*^99^^^-^ ('(fsr. Division Shrff. c,^ '- i /^^ /JUh! iOi \ \ \ • # A tAREFUL AND STRICT INQUIRY INTO THE MODERN PREVAILING NOTIONS OF THAT FREEDOM OF WILL, WHICH IS SUPPOSED TO BE ESSENTIAL TO MORAL AGENCY, VIRTUE AND VICE, REWARD AND PUNISHMENT, PRAISE AND BLAME. BY JONATHAN EDWARDS, A. M. Rom. ix. 16. It is not of him that ivilkth. \ ALBANY : PRINTED FOR AND SOLD BY WHITING, BACKUS Sc WHITING, NO. 45, STATE-STREET : SOLD ALSO BY THEM AT THEIR STORES IN SCHENECTADY, UTICA AND CANANDAIGUA. 1804, THE PREFACE, Many find much fault with the calling profefTing Chriftians, that differ one from another in feme mat- ters of opinion, by di(Lin6l names ; efpecialiy calling them by the names of particular men, who have dif- tinguifiied themfelves as maintainers and promoters of thofe opinions ; as the calling fome profeffing Chriftians Arminians, from Arminius ; others Ariaris, from Arius ; others Socinians, from Socinus, and the like. They think it unjuft in itfelf ; as it feems to fuppofe and fugged, that the perfons marked out by thefe names, received thofe dotlrines which they en- tertain, out of regard to, and reliance on, thofe men after whom they are named ; as though they made them their rule ; in the fame manner, as the follow- ers of Christ are called Chnjiians ; after his name, whom they regard and depend upon, as their great Head and Rule. Whereas, this is an unjuft and groundiefs imputation on thofe that go under the fore-mentioned denominations. Thus [uxy they) there is not theleaft ground to fuppofe that the chief Divines, who embrace the fcheme of do6trine which is, by many, called Arminianifm, believe it the more, becaufe Arminius believed it : and that there is no reafon to think any other, than that they fincerely and impartially ftudy the holy Scriptures, and enquire I'fter the mind of Chrift, with as much judgment and fincerity, as any of thole that call them by thefe names ; that they feek after truth, and are not care- ful whether they think exattly as Arminius did; yea, that, in fome things, they a6lually differ from him> iv The preface. This praftice is alfo eftccmed actually injurious on this account, that it is fuppored naturally to lead the multitude to imagine the difFerence between perfons thus named and others, to be greater than it is ; yea, as though it were fo great, that they muft be, as it were, another fpccics of beings. And they objedl againfl it as aiiling from an uncharitable, narrow, contradcd fpirit ; which, they fay, commonly in- clines perfons to conline all that is good to them- felves, and their own party, and to make a wide dif- tin6lion between thcmfelves and others, and iligma- tize thofe that differ from them with odious names. They fay, moreover, that the keeping up luch a dif- tin£lion of names has a dire6l tendency to uphold diftancc and difafFedion, and keep alive mutual hat- red among ChriRians, who ought all to be united in friendihip and charity, however they cannot, in all things, think alike. I confefs thefe things are very plaufible. And I will not deny, that there are fome unhappy confe- quences of this diflindion of names, and that men's infirmities and evil difpofitions often make an ill im- provement of it. But yet, 1 humbly conceive, thefe objedions are carried far beyond reafon. The gen- erality of mankind are difpofed enough, and a great deal too much, to uncharitablenefs, and to be cenfo- rious and bitter towards thofe that differ from them in religious opinions : which evil temper of mind will take occafion to exert itfelf from many things in thcmfelves innocent, ufeful and necellary. But yet there is no neccffity to fuppofe, that the thus diftin- guilhing perfons of different opinions by different names, ariles mainly from an uncharitable fpirit. It may arife troni the difpohtion there is in mankind (whom God has diRmguilhcd with an ability and inclination for fpcech) to improve the benefit of lan- guage, in the proper ufc and dcf\gn of names, given The preface. v to things which they have often occafion to fpeak of, or fignify their minds about ; which is to enable them to exprefs their idear with eafe and expedition, without being encumbered 'with an obfcure and dif- ficult circumlocution. And the thus diflinguiftiing perlons of different opinions in religious rnatterr may imply nor infer, any more than that there is a differ, ence, and that the difference is fuch as we find we have often occafion to take notice of. and make men- tion of. That which we have frequent occafion to fpeak of, (whatever it be, that gives the occafion) this wants a name : and it is always a defe6i in lan- guage, in fuch cafes, to be obliged to make ufe of a defcription, inftead of a name. Thus we have oftca occafion to fpeak of thofe who are the defcendants of the ancient inhabitants of France, who were fub- ie6ls or heads of the government of that land, and fpake the language peculiar to it ; in didindion from the defcendants of the inhabitants of Spain, who belonged to that community, and fpake the lan- guage of that country. And therefore we find the great n?ed of dillin6l names to fignify thefe different forts of people, and the great convenience of thofe diftinguifhing words, French and Spaniards ; by which the fignincation of our minds is quick and eafy, and our fpeech is delivered from the burden of a continual reiteration of diffufe defcriptions, with which It muff otherwife be embarraffed. That the difference of the opinions of thofe who, in their general fcheme of divinity, agree with thefe two noted men, Calvin and Aiminius, is a thing there is often occafion to fpeak of, is what the prac- tice of the latter itfelf confeffes ; who are often, in their difcourfes and writing?, taking notice of the luppofed abfurd and pernicious opinions of the former fort. And therefore the making ufe of dif- ferent names in this cafe cannot reafonablv be oh- V vi The preface. jefted againft, or condemned, as a thing which muft come from fo bad a caufe as they aflign. It is eafy to be accounted for, without luppoling it to arife from r.ny other fource, than the exigence and natur- al tendency of the (late of things ; confidering the faculty and difpofition God has given to mankind, to cxprcis things which rhcv have frequent occafion to mention, by certain diitinguifliing names. It is an effcd that is fimilar to what we fee arife, in in- numerable cafes which are parallel, where the caufe is not at all blame-worthy. Nevcithelefs, at fivft, I had thoughts of carefully avoiding the ufe of the appelhuion, Arminian, in this treatife. But I foon found 1 (hould be put to great difficulty by it; and that my difcouife would be fo encumbered with an often repeated circumlocution, inflrad of a name, which would exprefs the thing in- tended, as well and better, thai I altered my purpofe. And therefore I mud afk the excufe of fuch as are apt to be offended with things of this nature, that I have fo freely ufed the term Arminian m theJollow- ing dilcourfe. I profefs it to be without any de- IjgD, to fligmatize pcrfons of any fort with a name of reproach, or at all to make them appear moreodious. If, when I had occafion to fpeak of thofe Divines who are commonly called by this name, I had, inllead of Uv ing ihi:m Ar?Kini(i7is, called them thrfc men, as Dr. Whiiby does Calvinijlic Divines ; it probably would not have been taken any better, o; thought to (hew a bitter temper, or more good manners. I have done as I would be done by, in this matter. H-jwever the term Ca!viniftic\s, in thefe diys, among mofl, a term of greater reproach th.m the term Anninian ; yet I (hnu d not take it at all amifs, to be called a Calvmfjl, lof dJlindion'o lake : though I utterly dif- claim a dependence on Calvin, or believin^^ fhe (Jodrincs which 1 hold, becaufc he believed^ and The preface. vii taught them; and cannot juftly be charged with be- lieving in every thing jufl: as he taught. But, left I fhould really be an occafion of injury to i'ome pertons, I v/ould here give notice, that though I generally fpeak of that do6lrine, concern- ing Free- Will and moral Agency, which I oppofe, as an irminian do6lnne ; yet 1 would not be under- flood, as afferting that every Divine or Author, whom I have occalion to mention as maintaining that dodtrine, was properly an Arminian, or one of that fort which is commonly called by that name. — Some of them went far beyond the Arminians : and I would by on means charge Arfiiinians in general with all the corrupt do£lrine, which thefe maintain- ed. Thus, for inilance, it would be very injurious, if I fhould rank Arminian Divines, in general, with fuch Authors as Mr. Chubb. I doubt not, many of them have fome of his do&rines in abhorrence ; though he agrees, for the molt part, with Arminians, in his notion of the Freedom of the Will. And, on the other hand, though I fuppofe this notion to be a leading article in the Arminian fcheme, that which, if purfued in its confequences, will truly infer, or naturally lead to all the reft ; yet 1 do not charge all that have held this do6lrine, with bein^ Arminians^ For whaiever may be the confequences of the doc- trine really, yet fome that hold this dodrine, may not own nor fee thefe confequences ; and it would be unjuft, in many inflances, to charge every Author with believing and maintaining all the real confe- quences of his avowed do6lrines. And I defire it may be paiticuJarly noted, that though I have occa- fion, in the following Dilcourfe, often to mention the Author of the book, enut'ed An EJfay on the Fres» dom oj the Will in God and the Creature, as holdino- thiit liu ion of Freedom of Will, wiiich I oppole; yet I do not mean to call him an Arminian : how- Viii The PREFACE. ever, in that cIo6tiine he agrees with Arminians, and departs from the current and general opinion of Cat- vinijls. If the Author of that EfTay be the fame as it is commonly afcribed to, he, doubtlefs, was not one that ought to bear that name. But however oood a Divine he was in many rcrpe61s, yet that par- ticular Arminian doQrine which he maintained, is never the better for being held by fuch an one ; nor is there lefs need of oppofing it on that account ; but rather is there the more need of it ; as it will be likely to have the more pernicious influence, for be- intr taught by a Divine of his name and charadler ; fuppofing the dodiinc to be wrong, and in itfelf to be of an ill tendency. I have nothing further to fay by way of preface ; but only to bcfpeak the Reader's candor, and calm attention to what I have written. The fubje£l is of luch importance, as to de7nand dittcnt'ion, znd the mofl thorough confideration. Of all kinds of knowledge that we can ever obtain, the knowledge of God, and the knowledge of ourfelves, are the mod important. As religion is the great bufinefs, for which we are created, and on which our happinefs depends ; and as religion confiQs in an intercourfe bet^v^en our- felves and our Maker; and fo has its foundation in God's nature and ours, and in the relation that God and wc fland in to each other; therefore a true knowl- edge of both muft be needful, in order to true reli- gion. Ij It the knowledge of ourfelves ronfifls chief- ly in right apprehcnfions concerning thofe two chief faculties of our nature, the Undcrjlandin^ and Will, Both are very important : yet the fcience of the lat- ter mull be confcllcd to be of greatefl moment; in- afmuch as all virtue and religion have their feat more immediately in the Will, confiiling more efpecially in right ads and habits of this faculty. And the grand queftion about the Ficedom of the Will^ is The preface. ix the main point that belongs to the fcience of the Will. Therefore, I fay, the importance of this fub- je£t greatly demands the attention of Chriftians, and efpecially of Divines. Bat as to my manner of hand- ling the fubjeft, I will be far from prefuming to fay, that it is fuch as demands the attention of the reader to what I have written. I am ready to own, that in this matter I depend on the reader's courtefy. But only thus far I may have fome colour for putting in a claim ; that if the reader be difpofed to pafs his cenfure on what I have written, I may be fully and patiently heard, and well attended to, before I am condemned. However, this is what I would hum- bly ajk of my readers ; together with the prayers of all fmcere lovers of truth, that I may have much of that Spirit which Chriftpromifed his difciples, which guides into all truth ; and that the bleiTed and pow- erful influences of this Spirit would make truth vic- torious in the world. GENERAL TABLE OF THE CONTENTS. PART I. Wherein are ex-phlned various Terms and Things belonging to the fubje£l of the enfuing difcourfe. s Pagt ECT. I. Goncernlng the Nature of the Will, I Sect. II. Concerning the Deter?7iination ot the Willy 6 Sect. III. Concerning the meaning of ihe terms Neceffity, Lnpojfibility, Inability, &c. and of Contingence, 17 Sect. IV. Of the diflinftion of natural and moral NecefTity and InabiHty, 27 Sect. V. Concerning the Notion ot Liberty and oi moral A* gencyt 36 P A R T II. Wherein it is confidered, whether there is, or can be anj^ fuch fort ot FreedOxM of Will, as that wherein Arminians place the EfFence of the Liberty of all moral Agents ; and whether any fuch thing ever was, or can be conceived ot. S ECT. I. Shewing the manifeft inconfiftence of the Arminian Notion ot Liberty ot Will, confifting in the Will's fdf' determining Power^ 42 3,ii The contents. Page Skct.II. Several fuppofcd ways of evading the foregoing RcaloninK conlidercd, j rr r ■ ^7 Sect 111 Whether any Event whatioevcr, and Volition in partuular. can come to pafs wiifiout a Cavjt ot its Exift- cnce, ._ . , r^ ^^^ Sect. IV. Whether Volilion can arile without a Laule. throui^h the Aclivily ot the Nature of the Soul, 62 Sect. V. Shewma that \\ the things alTerted in thele Evahons (hould be fuppoFed to be true, they are ahogether imperti- nent, and cannot help the Caufe ot Arwiman Liberty ; and how, this being the Hate oi the cale, Armiman writers are obliged to talk inconj^f.tntly, 6y SicT. VI. Concerning the Will's determining in things which are perle6\ly inilijnent, in the view of the mind, 73 Spxt. VII. Concerning the Notion ot Lilberty of Will con. fi fling in Indifference, 82 Sect. VIU. Concerning the fuppofed Liberty of the Will. as oppofite to all Necejfiiy\ 95 Sect. IX. Of the connexion of the A61s of the ^-Tz// with the Ditlates of the Underjlanding^ _ 100 Sect. X. Volition neceffarily connefted with the Influence oi Motives. With particular obfervation of the great In- confiftency of Mr. Chubb's Ailenions and Reafonings, a- bout the Freedom ot the Will, 110 Sect. XI. The Evidence ot God's certain Fore-knowledge ot the Volitions ot moral Agents, 128 Sect. Xll. Goal's certain Fore- knowledge o\ the future Vo- litions ot moral Agents, inconjijient with fucha Cpntingence oi thofe Volitions, as is without all NccefTity, 153 And inters a NccefTity ot Volition, as much as an ahfolute De^ crce, 1^9 Sect. XIII. Whether we fuppofe the Volitions of moral A- gcnts to be conncfted with any thing antecedent, or not, yet thev muft be necfJJ'ary^ in iuch a fenie, as to overthrow Armiman Liberty, 170 PART m. Wherein is enquired, whether any fuch Liberty of Will as Armxm&ns hold, be neceirary to moral Agency, Virtue and Vice, Praife and Difpraife, ^c, Oect. I. God's moral Excellency necejfary, yet virtuous and pratjc'worthy, 17^ The contents. xlii Page Sect. II. The AQs o\ the Will of the human Soul ot J e-' sys Christ ntccjfanly holy^ytwirtuous^ praije -worthy ^ rewardable. Sec. 180 Sect. III. The Cafe ot fuch as ^re given up of' God to Sin^ and o\ tallen Man in general, proves moral Ntc(i[Jity and Inability to be conHftent with hlame-Tv or thine fs^ 198 Sect. IV^. Command, and Obligation to Obedience, conJiJUnt with moral Inability to obey, 206 Sect. V. T\i-6X Sincerity di Dei'ires and Endeavours, which is fuppofed to exciife in the non-performance of Things ia themlelves good, particularly confidered, 220 Sect. VI. Liberty of Indifference not only not necejfary to Virtue, but utterly inconfijitnt with it ; and all, eimer vir- tuous or vicious Habits or Inclinations^ inconfiltcnt with Armiman Notions of Liberty, and moral Agency, 230 Sect. Vil. Armiman Notions ot moral Agency inconfillent with all Influence ot Motive and Inducement, in cither virtu- ous or vicious A6tions, 2^^ PART IV. Wherein the chief Grounds of the Reafonings of Arjninians, in Support and Defence of their Notions of Liberty, moral Agency, o^c. and again/l the oppofite Do6"irine, are con- fidered. Oect. I. The Effcnce of the Virtue and Vice of the Difpo- fitions ol the Heart, and Afts of the V/ill, lies not in their Caufcs, but their Nature, 249 Sect. II. The Falfinejs and Inconfi/hnce of that metaphyfical Notion of Atlion and Agency, which feems to be generally- entertained by the Defenders of the forementioned Notions of Liberty, moral Agency, (^c. ocy Sect. III. The Reafons why fome think it contrary to com- mon Saijc, to fuppofe Things which are ntceffary, to be wor- thy of either Praife or Blame, 266 Sect. IV. It is agreeable to common Sen/e, and the naturai Amo- tions of Mankind, to fuppofe moral NecefTity to be confift- ent with Praife and Blame, Reward and Punifhmcnt, 27^ Sect. V. Concerning thofe Ohjtdions, that this fcheme oi:' Ncceffity renders all Means and Endeavours tor the avoid- ing of Sin or the obtaining Virtue and Holinefs, vain and to no purpole ; and that it makes iMen no more than mere Machines, in affairs oi Morality and Religion, sS^ xiv The CONTENTS. Page Sect. VI. Concerning that Ohjcflion agalnft the Doftrine which has been maintained, thatit^^rd^j with i\iQ Stoicd do61rinc of Fate, and the Opinion of Mr. Hobbes, 294 Sect. VII. Concerning the Nccejfity oi the Divine Will, ^ 298 Sect. VIII. Some further ObjeBions again fl the moral Ne- cfjjiiy of God's Volitions, confidered, 310 Sect.'^IX. Concerning that ObjeSlion againft the Dofirine which has been maintained, that it makes God the Author o/Sin, 327 Sect. X. Concerning Sin's Jirjl Entrance into the World. . .348 Sect. XI. Of a fuppofed inconfijlence, of thefe Principles with God's moral char aB:cr^ 356 Sect. XII. Ot a (uppofed Tendency of thefe Principles to Atheiffji and Liccntiou/nefs, 35^ Sect. "XII I. Concerning that OhjeBion againft the Reafon- jng by which the Calvimjiic Dotlrine is I'upported, that it is mctaphyjical and abjlrufe^ 360 THE CONCLUSION. W HAT Treatment this Difcourfe may probably meet with from fomc perfons, 370 Conjequences concerning feveral Calviiujiic DoElrines ; (uch as univcr/al, deci/ivc Providence, 372 The total Depravity and Corruption of Man's Nature, 373 Efficacious Grace, 37^ An univcrfal and abfolutc Decree ; and abfolute elcinal, per- fonal Eletlton, 37^ Particular Redemption, ^yj Per/ever ance of Saint:, 378 Concerning the Treatment which Calvini/iic Writers and Di- vines have met with, 379 The Unhappinefs ot the Change lately in many Protejlant Coiiniiies, r^gj Thz Bold nefs of fomc Writers, ibid The excellent ITf/dom appearing in the Ilo'y Scriptures, 382 PART L Wherein are explained and Jlated various Terms and Things belonging to the Subject of the enfuing Dif- courfe. Section I, Concerning the Nature of the Will, It may poflibly be thought, that there is no great need of going about to define or defcribe the Will ; this word being generally as well underftood as any other words we can ufe to explain it : and fo per- haps it would be, had not philofophers, metaphyfi- cians and polemic divines brought the matter into obfcurity by the things they have faid of it. But fince it is fo, I think it may be of fome ufe, and will tend to the greater clearnefs in the following dif- courfe, to fay a few things concerning it. And therefore I obferve, that the Will (without any metaphyfical refining) is plainly, That by which the mind choofes any thing. The faculty of the Willis that faculty or power or principle of mind by which it is capable of choojing : an att of the Will is the fame as an a6l of choojing or choice. If any think it is a more perfe61: definition of the Will, to fay, that it is that by which the foul either G 2 The Nature of the Will. Part !• choofes or rcfitfts ; I am content with it : though I think that it is enough to fay, it is that by which the foul choofes : for in every a6l of Will whatfo- cvcr, the mind choofes one thing rather than anoth- er ; it choofes fomething rather than the contrary, or rather than the want or non-exiftencc of that thing. So in every act of refufal, the mind choofes the ab- fence of the thing refufed ; the pofitive and the neg- ative are fet before the mind for its choice, and it choofes the negative ; and the mind's making its choice in that cafe is properly the atl of the Will ; the Will's determining between the two is a volunta- ry determining; but that is the fame thing as mak- ing a choice. So that whatever names we call the a6l of the Will by choofing^ refujing, approving, dif^ approving, liking, dijlikmg, embracing, rcjeEling, de^ iermining, direding, commanding, forbidding, inclining or being averfc, a being pleafed or difpleafed with ; all may be reduced to this of choofng. For the foul to a6i voluntarily, is evermore to a6l elc5lively, Mr. Locke* fays, '• The Will fignifies nothing ** but a power or ability io prefer or choofe.** And in the foregoing page fays, *' The Vford preferring " fcems beft to exprefs the a6l of volition ;" but adds, that *' it does it not precifely ; for (fays he) ** though a man would prefer flying to walking, *• yet who can fay he ever wills it ?" But the in- ftance he mentions docs not prove that there is any thing elfe in willing, but merely preferring: for it fhould be conGdered what is the next and imme- diate obje6l of the Will, with refpeft to a man's walking, or any other external adlion ; which is not bcmg removed from one place to another; on the earth, or through the air ; thefe are remoter obje6ls of preference ; but fuch or (uch an immediate exer- tion of himfclf. The thing nextly chofen or pre- *Human Uaderftandios. Edit. 7. vol. i. p. 197. Sea. I. The Nature of the Will. 3 ferred when a man wills to walk, is not his being removed to fuch a place where he would be, but fuch an exertion and motion of his legs and feet, &c. in order to it. And his willing fuch an alteration in his body in the prefent moment, is nothing elfe but his choofing or preferring fuch an alteration in his body at fuch a moment, or his liking it better than the forbearance of it. And God has fo made and eftabhfhed the human nature, the foul being united to a body in proper ftate, that the foul preferring or choofing fuch an immediate exertion or alteration of the body, fuch an alteration inftantaneoufly follows. There is nothing elfe in the a6lions of my mind, that I am confcious of while I walk, but only my pre- ferring or choofing, through fucceffive moments, that there fhould be fuch alterations of my external fen- fations and motions ; together with a concurring habitual expectation that it will be fo ; having ever found by experience, that on fuch an immediate preference, fuch fenfations and motions do a6lually, inflantaneoufly, and conftantly arife. But it is not fo in the cafe of flying : though a man may be faid remotely to choofe or prefer flying ; yet he does not choofe or prefer, incline to or defire, under circum- flances in view, any immediate exertion of the mem- bers of his body in order to it ; becaufe he has no expe6lation that he fhould obtain the defired end by any fuch exertion ; and he does not prefer or in- cline to any bodily exertion or effort under this ap- prehended circumftance, of its being wholly in vain. So that if we carefully diftinguifli the proper obje6ls of the feveral a6ls of the Will, it will not appear by this, and fuch like inftances, that there is any differ- ence between volition d^ndi preference ; or that a man's choofing, liking bed, or being befl pleafed with a thing, are not the fame with his willing that thing ; as they fcem to be according to thofc general and '4 The Nature of the WiM. Part L more natural i"notions of men, according to which language is formed. Thus an a6l of the Will is commonly exprefled by its pkafing a man to do thus or thus ; and a man doing as he wills^ and doing as he plcafes, are the fame thing in common fpeech. Mr. Locke* fays, " The Will is perfeaiy diftin- ** guifhed from Defire; which in the very fame •• a6lion may have a quite contrary tendency from *' thar which our Wills fet us upon. A man (fays ** he) whom I cannot deny, may oblige me to ufe ** perfuafions to another, which, at the fame time I *' am fpeaking, I may wifli may not prevail on him. *' In this cafe it is plain the Will and Defire run ** counter." I do not fuppoCe, that Will and Defire are words of precifely the fame fignification : -Will feems to be a word of a more general fignification, extending to things prefent and abfent. Defire re- fpe£ls fomething abfent. I may prefer my prefent fituation and pollure, fuppofe fitting flill, or having my eyes open, and fo may will it. But yet I cannot think they are fo entirely di[lin6l, that they can ever be properly faid to run counter. A man never, in \ any inftance, wills any thing contrary to his defires, or defires any thing contrary to his Will. The fore- mentioned inftance, which Mr. Locke produces, does not prove that he ever does. He may, on fome con- fidcration or other, will to utter fpeeches which have a tendency to perfuade another, and ftill may defire that f/iey may not perfuade him : but yet his W^ill and Defire doci not run counter at all : the thing which he wills, the very fame he defires ; and he does not will a thing, and defire the contrary in any particular. In this inftance, it is not carefully ob- ferved, what is the thing willed, and what is the thing defired : if it were, it would be found that ♦ Hum. Uad. vol. i, p. 203, 20^. SeEt. I. The Nature of the Will. 5 Will and Defire does not clafli in the leaft. The thing willed on fome confideration, is to utter fuch words ; and certainly, the fame confideration fo in- fluences him, that he does not defire the contrary : all things confidered, he choofes to utter fuch words, and does not defire not to utter them. And fo as to the thing which Mr. Locke fpeaks of as defired, viz. That the words, though they tend to perfuade, fhould not be effedual to that end; hlis Will is tiot contrary to this ; he does not will that they fhould be efFe6lual, but rather wills that they fhould not, as he defires. In order to prove that the Will and Defire may run counter, it fhould be fhown that they may be contrary one to the other in the fame thing, or with refpe6l to the very fame obje6l of Will or Defire : but here the objefts are two ; and in each, taken by thenifelves, the Will and Defire agree. And it is no wonder that they fhould not agree in different things, however little diflinguifhed they are in their nature. The Will may not agree with the Will, nor Defire agree with Defire, in dif- ferent things. As in this very inflance which Mr. Locke mentions, a perfon may, on fome confidera- tion, defire to ufe perfuafions, and at the fame time may defire they may not prevail ; but yet nobody will fay, that Defire runs counter to Defire ; or that this proves that Defire is perfeQly a diftin6l; thing from Defire, — The lilce might be obferved of the other inflance Mr. Locke produces, of a man's defiring to be eafed of pain, &c. But not to dwell any longer on this, whether De- fire and Will, and whether Preference and Volition be precifely the fame things or no ; yet, I trufl it will be allowed by all, that in every aft of Will there is an adl of choice ; that in every volition there is a preference, or a prevailing inclination of the foul, whereby the foul, at that inflant, is out of a ftate of 6 OJtiu Determination •Jtkc WiU, Part I. perfe^ indiflFerecce, iritb refpe^ to the dircS objeft of tbe volition. So that in every ad, or going forth of the Will, ibcrc is fome pi epon deration of the mind or inclination, one wi^y ra:her than another ; 93oA the foul had rather A#w or d^ one thing than aftoiher, or than not to hare or do that thing ; and that there, where there is abfolutelv no preferring or dioofing, but a peifed continuing equilibrium, there IS no Toliiion. S X C T I o N IT, Cmxtnamg iif Detcrminadon pfiii WUS. St iHtwmimu^ iJu Wi3, if the phrafe be ufcd with aaj mnmmg^ waft be intended, c^n^ thsi the sBof tktmU^ChmuJhmUhtUm&,mi9M9Umwij€: and tbe Will is fud to be deCermiMd, when, in confe- qaence of fomc adion, or iiiiacDce, its choice is di- redcd to, amd fixed upon a particular objed. As when we fpeak of tbe DetcrmiaatioQ of motion, we mean CMifing the BDocioa of the bo^ to b? fuch a war, or in fuch a diredion, rather than another. To talk of the Detenmnatioa of tbe Will, fap- pofes an effed, which moft bavc a caufe. If the Will be dctcnained, there is a Determiner. This muft be foppoied to be intended even by them that far, tbe Will determii>c$ itfelf. If it be fo, the ^^" 1 is both Determiner and determined ; it is a ciuie that afts and produces effeds upon itfelf, and '\s tbe objed of iu own influence and adion. With refpcd to that grand enquiry, Wkst ieUr^ rnaes tht Utfi diBcic cf thiniUerJtamding. It is fafficient to my prefent parpofc to fay — It is thai mctiv^y rj^hick, ai itJlaTUji m the viemoftkemiad, istU Jiron^ffi that dcttrmimi the WUL Bat it may be nc- ctS^ry that I fbooid a little explain my meaning in this. By motive, I mean the whole of that which mores, excites or invites the mind to voliiion, whether that be one thing dngly, or many things conjanaiy. Many particular things may concur and nnite their ftrength to induce the mind ; and when it is fo, all together arc as it were one coraplex motive. And when I fpeak of the /rntgfjt mdirx, I have refped to the ftrength of the wboie that operates to induce to a particular a^ of volidoo, whether that be the ftrength of one thing alone, or g€ aamj togecfaer. Whatever is a motive, in this fenfc, moft be fome- thing that is tjOdra in the 9km or sp^rfhtmfiou sftis wtierfiamdiltg, or perceiTiog fac^^. Nocting can induce or invite the mind to will or aS any thiag, any farther than k is perceived, or u fome way or ether in the mind's view ; for what is wholij na- perceived, and perfe^ly out of the mind'? view, ^n- not affeS the ir ind at all. It is mo ^evident, that nothing is in the mind, or reaches it, or cakes any hold of it, any ocherwtfe than as it is percciTed or thought of. And I think it mnft alfo be allowed l^ all, that every thing that is properly called a motive, cxcire- mect or inducement to a perceiving willing agenc, has fome fort and decree of tcmdoKy^ or sdmnU^e to move or excite the Will, previous to the effe&. or to the ad cf the Will excited. This previous tcn- «ency of the motive is wh2: 1 call ih: ^^r^ph sf t^-^ 8 What determines the Will, Part I. motive. That motive which has a lefs degree of pre- vious advantage or tendency to move the Will, or that appears lefs inviting, as it ftands in the view of the mind, is what I call a weaker motive. On the contrary, that which appears mod inviting, and has, by what appears concerning it to the underftanding or apprehenfion, the greateft degree of previous ten- dency to excite and induce the choice, is what I call the Jlrongejl motive. And in this fenfe, I fuppofe the Will is always determined by the ftrongeft motive. Things that exift in the view of the mind have their ftrength, tendency or advantage to move or excite its Will, from many things appertaining to the nature and circumftances of the thing viewed, the nature and circumftances of the mmd that views, and the degree and manner of its view ; which it would perhaps be hard to make a perfeft enumeration of. But fo much I think may be determined in general, without room for controverfy, that whatever is per- ceived or apprehended by an intelligent and volun- tary agent, which has the nature and influence of a motive to volition or choice, is confidered or viewed as good ; nor has it any tendency to invite or engage the eleftion of the foul in any further degree than it appears fuch. For to fay otherwife, would be to fay, that things that appear have a tendency by the appearance they make, to engage the mind to ele6t them, tome other way than by their appearing eligi- ble to it; which is abfurd. And therefore it muft be true, in fome fenfe, that the Will always is as the greatfjl apparent ^ocd is. But only, for the right undcrllanding of this, two things muft be well and diftin6lly obferved. 1. It muft be obferved in what fenfe I ufe the term good ; namely as of the fame import with agree^ able. To appear good to the mind, as I ufe the Se£l. II. What determines the Will 9 phrafe, is the fame as to appear agreeable, or feem fleafmg to the mind. Certainly nothing appears inviting and eligible to the mind, or tending to en- gage its inclination and choice, confidered as evil or difagreeahle ; nor, indeed^ as indijfertnt, and neither agreeable nor difr^greeable. But if it tends to draw the inclination, and move the Will, it mud be un- der the notion of that which fuits the mind. And therefore that mud have the greateft tendency to at- traft and engage it, which, as it ftands in the mind's view, fuiis it bed, and pleafes it molt ; and in that fenfe, is the greated apparent good : to fay other- wife, is little, if any thing, diort of a dire6l and plain contradidion. The word good, in this fenfe, includes in its fig- nification, the removal or avoiding of evil, or of that which is difagreeable and uneafy. It is agree- able and pleafjng to avoid what is difagreeable and xiifpleafing and to have uneaGnefs removed. So that here is included what Mr. Locke fuppofes de- termines the Will. For when he (peaks of unea- fmeG; as determining the Will, he mud be under- ftood as fuppofing that the end or aim which gov- erns in the volition or a6lof preference, is the avoid- ing or removal of that unealinefs ; and that is the fame thing aschoofmg and feeking what is more ea- iy and agreeable. 2. When I fay, the Will is as the greated appar- ent good is, or (as I have explained it) that volition lias always for its objed the thing which appears .mod agreeable ; it mud be carefully obferved, to avoid confulion and needlefs objedion, that I fpeak fii the diretl and irdmediate objedl ot the a£l of voli- tion ; and not fome obje6l that the a6l of Will has not an immediate, but only an indiredl and remote lefpe^l to. Many a6ts of volition have fome remote relation to an obje61, that is ditrerent from the thing D lo What determines the Will, Part L mon: immediately willed and chofen. Thus, when a drunkard has his liquor before him, and he has to choofc whether to drink it or no ; the proper and immediate obje6ls, about which his present volition is converfant, and between which his choice now de- cides, are his own a6ls> in drinking the liquor, or let- ting it alone ; and this will certainly be done ac- cording to what, in the prcfent view of his mind, taken in the whole of it, is moft agreeable to him. If he choofes or wills to drink it, and notto letita- lone ; then this aftion, as it (lands in the view of his mind, with all that belongs to its appearance there, is more agreeable and pleafing than letting it alone. But the objefts to which this a6l of volition may relate more rem.otely, and between which his choice may determine more indire£lly, arc the prefent plea- fure the man expefts by drinking, and the future mifery which he judges will be the confequence of it : he may judge that this future mifery, when it comes, will be more difagreeable and unpleafant, than refraining from drinking now would be. But .thefe two things are not the proper objefts that the a6l of volition Ipoken of is nextly converfant about. For the a6l of Will fpoken of is concerning prefent drinking or forbearing to drink. 'If he wills to drink, then drinking is the proper objeft of the a6l of his Will ; and drinking, on fome account or other, now appears mofl agreeable to him, and fuits him beft. If he choofes to refrain, then refraining is the imme- diate objcdt of his Will, and is mofl pleafmg to him. If in the choice he makes in the cafe, he prefers a prefent plcafure to a future advantage, which he judges will be greater when it comes ; then a leffer prclent pleafurc appears more agreeable to him than a greater advantage at a diftance. If on the contra- ry a future advantage is preferred, then that appears inoll agreeable, and fuits him be^. And fo ftill Sea. 11. What determines the Will. tt the prefent volition is as the greateft apparent good at prefent is. I have rather chofen to exprefs myfelf thus, that the Will always is as the grcatejl apparent good, or as what appears mojl agreeable, is, than to fay that the Will is determined by the greateft apparent good, or by what feems moft agreeable ; becaufe an appear- ing moft agreeable or pleafing to the mind, and the mind's preferring and choofing, feem hardly to be properly and perfediy diftind. If ftri6l propriety of fpeech be infifted on, it may more properly be faid, that the voluntary aBion which is the immediate confequence and fruit of the mind's volition or choice, is determined by that which appears moft a- greeable, than the preference or choice itfelf ; but that the a6i of volition itfelf is alwaj^s determined by that in or about the mind's view of the objeft, which caufes it to appear moft agreeable. I fay, in or about the mind's view of the obje6t, becaufe what has influence to render an obje6l in view agreeable, is not only what appears in the obje6l viewed, but al- fo the manner of the view, and the flate and circumjianc" es of the mind that views. — Particularly to enume- rate all things pertaining to the mind's view of the obje6ls of volition, which have influence in their ap- pearing agreeable to the mind, would be a matter of no fmall difficulty, and might require a treatife by itfelf, and is not neceffary to my prefent purpofe. I (hall therefore only mention fome things in general. I. One thing that makes an objedl: propofed to choice agreeable, is the apparent nature and circiim' Jlances of the objeB, And there are various things of this fort, that have an hand in rendering the obje6l more or lefs agreeable ; as, 1, That which appears in the objedl, which ren- ders it b eaiUiful 3ind pleafant, or deformed and irkfome to the mind ; viewing it as it is in itfelf. 12 What determines the Will Part I. 2. The apparent degree of pleafare or trouble attending the obje6t, or the confequence of it. Such concomitants and confequents being viewed as cir- cumftanccs of objefts, are to be confidered as be- longing to it, and as it were parts of it ; as it ftands in the mind's view, as a propofcd obje6l of choice. 3. The apparent Jlate of the pleafure or trouble that appears, with refped to dijlancc of time ; being either nearer or farther off. It is a thing in itfelf agreeable to the mind, to have pleafure fpeedily ; and difagreeable to have it delayed ; fo that if there be two equal degrees of pleafure fet in the mind's view, and all other things are equal, but only one is beheld as near, and the other far off; the nearer will appear mod agreeable, and fo will be chofen. Becaufe tho' the agreeablenefs of the obje6ls be ex- adily equal, as viewed in themfelves, yet not as viewed in their circumftances ; one of them having the additional agreeablenefs of the circumllance o£ nearnefs. II. Another thing that contributes to the agreea- blenefs of an obje6"l of choice, as it (lands in the mind's view, is the manner of the view. If the ob- jed be fomething which appears conne6led with fu- ture pleafure, not only will the degree of apparent pleafure have influence, but alfo the manner of the view, efpecially in two refpeQs. 1. With relped to the degree o^ judgvient, or ^^tm* nefs of ajfcnt, with which the mind judges the pleaf- ure to be future. Becaufe it is more agreeable to have a certain happinefs, than an uncertain one ; and a pleafure viewed as more probable, all other things being equal, is more agreeable to the mind, than that which is viewed as lefs probable. 