itchy may be a 
 fufficient proof of God'5 interpoiition. 
 For if, in the cafe of a contention, the 
 fiiperior power muft be afcribed to God, 
 tlfcn Miracles as Juchy or oi fiich a kind y 
 as having none equal to them, or able . 
 to ftand againfl them, mufl, in fuch a 
 flate, be a fufficient proof of their being- 
 done by God, and give a fufficient war- 
 rant to receive any Dodlrine that is at^ 
 tefted by them.. 
 
 For, let it be fuppofed, that the Egyp^- 
 iian Magicians had deftroyed the power 
 of MofeSy and brought all the miraculous 
 evils upon the Ifraelites, as enemies of the- 
 Egyptian Gods, which he brought upon 
 them ; what . confequence mufl Reajon. 
 have drawn from fuch an event ? Could 
 Rcafon have proved, that the God that 
 
 made 
 
( ^5o ) 
 made the world was one God, and that 
 he alone ought to be worlhipped ? Or 
 that the Egyptians ought to have left their 
 Gods, who had the whole Creation in their 
 hands in fuch a manner, as to change the 
 nature of things as they pleafed, and 
 deftroy every power that oppofed them. 
 Now, either the cafe here fuppofed is 
 poffible, or it is impoffible. If it be pof- 
 fible, then all the reafons for worlhip- 
 ping the one true God^ taken from the na-- 
 iure dind JIate of the credition, may en- 
 tirely ceafe, and be fo many reafons for 
 idolatrous worfhip. For no one can 
 have any reafons for worfhipping the one 
 true God, from the nature and Itate of 
 the Creation, if other Gods have the 
 greatefl power over it, and can turn 
 every thing into d. plague upon thofe that. 
 do not worfhip them. 
 
 But 
 
( J^I ) 
 
 Blit if this cafe be impoflible, then it 
 necelTarily follows, that Miracles, asfuch^ 
 and confidercd in ihcmfelveSy may be cer- 
 tain and infallible proofs of God's inter- 
 poiition. For this cafe can only be im- 
 pofTible, becaufe the greateft, plained 
 Miracles cannot pollibly be on the fide 
 of error. But if this cannot be, then the 
 greateft, plaineit Miracles, as Juchy and 
 confidered in them/elves y are an infallible 
 mark of truth. 
 
 And he that abides by Miracles in fuch 
 circumftances, as proofs of the operation 
 of the one true God, has the fame cer- 
 tainty of proceeding right, as he that 
 takes the flatc and nature of the Cre- 
 ation, to be the eifed: of the one true 
 God. 
 
 And as Miracles, thus confidered in 
 thcmfelves, are the highefl and moil 
 
 undeniable 
 
( 15^ ) 
 imdeniable evidence^ of- the truth and 
 divinity of any Revelation ; fo Chrif- 
 ti^nity ftands fully diftinguifhed from- 
 all other religions, by the higheft and 
 moft undeniable evidence; fince it has 
 all the proof that xkit higheft Jiate of Mi- 
 racles can give, and ^\try other reli- 
 gion- is without any fupport from them*' 
 Thus I have, from a confideration of 
 the {late and condition of man, and the^ 
 feveral relations which God ftands in 
 towards his creatures, ihewn, that it is 
 utterly impoflible for human Reafon to 
 be a competent judge of the fitnefs, or 
 unfitnefs, of all that God may, or may 
 not, require of us. The two following 
 chapters fhall ftate the nature and per- 
 fedlion of Reafon, coniidered in itfelf, or 
 as it is a faculty, or principle of adion . 
 in hunciaa nature, 
 
 CHAP^ 
 
( 153 ) 
 
 GIIAP. IV* 
 
 Ofthejlate and nature of REASON, as 
 it is in man ; and hozv its perfe£fi(m in 
 matters of Religion is to. be known.. 
 
 X EOFLE, who take to themfelves the 
 names of Free-thinkers , make their court 
 to the world, by pretending to vindicate 
 the right that all men have, to judge and 
 ad: according to their own Reafon. 
 Though, I think, the world have no more 
 to thank them for on this account, than 
 if they had pretended to aiTert the right 
 that every man has, to fee only with his 
 oi^n eyesy or to henr only with his own. 
 ears.. 
 
 For 
 
( ^S4- ) 
 
 For their own Reafon always did,doeSi 
 and* ever will, govern rational creatures;, 
 in every thing they determine, either in 
 fpeculation or pradlice. It is not a matter 
 o^ duty for men to ufe their own Reafon, 
 but ofneccffity: and it is as impoffible to 
 do otherwife, as for a Being, that can- 
 not aift but from choice, to adl without 
 choice. And if a man were to try not- 
 to a(^ according to his own Reafon or 
 Choice, he would find himfelf under the 
 fame difficulty, as he that tries to think, 
 without thinking upon fomething. 
 
 And if God were to command us, 
 by freih revelations, every day of our 
 lives, not to a6l from a principle of Rea- 
 fon and Choice, fuch revelations could' 
 have no more effedtupon us, than if they 
 came from the W'eakeft amongft man- 
 Kind. For, as our principle of adling is • 
 
 njofe 
 
( I5S ) 
 not derived from ourfclvcs, fo it is no 
 more in our power to alter it, or con- 
 tradidl it, than it is in the power of mat- 
 ter not to gravitatCy or to exifl, without 
 taking up fome place, 
 
 Man is under the fame ncceflity of 
 a^ing from his own choice, that matter 
 is of not acting at all : and a being, 
 whofe principle of acTiion is Reafon and 
 Choice, can no more ad: without it, or 
 contrary to it, than an extended being 
 can be without extcniion. 
 
 All men, therefore, are equally rea- 
 fonable in this refped:, that they are, and 
 rnufl be, by a ;^f rf^/y of nature, equally 
 direded and governed by their own 
 Reafon and Choice. 
 
 For, as the principle of adion, in hu- 
 man nature, is Reafon and Choice y and 
 nothing can be done, or believed, but for 
 2 fc?ne 
 
( 156 ) 
 Jo7ne reafofty any more than a thing can be 
 chofen and not be chofen ; fo the ading 
 according to one's own Reafon, is not 
 the privilege of the Philq/ophery but ef* 
 fential to human nature ; and as infc- 
 parable from all perfons, as felf-con~ 
 fcioufnefsj or a fenie of their own ex-^ 
 iftence. 
 
 The difpute, therefore, betwixt Chrif--^ 
 tians and Unhelievers, concerning Reafon, 
 is not, whether men are to ufe their own 
 ReafoHy any more, than whether they arc 
 to fee with their own eyes ; but whether 
 every man's Reafon muft needs guide 
 him by its own lights or muft ceafe to 
 guide him, as foon as it guides him by 
 a light borrowed from Revelation ? This 
 is the true Hate of the queftion ;' not 
 ivhether Reafon is to be followed, but 
 when it is heji followed ? not whether it 
 
 is 
 
( 157 ) 
 is to be our Guide, but how it may be 
 made our faf eft guide. 
 
