THE 
 
 EFFICACY OF PRAYER 
 
 &C. &C. 
 
THE 
 
 EFFICACY OF PRAYER 
 
 BEING 
 
 THE DONNELLAN LECTURES 
 
 FOE THE YEAR 1877. 
 
 BY 
 
 JOHN H. JELLETT, B. D., 
 
 SENIOR FELLOW OF TRINITY COLLEGE, DUBLIN ; 
 FORMERLY PRESIDENT OF THE ROYAL IRISH ACADEMY. 
 
 THIRD EDITION. 
 
 DUBLIN: HODGES, FOSTER, AND FIGGIS, 
 
 PUBLISHERS TO THE UNIVERSITY. 
 
 LONDON : MACMILLAN AND CO. 
 
 1880. 
 
DUBLIN : 
 PRINTED AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS. 
 
TO 
 THE REV. HUMPHREY LLOYD, D.D., 
 
 PROVOST OF TRINITY COLLEGE, DUBLIN, 
 
 IS, BY PERMISSION, RESPECTFULLY INSCRIBED, 
 BY 
 
 his sincere friend, 
 
 The Author. 
 
■-'•vve'V'ww^'^ ■ 
 
 n~^HERE is, I suppose, no question in Theology 
 the decision of which more deeply affects 
 man's practical life than this — Has Prayer any 
 effect beyond the mind of the person who prays ? 
 If this question be answered in the negative — if 
 we arrive at the conclusion that Prayer has no ex- 
 ternal efficacy, it is plain that its internal efficacy 
 must speedily disappear. No man's mind can be 
 beneficially affected by the constant repetition 
 of that which he believes to be a mere idle form. 
 Indeed with such a belief he would soon discon- 
 tinue the practice ; and it is far better that he 
 should. 
 
 My object in the following Lectures is to 
 examine the evidence on both sides of this im- 
 portant question. Previously to entering upon 
 this examination, I have offered some remarks 
 upon the principle which has been commonly 
 
viii Preface. 
 
 allowed to guide such discussions. The dispu- 
 tant who maintains the truth of any Christian 
 doctrine is usually expected to assume the cha- 
 racter of an apologist — one whose duty is to 
 defend the position which he has taken up ; while 
 his opponent is allowed to assume the more ad- 
 vantageous character of an assailant — one who 
 has no position to defend, and whose sole duty 
 is to point out any weakness which may exist 
 in the position which he attacks. I have en- 
 deavoured to show that in practical questions, 
 where some decision is inevitable, this mode of 
 conducting the discussion is inconsistent with 
 the principles of fair argument; giving to the 
 advocate on the negative side of the question 
 an advantage to which he has no just right. 
 I have endeavoured to show, further, that this 
 practical character attaches to the present dis- 
 cussion ; which must therefore be conducted, not 
 between an apologist and a critic, but between 
 the advocates of two systems of the world, one 
 of which includes prayer among the causes 
 which produce or modify phenomena, while the 
 other system excludes it. 
 
 There is another error in the discussion of 
 questions like the present — an error which is 
 common to the advocates on both sides of the 
 
Preface. ix 
 
 question. It is the error of those who would 
 decide such a question by one Mnd of evidence — 
 according an absolute supremacy, some to sta- 
 tistics — some to the moral sense — some to the 
 Bible; and treating the opposition of any other 
 kind of evidence as a mere difficulty^ to be ex- 
 plained and removed if possible; but whether 
 explained or not, to be allowed no real weight 
 in the decision. This mode of deciding a ques- 
 tion is plainly illogical, unless the favoured kind 
 of evidence has the force of demonstration — 
 which is never the case. 
 
 I have endeavoured to guide the inquiry 
 by the two principles here indicated — treating 
 the question as one of comparative probability 
 between two opposing systems of the world, 
 and not excluding from a share in the deci- 
 sion any evidence, from whatever source derived. 
 Lecture I. and part of Lecture II. are devoted 
 to the establishment of these principles. 
 
 In Lectures II. and III. I have examined 
 the class of objections to a system of the world 
 which includes prayer, founded on the concep- 
 tion which the objectors have formed of the 
 nature of God. This class of objections I have 
 called ^^ theological." 
 
 Lecture IV. contains an examination of a 
 
Prefc 
 
 ace. 
 
 class of objections which may be called ^' philo- 
 sophic," being wholly independent of Theology, 
 and professedly derived from the principles and 
 methods of physical science. 
 
 In Lectures V. and VI. will be fomid the 
 arguments on the other side of the question. 
 In order to maintain, in accordance with the 
 principle stated in Lecture I., an equality in 
 form between the opposing arguments, I have 
 stated the arguments on the positive as well as 
 on the negative side of the question in the form 
 of objections, pointing out the difficulties which 
 would accompany the acceptance of a system of 
 the world from which prayer is excluded. 
 
 Some questions, which seemed to require a 
 more lengthened discussion than could be given 
 to them in the text, have been examined in 
 the Appendix. I have considered in this way 
 the power of man to inquire into the attri- 
 butes of God, and the right of the moral sense 
 to judge of His moral attributes; the criterion 
 of ultimate truth ; the essential nature of those 
 occurrences which we call miracles ; the inherent 
 superiority of mind over matter ; the argument 
 from statistics; and that which may be derived 
 from the general consent of mankind. 
 
 In the Introduction I have given a brief 
 
Preface, xl 
 
 historical sketch of the progress of the contro- 
 versy. I cannot say that the result of this in- 
 vestigation is satisfactory. The history itself, 
 so far as I have been able to discover it, is 
 very meagre. Although dating from an early 
 period in the history of Christianity, the ques- 
 tion of the efficacy of prayer seems to have 
 attracted little attention for several centuries — 
 at least I can find no trace of it, as a contro- 
 versy^ in the great Christian writers who suc- 
 ceeded Origen. But of course the silence of 
 these writers does not justify us in asserting 
 that the controversy did not then exist, though 
 we may infer that it did not attract much notice. 
 The same obscurity attaches to the history of 
 the question throughout. Thus, for example, it 
 is exceedingly difficult to determine at what time 
 the argument against the efficacy of prayer which 
 finds most favour in the present day — that, 
 namely, which professes to be founded on ex- 
 perience — first appeared. It was certainly used 
 early in the eighteenth century, and seems, as 
 I have shown in the Introduction, to have been 
 well known then. It is probable, therefore, that it 
 was not a new argument at that time ; although, 
 with one exception, I have been unable to dis- 
 
xii Preface. 
 
 cover it in any of the principal writers of the 
 century preceding. 
 
 I have only to add^ that my desire through- 
 out these Lectures was to speak as though I were 
 addressing inquirers, and with this purpose to 
 state the arguments fairly on both sides of the 
 question; but with no intention, certainly, to 
 conceal my own opinion as to the result to 
 which such an inquiry ought to lead. 
 
 Trinity College, 
 Noi'emher, 1878. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 Page. 
 Inthobuction, ^1^ 
 
 LECTURE I. 
 
 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OE THE INQUIRY . 
 
 Controversy between an apologist on the one side and a critic 
 on the other allowable in theoretical but not in practical 
 science. — General criterion of the applicability of this form 
 of controversy: inapplicable to many of the doctrines of 
 Christianity. — Doctrine of the Efficacy of Prayer : its prac- 
 tical character. — Mode of stating the question. — Form of 
 Theism assumed. — Divine attributes, how investigated. — 
 Evidence of Scripture not universally applicable. — Evi- 
 dence afforded by the moral faculty.— Illogical scepticism, 1-18 
 
 LECTrUE II. 
 
 THEOLOGICAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE EFFICACY OF 
 PRAYER. 
 
 Limitation in the use of the word '' Prayer."— Has Prayer 
 any external eff'ect ?— Question not to be decided by any 
 one hind of evidence. — General statement of the theolo- 
 gical argument against the efficacy of Prayer. — Is emotion 
 a moral defect ? — Tendency to yield to supplication justi- 
 fied by analysis of Prayer. — Absence of petitionary Prayer 
 may show the highest faith. — Prayer considered as a con- 
 dition. — Universality of moral distinctions, 19-35 
 
xiv . Co7itents, 
 
 LECTURE III. 
 
 THEOLOGICAX A.EGIIMENTS AGAINST THE EFFICACY OF PRATEK. 
 MIRACLES. 
 
 Page. 
 
 Illogical limitation of argument against miracles. — What is 
 a miracle ? — Not merely a wonder. — Essential difference of 
 a miracle. — Causes which tend to conceal the true nature of 
 
 a miracle Are miracles derogatory to the character of 
 
 God ? — Superiority of mind over matter probably perpetual. 
 — The purposes of God may be incapable of being effected 
 by mechanism. — Inconsistency in the limitation of the 
 theological arguments against the Divine interference, . 36-50 
 
 LECTURE IV. 
 
 PHILOSOPHIC OBJECTIONS TO THE EFFICACY OF PRAYER. 
 
 Two opposite errors with regard to the application of argu- 
 ments drawn from physical science. — General principle of 
 Law. — Principle of Law not violated by a miracle. — No 
 Law of Nature violated by a miracle. — Physical arguments 
 against the efficacy of Prayer. — Method of differences. — 
 Argument from experiment. — Hospital test. — Legitimate 
 inference from this experiment. — Argument from statistics. 
 — Tested by imagining the statistics to be reversed, . . . 51-69 
 
 LECTURE V. 
 
 OBJECTIONS TO A THEORY OF THE WORLD WHICH EXCLUDES 
 PRAYER. 
 
 Argument from Scripture. — Teaching of the Old Testa- 
 ment. — Intercessory Prayer. — New Testament Teaching 
 
 and example of Christ. — Argument from general consent. 
 — Criterion of ultimate truth. — Difficulty of disbelief. — 
 Argument from general consent cannot be altogether set 
 aside without universal scepticism, 70-86 
 
Contents. xv 
 
 LECTUKE YI. 
 
 ARGUMENT AGAINST A SYSTEM OF THE WORLD WHICH 
 EXCLUDES PRATER DERIVED FROM THE GENERAL ASSENT 
 OF MANKIND. RECAPITULATION. 
 
 Page. 
 
 General agreement on this subject proved by the history of 
 Religion. — Source of this agreement a Moral Instinct. — - 
 Man's conception of the Divine Nature, in what sense 
 anthropomorphic. — Argument from Christian expe- 
 rience. — Objection to this argument : Answer. — Ob- 
 jection to the criticism on the experimental test : 
 Answer. — Recapitulation, 87-103 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 Note A, Page 1. 
 
 IMPOSSIBILITY OF MAINTAINING A SCEPTICAL ATTITUDE WITH 
 REGARD TO RELIGION. 
 
 Bishop Butler's decision of this question. — Reservation 
 with which it is to be understood, 105-6 
 
 Note B, Page 8. 
 
 OBJECTIONS to A STATEMENT OF THE QUESTION AS TO LYING 
 between OPPOSING PROBABILITIES. 
 
 This statement may seem unduly favourable to the nega- 
 tive side. — Principle of Bishop Butler. — Injurious effects 
 of a delusive belief in the efficacy of Prayer, .... 106-9 
 
 Note C, Page 13. 
 
 attributes of the deity. 
 
 Can man form any conception of the Divine attributes ? — 
 Opinion of Mr. Herbert Spencer. — Meaning of " The 
 Absolute " as applied to the Divine Being. — Ambiguity 
 
xvi Co7itents. 
 
 Page. 
 
 of the word " unknowable." — In what sense is it true 
 that it is unphilosophic to inquire into ''the unknow- 
 able " ? — Not true as applied to an inquiry into the Divine 
 attributes. — Utility of such inquiry. — Effect which would 
 be produced on the religious sentiment if the inquiry 
 were wholly renounced, 109-21 
 
 Note D, Page 15. 
 ceiteeion^ of ultimate truth. 
 
 Belief in our criterion of truth.' — Impossibility of disbelief 
 to be preferred to belief as a criterion of truth. — Am- 
 biguity in the expression "impossibility of disbelief." — 
 DijGference between "incredible" and "inconceivable." — 
 The test of truth is the incredibility^ not the inconceiva- 
 bility, of the opposite. — Principle of causation. — Mr. 
 Spencer's use of the word "unbelievable." — Is it ad- 
 missible ? — Example. — Difficulty not imjwssihility of dis- 
 belief the general criterion of truth, 122-41 
 
 Note E, Page 17. 
 eight of the moral faculty to judge of the 
 
 attributes OF GOD. 
 
 Answer to the question given by Mansel. — Different answer 
 given by F. "W. Newman. — Those who deny the right 
 are bound to disprove it. — Effect of the denial on re- 
 vealed religion. — Moral sense not infallible Errors of 
 
 the intellect often attributed to the moral sense. — Deci- 
 sion of the moral sense often given upon an imaginary 
 case, for which the intellect is responsible. — Instance in 
 the Calvinistic controversy. — Assumed infallibility of 
 Scriptural evidence. — Mr. Mansel's definition of " moral 
 miracles." — Is the moral law ever suspended ? . . . . 141-52 
 
 Note F, Page 23. 
 
 OBJECTIONS to PRAYER DERIVED FROM THE REGULAR 
 SEQUENCE OF PHENOMENA. 
 
 Natural law violated by the success of Prayer for a physical 
 benefit, according to Mr. Stopford Brooke. — Is thistrue ? 
 — Effect of the voluntary actions of men. — Instance in 
 the rainfall, 152-5 
 
Conte7its. xvii 
 
 KoTE G, Page 25. 
 
 IS AN EMOTION A MORAL DEFECT ? 
 
 Page. 
 
 Answer to tlie question given by the Stoical philosopliy. — 
 Rejected by tbe general sense of mankind. — Is the ab- 
 sence of emotion in a higher order of beings a mark of 
 their superiority? — Opinion of Bishop Butler. — Do we 
 consider the moral character to be exalted by the insen- 
 sibility which is often produced, even in the benevolent, 
 by familiarity with scenes of sorrow? — Is the Divine 
 mind wholly without passive power ? — Dilemma, . . . 156-61 
 
 KoTE H, Page 38. 
 
 WHAT IS A MIEACLE? 
 
 Opinion of Professor Mansel — Professor Baden PoweU — 
 Bishop Butler. — Archbishop Trench.— Two laws cannot 
 be opposed.— Is the difficulty of admitting the truth of a 
 miracle lessened by the principle that *' God works by 
 means" ?— Opinion of the Duke of Argyll.— Instance in 
 the plague of locusts, 161-8 
 
 KoTE I, Page 41. 
 
 ILLOGICAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE WOELD OF SPIRIT 
 AND THE WOELD OP MATTEE. 
 
 Argument of the Duke of Argyll against this distinction, . 169 
 
 l^oTE K, Page 46. 
 
 INHERENT SUPERIORITY OF MIND OVER MATTEE. 
 
 This superiority may be asserted without deciding the 
 question whether mind and matter be modifications of 
 the same substance. — Marks of superiority. — Power of 
 invention. Power of improvement. — Man could not be 
 f uUy replaced by a machine. — Is this a defect in man ? . 169-73 
 
 b 
 
xvili Contents, 
 
 Note L, Page 68. 
 the statistical argument. 
 
 Page* 
 
 Opposite opinions as to the applicability of the statistical 
 argument. — Dr. Hessey. — Mr. Galton. — The statistical 
 argument is applicable, but has no right to a monopoly. — 
 Principle laid down by Mr. Galton for the guidance of 
 the statistical inquiry — Statistics collected on this prin- 
 ciple inapplicable to the Christian theory of Prayer. — 
 Two elements of uncertainty in arguments derived from 
 statistics of recovery from sickness. — Argument from 
 the silence of physicians with regard to the efficacy of 
 Prayer. — This would prove too much. — Assumption made 
 by Mr. Galton in the construction of the statistical ar- 
 gument. — Instances. — Length of life of kings. — Of the 
 clergy. — Differently treated by Mr. Galton. — Logical 
 conditions of the Method of Differences. — General con- 
 clusion, 174-88 
 
 KoTE M, Page 79. 
 
 AEGIJMENT FEOM THE GENERAL CONSENT OF MANEIND. 
 
 Ought any weight to be attached to the belief of others ? — 
 Relation between this question and that of the criterion 
 of ultimate truth. — Sole use of the argument from other 
 people's opinions, according to Mill. — Logical consequence 
 of this principle. — This principle is seldom or never logi- 
 cally carried out, but such a development is not impos- 
 sible. — Presumption in favour of the truth of the thing 
 believed. First question to be asked in determining the 
 value of such belief. Case of intuitive beliefs. — Moral 
 intuitions. — Application to the question of the efficacy 
 of Prayer. — Mr. Galton's reductio ad absurdum of the 
 argument from universality. — It is not an absurdity that 
 the prayer of a heathen may meet with favour, . . . 188-203 
 
INTRi 
 
 i MONGr the subjects of controversy which engaged 
 -*^ the attention of pre-Christian Theists, the Efficacy 
 of Prayer can hardly be reckoned. Whether a God or 
 Gods existed, and what was their nature— whether they 
 were corporeal or incorporeal, mortal or immortal — these 
 were questions which possessed a certain amount of in- 
 terest. But the efficacy of prayer to these deities does 
 not seem to have been, directly, a subject of discussion. 
 With, at least, the great majority of pre-Christian Theists, 
 this dogma seems to have been regarded as a necessary 
 part of Theism. That the God, or Gods, whose existence 
 they admitted, were quite as properly objects of prayer as 
 of any other kind of worship, and that these beings were 
 influenced by the prayers of their worshippers, were ar- 
 ticles of belief nearly co-extensive with the belief in the 
 existence of the deities themselves. Plato puts into the 
 
 mouth of Socrates a warning against rash or ignorant 
 
 b2 
 
XX Introduction. 
 
 prayer, but tlie danger from widch lie would guard Al- 
 cibiades is that bis prayer may be granted, not that it 
 may be refused.^ Cicero, who has treated largely of the 
 existence, nature, and providence of the Gods, gives no 
 indication of any scepticism among Theists as to the 
 efficacy of prayer. 
 
 There is indeed an apparent exception to the truth of 
 the statement that no pre-Christian Theists were sceptical 
 on this subject. An Epicurean would not, probably, have 
 called himself an Atheist, yet his Theism was such as to 
 render this belief impossible. Prayer to a being who was 
 supposed to take no part in human affairs — nay, from 
 whose existence all activity was supposed to be absent, 
 could only be a mockery. Nor indeed is the applicability 
 of this remark limited to the theology of Epicurus. Any 
 theology which denies the present activity of the Divine 
 Being renders prayer an absurdity. So far as this ques- 
 tion is concerned, it matters not whether, with the Epicu- 
 rean, we suppose the Deity to have been always inactive, 
 or assume, with some modern thinkers, that He, as it 
 were, " set the universe going," and then abandoned it to 
 the action of secondary causes. 
 
 In a certain sense, therefore, the controversy with regard 
 to the efficacy of prayer may be said to have existed among 
 ^ Alcihiades II. 
 
Introduction, . xxi 
 
 ancient Theists. But it can hardly be said to have had a 
 separate existence. It was merged in the more general 
 question of the nature of the Grods. "We may not say that 
 the efficacy of prayer was admitted by all ancient Theists, 
 but it does seem that this doctrine was not denied by any 
 whose theology rendered its admission possible. Even 
 with Epicurus and his followers, the denial of the efficacy 
 of prayer is to be inferred rather from the nature of their 
 theology than from any distinct statement. Cotta, argu- 
 ing as an Academic, alleges as a reductio ad absurdum of 
 Epicureanism, that it renders prayer nugatory.^ 
 
 There is some difficulty in ascertaining with precision 
 the opinion of the Stoics on this subject. If this opinion 
 be deduced from the system of the world taught by 
 Zeno, Chrysippus, and their followers, it might seem that 
 no efficacy could have been attributed to prayer. Eor 
 prayer can hardly exist under a system of either Panthe- 
 ism or Fatalism, and the Stoical doctrine appears to have 
 partaken of both characters. Pantheism which denies the 
 personality of the Divine Being, and Fatalism which sup- 
 poses the sequence of events to be fixed beyond the power 
 of Grod or man to change — both these theories seem to ex- 
 clude prayer. On the other hand, the propriety of prayer 
 was distinctly taught by members of the Stoic school. 
 
 ^ Cicero, de Natura Deorum^ Kb. i. c. 44. 
 
xxii Introduction, 
 
 Diogenes Laertius, in enumerating the dogmas of the 
 Stoic philosophy, says — " The wise man will pray, asking 
 good things from the Grods, as Posidonius says in the first 
 book of his treatise on Duties, and Hecaton says the same 
 thing in the thirteenth book of his treatise on Extraordi- 
 nary Things." ^ It is remarkable that Posidonius is men- 
 tioned by the same author as one of those Stoics who 
 taught that all things were produced by fate.^ It would 
 seem therefore that the Stoics had some way of reconciling 
 these apparently inconsistent theories, or perhaps that they 
 did not perceive the inconsistency. Moreover, the doc- 
 trine that the world is ruled by a power independent of 
 the Grods was certainly not held by all the members of the 
 Stoic School. Balbus, introduced by Cicero as the repre- 
 sentative of the Stoics, distinctly states their belief that 
 the world is ruled "by the providence of the Gods^^; com- 
 plaining that the Epicureans misrepresented them by 
 omitting the words "of the Gods," and thus making 
 them, as it were, personify Providence as a distinct power 
 ("tanquam anum fatidicam"). These words were, he 
 says, omitted by the Stoics merely for the '^^ake of brevity, 
 and were always understood.^ On the whole, I do not 
 
 1 Diogenes Laertius (Yonge's translation), p. 304. 
 
 = iZ>. p. 313. 
 
 ^ Cicero, de Natura Deorum, lib. ii. § 29. 
 
Introduction. xxiii 
 
 think tHat we should be justified in describing the Stoics 
 as unbelievers in the efficacy of prayer, however this scep- 
 ticism might seem to be the necessary result of their philo- 
 sophic tenets. 
 
 There is another fact which it is necessary to notice, in- 
 asmuch as it may seem to be inconsistent with the asser- 
 tion that the efficacy of prayer was accepted by all the 
 pre-Christian Theists, whose theology rendered such a be- 
 lief possible. Speaking of the denial of this doctrine by 
 Prodicus and his followers, Clement of Alexandria tells 
 them that they must not imagine themselves to be ori- 
 ginal in this scepticism, which had characterised, long 
 before, the philosophers of the Cyrenaic School.^ Else- 
 where Clement defends Theodorus, one of the most dis- 
 tinguished disciples of this School, against the charge of 
 Atheism, which had been very freely brought against 
 him.' If we may rely on Clement in both his state- 
 ments, it would seem that we have here an instance of 
 pre-Christian Theists who denied the efficacy of prayer, 
 and of whom we have no proof that their theology ren- 
 dered belief in this doctrine impossible. 
 
 With regard to Clement's defence of Theodorus, it is in 
 
 1 Vol. ii., p. 415 (Clark's Ante-Nicene Christian Library). 
 
 2 Vol. i., p. 33. For the charge of Atheism vide Cicero, de Natura 
 Deorum^ lib. i. § 42. 
 
xxlv Introduction. 
 
 truth rather a confirmation than a refutation of the charge 
 of Atheism — amounting in fact to this, that Theodorus 
 had renounced the false theology of his time, yet without 
 acquiring anything better. No account remains to us of 
 the Cyrenaic theology — if they had a theology. They 
 have left no authoritative record of their system, and we 
 are obliged to have recourse to such information as we can 
 gather from authors who wrote long after the school had 
 ceased to exist. From Diogenes Laertius, who has left us 
 the most detailed account of the Cyrenaic philosophy, we 
 learn their opinions on many physical and ethical ques- 
 tions ; but only one doubtful phrase is capable of a theolo- 
 gical reference. Among the qualities from which a wise 
 man ought to be free, the Cyrenaics reckoned one which 
 may be either religious or superstitious according to the 
 meaning which we assign to the Greek word used i^uai^ 
 haifxovia).^ If the former be the true meaning, it would 
 go far to justify the accusation of Atheism which has been 
 brought against them. If we are to understand the word 
 in the second sense, it would leave the question of the na- 
 ture or existence of Cyrenaic theology imdecided. On the 
 whole, if this School had any definite maxim on the sub- 
 
 1 Lib. ii., segm. 91, 92. The reason given for the freedom of the 
 wise man from Seia-iSai/jLovla, namely, that this quality is the result of 
 an unreal notion (kcj/V Sd^av), would apply to either sense of the word* 
 
Introduction. xxv 
 
 ject of prayer, such, a maxim may have arisen, not im- 
 probably, from the absence of, at least, practical Theism. 
 Certainly the ethical system of Aristippus breathes very 
 little piety. 
 
 The first systematic discussion of this question which I 
 have been able to discover is contained in the writings of 
 Maximus Tyrius, about the middle of the second century. 
 His eleventh dissertation bears the title, " Whether prayer 
 is right" (fct Sa i^)x^a%aL) — a question which he decides in 
 the negative. His argument is not unlike that afterwards 
 ascribed by Origen to the sceptics of his own time. Maxi- 
 mus Tyrius contends that if those who pray are worthy to 
 gain their petitions, they will gain them without prayer ; 
 nay, all the more because they will have shown (by not 
 praying) both modesty and faith. ^ Further, in opposi- 
 tion to prayer for individual benefits, he argues that if 
 events are arranged by the Divine Providence, and if this 
 Providence concerns itself, as he thinks probable, only 
 about the general interest, private petitions will not be 
 granted.- 
 
 The controversy as to the duty and efficacy of prayer 
 found a very early place in the history of Christianity. 
 In the treatise^ which Origen has devoted to the subject of 
 
 1 Dissertation xi. p. 117 (Davis's edition). 
 
 2 Ih, p. 118. 
 
 3 Tom. i. p. 186, et seq. (Benedictine edition). 
 
xxvi Introduction, 
 
 prayer, is to be found the statement of objections wbicb. 
 are alleged by the controversialists of the present day. 
 There is, for example, no one of the theological objections 
 against the efficacy of prayer more commonly urged by 
 modem controversialists than this dilemma — If it be right 
 that we should have the blessing for which we pray, Grod 
 will grant it to us without prayer, and if it be not right, 
 He will not grant it at all. This objection is stated and 
 commented on by Origen.- Other objections equally 
 familiar to us now are stated by the same author. Thus, 
 for example, it is objected to prayer for virtue that, if the 
 petitioner be one of the elect, he will gain his object with- 
 out prayer, and if he be not one of the elect, he will not 
 attain it by prayer.^ This dilemma resembles the for- 
 mer, showing however by its form of expression that it 
 was derived from a source professedly Christian. The 
 same is indeed apparently true of all the objections enu- 
 merated by Origen, who does not seem to concern himself 
 with non- Christian disputants. We may add to those 
 already mentioned the ordinary objections derived from 
 the unchangeabib'ty f.nd foreknowledge of God, which 
 are also stated and discussed by Origen.* 
 
 If Origen's account of the class of men from whom ob- 
 
 1 Infra, p. 22. -^ Tom. i., p. 204. 
 
 2 Tom. i., p. 205. * lb. pp. 206-8. 
 
Introduction, xxvii 
 
 jections to prayer proceeded be true, there is a certain 
 similarity between the sceptics of his time and those 
 abeady alluded to as belonging to an earlier period. 
 With the later sceptics, as with the Epicureans, denial of 
 the efficacy of prayer, if we are to accept the statement of 
 Origen, would appear to have been a necessary result of 
 their fundamental principles. The Epicurean could not 
 admit that prayer had any effect with deities whom he 
 believed to be wholly inactive. And according to Origen, 
 denial of its efficacy was almost entirely confined to those 
 who disbelieved, although they might not openly deny, 
 either the existence or the providence of Grod.^ To both 
 these classes — the Atheist and the Epicurean — the efficacy 
 of prayer was obviously an absurdity. But it must be 
 admitted that the objections against this doctrine enume- 
 rated by Origen do not, when considered in themselves, 
 appear to have been founded upon either Atheistical or 
 Epicurean principles. The objectors may indeed have 
 thought it advisable to argue rather upon the principles 
 of their opponents than upon their own ; but the internal 
 
 ^ Tom. i. p. 203. This is the only consistent meaning which I can 
 pnt upon two apparently contradictory statements of Origen — one, that 
 scarcely any one denied the efl&cacy of prayer who did not also reject 
 either the existence or the providence of God ; the other, that he does 
 not propose to consider the objections made by any person who re- 
 jected either of these doctrines. 
 
xxviii Introduction, 
 
 evidence, so far as it goes, seems to be unfavourable to 
 the truth of Origen's statement. It appears to be more 
 probable that, then as now, there existed a class of men 
 who, believing in the existence and providence of Grod, re- 
 jected the doctrine of the efficacy of prayer, principally 
 because they found it to be inconsistent with their theistio 
 conceptions. Among Pagan Theists, Maximus Tyrius 
 appears to have belonged to this class. 
 
 Of the sect founded by Prodicus, to which Clement 
 attributes disbelief in the efficacy of prayer, we have no 
 minute information. It was probably an offshoot of the 
 Carpocratians, a sect of Alexandrian Gnostics which ex- 
 isted in the second century. Whether Prodicus inherited 
 from them this particular opinion we do not know ; pro- 
 bably, however, had the fact been so, Clement would have 
 recorded it. 
 
 Combining these several facts — 1. That of the Chris- 
 tian writers of the second century only the two Alexan- 
 drians, Clement and Origen, allude to this controversy; 
 2. That the denial of the efficacy of prayer is attributed 
 by Clement to Prodicus, a Grnostic and probably a disciple 
 of the Alexandrian Carpocrates ; 3. That the first distinct 
 statement of the controversy is to be found in the writings 
 of Maximus Tyrius, who, although not an Alexandrian, 
 was a Platonic philosopher — we may infer with probabi- 
 
Introduction, xxix 
 
 lity tliat its source is to be sought in the Neo-Platonic 
 School of Alexandria. If this be true, we may fix the 
 date of its commencement at some period between 
 A.D. 100 and a.d. 150. No allusion to it is to be found 
 in the works of the Platonist Philo ; and his silence ren- 
 ders it improbable that it was known in the first century. 
 On the other hand, it is distinctly stated by Maximus 
 Tyrius, who was at the zenith of his fame under Marcus 
 Aurelius, a.d. 161-80. 
 
 So far as we can judge from the principal Christian 
 writers, the controversy appears to have slumbered for 
 many centuries after the time of Origen. Chrysostom 
 and Augustine have both dwelt largely upon the subject 
 of prayer, and the same is true in different degrees of 
 Cyril, Hilary, and others. But no one of these writers 
 appears to be conscious of the existence of any general 
 scepticism as to its efficacy. They notice, indeed, and 
 labour to remove, certain difficulties which are opposed to 
 the acceptance of this doctrine. Thus, for example, the 
 question — ^why, in answer to human prayer, the blessing 
 prayed for often comes but slowly, is quite a favourite 
 subject of discussion ; as is also the reconcilement of the 
 efficacy of prayer with the Divine foreknowledge. But 
 the tone of these writers is that of teachers rather than 
 that of controversialists. They write, apparently, more 
 
XXX Litrodudion. 
 
 with the purpose of removing dijficulties from the minds 
 of believers than with the purpose of convincing or con- 
 futing unbelievers. It is of course impossible to say that 
 the controversy did not exist. It undoubtedly did ex- 
 ist in the time of Origen, and probably continued to 
 exist subsequently, although I have been unable to tracts 
 it. But the silence of such writers as Chrysostom ana 
 Augustine with respect to this controversy justifies the 
 supposition that it was not very conspicuous, or perhaps 
 not very widely diffused. 
 
 In the writings of Thomas Aquinas (second half of the 
 thirteenth century) the question assumes a definitely con- 
 troversial shape. Difficulties attendant on the theory of 
 prayer are noticed and treated of, not as perplexities felt 
 by believers, but as objections alleged by opponents. 
 Like the objections noticed by Origen, and indeed all the 
 early objections to the efficacy of prayer, the arguments 
 stated and controverted by Thomas Aquinas are of the 
 kind which I have called theological.^ Some are founded 
 on the prescience or the immutability of God.^ One de- 
 pends on the assumed principle, that, as it is a stronger 
 proof of liberality to give unasked than in compliance 
 with a petition, the offering of such a petition is an 
 affront to Him.^ Another is founded on the theory of 
 
 1 Infra, p. 22. 2 p^rt ii., div. ii., qu. 83, art. 2. ^ j^^^ 
 
Introduction, xxxi 
 
 predestination.^ Another, which is indeed rather moral 
 than theological, deprecates prayer for temporal blessings, 
 because anxiety for such things lowers the tone of the 
 mind, and is moreover forbidden to us.^ 
 
 The history so far, and indeed for a long period after 
 the time of Thomas Aquinas, is, as I have said, that of a 
 controversy purely theological. The objectors of the thir- 
 teenth century, like the objectors of the second century, 
 derive their arguments against the efficacy of prayer from 
 its supposed inconsistency with the Divine attributes. 
 There is as yet no trace (so far at least as I can discover) 
 of the arguments, so popular in our day, derived from the 
 principles and methods of physical science. Nor is this 
 to be wondered at. Physical science can hardly be said 
 to have existed. The methods of physical science, in the 
 modern sense of those words, did not exist. We can 
 therefore hardly expect to find arguments such as these 
 in use before the time of Bacon. 
 
 That Bacon himself had no scepticism with regard to 
 the efficacy of prayer, even in the physical world, ap- 
 pears from one of the prayers which he has left behind — 
 prayers evidently composed for his own use. This prayer 
 contains a distinct petition for a temporal blessing — "O 
 Lord, let thy holy angels pitch their tents about us, to 
 
 ^ Part i., qu. 23, art. 8. ^ p^rt ii., div. ii., qu. 83, art. 6. 
 
xxxii Introduction, 
 
 guard and defend us from all the malice of Satan, and 
 from all perils both of soul and hodyr ^ I cannot find 
 that he has treated of the question itself. 
 
 I can discover no proof that this controversy obtained 
 much attention during the seventeenth century. The 
 great English divines of that time have hardly noticed it. 
 Among the philosophic writers, Hobbes defends the prac- 
 tice of prayer, not because it influences the Divine will, 
 but because it is the condition which God has prescribed 
 to those who desire to obtain His blessings.^ At the close 
 of this century, however (a.d. 1695), Bayle notices an 
 objection to which, since his time, much importance has 
 been attached, namely, that, as a matter of fact, devout 
 prayers are not always granted.^ But he does not go so 
 far as to say that they are never granted. In other words, 
 although denying that devout prayer is always efficacious, 
 he does not assert that it is never efficacious. It is remark- 
 able that Bayle admits, as a matter of fact, that the argu- 
 ments on the positive side of this question generally 
 produce in the minds of those who hear or read them a 
 conviction which is almost complete.^ 
 
 A Vol. vii. pp. 7, 8 (Montague's edition). 
 
 2 Opera Philosophica, vol. ii. p. 124 (Molesworth's edition). 
 
 3 Diet. Hist, et Crit., torn. iv. p. 235 (5th edition). Art. Sommono- 
 •Codom. 
 
 * Ibid. 
 
Introduction, xxxlii 
 
 The argument thus briefly noticed by Bayle is men- 
 tioned and controverted by Wollaston ; ^ who alleges in 
 opposition to it the uncertainty which necessarily attends 
 the attempt to discover the effects of prayer from actual 
 observation, with other arguments which have been often 
 used since. Some years later the same objection is 
 adopted by Chubb.^ It is remarkable that, in the deve- 
 lopment of this objection, Chubb adduces the same case 
 upon which Mr. Galton has laid great stress, namely, the 
 want of success which attends prayer for kings. There is 
 however this difference — that, whereas Mr. Gralton's argu- 
 ment is founded on the alleged failure of prayer for the 
 longevity of kings, Chubb's argument is founded on the 
 alleged failure of prayer for their morality. 
 
 The argument against the efficacy of prayer derived 
 from the supposed invariability of the course of Nature 
 probably took its rise about the same time. It is not 
 noticed by Bayle, but Dr. Samuel Clarke early in the 
 eighteenth century speaks of it as being commonly known 
 then. In his sermon on the Duty of Prayer (Serm. . 
 CLViii.), after m-ging the necessity of faith as a condi- 
 tion of successful prayer, he says — " The greatest objec- 
 tion that vain men have made against the faith I am 
 
 ^ Religion of Nature, p. 125. 
 "^ Posthumous Works, vol. i., pp. 279-80. 
 c 
 
xxxiv Introduction. 
 
 speaking of is, that things seem regularly to proceed in 
 the course of Nature, and according to the efficiency of 
 second causes ; and that therefore, * What is the Almighty 
 that we should serve him? and what profit should we 
 have if we pray unto Him ? ' " — Job. xxi. 15. ^ 
 
 No substantial change in the lines of the controversy 
 appears to have been made since the early part of the 
 eighteenth century. Arguments have been indeed worked 
 out in greater detail, and in one case an important modi- 
 fication has been suggested ; but in principle these argu- 
 ments have remained the same. Inconsistency with the 
 character of Grod — inconsistency with the laws of Nature — 
 inconsistency with experience — ^these were the objections 
 alleged early in the eighteenth century against the suppo- 
 sition of the Divine interference, and these are the objec- 
 tions urged still. The present state of the controversy 
 may be gathered very fully from several papers which 
 appeared in the Contemporary and Fortnightly Eeviews 
 for the years 1872-3, by Professor Tyndall, Mr. Gralton, 
 Professor M'Cosh, Mr. Littledale, Mr. Knight, the Duke 
 of Argyll, and an anonymous writer to whom I shall 
 allude presently. The arguments on the negative side of 
 the question are founded on the three principles which I 
 have stated, and so far they cannot be said to involve 
 anything new. 
 
 1 Works, vol. ii., p. 281. 
 
Introductmi. xxxv 
 
 But the modern controversy, though not new in its 
 principles, is marked by certain features which are peculiar 
 to itself. It is less Theistic than the older controversies. 
 Some of the disputants, setting the theological arguments 
 wholly aside, have assumed the right to decide the ques- 
 tion by the methods of physical science — observation and 
 experiment; the use of this latter method having been 
 suggested (I believe for the first time) by the anonymous 
 writer to whom I have before alluded. 
 
 Among the theological arguments which are thus set 
 aside, none are excluded more rigorously than those de- 
 rived from Scripture. In discussing the kindred question 
 of miracles, Spinoza has taken some trouble to prove that 
 Scripture is on his side.^ I do not suppose that any 
 modern controversialist, holding the opinions of Spinoza, 
 would do as much. Certainly if we take our ideas of 
 modern thought from the controversy of 1872-3, we shall 
 be inclined to think that the evidence of Scripture has 
 been altogether banished from the discussion. Indeed the 
 assertion of Mr. Gralton that "the collapse of the argument 
 of universality leaves us solely concerned with a simple 
 statistical question"^ can mean no less. The tacit refusal 
 of the disputants on one side of the question to argue it, 
 
 ^ Tractatus Theologico-PoUticus, cap. vi. 
 
 2 Fortnightly Review^ vol. xii. (new series), p. 126. 
 
xxxvi Introduction, 
 
 in any degree, upon Scriptural evidence seems to have 
 widened the separation between them and some of the dis- 
 putants on the positive side ; while others, anxious to pre- 
 serve some common ground, have been perhaps too ready 
 to fight the whole battle upon a field chosen by their op- 
 ponents. Thus the controversy has become less Theistic. 
 But indeed this tendency to decide a question, not by a re- 
 view of the ivliole evidence, but by that kind only which the 
 reasoner's habits of thought have led him to prefer, is not 
 peculiar to the controversies of theology. 
 
 The controversy of 1872-3 is also marked by an at- 
 tempt to define a certain sphere within which prayer is 
 efficacious — excluding it strictly from the world of matter, 
 but conceding to it a very large power in the world of 
 spirit. This species of compromise would, no doubt, neu- 
 tralise objections which have been made to the doctrine in 
 the name of physical science. But I think that few per- 
 sons, having read Mr. Knight's two papers,^ and the reply 
 of the Duke of Argyll^ to the first, will think that the 
 attempt was successful. I may add that, although this 
 limitation of the sphere in which the efficacy of prayer is 
 asserted would relieve the doctrine from the statistical ob- 
 jection as stated by Mr. Gralton, it would not relieve it 
 from the statistical objection as stated by Chubb (p. xxxi). . 
 
 1 Contemporary Review y vols, xxi., xxiii. 
 
Introduction, xxxvii 
 
 The prayers of their subjects coiild have no effect, accord- 
 ing to Mr Knight, in increasing the longevity of kings, but 
 there is no reason why such prayers should not be effica- 
 cious in improving their morality. 
 
 To any person who reviews calmly the present state of 
 the controversy, it must be a matter of deep regret that 
 into this, as into so many theological discussions, there has 
 been infused a spirit of bitterness highly imfavourable to 
 the cause of truth. Writers on the negative side of this 
 great question complain, that accusations have been brought 
 against them and injurious epithets applied to them, which 
 they are conscious to themselves that they do not merit. 
 Unfortunately this is not a solitary case. The odium 
 theologicum has passed into a proverb ; and it has become 
 usual to contrast the passion and bitterness of theologians 
 with the philosophic calm of scientific men, greatly to the 
 disadvantage of the former. But the comparison is not 
 just ; and there is something to be said in apology for this 
 violence, cruel and disastrous as it has often been. The 
 scientific man is calm — true ; but he has usually no temp- 
 tation to be otherwise. His happiness is in nowise in- 
 volved in the result of the investigation which he conducts ; 
 and he may therefore bring to his task a mind unprejudiced 
 and unimpassioned — earnest for truth, and having no rea- 
 son to be earnest for anything else. But, while human 
 
xxxviii Introduction. 
 
 nature is what it is, it would be vain to expect that men 
 will bring the same tranquillity to a discussion in whose 
 result their hopes and affections are deeply concerned. So 
 it is with many of the discussions of theology ; and in an 
 eminent degree with the doctrine which forms our present 
 subject. 
 
 True or imtrue, the doctrine of the efi&cacy of prayer 
 has been to millions the very life-blood of their religion. 
 It is associated with the affections of their earliest child- 
 hood. It has accompanied them in the struggles of ma- 
 turer life. In pain and in sorrow it has been their comfort 
 to think that there is a Friend of whom they may ask 
 relief with a hope that the prayer will be successful. The 
 comfort may be a delusion — the hope utterly baseless ; and 
 if this be so, it is the duty of those who see more clearly 
 to show to their weaker brethren that they are deceived by 
 a phantom. But when we expect that men will receive the 
 attempt to destroy one of their dearest hopes with the 
 equanimity which marks the student of pure science, we 
 are asking of human nature more than it can give. Per- 
 fect allegiance to truth does indeed require that we should 
 weigh with complete impartiality the evidence by which 
 an asserted doctrine is sustained, how long and closely so- 
 ever it may have twined itself into our hearts. So, too, 
 does a perfect allegiance to truth require that we should 
 
Introduction. xxxix 
 
 weigh with complete impartiality the evidence by which 
 a criminal charge is sustained, regardless of the fact that 
 the accused is our dearest friend. But human nature 
 cannot do it. 
 
 It is, I repeat, vain to expect that a contest in which 
 men's affections are engaged can be carried on with the 
 tranquillity which characterizes the discussions of pure 
 science. It is not so in the contests of politics — it is not so 
 in the contests of theology ; and it is scarcely possible that 
 it should ever be so. But the disputants would do well to 
 remember that the advocate whose words are to be read 
 cannot use bitter and passionate language with the same 
 effect, nor even with the same impunity, as the advocate 
 whose words are only to be heard. Did the Christian ad- 
 vocate always bear in mind how much Im cause, above all 
 others, is injured by the use of language of this kind, we 
 should probably hear less of it in theological controversy. 
 
 There are attacks directed against the Christian religion 
 which cannot and ought not to be met by a purely intel- 
 lectual opposition. Sneers against that which men vene- 
 rate, like sneers against those whom they love, must excite 
 in their minds a feeling of moral reprobation — contempt, 
 if these sneers are powerless — indignation, if they affect 
 the minds of other men. But there are attacks, and those 
 the most formidable of all, which cannot be met with these 
 
xl Introduction, 
 
 weapons. The Christian advocate would do well to re- 
 member that, in the world of educated men, he has no 
 opponent so dangerous as the respectful sceptic ; who, re- 
 fusing to believe, gives without passion the reasons for his 
 unbelief. Such an opponent is not to be met by invective ; 
 and he who chooses this weapon must be prepared for the 
 inference, that he has chosen it because in a contest of 
 reason he could only expect defeat. Probably no cause 
 has suffered more from this inference than the cause of 
 Christianity. 
 
LECTtJEE I. 
 
 FUNDAMENTAL PEINCIPLES OF THE INQUIEY. 
 
 St. Ltjke, ix. 50. 
 "He tliat is not against ns is for us." 
 
 St. Matth. xii. 30. 
 *' He that is not with me is against me." 
 
 THE two passages which I have here quoted might, 
 to a hasty reader, present an appearance of incon- 
 gruity. In reahty, they are but different expressions of 
 the same truth — the impossibility, namely, of main- 
 taining a neutral attitude towards religion. Limited in 
 expression here to the religion of Christ, they really 
 enunciate a principle applicable to all religions. They 
 tell us that it is impossible to maintain a purely sceptical 
 attitude with regard to Christianity; and that is true, 
 not because it is Christianity, but because it is a religion — 
 because it is not a mere system of speculative truth, but 
 is intended to influence the lives of men.^ 
 
 ^ Appendix, Note A. 
 
2 Controversy between Critic a7id Apologist^ 
 
 I have prefixed these passages to the investigation in 
 which I have now to engage you, as indicating concisely 
 the principle on which I propose to conduct it — a prin- 
 ciple not peculiar to the present question, but which 
 ought to underlie all such investigations. This principle 
 I now proceed to state more fully. 
 
