m^- 
 
 fc» I, I- i= ' 
 ^ If . 
 
 
 T"^i J 
 
 'i^u. 
 
 '"i\:; 
 
 
 :).;■)':■ 
 
OFPfilS$>^ 
 
 1921 
 
 (^omhiiv^'i 
 
 ,^ 
 
PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 AND 
 
 NATURAL THEOLOGY 
 
BY 
 
 OWEN A. HILL 
 
 Ethics, General amd 
 Special 
 
PSYCHOLOGY "' ''""n 
 
 AND ^^<iOlDi)iri^i^' 
 
 NATURAL THEOLOGY 
 
 BY 
 OWEN A. HILL, S.J., Ph.D. 
 
 Lecturer on Psychology 
 Natural Theology and Ethics at Fordham University 
 
 THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 
 
 1921 
 
 All rights reserved 
 
COPTEIGHT, 1921, 
 
 By the MACMILLAN COMPANY 
 
 Set up and dectrotjped. Published, February, 1921 
 
3!m|iruni pattBt. 
 
 JOSEPHUS H. ROCKWELL, S.J.. 
 
 PraeposUus Prov. Mwrylandiae Neo-Eboracenais. 
 
 53'il|a nbatat 
 
 ARTHURUS J. SCANLAN, D.D.. 
 
 Censor Librorum. 
 
 ^mptimntwc, 
 
 PATRITIUS J. HAYES, D.D.. 
 
 Archiepiscopus Neo-Eboracensis, 
 
 Nbo-Ebokaci, die 25 Novembris. 1920. 
 
PEEFACE 
 
 This volume on Psychology and Natural Theology is the re- 
 sult of years of experience in the class-room. It has at least 
 the merit of being thoroughly tried out and tested, and that in 
 itself means some commendation. With help from his teacher 
 the average student can readily grasp its contents, and raaturer 
 minds can without any extraneous aid master its statements, 
 and champion their validity against all opponents. It has been 
 the author's aim to combine as far as possible the conciseness 
 of the text-book with the fuller flow of the essay; and he in- 
 dulges the hope that, while consulting the needs of the pupil 
 in class, he has not entirely neglected the predilections of the 
 general reader. Philosophy and rhetoric are no enemies; and 
 the thought somewhat accounts for the extended notice Inger- 
 soll and Verworm get, and for the separate article on Hypno- 
 tism. Theology contains no more important truth than the 
 existence of God; and Ingersoll, with the help of empty argu- 
 ments and glittering language, is responsible for not a few of 
 the atheists in our own country. In all Psychology immortality 
 and free-will are the dogmas of most practical worth ; and their 
 opponents appeal for support to the reputed learning of men 
 like Verworm. Hypnotism and kindred practices of devil- 
 worship will continue to work harm till stripped of their mys- 
 tery ; and right psychology is the single remedy. 
 
 While deriving no argument from Church or Scripture in 
 matters purely philosophical, the author never hesitates, when 
 opportunity offers, to mention a dogma of faith, or explain some 
 truth contained in the catechism. When constrained to trans- 
 fer a technical term of Scholastic Philosophy from Latin to 
 English, he selects the best equivalent at his disposal. On oc- 
 casions he multiplies proofs, not because they are individually 
 weak, but because truth gathers strength and force when viewed 
 from different sides. 
 
 When reading a book one wants to know primarily what the 
 
 vii 
 
viii PREFACE 
 
 writer himself has to say, not what others have to say ; and this 
 is the author's excuse for the meagre disphiy of foot-notes, and 
 references, and quotations in his work. As between men, the 
 prestige of an opponent lends no intrinsic value whatever to 
 his argument. In the field of philosophy every individual's 
 authority is worth only as much as his arguments. xVrgumcnts 
 from authority are, perhaps, the weakest in all philosophy, wholly 
 subsidiary and corroborative, of no weight with the wise, with- 
 out prior and independent arguments based on the very nature 
 of things; and the common consent of mankind is only a seem- 
 ing exception to this rule. 
 
 Psychology and Natural Theology, all the Metaphysics of 
 Senior Year in Jesuit Colleges, are combined in the one vol- 
 ume; and this makes for economy as well as for convenience. 
 Questions are thoroughly explained, without sending the pupil 
 to other sources of information. The discussion of diflBculties 
 is unusually complete; and experience quite satisfies the au- 
 thor that nothing in all philosophy is more important than this 
 solution of difficulties. It is virtually an application of the 
 Case System to philosophy. The highest kind of knowledge, 
 the only kind of knowledge really worth while, is certainty; 
 and certainty is incompatible with concrete possibility of the 
 opposite. Certainty is out of the question as long as any single 
 opposing argument remains unanswered, no matter how many 
 favorable arguments are urged in defense of a thesis or state- 
 ment. Hence the supreme need of being able first to compre- 
 hend, and then to answer the arguments of opponents. 
 
 All the matter is done into set and concise theses, and the 
 Scholastic method of presentment is strictly adhered to. In 
 religion a good Catholic can be nothing but a devoted son of 
 the Church, and in philosophy he can be nothing but a thorough 
 Scholastic, an enthusiastic follower of St. Thomas. Pope Leo 
 XIII forever settled that. Eeligion was not improved by the so- 
 called Eeformation, and Luther himself on no few occasions 
 adverts to the fact. Luther and the Eeformers worked no 
 more harm to faith and morality than Kant, with his fore- 
 runners and followers, worked to reason and philosophy. Prot- 
 estantism is a wilderness of religious confusion, and modern 
 philosophy is a conglomeration of falsehoods, beneath the con- 
 
PKEFACE ix 
 
 tempt of honest and healthy minds. AYe have small respect for 
 modern systems in philosophy, with their pitiful mistakes and 
 empty rant, culminating in mental obliquity and religious de- 
 spair. Kant was a disciple of Luther, and all his philosophy 
 is in substance an attempt on the part of the disciple to give 
 an air of respectability to the master's principle about the right 
 to private judgment. Kant's autonomy of reason is but a de- 
 velopment of Luther's individual right to interpret Scripture. 
 One is key to Protestant Ethics, the other is key to Protestant 
 theology; and both are the crown and consummation of Sub- 
 jectivism. Translated into plain English, Kant's categorical 
 imperative runs this way, " Act as you think, and think as you 
 like." With him speculative or pure reason is the faculty 
 which thinks things in themselves, things as they are; and it 
 has nothing to do with the categorical imperative, or with any 
 other question bearing on conduct, God or the Soul. Kant 
 writes it down the fruitful cause of all the aberration, confu- 
 sion and superstition conspicuously abundant, he thinks, in 
 Catholic philosophy and theology. With him practical reason 
 is the faculty which thinks things not in themselves, not as 
 they are, but as they are in us, as we want them to be; and 
 it furnishes him with his categorical imperative, and with all 
 his certainty about the existence of God, the reality and the 
 immortality of the soul. His practical reason subjects think- 
 ing to wishing, and, because it partakes more of the nature of 
 an appetitive than of a cognoscitive faculty, can with more 
 propriety be called the will than the reason. And when a man 
 makes his will the standard of his conduct, his descent into the 
 abyss of wickedness is imminent and swift; when he makes his 
 will the criterion of truth, whatever is desirable becomes true, 
 whatever is undesirable becomes false, and the multiplication- 
 table needs to be readjusted. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 PART I — PSYCHOLOGY 
 INTRODUCTION: 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Philosophy — Definition and Division 1-4 
 
 Psychology — Definition and Division 4-5 
 
 Thesis I. Life is that perfection in a being which makes 
 self-motion or immanent action possible with it. We 
 must recognize in plants a life-giving principle essentially 
 different from inert matter and its forces, physical and 
 chemical. Brute animals are not mere automatic ma- 
 chines, but they possess the faculty of sense. They are 
 nevertheless without intellect. Universal evolution or 
 Darwinism is therefore absurd 6-33 
 
 Thesis II. Sensation is an immanent and cognoscitive act. 
 There can be no sensation without a faculty and object, 
 and union between the two in the faculty. Sensation per- 
 ceives the outside object, not its species or image, not the 
 organ impression 34-45 
 
 Thesis III. There exists in man a spiritual cognoscitive fac- 
 ulty or intellect, essentially different from sense; and this 
 faculty has truly universal ideas 46-54 
 
 Thesis IV. Monism, of whatever shape, cannot explain the 
 
 soul 55-62 
 
 Thesis V. The rational soul of man is an immaterial sub- 
 stance, in its existence and in its operations intrinsically 
 independent of matter. The rational soul of man is a 
 substance physically simple, in point of essence and in 
 point of extension. In man there is but one soul, the 
 life-giving principle of his intellectual, and his sensible 
 perceptions, and his growth. In man the rational soul 
 and the human body are so united among themselves that 
 from the union a single nature, a single substance 
 
 arises 63-82 
 
 xi 
 
xii CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Thesis VI. The soul of man, even when separated from the 
 body, is of its nature capable of existence and life; 
 neither can it possibly be deprived of them. The soul of 
 man will, therefore, live forever 83-114 
 
 Thesis VII. The intellect, to understand, has need of the 
 imprinted intelligible image as a determining principle. 
 This imprinted intelligible image is the joint product of 
 a phantasm and the working intellect, acting as partial, 
 efficient, subordinate causes. The receiving intellect and 
 this imprinted image so combine as efficient causes to put 
 the act or idea, that the idea in its entirety proceeds from 
 both as from subordinate causes 115-142 
 
 Thesis VIII. There exists in man a rational appetite or 
 will, which can desire every good proposed by the intel- 
 lect, and nothing but good. All the objects of its actual 
 desires must in some measure assume a relation of fitness 
 with the subject 143-149 
 
 Thesis IX. Man's will enjoys freedom of choice, and no 
 previous judgment holds it to a set decision. Fatalism, 
 therefore, and Determinism are absurd .... 150-182 
 
 Thesis X. The Truth about Hypnotism 183-195 
 
 PAET II — NATUKAL THEOLOGY 
 
 INTRODUCTION 197-199 
 
 Thesis I. From the created things of earth, from the order 
 apparent in the physical universe, from the moral order 
 naturally known to us, finally, from the common consent 
 of mankind, we prove a posteriori that there is a God 200-241 
 
 Thesis II. God is infinite, altogether simple, and essentially 
 
 one 242-262 
 
 Thesis III. God is unchangeable, as well physically as mor- 
 ally. He is besides eternal and immense .... 2G3-270 
 
 Thesis IV. God knows all past, present, future, possible and 
 futurible things 271-286 
 
 Thesis V. God has a will, necessary with regard to Himself, 
 
 free with regard to creatures 287-293 
 
CONTENTS xiii 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Thesis VI. Creatures, to continue in being, need positive 
 and direct conservation on the part of God. Creatures, 
 to act, need physical and immediate cooperation on the 
 part of God 294:-301 
 
 Thesis VII. God's cooperation with man's free will is no 
 physical predetermination 302-305 
 
 Thesis VIII. God and evil 306-310 
 
 Thesis IX. God's cooperation, viewed as something outside 
 of God, is the creature's act, proceeding at one and the 
 same time from the creature as from second or particular 
 cause, and from God as from first and universal cause 311-312 
 
 Thesis X. Physical predetermination is a, useless in neces- 
 sary agents; &, useless in free agents and destructive of 
 free will. Simultaneous cooperation is right . . . 313-328 
 
 Thesis XI. Providence belongs to God 329-331 
 
 Thesis XII. God's providence a, extends to everything cre- 
 ated, and h, touches man in a very special way . . 332-335 
 
 Thesis XIII. X, God's providence over all is immediate and 
 particular; Y, God's a, government of the world is h, in 
 part immediate* in part mediate 336-338 
 
 Index 339 
 
PSYCHOLOGY 
 AND NATURAL THEOLOGY 
 
 PART I— PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 DEFINITION AND DIVISION OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 A definition is a collection of words briefly setting forth a 
 thing's yiature. Division is the breaking up of a whole into its 
 parts. Philosophy, in virtue of its Greek parentage, means 
 love of wisdom, and this is called its nominal or name definition. 
 Wisdom itself is a superior sort of knowledge, a knowledge that 
 sticks not at the outward surface or external appearance of 
 things, but burrows deeper, and in such sort sifts the very es- 
 sence of the object known, that human effort can proceed no 
 farther with the examination. Philosophy, then, with us is 
 knowledge of things in their last and most universal causes, 
 so far as such knowledge is attainable by the light of 7iatural 
 reason; and this is called its real definition. With the old 
 Romans we distinguish three ways of knowing, set forth in the 
 Latin terms cognitio, scientia, sapientia. The English equiva- 
 lents are Knowledge, Science, and Wisdom. We cannot better 
 illustrate their differences than by alleging an example. A man 
 walks along a public thoroughfare. The common, unsophisti- 
 cated citizen, viewing him from a distance, has knowledge to 
 the effect that the being in motion is what we usually style a 
 man ; but he can give hardly any reasons for the knowledge within 
 him. At most he can offer but very imperfect and superficial 
 reasons, qualities, for instance, that might equally well exist 
 in some certain animal as far removed from man as day from 
 night. This common, unsophisticated citizen is possessed of 
 
 knowledge in its rudest and simplest state, namely experiment 
 
 1 
 
2 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 and authority. Suppose a physiologist near, a man thoroughly 
 acquainted with all the various muscles, bones, sinews, and the 
 whole organism of the human frame. He is of opinion, too, 
 that the object in front is what in every-day parlance we call 
 a man. But he can substantiate his opinion with solid reasons. 
 He walks upright, not on all fours. He has arms and legs, not 
 fore-legs and hind-legs. He has fingers on his hands and toes 
 on his feet, that preserve due proportions. These, indeed, are 
 good reasons; but not final, not what our definition styles the 
 last and most universal causes. They are not the last, because 
 there is one farther removed, so far removed in fact, that, unless 
 philosophy suggested it, the physiologist would be in continual 
 danger of confounding men with beasts. They are not the 
 most universal, because a large proportion of men are without 
 one or other characteristic. Some men have no arms, others 
 have no legs. Some men possess more than the requisite num- 
 ber of fingers and toes, others are wholly without them. The 
 physiologist's knowledge is, of course, more perfect than that 
 of the unsophisticated citizen. It is called scientific knowl- 
 edge, or science. A philosopher now appears on the scene. He 
 accosts the stranger, holds a short conversation and remarks, 
 " Here in good sooth is a man, because he is a rational animal." 
 His reasons are the last and most universal. It is quite im- 
 possible to hit on any reasons beyond. They are besides applic- 
 able to whatever man walks, has walked or will walk the earth. 
 The intrinsic absolutely last cause of a thing is its essence; the 
 extrinsic absolutely last cause of things is God. Things in our 
 definition comprise whatever exists or can be conceived to exist. 
 It is perhaps the most indefinite noun in our language. It in- 
 cludes God, the angels, man and the material world or universe, 
 from the hugest brute in the jungles of Africa to the minutest 
 grain of sand on the seashore. The word cause is taken to 
 mean whatever by way of answer satisfies the question, " Why 
 is this thing such or such?" Kant makes philosophy a fixed 
 knowledge of the laws and causes of reason's spontaneity; and 
 with him everything is merely subjective. Wisdom embraces 
 all that God knows. It is an abyss that man can never hope to 
 fathom. God knows everything capable of passage into an in- 
 finite mind. He knows things not only in their proximate or 
 most palpable and apparent causes; but also in their last and 
 
INTRODUCTION 3 
 
 most universal causes, and in all the intermediate causes ranking 
 between the proximate and most universal causes. Our knowl- 
 edge, of course, is less wide. Our imperfect philosophy must 
 rest satisfied with knowing some few or many things in their 
 universal and last causes, without attempting to trace these last 
 and universal causes through such as are proximate and inter- 
 mediate. Pythagoras on this account refuses to denominate 
 men wise. He vindicates this attribute to God alone. He 
 writes himself down not a wise man, but a philosopher, a man 
 in eager pursuit of wisdom. 
 
 Division is the separation of a whole into its parts. 
 
 Plato divides philosophy into -real, rational and moral ; the 
 philosophy of things, of mind, and of will; and they are called 
 Metaphysics, Logic, Ethics. Hence our division: 
 
 Philosophy 
 
 . [ Minor, Dialectics 
 J^ogic I Major, First Principles 
 
 ' General — Ontology 
 Metaphysics i r Cosmology 
 
 I Special - Psychology 
 Theology 
 
 Ethics ^ 
 
 r General 
 
 [ Special 
 
 Sir Francis or Lord Bacon penned a wholesome truth, when 
 he wrote, " Leves gustus in philosophia movere fortasse possunt 
 ad atheismum, sed pleniores haustus ad Deum reducunt." 
 " Sips of philosophy can perhaps lead a man to think there is 
 no God, but fuller draughts tend ever to belief in His exist- 
 ence." We fancy with reason that the world of to-day is flooded 
 with atheists, infidels, and empty theorists, only because the 
 world of to-day, while spurring on its votaries to unparalleled 
 diligence in things material, encourages them to skim lightly 
 over facts that bear on the mind, the spiritual and nobler part 
 of man. And the world will continue dark to life eternal, until 
 it changes its method of studying philosophy. As long as men 
 rest content with mere dabbling in this most sacred and most 
 sublime of the natural sciences, so long will there be presump- 
 tuous scatter-brains, ready to scoff at truths too hidden and too 
 abstruse to be taken in by a casual glance. This is all true 
 
4 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 even of the philosophy that Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, long 
 before Christ's coming, taught in the groves and the highways 
 of Greece; but the remark gathers additional strength, when 
 applied to what we style Catholic Philosophy. This latter is 
 grounded in the natural resources of man's intellect, as was that 
 of the pagans. Divine revelation, though it forms in Catholic 
 Philosophy no real foundation or reason for the acceptance of 
 truths, has nevertheless suggested to later times sublime ideas 
 and sublime principles, that never entered into the mind of 
 Socrates, Plato, or Aristotle. This fact led an English Jesuit, 
 Father Clarke, to say : " Catholic Philosophy is not a system 
 which can be explained in half an hour to the chance inquirer. 
 Its principles are so intimately bound up with the Catholic 
 Faith that it is to the non-Catholic a sealed book, an unin- 
 telligible mystery, which has for him no more meaning than 
 an utterly unknown language." 
 
 DEFINITION AND DIVISION OF PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 Maher, pp. 1-26 
 
 Psychology is the second branch of Special Metaphysics ; and, 
 though less comprehensive than Cosmology, is far more impor- 
 tant in its application. Like kindred expressions in philosophy, 
 it is a Greek term, and means discourse or reasoning about the 
 soul, or the 'principle of life in living beings. It is easy to 
 falsely suppose that human beings alone possess souls. They 
 alone possess rational souls, but the tree, as well, and the horse 
 have within them a life-giving principle, that truly deserves 
 the name soul. Psychology, however, pays small attention to 
 beings other than human, and examines more in detail that 
 most splendid of God's works, the soul of man, fathoming as 
 far as possible its hidden secrets and veiled mysteries. It dis- 
 cusses the peculiarities of life in plants and brutes. It sets 
 down and elucidates the properties and characteristics of life 
 in man, describes the union prevailing between body and soul, 
 strengthens beyond danger of loss our belief in immortality, 
 offers a straightforward and satisfactory solution of what must 
 forever remain a partial mystery, the joint operations of in- 
 tellect and sense, and finally furnishes us with a clear insight 
 into the workings of the will and its dread power of liberty. 
 
INTRODUCTION 5 
 
 The Greek word for soul means breath, the most attenuated 
 substance within experience, and is another tribute to early 
 philosophy's right appreciation of the soul's spirituality, and 
 open condemnation of modern Materialism. 
 
 Psychology is twofold, empirical or phenomenal, and ra- 
 tional. The former proceeds by way of experiment, deals chiefly 
 with results, and can well be called effect-psychology. The 
 latter proceeds by way of reasoning and argument, deals chiefly 
 with the faculties themselves, and can well be called cause- 
 psychology. Two methods are in vogue for the solution of 
 problems in empirical psychology, one subjective, the other 
 objective. The flrst named is the more reliable of the two as 
 well as the more immediate. It is wholly introspective, based 
 on personal consciousness of individual mental phenomena, and 
 borrows its information from inside sources. The other method, 
 even if less reliable, and more mediate, is, when employed as 
 an aid to introspection, quick and quite satisfactory. In this 
 second method the student ranges beyond the fleld of his own 
 personal consciousness, and, appealing to the consciousness of 
 others, borrows information from outside sources. It finds 
 material in other men's minds, in language, in history, in ani- 
 mal psychology, in physiology, psychiatry and psychometry. 
 Psychology is likewise divided into Inferior and Superior. In- 
 ferior deals with characteristics common to all three kinds of 
 life, and with characteristics peculiar and proper to plant and 
 brute life. Superior deals with characteristics exclusively proper 
 to man. 
 
THESIS I 
 
 Life is that perfection in a being which makes self-motion or 
 immanent action possible with it. We must recognize in plants 
 a life-giving principle, essentially different from inert matter 
 and its forces, physical and chemical. Brute animals are not 
 mere automatic machines, but they possess the faculty of sense. 
 They are, however, without intellect. 
 
 Maher, pp. 579-594; Jouin, pp. 151-161. 
 
 QUESTION" 
 
 In this first thesis, which embraces all Inferior Psychology, 
 we dispose of every living creature but man ; and so make ready 
 for the large work before us, by clearing from our field of 
 view a multitude of beings that would otherwise darken our 
 vision. Plants of whatever description, from the humblest 
 mosses to the fern-like branches that seem to fold their leaves 
 at the touch of a hand, fill the lowest department in the king- 
 dom of life. Beneath them in creation are ranged anorganic 
 or lifeless beings, such as stones and minerals, all far enough 
 removed from them by manifest and specific differences to make 
 the line of separation always possible to the master mind. 
 Above them in creation are ranged beings endowed with a more 
 perfect life, brute animals; while at the top and head of visible 
 creation stands man, whom God, as Scriptural simplicity puts 
 it, " made just a little inferior to the angels." The deep im- 
 portance of this thesis may not at first sight be evident, but a 
 moment's reflection about what Materialism proposes to itself 
 to compass, can satisfy the most incredulous that it has a force 
 of its own, which fully entitles it to the conspicuous place it 
 fills in psychology. Materialism would persuade itself and us 
 that spirit is a myth of fairyland, and that matter, physical 
 and chemical agents, are quite equal to the task of producing 
 thoughts or ideas, attributed by ordinary mortals to a spiritual 
 
 6 
 
THESIS I 7 
 
 agency, the soul, that cannot be weighed, or measured, or an- 
 alyzed in the laboratory. If Materialism were true, regarding 
 the highest kind of life falling under our immediate expe- 
 rience, we should scarcely hesitate to affirm that these same 
 physical and chemical forces can produce whatever phenomena 
 in the life of plants and animals elicit our wonder, and compel 
 us to adopt the theory set down in our thesis. On the con- 
 trary, we base all psychology on the indisputable fact that even 
 plants, the most imperfect sort of life known to us, contain 
 within themselves a principle essentially different from inert 
 matter and its forces. Of a surety, if plants call for such a 
 principle, animals and men, endowed with a kind of life far 
 superior to theirs, stand in still greater need of something such ; 
 and so Materialism in its attempt to level all distinction be- 
 tween mind and matter is absurd. Materialists take the high- 
 est order of life, man, and pretend to explain it by matter. We 
 take the lowest order in life, plant, and show that mere matter 
 is no adequate explanation. 
 
 TERMS 
 
 Life. The word life admits of as many and as various mean- 
 ings as the word nature. At one time it means conduct, at an- 
 other it is applied to creatures separated by an immense chasm 
 from all notion of conduct. This much, however, may be said 
 by way of reducing the expression to something like oneness of 
 meaning. Life, as we use it here, is what lies at the base of 
 all the conceivable notions suggested by the word. For it is 
 quite plain that there is some peculiar feature common to all 
 the beings known as living. Motion is this feature, and we are 
 conscious within ourselves of acquaintance with this peculiar 
 feature as often as the word life or living presents itself. An 
 animal is alive when it moves; dead, when it is still, as St. 
 Thomas says. Life is a substantial form, and, therefore, an in- 
 complete substance, which, together with the matter, tree or 
 body in brute and man, constitutes a single living substance. 
 Life taken in a wider sense, and with a marked shade of differ- 
 ence in meaning, may be considered an accidental form; inas- 
 much as it gives essence and specific being to every concrete 
 and individual act of a living creature. Accidental life is 
 
8 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 actual self-motion or immanent action; substantial life, the 
 basis and support of accidental, is mere capability or possi- 
 bility of self-motion. The former is a mere accident because 
 it simply modifies or limits an accident, such as are all the 
 actions of plants, brutes and men. Substantial life is for 
 things alive being or essence; accidental life is superadded to 
 the same, and is resident in every act put or placed by the liv- 
 ing subject. Substantial life is, therefore, capahility of self- 
 motion or immanent action; accidental life is the manifesta- 
 tion of this same capahility in action. 
 
 Life in actu primo is a substance; life in actu secundo is an 
 accident. 
 
 Life in actu primo physically taken, is the soul ; in actu primo 
 metaphysically taken, it is capacity. Parallels are, rational 
 animal and rational animality. 
 
 Defective definitions of life: 
 
 Bichat describes life as a sum of the functions which resist 
 death; Beclard, as a sum of the phenomena peculiar to organ- 
 ized beings; Owen, as the center of intussusceptive assimilative 
 force, capable of reproduction by spontaneous fission; Comte, as 
 a twofold internal movement, composition and decomposition, 
 at once general and continuous ; and Spencer, as the continuous 
 adjustment of internal relations to external relations. All 
 these descriptions are defective and wrong, because they halt 
 at effects and touch only accidental life. Philosophy is the 
 science of things in their last causes, not in their effects; and 
 we want a description of substantial life. 
 
 Self-motion. Motion is of so many different kinds that the 
 epithet self is absolutely necessary for the full conveyance of 
 what we mean by life. There are a motion in place, a motion 
 in time; self-motion and motion received from another; mo- 
 tion of mind, motion of body, and others too numerous to men- 
 tion. But the idea common to, and invariably found at the 
 bottom of, these several notions, is that of change or passage 
 from one state to another. We must recognize here the difft- 
 culty, that God possesses life without experiencing change. Life 
 is not univocal in God and creatures. Hence, two definitions 
 are needed. We are now describing life as it exists in crea- 
 tures. Created life is in God in an eminent way, — with all 
 its perfections, without its imperfections. Immanent action is 
 
THESIS I 9 
 
 characteristic of life in God, too: and, though it produces no 
 change in God Himself, since He is always in act, it fosters 
 and promotes changes in others, outside of God; so including 
 within itself the notion claimed above to be common to life in 
 general. Creatures in even their vital or immanent acts are 
 moved or influenced by object and end; God moves Himself 
 altogether, and therefore, God's life is the most perfect con- 
 ceivable. Agent in immanent act determines itself; sight is 
 from eye; sight of this or that is from object. The Scholastics 
 thus graphically put the thing. In Deo movens et motum sunt 
 perfecte unum. Dei intellectus est Dei substantia. Deus est 
 sua vita in actu secundo. And they mean that God in all His 
 acts is agent, action, object and end; that God's intellect is 
 God Himself in substance; that in God there is no distinction 
 between substantial life and accidental; He is actus purissimus, 
 an utter stranger to mere potency or capability. Life can be 
 viewed in a threefold way, as continuous improvement, as self- 
 motion, and as immanent action. Its conspicuous feature in 
 plants is continuous improvement; in brutes, self-motion; in 
 man, immanent action. All three are manifestations of life, 
 and therefore immanent action. Immanent action betrays it- 
 self in plants as continuous improvement, and so of the rest. 
 
 Immanent action. Immanent is only a Latin expression for 
 indwelling or abiding within, and has for opposite the term 
 transient, an exact equivalent for passing from one thing to 
 another, or changing position. An act therefore is imman&nt 
 when it stays in or perfects the agent from which it proceeds, 
 when the principle or originating cause of the act and its term 
 are in the agent to which it is ascribed. All really vital acts 
 are immanent, and from this very fact contribute to their doer's 
 perfection. The acts of inert or lifeless causes, like molecules 
 in minerals, are transient, contribute nothing to their improve- 
 ment, and either proceed from a principle outside the agent or 
 have their finish or term in an outside object. Light proceed- 
 ing from the sun is no vital act, and the sun is not a living 
 body, because, though the light proceeds from the sun itself, the 
 term of the act or illumination is in other bodies distinct from 
 the sun, A flow of water is no vital or immanent act, because, 
 though the term of the act is resident in the water, its prin- 
 ciple is in gravity, or pressure, or some such external force. 
 
10 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 Again, in this matter of life or immanence we recognize three 
 different principles, the principium quod, the principium quo 
 remotum, and the principium quo proximum; and immanence 
 is secured, if the act proceeds from and terminates in any of 
 these three principles. The first of the three is called the sup- 
 positum, or the whole being; the second, the principle of life 
 or the soul; tlie third, the faculty employed. These three fix 
 the varying degrees of immanence. An act terminating, like 
 a thought or idea, in some faculty intrinsically independent of 
 the being's material element, is more immanent than an act 
 terminating in a faculty intrinsically dependent on such an 
 element, or in the whole being. Vegetation terminates in the 
 whole plant; sensation, in some organic faculty, like the eye; 
 thought, in an inorganic or wholly spiritual faculty, the intel- 
 lect. A blow is a transient act that begins in the agent and 
 finishes in outside object; it is immanent, when viewed apart 
 from outside object. A piece of stretched rubber, seeking its 
 normal position, is not alive; because, though the term of the 
 act is in the rubber, the force compelling it is in some external 
 agency, namely in the pull that previously stretched it. Mo- 
 tion in the rubber is exerted to attain its connatural condition, 
 no ulterior perfection. It is a case of flowing water and grav- 
 ity. Immanence makes life, and three grades of immanence 
 make three grades of life. With regard to the principle, mere 
 execution makes plant life; execution according to a form sen- 
 sibly known makes brute life; and execution according to a 
 form intellectually known, with a view to some end not deter- 
 mined by the Creator, but fixed by the agent, makes human 
 life. With regard to the term, its reception or residence in the 
 whole subject or agent makes plant life; its reception or resi- 
 dence in a part or organ of the agent makes brute life; and 
 its reception or residence in a faculty altogether independent 
 of the agent's organism makes human life. Again, with term 
 for viewpoint, living beings take to themselves something from 
 without. Plants take elements of matter; brutes take material 
 images or sensations, men take immaterial images or ideas. 
 
 Plants : 
 
 The order in life is, plants, brutes, men. St. Thomas says, 
 the more self-motion, the more life. The three things in self- 
 
THESIS 1 11 
 
 motion are, end, sensible knowledge, intellectual knowledge, 
 with choice of means. Hence we have plants, brutes, men. 
 There is no knowledge in plants, only execution; in their case 
 end and form are from nature and from without. Knowledge 
 is had in brutes, but at the highest mere instinct; they have 
 no knowledge about the relation of means to end. Choice of 
 means and knowledge of end as such, or universal knowledge, 
 belong to men. 
 
 With the philosopher-, plants are beings endowed ivith veg- 
 etable life; beings capable of that self-motion or immanent ac- 
 tion, which manifests itself in growth by the peculiar process 
 styled intussusception; beings able to nourish themselves, and 
 produce other individuals of the same specific complexion. A 
 snowball grows in size by successive additions from without, 
 by juxtaposition, by aggregation. But it would be silly to ex- 
 pect the snowball to reach out for neighboring substances, like 
 soil and moisture, put them through a series of transforma- 
 tions and change them into snow. 
 
 Plants are organic bodies without sensation ; but distinguished 
 from inorganic by evolution, propagation and structure. 
 
 Our adversaries are the Cartesians and modern physiologists. 
 
 It is a delicate matter to determine just where the world of 
 vegetation leaves off, and where the world of inanimate or dead 
 nature begins. Even the most learned quarrel among them- 
 selves and puzzle over the question whether certain beings, to 
 all appearances dead, deserve the name of plant or not. The 
 philosopher enters no such controversy. He is content to know 
 that whatever tallies with the above description is a plant, and 
 that whatever falls away from it belongs to some higher order 
 of life, or is dead. There are three processes in plant life, 
 nutrition, growth and reproduction or generation; and there 
 are three corresponding faculties or powers. Nutrition is that 
 process by which an organic substance changes food into its 
 own substance, to preserve itself in being. It differs from 
 growth and reproduction. This nutrition constitutes the vital 
 stream, and mends the wear and tear entailed by life on the 
 body and its organs. By virtue of waste and repair living 
 bodies within certain definite periods undergo a complete change. 
 Experiments show that the principle of life affects even the 
 bones and such portions of the animal structure as seem least 
 
12 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 vital. Instances are poultry and pigeons from whose food cal- 
 careous salts were extracted. Nutrition includes absorption of 
 food by root and leaf from soil and air, circulation of food- 
 product, breathing and exhalation. By day the leaves absorb 
 carbonic acid gas in the atmosphere, decompose it, and retain 
 the carbon to exhale the oxygen. By night oxygen is absorbed 
 and carbonic acid gas exhaled. Thus equilibrium is preserved 
 in the vegetable and animal kingdoms. The waste product 
 of plants or oxygen is food supply for animals, and the waste 
 product of animals, or carbonic acid gas, becomes the food- 
 supply of plants. Secretion and assimilation are other func- 
 tions of nutrition. Growth is that vital process by which or- 
 ganic substances attain to their due size by assimilation of food. 
 Reproduction or generation is that vital process by which one 
 living being derives its life from another living and conjoined 
 being, with specific likeness in nature for result; or, as St. 
 Thomas puts it, " origo viventis a vivente principio, conjuncto 
 in similitudinem naturae." 1. Q. 27. a 2. Explanation : Life 
 alone can produce life, to exclude abiogenesis or spontaneous 
 generation. The term must be alive, to separate generation 
 from the production of sweat and tears. To be immanent ac- 
 tion, the new birth must be conjoined with the parent during 
 the process of generation. As soon as separation ensues, gen- 
 eration is over. The hen that hatches another's egg is not the 
 chick's mother. Adam did not generate Eve, because the mere 
 removal of a rib has no natural bearing on the production of 
 a specifically similar being. Of the three functions, nutrition 
 is first in point of time, last in point of dignity; generation is 
 last in point of time, first in point of dignity. Generation is 
 effected in three ways, by fission, by germination, and by ovula- 
 tion; by multiplication, by bud, by Qgg. Some plants and 
 lower animals are produced the first two ways. The third way, 
 uncommon in lower orders of life and limited to their more 
 perfect species, is proper to brutes and men. In fission, orig- 
 inal cell breaks into several; in gemmation, buds arise on out- 
 side of living body. Two principles conspire to the third proc- 
 ess, the seed-cell or egg, and the fecundating principle. The 
 result is the fecundated egg. Here arises the old difficulty 
 about the precise time of the soul's appearance in the embryo. 
 Old writers were of opinion that a long or short delay had 
 
THESIS I 13 
 
 place. It is to-day a common opinion with theologians, phi- 
 losophers and physiologists that the soul is present from the 
 first moment of fecundation. Spontaneous generation, or the 
 derivation of life from dead matter, is a theory long since ex- 
 ploded. Materialists and Evolutionists greedily swallowed the 
 theory, to escape the admission of God and a soul. But sci- 
 entists like Pasteur have proved conclusively that life always 
 has its origin in antecedent life. Worms in putrified meat 
 are due to eggs laid hy flies, and the worms are the larvae of 
 future flies. Worms in apples and pears are larvae of noc- 
 turnal butterflies. Pasteur showed by experiment that no life 
 develops in a liquid, when germs are completely shut out. All 
 appearances of spontaneous generation are due to germ-deposits 
 from the air. Haeckel and Darwin admit that spontaneous 
 generation is a postulate of Evolution. There is a wide differ- 
 ence between modern Materialism and the old Scholastics in 
 this matter. Scholastics ascribed everything to God and the 
 planets. Spontaneous generation is opposed to experience and 
 reason. No instance of the thing can be adduced, and its advo- 
 cates appeal to earlier times, ages back, when nature was younger 
 and its forces fresher; as though the specific nature of these 
 forces had undergone a change. Eeason cries out against the 
 theory, because no effect can be superior to its total cause. 
 
 About the first origin of life, it is then certain that living 
 beings are not sprung from minerals or dead matter. God pro- 
 duced first life with the cooperation of matter. He made mat- 
 ter fit to receive life, and produced life in this prepared matter, 
 not by creation, but by educing vital forms from it. These 
 first organisms could have been seeds or perfect plants and ani- 
 mals of full growth. He could have made all the different 
 species of plants and animals now extinct and as we have them, 
 or He could have made a few inferior species in the plant and 
 animal kingdoms from which the others were successively 
 evolved. This much is certain, that man's soul is immediately 
 created in every individual instance. Adam's body in the ob- 
 vious sense of Scripture came immediately from the hands of 
 God, without any process of evolution from lower life. Theolo- 
 gians commonly agree that at least the lower species of plant 
 and animal life came immediately from God, and not from 
 natural evolution. The souls of plants and brutes are substan- 
 
14 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 tial, but material and non-subsistent. They do not consist of 
 matter, but are educed from matter, and are intrinsically de- 
 pendent on matter for their being and activity. They cannot 
 exist apart from matter. A thing's highest operation or activ- 
 ity settles the quality of its being, and the highest operations 
 of plants and brutes are intrinsically dependent on matter. 
 Nutrition, growth, generation, sensation, cannot be exerted 
 without organs. Man's soul is intrinsically dependent on or- 
 gans for vegetative and sensitive life. In intellectual opera- 
 tions it is extrinsically dependent on the senses or matter, and 
 this dependence is due to union with the body. Separated from 
 the body, it can thinlc without dependence on organs; and this 
 constitutes intrinsic independence of matter. Souls of plants 
 and brutes are not created, but generated; because creation has 
 for term either a complete substance, like an angel, or a sub- 
 sistent if not complete substance, like the human soul. The 
 souls of plants and animals are not immortal, because they 
 perish with the body's organism. 
 
 Life-giving principle. Soul is another name for the same 
 thing. The eyes cannot see this life-giving principle in plants, 
 or brutes, or men. A plant cannot be boiled down to secure 
 it by evaporation or any known process of chemistry. But our 
 knowledge is not limited to the visible universe. It reaches 
 beyond, to a world of beings too closely allied with the intel- 
 lect to be grasped by the gross senses. Organism is not this 
 principle of life, though it invariably accompanies the same; 
 because organism perseveres after life's disappearance from the 
 body. It is a substantial form, an incomplete substance, which 
 escapes in its details our present imperfect vision. 
 
 This life-giving principle is a substance, because no accident 
 can give species to living body. 
 
 It is a form, because it is not prime matter, which is po- 
 tency and no act. 
 
 It is a soul, because the vital principle in living bodies. 
 
 It is a principle, or that from which another proceeds. Such 
 a principle must be admitted; otherwise we have an effect with- 
 out a cause, or we make God second cause of everything. 
 
 Adversaries : Materialists deny in all three kingdoms — 
 Tongiorgi denies in plants — Cartesians deny in plants and ani- 
 mals — Materialists explain life mechanically, by local motion ; 
 
THESIS I 15 
 
 physically and chemically, by forces. We recognize this prin- 
 ciple in a general way as the reality which restricts or limits 
 living beings to their place or class in the universe of exist- 
 ences. St. Thomas with Aristotle describes this soul as "Actus 
 primus corporis pliysici, organici, potentia vitani hahentis." 
 Explanation: Actus is an imperfect translation of Aristotle's 
 word which means finish or completion, entelechy. First act 
 or finish, because it is a form which determines to species; 
 matter without form is undetermined. The body in man is 
 not a form, because it actuates no subject. First form, be- 
 cause it is a substantial form; because there is no form prior 
 to it. Physical means natural, not artificial or mathematical. 
 Scotus posits a forma corporeitatis. This is the question with 
 Scotus, is the body prime matter or second matter? We main- 
 tain that one and the same soul constitutes prime matter a 
 body and a living body, as substantial form and vital principle. 
 The life mentioned in our definition of Soul is accidental life, 
 not substantial. 
 
 This principle of life is not the body, because one perseveres 
 in the other's absence, and in that event every body would be 
 a living body. It is material in the sense of intrinsic depend- 
 ence, not in the sense of three dimensions. A word about its 
 faculties or powers. Vital acts are ascribed to three princi- 
 ples. The principium quod is the suppositum or whole agent, 
 body and soul; the principium quo remotum is the soul; the 
 principium quo proximum is some particular faculty of the 
 soul. Faculties are organic and inorganic. Organic are in 
 whole composite, and they are vegetative and sensitive. In- 
 organic are in soul alone, and they are intellectual. Faculties 
 are active and passive. Active need no outside object as de- 
 terminant, and they are vegetative. Passive need such an ob- 
 ject, and they are sensitive. The intellect is both active and 
 passive; passive, inasmuch as it needs a phantasm for the im- 
 printed intelligible image; active, inasmuch as with this image 
 it elicits the developed intelligible image or idea. From this 
 point of view agens is passive, possibilis is active. All facul- 
 ties are active inasmuch as they actively operate; for this reason 
 the agens is active as well as passive, and the same is true of the 
 senses. Act and formal object give name to faculty. Vital acts 
 are six, vegetative, sensitive, intellectual, appetite, will, loco- 
 
16 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 motion. Soul and faculties are really distinct with inadequate 
 distinction, because soul is designed to inform body, facul- 
 ties are designed to work; soul is faculties and something 
 besides. 
 
 Essentially different. The physical and chemical forces of 
 nature, blended with organism, differ indeed accidentally from 
 the same forces, considered in themselves and apart from all 
 organism; and Tongiorgi thinks these forces, thus accidentally 
 modified, a sufficient explanation of life in plants. We con- 
 tend for a still greater, an essential difference between the prin- 
 ciple of life and these forces. The former, instead of being 
 the latter, exercises the authority of a sovereign over them, 
 and compels them to elicit, when under its potent influence, 
 effects wholly different from ordinary results. Of course, the 
 principle of life and material forces are in substantial union; 
 not in accidental union, as Plato and others teach. Thus, 
 oxygen in contact with anorganic bodies works havoc and de- 
 struction. It rusts iron, consumes wood, decomposes lifeless 
 flesh. But oxygen is inhaled in thick volumes by ailing pa- 
 tients. Indeed, for diseases like pneumonia, repeated draughts 
 of pure oxygen are most healthful medicine. We enumerate 
 nine conspicuous differences between plants and minerals. 
 
 (1) Make-up and constitution. Plants are heterogeneous; 
 minerals, homogeneous. Plants are made up of wood, bark, 
 leaves, roots, cells, fibers. Minerals are the same throughout. 
 
 (2) Origin. Plants result from seed or generation; min- 
 erals, from chemical composition. 
 
 (3) Reproduction. By fission, gemmation, ovulation; min- 
 erals are multiplied by outside agency, by breaking asunder. 
 
 (4) Growth. Plants grow by intussusception, and are never 
 born with their full size; minerals grow by successive additions 
 from without and are of any size. 
 
 (5) Size. Each species of plant has its own fixed size; min- 
 erals attain to any size. 
 
 (6) Duration. Every plant has its own limited duration; 
 minerals are of unlimited duration. Plants destroy them- 
 selves; minerals are destroyed by outside agencies. 
 
 (7) Shape. Every plant has its own fixed shape, and curves 
 predominate; minerals assume any shape, and straight lines 
 predominate. Most minerals are shapeless, some occur as crys- 
 
THESIS I 17 
 
 tals or geometrical figures, and can always be broken into 
 crystals of smaller dimensions. 
 
 (8) Chemical composition. In plants the chemical elements 
 are complex; in minerals, simple. Protoplasm or life-stuff is 
 made up of carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, nitrogen. Sulphur and 
 phosphorus frequently occur. Iron enters the blood. Calcium 
 and magnesium in the form of phosphates enter the bones. Po- 
 tassium is required for muscular tissue; sodium and chlorine 
 for the secretions. Minerals are made up of one or two ele- 
 ments, and their composition is stable. 
 
 (9) The activity of plants is immanent; that of minerals, 
 transient. 
 
 X.B. If life were the product of physical and chemical 
 forces, it would be possible to form a living body by suitable 
 combinations. And yet no plant, not even the lowest moss, 
 can be produced from the crucible. The chemical constituents 
 of the animal body are well known, their proportions and affini- 
 ties can be expressed in arithmetical formulae; but no scientist 
 has ever yet produced an organism. We know exactly the ele- 
 ments of an egg, how much oxygen, how much hydrogen, how 
 much nitrogen; we can blend them in accurate proportions; 
 but science cannot make an egg able to hatch a tadpole. No 
 laboratory will ever create a cell, a muscle, a nerve. In life 
 there is a something present that science cannot detect, and 
 this something is the principle of life, the soul. The substan- 
 tial changes manifest in life-action are Scholasticism's chiefest 
 argument for the existence of matter and form. Without mat- 
 ter and form these changes would be a series of annihilations 
 and creations, processes beyond the reach of mere creatures or 
 natural agents. Hydrogen and oxygen are transformed by the 
 electric spark into water; and water is transformed by the 
 same agency back again to hydrogen and oxygen. The matter 
 of a living being is changed by retrograde metamorphosis into 
 inorganic substances to become the food of a plant, and the 
 plant becomes the food of an animal. That animal may be 
 the very one from which this traveling matter originally came. 
 Carbonic acid in the air is decomposed by plants. These plants 
 give back the oxygen, to retain the carbon. This carbon in the 
 plant finds its way back to an animal in the form of vegetable 
 food, and, brought into contact with the oxygen supplied by 
 
18 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 the lungs, is given forth in respiration in the form of carbonic 
 acid. And the process begins all over again. All change pos- 
 tulates a subject common to each term of the change, unless 
 we want to admit annihilation and creation; and this common 
 subject is prime matter, materia prima. 
 
 Inert. Inert is here opposed to alive or living. Inert can 
 mean inactive ; but absolute inactivity is unknown among God's 
 creatures. Every being, even the most insignificant in the uni- 
 verse of existences, a grain of sand, exerts a power proper and 
 peculiar to itself. Inert therefore means lifeless, incapable of 
 self-motion or immanent action. 
 
 Physical and chemical forces. Cohesion, attraction, repul- 
 sion, gra\dty, chemical union, affinity, proportions, and others 
 of the same nature too numerous to mention, and discussed at 
 great length in Physics and Chemistry. 
 
 Brute animals. As soon as a living being gives conclusive 
 evidence of a sense, external or internal, with no pretensions to 
 any superior faculty, we assign it to the category of brute ani- 
 mals. 
 
 Three operations in man and brute absent from plants: 
 They apprehend bodies according to qualities, having external 
 and internal senses with sensorial organs. They seek or shun 
 bodies thus apprehended, having appetite. They move locally 
 towards or away from bodies thus apprehended, having loco- 
 motion. 
 
 The recognition of objects manifest in brutes, is sufficient 
 foundation for attributing to them the possession of senses; 
 while absence of speech and of all mechanical progress induces 
 us to deny them the possession of intellects. Transmigration 
 makes brutes as intellectual as man. Pythagoras, Empedocles, 
 Democritus, Anaxagoras, Epicureans deny man's superiority. 
 Sensists, Physiologists and Materialists make all knowledge a 
 physical and chemical process. Darwinists give inferior minds 
 to brutes. Some animals are more perfect than others. They 
 are commonly graded in our estimation by the fineness and 
 number of their senses. Thus, while not a few are limited to 
 the use of one single sense, others rejoice in the full exercise 
 of all the external and internal senses we ascribe to man. But 
 the most perfect never evince signs calculated to persuade the 
 unprejudiced mind that they understand. They hear, they see, 
 
THESIS I 19 
 
 they remember, they dream ; but they never elicit an idea, never 
 utter a judgment, never give expression to a syllogism. Some 
 brutes surpass men in the possession of a certain single sense, 
 usually the sense employed for purposes of self-preservation. 
 But no brute has all nine senses of the same uniform fineness 
 as man's. Their soul, or principle of life, is material; not in 
 the sense that it has quantity, can be weighed, or measured, 
 or handled; but in the sense that for all its being and all its 
 operations it is dependent on the body, or matter. It is derived 
 from the parents in its entirety, because it possesses no specific 
 property transcending the nature of material faculties, like the 
 senses. It perishes with the body. Such dependence is reck- 
 oned intrinsic and extrinsic. Man's soul essentially connotes 
 extrinsic dependence on body or matter. In its first opera- 
 tions it presupposes and demands as a necessary requisite some 
 previous work of the senses. It is not the gift of parent to 
 child, but is the result of a new act of creation in each indi- 
 vidual instance. In itself it can exist, and after death it does 
 exist, without any dependence whatever on the body, that crum- 
 bles to dust. Sensitive life presupposes vegetative. We note 
 these several differences between the two. 
 
 1. Chemical elements in the animal combine in fours to 
 form albumen; and these elements are carbon, hydrogen, oxy- 
 gen and nitrogen; in plants, they combine in threes to form 
 cellulose; and they are carbon, hydrogen and oxygen. 
 
 2. In brutes vegetative life is made more perfect by union 
 with sensitive, and changes food into flesh, bones and nerves. 
 
 3. Animals feed on plants and other animals; plants feed 
 on minerals. Organic food supports animals; inorganic, plants. 
 
 4. Sensation is specific difference between plants and brutes; 
 and sensation is the perception of bodily substances in the con- 
 crete. 
 
 Automatic machines. No machine is strictly automatic, but 
 only such in appearance. The word is of Greek origin, and 
 signifies a thing gifted with self-will or self-motion. And yet 
 there are machines, which from the nice perfection of their 
 mechanism lead the superficial observer to conclude that they 
 derive their motion from nothing external to themselves. Thus, 
 the watch and locomotive to all appearances depend on no out- 
 side agency for their motion. But the watch will run down 
 
20 
 
 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 and stop, unless its owner at stated intervals applies the phys- 
 ical force needed to wind it up; the locomotive will come to a 
 standstill, unless its cylinder is kept well supplied with steam. 
 Brute animals differ from locomotives and watches in this, that, 
 once in existence, they are capable of passing from one place 
 to another and of eliciting various acts without any absolute 
 dependence on beings or forces external to themselves. It was 
 an opinion of Descartes that brutes are machines set in motion 
 and kept in motion by the immediate influence of God. 
 
 Sense and Intellect. The intellect is a spiritual cognoscitive 
 faculty, able to know immaterial objects and material objects 
 in an immaterial, universal, abstract way; able to know the 
 causes and essences of things; able to reflect on itself and its 
 acts, to pronounce formal judgments, and to formally reason. 
 A formal judgment unites or separates ideas; it affirms or de- 
 nies; a virtual is matter for a formal, it comprehends without 
 uniting or separating. Sensations are virtual judgments, and 
 they deal with concrete qualities of individual things ; e. g. 
 color and shape of bread. Such a virtual judgment moves 
 sensitive appetite. 
 
 Sense is a material cognoscitive faculty; knows material ob- 
 jects in a material way. 
 
 Cognoscitive 
 
 Faculties, 
 
 Instruments - 
 
 of 
 Knowledge 
 
 N.B. 
 
 DIAGRAM 
 
 Sight 
 Hearing 
 External -! Touch 
 Taste 
 Senses J [Smell 
 
 'Sensile Discrimination 
 Imagination 
 Sensile Consciousness 
 Sensile Memory 
 
 'Intelligence 
 Judgment 
 Intellect^ " uin.iiig ^ jjeggon 
 
 Consciousness 
 Memory 
 
 For explanation see Thesis II. 
 
 .Internal 
 
THESIS I 21 
 
 Division — Four Parts and a corollary — 
 
 I. Life is capacity for self-motion. 
 II. Soul of plant, essentially different from physical and 
 chemical forces of plant. 
 
 III. Brute animals have senses. 
 
 IV. Brute animals have no intellect. 
 CoroUary — Evolution is absurd. 
 
 PEOOPS, I, II, III, IV 
 
 /. N.B. This first part is a definition, and definitions need 
 not be proved, but explained. A definition is a principle, by 
 supposition the subject contains the predicate. We need only 
 show that our definition is correct, that it applies to living 
 beings and none else. 
 
 It is the common opinion of mankind that things gifted with 
 the capability of self-motion or immanent action are alive, and 
 that things without the same capability are dead. 
 
 But what renders a thing alive is life, and in certain circum- 
 stances, here fulfilled, the common opinion of mankind is in- 
 fallible. 
 
 Ergo life is capability of self-motion or immanent action; 
 life is that perfection in a being which makes self-motion or 
 immanent action possible. 
 
 With regard to the Major. To the average mind motion al- 
 ways suggests life; stillness, death. And the thing is clear in 
 the case of a live or dead animal. With motion in evidence 
 minds always satisfy themselves regarding the presence or ab- 
 sence of life by determining motion's origin. Flowing water 
 is an instance. 
 
 With regard to the Minor. The judgment partakes of the 
 nature of a moral judgment. 
 
 II. N.B. Eecall notions regarding plants. Their princi- 
 ple of life is a substantial form called soul. They have three 
 operations. They have no sensation. Their soul is non-sub- 
 sistent. Their soul is indivisible in itself; divisible because of 
 matter. Plants live because a one suppositum, in which activ- 
 ity begins and ends. One suppositum, because one activity, 
 and everything concurs to produce seed and evolve organism. 
 Activity begins and ends in plant, because organism takes up 
 
22 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 nutriment, assimilates it to own substance, and distributes it — 
 
 Plants possess a, energies, and b, qualities, essentially differ- 
 ent from those of minerals or dead matter. But no effect exists 
 in nature without its proper cause. 
 
 Ergo there is in plants some cause of these energies and 
 qualities essentially different from those of minerals, namely, 
 physical and chemical forces. In one word there must reside 
 in plants a principle of life, designed to order aright and watch 
 over these physical and chemical forces. 
 
 With regard to the Major, (a) The origin, growth and re- 
 production of plants are quite different from those of minerals. 
 A plant begins as a minute cell, feeds on surrounding matter, 
 grows, multiplies itself into other cells, which in turn combine 
 to form the embryo. From the embryo a perfect organism 
 arises. Besides, the plant mends whatever parts suffer loss, 
 and keeps itself alive. Minerals betray no such energy. Their 
 every act is transient, and they grow only from without. 
 
 (b) Plants are organic beings. Witness the cells in a tree, 
 the roots, stalk, leaves, petals and intricate details of the flower 
 in a rosebush. The chemical composition of plants is another 
 feature distinguishing them from minerals. The shape of a 
 plant is uniform and constant for the same species; minerals 
 are indifferent to all shapes. Crystallization induces set and 
 regular forms in minerals; but each crystal admits of division 
 into others of the same character. Besides, the lines in a crys- 
 tal are invariably straight, while in plants they are at one time 
 straight, at another time curved. 
 
 III. 1. It is the common opinion of mankind, strengthened 
 by most evident signs on the part of brute creation and by the 
 wonderful structure of brute bodies, that animals possess the 
 faculty of sense, a) external and (b) internal. They have or- 
 gans, operations, effects, phenomena, like our own. But the 
 common opinion of mankind thus strengthened is an infallible 
 guide. Ergo animals possess the faculty of sense, and are not 
 mere automatic machines. 
 
 With regard to the Major, (a) About external senses there 
 can be no difficulty. 
 
 (b) Signs of internal senses follow. Sensile consciousness 
 or central sense is evinced from the fact, that to hear, a dog 
 uses his ears, not his eyes or tail; imagination from the fact. 
 
THESIS I 23 
 
 that a dog barks in his sleep and goes through all the motions 
 of a street-fight. Sensile memory enables a dog to seek home, 
 and to find his master in a crowd. With the help of sensile 
 discrimination or instinct birds gather straw for their nest, and 
 a young sheep dreads the wolf. 
 
 2. Brutes have sense-organs. Ergo they have sense. 
 
 3. Brutes have sensitive appetite, as their movements make 
 evident. But appetite supposes knowledge. Ergo they have 
 sense. 
 
 IV. Brutes give unmistakable evidence that they are pos- 
 sessed of (a) neither universal ideas, (b) nor psychological re- 
 flection. But beings without universal ideas and psychological 
 reflection are without intellect. Ergo brute animals are with- 
 out intellect. 
 
 With regard to the Major, (a, b.) (a) The fact that we 
 have universal ideas is betokened by our use of arbitrary and 
 conventional signs for language. But the use of such signs is 
 unknown among brute animals. Ergo. 
 
 Brutes make themselves understood by natural signs, and 
 are utter strangers to speech. Parrots can be taught by com- 
 binations of images in the fancy to emit a limited number of 
 sounds, but these sounds do not constitute language. 
 
 (b) Psychological reflection, turning wholly on ourselves and 
 our acts, leads us to change our methods, to indefinitely improve 
 on our own works and those of others, and to make progress 
 generally. But no such change of methods, no such improve- 
 ment or progress appears in the lives of brute animals. Ergo. 
 
 Corollary — Universal Evolution or Darwinism is therefore 
 absurd. 
 
 Evolution derives all the different species of plants and ani- 
 mals from one or a few primitive species. In his early work 
 Darwin admits that the beginning of things is an insoluble 
 problem, and declares himself an agnostic. When younger he 
 acknowledged a Creator, to account for primitive species. Later 
 in life he abandoned God altogether. This change was due to 
 the logical development of his theory by men like Haeckel. 
 Natural selection was the factor introduced by Darwin to ex- 
 plain the multiplication of species. The industry of man by 
 breeding and crossing can effect changes in plants and animals. 
 Nature, according to Darwin, can rival man in this process; 
 
24 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 and nature's activity is displayed in natural selection. Vari- 
 ability, natural selection, heredity, struggle for existence and 
 survival of the fittest are the magic terms occurring everywhere 
 in Darwin's work. With him, natural selection is the prime 
 cause of specific evolution; and natural selection is the preser- 
 vation of favorable individual differences and variations, and 
 the destruction of such as are injurious. All the young of plants 
 and animals cannot reach maturity. A codfish lays 9,000,000 
 eggs in a season. In 750 years the elephants descended from a 
 single pair would be 19,000,000. Our chief objections to nat- 
 ural selection are two. It is in itself insufficient, classes are not 
 species; and it contradicts facts. Besides, it eliminates formal, 
 final and efficient causality, to leave only material. It pro- 
 fesses to get man from monkey. The form or essence of man 
 is not latent in monkey as that of oxygen is in water, and such 
 a man would be without a formal cause. No monkey can essay 
 becoming a man, because that would mean self-destruction, and 
 purpose would be wanting. No monkey can make himself a 
 man, because effect would be superior to cause. Haeckel in 
 Germany pushed Darwin's theory to its logical limit when, 
 applying it to the world at large, he essayed to explain the 
 origin of the universe, man included, from primordial matter; 
 and Darwin was not long catching up with Haeckel. In this 
 way, the theory of natural selection degenerated to the system 
 of Eealistic Monism. Monism, as the name implies, derives 
 everything from one principle, matter. It is opposed to Dual- 
 ism which recognizes spirit as well as matter. Monism is a 
 gross mistake, because it denies God and immortality; because 
 it advocates the fortuitous concourse of atoms, laughed to scorn 
 by Cicero; and because it destroys all moral order. Haeckel 
 himself was a mammoth fraud, and his open dishonesty robbed 
 his old age of whatever prestige his early years enjoyed. Dar- 
 winists, with Haeckel, maintain that man is descended, body 
 and soul, from the ape. One Friedenthal remarks that not only 
 are we descended from monkeys, but we are monkeys ourselves. 
 Advocates of the wild theory see an argument in the circum- 
 stance, that the differences between men of two races are greater 
 and more striking than the differences between a man and an 
 ape. They close their eyes to the fact that the difference be- 
 tween souls of men is one of degree, not of kind; while the 
 
THESIS I 25 
 
 difference between the souls of men and souls of apes is one of 
 kind, not merely of degree. The soul of man is not descended 
 from the soul of an ape. Keasou and revelation bear loud wit- 
 ness that the soul of man is spiritual and created. Neither is 
 man's body descended from the body of an ape. Arguments to 
 the contrary are nothing worth. They are mainly two, resem- 
 blances and paleontology, or ancient remains. In their zeal to 
 discover resemblances our opponents neglect differences. The 
 differences between the body of a man and the body of an ape 
 are too wide to countenance one's origin from the other. The 
 skull-cap, the brain, and the bones are worth study. Mucker- 
 mann, S.J., has tables to prove that the skull-cap of man is 
 about three times as large as that of an ape. The circumfer- 
 ence of a man's skull is twice that of an ape's. The human 
 brain is three times heavier than that of the ape. In man it 
 is the 37th part of his body's weight; in an ape, the 100th 
 part. Speaking of bones, Virchow says, " The differences are 
 so wide, that almost any fragment is sufficient to diagnose 
 them." 
 
 Besides, no intermediate form occurs to bridge the chasm 
 between man and ape. The missing link is still missing. The 
 wisdom of the Creator is sufficient explanation for all the dis- 
 covered resemblances. Man is the king of creation, and ought 
 to embrace all kingdoms. Infimi supremum debet attingere 
 infimum supremi. Natura odit saltus. The argument from 
 paleontology is of as little weight. The Pithecanthropus erectus 
 and the Neanderthal skull-cap prove nothing. The bones of the 
 first were found in different places and put together, a farcical 
 imposition. No ape ever yet regularly walked erect. Dancing 
 bears are trained to walk on their hind-legs, but the attitude 
 is unnatural and violent. The Neanderthal skull-cap might 
 belong to anything, a Hollander, a German, an Icelander or a 
 Celt. All paleontological finds prove man possessed of intel- 
 lect. Hence the various implements of the Stone, Iron and 
 Brass Ages. 
 
 N.B. Not all Evolution is Darwinism. Evolution itself is 
 opposed to constancy or fixity of species; and Evolution is of 
 two kinds. Universal or Sweeping and Particular or Eestricted. 
 Constancy holds that all species of plants and animals, as they 
 now exist, were created. Sweeping Evolution holds that a few 
 
26 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 elementary organic bodies took their rise in matter from chance 
 grouping of atoms. Eestricted Evolution teaches that a few 
 species of plants and animals were created, the others developed ; 
 God created first organisms and gave them special power to 
 develop higher. Man and his soul are excepted. Man was 
 created, body and soul. Mivart derives man's body from the 
 ape. Of these theories, constancy or fixity of species is most 
 in harmony with simple faith, and most in disfavor with mod- 
 ern science. Sweeping Evolution is Realistic Monism and 
 downright ignorance. Eestricted Evolution is semi-scientific, 
 not opposed to so-called educated faith, and is held by Catholic 
 scientists, like Wassmann, S.J. Hence our thesis: (a) Uni- 
 versal Evolution or Darwinism is opposed to right reason; Par- 
 ticular or Restricted Evolution is (&) without foundation, and 
 (c) contradicts facts. 
 
 With regard to the terms. Species in Evolution means a 
 collection of individuals more or less alike, capable of progeny 
 without limit. The two requisite elements are, like shape and 
 fertility. Members of the same species can have accidental 
 differences. A variety is such a collection of the same species 
 as have the same accidental differences. The variety is called 
 a race if these accidental differences are handed down by gen- 
 eration and become fixed. By law of reversion, varieties re- 
 turn to primitive type, unless pairs of the same variety gen- 
 erate. 
 
 Fixity or constancy of species means that one species never 
 becomes another. All the species of plants and animals, as 
 they now exist, were in existence from the beginning. 
 
 Evolution means that all the species now extinct and now in 
 existence are sprung from one or a few primitive species. 
 
 The language our opponents employ is about as follows: 
 Variation in species is inherited by offspring. Nature by 
 means of natural selection fosters some characteristics, and lets 
 others disappear. The struggle for existence is nature's abettor 
 in this task. As a result of the struggle, only the fittest sur- 
 vive. These survivors with the lapse of ages originate entirely 
 new species of plants and animals, the series ending in man 
 himself. Darwin has no explanation for the origin of life. 
 Heredity, natural selection, struggle for existence are the factors 
 he employs to explain the origin of species. 
 
THESIS I 27 
 
 Proofs, (a) Universal Evolution or Darwinism denies God 
 and immortality; postulates fortuitous concourse of atoms, and 
 spontaneous generation; and destroys the moral order. 
 
 (6) Heredity is no explanation, because only specific char- 
 acteristics are transmitted naturally. Accidental characteristics 
 are transmitted only by the interference of an intellectual cause 
 like man, and such varieties naturally revert to original type. 
 Eventually the progeny of mulattoes is coal black. A donkey, 
 as St. Thomas says, never essays becoming a horse, because 
 that would mean self-destruction. Natural selection is no ex- 
 planation, because in this ease a blind agent would be able to 
 accomplish what man has not yet been able to do, develop a 
 new species. The struggle for existence would account for the 
 disappearance of lower, not for the evolution of higher species. 
 
 (c) It contradicts present as well as past experience. Evo- 
 lutionists admit that at present like generates like, and by no 
 process can new species be gotten from old. They appeal to 
 the past with as little success. Within history. Job and Aris- 
 totle describe animals and plants of the same complexion as our 
 own. Plants, dogs, cats, birds and cows found in Egyptian 
 tombs, and five thousand years old, are like our own. Fossils 
 come down from prehistoric times are like present-day animals, 
 unless they happen to be extinct; and there is no trace of in- 
 tervening types, which ought to be numerous in the hypothesis 
 of evolution. 
 
 Principles. Rudimentary organs can have ornament for pur- 
 pose as well as utility. Sweeping Evolution is against faith. 
 Some, like Lamy and Urraburu, think Eestricted Evolution, 
 even when not extended to men, against the faith; others see 
 no opposition. Nearly all Catholic theologians vote it highly 
 wrong to ascribe the origin of man's body to evolution from a 
 monkey. It was immediately produced from slime of the earth. 
 
 PRINCIPLES 
 
 A. 1. The chemical elements in a molecule perfect them- 
 selves. Ergo immanent action. 
 
 2. The flame in a candle feeds on the wax. Ergo immanent 
 action. 
 
28 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 3. Sensation is determined by object, an extrinsic principle. 
 Ergo no immanent action. 
 
 4. Motion is always from another. Ergo no self-motion. 
 Answers. (1) Each atom perfects another atom, or the 
 
 atoms together make a new substance. Ergo no immanent 
 act. 
 
 (2) The flame is not one substance, but an aggregate; and 
 it does not feed on the wax by intussusception. 
 
 (3) The object determines sensation objectively, not subjec- 
 tively. Sight is from the eye; the sight of this or that thing 
 is from the object. 
 
 (4) Motion is from another, but that other can be united 
 with the thing moved. The mind is not the man, but is united 
 with him. 
 
 B. 1. Immanence is of only one kind. Ergo only one kind 
 of life. 
 
 2. In brutes vegetative life produces sensitive substance; sen- 
 sitive life, only accidents. Ergo vegetative is superior to sensi- 
 tive. 
 
 3. Mere execution of motion is life for plants. Minerals 
 execute motion. Ergo they have life. 
 
 4. Sensation is superior to vegetation because of forms as- 
 sumed. But vegetation assumes forms, leaves and the like. 
 Ergo no superiority. 
 
 5. Plants assume material substances; senses material acci- 
 dents. Ergo senses not superior. 
 
 Answers. (1) Immanence itself is of only one kind; but 
 acts vested with immanence are of three kinds, vegetation, sen- 
 sation, thought. 
 
 (2) Vegetative life in brutes produces sensitive substance not 
 by itself, but in conjunction with sensitive life. The accidents 
 produced by sensation are in the order of knowledge, and there- 
 fore higher than mere vegetation. 
 
 (3) The motion of minerals passes to outside objects, it is 
 not received in the minerals themselves. Principle outside. 
 One molecule perfects another, it never perfects itself. 
 
 (4) The forms vegetation assumes are determined by nature, 
 and in the material order ; those of sensation are determined by 
 the agent, and in the cognoscitive order. 
 
 (5) The material accidents assumed in sensation are of a 
 
THESIS I 29 
 
 higher order than the material substances assumed in vegeta- 
 tion. 
 
 C. 1. Difference of origin proves no essential difference. 
 An apple can be created or grown. 
 
 2. Difference in duration proves no essential difference. 
 Men die at different ages. 
 
 3. Living beings tend towards quiet as well as minerals. 
 Everything dies. Ergo tendency to motion is no sign of life. 
 
 4. Difference in activity proves no essential difference in be- 
 ing. Moderate heat cures, excessive heat kills. 
 
 Answers. (1) Difference in natural origin proves essential 
 difference. Creation is supernatural in sense that it transcends 
 the power of created natures. God alone can create. 
 
 (3) Duration constitutes essential difference between plants 
 and minerals, not because long and short, but because deter- 
 mined and undetermined. 
 
 (3) Life when born never tends to quiet; when developed, 
 it tends not to the quiet of death, but to cessation from vital 
 changes. 
 
 (4) To cure or kill is not the formal effect of heat, but of 
 a greater or less degree of heat. We argue from formal ef- 
 fects of plants and minerals. 
 
 D. 1. Difference in the combination of atoms can explain 
 life, without any principle of life or soul. Letters and arrange- 
 ment, meaning and no meaning. 
 
 2. Chemical analysis can detect no principle of life. Ergo 
 none exists. 
 
 3. The soul is that at the disappearance of which life ceases. 
 Life in the plant ceases when its parts are sundered and dis- 
 turbed. Ergo. 
 
 4. The principle of life is neither a substance nor an acci- 
 dent, neither a body nor a spirit. 
 
 5. A plant is no more one substance than a machine. 
 Answers. (1) Difference in combination cannot explain 
 
 generation, tendency to motion, necessity of union among parts, 
 determined duration. Letters get meaning not from them- 
 selves, but from relation to men's ideas. 
 
 (2) Reason can detect what escapes the notice of chemical 
 analysis. It is not the business of chemical analysis to detect 
 souls. 
 
30 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 (3) Cohesion and arrangement of parts are conditions of 
 life, not its formal cause. 
 
 (4) The principle of life is an incomplete substance, it is 
 neither a body nor a spirit; but it is something material or 
 something spiritual. 
 
 (5) Unity in the machine comes from without; unity in 
 the plant comes from within. 
 
 E. Some points of difference between the intellect and the 
 senses. The senses acquire knowledge of only individual ma- 
 terial objects without any generalization. They attain to the 
 composite substance, inasmuch as it is a jumble of essence, 
 properties and accidents; and are primarily affected by the 
 properties and accidents in things. They are never capable of 
 an explicit judgment; but only apprehend, without any union 
 or separation of ideas. The intellect takes up sensible percep- 
 tion, and, separating the essence and substance from their prop- 
 erties and accidents, views them alone, and so acquires uni- 
 versal ideas. It compares one idea with another, and, when 
 satisfied that a resemblance exists, units the two by affirmation, 
 or elicits a judgment. The appetites follow the natures of 
 their prime movers. Thus, the sensible appetite, wholly de- 
 pendent on the senses for its every movement, never looks be- 
 yond material goods. The intellectual appetite, because in- 
 tellect is the mainspring of its actions, soars beyond matter. 
 
 F. Mr. Broderip's story of a dog at crossroads seems to 
 prove syllogism and reason. The dog tries in vain for scent 
 of his master along two branches. Keturning, he trots along 
 third branch, with nose in the air. The dog would seem to 
 argue thus: My master is somewhere along one of these three 
 roads. He is not along two of them. Ergo he walks the third. 
 
 Answer. The phenomenon admits of a dozen different ex- 
 planations. The dog may have detected ground or air traces 
 of his master only after completing examination of first two 
 roads. A dog can scent his master without keeping his nose 
 to the ground. 
 
 G. The artistic effects of brute animals are due to the in- 
 stinct they receive from God, and are wrought after so mechan- 
 ical and unvarying a way that the animals themselves are 
 rather passive than active with regard to the artistic element 
 inherent in them. 
 
THESIS I 31 
 
 H. Absolutely sjDeakiiig, God could have created animals 
 mere automatons; but at present such creation is an utter im- 
 possibility, unless we want to accuse God of wilfully and ef- 
 fectively deceiving us at every step. 
 
 (/) Identity of vegetative and sensitive souls. In a brute 
 animal there is but one soul, the principle of vegetation and 
 sensation. One and the same soul is the remote principle of 
 growth and sensation; the faculties or proximate principles are 
 several and distinct. The animal has but one being and one 
 activity. It gets both from the principle of life or the soul. 
 Ergo the soul is one. It has but one being, because it is one 
 individual. It has but one activity, and tlierefore but one prin- 
 ciple, because its activity is immanent, and this would be impos- 
 sible in the event of several principles. Other reasons: Wlien 
 growth ceases, sensation is at an end; and vice- versa. Growth 
 ministers to the organs of sense, and sensation is impaired when 
 growth is disturbed by disease or drink. Growth and sensation 
 are of uniform perfection in the different species. 
 
 {J) The souls of brutes are non-subsistent. They are not 
 accidents, but incomplete substances and non-subsistent; that 
 is, they have no being or activity independent of matter or the 
 body's organs. Eeasons: Growth and sensation are a brute's 
 highest activity, and both are intrinsically dependent on or- 
 gans. When an organ of sense is injured or diseased, the cor- 
 responding sensation is impossible. The senses are tired by 
 frequent and intense application, they are disturbed by violent 
 excitation, and these are signs of intrinsic dependence on or- 
 gans. 
 
 Corollaries. 1. The brute soul is not created. Supernatur- 
 ally, it can be created; but naturally, it calls for production 
 from something of subject; and creation is production from 
 nothing of self and subject. Naturally speaking, what cannot 
 continue in existence without matter, cannot begin its existence 
 without matter. In first production, the whole brute, body and 
 soul, was created. 
 
 2. The souls of brutes are generated by their parents, be- 
 cause the whole suppositum is generated, and creation is out of 
 the question. 
 
 3. Souls of brutes die with the body. They are corrupted 
 by accident, not in themselves. 
 
32 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 (K) About the divisibility of souls. X. Y. Z. 
 
 X. The soul of man is alone indivisible per se and per ac- 
 cidens. 
 
 Y. All other souls are divisible per accidens. 
 
 Z. The souls of more perfect brutes die in part when di- 
 vided. X. The human soul is indivisible. Eeasons: The 
 part in an amputated limb vrould corrupt or remain; and 
 neither supposition is tenable. The same soul thinks, wishes, 
 sees, hears, and the like; and consciousness vouches for this. 
 All the parts would think or only one part; and both supposi- 
 tions are impossible. All the parts would be free or only one 
 part; and the two suppositions are impossible. Simple acts call 
 for simple principles ; and thoughts are simple acts. Simplicity 
 goes with spirituality, not vice-versa. 
 
 PKINCIPLES 
 
 {1) Man's soul has quantity, because it is received in body 
 and is spread over body. 
 
 Answer. It is received and spread in such a way that the 
 whole soul is in the whole body and in each part of the body. 
 
 {2) The soul is affected by bodies. 
 
 Answer. Not in itself, but because of union with the body. 
 
 (5) That would be multilocation. 
 
 Answer. Multilocation calls for several adequate places. 
 The soul is in one adequate place, the whole body. 
 
 (-^) The soul would move and be quiet at the same time. 
 
 Answer. Under different respects. 
 
 (5) The soul would have to withdraw from an amputated 
 limb. \ 
 
 Answer. Soul simply loses one of its presences. 
 
 {6) The soul reappears in an affixed limb. 
 
 Answer. The affixed limb is all right for vegetative powers 
 of soul in rest of body. 
 
 Y. In plants and imperfect brutes the soul is divisible. 
 Eeasons: Experience with worms and snakes; shoots and 
 grafts. If parts of the soul animate cut portions of the plant 
 or animal, the soul must have had parts in potency before the 
 cutting. These parts because of union were actually one soul, 
 potentially many souls. Actual simplicity is compatible with 
 
THESIS I 33 
 
 composition in }X)tency, or indivisibility per se is compatible 
 with divisibility per accidens. If the severed portion of the 
 body is without the requisite organism for life, the soul in it 
 ceases to exist, because intrinsically dependent on matter. Im- 
 perfect animals are such as have few senses and a ruder or- 
 ganism, like earth-worms. Even plants and worms, when cut 
 into small pieces, die; because the organism is defective in 
 minute portions. Plants and animals cannot be divided longi- 
 tudinally but transversely, because of organism. Z. In per- 
 fect brutes the soul is divisible, but it dies in part. It has no 
 parts per se, it has parts per accidens; and it dies in part be- 
 cause of intrinsic dependence on organism. Eeasons: Souls 
 in perfect brutes are as material as souls in imperfect brutes, 
 and therefore divisible per accidens. After division parts die, 
 because of more intricate organism. A part of the soul dis- 
 appears from the severed portion. Not the whole soul. Ergo 
 a part only. The whole soul would either corrupt, or subsist 
 in itself, or retire to the live portion. Not corrupt, because 
 whole soul exists in live portion. Not subsist in itself, be- 
 cause it is material. Not retire to live portion, because that 
 portion already has a soul. Part of the soul corrupts, because 
 corruptible by accident. iV. B. Different in man, because his 
 soul is spiritual and exists independent of matter. In an am- 
 putated limb man's soul neither corrupts, nor subsists in itself, 
 nor retires to live portion of body. Man's soul admits of no 
 composition in potency, or by reason of matter. It simply 
 ceases to inform or actuate the amputated limb. In material 
 souls, to exist and to actuate are the same; in a spiritual soul, 
 to exist and to actuate are not the same. The human soul can 
 cease to actuate without ceasing to exist. 
 
 P. 8. When the organism in plant or animal is divided, 
 the soul is by accident divided, because it intrinsically depends 
 on matter and shares in matter's imperfection. The form or 
 any quality of gold is divided in the same way. The soul, as 
 form of plant or animal, is as dependent on matter for its be- 
 ing as the form or any quality of gold. The soul in a separated 
 branch is no proof that there were actually several souls in the 
 tree, but only potentially. 
 
THESIS II 
 
 Sensation is an immanent and cognoscitive act. There can 
 he no sensation without a faculty, an object, and union between 
 the two in the faculty. Sensation perceives the object, not its 
 species or image, not the organ impression. 
 
 Maher, pp. 63-208 ; 26-54. Jouin, pp. 161-171. 
 
 QUESTION 
 
 Division. — 'Three parts. 
 
 I. What is sensation? It is an immanent and cognoscitive 
 act. 
 
 II. How is sensation accomplished? By union of faculty 
 and object in faculty. 
 
 III. What does it perceive? The outside object. 
 Adversaries. 1, II, III. 
 
 I. Materialists deny soul, and maJce sensation a purely me- 
 chanical and transient act. With them, sensation is motion 
 transmitted to the brain and provoking modifications and re- 
 actions of a purely mechanical nature. In other words, sen- 
 sation is molecular motion of the brain, whether phosphor- 
 escence, or electrical tension, or what not. 
 
 II. With Descartes, the soul is always thinking. With Leib- 
 nitz, every thought has its sufficient reason in some prior 
 thought. Scholastics, whether in sensation or thought, demand 
 union between faculty and object. Object cannot be united 
 with faculty. Hence a substitute is needed, and this is the 
 species impressa. Act must be immanent. Hence species ex- 
 pressa. 
 
 III. Loclce and Cartesians deny objectivity of sensations. 
 
 Species and organ-changes are that which is known, and in 
 
 which objects are known. 
 
 34 
 
THESIS II 35 
 
 TEEMS 
 
 Faculties. Aristotle attributes five powers or faculties to the 
 soul of man, vegetative, locomotive, appetite, sense, reason. 
 The first four are common to man and brute. The fifth is 
 proper and peculiar to man. The first two have no bearing on 
 knowledge, and can for the present be neglected. St. Thomas 
 emphasizes the difference between sensitive appetite and ra- 
 tional appetite. As sense and reason are two phases of knowl- 
 edge, appetite and will are two phases of desire. Therefore, 
 all question of growth and locomotion aside, the soul of man 
 embraces these four faculties or powers, sense and reason in the 
 cognitive order, appetite and will in the appetitive order. And 
 with these four topics we are especially concerned in Psychology. 
 
 Senses and Sensation. The senses are the first of man's 
 cognitive faculties to halt our attention. We met them in 
 Major Logic, and we can best begin by recalling some of the 
 notions there set down. We then described the senses as ma- 
 terial, organic, cognoscitive faculties, common to man and brute. 
 They are instruments employed by man in his acquisition of 
 sensations. Sensations in man are modifications of a living 
 organ of sense, presenting to its owner some object affected 
 with extension and resistance. An organ is any part of a living 
 body possessed of a structure adapted to the performance of 
 some function closely allied with life. The sense is called sight; 
 the sensation, vision; the organ, the eye. Intellect is that spir- 
 itual, inorganic, cognoscitive faculty in man, separating him 
 from brute creation; or the faculty attaining to all the knowl- 
 edge peculiar to the senses, and furnishing man with a uni- 
 versal and abstract knowledge, to which the senses cannot as- 
 pire. Eeturning to the senses, they are external and internal. 
 
 External, when organ is on surface of agent, and object is 
 outside of agent; internal, when organ is in brain and object 
 is inside the agent. The external senses are five, sight, hearing, 
 touch, taste and smell, because there are five organs. There is 
 no sixth sense, because there is no sixth organ. The internal 
 senses are four, 1, sensus communis, sensile consciousness, or 
 central sense; 2, vis gestimativa, sensile discrimination or in- 
 stinct; 3, sensile memory; and 4, imagination. The one in- 
 
36 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 tellect exercises three different functions, called simple appre- 
 hension, judgment and reasoning. The resultants of these 
 several functions, expressed in language, are the word, the 
 proposition and the syllogism. In the production of an idea 
 the intellect acts in a twofold capacity. Under one aspect it is 
 called intellectus agens, or the working intellect; under the 
 other, intellectus possibilis, or the receiving intellect. As work- 
 ing intellect, it conspires with the phantasm to effect what we 
 call the imprinted intelligible image. As receiving intellect it 
 cooperates with the imprinted intelligible image to produce the 
 developed intelligible image, or idea proper. 
 
 Without wishing to lose ourselves in a labyrinth of ques- 
 tions, and with no desire to encroach on the domain of physi- 
 ology, it will be enough for the present to merely note the or- 
 gans and the objects of the several senses, external and in- 
 ternal. The organ of sight is the eye, its formal object is col- 
 ored surface, or color. The organ of hearing is the ear, its 
 formal object is sound. The organ of touch is the whole outer 
 surface of the body, its formal object is manifold; roughness 
 and smoothness, temperature, organic disturbance, pressure, 
 resistance. The organ of smell is the inner surface of the nose, 
 its formal object is odor. The organ of taste is the surface of 
 tongue and palate, its formal object is sweetness, bitterness and 
 the like. 
 
 Of the internal senses it may be said in general that their 
 organs are the nervous system and special compartments of 
 the brain. The formal object or purpose of sensile conscious- 
 ness is to discriminate between and differentiate the operations 
 of the external senses, while they are present. The formal ob- 
 ject or purpose of instinct is to apprehend objects as fit or use- 
 ful to satisfy the needs of animal nature, which qualities es- 
 cape the knowledge of the external senses. Sensile memory re- 
 tains and excites past sensations. It adds to imagination the 
 recognition of old sensations as past. Imagination retains and 
 combines past sensations without knowing them for past sen- 
 sations. 
 
 In every sensation we recognize three distinct stages, the ac- 
 tion of some outward body on the organ, disturbance in nerves 
 forwarded to the brain, and the conscious sensation. The out- 
 ward body falls within the domain of Physics. Physiology has 
 
THESIS II 37 
 
 to do with the nerve-disturbance, and Psychology is busy with 
 the sensation proper, the finished product. Physiologists tell 
 us that our nervous apparatus is twofold, the sympathetic sys- 
 tem for purposes of veggtation or growth, and the cerebro- 
 spinal system for purposes of knowledge. We remark in pass- 
 ing that, while these nerves with the body's organs are joint 
 factors in the production of sensations, they are no adequate 
 explanation of the same. Even sense knowledge, whether in 
 brutes or men, postulates in addition to nerves, organs, physical 
 and chemical forces, a principle of life, a soul, too subtle to be 
 detected by eye or microscope, simple per se, divisible per ac- 
 cidens and material, not in the sense that it is measurable, but 
 in the sense that it is intrinsically dependent on matter for its 
 existence and activity. 
 
 Materialism is, therefore, wrong, when it professes to ex- 
 plain even sense-knowledge with the single help of nerves, or- 
 gans, and physical or chemical forces. It is wronger still, 
 when it ascribes the same origin to thought or intellectual 
 knowledge. Nerve action and molecular movement are condi- 
 tions, not the cause of thought, and non causa pro causa is a 
 sophism. Sensation is the work of neither the body nor the 
 soul alone, but of the composite being resulting from the union 
 of both, the animal. There is no sensation in a soul separated 
 from the body. In hell God supplies for sensation. Our ideas 
 are dependent on our senses up to the formation of the phan- 
 tasm. Beyond that stage they are entirely spiritual; organs 
 and nerves play no part whatever in their final production, and 
 a wholly immaterial faculty, the intellect, is their single ex- 
 planation. Apart, therefore, from the body and its organs, the 
 intellect can exist and operate; and its dependence on the body 
 is merely extrinsic, due entirely to our present condition, and 
 open to complete reversal after death, or separation from the 
 body. 
 
 Omitting the sympathetic system of nerves, the cerebro- 
 spinal system can be best described as a central mass, con- 
 nected with all the different parts of the body by wires. This 
 central mass is made up of brain and spinal cord, the wires are 
 the nerves. The spinal cord is a column of white fibrous mat- 
 ter, enclosing a core of gray cellular substance called the mar- 
 row. The nerves are strings proceeding in pairs from the 
 
38 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 back and front of the spinal column. The front, anterior, ef- 
 ferent or motor nerves transmit impulses outward, and are the 
 instruments of muscular movement. The back, posterior, af- 
 ferent or sensory nerves transmit impulses inward, and give 
 rise to sensations. These nerves branch to all parts of the 
 body in such profusion that the finest needle, applied to any 
 portion of the body's surface, will come in contact with a 
 nerve. The brain contains four compartments, the medulla 
 oblongata, a prolongation of the spinal cord, with nerves for 
 the face, heart and lungs; the cerebellum, above and back of 
 the medulla, with nerves for locomotion ; the pons Varolii, above 
 and in front of the medulla; and the cerebrum, or large brain, 
 above all, with its two hemispheres and its two fissures, the 
 Sylvian and that of Eolando. The nerves with ends in the 
 head would seem to be located in the four different compart- 
 ments of the brain; those with ends in the rest of the body, in 
 the spinal column. The nerves are in pairs, efferent and af- 
 ferent, like the wires in an electric circuit; and this would seem 
 to be the process of sensation. An impression wrought on the 
 end-organ of an afferent nerve is transmitted to a center in the 
 brain. At its arrival in the brain a sensation is awakened. 
 Conscious sensation produces an impulse, which flowing back 
 along a motor nerve causes movement. Treading on the foot 
 is an example. 
 
 Sensation is not in the brain, but in the organ proper to the 
 sensation in question. Scholastics are against physiologists in 
 this matter. The outward organ receives the impression, and 
 sends it on to the brain; reaction follows in the brain, to in- 
 form central sense, and go back to the outward organ. This 
 reaction is responsible for the two species, imprinted and de- 
 veloped. Reasons: 1. Experience and common sense; 2. A 
 hurt in the brain is not felt elsewhere; 3. The brain can be 
 removed and sensation continue; 4. Peculiar construction is in 
 organ, not in brain; 5. The brain finishes its work with the 
 internal senses. 
 
 The motion is too slow to be electrical. It is no faster than 
 80 or 200 feet a second. 
 
 Physiologists have mapped the different nerve-centers in the 
 brain, and located with more or less accuracy the positions of 
 the several sense-centers. Thus, while the upper portion of 
 
THESIS II 39 
 
 the brain is reserved for memory and imagination, the origin 
 of the olfactory nerves is in the center of the base of the brain; 
 that of the optic nerves, a little back of the first pair. The 
 other nerves start in the medulla, and they control the skin of 
 the face, and the muscles of the tongue and jaws. The audi- 
 tory and gustatory nerves are rooted here. The tactual and 
 motor nerves arise lower down in the spinal cord. St. Thomas, 
 in his treatise on the internal senses, assigns each its own 
 definite compartment of the brain, and in his own crude way 
 foreshadows the work of modern physiologists. The ends of 
 the gustatory nerves are on the surface of the tongue and palate, 
 and the body to be tasted must be in a state of solution. The 
 ends of the olfactory nerves are in the membrane lining the 
 inner surface of the nose, and the stimulating particles must 
 be drawn over the sensitive surface by inhalation. The ends 
 of the tactual nerves are in the dermis, immediately under the 
 cuticle or outer skin. These papillae are stimulated by pres- 
 sure on the outer skin. The ends of the auditory nerves are 
 in" the liquid distributed throughout the labyrinth or inner ear. 
 The ends of the optic nerves are in the inner strata of the 
 retina, and are a layer of rods and cones, conveying the image 
 on the retina as a neural tremor to the brain. The ear and the 
 eye are the most complicated of our sense-organs. Obviously 
 we cannot enter into a detailed explanation of each. That 
 would be to trespass on physiology. We therefore dismiss the 
 subject with these few remarks. The ear is made up of three 
 parts, the pinna or sail and meatus; the tympanum, drum or 
 middle ear; and the labyrinth, or inner ear. The eye contains 
 the sclerotic, the cornea or pupil, the choroid coat, the retina, 
 the yellow spot and the blind spot. 
 
 We recognize in sensation two values, the emotional, or 
 pleasure and pain; and the cognitive, or knowledge. In the 
 order of emotion the senses are thus rated, systemic, taste, 
 smell, hearing, touch, and sight. In the order of cognition 
 this rating is reversed to sight, touch, hearing, smell, taste, sys- 
 temic. This order stands only when the senses are viewed di- 
 rectly, without taking into account appropriation by means of 
 association and inference. 
 
 Idealism questions the validity of our sensations as instru- 
 ments of knowledge, contending that they can furnish us with 
 
40 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 no solid certainty regarding the objective reality of tilings. 
 But this wrong system, evolved by Berkeley and others from 
 false prineiples advanced by Descartes and Locke, was abun- 
 dantly refuted in Cosmolog)^; and we refer readers to that 
 treatise. 
 
 Many im])ortant discoveries with a bearing on the growth 
 and development of sense perception are due to physiological re- 
 search, and they are being daily multiplied. Thus, the weight 
 of the brain at birth is about one-sixth that of the whole body. 
 During the child's first year it almost doubles its size, and 
 after-growth is much less rapid. It is full sized at the end 
 of the seventh year. In normal European adults it weighs 
 from 46 to 52 ounces. The child is born deaf, and in the mat- 
 ter* of sight is able merely to distinguish light from darkness, 
 without the ability to discriminate colors. Infancy covers the 
 first two years, when the senses reach maturity, and locomotion 
 and speech are imperfectly acquired. Childhood reaches to the 
 seventh year. During this period memory and imagination 
 grow, play-impulse appears, knowledge of personality, self-con- 
 sciousness and use of reason. Boyhood runs from seven to 
 fourteen. This is the plastic period. Habits and passions are 
 hard to dislodge at fifteen. Youth ranges from fourteen to 
 twenty-one. Character becomes set and fixed; the passions are 
 prominent, and these years are the season of ideals. This pe- 
 riod colors the man's whole future life. 
 
 The primary and secondary qualities of matter are only the 
 formal and material, or proper and common objects of the 
 senses. Thus, color, sound and the like are primary qualities; 
 while extension, figure, motion, rest, number and the like are 
 secondary. 
 