 The Free-thinkers^ therefore, rather ap* 
 peal to the Pailions, than the Reafon of 
 the people, when they reprefent the 
 Clergy and Chriftianity as enemies to 
 Reafon, and juft thinking, and them- 
 felves as friends and advocates for the 
 ufe of Reafon. 
 
 For, Chriftians pretend to no guide, 
 but under the guidance of their Reafon ; 
 nor to alTert any thing, but becaufe it 
 cannot be reafonably denied. They 
 oppofc unbelievers, not becaufe they 
 reafoHy but becaufe reafon ///. They re- 
 ceive Revelation, not to fupprefs the 
 pouer, but to improve the light of their 
 Reafon ; not to take away their right of 
 judging for themfelves, but to fecure 
 them from falfe Judgments : and what- 
 P ever 
 
( I5S ) 
 t!Ver is required to be believed^ or prac- 
 tifed, by Revelation, is only fo far re- 
 quired, as there is reafon for it ; or, be- 
 caufe it is more reafonab.Ie than the 
 contrary. 
 
 Ifj therefore, a poor peafant Ihould 
 call upon our Free-thinkers, to lay alidc 
 their bigotry to ideas^ arguments^ and phL 
 lofoph)\ and govern themfelves by Rea- 
 fon ; it would be no more abfurd, than 
 for them to exhort Chridians to lay 
 afide their bigotry to creeds and do&rines 
 of Revelation, and to govern themfelves 
 .by Reafon. 
 
 For it may as well be affirmed, that a 
 man departs from the ufe of his Reafon, 
 becaufe he depends upon ideas^ argiu- 
 mentSy and Jyllogijms ; as that he departs 
 from the ufe of his Reafon, becaufe he 
 
 proceeds 
 
( liTQ ) 
 proceeds upon Prophecies, Miracles y and 
 Revelations, 
 
 And if he ufe his Reafon weakly 
 and be fubjccl to deiuiion in thefe points, 
 Ivs no more renounces his Reafon, or goes 
 over to another direclion, than Hobhes, 
 Spinofa, Bayle, Collins , or Tolandy renounce 
 their Reafon, when they take their owi> 
 fancies to be demonflrations. 
 
 Chriftians, therefore, do not difl^r 
 from unbelievers, in the conftant ufe of 
 their Reafon,' but in the manner of ufmg 
 it : as virtuous men differ from Rakes, 
 not in their defire of happinefs, but ia 
 their manner of feekins: it. 
 
 It appears from what has been faid, 
 that. Every man's own Reafon is his only- 
 principle of adion ; and that he mufl 
 judge according to it, whether he re- 
 ceives, or rejeds, Revelation. 
 
 Now, 
 
( i6o ) 
 
 Now, although every man is tojudgc 
 according to the light of his own Rea- 
 fon, yet his Reafon has very little light 
 that can be called ils owji. For, as we 
 derive our nature from our parents, fa 
 that which we call generally natural 
 knowledge^ or the light of nature, is a 
 knowledge and light that is made natu-. 
 ral to us, by th.t fame authority which 
 makes a certain languagey certain cujiomsy 
 and 7nodes of behaviour, natural to us. 
 
 Nothing feems to be our own, but a 
 lare capacity to be inflruded, a nature 
 fitted for any impreHions ; as capable of 
 vice as virtue ,♦ as ready to be made a 
 vicious animal, as a religious rational 
 creature ; as liable to be made a Hotten-* 
 iot^ by being born among Hottentots^ 
 as to be a Chrijiian^ by being born among 
 Chriftians, 
 
1 i6i ) 
 
 So that our moral and religious know- 
 ledge is not to be imputed to the inter- 
 nal light of our oi^y^ Re af on dind Nature, 
 but to the happinefs of having been 
 born amongft reafonable beings, who 
 have made a fenfe of religion and mo- 
 rality as natural to our minds, as arlicu^ 
 laie language to our tongues. 
 
 It is not my intention by this, to iig^i 
 nify that there is not a good and evil^ right 
 and wrongs founded in the nature of 
 things ; or that morality has any depen- 
 dance upon the opinions or cuftoms of 
 men ; but only to fhew, that we find, out 
 this right and wrong, come to a y^/i/t' of 
 this good and evil, not by any inward 
 ftrength, or light, that nature of itfelf 
 affords, but by fuch external means, as 
 people are taught articulate language, 
 
 civility. 
 
( i62 ) 
 
 chilityy politenefsy or any other rules of 
 civil life. 
 
 Men do not prefer virtue to vice, from 
 a philofophical contemplation of the fit^ 
 nefs of the one, and the unfitnefs of the 
 other, founded in the nature of things ;. 
 but becaufe it is a judgment as early in 
 their minds, as their knowledge of the 
 words, Virtue and Vice. 
 
 And it can no more be reafonably af- 
 firmed, that our knowledge of God and 
 divine things, our opinions in morality^ 
 of the excellency of this or that virtue, 
 of the immortality of our fouls, of a fu- 
 ture life, of rewards and punifhments, arc 
 the effedls of our natural light i than it 
 can be reafonably affirmed, that our liv- 
 ing mfociety^ our articulate language, and 
 er^-^ pojiure^ are owing to the light of 
 nature. 
 
 For, 
 
( 1^3 ) 
 
 Tor, as all mankind find themfelves itt 
 this flate, before any reafoning about it 5 
 as educatioiiy and human authority have fet 
 our bodies upright ^ taught us language y^indi 
 accuilomed us to the rules and manners 
 of a focial life; {o education yTmidi the/ame 
 human authority, have imprefled and 
 planted in our minds, certain notions of 
 God and divine things, and formed us 
 to a fenfe of good and evil, a belief of our 
 foul's immortality, and the expedlation 
 pf another life. 
 
 And mankind are no more left to find 
 out a God, or the fitnefs of moral vir- 
 tue, by their own Reafon, than they arc 
 left by their own Reafon to find out who 
 are fheir parents, or to find out the fit- 
 nefs of fpeaking an articulate language, 
 or the reafonablenefs of living in fociety. 
 
 On the contrary ; we know that our 
 
 manner 
 
r 1^4 )^ 
 
 manner of coming into the world fubjedls 
 tis, without any choice, to the language; 
 jentimeniSy opinionsy and manners of thofe 
 amongit whom we are born. And 
 though, when we come to any ftrength; 
 or art of reafoning, or have a genius for 
 philofophick enquires, we may thence 
 deduce proofs of the Being and Atirihuies 
 of God, the Reajonahlenejs of religion 
 and morality, the l^lature of our fouls^ 
 and the Certainty of a future fbate, and 
 find that the opinions and tradition of 
 mankind, concerning thefe thingsj are 
 well founded; yet thefe are an after-' 
 knowledgey not com.mon to men, but 
 accidental confirmations of that know^- 
 ledge and belief of a God, Religion, 
 and Morality, which were before fixed 
 in us more or lefs^ by education, and the 
 2 authority 
 
( ^65 ) 
 
 authority of thofe amongft whom v/e 
 have lived. 
 