 The word "apologist," so commonly applied to those 
 who have written favourably of the evidence of Chris- 
 tianity, expresses a disadvantageous position, which has 
 been very generally assigned to them, and which they 
 have been, I think, too ready to accept. If of two con- 
 troversialists the one is required to assume a position 
 purely defensive, while the other is permitted to assume 
 a position purely critical, there can be no doubt that 
 the second controversialist starts with an enormous 
 advantage. Not, be it observed, necessarily an unfair 
 advantage. There are controversies in which the 
 rules of right reason absolutely require those who con- 
 duct them to assume this relative position. There are 
 controversies which, from their very nature, must be con- 
 ducted between critics on the one side and defenders, 
 or, to use our fomier term, apologists, on the other. 
 Still, I repeat, in any such controversy, the disputant 
 who is allowed to assume the position of a mere critic 
 enjoys an immense advantage. He is not expected to 
 prove anything. He is not required to show that the 
 position which he defends is stronger than that occupied 
 by his opponent, for he defends no position. His duty 
 is simply to criticise the argument of his opponent ; to 
 point out its weakness, if it have any such ; to show (and 
 this more nearly concerns our present inquiry) that there 
 
allowable in Theoretical Science. 3 
 
 are difficulties which his opponent has failed to remove — 
 to show, in fact, that the argument which he criticises falls 
 short of full proof. In a word, the apologist is required 
 to prove his assertion to be true, while the critic is not 
 required to prove it to be untrue. If the apologist fail 
 to do that which is thus required of him, the critic has 
 but to point out the failure, and he will be pronounced 
 to have been victorious. 
 
 Now, there are controversies in which this is quite 
 right, but there are controversies in which it is wholly 
 "vvrong; and as the controversial principle which I have 
 stated gives necessarily to one of the supposed disputants 
 a very serious advantage, it is right that before such a 
 princijDle is adopted we should seek to define the class of 
 questions to which it is applicable, in order that we may 
 determine whether in this class the controversy in hand 
 be included. 
 
 Now, in the first place, it is quite plain that there 18 
 such a class. In the scientific world we know it well. 
 Thu.s, when a scientific man is presented with a theory 
 of any natural phenomenon, he is in general perfectly 
 justified in assuming a position purely critical. It is in 
 general his undoubted right to criticise the theory which 
 is submitted to him; to state any scientific objections 
 Avhich may be alleged against it ; to point out any parts 
 of the complex phenomenon which it has failed to account 
 for; and that without being required to advance any 
 theory of his own. This is perfectly just, so long as we 
 have to deal with purely theoretical science. You may 
 refuse to believe that light is an undulation without being 
 required to maintain that it is a projectile, or to hold 
 
 b2 
 
Not allowable in Practical Scii 
 
 cience. 
 
 any theory on tlie subject ; and you may do this because 
 in such a question the mind may, after hearing the 
 evidence, reasonably assume any one of three attitudes — 
 namely, belief, disbelief, or unbelief. But let the ques- 
 tion pass from the region of theory to the region of 
 practice, and the third of these attitudes usually becomes 
 impossible. If the question which the theory professes to 
 solve be a practical one, you cannot usually take up the 
 position of unbelief. You may act as if you believed 
 the theory to be true, or you may act as if you believed 
 it to be false ; but you cannot act as if you did not 
 know whether it be true or false. So far as your 
 actions are concerned, you cannot leave the question 
 undecided. 
 
 A single example taken from the world of science will 
 sufficiently illustrate this principle. The physicist, who 
 believes in the nearly spherical figure of the Earth, 
 is bound to maintain his thesis against all comers, 
 without being entitled to require of any objector that 
 he should produce a counter-theory. If he attempt 
 to meet an objection by asking of the objector, " Well, 
 what do you believe the Earth's figure to be ? " the 
 other may fairly retort — "I do not know — I have no 
 theory on the subject, and am merely exercising my right 
 to criticise yours." 
 
 But this retort, perfectly fair when addressed to a 
 physicist, would have no force at all if addressed to a 
 sailor. For he may quite fairly reply — " Then I cannot 
 listen to you. I must decide the question; the exigen- 
 cies of my profession require that I should decide it. I 
 must have charts ; I must be guided by rules of naviga- 
 
General Crlteriofi — applied to Christianity, 5 
 
 tion; and neither cliarts nor rules can be constructed 
 without answering the question — ' What is the figure of 
 the Earth?' That which I have to determine, therefore, 
 is not whether the received theory be free from all objec- 
 tions, but whether it be more probable than any other 
 theory which has been started. Scepticism may be 
 possible to you — it is impossible to me." 
 
 The principle contained in this answer indicates exactly 
 the inquiry which we ought to make before we allow a 
 controversy to be conducted as between an apologist on 
 one side, and a critic on the other : — Is the question at 
 issue of such a kind that the mind may refuse to come 
 to any decision ? is an attitude of pure scepticism possible ? 
 If it be, then the mere critic has a legitimate standing 
 ground, and this mode of conducting the controversy is 
 legitimate too. If it be not, the position of the mere 
 critic is untenable, and the mode of conducting the con- 
 troversy oi which I have spoken should not be permitted 
 by the apologist, if he desire to do justice to his cause. 
 
 We have now to inquii^e to which of these classes 
 religious controversy — and more especially that question 
 which is now to engage us — properly belongs. How far 
 is it right that the Christian apologist should concede to 
 his opponent the position of a mere critic? Applying 
 the test which has just been defined, we must inquire — Is 
 it possible to maintain, with regard to Christian doctrines, 
 an attitude purely sceptical? Now there are doctrines 
 very commonly included in systems of Christianity, with 
 regard to which it is quite possible to maintain this atti- 
 tude. Take, for example, the doctrine of the eternity of 
 future punishment. You are not compelled to decide 
 
6 Scepticis7n with regard to Theism impossible. 
 
 that question ; for whether you believe the doctrine to be 
 true, or believe it to be false, or leave the question unde- 
 cided, your life and actions may be quite the same. And 
 therefore the opponent of such a doctrine as this may 
 quite justly take up a purely critical position, refusing to 
 decide the question at all, until the evidence, on one side 
 or the other, attains a considerable preponderance. 
 
 But there are parts of Christianity with regard to 
 which you could not assume such an attitude. Take, for 
 example, the doctrine of Theism itself, at least as Christians 
 understand it. The truth of that doctrine is a question 
 which you cannot leave undecided, by your life, if not by 
 your words. You may say, as Positivists do say, that you 
 do not know whether there is a Grod or no ; but you must 
 live either as a Theist or as an Atheist ; and, therefore, I 
 conceive, the Theist who allows his opponent to assume 
 a position pm*ely critical, maintaining himself a position 
 pm-ely defensive, makes a concession injurious to his 
 cause, and forbidden by the rules of just reasoning. The 
 question which man's life requires him to decide is not 
 whether the existence of a Grod be proved by overwhelm- 
 ing evidence, but whether the scheme of Theism or of 
 Atheism — a system of the world which includes the 
 Divine element, or a system of the world which excludes 
 it — ^be the more probable. For according to one or other 
 of these systems you must live. If you say, as some do say, 
 "The evidence is not satisfactory, and I must therefore 
 decline to decide the question," you profess to do that 
 which you cannot do. Your life will decide it. You may 
 imagine your attitude to be one of philosophic scepticism 
 — ^practically it is an attitude of disbelief; and if you 
 
Doctrine of the Efficacy of Prayer. 7 
 
 assume this attitude in tlie face of any preponderance of 
 evidence in favour of the system of Theism as opposed to 
 the system of Atheism, then, I conceive, your conduct is 
 not consistent with the principles of just reason. 
 
 Having thus indicated these two classes of truth — the 
 class, namely, towards which the mind can, and the class 
 towards which it cannot, maintain a scejDtical attitude — 
 I proceed now to inquu-e to which of these classes the 
 doctrine which is to form the subject of the present Course 
 of Lectures properly belongs — I mean the doctrine of the 
 efficacy of prayer. And, in the first place, let me state 
 the doctrine itself, as I propose to consider it. 
 
 The doctrine of the efficacy of prayer, which is a part, 
 though not a necessary part, of Theism, asserts that among 
 the causes which produce or modify phenomena, both 
 mental and physical, prayer is one. It asserts that this 
 effect is produced, not as in the case of causes pui-ely phy- 
 sical, by necessary consequence, but through the interven- 
 tion of the will of the Supreme Being in the series of 
 antecedents. It asserts, therefore, by necessary implica- 
 tion, that the will of the Supreme Being is a real cause — 
 a cause whose action is not confined to the past, when it 
 may be supposed to have called into existence certain 
 forces which were destined thenceforward to act by them- 
 selves, but active noii\ intervening noiv in the sequence 
 of physical phenomena, in a manner analogous to the 
 intervention of man, or any other personal being, in a 
 similar series. It asserts that the Supreme Being has 
 prescribed to man, as the means of obtaining this inter- 
 ference, prayer. It does not assert that this means is 
 absolutely necessary, nor does it promise unfailing success. 
 
8 Practical Character of Question. 
 
 But it does assert that among the antecedents which 
 determine the Divine interference, prayer is one. It 
 asserts that this connexion is of Divine appointment, and 
 that therefore it is the duty of man to make use of the 
 means so ordained. 
 
 Now, it seems plain that this doctrine belongs to that 
 practical class just described, towards which we cannot, in 
 our lives, assume a sceptical attitude. We must either 
 pray, or abstain from prayer. If we pray, we act as if 
 the doctrine were true. If we abstain from prayer, we 
 act as if the doctrine were false ; that is to say, we act 
 in the same way as a man would act who believed it to 
 be false. There is no third course possible. It is not, 
 then, just to require of the advocate of this doctrine that 
 he should assume an attitude purely apologetic. Nor will 
 the inquirer arrive at practical truth who thinks that he 
 may suspend his decision till every objection has been 
 removed. His task really is to consider and compare two 
 cosmical theories — the one including, and the other ex- 
 cluding the efficacy of prayer, and to decide, upon a 
 review of the whole evidence, which of the two is the 
 more probable.^ 
 
 It is on this principle that I propose to conduct the 
 present inquiry. My object is to present to you, as fully 
 as I can, the evidence on both sides of the question, so as 
 to aid you in determining upon which side the greater 
 probability lies. As in all such cases, a higher probability 
 is all that we can have. It may be a much higher proba- 
 bility, or it may be one which does but just turn the 
 
 ^ Appendix, Note I>. 
 
Mode of co7idHcting the Coiitroversy . g 
 
 scale ; but we must not expect more than a probability. 
 And if we are sometimes disjDOsed to repine, because in 
 matters which so deeply concern our welfare as the truths 
 of religion we cannot have certainty, and are often forced 
 to accept instead a probability which is not high, we must 
 remember that this necessity is in nowise limited to the 
 domain of religion. It is a necessity which meets us 
 everywhere. Nay, it is most imperative, as it seems, 
 most cruel, when the question to be decided is one which 
 may involve the happiness of our whole lives. In trifles 
 — the pursuits of an hour or a day — our path is often 
 clear enough ; but in things of the deepest moment, in 
 which a right judgment is to us of the last importance, 
 who has not felt the distracting doubt which tells him 
 how slight is the evidence upon which he is often forced 
 to decide ? 
 
 The two theories of which I have spoken — that, namely, 
 v/hich includes in the system of the world, and that 
 which excludes from it, the element of prayer — being 
 dn-ectly opposed (in technical language, contradictories), 
 and no third theory therefore being possible, it is, logi- 
 cally, immaterial whether we consider successively the 
 arguments in favour of each of these theories respectively, 
 or the arguments against them. I prefer the latter form 
 for the discussion, inasmuch as it is in this form that 
 arguments in favour of the second or prayerless theory 
 are usually presented. These arguments usually appear 
 as objections — objections to the introduction of prayer 
 among the causes which produce or modify phenomena: 
 and the usual mode of conducting the discussion on the 
 other side is to endeavour in the first place to obviate 
 
I o Fundamental Assumption . 
 
 these objections, and then to produce any positive evi- 
 dence which can be produced on that side. I do not, 
 however, adopt this form of discussion, for the reason 
 already stated, namely, that it allows, at least in appear- 
 ance, the one disputant to assume an attitude purely scep- 
 tical; and as I have before explained] to you, we have 
 in the world of practice nothing to do with scepti- 
 cism. The question really lies between belief and dis- 
 belief. 
 
 I propose, therefore, to examine successively the argu- 
 ments against a theory of the world which includes prayer, 
 and the arguments against a theory of the world which 
 excludes prayer. By giving this form to the discussion, 
 neither disputant will be allowed the advantage which be- 
 longs to the position of one who assails without being 
 required to defend. Thus the sceptic will be excluded; 
 and the real disputants — the believer and the disbeliever 
 — will be placed, so far as the form of the discussion is 
 concerned, on a footing of perfect equality. 
 
 It is necessary in all such inquiries, if we would con- 
 duct them fairly, to begin by defining exactly the starting- 
 point, if I may so call it. At what stage do we propose 
 to take up the controversy ? Do we commence without any 
 assumption, or do we commence at a later stage, assuming 
 the truth of certain principles which we suppose to have 
 been previously established ? If we adopt this latter 
 course — and it is that which here we must adopt, if we 
 would confine the discussion within reasonable limits — 
 what are the principles which we assume ? An accu- 
 rate statement of these principles is necessary for two 
 reasons : in the first place, because they are the founda- 
 
Form of Theism assumed. 1 1 
 
 tion of all the subsequent reasoning; and, secondly, be- 
 cause these principles mark exactly the extent of the 
 conclusions obtained. I need hardly remind you that 
 when we start with an assumption, the conclusion ob- 
 tained is necessarily conditional — conditional on the truth 
 of the principles assumed. The value of the conclusion 
 therefore depends on the nature of the assumption which 
 has been made. 
 
 One principle which necessarily underlies every discus- 
 sion on the subject of prayer is Theism. "Without 
 belief in Theism prayer would be an impossibility, or 
 rather an absurdity. There can be no prayer without 
 belief in the existence of a Being to whom prayer is 
 addressed. Every discussion like the present must, there- 
 fore, commence on the one side, with the proof or 
 assumption of the existence of a Grod. 
 
 But a belief in Theism, thus vaguely expressed, is not 
 sufficient to give a standing-ground to the present dis- 
 cussion. There are systems of Theism (so called, at 
 least), under which prayer would be scarcely less absurd 
 than under a system of Atheism. If Grod be but a name 
 given to the aggregate of the forces of Nature, or ta 
 the aggregate of the beneficent forces of Natm-e — if, in a 
 word, the conception underlying that name be Panthe- 
 istic — ^prayer seems hardly intelligible. In fact, prayer 
 must be addressed to a person, not to a force or aggre- 
 gate of forces. The adoption of the Pantheistic idea 
 would, therefore, stop the whole discussion on the 
 threshold. 
 
 I propose, then, to assume the existence of a personal 
 God. I do not enter upon a proof of the truth of this. 
 
12 Divine Attributes — Jww investimted. 
 
 S' 
 
 tenet. Siicli an addition to the present inquiry would 
 lengthen it far beyond its proper limits. Assuming, then, 
 as I propose to do, the truth of this form of Theism, I 
 only remind you, with regard to its proof, that this doc- 
 trine belongs to the class already defined. It is one 
 towards which we cannot maintain a sceptical attitude 
 in our lives, whatever we may do in theory. The duties 
 which belief in a Supreme Euler of the universe brings 
 with it must be either performed or neglected. If you 
 perform them, whatever your speculative belief may be, 
 your life is that of a Theist. If you neglect them, your 
 life is, except perhaps in one particular, that of an 
 Atheist. It is, I know, a favourite position with a cer- 
 tain school of thinkers that, the existence of a Grod being 
 a question utterly beyond the range of the human intel- 
 lect, we ought to have no opinion on the subject. But 
 the life of one holding this view does not differ from the 
 life of an Atheist in any respect but one, namely, that an 
 Atheist, holding as he does a definite opinion on the 
 subject, may think himself bound to try to convince 
 others that there is no God ; while the Positivist can at 
 most think himself bomid to try to convince them that 
 they can never know whether there be or not. But, 
 after all, the practical effect of such a difference is very 
 trifling. 
 
 There is another question connected with Theism in its 
 practical relation to man, which, as essential to my pre- 
 sent subject, I must here consider. This question may be 
 stated as follows : — Assuming that God does exist, ought 
 we to endeavour to form an idea of His character? and 
 if so, how is this to be done ? In other words, are the 
 
Use of Scidpture. 1 3, 
 
 moral attributes of tlie Supreme Being a proper subject 
 for man's inquiry ? ^ and if so, bow is sucb an inquiry to 
 be conducted, and from wbat source are we to obtain our 
 information ? 
 
 Now, in reply to the first question, we may say tbat 
 some idea of tbe attributes of Grod is an essential part of 
 practical Tbeism. It belongs to tbat class of questions 
 of wbicb I bave more tban once spoken. It is a question 
 to wbicb, if we are to remain Tbeists in any practical 
 sense, we must give mme answer. To believe in tbe 
 existence of a Grod, of wbose cbaracter we form no con- 
 ception, is, so far as our Kves are concerned, tbe same as 
 to disbelieve His existence. If Tbeism is to affect our 
 lives, if tbe idea of pleasing Grod is to form one of tbe 
 motives wbicb prompt om^ actions, we must bave some 
 means of determining, or at least of imagining, wbat is 
 pleasing to Him. In otber words, we must form some 
 conception of His cbaracter. How is tbis to be done ? 
 Witb tbe answer to tbis question I may fitly conclude 
 tbis preliminary inquiry. 
 
 Some will answer readily enougb : " Take your idea 
 from tbe Bible. Tbere Grod bas revealed as mucb of 
 His natm^e as it is fitting tbat man sbould know. * Accept 
 tben reverently tbat wbicb bas been tbere ' written for 
 yom- learning.' Question not its trutb, bow unlike soever 
 it may be to tbe conclusions at wbicb your unaided reason 
 migbt bave arrived, and seek to know no more." 
 
 But it may be iairly u.rged against tbis mode of form- 
 ing a conception of tbe Divine Natm^e, tbat witb regard 
 
 1 Appendix, Note C. 
 
14 Scriptttre not universally applicable, 
 
 to one of the Divine attributes, it is a intitio princiim. 
 For the highest point to which the evidence for Eevelation 
 can attain is to prove that it is a Eevelation. If this 
 evidence can show that Scripture has come from Grod, it 
 has done all that it professes to do. But if we would 
 pass from the proof of the origin of Scripture to the proof 
 of its truth, some consideration of the character of Grod 
 must necessarily intervene. One, at least, of His attri- 
 butes we must have arrived at before we can thus estab- 
 lish the truth of Eevelation. We must believe in the 
 truthfulness of its Author. So far, then, as the attri- 
 bute of truthfulness is concerned, the character of Grod 
 cannot be known from Scripture ; and it may be fairly 
 contended that any argument in support of the existence 
 of this attribute drawn from Scriptm^e must be fallacious, 
 inasmuch as it begins by assuming that which it pro- 
 fesses to prove. 
 
 This argument is undoubtedly valid with regard to 
 the one Divine attribute to which it is here applied. We 
 cannot logically build on Scripture our faith in the truth- 
 fulness of God, for it is on that very faith that the 
 authority of Scripture rests. But if we can find any other 
 foundation for this belief, we may then avail ourselves 
 of the aid of Scrij)ture to give us information with regard 
 to other Divine attributes. At the same time we shall 
 do well to recollect (and men do not always recollect) 
 that, as no building can be stronger than its foundation, 
 the reliance which we place in the evidence of Scripture 
 ought never to exceed the reliance which we place in 
 the evidence, whatever it may be, which convinces us 
 of the truthfulness of Grod. What is this evidence? 
 
Original Source of Inforuiation, 15 
 
 "We must reply by anotlier question. Whence comes 
 our belief in the truthfulness of our own faculties? 
 When our intellect or our moral faculty reveals to us 
 a truth, why do we believe that it ?"s a truth, and not 
 a mere figment of our own minds? How do we, 
 who know only the feelings of our minds, come to be- 
 lieve that we have a knowledge of things, not merely 
 as we think them to be, but as they really are ? I can 
 conceive but one answer to this question. We believe 
 in our faculties because we cannot help it — because we 
 are impelled to that belief by a force which we can 
 neither evade nor resist ; and even when we might seem 
 to surrender our own judgment to that of another, it 
 is upon a faculty of our own that we still rely. We 
 prefer the judgment of another to our own, because 
 our o^vn reason tells us that in this particular case that 
 other is probably better informed than ourselves. If this 
 belief in our own faculties fails, all fails. " There is 
 apparently," says Mr. Groldwin Smith, "no ultimate 
 criterion of truth, either physical or moral, except our 
 inability, constituted as we are, to believe other- 
 wise." ^ 
 
 Belief in the truthfulness of our own faculties would 
 seem to lead by necessary consequence to belief in the 
 truthfulness of their author — if they have an author. If 
 man's faculties be the work of God, man can hardly 
 distrust Him without also distrusting them. If He be 
 a deceiver, so, in all probability, are they too. If they 
 are truthful, so too is He. It is thus, I conceive, that 
 
 ^ MacmillarCs Magazine^ No. 207, p. 200. 
 
1 6 Moral Facility, 
 
 we arrive at belief in the truthfulness of Grod. As soon 
 as this belief is established, the Bible, if proved to be 
 a revelation, may aid us in acquiring a knowledge of 
 other Divine attributes ; liere^ it can give us no assistance, 
 inasmuch as it can have no authority until this belief has 
 been established. While it is right, therefore, in forming 
 our ideas of the other Divine attributes, to avail ourselves 
 of the aid of Eevelation, we must remember that the 
 Bible is not the only, nor even the first, source of infor- 
 mation on this subject. To disparage the human facul- 
 ties, as some would do, with the purpose of glorifying the 
 Bible, is to disparage the foimdation with the purpose of 
 glorifying the superstructure. 
 
 If, then, we would form of the Divine attributes the 
 best conception of which we are capable, we must draw 
 our information from every source which is within our 
 reach — from the Bible certainly — from our own faculties 
 not less certainly — and pre-eminently among them, from 
 the moral faculty. There is no source from which we can 
 more safely derive our information. It is not infallible — " 
 what is ? — but it is less liable to error than any other 
 human faculty. Even the errors which have been as- 
 cribed to it may often be more justly attributed to the 
 intellect. The moral sense may have decided rightly 
 upon the case laid before it, but the case itself was 
 erroneously stated, and this is the fault of the intellect. 
 Thus, for example, it cannot be fairly alleged that the 
 moral sense is incapable of judging of the character of 
 God, heccmse it is often incapable, or very imj)erfectly 
 capable, of deciding what God ought to do in some actual 
 case. The error in the decision of this latter question is 
 
The Highest Sources of Information. 17 
 
 most probably not a faulty moral judgment, but an erro- 
 neous or imperfect conception of the facts. For this error 
 the intellect, not the moral sense, is justly responsible. 
 
 On the whole, then, if we inquire, Ought we to en- 
 deavour to form a conception of the character of God ? 
 the answer must be — Yes ; for without some such concep- 
 tion we cannot be practical Theists. "We cannot worship 
 an unknown and unimagined God. And, if we inquire 
 further, "WTience is this conception to be derived ? the 
 answer must be — Primarily and principally from the 
 moral nature which He has given to man.^ 
 
 I know, indeed, that this source of information is far 
 from being a favourite with some theologians. We have 
 not to search far among schools of theology, before we find 
 presented for man's worship, and even for his love, a por- 
 trait of God, which, judged by man's moral nature, is the 
 portrait of a Being unjust, selfish, and cruel. To make 
 the reception of such a portrait possible, it is absolutely 
 necessary to discredit the faculty by which it is con- 
 demned, and it is discredited accordingly. But those 
 who reject the testimony of man's moral nature would 
 do well to reflect on all that is involved in that rejection. 
 Discredit that testimony, and which of your faculties will 
 you trust ? Discredit your faculties, and where will you 
 find a foundation for your religion ? But the truth is, 
 that you cannot discredit your faculties in practice, what- 
 ever you may do in speculation. Your own faculties are, 
 and must be, the guide of your life. You may fancy that 
 you have surrendered your own judgment to a man, or a 
 
 ^ Appendix, Note E. 
 c 
 
1 8 Illogical Scepticis?n. 
 
 Church, or a book, but it is upon your own judgment that 
 you stni rely — ^the judgment by which you have recog- 
 nized the authority of the man, or the Church, or the 
 book. If that judgment be not correct, and it is upon a 
 faculty of your own that you must rely to assure you of 
 its correctness, the whole superstructure of your belief 
 falls to the ground. 
 
 If men attempted to carry out consistently the prin- 
 ciple of disparaging the human faculties, they would soon 
 be convinced of its logical absurdity. But they are not 
 consistent. Some one favourite faculty is really, though 
 often imconsciously, exempted from the condemnation. 
 And when men believe that they have attained an infal- 
 lible guide, they are really attributing infallibility to 
 one of their own faculties. 
 
 One man thinks that he believes in the infallibility of 
 the true (^. e. his own) Church. He is really believing 
 in the infallibility of two judgments of his own mind ; 
 one — that the true Church is infallible ; the other — that 
 his own is the true Church. Another thinks that he 
 has found an infallible guide in the Bible. But he, too, 
 is attributing infallibility to the human faculty which has 
 ascertained its origin, and to the human faculty which 
 determines its meaning. 
 
 I repeat, therefore — Scepticism with regard to the 
 human faculties is universal scepticism. He who created 
 man gave him these faculties for the discovery of truth. 
 If he cannot discover it thus, he cannot discover it at 
 aU. 
 
LECTUEE II. 
 
 THEOLOGICAL AEGUMENTS AGAINST THE EFFICACY 
 OF PEAYEE. 
 
 St. Matthew, vi. 8. 
 
 *' Your Father knowetii what tMngs ye have need of, before ye 
 ask him." 
 
 TnrAVINGr, in my last Lecture, stated the principles 
 -■— ^ on which I propose to conduct the present inquiry, 
 I now proceed to consider the question itself — the ques- 
 tion, namely, of the efficacy of Prayer. I have already 
 entered on the statement of this question sufficiently far, 
 to show that it belongs to that practical class which com- 
 pels a decision. At the risk, however, of some repetition, 
 I wish to state here, at the commencement of the actual 
 investigation, the precise question on which I propose to 
 engage you during the present Course. 
 
 Is Prayer a cause, in the philosophical sense of that 
 term ? Has it real effects ? Are there any phenomena 
 which are produced, or modified, by the appearance of 
 Prayer among the antecedents ? Or, if this can hardly be 
 disputed (there is, perhaps, no phenomenon which is 
 
 c2 
 
20 Has Prayer any External Effect ? 
 
 absolutely inoperative), what is the range of its action? 
 Are its effects altogether restricted to the mind of the 
 individual who prays, or do they extend to the outer 
 world? If they do so extend, is the sphere of the ope- 
 ration of Prayer purely spiritual, or has it power also in 
 the physical world ? 
 
 I must observe here, that I use the word " prayer," not 
 in that widest signification in which it denotes all com- 
 munion of the soul with God, but in the narrower sense, 
 in which it comprises only that part of the soul's commu- 
 nion which consists of 2wtition — requests addressed by 
 man to God. 
 
 Premising this limitation in the use of the word, I 
 proceed to consider our first and greatest question — Has 
 prayer any effect besides its reflex action on the soul of 
 him who prays ? 
 
 Now, it will be conceded on all hands, that prayer can 
 produce an external effect only in one way — namely, by 
 determining the appearance of the Divine volition in the 
 series of antecedents. Prayer is not of the nature of a 
 physical cause. It cannot produce a physical effect by 
 the introduction of a series of purely physical pheno- 
 mena. It is a petition addressed by man to God, and 
 can act only, like any other petition, by influencing the 
 will of the person to whom the petition is addressed. At 
 the same time, it must be remembered that this action 
 may belong to either of two kinds. It may be either the 
 determining cause which affects the will of the person to 
 whom the petition is addressed, or the condition which 
 that person himself has prescribed, as essential to be 
 fulfilled by any one who wishes for his interference. 
 
A^ot to be decided by one kind of Evidence. 2 1 
 
 strictly speaking, this latter may also be considered to be 
 a cause ; but it is a cause of so peculiar a kind, that it will 
 contribute to clearness if we class it separately. There is 
 ^mother reason for this separate classification, to which I 
 shall allude further on ; for the present, I do not enter 
 upon the question between the different theories of the 
 mode of action of prayer, which may be founded on the 
 -classification which we adopt. I take up the question 
 simply in this form — Has prayer any effect in procuring 
 the interference of the Divine Being? I propose to lay 
 before you, as fully as I can, the evidence and arguments, 
 from whatever source derived, on both sides of this ques- 
 tion. I ssLj^from ivhatever source derived ; for I must pro- 
 test against the method, not uncommon in controversy, 
 which makes one kind of argument supreme, and then 
 practically refuses to listen to the rest. Practically refuses, 
 I say; for although men do not absolutely ignore these 
 arguments, it is often quite plain that they allow fco them 
 no share in the decision of the question. That decision 
 is formed in accordance with the favourite kind of argu- 
 ment; and the others, if they oppose themselves, are 
 treated as difficulties, to be overcome, if possible; or, if 
 that be not possible, frankly admitted to be insm-mount- 
 able, but, in no case, to be allowed any real weight in 
 deciding the question. 
 
 I now proceed to state the argimients against the 
 theory that prayer has a real efficacy, either as a cause 
 or as a condition, in determining the interference of Grod 
 in the sequence of events. These arguments may be 
 conveniently divided into two classes, which we may 
 
22 Arguments against Efficacy of Prayer, 
 
 denominate, respectively, the theological argument and 
 the philosophic argument. 
 
 The first of these arguments is purely Theistic. It is 
 based upon the alleged inconsistency of the theory of 
 prayer with the attributes of Grod, according to the best 
 conception which we can form of them. 
 
 The second argument is wholly independent of The- 
 ism ; being derived from the alleged inconsistency of this 
 theory with the principle of law, or with the facts 
 which observation has made known to us. I do not 
 mean to say that these two kinds of argument can be 
 kept perfectly distinct. One form of the theological 
 argument does lean a good deal upon considerations 
 which are more nearly scientific than theological. Still 
 the distinction is sufficiently broad to justify its adop- 
 tion, as a matter of convenient arrangement. 
 
 The theological argument against the external efficacy 
 of prayer may be summed up in one phrase — incon- 
 sistency with the attributes of God. Shall it be thought, 
 it is urged, that an All-wise Being needs to be informed 
 of that which His creature requires? Does He not 
 already know it far better than the creature can tell 
 Him? And, if we needed anything to complete our 
 assurance upon this point, has not Christ Himself told 
 us, in the words of my text, that " Your Father knoweth 
 what things ye have need of, before ye ask Him "? 
 
 Again, and with reference to the same attribute of 
 wisdom — Do you not in prayer ask of God that He will 
 reverse or modify arrangements which we must suppose 
 to be already the best ? Have not all the circumstances 
 
Theological A rgument. 2 3 
 
 of the case which has evoked your prayer been already 
 foreseen by Him? If the efficacy of prayer mean any- 
 thing, does it not mean that prayer has power to change 
 that which Grod, having fully foreseen all these circum- 
 stances, and thus having the whole case before Him, had 
 resolved to do ? 
 
 Or again, to take another and very favourite form of 
 the argument — ^Do you not in effect ask Grod to perform 
 a miracle ? That event which you ask Him to hinder or 
 modify is, to the philosophic eye, but one link in an end- 
 less chain — one unit in a vast sequence, visible in some 
 small part to us — lost at both sides in the darkness of a 
 real infinity. It may seem a small thing that you ask ; 
 but is anything small to which such a relationship 
 attaches ? Do you not really ask Him to change at your 
 desire a vast, infinite arrangement, which He has made 
 from all eternity for the sequence of phenomena ? Is 
 there, indeed, changeableness in the Most High ? And 
 what is man, that such a revolution should be made for 
 him?i 
 
 Again — and this is the last form of the theological 
 argument on this side of the question which I shall 
 notice — What effect can you attribute to supplication — as 
 such ? Is God like a weak man, who can be bent from 
 His purpose by mere entreaty ? Shall we represent Him 
 as one whose actions are directed, not by reason, but by 
 a mere emotion ? 
 
 The first of these arguments need not detain us long. 
 Any theory of prayer to which it is applicable must be 
 
 1 Appendix, Note F. 
 
2 4 Theological A rg ument. 
 
 rejected as untrue. If you pray to Grod under tlie im- 
 pression that you are informing him of your wants, you 
 wholly misconceive the proper function of prayer. In 
 fact, such a theory would hardly be consistent with itself. 
 If God does not know our wants, He can hardly know 
 our thoughts, nor therefore our prayers. But the falsity 
 of this theory of prayer, if indeed such a theory be really 
 received by any one, is no argument against prayer itself. 
 Christ Himself, who taught and exhorted His disciples to 
 pray, at the same time warned them against this concep- 
 tion of the nature of prayer: "Your Father knoweth 
 what things ye have need of." 
 
 The third of the foregoing arguments (I postpone for 
 the present the consideration of the second) is in every 
 respect more weighty. Any theory of the efficacy of 
 prayer must maintain that Grod will do for a suppliant 
 something which He will not do for one who does not 
 supplicate. And the question has presented itself to 
 many minds — Do we not thereby attribute to Grod a 
 weakness ? If it be right that the petitioner should have 
 that for which he prays, ought not Grod to grant it with- 
 out the petition ? and if it be not right, sui^ely He ought 
 not to grant it at all? Does not such a theory repre- 
 sent an All- wise Being as swerving from the right course 
 under the influence of a mere emotion ? 
 
 Before attempting to estimate the force of this argu- 
 ment, I must remind you, that the efficacy of prayer may 
 be understood in one of two diiferent senses, to one of 
 which only is the present argument strictly applicable. 
 Prayer may either act directly upon the will of Grod, as 
 ^ it acts upon the will of man, or it may be simply the 
 
Is E 7910 f ion a Moral Defect ? 25 
 
 condition wliich God has prescribed for man's fulfilment j 
 before He grants the blessing. It is only to the former 
 of these theories of prayer that the argument is strictly 
 applicable ; although an argument somewhat similar may 
 be urged against the other. I shall consider it farther 
 on ; at present I proceed to examine the argument which 
 I have already stated. 
 
 And, in the first place — Is an emotion a moral defect ? * 
 If we ask our moral sense to draw for us a character as 
 perfect as possible, will it give in reply a nature from 
 which all emotion is excluded ? Is the highest type of 
 hnmanity, for example, to be found in the man who 
 passes through life owning allegiance to no power but those 
 of reason and conscience — unsympathising with the joys 
 of his fellow-men — untouched by, though not careless of, 
 their sorrows — relieving, but only as a duty, the distress 
 for which he does not feel — giving to misery all he has, 
 but not a tear ? Is that our idea of human perfection ? 
 And would we, if it were possible, erase or forget the 
 record of tears drawn from the eyes of One greater than 
 man, by the sight of human sorrow or the forecast of 
 human misery ? Is that story a blot on the life of Jesus 
 of Nazareth ? There can be no doubt as to the answer 
 which these questions would receive. Whatever picture 
 we may draw of God, we should regard a man wholly 
 devoid of emQtion as a mere monster. He is strong, he 
 is upright ; we should fear him and admire him ; but we 
 should turn from him with repugnance as altogether 
 imlovable. And man's moral nature will never give him 
 
 * Appendix, Note G. 
 
26 Is Emotion a Moral Defect ? 
 
 as a perfect ideal a character which cannot command 
 love. 
 
 But when we propose to apply the same principle to 
 the ideal of God, we may be met by the answer that such 
 an extension cannot be justified. This is indeed, it may 
 be said, the verdict of our moral nature as regards man. 
 Drawn from man, the picture is a picture only of man. 
 The attempt to find there the lineaments of God is pre- 
 sumptuous and vain. But to this it may, I think, be 
 fairly answered — that this verdict of our moral sense, 
 although derived from man, and primarily applied to 
 man, is one of those which we cannot help regarding as 
 universal in its application. We are compelled by our 
 moral nature to regard the power of commanding love as 
 a moral perfection, and the want of that power as a moral 
 defect, in any being whatsoever : and our moral sense 
 tells us also that love cannot be bestowed on an emotion- 
 less being. So far, then, as our moral nature may be 
 trusted (and what may we trust if not that?), it is the 
 absence, and not the presence, of emotion, which is to be 
 regarded as a defect in any being, human or Divine. If 
 this be true, the supposition that some of the Divine 
 actions are prompted by an emotion does not degrade, but 
 exalt, the conception which we have formed of God. 
 
 I need hardly remind you that the teaching of Scrip- 
 ture — whatever weight we may assign to that — is alto- 
 gether coincident with this view. When we are told, that 
 "the Lord pitieth them that fear Him, like as a father 
 pitieth his children"; when Christ tells His disciples, that, 
 because they have loved Him, the Father has loved them ; 
 surely it is intended to draw a parallel between the humau 
 
Tendency in Mail to yield to Supplication. 2 7 
 
 and the Divine feeling. The one is, confessedly, an emo- 
 tion : and, if the words used be read according to any 
 ordinary principle of interpretation, they imply that the 
 other is an emotion too. It is, no doubt, sometimes con- 
 tended, that no more is meant than that the Divine action 
 is such as would, in man, follow from the presence of the 
 emotion ; and this interpretation is perhaps barely possible. 
 But it is certainly not the natural interpretation; and if 
 it were really a degradation to our conception of Grod to 
 attribute emotion to Him, Christ would hardly have used 
 words which were so likely to confirm His disciples in this 
 false conception. I do not, however, dwell on this point, 
 my present argument being based, not on Scripture, but 
 on man's moral sense. 
 
 Assuming, then, that the conception of the Divine 
 nature is not degraded by the presence of emotion as an 
 element, we have still to inquire, whether emotion can 
 conceivably be evoked in the Divine mind by human 
 prayer. Is it compatible with the Divine perfections 
 that God should feel compassion — the emotion which 
 prayer would naturally evoke — for one who prays, more 
 strongly than for one who does not pray ? What reply 
 does our moral nature make to this question ? 
 
 Let me put it in a slightly different form. Is it a 
 mere human weakness which prompts man to yield com- 
 pliance to a suppliant, merely because he is a suppliant ? 
 Does our moral nature recognize this tendency, which 
 undoubtedly exists, as deserving of approbation or of 
 censure ? It is an undoubted phenomenon of human 
 nature, that the claim which suffering has upon our com- 
 passion is enhanced in our eyes, by the fact that tho 
 
28 Tendency in Man to yield to Supplication. 
 
 sufferer has implored our assistance. What does our 
 moral sense say to this? Is it a fault or a virtue? 
 
 I cannot say that the answer to this question is so 
 positive as in the former case. It is somewhat com- 
 plicated by the admiration which we certainly feel for 
 uncomplaining sorrow. But what should we say of a 
 man who has no such tendency? What should we say 
 of the parent, if such there be, who feels no desire to 
 grant his child's request, simply because it is his request ? 
 I think that we should call him a hard man. I think 
 that we should feel, towards such a character, some por- 
 tion of the moral repugnance which would be evoked by a 
 €haracter wholly devoid of emotion ; and this repugnance 
 is of the nature of moral disapprobation. Doubtless, we 
 should condemn the parent who always yielded to the 
 wish of the child, how unwise and injurious soever such 
 compliance might be. But we should also condemn the 
 parent who felt no desire to yield, and who could refuse his 
 child's earnest petition without some degree of pain. In a 
 word — desire to comply with the child's request is a motive 
 which we expect to find in a parent's heart. It is a motive 
 which is, and ought to be, frequently overcome by other 
 motives ; but it ought to be there ; and we should regard as 
 morally defective a natm-e from which it is wholly absent. 
 
 Now, if we examine the elements of which prayer to 
 any one consists, or as we should perhaps more correctly 
 say, the feelings of which prayer is the natural result, 
 we shall find no difficulty in understanding the desire to 
 comply with an earnest petition, which exists in every 
 kindly nature. These component feelings, if I may so 
 call them, are two — desire and trust. Prayer is the result 
 
Justified by Analysis ofi Prayer, 29 
 
 of earnest desire for the thing asked for, combined with 
 trust, more or less firm, in the person from whom it is^ 
 asked, that he will be disposed to grant the request. It 
 is this latter element — often very weak, but never wholly 
 absent — which, I conceive, distinguishes the case of one who 
 prays from the case of one who desires without praying. 
 It is the presence of this element of trust which disposes 
 man to prefer a suppliant to one, quite as deserving per- 
 haps, who does not supplicate. In man, we know as a fact^ 
 that there is nothing which more powerfully affects a gene- 
 rous mind than trust reposed in it by another ; and, I may 
 add, it is an emotion of which our moral sense entirely ap- 
 proves. Finding its highest expression in the love of the 
 parent for the child, this emotion mingles in all our holiest 
 feelings. It is present, as a powerful element, in love and 
 friendship. The sacred rights of hospitality, as we call 
 them, owe their sacredness to nothing else ; and if, among 
 the shades of human guilt, we would distinguish one of 
 surpassing darkness, it is the guilt of trust betrayed. So 
 it is with man. 
 
 Now, in reasoning from the case of j)etition addressed 
 to man to that of petition addressed to God, the principles 
 already laid down allow us to conclude, that the presence 
 of the element of trust will justify a preference, on the 
 part of God, for the person in whom that element is 
 present ; so that he might fairly receive a blessing, which 
 was withheld from one equally deserving in other respects, 
 from whose mind the element of trust was absent. How 
 entirely this principle pervades the New Testament, I 
 need hardly remind you. In truth, it is the groundwork 
 of Christianity. 
 
30 Absence of Petitionary Prayer 
 
 But it will be said, Does not this principle place ano- 
 ther class above those who pray ? Is the fullest trust 
 shown by them ? Or is it not rather shown by the man 
 who, earnestly desiring a blessing, yet forbears to ask for 
 it, because he feels a perfect confidence that, if it be right 
 that he should have it, God will grant it to him ? And 
 if He who reads the heart of man find in it that combina- 
 tion, must He not prefer it to the less perfect trust 
 expressed by prayer ? Might not even an earthly parent 
 be so entirely trusted, that the requests of the child should 
 have, as their sole object, to inform the parent what things 
 he has need of ? And, if he feel the same confidence in his 
 Heavenly Father, who knows all these things before he 
 asks Him, why should he ask at all ? A prayerless life 
 may express complete absence of faith; but may not a 
 prayerless life, in this sense of the word prayer, express 
 the very perfection of faith ? 
 
 Thus stated, and applied to an ideal class, I think that 
 the argument is unanswerable. You will remember that 
 we are now considering the inherent power of prayer to 
 affect (I hope that I do not speak irreverently) the Divine 
 mind. We are not considering the other theory, which 
 represents prayer as a condition for the bestowal of His 
 blessings, which Grod has Himself imposed ; and we there- 
 fore, necessarily, leave out of sight all positive command 
 on the subject. Neither do we now discuss the question, 
 whether such a class as that which I have indicated 
 really exists. But if the question be, whether we cannot 
 conceive in man a Theism so exalted as to be, in our 
 present limited sense of the word, prayerless, I think we 
 must reply in the affirmative. The highest development 
 
might show the Highest Faith. 3 1 
 
 of faitli, no less than its non-existence, may conceivably "be 
 indicated by a complete absence of petitionary prayer. 
 
 To the whole question, then, whether the supposition 
 that the Divine will is affected by prayer be inconsistent 
 with the best conception which we can form of the attri- 
 butes of Grod, the reply appears to be, No — it is not incon- 
 sistent ; although we can conceive a condition of the 
 human mind marked by absence of petitionary prayer, 
 which we might expect to have still more power in affect- 
 ing the Divine mind. Whether faith so exalted really 
 exists in any human being, is a question which only He to 
 whom all hearts be open can decide. 
 
 To complete the examination of the argument which 
 would infer the absolute inefficacy of prayer, irrespectively 
 of the nature of the thing prayed for, from the unchange- 
 able nature of Grod, it is necessary to consider the other 
 theory, which regards prayer not as a cause, in the usual 
 (I can hardly say the proper) sense of the word, but as a 
 <iondition, of which Grod requires the fulfilment from those 
 who desire to receive a blessing at His hands. It is plain 
 that the argument which we have been examining does 
 not properly apply to this theory. Here there is no direct 
 action on the Divine mind attributed to prayer. It is not 
 then necessary to ascribe to God, as the former theory 
 does, anything of the nature of an emotion. The efficacy 
 of prayer, in this sense, is consistent with the ascription to 
 the Supreme Being of a nature perfectly emotionless. I 
 have given some reasons against the truth of such an 
 ascription ; but the conditional theory of prayer does not 
 require the decision of the question in either way. Is 
 there, then, any argument derived from the attributes of 
 
32 Prayer considered as a Coiidition. 
 
 Grod against the affixing of a condition like this to the grant 
 of the desired blessing ? 
 
 Directly, as I have said, the argument which we hava 
 been considering does not affect this supposition — indi- 
 rectly, and with diminished force, it does. For it may be 
 contended that, if it be derogatory to the character of 
 Grod to suppose Him to be moved by man's petition, any 
 practice which tends to encourage that notion is open ta 
 serious objection. And it may be contended too, that, 
 whatever men may profess or teach upon this subject, the- 
 practice of earnest prayer encourages — nay, almost re- 
 quires — a belief that such prayer does, in the proper sense 
 of the word, influence the Divine will. 
 
 The first of these principles is certain ; and the second, 
 if not imiversally true, does, I am sure, faithfully represent 
 the condition of many minds. The argument which we 
 have examined does therefore apply, although indirectly 
 and with diminished force, to the conditional theory of 
 prayer. I say "with diminished force" ; for it is one thing 
 to charge a theory with being false, and quite another 
 thing to say that it tends to encourage in some minds, 
 though without teaching it, a serious mistake. Whether 
 or not the notion, that the Divine will can be actually 
 influenced by human prayer, he a mistake, is a question 
 which I have already considered. If it be, the first-men- 
 tioned theory of prayer is untenable ; and a strong, though 
 not absolutely conclusive, objection lies against the other. 
 Not absolutely conclusive — for it is possible, that the advan- 
 tages, derivable from the existence of such a condition as 
 prayer, might more than counterbalance the injury caused 
 to some minds by the mistake of which I have spoken. 
 