 In every operation of the senses we must distinguish two 
 phases or elements, one in the subject, the other in the object. 
 Odor in me and odor in the rose, are a familiar example. The 
 object must somehow get into the subject, and the two must 
 come into close contact. Sensation perhaps best expresses the 
 act from a subjective; perception, from an objective point of 
 view. The Scholastics explain everything with their species 
 intentionales, knowledge-likenesses or images. They are called 
 intentionales because with their help the faculty tends towards 
 or goes out to the object. A species witli them was no ma- 
 
THESIS II 41 
 
 terial efflux from the object. Objects, according to them, al- 
 ways act on the organ through intervening media. A species 
 was a modification of the faculty, helping to knowledge of out- 
 side objects. It was a transference of the object to the faculty. 
 With them, outside objects were the things known, not their 
 species. Sense and intellect never know species, they know the 
 corresponding outside objects, trees, horses, and the like. They 
 never pass from a knowledge of species to a knowledge of outside 
 objects. And all this was pithily and accurately expressed in 
 the formula: "Species est id quo res intelligitur, non id quod 
 intelligitur , neque id ex quo vel in quo res intelligitur." Locke 
 and idealists in general make the mistake of limiting our 
 knowledge or certainty to these species, declaring the species, 
 id quod intelligitur. The Scholastics were wiser, and based 
 their position on the following argument, contained in St. 
 Thomas, 1, q. 85, A. 2. " Every such purely subjective view 
 of knowledge is wrong, because what we know is ultimately 
 the subject matter of science, and science deals with outside 
 objects, like the stars, the elements, trees and such, not with 
 modifications of the agent, like the species. Besides, this false 
 theory renews the error of whatever ancient philosophers main- 
 tained that everything is exactly what it is perceived to be ; that 
 honey is in reality sweet and bitter, with entire dependence on 
 the normal or abnormal taste of the tasting agent." 
 
 These species are intentionales inasmuch as they are psychi- 
 cal expressions of material things. They are sensiles and in- 
 telligibiles, in accordance with the faculty employed. Impressae, 
 or imprinted, are resultants from action of the object; ex- 
 pressae, or developed, are resultants from reaction of the faculty. 
 Memory and its readiness argue the existence of impressae. 
 Both kinds are affections of the faculty, not the object on the 
 retina of the eye, not nervous disturbance. Hence the epithet, 
 intentionales. If we want to escape the absurdity of innate 
 ideas, we must maintain that material objects act on our facul- 
 ties, and base our knowledge. The deaf cannot hear a sound 
 or think it; the blind cannot see a color or think it. Ergo 
 mind and sense do not altogether determine their own modifi- 
 cations. Furthermore, knowledge represents realities, unless we 
 want to be skeptics ; and sensation and thought are the psychical 
 expression of things. 
 
42 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 Imagination and sensile memory are important enough to 
 deserve our special attention. The imagination is that in- 
 ternal sense which stores away old sensations, preserves them, 
 presents them luhen called for, and combines them to form new 
 images. It forms representations of material objects apart 
 from their presence. Its energy results in what we call a 
 phantasm. As compared with that of the other senses, the 
 work of the imagination is faint in intensity, obscure in out- 
 line, transitory in character, normally subject to our control 
 and without bearing on objective reality. Ordinarily the 
 imagination is reproductive; when productive, constructive, cre- 
 ative, it assumes the name of fancy. Memory is not reproduc- 
 tion, but recognition. Illusions, dreams and reveries are due 
 to the imagination. Illusion differs from fallacy and delusion. 
 It is a spurious act of apprehension. Its causes are subjective 
 or objective. Thus, strong anticipation of an event leads one 
 to perceive the occurrence before it happens; as in the case of 
 the butcher, who thought his arm torn by a meat-hook. De- 
 sire and fear can work kindred results in the case of a timid 
 traveler and a child treated to ghost-stories. Ill health and 
 disordered organs, along with irregularities in medium, are 
 instances of objective influences. Hallucinations are illusions 
 of an extreme and permanent kind. Dreams and reveries are 
 due to the fact that the imagination usurps the functions of 
 the external senses, which in sleep and drowsiness are inactive 
 along with will, reflection, and the power to compare. Dreams 
 seem real, because we are completely at the mercy of the imag- 
 ination. They are incoherent and extravagant, with a tinge 
 of consistency, and they regularly exaggerate actual impressions. 
 The mind accepts as real the representations of the imagination, 
 unless some faculty checks them; and in sleep no checking 
 faculty is at hand. 
 
 Memory is tJie faculty that retains, recalls and recognizes 
 past cognition or knowledge. If this past knowledge is sensa- 
 tion, the memory concerned is sensile ; if it is thought, the mem- 
 ory is intellectual. We are at present dealing with memory 
 taken as an internal sense; but what is true of sensile is 
 easily applicable to intellectual memory. Aristotle distin- 
 guishes between memory, mneme, and reminiscence or recol- 
 
THESIS II 43 
 
 lection, anamnesis; between retention and recall or recognition. 
 Modern writers call the first spontaneous, or automatic; the 
 other, voluntary memory or recollection. St. Thomas restricts 
 reminiscence to man, because it involves will and reason. If 
 brutes have sense and appetite, we fail to see why they must 
 be denied an inferior kind of reminiscence. 
 
 Logically, the first question demanding attention is the re- 
 tention of past sensations. The Schoolmen were far clearer, 
 simpler and wiser on this subject than moderns, who, because of 
 their materialistic tendencies, render a plain and easy problem 
 a tangled mass of confusion. The Scholastics meet the diffi- 
 culty by supposing the memory a thesaurus specierum, a treas- 
 ury of past experiences. When sensations disappear from con- 
 sciousness, the soul with the help of the organism retains these 
 modifications, images, species, as faint dispositions or habits. 
 Eeproduction and recognition are based on laws of association. 
 They are three, the Law of similarity, the law of contrast, and 
 the law of contiguity in space and time. They mean that men- 
 tal states suggest like, or different, or connected states in past 
 experience; and our doctrine of species or psychical expressions 
 of objects is ample explanation. Memory is likewise helped 
 by the strength of the original impression, by frequent repeti- 
 tion, and by freshness of the experience. A good memory mani- 
 fests itself in facility of acquisition, tenacity, and readiness of 
 reproduction. Ben Jonson, Scaliger, Pascal, Macaulay, Mez- 
 zofanti, were remarkable in this particular. Children ought to 
 be trained to judicious, not mere mechanical, memory. 
 
 Immanent act is opposed to transient. In a transient act, 
 the effect is received in a suppositum really different and dis- 
 tinct from the agent. In an immanent act the effect is re- 
 ceived in the agent itself. An act is immanent in broad sense 
 when the effect is not a perfection of the faculty from which it 
 proceeds, e. g. nutrition and locomotion ; it is immanent in 
 strict sense when the effect is a perfection of the faculty, e. g. 
 to feel, to think, to wish. 
 
 Cognoscitive act means knowledge; it means to know; it 
 means to become the thing known, e. g. I hold this in my 
 memory. "We become the thing known, not according to its 
 material being, but according to its ideal or intentional being. 
 
44 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 This intentional representation, its substitute in the faculty, 
 is called a species, whether intelligibilis or sensibilis. Hence 
 Jcnowledge is the vital expression of an object in the faculty. 
 
 PROOFS I, II, III 
 
 I. Sensation is an immanent and cognoscitive act. 
 Immanent, from experience. Common or central sense is 
 
 witness that sensation proceeds from me, and is received within 
 me. 
 
 Cognoscitive, because it is a vital expression of the object, as 
 in vision or imagination. 
 
 II. a. A faculty and object are needed; t. There must be 
 union between the two. c, This union must be in the faculty. 
 
 " There can be no act without a principle and a term. Some- 
 thing must perceive, and something must be perceived. The 
 faculty is the principle; the object is the terminating term; its 
 substitute, the species, is the determining term. 
 
 * The faculty is indifferent, and must be determined by the 
 object. This determination is impossible without union be- 
 tween the two, because action from a distance is repugnant; 
 non datur actio in distans; the effect cannot be altogether sepa- 
 rate from its cause; where a thing does not exist it cannot act; 
 esse is prior to agere. 
 
 " Union must be in faculty, because otherwise sensation 
 would not be an immanent act. 
 
 III. Sensation perceives the object, not its species or image, 
 not the organ impression. We perceive objects not as they 
 are in us, but as they are outside of us, e. g. trees. When we 
 touch a sphere, tlie sensation is of a convex thing, not of a 
 concave thing. 
 
 PRINCIPLES 
 
 7. A. Knowledge means a judgment. Sensation is no 
 judgment. Ergo sensation is no knowledge. Answer. Per- 
 fect knowledge means a judgment, I grant; imperfect, I again 
 distinguish. It means a formal judgment, I deny; a virtual, 
 I grant; 
 
 B. Sense must know that the object exists. Impossible to 
 
THESIS II 45 
 
 sense. Ergo. Answer. Must know in the concrete, I grant; 
 in the abstract, I deny, 
 
 C. The ultimate principle of knowledge ought to be im- 
 material. Answer. Immaterial, in sense of not matter, I 
 grant; immaterial, in sense of independent of matter, I again 
 distinguish. In intellectual knowledge, I grant; in sensation, 
 I deny. Sensation is organic, or material, in sense that it pro- 
 ceeds not from the soul alone, but from the composite or organ 
 informed by the soul. Thought is inorganic, wholly immaterial. 
 
 //. D. The physical change induced in the organ explains 
 sensation, without any union between faculty and object. An- 
 swer. It involves adaptation to sensitive cognition, I grant; 
 otherwise, I deny. 
 
 E. Sense is no voucher for species impressa. Ergo species 
 is not needed. Answer. The species impressa is demanded by 
 reflection and reasoning combined. 
 
 F. Species impressa is enough. Ergo, there is no need of 
 species expressa. Answer. It is not enough, because it is a 
 virtual image, and transient, passing from object to faculty; 
 the expressa is a formal image, and immanent. 
 
 ///. G. It is not the work of the senses to judge about the 
 nature of things. That belongs to the intellect. Answer. 
 About inner essence, I grant; about outer accidents, I deny. 
 
 H. Light, heat, electricity are all explained by vibrations. 
 Ergo, there are no sensible qualities, but vibrations. Answer. 
 Sensible qualities are vibrations, I deny; are accompanied by 
 them, I grant. Sensibles are proper, common and per acci- 
 dens, e. g. color, shape, substance or man. Proper Sensibles 
 are active forms and energies inhering in bodies. Vibrations 
 and undulations are not these qualitates sensibiles, but accom- 
 pany them . 
 
 /, Bodies are felt and perceived through vibrations. Ergo, 
 there are no qualities. Answer. Sensibles are vibrations only, 
 I deny; joined with vibrations, I grant. 
 
 J. Color blind see wrong. Ergo, there are no sensible quali- 
 ties. Answer. In vitiated condition, I grant; in normal, I 
 deny. They see only in part. 
 
 K. Senses reach bodies through species impressa. Ergo, 
 they reach not bodies. Answer. As medium quod, or in quo, 
 I deny; as medium quo, I grant. 
 
THESIS III 
 
 There exists in man a cognoscitive faculty, essentially dif- 
 ferent from sense; and this faculty has truly universal ideas. 
 
 Maher, pp. 239-253; Jouin, pp. 210-215. 
 
 QUESTION 
 
 Division. Two parts: I. Intellect; II. Universals. 
 
 The soul is ultimate and radical principle of all man's life. 
 It needs accidental principles or natural faculties to elicit vital 
 acts. Faculty can be whole eye or soul-power in the eye. 
 Whole eye, compounded of organ and power, is certainly dis- 
 tinct from soul by inadequate distinction. St. Thomas makes 
 faculties real and distinct properties flowing from essence of 
 soul. They are not the soul's substance. 
 
 Faculty is a proximate and connatural principle of vital 
 operations; not remote like soul; not accidental like habit and 
 species. Number of faculties is the same as number of apti- 
 tudes for vital operations. Faculties are denominated by acts 
 and formal objects. According to Aristotle the soul's facul- 
 ties are five, vegetative, sensitive, intellectual, appetitive, loco- 
 motive. 
 
 Question: Is the formal object of intellect different from 
 
 formal object of sense? 
 
 TEEMS 
 
 I. Intellect is a higher faculty than sense, because its knowl- 
 edge is of a higher order; and causes are graded by their ef- 
 fects. Man is superior to brute, primarily because of what 
 he can do, when he exerts his highest energy. All knowledge 
 is not ultimately reducible to sensation, in spite of the popu- 
 larity the opposite doctrine to-day enjoys. The materialistic 
 tendencies of our age are altogether responsible for the sad 
 mistake, and the penny-wise philosophers, who cater to the 
 
 46 
 
THESIS III 47 
 
 public taste, are variously known as Sensationalists, Associa- 
 tionists, Materialists, Phenomenists, Positivists, Empiricists 
 and Evolutionists. Sensationists reduce all knowledge to sen- 
 sation. Associationists make all knowledge a grouping of sen- 
 sations by similarity, contrast, and by contiguity in time or 
 space. Materialists hold that all knowledge turns on matter, 
 and that the mind is a function of organism. Phenomenists 
 restrict all knowledge to phenomena or appearances open to the 
 eye, the ear, and the other senses. Positivists limit knowledge 
 to positive science, to laws observable in phenomena or sense- 
 occurrences, with no concern for metaphysics or ultimate re- 
 alities. With Empiricists knowledge is bounded by what falls 
 under the experience or notice of the senses. According to Evo- 
 lutionists mind is evolved from matter, and therefore different 
 from sense in degree only, not in kind. Adversaries. Material- 
 ists make intelligence motion in matter like sensation, with no 
 essential difference. Cartesians make intellect and sense differ 
 essentially from matter, accidentally among themselves. If 
 brutes had sense, they would have intellect. They raise sense 
 to intellect, sensation to intelligence. Sensists reduce intellect 
 to sense, intelligence to sensation; making concept, judgment, 
 reasoning, reflection sensations, associated or transformed; 
 making intellect Just as organic as sense, with no essential dif- 
 ference. So Locke and Condillac. With Locke, judgments are 
 composite sensations; with Condillac, judgments are sensations 
 transformed from imperfect to perfect. 
 
 We are capable of several acts that clearly prove intellect's 
 essential superiority over sense. These acts are intellectual 
 attention, comparison, and judgment, especially in the case of 
 necessary judgments; universal and abstract concepts, reflec- 
 tion and self-consciousness. With regard to attention, we re- 
 mark that active attention is a secondary act, an interior reac- 
 tion of a higher kind, superadded to primitive sense-impres- 
 sions, which induce a condition of mere passivity. An orange 
 on a table can furnish forth a fair example. Comparison and 
 judgment postulate intellect. These acts are impossible with- 
 out a force holding the compared ideas together in the con- 
 sciousness, and discerning the relation of similarity between 
 them. Coexistence or successive occurrence of impressions is 
 not enough. A third and distinct activity must be present. 
 
48 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 able to apprehend the common feature. And all this becomes 
 clearer in the casef of necessary judgments, as contrasted with 
 empirical or a posteriori judgments, about the antipodes, a 
 man's photograph, fire and heat, white snow, glass as a food. 
 Sense tells us that a particular fact exists; intellect tells us 
 that a universal truth holds. Universal and abstract concepts 
 likewise prove intellect. Science without universal ideas is 
 impossible. Imagination cannot form them. Berkeley log- 
 ically admits this, and concludes that we have no universal 
 ideas because we have no faculty for their formation. His 
 catalogue of faculties is incomplete. The concept represents a 
 thing's nature or essence without accidental conditions; the 
 image sets forth concrete conditions. The concept is one ap- 
 plicable to many; the image is applicable to but one. The 
 concept is immutable and necessary; the image, changeable, 
 different in each individual of the same class. When we say 
 that the whale is a mammal, we mean no particular whale, but 
 every whale. Eeflection and self-consciousness demand intel- 
 lect. We can recognize ourselves as something more than our 
 transient states. Something goes over from primitive condi- 
 tion to present condition of consciousness. That something is 
 not sense. Ergo it is intellect. 
 
 The intellect is a spiritual, non-organic faculty; sense is an 
 organic, corporeal, material faculty. Objects of sense are ma- 
 terial phenomena, and sense employs bodily organs. The eye 
 sees, the ear hears, or better still, the soul sees and hears by 
 means of the eye and ear. The soul thinks by means of the 
 intellect. It thinks by means of the phantasm only acci- 
 dentally, or because of the present union in force between body 
 and soul. Unity of consciousness is possible to only a spiritual 
 agent, because matter cannot be turned back upon itself. In- 
 dividual, concrete objects appeal to an organic faculty, like 
 sense; universal ideas, necessary judgments appeal to only a 
 spiritual faculty, an intellect. Extrinsic dependence of intel- 
 lect on brain is far from making it material. Stimulation of 
 sense is a conditio sine qua non in this life for intellectual ac- 
 tivity, not a cause. 
 
 Balmes and Lotze refute the Sensism of Condillac. Con- 
 dillac says, " a statue of gold with but one sensation has but 
 one attention and no judgment. Two sensations would form 
 
THESIS III 49 
 
 two attentions, and would make comparison and judgment pos- 
 sible." In this theory all sensation would be attention, and 
 all attention would be sensation. But attention is application 
 of the mind to something. The perception of the difference 
 between a pink rose and a red rose, is the effect of an activity 
 of a different order from sensation, and that is intellect. Dif- 
 ference is an abstraction, and no proper object of sense. As 
 Lotze says, attention has for purpose the discovery of relations, 
 a work beyond the reach of sense. 
 
 11. Universals — Systems : Nominalism, Conceptualism, Ex- 
 aggerated Realism, Moderate Realism. Universal is derived 
 from the Latin phrase, unum versus alia, and means one with 
 a relation to many, e. g. man, all essences are universals. Five 
 different ways of being universal, in causando, God as cause 
 of all things; in significando, words, James as standing for 
 all of that name; in repraesentando, circle on blackboard as 
 standing for all circles; in essendo, one existing of its nature 
 in many, man taken as an essence; in praedicando, one of its 
 nature predicated of many, man taken as an essence. Our 
 present question is about last two; and they mean, one thing 
 suitable to exist in many according to its whole being. 
 
 Essences are formal object of the intellect, without saying 
 a word about their existence in many. We now discuss whether 
 and how the mind conceives a universal, one existing in many. 
 NominaUsm teaches that universals are mere words. This 
 system admits universals in significando, denies universals in 
 repraesentando and in essendo, employing this argument: No 
 universal idea is possible without a universal object. But there 
 are no universal objects. Ergo there are no universal ideas, 
 and universals are mere words. Conceptualism teaches that 
 universals are mere ideas, without any corresponding reality; 
 they are mere figments or creations of the mind. This system 
 admits universals in repraesentando, denies universals in es- 
 sendo, employing this argument : Universal words call for uni- 
 versal ideas, with no universal object. Ergo universals are 
 mere ideas or concepts, with no corresponding reality a parte 
 rei, circle on board. Exaggerated Realism teaches that uni- 
 versal objects exist apart from and outside of us; that some- 
 where a universal man is just as much a concrete reality as an 
 individual man among us; employing this argument : Univer- 
 
50 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 sal words call for universal ideas, universal ideas call for uni- 
 versal objects. Ergo universal objects exist apart from and 
 outside of us. There are three schools of Exaggerated Real- 
 ism. Plato taught that in another sphere man, horse, tree 
 without individuating notes exist, like individuals here. On- 
 tologists, Malebranche and the rest, held that universals are 
 divine ideas immediately perceived by the mind. William of 
 Champeaux maintained that individuals of the same species 
 have numerically as well as specifically the one nature. 
 
 Moderate Realism teaches that universals are formally in the 
 mind, fundamentally in things, employing this argument : We 
 certainly have universal ideas, otherwise all science is out of 
 the question. There can be no idea without its corresponding 
 object, otherwise all our knowledge deteriorates to subjectivism 
 and idealism. On the other hand there can be no physical uni- 
 versal a parte rei, as that would be a contradiction in terms, 
 one and at the same time many under the same aspect. Hence 
 universals are formally in the mind, fundamentally in things. 
 Formally in the mind, because universality is not real but 
 logical. Fundamentally in things, because the similarity of 
 essences specifically the same, is foundation for conceiving 
 many as one. 
 
 Universals are of two kinds, direct and reflex. The names 
 explain themselves. A direct universal is the abstract essence, 
 or the essence separated from its individuating notes, with 
 never a word about its presence in one or many. A reflex uni- 
 versal is gotten from the direct by that operation of the mind 
 called reflection. The mind reflects on the direct and discovers 
 that it says a relation to many, that it is actually multiplied 
 or capable of multiplication in many. Indeterminate would be 
 the more proper name for direct. The reflex is the universal 
 properly and strictly so called. The direct is in the individual, 
 but with notes. The reflex is formally in the mind alone, it is 
 an ens rationis, it is in the individual only in potency. The 
 real universal is many actually, one in potency;. the logical is 
 many in potency, one actually. The real universal is the direct 
 universal, as explained above; the logical universal is the reflex 
 universal, it is the direct, considered apart from accompanying 
 individuating notes. The essence of man is one, human, capa- 
 ble of lodgment in every individual of the race. 
 
THESIS III 51 
 
 PROOFS 
 
 I. Intellect differs essentially from sense. Faculties are 
 essentially different, when their formal objects are essentially 
 different. But tlie formal objects of intellect and sense are 
 essentially different. Ergo. 
 
 With regard to the Major. An orange, as reached by the dif- 
 ferent senses, is example. 
 
 With regard to the Minor. Intellect perceives unextended 
 objects, and extended objects in an unextended way. Sense 
 perceives extended objects in an extended way. Unextended 
 objects are being, essence, existence, possibility, substance, right, 
 duty, virtue. Extended objects in an unextended way are man 
 as universal, all universals. Sense is an organic faculty, rooted 
 in whole composite, and necessarily knows only extended ob- 
 jects in an extended way, e.g. Man as object of vision. 
 
 PEINCIPLES 
 
 A. Only material things are known. Ansiver. By act of 
 phantasm, I grant; by intellect, I deny. 
 
 B. Intellect is intimately united with body. Answer. In 
 unextended way, I grant; in extended way, I deny. 
 
 PEOOFS 
 
 II. The mind has truly universal ideas. 
 
 Three things to prove. A. We have truly universal ideas, 
 against Nominalism and Conceptualism. 
 
 B. There are no universals a parte rei, against Exagger- 
 ated Realism. 
 
 C. Universals are fundamentally in things; formally, in the 
 mind. A. 1°, The common nouns in our language prove truly 
 universal ideas. They stand for something. Otherwise most 
 of our language is vain. They stand for nothing individual, 
 like a man; they stand for no collection of individuals like an 
 army. Every individual has its own particular name; and the 
 name of a collection cannot be attributed to its component 
 parts. An individual man is John Smith or something such. 
 
52 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 no single soldier is called the army. Ergo common nouns 
 stand for something common to many, or for universals, and 
 we have truly universal ideas. 
 
 2°. The collective nouns in our language, like army, prove 
 truly universal ideas. No idea of a collection can be had with- 
 out some enumeration of individuals, and this enumeration of 
 individuals is impossible without universal ideas. A stone and 
 a plant cannot be united in a collection, or enumerated as two 
 in their capacity of stone and plant; but only in their capacity 
 of corporeal substances or bodies, the note common to both. 
 John Smith and James Brown cannot be united in the collec- 
 tion called army, or counted as two in their capacity of indi- 
 vidual men; but only in their capacity of soldiers, the note 
 common to both. Arithmetic can do nothing with a barrel of 
 molasses and a ton of hay taken individually; but it can find 
 their value in money or in weight, the notes common to both. 
 
 B. Exaggerated Eealism is a contradiction, because it as- 
 cribes unity and plurality to the same thing under the same 
 respect. Moderate Eealism escapes blame, because it makes 
 the object of a universal idea plural really and one logically; 
 plural, inasmuch as it exists fundamentally in things; one, in- 
 asmuch as it exists formally in the mind. 
 
 C. 1°. Universals are fundamentally in things, formally 
 in the mind. Things and mind cooperate to form universals. 
 Things contribute the matter, mind contributes: the form. 
 Ergo universals are fundamentally in things, formally in the 
 mind. 
 
 2°. The similarity of essences specifically the same and nu- 
 merically different is in things, and this similarity is foundation 
 for conceiving many as one. Ergo universals are funda- 
 mentally in things. 
 
 3°. Unity and communicability constitute the formality or 
 essence of a universal. Both are due to work of the mind, 
 and are not in things. 
 
 Ergo universals are formally in the mind. 
 
 With regard to Minor. Before work of the mind, essences 
 specifically the same are numerically many, not one. They are 
 as many as the individuals possessing them. 
 
 Before work of the mind, essences are not communicable, but 
 individual; each essence is restricted or limited to the indi- 
 
THESIS III 53 
 
 vidual possessing it; the essence man in John Smith, belongs 
 exclusively to John Smith, and to no other. 
 
 N.B. The whole universal, direct as well as reflex, is an 
 ens rationis. John Smith is an ens reale. When we say, 
 John Smith is a man, we mean that he is an ens rationis and 
 something more, he is a direct universal along with individuat- 
 ing notes. The direct universal, on which reflection works to 
 produce the reflex universal, though it is an individual essence, 
 is not an ens reale. An individual essence is an ens reale, when 
 taken as it exists in nature, with individuating notes. The di- 
 rect universal is indeed an individual essence, but stripped of its 
 individuating notes, and taken as it exists in the mind, not as 
 it exists in nature. Ergo the whole universal is an ens ra- 
 tionis. 
 
 Corollaries. A. How we know our own body and singulars. 
 
 B. How we know our soul. 
 
 C. How we know God. 
 
 A. We know our own body and singulars by reflection. Re- 
 flection is twofold; strict and less strict. Strict turns on 
 faculty's own acts; less strict turns on acts of another faculty. 
 "We know individuals as individuals by reflection on phantasms 
 of them. Ergo we know singulars directly through the senses, 
 indirectly through the intellect, reflecting on sensations. All 
 this is plain from' the circumstance that we define or cogni- 
 tively grasp individuals with the help of notes falling under 
 the senses, like time, place, shape, color. 
 
 Ergo intellect has knowledge of singulars from the senses. 
 But the senses never lead into the intellect. Ergo the intellect 
 reflects on the senses. 
 
 B. We know our soul through its acts, not through its 
 essence. Otherwise we should always know our soul, and this 
 knowledge at times escapes us. 
 
 C. We know God by negation, affirmation, and analogy. 
 Our concepts of God are analogical and negative-positive. 
 
 PEINCIPLES 
 
 A. 'No concept, unless object is real. Universal is not real. 
 Ergo no universal idea. 
 
54 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 Answer. Unless real with regard to wliat is conceived, I 
 grant; with regard to manner in which it is conceived, I again 
 distinguish; unless real fundamentally, I grant; unless real 
 formally, 1 deny. 
 
 B. Manner of ohject's existence precedes act of faculty. 
 Ergo universals a parte rei. 
 
 Answer. Fundamentally at least, I grant; formally, I deny. 
 
 C. One and many, of same tiling, a contradiction. Ergo no 
 universal. 
 
 Answer. Under same respect, I grant; under different re- 
 spects, I deny. Entitatively and representatively. 
 
 D. Essence is one in many individuals before work of the 
 mind. Ergo. 
 
 Answer. Specifically, I grant; numerically, I deny. Log- 
 ical unity, and real unity. 
 
The Soul — What It Is Not 
 THESIS IV 
 
 Monism in whatever shape is no adequate explanation of the 
 soul. 
 
 Maher, pp. 474-524; Jouin, pp. 186, 187. 
 
 QUESTION 
 
 Our opponents are Kant, Hume, Mill, James, Monists 
 
 According to Kant our knowledge or certainty is limited to 
 phenomena, or appearances, or experiences, whether they he 
 sensible or intellectual. IFe have no certain knowledge about 
 noumena, or things in themselves. In this question of the soul, 
 or the Ego, as he prefers to call it, he distinguishes between 
 phenomena and noumena by recognizing an empirical Ego and 
 a transcendental Ego. In plain language, the first is the soul 
 apj)ealing to our notice in its several activities of thinking, 
 willing, remembering, believing, loving, reflecting, hoping and 
 the like. In this phase tlie Ego belongs to the class of phenom- 
 ena, it can be studied with profit, and in its discussion we can 
 compass knowledge or certainty. The second or transcendental 
 Ego is the soul in itself, and apart from its activities. Thus 
 considered, the soul belongs to noumena, it is beyond our mental 
 reach, and time spent in its study is time wasted, and the whole 
 thing ends in uncertainty, confusion and superstition. We 
 contend that noumena are as much the object of knowledge as 
 phenomena, that we have minds as well as senses, and that the 
 mind's eye sees farther and better than the body's. We have 
 immediate knowledge of the soul, and that is a distinct gain 
 over our knowledge of outside phenomena. We have no intui- 
 tion of a naked pure Ego, stripped of all particular forms of 
 behavior, and we have need of no such intuition. It is quite 
 impossible in our present condition of dependence on sense for 
 knowledge. But, with the help of internal observation, com- 
 
 55 
 
56 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 bined with rational deduction from evident principles, we can 
 prove to certainty that the soul is a real, abiding, simple, spir- 
 itual and immortal being; and that is what we purpose doing 
 in the next thesis. 
 
 The Empiricists, witJi Hume for leader, make mind a suc- 
 cession of transitory feelings, because forsooth senses vouch 
 for no permanent self or abiding basis of these changes, and 
 knowledge vouched for by the senses is alone valid knowledge. 
 At any rate, the senses vouch for these transitory feelings; and 
 the mind, beginning work where the senses leave oil', unequivo- 
 cally informs us that judgment, reasoning, reflection, memory, 
 with a bearing on these evanescent states, vouclied for by the 
 senses, would be absolutely impossible without the existence of 
 a real, abiding subject, which puts together and holds together 
 the terms of the judgment, which combines the premisses of 
 the syllogism, which compares past with present states in re- 
 flection and memory. As well have a separate dynamo for 
 each electric light in the city, for each car in the Subway, or 
 Tube. Mill makes the mind a series of feelings aware of itself 
 as a series, and talks of a thread of consciousness, to secure the 
 needed unity of mind in its different activities. But a series 
 always remains a series, and the Ego is with Mill just as much 
 a mere succession of states as it is with Hume. In our theory 
 the Ego is not, as Mill thinks, something diiferent, in the sense 
 of separate, from any series of feelings. The true Ego is the 
 mind plus its states. It is an abiding existence, with a series 
 of feelings. Its states are but modifications of the Ego. 
 Hume flatly denies the need of a permanent subject for thought- 
 activity. Mill sees permanency in a series aware of itself as a 
 series. 
 
 James of Harvard, rejecting Hume and Mill, secures perma- 
 nency of subject by conceiving the Ego as a stream of con- 
 sciousness, in which each section knows the previous section and 
 in it all that went before. And he illustrates ownership by ap- 
 pealing to the example of a long succession of herdsmen, com- 
 ing rapidly into possession of the same cattle by bequest. Each 
 thought is thus born an owner, and dies owned, transmitting 
 whatever it realized as its self to its later proprietor. Tlie 
 chief features in James' theory are, stream, cognition of pre- 
 ceding states, and inheritance. The expression, series of states. 
 
THESIS IV 57 
 
 is certainly more accurate than stream, because of interruptions 
 by sleep and the like. Present thought's ownership of all 
 former learning is a mystery, without the permanency of some 
 subject that appropriated and retains all previous learning. 
 My present thought was not in existence years ago to be vested 
 with ownership in anything. In the case of the cattle the title 
 was always in existence. It would be interesting to know what 
 happens to the stream during six or seven hours of sleep and 
 unconsciousness, unless some permanent, abiding subject bridges 
 the gap. A man's ownership of cows is different from his own- 
 ership of past existence. It must forever remain hard to un- 
 derstand how each pulse of cognitive consciousness possesses the 
 life history of the individual; and that is James' theory. It is 
 a paroxysmal unintelligibility. The common sense theory is 
 much less open to objection. The soul, the subject of past ex- 
 periences, abides within me, and possesses the power to repro- 
 duce and recognize many of these past experiences, forever alive 
 to its own identity in successive thoughts. 
 
 Arguments of James. 
 
 (1) No soul is needed. Answer. Persevering identity of 
 conscious subject, judgments, reasoning, memory are impos- 
 sible without it. 
 
 (2) The soul is worthless to explain thought. Answer. 
 Conscious succession of thought is impossible without it. The 
 notion of thoughts and feelings inhering in nothing is absurd 
 and unthinkable. Were such thoughts and feelings possible, 
 they would never constitute an enduring Ego. 
 
 (5) The argument from free will is nothing worth. An- 
 swer. It is worth much when deliberation, reflection, resist- 
 ance, responsibility, remorse are taken into account. 
 
 (^) James stands for an anima mundi, a universal soul. 
 
 Answer, (a) There is no evidence in favor of its existence. 
 We argue from our own soul to that of others because of organ- 
 ism. 
 
 (6) It is an incoherent notion and in conflict with facts, 
 (c) It leads to pantheism. 
 
 Double consciousness doubles the difficulty for Mr. James. 
 In the case of Felida I, and Eelida II, the phenomenon is no 
 
58 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 doubt due to faintly conscious activities, or to reflex and auto- 
 matic processes of the animated organism. 
 
 TERMS 
 
 Dualism and Monism. 
 
 r Ultra — Plato and Descartes. 
 
 (_ Moderate — Aristotle, St. Thomas, and Scholastics. 
 
 Idealism — Berkeley. 
 
 Materialism — Cabanis, Vogt, Molcschott, Huxley, 
 
 Buchner, Locke, Bain, Hodgson. 
 Iicalistic — Clifford, A. Bain, Spencer, Huxley, Hoff- 
 
 Dualism -l 
 
 Monism 
 
 ling. 
 
 Monism makes mind and body one. Dualism makes mind 
 and body two. Ultra Dualism makes mind and body too sep- 
 arate, with Plato and Descartes for advocates. Moderate Dual- 
 ism puts mind and body in substantial uniori, ivith Ari^otle 
 and Scholastics for advocates. Monism is of three kinds, Ideal- 
 ism, Materialism, Realistic Monism. Idealism- teaches that 
 there is no matter, that everything is mind. In Idealism the 
 material world is an illusory creation of the mind; all minds 
 are one, all are wavelets on the ocean of universal conscious- 
 ness. Materialism teaches that there is no mind, that every- 
 thing is matter. Arguments : 
 
 (1) Experience vouches for brain, not for mind. 
 Answer. Reason vouches for mind. 
 
 (2) Thought is dependent on neural functions. 
 Answer. Extrinsically ; a condition is no cause. 
 
 (3) We cannot imagine how matter acts on mind and vice- 
 versa. 
 
 Answer. We can understand. 
 
 (4) Conservation of energy and law of inertia are opposed 
 to interaction. 
 
 Answer. These laws are meant for matter. 
 
 (5) According to Cabanis thought is a secretion of the brain ; 
 according to Vogt, the relation between thought and the brain 
 is the same as between bile and liver; according to Moleschott 
 thought is motion in matter, phosphorescence of the brain. 
 
 Answer. Thought is unextended; secretion is movement, a 
 
THESIS IV 59 
 
 material product, occupies space, result possesses weight and 
 resistance, external senses can perceive process, results continue 
 when unperceived. Conscious states are just the reverse, their 
 esse is their percipi. 
 
 (6) Huxley makes thought a function of nervous matter. 
 
 Answer. The one function of matter is to experience move- 
 ments or changes in matter. The brain functions or expends 
 energy when we think, but this functioning or expenditure of 
 energy is not thought. 
 
 (7) With Buchner, mind is a sort of steam engine, magnet- 
 ism, electricity. 
 
 Answer. These things cause movement like the organism of 
 the body; but consciousness is different; it is life centered in 
 one single being, in a peculiarly indivisible unit. 
 
 (8) Locke teaches that matter has many unknown qualities, 
 and that thought may be one of them. 
 
 Answer. Matter has no quality directly contrary to its own 
 nature, God cannot effect a metaphysical impossibility. 
 
 (9) Bain argues that dependence on matter disproves spirit- 
 uality. Mind varies with weight of brain, its convolutions, its 
 phosphorescent activity; mentality increases and deteriorates 
 with growth of brain. 
 
 Answer. Scholastics never conceived the soul an independent 
 entity isolated from the body. The soul is the substantial form 
 of the body, implying most intimate union and mutual inter- 
 dependence. Therefore, bodily conditions influence mental 
 operations. The intellect requires as an essential condition 
 operations of sense and imagination, and whatever affects them 
 affects the operations of the intellect. The intellect is, there- 
 fore, extrinsically dependent on organs for its material. Its 
 activity, manifest in thoughts, judgments, reasoning, psycho- 
 logical reflection, consciousness, proclaims it spiritual and in- 
 trinsically independent of matter. We never find mind apart 
 from the body, but we often find the body apart from mind. 
 
 N.B. About the size and weight of brain. Taken absolutely, 
 the brain of an elephant or whale weighs more than a man's. 
 Taken relatively, that of a titmouse or child weighs more than 
 an adult's. Considering convolutions, the brain of an ox is su- 
 perior to man's. In point of phosphorus, the brain of a sheep 
 or goose is richer than a man's. The measurement of an aver- 
 
60 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 age Parisian's skull is 1.5 ; that of a Cave-man 1.6. Gambetta's 
 brain weighed only two and a half pounds. Four pounds are 
 ordinary. 
 
 (10) AVith Dr. Shadworth Hodgson, conscious states never con- 
 dition, modify or determine each other. All Materialists main- 
 tain that there is no reaction of consciousness on nerves. 
 Neural or cerebral action conditions consciousness. He alleges 
 as an example a man turning aside from a wheelbarrow. The 
 image on the retina determines nerve-action, and nerve-action 
 results in the appropriate movement. The mental state is a 
 mere epiphenomenon. The only alternative is the admission of 
 an immaterial agent, and we have no experience of that. 
 
 Answer. Take other examples besides wheelbarrow; novelist 
 writing a novel, a detective gathering clews, a man seeking re- 
 venge in murder, premisses in syllogism and conclusion. 
 
 Real Monism teaches that mind and body are not two dis- 
 tinct realities, hut merely two aspects, sides, phases of one be- 
 ing; and that there is no real interaction between mental and 
 bodily states. In other words, mind and body are one; mind 
 is body, and body is mind. 
 
 W. Clifford, A. Bain, H. Spencer, Huxley and H off ding up- 
 hold Real Monism. 
 
 Clifford invented the word mind-stuff. Every particle of 
 matter has a bit of rudimentary intelligence. The molecules 
 of matter and appended morsels of mind have no mutual influ- 
 ence or interaction. Each goes it own way, and hence Parallel- 
 ism. Arguments: (1) Parallelism is plain from Physiology. 
 (2) Mutual interaction is impossible from Physics. {3) Ori- 
 gin of life in dead matter is plain from Evolution. In the 
 jelly-fish mind-stuff rises to sentience. Elements of mind-stuff 
 are enclosed in a film on under side of fish. In vertebrates 
 mind-stuff rises to consciousness; in the human brain, to in- 
 telligence. 
 
 Bain restricts Parallelism to man. With him, mental life is 
 a phase or aspect of neural changes. Mental and physical pro- 
 ceed together as undivided twins. There is no interaction be- 
 tween mind and body, nothing but unbroken material succes- 
 sion. Neural antecedents alone determine neural changes, men- 
 tal sequence goes with material sequence, but never modifies it. 
 
 Spencer sees and acknowledges the impossibility of identify- 
 
THESIS IV 61 
 
 ing mental states with neural processes, or mind with body. A 
 unit of feeling, he says, has nothing in common with a unit 
 of motion. And yet he concludes with Clifford and Bain that 
 mind and nervous action are subjective and objective faces of 
 the same thing, which is itself unknowable. 
 
 Answer. Clifford makes too large a call on our faith. Sci- 
 ence never yet discovered a trace of feeling or intelligence in 
 minerals or dead matter. Bain has to explain why bodies in 
 conscious beings have this subjective aspect, while other bodies 
 are without it. Consciousness cannot be a new form of ma- 
 terial energy, unless he admits that material energy can issue 
 forth from consciousness. Conservation of energy demands this 
 mutual interchange according to physicists. The mind-stuff in 
 molecules is either conscious or unconscious. If unconscious, 
 no multitude of unconscious acts can constitute conscious in- 
 telligence. If conscious, all material things ought to own a 
 mental existence. Plants and leaves ought to have minds, steam- 
 tugs ought to rejoice, an abandoned coal-mine ought to enter- 
 tain emotions of sadness. Besides, mental states are not com- 
 posite; they are indivisible, as is evident in thought, judgment, 
 reasoning, memory, self-consciousness; and their principle is 
 not made up of separate minute intelligences. 
 
 Monism is absurd in its denial of mind's influence on body. 
 In Evolution, its own pet theory, natural selection and struggle 
 for existence suppose that pleasurable feelings, awakened by 
 songs and colors in birds, determine and modify their bodily 
 activity. If thought never influences action, we cannot argue 
 to the existence of other minds besides our own. Mind and 
 will, love and hate, would have nothing to do with the wonder- 
 ful changes in history. J^eural groupings would be their sole 
 cause. All mental activity would be only an aspect or phase 
 of body, with no efficient bearing on events beyond mere se- 
 quence and succession. The terms employed by Monists are 
 ludicrous, crutches for halting theories, childish attempts to 
 deceive with half-understood words, metaphorical phrasings ex- 
 pressive of the talker's ignorance. For instance, a two-sided 
 cause is about as intelligible as a blue sound or a three-sided 
 motion. 
 
 Hoffding appeals to two laws. Conservation of Energy and 
 Inertia. 
 
62 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 Conservation of Energy makes the sum total of energy in the 
 nniver.'ie remain always the same. 
 
 Inertia makes rest or uniform motion in a straight line con- 
 tinue, unless impressed forces change it. 
 
 Ansircr. ]'hysical movement is modified not only by phys- 
 ical forces, but also by ideas. Witness the part ideas of justice, 
 fair treatment and tiie like play in strikes and other economic 
 upheavals. The first law is verified only in case of inanimate 
 matter, and cannot be demonstrated for living organisms. 
 Even in the case of inanimate matter it would not seem to be 
 universal. Witness a cap setting off a ton of dynamite. The 
 soul must not be considered a foreign agent acting on the body; 
 it is the body's substantial form, most intimately united with it. 
 It modifies not the quantity of the body's energy, but its qual- 
 ity; and the liberation and control of a man's physical activity 
 by his mind, in the shape of thoughts and wishes, need not con- 
 flict with the law of conservation of energy. About the law 
 of inertia, Hoffding changes Newton's formula to read thus, 
 the state of a material point can be altered only through the 
 influence of another material point; and thus worded the law 
 is abundantly refuted by reference to natural selection in Evolu- 
 tion, to our knowledge of minds in other men, and to history's 
 dependence on thoughts, ideas, principles and feelings. New- 
 ton was too wise a philosopher to make any such mistake. Lu- 
 ther, to suit his vile purposes, changed the wording of the Bible ; 
 small wonder if Hoffding changes the wording of Newton's 
 formula. Finally, Monism rests not on reason, but on faith, 
 with ignorant men like Hoff'ding for sole authority; and it fin- 
 ishes in Agnosticism. 
 
The Soul — What It Is 
 THESIS V 
 
 TTie rational soul of man is an immaterial or spiritual sub- 
 stance, that V?, in its existence and in its operations it is intririr- 
 sically independent of matter. The rational soul of man is a 
 substance physicalh/ simple in point of essence and in point of 
 extension. In man there is but one soul, the life-giving prin- 
 ciple of his understanding, JlIs sensible perception, and his 
 growth. In man the rational soul and the human body are 
 so united among themselves that from the union a single na- 
 ture, or a single substance arises. 
 
 Maher, pp. 459-47-i; 54i-579. Jouin, pp. 180-193. 
 
 QUESTION 
 
 This and the succeeding thesis are most important. They 
 constitute the body of what we term Eational Psychology as 
 opposed to Empirical ; cause-Ps3'chology as opposed to effect- 
 Psycholog}\ In them we determine what reason teaches re- 
 garding the nature, origin and destiny of the human soul. 
 And the method we follow is at the same time inductive and 
 deductive. From what the soul does we gather what the soul is. 
 
 In the preceding thesis we mentioned Materialism. Its de- 
 fenders, if logical, are ultimately forced to the deplorable and 
 unlovely expedient of denying first and foremost the existence 
 of God, then the immateriality of the soul and its immortality. 
 In Materialism man is only a more delicately elaborated brute, 
 with organs favorable to nicer combinations of chemical ele- 
 ments, and an arrangement of parts conducive to a fuller appli- 
 cation of the physical forces of dead nature. This is Material- 
 ism reduced to its barest simplicity. Some ^laterialists may 
 repudiate this analysis of their system, and indignantly pro- 
 test that no such tenets are theirs. They are at least unwilling 
 
 63 
 
64 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 witnesses to the repugnance ever evinced by reason to false and 
 unsound theories; and, to the detriment of their reputation as 
 logicians, they halt before a difficulty, that can be neither 
 climbed over, nor gone around, nor removed. With us, matter 
 is in the present imperfect condition of things an indispensable 
 requisite for work of the mind. Man's soul is so wedded to his 
 body, his intellect to his senses, that thought depends on sen- 
 sible perception, and therefore mind on matter, in much the 
 same way as the sculptor depends on his block of marble. But 
 matter of itself is as incapable of thinking as the unshapen 
 rock is of transforming itself into a Venus of Phidias or a Moses 
 of Michael Angelo. Organs are not the cause of thought, they 
 are a mere condition. Brain is to thought what light is to vision. 
 Vision is impossible without light, but nobody ever thought 
 light the cause of vision. Only a fool could be guilty of think- 
 ing or saying that light sees. Pain and sunshine are necessarj' 
 for vegetation, without being its cause. If mind and will were 
 organic, they ought to be for the organism. They are not for 
 the organism, but for higher and spiritual good. Intellect and 
 will cannot add an inch to a man's stature. They cannot im- 
 prove his digestion or cure the body's ills. 
 
 Materialism, if true, would of course put outside of all ques- 
 tion the other properties attributed by us to the soul. Its sim- 
 plicity, its oneness, and the part it plays in the composition of 
 man, would be foolish fancies, since it would be itself only the 
 offspring of a dream. Plato, that master mind of antiquity, 
 trusting to sensible emotions that arise within us when affected 
 by one movement of the soul or another, recognized in man the 
 presence of three more or less separate souls; the principle of 
 Jinowledge situated in the brain, the principle of anger or im- 
 petuous desire situated in the heart, and the principle of milder 
 desire and growth situated in the liver. The followers of Apol- 
 linaris and the Manicheans were content with two ; the former, 
 with principles of sensible perception and intellectual knowl- 
 edge; the latter, with principles of good and evil. In this 
 matter Pope Pius IX saw fit to condemn the teachings of a 
 certain Gunther, who described man as a happy union of spirit 
 and matter, resulting, however, from a process of evolution, 
 by which matter in man, pushed to its utmost perfection, put 
 on the nature of a spirit, and assumed the dignity of a human 
 
THESIS V ^5 
 
 soul. Our doctrine, the only admissible doctrine on this point, 
 is that man's parents make ready his body. On its completion, 
 God by a separate and individual creative act breathes into the 
 body a soul, the image of Himself, destined never to die. 
 
 The combined action of soul and body, and the influence 
 they exert on one another, are full of difficulty. The one safe 
 way of explaining these partial mysteries is that, which at the 
 same time answers all reasonable questions, and avoids the rocks 
 on which great minds split. Such an explanation we adopt. 
 Plato, following his theory of the soul's imprisonment for some 
 past offense, attributed to the rational soul of man about the 
 same influence over his body as the sailor exerts on his ship, 
 the rider on his horse. With him, therefore, soul and body 
 were hardly more a unit than are the sailor and his ship. 
 Malebranche applied Occasionalism to the intercommunication 
 between soul and body. This theory makes God constantly 
 work miracles, and is altogether opposed to our consciousness 
 of the influence exerted by outside objects on our thoughts, and 
 of the mutual interaction in force between body and soul. It 
 makes phases of mind occasions provoking God to produce cor- 
 responding changes of body, and vice-versa. Leibnitz refers 
 everything to the preestablished harmony mentioned in Ontol- 
 ogy. He solves the problem with one miracle, accomplished 
 from the start, when soul and body are arranged to keep to- 
 gether like two clocks. All three, Plato, Malebranche, and Leib- 
 nitz, destroy the intimate physical union of soul and body, and 
 the mutual interchange of influences between them, which we 
 recognize, and for which in this thesis we contend. 
 
 TEEMS 
 
 Rational Soul. The soul of man can be well and briefly de- 
 scribed as the root and principle of his whole life. His life 
 partakes of all three kingdoms, vegetable, brute and human; 
 and its principle is therefore at one and the same time a vege- 
 table soul, an animal soul, and a rational soul. Here we desig- 
 nate it by the last epithet, because it expresses his true dignity, 
 and implicitly predicates of him the lower perfections, vegeta- 
 tion and animality or sensation. 
 
 Immaterial. Immateriality and simplicity are quite differ- 
 
66 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 eut notion?. SimpUcily, formally and strictly iahen, is the 
 denial of conipodtion, or uf parts; itmnateiiality is the denial 
 of intimate, intrinsic dependence on matter, he it primal or 
 second matter. Extrinsic dependence on matter, such as is nat- 
 ural to man's soul during its sojourn on earth, or that necessity 
 it lies under of deriving all its knowledge and exerting all its 
 faculties through the agency of the body's organs, nohow lessens 
 or interferes with its intrinsic independence of matter, or that 
 natural right it possesses to existence or being with absolute 
 freedom from matter. The brute's soul is both intrinsically 
 and extrinsically dependent on matter; that is to say, it derives 
 its original being from matter, and depends as well on matter 
 for its every act. However, it is not matter, but something 
 quite distinct from it. Neither is it necessary to know just 
 what it is; since there are in the universe things innumerable, 
 of whose essences we are wholly or partially ignorant; and this 
 principle of life is one of them. To exact such knowledge of 
 us would be as absurd as to demand of the scientist what is the 
 precise nature of that mysterious force, which, generated by the 
 rapid revolution of metallic plates, lights up a city and carries 
 commuters home. 
 
 Substance. Man's soul is a substance. All beings are di- 
 vided into substances and accidents. We are better acquainted 
 with accidents than with substances, because they appeal to our 
 senses. But we are more certain about the reality of substances, 
 than we are about the reality of accidents, because our informa- 
 tion regarding them is based on reason, a more reliable instru- 
 ment of knowledge than the senses. Naturally speaking, there 
 can be no accident witliout its corresponding substance. Acci- 
 dents of their very nature inhere or subsist in another, and that 
 other is substance. Y^ou can have no shape, no color, no pain, 
 no thought without a something to base them. Sfotion is un- 
 thinkable without something that is moved. Thoughts cannot 
 inhere in nothing, desires cannot proceed from nothing. Inner 
 experience is testimony conclusive that there is within me an 
 Ego or self, which is the center and source of my ever changing 
 acts and states. Thoughts and wishes appear and disappear, 
 the thinker or wisher goes on forever. What thought within 
 me a year ago, thinks witliin me to-day. Substance is not a 
 mere noumenon, which never reveals itself to knowledge. It 
 
THESIS V 67 
 
 is not a secret substratum, like the core of an onion ; its pri- 
 mary element is not permanence without change, but existence 
 in itself and not in another. It can be produced by another, 
 but after its production it stands in itself without exigence of 
 inhesion in another as in a subject. Permanence amid changes 
 is a property flowing from its nature. In the case of an in- 
 complete substance it can unite with another to form one com- 
 plete substance; but this union is of a peculiar kind, not at all 
 like the inhesion proper to accidents. The soul is an incom- 
 plete, not a complete substance. It is a substance, because it 
 exists in itself; it is incomplete, because it is designed by na- 
 ture to inform and enliven the human body, and so help to 
 the finish of the complete substance, man. It is a spiritual in- 
 complete substance or form, and differs from pure spirits or 
 angelic forms only in this point, that nature intended it to be 
 bound up with the human body, while angels are ordained to 
 nothing such. In other words, angels are completely subsistent 
 forms, the human soul is an incompletely subsistent one. 
 
 That the soul is a real unitary being, which abides the same 
 during all the varying modes of consciousness, is plain in re- 
 flection on past experiences, and in that process of memory we 
 call recollection. Judgments and the syllogism are impossible 
 without the permanence of a being during the interval it takes 
 to pass from subject to predicate, from premisses to conclusion. 
 Our assurance about past events is as live and vivid as our 
 assurance about the present. Material organism completely 
 changes in a comparatively short time. It is therefore no en- 
 during basis for reflection or recollection. Fleeting acts in the 
 same way are no permanent foundation for linking the years. 
 Apart from memory, self-consciousness discloses only the pres- 
 ent existence of the Ego; but memory adds to consciousness 
 persistent identity of the mind as a real being. The Ego al- 
 ways sails into view as the combining center of past and present 
 experiences. 
 
 Physically simple. Simplicity is the denial of composition, 
 and a good idea of physical simplicity as opposed to metaphys- 
 ical simplicity, and of what constitutes the various kinds of 
 simplicity and composition, can be gathered from an inspection 
 of the diagram of wholes, set down under Division in Minor 
 Logic. The soul is composed of metaphysical parts, essence 
 
68 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 and existence; it is composed, too, of various faculties which 
 make it what was there described as a virtual whole. But these 
 degrees of composition do not in the least interfere with its 
 physical simplicity in point of essence and in point of exten- 
 sion. In other words, the soul is neither a physical essential 
 whole, nor a physical integral wliole. A physical essential 
 whole is composed of matter and form; and the human soul is 
 a pure form without any admixture of matter. A physical in- 
 tegral whole contains parts of a fixed quantity, size, magnitude ; 
 and no such division touches the human soul. Some are of 
 opinion that the soul of a brute is thus composed of parts, and 
 that in its entirety it exists spread over the whole body, with- 
 out existing in any part of the body whole and entire. Scholas- 
 tics in general, with St. Thomas, hold the contrary opinion; 
 and we stand with them. According to them the brute soul 
 is simple per se; and, because completely immersed in matter, 
 divisible per accidens. All are agreed that the human soul 
 enjoys definitive existence, existing at the same time whole and 
 entire throughout the body, and whole and entire in each part 
 of the same. 
 
 Location of the soul. The soul's simplicity settles its loca- 
 tion. Because it is simple, the soul exists whole and entire in 
 the whole body, whole and entire in each part of the body. 
 This kind of existence, peculiar to spirits, is called definitive 
 as opposed to circumscriptive, the kind peculiar to bodies. A 
 body, because of its quantitative extension, fills its place in such 
 a way that the whole body is in its whole space and only a part 
 of it is in each part of its space. Eeason is entirely responsible 
 for our notion of definitive existence. The imagination helps 
 only fundamentally, not formally; because imagination has to 
 do with only extended bodies and their qualities. It would be 
 vain, therefore, to strive to imagine definitive existence. The 
 soul, therefore, exists whole and entire in the whole body, whole 
 and entire in each part of the body. 
 
 The soul, we have already seen, is not a physical essential or 
 a physical integral whole. It is, however, a metaphysical whole, 
 composed of the three faculties, vegetative, sensitive and intel- 
 lectual, which are functions of one and the same soul. Though 
 the whole soul is present in each part of the body, it is not 
 everywliere present in all its activity or force. Its vegetative 
 
THESIS V 69 
 
 and sensitive activities are intrinsically dependent on set and 
 special organs; its intellectual activity is extrinsically depend- 
 ent on the imagination and sensile consciousness, and they are 
 situated in the brain. Though present whole and entire in all 
 three organs, the soul sees only in the eye, hears only in the 
 ear, and thinks only in the brain. This fact led some phi- 
 losophers, who denied the substantial union of soul and body, 
 to restrict the soul to definite locations in the body. Plato and 
 Descartes made the brain its residence; others, the heart, the 
 blood, the cerebellum, the spinal marrow and so on and so 
 forth. 
 
 We prove in the fourth part of our thesis that body and 
 Goul in man coalesce as matter and form to make one complete 
 substance, one complete nature. In other words, the soul ani- 
 mates the body, the whole body; and as this animation is a vital 
 or immanent act, the soul must be present wherever it has 
 place; in every part of the body, in even the hair, the nails 
 and the teeth. The whole soul is in each part of the body, be- 
 cause, as a simple substance, wherever it exists it exists whole; 
 and it animates every solid portion of the body at least by 
 way of vegetative principle. Different faculties can be con- 
 sidered metaphysical parts of the soul, calling for organs of 
 definite shape and efficacy; and the metaphysical parts have 
 fixed locations in the body, determined by the seats of the sev- 
 eral organs. Thus, the soul, as far as its power of seeing or 
 hearing is concerned, is in the eye or ear respectively; and so 
 of the rest. Were the reverse true, the body would be as ca- 
 pable of understanding as it is of growth. The intellect is in 
 the brain, inasmuch as it is the seat of the imagination, on 
 which the intellect extrinsically depends. It is in the foot, in- 
 asmuch as it is in the soul, which communicates life to the 
 foot and actuates it. Man is what results from union of soul 
 and whole body, not what results from union of soul and part 
 of the body. The soul fills the body in much the same way 
 as God fills Heaven and earth, not as air fills the room. When 
 an arm or limb is removed, the substance of the soul is not 
 diminished, because it is without quantity. It merely loses a 
 presence, and its activity is limited in extent. 
 
 Phrenology attempted to locate in the brain the precise posi- 
 tions of various mental powers. Bumps may indicate sensa- 
 
70 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 tion-development, they can never measure intellectual or emo- 
 tional development, because intellectual faculties are not lo- 
 cated in organs or intrinsically dependent on them. Cerebral 
 functions can be located, and of late years motor-centers and 
 sensation-centers have been settled with some definiteness. Stim- 
 ulation by electricity in certain areas of the brain produces 
 movement in certain limbs; and definite portions of the brain 
 seem to be connected with the work of the eye, the ear and the 
 other senses. Much of the brain, especially in the frontal re- 
 gion, is silent or not responsive, and this unoccujjied territory 
 may belong to memory, imagination, and the other internal 
 senses already described and explained. St. Thomas centuries 
 ago hinted as much, when he assigned each its own particular 
 portion of the brain. The motor-center is usually found on tho 
 side of the head opposite to the correlated member. 
 
 One kSoul. The unity proper to the soul is that of indivisi- 
 bility. The human soul, besides being undivided or one, is in- 
 divisible per se and per accidens. 
 
 Substance and Nature. A substance is a being existing in it- 
 self. A nature is a substance, viewed as a being possessed of 
 activity. Since, therefore, every substance, as soon as it begins 
 to exist, contains within itself an activity peculiar and proper 
 to its own species, every substance is a nature. The distinc- 
 tion between the two is only a distinction of reason. 
 
 Division — Four parts. 
 
 I. The soul of man is a spiritual substance. 
 
 II. The soul of man is a simple substance. 
 
 III. The soul of man is one. 
 
 IV. Body and soul unite to form one substance, one nature. 
 
 PROOFS I, II, III, IV 
 
 /. A thing's liighest effort indicates the order and degree of 
 its being. But the highest effort of the soul, the exercise of 
 the intellect and will, is immaterial. Ergo the being of the 
 soul, the soul itself, is immaterial. 
 
 With regard to the Minor. That work or operation is im- 
 material, which is consummated without any intrinsic concur- 
 
THESIS V 71 
 
 rence of a bodily or material organ. But the work of the mind 
 and will is without any such concurrence. Ergo it is imma- 
 terial. 
 
 With regard to this Minor. The mind attains to notions ex- 
 pressive of things, to which the senses can never attain, possi- 
 bility, necessity, decency, duty and the like. It recognizes sen- 
 sible objects that have not fallen, and may perhaps never fall, 
 under the observation of the senses; when, for instance, it per- 
 ceives in a cause the effect it is capable of producing, and in 
 an effect the cause which gave it being. The mind, too, fre- 
 quently corrects and checks the work of the senses. A faculty 
 intrinsically dependent on a bodily organ can react only in re- 
 sponse to a physical impression, and can form only images of 
 a concrete character, of a purely here-and-now existence. In 
 psychological reflection the Ego reflecting and the Ego reflected 
 upon are the same. The Ego is at once subject and object. A 
 sheet of paper cannot be turned back upon itself. A part can 
 be folded back upon a part, but the whole sheet cannot be folded 
 back upon the whole sheet. The will never confines itself to 
 such material goods as influence the senses, but specially longs 
 for goods that far transcend all mere bodily gratification. 
 Hence truth, knowledge, virtue, honor, which make no impres- 
 sion whatever on a material organ, are prizes highest in favor 
 with man's inclinations and desires. If our volitions were 
 merely subjective phases or mental states inseparably bound up 
 with organic processes, their moral freedom would be impos- 
 sible, and man would be incapable of responsibility and mor- 
 ality. 
 
 //. (a) Physically simple in point of essence. (&) Phys- 
 ically simple in point of extension. 
 
 (a) The two parts would be either matter and form, or prin- 
 ciple of thoughts and principle of wishes. But neither suppo- 
 sition can be admitted. Ergo. 
 
 With regard to the Minor. The first supposition is too ab- 
 surd to need further attention. We just proved the soul a 
 spiritual substance. If one of its constituents is prime matter, 
 it must be at one and the same time spirit and matter, or spir- 
 itual matter, which is a contradiction in terms. Common sense 
 and personal experience are loud in their denial of the exist- 
 ence within us of two separate principles or souls, one the in- 
 
72 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 strument of our thoughts, the other that of our wishes; while 
 the assertion of such duality is entirely without foundation, 
 and rests on no solid proof whatever. 
 
 N.B. This whole argiiment is based on unity of conscious- 
 ness. The mind cannot be an extended agent like the brain, 
 and at the same time think, judge and reason. In the matter 
 of thought three impossible alternatives present themselves. 
 Different parts of the idea must belong to different parts of the 
 brain or soul; each part of the brain or soul must contain the 
 whole idea; the whole idea must belong to a single part of the 
 brain or soul. First and second cases are evidently impossible. 
 In the third case the part of the brain or soul in question would 
 be either extended or simple. If extended, the whole question 
 recurs again. Any judgment, any syllogism can as readily 
 prove the brain an impossible subject or agent. 
 
 (h) The soul is capable of acts representative of things ut- 
 terly simple in point of extension ; as, for instance, that simplest 
 of all notions, being, and the thought pondered in psycholog- 
 ical reflection. These acts, to be truly representative of such 
 objects, must be themselves simple in point of extension. If 
 an agent quantitatively extended produced an effect simple and 
 without all quantitative extension, the effect would be superior 
 to the cause ; and that axiom, at the root and basis of all phi- 
 losophy, would be rudely torn away and demolished. 
 
 ///. (a) Identity of the principle of sensible perception and 
 understanding, meaning the remote principle or soul, not the 
 proximate principle or faculty. (&) Identity of the principle 
 of sensible perception and growth as above. 
 
 (a) Consciousness is witness that it psychologically reflects 
 on sensible perceptions and on concepts or acts of the under- 
 standing. But this could not be the case, unless the principle 
 of sensible perception and understanding were one and the 
 same. Ergo. 
 
 With regard to the Minor. Sensation and understanding are 
 immanent acts, and as such dwell in their entirety within their 
 principle or subject. It would, therefore, be impossible for 
 consciousness to psychologically reflect on sensations and con- 
 cepts or mental acts, if one and the other sprang from different 
 and distinct principles. In that case, either the sensation or 
 the concept would cease to be immanent, and, passing from its 
 
THESIS V 73 
 
 own principle, would be received in another principle, and would 
 so become a transient act. Furthermore, when the senses are 
 very intensely employed, the intellect as a rule remains in pro- 
 found quiet, and vice-versa. Dante in his Commedia adverts 
 to this fact. All our intellectual knowledge takes its rise in 
 sensible perception. Work of the outer senses and of the imagi- 
 nation is a necessary prerequisite and a tremendous aid to the 
 acquisition of mind-lore. The inner struggle between sensible 
 appetite and spiritual desire is another sign that the principles 
 of sense and intellect are one. Like doubt, the state of sus- 
 pense between two views, such a war supposes the battle-field 
 to be one and the same principle or mind. 
 
 (b) Identity of the vegetative and sensitive principle in man 
 is proved, if between growth and sensation there exists the 
 closest kind of relationship in point of graded perfection, dura- 
 tion, subserviency and influence. But such a relationship exists. 
 Ergo. 
 
 With regard to the Major. Unless the principles were iden- 
 tical, sensation and growth would now and then fail of one or 
 other of the relationships just enumerated. 
 
 With regard to the Minor. These are recognized facts, that 
 the more perfect the power of sensible perception in a man, 
 the more perfect are his powers of nutrition ; that man ceases to 
 grow or to nourish himself when he ceases to use his senses; 
 that in fact all three lives go out at once; that the faculties 
 of growth are ordained by nature to repair and strengthen the 
 organs of sense; that close application of the senses, as well 
 as too absorbing study, ruins digestion and impairs all the 
 organs of nutrition. 
 
 IV. Man, or what results from the union of body and soul, 
 is capable of actions, which, possible to neither component taken 
 separately, can belong only to the whole compound, as to a 
 complete principle, one and undivided. But such a compound 
 is a single nature and a single substance. Ergo. 
 
 With regard to the Major. Man is conscious of the fact that 
 he is a being of a certain quantity or extension. The body alone 
 cannot be the principle of this consciousness, since left to its 
 own resources it is absolutely incapable of all consciousness. 
 Neither can the soul alone compass this cognition, since left to 
 itself it is just as incapable of conceiving itself made up of a 
 
74 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 certain quantity, and possessed of a certain extension. This 
 act of perception, too, is one and undivided; nut the resultant 
 of two or more acts, derived from two or more principles. Man 
 also has knowledge of large and small beings outside of him- 
 self. But knowledge of such beings requires an agent or prin- 
 ciple, itself possessed of formal extension or quantitative parts. 
 Such an agent the soul alone can never be considered, because 
 of the simplicity, already proved its natural birthright. Neither 
 can the body alone acquit itself of this operation, because its 
 own unaided powers can never attain to knowledge of any kind 
 whatever. Therefore, the only principle capable of acquiring 
 this knowledge is the whole man taken as a unit, or that being 
 compounded of body and soul. 
 
 PEINCIPLES — sriEiTUALiTY 
 
 A. In spite of what Locke says to the contrary, matter is 
 utterly incapable of understanding. Intelligent matter is as 
 much an impossibility as a square circle; because it contains 
 notes necessarily destructive of one another. Intelligent mat- 
 ter would be spirit and matter, and therefore an intrinsic impos- 
 sibility. Voltaire thought Locke's theory solid, because matter 
 can contain within itself such simple properties as gravity, and 
 the various forces of nature. These properties are indeed sim- 
 ple, but they are not on that account spiritual. Spirituality and 
 simplicity are quite different notions, and the forces adduced 
 by Voltaire are intrinsically dependent on matter. 
 
 B. The soul's extrinsic dependence on matter, or bodily or- 
 ganism, makes it possible for a diseased brain, as in the insane, 
 to disturb the course of its operations. But this is only an ex- 
 trinsic and indirect effect, not directly or intrinsically affecting 
 the soul, or that faculty of the soul known as the intellect. The 
 action of the brain is not thought itself or its cause, but only 
 a prerequisite condition for thouglit in present circumstances. 
 The phantasm contributes only to thought's beginning, it plays 
 no part in thought's finish. The species impressa and intel- 
 lectus possibilis finish the thought. And this is what we mean 
 by extrinsic dependence and intrinsic independence. Matter 
 enters the constitution of a man's essence; and from this cir- 
 cumstance it follows that the natural exercise of his highest 
 
THESIS V 75 
 
 faculty must depend at least extrinsically, not intrinsically, on 
 matter. 
 
 C. All our notions, coming as they must through the senses, 
 are originally of things more or less material. Hence, when 
 discussing and proving the spirituality of the soul, our argu- 
 ments may appear weak from the fact, that we seem to substi- 
 tute analogical for imivocal notions. In other words, we prove 
 the soul spiritual, though possessed of nothing but figurative 
 notions of what spirituality is. Our concept of a spiritual sub- 
 stance, like the soul, is not intuitive and purely positive, as it 
 is when a body or material substance is in question. It is what 
 we call an abstractive and negativo-positive concept. In other 
 words it strips bodies of triple dimension or quantity, to ex- 
 press spirit's substantial being; and at the same time keeps 
 apart from spirit the imperfection attaching to quantity. And 
 this arises from the need we lie under of beginning intellectual 
 work with the senses. 
 
 D. Man understands, and man is a material and organic 
 principle. Ergo the soul is not spiritual. 
 
 Answer. Man is the principium quod, not the principium 
 quo. The soul is the principium quo remotum; the intellect, 
 the principium quo proximum. Man is said to understand, be- 
 cause acts are attributed to the whole suppositum or person. 
 Actiones sunt suppositorum. A man's thoughts belong to him, 
 but his soul and its faculty of understanding are their principle 
 or cause. 
 
 E. The soul is the form of the body in such a way that it is 
 not totally buried or sunk in bodily matter, like the soul of 
 brutes or plants; but in such a way, that, as root and principle 
 of intellectual acts, it is intrinsically independent of matter. 
 
 F. The soul is the body's form in such a way that it has acts 
 distinct from its informative activity. Its informare is not its 
 esse, as happens in brutes and plants. It is the root of spiritual 
 energies like understanding, in addition to being the body's 
 form. 
 
 G. The soul sickens and grows old with the body. Ergo it 
 is material. 
 
 Answer. Not with regard to its substance, but with regard 
 to its faculties ; intrinsicall}^, with regard to vegetation and sen- 
 sation; extrinsically, with regard to use in the case of intellect. 
 
76 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 Vaughan illustrates with the exainj)le of a broken-down har- 
 monium and a sonata. The player must use the defective in- 
 strument, because no otlier is at hand. It would be a mistake 
 to think that the power of musical execution or the merit of 
 the piece is in the instrument. 
 
 H. Children resemble parents in mind and will. Ergo soul 
 is derived from parents, and material. 
 
 Answer. Children get organs from parents; mind and will 
 extrinsically depend on organs. Hence resemblance. 
 
 /. Even rational appetite in man inclines more to material 
 goods than to spiritual. Ergo soul is material. 
 
 Answer. Men without reason make this mistake. ]\Ien with 
 reason sometimes go wrong in the matter, but always with full 
 knowledge that they are insulting their true dignity. 
 
 J. There is no contradiction in intrinsic dependence for vege- 
 tation and sensation, and intrinsic independence for under- 
 standing, because not affirmed under the same respect. 
 
 K. The body receives the soul, not according to the soul's 
 whole capacity, but according to its own capacity, vegetative 
 and sensitive. 
 
 Simplicity 
 
 A. The soul moves the body, not by the kind of contact or 
 touch most familiar to us, and styled that of quantity or mass; 
 but by a kind peculiar to spirits, and styled that of power, in- 
 fluence, virtue. Only the first kind supposes quantity and ex- 
 tension in the agent or mover. The soul moves the body inas- 
 much as it is the body's form, not inasmuch as it is the principle 
 of intellectual life and activity. 
 
 B. A spirit freed from all connection with matter, or a sep- 
 arate spiritual substance, should perhaps have force sufficient 
 to move any mass or weight whatever. The doctors disagree 
 in this matter; St. Thomas and Suarez deny angels the power, 
 Scotus is against them. But our soul is not such a spirit. It 
 is bound up with the body as its form. No wonder then that 
 it encounters bodies offering resistance too great for any effort 
 it can elicit. In the execution of movements the soul intrin- 
 sically depends on nerves and muscles. In ordering movement 
 it is free from this intrinsic dependence. 
 
 C. St. Thomas remarks in one of his treatises that matter 
 
THESIS V 11 
 
 and form can be said to have two meanings. Matter can some^ 
 times be confounded with possibility or essence, and form with 
 actuality or existence outside tlie mind. In this acceptation, 
 matter and form can be attributed to the soul. But the com- 
 position thence resulting is only metaphysical, and that we agree 
 to recognize in the human soul. The proper and strict mean- 
 ings of the terms matter and form are not essence and exist- 
 ence; but essence itself is the result of their combination. 
 Hence in this latter sense the soul cannot be said to consist of 
 matter and form, since it is pure form, uniting not with any- 
 thing in itself, but with the human body, to form the essence 
 and existence called man. 
 
 D. The soul animates the body, the whole body; and, as this 
 animation is a vital or immanent act, the soul must be present 
 wherever it has place, in every part of the body, in even the 
 hair, the nails and the teeth. There is some difficulty about 
 the soul's presence in the blood. Cajetan is of opinion that the 
 soul animates the blood. Others, like Bonaventure, Albertus 
 Magnus, Suarez, DeLugo, Lessius, a Lapide, maintain the con- 
 trary. As usual, both sides appeal to Aristotle and St. Thomas. 
 If the blood be actually part of the body, if it possesses organ- 
 ism and enjoys even vegetative life, it must be said to be ani- 
 mated by the soul. The Thomists, with the approval of some 
 modern physiologists, ascribe all three qualities to the blood. 
 Their opponents advance arguments to show that the blood 
 is actually no part of the body, that it is without organs, and 
 that it evinces no sign of growth. Quite the contrary, St. 
 Thomas safeguards the integrity of the Blessed Virgin's body 
 in the Incarnation, by urging that the body of Christ was made, 
 not from the flesh or bones of His Mother, but from her blood, 
 which is not an actual part of the body, but a part only in 
 potency, and as such removable without detriment to the body. 
 Physiologists are not agreed among themselves that the blood 
 contains organs and betrays symptoms of growth. A few at 
 most contend that the red globules, a small percentage of the 
 whole supply, fulfill these conditions. Even the red globules 
 are disjoined from the rest of the body, and on this score in- 
 capable of animation by the soul. 
 
 The chief arguments advanced by upholders of the negative 
 are these three. The blood acquits itself of no vital act in even 
 
78 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 the vegetative order. The blood is nourishment for the body; 
 and, therefore, has its own form before conversion into the body's 
 substance. The blood is disjoined from the solid parts of the 
 body. Transfusion of blood proves it possessed of its own form. 
 (N.B. Grafting of skin would rel'utc this last argument.) St. 
 Thomas teaches that, like the different body-humors, the blood 
 is not yet part of the body, but on its way to this dignity. 
 Finally, there are weighty arguments for both sides; and, till 
 the Church settles the matter, by an explicit definition, the 
 two opinions must be voted probable. 
 
 To meet the theological argument, derived from the divinity's 
 union with the blood in Christ, and its consequent assumption 
 by Christ as part of the human body, defenders of the nega- 
 tive opinion distinguish between primary and secondary parts 
 of the body. Primary parts have organic structure, and are 
 animated by the soul ; secondary parts, like the blood and hu- 
 mors, have no organic structure, are not animated by the soul, 
 and still contribute to the wholeness or entirety of the human 
 body. To be united with the divinity, the blood need only be 
 part of the body in Christ, whether primary or secondary. In 
 much the same way, the body of Christ in the Holy Eucharist 
 postulates, in virtue of natural connection, the presence of His 
 sacred blood in the Host, whether the blood be a primary or 
 secondary part of the body. Though not animated or vivified 
 by the soul, the blood gets its form, or is denominated human, 
 from the soul. Hence, body and soul are not like a house and 
 its form. The house is an artificial whole, and its form is an 
 artificial form. Man is a natural whole, and his soul is a 
 natural or substantial form. The parts of a house have their 
 own form before union, the parts of the body are without form 
 before the soul's approach. Or as St. Thomas puts it, a sub- 
 stantial form gives finish and perfection not only to the whole, 
 but also to its parts. 
 
 E. The soul is in potency to accidental acts, not to substan- 
 tial acts. It cannot change to another form. Hence it is phys- 
 ically simple in point of essence. It is its own formal cause, 
 and has no other; though it has an efficient cause, God. As a 
 simple form, it is simple act, but finite; unlike God, whose 
 actuality is His essence. The soul's actuality is not its essence. 
 
 F. The soul is coextensive with the body. Ergo compound. 
 
THESIS V 79 
 
 Answer. Definitively, not circumscriptively. 
 
 G. The soul has extended or quantitative faculties for vege- 
 tation and sensation. Ergo compound. 
 
 Answer. As root or principle, not as subject in which they 
 inhere. The whole man is the subject in which they inhere. 
 
 H. Growth and amputation prove parts and quantity. Ergo 
 compound. 
 
 Answer. New presences, not new substance. Amputation af- 
 fects presence, not substance. Amputation is not to be under- 
 stood as the soul's withdrawal irom severed portion, but as sun's 
 disappearance from room, when window is closed. 
 
 Unity 
 
 A. The word formally plays an important part in this branch 
 of philosophy. Admitting many nice distinctions, and various 
 interpretations, the word can easily lead a beginner astray. It 
 has two senses, inasmuch as it sometimes prescinds from other 
 perfections inherent in a being, and sometimes excludes from a 
 being all perfections higher than that said to belong formally 
 to it. Thus, the human soul is said to be in the first sense 
 formally vegetative, sensitive and intellectual. In the second 
 sense it is formally intellectual only. Souls formally vegeta- 
 tive and sensitive in the second sense, such for instance as 
 those of plants and brutes, are perishable and subject to death. 
 But man's soul, because not formally vegetative and sensitive 
 in the second sense, but only such in the first sense, is not 
 necessarily perishable and subject to death. 
 
 B. Some see in the war between man's passions and desires 
 an argument for plurality of souls; because, forsooth, opposi- 
 tion demands at least two agents, and one soul cannot be at 
 odds with itself. But they forget that the strife is not neces- 
 sarily between souls, but between the different powers or facul- 
 ties of the one soul. Man's soul, though in reality one, is vir- 
 tually or in its forces and faculties many. There would be no 
 quarrel, were there two souls. Each would go its own way. 
 
 C. The soul of man is wholly incorruptible. Its vegetative 
 and sense-principles are not corrupted after separation from the 
 body, but simply hindered from activity. 
 
 D. The notion of a vegetative or sensitive soul contains in 
 itself no notion of corruptibility or incorruptibility, in much 
 
80 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 the same way as animality conveys no notion of rationality or 
 its absence. Animality in man is rational, in brutes it is ir- 
 rational. Even so vegetative and sensitive souls in plants and 
 brutes are corruptible, in man they are incorruptible. Souls 
 in plants and brutes acquit themselves of no higher life than 
 vegetation and sensation, and they are on this account intrin- 
 sically dependent on organs, and corruptible by accident. The 
 soul in man, which is at the same time vegetative, sensitive and 
 intellectual, acquits itself of intellectual life, and is therefore 
 intrinsically independent of matter and incorruptible. 
 
 E. Animal is said univocally of man and brute; because the 
 soul of man, though generically different from the soul of 
 brute, when viewed as merely intellectual, is similar and re- 
 ducible to the soul of brute, when viewed as the root and prin- 
 ciple of sensation. Man the compound is as corruptible as 
 brutes, and therefore in the same genus. His soul is a spirit- 
 ual substance, is in the genus of spirits, and therefore incor- 
 ruptible. Genus is said of the whole compound, not of its 
 form. 
 
 F. Man's soul is not a species of the genus spirit, a species 
 of the genus animal, and a sjjecies of the genus plant. But 
 it is a species of the genus spirit alone, and at the same time 
 the root and principle of properties that belong to the lower 
 genera, animals and plants. 
 
 G. Man is not an animal in virtue of one soul, rational in 
 virtue of another. He is a rational animal in virtue of one 
 Boul, substantially spiritual, in root or principle vegetative and 
 sensitive. Genus and specific difference are concept-beings, and 
 a distinction of reason between souls is sufficient. 
 
 Composition of Man 
 
 A. We Catholics, relying on the promise made in person by 
 Christ to St. Peter and his successors, that truth should be the 
 Church's everlasting legacy, bow our heads and our hearts to 
 her divinely secure guidance in matters as well philosophical 
 as theological. In her representatives, the Popes and the Coun- 
 cils, she has at times seen fit to promulgate lier tenets with re- 
 gard to the composition of man, and we quote these few. Un- 
 der Clement V, in 1311, an Oecumenical Council inscribed this 
 definition among its decrees. " "We condemn as false and di- 
 
THESIS V 81 
 
 rectly opposed to the Catholic faith whatever system maintains 
 that the rational soul of man is not truly and of itself the form 
 (or actuating, determining principle) of man's body. If any 
 man boldly presumes to contend that the rational soul is not of 
 itself and essentially the form of the human body, let him be 
 counted a heretic." In the 5th Lateran Council Leo X thus 
 decreed, " We severely condemn all who assert that man's ra- 
 tional soul is subject to death, or that it is numerically one and 
 the same in all men. Not only is it truly, of itself and essen- 
 tially the form of the human body, but it is also immortal, and, 
 in exact proportion with the number of bodies into which it 
 is breathed, individually multiplied and necessarily so multi- 
 plied." 
 
 B. Soul and body, though a simple substance and a com- 
 pound, thougli spirit and matter, though indivisible and di- 
 visible, can unite to form one complete and compound sub- 
 stance in the capacity of matter and form or incomplete sub- 
 stances. They could never unite to form a simple substance. 
 
 C. Substantial union is impossible, unless the soul somehow 
 partakes of the body's material being, while the body somehow 
 partakes of the soul's spiritual being. And, as a matter of fact, 
 the body does partake of the soul's being; not inasmuch as the 
 soul is precisely spiritual, but inasmuch as it is the root and 
 principle of vegetative and sensitive life. In the same way the 
 soul partakes of the body's material being not inasmuch as it 
 is the root and principle of thought, but inasmuch as it is the 
 root and principle of growth and sensation. 
 
 D. The body before union with the soul would seem to be 
 matter with form, and therefore the soul is not the single form 
 of the human body. Before union with the soul the body is not 
 a complete, but an incomplete substance, under the aspect of a 
 human body. It is an actual being only in a wide sense, not 
 in a strict sense; and only an actual being in strict sense is 
 constituted such by form. The dispositions, induced in the 
 body by generation before union, are not accidents; but requi- 
 sites for primal matter, adapted to the form called soul. The 
 body's chemical elements before union are not complete sub- 
 stances, fixed in determined species; but a total subject, fit to 
 be informed and given a fixed species, or made a himian body 
 by the soul. 
 
82 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 E. It is impossible for a pure spirit to be a constituent part 
 of a body. The same is not true of a spirit like the soul, which 
 is a spirit naturally ordained to be at the same time root and 
 principle of vegetative and sensitive life. 
 
 F. The body before union is not complete as a human body. 
 It gets that completeness from the soul. It is complete, as a 
 collection of elementary bodies, each with its own form, in such 
 a way that the collection is an incomplete subject ready to be 
 informed by the soul. These forms are latent during union, 
 and are educed from the potency of matter after separation. 
 
 G. Body and soul are not two species under one genus, but 
 they are two principles constituting one species of a genus. 
 Therefore, body and soul are not of the same genus. 
 
 H. JSTo corpse-form need be admitted, because after death the 
 body ceases to be a body, and becomes rather a collection of 
 bodies. 
 
 I. When faith teaches that the soul of Christ is in the 
 Sacred Host not vi verborum, but per concomitantiam, it is 
 talking of the soul of Christ, not inasmuch as it is the form 
 of His body; but inasmuch as it is spiritual, or root and prin- 
 ciple of intellectual operations. This is one of many probable 
 explanations. 
 
 J. The dead body of Christ was truly one with the living 
 body of Christ materially, not formally; because of union with 
 the divine personality of Christ, not because of the form or soul. 
 
 K. When the soul actually informs the body, it informs it 
 by virtue of its essence. It is, however, of the soul's essence 
 to inform the body not actually but aptitudinally. Therefore, 
 subsistence after separation is quite possible to the soul. 
 
 L. The body in union would seem to be an accident, because 
 it accrues to the soul already created by God. But the soul, as 
 the body's form, is not a complete substance; and accidents in- 
 here in only complete substances. 
 
 M. Soul and body combine as matter and form, not as chem- 
 ical elements. They do not perish like chemical elements to 
 produce a third reality, the man ; because the process of union 
 is not mutual conversion or change, but mutual communication 
 of their realities. 
 
THESIS VI 
 
 The rational soul of man, even when separated from the hody, 
 is of its nature capable of existence and life, neither can it pos- 
 sibly be depiived of them. The soul of man will therefore live 
 forever. 
 
 Maher, pp. 524-544; Jouin, pp. 193-200. 
 
 QUESTION 
 
 This thesis contains four parts, and is most important. It 
 bears directly on man's moral life; and must, when carefully 
 studied and thoroughly understood, produce a lasting impres- 
 sion for good. If our career is to begin and end with this 
 shifting life, this round of joys and sorrows; if our thoughts, 
 words and deeds are not to follow us beyond our deathbed; if 
 no grim spectres in the shape of deeds ill done, of duties un- 
 fulfilled, are to confront us before the judgment seat, my pres- 
 ent mode of life and yours are a hallucination and cruel self- 
 deceit. Wliy deny ourselves, why restrain our passions, why 
 say nay so many times a day to appealing self-indulgence, if 
 we are candidates for the same blank fate as the dumb herd 
 of dull sensualists, who pamper self, who give unbridled rein 
 to their passions, whose self indulgence knows not what refusal 
 or disappointment means? 
 
 It is an article of faith that these our bodies, after hiding 
 away a space in the ground, will arise at the last day, be re- 
 united with the soul, and with some few modifications, called 
 for by their new sphere of existence, will last forever, the eter- 
 nal companions of the spirits within us. But the immortality 
 of the soul is a dogma of reason, and was recognized and con- 
 tended for as such by ignorant and learned alike, long ages be- 
 fore the advent of Christ and the establishment of His Church. 
 Pagans, who lived before tbe full light of divine revelation 
 dawned on the world, to clear up mysteries and brighten up old 
 truths, could without fault profess ignorance of the astounding 
 
 83 
 
84 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 favor gratuitously done human nature, the immortality of the 
 body. The body, the soul's companion, is of itself heir to cor- 
 ruption ; and had not our gracious Master, wishing to signalize 
 His wondrous goodness, decreed to the contrary, it would for- 
 ever tenant the cold grave. Small wonder that this consoling 
 dogma, now so familiar to mankind, entirely escaped even the 
 noblest geniuses of paganism. Guided by unaided reason, we 
 can readily enough compass the notions of absolute and natural 
 immortality. The first is peculiar to the infinite being known 
 as God, the second is the birthright of such spiritual substances 
 as angels and the souls of men. We, who hear God speak in the 
 Scriptures, distinguish a third species of immortality, that of 
 grace, accruing to an otherwise corruptible body only because 
 God's free and limitless will was pleased to so dower it. Omit- 
 ting for the present all discussion of the body's immortality and 
 of God's immortality or eternit}^, we mean to weigh and prove 
 the immortality of the soul. 
 
 Whether pagans or Christians, men with a claim to reason 
 and its sober use have been a unit on the fact in question. A 
 wide variety rules when the fact comes to be explained; and 
 the crude notions of some ancient philosophers are scarcely more 
 puerile than the theories advanced by not a few of the enlight- 
 ened minds of our own time. These ancients at least recog- 
 nized the utter impossibility of confounding thought with the 
 products of matter, and thus soared worlds beyond the teachers, 
 who to-day contend that dead matter can elicit concepts. The 
 origin of this half mysterious principle they could not satis- 
 factoril}^ determine. Their attempts to surmount this first dif- 
 ficulty were many and curious. 
 
 One school, with the great Plato and Pythagoras, thought 
 that human souls were beings from another sphere, that of the 
 stars, who because of some unknown wickedness had been con- 
 demned by an ofl^ended Creator to drag out a miserable exist- 
 ence in this body, or prison-house of death. Another school, 
 of a pantheistic turn of mind, reckoned human souls particles 
 struck ofi:' from the divinity. Coming nearer our own age of 
 Materialism, we meet with such theories as these. The soul 
 is the result of generation in much the same way as the body; 
 and this is Material Traducianism. The soul is the product 
 of the parents' souls, which actually produce it from their own 
 
THESIS VI 85 
 
 substance, and this is Spiritual Traducianism ; or create it from 
 nothing, and this is Exaggerated Creatianism. Eosmini under- 
 took to split the difference between these two equally false sys- 
 tems, and maintained that the human soul, inasmuch as it is 
 the principle of growth and sensation, derives its origin from 
 the parents. God afterwards presents the idea of being to 
 this vegetative and sensitive soul, and so renders it intellectual, 
 rational, spiritual. 
 
 We need not remark that Plato, Pythagoras, and the moderns 
 referred to, strangely deceived themselves in assigning so un- 
 worthy an origin to what is noblest in nature. "Were Plato's 
 hypothesis correct, the union at present in force between soul 
 and body would be unnatural and galling. The imprisoned 
 spirit would still retain some recollection of the happy hours 
 it whiled away among the stars, before falling a victim to God's 
 vengeance. But nobody is ready to grant that either of the 
 above facts has place. The union of body and soul is won- 
 derfully natural, and so pleasant withal that separation or death 
 is the one evil against which man most strenuously contends. 
 
 Plato met our second difficulty by making it the foundation 
 of his theory about the origin of our thoughts or ideas. Each 
 soul, he says, comes into the world fully equipped with knowl- 
 edge, stored away during its celestial sojourn, and elicited or 
 recalled during the slavery of life on earth by constantly re- 
 curring suggestions. Discere est reminisci. To learn is to 
 recollect. Fanciful fabric of this kind does credit to the poetic 
 longings and aspirations of Plato, it ill becomes pbilosophy. 
 Sober common sense in this particular matter, though it aban- 
 dons him to the mob unfavored of the Muses, raises the igno- 
 rant farmer high above the sage Plato. He feels, and will 
 stoutly maintain, that his ideas had no more claim to existence 
 within him before their present production, than have the dol- 
 lars and cents to existence in his ample pockets before he ex- 
 changes his crop for hard cash. Eosmini is wrong, because 
 an accidental fact, like the presentation of the universal idea 
 of being, cannot account for a specific change, like that of a 
 sensitive into an intellectual soul. Besides, a sensitive soul is 
 incapable of any such universal idea. Otherwise dogs and cats 
 could change to men. 
 
 Evolution can have no part in the soul's production. If the 
 
86 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 souls of parents cannot produce the child's soul, much less can 
 the sensitive soul of brutes be producing cause of a human 
 soul. Traducianism, whether it makes the bodies and the souls 
 of the parents, or their souls alone, the efficient cause of the 
 child's soul, is always a wide remove from the truth. For it is 
 impossible to consider their bodies capable of such an effect, 
 unless farewell is taken of the very first rule in all causation. 
 Effects can never surpass in excellence the nature of their causes. 
 Surely nobody will deny that a spiritual and intelligent soul is 
 in a multitude of respects superior to a material and dumb 
 body. The souls of the parents would accomplish this result 
 in one of two ways. They would make the child's soul from 
 particles of themselves, or would make it from absolute nothing- 
 ness. But the human soul is a simple substance, and as such 
 disclaims all connection with particles. Parents are not di- 
 vine, and creation, or production from absolute nothingness, is 
 essentially the work of God. Creation means production with- 
 out preexistent matter, power without limit, infinite might; and 
 God alone is infinite. God, and God alone, is equal to the task 
 of producing human souls. Because the man is said to be gen- 
 erated, it does not follow that the soul is generated. Because 
 the man dies, it does not follow that the soul dies. Genera- 
 tion is said of the whole suppositum or resultant from union 
 of body and soul, just as death is said of the whole suppositum ; 
 and as the man dies, while his soul goes on living, so the man 
 is generated, while his soul is created. 
 