 And as no Philofopher ever proved the 
 fiinefs of human nature for a focial life,, 
 frgm principles of reafon and fpeculation, 
 who had notfirft been taught the nature 
 and advantage of Society another way ; fo 
 no one ever pretended to prove the Be- 
 ing and attributes of God, or the excel- 
 lency of moral Virtue, who had not firj^ 
 hecn taught the knowledge of God an(J 
 moral virtue fome oiber way. 
 
 Now, if this be the flate of Reafon, as 
 it is in man ; if thi» be all the light that 
 we have from our ozvn nature, a i^are ca^^ 
 pacity of receiving good or bad imprefli- 
 ons, right or wrong opinions and fenti- 
 ments, according to the ftate of the world 
 that we fall into; then we are but poorly 
 
 furniilied 
 
( 1 66 ) 
 
 furnifhed, to alTert and maintjaiii' the aS^ 
 Solute perfe5iion of our own Reafon.. 
 
 If our light be little more than rhe 
 opinions and cufloms of thofe amongfl: 
 whom we live, and it be fo hard for a 
 man to arrive at a greater wifdom, than 
 the common wifdom of the place or 
 country which gave him biith and educa- 
 tion ; how unreafonably do we appeal ta 
 the perfedlion and fufficiencyof our own. 
 Reafon, againft the necejfuy and advan^ 
 tage of divine Revelation ? 
 
 If we be nothing without the afliftance 
 of men ; if we be a kind of fooliih, 
 helplefs animals, till education and ex- 
 perience have revealed to us the wifdom 
 and knowledge of our fellow-creatures; 
 fliall we think ourfelves too wife, and' 
 full of our own light, to be farther en- 
 
 lightened 
 
( ^^1 ) 
 
 lightened with a knowledge and wifdom 
 icvcMled to us by God lumfelf ? 
 
 May one not therefore juflly wonder, 
 what it is that could lead any people 
 into an imagination of the abfolute per- 
 iedion of human Reafon ? There feems 
 Jio more in the ftatc of mankind to be- 
 tray a man into this fancy, than to per- 
 fuade him that the reafon of Infants is 
 abfolutely perfedl. For fenfe and expe- 
 rience are as full and flrong a proof 
 againft one, as againft the other. 
 
 But it muft be faid for thefe writers, 
 that they decline all arguments from 
 facls and experience, to give a better 
 account of human nature ; but with the 
 famejuftice, as if a man were to lay afide 
 the authority of hifiory^ to give you a 
 truer account of the life of Alexander. 
 
 They 
 
( i68 ) 
 
 They argue about the perfedion of 
 human Reafon, not as if it were fome- 
 thing already in being, that had its na- 
 ture and condition^ and {hewed itfelf to 
 be what it is ; but as if it were fome- 
 thing that might take its ftate and con- 
 dition, according to their fancies and 
 fpeculations about it. 
 
 Their objedlion againft Revelation is 
 founded upon the pretended fufficiency, 
 and abfolute perfection, of the light and 
 ilrength of human Reafon, to teach all 
 in en all that is wife, and holy, and di- 
 vine, in Religion. But how do they 
 prove this perfedion of human Rea- 
 fon? Do they appeal to Mankind as 
 proofs of this perfedion ? Do they pro- 
 duce any body of men, in this, or any 
 other age of the world, that without any 
 
 afliitance 
 
( i69 ) 
 
 afliflance from Revelation, have attained 
 CO this perfecflion of rehgious know- 
 ledge ? This is not fomuch as pretended 
 to : the hiftory of fuch men is entirely 
 wanting. And yet the want of fuch a 
 fa6l as this, has even the force of demon- 
 ftration againft this pretended fufficiency 
 of natural Reafon., 
 
 Becaufe it is a matter not capable 
 of any other kind of proof, but muft be 
 admitted as certainly true, or rejedled 
 as certainly falfe, according as fa6t and 
 experience bear witnefs for or againft 
 it. 
 
 For an enquiry about the light, and 
 ftrength, and fufficiency of Reafon to 
 guide* and preferve men in the knowledge 
 and pradlice of true religion, is a quef- 
 tion, 2isfolely to be refolved by fa3f and 
 Q^ experience^ 
 
( ^lo ) 
 experkncey3.s if the enquiry was about the 
 ybape of man's body, or the number of his 
 fenfes. And to talk of a light and 
 ftrength of Reafon, natural to man, which 
 fadt and experience have never yet prov- 
 ed, is as egregious nonfenfe, as to talk of 
 natural fenfes, or faculties of his body, 
 which fadl and experience have never yet 
 difcovered. 
 
 For, as the exijfence of man cannot be 
 proved, but from fa6l and experience ; 
 fo every quality of man, whether of 
 body or mind, and every degree of that 
 quality, can only be proved by fad and 
 experience- 
 
 The degrees of human firengthy the 
 nature of human pajjions ^ the duration 
 of human life^ the light and ftrength of 
 human Reafon in matters of religion, 
 are things not poflible to be known in any 
 
 other 
 
( 17^ ) 
 ether degree y than fo far as fai5l and ex- 
 perience prove them* 
 
 From the bare conlideration of a ra- 
 tional foul in union ^vith a body, and 
 jDodily palTions, we can neither prove 
 man to be flrong or ivcaky good or hady 
 Jiekly or foiindy mortal or immortal: all 
 thefc qualities muft difcover themfelves> 
 as the eye difcovers its degree oi fight y the 
 hand its degree o^ ftrengthy &c. 
 
 To enquire therefore, whether men 
 have, by nature,^ light and ftrength fuf- 
 fie lent to guide^, and keep them in the 
 true religion? is the fame appeal to 
 fadl and experience, as to require, whe^ 
 thermea are mortal yfickly, or found y or 
 how far they cany?^ and hear. For no- 
 thing that relates to human nature, as 
 a quality of it, can poflibl.y have any 
 other proof. > 
 
 If 
 
f 172 } 
 
 If fome other enquirers into human 
 nature, fhould affirm, that there is in 
 mankind a natural injlin5i of mutual love 
 fufficient to make every man, at all times, 
 love every other man, with t\it fame degree 
 of affedlion as he loves himfelf ; I fup- 
 pofe fuch an opinion would be thought 
 too abfurd and extravagant, to need any 
 confutation. And yet all the abfurdity 
 of it would lie in this, that it affirmed 
 fomething of xkit Jufficiency of a natural 
 quality in man, which could not be fup- 
 ported by a lingle inftance of any one 
 man, and was contrary to the experience 
 and hiflory of every age of the world. 
 
