CH {VWU^MT«»3)LUU : 1 ■vV> ..A^^ >■;// ^^' N PRINCETON, N. J. '7-T THEOLOGICAL TRACTS. THEOLOGICAL TRACTS, SELECTED AND ORIGINAL, BY JOHN'^ROWN, D.D. PROFESSOR OF EXEGETICAL THEOLOGY TO THE UNITED PRESBTTERIAN CHURCH, AKD SENIOR PASTOR OF THE UNITED PRESBYTERIAN CONGREGATION, BROUGHTON PLAGE, EDINBURGH. VOL. III. A. FULLARTON & CO.: 44 SOUTH BRIDGE, EDINBURGH; AND 106 NEWGATE STREET, LONDON. 1854. Eni.MiuuGii: FL-LCARTON AND MACNAB, PKINTERS, I.EITH WALK. PREFATORY NOTE TO VOL. III. This volume will be found, it is hoped, at least equally deserving as its two precursors of a kind reception from those for whose advantage it is primarily intended. The tracts are more numerous, and not less varied and important in their subjects, than those in the volumes for- merly published. Six of them are original, and though not prepared for publication by the authors, are every way worthy of their high reputation. The reprint of Andrew Marvell's acute and witty Tract in defence of Howe, — a tract which though not inferior to any thing its distin- guished author has written, has never been included in any collection of his works, and which, as only one copy of it is known to exist, was in great danger of being lost, — gives a peculiar value to the volume. Errata. Vol. i. page 237, second line, /or 1788 read 1778. 241, last line,/o?' Bishops read Bishop. Vol. ii. page 5, eighth line from foot,/o?' Home read Hurd. 143, eighth line, for hearkening read hankering. 170, eighth line from foot, /or inconsistent read consistent. CONTENTS OF VOL. III. Page I. THE RECOXCILEABLENESS OF GOD'S PRESCIENCE OF THE SINS OF MEN, WITH THE WISDOM AND SINCERITY OF HIS COUNSELS, EX- HORTATIONS, AND WHATSOEVER MEANS HE USES TO PREVENT THEM. IN A LETTER TO THE HON. ROBERT BOYLE, ESQ., TO WHICH IS ADDED A POSTSCRIPT IN DEFENCE OF THE SAID LETTER, 1 BY THE REV. JOHN HOWE, M.A. II. REMARKS UPON A LATE DISINGENUOUS DISCOURSE, WRIT BY ONE T. D., UNDER THE PRETENCE " DE CAUSA DEI," AND OF ANSWER- ING MR. JOHN HOWE'S LETTER AND POSTSCRIPT OP GOD'S PRE- SCIENCE, &C., ...... 75 BY ANDREW IIAKVEIX. III. ON THE AEIAN HYPOTHESIS RESPECTING THE PERSON OF CHRIST, 139 BY ROBEKT BALMER, D.D. IV. ON THE STRENGTH OP THE EVIDENCES FOR THE DIVINITY OF CHRIST, 157 BY ROBERT BALMEK, D.D. ON THE PERSONALITY OP THE HOLY SPIRIT, . . 169 BY ROBEKT BALMEK, D D. VI. ON THE DIVINITY OF THE HOLY SPIRIT, . . • 185 BY ROBEKT BALMEK, D.D. VIII CONTENTS. Page VII. REMARKS ON THE DOCTRINE OF THE DIVINE DECREES, . 205 BY KOBEUT BAIMER, D.I). VIII. ON THE GLOKY OF GOD AS THE GREAT END OF MORAL ACTION, 219 BY JOHN MAETIN, D.D. IX. BRIEF THOUGHTS: I. CONCERNING THE GOSPEL, AND THE HIN- DRANCES TO BELIEVE IT. II. CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH THE GOSPEL BELIEVED GIVES PEACE AND HOPE. III. CONCERN- ING THE WAY IN AVHICH A BELIEVER COMES AT TRUE SATI.'iFAC- TION ABOUT HIS STATE TOWARDS GOD, . . . 243 BY THE REV. SAMUEL PIKE. X. THE LEADING DOCTRINES OF THE GOSPEL STATED AND DEFENDED. 283 BY JOHN SNODGKASS, D.D. XI. THE PROGRESS OP THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION, . . 334 BY THOMAS HARDY, D.D. XII. OBSERVATIONS ON THE CONDUCT AND CHARACTER OF J UDAS ISCARIOT, 371 BY THE REV. JOHN BONAE. XIII. ON THE PERFECTION AND USEFULNESS OP THE DIVINE LAW, 399 BY JOHN SHALLEY, D.D. THE RECONCILEABLENESS OF GOD'S PEESCIENCE OF THE SINS OF MEN, WISDOM AND SINCERITY OF HIS COUNSELS, EXHORTATIONS, AND WHATSOEVER MEANS HE USES TO PREVENT THEM. IN A LETTER TO THE HON. ROBERT BOYLE, Esq., TO WHICH IS ADDED A POSTSCRIPT IN DEFENCE OF THE SAID LETTER. REV. JOHN HOWE, M.A. PREFATORY NOTICE. John Howe, one of England's first Theologians, was bom May 17, 1630, at Loughborough, Leicestershire, of which place his father was minister. Being ejected from his living for Puritanism, the elder Howe sought a refuge in Ireland; but was soon, in conse- quence of the breaking out of the rebellion, obliged to return to his native countiy. His son was, at seventeen years of age, admitted as a sizer into Christ's College, Cambridge, where he became acquainted with Cudworth and More, with the latter of whom he formed an intimate friendship. He remained at Cambridge till 1648, when he took his degree of B,A. : after which he repaired to the Sister university and took the same degree there January 18, 1649. He obtained a fellowship in Magdalene College, and at the early age of twenty-two took the degree of M.A. He joined a small church under the pastoral care of Ur, Goodwin, the President of his Col- lege, and was soon after presbyterially ordained at Winwick, Mr. Herle, who succeeded Dr. Twisse in the chair of the Westminster Assembly, presiding on the occasion. About the year 1650 he settled as a minister at Great Torrington, in Devon, where he laboured most assiduously in all the departments of a Christian pastor's work. Li the close of 1656 or the beginning of 1657, being occasionally in London, he attended divine serA'ice in the chapel of Whitehall. His appearance attracted Cromwell's attention. At the close of the service a message was sent Howe, informing him that the Protector wished to sjieak with him. The conversation led to a request to preach at Whitehall chapel next Lord's day. The request was respectfully declined, but Cromwell would take no denial, and the result was that, not without reluctance, Howe was induced to accept the proffered office of the Protector's domes- tic chaplain, and removed his family from Torrington to Whitehall. He retained this situation till the deposition of Richard Cromwell from the Protectorship, when he gladly returned to his beloved V PREFATORY NOTICE. people at Torrington, from whom he had been reluctantly sepa- rated. Immediately after the restoration an attempt was made to ruin him by a charge of having uttered seditious and even treason- able matter from the pulpit. After a double trial, the judge found " that the charge was wholly founded on a mistake," and cleared him. It was not long, however, when in consequence of the act of Unifonnity, he, along with more than two thousand of his brethren, was deprived of his living on Bartholomew's day, August 24, 1662. But though Howe was an ejected minister he could not consent to be a silenced one — but availed himself of every opportu- nity of preaching in private houses those truths which he was no longer pejmitted to proclaim in public. In consequence of this he was soon brought into trouble. For several years he con- tinued to lead the life of a fugitive and a wanderer. To add to his scanty means of subsistence probably he in 1668 published "The lilessedness of the Righteous" a practical treatise which has few equals — perhaps no superior. It met with the success it desei"vcd, and likely led to his being invited to become domestic chaplain to Lord Massarene of Antrim Castle, Ireland — an offer which he gratefully embraced. He left England for that county early in 1G71, and remained in Lord Massarene's family about five years, which probably were the happiest in his life. In 1675 he was in- vited to take charge of a Presbyterian congregation in London, which after mature delibei-ation he resolved to accept. Soon after his removal to London he published the first part of his great work, " The Living Temple," and in 1677 he gave to the world the inge- nious and elaborate tract which holds the first place in this volume, " The reconcileableness of God's Prescience of the Sins of Men, with the wisdom and sincerity of his counsels, exhortations, and whatsoever other means he uses to prevent them" In 1680 he published his admirable " Letter out of the Country to a person of quality in the City, who took off"ence at the late sermon of Dr. Stillingflcet, Dean of St. Paul's, before the Lord Mayor." In 1682 he contributed to the continuation of Poole's Annotations — a short commentary on the three Epistles of John, and in 1683 was pub- lished his justly celebrated discourse on " Union among Protes- tants." It was during this year too that he wrote anonymously his exquisite letter of condolence and consolation to Rachel Lady Russell, on the death of her husband, w!:o died a martyr to the PREFATORY NOTICE. V cause of liberty. In 1685 when the persecutions of the Noncon- formists had reached their height, and the prospect of being per- mitted to prosecute his ministry most gloomy, he gladly accepted the invitation of Philip Lord Wharton to accompany him in his travels on the continent. In company with that nobleman he visited some of the most celebrated cities in Europe, and enjoyed literary intercourse with learned men of all parties. As there was no inducement for him to return home, after having spent a year in travel he settled at Utrecht and took a large house for the ac- commodation of English residents. While there he took part with some other Nonconformist ministers, who like himself had pre- ferred exile in Holland to pei'secution at home, in performing the offices of public worship in the English church in that city, and assisted in their studies some young Englishmen attending the university and preparing for the ministr)^. Here he made the ac- quaintance of Dr. Burnet, afterwards Bishop of Salisbuiy, and had several interviews witli the illustrious William Prince of Orange, afterwards King of England, who " ever after," says Calamy, " maintained a great respect for him." In 1687 when King James, for obvious reasons, abandoned every principle of his past policy, and published his " Declaration for Liberty of Conscience," Howe's congregation earnestly entreated him to avail himself of the decla- ration and resume his labours among them; and with this invita- tion he immediately complied. When the Prince of Orange in 1688 had amved at St. James's Palace, Howe, at the head of a deputation of Nonconformist ministers, presented a congratulatory address. In 1689 he published "The case of the Protestant Dis- senters represented and argued," and on the passing of the act of toleration on the 24th May in that )'ear, he gave to the world his admirable " Humble requests both to Conformists and Dissenters touching their temper and behaviour to each other upon the lately passed indulgence." He took an active part in endeavouring to unite the Presbyterians and Congregationalists in 1691, and was also involved in the controversies occasioned by the republication of Dr. Crisp's sermons. This occasioned the publication of his sublime discourses entitled " Carnality of Religious Contention," which certainly do, as his colleague Mr. Spademan says, " breathe a heavenly charity and concern for the Christian interest." The discussion of the Trinitarian question by Wallis, Sherlock, South, VI PREFATORY NOTICE. and Cudworth, led to the publication of his "Calm and Sober In- quiry," followed by a "Postscript," in 1694. In 1697 he published his sublime discourse on " The Redeemer's dominion over the invisible world," with a consolatory letter, inferior only to that addressed to Lady Russell, to Sir Charles and Lady Hoghton, on the loss of their son, whose untimely death had occasioned it. In 1701-2 he took a part in the controversy with respect to "occa- sional conformity," and advocated with gi'eat power, and in a beautiful spirit, " True Christian Communion." In the last of those years he completed " The Living Temple," publishing the second part and republishing the first part. Towards the close of 1 704 plain indications were given that the time was at hand when this great and good man must die. The earthly house of his tabernacle was very gently and gradually taken down. A few weeks before his death he sent to the press his discourse " On Patience in expectation of future blessedness," a virtue, alas, which few find it difficult to practise. Richard Cromwell visited him on his deathbed, and the " faithful chronicler," Calamy, tells us that " there was a great deal of serious discourse between them; tears were freely shed on both sides, and the parting was veiy solemn." He told his wife that " though he loved her as well as it was fit for one creature to love another; yet if it were put to his choice whether to die that moment— or to live for seven years to come, he would choose to die that moment." On his son, a physician, lancing his gangrened leg without apprising him of his intention, he asked what he was doing, adding, " I am not afraid of dying, but I am afraid of pain." His dying declaration was — " I expect salvation, not as a profitable servant, but as a pardoned sinner." He expired without a struggle on April 2d, 1705, having nearly finished his seventy-fifth year. Besides the works mentioned in this notice, Howe published a number of sermons, chiefly funeral, some of which are of transcendent excellence. Since his death many of his sermons have been published— in a state very different from thai in which he would have given them to the world, but almost all of them distinctly marked by the hand of a master. The best account of Howe, and it would be difficult to oven-ate its merits, is " The Life and Character of John Howe, M.A., with an analysis of his writings, by Henry Rogers," 1836. TO THE HOiX. ROBERT BOYLE. Sir, The veneration I have long had for your name, could not permit me to apprehend less obligation than that of a law, in your recommendmg to me this subject. For within the whole compass of intellectual employment and affairs, none but who are so unhappy as not at aU to know you, would dispute your right to prescribe, and give law. And taking a nearer view of the province you have assigned me, I must esteem it alike both disingenuous and undutiful, wholly to have refused it. For the less you could think it possible to me to perform in it, the more I might perceive of kindness allaying the autho- rity of the imposition; and have the apprehension the more obvious to me that you rather designed in it mine own advan- tage, than that you reckoned the cause could receive any, by my undertaking it. The doubt, I well know, was mentioned by you as other men's, and not your o^\^l•, whose clear mind, and diligent in- quiry, leave you little liable to be encumbered with greater difficulties. Wherefore that I so soon advert from you, and no more allow these papers to express any regard unto you, till the shutting of the discourse, is only a seeming disrespect or indecorum, put in the stead of a real one. For after you have given them the comitenance, as to let it be understood that you gave the first rise and occasion to the business and design of them; I had little reason to slur that stamp put upon them, by adding to their (enough other) faults, that of making them guilty of so great a misdemeanour and impertinency, as to con- tinue a discourse of this length, to one that hath so little leisure or occasion to attend to any thing that can be said by them. GOD'S PRESCIENCE OF THE SINS OF MEK Sect. I. What there is of difficulty in this matter I cannot pretend to set down in those most apt expressions wherein it was represented to me, and must therefore endeavour to supply a bad memory out of a worse invention. So much appears very obvious, that ascribing to the ever blessed God, among the other attributes which we take to belong to an every way perfect Being, a knowledge so perfect as shall admit of no possible accession or increase, and con- sequently the prescience of all future events, as whereof we doubt him not to have the distinct knowledge when they shall have actually come to pass ; since many of those events are the sinful actions or omissions of men, which he earnestly counsels and warns them against; this matter of doubt can- not but arise hereupon, viz., " How it can stand with the wisdom and sincerity which our own thoughts do by the earliest anticipation challenge to that ever happy Being, to use these (or any other means) with a visible design to pre- vent that, which in the mean time appears to that all-seeing eye sure to come to pass." So that, by this representation of the case, there seem to be committed together, — either, first, God's wisdom with this part of his knowledge, for we judge it not to consist with the wisdom of a man, to design and pursue an end, which he foreknows he shall never at- tain : or secondly, the same foreknowledge with his sincerity and uprightness, that he seems intent upon an end, whicli indeed he intends not. The matter then comes shortly to this sum. Either the holy God seriously intends the pre- vention of such foreseen sinful actions and omissions, or he 10 THE riECOXCILEABLENESS doth not intend it. If he do, his wisdom seems liable to be impleaded, as above. If he do not, his uprightness and truth. My purpose is not, in treating of this affair, to move a dispute concerning tlie fitness of the words prescience or foreknowledge, or to trouble this discourse with notions I understand not, of the indivisibility and unsuccessiveness of eternal duration, whence it would be collected there can be no such thing as first or second, fore or after, knowledge in that duration ; but be contented to speak as I can under- stand, and be understood — that is, to call that foreknow- ledge which is the knowledge of somewhat that as yet is not, but that shall sometime come to pass : for it were a mere piece of legerdemain, only to amuse inquirers whom one would pretend to satisfy ; or to fly to a cloud for refuge from the force of an argument, and avoid an occurring difficulty by the present reliefless shift of involving oneself in greater. Nor shall I design to myself so large a field as a tractate concerning the Divine prescience, so as to be obliged to discourse particularly whatsoever may be thought to belong to that theological topic; but confine the dis- course to my enjoined subject, and offer only such consider- ations as may some way tend to expedite or alleviate the present difficulty. Sect. II. It were one of the greatest injuries to religion,' a subversion indeed of its very foundations, and than by doing which, wo could not more highly gratify atheistical minds, instead, and under pretence of ascribing perfec- tions to the nature of God, to ascribe to it inconsistencies, or to give a self-repugnant notion of that adorable Being, the parts whereof should justle and not accord with one another. And yet equal eare is to be taken lest, while we endeavour to frame a consistent notion of God, we reject from it anything that is truly a perfection, and so give a maimed one ; whereby we should undo our own design, and by our over-much caution to make our conception of him agree Avith itself, make it disagree to him : for to .fti absolutely perfect Being, no other can agree than that, which not only is not made up of contradictions ; but which also comprehends in it all real perfections either explicitly. OF god's prescience, &c. 11 or whicli leaves room for all, by not positively excluding any of them : which to do, and afterwards to assign that as the proper notion of God, were itself the greatest contra- diction. We need, therefore, to be very wary, lest we pro- nounce too hastily concerning- any thing which, to our most sedate thoughts, appears simply a perfection in itself, that it carries with it a repugnancy to somewhat else necessary to be ascribed to him. We are first to suspect (as there is greatest cause) and inquire whether the ail be not wholly in our own minds; which in this and such like cases, we certainly shall, upon due reflection, find labouring under the natural defect of that incomprehensive narrowness that is, in some degree, unavoidably followed with confusion and indistinctness of thoughts; and may perhaps find cause to accuse them of the more culpable evils, both of slothfulness, that withholds them from doing what they can, and self-conceit, by which they imagine to themselves an ability of doing what they cannot. It cannot be unobserved by them that have made themselves any part of their own study, that it is very inci- dent to our minds, to grasp at more than they can compass ; and then, through their own scantiness, (like the little hand of a child,) to throw away one thing that hath pleased lis, to make room for another, because we cannot comprehend both together. It is not strange, that our so straitly limited understandings should not be able to lodge commodiously the immense perfections of a deity; so as to allow them liberty to spread themselves in our thoughts in their entire proportions. And because we cannot, we complain, when we feel ourselves a little pinched that the things will not consist; when the matter is, that we have unduly crowded and huddled them up together, in our incomprehensive minds, that have not distinctly conceived them. And though this consideration should not be used for the protection of an usurped liberty of fastening upon God, ar- bitrarily and at random, what we please; (as indeed what so gross absurdity might not any one give shelter to by such a misapplication of it?) we ought yet to think it sea- sonably applied, when we find ourselves urged with diflScul- ties on one hand and the other; and apprehend it hard, 12 THE RECONCILEABLENESS with clearness and satisfaction, to ascribe to God, what we also find it not easy not to ascribe. Nor would it be less unfit to apply it for the patronage of that slothfulness wherein our discouraged minds are sometimes too prone to indulge themselves. To which purpose I remember some- what very apposite in Minucius Felix, that many, through the mere tediousness of finding out the truth, do rather, by a mean succumbency, yield to the first specious show of any opinion whatsoever, than be at the trouble, by a pertinacious dili- gence, of applying themselves to a thorough search. Though the comprehension of our minds be not infinite, it might be extended much further than usually it is, if we would allow ourselves with patient diligence to consider things at leisure, and so as gradually to stretch and enlarge our own under- standings. Many things have carried the appearance of contradiction and inconsistency to the first view of our straitened minds, which afterwards we have, upon repeated consideration and endeavour, found room for, and been able to make fairly accord, and lodge together. Especially we should take heed lest it be excluded by over-much conceitedness, and a self-arrogating pride, that disdains to be thought not able to see through every thing, by the first and slightest glance of a haughty eye ; and per- emptorily determines that to be unintelligible, that an arro- gant, uninstructed mind hath only not humility enough to acknowledge difficult to be understood. Whence it is too possible some may be over-prone to detract from God what really belongs to him, lest any thing should seem detracted from themselves, and impute imperfection to him rather than confess their own ; and may be so over-ascribing to themselves, as to reckon it a disparagement not to be en- dured, to seem a little puzzled for the present, to be put to pause, and draw breath awhile, and look into the matter again and again ; which if their liumility and patience would enable them to do, it is not likely that the Author of our faculties would be unassisting to them, in those our inqui- ries which concern our duty towards himself. For thougli in matters of mere speculation, we may be encountered with difficulties, whereof perhajjs no mortal can ever be able to find out the solution, (which is no great prejudice, and may OF god's prescience, &;C. 13 be gainful and instructive to us,) yet as to what concerns the object of our religion, it is to be hoped we are not left in inextricable entanglements; nor should think we are till we have made our utmost trial; the design being not to gratify our curiosity, but to relieve ourselves of uncomfort- able doubtfulness in the matter of our worship, and (in a dutiful zeal towards the blessed object thereof) to vindicate it against the cavils of ill-minded men. Sect. III. But if the unsuccessfulness of often repeated endeavours make us despair of being able, with so full sat- isfaction, to reconcile some things which we have thought were to be attributed to God ; it will be some relief to us, if we find the things about which the doubt lies, are not of the same order, nor such as with equal evidence and neces- sity are to be affirmed of him. And when we make a com- parison, we may find ourselves at a certainty concerning those his attributes which most commonly, and at tlie first view, approve themselves to every man's understanding. Among which we little hesitate, (as we are most concerned not to do,) about those which carry with them the import of moral goodness ; and which render the object of our reli- gion, at once, both most venerable and lovely : for none do more naturally obtain for common notions concerning him ; so as even to prevent ratiocination or argument, with whom- soever the apprehension of his existence hath place. Every man's mind, it being once acknowledged that there is a God, refuses to conceive otherwise of him, than that he is holy, just, merciful, true, &c., and rejects with abhorrence the notion of an impure, unrighteous, cruel, deceitful Deity. As for those that, by a long train of our own more uncer- tain and lubricous reasonings, we endeavour to deduce, if we find ourselves constrained any where to admit a diffi- dence, it were rather to be placed here. For it is at first sight evident, since God is most certainly willing to be known of them that are sincerely willing to know him, that what is a natural impression, stamped by his own hand on every man's mind, hath more of absolute certainty, than what depends on metaphysical subtlety ; whereof so very few are capable, and whereby diverse pretenders thereto, 14 THE RECONCILEABLENESS do SO frequently (and perhaps very dangerously) ensnare themselves. And it is of far greater importance, such a notion of God be entertained, as whereby he may be ren- dered amiable, and an inviting object of love, (the very life and soul of all religion,) than such as shall be the result, and entertainment, only of scholastic wit. Yet also, since it is very manifest that man has now be- come a degenerate creature, and in an apostacy from God, he is very little to be trusted with the framing his own idea of him ; being certainly most unapt to allow any thing a place in it, that would have an unfavourable aspect upon his vicious inclinations and his guilty state. And the con- tagion of man's sinfulness having spread itself as far as he hath propagated his own nature, so as no notion in his mind can be more common than the perversion and distem- per of his mind itself; the possibility and danger is very obvious, of mistaking a dictate of depraved nature for an authentic common notion. And though these are not im- possible to be distinguished, and in some cases very easy, as when men find it imposed unavoidably upon them, to apprehend and acknowledge some things which they are very unwilling should be true, (in which case their senti- ments have the same right to be believed as the testimony of an enemy on the opposite party's behalf,) we have yet no reason to neglect any other means, whereby we may be more certainly directed how to conceive of God, or what we are to attribute to him, and what not. Sect. IV. Nor can we be at a greater certainty, than in admitting such things to belong to the blessed God, as he plainly affirms of himself; or any way, by his word, evi- dently discovers to belong to him. For as none knows the things of man, but the spirit of a man that is in him, so the things of God are known to none but the Spirit of God.* Taking therefore his own word for our measure in the pre- sent case, (which I will suppose the reader not to think it unreasonable to appeal to ; and what is here said, is intended only for those that have that estimate of the writings wont * 1 Cor. ii. 11. OF god's prescience, &c. 15 to go under that name,) what it says of him (much more what it proves) will no doubt be admitted for certain truth : though, if it say such things as, to us, seem not so mani- festly to agree with one another, our endeavour must be the more earnest and solicitous (as also it ought to be the more modest) to discuss, and remove the iva.vTio(pot,vi; or whatsoever semblance of disagreement. And whosoever concern them- selves to peruse that venerable book, will find every where, on the one hand, proclaimed and magnified in it, (what our own minds cannot but have been prepossessed of,) the most exquisite wisdom of God, whereby he forms and contrives the methods of all his dispensations, and disposes them in the aptest subserviency to his own great and most impor- tant ends ; that " all his ways are judgment," * and that he " worketh all things according to the counsel of his will :" t in sum, that all wisdom is appropriated to him, that he is celebrated in the style of " God, only wise." % Nor are we therefore to think it strange, if, many times, we are not able to trace him out, or understand the reason of every thing he thinks fit to do ; for the paths of the more perfect wisdom, must therefore be expected to be the more abtruse, and re- moter from common apprehension. How often do we find ourselves so far outgone bv wise and designing men, as that we are sometimes constrained to confess and admire their great prudence and conduct (when they have efiected their purposes) in those manage- ments, which we have before beheld, either with silent ig- norance, or perhaps, not without censure. How much less should the wisest of men regret it, to find all their conjec- tures exceeded by the infinite wisdom ; in the contempla- tion whereof, we find the great apostle (notwithstanding the vast capacity of his divinely enlightened understanding) exclaiming in a transport, " O the depth !"§ And when our eyes tell us, from so manifest stupendous effects, how far we are exceeded by him in power, it were reasonable to expect that he should surpass us proportionably in the con- trivances of his wisdom also. And whereas the conjunction * Dent, xxxii. 4. t Epli. i. 11. X Rom. xvi. ult. § Kom. xi. 33. 16 THE RECONCILEABLENESS is rare, among men, of deep political wisdom, -with integrity and strict righteousness ; this proceeds from the imperfec- tion and insufficiency of the former in great part, that they know not how to compass their designs, unless often, by supplying their want of wisdom, out of the spoil and viola- tion of their justice and honesty. Otlierwise, these are things not altogether so out of credit in the world, but that men would rather accomplish their purposes by fair and unexceptionable means, if they could tell how ; only the respect and deference they have for them is less, than what they bear to their own interests and ends. But besides the natural, inflexible rectitude of the divine will, we are secured, from his all-sufficiency, that we shall never be fraudulently imposed upon by any of his declara- tions unto the children of men. For there is nothing to be gained by it : and we cannot conceive what inducement he should have, to make use of any so mean and pitiful shifts for the governing of his creatures, whom he sponta- neously raised out of nothing, and hath so perfectly within his power. Unless we should be so most intolerably injuri- ous to him, as to imagine a w-orse thing of him than we would of the worst of men, that he loved falsehood for its own sake ; and that against his so constantly professed de- testation of it, the declared repugnancy of it to his nature, and the even tenour of his word, (every where agreeing with itself herein,) so often describing him by that property, " God that cannot lie," and with the same positiveness, avow- ing his own uprightness, and requiring it, expressing his great love to it, and the high delight he takes to find it in his intelligent creatures. The righteous God loveth right- eousness, and with his countenance doth he behold the up- i-ight.