 We therefore maintain, with all sound Catholic writers, that, 
 while each and every child born into the world derives its body 
 from a father and mother, its soul is the workmanship of the 
 supreme Artificer, and is immediately and individually created 
 by God, and by Him breathed into the organism assuming shape. 
 The soul of man is created by God, because it is finite and spir- 
 itual. As a finite being, it postulates an efficient cause. As a 
 spiritual being, it can result from no substantial change in pre- 
 existent matter, because its constitution is altogether devoid of 
 matter; from no substantial change in preexistent spirit, be- 
 cause spirits are incapable of division and substantial change. 
 Therefore it is created, and creative power belongs to God alone. 
 Creative power is absolutely independent of everything outside 
 
THESIS VI 87 
 
 the agent, and therefore infinite, impossible to creatures. No 
 creature can in any single ease create, because such power would 
 be, in the nature of things, unlimited, and on a level with God's 
 omnipotence. No creature can be employed as an instrumental 
 cause in the work of creation, because in every such case the 
 creature would be either a moral cause by prayer and petition, 
 or in virtue of immanence a total cause by its own activity, an 
 impossible supposition. 
 
 About the precise time of the soul's creation, St. Thomas, 
 following Aristotle and his crude notions of embryos, teaches 
 that the soul of the child is first vegetative, then sensitive, and 
 last of all rational. In the case of a male child the rational 
 soul appears only forty days after conception; in the case of a 
 female, the interval is lengthened to eighty days. Physiology 
 has weakened this opinion, and to-day philosophers and theolo- 
 gians commonly agree that the advent of the rational soul is 
 simultaneous with conception. The theory of St. Thomas is 
 at best only probable, and is no excuse for foeticide perpetrated 
 at the earliest stage of conception. The opposite opinion is 
 solidly probable; and to deliberately destroy even probable life 
 is most certain murder. The rational soul is principle of all 
 three kinds of life in man, and this is reason enough for its 
 immediate creation. 
 
 Besides assigning the human soul a wrong origin, ancient 
 philosophy likewise erred in its conception of the soul's destiny 
 after man's dissolution. It never once questioned the fact of 
 the soul's immortality, and all its mistakes turn on the kind 
 of future awaiting the soul. Its notions are wonderfully close 
 to the truth, and marvels of intellect, unaided by the fioods of 
 supernatural light ushered into the world by God's advent 
 among men. Our untutored Indians and the ruder Chinese 
 entertain notions of a hereafter analogous to those of ancient 
 paganism and heathendom. Rome's greatest epic loves always 
 to depict life beyond the grave as a boundless playground, where 
 warriors, hunters, lovers, pursue in unbroken bliss the sports 
 and pastimes, that filled out their little round of years on 
 earth. His picture is invariably accompanied by that com- 
 panion-piece of the lonesome lot ahead of rash mortals who 
 presume to offend the deity. 
 
88 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 " Lo, they reach saints' dwelling places, where a greener turf o'erspreads 
 Lawns, that level lie to spirits; where sweet virtue fragrance sheds. 
 Broader smile the glowing meadows, lit with light to men unseen, 
 And with stars, whose waning vigor dark would make moon's fullest 
 
 gleam. 
 Some in grass-grown rings their prowess test in bouts with friendly 
 
 foes, 
 Others on the glinting sea-sands wrestle, box, deal ponderous blows. 
 Merry here the nimble dancers pound and pat the echoing ground, 
 Sing to shells attuned by Orpheus, when he woke a world with sovmd." 
 
 ^neid VI, 640-648. 
 
 "Tortures dire assuage with anguish wounds self-will on earth cut 
 deep ; 
 Hanging high, some sate God's justice; others stifling vigils keep. 
 Deep adown in lakes of brimstone, hot with vengeful Heaven's ire; 
 Each and all are prod by Furies, births of unfulfilled desire." 
 
 ^neid VI, 739-743. 
 
 Or would you have the liquid numbers of rare old Horace, 
 who in the midst of his wine and his loves found sweetness in 
 soberer thoughts like these? 
 
 " I hammer out a chain of song. 
 To fasten me to fitful time; 
 With soulful words and ringing rhyme, 
 I link it tight, and weld it strong. 
 
 ■&' 
 
 "It renders life an endless day; 
 
 No rain, no wind can rust or wear, 
 No ages can its strength impair; 
 It binds me to my kind for aye. 
 
 " I steal away from meaner men ; 
 I die to live; my body sleeps. 
 My spirit, winged with fame, o'erleaps 
 Dull bounds, too thick for mortal ken. 
 
 " As long as priestess-virgins tread, 
 
 Beside gray years, the sun-flecked stair, 
 
 That winds up to Jove's house of prayer. 
 
 Green laurel grows, to wreathe my head." 
 
 Odes III, 30. 
 
 Cicero, the most eloquent man in all Eome, when every pub- 
 lic-spirited citizen was an impassioned orator, thus completely 
 satisfies his mind about the certainty of a future state of un- 
 ending bliss : " Happiness which can slip away is half misery. 
 
THESIS VI 89 
 
 Who persuades himself that stability and contiimed existence 
 pertain to a period of time admitting interrnption or end? 
 Heap wealth untold on a friend, bid him be happy. If a mo- 
 mentary doubt, touching the mere possibility of losing his for- 
 tune, find asylum in his mind, that friend must needs expe- 
 rience all the wretchedness of actual loss. Happiness cannot 
 dwell with the anxiety attendant on uncertain possession." 
 
 The same Cicero in a profound treatise, descriptive of old 
 age and its pleasures, introduces Cyrus consoling his children 
 from a death-bed in language like this, " My boys, do not imag- 
 ine that on my departure from your sight I shall exist no- 
 where, and be reduced to empty nothingness. Even while I 
 moved among you, you failed to discern my soul; but none 
 the less clearly did you understand from my conduct that it 
 lived in this old frame. Believe, therefore, that it continues 
 the same, though no longer seen of you. Heaven and earth 
 could not persuade me to fancy that souls enjoy life only in 
 these bodies of death, and die when they break off all commerce 
 with them; that souls fall away from knowledge, when they 
 take farewell of dull bodies that know not a thought. I hold 
 fast to this fundamental truth, that souls only then are wise, 
 when they begin that second stage of existence, freed from" all 
 admixture with material bodies." — De Senectute, c. 22. 
 
 All the old pagan writers of repute recognized the necessity 
 of a future life, and inclined to even our faith in the resurrec- 
 tion and immortality of bodies. But, as before remarked, they 
 adopted various strange notions and explanations of the manner 
 of life in store for the soul, and of its gradual processes of de- 
 velopment. Pythagoras suggests a very curious fancy, artis- 
 tically described by Horace and Ovid. Horace is recording the 
 address a dead sailor makes to some passing stranger. 
 
 '■^Pantho's son, Euphorbus brave, 
 To hell again is flown; 
 Dead at Troy, to death he gave 
 
 But muscles, pelt and bone. 
 Life restored, the sage he played, 
 
 Pythagoras, nature's seer; 
 Knew the shield, with which he stayed 
 Dread Trojans, mailed with fear." 
 
 Odes I, 28. 
 
90 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 Ovid in one of his Metamorphoses, or "Wonderful Changes 
 wrought in human forms, leads in the celebrated philosopher 
 Pythagoras, and makes him speak as follows: 
 
 " Souls, unloosed from prison houses, flit away to fuller life ; 
 Leave the cold abode of bodies, with diseased discomfort rife. 
 I myself, I well remember, used to fight in front of Troy; 
 Pantho's son, Euphorbus; old in wisdom, though a boy. 
 Atreus' younger son in battle launched the spear, that pierced me 
 
 through ; 
 And the shield, that then betrayed me, late in Juno's shrine I 
 knew." 
 
 Metamorphoses XV, 161. 
 
 Briefly, the al)surdities of metempsychosis and transmigra- 
 tion of souls are derived from the earliest promoters of phi- 
 losophy. Men, they thought, whether conspicuously deserv- 
 ing during life, or conspicuously wicked, merely changed their 
 first estate for another in the same or a different order of being. 
 Like Euphorbus in the story, the good were wont to abide 
 awhile in the nether world; whence, after a period of moral 
 cleansing, they issued as heroes of later periods. They died 
 blameless warriors or kings, and reappeared on earth, marvels 
 of thought or founders of nations. The bad assumed the shapes 
 of various brute animals, instinctively prone to the several vices 
 cherished by them. It is highly useful to note that though 
 reason, because of its natural weakness, failed to fully grasp 
 the dogma's intricate meaning, there is apparent all through 
 their writings a deep devotion to, a reverent regard for, that 
 grand old truth taught by unerring nature, the immortality of 
 the soul. With all their wanderings from the path of recti- 
 tude, with all their vicious inclinations and abominable turpi- 
 tude, they were men enough to acknowledge that a destiny for 
 better or worse awaited them, that they were to undergo a 
 reckoning for their misdeeds, and that feigned ignorance was 
 no secure refuge against the loud reproaches of a conscience, 
 not to be stifled or hushed. In this particular they were heroes 
 of a far more lovable type than the dullard agnostics of our 
 time, weeds in the luxuriant growth of modern civilization and 
 progress. Men's minds have undergone no essential change with 
 the ages, and nature's lessons are the same for ancients and 
 moderns. 
 
THESIS VI 91 
 
 TERMS 
 
 The rational soul of man. The soul of man is an incom- 
 plete, not a complete substance. It is a substance, because it 
 exists in itself; incomplete, because it is designed by nature 
 to inform and enliven the human body, and so help to the 
 finish of the complete substance, man. It is a spiritual in- 
 complete substance or form, and differs from pure spirits, or 
 angelic forms, only in this, that nature intended it to be bound 
 up in the human body, while angels are ordained to nothing 
 such. In other words, angels are completely subsistent forms, 
 the soul is an incompletely subsistent one. The souls of plants 
 and brutes are incomplete non-subsistent substances. They are 
 substances, and not accidents, because, though incapable of ex- 
 istence apart from the complete substance, rose or horse, they 
 play a necessary and intrinsic part in the constitution of the 
 one and the other. They cannot like accidents be present or 
 absent without specifically infiuencing the being, rose, or the 
 being, horse. These principles of plant and beast are simple 
 per se, divisible per accidens; they have no parts in themselves, 
 but exist whole and entire in each part of the being they 
 actuate; but, unlike the soul of man, they are material; the 
 plant and the animal are capable of neither thought nor voli- 
 tion, nor of any act in itself independent of and transcendent 
 to matter. 
 
 Of its nature capable of existence. In the order of the uni- 
 verse angels stand next to God. They are capable of existence 
 without a material body, and cannot like the human soul be so 
 clothed with matter as to constitute a single complete sub- 
 stance. 
 
 They are complete substances in themselves; and can assume 
 the appearance of man, only as man can assume this or that 
 shape; they can assume the appearance or shape of man as an 
 extrinsic accident. However, their existence was not actual 
 from all eternity; but, till God first created, was a mere possi- 
 bility. Herein consists the difference between God's being and 
 theirs. He has been and is an actuality from all eternity, and 
 never consisted of mere possibility. Man's soul remained a 
 mere possibility longer than the angels; and Adam possessed 
 
92 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 the first human soul, that passed from capability to actuality 
 of existence. Another difference between this human soul and 
 angelic spirits lies in the fact that it never loses its capability 
 of informing a material body, and constituting with it a single 
 complete substance, man; though this capability can remain for 
 a space unsatisfied, as happens in the interval between death 
 and the resurrection of bodies at the last day. The souls or 
 life-principles of plants and brutes are incapable of actual exist- 
 ence outside of material bodies. Their dependence, therefore, 
 on matter is most complete, it is intrinsic as well as extrinsic. 
 They are simple substances, but not spiritual. They exist whole 
 and entire in each part of the plant or animal, as the case may 
 be ; but are debarred from eliciting a thought or other spiritual 
 operation. Thus, their utter dependence on matter makes it 
 impossible for them to actually exist, separated from the bodies 
 they inform, and is our foundation for denying them immor- 
 tality. Their simplicity or freedom from parts, would, if not 
 interfered with by their materiality, ensure to them the posses- 
 sion of this rare quality. They are incorruptible per se, but 
 corruptible per accidens. From this it may be gathered that 
 the immortality of human souls depends not so much on their 
 simplicity as on their intrinsic independence of matter. Souls 
 nowise transcending the dignity of matter can be communi- 
 cated to effects by material causes. Hence we hold that the 
 parent-fiower and the parent-animal give complete being to their 
 offspring. 
 
 Life. Life is substantial and accidental. Here we are most 
 concerned with accidental. The soul's existence is substantial 
 life; its activity, manifest in thouglit and wish, is accidental. 
 Substantial life is a substantial form, and therefore an incom- 
 plete substance, which together with the matter, tree or body 
 in brute and man, constitutes a single living substance. Life, 
 taken in a wider sense, and with a marked shade of difference 
 in meaning, may be considered an accidental form, inasmuch 
 as it gives its essence and specific being to every concrete and 
 individual act of a living creature. Accidental life is actual 
 self-motion or immanent action ; substantial life, the basis and 
 support of accidental, is mere capability or possibility of the 
 same. The former is a mere accident, because it simply modi- 
 fies or limits an accident, such as are all the actions of plants, 
 
THESIS VI 93 
 
 brutes and men. Substantial life is for things alive being 
 or essence ; accidental is superadded to the same, and is resident 
 in every act put or placed by the living subject. Substantial 
 life, therefore, is capability of self-motion or immanent action, 
 accidental life is the manifestaton of this same capability in ac- 
 tion. 
 
 Cannot pof<sihIy be deprived. The creature, who would at- 
 tempt to annihilate a human soul, would present as sorry an 
 appearance as the madman, who contemplated annihilating the 
 universe. The one and the other undertaking are the prodigious 
 results of a divine act, and the Maker reserves to Himself the 
 power of annihilation, or reduction to primitive nothingness. 
 God's all embracing power reaches to every possible effect, and 
 appears to be bounded l)y only such empty imaginings as result 
 from combining notions mutually destructive. God's power 
 considered merely' in itself can accomplish everything conceiv- 
 able, everything not an intrinsic contradiction. But God's 
 power must not be considered merely in itself. It is essentially 
 necessary always to take into account His other attributes. His 
 wisdom, His Justice, His kindness. These several qualities are 
 never disparaged by any motion of God's omnipotence. Hence, 
 though the annihilation of a human soul would result in no 
 intrinsic contradiction, speaking absolutely, it would neverthe- 
 less be in palpable want of harmony with divine wisdom, divine 
 justice, divine kindness. Since, therefore, God can admit no 
 such want of harmony into His works, we may say with posi- 
 tive assurance that the soul cannot possibly be deprived of life 
 or existence. 
 
 To save God's wisdom from flaw in the annihilation of a 
 soul, opponents search for motives sufficient to induce Him to 
 depart from a law, that He manifestly made for Himself from 
 the beginning. But their search is vain. God in destroying 
 human souls could consult neither His own interests nor those 
 of souls. By their eternal preservation the divine glory will 
 be forever celebrated in hell as well as in Heaven. "Wicked 
 souls would, of course, a million times prefer to their in- 
 terminable woe utter disappearance from the world of being. 
 Desire to comply with this preference of theirs would indeed 
 be a motive, and a strong motive, inducing God to annihilate 
 them. But God can yield to no motive, however weighty it 
 
94 PSY€PIOLOGY 
 
 appears to us, if that motive coll ides with a higher duty, He 
 owes Himself and His divine attributes. God's justice could 
 not admit the influence of such a motive. The wicked by a full 
 and deliberate choice, in direct and downright opposition to 
 God's will, have cleaved to sin, and only reap the reward al- 
 lotted to Heaven to the abuse of its benefits and graces. Jus- 
 tice calls for a reparation or penalty as closely commensurate as 
 possible with the damage done. But the damage done is in- 
 finite in intensity, viewing the person wronged, and eternal 
 in duration, looking into the future. No creature can undergo 
 pain of infinite intensity, but every creature can suffer finite 
 pains throughout eternity. Hence it happens that any punish- 
 ment short of eternal hell-fire would leave divine justice only 
 partially sated, and therefore no justice at all. Thus would 
 the annihilation of condemned souls defeat God's plans, and 
 despoil Him of His most dread attribute. 
 
 Division — Four parts. I. Capable of existence. 
 
 II. Capable of life. 
 
 III. Cannot be deprived of them. 
 
 IV. Will live forever. 
 
 PEOOFS, I, II, III, IV 
 
 I. Ontological Argument. The soul, separated from the 
 body, is of its nature capable of existence, if it admits of corrup- 
 tion neither essentially nor accidentally. But the human soul 
 admits of corruption neither essentially nor accidentally. Ergo. 
 
 \Yith regard to the Minor. Only beings made up of physical 
 parts admit of corruption essentially. The soul is a simple 
 substance. Only beings intrinsically dependent on matter ad- 
 mit of corruption accidentally. The soul is spiritual, or a sub- 
 stance intrinsically independent of matter. N.B. Proofs for 
 the soul's simplicity and spirituality are contained in pre- 
 ceding thesis. 
 
 II. Ontological Argument. The soul can of its nature live 
 after separation from the body, if able to elicit thoughts and 
 wishes. But after separation from tlie body it can elicit 
 thoughts and wishes. Ergo. 
 
 With regard to the Minor. If death, or separation from the 
 
THESIS VI 95 
 
 body, deprived a soul of its thinking and wishing faculties, 
 or of all objects apt to serve as foundations for thoughts and 
 wishes, or of every conceivable method of performing these 
 operations; then, in sooth, would it be impossible for the soul 
 to live after separation from the body. But the faculties, in- 
 tellect and will, remain in the separated soul whole and sound 
 as they were before the change of condition. Indeed, as Cicero 
 well says, they put on a new activit}^ when released from the 
 bonds of clay that before enveloped them. After death the 
 human soul no longer exercises its vegetative and sensitive 
 powers; it no longer helps the eye to see, simply because the 
 body and the eye are disappeared from its influence, simply 
 because growth and sensation are operations intrinsically de- 
 pendent on matter. But thought and desire are operations pe- 
 culiar to an agent in itself free from all dependence on body-or- 
 gans or matter of whatever kind. If this agent during life on 
 earth seems to depend on sense for the material of its thoughts, 
 this dependence is only extrinsic, and does not at all enter into 
 its nature or essence. Organs are not the cause of thought, 
 they are a mere condition. Vision is impossible without light, 
 but nobody ever thought light the cause of vision. Only a fool 
 could be guilty of saying or thinking that light sees. Eain 
 and sunshine are necessary for vegetation without being its 
 causes. If mind and will were organic, they would be for the 
 organism. They are not for the organism. Mind and will 
 cannot add an inch to the man's stature, they cannot improve 
 his digestion, or cure his body's ills. The law still holds Chris- 
 tian Scientists for criminal neglect. 
 
 Neither will objects be wanting, to give occupation to the 
 mind and the will. God and the angels never had a body, 
 and yet the mine of their intellectual treasures is inexhaustible. 
 There are in material bodies qualities that cannot be perceived 
 by the unaided senses, which can well be perceived by the un- 
 aided intellect, truth, virtue, the whole world of abstractions. 
 Grod Himself can furnish forth food for thought, commensurate 
 only with eternity. The soul can contemplate itself, recall and 
 examine previous argumentations and notions, heaped away dur- 
 ing life on this sphere, and jealously preserved by intellectual 
 memory. In the present order of things, what the eye never 
 sees the heart never craves for, nothing exists in the intellect 
 
96 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 but what previously in some shape or other existed in the senses. 
 But, as is occasionally foreshadowed here below, the heart shall 
 then long for objects unseen of the eyes, the intellect shall 
 ponder knowledge far beyond the ken of the senses. Then the 
 human soul shall adapt itself to a method of knowing and 
 wishing peculiar to the angels. 
 
 ///. Theistic Ontological Argument. To lose existence, the 
 soul should have to either corrupt or be annihilated. But the 
 human soul can neither corrupt nor be annihilated. Ergo. 
 
 ^Yith regard to the Minor. We have Just seen that the soul, 
 because of its simplicity and spirituality, admits of no species 
 of corruption, whether essential or accidental. It can certainly 
 be annihilated by no mere creature. Annihilation is the pre- 
 rogative of the Creator. Man can annihilate nothing. He can 
 induce modifications into existences, but the result of his ut- 
 most endeavor is always a change of condition, never total de- 
 struction. God alone is therefore equal to such a task. No 
 atom is lost in a tree's decay. No drop of water is missing in 
 evaporation, freezing, passage from sea back to sea. Weight 
 of the universe is the same to-day as it was the first day of 
 creation. Annihilation and creation are parallel acts. It is 
 just as easy to get something from nothing as to get nothing 
 from something. Only God can annihilate. But God's various 
 attributes make it quite impossible for Him to expend His 
 energies on such an effect. His justice. His wisdom, and His 
 goodness render annihilation of human souls a manifest ab- 
 surdity. 
 
 IV. From St. Thomas — a, h, c, d. 
 
 a. Theistic Ontological Argument. God, who is the arti- 
 ficer of nature, never withdraws from beings characteristics be- 
 longing to their essence. But immortality is an essential char- 
 acteristic of the soul. Ergo the soul of man will live forever. 
 
 With regard to the Major. It is of the essence of everything 
 created, angels and the human soul alone excepted, to undergo 
 various changes, and finally be resolved into constituent ele- 
 ments, or suffer corruption. The composite being, man, is no 
 exception to this rule. Unending duration would therefore be 
 for every creature, but an angel and a human soul, the with- 
 drawal of a characteristic essential to it. Hence we contend 
 that the destructions and renewals everywhere apparent in na- 
 
THESIS VI 97 
 
 ture are no arguments against our Major, but strong arguments 
 in its favor. Could God act otherwise than as described in our 
 proof, He would be a Maker inferior in point of skill to many a 
 humble artisan we know. Such inferiority cannot without blas- 
 phemy be predicated of God. 
 
 6. Theistic Teleological Argument. Argument based on 
 man's natural craving for perfect happiness, and consequently 
 for immortality. 
 
 God cannot in justice render it absolutely impossible for man 
 to satisfy that desire for perfect happiness, implanted in him 
 by nature. 
 
 But if He annihilated the human soul. He would render it 
 absolutely impossible for man to satisfy that desire. 
 
 Ergo God cannot annihilate the human soul. 
 
 With regard to the Major. A natural craving or desire has 
 'these several marks. It has its origin in human nature, not in 
 education, prejudice, ignorance, and the like. It is unavoid- 
 able, so much so that no man can escape its influence. It is 
 universal, not restricted to this or that class of men, this or 
 that period of life, this or that condition; but common alike to 
 the whole race, to rich and poor, to good and bad, to young and 
 old, to slave and master. It is widely different from an ac- 
 quired or accidental craving, such for instance as a craving 
 for drink, for tobacco, for sensual pleasures, for intellectual 
 wealth. All these lower cravings have for object goods not 
 unmixed with evil; but the craving of which we speak in our 
 proof has for object unmixed good, good that repudiates all 
 commerce with evil, good therefore that cannot be coupled with 
 the slightest chance of loss or disappearance, ever-enduring 
 good. If God could render such a desire absolutely impossible 
 of fulfilment. He could break His promises, and could make of 
 man, His noblest creature in the visible world, a plaything of 
 folly and the laughing-stock of the universe. 
 
 With regard to the Minor. Perfect happiness for man and 
 the annihilation of the human soul are absolutely incompatible. 
 As long as our happiness does not tally with the degree of which 
 we know ourselves capable, so long does it fail of being perfect. 
 We know ourselves capable of happiness without end, and are 
 conscious of no absurdity when we wish to be forever happy. 
 To use the words of St. Thomas, "Brute creation desires life 
 
98 PSYICHOLOGY 
 
 and being inasmuch as tliey are a present possession, not as a 
 lasting possession, because they are wholly ignorant of what ever- 
 enduring life is. We, however, who know well what such exist- 
 ence is, long for it with a longing born of nature. Each and 
 every creature has its own natural measure of desire. In in- 
 tellectual beings, intellectual or abstract knowledge is the com- 
 pletest measure of desire. In man, this intellectual knowledge 
 reaches to a notion of existence without end. Hence his as- 
 pirations to immortality. Our desires in this matter are not 
 bounded by mere existence, but include also the notion of per- 
 fect happiness. This perfect happiness results from the fixed 
 union of these three elements, absence of all evil, possession of 
 every good compatible with our nature, unquestionable security 
 against ever falling away from this state of blessedness." 
 
 Apart even from this desire of perfect happiness, man's 
 perfectibility, his capacity for progress and improvement, in- 
 dicates immortality. He seeks truth, and life is too short to 
 compass all the truth. St. Augustine says, " Quid enim fortius 
 desiderat anima quam veritatem ? " Hence man's name, ani- 
 mal curiosum, the inquisitive being. Nobody can be said to 
 have acquired all knowledge, to have nothing more to learn, to 
 be beyond improvement. Hear Newton, " I know not what the 
 world will say of my labors; but it seems to me I was like a 
 child playing on the seashore, that finds now a smoother pebble, 
 and then a more brilliant shell, while the great ocean of truth 
 lay unexplored before me." Man is not capable of infinite de- 
 velopment. He cannot grasp all trutli simultaneously, and that 
 is limitation enough. When Strauss insists on the saying, old 
 people are done, old people outlive themselves, he may not know 
 that he is adducing an argument in our favor. These sayings 
 are declarations that the old people left their work incomplete, 
 or went a little way into the other life. History knows no 
 golden age realler than a dream. Man's imperfectibility in 
 this life means impossibility, unless another life supplements 
 this. Strauss sees in wasted seed, trampled apples, lost fish- 
 eggs, an argument against the need of a soul's full develop- 
 ment. But the cases are different. Things material perish be- 
 fore maturity, and this is true of man himself; because there 
 is not enough water, air, earth, to supjwrt all. In spirit-land 
 there is no crowding; feeding only whets appetite, and pro- 
 
THESIS VI 99 
 
 motes health ; one man's accumulation of intellectual wares beg- 
 gars not another. It would be a wonderful world, indeed, 
 where no seed would germinate, where no young apple would 
 develop, where no fish-egg would grow to maturity. And this 
 would be the case with the mind, were there no immortality. 
 
 c. Theistic Ethical Argument. Argument drawn from the 
 moral order of the universe. Man in pursuit of his end ought 
 to be bound by a perfect moral necessity to follow the dictates 
 of right reason. But such bond supposes the unending dura- 
 tion of reward and punishment. Ergo. 
 
 With regard to the Major. God imposes on human nature 
 this obligation. His consummate holiness makes it absurd to 
 think that He can be for a moment indifferent to compliance 
 and non-compliance with the duty. Worldly rulers can, per- 
 haps, become so remiss as to view with equal pleasure observance 
 and violation of their laws, but God can never descend to such 
 imperfection. 
 
 With regard to the Minor. If the reward of the virtuous is 
 to cease after a period, and the punishments of the damned are 
 to have an end, men would not hesitate long between choosing 
 the service of God and going over to the camp of His enemy. 
 They would desert in a body to the devil. There is not, per- 
 haps, on earth a man, woman or child, who has not already 
 experienced, or will not in the near future experience, one of 
 those ordeals which try the soul to its utmost. Saints and 
 sinners have presented to them alluring temptations, resistance 
 to which even bends the body to the ground. Nothing short of 
 Heaven, and an eternal Heaven, can prevail on man in some 
 circumstances to forego a present sinful gain, an enticing sinful 
 pleasure. In the lives of the saints there are recorded tempta- 
 tions, overcome only with closed eyes or hasty flight. How 
 many men would sacrifice the gratification of a passion, the 
 enjoyment of an awfully vivid and awfully present pleasure, if a 
 thousand years in hell were the only penalty, if the gnawing 
 consciousness of moral guilt were the only consequence? Few, 
 few indeed. Even as matters stand, with hell wide open be- 
 fore them, pleasure-seekers whose passions cannot brook delay, 
 rush over the precipice with full deliberation and full assurance 
 of results. 
 
 Eternal punishment is, then, the only sanction at all capable 
 
100 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 of deterring man from breaches of the moral law. It is, be- 
 sides, the only penalty commensurate with the weighty im- 
 portance and pressing necessity of that law. Whoever dies in 
 sin, foolishly casts himself into circumstances that leave him 
 an enemy to God, and preclude whatever chances he might have 
 had before to help himself. He is, therefore, in a state of per- 
 petual separation from God, and there is no help for it. God 
 Himself is powerless to change these relations, M'hen once the 
 period of probation is over, and man has readied the term of 
 his earthly existence. Justice, too, whose claims God cannot 
 after death disregard, demands that between the offense and 
 the punishment as perfect as possible a proportion have place. 
 The malice of sin is so heinous that malice more heinous can- 
 not be conceived. Its punishment, therefore, should be the 
 most painful that can be pictured. Man's nature is finite, and 
 cannot suffer pain of infinite intensity. The only particular in 
 which he partakes of the infinite, is the unending duration of 
 his soul. Nothing, then, remains for the lawmaker to do but 
 inflict on His rebellious subject woes of finite iutensit}^ of 
 infinite or eternal duration. 
 
 d. Consent Argument. Argument drawn from the universal 
 consent of mankind. A judgment, taking its rise in rational 
 nature as such, cannot be affected with error. But our judg- 
 ment concerning the immortality of the soul is such. Ergo. 
 
 With regard to the Major. This first premiss cannot be 
 denied without making God, the artificer of nature, a most way- 
 ward tyrant and a most inartistic Maker. 
 
 With regard to the Minor. In the Minor we simply main- 
 tain that our judgment concerning immortality has all the 
 elements of what was described in Major Logic as a judgment 
 ratified by the common consent of mankind. The four elements 
 there specified and their discussion follow. (1) A claim to 
 universality, to long duration and unchangeableness, as well 
 among the ruder as among the more civilized nations. During 
 all ages, and among all peoples the immortality of the soul has 
 been considered a truth beyond all question. Variations have 
 occurred in the kind of life awaiting the soul, but these varia- 
 tions little affect the main point at issue, the fact. (2) A 
 claim to exact agreement with all the rules of right reason. 
 This claim we made good in preceding remarks. (3) A claim 
 
THESIS VI 101 
 
 to absolute freedom from any such cause as prejudice, ig- 
 norance, and the like. Its universality is sufficient guarantee 
 for this claim. Education, prejudice and ignorance are not so 
 widespread in their influence. Education cannot overcome na- 
 ture; and, in the hypothesis of our opponents, immortality 
 would be against nature. " ISTaturam expellas furca, tamen 
 usque redibit." (4) Inculcation of moral and social truths 
 exclusively, not of scientific truths, such as the earth moves, 
 the sun stands still. 
 
 Belief in immortality is too solidly established a historical 
 fact to be overthrown by scoffers at religion and things holy. 
 Monuments raised to the memory of departed friends, funeral- 
 rites, sacrifices, pretended and real communication with the 
 dead, all are standing proofs of nature's promptings in the mat- 
 ter. With certain tribes, wives were burned alive to accom- 
 pany their husbands to the other world. Slaves were killed to 
 serve their dead masters. Feasts were set to celebrate their 
 happiness. Tombs in Egypt were meant for enduring mansions 
 or palaces. Inscriptions congratulate the dead on their entry 
 into peace and blessedness. Only a few select passages bearing 
 immediately on the subject were set down at the beginning of 
 our remarks. No one book could contain the unnumbered 
 tributes paid this world-old belief by historians, philosophers, 
 and poets. This historical fact has also peculiarities of its 
 own, that commend it particularly to credit. In spite of the 
 errors and mistakes, with which the belief is mixed up, espe- 
 cially among ruder peoples; in spite of the obscurity, that in 
 earlier ages enveloped it; in spite of the seemingly contradic- 
 tory views taken of the circumstances attendant on future ex- 
 istence; about future existence itself the persuasion has ever 
 been deep-rooted and unshaken. Skeptics have labored hard 
 to eradicate it from among men, the wicked have striven to 
 prove it a bugbear; but the more their flimsy arguments were 
 multiplied, and the deeper the search instituted, the purer and 
 stronger grew the unanimity of mankind. The senses are dead 
 set against immortality; passion is dead set against it; high- 
 handed oppression is dead set against it. It is, therefore, vain 
 to compare this belief with the long since exploded theory about 
 the motion of the sun and the fixity of the earth. What booted 
 it to the senses, or the passions, or sin, whether the earth moved 
 
102 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 or stood still? The whole social fabric depends for its per- 
 manency on this single dogma of immortality. 
 
 PEINCIPLES 
 
 A. A word has been already said about God's omnipotence 
 with reference to annihilation of human souls. To repeat, it 
 is plain that, absolutely speaking, God has power sufficient to 
 end a soul's existence. In fact, mere refusal of cooperation 
 on the part of God would work the soul's destruction. But the 
 question here is not so much what God can do in the abstract, 
 but what He will do in the concrete. He has clearly enough 
 made known His intentions; and, in connection with His other 
 attributes, He will not, and cannot annihilate human souls. 
 
 B. When the soul leaves the body, a form is removed from 
 its matter, and begins an existence peculiar to itself. This 
 peculiar existence is entirely natural, due to the human soul's 
 very nature. The case, then, is altogether different from that 
 urged by opponents, when they say that a form cannot exist 
 apart from its matter without experiencing a condition of vio- 
 lence, wholly inconsistent with nature. Forms intrinsically de- 
 pendent on matter cannot exist apart from matter; but forms 
 like the human soul, intrinsically independent of matter, can 
 readily enough exist and act without the help of matter. Sepa- 
 ration becomes highly natural and expedient, when the diseased 
 or maimed body ceases to be a fit dwelling place for the soul. 
 Union with the body is natural to the soul in our present con- 
 dition. Change of condition calls for change in natural mode 
 of existence. One being can have several natural modes of 
 existence, as is evident in caterpillar, pupa and butterfly. 
 Separation is just as natural to the soul as union, though union 
 is more perfect, because the soul can then exercise all three of 
 its functions. A separate soul loses in extent of activity, to 
 grow in intensity. The butterfly is more a thing of beauty 
 than the caterpillar or pupa. The soul's activity is less, inas- 
 much as it fails of growth and sensation; but incomparably 
 greater, inasmuch as it enjoys unhampered use of its intel- 
 lectual strength. 
 
 C. Notwithstanding the certainty that a future eternity is 
 ahead, man cannot but meet death with pain, discomfort and 
 
THESIS VI 103 
 
 anxiety. It is a violent rending of soul from body, a penalty 
 for original sin ; and was therefore meant by God to be ac- 
 companied by disagreeable symptoms. But the bitterest pang 
 attaching to death, is not the bodily torture, but the mental un- 
 certainty about the sort of future in store for the departing 
 soul; and, if it was during life addicted to sin, the utter aban- 
 donment of all the old haunts of pleasure. Saints, conscious 
 of duty done and unstained innocence, the pledges of a glori- 
 ous immortality, go out to meet death with little or no concern ; 
 they often hail it with joy. The fear attendant on dissolution 
 has its origin, not in uncertainty about life beyond the grave, 
 but in uncertainty about the kind of destiny the soul has worked 
 out for herself. This dread uncertainty is on occasions vivid 
 enough to make even men of God tremble. What must its ter- 
 rors be for half-hearted Christians, for out-and-out reprobates! 
 
 D. Strauss argues : A finite being is in naught infinite. 
 Ergo. Answer: Immortality like the soul's is not infinite, be- 
 cause it had a beginning and is communicated by another. 
 The soul can never say. Now I have lived an infinitely long 
 time. St. Thomas answered Strauss 700 years ago, De Anima, 
 a. 14, n. 4. 
 
 E. Biedermann says: Whatever originates in time, must 
 also pass away in time. Ergo. Answer: It can cease in time. 
 Whether it will or not, depends on the good pleasure of its 
 creator; and we know His pleasure from the soul's spirituality 
 and its aspirations. St. Thomas again, 1, Q., 75, a. 6, n. 2. 
 
 F. Strauss denominates our argument an arbitrary reverie; 
 a mere assertion; empty babble, called by the honest a prevari- 
 cation. He that does not inflate himself knows the finiteness 
 of his nature, and infinite duration terrifies him. Answer: 
 Immortality is not infinite duration. Honest men, with 
 Strauss and with Materialists in general, are civilized apes; 
 and he forgets the long record of the past. It is good to be 
 humble; but to have lower aims than those set for us by 
 nature, is not modesty; it is hypocrisy mixed with cowardice. 
 Immortality frightens only the reprobate, it has no terrors for 
 the just. Sinners dread, not long duration, but hell. 
 
 G. The Jews knew nothing about immortality. Witness 
 Eccles. 3.19. " The death of men and beasts is one." An- 
 swer: Preacher is showing vanity of the world. In things 
 
104 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 material, food, clothing, wealth, the death of men and beasts 
 is one. The Jews were stout believers in immortality, and 
 needed no reminder. Even the Egyptians believed it. 
 
 //. Philosophers have denied immortality. P]rgo. Answer: 
 Man's will is free and influences his statements. Denial seems 
 better to the immoral; and, therefore, sways their judgment 
 and will. 
 
 /. Whole nations have made mistakes in this matter. No 
 two agree in their conception of a future life. Ergo. Answer: 
 Their mistakes turn on the manner of immortality, not on the 
 fact. 
 
 J. Souls alike in origin and subsequent duration are prob- 
 ably alike in finish. But man's soul, like the souls of plant 
 and brute, begins in matter, and elicits vegetative and sensitive 
 operations. Ergo, like souls of plant and brute, man's soul is 
 mortal. Answer: Man's soul has its origin in creation, and 
 along with vegetation and sensation it enjoys intellectual ac- 
 tivity. Ergo it ought to be different in finish, or immortal. 
 
 K. Souls differ in degree of mentality; but these variations 
 are no sign of possible dissolution, because they are rooted not 
 in the soul's substance, but in organs the soul employs. Sub- 
 stantially all souls are of the same perfection. 
 
 L. In this life, the soul cannot think without phantasms; 
 but in a higher life God can and will supply the place of 
 phantasms. Actual vegetation and sensation disappear, poten- 
 tial remain ; and they are not the soul's single activity. 
 
 M. Erroneous consent regarding the sun's motion was a 
 scientific judgment, not moral or natural; and, being a mere 
 hypothesis, was far from firm. Sanction in another life is 
 per se sufficient to safeguard morality; by accident, and on 
 account of free will, it sometimes fails of this effect. History 
 proves the natural consequences of insuffieient sanction. Men 
 are content with the goods of this life because of their animal 
 nature. They dread death, not because insecure about immor- 
 tality, but about a happy immortality. The desire a young 
 man has to reach old age is natural in another way, dependent 
 on free will. 
 
 N. Kant argues: The soul weakens with the organism. 
 Ergo. Answer: It weakens, not in substance, but in applica- 
 tion of its powers ; and this means extrinsic dependence. 
 
THESIS VI 105 
 
 0. The separated soul is the body's form in potency, not 
 actually. 
 
 P. The soul's being is the body's being, and something 
 more, namely being proper to it as a spirit. 
 
 Q. Immortality is no incentive to selfishness, because God, 
 not self, is man's last end. 
 
 R. As a contingent being, the soul tends towards nothing 
 negatively, not positively. It needs conservation on the part 
 of God, 
 
 >S^. The wicked desire not annihilation, but surcease of pain. 
 
 T. Eternal punishment is just, and not opposed to the 
 mercy of God. 
 
 TJ. Desire of happiness is not to be confounded with its 
 accomplishment. 
 
 De. Verworm and Immortality 
 
 Columbia University lately harbored a distinguished physi- 
 ologist from the University of Bonn in Prussia, Dr. Max Ver- 
 worm by name. On October 26, 1910, with the approval, no 
 doubt, and encouragement of the University authorities, he 
 undertook to show a large audience, presumably made up of 
 Columbia students, that individual souls are no more immor- 
 tal than individual bodies. We venture to think that many of 
 his listeners were sons and daughters of devout Christians, 
 who hardly know that they are paying good money of the re- 
 public to have their children's minds infected with the dead- 
 liest brand of paganism's poison. We should hate to learn 
 that any educated Catholic sat the frivolous and impious lec- 
 ture through, without raising his voice in protest. Certainly, 
 the publicity given the thing by the morning papers ought to 
 open the eyes of Catholic and Protestant parents alike to the 
 hellish enormity of entrusting the education of their growing 
 boys and girls to advocates or abettors of a doctrine, that found 
 favor with only the grosser minds in paganism. The following 
 statements are taken verbatim from the Times' account of the 
 lecture, and for purposes of convenient reference we number 
 them. 
 
 1. " The soul is no more immortal than the body." 2. 
 " Every act of consciousness is intimately dependent on the 
 brain." 3. " A complex phenomenon ceases when a single con- 
 
106 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 dition fails." 4. " Paralysis completely inhibits conscious- 
 ness." 5. "A mournful faith in a future reward or punish- 
 ment awakens fear. Hell and purgatory, inventions of a 
 gloomy fancy, must give place to nobler incentives." 6. 
 " Thought of death ought not to arouse fear. Pain and fear 
 are physiological properties. The anguish of death would dis- 
 appear. Cowards fear death." 7. " Causal view must yield 
 to condition-view. Science neglects causes, to be content with 
 conditions. Vitalism is last example of causal view. It pro- 
 claimed life from life, till science discovered that life can pro- 
 ceed from death." 8. " External factors of life are plain, in- 
 ternal factors are a hopeless complication. We do not know 
 the exact chemical structure of a single cell. If an engineer 
 lacks but one part of a complicated machine, he cannot put the 
 machine together. Hence we cannot make living substances 
 artificially in a laboratory. If we could succeed in assembling 
 internal and external factors, the artificial system would live 
 like the natural amoeba, and eventually a human being would 
 result." 9. " Life is continual destruction and continual con- 
 struction." 10. " Media vita in morte sumus, sang the monk 
 of St. Gall." 11. "All life must die, and all life is death." 
 12. " Dust thou art, and unto dust thou shalt return." 
 
 And now we respectfully submit to Materialism's attention 
 the following comments. 1. " The soul is no more immortal 
 than the body." There can be no doubt regarding the body's 
 mortality. Any graveyard can satisfy the most skeptical. But 
 we presume to think it quite within reason to doubt regarding 
 the soul's mortality. Any one of the arguments advanced in 
 favor of its immortality, even the arguments based on universal 
 belief, ought to be able to pause the most rabid Materialist, and 
 urge him to at least waver in his position. Nobody ever saw 
 a dead soul; and, till he sees the phenomenon, a physiologist 
 ought in conscience to refrain from proclaiming the soul's 
 mortality. Possibly man's soul dies, because it is identical with 
 his body, or because it is totally submerged in matter, like the 
 brute's soul. Identity of soul and body is gross Monism; and 
 in all psychology nothing, perhaps, is easier to refute. Man's 
 soul has simple and spiritual activities, that positively preclude 
 as thorough a dependence on matter as that of the brute's soul. 
 If man is body alone, if his soul is an empty nothing, there 
 
THESIS VI 107 
 
 can of course be no question of the soul's mortality or im- 
 mortality. In that case man's soul is the hole in a doughnut, 
 and to talk learnedly about nothing ill becomes the wise. Ma- 
 terialists hold this opinion, and escape the whole difficulty by 
 denying the difficulty's existence. And while on the subject, it 
 does seem to me that the Materialist, though less refined 
 and scholarly, is more logical than the Monist. He at least 
 sticks to his colors, and goes down with a bad cause. And 
 there is a certain amount of amiable, even if imprudent, courage 
 in stupid perverseness. To deny the soul's existence, hurts 
 logic less than to affirm its existence, and with the same breath 
 dispute its immortality. 2. " Every act of consciousness is in- 
 timately dependent on the brain," because of the union at pres- 
 ent in force between the soul and the body ; but this is far from 
 denying that the soul itself is intrinsically independent of mat- 
 ter, or spiritual. Consciousness is but an act of the soul, not 
 the soul itself; and for this very reason a man can be uncon- 
 scious without being dead. An act can cease to be, without 
 involving its cause's destruction. Were the soul consciousness, 
 dead and unconscious would be synonymous, a verdict that no 
 reputable physician would countenance, whatever our learned 
 Doctor may say to the contrary. When a person faints or 
 sleeps, he is not by the very fact a candidate for the under- 
 taker. Even so, when the brain is hurt, and consciousness is 
 still, the soul's substance remains alive and intact. 
 
 3. " A complex phenomenon ceases, when a single condition 
 fails " ; and this is no reason why the cause of the complex 
 phenomenon should cease, when the phenomenon itself ceases, 
 or the single condition fails. Thought is the complex phenom- 
 enon, brain is its condition, the soul is its cause. Naturally 
 enough, if the condition, or work of the brain, is wanting, 
 there will be no thought; but this is far from proving that no 
 soul remains. Brain is to thought what light is to vision, the 
 soul is vision itself, or sight. Naturally enough, there is no 
 seeing without light; but no man ever yet thought himself 
 blind merely because he was seated in a dark room. Turn out 
 the lights in a hall. There is no seeing, though every man in 
 the hall has sight ; and we can satisfy ourselves of this by turn- 
 ing on the lights again. Empty the hall of men, then flood it 
 with light; and there is no seeing as well as no sight, because, 
 
108 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 though the condition for seeing is verified, the cause of seeing 
 or the seer is away. 4. " Paralysis completely inhibits con- 
 sciousness"; but it leaves the soul whole and sound. To in- 
 hibit the act of an agent, is not to destroy the agent itself. 
 For the information of surface-dabblers in philosophy, we again 
 submit our proofs for the soul's spirituality, or intrinsic inde- 
 pendence of matter or brain. We gather the soul's nature from 
 wbat the soul can do, just as we get the measure of a man's 
 psychology from the little he knows. The soul's activity is 
 basis for our certainty about the soul's intrinsic independence 
 of matter. The soul, therefore, is spiritual, because it has sim- 
 ple and spiritual ideas, ideas of things that cannot react on a 
 material organ like the brain. As examples of such ideas we 
 instance those of being, necessity, possibility, duty, honesty, all 
 abstract and all universal ideas. Further, the mind has knowl- 
 edge of material things that will never affect the agent's senses. 
 It can see a cause in its effects, effects in their cause. It cor- 
 rects the work of the senses. In psychological reflection the 
 mind turns back on itself, and no material faculty can perform 
 that trick. Whatever effects of the soul are patent to the senses, 
 fail when the brain is hurt, because in this department of its 
 activity the soul does allegiance to extrinsic dependence on mat- 
 ter. 5. " A mournful faith in a future reward or punishment 
 awakens fear." Here the professor passes from psychology to 
 ethics; and when a Materialist discourses ethics, he is laying 
 down rules for brutes of the field, ill at ease when hungry, con- 
 tent when their bellies are full; with no higher aspiration than 
 the ground, with no wider outlook than the present hour. For, 
 when true to his character, he must maintain tliat man is only 
 a more perfect brute, different from the monkey in degree, 
 not in kind. If thought is a secretion of tlie brain, if man's 
 highest faculty is sense, he is open to no subtler impression 
 than physical pleasure and physical pain; and bodily fear 
 would be as potent an incentive with man as it is with the dog 
 and the horse, the lion and the tiger. It would be as arrant 
 nonsense to talk to man of nobler motives, as to talk to dog 
 or cat of decency. Nobility is a spiritual and abstract reality; 
 and, appealing to no organic faculty, is eminently useless in 
 the case of brutes. For this reason the trainer of a lion carries 
 a sharp pointed instrument, the driver of a horse carries a 
 
THESIS VI 109 
 
 whip ; and both are abundantly supplied with lumps of sugar. 
 The prod and the whip awaken physical pain, the sugar awakens 
 physical pleasure. 
 
 But anon the Materialist forgets his part in tlie play, and 
 slips the garb of a motley jester, to don the robes of a wise 
 philosopher. Then he talks of fear as an unworthy motive, 
 and eulogizes what he styles with unctuous severity nobler in- 
 centives to virtuous conduct. Fear is not by half the weak and 
 ignoble incentive our friend paints it. One wiser than the 
 professor from Bonn, is authority for the statement, that the 
 fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom. Faith in a fu- 
 ture reward is hardly mournful. The crape belongs with more 
 right to Dr. Verworm's certainty about future nothingness. 
 Faith in a future punishment is mournful only in the case of 
 such as take no precautions to avoid it. Hell and purgatory 
 are no inventions of a gloomy fancy. They are facts backed 
 up with the undoubted word of God, and unprejudiced minds 
 lean their way at the instigation of naked reason. Eeason itself 
 is prejudiced in favor of liell and purgatory, ancient literature 
 is our warrant for the statement; and on this account revela- 
 tion encounters small difficulty when it clamors for a hearing 
 on these topics. 
 
 We further venture to suggest that two motives or incentives 
 to moral conduct are better than one, particularly when the 
 one selected is the weaker of the two. The Doctor in the heat 
 of argument makes the usual mistake of thinking that believers 
 in hell and purgatory altogether despise and neglect approval 
 of conscience and remorse, the esteem and contempt of their 
 fellows. We beg leave to assure him that we are just as much 
 sticklers for respectability as himself, and we court everybody's 
 and our own applause; but, in the impossible supposition of 
 future annihilation, we hardly know whether we should welcome 
 the pangs of self-denial, honest poverty, and life along the hard 
 lines of the Ten Commandments, rather than risk a rebuff from 
 conscience, sink in our own consideration, or expose ourselves 
 to the remote danger of discovery by the neighbor. In the 
 hypothesis of the Doctor, thought of death ought not to arouse 
 fear; it ought to arouse despair, as it regularly does. In our 
 hypothesis, thought of death ought to excite unease, because 
 separation is not, in one sense, the soul's natural condition; it 
 
no PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 ought to excite anxiety and fear, because nobody is certain 
 whether he is worthy of love or of hatred. It may not be 
 known to the professor tliat, in the case of believers, death stirs 
 less fear in the virtuous than in the wicked; and the circum- 
 stance is an indication that the dying dread not so much death 
 as the future lot awaiting them. Suarez, a rascal Jesuit, from 
 whom the Doctor could learn a vast deal of philosophy, died 
 with these words on his lips : " I did not know it was so sweet 
 to die." Whether pain and fear are physiological or psycho- 
 logical properties, makes small difference regarding the matter 
 in hand; but the Doctor can rest satisfied that the anguish of 
 death will never altogether disappear, and that Materialism 
 is the most hopeless remedy in the world for the disease's 
 cure. 
 
 6. If Dr. Verworm wants to meet death like a man, and not 
 like a dumb animal, let him shake off his prejudices, study 
 himself into the phase of mind regarding immortality, adopted 
 by the wisest and noblest men in all history, and then soberly 
 set to work along the surest path to a happy eternity, a life of 
 faith, religion, and uniform virtue. Animals have no dread of 
 death, because they know nothing beyond the present life. 
 With the lielp of chloroform, or strong drink, or the stupefying 
 principles of Materialism, men sometimes approach death with 
 all the dull indifference of dumb animals. But their lot is not 
 to be envied; and an ounce of the right kind of cowardice is 
 worth more than a ton of the wrong kind of courage. It is 
 the old story of the goat that stood on the track, to dispute 
 right of way with the locomotive. The goat's owner, happen- 
 ing on his remains, dismissed the incident with the remark 
 that his goat had a powerful lot of courage with a plentiful lack 
 of prudence. In this case the goat were better a live coward 
 than a brave carcass. We invite the professor to leave his shop 
 a while, throw himself into a meditative mood, and calmly 
 analyze, not nerves and muscles, but emotions. He will find 
 that, after all, courage, like despair, is only a species of fear. 
 Fear is reaction against impending evil. When tlie impending 
 evil wears the aspect of avoidability or possible escape, fear 
 becomes courage; when it seems inevitable and beyond perad- 
 venture certain, fear becomes despair. Neither the Materialist 
 nor the Christian can escape death, or whatever evil the sad 
 
THESIS VI 111 
 
 fact contains. The Christian however feels that with God's 
 grace he can still escape the evil consequences attendant on 
 death in sin, or an eternal hell; and so he welcomes the end 
 with courage. The Materialist can look forward to nothing 
 more pleasant than blank nothingness, with a suspicion of some- 
 thing worse; and so despair is his lot. Be wise unto sobriety, 
 not unto destruction. 
 
 7. The Doctor is back to philosophy, when he tells us 
 that the causal view must yield to the condition-view; and, 
 as usual, he is again wrong. Neither view must yield to 
 the other. There is plenty of room for the two views, 
 and they must be kept apart. The condition-view is peculiar 
 to science; and we have no desire to do robbery. The causal 
 view belongs to philosophy; and, as physiology is the science 
 of life, psychology is the philosophy of the soul. Science has 
 nothing to do with the last causes of things or their essences. 
 Berthelot, Pasteur, Bernard, and others too numerous to men- 
 tion, make wise acknowledgment of the thing; its business is 
 entirely with positive facts and their mutual relations. And 
 the sooner scientifists wake up to this sober truth, the better. 
 When science tells us that brain is a condition of thought, it is 
 venturing information it can well be supposed to have; and we 
 accept its authority; but when it goes farther and proclaims 
 brain the cause of thought, it is away from home, on forbidden 
 ground, and deserves about as much credit as a ditcher dis- 
 coursing on high art. Science ought to neglect causes, without 
 denying them ; and it ought to be content with conditions, with- 
 out confounding them with causes. To deny a thing is a rather 
 strange way to neglect it. Whether vitalism is a first, inter- 
 mediate, or last example of the causal view, it is enough for 
 us to know that vitalism, or the doctrine that life proceeds from 
 life alone, is come to stay, and is surer now than it was when 
 science was in its infancy. Science has actually strengthened 
 instead of weakening the position of vitalists. The ancients 
 and old Scholastics were somewhat staggered by the bogie of 
 spontaneous generation, till modern science, in the person of 
 Pasteur, clearly proved that seemingly spontaneous life actually 
 proceeded from preexistent germs. Science can examine till it 
 grows blind, it will never discover that life actually proceeds 
 from death; and when science gets away from facts, to talk 
 
112 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 about possibilities, it deserves no attention. It is for philoso- 
 phy, not for science, to talk about possibilities. 
 
 8. The professor's division of life-factors into external and 
 internal has the merit of sounding erudite, though factors with 
 him are a jumble of conditions and causes. His admission that 
 the internal factors are a liopeless complication, is a tribute to 
 the man's modesty, and almost tempts us to think that his case 
 is not quite so hopeless as the complication. But in the next 
 breath he makes bold to deny what leaders in his own chosen 
 study seem ready to grant. He says that we do not know the 
 exact chemical structure of a single cell, the quantitative re- 
 lations of its substances, their positions in space and the like; 
 whereas Liebig and others assert the contrary. In fact it 
 would be but an imperfect kind of chemistry and physiology 
 that failed of knowing these several items. All the chemical 
 and physical forces of an egg can be determined with exactness, 
 we can blend them in accurate proportions, positions and con- 
 ditions, without ever producing an egg able to hatch even a 
 tadpole. The one internal factor or cause, that escapes capture 
 and defies science, is the principle of life or the soul, con- 
 tended for by the Scholastics; and recalcitrants are rapidly 
 coming over to their camp, acknowledging that the attempt to 
 assemble elements with a view to obtaining life is a hopeless 
 undertaking. Hence we cannot make living substances arti- 
 ficially in a laboratory, and the task promises to remain an 
 impossibility for all time. 
 
 The Doctor's illustration of an engineer, unable to put a 
 complicated machine together, because he lacks one of its parts, 
 is but a lame subterfuge. If the engineer knew his business, 
 he would not be long discovering the missing piece, or inventing 
 a substitute, or acknowledging the machine an impossibility. If 
 he afterwards found that another workman, by assembling the 
 same parts, under the same conditions, produced a machine in 
 full operation, he would at once suspect a hidden agency, a 
 motor perhaps in the cellar; and he would take no rest till he 
 solved the problem. Scientists are puzzling their heads over 
 the egg and its contents, chemical and physical, without being 
 able to hatch even a tadpole. A healthy hen can without much 
 ado produce a chick from an egg of her own making. Scientists 
 therefore ought to suspect in the hen and the egg a hidden 
 
THESIS VI 113 
 
 agency, distinct from chemical and physical forces, a principle 
 of life, the soul contended for by Scholastics. Otlierwise, they 
 have on their hands a fact that admits of no explanation. 
 
 9. When the professor says that life is continual destruc- 
 tion and continual construction, he is only repeating the mistake 
 made by Comte and other positivists, who cannot see beyond 
 their noses; and like a woful blunderer he hopelessly mixes 
 causes and effects. Life is the principle or cause of continual 
 destruction and continued construction, not the destruction and 
 construction themselves. To hold his manner of talk is about 
 as sensible as to say that the candle, or gas, or electricity is 
 light, and that the man is the house he builds. 
 
 10. The monk of St. Gall, responsible for the touchingly 
 beautiful expression, " Media vita in morte sumus," knew well 
 what he was saying, though his materialistic interpreter alto- 
 gether misses his meaning. The monastery were no place for 
 him, unless he believed in the immortality of the soul; and he 
 held meditative discourse on the death of his body, not on 
 the death of his soul. 
 
 11. All life intrinsically dependent on matter or bodily or- 
 gans must die; the soul of man, because intrinsically inde- 
 pendent of matter, can live forever, and because of teleological 
 as well as ethical reasons must live forever. 
 
 12. Let the poet answer his last fling, " Dust thou art, to dust 
 returnest, Was not spoken of the soul." If he sets small or no 
 store by poetry, let him turn to the second chapter of Genesis, 
 the only authentic record we have of man's creation, and he 
 will find, perhaps, to his surprise, that the body of Adam, not 
 his soul, was made of dust. " And the Lord God formed 
 man of the slime of the earth; and breathed into his face the 
 breath of life, and man became a living soul." 
 
 We have been too busy with immortality's critic to urge in 
 detail philosophy's solid arguments for unwavering certainty 
 in this dogma of the ages. We have been answering objections, 
 and it is hard to tear down and build up with the same hand. 
 In our thesis we made good all our claims, and set immortality 
 on a basis that cannot be shaken by feather-weights in the 
 arena of controversy. We cannot close without recalling an in- 
 cident that had place in Brooklyn, New York, soon after the 
 publication of Dr. Verworm's views in the New York Times. 
 
114 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 The same paper is responsible for the story. A reverend gentle- 
 man, Mercer, by name, undertook to enlighten some members 
 of a Philosophical Society in that borough, and for his pains 
 was told that he buncoed his audience, and that clergymen in 
 general deceived their congregations to keep their soft jobs. 
 We sincerely pity the Rev. Mr. Mercer. It is disappointing 
 indeed to deserve bouquets, and get the decayed growth of gar- 
 dens. Whatever it means elsewhere, wanton abuse is not con- 
 sidered in politer circles a manifestation of gratitude or a mark 
 of chivalry. No doubt he left the gathering a wiser, even if a 
 sadder man. The president of the meeting, a Mt. Rinn, 
 vouchsafed Dr. Mercer the comforting and rather commonplace 
 bit of information, that a blow on the head with a sledge-ham- 
 mer, could make him a degenerate and a ruffian. The Doctor 
 might have replied that, if the hammer applied to Mr. Einn's 
 own head were heavy enough, it might produce the same sad 
 result. He preferred, however, to be more parliamentary, and 
 suavely dismissed the difficulty with a reference to Paderewski 
 and a battered piano. The illustration is well taken. We 
 merely remark that it could be strengthened by working out the 
 figure thuswise. As the artist, without detriment to his ability, 
 necessarily coaxes poor music from a cracked instrument, on 
 which his skill extrinsically depends; so the soul, without harm 
 to its substance, is hindered of intellectual activity, when the 
 brain, the organ on which it extrinsically depends, is reduced 
 to misshapen pulp with a hammer. 
 
THESIS VII 
 
 The intellect, to understand, has need generally of the im- 
 printed intelligible image, as a determining principle. This 
 imprinted intelligible image is the joint product of a phantasm 
 and the worMng intellect, acting as partial, efficient, subordinate 
 causes. The receiving intellect and this imprinted intelligible 
 image so combine as efficient causes to put the act or idea, that 
 the idea in its entirety proceeds from both as from subordinate 
 causes. 
 
 Maher, pp. 252-378; Jouin, pp. 200-210. 
 
 QUESTION 
 
 The Origin of our Ideas. And now we approach a mystery, 
 the profoiindest in all psychology. It bears on the origin and 
 genesis of our ideas. That we have ideas nobody can in reason 
 doubt; but to explain Just how they rise, is a delicate matter, 
 and calls for the sharpest kind of study. After all, the heart 
 of the problem is to know how the mind, an altogether spiritual 
 faculty, equips itself with knowledge of material and particular 
 objects, to afterwards pass to universal ideas; how to get a 
 material object, man, into a spiritual faculty, there strip him 
 of matter, spiritualize him, and hold up to view not this or that 
 individual man, as he exists in nature, but a peculiar kind of 
 man, a type representative of every individual in the human 
 species. 
 
 Among the ancients no guide is safer than Aristotle, and 
 since his time St. Thomas Aquinas is without an equal. Our 
 theory is the joint product of both, and cannot be far wrong. 
 It would be useless to look for the truth among modem writers. 
 The race of metaphysicians is dead, and to it has succeeded a 
 motley crew of biologists, physiologists, phrenologists, electri- 
 cians; all mere mechanics, without a single pretense to the re- 
 finement of subtler thought. They can be called empiricists or 
 experimenters. They limit our knowledge to sensation, and re- 
 us 
 
116 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 fuse to see in man any higher faculty than sense. In this con- 
 nection they are called Sensists or Materialists. They have 
 involved and intricate ways of establishing the identity in force 
 between thought and sensation, between operations of the mind 
 and operations of the senses; but the principles underlying their 
 whole method are too openly and grossly wrong to deserve at- 
 tention. They virtually reduce man to the level of a brute. 
 No essential difference has place between one and the other. 
 They differ only in quality of sensation. A man's senses are a 
 little better than a horse's, and that is all. Like the brutes, 
 men are born to enjoy themselves ; and they ought to be content 
 if they succeed in satisfying their animal instincts. They are 
 subject to no law, amenable to no penalty, begin and end with 
 this present life. Locke (1634-1704) is the reputed father of 
 this system. Condillac (1715-1780), Comte (1798-1857) fol- 
 lowed closely in his footsteps ; and it is safe to say that, outside 
 of Scholasticism, all of to-day's philosophy is more or less in- 
 fected with the same poison. Sensism, far from undertaking to 
 explain mind and the origin of its ideas, attempts to destroy 
 the reality of both, and avoids the difficulty by refusing to 
 acknowledge its existence. 
 
 There are, however, other wrong systems that have the merit 
 of at least meeting the question squarely; and these have a 
 claim on our attention. Chief among them is Plato's theory 
 of innate or inborn ideas, a theory that does large credit to 
 the man's poetic genius, without adding to his reputation as a 
 philosopher. Leibnitz (1646-1716), Wolff (1679-1764), and 
 Kant (1724-1804), have borrowed to a large or small extent 
 from Plato. Eosmini (1797-1855), too, is indebted to the 
 same master-mind for his method. Ontologism, with Male- 
 branche (1638-1715), for founder, is another theory not with- 
 out its supporters even at the present time. Traditionalism is 
 another explanation ventured by a school with a respectable 
 number of followers. We reserve for last place the true and 
 correct theory, formulated by Aristotle, adopted by St. Thomas, 
 and by the whole Scholastic world with him. 
 
 According to Plato, souls before their advent into the world 
 enjoyed a higher life among the stars. In that superior air 
 they owned a knowledge due to impressions made by their 
 Creator. They had ideas of every conceivable thing. For some 
 
THESIS VII 117 
 
 unknown crime these souls were after a term condemned to 
 unlovely companionship with bodies as to a prison, and hurled 
 headlong from sky to earth. These ideas they carried with 
 them to their new home, and one by one they rise to view at 
 the instigation of recurrent sensations. Hence all our present 
 knowledge is but a grouping of old ideas, and to learn is to 
 recollect. Des Cartes (1596-1650), is accused of adopting 
 innate ideas, but without reason. The innate ideas he con- 
 tends for are notions derived from neither outside objects nor 
 the will's activity, but from the mind itself. However, many 
 of his followers are amenable to the blame imputed to their 
 master. It costs small trouble to refute Plato's system. In- 
 nate ideas are empty creations of the fancy and have no founda- 
 tion in nature. They rest on the hypothesis that our souls 
 lived before our bodies, that the union in force between soul 
 and body is unnatural and a penalty, that there is a sphere or 
 a planet where universals exist much as individuals here on earth. 
 We certainly have no recollection of any previous life lived by 
 the soul; union with the body is in such measure the soul's 
 natural condition that it rebels against separation, and death 
 is on all sides reckoned a penalty or punishment; and our 
 universal ideas are easily gathered from individual objects 
 without the intervention of any so extraordinary a world. Eos- 
 mini thinks that our universal ideas postulate the need of at 
 least one innate idea, that of being in general; but, apart from 
 the fact that his doctrine is dangerously close to pantheism, our 
 universal ideas are easily derived from individual objects with- 
 out tlie help of a single innate idea. 
 
 Ontologism, though it gets its name from Gioberti (1801- 
 1852), was first mooted by Malebranche (1638-1715). The 
 height of its offending lies in the circumstance that it ascribes 
 the origin of our ideas to immediate vision of God, We have 
 intuition of God, He is absolute Being, and in Him we have 
 knowledge of all else. We must maintain, with all good Catho- 
 lics, that immediate knowledge of God is reserved to the next 
 life, and altogether impossible to mortals. The only knowledge 
 of God within present reach is the kind deduced from the open 
 book of creation, and therefore posterior rather than antecedent 
 to our knowledge of created objects. Besides, were Ontologism 
 true, it would seem to follow that, as we know everything in 
 
118 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 God, we likewise wish everything in God, and all the movements 
 of a man's will would be honorable and in strict accord with 
 morality. The end of the story would be inability to sin, and 
 the removal of everything like an essential difference between 
 good and bad, right and wrong. Further, Ontologism furnishes 
 a stout defense to Deism, Indifferentism and Rationalism. If 
 the mind sees everything in God, and if it fails of the truths 
 presented for belief by revelation, these so-called truths have 
 no reality, and revelation amounts to just nothing. No truth 
 would be absolutely beyond the reach of reason, and all need 
 of supernatural revelation would be at an end. Pantheism like- 
 wise has an ally in Ontologism. It derives the mind's activity 
 from the soul's close union with God. If things are knowable 
 only in God, they have their being, not in themselves, but in 
 God alone. In what measure a thing is, in that measure is it 
 understood, and vice-versa. The expression, man is being, 
 would seem to mean, man is the absolute being within certain 
 bounds and limits, a particle of God. 
 
 Traditionalism has DeBonald (1754—1840), for author, with 
 Bonnetty (1798-1879), and Ventura (1792-18G1), for cham- 
 pions and exponents. Its purpose is highly commendable. It 
 aims at tearing up Eationalism by the roots, but its wrong 
 methods only strengthen the error it attempts to destroy. Ac- 
 cording to its tenets, the mind left to itself never rises higher 
 than knowledge of sensible things; and to frame universal and 
 abstract notions, particularly in the field of religion, morality 
 and politics, needs the help of a higher mind. This higher 
 mind is the reason holding sway in society ; and because society, 
 representing the garnered lore of ages, hands down or passes 
 on these universal and abstract notions through the medium of 
 language, the system is called Traditionalism, and language is 
 a large factor in its economy. 
 
 Here are some of its most manifest absurdities. It is as im- 
 possible to think without the help of words as it is to see with- 
 out light. Man is as much able to create, as he is to discover 
 the truth. With the gift of speech, Adam got his first ideas 
 immediately from God. Against Traditionalism we distinguish 
 between quaestio juris and quaestio facti. As a matter of 
 possibility Adam could have formed language. As a matter of 
 fact, there are two opinions, 1, language was infused into Adam 
 
THESIS VII 119 
 
 with knowledge, 2, language was formed by Adam with help 
 from God. Traditionalists maintain that the mind cannot be- 
 gin to think or continue thinking without instruction admin- 
 istered through the agency of language, that man is without the 
 skill needed to formulate a language, or determine fixed signs 
 for his ideas; that primitive revelation was altogether natural, 
 because an absolute necessity to man's mental activity; that 
 the mind is entirely passive in its acquisition of knowledge ; 
 that faith, or the acceptance of truth with society for single 
 authority, is the basis and foundation of all philosophy and 
 science. We answer: That instruction through the medium 
 of language fails as an explanation of the origin of our ideas, 
 must be plain from the fact that a child learns nothing when 
 told that two sticks are of equal length, unless he knows before- 
 hand what equality and length are. The same word in differ- 
 ent languages gives rise to different ideas, and different words 
 in different languages give rise to the same idea. A word is 
 of no value without previous knowledge of the idea it represents. 
 Ideas are not understood by means of words, but words are 
 understood by means of ideas. If our ideas have their origin 
 in divine revelation, every trace of difference between natural 
 and supernatural truths is removed. No man can learn from 
 another, unless he is able with his own unaided strength to 
 grasp the truth proposed, unless he has ideas before he sits at 
 the feet of his teacher. St. Thomas says, " Sicut medicus 
 causare dicitur sanitatem in infirmo, natura operante ; ita etiam 
 homo dicitur causare scientiam in altero, operante ratione illius; 
 et hoc est docere." " Every teacher is a doctor. Medicine is 
 of no avail, without a constitution to cooperate with it; and 
 teaching is of as little avail, without a mind to cooperate 
 with it." 
 
 To know the reality of God, only three things are needed, 
 notions of being, cause and effect, and the principle of causality ; 
 a look or a glance at the world; and the impulse needed to re- 
 flect on the spectacle, and search out its causes. According to 
 the saner Traditionalists these three requisites are not beyond 
 the mind's native and unaided strength. Order is the root 
 and origin of every moral truth, and the mind is resourceful 
 enough to compass the notion of order and its consequences. 
 Religion therefore and morality are far from demanding any so 
 
120 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 extraordinar}^ a help as revelation or instruction. While words 
 are highly conducive to growth in knowledge and the accumula- 
 tion of ideas, they are hy no means absolutely necessary. To 
 understand, the mind is dependent on phantasms, and words are 
 the clearest, readiest and most flexil)lo phantasms at our com- 
 mand. Because they are easily retained, words are of incal- 
 culable assistance to the memory. Words are the most conveni- 
 ent of symbols, representing as they do ideas of the widest 
 conceivable variety. They are the key able to unlock the treas- 
 ury of all knowledge, human and divine, gathered from every 
 side by the learned at the expense of great labor, committed by 
 God to mankind, and sent down through the ages in spoken 
 and printed type. And yet, with all their advantages, words 
 are not an absolute necessity to thought. We often think of 
 things without being able to recall their names. On no few 
 occasions we are driven to the use of circumlocutions and 
 roundabout methods, simply because some single word has 
 slipped the memory. At other times our thoughts are so swift 
 that we cannot fit words to them as they rise. 
 
 Dismissing now the futile attempts made by Sensism, Platon- 
 ism, Ontologism and Traditionalism to explain the origin of 
 our ideas, we proceed to set forth and make good the one true 
 and correct theory, current among Scholastics, borrowed by 
 them from Aristotle, its first propounder, and St. Thomas 
 Aquinas, its eminent elaborator. The intellect is indifferent 
 to whatever ideas, all ideas look alike to it, it is capable in 
 itself of thinking house, horse or man ; and, to elicit a thought, 
 it must pass from this phase or condition of indifference to 
 determined and well defined relations with some set object. 
 In other words, the intellect has all the power needed to ap- 
 prehend whatever object; but this power will never bear fruit, 
 it will never result in a thought, unless some certain object 
 gets in the way of the intellect, and, as it were, restricts or 
 limits its attention. Thus, a magnet is vested with the capacity 
 or power needed to at^act or draw all iron; but it will never, 
 as a matter of fact, draw or attract iron, unless some particular 
 piece of that metal ig placed within the sphere of its activity. 
 Therefore, the object on which this or that thought turns is 
 the thing that holds the mind, determines it, restricts it, and 
 80 gives its apprehensive or thought-power a definite and con- 
 
THESIS VII 121 
 
 Crete market value. In this respect the intellect is a passive 
 faculty, inasmuch as it receives motion and influence from 
 another. 
 
 In our present condition the mind's proper ohject is the es- 
 sence of a material substance or body. Other objects can of 
 course engage its attention, but essences of bodies are reserved 
 to it in a special way, much as color is reserved to the eye, 
 sound to the ear. Bodies are made up of essence and accidents. 
 Sense has their accidents for object; mind, their essence. All 
 the accidents in a body grouped together constitute what we 
 call the material or less proper object of each of the five 
 senses. In addition to this material object, we portion off to 
 each particular sense its own formal or proper object. Thus, 
 the eye deals formally and properly with the body's color; the 
 ear, with its sound; the taste, with its sweetness; the touch, 
 with its smoothness. The imagination remains always a sense, 
 and its phantasms are mere reproductions of work done by the 
 external senses. Whereas, the eye merely sees color, the ear 
 merely hears sounds; the imagination sees, hears, touches, 
 smells and tastes. Its formal or proper object can well be said 
 to be the material object of the other senses. 
 
 To return now to the intellect. It passes from idleness to 
 activity, from capability of thinking to actual thought, with 
 help derived from its object, the essences of bodies. These es- 
 sences are themselves material, the mind is spiritual, and there 
 can be between the material and the spiritual no so intimate 
 commerce as the kind called for by an immanent act like un- 
 derstanding, unless the material is first modified. Before these 
 essences can enter the mind, they must be somehow or other 
 spiritualized. The intellect must be, therefore, equipped with 
 a faculty or virtue able to fit these material essences for en- 
 trance into a spiritual mind. Aristotle, therefore, ascribes to 
 the intellect a twofold power, one active, the other passive; 
 and names them respectively the intellectus agens and the in- 
 tellectus possibilis, the working and the receiving intellect. The 
 function of each is different and well defined. It is the busi- 
 ness of the intellectus agens to make the material essence ready 
 for the intellectus possibilis by modifying or spiritualizing the 
 same. This it accomplishes by producing a species iutelligibilis 
 impressa of the essence, and this in turn is representative of 
 
122 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 the essence, now stripped of its material environment or con- 
 comitants. This power of the intellectus agens to abstract 
 from the material elements surrounding body-essences ought to 
 cause no wonder. The eye is able to contemplate a body's 
 color without adverting to its other qualities. The mind ought 
 to be able to view a body's essence empty of all its accidents; 
 and, therefore, of all matter, in which its accidents are rooted. 
 The process no more results in change of matter to spirit than 
 the act of seeing results in the change of a body's sound, taste, 
 smell and smoothness to color. As a matter of fact, the mind 
 removes nothing from the body's essence. It leaves everything 
 just as everything was before the process of change began. As 
 the eye singles out the color in its material object, so the 
 intellectus agens singles out the spiritual in a body's essence, 
 shuts its sight to every material attribute it contains, and car- 
 ries away a species intelligibilis impressa of pure essence with- 
 out any admixture of matter. For purposes of thinking, this 
 species intelligibilis impressa serves the mind as substitute for 
 the body's essence, in much the same way as the species sensilis 
 serves the eye as substitute for the body's color. The color of 
 the seen body is not transferred to the eye. It remains where 
 it belongs. But a substitute for the color, its species sensilis, 
 finds its way to the eye, and vision follows. The body-essence 
 is not itself transferred to the mind. It remains always where 
 it belongs, in material surroundings. But a substitute for this 
 essence, its species intelligibilis impressa, finds its way into the 
 mind, and the thought or idea follows. This species intel- 
 ligibilis impressa is the joint work of the imagination and the 
 intellectus agens. This species is not what is understood or 
 thought. The essence itself is that. The species is that with 
 whose help the essence is thought or understood. To under- 
 stand or think is not the same as to produce these species or 
 receive them; but it is work the intellectus possibilis does, when 
 equipped with the species intelligibilis impressa. In last analy- 
 sis, the intellectus agens and the phantasm cooperate as partial 
 and subordinate effective causes, by way of a single complete 
 cause, to produce the species intelligibilis impressa. The in- 
 tellectus possibilis receives this first species, and thus equipped 
 it elicits a second, called, to distinguish it from the first, species 
 intelligibilis expressa; and this last is in reality the idea or 
 
THESIS VII 123 
 
 thought, the mind-waif, the mind-word, the close of the process 
 called thinking, or the simple apprehension. 
 
 In our present condition, because the intellectus agens must 
 always have play, we cannot think even spiritual things, though 
 they give rise to no phantasm, without in some way referring 
 them to sensible objects, capable of arousing phantasms. On 
 this account our ideas of spiritual things are analogical or 
 figurative ; comparative, not proper. Intellectual memory is the 
 intellectus possibilis, inasmuch as it retains old species im- 
 presses to elicit with their help new thoughts or ideas. And 
 yet in all its operations, so intimate is the mind's dependence 
 on work of the imagination, we cannot think or recall objects, 
 though actually possessed of their species, unless the imagina- 
 tion first evokes corresponding phantasms. This remark serves 
 to explain after what manner all our knowledge has its rise in 
 the senses, and in what measure mind depends for its informa- 
 tion on sense. St. Thomas thus elucidates the point, " Kon 
 potest dici quod sensibilis cognitio sit totalis et perfecta causa 
 intellectualis cognitionis, sed magis quodammodo est materia 
 causae." 1, Q., 84; A, 6. Sense supplies us with phantasms, 
 from them as from material the intellectus agens derives species 
 intelligibiles impressas, and these last with the intellectus pos- 
 sibilis are the real and eSicient cause of thought or intellectual 
 knowledge. 
 
 Tongiorgi, § 361, maintains that, while the axiom, "Nil in 
 intellectu quod non fuerit prius in sensu," occurs nowhere in 
 Aristotle or any conspicuous follower of Aristotle, it is of fre- 
 quent use with Sensists. After the mind of Aristotle, it means 
 that we know with the mind only what material things we 
 know first with the senses ; but what we discover with the mind 
 in material things is different from what we discover with the 
 senses. Moreover, the mind rises from its knowledge of ma- 
 terial things to the knowledge of things altogether immaterial 
 or spiritual, with dependence always on phantasms. In other 
 words, our knowledge begins with the senses, but never finishes 
 with them. According to Sensists the axiom means that our 
 intellectual knowledge is no wider or more extensive than our 
 sense-knowledge; it merely changes sense-knowledge in a va- 
 riety of ways, leaving its nature always the same. In other 
 words, our knowledge begins and ends with the senses, it is 
 
124 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 restricted to sensible, material objects; and things spiritual are 
 an empty dream. This is in brief Aristotle's doctrine regard- 
 ing the origin of ideas, and its main features are summarily 
 set forth in our present thesis. 
 
 TEEMS 
 
 The intellect is the spiritual, inorganic cognoscitive faculty 
 in man, separating him from brutes, and capable of knowledge 
 transcending the senses. The three powers in the soul, are set 
 forth in the subjoined diagram: 
 
 .J p ... ^ [Material, organic, is sense. 
 
 ° [Spiritual, inorganic, is intellect. 
 
 2. Appetitive Jf ^^f 7' ."^^^^^^^ ''. ^PPf ^^- 
 ^^ [spiritual, inorganic, is will. 
 
 {When it moves own body, is locomotion. 
 When it moves outside objects, is energy. 
 
 3. Executive 
 
 Imprinted intelligible image, or the species intelligibilis im- 
 pressa, is a determining reality, superadded in the nature of a 
 quality to the intellect, with the production of some fixed idea 
 in view; it is the joint work of phantasm and working intellect; 
 it paves ivay, it determines, it is the undeveloped photograph. 
 
 Finished intelligible image, or the species intelligibilis ex- 
 pressa, is the idea in its completeness; it is the joint work of 
 first image and receiving intellect; it is the developed photo- 
 graph. 
 
 Generally, because when object is spiritual, there is no need 
 of a new imprinted intelligible image, an old image stored 
 away suffices. 
 
 Determining principle, to enable the intellect to pass from 
 idleness to activity, because without image it is indifferent to 
 this or that particular idea. 
 
 Phantasm is the product of the imagination, the treasure- 
 house of sensible images, the highest of the senses, an organic 
 faculty seated in the brain. 
 
 Joint Work means that the phantasm and working intellect 
 combine as partial, subordinate, efficient causes. The image 
 
THESIS VII 125 
 
 and receiving intellect combine in same way to produce the idea. 
 An efficient cause by real and physical exertion of its power 
 produces another existence. Partial causes are opposed to ade- 
 quate; subordinate, to coordinate. Wlien two principles to- 
 gether are the whole or adequate cause of an effect, each of the 
 two is its partial cause. Causes are coordinate, when they are 
 of the same rank and nature with respect to the effect, and 
 each produces its part of the effect independently of the other. 
 Two horses drawing a chariot are partial, coordinate, efficient 
 causes. One of two such causes can by successive additions to 
 its strength become equal to the task of producing singly the 
 whole effect. Causes are subordinate, when they are of differ- 
 ent rank and nature, and each of them contributes in its own 
 particular sphere to the whole effect, in such a way that one 
 without the other can do nothing, neither ever becoming able 
 under any supposition to produce the whole effect. The writer 
 and his pen are partial, subordinate, efficient causes. Subor- 
 dinates are partial, indeed, with respect to their efficacy; but 
 they are whole or adequate causes, with regard to their result. 
 Each bears on the whole effect, not on part of it. 
 
 To understand means the first operation of the mind, result- 
 ing in a concept or idea. We are studying our intellectual 
 knowledge in its root or origin ; and, therefore, restrict our- 
 selves to concepts or ideas. These make up judgments, which 
 in turn combine to form reasoning or syllogisms. We deal 
 with direct, not reflex knowledge. Direct puts us in intellectual 
 possession of some outside object, like a man, a horse, or a 
 house. Eeflex is a further improvement on, an elaboration 
 of direct. 
 
 Knowledge, like every act, has what we call its term or limit, 
 that in which the act ends, finishes, closes; and philosophy 
 recognizes two kinds of terms in intellectual knowledge, or an 
 idea. They are called the intrinsic or subjective term, and 
 the extrinsic or objective term of the idea. The intrinsic term 
 is the idea itself, the actual likeness of the outside object ex- 
 istent in the mind, and technically called the species iutelli- 
 gibilis expressa. The extrinsic term is the outside object, whose 
 likeness exists in the mind; it is the man, the horse, or the 
 house of which we have an idea. 
 
 The word species needs explanation. It means likeness, that 
 
126 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 which makes some outside object present and visible to the 
 mind, much as the photograph stands for the man, or chips 
 for money. It is of two kinds. Tliere is a species intelligibilis 
 impressa along with a species intelligibilis expressa. The first 
 is the joint product of a phantasm and the intellectus agens, or 
 working intellect; the other is the joint product of the species 
 intelligibilis impressa and the intellectus possibilis, or receiving 
 intellect; and the difference between the two, to hold to the same 
 illustration, is about the same as that in force between an unde- 
 veloped and a developed photograph. The species intelligibilis 
 expressa is the idea itself, and it is called the mind-word, be- 
 cause the mind uses it as a symbol of the outside object, much 
 ftE we use words for symbols of our thoughts. That thought 
 results in this likeness, this species intelligibilis expressa or 
 mind-word, is evident from the fact that thought is a true vital 
 and cognoscitive act. Because it is a true act, it must have a 
 term, or result; because the act is vital, its term must be im- 
 manent or within the mind; because it is cognoscitive, the term 
 within the mind must be a likeness of the object outside the 
 mind. 
 
 It is a dogma in philosophy, conceded on all sides and made 
 good by experience, that knowledge arises when the mind pic- 
 tures its object, or assumes towards it the relationsliip of resem- 
 blance. Hence resemblance enters the definitions of all three 
 species of truth, logical, ontological and moral. In logical, the 
 mind resembles the object; in ontological, the object resembles 
 the mind; in moral, the word resembles the speaker's phase of 
 mind. And the species intelligibilis expressa is only this actual 
 likeness of the object struck off or delineated in the mind. In 
 thought, the thing understood or known is not the species, or 
 likeness ; but the outside object, the man, the horse, or the house. 
 When we use our eyes, we see not the sensile images of objects, 
 but the objects themselves. And all this is borne out by the 
 fact that we talk about these outside objects, not about our 
 ideas, or mental acts; and what Ave talk about, that is topic of 
 our thoughts. Philosophy sums up the whole thing when it 
 says that the mind-word or idea is that, by means of which we 
 understand or think; while the outside object is what we under- 
 stand or think. Subjective concept and objective concept are 
 the same as the idea's intrinsic term and extrinsic term respec- 
 
THESIS VII 127 
 
 tively. The objective concept of a man is the man's essence, 
 the man himself. The subjective concept of a man is the idea 
 of a man, the act of understanding a man. 
 
 Our first ideas are derived from sensile experience, and imme- 
 diately from phantasms, the products of the imagination, the 
 chiefest among our internal senses. From these first ideas 
 others can be evolved by process of analysis, comparison and 
 argumentation; and with these last we are not concerned. 
 Therefore, our external senses and our imagination contribute 
 as primary sources to our intellectual knowledge. We have al- 
 ready disproved the existence of anything like innate or inborn 
 ideas; and their rejection paves the way to cooperation of sense 
 with intellect in thought-formation. The denial of mutual de- 
 pendence between sense and intellect would virtually establish 
 a twofold nature in man. Eight order demands that the senses, 
 or inferior faculties, minister or do service to their superior, 
 the intellect. It is a matter of experience that children born 
 deaf or blind never elicit ideas of sounds or colors, whereas 
 such as fall deaf or blind a long or short interval after birth 
 readily elicit ideas of both kinds. This is clear evidence that 
 innate or inborn ideas are the idle suggestion of a poetic temper, 
 and that our first ideas are derived from sensile experience, 
 especially from phantasms. First ideas invariably deal with 
 bodies, substances vested with extension and resistance, material 
 for work of the senses. They are opposed to secondary ideas, 
 which have spiritual things for object. These last are called 
 anological, in opposition to proper, because we derive them from 
 comparison with bodies, material substances gifted with exten- 
 sion and resistance, cognoscible to the senses. A phantasm is 
 the product, the species expressa, of the imagination, the high- 
 est function of internal sense. We take phantasm here in its 
 objective sense, inasmuch as it is the outside object actually per- 
 ceived by the imagination. External sense can be called the 
 remote medium of oui intellectual knowledge; imagination, its 
 proximate medium. 
 
 Again, we appeal to experience for proof that imagination is 
 the proximate medium of our intellectual knowledge. Very 
 young children and grown up idiots cannot acquire ideas, are 
 outside the reach of instruction, in spite of the fact that their 
 intellects are right, and their external senses are sufficiently well 
 
128 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 developed. The mind undergoes no intrinsic change with the 
 child's growth, and it slaves to no natural dullness. The eyes 
 and the ears of a young child are as clear and sharp as those 
 of any adult. The difference, therefore, between very young 
 children and adults must be due to want of development in the 
 only remaining factor, the imagination; and phantasms are 
 proximate means to man's intellectual knowledge. With the 
 external senses sound and in good order, any hurt in the brain 
 or disturbance in the imagination prevents the mind from rea- 
 soning out new knowledge or putting to good use knowledge 
 already possessed. No hurt in the brain can hurt tlie mind 
 taken by itself, because the mind is of its very nature inorganic, 
 and therefore incapable of physical injury. Therefore, every 
 such hurt interferes with the process of thinking, simply because 
 the mind is in natural need of phantasms for its object or the 
 material of its ideas. When engaged in intellectual work, we 
 are conscious of immediate dependence, not on the external 
 senses, but on the imagination ; and the readier and richer the 
 imagination, the better and easier our work. Finally, order 
 vindicates to the imagination the prerogative of proximate 
 means to our intellectual knowledge. It is the highest of the 
 senses, while mere intelligence is the lowest of the mind's facul- 
 ties; and there is a law in philosophy to the effect that the 
 highest in a lower class touches or borders on the lowest in a 
 higher class. Supremum infimi attingit infimum supremi. 
 Therefore, the working intellect and the phantasm produce the 
 imprinted intelligible image; this image and the receiving in- 
 tellect in turn produce the idea, the developed intelligible image, 
 the intelligible image in its completeness. 
 
 Our theory postulates two distinct functions of intellect in 
 its first operation, simple apprehension or thought, namely the 
 working and the receiving intellect. The Thomists contend 
 for a real distinction between the two; Suarez denies every wider 
 distinction than virtual, and his reasons commend themselves 
 to our approval. One and the same faculty can be active and 
 passive, as happens in the case of the receiving intellect and the 
 will. The receiving intellect is passive with regard to the im- 
 printed intelligible image, and active with regard to the idea or 
 thought. The will is passive with regard to the influence ex- 
 erted by the intellect, and active with regard to the wish it 
 
THESIS VII 129 
 
 elicits. No contradiction has place, because they are active 
 and passive -ander different aspects, sub diverso respectu. The 
 images produced by the two are not in themselves complete and 
 independent, but mutually incomplete and supplementary; an- 
 other sign that they result not from two really distinct facul- 
 ties, but from one and the same faculty capable of two different 
 functions. Were the working intellect really distinct from the 
 receiving, it would be forever idle after death, a thing hard to 
 admit. Supposing mere virtual distinction between the two, 
 the difficulty disappears. Because they are really identical, one 
 would be as active as the other after death. 
 
 The working intellect is not formally or strictly eognoscitive ; 
 it is eognoscitive in a merely preparative way. All its efficiency 
 centers in the active production of one of the two joint prin- 
 ciples coalescing to form the intellectual act, the idea, the 
 thought. Its work begins and ends with the imprinted intel- 
 ligible image or likeness ; and the idea or formal cognition is 
 not this first image, but the joint product of it and the receiving 
 intellect. For this reason it is called the working intellect, the 
 intellectus agens; not because it understands, but because it 
 makes outside objects ready to be understood, spiritualizes them 
 after a fashion in the imprinted intelligible image, and thus 
 paves the way for their entrance into a spiritual and immaterial 
 soul. 
 
 And here another mystery confronts us, this spiritualization 
 of the outside object. We must maintain that the mind under- 
 stands not the imprinted intelligible image, but the correspond- 
 ing outside object; and this latter never ceases to be material, 
 a body, a substance vested with extension and resistance. Plato 
 thought to solve the mystery by introducing innate or inborn 
 ideas, conveyed to the mind from the first by the mind's maker. 
 The difficulty seemed to be otherwise insuperable because of his 
 formula, " Like knows like," or a spiritual soul can know only 
 spiritual things. Aristotle, improving on Plato, changed his 
 teacher's formula to the following: " The thing known assumes 
 in the mind the mind's own quality." In other words, material 
 things exist in the spiritual mind after a spiritual manner. In 
 more general terms, the formula runs this way, " Whatever is 
 received adopts the quality of its receiver." " Aequale cognos- 
 citur ab aequali," says Plato. " Cognitum est in cognoscente 
 
130 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 ad niodum cognoscentis," or " Receptum est in recipiente ad 
 modum recipieutis," says Aristotle. The upshot of the whole 
 thiug is that the imprinted intelligible image takes the place, 
 usurps the function, of the outside object. One is the other, 
 the image is after some fashion the outside object. We clear 
 the mystery by recognizing in things a twofold value, entitative 
 and representative. The agreement of image and object is not 
 of course in point of entitative value, but in point of representa- 
 tive value; non in essendo, sed in repraesentando. And in the 
 field of knowledge this agreement is sufificient basis for identify- 
 iug one with the other. Agreement in essendo has place, when 
 two things agree generically or specifically, as a man and a 
 horse, a man and a man. Agreement in repraesentando has 
 place, when one of the two contains a something able to lead us 
 to knowledge of the other, as a man and his photograph, the 
 imprinted intelligible image and its outside object. In the im- 
 age its entitative value must be sedulously kept apart from its 
 representative value. The marble in the statue is a different 
 thing from the Cajsar it represents. In the same way the phys- 
 ical being of the image is a different thing from tlie being of 
 the image inasmuch as it represents this or that outside object. 
 Small need to recount the differences in force between the image 
 and its object. The image is always an accident, the object is 
 often a substance; tlie image is simple and without parts, the 
 object is often a compound ; the image is a particular and con- 
 crete thing, the object is often a universal and abstract entity; 
 the image is a thing that can exist or cease, it comes and goes, 
 the object is often a thing that goes on forever. Agreement in 
 entitative value, in essendo, is not needed between the imprinted 
 intelligible image and its object, because its whole purpose is to 
 effect such a union between the mind and its object that the 
 mind be prepared or made ready to elicit a vital or immanent 
 likeness of the object; and such a likeness is compatible with 
 generic and specific differences, or independent of agreement in 
 essendo. The idea itself, the thought, lacks agreement in es- 
 sendo with its object; and yet, when we think, we think the 
 object. The imprinted intelligible image is in far less need 
 of any so close agreement as entitative. 
 
