:^ |^&££ti.^^l^)> ua.fe.iL*.a8B Hbaw riB«jt>i Wr^'fP;^f^^''J? una •},uii mm il ■ft I Kith?- wim THE NATUEE AND EXTENT DIVINE INSPIRATION, AS STATED BY THE WRITERS, DEDUCED FROM THE FACTS, OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. THE REY. C. A. HOW, M.A., OF PEMBBOKE COLLEGE, OXFOED, AND LATE HEAD MASTBE OF THE EOYAL QEAMMAE SCHOOL, MANSFIELD. LONDON: LONGMAN. GREEN, LONGMAN, ROBERTS, AND GREEN. 1864. PREFACE. Why should revelation and science be such sworn enemies ? Why should the battle-field be gradually widening, and the strife growing more deadly ? Why ? Because men of science have pursued a different course, with respect to their inves- tigations in nature, from that followed by the divine in his searching the Scriptures for the purpose of examining into the nature of Divine inspiration. The geologist has taken spade and hammer in hand, and investigated for himself; he has raked the bowels of the earth, uncovered the hid treasure, and left it to tell its own story. The astronomer has directed his telescope, with untiring perseverance, to the heavenly bodies, and allowed them, in their own inimitable way, to declare the glory of God. But the divine studies his Bible differently : he has preconceived ideas of what a revelation ought to contain, and, in his zeal for the preservation of his view of Divine truth, he has at one time condemned, and at another persecuted, those who have propounded truths deduced from science, because they stood out in contradiction to his views of Divine revelation ; and when at last the voice of science has become irresistible, he has endeavoured to twist the Scrip- tures to make them accord with her latest discoveries. Hence the tendencies of many thoughtful and learned men of the present day. Hence the destructive theories which VI PREFACE. arc ever and anon propounded, tending to unsettle the minds of thousands, and shaking their faith in the reaUty of a Divine revelation, while they offer nothing in return but a cold and ban-en rationalism. The writer of the following pages has attempted to study the Christian Scriptures as the naturalist studies God's natural laws. He has taken the New Testament, and exa- mined its contents, to see what evidence it would afford respecting the nature of its own inspiration. He has dug for the hid treasure, with no preconceived opinions. He has discussed the a priori question for the purpose of ascertain- ing the solidity of the foundation of existing theories, and of inquiring into the extent of our knowledge of the mode in which a revelation of the Infinite would be communicated to the finite ; and the facts of the case, as presented by the Christian Scriptures, have fully borne out the conclusions at which he has arrived. He has found in the person of the Redeemer the highest conceivable form of inspiration — the highest and most glorious manifestation of Deity to the finite mind. Revelation has been made in Him, and not merely by Him. Redemption has been purchased through Him. He has summoned the Apostles as witnesses, carefully weighed their testimony ; and has inevitably arrived at the conclusion that, while they testified as men to the facts which they had seen and heard, they possessed an unction from above, not according to the development-theory, which attributes inspiration to every one who surpasses his fel- lowmen in genius, acquirements, or profundity of thought, but supernatural enlightenment of such a kind, and to such an extent, as to leave no doubt that their inspiration was objectively imparted, and was a thing wholly distinct from any subjective endowment of the mental capacity; PREFACE. Vn that their inspiration was imparted through the agency of supernatural gifts, which, though neither destroying their individual personality nor controlling their language, nor bestowing infallibility on their conduct, afforded them an assistance proportionate to their need, and led them into " all the truth,^' and so fulfilled our Saviour's promise (which was never intended to extend to every truth, but to " the truth " — the particular truths of the Christian revelation); that these gifts, varying in their operations, and in their degrees, from human to superhuman and miraculous agency, were possessed in their fulness by Apostles, and that they were imparted in inferior measures to the early infant Church, one person possessing one gift, and another another ; and that the possession of an inferior gift often led tliese early Christians to suppose that they were equally inspired with the Apostles, and hence the sectarian spirit which prevailed, and the daring defiance of even apostolical authority. But inspiration was not confined to the act of recording the things written : the silences of the Scriptures are in- spired. No uninspired writer could have refrained from detailing certain things respecting which the silence of the New Testament is absolutely unbroken. He has found that our Lord appointed the Apostles to be witnesses of the great facts of His ministry. His death, and His resurrection. He has examined the Gospels, and found that they are the embodiments of the results of this apostolic testimony. He has examined the Epistles, and found that they con- tain the results of that inspiration which communicated to the Apostles all the deep truths of their Master's kingdom. But while he has found in them the fulfilment of the pro- mise to lead them by supernatural guidance into all the VIU PREFACE. truth of the gospel, he has discovered evidence no less direct that the individuality of the writers was neither superseded nor overwhelmed by the presence of inspiration. The author has viewed with pain the steady march of the spirit of unbelief, veiled under the specious pretext of honour- ing Christianity as the highest among the developments of man. He has felt that this honouring of the Redeemer as the highest of human teachers, while He claims to be a teacher come from God, is to mock Him by arraying Him in the robes of spurious royalty. He has therefore asked the Evangelists, " How did you originate your conception of that glorious Christ ? How did you conceive that picture of the perfect man, dying in agony and degradation, and succeed in enthroning Him in royal dignity on the throne of God? Is it true that you, fishermen of Galilee, created the first conception, and that others, with plastic hand, by the aid of myths and human developments, have elaborated the great ideal?" He has asked all the systems of thought or feeling possessed by the ancient world to labour with united eflbrt, and assert their claims to be the progenitors of a Christ. All have, with unanimous voice, declined the proffered honour. All are ready to produce what is of earth, earthly : all confess their inability to give birth to the Lord from heaven. Such is the work which the writer now introduces to the public. If it should become the means of freeing the mind of the thoughtful student of the Scriptures from those diffi- culties with which the theories of men have encircled them, his highest wishes will have been gratified ; for he is fully convinced that, if the Christian Scriptures be stripped of aU those strange things with which zealous but mistaken men have shrouded them, if they be allowed to have free course, they will most certainly be glorified. CONTENTS. CHAPTEE I. Introduction, The importance of the question re- specting the nature of inspiration, 1. The inductive method thecoi-rect mode of prosecuting the inquiry, 2. The natui'c and Hmits of the investi- gation, 3. Causes of the diversity of opinion as to the nature of inspiration, 5. Abstract reasonings incorrect guides to facts, 6. CHAPTER II. The inadequacy of all human conceptions of the Infinite a hmi- tation to the extent of truth which can be communicated in a Revelation. The distinction between the Infinite and the finite, 7. The conceptions in vrliich a revelation is made cannot represent the Divme reahties themselves, but are only approximations to them, 8. The distinction between the natural and the moral attributes of the Creator, 9. The conceptions used in a revelation must be imperfect human concep- tions, 10 ; must convey relative, not absolute, truth, 11 ; must be analogical representations of truth, 12. The nature of our conceptions of the Divine attributes, 13. CHAPTER III. Different theories as to the Extent of Divine Inspii-ation. The term " plenary inspiration " am- biguous, 15. Definition of " inspiration," 16. Great mental endowments not inspi- rations, 18. Definition of "verbal inspiration," 20. The consequences which flow from the theory, 22 ; its modifications, 23. The views of those who, whUe they believe in the inspiration of the Scripture, yet reject verbal inspira- tion, stated, 25. Inspiration is not a mere intensifi- cation of the ordinary faculties, 29. Distinction between inspiration and sanctification, 31. CONTENTS. CHAPTER IV. The Possibility of a Divine Revelation, and the Mode adopted in its communication. The question of the Divine origin of a revelation distinct from the mode of its communication, 33. Statement of objections to the po.«si- bihty of a miraculous revelation, 34. The hmits witliin which human ex- perience and analogical reasonings are bounded, 37. Reasonings founded on the Divine attributes veill not conduct us to the facts of nature, 40. Uniform action in conformity with law and order stated to be the only worthy conception of the mode of the Creator's actmg, 42. God not a mere mechanist or che- mist, 43. A perception of the Divine person- ahty is the foundation of rehgion, 44. The creation of the finite must have been one great deviation from pre- viously existing invariable law, 45. The possibility of creative acts proves the possibility of a miraculous re- velation, 46. Grod never works in nature by a double instrumentahty, 49. The expenditm-e of labovu* imposed by God as the condition of the dis- covery of truth, 51. Similar analogies will be found in revelation, 50, 52. A moral i-evelation possible, 53 ; it does not involve the use of a double instrumentahty, 54. The gospel discovers the motives which render obedience to the moral law possible, 56. A revelation will receive the necessary Divine attestation, 58. CHAPTER V. The Impossibility of arguing from the Divine Attributes to the Facts of Nature invalidates all such arguments when applied to the Facts of Revelation. Abstract reasonings would lead us to construct a universe wholly different fi'om the actual universe of the Creator, 59. Such reasonings equally inconclusive as to what He must do in commu- nicating a revelation, 60. We cannot reason to the facts of natiu'e from oiu* conceptions of Almighty power, 62 ; infinite wis- dom, 62 ; perfect goochiess, 66. Imperfections exist m the universe of the Creator, all-powerful, wise, and good, 63. All attempts to explain the existence of evU only remove the difficulty one step backwards, 68. God will manifest Himself as Re- vealer, analogously to the mode in which He has manifested Himself as Creator, VO. It is impossible to reason from the Divine perfection as to the par- ticular mode in which a revelation must be communicated, 71. The Divine Worker employs the most unexpected agencies in effectuating His purposes in creation and pro- vidence, 73. The waste in creation, 74. In communicating a revelation, the Creator cannot deny His moral perfections, 75. The hmits of our powers of reasonmg on such subjects, 78. No single Divine attribute an adequate representation of the whole of the Divine character, 79. The above illustrated in the case of the doctrine of the Atonement, 80. Hiunan conceptions of benevolence and justice not an adequate repre- sentation of those attributes as they exist in God, 81. The assertion that the conceptions in every revelation must be human conceptions no hmitation to the omnipotence of God, 83. AH such conceptions must partake of the nature of anthropomorphism, 86. CONTENTS. XI The Christian Scriptures written on tlie assumption of this principle, 88. The Christian revelation consists of an objectiye fact, 89. Spiritual truth taught in the Scriptures through material imagery, 91. General conclusions which follow from the previous reasonings, 93. CHAPTER VI. The theory of Verbal Inspiration contrary to the mode of the Creator's actius: in Creation and Providence. The written and oral teaching of the Apostles equally inspired, 96. The tlieory of verbal inspiration cannot be proved from, its being desnable that it should have been so com- municated, 98 ; nor because such a mode of commvmication would have precluded liabihty to mistake its meaning, 99 ; (man has been created to be a feUow-worker with God, 101 ;) nor from considerations of the Divine goodness, 104 ; nor because the Scriptures must be in- falhble guides to truth, 105. Their claim to speak with authority rests on their having received a Divine attestation, 107. Such an attestation must be mira- culous. The nature of a miracle, 108. The claims of a revelation attested by miracles, 111. Verbal inspiration cannot be proved from reasonings founded on the Divine perfections, 112 ; nor because the Scripttu-es are called " God's word," 113. The varied nature of the contents of the Christian Scriptures, 116. The degree of inspiration proportioned to the subject-matter, 117. The liighest form of inspiration ex- hibited in our Lord's person, 118. The true nature of inspiration must be learned from the facts and de- clarations ofthe New Testament, 119. CHAPTER VII. The Incarnation is the great objective Manifestation of Deity to the finite mind. The Person of Christ exhibits the highest form of Inspiration. The mode in which the Clu-istian revelation differs from all previous Divine communications, 123. The perfections of God, as far as they can be comprehended by the fhiite mind, are manifested in the Incar- nation, 125. Deity in His essential nature invisible to man, but manifested in Clu-ist, 126. The representations of the synoptic Gospels on this subject, 129. The word of hfe the subject of apos- tolic testunony, 130. Christ the image of the invisible God, 131. Unsearchable riches of Divine know- ledge manifested in His person, 132. The fulness of the Godhead mani- fested in His human nature, 133. God manifest in the flesh, 134. The Cliristian revelation not a theory, but a fact, 135. The inspiration which was the result of the indweUing of Deity in our Lord's person, 137. Our Lord's assertions respecting the nature and extent of His own knowledge, 138. The views presented by the synoptic Gospels, 139. Ml CONTENTS. CHAPTEK VIII. The Nature of our Lord's Knowledge derived from the Inspiration of the Spirit. Its two recorded limitations. Our Lord's human nature created, and thcreibre finite, 112. The purpose for which it I'cceived the fuhiess of inspiration from the Spirit, 143. The first limitation of His human knowledge, as asserted by St. Luke, 144. The second limitation, asserted by St. Mark, 145. The real nature of that limitation, 146. St. Mark's words contradict no truth of the Incarnation, 148. Contrast between our Lord's inspi- ration and that of the prophets and apostles, 148. CHAPTER IX. The Nature of the Inspiration of the Apostles. The Apostles wit- nesses. Our Lord's promises. The Sources of St. Paul's apostolic Knowledge. Belief in the gospel founded on a human and a Divine testhuony, 150. The Spu'it testified by the exertion of miraculous power, 151. The Apostles testified to facts of which they had been actual wit- nesses, 152. No human testimony can exist with- out an act of recollection, 153. Tacts, as facts, do not admit of greater or less degrees of truth, 155. The difiiculty of correctly reporting discourses, when not copied down at the time when they were de- livered, 156. Ouv Lord's promises to the Apostles of svipernatm-al assistance, 158 : — 1st, of supernatural aid to their me- mories, to enable them to recollect the discom'ses of our Lord, 161. 2nd, of the witness of the Spii'it to corroborate their human testimony, 162. 3rd, of supernatural guidance into the knowledge of the truths of the Christian revelation, 163. 4th, to discover events yet future, 165. 5tli, promise of supernatural assist- ance when called on to defend themselves in courts of justice, 167. Promises of inspiration not vague, but definitely limited to the things which are Christ's, 166. The contrast between St. Paul and the origmal Apostles, 168. St. Paul's knowledge both of the truths and of the facts of the gos- pel not derived from human sources, but fi'om inspkation, 169. CHAPTER X. The Spiritual Gifts — their character. The statements of St. Paul respecting the nature of the spiritual gifts, 172. Theu" communication was the fulfil- ment of our Lord's promise of supernatural inspii-ation, 175. The inspiration conferred by them not confined to the Apostles, 177. Nor were they imparted to all in equal degrees, 179. They were distinct spu'itual endow- ments, 180. CONTENTS. xni CHAPTER XI. The Spiritual Gifts the chief source of Apostolic Inspiration. Nature of the Inspiration imparted by each gift. The The natm-e of the gift of tongues, and the phenomena by which it was accompanied, 181. The pui'poses for which it was de- signed, 184. The gift of mterpretation, 186. The gift of wisdom the gift preemi- nently apostohc, 186. The gift of prophecy the second great spiritual endowment, 189 ; its precise nature, 190. The sphitual gift of knowledge, 191. The two miraculous gifts — their dis- tinction, 193. The gift of discerning of spirits, 195. The gift of faith, 196. The sph'itual gifts, in their exercise, were subject to the control of the rational will, 198 j were permanent mental endowments, 201. The calmness with which their exer- cise was attended, 202. CHAPTER XII. The Limits of the Inspiration conferred by the Supernatural Gifts. They were limited to a definite sub- ject-matter, 203. The knowledge conveyed by tliem was hmited witliin the fvmctions of the respective gifts, 204. The possession of a gift did not secure its right use, 206. The cause of resistance to apostohc authority, 207. Their possession did not convey a general infaUibihty, 208. The suj^ernatural direction which they aiForded the Apostles m their mi- nistry, 209. Errors m conduct compatible with msphation, 212. St. Peter at Antioch, 113 ; his inspi- ration did not liinder him from compromising Christian truth by his conduct, 215. The quarrel between Paul and Bar- nabas, 217. St. Paul's last visit to Jerusalem — the plan formed to obviate his dan- ger, 220. The conduct of all parties concerned inconsistent with the consciousness of possessing supernatural guidance on this subject, 225. The sph-itual gifts afforded no super- natural guidance on questions of chronology, 226. The nature and extent of general pro- mises, 228. The difficulties of St. Stephen's speech, 230 ; their proposed solutions, 231. General promises not to be construed to the letter, 234. CHAPTER XIII. General Character of the Gospels, and the Nature of their Inspira- tion : their Inspiration not Verbal. The Gospels contain the results of the highest form of inspiration in our Lord's words and actions, 235. If the facts of the Gospels are true, they preserve the results of that insphation, 236. Tbe pecuhar phenomena presented by the Gospels, 237. Difficulties with which the theory of verbal insphation is attended when apphed to the Gospels, 238, whe- ther we assume that the Evange- lists wrote independently, 241, or with the intention of supplementing each other, 243. The peculiar character of St. John's Gospel, 244 ; its bearing on the present question, 245. XIV CONTENTS. CHAPTER XIV. Examination of Parallel Passages in the Gospels, with a view to determine the Nature of the Inspiration by the aid of which they were composed. Compai'ison of the Evangelists' ac- counts of the institution of the Eucharist, 247. The parable of the vineyard, 252. The agony in the garden, 254. The inscription on the cross, 257. The miracle at Gradara, 259. The miracle at Jericho, 263. The events of the Passion, 265 ; and of the Resurrection, 270. The night of our Lord's last Passover, 270. The death of Judas, 272. The history of the centurion's ser- vant, 273. The cure of a woman with an issue of blood, 274 ; of the demoniac child, 277 ; of the daughter of the Syro- phenician woman, 280. The cleansing of the Temple, aiid the cursing of the barren fig-tree, 282. St. Matthew's genealogy, 283. CHAPTER XV. The Silences of the Gospels proofs of their Inspiration. The Gospels are selections from an extensive mass of materials, 285. The necessity that the Apostles should have been guided in making this selection, 286. The character of the silences of the Gospels, 287. Their silence as to our Lord's perso- nal appearance, 288. The silence respecting the history of our Lord's youth and early man- hood, 290. The silence respecting our Lord's brethren, 291. The silence respecting Lazarus's know- ledge of the unseen world, 292. The silence respecting the nature of oiu* Lord's sufferings, 293. Other silences of the Gospels, 294. These silences can only be accounted for on the supposition that the Evangelists were supernaturally hindered from breaking them, 295. CHAPTER XVI. The View which the Facts of the Gospel would suggest to a careful reader, who had not previously perused them,^ respecting their Origia and the Mode of their Inspiration. The theory of their mythic origin, 298. The Gospel miracles not mythic, 299. Their mythic origin contradicted by their general contents, 299. Difficulties ui the way of beheving any one of the Gospels contains the mythic story of which the other Gospels are later modifications, 301. Difficulties in the way of considering the common narrative, freed from its miracles, as the original story, 302. The Jesus of the Gospels no mythic creation, 304. The phenomena presented by the discourses consistent with our Lord's promise to assist the memo- ries of the Apostles in recollecting them, 306. The phenomena presented by the facts present all the variations of human testunony, 309. The results of the evidence as bearing on the theory of verbal inspira- tion, 311. The character of St. Luke's Gospel, and the soiirces from which it was derived, 314. CONTENTS. XV CHAPTER XVII, The gradual Enlightenment of the Apostles in the great Truths of the Christian Revelation. Our Lord's promise implies that the enlightenment of the Apostles would not be sudden, but gradual, 318. The Apostles at first ignorant that the gospel was to be preached to the Gentiles, 320. The importance of the truth of the calhng of the Gentiles, 323. The gradual development of tfiis truth in the Apostles' minds, 326. St. James's Epistle an exemplification of the mode of teaching Christian ti'uth in the Jewish Church, 331. Their first enhghtenment qualified the Apostles to preach the gospel to the Jews only, 332. CHAPTER XVIII. Nature and Extent of fuU Apostolic Inspiration. St. Paul's assertions respecting his own inspiration considered in — 2 Cor., xu. 2-4, 333; 1 Cor.,ii. 6-16, 335; Eph., iii. 1-11, 339 ; Col., i. 25-28, 343 ; Titus, i. 1-3, 344; Pliil., hi. 8-10, 345 ; 1 Tliess., ii. 13, 347 ; 1 Cor., xiv. 37 ; 2 Cor., xi. 17, & xiii. 2-3, 350; Gal., iv. 14, & 2 Tim., iii. 14-17, 351. The objective nature of the truth communicated by inspiration, 336- 342. Truths discovered by revelation do not extend to the knowledge of God revealed by the created uni- verse, 341, 344. The Apostle an ambassador, 350. CHAPTER XIX. The Human Element in Apostolic Inspiration. The individuahty of the writers a human element in the Epistles, 354. The undeniable presence of that indi- viduality in the Epistles of St. Paul, 355 ; St. John, 358 ; St. Peter, 359; St. James, 361. The distinction between the Divine and human elements in the Epis- tles, 362. Examination of the Divine and human elements in 2 Cor., i. 5-24, 365 ; Phil., i. 3-18, 368 ; Phil., ii. 17-30, 369 ; Col., iv. 7-9, 370 ; 1 Thess., iu. 1-8, 371. The precise weight attached bySt.Paul to liis own experience and example, 372. Comparison between St. Paul and Jeremiah, 373. The diiFerence of the styles of the Apostles, 376 ; their difierent modes of stating and reasoning on the same truth, 378. The mode of quoting the Old Testa- ment adopted by the writers of the New, 379. The Book of Eevelation, 382. CHAPTER XX. The Res\ilts of the preceding Inquiries on existing Theories of Inspiration. The effects of the present spirit of inquiry, 383. The danger of evading difficulties, 385. The Church of Rome an impressive warning to the discouragers of in- vestigation, 386. XVI CONTENTS. The danger to wliicli the assumption of the theory of verbal inspiration exposes Cliristianity, 387 ; it occa- sions scepticism among scientific men, 389. The assertions of Scripture respect- ing the nature of its own inspira- tion are in accordance with the facts of the New Testament and the ana- logies of nature, 390. CHAPTER XXI. The Christ of the Gospels no creation of the unassisted powers of the human mind. G-eneral statement of the views of those who maintain the human ori- gin of Christianity, 393. Christianity, as an existing fact, re- quires that an account of its origm should be given, 395. The nature of the developments of purely human ideas, conceptions, and feeUngs, 396. Human developments require long periods of time for tlieu* comple- tion, 399. Christianity originated in an historic age, 402. The greatness of the interval which separates Christianity from any pre- viously existing system of thought or feeling, 403. The problem to be solved by those who assert a human origin of Christia- nity — the creation of the conception of the Christ of the Gospels, 406. The conception of the suffering Christ, 408. Tlie conception of the perfect human Christ, 411. The conception of the Divine Chi-ist, as portrayed in the Gospels, 415. The greatness of the work accom- plished by the Evangelists, 417. The nature of the elements out of which Christianity must have ori- ginated, if it be a human develop- ment, 419. Neither the Egyptian tone of thought, 420, nor the Indian, 421, nor the Chinese nor Persian, 422, nor the Grecian, 423, nor the Roman, 426, nor the Jewish, 427, could gene- rate the conception of a Christ. The historical conditions of the pro- blem, 429 ; illustrated by the slow growth of English nationahty, 432. The conception of the Christ of the Gospels incapable of being pro- duced by the fusion together of every element then existing in the world, 433. The Jewish Church of the prophets would have been inadequate for its production, 435. The historic Christian Church pre- sents no appearance of having been able to generate the conception of a Christ, 436. Conclusion, 437. .REC.JUN188, THE NATURE OF INSPIRATION INDUCTIVELY CONSIDERED. CHAPTER I. INTKODUCTION. The question respecting the nature and extent of Divine in- spiration is one of enlarging and deepening interest. Among tlie theological questions of the day, it occupies a place of the highest importance. With an extensive class there is a tendenc}^ to push the inspiration of the Scriptures to the extremest limits of verbalism. Others, on the contrary, are using their strongest efforts to represent the supposed inspira- tion of the NcAV Testament as nothing but a product of the unassisted reason of man. Whatever view we take on this question, our opinions as to the character of the Christian religion must be materially affected by the opinions which we entertain respecting the nature of the inspiration of the New Testament. Our views as to the degree and the mode of the inspiration of the Christian Scriptures must also exert a powerful influence on the principles of interpretation which ought to be applied for the elucidation of their meaning. When the unbeliever is directing the strongest attacks against the Sacred Volume, it is necessary that the defender of the fortress should be acquainted with the nature of the works which he is called upon to protect, and should carefully avoid occupying unnecessary, extended, or dangerous positions. The / chief objections wliicli are urged against Christianity, and which cause great difficulties to the minds of many, are not objections against the essence of Christianity as a Divine re- velation, but owe their entire weight to certain interpreta- tions of detached portions of its contents, which interpreta- tions have originated in particular theories respecting the mode of the inspiration of the Scriptures. The question as to the nature of the inspiration of the New Testament may be considered as the great theological question of the day. The utmost variety of opinion has been maintained re- specting the nature and degree of the inspiration under the influence of which the New Testament has been composed. Have such opinions the foundation of certainty, or are they mere assumptions based on uncertain evidence ? On what principles have these theories been assumed ? Many of them are founded on considerations supposed to arise out of the probabilities or the necessities of the case. It is not even pretended that the greater portion of such opinions are the result of careful inquiry into the facts presented by the pages of the New Testament : they are based on mere grounds of supposed antecedent probability. Now universal experience has proved that, except within the region of strict demonstration, the principles of induction are the only safe guides to truth in every department of human knowledge. Why should not those principles be applied to the New Testament Scriptures, with a view to ascertain from those Scriptures themselves the nature of the inspiration under the influence of which they have been written ? Mere assertions and theories applied to the study of the natural universe have led those employing them, not to the discovery of truth, but into endless mazes of error. Why should assumptions and theories, which have been utterly discarded as guides to truth in every matter of inferior mo- ment, be still retained as the only safe modes of determining the nature of the inspiration under the influence of which the New Testament Scriptures have been composed ? Ancient philosophers indulged in useless speculations as to what the universe must be. They thought that the mere deductive powers of the human intellect were adequate to the investigation of its laws. Nature obstinately refused to give a response to such a mode of investigation : endless metaphysical jargon was the result, hut no great truth was discovered. Our present knowledge of the universe has been attained, not by theorizing as to what that universe ought to be, but by investigating what it actually is. According to the statements of our common histories, when Queen Elizabeth entered London on her accession to the throne, she was presented with a copy of the New Testament. This gift she thankfully received. In addition to this gift, there was presented to her a petition purporting to come from four supposed prisoners, Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John, praying that their imprisonment, which they had been suffer- ing, might be brought to a termination. The Queen replied that before she complied with the prayer of the petition she would consult the prisoners themselves, and hear from their own mouths whether they desired the liberty which was sought for them. This determination was certainly not unreason- able. In the same manner, before we assume that the writers of the New Testament have written under the influence of this or that particular mode of inspiration, it seems no less reasonable to ask the writers themselves, under what degree and particular mode of inspiration they assert that they have actually written. It would be absurd to assume for them an inspiration which they themselves may possibly disclaim. Such an inquiry we propose addressing to the writers of the New Testament. We do not purpose to extend this inquiry to the Scriptures of the Old Testament. It will be strictly limited to the writers of the New Testament alone. We propose to inquire — I. Whether there are any grounds of antecedent certainty which can aid us in determining the nature of the inspiration which must have been afforded to the authors of the Chris- tian Scriptures, if they are a revelation from God. II. We shall inquire of the writers themselves, what asser- tions they make respecting the nature and degree of the in- spiration under the influence of which they wrote. B 2 III. We shall investigate what is the nature and degree of the inspiration which the facts of the New Testament pre- suppose to have been required for its composition ; and we shall compare the evidence which the facts present with the assertions of the writers themselves^ and with the antecedent probabilities of the case. IV. We shall inquire into the possibility of the New Testa- ment having originated out of the action of influences purely and entii'ely human. There are two extreme limits within which all views as to the nature of the inspiration of the New Testament must be contained. One view asserts that every idea, word, thought, and expression, as they came from the penmen themselves, are the direct inspiration of the Holy Spirit. If this view be carried out consistently, there can be no human element whatever in the Christian Scriptures. They must be abso- lutely, in every part of them, the word and dictation of God. The only thing which man can have had to do with their composition is to copy down with pen, ink, and paper what the Spirit of God has dictated. Consequently everything contained in the New Testament must be alike infallibly cer- tain, whether it be religious doctrine or precept, or statements of historic fact, or anything which we may read there in the remotest degree connected with the proper subject-matter of the New Testament revelation, and even in statements con- nected with scientific truth. Throughout the whole, there- fore, whether it be thought, fact, or style, not the smallest error can exist, as being the infallible dictation of the Spirit of God, to whom the penmen acted in no other character than that of amanuenses. But, according to the opposite line of thought, when divested of all ambiguities of expression, the authors of the New Testa- ment were no otherwise inspired than as men of lofty genius, such as Shakespere and Milton, were inspired. Persons hold- ing these oj)inious maintain that there is a sense in which every man of exalted genius is an inspired man. According to these views, no other inspiration was possessed by the writers of the New Testament beyond an inspiration of this description^ or beyond what the possession of superior powers, or being- endowed with larger degrees of spiritual insight, may afford to one man above another. These sentiments, expressed in Avords devoid of ambiguity, mean that the writers of the New Testament were wholly devoid of the aid of any species of supernatural inspiration. Few persons at the present day take the ground that the writers of the New Testament were simple barefaced impos- tors. The age in which it can be asserted that the whole of Christianity is a cunningly devised fable, invented by crafty men, is passed away. The most extreme men of the present time admit that its authors were animated by benevolent in- tentions, and perhaps inspired by an inspiration analogous to the inspiration of genius. Most modern unbelievers allow that Christianity forms the highest development to which the human race has yet succeeded in attaining. The next higher growth to which man can attain will be one which will be reached under their own guidance. Now it is impossible that views thus widely differing re- specting the character of such a book as the New Testament can have originated in an examination of the contents of the book itself. The book is one of no inconsiderable dimensions. The facts presented by it are large and extensive. It seems to be impossible that conclusions of so opposite a character should have been arrived at respecting the authorship of the same book, Avith so extensive a mass of materials to assist in the formation of a judgment. Nothing can be wider than the diversity of the opinions in question. One party asserts that the whole contents of the book is without one human element — everywhere and entirely divine. The other party is equally confident in their assertion that the entire book is without one divine element — everywhere and entirely human. Such a disagreement respecting the nature of the same facts can only have originated in theories assumed on a priori grounds, quite independently of a calm and impartial exami- nation of the contents of the book itself. It is impossible that any study of the