Moral Distinctions UniversaL ^iZ 
 
 In truth, tlie oLjection, that they are productive of some 
 mischief, may be justly alleged against all powerful 
 agents, how good soever their general effect may be. It is 
 a good thing to love our children — ^to love our country — 
 and yet many a grievous wrong has grown out of the 
 one love, and many a desolating war would have been im- 
 possible without the other. It is therefore but in accord- 
 ance with analogy that such a condition as prayer might 
 be prescribed to man, even if it did tend to develop in 
 some minds an untrue conception of the Divine nature. 
 If the conception so developed be not untrue, the whole 
 argument, as against either theory of prayer, falls to the 
 ground. 
 
 Before I pass from this part of my subject, I must add 
 a few words to that which I have abeady said in justifi- 
 cation of the principle of allowing our moral nature to 
 judge of Grod, as we allow it to judge of man. I have 
 said that we are compelled by a necessity of our nature 
 — ^that necessity which is our ultimate criterion of truth — 
 to believe that the moral distinctions which our moral 
 sense has made known to us are universal. "We cannot 
 believe that the distinction between virtue and vice is due 
 to any peculiarity of our own minds, nor that the moral 
 approval and censure which these qualities call forth 
 from us are applicable only to man. As readily might we 
 believe that the theorems of geometry are figments of the 
 human mind ; or that their truth is limited to this earth, 
 and ceases when we pass its bounds, as that time, or place, 
 or person, can obliterate or change the relations which the 
 words virtue and vice, moral approval and moral censure, 
 necessarily present to our minds. 
 
 D 
 
34 Conceptmi of the Divine Attributes, 
 
 The alternatives then are these — either we must abstain 
 from the attempt to form any conception of the moral 
 attributes of Grod, or we must judge of those attributes bj 
 our own moral nature. The adoption of the former alter- 
 native would give to man a life differing in no important 
 respect from that of an Atheist. We might raise altars to 
 *'The unknown Grod"; but there our worship would neces- 
 sarily end. I cannot see how any sentiment, other than 
 a vague feeling of awe, could be excited by a Being of 
 whose nature we had formed no conception. If, on the 
 other hand, we do attempt to form such a conception, the 
 moral qualities which we attribute to God must be similar 
 in kind to those of ^which our moral nature approves in 
 man. Thus, when we speak of the justice or the mercy 
 of God, our words, if they have any meaning, must denote 
 qualities similar to those which we call by the same names 
 when we find them in men. In either case, the word 
 denotes a quality which evokes in our minds a particular 
 kind of moral approbation; and, by a necessity of our 
 nature, this approbation is universally evoked by the same 
 quality, in whatever being it may be present. Thus, I 
 conceive, we are justified by the necessities of practical 
 Theism in attempting to form a conception of the moral 
 attributes of God : and we are justified by the felt univer- 
 sality of moral distinctions in forming that conception by 
 the aid of our moral nature. 
 
 I should now proceed to consider an argument which is 
 perhaps more frequently heard than any other theological 
 argument on this side of the controversy, and which is 
 conveyed in the question. Do we not ask God to work a 
 miracle on our behalf, at least in all the cases in which 
 
How formed, 35 
 
 tlie benefit asked for is physical? Do we not ask Him to 
 reverse or modify the order of nature for our pleasure? 
 And is not such a request utterly unreasonable, disre- 
 spectful to the Supreme Euler of the Universe, and based 
 upon a total misconception of His character, and of the 
 relation which subsists between us and Him? 
 
 But this argument is too important to be examined 
 shortly. Capable as it is of brief and simple statement, it 
 will be found to involve principles and to open out ques- 
 tions requiring to be considered at some length; and I 
 must therefore postpone the examination of it till my next 
 Lecture. 
 
 d2 
 
LECTUEE III. 
 
 THEOLOGICAL AEGIIMENTS AGAINST THE EFFICACY 
 OF PEAYEE-MIRACLES. 
 
 *'Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing? and one of tliem shall 
 not fall on the ground without your Father." 
 
 IN my last Lecture I concluded, as you may remember,, 
 the examination of an argument which would infer 
 the inefficacy of petitionary prayer in general from the 
 best conception which we can form of the attributes of 
 Grod. This argimient is wholly independent of the parti- 
 cular object of the petition itself, and is equally applicable, 
 whether the thing asked for belong to the world of spirit 
 or to the world of matter. 
 
 The argument which I have now to examine professes 
 to have a more limited scope. Those who make use of it 
 do not usually deny the efficacy of prayer in all cases. 
 Leaving it untouched when its object is a spiritual bless- 
 ing, they only seek to exclude the physical world from 
 its operation. They will allow man to ask that his faith 
 may be strengthened, or that his heart may be purij&ed ; 
 
Limited Scope of Argument, 2il 
 
 but they deny the propriety of prayer for temporal bless- 
 ings. Against such prayer they direct the argument which 
 we have now to consider; and it would seem that they 
 limit the argument to prayer having this purpose. I 
 need hardly, however, remind any logician that the limits 
 of an argument do not depend upon the will of him who 
 uses it. It may suit his purpose to apply it only to a 
 particular case, and even, in other cases, to take up a 
 position inconsistent with it ; but the limits of an argu- 
 ment depend upon the argument itself, and not upon the 
 application which the controversialist may choose to make 
 of it. It is then, in dealing with any such argument, 
 important to inquire. What is its legitimate scope ? Does 
 the restricted use made of it denote a real limitation, or 
 is it merely arbitrary ? We shall find this inquiry to be 
 in the present case of much importance. 
 
 When it is proposed to pray to Grod for any physical 
 benefit, as, for example, for the arrest of a famine or a 
 pestilence, it is often objected — Are you not asking Him 
 to perform a miracle ? That physical phenomenon which 
 you ask Him to remove or to reverse is the result of a train 
 of physical causes reaching back to the commencement of 
 all things, if they had a commencement — infinite, if they 
 had not. Is it credible — would it be right — that God 
 should break this chain to gratify you ? Are not miracles 
 (and you ask for no less), if they have ever existed, to be 
 regarded as rare exceptions to the orderly course of nature ? 
 Do you expect to change them into matters of every-day 
 occurrence ? And when you ask of God thus to interfere, 
 are you not in effect regarding Him as an unskilful 
 mechanician, whose work is so imperfect as to require 
 
38 What is a Miracle ? 
 
 this constant meddling ? Is not such a petition necessarily 
 useless ? Worse than that, is it not dishonouring to Grod,. 
 so far as you can dishonour Him ? 
 
 I have said that this argument is commonly directed 
 only against prayer for physical results ; and I now pro- 
 ceed to inquire, in the first place, whether this limitation 
 be justifiable. It is said that, in praying for the produc- 
 tion of a physical effect, we ask Grod to perform a miracle. 
 Is this true ? and if it be true, is it true of such prayer 
 only? 
 
 I am obliged to touch here on the well-worn question of 
 miracles; and it is with special reference to this part of 
 my subject, that I have spoken of the difficulty of keeping 
 perfectly distinct the theological and the philosophic argu- 
 ments against prayer. For the uniformity of nature and 
 the attributes of the Author of nature are so closely con- 
 nected, that it is impossible to preserve a perfectly sharp 
 distinction between considerations drawn from these con- 
 ceptions respectively. But the argument itself is in no- 
 wise affected by this slight want of precision, which is 
 indeed more apparent than real. 
 
 Is it then true that in asking for a physical benefit we 
 ask for a miracle, while in asking for a spiritual benefit 
 we do not ? What is a miracle ? ^ 
 
 It is, some will say, a violation, or a suspension (these 
 words really mean the same thing) of the laws of nature* 
 It is, others will tell us, a display of superhuman power — 
 the performance, by the power of God, of something which 
 is beyond the power of man. I shall endeavour to show^ 
 
 1 Appendix, Note H. 
 
What is a Miracle ? 39 
 
 furtlier on, that the former definition is inaccurate. The 
 second is true, but with this reservation, that in order to 
 constitute a miracle it is not necessary that the result itself 
 should be beyond the power of man. The restoration of 
 sight to the blind man would not lose its miraculous cha- 
 racter, if it could be shown that the case was not beyond 
 the power of a skilful oculist. But if we take into account 
 both the result and the physical means employed, the 
 transaction toas a display of superhuman power, and the 
 definition is fully justified. Let me explain this to you a 
 little more at length. 
 
 We know that man's will, without the intervention of 
 man's body, has no power on anything external to him- 
 self. A mental antecedent may have its immediate conse- 
 quent in the mind or body of the individual, and, so far 
 as we know, only there. If an antecedent in the mind of 
 an individual have a remote consequent without him, 
 we know that some phenomenon in the body of the 
 individual must have intervened in the series. And this 
 is equally true, whether the remote consequent be itself 
 physical or mental. You cannot cause a pebble to rise 
 from the ground, however earnestly you may desire it, 
 without the intervention of your body. You cannot 
 affect the mind of your fellow-man, however strongly 
 you may will it, without the intervention of your body. 
 Thoughts the most burning, until they are clothed in 
 words, or find some other bodily expression, have no power 
 beyond the individual in whose heart they are formed. 
 So it is with the work of man. 
 
 But it is otherwise with the work of God. There a 
 mental antecedent is followed by an immediate external 
 
40 Not merely a Wonder. 
 
 consequent. This consequent may not indeed be itself tlie 
 end of the Divine action. Between the mental purpose 
 and the final result may intervene, as in the actions of 
 man, any number of links; but the essential difference 
 between the actions of Grod and the actions of man is this 
 — that in the former case there is an immediate transition 
 from a volition to an external result. 
 
 And this, I conceive, is also the essential difference of a 
 miracle. It is not merely that the result is wonderful. 
 There is no one of these results which we might not con- 
 ceive to be effected by means to which, however they 
 might astonish us, we should never think of giving the 
 name " miraculous." Take the most wonderful of all — 
 the raising of a dead body to life. We know that gal- 
 vanism has succeeded in reproducing some of the vital 
 phenomena. Suppose the discovery to be announced of a 
 yet more powerful agent which should reproduce all these 
 phenomena — an agent which should restore all the vital 
 powers, not for a moment but permanently ; so that these 
 powers should continue to act when the work of the restor- 
 ing agent had ceased. We should receive such an an- 
 nouncement with immense scepticism. We should require 
 for the proof of its truth the most overpowering evidence. 
 If convinced of its reality, we should call it wonderful in 
 the extreme ; but we should not call it mii-aculous. We 
 should say — It is the result of a physical combination 
 hitherto untried. It is new. It is unlike anything which 
 has been done before ; it is utterly marvellous ; but it is 
 not a miracle. But if it be true that Lazarus rose from 
 his tomb at the command of Christ, then we do call that 
 result a miracle. Why? Because, the physical antece- 
 
Essential Differeiice of a Miracle. 4 1 
 
 dents being obviously inadequate to the production of 
 such a consequent, we are forced to attribute it to an 
 immediate mental antecedent — a mental cause wHch is 
 capable of producing an immediate external effect. It is 
 tbis wbicb convinces us of the presence of superhuman 
 power. It is this which constitutes a miracle. And I do 
 not hesitate to say that, if the time should ever come 
 when man can produce by his simple volition an imme- 
 diate external result, the generic difference between mi- 
 racles and ordinary phenomena will have disappeared. 
 
 "We are now in a position to consider whether the dis- 
 tinction which, while excluding prayer from the physical 
 world, would leave the spiritual world still open to it, be 
 founded on reason.^ The exclusion of the operation of 
 prayer from the physical world is, so far as this argument 
 is concerned, based on the idea that, in asking God to 
 grant us a physical benefit, we ask Him to perform a 
 miracle. But we have seen, I think, that this is equally 
 true if the benefit asked for be spiritual. There, as here, 
 we ask for the exertion of a power transcending, not only 
 in degree but in kind, the power of man. There, as here, 
 we ask for an action possessing the distinctive character 
 of a miracle, namely, a volition followed by an immediate 
 external result. The truth is that, to ask G-od to act at all 
 and to ask Him to perform a miracle, are one and the 
 same thing. 
 
 There are certain causes which tend to conceal this 
 truth from our minds. For example, there is a very 
 common saying that " God works by means." Now, if it 
 
 ^ Appendix, Note I. 
 
42 Causes of Error, 
 
 be meant by this saying that between the Divine volition 
 and the final result a long series of physical causes is 
 frequently interposed, the saying is quite true. If it be 
 meant that, at some remote period, G-od established a 
 cause or system of causes, by the sole action of which, and 
 without further action on His part, all phenomena are 
 now produced, such a supposition would amount to a 
 denial of any direct action on Grod's part, and would 
 therefore banish petitionary prayer altogether. This, how- 
 ever, is, quite plainly, not the sense in which the saying is 
 used. But if it be meant that the action of Grod is ever 
 strictly analogous to the action of man, then the saying^ 
 is not true. Whatever be the length of the interposed 
 physical series, there is one link which takes it out of the 
 category of human actions — a volition followed by an im- 
 mediate external result. 
 
 But the principal cause which leads men to admit 
 readily, and without calling it miraculous, the direct 
 action of God on the human mind, while they at once 
 give that name to any direct action of God on the human 
 "body, is, I suppose, the obscurity which surrounds men- 
 tal, as compared with physical, sequences. We cannot 
 indeed, except in some few cases, assign with accuracy 
 to a physical phenomenon its system of antecedents, or, 
 as we call it, its cause. Still we are not wholly in the 
 dark, and can generally form some rough idea on the 
 subject. But how often are we wholly in the dark as 
 to the cause of a mental phenomenon ? Of the sequences 
 in other minds we know almost nothing. But even in 
 each man's own mind, how often do thoughts spring up 
 so completely " unbidden," to use a common phrase, that 
 
Lwiitation of Argument 7iot justified, 43 
 
 lie can form no idea whatever of their cause ? And sa 
 he accepts without difficulty the theory of a direct spiri- 
 tual influence, not as exceptional, but as an ordinary 
 occurrence. But I must remind you that the question 
 is not whether the occurrence be usual or unusual, but 
 whether it bear impressed upon it the character of a 
 miracle. And, if by a miracle be meant the exertion 
 of a power transcending, not only in degree but in kind, 
 the power of man, that name attaches to the interven- 
 tion of God in the spiritual world no less than to His 
 intervention in the physical world. If then it be an 
 objection to prayer for temporal blessings, that we therein ^ 
 ask God to perform a miracle, it is equally an objection 
 to prayer for spiritual blessings. You ask Him to per- 
 form as real a miracle, when you ask Him to cure your 
 soul of a sin, as you do when you ask Him to cure your 
 body of a fever. The other meaning attached to the 
 word miracle, in which it is supposed to involve a vio- 
 lation of the principle of law, I shall consider more 
 appropriately when I come to examine the philosophie 
 objections to the doctrine of prayer. 
 
 Hitherto my object has been to show you, that the- 
 scope of the argument which we have been examining 
 is more extended than is supposed by many of those 
 who use it, and that if we are to allow it the power 
 of excluding prayer from the world of matter, we must 
 allow it also the power of excluding prayer from the 
 world of spirit. We have now to consider a more impor- 
 tant question. Is the argument itself valid? Is it 
 in truth derogatory to the character of God that we 
 should ask, or expect Him to interfere ? I take, as the 
 
44 Argument Use 1/ Invalid, 
 
 <3ase most favourable to those who advance the argu- 
 ment, the application which they themselves make. Let 
 the question then be — Is it derogatory to the attributes 
 of God to suppose that He interferes in the world of 
 matter — to supply a dearth, or to arrest a pestilence ? 
 To this question many answer : Yes, it is derogatory to 
 His attributes. For by making such a supposition you 
 in effect assign to Him (to use again a favourite analogy) 
 the character of an unskilful mechanician, whose work 
 will not fulfil its purpose without constant interference 
 on the part of the maker. 
 
 Now it is derogatory to the character of the mecha- 
 nician that his work should require this constant inter- 
 ference. For his purposes are capable of being fully 
 carried out by mechanism ; nay, the very machine which 
 he has made professes to carry them out, and is rightly 
 considered imperfect if it do not. But, before we accept 
 the application of this analogy to the works of God, we 
 must ask — Is it derogatory to His character to suppose 
 that He has purposes which cannot be effected by any 
 system of mechanism, however perfect ? Is it deroga- 
 tory to His character to suppose that He has powers, 
 and uses them in the government of the universe, which 
 cannot be transferred to any system of mere matter, how- 
 ever admirable its arrangement might be ? 
 
 How should we decide a similar question in the case of 
 man ? Suppose that it were suddenly revealed to us, that 
 the machine of the thirtieth century would have as much 
 power as the man of the nineteenth. Suppose that we 
 could foresee that our successors of the thirtieth century 
 would be able to construct a machine capable of doing, 
 
Superiority of Mind over Alatter Perpetual. 45 
 
 unaided, all that we of tlie nineteenth can do by any 
 means. I suppose we should say that such an achieve- 
 ment indicated an enormous development of the human 
 intellect. But suppose that we were told further, that 
 this machine would do, not only all that we of the nine- 
 teenth century can do, but all that the men of the thir- 
 tieth century themselves could do, and even all that they 
 wished to do. I think that we should call this a very 
 one-sided development of the human intellect; for it 
 would imply that, while the machine-producing power 
 of the himian mind had advanced with prodigious rapi- 
 dity, its other powers and — more than that — its aims, 
 had, comparatively, stood still. It is, we generally think, 
 but a poor spirit whose aims do not soar far above its 
 powers. But what should we say of one whose aims rose 
 no higher than the power of a machine which he himself 
 could make? If we wished to draw an ideal picture of 
 intellectual perfection, should we do so by effacing that 
 superiority of mind which has hitherto rendered so many 
 of its powers intransferable to matter? Shall we regard 
 the possession of these intransferable powers as being 
 itself a mark of imperfection? Is the superiority of 
 mind over matter indeed but temporary, and do we look 
 for a day when it shall have passed away for ever ? Nay, 
 my brethren, there is that in the human mind which tells 
 quite another story. There is that in the human mind 
 which bids us look into the future, with the anticipation, 
 not that the powers of mind and of matter will ever be 
 equalized, but rather that the inherent superiority of the 
 former will every day become more marked. 
 
 For, what is human life? Is it not one long battle 
 
46 Superiority of Mind over Matter Perpetual. 
 
 between tlie spirit of man and those powers of organised 
 matter which we call the forces of nature? And who 
 does not know the history of that battle — a battle often 
 lost, but always renewed, and with ever-increasing success 
 — the history of one combatant often defeated, but always 
 advancing — of another, often victorious, but always driven 
 back? And if the spirit of man can smile now at material 
 dangers before which it once sunk helpless and hope- 
 less, does that point to a time when the powers of mind 
 and matter shall be equalized? Is not the story of that 
 battle a proof, if there were no other, of an inherent supe- 
 riority ? 
 
 There is yet another point. If there be in the powers 
 of the human spirit a continued advance which matter 
 does not share, is not this even more strikingly true of its 
 aspirations? Does not each one of us feel that, how rapid 
 soever may be the advance of his actual powers, his aspira- 
 tions advance more rapidly still ? Do not the philosopher 
 and the savage differ even more in their aspirations than 
 they differ in their actual powers? ^ 
 
 Now, my brethren, would you call it a mark of imper- 
 fection in the human spirit that it should never be able to 
 efface the signs of its own superiority — that it should 
 never be able to construct a machine which should replace 
 itself? Is it derogatory to man, that the powers of his 
 intellect should keep ever in advance of the powers of 
 any system of matter, however admirably he may him- 
 self have arranged it? Nay, is it not rather his glory? 
 And if it be, shall we call it derogatory to the Infinite 
 
 ^ Appendix, Note K. 
 
Divine Picr^poses cannot be effected by Mechanism. 47 
 
 Spirit, that the marks of His ineffable superiority are 
 ineffaceable even by Him? Is it unworthy of Him, that 
 even He cannot construct a machine which could replace 
 Himself — that He should have purposes which no system 
 of matter could fulfil ? Surely not. 
 
 Before, therefore, we are justified in rejecting, as de- 
 rogatory to the character of Grod, the theory that He does 
 interfere in physical sequences, we ought to have evidence 
 to convince us that it is at least improbable that He has 
 any purposes which cannot be fulfilled by a machine. 
 Thus, if we were asked, Is it not a clumsy and circuitous 
 way of producing a physical effect, to arrange a system of 
 antecedents which would produce a different effect, and 
 then to modify their natural result by direct interference, 
 when the physical antecedents might have been so arranged 
 as to produce the required effect without interference? 
 the answer is. Yes, if no more was intended than the pro- 
 duction of the physical effect. Thus, for example, when 
 the advocate of the efficacy of prayer contends that a pes- 
 tilence may have been arrested by the interference of Grod, 
 he may be asked. Might not the same effect have been 
 produced in a manner more simple, and therefore more 
 consistent with the Divine perfections, by so arranging 
 the physical antecedents that the pestilence should only 
 last the required time? The answer is. Yes, if no more 
 were intended than that the pestilence should last for a 
 certain time. But before you ask me to reject the "dogma 
 of interference" as inconsistent with the attributes of Grod,A 
 you are bound to produce evidence sufficient to make it 
 at least probable that among the Divine purposes there 
 were none which might not have been fulfilled by a 
 
48 Divine Purposes cannot be effected by Mechanism, 
 
 purely physical sequence. Can any such evidence be pro- 
 duced? 
 
 It is certainly not true that the antecedents to a purely 
 physical event are in all cases themselves purely physical. 
 On the contrary, the voluntary actions of men occupy, as 
 we know, a large part of these sequences. Whatever may 
 he said of the dogma of Divine interference, the dogma of 
 human interference is undoubted. There are few physical 
 sequences wholly free from it: and yet this method of 
 producing an effect is quite as circuitous, and, if Divinely 
 appointed, quite as inconsistent with the attributes of Grod, 
 as the Divine interference is supposed to be. Thus, in 
 the case already referred to, let it be supposed that the 
 physical causes, acting by themselves, would produce a 
 pestilence lasting for a year. But the interference of man 
 devises a remedy which puts an end to the pestilence in 
 six months. If we regard this arrangement as being of 
 Divine appointment, may we not ask why this circuitous 
 method was resorted to, and why the purely physical an- 
 tecedents were not originally so arranged that the pesti- 
 lence should only last for six months ? But there is an 
 obvious answer : — Because the arrest of the disease by the 
 voluntary action of man fulfils purposes — certainly with 
 regard to himself, probably with regard to the physical 
 world also — which could not have been effected by a 
 purely physical sequence. Is it unreasonable to apply the 
 same principle to Divine interference? May not similar 
 purposes exist there also? If it be the Divine appoint- 
 ment that the spirit of man should intervene in physical 
 sequences, is it improbable that the Spirit of Grod should 
 do the same? Certainly the argument from analogy 
 
Inconsiste7it Objection to Divine Liter/erence. 49 
 
 seems to point the other way. "What the purposes effected 
 by the Divine interference may be supposed to be, or 
 whether we have any means of forming an idea on the 
 subject, are questions which I hope to consider at a later 
 stage of the present inquiry. 
 
 I have thus endeavoured to lay before you, so far as I 
 know them, that class of arguments directed against the 
 efficacy of prayer which I have called theological, as 
 being deduced from conceptions of the attributes of Grod. 
 I cannot say that they appear to me to possess any great 
 weight. The first is deduced mainly from the Stoic ideal 
 of mental perfection. I believe this ideal, as applied to 
 either Grod or man, to be wholly untrue ; and I am sure 
 that if we could see it realised in man, our moral nature 
 would turn from it with repugnance. To give weight to 
 the second objection, it is necessary to form a conception 
 of the purposes of Grod with regard to the universe, which 
 seems to me to be a very limited one ; and to produce evi- 
 dence sufficient to show that this conception is probable. 
 I do not think that such evidence can be produced ; nay, 
 as I have endeavoured to show, the argument from analogy 
 appears to point to an opposite conclusion. 
 
 Before leaving this part of my subject, I wish to point 
 out an inconsistency (at least it so appears to me) in the 
 theory which would exclude the interference of Grod from 
 physical, while admitting it in mental sequences. The 
 truth is, that this theory really admits the very kind of 
 interference to which it objects. That man interferes in 
 physical sequences is certain. If, then, Grod interferes in 
 the sequences of human thought, He interferes in physical 
 sequences, not directly, but quite as effectually as if He 
 
50 In Physical Sequences, 
 
 acted on the physical phenomena themselves. If it be 
 derogatory to the character of God to assume that He 
 interferes in physical sequences directly, it is quite as 
 derogatory to His character to assume that He inter- 
 feres indirectly. Thus the interference of God with the 
 sequence of physical causes which produces a pestilence is 
 equally real, whether He act directly on the causes them- 
 selves, or suggest a remedy to the mind of a physician ; 
 and, if we cannot assume the one kind of interference 
 without representing Him as an unskilful mechanician who 
 is obliged to mend his own work, neither can we assume 
 the other without a like imputation. 
 
 In my next Lecture I hope to conclude the inquiry into 
 the evidence against a system of the world which includes 
 prayer, by examining that class of arguments which I 
 have called philosophic, and which are based on a sup- 
 posed inconsistency of this system with the principle of 
 Law, or with the facts which observation has made known 
 to us. I have only to add, in concluding the examination 
 of the theological arguments on the same side of the ques- 
 tion, that the ideal on which they are based is certainly 
 not a popular ideal. The history of man tells us, that his 
 moral nature does not willingly draw for itself the picture 
 of a God who refuses to listen to prayer. But I hope to 
 speak more fully of this hereafter. 
 
LECTUEE IV. 
 
 PHILOSOPHIC OBJECTIONS TO THE EFFICACY OF 
 PKAYEE. 
 
 St. Matthew, x. 29. 
 
 ^' Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing? and one of tliem shall 
 not fall on the ground without your Father." 
 
 HAVINGr, in my last Lecture, concluded the exami- 
 nation of the arguments against the efficacy of 
 prayer which I have called theological, I now proceed 
 to examine, in accordance with our original division, the 
 more purely philosophic arguments on the same side of 
 the question. These arguments, differing from each other 
 in their nature, and, as I think we shall see, in their 
 weight, agree in this, that they are in no sense Theistic. 
 They make no assumption with regard to the attributes 
 of God, nor even with regard to His existence. Leaving 
 such questions wholly aside, these arguments deal with 
 the theory of the efficacy of prayer as they would deal 
 with any other physical theory ; proposing to show, either 
 that the theory itself is a priori improbable, as being ap- 
 parently inconsistent with some established principle; or 
 
 e2 
 
52 Two Opposite Errors. 
 
 that it is Tinreal, because the results which it predicts are 
 inconsistent with facts. 
 
 In examining these arguments we must be careful to 
 guard against two opposite errors into which some have 
 fallen. We may, as some have done, declare the ordi- 
 nary methods of physical science to be inapplicable to the 
 present case. This position is wholly untenable. The 
 theory of prayer asserts that many of its results are physi- 
 cal phenomena ; and all physical phenomena are amenable 
 to the methods of physical science. It must be remem- 
 bered, however, that if these methods are so applied as to 
 violate the conditions imposed by the theory, the result of 
 such an investigation, considered as affecting the truth of 
 the theory, is not reliable. We shall find the importance 
 of this reservation further on. 
 
 But there is an opposite error into which we may also 
 fall, namely, decision of the question by physical consi- 
 derations only, all other arguments being set aside. This 
 exclusive mode of deciding questions, popular as it is, 
 cannot be justified unless the argument to which this 
 exclusive privilege is given has the force of demonstra- 
 tion. If it can only furnish probable results, it is plain 
 that these may be outweighed by the opposing probabili- 
 ties of the arguments which we have neglected. Now, 
 in the present case, if it could be absolutely proved that 
 the theory of the efficacy of prayer is inconsistent with a 
 thoroughly established principle, or with observed facts, 
 we should be justified in rejecting it without further 
 inquiry. But if neither inconsistency can be absolutely 
 proved, the argument derived from its probability, if it 
 be probable, can only take its place among other argu- 
 
Principle of Law, 53 
 
 •merits, without any exclusive right to decide the ques- 
 tion. 
 
 It is said — and this is, perhaps, the most popular ar- 
 gument against the efficacy of prayer — that this theory 
 is contrary to the principle of Law. If this proposi- 
 tion, understood in the proper sense of the words, were 
 established, it would go far to render any further discus- 
 sion unnecessary. But I do not think that it is always 
 understood in the proper sense of the words, and I shall 
 have occasion to point out an improper sense in which it 
 seems to have been used, and in which it is very much 
 less forcible. For the present I take the words in their 
 proper sense ; and I proceed to inquire, whether it be true, 
 that the theory of the efficacy of prayer is contrary to the 
 general principle of Law. 
 
 What in the general principle of Law ? Taken in 
 the strictest sense of the word, the principle of Law is 
 this — that the same system of antecedents will always, 
 and everywhere, be followed by the same consequent. 
 Expressed in more popular language, it declares, that 
 the same cause is always and everywhere followed by 
 the same effect. The change of time or place, if it 
 leave the antecedents unchanged, leaves the consequent 
 unchanged also. This is the principle of Law in its 
 strictest sense. Now, to render justifiable the applica- 
 tion of this principle to any particular case, it must be 
 ascertained that the entire system of antecedents, and 
 not the physical antecedents only, are identical in the 
 cases which are compared with each other. Thus it is 
 no violation of the principle of Law to assert, that the 
 introduction of a volition into one of two identical con- 
 
54 Principle of Law not violated by Prayer, 
 
 ditions of the human body determines a totally different 
 result. There is a movement in the one case; there is 
 none in the other; but the principle of Law remains 
 inviolate. 
 
 So, too, it is no violation of the principle of Law, io 
 suppose that the introduction of a Divine volition into 
 one of two identical systems of antecedents should deter- 
 mine a wholly different consequent; and it is this, and 
 nothing else, which is asserted by the doctrine of the 
 efficacy of prayer. It is not asserted that, as a result 
 of prayer, a different consequent follows from the same 
 system of antecedents ; but it is asserted, that, as a result 
 of prayer, a new antecedent appears, and that thus the 
 consequent is changed. Whether this really be so is 
 another question, but it certainly may be so without any 
 violation of the principle of Law. 
 
 This argument against the efficacy of prayer takes 
 sometimes a different form of expression. He who prays 
 is said to ask for a violation, not of the general prin- 
 ciple of Law, but of some one or more of the actual 
 laws of Nature. And if it be true, as I think it is, that 
 prayer asks for a miracle, this form of the argument 
 derives support from a very common definition of a 
 miracle, namely, that it is a violation, or (to borrow the 
 usual euphemism) a suspension, of some law of Nature. 
 It is then important to inquire whether this definition 
 be correct. 
 
 I have called this argument a different form of expres- 
 sion of the former argument ; and this is true, for the 
 second, so far as it is valid, is identical with the first. If 
 the law of Nature, which is said to be violated (or sus- 
 
Ahr by any Miracle, 55 
 
 pended), be a real law, it cannot be violated without a 
 yiolation of the principle of Law itself. The inviolability 
 of any particular law of Nature is connected with the in- 
 violability of the principle of Law, as the truth of any 
 one of a number of particular propositions is connected 
 with the truth of the universal which contains them all. 
 If the principle of Law be true, and if any asserted law 
 of Nature can be shown to have been violated in a single 
 instance, the alleged law is untrue. To say, then, of a 
 miracle that it is a violation of a law of Nature, and to 
 say that it is a violation of the principle of Law, are one 
 and the same thing. It must be remembered, however, 
 that any one who employs this argument in its second 
 form is bound to show, not only that the asserted law has 
 been violated, but also that the asserted law is really a 
 law. Without such proof the argument is obviously in- 
 valid ; and I think that asserted violations of the principle 
 of Law will be often found to mean no more than vio- 
 lations of something which the objector assumes to be a 
 law. It is in this assumption that the weakness of the 
 argument commonly lies. 
 
 Is a miracle a violation (or suspension) of any law of 
 Nature? Take for example any one of the miracles of 
 Christ. What law of Nature was violated by the raising 
 of Lazarus, if such a thing really happened ? That it 
 is impossible to restore life to a dead body? No such 
 negative law exists, or could exist. All that we are jus- 
 tified in saying is this, that this result cannot be effected 
 by any combination which man has hitherto tried. That 
 no mere word could effect such a result ? This is true ; 
 but it is not supposed that the result was effected by a 
 
56 No Law of Nature violated by Miracle, 
 
 mere word. The nearest approach to a law of Nature 
 which was violated by the supposed miracle is that to 
 which I have already alluded, namely, that a volition 
 cannot be followed by an immediate result external to the 
 individual who wills. Now, it is always a matter of un- 
 certainty to establish a negative law : still, notwithstand- 
 ing some asserted phenomena, it does seem to be a natural 
 law that man's will, without the intervention of man's 
 body, is powerless upon the external world. But we have 
 no right to extend this law to the Divine volitions; nor 
 indeed could we do so, consistently with any system of 
 Theism which ascribes action at any time to the Divine 
 Being. If a Divine volition cannot be followed by an 
 external consequent, it is hard to see how the Deity, un- 
 less corporeal, can act at all, or could have acted at any 
 time. Only an Epicurean theology would be possible 
 under such a limitation. 
 
 I might now pass on from this argument ; but the idea 
 that a miracle implies a suspension of Law, or of some 
 particular law, is so widely spread among persons of all 
 theological opinions, that it may be well to say a few 
 words more for the purpose of showing its falsity. 
 
 Take the following example : — Walking along a dan- 
 gerous path, you slip, and are about to fall over a cliff. 
 You call to a friend who is near to save you. Do you ask 
 him to suspend the law of gravity ? Certainly not. You 
 ask him to overcome the force of gravity by opposing to it 
 the stronger force of the muscles of his arm ; and whether 
 he comply with your request or not, the law of gravity 
 continues equally in force. This we all know. 
 
 Now suppose that, instead of calling on a human 
 
No Law of Nature violated by Miracle, 57 
 
 friend, you call on God to save you. Experience has 
 indeed taught us that God does not usually grant such 
 requests. But our present question is not whether the 
 request is likely to be granted, but what the request itself 
 implies. Do you, in that request, ask of God that He 
 will suspend the law of gravity ? No more than if you 
 addressed the same prayer to a man. Here, as there, 
 you ask that the force of gravity may be overcome by a 
 stronger force. The difference between the two cases is 
 this, that the exertion of the Divine volition has an im- 
 mediate effect upon the external world, which a human 
 volition has not ; and that there may be, although we can- 
 not certainly say that there is, in the Divine action an 
 actual creation of force in its material sense, which cer- 
 tainly does not accompany the human action. You do 
 not, then, when you pray for a physical benefit, ask for 
 the suspension of any law of Nature, unless there be a 
 law of Nature which negatives the direct action of the 
 Divine will. If there be such a law, the Divine Being 
 must be, and must have been in all time, absolutely in- 
 active. Even the creation of protoplasm or of a fire-mist 
 must be declared to be impossible. Such a supposition 
 could lead to no conclusion but Atheism (as distinguished 
 from Antitheism). For it would be impossible to adduce 
 any evidence of the existence of a Being who is devoid of 
 all power of external action. 
 
 To sum up, then, in a few words, that which has 
 been said on this branch of the subject. When you ask 
 God to do anything — when you ask Him to produce 
 any effect, physical or moral, you ask for a miracle. You 
 ask for the exertion of a power differing in kind from 
 
58 Physical Argumefit against Prayer, 
 
 any power possessed by man ; and the object of your 
 prayer is no less a miracle, when you ask Grod to act 
 upon your mind, than when you ask Him to act upon 
 your body. But you do not ask for the suspension of 
 any law of Nature ; unless there be a law which would 
 deprive the Deity of all power, and thus reduce Him to 
 practical non-existence, for the past no less than for the 
 future. 
 
 The Philosophic argument against the efficacy of prayer 
 which I now proceed to consider is in every respect diffe- 
 rent from those which we have been examining — different 
 in kind — different also in weight. It does not accuse 
 the doctrine against which it is directed of inconsistency 
 with any principle, Theistic or philosophic. It simply 
 says — the efficacy of prayer in the physical world is not 
 a fact. And it proposes to establish the truth of this- 
 assertion by the ordinary methods of physical inquiry — 
 observation and experiment. You believe, it says to the ad- 
 vocate of prayer, that certain physical results are thereby 
 produced. JELoiv they are produced is a question with 
 which we have no concern, nor do we take any exception 
 to your theory on that score. But many of the asserted 
 results of prayer are ordinary physical phenomena, whose 
 existence, if they be real, ought to show itself to the ordi- 
 nary modes of physical inquiry ; and if this inquiry fail 
 to detect the existence of such a cause, we must refuse to 
 acknowledge its reality. It is not merely that this reality 
 is unproved by physical methods. We believe that we 
 can subject the series of phenomena, in which prayer is 
 supposed to intervene, to physical tests, which must show 
 the reality of this cause, if it be real ; and as these tests 
 
Method of Differences. 5 9 
 
 give no indication of its existence, we must believe it to be 
 not merely unproved but untrue. 
 
 I now proceed to consider this argument in detail ; but 
 before doing so, I may remark, that it is not to be met 
 by any general declarations of the inapplicability of 
 physical methods of inquiry to such a problem as this. 
 The disputant who denies or limits the applicability of 
 physical methods to the investigation of alleged physical 
 facts, whatever be the supposed cause, is bound to show 
 the reason for this denial or limitation. If he cannot show 
 this, the general principle holds good, namely, that the 
 methods of inductive science are applicable to all physical 
 phenomena. 
 
 The physical method of investigation applied, in the 
 argument which I have now to consider, to the doctrine of 
 the efficacy of prayer, is that which is technically known 
 as "the method of differences." It is proposed to take 
 two series of antecedents, differing only in this, that 
 prayer enters into the one series, and not into the other, 
 and then to determine by observation whether there be 
 any corresponding difference between the consequents. 
 If there be, we are bound to admit the efficacy of prayer ; 
 if there be not, we are equally bound to deny it. It is 
 admitted that in this, as indeed in nearly all cases, the 
 application of the method of differences is attended by one- 
 serious difficulty, namely, that we do not readily find two 
 series of antecedents, or in common language two cases,. 
 which differ only in the presence or absence of prayer. 
 It is proposed to overcome this difficulty in one of the 
 following ways, both which are in common use among 
 physicists. 
 
6o Argument fro ?n Experiment. 
 
 The first is the method of experiment. The use of this 
 method enables us, it is thought, to obtain by actual com- 
 bination two series of antecedents differing only in the 
 one element. This is the principle of the celebrated 
 " hospital test." It was proposed, as many of you know, 
 to take two wards of the same hospital, to each of which 
 the same class of patients should be sent, great care being 
 taken, in the allotment of the patients, to give to neither 
 ward any advantage over the other. Then it was pro- 
 posed to invite the Christian world, or a part of it, to pray 
 for the recovery of the patients in one ward, leaving those 
 in the other ward unprayed for; and finally, after the 
 process had been continued long enough to form a suffi- 
 cient induction, it was proposed to examine the respective 
 percentages of recovery, for the purpose of determining 
 whether the ward for which prayer had been made could 
 show a more favourable return. If so, the efficacy of 
 prayer would be established; if not, it is contended that 
 the principle of the method of differences requires us to 
 reject the doctrine as untrue. 
 
 This experiment was, I presume, never actually tried : 
 indeed, for reasons upon which I need not now 
 enter, it would be very difficult to make it. But let 
 us suppose that the experiment was made, and with 
 this result, that no difference between the respective 
 percentages of recovery could be detected. What does 
 the principle of the method of differences require us 
 to infer from this? The general inefficacy of prayer? 
 Certainly not; but the inefficacy of prayer under the 
 r^onditions of the experiment. I need not tell any physi- 
 cist that we cannot deny the existence of a force merely 
 
Legitimate Inference frovi this Argmmnt. 6 r 
 
 because under certain conditions its effect is not per- 
 ceptible. 
 
 Now, if prayer were an ordinary physical force, its 
 effect would be, of course, independent of tbe motives 
 of tbe person employing it. These motives are not, in 
 such a case, to be reckoned among tbe essential condi- 
 tions of tbe phenomenon, nor can their variation in 
 anywise change the effect. But it is not so with prayer. 
 Prayer, if it produce any effect, produces it by acting 
 on the will of a sentient Being, who knows perfectly 
 the motives by which the petitioner is actuated. Ana- 
 logy, if we had no other reason, would lead us to infer, 
 that the nature of these motives is an important element 
 in determining the success or failure of such action. 
 The motive of the petitioner being thus an essential part 
 of the phenomenon which we have to study, it is plain 
 that we should not be justified in arguing from the case 
 of prayer presented with one kind of motive to that of 
 prayer presented with a kind of motive wholly different. 
 Assuming, therefore, that the experiment was tried ; and 
 that the result was to establish a perfectly uniform per- 
 centage of recovery, as between the two wards, the legi- 
 timate inference would be this, and no more — that prayer, 
 tried as an experiment, will not succeed. If there be any 
 theory which predicts the success of experimental prayer, 
 the result of the experiment, if such were the result, 
 would be fatal to it. But I am not aware that there 
 is any such theory. Certainly it is not the Christian 
 theory. The teaching of Christ with regard to the con- 
 ditions necessary to successful prayer is quite different. 
 He does not say — Try the experiment fairly, and you 
 
62 Applicable 07ily to Experimental Pray a^. 
 
 will succeed ; but, " What things soever ye desire, when 
 ye pray, believe that ye receive them, and ye shall have 
 them." ^ "If thou canst believe, all things are possible 
 to him that believeth." ^ Christ teaches us, in fact, that 
 trust in the goodness of Grod should precede prayer, not 
 follow it. 
 
 It has been said to be derogatory to the character of 
 God to suppose that prayer could be rendered ineffectual 
 by the presence of such a motive. I shall examine this 
 argument further on. At the present stage of the dis- 
 cussion such an examination would be out of place, as 
 it would lead us back into the region of Theism, with 
 w^hich I have here no concern. My present purpose is 
 only to determine the legitimate inference to be drawn 
 from the assumed result of a certain experiment. And, 
 I repeat, this inference is, not the inefficacy of prayer in 
 general, but the inefficacy of prayer when offered as an 
 experiment. The proposed experiment, therefore, appears 
 to me to be devoid of weight, as directed against the 
 Christian theory of prayer; and any other experiment 
 having the same purpose would be open to the same 
 objection. 
 
 I come now to consider a philosophic argument, agree- 
 ing with the last, in that it is based on the method of 
 differences, but differing from it, in that it employs ob- 
 servation, not experiment, to obtain its facts, and is 
 therefore not open to the objection which we have seen 
 to lie against the other. To speak technically, the former 
 argument seems to me to be an ignoratio eUnclii; the pre- 
 sent argument certainly is not. 
 
 ' St. Mark, xi. 24. 2 St. Mark, ix. 23. 
 
Argmnent from Statistics — Example, 63 
 
 This argument may lie stated generally as follows : — 
 
 There are certain classes of phenomena, into whose 
 antecedents prayer enters more largely than it does into 
 the antecedents of other phenomena of a similar kind. 
 Hence it is inferred that, if prayer be really efficacious, 
 its efficacy ought to be shown by a corresponding diffe- 
 rence in the results. We have, therefore, only to exa- 
 mine the statistics of such phenomena, and if no marked 
 difference can be detected, we are justified in denying 
 the efficacy of prayer, at least in phenomena of that 
 kind. 
 
 Thus, for example, if we would know whether prayers 
 for longevity have any real effect, we have only to 
 examine the vital statistics of a class in whose behalf 
 this prayer is more frequently offered than in the case 
 of ordinary men. Such a class we have in reigning 
 Sovereigns. "Grant the King a long life" is quite a 
 common prayer. If, then, statistical tables show no supe- 
 riority in length of life to be enjoyed by Kings, may we 
 not infer that, in their case at least, prayer is ineffica- 
 cious? And if it be without effect in their case, does 
 not analogy lead us to infer that prayer for long life 
 is without effect in any case? If this be so, is there 
 not a general presumption against the efficacy of prayer 
 for any physical benefit ? It is plain, too, that this pre- 
 sumption is strengthened by every additional case of the 
 same kind. 
 
 It has been attempted to turn away the force of this 
 reasoning by general assertions that the statistical method 
 ought not to be applied to questions like the present. 
 But for such assertions I can see no ground. The me- 
 
64 Argument from Statistics. 
 
 thod of differences, and statistics as its proper auxiliary^ 
 are applicable to every case in wliicli an asserted causa 
 and an asserted effect are both witbin the cognizance of 
 man. This condition is fulfilled in the present case. 
 The effect, namely, the longevity of a certain class, is 
 altogether within human cognizance ; and although the 
 same cannot be said of each individual unit in the com- 
 plex cause — for we cannot look into each man's heart and 
 decide whether his prayer be real or merely formal — yet 
 we are justified in assuming that, among so great a num- 
 ber of prayers, many are genuine. The use, therefore, 
 which this argument proposes to make of statistics and 
 of the method of differences appears to me to be quite 
 legitimate. 
 
 In seeking to determine the actual weight to be as- 
 signed to the arguments in the present case, I remark, 
 in the first place, that the method of differences is then 
 only perfectly conclusive, when the cases compared are 
 identical in every important respect but one. If they 
 differ in more than one important element, the diffe- 
 rence of result may, as far as the method of differences 
 is concerned, be with equal justice attributed to any 
 of these variations. So likewise, if the difference of 
 result be not that which the presence of a new element 
 would lead us to expect, we cannot infer that that ele- 
 ment is inoperative, unless we are sure that its operation 
 has not been counteracted by some of the other diffe- 
 rences which exist between the two cases. 
 
 To show you how strongly this principle would be 
 asserted on the other side of the question, let it be sup- 
 posed that, in the case which we have been considering. 
 
Argument from Statistics. 65 
 
 the result of the statistical inquiry was different from that 
 which it is supposed to be. Suppose it to have been 
 proved, by an examination of the statistics of the case, that 
 Kings do on the average live longer than other men. 
 Suppose now that some advocate of the doctrine of the 
 efficacy of prayer were to adduce this fact as evidence in 
 support of the doctrine for which he contended — what 
 reply would be made to him ? It would be said, This is 
 not a legitimate application of' the method of diif erences ; 
 for Kings differ from ordinary men in other respects 
 besides the fact that more prayers are offered up for them. 
 It may be that they are more carefully reared in their 
 youth. It may be that they live easier lives than other 
 men — in a word, the effect which you attribute to prayer 
 may be due to a quite different cause. Even if no such 
 cause can be pointed out, the phenomenon is too complex 
 to justify you in assuming that no such cause exists. 
 This objection seems to be reasonable. 
 