 To return now to the intellectus possibilis, the receiving in- 
 tellect. Unlike the working intellect, it is formally and strictly 
 
THESIS VII 131 
 
 cognoscitive. It receives the imprinted intelligible image, and 
 with its help elicits the idea or thought in a finished state. Be- 
 cause of this twofold process it is called in Latin, patibilis or 
 possibilis. It is patibilis, or receptive, or capable of suffering 
 at the hands of another, inasmuch as it receives the imprinted 
 intelligible image from the working intellect ; and possibilis or 
 possible, or capable of becoming things, inasmuch as it has the 
 power of transforming itself into everything conceivable in the 
 universe by the vital and immanent expression of wdiatsoever 
 reality. It can become everything in much the same sense as 
 the photograph becomes the man it represents. 
 
 The reality of imprinted intelligible images once admitted, 
 we must admit in the mind a certain inborn faculty able with 
 the help of phantasms to evolve these images. We cannot assign 
 the phantasm for adequate and complete cause of such images, 
 because these images, as intellectual forms and therefore spiritual 
 accidents, are of an essentially higher order than phantasms 
 which are acts of the whole man, body and soul acting as a 
 single principle, and therefore organic and material accidents. 
 The reception of phantasms into the intellect cannot be assigned 
 as adequate and complete cause of these images. First of all, 
 it is quite impossible for the intellect to receive unmodified 
 phantasms, phantasms as such. The intellect is an inorganic 
 faculty and phantasms are organic accidents. As a matter of 
 fact, phantasms undergo no change in the process of thought. 
 They remain what they were, and the imprinted intelligible 
 image is far from being a modified phantasm. It is a third 
 entity, derived from the joint energy of the working intellect 
 and the phantasm. Aristotle's formula, the thing known as- 
 sumes in the mind the mind's own quality, is no proof that a 
 phantasm received into the intellect is adequate and complete 
 cause of the imprinted intelligible image. The phantasm is 
 of its nature and essence organic, and to transform it into an 
 inorganic being like the imprinted intelligible image would 
 be not to change but to destroy it. Therefore the phantasm 
 and the receiving intellect are not of themselves enough to 
 account for the idea or thought, and we must admit the addi- 
 tional function denominated the working intellect. Aristotle 
 dismisses the matter with this simple proof. The soul of man 
 is intrinsically intellectual, and because nature is never lacking 
 
132 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 in necessary helps, and because she never imposes a task with- 
 out at the same time supplying everything needed for its ac- 
 complishment, the soul of man must be intrinsically and abun- 
 dantly equipped witli all the requisites for intellectual acts like 
 ideas and tlioughts. But thought is impossible witliout the im- 
 printed intelligible image, and this in turn is impossible with- 
 out the intrinsic equipment we call the working intellect. Ergo 
 the soul of man is equipped with the working intellect, or fac- 
 ulty able with the help of phantasms to produce the imprinted 
 intelligible image. 
 
 The working intellect works only in conjunction with phan- 
 tasms, and phantasms are possible only when there is question 
 of objects perceptible to the senses. When the object of the 
 idea or thought is spiritual, not sensible, the receiving intellect 
 performs the whole operation, without any distinct employment 
 of the working intellect. Old imprinted intelligible images 
 stored away in the memory are called into play, and for this 
 reason our ideas of spiritual objects are anological and not 
 strictly proper; they are based on our knowledge of sensible 
 objects and are evolved from it by comparison and kindred 
 processes. The words in our language expressive of spiritual 
 objects are figurative; for instance, idea, concept, notion. The 
 energy of the working intellect is restricted to the imprinted 
 intelligible image. Every other intellectual operation belongs 
 immediately to the receiving intellect, mediately to the work- 
 ing intellect. Therefore ideas, judgments, syllogisms, the de- 
 rivation of new ideas from old ones, memory, all are the work 
 of the receiving intellect. The Scholastics ascribe a triple ef- 
 ficacy to the working intellect; it lights up the phantasm, it 
 makes the object of the phantasm ready for the intellect, it 
 produces the image. Suarez sees herein only three ways of ex- 
 pressing one and the same thing, the production of the image. 
 To derive the image from a phantasm and from individuating 
 notes are different things. The latter expression is incorrect. 
 
 Division. Three parts. 
 
 I. Need of image as determining principle. 
 II. Image, joint result of phantasm and working intellect. 
 III. Image and receiving intellect combine as partial subordi- 
 nate efficient causes to produce idea. 
 
THESIS VII 133 
 
 PEOOFS I, II, III 
 
 /. 1°. The need of the image is rooted in the twofold fact 
 that the mind views all objects with indifference; and that, to 
 know, the mind must assume the relation of resemblance with 
 its object. Hence our argument. 
 
 To apprehend a set object, the mind must la}'' aside its in- 
 difference to all objects, and restrict its attention to this par- 
 ticular object. This can be effected only by intrinsic union of 
 the mind with its object, or, failing that, with some likeness 
 representative of the object, and fitted to enter the mind. In- 
 trinsic union of mind and object is impossible. One is spirit- 
 ual; the other, material. Therefore union of mind with the 
 object's likeness is the one way left; and this likeness, the only 
 likeness fitted to enter the mind, is what we call the imprinted 
 intelligible image. Ergo the intellect, to understand, has need 
 generally of the imprinted intelligible image as a determining 
 principle. 
 
 N.B. The material phantasm cannot unite with the mind 
 to remove its attitude of indifference, either as a mere condi- 
 tion, or a form, or a cause immediately with the mind effective 
 of the idea. Therefore all its activity is restricted to coopera- 
 tion with the mind in the production of a principle, able by in- 
 trinsic union to help the mind elicit the idea. And this com- 
 bined effort of phantasm and mind results precisely in what 
 we termed the imprinted intelligible image. Mere presence of 
 the phantasm as a condition could never intrinsically affect the 
 mind's attitude of indifference. "Witness magnet and wood. 
 The phantasm could never enter the mind as a form, because 
 its proper seat is the whole man, the composite made up of 
 body and soul; whereas the mind dwells altogether in the soul. 
 The phantasm is, besides, a quantitative accident, and cannot 
 be form to a simple substance like the mind ; it is an individual 
 and material thing, whereas the mind apprehends things uni- 
 versal and spiritual. The naked phantasm cannot work in con- 
 junction with the mind, because its material quality bars it 
 from intrinsic union with the mind. Phantasm and mind not 
 like two horses, but like pen and hand. 
 
 2°. The need of this image can likewise be gathered from 
 
134 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 comparison with sensation. The senses, to perceive, need im- 
 printed sensile images of their objects. In a parallel way, the 
 mind, to understand, ouglit to have imprinted intelligible images 
 of its objects. 
 
 N.B. The two images, the imprinted and the resultant or 
 developed, are means by which the mind knows its object, but 
 after difl'ereut manners. The imprinted is effective merely, the 
 resultant or developed is formal as well as effective. 
 
 //. The working intellect and tlie phantasm are the image's, 
 a. efficient causes, h. partial, c. subordinate, a single complete 
 principle of activity. 
 
 a. Efficient causes. They are principles producing another 
 existence by the real and physical exertion of their powers. 
 
 h. Partial. Neither is equal to the whole effect. The image 
 gets its spirituality from the working intellect; its power to 
 represent, from the phantasm. The illumination or elevation 
 derived from intellect to phantasm is extrinsic, and leaves the 
 phantasm wholly the same in itself. It remains always quite 
 material. A parallel instance is the case of two boys, unable 
 of themselves to haul a boat, and equal to the task when helped 
 by four others. The same two boys are now partial causes of 
 the whole effect, and undergo no change whatever. An engine 
 could lend them the same assistance, and the two boys would 
 still be partial causes, without becoming engines. Between the 
 phantasm and working intellect there is, of course, want of pro- 
 portion as far as physical entity is concerned ; but proportion 
 between them in point of power and causality is present, and 
 that is enough. Proportion of entity is wanting between the 
 two boys and the engine, but tliat prevents nobody from calling 
 the boys and the engine causes of the effect. To work together, 
 they must unite, not indeed in being or entity, but in power, 
 like the boys and the engine. 
 
 c. Suhordijiate. The phantasm and working intellect are of 
 different rank and nature; the phantasm contributes to the 
 image its representative quality, the intellect its spirituality; 
 in such a way that one without the other can do nothing, neither 
 ever becoming able under any supposition to produce the whole 
 effect. One is principal, the other instrumental; like the pen- 
 man and his pen, the sculptor and his chisel. 
 
THESIS VII 135 
 
 in. a. The receiving intellect is partial cause of the idea. 
 6. The image is partial cause of the idea. 
 
 a. A vital act must proceed from a vital principle or cause. 
 But ideas are vital acts, and the intellect is vital principle or 
 cause. Ergo ideas proceed from the intellect. 
 
 N.B. If the image were sole cause, the idea would be pro- 
 duced in the intellect but not by it. 
 
 &. When of two principles one completes the other in the 
 order of efficiency, the first assumes the quality of partial effi- 
 cient cause. But the image completes the receiving intellect in 
 the order of efficiency. Ergo the image is partial efficient cause 
 of the idea. 
 
 N.B. The image contributes determinateness to the receiv- 
 ing intellect, it is the phantasm spiritualized. 
 
 a. and h. An idea is the vital expression of a set object. Its 
 vitality comes from the receiving intellect, its expressiveness of 
 a set object comes from the image. Ergo, because the whole 
 act is vital and at the same time expressive of the object, the 
 whole act proceeds from one and other principle. They are, 
 besides, of a different rank and nature; and one without the 
 other is unequal to the effect, or idea. 
 
 N.B. Of the two principles, the mind is the more important, 
 because origin of the idea's vitality. In point of specification 
 the image is the more important, because origin of the idea's 
 determinateness. The image can be called the mind's form, or 
 formal cause of the idea, inasmuch as it determines the mind 
 and gives specific value to the idea ; and the imprinted image 
 is efficient cause of the idea, inasmuch as it actively cooperates 
 with the mind, after making it immediately ready for the act. 
 Therefore, thought is a new act, distinct from the first image, 
 its production and its reception. The developed image is in the 
 intellect in a vital way, and the whole act arises from the in- 
 tellect, and remains in the intellect. 
 
 Two Assertions, a. h. 
 
 a. 1. Our ideas of individual material things are particular 
 and proper, not general and common. 
 
 2. Their imprinted intelligible images are likewise particular 
 and proper. 
 
136 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 S.Q. Cajetan denies tlie whole statement, asserting that the 
 mind first forms universals, and passes from them to particular 
 individuals hy a process of argumentation. St. Thomas denies 
 the second part, asserting that the mind first knows universals, 
 and then by a species of reilection on, or return to, the phan- 
 tasm, knows clearly and distinctly particular individuals. In 
 other words, we have developed images of particulars, imprinted 
 images of universals alone. 
 
 TERMS 
 
 Ideas are particular and proper, when the notes they em- 
 brace belong to one set object and to no other, and when tliey 
 clearly separate this set object from every other like it, e. g. 
 Peter, They are general and common when they are universals, 
 e. g. man. When proper means definite and distinct, when 
 common means confused and indefinite, our ideas of particu- 
 lars are rather common than proper. Constituent notes are 
 less clear in particulars than in universals. 
 
 PROOFS 
 
 a. 1°. In the judgment, Peter is a man, one term is par- 
 ticular; the other, universal. To frame judgment, we must 
 have like ideas of both. Ergo particular and proper. 
 
 2°. Developed image and imprinted image ought to be of the 
 same order. If one is particular, the other ought to be par- 
 ticular and proper. Developed images are particular and 
 proper. Ergo imprinted images ought to be particular and 
 proper, 
 
 ]S[,B. A thing's individuality is not constituted by its mat- 
 ter, but by its entire reality. The individual stripped of its 
 matter, still remains an individual. 
 
 b. Knowledge of individual particular objects precedes knowl- 
 edge of universals. 
 
 1°. First images are basis of first knowledge. Images of in- 
 dividual particular objects are the first we receive. Ergo knowl- 
 edge of individual particular objects precedes knowledge of uni- 
 versals, e. g. this body before body ; this sound before sound. 
 
THESIS VII 137 
 
 2°. Particular and proper ideas can be foundation for uni- 
 versals, not vice-versa. Ergo. 
 
 3°. Children first get idea of this red thing, then successively 
 they get ideas of thing, quality, color, red. 
 
 4°. Experience is proof that we first know individual par- 
 ticular objects. 
 
 To Reconcile Seeming Differences Between the 
 
 Scholastics 
 
 Suarez refuses efiicient causality to the phantasm in the pro- 
 duction of the image, confining it to the working intellect. He 
 makes the phantasm matter for the image, or incentive for the 
 intellect, or model cause. He calls the production of the image 
 no vital and immanent, but a transient act. Hence the work- 
 ing intellect is not cognoscitive, but merely preparative. His 
 reason is parity with the will. The will is the whole cause of 
 its operation, though intellectual knowledge necessarily pre- 
 cedes. In like manner the working intellect ought to be whole 
 cause of the image, though the phantasm necessarily precedes. 
 Opponents to Suarez try to show that the phantasm would in 
 that case be deprived of all causality in the production of the 
 images; but to my mind they fail to make clear how model 
 causality would be absent. Such causality is always extrinsic 
 and calls for no intimate or intrinsic union with the efiicient 
 cause. We maintain against Suarez that the phantasm exerts 
 what efficient causality belongs to the instrument, the pen in 
 the case of writing, the chisel in the case of a statue. For such 
 causality merely extrinsic union between the principal agent 
 and instrument is needed, and of this the material phantasm 
 is capable. The production of the first image is no vital or 
 immanent act in strict sense, because, though its term or result 
 dwells in the intellect, it proceeds from a partial principle out- 
 side of the intellect. On the contrary, the production of the 
 second image or idea is a vital act, because it proceeds in its 
 entirety from the intellect, equipped, of course, and intrinsically 
 equipped with the first image ; and because it remains in the in- 
 tellect. The material nature of the phantasm bars intimate 
 union with the working intellect, and as a mere instrument it 
 demands only extrinsic union. The spiritual nature of the first 
 
138 PSYCITOLOGY 
 
 image fits it for intrinsic union with the receiving intellect, and 
 renders the idea a vital or immanent act. The image cannot be 
 called an instrument, as compared with the receiving intellect. 
 The two are equally principal. The phantasm is and must be 
 called an instrument as compared with the working intellect. 
 
 Opinion of St. Thomas 
 
 Two reasons why phantasm cannot immediately combine with 
 receiving intellect to produce ideas. 1. Phantasm is likeness of 
 individual thing. 2. It exists in a body-organ and is organic. 
 Ergo it cannot pass to receiving intellect, which represents uni- 
 versal, and is immaterial. 
 
 N.B. Sensile image can pass to eye because both represent 
 individual things and are organic. 
 
 Illumination of Phantasm 
 
 Phantasms are made intelligible by working intellect, as col- 
 ors are made visible by light. 
 
 IST.B. Two opinions about color and light, 1°. Light gives 
 color the power to excite vision. 2°. Light merely clarifies the 
 medium air. 
 
 Light makes color actually visible, the working intellect makes 
 the phantasm actually knowable. Color, made actually visible 
 by light, impresses its likeness on the retina ; the phantasm, 
 made actually knowable by the working intellect, impresses its 
 likeness on the receiving intellect. Color in tlie presence of 
 light becomes actually visible, to the extent that it becomes able 
 to excite vision, not to the extent that it is actually seen. The 
 phantasm is made actually knowable by the working intellect, 
 to the extent that it becomes able to excite the receiving intel- 
 lect, not to the extent that it is actually known. 
 
 The two kinds of illumination for phantasm are root-illumina- 
 tion and formal illumination. Eoot-illumination is derived from 
 intellectual soul. Because sensation in man is more potent than 
 in brutes, phantasm is more potent in man and better fitted to 
 produce image. Formal comes from fact that working intel- 
 lect enters into intimate union with phantasm, and raises it as 
 principal raises instrumental. Because immaterial, its union 
 with phantasm is restricted to latter's universal aspect, neglect- 
 ing its material surroundings. Hence a twofold abstraction, 
 
THESIS VII 139 
 
 1. formal, 2, causal. One rids the phantasm of material sur- 
 roundings, and views it in the light of a universal, making it, 
 as far as view is concerned, homogeneous with the receiving in- 
 tellect, or immaterial. The other views the phantasm as ma- 
 terial or stuff for the cause of intellectual knowledge or thought. 
 The working intellect plays the part of formal cause ; the phan- 
 tasm, the part of material cause. The image is spiritual on the 
 side of the working intellect ; it is representative of the object on 
 the side of the phantasm. The phantasm therefore contributes 
 efficiency and determinateness to the working intellect in the 
 production of the image. The illumination and the abstraction 
 attributed to the working intellect are one and the same act. 
 Light at the same time manifests color in the object and ab- 
 stracts from its sweetness and other qualities, being of no serv- 
 ice to impress them on the palate or other senses. 
 
 Opinions of Mastrius, Conimbricenses and Others 
 
 The working intellect acts not on the phantasm, but with it. 
 The phantasm undergoes no intrinsic change or elevation; but 
 the addition of outside light from the working intellect raises 
 it to the dignity of participation as an efficient cause in the 
 production of the image. The working intellect is no complete 
 and whole cause of the image; the phantasm cooperates with it 
 in the role of a less principal cause. The image in point of 
 being is spiritual, and this quality it gets from the working in- 
 tellect; in point of power to represent, it pictures the object, 
 and this it gets from the phantasm. Matter cannot act on 
 spirit as a complete and whole cause, or even as a more prin- 
 cipal cause; but it can act on spirit as a partial or less prin- 
 cipal cause. The phantasm becomes no instrument, in the 
 hands of the working intellect, with intrinsic elevation like that 
 of the pen in the writer's hand. It simply remains a less prin- 
 cipal cause, acting in conjunction with the working intellect, 
 like the boy aided by four others in hauling a boat that calls for 
 the strength of five. The boy's power is not intrinsically modi- 
 fied, it is merely helped from the outside. The two together, 
 phantasm and intellect, constitute a single whole and complete 
 cause ; one contributing to the image its spirituality ; the other, 
 its representative value. The Conimbricenses say that the phan- 
 tasm, in spite of its material nature, is made fitter and more 
 
140 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 able by extrinsic union with the working intellect to produce 
 beyond its natural capacity a spiritual effect. With them the 
 illumination of the phantasm is not root-illumination, as Ca- 
 preolus thinks; nor formal, as Cajetan thinks; but efficient. 
 They are far from meaning that the working intellect intrin- 
 sically modifies the phantasm by pouring new light into it. 
 But, like a light shining from the outside, it raises it by a share 
 in its own radiance to the dignity of participation as a partial 
 cause in the effective production of the image. The working 
 intellect is called an outside light, not to deny it the union in 
 force between the two partial causes, but to deny anything like 
 intrinsic elevation, resulting to the phantasm from a share in 
 the working intellect's own being or reality. They vindicate 
 efficient causality to the phantasm for two reasons, to secure 
 determinateness, and to account for the element of representa- 
 tion in the image. They reject model causality on the ground 
 that it is rather passive than active ; whereas the causality of the 
 phantasm is essentially active. The working intellect does not 
 produce the image from the phantasm, as the artist or sculptor 
 produces his painting or statue, with an eye on his model. 
 
 Opinions of Cajetan, Capreolus and Scotus 
 
 These writers agree with us in ascribing efTicient causality to 
 the phantasm. Cajetan and Capreolus make the phantasm an 
 instrumental cause; Scotus with us makes it a partial cause, 
 uniting with the intellect to form the complete and whole cause 
 of the image. Each of the two opinions is highly probable. 
 Instrument, however, must be taken in its wider sense; and 
 must be made to mean whatever lends assistance to another in 
 the production of an effect. The phantasm is no instrument in 
 strict and proper sense, because it derives no intrinsic elevation 
 from the working intellect. When two such causes are hetero- 
 geneous, like the phantasm and working intellect, one cannot of 
 itself produce an effect of the same nature as the effect ascribed 
 to both. The parity of two lamps and one lamp producing 
 light, fails in this that the partial causes are homogeneous. 
 
 P.S. Suarez thus explains the whole process of thought. 
 With the eyes we see Peter; this sensile image is transferred 
 to the imagination, where it becomes a phantasm; the working 
 intellect in union with the phantasm produces the individual 
 
THESIS VII 141 
 
 particular imprinted intelligible image of Peter, and the re- 
 ceiving intellect in union with this last produces the idea of 
 Peter, who is an individual particular object. Then the re- 
 ceiving intellect by a second effort, prescinding or abstractive 
 in nature, without any new image, omits all the individuating 
 attributes of Peter, without a care for his individual differences 
 with other men, forms an idea of his specific nature, his quality 
 of man, and this idea is what we call the direct universal. At 
 last by a third effort, after employing the same process with 
 regard to several men, by a method comparative in nature, this 
 quality of man in Peter is conceived as a quality common to 
 a multitude of individuals, and in this way is conceived what 
 we call the reflex universal. 
 
 PEINCIPLES 
 
 A. The greater contains the less. Ergo, the intellect by it- 
 self is equal to the task of producing the image. 
 
 Answer. In its own order, I grant; in another order, I deny. 
 The intellect cannot by itself understand, neither can it produce 
 the image. The phantasm is needed not in the cognoscitive 
 order, but in the order of determinateness and representation. 
 Four quarts of wine do not contain three quarts of water. It 
 might be true of milk. 
 
 B. No proportion between phantasm and working intellect. 
 Ergo. 
 
 Answer. In point of being, I grant; in point of causality or 
 power, I deny. The phantasm is not formally and intrinsically 
 united with the intellect. 
 
 C. An active is superior to a passive agent. Phantasm is ac- 
 tive, intellect is passive. 
 
 Answer. In question of two whole and complete causes, I 
 grant; in question of two partial causes, I deny. Besides, the 
 agens is active as well as passive. 
 
 D. Matter cannot act on spirit. Ergo. 
 
 Answer. As whole cause or more principal, I grant; as par- 
 tial or less principal, I deny. 
 
 E. Image is made out of phantasm. Ergo, material cause. 
 Answer. As virtually containing the image, I grant; as stuff 
 
 of image, I deny. 
 
142 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 F. The effect follows the weaker of the two causes. 
 Answer. In syllogisms, 1 grant; outside of syllogisms, I 
 
 deny. The saying holds good for the conclusion in a syllogism. 
 In this present case the effect follows both causes, getting spir- 
 ituality from the working intellect, and representative power 
 from the phantasm. 
 
 G. Image cannot be explained, unless phantasm receives some- 
 thing from intellect. 
 
 Answer. Example of boys hauling boat with engine explains 
 things. 
 
THESIS VIII 
 
 There exists in man a rational appetite or will, which can 
 desire every good proposed by the intellect, and nothing but 
 good. All the objects of its actual desires must in some measure 
 assume a relation of fitness with the subject. 
 
 Maher, pp. 378-425; 208-228. Jouin, pp. 171-180. 
 
 Division. Our thesis contains four parts. I. Man has a will. 
 II. The will has for object every good. III. The will never has 
 evil for object. IV. Every object of man's wishes must re- 
 dound to the wisher's interests. 
 
 QUESTION 
 
 All morality resides in the will, and a thorough knowledge of 
 Ethics is impossible without an equally thorough knowledge of 
 the nature of the human will. Freedom of will is an all im- 
 portant factor in the discussion; but experience is so loud in 
 its declaration of this natural dogma that we can for the pres- 
 ent leave it untouched. It is a large question, and will get 
 proper attention in next thesis. Here we contend that man has 
 a will, that good is the only object capable of setting its activ- 
 ity in motion, and that an element of selfishness is naturally, 
 and, therefore, necessarily bound up in every human desire. 
 
 TEEMS 
 
 Rational appetite or will is a spiritual, inorganic faculty of 
 the soul, capable of seeking good by acts elicited under the di- 
 rection of the intellect. It is opposed to sensitive appetite, com- 
 mon to man and beast, dealing with merely material or sensi- 
 ble goods. The most apparent difference between these two fac- 
 ulties is furnished forth in the freedom inherent in one, alien 
 to the other. There are, of course, other differences more im- 
 
 143 
 
144 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 portant and more characteristic; but since they depend for 
 illustration on objects not common to man and beast, a com- 
 mon foundation for comparison is wanting and contrast loses. 
 But, supposing the objects of appetite in some definite instance 
 the same, freedom in the case of man, necessity in the case of 
 brutes, become distinguishing characteristics. Thus, a hungry 
 horse when confronted with oats, and equipped with all the 
 usual requirements for the enjoyment of a good meal, cannot 
 refrain from eating. A man on the very verge of starvation, 
 can, in the midst of plenty and in spite of most vehement de- 
 sire and utmost relish, shut his lips tight, and persistently re- 
 fuse to touch food. The reason is plain. A horse's highest 
 faculty of desire is sensitive appetite, a necessary agent, which 
 in the presence of certain conditions must act. Man has, in 
 addition to this sensitive appetite, a spiritual faculty of desire 
 called will, a free agent forced to act by no combination of cir- 
 cumstances, by no array of outward conditions. The will in 
 man is absolute mistress of all the sensitive appetite's motions, 
 and can on all occasions command them authoritatively. The 
 will can, therefore, say nay to whatever sensitive instincts 
 threaten harm to man's higher good. It can for purposes of 
 virtue order fasting, though the body would be much benefited 
 by feasting. It can, for purposes of fame, keep out of bed 
 whole nights at a time men bent on winning an election or 
 solving some deep intellectual problem. But, like other mas- 
 ters, the w4U can, if so inclined, surrender its supremacy, and 
 follow the behests of lower appetites. To escape a quarrel with 
 the senses, it can eat, drink, and make merry, even to the death 
 of the soul. It can yield to sleep, that lands the sleeper in a 
 hospital or the morgue. 
 
 Every good. Like the two other transcendental qualities of 
 being, one and true, good admits of no essential definition. The 
 three might be called being without division, being with mind- 
 conformity, being with fitness; but indivision, conformity, and 
 fitness are themselves being; and what ought to be the specific 
 difference is contained in the genus. Good can he best de- 
 scribed as ivhal a thing possesses in virtue of its perfection, 
 completeness or finish. 
 
 Aristotle offers tJiis other description, " Good is what every- 
 thing seeks." The first assigns the real cause of a thing's good- 
 
THESIS VIII 145 
 
 ness. A thing is good, not because ever3'thing seeks it, but be- 
 cause it is perfect, complete or finished. Quite the contrary, 
 one thing is sought by another because it is good. Transcen- 
 dental goodness in foundation, is a thing's being or perfection; 
 formall}^, it is the same, with the quality of fitness or desirable- 
 ness added. Perfection is nothing more than finish. Thus, a 
 work is said to be perfected when finished; God's attributes are 
 said to be perfections, because they are the ne plus ultra in their 
 several spheres. God's wisdom is a perfection, because it is as 
 capacious as wisdom can well be, when pushed to its limit. Our 
 wisdom is perfect, when it is as far-reaching as man can ambi- 
 tion. Every class of beings has its own grade of perfection, 
 and our wisdom can as truly be called a perfection as God's. 
 However, only God's wisdom can be called absolute perfection. 
 The degrees of perfection conceivable are without number. A 
 thing is said to be first finished or made, when it passes from 
 the state of possibility to that of actuality. A clock is said to 
 be finished or completed, when from having been a clock in 
 possibility it becomes a clock in fact. After its completion a 
 being can acquire other and other perfections. Hence the first 
 obvious division of good things; good in some respects, and 
 good in every respect. God alone is absolutely good; but our 
 thesis holds true, if every being is good in some particular or 
 other. Another division of goods : 
 
 fl. Eeal 
 
 [2. Apparent 
 
 3. Becoming 
 
 4. Agreeable 
 
 5. Useful 
 
 Explanation of Diagram: 1. Good in itself, that which is in 
 reality and truth the good it is thought to be, and is suited to 
 the desires most in harmony with the nature that seeks it. Such 
 desires have their origin in the specific portion of a being. 
 
 2. Evil in itself; good in the mind; apprehended as good; 
 that which is not the good it is thought to be, because it is 
 suited to desires less in harmony with a nature. Such desires 
 have their origin in the generic portion of a being. The spe- 
 cific portion of man is rationality, his generic portion is ani- 
 mality. Desires originating in his reason, his spiritual desires, 
 aim at his only true good; desires originating in his body, the 
 
146 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 seat of animality, his carnal desires, have only apparent good 
 for object, and are often directly opposed to his real good. Ap- 
 parent good is real good, when reason rules. Eeal good opposed 
 to reason becomes apparent. 
 
 S. Very like real good, inasmuch, as it is something befitting 
 the whole man, and is loved for itself. And yet hardly any 
 good is so purely becoming as not to admit modifications, 
 partaking of the nature of the useful and the agreeable, e. g. 
 virtue. 
 
 Ji-. Befitting man as a whole, and loved not precisely because 
 of itself, but because of the pleasure attendant on its possession. 
 It often partakes of the nature of an apparent good, inasmuch 
 as it ministers to only what is generic in man, and opposes rea- 
 son, e. g. trip to the country. 
 
 5. Sought not at all for itself, but because it serves as a step- 
 ping-stone to some other good. It would not be missed, if only 
 the good it helps to procure could be obtained without its assist- 
 ance, e. g. medicine. 
 
 N.B. Nearly every good in nature is a mixture of the three, 
 and is one or other according to the view taken of it. 
 
 Other examples are light for plants ; moisture for roots ; straws 
 for the swallow; downward motion for a stone, rest for the same, 
 occupation of proper place. 
 
 Proposed hy the intellect. The will is a blind faculty and 
 needs guidance. Though condemned to inactivity till it re- 
 ceives a message from the mind, it invariably shapes its own 
 course, and reserves to itself the right to accept or reject the ad- 
 vice of its friend the intellect. 
 
 Nothing hut good. Since everything positive is good, the ca- 
 pacity of human desire is without limit. Evil is a negation, 
 and sin itself physically considered, or viewed as a positive 
 something, is good. Evil is the denial of good. More properly, 
 it consists in the absence of some good that a being should 
 have or own. Hence want of sight is no evil in a stone or a 
 tree; but it is an evil in a horse or a man. Something good 
 always serves as a foundation for evil. In other words, there 
 is nothing in the universe wholly and solely bad. Lazy pupils 
 furnish the leaves of the trees with their food in the shape of 
 nitrogen. Whatever is, is good; good and being are convertible. 
 
THESIS VIII 147 
 
 PEOOFS I, II, III, IV 
 
 I. 1°. Man often longs for objects, which are beyond the 
 sphere of sensitive appetite. Ergo, besides sensitive appetite, 
 man must be equipped with some superior faculty of desire, 
 spiritual and rational, a will. 
 
 With regard to the Antecedent. Virtue, eternal life, God, 
 honor are such objects. 
 
 With regard to the Consequent. No effect can be without its 
 proportionate cause. 
 
 2°. God has implanted in every creature a tendency or mo- 
 tion towards self-perfection in strict accord with that creature's 
 nature. But man's nature is supra-sensitive, intellectual, ra- 
 tional. Ergo, the faculty in man corresponding to this tend- 
 ency or motion is supra-sensitive, rational, a will. 
 
 II. 1°. Experience is witness that no conceivable good es- 
 capes the attention of man. Ergo. 
 
 2°. The energy of the wiU has for measure the energy of the 
 intellect. But the intellect is capable of knowing all entity, all 
 being, all good. Ergo, the will can desire every good. 
 
 III. No faculty can embrace a thing outside the sphere of 
 its formal object. But evil, the opposite of good, is outside the 
 formal object of the will. Ergo, the will cannot desire evil, 
 i. e. it can desire nothing but good. 
 
 With regard to the Minor. Evil, as such, is nothing. Evil, 
 as such, is absence of good; and good proposed by the intellect 
 is the will's formal object. 
 
 IV. 1°. The good we seek, we want for ourselves or others. 
 If for ourselves, our statement stands. If for others, then, be- 
 cause these others are some way connected with us, their good 
 is in a measure our advantage; or we find in the very act of 
 wishing some feature of self-profit, whether it be usefulness, or 
 pleasure, or fitness. Ergo. 
 
 N.B. From acts of benevolence the quality of fitness can 
 never be absent. 
 
 2°. Every movement of the will is a striving towards some 
 object, in which the will seeks rest; and no agent looks for rest 
 in a good thing absolutely without the relation of fitness for 
 himself. Ergo. 
 
148 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 PKINCIPLES 
 
 A. The last part of our thesis is at seeming variance with 
 what theology teaches concerning perfect love of God. Perfect 
 love of God is love of such sort as thoroughly excludes all mo- 
 tives of selfishness, and tends towards God for His sake alone. 
 Imperfect love has for basis and support, not the infinite per- 
 fections of God, but some profit we expect to derive from the 
 act, e. g. eternal happiness in Heaven, escape from the pains 
 of hell. It would thus seem that, because a man's own interests 
 cannot be absent from any movement of his will, perfect love 
 of God, which of its very nature banishes all thought of self, 
 becomes impossible. But a little reflection removes the diffi- 
 culty. ^Nothing, certainly, is more in harmony with the dig- 
 nity of human nature than perfect love of God ; and every act 
 of the kind, whether the agent adverts to the fact or not, is 
 a consummate perfection. Therefore, at the very instant of per- 
 fect love man necessarily assumes a new dignity, and adds to 
 his wealth of perfections. All this, too, without once making 
 his own profit the ground for positing his act of love. Of 
 course, if he changes his motive, and makes the fitness of the 
 act the reason for his acting, he falls away at once from per- 
 fect love. In other words, self-profit is a condition necessarily 
 involved in even perfect love of God. It never rises to the dig- 
 nity of a motive. Or, as theologians express it, self-profit is 
 the ontological root of even perfect love, it is not perfect love's 
 motive-root. The distinction means simply this, tliat, inde- 
 pendently of the lover's intention, the element of self-profit is 
 mixed up with every object able to elicit emotions of love. This 
 element is wrapped up in the very being of the object in ques- 
 tion, and cannot be separated from it. But nothing prevents 
 the lover from neglecting in his calculations this inborn element, 
 and choosing for motive whatever consideration he sees fit to 
 adopt. This consideration, to constitute an act of perfect love, 
 must be God alone, or God's infinite perfections. 
 
 B. An elicited act proceeds from the will solely, it begins and 
 ends in the will. An ordered act proceeds from the will in con- 
 junction with another faculty; it begins in the will and ends 
 with, e. g. the intellect, the senses, or the power of motion. A 
 
THESIS VIII 149 
 
 mere wish is an elicited act; the raising of the hand is an or- 
 dered act. 
 
 C. The intellect, the end, and the sensitive appetite act on the 
 will. The intellect exerts a moral influence on the will by way 
 of persuasion, inasmuch as a formal Judgment of the mind is 
 a prerequisite for deliberate and free acts of the will. In other 
 words, the intellect sets the will in motion by proposing to it 
 something desirable. The end exerts figurative, not a physical, 
 influence; inasmuch as it attracts the will by its desirableness. 
 Its effect is wholly confined to the intentional order, not the 
 order of execution. The sensitive appetite exerts merely indi- 
 rect influence on the will; inasmuch as it vindicates to some 
 object an appearance of fitness, and, by concentrating the atten- 
 tion on the good sought, affects the mind's judgment, and 
 through its agency the will. 
 
 D. Apart from the soul's vegetative powers, the will can issue 
 orders to all the soul's forces. It wields over the sensitive ap- 
 petite the authority of a king over his subjects, not that of a 
 master over his slave. It rouses the mind to attention, and to 
 assent in judgments not immediately evident. 
 
 E. The manner of desire is the characteristic that chiefly dis- 
 tinguishes appetites, not their objects. Eational appetite de- 
 termines itself, shapes its own course. Sensitive appetite is de- 
 termined from without, is guided by another. The objects of 
 the two appetites may be identical, the manner of desire is in 
 each case different. 
 
THESIS IX 
 
 Man's will enjoys freedom of choice, and no previous judg- 
 ment holds it to a set decision. Fatalism, therefore, and De- 
 terminism are absurd. 
 
 EicTcahy. Free Will and Four English Philosophers. 
 
 QUESTION 
 
 We stand for free will. Our opponents stand for Fatalism 
 or Determinism. The Calvinists or Presbyterians as a body 
 belong to this class, because of their belief in predestination. 
 Determinists pretend to differ from fatalists, but the difference 
 is small. 
 
 TERMS 
 
 Will is rational appetite, a spiritual, inorganic faculty, ap- 
 petitive of good at the instigation of the intellect. It seeks 
 good, shuns evil; and its various operations are grouped under 
 the nine names already attributed to the manifestation of pas- 
 sion or sensitive appetite, as species of the two generic emo- 
 tions, love and hate. They are desire, delight, hope, despair; 
 abhorrence, displeasure, fear, courage ; and anger. Though 
 their names are the same, the operations are quite different. 
 Love and desire in the will are quite other than love and de- 
 sire in the appetite ; and the kind of knowledge basing the emo- 
 tions is the radical measure of their difference. They are as 
 far apart in nature and perfection as intellect and sense. In 
 man sense and intellect work together in mutual harmony, and 
 the two appetites, superior and inferior, will and appetite, so 
 easily merge that it is a task to make separate study of them 
 in our consciousness. Sufl&ce it to say that the passions or 
 manifestations of sensitive appetite betray themselves in body- 
 changes, and turn invariably on material, concrete and par- 
 ticular goods; while the manifestations of will, our wishes, re- 
 
 150 
 
THESIS IX 151 
 
 strict themselves to the soul and regularly turn on spiritual, 
 abstract and universal goods. When particular goods occupy 
 the will's attention, they are viewed in the light of universals; 
 and we were at some pains to make this point clear in our 
 Ethics, Thesis V. We could perhaps with profit label emo- 
 tions of the will in a way calculated to keep them distinct from 
 the passions; and with all modesty we venture these several 
 names, wish, enjoyment, longing, discouragement; aversion, sad- 
 ness, dread, fortitude and rage. It might be better still to call 
 the passions desire, delight, longing, despair; abhorrence, sad- 
 ness, dread, courage ; and rage ; reserving for movements of the 
 will wish, joy, hope, discouragement; aversion, displeasure, fear, 
 fortitude; and anger. Sense precedes intellect in the field of 
 knowledge, and in the field of desire appetite is before will. 
 Previous delight would seem to be an indispensable requisite for 
 desire. The child first experiences good resident in color, 
 sound, food or whatever else; delight results, and at some long 
 or short interval after the experience closes, some incident awak- 
 ens a phantasm of the now absent good, and desire ensues. In 
 a parallel way, intellectual knowledge of some absent blessing 
 can urge the will to wish its possession. In last analysis, every 
 wish involves a triple process, thought of good; appreciation 
 of its goodness ; and tension, attraction, impulse towards it. 
 Sense, the regulator of passion, is of very wide extent, and 
 practically without limit. Utilitarians are wrong, when they 
 maintain that all our wishes are towards pleasure and away 
 from pain. The will's formal object is good ; and good is three- 
 fold, becoming, agreeable and useful; honestum, delectabile and 
 utile. Becoming good can stir the will as well as agreeable 
 good; and, when that is the case, our wishes are not towards 
 pleasure and away from pain. Many of our desires are un- 
 selfish, and primarily trample our personal pleasure. We can 
 choose right for its own sake against the maximum of pleasure. 
 The Hedonistic paradox vouches for the same truth; deliberate 
 pursuit of pleasure is suicidal, pleasure kills pleasure. 
 
 Choice. Choice supposes a conflict of desires. The stronger 
 desire ought to win, though free will can, up to the last mo- 
 ment, keep it from victory. The strength or weakness of a 
 desire is measured by the force of its motives; and every mo- 
 tive is a mixture of these several elements, subjective conscious- 
 
152 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 ness of the object's goodness, its own objective goodness, char- 
 acter of the man, and degree of attention or absorption given 
 to object. Many of our acts are spontaneous, and void of de- 
 liberation, e. g. dressing, eating, walking, talking. In acts of 
 the kind choice plays little or no part; and they are, as a rule, 
 morally right or wrong indirectly and in cause. At other times 
 we are beset by different motives, urging different courses of 
 conduct; and we simply must choose. Some of these motives 
 are moral obligation, worldly advantage, pleasure. Delibera- 
 tion then has place. We weigh things, Ijalance them, and 
 often the process covers only an inappreciable amount of time. 
 Choice or decision follows; and this act is constituted by the 
 acceptance of some suggested course, or its rejection. Psy- 
 chologists distinguish four different types of choice or selec- 
 tion, and they admit of easy understanding. Eeasouable deci- 
 sion has clear balance on one side. Impetuous decision is im- 
 patient of suspense. Acquiescent follows present inclination, 
 line of least resistance. Anti-impulsive calls for painful and 
 prolonged endeavor; it is like driving a thorn into one's own 
 flesh. James, vol. 2, p. 534. All four kinds are sure signs of 
 freedom, the fourth kind is unimpeachable evidence. Volition 
 is another name for choice, and quite a different thing from mere 
 desire. Desire may embrace two contending courses of action, 
 while volition necessarily embraces one and rejects the other. 
 Some descriptions of common terms. Instinct means uncon- 
 sciously purposive impulse. Impulse means tendency towards 
 good obscurely felt; it is feeling-prompted movement. Desire 
 implies tension, yearning towards absent good. Motive is 
 whatever attracts the will. Intention is end energizing the will. 
 Choice is selection of means. Purpose signifies deliberately 
 formed intention with regard to a series of future acts. Wish 
 is mere desire without effort or intention. 
 
 Choice is a manifestation of self-control, a very important 
 factor in morality; and tliis control is pliysical, prudential or 
 moral. Physical is exerted when we keep down our temper, 
 keep down manifestations of it. Prudential is control of 
 thought. It may be direct or indirect. Direct, when one says, 
 I will not be angry. This is a weak means, because it fixes 
 attention on the feeling we want to escape. Indirect, when 
 we transfer our attention to some other matter; when we make 
 
THESIS IX 153 
 
 a determined effort to think of something else. Children should 
 be trained to self-control. They are helped to self-restraint by 
 recollection of a past prohibition or painful experience. Hence, 
 spare the rod, and spoil the child. Hence judicious expression 
 of approval or disapproval is a great need. Self-control comes 
 after physical appetite, or instincts and desires. It develops 
 with habits, which are acquired aptitudes for particular modes 
 of action. With Carpenter the physiological basis of habits is 
 growth of organism to mode in which exercised. He makes 
 their psychological basis association by contiguity. Habit is a 
 second nature or bent. Some rules for habits. Bain offers 
 this. Make a vigorous start, and admit no exception till habit 
 is rooted. James has this : Make your nerves an ally, not an 
 enemy. Seize first chance to keep resolution. Add a little 
 gratuitous exercise every day. Self-denial is the only means 
 to strengthen will. Order is a great help. School-life and 
 discipline of games contribute much to same result. This self 
 control is needed for individual and state ; it is the moral ele- 
 ment in education ; there can be no morality without religion. 
 Character is a combination of habits and temperament; it is 
 part nurture, and part nature. Characters are strong, obsti- 
 nate and vacillating or weak. Temperaments are choleric or 
 energetic, sanguine or vivacious, phlegmatic or somnolent, mel- 
 ancholic or introspective. 
 
 Fatalism. For a fair exponent of Fatalism we choose Jona- 
 than Edwards. He was born at Windsor on the banks of the 
 Connecticut in 1703. At thirteen he entered Yale, when seven- 
 teen graduated, and at the early age of nineteen was a preacher 
 in 'New York, He labored afterwards in and about Boston, 
 wrote much of a metaphysical, political and religious nature, 
 was called to the presidency of Princeton University in Jan- 
 uary, 1758, and two months later yielded to a fatal attack of 
 smallpox. He was a lovable character, and a glance at his dead 
 portrait is sufficient proof that to know him was to revere him. 
 Friends, allowing their affection to run away with their good 
 sense, thoughtlessly lavish on him such titles as the greatest 
 theologian that lived in the Christian ages, the Metaphysician 
 without a rival, the wisest and the best of mankind. There is 
 no denying that he was a pure and upright man, but to say 
 that he knew as much theology as some of to-day's obscure work- 
 
154 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 ers is an exaggerated untruth. His knowledge of metaphysics 
 was painfully limited, and shockingly at fault on questions that 
 demanded but a small amount of penetration. An infatuated 
 reviewer hazards the remark that his defense of Calvinistic di- 
 vinity remains unanswered and unanswerable. He triumph- 
 antly goes on : " The subject since then has hardly been one 
 of controversy, though it has been occasionally talked about. 
 Scholars have no need to be informed that Edwards never en- 
 tertained any such doctrines as tlie word Fatalism describes." 
 Some of the assertions made in Edwards' own work prove this 
 brag arrant nonsense. We quote at length, " We say with pro- 
 priety that a bird let loose has power and Liberty to fly. But 
 one thing more I would observe concerning what is vulgarly 
 called Liberty; namely, that power and opportunity for one to 
 do and conduct as he will, or according to his choice, is all 
 that is meant by it, without taking into the meaning of the 
 word anytliing of the cause or original of that choice; or at all 
 considering how the person came to have such a volition; 
 whether it was caused by some external motive, or internal 
 habitual bias ; whether it was determined by some internal ante- 
 cedent volition, or whether it happened without a cause ; whether 
 it was necessarily connected with something foregoing, or not 
 connected. Let the person come by his volition or choice how 
 he will; yet if he is able, and there is nothing in the way, to 
 hinder his pursuing and executing his will, the man is fully and 
 perfectly free, according to the common and primary notion of 
 freedom. But the word as used by Arminians, and Pelagians, 
 and others, who oppose the Calvinists, has an entirely different 
 signification. These several things belong to their notion of 
 Liberty. 1st. That it consists in a self-determining power of 
 the will, or a certain sovereignty the will has over itself and its 
 own acts, whereby it determines its own volitions, so as not to 
 be dependent in its determinations on any cause without itself, 
 nor determined by anything prior to its own acts. 2nd. In- 
 difference belongs to Liberty in their notion of it, or that the 
 mind previous to the act of volition be in equilibrio. 3rd. Con- 
 tingence is another thing that belongs and is essential to it, not 
 in the common acceptance of the word, as that has been already 
 explained, but as opposed to all necessity or any fixed and cer- 
 tain connection with some previous ground or reason of its 
 
THESIS IX 155 
 
 existence. They suppose the essence of Liberty so much to 
 consist in these things, that, unless the will of man be free in 
 that sense, he has no real freedom, howmuchsoever he may be 
 at Liberty to act according to his will. The brute creatures are 
 not moral agents, because they do not act from choice guided 
 by understanding, or with a capacity of reasoning and reflect- 
 ing, but only from instinct." These are a few of Edwards' 
 utterances concerning the will; and the fear they betray about 
 entering deeply into the question, and their insistence on ideas 
 common to the uneducated crowd, are signs of a surface-knowl- 
 edge, afraid of the light. Fatalism is a child of Satan, and like 
 Satan it loves the dark. We, who form part of the multitude 
 styled by Calvinists Arminians, feel confident enough of our 
 position to invite scrutiny, and descend to the minutest pos- 
 sible details. These Arminians were a sect among Calvinists, 
 who rejected Calvin's doctrine of predestination. They got their 
 name from a Dutch professor. Jacobus Arminius, who headed 
 the sect, called Eemonstrants. 
 
 The author, no doubt, means well; and much of his inac- 
 curacy is due to the feebleness, with which he takes hold of his 
 subject, and the dread he has of penetrating beyond mere ap- 
 pearances. Fatalism is consistent with the freedom of a bird, 
 not with the freedom of a man; it is consistent with immunity 
 from violence, not with immunity from necessity. In the case 
 of a bird freedom is used figuratively. Birds are free only by 
 analogy. Liberty or freedom is a property of the will, in much 
 the same way as laughter is a property of the man. Choice, 
 taken as a power, may be identified with liberty and freedom; 
 taken as an act, it is the final result or effect of the will's 
 operation. The will itself is best defined as rational appetite, 
 that faculty spiritual and inorganic, which by acts elicited 
 under the guidance of the intellect seeks after good. Edwards 
 is impatient at our leading into the discussion notions of cause 
 of volition, indifference of will, and the like. In his shallow- 
 ness he fails to see that liberty cannot be half understood, un- 
 less the nature of the will and of its operations is beforehand 
 mastered. Many causes can be ascribed to each movement of 
 the will. Thus, the intellect exerts on the will an influence 
 peculiar to moral causes, that of persuasion; or, according to 
 St. Thomas, the intellect sets the will going, only in as much 
 
156 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 as it proposes to the same a thing desirable. The end sought 
 exercises an influence, best described as attraction or beckoning 
 towards. The sensitive appetite, common to man and beast, 
 is on occasions no small factor, when the will is about to put 
 an act. These various causes play an important part in man's 
 human doings; but when the question of liberty or freedom is 
 uppermost, they fall back before what we designate the deter- 
 mining cause of the will's choice. 
 
 If I understand Edwards and his brother Calvinists aright, 
 God, and God alone, is such determining cause. It must be 
 remembered that God is said to be the first cause universally, 
 whether guiding cause, drawing cause, or determining cause. 
 For from Him, the uncreated cause, all these created causes 
 derive their full efficacy, and on Him they depend for all their 
 validity. But He is no more the second determining cause 
 than He is our intellect and our will; He is no more the cause 
 of my free choice than He is of the building on which the work- 
 men are now engaged. Man's will is itself the only determin- 
 ing cause, consistent with human liberty. No created good, as 
 experience teaches, is such cause; no uncreated good is such, 
 unless we bid adieu to liberty, and agree to reckon man a neces- 
 sary agent, with only that shadow of choice, which consists in 
 invariably doing what another, even though that other be God, 
 determines on having done. Nor need this species of self- 
 causation frighten the reverent. It does not make of the will, 
 or of the act of the will, a self-existent being. Ijt simply makes 
 of the will, which was primarily made by God, a self-determin- 
 ing cause. It does not annihilate the influence exerted by other 
 causes, such as God, the intellect, the end and such like; but 
 it vindicates to the will the awful power of ultimately shaping 
 its own choice. 
 
 Now that the faculty, whose property is much-disputed lib- 
 erty, is sufficiently familiar, we shall labor to clear up difficul- 
 ties liable to arise from this other source. Liberty in its sim- 
 plest acceptation means, not precisely power that any one has 
 to do as he pleases, but rather freedom or immunity from some- 
 thing. Liberate, deliver and liberty are all words from the same 
 Latin stock. Liberty is not a power or a faculty, it is a prop- 
 erty of some power or faculty, called the will. Liberty is not 
 choice. It precedes choice, and for particular instances ceases 
 
THESIS IX 157 
 
 when choice begins to exist. Liberty, too, has many aspects. It 
 may be what philosophers are pleased to call immunity from 
 force or immunity from necessity. The former is immunity 
 from external violence, the only kind known to the bird men- 
 tioned by Edwards. The latter is immunity from an inner 
 force, and to this kind birds and everything less than man are 
 utter strangers. Instinct dominates and determines all their 
 activity. Immunity from necessity can be threefold, that of 
 contradiction, that of contrariety and that of specification. The 
 first is in play when the will chooses, for instance, between lov- 
 ing and not loving; the second, when it chooses between loving 
 and hating; the third, when it chooses between walking and 
 studying. 
 
 But the most striking peculiarity of all in man's liberty, is 
 that state of absolute indifference, in which it must continue 
 up to the very moment of its choice. It is an active, not a pas- 
 sive indifference; and consists in the circumstance, that, though 
 every conceivable condition in the shape of ability, inducement, 
 inclination and the like, be present and fulfilled, the will is 
 still able to allow its ability to lie idle, to close its eyes to the 
 inducements, and deny its inclinations. Expressed otherwise, 
 this indifference is contained in the power inherent in the will 
 to adopt one of several alternatives offered, whether the alter- 
 native adopted be more in accordance with common-sense or 
 not, whetlier it has more motives in its favor or not, whether 
 it is in the very opinion of the chooser destined to injure or 
 benefit him. Leibnitz and a few other philosophers are of opin- 
 ion that it is impossible for the human will to choose an object 
 or a line of conduct, which is calculated in the mind of the 
 chooser to prove damaging in the event. But experience is 
 argument enough to upset every such theory. A man's will 
 may very decidedly lean towards something, the man may know 
 in his heart that such and such a decision alone will meet with 
 reason's approval, he may count as sure his eternal damnation 
 in the case of a refusal; and yet, up to the very moment of 
 choosing, his will, though biassed by these different reflections 
 and emotions, nevertheless, ultimately determined by itself solely, 
 can reject the something to which his eternal salvation is at- 
 tached. If God deprived man of this dread power, man would 
 not be a free being; and man's service would be worth about 
 
158 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 as much as that of brute beasts, and as little deserving of eternal 
 reward. God can suggest motives, His saving grace can do a 
 vast deal towards guiding His servants aright; but at the close 
 of all, man has his destiny in his own hands. Fatalism affects 
 man's daily life more closely and ruinously than other false 
 systems encountered in philosophy. A fatalist, whether he con- 
 siders himself doomed to felicity or perdition, is a wretched 
 character, indeed; and in either event is open to tremendous 
 moral dangers. If satisfied that Heaven depends not on his 
 efforts, but on God's kindness, a door is thrown open to all 
 sorts of excesses and license. If satisfied that in spite of all 
 his honest efforts he is to associate throughout eternity with 
 criminals, the only alternative is, of course, to give liis passions 
 full fling, and make this earth his Heaven. 
 
 Determinism. Fatalism or Determinism is the doctrine we 
 combat in this thesis. Mill endeavors to distinguish between 
 Fatalism, which he repudiates, and Determinism, which he ad- 
 vocates. In Fatalism our conduct is fixed by fate or external 
 circumstances, in a way independent of our feelings and wishes. 
 In Determinism our conduct is fixed by our feelings or wishes, 
 and these in turn are fixed by our character. The determinist 
 can try to shape his own or another's conduct by appeals to 
 feelings, though the attempt is mere sham. The fatalist must 
 abandon every such attempt. Determinism is a soft Fatalism, 
 which claims the name of freedom. Fatalism is too gross a 
 theory to appeal to modern refinement, freedom of will proves 
 too much a source of annoyance to the irreligious. Determin- 
 ism would seem to have been hit upon as a happy means of 
 escape from the reproach of silliness and remorse of conscience. 
 Determinism differs too little from Fatalism to deserve a new 
 name. It is but another phase of a theory old as Sophocles 
 and his story of (Edipus. With the ancients, man had no con- 
 trol over his destiny. Some outside force, like the divinity, 
 fate, chance, Nemesis, arranged at its own pleasure every detail 
 in a man's life; and, as occasions arose, man without any choice 
 in the matter simply followed this fixed schedule. He might 
 be eminently virtuous, or eminently wicked ; but personal en- 
 deavor counted for just nothing in his life's history. No mat- 
 ter what effort he made to escape the perpetration of murder, 
 at the hour and on the day decreed by fate, he found liimself 
 
THESIS IX 159 
 
 betrayed into the act, and was all wonder at the occurrence, as 
 inevitable as it was unforeseen. And fate consulted only its 
 own plans in formulating its decrees. Its victim's honesty or 
 wickedness was never taken into account. Foreknowledge of 
 his future dispositions never operated with fate to save him 
 from crime; and its helpless victim, when the crisis came, 
 thought himself a hero, only to discover suddenly that he was 
 a parricide, or an adulterer of the vilest type. The predestina- 
 tion of the reformers is this Fatalism of the ancients, trans- 
 ferred to modern times. With them, God is fate ; and man has 
 about as much to do with his salvation or damnation as he has 
 to do with the shape of his nose. These false teachers, 
 
 " Complacent fold their scarlet hands, 
 
 And Heavenward roll their rheiuny eyes 
 To thank the god, pound-penny wise. 
 Who freedom tied with iron bands; 
 " Then bade his slaves work out their fate. 
 And choose, where choice is out of reach; 
 Predestining beforehand each 
 To everlasting love or hate " 
 
 We believe with Fatalists that some certain men are predes- 
 tined to Heaven, some certain others to hell; but always with 
 dependence on the free exercise of their will. As a matter of 
 fact, every man born into the world is going to die a saint or a 
 sinner; his last moment is going to find him in the state of 
 grace or in the state of sin. In every emergency of life, from 
 the cradle to the grave, he is most assuredly going to make 
 definite choice between two or more fixed lines of conduct; he 
 is going to infallibly yield to or resist temptation ; and God's 
 wisdom would be an imperfect thing, unless He knew from all 
 eternity what was going to be the outcome of the struggle in 
 each individual case. But we are no Fatalists. God's fore- 
 knowledge of things is far from interfering with, or destroying, 
 man's free will. God does not first decree things, and then 
 make man's conduct measure up to, or fit in with His decrees. 
 He first foresees the free and untrammeled conduct of men, 
 and then, without exerting the pressure of a hair on their free- 
 dom. He makes His decrees measure up to or fit with men's 
 conduct. Men may profess to see a species of iron cruelty in 
 the arrangement; but, whether cruel or not, there was no alter- 
 
160 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 native for God, in the event that He wanted to create men free, 
 and safeguard His other attributes. The cruelty of Fatalism is 
 immeasurably more abominable and despotic; absolutely sub- 
 versive of morality; provocative, at the same time, of overween- 
 ing presumption and abysmal despair, of sottish laziness and 
 ungenerous cowardice. It is no cruelty in God to let free agents 
 work out their destiny for weal or woe along the lines of their 
 own nature; and God is not to blame for man's abuses. In 
 another order He could hinder these abuses, but not in the pres- 
 ent; and this self-imposed helplessness is no imperfection in 
 God. 
 
 Determinism is a refinement of Fatalism; invented, to save 
 its parent from the shame attaching to idiocy ; and encouraging 
 blind adherents to persevere in their folly, with the thin assur- 
 ance that, in spite of fate, they still are free. A man's con- 
 duct, they say, is determined by a mixture of internal and ex- 
 ternal agencies, making up his character. Character, we have 
 seen, is the result of inherited constitution and personal acts, 
 culminating in habits. Of these two factors in character, habit 
 is far and away the more important; and, because it is the ele- 
 ment we determine or manufacture for ourselves, it is founda- 
 tion for the conviction that character is the man, and that a 
 man is what he makes himself. The constitution we inherit 
 from our parents is, in substance, quite beyond our control. 
 It may create trouble for us in the moral order, it may pave 
 the way of virtue with roses, and exempt us from struggles, 
 that are nothing short of an inheritance to others. But we 
 know our limitations; our constitution and tendencies are no 
 secrets to ourselves; and, as it is our duty to fight every wrong 
 inclination, even when inherited; and, as it would be superlatively 
 cruel and absurd to think that every such battle means sure 
 defeat, we must carry about with us a power able to correct 
 even our constitution, to follow its behests when they are right, 
 and manfully, heroically spurn them aside when they are wrong. 
 Therefore, even from the viewpoint of constitution, man's will 
 is not determined but free. Moral evil consists not so much 
 in having wrong tendencies, tastes and inclinations, as in yield- 
 ing to them, and supinely allowing them to sway our whole 
 conduct. Temptation is no wrong, consent to it constitutes all 
 the blame; and in Determinism consent and temptation are 
 
THESIS IX 161 
 
 identical, when defeat is the outcome, because dissent in that 
 case is out of the question. 
 
 Habits are the other feature of character, and Determinism 
 would have us think that habits determine us, in emergencies 
 of choice, to this or that line of conduct. Whatever influence 
 habit exercises over our free-will, and we are far from attribut- 
 ing to habit any decisive or determining influence, that influ- 
 ence is rooted in movements the will elicited, when the will ad- 
 mitted the separate acts constituting the habit. The resultant 
 of habit may be an indeliberate act, put without choice or ef- 
 fort ; but the habit itself is resultant of free and deliberate acts, 
 whether they be few or many. Thus it happens that every 
 indeliberate act, due to habit, is free, at least in cause; 
 while every deliberate human act is free in itself and by very 
 nature. 
 
 Along with natural disposition and acquired habits, our op- 
 ponents mass together a multitude of external conditions, influ- 
 ences, and motives as determining causes of our conduct. We 
 stand ready to grant that these several elements enter largely 
 into the economy of free-will as persuaders, counselors, weights 
 in its adoption of a policy; but we emphatically deny that they 
 necessarily constrain the will, or irresistibly hold it to either 
 of any two alternatives. They may urge the will, advise it, 
 bring pressure to bear on it; but the will itself remains always 
 master of the situation, and never loses its power to refuse to 
 be persuaded, to reject even the wisest advice, and resist every 
 species of outside pressure, even to its own loss and discomfiture. 
 And this is exactly what we mean by free will. It is stronger 
 than disposition, stronger than habit, stronger than whatever 
 combination of environment, education, and motives. It can 
 prefer folly to wisdom, vice to virtue, pain to pleasure, loss to 
 gain, hell to Heaven; conscious, all the while, that it is tram- 
 pling under foot better instincts, degrading its owner's dignity, 
 sacrificing the greater for the less, and accumulating a rich 
 store of bitter remorse and piercing regret. 
 
 Professor James on the whole stands for freedom of will. 
 But he hesitates. He makes his position a matter of choice, 
 and flatters determinists with the acknowledgment that psychol- 
 ogy is unable to solve the problem, and definitely decide one 
 way or the other. His psychology may be unequal to the task; 
 
162 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 and the circumstance ought to have, at least, tempted him to 
 revise his work, and diligently search it for flaws. The system 
 of psychology, unable to explain so patent a fact as free will, 
 must be radically wrong and imperfect. He prefers to leave 
 the question of free will altogether out of his account; because, 
 he says, if it exists, it can only be to hold some one ideal object 
 a little longer or a little more intensely before the mind, and so 
 make more effective one of two alternatives, which present them- 
 selves as genuine possibles. He makes choice the outcome of 
 attention, and seems blind to the circumstance, that we can in 
 an instant admit one of two alternatives, after giving whole 
 hours to the consideration of its opposite. Dynamically, he 
 makes free choice an operation amongst those physiological in- 
 finitesimals, which calculation must forever neglect. Here he 
 may be scattering that mind-dust, of which he speaks in an- 
 other chapter; and, whether or no, he is throwing the dust of 
 obscurity into the eyes of his readers. Choice is a matter to 
 be decided by psychology, not by physiology; unless we want 
 to surrender our trade and all turn materialists. And choice in 
 psychology is no operation among infinitesimals, but among defi- 
 nite agencies, written in as large characters as a Hippodrome 
 sign, and closer to the man than his nose. 
 
 James thus analyzes Determinism and Fatalism. Fatalism 
 affirms the impotence of free effort; Determinism, its unthink- 
 ability. The latter admits the name, acknowledges effort which 
 seems to breast the tide, but claims the effort as a portion of 
 the tide. Variations or exertions of free effort are in this sys- 
 tem mathematically fixed functions of the ideas themselves; 
 and these, in turn, are the tide. This tide-theory fits in with 
 James' own fancy; because, in his doctrine concerning the 
 origin of our ideas, he is a rank associationist. He and his 
 fellow-conspirators agi:>inst sound philosophy forget that, even 
 if flow of thought be conceived as a tide, the cause of the tide 
 still awaits explanation ; and that is where his theory fails, and 
 where our theory succeeds. The cause of the tide is the in- 
 tellect, a spiritual and inorganic faculty of an immortal soul, 
 which James and men of his ilk hate to admit. The cause of 
 choice or selection is the will, another spiritual and inorganic 
 faculty of the same immortal soul; and to refuse to acknowl- 
 edge an intellect, is to refuse to acknowledge a will. 
 
THESIS IX 163 
 
 The explanation of free effort offered by Professor Lipps 
 likewise appeals to his favor. This learned professor wants to 
 explain the very simple phenomenon of self-determination, and 
 pompously explains just nothing. When opportunity to choose 
 arises, two masses of ideas contend for our consent; one larger, 
 the other smaller. The larger invariably and irresistibly wins; 
 and yet we are said to determine ourselves, because the more 
 abundant mass is conceived as ourselves, while the less abun- 
 dant mass is conceived as the resistance. Which would all be 
 very beautiful, if ideas were in the will and not in the intellect. 
 The truth of the thing is that the will determines itself at the 
 instigation of the intellect. The will is the cause of our wishes, 
 as the intellect is the cause of our ideas. Ideas have about as 
 much to do with our wishes as outside objects have to do with 
 our ideas; with this difference, that the will enjoys freedom, 
 to which the intellect is a stranger. 
 
 And this brings us to the dishonest estimates of Scholastic doc- 
 trine seriously put forward by our opponents. James calls them 
 caricatures of the kind of supposition free will demands. Men 
 like John Fiske are nothing short of dishonest, when they tell 
 their readers that in our system volitions arise without cause 
 and are ascribed to blind chance. For their instruction, we 
 repeat that mind or self is the cause of our volitions, and that 
 chance plays no part whatever in the transaction. It is equally 
 unjust and untrue to say that volition with us is motiveless. 
 Volition with us is not wthout motives, but between them. We 
 adopt the examples Fiske himself proposes. We can suspect 
 an enemy of murder, because, while disposition is not a de- 
 termining, it is still a weighty motive. Hence we give the 
 enemy a fair trial, and proceed with due caution. And this is a 
 wise provision of law, for we often discover that some former 
 friend really perpetrated the deed. As Mr. Fiske sees things, 
 the enemy would have no choice in the matter but to kill; and 
 we should ourselves be murderers, if we hanged the man who 
 killed another from resistless impulse. It is not good law to 
 punish the insane. When a man hurls himself from a high 
 window, the first impulse is to account him insane; because, 
 though the instinct of self-preservation is not a determining 
 motive, it is nevertheless a weighty motive, and the suicide's 
 choice seems so absolutely devoid of reason that we charitably 
 
164 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 suppose him stripped of that faculty. And yet men have thrown 
 themselves from high windows without heing insane; and if 
 they survived the shock, they were arrested and hauled to court 
 for trial, and on no few occasions punished with imprisonment. 
 Were Mr. Fiske their judge, he could not in conscience pass 
 sentence of condemnation on attempted suicides, because in his 
 theory the poor fellows did simply what they could not help 
 doing. We can, as well as he, frame a theory of human ac- 
 tions; but with us the theory will be always subject to correc- 
 tion, with him it will be always infallible. Tlierefore, all the 
 man's rhetoric about the mother strangling her first-born, the 
 miser casting his gold into the sea, the sculptor breaking in 
 pieces his statue, goes for naught; unless it goes to prove what 
 we readily grant, that the will in free choice is always influ- 
 enced, though never determined by motives. His conception 
 of history is as wrong as his philosophy. History is a record 
 of facts, not a compilation of men's motives, environments and 
 dispositions. Free agents are able to cut loose from motives, 
 environments and dispositions; and to suppose that they un- 
 varyingly act in accord wdth them, is to make a grievous mis- 
 take, and substitute idle and uncertain speculation for the 
 truth. It is to measure facts by theories, gather a man's wis- 
 dom from the size of hat he wears, and multiply the absurdities 
 that make modern science man's greatest shame as well as his 
 crowning glory. 
 
 Freedom of choice. Freedom is immunity from something, 
 and is of three kinds, freedom of nature, freedom from sin, and 
 freedom from woe. St. Paul thus beautifully describes all 
 three. " Having no necessity, but having power of his own 
 will," I Cor. vii, 37. " Being freed from sin, we have been 
 made servants of justice." Eom. vi, 18. " Delivered from the 
 servitude of corruption into the liberty of the glory of the 
 children of God." Piom. viii, 21. We have to do with the 
 freedom of nature; and it is of two kinds, immunity from ex- 
 trinsic violence, and immunity from intrinsic violence; or from 
 force, and from necessity. Immunity from force makes an act 
 spontaneous or voluntary, and is common to minerals, plants 
 and brutes with men. The word s])ontaneous is ajjplicable to 
 whatsoever beings; to fire and plants, as well as to man. The 
 word voluntary in its strict sense applies to man alone, though 
 
THESIS IX 165 
 
 in a wider sense it can be said of brutes. Usually, spontaneous 
 is reserved for acts of the sensitive appetite; voluntary, for acts 
 of the rational appetite or will. Seeing and walking are said 
 to be voluntary in a mediate way, because of a command issued 
 by the will. 
 
 Immunity from necessity is man's peculiar possession; and 
 is called freedom of indifference, freedom of choice, and free 
 will. It is threefold, that of contradiction, that of contrariety, 
 and that of specification. It can be best described as that 
 quality, in virtue of which the will can, when every needed 
 prerequisite for action is present and fulfilled, elicit an act or 
 refrain from doing so, elicit a good act or a bad act, elicit 
 any one of several specifically difi^erent acts. Freedom is neither 
 an act nor a habit, but a quality of the will. Its indifference 
 is towards the act called second, not the act called nearest first 
 or remotest first. The will is in actu primo proximo to choice 
 or election, called actus secundus, when every prerequisite, in- 
 trinsic and extrinsic, for action is present and fulfilled. 
 
 This indifference of the will must be objective and sub- 
 jective, both passive and active. Objective is on the part of 
 the object, and is verified when the good in question is of such a 
 nature that it can be either embraced or rejected. Objective 
 is needed, because freedom can turn on only such an object; it 
 is not enough, because it affects only the judgment, and free- 
 dom is a matter of will, not of intellect. Subjective is on the 
 part of the will, and consists in the circumstance that the will 
 is prepared and ready to act or be acted on; the indifference 
 being active and passive respectively. Subjective passive is 
 needed, because the act as immanent must be received in the 
 will; it is not enough, because otherwise bodies with respect 
 to accidents, and prime matter would be free. Subjective ac- 
 tive indifference is needed in two senses, separate from nearest 
 first act and conjoined with nearest first act; in separate sense, 
 because even without the needed prerequisites the will must be 
 in root capable to choose. This indifference in separate sense 
 is not enough, because otherwise the intellect would be free, 
 inasmuch as it is indifferent before the phantasm cooperates. 
 In conjoined sense, because it is the one thing wanting, when 
 all else is supplied; it is enough, because to act follows. Free- 
 dom is likewise divided into physical and moral. Physical is 
 
166 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 freedom from violence, whether extrinsic or intrinsic. Moral is 
 freedom from law, or the right to choose between opposites 
 without damage to any prescription of moralit}'. 
 
 Previous judgment. The will acts at the instigation of the 
 intellect. Good is its object, and intellect is what distinguishes 
 good from evil. The intellect, therefore, discovers good to the 
 will ; and when that good is less than God intuitively seen, the 
 will has power to embrace or reject it. Judgments preceding 
 work of the will are conceived as of two kinds, speculative and 
 practical. The first is worded this way, " This object is open 
 to choice or rejection." The second is worded this way, " This 
 object ought to be chosen, if you want to be prudent; it may 
 be rejected, if you want to be imprudent." The judgment, 
 " I choose this," is not previous, but consequent to work of the 
 will; and announces the will's decision, resulting from the free 
 and untrammeled use of its own native activity. A whole army 
 of judgments, speculative and practical, may precede the will's 
 choice. They may influence the will by urging, advising, pro- 
 posing motives; but they never determine the same in such 
 fashion that any one of several alternatives becomes impossible. 
 That impossibility arises only after the will has made definite 
 choice, and it constitutes what we call consequent, not ante- 
 cedent necessity. 
 
 The Thomists would seem to attribute to their practical 
 judgment a constraining force, destructive of freedom. But, 
 as good Catholics, they cannot run counter to a dogma of faith; 
 and free will is such a dogma. Therefore, they have recourse 
 to the rather weak explanation that their practical judgment is 
 itseK free, and man's choice has its freedom from this circum- 
 stance. It might be better to reject every species of practical 
 judgment, with an appearance even of Determinism, and say 
 that the only previous judgment required is speculative. It 
 is hard to see how freedom can stand with the judgment, " This 
 must be done," for prerequisite; and it is harder still to see 
 how any such imperative judgment squares with the truth, 
 when any two finite goods are proposed as alternatives for 
 choice. Such a judgment would be a lie pure and simple, as 
 we know from experience. It is the business of the intellect 
 to furnish light to the will, not to determine it. Praemotio 
 physica is another Thomistic theory at seeming variance with 
 
THESIS IX 167 
 
 the truth; but we choose to postpone its discussion to Natural 
 Theology. It bears on God's cooperation with His creatures, 
 and was seemingly invented to safeguard His eternal decrees, 
 His dominion, and wisdom. Let it be enough for the present 
 to remark that without any praemotio physica, or interference 
 with man's free will, God's cooperation, decrees and wisdom 
 can be otherwise kept safe from danger. Foreknowledge of 
 man's free acts guides God in His decrees, and man's free acts 
 precede God's knowledge, not of course in the order of time, 
 but in the order of nature. 
 
 Division — Two parts. I. Man's will enjoys freedom of choice. 
 
 II. No previous judgment determines 
 the will. 
 
 PROOFS, I, II 
 
 I. Free will is a fact, and no amount of bad philosophy can 
 reason away facts. It can confuse people, but not convince 
 them. 
 
 1. The fact of consciousness. The deeds we daily do are in 
 our power, ourselves for witnesses. At our own good pleasure 
 we do this, and we do that, and we do their opposite ; and, 
 while actually engaged in the performance of some particular 
 work, we feel altogether free ; we feel in such sort masters of 
 ourselves that we could equally well act otherwise, if disposed 
 to incur the reproach of imprudence and blame; and all this 
 without a change in circumstances, without a change in our 
 motives. 
 
 2. The fact of common agreement among men.. Even De- 
 terminists in practical every-day life shape their conduct in 
 strict accord with our theory. They talk Determinism, to act 
 Free-will. They ascribe objective value to all these several 
 ethical notions, imputability, responsibility, virtue, vice, justice, 
 injustice, merit, blame, right, duty. They advise and exhort 
 their friends. They lay down rules, enact laws, proffer counsel, 
 draw up petitions, assign rewards, and inflict penalties. In 
 Determinism, environment, character, and habits inexorably 
 fix a man's conduct; all three are out of his control; he does 
 simply what he cannot help doing; and in this sorry event 
 
168 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 tiiese several ethical notions are absolutely without meaning or 
 substance. This universal consent of mankind with a bearing 
 on the reality of free-will is no mere theoi'etical tenet, like the 
 earth's movement around the sun, but aai eminently practical 
 dogma, of vital importance in men's affairs, and the very basis 
 of civil and political society. 
 
 3. The metaphysical fact of relationship between intellect 
 and will. We will as we know. Determinism goes to the ab- 
 surd lengths of binding the will to necessarily embrace what 
 the mind clearly tells the will need not be embraced. In other 
 words, Determinism is a huge lie, open discord between the 
 objective and subjective. Objective indifference, we have seen, 
 is a reality vouched for by the mind. Every good with which 
 we are acquainted, God Himself not excepted, sails into our 
 notice as a mixture of attractive and repellent qualities, wears 
 in our eyes tlie double aspect of good and evil. The subjective 
 element, corresponding to this objective indifference, is in De- 
 terminism iron necessity, the unfailing and uniform impossi- 
 bility of escape from- what has repellent features. It is highly 
 unnatural to constrain God's noblest creature to embrace with- 
 out fail a fixed good, that he here and naw knows to be alto- 
 gether unnecessary. 
 
 II. Practical judgment, as understood by Thomists, would 
 seem to destroy free will. That faculty is not formally free 
 which is no longer indifferent, no longer vested with ownership 
 in its act, when once every prerequisite for the act is verified. 
 
 But such a faculty is the will, when, in the theory of our 
 opponents, the last practical judgment is uttered. Ergo, in 
 the theory of our opponents the will is not free. 
 
 With regard to the Minor. This practical judgment is a 
 prerequisite for the act; because without it, they contend, the 
 will can elicit no act, and with it the will is no longer indif- 
 ferent to several alternatives, but necessarily restricted and de- 
 termined to one. 
 
 N.B. The act of the will, they say, is not absolutely, but 
 only conditionally determined; it is mediately free, inasmuch 
 as the will allows itself to be swayed by the motives provoking 
 the practical judgment. This subterfuge is nothing worth, be- 
 cause the will would in this event be swayed either by chance 
 or by a second practical judgment. Chance is no cause at all. 
 
THESIS IX 169 
 
 and this second practical judgment would call for a third, and 
 a fourth, and a fifth without end. Again, they say this prac- 
 tical judgment has its origin in a certain predilection of the 
 will. If this predilection is one of the prerequisites for the 
 act of choice, the will is no longer free, but determined. If it 
 is not, the will is free; but no last practical judgment is needed 
 among the prerequisites. 
 
 P.S. Additional proofs of free will from Maker, pp. 
 398-425. 
 
 Ethical — Psychological — Metaphysical 
 
 Ethical Argument. 1. Obligation. If I am bound to ab- 
 stain from an evil deed, it must be really possible for me that 
 this deed shall not occur. And the obligation is plain. " Eight 
 conduct is not merely a beautiful ideal, which attracts me. It 
 commands me with an absolute authority. It obliges me un- 
 conditionally." Noel. In the Determinist theory no other 
 choice than that actually elected was really possible to the sin- 
 ner throughout his life, and the present criminal choice is in- 
 exorably determined by the equally inevitable choices that went 
 before. 
 
 2. Remorse and repentance. These emotions are possible 
 only in case of acts I freely did, acts that were mine, acts I 
 could have avoided. No remorse or repentance accompanies 
 harm done through no fault of mine, but by accident, harm 
 not in my power. Determinism makes both classes of acts 
 equally the inevitable outcome of my nature and circumstances. 
 With it, crime is as unavoidable as an earthquake. 
 
 3. Merit and desert. We deserve reward or punishment only 
 by acts that are free. Other acts deserve neither. Witness the 
 " I could not help it," of the child about to be punished. In 
 Determinism, punishment is purely preventive, not retributive. 
 Praise and blame are not just rewards for self-sacrifice, but 
 judicious incentives for future services. Like the old saying, 
 " gratitude is a delicate sense of favors to come." 
 
 Jf.. Responsibility. I might fasten a plague on the whole city, 
 administer poison to father and mother, and yet not be re- 
 sponsible, or morally guilty, or justly punishable; because it 
 was not my free act, because I could not help it. Maniacs and 
 somnambulists are judged unaccountable for same reason. 
 
170 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 Three things constitute responsibility, binding authority, knowl- 
 edge of this authority's will, and power to perform or abstain 
 from the act ; in fewer words, duty, knowledge of duty, and 
 freedom. 
 
 6. Justice means volition according to law. In Determin- 
 ism, all volitions are as much according to law as the ebbing 
 tide. Moral law is physical law ; and whatever is, is right. 
 
 N.B. Determinism distorts moral conceptions. It gives 
 new meanings to notions as old as the world. Right science 
 accepts facts as they are, examines without manufacturing 
 them, interprets without transforming them. 
 
 Psychological argument, from consciousness, or introspective 
 analysis of our own volitions. 
 
 1. Att-ention. I myself guide the course of my own thoughts. 
 This phenomenon is clear in recalling a forgotten fact, or in 
 guessing a riddle. Alexander alleges the example of two weights 
 pulling as twelve and eight. Endow these weights with active 
 power of selective attention, and twelve can become five, eight 
 can become twenty. 
 
 2. Deliheration. There may be question of investing my 
 money or selecting a servant. Deliberation is plainly an exer- 
 cise of free volition. I freely recall and detain the reason or 
 motive before my consciousness. I have had experience of the 
 opposite kind, passive oscillation of rival impulses, and can 
 therefore compare. 
 
 3. Choice, or decision. This is the culmination of freedom. 
 I may be tempted to excuse a fault by a lie, to commit some 
 small dishonesty. The evil thought may be present before ad- 
 vertence; then its sinfulness appears, and the struggle begins. 
 I decide to consent or resist. The act of decision is mine ; it is 
 free, not determined by habit or motive; and this very circum- 
 stance is ground for remorse or congratulation. 
 
 J/.. Resistance to persistent temptation. This is activity along 
 the line of greatest resistance, volition against the prepon- 
 derating impulse or motive. Motive of virtue attracts without 
 making my course the pleasanter. 
 
 N. B. Spinoza objects, saying that men deceive themselves 
 in thinking that they are free, because they know not the cause 
 of their actions. A difl'crent act is conceivable, and this they 
 confuse with possibility. Answer: We know self to be the 
 
THESIS IX 171 
 
 cause, and the possibility of the act is conceived as a hypo- 
 thetical reality easily reducible, and too often reduced, to an 
 absolute reality. 
 
 Metaphysical argument, from imperfection of created goods. 
 Every good on earth is a mixture of good and evil. Will is 
 determined by adequate object alone, perfect good, God in- 
 tuitively seen. Element of good is attractive; element of evil, 
 repellent. What of its very nature repels, cannot irresistibly 
 attract. 
 
 N.B. Free will upsets Materialism, and this is the rock of 
 offense. It calls for a spiritual faculty, superior to matter, not 
 completely controlled by physical organisms. If the will is 
 free, man is more than an organized frame. 
 
 PEINOIPLES 
 
 A. Psychological — B. Metaphysical — C. Physiology, 
 Physics, Statistics. 
 
 A. Psychological. 1. Abusive lies. Bain says, free will is 
 a power that comes from nothing, has no beginning, follows no 
 rule, respects no time or occasion, operates without impartiality. 
 Maudsley says, free will is an unmeaning contradiction in terms, 
 an inconceivability in fact. Stout calls it a Jack-in-the-box, it 
 springs into being of itself, as if it were fired out of a pistol. 
 Answer: Lies need no answer. Choice in Determinism re- 
 sembles the pistol-bullet. It is about as free, meritorious, and 
 blameworthy. Recall the Brockton murder described by James. 
 
 2. Introspection tells us that we are always determined by 
 motives, unable as we are to resist strongest or most pleasurable. 
 Answer: Introspection tells us the contrary. Involuntary acts 
 are determined by character and motives, and they are nu- 
 merous. Deliberate acts are influenced, but not determined by 
 them. 
 
 3. The strongest motive always prevails. Answer: The 
 strongest, meaning the ultimately prevalent, I grant; and that 
 is tautology, or by consequent necessity. The strongest, mean- 
 ing the most pleasurable, I deny; or by antecedent necessity. 
 
 If. Free wiU is liberty to desire or not desire. Impossible. 
 Ergo. Answer: This is an unfair description. Lewes is 
 fairer. Desire is ambiguous. It can mean consciousness of 
 
172 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 want, and rejection of, or consent to feeling. Free will is de- 
 sire in second, not in first sense. 
 
 5. Our neighbors are always determined by character and 
 motives. Social life is impossible without forecasts. Men's 
 conduct is as measurable as the movements of a planet. An- 
 swer: Such forecasts deal with external acts, and many such 
 are indeliberate. The will is influenced, though not inexor- 
 ably determined, by character and motives in even deliberate 
 acts. Only the virtuous resist the solicitations of pleasure. 
 Mental association somewhat accounts for these forecasts. 
 Character and motives are the only factors in others known to 
 us, their wills are hidden. Eeflection enables us to praise or 
 blame, and therefore ascribe moral acts to free will. 
 
 6. SeK or the Ego is a mere aggregate or series of states 
 without anything permanent. Answer: I deny. Self is per- 
 manent subject, enduring one and same in varied changes. 
 
 7. Spencer denies a permanent self or Ego. Answer: So 
 much the worse for Spencer. Consciousness is evidence. Mem- 
 ory and reflection are evidence. Consciousness of a permanent 
 self cannot certainly prove it transitory. 
 
 B. Metaphysical. 1. Nothing exists without a cause. Ergo 
 no free will. Answer: Self, the Ego, the will, is cause of 
 choice. 
 
 2. Free will is against the law of causation. Answer: This 
 objection mixes two things, nothing without a cause, and uni- 
 formity of nature. Uniformity in physical order is different 
 from uniformity in sphere of the mind. The law is not yet 
 completely establislied in physical nature. In sphere of the 
 mind exceptions are innumerable. 
 
 C. Physiology, Physics and Statistics. 
 
 1. Uniformity is rigid among corporeal changes. Ergo 
 equally rigid in mental correlates. Answer: Mind depends on 
 body, but its acts are not determined and conditioned by body. 
 Ladd says, " Physiology neither disproves nor verifies the pos- 
 tulate of free will." 
 
 2. Physics, and Conservation of Energy. Answer: This law 
 would prove that no bodily movement was ever influenced by a 
 mental act; and this is against experience. 
 
 3. Statistics. BucJcle says, " Suicide is the product of gen- 
 eral conditions in society. The felon only carries into effect 
 
THESIS IX 173 
 
 what is a necessary consequence of preceding circumstances, and 
 all this is proved by statistics." Answer: Free will is com- 
 patible with general uniformity in even individual conduct, 
 because indeliberate acts are outcome of character and motives; 
 because a man cannot act without motives, and the commonest 
 motives are pleasure, interest, and duty; because motives influ- 
 ence without determining. Statistics are for the community, 
 not for an individual. Xo two of all the suicides were pre- 
 cisely alike in antecedents. If it could be shown that three 
 hundred precisely similar sheaves of motives actuated three 
 hundred suicides, something would perhaps be accomplished. 
 
 D. Theology. God's foreknowledge would be uncertain. 
 Answer: There is no future or past with God, all is present. 
 He foresees free acts without determining them. God's vision 
 does not affect our freedom. Eecall Dante's boat and the man 
 on shore. 
 
 E. Psychology would be impossible as a science. There 
 would be nothing uniform, no law in theory of free will. 
 Answer: Psychology has abundance of other material for laws. 
 The interference of free will is ethically momentous, psycho- 
 logically small. Besides, free will knows conditions, and is not 
 altogether lawless. 
 
 (F) Hobhes, — (G) Hume, — (H) Mill, are all opposed, with 
 Locke, to free will. From. Rickaby, 8. J., " Free Will and Four 
 English Philosophers." 
 
 F. Hobbes. 1. It is no dishonor to God, to say that He 
 can so order the world as sin may be necessarily caused thereby 
 in a man. Power irresistible justifies all actions. Ergo, God 
 can force a man to sin, and then punish him without being un- 
 just. Answer: Mill has to say on this god of Hobbes. " I 
 will call no being good, who is not what I mean when I apply 
 that epithet to my fellow creatures; and if such a being 
 can sentence me to hell for not calling Mm so, to hell I will 
 go." 
 
 2. Laws prohibiting necessary acts are not unjust. All law 
 is just, because the subject consents. Theft, though necessary, 
 can be punished to deter others. Necessary acts of theft are 
 noxious, and we justly destroy all that is noxious, both beasts 
 and men. Answer: There is a difference between punishing 
 and blaming. We blame men as well as punish them. 
 
174 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 3. Consultation precedes choice, and therefore consultation is 
 not in vain. Answer: But the consultation of Hobbes was de- 
 termined by antecedent circumstances, reaching farther back 
 than the l)irth of the consultor. Hobbes sees danger in this 
 doctrine. Hence his request to the Marquis of Newcastle and 
 the Bishop of Londonderry to keep private what he writes here. 
 
 J^. Praise and dispraise depend not on the necessity of the 
 action. We praise what is good, and dispraise what is evil. 
 Necessary acts can be good or evil. Answer: Praise touches 
 excellences proper to thing's nature. Lianimate things are 
 praised for their beauty and usefulness; plants and brutes, for 
 full growth ; men, for stature, strength, beauty, quick wit, com- 
 mand. Man is alone praiseworthy, when he exercises free will. 
 
 5. Piety means two things, to honor God in our hearts, 
 thinking mightily of His power, and to signify that honor by 
 words and acts. Necessity allows of both. Ansiver: Power 
 is the quality in God best known to beginners. After power, 
 comes justice. The tyro fears, the proficient hopes, the expert 
 loves. The god of Hobbes is not good, he is only omnipotent. 
 
 6. The prayer is decreed together in the same decree, wherein 
 the blessing is decreed. Answer: The prayer is foreseen in 
 the decree, wherein the blessing is decreed. Prayer is the ac- 
 knowledgment of God's dominion, but it is for that very reason 
 free. Forced acknowledgment is no homage. 
 
 7. Sin can be voluntary, and yet necessary. Answer: Nec- 
 essary sin is no contradiction. It has place in hell. Love in 
 Heaven is voluntary and necessary. Love of an object, that 
 completely satisfies, is necessary and voluntary. A toy satisfies 
 the child; God, a seraph. Man occupies a middle position; 
 nothing on earth completely satisfies him. Ergo, voluntary in 
 man means free. Eead Ecclesiasticus xv, 11. 
 
 8. Necessity is not compulsion, as is plain in the case of a 
 sailor throwing his cargo into the sea. Love, revenge, lust are 
 free from compulsion, but are necessary acts. Answer: Aris- 
 totle thus defines compulsion, " violence from without, the 
 party compelled contributing nothing of his own." Goods cast 
 into the sea are no fair example of compulsion. A deed done 
 by compulsion of fear is not necessitated. Passion weakens 
 freedom, and fear is strongest of the passions. The popular 
 impression that fear compels, is grounded in the fact that other 
 
THESIS IX 175 
 
 passions are home-products, while fear is an importation from 
 outside. 
 
 9. The last dictate of the understanding necessitates the act, 
 as the last feather breaks the horse's back. Answer: Here is 
 the process. Speculative Judgment comes first, This is open 
 to choice, so is that. Hypothetical practical judgment follows. 
 This ought to be chosen, if I want to be prudent ; and that can 
 be chosen, if I want to be imprudent. Absolute practical judg- 
 ment closes the process, I choose this, and I want to be prudent ; 
 or I choose that, and I want to be imprudent. The absolute 
 practical judgment is but a mental expression of the willed 
 act, and is altogether consequent to the will's determination. 
 The hypothetical practical judgment precedes the will's act, and 
 leaves everything undetermined. Hence our distinction. The 
 last judgment of the mind determines the will, the last specu- 
 lative judgment, I deny. The last practical judgment, I dis- 
 tinguish. The last hypothetical, I deny. The last absolute, I 
 distinguish again. With antecedent necessity, I deny. With 
 consequent necessity, I grant. We cannot actually choose a 
 thing, and remain free to choose its alternative. But the 
 necessity we impose on ourselves is consequent, not antecedent 
 to our actual choice. 
 