book could have suggested two theories respecting the nature of its contents so fundamentally and radically opposed. The facts and phenomena presented by the New Testament, by the investigation of which a judgment might be arrived at, are so extensive, that the usual theories which are propounded as to the nature of the inspiration of its writers cannot have been deduced either from the asser- tions of the writers themselves or from the facts and phe- nomena presented by them. They must have been the result of a priori considerations as to the degree of inspiration with which such a book ought to have been composed. The theo- ries have not been deduced from the facts, but the facts have been tortured into agreement with the theories. From what cause has this resulted ? Evidently from this : — Speculation is easy ; investigation is laborious : man is naturally disposed to adopt the easier course. But while men have contented themselves with speculating on what the universe ought to be, instead of patiently inquiring what it actually is, nothing but the most grotesque theories or barren speculations have resulted from their attempts to unfold its secrets. Systems called by the name of sacred systems of the universe have frequently been propounded, but they have con- ducted the speculators further and further from the true view of the universe of the Creator ! Similar speculations have been employed for the purpose of ascertaining the nature of the inspiration with the aid of which the New Testament has been composed. Can we be justified in applying to the eluci- dation of the inspiration of the New Testament a system of investigation which has been exploded as a guide to truth in every other department of knowledge ? It becomes therefore a subject of the highest interest, on the supposition that the Creator were pleased to make a supernatural revelation, to ascertain whether any grounds of antecedent certainty exist which will enable us to determine what must be the nature and extent of that revelation, or the mode which must be adopted in its communication. It will be found that our grounds of antecedent knowledge on this subject are of a very narrow and limited description. On such a subject we require not mere probabilities, but demonstrations, or well- ascertained analogies. CHAPTER II. THE INADEQUACY OF ALL HUMAN CONCEPTION OF THE INFINITE A LIMITATION TO THE EXTENT OF TRUTH WHICH CAN BE COMMUNICATED IN A RE^ ELATION. There is one fundamental limitation under which every revelation must be communicated. This limitation has all the self-evidence of axiomatic truth. It is founded on the essential difference between the finite and the infinite. A revelation to man must be expressed in conceptions not of the infinite^ but of the finite. The distinction between the in- finite and the finite is not a difference of degree, but of kind. The finite cannot comprehend the infinite*. Between the ideas of the finite and the infinite not only an impassable gulf is fixed, but there is an essential difference of nature. If a revelation of the infinite is made to the finite, the truths which are revealed must be expressed in concep- tions relative to the finite mind. The necessity of this is founded on the truth that the infinite ideas of God cannot be represented adequately by the imperfect conceptions of man. The ideas of the human mind can form no adequate measures of the eternal reality. In all human modes of conceiving the infinite, we attempt to arrive at an approximate idea of the infinite by successive additions of the finite. But no successive additions of finite added to finite will make up the total of the infinite. The very notion of infinite is inconsistent with the idea of totality : of the true nature of that total it is impossible to form even a conception. After any amount of successive additions, * This subject has beeu most ably handled by Mr. Mansel, in his Bampton Lectures '^ On the Limits of Human Thought," as an argument against rationalistic speculation. The principles laid do^vTi by Mr. Mansel are equally important as proving the futility of attempts to determine on abstract grounds what must be the contents of a revelation, and the mode wliich must be adopted in its communication. Man's inability to conceive the nature of the infiuite must form a necessary limit to the possibility of a revelation. we are still indefinitely remote from the idea of infinity. Successive additions of portions of time piled one on the other will make no adequate representation of the actuality of eternity. No continuous enlargement of successive space will make up the total of immensity. No accumulations of finite power will image to the mind the reality of the Al- mighty. The infinite must differ from the finite, not only in conception, but in nature. An actual conception of the nature of the infinite by the finite must therefore be an imjDOssibility. If therefore a revelation be made of the infinite so as to be comprehensible by man, it is necessary that the unlimited and perfect ideas of the Divine mind should be translated into the limited and imperfect conceptions of the human. The conceptions of the human mind neither are nor can be the divine realities themselves. The utmost which the human mind can attain to must be an analogical expression of those realities, or they may be represented by approximation. It follows as a necessary consequence, from the distinction which exists between the ideas of the finite and the infinite, that, if God makes a revelation of himself, the ideas employed in making that revelation cannot be the absolute and infinite ideas of God himself, but such ideas of the human mind as are the best representations and the nearest approximations to the conceptions as they exist in the mind of the Creator. If they were ideas actually measuring and representing the infinite, they could not be introduced into the finite under- standing. Any other class of ideas except that which is finite and limited would be simply incomprehensible to the human mind ; they would fail to convey any conception to the understanding. The ideas, therefore, in which a revelation is conveyed must be imperfect and inadequate conceptions of the reality of the Divine nature. They cannot be the ideas as they exist in God, but such conceptions only as man is capable of comprehending. The nature of the actual relationship between the finite conceptions of man and the conceptions of the Creator, and in what degree the thoughts of the human mind can approxi- 9 mate to the divine realities^ are questions on which we need not enter. The point which is essential to be observed in re- lation to our present inquiry is, that between human concep- tions and their realities as they exist in God there is a diflfer- encCj not merely of degree, but of kind. But it may be contended that there is a distinction between the attributes of the Creator. To some of those attributes the idea of infinite may be properly applied. Those to which the term "infinite" properly belongs are not capable of being taken cognizance of by the finite understanding. But it may be urged that the proper term to denote His moral attributes is not "infinite/' but "perfect." Now, although it is true that the mind of man can form no conception of the infinite, yet it may be able to form an adequate conception of the perfect. The eternity of God, His power, His wisdom, may be infinite, and as such utterly incomprehensible as to their actual exist- ence by man. But His goodness. His holiness. His truth. His benevolence are not correctly designated as infinite, but as perfect. It is contended that while the one of these cannot be adequately represented by any formula of human thought, the representations of the other are capable of being embraced by the human mind, or at least are nearer approximations to the divine realities. Now the truth of a portion of this position we are not prepared to dispute. But although a distinction between the ideas of the infinite and the perfect really exists, yet the perfect attributes of God are the attributes of the unlimited and infinite Being. Our conceptions of the perfect are conceptions derived from the attributes of beings who are limited. The Being of the Creator is absolute, infinite, unconditioned ; the being of the creature is relative, finite, conditioned. The moral attributes of the Creator and the creature must partake in this essential distinction of cha- racter. Although perfect may be the best term to denote the moral attributes of the Creator, yet the conception of perfec- tion, when applied to God, must be different in kind from that conception when applied to the creature. The attri- butes of God must be the perfect attributes of the infinite Being. The attributes of man are imperfect attributes of 10 the finite. In proportion to the difference between the finite and the infinite, the creature^s conceptions of even the moral attributes of God must be imperfect representations of the realities as they exist in the Divine mind. How a perfect moral attribute exists in an infinite Being cannot be distinctly conceived by a finite comprehension. Although then we are ready to admit that the moral attri- butes of God are not infinite, but perfect, and consequently that it would be more correct to say that God is perfectly (not infinitely) holy, or that He is perfectly (not infinitely) good, yet we must not overlook the fact that these attributes are the perfect attributes of the infinite Being ; consequently the actual conception of the divine reality of those attributes can only be conceived of in the human mind in terms of the limited and the imperfect. It follows as a necessary consequence, that, in representing such truth to the human understanding in a divine revela- tion, such imperfect and finite conceptions of the mind of man must be employed to represent the perfect attributes of God as are not exact measures of the attributes themselves, but the best which the mind of man can furnish for their representation. Man has no other conceptions by which they are capable of being imaged to his mind. It will be unnecessary for our present purpose to deter- mine whether the various attributes of the Creator exist in the Divine mind independently, or whether they flow from a single principle in the Divine mind, of which they are only modifications. If, instead of existing in the Divine mind in- dependently, those attributes are only modifications of a common principle, it will greatly increase the difiiculty in representing in human conceptions the perfections of the Infinite. How the Infinite exists in Himself, what is the nature of the absolute and the unconditioned, and of the moral perfections existing in an infinite Being, are points entirely beyond the limits of human apprehension. How the Infinite was first moved to the creation of the finite, when previously nothing but the Infinite existed, is among the secrets which, although man strain his utmost powers to determine, are be- yond the limits of finite powers to grasp or even to conceive. 11 From these considerations we arrive at the conclusion that the Creator must have formed the creature subject to one condition. That condition is that the creature must exist, conceive, and think, not as infinite, but as finite ; and that be- tween the perfection of the Creator and the creature a gulf must exist, the profundity of which it is impossible for man to fathom. Consequently every conception which the creature forms of the Creator must be subject to this condition. No conception, therefore, which man can form can be an adequate representation either of the mode of the actual existence or of the attributes of God. It is a necessary deduction from this truth, that, if the Creator condescended to reveal Himself to the creature, the ideas in which that revelation would require to be communi- cated cannot be the infinite or the perfect conceptions of the absolute Being, but the imperfect and relative conceptions of the finite mind. All revelations from God to man must be subject to the previous condition which renders the exist- ence of the created possible, that, the conceptions of man being finite, all the thoughts, ideas, and conceptions contained in the revelation must be finite likewise, and, as being finite, cannot fully represent the conceptions of the infinite and eternal God. If, then, we were to assume that the Christian Scriptures have been communicated with the highest degree of Divine inspira- tion, and even that every word composing them was the express dictation of the Divine Spirit, and that every concep- tion contained in them was His express suggestion to the human mind, yet on this assumption there is one necessary limitation as to the knowledge which that revelation would convey, one human element in that knowledge — that the ideas composing the revelation can only be adequate repre- sentations of the divine realities as far as the ideas and con- ceptions in the mind of man approximate to being adequate representations of the realities in the mind of God. It follows from the necessity of the case, that the revelation must be a relative and not an absolute revelation. The trutlis which it contains must be expressed in inadequate human 12 conceptions, and not in divine realities. To enable man to receive an absolute revelation from God, he must cease from the very condition of his being. Instead of being the finite, he must become the infinite. None but the infinite can comprehend the Almighty as He is. The being who can comprehend Him must himself be infinite. The whole of man^s knowledge is limited, finite, and human. The whole of his conceptions and ideas, however complicated, have originated in three sources alone. They have sprung either out of the perceptions of external things by the mind itself, or from the reflex action of the mind upon these per- ceptions, or from the feelings and affections of the mind and its own self-consciousness acting upon them. Out of these three sources every thought, idea, and concep- tion of man has originated. All existing ideas in their utmost comj)lexity are combinations of thought arising out of one or more of these three sources. The external has combined with the internal, and the internal with the external. The ideas of necessity and freedom, of moral and physical, of cause and effect, of time and space, of happiness and misery, of holiness and sin, of finite and infinite, have all issued from one of these sources or several in combination. In such terms the truths of every revelation must be expressed. The only question is. In what degree has the Creator created these original concep- tions of man so as to be representations and analogies of the realities in His own glorious being ? The truths, therefore, which are communicated in any reve- lation must be analogies more or less remote from the actual- ities themselves. They cannot be perfect representations of the infinite God, even if we assume the revelation to have been commimicated with the highest possible degree of inspi- ration. They must be such ideas and conceptions as the mind of man is capable of conceiving, and which the perfection of the Divine knowledge sees to be best suited for conveying to the mind of man the amount of truth respecting the Divine nature and perfections which the Creator intended to disclose. The vehicle employed in the communication of truth must be conceptions as they exist in the mind of man, not as they 13 exist in the mind of God. If the ideas were not finite hiunan ideas, they would be without the power of conA^eying meaning to the mind of man. Even the idea of infinite used in the revelation must be the human conception of infinity, and not the divine reality. The nearest approximation to the idea of infinity which man possesses is a series indefinitely prolonged, without ever actually ending, which in neither direction has bounds or limits. This is man^s only positive notion of infinity. But it is not its reality, but its approximation. Such an idea is the highest which we can conceive of the Creator. We can only form a conception of His existence as without limits in past or future time. Our notion of Him as the Almighty is the human conception of power, but without limits to that power. All power Avhicli is conceivable or limited does not represent a positive idea of the Almighty power. Although the manifestations of His power which we behold are presented to us under the condition of limitation, it must be free from this limit in its actual existence in Him. The only conception which we can form of His wisdom is wisdom without limits. All actually conceivable wisdom? therefore, is not the adequate representation of the wisdom of God. Every positive conception of existence, wisdom, or power which man is capable of forming, being conceived under the condition of limitation, cannot possibly represent the attributes of the infinite. When we want to form an idea of God's moral character, we add on to the conception of His infinite Being the notion of perfection. This idea of perfection applied to the infi- nitude of God is the human idea of perfection indefinitely extended. The positive view which we take of it is the denial of all the imperfection to which all finite perfection is neces- sarily subject. Such is the highest conception which the human mind can form of the moral perfections of the Creator. It is equally impossible to form an adequate positive concep- tion of the perfect m the Infinite mind as to form a positive conception of the infinite itself. By such conditions, therefore, the contents of a revelation, whatever may be the degree of its inspiration, must be limited, 14 and in conceptions of this description it must be expressed. No revelation is possible to man which does not contain one human element — the representation of the infinite in the inadequate ideas of the finite. To suppose the contrary is to assume the possibility of God^s making a contradiction. But before we inquire whether there are any self-evident grounds of certainty, by means of which we are entitled to infer the nature or the extent of the inspiration through which the revelation must be communicated, previously to all examination of the facts presented by the revelation itself, it will be necessary to inquire into the nature of the various views of the mode in which we can conceive that inspiration is capable of being communicated to man. We shall then be better able to estimate the value of any theories as to the extent in which inspiration has been vouchsafed for the com- munication of a revelation. CHAPTER III. DIFFERENT THEORIES AS TO THE EXTENT OF DIVINE INSPIRATION. It has been very extensively held that the Christian Scrip- tures have been written under the influence of an inspiration designated as plenary inspiration. The term plenary insj)i- ration, used as a description of the Divine method of commu- nicating a revelation, is one of no inconsiderable ambiguity. According to the context in which the expression occurs, it may be not incorrectly used to denote any conceivable degree of inspiration whatever. It is hardly possible for any one to believe that any parti- cular book, such as the Christian Scriptures, has been written under the influence of inspiration at all, and not to hold that the inspiration under the influence of which it must have been composed is plenary. The term "plenary inspiration" means full inspiration ; if, therefore, we use the expression in its un- 15 qualified sense^ it cannot mean anything short of what is designated by the term " verbal inspiration/^ When we use the expression verbal inspiration, we mean that every word, thought, conception, and expression in the Scriptm^es is the absolute dictation of the Spirit of God, and that the writers of the different books in the Bible have merely copied down what the Divine Spirit dictated to them. Inspi- ration in this sense is the highest form in which we can con- ceive of inspiration as communicated. It represents it as so complete, that all the faculties of the human soul are entirely superseded by the action of the inspiring Spirit. In this sense therefore the inspiration may be said to be full, absolute, and complete. If therefore, by the expression plenary inspiration, we intend to denote the fullest form of inspiration, it will be more correctly designated by the expression verbal inspiration. But this is not the sense which is usually intended when it is asserted that the Christian Scriptures have been composed under the influence of plenary inspiration. Something short of verbal inspiration is usually intended. But as soon as we qualify the expression, the term loses all definite meaning. In a qualified sense it is difficult to conceive that any one who believes in the inspiration of the Christian Scriptures can believe that they have been delivered to man by any other than a plenary inspiration. If they are inspired at all, they must have been fully inspired as far as it was the Divine purpose to communicate supernatural knowledge. If God intended to make any revelation, it is not conceivable that He has not communicated fully what He intended to reveal, or that He has not given the necessary amount of in- spiration to communicate that knowledge. If the inspiration therefore were not plenary, it would be the same thing as to suppose that God has purposed to reveal truth, but that He has withheld the degree of inspiration necessary for its com- munication. Still, when plenary inspiration is spoken of as a distinct form of inspiration from verbal inspiration, we use an ambiguous term. If we concede that the Scriptures are not verbally inspired, we concede that their inspiration cannot be plenary, 16 because, in whatever degree the inspiration is less than verbal, a degree of inspiration mnst have been eiiiployed less than the fullest form of inspiration. The fullest form of inspiration would have required that every word, thought, and expression, even that the style in which the Scriptures are composed, should be the work of the Spirit of God. In whatever degree we admit in them the existence of any element of which He is not the complete and absolute Author, we detract from the fulness of the inspiration. Its amount then becomes a ques- tion of degree. In the strict sense of the term^ therefore^ ple- nary inspiration cannot be anything short of verbal inspiration. Now what do we mean when we assert that the Scriptures have been composed by the aid of supernatural inspiration ? We intend by that expression that there is an element in them which the unassisted powers of the human mind never would have produced by the simple exercise of its natural powers. We conceive of the influence as one by Avhich an intelligent mind introduces new truths^ new forms of thought, and new feelings into the mind of another by agencies different from the action of the ordinary mental powers. We imply also that the inspired person has a consciousness that the feel- ings, truths, and conceptions in question have been intro- duced into his mind by an external influence distinct from the powers of the mind itself. If we say that a book has been composed by the aid of inspi- ration, and intend by that expression only to assert that it has been composed by some secret influence belonging to the mind itself, and arising out of its natural powers, we employ a term essentially fallacious. Latent powers exist in the mind, the action of which we cannot refer to any known law ; but we, understand a wholly different thing from the exertion of any power of this description when we assert that the Scriptures have been composed by the aid of inspiration. Our present inability to assign such phenomena to the action of any known law affords no ground for believing that they act indepen- dently of law. To call such phenomena by the term insj)iration is to confound together ideas essentially differing in meaning. It is not uncommon, however, to use the term in a mctapho- 17 rical sense. But when it is so used, we are never in danger of mistaking its meaning. In this sense we speak of the in- spirations of the poet and of the man of genius. By such an expression we intend to express the suddenness of the concep- tions, or the unknown powers of mind in which they originate. Such expressions are never intended to convey that the thought has originated in any source different from the natural powers inherent in the mind. In the same manner the powers which have originated great discoveries and inventions have been designated by the term inspirations ; and so have perceptions of truths which have the nature of intuitions, which are per- ceived at a glance by men of lofty powers, but which men of inferior intellect are compelled to arrive at by long and pain- ful deductions. Different theories may be invented to account for the origin of all such thoughts ; but whatever explanation we may accept, they must be the result of some great law of the human mind differing entirely from what we mean when we speak of thoughts, conceptions, or ideas being commu- nicated by means of divine inspiration. When, then, it is as- serted that the Christian Scriptures have been composed under the influence of divine inspiration, if we use that term and only intend to convey the meaning that it is the same influence, only higher in degree, as that by the aid of which any ordinary book of man is composed — if we intend by that expression nothing more than that they have been composed by the aid of genius, or of deep spiritual insight or superior power of in- tuition, but by no influence acting on the mind from without and differing in character from its other powers, — it is to delude ourselves and others by a fallacious use of words. We can only consistently mean, when we use the term inspiration to denote the mode of the composition of the Scriptures, that they have been composed by the aid of another personality acting on the mind, whose action has produced results which the mind would have failed to produce except as the result of His operation, and that it is a direct communication from God, differing from the ordinary mode of His operation on the soul. It is necessary to keep this distinction in view, because there is a sense in which every ordinary power of the human mind c 18 is ail inspiration from God: " an inspiration from the Almighty giveth man understanding." All our mental powers being God's gifts, in this sense of the expression, they may be said to be derived from His inspiration. But, although all the human powers may be said to be derived from an inspiration from the Almighty, nothing would be more absurd than to speak of ordinary books, or even works which are the creations of the highest genius, as composed by the aid of divine in- spiration. We must also be careful to distinguish between certain natural states of human progress and enlightenment under the direction and guidance of Divine Providence, and super- natural communications of truth made to man by inspiration. No two conceptions can be more fundamentally distinct. Perhaps no more dangerous attack has been opened on the authority of divine revelation than the attempts made by numerous writers of the present day to represent these as flowing from the same influence as inspiration, and of sub- stantially the same authority. It is well known that a large class of writers who claim to believe in revelation represent all the great developments of man as essentially divine, and among these developments assign Christianity a high rank. Still the views which are advocated imply that there is no essential difference in kind between them. Such writers assert and maintain that all the great races of men have been endowed by the Creator with certain great mental qualifications, which have gradually elaborated cer- tain great points of the national character. According to these views, all past forms of civilization have not only been under the general superintendence of the providence of God, but have had God for their author, and have been looked upon by the Divine Being with actual and positive approba- tion. Thus he has endowed the Oriental with his genius for metaphysical speculation ; the Greek vnth his exquisite taste for beauty, and his genius for philosophy; the Roman with his special talent of political constructiveness ; the Hebrew with his moral sense, and his monotheistic perceptions, and his personal religion. Out of these elements, all partaking 19 of a divine cliaracter, have been developed Christianity and modern civilization. In some sense or other, all these special endowments may be received as inspirations from God. By this mode of representing the matter, the human is not deified, but the divine is reduced to the standard of humanity. The same class of thinkers take a similar view of the deve- lopments of the Christian Church; they are all alike de- signed by its Founder, and divine. The Christianity of the earlier centuries, the Christianity of the middle ages, the Christianity of the Romish Church, the Christianity of the Greek Church, the Christianity of the Reformation, are all necessary developments of the great idea, are all the results and workings of the universal inspiring Spirit. The great principle maintained is. Whatever has habitually prevailed among large masses of men must have been divine, and therefore derived from an inspiration from God. It is a great truth, that every event which happens has a spe- cial place in the dispensations of Divine Providence. All things which occur, every endowment which man possesses, have been and are regulated by the powerful hand of the Creator. He makes all things subservient to the great purposes of His providence. "The Most High ruleth in the kingdoms of men, and giveth them to whomsoever He will, and setteth up over them the basest of men.'^ Every event of Providence, the whole combined agency of man, has been rendered sub- servient to the introduction of His great revelation. The gospel was revealed in the fulness of the times. This involves an overruling influence exerted over all human things, the nature of which must remain for ever unknown to man. How God in His ordinary providence acts on the human mind, without interfering with its freedom, is a depth the profun- dities of which we cannot penetrate. But to represent these influences as of a similar nature to those which we mean when we speak of a revelation communicated by inspiration is to confound together conceptions essentially distinct. We must also be careful to observe the distinction between the conceptions of inspiration and superintendence. Each may exist without involving the other. A man may be in- c3 20 spiredj and yet have no general superintendence exerted over him in communicating to others the things which were super- naturally discovered to his mind. A general superintendence may be exerted over a man's mental operations, and no new truth or feeling may be imparted to him. Inspiration and superintendence may coexist in the same mind, and yet their influences may be entirely distinct. By inspiration fresh truths are introduced into the mind. Superintendence re- gulates those already there. But supposing God to have made a revelation by super- natural inspiration, we must examine the nature of the views held as to the degree in which such inspiration has been communicated. The believers in the supernatural inspiration of the Christian Scriptures divide themselves into two classes : one of these holds that they must have been communicated by what is called verbal inspiration ; the other maintains that a human element of some kind exists in them, together with a divine one. We will proceed to lay down what ought to be the complete theory of verbal inspiration. Of all the theories of the manner in which inspiration has been communicated, this theory is the most complete ; it leaves nothing unaccounted for ; it eliminates out of the con- ception of inspiration everything human. As a theory it is beautifully consistent. According to the opinions of those who believe that this theory is the true account of the mode of the inspiration of the Christian Scriptures as they issued from the hands of those Avho transcribed them, they must have been completely and in every part the work of the Holy Spirit. The only human agency employed in their produc- tion must have been the simple act of copying what the Spirit of God dictated. Every word, assertion, and declara- tion in them are His positive word, assertion, and declaration. Facts, doctrines, precepts, references to history or chronology, quotations from writers sacred or profane, allusions to scientific truth, visions or prophetic declarations, mere refer- ences to the most ordinary actions of life, according to this view, are not the work of man, but of Omniscience. The only use which has been made of human agency in the composition 21 of the book has been to copy down with pen, ink, and paper what has been dictated by the Divine Spirit. By some of those who entertain this view the theory has been pushed to the full length of asserting that the auto- graphsj as they came from the hands of the inspired penmen, must have been devoid of a single inaccuracy or mistake. Such persons carry out the theory to its legitimate con- sequences ; and it is difficult to see how a person holding it can be satisfied with less. If it is absolutely necessary that a divine revelation should be communicated with all the accu- racy of verbal inspiration, there is no reason why it should not both have dictated the entire contents of the Christian Scriptures and superintended their transcription. Nor can any reason be given why such a superintendence should not have been exerted over their transcription and translation to the present day, as to have prevented every human element of error from impairing the accuracy of this perfect transcript of the Divine mind. The only reason which can be given is, that it would have involved a perpetual miracle. But why, if it were necessary, should not a perpetual miracle be wrought ? We have something very like one in the continual separate existence of the Jewish people during a space of 1800 years, scattered as they are in every climate and through every nation. But while the theory of verbal inspiration has been con- structed for the purpose of eradicating every conceivable human element in the structure of the Scriptures, many of its supporters shrink from carrying it out to its full and legiti- mate consequences ; they feel that the facts as they exist in the Scriptures are hard to reconcile with the theory. While, therefore, they are ready to maintain that they have been generally dictated by the Spirit, they hesitate to assert that the style of these writings is His work. But if the theory be correct, on what conceivable principle can its supporters hesi- tate to ascribe the style of the Scriptures to the Divine Spirit ? Every sentence in them has been dictated by Him. Every declaration has nothing in it human, but is wholly divine. But if every word be a divine dictation, and the influence of the 22 minds of the writers has been completely superseded under the agency of inspiration, the style in which they have been composed requires to be accounted for. The existence in them of a peculiar style is an undeniable fact. It must be either human or divine. It must be that of the individual writers or that of the Spirit of God. It follows that if the whole contents of the Christian Scrip- tures be the dictation of the Spirit, without the intermixture of any human element, the style in which the thoughts are conveyed cannot be that of the persons whose names are pre- fixed to the books, but the composition of the Divine Spirit. But if He is the author of the style, the perfection of the divine ought so far to transcend that of any human style as the ordinary works of God transcend those of man. To make the theory perfect, it must be assumed that the style in which the Scriptures have been composed must be an exhibi- tion of this perfection. Mahommed makes the pretension in his Koran, that the style in which it is composed is actually divine, and that its excellence is a proof of the divine origin of the book. In making this assertion, he is consistent with his own principles ; for he affirms that the contents of his revelation have formed from eternity a portion of the Divine mind. But the theory does not require the assertion of the absolute perfection of the style. The separate works of God are not necessarily absolutely perfect. We are only com- pelled to claim for it the same degree of perfection which is displayed in the other Divine operations. According to the theory of verbal inspiration, in whatever degree the divine mode of working transcends the human, the divine style ought to be similarly distinguished from the styles of imperfect and fallible men. To admit less than this, is to admit the presence of a human element of some kind in the composition of the Scrip- tures. Many of the advocates of the doctrine of verbal in- spiration hesitate to carry it out in this manner to its legiti- mate consequences. But it may be asked, On what principle of consistency do they stop short of pushing the theory to these consequences ? Those who hold the theory are ready 23 to argue in its support^ If the Scriptures contain any, even the smallest amount of imperfection, how shall we know where that imperfection ends ? From the supposed cogency of this argument, it is inferred that the Scriptures can only have been composed under the influence of verbal inspiration. But the argument admits of being applied in another direction with equal cogency. It may be urged, the style is either human or divine. If the style is human, there is a human element in the structure of the Scriptures; and if one human element exists, who shall assign its limits ? If there are faults in the poetry, if any particular passage might have been expressed with greater perspicuity, if inaccuracies of grammar exist, who shall say that such inaccuracies may not extend to a genealogy, a date, or a fact ? Imperfections must be the result of human, and not of divine agency ; and if one single mark of human agency be admitted, the theory of verbal inspiration is subverted. If such a theory must be assumed as an explanation of the mode of the inspiration of the Scriptures, it must not be used only as far as it is con- venient, and then abandoned ; it must be fully carried out to its legitimate consequences. Its correct statement requires that the style, no less than the substance, of the Scriptures should be the work of God. But the phenomena presented by the Scriptures have pro- duced various modifications in the theory. After the theory has been modified, its precise nature is difiicult of definition. Perhaps those who make the modifications seldom realize to themselves the full extent in which those modifications de- stroy the theory itself. It is then the common resource to conceal the indistinctness of the theory behind the ambi- guous phrase of " plenary inspiration.