 By what has been here faid, I hope 
 the reader will obferve, that this en- 
 quiry about the perfedlion or imperfec- 
 tion, the flrength or weaknefs of Rea- 
 fon in man, as to matters of religion, refls 
 
 'ucholly 
 
( 173 ) 
 
 wholly upon fad and experience ; and 
 that therefore all fpeculative reafonings 
 upon it are to be looked upon as idle and 
 vilionary, as a fick man's dreams about 
 health ^ and as wholly to be rejedled, as 
 any fpeculative arguments that fhould 
 pretend to prove, in fpite of all facfls and 
 experience, the immortality^ and unalter'* 
 ahk ftate of human bodies. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
( m ) 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 Shewingy that all the mutability of our 
 tempers y the diforders of our pajfwnsy the 
 corruption of our heart Sy all the reveries 
 of the imaginationy all the contradi(flions 
 and abfurdities that are to he found in. 
 human opinions y are JlriMyyand precife-* 
 ly the 7nutahilityydiforderSy corrupt ion y and. 
 abfurdities of human Reafon.. 
 
 XT is the intent of this chapter to fhew^, 
 that although common language af- 
 cribes a variety of faculties and principles 
 to the foul, imputing this adion to the 
 blindnefs of our paffenSy that to the in- 
 conftancy of our tempers ; one thing to the 
 
 heat 
 
( 175 ) 
 
 heat of our hnagination^ another to the 
 coolnefs of our reafon / yet, in ftridlnef* 
 of truth, every thing that is done by us 
 is the adlion and operation of our Reafon^ 
 and is to be afcribed to it, as the fole 
 faculty or principle from whence it pro- 
 ceeded, and by which it is governed and 
 effeaed. 
 
 Nobody denies, that there is a Law 
 or Light of Reafon common to men. AH 
 this is as freely granted, as that love and, 
 hatredy feeling and Jenfation are common 
 to men ; and is granting no more, than 
 that men are by nature intelligent and 
 rational Beings. For the faculties of 
 man, as he is an intelligent being, as 
 necelTarily perceive fome difference in 
 adlions, as to gooddSi^ had^ as they per- 
 ceive fome things they like, and fome 
 things they diflike. In this {^.n^t^ there 
 
 is 
 
( 176 ) 
 is a law, or light of Reafon, common to 
 all men ; and the law of Reafon is in 
 men, as the law of ibinkingy of liking, 
 and dijliking is in men. 
 
 And the different degrees of Reafon 
 are in men, as the different degrees of 
 love and averfion ; as the different de- 
 grees of wit, parts, good nature, or ill 
 nature, are in man. 
 
 And as all men have naturally more 
 or lefs of thefe qualities, fo all men have 
 naturally more or lefs of Reafon : and 
 the bulk of mankind are as different 
 in Reafon,. as they are in thefe qua^ 
 lities. 
 
 As Love is the fame paflion in all 
 men, yet is infinitely different ; as Hatred 
 is the fame paffion in all men, yet with 
 infinite differences ; fo Reafon is the 
 
 fame 
 
( ^11 ) 
 
 fame faculty in all men, yet with infinite 
 differences. 
 
 And as our Paflions not only make us 
 different from other men, but frequently, 
 ami almoft daily, different from our- 
 fclves, loving and hating under great 
 inconftancy ; fo our Reafon is not only 
 different from the Reafon of other men, 
 but is often different from itfelf by a 
 llrange inconffancy, fetting up firft one 
 opinion, and then another. 
 
 So that when we talk of human Rea^ 
 Jon, or a Reafon common to mankind, we 
 talk of as various^ wicertaWy and unmea^ 
 Jurahle a thing, as when we talk of a 
 lovey B. liking, an aver/ion, a good nature or 
 /// nature, common to mankind ; for 
 thefe qualities admit of no variation, 
 uncertainty, or mutability, but fuch as 
 
 they 
 
( >78 ) 
 they direclly receive from the Reafon of 
 mankind. 
 
 For it is as much the Reafon of man; 
 that adls in all thefe tempers, andmakes 
 them to be juft what they are, as it is 
 x!?iQ Reafon of man that demonilrates a 
 mathematical propofition^ 
 
 Was our Reafon fkady^ and of one 
 kind, there: would be juil the fame flea- 
 dinefs and regularity in our tempers; 
 did not Reafon fall into miflakes, follies 
 and abfurdities,. we fhould have nothing 
 foolifh or abfurd in our love or averfion. 
 For ON try humour, every kind of love 
 or averfion, is as flridly the a5}ion or 
 operation oi our Reafon, as judgment is 
 the a(5lof our Reafon* 
 
 And the tempers and paflions of a 
 child differ only from the tempers and 
 
 paflions 
 
( 1-9 ) 
 
 paflions of a man. cxavlly in the fame 
 •degree, as the Reafon of a child diiicrs 
 from the Reafon of man. 
 
 So that our paflions aud tempers are 
 the natural adlions and real €ffed:s of our 
 Reafon, and have no qualities, either 
 •good or bad, but fuch as are to be im- 
 puted to it. 
 
 A laudable good nature, or a laudable 
 averfion, is only Reafon ading in a cer~ 
 tain manner ; a criminal good nature, or 
 a criminal averfion, is nothing elfe, but 
 an ill-judging Reafon ; that is, Reafon 
 ading in another certain manner. 
 
 But ftill it is Reafon, or our under- 
 flanding, that is the only agent in our bad 
 paflions, as well as good paflions ; and 
 as much xkatjole agent in all our paflions 
 and tempers, as in things of mere fpe- 
 culation. 
 
 % So 
 
( iSo ) 
 
 So that the ftate of Rcafon in human 
 life, is nothing elfe but the ftate of human 
 tempers and paflions ; and right Reajon m 
 morality, is nothing elfe but right love and 
 right averfion. 
 
 And all our tempers and ways of liking 
 and difliking, are as much the adls and 
 operations of our Reafon, as the wifefl 
 adlions of our life; and they only differ 
 fi-om Reafon, as Reafon differs from 
 itfelf, when it judges rightly, and when 
 it judges erroneoudy. 
 
 All that therefore, which we com- 
 monly call the weaknefs, blindnefs, and 
 diforder of our fafjions^ is in reality the 
 weaknefs, blindnefs, and diforder of our 
 Reafon. For a right love, or wrong 
 love, denotes only our Reafon adihg in 
 a certain particular manner. 
 