 10. Water has liberty to descend, because there is no im- 
 pediment in the nature of water. Its inability to ascend is not 
 want of liberty, but want of power. In the same way man has 
 liberty, even when necessitated ; because there is no impediment 
 in his nature. His inability to choose an alternative is not 
 want of liberty, but want of power. Answer: Water and 
 brutes are free metaphorically. Things are said to be free, 
 when allowed to act according to their nature. ISTatures are 
 different, and ought to be of different powers. Man ought to 
 be free in one way; water and brutes, in another. Hobbes 
 makes them all free in the same way. Like Edwards, Hobbes 
 knows only one kind of freedom, that from force or violence. 
 He knows nothing about freedom from necessity. Intrinsically, 
 water is just as free to ascend as it is to descend. All the dif- 
 ference is extrinsic. Water has no real freedom at all. Free- 
 dom means choice, and water never chooses. Somebody chooses 
 for it. Somebody removes the impediment, and it flows. 
 Somebody sets an impediment in its path, and it stops flowing. 
 
176 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 An up-slope is an impediment, a down-slope is its removal ; and 
 the water never makes either. Water seems to be free, just as 
 the meadow seems to smile, or the medicine seems to be healthy. 
 All metaphors are as close approaches to the truth. Man's 
 proper freedom is from within, not from without. He enjoys 
 the inferior kind of freedom common to rivers and birds. We 
 call it freedom from force or violence. But his rational nature 
 calls for a higher kind, denominated freedom from intrinsic 
 constraint or necessity. Something in water makes flowing 
 necessary, when impediments are removed. Nothing in man 
 makes it necessary for him, in whatever emergency, to choose 
 one alternative rather than another. Nothing outside of man 
 can constrain his will, though many outside impediments can 
 constrain his other faculties; and while his will is never under 
 restraint, the man himself can be said to be in that condition. 
 
 11. I conceive that nothing taketh beginning from itself, but 
 from the action of some other immediate agent without itself. 
 The cause of will is not the will itself, but something else not 
 in its own disposing. Answer: Spontaneous volitions are 
 traceable to necessary causes, reflex volitions ordinarily are not. 
 This is but a repetition of the aged Scholastic difficulty, Omnia 
 mota moventur ab alio, everything moved is moved by another, 
 whatever has motion is moved by another. And the answer is 
 easy. There is a difference between moving and necessitating. 
 Hobbes has to prove, not that the will is moved, but that it is 
 necessitated by another. Many outside things move the will. 
 The intellect moves it by proposing good, and this is termina- 
 tive motion. God moves it by concurrence or cooperation. 
 But, when an agent, like the will, enjoys active indifference, 
 nothing outside moves it determinately and physically, but only 
 morally and in the order of thought. 
 
 12. A sufficient cause is a necessary cause. Every alternative 
 actually chosen is by the very fact a sufficient, and, therefore, 
 a necessary cause. Ergo, no free will. Answer: An object 
 that has drawbacks is no sufficient cause for a necessary voli- 
 tion. If a volition follows, it will be not necessitated but free. 
 There is sufficient cause for a free volition, not sufficient cause 
 for a necessary volition. 
 
 13. It is necessary that to-morrow it shall rain or not rain. 
 If it be not necessary it shall, it is necessary it shall not rain. 
 
THESIS IX 177 
 
 Answer: Either is true determinately, I deny; — indetermin- 
 ately, I grant. Hobbes answers, necessity remains, though we 
 know it not. Take this example. It is necessary that to- 
 morrow Philip shall sin or not sin. Hobbes cannot show that 
 sin in Philip to-morrow is either a necessity or an impossibility 
 antecedent to his exercise of free will, but only consequent on 
 same; and we admit consequent necessity or determination. 
 He mixes two things, the assertion of Philip's sinning to-mor- 
 row necessarily involves the denial of his not sinning, and the 
 assertion of Philip's sinning to-morrow involves the denial of 
 his necessarily not sinning. 
 
 G. Hume. 1. The exceeding multitude and variety of the 
 antecedents to volition, alone prevent us from determining ac- 
 curately in all cases the result, which uniformly and necessarily 
 follows. Answer: Freedom of will is not based on the im- 
 possibility of predicting a man's conduct. It is quite as im- 
 possible to predict the weather, and nobody on this account 
 calls the weather free. The basic argument for free will is 
 consciousness of the fact; and this is strengthened by others, 
 in which impossibility of prediction forms no part. The con- 
 duct of a man cannot be predicted with anything like absolute 
 certainty; and free will is the chief cause, not antecedents. It 
 is easier to make a guess at the weather. Of course man is 
 amenable to motives, environment, habit and disposition; but 
 these several factors exert no determining influence. They are 
 on so many occasions discounted, that predictions based on 
 their constancy are altogether unreliable. The number of in- 
 stances sufficing for an induction in the grosser region of mat- 
 ter, is not sufficient in the finer domain of intelligence. 
 
 2. Because God is the ultimate author of all our volitions, 
 human actions either have no moral turpitude at all, or they 
 must involve our Creator in the same guilt. Answer: Hume 
 solves the difficulty by declaring it a sublime mystery, to pry 
 into which is temerity. To reconcile free will with God's 
 prescience, or to defend absolute decrees and free God from 
 sin, exceeds, he thinks, all the power of philosophy. In our 
 system, the mystery admits of easy solution. God's prescience 
 is consequent to man's exercise of his free will, not indeed in 
 the order of time, but in the order of nature. 
 
 H. Mill. 1. Freedom is consistent with divine foreknowl- 
 
178 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 edge. Ergo, with human. Answer: No parity. God is in- 
 finite, man finite. With God, duration is eternity; with man, 
 time. Eternity is nunc stans, time is nunc fluens. There is 
 no past or future with God. What will happen a hundred 
 years hence, is present in the now of God. Men must wait till 
 it happens. St. Augustine reduces the three tenses to one, 
 the present. The present of things past is memory ; the present 
 of tilings present is intuition; the present of things future is 
 expectation. 
 
 2. " We know that we are not compelled to obey any par- 
 ticular motive. We feel that, if we wish to prove that we have 
 the power of resisting the motive, we could do so (that wish 
 being, it needs scarcely be observed, a new antecedent) ; and 
 it would be humiliating to our pride, and paralyzing to our 
 desire of excellence, if we thought otherwise." Answer: This 
 looks like our own doctrine. The parenthesis makes it De- 
 terminism, because it makes our volitions and actions invariable 
 consequents of our antecedent states of mind. We maintain 
 that our conduct and volitions are consequents of choice, and 
 choice can oppose antecedent states of mind. It can reject 
 what the mind approves, and approve what the mind rejects. 
 Hammered iron is the invariable consequent of antecedent con- 
 ditions. Crime is not, as can be readily seen in the case of 
 saint and sinner, with the same disposition and the same mo- 
 tives at their disposal. According to Mill, Abel would never 
 do right, if placed with Cain's character in an occasion similar 
 to that in which Cain does wrong. 
 
 3. Determinism means that the given cause will be followed 
 by the effect, subject to all possibilities of counteraction by other 
 causes. Necessity, or the doctrine of Hume, in common use 
 stands for the operation of those causes exclusively, which are 
 supposed too powerful to be counteracted at all. 
 
 Answer: Hume adds to uniformity of sequence an element 
 of uncounteractableness. But in Mill's philosophy, as in 
 Hume's, whatever is actually uncounteracted is practically and 
 in the concrete uncounteractable; and, therefore, to happen and 
 to happen of necessity are one. 
 
 Jf. Determinism is remote from Fatalism; and yet most De- 
 terminists are Fatalists. A Fatalist half believes, — and no- 
 body is a consistent Fatalist, — not only that whatever happens 
 
THESIS IX 179 
 
 is the infallible result of the causes which produce it, and that 
 is Determinism, but also that there is no use in struggling 
 against it. According to Fatalists, a man's character is formed 
 for him, and not by him. According to Determinists, a man's 
 character is formed in part for him, and in part by him. 
 
 Answer: In Determinism we make our own character, if we 
 will; but if we will, comes from no effort of our own, but 
 from circumstances or external causes, which we cannot help. 
 As Mill foolishly puts it, our characters are formed for us in 
 the ultimate resort, by us as intermediate agents. 
 
 5. The Free-will doctrine, by keeping in view precisely that 
 portion of the truth, which the word necessity puts out of 
 sight, namely, the power of the mind to cooperate in the 
 formation of its own character, has given to its adherents a 
 practical feeling much nearer the truth than has generally 
 existed in the minds of Necessitarians. Determinism is good 
 for the culture of others; free will, for self -culture. 
 
 Answer: Mill would here seem to be a Libertarian. He 
 makes three concessions. We are able to modify our char- 
 acter, if we will; we are masters of our habits and temptations, 
 not they of us; we could resist habit or temptation, even when 
 we yield to it. Perhaps he means, we could, but cannot; could, 
 if circumstances were different; cannot, as they are. 
 
 6. What I am able to do is not a subject of consciousness, 
 we are conscious of what is, not of what will or can be. Con- 
 sciousness is not prophetical. 
 
 Answer: I do, I can, I am, are three facets of the same 
 truth. I do, implies I can; I do and I can, imply I am. I 
 can do a thing, does not mean I shall do it. I can, is not 
 prophetic. I can use my endeavor, is a fact of present con- 
 sciousness. These endeavors will be adequate to the occasion, 
 is an inference from past to future, and is prophetical. 
 
 7. I dispute altogether that we are conscious of being able 
 to act in opposition to the strongest present desire or aversion. 
 When we think of ourselves hypothetically as having acted 
 otherwise than we did, we always suppose a difference in the 
 antecedents, — 'We picture ourselves as having known something 
 that we did not know, or not knowing something that we did 
 know, which is a difference in the external motives; or as having 
 desired or dishked something more or less than we did, which 
 
180 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 is a difference in the internal motives. Ergo antecedents de- 
 termine volition. 
 
 Answer: ^lill here proves himself an absolute Necessitarian, 
 a Fatalist. If a man's aversion to crime is weaker than 
 temptation, he must commit it. If his desire is weaker than 
 his horror, he must abstain from it. And this is Fatalism. 
 Rickaby explains the case by saying that in two alternatives, 
 when one complacency is stronger than the other, the man can 
 wait and do nothing till the other complacency becomes the 
 stronger. After a long or short repetition of this process he 
 eventually selects that one of the two alternatives, to which he 
 last adverted. Mill could well rejoin that the alternative, to 
 which he last adverted, was the stronger of the two, and so 
 determined or necessitated his choice. In this case the cir- 
 cumstance of last advertence would be the determining factor. 
 It might be better to say that though the two alternatives con- 
 tended simultaneously for notice, and that though one ap- 
 peared stronger than the other, the man could still choose, 
 and often does choose the weaker. Free will does not neces- 
 sarily mean the actual, but the possible choice of either. In 
 fact, free will exists no more in this or that particular, when 
 once actual choice has been made. To prove his free will, a 
 man need not necessarily choose the weaker alternative. As a 
 matter of fact, he generally chooses the stronger, but always 
 with an abiding conviction that he could have chosen the 
 weaker. 
 
 8. There are two ends, which in the Necessitarian theory are 
 sufficient to justify punishment, the benefit of the offender and 
 the protection of others. Answer: There is another feature 
 that renders it altogether unjust, and that is the blame in- 
 volved in punishment. In addition to pain, punishment in- 
 volves blame; and this is never imputed to agents unable to 
 help themselves. Mill maintains that we can know that we 
 ought to be punished for our misdeeds without knowing that 
 our wills are free. He affirms that the ordinary notion of 
 justice is altogether a mistake. It is expedient for the greatest 
 happiness of the greatest number, that a man who has been 
 compelled to crime should suffer a penalty able on the next 
 occasion to hold him to virtue, and this is Utilitarianism. In 
 this event, lunatics ought to be punished, as they are open to 
 
THESIS IX 181 
 
 the agency of fear. But no civilized country has yet descended 
 to that meanness. 
 
 9. The true doctrine maintains against Asiatic Fatalism, that 
 of Oedipus, wherein a superior power overrules our desires, and 
 Modified Fatalism, wherein our character is made for us, not 
 by us, that our character is in part amenable to our will. 
 
 Answer: This is Eoundabout Fatalism. Thus, we can im- 
 prove our character by our own voluntary exertions, which sup- 
 pose that there was already something in our character, which 
 led us to improve it, and accounts for our doing so. He de- 
 rives our volitions from our characters and circumstances, our 
 character from our volitions and circumstances, and our voli- 
 tions again from our character and circumstances. Unless our 
 character and circumstances cause and determine us to do so, 
 we shall make no voluntary efforts for the improvement of our 
 character. 
 
 I. a. Will is moved by greater desire. Ergo. 
 
 b. Fear necessitates will. Ergo. 
 
 c. Will requires aid of intellect to pass from potency to 
 act. Ergo. 
 
 d. Will in first act is still indifferent to will in second 
 act. Ergo. 
 
 e. While eliciting an act the will cannot not elicit the act. 
 Ergo. 
 
 f. Will acts in virtue of motion received from first cause. 
 Ergo. 
 
 g. An act foreknown by God will infallibly take place. 
 Ergo. 
 
 Answers: a. Will is moved, attracted, influenced, I grant; 
 determined, necessitated, I deny. 
 
 b. Fear exercises greatest stress on will, I grant; fear ne- 
 cessitates, I deny. 
 
 N.B. When fear dethrones reason, act is not human ; and 
 only human acts are free. When deliberation is absent, act is 
 not human and, of course, not free. 
 
 c. Requires intellect to pass from potency to first act, I 
 grant; from potency to second act, I deny. Will in first act is 
 ready to wish, will in second act is actually wishing. 
 
182 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 d. Will in first act is indifferent, with merely passive indif- 
 ference, I deny ; with active, I grant. 
 
 e. Constraint is antecedent, I deny; constraint is consequent, 
 I grant. 
 
 f. This motion of first cause is antecedent and necessitating, 
 I deny; simultaneous and indifferent, I grant. 
 
 g. Will infallibly, certainly take place, I grant; will in- 
 fallibly and with necessity take place, I again distinguish; a 
 necessary act, I grant; a free act, I deny. 
 
 J. a. What God foresees will necessarily take place. Ergo. 
 
 b. Omission of an act foreseen by God is impossible. 
 Ergo. 
 
 c. Free will depends on God's foreknowledge, and this 
 in turn is independent of free will. Ergo. 
 
 Answers: a. With logical or consequent necessity, I grant; 
 with physical or antecedent, I again distinguish; in necessary 
 agent, I grant; in free, I deny. 
 
 b. Logically or consequently I grant; physically, or ante- 
 cedently, I again distinguish; in necessary agent, I grant; in 
 free, I deny. 
 
 c. Depends on God as spectator, I grant; as determining 
 cause, I deny. 
 
THESIS X 
 
 The Truth About Hypnotism 
 
 Division 
 Statement of Question 
 
 A. Definition 
 
 B. Division I, II, III 
 
 C. Hypnotic Sleep 
 
 D. Ethics of Hypnotism. 
 
 E. Church and Hypnotism. 
 
 Maker, pp. 594-603. 
 
 QUESTION 
 
 Our theme is in point of fact an old one. The name it uses 
 for present disguise is of comparatively recent origin. Error 
 has as many changes of spots as the proverbial leopard, and 
 error's changes are generally no less superficial. We are to-day 
 fighting, in the domains of theology and philosophy, theories 
 done to death centuries ago, and resurrected whole. Hypno- 
 tism used to be called Mesmerism, Animal Magnetism, Braid- 
 ism and other isms too numerous to mention. Mesmer, a 
 German physician (1733-1815), in the course of enquiries into 
 the nature and cure of diseases, thought he discovered in a 
 certain magnetic fluid the vehicle of all the ills to which this 
 flesh is heir; and, acting on his discovery, proceeded to make 
 the world whole through the agency of the wonderful fluid. He 
 was of opinion that every animal, whether man or beast, carries 
 about a stock of this commodity, and that disease is the out- 
 come of a disorder in its distribution, which can easily be set 
 to rights by a few passes of the hand and shakes of the head. 
 There is no denying the fact that certain infirmities, notably 
 those of nervous origin, are eminently susceptible to treatment 
 of this sort. Bread-pills in boarding-colleges have worked won- 
 
 183 
 
184 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 derful revolutions in the health of boys and girls, and have 
 often saved the victims of a too vivid imagination from early 
 graves. Even so, Mesmer, by instilling large faith into his 
 patients, restored to use many a stiffened limb, and broke up 
 the beginnings of many a serious malady. He himself in- 
 sisted that everything was due to animal magnetism, the ex- 
 istence of which is to-day roundly denied by the soberer and 
 more eminent students of medicine. Braid was an English- 
 man, who followed in the footsteps of Mesmer, and met witli 
 success so phenomenal that the new remedy became identified 
 with his name. 
 
 A. For a definition of hypnotism, I open my Century Dic- 
 tionary, and find there this accurate description, " An abnormal 
 mental condition, characterized by insensibility to most im- 
 pressions of sense, with excessive sensibility to some impres- 
 sions, and an appearance of total unconsciousness. This is 
 true especially of that variety of this condition which is arti- 
 ficially induced, usually by concentrating the attention of the 
 subject upon some object of vision, as a bit of bright glass, 
 or on the operator, who generally aids in producing the result 
 by making a few light passes with his hands. When in this 
 condition, the mental action and volition of the subject are to 
 a large extent under the control of the operator. The state 
 begins in a gradual loss of taste, touch, and the sense of tem- 
 perature ; next, colors are imperfectly distinguished ; then, forms 
 grow indistinct; and then the eye is immovable, and nothing is 
 seen. The ear never sleeps in these experiments. The subject 
 believes, and at last does, all that is commanded. Senses fall 
 completely under control of the hypnotizer; and in many cases 
 the interval between normal waking and hypnotic sleep covers 
 only a minute." 
 
 The word hypnotism is of Greek parentage, and claims rela- 
 tionship with hypnotizo, the exact equivalent of " to put to 
 sleep." The name is admirably well chosen, as the whole 
 process consists in producing sleep, or lulling all the senses 
 but hearing into unconsciousness. Some very remarkable pe- 
 culiarities attach to this hypnotic sleep, and render it widely 
 different from nature's sweet restorer. Thus, for instance, all 
 adepts in the art of hypnotizing agree that the ears of the 
 subject under their influence never once lose their acuteness 
 
THESIS X 185 
 
 and susceptibility to sound. The other four senses of sight, 
 smell, touch, and taste are all topsy-turvy during the spell, 
 and wholly incapable of discriminating between colors, odors, 
 surfaces, and flavors; but the hearing is wide awake, and de- 
 tects every whisper. This very circumstance makes it possible 
 for the artist to ply his trade and perform tricks that be- 
 wilder the witnesses. For, the senses being the gateways of 
 the mind, the artist through the subject's ear has at least one 
 entrance to the subject's mind; and, once inside, he can there 
 create impressions, that the other senses would, if awake, cor- 
 rect. The hypnotic state can, therefore, be characterized as 
 an incomplete sleep, a doze. It has many points in common 
 with these several phenomena, notably that of delicacy of hear- 
 ing. It is, like them, interrupted by noise not above the or- 
 dinary, or even by deep silence, when some regular chain of 
 sounds preceded. For instance, it has been the experience of 
 many to awake early at night, when slumber is not deep, be- 
 cause a clock in the room suddenly stopped ticking. These 
 same persons, a few hours later, when in the middle of their 
 sleep, would hardly awake, if the world stopped going around. 
 A man under hypnotic influence hears the operator's voice dis- 
 tinctly. He answers in that disconnected sort of language com- 
 mon to dreams. He sees, but so obscurely that he cannot dis- 
 tinguish a horse from a broomstick. He smells and tastes, but 
 cannot distinguish a cabbage from a rose, a potato from an 
 orange. 
 
 In this matter of hypnotism, a common every day drunk is 
 an interesting study, and presents many analogies. Thus, when 
 well tightened up, the victim of too much conviviality loses, 
 along with self-respect and gentility, several at least of his five 
 senses. His power of locomotion is so badly beyond control 
 that, try as he will, he cannot make progress, except by tacking ; 
 and sometimes his fetches are so wide that he lurches all the 
 way to the car-tracks before steering to the east or west, as the 
 case may be. I have seen them leave the sidewalk altogether, 
 dart through the railing in front of a stranger's residence, con- 
 tinue straight down the area-steps to the basement door, and 
 then turn back only because they found the door locked. Peo- 
 ple with some experience in this line aver that the houses on 
 either side of the street play a sad trick on the eyes, and seem 
 
186 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 to lean till they form an arch overhead. They likewise aver 
 that, as soon as they themselves take up a position of rest at 
 a corner, the houses on the opposite side, with their numbers 
 in flaring evidence, seem to pass in mock procession. And all 
 this with such an air of reality that they count it best to wait 
 just where they are, till their house passes along. They con- 
 fess to snakes, and are frecjuently detected with their arms 
 thrown lovingly around a cold lamp-post or trolley pole, ad- 
 dressing it as a friend with effusiveness and a copious abun- 
 dance of tears. I allege these instances, only to prove my 
 contention, that hypnotism is in most cases merely on a level 
 with events in daily life, that, because of their commonness, 
 excite in us no wonder. To understand this the more thor- 
 oughly, let us examine in detail some of the startling perform- 
 ances of hypnotism. 
 
 B. Division. They can be conveniently ranged in three 
 classes. Let the first embrace such as proceed from deception 
 practiced on the senses. Under the second we can include all 
 such as turn on the obedient deference the subject pays to the 
 commands of the hypnotist. Under the third class we can group 
 marvels that are merely fraudulent appearances, the result of 
 trickery and magic; or, if the realities they are represented to 
 be, outside tlie sphere of natural agencies, due entirely to the 
 interference of beings of another and a higher order, namely evil 
 spirits or demons. 
 
 I. Phenomena of the first and second classes present little 
 or no difficulty to the student of philosophy, at all acquainted 
 with the operations of the senses and the mind's dependence on 
 the senses for its ideas. Thus, the whole process consists sim- 
 ply in this, that the operator, generally a man gifted with a 
 pair of dark flashing eyes, looks fixedly at his victim, and, after 
 a few bewildering movements of the hands, has the subject 
 completely at his mercy. Four of the patient's senses are half 
 asleep and practically useless. His hearing is wide awake, and 
 the performance begins. First, for instance, a potato is thrust 
 into his hand, and he is told with monotonous solemnity that 
 he holds an orange. He is tlien commanded to eat the orange, 
 and he devours the potato with an air of relish and avidity, 
 thinking all the while that he is really eating an orange. The 
 explanation is easy and simple. The man's sense of touch is 
 
THESIS X 187 
 
 numb, and cannot discern the difference between the shape of 
 a potato and that of an orange. His sense of taste is equally 
 numb or drowsy, and cannot distinguish the flavor of a po- 
 tato from that of an orange. All the while, however, his hear- 
 ing is wide awake. It never for a moment abandons him; and 
 as it is for the present the only channel through which he 
 receives ideas, he thinks, without any means of correcting the 
 mistake, that everything is just as it is represented by the op- 
 erator. He thinks that he grasps an orange, that he tastes 
 an orange, that he eats an orange. Numerous other tricks 
 can be practiced on him while the spell lasts. A bundle of 
 rags can be laid in his arms, and, at the suggestion of the 
 operator, he will fondle and toss the same as though it were 
 a real live baby. A rod and line can be put in his hands, and 
 he will sit at the edge of the stage and fish contentedly. Or 
 he will prance about boy-fashion on a broomstick, as though he 
 were riding a cavalry-horse. It is worth noting, in this first 
 series of marvels, that the hypnotist's words are always accom- 
 panied by actions. He would be powerless in the four experi- 
 ments just enumerated, unless he actually slipped a potato into 
 the hand of the subject, laid a bundle of rags on his arm, or 
 furnished him with fishing tackle and a broomstick. I call 
 your attention to this circumstance, as it will afterwards serve 
 to mark off the difference between the mind's activity in the 
 two conditions of dreaming and hypnotism. 
 
 II. Passing now to the second class of phenomena, such as 
 turn on the obedience rendered the hypnotist by his subject, we 
 see in them nothing very extraordinary. After inducing sleep, 
 he issues a series of orders that are faithfully executed. He 
 bids the man walk, sit down, dance; and all these different 
 attitudes are assumed in order. He tells the victim that it is 
 warm, and the victim unbuttons his coat for a breeze. He tells 
 him in the next breath that it is cold, and the victim's teeth 
 chatter. He places a piece of hot iron in close proximity to 
 the face and hands of the victim without creating any sensa- 
 tion of pain or discomfort. All this time the victim's tem- 
 perature, subjectively speaking, undergoes no change. Every- 
 tliing is the result of a catalepsy or partial paralysis, produced 
 by the sleep in which he is wrapped. For my part, I do not 
 wonder that the victim of hypnotism falls into the prescribed 
 
188 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 attitudes, unbuttons his coat, shivers, and experiences no in- 
 convenience when brought near hot iron. The wonder would 
 be if the contrary happened. While under hypnotic influence, 
 the mind and will of the patient are absolutely at the mercy 
 of the operator, for the very evident reason before advanced. 
 Every sense but that of hearing is practically dead. Touch 
 is of no more value to him than it is to a paralytic. His mind 
 is wholly dependent on his ears for ideas, and whatever statement 
 the operator makes is necessarily accepted as true. Hence, if 
 he says that it is warm, the patient must believe that it is 
 warm, and behave accordingly. If he says that it is cold, there 
 is nothing left for the patient to do but shiver. If he says that 
 a plate of hot iron is cold, the patient has nothing to help him 
 detect the fraud. The will acts only at the instigation of forms 
 conceived in the mind; and, as the operator holds the Tcey to his 
 victim's mind through the single sense of hearing, his orders 
 are communicated to the will of the victim, and, whether they 
 prescribe walking, sitting or dancing, are immediately executed. 
 The whole groundwork, therefore, of hypnotism is founded on 
 these two evident principles of Scholastic philosophy. " Nil in 
 intellectu, quod non fuerit prius in sensu," and " Nil volitum 
 nisi praecognitum." They mean in cold English, " Man's mind 
 derives its every idea, in root at least, from the senses," and 
 " Man's wishes derive life and being from his thoughts." The 
 two principles are shadowed forth in our old saying, " What 
 the eye never sees, the heart never craves for." 
 
 C. Hypnotic Sleep. It would be here in order to discuss 
 the third class of phenomena, such as speaking or understand- 
 ing a hitherto unknown tongue, mind-reading, vision through 
 walls and bandages, detection of hidden diseases and marvels 
 of the kind. But, as we have serious doubts about the reality 
 of these phenomena, or admit their reality only on the sup- 
 position that they are due to the agency of evil spirits or de- 
 mons, we prefer to dismiss them for the present with this slight 
 notice. Later we shall have more to say regarding them. We 
 wish to further pursue our investigation into the phenomena of 
 the first and second classes. I have said before, and I now 
 repeat, that the phenomena of the first and second classes are 
 no great marvels of themselves, and admit of easy, natural 
 explanation. But we cannot deny that the hypnotic sleep. 
 
THESIS X 189 
 
 which makes them possible, possesses some mystery; and that 
 its production seems, at first sight, something of a miracle. 
 However, experience can be of much valuable service to us 
 here, and we can strip this strange sleep of many of its weird 
 characteristics by viewing it in the light of kindred occurrences, 
 that make all too faint an impression on us because of their 
 frequency. I have already alluded to the stupefying effect of 
 strong drink on a man's senses. Let me call your attention to 
 a few facts in your own experience equally strange. Some 
 preachers have the happy faculty of putting their listeners to 
 sleep. You must know friends, whose heavy conversation is a 
 mild narcotic, producing, first, half suppressed gapes, then 
 humiliating nods, and last of all oblivious drowsiness. Mothers 
 know well the soporific effect of the human voice, when properly 
 modulated; and they lead many an annoying baby to the land 
 of dreams with a lullaby. If you analyze these cases, you will 
 find that sleepiness invariably follows on the constant recur- 
 rence of the same tone. The ear tires of monotony, and com- 
 municates its disgust to the other senses. The whole man 
 then sinks under the weight of fatigue and seeks rest in sleep. 
 Nor is the ear the only organ thus affected. The eye is just as 
 sensitive to an immovable light, if particularly soft; to a pair 
 of twisted eyeballs gleaming steadily in the dark; and to a 
 series of bright plates or colors passed i-n rapid succession be- 
 fore it. This, then, is the whole secret of the hypnotist's suc- 
 cess. Nature has gifted him with no magic power, no hidden 
 force, no magnetic fluid, no supernatural influences. All such 
 talk is silly nonsense, and the fustian of fakirs. Nature has, per- 
 haps, given him a pair of strikingly dark eyes with a lustrous 
 sparkle, a raven black mustache, the pompous and martial bear- 
 ing of a drum-major on parade; but beyond this she has be- 
 stowed on him no hypnotic abilities denied the meanest of her 
 children. He rolls his lively eyes, he utters a few sonorous 
 words in even stress and with mock solemnity, he makes a few 
 poetically rounded gestures with his shapely hands, and the 
 hoodooed patient obediently falls asleep. From the fact that 
 he singles out definite portions of the hands, and forehead, 
 and ears, designated as the locations of certain sense-nerves, 
 making repeated passes over them, I have no doubt that he 
 produces in the senses of touch, taste, and smell effects of the 
 
190 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 same nature as those produced by monotony in the sense of 
 hearing, and by quick flashes of light in the sense of vision. 
 
 It must likewise be remarked that nearly all his power comes 
 from the patient on whom he practices. If weak willed and 
 anxious to submit to his influence, the hypnotist's task is easy. 
 Many a timid young miss, they say, looks around for a con- 
 venient place in which to faint, when made listen to thrilling 
 stories of the hypnotic art, or the darker secrets of fortune- 
 telling. A calm, cool person, with his will in his hands, with 
 complete power over self, master of his every nerve and muscle, 
 aware of hypnotism's hollow pretensions, can be refractory un- 
 der every attempt, can successfully resist the efforts of all the 
 hypnotists in Christendom. Such a man, however, is a rare 
 bird, and seldom met with at hypnotic seances. The crowd, 
 that usually flocks to entertainments of the sort, is made up of 
 nervous, excitable, fidgety men and women, boys and girls, 
 only too ready to believe that the magician is vested with irre- 
 sistible forces. And, just as hypnotism is nothing, has nothing, 
 can do nothing, without your consent and assistance, so with 
 your consent and assistance it can make good nearly all its 
 claims at the present day. 
 
 Hypnotism is, therefore, a particular kind of sleep, de- 
 termined by definite physiological causes, without the interven- 
 tion of any unknown or supernatural agent. A dream presents 
 as many difficulties to the enquiring student as hypnotic sleep. 
 The reason is not far to seek. We are so little impressed by 
 dreams, that we never stop to enquire into their nature and 
 conformation, only because they are in constant attendance on 
 our sleeping hours. Hypnotism arrests our attention, because 
 it falls to the lot of only a chosen few to experience its weird 
 spell. There are, however, differences between the two states 
 of dreaming and hypnotism, as before renuirked; and it may 
 be worth our while to here record a few. The impressions 
 received in one state and the other are so vivid and lifelike, 
 that you cannot help believing them realities instead of repre- 
 sentations. And yet no impression whatever can be conveyed 
 in hypnotic sleep, unless the operator at the very birth of the 
 impression suggests some definite thought. He must, in other 
 words, place a potato in the patient's hand, a rag-baby in his 
 arms, to successfully deceive. In dreams, on the contrary, no 
 
THESIS X 191 
 
 such necessity is apparent. An impression had days, months, 
 years before, and faithfully recorded in the imagination, can 
 give rise to a dream as true to life as the scene that first 
 produced the impression. Sometimes, of course, a dream is 
 the outcome of a present sensation; as, when an arm or limb 
 gets into some uncomfortable position, when the shoulders are 
 pressed heavily by the bedclothes, or when the hand rests sud- 
 denly on the hard wood or cold iron of the bedstead. But, 
 generally, our dreams are the growth of old impressions, stored 
 away somewhere in the lumber-room of the imagination. These 
 impressions are kept in equilibrium during the day by the mul- 
 titude of thoughts, that usually beset us in busy work-time. 
 At night, however, they resume their force, and the dream be- 
 gins. Though sometimes difficult to trace the connection be- 
 tween past or present sensations and the dream in hand, such 
 a connection always exists. Thus, for instance, you may have 
 been conversing with some friend at a street corner, just as a 
 throbbing locomotive, with flaming headlight, rushed by. That 
 night you dream of a railroad accident; or, mayhap, your fancy 
 converts the locomotive into a lion, with the headlight for eyes 
 of fire, and the puffing for loud roars. If your hand rests on 
 some cold object, you are prone to dream of death, of mer- 
 maids. From mermaids you pass to mummies wrapped in an- 
 tediluvian bandages; from mummies to Egyptian hieroglyphics, 
 and so on without limit. When dreaming, your own brain 
 suggests everything. When under hypnotic influence, you are 
 dependent on the operator for suggestions. If he puts a dish 
 of ammonia under your nose, and tells you that you are smelling 
 a rose, you feel persuaded that you are smelling a rose, though 
 your eyes run with tears. 
 
 III. Before passing to the moral aspect of hypnotism, its 
 influence for good and evil, it may be well to insert here, by 
 way of parenthesis, a few remarks about such hypnotic phenom- 
 ena of the third class as we summarily dismissed earlier in 
 the paper. We said, then, if you remember, that many such 
 phenomena are smart tricks and empty appearances, contend- 
 ing at the same time that others are due entirely to the inter- 
 vention of evil spirits. With regard to tricks we feel safe in 
 taking this single position. We may not be able to detect and 
 lay bare the inner mysteries of some fraud, hinging on the 
 
192 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 dexterity of a magician; but we know from antecedent reasons 
 that nature is incapable of such an effort, and that the God of 
 nature would not allow, for the trivial purpose of tickling men's 
 curiosity, so momentous a departure from nature's laws. We 
 conclude, then, that the whole business is a cleverly contrived 
 piece of deception, and that the magician at least knows where 
 the deception begins and leaves off. With regard to evil spirits, 
 I can well afford to be brief. My audience is composed of 
 believers, willing to stake their lives on the truth of God's 
 word as contained in the Bible; and the Bible is clear about 
 the existence of evil spirits, and about their interference in the 
 affairs of men. We, then, as Catholic philosophers, claim that 
 the scale of being in the universe is nicely graded, and that be- 
 tween God and man there is a species of existences superior to 
 man, inferior of course to God. These existences are pure 
 spirits; and, whether buried in hell or glorious in Heaven, are 
 gifted with rare powers of intelligence, more conversant with 
 the secrets of nature than the combined wisdom of our own and 
 every other age. And yet they are God's obedient servants. 
 Their activity is held in check by His supreme will. They 
 accomplish only such refsults as He in His wisdom sanctions. 
 Every devil is, therefore, a consummate wizard; and every 
 devil was acquainted with the hidden possibilities of electricity 
 and the wonders of the X-ray long before Edison or Eoentgen 
 was born. The business of the fallen angels is to drag souls 
 to hell; and, to further this purpose, they use all the resources 
 of their wisdom. I can conceive that God Himself, after hav- 
 ing put at man's disposal the authority of His sacred word 
 and the guidance of His true Church, allows these spirits of 
 darkness to test man's faith by the performance of wonders in 
 the persons of iniquitous tools. Armed with this permission, 
 the devil can communicate some of his skill to an unprincipled 
 man. This agent, sacrificing everything to love of fame and 
 greed of money, can turn his advantage to good profit; and 
 weak-minded men and women, who hang on his words, will by 
 degrees fall victims to the mistake of thinking they see God's 
 finger, where men of faith and sound sense plainly discern the 
 devil's tail. The next step in their downward progress is to 
 banish the supernatural altogether from the horizon of their 
 lives, and drift into unbelief, the paganism of modern times. 
 
THESIS X 193 
 
 Their ruin is wrought by performances like the following. 
 Their little idol, they say, reads in a dark room, with his eyes 
 tightly bandaged. He sees with the soles of his feet. He 
 readily and without previous study understands and talks a 
 foreign tongue. He describes some distant capital, some cele- 
 brated park, never in the course of his life visited. He detects 
 through the flesh the progress of a disease, and prescribes effi- 
 cient remedies. He sees the soul through the walls of the body, 
 reads its thoughts, its desires, its passions, and crimes. Now, 
 these are marvels certainly; so striking withal, that I suspect 
 the veracity of pretended witnesses to their reality. The ut- 
 terances of these witnesses assuredly are not articles of faith; 
 and, when my faith is silent in matters opposed to all the 
 Physics and Philosophy I know, I beg leave to be incredulous. 
 However, if brought face to face with these vaunted facts, I 
 should still suspect a trick somewhere; and, if driven from even 
 this corner, I should as a last resource fall back on the inter- 
 vention of evil spirits, working with Heaven's sanction. From 
 the science of Physics, I know that the eye, not the foot, is the 
 organ of sight; that light is the natural medium of vision; and 
 that, to be seen, an object must needs be present. From ex- 
 perience and the very nature of language, I know that hard 
 study and continued practice are the only means appointed to 
 acquire facility in a foreign tongue. From philosophy and 
 theology, I know that the heart's secrets are a man's own and 
 God's; and that, unless willingly betrayed by some outward 
 emotion depicted in the face or movements, they remain sealed 
 mysteries to outsiders. When, then, some wizard of no great 
 reputation for piety or zeal pretends to upset by his unaided 
 self all these well authenticated laws, my faith issues no com- 
 mand to believe; and I claim the privilege to doubt, and to 
 doubt most uncompromisingly. 
 
 D. Ethics of Hypnotism. Enough, then, of the shallow pre- 
 tensions of hypnotism in this last phase. A word, now, about 
 hypnotism's danger in the case of the subject; and I am done. 
 It has been unwisely compared in this matter of danger to the 
 use of anassthetics. The comparison is faulty in many respects. 
 A person under the influence of anaesthetics is indeed no longer 
 master of his body; but his soul is his own. A person under 
 the influence of hypnotism is deprived of even that possession. 
 
194 PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 His mind and his will are at the mercy of the operator. 
 Hence, tliouj^h many a future of wrecked hopes dates its be- 
 ginning from the imprudent use of ana3sthetics, the use of 
 an;>?sthetics is nowise forbidden, when proper precautions are 
 taken. The strong right arm of a friend seated near can 
 easily preclude every possibility of harm. But the strong right 
 arm of a friend is powerless to shield the victim of hypnotiza- 
 tion. Everything depends on the integrity of the operator. 
 The victim's mind is active, his will is active; and yet over the 
 one and the other the victim has as little control as persons 
 asleep have over their own. He is absolutely at the mercy of 
 the hypnotist for good or evil. He is not free to accept or 
 reject the suggestions prompted. His mind can be filled, in 
 spite of himself, with pictures that will torment his soul, and 
 drag it down to hell, even when awake. Threats can drive him 
 to the perpetration of filthy and horrid crimes. A martyr 
 could, of course, resist these threats; but martyrs always die in 
 full possession of their senses, and hemmed round about with 
 the abundant grace of God. Even if no harm came of the 
 experiment, when you reflect that, in surrendering yourself to 
 the influence of hypnotism, you are simply putting yourself 
 into the hands of another man, to be by him lifted up to 
 Heaven or buried in the mire of sin, you cannot but consider 
 the proceeding extremely dangerous and foully wrong. Every 
 novice in the study of morality understands that the victim 
 of hypnotism is not directly responsible for his actions during 
 the precise period of the spell; but in hypnotism, as well as in 
 drunkenness, we recognize two kinds of responsibility. When 
 bereft of the untrammeled use of his free will, a man is capable 
 of only indirect responsibility. But that same man, who, with 
 his eyes wide open to the danger, submits to the process of 
 hypnotization or drinks to excess, is directly responsible during 
 the last moments of consciousness for whatever violence he 
 does the laws of morality while intoxicated or hypnotized. In 
 that last moment he makes deliberate choice of all the crimes 
 and sins he afterwards commits, and must before God stand 
 the consequences of his choice. 
 
 E. Church, and Hypnotism. In this paper, which is by no 
 means exhaustive of the subject, I have studiously avoided all 
 reference to documents of the Church on the question in hand. 
 
THESIS X 195 
 
 issued at various intervals in her history. Suffice it to say 
 that she is loud in her denunciation of everything savoring of 
 hypnotism, of everything with even a remote semblance to that 
 devil-worship, which is the crying evil of our times. The ques- 
 tion has been already submitted to the Holy See for decision. 
 Our Church, with all that caution characteristic of her pro- 
 ceedings, has declared against hypnotism only when it involves 
 superstition, applies physical means otherwise forbidden, or 
 seeks unlawful ends or objects. In medicine, when employed 
 by a man of skill and integrity, with all due precautions against 
 danger to the patient, its use, in view of the Church's decision, 
 can hardly be condemned. Its employment for purposes of idle 
 curiosity I should not hesitate to brand a crime. When it pre- 
 tends to phenomena, that transcend the forces of nature, it is 
 little short of idolatry or devil-worship. To even assist at hyp- 
 notic seances, may easily constitute a sin; to submit to the 
 process of hypnotism, outside of real need in the field of medi- 
 cine, rarely or never escapes the imputation of sin. We have 
 no more right to enter the hypnotic state from motives of curi- 
 osity, then we have to get drunk for the purpose of knowing 
 how it feels to be intoxicated. And, therefore, we Catholics 
 must leave hypnotism severely alone. The less we have to do 
 with these modern fads and cults, the better. We should be 
 frightened from all participation in affairs of the sort by the 
 reflection, that hypnotism and kindred practices are curses of 
 modern civilization, and effective tools in the hands of the 
 enemy for the destruction of faith and the damnation of souls. 
 
PART II — NATURAL THEOLOGY 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 We are now come to the crown and consummation of our 
 work. Philosophy is our topic; and, if philosophy is knowledge 
 of things in their last causes, this present department of the 
 study, because it deals with God, the absolutely last cause of 
 everything, more deserves the name than any preceding chap- 
 ter. Natural Theology is more philosophy than Logic, Psy- 
 chology or Ethics, and claims as such our deepest attention and 
 utmost reverence. Theodicy is another name for Natural Theol- 
 ogy, and was first introduced by Leibnitz. It means the justifi- 
 cation of God, and was framed by its inventor with a particular 
 view to what he considers the hardest problem in the whole study, 
 the reconciliation of God's attributes with the evil in the uni- 
 verse. Theology itself means discourse or reasoning about God. 
 Plato and Aristotle use the word. St. Thomas makes Aristotle 
 call Orpheus, Hesiod and Homer the poets of Theology. Max 
 Muller derives the Greek " Theos " from the Sanscrit, Deva, 
 meaning light, splendor, the Brilliant. St. Paul describes God 
 as dwelling in inaccessible light. St. Gregory calls the vision 
 of God, incircumscriptum lumen, light without limit, a sky 
 with no horizon. The epithet, natural, is prefixed, to separate 
 this branch of the science from its near neighbor, supernatural 
 or dogmatic theology. Wide differences keep the two apart. In 
 Natural Theology we rely altogether on unaided reason, or our 
 conclusions are quite independent of any special help from 
 Heaven. We base no argument on Scripture or tradition, though 
 as devout Catholics we are keen to the need of formulating no 
 doctrine opposed to revelation as interpreted by the Church, the 
 pillar and ground of truth. Dogmatic theology reserves to it- 
 self all such extraneous assistance ; and, whereas we philosophers 
 advance only such principles as approve themselves to the veriest 
 
 pagan, and most consummate stranger to the written and spoken 
 
 197 
 
198 NATURAL THEOLOGY 
 
 word of God, theologians properly so called have first recourse 
 for argument to revelation, embodied in Scripture, tlie Fatliers 
 and the Councils, and make reason a species of appendage to 
 faith. On this account Natural Theology is best described in 
 full as l-nowUdge of God compassed in the light of reason. 
 Dogmatic, on the contrary, is knowledge of God compassed in 
 the light of revelation. 
 
 Eeason naturally enough precedes revelation, and in this re- 
 spect Natural Theology makes the mind ready for supernatural. 
 It puts on a solid footing what we call the praeambula fidei, the 
 preliminaries to faith, and secures reason's voucher for truths 
 that lie worlds beyond the sphere of reason's limited grasp and 
 comprehension. In this sense philosophy is handmaid to theol- 
 ogy, and the open book of creation is key to the scaled page 
 of revelation. As compared with the knowledge of God we get 
 from our catechism, the notions of God we derive from Natural 
 Theology are dim, unfinished and pitifully indistinct. The 
 most we can hope to do is establish the existence of God, vin- 
 dicate to Him and explain His most characteristic attributes, 
 and set in a clear light His influence. His intervention, His 
 interference in the world's constitution and history. We there- 
 fore divide our treatise into three main parts, the existence of 
 God, His attributes, and His influence or activity in created 
 nature. In the first we contend that the one sound argument 
 able to put the truth of God's existence on a solid basis, is essen- 
 tially an a posteriori argument, derived from the contingent 
 nature of created things, from the physical order apparent in 
 the universe, from the moral order everywhere acknowledged, 
 and from the common consent of mankind. In rejecting other 
 arguments as insufficient and misleading we run counter to a 
 host of opponents. AVe have to do with Ontologism as preached 
 by Malebranche, 1715, Gioberti, 1852, Rosmini, 1855, and 
 Ubaghs, 1856; with the ontological or a priori argument of St. 
 Anselm, 1109, Descartes, 1G50, Leibnitz, 1716; and with the 
 treacherous attempt of Kant, 1781, to undermine all certainty 
 about God's existence, by proclaiming it an impossible problem 
 for the speculative reason, abandoning the belief to what he 
 Btyles practical reason, an internal voice, categorically command- 
 ing the performance of good and avoidance of evil, a voice man 
 cannot disregard without harm to his dignity, a voice without 
 
INTRODUCTION 199 
 
 meaning in the event of refusal to acknowledge a supreme law- 
 giver. Jacobi, 1810, imitates Kant, when he reduces our cer- 
 tainty about God to a kind of irresistible spiritual feeling. 
 Bonald, 18^0, applies traditionalism to the same truth and re- 
 stricts certainty to primitive revelation on the subject. Lamen- 
 nais, 1854, was moved by the same line of reasoning to refer 
 everything to the common consent of mankind, making it the 
 universal criterion of truth. Hamilton and Mansel ascribe our 
 certainty in the matter to harmony between the belief and our 
 moral instincts. Herbert Spencer borrows his best arguments 
 in favor of agnosticism from principles advocated by Mansel. 
 All these several philosophers, from Kant down, are enemies in 
 the camp, they are mere pretenders, and by setting truth on a 
 crumbling foundation, easily overturned by truth's adversaries, 
 they are doing the cause of righteousness and religion a world 
 of wrong. Catholics among them, like Jacobi, Bonald and 
 Lamennais, may have been sincere in their convictions; but 
 they were stubbornly proud, and their sincerity is small recom- 
 pense for the harm their theories have already done and still 
 continue to do. 
 
 Our argument dates back to the days of Plato, 348, b. c, 
 and Aristotle, b. c. 322. It was maintained by St. Augustine, 
 430, St. Thomas Aquinas, 1274, and all the Schoolmen; by 
 Bacon, 1626, and Locke, 1704. St. Anselm, Descartes and 
 Leibnitz acknowledged its cogency, and were far from resting 
 their case on the ontological argument. In their writings all 
 three draw on finite things to establish the truth of God's exist- 
 ence. Scientific minds of the first rank take sides with us, 
 men like Kepler, Newton, Faye, Sir John Herschel, Sir Wil- 
 liam Thomson, and others too numerous to mention. We there- 
 fore have no reason to be ashamed of the position we take. The 
 scientific world and the world of riglit philosophy are with us, 
 and it would be the height of folly to bow down before the 
 authority of crooked reasoners like Kant and Spinoza and In- 
 gersoll, or giants of a later growth, like that Bowne of Boston 
 University, who unblushingly says that theism, the fundamental 
 postulate of our total life, cannot be demonstrated without as- 
 sumption, and that it is strictly proved by nothing. 
 
THESIS I 
 
 From created things of earth, from the order apparent in the 
 physical universe, from the moral order naturally known to us, 
 finally from the common consent of manlcind, we prove a pos- 
 teriori that there is a God. 
 
 Boedder, pp. 1-85; 149-233; 325-344. Jouin, 
 pp. 219-228. 
 
 QUESTION 
 
 Agnostics are our chief opponents, and this term agnostic is 
 but a Greek twist for our Latin ignoramus or Anglo-Saxon 
 dunce. They make open boast of the title agnostic, and the 
 term translated means the man who never knows. What in 
 common language is an ignoramus, becomes in the smoother 
 diction of polished refinement an agnostic. Herbert Spencer, 
 Ingersoll and men of their ilk, who, for reasons best known to 
 themselves, take sides against the universe of thought and cham- 
 pion the cause of wretches weak-minded and vicious enough 
 to sacrifice principle to pleasure, and slink away from the most 
 palpable responsibility catalogued in the duties of life, are by 
 their ovnx confession agnostics, and as sucli deserve small or 
 no consideration at our hands. They are not honest with them- 
 selves, and the first step in the way to religious knowledge is 
 sincerity. Their blind followers are more appealing objects of 
 pity, and we pause to remind them that their leaders are by 
 their own acknowledgment agnostics. Words are but words, 
 and, whether the symbol used to express the condition be of 
 Greek or Latin or Anglo-Saxon parentage, it is a dismal busi- 
 ness to borrow knowledge from the man who never knows. The 
 process is wonderfully like borrowing money from a pauper, 
 feeding on the air, or reading by the light of night's inky dark- 
 ness. Happily enough for Spencer and Ingersoll themselves, 
 their ignorance is but partial; and though agnostics, when God 
 or religion is in question, they are reputed oracles of wisdom in 
 
 200 
 
THESIS I 201 
 
 matters scientific and legal. The two are besides well equipped 
 with the gift of fluency, ease and richness of expression. They 
 have led thousands astray, and the philosophy of Kant, no 
 doubt, proved their own undoing. Vigorous measures must be 
 taken with them and their followers, no single concession must 
 be made their empty vaporings, and we must guard against the 
 ' mistake of that good easy man, Dean Mansel, who in the dual 
 capacity of Protestant divine and lecturer at Oxford threw down 
 his arms in the fight, declaring that faith in revelation alone, 
 or the transmitted word of God, could be sufficient guarantee 
 for certainty about God's existence. Champions thus faint- 
 hearted and unskilled are a hurt to the cause they uphold, and 
 unwittingly, perhaps, treat the devil to a victory, when they 
 set up manikins easily overturned by a breath of wind. 
 
 There was a school of philosophers, named Traditionalists, 
 who, though perhaps adverse to receiving into their ranks so 
 radical an expounder of their tenets as this Oxford preacher, 
 partook in no small degree of his notions, and were perhaps 
 in some measure responsible for his wanderings. Tradition, 
 they contended, handed down from father to son, as the de- 
 positary of a truth once communicated by God to mankind, 
 is the groundwork of our belief in God's existence. Few were 
 unthinking enough to maintain further that all other demon- 
 strations establishing God's existence were idle and proved noth- 
 ing. We ourselves make use of the very argument they ad- 
 vance, but assign it only its own modicum of importance, and 
 are better pleased with the expression, common consent of man- 
 kind, than with tradition, a word always more or less suspected 
 by merely natural philosophers. We venture to think it impera- 
 tively necessary and marvelously easy to convince an ordinary 
 understanding of God's existence, without any recourse what- 
 ever to such extrinsic motives as the testimony of the race or 
 the traditions of Christianity. 
 
 The Ontologists, under the leadership of Malebranche, whose 
 acquaintance we made in Major Logic when discussing the 
 criterion of truth, applying a test there shown to be inadequate, 
 think that God's existence is made sure to our reason by that 
 immediate knowledge of God, and by that familiar intercourse, 
 which they fancy He has vouchsafed us. Apart from the two 
 last theories, common to even a few Catholics, there are in the 
 
202 NATURAL THEOLOGY 
 
 Church two classes of philosophers, who, though a unit about 
 the possibility and necessity of proving God's existence, sep- 
 arate when the species of argument allowable and conclusive 
 enters into the question. 
 
 St. Anselm, supported by a smaller number of adherents, 
 holds out for the validity of what we call an a priori proof. 
 St. Thomas, and his followers are far more numerous, finds 
 fault with such proof, and contends that man's reason cau 
 never in this matter attain to anything beyond an a posteriori 
 proof. To the better understanding of these differences of 
 opinion, it will much help to make clear the distinction between 
 an a priori and an a posteriori demonstration. Priority in the 
 ontological order is said with reference to the truth contained 
 in the conclusion on the one hand, and on the other to the 
 truths contained in the premisses. Of course, in the logical 
 order, or in the order of existence in the mind, the premisses 
 always precede the conclusion, no matter to what species the 
 demonstration belongs; but in the ontological order, or in the 
 order of existences outside the thinking subject, the reverse may 
 be the case, and is the case in all a posteriori demonstrations. 
 In an a priori demonstration, therefore, the truth bound up 
 in the conclusion depends, in the order not of thought but of 
 being, on the truths contained in the premisses. In an a pos- 
 teriori the truth involved in the premisses depends, in the 
 same order of being, on the truth contained in the conclusion. 
 This priority or dependence may be twofold, physical and meta- 
 physical. It is physical, when that peculiar to cause with ref- 
 erence to its effects ; metaphysical, when that peculiar to essence 
 with reference to attributes derived from essence. Wheu, there- 
 fore, we come to decide on the question at issue between St. 
 Anselm and St. Thomas, we have merely to ask and answer the 
 question. Are the truths of the premisses, used in any conclu- 
 sive demonstration of God's existence, dependent on or inde- 
 pendent of the truth contained in this assertion, God exists? 
 In our opinion the truths contained in the premisses are de- 
 pendent on the truth expressed in the conclusion, and the only 
 legitimate demonstration is, therefore, a posteriori. Thus, be- 
 cause God exists, created nature exists; because God exists, 
 physical order exists, and so of our other arguments. God 
 does not exist in the real order, the order outside of our mind, 
 
THESIS I 203 
 
 because created nature exists, or physical order, and so of the 
 rest. Our knowledge of His existence is certainly brought about 
 or caused by the existence of created nature, physical order and 
 such. But such existence of God is existence in the order of 
 thought, or logical; in which order, we said, the conclusion is 
 always dependent on the premisses. St. Anselm's syllogism, 
 if a demonstration at all, can with justice enough be denomi- 
 nated a priori. But a glance at its make-up must convince the 
 mind that one of two faults is inseparable from it. It is either 
 a begging of the question, or an unpardonable passage from 
 the logical to the real order of being, from beings as they exist 
 in the mind to beings as they exist outside the mind. 
 
 It runs as follows : God is the most perfect being, the be- 
 ing whose superior cannot be even conceived. But such a being 
 cannot possibly be considered non-existent. Ergo God actually 
 and really exists. Here is another form of the same argument: 
 God is the most perfect being. But actual and real existence 
 cannot be wanting to such a being. Ergo God really and ac- 
 tually exists. God in the first premiss can have two meanings, 
 God within the mind eliciting the judgment or the notion of 
 God, and God outside of that mind, or the objective reality of 
 God. If the first meaning be chosen, it must undergo no 
 change in the conclusion. Filled out, the conclusion will then 
 read: God in the mind, or the notion of God, is the notion 
 of a being endowed with real and actual existence. But this 
 conclusion is not to the point. We do not wish to prove that 
 our notion of God is such and such, but we wish to prove that 
 God Himself is such and such. If the second meaning be 
 chosen, the conclusion is indeed what we would have, but the 
 question was begged in the Major. For in asserting there that 
 God outside of the mind, or the objective reality of God, is the 
 most perfect being, we at once clothe Him with real and actual 
 existence, whereas the whole argument was instituted to dis- 
 cover whether God actually and really exists or not. There- 
 fore, St. Anselm's argument must suppose from the very start 
 that God exists. Based on this supposition, it is an admirable 
 and conclusive proof that God, if there is actually such a being, 
 can never have existed in mere possibility, but must have al- 
 ways existed really and actually. Briefly, it fixes with cer- 
 tainty the necessary mode of God's existence, not the fact of 
 
204 NATURAL THEOLOGY 
 
 His existence. The fact of God's existence must be derived 
 from some other source. With St. Thomas we hold that the 
 only legitimate source at our disposal is the world about us, the 
 product of God's might ; and that therefore passing from effect 
 to cause, we argue a posteriori ad prius, or from what comes 
 second to what comes first. Here is an instance of a proper a 
 priori argument. The soul is a substance, simple and spiritual- 
 But all substances, simple and spiritual, are immortal. Ergo 
 the soul is immortal. 
 
 TERMS 
 
 From the created things of earth: 
 
 Creation was discussed at some length in Cosmology, and 
 acquaintance with many of the remarks there made can with 
 profit be renewed. We there proved that this world is the crea- 
 tion of some omnipotent cause. We proved the world produced 
 from nothing, and production from nothing demands omni- 
 potence. This conclusion was forced upon us by a considera- 
 tion of the world's changes and modifications. They are plainly 
 apparent to every observer, and to the reasoning mind they as 
 plainly make manifest the world's contingency, and therefore 
 its production by another. Contingency and actual existence 
 are more potent signs of production by another than blaze and 
 smoke are of fire. Tliis other, or producing being, whose au- 
 gust prerogative it is to exist from eternity without ever being 
 produced, and to create from the beginning of time everything 
 in the universe but Himself, is God. Our notion then of God, 
 from this first or fundamental view, is representative of a being 
 unproduced Himself, and therefore without a cause ; the Maker 
 of everything else, and therefore the cause to which all else 
 must be referred as effect. Unlike St. Anselm, we do not argue 
 from this notion or logical being to the reality it represents. 
 We begin with tilings sensibly present to us, and from the real 
 order of existences about and around us we pass to the central 
 existence of all, invisible indeed to our eyes of flesh, but none 
 the less real on that account. Hence too our argument is a 
 posteriori in that God's existence, the truth in the conclusion, 
 is the cause not the effect of the world's existence, the truth in 
 the premisses. An actual existence, unproduced, necessary, non- 
 
THESIS I 205 
 
 contingent, is that wJiicli so exists from eternity that it is equally 
 impossible for it to have never existed, to cease existing, or to 
 experience a change in its mode of existence. An actual, pro- 
 duced, hypothetical, contingent being is that which at some pe- 
 riod of time did not actually exist, ivhich can in itself at any 
 moment cease existing, and is capable of constantly undergoing 
 changes in its mode of existence. Such are the created things 
 of earth. 
 
 From the order apparent in the universe: 
 
 Order is the becoming arrangement or disposition of several 
 things, based on fixed relations, and designed for the attainment 
 of certain ends. Order is the work of reason, and rational 
 agents work towards an end with knowledge and choice. This 
 is a very general definition, admitting of applications innumer- 
 able, and too abstruse for any single individual, no matter how 
 highly gifted, to follow to the end and describe. An astronomer 
 can acquaint you with some of the wonders of intellect apparent 
 in the heavens. If honest, he will tell you that life is all too 
 short to pursue with anything like complete satisfaction one 
 branch of his work. The botanist can find in the most neg- 
 lected flower traces of an intelligence infinitely more capable 
 than the skill, which enables the most consummate artist to 
 trace even on canvas the despised flower's outlines, and at- 
 tempt to fill in with tints that can be dreamed of, but never 
 conveyed. The student of Natural History can, after years of 
 painful research, communicate to admiring listeners a few of 
 the baffling secrets hidden away in the anatomy and habits of 
 animals. But with all their progress, all their devotion, no 
 astronomer has yet produced a system of planets and stars 
 comparing favorably with ours, no botanist or artist has yet 
 produced a single violet, no Cuvier has yet constructed a diminu- 
 tive house-fly. 
 
 Cicero, the poet of eloquence, thunderstruck at the various 
 sights let in on his eyes, rapturously exclaims : " We scorn 
 calling that thing a man, which, while gazing at the steady 
 motions in the sky above, at the unvarying march of the stars, 
 can be blind to the presence of an intellect in the work, can 
 with stupid effrontery maintain that all is the result of chance, 
 though no mind has yet measured the wisdom obtruding it- 
 
206 NATURAL THEOLOGY 
 
 self everywhere. Look at this earth of ours hanging in the 
 middle of the universe, held together by the swing of its rapid 
 revolution, clotlied with flowers, fields of green, trees and fruits, 
 so nicely scattei'ed over its surface, that this otlierwise tedious 
 and wearisome multiplicity is toned by a variety, that ministers 
 to pleasure without ever disgusting witli surfeit. See too the 
 streams of soothing coolness which flow on forever, the mighty 
 rivers running down to the sea, their bank-slopes bright with 
 the freshest green, the recesses of hillside grots, the jutting 
 crags, the lowering mountains, the stretches of level plain. 
 What a collection of beasts, how graceful the airy sweeps, how 
 soft the songs of the birds ! Must I lead in on the scene fair 
 nature's king and guardian, him who keeps jealous watch over 
 her vast extent, who checks the ravages of destructive brutes 
 that would turn her into a desert, the growths of luxuriant 
 vegetation, that would make of her a wilderness? Behold the 
 meadows, the islands, the seashores, that glisten with his toil, 
 dotted with his homes and his cities. Were man's eyes once 
 so touched by Heaven as to see as plainly as does the mind 
 these wonders, could he for a moment doubt about God's exist- 
 ence ? " Thus Cicero. Epicurus and his herd, because it was 
 more convenient for them, and less a reproach to their gross 
 lives, pretended to see only a blind chance at work in nature, 
 and scouted the idea of final causes or ends. In Ontology we 
 upset tliis ignoble view of nature; and, in opposition to the 
 imaginings of Epicurus, advanced solid reasons in proof of our 
 belief that every agent works unto an end, be that agent God, 
 angel, man or creature inferior to man. It is hardly worth 
 while to here repeat what was there said. It will be sufficient 
 for us to again reflect upon it. 
 
 From the moral order culturally Tcnown to us: 
 
 We base our argument on no set system of revealed or natural 
 religion. We discuss man's instincts in their nakedness, whether 
 Catholicity has ennobled and elevated them, whether Protestant- 
 ism has weakened and poisoned them witli uncertainty, or 
 whether Mohammedanism has degraded and almost submerged 
 them in the sink of sensual vice. Our platform is as broad 
 as the earth and takes in all shades of belief, all the variations 
 of creeds revealed by God, or manufactured by men. We ap- 
 
THESIS I 207 
 
 peal to that whisper, which, perhaps more faint and indistinct 
 in the bosom of the grosser pagan of savagery than in the re- 
 fined Christian of virtuous civilization, nevertheless manages 
 to make itself heard, when the tumult of passion is loudest, and 
 when its voice is most unwelcome. We pretend only to show 
 the necessary connection between the existence of God and that 
 familiar monitor, which prompts man to sin in the dark, and 
 drives the guilty soul to recesses, whence it would, if possible, 
 shut out the light of an unseen eye. Man may have faith of 
 no description whatever, he may be the veriest heathen or pagan 
 alive, but he has a conscience. It is an awkward possession 
 on occasions, a companion whose dogged persistence is at times 
 extremely uncomfortable. But there it is, and there is no help 
 for it. It is God's minister, and we can no more get rid of it, 
 than we can get rid of ourselves. It is the executive of a moral 
 force; and, extending to secrets over which policemen have no 
 control, it exercises a wider and more effective influence. The 
 moral force, whose interests it advances, is familiar to all as 
 the Natural Law. Law in general, for want of a fuller defini- 
 tion, we here describe as the prescjiption of a superior forbid- 
 ding or commanding some certain action. Its effect in the 
 subject is an almost instinctive impulse to consider himself 
 bound by the strictest kind of moral necessity to acquit himself 
 of a duty, and stand away from the object under ban. The 
 Natural Law we can with sufficient correctness call that pre- 
 scription which is founded on the very essences of things, inde- 
 pendently of all merely human activity' and manifested to man 
 by the pure light of reason, without any profound elucuhrations 
 in the philosopliic lore of right and wrong. It forbids actions 
 intrinsically evil, prescribes actions, the non-performance of 
 which would be intrinsically evil. Conscience is reason, inas- 
 much as it advertises man of his duty in this matter, praising 
 him, chiding him, accusing him, as circumstances require. This 
 argument extends to deeper details than the mere existence of 
 God. It proves God a supreme being, a re warder and avenger, 
 infinitely holy and just, all powerful and knowing to a degree 
 absolutely without bounds. The dictates of conscience are not 
 simple figments of the mind, without any foundation in reality, 
 owing their entire being to the work of the intellect. They 
 are as stern facts as the mind itself. They rise up and declare 
 
208 NATURAL THEOLOGY 
 
 themselves, whether the man wishes to entertain them or slight 
 them. The mind never creates them, it simply perceives them. 
 If remorse depended on ourselves alone, it would seldom annoy 
 
 118. 
 
 Common consent of manHnd: 
 
 It is safe to say that the tendencies of modern science are 
 atheistic. Certainly nature is not to blame for this perversion 
 of her lessons. She silently but eloquently puts forth the claims 
 of God; and reason, untrammeled by any sordid passion, dis- 
 tinctly and gladly hears her whispers. But pride distorts the 
 sermon, and hearkens to only its own uncertain conclusions. 
 Passion cannot entirely blot out sentiments born with the man, 
 but it can and does deaden these sentiments, and so obscure 
 them that they virtually disappear. No wonder then that after 
 long years of intimacy with erring self-conceit men find them- 
 selves with scarcely a vestige of truths implanted in their very 
 nature, and originally ready to burst forth spontaneously. The 
 devil went so utterly blind with pride that, though much closer 
 to God's august presence than we, he one day lost consciousness 
 of God's might, and challenged Omnipotence to battle. Who 
 is going to be surprised then, if weak, ignorant men, with pas- 
 sions alert and strong, away off from God's absorbing counte- 
 nance, wrap themselves up in themselves, and refuse to pay to 
 a being infinitely their superior the homage of acknowledgment? 
 For a species of atheism the devil was hurled from Heaven ; 
 for a species of atheism more ignoble still, no corner in hell 
 can be found too warm. Angelic atheism had, to my mind, 
 some redeeming features; but human atheism, which is never 
 more than practical, unsupported by any theory with the least 
 shadow of substance, is extremely abominable. There may be 
 practical atheists, men degraded and dull enough to openly 
 profess unbelief in God, to shape their lives much as they would, 
 if there were no God; but no human heart has yet been so 
 poorly moulded by God as to honestly believe that its Maker 
 does not exist. 
 
 It is not my intention to enter into the literature and re- 
 mains bequeathed to us by nations coeval with the birth of the 
 world, to interpret hieroglyphic inscriptions traced on the tiles 
 and sepulchres of Babylon and Egypt, nor even to lay before 
 
THESIS I 209 
 
 you the results of devoted research among their ruins. Vol- 
 umes have been already written on the subject, and the almost 
 unanimous verdict of students, worthy of credit, is that belief 
 in God's existence is as old as the world itself; that, though 
 very absurd notions have crept into religious systems such as 
 those of Greece and Rome, the fundamental idea of the actuality 
 of some superior existence has uniformly been cleaved to. Here 
 at home the Puritan ministers Roger Williams and John Eliot, 
 who were among the first white men in close contact with the 
 Indians, persistently declare that they never once in the course 
 of all their wanderings happened on a single red man, not per- 
 suaded of the existence of God. Darwin and his materialistic 
 followers may theorize and theorize, may give out as their deeply 
 rooted conviction that man began as a monkey, and, after suc- 
 cessive stages of evolution, by a subtle and fatal use of Dialec- 
 tics hit upon, among other erroneous principles, that of God's 
 existence. " Descent of Man," vol. 1, page 204. Ingersoll may 
 prate about ignorance, fear, prejudice, the cupidity of priests 
 and what not. Facts nevertheless stubbornly refuse to give way 
 to theories; and, though I spend a year endeavoring to prove 
 a horse a tree, I reap for reward of my pains only obloquy, 
 shame and the reputation of being a fool. Plato has somewhere 
 in his voluminous works this pithy saying, " Greeks and all 
 the peoples outside Greece profess belief in the existence of 
 God." Cicero takes the one sensible view of variety of creeds, 
 when he says, " Among men there is no race so completely un- 
 civilized as not to know, though ignorant perhaps of His true 
 nature, that a God must be acknowledged." Plutarch, the cele- 
 brated historian of ancient heroes, replying to a certain opponent 
 of his, remarks, " If you travel much, you will no doubt visit 
 cities without walls, without kings, without dwellings, without 
 resources, without a currency, without a literature. Nobody 
 has yet discovered a city without temples and gods, without 
 rituals, oaths, shrines; without sacrifices instituted to call down 
 blessings and avert evils." 
 
 Polytheism, or the worship of several gods, is an absurdity 
 in itself; but it none the less clearly points out the tendency 
 of the human mind, and establishes none the less solidly the 
 fact for which we here contend. Besides, polytheism invariably 
 recognized one divinity superior to the rest, and so, virtually 
 
210 NATURAL THEOLOGY 
 
 if not explicitly, was a profession of monotheism or one-god- 
 serviee. Jupiter was God with the Romans; Zeus, God with 
 the Greeks; Juno, Apollo, Mars, Diana, Venus, were princes 
 and princesses in Jove's kingdom, endowed with many high 
 prerogatives, but denied that supremacy which could alone 
 make them gods. 
 
 God: 
 
 It is not our business to prove that God is one in substance 
 and triple in person, that He once descended to earth and as- 
 sumed human nature. We are in the domain of natural theol- 
 ogy. The mysteries of the Most Holy Trinity and the Incar- 
 nation belong to supernatural or revealed theology, and pre- 
 suppose the gift of faith. The God, whose existence we estab- 
 lish in this present thesis, is the one ens a se in the world, the 
 unproduced and necessary being; the first cause of everything. 
 Himself without a cause; the all powerful, all wise, all holy, 
 all just being, who presides over the interests and destiny of 
 man. Later we prove Him the being whose superior cannot be 
 even conceived, and from this prerogative all others flow. He 
 is therefore infinitely perfect, infinitely simple and peculiarly 
 one. He is an utter stranger to change, eternal and immeas- 
 urable. 
 
 PROOFS I, II, III, IV 
 
 /. a. There exist beings which were produced. But pro- 
 duced beings ultimately suppose as cause a being non-produced. 
 Ergo, this non-produced being, or God exists. 
 
 With regard to the Major. There exist beings which undergo 
 at least accidental changes. But such beings are produced be- 
 ings. Ergo, produced beings exist. 
 
 With regard to this Minor. An actual non-produced being 
 can undergo no change. Ergo, the beings in question are pro- 
 duced beings. 
 
 With regard to this Antecedent. An actual non-produced 
 being is a necessary being. But a necessary being can undergo 
 no change. (In what state would it be necessary? In none.) 
 Ergo, an actual non-produced being can undergo no change. 
 
 With regard to the Minor. Multiply men beyond the num- 
 
THESIS I 211 
 
 ber of the stars, and to the whole multitude no higher epithet 
 can be applied than that of rational. Increase of number could 
 never result in changing their dignity to that of the angelic or 
 divine. Majus et minus non mutant speciem. Even so with 
 produced beings. Thougli they include everything in the uni- 
 verse, one alone excepted, they must ever and always be styled 
 produced beings, and must therefore have their actual existence 
 from something outside of themselves. Outside of themselves, 
 however, since they take in the whole round of produced beings, 
 there can be only the non-produced being, whom we reverently 
 call God. Production from another is an attribute essential to 
 things subject to change ; it is not an element that may be pres- 
 ent or absent, and still have the same influence on their actual 
 existence. Without production there is for them no such thing 
 as actual existence. 
 
 N.B. Produced beings can come from produced beings as 
 from proximate causes, not as from ultimate causes. All these 
 proximate causes are produced beings, and no matter how much 
 you multiply them, you will never get from the collection a 
 non-produced being. All the plants in the world will not make 
 a horse. Produced beings and non-produced being differ as 
 widely as plant and horse, specifically; yea, even more widely. 
 But this collection of produced beings is unintelligible without 
 a cause. Otherwise you would have an effect without a cause. 
 This cause must be outside the collection, which embraces all 
 produced being, and must therefore be a non-produced being, 
 God. 
 
 &. Everything actual is either produced or non-produced. 
 But it is impossible for all to be produced. Ergo, there exists 
 at least one non-produced, God. 
 
 With regard to the Minor. Everything produced is an effect. 
 But there can be no effect without a cause. Ergo, it is impos- 
 sible for all to be produced. 
 
 N.B. Beings at this moment existing and beings that have 
 already existed form a series, closed at least as far as this end 
 of the line is concerned. Since an actual indefinite series is 
 impossible, it must be closed also at the other end of the line. 
 Since, further, the last being at this end of the line is a pro- 
 duced being, — otherwise it would be a cause with no effect 
 whatever, — the last being at the other end of the line, or the 
 
212 NATURAL THEOLOGY 
 
 first being of the series, must be a producer only, as the pro- 
 ducers must alwaj's be just as many as the beings produced. 
 The first being in the series cannot produce the second, and 
 then be itself in turn produced by the second. For through 
 the instrumentality of the second it would produce itself, or 
 exercise an activity, which by supposition it does not yet possess. 
 
 //. There exists in the surrounding universe an order of 
 things undeniably wonderful. But such an order supposes as 
 capable cause some being, in intellect far above the visible works 
 of the universe, an all-wise being, God. Ergo, God exists. 
 
 With regard to the Major. Its vastness, variety, intricate 
 simplicity, perfection, long continuance, make this world's order 
 truly wonderful. 
 
 With regard to the Minor. This order arises not from the 
 essences of its constituents, because they are things subject to 
 change, and therefore wholly indifferent of themselves to this 
 or that combination. It arises from neither hap-hazard nor 
 accident. Otherwise, nothing at all, or at most a cause without 
 intelligence would be on an equal footing with a cause full of 
 intelligence. "W^ierefore it has its origin in some being wholly 
 distinct from, and immeasurably superior to, tiie whole visible 
 universe, the being we know as God. The establishment of an 
 intelligence greater than any with which we are acquainted, 
 would serve to confound atheists; but the intelligence here dis- 
 played is nothing short of infinite. It is the intelligence of the 
 actual non-prodiiced being already proved, and therefore in- 
 finite. 
 
 ///. Everybody at times, even against his will, feels himself 
 urged by the most exacting kind of moral necessity to perform 
 some actions and omit others. But this natural impulse be- 
 tokens the existence of some supreme Lawgiver, a rewarder and 
 avenger, absolutely holy and just, all powerful and omniscient. 
 Ergo, God exists. 
 
 With regard to the Major. The sting of conscience, remorse 
 of conscience, are by-words, and represent a psychological ex- 
 perience that falls to the lot of saint and sinner alike. 
 
 With regard to the Minor. Our inability to escape from 
 pleasant and irksome feelings, attendant on good and evil done, 
 is an unerring sign that the being responsible for these emo- 
 tions is extraneous to ourselves, superior to us, human nature's 
 
THESIS I 213 
 
 supreme Lawgiver. Reason is rather passive than active in 
 this matter of conscience. It does not precisely shape these 
 dictates itself, it merely perceives them, in much the same way 
 as it perceives universality. If their presence or absence de- 
 pended on our will, unpleasant pangs would be exceedingly 
 rare. Neither is conscience still, when once its message of re- 
 proof or congratulation is conveyed. It further excites a dread 
 of future punishment, a hope of future reward, and therefore 
 proclaims the existence of an all-powerful avenger and rewarder. 
 The deeds falling under the blame or praise of conscience are 
 not necessarily outward and open to the gaze of the world. 
 They are oftener. perhaps, thoughts and intentions, hidden from 
 men's eyes, divulged to not even a father, motlier, husband 
 or wife, but so securely wrapped up in the saint's or cul- 
 prit's bosom as to go out only with death and descend to the 
 grave with him. Surely, then, if our fear and hope have any 
 foundation at all, and to think otherwise is absurd, the being, 
 who inspires the one and the other, must be possessed of a 
 vision infinitely more piercing than any falling under human 
 observation. 
 
 IV. It is a judgment ratified by the common consent of 
 mankind, that there exists a divinity or God, to whom worship 
 is due. But such a judgment cannot be false. Ergo, God 
 exists. 
 
 With regard to the Major. This first premiss is largely a 
 matter of history, and has been so often and so overwhelmingly 
 verified, that any further details on the subject would hardly 
 be an addition to the facts already gathered, and indisputably 
 substantiated by men of established probity and learning. Suf- 
 fice it to say that atheists themselves do not attack the univer- 
 sality of the belief. They rest content with a vain inquiry into 
 the motives prompting the belief. Fear, they say, cupidity 
 and fraud, prejudice and ignorance are at the bottom of this 
 huge mistake, not nature. But their assertions are emptier 
 than the air that gives them voice. Fear is the parent of 
 atheism, not of belief in God. It is a fact of history that the 
 most fearless and most courageous of nations have ever been 
 loudest in their profession of God's existence, and sincerest in 
 their reverent worship. A man never assumes the dread re- 
 sponsibilities entailed by belief in God out of fear. It is a 
 
214 NATURAL THEOLOGY 
 
 characteristic of fear to shirk responsibility. On second thought 
 I should hesitate to denominate fear the cause of either atheism 
 or belief in God. Fear in the one case and the other is an 
 effect of certainty about God's existence, and would be wholly 
 meaningless and easily divested, could that certainty be once 
 weakened. It is just as silly to deny the existence of God, as 
 it is to deny that well grounded fear and respectful reverence, 
 which it prompts. Cicero made of Epicurus, a fair counter- 
 part of our Ingersoll in point of blasphemy, the following re- 
 proachful but honest remark, " I never yet in the course of a 
 life-time met the man, who stood more in awe of what he pro- 
 fessed to regard idle grounds for fear, death, namely, and the 
 gods." It is impossible to believe that recalcitrant men were 
 ever so short-sighted and servile as to allow overbearing and 
 greedy rulers, spiritual or temporal, to thrust on them this to 
 the rebellious most irksome belief. I ratlicr fancy that fraud 
 and cupidity have been obstacles to its growth and propaga- 
 tion. No human law, attended with so much and so persistent 
 inconvenience, would be long tolerated by a single people, to 
 say nothing of the whole world. Prejudice may exert a wide 
 influence, when it countenances ease and remissness, or min- 
 isters to any passion. But its influence is limited indeed, when 
 it stands in the way of self-gratification and self-indulgence. 
 The circumstance that a father and mother followed such and 
 such a line of belief, may be of great weight with the young 
 and uneducated, when a religion is to be chosen. But men are 
 wont to grow out of youth and diffident ignorance. They are 
 not slow to put aside prejudices less imj)ortant in their bearing 
 on life than this. Besides, prejudice in the case of the child 
 does not incline him to belief precisely in God, but to a par- 
 ticular kind of belief in God. Ignorance is perhaps the emptiest 
 of all the causes alleged by atheists. Aristotle, St. Thomas, 
 Cicero, Plato, Kepler, Newton and all learned men of note are 
 living illustrations of that beautiful saying ascribed to Bacon, 
 " Sips of pliilosophy may indeed lead up to atheism, but fuller 
 draughts lead the soul on to God." 
 
 With regard to the Minor. A judgment ratified by the com- 
 mon consent of mankind cannot be false, because it takes its rise 
 in rational nature as such ; and reason as such, or reason per se 
 is infallible, unless we want to make man a being designed for 
 
THESIS I 215 
 
 the truth and destined to never compass it; unless we want to 
 make reason an instrument designed to defeat its own purpose. 
 Every such judgment has four qualities, separating it from what- 
 soever other judgments, no matter how universal. 1. It has a 
 claim to universaliiy, to long duration and unchangeableness as 
 well a)nong ruder as among more civilized peoples. 2. It has a 
 claim to exact agreement with all the rules of rigid reason. S. 
 It has a claim to absolute freedom from any such cause as preju- 
 dice, ignorance and the like. Its universality is sufficient guar- 
 antee for this claim. Jf. It has a claim to the exclusive incul- 
 cation of moral and social truths, not of scientific truths. Small 
 harm comes of scientific mistakes, moral mistakes reach to eter- 
 nity. Nature provides for morality, not for science. 
 
 PRINCIPLES 
 
 A. From Boedder. Nat. Theol., pp. 15-24. 
 
 Ontologists contend for no intuitive vision, such as the elect 
 enjoy in Heaven. They contend for direct consciousness of 
 God's existence. Our ideas, they say, are occasioned by sensa- 
 tions, tliey are not caused by them or the mind, but by God 
 immediately present, like a sun in the middle of a thinking 
 world. 
 
 Answer. We must make an effort to feel sure of God's exist- 
 ence. It costs labor to dispel doubts. 
 
 Matter is direct object of mind, not spirit; like owl in mid- 
 day, when confronted with spiritual. The idea of God's exist- 
 ence is implanted in us by God, inasmuch as He gave us a 
 reason capable of at once grasping His existence. 
 
 If we saw God immediately, we should see His essence. We 
 see everything in God as we see everything in the sun, in prin- 
 ciple of knowledge, not in object known. 
 
 B. Objections raised by Ontologists : 
 
 1. Notion of infinite cannot be gotten from finite. We have 
 notion of infinite. Ergo, immediate. 
 
 2. Harmony of order. God first. Ergo idea of God ought 
 to be first idea and immediate. 
 
 3. God, man's last end, first object of will. Ergo, first object 
 of intellect and immediate. God is first truth. Ergo, first 
 known. 
 
216 NATURAL THEOLOGY 
 
 4. God alone intelligible by Himself, creation intelligible 
 only in God. Ergo, God first and immediate. 
 
 5. Universals, based on direct intuition of God, because eter- 
 nal, necessary, unchangeable. Ergo. 
 
 Ansicers. 1. Infinite can be gotten from finite analogically, 
 by positivo-negative concepts. 
 
 2. This harmony is not needed except in perfect knowledge 
 like God's. In Imman knowledge truth is possible without this 
 order. We can know a book first, and then its author. 
 
 3. To be last end, God must be known and wished not first, 
 but somewhere in life or after death. God is subsistent truth, 
 not truth in the abstract and common to creatures. Skeptics 
 can deny the second truth, not the first. 
 
 4. Creatures have existence distinct from God, though not 
 independent. Existence is basis of intelligibility. Ergo, crea- 
 tures have intelligibility distinct from God. God is cause of 
 their intelligibility, as He is of their existence. 
 
 5. They are negatively eternal; logically, not physically. 
 God is physically and really eternal, necessary and unchange- 
 able. Otherwise universals would be gods. 
 
 C. Difference between St. Anselm, Descartes and Leibnitz: 
 St. Anselm argues from notion, God the greatest being that 
 
 can be conceived. Descartes argues from notion, existence 
 contained in clear and distinct idea of God. Leibnitz argues 
 from notion, God possible, because no contradiction proved in 
 concept of God. 
 
 Answer. All forms sin because unwarranted passage from 
 ideal to real. Monk Gaunilo pointed it out in St. Anselm's 
 time. He refuted argument with story of the Lost Island, 
 greater than any conceivable, inscribing his work, Opusculum 
 pro Insipienti, a reference to the Scripture, The fool hath said 
 in his heart, There is no God. The Lost Island must be a 
 reality, because the greatest conceivable island. Anselm an- 
 swered by saying that his argument was good for only the in- 
 finite being, not for finites. 
 
 Answer. St. Anselm assumes that the idea of infinite being 
 is not a contradiction, and this without warrant, unless he first 
 appeals to an a posteriori proof. Suppose many self-existent 
 beings, and no being would be infinite. 
 
 D. Agnostics especially deny an intelligent first cause. They 
 
THESIS I 217 
 
 admit some kind of first cause, like the forces of matter, nebular 
 hypothesis, atoms and such. 
 
 Answer. Our unproduced cause must be intelligent because 
 some of its effects, men, are intelligent; it is infinite because 
 unproduced. Ergo, no begging of question. Opponents deny 
 a finite intelligent first cause. Ergo, no need to prove God 
 infinite. Later we prove God infinite from the notion of neces- 
 sary or actual non-produced being. 
 
 E. Urrahuru: Tlieod., D. 1, c. 2, a 1, vol. 7, pp. 89-95. 
 
 1. Contingency of things created not yet proved. Ergo. 
 
 2. Though individual creatures are contingent, collection may 
 be necessary. The door is not the house, neither is the window ; 
 but all the parts together can be called the house. One horse 
 may not be able to haul a load, equal to the strength of five. 
 Not lawful to argue from distributive to collective. Ergo, all 
 contingents. 
 
 3. In the supposition of an infinite series there would be no 
 first cause. Ergo, all contingents. 
 
 4. A can produce B, and then disappear to be later produced 
 by B. Ergo, all contingents. 
 
 5. World could be eternal, and therefore necessary. Ergo, 
 no first cause, and all contingents. 
 
 6. A necessary being can be from another, or produced. 
 Ergo, all contingents. 
 
 7. Conclusion follows weaker part. Contingent in prem- 
 isses. Ergo, necessary out of place in conclusion. " Latius 
 patet conclusio quam praemissae " ; from contingent to necessary. 
 
 Answers. 1. Contingency proved in Cosmology. Change 
 proves contingency. 
 
 2. Not lawful, when distributive is the collective inadequately 
 taken, I grant ; when the distributive is the collective in no sense 
 whatever, I deny. Necessity belongs to contingents not even 
 inadequately. In contingents there is not even a partial apti- 
 tude for necessity. Ergo, necessity cannot be said of collec- 
 tion. The door is the house inadequately taken, and so is the 
 window. No contingent being is the necessary being inade- 
 quately taken. 
 
 3. Infinite series, an absurdity, because series denotes some 
 first and infinite denotes no first; square circle. Wliether ab- 
 surd or not, the whole infinite series of contingents must have 
 
218 NATURAL THEOLOGY 
 
 an outside cause. In a crowd of one hundred, to have a hun- 
 dred wliipped men, either somebody outside the hundred must 
 whip, or somebody in the hundred must whip himself, or be 
 whipped by another, whom he has mediately or immediately 
 whipped. The cause of the series is in or outside the series. 
 If out, necessary being; if in, each has cause, and one will me- 
 diately or immediately be cause of itself. 
 
 4. A ought to have cause before it produced B, not after. 
 Otherwise it could not perish after its production of B. 
 
 5. World could be eternal by its very essence, I deny; by 
 favor of the first cause, I grant. Only a thing eternal by its 
 very essence is necessary, a thing eternal by favor is contingent. 
 
 C). A necessary being can lie ens ab alio, or from another, 
 when it proceeds from a first cause working necessarily, not 
 when it is necessary by its very essence. 
 
 7. This axiom is a rule regulating the formal truth of syl- 
 logisms, and the weakness in question is that of negative as 
 compared with positive, particular as compared with universal. 
 It has no bearing on the relative dignity of trutlis in premisses 
 and conclusion. Necessary being occurs in premisses, and there- 
 fore has right to a place in the conclusion. Contingents pre- 
 suppose necessary. Contingents exist. Ergo, necessary exists. 
 We do not derive God from contingents, but from necessary 
 connection between necessary being and contingents. A neces- 
 sary being or God exists necessarily not contingently, because, 
 though contingent beings in the premisses are contingent in 
 themselves, when once placed in existence, they necessarily exist; 
 and God in the conclusion exists the same way, necessarily. 
 The inquiry cannot be pursued to infinity. 
 
 F. From Urrahuru: 1. c, pp. 97-102. 
 
 1. Creature-causes are enough to explain effects. Ergo, no 
 first cause. 
 
 2. Spencer. World cannot be ens a se. Ergo, no ens a se 
 possible. 
 
 3. Mill. Neither experience nor reason proves first cause. 
 Experience teaches only second causes. Eeason is no voucher 
 for principle of causality. Experience alone vouches for suffi- 
 ciency of cause; and experience teaches that effect can surpass 
 cause. More perfect beings are evolved from less perfect ; world 
 from nebulous mass. 
 
THESIS I 219 
 
 4. Present things have beginning. Not so primal elements, 
 which are eternal. 
 
 Answers. 1. Enough, immediately and proximately, I grant; 
 remotely and mediately, I deny. 
 
 X.B. A first cause must always be supposed. 
 
 2. A stone cannot understand. Ergo, nothing can under- 
 stand. 
 
 3. Experience is silent about first cause, does not deny. 
 Principle of causality is not due to experience, it is analytic. 
 Life in less perfect explains evolution to more perfect. Sup- 
 posing the nebular hypothesis true, God gave the nebulous mass 
 power to become world. Certainly the nebulous mass cannot be 
 without cause. Ergo, first cause. 
 
 4. Primal elements are contingent, and could never begin 
 without cause, even if eternal. 
 
 G. From Urraburu: 1. c, pp. 104-107; pp. 111-124. 
 
 1. Numbers are greater and greater without greatest conceiv- 
 able number. Same of bodies. Ergo, contingent beings, a pari, 
 without necessary, ens ab alio without ens a se. 
 
 2. According to argument, a most perfect man ought to be 
 the cause of all other men. Absurd. 
 
 3. God ought to be primus motor immobilis. He is not, be- 
 cause of intellect and will. Faculties are eternal, thoughts and 
 wishes are in time. God passes from potency to act. Ergo. 
 
 4. Vital faculty moves itself. Ergo, vital faculty is God. 
 
 5. An eternal world would not be in potency, but would be 
 actus purissimus. Ergo. 
 
 6. Primal elements of world get motion from their essence. 
 Ergo. 
 
 Answers. 1. No parity, greater and greater numbers are al- 
 ways in same class. Same of bodies. Ens a se and ens ab alio 
 are in different classes. Numbers will not give bodies. 
 
 2. Essence is the same in all men. No man is more perfect 
 than another in essence. Essence of ens a se is different from 
 essence of ens ab alio. 
 
 3. God moves Himself without dependence on another. The 
 axiom, Omne motum ab alio movetur, is said of physical mo- 
 tion, not of metaphysical, like thought and wish. Created in- 
 tellects and wills pass from potency to act, not God's. He is 
 actus purissimus. His intellect and will are from eternity, like- 
 
220 NATURAL THEOLOGY 
 
 wise His tlioughts and wishes. Effects ad extra are in time. 
 Terms are in time. Aristotle, when lie calls God primus motor 
 immobilis, means that there is in God no physical motion, mo- 
 tion peculiar to inert bodies, which is always from and by an- 
 other. Plato says that God moves others by moving Himself, 
 and he is talking of uncreated metaphysical motion, thought 
 and wish. Thought and wish in creatures are self-motion, work 
 of intellect and will, though they must always be started by 
 another. Intellect and will move themselves, but under motion 
 from another. The will wishes under, not from and by, mo- 
 tion from the intellect; the intellect thinks under motion from 
 the species. Thought and wish in God arc self-motion witliout 
 dependence on anything distinct from intellect and will. God's 
 intellect is God's will, and both are God Himself. 
 
 4. Adequately and without dependence on God, as first cause, 
 I deny ; inadequately and with dependence, I grant. Vital fac- 
 ulty moves itself under motion from another, God moves Him- 
 self without such dependence. 
 
 5. It would be in potency after its creation, and therefore in 
 itself in potency before creation. 
 
 6. Primal elements get not existence from their essence. 
 Even in this hypothesis God is needed. 
 
 H. From Urrahuru. Order in world. 1. c, pp. 130-142. 
 
 1. Kant: a. From analogy between nature and art. Ergo, 
 not certain. 
 
 b. Argument proves need of architect, not need of creator of 
 matter. 
 
 c. Finite effect calls for no infinite cause. 
 
 2. God not omnipotent, because as such He ought to be able 
 to use means out of proportion with effects. Finite causes can 
 do as much as God. 
 
 3. God would have to sanction everything done in the world, 
 like capture of fly by spider. 
 
 4. Atoms could combine to form order in tlie world. Organ- 
 ism and wonders it can perform. Tyj)e in an urn after a suffi- 
 cient number of pourings would assume the form of Virgil's 
 ^neid. 
 
 5. No order in the world: 
 
 a. No finality ; some creatures have no purpose, rudimentary 
 organs, parasites, bacilli, pain. 
 