^^ The object kept in view is to make the smallest concession possible to the pre- sence of a human element. If any portion of the theory be at hopeless issue with a palpable fact, that portion has been abandoned : by this surrender its consistency has been marred. It then becomes extremely difficult to give to the view main- tained a clear and distinct expression. It has been conceded by persons professing to hold this 24 theory^ that some human element may have entered in a low degree into the structure of the Scriptures ; but such an in- fluence has been exerted over this human element by the Spirit of God as to eradicate out of it all the defects to which^ as human^ it is liable : but no clear explanation is offered^ what is the precise nature of that influence. A human some- thing is supposed to exist in the structure of the Scriptures, but the defects to which it is liable are counteracted by a divine influence ; but we are not told what is the nature of the influence. Language of this kind supplies us with no distinct conception on which we can reason; it furnishes us with nothing but vague generalities. Divested of ambiguities, it is difficult to see how this view differs from that of verbal inspiration. The most distinct view which can be formed of what is intended by such a statement is, that some thoughts and modes of expression in the Scriptures must be admitted to be human. Those thoughts and conceptions, however, in a manner of which no distinct idea can be formed, have under- gone such a constant revision by the Spirit of God as to have become divested of their human character. We will explain what we apprehend that the propounders of such a theory intend, by an illustration : — An incorrect time-piece has been constructed, and set working. The force of the springs, if left to the natural result of their o^vn opera- tion, would cause the time-piece to go either too fast or too slow, or, from defects in the works, it might cause inequalities of motion. But the maker of the time-piece, by appljdng forces external to the machinery, counterbalances its imper- fections, and produces the result of correct time. He effects this by applying to the time-piece a power from without, pro- ducing an influence in an opposite direction to that exerted by the springs exactly sufficient to counterbalance their irre- gularities. In like manner the human elements employed in communicating a revelation, if left to their natural operation, would produce various degrees of imperfection ; but as in the time-piece the action of external forces counterbalances the defects of the machinery and the inequahties of its motion. 25 so the agency of the Spirit of God constantly exerts a coun- terbalancing influence on the imperfection of the human agencies employed in communicating a revelation. In the one case we can clearly comprehend the nature of the agencies employed; in the other case^ the imperfection of our con- ceptions of them hinders us from forming any rational con- clusion as to their nature^ and destroys the force of the analogy. But there is a numerous class of persons who believe in the divine character of the Christian revelation, but who deny that the nature of the inspiration under the influence of Avhich it has been communicated is verbal inspiration. We will state their leading opinions. Such persons maintain that the great end and purpose for which a divine revelation would be communicated is limited to the clear discovering and the correct statement of those truths which form the peculiar and exclusive subject-matter of a divine revelation. Inspiration, therefore, would not be a general influence exerted over the whole powers of the mind, nor would it confer a general infallibility on persons under its influence, but it would be strictly limited to the communica- tion of the special truths forming the subject-matter of the divine revelation. There are two modes through which the Creator may dis- cover Himself to man. One of these is the manifestation of the Divine character and perfections made by means of the works of creation. The other is the discovery of His character and will by communicating truth to the mind directly by in- spiration. Now persons holding such opinions maintain that the truths which are discovered through the manifestation which God has made of His character and perfections in creation and providence form a revelation which has a distinctive character. The truths discovered are all confined within a particular range of subject-matter. On many subjects on which man feels the profoundest interest, such as his future condition beyond the grave, they communicate to him little or no information. The mode in which man learns the truths 26 communicated by this natural revelation of God is a careful study of tlie laws of the universe by the exercise of the ordi- nary faculties of the mind. Now it is asserted that everything which we know of the character of God^ as discovered by creation and providence^ leads us to the conclusion that those things which He has given man ample opportunities to discover by the careful use of his natui'al faculties He would not discover to him by a supernatural revelation. It is inconsistent with the per- fections of God to employ a double set of means for pro- ducing a single result. The use of double means for the pro- duction of a single result is the effect of finite imperfection. The proper subject-matter for a supernatural revelation^ there- fore_, is that class of truths respecting which the works of creation and providence afford us no information, or which the human faculties are unable to deduce from those works. To suppose that God will reveal by inspiration what He has already revealed by creation, and which He has furnished man with faculties to discover for himself, is to assume it possible that the Creator will employ a double agency for the purpose of effecting a single result, which is the refuge of imperfect power or of imperfect wisdom. Now in making a discovery of the character or the will of God to the mind of man, two things, according to the views in question, are essentially necessary — an objective manifesta- tion of Himself made by God, and a subjective communication of that manifestation imparted to the mind of man. The objective manifestation of God in the created universe consists in the works of creation and providence. The know- ledge of the Divine character and perfections is communi- cated to the human mind through the exercise of its rational powers in the study of those works. But the manifestation of His perfections to the human mind by a supernatural reve- lation will involve an objective manifestation of God, the meaning of which will be communicated to the mind, not by the exercise of the ordinary faculties, but by inspiration. To such a manifestation, therefore, inspiration will be strictly limited. 27 Now, if the Creator be pleased to make a supernatural revelation of Himself, that revelation must be made relatively to the faculties of those for whom it is intended ; it could not be an absolute, but a relative revelation. It must have a special object and a particular purpose. Consequently, if God determined in Himself the extent of truth which He had re- solved to communicate, those who believe in the divine inspi- ration of the Scriptures, while they deny their verbal inspira- tion, maintain that the inspiration woukl be strictly limited to the special subject-matter which God intended to disclose, and to the faculties through the agency of which He purposed to make the disclosure. If, therefore, the revelation was made in a form which either admitted or required the inter- mixture of other subject-matter with its contents besides the special truths which it was the Divine purpose to disclose, they consider that divine inspiration would only be afforded to the truths forming the proper subject of the divine com- munication. Consequently, if it is assumed that the Chris- tian Scriptures contain a revelation from God, and that for special reasons those Scriptures have been composed in an historical form, many subjects may be introduced into them external to the proper subject-matter of a revelation, for the recording of which the assistance of supernatural inspiration may not have been afforded. The necessity for inspiration would only extend to that portion of them in which the truths which it was the special purpose of God to reveal were con- tained. ^ Different views are taken by persons who believe in the reality of a divine revelation, as to the manner in which the inspiration itself has been afforded. According to one view, the revelation has been communicated in all its fulness, once and for all, to the mind of the inspired person ; and after he has been once perfectly taught the contents of the revelation, he has been left to the exercise of his ordinary faculties in making known to others those contents. Others think it more probable that, after the contents of the revelation have been communicated to the mind, a constant supernatural guidance has been afforded whenever the revelation was com- 28 municated to others, so far as to avoid the danger arising from the imperfection of the human faculties, and to com- municate that revelation with absolute truth and correctness. The inspiration by which the Christian Scriptures have been revealed may have been communicated in this manner. The whole of the divine truths contained in them may have been clearly discovered by one original act of inspiration, and then left to the action of the ordinary faculties of the mind ; or those faculties may have been assisted, whenever those truths were communicated to others, by the presence of supernatural inspiration, allowing other elements in different measures and degrees to coexist with that inspiration. Different opinions are held as to the degree in which such assistance has been afforded. As we are imperfect judges of the extent in which God would be pleased to make a revela- tion, so we must be equally imperfect judges of the extent in which He would be pleased to exercise such guidance over the persons employed in communicating it. All that can be asserted with certainty is, that to whatever extent it is the purpose of God to reveal Himself, His purpose, whatever it may be, will certainly be accomplished. Any modification, therefore, of view respecting the Divine purposes as to the extent of the revelation will render necessary a correspond- ing modification as to the instrumentality through which those purposes have been accomplished. The revelation contained in the Christian Scriptures is in an historical form. As they contain a great variety of matter, different portions of the matter contained in them may have required different degrees of inspiration for the assistance of the writers in their composition. Some portions of the Christian Scriptures consist of accounts of facts which have actually occurred ; other portions are descriptions of feelings which have been experienced by the writers. Some portions consist of precepts for the regulation of conduct ; other por- tions profess to be revelations of great truths. They like- wise contain allusions to various customs, manners, and histo- rical events. The Epistles contain details of the conduct of the writers when placed in particular situations. Now the 29 contents of the Christian Scriptures being of this varied de- scription, diflPerent opinions are held by those who believe that they have been communicated under the influence of supernatural inspiration, as to what degree elements thus widely different in character have required that supernatural assistance should be afforded to the authors. With persons who believe that God never employs unnecessary means to effectuate His ends, it would be a probability almost ap- proaching to certainty that God would proportion the aid of inspiration to the requirements of the different subject-matters contained in the Scriptures. The allusion to an ordinary matter of fact or to some historical detail lying within the powers of the ordinary faculties of the writers would require the aid of a far less degree of supernatural assistance than the statement of some great truth respecting the Divine cha- racter and perfections. Among those, therefore, who are firm believers that the Christian Scriptures have been communi- cated by the ' aid of divine inspiration, it may still be an open question as to the extent in which particular portions of the Scripture^ have participated in that inspiration. It has been asserted that the correct view of inspiration is, that the spirit of man is penetrated in all its functions and powers by the Spirit of God, and thereby all its thoughts, conceptions, and powers are elevated to a height to which they would otherwise be incapable of attaining. According to this theory, inspiration consists in a preternatural eleva- tion of the existing powers of the human mind. We are quite unable to determine to what extent truths which lie beyond the reach of our present faculties would be discoverable by the mind if the powers of those faculties were indefinitely multiplied. A large amount of truth, of a similar description as that with which we are at present ac- quainted, would undoubtedly be thrown open to our view ; but whether the intensification of our faculties would enable us to penetrate into new and distinct regions of truth, we have no data to determine. We therefore cannot concede that it is an adequate ac- count of what we mean when we assert that a revelation has 30 been communicated by inspiration from God, to define the in- fluence by which the revealed truths have been communi- cated as a simple intensification of the existing faculties of man. Such an increase of power, while it might have greatly enlarged our knowledge of present truths, might have admitted us to the acquaintance of no new species of truth. The Holy Spirit might penetrate and intensify all the existing powers of the mind, and yet they might leave us in the dark on various subjects respecting the Divine character and perfections of the highest importance for us to be informed on. But if inspiration consisted simply in a communication of an increase of power to the ordinary faculties of the mind, one element essential to a divine revelation would be wanting. The person thus inspired would not be sensible that the source of his additional knowledge would be the testimony of a personality external to his own mind. He could have no direct evidence that the truths communicated to him were imparted by God. Such truths, therefore, would have no higher authority to bind the conscience than those discovered by the ordinary course of our mental operations. In the case of a revelation of the Divine will, we want to have distinct evidence that it is God who is speaking, and not man. Although He may employ certain portions of man's ordinary mental powers in communicating a revelation, its very notion implies a direct sense of the presence of God in the mind of him to whom the revelation is imparted. We do not deny that the effect of inspiration on the human mind may be to intensify the existing powers, and call them into a far more vigorous action. Such an effect seems to have been produced on the writers both of the Old and New Testaments. But if we restrict inspiration to the production of this result, Ave make no sufficiently clear distinction be- tween it and the ordinary operations of the mind of man. The supporters of this theory hold a very extensive com- munication of an inspiration of this description. Many are of opinion that in this sense most of the great writers in the world's history, who have produced beneficial results, have been inspired. The view is closely connected with that to 31 which we have already alluded, which confases between God's providential government of the world and the results of super- natural inspiration. To one more theory we must make a brief allusion — that which identifies the ordinary operation of God's Spirit in sanctifying the heart with the results of divine inspiration. Into the profound depths of this question we shall not enter. It would require to be discussed in a separate treatise. We shall only make two observations respecting it. The action of the Holy Spirit in new-creating the heart must unquestionably open to the intellect discoveries of spiritual truth substantially new. The new feelings and affec- tions implanted in the soul must introduce a fresh body of truth into the understanding. If the renovation of the human mind imparts to it a fresh spiritual sense, a fresh body of truth by this influence must be discovered by the mind precisely proportionate to the change wrought in the feelings and affections in the soul. So far the influence exerted may be similar. But if we restrict inspiration to an influence of this de- scription, we shall unduly narrow the limits of what we mean when we speak of God's making a supernatural revelation. Such an expression implies the direct imparting by God of objective truth to the mind, not a mere creation of subjective feelings and affections which throw their light into the human understanding. That such influence may be closely allied to that which we designate by the expression divine inspiration, we are far from denying ; but it were to confound ideas essen- tially distinct to confine it to such influence, and to assert that it gives a full account of those phenomena which we de- signate by the term divine inspiration. One essential ele- ment it would leave entirely wanting — the distinct perception by the mind possessed of inspiration that it was God who was imparting truth to the mind by a direct personal agency. Such then are some of the theories which are held by those who believe in the supernatural inspiration of the Christian Scriptures respecting the nature of that inspiration. No opinion is at present expressed as to the truth or the fallacy 32 of those views. They have been stated because^ in examining the nature of the inspiration of the writers of the New Testa- ment, it is necessary that we should have a distinct view of these various theories. In determining the question as to the nature and extent of the inspiration vouchsafed to the writers of the Christian Scriptures, if we assume that they are a revelation from God, there are only two modes of inquiry open to us. First, what is the degree of light which is thrown on the subject by any antecedent certainty or antecedent probability which the mind possesses independently of all inquiry into the nature of the facts presented by the Christian Scriptures ? Secondly, supposing that the Scriptures are authenticated as a revelation from God, what assertions do they make re- specting the nature of the inspiration under the influence of which they have been composed, and what degree of inspira- tion do the phenomena contained in the Scriptures neces- sarily presuppose to have been afforded to the writers ? We will now proceed to examine what degree of ante- cedent certainty we possess as to the nature and degree of the inspiration of a revelation, supposing that it is the pur- pose of God to communicate a revelation of Himself to man. Now the amount of the inspiration through which a reve- lation has been communicated to man is a question quite distinct from the divine origin of the revelation itself. Our belief as to whether a revelation has been made by God to man must be entirely dependent on the evidence afibrded as to its reality. A revelation professing to come from God must be sufficiently attested as having Him for its author, before any one can be called on to believe in its divine cha- racter. We cannot be satisfied with a mere declaration of any person claiming to publish a revelation that he is under the influence of inspiration as a sufficient ground for believing that he is so. Something more than mere assertion is posi- tively required. But the determination of the nature and degree of the inspiration with which a revelation has been given is a matter entirely distinct from the sufficiency of the evidence on which a belief in its divine origin rests. If the 33 attestation to any revelation that it is of divine origin is sufficient^ our belief that it is such a revelation in no way- depends on our views as to the nature and extent of the in- spiration under the influence of which it has been communi- cated. This distinction has been frequently overlooked. It has often been asserted that the denial of a particular mode of inspiration is equivalent to the denial of the divine origin of the revelation itself. But the question whether any particular person is authorized to publish a revelation from God, or whether any particular book contains an account of such revelation, is a point which must be determined wholly by evidence. It resolves itself into the inquiry. Have we, or have we not, sufficient evidence that such a particular person has been authorized by God to publish a revelation of His will ? Can he produce the broad seal of Almighty God, guarantee- ing to us the truth of his divine commission ? CHAPTER IV. THE POSSIBILITY OF A MIRACULOUS INSPIRATION, AND THE MODE ADOPTED IN ITS COMMUNICATION. The certainty that a revelation has been made by Almighty God must ultimately resolve itself into the question, whether it has received a miraculous attestation. Such an attestation is the only means whereby the reality of a divine commission can be directly proved. Other evidence, such as the moral character of the revelation, may afford corroboration to the proof; but the moral character of a revelation alone would be powerless to assure us of its divine authority, or to render it binding on the conscience, without the support of a mira- culous testimony. A miracle denotes the finger of God. A revelation guaranteed by a miraculous testimony must be believed to be such, whatever questions may be raised as to the extent of the inspiration through which it has been com- 34 municated. The degree of the inspiration can have nothing to do with the evidence on which the reality of the miracles rests. But it is extensively held that the human mind possesses antecedent grounds of certainty^ which render all inquiry into the evidence of a supposed revelation unnecessary, and a miraculous attestation to such a revelation impossible. The ground on which such an assertion is made is, that the uni- verse is regulated by one unvarying principle of law or order, from which all deviation is impossible. A divine revelation supernaturally communicated, or a miracle as the evidence of such a revelation, would be a violation of the established law and order by which the universe is regulated. From this principle no deviation has taken place within the experience of man. It is not asserted that human experience is cognizant of all the actings of God, or even with a considerable por- tion of them ; bu^t it is assumed that the experience of man with respect to the subjection of the created universe to un- alterable law is a fair representation of all the actings of God which do not come within the range of that experience. From these premises it is assumed that action in con- formity with law and order is an essential attribute of the Divine mind, and that everything contained within the uni- verse must be an exhibition of this portion of the Divine character. It is deduced as a consequence from these pre- mises, that if the Creator were to violate the existing order of the universe. He would deny an essential attribute of His own nature. But as a supernatural revelation, from its very conception, must be a deviation from the universal law and order by which the universe is governed, every miracle per- formed in attestation of such a revelation must be an addi- tional violation of this principle. If, then, from its very con- ception, a miraculous revelation must be a violation of pre- viously existing law, it follows on indubitable grounds of antecedent certainty, that both such a revelation itself and the only evidence which can support it are impossibilities, being repugnant to the known character of God. This reasoning is frequently supported by other minor 35 considerations. It is urged that it is more worthy of the Creator that He should only act in conformity with law, than that He should deviate from it, in effectuating His purposes. It would be a reflection on His wisdom, if, after having once established a particular order, He had any necessity for its violation. It is urged that it presents a far more glorious view of the Divine perfections if we assume that there never has been any occasion for the interference of the Creator, in altering the existing laws of the universe, since the period when He first created it. It gives the highest ideas of the Divine power and wisdom if we suppose that the Creator, in His primitive act of creation, so regulated the universe by law that it has ever since continued to evolve itself in steady subjection to those laws, which have been laid down with such perfect wisdom as never to have required one special interference from the hour of creation. Now, on what are these views based? Have they any grounds of positive certainty on which to rest? Are the reasons alleged self-evident truths or uncertain probabilities? We have no intention to deny that on some subjects grounds of antecedent certainty exist, which are valid evi- dence on which the mind must rest prior to all inquiry as to fact. If such principles possess the evidence of demonstra- tion, the mind is unable to refuse its assent to them ; but siich grounds of belief must be self-evident truths, or capable of demonstration from self-evident principles. They must not be mere probabilities, which, when they are applied as exponents of the modes of the action of the Creator, lead to results which experience testifies to be universally untrue. The objection resolves itself into two parts. First, it is con- trary to the Creator's character as a lover of law and order to manifest Himself at all in any other manner than that in which He has manifested Himself in the creation and govern- ment of the universe. Secondly, that any miraculous attes- tation to such a supposed revelation is, for the same reason, impossible. Now it must be conceded that, as far as man's knowledge of the created universe extends, one universal principle of law d2 36 and order is the rule by which the Creator manifests Him- self in its creation and providence. Every phenomenon with which we are acquainted in the universe is the effect of law. The inanimate universe is regulated by universal laws of un- varying constancy;, no deviation from which has ever come under the cognizance of man. Those laws contain within them the principle of their own preservation. There is one unva- rying sequence of cause and effect. With respect to the sen- sient creation, the same general principle prevails. But here our knowledge is less complete. The free will of man inter- feres with the operation of mere physical laws. It presents phenomena of a character entirely distinct from the results of those operations. Free will, as a cause, differs in its entire conception from mere physical sequence. Our conception of a personal God involves the highest exercise of free will. The free spontaneity of His will has produced creation ; but how and when the various orders of beings have been brought into existence we have no positive data to determine. The- ories in abundance have been propounded; but whatever knowledge may be hereafter obtained on the subject, the evi- dence as to their origin which is possessed from an induction of facts is wholly insufficient to entitle the theories which have been propounded on the subject to be reckoned among established truths. They are only deductions from probabili- ties or remote analogies. Those who propound the views of which we have been speaking assert that species have been evolved successively, without any fresh creative act, from species previously exist- ing, and that the higher forms of being have been gradually developed from the lower, in ever-increasing perfection, until at last the production of man has been the crowning result of these successive developments. This assertion, however, is a theory, of which the proof, if not wholly wanting, must be pro- nounced to rest on evidence indefinitely small. The paucity of the data on which the theory is erected, compared with the vast extent of the theory itself, is of a very surprising character. Those who hold the contrary opinion maintain that each separate species has come into existence by a sepa- 37 rate creative act. The opponents of this view reply^ that the number of these species requires such a number of creative acts as to render such a supposition improbable. But on what observed facts does the former of these theo- ries rest ? on what is the opinion founded ? On the observed laws of order which the inanimate creation obeys. But have we a knowledge of the laws by which the entire universe is governed ? If not, by what right do we extend our inferences from such laws into regions essentially distinct? Our ob- servations are confined to existing phenomena, and lie entirely beyond the region of creative acts. To extend inferences drawn from existing phenomena into the region of creative acts is to assume as true what ought to be proved. Positive proof that species have been evolved from species by the action of general laws, there is none. No fact of such trans- formation can be adduced. Geology supplies no direct evi- dence of such transformations. No one instance has yet been found of an organized being in a state of transition from one species to another. But because the natural universe, as far as it has come under observation, obeys the law of order, and is regulated by a necessary sequence of causes and effects, it has been affirmed that every other portion of the universe must have been evolved in conformity with the same law. Such an inference has been said to be not in conformity with probability merely, but with analogy. It must be admitted that analogy is a much higher ground for belief than bare probability ; but we are entitled to ask whether we have any evidence or experience sufficiently ex- tended to assure us that in such a case the analogy will hold. Considering the infinite variety of modes in which it may please the Creator to manifest Himself, an analogy derived from one single mode of His manifestation can be no certain guide to one of an entirely diff'erent description. Before, therefore, we can assume that the whole of the manifestations of the Creator in the universe are simple manifestations of law and order, and that He never manifests Himself by occa- sional deviations from them, we require evidence of a positive. 