2. With refpeft to the degree of the idea of the future pleafure. With regard to things which are the fubjc6l of our thoughts, either patt, prefent Qf Sea. II. What determines the Will. 13 future, we have much more of an idea or apprehen- fion of feme things than others; that is, our idea is much more clear, lively and Ilrong. Thus the ideas we have or fenfible things by immediate fenfation, are ufually much more lively than thofe we have by mere imagination, or by contemplation of them when abfent. My idea of the fun, when I look up- on it, is more vivid than when I only think of it. — Our idea of the fweet reliOi of a delicious fruit is ufually flronger when we tafle it, than when we on- ly imagine it. And fometimes the idea we have of things by contemplation, are much flronger and clearer, than at other times. Thus, a man at one time has a much flronger idea of the pleafure which is to be enjoyed in eating fome fort of food that he loves, than at another. Now the degree, orflrength of the idea or fenfe that men have of future good or evil, is one thing that has great influence on their minds to excite choice or volition. When of two kinds of future pleafure, which the mind confiders of, and are prefented for choice, both are fuppofed exa6lly equal by the judgment, and both equally certain, and all other things are equal, but only one of them is what the mind has a far more lively fenfe of, than of the other; this has the greatefl advantage by far to afFeft and attract the mind, and move the Will. It is now more agreeable to the mind, to take the pleafure it has a (Irong and lively fenfe of, than that which it has only a faint idea of. The view of the former is attended with the flrongell appetite, and the greatefl uneaiiners attends the want of it ; and it is agreeable to the mind to have uneafinefs remov- ed, and its appetite gratified. And if feveral future enjoyments are prefented together, as competitors for the choice of the mind, fome of them judged to be greater, and others Itis ; the mind alfo having a greater fer?fe and more lively idea of the good of 14 What determines the Will Part I. fomc of ihem, and of others a lefs ; and fome are viewed as of greater certainty or probability than others ; and thofe enjoyments that appear mod a- greeable in one of thefe refpeds, appear lead fo in others : in this cafe, all other things being equal, the agreeablenefs of a propofed objctlof choice will be in a degree fome way compounded of the degree of good fuppofed by the judgment, the degree of apparent probability or certainty of that good, and the degree of the view or fenfe, or livelinefs of the idea the mind has of that good ; becaufe all togeth- er concur to conftitute the degree in which the ob- je6t appears at prefent agreeable; and accordingly volition will be determined. I might further obfcrve, the flateof the mind that views a propofed obje6l of choice, is another thing that contributes to the agreeablenefs or difagreea- blencfs of that obje6l ; the particular temper which the mind has by nature, or that has been introduced and eflablifhed by education, example, cuftom, or fome other means; or the frame or ftate that the mind is in on a particular occafion. That obje6l which appears agreeable to one, does not fo to an- other. And the fame obje£l does not always appear alike agreeable, to the fame perfon, at different times. It is raofl agreeable to fome men, to follow their realon; and to others, to follow their appetites : to fome men it is more agreeable to deny a vicious in- clination, than to gratify it : others it fuits befl to gratify the vilefl appetites. It is more difagreeable to fome men than others, to counier-afl a former refolution. In thefe refpeds, and many others which might be mentioned, different things will be mod agreeable to different perfons; and not only fo, but to the fame perfons at different times. But polfibly it is necdlefs and improper, to men- tion the frrtmc and Hate of the mind, as a diftinft Sea. II. What determines ths Will. 15 grourxd of theagreeablenefs of obje6ls from the other two mentioned before, viz. The apparent nature and circumftances of the obje6ls viewed, and the manner of the view : perhaps if we Rri6lly confider the matter, the different temper and ftate of the mind makes no alteration as to the agreeablenefs of objeds, any other way than as it makes the objeQs themfelves appear differently beautiful or deformed, having apparent pleafure or pain attending them : and as it occafions the manner of the view to be dif- ferent, caufes the idea'of beauty or deformity, pleaf- ure or uneafinefs to be more or lefs lively. ' However, I think fo much is certain, that voli- tion, in no one inilance that can be mentioned, is otherwife than the greateil apparent good is, in the manner which has been explained. The choice of ihe mind never departs from that which, at that lime, and with refpedl to the direct and immediate objeQs of that decifion of the mind, appears mofl agreeable and pleafing, all things confidered. If the immediate obje6ls of the Will are a man's own a6lions, then thofe adions which appear mofl agree- able to him he wills. If it be now mofl agreeable to him, all things confidered, to walk, then he now wills to walk. If it be now, upon ihe whole of what at prefent appears to him, mofl agreeable to fpeak, then he choofes to fpeak : if It fuits him befl to keep filence, then he choofes to keep filence. There is fcarcely a plainer and more univerfal dictate of the fenfe and experience of mankind, than that, when men a6l voluntarily, and do what they pleafe, then they do what fuits them befl, or what is mofl agree- able to them. To fay, that they do what they pleafe, or what pleafes them, but yet do not do what is a* grecahk to them, is the fame thing as to fay, they do what they pleafe, but do not a6l their pleafure ; and that is to fay, tiiat they do what they pleafe, and yet do not do what thc^v nlcafe. 1 6 What determines the WilL Part I. It appears from thefe things, that in fome fenfe, tht Will always follows the lajl didate of the underjland- tng. But then the underjl anding mud be taken in a large fenfe, as including the v\^hole faculty of per- ception or appi chenfion, and not merely what is call- ed reafon or judgfncnt. If by the di6»:ate of the un- derllandmg is meant what reafon declares to be beft or moil for the perfon's happinefs, taking in the whole of its duration^ it is not true, that the Will always follows the iafl di6i:ate of the underftanding. Such a didate of reafon is quite a different matter from things appearing now mofl agreeable ; all things being put together which pertain to the mind's pref- ent perceptions, apprehenfions or ideas, in any re- fpe6l. Altho' that didlate of reafon, when it takes place, is otje thing that is put into the fcales, and is to be confidered as a thing that has concern in the oompound influence which moves and induces the Will ; and is one thing that is to be confidered in eflimating the degree of that appearance of good which the will always follows ; either as having its influence added to other things, or fubducied from ihem. When it concurs with other things, then its weight is added to them, as put into the fame fcale ; but when it is againll them, it is as a weight in the oppohte fcale, where it refills the influence of other things : yet its refiftance is ofien overcome by their greater weigh:, and fo the a6l of tha Will is deter- iiiined in oppofition to it. The things which I have faid, may, I hope, ferve, in fo»ne meafure, to illuftrate and confirm the pofi- tion I laid down in the beginning of this fedlion, viz. That the Will is always determined by thcjirongejl 7notive, or by that view ot the mind which has the created degree of previous tendency to excite voli- tion. But whether 1 have been fo happy as rightly to explain the thin^ wherein confi!ls thc'fhength of Sea. III. The Natuft of Neceffity. 17 motives, or not, yet my failing in this will not over- throw the pofition itfelf ; which carries much of its own evidence with it, and is the thing of chief im- portance to the purpofe of the enfuing difcourfe : And the truth of it, I hope, will appear with great clearnefs, before I have finifhed what I have to fay on the fubjedi; of human liberty. Section III. Concerning the Meaning of the Terms Neceffity, Im* poffibility, Inability, &c. and 0/ Contingency 1 HE words necejfary^ impojfihle. Sec, are abundantly ufed in controverfies about Free- Will and moral agency ; and therefore the fenfe in which they are ufed, Ihould be clearly underftood. Here I might fay, that a thing is then faid to be necejfary, when it muft be, and cannot be otherwifc. But this would not properly be a definition of Ne- ceffity, or an explanation of the word, any more than if I explained the word miiflt by there being a Neceffity. The words muji^ can, and cannot, need explication as much as the words necejfary and m- fojfible ; excepting that the former are words that children commonly ufe, and know (omething of the meaning of earlier than the latter. The word necejfary, as ufed in common fpeecb, is a relative term ; and relates to fome fuppofed oppo- lition made to the exiftence of the thing fpoken of, which is overcome, or proves in vain to hinder or alter it. That is neceffary, in the original and prop- er fenfe of the word, which is, or will be, notwith- ftanding all fuppofable oppofition. To fay, that a E i8 The Nature o/'Neceflity. Part I. thing is ncccflary, h the fame thing as to fay, that it is impofliblc, it (hould not be : But the word im^ pojihk is maj-iifeftly a relative term, and has refer- ence to fuppoled power exerted to bring a thing to pafs, which is infufTicient for the efff;6: ; as the word unable is rcldtive, and has relation to ability or en- deavour which is infufficient ; and as the word irre^ fiftible is relative, and has always reference to refift- ance which is made, or may be made to fome force or power tending to an eff-cl, and is infufficient to wiihftand the power, or hinder the efFe6i;. The common notion of Neceffity and Impoffibility im- plies fomething that fruftrates endeavour or delire. Here leveral things are to be noted. 1. Things are faid to be neceffary in general, which are or will be notwithflanding any (uppofa- ble oppofuion from us or others^ or from whatever quarter. But things are faid to be neceffary to us, which are or will be notwithflanding all oppofition fuppofable in the cafe from us. The fame may be obferved of the word impojfihle, and other fuch like terms. 2. Thcfe terms neccfary, impoffibk, irreffiible, ^ do efpecially belong to controverfy about liberty and moral agency, as ufed in the latter of the two {tn^es now mentioned, viz, as neceffary or impoffible to us, and with relation to any fuppofable oppofition or endeavour of ours, 3. As the word Nccejfily, in its vulgar and com- mon ule, is relative, and has always reference to fome fuppofable infufficient oppofition ; fo when Ave Ipeak of any thing as neceffary to us, it is with relation to fome fuppofable oppofition of cur Wills, or fome voluntary exertion or effort of ours to the contrary : For we do not properly make oppolition to an event, any otherwife than as we voluntarily oppofc it. Things arc faid to be what muft be, or Sea. III. The Nature of K^cciTity. 19 necejfarily are, a$ to us, when they are, or will be, though we defire or endeavour the contrary, or try to prevent or remove their exigence : but fuch op- pofition of ours always either conlifts in, or implies oppolition of our Wills. It is manifefl that all fuch like words and phrafes, as vulgarly ufed, are ufed and accepted in this man- ner. A thing is faid to be neccjfary, when we can- not help it, let us do what we will. So any thing is faid to be impojfible to us, when we would do it, or would have it brought to pafs, and endeavour it ; or at leafl may be fuppofed to defire and feek it ; but all our defires and endeavours are, or would be vain. And that is faid to be irrefijlible, which overcomes all our oppolition, refiftance, and endea- vour to the contrary. And we are to be faid unable to do a thing, when our fuppofable defires and en- deavours to do it are infufficient. We are accuftomed, in the common ufe of lan- guage, to apply and underftand thefe phrafes in this fenfe : we grow up with fuch a habit ; which by the daily ufe of thefe terms, in fuch a fenfe, from our childhood, becomes fixed and fettled ; fo that the idea of a relation to a fuppofed will, defire and en- deavour of ours, is flrongly conne£led with thefe terms, and naturally excited in our minds, whenev- er we hear the words ufed. Such ideas, and thefe words, are fo united and aCTociated, that they una- voidable go together ; one fuggefls the other, and carries the other with it, and never can be feparated as long as we live. And if we u\^e the words, as terms of art, in another fenfe, yet, unlefs we are ex- ceeding circumfpe6l and wary, we fhall infenfibly flide into the vulgar ufe of them, and fo apply the words in a very inconfiftent manner : this habitual connexion of ideas will deceive and confound us in our reafonings and difcourfes, wherein we pre- 20 The Nature of Neceflity. Part I. tend to ufe thefe terms in that manner, as terms of art. 4. It follows from what has been obferved, that when thefe terms nccejfary, impojjible, irrejijlible, una' ble, &c. are ufed in cafes wherein no oppofition, or infufficient will or endeavour, is fuppofed, or can be fuppofed, but the very nature of the fuppofed cafe itfelf excludes and denies any fuch oppofition, will or endeavour, thefe terms are then not ufed in their proper fignification, but quite befide their ufe in common fpeech. The reafon is manifeft ; namely, that in fuch cafes we cannot ufe the words with re- ference to a fuppofable oppofition, will or endea- vour. And therefore if any man ufes thefe terms in fuch cafes, he either ufes them nonfenfically, or in fome new fenfe, diverfe from their original and proper meaning. As for inftance ; if a man (hould aflBrm after this manner, That it is neceffary for a man, and what muft be, that a man fhould choofe virtue rather than vice, during the time that he pre- fers virtue to vice ; and that it is a thing impoflible and irrefiftible, that it fhould be otherwife than that he fhould have this choice, fo long as this choice continues ; fuch a man would ufe the terms mii/i, irrejijlible, Sec, with perfe6l infignificance and non- fenfe ; or in fome new fenfe, diverfe from their com- mon ufe ; which is with reference, as has been ob- ferved, to fuppofable oppofition, unwillingnefs and xefiftance ; whereas, here, the very fuppofition ex- cludes and denies any fuch thing : for the cafe fup- pofed is that of being willing and choofing. 5. It appears from what has been faid, that thefe terms necejfary, impoJJib[e, Sec. are often ufed by phi- lofophers and metaphyficians in a fenfe quite diverfe from their common ufe and original fignification : For they apply them to many cafes in which no op- pofition is fuppofed or fuppofable. Thus they ufe Scft. III. TheVature of l^tct^iiy. si them with refpedl: to God's exiftence before the cre- ation of the world, when there was no other being but He : fo with regard to many of the difpofitions and a£ts of the Divine Being. Such as his loving himfelf, his loving righteoufnefs, hating fin, &c. So they apply thefe terms to many cafes of the inclina- tions and a6lions of created intelligent beings, an- gels and men ; wherein all oppofition of the Will is ftiut out and denied, in the very fuppolition of the cafe. Metaphyfical or Philofophical Neceffity is nothing different from their certainty. I fpeak not now of the certainty of knowledge, but the certainty that is in things themfelves, which is the foundation of the certainty of the knowledge of them ; or that where- in lies the ground of the infallibility of the propofi- tion which affirms them. What is fometimes given as the definition of phi- lofophical Neceffity, namely, That by which a thing cannot but be^ or whereby it cannot be otherwife, fails of being a proper explanation of it, on two accounts : Firjl, the words can^ or cannot, need explanation as much as the word Neceffity ; and the former may as well be explained by the latter, as the latter by the former. Thus, if any one afked us what we mean, when we fay, a thing cannot but be, we might ex- plain ourfeives by faying, we mean, it mufl neceffa- rily be fo ; as well as explain Neceffity, by faying, it is that by which a thing cannot but be. And Secondly^ this definition is liable to the foremention- ed great inconvience i the words cannot, or unable, are properly relative, and have relation to power ex- erted, or that may be exerted, in order to the thing fpoken of; to which, as I have now obferved, the word Neceffity, as ufed by philofophers, has no re- ference. Philofophical Neceffity is really nothing elfe than 22 The Nature of Ncctffity, Parti. the full and fixed connexion between the things fjgoified by the fiibjcft and predicate of a propor- tion, which afTirms fomething to be true. When there is fuch a connexion, then the thing affirm- ed in the propofition is neceffary, in a philolophical fenfe ; whether any oppofition, or contrary efiFort be fuppofed, or fuppofable in the cafe, or no. When the fubje6l and predicate of the propofition, which affirms the exigence of any thing, either fubftance, quality, a£l or circumftance, have a full and certain connexion, then the exiftence or being of that thing is faid to be neceffary in a metaphyfical fenfe. And in this fenfe I ufe the word Nccejfiiy, in the following dilcourfe, when I endeavour to prove that Neccffity is not inconfijlcnt zvith liberty. The luhje6l and predicate of a propofition. which affirms cxillence of fomething, may have a full, fix- ed, and certain connexion feveral ways. - (i.) They may have a full and perfe6l connexion in and of themf elves ; becaufe it may imply a contra- diction, or grois abfurdify, to fuppofe them not con- ne6led. Thus many things are neceffary in their own nature. So the external exiftence of being generally confidercd, is necefidry in itfelf : becaufe it would be in itfelf the greateft: abfurdit'y, to deny the exiftence of being in general, or to {d^y there was abfolute and univerfal nothing ; and is as it were the fum of all contradi6lions ; as might be fliewn, if this were a proper place for it. So God's infini- ty, and other attributes are neccllary. So it is ne- cefi"ary in its own nature, that two and two fliould be four ; and it is necelfary, that all right lines drawn from the centre of a circle to the circumference fhould be equal. It is neceffary, fit and fuitable, that men fhould do to others, as they would that they fhould do to them. So innumerable meta- phyfic?.! and mathematical truths are neceffary in Sea. III. The Nat^j,rc of ^^^QCt^^iiy. 23 them/elves : the fubjc^l; and predicate of the propo- (ition which affirms ihein, ave pcrfc6lly connedled 0/ thcmfdves. (2.) The connexion of the fubjefl and predicate of a propofition, which atlirms the exiftence of fome- ihing, may be fixed and made certain, becaufe the exillence of that thing is aheady come to pafs ; and either now is, or has been ; and fo has as it were made fure of exinence. And therefore, the propofi- tion which afTirms prefent and pall exiftence of it, may by this means be made certain, and neceHj'arily and unaherably true; the pall event has fixed and decided the matter, as to its exiilence ; and has made it impofiible but that exiftence fhould be truly pre- dicated of it. Thus the exillence of whatever is al- ready come to pafs, is now become ncceflary ; it is become impoliible it ftiould be olherwife than true, that fuch a thing has been. (3.) The fubje6l and predicate of a propofition which afhrms fomething to be, may have a real and certain connexion conjcquently ; and fo the exiftence of the thing may be confequently neccflary ; as it may be fureiy and firmly conne6ied with fomething elfe, that is necellary in one of the former refoetls. As it is either fully and thoroughly conneQed with that which is abfolutely necelTary in its own nature, or with fomething which has already received and made fure of exiftence. This NcceiFuy lies in, or may be explained by the connexion of two or more propofitions one with another. Things which are perfedly conne6led with other things that are nc- ceflary, are necellary themfelves, by a NecelFity of confequence. And here it may be obferved, that all things which are future, or ivhich will hereafter be^in to be. which CMi be l.nd to be necellary, are necellary only in this lall way. Their exiftence is not ueccUluy in iifelf ; 24 The Nature o/NcctBty. Part I, for if fo, they always would have exifled. Nor is their exillence become neceffary by being made fure, by being already come to pafs. Therefore, the only way that any thing that is to come to pafs hereafter, is or can be neceffary, is by a connexion with fomething that is neceffary in its own nature, or fomething that already is, or has been ; fo that: the one being fuppofed, the other certainly follows. And this alfo is the only way that all things paft, excepting thofe which were from eternity, could be nec&ffary before they came to pafs, or could come to pafs neceffarily ; and therefore the only way in which any effect or event, or any thing whatfoever that ever has had, or will have a beginning, has come into being neceffarily, or will hereafter neceffarily exifl. And therefore this is the Neceffity which ef- pecially belongs to controverfies about the a6ls of the Will. It may be of fome ufe in thefe controverfies, fur- ther to obferve concerning metaphyfical Neceffity", that (agreeable to the diftinftion before obferved of Neceffity, as vulgarly underftood) things that exift may be faid to be neceffary, either with a general or particular Neceffity. The exiftence of a thing may be faid to be neceffary with a ^Ieccffiry. 7"hat is, the efFe6l may be asperfeftly connedled with its moral caule, as a natural necef- fary clYttl is with its natural caufe. Whether the Will in every cafe is ncceifarily determined by the ilrongtll motive, or whether the Will ever makes any reiidance to luch a motive, or can ever oppofe the Ilrorigell prefent inclination, or not ; if that matter IJiould be controverted, yet 1 fuppofe none ivill deny, but that, in fome cafes, a previous bias and inclination, or the motive prefented, may be fo powerful, that the a6l of the Will may be certainly and indiilblubly conne6led therewith. When mo- tives or previous bias are very lirong, all will allow- that there i^ (ome dijiadty in [ip\\v.\ a;.'^ainft them* SeQ:. IV. 6)/ Natural and Moral NecefTity. 29 And if they were yet (Ironger, the difficulty would be Hill graater. And therefore, if more were Qill add- ed to their flrength, to a certain degree, it would make the difficulty fo great, that it would be whol- ly impoffihh to lurmount it ; for this plain rcafon, becaufe whatever power men may be fuppofed to have to furmount difficulties, yet that power is not infinite; and fo goes not beyond certain limits. If a man can furmount ten degrees of difliculty of this Icind with twenty degrees of ilrcngth, becaufe the degrees of flrength ore beyond the degrees of diffi- culty ; yet if the difficult)^ be increafed to thirty, or an hundred, or a thoufand degrees, and his ftreugth not alfo increafed, his ftrength will be wholly infuf- ficient to furmount the difficult)^ As therefore it mull be allowed, that there may be fuch a thing as 2ijurc and -perfeB connexion between moral cau ies and effeds ; fo this only is what I call by the name of moral Nccejfity, 2. When 1 ufe this diftindion of moral and natur- al Necejfity, I would not be underflood to fuppofe, that it any thing comes to pafs by the former kind of Neceffity, the nature of things is not concerned in it, as well as in the latter. I do not mean to deter- mine, that when a moral habit or m.otive is fo (Irong, that the a6l of the Will infallibly follows, this is not owing to the nature 0/ things. But thefe are the names that thefe two kinds of Neceffity have ufually been called by; and they muft be diflinguiffied by fome names or other; for there is a diflinction or difference between them, that is very important in its confequcnces. Which difference docs not lie fo much in the nature of the connexion, as in the two terms conneBed. The caufe with which the cffcft; is conne6led, is of a particular kind, viz. that which is of moral nature; either fome previous habitual difnohtion, or fom^e motive exhibited to the under- ^0 Of Natural ^ni Moral Necefiity. Part I, Handing. And the efFeCl is alfo of a particular kind; being likewife of a moral nature; confifting in feme inclination or volition of the foul or volun- tary a6lion. 1 fuppofe, that Neceffity which is called natural^ in diflin6lion from moral neceffity, is fo called, be- canfe vierc nature, as the word is vulgarly ufed, is concerned, without any thing of choice. The word nature is often ufed in oppofition to choice: not be- caufc nature has indeed never any hand in our choice ; but this probably comes to pafs by means that we firft get our notion of nature from that dif- ccvnible and obvious courfe of events, which we ob- ferve in many things that our choice has no concern in; and efpecially in the material world; which, in very many parts of it, we eafily perceive to be in a fettled courfe ; the dated order and manner of fuc- cefFion being very apparent. But where we do not readily difcern the rule and connexion, (though there be a connexion, according to an eftabliftied law, truly taking place) we fignify the manner of event by fome other name. Even in many things which are feen in the material and inanimate world, which do not difcernibly and obvioufly come to pafs ac- cording to any fettled courfe, men do not call the manner of the event by the name of nature, but by fuch names as accident, chance, contingent, ccc. So men make a diflindion between nature and choice ; as though they were completely and univerfally dif- tin6t. Whereas, I fuppofe none will deny but that choice, in many cafes, arifes from nature, as truly as other events. But the dependence and connexion between a61s of volition or choice, and their caufes, acGOidmg to eflablifhcd laws, is not fo fcnfible and obvious. And we obferve that choice is as it were a new principle of motion and a6lion, different from that cftablifhed law and order of things which is mofl Sea. IV. 0/"Moral Neceflfity. .< 31 obvious, that is feen efpecially in corporeal and fenlible things ; and alfo the choice often interpofes, interrupts and alters the chain of events in thefe ex- ternal obje6ls, and caufes them to proceed other- wife than they would do, if let alone, and left to go on according to the laws of motion among them- ielves. Hence it is fpoken of as if it were a princi- ple of motion entirely diftintt from nature, and properly fet in oppofition to it. Names being com- monly given to things, according to what is mod obvious, and is fuggefted by what appears to the fenfes without reflexion and refearch. 3. It muft be obferved, that in what has been ex- plained, as fignified by the name of moral Necejfity, the word Neceffiiy is not ufed according to the origi- nal defign and meaning of the word : for. as was obferved before, fuch terms, necejfary, impojfible^ irre^ Jijlible, &c. in common fpeech, and their mod prop- er fenfe, are always relative ; having reference to fome fuppofable voluntary oppofition or endeavour, that is infufficient. But no fuch oppofition, or con- trary will and endeavour, is fuppofable in the cafe of moral Neceflity ; which is a certainty of the in- clination and will itfeif ; which does not admit of the fuppofition of a will to oppofe and refill it. For it is abfurd to fuppofe the fame individual will to oppofe itfeif, in its prefent ad ; or the prefent choice to be oppofite to, and refilling prefent choice : a.s abfurd as it is to talk of two contrary motions, in the fame moving body, at the fame time. And therefore the very cafe fuppofed never admits of any trial, whether an oppofing or refilling will can overcome this Neccliity. What has been f^ud of natural and moral Necef- fity, may ferve to explain what is intended by natu- ral and moral Inability. We are laid to be naturally unable to do a thing, when we cannot do it if we 32 OJ Moral Inability. Part I. will, bec/ufe what is mod commonly called nature does not allow of it, or becaufe of Tome impeding defeat or obdacle that is extrinfic to the will ; either in the faculty of underflanding, conflitution of body, or external objeds. Moral Inability confifts not m any of thefe things ; but either in the want of inclination ; or the ftrength of a contrary inclina- tion ; or the want of fufficient motives in viev*', to induce and excite the a6l of the will, or the ftrength of apparent motives to the contrary. Or both thefe may be refolved into one ; and it may be faid in one . word, that moral Inability confifts in the oppofttion or want of inclination. For when a perfon is una- ble to will or choofe fuch a thing, through a defe6l of motives, or prevalence of contrary motives, it is the iame thing as his being unable through the want of an inclination, or the prevalence of a contrary inclination, in fuch circumftances, and under the influence of fuch views. To give lome inftances of this moral Inability, — A woman ol great honour and chaftity may have a moral Inability to proftitute herfelf to her flave. A -child of great love and duty to his parents, may be unable lo be willing to kill his father. A very laf- civious Kian, in cafe of certain opportunities and temptations, and in the abfence of fuch and fuch rcftraints, may be unable to forbear gratifying his lull. A drunkard, under fuch and fuch circum- ftances, may be unable to forbear taking of ftrong drink. A very malicious man may be unable to exert benevolent a£ls to an enemy, -or to delire his prof- peiity ; yea, fome may be lo under the power of a vile dilpofition, that lliey may be unable to love thole who are molt worthy of their efteem and affec- tion. A Hrong habit of virtue, and great degree of holincls \\\a\ caufe a moral Inability to love \vickcdncfs in general, may render a man unable to Sea. IV. OJ Moral Inability. 3 j take complacence in wicked perfons or things ; or to choofe a wicked life, and prefer it to a virtuous life. And on the other hand, a great degree of habitual wickednefs may lay a man under an Ina- bility to love and choofe holinefs j and render him utterly unable to love an infinitely holy Being, or to choofe and cleave to him as his chief good. Here it may be of ufe to obferve this diftin6tion of moral Inability, viz, of that which is general and habitual, ^and that which is particular and occafionalm l^y a general and habitual moral Inability, I mean an Inability in the heart to all exercifes or a6ls of will of that nature or kind, through a fixed and habitu- al inclination, or an habitual and dated defe^:, or want of a certain kind of inclination. Thus a very ill-natured man may be unable to exert fuch a6ls of benevolence, as another, who is full of good nature, commonly exerts ; and a man, whofe heart is hab- itually void of gratitude, may be unable to exert fuch and fuch grateful a6is, through that dated de- feat of a grateful inclination. By particular and oc-^ cajional moral Inability, I mean an Inability of the will or heart to a particular a6t, through the ftrength or defe6l of prefent motives, or of inducements pre- fented to the view of the underftanding, on this occa-> fion* If it be fo, that the will is always determined by the ftrongeft motive, then it mull always have an Inability, in this latter fenfe, to a6l otherwife than it does ; it not being poflible, in any cafe, that the will (hould, at prefent, go againft the motive which has now, all things confidered, the greateft ftrength and advantage to excite and induce it* The former of thefe kinds of moral Inability, con- fiding in that which is dated, habitual and general, is mod commonly called by the name of Inability ; becaufe the word Inability, in its mod proper and original fignification, has refped to fome Jlated de^ G g4 OJ Moral Inability. Part I. Jc5l.. And this efpecially obtains the name of Ina^ bility alfo upon another account : I before obferved, that the word InabiUty in its original and moft com- mon ufe, is a relative term ; and has refped to will and endeavour, as fuppofable in the cafe, and as in- lufficicnt to bring to pafs the thing defired and en- deavoured Now there may be more of an appear- ance and fh idow of this, with refped to the afts which arife from a fixed and ftrong habit, than oth- ers that arife only from tranfient occafions and caufes. Indeed will and endeavour againft, or diverfe from prcfcnt a6ls of the will, are in no cafe fuppofable, whether thofe a6ts be occafional or habitual ; for that would be to fuppofe the will, at prefent, to be otherwife than, at prefent, it is. But yet there may be will and endeavour ^gd\n^ future a6ls of the will, or volitions that are likely to take place, as viewed at a diftance. It is no contradidion to fuppofe that the a£ls of the will d^l one time, may be againft the a6ts of the will at another time ; and there may be defires and endeavours to prevent or excite future a6ts of the will ; but fuch defires and endeavours are, in many cafes, rendered infufficient and vain, through fixednefs of habit : when the pccafion re- turns, the ftrength of habit overcomes, and baffles all fuch oppofition. In this refpe6l:, a man may be in miferable flavery and bondage to a ftrong habit. But it may be comparatively eafy to make an alter- ation with refpeft to fudi future a6ls as are only occafional and tranfient ; becaufe the occafion or tranfient caufe, if forefeen, may often eafily be pre- vented or avoided. On this account, the moral In- ability that attends fixed habits, efpecially obtains the name of Inability. And then, as the will may remotely and indiretily refift itfelf, and do it in vain, in the cafe of ftrong habits; fo reafon may refift prcfcnt a6ts of the will, and its refiftance be infuffi- Sea IV. OJ Moral Inability. 35 cient ; and this is more commonly the cafe alfo, when the a6ls arife from ftrong habit. But it muft be obferved concerning moral Inabil- ity, in each kind of it, that the word Inability is ufed in a fenfe very diverfe from its original import. The word fignifies only a natural Inability, in the proper ufe of it ; and is applied to fuch cafes only wherein a prefent will or inclination to the thing, with refpeSl to which a perfon is faid to be unable, is fuppofable. It cannot be truly faid, according to the ordinary ufe of language, that a malicious man, let him be ^bever fo malicious, cannot hold his hand from flrik^ ing, or that he is not able to (hew his neighbour kindnefs ; or that a drunkard, let his appetite be Ikever fo flrong, cannot keep the cup from his mouth* In the ftrifteCl propriety of fpeech, a man has a thing in his power, if he has it in his choice, or at his elec^ tion : and a man cannot be truly faid to be unable to do a thing, when he can do it if he will. It is improperly faid, that a perfon cannot perform thofe external adions which are dependent on the a6l of the will, and which would be eafily performed, if the a6l of the will were prefent. ^ And if it be im- properly faid, that he cannot perform thofe external voluntary adions, which depend on the will, it is in feme refpe61; more improperly faid, that he is una- ble to exert the ads cf the will themfelves ; becaufe it is more evidently falfe, with refped to thofe, that he cannot if he will : for to fay fo, is a down-right contradidion : it is to fay, he cannot will, if he doti will.) And in this cafe, not only is it true, that it is eafy for a man to do the thing if he will, but the very willing is the doing ; when once he has willed, the thing is performed ; and nothing elfe remains to be done. Therefore, m thefe things to afcribe a nonperformance to the want of power or ability, i^ r.ot juft ; becaufe the thing wanting is not a being ^6 Tfu Notion of Liberty, Part I. able, but a being willing. There are faculties of mind, and capacity of nature, and every thing elfe fufficient, but a difpofition : nothing is wanting but a will. Section V. Concerning the Notion of Liberty, and of Moral Agency, J. HE plain and obvious meaning of the words Free-^ Ami and Liberty, in common fpeech, is pemtr, oppor^ tunity or advantage, (hat any one has, to do as he pleafes. Or in other words, his being free from hinderance or impediment in the way of doing, or conducing in any refpefl, as he wills * And the contrary to Liberty, whatever name we call that by, is a perfon's being hindered or Unable to condu^ as he will, or being neceflitated to do otherwife. If this which I have mentioned be the meaning of the word Liberty, in the ordinary ufe of language ; as I trull that none that has ever learned to talk, and is unprejudiced, will deny ; then it will follow, that in propriety of fpeech, neither Liberty, nor its con- trary, can properly be afcribed to any being or thing, but that which has fuch a faculty, power or proper- ty, as is called will. For that which is pofifeffed of no fuch thing as will, cannot have any power or of-- fortunity of doing according to its -will, nor be necefli- tated to a6^ contrary to its will, nor be reftrained from afting agreeably to it. And therefore to talk of ♦ I fay not only doing, but conducing i becaufe a volunta- ry forbearing to do, fitting ftill, keeping filence, &c. are in. ilances of perfons conduEl, about which Liberty is exercifecl ; though they are not fo properly called doin^. S€£l. V. end o/MoyhI Agency. gy Liberry, or the contrary, as belonging to the very will ttfelfj is not to fpeak good fenle ; if we judge of fenfe, and nonfenfe, by the original and proper fig- nification of words. For the will iifelfh not an A- gcnt that hai a will : the power of choofing itfelf, has not a power of choofing. That which has the power of volition or choice is the man or the fotj, and not the power of volition itfelf. And he that has the Liberty of doing according to his will, is the Agent or doer who is poffeffed of the will ; and not the will which he is poflefled of. We fay with pro- priety, that a bird let loofe has power and Liberty to fly ; but not that the bird's power of flying h^s a power and Liberty of flying. To be free is the prop- erty of an Agent, who is pofTelTed of powers and faculties, as much as to be cunning, valiant, bounti- ful, or zealous. But thefe qualities are the proper- ties of men or perfons ; and not the properties of properties. There are two things that are contrary to this which is called Liberty in common fpeeeh. One is conjlraint ; the fame is otherwife called ybrc^, com^ pulfioUy and coaclion ; which is a perfon's being ne- ceifitated to do a thing contrary to his will. The other is rejlraint ; which is his being hindered, and not having power to do according to his will. But that which has no will, cannot be the fubjc6l of thefe things. — I need fay the lels on this head, Mr. Locke having fet the fame thing forth, with fo great clcjgir- fiefs, in his EJfay oy, the Human Undcrjlanding. But one thing more I would oblerve concerning what is vulgarly called Liberty; namely, that power and opportunity for one to do and condu6l as he will, or according to his choice, is ail that is meant by it ; without taking into the meaning of the v^ord any thing of the caufe or original of that choice ; or at all confidering how the pcrfon came to have fuch S The Notion of ]J\hQxtyf Part L a volition ; whether it was caufed by fome external motive, or internal habicual bias ; whether it was determined by fome internal antecedent volition, or whether it happened without a caufe; whether it was necelTarily conneded with fomething foregoing, or not connefted. Let the perfon come hy his vo- lition or choice how he will, yet, if he is able, and there is nothing in the way to hinder his purfuing and executing his will, the man is fully 5nd perfe6t- ly free, according to the primary and common no- tion of freedom. What has been faid may be fufEcient to fhew what is meant by Liberty^ according to the common no- tions of mankind, and in the ufeful and primary acceptation of the word : but the word, as ufed by Arminians, Pelagians and others, who oppofe the Calvm/Jls, has an entirely different fignification. — Thefe feveral things belong to their notion of Liber- ty. 1. Thdit it coniifis in a fel/-deter7nini7ig power ia the will, or a certain fovereignty the will has over itfelf, and its own a6ls, whereby it determines its own volitions ; fo as not to be dependent in its de-. terminations, on any caufe without itfelf, nor deter- mined by any thing prior to its own ads. 2. /«- difference belongs to Liberty in their notion of it, or (hat the mind, previous to the ad of volition be, in iquilibrio, 3. Contingence is another thing that be- longs and is effential to ic ; not in the common ac- ceptation of the word, as that has been already ex- plained, but as oppoled to all ntujfiiy^ or any fixed and certain connexion with lome previous ground or rcafon of its exiftence. They fuppofe the elTence of Liberty fo much to confill in thefe things, that unlefs the will of man be free in this fenfe, he has no real freedom, howmuchloever he may be at Lib- erty to ad according to his will. A moral Agent is a being that is capable of thofe Se6l. V. and of Moral Agency. 