THESIS 1 221 
 
 b. We ought to know whole world to be able to decide finality. 
 
 c. World a machine. We ought to know end of whole world, 
 and how each part conspires to that end. 
 
 d. Like shooting a million guns to kill a hare; seeds lost; 
 a few saved by chance to perpetuate species; geniuses lost by 
 poverty, carelessness of parents, laziness and such. 
 
 Everything from chance, no finality. 
 
 Answers, a. Argument not from analogy, but from meta- 
 physical principle, order is the work of intelligence. Order in 
 nature calls for mind as well as order in art. Analogy used to 
 illustrate, insisted upon, because it serves to disprove atheism. 
 Eelative notion of God's intelligence enough; absolute, not 
 needed. The world is not so perfect, but that it could be more 
 perfect. But everything in the world has some point of per- 
 fection. Imperfections are relative, and in harmony with per- 
 fection as a whole. 
 
 b. This architect, being ens a se, must likewise be the creator 
 of matter. Besides, we use the argument to prove God a real- 
 itj', not to prove Him the creator of matter. 
 
 c. Finite effect cannot always be produced by finite cause. 
 Examples are creation of world, knowledge of future free con- 
 tingents. Enough, immediately and proximately, I grant; re- 
 motely and mediately, I deny. A second finite cause could 
 produce the world, but dependent on a first infinite cause. This 
 finite effect ultimately calls for an unproduced, and therefore 
 infinite cause. 
 
 2. Omnipotence can use means out of proportion, means in- 
 trinsically repugnant, I deny; intrinsically possible and out of 
 proportion, I again distinguish, with ordinary power, I deny; 
 with absolute power, I grant. God always employs His ordi- 
 nary power. Absolute power means omnipotence without re- 
 gard to other attributes; ordinary power means omnipotence 
 viewed in connection with other attributes like wisdom, justice 
 and the rest. 
 
 3. God would have to sanction, with His approval, I deny; 
 with His permission, I grant. 
 
 4. Atoms could form order under direction of first cause; not 
 otherwise. Organisms get their power from first cause. The 
 forces of matter directed by an intelligence can accomplish 
 wonders; not otherwise. We are not ignorant of what the forces 
 
222 NATURAL THEOLOGY 
 
 of matter can do when left to themselves, and when guided by 
 God or man. The example of Virgil's ^neid and type is little 
 worth. 
 
 a. The type are made by intelligent beings. 
 
 b. They arc j)laccd in an urn, poured through a hole, and set 
 on proper ends; intelligence. 
 
 c. They occupy a finite space, stand in forms; not verified 
 in atoms. 
 
 The order apparent in brute work comes from God. The 
 laws supposed by Evolutionists to guide matter in its opera- 
 tions are meaningless, unless there exists a Legislator. 
 
 5. a. Some creatures have no purpose known to us, I grant; 
 known to God, I deny. Many ends are assignable to rudi- 
 mentary organs, bacilli, parasites, pain. 
 
 b, c. It is not necessary to know all the order in the world. 
 We know enough to establish God. 
 
 d. 2^ot like hunter and hare in case. God shoots where hare 
 is, the million guns shoot a million hares. Not every seed is 
 meant by God to grow to a plant. Some are meant to supply 
 food to the birds, and these in turn preserve such seed as become 
 plants. Geniuses are to be evolved with dependence on men's 
 free will. Not all are intended by God to fully develop. 
 
 /. From Urrahuru. Common consent. 1. c, pp. 158-164. 
 
 1. Atheists numerous. 
 
 2. Other universal opinions proved false. Examples are, mo- 
 tion of sun, no antipodes. 
 
 3. Different opinions about God rob consent of universality. 
 
 4. Polytheism can be proved from common consent. Ergo. 
 
 Answers. 1. Practical atheists are numerous, I grant ; theo- 
 retical, I deny. Atheists with the Greeks were men who denied 
 the gods of the state; and they were better theists than their 
 neighbors, e. g. Socrates. The Hebrews are called atheists by 
 Pliny. The atheists of to-day rest on fool reasons. They deny 
 a personal God, not a first cause. There never was a nation 
 of pantheists or atheists. 
 
 Barbarians are poor examples to cite in favor of any sys- 
 tem, passion kills moral instincts. Buddhist philosophers are 
 atheists, not the common people. 500 millions of people, few 
 philosophers. 
 
 2. Scientific, not ethical. See page 215. 
 
THESIS I 223 
 
 3. Different opinions, about God's existence, I deny; about 
 God's qualities, I grant. 
 
 4. Polytheism never universal, Hebrews always monotheists; 
 philosophers wise to absurdity. Jupiter alone God; not last- 
 ing, because dead ; against reason. 
 
 J. From Urraburu. Moral order, conscience. 1. c, pp. 166- 
 171. 
 
 1. Eemorse disappears with crime. Ergo, no criterion. 
 
 2. Believers are sinners as well as atheists. 
 
 3. Other motives able to keep men virtuous, honor, esteem, 
 self-respect. 
 
 Answers. 1. Eemorse disappears, I deny; weakens, I grant. 
 
 2. Believers are sinners, because they are free. Motives for 
 sin fewer and weaker in believers. 
 
 3. Other motives, universal and sufficient, I deny; particular 
 and indifferent, I grant. 
 
 K. From Urrahuru. General. 1. c, pp. 173-181. 
 
 1. Infinite good ought to exclude evil. 
 
 Ansiver. From Himself, I grant; from others, I again dis- 
 tinguish ; if necessary agent, I grant ; if free agent, I deny. 
 
 2. The good are afflicted, the wicked prosper. 
 
 Ansiver. Affliction meant for higher good, I grant; affliction 
 not meant for higher good, I deny. Uses of adversity. 
 
 3. Energy in world, enough to explain things. 
 
 Answer. Placed in it by first cause, I grant; had of itself, 
 I deny. 
 
 4. Qualities of God not proved. 
 
 Ansiuer. Existence not proved, I deny; qualities, I grant. 
 An sit and quid sit. 
 
 5. Spencer: 
 
 a. Infinite duration inconceivable. 
 
 b. God is not finite beings. Ergo, not all being, not infinite. 
 
 c. Absolute has relations, mind, will, creation. 
 
 d. Has consciousness, if free; and that says relations. 
 
 e. God can do all things and can do no evil. He punishes 
 and pardons. He can foresee and prevent evil, and yet permits 
 it. 
 
 Answers, a. Simple infinite duration can be conceived some- 
 how, not in itself; successive cannot. Eternity means no be- 
 ginning, no end, no succession. 
 
224 NATURAL THEOLOGY 
 
 b. God contains all finites virtually and eminently. To be 
 finites formally would be an imperfection. 
 
 c. No real relation in God, only logical, which adds nothing 
 real to God, mere external denomination. 
 
 d. No real relation. 
 
 e. One act, different terms; moral evil as such needs no 
 cause, it is nothing positive. He permits and does physical 
 evil for good reasons. He permits moral evil without doing it; 
 men are free. 
 
 Other seemingly contradictory qualities urged by Agnostics: 
 He is everywhere and nowhere; immovable and works ad 
 
 extra. He is good without quality; large without quantity; 
 
 whole, without parts; free and unchangeable. 
 
 6. Kant. 
 
 We prove necessary being infinite, and then infinite being 
 necessary, or necessarily existing. Ergo, our argument is a 
 priori. 
 
 Ansiver. We prove a posteriori existence of necessary being, 
 and then in turn this being is infinite because necessary. And 
 all the while God is real, not notional, as with St. Anselm. 
 Our argument is not from an idea, but from the real existence 
 of things in the universe. Once God's existence is proved real. 
 His other attributes can be demonstrated from ideas. Our ar- 
 gument would be a priori, if it ran this way : The necessary 
 exists. Ergo, the contingent exists. 
 
 7. God is imaginary, no real being. 
 
 Answer. We know God by analogical concepts, belonging to 
 Him alone, as to a most real being. God is pictured as a man 
 only because of our weakness and limitations. Our concept of 
 God is objective, inasmuch as it follows our concept of phys- 
 ical realities. It is not logical like St. Anselm's. All the 
 analogy is between God's attributes and man's, not between the 
 existence of a necessary being and that of contingents. Rela- 
 tion of dependence between God and creatures is real on the 
 part of creatures; and in this thesis we want to prove the exist- 
 ence of God, not His perfections. There is a distinction of 
 reason, on our part, between God's essence and His existence, 
 and therefore we can reach one without reaching the other. 
 
 L. From Boedder, pp. 149-233. Traditionalism: 
 
THESIS I 225 
 
 1. Faith and science have different objects. Existence of 
 God, a dogma of faith. Ergo, above reason. 
 
 Answer. Motive makes difference, science based on reason; 
 faith, on the authority of God's word. Some dogmas above 
 reason, others not. God's existence, object of science as well 
 as of faith. God reveals truths within reach of reason, to 
 lessen difficulty. Men incapable and lazy. Knowledge would 
 come late in life. There would be more room for error. 
 
 2. Impossible to pass from finite to infinite. Ergo, tradi- 
 tion needed. 
 
 Answer. Impossible at one bound, not by successive steps. 
 M. First Cause — Kant, Spencer, Mill. Boedder, Nat. 
 
 Theol, pp. 152-165. 
 Kant: 1. Ontological proof unsound. 
 Answer. We agree. 
 
 2. Uncertain about principle of causality. 
 Answer. That is scepticism. 
 
 3. Must fall back on ontological. 
 
 Answer. We argue a posteriori; from contingent to neces- 
 sary, and then to infinite. 
 
 4. Argument from design fails. Architect needed, not crea- 
 tor, unless recourse is had to ontological proof. 
 
 Answer. We prove creator a posteriori. 
 
 5. Mere intelligent mind enough. 
 
 Answer. Not enough; must be outside of order and crea- 
 tures. 
 
 Spencer: 1. Self existent is inconceivable. Ergo, atheism, 
 pantheism and theism are wrong; agnosticism right. Self ex- 
 istent, without beginning, impossible to conceive, because of 
 infinite past time. 
 
 Answer. Impossible to materialists, who recognize only or- 
 ganic or sensible knowledge. God's duration is not time, but 
 eternity; and in eternity there is no succession; everything is 
 at once. 
 
 Mill : 1. Our argument, because world is changeable, it needs 
 a cause. Add, and this cause is without a cause, and you have 
 the truth. Elements of world are essentially unchangeable. 
 Ergo, no need of cause. 
 
 Answer. Essentially unchangeable elements would be in- 
 
226 NATURAL THEOLOGY 
 
 capable of changed combinations, and these combinations would 
 have to be effected by another. 
 
 2. Causes within our experience had their cause. Ergo, no 
 such thing as cause without a cause. 
 
 Answer. They have their causes, because they are creatures 
 and contingent. It is not of the essence of causation to have a 
 cause, but an accident or circumstance due to contingency. 
 
 3. Conscious production requires a mind, not unconscious 
 production, and world's production may be of latter kind. Be- 
 sides, effect can be superior to cause, as in tree and seed. 
 
 Ansivei'. LTnconscious production would not explain con- 
 scious creatures. Effect cannot surpass cause; life and organ- 
 ism explain seeming departure from rule. Tree not superior 
 to its complete cause. 
 
 N. Physical order or design. Mill, Lange, MallocJc. Boed- 
 der, pp. 165-182. 
 
 Mill: 1. Mechanism of eye explained by survival of fittest, 
 by chance, exclusive of finality. 
 
 Answer. This is only pushing the difficulty back. Self-con- 
 structing machine calls for even higher intelligence. Same as 
 old theory, fortuitous concourse of atoms, and this calls for in- 
 telligence. 
 
 2. Paley's watch gets motion from without. Organisms are 
 different, and get motion from within. 
 
 Answer. Same as the old theory, anima mundi, and this calls 
 for an outside cause, self-existent. Monism and pantheism are 
 wrong. Dualism is right, God and the world. 
 
 3. Omnipotence needs no design. It can use any means. 
 Answer. It cannot use intrinsically impossible means. By 
 
 absolute power it can use any meana, not by ordinajy power, 
 and it can freely use either. 
 
 Lange: 1. Clumsy providence, great waste of organisms. 
 
 Answer. Bread and eggs no waste when meal for the phi- 
 losophers, and yet seeds are destroyed in their making. A best 
 world is impossible, except in relative sense. God's absolutely 
 last purpose is His own extrinsic glory. His relatively last 
 purpose is the happiness of mankind. He chooses and uses 
 best means for this twofold purpose. 
 
 Mallock: 1. God misses bull's-eye ofteuer than He hits it. 
 
THESIS I 227 
 
 Answer. It all depends on what the bull's-eye is. If it is 
 the maturity of all seeds, yes ; if it is His glory, no. 
 
 0. In general, Darwin. Boedder, pp. 182-200. 
 
 According to his son Francis, Darwin never denied the exist- 
 ence of God. He first lost faith in the gospels, then faith in 
 God. He was a non-aggressive agnostic. He has three objec- 
 tions to argument from design: 
 
 1. There is no more design in organisms than in course the 
 wind blows. All adaptation in nature cannot be referred to 
 creative design. Instances, rocks from precipice to form house, 
 change of rock-pigeons into fantails, innocent man struck by 
 lightning, swallow devouring gnat. 
 
 Answer. Every effect in creation was foreseen by one act of 
 the mind, and at the same time ordained. 
 
 2. Rudimentary organs serve no purpose. 
 
 Answer. Man need not know purpose; angels perhaps know. 
 Clown visiting artist's workshop and amazed at utensils. St. 
 Augustine has fine passage on this subject. A surprised fly on 
 the top of Liberty Statue. Many assignable purposes, balance 
 of organism, excretions removing material from blood. 
 
 3. Suffering in sentient beings, without purpose. Men and 
 animals. Bacilli in human organism, cat teasing mouse. 
 
 Answer. Not for suffering's sake; God is not cruel or wan- 
 ton. Some higher purpose, patience, precautions for health. 
 Natural Selection regulates things for Darwin, but Natural 
 Selection calls for intelligence in Creator. 
 
 4. Different opinions about God. 
 
 Answer. About qualities, I grant; about existence, I deny. 
 
 5. Origin of things an insoluble mystery. Ergo agnostic. 
 Answer. He grants premisses and connection, but refuses 
 
 conclusion. That is skepticism. 
 
 6. Mind sprung from amoeba cannot solve problem. 
 Answer. This is false humility. The mind is spiritual, the 
 
 work of creation, and sprung from no amoeba. Darwin finishes 
 thus : " I have had no practice in abstract reasoning, and I 
 may be all astray." 
 
 P. Pantheism — Spinoza, Ficlite, Hegel. Boedder, pp. 200- 
 209. 
 
 1. Spinoza. Whole system based on definition of substance. 
 
228 NATURAL THEOLOGY 
 
 " That which is in itself, and is conceived by itself alone, that 
 is to say, that of which the concept can be formed without in- 
 volving any other concept." 
 
 Answer. Definition is ambiguous. It can mean a complete 
 individual physical being, as distinguished from its properties 
 and accidents, and this is correct; or self-existent being, inde- 
 pendent of every other being as subject of inhesion or produc- 
 ing cause, and this is pantheistic and wrong. Taken the sec- 
 ond way, tliere is only one substance, God ; taken the first way, 
 there are many substances. 
 
 2. Fichte: The Ego is all reality or God. Knowledge of 
 existences separated from the Ego impossible. This feature of 
 theory was suggested by Kant's doctrine about the speculative 
 reason's inability to have certainty regarding the objectivity of 
 things. The most expeditious w^ay to solve the difficulty was 
 to remove the object altogether, and make the world one infinite 
 subject, God. God, therefore, is all, and we are but modes and 
 accidents of God. The most expeditious w^ay to cure pain, is 
 to kill the patient. Fichte could find no bridge to carry him 
 from real subject to real object. If he sat down and thought 
 hard of the reality of his opponents, the process might prove a 
 help. 
 
 3. Hegel took the other alternative and did away with the 
 subject. With him God and Idea are one. This is to say that 
 Being and Idea are one. The statement is true of God alone, 
 not of men. In God, because of His simple essence, being and 
 idea are one. Everything in God is one. His divine essence. 
 With Hegel the universal alone is real, the singular is unreal; 
 and this theory dates back to Plato. He confounds things as 
 they are in themselves with things as they exist in our minds. 
 Of course the concept of being in general embraces all, God and 
 creatures. But no concrete reality corresponds to such concept. 
 It is a logical being, with mere foundation in fact. In Hegel's 
 theory all men would be one man, and a single death would be 
 the race's destruction. 
 
 N.B. Monists are atheists, because their god is no God at 
 
 aU. 
 
 Q. Aristotle and necessity of eternal motion, or an eternal 
 
 world. Boedder, pp. 209-214. 
 Aristotle admitted God, but had no idea of creation or pro-. 
 
THESIS I 229 
 
 ductioii from nothing. Hence his mistake. He has three ar- 
 guments to prove the world eternal : 
 
 1. A thing to be changed must exist, and a thing to exist must 
 be changed. Ergo, eternal change. 
 
 Answer. World comes of creation, production from nothing, 
 and this entails no real change. 
 
 2. Time means motion, and time had no beginning. Ergo, 
 motion is eternal. 
 
 Answer. Aristotle mixes time with duration. There are 
 two kinds of duration, time and eternity. Time means succes- 
 sion and has beginning. Eternity means no succession, and 
 has no beginning. Aristotle urges and says, before the first 
 moment of time there was no time. But the word before means 
 time before the first moment. Ergo, the very expression means 
 that time had no beginning. 
 
 Answer. The word before is said of imaginary time, it is a 
 help to language; or it may refer to eternal duration preceding 
 time. Kant uses same argument to prove the world eternal. 
 Empty time is impossible; and, unless the world exists from 
 eternity, there would be empty time preceding its creation. 
 
 Answer. Empty time is impossible, it is no time. Eeal time 
 began with the created world. Eternity alone existed before 
 that. 
 
 3. Motion is from God. God is unchangeable. Ergo mo- 
 tion is eternal. 
 
 Answer. God is free. His creative act is eternal, its effect 
 appeared in course of time. Like king's decrees. They are 
 made to-day, go into effect next year. Cousin urges a similar 
 difficulty; God had to create from eternity or not at all. Ergo, 
 world eternal. 
 
 Answer. He chose freely to create from eternity and have 
 effects appear in time. God is essentially a cause, only inas- 
 much as He can cause, not inasmuch as He actually causes. 
 He is a cause by extrinsic denomination when His effects ap- 
 pear. King and law, above. 
 
 R. Dean Mansel — Limits of Religious Thought. Eight lec- 
 tures at Oxford. Boedder, pp. 214-232. 
 
 His conclusion, difficulties are insuperable, but only subjec- 
 tive, not objective. Faith in Christ is enough. Spencer calls 
 this eternal war between our mental faculties and moral obli- 
 
230 NATURAL THEOLOGY 
 
 gations, the radical vice of religion. Here are Hansel's in- 
 superable difficulties : 
 
 1. The absolute and infinite being must contain all finite per- 
 fections and imperfections, all evil possible and actual. 
 
 Answer. Created perfections are in God not formally, but 
 eminently, stripped of their imperfection. Privation, like evil, 
 is not in God at all. Beauty is not lessened by its representa- 
 tion in wood, metal, stone; God is not lessened by creatures, 
 imperfect representations of Him. 
 
 2. The absolute being cannot be a cause, which says relation 
 to an effect. It cannot be infinite because of the added per- 
 fection accruing from new relation. 
 
 Answer. A free cause like God says no real relation. Ef- 
 fects work no change in God. All the change is extrinsic to 
 God. He is cause from eternity, His effects are in time. God 
 is His thought, not merely the cause of His thought. There 
 are no accidents in God, nothing but substance. 
 
 3. Consciousness destroys the absolute. It is relative, say- 
 ing subject and object. 
 
 Answer. That is hardly true of our own consciousness, much 
 less of God's. In God's knowledge subject and object are not 
 distinct. Even in our own case, consciousness can have self 
 for object. Subject and object are necessarily distinct only in 
 sensible knowledge, not in intellectual knowledge. 
 
 4. God's attributes are opposed to His simplicity. 
 Answer. His essence, in virtue of its self-existence, contains 
 
 without division and composition, equivalently and superemi- 
 nently all conceivable perfections. 
 
 5. He is omnipotent, and yet unable to do evil. 
 
 Answer. Evil as such is a privation, and no reality. God 
 cannot start to do something and do nothing. He is the cause 
 per accidens of evil, inasmuch as He is the cause per se of what- 
 ever physical reality attaches to moral evil. 
 
 6. God's wisdom and freedom are irreconcilable. 
 
 Answer. His decrees are from eternity, and as free as they 
 are eternal. There is a difference between necessarily or in- 
 fallibly knowing and knowing with necessity. 
 
 7. God cannot be a personal being, because personality is a 
 limitation and a relation. 
 
 Answer. Personality is subsistence of an intelligent nature. 
 
THESIS I 231 
 
 Subsistence means the existence of a natural whole, as distin- 
 guished from the existence of the component parts of a natural 
 whole. Arm and the body are examples of non-subsistent be- 
 ings. The soul enjoys incomplete subsistence. The whole man 
 is a subsistence. Our notion of personality involves no idea of 
 relation or limitation. Personality is not consciousness, though 
 it implies consciousness. Besides, consciousness does not neces- 
 sarily imply difference between subject and object. In psycho- 
 logical reflection subject and object are same. 
 
 S. Ingersoll, the American Agnostic. 
 
 Agnosticism in this country had an able defender in the per- 
 son of Col. Eobert G. Ingersoll, who two or three decades ago 
 traveled from city to city, delivering lectures with the avowed 
 purpose of shaking belief in the existence of God. He ac- 
 quainted the world with no new information, serving up only 
 the age-old difficulties answered time and time again. But he 
 was a speaker of remarkable skill, able to garnish his lies with 
 all the graces of eloquence ; and religious error, never without 
 its charms for the wicked, borrowed new attractiveness from 
 its advocate's smooth diction, splendid imagery and rhetorical 
 cunning. At the height of his success he ventured an article 
 in the North American Review of December, 1889. It was 
 entitled, " Why Am I an Agnostic ? " and can be considered a 
 fair specimen of his methods. We purpose a running commen- 
 tary on the article, quoting him verbatim, and answering as 
 circumstances require. 
 
 " The cruelties of a supposed Deity " — Can we account for 
 the cruelty of the judge, who condemns the murderer to death 
 by hanging; for the cruelty of the king, who throws into prison 
 the wretch presumptuous enough to slap him in the face; the 
 cruelty of the mother, who makes the flesh of her boy tingle 
 for some misdeed or other ; the cruelty of the farmer, who lines 
 the road to his orchard with watchdogs; the cruelty of the hus- 
 band, who looks on and sees his wife die; the cruelty of the 
 railroad director, who sits in his ofiice and reads of lives cut 
 down by his locomotive; the cruelty of the surgeon, who lances 
 the wound to effect a cure, who lops off an arm to keep the 
 heart going? We can; and it is no harder to account for the 
 cruelties of a supposed Deity. 
 
 "Why? why?? why???" Because He knew that sufferings 
 
232 NATURAL THEOLOGY 
 
 patiently endured in this life for His sweet sake, are pledges 
 of eternal felicity, and that Heaven is the reward of only he- 
 roic sacrifices; and because He knew that timely chastening is 
 most salutary medicine, and that briars scattered over some 
 paths liave led tlie travelers to pastures, from which roses 
 would have diverted them ; and because He knows that eternity 
 will furnish ample time for the adjustment of differences, and 
 the renewal of the quality of justice between destroyers of souls 
 and of bodies and their victims; because of innumerable other 
 reasons, which will occur in myriads to the mind of him, who 
 sits down and consults his own heart and his own unbiassed 
 judgment. 
 
 " The man who knows the limitations of the human mind," 
 is no Agnostic, unless the word has changed its meaning. In 
 sooth he is more gnostic or knowing than ordinary men, for 
 whom the terms, Creator, Preserver, Providence, have not lost 
 all meaning. The man who fails of ascertaining first or final 
 causes, of comprehending the supernatural, or of conceiving of 
 an infinite personality, so far from knowing the limitations of 
 the human mind, is ignorant of its most elementary capabilities. 
 The Agnostic can give no value to human testimony, as he can, 
 if logical, give no value to the testimony of intrinsic evidence 
 itself. As soon as he gives any value whatever to one or the 
 other, no matter how insignificant, he ceases to be an Agnostic. 
 
 The conclusions to which a mind comes do not make or 
 change the objective realities, which form the basis of the con- 
 clusion. The judgment a man forms can be tainted with pre- 
 judices and ignorance; but such judgments, as well as tliose 
 free from all taint, in nowise create or modify the realities in 
 themselves, which exist before and after all human judgments 
 with precisely the same characteristics. God's existence does 
 not depend on the fact that mankind universally recognizes it, 
 but this recognition depends on the fact that God exists. God's 
 existence is the foundation, its recognition is the house. This 
 universal recognition would in other words be impossible, un- 
 less God in reality existed. However, under given conditions, 
 such for instance as had place before the creation of man, God 
 could have existed and been entirely independent of all outside 
 recognition. Even now, though it is impossible for Him to 
 exist without a definite relation to man's recognition, this rela- 
 
THESIS I 233 
 
 tion is not that of dependence; it is not the relation between 
 man's knowledge of God's existence and that existence itself. 
 
 It does occur to man that it is necessary to account for the 
 existence of an infinite personality. In the opinion that there 
 can be a designer, who was not designed, there is no absurdity 
 whatever, if absurdity means a contradiction in terms. Man 
 does not take it for granted that matter was created and that 
 its Creator was not. He does not assume that a Creator ex- 
 isted from eternity without cause, and created what is called 
 matter out of nothing. Man, or at least man as a thinking 
 animal, assumes nothing, takes nothing for granted in this 
 matter, but what Ingersoll himself and men with a grain of 
 common sense assume and take for granted. In our thesis on 
 Creation we proved to the satisfaction of the thoughtful that 
 matter was created, and that its Creator was not. We proved 
 too, and later on will more explicitly prove, that this Creator 
 existed from eternity without cause, and that He created what 
 is called matter out of nothing. 
 
 " How could such a being be intelligent ? " He Himself, or 
 His unfathomable essence contained subjects enough, and more 
 than enough for thought. He could know Himself. 
 
 " How could such a being be powerful ? " Suppose that a 
 giant never struck a blow, never lifted a pin from the ground, 
 never once exerted the mighty force within him on outside 
 objects, would he therefore cease to be powerful? His essence 
 was from the beginning, to suggest an idea and a multitude of 
 ideas. What would be the consequence, if relations did not 
 exist in the sense in which Ingersoll understands them? In- 
 gersoll's mind is so that it can conceive aright of very little in 
 matters of a higher order, and nature has its Maker to thank 
 that in the present state of things matters depend very little 
 on Ingersoll's understanding or misunderstanding them; and 
 the sooner he wakes up to the full force of this little truth, the 
 better. 
 
 After all the works written on the subject, only ignorant 
 stupidity can confound creation with production without an 
 eflBcient cause. Nobody can conceive of production destitute 
 of both material and efficient cause; but production without a 
 material cause only, is easy enough of conception. We postu- 
 late nothing in this matter. We have already proved the ex- 
 
234 NATURAL THEOLOGY 
 
 istence of God, and He can well be efficient cause of creation. 
 
 " "We cannot conceive of the destruction of substance." His 
 reason for this assertion is threadbare and worthless, upset time 
 and time again. His persistence in clinging to all such worn 
 out and long exploded notions, is only another proof that In- 
 gersoll is either ver}' ignorant as far as acquaintance with books 
 is concerned, or very insincere. We cannot conceive of the de- 
 struction of substance, forsooth, because we never saw it de- 
 stroyed, nor otherwise experienced a sensation tallying with its 
 destruction. We could not, for precisely this same reason, con- 
 ceive of substance as it exists. We see and touch only acci- 
 dents. Yet IngersoU must feel sure that he has come to the 
 knowledge of or conceived substance, as it exists. He cannot, 
 however, he complains, conceive of substance destroyed or an- 
 nihilated. The indestructible certainly cannot be created ; but 
 outside of God everything is destructible, and therefore admits 
 of creation. 
 
 " These questions should be answered by every one," — not 
 according to the structure of his mind, but according to the 
 truth, according to the facts before him and visible to him. 
 
 " In the realm of thought majorities do not determine " for 
 the wise; but they generally have the truth on their side. The 
 flagman at a street-crossing does not determine the certain ap- 
 proach of the train ; but it is highly dangerous to cross the 
 tracks, when he signals you back. A gathering of clouds in 
 the sky does not necessarily determine a downfall of rain; but 
 when the clouds huddle together, it is imprudent to fare forth 
 attended by a high silk hat, without a rainstick or some such 
 protection. 
 
 " Each brain is a kingdom, each mind is a sovereign," but 
 some brains are kingdoms blessed with anarchy, some minds 
 are dethroned and puling sovereigns. The universality of a 
 belief tends always to prove its truth. In certain circumstances, 
 as in this question of God's existence, it absolutely proves its 
 truth. Belief in God and belief in the devil were produced by 
 neither ignorance, nor fear, nor selfishness. It is a fact of 
 history that the most ignorant nations have been the least re- 
 ligious, and that the most fearless and most magnanimous peo- 
 ples have been most steadfast and consistent in holding to the 
 notion of a divinity. Old Greece and old Rome are certainly 
 
THESIS I 235 
 
 far from being open to the reproach of ignorance, cowardice 
 and selfishness. But old Greece and old Kome were in the days 
 of their primal vigor devout servants of the beings, unworthily 
 of course regarded as gods, and their splendor faded away only 
 when this piety lost its hold on the races, and they strove to 
 forget God. Agnosticism is the fatal fruit of supine ig- 
 norance, of unmanly fear, and narrow selfishness. 
 
 The savage would not have invariably fallen prostrate, and 
 called on the Unknown, unless the Unknown were made fa- 
 miliar to him by the promptings of nature, an unerring guide 
 on occasions. This saving lesson of nature could not be lost, 
 but through the long night of savagery it grew brighter and 
 stronger, till to-day there is no conviction more widespread, 
 more firmly rooted. The undimmed lustre and unfllagging 
 strength of this lesson are sufficiently accounted for by the fact 
 that, though dispositions, and customs, and prejudices, and 
 fears, and ignorance can all undergo changes, man's nature and 
 its fundamental teachings are immutable, and undergo none of 
 the vicissitudes of time. The savage's heart told him, more 
 plainly than did his eyes reveal colors, that by his actions he 
 could offend and displease this Unseen, but well understood 
 Being. He took every care to propitiate God, and call down 
 God's blessings. To-day our patriotic fellow-citizens rear en- 
 during shafts to Lee, Grant, and hosts of others, who deserved 
 well of their countrymen. Even so the savage, untutored save 
 by nature, hewed out of stone or wood what he conceived to be 
 an image of this unseen being, and set it up in some conspicu- 
 ous place, where it would minister unto holy thoughts. If 
 some minds among them were gross enough to confound the 
 deity himself with these images, they belonged to idolaters, and 
 fell victims to an ignorance almost as excusable as that which 
 prompts the reiterated nonsense of misguided Protestants, touch- 
 ing Catholicity's reverence for images, relics and other objects 
 of devotion. 
 
 Integrity of life, the savage felt, was a bond of union be- 
 tween Heaven and earth, and the virtuous or the priests had 
 characteristics that endeared them to God, and served as claims 
 for more intimate and friendly intercourse with the Sovereign 
 Lord of all. Xowadays impulse teaches the most cultured and 
 the most unsophisticated alike, that a favor is most readily 
 
236 NATURAL THEOLOGY 
 
 obtained from the great through the intercession of a friend. 
 The god represented rudely in stone did not answer prayers 
 and protect his worshippers of old, precisely as our God to-day 
 seems not to answer prayers, seems not to protect His wor- 
 shipers. The prudent mother descends not to the silliness of 
 complying with her hopeful's every request. No miracles were 
 ever wrought by idols of stone, but miracles of the Christian 
 era 'are plentiful part and parcel of the world's history. Some 
 eyes are so that, let their owners tiy as they will, they can 
 never see blue otherwise than as green; some heads are so that 
 an abundant crop of hair nevermore will grace them. Asses, 
 they say, can be made enjoy a meal of shavings by adjusting 
 spectacles of the proper hue. Even so, Ingersoll's mind is so 
 that it is forced to the conclusion that substance is eternal, that 
 the universe was without beginning and will be without end, 
 that the substance of things is from eternity to eternity. Con- 
 stellations will of a surety fade, but not from the infinite 
 spaces. The mind capable of grasping infinite spaces, should 
 find little difficulty, it seems, conceiving an infinite being, or 
 God. Yes, the' questions of origin and destiny seem to be be- 
 yond the powers of the human mind, often alas! only because 
 the owner of the mind is too lazy and too dishonest to tax the 
 mind's powers to their fullest. I have fallen in with many a 
 dull boy, far beyond the powers of whose mind the open 
 mysteries of algebra seemed to be placed. 
 
 Love of parents and reverence for ancestors are motives not 
 to be spurned in choice of an opinion or dogma. But they 
 are not the real groundwork of a philosopher 's certainty about 
 the existence of God. The. fact that they persuade or urge to 
 the belief should not certainly be taken for proof conclusive 
 that the belief itself is to be departed from. Li fact the weight 
 of authority is on its side, and the mother's creed should not 
 be departed from until satisfactorily proved false. But Ag- 
 nostics and Free-thinkers are assuming a large contract, when 
 they undertake so to illumine mankind as to make evident the 
 falseness and hollowness, they fancy existing in our certainty 
 about the reality of God. I do not believe in the existence of 
 God, because my mother and father believed in it before me; 
 but because my own individual reason teaches me that such 
 belief alone is pro])er and justified by events about and around 
 
THESIS I 237 
 
 me. There can be in religion many sorts of progress; but in 
 point of dogma there can be no progress. The one religion in 
 Adam's time and the time of the apostles, was dogmatically as 
 perfect and as true as it is to-day, and as it will be at the end 
 of all time. The one true religion can be more and more widely 
 spread, and can claim, as the years roll on, more and more 
 subjects; our knowledge of its dogmas can grow, can pass from 
 implicit to explicit; but it was at the very origin of the race 
 as pure and as perfect and as true as it will ever be. There 
 may be progress in science, there may be progress in astronomy, 
 geology, philosophy; but in religions progress as such is im- 
 possible. 
 
 The Christian is sure that Mahomet was an impostor, not 
 simply because the people of Mecca declared him no prophet, 
 but from signs also that to any student of history are far more 
 unerring and unmistakable. Besides, the confession of the peo- 
 ple of Mecca with regard to their leader and prophet, would 
 have more weight in any court of justice than the denial of 
 Christ's Messiahship by Israel, whose sceptre and sway Christ 
 came to abolish. 
 
 The seven articles taught a man are not rolled up and 
 crammed down his throat; but they are proposed to his con- 
 sideration, and, unless reason has deserted him, he accepts 
 them; and, without a sigh of hesitancy, though they entail upon 
 him severe sacrifices and trials, he makes them the pole-star of 
 his pilgrimage. 
 
 If the average man seems to Ingersoll to merely feel, it is 
 because the truth of God's existence is so patent and so im- 
 bedded in our very nature, that reason accomplishes its work 
 with all the ease and facility commonly observed in operations 
 of the feelings. 
 
 There are unmistakable signs, by which the average man can 
 settle for himself whether his God is the true God or not; 
 whether the will of the true God is contained in his version of 
 the Holy Scriptures or not; whether the only true Church is 
 the one to which he belongs or not. There is no reason what- 
 ever why the average man should spend a single day in un- 
 certainty on these several points. Notice what a falling away 
 from his first position is evident in the stand here taken by 
 the Agnostic. He started out hymning the impossibility we 
 
238 NATURAL THEOLOGY 
 
 are under of ever arriving,' at certainty about God's existence. 
 The question is now not about God's existence, which no longer 
 seems to be disputed, but about the existence and elioice of the 
 true religion. 
 
 Multiplicity and variety of religion are no argument against 
 the existence of God. On the contrary, they are a weighty 
 element in the group of proofs adduced by the Theist against 
 the Atheist. If the average Christian had been born in Turkey, 
 he would not have been a Mohammedan, unless he willfully 
 closed his eyes to the light, and locked his mind to the entrance 
 of all thoughts in unison with reason. To escape the gross 
 error of ^Mohammedanism, he would not have had to read con- 
 troversial works, or peruse tracts spread broadcast. He would 
 have had simply to sit down and seriously think the matter 
 over. God has not left His creatures entirely to their veriest 
 whims and vagaries in choice of religion. He has endowed 
 reason with a sort of instinct, which, unless unduly tampered 
 with, weakened or annihilated, is unexceptionably sure to lead 
 man to the proper knowledge of his Creator, and of the service 
 most pleasing to Him. If the average man believes implicitly 
 in the religion of his country, because he knows nothing of any 
 other, and -has no desire to know, the fact is no necessity im- 
 posed upon him by nature; but is due to either his intellectual 
 inactivity or incapability. The true religion courts examina- 
 tion, and her deepest and firmest believers are those who have 
 investigated other creeds, -and come away with an utter disgust 
 for their hollowness and wretchedness. 
 
 It is unparliamentary and unkind to accuse anybody, no 
 matter how misguided he may be, of deliberately telling a lie. 
 But misunderstanding hardly does justice to tiie wide depar- 
 ture from the truth, evident in this assertion of Ingersoll, 
 " Then these same Christians say to the inhabitants of a Chris- 
 tian country. You must not examine, you must not investi- 
 gate; but, whether you examine or not, you must believe, or 
 you will be eternally damned." Christians say. If the result 
 of your examination is refusal to believe, and you live up .to it, 
 for the small pains taken to arrive at the truth, and for rejec- 
 tion of nature's most salutary and most unequivocal advice, you 
 will be eternally damned. The right to examine involves the 
 necessity to accept and reject, not to accept or reject. It in- 
 
THESIS I 239 
 
 volves the necessity to accept one and reject every other, if the 
 examination is to bear any fruit at all. It by no means in- 
 volves the necessity of rejecting all. Else it would be a futile 
 endeavor and mere waste of time and pains. Christians have 
 examined, and their search has not been without result; and 
 they have freely given to the world the conclusions attained to. 
 If Christians read the Koran or the religious writings of India 
 and China, the opinions transmitted to them by their ancestors, 
 if properly transmitted, would undergo no change whatever, 
 except perhaps in intensity of disgust for the absurd systems 
 there woven together. They have read IngersoU without harm, 
 and, as between IngersoU and the Koran, the Koran has fewer 
 points of danger. 
 
 Christians are more rational than to think only that the 
 true religion, which succeeds in staying volcanoes, earthquakes, 
 conflagrations. God has designs on the world, with which He 
 cannot, as it were. Himself interfere, and the will of vicious 
 man is a power against which no force can hold its own. The 
 real God looks on and smiles complacently at the calamities 
 that befall His servants, as they befell Job, because He knows 
 what a weight of glory the sufferings of this present time lay 
 up in Heaven, and because He knows full well that the pains 
 of this life are as nothing, compared with the joys of the life 
 to come. God does not necessarily favor His servants here 
 below, because eternity is the more proper period to devote to 
 such return of thanks. This is rather a place of probation, in 
 which the patience, and love, and sacrifice of His friends are 
 tested. For my part, I never feel easy when the current of 
 life runs smooth. There is about quiet and absence of trouble 
 an atmosphere of self-distrust, of dread that everything is not 
 right, and that God has perhaps stricken my name from the 
 roll of candidates for honor and conspicuous service. I almost 
 fancy that God is engaged in advancing the wages of past ef- 
 forts, and making payment in full now for what I would rather 
 have accumulate interest here, and be handed over in bulk only 
 in Heaven. The prosperity and ill-luck of nations alike de- 
 pend upon the providence of God; but neither the one nor the 
 other is an infallible sign of His pleasure or displeasure. 
 
 Infidels and Agnostics and heretics alone have neither praise 
 nor blame for any man, no matter what his creed. In this 
 
240 NATURAL THEOLOGY 
 
 point at least they are true to themselves, and to the tenets 
 they adopt. But the Catholic who has truth, and who is con- 
 scious that he alone has truth, is and ever will be at war with 
 the disseminators of false and pernicious doctrines. One error 
 can live at peace with another error, it can crave for peace, 
 when truth is nigh. But trutli can never lie down with false- 
 hood. Truth is essentially pugnacious, and cannot, without 
 being recreant to itself, throw do^vn its arms, till ever^-thing is 
 drawn unto it, till its reign is absolutely universal. This fact 
 will account for the intolerance of Catholicity and the dilly- 
 dallyism of Protestantism. This fact is a sufficient reason for 
 Rome's battle cry of, iSTo Compromise, and the Pope's refusal 
 to hear of half-measures towards reconciliation. Truth cannot 
 be reconciled with falsehood. Sooner will the earth and the 
 sky meet, sooner will the wolf make truce with the lamb. A 
 creed can be good, no matter what manner of man professes 
 it; but no thoroughly good man can long slave to an essen- 
 tially bad creed. " The brain of man has been the trysting- 
 place of contradictions," but truth is sure to always win before 
 the day is over. " Next to finding truth, the greatest honor 
 must be won in honest search " ; but search without any result 
 but falsehood is lamentable indeed, and deserving of honor 
 hardly even when truth is impossible as a result ; when such re- 
 sult is impossible, and known beforehand to be impossible, 
 search is pitiable in the extreme, as waste of time and of other- 
 wise profitable labor. 
 
 Ingersoll examined the religions of many countries and the 
 creeds of many sects, in much the same way as the boy who 
 once attempted to read without having mastered the alpliabet. 
 There are fundamental ideas, which must first be pondered and 
 appreciated, before an examination can be productive of proper 
 conclusions. One of these fundamental ideas, to which he is 
 apparently an utter stranger, is the historical fact that this 
 earth of ours is accursed of God, and that suffering and sorrow 
 patiently borne are the coin, with which the Son of God Him- 
 self purchased His glorious Resurrection, with which, there- 
 fore, we Hi.s brothers by adoption are to purchase Heaven. 
 Ingersoll's preference for Shakespeare is of about as much 
 value with men of sober thought, when judgment is to be 
 passed on the inspired writers, as the seven-year-old's prefer- 
 
THESIS I 241 
 
 ence for Mother Goose's Melodies, when Judgmtnt is to be 
 passed on the masterpieces of Homer, Sophocles, Demosthenes, 
 Virgil, Horace, and Cicero. In one case and the other ig- 
 norance accounts for the perverseness of taste. Humboldt, 
 Darwin, Laplace, Huxley and Tyndall, though guilty of many 
 gross inaccuracies, and eaten up with a false estimate of their 
 abilities, knew more about science than any knowledge the 
 writer of Genesis betrays. But Moses talked and wrote to be 
 understood by the men of his time, he made no pretensions to 
 scientific knowledge of a later date, and, in communicating his 
 rude notions about geology and astronomy, is nowise worthy 
 of blame. His business was to narrate the conduct of God 
 with His people, and, in knowledge bearing immediately on his 
 subject, he was incalculably far in advance of the modern 
 thinkers, who out of inane levity laugh at him. What Moses 
 intended to say was true. In matters of science he intended 
 to say what appeared to the senses, and not what was scienti- 
 fically accurate. We ourselves say that the sun rises and sets. 
 
 " We believe in the accumulation of intellectual wealth," 
 not in the stowing away of intellectual garbage and trash. We 
 believe in the intellectual wealth, which has the true ring of 
 genuine gold, which has truth stamped all over it, which frees 
 men from fear, and makes its owners light and buoyant with 
 the spirit of the liberty of the children of God, and with that 
 exuberance of feeling possible to only a deep, and solid, and 
 eternal love of God. Let us by all means acknowledge our 
 ignorance, when the subject is beyond our ken or the sphere of 
 our activity; let us reverently leave to God's time the depths of 
 mysteries, which elude our weak and limited reason. But let 
 us be men enough, when knowledge entails pain and sacrifice, 
 that can be shirked by a profession of ignorance; let us then, 
 I say, be men enough to rise up and say. We do know. 
 
THESIS II 
 
 God is infinite, altogether simple, and essentially one. 
 
 Boedder, pp. 85-109; Jouin, pp. 228-238. 
 
 QUESTION 
 
 In our first thesis we proved the existence of God. Unlike 
 St. Anselm, we kept always in the order of objective reality. 
 We did not pass from an abstract notion to the concrete ex- 
 istence of a being represented by that notion. On the con- 
 trary, we began with the concrete realities about and around 
 us, contingent beings in the universe, and deduced from these 
 concrete contingents the concrete existence of a concrete cause, 
 producing them. Himself not produced. God is, therefore, as 
 real, live and physical a being as His effects. He is no mere 
 notional or logical reality, or abstraction existent in the mind 
 alone, with no claim to a place in the objective order of things. 
 He is the First Cause, set at the head of the series, terminating 
 at this end in an effect. The notion effect touches Him not. 
 He is a producer merely, the cause of everything, with nobody 
 and nothing outside for His own cause. He is His own full 
 explanation, deriving neither His being nor His attributes from 
 aught else. He is the one being a se in the universe. Every- 
 thing else is a being ab alio. These expressions a se and ah 
 alio, interpreted, mean that, whereas God is the absolutely nec- 
 essary being, everything else is contingent. As the absolutely 
 necessary being, actual existence attaches to His person in much 
 the same way as roundness to the circle, rationality to the man. 
 Actual existence is, therefore, of His very essence, it is as im- 
 possible to think God non-existent as it is to think a square 
 circle. It is quite possible to think everything else non-existent, 
 because actual existence is a favor conferred on everything else 
 by the single necessary being, God. 
 
 We come now to the attributes of God. And here we must 
 remember that we are talking after the manner of men. At- 
 
 242 
 
THESIS II 243 
 
 tributes are accidents, and in strict language God is without 
 accidents. Accidents connote imperfection, and are wholly in- 
 compatible with necessary being. And yet the imperfect na- 
 ture of our knowledge constrains us to hold speech of God's 
 attributes, much as we talk of His eyes, hands and ears. God 
 has no eyes, hands or ears; but He possesses within Himself 
 whatever perfection these several organs .secure to their owners, 
 without the limitations attendant on sense-perception. In the 
 same way, God has no attributes, and yet we ascribe to Him 
 whatever perfection attaches to simplicity, unity, immutability, 
 eternity, immensity, wisdom, justice, pity and other qualities. 
 The necessary being is His attributes. Hence in exact lan- 
 guage God is wisdom, is justice, and mercy, and pity. His es- 
 sence is His all, and everything in God is one. Attributes over- 
 lap each other in God. Justice and mercy are one and the 
 same thing in God, His undivided and indivisible essence, 
 though we conceive and think them as distinct and separate 
 realities. One single cause can be the root-principle of many 
 different effects, and God's essence can display itself now as 
 wisdom, now as justice, now as mercy, without undergoing any 
 intrinsic change whatever. Among these so-called attributes of 
 God we reckon some fundamental, others accessory. Their re- 
 spective importance is wholly responsible for this division. The 
 fundamentals in our eyes serve as basis for the others, and the 
 three established in our present thesis are accounted such. To 
 prove whatever other attributes of God, we regularly appeal to 
 His infinity, simplicity and oneness; and these in turn are 
 rooted in His aseity or self-origination. 
 
 TERMS 
 
 God, the supreme being established in our first thesis; the 
 being a se, with self for single origin ; first cause of everything ; 
 creator of Heaven and earth; infinitely wise and holy, and 
 just; the artificer of creation; the rewarder of the just, and 
 avenger of the wicked; man's last end; the universally ac- 
 knowledged Lord and Master of created and contingent being. 
 Infinite wisdom, holiness and justice flow as corollaries from 
 our first thesis. Here we intend to prove God infinite in every 
 respect, and we take for granted only what we already proved. 
 
244 NATURAL THEOLOGY 
 
 Infinite — This word can prove misleading, because of the 
 double meaning it involves in Latin, if not in English. In 
 Latin it can mean unfinished, incomplete, a thing still in po- 
 tency to some finish or perfection; and this is what we call 
 infinite in privative sense. It denotes a being not yet in posses- 
 sion of some due or needed perfection. It must be plain that 
 infinite is not asserted of God in this first sense. Infinity of 
 the kind is imperfection, and imperfection has no part in God. 
 Infinite can likewise mean a thing that has no end or limit; 
 a thing, from which no perfection is absent; a thing so perfect 
 that nothing greater can be conceived or thought; and this is 
 what we call infinite in a negative sense, or in positivo-nega- 
 tive sense. God is infinite after this second manner. His 
 perfections are without bound and limit. He is so great that 
 nothing greater can be conceived or thought. 
 
 All-perfect and infinite are very much alike. All-perfect, 
 when restricted to actually existent perfections, falls short of 
 the infinite; when made to embrace as well all possible perfec- 
 tions, it coincides with the infinite. Infinite is the better term, 
 because it explicitly removes all limits, and this the term, all- 
 perfect, fails to do. Infinite is part negative, part positive. 
 It is the explicit denial of all limits, all imperfections, and the 
 implicit affirmation of all actual and possible, or real and think- 
 able perfections. The perfections within our acquaintance are 
 of many different kinds. Of these some are simple in the sense 
 of unmixed, and embody in ttheir concept no suspicion of im- 
 perfection ; others are mixed, and involve in their very essence 
 a touch of imperfection. Fair examples of the two are wisdom 
 and science, or knowledge gotten by intuition and knowledge 
 gotten by the roundabout and laborious process of reasoning. 
 In common with all perfections these two exist in God. Sci- 
 ence is as much His possession as wisdom. And yet science is 
 an imperfect perfection; and, to do God no offense, we must 
 maintain that science exists in Him quite otherwise than as 
 wisdom exists in Him. Other examples of mixed perfections 
 are quantity and courage. Quantity is essentially finite and 
 connotes parts; courage postulates an element of danger for its 
 owner. 
 
 Simple perfections are predicated of God one way; mixed 
 perfections, another. We distinguish three possible ways, 
 
THESIS II 245 
 
 formally, eminently, virtually. A perfection is formally resi- 
 dent in a being, if it belongs to the being in the full and com- 
 plete sense of its definition or essence. Whiteness is thus a 
 perfection of a white wall. A perfection is eminently resident 
 in a being, when present, not in the complete and full sense 
 of its definition or essence, but by way of inclusion in some 
 equivalent perfection of a higher order. Sense is thus con- 
 tained in intellect; and angelic knowledge is not formally, but 
 eminently sense-knowledge. To contain a mixed perfection 
 eminently, is more in God than to contain it formally, because 
 it is to contain the mixed perfection in an infinite, not a finite 
 way. God cannot formally contain a mixed perfection, He 
 cannot eminently contain a simple perfection. A perfection is 
 virtually resident in a being, when present causally, inasmuch 
 as the being is equal to the task of producing the perfection in 
 question. All the perfections of an apple are thus contained 
 in the parent tree, and every created perfection is thus con- 
 tained in God. Mixed perfections have no formal existence in 
 God, but only eminent or virtual. Created simple perfections 
 exist formally in God as simple perfections, eminently and 
 virtually as created; formally, because they exist in Him in 
 the full and complete sense of their definition or essence, which 
 by supposition involves no imperfection; virtually, because He 
 produces them; eminently, because the same or an equivalent 
 perfection in God embraces them in a surpassing way. Thus, 
 wisdom in God, considered as His essence, or the resultant of 
 His diiferent perfections, is equivalent to perfections specifically 
 infinite, and to an infinite number of perfections in each spe- 
 cies; and this is the same as saying that wisdom in God is in 
 reality every other conceivable perfection, infinite in point of 
 number and in point of intensity. This is not true of created 
 wisdom, or wisdom in man. 
 
 In the ontological order, the objective order, the order of 
 things as they are, all perfections are in God first, principally, 
 properly, and in an infinite manner; and they descend from 
 Him to creatures by the method of participation, secondarily, 
 metaphorically, by grace of a figure of speech. In the logical 
 order, the subjective order, the order of thought, or of things 
 as we think them, all this is reversed; and perfections as they 
 exist in creatures come first to our knowledge, principally, 
 
246 NATURAL THEOLOGY 
 
 properly, and in a finite way; and from them, as from effects, 
 we rise to God their cause by affirmation and negation, as- 
 cribing to God what is perfect in them, removing from God 
 what is imperfect in them, always with due regard to the ex- 
 cess or eminence the divine nature demands. These analogical 
 or metaphorical notions help us to only an inadequate or in- 
 complete knowledge of God's essence; and therefore our knowl- 
 edge of God at its best is essence-knowledge in only a wider 
 sense, inasmuch as we become aware of many attributes alto- 
 gether absolute, intrinsic and essential to God. 
 
 In spite of its imperfection our knowledge of God is still 
 true, even though our mode of knowing the infinite is different 
 from the infinite's mode of being ; because, while attributing 
 these perfections to God, we strip them of the manner of ex- 
 istence peculiar to them in creatures. Thus, in a confused and 
 obscure way we arrive at their mode of existence in God. On 
 this account we know in a measure, and in a measure we know 
 not what God is. We know not with adequate, complete and 
 literal or proper knowledge; we know inadequately, incom- 
 pletely, figuratively and by analogy. Life in man, because 
 created, is metaphorical life when compared with life in God. 
 Face, for instance, is said univocally of a, human being, ana- 
 logically of a portrait. Wihat a beautiful face ! is an exclama- 
 tion applicable to persons and pictures. The face of the man 
 is even less superior to the face in his portrait than whatever 
 perfection in God is to the same perfection in His creatures. 
 In the objective order things on earth are the analogues of God 
 in Heaven; in the logical order God is the analogue of things 
 on earth. 
 
 Hence we are far from classifying God with creatures, when 
 we attribute to Him perfections of the same name as perfec- 
 tions His creatures enjoy. To classify two or more beings 
 under the same species, the beings in question must be exactly 
 alike under at least one aspect. Thus, we are justified in 
 classifying men under one species, human, because individuals 
 of the race, no matter how marked and numerous their differ- 
 ences, are exactly alike in their possession of reason. But God 
 and creatures are exactly alike under no single aspect. Even 
 in point of being, the most general notion within our ac- 
 quaintance, they are different. God is being a se; creatures are 
 
THESIS II 247 
 
 beings ab alio. And this difference is brought out in the ex- 
 pression, God is wisdom, while man merely has wisdom. God 
 is whatever is, man has things that are. 
 
 Locke thinks that our notion of infinite is gotten from the 
 addition of finite to finite, but he is sadly mistaken. No such 
 addition results in more than the finite. For this very reason 
 an infinite number and an infinite space are equally absurd. 
 Number is a collection of units, and no such collection is so 
 great that the addition of another unit is inconceivable. If it 
 ever became infinite, the removal of one unit would make it 
 finite, and its infinity would be made up of the remaining 
 finite number and the removed finite unit. Space is made by 
 the dimensions between the surfaces of a body or bodies. These 
 dimensions can never become so large as not to allow of a 
 larger. If space were infinite, a part, say a cubic inch, would 
 be contained in it an infinite number of times, and infinite 
 number is absurd. No less so is infinite space. Number and 
 space can readily be conceived as indefinite, so great that every 
 assignable number and every assignable space are as nothing in 
 comparison with them; but the indefinite, while unlimited in 
 potency, is always limited or finite in fact. 
 
 Spinoza in his pantheistic way writes, God is not infinite. 
 He is nothing but the energy of nature scattered in creatures. 
 Hobbes teaches that the infinite means nothing more than our 
 own want of power, as who should say, we know not whether 
 God is without limit, and wherein His limitations consist. 
 Some Traditionalists and Scholastics maintain that reason can- 
 not prove God infinite; but in the main the position they take 
 admits of explanation. 
 
 Altogether Simple — physically and metaphysically. Simpli- 
 city is the denial of composition. A compound being has parts, 
 a simple being has none. These parts may be physical or 
 metaphysical. Physical parts are realities quite independent of 
 the mind, one different from the other, uniting to form a com- 
 plete being called the whole. Instances are, body and soul in 
 man; head, arms, trunk, limbs in body; mind and its thoughts 
 in soul; hydrogen and oxygen in water; matter and form in 
 body and water. 
 
 Metaphysical parts are concepts, dependent on the mind for 
 their reality, with foundation in fact, one different from the 
 
248 NATURAL THEOLOGY 
 
 other, uniting to form a complete being called the whole. In- 
 stances are, aniniality and rationality in man; essence and ex- 
 istence in soul. 
 
 Logical parts are concepts dependent on the mind for their 
 reality, with no foundation in fact, different aspects of one and 
 the same thing, uniting to form a complete being called the 
 whole. Instances are, memory, mind and will in the soul; 
 man and brute in animal. The soul is really distinct from its 
 faculties with an inadequate distinction. This is far from 
 making the faculties physical or metaphysical parts of the soul. 
 They are different views of one and the same soul. The soul 
 is each of its faculties and more besides. Wholes are physical, 
 metaphysical or logical, according as the parts constituting them 
 are physical, metaphysical or logical. A thing physically sim- 
 ple can be considered a metaphysical or logical compound. 
 The soul is an example. A physically simple substance can be 
 considered a physical compound in combination with its acci- 
 dents. The soul admits of this composition, and it is far from 
 affecting the soul's substantial simplicity. It has no existence, 
 when the soul is oonsidered apart from its accidents. Logical 
 composition is compatible with physical and metaphysical sim- 
 plicity. The thing in question is simple and without parts, 
 logical composition results from viewing this simple being un- 
 der different aspects. Man and brute are no physical or meta- 
 physical parts of animal, because man is animal, and brute is 
 animal. Animality and rationality are metaphysical parts of 
 man, because man is neither animality nor rationality, but a 
 combination of the two. They are not physical parts of man, 
 because they are mere concepts, and never exist as such outside 
 the mind. Memory, mind and will are neither physical nor 
 metaphysical parts of the soul, because memory is the soul 
 exercising a certain function, mind is the soul exercising an- 
 other function, and will is the soul exercising a third function. 
 Logical composition is altogether on the part of the thinker, 
 and leaves the being's simplicity untouched. It can therefore 
 be without harm recognized in God. Metaphysical composition 
 offends against perfect simplicity, and must be excluded from 
 God. It is a quality native to everything less than God, be it 
 an angel or a soul. Everything less than God, every contingent 
 being, is certainly made up of the metaphysical parts, essence 
 
THESIS II 249 
 
 and existence, one of which is not the other, the two uniting to 
 constitute the being in question, whether angel or soul. Exist- 
 ence is of tlie essence of a necessary being, one is the other, 
 and there can be no union or composition between one and the 
 same thing. Physical composition is grosser than metaphysical, 
 and with all the more reason has no place in God. And now 
 to resume. Physical composition goes into these classes, matter 
 and form, integral parts, substance and accident, accident and 
 accident, substance and substance. Metaphysical composition 
 goes into essence and existence, genus and difference. Logical 
 composition goes into faculties of soul, genus and species. 
 
 Simplicity means more than unity. One means undivided, 
 simple means indivisible. Unity excludes division, while it is 
 compatible with composition. Man is an example. Simplicity 
 excludes composition as well as division. The soul is an ex- 
 ample. Viewed substantially the soul is physically simple. 
 Viewed with its accidents it is a physical compound; but, as 
 before remarked, this physical composition affects not the soul 
 itself, but the soul in connection with its accidents, which may 
 be present or absent without at all touching the soul's sub- 
 stance. There is no substantial composition in God, because a 
 physical substantial whole is made up of, and dependent on, 
 parts different from itself, and God can be dependent on noth- 
 ing different from Himself. There is no accidental composi- 
 tion in God, because an accidental physical whole results in part 
 from an accident, an accident is an added perfection or modifi- 
 cation, and to God no perfection or modification can be added. 
 There is no metaphysical composition in God, because its founda- 
 tion is contingency, as is evident in essence and existence; and 
 there is no contingency in God, the one necessary being. The 
 metaphysical composition of genus and difference is absent from 
 God, because He can be classed under no genus. He is per- 
 fectly similar to creatures in no respect, and genus is constituted 
 by mutual and perfect similarity in some one respect. His 
 justice, on account of its independence, is not perfectly similar 
 to any created justice; and so of His very being and the rest. 
 Animal in man is perfectly similar to animal in brute. Each 
 divine attribute coincides with the divine substance; and each 
 implies the rest, though it fails to express them. His attributes 
 are absolutely inseparable in their application to objective re- 
 
250 NATURAL THEOLOGY 
 
 ality. The}' are not metaphysically compounded, though meta- 
 physically distinct. Compounded things must be distinct, but 
 distinct things need not be compounded. The Three Divine 
 Persons are really distinct, but they are not compounded into 
 one Godliead, because they are really identical with the God- 
 head. The Three Persons are virtually distinct from the God- 
 head, but they are not virtually compounded into the Godhead, 
 because the concept of each Divine Person involves the concept 
 of the Godhead. Therefore, the mystery of the Trinity is not 
 opposed to the physical or metaphysical simplicity of God. 
 
 Essentially one. Unity is the denial of division, and pertains 
 to whatever being is in itself undivided. Units or ones are of 
 as many different kinds as there are degrees of unity. The 
 whole world in spite of its divisions can be called one in vir- 
 tue of logical unity, a figment of the mind with no foundation 
 in fact. The world is no more a real one than two separate 
 loads of sand are one load. The connecting bond between its 
 parts is wanting. Other units are real ones, in virtue of a 
 real unity, nowise dependent on the mind for its reality, and 
 this because they are actually undivided or indivisible or, though 
 divided and divisible, held tight together by a connecting bond. 
 An inch, a foot, a yard is called a mathematical one or unit, 
 inasmuch as it is a basis or foundation for number or measure. 
 Whatever can be called a being is a transcendental one, and this 
 again goes into individual and formal ones. Peter is an indi- 
 vidual one, inasmuch as he is not only undivided in himself, 
 but also separated from everything else; and whatever exists 
 in the world of realities is affected by this individual unity. 
 Formal unity belongs to essences, making them ones, though 
 they are compounded of different notes. Man in spite of ra- 
 tionality and animality is one after this fashion. Simple be- 
 ings vindicate to themselves the highest hind of created unity, 
 called that of indivisihility. Tliey are one in such a way that 
 they are not only undivided but indivisible in themselves. 
 Physically considered, the soul rejoices in this supreme degree 
 of unity. ]\Ietaphysically considered, it lacks the quality; for 
 GK>d alone is both metaphysically and physically simple. Unity 
 of composition belongs to beings resulting from union of two 
 or more principles intended by nature to form them. Tt ren- 
 ders a thing actually ui>divided without removing the possibil- 
 
THESIS II 251 
 
 ity of division or separation; and man, as composed of body 
 and soul, is such a unit. The unity of art belongs to works of 
 skill or mechanism, which, having no very close physical con- 
 nection between their parts, preserve throughout a sort of order 
 and relation. A house, a coat, a chair are ones of this sort. 
 Unity of aggregation is in force where things have among them- 
 selves no other connection than that of nearness of position, 
 as may be seen in a heap of stones, a pile of sand, a mound of 
 earth. After all, these different varieties of unity, because 
 proper to creatures, have little or nothing to do with our 
 thesis. We here affirm of God a oneness peculiar to Himself, 
 and altogether outside the range of created nature. Essential 
 unity can be predicated of no creature; transcendental unity 
 in some or other degree is the highest of which it is capable. 
 Essential unity makes God one in such a manner that He is not 
 only undivided and indivisible in Himself, hut He is the only 
 God, the only one of a kind, and a class hy Himself. God is 
 no genus like animal. He is no species like man. There are 
 many men, there is only one God. Again, the Latins had two 
 words for our one : unus and unicus. God is more than unus or 
 one; He is unicus, and we have no English equivalent, except- 
 ing perhaps unique. God the Father, God the Son, and God 
 the Holy Ghost, are not like man A, man B, and man C. 
 The Three Divine Persons have one and numerically the same 
 individual essence; each of the three men has his own indi- 
 vidual essence, and that of A belongs not to B or C. As St. 
 Thomas puts it, the oneness and commonness of human nature 
 are not an objective reality, but a subjective consideration; 
 while the actuality signified by the divine essence is one and 
 common as an objective reality. In separate human natures 
 we have not real identity, but only similarity ; and in the Three 
 Divine Persons we have real identity of nature. We are not 
 concerned with the Trinity, that question belongs to dogmatic 
 theology. We have but to prove God one in essence. 
 
 It is hard to comprehend how men could make a mistake in 
 this matter of God's oneness; but the fact stands, whatever its 
 explanation; and while God in modern times is made one too 
 few, in ancient times He was made several too many. Poly- 
 theism is opposed to Monotheism, and is of many different 
 kinds. Some contend that it was the primitive form of reli- 
 
252 NATURAL THEOLOGY 
 
 gion, and that by successive stages of evolution it grew, as 
 civilization advanced, to Monotheism. But these men have 
 small or no regard for the Bil)le. Genesis is clear evidence 
 that Adam and all his posterity down to the time of Abraham 
 worshiped one God. Idolatry saw the beginning of polythe- 
 ism, and the Chaldeans would seem to have been its first pro- 
 moters. The stars and planets were divinities in their eyes. 
 From them the mistake passed to the Egyptians and Phoeni- 
 cians, the Greeks and the Romans. Men and the devil were 
 responsible for idolatry. Men got themselves ready for the 
 abomination in a threefold way : They allowed their esteem 
 for relatives and heroes to usurp the place of God in their 
 thoughts. They allowed their admiration for works of art 
 to exceed due bounds. They dulled their minds by grosser 
 crimes, and fell away from right knowledge of God, to fasten 
 their hearts on creatures of surpassing beauty or power. The 
 devil finished the work by making the idols his oracles and in- 
 struments in the performance of various prodigies. The sin 
 assumed many different phases, astrolatry, demonolatry, an- 
 thropolatry and fetish-worship. With the Greeks no mountain, 
 hill, river or spring, no tree or plant was without its divinity. 
 Varro counts up 300 Jupiters and 6,000 lesser gods. The 
 Hindoos had 33 million gods; some say 300 millions. The 
 Japanese maintain pagodas where as many as 33,333 deities 
 are worshiped, each with its own statue. The ancient Mexi- 
 cans honored at least 2,000 gods. The Egyptians were famous 
 for the queer beings they selected as objects of worship, onions, 
 garlic, crocodiles, snakes, dogs, cats, hawks, crows, goats, scor- 
 pions, bats, mice, cows. 
 
 Lamennais, on this subject of idolatry, makes a statement not 
 borne out by history, and Protestants employ it against 
 Catholicity's veneration of images. He maintains that pagans 
 gave their idols only relative worship, of the same nature as 
 that accorded images by Catholics. But pagans themselves 
 bear opposite witness, and they ought to know their own minds 
 better than Lamennais. They testify that they regarded their 
 idols gods, no mere representations, and paid them absolute 
 worship. In cases where pagan worship was merely relative, 
 the gods their idols represented were false gods, and all such 
 worship was decidedly wrong. The old Greeks and Romans 
 
THESIS II 253 
 
 were examples. We Catholics render absolute worship to God 
 alone in person, relative worship to His images. The homage 
 we pay the Blessed Virgin Mary and the saints, as well per- 
 sonally as in their statues, is purely relative. In person they 
 are mere creatures like ourselves, though closer friends to God; 
 and their statues are possessed of no divinity, but persevere 
 without change the material of which they are made. A piece 
 of marble shaped to represent Washington gets more honor at 
 the hands of Americans than the same piece of marble ready 
 for work in the sculptor's studio; and Americans are no idola- 
 ters. 
 
 DIVISION" 
 
 Three Parts, I, II, III 
 I, Infinite; II, Simple; III, One 
 
 PROOFS 
 
 /. Ood is infinite. 
 
 1°. The absolutely necessary being, God, cannot be finite. 
 Ergo, God is infinite. 
 
 With regard to the Antecedent: 
 
 It would be absolutely necessary inasmuch as it is infinite, 
 or inasmuch as it is finite in such or such a degree. But 
 neither holds true. Not the first, because in that case all 
 finites would be absolutely necessary, or incapable of change; 
 and our experience is other. Not the second, because in that 
 case, since no finite is so great that greater and greater cannot 
 be conceived, there would be an endless multitude of absolutely 
 necessary beings, whereas there can be but one absolutely nec- 
 essary being. If there were two absolutely necessary beings, 
 they would have different essences. If one had actual exist- 
 ence for essence, the other could have only possible existence 
 for essence, and would be contingent. It would therefore be 
 at the same time necessary and contingent, a square circle, a 
 contradiction in terms. 
 
 N.B. When we say that a thing is whiteness itself, that a 
 wicked deed is baseness itself, that an orator is eloquence 
 
254 NATURAL THEOLOGY 
 
 itself, we are captive to the notion of infinite our argument 
 contains. We merely contend that God is infinite, because He 
 is being itself, ipsum esse. As whiteness, baseness and elo- 
 quence are forms conceived in the mind as bases of certain 
 specific qualities or perfections, so being is the form conceived 
 as basis of every quality or perfection conceivable. Being is 
 basis of whatever perfection, because unless it is, it is nothing. 
 Therefore, in ascribing being to (xod as His essence, we are 
 ascribing to God every conceivable perfection in every con- 
 ceivable degree, which is infinity. 
 
 2°. An actual being is infinite, when it suggests no suffi- 
 cient reason for limit. But God, as unproduced, is such a be- 
 ing. Ergo, God is infinite. 
 
 With regard to the Minor: 
 
 In case of a produced being its efficient cause suggests limit. 
 It is due to, this particular cause and no other. The unpro- 
 duced being is without efficient cause, and limit can accrue to 
 it only in virtue of its essence. Its essence, however, can ex- 
 clude no simple perfection and no mixed perfection, when rid 
 of its imperfections. Essence excludes only what conflicts with 
 essence, only what in combination with essence would provoke 
 contradiction. But contradiction is out of the question, where, 
 as in this case, everything is affirmation. On the one hand 
 God is being itself, ipsum esse; on the other, simple perfection 
 and mixed perfection, when rid of imperfections, are pure 
 affirmations without a trace of negation. Contradiction is im- 
 possible without a negation or denial. A square circle is a 
 square-not-square. 
 
 3°. God is the actual or possible maker of all else, actual 
 and possible. But the maker of all else is infinite. Ergo, 
 God is infinite. 
 
 With regard to the Minor: 
 
 The maker of a thing gives the thing its perfections. No- 
 body gives but what he first has. Ergo as maker of all else, 
 actual and possible, God has all perfections, actual and pos- 
 sible, which is infinity. 
 
 4°. All conceivable perfections are either unproduced and 
 necessary, or produced and contingent. But the absolutely 
 
THESIS II 255 
 
 necessary being ought to possess both kinds, and therefore be 
 infinite. Necessary perfections partake of the necessary being's 
 nature, and cannot exist apart from it. Contingent perfec- 
 tions exist only by favor of the necessary being's efficiency; 
 and, since nobody gives but what he first has, this necessary 
 being possesses all the actual and possible perfections resident 
 in His effects, actual and possible. Possible perfections are 
 producible, and get their producibility from God. 
 
 5°. Actual creative power is infinite. Grod is creator. Ergo, 
 God is infinite. 
 
 With regard to the Major: 
 
 Actual creative power is infinite, because it produces some- 
 thing from nothing, and is independent of every outside agency. 
 
 PEINCIPLES 
 
 A: Infinity is perfection, perfection means finish, and is of 
 two kinds, relative and absolute. Perfection makes a thing per- 
 fect, and a thing can be perfect in two ways, simply perfect 
 and perfect after a manner, or perfect privatively and perfect 
 negatively. That is perfect after a manner, which has every- 
 thing its nature demands for wholeness and completeness; and 
 creatures as well as God are perfect in this sense. That is 
 simply perfect, which has every perfection, every conceivable 
 degree of being and reality, and every perfection is its due in 
 such sense that no perfection at all can be absent from it either 
 privatively or negatively. When some perfection is absent from 
 a thing, that thing is called imperfect. A perfection is pri- 
 vatively absent from a thing, when the thing's nature demands 
 its presence or possession. A perfection is negatively absent 
 from a thing, when the thing's nature makes no such demand, 
 when the thing's nature is complete and whole without the 
 absent perfection. Sight is privatively absent in a blind man; 
 negatively absent in a stone. A blind man is privatively im- 
 perfect, a blind stone is negatively imperfect, and a negatively 
 imperfect thing can be a privatively perfect thing. In the 
 case of God, because all being or reality is His due, as the 
 ens a se, the absolute, the necessary, to be negatively imperfect 
 would amount to being privatively imperfect too. Sight can 
 
256 NATURAL THEOLOGY 
 
 be absent from the stone without rendering it truly and really 
 imperfect, nothing can be absent from God without rendering 
 Him truly and really imperfect ; and this presence of every- 
 thing in God constitutes His infinity. 
 
 B: God is the greatest conceivable being. ISTo greater, no 
 better being than God can be conceived or thought, because 
 His essence is being, He is being itself. In other words, He 
 contains within Himself the plenitude or completeness of all 
 being and the reality of every perfection. 
 
 C: God is first principle. But first principles are imper- 
 fect, because they unite to form something complete and per- 
 fect. Ergo, God is imperfect. 
 
 Answer: God is first principle in the sense of efficient cause, 
 I grant; in the sense of formal or material cause, I deny. 
 
 D: That is perfect which is finished, completed, totally 
 made. But the term " made " has no place in God. Ergo. 
 
 Answer: Taken radically or in root, perfect means made, 
 I grant; taken in its true and universally received sense, I 
 deny. 
 
 St. Gregory explains. As best we can, we proclaim in a 
 stammering way the lofty attributes of God. Certainly, what 
 is not made cannot in strict language be called completely or 
 totally made, or perfect. But, because a thing in process of 
 making passes from potency to act, we denominate perfect what- 
 ever actually exists, whether its mode of existence is perfect 
 or imperfect. 
 
 E: Infinity involves a multitude of perfections, and there- 
 fore destroys simplicity. Ergo. 
 
 Answer: These perfections are many a parte rei, as a mat- 
 ter of fact, separate realities outside of the mind, I deny; 
 many a parte mentis, as a matter of thought or notional, con- 
 stituting one physically simple reality in God, I grant. St. 
 Thomas explains. A king's power in much the same way con- 
 tains all the scattered particles of authority resident in his 
 officials. 
 
 F: God is all being, and this sounds like Pantlieism. 
 
 Answer: God is all being in the sense that He is the formal 
 being of everything else, in the sense that nothing has being 
 but God, I deny; in the sense that no grade of perfection, no 
 degree of being can possibly or actually exist without in some 
 
THESIS II 257 
 
 way belonging to Grod, I grant. This illustration may serve to 
 elucidate things. The fact that some man is a substance, with 
 a body, life, sense and intellect, is far from eliminating or 
 annihilating other substances, bodies, life, senses, and intellects. 
 In the same way the fact that God is all being, or possesses 
 within Himself the plenitude of being, is far from denying the 
 existence of other beings and other realities besides God and 
 distinct from God. If God is creator, there must be other 
 beings proceeding from His hands, and dependent on His might 
 for existence. 
 
 0: To be is God's essence. But naked being says nothing 
 of life, or knowledge, or freedom. Ergo, God is imperfect. 
 
 Answer: God's essence is being of itself subsistent, I grant; 
 abstract being, which bases the actuality of whatever exists, I 
 deny. The being we affirm of God is, like His wisdom, a con- 
 crete and subsistent reality. The being we affirm of creatures 
 is an abstraction of the mind, with no concrete substantial re- 
 ality in fact. Hence being embraces in God every possible and 
 actual perfection. Our way of thinking makes these perfec- 
 tions different formalities from God's being, but in reality they 
 are one and the same with His being. 
 
 H: The infinite cannot be a person, because a person is 
 distinct from others, and distinction means limit. So the Ger- 
 man Transcendentalists argue. 
 
 Answer: God is infinite and undetermined negatively, not 
 privatively — Privatively means without actuality, unfinished, 
 lacking some further perfection. Negatively means with ac- 
 tuality, and without limit; lacking no perfection, but distinct 
 from everything else. 
 
 PEOOFS 
 
 //. Ood is absolutely simple, (a) no physical composition in 
 God; (h) no metaphysical composition in God. 
 
 (a) The physical parts in God would be beings a se or be- 
 ings ab alio. Were they beings a se, each part would be infinite 
 and God, without the others. "Were they beings ab alio, a col- 
 lection of contingent beings would constitute a necessary being, 
 and this is absurd. 
 
 (b) Every metaphysical compound can be conceived as dif- 
 
258 NATURAL THEOLOGY 
 
 ferent from what it in reality is. But this is impossible in 
 God, the necessary being. Ergo, G^d is metaphysically simple. 
 
 With regard to the Major: 
 
 Peter is a metaphysical compound inasmuch as he is made 
 up of possible and actual existence. He can be stripped of 
 actual existence, and conceived as a mere possible. Animality 
 and rationality in the man admit of the same mental separa- 
 tion, and one can be conceived without the other. 
 
 With regard to the Minor: 
 
 Because God's essence is actual being, He can be conceived 
 or thought only as He actually is, and to think Him actually 
 non-existent, or to think Him in some different state or con- 
 dition, involves intrinsic contradiction. 
 
 PRmCIPLES 
 
 A: One simple cause produces one simple effect. Ergo, 
 God is not simple. 
 
 Answer: When the cause is a necessary agent, I grant; 
 when it is free, I again distinguish, if it is one and simple in 
 fact and in power, I grant; if it is one and simple in fact, 
 manifold in power, I deny. 
 
 B: Compounds are better than simples. Ergo, God not 
 simple. 
 
 Answer: In the world of bodies, I grant; in the world of 
 spirits, I deny. Composition perfects bodies; simplicity per- 
 fects spirits, and God is a spirit. 
 
 C : If simple, God could be completely and entirely known, 
 or comprehended. Ergo. 
 
 Answer: He could be known whole and wholly, I deny; 
 He could be known wliole, but not wholly, I grant. Because 
 He cannot be known wholly. He cannot be comprehended. St. 
 Thomas explains. The measure in which God can be known 
 is infinite, man's mind is finite. Ergo, man cannot wholly 
 know God. There are no parts in God. Ergo man must 
 know Him whole, or not know Him at all. Comprehension is 
 perfect knowledge, and knows its object in every conceivable 
 detail. 
 
THESIS II 259 
 
 D: Every compound can be reduced to its simples; and, to 
 avoid infinite series, we must come at last to some absolutely 
 simple thing. Ergo, God is not the only absolute simple. 
 
 Answer: Nothing outside of God escapes metaphysical com- 
 position. 
 
 E: God has many perfections. Ergo, God is not simple. 
 
 Answer: Many in themselves, I deny; many in our mind, 
 I grant. God's essence is one, and equivalent to many. 
 
 F: In God there is something common and something 
 proper, nature and personality. Ergo. 
 
 Answer: The common and proper are in fact one and the 
 same thing, I grant; not one and the same thing, I deny. 
 
 0: To be one in one is more simple than to be one in 
 several. God is one in several. Ergo. 
 
 Answer: If that one is itself in the several, and tlie several 
 are constituted by personalities and relations, I deny; if that 
 one is a distinct thing in the several, I grant. God is one and 
 three ; but the three are one in essence. 
 
 H: The Three Persons in God are three things, according 
 to St. Augustine. But three things give composition. Ergo, 
 God is not simple. 
 
 Answer: Three things have composition, when united among 
 themselves, I grant; when not united, I deny. St. Thomas 
 explains. The Three Persons involve no composition. The 
 Three Persons, compared with God's essence, are one and the 
 same with it; and therefore there is no composition, which 
 demands union. 
 
 /; Equality and inequality are in God, as in Trinity and 
 towards creatures. Likeness is in God, man being made to His 
 image and likeness. But quantity is basis of equality and in- 
 equality, quality is basis of likeness. Ergo, accidents are in 
 God. Ergo, God is not simple. 
 
 Answer: Accidents are in God as they are in creatures, I 
 deny; virtually in God, God's substantial perfection is equiva- 
 lent to the perfection contained in quantity, quality and other 
 accidents, I grant. 
 
 J: Wisdom, justice and the like are accidents in man. 
 Ergo, in God, and He is compound. 
 
 Answer: Accidents in man are not accidents in God, be- 
 cause nothing is predicated univocally of God and creatures. 
 
260 NATURAL THEOLOGY 
 
 K: God can be thought without goodness, wisdom and the 
 like. Ergo, they are accidents. 
 
 Answer: God can be thought incompletely without them, 
 I grant; completely, I deny. 
 
 L: God can be a species under substance, when substance 
 is taken to mean a being in itself, without reference to the 
 mode of its origin. One species would be a being in itself, 
 whose essence is existence, God; the other species would be a 
 being in itself, whose essence is not existence, creatures. 
 
 Answer: Taking substance in this precise sense, being in 
 itself, whose essence is existence, could not be ranged under it 
 as under a genus, just as an animal, that would be by its es- 
 sence a rational animal, could not be ranged under animal, 
 prescinding from rationality and irrationality. God is transcen- 
 dental substance, not predicamental. He is substance and 
 everything in transcendental sense, as creatures are beings. 
 Everything is being, not everything is substance. 
 
 PROOFS 
 
 III. God is essentially one. 
 
 God is a being of such sort that no greater or more perfect 
 can be conceived or thought.^ 
 
 But in the event of several gods, none would be such. Ergo, 
 God is essentially one. 
 
 With regard to the Minor: 
 
 Each of these several gods would be equal. But he who 
 has no equal is greater than he who lias. Ergo, a greater can 
 be conceived. If one of the several could hinder the others, 
 the others would not be omnipotent. If one could not hinder 
 the others, he would not be omnipotent. 
 
 PRINCIPLES 
 
 A : There are two kinds of unity, transcendental and mathe- 
 matical. The first is constituted by absence of division; and 
 God is more than undivided. He is because of His simplicity 
 absolutely indivisible. Ergo, His transcendental unity is of 
 the highest. He is besides mathematically one. He is the 
 
THESIS II 261 
 
 only one of a kind, possible as well as actual. And this is 
 what we mean when we say that God is essentially one. 
 
 B: These several gods could agree to always do and wish the 
 same thing. Ergo, no conflict. 
 
 Answer: If this agreement were necessary', they would not 
 be free, and that would be an imperfection. If the agreement 
 were free, their condition would be mutual dependence, dif- 
 ferences and displeasure would be possible, and that would be 
 imperfection. 
 
 C : The Three Persons are not three gods, because they have 
 numerically one and the same nature. Though really distinct 
 among themselves, each is identical with the one divine na- 
 ture, each is infinite, each is in the others, each formally pos- 
 sesses all the perfections of the others, because God's essence is 
 God's perfections, and each Person is identical with the one 
 divine essence. 
 
 D: God, as the most perfect being, ought to be able to pro- 
 duce a being like Himself. Ergo, several gods. 
 
 Answer: The axiom is true of beings, whose nature can be 
 multiplied in different individuals, I grant; of the being whose 
 nature cannot be so multiplied, I deny. 
 
 E : God would not be omnipotent or supremely good. Ergo. 
 
 Answer: An essentially infinite being cannot be the effect 
 of omnipotence, because a produced being of the kind is an in- 
 trinsic contradiction. Omnipotence need only be able to pro- 
 duce greater and greater effects, without ever exhausting its 
 efficiency. 
 
 F: Solitude, or the state of being alone, is an evil. Ergo, 
 several gods. 
 
 Answer: In a being sufficient unto itself, I deny; in a being 
 not sufficient unto itself, I grant. 
 
 G: A nature, that exists in several really distinct persons, 
 cannot be one. Ergo, God is not one. 
 
 Ansiver: In question of created beings, I grant; in question 
 of God, I deny. Faith teaches the mystery, 
 
 H: The common consent of mankind favors polytheism as 
 much as monotheism. Ergo, 
 
 Answer: Regarding Polytheism, the consent of mankind 
 was never universal, enduring, reasonable or a matter of genu- 
 ine tradition. It was not universal, because the Hebrews al- 
 
262 NATURAL THEOLOGY 
 
 ways worshiped one God, and wise men among the pagans, 
 like poets and philosophers, acknowledged one supreme ruler, 
 usually Jupiter. It was not enduring, because from creation 
 to the deluge monotheism was universally recognized, and long 
 after the deluge the same system prevailed. Since the dawn 
 of the gospel, the better, if not the greater, part of mankind 
 professed monotheism. It is unreasonable, because several gods 
 are an open contradiction, and the gods of antiquity were char- 
 acters of the lowest type, animals of the most repulsive nature, 
 plants and even lifeless objects. The demons' perpetrated seem- 
 ing miracles and forged sham prophecies, to propagate poly- 
 theism. 
 
 /.- A form can without contradiction be multiplied, when 
 it is not its own individuation. But God's form. His essence, 
 is His own individuation. St. Thomas explains. That in vir- 
 tue of which a thing is this particular thing, cannot be com- 
 municated to others. That in virtue of which Socrates is a 
 man, can be communicated to others ; but that in virtue of 
 which Socrates is this particular man, cannot be found outside 
 of Socrates himself. If therefore in virtue of one and the 
 same tiling Socrates were a man and this particular man, sev- 
 eral men would be just as impossible as several Socrates. And 
 this is what happens in the case of God. God is His nature; 
 Socrates is not his nature. In virtue of one and the same 
 tiling, His essence, God is God and this particular God. God 
 therefore is one. S.T. l.q.ll a 3. 
 
 J: Every created thing is one by its essence; but, since it 
 always consists of potency and act, it involves at least meta- 
 physical composition. 
 
 K: Oneness in created things involves denial of only physi- 
 cal, not metaphysical division ; oneness in God implies denial 
 of metaphysical division as well. 
 
 L: Finite perfection under the same genus can be manifold, 
 not infinite perfection. 
 
 M: In question of finite natures, plurality removes no per- 
 fection ; in question of an infinite nature plurality introduces 
 imperfection. 
 
THESIS III 
 
 Ood is unchangeable, as well physically as morally; He is 
 besides eternal and immense. 
 
 Jouin, pp. 338-238; Boedder, pp. 333-356. 
 
 DIVISION 
 
 Three Parts, I, II, III 
 I, Unchangeable; II, Eternal; III, Immense 
 
 TEEMS 
 
 Unchangeable. Change is passage from one state or condi- 
 tion to another. Physical change affects the being's nature; 
 moral change, its will. Intrinsic changes have place inside the 
 changed being, and are absent from God; extrinsic changes af- 
 fect outside beings, and are compatible with divinity. 
 
 PROOFS 
 
 1. (a), Physically; (b). Morally. 
 
 (a). 1°. God is the being determined by sheer force of es- 
 sence to actual existence; His existence is His essence. Every- 
 thing in God is one. But determination to actual existence 
 involves determination to an actual mode of existence. Ergo, 
 God is determined to an actual mode of existence. 
 
 With regard to the Major. This actual mode is as much 
 part of His essence as actual existence itself, and existence in 
 this actual mode, because it belongs to God's essence, admits of 
 neither removal nor change. Ergo, God is physically unchange- 
 able. 
 
 Witli regard to the Minor. An actual existence cannot be 
 without its own fixed mode, any more than actual motion can 
 be without its own fixed direction and velocity. 
 
 2°. Physical change in God would be to worse, or better, or 
 
 263 
 
264 NATURAL THEOLOGY 
 
 an equivalent. Cliange to worse, because an imperfection, is 
 out of question in the infinite. Change to better is no less 
 absurd in the infinite. Change to an equivalent presupposes 
 the possibility of two infinites. 
 
 (b). Moral change is eliange of will. It means modification 
 of plan, already conceived, or a halt in will-process, implying 
 that now at last Grod begins to wis'h or not wish a thing. 
 
 1°. Such a change would arise from some physical change in 
 *he mind of God, or from want of Jcnowledge, or from- insta- 
 bility of purpose. But God is incapable of physical change; 
 and, because infinite, He is a stranger to ignorance and incon- 
 stancy. 
 
 2°. Because His intellect and will are infinite, God as a 
 matter of fact can by a single act of His will arrange the uni- 
 verse and its every minutest detail. Ergo, He must be sup- 
 posed to have once for all made such disposal of everything by 
 a single eternal wish. 
 
 With regard to the Consequent: 
 
 Apart from the reproach of inconstancy, no reason can be 
 assigned for delay on God's part with regard to any single 
 decree of His providence. He had to make no experiment, to 
 become aware of His freedom. That would derogate from His 
 knowledge; and prudence would preclude useless trial. Nor 
 had God reason to fear that the result of an eternal decree, like 
 a sick man's cure to be realized in the course of time, would 
 fail His expectations. The omnipotence of His will centres 
 in the circumstance that the external eft'ect of His wish begins 
 to exist, not at the precise moment when He wishes, but at 
 whatever remote moment of time He chooses and decrees. 
 
 PRINCIPLES 
 
 A. When He works, God moves Himself with a species of 
 motion improperly so called. He works without passing from 
 potency to act. He is always in action, never in potency. 
 
 B. It is one thing to change one's mind, and quite another to 
 wish a change in things. By one and the same act of the will 
 a person can wish one thing and another to happen at different 
 times. 
 
THESIS III 265 
 
 C. Freedom implies in God as well as in creatures indiffer- 
 ence with regard to the object; but this kind of indiSerence is 
 extrinsic to the agent. Freedom in creatures further implies 
 indifference to the act of choice itself, and this indeed is in- 
 trinsic to the agent, and involves real change. But the latter 
 species of indifference is absent from God, because the act of 
 His will is always from eternity. 
 
 D. To wish, viewed actively, touches the term or object of 
 the wish; viewed passively, it touches the wish itself, inasmuch 
 as it is an immanent act. To pass from one wish to another, 
 viewing the wish actively, is no change; but to pass from one 
 wish to another, viewing the wish passively, involves change. 
 God is always in act, and a stranger to wishing, viewed pas- 
 sively. 
 
 E. God can wish and not wish with the one act, because all 
 the difference is in the outside term, not in the act itself. 
 
 F. The use of freedom in itself implies no change; consid- 
 ered in its term or effect, it implies change in created agents on 
 account of wishing viewed passively; and this view of wishing 
 is not verified in God. 
 
 G. Love and hate in God are one and the same act in point 
 of principle, different acts in point of term or object. 
 
 H. God passes from the condition of non-creator to that of 
 creator by an act eternal in point of principle, temporal in point 
 of term or object, not by an act temporal in point of principle. 
 
 I. In God there is in reality no time before, no time after, 
 but only according to our way of thinking. 
 
 J. It is quite correct to say that God with a single act of the 
 will wishes this, later wishes that to happen. 
 
 K. Freedom means power to change one's mind. 
 
 Ansiver. In creatures, I grant; in God, I deny. Freedom in 
 creatures is weighted with imperfection, in God it is free from 
 same. 
 
 L. Prayer changes God's mind. 
 
 Answer. Prayer leaves God's mind as it was from eternity. 
 In the event that prayer was to be neglected, God's mind would 
 have been other from eternity. 
 
 M. To pass from hate to love is change. 
 
 Answer. In beings capable of potency, I grant; incapable, 
 I again distinguish: change on the part of God, intrinsic, I 
 
266 NATURAL THEOLOGY 
 
 deny; change on the part of the term or object, extrinsic, I 
 grant. 
 
 N. God assumes new denominations and these betoken change. 
 
 Answer. New relative denominations, I grant; absolute, I 
 deny. A white wall, without any change on its part, becomes 
 like another wall treated to a coat of white paint. 
 
 0. Incarnation involves change 'in God. 
 
 Answer. Change in humanity assumed, I grant; in God as- 
 suming humanity, I deny. 
 