38 and not of an analogical character. Before vre can apply analogical evidence in sncli a case, we must be certain that the facts from "svliich the analogies are derived are fair repre- sentations of the conduct of the Creator. "\Ve must be sure that our field of vision is not a narrow corner of the universe, but that it commands an extensive view of its general princi- ples. In this case the extent of our knowledge is too limited to admit of such an application. The theory does not profess to be founded on an induction of facts, and is wholly inappli- cable to creative acts. Our finite experience is of a nature far too limited to enable us to judge what is or what is not antecedently probable with respect to the Creator in matters of this description, or to assume on such data that God cannot deviate from such laws as om' limited experience of His actings has induced us to consider as the laws which regulate His conduct. This experience is a safe guide to truth within its legitimate boinids ; extended beyond the limits of those boundaries, it leads to inferences not resting on certainty, but bare probability. Unless a di-sdne revelation or a miracle were a deviation from the ordinary law of the Creator's acting, it would lose its essential character as a revelation or a miracle. It is the very essence of the nature of miracles that they should be such a deviation : it forms the groundwork of our conception of them. As man's experience is finite, it is evident that an infinite amount of the actings of God must lie beyond its range. He cannot, therefore, be in a position to lay down the laws of what is, or what is not, possible with God. The experience of man can only bring under our observation what is a mere sample of the actings of the Creator. We have therefore no grounds for assuming that the actings of the infinite Being, which in past eternity must have been as infinite as Himself, are all of one and the same character, or that their nature can be adequately represented by the small number of them which have come under om* limited observa- tion. We are ready to grant that a deviation from law and order in the mode of the Divine actings has never come under scientific experience. Yet it is too much to assume, from this 39 experience, that tlie eternal Creator, in all the modes of His self-manifestation in the course of a bygone eternity, can never haAC acted otherwise than in conformity with that experience. From the nature of the case our inductions respecting the past actings of the Eternal and the Infinite must be of a far less general nature than those of the Indian king who, on the strength of the evidence of his contracted experience, pronounced that the existence of ice was an impossibility. It was beyond the limits of his experience ; but his experience was no measure of the universal experience of man. He argued from analogy. That analogy held good within the range of the circumstances to which it was applicable ; it led to untrue inferences when it was assumed as a universal measure of things. In a far greater degree any conclusions founded on the limited experience of man, as to what must have been the mode of the acting of the Infinite and the Eternal throughout the infinitude of the present and the past, must be founded on an induction far too limited to enable us to assert what is or is not possible with God. Who will venture to assert that, in the eternity of the past or in the infinitude of the present, the Divine mode of acting may not have presented a character entirely difl:erent from any mani- festation which has taken place within the limited sphere of our finite view ? To assert that our experience is an adequate measure of the mode of the Divine acting is a conclusion far too wide to be founded on mere probability or analogy. Such a conclusion requires the support of an evidence which is un- attainable by man. It is impossible, therefore, on the foundation of any ex- perience which is attainable by man, to arrive at the con- clusion that law or order is so essential a conception of the Divine nature that any deviation from them is repugnant to our conception of the Divine attributes, and therefore ante- cedently impossible. But the theory under discussion pre- supposes that they are such essential qualities of the Divine mind, that any deviation from them involves a contradiction. On both points the evidence is imperfect. We do not know 40 on any evidence whicli must command the assent of the un- derstanding, even if the Creator^'s actings had been founded on these jarinciples^ that it is self-contradictory that he should act in a different manner. The assertion that such is the in- variable mode of the acting of the Creator is founded on an induction which extends only as far as the experience of man. Beyond that experience lie the infinite actings of God in the eternity of His existence. This assertion is of the same class as numerous other a prio7'i assertions^ which are found to be utterly groundless when they are tested by experience. To justify us in assuming that the Creator cannot deviate from those laws which have come under human observation in the government of the universe, we ought to have evidence nothing short of demonstration that such deviation must be repugnant to the Di^dne perfections. It cannot be proved that the evidence which we possess, that the love of law and order is so essential an attribute of the Divine mind as to render all de-sdation from it on the part of the Creator impossible, exceeds the evidence which we pos- sess of the other attributes of God; or that conclusions founded on this portion of the Di\dne character will be more certain guides as to what has been the actual conduct of the Creator than conclusions professedly deduced from the other perfections of His nature. But those conclusions founded on the other attributes of God, when pushed to their strict logical consequences, are found to be incorrect guides to the actual facts presented by the universe. Why, then, should such principles be assumed as correct guides in determining ques- tions respecting the possibility or the impossibihty of a divine revelation ? It is impossible to deduce the facts of the actual structure of the universe by a priori arguments derived from our human views of the Divine perfections. To adduce a few examples. The power of the Creator is infinite. We might infer, there- fore, that every exertion of His power ought to contain distinct traces of His infinity. No one exertion of that power ought to admit of increase, or contain traces of defect. But, accord- ing to our modes of conception, every exertion of that power 41 is not a display of infinite power ; it is only such a display of power as the necessities of the case demand. In like manner^ it is an undoubted truth that the Almighty is infinitely wise. Shall we infer from this attribute that every created thing as it exists in the universe must have had the whole treasures of this infinite wisdom expended on it ? If this conclusion be true, the Creator could not make ever- increasing displays of the profundity of His wisdom. Because God is infinitely wise, no person will maintain that in each special manifestation of His wisdom the whole resources of that wisdom must be displayed. In the manifestation of his wisdom displayed in His works, we observe degrees of wisdom actually employed. If we were able to comprehend the works of the Creator taken as a whole, we might discover in them the resources of infinite wisdom. But the works of the Creator, taken as a whole, do not exist to finite minds. There is not only the past eternity in which He has operated, but there is the eternity yet to come, in which he will never cease from His glorious manifestation. But man can only conceive of them under the limitation of time. The resources of infi- nite wisdom cannot be displayed in special acts. Even in any existing state of the universe, the profundities of His wisdom are not exerted in any single manifestation, but they will require an eternity in which they will be unfolded. Another attribute of the Creator, which the supporters of the theory we are impugning are the foremost to maintain, is His goodness. That God is perfectly good is a great truth at the foundation of religion. But will it be maintained by the supporters of this theory, that in every creative act of God we find a perfect manifesta- tion of the attribute of goodness ? On the contrary, all their views of the universe are based on the supposition that in His actual working God commences Avith lower beginnings, and advances to more perfect displays of goodness. The universe, as it comes under human observation, is no perfect display of that attribute. Arguments deduced from that attribute by strict logical consequence would lead us to infer a different structure of the universe from that which actually exists. We 42 might argue from the existence in the Creator of the attribute of perfect goodness^ united with infinite wisdom and power, that the existence of evil, whether moral or physical, would be utterly impossible. For this conclusion we have far higher grounds of antecedent probability than that a miraculous revelation is impossible, because the love of law and order are attributes of the Almighty. The argument which infers from the perfect goodness of the Creator, united with His infinite wisdom and power, that evil could not exist in the universe of which He is the Creator and Governor, would lead us to a conclusion which contradicts the actual phenomena of that universe as they come under our observation. Evil exists in the universe of the all-power- ful, the all-wise, and the all-perfect God, however contrary it may be to our ideas of antecedent certainty that it would exist. If we cannot infer from the attributes of infinite power, wisdom, and perfect goodness in the Creator that evil cannot exist in the universe of which He is the author, we are in no position to argue that a supernatural revelation or miracles wrought in its attestation are impossible, because the love of order and law are conceived of by us as among the attributes of God. But the asserters of this opinion maintain that the unalter- able and universal dominion of law and order in the universe affords the most perfect conception which we can form of that universe as framed by the creative power of God, and as governed by the wisdom of His providence. They assume that the highest conception which can be framed of the wisdom and power of the Creator is, that He so formed the universe at the beginning, and impressed its laws on it with that perfec- tion of wisdom, that they have by their own self-acting evolved every existing thing, without the necessity of a single subse- quent interposition of the Creator's hand. It is asserted to be the highest possible view which we can take of the charac- ter of God, that l)y one act of creation He has accomplished His work, and that the creation has since evolved itself accord- ing to His eternal laws, without the necessity of His special intervention. It would undoubtedly denote a higher degree 43 of wisdom in a human artist, if lie could not only form an in- strument or piece of machinery fully capable of executing its purpose, but which also possessed the power of generating a new piece of machinery out of itself in endless succession, equally capable of executing the intentions of the original contriver. Because it is assumed that such a view is the highest which can be taken of the intelligence and power of the Creator, it is taken for granted that it is the only one in conformity with which He can act in the government of the universe. If this theory be correct, it follows that any variation from this law would imply a lower display of the perfection of God. But a revelation or a miracle is a deviation from esta- blished order previously existing ; it involves a special in- tervention of the Creator. His original contrivances must therefore have been imperfect, to render such a special in- tervention necessary. His work was not perfect from the first; but as the Creator is perfect, no work involving im- perfection can be His. A revelation, therefore, and miracles wrought in attestation of it are impossible. Such reasonings might have considerable cogency if we had sufficient evidence that the Creator had no other perfection beyond that of the most perfect of mechanists. A mechanist who can make a machine so perfect as never to require recti- fication, which contains within itself the powers necessary for its own reparation, and which, in addition to these extraordi- nary properties, could evolve out of itself in endless succes- sion other similar machines, would undoubtedly display greater resources of wisdom and power than one who could only make a machine without the other properties in question. Such a mechanist would be the most perfect of mechanists; he would make a single machine, and retire from action for ever ; his perfection would be so great, that even if he were to cease to exist, he would not be found wanting ! But in reply we ask, Is the only view which we can take of the character of the Creator that of a perfect mechanist or chemist? Has He no moral attributes through which to display the glories of His being ? May He not make a 44 manifestation of them, as well as of His wisdom and His power? Has He not also a personality ? Is not the absolute freedom of His will a most glorious attribute of His nature ? May not a manifestation of the self-determination of His free will be as glorious a display of His character as an inva- riable acting in conformity with order and law by physical sequence ? May He not stand in other relations to His creatures than those of a simple mechanist or a chemist? May He not also manifest Himself to them in the capacity of a Father ? His character as Father of rational beings is a most glorious attribute of the Eternal. Is it not possible that He may appear more glorious in some one or in all of these aspects than by a mere exhibition of Himself as the most perfect mechanist, whose perfection was so great that He needed to act only once, and then for ever sink into inac- tivity, and be to us as though He existed not? Such possi- bilities are worthy of being seriously reflected on before the theory in question is propounded as the only possible account of the Divine conduct. It by no means follows that, because such a view may give us the most exalted idea of the Creator as a mechanical con- triver, it is the best means of displaying the other perfections of His nature, or that the simple idea of God as the most perfect of mechanical contrivers is the most glorious manifes- tation of the Creator. Nothing is more necessary, in order that the mind of man may have perfect trust in God, than that it should have a most distinct and constant perception of His personality. A sense of the Divine personality forms the foundation of all feeling towards Him in the capacity of a Father. It is surely equally important that His creatures should be capable of contemplating tbeir Creator as a Father, as that they should view Him as the most perfect of me- chanical contrivers. But unalterable continuity of action destroys man's sense of personality. The pui'e spontaneity of will is not most clearly manifested by the action of immutable and eternal law. Action in conformity with never -deviating law, unless corrected by other influences, has a tendency to produce the belief that the action is mechanical or dy- 45 namical, not spontaneous or free. Occasional interruptions in the continuity of the action of God may be necessary as evidence of the personality of the Creator. If, therefore, He be anything else than a mere mechanist, it may be no dimi- nution of His perfection to interrupt the law and order of the universe by occasional manifestations of Himself, and to in- struct His creatures by means of a supernatural revelation. But even on the theorizer^s own representation of his theory, it contains in it one weak point, which brings it to inevitable ruin and destruction. On his own principles, there has been at least one interruption of the law and order of all things. The universe is not the result of blind necessity or chance, but the work of an intelligent Creator. Creation, therefore, had a beginning. There once was a time, however remotely distant, when finite existence began to be. The only way in which this consequence can be evaded is to break down the distinction between the finite and the infinite, and to take refuge in pantheism. Before the commencement of the finite, the infinite existed alone. The infinite must once have evolved the finite. The laws which the Creator has impressed on created things may have been so perfect as never to have required any interference on His part from the first act of creation by any fresh exertion of creative power or special interference of His providence. But one interrup- tion of law and order has taken place, when the Creator pro- duced the finite. Prior to the creation of the finite, law and order subsisted only in the bosom of the Infinite. The creation of the finite must have been the greatest of all conceivable interruptions of that state of order which pre- viously existed. Hitherto creative power had never ener- gized in the upholding of the finite. But if one interruption, and that the greatest of all interruptions, of order previously existing has taken place, and in it the Creator has been essen- tially glorious, why may He not, in the unknown depths of His wisdom, make other interruptions, and in them appear equally glorious? As He has once become the author of the natural revelation, why may not He become the author of a new moral and spiritual creation ? A new moral and 46 spiritual creation is surely as worthy an occasion for the exertion of creative energy as the production of the material universe. In making these observations we have no intention of dis- puting the truth of the assertion that manifestations in con- formity with law and order are the only manifestations made by the Divine mind in the material universe, as far as scien- tific experience has yet penetrated. But how can we know that it is not the necessary condition of enabling the human mind to grasp a distinct conception of the personahty of God, that a general principle of acting in conformity with law, united with occasional deviations from such a mode of action, should be the mode in which the Creator manifests Him- self to His creatures ? What actual experience have we of creative acts ? Distinction between species exists as a fact in creation. The generation of new orders can be as readily accounted for by an exertion of the creative power of God as by a gradual evolution of one species from another by the agency of natural laws. Why, then, are creative acts deemed incredible ? Unless pantheism is the true solution of the existence of the universe, one creative act there must have been ; and if one, why not more ? And if creative acts be not incredible, how can miracles be impossible ? Variations from existing laws may even be necessary to enable us to appreciate the fulness of the beauty of the usual laws of order under which the Infinite has manifested Himself. Variation itself seems to be one of the necessary conditions of perception. What is it which gives us a sense of the beauty of the law and order by which the universe is re- gulated and governed ? Our power of comparing it with irre- gularity and disorder. We conclude, therefore, that we have no grounds of ante- cedent certainty which can justify us in drawing the con- clusion that the uninterrupted observance of law in the uni- verse is so glorious a representation of the character of God as to amount to a demonstration that all deviations from it are impossible in Him, nor from its existence in the material universe can there be any adequate grounds for inferring 47 that a discovery of Himself by means of a revelation attested by miracles is impossible with God^ or involving any violation of the Divine attributes. But we are entitled to draw a contrary inference. If God has once in the course of His actings deviated from the order previously existing, we infer with inevitable certainty that what He has done once He may do again. He has once made this deviation, when He created the finite; He may, there- fore, make another deviation for the purpose of effecting a new moral and spiritual creation. A revelation, therefore, accompanied with miracles wrought in attestation of it, contradicts no known truth respecting the Divine nature. Miracles could prove no adequate attes- tation of a divine commission, if the usual mode of the Divine acting was not in conformity with law. If their performance was frequent, our notion of law, and consequently our idea of a miracle, would be subverted. The assumption, therefore, that a revelation with a miraculous attestation is impossible, is a mere theory unsupported by evidence : it rests for support on no intuitive truth, nor can it be demonstrated to be a consequence of such truth. There is one antecedent probability, respecting the mode of communicating a revelation, which has the self-evidence of an axiom. To whatever extent it was the purpose of God to reveal Himself in a revelation, that purpose, in whatever reve- lation He was pleased to make. He would fully and effectually accomplish. Such a proposition simply asserts that, in the case of a Being who is infinitely powerful and wise. His purposes and the effects resulting from those purposes are necessarily coin- cident. With the Almighty, to will is to accomplish. He has the most perfect knowledge of the means by which His volitions can be effectuated. His infinite power gives Him an absolute command of those means. He can therefore have neither impediment nor hindrance in the execution of His designs. To whatever extent the Creator has de- termined to reveal Himself, that purpose He must have thoroughly and completely effected. If this were not the 48 case, there must exist a limitation either to His power or His knowledge. But before we can apply this truth for the purpose of de- termining the nature of the revelation, or the instrumentality- through which it has been communicated, we must know the extent of truth which it was the Divine purpose to reveal. But we are no adequate judges af the amount of truth which God must communicate to man. We cannot, therefore, de- termine the precise extent in which it would please God to make a revelation of Himself. We can only know what He ought to reveal, by ascertaining from His own declarations what He has been pleased to reveal. We shall then be fully justified in concluding that the Divine purposes have been fully carried into eflFect in every communication which possesses evidences of being a divine revelation. It is also a truth of the highest antecedent certainty, that neither in the subject-matter of a revelation nor in the means employed for its communication can the Creator act contrary to the moral attributes of His nature. There are many points connected with those attributes, which, as we have seen, lie beyond the range of the human understanding ; but, within the limits of that understanding, it is a universal truth that the Creator can only act according to the moral perfections of His nature. If we were to assume that God could act otherwise, it would be equivalent to the admission that God can act without motives. The moral attributes of the Deity must be the motives of the Divine conduct. The imperfection of our understandings impairs the force of our conclusions when we attempt to argue to things as they must exist from the separate attributes of God, because we are unable to determine the bearing of one of those attributes on another. But within those limits where the mind has ade- quate powers of judgment, we may safely conclude that what- ever professes to be a revelation from God, and contradicts the Divine attributes in their great and essential bearings, brings with it direct evidence of untruthfulness and impos- ture. The principle is only dangerous when it is pushed into regions of thought where the limited intelligence of man ren- 49 ders him an incompetent judge either of the Divine attributes themselves or of the general system of the Divine govern- ment. We may also assume on principles of analogy, united with considerations derived from the Divine character, that if it pleased God to communicate a knowledge of Himself by a supernatural revelation, the knowledge which He was pleased to communicate by such a revelation would not be extended to those subjects the knowledge of which the human mind was able to attain by means previously imparted. The evidence of this truth rests on direct analogy, derived from God^s mode of action as Creator and Preserver of the universe, supported by considerations deduced from His infi- nite wisdom and power. The force of such an analogy, de- rived from actual manifestations of the Creator, as to what His conduct would be in other similar manifestations, differs entirely in point of evidence from a mere antecedent proba- bility. It reaches little short of certainty when the analogies themselves fully coincide with conclusions respecting the Divine conduct which we should deduce from the Divine per- fections. If God has acted in a particular manner in one case, it afibrds a probability, amounting to a certainty, that He will act in the same Avay in a similar case when the same perfections of His nature are involved. Now we observe that, in His works of creation and pro- vidence, the Creator never uses a double set of means for the purpose of efiectuating the same end ; He can have no occa- sion to do so. Infinite power furnishes Him Avith every pos- sible resource for effectuating His purposes. No possibility is beyond the reach of Omnipotence. Whatever can be. He can eflFectuate and call into being. His infinite wisdom gives Him the most perfect knowledge of the means suited for carrying His purposes into efi^ect. There is no possible con- trivance which He does not know, and which, knowing. He cannot create. There is no possible result which He does not foresee, and against which He cannot provide. Consequently whenever God acts He has the most perfect knowledge of the means which He uses^ and of the mode in which His purposes E 50 can be effectuated, and the most perfect power to create the means and adapt them to their respective uses. The means which the Creator uses, therefore, cannot fail to effectuate His ends; consequently He cannot have occasion to use a double instrumentality. In conformity with this great principle are the facts of nature. Whether the operation be great or small, we always see the Almighty working by a single set of instruments. He never makes provision for the possible failure of one instru- mentality, by providing another to aid or supplement it. No two sets of means are provided for producing the same result. The simplicity of the Divine operations always stands in marked contrast to the multiform contrivances of man. This is the uniform mode of the Divine agency, whether we trace the operations of the Almighty in the force with which He propels a planet, in the wondrous contrivances with which He has constructed the bodies of animals and vegetables, or in the minute structure of a microscopic animalcule. The use of a double set of means for effectuating the same end is the result of a consciousness of imperfection of power or wisdom in the operator. Such consciousness of imperfec- tion cannot exist in the Almighty. "When man provides a double instrumentality or multiform contrivances for the ex- ecution of the same work, he does so under the fear that one of his instruments may fail in producing that which he is seeking to effectuate, or owing to his imperfect command of means. If we were certain that one instrumentality would effect our purpose, or if all means lay freely at our disposal, it would be a deficiency of wisdom to provide a variety of con- trivances ; but neither fear as to the result of His operations, nor deficiency of wisdom, is possible with the Creator. The same mode of operation which (lod em])loys as Creator and Preserver of the universe we should expect that He would employ in communicating a revelation of His will. As it is inconsistent with His perfections to employ two distinct and separate means for effectuating the same end in creation, so it is in the highest degree improbable that He would com- municate the same truth to man by two methods wholly and 51 entirely distinct. Wliat the perfections of the Divine nature have prompted Him to do in the one series of acts^ the same perfections will prompt Him to do in a similar course of action. If the same God is the author of creation, provi- dence, and revelation, we should find Him displaying in each alike the same power and Avisdom. He would not provide man with adequate means of attaining truth by natural reve- lation, and then provide a Avholly different means of attaining to the same truths by means of a supernatural revelation. What, therefore, God has provided man with adequate means of learning by the use of his natural faculties, by the study of the created universe, that knowledge He would not communi- cate by a wholly different instrumentality — that of inspiration. Still less is it conceivable that the infinitely wise Crea- tor would use two different methods of discovering the same truth to man, the one of which would render necessary a great degree of exertion on his part in the discovery of truth, and the other would discover the same truth without any efibrt on the part of man being needful. If there are two methods of doing the same thing, a laborious one and an easy one, the easy one will be adopted, the laborious one avoided. Who would trouble himself with the laborious investigations of geo- logy, if its truths could be read in the pages of a supernatural revelation? Who would undertake the laborious exertion of research in all the great branches of science, if God had pro- vided a shorter, an easier, a more royal road to the attainment of truth? All the most valuable of the truths which man discovers by the exercise of his natural powers require exer- tion for their discovery. If these truths were also discovered by divine revelation, the necessity of laborious exertion would be entirely superseded. All the great truths to which man has attained by the use of his natural faculties have required a great expenditure of labour for their discovery. The exercise of the higher powers of the mind in the discovery of those truths is the divinely appointed means by which, in the natural course of things, the knowledge of them is attainable. Few persons unac- quainted with these subjects can form an adequate idea of E 2 52 the amount of labour by which the great discoveries in mathe- matical and physical science have been effected. The expenditure of labour as the necessary condition is the universal law which the Creator has imposed in the attain- ment of every ordinary branch of human knowledge. The higher the truth the greater is the labour necessary for its acquisition. God has placed His book of nature open for man to read it, but He has not intended that he should read it with- out the exertion of all his mental powers. Man^s discoveries in the kingdoms of nature and providence have been vast; but they have been effected by means of the highest energy and exertion. Is it to be supposed, then, that God would ordain a laborious method for the discovery of truth, and supersede His own appointed method by discovering those truths by a supernatural revelation ? We may lay it down, therefore, as a condition by which the extent of a divine revelation will be limited, that God will not communicate to man by inspiration the knowledge which He has already given him ample means of acquiring by the exercise of his natural powers. The inspiration, therefore, with which a revelation would be communicated would not be extended to matters adventitious to the proper subject-matter of that revelation. It follows as a necessary consequence that the truths of physical science would form no proper subject-matter of a divine revelation, nor would be communicated to man by super- natural inspiration. God has already provided man with a distinct and separate instrumentality, affording him ample means of attaining the knowledge of those truths — the labo- rious exertion of the powers of his mind on the phenomena presented to him by God in the book of nature. To suppose that the Creator has ordained this laborious method of arriving at these truths, and then discovered them by a preternatural revelation, would be little short of ascribing to Him an act of folly of Avhich man would not be guilty. If this view of the case be correct, numerous objections against divine revelation, arising out of difficulties suggested by physical science, at once fall to the ground. The discovery 53 of the truths of physical science is no proper function of inspiration; it belongs to the natural faculties of man, for which they are completely adequate. An inspired writer, therefore, if he has occasion to mention matters connected with scientific truth, may use popular language and popular conceptions on such subjects, even when they involve an in- correct scientific theory. A remarkable instance of such usage occurs in the Gospels, in the history of the cure of the woman with an issue of blood. To this we will recur in its proper place. It is no function of revelation to correct scien- tific errors, or rather errors which exist through the want of scientific knowledge. We have already proved that revealed truth must be communicated to man in ordinary human lan- guage. The expression "in hell,^^ et? aBov, involves an in- correct scientific theory. It is an expression derived from heathen mythology, and denotes "the house of Hades or Pluto." The sacred writers use the words in their popular sense, without being committed to their incorrect theory. The occurrence of such modes of statement can form no possible objection against Christianity as a divine revelation. For similar reasons we infer that, in a revelation itself, truth will not be so revealed as to supersede all necessity for the exertion of man^s mental powers on the subject-matter of that revelation. Labour is ordained by God as the road to knowledge. We cannot, therefore, assume, because God has made a supernatural revelation of truths not discernible by the natural faculties, that He meant to supersede the neces- sity of the active exercise of man's mental powers on those truths. It will perhaps be objected that, on these principles, the communication of moral truths to man by means of a super- natural revelation, if not impossible in itself, is a mode of acting which the Creator would not adopt, as involving the use of two sets of instruments for the production of the same result. It has been asserted as an objection against Christianity, that a revelation of moral truth is impossible, because the conceptions of moral truths must previously exist in the 54 human mind before they can be introduced into the mind from an external source. Unless such moral conceptions existed in the mind, the mind would have no ideas where- with to comprehend the external communication. It has been further urged, that conscience is the one and exclusive source of all moral obligation ; and if conscience is the source of all moral obligation, moral truth can have neither force nor power as communicated by a supernatural revelation. The objection in this form is a most patent fallacy. It is equally powerful against the possibility of communicating any kind of truth, as against the possibility of discovering moral truth by revelation. The argument would be equally efi&cacious to prove that it is impossible to teach or commu- nicate the truths of Euclid, because the primary conceptions connected with mathematical science must previously exist in the mind before the teacher can operate with success. God, in ordaining the laws of the human mind, has mutually adapted the objective and the subjective to each other. The eye cannot see without an object ; the object is modified from what it actually is by the eye. Moral truth, doubtless, could not be revealed to man, if he had not a moral nature. Man's possession of a conscience gives to morality a binding force. But conscience pronounces judgment on the various moral truths presented to it for its decision. Whatever truth the understanding presents to the conscience, the con- science pronounces on its validity. But our immediate inquiry is not whether it is possible that God can make a moral revelation, but whether His doing so involves the use of a double instrumentality in the sense in which we have already proved that it is not the mode of the Divine acting. The full discussion of this would render necessary the dis- cussion of one of the deepest of revealed doctrines, the de- pravity of man, and the mode in which that depravity has been occasioned. The Scriptures assert its existence as a fact. Revelation declares that free will, the glorious image of the Divine freedom, has been imparted to man by his Maker, and, through the abuse of that freedom, the moral 55 constitution of man has been impaired. The balance of his powerSj as they were established by his Creator, has been subverted. It is one of the conditions of the creation of free- dom, that man shoidd have a derived power of working on his own being. If the assertions of the Scriptures respecting man are correct, this difficulty is dissipated. In speaking of moral truth, two points must be kept dis- tinct, which there is great danger of confounding. There is the moral truth or the moral duty itself. There is the mo- tive by which the moral truth is enforced on the practice. What Christianity asserts is, that the moral truths which man knows, he is powerless to effectuate without the aid of the motives which she alone is powerful to supply. Human testi- mony fully confirms the first of these assertions. To what extent are the natural faculties of man, devoid of supernatural illumination, capable of discovering the great truths of morals ? There is no moral truth which Christianity teaches which does not commend itself to the human conscience. When such a truth is propounded to the conscience, it cannot help pronouncing that it is a reasonable duty. When the con- science hears the great truth announced, " Thou shall love thy neighbour as thyself," it is compelled to pronounce that the command is reasonable. But while man must admit this obligation, there are in man's present state other principles within him which render him unwilling to practise it. This admission of obligation, united with disobedience to its injunctions, constitutes the essence of guilt. If the records of existing literature were examined, they would be found to contain a large portion of moral truth. Numbers of precepts contained in revelation, not indeed pro- pounded as a great code of human duty, but in a detached form, have been discovered by persons who have not had the benefit of a direct revelation. But while the mere knowledge of moral truth has existed, man's unassisted powers have been unable to discover any motive sufficiently powerful to enable him habitually to 56 practise what conscience has pronounced to be a matter of obligation. The highest motive which heathen philosophers have been able to discover, to enforce the practice of virtue, has been the conception of its moral beauty. They were unable to sanction it by the realities of a future state. They could only appeal to its tendencies to produce happiness in this world. Of the nature of the love of God, as a motive to holi- ness, they were ignorant. Mere appeals to the excellency of virtue were the imperfect substitute. They were the highest motive with which they were acquainted. They freely con- fessed its feebleness. Man^s impetuous passions easily broke through the weak restraint. The moral law of conscience, to use the expression of St. Paul, "was weak through the flesh." Man was cornipt, and reason and philosophy failed