( tSi ) 
 
 So that if any thing can be faid pre- 
 cifely, or with exadlnefs, of love, aver- 
 flon, good nature or ill nature, as com- 
 mon to mankind ; the fame may be faid 
 of Reafon, as common to mankind. 
 
 And, if it would be very fooiifh and 
 abfurd, to afcribe an abfolute pcrfedlion 
 to human love, making it alone a fuffi- 
 cient guide to all good ; or an abfolute 
 perfection to human hatred, as a fuffi- 
 cient prefervative from all vice ; it is 
 equally abfurd to afcribe the fame per- 
 fecflion to human Reafon : becaufe nei- 
 ther love nor hatred have any thing per- 
 fed or impcrfed:, good or bad in them, 
 but what is folely the adlion and opera- 
 tion* of Reafon. 
 
 For the diilindlion of our Reafon 
 
 from our Paflions, is only adillinftion in 
 
 R Ian- 
 
( l82 ) 
 
 language, made at pleafure ; and is n% 
 more real in the things thcmfelves, than 
 the de/ire and inclimiiion are really diffe- 
 rent from the JVilL All therefore that 
 is weak and fooliili in our padions, is the 
 weaknefs and folly of our Reafon ; all 
 the inconftancy and caprice of our hu- 
 mours and tempers, is the caprice and 
 inconftancy of our Reafon. 
 
 It is not Flattery^ that compliments 
 vice in authority ; it is not Corruption^ 
 that m.akes men proflitute their honour ^ 
 it is not Senjiialiiy^ that plunges men into 
 Debauchery j it is not Avarice, that makes 
 men fordid ; it is not Amhition^ that 
 makes them reftlefs ; it is not Bribery, 
 that makes men fell their confciences ; 
 it is not Interefty that makes them lie and 
 cheat, and perjure themfelves. What 
 
 is 
 
( ^^3 ) 
 is it therefore? Why, it is Reafoiiy the 
 ufe of Re of on ^ human Reafon^ that docs all 
 this. 
 
 To fuppofe that Reafon permits itfelf 
 to be governed by pafTions or tempers, 
 but is not the immediaiey full agent of all 
 that is done by them, is as abfurd, as 
 to fuppofe that Reafon permits itfelf to 
 be governed by the hand "when it is writ- 
 ing falfely, or the tongiie when it is talking 
 profanely, but is not the immediate, 
 dired agent of all that is written and 
 fpoken by them. 
 
 Brutes arc incapable of imprudence 
 and immorality, bccaufe none of their 
 adlions are the adions of Reafon : t\crj 
 thing therefore that is imprudence, im- 
 morality, bafenefs, or villany in us, muft 
 be the ad of our Reafon ; otherwifc it 
 
 could 
 
( iH } 
 
 could no more be imprudent or immo- 
 ral, than the actions of brutes. 
 
 If, therefore, Reafon be the only fa- 
 culty that diftinguiflieth us from brutes ; 
 it necefTarily follows, that thofe irregu- 
 larities, whether of humour, pallions, 
 or tempers, which cannot be imputed to 
 brutes, muft be folely attributed to that 
 faculty by which we are difiinguiihed 
 from brutes; and confequently, every 
 thing that is foolifh, vain, fhameful, 
 hlik^ treacherous, and bafe, muft be the 
 fole exprcfs acfls of our Reafon ; fince, if 
 tbxy were the adls of any thing elfe, 
 diey could have no more vanity, fal- 
 Hiood, or bafenefs, than hunger and 
 thinl. 
 
 As therefore all that is faithful, jufl, 
 and wife, can only be attributed to that 
 
 whicix. 
 
f X85 ) 
 
 which is done by our Reafon ; fo, by 
 pi lin confequencc, all that is vain, falfc, 
 or fhameful, can only be imputed to any 
 adls, as they are the a6ls of Reafon. 
 ^ It is not my intent in the lead to cen- 
 fure or condemn our common language, 
 which coniiders and talks of Reafon and 
 the Paflions, as if they were as diiferent 
 as a governor and his Juhje^is, 
 
 Thefe forms of fpeech are very intel- 
 ligible and ufeful, and give great life 
 and ornament to all difcourfes upon mo- 
 rality ; and are even neceifary both for 
 the Hiftorian, the Poet, and the Ora- 
 tor. 
 
 But, when certain perfons afcribe to 
 human Reafon, as a dijiin^ faculty of 
 human nature, I know not what perfect 
 Hon, it is neceifary to confider human 
 Reafon and human Nature, not as it is 
 
 repre- 
 
reprefcnted in common language, but as 
 it is in reality in itfelf. 
 
 Notwith flan ding, therefore, in com- 
 mon language, our Paffions, and the 
 ejfecls of them, are very ufefully diftin- 
 guifhed from our Reafon, I have here 
 ventured to fhew, that all the diforders 
 of human nature, are precifely the difor- 
 ders of human Reafon ; and that all the 
 perfe(fi:ion or imperfe^ion of our paf- 
 lions, is nothing elfe but the perfcdion 
 or imperfeSlion of our Reafon. 
 
 And we may as well think, that judg- 
 ment, prudence, difcretion, are things 
 different from our Reafon, as that hu- 
 m.our, temper, approbation, or averfion, 
 are really different from our Reafon. 
 
 For, as it is a right exercifc of Rea- 
 fon, that denominates its actions to be 
 Prudence, Judgment, 2in^ Difcretion s fo it 
 
 is 
 
( i87 ) 
 is a wrong cxercife of Reafon, that deno- 
 minates its a6lions to be HumouTy T^empeTy 
 and Caprice. 
 
 And it would be as abfurd to con- 
 demn humour and caprice, if they were 
 not the aftions and operations of Reafon, 
 as to commend a prudence and difcre- 
 tion, that were the effefts of an irrational 
 principle. 
 
 Our follies, therefore, and abfurdities 
 of every kind, are as neceilirily to be 
 afcribed to our Reafon, as the firft, im^ 
 mediate y and fole Caufe of them, as our 
 wifdom and difcretion are to be afcribed 
 to it in that degree. 
 
 The difference betwixt Reafon afTent- 
 ing to the properties of a fquardy and 
 Reafon a6ling in motions of defire or 
 averfioHy is only this, that in the latter 
 cafe it is Reafon, ading under a {^w^q of 
 
( rm ) 
 
 gco'd or evily in the former cafe, it is 
 Reafon adling under a fcnfe of magni"^ 
 tude. 
 
 And as the relations of mao;nitude. as 
 they are the objefe of our Reafon, are 
 only the objeds of its ajfent or d'ljfent ; ^o 
 good and evil, as they are objects of our 
 Reafon, are only the objeBs of its de- 
 fire or averfion : and as the alTent or dif- 
 fent, in matters of fpeculation, whe- 
 ther right or wrong, is folcly the a8: of 
 our Reafon; fo defire or averfion, in 
 human life, whether right or wrong, is 
 equally the a8; of our Reafon. 
 