* Nor is his testimony the less to be regarded for that it is laudator}^ and of himself. For we are to consider the prerogative of him that testifies, and that if he were not avToV/ffToj he were not God. Besides that his giving us this or any representation of himself (to whom it were enough to enjoy his own perfections) is a vouchsafement, and done of mere grace and favour to us, that we may by * Psalm xi. 17. OF god's prescience, &c. 17 it be induced to place with satisfaction our unsuspicious trust and confidence in him ; as also, that he says in all this, no other thing of himself, than what our own minds, considering him as God, must acknowledge most worthy of him, and agreeing to him with the most apparent necessity. This part, therefore, of the idea of God hath so firm a foundation, both in the natural complexion of our own minds, and the report which his word makes of him, that on this hand we are hemmed in as by a wall of adamant ; and cannot have the thought of defending his prescience, by entrenching upon his wisdom and truth, without oftering the highest violence both to him and ourselves. Sect. Y. On the other hand, also, as it cannot but seem to us a higher perfection to know all things at once, than gradually to arrive at the knowledge of one thing after another ; and so proceed from the ignorance of some things to the knowledge of them ; and that nothing is more cer- tain, than that all possible perfection must agree to God ; so we find his own word asserting to him that most perfect knowledge which seems to exclude the possibility of in- crease ; or that anything should succeed into his knowledge. For how plainly is it afiirmed of him that he knows all things. And even concerning such future things as about which our present inquiry is conversant, the afiirmation is express and positive : " I am God, and there is none like me, declaring the end from the beginning, and from ancient times the things that are not yet done."* Nor is the afllirma- tion naked and unfortified. For in the same sacred re- cords we have the same thing both affirmed and proved ; inasmuch as we find, in a great part thereof, are contained things foretold by most express prophecy, unto which the events recorded in other parts (and many of them in other unquestioned writings besides) have so punctually corre- sponded, as to leave no place for doubt or cavil. Instances are so plain and well known that they need not be men- tioned. And surely what was so expressly foretold could not but have been foreknown. It seems then an attempt * Isa. xlvi. 9, 10, with chap. xli. 22, 23. B 18 TUE RECOXCILEABLENESS also equally hopeless and unrelieving, as it were adventurous and bold, to offer at the protection /)f his wisdom and sin- cerity, by assaulting his prescience or certain foreknowledge of whatsoever shall come to pass. And that their defence is not to be attempted this way, will further most evidently appear from hence, that it is not impossible to assign parti- cular instances of some or other most confessedly wicked actions ; against which God had directed those ordinary means of counselling and dehorting men, and which yet it is most certain he did foreknow they would do. As, though it was so punctually determined even to a day,* and was (though not so punctually!) foretold unto Abraham, how long, from that time, his seed should be strangers in a land that was not theirs; yet how frequent are the coun- sels and warnings sent to Pharaoh to dismiss them sooner ; yea, how often are Moses and Aaron directed to claim their liberty, and exhort Pharaoh to let them go, and at the same time told he should not hearken to them. J Nor indeed is it more seldom said that the Lord hardened Pharaoh's heart, lest he should. Though it may be a doubt whether those passages be truly translated; for the gentler meaning of the Hebrew idiom being well known, it would seem more agreeable to the text, to have expressed only the intended sense, tlian to have strained a word to the very utmost of its literal import, and manifestly beyond what was intended. After the like manner is the propliet Ezekiel sent to the re- volted Israelites, and directed to speak to them with God's own words, the sum and pui'port whereof was to warn and dehort them from their wicked ways, lest they should die ; when as yet it is plainly told him, " but the house of Israel will not hearken to tliee, for they will not hearken to me."§ Unto which same purpose it is more pertinent than necessary to be added, that our Saviour's own plain assertions that he was the Son of God, the many miracles by which he con- firmed it, and his frequent exhortations to the Jews to believe in him thereupon, had a manifest tendency to make him be known and believed to be so, and consequently to prevent * Exod. xi. 41. f Gen. xv. 3. J Exod. iv. &c. § Ezck. iii. 7. or god's prescience, &,c. 19 that most horrid act of his crucifixion ; for it is said, and the matter speaks itself, that " if they had known, they woidd not have crucified the Lord of glory:"* notwithstanding that it was a thing *' which God's hand and counsel had determined before to be done." f That is, foreseeing wicked hands would be prompted and ready for this tragic enterprise, his sove- reign power and wise counsel concurred with his foreknow- ledge so only, and not with less latitude, to define or deter- mine the bounds and limits of that malignity, than to let it proceed unto this execution ; and to deliver him up (not by any formal resignation or surrender, as we well know, but permitting him) thereunto. Though the same phrase of de- livering him hath, elsewhere, another notion, of assigning or appointing him to be a propitiation for the sins of men, by dying ; which was done by mutual agreement between both the parties, him that was to propitiate and him who was to be propitiated. In which respect our Saviour is also said to have given himself for the same purpose ; | which purpose it was de- termined not to hinder prepared hands to execute in this way. Now if it did appear but in one single instance only, that the blessed God did foreknow and dehort from the same act, it will be plainly consequent, that his warnings and dehorta- tions from wicked actions in the general, can with no pre- tence be alleged as a proof against his universal prescience. For if the argument he dehorted from the doing such an action, therefore he did not foreknow it, would be able to conclude any thing, it must be of suflScient force to conclude universally; which it cannot do, if but a single instance can be given, wherein it is apparent he did both dehort and fore- know. It can only pretend to raise the doubt which we have in hand to discuss, how fitly, and with what wisdom and sincerity, he can be understood to interpose his counsels and monitions in such a case. Sect. YI. Wherefore nothing remains but to consider how these may be reconciled, and made appear to be no way inconsistent with one another. Nor are we to apprehend herein so great a difficulty, as it were to reconcile his irre- * 1 Cor. ii. 8. f Acts iv. 28. t Tit. ii. 14. 20 THE RECONCILEABLENESS sistible predeterniinative concurrence to all actions of the creature, even those that are in themselves most malignantly wicked, with the wisdom and righteousness of his laws against them, and severest punishments of them according to those laws. Which sentiments must, I conceive, to any impartial understanding, leave it no way sufficiently ex])licable, how the influence and concurrence, the holy God hath to the worst of actions, is to be distinguished from that which he afibrds to the best ; wherein such inherently evil actions are less to be imputed to him who forbids them, than to the malicious tempter who prompts to them, or the actor that does them ; or wherein not a great deal more ; and leave it undeniable, that the matter of all his laws, in reference to all such actions that ever have been done in the world, was a simple and most natural impossibility. Nothing being more apparently so, than either not to do an action whereto the agent is determined by an infinite power ; or to separate the malignity thereof from an intrinsically evil action ; and that this natural impossibility of not sinning was the ineluctable fate of his (at first) innocent creatures : who also (as the case is to be conceived of with the angels that kept not their first station) must be understood irreversibly condemned to the suti'ering of eternal punishment, for the doing of what it was (upon these terms) so absolutely impossible to them to avoid. Sect. VII. This too hard province the present design pretends not to intermeddle in, as being neither apprehended manageable, for those briefly mentioned considerations, and many mo-re that are wont to be insisted on in this argument: nor indeed at all necessary. For though many considera- tions have been, with great subtlety, alleged and urged to this purpose, by former and some modern writers, (which it is beside the design of these papers severally to discuss,) these two whicli seem the most importunate and enforcing, will, I conceive, be found of little force; and then the less strength which is in others will be nothing formidable: viz. (1.) that it necessarily belongs to the original and fountain Being, to be the first cause of whatsoever being ; and consequently that what there is of positive being in any the most wicked action, must principally owe itself to the determinative pro- OF god's prescience, &c. 21 ductive influence of tliis first and sovereign cause; otherwise it would seem there were some being that were neither primum nor a primo. And again, (which we are more con- cerned to consider, because it more concerns our present subject,) (2.) that it were otherwise impossible God should foreknow the sinful actions of men, (many whereof, as hath been observed, he hath foretold,) if their futurition were a mere contingency, and depended on the uncertain will of the subordinate agent, not determined by the supreme. But neither of these seem able to infer the dismal con- clusion of Grod's concurring by a determinative influence unto wicked actions. Not the former ; for it may Avell be thought sufliciently to salve the rights and privileges of the first cause, to assert that no action can be done but by a power derived from it ; which in reference to for- bidden actions, intelligent creatures may use or not use as they please, without over- asserting, that they must be irre- sistibly determined also, even to the worst of actions done by them. Besides that it seems infinitely to detract from the perfection of the ever-blessed God, to aflfirm he was not able to make a creature, of such a nature, as, being continu- ally sustained by him, and supplied with power every mo- ment suitable to its nature, should be capable of acting unless whatsoever he thus enables, he determine (that is, for it can mean no less thing, impel) it to do also. And except it were aflirmed impossible to God to have made such a creature, (that is, that it implied a contradiction, which certainly can never be proved,) there is no imaginable pretence why it should not be admitted he hath done it ; rather than so fatally expose the wisdom, goodness, and righteousness of God, by supposing him to have made laws for his reasonable creatures, impossible, through his own irresistible counter- action, to be observed ; and afterwards to express himself displeased, and adjudge his creatures to eternal punishments, for not observing them. I am not altogether ignorant what attempts have been made to prove it impossible, nor again, what hath been done to manifest the vanity of those attempts. But I must con- fess a greater disposition to wonder, that ever such a thing should be disputed, than dispute so plain a case ; and tliat 22 THE RECONCILEABLENESS a matter whereupon all moral government depends, both human and divine, should not have been determined at the first sia^lit. It is not hard for a good wit to have somewhat to say for any thing; but to dispute against the common sense of mankind, we know beforehand, is but to trifle : as the essay to prove the impossibility of local motion. The notion of the goodness and righteousness of God, methinks, should stick so close to our minds, and create such a sense in our souls, as should be infinitely dearer to us than all our senses and powers ; and that we should rather choose to have our sight, hearing, and motive-power, or what not be- sides disputed, or even torn away from us, than ever sufter ourselves to be disputed into a belief that the holy and good God should irresistibly determine the wills of men to, and punish, the same thing. Nor is it dilficult to urge more puzzling sophisms against the former, than for this latter. But the efforts of a sophistical wit against sense, and more against the sense of our souls, and most of all against the entire sum and substance of all morality and religion, at once, are but like the attempt to batter a wall of brass with straws and feathers. Nor is the assault, on this part, more feeble and impotent, than the defence is wont to be of the other. For I would appeal to the quick refined sense of any sober and pious mind, after serious, inward consultation with itself; being closely urged with the horror of so black a con- ception of God, that he should be supposed irresistibly to determine the will of a man to the hatred of his own most blessed self, and then to exact severest punishments for the oflence done; what relief it would now be to it, to be only taught to reply, that man is under the law, and God above it — a defence that doubles the force of the assault. What ! that God should make a law, and necessitate the violation of it! and yet also punish that violation ! And this be thought a suilicicnt salvo, that himself is not subject to any law ! Will a (|uick-scented, tender s|)irit, wounded by so unsufi'er- able indignity offered to the holy God, be any whit eased or relieved, by the thin so])histry of only a collusive ambiguity in the word law ? which sometimes signifies the declared pleasure of a ruler to a subject ; in which sense any eye can see God can be under no law, having no superior ; but not OF god's prescience, &c. 23 seldom, also, an habitual fixed principle and rule of acting after one steady tenor : in which sense how manifest is it, that the perfect rectitude of God's own holy gracious nature is an eternal law to him, infinitely more stable and immuta- ble than the ordinances of day and night ! Or what relief is there in that dream of the supposed possibility of God's making a reasonable creature with an innocent aversion to himself ? For what can be supposed more repugnant, or what more impertinent ? If innocent, how were it punishable ? A law already made in the case, how can it be innocent ? But whatsoever strength there may be in arguments and replies, to and fro, in this matter ; that which hath too ap- parently had greatest actual efficacy, with many, hath been the authority and name of this or that man of reputation, and the force of that art of imputing a doctrine, already under a prejudicial doom, to some or other ill-reputed former writer. I profess not to be skilled in the use of that sort of weapons. And what reputation ought to be of so great value with us, as that of God and religion ? Though if one would take that invidious course, it were easy to evince, that such a predeterminate influx to the production of all whatso- ever actions, is the dearly espoused notion of one, of as de- servedly an ill character, as ever had the name of a Christian writer:* and whether he would not take that name for a dishonour to him, I pretend not to know. But let us take this sober account of the present case, that in this temporary state of trial, the efficacious grace of God is necessary to actions sincerely good and holy ; which therefore all ought \uidespairingly to seek and pray for ; but that in reference to other actions, he doth only supply men with such a power, as whereby they are enabled, either to act, or, in many in- stances, (and especially when they attempt any thing that is evil,) to suspend their own action. And surely it carries so unexceptionable a face and aspect with it, that no man that is himself sober, will think the worst name, of whosoever shall have said the same thing, were a prejudice to it ; or should more oblige him to reject it, than we would think ourselves obliged to throw away gold, or diamonds, because * Hobbes. 24 THE RECONCILEABLENESS an impure hand hath touched them ; or to deny Christ, be- cause the devils confessed him. Though also, if any should impute the so stating of this matter to any author, that hath been wont to go under an ill name and character, in the Christian church ; there were a great oversight committed ; to say no harder thing of it. For the writers whose names would be supposed a prejudice, have neither said the same thing, nor with the same design. They would have this in- determination of the power afforded to the creature, to be so universal as to extend equally to evil actions and to good ; and have asserted it with a manifest design to exclude effica- cious grace, in reference to the best actions. Whereas this account would make it not of so large extent : (as it were very unreasonable any should:) for though it may well be supposed extendible to many actions, besides those that are intrinsically evil, or to any that are not spiritually good, yet nothing enforces (nor can it be admitted) that it should actually and always extend so far. For Avho can doubt but God can overrule the inclinations and actions of his creature, when he pleases; and, as shall best consist with his wisdom, and the purity of his nature, either lay on or take oft' his de- termining hand. Nor is it here asserted with any other de- sign, than to exempt the blessed God, as far as is possible, from a participation in the evil actions of his creatures ; in the meantime entitling him most entirely to those that are sincerely good: though it must be left imputable to men themselves (it being through their own great default) if they have not the grace which might eft'ectually enable them to do such also. And as for the latter : this supposed inde- termination of the human will, in reference, especially, to wicked actions, is far from being capable of inferring, that God cannot therefore foreknow them ; or any thing more, than that we are left ignorant of the way, how" he foreknows them. And how small is the inconvenience of acknowledg- ing that, yea, and how manifest the absurdity of not acknow- ledging the like, in many cases! since nothing is more cer- tain, than that God doth many things besides, whereof the manner how he does them, wo can neither explicate nor un- derstand! For neither is it difficult to assign instances more than enough of actions done by ourselves of the manner OF god's prescience, «&;c. 25 whereof we can give no distinct account, as those of vision, intellection, with sundry others. Some have been at great pains, we well know, to explain the manner of God's foreknowledge of these futurities, otherwise than by laying the foundation thereof in his supposed effica- cious will or decree of them. They that can satisfy themselves with what Thomas [Aquinas] and Scotus have attempted, and the followers of them both — that can understand what it is, with the one, for all things to be eternally present to the Divine intellect in esse reali, and not understand by it, the world to have been eternal ; or, what with the other, that they be all present only in esse representativo, and not understand by it, barely that they are all known, and no more, (which seems like the explication of the word invasion by invasion,) let them enjoy their own satisfaction. For my own part, I can more easily be satisfied to be ignorant of the modus or medium of his knowledge, while I am sure of the thing; and I know not why any sober-minded man might not be so too; while we must all be content to be ignorant of the manner, yea, and nature too, of a thousand things be- sides, when that such things there are, we have no doubt ; and when there are few things, about which we can, with less disadvantage, suffer our being ignorant, or with less dis- reputation profess to be so. It cannot therefore be so af- frightful a thing, to suppose God's foreknowledge of the most contingent future actions, well to consist with our ignorance how he foreknows them, as that we should think it necessary to overturn and mingle heaven and earth, rather than admit it. Sect. YIII. Wlierefore waving that unfeasible, unneces- sary, and unenjoined task, of defending God's predetermina- tive concourse unto sinful actions ; our encounter must only be of the more superable difficulty, to reconcile his prescience of them with his provisions against them, i. e. how fitly the wise and holy God can have interposed his precautions and dissuasions, in their own nature, aptly tending to withhold and divert men from those evil actions, which he yet foresees they will do. And it is, in the first place, evident, there can be no pretence to allege that there is any such repugnancy I'b THE RECONCILEABLENESS in the matter, as shall amount to a contradiction, so much as virtual, or which the things signified, on the one part and the other, can. be understood any way to import. That indeed there should be a direct and explicit contradiction between foreknowing and dehorting, we may, at first sight, perceive the terms cannot admit ; for there is nothing enunciated (affirmed or denied) in either. But let the sense of both be resolved into propositions, capable of being confronted to one another, and all that can be made of the former mUI only come to this, " You will do such a thing," and of the latter, no more but this, "You ought not to do it:" these are at as great distance, as can be imagined, from grating upon, or jarring with, one another. And wherein is the in- decorum of it, that both these effata should proceed from the same mouth, viz., of a governor, or one that hath authority over others. We will, for discourse sake, suppose a prince endowed •with the gift or spirit of prophecy. This most will acknow- ledge a groat perfection, added to whatsoever other his ac- complishments. And suppose we this his prophetic abihty so large, as to extend to most events that shall fall out within his dominions. Is it hereby become unfit for him to govern his. subjects by laws, or any way admonish them of their duty? Hath this perfection so much diminished him as to depose him from his government? It is not, indeed, to be dissembled, that it were a difficulty to determine, whether such foresight were, for himself, better or worse. Bound- less knowledge seems only in a fit conjunction with as un- bounded power. But it is altogether unimaginable that it should destroy his relation to his subjects: as wdiat of it were left, if it should despoil him of his legislative power, and capacity of governing according to laws made by it? And to bring back the matter to the supreme Ruler: let it for the present be supposed only, that the blessed God hath, belonging to his nature, the universal prescience Avhereof we are discoursing ; we will, surely, upon that supposition, ac- knowledge it to belong to him as a perfection. And were it reasonable to affirm that by a perfection he is disabled for government; or were it a good consequence, ' He foreknows all things, he is therefore unfit to govern the world?' OF god's prescience, &.C. 27 Sect. IX. And, that vre may consider tlie matter more narrowly, would the supposition of such foreknowledge in God, make that cease to be man's duty which had otherwise been so, and take away the diflerences of good and evil ? Would it nullify the obligation of God's law, and make man's own inclination his only rule? or, if it be said, because it is foreknown man will do such a thing, therefore he may, where is the connexion? For what influence can foreknovv- ledge have, to alter or affect any way, either the nature of the thing foreknown, or the temper of the person that shall do it ; any more than the present knowledge of the same thing, now in doing? which knowledge none would deny to God; and which, when it occurs to a man, is no more under- stood to make an evil action innocent, than the action makes the eye guilty, of him that beholds it only and detests it at once. Surely what is, in its own nature, whether good or evil, can never not be so, be it foreknown or not foreknown. But if what was otherwise man's duty, be still his duty, what can make it unfit that it be declared, and made known to him to be so? and how is that otherwise to be done, than by these disputed means ? yea (for this is the case) what can make it less fit, than it would be that God should cease to rule over the world ; and quit the right of his government to his revolted creatures, upon no other reason than only that he foresees they have a mind to invade it ? It may now perhaps be said, all this reasoning tends indeed to establish the contrary assertion, that notwithstanding God do fore- know man's sin, it is however necessary he forewarn him of it — but it answers not the objected difficulty, viz., how rea- sonably any such means are used for an unattainable end ; as it is manifest, the end, man's obedience, cannot be attained when it is foreknown he will not obey. Sect. X. It may here, before we proceed further, not be unseasonable to consider, (a matter, as is known, wont to be much vexed in the schools,) how God may be said to act for any end at all. And it appears very certain, that he who is so every way absolutely perfect and happy, cannot be thought to intend and pursue an end, after the same manner as we are wont to do. We beins: conscious to ourselves of indi- 28 THE RECOXCILEABLENESS gency, or, at the best, of obligation to the author of our beings, are wont to design tliis or that end for the reheving of ourselves, or the approving ourselves to him. And, our satisfaction depending upon the attainment of it, we solicit- ously deliberate about the fittest means to attain it ; and are tossed with various passions of desire, and hope, and fear, and joy, and grief, according as the end is apprehended more or less excellent, or likely to be attained ; varying often our course upon new emergencies, as this or that may probably promote or hinder the success of our pursuit. In short, we pursue ends, as being both impatient of disappointment, and uncertain of their attainment. The blessed God, being indigent of nothing, nor under obligation to any one, cannot be supposed to j^ropound an end to himself as that whereupon his satisfaction depends, which were inconsistent with his already complete felicity, and would argue him but potentially happy ; but acting always from an immense self-sufficient fulness of life, and of all perfections, doth ever satisfy himself in himself, and take highest complacency in the perfect goodness, congruity, and rectitude of his own most holy will and way. And again, as he doth not seek a yet unattained satisfaction, in any end he can be supjwsed to propound to himself; so nor can he be thought to deliberate, as we are wont to do, concerning the means of effecting any. For deliberation would imply doubtfulness and uncertainty, which his absolute perfection cannot admit, nor doth need ; the whole frame and compass of things intended by#iim, in their distinct references and tendencies, being, at once, present to his all-comprehending view ; so that there can be no place for any intermediate knowledge with him, or for any new resolves thereupon. " Known to the Lord are all his works from the beginning of the world."* Sect. XI. This being premised; it is now further to be considered, that howsoever one end oftentimes is not attained, unto which the publicly extant declarations of the divine will have a visible aptitude, viz. the obedient compliance of men ♦ Acts xv. 18. OF god's prescience, &c. 29 with them ; another more noble end was, however, attahi- able, not unbecoming the designment of the divine wisdom, and which it was every way most worthy of God to be more principally intent upon. It is fit the mention of this be pre- faced with an obvious remark; — that the misapprehension of the state of things between God and man doth, in great part, owe itself to our aptness to compare unduly the divine government with that of secular rulers ; and our expectation to find them in all things agreeing with each other. Whereas there cannot but be a vast difference between the constitu- tion and end of God's government over his creatures, and more especially mankind, and that of man over his fellow- creatures of the same kind. The government of secular human rulers can never be, in the constitution of it, altogether absolute, nor ought, in the design of it, primarily to intend the personal advantage of the ruler himself, who as much depends upon his subjects, and hath (at least) as great need of them, as they can be understood to have of him. But as to the blessed God the matter is apparent, and hath its own triumphant evidence, that since he is the original and root of all being, that all things are mere dependencies upon his absolute pleasure, and entirely of him, and by him, all ought to be to him, that he alone might have the glory.