to discover any motive powerful for his reformation. On this point the language of philosophers is the language of despair. They feel themselves powerless to act on the vulgar herd. They might discuss curious points of morals with their select disciples, but they were utterly destitute of motives through which to preach to man a resurrection to holiness, or even to render their own principles powerful to influence their own conduct. Seneca preached high moi-ality, dwelt in a marble palace, and justified Nero^s murder of his mother. But although, in man's present condition, the motives furnished by natural light are wholly powerless to effectuate the moral law as a binding influence on the conduct, it by no means follows that they were equally powerless in the ori- ginal constitution of man. God created him a free agent, and through that free agency he has become an independent worker. Even the present constitution of man — that state which man by his free agency has induced — points to what was once the rightful supremacy of conscience. Permitted free agency has subverted its dominion. Free agency and the possession of a rational will have made man a cause. They have enabled him to operate on his own being. A motive powerful to impart strength to the present weak- ness of man, but absent from every system of morals, it is the 57 purpose and the glory of revelation to supply. Revelation ■vritlidraws the curtain which veils the unseen world, and with powerful reality discloses the great truth of man^s responsi- bility. Revelation denies not the beauty of virtue, but it creates a motive powerful to strengthen, to quicken, and to animate the inmost recesses of the human heart — the love of God in Christ. Revelation discloses in morals a new crea- tion — infinite love dying for the unholy, a glorious Christ freely offering himself as a sacrifice for man. What man's natural powers have been unable to invent, revelation has created — a motive powerful to animate the lifeless body of morality — the law of love — Christ, through his death and resurrection, become the Lord both of the dead and living. Christian morality now centres in Christ's glorious person. The creation of a motive powerful to enforce moral obligation has been attended with a corresponding enlarge- ment of the bounds of morality itself — " Love one another, as I have loved you." Shall we, then, assume that the Creator has failed in the execution of His work, and not created a motivity adequate to enable man to yield obedience to the moral law ? Is His purpose therefore void of its effect? We answer, He has created free agency in man, subject to the necessary con- ditions which free agency involves, and His purpose is the creation of that free agency. Shall we assume that He has supplemented an imperfect operation by a double instru- mentality ? Having first created man with a motive which was inadequate, has He provided an adequate one by revela- tion? We reply. By His creative act He has created free agency in man, subject to the conditions which it involves. By revelation He has created motivity adequate to obedience, without impairing the free agency which He has created. In producing obedience in the holy, in generating holiness in man, and in overthrowing the dominion of moral evil, the Creator works by a single instrumentality, by motives which are the sole product of revelation, which, when firmly em- braced by the human mind, are powerful to render the moral law the living guide of the life of man — the great truths which 58 He has disclosed in bygone ages by inspiration, and Las consummated in the revelation of the Gospel. It is also a matter of antecedent certainty that, if it pleased the Creator to make a supernatural revelation of His ^vill, He would adopt the necessary means for authenticating that revelation with the stamp of His own authority. He would provide that tliose for whom it was intended might be under no uncertainty that its truths proceeded fi'om Him. With- out such an authentication, the end and purpose of making the revelation would entirely fail of attaining their object. The proper authentication of the revelation must therefore form a substantial portion of the Divine plan. Unless suf- ficient e\'idence were aflbrded that the revelation was from God, it would be the same as if it had never been com- municated. But respecting the amoimt of truth which God would com- municate in a revelation we have no other grounds of ante- cedent certainty to guide us. Before we can determine such a qviestion, we must know the nature of the Divine piu'poses, and be able to penetrate to the remote depths of the Divine mind. But who can presume to penetrate into the council- chamber of the ]\Iost High? All theories propounded on such a subject can be no better than mere guesses, founded on more or less of supposed probability, respecting which certainty is not attainable by man. CHAPTER V. THE BIPOSSIBILITY OF AEGUING FROM THE DIVINE AT- TRIBUTES TO THE FACTS OF NATURE INVALIDATES ALL SUCH ARGUMENTS WHEN APPLIED TO THE FACTS OF A REVELATION. This involves a truth of the utmost importance for the de- termination of the mode in which inspiration must be com- municated. If antecedent assumptions, founded on om^ views 59 of the Divine attributes, fail to conduct us to the facts of nature as they actually exist, they must be wholly impotent to determine what must be the facts of a revelation. If we were to reason as to what the universe must be from those attributes, we should construct a universe widely different from the one which the Creator has actually formed. As this has a most important bearing on our estimate of what, on mere grounds of antecedent i)robability, avc might expect in a divine revelation, we will adduce a few instances of the utter fallacy of all such reasonings. It would seem to be antecedently probable, that the attri- bute of perfect goodness in the Creator would render it ne- cessary that He should communicate to man the greatest pos- sible degree of happiness Avhich he was capable of receiving. This would appear more probable when we consider that His goodness cannot possibly be impeded by defects either in His power or His wisdom. What impediment can obstruct Om- nipotence? If the Creator is absolutely good, wise, and powerful, we should not only naturally conclude that no evil existed under His government, but that every creature was actually enjoying the greatest amount of happiness of which its nature was capable. The same argument would lead us to conclude that there could be no degrees of happiness in the universe, but that every creature must have been alike endowed with happiness by its Creator. If God be almighty, all- wise, perfectly good, and perfectly just, how can He bestow on one being a greater degree of happiness than He has bestowed on another ? No grounds of merit can be the reason of His preference. If He has done so, it must be at the expense of the attribute of equity. On similar grounds we might assume that we sliould find no progressive happiness in the universe, but that the greatest possible degree of happiness had been communicated at once. If God is perfectly good, nothing but limitations in His power or His wisdom can hinder Him from the most per- fect display of goodness in each particular instance. On similar grounds we might argue that the Creator must 60 have communicated to man the greatest amount of knowledge which he was capable of receiving. For the same reasons we might infer that all were endowed with equal faculties for its attainment^ and that the highest possible degree of knowledge had been communicated at once. On similar antecedent views of the Divine attributes we might infer that God had not made the acquisition of knowledge difficult, because it is so desirable. On the same grounds we might infer that such knowledge did not require to be communicated by revelation at all, but that the Divine goodness rendered it necessary that all desirable knowledge should have been communicated from the very first. From such reasonings we might build a universe wholly different from the one which has been actually erected by the Almighty. Such conclusions would seem to follow with inevitable certainty from reasonings on separate attributes of the Creator; but, when tested by His acts, they totally fail us in unfolding the actualities of His creative works. If then we make similar assumptions as to what God must do in communicating a revelation, on the ground of our human views as to the perfection of the Divine attributes, and argue from those views of perfection what the particular acts of the Divine Being must be in communicating a revelation of His will, we shall wander as far from the truth, with respect to the actual facts of that revelation, as similar modes of ar- gumentation on the same attributes would cause us to wander from the actual facts exhibited in God^s creative and provi- dential kingdoms. From such reasonings we might draw the most varied inferences as to what God must reveal, and the mode which must be employed by Him in making that reve- lation. But our only means of knowing what perfect goodness requires God to do in any particular case is by inquiring what He has actually done. In the same manner, our only means of knowing what amount of knowledge God mu^st communicate, if He be pleased to make a revelation, is by ascertaining what amount of knowledge He has actually communicated, either by the study of the works of nature or by examining the pages of an authenticated revelation. 61 We are equaUy devoid of all grounds of antecedent proba- bility to guide us, if it were the Creator^s pleasure to make a revelation, what would be the means employed in communi- cating this revelation, or whether the revelation would consist of a simple divine element, or to what extent a human ele- ment might be united or mixed up with the divine one. The argument from our human view of the Divine attri- butes to facts as they exist, or deductions from single Divine attributes as to what must or ought to be, universally fail when brought to the test of things as they actually exist. It is hardly possible to conceive of any assertion which could have a higher degree of antecedent probability than that evil could not exist in the universe of a perfect Creator. No pro- bability as to the mode which God must adopt in communi- cating a revelation can have an amount of evidence at all comparable with this. But evil does exist. Its existence has proved a sore trial to the faith of the good in every age. The intellect of man has vainly endeavoured to fathom this profound mystery from the earliest dawn of human thought. With our present faculties, it is impossible to deduce the actualities of existence from considerations derived from the attributes of God. Our reasonings are based on our finite views of single and separate attributes in the Creator. We are unable to take a combined view of the complicated whole, or to deduce Avhat must be the necessary result of their complicated action. We are equally unable to grasp the Divine works taken as a whole; and until we can do so it is impossible to form an opinion as to the relations which detached portions of them bear to the Divine perfections. Until we can comprehend both of these subjects, our reasonings as to what God must or must not do in particular cases are necessarily futile. The clear perception of this truth is of the utmost import- ance in forming a judgment as to what God must or must not do in communicating a revelation of His will. Most assertions made on this subject rest on precisely the same foundation as similar assertions made as to what must be His conduct as Creator and Preserver of the universe. A large portion of the views usually maintained as to what must be 63 tlie nature of a divine revelation are bare probabilities of this description. Nothing was more common in former times than for ingenious writers to construct systems of the universe founded on their views of what the Divine attributes require that it should be. Nothing has been more fallacious than these systems as exponents of its actual facts. In a similar manner, it has been a general practice to construct systems based on antecedent data of what must be the mode of com- municating a divine revelation, and what must be the contents of that revelation. Why should this latter mode of procedure lead to results more satisfactory than the former ? Research as to the actual facts presented by the universe has proved the resultlessness of such reasonings. Similar investigation into the actual facts of revelation will prove no less destruc- tive to the latter. It is so important to perceive the utter resultlessness of this species of argument as a guide to truth as to the actuali- ties of creation and providence, that we must adduce the chief instances in which such reasonings would conduct us to con- clusions utterly opposed to facts as they actually exist in nature. First, as to our conception of almighty power. There is no- thing which almighty power cannot efltectuate which does not involve a contradiction. We may argue from this attribute that the universe cannot contain a defect which it was in the poAver of the Omnipotent to have prevented. But defects do exist, which it is impossible to say that almighty power could not have hindered. Could not almighty power have framed otherwise the imperfect organisms which we see in nature ? Could not Omnipotence have prevented the monstrosities which not unfrequently are produced in the animal and vege- table kingdoms ? Arguing from a priori principles, we shoidd draw the conclusion that every exhibition of God's poAver must be absolutely free from every conceivable defect. Such conclusions, however, will inadequately represent the facts of nature. Similar conclusions will folloAV from abstract arguments derived from the perfect wisdom of the Creator. The Creator 63 is not only perfectly wise, but He unites infinite wisdom with infinite power. Infinite wisdom gives the Creator boundless skill. Nothing is beyond His power of contrivance. Infinite power enables Him both to create and use the means which His "wisdom suggests. Every resource is at His command. From the existence of these attributes in the Creator, if we argue on antecedent principles and frame a system of the universe in conformity with their conclusions, we should infer that there could not exist in the universe one single imperfection which it was within the power of either of those attributes to have prevented. We might infer that an im- perfect work of any description could not have proceeded from the hands of infinite wisdom and power. This would lead us to the conclusion either that such imperfect works did not exist in the universe of God, or that, where they did exist, they must be the result of the operation of another worker than God. But how stand the facts of the case ? As we contemplate the universe, is it free from every imperfection which infinite power and wisdom united could not have obviated ? When we see with our eyes defects in the animal or the vegetable king- doms, shall we, on the strength of our reasoning, deny their existence, or say that God is not the author of them ? Shall we assert that everything in the universe which, to human apprehension, denotes imperfection cannot be the workman- ship of God ? Shall we say of every imperfect organism Avhich exists in animals or vegetables, that God did not make it thus ? When we see a man lame, blind, or a cripple, or with some other defect in his bodily structure, shall we say that God did not make that man ? If God has not made these organisms thus, who has? Have they made themselves? Are their defects owing to their being evolved through the operation of imper- fect laws ? Did not God make those laws ? Shall we say that the devil has made them thus ? The facts are undeniable, and are to be found widely scat- tered through every department of nature. The Divine work- manship presents tlie most wonderful exhibitions of the opera- tion of the Creator ; but perfection is not the universal rule of 64 actual existence. Some endeavour to account for the existence of these imperfections by the action of general laws^ others by the existence of sin, others by the counteracting agency of an independent principle of evil. How do these considerations aid us to explain the difficulty ? They remove it only one step further back. If they result from the action of general lawsj if God is the Creator of the universe. He has ordained those laws in their imperfect operation. There, then, must have been a limit to His power or His wisdom. If those laws operate independently of Him, there is a plain limitation of His power. If they are dependent on Him, and they act im- perfectly, how shall we say that He is not their author ? If the imperfections are the result of sin, then sin itself has been permitted to enter and ravage the universe of which the Creator is the sovereign Lord. Could not Omnipotence and Omniscience have prevented such a result ? The organisms in question, despite of their defects, are marvellous exhibi- tions of creative power and wisdom. Did God make the per- fect portions of them, and sin the imperfect ones? In as- suming such a power as sin, we assume the existence of a power of working in the universe, which owes its being to the Divine will, independent of the power of the Almighty, which He either cannot or will not control. If we ascribe these imperfections to the existence of an independent principle of evil, we at once assert that there is an agent operating in the universe independently of the Almighty, whose operations He is able neither to overcome nor restrain. By these solu- tions we do not explain the difficulty, but remove it one stage from our view. But that God has built the universe and all things therein, is the great truth proclaimed alike both by natiu'al reason and revealed religion. Whatever is done there. He must have been, and is, the doer of it. This truth stands on a higher ground than any truth merely deduced from our con- ceptions of His separate attributes. If an animal is born with two heads or with superfluous limbs, shall we venture to affirm that God did not make it? The organism itself contains mighty exhibitions of wisdom and of power. Who 65 formed its vessels in all their complicated relationships? who assigned to each their respective functions ? If they are not God's work, they must have either produced them- selves or be the work of one who is not God. The existence of these things in nature presents us with but three alternatives. Either the Creator has created the world subject to definite laws, and by means of these laws, without any further operation on His part, He has evolved all existing things : these laws have become deranged, maimed, and imperfect ; and He has left the imperfection to itself, and He has ceased to exert over them either creative power or providence. Or He has permitted one who is not God to perform creative acts in His own universe. Or, for reasons unknown to us, in the regular exercise of His creative energy. He has formed the imperfect organisms Himself. To ascribe these things to the first of these causes is to admit a theory which banishes the Creator to a remote distance from His works, and, after all, obliges us to admit imperfection in His acting. To ascribe them to the second is to admit a theory which no devout theist will concede. It follows, there- fore, that the organisms, with all their imperfections, must be the Creator's work, which, for reasons which we cannot pene- trate, but which must be consistent with His infinite power and wisdom. He has made thus. We are inadequate judges, therefore, respecting the inferences which are to be deduced from the attributes of God as to the nature of the facts which must be presented by creation. Reasonings, therefore, deduced from the attributes of God as to what must be the actualities of creation fail to conduct us to a knowledge of the created universe. The actual uni- verse differs vastly from what we should have expected, on mere antecedent considerations derived from the Divine attri- butes, would have been the universe of the Almighty, the infinitely wise and benevolent God. Instrumentality is used to eff"ectuate His purposes, such as we should never have expected; it contains what to human conceptions imply limitation of power, of wisdom, and of goodness, in the very midst of displays of the same attributes, which prove the p 66 reality of their existence in the Creator. These imperfec- tions do not exist in the actual structure of the universe, but arise from the limitation of the human mind, and its inability to apprehend in their fulness both the perfections and the works of Him whose being and whose perfections are beyond the apprehension of the finite. These difficulties must ever exceed the powers of man to fathom. Our inability to recon- cile all the facts of the universe with our conceptions of the perfection of the attributes of the Creator leads to one in- evitable conclusion, that all reasonings from a priori views of what ought to be, to facts as they are, are inconclusive ; they fail to conduct us to the truth of the universe as it has actu- ally issued from the hand of its Creator. But what follows ? Shall we argue from our views of the attributes of the Creator that the perfection of these attri- butes, which have not rendered it necessary that He should produce a universe perfect according to human conceptions, must compel Him to make a revelation which fully realizes these human notions of perfection? Shall we insist that everything in that revelation must be squared according to our rule and plummet ? Shall we assert, if it contains things which we should not have expected it to contain, or if it has been communicated in a manner less accvirate than we may think desirable, or by a different mode of inspiration from that which we should have supposed antecedently probable, that a revelation, however strongly attested, cannot be a re- velation from the Most High ? We might as well assert that the universe cannot be His work. On the contrary, we will infer that reasonings which wholly fail in explaining the Divine conduct, as God actually exhibits it as Creator and Preserver of the universe, will be equally unsafe guides to truth when applied to what God must do as the author of a supernatural revelation. Similar conclusions may be deduced from the human view of the Divine attribute of goodness. God is absolutely and perfectly benevolent and good ; to this goodness He unites in- finite power and wisdom. He has, therefore, at His com- mand the most absolute means of most perfectly exhibiting 67 this attribute in creation and providence. His benevolence prompts Him to produce the greatest possible amount of good ; His wisdom enables Him to contrive the means suit- able for its production; His power enables Him to create the means, and effectuate the full purposes of His will. Arguing, therefore, on our human views of these three sepa- rate Divine attributes, it follows as a legitimate conclusion, that every existing being in the universe is endowed with the highest degree of happiness of which it is capable. Now no antecedent probability as to the mode which God must adopt in communicating a revelation has an equal degree of apparent certainty as that, if God is perfectly good, powerful, and wise, in the universe of which He is the Creator and Preserver, neither moral evil nor physical suffering would have been permitted to exist. Their existence at all, according to our conceptions, implies some limitation of the Divine good- ness, power, or wisdom. Still greater is the degree of im- probability that they would have been permitted to exist to the extent in which they actually do exist. If we assume that perfect and absolute goodness exists in the Deity, united with power without bounds to effec- tuate, and wisdom to contrive, how is it possible that misery should have entered the kingdom of the Almighty ? How is it that holiness is frequently in the deepest de- pression in thf.t world in which the Creator has all things in His hands, and over which the Lord is king for ever and ever ? The argument seems a near approach to demonstra- tion. The perfect goodness of the Divine mind moves the Deity to the production of nothing but good. To the purity of the Divine character moral evil is utterly repugnant. His omnipotent power enables Him to effect whatever His goodness and holiness will, at least everything not in- volving a contradiction ; His infinite wisdom gives Him the most perfect acquaintance with the means by which His ends can be accomplished, and of the tendencies of those ends. How, then, can moral or physical evil exist as the result of the creative power or providence of God, perfectly good and perfectly holy, with infinite power, and knowledge f2 68 ■without limit ? How antecedently improbable is it that moral evil should not only have entered, but actually have spread in the universe of that God to whom sin is utterly repugnant ? But sin, evil, and suffering do exist in the imiverse, and in a degree which is both painful and awful. Its existence is so palpable, it is so much the experience of daily life, that to attempt to prove it is a work of supererogation. Its existence is not a diflSculty Avhich lies hard on the Christian faith alone; it is no less perplexing to the philosopher. It bears equally hard on natural religion as on Christianity. Some, therefore, as a solution of the difficulty, have denied the existence of God. Others, forgetting that the difficulty lies equally at the seat of every system of theism, in consequence of the supposed difficulties which it presents, deny that the Christian religion is a revelation from God. Others endeavour to palliate by every conceivable device the amount of evil which actually exists. But can they deny that evil exists at all ? Such a denial is the only thing which can really solve the difficulty. Little and great is all alike to the Creator. He could as easily have prevented a little evil as a great one. If they cannot deny its entire existence, to diminish merely the amount of evil will not help them. A Creator all-powerful, wise, and good could have prevented the smallest evil from entering the universe. Shall the denial of the existence of a Creator be the refuge to which we will have recourse ? But the universe is full with the proofs of His being. To do so is to attempt to evade one difficulty by rushing into a greater. We might as well deny that the universe itself exists. Shall we assert that there is no real distinction between moral and physical evil, and that the existence of physical evil is a necessary con- sequence of the existence of finite being ? Then, unless we can show that it involves a contradiction, we admit that a necessity exists independently of the will of the Creator, which even that will could not overcome ; or we rush into the ab- surdities of pantheism. But it has been asserted, as an explanation, that physical evil is the result of moral evil, and that moral evil owes its being to the independent freedom of the human will, and 69 man^s revolt fi'om his Maker. That physical suffering is occa- sioned by moral evil requires proof; but supposing the latter portion of the assertion true, does this supposition get rid of the difficulty ? does it do more than remove that difficulty backwards a single step. When God created the universe subject to the conditions to which He subjected it, had He not the most perfect knowledge whereto those conditions tended ? Was not the subjection of the human mind to its existing conditions the result of the fiat of His creative power ? Could He not have created it subject to other conditions ? Unless the supposition involves a positive contradiction, the assertion that God could not have prevented the entrance of evil into the universe, or that He could not have acted otherwise than He has acted, is a direct limitation of the power of the_Creator. It has been urged that the free agency of moral beings could only have existed if they were created subject to the condition that considerable numbers of them would fall. Consequently, that the misery occasioned by the sinfulness of man is a necessary condition of his free agency. But have we any reliable evidence that it is so ? Are such assertions better than conjecture? Even if it were so, we assign a limit to the power of the Creator. But on what evidence have we the assurance that the creation of free will could not be united with such a perception of the existence of goodness as to have placed an effectual barrier to the existence of evil ? To assume that this was impossible, unless we can show that it involves a contradiction, involves either a limitation in the power of God or the assertion that something exists indepen- dently of His will. But the difficulty has been explained by asserting that moral evil will be ultimately eradicated, and physical suffering compensated for in another state. But how does this assump- tion explain the present existence of either physical or moral evil in the universe of a perfectly powerful, wise, holy, and benevolent Creator ? The point which requires solution is not how it can be compensated hereafter, but the fact of its pre- sent existence here, and how its existence is compatible with the attributes of perfect goodness and infinite power and wisdom in God. Could He not have prevented it altogether ? 70 The only adequate answer which can be given respecting such difficulties is^ that their solution transcends all the powers of the human understanding. Except to a very limited extent^ we can arrive at no certainties, from arguments based on human views of the Divine attributes, as to what must be the Divine conduct in particular cases, or what is required by the action of those attributes as a complicated whole. We have abundant proof that infinite power, infinite wisdom, and per- fect holiness are attributes of God, and that feelings towards God corresponding to those attributes are great duties of man. We know that a Being who is good must produce good by His creative acts ; we know that such a Being cannot be tempted of evil. This should teach us humility in making positive assertions in matters beyond the reach of our faculties. But the only answer which can be given to the difficulties is, we are entirely unable to determine the mode in which the attributes of God must operate in every creative act of the Almighty. If, then, reasonings founded on human views of the attri- butes of God lead us to incorrect views as to the facts of crea- tion and providence, and if we should form from such reason- ings most incorrect views as to the manner in which He ought to have created the universe, reasonings founded on similar views must lead to conclusions equally erroneous as to the mode which He must have adopted in discovering Him- self by a supernatural revelation. We will now consider what light is afforded by these prin- ciples on the subject-matter of a divine revelation, and the mode in which it must be communicated. If the same God is the author of creation and providence, and the author of a revelation, we have the strongest ante- cedent certainty that as He displays Himself in the one He would display Himself in the other. This is founded on God^s character as a moral agent. The action of the Divine attributes must be constant and invariable. With the all- perfect God capriciousness must be impossible. The Divine attributes must form the motives of the Divine conduct. Whatever difficulties we should find in the one, we should expect similar difficulties in the other. If reasonings founded 71 on human views of the Divine conduct failed as guides to facts in the one^ we should expect them similarly to fail in the other. This analogy prevails through all the works of the Creator. "We find it a rule pervading all the operations of intelligent beings^ that their works must contain a general impress of their character. The difficulties which we find in them are all of a similar description. If, therefore^ the antecedent probabilities of which we have been speaking are insufficient guides to enable us to arrive at the actual facts of God^s crea- tive acts and general government, we conclude that similar presumptions, when applied to the facts of a revelation, will be equally insufficient guides to unfold to lis the actual facts of that revelation, or the mode of its communication. Now, on what evidence do the usual theories that such and such things must necessarily form a portion of a Divine reve- lation, or that it must be communicated in this or that particu- lar manner, rest ? Are the principles in question at all different in character from those which have been frequently applied to determine the manner in which God must have acted as Creator, and which have led to conclusions utterly at variance with the facts which the universe presents ? It has been often asserted that if God be the author of a revelation, it must be absolutely perfect according to human views of the perfection of the Divine character. But what evidence does this assertion rest upon beyond the very prin- ciples which, when they are applied to account for creation, totally fail in conducting us to the truth of what God has actually done. We cannot infer that each separate detail of a divine revelation must be perfect, more than we can infer that each separate detail of creation and providence must possess a distinct and separate perfection. Perfect it will un- doubtedly be as far as God's purposes are concerned ; for that is the same thing as asserting that whatever He purposes He accomplishes. But we are ignorant of the precise nature of those purposes, and therefore we are unable to measure it by a human standard of perfection. 