 All the good, therefore, that there is 
 in any of our defires or averdons, is the 
 good of our Reafon; and all the evil or 
 blindnefs there is in any of our pafTions, 
 is folely the evil and blindnefs of our 
 Reafon, 
 
 Becaufe 
 
( l^ ) 
 
 Becaufe love, delire, averfion, denote 
 nothing elfe but our Reafon a6ling in a 
 certain manner; jufi: as prudence, dif- 
 cretion, and judgment, denote nothing 
 elfe but our Reafon a6ling in a certain 
 manner. 
 
 We often fay, that our Pafllons deceive 
 us, or perfuade us ; but this is no more 
 flrid:ly fo, than when we fay, our intereji 
 deceived, or a bribe blinded us. For 
 bribes and interefl are not adlive prin- 
 ciples, nor have any power of deception ; 
 it is only our Reafon that gives theia a 
 falfe value, and prefers them to a greater 
 good. 
 
 It is jufi: fo, in what we call the deceit 
 of our Paflions : they meddle with us na 
 more than bribes meddle with us ; but 
 that pleafurable perception, which is 
 to be found in certain enjoyments, is by 
 
 our 
 
f 190 I 
 
 our Reafon preferred to that better good, 
 which wemight exped: from a felf-deniaL 
 
 We fay again, that our Paffions paint 
 things in falfe colours, and prefent to our 
 minds vain appearances of happinefs. 
 
 But this is no more ftridly true, than 
 when we fay, our Imagination forms 
 caflles in the air. For the imagination 
 fignifies no diftindl faculty from our 
 Reafon, but only, Reafon ading upon our 
 9wn ideas. 
 
 So, when our Paflions are faid to give 
 falfe colours to things, or prefent vain 
 appearances of happinefs, it is only our 
 Reafon ading upon its own ideas of ^c<?i 
 and f'w7, juft as it ads upon its own ideas 
 of architedfure^ in forming caftles in the 
 air. 
 
 So that, all that which we call different 
 faculties of the foul., tempers and pafiions 
 
 of 
 
( '91 ) 
 of the heart, (Iriftly fpcaking, means no- 
 thing elfe but the various a6ls and ope- 
 rations of one and the fame rational 
 principle; which has dirfercnt nanncs, 
 according to the ohje^ls which it atls 
 upon, and the manner of its ading. 
 
 In fome things it is called fpeculative, 
 in others it is called practical Reafon. 
 And we may as jultly think our fpecu- 
 lative Reafon is a different faculty from 
 ourpraQ:ica4 Reafon, as that our tempers, 
 averiions, or likings, are not as fully and 
 folely to be afcribed to our Reafon, as 
 fyllogifms and demonftrations. 
 
 For, it is our Reafon alone that chufes 
 the true good ; fo it is our Reafon alone 
 that thufes the falfe good : as it is Rea- 
 fon alone that is the agent, when purity 
 and integrity are preferred to fenTaal 
 pleafure, and fccular advantage; fo it is 
 4 our 
 
( 192 J 
 
 our Reafon alone that is the agent, \vhe» 
 fenfual pleafure, and fecular advantage, 
 are preferred to purity and integrity. 
 
 For the fame Principle, which is the 
 agent of all that is good in us, nnuft be 
 equally the agent of all that is evil. 
 
 All virtue is nothing elfe, but Reafon 
 ailing in a certain manner; and all vice 
 is nothing elfe, but Reafon ading in a 
 certain contrary manner. All the dif- 
 ference is in the actions, and none at all 
 in the agent. 
 
 And to fay, that Reafon a6ls in our 
 virtues, and Paflion a6:s in our vices, 
 is as abfurd, as to fay the contrary, that 
 Paflion is the agent in our virtues, and 
 Reafon the agent in our vices. For the 
 aftion or power of Reafon is as much 
 required to make any thing vicious, as 
 to make any thing virtuous. 
 
 Every 
 
( ^93 ) 
 
 Every thing therefore that is choren, 
 whether it be good or bad, is the exprefs 
 adt and operation of Reafon. 
 
 Reafon therefore is certainly the worll, 
 as well as the beft faculty that we have : 
 as it is the only principle of virtue, fo it 
 is, as certainly, the fole caufe of all that 
 is bafe, horrid, and fhameful in human 
 life- As it alone can difcover truth, fo 
 it alone leads us into the grofTeft errors. 
 
 It was as truly Reafon that made Me^ 
 dea kill her children, that made Cato kill 
 himfelf, that made pagans offer human 
 facrifices to idols ; that made Epicurus 
 deny a providence, Mahomet pretend a 
 revelation ; that made fome men fcep- 
 ticks, others bigots ; fome enthufiafts, 
 others profane ; that made Hohhes alTert 
 all religion to be human invention, and 
 Spinofa to declare trees, and ftoncs, and 
 S animals, 
 
( 194 ) 
 animals, to be parts of God ; that makes 
 Free-thinkers deny freedom of will, and 
 Fatalifts exhort to a reformation of man- 
 ners ; that made Faux a confpirator, and 
 Ludlow a regicide ; that made Muggle- 
 ton2L fanatic, and Rochefler a libertine: 
 it was as trul^ human Reafon tliat did 
 all thefc things, as it is human Reafon 
 that dcmonflrates mathematical propofi- 
 tions. 
 
 For as all miflakes in fpeculation arc 
 as much the ad:s and operation of Rea- 
 fon, as true concluiions ; fo all errors in 
 duty, whether civil or religious, arc as 
 much the adts of our Reafon, as the ex- 
 ercife of the mofl: folid virtues. 
 
 Medea and Cato adled as truly accord- 
 ing to the judgment of their Reafon, 
 at that time, as the Confejfor that 
 
 chufcs 
 % 
 
( 195 ) 
 chufcs rather to fuffcr, than deny hiai 
 faith. 
 
 And the difference betwixt them does 
 not confift in this, that one power or fa- 
 culty of the mind, adted in one of them, 
 and another faculty, or power of the 
 mind, adled in another ; that is, that 
 Reafon aded in one, and Paflion in ano-^ 
 tiier ; but purely in the different Jiate of 
 their Reafon. For had not Medea and 
 Cdto thought it beft to do what they did, 
 at the time they did it,, they would no 
 more have done it, than the Confejfor 
 would chufe to fuffer rather than deny 
 his faith, unlefs he had judged it befl fo 
 to do. 
 
 •It may indeed be well enough faid in 
 common language, that Paflion made 
 IvLdca and Caio to do as they did, juft as 
 it may be faid of a man that affirms a 
 
 plenum. 
 