 II. God is eternal. 
 
 TERMS 
 
 Eternal. Eternity formally taken is duration essentially 
 without beginning, tvithout end, and without succession. Dura- 
 tion is a thing's continuance in being, or the period a thing 
 lasts. Time, the dwation proper to creatures, has three oppo- 
 site characteristics : it embraces a beginning, an end and succes- 
 sion. Causally, eternity tallies with the definition of Boethius, 
 " Interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta possessio." The 
 perfect possession of life without limit and all at once. No be- 
 ginning, no end; no past, no future; indivisible now or pres- 
 ent ; one single fixed point, admitting of no division, vested with 
 all the perfection of successive duration. Eternity is duration 
 like time in every respect save succession and limit. When 
 we talk of the past and future in God, we are consulting our 
 own weak and imperfect power of thought and speech. Eter- 
 nity must not be conceived as time infinite from front and 
 back. That indivisible point, described as eternity, coexists with 
 all real happenings in the course of time, and therefore admits 
 of extrinsic division. Eternity is intrinsic to God, and there- 
 fore a necessary attribute; coexistence with things created is 
 extrinsic to God, and necessary only in the hypothesis of crea- 
 tion, properly speaking no divine attribute. 
 
 PROOF 
 
 He is eternal, who goes on existing without beginning, with- 
 out end, and without succession. 
 
 But God goes on existing without beginning, without end, 
 
THESIS III 267 
 
 and without succession, because He is the absolutely necessary 
 and infinite being, and because He is unchangeable. 
 Ergo, God is eternal. 
 
 PRINCIPLES 
 
 A. The eternity essences and possibles have is a gift they en- 
 joy at God's hands, God's eternity is His own by favor of His 
 essence. They are eternal by participation; He, without par- 
 ticipation. 
 
 B. Inasmuch as eternity coexists with this precise moment, 
 it does not coexist with any set moment of the past or a future 
 year. 
 
 C. Eternity becomes no larger with time, just as the soul be- 
 comes no larger with the growing body. Neither soul nor eter- 
 nity has large or small, because both are simple, indivisible and 
 without quantity. A point on the bank of a stream with the 
 water flowing past. 
 
 D. God created eternity in the wide sense, not in the strict 
 sense ; of others, not His own. God is eternity. 
 
 E. Boethius, Nunc stans makes eternity, not in reality, but 
 after our way of thinking. God is eternity. 
 
 F. God is before and after eternity, in aeternum et ultra, 
 Exod. 15.18, in wide sense, not in strict. 
 
 III. God is immense. 
 
 TERMS' 
 
 Immense. Formally iaken, immensity is infinite filling ex- 
 istence, or infinite spiritual occupancy, or infinite capacity to 
 he spiritually present. Considered in cause or principle, it is 
 the power of infinite presence. With regard to body space, it 
 is an intrinsic and essential attribute of the divine nature, in 
 virtue of which God is intimately and substantially present to 
 every conceivable place and thing, possible as well as actual. 
 
 We distinguish three kinds of existence : circumscriptive, 
 proper to bodies; definitive, proper to the soul and angels; and 
 filling or all pervading, peculiar and proper to God. Their dif- 
 ferences admit of easy understanding. Immensity is not pre- 
 cisely omnipresence. The whole difference between the two 
 
268 NATURAL THEOLOGY 
 
 lies in the reality or absence of creatures. Immensity is tHe 
 root of omnipresence, and independent of creatures; omnipres- 
 ence presupposes their existence, and is therefore hypotheticaJ, 
 extrinsic to God, and an attribute only when confounded with 
 God's immensity. To say nothing of the hypostatic union in 
 Christ and the union of grace in the souls of the just, God is 
 in creatures after a threefold manner: 
 
 He is in things hy His essence or substance, inasmuch as He 
 substantially exists wherever a creature exists or can exist, that 
 is everywhere, even in imaginary space. This is the presence 
 of which our thesis speaks, and it accrues to God from the fact 
 that He is the actual or possible cause of all things actual and 
 possible, and the impossibility of action from a distance ren- 
 ders it necessary. A body is after this manner in the space 
 it fills, and the soul's presence in the body is of the same 
 nature. 
 
 God is in tilings ty His power, inasmuch as everything in 
 nature is subject to His rule and authority, inasmuch as He 
 keeps all in being and cooperates with all. In much the same 
 way the king is in all his kingdom. He is in all things hy 
 His presence, inasmuch as all things come under His notice and 
 knowledge. After this fashion a man can be said to be in a 
 whole room, though he occupies only a definite portion of the 
 same. By His essence-presence God pervades all things; by 
 His power-presence He preserves all things; by His presential 
 presence He comprehends all things. Every actual being, 
 whether a spirit or a body, has two locations or wheres, one 
 intrinsic the other extrinsic. A thing's intrinsic location is 
 constituted by its substance, it is an absolute quality, and quite 
 independent of surrounding objects. Extrinsic location is the 
 spatial relation a thing bears with some neighboring object, 
 affecting it, when a body, with contact of mass or quantity; 
 and, when a spirit, with contact of influence. A body's extrin- 
 sic location is determined by the outer surface of some enclos- 
 ing medium ; its intrinsic location is determined by its own outer 
 surface. The enclosing medium can be changed, removed, or 
 destroyed without at all influencing the thing's intrinsic loca- 
 tion. Adsence would be the right term for intrinsic location, 
 as presence is for extrinsic. God's intrinsic location is His 
 immensity. It is without bound or limit, permeating and per- 
 
THESIS III 269 
 
 vading everything, as much an actuality in imaginary as in 
 real space. 
 
 PROOFS 
 
 1°. Immensity is a simple perfection, infinite in the case of 
 God, and actual. But no perfection of the kind can be absent 
 from God. Ergo, God is immense. 
 
 With regard to the Major. It is simple because it involves 
 no imperfection. Immensity is infinite definitive existence; 
 and, in virtue of definitive existence, the soul after its own meas- 
 ure surpasses whatever material atom or body. Definitive exist- 
 ence, proper to the soul, is a closer approach to immensity than 
 circumscriptive, the badge of bodies. It is infinite in the case 
 of God, because infinite essence calls for infinity in every par- 
 ticular, even in the matter of coexistence with outside objects. 
 God's coexistence is infinite in itself; finite by accident, because 
 outside objects are finite. It is actual, because God is pure act, 
 with no suspicion of potency, and whatever belongs to His in- 
 trinsic constitution is always from eternity to eternity. 
 
 2°. As a matter of fact, our world actually exists in, and is 
 enclosed by, imaginary space. God ought to enjoy the same 
 perfection. Imaginary space is not altogether nothing. It is 
 emptiness stretching in every direction, without a body in sight, 
 but fit always to be filled with bodies. There is nothing to 
 prevent God from creating an angel, or a man, or anything 
 else, in imaginary space; and, in the event of such a creation, 
 to save Him from change, we must consider Him a reality in 
 imaginary space, prior to the production of the angel or man. 
 Eeal space is the world's intrinsic locus, imaginary space is its 
 extrinsic locus. Both are equally God's intrinsic locus. 
 
 PRINCIPLES 
 
 A. Heaven is said to be God's special and proper abode only 
 after a manner, and inasmuch as He there manifests Himself 
 by way of reward to the elect. 
 
 B. God exists in foul places, without at all contracting harm. 
 God is distinct from the places He occupies, and no physical 
 union intervenes. The sun can serve for illustration. 
 
270 NATURAL THEOLOGY 
 
 C. God approaches us and withdraws from us only in a meta- 
 phorical and figurative sense. 
 
 D. In imaginary space nothing but God exists, with imag- 
 inary space for intrinsic locus; and nothing but God, far from 
 being pure and simple nothing, is a mighty large something. 
 
 E. The terms here and where are applicable to not only ac- 
 tual but also possible bodies. 
 
 F. Chrysostom and Augustine say that God is nowhere, be- 
 cause He cannot exist in place. That kind of existence is char- 
 acteristic of bodies. 
 
 Answer. They deny circumscriptive and definitive presence 
 of God, not filling or pervading presence. In much the same 
 way they contend that God does not exist in time, meaning 
 that His existence is a stranger to succession, without at all 
 questioning His coexistence with time. 
 
 G. God is indivisible, and cannot be in two places or times. 
 
 Answer. There are two kinds of indivisibles, one of quan- 
 tity, the other outside of quantity. A point and a moment are 
 instances of the first kind. The soul, an angel and God are 
 instances of the second kind. A point or a moment cannot 
 exist in two places or times ; but by their influence, not by their 
 mass or quantity, — they have none — the soul, an angel and 
 God can be in many places and many times. 
 
 H. What exists whole and entire anywhere cannot exist out- 
 side of that place. Ergo. 
 
 Answer. What exists whole and entire by wholeness of quan- 
 tity, I grant; by wholeness of essence, I deny. A\Tiiteness in 
 whole wall, and in part of the wall, can serve for illustration. 
 
 /. The stronger the agent, the more able to work from a 
 distance. Ergo, God need not be present to His effects. 
 
 Answer. Always with a medium, I grant; otherwise, I deny. 
 Actio in distans, is a contradiction. 
 
THESIS IV 
 
 God knows all past, present, future, possible and futurihle 
 things. 
 
 Jouin, pp. 238-243. Boedder, pp. 255-290. 
 
 TERMS 
 
 God's hnoivledge. God, because infinite, is a spirit enjoying 
 the most perfect conceivable kind of life. Only simple perfec- 
 tions are formally in God, mixed perfections exist in Him vir- 
 tually and eminently. Intellectual life, manifest in thought 
 and wish, is the one kind of life free from every admixture of 
 imperfection, the one brand of life deserving the title simple 
 perfection. All created life, intellectual as well as sensitive and 
 vegetative, is a mixed perfection and has no formal being in 
 God. Life in God is pure act, with no suspicion or trace of 
 mere potency; it is substance, and no accident; it is identical 
 with God's own essence; infinite and wholly devoid of parts. 
 And what is true of God's life is true of His knowledge. God's 
 knowledge is God's life, God's substance, God's essence. His 
 knowledge is one single act, not made up like ours of many 
 different acts. In God's knowledge all the multiplicity is in 
 its terms or objects; in our knowledge every new term or object 
 calls for a new act, and acts in our case are as numerous or mul- 
 tiplied as the terms or objects of our knowledge. There is no 
 past or future with God, everything is present. God with one 
 single act of His mind reaches whatever is capable of being 
 known, in all the wide range of its knowability. And the rea- 
 son is plain. Otherwise a higher and better intelligence could 
 be conceived or thought, and God's knowledge would fall short 
 of being infinite. He knows all things, and knows them ex- 
 haustively or comprehensively. 
 
 The determining principle of God's knowledge, the agency 
 substituting in God for the imprinted intelligible image in our 
 knowledge, the actual and sufficient reason of His knowledge, 
 
 271 
 
272 NATURAL THEOLOGY 
 
 is His divine essence. His essence is term-object as well as 
 motive-object of His knowledge. On this account God's essence 
 is the one primary object of His knowledge. Everything out- 
 side of God is a mere term-object, a secondary object of His 
 knowledge. All this, to preclude difficulties, and free God from 
 suspicion of dependence for His knowledge on things outside 
 of Himself. In addition to our essence we have need of the 
 imprinted intelligible image to understand, because of our in- 
 difference and potency to actual knowledge, ignorant now and 
 knowing a moment later. God has no sucli need. His essence 
 is enough to explain all, as He is pure act, and a stranger to 
 mere potency. God's essence is primary object of His knowl- 
 edge, because it is what He first knows, and that by which He 
 knows everything else. It would be wrong to say that God has 
 many ideas in the same sense as ourselves. He has but one 
 idea, and this single idea is representative of whatever is know- 
 able. His idea is one, its terms are without number. If God 
 knew one thing after another, like ourselves. He would know 
 an infinite numl)er. But, as a matter of fact. He knows infinite 
 things all at once and by the same single act. No absurdity 
 attaches to infinite multitude, but to infinite number, which is 
 multitude measured with some unit for standard. God's essence 
 is different from aught else, and yet it is the means God em- 
 ploys to know aught else, because it eminently and virtually 
 contains everything else. 
 
 Past, present, future, possible and futnrihle things. God's 
 knowledge is threefold: 1, knowledge of vision, 2, knowledge of 
 simple intelligence, 3, intermediate knowledge; with actuals, pos- 
 sibles, and futuribles for respective objects. In Scholastic lan- 
 guage God's knowledge is : scientia visionis, scientia simplicis in- 
 telligentiae, and scientia media. We repeat that there is no past 
 or future with God, everything is present. Knowledge in God 
 comprises no many different acts, God's knowledge is one act, and 
 God's knowledge is His substance. The names we employ are 
 derived from the process human knowledge follows. We see only 
 actually present objects, we understand essences whether pres- 
 ent or absent, and we discourse of things that are not, but would 
 be in the event of a certain condition's fulfillment. Therefore 
 God's knowledge of vinon has for object things vested with 
 actual existence, whether in the past, the present, or the future. 
 
THESIS IV 273 
 
 His knowledge of simple intelligence lias for object pure pos- 
 sibles or essences never vested with actual existence. His in- 
 termediate knowledge has for object futuribiles, or free condi- 
 tioned futures, or futures dependent on a double condition, the 
 exercise of free will along with some different and distinct con- 
 dition. Conditional futures are not the same as futuribles. 
 Conditional futures are reducible to absolute futures; and, as 
 such, form part of God's knowledge of vision. Futuribles are 
 not reducible to absolute futures or mere possibles, and so con- 
 stitute a third object of God's knowledge, distinct from objects 
 embraced by God's vision and simple intelligence. The knowl- 
 edge in God concerned with futuribles is called intermediate, 
 because it partakes of the nature of both vision and simple in- 
 telligence, without being identical with either. Their possibil- 
 ity in the abstract is matter for simple intelligence, and their 
 impossibility in the concrete is matter for vision; and the di- 
 vine knowledge embracing the two we denominate media or 
 intermediate. Simple intelligence is necessary knowledge in 
 God, and precedes every free decree, not in the order of time or 
 of nature, but of power or origin. Vision is contingent knowl- 
 edge and follows a free decree, not in time but in nature. In- 
 termediate agrees with simple intelligence, inasmuch as it pre- 
 cedes every free decree; it differs from same, inasmuch as it is 
 contingent knowledge. Intermediate agrees with vision, inas- 
 much as it is contingent knowledge; it differs from same, inas- 
 much as it precedes every free decree. A futurible is more 
 than a possible viewed precisely as such, and therefore it is out- 
 side the range of simple intelligence. It is a possible with a 
 bearing on actuality, destined in default of a condition to never 
 materialize, and therefore it is outside the range of vision. 
 
 For obvious reasons God's essence is called the necessary ob- 
 ject of His knowledge. Things outside of God, like past, pres- 
 ent, future and futurible things, are for equally obvious reasons 
 called the contingent or hypothetical objects of God's knowl- 
 edge. The past is what once was and is no more; the present 
 is what now is; and the future is what is going to be, though 
 nothing now. A necessary future depends on created causes 
 that follow necessary law, like the next eclipse. A free future 
 depends on free will, whether mediately or immediately. An 
 instance would be, John will eat to-morrow at nine. A future. 
 
274 NATURAL THEOLOGY 
 
 whether necessary or free, is said to be absolute, when its orig- 
 inating cause is effective and prerequisite conditions are veri- 
 fied. It is said to be conditioned, when its cause and condi- 
 tions never materialize. This last sort of future is known as 
 a futurible, and is what would happen in event of certain con- 
 ditions, but never will happen because the conditions will not 
 be verified. An instance would be. Were John invited to the 
 game, and he never will be invited, he would excuse himself on 
 the plea of business. Were miracles worked in Corozain, and 
 they never will be worked, its people would be converted. 
 
 About God's knowledge of past and present there can be no 
 difficulty. Such knowledge is within man's reach, and it would 
 be blasphemy to reckon God inferior to man. About futures 
 and futuribles the question is not so easy, and calls for proof 
 as well as explanation. Past and future say a relation to the 
 present. They are respectively a long or short distance behind 
 or in front of the present. God antedates everything, and God 
 always exists. When events are taken as terms of God's de- 
 crees, God antedates them in time ; when they are taken as these 
 decrees themselves, God is simultaneous with them in time, prior 
 to them in nature. In our case the future often becomes a 
 reality only after we cease to exist, many events in the past were 
 actual realities before we began to be; but in the case of God 
 nothing of the kind can possibly happen. He is present to 
 whatever future. He is present to whatever past; and all this 
 in virtue of the double fact that past, present and future are 
 bound up in His decrees from eternity, and that He always 
 was, always is, and always shall be. Time works no change in 
 God, it works changes in things outside of God. We know the 
 present because it is an actual reality. We know the past be- 
 cause it was once an actual reality. We can guess at the future 
 without precisely knowing it, because it never was and is not 
 now an actual reality. But with God, in virtue of His eternal 
 decrees, the future is as mucli an actual reality as the past and 
 the present. All things are futures with reference to God, be- 
 cause His existence precedes them; all are presents, because 
 actual from eternity in His divine decrees ; all are pasts, because 
 He outlives them all. 
 
 Whatever has a determined being has a determined truth, 
 and determined truth is the one requisite for knowledge on the 
 
THESIS IV 275 
 
 part of the mind's object. Whatever is, is knowable ; and every- 
 thing knowable is necessarily known to the infinite mind. That 
 past, present, future, possible, and futurible things are, is plain 
 from their several definitions. The past is that which was ; the 
 present is that which is; the future is that which will be; the 
 possible is that which can be, but never will be; the futurible 
 is that which can be and never will be, but would be under cer- 
 tain conditions not to be verified. To resume, there can be no 
 difficulty about God's knowledge of past and present things and 
 of necessary futures. Free futures are of two kinds, absolute 
 and contingent. In absolute free futures the consent of the 
 will is the one requisite condition for their knowledge. In 
 contingent free futures, or futuribles some added condition at- 
 taches to consent of the will. To the mind of God necessary 
 futures are as much facts as the past or the present. Absolute 
 free futures are as much facts as necessary futures, in the event 
 that God knows beforehand how the will is going to choose. 
 This foreknowledge must in no way interfere with human free- 
 dom; and in this particular we clash with such Thomists as 
 advocate physical predetermination. Contingent free futures 
 or futuribles are as much facts as necessary futures, in the event 
 that God knows beforehand how the will would choose, were 
 certain conditions verified. In futuribles God must know two 
 things, the will's choice and the conditions to be verified. 
 
 About absolute free futures St. Augustine says : " As your 
 memory of past events never forced them into being, so God's 
 foreknowledge of future events never forced them into being." 
 Dante beautifully expkins tlie thing, when he compares the 
 bearing of God's foreknowledge on a free agent's future acts 
 wdth the bearing of a spectator's knowledge on the direction 
 a ship takes under influence of wind and tide. The will in 
 course of time never chooses this or that because God foresaw 
 the choice, but God foresees the choice because the will is go- 
 ing to so choose. God's foreknowledge is not the cause of our 
 choice; our choice, on the contrary, is the cause of God's fore- 
 knowledge; not indeed the determining cause, which is His 
 essence alone, but the terminating cause, or conditio sine qua 
 non. What God foreknows, necessarily happens; but we recog- 
 nize a twofold necessity, antecedent and consequent. Ante- 
 cedent necessity has play in necessary causes, and has play 
 
276 NATURAL THEOLOGY 
 
 prior to the act; consequent has place in free causes, and is sub- 
 sequent to the act. Antecedent destroys freedom; consequent is 
 compatible with freedom. Even a free act must be, when it 
 is once placed or put. God's knowledge of free futures, like 
 man's freedom of choice, acknowledges consequent necessity, it 
 repudiates antecedent necessity. God's knowledge, like all 
 knowledge, presupposes its object; but this precedence of object 
 is precedence of termination, not of determination. God's 
 knowledge in point of determination precedes its object in the 
 order of time as well as of nature, when there is question of 
 men's free acts taken as realities. In much the same way God's 
 knowledge depends on our freedom terminatively, not determi- 
 natively; and terminative dependence is no intrinsic imperfec- 
 tion in God. The reality of a futurible is not absolute, but 
 only hypothetical; and one as well as the other can base knowl- 
 edge. 
 
 DIVISION 
 
 Three Parts — I, II, III 
 
 7. Past, present, and possible things. II. Necessary futures 
 and absolute free futures. III. Contingent free futures, or fu- 
 turibles. 
 
 PROOFS 
 
 I. 1°. Knowledge of past, present and possible things is a 
 simple perfection. Ergo, it exists in God. 
 
 2°. Man enjoys this knowledge. Ergo, God a fortiori enjoys 
 the same. 
 
 II. 1°. God knows whatever is vested with determined or set 
 truth, and is therefore knowable. But necessary futures and 
 absolute free futures are vested with determined truth. Ergo. 
 
 WitJi regard to the Minor. Whatever event as a matter of 
 fact has place in the future is nothing vague or undetermined, 
 even before its occurrence. Before its occurrence it is a some- 
 thing as set and fixed as it is after its occurrence, of course in 
 the logical not in the real order. 
 
 2°. In the matter of actuality the future is no worse off than 
 the past; and yet nobody hesitates to ascribe knowledge of the 
 past to man himself. 
 
 I 
 
THESIS IV 277 
 
 3°. It is unworthy God to suppose that He learns by degrees, 
 or to think tliat to know the future He must wait till it happens 
 in the real order of things. 
 
 4°. Without this knowledge of necessary futures and abso- 
 lute free futures God would be no effective ruler of the universe. 
 Such knowledge is a requisite for providence. 
 
 ///. 1°. Every statement regarding futuribles contains set 
 or fixed truth, and therefore futuribles are knowable objects. 
 But God knows everything knowable. Ergo, God knows fu- 
 turibles. 
 
 With regard to the Major. The thing is plain in absolute 
 free futures. Eegarding Peter in fixed conditions one of two 
 contradictories must necessarily be true. Either he will sin, 
 or he will not sin. He cannot do the two things, sin and at 
 the same time not sin. The thing ought to be equally plain in 
 contingent free futures or futuribles. Eegarding Peter in dif- 
 ferent conditions one of two contradictories must necessarily be 
 true. Either he would sin, or he would not sin. He could 
 never do the two things, sin and at the same time not sin. 
 
 2°. Without this knowledge of futuribles God, desirous of 
 some effect, would have to make trial of several different means. 
 But every such need is derogatory to God's dignity. Ergo, 
 God knows futuribles. 
 
 3°. Knowledge of futuribles is a very desirable perfection. 
 Ergo, it belongs to God. 
 
 4°. Knowledge of futuribles is a requisite for providence. 
 Ergo, it belongs to God. 
 
 5°. All men ascribe this knowledge to God. Ergo. 
 
 Scholion I. About Absolute Free Futures. 
 
 The fact that God knows absolute free futures and futuribles 
 is easy enough of comprehension, but the process by which He 
 knows them is somewliat obscure. And first with regard to 
 absolute free futures. Some Thomists maintain that God knows 
 them in predetermining decrees. These decrees are wishes on 
 the part of God, ordaining the future act prior to all foreknowl- 
 edge of the agent's behavior. Therefore the last reason why 
 G^d knows absolute free futures is because He formulates a 
 decree, establishing the future event prior to all foreknowledge 
 of the future event itself. To bring about such events God 
 
278 NATURAL THEOLOGY 
 
 therefore employs physical predetermination, He energizes the 
 will by antecedent pressure. This predetermination, according 
 to Goudin, a good Thomist, is a quality transient in nature, 
 communicated to the ivill, and binding the will, without a chance 
 of escape, to a fixed act. These decrees unduly exalt God's 
 power, to insult and destroy man's feedom. We maintain, 
 therefore, that they are superfluous and hurtful to human free- 
 dom. They are superfJuovs for four main reasons. Physical 
 predetermination is not needed to explain God's quality of 
 
 a, first cause, 
 
 b. His supreme dominion, 
 
 c. His foreknowledge, or 
 
 d, the will's indifference. 
 
 a. These four facts are enough to constitute God first cause 
 of man's free acts : 
 
 1. He makes the will and its energies. 
 
 2. He predetermines it to good in general, the summum 
 bonum. 
 
 3. With the help of the other faculties He sets the will in mo- 
 tion by proposing some particular and finite good. 
 
 4. He contributes to the act by simultaneous cooperation with 
 the will. 
 
 b. Dominion is twofold, moral and physical. God's total 
 dominion is manifest in His bestowal or refusal of cooperation, 
 and in His arrangement of circumstances with a view to this 
 or that foreseen act of the will. 
 
 c. God's foreknowledge is abundantly explained by His in- 
 termediate knowledge, in conjunction with His decree to co- 
 operate with the will. 
 
 d. The will's indifference is active as well as passive, and 
 must not be tampered with by any stress brought to bear on 
 its inner nature. Mere passive indifference leaves freedom in- 
 complete, active gives it completion and finish. T.his active 
 indifference can be said to be objectively lifted by the good in 
 question, not effectively. It is formally lifted by the will it- 
 self engaged in actual choice. 
 
 Physical predetermination is hurtful to human freedom, be- 
 cause it is a prerequisite for every act of the will; and, when 
 
THESIS IV 279 
 
 once present, the will is no longer able to omit the act or put 
 its contrary. But freedom is on all sides admitted to be that 
 capacity of the will, in virtue of which, with every prerequisite 
 for activity present and verified, the will is still able to omit 
 the act or put its contrary. All Thomists consider physical 
 predetermination a simple prerequisite. Billuart tries to get 
 round the difficulty with the help of a time-honored distinction, 
 sensu composite and sensu diviso, compound sense and divided 
 sense. And he alleges this example. A man seated cannot 
 walk. True in compound sense, untrue in divided sense. In 
 much the same way, the will with physical predetermination 
 cannot choose in compound sense, though it can still choose in 
 divided sense. No parity. Physical predetermination is a pre- 
 requisite for willing; sitting is no prerequisite for walking. 
 You can separate sitting from walking, you cannot separate 
 physical predetermination from willing. Nobody can walk 
 while he remains seated, and nobody can choose when com- 
 pelled by physical predetermination. A man seated can change 
 his position, a man willing cannot get away from physical pre- 
 determination. Were sitting a prerequisite for walking, no man 
 could ever walk; and, because physical predetermination is a 
 prerequisite for willing, no man can ever choose. This potency 
 to choose in divided sense is no potency at all; because the one 
 prerequisite for the contrary act, namely physical predetermina- 
 tion, is forever wanting. Every such potency is metaphysically 
 iiTeducible to act, and therefore vain and empty, a mere fig- 
 ment of the mind, and of no practical use whatever. Freedom 
 of the sort would be lame and halt, altogether incomplete, be- 
 cause forever without its essential prerequisite, corresponding 
 physical predetermination. It would be freedom to put one 
 set act, and tliat is no freedom at all. To omit the act, to put 
 its contrary, would be altogether out of the question, because 
 physical predetermination to one thing or the other would never 
 be verified. 
 
 Billuart thinks he sees a resemblance between his physical 
 predetermination and the foreknowledge of a man's free act 
 we vindicate to God. They are both prerequisites, but there 
 the resemblance ceases. Predetermination imposes antecedent 
 necessity on the will; foreknowledge imposes only consequent 
 necessity, because it presupposes man's actual exercise of his 
 
280 NATURAL THEOLOGY 
 
 freedom. Billuart then appeals to mystery, saying that God in 
 some strange and hidden way moves the will in a manner be- 
 fitting its nature. But mysteries are matter of revelation, and 
 God is their author, not Billuart or the Thomists. Besides, 
 mysteries involve no contradiction, and free will physically pre- 
 determined is a square circle. We admit the maxim, omne 
 movens motum, motion on the part of a mover precedes move- 
 ment in the thing moved. But God is mover enough without 
 physical predetermination. He moves the will by implanting 
 in it a natural desire for happiness, a leaning towards good in 
 general, the summum bonum ; by the proposal of particular 
 goods, and by simultaneous cooperation with the will in all its 
 acts. To the objection that God in our system would be unable 
 to get from man whatever act He wants, we answer that God 
 is still supreme Lord of animals, plants and stones, though He 
 cannot squeeze a thought from them. Besides, grace, coupled 
 with consent and foreknown as such, can enable God to get from 
 man whatever act He wants. 
 
 P.S. God and the will together choose, or determine the 
 man's act; but God must not on this account be called its de- 
 termining cause. God and the eye see together, vision is a body- 
 act, accomplished with the help of organs; and yet God must 
 not be said to see corporeally or employ organs. All this about 
 absolute free futures and physical predetermination, according 
 to Thomists their single explanation. Therefore, with Thomists 
 God knows absolute free futures in these physically predeter- 
 mining decrees. We reject all such decrees in the matter of 
 absolute free futures; and must otherwise explain God's man- 
 ner of knowing them. God of course knows all tilings, past, 
 present, future and futurible in His essence as in formal object. 
 When we say He knows things in anything else, we mean to 
 introduce no new formal object, but merely assign the root- 
 reason why His essence represents absolute free futures and fu- 
 turibles to His intellect. We maintain that God knows abso- 
 lute free futures in themselves and in a mutual combination of 
 His intermediate knowledge and a resultant decree. He knows 
 absolute free futures in themselves, because they are in His 
 essence only eminently, and He must know them formally; be- 
 cause they must influence His intellect at least intentionally, as 
 the sound of the bell when one has vowed to say a Hail Mary 
 
THESIS IV 281 
 
 when the bell rings ; because they are the root-basis of the di- 
 vine knowledge touching them. He knows absolute free fu- 
 tures in a mutual combination of His intermediate knowledge 
 and a resultant decree, because this is the process. If I gave 
 Peter grace A, Peter would consent. I will give Peter grace A. 
 Ergo, Peter will consent. The Major is a matter of interme- 
 diate knowledge; the Minor is a resultant decree. 
 
 PRINCIPLES 
 
 A. Opponents object and say, God knows things inasmuch 
 as He is their cause. We distinguish : By vision for actuals, 
 by intelligence for possibles, by intermediate for futuribles. 
 Necessary futures belong to vision; absolute free futures and 
 contingent free futures or futuribles, to intermediate. For ex- 
 planation see page 272. The medium God employs, when He 
 knows absolute free futures in themselves, is infallible, because 
 His knowledge is posterior, not prior to act's futurity. Things 
 would stir God to knowledge in sense of objective conditions, 
 not in sense of physically determining motives. At most, things 
 would be intentionally determining motives, and no imperfec- 
 tion or dependence attaches to that kind of motive. In no sense 
 of the word must God be said to know absolute free futures in 
 physically predetermining decrees, because man's freedom must 
 be kept intact. 
 
 B. Regarding God's way of knowing futuribles, the Thomists 
 introduce as mediums what they call subjectively absolute, ob- 
 jectively conditional decrees, decrees actually had but suspended 
 in effect till a condition is verified. We deny every such decree 
 in God, while ready to recognize subjectively conditional decrees, 
 not what is, but what would be. God knows futuribles not in 
 these decrees of the Thomists, but in themselves, inasmuch as 
 the actual existence they would have in the event of a certain 
 condition is the ultimate reason and basis of God's knowledge 
 touching them. Scripture is witness to God's knowledge of 
 futuribles in St. Matthew 11-21. "Woe to thee, Corozain, woe 
 to thee, Bethsaida; for, if in Tyre and Sidon had been wrought 
 the miracles that have been wrought in you, they had long ago 
 done penance in sackcloth and ashes," Besides, were God with- 
 out this knowledge, He would be held to the unworthy expe- 
 
282 NATURAL THEOLOGY 
 
 dient of making trial or experiment. In Matthew Corozain 
 and Bethsaida stand for the Jews; Tyre and Sidon, for the 
 Gentiles. Miracles were worked for the Jews, not for the Gen- 
 tiles. The Jews in spite of miracles failed of conversion; the 
 Gentiles would have been converted in the event of the same 
 miracles. And Christ reproaches the Jews as guilty of a heav- 
 ier condemnation than the Gentiles. Hence we argue. Had 
 God foreknown the conversion of the Gentiles in these decrees 
 of the Thomists, the Jews could have objected and said that the 
 Gentiles would -have done only what they could not help doing, 
 and would have deserved no credit for their conversion. Phys- 
 ical predetermination would have converted the Gentiles in the 
 event of miracles. The reproach made the Jews would be un- 
 reasonable, because through no will of their own they were with- 
 out physical predetermination, a necessary prerequisite for con- 
 version, and the Gentiles would be possessed of the same. Nor 
 will it do to say that the Jews were denied physical predeter- 
 mination because of their sins. Successive sins would then re- 
 sult from successive privations of physical predetermination, and 
 progress would be made towards an infinite series. 
 
 Billuart has two reasons for thinking this complaint of the 
 Jews without foundation : 
 
 1. They had sufficient grace; they had the power, though 
 that power was of no avail without physical predetermination. 
 And he appeals to these examples. Fire is able to burn, bread 
 to nourish, mind to understand; though the fire must be ap- 
 plied, the bread must be eaten, and the mind must have species 
 or images. To this we answer that sufficient grace of this kind 
 confers only a tied up power, nowise reducible to act. It is 
 like handing a man a sword, binding him with ropes, and then 
 telling him to defend himself. The predetermination is a pre- 
 requisite. 
 
 2. The hardness of heart and ingratitude displayed by the 
 Jews account for their privation of physical predetermination. 
 But this is only to move the difficulty back. Predetermination 
 is refused now, because it was refused on a former occasion. 
 
 C. This passage in St. Paul would seem to favor Thomism: 
 " He hath mercy on whom He will, and whom He will He hard- 
 eneth." Rom. 9.18. But the apostle is talking of a call to the 
 faitli, not of predestination. Men called to the faith have 
 
THESIS IV 283 
 
 not merited the favor, men not called to the faith miss the favor 
 because of their sins. Besides, predestination is in everybody's 
 power; physical determination was not in the power of the Gen- 
 tiles. Intermediate knowledge in God explains the problem of 
 free will, it fails to explain why God confers merely sufficient 
 grace on one man, efficacious grace on another; and this is the 
 burden of St. Paul's lesson. God's will is the explanation. 
 
 SchoUon II. About Futuribles. 
 
 And now the question arises, how does God know futuribles. 
 We just proved that God knows absolute free futures in them- 
 selves, and in that combination of intermediate knowledge and 
 decree already explained. Here we maintain that God knows 
 futuribles in themselves, inasmuch as the actual existence they 
 would have in the event of a certain condition bases as root- 
 reason God's knowledge of them. God is said to know things 
 in themselves and in Himself; and the two sayings must be 
 kept apart. There can be no difficulty about God's knowledge 
 of all things, actual, possible and futurible in Himself, or in 
 His essence. His essence is His primary object. His essence 
 is all things. His essence is cause of all, it is to God what 
 species or image is to us. He knows His essence, and in it all 
 things else. To know a cause comprehensively, is to know all 
 its effects; and all things are in God's essence as effects are in 
 their causes. Ergo, God knows all things in Himself. The 
 contingent reality of futuribles is in God's essence as well as 
 the actual reality of pasts, presents and necessary futures. 
 
 All the difficulty turns on God's knowledge of things actual, 
 possible and futurible in themselves. Actuals, whether past, 
 present or future, and possibles can readily be known in them- 
 selves, because they have a reality of their own, actual or pos- 
 sible as the case may be. Futuribles are different. They would 
 seem to have no reality of their own, being neither actuals sim- 
 ply nor possibles simply. Futures are of two kinds, necessary 
 and contingent. Xecessary futures are reducible to actuals, 
 and therefore belong to knowledge of vision. Contingent fu- 
 tures are of two kinds, absolute free futures dependent on choice 
 as single condition, and contingent free futures or futuribles, 
 dependent on a double condition, choice for instance and mira- 
 cles. Matters of vision and intelligence are known in prede- 
 
284 NATURAL THEOLOGY 
 
 temiining decrees; absolute free futures and futuribles are 
 known prior to any predetermining decree. Hence the need of 
 intermediate knowledge in God. Futuribles are like possibles, 
 inasmuch as they will never be reduced to act; they are unlike 
 possibles, inasmuch as they would be reduced to act in the event 
 of a certain condition. They are like actuals, inasmuch as they 
 would be reduced to act, having contingent actuality ; they differ 
 from actuals, inasmuch as they never will be reduced to act. 
 The same is in a measure true of absolute free futures; and 
 they belong to neither vision nor intelligence, but to intemie- 
 diate knowledge. Their reality in God's mind precedes every 
 predetermining decree, unlike actuals, possibles, and necessary 
 futures. 
 
 Therefore, absolute free futures are known in themselves and 
 in the combination of intermediate knowledge with resulting 
 decree, which is by no means predetermining. In themselves, 
 because God must know their formal being, not merely their 
 eminent being, which alone exists in His essence; because they 
 must themselves as formal object intentionally stir God's knowl- 
 edge; and because they are root and basic condition for God's 
 knowledge of them. In the combination of intermediate knowl- 
 edge with resulting decree, to save man's freedom from harm or 
 diminution. 
 
 Futuribles are known in themselves, and in a kindred com- 
 bination of intermediate knowledge with resulting decree, by no 
 means predetermining. In themselves, because what is true of 
 the absolute reality of absolute free futures is true of the con- 
 tingent reality of futuribles. In the combination of intenne- 
 diates knowledge with resulting decree, by no means predeter- 
 mining, to save man's free will from harm or loss. The decree 
 in this latter case denies for instance miracles, and posits the 
 consequent non-occurrence of conversion. The decree is sub- 
 jectively absolute with regard to miracles, subjectively condi- 
 tional with regard to conversion. Tliomists teach the contrary. 
 When we say that futuribles are not known in decrees, we mean 
 Thomistic decrees, subjectively absolute. BcUarmine and Mo- 
 lina talk about supercomprehension of the will, and they mean 
 our combination of intermediate knowledge and resulting de- 
 cree. Futuribles have a reality all their own, not pliysical of 
 course -and absolute, but moral and contingent ; and that suffices 
 
THESIS IV 285 
 
 to base their truth and save the axiom, omiie veruin est ens. 
 Their reality is not a physical reality they have, but a moral 
 reality they have in virtue of the physical reality tliey would 
 have in event of a certain condition. 
 
 PRINCIPLES 
 
 A. Three kinds of knowledge in God, necessary, free, and in- 
 termediate. Necessary antedates every decree, cannot be absent. 
 Free follows a decree, can be absent ; intermediate antedates every 
 decree, can be absent. 
 
 B. When the Fathers say that men are lost and saved because 
 God wills it, they are using " because " in illative, not causative 
 sense, e. g. Antichrist will seduce many because Christ foretold 
 it. 
 
 C Salvation in first act is from God ; in second act, from God 
 and man. Ergo, in full and complete sense from the two to- 
 gether. 
 
 D. Grace given to Peter, and grace given to Judas, the same 
 intrinsically and physically, not extrinsically and morally. 
 Grace given to Peter extrinsically different, because foreseen by 
 intermediate knowledge in conjunction with consent. 
 
 E. Man saves himself not as cause, but as putting the indis- 
 pensable condition, cooperation with grace. God gives the 
 grace that saves, man only puts the condition. Ergo, God saves 
 rather than the man. 
 
 F. Intermediate knowledge is not the reason why grace is 
 given. It is merely directive of God, and God can allow this. 
 The Pelagians made the mistake of thinking that intermediate 
 knowledge is the reason why God gives grace. 
 
 G. To reconcile God's foreknowledge with man's freedom. 
 God's foreknowledge is eternal, and in point of time antedates 
 our free acts. Intentionally, objectively, and terminatively our 
 acts antedate God's foreknowledge, and they shape it. Our 
 acts are necessary only with consequent necessity. Hence it is 
 true to say, God foresees that Peter will consent, and Peter can 
 refuse to consent. 
 
 B.. God's knowledge of vision is neither the directive nor ef- 
 fective cause of our free acts. God's wisdom is in some sense 
 the cause of tilings. Ps. 103.24, " Thou hast made all things 
 
286 NATURAL THEOLOGY 
 
 in wisdom." Directive cause is intelligence and intermediate. 
 Effective is will in a decree, no Jvnowledge. Proof : Acts would 
 not be free, because God's knowledge of vision is based on a 
 predetermining decree. St. Augustine says, (iod's knowledge is 
 no more the cause of free acts than our memory is the cause 
 of past events. Damascene says, God's knowledge of our free 
 acts is no more their cause than the doctor's knowledge of a 
 coming disease is its cause. Our conduct precedes God's knowl- 
 edge with priority of causation improperly so called, it is de- 
 terminative of God's knowledge as object and mentally, not 
 physically. 
 
THESIS V 
 
 God has a will, necessary with regard to Himself, free with 
 regard to creatures. 
 
 Jouin, pp. 242-245. Boedder, pp. 290-325. 
 
 TERMS 
 
 Will. That God has a will hardly needs proof after proving 
 that He has an intellect. Scripture is plain and removes all 
 doubt from the minds of believers. " Whatsoever the Lord 
 pleased, He hath done." Ps. 134.6. " He loves justice, and 
 hates iniquity." Ps. 44.8; and these acts call for a will. To 
 will is a simple perfection, and as such cannot be absent from 
 God. Besides, there is no knowledge without desire, and God 
 has most perfect knowledge. Even dead things like stones, 
 and live things without knowledge like plants, have tendencies. 
 Only live beings with knowledge have elicited appetite. Appe- 
 tite has good for object, and good can be sensible or intellectual, 
 material or spiritual. The will tends towards good and away 
 from evil. Tendency towards is love, tendency away from is 
 hate. "Whatever emotion of the soul is free from imperfection 
 can be attributed in strict sense to God, others only by way of 
 figure. Desire with respect to extrinsic things and delight are 
 species of love that involve no imperfection. Aversion is a 
 kindred species of hate. Hope, fear, sadness, remorse, despair, 
 anger, are absent from God, and are ascribed to Him only 
 figuratively, by comparison with man. Hope and despair imply 
 a superior; fear, and sadness, and anger imply harm proper to 
 self; remorse means change of heart. Hatred in God involves 
 none of the disturbances it involves in man. 
 
 In reality and formally speaking, God's will is God's essence; 
 and His infinite simplicity is the reason. And yet we keep them 
 apart in our mind. God's will is eutitatively one act, termina- 
 tively many acts; by nature simple, virtually compound. His 
 
 287 
 
288 NATURAL THEOLOGY 
 
 one wish equals every possible wish, and touches all possible 
 objects. God is at the same time the principle of His wishes 
 and their object, though with our minds we distinguish between 
 the principle of God's wishes and their objects. The distinc- 
 tion rests in the fact, that, because God is infinite, His one wish 
 equals many, and because the act of wishing one thing is not, 
 at least terminatively, the act of wishing another. Creation is 
 proof that God's will can turn on things outside Himself. Dif- 
 ferences in object are responsible for our division of God's will 
 into will of good pleasure and will in symbol, antecedent will 
 and consequent, conditional and absolute, with effect and with- 
 out effect. 
 
 A word about each : 
 
 Will of good pleasure turns on what God really and truly 
 wants. Will in symbol resembles the written legal instrument 
 among men. God's will is seen in some external act. At times 
 in Scripture God makes plain by the turn events take what 
 He wants, the opposite of what He might be supposed to 
 want. Examples are the sacrifice of Isaac by x\braham, and 
 the silence imposed by Christ on the cured leper. St. Matt. 
 8.4. 
 
 Antecedent will in God means what He wishes in the most ab- 
 solute manner, without regard to particular circumstances. 
 Consequent will means what He wishes with an eye to particu- 
 lar circumstances. With antecedent will He wishes the salva- 
 tion of all, saint and sinner alike. With consequent will He 
 wishes saints saved and sinners lost. Hence it is plain that 
 God can wish with consequent will what He previously fought 
 against with antecedent will. Their theory of physical prede- 
 termination drives the Thomists to limit the particular circum- 
 stance in question of consequent will to the beauty of the uni- 
 verse and a display of justice. These motives had all to do with 
 the wickedness of Judas and the holiness of Peter. The man's 
 use of his free will is the circumstance on which we insist. 
 God's antecedent will prescinds from man's use of his free will, 
 His consequent will takes this circumstance into account. Con- 
 ditional will in God means a wish subject to a condition, and 
 the condition hangs on man, not on God. Absolute will carries 
 no condition, and is always fulfilled. Will with effect and will 
 
THESIS V 289 
 
 without effect explain themselves. No absolute will of God is 
 without effect, conditional will is often without effect. With 
 the same antecedent will God wishes all to be saved and wishes 
 to bestow on all the means of salvation. In one case His ante- 
 cedent will is conditional, in the other absolute. Every conse- 
 quent wiU of God is absolute and with effect. Sometimes will 
 with effect is not consequent, though it is absolute on the part 
 of God. 
 
 Free. The formal object of God's will is His own goodness. 
 It is what first and of itself moves His wiU; and, being alone 
 infinite, is alone in proportion with His faculty of wishing. 
 The primary material object of God's will is God Himself; the 
 secondary material object is every being outside of God, because 
 all share in the goodness of God. When God Himself is ob- 
 ject, God's will is not free; when creatures are object, God is 
 free. Freedom is immunity from necessity or from restriction 
 to one line of conduct. 
 
 There are two kinds of freedom, because there are two kinds 
 of necessity, physical and moral. We are talking about phys- 
 ical freedom, not moral. Two Icinds of physical freedom, be- 
 cause there are two kinds of physical necessity, extrinsic and 
 intrinsic. Immunity from extrinsic necessity is called freedom 
 of spontaneity or freedom from violence. Immunity from in- 
 trinsic necessity is called freedom of choice, or of indifference, 
 and is of three kinds, contradiction, contrariety and specifica- 
 tion. 
 
 With regard to moral evil or sin, God enjoys no freedom of 
 contrariety. He simply must hate sin. He simply must love 
 virtue. Witli regard to metaphysical and physical evil He en- 
 joys freedom of contrariety. We leave God's decrees out of the 
 question, because they are eternal and banish suspension of will 
 from God. Freedom in our thesis means that whatever crea- 
 tures God wishes to come into being. He wishes them in such 
 a way that He could have not wished them. No imperfection 
 must attach to God's freedom. Therefore it must be conceived, 
 not as indifference on the part of a potency to be reduced to 
 act, but as indifference on the part of an act, put from eternity, 
 to touch this or that object, as indifference to whatsoever term 
 outside of God. 
 
290 NATURAL THEOLOGY 
 
 Division — Two Parts, I, 11. I, Necessary; U, Free, 
 
 PROOFS 
 
 I. 1°. Infinite will cannot be indifferent to infinite good 
 perfectly known. Ergo, God necessarily loves Himself. 
 
 2°. A well ordered and holy will cannot but love a being in- 
 finitely deserving of love. Ergo God necessarily loves Him- 
 self. 
 
 //. 1°. God's will is free with regard to what tilings He 
 knows to be contingent. But God knows creatures to be con- 
 tingent. Ergo, God's will i« free with regard to creatures. 
 
 2°. Creatures are particular goods, and no adequate object 
 for even a finite will. We ourselves can embrace particular 
 goods, we need not embrace them. They are no adequate good, 
 and not necessarily connected with God's existence. 
 
 3°. Prayer proves free will in God. It supposes God able to 
 grant or refuse the favor. 
 
 4°. Liberality implies same. A favor is a gift that can be 
 withheld without wrong, and liberality means the bestowal of a 
 favor. 
 
 PRINCIPLES 
 
 A. 1°. God has no end or good distinct from Himself. He 
 is good and end for Himself and for all besides. 
 
 2°. A perfectible will is a moved mover, not a divine will. 
 
 3°. Will of God, viewed in principle, is God's being; not 
 when viewed in term, unless His essence is object. 
 
 4°. God's will is not stirred by creatures. His essence stirs 
 Him to wish creatures, always as secondary object. 
 
 5°. God's purpose, when He seeks outside objects, is not to 
 perfect Himself, but to communicate His goodness to others. 
 
 6°. God's wish is one formally, many virtually. 
 
 B. \°. God's wish is eternal, viewed in principle; temporal, 
 viewed in term; its necessity is consequent, not antecedent. 
 
 2°. God's wish regarding outside things is identical with 
 His essence after the manner of a transient, not an immanent 
 act. 
 
 3°. God's wish would be contingent, if He could not wish 
 after wishing; not, hmvever, if He can not wish before wishing. 
 
THESIS V 291 
 
 The first implies change, and therefore contingency; the second 
 implies no change. 
 
 C. 1°. The necessity, with which God knows things outside, 
 is consequent on His decree to create, and consequent on the 
 free acts of men. 
 
 2°. God knows only the possibility of things with antecedent 
 necessity, not their future reality or futuribility. He knows 
 the latter with consequent necessity, dependent on free will and 
 the realization of conditions. 
 
 D. Freedom in creatures, because it involves potency, is a 
 mixed perfection; not in God, because it is act, and no potency. 
 
 E. We conceive God's will as able to determine itself; in it- 
 self, and as a matter of fact, it is determined from eternity; 
 in such a way, howeve-r, that it could have otherwise determined 
 itself. 
 
 F. The act by which God loves Himself and creatures is en- 
 titatively the same, not terminatively. It is necessary entita- 
 tively, not terminatively, unless His essence is object. 
 
 G. 1°. Freedom of contrariety regarding moral good and 
 evil is no perfection, and is absent from God. 
 
 2°. God can draw good from evil; and with God, to permit 
 evil is good and no harm. 
 
 Scholion. To re'concile God's freedom with His immutability. 
 
 God's freedom must not prejudice His immutability. New 
 volitions must not be new realities in God. They are new re- 
 lations, but non-mutual. All the change is in the outside term 
 they affect, not in God their author. The relation is logical 
 on the part of God. God is really the same before and after 
 the world exists. On the part of creatures it is real. Crea- 
 tures are different before and after God's wish. The thing in 
 God that makes Him free, that makes Him now wish and then 
 not wish creatures, is God's substantial volition, His very es- 
 sence. There are no accidents in God. Wishes in us are acci- 
 dents, in God they are a substance, they are Himself, His es- 
 sence. 
 
 In God freedom stands with immutability, because it rests on 
 the surpassing and infinite actuality of His substantial voli- 
 tion. On account of its infinite actuality volition in God can 
 without change, increase, diminution, lean or not lean towards 
 
292 NATURAL THEOLOGY 
 
 creatures in a way beyond our mental grasp. "When He leans 
 towards creatures, He wishes them, and they are terms of His 
 act. When He leans away from them, they are no terms of 
 His act, and He wishes them not. The mystery of God's free- 
 dom lies in this, that His volition, enduring the same substance 
 without change, views outside things in different lights, wishes 
 some, not wishing others. The act of volition in God is neces- 
 sary and eternal, its termination is free and in time. Hence 
 term or object is the important factor in God's freedom. No 
 free act entitatively taken can be absent from God, a free act 
 terminatively taken can be absent from God. The act by 
 which God loves Himself is necessary, the act by which He 
 loves creatures is free. No contradiction, because the act is 
 necessary and free under different respects, entitatively and 
 terminatively. 
 
 The act constituting God free is God Himself, and this act 
 is not considered in itself, but inasmuch as it connotes terms 
 or objects. The infinite nature of God alone explains the 
 wondrous efficacy of this act. Finite acts, like our own wishes, 
 are quite other. As soon as my free act exists, it becomes 
 necessary. It is called free, because it proceeds from an in- 
 different potency; and, at the very instant of its doing, it is 
 done in such a way that, prior by nature to its doing, it could 
 have been left undone. Of course, when once done, it is neces- 
 sary, and no longer free, it is shackled to its formal object. An 
 act in God is free, not because it proceeds from an indifferent 
 potency. There is no potency in God, He is all act. Act in 
 God is God Himself, and therefore of no act in God can it be 
 said that, prior by nature to its doing, it could have been left 
 undone. An act in God is free, because in virtue of its infinite 
 and substantial actuality it looks effectively, or leans with life- 
 giving efficacy towards one or other of two outside objects. 
 In this way an act, necessary and immutable in itself or entita- 
 tively, by virtue of this look or tendency induces change in an 
 outside object, connotes the outside object, and is free in its 
 causative capacity. 
 
 Another explanation. In every act of wishing, a created 
 will undergoes an intrinsic change, because it passes from po- 
 tency to act. It undergoes no additional intrinsic change be- 
 cause it chooses, or wishes with freedom. God in the act of 
 
THESIS V 293 
 
 wishing undergoes no such intrinsic change, because passage 
 from potency to act has no place in God. He is act, and act 
 alone. And therefore no intrinsic change attaches to God's 
 will when it chooses, or wishes with freedom. Hence God can 
 be said to wish or not wish from eternity, because no intrinsic 
 change, no passage from potency to act, is incurred in the 
 double process. Creatures cannot be said to at any fixed mo- 
 ment wish and no.t wish, because the double process in their 
 case involves- intrinsic change, passage from potency to act. 
 
THESIS VI 
 
 7. Creatures, to continue in being, need positive and direct 
 conservation on the part of God. 
 
 II. Creatures, to act, need physical and immediate coopera- 
 tion on the part of God. 
 
 Jouin, pp. 250-253. Boedder, pp. 344-370. 
 
 Division — Two Parts, I, II. I, Conservation; II, Coopera- 
 tion. 
 
 QUESTION 
 
 7. There is nothing in the nature of a contingent being to 
 make its continued existence necessary, and all creatures are 
 contingent. Only the necessary being enjoys this property, and 
 independence in the matter of continued existence means inde- 
 pendence in the matter of origin. Continuance is only a mode 
 of existence, modes follow substance ; and contingents are as 
 helpless regarding continuance in being as they are regarding 
 original existence. As nothing in their nature demands first 
 origin, and creation alone accounts for their first appearance 
 in the universe of existences or realities; so nothing in their 
 nature demands continuance in being, and conservatism alone 
 accounts for their perseverance in the universe of realities. The 
 quality of contingence in creatures makes conservation as much 
 a need as creation ; and, as all contingents are necessarily created, 
 all contingents are necessarily conserved. 
 
 TEEMS 
 
 7. Conservation means divine activity responsible for a crea- 
 ture's continuance in being. It can be negative or positive; di- 
 rect or indirect. Negative conservation is simple non-destruc- 
 tion, policy of hands off, e. g. when we refrain from killing a 
 neighbor. Positive conservatism implies actual influence on the 
 thing conserved, e. g. food sustains life. In negative, the pre- 
 
 294 
 
THESIS VI 295 
 
 server does nothing; in positive, he does something. Direct 
 conservation exei'ts immediate influence on object, and it is a 
 species of continuous production, e. g. the shape of a vessel 
 sustains the shape of the liquid it contains. Indirect conser- 
 vation wards off destructive agencies, e. g. salt sprinkled on meat 
 kills germs. 
 
 Sense of tliesis. God positively and directly keeps in exist- 
 ence every contingent being, and without this divine activity 
 no contingent being could continue in existence. Deists are of 
 opinion that God after creation left the world to itself, to its 
 own native forces, physical and chemical, and to unchanging 
 laws. 
 
 PROOFS 
 
 I. 1°. Unless creatures need positive and direct conserva- 
 tion, God cannot annihilate them. But God can annihilate 
 creatures. Ergo, they need conservation. 
 
 With regard to the Major. The term of annihilation is noth- 
 ing. A positive act cannot have nothing for term. Ergo, an- 
 nihilation can be accomplished only by withdrawal of positive 
 and direct conservation. 
 
 With regard to the Minor. God's supreme and absolute do- 
 minion demands it. Creatures can exist only as long as God 
 wants them to exist, and no longer. Even man can destroy the 
 work of his hands. 
 
 N.B. Immortality of the soul is no limitation of God's power, 
 because God's own attributes forbid soul's destruction, and 
 God's attributes are God Himself. 
 
 2°. St. Thomas. 
 
 What depends on another for its being, as opposed to its 
 making or production, depends on that other for its continuance 
 in being. But all creatures depend on God's immediate work 
 for their being. Ergo, they need conservation for continuance 
 in being. 
 
 With regard to the Major. Dependence in making lasts 
 while making continues, and then ceases. A pari, dependence 
 in being ought to last while being continues. 
 
 With regard to the Minor. Effects depend on cause for their 
 being, when they can be produced by no other cause; for their 
 making only, when they can be produced by another cause. 
 
296 NATURAL THEOLOGY 
 
 Every effect of a creature can be made by another cause, e. g. 
 son, house. Nothing can be made without God's cooperation. 
 Primal matter, angel, soul depend on God for both being and 
 making. They must be created. 
 
 3°. Without this dependence, God's dominion would be less 
 perfect than it is. Ergo. 
 
 PRINCIPLES 
 
 A. What cannot but be, needs no conservation. But actual 
 creatures cannot but be. Ergo, they need no conservation. 
 
 Answer. Actual creatures cannot but be in hypothetical 
 sense, not in absolute sense. God alone cannot but be in abso- 
 lute sense. The hypothesis is plain. Actual beings cannot but 
 be as long as they remain actual. They can not be, when they 
 cease to be actual. 
 
 B. Nothing, whether a house or a wall or anything else, de- 
 pends on man for its being. Things depend on God for their 
 being (esse); on man for their making (fieri). For this rea- 
 son a house can endure without further activity on the part 
 of its second cause or man, not without activity on the part of 
 its first cause or God. 
 
 C. Things tend towards nothing negatively, not positively; 
 and this tendency is no argument against immortality. The 
 soul has no need of indirect conservation. It needs direct. 
 
 D. The soul's immortality is indeed natural, but not abso- 
 lute; and its self -conservation is indirect, not direct. Its spir- 
 ituality and simplicity are salt preserving it from the destruc- 
 tive and corruptive germs of materiality and composition. God 
 directly conserves the soul. 
 
 E. Conservation is a continuance of the act of creation, not 
 a renewal of the act. Everything in God is one. Conservation 
 and creation are one and the same act, the terms of the act are 
 different. Creation therefore is not sufficient to explain crea- 
 tures, conservation is besides needed. 
 
 F. A substance is a being that stands in itself, exists of it- 
 self, without need of inherence in another as subject. This 
 circumstance is no argument against conservation. Substances 
 depend on God for their existence, they are independent of 
 creatures. Accidents on the contrary depend on creatures for 
 
THESIS VI 297 
 
 their existence, they cannot naturally exist without some sub- 
 stance for subject of inhesion. 
 
 G. The reason why a house can continue to exist without its 
 builder, hot water without fire, is because they do not depend 
 for their being, but for their making on builder and fire. They 
 depend on God for being and cannot continue without Him. 
 
 H. A creature able to continue without conservation would 
 reflect more credit on God's omnipotence. 
 
 Answer. Square circle. Kecessary and contingent. God 
 could not annihilate. 
 
 7. Indirect and accidental conservation of bodies is within 
 the province of creatures ; e. g. salt and meat. 
 
 a. Positive and direct self-conservation belongs immediately 
 to no creature, even in partial sense, because creature would be 
 ens a se. 
 
 b. God immediately conserves all, because dominion demands 
 it. 
 
 c. Sometimes He conserves by Himself alone, e. g. primal 
 matter, angel, soul. 
 
 d. At other times with the help of creatures, e. g. light and 
 sun, image and object. Their esse is situated in their fieri. 
 
 J. Things cannot conserve themselves, though they can con- 
 serve others. They cannot produce themselves, though they can 
 produce others. 
 
 K. Annihilation is denial of conservation, no positive act. 
 God alone can annihilate, because God alone can conserve. God 
 never annihilates. Absolute power can, ordered power cannot 
 do it. Against nature of spirit, against nature of primal mat- 
 ter, which always endures, most fit to exist, made and destroyed 
 by God alone. God's power and goodness are more manifest 
 in conservation than in annihilation. Ergo, by miracle. 
 
 L. God can annihilate. Finis respondet principio. Like be- 
 ginning, like end. God alone in the beginning. Ergo, God 
 alone in the end. 
 
 Ansiver. Creation declares power, annihilation would deny 
 it. Creatures have infinite passive potency, enough for unend- 
 ing duration, not infinite active potency required for eternal 
 duration. Forms and accidents are destroyed, but not annihi- 
 lated, because subjects from which educed and substances in 
 which they inhere remain. 
 
298 NATURAL THEOLOGY 
 
 II. Creatures, to act, need physical and immediate coopera- 
 tion on the part of God. 
 
 TERMS 
 
 Cooperation with second causes is what we mean by God's 
 concurrence with creatures, Dei concursus. It can be super- 
 natural, natural; immediate, mediate; physical, moral. Super- 
 natural has to do with the order of grace, and belongs to dog- 
 matic theology. Natural has to do with deeds in the natural 
 order, and belongs to our thesis. Immediate touches or influ- 
 ences the creature's activity in such a way that the whole re- 
 sult, act and effect alike, depends of itself and directly on God's 
 conjoined efficacy. Mediate reaches the cause alone, not the 
 cause's effect. Mediate cooperation begins and ends with the 
 bestowal of energies on creatures. Mediate puts the sword in 
 a man's hand, immediate helps wield the sword; one prepares 
 the cause, the other works in conjunction with cause. Physical 
 is here opposed to moral. Moral influence affects the agent's 
 will, and through it the effect he produces. It can be extrinsic 
 by advice, or intrinsic by predisposing, and God alone enjoys 
 second power. It is always mediate, regarding the outward act. 
 Physical influence affects the agent's outward act. It is im- 
 mediate, and contributes to the agent's outward act the same 
 kind of force the agent himself contributes. 
 
 N.B. God's moral cooperation extends to only good acts. 
 His physical to good and bad acts. Other meanings of moral 
 and physical. Moral activity is free activity; physical is de- 
 termined or necessary activity. A man acts morally; a brute, 
 physically. In matter of certainty, moral, physical and meta- 
 physical have their own meanings. Physical is likewise op- 
 posed to logical. The physical exists as a matter of fact and 
 is independent of all thought. The logical is dependent on 
 thought for existence, and as a matter of fact exists nowhere 
 outside of thought, e.g. the world and being in general, par- 
 ticulars and universals, this man and man. In compounds, 
 parts are physical, metaphysical and logical; or really distinct, 
 virtually distinct with foundation, and without foundation in 
 fact. In our thesis physical is opposed to moral, without refer- 
 ence to other meanings. 
 
THESIS VI 299 
 
 PROOFS 
 
 II. 1". A thing's activity follows the nature of its existence 
 or being. But creatures, because contingent existences, depend 
 for their continued existence on God's physical and immediate 
 conservation or preservation. Ergo, creatures, because contin- 
 gent activities, depend for their activity on God's physical and 
 immediate cooperation. 
 
 With regard to the Major. Agere sequitur esse — Sicut res 
 est, sic agit; are axioms in philosophy. They mean activity 
 follows existence; in what measure a thing is, in that measure 
 it acts. 
 
 With regard to the Minor, preceding thesis. 
 
 2°. Whatever is a being by participation depends on God for 
 its existence. But the acts of creatures are accidents, imperfect 
 beings by participation. Ergo, they depend on God for their 
 existence or production, and God is part cause of them, co- 
 operator. 
 
 3°. It would otherwise be hard for God to hinder or restrain 
 the activity of His creatures, and that would destroy supreme 
 dominion. To prevent a certain thought or wish, God would 
 have to do away with an intellect or a will, and immortality 
 forbids. 
 
 N.B. God as first cause is complete in His own order, i. e. 
 no other first cause is needed. Creature as second cause is com- 
 plete in its own order, i. e. no other second cause is needed. 
 Nor one nor other is superfluous, e. g. writer and pen ; phan- 
 tasm and working intellect; image and receiving intellect. Dif- 
 ference between God and examples: No dependence in God, 
 all the dependence is in creatures. Ergo, the relation is non- 
 mutual. In examples the dependence is mutual, equally af- 
 fecting the two terms of the relation. God alone of His very 
 essence acts without dependence. Creatures essentially act with 
 dependence, because they exist with dependence. 
 
 PEINCIPLES 
 
 A: If God were single cause of creature's acts, no act would 
 be immanent, because principle would be outside of agent. This 
 
300 NATURAL THEOLOGY 
 
 is not the case when God acts as first cause only, leaving to 
 creatures all the activity attaching to second causes. 
 
 B: Free will remains unharmed, because God's cooperation 
 is simultaneous with wish, not prior to same. 
 
 C: One and the same act can immediately and wholly pro- 
 ceed from two agents of different orders, not from two agents 
 of the same order. God and creature are subordinates, not 
 coordinates. 
 
 D: God permits sin, refrains from preventing it; and this 
 is the whole extent of His cooperation with sin. Sin is not 
 necessarily mixed up with God's part of the work, it lies in 
 abuse of will; and God is not bound to physically hinder free 
 exercise of the will, whether it be use or abuse of the faculty. 
 God's cooperation is indifferent to use and abuse, man makes it 
 one or the other. 
 
 E: God gives to every nature all it needs. Ergo, no co- 
 operation. Answer: Always in accordance with quality of 
 nature. To contingent natures He gives contingent or de- 
 pendent activity. 
 
 F: Creatures are by themselves sufficient. Cause is often 
 equal or superior to effect. Ergo, no need of outside help. 
 Answer: Cooperation is not needed because effect surpasses 
 created cause, it is due entirely to intrinsic want of creature as 
 a contingent being. Angel cannot create another angel or a 
 fly; father alone cannot produce a son. 
 
 G. Creatures are superfluous, because God can produce whole 
 effect. Ergo. 
 
 Answer: God uses creatures not because He needs them, but 
 to show forth His goodness. 
 
 H : Creatures are God's images. Ergo, they act like God, 
 with independence. 
 
 Answer: Creatures are like God, they are not equal to Him. 
 
 I : God uses creatures as instruments. Ergo, cooperation is 
 not immediate. 
 
 Answer: Creatures are not instruments in strict sense; and 
 God's immensity makes God everywhere present. Like and un- 
 like instruments. Free will moves itself. Instrument makes 
 effect like principal. Not so creatures. 
 
 J: God ouglit to be able to vest a created cause with inde- 
 pendent activity. Ergo. 
 
THESIS VI 301 
 
 Answer: Square circle, necessary contingent, could not hin- 
 der. 
 
 K: Infinite power would be needed for every effect. Ergo. 
 
 Answer: On part of first cause, not on part of second. 
 Things are hard and easy with regard to second causes, not 
 with regard to first. 
 
 L: God cooperates with matter and form as efficient cause, 
 not as matter and form. 
 
THESIS VII 
 
 God's cooperation with man's free will is no physical pre- 
 determination. 
 
 Boedder, pp. 370-381. 
 
 QUESTION 
 
 We have to choose between physical predetermination of the 
 Thomists and simultaneous cooperation of the Jesuits. 
 
 TEEMS 
 
 Simultaneous cooperation means that God's act on the out- 
 side is simultaneous with creature's act; neither before, nor 
 after, but along with it. There is nothing in the effect but 
 what proceeds from the creature, nothing but what proceeds 
 from God. The whole effect begins with both and depends on 
 both, e.g. pen, penman and writing. God's intermediate 
 knowledge saves free will from harm. 
 
 Physical predetermination is actio Dei qua voluntatem bu- 
 manam, priusquam ipsa se determinet, ita ad actum movet 
 insuperabili virtute, ut voluntas nequeat omissionem sui actus 
 cum ilia praemotione conjungere. (Gonet.) Gonet, there- 
 fore, and he is a representative Thomist, thus describes physi- 
 cal predetermination: Before the will determines itself, God 
 moves it to act with such irresistible force that it cannot com- 
 bine omission of the act with God's intervention. Thomists re- 
 ject intermediate knowledge in God, and make no provision for 
 free will beyond a mere assertion. All Thomists maintain that 
 God predetermines the will to every act in such a way, that the 
 will, too, freely determines itself, and vote the whole question 
 of free will an insoluble mystery. Praedeterminatio is not 
 praemotio in strict sense, though Thomists confound the two. 
 One means predetermination and it destroys free will, makes 
 
 302 
 
THESIS VII 303 
 
 it a necessary agent; the other means antecedent influence, and 
 it influences free will without destroying it, secures a set act 
 put with entire freedom by the will. Whatever act God wants 
 He can get from a man, and get it without danger of failure. 
 Otherwise men would be outside His supreme dominion. He 
 can refuse cooperation to every wish but the wish He wants. 
 "With the help of indeliberate acts, provoked in the man, God 
 can morally entice and physically drive the will to good acts 
 prior to its self-determination. In this sense God can physi- 
 cally predispose the will, exert prior influence on it, but He 
 cannot determine or predetermine it. 
 
 PROOF 
 
 According to Thomists themselves, these are characteristic 
 features of physical predetermination. It is concerned with a 
 specific and individual act ; it depends on God's will alone ; it is 
 an essential prerequisite for the act, and is essentially con- 
 joined with the act. 
 
 But where an essential prerequisite for the act is not in the 
 agent's power, where a condition of such sort, that the act 
 cannot be omitted in the event of its fulfillment, is not in the 
 agent's power, freedom is out of the question, and beyond un- 
 derstanding. 
 
 Ergo, God's cooperation with man's free acts is no physical 
 predetermination. 
 
 With regard to the Minor. Evident from the very concept 
 or idea of freedom. Explanation of St. Thomas : Man would 
 have no free will, unless it rested with himself to determine his 
 act in such a way that he chooses this or that according to his 
 own judgment. Two things in every act, substance of act and 
 determination of agent. Act is in agent's power only when 
 agent determines himself, and freedom means dominion over 
 act. Unless man determines himself, he is not free. Instinct 
 rules brutes, A condition which makes something necessary 
 never destroys freedom, when it is in our power. A condition 
 which makes something necessary always destroys freedom, when 
 it is not in our power, e. g. if you run, you must move. If God 
 foresees that you are going to sin, you must sin. With the 
 Thomists the condition, namely, physical predetermination, is 
 
304 NATURAL THEOLOGY 
 
 not in our power, it is altogether dependent on the will of 
 God. In the event of such or such predetermination, such or 
 such an act must follow; and, whether we have such or such a 
 predetermination, depends on God, not on ourselves. 
 
 Here is another sad consequence. In physical predetermina- 
 tion God would not merely permit sin, He would determine or 
 compel man to the commission of sin. According to the Thom- 
 ists the matter of sin, the physical act, is willed and prede- 
 termined by God; its form alone, its malice, is merely per- 
 mitted. But in willing the matter of sin, God necessarily wills 
 its form, since matter and form are metaphysically conjoined, 
 and therefore inseparable in the order of reality. Man himself 
 never wills the formal malice of sin, that would be to wish 
 evil. He wishes the good involved in the sinful act, and he 
 incurs blame because malice is inseparably connected with the 
 good he wishes. God would therefore be as much in the wrong 
 as man, and therefore unholy. We make the whole sinful act, 
 matter as well as form, substance as well as malice, proceed 
 from God by the single way of permission without approval. 
 
 SchoUon — How God moves or influences the will in its free 
 acts. St. Thomas: God implants in every will a tendency to- 
 ward, a natural craving for, complete happiness, universal 
 good, the summum bonum, Himself; and without this tendency 
 man can desire nothing. In this single respect is man's will 
 predetermined by God. With regard to particular goods, man 
 determines himself, with the help of his intellect, to wish this 
 good or that good, real good or apparent good. 1-2; q.9; a.6; 
 ad.3. 
 
 N.B. A real good is good in itself, good as a matter of 
 fact ; an apparent good is evil in itself, good in the mind, e. g. 
 revenge. Real good helps to last end; apparent good turns 
 agent aside from last end. Every agent under man seeks real 
 good, because nature or an unerring God fixes and rules its ap- 
 petite. Man can seek real or apparent good, because his will 
 or appetite is fixed and ruled by a reason capable of error and 
 mistake. God's cooperation with man's free acts has a parallel 
 in the case of a ship, the wind and its pilot. If the boat goes 
 wrong and breaks on the rocks, the fault is not with the wind, 
 but with the pilot who made poor use of the wind. The wind 
 is man's tendency towards universal good, implanted in him 
 
THESIS VII 305 
 
 by his creator, the pilot is free will in its selection of particular 
 good. With the Thomists the wind would be God and free 
 will acting in concert, or the wind would be the pilot. 
 
 PRINCIPLES 
 
 A: God's activity is simultaneous with man's in every free 
 act. First cause is prior to second by nature, not in time. 
 Priority of nature means simply that man's wish is more de- 
 pendent on God than on man himself, because man gets all 
 his activity from God. 
 
 B: God and man are partial causes of man's every wish, 
 from the viewpoint of cause only. From the viewpoint of 
 effect they are total causes, one subordinate to the other, like 
 phantasm and working intellect with regard to the image; like 
 pen, penman and writing. God produces the whole effect, man 
 produces the whole effect, the whole wish, but under different 
 aspects; God under universal aspect, man under particular 
 aspect. 
 
 C: Man cannot wish without God, but God need not pre- 
 determine man. 
 
 D : The indifference we ascribe to free will is active, not 
 merely passive. Active indifference can be removed by the 
 agent; passive must be removed by another. 
 
 E: Man's will is in potency to second act, not to first act. 
 Its actuality in first act can change to actuality its potency to 
 second act. 
 
THESIS VIII 
 
 Ood and Evil 
 
 Boedder, pp. 393-412. 
 
 QUESTION 
 Cooperation of God in metaphysical, physical and moral evil. 
 
 TERMS 
 
 Evil is opposed to good. Good is perfection, whatever con- 
 tributes to a thing's finish or completeness. Evil is privatio 
 boni debiti; it is absence or want of a good that ought to be 
 present, e. g. blind man. Defect is absence of good that ought 
 not to be present, it is limitation, or metaphysical evil, e. g. 
 blind stone. Every creature is a metaphysical evil because of 
 limitations or finite nature. Peccatum means slip of the mind, 
 mistake, beside agent's end or purpose, e. g. poor scribe, ig- 
 norant doctor. Culpa is slip of the will, fault, sin, blame- 
 worthy, in power of agent. A slip of the tongue is no fault 
 of the heart. Metaphysical evil is defectus, want, limitation. 
 Physical evil is malum or peccatum, or absence of a good in 
 the physical order, that ought to be present. Moral evil or sin 
 is culpa, act of will opposed to rectitude or virtue. Moral evil 
 has to do with the man's will; physical, with any other faculty 
 of the man, e, g. blind, deaf, sick. God has to wish metaphysi- 
 cal evil every time He creates. Limitation is of the essence of 
 a creature. God can wish physical evil not in itself, but as a 
 means to some moral good or to some greater physical good. 
 God cannot wish moral evil as an end or as a means. He can 
 however permit or allow it. God's permission of moral evil is 
 always physical, never moral. We distinguish two kinds of 
 such physical permission, negative and positive. Negative is 
 the policy of doing nothing, leaving things alone, letting a 
 thing happen without at all desiring it. Positive is the policy 
 
 306 
 
THESIS VIII 307 
 
 of doing something negative, actively leaving things alone, let- 
 ting a thing happen with bias in its favor. Negative permis- 
 sion is extrinsic to the permitting agent, positive permission is 
 intrinsic to him. To be negative and nowise positive, per- 
 mission must have two requisites. 1. No approval of the thing 
 permitted, but displeasure. 2. The thing permitted must not 
 necessarily follow from what the agent does. If it necessarily 
 follows, the agent must not be bound to refrain from doing 
 what he does. If he is bound to refrain, the origin of the 
 obligation must be something other than the evil that follows. 
 God's permission of evil is purely negative. 1. God, far from 
 approving of moral evil or sin, threatens it with the heaviest 
 sanction conceivable, the pains of hell. 2, Sin never neces- 
 sarily follows from what God does, but from abuse of free will, 
 for which man himself is alone responsible. God's cooperation 
 is indifferent, the same for virtue and the same for sin, man's 
 free will makes the difference. God is not bound to physically 
 liinder man's abuse of his free will from a motive of justice to 
 man, because man of himself can avoid the calamity. His own 
 holiness is no constraining motive, because, far from approving 
 the sins of men, God detests them; and the sins of men never 
 prejudice the holiness of God. God's goodness simply holds 
 Him to the duty of sharing His gifts with free agents to what- 
 ever extent these free agents desire. His goodness holds Him 
 to good, not to better or best. His wisdom could be no motive 
 for the physical prevention of sin, because He can derive good 
 from even moral evil. 
 
 Two questions: 
 
 I. Can God wish to do evil Himself? 
 II. Can God wish others to do evil? 
 
 PKOOFS 
 
 I. God can wish neither physical nor moral evil per se, be- 
 cause they are opposed to good, the will's object. 
 
 God can wish physical evil per accidens, because it is not 
 evil simpliciter, but evil conjoined with good, greater than the 
 good the evil opposes. 
 
 Physical evil sometimes contributes to restoration of moral 
 
308 NATURAL THEOLOGY 
 
 order, to establishment of Justice and preservation of order in 
 the world. Pain leads to medicine and cure. 
 
 God can wish moral evil neither per se nor per accidens. He 
 can permit it. He cannot wish to sin Himself, He cannot wish 
 others to sin ; beause against His holiness. 
 
 Not per se, because otherwise men could without blame wish 
 sin. Not per accidens, because no conjoined good can be su- 
 perior to the good opposed by sin. Divine good and right 
 order are opposed by sin, and no good can be greater. And yet 
 sins happen. God cannot wish them. Ergo, He permits them ; 
 and to permit sin is good, not evil. 
 Four good tilings in permission of sin: 
 
 1. Good, to let free will choose between good and evil, while 
 forbidding evil and supplying needed means for its avoidance. 
 
 2. Good, to refrain from means and helps that would force 
 free agent to avoid sin. 
 
 3. Good, to bestow means and helps that God foresees will 
 prove inefficacious because of man's malice. 
 
 4. Good to afford general cooperation, dependent on man's 
 free will for good or evil, 
 
 PRINCIPLES 
 
 A: "The Lord hath bid Semei curse David." II Kings 
 xvi, 10. 
 
 Answer: Bid means permit. Other meaning absurd. Bid 
 and permit interchanged. St. Mark x, 3. Reason enough for 
 permitting is the fact that they can be directed to higher pur- 
 poses of providence. Not reason enough for wishing them. 
 Same true of martyrs and Passion of Christ. Sin is not on 
 this account good, because capacity for direction is not in sin, 
 but outside. 
 
 B : Men are hardened by God, blinded, led into sin, e. g. 
 Pharao. Exodus iv, 21; People, Isa. vi, 10; Egypt, Isai. xix, 
 14; hardeneth, Rom. ix, 18. 
 
 Ansiver: Permits, allows, denies more abundant helps, sends 
 occasions He knows men will abuse. All men get sufficient 
 grace, not all get efficacious grace. 
 
 C : One sin is often penalty of another. God can wish 
 penalty. Ergo, He can wish sin. 
 
THESIS VIII 309 
 
 Answer: Commission of sin no penalty, but the denial of 
 more abundant graces or helps that could impede sin. 
 
 D: Sins would be outside the order of providence, beyond 
 God's power. 
 
 Answer: The physical act needs His cooperation, deformity 
 is in human will. Besides, God permits them for good pur- 
 poses. He never wishes them. To wish by consequent will is 
 to permit. 
 
 E: God causes sin by cooperation. What He causes. He 
 wishes. Ergo. 
 
 Answer: He causes sin in the sense of permitting, not in 
 the sense of loving or wishing. 
 
 PROOFS 
 
 II. God cannot wish others to do evil. God cannot wish sin 
 to be committed. 
 
 1°. No difference between wishing sin and wishing sin to be 
 committed. Qui facit per alium, facit per se. Men would do 
 no harm, if God could wish them to commit sin. N"o harm to 
 do what God wants done. 
 
 2°. God forbids sin. Ergo, He cannot wish sin to be com- 
 mitted. 
 
 PEINCIPLES 
 
 A: Either God wishes sin to be committed, or He wishes 
 sin not to be committed. But He does not wish sin not to be 
 committed. Ergo, He wishes sin to be committed. 
 
 Answer: Enumeration is not complete. Datur tertium. 
 There is a third alternative. He permits sin. God's will re- 
 garding the non-existence of sin is not absolute and efficacious. 
 It is not will of good pleasure ; but antecedent and inefficacious, 
 will of symbol. His will to permit sin is absolute and effica- 
 cious. 
 
 B : Commission of sin and non-commission of sin are con- 
 tradictories. Ergo. 
 
 Answer: To wish commission of sin, and to wish non-com- 
 mission of sin are not contradictories. Two affirmations can- 
 not be contradictories. God neither wishes sin to be commit- 
 ted, nor does He wish sin not to be committed. He wishes to 
 
310 NATURAL THEOLOGY 
 
 permit sin to be committed. He does not wish sin to be com- 
 mitted, and that is different from He wishes sin not to be com- 
 mitted. 
 
 C : Sins are committed. Ergo, it is impossible for God to 
 wish no sin to be committed. Ergo, He wishes sin to be com- 
 mitted. 
 
 Answer: With consequent and efficacious will, I grant; with 
 antecedent and inefficacious will, I deny. 
 
 The commission of sin, and the non-commission of sin are 
 contradictories. To wish the commission of sin, and to wish 
 the non-commission of sin are not contradictories. 
 
 D: St. Aug. Evil is not good, but the existence of evil 
 is good. Enchir. c. 96. Ergo, God can wish sin to be com- 
 mitted. 
 
 Answer: To permit evil to exist is good. Enchir. c. 27. 
 " Nullo modo sineret aliquid mali esse in operatione, nisi, etc." 
 St. Aug. would not say sineret but vellet; because God can 
 wish good and not merely allow it. 
 
 E: St. Aug. Sin helps to order and beauty in the world. 
 Enchir. c. 10. Ergo. 
 
 Answer: Per se, no; per accidens, yes. Per se, sin destroys 
 order; per accidens, it is an occasion for higher good. felix 
 culpa. 
 
THESIS IX 
 
 God's cooperation, viewed as something outside of God, is the 
 creature's act, proceeding at one and the same time from the 
 creature as from second or particular cause, and from God as 
 from first and universal cause. 
 
 Boedder, pp. 344-370. 
 
 QUESTION 
 
 God's cooperation, viewed as something in God, is His eternal 
 decree, and we are not at present concerned with that. We 
 now study God's cooperation in term or in effect ; and we main- 
 tain that it is the creature's act. The creature's cooperation 
 in term is likewise the creature's act. In other words the crea- 
 ture's act is the whole effect of God, and the whole effect of the 
 creature. The whole act must be ascribed to God, and the 
 whole act must be ascribed to the creature, not a part of the 
 act to each, e. g. pen and penman in writing. Therefore God's 
 cooperation, viewed in term, connotes nothing distinct from the 
 creature's act, and the physical predetermination of Thomists 
 is ruled out. 
 
 PEOOF 
 
 Really and truly to cooperate, God and creature must com- 
 bine to produce the effect, and by way of term nothing but the 
 creature's act need result, to the utter exclusion of any pre- 
 determination or extra principle. Ergo, God's cooperation is 
 the creature's act. With regard to antecedent: This view of 
 God's cooperation keeps intact the creature's essential depend- 
 ence on God for its causative virtue, the creature's dependence 
 on God in process of its exercise of activity, and God's owner- 
 ship of the whole act or effect. The creature not only exists in 
 virtue of God's conservation, it acts in virtue of God's coopera- 
 tion. By virtue of His immensity God is immediately present 
 
 311 
 
312 NATURAL THEOLOGY 
 
 to the creature at three different periods, before the act begins, 
 while the act is in progress, and when the act is completed. 
 Before the act begins, He gives the creature causative virtue; 
 while the act is in progress, He gives the creature help; and 
 when the act is done, the whole thing is God's. The creature 
 moves and applies itself to the act's accomplishment only by vir- 
 tue of help borrowed from God. God performs the act, as first 
 cause; the creature, as second cause. God is not only the prin- 
 ciple of man's causative virtue. He is also the principle of 
 man's act. 
 
 On the other hand, all the creature's essential dependence on 
 God in process of its exercise of activity is kept intact. St. 
 Thomas in different places describes this dependence as five- 
 fold. God cooperates with creatures, (1) hy giving them their 
 nature and its forces; (2) hy preserving them in being; (3) 
 hy applying them to actual work; (^) hy vesting them with the 
 capacity of instruments; (5) hy moving them in quulity of 
 their last end. This fivefold dependence calls for no physical 
 predetermination. 
 
 Besides, these three axioms need explanation: (a) Second 
 causes never act without motion from the first cause, (b) Sec- 
 ond causes must be applied to actual work by the first cause, 
 (c) Second causes act only in virtue of the first cause. Ex- 
 planation: (a) No motion is required beyond the reception of 
 being and connatural activity. Creation and conservation are 
 themselves motion. Motion is a metaplior derived from artist's 
 use of his tools, and employed to express creature's dependence 
 on God. The real and proper sense is, second causes never act 
 without help from the first cause, (b) The word application 
 is as much a metaphor as motion. It is a figure used to portray 
 the superiority of the first cause, which directs second causes 
 and prescribes their appointed ends, (c) The power attaching 
 to every creature is God's power, because He preserves all and 
 cooperates with all. 
 
THESIS X 
 
 Physical predetermination is a, useless in necessary agents; 
 6, useless in free agents, and destructive of free will. Simul- 
 taneous cooperation is right. 
 
 Boedder, pp. 439-448. 
 
 QUESTION 
 
 Two parts: I. Physical predetermination. II. Simultane- 
 ous cooperation. 
 
 TERMS 
 
 I. Physical Predetermination 
 
 Thomists teach two kinds of predetermination ; one eternal, in 
 God, a decree; the other temporal, in creature, motion im- 
 pressed on creature; and this is physical predetermination. 
 Second is instrument of first, and is likewise called antecedent 
 influence. Predetermination and antecedent influence are 
 synonymous with Thomists, not in themselves. Predetermina- 
 tion is infallible, influence not. Grace is influence, not prede- 
 termination. Predetermination is different from influence of 
 object, e. g. intellect moves will objectively ; different from 
 moral influence, e. g. invitation ; different from simultaneous 
 cooperation, or help. Physical predetermination can he best 
 described as (1) a true push, real motion, (2) proceeding from 
 God alone, (3) received in second cause, (^) gotten and kept 
 without power of choice, (5) prior to act and cause of act, (6) 
 absolutely necessary to every act of every creature, (7) brooTc- 
 ing no denial and infallibly connected ivith the creature's act, 
 (8) supplied by God, not to make the creature proximately able 
 to ad, but to make it actually active; to put it not in first or 
 second act, but between the two. It supposes fire equipped with 
 natural power to burn (remote first act), and with all condi- 
 
 313 
 
314 NATURAL THEOLOGY 
 
 tions dependent on other second causes (proximate first act), 
 like dry wood applied. Over end above all this, physical pre- 
 determination is required, to save God's dominion over His 
 creatures. With all these requisites fulfilled, creatures cannot 
 act unless they are applied, excited, moved, actuated, determined 
 by God. Physical predetermination is intrinsic to second 
 cause. Another kind is extrinsic, due to act of God's will and 
 to a mysterious sympathy or harmony in second cause ; and wc 
 are not concerned w4th this extrinsic kind. Yet -another kind 
 of antecedent influence is indifferent to will's consent and dis- 
 sent; and we are not dealing with this kind either. We all 
 contend for physical and immediate cooperation on the part of 
 God, not content with mere moral cooperation. Two classes of 
 creatures, necessary and free. Hence our thesis. 
 
 PROOFS 
 
 (a) 1°. God's supreme dominion and the dependence of 
 creatures are secured by simultaneous cooperation. Three 
 things in second cause, power, exercise of power, and resulting 
 effect. All three depend on God in simultaneous cooperation, 
 because of creation, conservation and cooperation. No act is 
 possible without physical and immediate cooperation. 
 
 2°. Physical predetermination is not needed to apply, to move, 
 
 to excite, determine creature. 
 
 Apply means to unite.; union between creature and God se- 
 cured by immensity; union between creature and effect se- 
 cured by inclination stamped on nature. 
 
 Move means no local motion needed, like cook setting meat to 
 fire. 
 
 Excite means inclination stamped on nature. 
 
 Determine in specie means inclination stamped on natiire. 
 Creatures rather determine God's cooperation e. g. Sun 
 to shine; sun to produce wheat, pears, roses. 
 
 Determine in individuo means simultaneous cooperation and 
 decree. 
 
 (b) Useless in free agents. 1°. Free will can do nothing 
 without simultaneous cooperation. God can refuse it, and will 
 becomes helpless. 
 
 2°. Will would have only passive and negative indifference, 
 
THESIS X 315 
 
 like intellect: freedom demands active indifference. Free will 
 means dominion over act, and there is no such dominion where 
 will must wait for determination by another. 
 
 Destroys free will. 1°. Phj^sical predetermination is not in 
 our power. With it, the act must follow; without it, the act 
 cannot be placed. This is clear from qualities of physical pre- 
 determination enumerated above. We cannot fly without wings, 
 read without light, walk when chained. Vain distinctions used 
 by Thomists, originative et terminative; sensu diviso et sensu 
 composito. N.B. Simultaneous cooperation goes always with 
 foreknowledge, and never affects man's freedom. 
 
 2°. No violation of a commandment could be imputed to 
 man. Ad impossibile nemo tenetur — infinite series. 
 
 3°. God determines the will; and, to be free, the will must 
 determine itself. Necessary agents would determine themselves 
 to the same extent as man. 
 
 4°. God would be the author of sin. Formal wickedness of 
 act is inseparably connected with material entity of act. It is 
 worse to physically drive a man to sin than to morally incite 
 him. God advises against sin, and cannot drive to sin. N.B. 
 Simultaneous cooperation is material, not formal. It is giving 
 necessary help according to agent's nature. Physical prede- 
 termination is formal cooperation. It is giving unnecessary 
 help, against agent's nature. 
 
 PRINCIPLES 
 
 A. Second causes act with motion, application, virtue of 
 first. Ergo. 
 
 Answer: Motion of first is creation and conservation of sec- 
 ond cause and its energies. Application of first is union with 
 help of another second cause, and God is its author. God's 
 eternal decree bearing on simultaneous cooperation moves and 
 applies second cause from eternity. Aristotle proves God from 
 need of a first mover. Virtue of first is creation and conserva- 
 tion of second cause and its energies, along with simultaneous 
 cooperation. 
 
 B. To act, a thing must actually exist. Ergo. 
 
 Answer: Second cause actually exists and has natural en- 
 ergies. Nothing more is required. First act is not a mixture 
 
316 NATURAL THEOLOGY 
 
 of potency and act, even in case of the soul's faculties. Actu- 
 ality is present before exercise of faculty. 
 
 C. Second causes are instruments of first, and must be 
 applied. Ergo. 
 
 Answer: True of artist's instruments, not of others. Crea- 
 tures are not instruments of God in strict sense. Instrument 
 contributes to likeness with principal in effect. Creatures con- 
 tribute to likeness with themselves, not with God. Instruments 
 have no dominion over act, men have. 
 
 D. God must cause the creature's act. It is something. 
 
 Answer: He causes it by creation, conservation, and co- 
 operation. He gives the creature being and natural energies, 
 and exerts His omnipotence. 
 
 E. Will is indifferent and needs to be determined. Ergo. 
 Answer: With active indifference. It determines itself. 
 
 F. God has charge of the universe, and must direct things. 
 Ergo. 
 
 Answer: He directs men as general directs army. He gives 
 soldiers being and natural energies, encourages them, advises, 
 promises reward. He does not haul them around physically. 
 
 G. God must arrange things without danger of mistake. 
 Ergo. 
 
 Answer: God must leave men free. Simultaneous cooper- 
 ation with the help of intermediate knowledge secures all this. 
 Consequent and extrinsic necessity needed, not antecedent and 
 intrinsic. 
 