73 It has been generally assumed that if God be the author of a revelation^ every portion of it must contain an equally distinct statement of truth ; God cannot have employed mere relative truth in communicating with man ; the truth con- veyed in the revelation must be absolute truth respecting His own moral character and perfections. But is this the rule by which the Creator acts in nature? Do apparent imperfections in nature, does the existence of moral evil and physical suffer- ing, prove that the Creator is not infinitely powerful, wise, and good ? Are not many of the truths conveyed by God's actings in nature relative truths ? Particular stages of human civilization are only capable of low views respecting the Divine character. The views of moral obligation between man and man are of a similar description. It is thought unworthy of the Deity to use language, in a revelation of His will, accommodated to an imperfect civilization or imperfect spiritual and moral perception. Hence an objection is urged against considerable portions of the Old Testament as a divine revelation. On the other hand, those who maintain its divine origin endeavour to evade its supposed difficulties by assigning to such passages a degree of enlightenment and elevation of moral feeling which no person would naturally draw from the passages themselves. The whole force of the objection arises from supposing that a revelation can contain truth expressed in terms as it abso- lutely exists in the Divine, and not expressed relatively to the human mind. When we clearly perceive that all the disco- veries of a divine revelation must consist of relative truth, the only question which can exist is as to the degree of the ac- commodation. It is impossible to deny the principle that all revealed truth respecting God must be relative, and not absolute. This truth we have already proved. In conformity with this mode of discovering truth by a supernatural revelation is the actual mode of the Divine working in creation and providence, as it is portrayed in the book of nature. The Creator has unquestionably commenced His operations with the lower forms of life, and with less complicated structures, and has advanced by slow and gradual 73 stages to tlie creation of the higher. To the truth of this every discovery of science bears unequivocal testimony. Whatever conclusions we may arrive at from abstract reasonings on the Divine attributes, the actual operations of the Almighty as they come under man's observation in His works give one uniform testimony, that the Creator as a worker does not produce works abstractedly perfect, even according to human notions of perfection, but the law of His operations is to advance higher and higher, from stage to stage, in the king- dom of nature. God manifests Himself as a worker, not in time, but in eternity, ever manifesting fresh and unceasing displays of His glories. Human conceptions of perfection are applicable only to a being who exists in time. If, then, as Creator and Preserver of the universe, God begins with that which is imperfect, and gradually advances by slow progress towards perfection, we may conclude that the same Divine worker will act in a similar manner in making a revelation of His will. It has been argued from the supposed necessity that the Creator should display Himself in each of His particular operations as a perfect worker, that it is impossible that a human element should exist in a revelation which is wholly divine. The admission of a human element existing there is represented as a denial of its perfection, and therefore of its divine character. Now on what foundation can such an assumption rest? We have already seen that all arguments from the human views of perfection to corresponding displays of perfection in the separate Divine operations are entirely futile. We have also already seen that, whatever apparent imperfection there exists according to man's estimate of it in the Divine opera- tions, we should expect to find similar phenomena in a reve- lation of which the same moral Being was the author. To say that a human element cannot exist in union with a divine one in a revelation, is to assert that we are adequate judges of the means which infinite wisdom must employ in its operations. But in creation and providence God employs agencies, for the purpose of effecting His designs, of a character such as we 74 never should have expected. Who would have anticipated that the benevolent Author of all good would have employed earthquakes^ volcanoes, storms and tempests, pestilence and war, for the effectuation of the most gracious purposes ? Who would have imagined that the immense destruction of animal life would have been a means subservient to the most benevo- lent ends * ? Nothing strikes the devout contemplator of the Creator's works as more contrary to what he should have antecedently expected than the existence on an enormous scale of what, contemplated in a human point of view, has been designated as a waste in creation. Vast numbers of things, formed with elaborate creative power and skill, seem formed for no other end than that they should perish, and, as far as man can see, effectuate no purpose in creation. No tongue can tell of the enormous expenditure of animal life in the ocean, in the air, and on the land. The number of eggs which the Creator has formed Avhich never emerge into life is past all computation. Seeds, which are formed with ad- mirable workmanship, and perish, are as numerous as the sand on the ocean shore. Infinite varieties of the mos^ com- plicated organisms, or of the most elaborate structures, adorned with inconceivable beauty, have probably never been contem-^ plated by an eye capable of appreciating their glories from the hour of their creation. Birds who have never emerged from primeval forest, shells buried in the profoundest depths of ocean, and insects in numbers numberless, too minute for human eye to behold. He has arrayed in robes of beauty, at which Solomon's, in all their glory, must stand abashed. The human mind eagerly asks, like Judas of old. To what purpose is this waste ? Is it that the Creator, in the solitude of His infinitude, rejoices in the contemplation of the productions of His boundless power and of the results of His infinite wisdom? The Creator refuses to answer. He dwells in a depth impe- netrable to man. To the height of His infinity who shall soar? To human apprehension, creation is full of waste; but who shall venture to assert that it is waste with God ? But, if such be the aspect of creation when contemplated by the limited faculties of man, who shall venture to assert * See ' Plurality of Worlds/ passmi. 75 that a similar aspect may not be presented by a divine reve- lation vrhen viewed by the same faculties, if that revelation has the Creator of the universe for its author ? If it contains things of which we cannot see the use, is that to be accepted as affording conclusive proof that it cannot come from God? If it contains means for effectuating His purposes such as we should not have antecedently expected, can that prove that it cannot have God for its author ? If it does, the same argu- ment proves that the universe is not the workmanship of the Most High. If in the created universe the Almighty has used earthquakes and volcanoes to effectuate the purposes of benevolence — if storms and desolations do His bidding — if He makes wars and revolutions subservient to the moral training of mankind — if creation abounds with "what to human appre- hension is a wasteful expenditure of power, who shall venture to assert that He, who is all-powerful and all-wise, cannot introduce a human element into a revelation, and use it as an instrument for the discovery of His will ? Whether, then, a revelation woiild be discovered in an historical form, whether it would contain dogmatic state- ments of truth, or would present us with a complete system of theology, whether its records would be confined strictly to the subject-matter of a supernatural revelation, or in what proportion the human and the divine would be interwoven in such a revelation, are questions which can be determined by no antecedent reasonings. Such reasonings would be equally fallacious, as we have found them, as guides to the structure of the universe. We are equally unable to determine through what agencies of the human mind the revelation would be communicated, of what kind would be the instruction afforded, whether a constant supervision would be exerted over every stage of its delivery, or whether it would be rapid or gradual in its communication. Antecedent certainty on such sub- jects we have none. If we wish to have definite views on them, our views must be deduced from the facts of an actually authenticated revelation. The absence of all a priori certainty on this subject is the necessary consequence of the limited human intellect being unable adequately to judge the conduct 76 of the Infinite mind. This inability results from the human mind not possessing conceptions which are measures of the actualities as they exist in God, but only imperfect represen- tations of them. Its antecedent judgments can only afford grounds of certainty when they are confined to the great outlines of the conduct and character of God. Limited thus, if a professed revelation contradicts such primary views of the Divine character, it cannot have God for its author. Sup- posing a revelation conceded to a pretended prophet indul- gences which it denied to other men, if there was anything in it AAdiich plainly and palpably contradicted the Divine attri- butes taken as a whole — as that God looked with compla- cency on actions essentially immoral, or that the great Go- vernor of the universe possessed a material body, or that He was not self-existent, or that anything existed independently of His will, or that He was in any way subject to finite limi- tation — this would be ample and sufficient proof that such a pretended revelation could have not had God for its author. But to be able in this manner to form a correct judgment on the general principles of the Divine character, and the con- tents of a revelation as in conformity with it, is a very dif- ferent thing from being able to decide whether the minor contents of a revelation are consistent with particular attri- butes of God. We know, on the highest evidence, that the Creator must be self- existent, almighty, and infinitely wise. We know that He must possess the moral perfections of perfect holiness, benevolence, justice, and truth. None of these perfections God can deny ; for if He Avere to do so, it were to deny Him- self. Certain assertions might distinctly deny these Divine attributes, and thereby afford palpable proof that they had not the sanction of Divine authority. The human mind is a fully competent judge that the distinct approbation of false- hood would be a contradiction of the Divine veracity, or that the holding one man responsible for the same thing for which he held another irresponsible, would be a contradiction of the Divine justice, or that the condemning a man for an action for which he was entirely irresponsible would be totally in- 77 consistent with the character of Him who is the Judge of all the earth. If, again, a professed revelation were to assert that God had made particular men for the purpose of devoting them to everlasting suffering, such an assertion would be an unquestionable contradiction of the Divine goodness, and prove that the pretended revelation was not from God. But this is a very different thing from judging a particular act of the Divine conduct which forms part of a complicated whole, and affirming that our view of it contradicts the Divine charac- ter. Do we fully comprehend it in all its bearings ? Do we know its ultimate issues ? Can we sound the remote depths of the Divine perfections ? It is one thing to assert that God cannot lie, and another that the doctrine of an atonement is demonstrably inconsistent with the Divine benevolence, or, because we cannot reconcile the existence of moral and phy- sical evil with the Divine perfections, to deny the existence of a holy or an intelligent Creator. If, therefore, we judge of what God reveals from what He actually does, a revelation of the Divine will may unite a divine element with a human one, involving various degrees of what may appear to human judgment imperfections. Before we can determine what effect certain supposed imper- fections may have on disproving that a book containing such difficulties can be a divine revelation, we must have clear and indisputable evidence that they lie within the powers or the cognizance of the human faculties. It is instructive to observe to what opposite results the same antecedent assumptions lead different minds. One class of mind assumes that an inspired revelation must correspond with certain a priori assumptions which have been formed respecting it, both as to the subject-matter of what the reve- lation must consist and as to the manner in which it must have been communicated. According to their view, the Christian Scriptures do not realize this ideal ; therefore they are not a revelation from God. The other class make the same a prioi'i assumptions. According to their view, the Christian Scriptures are from God; therefore they attempt to force the facts and phenomena of those Scriptures into 78 conformity with the conditions under which they have as- sumed that a supernatural revelation must have been com- municated. Now the objections against the Divine character of Christi- anity for the most part resolve themselves into certain views of the Divine character and attributes, founded on antecedent reasonings, to which particular doctrines or statements in Scripture are said to be repugnant. Now antecedent assump- tions, to be applicable to such a case, ought to be self-evident truth or demonstrations from such truths. It will not be suffi- cient that they should rest on a mere foundation of probabi- lity. When, then, we assume certain consequences as flowing from the attributes of the Creator, and apply those conse- quences as criteria for judging the contents of a supposed revelation, what is the nature of the evidence on which those judgments rest? Are they self-evident, demonstrative, or probable ? If they are the latter merely, the objections can have no force to subvert the evidence by which a divine reve- lation is attested. But we must not only have evidence that our deductions are necessary consequences flowing from par- ticular attributes in the Creator, but also have sufficient grounds for arriving at the conclusion that the action of the attribute from which our conclusions are deduced may not be modified by that of another attribute of the Divine mind. To enable us to form an adequate judgment on such subjects, we ought to have as our point of view a standing- point from whence we may be able to survey the compli- cated action of the attributes of the Divine mind, or else to be able to form a conception of the common principle in the Divine mind of which the various Divine attributes are mani- festations or modifications. Until we can determine whether any single Divine attribute be a complete manifestation of the whole of the Divine character, our conclusions as to what God must or must not do in particular instances must be involved in uncertainty. It will be necessary to determine to what extent a particular Divine attribute may be modified in its action by another. What is the relationship which the Divine attribute of goodness bears to those of holiness or justice 79 must be determined^ before we can deduce any certain con- clusions from either of them separately. The whole of the Divine character cannot be reduced by the human under- standing to the action of any one of its single attributes. The common objections brought against the Christian Scriptures are founded on the assumption that some one of the Divine attributes is a full and complete representation of the Divine character. The attribute most commonly assumed as being this full representation of it is the attribute of bene- volence. It is asserted that all the other attributes of the Divine character are mere modifications of this single at- tribute. But what right have we to make this assumption? Is it an assumption founded on any self-evident truth ? Why may not holiness, or justice, or veracity be assumed as the single Divine attribute of which the others must be modifications or manifestations ? Is the assumption that benevolence must be the single attribute of Deity founded on any self-evident principles, or any demonstration flowing from such principles ? Is not the assumption rather made because it is a convenient assumption? To beings of greater purity than ourselves, perfect holiness may appear the most venerable attribute in the Divine mind. But if the attribute of benevolence be the source from which all the other Divine perfections flow, it cannot be the mere human conception of such an attribute, but one of a wider and more comprehensive range, which includes justice, holiness, truth, and all the other Divine perfections in its wide embrace. According to our conceptions, justice and holiness differ from benevolence, not in degree, but in concep- tion and idea. We can have no right, therefore, to assume a mere human conception of benevolence as the adequate con- ception of that attribute in the Divine mind which embraces in itself all the other perfections of the Divine nature, and then to measure every other doctrine or statement in the Chris- tian Scriptures by such a standard. If we apply to other conceptions which have a human origin a standard of bene- volence which is the strict human conception of that quality. 80 and then apply it to principles entirely differing from it in conception, it is easy enough to make statements in the Scrip- tures contradict such supposed attributes of God. If we imagine an attribute of the Divine nature which is wholly different from any mere human conception of it, and apply it to other classes of conceptions not similarly modified, we can have no right to assign to such conclusions the evidence of demonstration. If it is the human idea of benevolence which we employ, the action of that attribute must be modified by considerations deduced from the other attributes of God. On grounds such as we have been considering, it has been often asserted that the Scripture doctrine of the atonement contradicts the Divine attributes, and therefore it cannot have been revealed to man by God. We select this doctrine as a sample of many others. The two attributes in God, to which this doctrine has special relation, are His benevolence and His justice. It has been urged that it is inconsistent with the perfect benevolence of the Deity that He should require an atonement in order that He may pardon sin. If the Deity is perfectly benevolent, He can require nothing but repentance. It is also urged to be contrary to the Divine justice to inflict sufferings on one person as a satisfaction for sins committed by another. Now into the profound depths of such questions we shall not enter. Our only concern with them is, what limits do they necessarily assign to the capacity of the human faculties to pronounce on such questions, and, consequently, of the powers of the human mind to form a judgment as to what must or must not be the contents of a Divine revelation, or the mode of its delivery ? Now the conceptions of benevo- lence, justice, and the atonement are the human representa- tions of those conceptions, and not the realities in the Divine mind. We are dealing entirely with those human represen- tations. The Divine realities cannot be represented in our finite comprehensions. If, then, we assume the human idea of benevolence as fully representing the actual attribute in the Divine mind, it is not difficult to make the assertion, that the Deity requires an 81 atonement before He can pardon sin, contradict that attri- bute. With equal ease, the inflicting sufiering on one en- tirely innocent, as a compensation for suffering which ought to be borne by the guilty, even when that suffering is borne voluntarily, may be made to contradict the human concep- tion of the attribute of perfect justice. But the human con- ceptions of benevolence and justice are conceptions which are entirely distinct from each other; they have nothing in them in common. As they exist in man, they energize in a manner independent of each other; they can be represented by no common attribute of which we can form a distinct con- ception. Their requirements may frequently clash. If we suppose both of them to exist equally in the same mind, the strict feeling of justice demands that the reward of demerit should be rigidly dealt out to the offender. The feeling ot benevolence requires that suffering should be annihilated, and happiness created. According to our human conceptions of these attributes, one of them cannot possibly be the common ground of the other ; they may clash, but they cannot coin- cide. A common principle may exist in the Divine mind under the influence of which the claims of each may be modi- fied. An atonement may be consistent with neither of the human conceptions of benevolence or justice ; but it may be consistent with the complicated action of both, or with a common principle which forms their groundwork in God. But when it is asserted that the doctrine of atonement con- tradicts either the Divine attribute of benevolence or of justice, this cannot be meant of a human conception of benevolence or justice, but of a higher conception, to which the name of benevolence has been given as an attribute which compre- hends in its wide action all the other perfections of the Divine mind, and which is supposed to be an adequate measure and representation of the reality as it exists in God. If the doctrine of an atonement contradicted merely the human conceptions of benevolence or justice, it would prove nothing against the possibility of Christianity being a divine revela- tion. The objection only possesses cogency if it could be shown that it contradicted an attribute of benevolence which G 82 the human mind was capable of comprehending as an ade- quate exponent of all the other perfections of the Divine nature. Such must be the character of the attribute of benevo- lence when we assert that it is the single attribute of the Divine nature. Such an attribute cannot be comprehended by man so as to enable him, from reasonings founded upon it, to draw definite conclusions respecting the Divine pro- ceedings. It may be that such an attribute does exist in the Divine mindj but both its nature and mode of action must be quite incomprehensible to the human mind. If we survey the Divine conduct as regulated by the human conceptions of benevolence or justice, it may not be the precise result of the action of either of those attributes, but may be modified in conformity with the requirements of both. If the Divine conduct was the result of either single attribute, the doctrine of atonement might contradict that attribute ; but if it is the result of the complicated action of different Divine perfec- tions, we can have no evidence of such contradiction. Our human conceptions of the Divine justice and holiness are not adequately represented by our human conception of benevolence. Fallacies of this kind arise from assuming that a human conception of a Divine attribute is an adequate measure of the depths of the Infinite mind, and then using that attribute as an adequate measure of the other perfec- tions of the Almighty. Conceptions of this kind differ Avholly from the class of conceptions to which we have already alluded, and which, from their distinctness and definiteness, are within the range of the human faculties to pronounce as to their agreement with the Divine character. Various other doctrines in the Christian Scriptures have been objected to as inconsistent with the character of God. The greater proportion of these objections are based on a similar foundation of sand — that one or more of the Divine attributes adequately represents the perfections of the Most High, and that the human conception of those attributes is the perfect measure of the Divine reality. "We have only selected the doctrine in question as a sample •83 of such objections, founded on antecedent probabilities, on the strength of which it has been asserted that Christianity cannot be a revelation communicated by inspiration from God. With respect to all such objections there is one answer: the human understanding does not furnish us with any grounds of antecedent certainty as to the precise relationship which the conceptions in question bear to the attributes as they exist in God, and consequently we can have no evidence that, if such doctrines form a portion of a professed revelation, they are destructive of its claims to a divine origin. Objec- tions of this kind are founded on precisely the same ante- cedent probabilities as those which, when they are applied as exponents of the Divine working in creation or providence, expressly contradict the realities of things as they exist in the universe, which forms the great revelation of the omnipo- tence and omniscience of the Creator. Our being assured of the fallacy of such antecedent reason- ings is of the highest importance, because those are of a pre- cisely similar description, on the strength of which particular theories have been erected respecting the mode in which in- spiration must have been communicated. If the one are unreliable, the otliers must be equally untrustworthy. From these premises, therefore, we draw the general con- clusion that it is impossible to reason on such conceptions as to what may or may not be possible in a revelation from God, or what will bs the mode adopted for its communication, because the conceptions on which we reason are only meta- phorical representations, made to the finite understanding, of the realities of the Divine mind. We have already proved that if it pleased the Creator to communicate a revelation, there is one limitation under which that revelation must have been communicated — that the conceptions contained in it cannot consist of the Divine con- ceptions of His own attributes and perfections, but the best representations of the infinite and perfect ideas, as they exist in the Creator, which the limited and finite intellect of man is capable of affording. In asserting that every revelation must be subject to this precondition, and can only be made in g2 84 conformity witli it, we are not assigning a limitation to tlie powers of the Creator. The limitation has been imposed by the Creator on Himself; and it implies no defect of power in a worker to assert that His operations must be confined within limits which He Himself has imposed. These self-imposed limits which God has assigned to His own working are the preconditions under which He has created the finite. He might have created beings subject to different preconditions; but having once created them subject to certain limitations, they can only act in conformity with the laws imposed upon them by their Maker. To say that the Almighty could only make a revelation of Himself to man in conformity with existing laws of thought, is only the same thing as assert- ing that, the Creator having made man subject to certain laws of thought, as long as man continues to be man, the Creator can only communicate truth to him in conformity with those laws which He has Himself imposed on the human mind. We will illustrate our meaning by an example from mathe- matical truth. The Creator of the human mind has precon- ditioned our conception of a triangle to be such that its three angles cannot but be equal to two right angles. It is there- fore no limitation to the power of Omnipotence, to assert that it is impossible to make a triangle with its three angles equal to three right angles. Such a triangle would not simply be an impossibility, but a contradiction. In the same way it is no limitation to the power of God to affirm that, when He has preconditioned the human mind to be only capable of conceiving in limited finite conceptions, it is impossible for Him to communicate to it an intelli- gible revelation in any other ideas than in the conceptions of the finite, or that it can be made by Him in the perfect con- ceptions of the Infinite mind. To assert its possibility is to assert a positive contradiction. "We know, therefore, with demonstrative certainty that every revelation made by God to man must employ as its vehicle for communicating truth the bmited and imperfect conceptions of the human mind, and that to this extent a human element must exist in the Christian Scriptures. It 85 follows, therefore, that if it pleased God to make a revelation of Himself to man, the truths communicated must undergo a process of translation from their divine realities into the cor- responding human representations of them, which are the best counterparts of the Divine realities themselves. Such a revelation, therefore, must be limited to the discovery of such portions of the Divine character as the mind of man possesses ideas through which the representation of the Divine realities becomes possible. Consequently the truths contained in the revelation can only represent the Divine realities as far as the human thoughts have been preconditioned to be representa- tions of those realities. But we have already observed that all human conceptions have been derived from three sources — the mind's perception of external and material things, the feelings and affections of the mind itself, and the self-conscious acting of the mind on itself. These form the original source of all the conceptions that we possess, which are common between man and man, and through which thought, speech, and language become possible. Within the boundaries of such conceptions, therefore, the possibility of communicating truth to man, which was pre- viously unknown, must be limited. Now, in order that a revelation may be intelligible to man, it is necessary that it should be couched in those concep- tions common to the human mind. If it were not so, it might be a revelation to an individual, but it could not be so to the human race. It would be impossible that its contents should be capable of communication by one man to another. It is, doubtless, possible, if such were the Creator's pleasure, to make a revelation to each separate individual. But the ideas in which such a revelation was communicated could not form subjects of common thought, and consequently could not form a written revelation. If such a revelation were made, it could not form a subject of teaching by man to man. All teaching must be made through the medium of intelligible thoughts, common between man and man. The teaching of a revelation by one man to another can only be effected through the medium of common subjects of thought capable of find- 86 ing expression in intelligible language. If the thoughts in a revelation were not ordinary human thoughts, they could exist only for each separate person. In every revelation which is designed for the use of the human race, it is necessary that the various conceptions which it contains should be derived from one or more of the three sources above mentioned. Its conceptions, therefore, will consist of ideas derived from the mind's conceptions of ex- ternal things, or from its own feelings and affections, or from its own self-conscious actings, and be subject to all the neces- sary conditions of such classes of conceptions. It follows as a necessary consequence, that, in every revela- tion of God communicated to the spirit of man, another human element must exist in it — that the conceptions, ideas, and thoughts in which that revelation is expressed are all derived either from man's conceptions of external things or from his moral perceptions, and that they only metaphori- cally represent truths as they exist in God. Whatever theory of inspiration is adopted, the necessity for this concession cannot be evaded. It also follows, from the nature of the human mind, that the ideas and conceptions in which spiritual and divine truth is announced to man must partake of the character of an- thropomorphism. This word is frequently used to denote grossly corporeal conceptions of the Deity; but its real mean- ing implies nothing more than that we conceive of God by means of conceptions which are originally derived from man. In this sense it is impossible that our conceptions of Him can have any other origin. To apply degrading or corporeal conceptions, derived from man, to the Creator, is to give a perverted view of His character and existence. But, in our zeal against the application of such conceptions to God, we are in danger of forgetting that it is a question of degree only, and that even our highest and most spiritual conceptions of God can claim no other origin. To represent God as possessed of body, parts, or passions, is degrading to His nature; but when we assert that He is of infinite power, wisdom, and goodness, let us not forget the real origin of the conceptions in question. 87 When, therefore, the Christian Scriptures speak of the perfections of God, the terms which they employ cannot be expressions directly denoting the Divine perfections them- selves, but expressions originally derived from the material universe, or from the human mind, analogously expressing those perfections. When the Scriptures use the expression '^Almighty," what is the conception which they are alone able to convey by it? Does it unfold the eternal reality of the Divine mind ? The positive ideas of power which it con- veys are all derived from the created universe. The power which could eflFect creation is the highest positive degree of power which the human mind can conceive of. The con- ception of that degree of power is the positive idea which is conveyed by the expression " Almighty." But that positive conception is a finite conception ; it therefore does not ad- equately represent the idea of power as it exists in God. To supply this defect in our conception, we deny the existence of bounds to the power, and express this denial by the word "Almighty." This portion of the conception is entirely negative. The only positive conception, therefore, which the mind possesses is one derived from the created universe. The human idea of existence, purged of its imperfections, must also be used analogously to represent the existence and being of the Creator. We add to the positive human con- ception the negative expressions of "absolute," "uncondi- tioned," " infinite." The human idea of existence forms the only positive conception formed by the mind. By applying to it the expressions " absolute," "unconditional," "infinite," we endeavour to eliminate out of that conception the finite imperfections with which it is necessarily associated; but still our conception is the finite human conception. The human ideas of goodness, holiness, purity, justice, mercy, and truth must be the positive portion of our concep- tions when we speak of the moral perfections of the Most High. There is no other source whence the positive portion of those perfections can be derived than the conceptions of those affections as they exist in man. To free them from these imperfections as attributes of man, we apply to them 88 the negative conception of infinite or perfect when they are applied to God. Still, by this process we do not destroy the human character of the positive conception. When we say that God is perfectly benevolent, good, and holy^ we mean to assert that there are affections in Him corresponding to those attributes in man, which we endeavour to free from finite imperfection by qualifying them by the negative conception of perfect. The only conception which man possesses of will is one de- rived from his own self-consciousness. This, when the nega- tive conception of freedom from conditions and limitations is attached to it, is the only positive conception which can be used when mention is made of the will of the Creator. The human notion of existence is one which is necessarily complicated with conceptions of time and space. Man can- not conceive of anything actual, except as existing in one or the other of those conditions. This notion is applied to the Creator, divested of the conditions which are necessarily involved in it as a positive human conception. Throughout every revelation^ therefore,, the imagery in which God is spoken of must be imagery derived from the created universe or from the corresponding attributes in man. God cannot otherwise become the object of human thought. This is another human element which must necessarily form an ingredient in every revelation. The Christian Scriptures are written on the assumption of the truth of these principles ; they consequently even ascribe to God bodily organs, for the purpose of denoting those affections which in man are associated with the exercise of those bodily functions. This language is anthropomorphistic, but it is one which is clearly comprehensible. It only be- comes dangerous when we mistake its nature and suppose that, instead of being only metaphorically applicable to God, it denotes realities existing in the Divine nature. Thus God is said to have eyes : the eye, to man, is the source of know- ledge. By this image the perfection of the Divine know- ledge is intended to be conveyed. God is said to have hands : this assertion is used to denote that God has those affections 89 and energies of which hands in man are the most appropriate expression. God is said to be seated, to denote His sove- reign power, because that is the mode in which sovereign dignity is displayed by man. In a similar manner all the bodily organs and material and mental portions of man^s natm'e are used to denote perfections of the Most High. This human element, therefore, must exist in every revela- tion, whatever be the degree of its inspiration. The careful student of the Christian Scriptures cannot fail to be struck with the fact that there is something, which they designate as "the gospel," quite distinct from the contents of the Scriptures themselves. According to the New Testa- ment, the Christian revelation consists of two portions, both accommodated to the finite understanding of man. The one of these portions is preeminently called the evayyeXcov, or "good news," and consists of a succession of outward objective historical facts — the manifestation of incarnate Deity in human flesh, the historic life and death of Christ ; the other consists of the record of those facts, and the comments on those facts — the actual written records of the New Testament itself. What the Christian Scriptures preeminently desig- nate as the Gospel is not a body of doctrines or precepts, but the great historic fact of the manifestation of Christ as the revelation of Deity in His incarnate person. Of this we shall adduce proof hereafter : at present we assume its reality. Now if the Christian revelation be made in the Divine person of the incarnate Son of God, it is evident that such a revela- tion would be the nearest possible approximation to the realities of the Divine perfections which the finite intellect of man is capable of comprehending; but even high as such a revelation would be, still it must be limited to meet the conditions of man^s finite nature. The perfections of incar- nate Deity must be the highest reflections of the glories which flow from the invisible and incomprehensible foun- tains of Godhead. The perfections of God manifest in the flesh must be the highest possible displays which human thoughts can conceive, or human language can convey, of the incomprehensible glories of that Being whom none can 90 behold and live ; but while they are the representations nearest to the reality which the finite can receive of the in- finitCj they cannot be the infinite itself. In making this manifestation of Himself to man^ the agency employed by God consists in the fact of the Incarna- tion — the union of the infinite with the finite. Such a revela- tion would have no other limitation than the necessity that the Divine nature must be veiled in finite representations. As far as the infinite in God can be represented in human nature, the objective fact of the Incarnation must be its ab- solutely perfect representation. As an objective fact, it must be a revelation in itself, quite independently of all views taken of that fact by the percipient powers of the mind, in the same manner as the objective universe is a revelation of the Creator's glories quite distinct from any particular view which the mind forms of that universe. But every objective existence involves a subjective view taken of that existence by the mind itself. There is the ex- ternal universe as it exists in itself; there is the conception which the mind forms of that universe : there is the great fact of the Incarnation ; there is the view which the mind of man conceives of the Incarnation. Actual existence differs from our perceptions of that exist- ence. Every object, as it exists in itself, receives a colouring through our percipient faculties. The actual perception which we form of things consists of the union of the objective and the subjective — of actual existence with the powers of perception. We are incapable of knowing actual existences otherwise than as they are coloured by the percipient powers of the mind. In conformity with this principle, the Christian Scriptures both contain the records of the revelation made by God in the person of Christ, and an exposition of the meaning of this great revelation of God, expressed in ideas and conceptions relative to the mind of man. The question here involved is one which must be kept quite distinct from all mere views of the degree of inspiration with which those Scriptures must have been communicated. Whatever be the degree of inspiration which has been afforded to their writers. 