39 adions that have a moral quality, and which can properly be deno ninated good or evil in a moral fenfc, virtuous or vicious, commendable or faulty. To moral Agency belongs a moral faculty, or fenfe of moral good and evil, or of fuch a thing as defert or worthinefs, of praife or blame, reward or punifli- ment; and a capacity which an Agent has of being influenced in his adions by moral inducements or motives, exhibited to the view of underftanding and reafon, to engage to a condu61 agreeable to the mor- al faculty. The fun is very excellent and beneficial in its ac- tion and influence on the earth, in warming it, and caufing it to bring forth its fruits ; but it is not a moral Agent : its a6lion, though good, is not virtu- ous or meritorious. Fire that breaks cut in a city, and confumes great part of it, is very mifchievous in its operation; but is not a moral Agent : what it does is not faulty or finful, or deferving of any punifhment. The brute creatures are not moral A- gents: the aQions of fome of them are very profita- ble and pleafant; others are very hurtful : yet, fee- ing they have no moral faculty, or fenfe of defert, and do not a6l from choice guided by underftand- ing, or with a capacity of reafoning and refledling, but only from inllindi, and are not capable of being influenced by moral inducements, their anions are not properly finful or virtuous ; nor are they prop- erly the fubjeds of any fuch moral treatment for what they do, as moral Agents are for th ir faults or good deeds. # Here it may be noted, that there is a circuoaflan- tial diflPerence between the moral Agency of a ruler ^nd ^fuhjed. I call it circimjiantial, becaufe it lies only in the diff'erence of moral inducements they are capable ot being influenced by, arifing from the dif- ference of circumjiances. A ruler admg iu that ca- |0 The Notion of Liberty, Part I. p:\ci(y otily, is not capable of being influenced by a moral law, and its lantlions of thrcatenings and promifes, rewards and punifliments,as thtfubje^is ; ihough both may be influenced by a knowledge of moral good and evil. And therefore the moral a- gency of the Supreme Being, who acts only in the ca- pacity of a rider towards his creatures, and never as iifuhjed, differs in that refpe^t from the moral Agen- cy of created intelligent begins. God's adlions, and particularly thofe which he exerts as a moral govern- or, have moral qualifications, are morally good in the higheft degree. Thev are moft perfe6lly holy and righteous : and we mad conceive of Him as in- fluenced in the higheft degree, by that which, above ^U others, is properly a moral inducement, viz. the moral good which He fees in fuch and fuch things : and therefore He is, in the moft proper lenfe, a moral Agent, the fource of all moral ability and Agency, the fountain and rule of all virtue and moral good ; though by reafon of his being iupreme over all, it is not poflible He (hould be under the influence of law or command, promifes or thrcatenings, rewards or punidimcnts, counfels or warnings. The eflential qualities of a moral Agent are in God, in the greateft poftible perfedion ; fuch as underftanding, to per- ceive the difference between moral good and evil ; a capacity of difcerning that moral wotthinefs and de- merit, by which fome things are praife-worthy, oth- ers deferving of blame and punilhment ; and alfo a capacity of choice, and choice guided by underftand- ing, and a power of ading according to his choice or pleafure, and being capable of doing thofe things which ale in ihe higheft fenfe praife-worthy. And herein does vtry much confift that image of God wherein he mc^dc man, (which we read of, Geti. I. 26, 27. and Ciuid. IX. 6.) by which God diftinguiOi- cd man fforu the beads, mz. in thofe faculties atud Se61:. V. and ^t/" Moral Agency, 4^. principles of nature, whereby He is capable of moral Agency. Herein very nnuch confifls the natural image of God ; as his fpiritual and moral image, wherein man was made ac firft, confided in that moral excellency, that he was endowed with. H PART II. Wherein it is confulercd whether there is or can he any fuch Sort oj Fi^PEDoM OF Will, as that wherein Arminians place the EJfence of the Liberty of all moral Agents ; and whether any fuch Thing ever was or can be conceived of E C T I O N Shewing the manifefi Inconfflence of the Arminian Ne- tion o/' Liberty of Will, confijling in the Will's felf- detennining Power. JljLaving taken notice of thofe things which may be nccefTarv to be obferved, concernin2[ the meanincr of the principal terms and phrafes made ufe of in con- troverfies concerning human Liberty, and particu- larly obferved what Liberty is according to the com- mon language and general apprehenfion of mankind, and what it is as underflood and maintained by Ar- vnnians ; I proceed to confider the Arminian notion of the Freedom of the Will, and the fuppofed necefiity of it in order to moral agency, or in order to any one's being capable of virtue or vice, and properly the fubjett of command or counfel, praife or blame, promiles or threatcnings, rewards or punilhments ; or whether that which has been defcribcd, as the thing meant by Liberty in common fpeech, be not fufficient, and the only Liberty which makes or can make any one a moral agent, and fo propc \y the fubje^l of thelc things. In this Part, I fiiall con- Se£l. I. The Tnconfijitnu^ &c. 43 fider whether any fuch thing be poffible cr conceiv- able, as that Freedom of Will which Arminians in- fifl on ; and fhall enquire, whether any fuch fort of Liberty be neceflary to moral agency, ^c. in the next Part. And fiifl of all, I (liall confider the notion of a f elf- determining Power in the will : wherein, accord- ing to the Arminians, does mofl; effentially confift the Will's Freedom ; and fhall particularly enquire, whether it be not plainly abfurd, and a manifeft in- confillence, to fuppofe that the will itjclj determines all the free aBs of the Will, Here I (hall not infift on the great impropriety of fuch phra fes and ways of fpeaking as the Will's de^ termining itfelf ; becaufe adions are to be afcribed to agents, and not properly to the powers of agents; which improper way of fpeaking leads to many mif- takes, and much confufion, as Mr. Locke obferves. But I fhall fuppofe that the Arminians, when they fpeak of the Will's determining itfelf, do by the Will mean i\\& foul willing, I fhall take it for granted, that when they fpeak of the Will, as the determiner, they mean the foul in the exercife of a poioer of willing, or adling voluntarily, I fhall fuppofe this to be their meaning, becaufe nothing elfe can be meant, without the groff- eft and plainefl abfurdity. In all cafes when we fpeak of the powers or principles of ading, as doing fuch things, we mean that the agents which have thefe Powers of a6ling, do them in the exercife of thofe Powers. So when we fay, valour fights courage- oufly, we mean, the man who is under the influence of valour fights courageoufly. When we fay, love feeks the object loved, we mean, the perfon loving feeks that objeft. When we fay, the underftanding difcerns, we mean the foul in the exercife of that faculty. So when it is faid, the will decides or de- termines, the meaning mult be, that the perfon in 44 1'h't IncQnfiJlcncc of Part II. the exercife of a Power of willing and choofing, or the foul a6ling voluntarily, determines. Therefore, if the Will determines all its own free a£ls, the foul determines all the free ads of the Will in the exercife of a Power of willing and choofing ; or, which is the fame thing, it determines them of choice ; it determines its own a6ls by choofing its own ads. If the Will determines the Will, then choice orders and determines the choice : and acts of choice are fubje6l to the decifion, and follow the conduft of other ads of choice. And therefore if the Will determines all its own free a6ls, then every free ad of choice is determined by a preceding a6l of choice, choofing that ad. And if that preceding ad of the Will or choice be alfo a free ad, then by thefe principles, in this ad too, the Will is felf-de- termined : that is, this, in like manner, is an ad that the foul voluntarily choofes ; or, which is the fame thing, it is an ad determined ftill by a preceding ad of the Will, choofing that. And the like may agaia be obferved of the laft mentioned ad ; which brings us diredly to a contradidion : for it fuppofes an ad of the Will preceding the firft ad in the whole train, direding and determining the reft ; or a free ad of the Will, before the firft free ad of the Will. Or elfe we muft come at laft to an ad of the W^ill, de- termining the confequent ads, wherein the Will is not felf-determined, and fo is not a free ad, in this notion of freedom : but if the firft ad in the train, determining and fixing the reft, be not free, none of them all can be free ; as is manifeft at firft view, but (hall be demonftrated prefently. If the Will, which we find governs the members of the body and determines and commands their motions and actions, does alfo govern itfelf, and de- termine its own motions and actions, it doubtlefs de- termines them the fame w^y, even by antecedent Se6l. I. Self' determining Power. 45 volitions. The Will determines which way the hands and feet (hall move, by an a6l of volition or choice : and there is no other way of the Will's de- termining, directing or commanding any thing at all. Whatsoever the Will commands, it commands by an ^61 of the Will. And if it has itfelf under its com- mand, and determines itfelf in its own adions, it doubtlefs does it the fame way that it determines other things which are under its command. So that if the freedom of the Will confifts in this, that it has itfelf and its own a6tions under its com.m.ind and dire6lion, and its own volitions are determined by itfelf, it will follow, that every free volition arifes from another antecedent volition, directing and com- manding that : and if that direciing volition be alfo free, in that alfo the Will is determined : that is to fay, that direding volition is determined by another going before that ; and fo on, until we come to the firft volition in the whole feries : and if that firft volition be free, and the Will felf-determined in it, then that is determined by another volition preced- ing that : which is a contradiftion ; becaufe by the fuppofition, it can have none before it to direft or determine it, being the firfl: in the train. But if that firft volition is not determined by any preceding a6l .of the Will, then that a6l is not determined by the Will, and fo is not free in the Arminian notion of freedom, which confifts in the Will's felf-determina- tion. And if that firft a6l of the Will, which de- termines and fixes the fubfequent a6ls, be not free, none of the following a6ls, which are determined by it, can be free. If we fuppofe there are five a6is in the train, the fifth and laft determined by the fourth, and the fourth by the third, the third by the fccond, and the fecond by the firft ; if the firft is not deter- mined by the WilJ, and fo not free, then none of them aie truly determined by the Will : that is, that 4^ The Ldconjijlence, Sec, Part II. each of them arc as they are, and not othervvife, is not firft owing to the Vv'ill, but to the determinaiion of the firfl in the feries, which is not dependent on the Will, and is that which the Will has no hand in the determination of. And this being that which decides what the reft fliall be, and determines their exiftence ; therefore the firft determination of their exiftence is not from the Will. The cafe is juft the lame, if inftead of a chain of five a6ls of the Will, we ftiould fuppofe a fucceflion of ten, or an hundred, or ten thoufand. If the firft a6l be not free, beine determined by fomething out of the Will, and this determines the next to be agreeable to itfelf, and that the next, and fo on ; they aie none of them free, but all originally depend on, and are determined by fome caufe out of the Will : and fo ail freedom in the cafe is excluded, and no a6l of the Will can be free, according to this notion of freedom. If we fhould fuppofe a long chain of ten thoufand links, lb connected, that if the firft link moves, it will move the next, and that the next ; and fo the whole chain muft be determined to motion, and in the dire6lion of its motion, by the motion of the firft link ; and that is moved by fomething elfe : in this* cafe, though all the links, but one, are moved by other parts of the fame chain ; yet it appears that the motion of no one, nor the direQion of its motion, is from any felf.moving or lelf-determining Power in the chain, any more than if every link were immediately mov- ed by fomething that did not belong to the chain. If the Will be not free in the firft a6t, which cauf s the next, then neither is it free in the next, which is caufed by that firft a6l : for though indeed the Will caufed it, yet it did not c.uife it freely ; becaufe the preceding a6l, by which it was caufed, was not free. And again, if the will be not free in the fecond ad, i'o neiihci can it be in the third, which is caufed by Sc6l. II. SuppofcA Evafions confidered. 47 that ; becaufe in like manner, that third was de- termined by an atl of the Will that was not free. And fo we may go on to the next a 61, and from that to the next ; and how long foever the rucceflion of a61s is, it is all one ; if the firft on which the whole chain depends, and which determines all the rcfl, be not a free a^fc, the will is not free in caufing or de- termining any one of thole a6ls i becaufe the a61: hy which it determines them all, is not a free a6l ; and therefore the Will is no more free in determining them than if u did not caufe them at all. Thus, this Ar- minian uoixow of Liberty ot the Will, confining in the WilTs Self-dettrviuiation, is repugnant to ilfelf, and ihuts itfelf wholly out of the world. Section II. Several fuppcfcd Ways o/Evsidlng the forejoing Reafon^ ing confidered. If to evade the force of what has been obferved, it (hould be faid, that when the Arrninians fpeak of the Will's deicrminingits own a6ls, they do not mean that the Will determines' its af.is by any preceding a6l, or that one a6l of the Will determines another ; but only that the faculty or power of Will, or the foul in the ufe of that power, determines its own volitions ; and that it does it wiihout any aQ going before the 7\tl determined ; fuch an evafion would be full of the mod grofs abfurdity. 1 confefs, it is an evafion of my own inventing ; and I do not know bull (hould wrong the Arminians/\n fuppofing that any of them v>'0uld make ufe of it. But it be- ing as good a one as 1 can invent, I would obfcrve upon it a few thi.fgs. 48 Suppofed Evafions confidcred. Part !!• Firjl-^li iht faculty or power of the will deter- mines an a6l of volition, or the foul in the ufe or excrcife of that po-cver^ determines it, that is the fame thing as for the foul to determine volition by an a(fi of Will. For an cxercife of the power of Will, and an atl of that power, are the fame thing. Therefore to fay, that the power of Will, or the loul in the ufe or excrcife of that power, determines vilition, without an act of Will preceding the volition determined, is a contradi6lion. Secondly — If a power of Will determines the aQ: of the will, then a power of choofing determines it. For, as was before obferved, in every a6l of Will, there is choice, and a power of willing is a power of choofing. But if a power of choohng determines the a6l of volition, it determines it by choofing it. For it is mod abfurd to fay, that a power of choof- ing determines one thing rather than another, with- out choofing any thing. But if a power of choofing determines volition by choofing it, then here is the aft of volition determined by an antecedent choice, choofing that volition. Thirdly — To fay, the faculty, or the foul, deter- mines its own volition, but not by any aft, is a con- tradiftion. Becaufe for the foul to direct, decide, or determine any thing, is to aft ; and this is fuppofed ; for the foul is here fpoken of as being a caufe in this affair, bringing fomething to pafs, or doing fome- thing ; or, which is the fame thing, exerting itfelf in order to an effeft, which efFeft is the determina- tion of volition, or the particular kind and manner of an aft of Will. But certainly this exertion or aftion is not the fame with the efFeft, in order to the produftion of which it is exerted ; but mufl be fome- thing prior to it. Again — The advocates for this notion of the free- dom of the Will, (peak of a certain fovcrcignly in SeQ. II. SuJ?pofed EvdiHons covfidered, 49 the Will, whereby it has power to determine its owa volitions. And therefore the determination of vo- lition muft itfelf be an aft of the Will ; for otherwife it can be no exercife of that fuppoled power and fovereignty. J^am — If the Will determines iifelf, then either the Will is aSlivc in determining its volitions, or it is not. If it be a6live in it, then the determination is an ^<^of the Will ; and fo there is one a6l of the Will determininoj another. But if the Will is not adiv^ in the determination, then how does it cxcrcifc any liberty in it ? Thefe gentlemen fuppofe that the thing wherein the Will exercifcs liberty, is in its de- termining its own a6ls. But how can this be, if it be not a^ive in determining ? Certainly the Will, or the foul, cannot exercife any liberty in that wherein it doth not aB, or wherein it doth not exercife itfelf » So that if either part of this dilemma be taken, this Icheme of liberty, confiding in felf-determining power, is overthrown. If there be an a6l of the Will in determining all its own free a6ls, then one free aft of the Will is determined by another ; and fo we have the abfurdity of every free aft, even the very firfl:, determined by a foregoing free aft. But if there be no aft or exercife of the Will in deter- mining its own afts, then no liberty is exercifed in determining them. From whence it follows, that no liberty confifts in the Will's power to determine its own afts : or, which is the fame thing, that there is no fuch thing as liberty conhliing in a felf-deter- mining power of the Will. If it (hould be faid. That although it be true, if the foul determines its own volitions, ic mufl be ac- tive in fo doing, and the determination itfelf mufl be an aft ; yet there is no need of fuppoling this aft to be prior to the volition determined ; but the Will or foul determines the aft of the Will in wHIwf : it 50 Suppojcd Eva (ions confjcrcd. Part II. determines its own volition, in the very a£l of voli- tion ; it directs and limits the a6l of^the Will, caul- ing it to be lo and not oiherwife, m exerting the a^i, \vi:hout any preceding a6l to exert that. If any fhould fay after this manner, they muft mean one of ihefe three things : Either, (i.) That the deter- mininiT ^f} though it be before the a6l determin- cd in the order of nature, yet is not before it in order of time. Or, (2.) That the determining a6l is not before the a6l determined, either in the order of time cr nature, nor is truly dillin6l from it ; but that the foul's determining the aft of volition is the fame thing with its exerting fuch a particular a6l, is its caufing and determining the aft. Or, (3.) That volition has no caufe and is no efFeft ; but comes into exiilence, with fuch a particular deter nination, without any ground or reafon of its exiflcnce and determination. I fhall confider thefe diftindly. (1.) Ii all that is meant, be, that the determining a6l if) not before the a6l determined in order of time, it will not help the cafe at all, though it fhould be allowed. If it be before the determined a6l in the .order of nature, being the caufe or ground of its ex- iftence, this as much proves it to be diftinft from it, and independent of it, as if it were before in the or- der of lime. As the caufe of the particular motion of a natural body in a certain direftion, may have no diltance as to time, yet cannot be the fame with the modon effefted -by it, but muft be as diftincl from it as any other caufe that is before its effeft in the order of time : as the archite6l is diflinft from the houfe which he builds, or the father diftin6l from the fon which he begets. And if the a6l of the Will determining be diftm6t from the a6l determin- ed, and before it in the order of nature, then we can go back from one to another, till we come to the firfl in the feries, which has no a6t of the Will before it 5e6l. II. Siippofed EvsiCions confidcred, 51 in the order of nature, determining it ; and confe- quentlv is an ad not determined by the Will, and fo not a free ad, in this notion of freedom. And this being the a6l which determines all the red, none of them are free a6ls. As when there is a chain of many links, the firft of which only is taken hold of and drawn by hand ; all the reft may follow and be moved at the fame inftant, without any diftance of time ; but yet the motion of one link is before thae of another in the order of nature ; the laft is moved by the next, and fo till we come to the firft ; which not being moved by any other, but by fomething diftintl from the whole chain, this as much proves that no part is moved by any felf-moving power in the chain, as if the motion of one link followed that of another in the order of time. (2.) If any fhould fay, that the determining ad is not before the determined ad, either in order of time, or of nature, nor is diftind from it ; but that the exertion of the ad is the determination of the ad ; that for the foul to exert a particular volition, is for it to caufe and determine that ad of volition : I would on this obferve, that the thing in queftion feems to be forgotten, or kept out of light, in a darknefs and unintelligiblenefs of fpeech ; unlefs fuch an objedor would mean to contradid himfelf. The very a6l of volition itfelf is doubtlefs a determination of mind ; i, e. it is the mind's drawing up a conclufion, or coming to a choice between two things, or more, propofed to it. But determining among external objecis of choice, is not the fame v/ith determining the aB of choice itfelf, among various poflible ads of choice. — The queftion is, What influences, di- reds, or determines the mind or Will to come to fuch a conclufion or choice as it does ? Or what is the caufe, ground or rcafon, why it concludes thus, and nototherwife ? Now it muft be aniWercd, according 52 Suppofed Evafions confidered. Part II. to the A rmifiiaji notion of freedom, that the Will in- fluences, orders and determines itfelf thus to aft. And if it does, I fay, it muft be by feme antecedent aft. To fay, it is caufed, influenced and determin- ed by fomething, and yet not determined by any thing antecedent, either in order of time or nature, is a contradiftion. For that is what is meant by a thing's being prior in the order of nature, that it is fomc way the caufe or reafon of the thing, with re- fpeft to which it is faid to be prior. If the particular aft or exertion of Will, which comes into exiftence, be any thing properly deter- mined at all, then it has fome caule of its cxifting, and of its exifling in fuch a particular deterT>inate manner, and not another ; fome caufe, whofe influ- ence decides the matter : which caufe is diftinft from the cfFeft, and prior to it. But to fay, that the Will or mind orders, influences and determines itfelf to exert fuch an aft as it does, by the very exertion it- felf, is to make the exertion both caufe and eff^eft ; or the exerting fuch an aft, to be a caufe of the ex- ertion of fuch an aft. For the queflion is, What is the caufe and reafon of the foul's exerting fuch an aft ? To which the anfwer is, The foul. exerts fuch an aft, and that is the caufe of it. And fo, by this, the exertion muft be prior in the order of nature to itfelf, and diftinft from itfelf. (3.) If the meaning be, that the foul's exertion of fuch a particular aft of Will, is a thing that comes to pafs of itfelf, without any caufe ; and that there is abfolutely no ground or reafon of the foul's being determined to exert fuch a volition, and make fuch a choice, rather than another, I {Ay, if this be the mt2imt)go{ Arminians, when they contend foearneft- ly for the Will's determining its own afts, and for liberty of Will confifting in felf-determining power; they do nothing but confound themfflvcs and oth- Se£l;. II. Suppofed Evafions confidcrcd. 53 crs with words without meaning. In the quefiion, What determines the Will ? and in their anfwer, that the Will determines itjelf, and in all the difpute about it, it I'eems to be taken for granted, that fomething determines the Will ; and the controverfy on this head is not, whether any thing at all determines it, or whether its determination has any caufe o>: foun- dation at all : but where the foundation of it is, whether in the Will itfelf, or fome where elfe. But if the thing intended be what is abovementioned, then all comes to this, that nothing at all determines the Will ; volition having abfolutely no caufe or foundation of its exiftence, either within, or without. There is a great noife made about felf-determining power, as the fource of all free a6ls of the Will : but when the matter comes to be explained, the meaning is, that no power at all is the fource of thefe a6is, neither felf-determining power, nor any other, but they arife from nothing; no caufe, no power, no influence, being at all concerned in the matter. However, this very thing, even that the free a6ls of the Will are events which come to pafs without a caufe, is certainly implied in the Arminian notion of liberty of Will ; though it be very inconliftent with many other things in their fcheme, and repugnant to fome things implied in their notion of liberty. Their opinion implies, that the particular determi- nation of volition is without any caufe ; becaufe they hold the free a6ls of the Will to be contingent events ; and contingence is effential to freedom in their notion of it. But certainly, thofe things which have a prior ground and reafon of their particular exiftence, a caufe which antecedently determines them to be, and determines them to be jull as they are, do not happen contingently. If fomething foregoing, by a cafual influence and connexion, de- termines and fixes precifely their coming to paf^. 54 ^. con- tingent thing whether they (ha]: t ome to pals or no. And becaufe it is a qucflion, in niauy rc^rpe6ts, very important in this controverfy abour the iree- dom of Will, whether the free acls oj the Will arc events which come to pafs without a caujt ? I fhall be partic- ular in examining this point in the two following fcftions. Section III. Whether any Event whatfoever, and Volition in par^ ticular^ can come to pafs without a Caufe of its ex* iflence. JjEFORE I enter on any argument on this rubje6l, I would explain how I would be underftood, when I ufe the word Caufe in this difcourfe : fince, for want of a better word, I fhall have occafion to ufe it in a fenfe which is more extenfive, than that in which it is fometimes ufed. The word is often ufed in fo reftrained a fenfe as to fignify only that which has a pofitive efficiency or influence to produce a thing, or bring it to pafs. But there are many things which have no fuch pofitive produdive influence ; which yet are Caufes in that refpt6l, that they have truly the nature of a ground or reufon why iome things are, rather than others ; or why they are as (bey are, rather than otherwife. Thus the abfence of the fun in the night, is not the Caufe of the falliii;- rf the dew at that time, in the fame manner as its bt^-ms are the Caufe of the afcending of the vapours in the day-time ; and its withdraw metit in !:he winter, is not in the fame manner the Caufe of tie freezing of the waters, as its approach in the fpring ij> ilie Caufe Se6l. III. No Event without a Caufe. 55 of their thawing. But yet the v/ithdrawment or ab- fence of the iun is an antecedent, with which thefe efFeds in the night and winter are conne6led, and on which they depend ; and is one thing that be- longs to the ground and reafon why they come to pais at that time, rather than at other times i though ihe abfence of the fun is nothing pofitive, nor has any pofitive influence. It may be further obferved, that when I fpeak of connexion of Caufes and Effects, I have refpedl to mor^ al Caufes, as well as thole that are called natural in diftinclion from them. Moral Caufes may be Cauf- es in as proper a (enfe, as any caufes whatfoever ; may have as real an influence, and may as truly be the ground and reafon of an Event's coming to pa fs. Therefore I fomctimes ufe the word Canfe, in this enquiry, to fignify any antecedent, either natural or moral, pofidve or negative, on wnirh an Event, either a thing, or the manner and circumflance of a thing, fo depends, that it is the ground and reafon, either in whole, or in part, why it is, rather than not ; or why it is as it is, rather than otherwife ; or, in other words, any antecedent with which a confe- quent Event is fo connecled, that it truly belonors to the reafon why the propofition which affirms that Event, is true ; whether it has any poGtive in- fluence or not. And in an agreeabienefs to this, I fometimes ufe the word effect for the confequence of another thing, which is perhaps rather an occa- fion than a Caufe, moll properly fpeaki ng. I am the more careful thus to explain xny mean- ing, that I may cut offoccahon, from any that might leek occafion to cavil and objed againll Tome things which 1 may {siy concerning the dependence of ail things which come to pafs, on fome Caufe, and their connexion with their Caufe. 56 No Event without a Caufe. Part II. Having thus explained what I mean by Caufe, I alTert that nothing ever comes to pafs without a Caufe. What is felf-exiftent muft be from eterni- ty, and muft be unchangeable : but as to all things that begin to he, they are not felf-exiftent and there- fore muft have fome foundation of their exiftence without themfelves. That whatfoever begins to be, which before was not, muft have a Caufe why it then begins to exift, feems to be the firft dilate of the common and natural lenfe which God hath im- . planted in the minds of all mankind, and the main foundation of all our reafonings about the exiftence of things, paft, prefent, or to come. And this di6tate ol common fenfe equally refpe£ls fubftances and modes, or things and the manner and circumftances of things. Thus, if we fee a bo- dy which has hitherto been at reft, ftart out of a ftate of reft, and begin to move, we do as naturally and necciiarily fuppofe there is fome Caufe or rea- lon of liiis new mode oi exiftence, as of the exiftence of a body itfelf which had hitherto not exiftcd. And lb if a body, which had hitherto moved in a certain dneclion, fliould fuddenly change the diredion of its motion ; or if it fliould put off its old figure, and take a new one ; or change its colour : the be- ginning of thefe new modes is a new Event, and the mind of mankind necefl"arily fuppofes that there is fome Caufe or reafon of them. If this grand principle of common fenfe be taken away, all arguing from eff'ccls to Cauies ceafeth, and fo all knowledge of any exiftence, befides what we have by the moft dire6t and immediate intui- tion. Particularly all our proof of the being of God ccafes : we argue His being from our own be- ing, and the being of other things, which we are {cn^ liblc once were not, but have begun to be ; and fiom the being of the world, with all its conftituent Sefl;. III. No Event without a Caufe. 57. parts, and the manner of their exiftence ; all which we fee plainly are not neceffary in their own nature, and fo not felf-exiftent, and therefore mufl have a Caufe. But if things, not in theml'elves neceffary, may begin to be without a Caufe, all this arguing is vain. Indeed, I will not affirm, that there is in the na- ture of things no foundation for the knowledge of the Being of God without any evidence of it from His works. I do fuppofe there is a great abfurdity in the nature of things fimply confidered, in fup- pofing that there (hould be no God, or in denying Being in general, and fuppofing an eternal, abfolute, univerfal nothing : and therefore that here would be foundation of intuitive evidence that it cannoc be, and that eternal, infinite, mofl perfeft Being mud be ; if we had flrength and comprehenfion of mind fufficient, to have a clear idea of general and uni- verfal Being, or, which is the fame thing, of the in- finite, eternal, moft perfeQ Divine Nature and Ef- fence. But then we fhould not properly come to the knovf ledge of the Being of God by arguinrr : but our evidence would be intuitive : we fhould fee it, as we fee other things that are neceffary in them- felves, the contraries of which are in their own na- ture abfurd and conlradidory ; as we fee that twice two is four; and as we fee that a circle has no an- gles. If we had as clear an idea of univerfal in- finite entity, as we have of thefe other things, I fuppofe v/e ftiouid mofl intuitively fee the abfur- dity of fuppofing fuch Being not to be ; fliouid im- mediately fee there is no room for the queflion, whether it is pofiible that Being, in the moil Gener- al abflra£led notion of it, fhould not be. But we have not that flrength and extent of mind, to know this certainly in this intuitive independent manner : but the way that mankind come to the knowledge K 58 No Event without a Caufe, Part II, of the Being of God, is that which the apoftle fpeaks of, Rom. i. 20. The invifible things of Him, from the creation of the world, are clearly feen ; being underjiood by the things that are made ; even his eternal power and Godhead. \Ntfrfi afcend, and prove a pofteriori, or from efFe8:s, that there mud be an external Caufe ; and ihtw ft condly, prove by argumentation, not intu- ition, that this Being mud be nCvCefTarily ex.;{lent ; and then thirdly, from the proved necefiity of his ex- iftence, we may defend, and prove many of bis per- fections a priori. But if once this grand principle of common fenfe be given up, that what is not necejfary in itfelf muft have a Caufe ; and we begin to maintain, that things may come into exiftence, and begin to be, which heretofore have not been, of themfelves, without any Caufe ; all our means of afcending in our argu- ing from the creature to the Creator, and all our evidence of the Being of God, is cut off at one blow. In this cafe, we cannot prove that there is a God, either from the Being of the world, and the creatures in it, or from the manner of their being, their order, beauty and ufe. For if things may come into exiflence without any Caufe at all, then they doubtlefs may without any Caufe anfwerable to the effe'51:. Our minds do alike naturally fup- pofe and determine both thefe things ; namely, that what begins to be has a Caufe, and alfo that it has a Caufe proportionable and agreeable to the efFe6l. The fame principle which leads us to determine, that there cann'it be any thing coming to pafs with- out a Caufe, leads us to determine that there cannot be more in the cSaEk than in the Caufe, Yea, if once it Ihould be allowed, that things may come to pafs without a Caufe, we fhould not only have no proof of the Being of God, but we fhould be without evidence of the exillence of any thing Seft. III. No Event without a Caufe, 53 whatfoever, but our own immediately prefcnt ideas and confcioufnefs. For we have no way to prove any thing elfe, but by arguing from e{re6ls to Cauf- es : from the ideas now immediately in view : we argue other things not immediately in view : from fenfations now excited in us, we infer the exiftence of things without us, as the Caufes of thefe fenfa- tions : and from the exiftence of thefe things, wc argue other things, which they depend on, as efFeQs on Caufes. We infer the paft exiftence of our- felves, or any thing elfe, by memory ; only as we argue, that the ideas, which are now in our minds, are the confequences of paft ideas and fcnfations.--r- We immediately perceive nothing elfe but the ideas which are this moment extant in our minds. We perceive or know other things only by mea?is of thefe, as neceflarily conne6ied with others, and dependent on them. But if things njay be without Caufes, all this neceffary connexion and dependence is diflblv- ed, and fo all means of our knowledge is gone. If there be no abfurdity or difficulty in fuppofing one thing to ftart out of non-exiftence, into being, of itfelf without a Caufe ; then there is no abfurdity or difficulty in fuppofing the fame of millions of millions. For nothing, or no difficulty multiplied, ftill is nothing, or no difficulty : nothing multipli- ed by nothing, don't increafe the fum. And indeed, according to the hypothefis I am op- pofing, of the a6ls of the Will coming to pafs with- out a Caufe, it is the cafe in fad, that millions of millions of Events are continually coming into ex- iftence contingently, without any Caufe or reafon why they do fo, all over the world, every day and hour, through all ages. So it is in a conftant fuc- ceffion, in every moral agent. This contingency, this efficient nothing, this efFedual No-Caufe, is al- ways ready at hand, to produce this fort of cfFefts, 6o No Event without a Caufe, Part II. as long as the agent exifts, and as often as he has occafion. If it were fo, that things only of one kind, viz, a6ls of the Will, fcemed to come to pafs of them- felves ; but thofe of this fort in general came into being thus ; and it were an event that was continu- al, and that happened in a courfe, wherever "were capable iubjeds of fuch events ; this very thing would demonftrate that there was fome Caufe of them, which made fuch a difference between this E- vent and others, and that they did not really happen contingently. For contingence is blind, and does not pick and choofe for a particular fort of Events. Nothing has no choice. This No- Caufe, which caufes no exiflence, cannot Caufe the exiftence which comes to pafs, to be of one particular fort only, dif- tinguiihed from all others. Thus, that only one fort of matter drops out of the heavens, even water, and that this comes fo often, fo conftantly and plentiful- ly, all over the world, in all ages, fhows that their is fome Caufe or reafon of the falling of water out of the heavens ; and that fomething belides mere contingence has a hand in the matter. If we fhould fuppofe non-entity to be about to bring forth; and things were coming into exiftence, without any Caufe or antecedent, on which the ex- iftence, or kind, or manner of exiftence depends; or which could at all determine whether the things Ihould be ftones., or ftars, or beafts, or angels, or human bodies, or fouls, or only fome new motion or figure in natural bodies, or fome new fenfations in animals, or new ideas in the human underftanding, or new volitions in the Will; or any thing elfe of all ihc infinite number of pofTibles; then certainly it would not be expected, although many miliions of millions of things are coming into exiftence in this manner, all over the face of the earth, that they Se£l. III. No Event without a Caufe, Gt fhould all be only of one particular kind, and that it fhould be thus in all ages, and that this fort of cx- iftences fhould never fail to come to pafs where there is room for them, or a fubjedl; capable of them, and that conftantly, whenever there is occafion for them. If any fhould imagine, there is fomething in the fort of Event that renders it poflTible for it to come into exiftence without a Caufe, and fhould fay, that the free acls of the Will arc exigences of an ex- ceeding diflFerent nature from other things ; by reafon of which they may come into exiflcnce with- out any previous ground or reafon of it, though other things cannot ; if they make this objeQion in good earnefl, it would be an evidence of their flrangely forgetting themfelves : for they would be giving an account of fome ground of the exiRence of a thing, when at the fame time they would main- tain there is no ground of its exiftence. Therefore I would obferve, that the particular nature of exift- ence, be it never fo diverfe from others, can lay no foundation for that thing's coming into exiftence without a Caufe ; becaufe to fuppofe this, would be to fuppofe the particular nature of exiftence to be a thing prior to the exiftence ; and fo a thing which makes way for exiftence, with fuch a cir- cumftancc, namely, w^ithout a caufe or reafon of exiftence. But that which in any refpe6l makes way for a thing's coming into being, or for any manner or circumftance of its firft exiftence, muft be prior to the exiftence. The diftinguifhed nature of the effect, which is fomething belonging to the efiFeft, cannot have influence backward, to a6l be- fore it is. The peculiar nature of that thing called volition, can do nothing, can have no influence, while it is not. And afterwards it is too late for its influence : for then the thing has made fure of ex- iftence already, without its help. G2 Volition not without a Caufe, Part It, So that it is indeed as repugnant to reafon, to fuppofe that an ad of the Will lliould come into ex- iftence without a Caufe, as to fuppofe the human foul, or an angel, or the globe of the earth, or the whole univerfe, iliould come into cxillence without a Cciufe. And if once we allow, that fuch a fort of ^"' ^y fii^ftaQing; or be a determining Caufe of different ads, or any difFerenC efFeds, fometimes of one kind, and fometimes of an- other, any other way than in confequence of its own diverfe ads, is manifeft by this ; that if fo, then the fame Cdu(Q, the fume caufal Power, Force and Influ- ence, withciit variation in any refpeB, would produce different effects at different times. For the fame fub- flance of the foul before it ads, and the fame adive nature of the foul before it is exerted [i, e. before in the order of nature) would be the Caufe of different ef- feds, viz. Different Volitions at different times. — But the fubllance of the foul before it ads, and its adive nature before it is exerted, are the fame with- out variation. For it is fome ad that makes the firll Variation in the Caufe, as to any caufal exertion, force or influence. But if it be fo, that the foul has no different caufality, or diverfe caufal force or in- fluence, in producing thefe diverfe effcds; then it is evident, that the foui has no influence, no hand in the diverlity of the cffed ; and that the difference of the effe6i cannot be owing to any thing in the foul; or, which is the fame thing, the foul does not: determine the diverfi'^V of the eltcd ; which is con- trary to the fuppofuioa. — It is true, the fubftance of the foul before it ads, and before there is any difference in that refped, may be in a different ftate and circumftanccs : but thoio whom I oppofe, will not allow the different circumilances of the foul to be the determining Caufcs of the aCts of the Will ; as being contrary to their notion of felf-determina- tioH and felf-motion, L CS Volition not without a Caufe, Part II. 5. Let us fuppofe, as thefe divines do, that there are no atis of the foul, ftiiftly fpeaking, but free Volitions; then it will follow, (hat the foul is an adlive beinix ir^ nothin^r further than it is a volunta- ry or eleQive being ; and whenever it produces ef- fects actively, it produces efFe61s voluntarily and eledlively. But to produce effects thus, is the fame thing as to produce effeCtS in confequaice oj^ and ac- cording to, its own choice. And if fo, then furely the foul does not by its a6livity produce all its own ads of Will or choice themfelves : for this, by the fuppofition, is to produce all its free a6ls of choice voluntarily and eledively, or in confequence of its own free a6ls of choice, which brings the mat- ter diredly to the forementioned contradidlion, of a free a6l of choice before the firfl free a6t of choice* According to thefe gentlemen's own notion of ac- tion, if there^arifes in the mind a Volition without a free a6l of the Will or choice to determine and pro- duce it, the mind is not the a6live voluntary Caufe of that Volition; becaufe it does not arife from, nor is regulated by choice or defign. And therefore it can- not be, that the mind (hould be the a6live, volunta- ry, determining Caufe of the firft and leading Voli- tion that relates to the affair. — The mind's being a defigning C2iu{Q, only enables it to produce effe£lsin confequence of its defign ; it will not enable it to be the delignhig Caufe of all its own defigns. The mind's being an elective Caufe, will only enable it to produce effe6ls in confequence of its eleBions^ and according to them ; but cannot enable it to be the ele6tive Caufe of all its own ele6lions; becaufe that fuppof- €s an ele6lion before the firft ele6lion. So the mind's beifig an aElivc Caufe enables it to produce effeQs in confequence of its own acls, but cannot enable it to be the determining Caufe of all its own aUs ; for that is ft ill in the lame manner a contradiction ; as Se6k. V. Thefe Evajions Impertinent. 