 H. In simultaneous cooperation God is first cause, first 
 mover, first free, first to determine, first cause of whole thing, 
 Lord of man and all creation besides. Decree exists before 
 second cause. Actual cooperation is first in dignity, necessity 
 and independence; not in fact, nature or causality. Man's 
 freedom is from God, and determines cooperation in decree. 
 God gives everything to creature. God is Lord of all; nega- 
 tively, by refusing cooperation ; positively, necessary agents act 
 according to nature, free agents can be led with the help of 
 intermediate knowledge. And so simultaneous cooperation, the 
 system advocated by ]\Iolinistp, neither unduly exalts nor unduly 
 depresses the dominion of God or human endeavor; and fur- 
 nishes forth a rational explanation of human conduct without 
 detriment to the majesty of God or the liberty of man. 
 
THESIS X 317 
 
 II. Simultaneous Cooperation- 
 
 TERMS 
 
 Eight doctrine teaches that God's act on the outside is simul- 
 taneous with creature's act, neither before nor after, but along 
 with it; that there is nothing in the effect but what proceeds 
 from the creature, nothing but what proceeds from God ; that 
 the whole effect begins with both and depends on both. This 
 is cooperation in second act. Cooperation in first act is God's 
 act on the inside, it is God's power determined by an eternal 
 decree, and applied to cooperation with creature. It is eternal 
 and not simultaneous ; precedes the creature's act in time and 
 in nature; cause of act destined to follow in course of time. 
 Simultaneous in second act is creature's act inasmuch as it pro- 
 ceeds from God. No act of creature but it proceeds, without 
 possibility of division, from simultaneous cooperation of God 
 and creature. In second act it is prior in dignity, universality, 
 necessity, and consequence to creature's act; not in nature or 
 in time. Cooperation in first act is a decree formulated with 
 help of intermediate knowledge, by which God knows what the 
 free agent will do in the event of divine cooperation. This be- 
 comes cooperation in second act without more ado, as soon as 
 the creature exerts its activity. In the case of necessary agents 
 this decree is absolute and necessarily conjoined with a fixed 
 effect. In the case of free agents it is efficacious but indifferent, 
 neither wholly antecedent nor wholly absolute, but virtually and 
 equivalently conditional. Efficacious, because it will secure a 
 fixed effect without being necessarily conjoined with it. In- 
 different, because the will in second act remains intrinsically 
 indifferent or free. 
 
 PEOOF 
 
 The decree is meant to constitute the will in nearest first 
 act to operation, and in this phase the will must be free. Not 
 antecedent, because of intermediate knowledge; virtually con- 
 ditional for same reason. Of course, such a decree leaves free 
 will unharmed. The will determines itself with God's co- 
 operation. God and will are cause of determination in such a 
 
318 NATURAL THEOLOGY 
 
 way that determination is left to the will's dominion and 
 choice. Simultaneous cooperation in first act, though prior to 
 creature's act, is not physical predetermination, because inter- 
 mediate knowledge shifts the creature's act from time to eter- 
 nity, and in this way the eternal decree is simultaneous with 
 the creature's act. God is after a manner determined by crea- 
 tures, but this implies no imperfection. It is objective deter- 
 mination and extrinsic. It effects nothing in God physically 
 or morally. It arises from God's wish to suit Himself to the 
 natures of things, and depends altogether on His own free-will 
 and energy. 
 
 About God's Cooperation with Sin 
 
 Matter of sin is the physical act ; form of sin is its malice, 
 deformity. God cooperates with sinner, and wishes the act; 
 because no effect of creature exists without God's physical and 
 immediate cooperation. God wishes the physical act permis- 
 sively, not approvingly; because to wish it otherwise would be 
 to contract the malice of sin. In a lie the physical act is iden- 
 tical with the malice, and God would wish a man to commit 
 sin. He would wish something dishonorable. God is not the 
 cause per se of sin, but only its cause per accidens. Per se 
 means with full intent and approval. God merely permits, dis- 
 approves, detests, threatens. Examples of causes per accidens: 
 musician and builder with regard to house; builder and legal 
 quarrel over house; two incendiaries; against wishes and be- 
 yond expectations. God is not the author of sin, because on 
 no score can it be imputed to Him. Not because He gave man 
 free will. He gave it for good purpose, strengthens it with 
 grace, rewards its right use with Heaven. Not because He re- 
 frains from preventing sin. He prevents sin in a way suited 
 to free nature; not held to prevent it every possible way. Not 
 because He produces the physical act. He has a right to pro- 
 duce it as universal providence, and He is far from approving 
 or encouraging it. He is the author of virtue, because He co- 
 operates approvingly with virtue. 
 
 SCHOLION — ThOMISM AND MOLINISM COMPARED 
 
 According to the Thomists, who reject Molina's middle or 
 intermediate knowledge in God, every thing, apart from His 
 
THESIS X 319 
 
 own divine essence and purely possible beings, is open to the 
 eyes of God in His decrees. All the future then is destined to 
 come to pass because God has so decreed, and in that decree 
 God foresees every minute detail of the future. In this state 
 of things God must evidently have at His disposal means cal- 
 culated without fail to bring about these future events, and on 
 the other hand these means must not rob man of liberty. On 
 this difficulty the whole question hinges, and the explanation 
 offered by the Thomists is necessarily weak. God has decreed, 
 tliey say, that somewhere in the course of time a certain free 
 agent is to acquit himself of a certain act and no other. This 
 divine decree is sure of fulfillment, because it proceeds from 
 omnipotence and includes the application of means, that simply 
 render any other course of action utterly impossible. These 
 means are gathered up in the one word physical predetermina- 
 tion. In the supernatural order this physical predetermination 
 or necessitating bias is nothing other than efficacious grace. 
 They opine that in any other hypothesis God would not be the 
 first, primary and immediate cause of human activity, and that 
 the created human will would of its own unaided forces pass 
 from a state of rest to activity, and would be the first, primary 
 and immediate cause of its own salvation. The Thomists con- 
 jure up this process in the affairs of grace. Man has these 
 four gifts from God, 1°, existence; 2°, sufficient grace; 3°, ef- 
 ficacious grace or physical predetermination; 4°, simultaneous 
 cooperation, as between will and grace. The sureness of the 
 future event, the impossibility of its failure, assumes a threefold 
 guise as considered resident in the act itself, in the will of God, 
 and in God's knowledge. 
 
 These three guises are distinguished by the titles, objective, 
 affective and intellective. The first, in the Thomistic system, is 
 derived from their physical predetermination, or bias exerted by 
 God on the will ; the second, from the divine decree antedating 
 foreknowledge of the man's consent, and ordaining the bestowal 
 of that same physical predetermination ; the third, from the 
 knowledge God has of the said decree. In God's regard, there- 
 fore, the connection between grace and the act elicited under 
 its influence, is not one of foreknowledge, but of causality. The 
 sureness of the act leans not on God's foreknowledge of the 
 man's proffered consent; but God's foreknowledge of the prof- 
 
320 NATURAL THEOLOGY 
 
 fered consent is wholly founded on God's omnipotence. Hu- 
 man liberty, the Thomists say, emerges unhurt from this 
 forcing process, because God deals throughout with the will in 
 a way suited to its inherent freedom. The way itself is strange, 
 mysterious, inexplicable. To make the will appear capable still 
 of choice under pressure from physical predetermination, they 
 employ the time-honored distinction turning on divided or sepa- 
 rate and united or conjoined senses. Under its protecting fold, 
 they say that the will, though unable to choose in a united or 
 conjoined sense, is still able to choose in a divided or separate 
 sense; and human liberty remains intact. It may be well to 
 set down here what some eminent Dominicans have said of 
 this distinction. Cajetan says, " It fails to satisfy the mind " ; 
 Aravius, " I set small store by it " ; Albertini, " When it comes 
 to answering difficulties, we -abandon the system with as much 
 piety as wisdom " ; Billuart, " My answer is, that it is a mys- 
 tery " ; Bannez, " Ignorance and rashness. We believe the 
 Trinity, though we do not understand." N.B. The Trinity 
 contains no element which renders the mystery absurd or con- 
 tradictory. The Trinity is revealed doctrine. The Thomists 
 can appeal to no revelation for their physical predetermination. 
 Grace borrows none of its strength from free will. Its efficacy 
 is its own intrinsic property. Neither is its bearing on the will's 
 free consent based on what the Thomists style God's physical 
 predetermination. 
 
 Here we are face to face with two systems of theology, that 
 had their origin in attempts to reconcile the action of God's 
 grace with human liberty. Like the Trinity, the question is, 
 and must forever remain, a mystery. But nothing prevents us 
 from endeavoring here, as we endeavor in the case of the Trin- 
 ity, to show that the mystery involves no contradiction and vio- 
 lates no principle of reason. Mysteries are superior, not hostile 
 to reason. Faith is higher homage of the mind, not its stultifi- 
 cation. 
 
 What we call actual grace is an indispensably necessary help 
 to salvation. This actual grace, one and always the same in 
 itself, sometimes meets with resistance in the soul, sometimes 
 with welcome. Men at times under stress of temptation reject 
 the help offered by Almighty God, and walk the ways of the 
 devil. Men at other times in spite of temptation yield to the 
 
THESIS X 321 
 
 saving influence of grace, and keep the straight and narrow path. 
 Theology calls resisted grace merely sufficient, it calls grace 
 welcomed, cherished, put to good account, efficacious. Man's 
 unaided will, however, is far from raising merely sufficient to 
 the dignity of efficacious grace. Man's will must be conceived 
 as under the influence of grace even before the act of consent is 
 placed, and grace under this aspect is named preventing. No 
 matter, therefore, what part human activity plays in its accom- 
 plishment, salvation always remains the free and gratuitous 
 gift of God, rooted in the bestowal of this preventing grace. 
 The will thus elevated makes choice of virtue, spurns aside sin, 
 and straightway what was preventing grace becomes assisting 
 grace. Therefore, the will in putting a salutary act, an act 
 tending towards salvation, passes not from complete quiet or 
 rest to action, but from an indeliberate to a deliberate act. On 
 this account divine grace and the will operate together in the 
 production of a salutary act, when that act is considered in its 
 formal or distinctively last stage; when it is considered in its 
 totality or from beginning to end, grace must be said to ante- 
 date the will. In other words, grace is first merely preventing 
 grace, to become later on assisting grace. 
 
 These truths well in mind, to answer future difficulties, we 
 can now draw nearer the central problem. As a matter of fact, 
 God has determined from all eternity to confer on certain sin- 
 ners and on all His elect efficacious graces, helps to the perform- 
 ance of virtue they shall not, yea cannot, even though free 
 agents, reject or fail to use. It is the province of theology to 
 save God from the reproach of doing violence to human liberty 
 in this saving process. God's omnipotence must not be exalted 
 at the expense of His creatures' inalienable prerogatives, that 
 would be to insult God's wisdom; nor must the creature's ac- 
 tivity be unduly exaggerated at the risk of belittling God's 
 supreme dominion. Salvation must be so explained that it re- 
 main at one and the same time the free and gratuitous gift of 
 God, and the reward due in justice to a man's hard efforts. 
 The Thomists, it seems to us, ascribe too much to God's om- 
 nipotence, and leave too small play for human endeavor, re- 
 ducing free will to something dangerously like a necessary 
 agent, without choice, and consequently without merit. We 
 seem to them to emphasize beyond measure the energies of free 
 
322 NATURAL THEOLOGY 
 
 will, and rele,a:ate God's omnipotence to too obscure a corner in 
 the scheme of salvation and sanctitication. Whether Thomists 
 or Molinists, we are all of us Catholics, and we are agreed about 
 such defined points of doctrine as the gratuity of grace, the 
 nature of merit and the continued existence of liberty alongside 
 of efficacious grace. Our Church is a unit on these matters, 
 and leaves no room for doubt or discussion. But condescend- 
 ing, as it were, to reason, she leaves a wide field for argumenta- 
 tion, when methods of explanation are to be adopted. She 
 has condemned neither Thomists nor Molinists, and even en- 
 courages them to pursue their investigations without limit, 
 provided always that due deference be paid to the demands of 
 faith. Hence the TJiomists, though they seem in as many 
 words to deny free will when grace exacts consent, are never- 
 theless careful to always close their remarks with the saving 
 statement that, though God forces or determines the will. He 
 always does so in some mysterious way, escaping our powers of 
 perception, but adapted to a free agent, and leaving the agent's 
 liberty inviolate and intact. The statement saves their faith, 
 and puts their orthodoxy beyond suspicion; but it is far from 
 satisfying, and leaves the mystery just as much a mystery as 
 ever. The Molinists have no such subterfuge to offer; and, 
 while vindicating to free will all its vast prerogative, they in no 
 whit diminish the Creator's supreme and universal dominion. 
 In our exposition we begin with the system of the Thomists, 
 remarking that, though they profess to derive their doctrine 
 from passages in the writings of St. Thomas, the Molinists are 
 just as loud in declaring that the Angelic Doctor is autliority 
 for their position. Since, however, the illustrious St. Thomas 
 was himself a Dominican, the Thomists, belonging to the same 
 Order, wear his proud name with a peculiar grace, and nobody 
 disputes the title with them. We are ourselves Molinists, east- 
 ing our lot with tliat leader among Jesuit theologians on ques- 
 tions of grace. Father Molina of Spain. God's knowledge of 
 things plays an important part in the two systems; and, as 
 explained by Thomists and Molinists, presents the first marked 
 difference. To keep God's independence of created things safe, 
 we must hold that God knows everything in His own essence, 
 without in any way leaning on things themselves for that knowl- 
 edge. In the universe of things we distinguish these several 
 
THESIS X 323 
 
 categories, 1°, Necessaiy things, things such of their very na- 
 ture that they cannot not be. God Himself and pure possibles 
 are instances. 2°. Contingent things, things that can with 
 equal indifference be or not be. Past, present and future oc- 
 currences are instances. Some future events are subject to 
 conditions, tliey are dependent for- their existence in time on 
 certain circumstances. If these circumstances have place, then 
 the future events follow as a matter of course; if the circum- 
 stances are wanting, the future events likewise fail of actual 
 being. Besides, some of these future events are the effects of 
 necessary causes ; others are the effects of free causes. Events of 
 the first kind present no difficulty, and fall under our second 
 category or contingents. Events of the second kind present a 
 difficulty, and constitute a third class. 3°. Futuribles, or fu- 
 ture events derivable from free agents, that would indeed have 
 place under certain fixed conditions, but never as a matter of 
 fact happen because these conditions are never fulfilled. The 
 conversion of the Tyrians as described by Our Lord in St. 
 Matthew xi, 21, is an instance in point, "Wo to thee, Corozain; 
 wo to thee, Bethsaida; for if in Tyre and Sidon had been 
 wrought the miracles that have been wrought in you, they had 
 long ago done penance in sackcloth and ashes." The conver- 
 sion of Tyre and Sidon belongs to what we call f uturible. events. 
 In other words, it never happened, but would certainly have 
 happened, were the miracles forthcoming. We distinguish, like- 
 wise, between a futurible only and a futurible future. The for- 
 mer never happens, the latter happens, and is considered fu- 
 turible, only under the aspect of complete independence from its 
 occurrence. 
 
 To embrace these different objects of knowledge, theologians 
 agree to recognize in God different ways of apprehending the 
 truth. Of course, this agreement is a matter of mere con- 
 venience. All theologians are satisfied that everything in God 
 is absolute unity, and they speak of multiplicity only to bring 
 God into closer range with our feeble intellects. The Thomists 
 limit God's knowledge to two kinds, vision or seeing, and in- 
 telligence or understanding. Every object in the field of knowl- 
 edge, they contend, is attainable by these two processes. In- 
 telligence grasps things possible, and future events dependent 
 on a condition. Vision grasps existences, whether necessary, like 
 
324 NATURAL THEOLOGY 
 
 tliat of God Himself, or contingent, like that of aught else in 
 the universe of facts. What we described as futuribles, if ad- 
 mitted at all as objects of God's knowledge, are referred partly 
 to intelligence, partly to vision. 
 
 The Molinists, admitting intelligence and vision, introduce 
 a third kind of knowledge, labeling it middle or intermediate. 
 Thev hold it necessary for the understanding of events styled 
 futuribles, and derive its name from the circumstance that it 
 partakes at the same time of intelligence and vision. The 
 Thomists are up in arms against this third kind of divine knowl- 
 edge, branding it an unnecessary and dangerous innovation. 
 That it is a necessary feature of God's knowledge, may be easily 
 seen from these three examples, supposing an individual, Peter, 
 under the influence of efficacious grace, 
 
 1°. Intelligence. Peter, looking merely at the essences of 
 
 things, can with this grace be converted. 
 2°. Vision. Peter, acting as a necessary agent, shall with this 
 
 grace necessarily be converted ; i. e. Peter with this grace 
 
 cannot possibly escape conversion. 
 3°. Middle or Intermediate. Peter, acting as a free agent, 
 
 shall with this grace be converted ; i. e. Peter even with 
 
 this grace could still escape conversion and embrace 
 
 damnation. 
 
 We, therefore, define middle or intermediate knowledge as the 
 certain and infallible knowledge by which God is acquainted 
 with futuribles, with events destined to happen only on the ful- 
 filment of a condition, that has a bearing indeed on their oc- 
 currence, but no necessary connection with same. This knowl- 
 edge in God has accordingly for object future acts springing 
 from free agents, in the event of a certain condition's fulfil- 
 ment. It is easy, therefore, to see that it has for object acts 
 in a double sense contingent. They are contingent on the con- 
 dition, wliich may or may not be verified; and, even after the 
 verification of the condition, they are contingent on the choice 
 made by the free will of the free agent. To illustrate, we take 
 again that Scriptural example of the Tyrians, "The Tyrians 
 would be converted, if given the grace bestowed on the people 
 of Corozain." This conversion of the Tyrians falls into the 
 
THESIS X 325 
 
 class of objects known by Grod with that knowledge described 
 as middle or intermediate. It is a futurible, and in only a 
 half-sense of the word a mere conditional future. Were it a 
 mere conditional future, the Tyrians on the acceptance of such 
 grace would be converted in spite of themselves, and would be 
 practically deprived of freedom. But the Tyrians are men, 
 vested with free will; and, therefore, even in the presence of 
 efficacious grace, they are at liberty to choose either conversion 
 or damnation. Their conversion becomes a necessary fact only 
 after they have rendered full and free consent to the inspiration 
 of grace. Grace, therefore, as far as their ultimate conversion 
 is concerned, is a condition with a bearing, indeed, and a very 
 vital bearing, on their conversion, and yet not necessarily con- 
 nected or bound up with it. In other words, grace can still 
 be present, and the conversion of the Tyrians can fail of effect. 
 The one thing in the whole affair that caps and finishes the 
 business, is the free and unconstrained consent of the Tyrians 
 to act as grace prompts. And this is our whole reason for say- 
 ing that one element of grace's efficacy is derived from a source 
 outside of grace. That element we call its efficacy of connection. 
 The other element, called its efficacy of force or strength, is 
 intrinsic and wholly native to grace itself. 
 
 That God has knowledge of futuribles, and therefore middle 
 or intermediate knowledge, is evident from the express declara- 
 tion of Christ concerning the Tyrians. St. Matthew, xi, 21. 
 Besides, futuribles are capable of being known, and God knows 
 everything such. God knows these futuribles neither in their 
 proximate cause, nor in His own decrees; but in themselves, as 
 they exist previous to any divine decree, -formulated in their 
 regard. Knowledge of a thing always presupposes the thing's 
 existence. We are, however, far from maintaining that the 
 futurible is the cause of God's knowledge. It is a mere condi- 
 tion, but a condition indispensably and unqualifiedly necessary. 
 God, therefore, knows a futurible beforehand, because it is in 
 reality going to happen. The futurible is going to happen, not 
 precisely because God knows it is going to happen. Or, as St. 
 Justin says, " The future reality of a futurible does not follow 
 after God's foreknowledge, but God's foreknowledge follows 
 after the futurible's future reality." 
 We have these several counts against the system of the Thotnists: 
 
326 NATURAL THEOLOGY 
 
 1°. The divine decrees, in which according to this system 
 God sees futuribles, are described as subjectively and on the 
 part of God absolute, objectively and on the part of the futur- 
 ibles tliemselves conditional. Sucli mixed decrees are offenses 
 against common sense. God cannot absolutely decree a thing 
 diametrically opposed to another divine wish. This would be 
 a fair instance of such a decree. I absolutely and without con- 
 dition decree the conversion of the Tyrians, and I at the same 
 time absolutely withhold from the Tyrians the grace of con- 
 version or efficacious grace. 
 
 Besides, since the fulfillment of the required condition is, 
 according to the Thomists, entirely independent of free will, 
 and altogether dependent on God, these decrees could be with 
 more justice called even subjectively conditional, or conditional 
 on the part of God. This grace, they say, has all its double 
 efficacy of force and connection from within, and comes in its 
 entirety from God. It may be here remarked that some Thom- 
 ists venture the opinion that God seriously wishes some men 
 to be sinners, to secure variety in the universe. We heartily 
 disagree with the sentiment. 
 
 Again, were God capable of having the decrees postulated by 
 the Thomists, there would exist in God a decree without any 
 corresponding result in nature. The Thomists are fond of 
 quoting these as parallel examples, " I intend to give Lorenzo 
 a thousand dollars, if he marries my daughter." " I intend to 
 make a present of a horse to Egbert, if he meets me to-morrow." 
 These are not parallel examples, because in these two cases 
 the condition is in the power of the parties on whom the favor 
 is to be conferred, in the power of Lorenzo and Egbert; not 
 altogether in the power of the man who pledges himself to 
 confer the favors. The reverse happens in the case of efficacious 
 grace. God decrees the favor, and the condition, too, proceeds 
 wholly from God, being put outside the reach of the human 
 will, when constituted by God's physical predetermination. To 
 make the above cases parallel, they would have to read in this 
 absurd way, " I intend to give Lorenzo a thousand dollars, if 
 he marries my daughter; but at the same time I am going to 
 take efficacious means to prevent the marriage." " I intend to 
 make a present of a horse to Egbert, if he meets me to-morrow; 
 but I am at the same time going to take efficacious means to 
 
THESIS X 327 
 
 prevent his meeting me." Surely, this is not the way God of- 
 fered the grace of conversion to the Tyrians, this is not the way 
 He offers grace to any sinner. 
 
 2°. Human liberty is done to death by the Thomists. It is 
 robbed of active indifference. In other words, when hard 
 pressed by physical predetermination, it no longer remains 
 mistress of its own acts. It is wholly without freedom of 
 choice, because it is forced by an antecedent, intrinsic and in- 
 surmountable necessity, i. e. physical predetermination. 
 
 3°. There would be no such thing as sufficient grace properly 
 so-called, because witliout this physical predetermination, which 
 at once constitutes grace efficacious, the grace present would not 
 proximately equip the agent for action. 
 
 Passing now to the Molinists, it is easy to show that their 
 system is free from every reasonable objection. We have al- 
 ready said that the sureness of the future event, the impossi- 
 bility of its failure, assumes a threefold guise, as considered 
 resident in the act itself, in the will of God, and in God's 
 knowledge. The corresponding titles are, objective, affective 
 and intellective. With the Molinists, the first is derived from 
 the free act of the will, already elevated and ennobled by pre- 
 venting grace, and choosing of its own inherent virtue; the 
 second, from an absolute decree of God, elicited under the 
 guidance of middle or intermediate knowledge antedating the 
 decree itself; the third, from middle or intermediate knowledge 
 as above described. The objective sureness, therefore, arises 
 from the relation of fitness in force between the grace bestowed 
 and the free consent of the will, based on the fact that the will 
 is in reality of its own free choice going to embrace the grace 
 offered. " In this way," says Suarez, " grace will infallibly 
 meet with consent, not because the will cannot act otherwise, 
 even when confronted with this grace, but because the will as 
 a matter of fact is not going to act otherwise." The divine de- 
 cree constituting affective sureness is called predefinition or 
 predestination, though predestination is more properly said of 
 glory in Heaven than of any single grace. The ]\Iolinists thus 
 describe predefinition, "A divine decree or wish, by which God 
 prior to the act itself decrees from all eternity, positively, ab- 
 solutely and efficaciously that the will shall in time acquit itself 
 of a certain good act." This, then, according to Molinists, is 
 
328 NATURAL THEOLOGY 
 
 the order and process followed in the conversion of an indi- 
 vidual, say Peter: 
 
 1°. God by means of simple intelligence knows all possible helps 
 and knows the possibility of Peter's conversion. 
 
 2°, God by means of middle or intermediate knowledge fore- 
 sees what helps Peter will freely embrace or reject. 
 
 3°. Of these helps, God chooses, e. g. A, one He foresees Peter 
 will freely embrace if put in his way. 
 
 4°. God now by means of vision knows that Peter's conversion 
 is absolutely going to happen in time. 
 
 5°. At the proper moment God sends Peter the help A, Peter 
 embraces it, and is converted. 
 
GOD'S PROVIDENCE, HIS GOVERNMENT AND 
 
 OWNERSHIP 
 
 THESIS XI 
 
 Providence belongs to God. 
 
 Jouin, pp. 253, 254; Boedder, pp. 381-393. 
 
 TERMS 
 
 Providence is from providentia, compounded of porro and 
 videre, and means to see from afar. It is therefore a part of 
 prudence, which orders things to their ends, and has to do 
 with future contingents, not with pasts or presents. It can 
 turn on one's own acts or on another's. In the matter of one's 
 own acts providence is the prudence of the monk or solitary. 
 In the matter of another's acts, it can be domestic or family 
 prudence; political, state or civil prudence; prudence of the 
 king. God's prudence or providence deals with the acts of 
 others, not with His own. He is His own last end, and there 
 can be no question of ordering His own acts. His end and 
 His acts are God Himself. Providence includes knowledge and 
 will, and is essentially resident in knowledge, practical not 
 merely speculative. Government presupposes providence. 
 Providence plans order, government executes the plans of provi- 
 dence, and ownership is a corollary of both. Providence is 
 from eternity, government is a matter of time, and presupposes 
 creation. Physical providence extends to all creatures without 
 exception, the quick and dead. Moral embraces only men and 
 angels, beings with free wills. Supernatural touches the order 
 of grace; natural, the order of nature. Natural or physical 
 providence turns on creation, conservation and cooperation, 
 along with times and places best suited to the accomplishment 
 of God's designs in the universe, e. g. men of providence in 
 Church history, like St. Ignatius. Moral or supernatural turns 
 
 329 
 
330 NATURAL THEOLOGY 
 
 on God's laws and precepts, promises, threats, rewards, punish- 
 ments, graces, miracles, gifts. Briefly, moral has to do with 
 man's elevation, redemption, justification, decrees regarding 
 men's virtuous acts, permission of sin, grace's helps. Heaven, 
 hell. 
 
 Providence means a plan and its infallible accomplishment, 
 with a distinction. God's providence, like His will, is twofold, 
 antecedent, conditional and inefficacious as well as consequent, 
 absolute and efficacious. Predestination of the elect is a mani- 
 festation of God's consequent providence, while the loss of the 
 damned and God's wish to save all mankind are manifestations 
 of His antecedent providence. Hence the distinction, God's 
 plans are infallibly fulfilled, I distinguish. Eegarding su- 
 preme end of everything, God's glory, I grant ; regarding other 
 ends, not supreme or simply last, I again distinguish. In 
 question of consequent and absolute providence, I grant; in 
 question of antecedent and conditional providence, I deny. 
 Whether men are lost or saved, God gets from creation the very 
 measure of glory He meant to have from the beginning; good- 
 ness and mercy in Heaven, justice in hell. Man's salvation de- 
 pends on his own free will, and God's providence regarding it 
 is antecedent and conditional, not consequent or absolute. 
 God is held to supply of means and nothing more. 
 
 Three opinions about divine act in which providence formally 
 resides, in intellect and will both, in will alone, in intellect 
 alone. In second opinion will wishes end and chooses means; 
 in third, intellect foreknows creatures, ends and means, with 
 the decree to create and choose set means for measure of glory 
 God freely purposes. The Thomists, with a view to physical 
 predetermination, introduce a third act of intellect ordering the 
 accomplishment of preconceived plans; and this third act for- 
 mally constitutes providence. Providence connotes two things, 
 foreknowledge and care; first belongs to intellect; second, to 
 will; and from the very term, providence, it would seem to 
 formally reside in intellect. There must be no suspicion of 
 physical predetermination. St. Thomas puts it in intellect. In- 
 termediate knowledge certainly enters providence. The Vati- 
 can defined providence an article of faith, Denziger, 1933. 
 Deists and Fatalists deny, with Democritus, Epicurus, and their 
 chance-grouping of atoms. Aristotle and Cicero are under 
 
THESIS XI 331 
 
 suspicion. Ancients separated incorruptible from corruptible 
 things in this matter. 
 
 PEOOFS 
 
 1°. Order in world calls for government, and this in turn 
 calls for providence. Ergo. 
 
 2°. Providence is a great perfection in God. Ergo. 
 
 3°. Nothing in providence surpasses God's power or knowl- 
 edge, nothing conflicts with His dignity. Ergo. 
 
 4°. Providence in last analysis means conservation and co- 
 operation. Ergo. 
 
 PEINCIPLES 
 
 A. God takes counsel without doubt or -hesitation. His 
 knowledge is intuitive. No formal study of means, but virtual. 
 Our study without its imperfections. 
 
 B. Providence is eternal with regard to substance of act, 
 temporal with regard to execution or outward terms. 
 
 C. No composition in God, because intellect and will are 
 one thing in God, His substance. 
 
THESIS XII 
 
 God's providence a, extends to everything created, and b, 
 touches man in a very special way. 
 
 Boedder, pp. 381-393. 
 
 PEOOFS 
 
 a, 1°. God's providence is coextensive with His causality. 
 Ergo. 
 
 2°. Every agent works unto an end, and God is of all agents 
 the most perfect. Ergo. 
 
 3°. God's providence ought to be the most perfect conceiv- 
 able. Ergo. 
 
 4°. Birds of the air, lilies of the field, grass in the meadow. 
 St. Matt, vi, 36. Hair of the head. St. Matt, x, 29. 
 
 N.B. Regarding good, God's providence is approving; re- 
 garding evil, permissive. 
 
 PRINCIPLES 
 
 A. No chance in the world. 
 
 Answer: Respecting God, I grant; respecting man, I deny. 
 Chance with man is what happens ex inopinato, beyond ex- 
 pectation. 
 
 B. A good provider excludes evil. Ergo, no providence. 
 
 Answer: A particular provider, I grant; a universal pro- 
 vider, I deny. Destruction of individuals contributes to per- 
 petuity of species. A king looks to the community, not to 
 individuals. Evil is from God, as darkness is from the sun. 
 
 C. Doth God take care for oxen ? I Cor. ix, 9. 
 
 Answer: No care at all, I deny; no special care as for men, 
 I grant. St. Jerome says, it is beneath God's majesty to care 
 for gnats, bugs, fleas, flies. Same distinction as above. 
 
 332 
 
THP:S1S XII 333 
 
 D. God left man in the hands of his own counsel. 
 Answer: No determination, I grant; no providence, I deny. 
 
 E. God does no evil. Ergo. 
 
 Answer: Approvingly, I grant; permissively, I deny. 
 
 F. A prudent man permits no subject to commit evil. 
 Ergo. 
 
 Answer: To obtain greater good, I deny; othervrise, I grant. 
 It is of the nature of free agents to be able to do evil; and 
 providence never destroys, it respects natures. 
 
 G. It is easier to get good from good, than good from evil. 
 Ergo. 
 
 Answer: Every good can be gotten from good, I deny; 
 some goods can be gotten from evil alone, I grant; e.g. pa- 
 tience, repentance, martyrdom. 
 
 H. Nobody gets evil from good. Ergo, nobody ought to get 
 good from evil. 
 
 Answer: Wrong to make good subserve evil, right to make 
 evil subserve good. 
 
 I. Man must not do evil to procure good. Ergo, nor God. 
 
 Answer: Man cannot permit evil, when it is in his power to 
 prevent, and prevention is a duty, without approving of it and 
 therefore doing it. God can permit evil without approving 
 of it. To do evil and to permit evil are two different things. 
 
 J. Man is able to take care of himself. 
 
 Answer: Sufficiently, I deny; insufficiently, I grant. 
 
 K. Men's acts are oftener crooked than brutes'. Ergo. 
 
 Answer: Providence is to blame, I deny; free will is to 
 blame, I grant. 
 
 L. Sin is most hateful. Ergo, God cannot permit. 
 
 Answer. Sins are greater and lesser. He can without ap- 
 proval permit a lesser sin to avoid a greater. In this case He 
 chooses not between good and evil, but between two goods. He 
 chooses the greater good, rejects the lesser, because absence of 
 the greater evil is a good. In permitting the lesser evil He is re- 
 jecting the lesser's absence. Besides, no harm attaches to the 
 permission of evil, when approval is withheld and prevention is 
 no duty. God threatens sin, and He made men free. 
 
 M. Providence is eternal. Ergo, predetermination. 
 
 Answer. It antedates man's act in time, I grant; in nature 
 and causality, I again distinguish, foreknowledge of act with 
 
334 NATURAL THEOLOGY 
 
 help of intermediate knowledge presupposed, I grant; otheririse, 
 I deny. 
 
 N. Miracles are departures from regular order. Ergo, no 
 providence. 
 
 Answer. Departures with a just cause, I grant; without a 
 just cause, I deny. 
 
 PEOOFS 
 
 b, 1°. Special providence for man, because highest of visible 
 creatures, and closest to God, and a good provider attends to 
 dignity of objects he manages. 
 
 2°. God loves man in a special way, that of friendship, and 
 the world was made for man. 
 
 3°. Man needs providence more than other creatures. The 
 others are ruled and determined, they cannot go astray. Man 
 is free and can disturb order. Hence manifestation of provi- 
 dence in natural law, religion and worship, instinct for good, 
 stings of conscience, society, rewards, punishments. 
 
 4°. History is witness. Church overcame enemies in spite of 
 their greater strength. Eoman emperors, heretical countries 
 never prevailed. Endurance of Church is a lasting miracle. 
 
 PEINCIPLES 
 
 A. God hath equally care of all. 
 Answer. Equally, I grant; equal, I deny. 
 
 B. Man's solicitude would be idle. Ergo. 
 
 Answer. Undue, T grant; due, I deny. God gave man rea- 
 son, to use it and look out for himself. His industr}' cooperates 
 with God's providence. Work hard, as if ever3'thing depended 
 on yourself; trust in God, as if nothing depended on you. 
 
 C. "We would have cured Babylon, but she is not healed; 
 let us forsake her," Jer. 51.9. Ergo, God has no care for sin- 
 ners. 
 
 Answer. No care in comparison with saints, I grant; in 
 comparison with lower creation, I deny. 
 
 D. Greek Fathers deny providence in evil acts. Ergo. 
 Answer. Deny approving, I grant; deny permissive, I deny. 
 
 E. Good suffer, wicked prosper. Ergo. 
 
THESIS XII 335 
 
 Ansicer. N'ot always the case. Good must atone for lesser 
 faults. In many things we all offend, St. James 3.2. Just 
 man shall fall seven times, Prov. 34.16. If we say that we have 
 no sin, the truth is not in us, 1. St. John 1.8. Wicked do some 
 good and deserve a reward. None in next life. Ergo, here. 
 Providence bears on last end or next life, not on proximate end 
 or this life. Adversity tests virtue; perfects justice, fortitude, 
 contempt of world, meditation, love of God. Seneca, and the 
 uses of adversity. Jove, and the spectacle of a just man in con- 
 flict with trouble. Horace, and his man of principle face to 
 face with a cracked world. Prosperity ought to drag wicked 
 back to God's feet, He is an indulgent Father. Horace's peda- 
 gogue and cakes. 
 
THESIS XIII 
 
 X. God's providence over all is immediate and particular. 
 Y. God's (a) government of the world is (h) in part imme- 
 diate, in pari mediate. 
 
 Boedder, pp. 381-393. 
 
 QUESTION 
 
 X. Plato teaches three kinds of providence. God cares for 
 spiritual things, genera, species, universal causes. Inferior 
 deities in planets care for matter, things that are bom and 
 things that die. Demons, midway between the gods and our- 
 selves, care for human affairs. Plato is wrong when he removes 
 planets and men from immediate providence of God. 
 
 PROOF 
 
 God provides for things as He knows them. He knows them 
 immediately and particularly. Ergo. Kings fail to provide 
 immediately for details because of their limited ability. God's 
 ability is absolutely unlimited. 
 
 PRINCIPLES 
 
 A. St. Augustine says, " Better not to know things than to 
 know them." Ergo. 
 
 Answer. True of men, I grant; true of God, I deny. Bet- 
 ter for men not to know vice and sin, because we are of limited 
 intellectual capacity, and knowledge of evil and sin crowds out 
 knowledge of better things. Besides, knowledge of evil drags 
 down the will. G^d is of infinite capacity, and God is above 
 tempting. 
 
 N.B. God's providence imposes necessity on necessary agents, 
 none on free agents, because providence respects natures, it does 
 not destroy them. All the order in the world, with respect to 
 necessary agents, is such by virtue of providence that it cannot 
 
 336 
 
THESIS XIII 337 
 
 be other; with respect to free agents, its necessity is not ante- 
 cedent, but consequent; and this consequent necessity presup- 
 poses God's intermediate knowledge of what act a free agent 
 would put, and put freely, in such and such circumstances, if 
 suited help and cooperation were granted. No physical pre- 
 determination. The order of providence is not uncertain or 
 inefficacious, because God gets what He wants from all crea- 
 tures with either antecedent or consequent necessity. Conse- 
 quent is as infallible as antecedent. Creation supposed, provi- 
 dence in God is a necessity; because creation and conservation 
 without providence would be against God's goodness and wis- 
 dom. St. Ambrose says, " Though to refrain from making a 
 thing contains no wrong, to take no care of what you make is 
 the height of unkindness or cruelty." 
 
 Y. (a) God governs the world. 
 
 QUESTION" 
 
 Government is execution of plans which constitute providence. 
 Boethius says, " You bind the elements to keep cold and hot, 
 dry and wet together, lest subtle fire escape, or its heavy weight 
 bury the earth in the sea." 
 
 PEOOFS 
 
 (1) Actual order in the world proves God's government. 
 Order in house bespeaks owner's management. 
 
 (2) Government touches whatever agents tend to an end. 
 All agents work unto an end. Men work with knowledge of 
 end and self-motion; other creatures, without knowledge of 
 end and with motion communicated by God, or instinct, or na- 
 ture. God governs lower creation as the bowman governs the 
 arrow. The arrow is ignorant, but the bowman knows. 
 
 N.B. One God governs the world, not many, in spite of op- 
 posites ; because universal and last end harmonizes particulars 
 and proximates. Nothing in the world happens out of accord 
 with God's government, because nothing can escape God's knowl- 
 edge or purpose; nothing can oppose His will or omnipotence, 
 which are all infinite. 
 
338 NATURAL THEOLOGY 
 
 PEINCIPLES 
 
 A. A just king punishes only transgressors of his law. No- 
 body transgresses God's law, because everything happens in ac- 
 cord with His government. 
 
 Answer. To do what God permits without approval is to 
 transgress God's law. 
 
 (b) God governs some things immediately, others mediately. 
 
 PROOFS 
 
 1°. God governs the world by others as He causes by second 
 causes. 
 
 2°. Better to be good in self and good to others than to be 
 merely good in self. 
 
 3°. A good teacher makes not only wise pupils, but able teach- 
 ers. 
 
 4°. God uses intellectual beings to govern lower orders. 
 Hierarchy among angels, guardian angels for men, rulers among 
 men ; minerals, plants, brutes, men ; hierarchy of universe. 
 
 N.B. God's dominion extends to ownership and jurisdic- 
 tion; and it is essential. Man's ownership in the concrete is 
 accidental and from diverse titles, occupancy, purchase, gift 
 and the like. God's ownership is essential because rooted in 
 creation, conservation and cooperation. Lessius says, " Subjec- 
 tion or dependence is measure. Man's ownership of internal 
 acts is fuller than his ownership of external acts. ' First are 
 free from organs, second dependent on organs. Man's owner- 
 ship of senses and limbs is fuller as compared with fortune and 
 wealth. First are intrinsic, others are from extrinsic title, like 
 inheritance, purchase, occupancy." Men are always relative 
 owners with regard to God. In disposing of their property as 
 they like, they can offend God without harming their neighbor. 
 God's ownership is basis and foundation of man's ownership. 
 Jurisdiction likewise belongs to God. The right to rule and 
 govern men belongs to their maker. " King of kings, Lord 
 of lords." 1 Tim"^ 6.15. "By me kings reign." Prov. 8.15. 
 " No power but from God." Rom. 13.1. " All power in 
 Heaven and in earth." St. Matt. 28.18. 
 
INDEX 
 
 Absolute free futures, 277, 278. 
 
 Accident, without substance, a 
 miracle, 66; in God, and in crea- 
 tures, 259. 
 
 Act, in which providence resides, 
 330. 
 
 Actual simplicity and potential 
 composition, 32. 
 
 Actuality of past and future, equal, 
 276. 
 
 Adam, body and soul, 13; and lan- 
 guage, 118, 119, 120. 
 
 Aeneid, and type, 220, 221, 222. 
 
 Aequale cognoscitur ab aequali, 
 129. 
 
 Agere sequitur esse, and coopera- 
 tion, 299. 
 
 Aggregation, and snowball, 11. 
 
 Agnostics, inferior to pagans on 
 score of immortality, 90; 200; 
 deny intelligent cause, 217; and 
 knowledge, 232. 
 
 A Lapide, on blood and soul, 77. 
 
 Albertus Magnus, on blood and 
 soul, 77; on sensu diviso, 320. 
 
 Anaesthetics, and hypnotism, 193. 
 
 Analogical knowledge of God, true, 
 240. 
 
 Anaxagoras, on soul in brute and 
 man, 18. 
 
 Anima mundi, and James, 57. 
 
 Annihilation of soul, impossible 
 to God's ordered power, 93, 102; 
 without a motive, 93; demands 
 conservation, 295, 297. 
 
 Anselm, St., on God, 198, 199; a 
 priori argument, 202; his syl- 
 logism, a fallacy, 203; Descartes 
 and Leibnitz, different, 216. 
 
 Antecedent and consequent will in 
 God, 288. 
 
 Apollinaris, and two souls, 64. 
 
 Appetite, rational and sensitive, 
 149; and passions, 150, 151. 
 
 Aravius, on sensu diviso, 320. 
 
 Aristotle, 4; on soul, 15; on plants 
 and animals of his time, 27 ; on 
 faculties, 35, 46; on memory, 
 42; and Dualism, 58; on blood 
 and soul, 77 ; on origin of ideas, 
 115, 120; and nil in intellectu, 
 123; thing known assumes 
 mind's own qualities, 129, 130; 
 proves two functions of intellect, 
 131, 132; on good, 144, 145; on 
 compulsion, 174; on theology, 
 197; on God, 199; and primus 
 motor, 220; and eternal world, 
 228, 229. 
 
 Arminians, and Edwards, 154, 155. 
 
 Asiatic Fatalism, 181. 
 
 Associationists, 47. 
 
 Atheists, and Lucifer, 208; prac- 
 tical and theoretical, 222. 
 
 Atoms in molecule, and life, 27, 
 28. 
 
 Attention, proves free will, 170. 
 
 Attributes of God; no accidents in 
 God; God is His attributes; 
 overlap in God; His essence dis- 
 plays itself as wisdom, justice 
 and the rest; fundamental and 
 accessory, 243. 
 
 Augustine, St., man's desire of 
 truth, and immortality, 98 ; on 
 the three tenses, 178; and Three 
 Persons, three things, 259; on 
 absolute free futures, 275; on 
 God and memory as cause of 
 acts, 286; on sin, 310; sin, order, 
 beauty, 103; felix culpa, 310; 
 on providence, 336. 
 
 B 
 
 Bacon, on philosophy and atheism, 
 
 3; on God, 199, 214. 
 Bain, mind is material, 59; and 
 
 Parallelism, 60; and rules for 
 
 339 
 
340 
 
 INDEX 
 
 hahits, 153; lies about free will, 
 171. 
 
 Balmes, against Condillac, 48. 
 
 Bannez, on sensu diviso, 320. 
 
 Because, in illative sense, 285. 
 
 Beclard, on life, 8. 
 
 Benevolence, never without fitness, 
 147. 
 
 Berkeley, and idealism, 40. 
 
 Bernard, on science and last 
 causes. 111. 
 
 Bertlielot, on science and last 
 causes, 111. 
 
 Bieliat, on life, 8. 
 
 Biedermann, against immortality, 
 103. 
 
 Billuart, and physical predetermin- 
 ation, 279, 280; sensu composite 
 and diviso, 279; predetermina- 
 tion, and God's foreknowledge, 
 279, 280; predetermination, a 
 mystery, 280; and complaint of 
 Jews, 282; on sensu diviso, 320. 
 
 Blood, its animation by the soul, 
 77, 78. 
 
 Body, knowledge of, 53; primary 
 and secondary parts, 78'; sub- 
 stance, no accident, 81, 82. 
 
 Boethius, on eternity, 266. 
 
 Bonald, on God, 199. 
 
 Bonaventure, St., on blood and 
 soul, 77. 
 
 Bonnetty, on ideas, 118. 
 
 Bowne, on God, 199. 
 
 Braid and hypnotism, 184. 
 
 Brain, 38 ; St. Thomas, and in- 
 ternal senses, 39; and growth, 
 40; size and weight, 59, 60; 
 St. Thomas, on, 70; diseased, 
 74; and consciousness, 107. 
 
 Broderip's dog, and reason, 30. 
 
 Brutes, and life, 11; have senses, 
 22 ; have no intellect, 23 ; artistic 
 effects, 30; three operations, ab- 
 sent from plants, 18; soul and 
 qualities, 31. 
 
 Buchner, mind and engine, 59. 
 
 Buckle, statistics, and free will, 
 172, 173. 
 
 Buddhists, and God, 222. 
 
 Bull'8-eye missed, 226, 227. 
 
 Cabanis, mind and secretion, 58. 
 
 Cain and Abel, and Mill, 178. 
 
 Cajetan, on blood and soul, 77 ; 
 on ideas, 136, 140; on sensu di- 
 viso, 320. 
 
 Calvinists, God the determining 
 cause of choice, 154, 155, 156. 
 
 Capreolus, on ideas, 140. 
 
 Carpenter, on habits, 153. 
 
 Cartesians, and life in plants, 11; 
 deny soul in brutes and plants, 
 14; on objectivity of sensations, 
 34, 40; and intelligence, 47. 
 
 Caterpillar, pupa, butterfly, 102. 
 
 Catholics, will the determining 
 cause of choice, 155, 156; no Fa- 
 talists, 159, 160; and predestina- 
 tion, 159. 
 
 Causal view, and condition view, 
 HI. 
 
 Causes, efficient, partial and ade- 
 quate, coordinate and subordi- 
 nate, 125; of imprinted image, 
 phantasm and working intellect, 
 134; of developed image, im- 
 printed image and receiving in- 
 tellect, 135; proximate and ul- 
 timate, 211; have their causes, 
 226. 
 
 Change, physical and moral, in- 
 trinsic and extrinsic, 263 ; of 
 mind and in things, 264; and 
 freedom in God, 265. 
 
 Character, habits and tempera- 
 ment, 153; in Determinism, 
 179. 
 
 Children, and self-control, 153. 
 
 Chinese, on future life, 87. 
 
 Choice, supposes conflict of desires, 
 151 ; four types, reasonable, im- 
 petuous, acquiescent, anti-im- 
 pulsive, 152; selection of means, 
 152 ; manifestation of self-con- 
 trol, 152; its cause, and Hobbes, 
 176. 
 
 Christian and Mahomet, 237; and 
 Koran, 239. 
 
 Church, condemns neither Molin- 
 ism nor Thomism, 322; and hyp- 
 notism, 194, 195. 
 
 Cicero, and grouping of atoms, 24; 
 on future life, 88, 89; on phys- 
 ical order, 205, 206; on variety 
 in religions, 209; on Epicurus 
 and fear, 214. 
 
 Circumscriptive eiistence, 267. 
 
INDEX 
 
 341 
 
 Clarke, S. J., on Catholic philoso- 
 phy, 4. 
 
 Classification of God, impossible, 
 246. 
 
 Clement V, Pope, soul form of 
 body, 80, 81. 
 
 Clifford, VV., and mind-stuff, 60. 
 
 Cognitum est in cognoscente ad 
 modum cognoscentis, 129, 130. 
 
 Cognoscitive act, 43; strictly and 
 preparatively, 129. 
 
 Color-blind, 45. 
 
 Common consent, proves immortal- 
 ity, 100, 101 ; proves free will, 
 107; proves God, 208, 209, 213, 
 214, 215; objections, 222, 223; 
 and four qualities, 215. 
 
 Comte, on life, 8, 113; and Sens- 
 ism, 116. 
 
 Composition of man, proved, 73, 
 74. 
 
 Conceptualism, 49, 51, 52. 
 
 Condillac, judgment, 47; and Sens- 
 ism, 116. 
 
 Conimbricenses, on ideas, 139. 
 
 Conscience, proves God, 207, 212, 
 213; its functions, 212, 213. 
 
 Consciousness, and brain, 107 ; 
 proves free will, 167; and De- 
 terminism, 179. 
 
 Conservation of creatures, 294- 
 298; as much a need as creation, 
 294; definition and kinds, 294, 
 295; proofs, 295, 296; objections, 
 296, 297. 
 
 Consultation, and free will, 174. 
 
 Contact, of mass and of power, 76. 
 
 Contingent, and necessary, 204; 
 postulates production by an- 
 other, 204. 
 
 Control, physical and prudential, 
 152; deliberate acts, 152. 
 
 Conversion, its process in Molin- 
 ism, 328. 
 
 Cooperation, with free will, no 
 physical predetermination, 302- 
 306; proof, 303, 304; objections, 
 305; with sin, 318; cooperation 
 with creatures, 298-302; defini- 
 tion and kinds, 298; moral and 
 physical, and other meanings, 
 298 ; proofs, 299 ; objections, 300, 
 301; objectively, creature's act; 
 subjectivelv, a decree of God, 
 311, 312. 
 
 Corozain and Bcthsaida, 281, 282, 
 323, 324, 325. 
 
 Corruption, essential and acci- 
 dental, alien to the soul, 94. 
 
 Created things, contingent, 204; 
 prove God's existence, 210, 211; 
 objections, 217, 218, 219, 220. 
 
 Creatianism Exaggerated, 85. 
 
 Creation, of soul by God, 86; and 
 cause, 233. 
 
 D 
 
 Damascene, St., God and doctor, 
 286. 
 
 Dante's boat, and free will, 173. 
 
 Darwin, on spontaneous genera- 
 tion, 13; and evolution, 23; on 
 God, 209; against God, 227. 
 
 Darwinism, Universal Evolution, 
 absurd, 23-28; denies God and 
 immortality, postulates spon- 
 taneous generation and group- 
 ing of atoms, destroys morality, 
 27. 
 
 Darwinists, mind and brute, 18. 
 
 David and Semei, 308. 
 
 Death, a penalty, and disagree- 
 able, 102, 103. 
 
 De Bonald, on ideas, 118. 
 
 Deception, in hypnotism, 186. 
 
 Decision, proves free will, 170. 
 
 Definition, 1. 
 
 Definitive existence, 68, 267. 
 
 Deism, and Ontologism, 118. 
 
 Deliberation, proves free will, 170. 
 
 Delight precedes desire, 151. 
 
 De Lugo, on blood and soul, 77. 
 
 Democritus, on soul in brute and 
 man, 18. 
 
 Denial of immortality, hypocrisy 
 and cowardice, 103. 
 
 Dependence, for being and for mak- 
 ing, 295, 296, 297. 
 
 Descartes, on God, 198, 199; on 
 brutes, 20; on union of faculty 
 and object, 34, 40; on soul's lo- 
 cation, 69; and innate ideas, 117. 
 
 Desire, 152; triple process, 151; 
 volition diflerent, 152. 
 
 Determined being has determined 
 truth, 274, 275. 
 
 Determinism, 158-165; soft and 
 polite Fatalism, 158, 160; temp- 
 tation and consent identical, 160, 
 
342 
 
 INDEX 
 
 161; and Fatalism, 178, 179; 
 
 and free will, 170; and charac- 
 ter, 179; and punishment, 180. 
 Dilemma, about rain, and freedom, 
 
 176, 177. 
 Discere est reminisci, with Plato, 
 
 85. 
 Divisibility of souls, 32, 33, 70, 71, 
 
 72. 
 Division, 1; of Natural Theology, 
 
 198. 
 Dominion, demands cooperation, 
 
 299; in God is ownership and 
 
 jurisdiction, 338. 
 Door, window, house, 217. 
 Dualism, mind and body, two, 58; 
 
 Ultra and Moderate, 58. 
 Duration, 206; infinite, 223. 
 Dust thou art, 113. 
 
 E 
 
 Ear, 39. 
 
 Edwards, Jonathan, and Fatalism, 
 153, 154, 155; estimate of Cath- 
 olic doctrine on free will, 154, 
 155. 
 
 Ego, empirical and transcendental, 
 55. 
 
 Egyptians, and deities, 252. 
 
 Elicited and ordered acts of will, 
 148. 
 
 Eliot, Williams, Indians, and God, 
 209. 
 
 Embryo, and soul, 13. 
 
 Empirical and rational psychology, 
 5. 
 
 Empiricists, 47 ; soul, a succession 
 of transitory feelings, 50. 
 
 Epicureans, on soul in brute and 
 man, IS. 
 
 Epicurus, and chance, 200; and 
 fear of the gods, 214. 
 
 Eternal punishment, demands im- 
 mortality, 99, 100; eternal world 
 and Aristotle, 228, 229; God 
 proved eternal, 206; objections, 
 207. 
 
 Eternity, 266; causally and form- 
 ally, 266; Boethius, on, 266; of 
 essences, and of God, 267 ; no 
 larger with time, 267. 
 
 Ethical arguments for free will, 
 169, 170, 171. 
 
 Ethics and hypnotism, 193, 194. 
 
 Euphorbus in Ovid, 90. 
 
 Evil, denial of good, 146; and 
 kinds, 306. 
 
 Evolution, resemblances and palae- 
 ontology, 25 ; Universal and Par- 
 ticular, 25, 26; and Monism, 61; 
 and soul, 80. 
 
 Evolutionists, and intelligence, 47. 
 
 E.xamination, and right to accept 
 and reject, 238. 
 
 Existence of God, angels, separated 
 souls, 91, 92 ; and its three kinds, 
 267. 
 
 External senses, five, 35. 
 
 Eye, 39. 
 
 Facts prove free will, 167. 
 
 Faculties, organic and inorganic; 
 active and passive, 15, 35 ; defi- 
 nition, 40; St. Thomas and Aris- 
 totle, on, 40. 
 
 Faith, and science, and God, 225. 
 
 Fatalism, 153-158; 173-183; free- 
 dom of a bird, not of a man, 155; 
 consequences, 158; Sophocles, Oe- 
 dipus and, 158, 159; harsh and 
 gross, 158. 
 
 Faye, on God, 199. 
 
 Fear, and wisdom, 109; and God, 
 213, 235. 
 
 Felida, of James, 57. 
 
 Fichte, the Ego, and pantheism, 
 228. 
 
 Filling, or all-pervading existence, 
 267. 
 
 Finite effect, and finite cause, 221. 
 
 First Cause, God; second causes, 
 creatures, 312; axioms about, 
 312. 
 
 Fission, 12. 
 
 Fixity of species, 26. 
 
 Flame in candle, and life, 27, 28. 
 
 Foeticide, and St. Thomas, 87. 
 
 Forces, physical and chemical, 18; 
 not soul, 16. 
 
 Forecasts, and free will, 172. 
 
 Form, intrinsically independent of 
 matter, 102. 
 
 Formal objects of senses, 36; of 
 intellect and sense, 51 ; of mind, 
 essences of bodies, 121. 
 
 Formally, in prescinding and ex- 
 cluding sense, 79; formally, em- 
 inently, virtually, 245. 
 
INDEX 
 
 343 
 
 Free agent, and predetermination, 
 314, 315. 
 
 Freedom, moral and physical, 165, 
 166 ; in God, 289 ; regarding evil, 
 289 ; in creatures, a mixed jjer- 
 fection; in God, simjjle, 291; and 
 immutability in God, 291, 292, 
 293. 
 
 Free will, is stronger than char- 
 acter, environment, IGl ; freedom 
 of choice, immunity from neces- 
 sity, 164, 165; St. Paul, and 
 three kinds, 164; Lipps on, 163; 
 Fiske on, 163, 164; James on, 
 161, 162; dishonest estimates of, 
 163, 171; proofs, 167-171; and 
 strongest motive, 171, 181; not 
 liberty to desire or not desire, 
 171; and God's foreknowledge, 
 173, 181, 182; and Thomism, 
 320, 322. 
 
 Friedenthal, man and monkey, 24. 
 
 Future life, pagans a unit on fact, 
 differ in explanation, 87 ; Indi- 
 ans and Chinese, 87; Virgil, 87, 
 88; Horace, 88, 89; Cicero, 88, 
 89; Pythagoras, 89; Ovid, 90. 
 
 Futures, free futures, and futur- 
 ibles, 273, 274, 275; and fixed 
 truth, 277. 
 
 Futuribles, how God knows, 283, 
 284, 323, 325. 
 
 G 
 
 Gaimilo, and St. Anselm, 216. 
 
 Gemmation, 12. 
 
 Generation, 12; spontaneous, 13. 
 
 Gioberti, and Ontologism, 117; on 
 God, 198. 
 
 God, knowledge of, 2, 53; cannot 
 a-nnihilate soul, 96; known by 
 deduction, not by intuition, 117; 
 triple process in knowing, 119, 
 120; and free will, 157, 158; 
 proved a posteriori, not a priori, 
 198; exists, 200-241; infinite, 
 simple, one, 242-262; unchange- 
 able, eternal, immense, 263-270; 
 knows all things, 271-286; has 
 a will, 287-293; cooperates with 
 and conserves creatures, 294- 
 301 ; no physical predetermina- 
 tion, 302-305, 313-328; attitude 
 towards evil, 306-310; provi- 
 
 dence, 329-338; in history, 213, 
 214; and evil, 223, 231, 232, 239, 
 306-311; known analogically, 
 224; as real and physical as His 
 effects, 242; no species, 260; and 
 sin, 300; first cause, creatures 
 second, 299 ; causes acts of crea- 
 tures by creation, conservation, 
 coujjeration, 314. 
 
 Gonet, on physical predetermina- 
 tion, 302. 
 
 Good, one, true, 144; good and 
 kinds, 145, 151. 
 
 Good sufi'er, wicked prosper, 223, 
 334, 335. 
 
 Government of world and God, 
 337 ; immediate and mediate, 
 338. 
 
 Grace, actual, sufficient, efficacious ; 
 preventing, assisting, 320, 321, 
 
 Greeks, and deities, 252. 
 
 Gregory, St., and incircumscriptum 
 lumen, 192; on made, in God, 
 256. 
 
 Growth,' 12. 
 
 Gunther, and two souls, 64. 
 
 H 
 
 Habits and rules, 153. 
 
 Haeckel, on spontaneous genera- 
 tion, 13; and evolution, 24. 
 
 Hamilton on God, 199. 
 
 Hearing in Iiypnotism, 187. 
 
 Hedonism's paradox, 151. 
 
 Hegel Idea and pantheism, 228. 
 
 Hen, and scientist, and egg, 112. 
 
 Heredity, 24, 26. 
 
 Herschel, on God, 199. 
 
 Hindus, and deities, 252. 
 
 History, and God, 213, 214; proves 
 immortality, 101. 
 
 Hobbes, on infinite, 247; against 
 free will, 173-177. 
 
 Hodgson, conscious states, and 
 nerves, 60. 
 
 Hofl'ding, on energy and inertia, 
 62 ; and Newton, 62. 
 
 Horace, on future life, 88, 89. 
 
 Hume, on soul, 56; against free 
 will, 177. 
 
 Huxley, on soul, 59. 
 
 Hypnotism, 183-196; and Mesmer, 
 1S3; and Braid, 184; definition, 
 184; senses in, 186 j and intoxi- 
 
344 
 
 INDEX 
 
 cation, 185, 186; phenomena, and 
 three classes, 186; deception of 
 senses, 186, 187; hearing wide 
 awake, other senses asleep, 187; 
 obedience in, will in, 188; sleep 
 In, 188, 189; dreams, and, mo, 
 191; tricks in, spirits in, 191, 
 192; preternatural phenomena, 
 193; and Ethics, compared with 
 anaesthetics, 193, 194; and 
 Church, 194, 195. 
 
 Idealism, 40, 41; and Monism, 58. 
 
 Ideas, their origin, 115-143; Aris- 
 totle, St. Tiiomas, Scholastics, 
 115, 120; Materialists and Sens- 
 ists, 116; Plato, Leibnitz, Kant, 
 Wolff, Rosmini, 116, 117; Ontol- 
 ogists, Traditionalists, 116, 117, 
 118, 119, 120; Descartes, 117; of 
 spiritual things, analogical, 123; 
 external senses, remote medium 
 of; imagination, proximate me- 
 dium of, 127, 128; particular 
 and proper, general and com- 
 mon; and precedence, 136. 
 
 Identity of souls in brute, 31; in 
 man, 72, 73. 
 
 Ignorance, and God, 214, 235. 
 
 Illumination of phantasm, radical 
 and formal, 138, 139. 
 
 Illusions, 42. 
 
 Images, imprinted intelligible, 
 124; developed, 124. 
 
 Imagination, 42; and phantasms, 
 121, 124. 
 
 Immanence, and cooperation, 299; 
 and three degrees, 10. 
 
 Immanent action, 9 ; object and 
 eye, 28, 43, 44. 
 
 Immense, God proved, 269; objec- 
 tions, 269, 270. 
 
 Immensity and omnipresence, 268. 
 
 Immortality of soul, 83-115; its 
 bearing on morality, 83 ; of 
 body, from faith ; of soul, from 
 reason as well, 83, 84; absolute 
 in God, natural in soul and 
 angel, gratuitous in bodies, 84 ; 
 proofs, 94-102; objections, 102- 
 115; a natural desire, 98: per- 
 fect happiness demands, 97, 98; 
 
 man's perfectibility demands, 
 98; sanction demands, 99, 100; 
 justice demands, 100; common 
 consent demands, 100, 101; in- 
 corruptibility demands, 94; not 
 infinity, 103; denial is hypocrisy, 
 103; Jews and, 103; Kant 
 against, 104 ; Verworm against, 
 10")-115; and conservation, 296. 
 
 Immunity from necessity, man's 
 peculiar possession, 165. 
 
 Immutability, and freedom in 
 God, 291, 292, 293. 
 
 Imprinted image, entitative and 
 representative values, 130; re- 
 moves indifference of mind, 133. 
 
 Incarnation, and change in God, 
 266. 
 
 Indefinite series, impossible as ac- 
 tual, 211. 
 
 Indians, and future life, 87. 
 
 Inert, opposed to living, 18. 
 
 Inferior and superior psychology, 
 5. 
 
 Infinii supremum attingit infimum 
 supremi, 25. 
 
 Infinite, privative sense, and neg- 
 ativo-positive, all perfect, 244 ; 
 with Locke, Spinoza, llobbes, 
 247; God proved infinite, 253, 
 254, 255; objections, 255, 256, 
 257; will and infinite good, con- 
 tingent good, 290; infinite series, 
 absurd, 217, 218; with no suffi- 
 cient reason for limits, 254; 
 maker of all else, 254; creative 
 power, 255; multitude, and in- 
 finite number, 272. 
 
 Infinity, and multitude of perfec- 
 tions, in God, 256; and perfec- 
 tion, 255. 
 
 Influence of intellect, end and appe- 
 tite on will, 149. 
 
 Ingersoll, agnostic, 200; and God, 
 209; the American agnostic, 
 231-242. 
 
 Innate ideas, refuted, 116, 117. 
 
 Intellect, 46-52; and sense, 20; 
 differences, 30; compared, 48; 
 definition of, 35; and three op- 
 erations, 36 ; agens and possi- 
 bilis, working and receiving, 36, 
 121, 122; distinction between, 
 128, 129; receiving, possibilis, 
 patibilis, 131, 132; working, and 
 
INDEX 
 
 345 
 
 its triple efficacy, 132; Suarez 
 on, 132; counsels will, 146. 
 
 Intellectual wealth and trash, 241. 
 
 Intelligence in God, for possibles, 
 273. 
 
 Intermediate, in God, for futur- 
 ibles, 273. 
 
 Intoxication, and hypnotism, 185. 
 
 Intussusception, 11. 
 
 Ipsum esse, being itself, like elo- 
 quence itself, 253, 254. 
 
 Jacobi, on God, 199. 
 
 James, of Harvard, on soul, 56, 57 ; 
 rules for habits, 153; on free 
 will, 101, 162; on Determinism 
 and Fatalism, 162. 
 
 Japanese, and deities, 252. 
 
 Jews, and immortality, 103, 104. 
 
 Job, on plants and animals of his 
 time, 27. 
 
 Jonson, Ben, and memory, 43. 
 
 Judas, Peter, and Thomists, 288. 
 
 Judgments, prior to choice, specu- 
 lative and practical, 166; virtual 
 and formal, 44 ; ratified by com- 
 mon consent, and four qualities, 
 100, 101, 104. 
 
 Justice, demands immortality, 100; 
 proves free will, 170. 
 
 Justin, St., and futiu-ibles, 325. 
 
 Kant, on philosophy, 2; on soul, 
 55; on noumena and phenomena, 
 55; against immortality, 104; 
 on ideas, 116; on God, 198, 199; 
 and agnostics, 201; against God, 
 220, 221, 224, 22i;. 
 
 Kepler, on God, 199. 
 
 Knowledge, and science, and wis- 
 dom, 1, 2, 3; not a physical and 
 chemical process, 18; its instru- 
 ments, 20; defined, 44; of body, 
 and singulars, and God, 53 ; has 
 rise in senses, 123 ; its terms, 
 intrinsic and extrinsic, 125, 126; 
 resemblances, and three kinds of 
 truth, 126; in God, 271-287; is 
 God's essence, 271; one act, 
 many terms, 271; pure act, no 
 potency, 271; divine essence is 
 
 determining principle, 271; 
 threefold, vision, intelligence, in- 
 termediate, 272, 273, 274, 275, 
 276; proved, 276, 277. 
 
 Laboratory cannot produce life, 17. 
 
 Lamennais, on God, 199; on idol- 
 atry and Catholics, 252. 
 
 Lange, against God, 226. 
 
 Language, and Traditionalists, 119, 
 120. 
 
 Last causes belong to philosophy, 
 not to science. 111. 
 
 Lateran Council, soul form of body, 
 81. 
 
 Laws, and freedom, 173. 
 
 Leibnitz, on union of faculty and 
 object, 34; harmony and soul, 
 65; on ideas, 116; on choice, 
 157; and theodicy, 197; on God, 
 198, 199. 
 
 Lessius, blood and soul, 77; on 
 dominion in man, 338. 
 
 Liberality, proves free will in God, 
 290. 
 
 Liberty, defined and described, 156, 
 157; of contradiction, contrari- 
 ety and specification, 157. 
 
 Liebig, on physical and chemical 
 forces in a cell, 112. 
 
 Life, 6-34; definition, 7, 8, 21; sub- 
 stantial and accidental, 8, 92; 
 in God, 8, 9, 277; in creatures, 
 9; improvement, motion, action, 
 9; sun, water, rubber, 9, 10; 
 three principles, quod, quo re- 
 motum, quo proximum, 10; three 
 grades, 10; in plants, brutes, 
 men, 11; and first origin, 13; 
 laboratory cannot produce, 17; 
 internal and external factors, 
 112. 
 
 Lipps, on free will, two masses of 
 ideas, 163. 
 
 Location, of soul, 69 ; of different 
 activities, 69; extrinsic and in- 
 trinsic, 268. 
 
 Locke, on objectivity of sensations, 
 34, 40; on judgment, 47; on 
 thought and matter, 59, 74 ; on 
 God, 199; on infinite, 247; on 
 ideas, 116. 
 
346 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Loss in extent and gain in inten- 
 sity, 102. 
 
 Lotze, against Condillac, 48. 
 
 Love and hate in God, one act, 
 265. 
 
 Lullaby and hypnotism, 189. 
 
 Luther and Bible, 62. 
 
 M 
 
 Macaulay, and memory, 43. 
 
 Made, no part in God, 256. 
 
 Malicr, and proofs for free will, 
 169, 170, 171, 172. 
 
 Majorities in realm of thought, 
 234. 
 
 Malebranche, on universals, 50; 
 Occasionalism, and soul, 65; on 
 ideas, IKi; on God, 198; and 
 Ontologism, 201. 
 
 Mallock, against God, 226, 227. 
 
 Manicheans, and two souls, 64. 
 
 Mansel, on God, 199; and agnostics, 
 201; and seven difficulties, 229, 
 230. 
 
 Mastrius, on ideas, 139. 
 
 Materialism, 6, 7, 03, 64 ; and man, 
 14, 18; and intellect, 47; on sen- 
 sations, 34, 37 ; on ideas, 37 ; 
 and Monism, 58, 59, 60. 
 
 Matter, and form from life-action, 
 17: primary and secondary qual- 
 ities of matter, 40. 
 
 Maudslcy, and lies about free will, 
 171. 
 
 Max Muller, on Theos, 197. 
 
 Media vita in morte sumus, 113. 
 
 Memory, sensile and intellectual, 
 42. 
 
 Men, and life, 11. 
 
 Merit proves free will, 169. 
 
 Metaphysical, argument for free 
 will, 171; parts, none in God, 
 258. 
 
 Metempsychosis, 90. 
 
 Mexicans, and their deities, 252. 
 
 Mezzofanti, and memory, 43. 
 
 Mill, on soul, 56; on Determinism 
 and Fatalism, 158; against free 
 will, 177, 178, 179, 180; on the 
 god of Hobbes, 173; on Cain and 
 Abel, 178; compares Determin- 
 ism and Fatalism, 178, 179; on 
 character in Determinism, 179; 
 on consciousness and free will, 
 
 179; a Fatalist, 179, 180; and 
 lloundaljout Fatalism, 181; 
 against God, 218, 225, 226. 
 
 Million guns to kill one hare, 221, 
 222. 
 
 Missing link, 25. 
 
 Mivart, and man's body, 26. 
 
 Moderate Dualism, 58. 
 
 Moleschott, mind and phosphores- 
 cence, 58. 
 
 Molinism, free from objections, 
 327 ; and Thomism compared, 
 318-329. 
 
 Molinists, and three kinds of 
 knowledge, 323. 
 
 Monism, 55-63; and natural selec- 
 tion, 24. 
 
 Moral evil, and God, 308. 
 
 Morality, in will, 143. 
 
 Moses, and science, 241. 
 
 Motives, and their elements, 152; 
 two better than one, 109. 
 
 Mournful faith, immortality, 108, 
 109. 
 
 Muckermann, and skull-cap, 25. 
 
 Multilocation, and quantity, in 
 case of soul, 32. 
 
 N 
 
 Natura odit saltus, 25. 
 
 Natural selection, 23, 26. 
 
 Natural theology, and revelation, 
 197. 
 
 Nature, responsible for universal 
 belief in (iod, 235. 
 
 Neanderthal skull-cap, 25. 
 
 Necessary, sin in hell, 174; and 
 contingent, 204 ; cannot be finite, 
 253; agents, and predetermina- 
 tion, 314. 
 
 Necessity, and God's foreknowl- 
 edge, 275, 276. 
 
 Negative permission, requisites, 
 307; of sin, good, 308. 
 
 Nerves, 37, 38; and ends, 39. 
 
 Newton, on God, 19!) ; and Holfding, 
 62; on limitations of his knowl- 
 edge, and immortality, 98. 
 
 Nil in intellectu, 123; and hypno- 
 tism, 188. 
 
 Nil volitum, nisi praecognitum, 
 188. 
 
 No compromise with error, 240. 
 
 Nominalism, 49, 51, 52. 
 
INDEX 
 
 347 
 
 Noumena and phenomena, and 
 
 Kant, 55. 
 Xutrition, 11, 12. 
 
 O 
 
 Obedience, in hypnotism, 187. 
 
 Objectivity of sensations, 41. 
 
 Obligation proves free will, 169. 
 
 Occasionalism, and soul and body, 
 65. 
 
 felix culpa, 310. 
 
 Omnipotence, absolute and relative, 
 221. 
 
 One essentially, and God, 251; 
 proof, 260; objections, 201, 2G2. 
 
 Ontological argument for immor- 
 tality, 94, 95. 
 
 Ontologism, and God, 198. 
 
 Ontologists, 201; refuted, 215, 
 210; on ideas, 110. 
 
 Order, 205; physical, 205, 206; 
 proves God, 212; moral, 206, 
 207; proves God, 212, 213; ob- 
 jections, 220, 221, 222. 
 
 Organs, definition, 35; of senses, 
 external and internal, 36 ; no 
 cause of thought, but condition, 
 64. 
 
 Origin, of soul, 84, 85, 86; Plato 
 and Pythagoras, on, 84; Tradu- 
 cianism. Material and Spiritual, 
 on, 85, 86; Exaggerated Creati- 
 anism, on, 85, 8G ; Rosmini, on, 
 85; Evolutionists, on, 86; crea- 
 tion by God, 86, 87 ; of our ideas, 
 115-143. 
 
 Ovid, on future life, 90. 
 
 Ovulation, 12. 
 
 Owen, on life, 8. 
 
 Ownership, in man, relative with 
 regard to God, 338. 
 
 Oxygen, and soul, 16. 
 
 Paderewski, and battered piano, 
 
 114. 
 Paley's watch, 226. 
 Pantheism, 227, 228; and God, all 
 
 being, 256; and Ontologism, 118. 
 Parallelism, Cliflord and Bain, 60. 
 Paralysis, and consciousness, 108. 
 Pascal, and memory, 43. 
 Pasteur, and spontaneous genera- 
 
 tion, 13, 111; on science and last 
 causes. 111. 
 
 Paul, St., on three kinds of free- 
 dom, 164; on God and light, 197; 
 and Thomists, 282, 283; harden- 
 ing by God, 308. 
 
 Perfect happiness, demands im- 
 mortality, 97, 98; perfect love of 
 God, ontological and motive root, 
 148. 
 
 Perfectibility demands immortal- 
 ity, 98. 
 
 Perfection, finish, good, 145. 
 
 Permission, negative and positive, 
 306, 307. 
 
 Personality, and infinity, 257. 
 
 Phantasm, cannot unite with mind, 
 133; and its illumination, 138; 
 its causality in ideas, 137. 
 
 Phenomena, and noumena, 55; in 
 hypnotism, three classes, 186; 
 preternatural, 192. 
 
 Phenomenists, and intelligence, 47. 
 
 Philosophy, definition and division, 
 1; handmaid to theology, 198; 
 and God, 214. 
 
 Phrenology, and soul, 69, 70. 
 
 Physical evil, and God, 307. 
 
 Physical predetermination, accord- 
 ing to Goudin, 278; explained, 
 319; according to Gonet, 302; 
 superfluous for four reasons, 
 278; hurts human freedom, 279; 
 and simultaneous cooperation, 
 compared, 308; ruled out, 311; 
 useless, and destructive of free 
 will, 313-317; is formal coop- 
 eration with sin, 315; makes 
 God author of sin, 315; not in 
 our power, with it act must fol- 
 low, without it act cannot be 
 placed, 315; leaves will only pas- 
 sive indifference, 314; with 
 Thomists, 315; elements, 313. 
 
 Physics, and free will, 172. 
 
 Physiologists, and soul, 18. 
 
 Physiology, and free will, 172. 
 
 Piety, and freedom, 174. 
 
 Pithecanthropus erectus, 25. 
 
 Pius IX, Pope, and Gunther, 64, 
 G5. 
 
 Plants, and life, and their func- 
 tions, 11 ; differ from minerals 
 in nine points, 16, 17 ; from 
 brutes in four points, 19; soul 
 
348 
 
 INDEX 
 
 esaentiallv different from forces, 
 21, 22, 2U\ organic beings, 22. 
 
 Plato, 4; on universals, 50, 52; and 
 three souls, 04; on soul's loca- 
 tion, C9; on origin of soul, 84; 
 discere est reminisci, 85; and 
 ideas, 116, 117; like knows like, 
 129; and primus motor, 220. 
 
 Plutarch, and God, 209. 
 
 Polytheism, and monotheism, 209, 
 210; and common consent, 223, 
 261, 202; kinds, 252; Chaldeans 
 first, 252; its three causes. 252; 
 with Greeks, Romans, Hindus, 
 Japanese, 252. 
 
 Positivists, and intelligence, 47. 
 
 Practical judgment, free will, and 
 Hobbes, 175. 
 
 Praeambula fidei, 198. 
 
 Praedett'rmlnatio and praemotio, 
 302, 303; one towards summum 
 bonum, other towards created 
 goods, 304. 
 
 Praemotio physica of Thomists, 
 166, 167. 
 
 Praise, and free will, 174; and 
 blame for creed, 240. 
 
 Prayer, and free will, 174; and 
 God, 236 ; and change in God, 
 265; and free will in God, 290. 
 
 Predestination, with Reformers 
 and Catholics, 159, 160. 
 
 Predictions, free will, and Hume, 
 177. 
 
 Preestablished harmony, soul and 
 body, 65. 
 
 Prejudice, and God, 214, 236. 
 
 Prescience of God, free will, and 
 Hume, 177; with Mill, 177, 178. 
 
 Presence of God in creatures, three- 
 fold, by essence, by power, by 
 presence, 268. 
 
 Previous judgment of Thomists, a 
 lie, 166; incompatible with free 
 will, 168, 169. 
 
 Procrress, in religion, 237. 
 
 Providence of God, 329-338; defi- 
 nition, 329; division, 329, 330; 
 antecedent and consequent, 330; 
 proved, .j.il ; objections, 331; 
 defined by Vatican, 330; extends 
 to all creatures, 332, 333; 
 touches man in very special way, 
 334; immediate and particular 
 over all, 330; and consequent ne- 
 
 cessity, in case of free agents, 
 
 337; St. Augxistine and Plato, 
 
 on, 336. 
 Psychological arguments for free 
 
 will, 170. 
 Psychology, definition, 4; rational 
 
 and experimental, 63. 
 Pythagoras, and philosopher, 3; 
 
 and Transmigration, 18. 
 
 Q 
 
 Qui facit per alium facit per se, 
 309. 
 
 R 
 
 Race, 26. 
 
 Rationalism, and Ontologism, 118. 
 
 Realism, Exaggerated, 49, 52 ; Mod- 
 erate, 50, 52, 53. 
 
 Realistic Monism, 60, 61, 62. 
 
 Relation between intellect and will 
 proves free will, 168, 171. 
 
 Remorse, proves free will, 169; and 
 God, 223. 
 
 Resemblances between parents and 
 children, 76. 
 
 Resistance to temptation proves 
 free will, 170. 
 
 Responsibility proves free will, 
 169. 
 
 Rickaby, Free Will, and Four Eng- 
 lish Philosophers, 173-182; on 
 choice and greater complacency, 
 180. 
 
 Rinn against Mercer, 114. 
 
 Rosmini, on origin of .soul, 85; on 
 ideas, 116; on God, 198. 
 
 Roundabout Fatalism, 181. 
 
 Rudimentary organs, 27. 
 
 Sailors and cargo, 174. 
 
 Salvation, free gift of God, and re- 
 ward of man's efforts, 321. 
 
 Sanction demands immortality, 99. 
 
 Savages, priests and God, 235. 
 
 Scaliger, and memory, 43. 
 
 Scholastics on ideas, 120; on free 
 will, 163, 171. 
 
 Scientific judgment, and ethical, 
 104. 
 
 Scotus, on ideas, 140. 
 
 Seated man cannot walk, 279. 
 
 Self-control and will, 153. 
 
INDEX 
 
 349 
 
 Sellishness, and God, 235. 
 
 Self-motion, 8, 9 ; motion always 
 from another, 28 ; motion in min- 
 erals, 28. 
 
 Sensation, 34-46; what, how ac- 
 complished, what it perceives, 
 34 ; with Materialists, 34 ; and 
 Cartesians, Descartes, and Locke, 
 34 ; three stages, 3(5 ; in proper 
 organ, not in brain, 38; two 
 values, cognitive and emotional, 
 39; in objective and subjective 
 phases, 40 ; and retention, 43 ; 
 union of facultj' and object, 44; 
 touch and sphere, 44; material 
 principle, 45. 
 
 Sensationists, and intelligence, 47. 
 
 Senses, in hypnotism, 185. 
 
 Sensists, and soul, 18; and ideas, 
 116; and Dualism, 58, 59. 
 
 Sensu diviso, and composito, 320. 
 
 Several gods, a contradiction, 260. 
 
 Shakespeare before Scripture, 240. 
 
 Ship, wind, pilot, and God's co- 
 operation, 304, 305. 
 
 Sickness affects organs, not soul, 
 75. 
 
 Simplicity, of soul, definition, 60; 
 kinds, 67, 68 ; brute soul, and St. 
 Thomas, 68; and location, 68, 
 69; proofs, 71, 72; objections, 
 76, 77, 78, 79; form without mat- 
 ter, 71; no quantity, 72. 
 
 Simplicity, of God, defined ; phys- 
 yical, metaphysical, logical, 247, 
 248, 249; no physical or meta- 
 physical composition in God, 
 257, 258, 259, 260; means more 
 than unity, 249; and Three Per- 
 sons, 250; God proved simple, 
 257, 258; objections, 258, 259, 
 260; and complete knowledge of 
 God, 258. 
 
 Simultaneous cooperation, 308 ; 
 explained, 317; is right, 317, 
 318, 319; is material coopera- 
 tion, 31.5. 
 
 Sin, infinite, viewing the person 
 offended, 94; physical act and 
 moral malice inseparable, 304; 
 God not author of, 318. 
 
 Singulars, knowledge of, 52. 
 
 Sleep, hypnotic, 188, 189. 
 
 Socrates, 4. 
 
 Sophocles, and Fatalism, 158, 159. 
 
 Soporific talker, and hypnotism, 
 189. 
 
 Soul, in man, what it is not, 55- 
 63; what it is, 63-115; its 
 powers, 124 ; in plant and brute, 
 material and non-subsistent; in 
 man, spiritual and incompletely 
 subsistent; a substance and 
 form, 14 ; in brute, mortal, made 
 by parents; in man, immortal, 
 created by God, 19; and chem- 
 ical analysis, 29; divisible in 
 plants and brutes per accidens; 
 in men, indivisible per se and 
 per accidens, 32, 33; in perfect 
 brutes, dies in part, 33 ; and 
 quantity, 32 ; and multilocation, 
 32 ; quality in brutes, 31 ; in 
 amputated limb, 32; a real, 
 abiding, unitary, simple, spirit- 
 ual, immortal being, 56; soul 
 and body form one substance, 
 73, 74; objections, 80, 81, 82; 
 coextensive with body, 79; par- 
 takes of body's material being, 
 81; of Christ in Sacred Host, 
 82; origin of soul, 84, 85, 86; 
 separated from body, can think 
 and wish, 95, 102; soul, and 
 body, and imntortality, 106, 107. 
 
 Species, in Evolution, shape and 
 fertility, 26. 
 
 Species, id quo, non id quod; in- 
 tentionales; sensiles and intel- 
 ligibilcs; impressa and expressa, 
 40, 41; body-essence spiritual- 
 ized, 121, 122; substitute for it, 
 122; escapes senses, not mind, 
 45. 
 
 Spencer, on life, 8; on soxil, 60, 
 61; on free will, 172; on God, 
 199; agnostic, 200; against God, 
 218, 223, 224, 225. 
 
 Spinal cord, 38. 
 
 Spinoza, on free will, 170; sub- 
 stance and pantheism, 228 ; on 
 infinite, 247. 
 
 Spirits in hypnotism, 192; evil, 
 and agents, 192. 
 
 Spirituality, of soul; different 
 from simplicity, compatible with 
 extrinsic dependence on matter, 
 66; definition, 66; proofs, 70, 71; 
 objections, 74, 75, 76 ; intrinsic 
 independence of organs, 71; con- 
 
350 
 
 INDEX 
 
 cept of, abstractive and noga- 
 tivo-positive, 75. 
 
 Spiritiialization of outside objects, 
 129, 130. 
 
 Spontaneous generation, 13; Pas- 
 teur, Haeckel, Scholastics, 13. 
 
 Spontaneous acts, without choice, 
 152; different from voluntary, 
 164, 165. 
 
 Stout, and lies about free will, 171. 
 
 Strauss, on immortal and infinite, 
 103; on seed never matured, 98. 
 
 Struggle for existence, 24, 26. 
 
 Suarez, on blood and soul, 77; 
 sweet to die, 110; on thought, 
 140, 141; on working intellect, 
 132; on phantasm, 137; on Mo- 
 linism, 327. 
 
 Subjectivism, and Ingersoll, 232. 
 
 Substance, and soul; for mind, not 
 for senses, 66, 67 ; complete and 
 incomplete, 67; and nature, 70; 
 and destruction, 234. 
 
 Substantial volition, and its in- 
 finite actuality in God, 292. 
 
 Supremum infimi attingit infimum 
 supremi, 128. 
 
 Temptation, not wrong, but con- 
 sent to it, 160, 161. 
 
 Theistic Ethical argument for im- 
 mortality, 99. 
 
 Theistic Ontological argument for 
 immortality, 96, 97. 
 
 Theistic Teleological argument for 
 immortality, 97. 
 
 Theodicy, justification of God, 197. 
 
 Theology, crown and consummation 
 of philosophy, 197; natural and 
 dogmatic, 198. 
 
 Thomas, St., on generation, 12; on 
 soul, 15; on faculties, 46; on 
 donkey and horse, 27 ; on brain 
 and internal senses, 39, 70: on 
 objectivity of sensations, 41; 
 simplicity of brute soul, (i8; on 
 angelic power, 76; on matter and 
 form, 77 ; blood, part of body in 
 potency, 77 ; on time of soul's 
 creation, 87 ; and foeticide, 87 ; 
 four arguments for immortality, 
 96-101; immortality, a natural 
 desire, 97, 98; answers Strauss 
 
 and Biedermann, 103; on ideas, 
 115, 136; on teacher and pupil, 
 119; on sense and intellect, 123; 
 on phantasm and intellect, 138; 
 on causes of choice, 155, 156; 
 and a posteriori argument, 202; 
 essence and individuation in 
 God, and in Socrates, 262 ; on 
 conservation, 295; on predeter- 
 mination, 303; on praemotio, 
 304 ; fourfold dependence of crea- 
 tures in cooperation, 312; au- 
 thority for Molinism, 322 ; on 
 providence, 330. 
 
 Thomism, and Molinism, compared, 
 318-329; wrong on three counts, 
 subjectively absolute and ob- 
 jectively conditional decrees, 
 death to liberty, no sufficient 
 grace, 326, 327. 
 
 Thomists, and previous practical 
 judgment, 166, 167, 168, 169; 
 and physical predetermination, 
 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 302, 
 303; and grace's process, 319; 
 favor God's dominion to preju- 
 dice of human endeavor ; Mo- 
 linists favor human endeavor 
 without prejudice to God's do- 
 minion, 321, 322; and two kinds 
 of knowledge in God, 323. 
 
 Thomson, on God, 199. 
 
 Thought, and its process, 122; 
 Suarez on, 140, 141 ; a true vital, 
 cognoscitive act, 126. 
 
 Three Persons, not three gods, 261. 
 
 Time, 266. 
 
 Tongiorgi, denies soul in plants, 
 14; on ideas, 123. 
 
 Traditionalists, 201; their argu- 
 ments, 225; on ideas, 116; ab- 
 surdities, 118, 119, 120. 
 
 Traduciaiiism, 85, 86. 
 
 Transmigralion of souls, 18, 90. 
 
 Tricks in hypnoti.sm, 191. 
 
 Trinitj', and physical predetermin- 
 ation, 320. 
 
 Tyre and Sidon, 281, 282. 
 
 U 
 
 Ubaghs, on God, 198. 
 Ultra Dualism, 58. 
 Unchangeable, God proved, 263, 
 264; objections, 264, 265, 266. 
 
INDEX 
 
 351 
 
 Unitary being, soul, 67. 
 
 Unity, of soul, 67, 70; proofs, 72, 
 73; objections, 79, 80; of indi- 
 visibility, 70; of God, defined, 
 kinds, 250, 251 ; transcendental 
 and essential, 251; unus and 
 xuiicus, 251; Three Persons, and, 
 251; St. Tliomas on unity in 
 God, 251. 
 
 Universals, 4U-55; what, and 
 kinds, 40; direct and retlex, 50; 
 proved from common and collec- 
 tive nouns, 51, 52; fundamental- 
 ly and formally, 52 ; ens rationis, 
 53. 
 
 Variety of religions, and God, 238 ; 
 in Evolution, 20. 
 
 Vaughau, and broken down har- 
 monium, 70. 
 
 Ventura, on ideas, 118. 
 
 Verworm, against immortality, 
 105-115; twelve arguments, 105, 
 106; soul mortal as body, 106, 
 107 ; consciousness depends on 
 brain, 107 ; complex phenomenon 
 and condition cease together, 
 107 ; paralysis inhibits conscious- 
 ness, 108; a mournful faith, and 
 fear, 108, 109, 110; cowards fear 
 death, 110, 111; causal view and 
 condition \iew, 111; life-factors, 
 internal and external, 112; 
 Comte on life, 113; monk of St. 
 Gall, 113; dependent on matter, 
 113; dust thou art, 113. 
 
 Vibrations, not sensible qualities, 
 but accompany them, 45. 
 
 Virchow, on bones of man and ape, 
 25. 
 
 Vision, in God, for actuals, present, 
 past, conditional and absolute 
 futures, 272, 273, 281. 
 
 Vitalism, strengthened by true sci- 
 ence, 111. 
 Vital acts, six, 15. 
 Voltaire, on thinking matter, 74. 
 
 W 
 
 War between passion and will 
 proves one soul, 79. 
 
 \\ assmann, on Particular Evolu- 
 tion, 26. 
 
 Waste of organisms, and God, 220. 
 
 \Vater, and liberty, and Hobbes, 
 175. 
 
 Whipped men, and necessary being, 
 218. 
 
 Wholes, and their kinds, 68. 
 
 Will, and its object, 143-150; defi- 
 nition, 143 ; will free, appetite 
 necessary, 143, 144; mistress of 
 appetite, 144; energy measured 
 by intellect's, all good, 147; 
 will's freedom, 150-183; nine 
 emotions, appetite and passions, 
 150, 151; in hypnotism, 188, 190. 
 
 Will in God, necessary regarding 
 Himself, free regarding crea- 
 tures, 287-294; in God, 287; 
 emotions in God, 287 ; God's es- 
 sence, 287 ; entitatively one act, 
 terminatively many, 288; and 
 its kinds, 288; of good pleasui'e 
 and in symbol, 288; antecedent 
 and consequent, 288; absolute 
 and conditional, 288; proofs, 
 290. 
 
 William of Champeaux, and uni- 
 versals, 50. 
 
 Wish, viewed actively and passive- 
 ly, 265. 
 
 Words and ideas, 119; flexible 
 phantasms, 120; useless without 
 prior ideas, 119, 120. 
 
 Worship, absolute and relative, 
 253. 
 
 PBINTED IN THE XTNTTED STATBS OF AMERICA 
 

 Date Due 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 JIA 4 ~ '5! 
 
 
 
 
 
 ira 
 
 
 
 m 
 
 
 
 ^^ji^^MMjiygjI^lg 
 
 mktmm 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 f