* Wherefore, it must be asserted, and cannot fail of obtain- ing to be acknowledged, by every impartial and sober con- siderer of things, that there is a much more noble and im- portant end, that all God's public edicts and declarations to men, (the instruments of his government over them,) do more principally aim at, than their advantage, viz. the dignity and decorum of his government itself; and that he may be found in every thing to have done as became him, and was most worthy of himself. And what could be more so, than that he should testify the aversion of his own pure and holy nature, to whatsoever was unholy and impure, his love of righteousness and complacency to be imitated herein, toge- ther with his steady, gracious propension to receive all them into the communion of his own felicity or blessedness (for the Redeemer's sake) who should herein comply with him ? * Rom. ii. 30 THE RECONCILEABLENESS Nor are we to understand that he herein so designs the reputation of his government, as men are often wont to do things out of design for their interest in that kind, that are, otherwise, against their overruled inclination. But we are to account these his declarations (although they are acts of an intelligent agent, and the products of wisdom and coun- sel, yet also) the spontaneous emanations of his own holy and gracious nature, such as wherein he most fully agrees, and consents with himself. And is it now to be expected, that because he foresees men will be wicked, and do what shall be unworthy of them, he must therefore lay aside his nature, and omit to do what shall be worthy of himself ? Sect. XII. And hereupon it may be expected, the more ingenuous and candid will allow themselves to think the matter tolerably clear, in reference to the former part of the proposed difficulty ; i. e. will apprehend this way of dealing with men not imprudent, or inconsistent with the divine wisdom, since, though one end, in a great part, fail, yet an- other, more valuable, is attained. But yet, as to the latter part, the difficulty may still urge, viz. how it can stand with sincerity ; whereas that end also which fails, seems to have been most directly intended, that the blessed God should seem so earnestly intent upon it : since it is hardly conceiv- able, that the same thing should be, at once, seriously in- tended as an end, and yet, at the same time, give the eye, which seems to design it, no other prospect than of a tiling never to be brought to pass. Wherefore we are next to consider, that we may proceed gradually, and not omit to say what is in itself considerable ; though it is not all (which cannot be said at once) that is to be said; — that tlie public declarations of the divine will, touching man's duty, do attain that very end, his obedient compliance therewith, in great part, and as to many (although it be foreknown tliey will prove inetieetual with the most) are the no less successful, tlian the apt means of attaining it. Nor, certainly, if it were foreknown the world would be so divided, as that some woidd obey, and others not obey, was it therefore the fittest course, that these two sorts should, by some extraordinary act of providence, be carefully severed OF god's prescience, &c. 31 from each other ; and those be dealt withal apart from the rest. But rather, that the divine edicts should be of a uni- versal tenor, and be directed to all as they are ; the matter of them being of universal concernment, and equally suitable to the common case of all men. Sect. XIII. Neither yet was it necessary, that effectual care should be taken, they should actually reach all, and be applied to every individual person. Since it is apparently to be resolved into the wickedness of the world that they do not so, and that there is not a universal diffusion of the gos- pel into every part. For it being evident to any one's reflection, that men are in a state of apostacy and defection from their Maker and common Lord, and therefore subject to his displeasure ; whereas the merciful God hath done his own part, and so much beyond what was to be expected from him ; issued out his proclamations of peace and pardon, upon so easy and indulgent terms, as are expressed in his gospel ; if, hereupon, men also did their part, behaved themselves suitably to the exigency of their case, and as did become reasonable creatures, fallen inider the displeasure of their Maker, (whereof their common condition affords so innu- merable, so pregnant proofs,) the gospel, wheresoever it should arrive, would have been entertained with so great a transport of joy, and so ready and universal acceptance, as very soon to have made a great noise in the world ; and being found to be of a universal tenor and concernment, and that what it says to one nation, it equally says the same to every one ; it could not but be, that messengers would interchangeably have run from nation to nation ; some to communicate, others to inquire after, those strange tidings of great joy unto all people, lately sent from heaven, concern- ing the Emmanuel, God with us — God, again upon his re- turn to man, and now in Christ reconciling the world to himself And thus how easily, and even naturally, would the gospel soon have spread itself through the world ! espe- cially the merciful God having so provided, that there should be an office constituted, and set up ; a sort of men, whose Avhole business it should be, to propagate and publish those happy tidings. But that men shoidd so indulge their sensual. 32 THE RECONCILEABLENESS terrene, inclination, as not at all to use their understandings and considering power, about other matters than only what are within the sight of their eye, when by so easy and quick a turn of thoughts they miglit feel and find out who made them, and was the original of their life and being, and that things are not right and as they should be, between him and them ; and so by what is within the compass of natural revela- tion, bo prepared for what is supernatural : — and not that only, but that to that stupidity, by wliich they are unapt to inquire after and receive, they should add that obstinate malignity by which they are apt to reject and oppose the merciful discoveries and overtures of their offended, reconcileable Creator andLord, — how manifestly doth this devolve the whole business of the little, slow ])rogress of the gospel in the world, upon themselves only ! As suppose we a prince of the greatest clemency, benig- nity, and goodness, from whom a whole country of his subjects have made a most causeless defection ; hereupon to send the whole body of the rebels a gracious proclamation of free par- don upon tlieir return to their allegiance and duty ; and it only from hence comes to pass, that every individual person of them distinctly understands not wliat the message from their prince did import; because, they that heard it would not, many of them, allow themselves to consider and regard it ; and others of tliem, with despiteful violence, fell upon the heralds, barbarously butchering some of them, and igno- miniously repulsing the rest : who would not say, that prince had fully done liis part, and acquitted himself answerably to the best character, though he should send to the rebels no further overtures ? Much more, if through a long tract of time, he continue the same amicable endeavours for their re- ducement, notwithstanding the constant experience of some ill success ; who would not cast the whole business of the continued ill understanding, between him and the revolters, upon themselves ? and reckon it imjiossible any should be ignorant of his kind and benign inclinations and intentions, if an implacable enmity, and disall'ection to him and his gov- ernment, were not their common temper ? Though so infinitely do the mercies of God exceed those of the most merciful prince on earth, as well as his knowledge and power ; that wheresoever there are any exempt cases, we OF god's prescience, &c. 33 must conceive him equally able and inclined to consider them distinctly. And so vastly different may we well sup- pose the degrees of happiness and misery to be, in the other world ; as that there may be latitude enough, of punishing and rewarding men, proportionably to the degrees of light they have had, and the more or less malignity, or propension to reconciliation, was found with them thereupon. Sect. XIV. Nor again was it at all incongruous, or unbo- coming, that the blessed God, this being the common tem|:)er and disposition of all men, to reject his gracious tenders, should provide, by some extraordinary means, that they might not be finally rejected by all. For what can be moi-e appropriate to sovereignty (even where it is infinitely less absolute) than arbitrarily to design the objects of special favour ? Who blames a prince, for placing special marks of his royal bounty, or clemency, here and there as he thinks fit ? or that he hath some peculiar favourites, with whom he familiarly converses, whom he hath won, by some or other not common inducements, and assured their loyal aftection ; though there be thousands of persons in his dominions be- sides, of as good parts, dispositions, and deserts as they 't It belongs to sovereignty, only so to be favourable to some, as, in the mean time, to be just towards all. Yea, and it must be acknowledged, such are the dispensations of the holy God towards the whole community of mankind, as import not only strict righteousness, but great clemency and mercy also. Though they might easily understand themselves to be oft'en- ders, and liable to the severities of his justice, they are spared by his patience, sustained by his bounty, protected by his power ; their lives and properties are fenced by his own laws. And whereas they are become very dangerous enemies to one another ; and each one his own greatest enemy ; it is provided by those laws, even for the worst of men, that none shall injure them, that all love them and seek their good. He interposes his authority on their behalf ; and if any wrong them, he takes it for an afiVont done to himself. By the same laws they are directed to industry, frugality, sobriety, temperance, to exercise a government over themselves, to bridle and subdue their own exorbitant lusts and passions ; c 34 THE RECONCILEABLENESS their more immediate tormentors, and the sources of all the calamities and miseries which befall them in this world. By all which evidences of his great care, and concern for their welfare, they might understand him to have favourable pro- pensions towards them, and that though they have offended him, he is not their implacable enemy ; and might, by his goodness, be led to repentance. Yea, and moreover, he hath sent them a Redeemer, his own Son, an incarnate Deity, Avho came down into this world, full of grace and truth, upon the most merciful errand. And they have some of them been in transports, when they have but fancied such a descent, for the doing them only some lighter good turn ; as upon the cure of the cripple, " Tlie gods," said they, " are come down in the likeness of men!"* He being filled with the glorious fulness of the Godhead, hath been a voluntary sacrifice for the sins of men ; and if they would believe and obey him, they would find that sacrifice is accepted, and available for them. And thougli they are disabled to do so only by tlieir own wicked inclina- tion, even against that also they hsxxo no cause to despair of being relieved, if tliey would (which they might) admit the tliouglits of their impotency, and the exigency of their case, and did seriously implore Divine help. Sect. XV. Now with whom these methods succeed well, there is no suspicion of insincerity. Let us see what pre- tence there can be for it, with the rest. It is to be consid- ered, timt, as to tl)em lie doth not apply himself to every, or to any, person immediately, and severally, after some such tenor of speech as this, " I know thee to be a profligate hope- less wretch, and thou wilt fhially disregard whatsoever 1 say to thee, and consequently perish and become miserable ; but however (though 1 foresee most certainly thou wilt not, yet) I entreat thee to hear, and obe}', and live." Indeed, sending a propliet to a ])romiscuous people, he foretells liim of such ill success.! But it is not told him he should suc- ceed so ill universally, and it is implied, he should not.| But the course the great God takes, is only to apj»ly him- * Acts xiv. n. t Ezek. iii. 7. t '^'^^'- '^1- OF god's presciexce, &c. 35 self to these (as hath been said) in common with the rest. For if it be said he also applies himself to them by the pri- vate dictates of his Spirit ; he doth not, by it, make formed speeches to men. But as to those its common motions, whereby it applies itself unto them, doth only solicit, in a stated manner of operation, in and by their own reason and consciences, (as he concurs wdth our inferior faculties, and with the inferior creatures suitable to their natures and ca- ]>aeities :) speaking no other than their own language, as they are instructed out of his word, or by other means ; Avhich he usually continues to do, till by their resistancies, they have sealed up their own consciences, and consequently (according to its more ordinary fixed course, and laws of access and re- cess) shut out the Holy Spirit both at once. Nor is it more to be expected he should universally alter that course, than that he should alter the courses of the sun, moon, and stars, and innovate upon universal nature. So that what is en- deavoured for the reducement of such as finally refuse to re- turn, by particular applications to this or that person, and beyond what is contained in the public declarations of his written word, is substituted by ministers and inferior agents, that know no more of the event than they do themselves. And that this was the fittest way of dealing with reasonable creatures, who, that will use his own reason, sees not ? Sect. XVI. That our disquisition may be here a little more strict, we shall inquire both, — What may be supposed possible to be alleged out of God's word, in reference to them that persist in wickedness till they finally perish, which it can be thought not consistent with sincerity, to have inserted upon the supposed foresight of so dismal an issue ; and — What more convenient course we can think of, which sincerity, (as we apprehend) would have required. As to the former. It may, perhaps, be alleged, that he professes to will the salvation of all men* — not to desire the death of him that diethf — yea, and professes himself grieved that any perish. | Now these things, compared with his public declarations and tenders, directed, in a universal tenoi-, * 1 Tim. ii. 4. f Ezek. xviii. 32. | Ps. Ixxxi. 12, 13. 36 THE RECONCILEABLENESS to all men, carry that appearance and show with them, as if he would have it believed, his end were to save all. Where- with his foresight of the perdition of so many seems ill to agree. For how can that end be seriously intended which it is foreseen will not be brought about ? And how can it be thought to consist with sincerity, that there should be an ap- pearance of his having such an end, unto which a serious real intention of it doth not correspond ? Wherefore we shall here examine, what appearance such expressions as those above recited, can, by just interpretation, be understood to amount unto ; and then show, tliat there is really with the blessed God what doth truly and fully correspond to that appearance ; and very agreeably too, with the hypothe- sis of his foreseeing how things will finally issue, with very many. And first, that we may understand the true import of the expressions which we have mentioned, and others of like sound and meaning, we are to consider, that though being taken severally and apart, they are not capable of a sense pre- judicial to the cause, the defence whereof we have luider- taken ; which we shall afterwards more distinctly evince ; yet, it were very injurious, to go about to afiix a sense unto a single expression, witliout weighing the general design of the writings, whereof it is a part. It were quite to frustrate the use of words, when a matter is to be represented, that is copious, and consists of many parts and branches, which cannot be comprehended in one or a few sentences ; if we will pretend to estimate and make a judgment of the speaker's full meaning, by this or that single ])assagc only, because we have not jutience or leisure to hear the rest ; or perhaps have a greater disposition to cavil at his words, than luiderstand his meaning. If a course resembling this should be taken, in interpreting the edicts or laws of jn-inccs and states, (suppose it wore a proclamation of pardon to delinquent subjects,) and only this or that favourable clause be fastened upon, without regard to the inserted provisos and conditions ; the (con- cerned) interpreters might do a slight, temporary, and easily remediable wrong to the prince, but are in danger more fatally to wrong themselves. Tiie edicts of the groat God, that are publicly extant to OF god's prescience, &;c. 37 mankind, (the universal publication whereof they partly vvitli- stand, and whicli they too commonly deprave, and perversely misinterpret, where they do obtain,) carry no such appear- ance with them, as if he had ever proposed it to himself, for his end, to save all men or any man, let them do what they please, or how destructive a course soever they take and shall finally persist in. If that were supposed his design, his so seemingly serious counsels and exhortations were as ludi- crous as they could be tliouglit, if it were as peremptorily de- termined all should perish. For what God will, by almighty power, immediately work, without the subordinate concur- rence of any second cause, must be necessarily ; and it is equally vain, solicitously to endeavour the engaging of sub- ordinate agents, to do that which without them is absolutely necessary, as it were to endeavour that, by them, which is absolutely impossible. Sect. XVII. That whicli his declarations to men do amount unto, is, in sum, thus much, — that, whereas they have, by their defection and revolt from him, made themselves liable to his justice, and very great consequent miseries ; he is will- ing to pardon, save, and restore them to a blessed state, upon such terms as shall be agreeable (the recompence due to his injured law being otherwise provided for, at no expense of theirs) to the nature of that blessedness they are to enjoy, the purity of his own nature, and the order and dignity of his government. That is, that they seriously re|)ent and turn to him, love him as the Lord their God, with all their heart and soul, and might and mind ; and one another as them- selves ; (being to make together one happy community, in the participation of the same blessedness ;) commit themselves by entire trust, subjection, and devotedness to their great and merciful Hedeemor, according to the measure of light wherewith he shall have been revealed and made known to them ; submit to the motions and dictates of his blessed Spirit, whereby the impression of his own holy image is to be renewed in them, and a divine nature imparted to them ; and carefully attend to his word as the means, the impressive instrument or seal, by which, understood and considered, that impression shall be made, and the very seeds out of which 38 THE RECONCILEABLENESS that holy nature, and the entire frame of the new creature, shall result and spring up in them ; so as to make them apt unto the obedience that is expected from them, and capable of the blessedness they are to expect ; tliat if they neglect to attend to these external discoveries, and refuse the ordinary aids and assistances of his good Spirit, and offer violence to their own consciences, they are not to expect he should over- power them, by a strong hand, and save them against the continuing disinclination of their own Avills. Nor (whatso- ever extraordinary acts he may do upon some, to make them willing) is there any universal promise in his word, or other encouragement upon which any may reasonably promise them- selves tliat, in the neglect and disuse of all ordinary means, such power shall be used with them, as shall finally overcome their averse, disaffected hearts. Sect. XVIII. It is true, that he frequently uses much im- portunity with men, and enforces his laws with that earnest- ness, as if it Avere his own great interest to have them obeyed; wherein, having to do with men, he doth like a man solicit- ously intent upon an end which he cannot be satisfied till he attain. Yet withal, he hath interspersed, every where, in his word, so frequent. Godlike expressions of liis own greatness, all-sufficiency, and independency upon liis creatures, as that if we attend to these his public declarations, and manifests of hin)self, entirely, so as to compare one thing with an- other, we shall find tlie matter not at all dissembled ; but might collect this to be the state of things between him and us, that ho makes no overtures to us as thinking us con- siderable, or as if any thing were to accrue to him from us ; but that, as he takes pleasure in the diffusion of his own goodness, so it is our interest to behave ourselves suitably thereunto, and, according as we comply witli it, and continue in it or do not, so we may expect the de- lectable communications of it, or taste, otherwise, liis just severity. That, thereiure, when lie exliorts, obtests, entreats, beseeches that we would obey and live ; speaks as if lie were grieved at our disobedience, and what is like to ensue us therefrom ; these are merciful condescensions, and the efforts of that goodness, which chooseth the fittest ways of moving OF god's PRESCIEXCE, &.C. 39 us, rather than that he is moved himself, by any such passions as we are wont to feel in ourselves, when we are pursuing our own designs ; and that he vouehsafeth to speak in such a way as is less suitable to himself, that it may be more suitable to us, and might teach us, while he so far com- plies with us, how becoming it is that we answerably bend ourselves to a compliance with him. He speaks, sometimes, as if he did suffer somewhat human, as an apt means (and which to many proves effectual) to bring us to enjoy, at length, what is truly divine. We may, if we consider, and lay things together, understand these to be gracious insinuations ; wherel^y, as he hath not left the matter liable to be so misunderstood, as if he w-ere really affected with solicitvide, or any perturbation concerning us, (which he hath sufficiently given us to understand his blessed nature cannot admit of,) so nor can they be thought to be disguises of him- self, or misrepresentations, that have nothing in him corre- sponding to them- For they really signify the obedience and blessedness of those his creatures that are capable thereof, to be more pleasing and agreeable to his nature and will, than that they should disobey and perish; (which is the utmost that can be understood meant by those words, " God will have all men to be saved and come to the knowledge of the truth ; ") but withal, that he so apprehends the indignity done to his government, by their disobedience, that if they obey not (as tlie indulgent constitution and temper of his law and government now are, in and by the Redeemer) they must perish ; and that he hath also such respect to the congruity and order of things, as that it shall not be the ordinary method of his government over reasonable creatures, to over- power them into that obedience, by which it may come to pass that they perish not. All which may be collected from those his own plain words, in that other recited text, and many besides of like import, when, with so^wful solemnity, he professes, that as he lives he takes no pleasure in the death of sinners, but that they may tiirn and live ; and adds, " Turn ye, turn ye; why will you die?"* That is, that their repentance, and consequent welfare, would be more grateful * Ezek. xxxiii. 11. 40 THE RECOXCILEABLENESS to him than their perdition, upon their persevering in destruc- tive ways; but yet, that if they were not moved to repent, by these his pleadings and expostulations used with them, they should die, and were therefore concerned to attend and liearken to such his reasonings and warnings, as tlie apt means to work their good ; not expecting he should take extraordinary courses with them, in order to it: and that the real respect he had thereunto, should never induce him to use any indeco- rous course to bring it about ; but that he had a more principal respect to the rules of justice, and the order of his govern- ment, than to their concernments : and that he, notwithstand- ing, expresses himself aggrieved that any finally ])erish. If we consider and recollect, what notices lie hath furnished our minds with, of the perfections of a Deity, and Avhat he hath remonstrated to us of his own nature, so plainly in his word ; we cannot understand more by it, than the calm dispassion- ate resentment and dislike, which most perfect purity and goodness have, of the sinfulness and miserable ruin of his own creatures. In all which, we have a most unexceptionable idea of God, and may behold the comely conjuncture of his large good- ness, strict righteousness, and most accurate wisdom all to- gether: as we are also concerned, in making our estimate of his ways, to consider them; and not to take our measure of what is suitable to God, by considering liim according to one single attribute only, but as they all are united, in his most perfect being; and in that blessed harmony, as not to infer with liim a difficulty what to do, or what not. Which some- times falls out with men, where there is an imperfect resem- blance of those divine excellencies, not so exactly contem- percd together. As it was with that Spartan prince and general in Plutarch, when finding a necessity to march his army, and taking notice of one, for whom he had a peculiar kindness, that thart of it with another. Nor doth any part of it, OF god's prescience, &c. 41 taken alone, import him so to liave willed the happiness of men, for any end of his, that he resolved he would, by what- soever means, certainly effect it ; as we are wont, many times, with such eagerness to pursue ends upon which we are in- tent, as not to consider of right or wrong, fit or unfit, in our pursuit of them, and so let the cost of our means not seldom eat up our end. Nor did that belong to him, or was his part as our most benign, wise, and righteous Governor, to provide that we should certainly not transgress, or not suffer prejudice thereby ; but that we should not do so, through his omission of any thing, which it became him to do to pre- vent it. Sect. XIX. It may therefore be of some use further to take notice, that a very diverse consideration must be had, of the ends which shall be effected by God's own action only, and of those which are to be brought about (in concurrence and subordination to his own) by the intervenient action of his creatures ; especially (which is more to our purpose) such of them as are intelligent, and capable of being governed by laws. As to the former sort of these ends, we may be confident they were all most absolutely intended, and can never fail of being accomplished. For the latter, it cannot be universally said so. For these being not entirely his ends, but partly his, and partly prescribed by him, to his reason- able creatures, to be theirs; we are to conceive he always, most absolutely, intends to do wliat he righteously esteems congruous should be his own part, — which he extends and limits as seems good unto him, — and sometimes, of his own good pleasure, assumes to himself the doing of so much, as shall ascertain the end ; effectually procuring, that his creature shall do his part also. That is, he not only enacts his laws, and adds exhortations, warnings, promises, to enforce it, but also emits that effectual influence, whereby the inferior wheels shall be put into motion, the powers and faculties of his governed creature excited and assisted, and (by a spirit in the wheels) made as the chariots of a Avilling people. At other times, and in other instances, he doth less, and meet- ing with resistance, sooner retires; follows not his external edicts and declarations, with so potent and determinative an 42 THE RECOXCILEABLENESS influence, but that the creature, through his own great de- fault, may omit to do his part, and so that end be not effected. That the course of his economy towards men on earth is, de facto, ordered with this diversity, seems out of question. Manifest experience shows it. Some do sensibly perceive that motive influence, which others do not. The same per- sons, at some times, find not that, which at other times they do. His own word plainly asserts it: " He works in us to will and to do, of his own good pleasure." Where he will, l)e, in this respect, shows mercy ; where he will, he hardeneth, or doth not prevent but that men be hardened. And indeed, we should be constrained to rase out a great part of the sacred volume, if we should not adniit it to be so. And as the equity and fitness of his making such difference (when it appears he doth make it) cannot without profaneness be doubted, so it is evident, from what was before said, they are far removed from the reach and confines of any reason- able doubt; since he forsakes none, but being first forsaken. Nor have men any ])retence to complain of subdolous dealing, or that they are surprisingly disappointed, and lurched of such help as they might have expected; inasmuch as this is so plainly extant in God's open manifests to the world, that he uses a certain arbitrariness, es]>ccially in the more exubei'- ant dispensation of his grace ; and is inserted to that purpose, that tliey may bo cautioned not to neglect lower assistances; and warned, because he works to will and to do of his own pleasure, therefore to work out their own salvation Avith fear and treuibling.