6y it fuppofes a determining a6l converfant about the firft aft, and prior to it, having a caufal influence on its exigence, and manner of exiflence. I ran conceive of nothing elfe that can be meant by the foul's hav^ing power to caufe and determine its own Volitions, as a being to whom God has giv- en a power of at^ion, but this ; that God has given power to the foul, fometimes at leaft, to excite Vo- litions at its pleafure, or according as it choofes. — • And this certainly fuppofes, in all fuch cafes, a choice preceding all Volitions which are thus caufed, even the firfl of them ; which runs into the forcmen- tioned great abfurdrty. Therefore the activity of the nature of the foul affords no relief from the difficulties which the no- tion of a felf'determining power in the Will is at- tended with, nor will it help^ in the leaft, its ab- furdities and inconfiftencies. Section V. Shewing^ that if the things averted in thefe Evajions fhould hefuppofed to be true, they are altogether im^ pertinent^ and cannot help the caufe of Arminian Liberty ; and how (this being the ft ate of the cafe) Ar- minian Writers are obliged to talk inconfijltntly. What was laft obferved in the preceding feftion may (hew, not only that the aftive nature of the foul cannot be a reafon why an aft of the Will is, or why it is in this manner, rather than another; but alfo that if it could be fo, and it could be proved that Volitions are contingent events, in that fenfe, that their being and manner of being is not fixed or determined by any caufe, or any thing antecedent j 68 Tliefc Evafions Impertinent, Part II. it would not at all ferve the purpofe of Arminians, to eftablifti the freedom of the Will, according to theirnotion of its freedom, as confiflingin the Will's determination of itjdf ; which fuppofes every free a6l of the Will to be determined by fome a6l of the Will going before to determine it ; inafmnch as for the Will to determine a thing, is the fame as for the foul to determine a thing by willing ; and there is no way that the Will can determine an a£l of the Will, than by willing that a6lof the Will ; or, which is the fame thing, choofmg it. So that here mull be two a6ls of the Will in the cafe, one going before another, one converfant about the other, and the Matter the objeft of the former, and chofen by the former. If the Will does not caufe and determine the a61; by choice, it does not caufe or determine it at all; for that which is not determined by choice, is not determined voluntarily or wz/Zzw^.^' ; and to fay, that the Will determines fomething which the foul does not determine willingl)', is as much as to fay, that fomething is done by the Will, which the foul doth not with its Will. So that if Arminian liberty of Will, confifling in the Will's determining its own a6ts, be maintained, the old abfurdity and contradiction mud he main- tained, that every free at^ of Will is caufed and de- termined by a foregoing free a6t of Will ; which doth not confift with the free a6ls arifmg without ;my caufe, and being fo contingent, as not to be fix- ed by any thing foregoing. So that this evafion muft be given up, as not at all relieving, and as that which, inftead of fupporting this fort of liberty, dii^ redely deftroys it. And if it Qiould be fuppofed, that the foul deter- mines its own a61s of W^ill fome other way, than by a foregoing ad of Will ; ftill it will not help the caufe ot their liberty of Will. If it determines them Se6l. V. Tlujc Evofwns Impertinene. 69 hy an a6i: of the underftanding, or fomp other pow- er, then the Will does not determine iifclf ; and fo the fel/'determining power of the Will is given up. And what liberty is there exercifed according to their own opinion of liberty, by the foul's being determined by fomething befides its own choice ? The afls of the Will, it is true, may be dire6i:ed, and efFe61ual]y de- termined and fixed ; but it is not done by the lours own will and pleafure ; there is no exercile at all of choice or Will in producing the elFeft : and if Will and choice are not exercifed in it, how is the liberty of the Will exercifed in it ? So that let Arminians turn which way they pleafe with their notion of liberty, confiding in the Will's determining its own a6ls, their notion deflroys itfelf. If they hold every free a6t of Will to be determined by the foul's own free choice, or foregoing free a6t of Will ; foregoing, either in the order of time, or na- ture ; it implies that grofs contradi6lion, that the firfl free a6l belonging to the affair, is determined by a free a6l which is before it. Or if they fay that the free a6ls of the Will are determined by fome other ati of the foul, and not an a6l of Will or choice, This alfo deftroys their notion of liberty, confifting in the a61s of the Will being determined by the Wi^ll Itfelf ; or if they hold that the a6ts of the Will are determined by nothing at all that is prior to them, but that ihey are contingent in that fenfe, that they are determined and fixed by no caufe at all ; this alfo deftroys their notion of liberty, confifting in the Will's determining its own ads. This being the true ftate of the Arminian notion of liberty, it hence comes to pafs, that the writers that defend it are forced into grofs inconfiftencies, in what they fay upon this fubjett. To inftance in Dr. Whitby ; he in his difcourfe on the freedom of yo* Artninians talk inconfiftently. Part 11. the Will, * oppofes the opinion of the Calvimjls, who place man's liberty only in a power of doing what he will, as that wherein they plainly agree with Mr. Hobbes. And yet he himfelf mentions the very fame notion of liberty, as the di6late of the fenfe and common rea^ Jon of 7}iankind^ and a rule laid dozon by the light o/na- ture^ viz. that liberty is a power of atling from our* Jelves, or DOING WHAT WE WILLf This is in- deed, as he fays, a thing agreeable to the fenfe and common reafon of mankind ; and therefore it is not fo much to be wondered at, that he unawares acknowl- edges it againft himfelf ; for if liberty does^ not con- lift in this, what elfe can be devifed that it fhould confift in ? If it be faid, as Dr. Whitby elfwhere in- fifts, that it does not only confift in liberty of doing what we will, but alfo a liberty of willing without neceffity ; ftill the queftion returns, what does that liberty of willing without neceffity conlift in, but in a power of willing as we pleafe^ without being im- peded by a contrary necelfity ? Or in other words, a liberty for the foul in its willing to a6l according to its own choice ? Yea, this very thing the fame author feems to allow, and fuppole again and again, in the ufe he makes of fayings of the Fathers, whom he quotes as his vouchers. Thus he cites the words of Origen, which he produces as a teftimony on his fide ; X The foul aas by HER OWN CHOICE, and it is free for her to incline to whatever part SHE WILL, And thofe words of Juftm Martyr; \ The doBrine of the Chriflians is this, that nothing is done orfvffcred accord* ing to fate, but that every man doth ^^ood or evil AC-^ CORDING TO HIS OWN FREE CHOICE, And from Eufebius, thefe words, || If fate be efiablif/ied, * In his Book on the five Points, Second Edit. p. 3,50, 351, Q52. + Ibid. p. 325, 326. i Ibid. p. 342. ^ Ibid. p. 360, (Ibid. p. 363. Se£l. V. Arminians ^^/y^ inconfiftently. j^l fhilofophy and piety arc overthrown. All iJiefe things de^ pending upon the ncctjjity introduced by thejlars, and not upon meditation and exercife PROCEEDING FROM OUR OWN FREE CHOICE And again, the words of Maccarius ; * God, to preferve the liberty of man's Willy fujfered their bodies to die, that it might be IN THEIR CHOICE to turn to good or evil.— They who are aBed by the Holy Spirit, are not held under any necejfily, but have liberty to turn themfelveSy and DO WHAT THEY WILL in this life. Thus, the do6lor iii eixe£l comes into that very notion of liberty, which the Crilviniils have ; which he at the (ame time condemns, as agreeing with the opinion of Mr. Hobbes, namely, the foul's ac'ling by its own choiccy mens doing good or evil according to their own free choice^ their being in that exercife xohich prO' ceeds from their own free choice, having it in their choice to turn to good or evil, and doing what they wilL So that if men exercife this liberty in the a6ls of the Will themfelves, it mud be in exerting a6ls of Will as they Will, or according to their oron free choice ; or exerting a6>s of Will that proceed f rem their choice. And if it be fo, then let every one judge whether this does not fuppofe a free choice going before the free a6l of Will, or whether an a6l of choice does not go before that a£t of the Will which proceeds from iL And if it be thus with all free a£ls of the Will, then let^every one judge, whether it v/ill not follow that there is a free choice or Will going before the fir ft free a6l of the Will exerted in the cafe. And then let every one judge, whether this be not a contradic- tion. And finally, let every one judge whether in the fcheme of thei'e writers there be any poffibility of avoiding thefe abfurdities. * In his Book on the five Points, Second Edlr. p. 369, 370. 72 Arminians i^/i inconfiftently. Part II. If liberty confifts, as Dr. Whitby himfelf fays, in a man's doing what he will ; and a man exercifes this liberty, not only in external a6lions, but in the a6ls of the Will themfelves; then fo far as liberty is ex- ercifed in the latter, it confifh in willing what he wills: and if any fay fo, one of thefe two things muft be meant, either, i.That a man has power to Will, as he does Will; becaufe what he Wills, he Wills; and therefore has power to Will what he has power to W^iii. If this be their meaning, then all this mighty controverfy about freedom of the Will and felf-de- termining power, cemes wholly to nothing; all that is contended for being no more than this, that the mind of man does what it does, and is the fubje6l of what it is the fubje6l of, or that what is, is ; where- in none has any controverfy with them. Or, g^. The meaning muft be, that a man has power to Will as he pleafes or choofes to Will : that is, he has power by one aft of choice, to choofe another ; by an antecedent aft of Will to choofe a confequent aft ; and therein to execute his own choice. And if this be their meaning, it is nothing but ihuffling -with thole they difpute with, and baffling their own reafon. For flill the queftion returns, wherein lies man's liberty in that antecedent aft of Will which chofe the confequent aft. The anfwer, according to the fame principles, muft be, that his liberty in this alfo lies in his willing as he would, or as he chofe, or agrtcable to another aft of choice preceding that. And fo the queftion returns in infinitum and the like anfwer muft be made in injinitum : in order to fup- port their opinion, there muft be no beginning, but free a6ls of Will muft have been chofen by forego- ing free afts of Will in the foul of every man, with- out beginning; and fo before he had a being, from all eternity. Se6l. VI. O/choofmg in Things inJifFerent. 73 Section VI. Concerning the Will's determining in Things which are perjt5lly indifferent in the View of the Mind, A GREAT argument for felf- determining power, is the fuppofed experience we univerlally have of an ability to determine our Wilis, in cafes wherein no prevailing motive is prefented : the Will (as is fup- pofed) has its choice to make between two or more things, that are perfe6lly equal in the view of the mind ; and the W^ill is apparently altogether indif- ferent ; and yet we find no d\^icn\ty in coming to a choice ; the Will can inllantly determine itfelf to one, by a fovereign power which it has over itfelf, without being moved hy any preponderating induce- ment. Thus the fors- mentioned author of an EJfay on the Freedom of the Will, Sec. p. 25, 26, 27, fuppofes, *' That there are many inftances, wherein the Will is *' determined neither by prefent uneafmefs, nor hy ** the greateft apparent good, nor by the lad dic- ** tate of the underf^mding, nor by any thing '' eife, but merely by itfelf as a fovereign, feh^-detcr- ** mining power of the foul ; and that the foul does '' not will this or that a6lion, in fotne cafes, hy any ** other influence but becaufe it will. Thus (fays *' he) I can turn my face to the South, or the North ; *• I can point with vny finger upward, or downward. '* And thus, in fome cafes, the V/iil determines itfelf *' in a very fovereign manner, becaufe it will, with- ** out a reafon borrowed from the und'2i{tandin2: : *' and hereby it difcovers its own perfc6l power of " choice, rifing from within itfelf, and free from all ** influence or reftraint of any kind." And in pages 66, 70, and 73, 74, this author very exprefsly fup- pofes the Will in many cafes to be determined by M 74 Of chcofuig in Things indifferent. Part II, no motive at all, and ails altogether ivithrjut motive, or ground of preference. — Here 1 would obferve, 1. The very fuppofition which is here made, dire£l- ]y contradids and overthrows itfelf. For the thing luppofed, wherein this grand argument confifts, is, that among teveral things the Will aftually choofes one before another, at the fame that it is perfeQly indifferent ; which is the very fame thing as to fay, the mind has a preference, at the fame time that it has no preference. What is meant cannot be, that the mind is indifferent before it comes to have a choice, or until it has a preference ; or, which is the fame thing, that the mind is indifferent until it comes to be not indifferent : For certainly this author did not fuppofe he had a controverfy with any perfon in fuppofing this. And then it is nothing to his purpofe, that the mind which choofes, was indiffer- ent once ; unlefs it choofes remaining indifferent ; for otherwife, it does not choofe at all in that cafe of indifference, concerning which is all the queftion. Befides, it appears in fa6i:, that the thing which this author fuppofes, is not that the Will choofes one thing before another, conceniing which it is indiffer- ent before it choofes ; but alfo is indifferent uhen it choofes ; and that its being otherwife than indifferent is not until afterwards, in confequence of its choice ; that the chofen thing's appearing preferable and more agreeable than another, arifes from its choice already made. His words are, (p. 30,) *' Where ** the obje6ls which are propofed, appear equally fit ** or good, the Will is left without a guide or direc- " tor ; and therefore muff take its own choice by ** its own determination ; it being properly a felf- ** determining power. And in fuch cafes the Will ** does as it were make a good to itfelf by its own •* choice, i. e. creates its own pleafure or delight in ** this felt-chofen good. Even as a man by fcizing Se6l. VI. Ofchcofingin Things indifferent. 5-5 ** upon a fpot of unoccupied land, in an uninhabit- *' ed country, makes it his own polTeflTion and prop- ** erty, and as fuch rejoices in it. Where things ** were indifferent before, the Will finds nothing to ** make them more agreeable, confidered merely m ** themfelves ; but the pleafure it feels ARISING •' FROM ITS OWN CHOICE, and its perfever- ** ance therein. We love many things we have '^ chofen, AND PURELY BECAUSE WE CHOSE «* THEM." This is as much as to fay, that we firfl begin to prefer many things, now ceafing any longer to be indifferent with re(pe6l to them, purely bccaufe we have preferred and chofen them before. Thefe things mufl needs be fpoken inconfiderately by this author. Choice or preference cannot be before it- felf in the fame inftance, either in the order of time or nature : It cannot be the foundation of itfelf, or the fruit or confequence of itfelf. The very a6l of choofing one thing rather than another^ is preferring that thing, and that is fetting a higher value on that thing. But that the mind iets an higher value on one thing than another, is not, in the firfl place, the fruit of its fetting a higher value on that thing. This author fays, p. 36, ** The Will may be per- ''feftly indifferent, and yet the Will may determine *' itfelf to choofe one or the other/' And again, in the fame page, *• I am entirely indifferent to either ; *' and yet my Will may determine itfelf to choofe." And again, ** Which I (liall choofe mufl be deter- *' mined by the mere a6l of my Will." If the choice is determined, by a mere a6l of Will, then the choice is determined by a mere a6l of choice. And con- cerning this matter, viz. That the a6l of the Will it- felf is determined by an a6l of choice, this writer is OLprefs, in page 72. Speaking of the cafe, where there is no fuperior fitnefs in objefts prefented, he yS 0/ the Will's determining Part II. has thefc v/ords : " Thtre it mud a6l by its own *•■ CHOICE, and determine itfelf as it PLEASES/' Where it is fuppofed that the very dcterinination, which is the ground and fpring of the Will's a6t, is an a6i: of choice and plea fur e, wherein one a 61 is more agreeable, and the mind better pleafed in it than another ; and this preference and Japerior pkafednefs is the ground of all it does in the cafe. And if fo, the mind is not indifferent when it determines itfelf, but had rather do one thing than another, had rather determine itfelf one way than another. And there- fore the IVill does not aft at all in indifference ; not fo much as in the hi ft ftep it takes, or the fir ft rife and beginning of its aftrng. If it be poffible for the underftanding to act in indifference, yet to be fure the Will never does ; becaufe the Will's beginning to a6i is the very fame thing as its beginning to chool'e or prefer. And if in the very firft aft of the Will, the mind prefers fomething, then the idea of that thing preferred, does at that time preponderate, or prevail in the mind : or, which is the fame thing, the idea of it has a prevailing influence on the Will. "So that this wholly dellroys the thing fuppofed, viz. That the mind can by a fovereign power .choofe one of two or more things, which in the view of the mind are, in every refpeft, peifeftly equal, one of which does not at ail preponderate, nor has any prevailing influence on the mind above another. So that this author, in his grand argument for the ability of the Will to choofe one of two or more things, concerning which it is perfeftly indifferent^^ does at the fame time, in eft'cdi, deny the thing he fuppofes, and allov/s and afierts the point he endea- vours to overthrow ; even that the Will, in clioof- ing, is iubj^.ft to no prevailing influence of the idea, or view cf the thing chofen. And indeed it is im- poiBble to offer this argument without ovenhrowing Seft. VI. in Things indifferent. 77 it; the thing fuppofed in it being inconfiHent with itlelf, and that which denies itfelf. To fuppole the Will to aft at all in a (late of perfect indifference, either to determine itfelf, or to do any thing elfe, is to affert that the mind choofes without choofi ng. To fay that when it is indifferent, it can do as it pleafes, is to fay rJiat it can follow its pleafure when it has no pleafure to follow. And therefore if there be any difficulty in the inftances of two cakes, two eggs, Sec. which are exaftly alike, one as good as another ; concerning which this author luppofes the mind in fa6l has a choice, and fo in effctl fup-^ pofcs that it has a preference ; it as much concerned himfelf to folvc the difficulty, as it does thofe whom he oppofes. For if thefe inftances prove any thing to his purpofe, they prove that a man choofes with- out choice. And yet this is not to his purpofe ; becaufe if this is what he afferts, his own words are as much againft him, and do as much contradidfc him, as the words of thofe he difputes againft can do. 2. There is no great difficulty in fiiewing. in fuch inftances as are aliedged, not only that it mujl 7ieeds he fo, that the mind muft be influenced in its choice, by fomething that has a preponderating influence upon it, but alfo how it is fo. A little attention to our own experience, and a diftinft confideration of the afts of our own minds, in fuch cafes, will be fufficient to clear up the matter. Thus, fuppcfing I have a chefs. board before me; and becaufe 1 am required by a fuperior, or defired by a friend, or to make fome experiment concerning my own ability and liberty, or on fome other con- fideration, 1 am determined "to touch fome one of the fpots or fquares on the board v;ith my finger; not being limited or direfted in the firft propofal, or my own firft purpofe, which is general, to any one in particular ; and thejebcing nothing in the fquares, yfil OJ the Wills determining Part II. in themfelves confidered, that recommends any one of all the fixty-four, more than another : in this cafe, my mind determines to give itfelf up to what is vul- garly called accident* by determining to touch that fquare which happens to be mofl in view, which my eye is efpecially upon at that moment, or which happens to be then mofl in my miud, or which I (hall be direded to by fome other fuch-like accident. — Here are feveral fleps of the mind's proceeding (tho' all may be done as it were in a moment) the Jirjl ftep is its ^dw^r^/ determination that it will touch one of the fquares. The next flep is another ^^Tier^/ de- termination to give itfelf up to accident, in fome certain way ; as to touch that w^hich (hall be mod in the eye or mind at that time, or to fome other fuch- iike accident. The third and la(l flep is a particular determination to touch a certain individual fpot, even that fquare, which, by that fort of accident the mind has pitched upon, has aQually offered itfelf beyond others. Now it is apparent that in none of thefe feveral fleps does the mind proceed in abfolute indifference, but in each of them is influenced by a preponderating inducement. So it is in the JirJ^ flep; the mind's general determination to touch one of the fixty-four fpots : the mind is not obfolutely indifferent whether it does fo or no ; it is induced to it, for the fake of making fome experiment, or by the defire of a friend, or fome other motive that prevails. So it is in the fccond flep, the mind's de- termining to give itfelf up to accident, by touching th^t which fhall be moll in the eye, or the idea of * I have elfewhere obferved what that is wl»lch is vulgarly called accidefit ; that it is nothing akin to the Ar??i2?iian meta- phyfical notion of contingence, fomething not ccnne^led with any thing foregoing ; but that it is fomething that comes to pafs in the courle ot things, in fome affair that men arc con- cerned in, untorefeen, and not owing to their dcfign. Setl, VI. in Things indifif-erent. ng which (hall be mofl prevalent in the mind, Sec, The mind is not abfolutely indifferent whether it proceeds by this rule or no ; but choofes it becaufe it appears at that time a convenient and requifite expedient in order to fulfil the general purpofe aforefaid. And fo it is in the third and laft ftep, it is determining to touch that individual fpot which a61:ually does pre- vail in the mind's view. The mind is not indiffer- ent concerning this ; but is influenced by a prevail- ing inducement and reafon ; which is, that this is a profecution of the preceding determination, which appeared requifite, and was fixed before in the fecond Hep. Accident will ever ferve a man, without hindering him a moment, in fuch a cafe. It will always be fo among a number of obje6ls in view, one will prevail in the eye, or in idea beyond others. When we have our eyes open in the clear fun- (bine, many ob- je6ls ftrike the eye at once, and innumerable images may be at once painted in it by the rays of light ; but the attention of the mind is not equal to feveral of them at once; or if it be, it does not continue fo for any time. And fo it is with refpe6l to the ideas of the mind in general : feveral ideas are not in e- qual flrength in the mind's view and notice at once; or at leaft, does not remain fo for any fenlible con- tinuance. There is nothing in the world more con- flantly varying, than the ideas of the mind: they do not remain precifely in the fame flate for the lead perceivable fpace of time : as is evident by this, that all perceivable time is judged and perceived by the mind only by the fucceflion or the fucceflive changes of its own ideas : Therefore while the views or perceptions of the mind remain precifely in the fame (late, there is no perceivable fpace or length of time, becaufe no fenfible fucceflion at all. As the a6ls of the Will, in each ftep of the fore 8o Of the Will's determining, ^c. Part II. mentioned procedure, does not come to pafs with- out a particular caufe, every a6t is owing to a pre- vailing inducement : fo the accident, as I have called it, or that which happens in the unfearchablecourfe of things, to which the mind yields itfelf, and hy which it is guided, is not any thing that comes to pafs without a caufe; and the n^ind in determining to be guided by it, is not determined by fomething that has no caufe; any more than if it determined to be guided by a lot, or the calling of a die. For though the die's falling in fuch a manner be acci- dental to him that cafts it, yet none will fuppofe that there is no caufe why it fails as it does. The involuntary changes in the fucceOion of our ideas, though the caufes may not be obferved, have as much a caufe, as the changeable motions of the motes that float in the air, or the continual infinite- ly various, fucctlTive changes of the unevennefles on the furface of the water. There are two things efpecially, which are proba- bly the occafions of confufion in the minds of them who inhfl upon it, that the Will a6ts in a proper indifference, and without being moved by any in- ducement, in its determination in fuch cafes as have been mentioned. 1. They feem to miflake the point in queftion, or at lead not to keep it diftinftly in view. The quef- tion they difpute about, is, vVhether the mind be in- different about the objtBs prefented, one of which is to be taken, touched, pointed to, Szc. as two Qggs, two cakes, which appear equally good. Whereas the queflion to be confidered, is, W^hether the per- fon be ind'/^erent with refpecl to his own aBions ; whether ho does not, on fome coniiJeration or other, prefer one a6l with refpedl to thefe objects before another. The mind in its determination and choice, in thefe cafes, is not mofl imiiiediately and diredly Seft. VI. Ofchoofmg in Things indifFerent. 8l converlant about the ohjeSls prcfcnted ; but the aBs to be done concerning thcle objeds. The objeds may- appear equal, and the mind may never properly make any choice between them : but the next a6t of the Will being about the exiernal a6lions to be performed, taking, touching, &c. thefe may not ap- pear equal, and one adiion may properly be chofeu before another. In each (lep of the mind's progrels, the determination is not about the objedls, unlefs indiredly and improperly, but about the a6lions, which it choofes for other reafons than any prefer- ence of the objeds, and for reafons not taken at all from the objects. There is no ncceflity of fuppofing, that the mind does ever at ail properly choofe one of the objefts before another ; either before it has taken, or after- wards. Indeed the man choofes to take or totich one rather than another ; but not becaufe it choofes the thing taken, or touched ; but from foreign confidera- tions. The cafe may be fo, th^ t of two things of- fered, a man may, for certain reafons, choofe and prefer the taking of that which he undervalues, and choofe to neglect to take that which his mind pre^ Jers, In fuch a cafe, choofing the thing taken, and choofing to take, are diverfe : and fo they are in a cafe where the things prefented are equal in the mind's eRcem, and neither of them preferred. All that faO; and experience makes evident, is, that (he mind choofes one a6lion rather than another. And therefore the arguments which they bring, in order to be to their purpofe, ought to be to prove that the mind choofes the aQion in perfe6l; indifference, with refpeSl to that aclion ; and not to prove that the mind choofes the adion in perfect indifference with refpedl to the ohje6l ; which is very podible, and yet the Will not aft at all without prevalent inducement and proper prepcnderation. N 9t Of Liberty of IndifFerence, Part II. 2. Another reafon of confufion and difTicuUy in this matter, feems to be, not diftinguilhing between a general indifference, or an indifference with re- fpe6l to whit is to be done in a more diftant and genera! view of it, and a particular indifference, or an indifference with refpe6l to the next immediate a£l, viewed with its particular and prefent circum- fiances. A man may be perfectly indifferent with refpetl to his own aHions^ in the former refpeft ; and yet not in the latter. Thus, in the foregoing inflance of touching one of the fqu«res of a chefs- board ; when it is firfl; propofed that I fhould touch one of them, I may be perfeQly indifferent which I touch ; becaufe as yet I view the matter remotely and generally, being but in the firfl; ftep of the mind's progrefs in the affair. But yet, when I am a6lually come to the laft ftep, and the very next thing to be determined is which is to be touched, having alrea- dy determined that I will touch that which happens to be mod in my eye or mind, and my mind being now fixed on a particular one, the a6l of touching that, confidered thus immediately, and in thefe par- ticular prefent circumftanccs, is not what my mind is abfolutely indifferent about. Section VII. Concerning the notion of Liberty of Will, conffling in Indifference. xA^iiAT has been faid in the foregoing fe6lion, has a tendency in fome meafure to evince the abfurdity of the opinion of fuch as place Liberty in Indiffer- ence, or in that equilibrium whereby the Will is without all antecedent determination or bias, and Sea. VII. OJ Liberty of Indifference. 83 left hitherto free from any prepoffeffing inclination to one fide or the other ; that the determination of the Will to either fide may be entirely from itfelf, and that it may be owing only to its own power, and that fovereignty which it has over itfelf, that it goes this way rather than that.* But in as much as this has been of fuch long {landing, and has been fo generally received, and fo much iiifified on by Pelagians, Semi- Pelagians, Jefu- its, Socinians, Arminians, and others, it may deferve a more full confideration. And therefore I fhall now proceed to a more particular and thorough en- quiry into this notion. Now, left fome (houid fuppofe that I do not un- derftand thofe that place Liberty in Indifference, or fiiould charge me with mifreprefenting their opin- ion, I would fignify, that I am fenfible, there are . * Dr. Whitby, and fome other Arminians, make a diftinc- tlon ol different kinds ot ireedom ; one of God, and perte6l fpirits above ; another oi perfoos in a ftate of trial. The for- mer Dr. Whitby allows to confift with neceflity ; the latter he holds to be without neceflity : and this latter he fuppofes to be rcquifite to our being the fubjeBs of praife or difpraife, rewards or punlfliments, precepts and prohibitions, promifes and threats, exhortations and dehortations, and a covenap.t- tieaty. And to this freedom he fuppofes Indifference to be rcquiiite. In his Difcourfe on the five points, p. 299, 300, he fays, *' It is a irecdorn (fpeaklng ot a Ireedom not only *' from CO atllon, buttrom neceflityj requifite, as we conceive, *' to render us capable of trial or probation, and to render cur *' aclions worthy of praife or difpraife, and our perfons ol re- *' wards or punifhments." An-^ in the next page, fpeakino- ol the fame matter, he fays, *' Excellent to this purpofe, are *' the words ol Mr. Thorndike : IVe fay not that Indifference *' is requijite to all jrcedom, but to the Jreedom oJ a man alone " in this /late of travail and proficience : the ground of wkick " IS God's tender of a treaty^ and conditions of peace and re- *' concilement to fallen ?nan, together with thofe precepts and *' prohibitions, thofe promifes and threats, thofe exhortations *' and dehortations, it is enforced with.'' 84^ Of Liberty confijling Part II. fome, who, when they talk of the Liberty of the Will as confifling in Indifference, exprefs them- felves as though they would not be underflood of the Indifference of the inclination or tendency of the Will, but of, I know not what, Indifference of the foul's power of willing ; or that the Will, with refpeft to its power or ability to choofe, is indiffer- ent, can go either way indifferently, either co the right hand or left, either aft or forbear to 2l&:, one as well as the other. Though this feems to be a refining only of fome particular writers, and newly invented, and which will by no means confift with the manner of expreffion ufed by the defenders of Liberty of Indifference in general. And I wifh fuch refiners would thoroughly confider, whether they diPvinctly know their own meaning, when they make a diflin£lion between Indifference of the foul as to its porver or ability of willing or choofing, and the foul's Indifference as to the preference or choice itfelf ; and whether they do not deceive themfelves in imagining that they have any diftinQ meaning at all. The Indifference of the foul as to its ability or power to Will, muff be the fame thing as the Indif- ference of the ftate of the power or faculty of the Will, or the indifference of the flate which the foul itfelf, which has that power or faculty, hiiherto re- mains in, as to the exercife of that power, in the choice it fhall by and by make. But not to infift any longer on the obftrufenefs and inexplicablenefs of this diflinClion ; let what will be fuppofed concerning the meaning of them that make ufe of it, thus much muft at lea ft be intended by Arminians when they talk of Indifference as effen- tial to Liberty of Will, if they intend any thing, ia any re(pe6l to their purpofe, viz. That it is fuch an Indifference as leaves the Will not detennined alrea- dy I but free from adual poffeffion, and vacant of Se6l. VIL in IndifFerencc. 85 predetermination, fo far, that there may be room for the exercife of the [elf- determining power of the Will ; and that the Will's freedom confills in, or depends upon this vacancy and opportunity that is left for the Will itfelf to be the determiner of the a6t that is to be the free a6l. And here 1 would obferve in the Jlrjl place, that to make out this fcheme of Liberty, the Indi{Fc;rence muft be per/e^ and abfolute ; there muft be a perfe6l freedom from all antecedent preponderation or in- clination. Becaufe if the Will be already inclined, before it exerts its own fovereign power on iticif, then its inclination is not wholly owing to itleif : if when two oppolites are propofed to the foul for its choice, the propofal does not find the foul wholly in a Hate of Indifference, then it is not found in a (late of Liberty for mere felf-determination. — The lead degree of an antecedent bias muft be inconfift- ent with their notion of Liberty. For fo long as prior inclination polTeffes the Will, and is not re- moved, it binds the Will, fo that it is utterly impof- lible that the Will fliould a6i; otherwife than agreea- bly to it. Surely the Will cannot a61: or choolc con- trary to a remaining prevailing inclination of the Will. To fuppofe otherwife, would be the fame thing as to fuppofe, that the Will is inclined conuzry to its prefent prevailing inclination^ or contrary to what it is inclined to. That which the Will choofcs and prefers, that, all things confidered, it preponde- rates and inclines to. It is equally impofiible for the Will to choofe contrary to its own remaining and prefent preponderating inclination, as it is to prefer contrary to its own prefent preference, or choofe contrary to its own prefent c/zozce. I'hc Will, there- fore, fo long as it is under the influence of an old preponderating inclination, is not at Liberty for a new free a6l, or any a6t that fhall now be an a6l of 86 OJ Liberty of Will Part 11. felf-determination. The ad which is a felf-deter- inined free aQ, mufl: bean a6l which the Will deter- mines in the poffeflion and ufe of fuch a Liberty, as conGfls in a freedom from every thing, v/hich, if it were there, would make it impollible that the Will, at that time, fliould be otherwife than that way to which it tends. If any one fhould fay, there is no need that the Indifference fhould be perfe6l ; but although a form- er inclination and preference ftill remains, yet, if it be not very ftrong and violent, pofTibly the llrength of the Will may oppofe and overcome it : — This is groCsly abfurd; for the firength of the Will, let it be never fo great, does not at all enable it to a6l one way, and not the contrary way, both at the fame time. It gives it no fuch fovereignty and command, as to caufe itfelf to prefer and not to prefer at the fame time, or to choofe contrary to its own prefenfc choice. Therefore, if there be the leafl degree of antece- dent preponderation of the Will, it mufl be per- fedly abolifhcd, before the Will can be at liberiy to determine itfelf the contrary way. And if the Will determines itfelf the fame way, it was not ^free de* termination, becaufe the Will is not wholly at Liber- ty in fo doing: its determination is not altogether from itfelf, but it was partly determined before, in its prior inclination : and all the freedom the Will exer- cifes in the cafe, is in an increafe of inclination, v/hich it gives itfelf, over and above what it had by forego- ing bias ; fo much is from itfelf, and fo much is from perfe6t Indifference. For though the Will had a previous tendency that way, yet as to that additional degree of inclination, it had no tendency. There- fore the previous tendency is of no confideration, with relped to the a£l wherein the Will is free. So that it comes to the fame thing which was faid at firfl. Sedi. VIL confijllng in Indifference. 