 Now the argument from the method of differences is 
 quite as strong on the positive as on the negative side 
 of such a question. In either case, the argument involves 
 an assumption. Thus, on the positive side, the argument 
 from the superior longevity of Kings (if such existed) would 
 be — " This superior longevity is due to the prayers of their 
 subjects, unless there be some other cause peculiar to 
 Kings capable of producing the effect." So, if the statis- 
 tics had an opposite result, the argument would be — ^' If 
 prayer were really efficacious, the prayers of their objects 
 would give to Kings a life longer than that of ordinary 
 men, unless there be some other cause peculiar to Kings 
 capable of counteracting the effect." So far, the argu- 
 
66 Argument fr 07)1 Statistics. 
 
 ments are similar, and it is quite as easy to suggest, 
 among the peculiarities of their position, causes which 
 tend to shorten the lives of Kings as causes which tend 
 to lengthen them. 
 
 But it is not necessary to resort to imaginary statistics 
 to illustrate the principle of which I have spoken. Let 
 me take a real case. There is, I suppose, no commoner 
 subject of prayer than protection from sickness, accident, 
 and other causes which shorten life. We may fairly 
 assume, too, that the clergy, as a class, pray more than 
 any other class ; and yet, if any Christian controversialist 
 were to adduce the superior longevity of the clergy as a 
 proof of the efficacy of prayer, he would hardly be listened 
 to. Differences favourable to longevity — as, for example, 
 greater temperance — between the clergy and other classes 
 would be at once pointed out. But it is quite as easy to 
 point out class differences in the clergy unfavourable to 
 longevity, as, for example, exposure to infectious diseases, 
 and, despite certain threadbare sarcasms, poverty. I can 
 see no warrant for asserting that, excluding one of the 
 class differences, namely, prayer, the combined action of 
 the rest would be on the whole favourable to longevity. 
 "We should be justified certainly in rejecting any supposed 
 proof of the efficacy of prayer, derived from the greater 
 longevity of the clergy. But we should be so justified, 
 not because we know the other class differences to be, in 
 their combined action, favourable to longevity — for we do 
 not know it — but because when we know only the result of 
 a number of causes, we cannot determine the separate action 
 of one of them. From such knowledge we cannot prove 
 the efficacy of the supposed cause ; but I must add, neither 
 
Argument fro7n Statistics, 67 
 
 <3an we disprove it. In truth, nothing is more difficult than 
 to find, by actual observation, two cases which satisfy the 
 logical condition of the method of differences, by present- 
 ing a complete agreement in all important points but one. 
 It is for this reason that we are frequently obliged, if we 
 would apply this method with success to physical research, 
 to have recourse to experiment, which enables us to con- 
 struct artificially two cases satisfying the required con- 
 dition. But in real life this condition is rarely fulfilled, 
 on account of the complexity of the phenomena, and the 
 number of differences which will be found to exist between 
 almost any two cases which we can select. 
 
 The conclusion to be drawn from these observations is 
 not, certainly, that an argument drawn from the method 
 of differences is of no weight, unless the conditions of that 
 method be rigorously fulfilled. Were this so, the method 
 of differences would be of little use to us, except in the 
 case of experiment. But it is an argument only ; it is not 
 a proof; and the weight to be assigned to it will neces- 
 sarily depend upon the completeness with which these 
 conditions are fulfilled. Every case, in which a greater 
 supply of the blessing prayed for co-exists with a greater 
 amount of genuine prayer, is an argument for the efficacy 
 of prayer for that blessing, unless this greater supply can 
 be distinctly traced to a cause independent of prayer. 
 Every case, in which a greater aijiount of genuine prayer 
 exists, without a greater supply of the blessing prayed 
 for, is an argument against the efficacy of prayer for that 
 blessing, unless it can be shown distinctly that a counter- 
 acting cause exists. If, in either case, the action of the 
 other cause cannot be shown, the argument, considered as 
 
68 Argumejit from Statistics, 
 
 a probable argument, is valid, and its weight depends 
 upon the improbability of the supposition that the effect 
 is produced or counteracted by such other causes. 
 
 I could not here examine in detail the several statistical 
 arguments which have been advanced against the efl&cacy 
 of prayer. This I hope to do elsewhere ;^ for the present 
 I would only remark that they are similar in character ta 
 the specimens which I have chosen, and that similar ob- 
 servations apply to them all. It is alleged, for example, 
 as an argument against the efficacy of prayer, that the 
 history of ships conveying missionaries, which may be 
 supposed to command in a more than ordinary degree the 
 prayers of the Christian Church, shows, notwithstand- 
 ing, as large a percentage of wreck as that of any other 
 ships. I do not suppose that we have any very accurate 
 statistics on this matter : but suppose for a moment that 
 the history of such ships did show a smaller percentage of 
 wreck, and that it was ]3roposed to found upon this fact an 
 argument in favour of the efficacy of prayer — would it 
 not be replied, that the induction was far too small to 
 enable us to isolate one cause among the many which 
 produce shipwreck. It might not be possible to deny to 
 the argument all weight ; but I am sure that the weight 
 assigned to it would be very small. Yet it is quite as 
 valid on the one side of the question as on the other. 
 
 We may say then of the Christian theory of prayer in 
 its relation to Science, that it is not opposed to the general 
 principle of Law; nor can it be refuted by experiment. 
 The argument derived from observation is in principle 
 
 ^ Appendix, Note L. 
 
Recapitulation. 69 
 
 perfectly valid, and tlie statistics collected by Mr. Gralton 
 and others are, on the whole, unfavourable to the theory of 
 prayer. But the incompleteness with which the conditions 
 of the method of differences are fulfilled obliges us to regard 
 the argument derived from these statistics as being very 
 far removed from proof. Let the argument be subjected 
 to the test of which I have spoken. Imagine the statistics 
 to be reversed. Suppose it to have been ascertained that 
 Kings do live longer than ordinary men, and that the 
 history of missionary ships shows a percentage of wreck 
 less than the average. Then ask those who use the argu- 
 ment whether they would admit that the theory of prayer 
 was thereby proved. I am very sure that they would 
 refuse, and rightly, to assent to s^^ch a conclusion. They 
 would say. It is an argument, but it is no more ; and that 
 is the truth. 
 
 I hope in my next Lecture to examine the evidence on 
 the other side of this important question. To those, if 
 such there be, who refuse to listen to any arguments save 
 those drawn from observation, I can only say. Unless the 
 argument to which you give this monopoly amount to prac- 
 tical demonstration, your exclusive method is not justified 
 by reason ; and you will not attain to truth if you de- 
 liberately mutilate the evidence on which it rests. 
 
LECTUEE V. 
 
 OBJECTIONS TO A THEORY OF THE WORLD WHICH 
 EXCLUDES PRAYER. 
 
 Psalm Ixv. 2. 
 ** Thou tliat hearest prayer, unto Thee shall all flesh come." 
 
 THE arguments hitlierto examined have been alto- 
 gether on that side of the question which is usually 
 called the negative side. They have taken the form of 
 objections to a system of the world which includes prayer 
 among the causes which produce or modify phenomena. 
 I now proceed to consider objections which may be made 
 against a system of the world which excludes prayer from 
 this list. I remind you that the choice must be made 
 between these alternatives ; and that scepticism, a state of 
 mind which is admissible, and even commendable, with re- 
 gard to many purely theoretic questions, is here rendered 
 impossible, so far, at least, as our actions are concerned, by 
 the practical character of the subject. I remind you also 
 that, in order to conduct the inquiry without giving an 
 undue advantage to either system, I proposed to examine^ 
 
Argument from Scripture, 71 
 
 not the arguments for and against one, but either the 
 arguments in favour of each, or the arguments against 
 each. These methods are plainly equivalent ; inasmuch 
 as, the systems being mutually exclusive, an argument in 
 favour of either system is an argument against the other. 
 I have preferred the negative form for both classes of argu- 
 ments, because it is in this form that arguments in favour 
 of the system which excludes prayer have generally ap- 
 peared. In other words, these arguments have usually 
 taken the form of objections. It is better, therefore, that 
 arguments in favour of the other system should be thrown 
 into the same form ; and it is in this form that I propose to 
 consider them. These objections will have, and have had, 
 in the estimation of men, an amount of weight varying 
 widely with their mental constitution and beliefs. Some 
 will appear to some minds to have no force at all. I do 
 not speak of those who refuse to admit the existence of a 
 God. To them, the very discussion of our present subject 
 would be an absurdity, and I have therefore excluded 
 Atheists from the number of those to whom these obser- 
 vations are addressed. But that, even among Theists, 
 there are wide differences as to the weight to be assigned 
 to such objections is well known, and will be apparent to 
 you as I proceed to consider them. 
 
 The first of these objections is suificiently obvious, what- 
 ever weight men may choose to assign to it. It seems 
 impossible to reconcile with the teaching of Scripture a 
 system of the world which excludes petitionary prayer. 
 No possible system of interpretation could remove this 
 element from the Bible. The general principle, of which 
 prayer is one development, penetrates the entire fabric of 
 
72 Argument from Scripture — Old Testament, 
 
 the old dispensations. If the records of these dispensations 
 teach anything, they teach this principle, that the actions 
 of God towards man are, or at least were then, conditioned 
 by the actions of man towards Grod. Assume the truth of 
 a system which is the reverse of this. Assume that the 
 actions of Grod are unconditioned by any actions of man 
 which have Grod for their immediate object, and try to 
 reconcile this system with the theology of the Old Testa- 
 ment, and you will find the task to be impossible. If it 
 be a delusion to think that such actions of man can in 
 anywise influence that which man receives from God, it is 
 a delusion which is intensified by all that the Old Testa- 
 ment teaches of the Divine nature. That man's welfare 
 is conditioned by some of his own actions, we all know. 
 That man's welfare was, under the old dispensations, con- 
 ditioned by actions whose immediate object was God — 
 which had no direct tendency to procure for man the 
 objects of his desire, and which could be supposed to affect 
 his welfare only through the Divine will — this is the dis- 
 tinct teaching of the Old Testament. The Mosaic Law, 
 for example, while it did not create the belief in the efficacy 
 of such actions — that had existed long before — added 
 largely to their number, and intensified the beKef itself, 
 by giving to it a formal sanction. 
 
 It is hardly necessary that I should adduce any in- 
 stances in proof of this. We do not need the authority 
 of the Epistle to the Hebrews to convince us, that sacrifice 
 had no direct tendency to cleanse man's heart from the 
 power of sin, or to deliver him from its consequences. 
 Both these effects were believed to follow directly from 
 the Divine volition, and sacrifice was but the condition 
 
Argument fro7n Scripture — Old Testament. 73 
 
 which Grod had made essential to their production ; and it 
 is evident that sacrifice was, like prayer, an action whose 
 immediate object was Grod. 
 
 If it cannot be denied that the general principle of 
 which I have spoken finds expression in the Mosaic Law, 
 it may, however, be contended that the particular develop- 
 ment of this principle, with which we are at present con- 
 cerned, holds a very subordinate place. Much is said of 
 the duty of obedience ; sacrifice is insisted on strongly, 
 and in great detail; but of the duty or the efficacy of 
 prayer we hear very little. 
 
 This is certainly true. So far as the formal exposition 
 of the law is concerned, prayer, as we understand the 
 word, is not strongly insisted on as a duty. But prayer 
 as a practice, and its efficacy as a fact, find a place in the 
 recorded lives of the best men of the Old Testament. The 
 Jewish lawgiver himself, though he did not impress this 
 duty very strongly upon his people, is recorded to have 
 employed, and that successfully, on every important occa- 
 sion, that kind of prayer, against which perhaps the most 
 plausible objections may be made — I mean intercessory 
 prayer. More than once, the intercession of Moses is re- 
 corded to have saved the Israelites from instant destruc- 
 tion.^ Again and again, the calamities, which descended 
 on their enemies in so many varied forms, are said to have 
 been arrested by the same agency.^ Nor is the possession 
 of this power with Grod represented to be peculiar to 
 Moses : the same is attributed to Abraham ^ and to Jacob.* 
 In fact the same principle runs through the historical part 
 
 1 Numbers, xiv. 11-20; xvi. 20-22, 44-49. 2 Exodus, viii.-x. 
 ^ Genesis, xviii. 23-32. * Genesis, xxxii. 28. 
 
74 Arguvient from Scriptiu^e — Old Testament, 
 
 of the Pentateuch. Historically if not dogmatically, the 
 doctrine of the efficacy of prayer appears in these Books 
 with perfect distinctness. It presents itself, in fact, less as 
 a truth to be taught and learned, than as a religious axiom 
 which no one doubted. 
 
 The same princij)le finds expression in the other Books 
 of the Old Testament. The prayers of Samuel,^ of Elijah,"^ 
 of Hezekiah,^ were, if we may believe these records, not 
 less efficacious than the prayers of Moses. The Psalms, 
 composed at various times, are inspired by the same belief. 
 It comforts the remorse of David.* It is the ray of light 
 which penetrates the darkness of the Babylonian captivity.* 
 But I do not care to dwell longer on this point, the rather 
 because I think that it will hardly be disputed. Whether 
 the doctrine of the efficacy of prayer be true or false, there 
 can be, I suppose, little doubt that it is taught throughout 
 the Old Testament. In rejecting, therefore, as false the 
 doctrine of the efficacy of prayer, we must rejsect as false 
 the teaching of the Old Testament, upon a point of the 
 last importance. 
 
 Many would, no doubt, accept this condition without 
 difficulty. Even among those who do not wholly deny 
 the authority of Scripture, some might be disposed to con- 
 tend that much of the teaching of the Old Testament was 
 not intended to be permanent. That Book, or rather col- 
 lection of Books, professes to record the dealing of God, 
 not with mankind in general, but with one very peculiar 
 nation, and under circumstances which are not likely to 
 recur. We cannot, then, argue that, because a certain 
 
 1 I. Samuel, xii. 18. ~ I. Kings, xvii., 21, 22; xviii. 36, 37, 38. 
 ^ II. Kings, XX. 2-11. * Psalm li. ^ Psalm cii. 
 
ArgU77ient fro7n Scripture — Old Testament. 75 
 
 condition was imposed upon men at tliat time, it is neces- 
 sarily in force now. Sacrifioe has passed away — why not 
 prayer also ? 
 
 This argument is to a certain extent valid. The efficacy 
 of prayer under the Jewish dispensation would not prov© 
 its efficacy now. It would be no sufficient answer to those 
 who simply deny the efficacy of prayer as 2, fact ; although 
 it would be quite a sufficient answer to those who deny the 
 efficacy of prayer as being inconsistent with the Divine 
 perfections. If we are prepared to adopt, on these grounds, 
 a prayerless system of the world, we must be prepared 
 also to reject the teaching of the Old Testament, as giv- 
 ing a false conception of the attributes of Grod. Many 
 would, as I have said, accept this condition without 
 difficulty. I only ask you to remember that it is the 
 condition. 
 
 We have now to inquire — Can the credit of Scripture be 
 saved by this hypothesis ? Is the position tenable, that 
 prayer was indeed Divinely sanctioned under the Jewish 
 dispensation, but that, like many other things having 
 similar authority, it passed away under the light of 
 Christianity? Is this one of the features in the teach- 
 ing of Moses, which has been effaced by the teaching of 
 Christ? 
 
 The reply which the New Testament gives to this 
 question is in nowise doubtful. The Founder of the 
 Christian religion has enforced and encouraged the prac- 
 tice of prayer by every means which a teacher could use. 
 In the first place, He has directly taught and enjoined it. 
 He has done so by direct precept : " Pray that ye enter 
 
76 Argume7it from Scripture — IVew Testajnenf, 
 
 not into temptation ; " ^ " Men ought always to pray and 
 not to faint ; "^ " Pray ye that your flight be not in the 
 winter, nor on the Sabbath-day." ^ He has done so even 
 more forcibly when He tanght His disciples how to pray.* 
 That form of words which is the common inheritance of 
 Christendom consists, not indeed wholly, yet so largely, 
 of petitionary prayer, that it is impossible to avoid the 
 conclusion, that Christ meant to teach the efficacy of such 
 prayer. 
 
 Further, in the words which precede the institution of 
 the Lord's Prayer, Christ enunciates, and in a certain 
 sense adopts, one of the most favourite objections to the 
 practice of prayer. I refer to that objection which, basing 
 itself on the omniscience of Grod, regards petitionary prayer 
 as at least superfluous — *' Your Father knoweth what 
 things ye have need of, before ye ask Him." ^ But you 
 will remember that the use which He makes of this un- 
 doubted truth is to guide, not to abolish, the practice of 
 petitionary prayer. " Use not vain repetitions," but " after 
 this manner pray ye." ^ He could hardly have given His 
 decision more plainly as to the true bearing of this objec- 
 tion — what it does prove, and what it does not prove. 
 And certainly no honest teacher would set himself to im- 
 prove a system which he believed to be false in its funda- 
 mental conception. 
 
 That the teaching of Christ on this subject was enforced 
 hj His own example I need hardly remind you. A single 
 
 1 St. Matthew, xxvi. 41. ^ Si. Luke, xviii. 1. 
 
 3 St. Matthew, xxiv. 20. 
 5 St. Matthew, vi. 7, 8, 9. 
 
Argument from Scripture — New Testame7it. 77 
 
 passage sucli as, " He went out into a mountain to pray, 
 and continued all night in prayer to God," ^ is sufficient 
 to sliow what value He attached to the communion of the 
 soul with Grod. But here we must be careful not to draw 
 from such a statement more than its legitimate conse- 
 quence. All prayer is not petitionary prayer ; and if we 
 had not the teaching of Christ on this subject, it would 
 not be possible to prove, from such a statement, that He 
 had given any sanction to the use of mcli prayer. Having 
 His teaching, however, in which the sanction is formally 
 given, the practice of petitionary prayer being even en- 
 joined, it would not be an unjust assumption that such 
 prayer was included in His own communion with Grod, 
 even if we had no other proof of this fact. But there is 
 independent proof that this was so. Thus, for example, 
 the recorded thanksgiving — " Father, I thank thee that 
 thou hast heard me,"" must plainly have been elicited by 
 the success of a previously offered petition ; and the ad- 
 dition, "I knew that thou hearest me always," proves 
 that the incident was not a solitary one, but that, on the 
 contrary, petitionary prayer was with Him a usual habit. 
 Further, and more nearly to our present purpose, the 
 Founder of the Christian religion not only made the 
 duty of prayer one of its precepts, but also made the 
 efficacy of prayer one of its doctrines. I need hardly 
 remind you of the strong language in which it is ex- 
 pressed — " If ye then, being evil, know how to give good 
 gifts unto your children, how much more shall your 
 Father which is in Heaven give good things to them 
 
 1 St. Luke, vi. 12. 2 g^^ j^i^j,^ ^^ 42^ ^2. 
 
78 Argument fro7n Scripture — New Testament, 
 
 that ask Him " ? ^ — language indeed whicli, if we do not 
 bear in mind and allow for the habitual strength of the 
 words of Christ, might seem to express a doctrine exagge- 
 rated beyond the bounds of any possible realization ; as 
 for example, "What things soever ye desire, when ye 
 pray, believe that ye receive them, and ye shall have 
 them."^ 
 
 But even more decisive than any individual text, as to 
 the teaching of Christ upon this point, is the general tone 
 of the language in which He speaks to His disciples of 
 God, and of their relations to Him. The very epithet 
 which He habitually used — " your Father " — would have 
 been, unless He meant to teach the efficacy of prayer, 
 necessarily misleading. If the analogy which that word 
 expresses was not meant to be real — if Christ did not 
 mean to teach His disciples, that in their hour of need 
 or of sorrow they might approach Grod with the same 
 feelings as those with which a child approaches an earthly 
 parent, then the use of this epithet was in nothing short 
 of a very cruel deceit. This alternative is, of course, not 
 to be thought of. 
 
 On the whole, then, unless we are prepared to reject, as 
 unauthentic, the records of Christ's teaching which remain 
 to us, I think we are bound to accept as proved the fact, 
 that He did teach to His disciples, and through them to 
 the world, the doctrine of the efficacy of prayer. We 
 cannot, then, accept a system of the world from which this 
 element is wholly excluded, without rejecting as erroneous 
 the teaching of Christ upon a point of the greatest impor- 
 
 ^ St. Matthew, vii. 11. 2 g^^ ;^fark, xi. 24. 
 
Argument fro7n General Co7isent. 79 
 
 tance. We must believe that He gave to the community 
 which He founded a false notion of the nature of Grod. 
 Many would, as in the case of the Old Testament, accept 
 this alternative without difficulty ; but, as before, I only 
 ask you to remember that it is the alternative. 
 
 The next argument, against a system of the world ex- 
 cluding prayer, which I proceed to consider, is that de- 
 rived from the general consent of mankind.^ To adopt a 
 system of the world from which prayer is excluded, would 
 be to disregard the most nearly universal of all the reli- 
 gious sentiments — to weed out of every system of Theism 
 the one element in which all systems agree. What weight 
 is to be attached to this consideration ? If mankind have 
 agreed to attribute a certain quality to the Divine Being, 
 ought we to regard that agreement as affording a certain 
 probability that He does really possess that quality? If, 
 to take the present example, men have agreed to ascribe 
 to Him a willingness to hear prayer, is this agreement to 
 be considered evidence in favour of the reality of this attri- 
 bute, or ought we to set it aside as being of little or no 
 weight ? 
 
 Before we adopt the latter alternative, which many 
 would assent to without difficulty, let us consider what are 
 its legitimate consequences. What is the nature of the 
 argument derived from the general consent of mankind ; 
 and, if we should feel bound to reject it as devoid of 
 weight, how would our beliefs generally be thereby af- 
 fected ? If we set aside here the general consent of man- 
 kind, not because it is overborne by other arguments, but 
 
 1 Appendix, Note M. 
 
8o Criterio7i of Ultimate Truth, 
 
 "because it is itself wholly unreliable, how far are we bound 
 to extend the same scepticism to other cases ? 
 
 I have already said, quoting from an eminent modern 
 writer, that with us the criterion of ultimate truth is simply 
 the impossibility of disbelieving it. We believe, because^ 
 we cannot help it. We adopt a certain conclusion, because 
 our minds are, by their own constitution, irresistibly urged 
 to this conclusion. If the force which thus urges us be 
 irresistible, we regard the conclusion as certain. If the 
 force be not absolutely irresistible, but only very great — 
 if disbelief be not impossible, but only very difficult — we 
 regard the conclusion as probable only. Sometimes this 
 impossibility, or difficulty, of refusing assent is felt imme- 
 diately ; sometimes it is not felt until the mind has passed 
 through the preliminary stage of apprehending and exa- 
 mining the proofs or arguments which are advanced in 
 support of the conclusion. But in either case, the ultimate 
 test of truth, certain or probable, is, for us, the impossi- 
 bility or difficulty of believing the reverse. 
 
 In the second case, where belief in the reverse of the 
 conclusion is not impossible, but only difficult, this diffi- 
 culty, and therefore our assurance of the truth of the con- 
 clusion itself, is enhanced, necessarily and rightly, by the 
 fact that the same difficulty has presented itself to a large 
 number of other minds. For the question must force 
 itself on our consideration. How is this agreement to be 
 accounted for ? Why have so many minds found a diffi- 
 culty in believing the opposite to this conclusion ? If the 
 difficulty were present to a few minds only, we might 
 suppose the existence of something exceptional in their 
 constitutions ; but if the agreement be general, if in the 
 
Difficulty of Disbelief . 8 1 
 
 great majority of minds, and in minds of every variety, 
 the conclusion satisfies the condition which is to us the ulti- 
 mate criterion of probable truth, I do not see how, on any 
 principle short of universal scepticism, we can deny to 
 such a conclusion the title of probable; unless there be 
 within our knowledge some cause (a moral prejudice, for 
 example) wholly unconnected with the truth of the conclu- 
 sion, which may account for the general agreement which 
 has been observed. If there be such a cause, the proof of 
 its existence in the minds of any number of men ought to 
 diminish the weight to be assigned to their agreement. 
 If the cause be universally present, its existence ought to 
 diminish the confidence which we place either in our own 
 judgment, or in that of other men ; and might even sug- 
 gest scepticism as the appropriate attitude for a philo- 
 sophic mind. But if this attitude be impossible, as in. 
 practical questions it must be, we must then decide by the 
 only ultimate test — difficulty of disbelief. 
 
 You will observe that I have taken as the criterion 
 of probable truth, not the facility with which the mind 
 believes the conclusion itself, but the difficulty which it 
 finds in believing the opposite. I have done so, because 
 this difficulty of disbelief appears to me to express clearly 
 the attitude which the mind assumes towards a conclusion 
 which we call probable. But perhaps I ought to add a 
 few words for the purpose of explaining to you the sense 
 in which I use the phrase " difficulty of disbelief." When 
 we speak of a proposition as certain, we mean, I suppose, 
 that no force of reasoning or evidence which we can con- 
 ceive it possible to adduce would change the attitude of 
 our minds from belief into disbelief. We think the pro- 
 
 G 
 
82 Difficulty of Disbelief , 
 
 position to be true, and we cannot conceive a mental con- 
 dition in which we should think otherwise. When we 
 speak of a proposition as highly probable only, we mean 
 that it would require a large force of evidence to change 
 the attitude of our minds, but that such a change is not 
 inconceivable. In the first case, disbelief is impossible ; in 
 the second case it is only difficult, in a degree varying 
 with the probability of the proposition itself. I do not 
 here speak of the grounds of probability, but of the state of 
 the mind itself, considered in relation to the proposition 
 which it regards as probable. 
 
 I have now to inquire how far we are justified in infer- 
 ring difficulty of disbelief from the mere fact of belief. 
 If we know, as a matter of fact, that men believe a propo- 
 sition, have we a right to assume that they would find 
 it difficult to disbelieve it ? Not in all cases, certainly. 
 Men give, not unfrequently, an indolent assent to an asser- 
 tion which may happen to come under their notice, and 
 yet it is impossible not to see, that they would have 
 assented quite as readily to an opposite statement if it 
 had been presented to them. From such a belief you 
 cannot infer difficulty of disbelief ; nor therefore can you 
 found upon it any argument in support of the probability 
 of the conclusion. Generally speaking, however, we maf/ 
 presume difficulty of disbelief from the fact of belief ; and 
 we may always do so, when the question is such that a 
 right decision is a matter of practical importance. Here, 
 it is highly improbable that the assent is careless, and 
 therefore also improbable — almost impossible — that the 
 mind would with equal facility have assented to an oppo- 
 site statement if presented to it. And if it should appear 
 
Argument from General Agreement, 83 
 
 that the mind, in arriving at the belief in question, had 
 distinctly before it the possibility that the opposite con- 
 clusion might be the true one, this latter supposition is 
 plainly inadmissible. If, then, we find a general agree- 
 ment among men upon a question in the right decision of 
 which they are deeply interested, and in which both sides 
 have been, most probably, under their consideration, we 
 may fairly assume that they would have found a difficulty 
 in coming to an opposite conclusion. I do not think, 
 therefore, that we can reject the argument in favour of 
 the truth of the conclusion which may be derived from 
 such an agreement, without general scepticism as to man's 
 power of arriving at probable truth. What amount of 
 actual weight ought to be assigned to such an argument is 
 another and a very difficult question. I can only suggest 
 some considerations tending to the solution. 
 
 But in the first place, let me endeavour to justify the 
 assertion that we cannot wholly reject, on any principles 
 short of universal scepticism, the argument drawn from 
 the general agreement of mankind. "We find that men 
 generally agree in a certain conclusion. That is the phe- 
 nomenon to be accounted for. Is the truth of the conclu- 
 sion a mode of accounting for this agreement ? If it be 
 not, we must suppose the human mind to be indifferent as 
 between truth and falsehood, and this supposition is equi- 
 valent to general scepticism. If there be in the human 
 mind a tendency to prefer truth to falsehood, the agree- 
 ment of mankind does raise a presumption in favour of 
 the truth of the conclusion in which they agree ; and the 
 evidential value of this agreement is much enhanced, if 
 the question be of such a kind that we are warranted in 
 
 g2 
 
84 Valueless Assent, 
 
 assuming that all or most of tliose who believe the conclu- 
 sion would have found it difficult to believe the contrary. 
 
 How shall we know that we mmj assume this ? How 
 shall we distinguish between that indolent, careless assent 
 which, but for some accident, might as well have been dis- 
 sent — which some cause as slight might change into dis- 
 sent ; or, it may be, born of ignorance, to vanish like other 
 spectres of the darkness before the growing light of know- 
 ledge — and that far other assent, the expression of a deeply- 
 seated belief, not perhaps unchangeable, yet hard to 
 change — an assent which we may find to be erroneous, 
 which is certainly not infallible ; but to which, I repeat, 
 we can deny all weight only by that complete distrust in 
 the human faculties which has no consistent result but 
 universal scepticism? 
 
 One kind of valueless assent, that, namely, which 
 springs from indolence, we have seen already how to ex- 
 clude. How to exclude the valueless assent which has its 
 root in ignorance or prejudice — for that problem, alas, 
 there is no complete solution. We can detect the igno- 
 rance or the prejudice of other times, but who shall teach 
 us to unmask the ignorance or the prejudice of our own 
 time ? 
 
 Yet even if we cannot find a complete solution of the 
 problem, we must try to solve it, at least partially, if we 
 would not abandon the pursuit of truth as hopeless. And 
 in this very phenomenon of general agreement we shall 
 find, I think, a partial solution. 
 
 The general agreement of mankind to accept a conclu- 
 sion as true is a phenomenon which we must try to 
 account for. Now to account for a general phenome- 
 
Argument from General Assent. 85 
 
 non we must look for a general cause — something 
 •which not only acts generally, but acts always or gene- 
 rally in the same direction. The truth of the conclusion 
 is such a cause. We cannot, as I have said, deny, on any 
 principle short of universal scepticism, that men are more 
 disposed to believe a true conclusion than a false one. 
 The truth of the conclusion is therefore a method of 
 accounting for the agreement of mankind to accept it. 
 If we propose to account for the agreement in any other 
 way, as by ignorance or prejudice, we are bound to show 
 not only that the cause which we select operates generally, 
 but that it would influence men generally in the same 
 direction. If this cannot be shown, there is a presump- 
 tion in favour of the cause which is general in its opera- 
 tion, namely, the truth of the conclusion. 
 
 This presumption is greatly strengthened, when we can 
 actually trace the general agreement to one of those com- 
 mon principles of human nature, whose authority we 
 always recognise in our search after truth. If the 
 general belief of which we speak be founded on such a 
 principle, it is plain that disbelief, which requires us to 
 reject its authority, could not be otherwise than difficult. 
 In such a case, then, the criterion of probability already 
 spoken of would be satisfied. In a word, the generality 
 of the agreement excludes an accidental cause. We must 
 seek its origin in some general principle of human na- 
 ture. Such an origin already establishes a presumption 
 in favour of the truth of that which men have agreed to 
 believe ; and if, further, we can show that the principle 
 to which this agreement owes its origin is one of those to 
 which we usually accord authority, the presumption is 
 
86 Argument fro7n General Assent, 
 
 very greatly strengthened. For we may fairly assume,, 
 that men who believe on such grounds would find it very 
 difficult to disbelieve. 
 
 I should now proceed to inquire whether, and how far,, 
 these principles are applicable to our present subject — the 
 general agreement among men on the practice, and there- 
 fore the efficacy, of prayer. I hope in my next Lecture 
 to consider this question, the examination of which will 
 nearly bring the present inquiry to a close. 
 
LECTUEE VI. 
 
 ARGUMENT AGAINST A SYSTEM OF THE WORLD WHICH 
 
 EXCLUDES PRAYER, DERIVED FROM THE GENERAL 
 
 ASSENT OF MANKIND-RECAPITULATION. 
 
 St. Matthew, vr. 9. 
 " Our Father, wMcli art in Heaven." 
 
 "TN my last Lecture I endeavoured, as you may remember, 
 -*- to make some advance towards a solution of the question, 
 What evidential weight ought we to assign to the agree- 
 ment of mankind ? We saw that the agreement ought to 
 be general, so as to exclude the supposition that it is 
 induced by any peculiarity, either of time or place ; and 
 that it ought to be capable of being traced, at least with 
 probability, to some of those principles which we recog- 
 nise as authoritative; so as to exclude, as far as we can 
 exclude, an agreement which is the result of prejudice. 
 
 I now proceed to inquire whether, and how far, these 
 conditions are fulfilled by the agreement which exists 
 among men on the subject of prayer. And, in the first 
 place. Is the agreement general ? To this question there 
 can be but one answer. Prayer is, and has ever been, an 
 
88 Argument from General Assent. 
 
 element of every system of Theism— of the polytheism of 
 the Grreeks and Eomans, no less than of the monotheism 
 of the Jews — of the religious systems of Zoroaster and of 
 Mahomet, no less than of the religion of Christ. The 
 spirit of prayer breathes through the hymns to Indra and 
 Varuna no less really than through the Psalms of David. 
 The phenomenon is quite general ; and the cause must be 
 sought, not in any accidental peculiarity, but in some 
 principle spreading as widely as human nature itself. So 
 far the condition is fulfilled. 
 
 In truth, the cause of the general agreement among all 
 systems of Theism on the subject of prayer is to be found 
 in the agreement on this point of all these systems in 
 their conceptions of the nature of the Divine Being. 
 These conceptions are indeed, in many respects, widely 
 different. It would seem almost profane to institute a 
 comparison between the portrait drawn by Christianity, 
 and the portrait drawn by Paganism. But they have 
 this element in common — All these systems, how widely 
 soever they differ in other respects, agree in depicting the 
 Divine Being as one who is willing to listen to the prayers 
 of His creatures. If, as in the Polytheistic systems, there 
 be more than one Divine Being, this characteristic is shared 
 by them all. 
 
 But our question is not yet answered. For we have 
 still to inquire. Whence comes tliis agreement ? Why do 
 portraits of the Divine Nature, drawn by religious sys- 
 tems so many and so various, agree in presenting the 
 same feature ? Only two causes, I think, can be assigned, 
 sufficiently general to account for the phenomenon — 
 general experience, and a moral intuition. As it is cer- 
 
Argument from the Moral Sense. 89 
 
 tainly not tlie first, we must seek the origin of this fea- 
 ture, common to all portraitures of the Divine Nature, in 
 a general moral intuition. It is man's moral sense which 
 has drawn the picture. It is man's moral sense which 
 tells him, that, among the qualities which in their aggre- 
 gate make up such a character as man can venerate, readi- 
 ness to comply, if possible, with the desire of a suppliant, 
 is one. An inexorable being is not man's ideal of moral 
 perfection ; and accordingly the history of the world tells 
 us that such a character has never been his ideal of God. 
 
 If you refuse to attribute this historical phenomenon to 
 a moral instinct, how do you propose to account for it? 
 What cause can be assigned sufiiciently powerful and suf- 
 ficiently general to account for the phenomenon ? 
 
 This conception of the Divine Nature, it will be an- 
 swered by many, is unreliable, because it is anthropomor- 
 phic. Your God is only an exaggerated man. You have 
 transferred, without authority, to your conception of the 
 Divine Nature elements which properly belong only to 
 the nature of man. It is in nowise surprising that there 
 should be agreement among portraits drawn from the 
 same original. But what inference can be deduced from 
 such agreement ? 
 
 If, by the assertion that our conception of God is an- 
 thropomorphic, it be meant that our portrait is a mere copy 
 — that we have transferred the elements of a human cha- 
 racter in the aggregate, and without selection, to our 
 conception of God — the assertion is not true. If it be 
 meant that we have formed our ideal of the Divine Nature 
 by a selection of human qualities, including some and 
 omitting others, I am not concerned to dispute the truth 
 
go Conception of the Divine Nature 
 
 of this theory ; on the contrary, I believe it to be correct. 
 But the question at once presents itself, On what principle 
 has the selection been made ? Why have we included 
 some human qualities in our conception of the Divine 
 Nature, and excluded others ? There seems to be but one 
 answer to this question. "We have included good quali- 
 ties, and excluded bad ones; in other words, we have been 
 guided in the selection by a moral instinct. This is in 
 effect the same account -of the matter with that already 
 given. The moral instinct of man is not indeed infallible ; 
 and there will be found in some of the conceptions which 
 men have formed of the Divine Nature elements which 
 are not good. It must be remembered, however, that we 
 are not now concerned with exceptional cases, but with an 
 element which is common to all, or nearly all, the concep- 
 tions which man has formed of God. 
 
 If, therefore, we resolve to adopt, as true, a system of 
 the world from which prayer is excluded, we must either 
 admit that the world is governed by a Being who is not 
 good ; or we must reject the all but universal verdict of 
 man's moral sense, that desire to comply with the prayer of 
 a suppliant is a necessary element of a benevolent nature. 
 
 In the earlier part of the present discussion, I alluded to 
 an argument sometimes advanced on the other side of the 
 question, professedly derived from the same source with 
 the present argument, namely, the conception which we 
 ought to form of the Divine Nature. I endeavoured to 
 examine this argument on its own merits, without inquir- 
 ing into the prevalence of the conception of moral excel- 
 lence on which it is founded. I may now add, appro- 
 priately to the present stage of the discussion, that this 
 
derived from Man s Moral Nature. g r 
 
 Stoic ideal never lias been generally accepted. It has 
 been a paradox, professed by very few, and which the 
 moral sense of mankind in general has refused to accept 
 as a picture of excellence either in God or man. 
 
 Hitherto I have considered the argument drawn from 
 the general agreement of mankind purely in its metaphy- 
 sical aspect, without the intermixture of any Theistic 
 element. Eeturning now into the region of Theism, I 
 proceed to inquire how this argument is affected by the 
 belief that man's moral nature, like the rest of the uni- 
 verse, is the work of a Divine Creator. 
 
 Eeliance on the efficacy of prayer, considered as a 
 general phenomenon of human nature, is founded, as we 
 have seen, in a common element pervading all the con- 
 ceptions which man has formed of the Supreme Being. 
 Particular classes of men — Christians, for example — have 
 other and special reasons for this belief ; but the general 
 reason, which we are bound to seek for a general phenome- 
 non, is, that absolute indifference to prayer is not recon- 
 cileable with the conceptions which men in general have 
 formed of Grod. Man's moral nature appears to be such, 
 that whenever it would draw a picture of ideal perfection — 
 or in other words, a picture of Cod — it has made com- 
 passion, evoked by prayer, one of the features of its por- 
 trait. If this portrait be untrue, we must suppose that 
 God has given to man a moral nature which is all but 
 universally unreliable in a matter so deeply important as 
 the character of God Himself, and the attitude which man 
 ought to assume towards Him. 
 
 The moral judgment of man is not indeed infallible ; 
 but if it can err, all but universally, in such a matter as 
 
92 Arguments fr 0711 Christian Expef 
 
 lence. 
 
 tMs — if men can agree to call tliat a moral excellence 
 wHch is a moral fault, where can their moral sense be 
 trusted ? Is not the legitimate result of such a supposi- 
 tion the worst of all scepticisms — moral scepticism ? And 
 if man's moral judgment be right — if desire to comply 
 with the wish of a suppliant he a moral excellence, what 
 system of Theism can exclude it from the ideal of God ? 
 
 Before concluding the examination of the arguments 
 on this side of the question, there is yet one upon which I 
 wish to say a few words ; although its scope is limited, 
 and many would, I suppose, dispute its reality. It is the 
 argument from what is commonly called "Christian ex- 
 perience." The fact upon which this argument is based 
 is this : — There are few practical Christians who will not 
 tell you that it has occurred to them at times to feel that 
 their prayers have been answered. Perhaps they have fal- 
 tered in the hour of danger; temptation has assailed 
 them, and they have felt themselves to be weak. They 
 have sought the aid of their Father who is in Heaven, 
 and their courage has sprung up anew. The temptation 
 but now so formidable has passed by harmless ; and they 
 will tell you that the effect has been produced, not by 
 anything in themselves, but by an external power, and in 
 immediate answer to their prayer. 
 
 The scope of this argument is, as I have said, limited. 
 It does not extend beyond the efficacy of prayer for spi- 
 ritual blessings. But as we have already seen that the 
 a priori objections to prayer for temporal blessings lie 
 equally against prayer for spiritual blessings, it is plain 
 that the argument, considered in its bearing upon objec- 
 tions of this class, is quite general, if it be real. But 
 
Objections to this Argument. 93 
 
 many will dispute the reality, not indeed of the facts, but 
 of the inference which is drawn from them. They will 
 say that these facts are a proof of the power of prayer, 
 not over the mind of God, but over the mind of the indi- 
 vidual who prays. They will say that these facts indi- 
 cate no more than the natural efficacy of a strong desu^e 
 to produce the desired result, if that result be mental. 
 You believe, they will say, that your heart has been puri- 
 fied, or your power of resisting temptation strengthened, 
 by prayer ; and so, indeed, it has been — not because 
 prayer has procured for you the aid of the Divine grace, 
 but because the earnest desire which has found expression 
 in prayer has, by its own natural power, purified or 
 strengthened your heart. That this is a possible expla- 
 nation of the phenomenon, there can be, I think, no doubt. 
 It is not impossible that the effect may be produced by 
 the reflex action of prayer on the mind ; if it were, we 
 should be absolutely compelled to adopt the other expla- 
 nation, and these facts would be decisive in favour of the 
 efficacy of prayer for spiritual blessings. But while we 
 cannot call this interpretation impossible, nor even, con- 
 sidered in its own nature, improbable, w^e must remember 
 that it would not be accepted by those who have the best 
 means of judging — those, namely, in whose minds the 
 effect is produced. They would tell you that they can 
 distinguish perfectly between the effect of an unexpressed 
 desire, however earnest, and the effect of the same desire 
 poured out to God. If you say that the whole phenome- 
 non is due to the firm belief, admittedly present to their 
 minds, that their prayers will be answered, and that from 
 this to the further belief that their prayers have been 
 
94 Criticis?n 07i the Experijnental Test 
 
 answered, the transition is easy ; tliey will refuse to 
 accept a theory of the phenomenon which implies that 
 this latter belief is a delusion of their own minds. They 
 will say that, like many other metaphysical theories, 
 capable of plausible statement, it is opposed to their inner 
 consciousness, and that therefore they must reject it as 
 untrue. 
 
 Now, it is quite true that they may be deceived. Their 
 consciousness may have reported untruly ; or they may 
 have mistaken for the testimony of consciousness some- 
 thing which was an inference, and an erroneous inference, 
 of their reason. But unless we are prepared to reject 
 altogether the evidence of man with regard to that which 
 passes within him, and with it the foundation of all men- 
 tal science, we cannot refuse to such an argument as this 
 a certain amount of weight. 
 
 I have thus endeavoured to lay before you, as fully as 
 the space allotted to me would permit, the arguments 
 on both sides of this great question. I have not know- 
 ingly omitted any, although, no doubt, many considera- 
 tions have suggested themselves to you which I have 
 failed to notice. But before I try to bring together in 
 one picture the opposing probabilities which we have 
 severally examined, I must supply one omission which 
 the course of the argument compelled me to make, and 
 which leaves the discussion still somewhat incomplete. 
 
 You may remember that, in commenting upon a cer- 
 tain experiment which has been proposed for the purpose 
 of testing the efl&cacy of prayer, I pointed out to you 
 that, assuming the result of the experiment to be as anti- 
 cipat.ed, we could not argue from that result against the 
 
Objection to this Criticism. 95 
 
 efficacy of prayer in general, but only against the efficacy 
 of prayer tried as an experiment. And I said that any 
 person holding the Christian theory of prayer would pre- 
 dict the result of such an experiment. It is objected to 
 this answer — You do but degrade your conception of 
 Ood, if you suppose that He would frustrate an experi- 
 ment made with the honest purpose of eliciting the truth ; 
 and if this be the Christian theory, so much the worse for 
 Christianity. The objection is both obvious and plausible. 
 I proceed to consider it. 
 
 It is true that the Christian theory of prayer would 
 predict the failure of such an experiment. It is true that 
 the Christian religion teaches us that trust in God is the 
 condition, not the result, of successful prayer. It is the 
 teaching of Christianity that he who comes to God in 
 prayer must believe that " He is a rewarder of them that 
 diligently seek Him." Is such a condition unworthy of 
 the character of God ? 
 
 I remind you here of an observation before made in 
 discussing the question. What is the peculiar claim of a 
 suppliant? Why do we prefer one who asks for our 
 assistance to another, equally deserving in other respects, 
 who does not ask for it ? We saw then that the element 
 which justifies this preference is trust. We prefer one 
 who asks, because the request itself implies trust. But if 
 we knew that this element was not present, and that the 
 request was only an experiment, I do not think that we 
 should be at all inclined to give a preference to such a 
 suppliant. In fact, there would be no reason for such 
 a preference. So, too, prayer to God offered without 
 trust has no special claim on His mercy. He who prays 
 
g6 Answer to the Objection — Recapitulatmi, 
 
 thus has no right to expect that he will be preferred to 
 one who does not pray at all. 
 
 But it may still be urged, Is not the purpose of prayer 
 in the supposed experiment a good purpose ? Is not he 
 who offers the prayer actuated by a sincere desire to elicit 
 the truth? And why should God baffle the purpose of 
 an honest inquirer, even if he be not possessed of the 
 Christian grace of faith ? 
 
 But the answer is obvious. Because, if Grod did com* 
 ply with such a prayer, he would simply lead the honest 
 inquirer astray. The success of the supposed experiment 
 would prove, not simply the efficacy of prayer, but the 
 efficacy of prayer without faith. If the Christian theory 
 of prayer be true, this conclusion is untrue ; and if God 
 were to grant success to such a prayer. He would lead 
 men to expect that which He did not mean to give them. 
 
 But it is time that this discussion should approach to a 
 close. Little indeed remains, but that I should take a 
 brief retrospect of the question as I have endeavoured to 
 present it to you, before I leave the decision to the judg- 
 ment of your own minds. 
 
 Two principles — neither, I think, doubtful — were origi- 
 nally adopted to govern the investigation ; one, that the 
 question belongs to that practical class, where scepticism 
 is impossible, and the mind is compelled to come to a 
 decision ; the other, that any attempt to decide the ques- 
 tion upon one kind of evidence ought to be rejected as 
 illogical, unless the evidence to which it is proposed to 
 accord this monopoly have the force of demonstration. 
 