I 196 ) 
 
 pknuniy or holds zny fpeculative abfur- 
 dity, that it is blindnefs or prejudice 
 that keeps him in it. Not as if blind- 
 nefs or prejudice • were powers or 
 faculties of his mind, but as they Sig- 
 nify iho: ill JIdte of his Reafon. Jull 
 fo the paflions may be faid to govern 
 men in their adlions ; not as if they 
 were powers of the mind, but as they 
 denote the difordered flaite of Reafon. 
 And whenever any thing is imputed to 
 jhe flrength and violence of our Paf- 
 lions, llriQly fpeaking, it only means 
 the weaknefs and low condition of our 
 Reafon at that time. 
 
 For Reafon governs as fully when our 
 adlions and tempers are ever fo bad, as 
 it does when our aftions and tempers are 
 found and good. And the only diffe- 
 rence 
 
( 197 ) 
 rence is, that Reafon aQing well, gd- 
 verns in the one cafe, and Reafon a6ling 
 ill, governs in the other. 
 
 Jufl as it is the fame Reafon, that 
 - fometimes judges flri6lly right, which 
 at other times judges exceeding wrong, 
 in matters of fpeculation. 
 
 When therefore we fay, that Reafon 
 governs the palTions, it means no more, 
 in flriQ truth, than that Reafon govern,s 
 itfelf ; that it afts with deliberation and 
 attention ; does not yield to its firft 
 judgments or opinions, but ufes fecond, 
 and third thoughts. 
 
 So that, guarding againft the Pafilon^, 
 is only guarding againft its own firft 
 judgments and opinions ; that is, guard-^ 
 ing againft itfelf. 
 
 To all this it may, perhaps, be obje^ft- 
 ed, that our paffions and tempers ariffc 
 
 from 
 
( 19^ ) 
 from bodily motions, and depend very 
 much upon the ftate of our blood and 
 animal fpirits ; and that, therefore, what 
 we do under their commotions, cannot 
 be attributed to our Reafon. 
 
 It is readily granted, that the body 
 has this Ihare in our paffions and tem^ 
 pers : but then the fame thing mufl: be 
 granted of the body, in all the ads and 
 operations of the mind. So that if our 
 delires and averlions cannot be imputed 
 to our Reafon, as its a6ls, becaufe of 
 the joint operation of the animal fpirits 
 in them ; no more can fyllogifms and 
 demonftrations be attributed to our Rea- 
 fon as its operations, becaufe the ope- 
 ration of bodily fpirits concurreth in the 
 forming of them. 
 
 For the moll abftrad thought, and 
 calm fpeculation of the mind, has as 
 
 truly 
 
( 199 ) 
 
 truly the concurrence^ and conjunFf opera- 
 tion of bodily fpirits, as our ftrongeft 
 defires or averiions. And it is as much 
 owing to the flate of the body that fuch 
 ♦ fpeculations are what they are, as it is 
 owing to theftateof the body that fuch 
 paffions are what they are. 
 
 For the motions of the bodily fpirits 
 are infeparable from, and according to,, 
 the flate and a6lion of the mind ; when 
 Reafon is in fpeculation of a trifle, they 
 concur but weakly ; when Reafon fpecu- 
 lates intenfely, their operation is eVr- 
 creafed^ And fometimes the attention 
 of the mind is fo great, and has fo en- 
 gaged and called in all the animal fpi-. 
 rits to its afliftance, that the operations 
 of our fcnfes are fufpended, and wc 
 neither fee nor feel, till the attention of 
 
 the 
 
( 200 ) 
 
 the mind has let the fpirits return to all 
 parts of the body. 
 
 Now, will any one fay, that thefe intenfe 
 thoughts are lefs the ads of the mind, 
 becaufe they have a greater concurrence 
 of bodily fpirits than when it is acfling 
 with indifference, and fo has a lefTer 
 quantity of bodily fpirits? 
 
 Yet this might as well be faid, as to 
 fay, that the alTent or diiTent, in fpecu- 
 lation, is the ad: of our Reafon ; but lik- 
 ing or di Hiking, loving or hating, are 
 not fo the ads of our Reafon, becaufe 
 they have a greater concurrence, and dif- 
 ferent motions of bodily fpirits. 
 
 For, as the mind is in a different flate 
 when it defires good, or fears evil, from 
 what it is when it only compares two 
 triangles ; fo the motions or concurrence 
 of the bodily fpirits have only/uch a dif- 
 ference 
 
( 201 ) 
 
 fereiice as is firicUy corrcfpondait to thefc 
 two ftates of the mind. They adl and 
 join as much in comparing the triangles, 
 as in the deiire of good, or fear of evil. 
 And the mindisjuft fo much governed 
 *by the body, in its paflions, as it is go- 
 verned by it in its calmcfb contem- 
 plations. 
 
 For as the gentle quiet operation of 
 the animal fpirits is then ftridly corrc- 
 fpondent, and entirely owing to the (late 
 and adion of the mind ; fo in all our 
 paflions, the ftrong and increafed motion 
 of the animal fpirits is then ftridlly cor- 
 refpondent, and entirely owing to the 
 ftateand adion of the mind. 
 
 So that Reafon is neither more nor lefs 
 the agent in all our tempers and paflions, 
 than it is in our molt dry and fcdate fpe- 
 culations. 
 
 It 
 
f 202 ) 
 
 It may, and often does happen, that a 
 man may have as great an eagernefs and 
 impatience in the folving a mathemati- 
 cal problem, as another hath to obtain 
 any great good, or avoid any great evil. 
 
 But may it therefore be faid, that it is 
 not Reafonthat folves, or defires to folvc, 
 the problem, becaufe the bodily fpirits 
 are fo aQ:ive in it ? 
 
 In a word; if our paffionsand tempers^ 
 might not be imputed to our Reafon, as 
 its own genuine a€ts and operations, be- 
 caufe they have fuch a concurrence of 
 bodily fpirits, neither could arguing, or 
 reafoning, be attributed to our Reafon^ as 
 its proper aO; and operation, beCaufe in 
 all argumentation the bodily fpirits are 
 neceflarily employed ; and the better and 
 clofer the reafoning is, the more they arc. 
 excited and employed. 
 
 If 
 
( 203 ) 
 
 If it fliould farther be objeQcd, that 
 Reafon is only right Reafon^ and therefore 
 cannot be faid to a6l or operate, but 
 where, and fo far, as -right Reafon a6ls. 
 
 This is as abfurd as to fay, that Love 
 fignif5.es only pure love, and Hatred juft 
 hatred ; and that therefore a man cannot 
 be faid to love or hate, but when, and fo 
 far, as his love is pure, and his hatred 
 
 To draw now fome plain confequen- 
 ces from the foregoing account. 
 