87 that as to the a6l of the Will, wherein the Will [$ free, there mud be perfeB Indifference, or equilibrium. To illuftrate this ; if we fhould fuppofe a fovereign felf-moving power in a natural body : but that the body is in motion already, by an antecedent bias ; for inftance, gravitation towards the centre of the earth : and has one degree of motion already, by virtue o^ that previous tendency ; but by its felf- moving power it adds one degree more to its motion, and moves fo much more fwiftly towards the centre of the earth than it would do by its gravity only : it is evident, that all that is owing to a felf-moving power in this cafe, is the additional degree of mo- tion ; and that the other degree of motion which it had from gravity, is of no confideration in the cafe, does not help the effeQ: of the free felf-moving pow- er in the lead; the efFe61: is jufl: the fame, as if the body had received from itfelf one degree of motion from a ftate of perfe6l reft. So if we fliould fup- pofe a felf-moving power given to the fcale of a bal- ance, which has a weight of one degree beyond the oppofite fcale; and we afcribe to it an ability to add to itfelf another degree of force the fame way, by its felf-moving power; this is juft the fame thing as to afcribs to it a power to give itfelf one degree of pre- ponderation from a perfecl equilibrium; and fo much power as the fcale has to give itfelt an over- balance from a perfedt equipoife, fo much felf-mov- ing feif-preponderating power it has, and no more. So that its free power this way is always to be meaf- ured from perfe6i: equilibrium. I need fay no more to prove, that if Indifference be effential to Liberty, it muft hz perfe6l Indiffer- ence : and that fo far as the Will is deftitute of this, fo far it is deflitute of that freedom by which it is its own mafter, and in a capacity of being its own de- Urminer, without being at all pafTive, or fubje6l to 88 OfLlhertyofWill Part IL the pouter and fway of fomeihingelfe, in its motions and determinations. Having oblerved thefe things, let us now try whether this notion of the Liberty of Will confilling in Indifference and equilibrium, and the Will's felf- determination in fuch a ftate be not abfurd and in- coniillent. And here I would lay down this as an axiom of unf^oubied cruth ; that . every free aB is done in a Jlate oj jreedom, and not only ajter fuch a Jlate, If an a6t of the Will be an a6i wherein the ioul is free, it muft be exerted in 3. Jlate of freedom, and in the ti^ne of free" dom. It will not fuiSce, that the a61; immediately follows a ftate of Liberty ; but Liberty muft yet continue, and co-exiil with the a6l; the foul re- maining in pofteftion of Liberty, Becaufe that is the notion of a free atl of the foul, even an a6l wherein the foul ufs or exercifes Liberty. But if the foul is not, in the very time of the adt, in the pojfef' Jion of Liberty, it cannot at that time be in the ufe of it. Now the queftion is, whether ever the foul of man puts forth an a6l of Will, while it yet remains in a flate of Liberty, in that notion of a ftate of Liberty, viz, as implying a ftate of Indifference, or whether i\\Q foul ever exerts an a6l of choice or preference, while at that very time the Will is in a perfefcl equi- librium, not inclining one way more than another. The very putting of the queftion is fuflicient toftiew the abmrdity of the affirmative anfwer : for how ridiculous would it be for any body to infift, that that the foul chocles one thing before anofber, when at the very lame mftant it is perfedly indiff"erent with refpeCl to each ! This is the fame thing as to fay, the foul prefers one thing to another, at the ve- ry fame time that it has no preference. Choice and preference can no more be in a ftate of Indift"erence, Se6l. VII. confijling in Indifference. 89 than motion can be in a (late of reft, or than the preponderation of the fcale of a balance can be in a Hate of equilibrium. Motion may be the next moment after reft ; but cannot co-exift with it, in any, even the leajl part of it. So choice may be immediately after a ftate of Indifference, but has no co-exiftence with it : even the very beginning of it is not in a ftate of Indifference. And there- fore if this be Liberty, no a6l of the Will, in any degree, is ever performed in a ftate of Liberty, or in the time of Liberty. Volition and Liberty are fo far from agreeing together, and being effential one to another, that they are contrary one to an- other, and one excludes and deftroys the other, as much as motion and reft, light and darkncfs, or life and death. So that the Will a6ls not at all, does not fo much as begin to a6l in the time of fuch Liberty : freedom is perfedly at an end, and has ceafed to be, at the firft moment of a6lion ; and therefore Liberty cannot reach the a6lion, to af- fe61;, or qualify it, or give it a denomination, or any part of it, any more than if it had ceafed to be twenty years before the a6lion began. The mo-, ment that Liberty eeafes to be, it ceafes to be a qualification of any thing. If light and darknefs fucceed one another inftantaaeoully, light quali- fies nothing after it is gone out, to make any thing lightfome or bright, any more at the firft moment of perfe£l darknefs, than months or years after. Life denominates nothing vital at the firft moment of perfeft death. So freedom, if it confifts in, or implies Indifference, can denominate nothing free, at the firft moment of preference or preponderation. Therefore it is manifeft, that no Liberty which the foul is poffelFed of, or ever ufes, in any of its a6ls of volition, confifts in Indifference ; and that the opinion of fuch as fuppofe, that Indifference be- O go Of Liberty of Will Part II. longs to the very eflence of Liberty, is to the high- eft degree abfurd and contradi6lory. If any one fliould iniagirie, that this manner of arguing is nothing but a trick and delufion ; and to evade the reafoning, fhould fay, that the thing wherein the Will exercifes its Liberty, is not in the a£i; of choice or preponderation itfelf, but in deter- mining itfelf to a certain choice or preference ; that the a6t of the Will wherein it is free, and ufes its ov/n fovereignly, confifts in its caufmg or determining the change or tranjition from a ftate of Indifference to a certain preference, or determining to give a cer- tain turn to the balance, which has hitherto been even ; and that this aft the Will exerts in a ftate of Liberty, or while the Will yet remains in equilibri- um, and perfe6l mafter of itfelf. — I fay, if any one choofes to exprels his notion of Liberty after this, orfome fuch manner, let us fee if he can make out his matters any better than before. What is afferted is, that the Will, while it yet re- mains in perfe6l equilibrium, without preference, determines to change itfelf from that ftate, and ex- cite in itfelf a certain choice or preference. Now let us fee whether this does not come to the fame abfurdity we had before. If it be fo, that the Will, while it yet remains perfedly indifferent, determines to put itfelf out of that ftate, and give itfelf a cer- tain preponderation; then I would inquire, whether the foul does not determine this of choice ; or whether the WilTs coming to a determination to do fo, be not the fame thing as the foul's coming to a choice to do fo. If the foul does not determine this of choice, or in the exercife of choice, then it does not determine it voluntarily. And. if the foul does not determine it votuntarily, or of its own Will, then in what fenfe docs its Will determine it ? And if the Will does not determine it, then how is the Liberty Seft. VII. confijling in IndifFerence. 91 of the Will exercifed in the del-ermination ? What fort of Liberty is exercifed by the foul in thofe de- terminations, wherein there is no exercife of choice, which are not voluntary, and wherein the Will is not concerned ? — But if it be allowed, that this de- termination is an a6l of choice, and it be infilled on, that the foul, while it yet remains in a flate of per- fe6l IndifFerence, choofes to put itfelf out of that flate, and to turn itfelf one way ; then the foul is al- ready come to a choice, and choofes that way. And fo we have the very fame abfurdity which we had before. Here is the foul in a flate of choice, j\nd in a flate of equilibrium, both at the fame time : the foul already choofing one way, while it remains in a flate of perfe6l Indifference, and has no choice of one way more than the other. — And indeed this manner of talking, though it may a little hide the abfurdity in the obfcurity of expreflion, is more nonfenlical, and increafes the inconfiftence. To fay, the free a6l of the Will, or the a6l which the Will exerts in a flate of freedom and IndifFerence, does not imply preference in it, but is what the Will does in order to caufing or producing a preference, is as much as to fay, the foul choofes (for to will and to choofe are the fame thing) without choice, and prefers without preference, in order to caufe or produce the beginning of a preference, or the firfl choice. And that is, that the firfl choice is exerted without choice, in order to produce itfelf. If any, to evade thefe things, fhould own, that a flate of Liberty, and a flate of Indifference are not the fame, and that the former may be without the latter ; but fhould fay, that Indifference is flill ef" fential to the freedom of an a6l of Will, in fome fort, namely, as it is neceffary to go immediately before it : it being effential to the freedom of an a6l of Will that it fliould direftly and immediately arifc gi Of Liberty's lying in a Power Part II. cut of a ftate of IndifFerence : flill this will not help the caufe of Arminian Liberty, or make it confillent with itfelf. For if the aft fprings immediately out of a ftate ot IndifFerence, then it does not arife from antecedent choice or preference. But if the a6l arifes direftly out of a ftate of IndifFerence, without any intervening choice to choofe and determine it, then the aft not being determined by choice, is not de- termined by the Will ; the mind exercifes no free choice in the afFair, and free choice and free W^ill have no hand in the delermination of the aft. Which is entirely inconiiftent with their notion of the free- dom of Volition. If any fhould fuppofe, that thefe difficulties and abfurdities may be avoided, by faying, that the Liberty of the mind confifts in a power to fufpend the aft of the Will, and fo to keep it in a ftate of Indifference, until there has been opportunity for connderation ; and fo fhall fay, that however In- difFerence is not efFential to Liberty in fuch a man- ner, that the mind muft make its choice in a ftate of IndifFerence, which is an inconliftency, or that the a6t of Will muft fpring immediately out of In- difFerence ; yet indifFerence may be eilential to the Liberty of afts of the Will in this refpcft, viz. That Liberty conFifts in a Poiver of the mind to forbear or fufpend the aft of Volition, and keep the mind in a ftate of IndifFerence for the prefent, until there has been opportunity for proper delib- eration : I fay, if any one imagines that this helps the matter, it is a great mi Flake : it reconciles no jnconfiftency, and relieves no difficulty which the alFair is attended with. — For here the following things muft be obferved : 1. That this Jiifpending, of Volition, if there be properly any fuch thmg, is itfelf an atl of Voli- tion, If the mind determine* to fufpend its aft, Sefl:. VII. to fufpend Volition. 93 it determines it voluntarily ; it choofes, on fome confidcration, to fufpend it. And this choice or determination, is an a6t of the Will : And indeed it is fcppofed to be fo in the very hypothefis ; for it is fuppofed that the Liberty of the Will confills in its Power to do this, and that its doing it is the very thing wherein the Will exercifes its Liberty. But how can the Will exercife Liberty in it, if it be not an aft of '.he Will ? The Liberty of the Will is not exercifed in any thing but what the Will does. 2. This determining to fufpend ading is not on- ly an aft of the Will, but it is fuppofed to be the only free aft of the Will ; becaufe it is faid, that this is the thing wherein the Liberty of the Will confifts, — Now if this be fo, then this is all the aft of will that we have to confider in this controverfy, about the Liberty of Will, and in our enquiries, wherein the Liberty of man confi ils. And now the fore- mentioned difficulties remain : the former queftion returns upon us, viz. Wherein confills the free- dom of the Will in thofe aUs wherein it is free ? z^nd if this aft of determining a fufpenfion be the only aft in which the Will is free, then wherein confifts the Will's freedom with refpeft to this aft of fufpen- fion ? And how is Indifference elfential to this aft ? The anfwer muft be, according to what is fuppofed in the evafion under confideration, that the Liberty of the Will in this aft of fufpenfion, confifts in a Power to fufpend even this aft, until there has been opportunity for thorough deliberation. But this will be to plunge direftly into the grofteft non- fenfe : for it is the aft of fufpenfion itfelf that we are fpeafeing of ; and there is no room for a fpace of deliberation and lufpenfion in order to deter- mine whether we will fufpend or no. For that luppofes, that even fufpenfion itfelf may be de- ferred : which is abfurd ; for the very deferring 94 0/ fufpending Volition, Part IL the determination of fufpenfion to conGder wheth- er we will fufpend or no, will be a6lually fufpend- ing. For during the fpace of fufpenfion, to con- fider, whether to fufpend, the a6t is ipfo faElo fuf- pended. There is no medium between fufpending to aft, and immediately ading ; and therefore no poflibility of avoiding either the one or the other one moment. And befides, this is attended with ridiculous ab- furdity another way : for now it is come to that, that Liberty confifts wholly in the mind's having Power to fufpend its determination whether to fuf- pend or no ; that there may be time for confidera- tion, whether it be beft to fufpend. And if Lib- erty confifts in this only, then this is the Liberty under confideration : we have to enquire now, how Liberty with refpecl to this aft of fufpending a de- termination of fufpenfion, confifts in Indiff^erence, or how Indiff^erence is effential to it. The anfwer, according to the hypothefis we are upon, muft be, that it confifts in a Power of fufpending even this laft mentioned aft, to have time to confider wheth- er to fufpend that. And then the fame difficul- ties and enquires return over again with refpeft to that ; and fo on for ever. Which, if it would fhew any thing, would fhew only that there is no fuch thing as a free aft. It drives the exercife of freedom back in infinitum ; and that is to drive it out of the world. And befides all this, there is a delufion, and a la- tent grofs contradiftion in the aff'air another way ; in as much as in explaining how, or in what ref- peft the Will is free with regard to a particular aft of Volition, it is faid that its Liberty confifts in a Power to determine to fufpend that ail, which plac- es Liberty not in that a5i of Volition which the en- quiry is about, but altogether in another antecedent Sea. VIIL Ofi\\t fuppofed Liberty, Sec. 95 aft. Which contradicts the thing fuppofed in both the queflion and anfvver. The queftion is, wherein confifls the mind's Liberty in any particular adl of Volition ? And the anfvver, in pretending to fhevv wherein lies the mind's Liberty in that a5l, in efFe6l; fays, it does not lie in that a6l at all, but in anoth- er, viz, a Volition to fufpend that aB. And therefore the anfwer is both contradi6lory, and altogether im- pertinent and befide the purpofe. For it does not fhew wherein the Liberty of the Will confifts in the a6l in queftion ; inftead of that, it fuppofes it does not confift in that a6l at all, but in another diftinft from it, even a Volition to fufpend that aft, and take time to confider of it. And no account is pre- tended to be given wherein the mind is free with refpeft to that aft, wherein this anfwer fuppofes the Liberty of the mind indeed confifts, viz, the aft of fufpenfion, or of determining the fufpenfion. On the whole, it is exceeding manifeft, that the Liberty of the mind does not confift in Indifference, and that Indifference is not eCTential or neceflfary to it, or at all belonging to it, as the Arminiam fup- pofe ; that opinion being full of nothing but abfur- dity and felf-contradiftion. Section VIIL Concerning the fuppofed Liberty of the Will, as oppofitc to all Neccffity. It is a thing chiefly infifted on by Arminians, in this controverfy, as a thing moft important and ef- lential in human Liberty, that volitions, or the afts of the Will, are contingent events ; underftanding contingence as oppofite, not only to conftraint, but ^6 OJ thefiippofed Liberty Part II. to all NecefTity. Therefore I would particularly confider this matter. And 1. I would enquire, whether there is, or can be any fuch thing, as a volition which is contingent in fuch a fenfe, as not only to come to pafs with- out any Neceflity of conRraint or co-aciion, but al- fo without a NcceJfUy of confequence, or an infallible connexion with any thing foregoing. 2. Whether, if it were fo, this v/ould at all help the caufe of Liberty. I, I would confider whether volition is a thing that ever does, or can come to pafs, in this manner, contingently. And here it muft be remembered, that it has been already fhewn, that nothing can ^ever come to pafs without a caufe, or reafonwhy it exifts in this man- ner rather than another ; and the evidence of this has been particularly applied to the a6ls of the Will. Now if this be fo, it will demondrably follow, that the a6ls of the Will are never contingent, or with- out neceffity in the fenfe fpoken of ; in as much as thofe things which have a caufe, or reafon of their exiftence, muft be conne^ed with their caufe. This appears by the following confideralions. 1. For an event to have a caufe and ground of its exifi:ence, and yet not be connected with its caufe, is an inconfiflence. For if the event be not con- nected with the caufe, it is not dependent on the caufe ; its exiftence is as it were loofe from its in- fluence, and may attend it or may not ; it being a mere contingence, whether it follows or attends the influence of the caufe, or not : And that is the fame thing as not to be dependent on it. And to fay the event is not dependent on its caufe is abfurd : It is the fame thing as to fay. it is not its caufe, nor the event the cffed of it : For dependence on the in- fluence of a caufe is the very notion of an effect. ScS:, VIIL without all NecefTity. 97 If there be no fuch relation between one thing and another, confiding in the connexion and dependence of one thina on the influence of another, then it is certain there is no fuch relition between them as is fignified by the terms caiife and rffech So far as an event is dependent on a caufe and connc6led with it, fo much caufality is there in the cafe, and no more. The caufe does, or brings to pafs no more in any event, than is dependent on it. If we fay, the connexion and dependence is not total, but par- tial, and that the efFe6l, though it has fome connex- ion and dependence, yet is not entirely dependent on it ; that is the fame thing as to fay, that not all that is in the event is an efFed of that . \ufe, but that only a part of it arifes from thence, and part fome other way. 2. If there are fome events which are not necefla- rily conneded with their caufes, then it will follow that there are fome things which come to pafs with- out any caufe, contrary to the fuppofition. For if there be any event which was not neceirarily con- re6led with the influence of the caufe under fuch circumftances, then it was contingent whether it would attend or follow the influence of the caufe, or no ; it might have followed, and it might not, when the caufe was the fame, its influence the fame, and under the fame circumflances. And if fo, why did it follow, rather than not follow ? There is no caufe or reafon of this. Therefore here is fomethincr with^ out any caufe or reafon why it is, viz. the follow- ing of the efFe6l on the influence of the caufe, with which it was not necefl'arily connecled. If there be a necefl'ary connexion of the effe6l on any thin^ antecedent, then we may fuppofe that fometimes the event will follow the caufe, and fometimes not, when the caufe is the fame, and in every refpedl in P 9? Of ihifiippofcd Liberty Part II. the fame Rate and circiim (lances. And what can be the caufe and leafou of this ftrange phenomenon, even this diverfity, that in one inftance, the efFecl Ihoiild follow, in another not ? It is evident by the fuppofition, th;it this is wholly wirhouc any caufe or ground. Here is fomething in the prefent manner of the exiRence of things, and ilate of the world, that is abfolutely without a caufe ; which is contrary to the fuppofition, and contrary to what has been be- fore demonflrated. 3. To fuppofe there are fome events which have a caufe and ground of their exiflence, that yet are not neceffarily conneded with their caufe, is to fup- pofe that they Tiave a caufe which is not their caufe". Thus, if the cfFc6l be not necefl'arily conneded with the caufe, with its influence, and influential circum- ftances ; then, as I obfervcd before, it is a ihing pof- lible and fuppofable, that the caufe may fometimes exert the fame influence, under the fame circum- ftances, and yet the efFecl not follow. And if this aflualiy happens in any inftance, this inftance is a proof, in fact, that the influence of the caufe is not fufficient to produce the eff'edl. For if it had been fufficient, 4t would have done it. And- yet, by the fuppofition, in another inftance, the fame caufe, with perfeftly the fame influence, and when all circum- Itancts which have any influence, are the fame, it ^ n^as followed with the eff-e^l. By which it is manifeft, that the effedt in this laft inftance was not owing to the influence of the caufe, but muft come to pafs fome other way. For it was proved before, that the influence of the caufe was not fufiicient to produce the effeft. And if it was not faflicient to produce it, then the piodudion of it could not be owing to that influence, but muft be owing to fomething elfc, or owing to nothing. And if the efFe£l be not owing Se6l. VIII. tviihoutall Nccc[riiy. gg to the influence of the caufe, then it is not the caufe ; which brings us to the contradiftion of a caule, and no caufe, that which is the ground and reafon of the exiftence of a thing, and at the fame time is not tho ground and reafon of its exiftence, nor is fufficient to be fo. If the matter be not already fo plain as to render any further rcafoning upon it impertinent, I would fay, thcit that which feetns to be the caufe in the fup- pofed cafe, can be no caufe ; its power and influence having, on a full trial, proved infufiicient to produce fuch an efl'eQ : and if it be not fufhcient to produce it, then it does not produce it. To fay otherwife, is to fay, there is power to do that which there is not power to do. If there be in a caufe fufRcient power exerted, and in circumftances fufficient to produce an efFetl, and fo the effc^ be a6lually produced at one time ; ihefe things all concurring, will produce the efre6l. at all times. And fo we may turn it the other way ; that which proves not fufficient at one time, cannot be fufficient at another, with precifely the fame influential circum fiances. And therefore if the efFe6: follows, it is not owing to that caufe ; unlefs the different time be a circumftance which has influence : but that is contrary to the fuppofltion ; for it is fuppofcd that all circumflances that have in- fluence, are the fame. And befides, this would be to fuppofe the time to be the caufe ; wh\ch is con- trary to the fuppofition of the other thing's being the caufe. But if merely diverfity of time has no influence, then it is evident that it is as much of an abfurdity to fay, the caufe was fufficient to produce the effe6l at one time, and not at another ; as to fay, that it is fufficient to produce the effect at a certain time, and yet not fufficient to produce the fame effe6t at the fam§ time. 100 Of the Connexion of the Will Part IK On the whole, it is clearly manifeft, that every ef- fe6l has a neceffary connexion with its caufe, or with that which is the true ground and reafon of its ex* iftence. And therefore if there be no event without a caufe, as was proved before, then no event what- foever is contingent in the manner, that Arminians fuppofe the free adls of the Will to be contingent. Section IX. 0/ the Connexion of the Ads of the Will with the DiC" tates oj the Underftanding. It is manifeft, that the a6ts of the Will are none of them contingent in fuch a fenfe as to be without all neceffity, or fo as not to be neceffary with a neceflity of confequence and Connexion ; becaufe every aO; of the Will is fome way connefted with the Under- ftanding, and is as the greateft apparent good is, in the manner which has already been explained ; name- ly, that the foul always wills or choofes that which, in the prefent view of the mind, confidered in the whole of that view, and all that belongs to it, appears mod agreeable. Becaufe, as was obferved before, nothing is more evident than that, when men aft voluntarily, and do what they pleafe, then they do what appears moft agreeable to them ; and to fay otherwife, would be as much as to affirm, that men do not choofe what appears to fuit them beft, or what feems mod pleafing to them ; or that they do not choofe what they prefer. Which brings the matter to a contradiction. And it is very evident in itfelf, that the a6ls of the Will have fome Connexion with tjie dictates or views Se6l. IX. ivith the Underftandin^. lOi O' of the Underftanding, fo this is allowed by fome of the chief of the Arminlan writers ; particularly by Dr. Whitby and Dr. Samuel Clark. Dr. Turnbull, though a great enemy to the do6trine of neceflity, allows the lame thing. In his Clirijlian Philojophy, (p. 196) he with much approbation cites another philoiopher, as cf the fame mind, in thefe v/ords : *• No m.an. (fays an excellent philofopher) fets him- ** felf about any thing, but upon fome view or other, ** which ferves him for a reafon for what he does ; " and whatfoever faculties he employ vS, the Under- ** (landing, wirh fuch light as it has, well or ill form- *' ed, conRantly leads ; and by that light, true or *' falfe, all her operative powers are dire6kd. The ** Will itfelf, howabfolute and incontiolabie foever " it may be thought, never fails in its obedience to ** the di6tares of the Underftanding. Temples have ** their facred images ; and we fee what influence ** they have always had over a great part of man- ** kind ; but in truth, the ideas and images in mens' ** minds are the invifible powers that conftantly " govern them ; and to thefe they all pay univerfaU ** ly a ready fubmiffion." But whether this be in a jufl conliflence with themfelves, and their own notions of liberty, I de- fire may now be impartially confidered. Dr. Whitby plainly fuppofes, that the a6ls and determinations of the Will always follow the Un- derftanding's apprehenfion or view of the greateft good to be obtained, or evil to be avoided ; or, in other words, that the determinations of the Will conftantly and infallibly follow thefe two things in the Underftanding : 1. The degree of good to be ob- tained, and evil to be avoided, propoltd to the Un- derftanding, and apprehended, viewed, and taken notice of by it, ^. The degree oj the UnderJlarJ- itig's vievjj notice or apprehenfion of that good or 102 Of the Connexion of the Will Part II, evil ; »v'hich is increafed by attention and confider- aiion. That this is an opinion he is exceeding pe- remptory in (as he is in every opinion which he mai.ntains in his controverfy with the Calvanifs) with dildain of the contrary opinion a$ abfurd and feL*^-conrradi6tory, v/ill appear by the following words of his, in his Difcourfe on the Five Points.* *' Now, it is certain, that what naturally makes ** the Underflanding to perceive, is evidence pro- '• pofed, and apprehended, confidered or adverted *' to : for nothing elfe can be requihte to make us ** come to the knowledge of the truth. Again, what *' makes the Will choole, is fomething approved by ** the Underftanding ; and confequently appearing *' to the foul as good. And whatfoever it refufeth, ** is fomething rcprefented by the Underftanding^ *' and fo appearing to the Will, as evil. Whence *' all that God requires of us is and can be only ** this ; to refufe the evil, and choofe the good. ** Wherefore, to fay that evidence propofed, appre- *' bended and conlidered, is not fufficient to make *' the Underftanding approve ; or that the greatefl; *' good propofed, the greateft evil threatened, when *•' equally believed and refle6led on, is not fufficient *' to engage the VViil to choofe the good and re- *' fufe the evil, is in efFe6t to fay, that -which alone *•' doth move the Will to choofe or to refufe, is not fuffi- " cient to engage it fo to do ; which being contra- *' diftory to itfelf, muft of neceffity be falle. Be it " then fo, that we naturally have an averfion to the *' truths propofed to us in the Gofpel i that only ** can make us indifpofed to attend to them, but '* cannot hinder our convi6iion, when we do ap- *' prebend them, and attend to them. — Be it, that *' there is in us alfo a renitency to the good we are * Second Edit. p. 211, 21a, 21Q. Seft. IX. toith the Underflanding. 103' ** to choofe ; that only can indifpofe us to believe ** ic is, and to approve it as our chiefefl good. Ba *' it, that we are prone to the evil that we fnoakl *' decline ; that only can render it the more diffi- *' cult for us to believe it is the worll of ev/ls. " But yet, zvhat we do really believe to be our chie/rjl ^^ good, will Jlill be chojen ; and what we apprehend '* to be the loorft oj evils, will, whilfl we do contimic ** under that conviilion^ be rejufed by us. It therefore *' can be only requifite, in order to thefe cndj?, ihac ** the Good Spirit lllould fo illuminate our Under- '' PtandincTs, that we attendincj to, and ccnfidorino- ** what lies before us, fhould apprehend, and be *' convinced of our duty ; and that the bleffings of *' the Gofpel fhould be fo propounded to us, as ^' that we may difcern them to be our chiefefl good ; *^ and the miferies it threateneth, fo as we may bs *' convinced that they are the word of evils ; that ** we may choofe the one, and refufe the other." Here let it be oblerved, how plainly and perem- torily it is aflferted, that the greatejl good propofed, and the greatcjl evil threatened, when equally believed and refiecied on, is fufficient to engage the Will to choofe the good and refufe the evil, and is that alone which doth move the Will to choofe or to refufe ; and that it is contraditlory to if elf to fappofe otherwife ; and there- fore mifl of neceffiiy bcfalfe ; and then what we do real- ly believe to he our chieffl good will fill be ckofen, and what we apprehend to be the worft of evils, wilL whi^fi xve continue under that conviclion, he refufed by us. Nothing could have been faid more to the purpoie, fully to {igniiy and declare, that the determination* of the Will muft evermore follow the illuminarion, convidion and notice of the Underftanding, with regard to the grcateft good and tvW propof'ed, reck- oning both the degree of good and evil undcrffood, and the degree of Underitanding, notice and con- 104 Of the Connexion oj the Will Part Ih vidion of fhat propofed good and evil ; and that it is thus neceflarily, and can be othervvife in no in- flance : becaufe it is aflerted, that it implies a con- traditlion, to fuppofe it ever to be otherwife. I am fenlib'e the Doctor's aim in thefe affertions is againfl the Calvanifls ; to (hew, in oppoiition to them, that there is no need of any phyfical opera- tion of the Spirit of God on the Will, to change and determine that to a good choice, but that God's op- eration and afhriance is only moral, iuggefting ideas to the UnderRanding ; which he fuppotes to be e- nough, if thofe ideas are attended to, infallibly to obtain the end. Bat whatever his defign was, noth- ing can more directly and fully prove, that every de- termination of the Will, in choofing and refuhng, is nccejfary ; direGly contrary to his own notion of the liberty of the Will. For if the determination of the Will, evermore, in this manner, follows the light, convidion and view of the Underllanding, concern- ing the greateft good and evil, and this be that alone which moves the Will, and it be a contraditlion to fuppofe otherwife; then it is necejfarily fo, the Will neceflarily follows this light or view of the Under- Handing, and not only in fome of its afts, but in every atl of choofing and refufing. So that the Will does not determine ufeif in any one of its own a61s ; but all its a6ls, every a6t of choice and retufal depends on, and is neceflarily connedted with fome antecedent caufe ; which caufe is not the Will itfelf, nor any a6l of its own, nor any thing pertaining to that fac- ulty, but fomething belonging to another faculty, whofc a6ls go before the Will, in all its a6is, and gov- ern and determine them every one. Here, if it fliould be replied, that although it be true, that according to the Do6lor, the final determi- nation of the Will always depends upon, and is in- fallibly conneded with the Undcrflaiidinn's coiivic- Se£l. IX. ivith /Ae Underflancling. 105 tion, and notice of the greatefl good ; yet the a£ls of the Will are not necelfary ; becaufe that convic-» tion and notice of the Underllanding is firfl; depen- dent on a preceding att of the Will, in determining to attend to, and take notice of the evidence exhibit- ed ; by which means the mind obtains that degree of convi6lion, which is fufficientand effedual to de- termine the confequent and ultimate choice of the Will ; and that the Will, with regard to that preced- ing act, whereby it determines whether to attend or no, is not neceffary ; and that in this, the liberty of the Will confifts, that when God holds forth fuffi- cient objedive light, the Will is at liberty whether to command the attention of the miad to it. Nothinrr can be more weak and inconliderate than fuch a reply as this. For that preceding ac]: of the Will, in determining to attend and confider, iiill is an a5l of the Will (it is fo to be furc, if the liberty of the M// confifts in it, as is fuppofed) and if it be an a6t of the Will, it is an a6i of choice or refufal. And therefore, if what the Dodor aCTerfs be true, it is de- termined by fome antecedent light in the Under- {landing concerning the greateft apparent good or evil. For he aflerts, it is that light which alone doth move the Will to choofe or refufe. And therefore the Will muft be moved by that in choofing to attend to the objedtive light offered, in order to another confequent a6l of choice ; fo that this a6l: is no lefs neceffary than the other. And if we fuppofe another adl of the Will, (till preceding both thefe mention- ed, to determine both, ftill that alfo mud be an a61: of the Will, and an a£t of choice ; and fo mult, hy the fame principles, be infallibly determined by fome certain degree of light in the Underftanding concerning the greateft good. And let us fuppofe as many atts cf the W^ill, one preceding another, as Q io6 Of the Connexion of the Will Part IL we pleafe, yet they are every one of them necef- larily determined by a certain degree of light in the Underftanding, concerning thegreateft and moft eligi- ble good in that cafe ; and fo, not one of them free according to Dr. Whitby's notion of freedom. — And if it be faid, the reafon why men do not attend to light held forth, is becaufe of ill habits contraded by evil a6ls committed before, whereby their min ds are indifpofed to attend to, and confider of the truth held forth to them by God, the difficulty is not at all avoided : ftill the queftion returns, What deter- mined the Will in thofe preceding evil a6ls ? It muft, by Dr. Whitby's principles, ftill be the view of the Underftanding concerning the greateft good and evil. If this view of the Underftanding be that alone which doth move the Will to choofe or refiife, as the Do6lor afferts, then every a6l of choice or refufal, from a man's firft exiftence, is moved and determined by this wiQv^ ; and this view of the Underftanding ex- citing and governing the a6l, muft be before the a6l: And therefore the Will is necelFarily determined, in every one of its a6ls, from a man's firft exiftence, by a caufe befide the Will, and a caufe that does not proceed from, or depend on any a6l of the Will at all. Which at once utterly abolifties the Doctor's whole fcheme of liberty of Will ; and he, at one ftroke, has cut the (inews of all his arguments from the goodnefs, righteoufnefs, faithful nets and finceri- ty of God, in his commands, promifes, threatenings, calls, invitations, expoftulations ; which he makes ufe of, under the heads of reprobation, eleflion, uni- verfal redemption, fufficient and efFe6lual grace, and the freedom of the Will of man ; and has enervat- ed and made vain all thofe exclamations againft the doftiine of the Calvmijls, as charging God with manifeft unrighteoufnefs, unfaithful nefs, hypocrify, fallacioufnefs, and cruelty ; which he has over, and Seft. IX. liiith the Underflanding. 107 over, and over again, numberlefs times in his book. Dr. Samuel Clark, in his Demonflration of the Being and Attributes of God,* to evade the argument to prove the neceffity of volition, from its necellary Connexion with the laft didate of the Underfland- ing, fuppofes the latter not to be diverfe from the aft of the Will itfelf. But if it be fo, it will not al- ter the cafe as to the evidence of the neceffity of the aa of the Will. If the diftate of the Underftand- ing be the very fame with the determination of the Will or choice, as Dr. Clark fuppofes, then this de- termination is no fruit or effeB of choice : and if fo, no liberty of choice has any hand in it ; as to volition or choice, it is neceffary ; that is, choice cannot pre- vent it. If the laft di6late of the Underftanding be the fame with the determination of volition itfelf, then the exiftence of that determination muft be ne- ceffary as to volition ; in as much as volition can have no opportunity to determine whether it fhall exift or no, it having exiftence already before voli- tion has opportunity to determine any thing. It is itfelf the very rife and exiftence of volition. But a thing after it exifts, has no opportunity to determine as to its own exiftence ; it is too late for that. If liberty coniifts in that which Arminians fuppofe, viz. in the Will's determining its own a6ts, having free opportunity, and being without all neceffity ; this is the fame as to fay, that liberty coniifts in the foul's having power and opportunity to have what determinations of the Will it pleafes or choofes. And if the determinations of the Will, and the laft dilates of the Underftanding be the fame thing, then liberty confifts in the mind's having power to have what dilates of the Underftanding it pleafes, having opportunity to choofe its own dic- tates of Underftanding. But this is abfurd ; for it Edit, VI. p. 95. lo8 Of the Connexion o//^c Will Part 11. h to make the determination of choice prior to tho diftate of Underftanding, and the ground of it ; which cannot conhft with thediftateof Underftand- ing's being the determination of choice itfelf. Here is no way to do in this cafe, but only to re- cur to the old abfurdity of one determination before another, and the caufe of it ; and another before that, determining that ; and fo on in infinitum. If the laft di6tate of the Underftanding be the determina- tion of the Will itfelf, and the foul be free with re- gard to that diftate, in the Arminian notion of free- dom ; then the foul, before that di6tate of its Under- ftanding exifts, voluntarily and according to its own choice determines, in every cafe, what that diftate of the Underftanding (hall be ; otherwife that dic- tate, as to the Will, is neceffary ; and the a61s determined by it muft alfo be neceffary. So that here is a determination of the mind prior to that didate of the Underftanding, an aft of choice going before it, choofing and determining what that diftate of the Underftanding fhall be : and this pre- ceding aft of choice, being a free aft of Will, muft alfo be the fame with another laft diftate of the Un- derftanding : and if the mind alio be free in that dic- tate of Underftanding, that muft be determined ftill by another ; and fo on for ever. Befides, if the diftate of the Underftanding, and determination of the W^ill be the lame, this con- founds the Underftanding and Will, and makes them the fame. Whether they be the fame or no, I will not now difpute ; but only would obferve, that if it be fo, and the Arminian notion of liberty confifts in a felf-dctermining power in the Underftanding, free of all neceflity ; being independent, undetermined by any thing prior to its own afts and determina- tions ; and the more the Underftanding is thus in- jjependent and fovereign oyer its own determinations, Se£l. IX. zuiih ihe Under HdLXiding, 109 the more free. By this, therefore, the freedom of the foul, as a moral agent, muR conftll in the indepen- dence of the Underflanding on any evidence or ap- pearance of things, or any thing whatfoever, that {lands forth to the view of the mind, piior to the Underftanding's determination. And wiiat a fort of liberty is this ! ronfifting in an ability, freedom and eafinefs of judging, either according to evidence, or againfl it ; having a fovereign command over itfelf at all times, to judge, either agreeably or difagreea- bly to what is plainly exhibited to its own vie w. Certainly it is no liberty that renders perfons the proper fubje6ls of perfuafive reafoning, arguments, expoftulations, and fuch like moral means and induce- ments. The ufe of which with mankind is a main argument of the Arminians, to defend their notion of liberty without all necelTity. For according to this, the more free men are, the lefs they are under the government of fuch means, lefs fubjeQ to the power of evidence and reafon, and more independent of their influence, in their determinations. And whether the Underllanding and Will are the fame or no, as Dr. Clark feems to fuppofe, yet in or- der to maintain the Arminian notion of liberty with- out neceffity, the free Will is not determined by the Underllanding, nor necefTarily conneded with the Underllanding; and the further from fuch Connex- ion, the greater the freedom. And when the liberty is full and complete, the determinations of the Will have no Connexion at all with the di6lates of the Underllanding. And if fo, in vain are all the ap- plications to the Underllanding, in order to induce to any free virtuous a6l ; and fo in vain are all in- liru6lions, counfels, invitations, expoftulations, and all arguments and perfuafives whatfoever : for thele are but applications to the Underftandmg, and a clear and lively exhibition of the objeds of choicQ !!