 The task which is here set before us — the task which 
 every man must perform, by his life, if not by his words — 
 
Recapitulation . 9 7 
 
 is to decide between a system of the world which includes 
 prayer, and a system of the world which excludes it. To 
 assist you in making this decision, without giving, in 
 form, any advantage to either side, I have presented to 
 you the arguments for and against the efficacy of prayer 
 as objections against these systems respectively. 
 
 Objections against a system of the world including 
 prayer among its efficient causes are derived, as we have 
 seen, principally from three sources : from a certain con- 
 ception of the Divine Nature ; from the principle of Law ; 
 and from experience. 
 
 Examining these objections successively, I endeavoured 
 to show you that the Stoic ideal, on which the first objec- 
 tion is founded, ought to be rejected as being inconsistent 
 with the moral sense ; and that, as a matter of fact, the 
 vast majority of mankind have refused to accept it as a 
 portrait of moral excellence, either in God or man. 
 
 I endeavoured to show you, further, that although it is 
 true that, in asking Grod to interfere, either in the world 
 of spirit or in the world of matter, we ask Him to per- 
 form a miracle, it is not true that we ask for a violation 
 of the principle of Law ; and that the '' dogma of interfe- 
 rence," when rightly understood, is in nowise derogatory 
 to the character of God, regarded as the Creator and Euler 
 of the world. 
 
 Passing from the a priori arguments against the efficacy 
 of prayer to those which are based upon experience, we 
 found that these are of two kinds, namely, arguments 
 drawn from experiment, and arguments drawn from obser- 
 vation; the scope of both being limited to the efficacy 
 of prayer in the physical world. I endeavoured to show 
 
 H 
 
g 8 Recapitu lation . 
 
 you that the first class ought to be set aside, as being 
 made under conditions inconsistent with the requirements 
 of the theory which it is meant to test. 
 
 But with regard to the argument from observation, it 
 is impossible to deny either its soundness or its appli- 
 cability to a question like the present. I have not at- 
 tempted to dispute either. But I have pointed out to 
 you the difficulty and uncertainty (an uncertainty which 
 has, indeed, become proverbial) introduced into the appli- 
 cation of this argument, by the complexity of the facts 
 with which it has to deal, and by the very imperfect man- 
 ner in which the conditions of the method of differences, on 
 which this argument is based, are fulfilled. These obser- 
 vations were meant to show, not that the argument is 
 without weight, but that it is very far from being deci- 
 sive. And I asked you, before fixing the amount of 
 weight which you would allow to any such argument 
 on the negative side, to imagine the statistics to be re- 
 versed, and then to consider what weight you would assign 
 to the argument thus transferred to the positive side. 
 
 Passing now from objections against a system of the 
 world which includes prayer, to objections against a sys- 
 tem of the world which excludes it, I pointed out to you 
 that the adoption of this latter system would compel us to 
 reject wholly the teaching of Scripture. If prayer forms 
 no part of the conditions by which the action of the 
 Supreme Being is determined, then it must be confessed 
 that "Moses and the prophets" give us a very false idea 
 of the Divine nature. If the Divine volition cannot be 
 influenced, or at least conditioned, by human actions 
 having God for their object, the Theistic teaching of the 
 
Recapitulation . 9 9 
 
 patriarclial and Mosaic systems must be regarded as radi- 
 cally false. 
 
 I reminded you also that that which is true of the 
 teaching of Moses is no less true of the teaching of Christ. 
 If we are constrained to reject the theory which includes 
 prayer among the causes which produce or modify pheno- 
 mena, we must also reject the teaching of Christ as, on 
 this point, wholly erroneous ; we must admit that the 
 Founder of the Christian religion gave to His disciples, 
 and through them to the Christian Church, the same false 
 notion of the nature of Grod which Moses and the prophets 
 had given before Him. And as we must suppose Him 
 to have been wrong in His teaching, so must we sup- 
 pose Him to have been wrong also in His life. For, 
 if there be truth in the history which remains to us, it is 
 plain that, as He taught, so He lived, and so He died. 
 
 We saw, further, that a system of the world which 
 excludes prayer is opposed to the universal religious senti- 
 ment of mankind. A prayerless Theism has found favour 
 with so few, that it may almost be said that it has never 
 existed. If, therefore, we accept a theory of the world 
 which excludes prayer, we must reject an intuition of 
 man's moral nature which is aU but universal. We must 
 suppose those portraits of Divine perfection, which man's 
 moral nature has di-awn, to be erroneous in that feature 
 in which they all agree. I showed you, by an exami- 
 nation of our ultimate test of truth, that although other 
 evidence may compel us to decide against this general 
 agreement of mankind, we cannot refuse to allow it weight 
 — even very considerable weight — on any principle short 
 of universal scepticism. 
 
 h2 
 
lOO Moral Effect of a Prayer less System. 
 
 The comparison of the two systems of the world which 
 we have been considering is not complete without an 
 examination of the moral effects of each. If it can be 
 said of two rival systems that the one can satisfy certain 
 moral wants of man's nature which the other leaves unsa- 
 tisfied, or that the one would foster the growth of moral 
 virtues which would be blighted by the other, I do not see 
 how any Theist can deny that such a difference would 
 raise a strong presumption in favour of the first. If the 
 system of the world and man's moral natui-e have come 
 from the same Author, it is not unreasonable to expect a 
 harmony between them. It is not probable, surely, that a 
 benevolent Being would implant in His creature moral 
 desires absolutely inconsistent with the system of the 
 world in which he lives. 
 
 You will understand that, retaining the limitation with 
 which I commenced, I speak but of the moral wants of 
 the Theist. What are they ? What moral wants are 
 awakened in the nature of man, when his reason has told 
 him of the existence of Grod ? Hear its expression in the 
 two words which I have prefixed to this Lecture — the first 
 words of that wondrous prayer which seems so truly to 
 reflect the nature of its Author — so Divine and yet so 
 human — ^those words which breathe to God the first moral 
 want of the Theist's nature — " Our Father." Words 
 the most familiar to every one among us — so familiar, 
 indeed, that we often forget the weighty truth which 
 they suggest, if they cannot be said to contain it — ^that 
 the first want awakened in man's moral nature by belief 
 in the existence of Grod is, that these words should em- 
 body a real feeling. And no system of the world will 
 
Moral Effect of a Prayer less System — A?ialogy. loi 
 
 satisfy the wants of man's moral nature, which does not 
 permit man to approach Grod with feelings of which these 
 words are the truthful exponent. 
 
 Would such feelings be possible under a system from 
 which prayer was banished? "Would such feelings be 
 evoked by a Being, whose individual will, if such a thing 
 ever existed, has long since ceased to act — abandoning 
 the universe, of which He might continue in name the 
 Grovernor, to a series of unintelligent causes, established 
 indeed by Him once for all, but thenceforward acting 
 as independently of Him as if He had ceased to exist ? 
 
 Take the analogous case. What would be the moral 
 eifeet of a like system introduced into the things of this 
 earth, and the part which the will of man enacts there? 
 What if all acts of individual kindness — all promptings 
 of individual mercy — those bright spots in oiu* existence 
 upon which giver and receiver alike look back so fondly — 
 were replaced by one uniform and gigantic system — doing 
 as much, perhaps more, good, but doing it quite irrespec- 
 tively of any individual feeling — established once and for 
 ever, and thenceforward pursuing its appointed course, 
 changeless and inexorable as a physical law ? What if 
 it were our duty, giving our labour or our money to the 
 support of this great system, to pass through life heedless 
 of individual suffering, deaf to the cry of individual sor- 
 row ? What if such a system were to take possession of 
 our homes ? What if it were the duty of the parent, 
 having made the wisest arrangements for the welfare of 
 his children, to say to them, "All this has been done for 
 you; and now remember that, whatever be your need, 
 whatever trouble may assail you, you must not look to me 
 
I02 Moral Effect of a Prayer less System. 
 
 for help " ? And what if the parent's heart were so 
 changed, that this duty should be possible to him ? Ask 
 yourselves, Are the moral wants of the child's nature to be 
 satisfied thus. Ask yourselves, how long love could sur- 
 vive under such a system. "What provisions, be they 
 never so wise — what advantages, be they never so great, 
 could efface from the child's heart the one withering 
 thought, that in his hour of sorrow he had sought his 
 father, and that he would not hear ? There is no differ- 
 ence in kind between the love of man and the love of 
 God ; and that which would blight in our hearts the love 
 of an earthly parent would be no less fatal to the love 
 of "Our Father who is in Heaven." 
 
 If, therefore, a system of the world from which prayer 
 is excluded be the true one, it must be admitted that we 
 live under a system which leaves important moral wants 
 of our natm^e unsatisfied, and which would render the 
 love of G-od nearly impossible. And without the love of 
 God religion is an unreal mockery. 
 
 Is the world indeed a vast machine, and no more ? If 
 it had an intelligent Author, has His work long since 
 ceased ? Is the difference between Theism and Atheism 
 only a matter of speculative curiosity ? Is the action 
 of the human spirit the sole exception (if it he an excep- 
 tion) to the otherwise uncontrolled power of purely phy- 
 sical causes? Is God the Governor of the world in this 
 sense only, that at an epoch immeasurably remote He 
 established these causes, intended thenceforward to act 
 by themselves? Is He now, for all practical purposes, 
 as completely non-existent as the Buddhist deity who 
 has attained Nirvana ? 
 
Conclusion, 103 
 
 Or, if we do not deny Him all action — if the " dogma 
 of interference" be not wholly untrue — is that interfe- 
 rence determined by reasons of which the desire of His 
 creatures is not one ? Are the words " Our Father which 
 art in Heaven" but an unmeaning sound ? 
 
 This is the question which you mu%t decide. Between 
 a system of the world which includes prayer, and a sys- 
 tem which excludes it, neutrality is impossible. If you 
 would perform rightly that inevitable task, you must 
 decide, not by a partial examination of the evidence, but 
 by a review of the whole. If you decide by any other 
 rule, if you give a monopoly to that kind of evidence — 
 science, moral sentiment, the Bible — which your habit of 
 thought may lead you to prefer, your method is wholly 
 indefensible. You may attain truth, but you wiU. attain 
 it only by accident. 
 
 I said at the commencement of these Lectures, that I 
 wished our consideration of this subject to take the form 
 of an inquiry. As such I have endeavoured to conduct it, 
 and as such I would leave it ; reminding you that the 
 question which your hearts and lives must answer is, not 
 whether a belief in the efficacy of prayer is unattended by 
 difficulties ; not whether the opposing argument (I think 
 we have seen that there is but one) can be completely 
 answered ; but whether that argument, to which it is im- 
 possible to deny weight, is sufficient to outweigh the 
 teaching of the Bible, the teaching of Christ, and the 
 moral sentiment of mankind. 
 
APPENDIX 
 
 Note A, Page 1. 
 
 IMPOSSIBILITY OF MAINTAINING A SCEPTICAL ATTITUDE WITH 
 EEGAED TO RELIGION. 
 
 *^In questions of difficulty, or such as are thought so, where 
 more satisfactory evidence cannot be had, or is not seen ; if the 
 result of the examination be, that there appears, upon the 
 whole, any the lowest presumption on one side, and none on 
 the other, or a greater presumption on one side, though in the 
 lowest degree greater; this determines the question, even in 
 matters of speculation ; and in matters of practice will lay us 
 under an absolute and formal obligation, in point of prudence 
 and of interest, to act upon that presumption or low proba- 
 bility, though it be so low as to leave the mind in very great 
 doubt which is the truth." — Analogy of Religion, pp. 5, 6 
 (Fitzgerald's edition). 
 
 The obligation of which Butler here speaks, attaching to 
 matters of practice as distinguished from matters of specula- 
 tion, appears to be founded on the principle stated in the text, 
 namely, the impossibility of maintaining, in practice, a sceptical 
 attitude. If such an attitude were possible — if in such a case 
 
io6 Appendix. — Impossibility of Religious Scepticism. 
 
 we could act, neither as if we believed a certain statement to be 
 true, nor as if we believed it to be false, but as if we did not 
 know whether it were true or false, I think that such a course of 
 action might, under certain circumstances, be the right one. In 
 matters of speculation, where suspense of judgment is possible, 
 we often — and quite reasonably — refuse to decide the question, 
 if the preponderance of evidence be very small. 
 
 "When, therefore, Butler says that such a preponderance '' de- 
 termines the question in matters of speculation," I think that we 
 must understand his statement with the reservation — unless the 
 mind may reasonably refuse to decide the question at all. But 
 in matters of practice, where the suspense of judgment is 
 usually impossible, and men are reduced to the alternative of 
 acting, either in accordance with or against a small preponde- 
 rance of evidence, the ''formal obligation" of which Butler 
 speaks is an undoubted reality. It must be remembered, how- 
 ever, in the application of this principle, that there are religious 
 questions which are not, in this sense, practical questions, and 
 that in dealing with such, the mind may, when the evidence is 
 slight, reasonably suspend its decision. Of such questions I 
 have given an example in the text (pp. 5, 6). 
 
 Note B, Page 8. 
 
 OBJECTION TO A STATEMENT OF THE QUESTION AS LYING SIMPLY 
 BETWEEN OPPOSSING PEOBABILITIES. 
 
 The statement in the text, that the duty of an inquirer into 
 the truth of the Christian doctrine of prayer is to determine 
 between two opposing probabilities, may be thought to be un- 
 duly favourable to those who hold the negative side of the 
 question. It may be contended that the present is one of those 
 cases alluded to by Butler, in which it is the duty of a prudent 
 
Question of opposing Probabilities. 107 
 
 man to act as if a certain proposition were true, even though 
 the probability be that it is untrue. "When the injury which 
 would result from a mistake on one side is much greater 
 than that which would result from a mistake on the other, it 
 may be the duty of a prudent man to decide by the magnitude 
 rather than by the probability of the result, and to accept the 
 greater probability of the lesser evil, rather than the lesser 
 probability of the greater evil. This principle is indisputable. 
 In the case of an apparently hopeless illness, no father will 
 hesitate to call in a physician, although the probabilities may 
 be as a hundred to one that the physician can do no good. He 
 will do so because he prefers the almost certain loss of money 
 to the bare possibility that he may be leaving his child to die. 
 Now it may be contended that the present is such a case. Por, 
 it will be said, if prayer be not efficacious, the man who prays 
 is, at worst, only losing his time : whereas, if prayer be effica- 
 cious, the man who does not pray is neglecting an ordinance of 
 God, and, it may be, forfeiting a blessing which he might other- 
 wise have secured. It may be contended, therefore, that 
 although as a matter of speculation the question must be de- 
 cided simply between opposing probabilities, yet that, as a 
 matter of practice, arguments on the positive side ought to have 
 a preference over arguments of equal strength on the negative 
 side. 
 
 This reasoning would be conclusive, if it were certainly true 
 that loss of time is the only evil which could attend the practice 
 of prayer, if prayer were without efficacy. But this is not cer- 
 tain. In the first place, there is always danger in an unreal 
 hope. Reliance upon external assistance is generally attended 
 by some danger that our own exertions may be relaxed ; and if 
 the reliance be groundless, this danger is not compensated by 
 any corresponding advantage. It may, no doubt, be replied, 
 that the exertions of the Christian are not relaxed by his reli- 
 
io8 Appendix. — Is this such a Question? 
 
 ance on Divine aid, because he knows that without such exer- 
 tions he will not be granted the aid which he seeks. This is 
 certainly true of those who have a full and practical belief in 
 the Christian doctrine of prayer, but it is not true of all those 
 who simply accept the efficacy of prayer as a fact ; and it would 
 be, I think, difficult to deny, that the effect of a delusive belief 
 in this tenet would be, on the whole, like the effect of most de- 
 lusive beliefs, injurious. It is, however, probable that the 
 injury, thus caused to the energy of human exertion, would be 
 less than that which would result from the neglect of a power- 
 ful aid, which is within man's reach, if the doctrine be true. 
 This probability, if conceded, would tend to justify a prefe- 
 rence, in practice, of arguments on the positive side of the 
 question. 
 
 Eut there are arguments against prayer, which would refuse 
 to admit that loss of time or relaxation of energy are the only 
 evils which could result from this practice. In all that class of 
 objections which I have called theological, being founded on 
 the supposed inconsistency of a belief in the efficacy of prayer 
 with a just conception of the Divine attributes, even the inno- 
 cence of the practice of prayer would be denied. If these argu- 
 ments be well founded, we cannot pray without forming an 
 unworthy conception of God, and thus dishonouring Him, as far 
 as our thoughts can dishonour Him. I have endeavoured to 
 show that the theological arguments have little weight, but 
 this could not be assumed at the outset. I have, therefore, in 
 conformity with the usual custom, stated the question as one 
 between opposing probabilities, without making any difference 
 between the theoretical and the practical solutions. But the 
 objection to this mode of dealing with the question is so far 
 valid, that if the theological arguments against prayer were set 
 aside, the philosophic arguments on the same side ought greatly 
 to outweigh all that can be offered on the other side of the 
 
Attributes of the Deity. 109 
 
 question, before they can be permitted to determine the actions 
 of a prudent man. 
 
 KoTE C, Page 12. 
 
 ATTEIBUTES OF THE DEITY. 
 
 Mr. Herbert Spencer has given a negative answer to the ques- 
 tion, whether man can form any conception of the Divine attri- 
 butes, and therefore, by necessary consequence, to the further 
 question, whether he ought to make the attempt. Such at- 
 tempts are, he thinks, a barrier to the complete reconciliation 
 between Religion and Science, which he anticipates, but which 
 cannot be reached, until Eeligion admits that the mystery 
 which she contemplates is absolutely inscrutable. And this 
 abandonment of the effort to hnow need not, he thinks, be 
 accompanied by any decay in the religious sentiment. JSTay 
 rather, the sentiment will take a wider and nobler form when 
 set free from the trammels which these false conceptions have 
 thrown around it.^ 
 
 Are these propositions true? Is it true that the Divine 
 Nature is absolutely inscrutable by man? Are man's concep- 
 tions of the Divine l^ature at best so imperfect, that he ought 
 to give up all attempts to form them? And would the religious 
 sentiment gain in breadth and nobleness by this surrender? 
 
 Is the Divine Being absolutely unknowable by man? This 
 question is ambiguous. It may mean either — Can we know 
 God as He is in Himself? or — Can we know Him in His rela- 
 tion to us? 
 
 Now, there can be no doubt as to the answer which we must 
 make to the question, if understood in the first sense. In the 
 
 ' First Principles, Part I. 
 
1 lo Appendix. — Attributes of the Deity. 
 
 ordinary sense of the word "know," we can not know God — 
 whatever meaning we may attach to that Name — as He is in 
 Himself. But the same may he said of every object of our 
 knowledge. "We know nothing of things as they are in them- 
 selves, as distinguished from the effects which they produce on 
 our minds. All our knowledge is relative — relative to our own 
 powers of reasoning or perception. ''The conviction," says Mr. 
 Spencer, "that human intelligence is incapable of absolute 
 knowledge is one that has been slowly gaining ground as civili- 
 zation has advanced. Each new ontological theory, from time to 
 time propounded in lieu of previous ones shown to be untenable, 
 has been followed by a new criticism leading to a new scepti- 
 cism. All possible combinations have been one by one tried 
 and found wanting; and so the entire field of speculation has 
 been gradually exhausted without positive result : the only re- 
 sult arrived at being the negative one above stated — that the 
 reality existing beyond all appearances is, and must ever be, 
 unknown." ^ Objects external to ourselves are known to us 
 only as causes which act upon our senses and, through them, 
 upon our intelligence, either directly or through the interven- 
 tion of other objects. An object which is incapable of such 
 causality is unknowable by us. The TJncausing, if we may use 
 the word, must be to us for ever unknown. 
 
 But surely this cannot be said of the Divine Being. He can- 
 not be described as The U ncausing, AVho is the Ultimate Cause of 
 all things.'^ When, therefore, we speak of Him as The Abso- 
 lute, we must understand by that epithet The Uncaused, not 
 The Uncausing. Whatever relativity attaches to the word 
 "cause," the same relativity attaches to the Ultimate Cause; 
 and it is precisely this relativity which brings the Divine 
 
 1 First Princiiiles, pp. 68, 69. 
 
 2 This latter epithet is adopted by Mr. Spencer himself : First Principles, 
 pp. 108-9. 
 
Attributes of the Deity, 1 1 1 
 
 Being in some degree within the sphere of human knowledge. 
 The relativity of all our knowledge excludes us from all know- 
 ledge of the Uncausing; but no similar impossibility opposes 
 itself to our knowledge of the Uncaused. Mr. Spencer uses the 
 word '* absolute" as synonymous with ''non-relative." ^ If this 
 latter term, in its proper sense, were applicable to the Divine 
 Being, the relativity of all our knowledge would render that 
 Being absolutely unknowable by us. But I do not see how the 
 term ' ' non-relative " can properly be applied to a cause. The very 
 name denotes a relation. But if a cause may be described as 
 non-relative, the non-relative is not unknowable. Tor it is evi- 
 dent that no cause is absolutely unknown to us of which we 
 know any of the effects. If we know these effects imperfectly, 
 or if the effects which we know be small in number, compared 
 with those of which we are ignorant, our knowledge of the cause 
 is imperfect — in the latter case very imperfect — but, as far as it 
 goes, real. In truth it is the only Mnd of knowledge which we 
 can possess. AVe know an external cause only by the effects 
 which it produces, either directly on ourselves, or indirectly by 
 the production of external phenomena, which in their turn 
 affect us. The most perfect knowledge of a cause which we 
 can possess is no more than knowledge of all the effects which 
 it is capable of producing. If it be capable of producing a 
 thousand effects, and if we know them all, our knowledge is 
 perfect ; or, to speak more accurately, it is as nearly perfect as 
 our present faculties appear to permit. If we know but one, 
 our knowledge is very imperfect. Still it is real as far as it 
 goes, and must not be confounded with absolute ignorance. 
 
 It must be remembered that the word ''cause" is here used 
 rather in a popular than in a strictly scientific sense. Strictly 
 speaking, the word "cause" is applied to the whole combination 
 
 ^ First Principles, p. 91. 
 
112 Appendix. — Attributes of the Deity. 
 
 necessary to produce a given effect ; and in this sense a cause 
 can have but one effect. But in a popular sense we use the 
 word ''cause" to denote some important element entering into 
 many different combinations, and profoundly modifying the 
 effect which the other elements, by themselves, would have pro- 
 duced. Thus, for example, we say popularly that heat melts 
 metals, turns water into steam, accelerates vegetable growth, 
 &c., meaning thereby that the introduction of a greater amount 
 of this element among the antecedents is followed by certain 
 important changes in the consequents. In this sense of the 
 word, a cause may have an indefinite number of effects. It 
 will contribute to clearness, however, if retaining for "cause" 
 its strictly scientific signification, we denote by the word 
 "agent" an element capable of entering into many different 
 combinations, and of modifying the effect which the remaining 
 elements of the complex antecedent would have produced. 
 
 These principles show conclusively, that our knowledge even 
 of the commonest natural agents must be in general very imper- 
 fect. The number of combinations, in which the effects pro- 
 duced by such agents have been actually examined, is usually 
 very small compared with the number of those into which these 
 agents are capable of entering ; nor have we any general rules 
 by means of which we can predict the operation of an agent in 
 an untried combination. JS'o chemist would undertake to pre- 
 dict the effect of the introduction of a substance into a new 
 combination. 
 
 If, then, the phrases ''unknowable," "inscrutable," and the 
 like, be intended to denote that which cannot be perfectly 
 known, every natural agent is probably unknowable. Light — 
 heat — agents the most coqimon, and the most carefully studied, 
 cannot be perfectly known till we have either attained the 
 power of predicting their action, or have examined every combi- 
 nation into which they can enter, and determined theii' effect in 
 
Attributes of the Deity. 113 
 
 all. We have probably no right to call anything impossibUf 
 but no task would seem to merit this epithet more nearly. The 
 number of possible chemical combinations, for example, may be 
 infinite ; the facts of organic chemistry do not, certainly, sug- 
 gest a limit. Even if the number be really finite, we are still 
 very far removed from complete knowledge. Whether, there- 
 fore, such agents be essentially unknowable or not, they are, in 
 this sense of the term, unknowable by us now and for a long 
 time to come. 
 
 But there is another consideration which renders it at least 
 possible that everything may, in this sense, be unknowable by 
 us. Our knowledge of all external things is derived through 
 six inlets which we call the senses. We can know an external 
 object only as it affects the senses, directly or indirectly. To 
 each of these senses correspond one or more qualities, as we call 
 them, of the objects, made known to us by that sense, and 
 unknowable, even inconceivable, without its aid. Colour, re- 
 flective power, transparency — these qualities of bodies one born 
 blind cannot know, nor even conceive. To such a person every 
 part of the external world is, in our present sense of the word, 
 unknowable. May it not be so with us all? May there not 
 exist beings possessed of senses other than ours ? If there be 
 such, analogy would lead us to suppose that each of these addi- 
 tional senses would give to those who possess them knowledge 
 of material qualities as completely unknowable by us, as colour 
 or transparency by one born blind. 
 
 If, therefore, by ''unknowable" be meant that which cannot 
 be perfectly known, all things are unknowable. Eut if by the 
 phrases '"unknowable," "inscrutable," be meant that which 
 cannot be known at all, no agent is unknowable of whose action 
 we know, or can know, even a single effect. 
 
 IN'ow, it is only when an agent is unknowable in the second 
 sense of the word, that we should be justified in stigmatizing as 
 
 I 
 
114 Appendix. — Attributes of the Deity. 
 
 unphilosopliic the attempt to inquire into its action. It is 
 plain that this case could never occur. Por, if an agent were 
 unknowable in this sense of the word, we could not know even 
 its existence, and inquiry would he no less impossible than 
 knowledge. 
 
 "We have, as I have said, no general rule enabling us to pre- 
 dict the operations of an agent in a new combination. Yet the 
 attainment of this power of prediction is the proper aim of 
 Science. It is this, in fact, which is implied in the idea of Law. 
 The establishment of a law enables us to predict the operation, 
 of an agent in a combination analogous to, but not identical 
 with, one in which the experiment has been already made. 
 The same idea is often expressed by the phrase *' quality" or 
 ^'property" of a substance. Thus, when it is said that an alkali 
 possesses the property of combining with an acid, we mean not 
 only to assert that it has been found so to combine in every 
 case in which the experiment has been made, but to predict that 
 if it be brought into the chemical presence of a newly-discovered 
 acid, the result will be the same. 
 
 So also with regard to the actions of an intelligent being. 
 "We study them, not simply for the purpose of recording what 
 men have done, but that we may be enabled to predict with a 
 certain amount of probability what men will do under similar 
 circumstances. In our ordinary language, we say that we 
 study human actions in order to learn human nature. The 
 idea is the same. It is by knowledge of human nature that we 
 are enabled to predict human actions. 
 
 Now, the knowledge thus obtained is necessarily very imper- 
 fect. We know but incompletely even the physical part of the 
 antecedents to a human action, and of the mental part we 
 know scarcely anything. The inference of the nature of man, 
 and yet more, the inference of the nature of any individual 
 man, from the knowledge which we possess of his actions, must 
 
Attributes of the Deity, 115 
 
 therefore always be uncertain. In one sense of the word, 
 human nature, and more especially individual human nature, is 
 "unknowable" by us. Yet no one would stigmatize as unphi- 
 losophic the attempt to acquire this necessarily imperfect 
 knowledge. On the contrary, it is an attempt which we ex- 
 pect every historian to make. We expect that he will endea- 
 vour to appreciate the character of the man or the nation whose 
 history he writes ; and if he fail to do this, we consider him to 
 be unworthy of the name *' historian." He is an annalist, but 
 he is no more. 
 
 These are the principles which guide our inquiries, whether 
 their subject be purely physical phenomena or the actions of 
 finite beings. We do not admit that either substances or men 
 are unfit subjects of inquiry, because they are probably in 
 much ''unknowable" by us; and in each case we place 
 before our minds, as the highest purpose of such inquiry, the 
 knowledge of the properties, or character, or ''attributes" of 
 these things or persons, so that we may be able to anticipate 
 the effect of their presence in a hitherto untried combination. 
 Is there any reason why an inquiry into the character of God 
 should be governed by different principles? Ought that inquiry 
 to be forbidden as unphilosophic, or ought its scope to be alto- 
 gether different ? Shall we say that true philosophy, while it 
 requires the historian or the psychologist to investigate the attri- 
 butes of man, forbids the theologian to investigate the attributes 
 of God? 
 
 If we view this question from the stand-point of practical 
 Theism, the answer must be as given in the text. Without 
 some conception of the Divine attributes, practical Theism 
 would be impossible. We could not worship an unknown and 
 unimagined God. If, then, practical Theism be a duty, some in- 
 quiry into the attributes of God is a necessity. Eut my present 
 purpose requires me rather to view the question from the stand- 
 
 i2 
 
1 1 6 Appendix. — Attributes of the Deity, 
 
 point of Mr. Spencer, and I do not, therefore, here assume the 
 truth of any form of Theism more definite than that which he 
 has indicated. 
 
 Let us assume, then, no more than this, that the causes 
 which we see at work in nature are not all, but that there 
 is "behind them a mighty and mysterious Power, manifested to 
 us in the phenomena of which it is the ultimate cause, and let 
 us give to this Power the name of God. The existence of such a 
 Power Mr. Spencer is prepared to recognise, and he thinks that 
 Science must recognise it too, if she would effect a reconcilia- 
 tion between herself and Eeligion. Eut he adds that Eeligion 
 is equally bound to admit that the mystery is absolute, and 
 therefore to renounce all inquiry into the '^ attributes" of a 
 Power which is essentially unknowable by man. The question 
 which we have to consider is — Ought Religion to assent to this 
 renunciation ? 
 
 That man's knowledge of such a Power as that which is here 
 indicated must be very imperfect, is evident. We have seen 
 that this imperfection attaches to our knowledge of every na- 
 tural agent; much more must it attach to our knowledge of such 
 an agent as this. But we have seen also that it is not imperfec- 
 tion but impossibility of knowledge which renders inquiry unphi- 
 losophic. All our knowledge is necessarily imperfect, and if we 
 renounce inquiry because it can only give us imperfect know- 
 ledge, we condemn ourselves to total ignorance on every subject. 
 If, then, we would give a just answer to the question, whether 
 the attributes of the Great Pirst Cause be a proper subject for 
 human inquiry, we must consider, not whether they can be 
 perfectly known, but whether they can be known at all. The 
 principles already laid down enable us to answer this question. 
 IN'o cause can be said to be wholly unknown of which we know 
 any of the effects, and this is no less true of the Great Pirst 
 Cause than of any other. If it be true that behind all the 
 
Attributes of the Deity, 117 
 
 causes which we see around us there exists a First Cause, of 
 which these secondary causes are themselves effects, every effect 
 of these causes gives us information with respect to the First 
 Cause. Every phenomenon which we observe teaches us some- 
 thing of that which is the ultimate cause of all phenomena. 
 The knowledge which we gain from any such phenomenon, or 
 from them all combined, is small indeed compared with that 
 which remains unknown, but it is real as far as it goes. It 
 does not seem just, then, to condemn as unphilosophic all 
 inquiry into the Divine attributes on the ground that the Being 
 who is the subject of such inquiry is unknowable. 
 
 JiN'either may we pass such a sentence on inquiry into certain 
 Divine attributes, because certain others are not only unknow- 
 able but unthinkable. Whether the operations of the Great 
 First Cause are in any degree affected by human sorrow or by 
 human prayer is a legitimate subject of inquiry, even though it 
 be true — as it assuredly is — that infinity is essentially unthink- 
 able. 
 
 ^ay, the results which flow from a certain attribute may pro- 
 perly be inquired into, with the purpose of testing their reality, 
 even though the attribute itself be unthinkable. We cannot, by 
 any effort, picture to our minds an Omnipresent Being, but the 
 result of the Divine Omnipresence, namely, that man's prayers 
 are always heard, is perfectly intelligible. 
 
 On the whole, then, I cannot think that we should be justi- 
 fied in rejecting inquiry into the Divine attributes as unphilo- 
 sophic, either on the ground that they are unknowable, or on 
 the ground that some of them are unthinkable. To render the 
 first objection true in fact, the word ''unknowable" must be 
 taken to denote imperfection, not total absence, of possible 
 knowledge, and in this sense the objection lies against inquiry 
 into any natural agent. The second objection lies only against 
 inquiry into the particular attributes which are unthinkable (as 
 
1 1 8 Appendix. — Attributes of the Deity, 
 
 for example, infinity), and does not always, even in such a case, 
 forbid inquiry into the results which may follow from the 
 existence of these attributes in the First Cause. "We have now 
 to ask — "What useful purpose is served by inquiry into the attri- 
 butes of the First Cause ? Granting that such inquiry is not in 
 itself unphilosophic, have we a sufficient reason for making it ? 
 To this it may, I think, fairly be replied, that the words ''First 
 Cause" are a sufficient answer to the question. "When we have 
 admitted that everything in l^ature, ourselves and our own 
 powers included, is ultimately due to the working of One Great 
 Agent, we have surely admitted enough to invest that agent, 
 whatever it may be, with the deepest interest for us. 
 
 Has the operation of the First Cause ceased with the establish- 
 ment of a number of secondary causes, or does its activity still 
 continue? That is our first question. If we have reason to 
 think that the First Cause is still active, the next question pre- 
 sents itself irresistibly — How does it work ? "What do we learn 
 from the nature of these effects, which we have agreed to ascribe 
 to it ? If all the secondary causes which are at work around us be 
 due to the working of One First Cause, does the nature of these 
 secondary causes teach us to look upon their Great Original as 
 a physical force, or as an intelligent being ? If the latter sup- 
 position appear to be the more probable, what analogy would 
 seem to exist between Him and other intelligent beings of whom 
 we have experience ? Some analogy we must have already ob- 
 served. Some perceived analogy it must have been which led 
 us to identify the First Cause with an intelligent being. But 
 how far do such analogies extend ? How far is it true that the 
 actions of the First Cause, which we have thus personified, are 
 prompted by motives similar to those which govern the actions 
 of men ? Is He benevolent, merciful, just ? In a word — what 
 are His attributes? And — not less important — has man any 
 power of modifying His actions ? 
 
Attributes of the Deity, 119 
 
 All these questions are suggested so irresistibly by the recog- 
 nition of a First Cause, and follow each other so naturally, that 
 it seems difficult to understand how the human mind can forego 
 the attempt to find some answer to each of them. It is an attempt 
 which may wholly fail, and which can give us at best but im- 
 perfect information; but I cannot think it just to condemn as 
 unpMlosophic or unimportant an inquiry which has for its 
 object the properties, or (to use the theological phrase) the 
 *' attributes" of the First Cause of all things. 
 
 It remains to consider, how the religious sentiment would be 
 affected by a renunciation of all attempt to inquire into the 
 nature of the First Cause. Suppose it to be admitted that the 
 First Cause is, in its nature, wholly unknowable by us; suppose, 
 for example, that we had formed no opinion upon the question, 
 whether this Cause be an intelligent being or a physical force ; 
 what kind of religious sentiment could the mind entertain with 
 such a conception, or rather absence of conception, of the object 
 to which religious sentiment is directed ? Not that, certainly, 
 to which Theists, in the ordinary sense of that word, give the 
 name. The religious sentiment, as Theists usually understand 
 the expression, is a mixed feeling, whose constituent parts are 
 awe and love. The second of these emotions can be evoked 
 only by a person, not by a force or aggregate of forces. If, 
 then, we exclude the element of personality from our con- 
 ception of the First Cause, we necessarily deprive the religious 
 sentiment of the element of love. Even if the element of person- 
 ality were not excluded, the religious sentiment would still be 
 devoid of the element of love, unless man had formed some 
 conception of the moral attributes of the First Cause. The 
 religious sentiment being thus deprived of the element of love, 
 what would remain ? What sentiment would be excited in the 
 human mind by the conviction that, above and beyond all that 
 we see, there exists a tremendous Power, the ultimate cause of 
 
I20 Appendix, — Attributes of the Deity. 
 
 all phenomena, but in its own nature unknown and unknow- 
 able ; an inscrutable mystery which we must not even seek to 
 penetrate ? Doubtless there is such a sentiment. A mysterious 
 Power, of which we know nothing but some terrible effect, does 
 awaken in our hearts a very deep and real feeling, simply be- 
 cause it 18 mysterious. "When an epidemic sweeps over a vil- 
 lage and destroys half of its inhabitants, the feeling which such 
 a calamity awakens is all the more intense, when we can point 
 to no physical cause which might seem to have marked for 
 destruction that village above all others ; and the intensity of 
 the feeling is lessened when we have discovered such a cause. 
 *'The pestilence that walkethin darkness" loses half its terrors, 
 when its path has been revealed to the eye of medical science. 
 
 But while we may not doubt the reality and depth of the 
 sentiment excited in our minds by a pestilence or any other 
 mysterious agent of destruction, we may fairly question the 
 propriety of calling it a religious sentiment. It is simply that 
 undefined feeling of awe with which we contemplate the union 
 of the Unknown and the Terrible. If we give to this feeling 
 the name *' religious," we are certainly using that word in a 
 sense altogether different from its ordinary sense. It will be 
 suiB&cient to indicate one essential difference. The religious 
 sentiment, as we usually understand the expression, is dis- 
 tinctly moral. It is not a mere passive impression, but has a 
 powerful influence upon man's life and actions. But the inde- 
 finite feeling of awe, which is produced by the contemplation of 
 vast results of an unknown cause, has not this character. Only 
 so far as the cause is known is any practical effect produced by 
 its contemplation ; and just in proportion as the effect becomes 
 practical does the undefined awe of which I have spoken pass 
 away. When it is said, therefore, that the religious sentiment 
 would be exalted by substituting, as the object of man's con- 
 templation, the idea of an unknown and unknowable cause 
 
Attributes of the Deity. 121 
 
 for the Theist's conception of God, it may be fairly replied that 
 the religious sentiment, as Theists understand the expression, 
 is, not exalted, but wholly taken away, another and quite dif- 
 ferent feeling being substituted for it. Whether this latter be 
 the more exalted feeling, is a question which I do not propose 
 to discuss. But it could not, surely, in any proper sense of the 
 words, be said to take the place of the religious sentiment as 
 Theists understand it. It could not fulfil the purposes which 
 the religious sentiment may and does fulfil. Love of God — the 
 religious sentiment of the Theist — is a feeling eminently prac- 
 tical. He who regards with a mingled feeling of affection and 
 awe a Being whom he believes to love virtue and to abhor vice 
 will find in that religious sentiment a powerful incentive to the 
 one and a powerful deterrent from the other. But no man will 
 live a purer or a nobler life, because he believes in the existence 
 of an inscrutable Cause, of whose nature he has not formed any 
 conception, not even attempting to decide the question, whether 
 this Great Cause is to be regarded as an impersonal force, or as 
 a sentient being. 
 
 On the whole, then, I do not think that we are justified in 
 regarding the First Cause as absolutely unknowable, nor that, if 
 such a conclusion were justified, the religious sentiment would 
 be changed for the better. If these conclusions be true, we have 
 no right to condemn, as unphilosophic or useless, the theologian's 
 attempt to inquire into the attributes of God. I may remark 
 that no inquiry which man can make could deprive his Theis- 
 tic sentiments of that element of awe which is excited by the 
 presence of the unknown. That which we know of God must 
 always bear so small a proportion to that which we do not 
 know,, that this element can never be obliterated. 
 
122 Appe7idix, 
 
 IToTE D, Page 15. , 
 
 ULTIMATE CEITERION" OF TRUTH. 
 
 The criterion of Truth has been the subject of a protracted 
 controversy between Mr. Mill and Mr. Herbert Spencer. I do 
 not purpose to enter upon this controversy, which will be found 
 in Mill's System of Logic, Book ii., chap. 7 ; and in Spencer's 
 Frinciples of Psychology, vol. ii., part vii., chap. 11. 
 
 The criterion as I have stated it, following Mr. Gold win 
 Smith, nearly agrees with the conclusions of Mr. Spencer, with, 
 however, a certain difference which I shall point out further 
 on. Por the present I wish to consider the question itself — 
 What is the criterion of truth? Before we can answer this 
 question, we must coTJsider what meaning we attach to the 
 words ''criterion of truth." Now, it is plain that we have,, 
 and can have, no means of distinguishing between that which i& 
 true, and that which we helieve to be true, unless the word 
 "believe" be understood to include in its signification a certain 
 amount of doubt. We do indeed frequently use a form o£ 
 words which appears to convey some such distinction. ■ We 
 say that we lelieve a statement to be true, but that we do not 
 know it to be true. In this case, however, it is plain that the 
 mental attitude, which we denote by the word "believe," is not 
 free from doubt. Sometimes, too, the word "know" is applied 
 to conviction produced by a particular kind of evidence, namely, 
 personal observation. But if these special meanings be set 
 aside, that which we helieve to be true, that which we know to 
 be true, and that which is true, are for us one and the same 
 thing. To believe a statement to be true and to know it to be 
 true are, if doubt be excluded, only different forms of expression 
 for the same mental phenomenon ; and that which we know or 
 believe to be true is wholly undistinguishable by us from that 
 
Ulti7nate Critermi of Truth, 123 
 
 which is true. The power of commanding undouhting helief 
 forms the essential difference of a class of statements which we 
 have no means of distinguishing from truth. Belief is a men- 
 tal phenomenon which, by an irresistible necessity of our na- 
 ture, we are obliged to refer to an external cause, namely, 
 objective truth. Only by the presence of the internal pheno- 
 menon do we know the existence of the external cause, and 
 whenever the internal phenomenon exists, we are compelled to 
 infer the existence of the external cause. In this sense, there- 
 fore, undouhting belief is a criterion of truth. In fact, belief in- 
 cludes the reference of the internal phenomenon to the external 
 cause. 
 
 It may be said that this reference is frequently erroneous, and 
 that the internal phenomenon often results from a cause dif- 
 ferent from the supposed external cause. This is certainly 
 true; but the legitimate inference from this want of constant 
 correspondence is simply, that man has no unerring rule for the 
 attainment of truth. Objective truth is a cause which we can 
 know only by its effect on our own minds. If that effect be 
 belief, we recognise the existence of this particular cause, for 
 belief implies this recognition. If the effect which we call be- 
 lief be not produced, the cause, objective truth, whether present 
 or not, is for us as though it did not exist. The cause, truth, 
 does not always produce the effect, belief ; and the effect, belief, 
 is frequently produced by causes different from truth ; but it is 
 certain that the cause can be known to us only by the effect ; 
 and the fact, that the connexion between these two is not in- 
 variable, is only another statement of the fact, that man has no 
 unerring means of arriving at objective truth. There is for us 
 no other truth than that which commands our undoulting helief. 
 
 Admitting, however, that undoubting belief is, in this sense^ 
 our only possible criterion of truth, we may still inquire. Is 
 there no distinction among the propositions to which we award 
 
124 Appendix, — Ultimate Criterion of Truth, 
 
 this undoubting belief ? Can we not recognise, in some of these 
 propositions, a claim to the title of objective truth higher than 
 that possessed by others ? And if we can, may we not give the 
 name ''criterion of truth" to the distinction, whatever it be, 
 which marks out this class from the rest? In reply to this 
 question we may say, in the first place, that all propositions 
 which command our undoubting belief are to each one of us, 
 considered in their relation to objective truth, perfectly equal. 
 Undoubting belief is but another name for certainty, and cer- 
 tainty does not admit of degrees. We can, then, distinguish 
 among propositions which command our undoubting belief, only 
 by introducing an element of doubt into the feeling with which 
 we regard some of them, and thus removing these beliefs from 
 the category in which they had previously stood. 
 
 This process of verifying or modifying our beliefs varies with 
 the nature of the propositions to which it is applied. If these 
 propositions be derived from other propositions previously ad- 
 mitted, we re-examine the process of derivation, and perhaps 
 also the original propositions themselves. But our present con- 
 cern is not with derived but with ultimate propositions. It is 
 plain, as has been often remarked, that the process of derivation 
 cannot go on indefinitely. The series, as we trace it back, 
 must have a beginning. There must be propositions which 
 command our belief by a power, not depending on any other 
 propositions, but inherent in themselves. It is with such ulti- 
 mate propositions that we are now concerned ; and the question 
 which we have to consider is this — Can we make any distinction 
 among the propositions which command our undoubting belief 
 without the intervention of any other propositions ? Have we 
 any means of verifying or modifying a belief which does not de- 
 pend upon proof, but on the nature of the thing believed ? 
 
 This, as we have seen, can only be done by introducing 
 doubt into the feeling with which we regard some of these 
 
Ultimate Criterion of Truth, 125 
 
 propositions. ]S"ow in every case, in which belief is really 
 a necessity of our nature, doubt is impossible. We must, there- 
 fore, endeavour to determine, whether the belief which we 
 accord to each of these propositions be of this kind, or whether 
 it be due to some other cause which more careful reflection 
 might remove. Por this problem we have, as I have said in 
 the text, no general solution. But we do very largely exclude 
 one kind of delusive belief, by adopting as our criterion of truth, 
 not simply belief in the proposition itself, but the impossibility 
 of believing the contrary. The application of this criterion ex- 
 cludes, as I have before said, that kind of indolent assent which 
 we sometimes give almost without thought. Ask a man whether 
 he believes a certain proposition, and if the proposition be fami- 
 liar to him, and have been accepted by those around him, he 
 will probably reply without hesitation, and with no appearance 
 of doubt, that he does believe it. But it is quite possible that 
 his belief, or that which he takes for belief, may amount to no 
 more than this — that it has never occurred to him to doubt it. 
 The affirmative has been suggested to him, but not the nega- 
 tive ; and the unreality of the belief is at once shown by its 
 disappearance when the negative is suggested. But ask him 
 whether it be impossiUe to dislelieve the proposition, and the 
 question itself suggests the negative. The question suggests 
 also, or rather demands, a mental effort, before it can be truth- 
 fully answered, and thus guards him, though not indeed per- 
 fectly, against that indolent acquiescence which is at once so 
 common and so entirely valueless. It is for this reason that 
 impossibility of disbelief is to be preferred, as a criterion of 
 truth, to undoubting belief. 
 