91 an important human element must form portion of tlieir con- tents ; they must speak of heavenly things by their earthly representations. Even in the revealed commentary on the great fact of the Incarnation, this is the only medium of teach- ing which is possible. This mode of teaching is most freely used in the New Testament Scriptures. They press every truth and metaphor which can be derived from earth into the service of dehnea- ting the unknown mysteries of the kingdom of heaven. At the same time they give us distinct warning that the imagery itself only metaphorically describes the Divine acts and cha- racter. We will illustrate this mode of stating spiritual truth by a few examples. Various representations of the Deity are made in the Scriptures which in their literal sense assert His limitation under the conditions of time and space. Expres- sions are used which imply a limited presence in particular places and definite localities ; but, while they are forced to use expressions of this description for the purpose of teaching us the relative truths which they are intended to convey, they guard against the error of our fancying that these truths are the ultimate realities of the Divine nature. While they assert that God dwells in heaven, they most emphatically declare that the heaven and the heaven of heavens cannot contain Him. They speak of the Spirit of God as poured out on the spirit of man. To pour is a conception which denotes a material action ; it implies motion : it is properly applicable to the passage of a liquid from the thing containing it into another locality; it can, therefore, only by a remote meta- phor denote an act of the Divine mind. But the laws of human thought necessitate the use of such metaphorical expressions in teaching spiritual truth. They may be, and are, imperfect instruments for teaching; but whether perfect or imperfect, they are the only ones which exist, and without them all knowledge of divine things would be impossible to man. A small or obscure light affords but imperfect vision; but if we have no other, we shall not see better by extinguishing it. A metaphor less remote than the idea of pouring might have been used; but, whatever degree of remoteness it might 92 possess, it could only represent a di\dne idea by a similar analogy. God is frequently said in Scripture to make the pure and holy soul His temple. The truth meant to be represented is the close union between it and God ; but;, although it is easy of apprehension, it is the plain case of an inadequate material conception used to denote a spiritual idea. In the same way the expressions of sitting on a throne, a divine fulness where He locally manifests His essential glory, acts of worship ren- dered in a material temple, the judgment-seat of a Roman governor {jBrjfxa XpiaTov), and multitudes of other material conceptions of this description are the constant means used to represent spiritual truth. Expressions of this kind we are in little danger of mistaking for realities. Why should we convert into realities expressions which, although less ob- viously of a material origin, are of a precisely similar de- scription ? But, while they use such teaching, the Scriptures empha- tically warn us that God is a Spirit. They use a term which, while it was metaphorical and material in its first use, is now employed by us as the highest negation of all material form. In the same manner they use language respecting His moral perfections : they speak of His repentance. His anger. His wrath, His jealousy. Now every one of these and kindred affections, applied to God, are attributes of the human mind, some of them imply- ing considerable degrees of imperfection. As human affec- tions, they necessarily imply the idea of change j but while the Scriptures use such expressions analogically to represent to us the Divine attributes or the Divine conduct, they em- phatically assert that with God there is no variableness nor shadow of turning. In all His attributes and perfections, whatever God is. He is ever and unalterably the same. In accordance with this principle, the first article of the Church of England defines the Deity as being without body, parts, or passions ; and then defines His perfections by ascribing to Him the human conceptions of power, wisdom, and goodness, and eliminates as far as may be the human imperfection involved in the conceptions by adding to them 93 the negative idea of the infinite. No effort of scientific de- finition can evade a necessity which is founded on conditions and limitations to which the human understanding has been created subject. General Conclusions. The following are the results of the foregoing reasonings as to the conditions under which a supernatural revelation must be communicated to man, and the limitations attending its communication : — 1. That as far as the Creator designed to make a revelation. He would fully realize His own purposes in making it. 2. That the conceptions through which the revelation must be communicated cannot be the Divine ideas them- selves, but their analogous representations and approxima- tions in human thought. 3. That to make the revelation an intelligible revelation to the mind of man, it must be made through the medium of human thoughts, conceptions, and ideas, more or less re- motely representing the divine realities. 4. That, even on the highest theory of inspiration, the human origin of the conceptions in which a revelation must be expressed is a necessary human element in every con- ceivable revelation. 5. That a revelation must be authenticated by a mira- culous attestation, if it is to have a binding obligation on the human conscience. 6. That we have no antecedent knowledge, amounting to certainty, as to the amount of truth which a divine revelation must contain. 7. That we have a very high degree of evidence that, in communicating a revelation, God would act in a manner analogous to the mode which He has already pursued in creation and providence. 8. That the evidence of a direct miraculous attestation given to a revelation is not affected by difficulties in its contents, which rest on no other foundation than uncertain probabilities. 94 9. That the only adequate ground which would justify the rejection of a supposed revelation^ supported by an apparent adequate attestation^ is that some portion of its contents palpably contradict self-evident truth respecting the Divine character and perfections, of which supposed contradiction the reason of man enables him to form an adequate judg- ment, and arrive at conclusions not based on probabilities, but on certainties. 10. That although the representation of divine truths by human conceptions of greater or less degree of imperfection must be a human element in every revelation, yet, if a revelation were communicated to the spirit of man by the Spirit of God, the analogies employed would be the best suited for conveying the nearest approximation to the divine truths. 11. That there is no evidence, nor any grounds of ante- cedent certainty possessed by man, either that a miraculous revelation is impossible, or that it cannot receive a mira- culous attestation. 12. That we have no grounds of antecedent certainty to guide us as to the nature or degree of inspiration with which a revelation would be communicated. 13. But that the inspiration afforded would not be a greater degree of inspiration than that which was necessary for the effectuating the purposes of God in communicating a revelation. 14. That such truths as God has already communicated by natural means, and which He has already given man the power to discover for himself, would not form the j)roper subject-matter of a supernatural revelation. 15. That, according to analogies of God's conduct in crea- tion and providence, inspiration would be confined to the proper subject-matter of the revelation itself, and would not be extended to mere collateral matter connected with the revelation. 16. That reasonings founded on certain human views of the Divine attributes as to what a revelation must contain, or what must be the mode of its delivery, are no less fal- 95 lacious than similar reasonings have proved as to the great facts of creation and providence. 17. That not only is there no antecedent presumption against the existence of a human element in a revelation, but the analogies of God's operations in creation and providence would lead us to infer the presence of such an element in every revelation of which the Creator and Preserver of the universe is the author. 18. That various assumptions which have been made re- specting the extent of a divine revelation, and respecting the mode in which it must have been communicated, rest upon no solid basis of truth, but on mere probable grounds of be- lief; and when such probabilities are applied as exponents of God's works in creation and providence, they totally fail us as guides to truth. These are the only truths, which are necessary deductions from the preceding reasonings, which bear directly on the question which we are now discussing. We are quite ready to admit that these reasonings involve considerations of the highest importance as to the mode of interpreting the Chris- tian Scriptures. They are also worthy of the deepest atten- tion as implying limits as to the extent in which the rational faculty in man can safely deduce consequences from the ana- logous representations of divine truth contained in the pages of a revelation. They raise an important question as to the reality of a large mass of metaphysical theology, and whether such theology consists of truths necessarily flowing from statements contained in revelation, or whether it is not mere barren speculations of the human intellect, extending its re- searches into regions far beyond the limits of its powers. However closely connected the discussion of the above de- ductions may be with these and similar questions, we must confine ourselves entirely to their bearing on the nature and extent of the inspiration under the influence of which the Christian revelation has been communicated. 96 CHAPTER VI. THE THEORY OF VERBAL INSPIRATION CONTRARY TO THE MODE OF THE DIVINE ACTING IN CREATION AND PROVIDENCE. "We must therefore proceed to examine tlie nature of the probabilities which are usually adduced as evidences of the truth of the theory of verbal inspiration. We observe, in the first place, that, assuming the truth of the facts as they appear in the New Testament, the written and the oral teaching of the Apostles must have been of precisely the same nature, and delivered with the same degree of inspiration. A con- siderable portion of the New Testament is derived from the oral teaching of the Apostles. The vrriters of the New Testament do not claim any higher degree of inspiration for their written than for their oral teaching, but, on the contrary, frequently put their oral teaching on a par, in point of au- thority, with their written teaching. If, therefore, the New Testament was composed under the influence of verbal in- spiration, or the inspiration denoted by any of the cognate theories, the same inspiration likewise belonged to every branch of their oral teaching when the Apostles and other inspired persons were occupied in teaching Christian truth. If, then, the Apostles were always under the influence of verbal inspiration whenever they taught Christian truth, the in- fluence of inspiration must, during the greater portion of their lives, have nearly superseded the use of their ordinary faculties. According to the statements of the historians, they were generally employed in their Master's work ; and if so, they must have ordinarily displayed the peculiar phenomenon of infallibility : whenever- they conversed on any subject of religion, it was not the individual Apostle who was heard discussing and arguing, but the Holy Spirit. It has been considered that the supposition that any in- spired writing has perished involves a considerable difiiculty. It is therefore inferred that the written teaching of the 97 Apostles must involve a much higher form of inspiration than their oral teaching ; and it has been taken for granted that no portion of their ^vritten teaching has perished. The difficidty of supposing that the whole of the oral teaching of the Apostles was the result of so high a gift as verbal inspi- ration has led to these assumptions. Hints, however, are found in the New Testament that other writings were com- posed by the Apostles, besides those which we at present possess, and other men were recognized as inspired. If this be the case, such writings have perished. But it is e\ddent from the assertions of the Scriptures themselves, that many things communicated by a high form of inspiration are no longer in existence. Before the Gospels were committed to writing, the oral teaching of the Apostles and of the original witnesses formed the only standard of divine truth possessed by the Church. Our present Gospels do not contain a record of the whole of the actions of our Lord, or of the whole of the discourses uttered by Him. Those which have been recorded must have been a selection out of a much larger portion of inspired teaching. The writers have only recorded what appeared to them sufficient for the purpose of handing down to future ages the great truths of Christianity. It is plain, therefore, that the de- livery of a truth by a high form of inspiration does not guarantee the perpetual preservation of that which must have been delivered under its influence. Now on what principle can we assume, on the supposition of the truth of the facts as recorded in the New Testament, that the writings of inspired persons must possess an inspira- tion which does not extend to their oral teaching ? The ge- neral teaching of the Apostles is frequently referred to in their writings as no less the result of assistance from on high than their written teaching. The early churches could have possessed no other knowledge of the facts of our Lord's life but the narratives of that life imparted to them by the original witnesses, before the present Gospels were committed to writing. The whole of the contents of the Gospels were most probably delivered orally before they were set forth in H 98 their present form. A similar position must have been oc- cupied by the oral preaching of the Apostles_, before the com- position of the Epistles, or before they had obtained general cir- culation. This oral teaching must have been the only autho- ritative standard of Christian truth which the Church was in possession of. Now it is impossible, on any sound principle^ to assume that when the Apostles taught the very same truths, or declared the same facts, by word of mouth, they were not possessed of the same inspiration as when they wrote them. It must be admitted that whatever degree of inspiration was possessed by them in the one capacity was possessed by them in the other. If the theory of verbal in- spiration be an accurate exponent of the degree of inspiration under the influence of which the Christian Scriptures must have been composed, it must be so because the Apostles were always verbally inspired. The theory of verbal inspiration, therefore, is encumbered with the difficulty of supposing that the ordinary faculties of inspired persons were superseded during the greater portion of their lives. One of the arguments adduced in proof of the necessity that the Christian Scriptures must have been communicated under the influence of verbal inspiration is, that it is exceedingly desirable that they should have been composed by the aid of the highest possible form of inspiration, so that they might contain nothing which is human, but only what is divine. We have already seen that this is a position which cannot be realized even on the verbal theory. Every human element cannot be excluded, even if the inspiration afforded was actually verbal inspiration. The whole machinery of thought and con- ception must be human. But it is a most unsafe guide to truth to argue because, according to ordinary human apprehension, it seems very desirable we should have certain things, that those things must be granted to us by God. The wisdom of God differs widely from the wisdom of man. Many things which seem to us most desirable to have been bestowed upon us, God has certainly not given. The number of additional blessings 99 which we might think desirable is absokitely endless. To set up our views of what we think it desirable that God should do, and to infer from this that God must have done so, is to measure with our finite wisdom the wisdom of the Most High. Nothing, therefore, is more absurd than to infer that, because it may appear to human wisdom desirable that a revelation should be communicated under the influence of verbal inspiration, it follows as a necessary consequence that this is the mode which the Divine wisdom must have adopted in its communication. It has been urged that a revelation which is designed to make men wise unto salvation, and which therefore must exert the most important influence on the happiness of man in the future world, should have been so communicated as not to leave the smallest doubt on the mind as to what was the meaning of any portion of its contents. It may seem that it is antecedently probable that it would be free fi'om any diffi- culty ; that every statement would have been made with the utmost possible plainness ; that it would have propounded a system of theology for our belief, and rules of conduct for our practice, respecting which no doubt could have originated, and that it would have left nothing to be inferred by us. But we have as much right to infer that God has never placed man in a situation of difficulty by His creative and providential acts as to assert that a revelation must be free from difficulties. But it has been asserted that the right reception of the truths of a divine revelation involves man's everlasting happi- ness in the world to come, and that truths invested with such unspeakable importance could not be communicated under a guidance inferior to that implied by verbal inspiration. In such a revelation every word must be verbally true, and the possibility of error must be rigidly excluded. We readily grant the high importance of such a revelation, and of the truths which it contains ; but this importance is no guide as to the means which God must necessarily employ in its communication. Will it be pretended that numbers of things in our present state do not exercise an influence of the highest importance on the future condition of man ? Will not H 2 100 the character, the tastes, the habits and tendencies which we form in this life exercise the most important influence on our happiness in the world to come ? Has man, in the formation of these things, any guidance like verbal inspiration to direct him ? Why may we not as well infer from the same premises that God the Creator has never placed man in this position at all, as lay it down that it is inconsistent with His charac- ter that such things should enter into a revelation ? The argument is equally good to prove that God could never have placed man in a position of difficulty or doubt, where he could run the risk of hazarding interests so infinitely momentous. But it will be replied, the purpose of a revelation must be to remedy the original defects in the situation in which man has been placed by his Creator. We answer, when we speak of defects in connexion with the works or the operations of the Almighty, we use such a term in reference to the imperfect views presented of those operations through the defects of the human understanding. We do not speak of defects in reference to the view taken of them by the Divine mind, or assert that there can really be any defect or imperfection in the Divine operations. To say that the purpose of God in making a supernatural revelation is to remedy the deficiencies of His working as Creator and Preser- ver of the universe is directly to ascribe imperfections to God, not in the human, but in the divine view of His own operations. We have therefore no right to assume that the difficulties which are presented to the human mind in the Divine mode of ope- ration in creation and providence will be removed by a super- natural revelation, or that the same mode of communicating truth would not be adopted in one as in the other. God intended to reveal Himself in creation ; why is it not equally probable that He has provided us in creation with an infallible guide to conduct us to the knowledge of those truths which it was His purpose to reveal by His creative works ? It will not be denied that the truths which God has thus revealed have a very deep and intimate bearing both on questions of religion and morality. It would be far more just to conclude that God has always 101 had good reasons for placing man in a situation "wliere he would have difficulties of this description to encounter, and that those difficulties which are presented in creation and providence would be found in a supernatural revelation of which God was the author. But every analogy derived from creation and providence directly contradicts the supposition that God woidd provide everything ready made for man, without His own laboiu* or exertion, in a revelation communicated by Him. On the contrary, we have the most abundant evidence that it is the Divine purpose that man should be a joint worker with Him- self. God has imparted to man no gift of nature which does not require the aid of his own exertions to perfect. The highest and the best gifts of God require the greatest exertions outhe part of man fully to realize their benefit. God has endowed man with gloiious gifts of reason and of intellect. These are the noblest gifts which the Creator has bestowed on him. Does any gift which man possesses require greater exertion on his part in order that it may attain its perfect develop- ment ? The gift will rust and almost perish unless kept in constant exercise. God has provided food for man in rich abundance; but all except the lowest kinds require mau^s co-operation in its production, and the higher the kind of food the gi'cater degree of human co-operation is necessary. God has clothed the animals ; He has not clothed man. Where- fore has He made this distinction ? To man He has imparted the power of providing clothing for himself, and therefore He wills that he should exert that power. To the animals He has given no such power, and therefore He has provided them with clothing. Is it probable then that that Being, who, while He has provided man with the means of getting food and raiment, yet has denied him either without the exertion of the faculties with which He has endowed him, in the spiritual world has entirely altered the course of His conduct, and has provided him with truth all ready for his use, without the necessity of the exertion of those faculties with which He has invested him ? God, again, has endowed man with bodily powers and ca- 102 pacities. But even for the fall perfection of those powers man's co-operation is necessary by exercise and exertion. In striking contrast is the mode in which God has imparted knowledge to the animal creation from that in which He has imparted it to man. To man He has communicated capacities for acquiring knowledge^ rather than actual knowledge itself : man is not born with knowledge. To the animal creation the Creator has acted otherwise. Whatever knowledge they possess is the direct gift of their Creator, complete and entire like a verbal inspiration. It requires no co-operation on their part for its complete development. Thousands of generations of bees have existed. Their knowledge has not been progressive. Thousands of years ago their knowledge and skill were as great as it is now. They have made no progress during the interval. Their Creator has invested them at once with knowledge on some subjects which it has required man long ages to discover. The bee knew, ages before man, that the use of the hexagon in building involved the greatest economy of space. The youngest bee goes at once to its work perfectly taught by its Creator. But man arrives at this knowledge after deep study of geo- metry, and only after a succession of discoveries. The reason of this is, that man is created to be a fellow worker with God. Nothing can be more striking to the thoughtful mind, in contemplating creation, than the extent to which it is evidently the pleasure of the Almighty that man should be a fellow worker with Himself. The whole kingdom of nature teems with evidences of this fact. It is one of the distinctive marks which separate the irrational races from the human. Every- thing in nature points to man as its archetype ; but everything in nature no less distinctly requires man to become a fellow worker with God before it can be appropriated to its use. The earth is fitted for his abode, and stored with everything which his wants require ; " but man must subdue it " *. The sea has been made by the Creator the highway of nations; but man must build his bark before he can traverse it and make it subservient to the purposes of intercourse. The Creator has fabricated the materials of steam ; but man has invented the * Geu. i. 28. 103 steam-engine. God created electricity, and endowed it with powers by which distance is annihilated; man has invented the telegraph. Metals in abundance God has stored in the earth for man^s use ; but man must invent before he can appropri- ate one of the Creator^s gifts. Many of the harsher powers of nature stimulate this same activity in man, working, as God works, by unalterable law; man has to co-operate with Him to avoid the pressure of those laws on himself. The very diffi- culties of nature force man to be a fellow worker with God. Nature is full of difficulties, in order that man may be full of work to overcome them. If such be the aspect of nature, why may not revelation also present similar features ? If it is the pleasure of the Al- mighty that man should be His fellow worker in creation and providence, why may it not be likewise His pleasure that man should be a fellow worker with God in His character of Re- vealer ? Man must be a co-worker with God before he can appropriate His gifts in nature ; why may not the same necessity exist before he can appropriate the knowledge com- municated by revelation ? Difficulties exist in nature for the purpose of forcing man to become a fellow worker with his Maker ; why may not similar difficulties exist in revelation for the purpose of effectuating the same end? If the very same difficulties exist in revelation as in nature, shall we without hesitation admit that nature is the workmanship of the Most High, and, because of the difficulties, deny that Christianity can have come down from the Father of light ? Shall we, with the verbal inspirationist, assume that that God who in creation and providence has hardly imparted to man a single gift which does not require his own co-operation for its perfection, has reversed the order of His operations in com- municating a supernatural revelation, and provided man with every truth all ready to his bands, without the necessity of ex- erting any power with which he is invested ? Analogy leads us to the conclusion that, if the God of creation and providence be the author of revelation. He would not invariably act by one rule in the one, and directly reverse it in the other. But the theory of verbal inspiration has been assumed to supersede the 104 necessity of human agency in the study of divine revelation^ and to present truth as much as possible ready made for man's use. If, therefore, the theory of verbal inspiration has been assumed as the mode in which a revelation must have been communicated because it presents truth as more ready for man^s use than any other supposition, and requires less human exertion for its attainment, that theory is assumed in direct contradiction to the known actings of God in creation and providence. It therefore is so far from possessing antecedent certainty, that it has not even a low degree of antecedent pro- bability that it would be the mode in which the Creator would communicate a supernatural revelation. But it has been asserted that the goodness of God renders it antecedently probable that, if God made a revelation to man, and rendered man's everlasting happiness at all dependent on his reception of that revelation, not only would it be au- thenticated by the highest degree of external evidence, but it must be communicated with an inspiration not inferior in accuracy to verbal inspiration or some of its cognate theo- ries. It has been asked. Can it be supposed that the Creator, if He has made such a revelation, has left in it anything dark and obscure for man to grapple with ? Surely the goodness of God requires that the knowledge of its contents, or the reception of its truths, should not depend on any imperfec- tions in the human intellect, but that truth should be communi- cated in the clearest and most distinct manner by God him- self. These assumptions, if true, would have rendered all supernatural revelation unnecessary from the first. The argument from the Divine goodness is equally potent to prove that God must have endowed man with all requisite know- ledge when He originally created him. But we answer that, while it is an unquestionable truth that the Judge of all the earth will certainly do right, such im- portant conclusions must not be assumed on what seems merely probable to us, but must rest on some certain grounds of evidence as to what has been the mode of the Divine pro- cedure in analogous cases. Now whatever we know of God as Creator and Governor of the universe contradicts the sup- 105 position. Has not God the Creator left man ignorant of many subjects deeply affecting his spiritual well-being ? Nor do the facts of the Christian Scriptures afford it any better sup- port. Our Lord^s mode of teaching in parables is expressly asserted to have been adopted from other reasons than because it was the plainest and the simplest method of communicating truth. If the argument possessed any real value, it would be effectual to prove that, if God made a revelation at all, that revelation must have been published in every part of the world, and proposed at once to the acceptance of every human creature. This we know He has not done : the mode of the Divine conduct, therefore, in making a revelation contradicts the supposition. We are not now dealing, however, with the facts of the New Testament, but with our antecedent knowledge. The same principle which leads us to infer that the Scriptures must have been communicated by verbal inspiration equally requires that they must have been preserved in the same degree of accuracy in which they were originally communicated. If it be necessary, from considerations of the Divine goodness, that the Scriptures should have been verbally inspired, the same goodness would require that an infallible guide should have been provided for their interpretation. The Church of Rome carries this theory out consistently, and maintains that the difficidt work of interpreting the Scriptures has not been left to the fallible judgments of ordinary men. According to her views, God has provided an infallible interpreter in herself. Her views on this subject have, in theory at least, the merit of consistency ; and if these antecedent principles are correct, it is difficult to escape from the necessity of the conclusion. Against this conclusion the stern logic of fact raises its inexo- rable protest. The original assumption, therefore, rests on no grounds of antecedent certainty, and, as a probability, contra- dicts alike the facts of creation and providence and the pages of revelation. It has often been asserted that if God be the author of the Scriptures, they must be infallible guides to truth, and that they must have been composed by the aid of verbal inspiration. 