• A^s of the Will Part IL to the mind's view. But if, after all, the Will muft be felf-determined, and independent of the Underftand- ing, to what purpofe are things thus reprefented to the Underftanding. in order to determine the choice ? Section X. Volition ntccjfarily conntBtd with the Influence of Mo^ tives ; with particular Ohfervations on the great In^ confijlenct of Mr, Chubb^s Afertions and Reafonings, about the Freedom of the Will, 1 HAT every aft of the Will has fome caufe, and confequently (by what has been already proved) has a neceffary connexion with its caufe, and fo is ne- ceffary by a neceffity of connexion and confequence, is evident by this, that every aft of the Will what- foever is excited by fome Motive : which is mani- feft, becaufe, if the Will or mind, in willing and choofing after the manner that it does, is excited fo to do by no Motive or inducement, then it has no end which it propofes to itfelf, or purfues in fo do- ing ; it aims at nothing, and feeks nothing. And if it feeksnothing, then it does not go after any thing, or exert any inclination or preference towards any thing : which brings the matter to a contradiftion ; becaufe for the mind to Will fomething, and for it to go after fomething by an aft of preference and inclination, are the fame thing. But if every aft of the Will is excited by a Mo- tive, then that Motive is the caufe of the aft of the Will. If the afts of the Will are excited by Mo- tives, then Motives are the caufes of their being ex- cited ; or, which is the fame thing, the caufe of their being put forth into aft and exiltence. And if fo. Sc61. X. €onns5led xvith Motivts. ill the ^xiflence of the a6ls of the Will is properly the efFeft of their Motives. Motives do nothing as Mo- tives or inducements, but by their influence ; and fo much as is done by their influence is the eff'e6l of them. For that is the notion of an eflFeft, fome- thing that is brought to pafs by the influence of another thing. And if volitions are properly the efFeds of their Motives, then they are necefl'arily connefted with, their Motives. Every efFeft and event being, as proved before, neceflarily conne6ted with that, which is the proper ground and reafon of its exiftence. Thus it is manitefl:, that volition is neceff'ary, and is not from any felf-determining power in the Will : the volition, which is caufed by previous Motive and inducement, is not caufed by the Will exercif- ing a fovereign power over itfelf, to determine, caufe and excite volitions in itfelf. This is not confid- ent with the Will's a6ting in a fl:ate of indiflPerence and equilibrium, to determine itfelf to a preference ; for the way in which Motives operate, is by biafing the Will, and giving it a certain inclination or pre- ponderation one way. Here it may be proper to obferve, that Mr. Chubb, in his Colle6lion of Tracts on various fubjefts, has advanced a fcheme of liberty, which is greatly di- vided againfl: itfelf, and thoroughly fubverfive of it- felf; and that many ways. I. He is abundant in aflerting, that the Will, in all its a6ls, is influenced by Motive and excitement; and that this is the previous ground and reafon of all its a6ts, and that it is never otherwife in any in- ftance. He fays, (p. 262) No aBion can take plaa mthoutfome Motive to excite it. And in p. 263, Fb- lition cannot take place without fome PREVIOUS reafon or Motive to induce it. And in p. 310, Action -would not take f lace mthoutfome reafon or Motive to induce it ; 112 Inconfijlenct of Mr, Chuhb's Part II. it being abfurd to fuppofe^ that the aBive faculty would he exerted without fome PREVIOUS reafon to difpofe the mind to aClion. So alfo p 257. And he fpeaks of thefe things, as what we may be abfolutely certain of, and which are the foundation, the only founda- tion we have of a certainty of the moral pcrfedions of God. P. 252, 253, 254, 255, 261, 262, 263, 264. And yet at the fame time, by his fcheme, the in- fluence of Motives upon us to excite to a6lion, and to be adlually a ground of volition, is confequent on the volition or choice of the mind. For he very greatly inGfts upon it, that in all free aftions, be- fore the mind is the fubje6l of thofe volitions, which Motives exciie, it choofes to be fo. It choofes, whether it will comply with the Motive, which pre- fents itfelf in view, or not ; and when various Mo- tives are prefented, it choofes which it will yield to, and which it will reje6l. So p. 256, Every man has power to aU, or to refrain from atling agreeably with, or contrary to, any Motive that prefcnts, P. 257, Every 7nan is at liberty to aB, or refrain from aBing agreeably ' with, or contrary to, what each ofthcfe Motives, confidercd fingly, would excite him to, — Man has power, and is as much at liberty to rejccl the Motive that does prevail, as he has power, and is at liberty to rejeB thofe Motives that do not. And fo p. 310, 311, In order to conftitute a moral agent, it is necejfary, that he fiould have power to aBy or to refrain from acling, upon fuch moral Motives as he pleafes. And to the like purpole in many oth- er places. According to thefe things, the Will afts ill ft, and choofes or refufes to comply with the Mo- tive, that is prefented, before it falls under its pre- vailing influence : and it is firft deterrnincd by the mind's pleafure or choice, what Motives it will be induced by, before it is induced by them. Now, how can thefe things hang together ? How Se6l. X. S chant of Liberty, ^c, 113 can the mind firfl; a61:, and by its a6l of volition and choicey determine what Motive fhall be the ground and reafon of its volition and choice ? For this lup- poles the choice is already made, before the Motive has its effed ; and that the volition is already ex- erted, before the Motive prevails, fo as adlually to be the ground of the volition ; and makes the pre- vailing of the Motive, the confequence of the voli- tion, which yet it is the ground of. If the mind has already chofen to comply with a Motive, and to yield to its excitement, it does not need to yield to it after this : for the thing is effected already, that the Motive would excite to, and the Will is beforehand with the excitement ; and the excite- ment comes in too late, and is needlefs and in vain afterwards. If the m.ind has already chofen to yield to a Motive which iiivites' io a thing, that implies, and in fa6l is a choofing the thing invikd to; and the very a6l of choice is before the influence of the Motive which induces, and is the ground of the ^ choice ; the fon is beforehand with the father that begets him : the choice is fuppofed to be the ground of that influence of the Motive, which very influ- ence is fuppofed to be the ground of the choice. And fo vice verfa, the choice is fuppofed to be the confequence of the influence of the Motive, which influence of the Motive is the confequence of that very choice. And befides, if the Will aQs firfi: towards tho Motive before it falls under its influence, and the prevailing of the Motive upon it to induce it to a6t and choofe, be the fruit and co!ifequence of its a6fc and choice, then how is the Motive a PREVIOUS ground and reafon of the aB and choice fo that in the nature of the things, volition cannot take place zjithout fome PREVIOUS reafon and Motive to induce it ; and that this a6l is confequent upon, and follov;s the Motive ? Which things Mr, Chubb often afTerts, as R 114 InConfiJlencc of Mr, Chiihb's Part II. of certain and undoubted truth. So that the very fame Motive is both previous and conjequent, both be- fore and after, both the ground and fruit of the very fame thing ! II. Agreeable to the forementioned inconfiftent notion of the Will's firll atling towards the Motive, ehoofing whether it will comply with it*, in order to its becoming a ground of the Will's afting, before any a6l of volition can take place, Mr. Chubb fre- quently calls Motives and excitements to the a6lion of the Will, the pajfive. ground or reajon of that a^fion : Which is a remarkable phrafe ; than which I pre- fume there is none more unintelligible, and void of diRin6l and confiftent meaning, in all the writings of Duns Scotus, or Thomas Aquinas. When he reprefents the Motive to a6lion or volition as paf- five, he muft mean — pailive in that affair, or pafTive with refpe£l to that aiSlion which he fpeaks of ; oth- erwife it is nothing to his purpofe, or relating to the deiign of his argument : he mud mean, (if that can be called a meaning) that the Motive to volition is firft aded upon or towards by the volition, ehoofing to yield to it, making it a ground of a6lion, or de- termining to fetch its influence from thence ; and fo to make it a previous ground of its own excita- tion and exilience. Which is the fame abfurdity as if one (houid fay, that the foul of man, or any other thing, fhould, previous to its exifting, choofe what cauie it would come into exigence by, and ftould a6l upon its cnufe, to fetch influence from thence, to bring it into being ; and fo iis caufe fhould be a paffive ground of its exiflence ! Mr. Chubb does very plainly fuppofe Motive or excitement to be the ground of the bang of volition. He f peaks of it as the giound or reafon of the E X- E R T ION of an av only move down with the force of one pound : but however, this is all that is required of it under thefe circumllances ; it is wholly excuf- ed from nine parts of its motion : and if the fcale, under thefe circumllances, negle6ls to move, and re- mains at reft, all that it will be blamed for, will be its ncgle6lof that one tenth part of its motion ; which it had as much liberty and advantage for, as in ufual circumftances, it has for the greater motion, which in fuch a cafe would be required. So that this new difficulty, does not at all increafe its expofednefs to any thing blame- worthy. Sea. III. c/ fallen Man. 203 And thus the very fuppofilion of difficulty in the way of a man s duiy, or proclivity to Sin, through a being given up to hardnefs of heart, or indeed by any other means whatfoever, is an inconfiftcnce, accord- ing to Dr. Whitby's notions of liberty, virtue and vice, blame and praife. The avoiding Sin and blame, and the doing what is virtuous and praife-worthv, mufl be always equally eafy. Dr. Whitby's notions of liberty, obligation, vir- tue. Sin, C^c, led him into another great inconfifl:- ence. He abundantly infills, that necellity is incon- fiflcnt with the nature of Sin or fault. He fays, in the forementioned treatifc, p. 14. Who can blame a per/on /or doing xuhat he cculi not help ? and p. 15, It being fenfibly unjujl, to punifi avy man for doing that which was never in his power to avoid. And in p. 341 , to confirm his opinion, he quotes one of the Fathers, faying. Why doth God command, if man hath not fret Will and power to obey ? And again in the fame and the next page, Who will not cry out, that it is folly to command him, that hath not liberty to do what is com- manded ; and that it is unjujl to condemn him, that has it not in his power to do what is required ? And in p. 373, he cites another faying, A law is given to him that can turn to both parts, i. e. obey or tranfgrefs it: but no law can be againjl him who is bound by nature. And yet the fame Dr. Whitby afTerts, that fallen Man is not able to perform perfe£l; obedience. In p. 165, he has thefc words : *'The nature of Adam *' had power to continue innocent, and without Sin ; " whereas, it is certain our nature never had to." — But if ive have not power to continue innocent and without Sin, then Sin is inconfjftent with NecefTity, and we may be imful in that which we have not power to avoid; and thofe things cannot be true wliich he aCTerts elfewhere, namely. " That if v/e be '' nccefTitated, neither Sins of omiflion nor commif- £04 Of the Inability o/" fallen Man. Part III, <' fion, would deferve that name," (p. 348.) If we have it not in our power to be innocent, then we have it not in our power to be blamelels : and if fo, we are under a Neceffity of being blame-worthy. — - And how does this confift with what he fo often af- ferts, that NecefTity is inconfiftent with blame or praife ? If we have it not in our power to perform perfe6l obedience, to all the commands of God, then we are under a NecefTity of breaking fome com- mands, in fome degree; having no power to peiform fo much as is commanded. And if fo, why does he cry out of the unreafonablenefs and folly of com- manding beyond what men have power to do? And Arminians in general are very inconfiftent with themfelvesin what they fay'^bf the Inability of fallen Man in this refpe6l. They ftrenuoufly main- tain, that it would be unjuft in God, to require any thing of us beyond our prefent power and ability to perform ; and alfo hold, that we arc now unable to perform perfe6l obedience, and that Chrifl died to fatisfy for the imperfe^ions of our obedience, and has made way, that our imperfeQ obedience might be accepted inftead of perfed : wherein they feem in- fenfibly to run themfelves into the groffefl inconfift- ence. For, (as I have obferved eifewhere) " they *' hold, that God, in mercy to mankind, has abolifh- *' ed that rigorous conftitution or law, that they were ** under originally; and inftead of it, has introduc- *« ed a more mild conftitution, and put us under a ** new law, which requires no more than imperledt ** fincere obedience, in compliance with our poor «' infirm impotent circumftances fince the fall." Now, how can thefe things be made confiftent ? I would afk, what law thefe imperfedions of our obedience are a breach of ? if they arc a breach of no law, that we were ever under, then they are not 3ins. And if they be not Sins, what need of Chrift's Se6l. III. Of the Inability o/Tallen Man. 205 dying to fatisfy for them ? But if they are Sins, and and the breach of feme law, what law is it ? they cannot be a breach of their new law ; for that re- quires no other than imperfetl obedience, or obe- dience with imperfedions : and therefore to have obedience attended with imperfe6lions, is no breach of it ; for it is as much as it requires. And they cannot be a breach of their old law ; for that, they fay, is entirely aboliftied; and we never were under it. They fay, it would not be juft in God to require of us perfefl, obedience, becaufe it would not be jull to require more than we can perform, or to punifh us for failing of it. And therefore, by their own fcheme, the imperfe£lions of our obedience do not deferve to be punifhed. What need therefore of ChriR's dying, to fatisfy for them ? What need of his Jiiffering to fatisfy for that which is no fault, and in its own na- ture deferves no fiiffcring ? What need of Chrift's dying, to purchafe, that our imperfeB obedience fhould be accepted, when, according to their fcheme, it would be unjuft in itfelf, that any other obedi- ence, than imperfeB Ihould be required ? What need of Chriil's dying to make way for God's ac- cepting fuch an obedience, as it would be unjufl in Him not to accept ? Is there any need of Chrift's dying, to prevail with God not to do unrighteouf- ly ? — It it be faid, that Chrifl died to fatisfy that old law for us, that fo wc might not be under it, but that there might be room for our being under a more mild law ; Rill I would inquire, what need cf Chrift's dying, that we might not be under a law, which (by their principles) it would be in itfelf un- jufl that we fhould be under, whether Chriil had died or no, becaufe, in our prefent ilate, we are not able to keep it ? So the Arminians are inconfiftent with thcmfelvcs, not only in what they fay of the need of Chiifl's fatisfadion to atone for thof^ imoerfedions, ^vhich 2o6 OJ Inability, and Obligation. Part III, we cannot avoid, but alfo in what they fay of the grace of God, granted to enable men to perform the fincere obedience of the new law. ** I grant (fays ** Dr. Stebbing*) indeed, that by reafon of original ** Sin, we are utterly difablcd for the performance ** of the condition, without new grace from God. '' But I (ay then, that he gives fuch a grace to all of " us, by v/hich the performance of the condition is *' truly pofTible : and upon this ground he may, and *' doth moft righteoufly require it." If Dr. Steb- bing intends to fpeak properly, by grace he mud mean, that afiiilance which is of grace, or of free favour and kindnefs. But yet in the fame place he fpeaks of it as very unreafonahle, unjufl and cruel, for God to require that, as the condition of pardon, that is become impofTible by original Sin. li it be fo, what^r(2Cdis there in giving affiflance and ability to perform the condition of pardon ? Or why is that called by the name of grace, that is an abfolute debf, which God is bound to beftow, and which it v/ould be unjufl and cruel in Him to withhold, feeing he requires that, as the condition of pardon, which he can- not perform without it. Section IV. Command and Obligation to Obedience, conjijlcnt with moral Inability to obey. It being fo much infified on by Arminian writers, that neceffity is inconfiftent with Law or Command, and particularly, that it is abfurd to fuppofe God by his Command Ihould require that of men which * Treatife oi the Operations ol the Spirit. 2 edit. p. H2, 113. Se6i. IV. Commands confijlent, &c, 20J they are unable to do ; not allowing in this cafe for any difference that there is between natural and mor- al Inability; 1 would therefore now particularly conlider this matter. And, for the greater clearnefs, I would diftindlly lay down the following things. I. The Will itfelf, and not only thofe anions which are the effe6ls of the Will, is the proper obje6l of precept or Command. This is, fuch or fuch a ftate or atls of men's Wills, is in many cafes, proper- ly required of them by Commands ; and not only thofe alterations in the flate of their bodies or minds that are the confcquences of volition. This is moft manifeft ; for it is the foul only that is properly and diredly the iubje6l of precepts or Commands ; that only being capable of receiving or perceiving Com- mands. The motions or ftate of the body are mat- ter of Command, only as they are fubje6l to the foul, and ccnneded with its ads. But now the foul has no other faculty whereby it can, in the moft dire6t and proper fcnfe, confent, yield to, or comply with any Command, but the faculty of the Will ; and it is by this faculty only, that the foul can diredly dif- obey, or refufe compliance : for the very notions of confenting, yielding^ accepting, complying, reju/in^, re^ jedinjy Sec, are, according to the meaning of the terms, nothing but certain a6ls of the Will. Obedi- ence, in the primary nature of it, is the fubmitting and yielding of the Will of one to the Will of another. Difobedience is the not confenting, not comply- ing of the Will of the commanded to the manifefted Will of the commander. Other a6ls that are not the a£ls of the Will, as certain motions of the body and alterations in the foul, are Obedience or Difobedience only indiredly, as they are conne6led with the ftate or adions of the Will, according to an eftabliQied law of nature. So that it is manifeft, the Will itfelf 2o8 Commands confijleni Part lit, may be required : and the being of a good Will is the mofl proper, dirc6l and immediate fubje6l of Command; and if this cannot be prefcribed or re- quired by Command or precept, nothing can ; for other things can be required no othervvife than as they depend upon, and are the fruits of a good Will. Corol. 1. If there be feveral a£ls of the Will, or a feries of ads, one following another, and one the ef- fe6l of another, the Jirjl and determining aEi is prop- erly the fubje6l of Command, and not only the con- fequenta6ls, which are dependent upon it. Yea, it is this more efpecially, which is that, which Com- mand or precept has a proper refpedl to i becaufe it is this aft that determines the whole affair : in this aft the Obedience or Difobedience lies, in a peculiar manner ; the confequent a6ls being all lubjeft to it, and governed and determined by it. This determin- ing governing aft mud be the proper objeft of pre- cept, or none. Corol. 2. It alfo follows, from what has been ob- ferved, that if there be any fort of aft, or exertion of the foul, prior to all free afts of the Will or afts of "choice in the cafe, direfting and determining, what the afts of the Will (hall be ; that aft or exertion of the foul cannot properly be fubjeft to any Command or precept, in any refpeft whatfoever, either direftly or indireftly, immediately or remotely. Such afts cannot be lubjeft to Commands direUly, becaufe they are no afts of the Will ; being by the luppofition prior to all afts of the Will, determining and giving rife to all its afts : they not being afts of the Will, there can be in them no confent to, or compliance with, any command. Neither can they be fubjeft to Command or precept indircBly or remotely ; for they are not fo much as the eJJeBs or confequences of the Will, being prior to all its afts. So that if there be any Obedience in that original aft of the foul, de- termining all volitions, it is an aft of Obedience Se6l. IV. 'with moral Inability, 209 wherein the Will has no concern at all ; it preced- ing every a6t oF Will. And therefore, if the foul either obeys or diiobeys in this a6l, it is wholly in- voluntarily ; there .is no willing Obedience or re- bellion, no compliance or oppofition of the Will in the aff.iir : and what fort of Obedience or rebeliioa is this ? And thus the Arminian notion of the freedom of the Will confiding in the fours determining its own a6ls of Will, inftead of being eflcntial to moral agen* cy, and to men's being the fubjecls of moral govern- ment, is utterly inconfiilent with it. For if the foul determines all its ads of Will, it is therein fubje6l to no Command or moral government, as has been now obi'erved ; becaufe its original determining a6l is no a6t of Will or choice, it being prior, by the fuppo- fition, to every acl of Will. And the foul cannot be the fubje6l of Command in the a6l of the Will itfelf, which depends on the foregoing determining a6t, and is determined by it ; in as much as this is necef- fary, being the neceffary confequence and cffc6l of that prior determining a6l, which is not voluntary. Nor can the man be the fabje6l of Command or government in his external adions ; becaufe thefe are all neceflary, being the neceflary effe6ts of the a6ls of the Will themfelves. So that mankind, ac- cording to this fcheme, are fubjeds of Command or moral government in nothing at all ; and all their moral agency is entirely excluded, and no room for virtue or vice in the world. So that it is the Ay'miniari fcheme, and not the fcheme of the Calvinifis, that is utterly inconfiilent with moral government, and with all theufe of laws, precepts, prohibitions, promifes or threatenings. Neither is there any way whatfocver to make their principles conGft with thefe things. For if it be faid, that there is no prior determining ad of the foul, Ea 210 Commands CO jifijlent Part III. preceding the a6ls of the Will, but that volitions are events that come to pafs by pure accident, without any determining caufe, this is mod palpably incon- fiftent with all ufe of laws and precepts ; for nothing is more plain than that laws can be of no ufe to di- rect and regulate perfeft accident : which, by the fuppofition of i(s being pure accident, is in no cafe regulated by any thing preceding; but happervs, this way or that, perfe6ily by chance, without any caufe or rule. The perfe6t ufeleffnefs of laws and precepts alfo follows from the Arminian notion of indifference, as cffeniial to that liberty, which is re- quilite to virtue or vice. For the end of laws is to hind to one fide ; and the end of Commands is to turn the Will one way : and therefore they are of no ufe, unlefs they turn or bias the Will that way. But if liberty confifts in indifference, then their biafing the Wifl one way only, deflroys liberty ; as it puts the Will out of equilibrium. So that the Will, having a bias, through the influence of binding law, laid upon it, is not wholly left to itfelf, to determine itfelf which way it will, without influence from without. II. Having (hewn that the Will itfelf, efpecially in thofe a6ls, which are original, leading and deter- mining in any cafe, is the proper fubjeft of precept and Command, and not only thofe alterations in the body, &c. which are the effe6ls of the Will ; I now proceed, in the fecond place, to obferve that the very oppofition or defect of the Will itfelf, in that a61:, which is its original and determining a£l in the cafe ; I fay, the Will's oppofition in this aEl to a thing pro- pofed or commanded, or its failing of compliance, implies a moral Inability to that thing : or, in oth- er words, whenever a Command requires a ceftain ilate or a6l of the Will, and the perfon commanded, notwithftanding the Command and the circumftanccs Sed. IV. uith moral Inability, 211 under which it is exhibited, flill finds his Will op- pofite or wanting, in that, belonging to its (late or ^^s, which is original and determining in the affair, ihat man is morally unable to obey that Command. This is manifell from what was obferved in the firftpart, roncerning th6 natureof??zara/ Inability, as dirtinguifhed from natural ; where it was obferved, that a man may then be faid to be morally unable to do a thing, when he is under the influence or prevalence of a contrary inclination, or has a want of inclination, under fuch circumflances and views. It is alfo evident, from what has been before proved, that the Will is always, and in every individual a6l, neceflarily determined by the ftrongeft motive; and lo is always unable to go againfl the motive, which, all things confidered, has now the greatofl: (Irength and advantage to move the Will. — But not further to infifl on thefe things, the truth of the pofition now laid down, viz. that when the Will is oppofite to, or failing of a compliance with a thing in its orig^ inal determining inclination or aB, it is not able to comply, appears by the coniideration of thcfe two things. i.CThe Will in the time of that diverfe or oppo- fite leading a6l or inclination, and when a6lually under the influence of it, is not able to exert itfeif to the contrary, to make an alteration, in order to a compliance. The inclination is unable to change itfeif; and that for this plain reafon, that it is una- ble to incline to change itfeif. Prefent choice can- not at prefent choofe to be otherwife : for that would be at prefent to choofe fomething diverfe from what is at prefent chofen. If the Will, all things now con- fidered, inclines or choofes to go that way, then it cannot choofe, all things now confidered, to go the other way, and fo cannot choofe to be made to go the other way. To fuppofe that the mind is nosv St 12 Commands conjiftcnt Part IIL fincerely inclined to change itfelf to a different incli-^ nation, is to fuppofe the mind is now truly inclined otherwife than it is now inclined. The Will may oppofe fome future remote a6l that it'is expofed to, but not its own prefent a6t. 2. As it is impofTible that the Will fliould com- ply with the thing commanded, with refpeft to its leading aEi, by any aft of its own, in tJie time of that diverfe or oppofite leading and original aB, or after it has aftually come under the influence of that deter- mining choice or inclination; fo it is impoflible it fliould be determined to a compliance by any fore- going a6l ; for, by the very fuppofition, there is no foregoing a6l ; the oppofite or non-complying a61: being that a6t which is original and determining in the cafe. Therefore it mufl be fo, that if this Jirji determining a5i be found non-complying, on the pro- pofal of the Command, the mind is morally unable to obey. For to fuppofe it to be able to obey, is to fuppole it to be able to determine and caufe lis Jlrjl determining act to be otherwife, and that it has pow- er better to govern and regulate lis Jirjl governing and regulating aU, which is abfurd ; for it is to fappoie a prior a6l of the Will, determining its firfl deter- mining a6t ; that is, an aft prior to the firfl, and leading and governing tht, original and governing aft of all ; which is a contradiftion. Here if it fhould be faid, that although the mind has not any ability to Will contrary to what it does Will, in the original and leading aft of the Will, becaufe there is fuppofed to be lio prior a61 to de- termine and order it otherwife, and the Will cannot immediately change itfelf, becaufe it cannot at pref- ent incline to a change ; yet the mind has an ability for the prefent to forbear to proceed to a6lion, and taking time for deliberation; which may be ap oc^ cafion of the change of the inclination, Se6l. IV. Tvith viorul Inah Lilly, 213 I anfwer, (1.) In this obje8ion that feems to be forgotten which was oblerved before, viz, that the determining to take the matter into confideration, is itfelf an a6t of the Wili : and if this be all the atl wherein the mind exercifes ability and freedom, then this, by the fuppofition, muft be all that can be com- inanded or required by precept. And if this a 61 be the commanding att, then all that has been obferved concerning the commanding a6l of the Will remains true, that the very want of it is a moral Inability to exen it, ^c, (2.) We are fpeaking concerning the firlt and leading acl of the Will in the cafe, or about: the affair; and if a determining to deliberate, or on the contrary, to proceed immediately without delib- erating, be the firlt and leading acl ; or whether it be or no, if there be another a6l before it, which de- termines that ; or whatever be the original and lead- ing a6t; (lill the foregoing proof (lands good, that the non-compliance of the leading att implies moral Inability to comply. If it (liould beobjeQed, that thefe things make all moral Inability equal, and fuppofe men morally un- able to Will otherwife than they a6tually do Will, in all cafes, and equally fo in every inllance. In anfwer to this objeftion, I defire two things may be obferved. Firfl^ That if by being equally unable, be meant as really unable ; then, fo far as the Inability is merely moral, it is true, the Will, in ev- ery inflance, a8s by moral necelFity and is morally unable to a 61 otherwife, as truly and properly in one cafe as another; as I humbly conceive has been pcr- feQly and abundantly demonllrated by what has been faid in the preceding part of this Eflay. But yet, in fome rei'pett, the Inability may be faid to be greater in fome inftances than otheis: though the man may be truly unable, (if moral Inability can truly be called Inability.) yet he may be further fronj 214 Commands covfijleni Part III, being able to do fome things than others. As it is in things, which men are naturally unable to do. — A perfon, whofe ilrengih is no more than fufficient to lift the weight of one hundied pounds, is as truly and really unable to lift one hundred and one pounds, as ten thoufand pounds ; but yet he is further from being able to lift the latter weight than the former; and fo, according to common ufe of fpeech, has a greater Inability for it. So it is in moral Inability. A man is truly morally unable to choofe contrary to a prefent inclination, vvliich in the leafl degree pre- vails ; or, contrary to that motive, which, all things confidered, has (Ircngth and advantage now to move the Will, in the leaft degree, fuperior to all other inotives in view : but yet he is further from ability to refill a very flrong habit, and a violent and deep- ly rooted inclination, or a motive vaftly exceeding all others in flrength. And again, the'Inability may, in fome refpe6ls, be called greater in fome infiances than otheis, as it may be more geiural and tr.UnJivt to all aBs of that kind. So men may be faid to be un- able in a different fenfe, and to be further from mor- al' ability, who have that moral Inability which is general and habitual, than they who have only that Inability which is occaf.onal and particular.* Thus in cafes of natural Inability ; he that is born blind may be faid to be unable to fee, in a difPerent man- ner, and is, in fome refpecls, further from being able to fee, than he whofe fight is hindered by a tranfient cloud or mi ft. And befides, that which was obferved in the firfl part of this difcourle, concerning the Inability which attends a firong aiid Jdtltd habit, fliould be here re- rnembcred, viz. that fixed habit is attended with this peculiar moral Inability, by which it is diftin- * See this diilinQion of moral Inability'expldincd in part I. Seel, IV. Se6l. IV. ^oith moral InabilUy, 215 guifhed from occafional volition, namely, that endeav- ours to avoid future volitions of that kind, which are agreeable to fuch a habit, much more frequently and commonly prove vain and infufficient. For though it is impoilible there fbould be any true fin- cere defires and endeavours againll a prefent volition or choice, yet there may be againll volitions of that kind, when viewed at a diftance. A perfon may de- fire and ufe means to prevent future exercifes of a certain inclination ; and, in order to it, may v/ifh the habit might be removed; but his deQres and en- deavours may be ineffedlual. The man may be faid in feme fenfe to be unable ; yea, even as the word unable is a relative term, and has relation to inefFcc- lual endeavours ; yet not with regard to prefent, but remote endeavours. Secondly,' It mull be borne in mind, according to what was obferved before, that indeed no Inability whatfocver, which is merely moral, is properly call- ed by the name of Inability ; and that in the llri6left propriety of fpeech, a man may be faid to have a thing in his power, if he has it at his ele6lion ; and he cannot be faid to be unable to do a thing, when he can, if he now pleafes, or whenever he has a prop- er, dire£l and immediate defire for it. As to thofe defires and endeavours, that may be againll the ex- ercifes of a flrong habit, with regard to which men may be faid to be unable to avoid thofe exercifes, they are remote dclires and endeavours in two re- fpefts. Firjl, as to time; they are never againll prelent volitions, but only againll volitions of fuch a kind, when viewed at a diftance. Secondly^ as to their nature ; ihefe oppofite defires are not dirc6lly and properly againll the habit and inclination itfelf, or the volitions in which it is exercifed ; for thefe, in themTelves confidered, are agreeable; but againll iomething elfe, that attends them, or is their confe- 2i6 Commands /Jni Invitations Part III, quence ; the oppofuion of the mind is levelled en- tirely againft; this ; the inclination or volitions them- fclves are not at all oppofed dire61:ly, and for their own fake; but only indiredtly and reniotely on the account of fomething alien and foreign. III. Though the oppofition of the Will itfclf, or the very want of Will to a thing commanded, implies a moral Inability to that thing ; yet, if it be, as has been already (hewn, that the being of a good Rate or a6l of Will, is a thing moll properly required by Command ; then, in fome cafes, fuch a Rate or a6l of Will may properly be required, which at prefent is not, and which may alio be wanting after it is commanded. And therefore thofe things may prop- erly be commanded, which men have a moral Ina- bility for. Such a Rate, or a6l of the Will, may be required by Command, as does not already exifl. For if that volition only may be commanded to be which al- ready isj there could be no ufe of precept ; Com- mands in all cafes would be perfe6liy vain and im- pertinent. And not only may fuch a Will be re- quired, as is wanting before the Command is given, but alfo fuch as may poffibly be wanting -afterwards ; fuch as the exhibition of the Command may not be efiFeQual to produce or excite. Otherwife, no fuch things as Difobedience to a proper and rightful Com- mand is poffible in any cafe ; and there is no cafe fuppofable or poITiblej wherein there can be an in- excufable or faulty Difobedience ; which Arviinians cannot affirm conliftently with their principles : for this makes Obedience to jull and proper Commands always neceffary, and Difobedience impoflTible. And fo the Armiman would overthrow himlelf, yielding the very point we are upon, which he lo flrenuouf- ly denies, viz. that law and Command are conhltent with necelfity. Se6l. IV. confijicnt with moral Inability, 217 If merely that Inability will excufe difobedience, which is implied in the oppoQtion or defeat of in- clination, remaining after the Command is exhibited, then wickednefs always carries that in it which ex- cufes it. It is evermore fo, that by how much the more wickednefs there is in a man's heart, by fo much is his inclination to evil the (Ironger, and by fo much the more, therefore, has he of moral Ina- bility to the good required. His moral Inability, confiding in the ftrength of his evil inclination, is the very thing wherein his wickednefs confifts ; and yet, according to Arminian principles, it mud be a thing incotififtent with wickednefs ; and by how- much the more he has of it, by fo much is he the further from wickednefs. Therefore, on the whole, it is maniftft, that moral Inability alone (which confifts in difinclination) never renders any thing improperly the fubje61: mat- ter of precept or Command, and never can excufe any perfon in difobedience, or want of conformity to a Command. (^Natural Inability, arifing from the want of natural capacity, or external hindrance, (which alone is prop- ' crly called Inability) without doubt wholly excufes, or makes a thing improperly the matter of Com- mand. If men are excufed from doing or adHng any good thing, fuppofed to be commanded, it mufi: be through fome defecl or obllacle that is not in the Will itfelf, but'*V!jltrinric to it ; either in the capacity ^^■ of underftandingj or body, or outward circumltances. Here two or three things may be obferved, 1. As to fpiritual duties or a6ls, or any good thing in the ftate or imminent a6ls of the Will itfelf, or of the affections, (which are only certam modes of the exercife of the Will)'if perfons are juftly excufed, it muft be through want of capacity in the natural faculty of undei Handing. Thus the fame fpiritual F2 2i8 Commands ^?2ti Invitations Part III. duties, or holy afFe£lions and exercifes of heart, can- not be required of men, as may be of angels ; the capacity of underftandjng being fo much inferior. So men cannot ba required to love thofe amiable perfons, whom they have bad no opportunity to fee, or hear of, or come to the knowledge of, in any way agreeable to the natural (late and capacity of the human underftanding. But the infufficiency of mo- tives will not excufe ; unlefs their being infufficient ariies not from the moral (late of the Will or incli- nation itfelf, but from the ftate of the natural under- Handing. The great kindnefs and generofity of an- other may be a motive infufficient to excite grati- tude in the perfon, that receives the kindnefs, thro' his vile and ungrateful temper : in this cafe, the in- fufficiency of the motive arifes from the ftate of the Will or inclination of heart,- and does not at all ex- cufe. But if this generofity is not fufficient to ex- cite gratitude, being unknown, there being no means of information adequate to the ftate and meafure of the perfon's faculties, this infufficiency is attended with a natural Inability vv'hich entirely excufes. 2. As to fuch motions of body, or exercifes and alterations of mind, v/hich does not confifl in the imminent afts or ftate of the Will itfelf, but are fup- pofed to be required as eff^e61s of the Will ; I fay, in fuch fuppofed eff'e6ts of the Will, in cafes where- in there is no want of a capacity of underftanding ; that Inability, and that only excufes, which confifts in want of connexion between them and the Will, If the Will fully complies, and the propofed efFedl does not prove, according to the laws of nature, to be connetled with his volition, the man is perfe6lly excufed ; he has a natural Inability to the thing re- quired. For the \Vill itfelf, as has been obferved, is all that can be diredly and immediately required by Command ; and other things only indireQly, as con- Se£l. IV. confijlent with moral Inability. 