 It may, perhaps, be objected that if the criterion of truth be 
 undoubting belief, or something equivalent to undoubting be- 
 lief, this equivalent should be rather impossibility of wwbelief 
 than impossibility of disholiQi. Impossibility of unbelief does 
 
126 Appendix. — Ultimate Criterio7i of Truth, 
 
 no doubt imply impossibility of disbelief, but it may be con- 
 tended that impossibility of disbelief does not necessarily imply 
 impossibility of unbelief. But, although it is certainly true 
 that unbelief does not imply disbelief, we may, I think, in the 
 present case, use them indifferently. Impossibility of disbelief 
 must imply either impossibility of unbelief or impossibility of 
 arriving at any conclusion — absolute scepticism, in fact. But 
 this is a state of mind with which we have here no concern. 
 "We are now considering only those propositions which the mind 
 helieves, for the purpose of determining whether any distinction 
 can be made among them. "We have therefore no concern with 
 propositions as to which the mind is sceptical. 
 
 There is an ambiguity in the expression, impossibility of dis- 
 belief, which it may be well to notice, although, as I shall 
 show, it does not strictly concern us here. When we say that 
 it is impossible to disbelieve a proposition, we may mean either 
 that the proposition is of such a kind that we cannot conceive 
 the production of any evidence which would induce us to disbe- 
 lieve it ; or, we may mean that disbelief is impossible in the pre- 
 sent state of the evidence as known to us. Impossibility of 
 disbelief, in the first sense, is the best criterion of truth which 
 we can have. Impossibility of disbelief, in the second sense, is 
 not a criterion of truth, unless we are sure that we know all 
 the evidence. If we only know part, impossibility of disbelief 
 ought to be accepted by us not as a criterion of that which 
 is certainly true, but only of that which is probably true, the 
 degree of probability depending upon the completeness of our 
 knowledge of the evidence. In the present case, where we are 
 concerned, not with derived but with ultimate propositions, for 
 which there is no evidence, there is no ambiguity in the expres- 
 sion, ''impossibility of disbelief." It denotes simply, that the 
 constitution of man's mind •and the nature of the proposition 
 are such, that he finds disbelief to be impossible. 
 
Ultimate Criterion of Truth. 127 
 
 Before proceeding further, I wish to make some remarks on 
 tlie criterion of truth as defined by Mr. Spencer, which differs 
 in some respects from that which I have here stated. Mr. 
 Spencer^ insists strongly on the difference between incredibi- 
 lity and inconceivability. The ultimate criterion of tlie truth 
 of a proposition is, he thinks, not that the contradictory of the 
 proposition is simply incredible^ but that it is inconceivable. 
 
 It is necessary then to inquire — What is the difference be- 
 tween the ideas expressed by these words respectively ? What 
 is the difference between the assertion that a statement is in- 
 conceivable, and the assertion that it is incredible ? And, in the 
 first place — What do we mean by this latter assertion ? More, 
 certainly, than simple disbelief. We disbelieve many state- 
 ments which we should not call incredible. Eut we call a state- 
 ment incredible when we feel that it is beyond the reach of any 
 possible evidence to convince us of its truth, l^ow, this incre- 
 dibility may arise, either from the nature of the proposition 
 itself, or from the evidence which we already possess on the 
 subject. Thus the statement that two right lines inclose a 
 space is incredible, and the statement that the Mle flows into 
 the Eed Sea is incredible; but the incredibility of the one 
 statement is of a different kind from that of the other. In the 
 former case the nature of the ideas compared, namely, the idea 
 of two right lines and the idea of space-inclosing power, is 
 such that they cannot, by any mental effort, be brought into 
 that relation which we call agreement. In the second case, the 
 incredibility of the statement does not arise from the nature of 
 the ideas compared. Considered in themselves, these ideas can 
 be brought together without difficulty in the relation of agree- 
 ment. The statement is incredible because we cannot admit its 
 truth without rejecting as untrue an enormous mass of evidence 
 
 1 Frinciples of Psychology, vol. u., p. 408. 
 
128 Appendix. — Ulthnate Criterio7i of Truth, 
 
 "by whicli it is shown that the Nile flows into the Mediter- 
 ranean. 
 
 These two statements appear to exemplify the only logical 
 distinction between a proposition which is inconceivable and a 
 proposition which is simply incredible. In an inconceivable pro- 
 position the ideas compared are so completely repugnant, that 
 no mental effort can bring them into the same mental picture. 
 In a proposition which is simply incredible without being in- 
 conceivable, it does indeed appear to us impossible to bring 
 the ideas into agreement; but the impossibility results, not 
 from the repugnancy of the ideas themselves, but from the 
 existence of evidence which the acceptance of the proposition 
 would compel us to reject, although it appears to us so per- 
 fectly convincing that we cannot refuse to believe it. In such 
 a proposition it is not impossible to bring the ideas into the 
 same mental picture. 
 
 It must be remarked, however, that this is not an ulti- 
 mate proposition. So far we have only succeeded in resolving 
 one incredibility into another. The statement that the Nile 
 flows into the Eed Sea is incredible, not in itself, but because 
 it is incredible that so many witnesses who have declared 
 that the Nile flows into the Mediterranean, uncontradicted by 
 even a single witness asserting that it flows into the Eed 
 Sea, should have spoken falsely. But why is this supposi- 
 tion incredible? Because, some writers would say, we have 
 found by experience that, when a large number of witnesses 
 testify of their own knowledge to the truth of an asserted fact, 
 the asserted fact is true. This statement may have one of two 
 meanings. It may be meant that experience ouglit to be the 
 foundation of our belief in testimony, and that any belief not so 
 founded is unphilosophic ; or it may be meant that experience 
 actually ^s the foundation of this belief. Taken in the latter 
 sense, the statement is, I think, inconsistent with fact. Belief 
 
Ultimate Criterion of Truth, 129 
 
 in testimony is antecedent to any such general induction as is 
 here spoken of. As a matter of fact, we learn from experience 
 rather distrust than confidence in testimony. Children do not 
 begin with scepticism, advancing gradually to belief. The pro- 
 gress is quite in the opposite direction. But assuming the 
 statement to be intended in the first sense of the words, and 
 conceding that conformity to experience is the only philosophi- 
 cal foundation for belief in testimony — a proposition which is 
 certainly not self-evident— the question still remains — Why is 
 a statement incredible because it is not conformable to expe- 
 rience ? Thus, in the present example, concurrent and uncon- 
 tradicted testimony has been found to be trustworthy in a 
 thousand cases. Why is it incredible that it should be decep- 
 tive in the thousand and first case ? 
 
 To take this instance in its strongest form. A thousand 
 witnesses have testified to the truth of each of a thousand 
 facts of the same nature — geographical facts, for example. We 
 have found that in every one of these cases the testimony of 
 the witnesses was true. If the same witnesses testify to the 
 truth of another geographical fact, not possessing any inherent 
 improbability, and not contradicted by any witness, why do we 
 reject as incredible the supposition that their united testimony 
 may, in this instance, be false ? 
 
 I do not think that we can push the analysis further back. 
 We cannot, as in the former case, resolve the incredibility of 
 the supposition into that of another supposition which is im- 
 plied by the first. If this be so, it does not seem possible to 
 give to the question just stated any answer but the follow- 
 ing : — Human nature is so constituted, that a break in unifor- 
 mity so complete as that which is implied in the supposition of 
 the falsity of the witnesses is, to it, incredible. We have seen 
 two phenomena, the statement of the witnesses, and the truth 
 of the fact stated, associated a thousand times. We have never 
 
 K 
 
130 Appendix — Ultimate Criterion of Truth, 
 
 known an instance of the occurrence of the first without the 
 presence of the other. Then, hy a necessity of our nature, of 
 which, so far as I can see, we can give no account but that it is 
 a necessity of our nature, we have come to regard the connexion 
 as indissoluble, and from the known reality of the one pheno- 
 menon to infer with certainty the reality of the other. We reject, 
 then, as incredible, the supposition that the connexion has been, 
 in a certain case, actually dissolved. Some might be disposed to 
 deduce the same conclusion as a case of the general principle 
 that ''like causes produce like effects." Observation of a phe- 
 nomenon has, in a thousand cases, caused the witnesses to give 
 a true report. We believe then, that, in the thousand and first 
 case, a like cause, namely, observation of a similar phenomenon, 
 has produced a like effect, namely, a true report ; and we reject 
 as incredible the supposition that the effect has been wholly 
 different. Eut we shall see reason to doubt that this is an 
 ultimate principle. 
 
 We have now to inquire whether the supposition of the 
 falsity of the witnesses be inconceivable as well as incredible. 
 If by inconceivable be meant that of which the mind can form 
 no picture, the falsity of the witnesses is certainly not incon- 
 ceivable. There is no difficulty in drawing a mental picture of 
 a habitually truthful man, or any number of habitually truth- 
 ful men, speaking falsely on some one occasion — even joining in 
 the same falsehood. The picture has not, indeed, any corre- 
 sponding reality, and we know that it has none. Eut the same 
 may be said of many other mental pictures. They have no cor- 
 responding reality. It is impossible to believe that they have a 
 corresponding reality ; but it is not impossible to di-aw the 
 picture. It is not impossible to draw a mental picture of a red 
 hot bar of iron standing in a barrel of gunpowder without an 
 explosion, although it is impossible to believe that such a thing 
 could be. In a word, it is incredible^ but it is not inconceivable. 
 
Ulthnate Criterion of Truth. 131 
 
 But it is impossible to draw a mental picture of two right lines 
 inclosing a space. The attempt to construct such a picture 
 would show that the elements which it is attempted to combine 
 are essentially discordant, and that no mental effort could suc- 
 ceed in bringing them together in the same picture. That two 
 right lines should inclose a space is, therefore, more than incre- 
 dible — it is also inconceivable. 
 
 If this be the true distinction between things inconceivable 
 and things simply incredible, we can see why we ought to as- 
 sume, as the ultimate criterion of truth, not the inconceivability 
 of the opposite, but its incredibility. If the list of ultimate 
 truths included those only of which the opposite is incon- 
 ceivable in this sense of the word, we have already seen that 
 we should lose one of the most important principles which 
 we possess, namely, the principle of uniformity. With the 
 principle of uniformity we should also lose another not less 
 important, namely, the principle which may be called the 
 foundation of all the scientific knowledge which we derive 
 from experience — the principle by which an isolated fact is 
 converted into a general truth — the principle, namely, that 
 'Uike causes produce like effects." 
 
 It may perhaps be contended that the production of dif- 
 ferent effects by the same cause is in itself inconceivable. I 
 do not think that this is true ; but, even if it were, it would 
 be of no importance to our present purpose. From the prin- 
 ciple thus stated we can derive nothing. Every one of the 
 collections of conditions which we call physical causes is 
 unique, l^o two are identical. The element of time or of place 
 varies, even if there be no other change ; and the principle, as 
 we really use it, is, that if the other conditions continue un- 
 altered, a change in the element of time or of place causes no 
 change in the result. 
 
 l^ow we can hardly say that the contradictory of this propo- 
 k2 
 
132 Appendix — Ultimate Criterion of Truth, 
 
 sition is inconceivable. Indeed, prior to experience, it is not^ 
 in the strict sense of the word, incredible. There does not 
 seem to be any absurdity in the supposition that the course of 
 nature might have been such, that the relation between cause 
 (in the ordinary meaning of the word) and effect might be, not 
 fixed, but variable with the time. Or, to speak more accu- 
 rately, a cosmical arrangement according to which the element 
 of time should form an essential part of the system of ante- 
 cedents which we call the cause is not inconceivable. It is not 
 impossible to draw a mental picture of a world in which such 
 an arrangement is the law of nature. If then the inconceiva- 
 bility of the contradictory be the test of an ultimate truth, 
 the proposition (or axiom) which is the base of all physical 
 science is not an ultimate truth. Why then should it be re- 
 garded as a truth at all? It may be said that we learn by 
 experience that the elements of time and place do not influence 
 the relation between cause and effect. But this is not true. 
 All that we learn from experience is, that, in a finite number 
 of observed cases, this relation lias remained unchanged. That 
 it has remained unchanged in a number of unobserved cases^ 
 or that it will always so remain, are wholly different proposi- 
 tions, which can be deduced from the observed facts only by the 
 help of the principle stated in p. 129, namely, that a phenomenon 
 which has been observed in a large number of cases will occur 
 in every similar case. This, if it be not the principle of causa- 
 tion itself, is the principle of simple uniformity, of which we 
 have seen that the contradictory is not inconceivable. The 
 criterion adopted by Mr. Spencer, if the word 'inconceivable" 
 be understood in its proper sense, would deprive us of the prin- 
 ciple of uniformity, and, with it, of the principle of causation. 
 
 It is necessary to observe that the sense in which I have used 
 the word "incredible " is, if I rightly apprehend him, different 
 from that which Mr. Spencer assigns to " unbelievable." This 
 
Ultimate Criterion of Truth. 133 
 
 word, as he uses it, seems to denote no more than difficulty of 
 belief, differing sensibly from impossihility . Mr. Spencer says — 
 "An unbelievable proposition is one which admits of being- 
 framed in thought, but is so much at variance with experience, 
 in which its terms have habitually been otherwise united, that 
 its terms cannot be put in the alleged relation without effort. 
 Thus it is unbelievable that a cannon-ball fired in England 
 should reach America ; but it is not inconceivable." ^ 
 
 I readily admit that we do not pronounce a proposition to be 
 certainly true when its opposite is ''unbelievable" in the sense 
 in which Mr. Spencer here uses the word. But it seems doubt- 
 ful whether this use of the word be admissible. If the mind 
 can by any effort bring together the subject and predicate of a 
 proposition, in the connexion which the proposition assigns to 
 them, we should hardly call the proposition wwbelievable. It is 
 difficult of belief, in a degree proportional to the mental effort 
 by which the subject and predicate are brought together, but it 
 is not absolutely "unbelievable." Thus, we may inquire — to 
 take the example which Mr. Spencer gives — Is it unbelievable 
 that a cannon-ball fired in England should reach America? 
 JS'ow, dynamical science can calculate the velocity of projection 
 necessary to give such a range to a cannon-ball. The question 
 which we have to consider is therefore this — Is it unbelievable 
 that such a velocity of projection should be given to a cannon- 
 ball ? The answer to this question must depend upon the sense 
 in which it is understood. If the question be — Is it unbeliev- 
 able that a ball discharged in England from any cannon hitherto 
 constructed, by any means hitherto employed, should reach 
 America ? the answer must be — Yes, for it involves the supposi- 
 tion that two wholly different effects follow from similar causes. 
 We can calculate the velocity which would be communicated to 
 the cannon-ball by an expansive force, acting during the whole 
 ^Frinciples of Fsychology, vol. ii. p. 408. 
 
134 Appendix. — Ultimate Criterio7i of Truth. 
 
 time of the ball's passage through a space somewhat less than- 
 the length of the cannon, and whose intensity (to take the most 
 favourable case) is maintained throughout at a point just below 
 that of the bursting force. We know that the velocity so com- 
 municated, in the longest and strongest cannon which was ever 
 cast, would be insufficient to carry the ball through the required 
 distance. Taken in this sense, the proposition is unbelievable. 
 Eut if the proposition be, that a cannon might be cast and an 
 explosive substance employed, which would communicate to the 
 ball the required velocity, such a proposition would certainly 
 not be unbelievable — although, for reasons upon which it is un- 
 necessary to enter, it would be very difficult of belief. In com- 
 mon language, we could not pronounce such a phenomenon to be 
 impossihle, but only highly improlalle. If the signification of 
 the word ^'unbelievable," as Mr. Spencer uses it, be truly indi- 
 cated by the proposition which he has given, understood in this 
 latter sense, it may readily be admitted that we ought not to 
 receive a proposition as certainly true, because its opposite is 
 unbelievable. Eut this use of the word '^ unbelievable" seem& 
 hardly consistent with its etymology. 
 
 There is still another objection to the acceptance of inconceiv^ 
 ability as the criterion of truth. We may fairly ask — Is every 
 inconceivable proposition also incredible ? If we find ourselves 
 unable to bring together in the same mental picture the ideas 
 which are denoted by the terms of the proposition, do we there- 
 fore assume that agreement between them is impossible? Thus, 
 for example, a merciful man may be wholly unable to picture to 
 himself a human mind delighting in the contemplation of human 
 suffering, regarded merely as suffering, and with no feeling of 
 hostility to the sufferer. Ought he to consider this combination 
 impossible? Plainly not; for there is historical evidence amply 
 sufficient to convince him that the combination has frequently 
 existed. 
 
Ultimate O/iterion of Truth, 135 
 
 ''There have been human minds so constituted as to take 
 pleasure in witnessing the suffering of a fellow-creature'* 
 Here we have a proposition which is, to a certain class of minds, 
 inconceivable, but not incredible. In such a case, therefore, in- 
 conceivability, regarded as a criterion of truth, fails, and would 
 be rejected even by the mind which had found itself unable to 
 form the conception. 
 
 This instance indicates a class of cases in which inconceivabi- 
 lity is necessarily an erroneous criterion of truth. The inability, 
 felt by some minds, to conceive as true the proposition stated 
 above, results from the inability of such minds to form a suf- 
 ficiently general conception of that which is expressed by the 
 term ''mind." This is a concrete term denoting the aggre- 
 gate of certain powers and qualities ; and this aggregate is not 
 conceived by all persons alike. The conception which each 
 man forms of the human mind is derived, not wholly, but very 
 largely, from observation of his own mind. Thus formed, the 
 conception will naturally include qualities which are prominent 
 in the mind by which it is formed. Some of these qualities 
 may be so closely interwoven into the texture of the individual 
 mind, that it may be wholly unable to conceive a mind from 
 which these qualities are absent. Thus, in the present instance 
 the mind of a humane man may be unable to conceive a mind 
 from which all kindly feelings are banished. When such a 
 man endeavours to bring together in one picture the human 
 mind, as he conceives it, and the quality of taking pleasure in 
 the suffering of another, he cannot help seeing that the ele- 
 ments which he attempts to combine are repugnant. The 
 picture is one which he cannot form. In other words, the pro- 
 position, in which this combination is asserted, is to him incon- 
 ceivable. If therefore the inconceivability of the opposite 
 were a test of, at least, subjective truth, the proposition — No 
 human mind can take pleasure in the suffering of another — 
 
136 Appendix, — Ultimate Criterion of Truth. 
 
 would be, to such a man, certainly true. This, as we know, is 
 not the case. The proposition is certainly false, and would be 
 recognised as false even by the person who was incapable of 
 embodying its contradictory in a mental picture. The incon- 
 ceivability of the contradictory is not therefore in such a case 
 a reliable criterion of subjective truth. 
 
 The same uncertainty may attend the application of this cri- 
 terion in every case in which one of the terms of the proposition 
 is concrete. If, as in the case which has just been considered, 
 inability to conceive the truth of a proposition results from in- 
 ability to form an adequate conception of that which is denoted 
 by the concrete term, the proposition may be perfectly credible 
 and yet inconceivable. We may be convinced by evidence that 
 the conception we have formed is inadequate, and yet be unable 
 to form any other conception. We may, therefore, be con- 
 vinced by evidence that a proposition is true, and yet be unable 
 to conceive it as true. 
 
 It must be remembered that, in such a case as that which 
 has been here discussed, the inconceivability attaches solely to 
 the mental phenomenon, not to the external acts which follow 
 it. There is no difficulty in forming a conception of the exter- 
 nal act of going to witness the torture of a fellow-creature. 
 "We may even conceive — although, to a man such as I have de- 
 scribed, this is more difficult — the appearance of the external 
 signs of pleasure. But it is when we endeavour to '' account 
 for" this phenomenon — when we try to picture to ourselves the 
 state of mind which these signs indicate — that the task becomes 
 to some minds impossible. 
 
 Theology furnishes many examples of such propositions. The 
 Divine attribute of omnipresence is certainly inconceivable, 
 or to use the modern expression, unthinkable. If, then, incon- 
 ceivability were to be regarded as the criterion of falsehood, the 
 proposition, God is omnipresent, should be regarded as false. 
 
Ultimate Criterion of Truth. 137 
 
 ^Q know that by very many it is not so regarded. The propo- 
 sition is inconceivable, but it is not incredible. In fact, it is 
 believed by every one who prays. 
 
 On the whole, I think that we are justified in adopting as the 
 ultimate criterion of truth, not the inconceivability, but the in- 
 credibility of the contradictory. The adoption of the former 
 would deprive us of some undoubted truths, and would admit 
 into the list of truths propositions which would be rejected as 
 untrue even by the individual to whom the contradictory was 
 inconceivable. 
 
 But, even in this form, the criterion of truth requires some 
 •explanatory observations before we can practically use it. Our 
 field of knowledge would be very narrow if it only included 
 propositions whose contradictories are incredible in the strict 
 sense of that word, in which it denotes impossibility of belief. 
 This, however, is not the meaning which is really attached to 
 the word ^'incredible," as commonly used. If we examine 
 carefully the statements to which we give that name, we shall 
 find that it denotes in general no more than a very high degree 
 of improbability. Even where the improbability is so high as 
 not to be distinguishable by the human mind from impossibility, 
 it is still true that the difference between the statements which 
 we call incredible and those which we call simply improbable 
 is very commonly a difference not in kind but in degree. The 
 evidence against both classes of propositions is often quite the 
 same in kind, differing only in amount. Thus, for example, 
 there is often no generic difference between the testimony 
 which is no more than enough to make a proposition slightly 
 improbable, and that which is so multiplied as to make a pro- 
 position incredible. In all propositions which are established or 
 disproved by cumulative evidence, there is no break in the 
 series of probabilities which extends from a probability of truth 
 so great as to be undistinguishable from certainty to a probabi- 
 
138 Appendix, — Ultimate Criterion of Truth, 
 
 lity of falsehood so great as to be undistinguisliable from incre- 
 dibility. 
 
 It is for tbis reason tbat I have taken as the ultimate cri- 
 terion of truth, to us, not impossihility, but difficulty of disbelief. 
 This difficulty is capable of all degrees from a very slight 
 difficulty, indicating a very slight probability, up to a difficulty 
 so great as not to be distinguishable from impossibility, indi- 
 cating a probability so high as not to be distinguishable from 
 certainty. The greater part of those propositions which we 
 call certain are not separated by any generic distinction from 
 propositions which are only highly probable. Indeed, if we 
 take into account the fallibility of the human intellect, it may 
 reasonably be doubted whether even demonstration can give us 
 more than a very high probability. If this be not so, it seems 
 difficult to account for mathematical controversy — an undoubted 
 fact in the history of science. 
 
 Are there any ultimate propositions which belong to the cate- 
 gory of probable truths ? Only one, I think ; but that one is 
 the foundation of every general truth concerning real tilings 
 which we possess ; it is the principle of incomplete uniformity. 
 And uniformity always is incomplete ; if it were not so, it 
 could give us no new truth. We believe a certain thing to be 
 true in a number of unobserved cases, because (to take the most 
 favourable supposition) in all observed cases it has been found to 
 be true. This statement of the principle shows that the uni- 
 formity is necessarily incomplete. For if it were complete, 
 there could be no unobserved case. We can say no more than 
 this — that the uniformity exists in all the cases which have 
 come under our observation ; and, by proposing to apply the 
 principle to an unobserved case, we admit that all cases have 
 not come under our observation. 
 
 l^ow, the assurance which we derive from such a uniformity 
 is essentially progressive, and, as such, can never differ, in kind. 
 
Ultimate Critejdon of Truth, 139 
 
 from probability. The observed uniformity may be so wide — 
 the number of observed cases may be so great — that the assur- 
 ance which we obtain from the principle cannot be practically 
 distinguished from certainty, but in its essence it is no more 
 than a high probability. Thus, for example, if a person, of 
 whom we only know that he had made one true statement, 
 should make a second statement, not possessing any inherent 
 improbability, we should in all likelihood believe him. But the 
 belief would not be strong. A very slight amount of opposing 
 evidence would be sufficient to change it into disbelief. If 
 then we were asked — Do you believe that to be true which the 
 witness asserts? we should probably reply in the affirmative. 
 But if we were asked — "Would you find it impossible to disbe- 
 lieve it? we should reply, Ko, nor even very difficult. This 
 difficulty, very small at first, increases with every fresh in- 
 stance of truthfulness of the witness, until after the occur- 
 rence of a very large number of such instances, extending over 
 a long period, and uninterrupted by a single instance of untruth- 
 fulness, the difficulty becomes so great as to be practically un- 
 distinguishable from impossibility. But the gradual process by 
 which this mental attitude has been reached shows that, in kindy 
 it is but difficulty still. Difficulty, therefore, not impossihility of 
 disbelief, is the criterion of truth as applied to the principle of 
 uniformity. 
 
 To avoid this conclusion some might be disposed to fall back 
 on the idea of causation, and to consider the proposition — '' Like- 
 causes produce like effects" — to be an ultimate principle. I have 
 before given some reasons for refusing to it this title. But, waiv- 
 ing this point, it may readily be shown that the principle in ques- 
 tion is, as applied to real phenomena, no more than probable. 
 Even if it were admitted to be certain that two systems of ante- 
 cedents differing only in the elements of time or place — and this. 
 is the nearest approach to identity which any two systems of an- 
 
140 Appendix, — Ultimate Criterion of Truth, 
 
 tecedents can present — will have consequents identical in the 
 same sense, we know that even this approximation to identity is 
 not presented by any combination of real phenomena. Even 
 in the case of an experiment, where the utmost care is taken to 
 secure an exact reproduction of certain conditions, we know that 
 «uch a reproduction is practically impossible. However carefully 
 the experiment be conducted, absolute identity with the pattern 
 is not to be looked for. Some variation in the antecedent, and, 
 corresponding to this, some variation in the consequent, cannot 
 be avoided ; and the principle which we use in predicting the 
 result of an experiment is really this — that, if we reproduce 
 approximately the prescribed conditions, we shall produce ap- 
 proximately the expected result. This principle is so far from 
 being absolutely certain, that it is known not to be universally 
 true. In general, no doubt, experience teaches us that a small 
 difference of antecedent produces no more than a small differ- 
 ence of consequent. Eut experience teaches us also that there 
 are cases in which an inappreciably small difference of ante- 
 cedent will produce an enormous difference of consequent. The 
 difference between the temperature which leaves a mass of 
 gunpowder apparently unchanged, and that which causes it to 
 explode and spread destruction round it may be but an infini- 
 tesimal fraction of a degree. The former case is indeed very 
 much more common, and we may therefore anticipate with a 
 high degree of probability that effects nearly identical will 
 follow from causes nearly identical. But to this principle 
 there are real exceptions, which, prior to experience, we have 
 no general method of determining. The principle that '■'■ Like " 
 (as distinguished from identical) ''causes produce like effects" 
 possesses, therefore, no more than a high probability. 
 
 On the whole, then, I think it appears that the basis of all 
 general physical knowledge is a principle which is no more than 
 probable. Belief in the contradictory of this principle is not 
 
Right of the Moral Faculty^ &c. 141 
 
 impossible, but only very difficult. Difficulty of disbelief is 
 therefore, in this case, to us, the ultimate criterion of truth. 
 
 I^OTE E, Page 17. 
 
 EIGHT OF THE MOEAL FACTJLTY TO JUDGE OF THE DrVINE ATTEIEUTES. 
 
 1^0 questions in ISTatural Theology have, in the present day, 
 attracted more attention or elicited greater diversities of opinion 
 than those which concern the right of man's moral sense to 
 judge of the morality of actions or purposes attributed to God. 
 Some have maintained that the right does not exist. Man, they 
 say, when he attempts to form such a judgment, undertakes a 
 work to which his powers are wholly unequal. The moral 
 sense was given him to guide his own actions, not to judge of 
 the actions of his Creator. In the pride of his heart he may 
 indeed assume to himself such an office, but the task is too 
 great for him. He has entered upon a path which will lead 
 him, not to truth, but to ruinous error. 
 
 Even writers, who would refuse to pronounce so extreme a 
 sentence, seem to discourage this kind of inquiry. Thus 
 Mansel : — ''The primary and proper employment of man's 
 moral sense, as of his other faculties, is not speculative, but 
 regulative. It is not designed to tell us what are the absolute 
 and immutable principles of Eight, as existing in the eternal 
 nature of God ; but to discern those relative and temporary 
 manifestations of them, which are necessary for human train- 
 ing in this present life The primary and direct 
 
 inquiry which human reason is entitled to make concerning a 
 professed revelation is, how far does it tend to promote or to 
 hinder the moral discipline of man. It is but a secondary and 
 
142 Appendix, — Right of the Moral Faculty 
 
 indirect question, and one very liable to mislead, to ask how far 
 it is compatible with the Infinite Goodness of God." — Limits of 
 Religious Thought, pp. 157-8. 
 
 On the other hand the author (F. W. ITewman), from whom 
 Mansel quotes, and against whom the foregoing passage is 
 'directed, would give to the moral sense the absolute right of 
 deciding on this compatibility. 
 
 "The human mind is competent to sit in moral and spiritual 
 judgment on a professed revelation, and to decide, if the case 
 seem to require it, in the following tone : — This doctrine attri- 
 butes to God that which we should call harsh, cruel, or unjust 
 in man: it is, therefore, essentially inadmissible." — E. W. 
 IS'ewman, The Soul, p. 58. 
 
 ''"With respect to the moral treatment of His creatures by 
 Almighty God, all men, in different degrees, are able to be 
 judges of the representations made of it, by reason of the 
 moral sense which He has given them." — H. B. "Wilson in 
 Assays and Reviews, p. 153. 
 
 In reply to the first class of opinions, it may fairly be asked — 
 By what authority do we deny to the moral sense, or any other 
 human faculty, the right to judge of any question which comes 
 before it ? Frimd facie each faculty has this right, and he who, 
 in any particular case, denies it, is bound to justify the denial. 
 If he cannot do this, the faculty retains its natural right to 
 judge of everything of which it can judge. 
 
 Thus when Mansel denies the right of the moral sense to 
 judge of *Hhe absolute and immutable principles of right, as 
 existing in the eternal nature of God," it is for him to dis^roYQ 
 it, not for the assertor of the right to prove it. He says that 
 the moral sense was not designed to tell us what these prin- 
 ciples are. But how is this negative to be proved ? How are we 
 to ascertain what things the moral sense was not designed to 
 tell us ? There are no doubt certain things which are not 
 
to judge of the Divine Attributes, 143 
 
 within its cognizance. It can give no information on subjects 
 Avliich belong to the province of pure intellect. It takes no 
 note of the relations of geometry. It tells us nothing of the 
 phenomena of matter. But it does take cognizance of a certain 
 quality of voluntary actions, and it professes to extend this 
 cognizance to the voluntary actions of all agents. It knows no 
 limitation to the principles which it has established. They are, 
 for it, the absolute and immutable principles of right, applicable 
 to all cases. The disposition which is ready to make a sacrifice 
 for the welfare of another is, so far, morally good ; the dispo- 
 sition which takes pleasure in the pain of another is, so far, 
 morally bad, in whatever beings these dispositions respectively 
 'Cxist. I cannot see, therefore, that an action has a right to 
 claim exemption from the judgment of the moral sense, because 
 this action is ascribed to God. I have shown in the text that 
 this exemption, if consistently carried out, would leave no logi- 
 cal standing ground to Eevealed Religion. 
 
 Suppose, for example, that it was stated, in a document 
 claiming to be inspired, that God had once given to man an 
 untrue revelation. Suppose that the claim of this document 
 to inspiration was supported by external proofs possessing a 
 certain amount of force. Should we be justified in bringing this 
 supposed revelation under the judgment of the moral faculty, 
 and rejecting it, because that faculty decided that the action 
 attributed to God was immoral ? If this question be answered 
 in the negative, the retort is obvious — Why do you believe the 
 "Word of God at all? If your moral faculty can tell you no 
 more than this, that untruthfulness is immoral in man, how do 
 you know that truthfulness is an attribute of God ? If you do 
 not know that truthfulness is an attribute of God, of what 
 value is Hevelation? 
 
 On the other hand, if the question be answered in the affir- 
 mative — if we do trust our moral sense, when it tells us of the 
 
1 44 Appendix, — Right of the Moral Faculty 
 
 truthfulness of God, the retort is equally obvious — By what 
 right do you single out one Divine attribute from the rest — 
 conceding to the moral faculty the right to judge of that one 
 — denying to the same faculty the right to judge of any of the 
 others ? If the moral faculty may decide that a certain quality, 
 as man understands it, is essential to the perfect nature of God, 
 why is its decision to be limited to a single attribute ? If we 
 concede to our moral faculty the right to reject a doctrine 
 which would represent God as untruthful, why should we deny 
 to it the right to reject a doctrine which would represent Him 
 as unjust, selfish, or cruel? If justice, benevolence, and mercy, 
 as existing in God, are to be understood to denote qualities 
 substantially different from those which we call by the same 
 names, as existing in man, may not the same rule be applicable 
 to truthfulness also ? If this be so, the epithet, God of Truth, 
 becomes, to us, unmeaning, and the foundation of Eevealed 
 Eeligion is taken away. This seems to be the necessary 
 result of a theory which denies to the moral faculty the right 
 to judge of the morality of actions attributed to God. 
 
 *' If God may be (what we should call) cruel, He may equally 
 well be (what we should call) a liar ; and if so, of what use is 
 His word to us?" ^ 
 
 On the other hand, it seems difficult to admit the claim of the 
 moral sense to an absolute supremacy. Thus, for example, let 
 it be supposed that proofs are laid before the intellect sufficient 
 to convince it that a certain doctrine comes from God. Sup- 
 pose also that the moral sense condemns this doctrine as 
 immoral. Are we justified in pronouncing that the decision of 
 the moral sense is necessarily right ? I think not. The moral 
 sense is not infallible — no human faculty is so. Moreover, the 
 decisions of the moral sense are given with very different de- 
 
 « F. W. Newman, The Soul, pp. 58-9. 
 
to Judge of the Divine Attributes. 145 
 
 grees of assurance. In some cases it pronounces with perfect 
 certainty — in others it gives but a hesitating verdict. We 
 have surely no right to declare that a decision of the moral 
 sense, however hesitating, ought to prevail against a decision, 
 of the intellect, however assured. It is therefore possible that 
 the proofs of the Divine origin of a doctrine may be sufficient to 
 outweigh an objection coming from the moral sense, compelling 
 us to adopt the conclusion that in this case the intellect was 
 right and the moral sense wrong. But, as I have said in the 
 text, I believe this to be a rare case. The task imposed on the 
 intellect in deciding such a question is so complex, as com- 
 pared with the simple intuition of the moral sense, that it must 
 necessarily afford more room for the intervention of error. If 
 then the opposition be between a process of reasoning and a 
 simple moral intuition, I think that we are bound to decide in 
 favour of the latter. 
 
 But we must be careful, in the application of this principle, 
 that the evidence to which we thus give the preference is that 
 of a simple intuition. Eor it is quite true that the judgment of 
 the moral sense is often wrong ; not because the intuition itself 
 is wrong, but because the judgment has been pronounced upon 
 an erroneous or imperfect statement of the facts of the case. 
 Por this error the intellect, not the moral sense, is responsible, 
 the statement of facts being the office of the intellect. If 
 then, under such circumstances, we give a preference to the evi- 
 dence afforded by a moral judgment over the evidence afforded 
 by a supposed revelation, we may be in reality preferring, not a 
 moral intuition to an intellectual process, but one intellectual 
 process to another. 
 
 This caution is especially necessary when we attempt ta 
 decide on the morality, not of an abstract quality, but of a 
 concrete action. In this case, a large part of the process is in- 
 tellectual. It is the intellect which must collect and put 
 
 L 
 
146 Appendix. — Right of the Moral Faculty 
 
 together the facts on which, in such a case, the moral judg- 
 ment is founded. Kot unfrequently too, if the ascertained 
 facts be too few to define the action sufficiently for the forma- 
 tion of a moral judgment, the intellect attempts to supply the 
 deficiency by hypothesis. Then the decision of the moral 
 faculty is given, not on the real case, which is but imperfectly 
 known, but on a case which has been artificially completed by 
 the assumption of additional facts or motives. The decision 
 itself is probably right ; but it has been given on an imaginary 
 case, and is therefore worthless; unless indeed, as sometimes 
 happens, the imaginary case is made to assume the character of 
 a doctrine. 
 
 A remarkable instance of a moral decision of this kind is to 
 be found in the history of the Calvinistic controversy. The 
 strongest argument againstt he supra-lapsarian doctrine of re- 
 probation is derived from its repugnancy to man's moral nature. 
 It is contended that this doctrine is condemned by the con- 
 science as immoral, and therefore inconsistent with the attri- 
 butes of God. To this it is sometimes replied^ that the same 
 objection lies against the permission of the existence of evil, 
 where no Theist would admit its validity. But this is not true. 
 The doctrine of reprobation is more than a statement — it is a 
 theory of the existence of evil. It supplements the undoubted 
 facts by the suggestion of a motive. God has permitted the exist- 
 ence of evil ; nay more. He has created evil men, in order that 
 their eternal punishment may augment His own glory. !N"ow, 
 it is plain that the addition of this motive renders the question 
 which is submitted to the moral- faculty much more definite, 
 and thus gives to its judgment much greater weight. In truth, 
 it substitutes a question which the moral faculty is competent 
 to decide for one which is beyond its reach. To decide that 
 
 ^Whately — Difficulties in the Writings of St. Paul, p. 145. 
 
to Judge of the Divine Attributes. 147 
 
 the permission of the existence of evil is inconsistent with the 
 character of a just and merciful God, the moral faculty must be 
 satisfied that no possible motive could justify this permission. 
 To decide that the doctrine of reprobation is inconsistent with 
 the character of a just and merciful God, it is only necessary 
 that the moral faculty should be satisfied that the creation of 
 evil would not be justified by the motive which this doc- 
 trine assigns to Him. The former decision is one which, I 
 conceive, the moral faculty has no right to make : not because it 
 is incapable of forming an idea of justice and mercy as they 
 exist in God, but because the circumstances, the nature of the 
 connexion between the evil which is in the world and the 
 Creator of the world, and the purposes which evil may be in- 
 tended to serve, are so imperfectly known to us, that the moral 
 faculty has not the elements upon which it could properly 
 found a decision. The case presented to it by the intellect is 
 not sufficiently definite. It is quite otherwise with the second 
 decision. The question which is there proposed to the moral 
 faculty, namely — Is it consistent with the character of a just 
 and merciful Being to bring into existence a mass of hopeless 
 misery with a selfish motive ? — is perfectly definite ; and the right 
 of the moral faculty to judge of it cannot be denied without 
 excluding from the cognizance of this faculty all moral quali- 
 ties, as they exist in God. Such an exclusion would leave us 
 without any religion, N'atural or Revealed. 
 
 It is often alleged, in support of the concession of supreme 
 authority to supposed declarations of Scripture, that this con- 
 cession is justified — nay, demanded — by a belief in the inspi- 
 ration of the Bible. He who believes, it is said, that the Bible 
 eomes from God ought to award to Scriptural declarations, as 
 compared with any other evidence, that supremacy which at- 
 taches to the Word of God, as compared with the word of man. 
 In reply to this argument, it may be observed, in the first 
 
 L 2 
 
148 Appendix. — Right of the Moral Faculty 
 
 place, that the process of reasoning by which the inspiration of 
 Scripture is proved is a human process, founded on evidence 
 collected by the human intellect, and weighed by the human 
 intellect. It does not enjoy any exemption from the errors to 
 which every process of human reasoning is liable ; and thi& 
 possibility of error affects every argument derived from Scrip- 
 ture itself. The evidence of Scripture cannot be stronger than 
 the evidence for Scripture. The same possibility of error at- 
 taches to the equally human processes of translation and inter- 
 pretation. Supreme authority cannot, then, be fairly claimed 
 for Scriptural arguments on the ground that the Word of God 
 is infallible. The Word of God is indeed infallible ; but there 
 is no infallibility in the process by which the Bible is proved ta 
 he the "Word of God. And it needs but a slight acquaintance 
 with the works of Biblical commentators to teach us that there 
 is no infallibility in the process by which the meaning of the 
 Bible is ascertained. 
 
 There can be no doubt that theological, or any other, investi- 
 gations would be greatly facilitated by awarding supremacy to 
 one liind of evidence. Such a concession would in fact obviate 
 the necessity of examining any but the favoured kind, unless it 
 should happen to be silent ; and, by thus simplifying our in- 
 quiries, relieve us of the perplexing doubt, which so often fol- 
 lows the investigation of opposing evidence. But, attractive as 
 it is, this simplification can rarely be justified by reason. I^a 
 one hind of evidence is so completely superior to the rest, 
 that it ought, in all cases of conflict, to be preferred. Some 
 writers, as we have seen, accord this supremacy to the moral 
 sense — others to a supposed revelation; but neither ver- 
 dict is consistent with reason. Indeed the very attract- 
 iveness of this simplifying process ought to excite in our 
 minds, if not suspicion, at least caution, in accepting it. 
 Doubt, in questions of practical importance, is so painful 
 
to Judge of the Divine Attributes, 149 
 
 to the human mind, that it is happy to seize upon any method 
 of removing it, often with very insufficient scrutiny of the prin- 
 ciples on which the method rests. Methods of deciding which, 
 had the voice of reason been listened to, would never have been 
 accepted, grew into favour because they promised a decision. 
 It was this which gave their popularity to omens and oracles — 
 to wizards and astrology. It is this which has at least aided in 
 procuring a ready admission of the authority of an infallible 
 ■church or an infallible preacher. Impatience of doubt — unwil- 
 lingness to undergo the labour necessary for its removal by the 
 slow methods of reason — this is a frequent combination of quali- 
 ties ; and a process which ministers to both ought, even for that 
 reason, to be received with grave caution. In the present in- 
 stance I have endeavoured to show that it ought not to be 
 received at all. 
 
 Eefore leaving this subject, I must notice a class of cases 
 called by Mr. Mansel '^ Moral Miracles," in which, if his defini- 
 tion be right, the decision of the unaided moral faculty would be 
 erroneous. As the question is important, I quote his own words : 
 
 ''There is indeed an obvious analogy between these tempo- 
 rary suspensions of the laws of moral obligation and that corre- 
 sponding suspension of the laws of natural phenomena which 
 constitutes our ordinary conception of a miracle — so much so, 
 indeed, that the former might without impropriety be desig- 
 nated as Moral Miracles. In both, the Almighty is regarded as 
 suspending, for special purposes, not the eternal laws which 
 constitute His own absolute nature, but the created laws which 
 He imposed at a certain time upon a particular portion of His 
 creatures." — Limits of Religious Thought, p. 159. 
 
 If in such cases the law of moral obligation be suspended, it 
 is plain that the decision of the moral faculty, which is in con- 
 formity with this law, must be erroneous. It is therefore im- 
 portant to inquire — Is the moral law suspended in such cases ? 
 
1 50 Appendix. — Right of the Moral Faculty 
 
 The second brancli of this analogy has been considered else- 
 where. I have endeavoured to show (pp. 55-8) that a miracle 
 is not a suspension of any law of IS'ature. ^Neither do I think 
 that the cases which Mr. Mansel calls ''moral miracles" can 
 justly he regarded as suspensions of the law of moral obligation. 
 The exceptional character of both classes of phenomena results^ 
 not from the suspension of any law, physical or moral, but from 
 the introduction of a new element into the system of antece- 
 dents. In the physical phenomenon, the introduced element is 
 the Divine volition. In the moral phenomenon, the introduced 
 element is the Divine command. In both cases, the introduced 
 element so changes the system of antecedents, that the conse- 
 quent is wholly altered, yet without the suspension of a physical 
 law in the one case, or of a moral law in the other. 
 
 This principle is plainly implied in the passage which Mr. 
 Mansel quotes from Bishop Butler : — '' There are some particu- 
 lar precepts in Scripture," the Bishop says, " given to particular 
 persons, requiring actions which would be immoral and vicious, 
 were it not for such precepts. But it is easy to see, that all 
 these are of such a kind, as that the precept changes the whole 
 nature of the case and of the action ; and both constitutes and 
 shows that not to be unjust or immoral, which, prior to the pre- 
 cept, must have appeared, and really have been so, which may 
 well be, since none of these precepts is contrary to immutable 
 morality.'''' — {^Analogy, Part ii.. Chap. 3). This passage does 
 not describe the suspension of moral law. On the contrary, it is 
 plainly stated, in the sentence which I have italicised, that 
 moral law is not suspended. But it is stated also that the inter- 
 vention of the Divine command so changes the conditions of the 
 action, that, although immoral if done unbidden, it becomes 
 perfectly consistent with moral law, when done under the 
 authority of God. This is a principle which is fully recognised 
 in the matters of this world. An act done by authority of the 
 
to Judge of the Divine Attributes. 151 
 
 State may be perfectly moral, which done without such au- 
 thority would be a heinous crime ; not because the moral law 
 which forbids the action in the second case is in the former case 
 violated, but because it is inapplicable. Deliberately to kill an 
 unresisting man is murder if done by a private person. Done 
 by a public executioner, it is no crime at all. If the moral law 
 were so stated as to include the second case — if, for example, it 
 were declared, without reservation, criminal to kill an unresist- 
 ing person — the statement would be plainly untrue. IS'ay, iu 
 the case mentioned, even when the sentence is unrighteous, no 
 fault is supposed to attach to the executioner. 
 
 The assertion that a moral law is suspended means, if rightly 
 understood, no less than this — that an action which is at one 
 time vicious becomes at another time virtuous, without any 
 change in the circumstances or in the motive. This is hardly 
 even conceivable. That a change in the circumstances and in the 
 motive should change the moral quality of the action implies no 
 suspension 'of the moral law ; and cases in which a moral law 
 is supposed to have been suspended are usually of this kind. 
 
 If indeed moral distinctions were not founded in the nature 
 of things, but owed their existence solely to the will of a supe- 
 rior, there would be no difficulty in imagining moral law to be 
 suspended. But such a theory would remove the foundation of 
 all religion. 
 