* Whereupon, elsewhere, after the most per- suasive alluring invitations : " Turn ye at my reproof: I will pour out my Spirit to you, I will make known my words to you," it is presently subjoined : " Because I called and ye re- fused; I stretched out my hand, and no man regarded; but ye have set at nought all my counsel, and would none of my reproof; I also will laugh at your calamity ; I will mock when your fear cometli." t From all which it is plainly to bo understood, that the general strain and drift of God's external revelation of his * Phil. ii. 12, 13. t I'ro^'- i-24— 20. OP god's prescience, &c. 43 mind to man, in his word, and the aspect of even those passages that can, with most colour, be thought to signify any- thing further, do amount to nothing more than this, that he doth so far really will the salvation of all, as not to omit the doing that which may effect it, if they be not neglectful of themselves ; but not so as to effect it by that extraordinary exertion of power, which he thinks fit to employ upon some others. Nor is it reasonably to be doubted, (such a will being all that can be pretended to be the visible meaning of the pas- sages before noted,) whether there be such a Avill in God or no : and so somewhat really corresponding, (the next thing promised to be discoursed) to the aspect and appearance here- of, which is offered to our view. For what should be the reason of the doubt ? He, wlio best understands his own nature, having said of himself what imports no less ; why should we make a difficulty to believe him ? Nor indeed can any notices we have of the perfections of the divine nature be less liable to doubt, than what we have of his unchangeable veracity ; whence, as it is impossible to him to lie, it must be necessary, that he be really Avilling of what he hath repre- sented himself so to be. I must here profess my dislike of the terms of that common distinction, the voluntas bene- placitl, et signi, in this present case : under which, such as coined, and those that have much used it, have only rather, I doubt not, concealed a good meaning, than expressed by it an ill one. It seems, I confess, by its more obvious aspect, too much to countenance the ignominious slander, which pro- fane and atheistical dispositions would fasten upon God, and the course of his procedure towards men ; and which it is the design of these papers to evince of as much absurdity and folly, as it is guilty of impiety and wickedness ; as though he only intended to seem willing of what he really Avas not ; that there was an appearance to which nothing did suhesse. And then why is the latter called voluntas ? unless the mean- ing be, he did only will the sign ; which is false and impious ; and if it were true, did he not will it with the will of good pleasure ? And then the members of the distinction are con- founded ; or, as if the evil actions of men were more truly the objects of his good pleasure, than their forbearance of 44 THE RECONCILEABLENESS them. And of these faults the appHcation of tlie distuiction of God's secret will, and revealed, unto this case, though it be useful in many, is as guilty. Sect. XX. The truth is, (unto which we must esteem ourselves obliged to adhere, both by our assent and defence,) that Grod doth really and complacentially will (and therefore doth with most unexceptionable sincerity declare himself to will) tliat to be done and enjoyed by many men, Avhich he doth not, universally, will to make them do, or irresistibly pro- cure that they shall enjoy. Which is no harder assertion, than that the impure will of degenerate, sinful man, is oppo- site to the holy Avill of God ; and the malignity of man's will to the benignity of his — no harder than that there is sin and misery in the world, which how can we conceive otherwise, than as a repugnancy to the good and acceptable will of God ? Methinks it should not be difficult to us to acknow- ledge, til at God dotli truly, and with complacency, will wliatso- ever is the holy, righteous matter of his own laws. And if it should be with any a difficulty, I would only make this sup- position, what if all the world were yet in innocency, yield- ing entire universal obedience to all the now extant laws of God, which have not reference to man as now fallen, (as those of repentance, faith in a Mediator, &c.) would it now be a doubt with any, whether God did truly and really will, and were pleased with, the holiness and righteousness which were every where to be found in the world ? Surely we would not, in this case, imagine the creature's will more pure and holy than the divine ; or that he were displeased with men for their being righteous and holy. Now again, sup- pose the world revolted, Avhat then is that holy will of God changed ? will we not say it remains the same holy law still, and stands the same rule of rigltteousness and duty that it was ? Doth the change of his rebel creatures infer any with him ? or do only tlie declarations of his former will remain to be their rule, and keep tliem still obliged, his will itself being become another from what it was ? Surely he might as easily have changed his laws. And if we say his Avill is changed, how should we know it to be so ? If we know it not, surely such a thing should not OF god's prescience, &c. 45 be said or thought. If we knew it, how should those yet ex- tant laws and declarations continue to oblige, against the lawgiver's known will ? And then the easy expedient to nullify the obligation of a law, that were thought too re- strictive, were to disobey it. And men might, by sinning once, license themselves to do the same thing (though then we could not call it sinning) always ; and so the creature's should be the supreme and ruling will ; nor had it been a false suggestion, but a real truth, that man, by becoming a sinner, might make himself a God. Or, if it shall be thought tit to say, that the divine Avill would not, in that supposed case, be said to be changed ; but only, that now the event makes it appear not to have been what we thought it was ; that were to impute both impurity and dissimulation to the holy, blessed God, as his fixed attributes, and what we thought unfit, and should abhor, to imagine might have place with him one moment, to affix to him for perpetuity. Sect. XXI. And whereas it may be thought to follow hence, that hereby we ascribe to God a liableness to frustra- tion and disappointment ; that is without pretence : the resolve of the divine will, in this matter, being not concern- ing the event what man shall do, but concerning his duty what he should, and concerning the connexion between his duty and his happiness ; which we say he doth not onl}^ seem to will, but wills it really and truly. Nor would his prescience of the event, which we all this while assert, let frus- tration be so much as possible to him ; especially, it being at once foreseen, that his will, being crossed in this, would be fulfilled in so important a thing, as the preserving the de- corum of his own government, which had been most a])- parently blemished, beyond what could consist with the perfections of the Deity, if either his will concerning men's duty, or the declarations of that will, had not been substan- tially the same that they are. We are, therefore, in assign- ing the object of this or that act of the divine will, to do it entirely, and to take the whole object together, without dividing it, as if the will of God did wholly terminate upon what indeed is but a part (and especially if that be but a less considerable part) of the thing willed. In the present case, 46 THE RECONCILEABLENESS we are not to conoeive that God only wills either man's tluty or felicity, or that herein his will doth solely and ultimately terminate. But, in the whole, the determination of God's will is, that man shall be duly governed, that is, congruously both to himself and him; that such and such things, most congruous to both, shall be man's duty, by his doing whereof, the dignity and honour of God's own government might be preserved, which was the thing principally to be designed, and in tlie first place; and, as what was secondary thereto, that hereby man's felicity should be provided for. There- fore it being foreseen a violation would be done to the sacred rights of the divine government, by man's disobedience, it is resolved, they shall be repaired and maintained by other means. So that the divine will hath its effect, as to what was its more noble and principal design ; the other part fail- ing only by his default, whose is the loss. And if yet it should be insisted, that in asserting God to will what by his laws he hath made become man's duty, even where it is not done, we shall herein ascribe to him, at least, an ineffectual and an imperfect will, as which doth not bring to pass the thing willed; it is answered, that imperfection were with no pretence imputable to the divine will, merely for its not effecting every thing, whereto it may have a real pro]iension. But it would be more liable to tliat imputation, if it should effect any thing, which it were less fit for him to effect, than not to effect it. The absolute perfection of his will stands in the proportion, which every act of it bears, to the importance of the things about which it is conversant : even as with men, the perfection of any act of will is to be estimated, not by the mere peremptory sturdiness of it, but by its proportion to tlie goodness of the thing willed. Upon which account, a mere velleity (as many love to speak) when the degree of goodness in the object claims no more, hath inieonceivably greater ])erfection in it, than the most obstinate volition. And since the event forbids us to admit that God did ever will the obedience and felicity of all, with such a will as should be cfi'ective thereof; if yet his plain word shall be acknowledged the measure of our belief, in this matter, which so plainly asserts him some way to will the salvation of all men, it is strange if, hereupon, we shall not admit OP god's prescience, &c. 47 rather of a will not-effective of the thing willed, than none at all. The will of God is sufficiently to be vindicated from all imperfection, if we have sufficient reason for all the propen- sions and determinations of it, whether from the value of the things willed, or from his own sovereignty w^ho wills them. In the present case, we need not doubt to affirm, that the obedience and felicity of all men is of that value, as where- unto a propeusion of will, by only simple complacency, is proportionable. Yet, that his not procuring, as to all, (by such courses as he more extraordinarily takes with some,) that they shall, in event, obey and be happy, is upon so much more valuable reasons (as there will be further occasion to show ere long) as that, not to do it, with the higher com- placency of a determinative wall, was more eligible. And since the public declarations of his good will, towards all men, im- port no more than the former, and do plainly import so much ; their correspondency to the matter declared is sufficiently apparent. And so is the congruity of both with his presci- ence of the event. For though, when God urges and incites men, by exhortations, promises, and threats, to the doing of their own part, (which it is most agreeable to his holy, graci- ous nature to do,) he foresee many will not be moved there- by ; but persist in wilful neglect and rebellions till they per- ish ; he, at the same time, sees that they might do otherwise, and that, if they would comply with his methods, things would otherwise issue with them: his prescience no way im- posing upon them a necessity to transgress. For they do it not because lie foreknew it, but he only foreknew it because they would do so. And hence he had, as it was necessary he should have, not only this for the object of his foreknow- ledge, that they would do amiss and perish; but the whole case in its circumstances, that they would do so, not througli his omission, but their own. And there had been no place left for this state of the case, if the public edicts and mani- fests had not gone forth, in this tenor, as they have. So that the consideration of his prescience being taken in, gives us only, in the whole, this state of the case, that he foresaw men would not take that course which he truly declared him- self willing they should (and was graciously ready to assist 48 THE RECONCILEABLENESS them in it) in order to their own well-being. Whence all complaint of insincere dealing is left without pretence. Sect. XXII. Nor (as we also undertook to show) could any course (within our prospect) have been taken, that was fit, in itself, and more agreeable to sincerity. There are only these two ways to be thought on besides; either, that God should wholly have forborne to make overtures to men in common ; or, that he should efficaciously have overpowered all into a compliance with them. And there is little doubt, but upon sober consideration, both of these will be judged altogether unfit. The former, inasmuch as it had been most disagreeable — to the exact measures of liis government, to let a race of sinful creatures persist, through many successive ages, in apostacy and rebellion, when the characters of that law, first written in man's heart, were in so great a measure outworn, and become illegible, without renewing the impres- sion in another way, and re-asserting his right and authority, as their ruler and Lord: — to the holiness of his nature, not to send into the world such a declaration of his will, as might be a standing testimony against the impurity wliereinto it was lapsed ; — to the goodness of it, not to make known upon what terms, and for whose sake, he v\-as rceoncileable ; and — to the truth of the thing, since he really had such kind propen- sions towards men in common, not make them known : — that it had, itself, been more liable to the charge of insincerity, to have concealed from men what was real truth, and of so much concernment to them. And he did, in revealing them, but act his own nature ; the goodness whereof is no more lessened, by men's refusal of its offers, than his truth can be made of none effect by their disbelief of its assertions: besides the great use such an extant revelation of the way of recovery was to be of, to those that should obediently comply with it, oven after they should be won so to do. Srct. XXIII. And the latter wo may also apprehend very unfit too; though, because that is less obvious, it requires to be more largely insisted on. For it would seem that if wo do not eftect any thing which we have a real will unto, it must proceed from impotency, and that we cannot do it^ OF god's presciknck, &c. 49 which, who would say of the great God ? Herein, therefore, we shall proceed by steps, and gradually offer the things that follow to consideration. As, that it were indeed most repugnant to the notion of a deity, to suppose any thing, which includes in it no contra- diction impossible to God, considered according to that single attribute of power only. But yet we must add, that this Avere a very unequal way of estimating what God can do, that is, to consider him as a mere being of power. For the notion of God so conceived, were very inadequate to him, which taken entirely, imports the comprehension of all per- fections. So that they are two very distant questions,— What the power of God alone could do ? and — What God can do ? And whereas to the former the answer would be, whatsoever is not in itself repugnant to be done ; to the latter, it must only be, — whatsoever it becomes or is agree- able to a being every way perfect to do. And so it is to be attributed to the excellency of his nature, if, amongst all things not simply impossible, there be any which it may be truly said he cannot do. Or, it proceeds not from the im- perfection of his power, but from the concurrence of all other perfections in him. Hence his own w^ord plainly affirms of him that he cannot lie. And by common consent it will be acknowledged, that he cannot do any unjust act whatsoever. To this I doubt not we may with as common suffrage (when the matter is considered) subjoin, that his wisdom doth as much limit the exercise of his power, as his righte- ousness or his truth doth ; and that it may, with as much confidence and clearness, be said and understood, that he cannot do an unwise or imprudent act as an unjust. Fur- ther, that as his righteousness corresponds to the justice of things, to be done or not done, so doth his wisdom to the congruity or fitness. So that he cannot do what it is unfit for him to do, because he is wise ; and because he is most perfectly and infinitely wise, therefore nothing that is less fit. But whatsoever is fittest, when a comparison is made between doing this or that, or between doing and not doing, that the perfection of his nature renders necessary to hmi, and the opposite part impossible. Again, that this measure must be understood to have a very large and most general D 50 THE RECOXCILEABLEXESS extent unto all the aftairs of his government, the ohject it concerns being so very large. We, in our observation, may take notice, that fewer questions can occur concerning what is right or wrong, than what is fit or unfit. And whereas any man may in a moment be honest, if he have a mind to it ; very few (and that by long experience) can ever attain to be wise. The things about which justice is conversant being reducible to certain rules, but Avisdom supposes very general knowledge of things scarce capable of such reduction. It is, besides, the primary requisite, in any one that bears rule over others : and must therefore most eminently influ- ence all the managements of the Supreme Ruler. Sect. XXIV. It is moreover to bo considered, that innu- merable congruities lie open to the Infinite Wisdom, whicli are never obvious to our view or thought : as, to a well-stud- ied scholar, thousands of coherent notions, which an illiterate person never thought of; to a practised courtier, or well- educated gentleman, many decencies and indecencies, in tlie matter of civil bcliaviour and conversation, which an unbred rustic knows nothing of ; and to an experienced statesman, tliose importancies, which never occur to the thouglits of him wlio daily follows the plough. What government is there that hath not its arcana, profound mysteries and reasons of state, that a vulgar wit cannot dive into ? And from whence, the account to be given, why this or that is done or not done, is not, always, that it would have been unjust it should be otherwise, but it had been imprudent. And many things are, hereupon, judged necessary not from the exigency of justice, but reason of state. Whereupon men of modest and sober minds, that have had exi)erience of the wisdom of their governors and their hajijty conduct, through a considerable tract of time ; when they see things done by them, the lead- ing reasons whereof they do not understand, and the cfi'ect and success comes not yet in view, suspend their censure, while as yet all seems to them obscure, and wrapt up in clouds and darkness ; yea tliough the course that is taken have, to their apprehension, an ill aspect ; accounting it be- comes them not, to make a judgment of things so far above their reach, and confiding iu tlie tried wisdom of their rulers, OF god's prescience, &;c. 51 Avlio, they believe, see reasons for what they do, into which they find tliemselves unable to penetrate. With how much more submiss and humble veneration ought the methods of the Divine government to be beheld and adored, upon the certain assurance we have, that all things therein are man- aged by that wisdom, Avhich could never in any thing mis- take its way ! Whereas, there was never any continued ad- ministration of human government so accurate and exact, but that after some tract of time, some or other errors might be reflected on therein. Again, it may further be said, without presuming beyond due bounds, that though infinite congruities must be sup- posed to lie open to the divine understanding, ^^•hich are concealed from ours, yet that these two things in the general are very manifestly congruous to any sober attentive mind, that directly concern, or may be applied to the case under our present consideration, viz. That the course of God's gov- ernment over the world, be, for the most part, steady and uniform, not interrupted by very frequent, extraordinary, and anomalous actions ; and again. That he use a royal lib- erty, of stepping out of his usual course, sometimes, as he sees meet. It cannot but appear to such as attend, liighly incongruous, should we affirm the antithesis to either of these ; or lay down counterpositions to them, and sup])ose the course of the Divine government to be managed agree- ably thereunto. Sect. XXV. For, as to the former ; what confusion would it make in the world, if there sliould be perpetual innovations upon nature — continual or exceeding frequent impeditions, and restraints of second causes. In the sphere of nature, the virtues and proper qualities of things, being never cer- tain, could never be understood or known. In that of policy, no measures, so much as probable, could ever be taken. How much better is it, in both, that second causes ordinarily follow tlieir inclinations ! And why is it not to be thought congruous, that, in some degree, things should be proportion- ally so, in tlie sphere of grace ? whefeto, by and b}^ we shall speak more directly. We pray, when our friends are sick, for their recovery. What can be the sober meaning and de- 52 THE RECONCILEABLENESS sign of such prayers ? Not that God would work a miracle for their restitution, (for then we might as well pray for their revival after death,) but, that God would be pleased so to co- operate, in the still and silent way of nature, with second causes, and so bless means, that they may be recovered, if he see good : otherwise that they and we may be prepared to undergo his pleasure. And agreeable hereto ought to be the intent of our prayers, in reference to the public affairs, and better posture of the world. And we may take notice, the Divine wisdom lays a very great stress upon this matter, the preserving of the common order of things ; and cannot but observe a certain inflexibleness of Providence herein ; and that it is very little apt to divert from its wonted course. At which weak minds are apt to take oftence : to wonder, that against so many prayers and tears God will let a good man die, or one whom they love ; or that a miracle is not wrought to prevent their own being wronged at any time ; or, that the earth doth not open and swallow uj) the person that hath done them wrong : are apt to call for fire from heaven, upon them that are otherwise minded, and do other- wise than they would have them. But a judicious person would consider, if it be so highly reasonable that my desires should be complied with so extraordinarily, then why not all men's ? And then were the world filled with prodigies and confusion. The inconveniences would soon be to all equally discernible and intolerable ; (as the heathen poet takes notice, should Jupiter's ear be over-easy ;) yea, and the impossibility were obvious of gratifying all, because of their many counter- desires. And for the other ; it were no less incongruous, if the Supreme Power should so tie its own hands, and be so astricted to rules and methods, as never to do any thing extraordinary, upon never so important occasion. How ill could the world have wanted sucli an effort of omnipotency, as the restriction upon the flames from destroying Sliadrach, Meshach, and Abednego ! or the miracles wrought in our Saviour's and tlie next following days ! Such tilings are never done, but when the all-comprehending wisdom sees it most congruous ; and that the cause will over-recompense the deflection from the common course. If no such thing OF god's prescience, &;c. 53 did ever fall out, what a temptation were it to mankind, to introduce into their belief an unintelligent fate instead of a Deity! Besides that the convincing testimony were wanting, which we see is so necessary for the confirmation of any par- ticular revelation from Grod, which comes not within the com- pass of nature's discovery, (upon which account also, it is as apparently necessary such extraordinary works should not be over-frequent, for then they become ordinary, and useless to that special end,) so that here the exertions both of the ordinate and absolute power of God (as some distinguish) have their so ap])ropriate, and so visibly apt and congruous, .uses, that they are discernible to a very ordinary understand- ing, how much more to the infinite wisdom of God! Sect. XXVI. Now hereupon we say further, there is the like congruity, upon as valuable (though not altogether the same) reasons that, in the affairs of grace, there be somewhat correspondent; that, ordinarily, it be sought and expected, in the use of ordinary means; and that, sometimes, its so- vereignty show itself in preventing exertions, and in working so heroically, as none have, beforehand, in the neglect of its ordinary methods, any reason to expect. And we may fitly add, that where sovereignty is pleased thus to have its exer- cise and demonstrate itself, it is sufficient that there be a general congruity, that it do so sometimes, as an antecedent reason to the doing of some such extraordinary things; but that there should be a particular, leading congruity or ante- cedent reason, to invite those extraordinary operations of grace to one person more than another, is not necessary. But it is most congruous, that, herein, it be most arbitrary ; most agreeable to the supremacy of God; to the state of sin- ful man, who hath infinitely disobliged him, and can deserve nothing from him ; yea, and even to the nature of the thing. For, where there is a parity, in any objects of our own choice, there can be no leading reason to this, rather than that. The most prudent man, that is wont to guide himself by never so exquisite wisdom, in his daily actions, where there is a perfect indifferency between doing this thing or that, is not liable to censure, that he is not able to give a reason why he did that, not the other : wisdom hath no exercise in that case. 54 THE RECONCILEABLEXESS But that the blessed God doth ordinarily proceed in these aftairs by a steady rule, and sometimes show his liberty of departing from it, is to be resolved into his infinite wisdom, it being, in itself, most fit he should do both the one and the other; and therefore to him most necessary. Whereu])on, the great apostle, St. Paul, discoursing upon this subject, doth not resolve the matter into strict justice, nor absolute sovereignty; (both which have their place too, in his pro- ceedings with men, as the sacred writings do abundantly testify:) but we find him in a transport, in the contempla- tion of the Divine wisdom, that herein so eminently shines forth : " the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God! how unsearchable are his judgments, and his ways past finding out!"* Sect. XXVII. To sum up all, we conclude it obvious to the apprehension of such as consider, that it was more con- gruous the general course of God's government over man should be by moral instruments. And howsoever it were very unreasonable to imagine, that God cannot in any case extraordinarily oversway the inclinations, and determine the will of such a creature, in a way agreeable enough to its nature, (though we particularly know not, as we are not concerned to know, or curiously to inquire in what way,) and highly reasonable to admit that in many cases he doth; it is notwithstanding manifest, to any sober reason, that it were Very incongruous, this should be the ordinary course of his conduct towards mankind, or the same persons at all times. That is, that a whole order of intelligent creatures should be moved only by inward impulses; that God's precepts, promises, and comminations, whereof their nature is capable, should be all made impei'tineneies, through his constant overpower- ing those that sliould neglect them ; that the f;xculties, where- by men are capable of moral government, should be rendered, to this purpose, useless and vain; and that they should be tempted to expect to bo constantly managed as mere ma- chines, that know not their own use. * Rom. xi. 33. See to the same purpose, cli. xvi. 25, 26, 27; and liph. i. 5, 6, 7, with the 8th. OF god's rRESCIESCE, &,c. 55 Nor it is loss apprehensible, how incongruous it were also, on the other hand, to suppose that the exterior frame of God's government should be totally unaccompanied with an internal vital energy; or exclude the inward motions, oper- ations, and influences, whereof such a creature is also fitly capable ; or tliat God should have barred out himself from all inward access to the spirits of men, or commerce with them : that the supreme, universal, paternal mind (as a heathen called it) should have no way for eflicacious communications to his own oftspring when he pleases ; that so (unsuitably to sove- reignty) he should have no objects of special favour, or no peculiar ways of expressing it. It is manifestly congruous that the Divine government over man, should be (as it is) mixed or composed of an external frame of laws, with their proper sanctions and enforcements, and an internal effusion of power and vital influence, correspondent to the several parts of that frame ; and which might animate the whole, and use it, as instrumental, to the begetting of correspondent impressions on men's spirits : — that this power be put forth, not like that of a natural agent, ad ultimum, (which if we would suppose the Divine power to be, new worlds must be springing up every moment,) but gradually, and with an apt contemperation to the subject, upon which it is designed ; to have its operations and withal arbitrarily, as is becoming the great Agent from whom it proceeds, and to whom it therefore belongs to measure its exertions, as seems meet unto him :— - that it be constantly put forth (though most gratuitously, .especially the disobligation of the apostacy being considered) upon all to that degree, as that they be enabled to do much good, to which they are not impelled by it : — that it be ever ready (since it is the power of grace) to go forth in a further degree than it had yet done, wheresoever any former issues of it have been duly complied with. Though it be so little supposable that man should hereby have obliged God there- to, that he hath not any way obliged himself, otherwise, than that he hath implied a readiness to impart unto man what shall be necessary to enable him to obey, so fiir as, upon the apostacy, is requisite to his relief; if he seriously endeavour to do his own part, by the power he already hath received ; agreeably to the common saying, homini facienti quod in se 56 THE RECONCILEABLENESS est, &c. That, according to tlie royal liberty wherewith it ■works, it go forth, as to some, with that efficacy, as notwith- standing wliatever resistance yet to overcome, and make them captives to the authority and love of Christ. Sect. XXVIII. The universal, continued rectitude of all intelligent creatures had, we may be sure, been willed with a i)eremptory, efficacious will if it had been best. That is, if it liad not been less congruous than to keep them some time (under the expectation of future confirmation and re- ward) upon trial of their fidelity, and in a state wherein it might not be impossible to them to make a defection. And so it had easily been prevented, that ever there should have been an apostacy from God, or any sin in the world. Nor was it either less easy by a mighty irresistible hand, uni- versally to expel sin, than prevent it ; or more necessary or more to be expected from him. But if God's taking no such course, tended to render his government over tlie world more august and awful for the present, and tlie result and final issue of all things more glorious at lengtli, and were conse- quently more congruous ; that could not be so willed, as to be eft'ectually procured by him. For whatsoever obligation strict justice hath upon ns, that congruity cannot but have upon him. And whereas it would be concluded, that what- soever any one truly wills, they would effect if they could, we admit it for true, and to be applied in the present case; but add, that as we rightly esteem that impossible to us which we cannot justly do, so is that to him, not only which he cannot do justly, but which, upon the whole matter, he cannot do most wisely also ; that is, whicli his infinite wisdom doth not dictate is most congruous and fit to be done. Things cohere and are held together, in the course of his dispensation, by congruities as by adamantine bands, and cannot be otherwise. Tiiat is, comparing and taking things together, especially the most important. For otherwise, to have been nicely curious about every miiuite thing, singly considered, that it might not possibly liave been better, (as in the frame of this or that individual animal or the like,) had been needlessly to interrupt the course of nature, and there- fore, itself, to him an incongruity ; and doth, in them that OF god's prescience, &c. 57 expect it, import more of a trifling disposition than of true ■wisdom. But to him Avhose being is most absolutely perfect, to do that which, all things considered, would be simply best, i. e, most becoming him, most honourable and Godlike, is absolutely necessary ; and consequently, it is to be attributed to his infinite perfection, that unto him, to do otherwise is absolutely impossible. And if we yet see not all these con- gruities which to him are more than a law, it is enough that they are obvious to his own eye, who is the only competent judge. Yet moreover, it is finally to be considered, that the methods of the Divine government are, besides his, to be ex- posed to the view and judgment of other intellects than our own, and we expect they shall to our own, in another state. What conception thereof is already received and formed in our minds, is but an embryo, no less imperfect than our pre- sent state is. It were very unreasonable to expect, since this world shall continue but a little while, that all God's managements and ways of procedure, in ordering the great aftairs of it, should be attempered and fitted to the judgment that shall be made of them in this temporary state, that will so soon be over, and to the present apprehension and capacity of our now so muddied and distempered minds. A vast and stable eternity remains, wherein the whole celestial chorus shall entertain themselves with the grateful contemplation and applause of his dee]) counsels. Such things as now seem perplex and intricate to us, will appear most irreprehensibly fair and comely to angelical minds ; and to our own, when we shall be vouchsafed a place amongst that happy community. What discovery God afibrds