2 1 9 ne6led with the Will. If, therefore, there be a full compliance of Will, ihe perfon has done his duty; and if other things do not prove to be conneQed with his volition, that is not owing to him. 3. Both thefe kinds of natural Inability that have been mentioned, and fo all Inability that excufes, may be refolved into one thing ; namely, want of natural capacity or ilrength ; either capacity of un- derftanding, or external flrength. For when there are external defeds and obllacles, they would be no obftacles, were it not for the imperfeQion and limi- tations of underRanding and ftrength. Corel, If things for which men have amoral Ina- bility, may properly be the matter of precept or Command, then they may alfo of Invitation and counfel. Commands and Invitations come very much to the fame thing ; the difference is only circumftan- tial : Commands arc as much a manifeftation of the Will of him that fpeaks, as Invitations, and as much teftimonies of expedation of compliance. The dif- ference between them lies in nothing that touches the afFair in hand. The main difference between Command and Invitation confifis in the enforcement of the Will of him who commands or invites. In the latter it is his kindnefs, the goodnefs which his Will arifes from: in the former it is his authority. — But whatever be the ground of the Will of him that fpeaks, or the enforcement of what he fays, yet fee- ing neither his Will nor expe6lation is any more teflified in the one cafe than the other ; therefore a perfon's being direded by Invitation, is no more an evidence of infmcerity in him that dire6is in mani- felling either a Will, or expedation which he has not, than his being known to be morally unable to do what he is directed to by command. So that aU this grand objettion of Arminians againft the Ina- bility of fallen men to exert faith in Chi iff, or to 1220 What Willingnefs and Part III perform other fpiritual gofpel duties, from the fmcer- ity of God's counfels and Invitations, mufl be with- out force. b^CTION V. That Sincerity of defires and Endeavours, which is fuppofed to excufe in the Non~pe^ formance of Things in thcmf elves good, particularly confidered. JLr is what is much infifted on by rnany, that fome men, though they are not able to perform fpiritual duties, fuch as repentance of fm, love of God, a cor- dial acceptance of Chrift as exhibited and offered in the gofpel, Sec, yet they may (incerely delire and endeavour thefe things ; and therefore muft be ex- cufcd ; it being unreafonable to blame them for the omiffion of thoie things, which they fincerely defire and endeavour to do, but cannot do. Concerning this matter, the following things may be obferved. 1. What is here fuppofed, is a great miilake, and grofs ablurdity ; even that men may fincerely choofe and defire thofe fpiritual duties of love, acceptance, choice, reje£lion, &c. confifting in the exercife of the Will itfelf, or in the dii'pofition and inclination of the heart ; and yet not be able to perform or exert them. This is abfurd, becaufe it is abfurd to fup- pofe that a man Qiould dire6lly, properly and fin- cerely incline to have an inclination, which at the fame time is contrary to his inclination : for that is to fuppofe him not lo be inclmed to that, which he is inclined to If a man, in the flate and a6ts of his Will and inclination, does properly and dircdly fall in with thofe 4uties, he therein performs ihcm ; for SeCt. V. Sincerity is no txcufe, 221 the duties themrelves confift in that very thing; they confifl in the ftate and a6ts of the Will being To form- ed and dire6led. If the toul properly and fincerely falls in with a certain propofed ad of Will or choice, the foal therein makes that choice its own. Even as when a moving body falls in with a propofed di- re6lion of its motion, that is the fame things as to move in that direftion. 2. That which is called a defire and wilUngnefs for thofe inward duties, in luch as do not perform, has refpe^t to thefe duties only indireQly and remotely, and is improperly reprefented as a willingnefs for them ; not only becaufe (as was obferved before) it refpeds thofe good volitions only in a diftant view, and with rerpe6t to future time ; but alfo becaufe evermore, not thefe things themfelves, but fomething elfe, that is alien and foreign, is the obje6l that ter- minates thefe volitions and defires. A drunkard, who continues in his drunkennefs, being under the power of a love, and violent appetite to ftrong drink, and without any love to virtue ; buc being alfo extremely covetous and clofe, and very much exercifed and grieved at the duuinution of his eflate, and profpe6l of poverty, may in a fort dejire the virtue of temperance ; and though his prefenfc Will is to gratify his extravagant appetite, yet he may wi(h he had a heart to forbear future a6ls of in- temperance, and forfake his exceffes, through an un- wiilingnefs to part with his money : but fliil he goes on with his drunkennefs; his wifhes and endeavours are infufficient and inefFe61tual : fuch a man has no proper, dired, hncere willingnefs to forfake this vice, and the vicious deeds which belong to it : for he a6ls voluntarily in continuing to drink to excels : his defire is very improperly called a willingnefs to be temperate ; it is no true defire of that virtue ; for It is not that virtue, that terminates his wilhes ; nor 222 What Willinrrnefs and Part III. £>■ have they any dired rcfpea at all to it. It is only ihefaving his money, and avoiding poverty, that ter- minates andexhaufls the whole flrength of his defire. The virtue of temperance is regarded only very in- dire6lly and improperly, even as a necelTary means of gratifying the vice of covetoufnefs. So, a man of an exceeding corrupt and wicked heart, who has no love to God and Jefus Chrifl, but, on the contrary, being very profanely ?nd carnally inclined, has the greatefl diftafle of the things of re- ligion, and enmity againft them ; yet being of a fami- ly, that from one generation to another, have mod of them died, in youth, of an hereditary confumption ; and fo having little hope of living long ; and having been inflru6ted in the ncceffity of a fupreme love to Chrifb, and gratitude for his death and fufiPerings, in order to his falvation from eternal mifery ; if under thefe circumflances he fhould, through fear of eter- nal torments, wifh he had fuch a difpofition : but his profane and carnal heart remaining, he continues ftill in his habitual diflafte o/, and enmity to God and religion, and wholly without any exercife of that love and gratitude, (as doubtlefs the very devils themfelves, notwithftanding all the deyiliflmefs of their temper, would wilh for a holy heart, if by that means they could get out of hell :) in this cafe, there is no hncere Willingnefs to love Chrifl and choofe him as his chief good : thefe holy difpofitions and exercifes are not at all the dire6l obje6l of the Will : they truly fhare no part of the inclination or defire of the foul ; but all is terminated on deliverance from torment : and thefe grrxes and pious volitions, notwithftanding this forced confent, are looked upon undefirable; as when a fick man defires a dofe he greatly abhors, to fave his life. — From thefe things It appears, 3. That this indireft Willingnefs which has been Se6l. V. Sincerity is no excuje, 223 fpoken of, is not that exercife of the Will which the command requires ; but is entirely a difiPerent one ; being a volition of a diflferelit nature, and terminated altogether on different obje6ls ; wholly falling fhort of that virtue of Will, which the command has re- fpe6l to. 4. This other volition, which has only fome indi- rect concern with the duty required, cannot excufe for the want of that good will icfelf, which is com- manded ; being not the thing which anfwers and fulfils the command, and being wholly dcltitute of the virtue which the command feeks. Further to iiluflrate this matter. — If a child has a moft excellent father, that has ever treated him with fatherly kindnefs and tendernefs, and has eve- ry way, in the highefl degree, merited his iove and dutiful regard, being with all very wealthy ; but the fon is of fo vile a difpofition, that he inveterately hates his father; and yet, apprehending that his ha- tred of him is like to prove his ruin, by bringing him finally to poverty and abje6l circumftances, through his father's difinheritin;^ him, orotherwife; which is exceeding crofs to his avarice and ambi- tion ; he, therefore, wifhes it were otherwife : but yet remaining under the invincible power of his vile and malignant difpoGtion, he continues ftill in his fettled hatred of his father. Now, if fuch a fon's indirect wiilingnefs to have love and honor towards his father, at all acquits or excufes before God, for his failing of a6lually exercihng. thefe difpofitions towards him, which God requires, it mull be on one of thefe accounts. (1.) Either that it anfwers and fulfils the command. But this it does not by the fuppohtion ; becaufe the thing commanded is love and honor to his worthy parent. If the command be proper and juil, as is fuppofed, then it obliges to the thing commanded; and fo nothing elle but that 224 TA^^ Sincerity of Endeavours Part III, can anfwer the obligation. Or, (2.) It muft be at leaft, becaufe there is that virtue or goodnefs in his indireft willingnefs, that is equivalent to the virtue required ; and (o balances or countervails it, and makes up for the want of it. But that alfo is con- trary to the fuppofition. The willingnefs the fon has merely from a regard to money and honor, has no goodnefs in it, to countervail the want of the pi- ous filial refpe6l required. Sincerity and reality, in that indir£6l: willingnefs, which has been fpoken of, does not make it the bet- ter. That which is real and hearty is often called fincere ; whether it be in virtue or vice. Some perfons are fincerely bad ; others are {inctrtly good ; and others may be fincere and hearty in things, which are in their own nature indifferent ; as a man may be fincerely defirous of eating when he is hun- gry. But a being fincere, hearty and in good earn- ell, is no virtue, unlefs it be in a thing that is vir- tuous. A man may be fincere and hearty in join- ing a crew of pirates, or a gang of robbers. When the devils cried out, and befought Chrift not to tor- ment them, it was no mere pretence ; they were ve- ry hearty in their defires not to be tormented : but this did not make their Will or defires virtuous. — And if men have fincere defires, which are in their kind and nature no better, it can be no excufe for the want of any required virtue. And as a man's being fincere in fuch an indirc6fc defire or willingnefs to do his duty, as has been men- tioned, cannot excufe for the want of performance ; fo it is with Endeavours arifing from fuch a willing- nefs. The Endeavours can have no more goodnefs in them, than the Will which they are the effeft and expreffion of. And, therefore, however fincere and real, and however great a perfon's Endeavours are ; yea, though they Ihould be to the utmoll of his abil- Se6l. V. is no Excufe. 22 D ity ; unlefs the Will v/hich they proceed from be truly good and virtuous, they can be of no avail, influence or weight to any purpofe whatfoever, in a moral ienfe or refpedh That which is not truly virtuous, in God's fight, is looked upon, by lliin, as good for nothing: and fo can be of no value, weight or influence in his account, to recommend, fatisfy, excufe or make up for any moral dcfedl. For noth- ing can counter-balance evil, but good. If evil be in one icale, and we put a great deal into the other, fincere and earnell defires, and many and great En- deavours : yet, if there be no real goodnels in all, there is no weight in it; and fo it does nothing to- wards balancing the real weight, which is in the op- polite fcale. It is only like the fubtrading a thouf- and naughts from before a real number, which leaves the fum jull as it was. Indeed fuch Endeavours may have a negatively good Influence. Thofe things, which have no pofi- tive virtue have no poiitive moral influence; yet they may be an occafion of pcrlbns avoiding ibme poiilive evils. As if a man were in the water witli a neighbour, that he had ill-will to, v/ho could not fwim, holding him by his hand ; which neighbour was much in debt to him; and fliould be tempted to let him fnik and drown ; but fliould rcfule to comply with the temptation ; not from love to his neighbour, but from the love of mo- ney, and becaufe by his drowning he fhould lole his debt ; that w^hich he does in preferving his neighbour from drowning, is nothmg good in the light of God : yet hereby he avoids the greater guilt that would have been contra£led, if he had defign- edly let his neighbour fink and perifh. But when Arminians, in their difputes with CalviniftS, infifl: (o much on fincere defires and Endeavours, as what mull excufe nien, mxull be accepted of God, <^c, it ii G 2 2 26 Of Promlfes Part III. "V manifeft i\\t.y have refpe^l to fome pofitive moral weight or influence of thofe defircs and Endeavours. Accepting, juHifying or excufing on the account of fincere honefl Endeavours (as they are called) and men's doin;ent that is neceiTarily determined to act, is d plain contradiction. Ij'At thofe are a precarious fort of demonPcrations, which men build on the meaning that they arbitra- rily aiTix. to a word ; cfpecially whca that nieanini| L2 258 The Arminiaii Notion o/'A6llon, Part IV, is abdrufe, inconfiHent-, and entirely diverfe from the original fenfe of the word in confimon fpeech. That the meaning of the word A^ion, as Mr. Chubb and many others ufe it, is utterly unintelli- gible and inconlillent, is manifefl, becaufe it belongs to their notion of an A6lion, that it is Ibmething wherein is no palnon or paffivencfs ; that is (accord- ing to their fcnfe of pafliveners) it is under the pow- er, influence or a61ion of no caufe. And this im- plies, that A6lion has no caufe, and is no eiFe6l ; for to be an efFe6i implies pajfivenefs, or the being fubjetl: to the power and Adion of its caufe. And yet they hold, that the mind's Atlion is the eflFe^t of its own determination, yea, the mind's free and vol- untary determination ; which is the fame with free choice. So that A6lion is the eiFe6"t of fomething preceding, even a preceding a6l of choice : and con- fequentJy, in this efFe6l the mind is paffive, fubjedl: to the power and A6lion of the preceding caufe, which is the foregoing choice, and therefore cannot be adive. So that here we have this contradi61ion, that A6lion is always the etFed of foregoing choice ; • and therefore cannot be A6lion ; becaufe it is paf^ five to the power of that preceding caufal choice ; and the mind cannot be adive and paffive in the fame thing, at the fame time. Again, they fay, ne- cefficy is utterly inconfiflent with Adion, and a ne- cefiTary Adion is a contradi6iion ; and fo their no- tion of Adion implied contingence, and excludes all necefliiy. And therefore, their notion of Adion implies, thit it has no necelfaiy dependence or con- nexion with any thing foregoing ; for fuch a de- pendence or connexion excludes contingence, and impHes ncceffity. And yet their noiion of Adion implies neccffity, and fuppofes that it is ncceffary, and cannot be comingcnr. For they fnppofe, that whatever is properly called Atlion, mull be deter- Sc6l. II. faljc and incojifijIaiL 259 mined by the Will and free choice ; and this is as much as to fay, that it muft be neccffary, being dependent upon, and determined by fomething fore- going ; namely, a foregoing a6l of choice. Again, it belongs to their notion of Aftion, of that which is a proper and meie a6f, that it is the beginning of motion, or of exertion of power; but yet it is im- plied in their notion of A6iion, that it is not the beginning of motion or exertion of power, but is confequent and dependent on a preceding exertion of power, viz. the power of Will and choice : for they fay there is no proper A6lion but what is freely chofen ; or, which is the fame thing, deter- mined by a foregoing a6l of free choice. But if any of them fliall fee caufe to deny this, and fay they hold no fuch thing as that every Atlion is chof- en or determined by a foregoing choice; but that the very firft exertion of Will only, undetermined by any preceding atl, is properly called A6lion ; then 1 fay, fuch a man's notion of Adlion implies neceffity ; for what the niind is the fubje6i: of, v/ith- out the determination of its own previous choice, it is the fubjedl; of neceffarily, as to any hand, that free choice has in the affair, and, without any abili- ty, the mind has to prevent it, by any Will or elec- tion of its own ; becaufe by the fuppofition it pre- cludes all previous a6ls of the VVill or choice in the cale, which might prevent it. So that it is again, in this other way, implied in their notion of a6t, that it is both necelTary and not neceffary. Again, it belongs to their notion of an a^, that it is no ef- fect of a pre-determining bias or preponderation, but fprings immediately cut of indifference ; and this implies, (hat it cannot be from foregoing choice, which is foregoing preponderation : if it be not ha- bitual, but accafional, yet it it caufes the a6l, it is truly previous, efficacious and determining. And yet, at the fame time, it is effential to their notion 2 Go TJie Arminlan Notion of ACl'ion, Part IV. of the at^, that it is what the agent is the author of freely and voluntarily, and that is, by previous choice and defign. So that, according to their notion of f!ie aQ, con- fidered with regard to its confequence^, thefe fo!- ) owing things are all efl'ential to it, viz. That it Ihould be neceffary, and not neceffary ; that it fliould be from a caufe, and no caufe ; that it; fhould be the fruit of choice and defign, and not the fruit of choice and defign ; that it fiiould be the beginning of motion or exertion, and yet confequent on pre- vious exertion ; that it ihould be before it is ; that it fhould fpring immediately out of indilference and equilibrium, and yet be the eMeQ of prepondera- tiun ; that it (hoald be felf-originated, and alfo have its original from fomething elle ; that it is what the tnind caufes itfelf, of its own Will, and can produce or prevent, according to its choice or pleafure, and yet what the mmd has no power to prevent, preclud- ing all previous choice in the affair. ,So that an aft, according to their metaphyfical notion of it, is fomeihing of which there is no idea : -it is nothing but a confufion of the mind, excited hv words without any diQin6t meaning, and is an abfolute non-entity ; and that in two rcfpe6Ks : (i.) There is nothing jin the world that ever was, is, or ran be, to anfwer the things which mud belong to its defcription, according to what they fuppofe to be elfential to it. And (2.) There neither 13, nor ever wa5, nor can be, any notion or idea to anfwer the word, as they ufe and explain ir. For if we fliould fuppofe any fuch notion, it would many ways del- troy itfelf. But it is impoffible any idea or notion ihould fubfifl in the mind, whole very nature and elfence, which conflitutes it, dedroys it. If fome learned philofopher, who had been abroad, in giving an account of the curious obfcrvaiions he had made SeQ, II. Jdlfc end incciifjlcnt. 261 in his travels, fiiould fay, " He bad been in Terra *' del Fiiego, and there had feen an animal, which he *' calls by a certain name, that, begat and bronght. *' forth itfelf, and yet had a lire and dam diftinft ** from itl'elt ; that it had an appetite, and was hun- *' gry before it had a being ; that his mafler, who *' led him, and governed him at his pleafure, was ** always governed by him, and driven by him where *' he pleated ; that when he moved, he always took *' a flep before the firll flep ; that he went with his *• head firll, and yet always went tail foremoft ; and *' this, though he had neither head nor tail :" it would be no impudence at all, to tell fuch a travel- ler, though a learned man, that he himfelf had no notion or idea of fuch an animal, as he gave an ac- count of, and never had, nor ever would have. As the forementioned notion of A6Hon is very in- confiflent, fo it is wholly diverfe from the original meaning of the word. The more ufual hgnification of it, in vulgar fpeech, fcems to be fome motion, or exercife cj poxver, that is voluntary, or that is the effeH of the Will ; and is ufed in the fame fenfe as doing : and moll commonly it is ufed to fignify outward Ac- tions. So thinking is often diftinguifhed from a^ing ; and defuring and willing, from doing. ]^Qiidts this more ufual and proper fignification of the word ABion, there are other ways in which the word is ufed, that are lefs proper, which yet have place in common fpeech. Oftentimes it is ufed to fjgnify fome motion or alteration in inanimate things, with relation to fome obje6l and eflFe6l. So the Ipring of a watch is faid to a& upon the chain and wheels ; the fun beams, to a£l upon plants and trees ; and the fire, to a6l upon wood. Sometimes the word is ufed to fignify motions, alterations, and ex- ertion of power, which are feen in corporeal things, conjidered abfolutely ; efpecially when thefe motions 262 The Arminlan Notion of A6lion, Part IV. feem to arife from Um\c internal caufe which is JiicU den ; fo that they have a greater rcfemblance of thofe inotions of our bodies, which are the efFeds of natur- al volition, or invifiblc exertions of Will. So the fermentation of liquor, the operations of the load- llone, and of ele6trical bodies, are called the Aclicn of thefe things. And {ometirnes the word ABion is ufed to fignify the exercife of thought, or of Will and inclination : fo meditating, loving, haling, in- clining, difmclining, choeiing and refoling, may be fometimes called acting : though more rarely (un- lefs it be by philofophers and metaphyficians) than in any of the other fenfes. But the word is never ufed in vulgar fpeech in that fenfe which Arminian divines ufe it in. name- ly, for the felf-determinate exercife of the Will, or an exertion of the foul that ariles without any necef- fary connexion, with any thing foregoing. If a man does fomething voluntarily, or as the efFe£l of his choice, then in the mod proper fenfe, and as the word is mofi: originally and comm.only ufed, he is faid to acl : but whether that choice or volition be "felf.determined, or no, whether it be conne£led with fore^oinrr habitual bias, whether it be the certain ef- fe6l of the flrongeil mo(ive, or fome intrinfic caufe, never comes into confideration in the meaning of the word. And if the word ABion is arbitrarily ufed by fome men otherwife, to fuit fome fcheme'of metaphyfic or morality, no argument can reafonably be founded on fuch a ufe of this term, to prove any thing but their own pleafure. For divines and philofophers flrenuoufly to urge fuch arguments, as though they were fuihcient to fupport and dcmonftrate a whole fcheme of moral philolophy and divinity, is certainly to ereft a mighty edifice on the fand, or rather on a ihadow. And though it may nou' perhaps, through Sc6l. IT. falft and inconfiJlenL 263 cuftom, have become natural for tliem to ufe the word in this fenfe (if that may be called a fenfe or meaning, which is inconfiftent with itfelf) yet this does not prove, that it is agreeable to the natural notions men have of things, or that there can beany thing in the creation that Ihould anfwer fuch a mean- ing. And though they appeal to experience, yet the truth is, that men are fo far from experiencing any fuch thing, that it is impo(fibIe for them to have any conception of it. If it fhould be objeQcd, that ABion and Paffioii are doubtlefs words of a contrary fignitjcation ; but to fuppofe that the agent, in its Action, is under the power and influence of fomething intrinfic, is to confound Adion and paffion, and make them the fame thing. 1 an fiver, that A6lion and pafTion are doubtlefs', as they are fometimes ufed. words of oppofite fignifica- tion ; but not as fignifying ory^o^ilc. exiflences, but only oppofite relalions. The words ccdijc and eJfeB, are terms of oppofite figniiication ; but, nevcrthelefs, if I aifett, that the fame thing may, at the fame time, in different refpeds and relations, be both caufi and effeFi^ this will not prove that I confound the terms. The foul may be both aBive and pajfroe in the fame thing in different refpe6ls ; active with relation toons thing, and pajfive with reladon to ano;her. The word pajfion, when fct in oppofition to Aclion, or rather ABivenefs, is merely a relative; it fignifies no effeft or caufe. nor any proper exiftcnce; but is the fame with pajfivcnefs^ or a being pa (live, or a being aded upon by fome thing. Wluch is a mere rela- tion of a thing to fome power or force exerted hy iome caufe, producing fome efFccl in it, or upon it. And AUion, when fct properly in oppofition to paf^ fioriy or pa ffivtnefs, is no real exiflence ; it is not the iame wiih AN A5iivn, but is a mere relation : it is 264 How this Arminian Notion Part IV. the aclivenefs of forcething on another thing, being the oppofire relation to the otlier, viz, a relation of power, or force, exerted by lorne caufe, towards another ihing, which is the fubjed of the efFe6l of ihat power. Indeed, the word A6lion is frequently ufed to iignify iomething not merely relative, hue more abjolute, and a real exiRence ; as when we fay an Action ; when the word is not ufed tranGtively, but abfolutely, for fome motion or exercife of body or mind, without any relation to any obje6^ or elFect : and as ufed thus, it is not properly the oppofite of pajfion ; which ordinarily fignifies nothing abfolute, but merely the relation of being acted upon. And therefore, if the word Aciion be uled in the like rela- tive fenfe, then A6lion and pafTion are only two con- trary relations. And it is no abfurdity to fuppofe, that contrary relations may belong to the fame thing, at the fame time, with refpe6l to dilTerent things. So to (uppofe, that there are ads of the foul by which a man voluntarily moves, and a£ls upon ob- je6ls. and produces effc^ds, which yet themfelves are effe6ls of fomething elfe, and wherein the foul itfelf is the object of fomething ading upon, and influ- encing that, do not at all confound A61ion and paf- lion. The words may neverthelefs be properly of oppofite fignification : there may be as true and real a difl'orence between adm^ and being cavjed to act, though we fhould fuppofe the foul to be both in the iame volition, as there is between living and being quickened, or made to live. It is no more a contradic- tion to fuppofe that Adion may be the efFe6l of iome other caufe, befidcs the agent, or being that a6ls, than to fuppofe, that life may be the cfFe«5i: ot lomc other caufe, befidcs the liver, or the being that lives, in whom life is caufed to be. The thing which has led men into this inconfifl- cn: no:ion of Adion, when applied to volition, as Sc^. II. probably amfc, 265 though it were efTential to this internal A£lion, that the agent fhould be felf-determined in it, and that the Will fhould be the caufe of it, was probably this ; that according to the fenfe of mankind; and the com- mon ufe of language, it is lo with relpefl to men's external actions ^ which are what originally, and ac- cording to the vulgar ufe and moft proper fenfe of the word, called Anions. Men in thefe are felf- direded, felf-determined, and their Wills are the caufe of the motions of their bodies, and the exter- nal things that are done ; fo that unlefs men do them voluntarily, and of choice, and the Adion be determined by their antecedent volition, it is no Ac- tion or doing of theirs. Hence fome metaphyfi- cians have been led unwarily, but exceeding abfurdly, to fuppofe the fame concerning volition itfelf, that that alfo mufl be determined by the Will ; which is to be determined by antecedent volition, as the mo- tion of the body is ; not confidering the contradic- tion it implies. But it is very evident, that in the mctaphyfical dif- tin6lion between A6lion and pallion, (chough long fince become common and the general vogue) due care has not been taken to conform language to ths nature of things, or to any diilin6t clear ideas. As it is in innumerable otlier philofophical, metaphif- ical terms, ufed in thefe difputes ; which has occa- fioned inexprefiible difficulty, contention, error and confufion. And thus probably it came to be thought, that neceflTity was inconfiftent with A6tion, as thefe terms are applied to volition. Firft, thefe terms ABion and NeceJJity^ are changed from their original mean- ing, as lignifying external voluntary AQion and couflraint, (in which meaning they are evidently in- confillent) to fignify quite other things, viz. volitioa itfelf, and certainty of exiitence. And when the M2 2 66 Why Calvlnifm is fappojed Part IV. change of fignification is made, care is not taken to make proper allowances and abatements for the dif- ference of fenfe ; but (lill the fame things are unwa- rily attributed to ABion and Ntcejfit)\ in the new- meaning of the woids, which plainly belonged to them in their hrft fcrife ; and on this ground, max- ims are ellabliQied without any real foundation, as though they were the moft certain truths, and the moli evident dictates cf reafon. But however ftrenuouily it is maintained, that what is necelTary cannot be properly called A6lion, and that a neceiiary Attion is a contradiQion, yet it is probable there are i&w Arminian divines^ who, if thoroughly tried, would ftand to thefe principles. They will allow, that, God is, in the higheft fenfe, an adive Being, and the higheft Fountain of Life and A6lion ; and they would not probably deny, that thole, that arc called God's acls of righteoufnefs, holincts and faithfulncfs, are truly and properly God's aBs, and God is really a holy*^^^?2^ in them ; and yet, I trufl:, they will not deny, that God necef- farily a6ls juftly and faithfully, and that it is impof- dble for Him to a6i unrighteoufly and uhholily. E c T I o N III. The Reafons ivhy fvne think it contrary to common Scnie, to fuppofe thofe Things which arc neceHsivy, to be worthy of either Praile or Blame. It is abundantly affirmed and urged by Arminian writers, that it is contrary to common Senfe, and the natural notions and apprcnhenlions of mankind, to fuppofe oiherwifc than that neceffity (making no dif- tinftion between natural and moral neccifuy) is in- Seel. III. contrary to common Senfe. 267 confiftent with Virtue and Vice, Praife and Blame, Reward and Punifliment. And their arguments from hence have been greatly triumphed in ; and have been not a little perplexing to many, who have been friendly to the truth, as clearly revealed in the holy Scriptures : it has feemed to them indeed dif- ficult, to reconcile Calviniflic doQrines with the no- tions men commonly have of juftice and equity. And the true reafons of it ieem to be thefe that fol- low. I. It is indeed a very plain dilate of common Senfe, that natural neceflity is wholly inconfiflent with juft Praife or Blame. If men do things which in themfelves are very good, fit to be brought to pafs, and very happy effetls, properly again fl their Wills, and cannot help it ; oj do them fr.)m a ueceflity that; is without their Wills, or with which their Wills have no concern or connexion ; then it is a plain diftate of common Senfe, that i,t is none of their vir- tue, nor any moral good in them ; and that they are not worthy to be rewarded or praifed ; or at ail ef- teemed, honored or loved on that account. And, on the othfer hand, that if, from like neceflity, they do thofe things which in themfelves are very unhap- py and pernicious, and do them becaufe they can- not help it ; the neceffity is fuch, that it is all one whether they Will them, or no; and the reafon why they are done, is from neceflity only, and not from their Wills ; it is a very plain dictate of common Senfe, that they are not at all to blame; there is no vice, fault, or moral evil at all in the effed done ; nor are they, who are thus ncceffitated, in any wife v/orthy to be punifhed, hated, or in the lead difre- fpe6led, on that account. In like manner, if things, in themfelves good and defirable, are abfolutely impoffibie, with a natural impoffibility, the univerlal reafon of mankind teaches. 268 Why Calvinifm isfuppofed Part IV. that this wholly and ptrfcBly excufes perfons in their not doing them. And it is aUo a plain dictate of common Senfe, that if the doing things, in themfelves good, or avoid- ing things, in themfelves evil, is not abfolutcly impofm fible, with fuch a natural impoffibility, but vQxy dif" Jieult, with a natural difficulty ; that is, a difficulty prior to, and not at all confiding in Will and incli- nation itfelf, and which would remain the fame, let the inclination be what it will ; then a peifon's neg- lecl or omiffinn is excufed infome meafure^ though not wholly ; his (in is lefs aggravated, than if the thing to be done were eafy. And if inflead of difficulty and hinderance, there be a contrary natural propenfi- ty in '^he ftate of things, to the thing to be done, or the efFe61; to be brought to pafs, abflrafted from any confideration of the inclination of the heart ; though thepropenlity be not fo great as to amount to a natur- al neceffity ; yet being forae approach to it, fo that the doing the good thing be very much from this natural tendency in the Hate of things, and but little from a good inclination ; then it is a di6late of com- mon Senfe, that there is fo much the lefs virtue in what is done ; and fo it is lefs praife- worthy and re- wardable. The reafon is eafy, viz. beca'ufe fuch a natural propenfity or tendency is an approach to natural neceffity ; and the greater the propenfity, ftill fo much the nearer is the approach to neceffity. And, therefore, as natural neceffity takes away or fhuts out all virtue, fo this propenfity approaches to an abolition of virtue ; that is, it diminijhes it. And, on the other hand, natural difficulty, m the (late of things, is an approach to natural impoffibility. And as the latter, when it is complete and abfolute, whol- ly takes away Blame ; fo fuch difficulty takes away fomc Blame, or diminiffies Blame; and makes thq thing dope to be lefs worthy of piinifhment. ScS. III. contrary to common Senfe. 269 II. Men, in their fiift ufe of fuch phrafes as thefe, mujl, cant, cant help it, cant avoid it, necejfary, unable, impojfible, unavoidable, irrcfijlahle. Sec, u(e them to lignify a necefifity of conftraint or reftraint, a natur- al neceflity or impofTibility ; or fome neceffity that the Will has nothing to do in ; which may be, whe- ther men will or no ; and which may be fuppofed to be juft the fame, let men's inclinations and de- fires be what they will. Such kind of terms in their original ufe, I fuppofe, among all nations, are rela- tive ; carrying in their fignification (as was before obferved) a reference or rerpe61; to fome contrary- Will, defire or endeavour, which, it is fuppofed, is, or may be, in the cafe. All men find, and begin to find in early childhood, that there are innumera- ble things that cannot be done, which they defire to do ; and innumerable things which they are averfe to, that mud be, they cannot avoid them, they will be, whether they choofe them or no. It is to ex- prefs this neceflity, which men fo foon and fo often find, and which fo greatly and early afFe6ts them in innumerable cafes, that fuch terms and phrafes are firft formed ; and it is to fignify iuch a neceflity, that they are firfl; ufed, and that they are moft con- Itantly ufed, in the common affairs of life ; and not to fignify any fuch metaphyfical, fpeculative and abflra6t notion, as that connexion in the nature or courfe of things, which is between the fubjeit and predicate of a propofition, and which is the foun- dation of the certain truth of that propofition ; to fignify which, they who employ themfelves in phi- lofophical inquiries into the firfl origin and meta- phyfical relations and dependencies of things, have borrowed thefe terms, for want of others. But we grow up from our cradles in a ufe of fuch terms and phrafes entirely dilferent from this, and carry- ing 9 fenfe exceeding diverfe from that, in which 270 Why Calvinifin isfappofed ?art IV. they are commonly ufed'in the controverfy between Arminians and Calvinijls. And it being, as was faid- before, a diftate of the univerfal fenfe of mankind, evident to us as foon as we begin to think, that the neceflity fignified by thefe terms, in the fenfe in which we firfl learn them, does excufe perfons and free them from all Fault or Blame ; hence our ideas of excufablenefs or faultinefs is tied to thefe terms and phrafes by a ftrong habit, which is begun in childhood, as foon as we begin to fpeak, and grows up with us, and is ftrengthened by conftant ufe and cuftom. the connexion growing ftronger and'ftrongcr. The habitual connexion, which is in men's minds between Blameleifnefs and thofc forementioned terms, mvjl, cannot, unable, ncccjfary, impQjfihle, unavoidable. See, becomes very flrong ; becaufe, as foon as ever men begin to ufe reafon and fpeech, they have oc- cafion to excufe themfeives, from the natural necef- lity fignified by thefe terms, in numerous inflances. — / cant do it — / could not help it. — And all man- kind have conftant and daily occafion to ufe fuch phrafes in this fenfe, to excufe themfeives and olh- ers, in almofl all the concerns of i'ife, with rcfpe6l to difcippointments, and things that happen, which concern and aflFedl ourfclves and others, that are hurtful, or difagreeable to us or them, or things defir- able, that we or others fail of. That a being accuflomed to an union of diflPerent ideas, from early childhood, makes the habitual con- nexion exceeding ftrong, as though fuch connexion were owing to nature, is manifeft in innumerable in- ftances. It is altogether by fuch an habitual con- nexion of ide':*s, that men judge of the bignefs or diftmce of the objefts of fight, from their appear- ance. Thus it is owing to luch a connexion early eftabliftied, and growing up with a pcrfon, that he judges a mountain, which he fees at ten miles dif- Seft. III. cow/r^r); /o common Senfe. 271 tance, to be bigger than his nofe, or further oft than the end of it. Having been uied fo long to join ^ conliderable dillance and magnitude with fuch an appearance, men imagine it is by a didate of natur- al lenfe : whereas, it would be quite otherwife with one that had his eyes newly opened, who had been born blind : he would have the fame vifible ap- pearance, but natural fenfe would di6late no fuch thing, concerning the magnitude or didance of whac appeared. III. When men, after they had been fo habitu- ated to conne6l ideas of Innocency or BlameleiTnefs with fuch terms, that the union feems to be the ef- fe6l of mere nature, come to hear the fame terms ufed, and learn to ufe them themfelves in the fore- mentioned new and metaphyfical fenfe, to fignify quite another fort of necellity, which has no luch kind of relation to -a contrary fuppofable Will and endeavour ; the notion of plain and manifeft Blame- leiTnefs, by this means, is, by a ftrong prejudice, in- fenfibly and unwarily transferred to a cafe to which it by no means belongs : the change of the ufe of the terms, to a fignification which is very diverie, not being taken notice of, or adverted to. And there are feveral reafons, why it is not. j. The terms, as ufed by philofophers, are not very dillincl and clear in their meaning : few ufe them in a fixed determined fenfe. On the contrary, their meaning is very vague and confufed. Which is what commonly happens to the words ufed to (ig- nify things intclleclual and moral, and to exprefs what Mr. Locke calls mix( modes. If men had a clear and dillinQ underftanding of what is intended by thefe metaphyhcal terms, they would be able more eafily to compare them with their original and com- mon Scnfe ; and fo would not be fo eafily led into delufion by no fort of terms in the world, as by words of this iort. 2J2 Why Calvinifrn isjuppofed Part IV. 2. The change of the fignification of the terms is the more infenfible, becaufe the things fignified, though indeed very different, yet do in fome generals agree. In neceffity^ that which is vulgarly fo called, there is a flrono connexion between the thins faid to be neceffary, and fomething antecedent to it, in the order of nature ; fo there is alfo in philofophical ne^ cejfity. And though in both kinds of neceffity, the connexion cannot be called by that name, with rela- tion to an oppofite Will or endeavour, to which it is fuperior ; which is the cafe in vulgar neceffity ; yet in both, the connexion is prior to Will and endea- vour, and fo, in fome rerpe6i:, fuperior. In both kinds of neceffity, there is a foundation for fome cer- tainty of the propofition, that affirms the event. The terms ufed being the fame, and the things fignified agreeing in thefe and fome other general circum- ftances, and the expreffions as ufed by philofophers being not well defined, and fo of obfcure and loofe fignihcation ; hence perfons are not aware of the great difference ; had the notions of innocence or fauhinefs, which were fo flrongly affociated with .them, and were ftri6ily united in their minds, ever fince they can remember, remain united with them ftill, as if the union were altogether natural and neceffary ; and they that go about to make a fepa- ration, feem to them to do great violence even to nature itfelf. IV. Another reafon why it appears difficult to reconcile it with reafon, that men ffiould be blamed for that which is neceffary with a moral neceffity (which, as was obferved before, is a fpecies of phi- lofophical neceffity) is, that for want of due coniid- eration, men inwardly entertain that apprehenfion, that this neceffity may be againfl men's W^ills and fincere endeavours. They go away with that notion, that men may truly will, and wifh and ftrive that it Se6l» 111. contrary to Commoti Senfe. 27J may be otherwife, but that invincible neceflity (lands in the way; And many think thus concerning them- (clves : fome, that are wicked men, think they \vi(h, that they were good, that they loved God and holi- nefs ; but yet do not find that their wifhes produce the efFed.