 The independent authority of the moral faculty is very dis- 
 tinctly stated by a late eminent writer. " By separating," says 
 Whewell, speaking of Warburton and his school, ''the idea of 
 Obligation from that of Natural Morality, and by transferring it 
 entirely to the Divine commands and promises, natural morality 
 was deprived of its peculiar instruction, and incapacitated from 
 bearing the testimony which it so readily and emphatically ren- 
 ders, when it is allowed to speak freely, to the perfections of 
 God's character and the holiness of His law." 
 
152 Appendix. — Objections to Prayer derived front 
 
 Again — ''We believe our Divine Ruler to be supremely holy, 
 just, and good ; and therefore we obey Him with joy and love, 
 as well as hope. Bat this distinction necessarily implies that 
 we can form an idea of moral goodness, justice, holiness, quite 
 other than obedience to the will of a superior." ^ 
 
 The same principle is thus expressed by Dugald Stewart : — 
 
 *'If moral distinctions be not immutable and eternal, it is 
 absurd to speak of the goodness or of the justice of God. ' "Who- 
 ever thinks,' says Shaftesbury, 'that there is a God, and pre- 
 tends formally to believe that He is Just and good, must suppose 
 that there is independently such a thing as justice and injustice, 
 truth and falsehood, right and wrong, according to which eternal 
 and immutable standards he pronounces that God is Just, right- 
 eous, and true. If the mere will, decree, or law of God, be said 
 absolutely to constitute right and wrong, then are these latter 
 words of no significance at all.' "^ 
 
 It is true, as these eminent writers have said, that if there be 
 no morality independent of the will of God, the assertion that 
 God is just or righteous is absolutely unmeaning. It is no less 
 true that if the moral faculty can tell us nothing of these quali- 
 ties as they exist in God, the assertion that God is just or 
 righteous is quite as unmeaning in the mouth of a human 
 being. 
 
 ISToTE P, Page 23. 
 
 OBJECTIONS TO PEATEH DERIVED FROM THE REGULAR SEaUENCE OF 
 DHENOMENA. 
 
 "Prayer has come into contact with scientific discovery, and 
 I express the problem in theological terms when I say that the 
 
 1 History of the Moral Sciences, pp. 129, 133, 134. 
 
 2 Stewart's iVorks, vol. vi., p. 229 (Sk W. Hamilton's edition). 
 
the Regular Sequence of Phenomena, 153 
 
 tmcliarigeability of God as Lord of the physical world is ex- 
 pressed in modern science by the law of the conservation of 
 force, and that that law denies the power of prayer to alter any 
 natural sequence. ......... 
 
 " If the doctrine of the conservation of force he true, when 
 we pray for the fall of a single shower of five minutes in length, 
 or the change of the direction of the wind by a single point, or 
 the evaporation of the faintest waft of cloud, by the indepen- 
 dent will of God, we are asking for a miracle, and for as real 
 and tremendous a disturbance of natural law as if we had asked 
 the postponement of the rising of the sun, or the sudden re- 
 moval of the moon from the sky. There is nothing little, or 
 nothing great, in the motion of the universe. The demand for 
 the creation of the smallest wave of new force is as serious a 
 demand as that for the creation of a force equivalent to that 
 which builds up a volcano in a night." — Stopford Brooke, Christ 
 in Modern Life, pp. 133-4. 
 
 I have transcribed this long passage because it states very 
 clearly the popular objection to prayer derived from the per- 
 sistency of Natural Law, giving to that objection a more than 
 ordinary definiteness, by pointing out the natural law which is 
 said to be violated by the supposed success of prayer for a phy- 
 sical benefit. It is, Mr. Brooke says, the law of the conservation 
 of force. A shower of rain, granted in answer to human prayer, 
 would violate this law. In fact, if I understand Mr. Brooke 
 rightly, he thinks that the direct interference of the Divine vo- 
 lition in a physical sequence implies the creation of force. Is 
 this true ? 
 
 It is certainly not true of the interference of human volition. 
 Man, in the exercise of his free will, can and does interfere 
 €very moment in physical sequences, wholly changing the 
 results which would, without such interference, have followed. 
 But we know that this change is effected without any creation 
 
154 Appendix, — Objections to Prayer derived from 
 
 of force. Thus, for example, when the exertion of man's will 
 determines the motion of his arm, the total amount of force ex- 
 isting in the world remains unchanged. Only the distribution 
 is affected. The exertion of man's will determines the conver- 
 sion of a certain quantity of that kind of motion which we call 
 heat into that other kind which we more usually call motion. 
 Ko creation of force is involved in this conversion, by which, 
 however, the sequence of physical phenomena may be altogether 
 changed. 
 
 Now, I do not mean to consider the question whether, in the 
 case of Divine interference, a creation of force may or may not 
 take place. But assuredly, the assumption that it does take 
 place is wholly unnecessary. The analogy of man's interfe- 
 rence shows conclusively that God may intervene in a series of 
 physical phenomena so as to change it completely, without any 
 creation of force. 
 
 Again Mr. Brooke says : — 
 
 *'The amount of rain which fell last week in England is to 
 the millionth of an inch the exact result of a series of antece- 
 dents which not only took place some time ago about the equator 
 and the pole, but which go back to the very beginning of 
 things."— p. 135. 
 
 If I rightly understand this passage, and those which imme- 
 diately precede it, Mr. Brooke does not include, in the series of 
 antecedents which cause rain, the voluntary actions of men. If 
 this be so, the statement is not true. It was said long since by 
 Arago, in discussing the question whether Science would ever 
 be able to predict the weather, that such prediction was in the 
 highest degree improbable, hecause (among other reasons) the 
 weather is in part the result of man's actions.^ The amount of 
 rain which fell last week in England is not the exact result of 
 
 ^Annuairefor 1816, p. 590. 
 
the Regular Sequence of Phenomena. 155 
 
 sucli antecedents as Mr. Brooke describes. It depends also 
 upon the actions of the men who cut down the forests and 
 drained the swamps. 
 
 It is true that hitherto the actions of men have produced 
 upon the rainfall of a country only a gradual and distant effect. 
 But no cautious thinker will pronounce a more immediate 
 power of influencing this phenomenon to be absolutely beyond 
 the reach of Science. If a theory of such more immediate in- 
 fluence were started, it would certainly be received with great 
 scepticism. The evidence offered in support of such a theory 
 would be subjected to a very severe scrutiny. But I do not 
 think that any scientific man would, without examining the 
 evidence or even the theory itself, reject it as necessarily un- 
 true, hecause it required a creation of force. The creation of 
 force is probably beyond the power of man ; but we are as yet 
 very far indeed from being able to see the limits of that which 
 may be effected by its redistribution. 
 
 ^Now if we may not condemn, as contrary to natural laiv^ 
 the supposition that man may produce such an effect, still less 
 are we warranted in pronouncing such a sentence upon the in- 
 terference of God. The only principle having any claim to the 
 title JN'atural Law, which may seem to be violated by the 
 ascription of such effect to the Divine interference, is that 
 stated in the text. We do certainly ascribe to God a power 
 differing in kind from any power possessed by man, when we 
 suppose that, in the case of His interference, a volition is fol- 
 lowed by an immediate external result. This immediate se- 
 quence is indeed forbidden by the law which controls the 
 actions of man. But the extension of such a law to the actions 
 of God could have, as I have shown, no result but practical 
 Atheism. 
 
156 Appendix. — Is an Emotion a Moral Defect? 
 JSToTE G, Page 25. 
 
 IS AN EMOTION A MORAL DEFECT? 
 
 The answer given to this question by the Stoical philosophy- 
 is well known. The description in the text of an emotion- 
 less man — of one whose motive is duty unmingled with feel- 
 ing — would be admitted as strictly applicable to the wise man. 
 Any deviation from such a model is censured as a weak- 
 ness, if not worse. Even compassion, which all moralists 
 would now recognise as essential to the highest type of human 
 •excellence, was rejected by the Stoical philosophy as, if not in 
 itself a vice, at least leading by necessary consequence to that 
 which is a vice — '' Cadit igitur in eundem et misereri et invi- 
 dere. Nam qui dolet rebus alicujus adversis, idem alicujus 
 etiam secundis dolet In quem igitur cadit mise- 
 reri, in eundem etiam invidere. Non cadit autem invidere in 
 sapientem : ergo ne misereri quidem."^ This extirpation of 
 the feeling need not, according to the same philosophy, cause 
 neglect of the act which is usually prompted by the feeling. 
 This may be better performed under a sense of duty — "Cur 
 misereare potius quam feras opem, si id facere possis ! an sine 
 misericordia liberales esse non possumus ? l^on enim suscipere 
 ipsi segritudines propter alios debemus : sed alios, si possumus, 
 levare segritudine.'"^ 
 
 It is unnecessary to add that, rejecting emotion as unworthy 
 of man, the Stoics would reject it far more strongly as unworthy 
 of God. 
 
 But this idea of the perfection of humanity is a paradox which 
 the general sense of mankind has always refused to accept. In- 
 deed it may well be doubted, whether even those who formed 
 the conception would have approved of it, had they seen it com- 
 
 1 Cicero, Tusc. Disp. in., 10. 2 jjji^^^ jy,, 26. 
 
Is an Emotion a Moral Defect ? 157 
 
 pletely realized. For we must be careful not to confound con- 
 trolled emotion with absence of emotion. The former is very 
 generally an object of admiration not alone to those, if there be 
 now any such, who hold the Stoical theory, but to those who 
 would utterly reject it. And it is quite possible that much of 
 the admiration, which men imagined themselves to have be- 
 stowed upon a mind from which emotion was absent, was 
 really given to a mind in which emotion was controlled. 
 
 But if this confusion be avoided, the answer which man's 
 moral nature has given to the question — Is an emotion a weak- 
 ness? — cannot be regarded as uncertain. Take, for example, the 
 emotion which, as we have seen, the Stoical philosophy condemns 
 as almost a vice — compassion. Compare the characters of two 
 men, whose active beneficence is the same, but of whom one 
 feeh for the distress which he relieves, while the other is insen- 
 sible to it. The Stoical philosophy prefers the second character, 
 but the general verdict of mankind is quite different. The man 
 who can feel no compassion would be pronounced by the moral 
 sense to be morally deficient, how beneficent soever his actions 
 might be. 
 
 Is this verdict limited in its application to man ? Do we ap- 
 prove of the presence of emotion in man and censure its absence, 
 merely because the weakness of human nature renders certain 
 important ends unattainable without emotion ? Is emotion, in 
 fact, to be regarded as a supply to certain deficiencies in human 
 nature, and can we not imagine a higher order of beings to 
 whom such a supply would be unnecessary ? If this be so, 
 ought we not to regard the absence of emotion in such beings 
 as a mark of moral superiority ? 
 
 Eishop Butler would, I think, answer this question in the 
 affirmative. He does indeed maintain strongly that, in com- 
 paring one man with another, emotion ought not to be regarded 
 as a weakness. On the contrary, the removal of this class of 
 
158 Appendix, — Is an Emotion a Moral Defect? 
 
 mental phenomena would leave a creature like man without a 
 sufficient principle of action. Butler therefore rejects alto- 
 gether the Stoical theory of the perfection of human nature. 
 On the other hand, he does seem to admit the force of the ohjec- 
 tion which would exclude emotion from any place in a perfect 
 nature. " Are not passion and affection," says Butler, stating 
 the Stoical ohjection, "themselves a weakness, and what a per- 
 fect being must be entirely free from?" To which his reply 
 is — ''Perhaps so, but it is mankind I am speaking of, imper- 
 fect creatures, and who naturally and from the condition we are 
 placed in, necessarily depend upon each other. With respect 
 to such creatures it would be found of as bad consequence to 
 eradicate all natural affections as to be entirely governed by 
 them. This would almost sink us to the condition of brutes, 
 and that would leave us without a sufficient principle of 
 action IsTeither is affection itself at all a weak- 
 ness, nor does it argue defect, any otherwise than as our senses 
 and appetites do ; they belong to our condition of nature, and 
 are what we cannot do without." In this passage he certainly 
 admits it to be at least probable that a nature more perfect than 
 that of man may be marked by a complete absence of emotion. 
 With regard to the Divine ISTature, Butler's language is still 
 more clear — " God Almighty is, to be sure, unmoved by passion 
 
 or appetite, unchanged by affection It is a real .... 
 
 absurdity to endeavour to eradicate the passions He has given 
 us, because He is without them." ^ 
 
 A minute criticism of this passage might show that it is not 
 absolutely inconsistent with a belief in the existence of affection, 
 as distinguished from passion or appetite, in the Divine JS'ature. 
 Still I suppose that Butler did mean to exclude it. But if it be 
 true that absence of emotion is essential to a perfect nature, 
 
 ^ Sermon Y., pp. 86-7 (Carmichael's edition). 
 
Is a?i Emotion a Moral Defect ? 159 
 
 why should not the moral faculty approve of a human nature in 
 which this mark of perfection is found combined with active 
 benevolence ? It is nothing to say that this combination does 
 not exist in man. The moral sense can judge perfectly well of 
 an imaginary character, provided that there be nothing essen- 
 tially discordant in the elements of which the picture consists. 
 There is no such discordance here ; nay, the combination is one 
 which is often approximately realized in those whom use has 
 familiarized with scenes of sorrow, blunting their sensibilities, 
 yet without diminishing their active benevolence. And the 
 question which we have to ask is — Do we consider the moral 
 character to be exalted by the insensibility which is thus pro- 
 duced ? Nay rather, do we not regard this insensibility as the 
 ^rice which the actively benevolent must pay for the power of 
 practical usefulness which their sad experience has given them ? 
 And if we could find a man who had gained the practical power 
 without losing the emotion, should we not regard him as 
 morally superior to one who had, in the process, become callous 
 to human suffering, although not neglectful of it ? JN'o one is 
 more familiar with scenes of sorrow than a physician. "Wit- 
 nessing those scenes, perhaps daily, he can hardly avoid the 
 gradual weakening of the '^passive impressions" (to use But- 
 ler's words) which generally attends such experiences. Yet 
 when we find, as we sometimes do, a physician who has not 
 paid this price for his powers of practical usefulness — whose 
 emotions are still fresh — who can pity as well as relieve, do 
 we not attribute to him a moral character, not exceptionally 
 low but exceptionally high ? Do we despise him because he 
 feels for the suffering which he is striving to alleviate ? God 
 forbid. 
 
 It is plain, then, that the approval which the benevolent 
 affections receive from the moral faculty is not given solely on 
 account of their results. They are approved for their own sake. 
 
l6o Appe7idix. — Is an Emotio7t a Moral Defect? 
 
 These affections form an essential part of the loftiest ideal of 
 human character which we are capable of forming. By what 
 process, then, do we arrive at an ideal of a swjt?^rhuman character 
 which excludes this element ? It seems difficult to answer this 
 question. 
 
 It may be objected that emotion necessarily implies passivity, 
 and cannot therefore be ascribed to God, who is, as Locke says, 
 above all passive power. To this, however, it may fairly be re- 
 plied that perception implies passivity quite as much as emotion. 
 *' In bare naked perception," says Locke, '' the mind is, for the 
 most part, only passive."^ This is evidently true. Por per- 
 ception is the effect produced on the mind by the presence of an 
 external object (if there be such a thing) ; and when we speak 
 of ''an effect produced on the mind" we speak of the mind as 
 passive. The truth is that we cannot conceive a mind which is 
 destitute of passive power to be conscious of the existence of 
 anything distinct from itself. We are obliged, therefore, in. 
 considering the relation of the Divine Being to other beings, 
 and to things, to make one of the following suppositions : — 
 
 1, There is nothing distinct from God. This is Pantheism. 
 
 2. The Divine Mind is unconscious of the existence or actions 
 of any being but Himself. No one, I presume, would accept 
 this supposition. 3. The Divine Mind is not destitute of pas- 
 sive power. If we attempt to escape from this logical dilemma, 
 by declaring that the whole matter is beyond the grasp of 
 human thought, and that, in some way inconceivable by us, the 
 Divine Mind may perceive without the possession of passive 
 power, we must be aware that the ascription of emotion to the 
 Divine Mind may be similarly defended. If the consideration 
 of our limited powers of thought requires us to admit, that per- 
 ception in the Divine Mind does not necessarily imply passive 
 
 ^ Essay^ Book ii., chap, ix., sec. 1. 
 
What is a Miracle ? 1 6 1 
 
 power, why should not the same consideration require us to 
 admit that, in the Divine Mind, the possession of passive power 
 need not be implied by the presence of emotion ? To our minds 
 both suppositions are inconceivable. 
 
 I conclude this note with the following deeply significant 
 words of P. W. I^ewman : — 
 
 '' To endeavour to resolve God into intellect without affections 
 is Atheism under a new name ; for mere intellect is not an 
 active principle." ^ 
 
 IToTE H, Page 38. 
 
 WHAT IS A MIEACLE.'' 
 
 ''The fundamental conception, which is indispensable to a 
 true apprehension of the nature of a miracle, is that of the dis- 
 tinction of Mind from Matter, and of the power of the former, 
 as a personal, conscious, and free agent, to influence the pheno- 
 
 1 The Soul, p. 42. 
 
 2 The definition of a miracle here given has evoked a certain amount of 
 opposing (though very friendly) criticism. This criticism has taken most 
 definite shape in the Church Quarterly Review for January of the present 
 year (1879). The reviewer (to whom, as indeed to all my reviewers, I 
 desire to return my hest thanks for their very favourable notices of the first 
 edition of the present work) objects : — 
 
 1. That I have left no room for the function of the secondary causes 
 which may intervene between the volition and the accomplishment of it. 
 Where, he asks, is the nexus of secondary causes to be broken in order to 
 introduce the supposed immediate volition .'' (The objection is rather anti- 
 cipated than alleged by the reviewer.) 
 
 2. That the asserted facts of electro-biology are inconsistent with the 
 supposition that man's will, without the intervention of man's body, has no 
 power over external nature. 
 
 3. That there is no generic distinction between the power of spirit over 
 the particular system of matter forming the human body and its power over 
 
 M 
 
1 62 Appendix. — What is a Miracle? 
 
 mena of the latter. We are conscious of this power in our- 
 selves ; we experience it in our every-day life : hut we experience 
 also its restriction within certain narrow limits, the principal 
 one heing that man's influence upon foreign hodies is only pos- 
 sible through the instrumentality of his own body. Beyond 
 these limits is the region of the miraculous. In at least the 
 
 any other system of matter. (I am not sure that I rightly understand this 
 objection.) 
 
 To answer the first question we must inquire — "Where and how does 
 human volition break tbe nexus of secondary causes ? To simplify the 
 inquiry, let it be supposed tbat tbere is but one man in tbe world, and that 
 his will is, for a time, inactive. During tbis period of inactivity tbe purely 
 physical causes are producing tbeir full effects. Among tbese effects some 
 are produced in tbe body of tbe man. By tbe action of tbe cbemical forces 
 tbere is developed in bis body, at every instant, a certain amount of tbat 
 motion, imperceptible to our senses as motion, which we call beat. Part 
 of tbis beat passes off, by radiation and otberwise, as beat ; wbile part is 
 transformed into tbe involuntary motions of tbe heart, lungs, &c., which 
 we call vital. Tbese phenomena are altogetber independent of tbe will, 
 which we bave supposed to be inactive. Now, let us suppose tbat tbe will 
 becomes active. Let tbe man will, for example, to move bis arm. How- 
 does tbat volition break tbe nexus of purely physical causes ? By effecting 
 the transformation of a certain amount of beat into a corresponding amount 
 of sensible motion. Tbe will cannot, as we know, create motion any more 
 than it can create matter. It can but change one kind of motion into 
 anotber; and tbe spbere of its direct power of effecting tbis cbange does 
 not extend beyond tbe system of matter wbicb is called tbe body. It is 
 tbus, I conceive, tbat tbe nexus of purely pbysical causes is broken by tbe 
 human will. And tbis break in tbe nexus does not annul tbe proper func- 
 tion of tbe pbysical causes. Tbese causes are as active as before ; and tbe 
 nexus is broken, not by annulling them, but by introducing tbe transform- 
 ing energy of tbe will, as a new element, into tbe series. 
 
 Precisely tbe same may be said of tbe interposition of tbe Divine will, 
 save tbat it is not, like tbe buman will, limited in its spbere of operation, 
 and tbat in tbe Divine interposition tbere may be, altbougb we cannot cer- 
 tainly say that tbere always is, a creation of motion. Tbe buman will can 
 interfere immediately only in one class of phenomena — tbe Divine will is 
 not bound by tbis limitation. But tbe function of tbe pbysical causes is not 
 annulled by either interposition. 
 
 "Witb regard to tbe phenomena of electro-biology, I cannot bold it to be 
 proved tbat tbere is an immediate action of tbe will of tbe operator upon 
 
JVIiat is a Miracle? 163 
 
 great majority of the miracles recorded in Scripture, the super- 
 natural element appears, not in the relation of matter to matter, 
 but in that of matter to mind; in the exercise of a personal 
 power transcending the limits of man's will. 
 
 '' . . . When a sick man is healed, or a tempest stilled by a 
 word, the mere action of matter upon matter may possibly be 
 
 the patient without the intervention of any hodily influence. It does not 
 seem impossible that the will may act primarily upon the body of the person 
 who wills, developing a bodily condition which in turn influences the body 
 of the other. The term " animal magnetism" would seem to indicate that 
 those who adopted it had formed some such idea of the phenomena in ques- 
 tion. Now analogy would lead us, in the absence of direct proof, to prefer 
 a theory of these phenomena, which is in accordance with the ordinary 
 operation of the human will, to a theory which assigns to it an operation 
 whoUy extraordinary. And if it be true that, in the electro -biological phe- 
 nomena, there is a direct action of the human will upon a foreign body, it 
 must be admitted that this group of phenomena is quite unique. I do not 
 think that there is evidence sufficient to justify us in attributing to the 
 human will a power so anomalous. The fact may be perfectly real, but the 
 power of the will over foreign matter is not a fact, but a theory devised to 
 account for a fact. I cannot, then, admit that the electro -biological phe- 
 nomena form a valid exception to that law which appears to govern all other 
 phenomena — that man's will, without the intervention of man's body, is 
 powerless upon external nature. 
 
 It has been said that the distinction which I have drawn between Divine 
 and human action does not indicate a difference in kind, inasmuch as there 
 is no such difference between the action of the will upon the particular 
 system of matter forming the human body, and the action of the will upon 
 any other system of matter whatever. I do not know that this can be re- 
 garded as an objection. At most, it is only an objection to the use of the 
 word "generic" as applied to the difference (p. 41). "We use the word 
 *' generic" with a good deal of laxity ; and it is, perhaps, impossible to lay 
 down a perfectly definite rule for its correct application. But it must be 
 admitted that there is an enormous gap between the will which can only 
 affect one such system of matter, and the will which can affect all systems 
 of matter in the universe. Whether this gap ought or ought not to be 
 •called "generic" is only a question with regard to the proper application 
 of a word. "Whatever we are to call it, the "gulf" is enormous, and 
 apparently impassable. I should hesitate to say the same of any other 
 difference which exists between a miracle and an ordinary pheno- 
 menon. 
 
 M 2 
 
1 64 Appendix. — What is a Miracll ^ 
 
 similar to that which takes place when the same effects occur Yu 
 a natural way : the miracle consists in the means by which that 
 action is brought about." ^ 
 
 This statement of the essential difference of a miracle agrees 
 with that given in the text, namely, that the difference consists- 
 in the immediate sequence of an external result to a volition. 
 
 Professor Mansel elsewhere uses expressions which seem to 
 imply that a miracle mmj he a violation of the laws of nature. 
 
 '' A miracle, in one sense, need not be necessarily a violation 
 of the laws of nature. God may make use of natural instru- 
 ments, acting after their kind." ^ 
 
 I have endeavoured to show (pp. 41-2) that the adoption of 
 natural instruments makes no change in the essential character 
 of the action. 
 
 Professor Baden Powell seems to adopt the same conception. 
 Speaking of natural phenomena, which still remain inexpli- 
 cable, he says : — 
 
 ''None of these or the like instances are at all of the same 
 kind, or have any characteristic in common with the idea of 
 what is implied by the term 'miracle,' which is asserted to 
 mean something at variance with nature and law."^ 
 
 Bishop Butler's opinion might appear at first sight to be 
 nearly the same — 
 
 " A miracle, in its very notion, is relative to a course of 
 nature ; and implies somewhat different from it ; considered as 
 being so."* 
 
 But it must be observed that, although miracles are here 
 stated to be different from a course of nature, they are not said 
 to be contrary to it ; and Butler's account of the matter is quite 
 consistent with the supposition, that a miracle implies no more 
 
 » Aids to Faith, pp. 20-21. 2 Limits of Religious Thought, pp. 128-9. 
 
 3 Essmjs and Reviews, p. 109. ^ Analogy, p. 80 (Fitzgerald's edition). 
 
What is a Miracle? 165 
 
 than the exertion of a force not included among the ordinary- 
 forces of nature ; and that it is, therefore, in a certain sense, 
 different from a course of nature, as including an element not 
 contained therein. 
 
 This distinction is marked by Archbishop Trench — 
 
 *' But while the miracle is not thus nature, so neither is it 
 ugaiiist nature. That language, however commonly in use, is 
 yet wholly unsatisfactory, which speaks of these wonderful 
 works of God as violations of a natural law. Beyond nature, 
 heyond and alove the nature which we know, they are, but not 
 contrary to it." ^ 
 
 The following statement of the same author seems to be less 
 accurate : — 
 
 "We should term the miracle not the infraction of a law, but 
 "behold in it the lower law neutralized, and for the time put out of 
 working by an higher; and of this, abundant analogous examples 
 are evermore going forward before our eyes. Continually wo 
 behold in the world around us lower laws held in restraint by 
 higher, mechanic by dynamic, chemical by vital, physical by 
 moral; yet we say not, when the lower thus gives place in 
 favour of the higher, that there was any violation of law, or 
 that anything contrary to nature came to pass ; — rather, we 
 acknowledge the law of a greater freedom swallowing up the 
 law of a lesser. Thus, when I lift my arm, the law of gravita- 
 tion is not, as far as my arm is concerned, denied or annihilated ; 
 it exists as much as ever, but is held in suspense by the higher 
 law of my will. The chemical laws which would bring about 
 decay in animal substances still subsist, even when they arc 
 hemmed in and hindered by the salt which keeps those sub- 
 stances from corruption." ^ 
 
 The word "law" appears to me to be in this passage incor- 
 
 ^ Notes on the Miracles, p. 15. ^Ibid., pp. 15, 16. 
 
1 66 Appendix. — What is a Miracle? 
 
 rectly used. Two forces may oppose each other; and we may 
 even speak of them as ^' higher" and '' lower." Eut two laws 
 cannot be opposed. If they appear to be so, either the opposi- 
 tion is unreal, or one of the asserted laws is untrue. Thus, in 
 the example which the Archbishop gives, the force of the muscle 
 is opposed to the force of gravity. But there is no opposition 
 between the laios of these forces. The law of gravitation does 
 not assert that a heavy body will necessarily fall, but only 
 that there is a force urging it downwards, which will produce 
 its proper effect, unless it be resisted by an opposing force of 
 sufficient magnitude. Much of the discredit which has been 
 thrown upon the reality of miracles may be traced to the neglect 
 of this distinction. Miracles have been declared to be incredible 
 because they were supposed to involve a violation of the laws of 
 nature. The truth is, not that a laio of nature has been vio- 
 lated or suspended, but that a force of nature has been over- 
 come by the action of a stronger force. We may neglect this 
 distinction in Theology, but we are careful to observe it in our 
 every-day life. To resist the laws of nature is the act of a 
 lunatic. To resist \hQ forces of nature is the very condition of 
 man's existence. It is true that this is in general done by 
 opposing one force of nature to another. Eut the intervention 
 of man's will is an essential part of the process, and without 
 this intervention the forces of nature would speedily terminate 
 his existence. The cold of one winter's night would be enough 
 to kill the strongest man alive, were not this force of nature re- 
 sisted by the exertion of his will. It is true that we can oppose 
 this natural force (using the word " cold" in a popular sense) 
 only by making use of forces quite as natural, namely, the non- 
 conducting property of certain bodies, and the heat of fire. But 
 to render the opposition effectual the action of the human will 
 is necessary. In the ordinary works of man, the intervention 
 of his body is required ; in a miracle the intervention is unne- 
 
What is a Miracle? 167 
 
 cessary. In both, a force of nature is overcome ; in neither, is 
 a law of nature Tiolated. 
 
 The importance of the common dogma that '' God works by 
 means" is strongly insisted on by the Duke of Argyll. Much 
 (if not all) of the difficulty which attends belief in supernatural 
 agency is due, he thinks, to neglect or denial of this truth. 
 Speaking of ''that idea of the supernatural which so many 
 reject as inconceivable," he says — ''What then is that idea? 
 Have we not traced it to its den at last ? By ' supernatural' 
 power, do we not mean power independent of the use of means, 
 as distinguished from power depending on knowledge — even in- 
 finite knowledge — of the means proper to be employed ? " 
 
 " This is the sense — probably the only sense — in which the 
 supernatural is, to many minds, so difficult of belief. JS'o man 
 can have any difficulty in believing that there are natural laws 
 of which he is ignorant ; nor in conceiving that there may be 
 Beings who do know them, and can use them, even as he him- 
 self now uses the few laws with which he is acquainted. The 
 real difficulty lies in the idea of Will exercised without the use 
 of means — not in the exercise of means which are beyond our 
 knowledge." ^ 
 
 Is this true ? Is it true that the difficulty, whatever it may 
 be, of accepting an alleged miracle as real would be materially 
 alleviated, if it were shown that natural means had been used 
 for its accomplishment ? Thus, for example, in the history of 
 the Egyptian plagues, the locusts are said to have been brought 
 and removed by "natural means," namely, easterly and west- 
 erly winds respectively. If any incredibility attach to these 
 asserted events, does the introduction of machinery in the 
 plague of locusts render the story of that plague more credible 
 than the story of other plagues, in which no such " natural 
 
 1 Reign of Laiv, p. 14. 
 
1 68 Appendix, — What is a Miracle ? 
 
 means" are said to have been used? Had the coming and de- 
 parture of the locusts been reported to have followed directly 
 upon the command of God, without the intervention of any 
 wind, would the story have been in any respect more impro- 
 bable ? I cannot think so. 
 
 Por it will be observed that the introduction of this machinery 
 does not remove the direct intervention of God ; it merely shifts 
 it back to an earlier part of the series. The east wind brought 
 the locusts ; but what brought the east wind ? It is as real a 
 miracle that the east wind should come at the direct command 
 of God as it is that the locusts should come without the wind. 
 "Whatever difficulties, theological or philosophical, attend the 
 reception of the one story, attend also the reception of the 
 other. So it is, too, in every similar case. The immediate 
 consequent of the special exertion of the Divine volition is a 
 miracle. Between the immediate consequent and the final result 
 any number of terms — ''means," as we call them — may be in- 
 terposed, and the multiplication of these terms serves to hide 
 from our eyes the real nature of the event. Men may think 
 that they are softening away its miraculous character by in- 
 sisting on the consideration that ''God works by means." But 
 this is not true. The miraculous character is not altered by 
 this consideration ; it is only disguised. A miracle is not the 
 less a miracle because, in the series of phenomena which we 
 call an event, there are present, in addition to the one miracu- 
 lous element, a hundred elements which are not miraculous. 
 
Superiority of Mind over Matter, 169 
 
 Note I, Page 41. 
 
 ILLOGICAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE WOELD OF SPIRIT AND THE 
 WORLD OP MATTER. 
 
 The impossibility of rejecting, as inconsistent with the uni- 
 versality of Law, the interference of God in the world of 
 matter, while admitting the possibility of such interference 
 in the world of spirit, is very forcibly stated by the Duke of 
 Argyll — 
 
 ''"Will this reasoning bear analysis? Can the distinction it 
 assumes be maintained? Whatever difficulties there may be 
 in reconciling the ideas of Law and of Volition are difficulties 
 which apply equally to the worlds of matter and of mind. The 
 mind is as much subject to Law as the body is. The Reign of 
 Law is over all, and if its dominion be really incompatible with 
 the agency of Volition, Human or Divine, then the mind is as 
 inaccessible to that agency as material things."^ 
 
 It is hard to see how the principle here laid down can be dis- 
 puted. When we ask God to grant us a spiritual benefit, we 
 ask Him to intervene in the sequence of mental phenomena. 
 If a change in the sequence of phenomena produced by the in- 
 tervention of the Divine Will be a violation of Law, we are 
 asking for a violation of Law ; and this violation is equally real 
 or equally unreal whether the interrupted sequence be in the 
 world of matter or in the world of mind. 
 
 KoTE K, Page 46. 
 
 INHERENT SITPERIORITT OF MIND OVER MATTER. 
 
 The position taken in the text with regard to the inherent 
 superiority of*mind over matter is altogether independent of 
 
 ^ Jte'ujn of Laiv, p. 61. 
 
lyo Appendix. — Superiority of Mind over Matter, 
 
 the question, whether mind may not be itself a modification of 
 matter. It is enough for my present purpose, that mankind 
 have adopted the division of the forces by which the phenomena 
 of the world are produced into two great classes, to which they 
 have given the names, mental and material ; and that the dif- 
 ference between these classes is sufficiently marked to justify 
 the classification as at least convenient. This principle is quite 
 familiar to us in the world of Science. We agree to place in 
 separate classes the force of heat and the force of electricity. 
 Eut we do not thereby decide the question whether these forces 
 may not be different modifications of a single force. Even if 
 this be true, the phenomena resulting from these modifications 
 respectively are so different as to justify a separate classification 
 of their causes. 
 
 So, too, in the present case. "We may speak of the superio- 
 rity of mind over matter, without deciding the question whether 
 mind and matter be modifications of the same substance. If this 
 be true, the meaning of the assertion will be, that the forces of 
 that modification which we call mind show a constant and 
 ever-increasing tendency to prevail over the forces of that other 
 modification which we call matter. 
 
 It may be contended, in opposition to this statement, that 
 mind prevails over matter only by arraying the forces of mat- 
 ter against each other; and that mind without the aid of matter 
 is powerless, whereas matter without the aid of mind has still 
 very great power. But it must be remembered that our present 
 question is not whether the powers of the mind require for 
 their development the aid of matter, but whether it be not true 
 that the mind possesses powers which (so far as we can judge) 
 cannot be transferred to any system of matter. It is true that 
 mind prevails against matter by the power which it possesses of 
 arraying the forces of matter against each other. We do not 
 overcome the force of fire by a thought, but by opposing to it 
 
Superiority of Mind over Matter. 171 
 
 another material force — the force of water. But the power of 
 arraying the material forces against each other — the power of 
 forming new combinations among the forces which exist around 
 us, and thus compelling them to produce the result which the 
 combiner wishes — the power of invention, as we usually call it — 
 appears to be exclusively the prerogative of mind. Man, who 
 himself possesses a large measure of this power, has never been 
 able to transfer it in the smallest degree to a material combina- 
 tion. "We may not, perhaps, pronounce such a transference to 
 be impossible, for we are rarely justified in pronouncing any 
 thing to be impossible. Eut we are justified in saying that 
 the history of mechanism, wonderful as it is, gives no indication 
 of the possibility of such a transference. The exquisite machine 
 of the nineteenth century is as far from possessing the power of 
 invention as was the knife of the stone period. 
 
 Closely akin to the power of invention, and, apparently, as 
 little capable of being transferred from mind to matter, is the 
 power of cumulative improvement. Only the mental powers 
 seem to be capable of deriving benefit from exjoerience. Only 
 the mental powers are strengthened and enlarged by knowledge 
 — by knowledge of that which other mental powers have done; 
 or tried to do. It would be an exaggeration of the truth to say 
 that this privilege is absolutely limited to man. Many of the 
 lower animals do to some small extent profit by experience. 
 Eut cumulative improvement — the power of transmitting the 
 experience of one generation to the next, so that the benefit de- 
 rived from such experience may constantly increase — this seems 
 to be peculiar to the mind of man. 
 
 On the whole, we are justified in saying that mind possesses 
 powers which appear to be intransferable to matter — that these 
 peculiar powers enable — and, so far as we can judge from all 
 the evidence which we possess, will always enable — mind to 
 triumph over matter, not indeed directly, but by arraying the 
 
172 Appe7idtx, — Superiority 0/ Mind over Matter, 
 
 forces of matter against each other. It is the possession of these 
 peculiar powers which justifies the claim of superiority so com- 
 monly made on behalf of mental as against material forces ; and 
 the power, which mind possesses, of transmitting the result of 
 its experience, and thus of securing a constant increase of men- 
 tal force, makes it in a high degree probable that this superio- 
 rity will become every day more marked. 
 
 The case imagined in the text, namely, the transference of the 
 powers possessed by the man of the nineteenth century to the 
 machine of the thirtieth, is conceivable only when understood 
 with a certain limitation. There are, as we have seen, powers 
 which we cannot conceive to be so transferred. "We cannot 
 conceive an inventing machine, nor a machine which will im- 
 prove itself by observation and experience. We cannot con- 
 ceive a machine which will adapt itself (unless by accident) 
 to a combination of circumstances unforeseen by the contriver. 
 We cannot therefore conceive it to be possible that man of any 
 age, how great soever its intellectual development may be, 
 should construct a machine capable of fully replacing the man 
 of any other age, however rude. 
 
 • But it may be argued that this very impossibility of transfer- 
 ring his powers to a machine is itself the result of man's imper- 
 fection. It is true — it may be said — that we cannot conceive a 
 machine capable of fulfilling (except by accident) a purpose 
 which was not contemplated by its designer. Man can adapt 
 himself to a new state of circumstances; but the machine which 
 man has made cannot. But the very expression "a new state 
 of circumstances " marks a human imperfection. If man pos- 
 sessed the power of foreseeing the future, there could be for him 
 no such thing as a new state of circumstances. Gifted with this 
 power, might he not, conceivably at least, construct a machine 
 which could do all that he himself could do ? And if this be a 
 conceivable power in man, does it not necessarily exist in God ? 
 
Superiority of Mind over Matter. 173 
 
 In answering this question we must observe that the field of 
 man's activity is twofold. Human actions affect either the sys- 
 tems of matter by which he is surrounded, or the minds of other 
 beings like himself. It is only in the former of these fields that 
 he can, even conceivably, be replaced by a machine. We may 
 conceive the physical effects which are now produced by the ac- 
 tion of man to be produced by a skilfully contrived machine, but 
 we cannot conceive a similar substitution to be successful in the 
 moral world. There, the effect depends not only on the thing 
 done, but on the manner in which, and the agent by which, it is 
 done. The machine and the sentient being may produce the 
 same physical phenomenon, but the moral effect of the two 
 actions will be wholly different. Even when both actions pro- 
 ceed from sentient beings, the moral effect of an action which 
 partakes in any considerable degree of a mechanical character 
 will differ widely from that of an action which does not contain 
 this element. Compare, for example, the moral effect of relief 
 given by individual kindness with that of relief given under a 
 poor-law. IS'or would this difference be obliterated, even if the 
 poor-law arrangements were known by the recipients of relief to 
 be the work of a benevolent despot, actuated solely by desire for 
 the welfare of his people. IN"© general system, be it never so 
 perfect, can replace individual kindness in its moral effects. 
 But as I have spoken of this subject more fully elsewhere, I 
 need only remark, that this difference between a sentient being 
 and a machine appears to us to be indelible. That such a being 
 should be able to transfer to a system of mechanism the moral 
 influence over the minds of men, which he himself possesses, is 
 to us absolutely inconceivable. 
 
4 Appendix — TJic Statisiical Argument. 
 
 ISToTE L, Page 68. 
 
 THE STATISTICAL ARGUMENT. 
 
 Very different opinions have been expressed by those who 
 have treated of the efficacy of prayer, as to the applicability of 
 this species of argument to such a question. Before examining 
 the particular specimen adduced in the present case, some have 
 declared the statistical argument to be wholly inapplicable, 
 while others have maintained that it is absolutely decisive. Dr. 
 Hessey and Mr. Galton may be taken to represent the opposite 
 poles of opinion. " To resort," says the former, ** to statistics 
 in such a matter is an absolute mistake, and we must recom- 
 mend those whose tastes lead them to such inquiries, to apply 
 them to other matters on which they may be legitimately and 
 profitably employed." ^ On the other hand, Mr. Galton thinks 
 that the question ought to be decided altogether by statistics. 
 
 " The collapse of the argument of universality leaves us 
 solely concerned with a simple statistical question — are prayers 
 answered or are they not ? " ^ With regard to the first position, 
 I have already said that I believe it to be untenable. The ob- 
 jections against the use of the statistical argument, which Dr. 
 Hessey and others have founded on the undoubted fact that 
 there are connected with each case certain important details, 
 of which we are necessarily ignorant, prove no more than this, 
 that, as we are obliged to assume things which we cannot strictly 
 prove, the argument ought not to be considered decisive. But 
 the rejection of the argument as inapplicable, hecause it is founded 
 on statistics, cannot be justified. A theory which professes to 
 find a connexion between two classes of phenomena, both of 
 which are to some extent within the cognizance of the human 
 
 ^ Boyle Lectures for 1873. p. 116. 
 
 2 Fortnightly Review, vol. xii. (new series), p. 126. 
 
TJie Statistical Argrument, 
 
 s 
 
 175 
 
 intellect, may be tested with more or less accuracy by obser- 
 vation and comparison of these phenomena — in other words, 
 by statistics. 
 
 On the other hand, the proposal to set aside all other argu- 
 ments and decide the question by statistics alone is quite as un- 
 reasonable. This monopoly can be justified only in two cases — 
 namely, when the selected argument has the force of demon- 
 stration, or when the rejected arguments are wholly devoid of 
 weight. Mr. Galton does not actually sa2/ this of arguments 
 drawn from the teaching of Scripture or the teaching of Christ : 
 he does not indeed mention these arguments at all. But when, 
 after having, as he conceives, disposed of the argument from the 
 general consent of mankind, he declares the question to be solely 
 one of statistics, it is plain that he regards the other arguments 
 as of no value whatever. I need hardly say that no Christian 
 controversialist could consent to conduct the discussion on these 
 principles. If the teaching and example of Christ on such a 
 point as this are to be set aside, not even because they are out- 
 weighed by other considerations, but because they are in them- 
 selves valueless, the Christian religion cannot be said to exist. 
 Mr. Leslie Stephen's question — Are we Christians? — must be 
 answered in the negative ; and it is hardly worth while to de- 
 fend one doctrine in the general collapse of Christianity. I must 
 premise, therefore, in examining Mr. Galton' s arguments, that 
 I cannot admit the reasonableness of the monopoly which he 
 claims for the statistical argument. I pass by, at this stage of 
 the discussion, the reasoning by which Mr. Galton seeks to 
 justify his rejection of the argument from general consent. 
 The examination of this reasoning will find a more fitting place 
 when I come to consider the argument itself : for the present I 
 would only observe that, in noticing any other argument, Mr. 
 Galton seems to admit that the statistical argument is not ab- 
 solutely decisive. I do not think that all those who agree with 
 
176 Appendix — The Statistical A rgument. 
 
 Mr. Galton's conclusion would admit so much. **We do not 
 "want to know," say a great many, "what has been taught as 
 truth, or what we may expect to be true. We want to know 
 what is true. Statistics can tell us that, and we will not listen 
 to any other argument." 
 
 If this claim to a monopoly in the decision of every question 
 to which they are applicable be a just claim, it must be confessed 
 that statistics are greatly belied by the common proverb that 
 *'you can prove anything by figures." Eut the truth is, that 
 the assurance derivable from statistics varies with the circum- 
 stances of the case, from the faintest presumption up to a proba- 
 bility so strong as to be indistinguishable from certainty. There 
 are, undoubtedly, cases in which all would concede a monopoly 
 to the statistical argument by refusing a hearing to any other. 
 1^0 one would listen to an d, priori argument against the con- 
 clusion that drunkenness is the cause of disease, crime, and 
 misery. If such an argument were advanced, men would say, 
 *' It can be shown by statistics that the fact is real, and we do 
 not care to hear an argument which could at most only show 
 that this fact is d priori improbable." This answer is quite 
 reasonable in a case where the statistical argument is so strong 
 as to leave no doubt on the mind of any one, but would be 
 altogether w^zreasonable in a great number of cases to which 
 statistics can be applied, but with results far less decisive. In 
 such cases the rejection of d_^nor« arguments cannot be justified. 
 The concession of an absolute superiority over a priori argu- 
 ments, which so many are willing to make to the argument from 
 statistics, is probably due to the fact that this argument pro- 
 fesses to tell us what lias happened ; whereas d priori arguments 
 only profess to tell what may be expected to happen or to have 
 happened. The very form of expression of the second class of 
 arguments shows that only a prolahle conclusion can be derived 
 from them ; whereas in the other the form of expression appears 
 
The Statistical Argimient. 177 
 
 to promise certainty, and not unfrequently obtains the credit of 
 that which it seems to promise. The truth is, however, as the 
 Calculus of Probabilities proves, that statistics never give absolute 
 certainty. Indeed the very nature of the argument, which is 
 essentially cumulative, shows that it can only lead to a proba- 
 ble conclusion. The probability may be so high as to give an 
 assurance which is practically equivalent to certainty ; but it is 
 a probability still, and may be a very slight probability. To 
 reject all other arguments in favour of that derived from statis- 
 tics, before we have even ascertained what amount of probability 
 this argument can give, is therefore inconsistent with the prin- 
 ciples of just reasoning. 
 
 In examining the several statistical arguments adduced by 
 Mr. Galton, I must take exception to the principles which he 
 lays down for the guidance of the inquiry. 
 