 Firji, If Reafon be, as above rcprc- 
 Icnted, the univerjal Agent ; if all the 
 difference amongfl men, either in fpecu- 
 lat'ion or practice, be only fuch a diffe- 
 rence as Reafon makes, then nothing 
 can be more extravagant, than to affirm 
 any thing concerning the degree of per- 
 
 fedtion 
 
( 204 ) 
 
 fe6lion or imperfeftion of Rcafon, as 
 common to man. It is as wild and ro- 
 mantic, as to pretend to Hate the mea- 
 fure of Folly and Wifdom, of Fear and 
 Courage, of Pride and Humility, of 
 good Humour and ill Humour, com- 
 mon to Mankind : for as thefe ftates of 
 the Mind are only fo many different 
 ftates of Reafon, fo no uncertainty be- 
 longs to them, but what, in the fame de^ 
 gree, belongs to Reafon. 
 
 Secondly, Granting that all matters of 
 Religion mufl: be agreeable to rights un- 
 prejudiced Kc^Son^ yet this could be no 
 ground for receiving nothing in reli- 
 gion, but what human Reafon could 
 prove to be neceflary : for human Reafon 
 is no more right unprejudiced Rea- 
 fon, 
 
( ao5 ) 
 Reafon, than a finner is finlefs, or a malt 
 an angel. 
 
 Granting again, that a man may go a 
 great way towards redifying his Reafon, 
 and laying aiide its prejudices ; yet no 
 
 * particular man can be a better judge of 
 the rcdlitude of his own Reafon, than he 
 is of the reditude of his own Jelf4ove^ 
 the fagacity of his own under/landings 
 the brightnefs of his own parts, the juft-. 
 nefs of his own eloquence^ and the depth 
 of his ovfvi judgment. 
 
 For there is nothing to deceive him in 
 
 felf-love, in the opinion of his ozvn merits 
 wit, jiidgynent and eloquence, but what has 
 the fame power to deceive him, m the 
 opinion of his own Reafon. And, if // he 
 the fate of mo jl feels to hefondejloftheirxiglieji 
 hrats, none feem fo inevitably expofed to 
 this fatality^ asthofe, whofe Religion is to 
 T have 
 
( 2C6 ) 
 
 have no form, but fuch as it receives from 
 their own hearts. 
 
 Thirdly, A man that has his Religiom 
 to chufe, and with this previous privi- 
 lege, that he need not allow any thing 
 to be matter of religion, but what hi« 
 own Reafon can prove to be fo, is in as 
 fair away to be governed by hisPaJfwns^ 
 as he that has hi^ condition of life to chufe, 
 v/ith the liberty of taking that, which 
 his own Reafon direds him to. 
 
 Does any one fuppofe now^, that no- 
 thing but right Reafon w^ould diredt him 
 in the choice of his condition ? Or that 
 he would make the better choice, bccaufe 
 he proceeded upon this maxim, that no- 
 thing could be right, but that which was 
 ao-reeabie to his own Reafon F Or that his 
 temper, his prejudices^ his felf4ove, his 
 
 paflions. 
 
( 2=7 ) 
 
 padions, his partiality, would have no 
 influence upon his choice, becaufe he 
 had reiigned himfelf up to his own 
 Reafon. 
 
 For as our choice of a condition of 
 * life is not a matter of fpeculation, but of 
 good and evil ; fo however it is recom- 
 mended to our Reafon, it chiefly excites 
 our paflions ; and our choice will be juft 
 as reafonable, as our tempers and paf- 
 lions are. And he, who is made the moft 
 pofltive of the fufficiency of his own 
 Reafon, will be the moft likely to be 
 governed by the blindnefs of his own 
 Paflions. 
 
 Now it is juft the fame in the choice 
 of a Religion, as in the choice of a con- 
 dition of life : as it is not a matter of 
 fpeculation, but of ^o(?<^ and <^*/7j fo, if 
 
 it 
 
( 208 ) 
 
 it be left to be ilated and determined hy 
 Gur own Rea/or/,. it rather appeals to our 
 Tempers, than employs our Reafon; 
 and to refign ourfelves up to our own 
 Reafon, to tell us what ought or not 
 to be a matter 6f Religion^ is only re- 
 ligning ourfelves up to our Tempers to 
 take what we like, and refufe what Vit 
 dijlike in Religion. 
 
 For, it is not only natural and eafy fof 
 him, who believes that nothing can be 
 a part of Religion, but what his Reafon 
 can prove necelTary to be fo, to take 
 that to be fully provedy which is only 
 mightily liked ; and all that to be entire- 
 ly contrary to Reafon, which is only 
 vaftly contrary to his Tempers ; this, I 
 fay, is not only natural and eafy to hap- 
 pen, but fcarce pollible to be avoided. 
 
 In 
 
f 209 ) 
 
 In a word ; when Self-love is a pro*, 
 per arbitrator betwixt a man and his ad- 
 verfary ; when Revenge is a juft judge of 
 Meeknefs ; when Pride is a true lover of 
 Humility i when Fal/hood is a teacher of 
 Truth; when Luji is a fail friend of 
 Chaftity; when the i7^ leads to the 
 Spirit ; when Senjuality delights in Self- 
 denial ; when Partiality is a promoter of 
 Equity ; when the Palate can tafte the 
 difference between Sin and Holinefs ; 
 when the Hayid can feel the truth of a 
 Proportion, then mviy human Reafonht 
 a proper Arbitrator between God and 
 Man ; the fole, final, jufb Judge of all 
 that ought, or ought not to be mat- 
 ter of a Holy^ Divine y and Heavenly Re- 
 ligion. — 
 
 Ao-ain : if this be the ftate of Reafon. 
 
 p.s,has been fully proved ; if all we be- 
 
 5 licv€ 
 
( 210 ) 
 
 lieve or difbclieve, love or hate, chufc 
 or refufe ; if all that is wife or abfurd, 
 holy or profane, glorious or ihameful, 
 in thought, word, or deed, be to be im- 
 puted to it; then, it is as grofs an abfur- 
 dity to talk of the perfe8:ion of human 
 Reajon^ as, of the unfpotted holinefs of 
 human Life^ the abfolute purity of hu^ 
 man Love^ the immutable juflicc of hu-^ 
 man Hatred ^ and the infallibility oi human 
 ConjeiJures^ 
 
 Lafily^ To pretend that our Reafon is 
 too perfed: to be governed by any thing 
 but its own light, is the fame extra- 
 vagance, as to pretend, that our love is 
 too pure to be governed by any thing but 
 its own inclinations, our hatred too juft 
 to be governed by any thing, but its 
 own motions. For, if all that is bafe 
 and criminal in love, all that is unjuil 
 
 and 
 
( 211 ) 
 
 and wicked in hatred, be flridlly and 
 folely to be imputed to our Reafon ; 
 then, no pcrfcdlion can be afcribed to 
 our Reafon, but fuch as is to be afcribed 
 to our love and hatred. 
 
 FINIS, 
 
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