106 The whole force of the argument depends on an ambiguity in the expression. The expression " the Scriptures must be an infallible guide to truth ^^ has a double meaning. If the Scriptures be a divine revelation, they will be sufficient guides to truth. But in what sense of the word " truth" is this assertion intended? There is truth as it has been objectively communicated by God. There is truth in its abstract form, as it is the subject of revelation. There are also the several perceptions and apprehensions of that truth as it appears to the mind of different persons. Now, supposing the Scriptures to be given by divine in- spiration, the objective truths (not our views of them, or our deductions from them) would be the truths to which the term infallible or efficient guides is properly applied. If we say that these truths are infallible guides to man, we must be careful to define what we mean by that expression. They are infallible as far as God's purposes are concerned, but not necessarily infallible guides to every particular individual whatever may be his peculiar mental character. The very same thing may be an infallible guide to one man, which is far from being an infallible guide to another. How far any- thing can be an infallible guide to any particular person for the purpose of regulating his faith or his conduct, is a ques- tion purely relative. It will entirely depend on his charac- ter or his disposition. What may be an infallible guide to an inquiring, earnest, teachable man, to make him wise unto salvation, may be very far from being an equally infallible guide to a person of an opposite character. It frequently happens that orders which, to a faithful and intelligent servant, pre- sent no difficulty or ambiguity, are utterly insufficient for the guidance of a careless one. A revelation from God must always be a sufficient guide to man : its infallibility as a guide must depend on the disposition and the character of those to whom it is addressed. The more correct expression of this truth would be, " The Christian Scriptures, if they are a divine revelation, are a sufficient guide, and ought to be an infallible guide, to every man, to lead him into the road to life everlasting." It is impossible, therefore, from such data to 107 infer the necessity of verbal inspiration. The only necessary inference is, that God has afforded sufficient inspiration. It has been asserted as a proof that the Scriptures must have been written under the influence of verbal inspiration, that if they were not, the whole evidence of the truth of their contents becomes endangered. If any human element exists in them, the inquiry has been put, How can we be certain that they contain anything divine ? The truth of the Scripture as a divine revelation cannot be affected by any theory as to the mode in which inspiration was communicated in its composition. Its claims to be re- ceived as a revelation from God rest on the sufficiency of the attestation which it has received from Him. If God makes a revelation of His will, man is bound to receive and obey it, in whatever manner it may please the Divine wisdom to communicate it. A sufficient attestation by God is the only ground on which a revelation possesses any claim to bind the con- sciences of man. The Christian Scriptures claim a miracu- lous attestation, quite independently of all questions as to the mode of their inspiration. If the attestation of a reve- lation were not miraculous, it would only bind the con- science of that person to whom it was communicated, and who possessed direct evidence in his own mind that the re- velation was from God. God might give, if it pleased Him, an internal attestation to every particular individual that a revelation of His will had been made to him. The Christian Scriptures themselves lay claim to an internal evidence com- mending itself to the heart and conscience, in addition to their outward miraculous attestation. But this internal evi- dence is not the ground on which they claim a binding au- thority. That binding authority is expressly declared to be derived from their having received a miraculous attestation. This is directly asserted by our Lord himself. " If I had not done among them the works which none other man did, they had not had sin ; but now they have no cloak for their sin." The miracles performed by our Lord, consummated by His own resurrection, and the miraculous powers with which 108 He subsequently invested the Apostles^ constitute that attes- tation. Now a real miracle is the full and sufficient attestation to a revelation, that it has God for its author. By it God places the stamp of His authority on the person who pro- fesses to have the revelation to communicate. A real mira- cle can only be performed by the great Governor of the universe, and by no inferior agent. The truth of this results from the following considerations. A miracle is a suspension of the ordinary mode of the Creator's acting, and His acting by a different instrumen- tality. The established laws of nature are the mode through which the Creator acts. They are not merely the laws of His acting, but, to speak more correctly, they are the act- ings of God in conformity with law predetermined by His own will. God, in His universal energy, is ever present in those laws. Now, if the laws of nature are only another word for the Divine energies themselves, any suspension of them can only be the result of a Divine act. A suspension of the laws of nature can therefore only be God ceasing to act by one me- thod, and acting in another. A miracle, therefore, if it be a suspension of the ordinary laws of nature, or a deviation from them, must be a Divine operation denoting a special act of the Creator. We do not here enter on the question of such miracles as may be of a doubtful character. A miracle may be a true miracle, but yet it may not be evidently miraculous to us. We speak only of such miracles as are miquestionable suspensions of the laws of nature. If the whole course of pro- vidence be the law of the Divine acting, and a miracle be a deviation from this ordinary mode of the Divine operation and the adopting of a different one, a miracle must give the Divine attestation to the person who is able to perform it. If a deviation from the ordinary laws of nature takes place at the word of a particular person, and those laws are the act- ings of the Creator, it proves the presence of God with that person at whose word the ordinary laws of nature are sus- 109 pended. " This is the fiiiger of God/' is the natural lan- guage which will be uttered by every man when he witnesses an unquestionable miracle. It will be admitted that a miracle is not more a divine act^ nor more an exertion of a divine power^ than the ordinary laws of providence are divine acts and exertions of divine power. No mistake is more common than to represent that a miracle is an extraordinary [i. e. extra great) exertion of a divine power. This error leads to an entire misapprehension of the true end and purpose of a miracle. The performance of a miracle is not intended to display power^ but to afford proof of a special intervention of God. It is God really ceasing to act in one way, and acting in another. If a man announces that he will perform a miracle, for the purpose of attest- ing a commission from God, the performance of the miracle by the Creator under these circumstances, at the word of the person claiming to reveal His will, affixes His broad seal to the truth of the assertion of the person who professes to be empowered to communicate a revelation. If the laws of nature are God's laws — the ordinary modes of the Divine actings, — the power to perform a miracle must be a proof of a special commission from God. In a miracle, God manifests the reality of His personal will by suspending His ordinary mode of operating. If miracles are actual Divine operations, and if none can interfere with the Divine actings but God himself, they can be performed by no inferior agent ; they therefore afford a conclusive proof of a divine commission. The greatest un- believer in existence, if he actually witnessed the cure of one born blind, and was certain that the cure had been effected by no other instrumentality than a word, would feel himself compelled to believe that the person at whose word the mira- cle had been performed was a messenger from God. It follows that a true and genuine miracle, wrought at the word of a person claiming to have a divine commission, is an attestation by God to the reality of that commission. It enables us to know that what He asserts or commands is asserted or commanded on the authority of God. If a sup- no posed revelation has a clear and certain miraculous attesta- tion, its right to be received is established^ quite distinct from any considerations as to the mode of its communication. The only question which can be raised is one of fact. Has the person claiming to be a prophet a miraculous attestation ? Are the miracles which he professes to perform undeniable suspensions of the ordinary laws of nature ? If he has a miraculous attestation, the mode in which the revelation has been discovered to the prophet's mind has nothing to do with our obligation to receive it. The mode in which a particular revelation has been com- municated to the prophet's mind is a simple question of the Divine will, and must be determined exclusively by the Divine wisdom. We are wholly inadequate judges of what the Divine wisdom requires God to do. When we see an act unques- tionably divine, we may be sure that it is founded on the Divine wisdom. A miracle is such a divine act. An event of ordinary providence is another. Whatever elements a re- velation attested by miracles contains, they have received the stamp of the Divine authority. If there be human elements in such a revelation, those human elements must have been placed there by God for a special purpose. It is not for man to attempt to improve on the works of God. Sup- posing such elements to exist, it is plainly God's intention that man should employ his faculties for the purpose of ascer- taining their comparative value. The assertion that if a human element exists in the Scrip- tures, it destroys all certainty as to the divine truths con- tained in them, is equivalent to limiting the Creator in the use of means. We ask, why cannot God combine a human and a divine element in a supernatural revelation ? Can God only work by such means as we should use ourselves ? The assertion that the presence of a human element in the Scrip- tures must nullify the divine one would only hold good if man had no faculties capable of discovering truth. We might as well assert that the evidences of revelation must be demonstrative, and not moral. But God has been pleased to give man few demonstrative truths to guide his conduct. Ill The evidence which He affords to man on most subjects is moral evidence. It admits of degrees. It is such as would be estimated differently by different minds. It is capable of being resisted. It requires a diligent search after truths and a readiness to admit truth when found. This is the general mode in which God communicates truth to man in His or- dinary dispensations. By what right do we assume that He reverses the whole mode of His procedure in communicating a revelation of His will ? Instead^ therefore, of any presumption in the form of the theory of verbal inspiration arising from these considerations, all antecedent probabilities contradict the supposition that it would be the mode in which Divine revelation would be communicated. It is far more probable that truth in the pages of a supernatural revelation will present the same aspect as it does in God^s revelation through the natural universe_, and that it will require the same moral conditions in the recipient as other truths of equal importance, of which God has not afforded demonstrative evidence. The very in- troduction of a human element into the record of a revelation may be part and parcel of the same divine plan. It may be intended to make the discovery of truth in some degree rela- tive to the moral character of the inquirer. Our duties respecting a revelation depend on the degree of its attestation as coming from God, and not on the mode of its communication. If it is God^s revelation, a reverent study of its contents is one of the highest of human duties. If it is sufficiently attested as divinCj there can be no doubt that it has been communicated, and the human elements introduced into it, by the Divine wisdom ; and although it may require careful study, yet the humble inquirer will be able to discover in it those truths which it Avas the intention of God to com- municate for his illumination and guidance. If a human element has been admitted into the revelation, we may safely trust Omnipotence and Omniscience that it has been intro- duced in such a way as not to endanger the existence of what is divine. It has been urged in support of the theory of verbal in- 112 spiration, that it is antecedently probable that this method would be employed, because it is a shorter and more compen- dious method of communicating truth. But we can have no ground of assuming, because, according to our conceptions, it may be the most direct method of communicating truth, that it must, therefore, be the mode which Infinite wisdom must necessarily employ. We may think it very convenient that every word in the Scriptures should have been a divine dicta- tion ; but to assume that it must be so, is to pretend that we are able to fathom the profoimd depths of the Divine mind. But the supposition that there is an antecedent necessity that a supernatural revelation must be communicated by an inspiration no less exact than verbal inspiration is chiefly founded on the notion that we may form a human standard of perfection, and apply it to the dealings of God as the revealer of His will. Whatever does not come up to that standard of perfection is assumed as unworthy of the Creator. According to human apprehension, a revelation communi- cated with all the accuracy of verbal inspiration may be con- sidered perfect, compared with one which contains an admix- ture of different human elements. But how do we know that this is perfection in the way in which the Creator views it ? We know that human standards of perfection very inade- quately measure the realities of the Creator's works in the universe which He has formed ; how do we know that they will be more trustworthy guides as to the facts of a super- natural revelation ? The admission that God is perfect is a very different thing from asserting that the human standard of perfection must be realized in every one of the Divine acts. The Divine works are transcendent displays of the infinite power, wisdom, and goodness of the Creator ; but as man is permitted to behold them, although the existing universe may be tending towards perfection, it is not perfect. Its law is progress. The facts of the universe prove that perfection does not now exist. On what ground, then, do we venture to assume that we must find in revelation the very opposite displays of the Divine actings to those which we actually find in creation and providence ? If we were to find such pheno- 113 mena in a revelation, would not their existence afford a strong antecedent probability that the revelation was a pre- tended one ? But it is a common argument in favour of the theory of verbal inspiration, that if the Christian Scriptures are a revelation from God, they must be God's word, and this renders it neces- sary that every word in them must be verbally inspired. If they are God's word, a human element cannot exist in them ; they must be throughout absolutely and completely divine. If they are God's word, every expression in them must be absolutely true. There is an ambiguity in the expression " God's word," which it will be necessary to remove. It may mean either God's own spoken word, or His will communicated through the agency of others. The expression " God's word " cannot be properly applied to a divine revelation in the first of these senses. It cannot be God's spoken word in the same sense that an utterance of man is man's spoken word. It is the use of it in this sense alone that can afford any aid to the theory of verbal inspiration. The expression is derived from the human use of the facul- ties of conception and of speech. To suppose that the great and infinite Spirit expresses Himself through a faculty of language is to represent Him as none other than ourselves. We might as well invest Him at once with bodily organs. But if we use the expression as denoting God's concep- tions, we have already proved that no revelation of God's infi- nite conceptions in their divine reality is possible to man. The divine realities must be translated into their nearest finite representations and approximations. To use the ex- pression "God's word" in the same sense in which we use the expression " man's word," and apply it to a revelation of His will, involves an impossibility. But the Scripture assertion, " God who cannot lie," involves a truth which lies alike at the foundation of theism and of revealed religion. The ambiguity which we have noticed is nothing less than an assumption of the whole question at issue. When it is asserted that the Christian Scriptures are God's I 114 word, the only correct sense which such an assertion can convey is, that they contain the general revelation of the Divine truth and will. They are God's word, because they contain His message to man. They embody the thoughts, ideas, and con- ceptions which it was His purpose to reveal. But if it is in- tended, by the expression that they are God^s word, to imply that every idea, conception, and expression in them is as much the idea, conception, and expression of God as the expressions contained in a book composed by a human writer are the actual expressions of that writer, we use language the only effect of which must be to mislead. When we employ the expression in a human sense, nothing can be the word of a writer in the strictest sense of that ex- pression, except that which has been originally conceived, and then expressed in language, by that writer. If a writer ex- presses the thoughts of others in his own particular style, he is hardly entitled to designate them as his word, if we insist on the use of expressions verbally exact. We accuse of plagiarism a writer who borrows the conceptions of others without acknowledgment, and publishes them as his own. In the same manner, if one person supply the original con- ceptions, and another work them up into languge, neither is entitled to claim the undivided authorship. If we use words in their strictest sense, both the conceptions and the language ought to be our own to entitle any particular expression to the designation of '^ our word." But, in the ordinary use of language, expressions of this description are not used strictly, but in their popular sense. In this sense, when we use the expression " our word," we denote by it that the words employed express our meaning knd intentions. If we send a message to a third person, and if the things which we intended to be communicated were honestly communicated, although the mode and conception and the language were those of the messenger, yet we should undoubtedly say that it was our message which was delivered, and we might honestly be held responsible for the conse- quences of it. In all such cases the truth is the essential point, not the language in which it is conveyed. A command 115 may be given by a person in authority to his subordinates. They may communicate that command to others, each in dif- ferent language from that originally given. Still the com- mand is effectually the command of the superior, as long as it conveys the real purport of his orders, however great may be the variation in the expression. A person who was bound to obey the commands of such a superior, but who pleaded that he did not esteem the commands to be his, because the language in which they were conveyed was not precisely the same as those in which the original commands were given, would be justly punished for disobedience. To infer that, be- cause it is asserted that a particular expression is the word or commandment of another, it must necessarily be expressed in that person's identical language and conceptions, is to assume that what is quite intelligible in a popular sense must be used with strict scientific propriety. To argue from the use of such a mode of expression to the particular mode in which the inspiration of the Christian Scriptures must have been communicated, is to assume the very point which it is neces- sary to prove. The assertion that the Scriptures are the word of God can- not honestly be forced to mean more than that they contain the mind and intention of God. They are God's word com- municated, not directly, but through the medium of a third person. This communication of the Scriptures, not imme- diately by God, but through the instrumentality of men, con- stitutes an essential difference between the sense in which they can be God's word and the sense in which a pure human utterance must be the word of man. The attempt to argue, because in a popular sense of the expression they are desig- nated as the word of God, that therefore the modes of the expression and the style must be equally divine as the sub- stance, is disingenuous and sophistical. In the case of a human author the expressions are not transferred through a second mind ; in the case of the Christian Scriptures, what- ever degree of inspiration we may claim for them, it is certain that the conceptions in them must have been transferred through the mind of the inspired person. The conceptions I 2 116 of the human author are entirely his own. In the case of a divine revelation, the conceptions have passed through a human medium ; they cannot be God's conceptions, but their approximations in human thought. It therefore by no means follows that, because the Scriptures are God's word, there cannot be a human element in them. The extent of such human element can only be ascertained by an appeal to the contents of the Scriptures themselves; it can- not be deduced from any grounds of antecedent probability. We cannot assume, because the Christian Scriptures are a revelation from God, that inspiration has been afforded be- yond the necessities of the case for the purpose of communi- cating those truths to man. All that we can infer is, that the record of the revelation contains those truths which it was the Divine purpose to reveal, and that they are so revealed as to be a guide to the humble inquirer as to the true way to life everlasting. But whether the inspiration with which they have been communicated has been verbal inspiration, or in- spiration in another form, is a point which we have no grounds of antecedent certainty to enable us to determine from such premises. Now the variety of subject-matter contained in the pages of the New Testament is very great. There is the account of our Lord's life and ministry, and of the discourses uttered by Him, given us in the four Gospels, interspersed with occa- sional reflections of the writers. It contains likewise another historical book, the Acts of the Apostles, which gives us an account of the planting of the most important Christian churches, and details the proceedings of some of the most eminent missionaries. These books contain a very consider- able number of historical allusions. Then follow the Epistles, in which we find, in a very unsystematic form, doctrinal state- ments, precepts, allusions to events well known to the writers of the Epistles and those to whom they are addressed, state- ments of feelings and experiences, observations on events passing in the Church, directions about matters of business, and salutations. Lastly, one book professes to be entirely prophetical. The mode of instruction adopted in these books 117 is of a most varied character. The truths treated of extend over the widest possible field, from the deepest truths of God to the most ordinary events of daily life. Now, such being the contents of the book, it would seem antecedently probable that a book which consists of such a vast variety of matter would not be written under the influence of a uniform degree of inspu'ation, but that the degree of inspiration would be in accordance with the requirements of the subject-matter. Nothing is more contrary to our notions of wdsdom than an undue expenditure of power. In human things, when we see a power applied out of all proportion to the effect intended to be produced, we consider it a deep re- flection upon the skill of the designer. No engineer would employ an engine of 200 horse-power to lift a weight which required only the exertion of fifty. No one would think of employing a man with the pow'crs of Sir Isaac Newton to discharge the duties of a copying-clerk. The Divine opera- tions in nature are all founded on similar principles — the proportion of means to ends. The same principle may even be traced clearly enough in the book of revelation itself. The Christian Scriptures never represent God as doing for man what man can do for himself. It is therefore highly ante- cedently probable that we should find God acting by the same principle as to the degree of inspirution with Avhich He com- municates a revelation of His will, and proportioning the Divine assistance to the requirements of the subject-matter. To illustrate this argument by an example taken from the New Testament itself : — In the eighth chapter to the Romans St. Paul confessedly treats of some of the most profound truths of religion. In part of the sixteenth chapter he is occupied in simply sending salutations to Christian friends. It is hardly possible to conceive of subject-matter more widely differing in character. Are we to assume that that God who carefully proportions means to ends in nature and providence, has afforded the same amount of supernatural guidance to discover to an apostle tlie deepest truths of revelation and to enable him to write, " Salute them which are of Aristobulus' household," or " The salutation of me, Paul, with my own 118 hand"? To assume that both passages have received an equal degree of supernatural assistance in their composition is to make a deep reflection on the Divine wisdom. We may infer, therefore^ that it is antecedently probable that the degree of inspiration afforded would vary according to the subject- matter. Now, if the great revelation of Christianity is made in the person of our Lord, it is antecedently probable that in His person and teaching would be exhibited the highest possible form of divine inspiration. That revelation, as we have already intimated, the Christian Scriptures assert to consist of two parts : the one consists in the revelation of the Divine character and perfections made in the person of Christ; the other in the various discourses uttered by Him, and in the doctrines taught by Him. To the truths as they flowed from the lips of our Lord the highest form of inspiration would necessarily belong, if in his person He is God incar- nate. As far as human ideas can express those truths, they must be expressed in our Lord's teaching with the greatest possible precision. Whatever degree of knowledge of the Divine character and perfections the human mind is capable of understanding, it is antecedently probable that the highest degree of that knowledge would be communicated in the teaching of Christ. No difficulties would impede Him in his teaching of truth, except those which the Creator has imposed as the necessary conditions and limits of human thought. He would be fully able to present to man the best view of the Divine realities which the human mind could possibly attain to. If the mind of man is only capable of attaining an analogous knowledge of truth, the analogies used by Him in its communication would be the best which the whole range of human conception could supply for their representation. Whatever may be the precise relation of our human conceptions to the divine realities, such a teacher would afford us the nearest approximation to the realities themselves. But, as the thoughts of man must be human, and not divine, even such a teacher must be limited in his teaching 119 by the essential conditions of human tliought. However divine the teacher, he must be limited by those conditions which God has imposed on His own acting. But, subject to this limitation, the teaching of one who unites the Divine nature with the human must involve the highest form of possible inspiration. Consequently it would be a probability, amounting to a certainty, that the inspiration which dwelt in Christ must have been higher than that with which any other messenger from God would be endowed. As our Lord^s person, life, and teaching must involve the highest form of inspiration, the only thing which is necessary is, that the history of His life and the records of His teaching should be transmitted to us Avith entire accuracy. In that case we should possess a revelation authorized by the highest form of inspiration, whatever might be the degree of inspira- tion afforded to those who recorded the history of ouj Lord's life or reported His discourses. The preceding observations prove that we have very limited grounds of antecedent certainty as to what must be the sub- ject-matter of a divine revelation, or the extent of the inspira- tion with which it must be communicated, or to what extent a human element might exist in an historical revelation like the Christian. Our only true means of determining what God must do in any given case is by carefully inquiring what He has actually done in creation and in providence. What the same Being has done in the one case, it is in the highest degree probable that, within certain limits. He will also do in the other. But the only means which we possess which can certainly lead to a satisfactory result is the examination of the sacred writers themselves as to what they assert respecting the nature of their own inspiration, and by carefully investigating the facts actually presented by that revelation. If the same God be the author of creation, providence, and the Christian revelation, we may conclude that the same me- thod which will conduct us to the knowledge of the Creator and Preserver of the universe would be the most likely to conduct us to the knowledge of the same Being as the revealer of His will. In creation and providence, the mode by which we 120 ascertain the laws of the Divine acting is by a careful induction of facts. Why should the most careful study of God's act- ings in creation and providence be the only mode of attaining a knowledge of the Divine conduct in the one, and why should not the study of the facts and phenomena of revelation be the road to truth as to the mode of the Divine acting in the other ? Why should we assume on mere grounds of proba- bility the mode and degree of inspiration which has been afforded for the composition of the Scriptures, and not inquire of those Scriptures themselves what is the mode and degree of inspiration with which they assert that they have been written? Why should such modes of investigating truth be false in creation and providence, and certain guides when ap- plied to revelation ? Is there any rational ground for refusing to accept the testimony of the Scriptures in such a case? Why are we to assume that they have been composed under a greater or less degree of inspiration than they themselves actually claim? If we assume that they are devoid of the inspiration under the influence of which they positively assert that they have been written, it is equivalent to a denial that they are a divine revelation at all. But what right have we, on the other hand, on mere probable grounds distinct from their own testimony to assume that they have been composed with the aid of a higher inspiration than they actually claim, or with an inspiration which they may possibly disclaim? Many motives may influence a human author to induce him to disclaim the powers which he possesses. This cannot be the case with an author who is divine. But it may be urged, their testimony on this subject is neither sufficient nor distinct. Is, therefore, the degree of their inspiration to be determined on grounds which, when applied to the works of creation and providence, conduct us to nothing but error and delusion? If it is correct that the Scripture testimony as to the nature of their own inspiration is indistinct, it is useless to have recourse to guides which will conduct us to erroneous conclusions as to other departments of the Divine conduct. Our appeal must be, on the contrary, to a careful anahsis of the facts presented by the Scriptures, 121 to enable us to arrive at a judgment of the nature and degree of inspiration by the assistance of which they have been com- posed. Now, we ask, why should not the facts of the Christian Scriptures be made the subject of a careful induction to enable us to determine the nature of their inspiration, in the same manner in which the phenomena of creation and providence must be subject to induction to enable us to determine the mode of the Creator's acting ? Why should the facts of a divine revelation be twisted into conformity with an antece- dent theory ? Why should not our theory, as in all other cases where man has attained to correct knowledge, be formed as the explanation of the facts ? Has the application of theories to the solution of the systems of creation and provi- dence been so fruitful in the discovery of truth as to encou- rage us to apply similar principles to the solution of important truths connected with the Christian revelation ? All our cor- rect knowledge of the kingdom of nature has been the result of careful study and analysis of facts; and through that analysis correct theoretic knowledge has been attained. All the truths of modern science have been discovered on this principle ; why, then, should not a similar principle be applied to ascer- tain the nature of the inspiration under the influence of which the Christian Scriptures have been composed, on all points which have been left doubtful by the assertions of the writers o#^ those Scriptures ? The right mode of determining this ques- tion is by an application of the inductive method to the facts of revelation, and by ascertaining from the testimony of the writers themselves the degree of inspiration by which they were guided, and under the influence of which they wrote. If, therefore, the Scriptures are silent as to the mode of their own inspiration, the only method of arriving at the truth as to what degree of inspiration was necessary for their composi- tion is a carefal induction and analysis of the facts which they contain. A principle which is the source of all the knowledge which man possesses cannot be a dangerous one to apply to the elucidation of the question of inspiration. We will therefore proceed to inquire what the Christian Scriptures themselves inform us respecting the nature of the 122 rerelation itself, the mode of its communication, and the extent of the inspiration afforded for its communication. We will then examine the facts and the phenomena presented by the revelation itself, and endeavour to deduce a theory of inspiration from the testimony of these facts. The only assumption which we shall make will be, that the Christian Scriptures have received a miraculous attestation, sufficient to prove them to be a revelation from God. We will first of all unfold a subject to which we have already alluded, as it forms the groundwork of all correct views on the subject of inspiration. CHAPTER VII. THE INCARNATION IS THE GREAT OBJECTIVE MANI- FESTATION OF DEITY TO THE FINITE MIND. THE PERSON OF CHRIST EXHIBITS THE HIGHEST FORM OF INSPIRATION. It has been already observed that the Christian Scriptures assert that the positive objective revelation of God has been made in the person of Jesus Christ. The fact that this reve- lation of God is objective in Christ's person forms the ground- work of the assertions of the Christian Scriptures. They declare that Christ is God manifest in the flesh. As far as the incomprehensible truths of the Infinite are capable of being imaged or grasped by the finite understanding, those truths, as an objective revelation, are manifested in the person of the God-man, in His life on earth. His death and resurrec- tion, and they ever will continue to manifest themselves in His divine person. The Christian Scriptures represent that this great manifestation of the Infinite in the person of the finite not only contains the highest revelation of the glories of the Godhead possible to men, but that it is designed for the enlightenment of intelligences far superior to the human race — " that untq^ the principalities and powers in heavenly 123 places might be known through the Church the manifold wisdom of God.^' The truth that the person of Christ is God manifest in the flesh, forms the corner-stone of the Christian revelation. If the person of Christ be in this sense divine, it is evident that there will be exhibited in Him the highest possible form of divine inspiration. We must therefore examine the testimony of the New Testament on the subject. One of the most remarkable passages in which that truth is directly asserted is the first chapter of the Epistle to the Hebrews : — " God, who at sundry times and in divers manners spake in time past unto the fathers by the prophets, hath in these last days spoken unto us by His Son, whom He hath ap- pointed heir of all things, by whom also He made the worlds; who being the brightness of His glory, and the express image of His person, and upholding all things by the word of His power, when He had by Himself purged our sins, sat down on the right hand of the Majesty on high; being made so much better than the angels, as He hath by inheritance obtained a more excellent name than tliey.^^ The translation of eV vIm by the words " by His Son " is unquestionably incorrect. The evident intention of the sacred writer was to assert, not that God spoke by His Son, but in His Son, i. e. in the person of His Son, which is the evident meaning of the Greek no less than the evident inten- tion of the writer. In this passage the following statements are made by the apostolic writer respecting the nature of the Christian revela- tion. The Christian revelation differs from all the other revela- tions of God to man, in the instrumentality through which it has been communicated. Former revelations were made through the instrumentality of inspired prophets : they gave utterance to the divine oracles. The Christian revelation has been communicated in the person of the Son of God. God has spoken unto us in His Son. It differs also in the mode of its communication. Former 124 revelations were made at sundry times and in divers manners. iTo\vfiep6)