of his own glorious excellencies and perfections, is principally intended to recommend him in that state wherein he, and all his ways and works, are to be be- held with everlasting and most complacential approbation. Therefore, though now we should covet the clearest and most satisfying account of things that can be had, we are yet to exercise patience, and not precipitate our judgment of them before the time : as knowing our present conceptions will differ more from what they will be hereafter, than those of a child from the maturer thoughts of the wisest man ; and that 58 THE RECONCILEABLENESS, &C. many of our conceits, which we thought wise, we shall then see cause to put away as childish things. The disoi'dor, Sir, of this heap ratlier tlian frame of thouglits and discourse, as it cannot be thought more unsuitable to the subject tlian suitable to the author ; and the less displease, by how much it could less be expected to be otherwise, from him, even in the best circumstances ; so it may lay some claim to your easier pardon, as having been mostly huddled up in the intervals of a trouljlesome, long journey ; wherein he was rather willing to take what opportunity the inconve- niences and hurry of it could allow him, than neglect any, of using the earliest endeavour to approve himself, as he is your great admirer. Most honoured Sir, Your most obedient humble servant, II. W. A POSTSCRIPT TO THE LETTER RECONCILEABLENESS OF GOD'S PRESCIENCE, &c. FiNDiXG that this discourse of the " Reconcileableness of God's Prescience of the Sins of Men, with the wisdom and sincerity of his counsels, exhortations, &c." hath been misun- derstood and misrepresented; I think it requisite to say some- what briefly in reference thereto. I wrote it upon tlie motion of that honourable gentleman to whom it is inscribed; who apprehended somewhat of that kind might be of use to render our religion less exceptionable to some persons of an inquii'ing disposition, that might perhaps be too sceptical and pendu- lous, if not prejudiced. Having finished it, I thought it best the author's name should pass under some disguise, supposing it might so better serve its end : for knowing my name could not give the cause an advantage, I was not willing it should be in a possibility of making it incur any disadvantage. And therefore, as I have observed some in such cases, to make use only of the two last letters, I imitated some other, in the choice of the penultimate. But perceiving that discourse now to fall under animadversion, I reckon it becoming to be no longer concealed. It was unavoidable to me, if I would, upon reasonable terms, apply myself to the consideration of the matter I had undertaken, of showing the consistency of God's prescience of the sins of men, with the preventive methods we find him to have used against them, to express somewhat of my sense of (what I well knew to have been asserted by divers school-men) God's predeterminative concurrence to 60 A POSTSCRIPT the sins of men also. For it had been (any one ma}- see) very idle and ludicrous trifling, to oiFer at reconciling those methods with God's prescience, and have waved that mani- festly greater difficulty, of reconciling them with his prede- terminative concourse, if I had thought there had been such a thing; and were a like case, as if a chirurgeon, undertaking a wounded person, should apj^ly himself, with a great deal of diligence and address, to the cure of a finger slightly scratched, and totally neglect a wound feared to be mortal in his breast. And whereas I reckoned God's prescience of all whatso- ever futurities, and consequently of the sins of men, most certain and demonstrable, (though it was not the business of this discourse to demonstrate it, but supposing it, to show its reconcileableness with what it seemed not so well to agree with,) if I had believed his predoterminative concurrence to the sins of men to be as certain: perfect despair of being able to say any thing to purpose in this case, had made me resolve to say nothing in either. For to show how it might stand with the wisdom and sincerity of the blessed God, to counsel men not to sin, to profess his hatred and detestation of it, to remonstrate to men the great danger they should incur by it; with so great appearance of seriousness to ex- hort, warn, expostulate with them concerning it; express his great displeasure and grief for their sinning, and consequent miseries; and yet all the while act them on thereto, by a secret, but mighty and irresistible, influence, — seemed to me an utterly hopeless and inqiossible undertaking; — the other, without this, (supposing, as to this, the case to have been as some have thought it,) a very vain one. But being well as- sured, that what seemed the greater difliculty, and to carry most of terror and affright in the face of it, was only a chimera, I reckoned the other very superable ; and therefore directed my discourse thither, according to the first design of it, which was in ett'ect but to justify God's making such a creature as man, and governing him agreeably to his nature. Now judging it requisite, that ho who should read that discourse concerning this designed subject with any advan- tage, should have the same thoughts of the other, which was TO THE LETTER, &C. 61 waved, that I had; I apprehended it necessary to communi- cate those thoughts concerning that, as I did. Not operosely, and as my business, but only on the bye, and as was fit in reference to a thing that was to be waved, and not insisted on. Now I perceive that some persons, wlio had formerly entertained that strange opinion of God's predeterminative concurrence to the wickedest actions, and not purged their minds of it, have been oftended with that letter, for not express- ing more respect unto it; and yet offered nothing themselves, (which to me seems exceeding strange,) for the solving of that great difficulty and encumbrance, which it infers upon our re- ligion. Nor do I much wonder, that this opinion of predeter- minative concourse to sinful actions, should have some stiff adherents among ourselves. For having been entertained by certain Dominicans, that were apprehended in some things to approach nearer us than others of the Eoman church, it came to receive favour and countenance from some of our own, of considerable note for piety and learning, whose name and authority cannot but be expected to have much influence on the minds of many. But I somewhat wonder, that they who have had no kindness for this letter, upon the account of its dissent from them, in this particular, should not allow it com- mon justice. For, because it hath not said every thing they would have had it say, and that would have been grateful to themselves, they impute to it the having said what it said not, and what they apprehended would be most ungrateful to all pious and sober men. The sura is, they give out con- cerning it, that it denies the providence of God about sin, which all good men ought to abhor from; and insinuate that it falls in Avith the sentiments of Durandus, which they know many think not well of. All that I intend to do, for the present, upon this occasion, .shall be to show wherein the letter is misrepresented, and charged with what it hath not in it; to remark what is said against that supposed sense of it, and give the true sense of what it says touching this matter, with a further account of the author's mind herein than it was thought fit to insert into so transient and occasional a discourse as that part of the letter was; whereby it may be seen, Avherein he agrees with those of that opposite persuasion, and what the very point of dif- 62 A POSTSCRIPT ference is. Furtlior than this, I yet intend not to go, till I see further need. There have two discourses come to my view that ha%'e referred to that letter. The one in manu- script only; Avhich, because it is uncertain to me whether the reputed author of it will own it or no, and because it says little or nothing by way of argument, against the true sense of the letter, I shall take no further present notice of. The other is printed, and otfers at somewhat of argument, which therefore I shall more attentively consider. It doth this letter an honour, whereof its author never had the least ambition or ex])ectation, to insert the mention of it into the close of a verj^ learned, elaborate work;* with which it might, yet, easily be imagined, its simplicity, and remoteness from any pretence to learning would so ill agree, that a quarrel could not but ensue. It is from one, who liaving spent a great part of his time in ti'avelling tlu'ough some regions of literature, and been peaceable, as for as I have understood, in his travels, it might have been hoped would have let this jmmphlet alone; when, for what I can observe, lie finds no fault with it but what he makes, and is fain to accuse it of what is no where to be found in it, lest it should be innocent. It is an unaccountable pleasure which men of some hu- mours take, in depraving what is done by others, when there is nothing attempted that doth interfere with them; nothing that can, righteously, be understood -to cross any good end, which they more openly ])retend to, nor the more concealed end (if they have any such) of their own glory. Common edification seems less designed, when every thing must be thrown down which is not built by their own hands, or by their own line and measure. I plead nothing of merit in this little essay; only I say for it, that I know not what it can be guilty of towards this learned man, that can ])ave occasioned this assault u])on it by his pen. By how much the less it keeps his road, the more I might have thought it out of the way of his notice. I am sure it meant him no harm, nor had any design to pilfer from him any part of his collections. But he says, he may not let it pass. Then there is no remedy. But I wonder what he should mean by * Court of the Gentiles, part ii. page 522. TO THE LETTER, &C. 63 " he may not." It must either mean, that he thouglit it un- hiwful to let it pass, or that he had a mighty strong and irresistible inclination to squabble a little with it. The former cannot be imagined. For then, for tlie same reason, he would have attempted sundry others of former and later days, that have said much to the purpose, which this letter doth but touch obiter, and on the bye, in its way to another design. But those were giants, whom it Avas not so safe to meddle with: therefore he could very wisely let them pass, though they have wounded his beloved cause, beyond all that it is in the power of his (or any) art to cure. Whence it is consequent, that the whole business must be resolved into the latter. And this inclination cannot but owe itself to some peculiar aspect and reference he had to the author ; whom, though he was in incognito, yet (as I have been in- formed) he professes to have discoursed with upon the sauie subject many times. And so, therefore, he miglit once more, before this public rencounter, if he had thought lit, and nature could have been repelled awhile. It is true, he hath found me not facile to entertain his sentiments in this matter. And, indeed, I have deeply dreaded the portentous imaginations which I found had more lightly tinctured his mind, as to this thing, concerning the blessed God ; than which, upon deliberation, I do believe, no human wit can ever devise worse ; and as I have often frcelv told divers of my friends, and it is very likely, among theiiii, himself. Though I do not suspect the contagion to have in- fected his vitals ; by a privilege, vouchsafed to some, that they may possibly drink some deadly thing that shall not hurt them. But why must an impatiency of this dissent break out into so vindictive an hostility ? I will not say I expected more friendly dealing ; for as I do well know it was very jjossible such a public contest might have been managed with that candour and fairness, as not at all to entrench upon Iriendsiiip ; so, as it is, I need not own so much weakness, as upon many years' experience, not to be able to distinguish and under- stand, there are some tempers less capable of tlie ingenuities that belong to that pleasant relation. But it was onl}^ a charitable error, of which I repent not, that I expected a more ri^'hteous dealing:. 64 A POSTSCRIPT He pretends to give my sense in other words, and then gravely falls to combating his own man of straw, which he will have represent me ; and so I am to be tortured in effigy. It can never be proved, that it implies a contradiction for God. to make a creature which should be capable of acting without immediate concourse. This he puts in a different character, as if I had said so much. And why might not my own words be allowed to speak my own sense, but that his understanding and eyes must then have conspired to tell him, that the sense would have been quite another ? It is a pre- determinative concurrence to all actions, even those that are most malignantly wicked, and again, God's concurring by a determinative influence unto wicked actions, which is the only thing I speak of; as what I cannot reconcile with the wisdom and sincerity of his councils and exhortations against such actions. And if he had designed to serve any common good end, in this undertaking of his, why did he not attempt to reconcile them himself? But the wisdom and sincerity of God are thouglit fit (as it would seem) to be sacrificed to the reputation of his more peculiarly admired schoolmen. If there be such a universal determination by an irresistible divine influence, to all even the wickedest actions, (which God forbid !) methinks such a difficulty should not be so easily passed over. And surely the reconciling such a de- terminative influence with the Divine wisdom and sincerity, had been a performance worth all his learned labours be- sides, and of greater service to the Christian name and honour. But it seems the denying concurrence by such predeter- mining influence, is the denying of all immediate concurrence. And i am sent to the Thomists, Scotists, Jesuits, and Suarez more especially to be taught otherwise ; as if all these were for detejmiinative concourse ; which is very pleasant, when the very heads of the two first-mentioned sects were against it, as we shall see further anon ; the third generally, and Suarez particularly, whom he names, have so industriously and strongly opposed it. Yea, and because I assent not to the doctrine of predeterminative concourse, I am represented (which was the last spite that was to be done me) as a favourer of the hypothesis of Durandus. And he might as TO THE LETTER, &C. 65 truly have said of Henry Nicholas, but not so prudently, be- cause he knows whose opinions have a nearer alliance to that family. Now I heartily wish I had a ground for so much charity towards him, as to suppose him ignorant that immediate concourse, and determinative, are not wont to be used by the schoolmen, in this controversy, as terms of the same signification. If he do himself think them to be all one, what warrant is that to him to give the same for my sense ; when it is so well known they are not commonly so taken, and that determinative concourse is so voluminously written against, where immediate is expressly asserted ? Let him but soberly tell me, what his design was, to dash out the word determining from what he recites of that letter, and put in immediate, which he knows is not to be found in any of the places he refers to in it. Or what was the spring of that confidence that made him intimate the Scotists, Thomists, the Jesuits, and particularly Suarez, to be against what is said in the letter, in this thing ? If he could procure all the books in the world to be burnt, besides those in his own library, he would yet have a hard task to make it be believed in the next age, that all these were for God's efficacious determination of the wills of men unto wicked actions. I need not, after all this, concern myself as to what he says about the no medium between the extremes of his disjunc- tive proposition. Either the human will must depend upon the Divine independent will of God, &c., (as he phrases it in the excess of his caution, lest any should think the will of God was not a divine will,) or God must depend on the human will, &c. ; unless he can show that the human will cannot be said to depend on the divine, as being enabled by it, except it be also determined and impelled by it to every wicked action. A created being that was entirely from God, witli all the powers and faculties which belong it ; that hath its continual subsistence in him, and all those powers continued and maintained by his influence every moment ; that hath those powers made habile, and apt for whatsoever its most natural motions and operations, by a suitable influence when- soever it moves or operates ; can this creature be said not to depend, as to all its motions and operations, unless it be also £ 66 A POSTSCRIPT unavoidably impelled to do every thing to which it is thus sufficiently enabled ? I again say, was it impossible to God to make such a crea- ture that can, in this case, act or not act ? It is here oddly enough said, tliat the author gives no demonstration hereof. Of what ? Why, that it can never be proved (as the refer- ence to the foregoing word shows) that it implies a contra- diction, &c. It seems, it was expected that author should have proved by demonstration, that it can never be jn'oved that it implies a contradiction for Grod to make a creature, Avhich should be capable of acting (as he feigns him to have said) without immediate concourse. By what rule of reason- ing was he obliged to do so ? But if the proving there is such a creature, as in the case before expressed, can act with- out determinative concourse, will serve turn to prove that it cannot be proved it implies a contradiction there should be such a one, I may think the thing was done ; and may think it sufficiently proved, that there is such a creature ; if it ap- pear (whereof there is too much proof) that there are such actions done by creatures, as for the reasons that were before alleged, it could not stand with the nature of God to deter- mine them unto. And was notliing said tending to prove this, that it could not consist with the nature of God to de- termine men unto all the wicked actions they commit ? It seems unless it were put into mood and figure, it is no proof. Nor was it the design of those papers to insist upon that sub- ject ; but there are things suggested in transitu, as such a discourse could admit, that, whether they are demonstrative or no, would j)uzzle a considering person : — that God should have as much iniluencc and concurrence to the worst actions as to the best; as much or more than the sinner or the tempter ; that the matter of his laws to Adam, and his pos- terity, should be a natural impossibility : and I now add, the irreconcileableness of that determination, with God's wisdom and sincerity, &c. These I shall reckon demonstrations, till I see them well answered. However, if mine were a bad ojunion, why was it not as confutable without the mention of Durandus ? But that was, witli him, an odious name ; and fit, therefore, to impress the brand which he desired I should wear for his sake. This is TO THE LETTER, &C. 67 a likely way to clear the truth ! Yet if it serve not one design, it will another, he thinks, upon which he was more intent. Are all for Durandus's way that are against a pre- determinative influence to wicked actions ? I could tell him who have shown more strength in arguing against Durandus than I find in all his arguments, who have yet written, too, against determinative concourse to such actions, more than ever he will be able to answer, or any man. The truth is, wlien I wrote that letter, I had never seen Durandus ; nor indeed did I consult any book for the writing of it, (as I had not opportunity, if I had been so inclined,) except, upon some occasions, the Bible : not apprehending it necessary to num- ber votes, and consider how many men's thoughts were one way, and how many the other, before I would adventure to think any of my own. But I have this day, upon the view of his animadversions, taken a view of Durandus too : and really cannot yet guess what should tempt him to parallel my conceptions with Durandus's, but that betook his for some- what an ill-favoured name. Durandus flatly, in several places, denies Grod's immediate concourse to the actions of the crea- tures ; * which I never said nor thought ; but do really be- lieve his immediate concourse to all actions of his creatures, both immediatione virtutis and sicppositi, (that I may more comply with his scholastic humour, in the use of such terms, than gratify my own,) yet not determinative unto wicked actions. Again, Durandus denies immediate concourse, universally and upon such a ground as whereupon the denial must equally extend to good actions as to bad ; viz., that it is impossible the same numerical action should be from two or more agents immediately and perfectly, except the same numerical virtue should be in each ; but he says the same numerical virtue cannot be in God and in the creature, &c.f Whereas he well knows the concourse or influence (for I here aftect not the curiosity to distinguish these two terms, as some do) Avhich I deny not to be immediate to any actions, I only deny to be determinative as to those which are wicked. Yea, and the authors he quotes,^ Aquinas and Scotus, though every body * L. ii. Disc. 1. Q. 5. D. 37. Q. 1. f Disc. 1, 2, 5, ut supra. I Sect. xi. 68 A POSTSCRIPT may know they are against what was the notion of Durandus, yet are as much against himself, if he will directly oppose that letter, and assort determinative concourse to wicked actions. They held immediate concourse, not determinative. The former, though he supposes divine help in reference to the elections of the human will, yet asserts the elections themselves to be in man's own power, and only says that in the executions of those elections, men can be hindered ; that (whatsoever influence he asserts of the first cause) men still, habent se indifferenter ad hem vel male eligendum* The other, though he also excludes not the immediate efiicacy of God in reference to the actions of men, yet is so far from making it determinative, that the reason he gives why, in evil actions, man sins and God does not, is that the one of those causes posset rectitudinem dare actui quam tenetur dare: et tamen non dat. Alia autem, licet non teneatur earn dare: tamen quantum est ex se daret, si voluntas creata co-opera- retur;'\ in the very place which himself refers to: wherein they differ from this author toto coelo, and from me, in that they make not determinative influence necessary in reference to good actions, which I expressly do. Thus far it may be seen what pretence or colour he had to make my opinion the same with Durandus's, or his own the same with that of Thomas and Scotus. But if he knew in what esteem I have the schoolmen, he would hardly believe me likely to step one foot out of my way, cither to gain the reputation of any of tlieir names, or avoid the disreputation. He, notwithstanding, supposed his own reputation to be so good (and I know no reason why he might not suppose so) as to make it be believed I was any thing he pleased to call me, by such as had not opportunity to be otherwise informed. And thus I would take leave of him, and permit him to use his own reflections upon his usage of me, at his own leisure; but that civility bids me (since he is pleased to bo at the pains of catechising me) first to give some answer to the questions wherein he thus expostulates with me. Q. 1. Wliether there be any action of man on earth so good, which hath not some mixture of sin in it ? And if God * 1 Q. 83. t L- iii- Disc. 27. Q. 2. TO THE LETTER, &;C. 69 concur to the substrate matter of it as good, must he not necessarily concur to the substrate matter as sinful? For is not the substrate matter of the act, both as good and sinful, the same ? A. 1. It seems, then, that God doth concur to the matter of an action as sinful. Which is honestly acknowledged, since by his principles it cannot be denied; though most of his way mince the business, and say the concurrence is only to the action which is sinful, not as sinful. 2. This I am to consider as an argument for God's predeter- minative concurrence to wicked actions ; and thus it must be conceived, that if God concur by determinative influence to the imperfectly good actions of faith, repentance, love to himself, prayer; therefore to the acts of enmity against him- self, cursing, idolatry, blasphemy, &c. And is it not a mighty consequence? If to actions that are good quoad sub- stantiam, therefore to such as are in the substance of them evil? We ourselves can, in a remoter kind, concur to the actions of others : because you may afford, yourself, your leading concurrence to actions imperfectly good, therefore may you to them that are downright evil? because to prayer, therefore to cursing and swearing? and then ruin men for the actions you induced them to? You will say, God may rather, but sure he can much less do so than you. How could you be serious in the proposal of this question ? We are at a loss how it should consist with the divine wisdom, justice, goodness, and truth, to design the punish- ing man, yet innocent, with everlasting torments, for actions which God, himself, would irresistibly move him to ; whereas his making a covenant with Adam in reference to himself and his posterity, implied there Avas a possibility it might be kept ; at least that he would not make the keeping of it, by his own positive influence, impossible. And you say, if he might concur to the substrate matter of an action as good, which tends to man's salvation and blessedness, ho must necessarily concur (and that by an irresistible determinative influence, else you say nothing to me) to the substrate matter of all their evil actions, as evil, which tend to their ruin and misery, brought upon them by the ac- 70 A POSTSCRIPT tions which God makes them do. I suppose St. Luke, vi. 9, with Hos. xiii. 9, show a difference. If you therefore ask me, why I should not admit tliis consequence? I say it needs no other answer, than tliat I take wisdom, righteousness, goodness, and truth, to belong more to the idea of God, than their contraries. Q. 2. Is there any action so sinful that hath not some natural good as the substrate matter thereof? A. True. And what shall be inferred ? That therefore God must, by a determinative influence, produce every such action whatsoever reason there be against it? You might better argue thence the necessity of his producing every hour, a new world ; in which there would be a great deal more of positive entity, and natural goodness. Certainly, the natural goodness that is in the entity of an action, is no such invita- tion to the holy God, by determinative influence to produce it, as that he should ofter violence to his own nature, and stain the justice and honour of his government, by making it be done, and then punish it being done. Q. 3. Do we not cut off the most illustrious part of divine providence in governing the lower world, &.e. ? A. What ? by denying that it is the stated way of God's government, to urge men, irresistibly, to all that wickedness for which he will afterwards punish them with everlasting torments ? I should least of all ever have expected such a question to this purpose, and am ashamed further to answer it. Only name any act of providence I hereby deny, if you can. In the next place, that my sense may appear in my own words ; and that I may show how far I am of the same mind with those that apprehend me at so vast a distance from them, and where, if they go further, our parting point must be ; I shall set down the particulars of my agreement with them, and do it in no other heads than they might have col- lected, if they had pleased, out of that letter. As, 1. That God exerciseth a universal providence about all his creatures, both in sustaining and governing them. 2. That, more particularly, he exerciseth such a providence about man. 3. That this providence about man extends to all the actions of all men. TO THE LETTER, &C. 71 4. That it consists not alone in beholding the actions of men, as if he were a mere spectator of them only, but is jjositively active about them. 5. That this active providence of Grod about all the actions of men consists not merely in giving them the natural powers, whereby they can work of themselves, but in a real influence upon those powers. 6. That this influence is in reference to holy and spiritual actions (whereto since the apostacy the nature of man is be- come viciously disinclined) necessary to be efficaciously de- terminative ; such as shall overcome that disinclination, and reduce those powers into act. 7. That the ordinary, appointed way for the communica- tion of this determinative influence, is by our intervening con- sideration of the inducements which God represents to us in his word, viz., the precepts, promises, and comminations, which are the moral instruments of his government. No doubt he may (as is intimated in the letter) extraordinarily act men in some rarer cases, by inward impulse, without the help of such external means, as he did prophets or inspired persons ; and when he hath done so, we were not to think he treated them unagreeably to their natures, or so as their natures could not, without violence, admit. But it hath been the care and designraent of the divine wisdom, so to order the way of dispensation towards the several sorts of creatures, as not only not, ordinarily, to impose upon them what they could not conveniently be patient of; but so as that their powers and faculties might be put upon the exercises where- of they were capable, and to provide that neither their pas- sive capacity should be overcharged, nor their active be unemployed. And whereas the reasonable nature of man renders him not only susceptible of unexpected internal im- pressions, but also capable of being governed by laws, which require the use of his own endeavour to understand and obey them ; and whereas we also find such laws are actually made for him, and propounded to him with their proper enforce- ments ; if it should be the fixed course of God's government over him, only to guide him by inward impulses, this (as is said in that letter) would render those law§ and their sanc- tions impertinencies ; his faculties, whereby he is capable of 72 ■ A POSTSCRIPT moral government so far, and to tliis purpose, useless and vain : and would be an occasion, which the depraved nature of men would be very apt to abuse into a temptation to them, never to bend their powers to the endeavour of doing any thing that were of a holy and spiritual tendency, (from which their aversion would be always prompting them to devise ex- cuses,) more than a mere machine would apply itself to the uses which it was made for, and doth not understand. Therefore lest any should be so unreasonable, as to ex- pect God should only surprise them, while they resolutely sit still and sleep ; he hath, in his infinite wisdom, withheld from them the occasion hereof, and left them destitute of any en- couragement (whatsoever his extraordinary dealings may have been with some) to expect his influences, in the neglect of his ordinary methods, as is discoursed already and at large in the letter; and which is the plain sense of that admonition ; Phil. ii. 12, 13. Yea, and though there be never so many instances of merciful surprisals, preventive of all our own consideration and care, yet those are still to be accounted the ordinary methods which are so de jure, which would actually be so if men did their duty, and which God hath obliged us to observe and attend unto as such. 8. That in reference to all other actions which are not sin- ful, though there be not a sinful disinclination to them, yet because there may be a sluggishness and ineptitude to some purposes God intends to serve by them, this influence is also always determinative thereunto, whensoever to the im- mense wisdom of God shall seem meet, and conducing to his own great and holy ends. 9. That, in reference to sinful actions, by tliis influence God doth not only sustain men who do them, and continue to tiiem their natural faculties and powers, whereby they are done ; but also, as the first mover, so far excite and actuate those powers, as that they are apt and habile for any con- generous action, to which they have a natural designation, and whereto they are not sinfully disinclined. 