 *' The principles are broad and simple upon which our inquiry 
 into the efficacy of prayer must be established. We must gather 
 cases for statistical comparison, in which the same object is 
 keenly pursued by two classes similar in their physical, but 
 opposite in their spiritual state ; the one class being prayerful, 
 the other materialistic. Prudent pious people must be com- 
 pared with prudent materialistic people, and not with the im- 
 prudent nor the vicious." ^ 
 
 The adoption of this principle would exclude from conside- 
 ration all cases in which the accomplishment of the petitioner's 
 desire is effected by means which we usually call ''natural." 
 Thus, for example, if the thing asked for be worldly prosperity, 
 the prayer may be answered by giving to the petitioner a larger 
 measure of the mental qualities by which worldly prosperity is 
 secured — by rendering him more intelligent or more cautious. 
 Mr. Galton, by refusing to compare prudent persons who pray 
 with imprudent persons who do not pray, in effect discards all 
 1 Fortnightly Hevieiv, ut supra, p. 126. 
 N 
 
178 Appendix. — The Statistical Argument. 
 
 such cases from consideration. Such a principle would admit 
 no prayer to he successful which was not the immediate antece- 
 dent to the acquisition hy the supplicant of that for which he 
 prays. If the immediate antecedent he a phenomenon which, 
 in the ordinary sequence of events, usually precedes that which 
 is the subject of the prayer, Mr. Galton's principle would re- 
 quire us to exclude such a case from our statistical inquiry. 
 
 Statistics thus obtained are inapplicable to the Christian 
 theory — perhaps to any theory — of prayer. It is not asserted 
 that in every case of successful prayer the blessing follows im- 
 mediately on the petition, without the intervention of any 
 other phenomenon. On the contrary, the common saying, that 
 ''God works by means," indicates the usual expectation of 
 certain intervening steps between the Divine volition and the 
 accomplishment of the petitioner's desire. All prayers which 
 are thus answered would be, according to Mr. Galton's principle, 
 classed as unsuccessful — a classification which is obviously un- 
 just. I cannot think, therefore, that any valid argument against 
 the efficacy of prayer can be founded on statistics so obtained. 
 It is right to observe, however, that the special statistics which 
 Mr. Galton has adduced are not open to this objection. But the 
 remark does apply with a certain amount of force to some of his 
 more general arguments. Thus prayer for the recovery of a 
 sick person may be answered either by giving a more than or- 
 dinary effect to the treatment which has been adopted, or by 
 suggesting a better treatment to the mind of the physician. 
 Suppose the prayer to be answered in the second way. The 
 physician has no means of distinguishing such a suggestion from 
 the ordinary prompting of his own mind. The amendment of 
 the sick person would be the immediate consequent, not of the 
 prayer, but of the application of a new remedy. Statistics col- 
 lected as Mr. Galton proposes to collect them would take no 
 cognizance of the intervention of prayer in such a series. Mr. 
 
The Statistical Argiuncnt. ing 
 
 Oalton "^oulcl refuse to compare the number of cases of recovery 
 under one kind of treatment with the number of cases of recovery 
 under a different kind of treatment. The difference of treat- 
 ment might be itself the result of prayer, but it would not be 
 attributed to prayer. The recovery of the sick person would 
 be ascribed simply to its immediate antecedents — namely, the 
 particular medical treatment employed ; and this treatment itself 
 would be, if any cause were sought, ascribed to the genius or 
 learning of the physician, unaided by any supernatural power. 
 In such a case prayer might have a real effect, and yet no trace 
 of the effect would appear in a statistical return. 
 
 Eut the attempt to deduce a conclusion with regard to the 
 efficacy of prayer from the statistics of recovery is attended by 
 another difficulty. It has been said — How are we to distinguish 
 real from unreal prayer ? We see hundreds — thousands — assume 
 the attitude and the words of supplication. What statistical re- 
 turn can tell us how many of them really pray ? But, in such a 
 case as that which we are now considering, shall we not rather 
 ask. How many do not pray? How many are there, at least 
 among Theists, whose scepticism is proof against the sight of one 
 they love hanging between life and death? Han may be sceptical 
 in calmer moments, but is he sceptical then? The impulse which 
 turns his eyes to heaven — the cry for help which rises to his Kps — 
 are these things confined to the ''religious world " ? The contro- 
 versialist may condemn these impulses as irrational, comparing 
 them to the mournful cry of a dumb animal when in pain. But 
 the question here is not. Are these things irrational ? but, Are 
 they real? If they are real, where shall we look for any 
 account, approaching to accuracy, of the unprayed-for sick ? If 
 we assume that none are prayed for except those whose friends 
 are habitually religious, I believe that we shall be very wide of 
 the truth. 
 
 There are, then, as it seems to me, two elements of uncer- 
 
 n2 
 
i8o Appendix. — The Statistical Arguinent, 
 
 tainty in arguments against the efficacy of prayer derived from 
 the statistics of recovery from sickness. In the first place, such 
 statistics would take no account of cases, if such existed, in 
 which the effect of prayer was shown, not directly, but by the 
 intervention of a natural agent ; and in the second place, they 
 would reckon as unprayed-for recoveries, and therefore as in- 
 stances adverse to the efficacy of prayer, many cases in which 
 real prayer had been made. 
 
 Eut I need not dwell further on this argument, as I do not 
 suppose that there are any accurate statistics of the percent- 
 ages of recovery among persons whose friends are religious, 
 as compared with similar percentages among those whose 
 friends are not religious. Mr. Galton's argument is here only 
 indirectly statistical. ''Physicians," he says, ''do not believe 
 in the efficacy of prayer. A class of men who are most deeply 
 interested in watching for every influence, favourable or in- 
 jurious, which can affect the progress of disease, have syste- 
 matically ignored the influence of prayer. If this influence 
 were real, must they not know it? If they believed it to be 
 real, would they not urge the use of this, as they would of any 
 other means which might promote the recovery of their patients ? 
 If they do not so urge it, is it not because they do not believe ?" 
 
 Does not this argument prove too much ? Are there no 
 physicians who believe in the efficacy of prayer ? It is certainly 
 a very common article of faith in the Christian world ? Is it 
 rejected by the whole medical world? If there be physicians 
 who believe in the efficacy of p?ayer, why do they not urge its 
 importance upon the friends of their patients ? Eecause, replies 
 in effect Mr. Galton, they do not really believe it. " Although 
 they have heard it insisted on from childhood upwards, they are 
 unable to detect its influence." ^ Mr. Galton does not, of course^ 
 
 > Page 127. 
 
The Statistical Arorument. i8i 
 
 mean that a physician will use no remedy unless he has personally 
 ** detected its influence." Enough for him that from whatever 
 reason — personal experience, the experience of other men, or a 
 knowledge of the general properties of the proposed remedy — 
 he helieves that this remedy will have a beneficial effect. Mr. 
 Galton's explanation of the fact that physicians do not usually 
 insist upon the importance of prayer cannot mean less than 
 this — that their belief is unreal. 
 
 Kow Mr. Galton can hardly doubt that very many of those to 
 whom he attributes unbelief would flatly contradict him. He 
 may say that they do not know themselves, and that they are 
 dignifying with the name of belief that which is no more than a 
 traditional idea, whose correctness it has never occurred to them 
 to question. Eut, as no man can look into the mind of another, 
 the fact remains, that Mr. Galton's mode of explaining the 
 silence of physicians as to the importance of prayer obliges him 
 to make an assertion with regard to the belief of other men, 
 which the men themselves — the only possible witnesses upon 
 the subject — would deny without hesitation. 
 
 But it may be said. This is an inference, not an assertion ; and 
 if you dispute its truth, you are bound to point out the fallacy 
 in the process by which it is inferred. To this it may be re- 
 plied, in the first place, that whether it be an assertion or an 
 inference, its truth is open to grave suspicion if it be opposed 
 to the testimony of those whose state of mind it professes to 
 describe. If it be a logical inference, this doubt necessarily 
 attaches to one or both of the premises from which it is in- 
 ferred. ]^ow Mr. Galton's argument may be logically stated as 
 follows : — 
 
 Physicians habitually urge upon the friends of their patients 
 the practice of everything which they regard as important to 
 the patient's recovery. 
 
 But they do not habitually urge the practice of prayer. 
 
1 8 2 Appendix. — The Statistical Argume7it. 
 
 Therefore they do not regard prayer as important to the re- 
 covery of their patients. 
 
 Of these premises the minor is, I suppose, generally, though 
 not universally, true. Eut certainly the same cannot be said of 
 the major premiss. Physicians do not habitually urge the prac- 
 tice of every thing which they regard as important to the recovery 
 of their patients. There is nothing, for example, more impor- 
 tant than kindness and love on the part of the friends who sur- 
 round the sick man's bed. Yet I do not suppose that physicians 
 habitually urge upon them the medical importance of kindness : 
 and the reason of this silence is not, certainly, that they regard 
 kindness as wwimportant, but that they assume as a matter of 
 course, unless they have proof of the contrary, that the friends 
 of the sufferer will be kind to him. 
 
 So, too, in the case of prayer. That a person who has faith, 
 even a weak faith, in its efficacy, will pray for one he loves 
 when attacked by a dangerous illness, is as certain as that one 
 of an affectionate disposition will be kind to him. The physician 
 who himself believes in the efficacy of prayer knows this per- 
 fectly. He knows that it is quite as superfluous to exhort a 
 person, who ^as even a small measure of this faith, to pray for a 
 suffering friend as it would be to exhort one of a loving dis- 
 position to be kind to him. Even a clergyman would probably 
 consider any very strenuous exhortation to the practice of this- 
 duty unnecessary. He knows that at such a moment submission, 
 not prayer, is the really difficult task. 
 
 But if the friend be an absolute (^wbeliever in the efficacy of 
 prayer, the exhortation would be useless, for another reason. 
 Such a person could not pray, except as an experiment ; and if 
 the physician holds the Christian theory on the subject, he 
 knows that experimental prayer will not succeed. 
 
 On the whole, I do not think that it can be reasonably in- 
 ferred from the silence of physicians, as to the efficacy of prayer,. 
 
The Statistical Argiunent. 183 
 
 that they really disbelieve it. And I am sure that there are 
 yery many who would, for themselves, reject such an assertion 
 as -wholly untrue. 
 
 Passing now to Mr. Galton's statistics proper, I observe, in 
 the first place, that before we can apply the Method of Differ- 
 ences to establish the action, or inaction, of a particular cause, 
 we must be satisfied that between the classes compared there is 
 but one cIcibs difference which is capable of producing the diffe- 
 rence of effect observed. "Where these precautions have been 
 neglected, the most absurd and contradictory results have been 
 deduced from facts which were in themselves true. Quite 
 recently, for example, writers and speakers have been mar- 
 shalling facts for the purpose of proving that vaccination 
 augments both the extent and the virulence of the small-pox 
 epidemic. Eesults like these, obtained generally by a disregard 
 of the necessary precaution mentioned above, have often brought 
 upon the statistical method a large amount of discredit, finding 
 its common expression in the well-known proverb which I have 
 before quoted. But this discredit is unjust. It attaches to the 
 abuse, not the use, of the statistical argument. The method of 
 statistics is no more responsible for the absurdities which men 
 professing to use it, while neglectful of its true principles, have 
 seemed to deduce, than is the science of logic for the fallacies 
 which their authors have affected to clothe in logical forms. 
 
 I cannot think that Mr. Galton has been careful to observe the 
 rule which I have stated. Thus, for example, in order to show 
 that prayers for longevity have no effect, he quotes certain 
 statistical returns which appear to prove that members of royal 
 families are in reality more short-lived than ordinary men, 
 although they have in a more than ordinary degree the benefit 
 of the prayers of the community. Now this argument is open 
 to the objection stated above. It makes an assumption with 
 regard to the effect of class differences which is purely hypo- 
 
1 84 Appendix. — The Statistical Argument, 
 
 thetical. Mr. Galton, indeed, makes the same assertion of those 
 who maintain the efficacy of prayer. Hypothesis is, he thinks, 
 necessary to make tlieir position tenable. Thus, after proving, 
 as he supposes, that members of royal families are more than 
 ordinarily short-lived, he says : '^ The prayer has, therefore, no 
 efficacy, unless the very questionable hypothesis be raised, that 
 the conditions of royal life may naturally be yet more fatal, and 
 that their influence is partly, though incompletely, neutralized 
 by the effect of public prayers." ^ 
 
 On this statement I have to observe that, in laying hypothesis 
 to the charge of his opponents, Mr. Galton mistakes his logical 
 position. The statistical argument is liis^ not theirs. It is he 
 who, if he would make it an argument, and not a mere collection 
 of facts, is constrained to assume a principle, namely this, that if 
 prayer be set aside, the other class differences would produce 
 exactly the effect which the facts show to he produced. This is 
 a pure hypothesis, and, so far as I can see, without foundation, 
 unless the inefficacy of prayer be already admitted. "We have 
 no right to select one of a number of asserted causes and declare 
 it to be inefficacious, because the total effect of all the causes is 
 contrary to that which this single cause, acting by itself, would 
 have produced. Thus, for example, suppose it to be admitted 
 (it is probably true) that royal children receive more than ave- 
 rage care during their childhood. Suppose that a statistician were 
 to argue from this fact, combined with the ascertained length of 
 life in the case of royal families, that care of children was use- 
 less or pernicious, every one would feel that his reasoning was 
 illogical. It would at once be replied — l^o ; you have not proved 
 that this care is either useless or pernicious ; for it is quite 
 possible that its effect may be more than neutralized by other 
 influences peculiar to the class, and unfavourable to longevity. 
 In the present case, no one, I presume, contends that the lives 
 1 Pa^e 128. 
 
The Statistical Argimient 185 
 
 of memlDers of royal families are shortened by prayer. If, there- 
 fore, \h& fact of a shorter duration of life in this class of persons 
 have been ascertained, it is plain that class influences unfavour- 
 able to longevity do exist. The sole question is of the amount 
 <A effect which these influences produce ; and it is a pure hypo- 
 thesis which assigns to them just such an intensity as to produce 
 the exact amount observed, without the intervention of the cause 
 which it is sought to discredit. The average life of members of 
 royal families is shorter, says Mr. Galton, by 6*18 years, than 
 the average life of ordinary gentry. Therefore the prayers for a 
 long life offered up in their behalf have no effect. The '' sup- 
 pressed premiss " (to speak logically) of this argument is, that 
 the other class differences between the members of royal families 
 and ordinary gentry would produce in the average lengths of 
 their lives a difference of 6-18 years — neither more nor less — 
 and this is a pure hypothesis. 
 
 It may be objected to the estimate of the longevity of the 
 members of royal families which Mr. Galton has here quoted 
 from Dr. Guy, that it is founded on a too narrow induction ; 
 and certainly the number of instances, 97, is somewhat small. 
 Still it is true that if these instances presented only individual 
 differences, the probability, mathematically estimated, would be 
 very considerable that Dr. Guy's figures denote a real class 
 difference. But it must be remembered that the number of 
 families from which these individuals are selected is very much 
 less than the number of the individuals, and that although the 
 number of individuals may be sufiicient to obliterate the effect 
 of individual peculiarities, the number of families may be quite 
 «wsufficient to obliterate the effect of family peculiarities. Two 
 or three short-lived individuals would produce no perceptible 
 effect, but two or three short-lived families might diminish the 
 average quite perceptibly. 
 
 Mr. Galton has himself given the instance, to which I have 
 
1 8 6 Appendix. — The Statistical A rguinent, 
 
 referred in the text, of the mode in which statistics apparently 
 unfavourable may be met. He refuses, and I think rightly, to 
 accept the superior longevity of the clergy as a proof of the 
 efficacy of prayer for a long life. In this case he recognises 
 fully the truth of the principle, that we have no right to pick 
 out one among a number of co-existing causes, and to ascribe a 
 given effect to that one. Mr. Galton does, indeed, point out 
 certain class differences which tend to lengthen the lives of the 
 clergy. But it is quite as easy, as I have shown in the text, to- 
 point out certain class differences which are emfavourable ta 
 their longevity. In fine, then, a statistical argument in favour 
 of the efficacy of prayer drawn from the longer lives of the clergy 
 is invalid. A statistical argument against the efficacy of prayer^ 
 drawn from the shorter lives of the members of royal families^ 
 is in nowise more valid. In order to construct either argument, 
 it is necessary to make an assumption, with regard to the aggre- 
 gate effect of the other causes which influence the duration of 
 human life, of which no sufficient proof can be given. 
 
 It is necessary to observe here that Mr. Galton quotes certain 
 statistics which might seem to weaken or even reverse any argu- 
 ment drawn from the greater longevity of the clergy. These 
 statistics are derived from the ages at death of clergymen whose 
 lives are recorded in the Biographical Dictionary ; and they 
 prove, if they prove anything, that whereas ordinary clergymen 
 live longer lives than other ordinary men belonging to the 
 higher classes of society, eminent clergymen live shorter lives 
 than other eminent men. Eut the statistics do not really prove 
 this ; and Dr. Guy himself, from whom Mr. Galton quotes, has 
 given the cause of the discrepancy : — ''As the Biography is very 
 comprehensive, the ages at death are those of clergymen who 
 have lived at very different periods of time, from the date of the 
 earliest trustworthy records down to the early part of the pre- 
 sent century." ^ This consideration would not invalidate Mr. 
 ^ Journal of the Statistical Society, vol. xiv., p. 290. 
 
The Statistical Argument, 187 
 
 Galton's inference, if the lives of the other eminent men were 
 taken in the same proportion from the different periods. But 
 this is not even approximately true. In the early centuries a 
 much larger proportion of eminent men were divines than in the 
 later centuries; and therefore the comparison is really made 
 "between persons living at different periods marked by different 
 average lengths of human life. JS'o trustworthy inference can 
 he drawn from such a comparison. 
 
 On the whole, a detailed examination of Mr. Galton's reason- 
 ing appears to me to justify the conclusions already stated. 
 
 The statistical argument is theoretically applicable to every 
 case in which the relation of cause and effect, or of condition 
 and result, is supposed to exist between two phenomena which 
 are, more or less completely, within the range of human know- 
 ledge. In all such cases the application of the "Method of 
 Differences" is perfectly logical, if the logical conditions of that 
 method have been fulfilled. If we can find two classes suffi- 
 ciently numerous to obliterate the effect of individual differences, 
 and whose only class difference consists in the presence of tha 
 alleged cause in one class and its absence from the other, the 
 statistics of such classes ought to tell us whether the cause does 
 really produce the effect ascribed to it. I conceive, therefore, 
 that Mr. Galton has a perfect theoretical right to apply the 
 statistical argument to such a question as that of the efficacy of 
 prayer. But, in the practical application of this argument, I 
 cannot think that he has successfully realized the conditions im- 
 posed by the Method of Differences. The classes of lives which 
 he compares have, quite independently of prayer, class differences 
 which affect length of life. His own statistics prove it — nay, 
 he is himself obliged to rely upon the existence of those diffe- 
 rences, lest an inference favourable to the efficacy of prayer 
 might be drawn from some of the statistics which he has adduced. 
 And in the case to which he seems to attach most weight, it is- 
 
1 88 Appe7idix. — Argument from the 
 
 plain that, if any general conclusion can be drawn from the 
 statistics, a class difference unfavourable to longevity does exist, 
 and the whole question relates to the amount of the effect which 
 it produces. That this amount is precisely the same as it would 
 be if prayers were discontinued may be true ; but it is not an 
 inference — it is a hypothesis. 
 
 "Without, then, denying all weight to Mr. Galton's statistical 
 argument against the efficacy of prayer, the assertion that it is 
 conclusive of the question, or even very strong, appears to me 
 to be untenable. 
 
 IS'oTE M, Page 79. 
 
 AEGUMENT FROM THE GENERAL CONSENT OF MANE:IND. 
 
 I have endeavoured to show (App., pp. 122, et seci.) that, to 
 •each individual, his own undoubting belief is his ultimate cri- 
 terion of truth, inasmuch as it is the mental effect by which only 
 he can recognise the presence of the cause, objective truth. 
 The question which I have now to consider is a different one. 
 That we must give weight to our own belief is a truism, amount- 
 ing to no more than this — that we must believe that which 
 we believe. What weight we ought to attach to the belief of 
 another, merely because it is his belief, or whether we should 
 attach to it any weight at all, are wholly different questions. 
 
 Different, however, as these questions are from that which 
 has been already considered, they have an intimate and necessary 
 connexion with it. If each man is obliged to adopt, as his 
 criterion of objective truth, his own undoubting belief, he can- 
 not reject as devoid of weight the undoubting belief of other 
 men, without exalting his own intellect into an exceptional 
 position to which it is in nowise entitled. A sentence which 
 •condemns as valueless the judgment of mankind generally, mak- 
 
General Consent of Mankind. 189 
 
 ing at the same time an exception in favonr of one individual, 
 cannot be reasonably defended. A sentence which makes no 
 exception implies universal scepticism. 
 
 I have said in the text (p. 85) that the general agreement of 
 mankind is a phenomenon which requires to be accounted for ; 
 and that the truth of the proposition in which they agree is a 
 mode of accounting for the agreement. In the absence, there- 
 fore, of any other plausible explanation of the phenomenon, we 
 are bound to attach considerable weight to the general agree- 
 ment of mankind, as evidence of the truth of the proposition. 
 So much is, in principle, admitted by llr. Mill, although the 
 actual amount of weight which he would concede to this argu- 
 ment appears to be small. Thus, in discussing the change in 
 the intellectual attitude of thoughtful unbelievers towards the 
 religious ideas of mankind, he says : — 
 
 *'This tendency of recent speculation to look upon human 
 opinions pre-eminently from an historical point of view, as facts 
 obeying laws of their own, and requiring, like other observed 
 facts, an historical or a scientific explanation (a tendency not 
 confined to religious subjects), is by no means to be blamed, but 
 to be applauded ; not solely as drawing attention to an impor- 
 tant and previously neglected aspect of human opinions, but be- 
 cause it has a real though indirect bearing upon the question of 
 their truth. Tor, whatever opinion a person may adopt on any 
 subject that admits of controversy, his assurance, if he be a 
 cautious thinker, cannot be complete unless he is able to account 
 for the existence of the opposite opinion. To ascribe it to the 
 weakness of the human understanding is an explanation which 
 cannot be sufficient for such a thinker, for he will he slow to 
 assume that he has himself a less share of that infirmity than the 
 rest of manhind, and that error is more likely to he on the other 
 side than on his own. In his examination of evidence, the per- 
 suasion of others, perhaps of mankind in general, is one of the 
 
I go Appendix. — Argument from the 
 
 data of the case — one of the phenomena to he accounted for. As 
 the human intellect, though weak, is not essentially perverted, 
 there is a certain presumption of the truth of any opinion held 
 by many human minds, requiring to be rebutted by assigning 
 some other real or possible cause for its prevalence." — Essay on 
 Theism, pp. 127, 128. 
 
 I may here remark, with special reference to the sentence 
 which I have italicized, that such an assumption as Mr. Mill 
 here speaks of, even were it allowable, would be wholly in- 
 sufficient to justify rejection of the belief of other men as devoid 
 of weight. "We have seen that each man's undoubting belief is, 
 for him, the ultimate criterion of truth. It is a mental pheno- 
 menon which includes a reference to objective truth as its cause. 
 This connexion between the internal and the external phenome- 
 non is one which, by a necessity of our nature, we are compelled 
 to recognise. Were this recognition to cease, the result would 
 be absolute scepticism. !N"ow, denial of all weight to the belief 
 of other men is equivalent to refusal to recognise, in their case, 
 any connexion between the internal phenomenon — belief, and 
 the external phenomenon — truth. He who, while continuing to 
 recognise the connexion in his own case, refuses to recognise it 
 as existing, in any degree, in the case of other men, must do 
 more than assume that he has a less share of infirmity than the 
 rest of mankind. He must assume that he is in this respect 
 unique among men. He must assume that, when existing in 
 his mind, belief has a significance which it has not in any other 
 mind. "With him — so he must think — belief indicates the pre- 
 sence of objective truth. "With the rest of mankind it indicates 
 nothing. I do not imagine that any man would adopt this con- 
 clusion when thus nakedly stated; but the denial of all argumen- 
 tative weight to the general belief of mankind involves no less. 
 
 So far, however, we have advanced but a short way. There 
 is little practical utility in the conclusion that some argumen- 
 
General Consent of Mankind. 19 r 
 
 tative weight ought to be conceded to the belief of mankind, 
 unless we can make some attempt to answer the question — How 
 much ? The concession of sowie weight to general belief will 
 avail but little, if the amount conceded is so small that it does 
 not practically affect the question in the decision of which this 
 •argument is employed. It is thus that Mr. Mill would treat it : — 
 
 **To a thinker," he says, ''the argument from other people's 
 ■opinions has little weight. It is but second-hand evidence ; and 
 merely admonishes us to look out for and weigh the reasons on 
 which this conviction of mankind or of wise men was founded.'* 
 — Essay on Tlieism, p. 156. 
 
 If I rightly understand this passage, the weight which Mr. 
 Mill would allow to the general consent of mankind is very 
 small indeed. If ''the argument from other people's opinions 
 . . . . merely admonishes us to look out for and weigh the 
 reasons" on which this consent was founded, the word " argu- 
 ment" would seem to be misapplied. If, in the investigation 
 of truth, the history of human belief is to enact a part merely 
 suggestive, being allowed no weight in the final decision of any 
 question, it is hard to see how the existence of a general belief 
 on any subject could furnish an argument, in the proper sense 
 of that word. Such a history will no doubt suggest arguments, 
 on which the mind of the inquirer is to decide ; but it would 
 seem that no significance ought to be conceded to the mere fact 
 that other men have examined these arguments and believed 
 them to be conclusive. This appears to be the legitimate in- 
 ference from the passage which I have quoted, although I can 
 hardly think that Mr. Mill intended so sweeping a sentence. If 
 the human mind be not indifferent as between truth and false- 
 hood, some significance must be attached to the fact of human 
 belief. If the human mind le indifferent, absolute scepticism 
 seems to be the only attitude which a thinker can assume. The 
 xemaining alternative, that each man should attribute to himself 
 
192 Appejidix, — Argument from the 
 
 a unique power of arriying at truth is, of course, not to be- 
 thought of. 
 
 But this principle leads us still further. Absolute denial of 
 argumentative weight to the fact of human belief leads, as we 
 have seen, to absolute scepticism. "We cannot exclude ourselves 
 from the sentence which we pass on mankind generally. If we 
 deny all significance to the fact of human belief, we must deny 
 all significance to the fact of our own belief. This is absolute 
 scepticism. If, while we do not absolutely deny it, we pro- 
 nounce the significance of human belief, considered as an argu- 
 ment, to be very slight, we must pass the same sentence upon 
 the significance of our own belief. This is scepticism too, though 
 not absolute scepticism. In the first case we deny that there is 
 any connexion between the mental phenomenon, belief, and the 
 external phenomenon, objective truth. In the second case, 
 while we do not deny the connexion altogether, we declare that 
 it is very slight. We declare that the number of cases in which 
 this connexion exists exceeds, but only by a very little, the 
 number of cases in which it does not exist ; and that, therefore, 
 an argument based upon the assumption of its existence in any 
 particular case is weak, and ought not to be relied on. The 
 first principle would annihilate human knowledge. The second 
 would reduce it to a low probability, to which the term ^' know- 
 ledge" would be quite inapplicable. The effect of either, if 
 logically carried out, would be to remove this word from our 
 vocabulary, or to change its meaning. 
 
 But neither principle is logically carried out. Men may deny 
 or underrate the argumentative value of the belief of other men, 
 but they treat their own belief quite differently. It may, in- 
 deed, be contended that we could not do otherwise. Scepticism 
 with regard to our own belief, it may be said, is impossible, for 
 it involves a contradiction. To realize it, the mind should 
 assume two opposing attitudes at the same moment — at once 
 
General Conseiii of Mankind. 1 93 
 
 "believing and not believing. It is, then, impossible to carry 
 out the principle logically. A necessity of our nature obliges 
 us to make an exception in our own favour. 
 
 I do not here stop to consider the argument against a prin- 
 ciple which may be derived from the fact that its logical de- 
 velopment is impossible. In the present case I think that the 
 impossibility is only apparent, and that if we were disposed to 
 carry out the principle logically, we could do so. The process, 
 I suppose, would be somewhat of the following kind : — A thinker, 
 who has arrived at the conclusion that no weight ought to be 
 allowed to the belief of other men, finds himself engaged in the 
 investigation of a question. The evidence presented to him is 
 sufficient to produce belief ; and as he is probably not thinking 
 at that moment of his general sceptical principle, belief is really 
 produced. Then, however, this principle does occur to his mind. 
 He reflects that he has already condemned as valueless the belief 
 of other men. He has denied that there is any connexion be- 
 tween the internal phenomenon, belief, as appearing in their 
 minds, and the external phenomenon, objective truth. Then 
 the thought may force its way — What right have I to think 
 that this connexion exists in my case ? Am I a unique being, 
 whose belief indicates the presence of objective truth, while 
 the belief of every other man is to be regarded as insignificant ? 
 Surely this cannot be. 
 
 The result of such a train of thought will be to shake the 
 belief which had been produced. It is not that he believes and 
 does not believe at the same moment, but that he ceases to be- 
 lieve — not because the evidence appears to him less convincing 
 than before, but because he has learned to distrust his own 
 faculties. The mind becomes in this instance, and under the 
 influence of the same thought will soon become in every in- 
 stance, incapable of belief. This is absolute scepticism — a state 
 of mind which is not, as some writers have said, self-contra- 
 
 o 
 
194 Appendix. — Argument from the 
 
 dictory. It is not a belief that there is no belief. It is simply 
 incapability of belief. The mind is so changed, that it is no 
 longer capable of producing the phenomenon, belief. I cannot 
 see that there is in this anything self- contradictory, however 
 rare such a state of mind may in reality be. It is rare, if in- 
 deed it exist at all. Even among those who condemn human 
 belief as worthless, or nearly so, this scepticism is rare, not be- 
 cause they are logical, but because they are illogical — because, 
 while they would discredit the faculties by which other men 
 arrive at truth, they make an unjustifiable exception in favour 
 of their own. 
 
 Admitting, however, that a general rejection of the argument 
 derived from human belief cannot be justified by reason, we may 
 still inquire whether we cannot exercise discrimination in the 
 reception of this argument. Are we obliged to assign argu- 
 mentative weight to every kind of human belief, or are there 
 any which, without general scepticism, we are warranted in re- 
 jecting ? We have seen that belief is an effect which, unless 
 we are prepared to adopt absolute scepticism as the proper atti- 
 tude of the human mind, we are, in the absence of positive evi- 
 dence, bound to ascribe to objective truth as its most probable 
 cause. This presumption in favour of truth remains, even in 
 the presence of opposing evidence, and must always be taken 
 into account in estimating the argumentative value of human 
 belief. As, however, this, like all other presumptions, may be 
 overcome by evidence, the first question which, in any case of 
 belief, we must endeavour to determine is, whether there be 
 such evidence — evidence, I mean, not against the truth of the 
 thing believed, but in favour of the existence of a cause of be- 
 lief other than truth. That there are such causes is well known. 
 Early education, self-interest, love, hatred, and others less re- 
 markable, may and do produce belief, in the absence of truth. 
 If the belief in question can be traced with probability to one 
 
General Consent of Ma7ikind. 195 
 
 of these causes, we are justified in attaching proportionately- 
 little argumentative weight to such a belief. This probability 
 may often be established when those who join in such a belief 
 have given their reasons for so doing. This statement may 
 show plainly the presence of some one or more of the extraneous 
 causes, if we may so call them. The same thing may appear 
 from the arguments by which men seek to win others to their own 
 opinions. If a man try to persuade another to adopt a particular 
 belief, not by laying before him evidence to prove its truth, 
 but by impressing upon him that it is beneficial to himself or 
 others that he should believe it, it is a probable inference that 
 his own belief was influenced by similar considerations. To 
 such a belief we should not be justified in attaching much argu- 
 mentative weight. It is probably one of those beliefs whose 
 existence is due, not to the truth of the thing believed, but to 
 one of those causes which I have called '' extraneous." 
 
 We have thus seen that, if the reasons assigned for a certain 
 belief by those who hold it belong to a class which does not pro- 
 fess to be connected with the truth of the thing believed, we 
 are justified in rejecting that belief as devoid of argumentative 
 weight. We have now to inquire whether the same be true in 
 every case in which the reasons appear to us to be insufiicient, 
 although professing to belong to a class which is connected with 
 the truth of the thing believed. Such appears to be the opinion 
 of Mr. Mill, in the passage already cited, in which he would 
 assign to the fact of human belief a function purely suggestive. 
 If this be its sole function, it is plain that we ought to attacli 
 no weight to the fact, that other men have considered these 
 arguments to be conclusive. Is this true ? Ought a thinker, 
 when attempting to determine the force of an argument which 
 other men have examined before him, to leave altogether out of 
 consideration the conclusion at which they have arrived ? Surely 
 such a course would involve the error noticed before — namely, 
 
196 Appendix, — Argument from the 
 
 a tacit assumption that his nature is exceptional — that the power 
 of arriving at truth by process of reasoning has been given to 
 him alone. If it have been given in any degree to other men, 
 the rejection of their reasoning as valueless seems to be illogi- 
 cal. The actual amount of weight to be assigned to such rea- 
 sonings will necessarily depend upon the intellectual power 
 of the reasoners, and upon their freedom from the action of the 
 extraneous causes of belief before alluded to. 
 
 It remains to inquire whether any weight ought to be assigned 
 to general belief in truths which come to us not by reason but 
 by intuition. Here it seems to me that a thinker has even less 
 right than in the case of truths obtained by reasoning to set aside 
 as valueless the conclusions of other men. In the case which 
 we have just considered, he may be able to refute the arguments 
 on which these conclusions are professedly founded. He may 
 be able to do this so as to satisfy, not only his own mind but also 
 the minds of others, that there is a fatal error in the reasoning 
 employed or in the facts which have been used as premises. 
 He may thus justify his neglect of these conclusions. But an 
 asserted truth which rests immediately on an intuition can 
 neither be proved nor refuted. The acceptance or rejection of 
 such a truth depends on the constitution of the mind to which 
 it is presented, and on nothing else. He who believes it can 
 give no reason for his belief beyond this, that he cannot help it. 
 The history of such beliefs cannot, therefore, be suggestive, and 
 must be set aside as valueless, if no weight is to be assigned to 
 the mere fact that these beliefs have actually existed. Is such 
 rejection justifiable ? 
 
 The subject of the supposed intuitive belief is not likely to 
 be a matter of intuition to the thinker himself. Rarely is an 
 intuitive belief displaced from the position which it holds in one 
 man's mind, by his knowledge that it does not hold that position 
 in the minds of other men ; and if the beliefs of other men have 
 
General Consent of Mankind, 197 
 
 had any share in implanting the belief in his mind, it cannot be 
 properly called an intuition. But the following observations 
 are applicable to either case. 
 
 The answer before given to the proposed rejection of human 
 belief as an argument may be repeated here. Intuitive belief, 
 like any other belief, is a phenomenon to be accounted for. 
 One of the extraneous causes by which other kinds of belief may 
 often be accounted for, namely, fallacious argument, has no 
 place here. If no one of the other extraneous causes, as educa- 
 tion, interest, &c., can be with certainty assigned to the pheno- 
 menon, we are compelled to allow a certain probability to the 
 theory of this phenomenon, which assigns as its cause the truth 
 of the thing believed. The amount of this probability will 
 necessarily depend on the improbability of the existence and 
 sufficiency of any of the extraneous causes. 
 
 Let us take, for example, one of our moral intuitions. It has 
 been observed (let us suppose), that a certain action is very 
 generally condemned by the moral sense of mankind. It is con- 
 demned, not on account of any results which may be traced to 
 it, but because the action is regarded as intrinsically bad. But 
 although generally y it is not (let us suppose) universally condemned. 
 Among those whose moral sense refuses to condemn the action 
 is included the thinker whom we have imagined. Ought he, 
 in such a case, to assign any weight to the fact, that, to the 
 majority of mankind, this action appears bad? Surely this 
 question must be answered in the affirmative. In the absence 
 of the superiority of one class or one individual to the rest, the 
 theory of probabilities would necessarily dispose an impartial 
 judge to give the preference to the conclusion accepted by the 
 greatest number, on the same principle which would lead him. 
 to prefer the testimony of a larger number of witnesses to that 
 of a smaller number, in the absence of any proved superiority of 
 the latter in intelligence or truthfulness, i^ow surely, if the 
 
igS Appendix. — Argument from the 
 
 supposed thinker believe, or even suspect, that an impartial 
 judge would decide in this way, he ought not to dismiss as de- 
 void of weight the consent of those who differ from him, even in 
 an intuition. 
 
 The argument in favour of the efficacy of prayer derived from 
 the general consent of mankind is, in part though not wholly, of 
 this nature. It is not certainly a mere intuition which makes 
 man a Theist, although it helps to do so. JNTor is it from an in- 
 tuition only that he derives his belief in the efficacy of prayer. 
 Many have learned it, or thought that they learned it, from ex- 
 perience. Many have accepted this, with other revelations of 
 the Infinite, from an authority which they believed to be more 
 than human. But belief in the efficacy of prayer is wider than, 
 either of these reasons, and we must seek its cause in that all 
 but universal moral judgment which has decided that indiffer- 
 ence to the prayer of a suppliant is inconsistent with the charac- 
 ter of a benevolent being. This judgment is not an inference 
 of the reason : it is simply a moral intuition. Those to whoso 
 minds it is present can deny its force as an argument only by 
 absolute moral scepticism. Those to whose minds it is not 
 present, if they are not absolute sceptics, can deny its force as 
 an argument only by claiming for their own intuitions a con- 
 formity to truth, of which they deny any share to the intuitions 
 of other men. The former alternative involves the surrender of 
 all moral truth ; the second is simply absurd. 
 
 Before concluding this note, I must notice the objection which 
 Mr. Galton alleges against the argument from general consent. 
 As this question is important, I give Mr. Galton's reasons for 
 rejecting the argument in his own words: — ''The argument 
 from universality either proves too much, or else it is suicidal. 
 It either compels us to admit that the prayers of Pagans, of 
 Fetish worshippers, and of Buddhists who turn praying wheels, 
 are recompensed in the same way as those of orthodox believers. 
 
General Consent of Manki7id. 199 
 
 or else the general consensus proves that it has no better 
 foundation than the universal tendency of man to gross cre- 
 dulity." ^ 
 
 Of this reasoning I have to remark, in the first place, that it 
 gives a very inadequate representation of the argument derived 
 from general consent. This argument is not wholly, nor even 
 chiefly, an argument from experience. It is in great part based 
 on the common element which enters into the Theistic con- 
 ceptions of all men. That the Supreme Ruler (or Rulers) of the 
 world hears, and to some extent complies with, the expressed 
 desires of men, is perhaps the one point in which all religions 
 agree; and the argument is this — that there is a presumption 
 that the Supreme Being does really possess an attribute with 
 which the moral sense of mankind has universally agreed to in- 
 vest Him. 
 
 But passing by the a jpriori form of this argument, and re- 
 garding it as founded solely on experience, we may inquire — 
 What is the absurdity to which Mr. Galton professes to reduce 
 it ? It compels us to admit, he thinks, that the prayers of the 
 votaries of false religions are recompensed '' in the same way as 
 those of orthodox believers." If by '4n the same way" Mr. 
 Galton means ''to the same extent," it is plain that we are not 
 required to admit this at all. "We do not admit that the ex- 
 perience of all men is of equal value because we admit that the 
 experience of every man is of 8ome value. We are not obliged 
 to maintain that the prayers of the Pagan are equally efficacious 
 with the prayers of the Christian, even if we do not deny them 
 all efficacy. But if Mr. Galton' s meaning be, that it is absurd 
 to concede any efficacy to the prayer of a Pagan, because his re- 
 ligion is untrue, I think that his reductio ad ahsurdum may fairly 
 be disputed. 
 
 Every religion which includes the idea of a being higher than 
 ^ Fortnightly Review, lit supra, p. 126. 
 
200 Appendix, — Argument from the 
 
 man, who gives his approval to virtue and his displeasure to 
 vice, includes one true element. It may be combined with a 
 group of false notions which hide its real character ; the con- 
 ception of a Divine Being may be so disfigured by these additions 
 as to seem wholly devoid of truth ; and we should probably de- 
 scribe those who had formed it as worshippers of false gods. But 
 this sentence is only partly just. These Theistic conceptions are 
 erroneous, but they are not wholly false; and the question 
 which Mr. Galton's argument requires us to consider is this — 
 Is it absurd to suppose that the Divine Being would have any 
 regard to prayers inspired by a conception of His nature, 
 deeply erroneous certainly, yet not without some elements of 
 truth ? "When the Eed Indian, knowing nothing of Revelation 
 or of Christ, raises his heart in prayer to the Great Spirit whom 
 he thinks of chiefly as the master of the ''happy hunting 
 grounds" which are his Heaven, is it absurd to suppose that 
 his prayer may meet with a response from God — the God of the 
 Christian? Some might perhaps reply — Yes, it is absurd that 
 such a prayer should be heard by the God of the Christian ; for 
 it is not addressed to the God of the Christian — it is addressed 
 to an imaginary being, who has no existence except in the fancy 
 of the worshipper. 
 
 In what sense is this proposition true ? Let us consider first 
 the case of a non-Christian monotheist. In what sense is it 
 true that the worship of Ormuzd was the worship of an imaginary 
 being? It is not, surely, the name which makes him imaginary. 
 If the conception of the Supreme Being formed by the disciple 
 of Zoroaster were identical with the conception of the Supreme 
 Being formed by the Christian, would the prayers of the ancient 
 Persian have been unreal, or the object of his adoration imagi- 
 nary, because the worshipper chose to call that object Ormuzd? 
 I think not. The difference between a real and an imaginary 
 being must be in something more essential than a name. 
 
General Consent of Mankind. 201 
 
 Is the object of this worship imaginary because the worship- 
 per's conception of the Supreme Being is erroneous ? This 
 argument would prove too much. Passing over the considera- 
 tion that all human conceptions of the Divine IS'ature must err, 
 at least by defect, it is enough to remark that even members of 
 the same Christian Church differ so widely in their conceptions 
 of the Divine Mature, that some of these conceptions must in- 
 volve serious error. The God of the Red Indian does not differ 
 more widely from the God of the Christian than the God of the 
 predestinarian differs from the God of the universalist. Yet 
 neither the predestinarian nor the universalist would deny 
 efficacy to the prayers of the other. It may be said, and it is 
 quite true, that these varieties of Christian opinion have in the 
 doctrine of Christ's mediation a common element which separates 
 them from all other forms of belief. Eut would any Christian 
 pronounce it to be absurd that God should listen to the prayer 
 of a Jew ? Why, then, is it to be called absurd that God should 
 listen to the prayer of a Persian ? 
 
 Mr. Galton's reductio ad ahsurdum is certainly more plausible 
 in the case of a polytheist. Here it may be contended that the 
 conception of the Divine Being which the^worshipper has formed 
 contains an element so completely false as to deprive it of all 
 reality. It may be said that of the objects of his worship all 
 but one must be imaginary, and that even to that one a worship 
 so divided could not be pleasing. Shall the "jealous God" of 
 the Bible, it may be asked, look with any favour on petitions 
 which He is required to share with JS'eptune or Ashtaroth ? 
 
 That such a prayer should meet with the same favour as the 
 prayer of the Christian would of course be an absurd supposi- 
 tion. That it meets with any favour at all may be anj untrue 
 supposition, but it is not absurd. It is not a supposition which 
 we are justified in summarily rejecting, as Mr. Galton proposes to 
 do. Nay, there is even something to be said in its favour. The 
 
 p 
 
202 Appendix — Argument /i^oin the 
 
 presence of a Theistic element gives to every system which in- 
 cludes it a certain amount of truth which, so far, distinguishes 
 it favourably from a system in which this element is wanting. 
 ISTo Theist will deny that the polytheist is nearer to the truth 
 than the atheist. N'or does it seem absurd or even improbable 
 that even this approximation to the truth, distant as it is, 
 should meet with some favour in the sight of God. I cannot, 
 therefore, admit the validity of Mr. Galton's reductio ad ahsur- 
 dum of the argument from general consent. 
 
 There is more truth than theologians generally admit in the 
 Universal Prayer — 
 
 ' ' Father of all I in every age. 
 In every clime adored 
 By saint, by savage, and by sage, 
 Jebovab, Jove, or Lord." 
 
 If Pope meant that doctrinal differences are unimportant, and 
 that the worship which the Greek or the Eoman addressed to 
 Jupiter was as true, and therefore as pleasing to God, as the 
 worship which the Jew addressed to Jehovah, or the Christian 
 to the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, he was wrong. Eut if 
 he meant, as I think he did mean, that pervading all these 
 forms of religion, obscured, but neither destroyed nor even com- 
 pletely hidden by a multitude of false notions, lies one great 
 truth, then he was profoundly right.^ 
 
 Let the Christian value, as highly as he will, the religion 
 which his Master came upon earth to teach. Let him strive, 
 as earnestly as he will, to scatter by the light of that Gospel 
 the clouds of error which rest where its light has never shone. 
 He cannot value it too highly. He cannot strive too hard. But 
 
 1 I may here refer to a a recently published Lecture of Professor Max 
 Miiller {Macmillan' s Magazine, No. 325, pp. 196, et seq.), in which he has 
 shown that even in the religions of Central and South Africa there is a 
 closer approximation to the truth than men are generally disposed to admit. 
 
General Consent of Mankind. 203 
 
 let him not think that he has a monopoly of truth, or that the 
 history of religion shows any exception to the principle, that no 
 system of pure falsehood ever succeeded yet. Falsehood there 
 is indeed abundantly in the religions of the world. The his- 
 torian of Theism has to tell of portraits of the Divine Nature 
 disfigured by injustice, by selfishness, and by cruelty. Some of 
 these portraits men have drawn for themselves ; for some they 
 have professed to find a higher authority. And if, in spite of 
 these hideous caricatures, the historian has to tell that over the 
 whole world Theism has continued to live, it is not to them that 
 it owes its vitality. Theism has lived because it is Theism ; 
 because it contains, undestroyed by all the false notions with 
 which men have associated it, the one true principle, that there 
 is in the universe a Power higher than mere physical force — 
 higher than the forces of the human intellect ; a Power which 
 is, or may be, the friend of man, and to which — or may we not 
 say to Whom ? — man owes certain duties : obedience always, re- 
 verence not quite so generally, love less frequently still. Alas ! 
 there have been, and there are, theological systems which would 
 seem to make love impossible. Yet when, possessing even these 
 imperfect glimpses of the truth, man turns to God, as he con- 
 ceives Him, and asks His aid, must we pronounce it to be an 
 absurdity that the "Father of all" should hear his prayer? 
 God forbid. 
 
 THE END. 
 
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