10. That, if men do then employ them to the doing of any sinful action ; by that same influence, lie doth, as to him seems meet, limit, moderate, and, against the inclination and design of the sinful agent, overrule and dispose it to good. TO THE LETTER, &C. 73 But now if, besides all this, they will also assert, that God doth, by an efficacious influence, move and determine men to wicked actions ; this is that which I most resolvedly deny. That is, in this 1 shall differ with them, that I do not sup- pose God to have, by internal influence, as far a hand in the worst and wickedest actions, as in the best. I assert more to be necessary to actions to which men are wickedly disin- clined ; but that less will suffice for their doing of actions to which they have inclination more than enough. I reckon it sufficient to the production of this latter sort of actions, that their powers be actually habile, and apt for any such action, in the general, as is connatural to them ; supposing there be iiO*^ ^ peccant aversion, as there is to all those actions that ^ii-e holy and spiritual ; which aversion a more potent (even a determinative) influence is necessary to overcome. I ex- plain myself by instance : — A man hath from God the powers belonging to his nature, by which he is capable of loving or hating an apprehended good or evil. These powers being, by a present divine in- fluence, rendered habile and apt for action, he can now love a good name, health, ease, life ; and hate disgrace, sickness, pain, death ; but he doth also by these powers, thus habili- tated for action, love wickedness and hate God ; I say, now, that to those former acts God should over and besides de- termine him, is not absolutely and always necessary ; and to the latter is impossible. But that to hate wickedness univer- sally, and as such, and to love God, the depravedness of his nature, by the apostacy, hath made the determinative influ- ence of efficacious grace necessary. Which, therefore, he hath indispensable obligation (nor is destitute of encourage- ment) earnestly to implore and pray for. My meaning is now plain to such as have a mind to understand it. Having thus given an account wherein I agree with them, and wherein, if they please, I must differ ; it may perhaps be expected I should add further reasons of that difference on my part : but I shall for the present forbear to do it. I know it may be alleged that some very pious as well as learned men have been of their opinion ; and I seriously be- lieve it. But that signifies nothing to the goodness of the opinion ; nor doth the badness of it extinguish my charity 74 A POSTSCRIPT TO THE LETTER, &C. nor reverence towards the men. For I consider, that as many hold the most important truths, and whicli most direct- ly tend to impress the image of God upon their souls, that yet are never stam)>ed with any such impression thereby ; so, it is not impossible some may have held very dangerous opinions, with a notional judgment, the pernicious influence whereof hath never distilled upon their hearts. Neither shall I be willing, without necessity, to detect other men's infirmities : yet if I find myself any way obliged further to intermeddle in this matter, I reckon the time I have to spend in this world can never be spent to better purpose, than in discovering the fearful consequences of that rejected opinion, the vanity of the subterfuges whereby its assertors think to hide the malignity of it, and the inefficacy of the arguments brought for it ; especially those two which the letter takes notice of. For, as so ill-coloured an opinion ought never to be admitted without the most apparent necessity, so do I think it most apparent there is no necessity it should be ad- mitted upon those grounds, or any other ; and doubt not but that both the governing providence of God, in reference to all events whatsoever, and his most certain knowledge of them all, may be defended, against all opposers, without it. But I had rather my preparations to these purposes should be buried in dust and silence, than I should ever see the occasion which should carry the signification with it of their being at all needful. And I shall take it for a just and most deplorable occasion, if I shall find any to assert against me the contradictory to this proposition : — That God doth not by an cflficacious influence, universally move and determine men to all their actions ; even those that are most wicked : — which is the only true and plain meaning of what was said, about this business, in the before -mentioned letter. KEMAPiKS UPON A LATE DISINGENUOUS DISCOUESE, WRIT BY ONE T. D. THE PRETENCE "DE CAUSA DEI," AND OF ANSWERING MR. JOHN HOWE'S LETTER AND POSTSCRIPT OF GOD'S PRESCIENCE, ETC. BY ANDREW MARVELL. PREFATORY NOTICE. Andrew Marvell, the friend of Milton, an incomiptible patriot, in most venal times, and perhaps the wittiest prose writer in the English language, was the son of a learned and pious Puritan min- ister of the same name, master of the Grammar school, and lecturer of Trinity church, in Kingston-upon-Hull. He was horn in 1620, sent to Cambridge at the expense of the corporation of his native city in 1635, and entered student of Trinity college. When at the university, an attempt was made to convert him to Popery, the ultimate result of which seems to have been a deepening his im- pressions of the falsehood and mischievousness of that system. In 1640 he was deprived of his father, who lost his life in rather re- markable circumstances, on crossing the Humber. For a number of years he seems to have been engaged in travelling over the Con- tinent of Europe. In 1653, he was engaged by Cromwell to super- intend the education at Eton of his nephew, — a young gentleman of the name of Button; and in 1657 he became assistant to Milton in the office of Latin secretary, which he held till the restoration. In 1660 he was chosen one of the representatives of the borough of Hull in the House of Commons, in which situation he was so ac- ceptable and useful to his constituents that he continued to occupy it as long as he lived. Besides the poems attributed to him, some of which are of high merit, he published a variety of tracts in prose, all of them occasional. His most celebrated work is, " The Re- hearsal Transposed," written in opposition to the infamous Samuel Parker, afterwards Bishop of Norwich. This little book, in two parts, with a profusion of witty sarcasm, contains much solid argu0 ment and eloquent writing, and may justly be reckoned one of the ablest exposures of the maxims of religious tyranny. It extorted high praise even from Swift, no friend to its principles. He died 78 PREFATORY NOTICE. • in 1G78, and the corporation of Hull, in gratitude for his long and faithful services, voted a sum of money to defray his funeral ex- penses, and erect a monument to his memory in the church of St. Giles-in-the-fields, London. The following is a list of his prose publications so far as they can be ascertained, for most of them were published anonymously. " The Rehearsal Ti-ansposed, or Animadversions upon a late book intituled, A Preface, shev^ing what grounds there are of fears and jealousies of Popery. London. Piinted by A. B., for the assigns of John Calvin and Theodore Beza, at the sign of the King's In- dulgence, on the south side of the Lake Lemane. 1672." "The Rehearsal Transposed. The second part : Occasioned by two let- ters, answered by Andrew Marvell. London. 1673." "Mr. Smirke, or the Divine in Mode, being certain Annotations upon the Animadversions on " the naked trath," together with a short histori- cal essay concerning general councils, creeds, and impositions in matters of religion, by Andreas Rivetus, Junior. Anag. Res Nuda Veritas. Printed A.D. 1676." "A Seasonable Question and an Useful Answer, by Andrew Marvell. Printed in the year 1676." " An Account of the growth of Poperj' and Arbitrary Government in England, by Andrew Mai-vell. Printed at Amsterdam in the year 1677." "A Seasonable Argument to persuade all the grand juries of England to petition for a new parliament, by Andrew Marvell. Amsterdam. Printed in the year 1677." The complet- est edition of Marvell's works is that by Captain Edward Thomp- son, in 3 vols. 4to ; and the best account of his life is that written by Hartley Coleridge. The Tract that follows has never been included in any edition of Marvell's works, though its merits well entitle it to such a place, and its authenticity is indisputable. In Maiwcll's day it was un- hesitatingly ascribed to him. Calaray, speaking of the tract to which it is a reply, saj'S, " Mr. Danson wrote against this tract, but I know not that Mr. IIowc took any notice of him ; though the ingenious Andrew Marvell, Esq., made a very witty and en- tertaining reply to him." " The point, however," as Mr. Rogers in his life of Howe well observes, " would be sufficiently clear, even if this testimony were wanting. The internal evidence alone would decide it. None who are in the .slightest degree acquainted with Audi"ew Marvell's peculiar vein of humour can mistake any PREFATORY NOTICE. 7& half-dozen pages as the composition of any other author." Mr. Howe's admirable tract, which occupies the first place in this vol- ume, was attacked from' various quarters. The learned but by no means judicious Gale inserted some animadversions on it in the last part of his " Court of the Gentiles." To these Howe replied in a Postscript to his treatise. His other two assailants were non- conformist ministers, both of whom attached only their initials to their performances; — the one John Troughton, and the other Thomas Danson, an intimate friend and fellow - collegiate of Howe's. The full title of Danson's work is "De Causa Dei; or a Vindication of the Common Doctrine of Protestant Divines con- cerning Predetermination, viz. The Interest of God, as the first cause in all the actions as such of rational creatures, from the in- vidious consequences -with which it is burdened by Mr. John Howe, in a late Letter and Postscript of God's Prescience, by T. D. 1 678." — The following Tract is intrinsically valuable, but it has the addi- tional recommendation of rareness in an uncommon degi-ee. As the only copy known to be in existence belongs to Dr. Williams' Library, Red Cross Street, London, it seems highly desirable that it should be placed beyond the hazard of being entirely lost. EEMAEKS UPON A LATE DISmGENUOUS DISCOURSE, ETC. Op all vocations to which men addict themselves, or are dedi- cated, I have always esteemed that of the ministry to be the most noble and happy employment ; as being more peculiarly directed to those two great ends, the advancement of Grod's glory, and the promoting of man's salvation. It hatli seemed to me. as if they who have chosen, and are set apart for that work, did, by the continual opportunity of conversing with their Maker, enjoy a state like that of Paradise ; and in this superior, that they are not also, as Adam, put in " to dress and keep a garden ;" but are, or ought to be, exempt from the necessity of all worldly avocations. Yet, upon nearer consideration, they likewise appear to partake of the common infelicities of human condition. For, although they do not, as others, eat their bread in the sweat of their brows (which some divines account to be, though in' the pulpit, indecent), yet the study of their brain is more than equivalent ; and even the theological ground is so far under the curse, that no field runs out more in thorns and thistles, or requires more pains to disencumber it. Such 1 understand to be those peevish questions which have overgrown Christianity ; wherewith men's minds are not only rent and entangled, but from whence they can no more hope for any wholesome nourishment, than to "gather grapes from thorns, or figs from thistles." And, if I may so far pursue the allegory, this curse upon divinity, as that upon the earth, seems to F 82 REMARKS UPON A LATE have proceeded also from tasting that forbidden fruit, of the " tree of knowledge of good and evil." For, in general, many divines, out 'of a vain aiFectation of learning, have been tempted into inquiries too curious, after those things which the wisdom of God hath left impervious to human under- standing, further than they are revealed. And hence, instead of those allowed and obvious truths of faith, repentance, and the new creature, (yet these too have their proper weeds that pester them,) there have sprung up endless disputes concerning the unsearchable things of God, and which are agitated by men, for the most part, with such virulence and intricacy, as manifest the subtilty and malice of the serpent that hath seduced them. But, more particularly, that very knowledge of good and evil, the disquisition of the causes from w^hence, and in what manner they are derived, hath been so grateful to the controversial female appetite, that even the divines have taken of it as " a fruit to be desired to make them wise," and given to their ])eople, and they have both eaten, at the peril of God's displeasure and their own happiness. Whereas, that second chapter of Genesis contains the plain history of good and evil, and (not to mention so many attestations to it of the Old and New Testaments) what other comment needs there, for what belongs to good, than that, James i. 17, that it is from God only, " that every good giving, and every perfect gift descendeth ?" And, as to evil, that also of St. James is sufficient conviction, ch. i. 13, 14, " Let no man say, when he is tempted, I was tempted of God ; God cannot be tempted with evil, neither tempteth he any man ; but every man is tempted, when he is drawn aside bv his own lusts and enticed." Or that of the same apostle, ch. iv. 1, "From whence come wars and fightings among vou?" (and even that logomachia, I fear, with which this question is vexed,) " Come they not hence ? even from your lusts that fight in your members." And there is no examin- iuo- Christian but must find both these truths evidently wit- nessed by his own conscience. Nevertheless, the thcologants of former and later times, not content Avith what is held forth in Scripture, have at- temi)ted to clamber and palm up higher, by the philosophy of that school where each of them hath first practised, and DISINGENUOUS DISCOURSE, &C. 83 have drawn God's prescience and predetermination upon this occasion, into debate ; arguing upon such points as no man, unless he were prior and precedent to the First Cause, can have the understanding to comprehend and judge of: and most of them do but say and unsay ; and while in words they all deny God to be the author of sin, yet in effect, and by the manner of their reasoning, they affirm it ; I therefore, being both apprehensive of the danger in such arguments, and more particularly conscious of mine own weakness, shall not presume to interpose my opinion in the differences about this matter, further than to say, — That if men by this fancied " opening of their eyes," have attained to see more clearly, and acknowledge the wickedness of their own actions, it re- sembles the modesty of our first parents, discerning their " nakedness :" but, if men shall also assert a predeterminative concourse of God to our evil, it seems to have too much of original perverseness, and of that fallen shortness of reason, whereby they would have found a nudity in the Creator, and. did implicitly reject their fault upon him, for the " serpent that he had ipade," and the " woman that he had given.'' But if any man there be that can reconcile this contro- versy, and so many more that arise out of it ; (for all the most important doctrines of Christianity serve on the one side, and all the fiercest questions of religion on the other, depending for truth and falsehood upon the success of this engagement,) if he can extinguish all those ill consequences, dull distinctions, and inconsistent notions, which have been levied in this quarrel, and reduce each party within the due limits of Scripture and saving knowledge ; such a person indeed deserves all commendation. And such an one I thought I had met with, nor yet see reason, notwithstanding all the late attempts upon him, to alter my opinion ; in a book entitled, " The Reconcileableness of God's Prescience of the sins of Men, with the Wisdom and Sincerity of his Counsels, Exhortations, and whatsoever other means He uses to prevent them ; in a Letter to the Honourable Eobert Boyle, Esquire;" and in a "Postscript to the late Letter of the Reconcileableness of God's Prescience, &c., by John Howe, the Author of that Letter." Yet there was one passage in the close of his " Letter," p. 84 REMARKS UPON A LATE 58, which seemed, as I thought, to lie open to censure ; where he asked pardon, as " having huddled it up ruostly in the intervals of a troublesome long journey." It seemed a piece too well elaborate to have been perfected amidst the hurry of the road, the noise of inns, and the nausea of the packet-boat. And how could he hope, after saying this, in so captious an age as we live, to escape some reflexion ? but that at least men would inquire Avhether he went by stage-coach, or on horseback ; both which are professed enemies to medi- tation and judgment ? (for it is probable he had not that ancient accommodation of horse-litters, wherein, without any impediment to their thoughts, men travelled with all the privacy and equipage of a closet,) whether he had not lost his way or fallen among thieves, and how he found himself after his journey ? Avith all the questions that men are sub- ject to at their arrival home, and which even when asked in civility, yet are troublesome. He might, had it not been for the jogging, have remembered how unfortunate most writers have been in such excuses, and what advantage ill-natured men have taken to misinterpret them. So he that apologised for using a foreign tongue was told, that no man had pro- hibited him his native language in his own country. Others, alleging that they had at the same time a fit of the stone, gout, or other distemper, have been taxed, as lying under no obligation of publishing their infirmities, but who might, however, have cured themselves of that of writing. And he that pretended to treat at once of a serious, while he was amused with " a more comfortable importance," was adver- tised, that he ought therefore to have so long abstained either from the one or the other.* But, in earnest, this confession of Mr. Howe's is so far from any such arrogance, that it rather argues his modesty. For, if some can even in riding name all the contrary motions, till they have by memory played out a game at chcs8 (which was first invented as an emblem oi predetermination), why should it be more difiicult, or less allowable, to one of Mr. Howe's abilities, in the in- terruptions of travel, to give a mate also to that question ? The worst therefore that can be said of him, in allusion cither * A reference to " the Rehearsal Transposed." DISINGENUOUS DISCOURSE, &C. 85 to his " Letter " or his journey, is — " at poteraf tiitior esse donii." Yet seeing this was tlie greatest fault that I re- marked in reading him over, I would not pass it by without • notice, lest I might have cause to suspect myself of a partial- ity, which I desire not that others should exercise in mine own particular. But for the rest, whereas the things considerable in all dis- courses are tlie subject, the end, the reasoning, the method, and the style; I must profess, thaf as far as I understand, I have met with few manual treatises, that do in all these respects equal it. For the subject, it appears in the title ; than which • there was none of greater dignity to be handled, or of greater use, if rightly explained and comprehended. And no less is that of predetermination, which he only treats of collaterally ; and upon which therefore, in hope to find him less prepared, he hath been attacked, as in the flank, with most vigour. His end was most commendable, being to make the paths straight, and remove those stumbling-blocks which the asperity of others had laid in the way to heaven; to rectify men's apprehensions concerning God, and leave them with- out pretence for negligence in their duties, or despair of per- formance; much less for despite against the Creator. His arguing then is plain and solid, for exadence, rather than dis- pute; nor does he either throw the dust of antique distinc- tions in the eyes of his readers, to blind them; or yet raise the spectres of ancient authors, or conjure their venerable names, to frighten men out of their senses and under- standing; but declares against all the prejudice or advantage by such proceeding, as unlawful charms, and prohibited wea- pons in the controversy. His method thereafter is direct and coherent, his style perspicuous and elegant : so that it is, in short, a manly discourse, resembling much, and expressing the human perfection ; in the harmony of language, the sym- metry of parts, the strength of reason, the excellency of its end, which is so serious, that it is no defect in the similitude with man, that the Letter contains nothing in it suitable to the property of laughter. All which put together, and although it does, and must everywhere partake also of human imperfection, it might have been hoped capable of that civility which men, and 86 REMARKS UPON A LATE especially learned men, but most of all divines, do usually, or should allow, to one another. That it should not be made ri- diculous, being writ in so good earnest; nor assaulted, being so inoffensive; much less that it should be defaced, mutilated, " stabbed in so many places, and the author through it, which is even in writing a kind of felony. Yet this hath been its misfortune in a rencounter with an immodest and hectoring discourse, pretending to the title, " De Causa Dei : or a Vin- dication of the Common Doctr^ie of Protestant Divines con- cerning Predetermination, viz. The Interest of God, as the First Cause, in all the Actions, as such, of Rational Creatures, from the Invidious Consequences with which it is burthened, by Mr. John Howe, in a late Letter and Postscript of God's Prescience; by T. D.'' By which first letters, seeing it ap- pears that he desires to pass incognito, I will so far observe good manners, as to interpret them only " The Discourse," heartily wishing that there were some way of finding it guilty, without reflecting upon the author; which I shall accordingly endeavour, that I may both preserve his, what- soever, former reputation, and leave him a door open to in- genuity for the future. But The Discourse justifies itself as if it had been typified by Paul's withstanding Peter to his face, when he came to Antioch, (so easy is it to patronise human passions under pretence of the cause of God, and apostolical example) T. D. p. 23. whereas it rather resembles in the bravery, though not in the occasion, that exploit of Peter's, Matt. xxvi. 51, 52, for which our Saviour, though done in his defence, rebuked him; adding, "They that take the sword, shall perish by the sword:" and the taking the pen hath seldom better success, if handled in the same manner. I therefore, having had the leisure to read it over, and thereby the opportunity of a second caution, how the unruly quill is to be managed, have thought that I could not at present render a better account of that time to myself or others, tlian by publishing these remarks; that, as Mr. Howe's Letter may serve for a pattern of what is to be imitated, so The Discourse may remain as a mark (the best use it can be put to) of what ought to be avoided in all writing of contro- versies, especially by divines, in those that concern religion. The nature of this matter would admit of no better method, DISINGENUOUS DISCOURSE, &C. 87 than that the errors observable should be distinguished under several heads, to each of which the particular instances are referred. The first article that I prefer against The Dis- course, is; Its trifling and cavilling about ivords, ivhen they affect not the cause. First instance. Mr. Howe, on purpose to prevent any such idle practice, had, in the last page of his Postscript, plainly summed up the constant sense both of that and his Letter which he would abide by : " That God doth not by an efficacious influence universally move and determine men to all their actions, even those actions which are most wicked." Here was the subject ready stated, against which, if any thing. The Discourse ought to have directly applied. But instead of that T. D. p. 1. it saith, " Mr. Howe gives us his sense in various terms, and such as seem repugnant to each other. One while that which he denies, is a precleter- minative concurrence, and predeterminative concourse; another while, it is predetermining influence, and a determinative in- fluence, and efficacious influence." This is the same in T. D. as if its " concurrent wherry-men," p. 27, after they had taken in their fare, should be long pulling off their doublets, and then carry a man to another stairs than they were di- rected. The one shows that they had but little heart to their labour; the other, that they know not the river, unless per- haps they have a design, if they can find a place convenient, to rifle the passenger. For Mr. Howe had expressly pitched upon that one term of efficacious influence. But as for those other repeated by The Discourse, they were such as Mr. Howe found in the controversy, not of his own making, nor therefore is he accountable for them: but, however, it was his ingenuity to mention them ; and having done so, to bind himself to a point, to one word of the most certain signification, as a place where any adversary might always be sure to speak with him. Yet it, to find out matter for discourse, and to show its great reading, tells us, as if that were the business, what Strangius saith, and what Dr. Twisse, concerning pre- determination and concourse; and again what Strangius, of 88 REMARKS UPON A LATE tlie difFereuce between concourse and influence, p. 2. and saith that, " as for those two phrases, predeterminative con- currence, and predeterminative concourse, they are in effect contradictio in adjecto." And so let them be, upon condi- tion that not Mr. Howe, (as The Discourse would have it) but the first inventor may be bound to answer for it. For the truth is, the brothers of dispute do usually so handle their matter, and refine so far, till they want at last either words to express their meaning, or meaning to express in words. And so it hath fared with these imaginers of the predeterminative concourse or concurrence. It is very well that this scene of debate lies in Oxford (or London), for, upon these terms, it would be impossible at Newmarket, where Prce and Con run their heats, to decide any match without sending for a judge to the next university; and it is less difficult for Pro and Con, or for Con and Non-con, to set their horses together. Yet suppose, as The Discourse af- firms, that thia predeterminative concourse, or concurrence had been words of Mr. Howe's own choosing ; whereas he on the conti'ary rejects them for that of efficacious influence, the im- propriety however therein had not been greater, than of that phrase -which T. D. p. 25. uses, and hath right to, shmdta- neous concourse, which is, if I mistake not, as much as to say, conconcourse. The same (if greater be the same) "trifling and cavil- ling about words that affect not the cause," it is to say, T. D. p. 2. " As for that latter phrase, influence, which Mr. Howe makes equipollent with the former concourse in these words. Post. p. 67. ' I here affect not the curiosity to distinguish these two terms, as some do;' I had rather he should hear Stran- gius again than me, blaming his not aftecting ' that curiosity of distinction,' and then it cites Strangius de Vol. Dei, lib. i. c. 2. p. 59., assigning the difference between them. This is a trivial litigation about words, where the thing intended is sufficiently understood (or rather is intelligible), and, whether it be said influence or concourse makes no more to the busi- ness, than the impropriety objected to predetermining or previous concourse, which any indifi'erent reader can see to have been spoken generally, of a priority of the supposed in- fluence on God's part, not in time, but in nature and cau- DISINGENUOUS DISCOURSE, &;C. 89 sality. Strangius, indeed, writing a large treatise concerning that subject, distinguished all the terms more accurately: but Mr. Howe, it being there done to his hand, and writing on the by only two or three pages, had not the space or the oc- casion to enlarge upon them. And it is an infirmity which Mr. Howe, I observe, is much subject to, that he seldom useth any notional terms or distinctions, where he can make men comprehend him better without them ; and at that indeed he liath a singular faculty. His very saying that he " affected not, there, the curiosity to distinguish those two terms, as some do," shows it ; but withal, that he was not ignorant of them, and that he also could distinguish when he saw reason, and in time and place convenient. The Discourse might with more cause have accused him of ambiguity, and raised scruples about his curiosity ; for that is taken in many several sig- nifications. As for example, sometimes it is used for a com- mendable exquisiteness in things considerable, and worth the labour. Otherwhiles it is described, " Quoties plus diligentia; quam oportebat impendiraus rebus, vel nostris, vel alienis. Nostris, quum minima quajque disquirimus et nuUius frugis : alienis, quum de rebus ca^terorum occultioribus non satis cum pudore perscrutamur aut interrogamus." So not Strangius, nor Doctor Twisse, but Cicero. Which that I may do equal right to The Discourse in translating Latin, is to say, " That is called curiosity, when men use an impertinent diligence in things relating to themselves or others : to themselves, when they are busy about every trifle, and what is of no moment : to others, when they exercise a scrutiny, or ask questions be- yond modesty, concerning their private aftairs." And I had rather it should hear Cicero again, " than me blaming" it for this latter sort of curiosity : " Eeperiam multos, vel innumer- abiles potius, non tam curiosos, nee tam molestos quam vos estis." That is, ' I could find many or rather innumerable men, neither so troublesome nor so curious as you are.' And Quintilian explains it further : " Est etiam quae parergia vo- catur, supervacua, ut sic dixerim, operositas : ut a diligente curiosus, et a religione superstitio distat," that is, ' There is also that which is called parergia, a superfluous and laborious nicety ; as a curious man difters from a diligent, or super- stition from religion.' But besides all this, curiosus signifies 90 REMARKS UPON A LATE an informer : in which sense, I suppose, both Mr. Howe and T, D. would be loath to accept it. Yet perhaps I may gratify them in the authority or quotation. Suet. Aug. c. 27. "Nam et pinarmm equitem Romanum, quam concionante se ad- missa turba paganorum, apud milites, subscribere qusedam animadvertisset, curiosum et speculatorem ratus, coram con- fodi imperavit." Which text, if a little helped in the trans- lating, might serve them to notable purpose : ' but however so it is, that taking the knight to be a spy and an informer, he caused him forthwith to be slain in his presence.' And lastly in the code, Tit. de Curiosis et Stationariis : curiosus is a postmaster, if Mr. Howe be disposed at any time to take another " long troublesome journey," and do not " disaftect also that curiosity." It had been much more to the purpose to have learned these several acceptations of curiosity, than to have exercised it in the worst sense, in such needless disquisitions, when a question stated in other terms was in expectation every minute to be disputed. But to say that in those words, " I here affect not the curiosity to distinguish these two terras of concourse or in- fiuence, as some do," was to make the latter phrase " influence equipollent with the former concourse," is gratis, or rather ingratius dictum, and ought not to have been but upon con- sultation first with Mr. Howe, to have had his concurrence ; no nor then neither. For should Mr. Howe be never so much of opinion, as he seems otherwise, that they are equi- pollent, yet it can never be true that these words do infer it. As suppose that I should say, ' I aftect not here the curiosity to distinguish betwixt the candour and the acuteness of Tlie Discourse in this particular,' do I therefore think them equi- pollent, or that one of them hatli not the stronger ingredi- ence ? though indeed there is little of either. Another (for this hath been too pregnant to say a second) instance to the same head is where The Discourse, p. 26. tells us ; " It is an unaccountable inadvertency, (for to salve his honour, so I will call it, rather than a slip of judgment,) to produce cursing and swearing for instances of actions down- right, or for the substance of them evil," &c. This indeed is curiosity in the highest degree of perfection, if (for I must be aware too of such exactness) there be degrees of perfec- DISINGENUOUS DISCOURSE, &C. 91 tion. And a heavy charge it is, which I know not whence it could light upon Mr, Howe, but that the curious are likewise given for the most part to be censorious, where they have no reason. For Mr. Howe, Post. pp. 68, 69, examining an argument used by some for God's predeterminative concur- rence to wicked actions, because there are no actions of man on earth so good, which have not some mixture of sin in them, &c. saith, " This argument must be thus conceived : that if God concur by determinative influence to the imper- fectly good actions of faith, repentance, love to himself, prayer ; therefore to the acts of enmity against himself, cursing, idola- try, blasphemy, &c. And is it not a mighty consequence, if to actions that are good quoad substantiam, therefore to such as are in the substance of them evil? We ourselves can in a remoter kind concur to the actions of others. Because you may afford yourself your leading concurrence to actions imperfectly good, therefore may you to them that are down- right evil? because to prayer, therefore to cursing and swear- ing? and then ruin men for the actions you induced them to? You will say, God may rather, but sure he can much less do so than you. How could you be serious in the proposal of this question ? " For this argument had been proposed by way of question, and I have on purpose set down Mr. Howe's answer at length, that it might be evident, without further brangling, how little, I mean how no, cause there was for this animadversion upon him, speaking expressly of such cursing and swearing only as is evil quoad substantiam. For cer- tainly those " acts of enmity against God himself," which Mr. Howe there enumerates, cursing, and then idolatry, blasphemy, &c. are, and were so understood by him, and by all but such as take care to the contrary, as much evil in themselves as that adultery which The Discourse itself owns to be so, p. 72. " because no end or circumstance can make it good." So that this ado is made for Mr. Howe's not saying profane cursing and swearing : indeed a very heinous and notorious omission ; even as it would be for a man, so often as he uses the words and or the, not to distinguish or tell his reader, that he intends and in an exegetical sense, or the in an emphatical; or whether in their ordinary capacity. How " unaccount- able soever this inadventency" were in Mr. Howe, it is well 92 REMARKS UPON A LATE The Discourse did not call our Saviour to account, Matt. v. 34, for forbidding swearing in general terms, nor St. James, V. 12, for the same as to swearing, or ch. iii. 9, 10, because the same apostle does not there descant upon cursing moi'e distinctly, and add profane to its character. But had The Discourse done so, it would have been obvious to every man, that the pen deserved the same brand which is set upon the tongue in that chapter. I wonder how in this lyncean per- spicacity it oversaw a more remarkable error of Mr. Howe's about " actions in their substance evil ; " where in the same page, 69, he writes qoad* substantiam, which could not be Mr. Howe's inadvertency; for in that paragraph he also spells conseqence and qestion in the like manner, and therefore must by the same consequence as that of cursing and swear- ing, have been a slip of his judgment. But, had it continued to be so unmercifully accurate, Mr. Howe might perhaps have told it its own; where p. 27. it mentions that "evil act of Adam's eating a tree" (for I see we ai'e all mortal), which is a phrase of very hard digestion. Other proofs of this head I reserve till further occasion, two or three instances upon each, being like so many witnesses sufficient for its conviction. The second article follows. Its iynorance and confusion about the matter that is in controversy. First instance. The Discourse, p. 3. saith: "The ambi- guity of Mr. Howe's phrases removed, and the sense of them being brought to a certainty, I assert the contradictory to his ])roposition : the term efficacious suiting well enough, if Mr. Howe intend by it an infallibility of the event, or the certain production of those actions which God hath an influence upon." Now, for the better understanding of this, it is fit to observe that Mr. Howe's proposition is this: " God doth not by an efficacious influence universally move and determine men to all their actions, even those actions that are most wicked." They that assert the contradictory, must therefore affirm that * It was not uncommon .aljout the time tliis tract was written to write q instead of qa. Gataker does so uniformly. — 'Ed. DISINGENUOUS DISCOURSE, &C. 93 God does : and much good may it do them. But The Dis- course, in the words before cited, capitulates that Mr. Howe should by efficacious intend infallihility, &c. It might almost as well have said transubstantiation, which we shall meet with, p. 35. hereafter. Now it is indeed fit that a respondent should gratify his opponent as far as may consist with civility and safety. But here arises a case of conscience; whether a man may give another leave, that desires it, to speak nonsense. I say no. For nonsense and idle words are of the same notion. But if he be one that I have no power over, and whom I can by no amicable means hinder from speaking nonsense, I, after having used all good endeavours, am excused. But here the case is stronger, where one shall not only take the liberty himself, but oblige me too to speak nonsense. To this I say, that to the best of my understanding, I never will, nor ought to do it in respect to any man. Yet no less a favour, or favours, doth The Discourse demand of Mr, Howe, in requiring that the term efficacious may be expounded by infallihility, that is, in effect, the most potent influence by no influence; for what influence hath infallibility upon the actions of another, or upon anything ? And this, if it should yet obtain it of Mi". Howe, yet would consist as ill with his own following words, or certain production; wherein he more than implies that in- fallibility and certain production are all one : whereas a man may certainly and infallibly know what he never produces, and some too, we see, produce what they never understand. But if The Discourse shall still opiniatre in this matter, let it, to try how well it suits, strike efficaciotis, for experiment, out of the question, and insert instead of it infallibility and certain production, and then see if there be any sense in it or grammar. Second instance. The Discourse, p. 9. pretends to give a definition of predetermination. Predetermination, it saith, " is thus defined ; A transient action of God, which excites every creature to act." Now it is generally known, that the two most perfect creatures in all logic, are a demon- stration and a definition. How good The Discourse is at the first shall afterwards be demonstrated. But as to a definition, it always consists, as being a dialectic animal, of a body, 94 REMARKS UPON A LATE which is the genus, and a difference, wliich is the soul of the thing defined; but this will in neither of these appear to be perfect or rational. For the genus here is action, and yet a ie'w lines below it saith, that " predetermination is to be con- ceived of per modum principii, under the notion of a principle, or cause of the creatures acting, but concourse only per modum actionis." Predetermination was but even before under the genus of action, and now of cause ; so that The Discourse hath been very liberal indeed of body to the defini- tion, having given it two rather than fail, though commonly we account such births to be errors of nature and monstrous. Had The Discourse interposed some pages, it might have only argued a default of memory ; but this inconsistence at one sight, and before its pen could be taken off, shows that de- fect not to have been, as with some persons, recompensed in judgment. And then for the difference that is assigned in this definition, it happens here, as usually where there is most body, that there is least soul. For there is nothing else left to be the difterence, but, " whereby God excites every crea- ture to act." If this be all. The Discourse might indeed very well say, p. 7. that Mr. Howe wouljj " be forced to grant pre- determination ;" for how could he possibly avoid it, when the antagonist defines it in Mr. Howe's own words ? who saith, Postscript, p. 72. " In reference to sinful actions ; by this in- fluence God doth not only sustain men who do them, and continue to them their natural faculties and powers whereby they are done ; but also, as the first mover, so far excites and actuates those powers, as that they are apt and habile for any congenerous action, to which tliey have a natural designation, and whereto they are not sinfully disinclined." Whereby " God excites the creature to act," saith The Discourse ; whereby " God excites and actuates those powers to," &c., saith Mr. Howe very fully here, and in aU other ])laces to the same sense ; so that if Tlie Discourse either understood Mr. Howe or itself, either its own definition, or the common ques- tion, what place was there left for arguing, unless to debate for debate's sake ? Usually when both parties say the same thing, there is an end of the discourse, but however of the dispute : there is, as iar as I see, no doubt to be made but Mr. Howe, as he hath, will grant this predetermination even DISINGENUOUS DISCOURSE, &C. 95 without " being forced,'' but yet upon condition, and it is but reasonable that The Discourse will retract its own foregoing words, p. 5. " This act of God is called predetermination, be- cause it limits the creature to this action rather than to that." This indeed will serve The Discourse for argument either of discourse or dispute with itself, being definition in eftect against definition to prevent monstrosity, supplying herebv two souls to the two bodies. But till it be better agreed with it, and can come to a clearer understanding with itself, no third person needs or can be interested in the contest further than as a spectator of some strange sight for his money, like the double child from Sussex. Third instance. The Discourse cites Mr. Howe, Post- script, p. 71. for having there said concerning " God's ex- citing man to act " those foregoing words that I come last from mentioning. But those words are not p. 71, but 72., and the mistake in the citation is probably an error only of the printer's. Though indeed in that p. 71. Mr. Howe with much perspicuity declares the same sense and opinion which he gives in other expressions, p. 72. For p. 71. he saith, "It hath been the care and designment of the divine wisdom so to order the way of dispensation towards the several sorts of creatures, as not only not, ordinarily, to impose upon them what they could not be patient of, but so as that their powers and faculties might be put upon the exercises whereof they were capable, and to provide that neither their passive ca- pacity should be overcharged, nor their active be unem- ployed." But the words repeated and excepted against are to be found in his p. 72, and upon them it is that The Dis- course fixes this unreasonable and ill interpretation and cen- sure ; " If by exciting and actuating the powers he means that God reduces them to act, he hath taken a large jump from Durandus to Twisse:" and so goes on to prove that ill- favoured and worse conceived suggestion. It ought suflS- ciently to have prevented this usage that Mr. Howe's Letter, p. 23. hath said, "That which hath too apparently had greatest actual efiicacy with many in asserting predetermi- nation, hath been the authority of this or that man of reputa- tion, and the force of that art of imputing a doctrine already under a prejudicial doom to some or other ill-reputed former 96 REMARKS UPON A LATE writer, I profess not to be skilled in the use of that sort of weapons." And therefore, not being himself the aggressor, but challenged and defied by another, he ought to have had the choice of them. What signifies Durandus here, but to call a man ill names instead of coming to the point ? and what Dr. Twisse, but to wear mail, or bring a second when Mr. Howe comes naked and single ? It is not what this or that man, but what truth saith, that is to be regarded ; what liberty soever The Discourse here takes to the contrary. It can by no means be made true, that Mr. Howe by these words, " God as the first mover so far excites and actuates those powers, as that they are apt and habile for any congen- erous action," professes himself of Dr. Twisse's opinion, no more than that he is of Durandus's after having thus declared his own as clearly as it is possible for any man's meaning to be minuted or explained. For Durandus holds only a mere conservation of the faculty, Dr. Twisse a predetermi- nation. But Mr. Howe, to avoid Durandus on the one hand, saith, " that in reference to sinful actions (for of these is the question) God doth not only sustain men who do them, and continue to them their natural faculties and powers," (which was all Durandus pretended to,) " but also so far excites and actuates those powers, as that they are apt and habile for any congenerous action," &c., whereas, if he would have spoke with Dr. Twisse, he must have said, ' but also excites and actuates those powers determinately to this or that action,' which would have differed the whole breadth of heaven from Mr. Howe's hypothesis. And certainly such an actual influ- ence as Mr. Howe describes, added to the natural faculty, is, if men look near, very distinguishable from mere conservation of that faculty on the one, and predetermination on the other side. For a faculty conserved, as a faculty in actu primo, (as men call it,) includes no such liability and present promp- titude in itself to action, as Mr. Howe proposes ; since then it could never suffer a privation of it but what were irre- coverable. Whereas common experience shows faculties may be sometimes unapt for action, and may be supposed always so, if every moment Avhen thc}' act they be not rendered apt by a superadded influence, which may habilitate them for action without determining them to this or that. So that all DISINGENUOUS DISCOURSE, &C. 97 the confusion herein objected to Mr. Howe, is to be referred to that head upon which I have charged it ; and the great jump is no more than what brain-sick passengers, being carried alongst by the wind and sea, in the heaving of their vessel imagine of the trees and steeples. For he is still in the same place, but no man knows whither away The Discourse may be driven, or what port it is bound to, and whether it do not sail without steerage, compass, or anchor. A fourth instance of its ignorance and confusion about the matter in controversy, is its varying, and that so often and so materially, the terms of the question. First of all it told us that it asserted the contradictory of Mr. Howe's pro- position ; which must be therefore by undertaking to prove (as was said formerly) " That God doth by efficacious influ- ence universally move and determine men to all their actions, even those actions that are most wicked/' T. D. p. .3. Yet immediately after having joined issue upon this, it hath a second device, p. 4, and " better likes Strangius his state of the question, viz. whether God does determine or pre- determine all creatures to all and each of their actions." And then, thirdly, p. o, it tells us more fully what the ques- tion is, and how its predetermination is to be understood, explaining it thus (though not fully enough), viz., " an act of God's by which he limits the creature to this action rather tlian to that." Such an act The Discourse hath granted at last, and it were to be reasonably expected, that, after having transformed the question thus oft to its own understanding and convenience, this contradictory at least to Mr. Howe's proposal should be adhered to as far as it goes, and main- tained : for otherwise what occasion was there, or what em- ployment is there left for this spirit of contradiction ? unless to rattle through the air, make vain apparitions, or in a calm day on a sudden to stir up a tempest. But if this be The Discourse's anti-proposition, I that intermeddle not as an opinionist either way, but endeavour only to comprehend as far as I can its meaning, shall for that purpose put a case in its own tenns. Suppose a man to meet with some afflicting calamity which tends to provoke, among other his passions, that of aversion or hatred. He considers this or that man mav have contri- 98 REMARKS UPON A LATE butod to his calamity : he considers also that God may have had a hand in bringing it u}3on him : he considers, perhaps, (and is yet undetermined, till God at least determine him,) whether to put forth one act of hatred toward this man or another, toward that man or another, toward God, or whether only to hate the evil itself that afflicts him. (For it cannot be that he should hate this man with the same act of hatred with which he hates another man, nor can he hate God by the same act whereby he hates either of them, or tlie afflict- ing evil that hath befallen him.) At last he is limited to this I'ather than another action, and apprehending with that profane person, 2 Kings vi. 33, " Behold this evil is from the Lord, what shall I wait for the Lord any longer?" he pours out his hatred against God himself. The question now is, who limits him to this action rather than to another ? Shall Ave say it is God ? The Discourse, holding the affirmative, must say it is God. This is indeed a dreadful representation of the case, but a true one. Nor is it therefore to be wondered, the question being so frightful, that The Discourse starts and runs away from it so often ; and after all this, p. 9. would forget that " predeter- mination is an act by which God limits the creature to this action rather than that," and undertakes to define it, exclu- sively to those words, (for the definition includes the whole nature of the thing defined) no more but " a transient action of God whicli excites every creature to act." And yet, fourthly, considering that the cause required no less ; after taking breath, and comforting its spirits. The Discourse re- turns again in part to the question, telling us in the bottom of the same page, 9, " Tliat it is in ])lain words whether God does move men to all their natural actions, and so to one rather than another." And thus now we have a fourth state of the question, but yet very difierent from the first ; the affirmative of which was undertaken to be defended. In short, the main controversy is about determining; but tliis fourth question does not so much as mention it either in word or in sense. For the determining in Mr. Howe's pro- position imports and is so ex]iressed, not only a moving men, l)ut an efficacious moving them. (There are many motions which may be ineft'ectual.) Nor only a moving them to this DISINGENUOUS DISCOURSE, &;C, 99 action rather than to that, but also to do this wicked action (for of such is the controversy) rather than forbear it. What kind of practice is this ? It is a worse thing to adulterate truth than money. The terms of the question are the stand- ard. But at this rate no man can know what is meum or tuicm, which is his own hypothesis, and which his adversary's, while what he issued in current sense and weight is returned him clipped or counterfeit. But the observation of this manner of dealing hath put me upon another thought much differing, and which at first perhaps may seem something extravagant. The camel is a beast admirably shaped for burthen, but so lumpish withal, that nothing can be more inept for feats of activity. Yet men have therefore invented how to make it dance, that, by how much unnatural, the spectacle might appear more absurd and ridiculous. Its keeper leads it upon a pavement so thoroughly warmed, that the creature, not able to escape nor abide it, shifts first one foot, and then another to relieve itself, and would, if possible, tread the air on all four, the ground being too hot for it to stand upon. He in the meantime traverses and trips about it at a cooler distance, striking some volunteer notes on his Egyptian kit, like a French dancing-master. But, knowing that his scholar is both in too much pain, and too dull to learn his measures, he therefore upon frequent observation accords a tune to its figure and footing, which comes to the same account. So that, after daily repeating the lesson in private, they seem both at last to be agreed upon a new Arabic saraband. Having thus far succeeded, he tries next whether what he taught by torture be not confirmed by custom, and if a cool hearth may not have the like etfect. The camel no sooner hears his fiddle, but, as if its ears burned with the music, and its memory were in its feet, the animal bestirs forthwith its long legs, and, with many an antic motion, and ill-favoured coupe, gratifies the master's patience and expectation. When he finds, upon constant experiment, that it never fails him, he thenceforward makes it public, and, having compounded with the master of the revels, shows it, with great satisfac- tion to the vulgar, every Bartholomew fair in Grand Cairo. I would not too much vex the similitude, but was run upon 100 REMARKS UPOX A LATE tins by a resemblance it hath ■nith some, who, not being framed at all for controversy, and finding the question too hot for them, do, by their flinching and shuffling from it, represent a disputation, till it is grown habitual to them, and they change ground as often, and have the same ajiprehen- sion of the sound of an argument, as the camel of an instru- ment. And yet The Discourse hath a fifth loose foot to clap on at need, as if four had not sufficed to prevaricate with, p. 11. where it exercises its uncouth nimbleness in syllogizing : but never was anything more ridiculously awkward. Mr. Howe had. Letter, p. 20, mentioned an argument used by those who hold the affirmative of predetermination ; " That it ne- cessarily belongs to the original and fountain Being to be the first cause of whatsoever being ; and consequently that what there is of positive being in any the most wicked action, must principally owe itself to the determinative productive influence of this first and sovereign cause ; otherwise it would seem that there were some being that were neither prinmm nor a primo." This was as plainly and as distinctly laid out as possible, but must forsooth be cast into a logical figure, where the officiousness argues the fraud, as of those who make false plate embezzling part of the metal, and yet make the owner pay moreover for the fashion. This is The Dis- course's syllogism : " All positive beings are eft'ccts of the first cause. All sinful actions" (for, it adds, "this is our limitation,") " are positive beings ; ergo, All sinful actions, as actions, are eftects of the first cause." So that here, by a syllogistical legerdemain, that term so essential in their argu- ment, as cited by Mr. Howe, the " determinative productive influence of the first and sovereign cause,'' is cleanly con- veyed away out of sight ; the proposition undertaken to be maintained, that " God doth by an efficacious influence uni- versally move and determine men to all their actions, even those actions that arc most wicked ;" or, as it lately varied, " limits men to this action rather than to that," is turned out of doors by its own foster-father, the keeping of it being grown it seems too chargeable ; and all now that is infen-ed is only that " all sinful actions, as actions, are etl'ects of the first cause." And what is that to the purpose? If Mr. DISINGENUOUS DISCOURSE, &C. 101 Howe must neither be allowed the use of his own weapons, nor upon the ground which tb.ey both were agreed on, it ap- pears that his challenger, notwithstanding all its bravades, had no design, or but little disposition to meet him. The whole of this may in a just sense be granted without preju- dice to Mr. Howe's cause. For it matters not that they are effects, unless it be also said and proved that they are '' effects produced by God's determinative influence." Yet how much powder is spent without doing the last execution! First a categorical, then an hypothetical syllogism fired at him, then forces him to distinguish, which is among disputants next to crying quarter, but will not give it him; runs him through with three replies to his distinction, and leaves him dead upon the place. While the proposition is all this while un- touched, Mr. Howe is out of gunshot, and his adversary (if one that only skirmishes with himself, deserves to be called so) is afraid to take aim, and starts merely at the report of his own musket. Thus hath The Discourse five several times altered the property of the question; which is my fourth in- stance of its ignorance and confusion about the matter in controversy; unless it ought to be interpreted as an argu- ment rather of a strong brain, after so many times, and sud- denly turning round, not to have fallen down senseless. A fifth instance to the same head, Mr. Howe, Letter, p. 21. had said, " It seems infinitely to detract from the per- fection of the ever-blessed God, to affirm that he was not able to make a creature of such a nature, as, being continu- ally sustained by him, and supplied with power every mo- ment suitable to its nature, should be capable of acting, un- less what he thus enables he determine (that is, for it can mean no less thing, impel) it to do also." To this The Dis- course replies, p. 15. "If we should take liberty of judging things by their appearance at first sight, without giving our- selves the trouble of a strict disquisition" (take whether you will, the liberty or the trouble, only talk not so magisterially) " we might easily be seduced into an imagination that it does no less infinitely detract from the divine perfection to affirm ; that God was not able to make a creature of such a nature, as that it might continually sustain itself, without a supply of power every moment from God. For that opinion seems 102 REMARKS UPON A LATE to tie God to a sliorter tedder " (how trivial and irreverently spoken !) " than an ingenious artificer who can raise an edifice that shall last many years without any need of his help for I'eparations." Compare now these two together, and mark what this reasoning of The Discourse amounts to. Mr. Howe conceives (else it were very hard) that a creature may act, being enabled by a continual supply of power from God every moment. Therefore quoth it, a creature may be, with- out being sustained or supplied from God any moment. But this perhaps was only to show how ingenious its first appre- hensions, and how candid are its first inclinations; and whether it were " easily seduced " itself, or had a mind to seduce others, it likes this conceit so well that it cannot yet let it go, but subjoins immediately ; " And this I the rather take notice of, because I find it the sentiment of the most acute Suarez," &c. But, whereas others find their second tlioughts to be the more judicious, its judging thus at first sight seems more accurate than its second seeming: They, ih. " who deny God's immediate operation in every action of the creature, (which Mr. Howe seems to do in his answer now under discussion) will doubtless be compelled to deny that the creature does depend immediately upon the actual infiu- ence of God." So it quotes the most acute Suarez, Met. Disp. 20. This is a most exemplary and primitive charity, whereby The Discourse hath sold all its own acuteness to give it to the poor Suarez; so that it hath reduced itself to that desperate and utmost dulness, as herein to say, " They who deny what Mr. Howe seems by this answer to do," that is as much as to say. They who suppose with Mr. Howe that a creature may act being enabled by God every moment, Avithout being impelled, (which he above, and always mo- destly asserts,) will doubtless be " com]x41ed to deny " that tlie creature depends immediately upon the actual influence of God, which is tantamount in sense, which useth to be the meaning, as to say, it seems to be denied that the creature does depend, because it is affirmed to depend. Ought not bills to be put up for men afiected with so peculiar a dis- temper? I cannot in the whole Common Prayer find any that is proper for this occasion. Another instance (for they do so multiply on me in read- DISINGENUOUS DISCOURSE, &C. 103 ing, that I forget to number them, and yet they are so signal in their kind, that they are not to be omitted) is p. 96. and onwards ; the vain attempt to reconcile God's predetermining by efficacious influence to wicked actions with his wisdom and sincerity by the same mediums that wei'e used by Mr. Howe to reconcile his prescience of them; yet this is un- dertaken to be done from p. 96. for several pages forward, and with the same confidence which is always necessary to such as promise impossibilities. But it is in the meantime an high contempt of all other men, and presumption of one's own understanding that can embolden to such an argument. Who is there, unless Adam gave him his name, but sees the difference between having an influence upon men's wicked actions, and having no influence, which prescience, as such, cannot signify him to have that foreknows? But neverthe- less Mr. Howe hath expressly enough asserted, and explained the influence God hath on all human actions. For further instance, see what The Discourse saith, p. 61. and so along, struggling to bring the immediate concourse, which Mr. Howe speaks of and avows, under the same pre- judice with predetermination, which he disclaims and argues against: for all that idle endeavour might have been saved and prevented by a small supplement of understanding or memory. For Mr. Howe always distinguishes (and so might any ordinary capacity for him, should he have trusted either that or men's common ingenuity) between concurring, though never so immediately, by an influence which doth but enable to an action, and by that which doth determine to it, or im- pel. If any man do but carry this about with him, as Mr. Howe does through his whole troublesome journey, it is a certain remedy against all galling, at least by this argu- mentation. One thing I could not but remark here, p. 61. of The Discourse in passing, how jovial it is and bucksome, which is just the humour of tyrants, bloodily cruel, and yet at the same time full of dissoluteness and laughter : " I will pause a little, with the reader's leave, and try my skill what answer I can excogitate for Mr. Howe, which will not be a common friend to us both " (pleasant) " as we have been hitherto one to another, and I hope shall remain notwithstanding this 104 REMARKS UPON A LATE public contest." Dear Damon, doubtless. But I perceive not that Mr. Howe hath yet had any contest with you, nor, if I can persuade him, is he likely to have for the future, but will avoid you for several reasons. Is this your friendship'/ what then, and how terrible is your malice? The ancient contests of friendship, and which made some pairs so illus- trious, were which of them should die for tlie other, not which should cut the other's throat. The utmost that I have ob- served upon such public contests, or that I think a man is bound to in Christianity, hath been to pardon such a friend, and bid him do his office. Here is to be seen or played T. D. indeed, or " Amity a la Mode." But go on. " This dis- tinction is an open friend to us, and to which therefore upon all fit occasions we pay our respects." This is pretty, and most softly said, as if it were by the Great Mogul lying upon a silken bed, and leaning upon cushions. And besides, it is a new invention, being the first time this that ever I heard of a man that contracted friendship with a distinction ; but most wise men, (and so I think should Mr. Howe,) have been used to distinguish with wliom they contract it. To ])roceed, speaking of determination and concurrence, these are the words : " But that it waits a fitter time to speak out her mind, she could say that she conceives not how she can compel the will," &c. (Of this compelling the will, I shall have occasion also to speak out my mind hereafter.) What use was to be made of a she in this i>lace, I cannot well imagine. At last The Discourse grows perfectly wanton : " If immediate concurrence thinks herself disobliged to satisfy an inquisitive curiosity as to the modus or manner how she joins with the creature in an action to which sin does neces- sarily adhere," &c. What would a man think of this? A female! An immediate concurrence! What sport were here prepared for that which is by our moderns called wit, but is no more than the luxuriant sterility of land, nor broken up or manured ! In the meantime, if The Discourse be really at so much ease, as it would seem by this way of talking, it is but a security of understanding, like that of conscience wherewith guilty persons confirm and deceive themselves for the present. I shall now come to the last instance of this article. DISINGENUOUS DISCOURSE, &C. 105 Not that I want abundance of more, or might not produce the whole book in evidence, but because it were time that I came to some period: and lest The Discourse should tliink I avoided its main strength, I shall there examine it where it pretends to no less than demonstration. For never was there thing so dreadfully accoutred and armed cap-a-pie in logic, categorical and hypothetical syllogisms, majors, minors, en- thymems, antecedents, consequents, distinctions, definitions, and now at last demomtration, to pin the basket: terms that good Mr. HoAve as a mere novice is presumed to be un- acquainted with, and so far from being able to endure the rattling of The Discourse's armour, that as those Eoman legions once bragged, even the sweaty smell of its armpits ■would be sufficient to rout him. But some creatures are as safe by their weakness, as others by their strength, from be- ing meddled with by a considerable adversary. I that can- not boast of any extraordinary faculty for disputation, nor yet confess myself void of common understanding, am there- fore the most proper perhaps to try the force of this demon- stration ; and whether The Discourse be not therein as feeble, as it was lately short in definition. It, p. 25. quotes Mr. Howe, Postsc. p. 67. that he does " really believe God's im- mediate concourse to all actions of his creatvires both imme- diatione virtutis et suppositi, yet not determinative to wicked actions;" then The Discourse proceeds: "We shall adven- ture a demonstration that it implies a contradiction for God to make a creature that can act without predetermination, i. e. applying it to action, and to one rather than to another action. And it is this. That such a creature would be but ens secundarium, a second being, not causa secunda, a second cause, or, (which is all one) God should be but ens primum, not causa prima, the first being, not the first cause," which it proves thus: "1. If God does concur only by simidta- neous " (an elegant term of The Discourse's own production) " concourse, and not hy predetermination, or previous motion, then God cannot be the cause of the actions of the creatures, as they proceed from' them: but the consequent is absurd, and it presumes Mr. Howe will not own it." What Mr. Howe may do, being thus hard put to it, I will not under- take: but surely there was never anything affirmed with less 106 REMARKS UPON A LATE truth or sense than The Discourse here doth, that " God should be the cause of the actions of the creatures, as those actions proceed from them," One would think the creatures themselves should be the causes of the actions as they " pro- ceed from them;" (for how otherwise are they causes at all of those actions ?) and Grod the cause of those actions as they " proceed from him." Now hoAV they proceed from him, Mr. Howe hath sufficiently shown his own conception of it, viz. " as they are done by a sufficient influence, which God immediately afi^brds to enable the creature to do them, not to determine it thereto." And is not God to be entitled a causa prima as well as ens primum, in reference to what is done by his influence in the way before expressed? Whereas, if God be the cause of the actions of the creatures, as those actions proceed from them, the action must be done by his influence alone, and then he should not be catisa prima, be- cause then there were no ca^isa secunda. But this was only sure The Discourse's demon-, and the next that follows its -stration. Mr. Howe had, as before cited, Postsc. p. 67. avowed God's immediate concourse to all actions of his creatures, both immediatione virtutis et suppositi. Upon which con- cession of his it argues thus, (with this prelusory vaunt, p. 26. " He is twice killed that is killed with his own wea- pon," so that no less than sudden death is to be expected in the case,) " If there be an immediate concourse, then there is a predetermination or putting the creature upon action before it acts: or else the creature is the first mover of itself to action." This is so unimaginably dull an argument, that really it requires a proportionable dulness in the reader, or an extraordinary acuteness to comprehend it, and how it should bo deduced from Mr. Howe's concession of immediate concourse. For the argument so put receives not the least strength, not any, from that concession of Mr. Howe's, but rather from his non-concession, and that he hath not yielded enough, and as much as The Discourse would have him, whicli pretends that immediate concourse alone is not suffi- cient to exclude the creature from being the first mover of its own actions. For, whether immediate concourse be granted, or not granted, the case is all one as to this argu- DISINGENUOUS DISCOURSE, &C. ]07 ment while so much is not granted whereby " an account may be given how God and the creature join in one indi- vidual action rather than another," as The Discourse would have it, p. 27. if Mr. Howe could have been persuaded to be thus demonstrated out of his reason. The illustration of Jts " plausible consequence," as it is called, p. 27. may perhaps be noted, and shall hereafter in its due place, but the demonstration carries the bell away, and I must yet follow its tinkling. And thus it goes on, pp. 27, 28. " An account how the particular actions of any ra- tional creature's will come to be determined, upon the exclusion of predetermination, I know none can be given." And how is thus proved? for sure to affirm it is not demonstration. Why thus: "Not by chance:" (unless this saying so be an instance that it may in some cases) nobody dreamed of any such thing ; but this was put in, I suppose, only for more harmony, and to run division, A good sleight it is, by proving first a thing which no man denies, to make it more credible that the argument upon the subject in controversy will be as cogent. For the question is upon its second member, " Not by the creature's self-determining power," and here The Discourse's main strength comes upon trial. "For that, as such, is indeterminate as to the acts to which we conceive it must be some way or other determined." Admirably good ! So it is indeed till the creature, as Mr. Howe conceives, have determined itself; and so it will be too if God be to deter- mine it, indeterminate till he have determined it. But if the creature do determine itself (which if it never do, how does The Discourse call it " a self-determining power ? ") then I hope it is not indeterminate. So that the whole stress of the cause which was to prove that the creature (" so influenced and actuated by God immediately for any congenerous action,'"' as Mr. Howe hath expressed it) cannot determine itself, is left in the lurch, and no demonstration hath been given hitherto, but of that confusion and ignoi'ance with which I have charged The Discourse in this article, about the matter in controversy. i But it argues further, pp. 28, 29. and with the same de- monstration, from a second concession (it were methinks more ingenuous, to call it a declaration or assertion) of Mr. 108 KEMAUKS UPON A LATE Howe's of God's immediate concourse and predetermination to the production of good actions, and the necessity thereof, pretends to infer the necessity of God's immediate concourse and predetermination likewise to all (that is, even to the most wicked) actions. But tins, beside the ridiculousness, is so odious an undertaking, that any pigus man, should he be superior in the contention, would repent of his victory. I sliall here waive it; but if The Discourse pride itself herein, I give it the joy as it deserveth. This demonstration I had assigned as the last instance of this head; but I think I may be dispensed with to add an- other, it being an act of charity. For there are yet behind six articles more, some of them of a more criminal and hein- ous nature than those two that hitherto I have insisted upon. 1. Its falsifications and fictions of what Mr. Howe hath not said. 2. Its injurious perverting of what he hath said. 3. Its odious insinuations concerning what there is no colour to object against. 4. Its insolent boasting and self-applause upon no occasion. 5. Its gross absurdities, inconsistencies, self-contradictions, and unsafe expressions. 0. The wrath and virulence of its spirit. — And oftentimes it chances that one and the same instance is applicable, and may be reduced to several of these heads. But therefore, as oft as I can impute any thing which might receive an higher accusation to its ignorance, confusion or dulness (which it is left in any man's self-determining power to remedy) I rather choose to state it upon this more innocent account. And that hatli been the cause which hath swelled this head be- yond equality : my intention being to be briefer on those that follow. I say therefore, that it is out of charity that I here attribute its inditi'erence between the modus of God's pre- science, and God's supposed predetermination to wicked actions to its stupidity rather than any other article, or make a new one for it on purpose. Tlie thing is thus. Mr. Howe (Letter, pp. 24, 25.) had, taldng notice of an argument which some use from God's prescience for his pre- determination, said, among other things, very piously, " This supposed indetermination of the human will, in re- ■DISINGENUOUS DISCOURSE, &C. 109 ference especially to wicked actions, is far from being culpa- ble of inferring that God cannot therefore foreknow them," &c. And after, upon consideration what others had endea- voured towards explaining or perplexing this matter, modestly adds, " For my own part, I can more easily be satisfied to be ignorant of the modus or medium of his knowledge, while I am sure of tlie thing, &;c. It cannot therefore be so aftright- ful a thing to suppose God's foreknowledge of the most con- tingent future actions, well to consist with our ignorance how he foreknows them, as that we should think it necessary to overturn and mingle heaven and earth rather than admit it." But The Discourse, pp. 32, j^3. signifies, and then by quoting some of these words would confirm it, tliat we need not be more solicitous, and are no more concerned to satisfy ourselves of the modus of predetermination to sinful actions, so as to separate them from the sinfulness of them, (for to Jiold the conclusion is with it demonstration,) than about the modus of God's prescience of them. Which must argue (whatever else) a palpable shortness of discourse to think there is no odds betwixt a thing so plainly revealed in the word of God as his prescience is, and so agreeable to all rational ap- prehension, and a notion so altogether unrevealed as this universal predetermination yet appears, and so contrary, if not to the whole scope and design of divine revelation, yet to all common understanding and genuine sense of right rea- son. But whensoever there shall be so clear proof made that there is such a thing as The Discourse's predetermination, as may soon be brought of prescience, when it shall be as duly stated among the divine attributes, then, and not till then, ought men to practise the same devout resignation of tlieir reasoning about it, as Mr. Howe hath laudably done in that of prescience : but in the meantime it may be handled not as causa Dei, 'but causa hominis, it is lawful to plead against it, and not to pay men's belief, but to aftbrd their charity to its abettors. There was one called Antipheron, whose name therefore seems rather to have been given liim by the people from a natural defect they observed in him than by his godfathers: he had a peculiar shortness of sight, but which turned him to account, and saved him the expense of sending to Mala- 110 REMARKS UPON A LATE mocco or Lambeth to the glasshouse. He needed not so much as contemplate himself in Polyphemus' mirror, the water. He carried his looking-glass always with him; the next air supplied all, and served him not only to breathe, but to see his face in, without any danger of staining or breaking it. A great convenience thus to be able every minute to blow himself a new looking-glass. But how happy were it, if, what the sliortness of his sight, the dulness of men's minds could ha\e the same effect, to object to them continually their own image, and make it unnecessary for others to represent them. Then might The Discourse also have excused me from this labour, and upoi^reflexion with itself, have discerned its own unfitness and ignorance to manage this or any other controversy. For Avant of such an immediate inspection on its own de- fects, its natural undistinctness seems to perceive faults in others, and, to find a mote in their eye, neglects the beam in its own. It overlooks so gross a practice as in its p. 47. to translate out of Strangius into English Doctor Twisse's argu- mentation about the same prescience of God of future con- tingencies, undertaking still to demonstrate, p. 46. (that is the w^ord) that this foreknowledge depends upon the divine decree, while in the meantime it never gives us, though the book was in its hand, Strangius his full and articulate answer to it in the same place, lest any man should know of it ; but, to conceal its own disability for any reply to it, cliallenges Mr. Howe to answer Dr. Twisse's irrefragable argument over again. But, p. 16., in Mr. Howe it can find two "unpardon- able faults in a man of learning and ingenuity." First, anticipation ; for, he having, Letter, p. 21. said, " unless he determine (that is to say, for it can mean no less thing impel,") that is the word accused, " the creature to do it : " this is made so heinous, that I thought at first it had been the anticipation of the revenue, but, when all comes to all, I see it is nothing but the explaining a word of less ob- vious import by another more obvious : and nothing is more usual in The Discourse itself, and among men of learning. And The Discourse itself adds here in the same minute " im- pelling, i. e. compelling (for that is Mr. Howe's sense of the term, as will appear ere long,)" which is methinks as early, DISINGENUOUS DISCOUKSE, &C. Ill and a more perverse anticipation than Mr. Howe is unpar- donable for, by how much it does by these last words own that impel, unless it signify compel, is allowable, but affirms that in Mr. Howe's sense it is compel, as will appear ere long, which is moreover false, and therefore I will be so subtle as to take out my pardon in time for calling this anticipation ; for indeed that Avhieh neither is, nor ever can appear, ere long or short (as for Mr. Howe to mean compel) cannot be anticipated. But the second unpardonable fault of Mr. Howe's is his " immodest begging the question :" and wherein ? "I may well call it so," (quoth The Discourse,) " because he knows we neither can nor will grant his argument without ruining our hypothesis." This is all the proof assigned of his beg- ging the question. I do indeed confess that Mr. Howe was much to blame in urging an argument to the ruin of their precious hypothesis ; but I think it falls not under that predicament of begging, though this does of robbing the question : and however his crime is more excusable, because, in common probability, Mr. Howe, having wrote his Letter and Postscript before The Discourse replied to him, might be ignorant that it was its dear hypothesis. For my part I take the very first title of the book, " De Causa Dei," to be more notoriously guilty both of anticipation and begging the question, than that Mr. Howe could have anything upon either account herein justly imputed or objected to him. The third article, of which I shall catalogue some, it being endless to enumerate all the instances. Its many strange falsifications and fictions of what Mr. Howe hath not said, and then discoursing of them as if they were said. As for a first instance. In its Epistle, p. 10. Mr. Howe is accused of having " denied God's immediate concurrence to all actions," because, Letter, p. 21. he says, (not as The Dis- course cites it, " it sufficiently salves," but) " it may well be thought sufficiently to salve the rights (and privileges, omitted) of the first cause, that no action can be done but by a power derived from it, which, in reference to forbidden actions, in- telligent creatures may use or not use as they please." Is 112 REMARKS UPON A LATE anything said liere that implies any denial of immediate con- currence ? Why may not that power derived be immediate to the action ? Is anything said to the contrary, or which accords not well with what is pretended to be said ex oppo- sito ? But to make this accusation good it conceals another passage in the very same paragraph : " Besides that it seems infinitely to detract from the perfection of the ever blessed God, to affirm he was not able to make a creature of such a nature, as, being continually sustained by him, and supplied with power every moment suitable to its nature, should be incapable of acting, unless whatsoever he thus enables he de- termine it to do also." So that the charge is founded merely on Mr. Howe's not having used the express word immediate concurrence in that sentence, and in concealing disingenuously what he had expressed, and what fully includes immediate concurrence in the sense that he afterwards asserts and ex- plains it, Postscr. p. 67. to be both immediatione virtutis, and suppositi to " all actions, though not determinative to wicked actions." Although it would be something ridiculous to say, that The Discourse read one part of this with its eyes shut, and the other part with its eyes open ; yet it is more fiilse that Mr. Howe did there, or anywhere else, deny God's im- mediate concurrence ; and it is the best excuse of which this (otherwise forgery) is capable. Second instance. It feigns in the same p. 10. that jNIr. Howe hath, Postscr. p. 71. "affirmed predetermination to all actions." It were strange if he should, but it is pretended to be proved by these his words : " The active providence of God about all the actions of men, consists not merely in giving them the natural powers whereby they can work of them- selves, but in a real influence upon those powers." This is (to speak the most softly, and indeed more softly than the tiling will admit) an unkind interpretation, after what Mr. Howe hath been quoted to say in my former instance : but especially, if The Discourse can or would be pleased to con- sider (after its invidious and deceitful generality in citing Letter, from p. 21 et seq. and the Postscript, without assign- ing one word) that Mr. Howe's asserting here of God's real influence upon men's natural powers does not at all imj)ly that predetermination, which he there all along opposes. DISINGENUOUS DISCOURSE, &C. 113 For can there be no influence but such as is deteriuining ? He hath shown there both may be and is. How often is there such influence by the operation of common grace as (loth not determine ? Third instance. In the same p. 10. because Mr. Howe liath, Letter, p. 20. said, " Some actions of the creatures are in themselves most malignantly wicked," and Letter, p. 24. " intrinsically evil : " therefore it, falsely enough, reproaches him to have by these words " denied that 41II actions have in them a natural goodness." Whereas Mr. Howe here speaks of actions as they are morally evil or wicked, that is, as specified by direction to an inidue object. Is not such a specifying direction intrinsical ? Is not the specification of everything intrinsical to it ? And so are not such actions truly said to be evil in themselves which so specified can by no circumstances be made good ? But Postscr. p. 69 (which is produced to argue him of inconsistence) he owns that " there is not any action so sinful, but hath some natural good as the substrate matter thereof," abstractly and physi- cally considered, and yet so they can never be produced by God nor man, but concreted with their individuating circum- stances ; nor doth the affirming the one infer the denial of the other. If it did, The Discourse itself hath done the same thing, p. 72. " Thus some actions are said to be in themselves evil, when they are evil in regard of their object, &e. Thus the hatred of God and adultery are in themselves evil," &c. But I suppose it would judge it hard dealing to say that it denies (though it be an hard saying to affirm) that natural good which is the substrate matter thereof, and which always at a dead lift it hath recourse to. Fourth instance. From Mr. Howe's having, Letter, p. 20. said, '•' Nothing is more apparently a simple and most strictly natural impossibility, than not to do an action whereto the agent is determined by an infinite power;" it, Epist. p. 11, hath the ridiculous grossness to charge Mr. Howe with there aflHrming that predetermination forces the will ; as if nothing could make a thing naturally impossible to a man but force. He cannot make a new sun ; but what force hinders him ? This is indeed force, or rather fraud ; for otherwise it is im- possible to deduce it. But whether of them be used against 11 114: REMARKS UPON A LATE a chosen adversary, makes it seems no scruple in a conscience diverted with disputation. Another instance. It calumniates Mr. Howe, p. 87. to have "asserted the positivity of sin," and there calls it, "the foundation of his hypothesis," proceeding with great pains to disprove it, " borrows one argument," to load him with, " from the most learned Dr. Barlow, the now renowned bishop of Lincoln," urges the minor, then the major, and draws up a whole process, as if it were in the spiritual court, against him, and T. D, were become his chancellor. There is none in England, nor especially Mr. Howe, as I imagine, but would reverence the authority of that excellent person in all points of learning or controversy. But The Discourse is too bold to make use of his power without his commission, in a case where Mr. Howe hath not said one word to affirm such positivity. A further instance. With the same truth, that is, false- hood, it feigns, and that often, that Mr. Howe, by God's having irresistible influence upon the will, means " God's forcing of the will unto the most wicked actions." As for example, p. 39. from Mr. Howe's, p. 24. " Irresistibly, that is in his sense forcibly." Whereas Mr. Howe there objects to his adversaries, their holding such an irresistible determi- nation of the will, but forcing of it nowhere. Yet at what expense of learning, and with how much loss of ink and in- genuity does The Discourse argue that the will cannot be forced ! which Mr. Howe, having denied that irresistible in- Muence, must of necessity disown for its further absurdity, had he thought his adversaries guilty of it. But ho appears to have been far fioui imagining it of them, nor could any but The Discourse have imputed it to him as his sense, that God does by force whatsoever he does irresistibly. What law of reason is there, or how can The Discourse justify such a falsification but by custom ? If that shall be a sufficient plea, it will never want in- stances further to warrant the practice. As in this following (forgery I may not call it, having to do with such exactness, but) rasure. Mr. Howe, having been upon the argument of the will of God concerning those that perish, had, Letter, p. 45. said, " The resolve of the divine will in this matter, was DISINGENUOUS DISCOURSE, &C. 115 not concerning the event," what he shall do, (i. e. abstractly and singly, as these next following words show) " but con- cerning his duty what he should, and concerning the con- nexion between his duty and his happiness." Hereupon what does mean The Discourse? p. 116. It refers to those words of his, p. 45. and recites a further passage of his Letter, to argue them of repugnancy these to the former, but to that purpose conceals Mr. Howe's last clause, " but concerning his duty what he should, and concerning the connexion between his duty and his happiness," which being taken in, as it ought, there could have been no pretence of inconsistency. And it adds, that Mr. Howe's answer. Letter, p. 46. " that ' imperfection is no way imputable to the divine will merely for not effecting everything whereto it may have a real propension,' is no answer to the objection : " upon this strange pretence, that " a real propension of will is no will," as if it were a thing impossible that propension should be either habitual or actual. So also for continual instance. The Discourse, pp. 118. 119, feigns a question to have been proposed by Mr. Howe, " Whether it be fitting for God efficaciously to overpower all men into a compliance with the overtures he makes to thcni in common : " and then it creates also an answer for him : " It is not fit for God to overpower men without making any overtures to them at all;" and, to make a song of three })arts, judicially decides: "the answer is not fitted to the question." I must confess that upon some former experiments I doubted of the rectitude of its judgment, but I was not wary enough to suspect a falsehood, which must be so notorious, as that there should be no such question or answer. But in good truth none there is that I can find of Mr. Howe's mark: the question nowhere in terms, but the answer neither in terms nor sense, nor anything like it. So that The Discourse is not to be allowed in any court either as a competent judge or a legal witness, but may deserve to be tried for this as a criminal before any logic-tribunal. Nor needs there any other evidence against it for conviction, than those very words of Mr. Howe, that it there hath cited : " Grace sometimes shows itself in preventing exertions, and in work- ing so heroically as none have beforehand [in the neglect of 116 REMARKS UPON A LATE its ordinary method] any reason to expect," Letter, p. 53. Now look back upon the supposititious answer, " to whom God makes no overtures at all : " then compare Mr. Howe's words, " in the neglect of its ordinary methods ; " and now let any man judge of the honesty of such an adversary. For how can they be said to neglect Grod's ordinary methods to whom he makes no overtures at all? Nor is the second scheme of its question and answer which immediately follows any whit better, but guilty of as perfect forgery as the first, and so ill contrived, that it neither agrees with the former, nor with the book, though pretending to be a true copy. And an instance it is of the same fraud to feign, pp. 119, 120. that Mr. Howe in his Letter hath, abstractly from the more fit course that God hath taken, " determined the unfit- ness of God's giving grace and salvation to all men." All that Mr. Howe hath said therein amounts only to assert the course which is not taken to be less fit, and that God doth, from the perfect rectitude of his own nature, take tliat course which was to bo taken most wisely, and do that which was most congruous and fit to be done, Letter, p. 5Q. What can better become us than to judge so of the ways that God hath pitched upon, and -wherein w^e have God's own choice to precede and be a guide to our judgment? I shall conclude this article with its quotation, p. 44. out of Dr. Manton's Comment on James i. 13. p. 101. as if that learned divine had aftirmed the disputed predetermination by those words. " Many who grant prescience, deny preordi- nation," (\i>;. quoth The Discourse, the decree whereof pre-