— The reafons why men think, are as fol- low : (1.) They find what may be called an indirect willingnefs to have a better Will, in the manner be- fore obferved. For it is impofTible, and a contradic- tion to fuppofe the Will to be diredly and properly againfl itfelf. And they do not confider, that this indire6t willingnels is entirely a different thing from properly willing the thing that is the duty and virtue required ] and that there is no virtue in that fort of willingnefs which ihey have. They do not confider, that the volitions, which a wicked man may have that he loved God, are no a61s of the Will at all againd the moral evil of not loving God ; but only fome difagreeable confequenccs. But the making the requifire diftindion requires more care of reflec- tion and thought, than moll men are ufedto. And men, through a prejudice in their own favour, are difpofcd to think well of their own defires and dif- pofitions, and to account them good and virtuous, though their refpeQ to virtue be only indireEl and remote, and it is nothing at all that is virtuous that: truly excites or terminates their inclinations. (2.) Another thing, that infenfibly leads and beguiles men into a luppofilion that this moral neceflity or impoffibility is, or may be, againfl: men's Wills and true endeavours, is the derivation arid formation of the terms themfelves, that are often ufed to expref^ it, which is fuch as feems diredly to point to, and holds this forth. Such words, for inflance, as una^ hie, unavoidable, impo[fihle, irrefijlihle ; which carry a plain reference to a luppofable power exerted, en- deavours ufed, refinance made, in oppofition to the Na 274 Why Cnhlni^m is fuppo/ed J &c. Part IV. neceffity : and the perfons that hear them, not con- fidering nor fufpcQing but that they are ufed in their proper fenfe : that fenfe being therefore underftood, there does naturally, and as it were neceffarily, arife in their minds a iuppofition, that it may be fo in- deed, that true defires and endeavours may take place, but that invincible neceffity (lands in the way, and renders them vain and to no efFe6l. V. Another thing, which makes perfons more ready to fuppofe it to be contrary to reafon, that men ftiould be expofed to the punifhments threat- ened to fin, for doing thofe things which are moral- ly necelFary, or not doing thofe things morally im- poflible, is, that imagination (Irengthens the argu- ment, and adds greatly to the power and influence of the Teeming reafons againft it, from the greatnefs of that puniihment. To allow that they may be juftly expofed to a fmall punifhment, would not be ib difficult. Whereas, if there were any good rea- fon in the cafe, if it were truly a diftate of reafon, that fuch neceffity was inconfiflent with faultinefs, or juft puniffiment, the demonftration would be equally certain with refpedl to a fmall puniihment, or any puniffiment at all, as a very great one : but it is not equally eafy to the imagination. They that argue againft the juftice of damning men for thofe things that are thus neceilary, feem to make their ar- gument the ftronger, by fetiing forth the greatnefs of the puniffiment in ilrong expreffions : — That a man Jliould be caji into eternal burnings^ that hejhould be made to fry in hell to all eternity for thofe things which he had no power to avoids and was under a fatal , unfruf irahle, invincible necefjity of doing. St^. IV. Necejfary Virliie, Slc. 275 Section IV. Jt is agreeable to common Senfe, and the natural No- tions of Mankind, to fuppoje moral Ncceffity to be confijlent with Praife and Blame^ Ravard and Pun- ijhment. Whether the reafons that have been given, why it appears difficult to Tome peiTons, to reconcile with common Senfe the praifing or blaming, rewarding or punifhing thofe things which are morally necef- fary, are thought fatisfa6lory or not ; yet it moft evidently appears, by the following things, that if this matter be rightly underftood, fetting alide all delufion arifing from the impropriety and ambigui- ty of terms, this is not at all inconfiftent with the natural apprchenfions of mankind, and that fenfe of things which is found every where in the com- mon people ; who are furtheft from having their thoughts perverted from their natural channel, by metaphyfical and philofophical fubtilties ; but, on the contrary, altogether agreeable to, and the very voice and di£tate of, this natural and vulgar Senfe. I. This will appear, if we confider what the vul- gar Notion of hlame-worthinefs is. The idea which the common people, through all ages and nations, have of faultinefs, I fuppofe to be plainly this ; a perfon's being or doing wrong, with his own will and fleafure ; containing thefe two things : 1. His doing wrong ^ when he does as he pkafes. 2. His pleafures be- ing wrong. Or, in other words, perhaps more in- telligibly expreffing their Notion ; a perfons having his heart wrong, and doing wrong from his heart. And this is the fum total of the matter. The common people do not afcend up in their reflexions and abftraftions to the metaphyfical 276 Nccfjfary Virtue, Sec, Part IV. fources, relations and dependencies of things, in or- der to form their Notion of faultinefs or blame- wor^ thinefs. They do not wait till they have decided by their refinings, what firft determines the Will ; whether it be determined by fomething extrinfic, or intrinfic ; whether volition determines volition, or whether the underilanding determines the Will ; whether there be any fuch thing as inetaphyficians mean by contingence (if they have any meaning ;) whether there be a fort of a ftrange unaccountable fovereignty in the Will, in the exercife of which, by its own fovereign a6ts, it brings to pafs all its own fovereign a6ts. They do not take any part of their Notion of fault or blame from the refolution of any fuch queflions. If this were the cafe, there are mul- titudes, yea, the far greater part of mankind, nine hundred and ninety-nine out of a thoufand, would live and die, without having any fuch Notion, as that of fault, ever entering into their heads, or with- out fo much as one having any conception that any body was to be either blamed or commended for any thing. To be fure, it would be a long time be- fore men came to have fuch Notions. Whereas it is manifcft, they are fome of the firfl; Notions that appear iu children ; who difcover, as foon as they can think, or fpeak, or ad at all as rational crea- tures, a fcnfe of defert. And, certainly, in forming their Notion of it, they make no ufe of metaphyfics. AH the ground they go upon, confifts in thefe two things ; experience, and a natural fcnfatioii of a certain fitnefs or agreeablenefs, which there is in uniting fuch moral evil as is above defcribed, viz. a being or ^oing wrong xvith the Will, and refentment in others, and pain infli6ted on the perfon in vv^hom this mor- al evil is. Which natural Senje is what we call by ^he name of confcience. \t is true, the common people and children, in Se6l. IV. agrecdhk to common Senfe 277 their Notion of any faulty a6l or deed, of any per- fon, do fuppofc that it is the perlbn's own acl and deed. But this is all that belongs to what they un- derftand by a thing's being a perfon's own deed or aclion ; even that it is Ibmcthing done by him of choice. That fome exercife or motion fliould be- gin of itfelf, does not belong to their No*tion of an aclion, or doing. If fo, it would belong to their No- tion of it, that it is fomething, which is the caufe of its own beginning : and that is as much as to fay, that it is before it begins to be. Nor is their No- lion of an adion ibme motion or exercife, that be- gins accidentally, without any caufe or reafon ; for that is contrary to one of the prime didlates of common Senfe, namely, that every thing that begins to be, has fome caufe or reafon why it is. The common people, in their Notion of a faulty or praife-worthy deed or work done by any one, do fuppofe, that the man does it in the exercife of liberty. But then their Notion of liberty is only a perfon's having opportunity of doing as he pleafes. They have no Notion of liberty confiding in the Will's firfl: ading, and fo caufing its own a6ls ; and deter- mining, and fo caufing its own determinations ; or choofing, and fo caufing its own choice. Such a Notion of liberty is what none have, but thofe that h^ve darkened their own minds with confufed met- aphyfical fpeculation, and abftrufe and ambiguous terms. If a man is not reftrained from a6ling as his Will determines, or conftrained to a6l other- wife : then he has liberty, according to common Notions of liberty, without taking into the ide;\ that grand contradidion of all, the determinations of a man's free Will being the efFeds of the determina- tions of his free Will. — Nor have men commonly any Notion of freedom confifting in indifference. For if (o, then it would be agreeable tp their No^ 278 Neceffary Virtue, Sec, Part IV. tion, that the greater indifference men a6l with, the more freedom they ad with ; whereas, the re- verfe is true. He that in a6ling, proceeds with the fulleft inclination, does what he does with the great- ell freedom, according to common Senfe. And To far is it from being agreeable to common Senfe, that fuch liberty as conGfts in indifference is requi- fite to praife or blame, that on the contrary, the dic- tate of every man's natural fenfe through the world is, that the further he is from being indifferent in his a6ling good or evil, and the more he does either with full and ftrong inclination, the mure is he efteemed or abhorred, commended or condemned. II. If it were inconfiilent with the common Senfe of mankind, that men (hould be either to be blamed or commended in any volitions, they have, or fail of, in cafe of moral neceffity or impoffibility ; then it would furely alfo be agreeable to the fame Senf« and reafon of Mankind, that the nearer the cafe ap- proaches to fuch a moral neceffity or impoffibility, either through a ftrong antecedent moral propenfity, on the one hand,* or a great antecedent oppofition and difficulty on the other, the nearer does it ap- proach to a being neither blameable nor commend- able ; fo that a6ls exerted with fuch preceding pro- penfity, would be worthy of proportionably lefs praife; and when omitted, the a6l being attended with fuch difficulty, the omiffion would be worthy of the lefs blame. It is fo, as was obferved before, with natural neceffity and impoffibility, propenfity and difficulty : as it is a plain diftate of the fenfe of all Mankind, that natural neceffity and impoffibili- ty take away fl// blame and praife; and therefore, that the nearer the approach is to thefe, through * It is here argued, on fuppofiiion that not all propenHty hnplies moral neceffity, but only fome very high degree ; wbich none will deny. SeQ. IV. agreeahk to common Senfe. 279 previous propenfity or difficulty, fo praife and blame are proportionably diminijhcd. And if it were as much a di6late of common Senfe, that moral necefli- ty of doing, or impjflibility of avoiding, takes away all praife and blame, as that natural necedity or irn- poffibility does this ; then, by a perfe6l parity of reafon, it would be as much the di£late of common Senfe, that an approach to moral necelfity of doing, or impoflibility of avoiding, diminijiies praife and blame, as that an approach to natural neceffity and impoffibility does fo. It is equally the voice of common Senfe, that perfons are exciijable in part, in neglefting things difficult againlt their Wills, as that they are excufahle wholly in negleQing things impoffi- ble againft their Wills. And if it made no differ- ence whether the impoffibility were natural and a- gainfl: the Will, or moral, lying in the Will, with regard to excufablenefs ; fo neither would it make any difference, whether the difficulty, or approach to neceffity be natural againft the Will, or moral, lying in the propenfity of the Will. But it is apparent, that the reverfe of thefe things is true. If there be an approach to a moral necef- fity in a man's exertion of good a6ls of Will, they being the exercife of a ftrong propenfity to good, and a very powerful love to virtue ; it is fo far from being the di6late of common Senfe, that he is lefs virtuous, and the lefs to be efteemed, loved and praifed; that it is agreeable to the natural Notions of all mankind, that he is fo much the better man, worthy of greater refpeft, and higher commendation. And the ftronger the inclination is, and the nearer it approaches to neceffity in that refpetl; ; or to im- poffibility of negle6ling the virtuous a6l, or of doing a vicious one ; (fill the more virtuous, and worthy of higher commendation. And, on the other hand, if af man exerts evil a6ls of mind; as, for inftance, 28o Neceffary Virtue, &c. Part IV. a6ls of pride or malice from a rooted and ftrong hab- it, or principle of haughtinefs and malicioufnefs, and a violent propenfity of heart to fuch a6ls ; accord- ing to the natural fenfe of men, he is fo far from being the lefs hateful and blameable on that account, that he is fo much the more worthy to he detelled and condemned, by all that obferve him. Moreover, it is manifefl that it is no part of the Notion, which mankind commonly have of a blame- able or praife-worthy a6t of the Will, that it is an a6l which is not determined by an antecedent bias or motive, but by the fovereign power of the Will it- felf ; becaufe, if fo, the greater hand fuch caufes have in determining any ads of the Will, fo much the lefs virtuous or vicious would they be account- ed; and the lefs hand, the more virtuous or vicious. Whereas, the reverfe is true: men do not think a good a6l to be the lefs praife-worthy, for the agent's being much determined in it by a good inclination or a good motive, but the more. And if good in- clination or motive, has but little influence in de- termining the agent, they do not think his a6t fo much the more virtuous, but the lefs. And fo con- cerning evil a6ls, which are determined by evil mo- tives or inclinations. Yea, if it be fuppoled that good or evil difpoli- tions are implanted in the hearts of men, by nature itfelf, (which, it is certain, is vulgarly fuppofed iu innumerable cafes) yet it is not commonly fuppofed, that men are worthy of no praife or difpraife for fuch difpofitions ; although what is natural, is un- doubtedly ncccflary, nature being prior to all a6ls of the Will whatfoevcr. Thus, for inftance, if a man appears to be of a very haughty or malicious difpofition, and is fuppofed to be fo by his natural temper, it is no vulgar Notion, no didate of the common Senfe and apprehcnfion of men, that fuch Se£l. IV. ^^ra^^/^ ^0 common Senfe. 281 difpofitions are no vices or moral evils, or that fuch perfons are not worthy of difeftecm, or odium and difhonour ; or that the proud or malicious ads which flow from fuch natural difpofitions, are wor- thy of no refentment. Yea, fuch vile natural dif- poiitions, and the (Irength of them, will commonly be mentioned rather as an aggravation of the wick- ed a6ls, that come from fuch a fountain, than an ex- tenuation of them. Its being natural for men to a6l thus, is often obferved by men in the height of their indignation : they will fay, '' It is his very '•' nature : he is of a vile natural temper ; it is as •^ natural to him to a6l fo, as it is to breathe ; he *' cannot help ferving the devil; &c/' But it is not thus with regard to hurtful mifchievous things, that any are the fubjeds or occafions of, by natural necef- fity, againfl their inclinations. In fuch a cafe, the neceflity, by the common voice of mankind, will be fpokenof as a full excufe. — Thus it is very plain, that common Senfe makes a vafl difference between thefe two kinds of neceffity, as to the judgment it makes of their influence on the moral quality and defert of men's a6lions. And thefe di6lates of men's minds ^x.t fo natural and necefl'ary, that it may be very much doubted whether the Arminians themfeives have ever got rid of them ; yea, their greatefl: dodors, that have gone furtheft in defence of their metaphyfical Notions of liberty, and have brought their arguments to their greatefl ftrength, and, as they fappofe, to a demon- ftration, againll the confidence of virtue and vice with any neceffity : it is to be queflioned, whether there is fo much as one of them, but that, if he fuf- fered very much from the injurious acls of a man, under the power of an invincible' haughtinefs and malignancy of temper, would not, fiom the fore- mentioned natural fenfe of mind, refent it far othcr- O 2 282 Calvinifm confijlent Part IV. wife, than if as great fufFcrings came upon him from the wind that blows, and fire that burns by natural necelfity ; and otherwife than he would, if he fuf- fered as much from the condu6t of a man perfectly delirious ; yea, though he firll brought his diftrac- tion upon him fome way by his own fault. Some feem to difdain the di(lin£tion that we make between natural and moral necejjity, as though it were altogether impertinent in this controverfy : *' that " which is necefiary (fay they) is neceifary ; it is ** that which mud be, and cannot be prevented. And " that which is impcflible, is impodible, and cannot *' be done : and, therefore, none can be to blame for *• not doing it." And fuch comparifons are made nfe of, as the commanding of a man to walk, who has loft his legs, and condemning and puniftiing him for not obeying ; inviting and calling upon a man, who is fhut up in a ftrong prifon, to come forth, ^c. But, in thefe things, Arminians are very unreafona- ble. Let common Senfe determine whether there be not a great difference between thofe two cafes ; the one, that of a man who has offended his Prince, and is caft into prifon ; and after he has lain there a while, the King comes to him, calls him to come forth to him, and tells him, that if he will do fo, and Vvill fall down before him and humbly beg his par- don, he ftiall be forgiven, and fet at liberty, and alfo be greatly enriched, and advanced to honour : the prifoner heartily repents of the folly and wickednefs of his efrence againft his Prince, is thoroughly dif- pofcd to abafe himfelf, and accept of the King's of- fer; but is confined by ftrong walls, with gates of brafs, and bars of iron. The other cafe is, that of a man who is of a very unreafonable fpirit, of a haugh- ty, ungrateful, wilful difpofition; and, moreover, has been brought up in traitorous principles ; and has his heart poftefTed with an extreme and inveterate Se6l. IV, ^iih common Scnfc. 283 enmity to his lawful fovereign ; and for his rebellion is caft into prifon, and lies long there, loaden with heavy chains, and in miferable circumflances. At length the compaffionate Prince romcs to the prif- on, orders his chains to be knocked off, and his prif- on-doors to be fct wide open ; calls to him, and tells him, if he would come forth to him, and fall down before him, acknowledge that he has treated him unworthily, and afk his forgivenefs ; he ihall be forgiven, fet at liberty, and let in a place of great dignity and profit in his court. But he is flout and ftomachful, and full of haughty malignity, that he cannot be willing to accept the offer : his rooted flrong pride and malice have perfe6l power over him, and as it were bind him, by binding his heart : the oppofition of his heart has the maflery over him, having an influence on his mind far fuperior to the King's grace and condefccnfion, and to all his offers and promifes. Now, is it agreeable to com- mon Senfe, to affert and (land to it, that there is no difference between thefe two cafes, as to any worthi- nefs of blame in the prifoners ; becaufe, forfooth, there is a neceffity in both, and the required a6l in each cafe is impoffible ? It is true, a man's evil dif- pofitions may be as ilrong and immoveable as the bars of a caftie. But who cannot fee, that when a man, in the latter cafe, is faid to be unable to obey the command, the expreilion is ufed improperly, and hot in the fenfe it has originally and in common rpeech ? And that it may properly be faid to be in the rebel's power to come out of prifon, feeing he can eafily do it if he pleafes ; though by realon of his vile temper of heart, which is fixed and rooted, it is impoffible that it fhould pleafe him ? Upon the whole, 1 prefume there is no perfon of good underftanding, who impartially conliders the things which have been obferved, but will aHqw, that 284 Calvinifm confijlcnt^ SiC, Part IV. it is not evident, from the didates of the common Senfe, or natural Notions of mankind, that moral neciffity is inconfiflent with Pralfe and lilame. And, therefore, if the Arminiam would prove any fuch in- confiftency, it muft be by feme philofophical and metaphyfical arguments, and not common Senfe. There is a grand illufion in the pretended demon- flration of Arminzans from common Senfe. The main llrength of all thefe demonflrations lies in that pre- judice, that arifes through the infenfible change of the ufe and meaning of fuch terms as liberty, able, unable, necejfary, impojfihk, unavoidable, invincible, ac- tion, &c, from their original and vulgar Senfe, to a metaphyfical Senfe, entirely diverfe ; and the ftrong connexion of the ideas of Blameleffnefs, &c. with fome of thefe terms, by an habit contracted and ef- tablifhed, while thefe terms were ufed in their firft meaning. This prejudice and delufion, is the foun- dation of all thofe pofitions, they lay down as max- ims, by which mofl of the Scriptures, which they alledge in this controverfy, are interpreted, and on which all their pompous demonflrations from Scrip- ture and reafon depend. From this fecret delufion and prejudice they have almofl: all their advantages : it js the ftrength of their bulwarks, and the edge of their weapons. And this is the main ground of all the right they have to treat their neighbours in fo alTuming a manner, and to infult others, perhaps as wife and good as themfelves, as xoeak bigots, men that dwell in the dark caves offiiperjlition, perverfdy Jet, oh- Jiinately Jhutting their eyes againjl the noon- day light, en- emies to common Senfe, maintaining the jirji-born of ab- furdities^ 8cc, Sec. But perhaps an impartial confid- eration of the things, which have been obfcrved in the preceding parts of this enquiry, may enable the lovers of truth better to judge, whofe do6lrine is in- deed abfurd, abfliufe, felfcontradiUory, and inconlift- Se£l. V. Endeavours not rendered vain, Sec. 285 ent with common Senfe, and many ways repugnant to the univerfal didlates of the reafon of mankind. Corol. From things which have been obfervcd, it will follow, that it is agreeable to common Senfe to fuppofe, that the glorified faints have not their free- dom at all diminilhed, in any refpedl ; and that God Himfelf has uie higheft poffible freedom, according to the true and proper meaning of the term ; and that he is, in the higheft poffible refped, an agent, and adive in the exercife of his infinite holincfs ; though he a6ts therein, in the higheft degree, necef- farily : and his aftions of this kind are in the high- eft, moft abfolutely perfect manner virtuous and praife-worthy : and are fo, for that very reafon, be- caufe they are moft perfe£lly neceflary. / bECTlONV. Concerning tliofe Objedions, that this Scheme of Necef- fity renders all Means and Endeavours for the a* voiding of Sin^ or the obtaining Virtue and Holmefs, vain, and to no purpofe ; and that it makes Men no more than mere Machines in Affairs of Morality and Religion. Arminians fay,if itbe fo, that fin and virtue come to pafs by a neceffity confifting in a fure connexion of caufes and efFe6ls, antecedents and confequents, it can never be worth the while to ufe any Means or Endeavours to obtain the one, and avoid the other; feeing no Endeavours can alter the futurity of the event, which is become neceflary by a connexion al- ready eftabliflied. But I defire, that this matter may be fully confid- ered; and that it may be examined with a thorough 286 Endeavours net rendered vain, Part IV. flri6}ners, whether it will follow that Endeavours and Means, in order to avoid or obtain any future thing, niuft be more in vain, on the fuppofition of fuch a connexion of antecedents and confequents, than if the contrary be fuppofed. For Endeavours to be in vain, is for them not to be fuccef&ful ; that is to fay, for (hem net eventually to be the Means of the thing aimed at, which cannot be, but in one of thefe two ways ; either, j^^y?, That although the Means are ufed, yet the event aimed at does not follow: or, fecondly, If the event does follow, it is not becaufe of the Means, or from any connexion or dependence of the event on the Means, the event would have come to pafs, as well without the Means as with them. If either of thefe two things are the cafe, then the Means are not properly fuccelT- ful, and are truly in vain. The fuccefsfulnefs orun- fuccefsfulnefs of Means, in order to an efxedt, or their being in vain or not in vain, confifls in thofe Means being conne6led, or not connected, with the e(Fe6l, in fuch a manner as this, viz. That the effe6l is with the Means, and not without them ; or, that the bei^g t)f the efFe6l is, on the one hand, conne6ied with Means, and the want of the efFe6l, on the other hand, is conne£ted with the want of the Means. If there be fuch a connexion as this between Means and end, the Means are not in vain : the more there is of fuch a connexion, the further they are from being in vain ; acd the lefs of fuch a connexion, the more they are in vain. Now, therefore, the queflion to be anfwered, (in order to determine, whether itfoliows from this doc- trine of the neceffary connexion between foregoing things, and confequent ones, that Means ufed in or- der to any effcd, are more in vain than they would be otherwife) is, whether it follows from it, that there is iefsof the foremcntioncd connexion between Means Sccl. V. hy Calviniftic Principles, 287 and effe6t ; that is, whether, on the fuppofition of there being a real and true connexion between ante- cedent things and confequent ones, there mufl be lefs of a connexion between Means and efFe61, than on the fuppofition of there being no fixed connex- ion between antecedent things and confequent ones : and the very dating of this quefiion is fufficient to anfwer it. It muft appear to every one that will open his eyes, that this quefiion cannot be affirmed, without the groffefl abiurdity and inconfiflence. — Means are foregoincj thin;][s, and elFedls are foUowincj; things : And if there were no connexion between foregoing things and following ones, there could be no connexion between Means and end ; and fo all Means would be wholly vain and fruitlefs. For it is by virtue of fome connexion only, that they become fuccefsful : It is fome connexion obierved, or reveal- ed, or otherwife known, between antecedent things and following ones, that is what dire6is in the choice of Means. And if there were no fuch thing as an eftablifhed connexion, there could be no choice, as to Means ; one thing would have no more tendency t(?an efF^cl, than another; there would be no fuch thing as tendency in the cafe. All thofe things, which are fuccefsful Means of other things, do there- in prove conne6led antecedents of them: and there- fore to allert, that a fixed connexion between antece- dents and confequents makes Means vain and ufelefs, or flands in the way to hinder the connexion between Means and end, is jufl fo ridiculous, as to fay, that a connexion between antecedents and confequents {lands in the way to hinder a connexion between an- tecedents and confequents. Nor can any fuppofed connexion of the fucceffion • V or train of a#tccedents and confequents, from the very beginning of all things, the connexion being niad^e already fure and neccflary, either by eftabiiiii- 288 Means and Endeavours made v^iin, Part IV. ed laws of nature, or by thefe together with a degree of fovereign immediate interpohdons of divine pow- er, on fuch and fuch occafions, or any other way (if any other there be;) I fay, no fuch neceffary con- nexion of a feries of antecedents and confequents can in the leafl; tend to hinder, but that the Means we ufe may belong to the feries ; and fo may be fome of thofe antecedents which are connefted with the con- fequents we aim at, in the eflablifhed courfe of things. Endeavours which we ufe, are things that exift ; and, therefore, they belong to the general chain of events ; all the parts of which chain are fuppofed to be con- neQed : and fo Endeavours are fuppofed to be con- nected with fome effefts, or fome confequent things or other. And certainly this does not hinder but that the events they are conne6led with, may be thofe which we aim at, and which we choofe, becaufe we judge them mofl likely to have a connexion with thofe events, from the eftabliflied order and courfe of things which we obferve, or from fomething in divine Revelation, Let us fuppofe a real and fure connexion between a man's having his eyes open in the clear day-light, with good organs of fight, and feeing ; fo that feeing is connedled with his opening his eyes, and not fee- ing with his not opening his eyes; and alfo the like connexion between fuch a man's attempting to open his eyes, and his aftually doing it: the fuppofed ef- tablifhed connexion between thefe antecedents and confequents, let the connexion be never fo fure and necellary, certainly does not prove that it is in vain, for a man in fuch circumflances, to attempt to open bis eyes, in order to feeing : his aiming at that event, and the ufe of the Means, being the cflFe6i: of his Will, does not break the connexion, or hindir the fuccefs. So that the objeQion we are upon docs not lie a- gainfl: the dodlnne of the neceflity of events by a Se6i;. V. hy the Arminian Scheme, 289 certainty of connexion and confcquence : Oa tlie contrary, it is truly forcible againfl the Arminian doctrine of contingence and felf-detcrmination; which is inconfiflent with fuch a connexion. If there be no connexion between thofe events, whereia virtue and vice confift, and any thing antecedent ; then there is no connexion between thefe events and any Means or Endeavours ufed in order to them : and if To, then thole Means muft be in vain. The lefs there is of connexion between foregoing things and following ones, fo much the lefs there is between Means and end, Endeavours and fuccefs ; and in the fame proportion are Means and Endeavours inefFec- tual and in vain. It will follow from Arminian principles, that there is no degree of connexion between virtue or vice, and any foregoing event or thing : or, in other words, that the determination of theexiflence of vir- tue or vice do not in the lead depend on the influ- ence of any thing that comes to pafs antecedently, from which the determination of its exigence is, as its caufe, Means, or ground ; becauiej fo far as it is fo, it is not from felf-determination : and, therefore, fo far there is nothing of the nature of virtue or vice. And (o it follows, that virtue and vice are not at all, in any degree, dependent upon, or connected with, any foregoing event or exiftence, as its caufe, ground, or Means. And if fo, then all foregoing Means mufl be totally in vain. Hence it follows, that there cannot, in any con- fijlence wiih the Arminian fcheme, be any reafonablc ground of fo much as a conjetlure concerning the conlequence of any Means and Endeavours, in order to efcaping vice or obtaining virtue, or any choice or preference of Means, as having a greater proba- bility of fuccefs by fome than others ; either from any natural connexion or dependence of the end 011 Pa 290 Calvinifm docs net encourage Sloih, Part IV. the xMeans, or tlivou;ih any divine conflitution, or levealed way of God's befto'.viiig or bringing to pais thete things, in confequence of any Means, Endea- vours, pra)ers or deeds. ConjeQures, in this latter cafe, depend on a fuppofition, that God himfclf is the giver, or determining caufe of the events fought : but if tiiev depend on fcif- determination, \then God is not the deteimining or difpofing author of them : and if thefc things are not of his difpofal, then no conjedure can be made, from any revelation he has given, conceining any way or method of his difpofal of theni. Yea, on ihefc principles, it will not only follow, that men cannot have any reafonabie ground of judgment or cor;jc6ture, that their Means and En- deavours to obtain virtue or avoid vice, will be fuc- cefsful, but they may be fure, they will not; they iiiay be certain, that they will be in vain ; and that if ever the thing, which ihey feek, comes to pafs, it will not be at all owing to the Means they ufe. For Means and Endeavours can have no efFedl at all, in order to obtain the end, but in one of thefe two .ways : either, (1.) Through a natural tendency and influence, to prepare and difpofe the mind more to virtuous ads, either by caufing the difpofition of the heart to be more in favour of fuch ads, or by bring- in ^^ the mind more into the view of powerful motives and inducements : or, (2.) By putting perfons more in the way of God's beflowm.ent of the benefit. But neither of thefe can be the cafe. A'ot the latttr ; for, as has been juil now obferved, it does not confifl wiih the Arminian notion of fclf-determination, which ihey fuppofe eilcntial to virtue, that God fhouldbe the bcllov/cr, or (which is the fame thing) the determining, difpoling author of virtue. Not Ihs Jonner, for natural influence and tendency fuppofes caufaiity and connexion ; and fuppofes necefTr.y of Se£l. V. Calvinifm dois not encourage Sloth. 291 event, which is inconfiQent with Arminian liberty. A tendency of xMeans, by biafing the heart in favour of virtue, or by bringing the Will under the influ- ence and powei of motives in its determinations, are both inconfillcnt with Arminian liberty of Will, con- fining in indifFerence, and fovereign felf-determina- tion, as has been largely demonftrated. But for the more full removal of this prejudice againft the dodlrine of nccefhiy, vrhich has been maintained, as though it tended to encourage a total negle6l of all Endeavours as vain ; the following things may be confidered. The quefiion is not, whether men may not thus improA'e this dodrine : we know that many true and wholefome do6trines are abufed : bur, vv^hcther the dodrine gives any jud occafion for fach an improveJ^ mcnt ; or whether, on the fuppofition of the truth of the doftrine, fuch a ufeof it would not be unrea- fonable ? If any fnall affirm, that it would not, but that the v^ry nature of the do6lrine is fuch as gives juft occaiion for it, it muft be on this fuppofition, namely, that fuch an invariable necelfity of all things already fettled, muft render the interpofition of all Means, Endeavours, conclulions or actions of ours, in order to the obtaining any future end whatfoever, perfe6liy infignificant ; becaufe they cannot in the Jeaft alter or vary the courfe and feries of things, in any event or circumflancc ; all being already fixed unalterably by neceflify : and that therefore it is folly, for men to ufe any Meansybr any end ; but their wif- dom, to fave themfelvcs the trouble of Endeavours, and take their eafe. No perfon can draw fuch an in- ference from this do6lrine, and come to fuch a conclu- fion, without contradi6ling himfelf, and going counter to the very principles he pretends to atl up^M : for he comes to a ccnclufion, and takes a courfe, in ordc- to an end, even his eaft^ or the faving himfelf from trou- 292 Calvinifm does not encourage Sloth. Part IV. ble ; he feeks fomething future, and ufes Means in order to a future thing, even in his drawing up that conclufion, that he will feek nothing, and ufe no Means in order to any thing in future ; he fceks his future er.fe, and the benefit and comfort of indolence. If prior neccfTity, that determines all things, makes vain all a6lions or conclufions of ours, in order to any thing future : then it makes vain all conclufions and condu6i: of ours, in order to our future eafe. The meafure of our eafe, with the time, manner, and every circumflance of it, is already fixed, by all-de- termining neceflity, as much as any thing elfe. If he fays within himfelf, '* What future happinefs or " mifery I fhall have, is already, in efFe6l, determin- *' ed by the nccefifary courfe and connexion of things ; " therefore, I will fave myfelf the trouble of labour *^ and diligence, which cannot add to my determin- ** ed degree of happinefs, or diminifh my mifery ; *' but will take my eafe, and will enjoy the comfort ** of floth and negligence." Such a man contradi6ls himfelf: he fays, the meafure of his future happi- nefs and mifery is already fixed, and he will not try- to diminifh the one, nor add to the other : but yet, in his very conclufion, he contradi6ls this ; for, he takes up this conclufion, io add to hi>fvlure happinefs, by the eafe and comfort of his negligence ; and to diminifh his future trouble and mifery, by faving himfelf the trouble of ufing ?vleans and taking pains. Therefore perfons cannot reafonably make this improvement of the dotlrinc of necefiTuy, that they will go into a voluntary negligence of Means for their own happinefs. For the principles they mufl; go upon in order to this, are inconfiRent with their making any improvement at all of the doctrine : for to make fome improvement of it, is to be influenced by it, to come to fome voluntary conclufion, in re- gard to their own condudl, with fome view or aim : Se6l. V. Calvinlfm does not make Men Machines. 293 bat this, as has been (liown, is inconfiflent with die principles they pretend to a6l upon. In (liorr, ihe principles are (uch as cannot be a61:ed upon at a\\, or, in any refpeB, confidently. And, therefore, in every pretence of a6ling upon them, or making any improvement at all of them, there is a felf- contradic- tion. As to that obje6lion againfl the do6lrine, which I have endeavoured to prove, that it makes men no more than mere Machines i I would fay, that not- withftanding this dodiine, Man is entirely, perfe6lly and unfpeakably different from a mere Machine, in that he has reaJbn ax^id undcrflandincj, and has a faculty of Will, and is fo capable of volition and choice ; and in that, his Will is guided hy the dic- tates or views of his underflanding ; and in that his external a6lions and behaviour, and, in many re- fpe6^s, alfo his thoughts, and the exercifes of his mind, are fubjeiSl to his Will ; fo that he has liberty to a£l according to his choice, and do what he plea fes; and by Means of thefe things, is capable of moral habits and moral atls, fuch mclinaiions and a£lions as, according to the common fenfe of mankind, arc worthy of praifc, efleem, love and reward ; or, ou the contrary, of difefteem, deteflaiion, indignation and punifhment. In thefe things is all the difference from mere Machines, as to liberty and agency, that would be any perfedion, dignity or privilege, in any refpe6l : all the difference that can be dehred, and all that can be conceived of; and indeed all that the pretennons of the Arminians themfelves com^e to, as they are forced often to explain themfelves. (Though rheir explications overthrow and abolifli the things affert- ed, and pretended to be explained,) for they are forc- ed to explain a felf-dx^tcrmining power of Will, hv a power in the foul, to de: ermine as it choofes ox 294 0/the Stoical Fate. Part IV. Wilis ; which comes to no more llian this, that a man has a power of choofing, and, in many inftanc- es, can do as he choofes. Which is quite a differ- ent thing from that contraditlion, his having power of choofing his firft aft of choice in the cafe. Or, if their fcheme makes any other difference than this, between Men and Machines, it is for the worfe : it is fo far from fuppofmg Men to have a dignity and privilege above Machines, that it makes the manner of their being determined flill more un- happy. Whereas, Machines, are guided by an un- derUanding caufe, by the fkilful hand of the work- man or owner ; the Will of Man is left to the guid- ance of nothing, but abfolute blind contingence. Section VI. Concerning that Obje61ion againji the Docirine which has been maintained^ that it agrees with the Stoical JDc^rinc o/F^te, and the Opinions of Mr, Hobbes, When Calvinijls oppofe the Arminian notion o^ the freedom of Will, and contingence of volition, and infift that there are no a6ls of the Will, nor any oth- er events v^hatfoever, but what are attended with fome kind of neceffity ; their oppofers cry out of them, as agreeing with the ancient Stoics in their do6lrine of Fate^ and with Mr. Kobbes in his opin- ion of neceffity. It would not be worth while to take notice of fo impertinent an obje6tion, had it not been urged by fome of the chief Arminian writers. There were many important truths maintained by the ancient Greek and Rcraan philofophers, and efpecially the ^Stoics, that are never the worfc for being held by Seft. VI. OJ the Stoical Fate. 295 them. The Stoic philofophers, by the general agreement of Chriilian divines, and even Arminian divines, were the greateft, wifeft, and moft virtuous of all the heathen philofophers ; and, in their doc- trine and pra6tice, came the neareft to Chriftianity of any of their fe6ls. How frequently are the fayings of thefe philofophers, in many of the writings and fer- mons, even of Arminian divines, produced, not as arguments of the falfenefs of the do6lrines which they delivered, but as a confirmation of fome of the greateft truths of the Chrifiian religion, relating to the unity and perfe6lions of the Godhead, a future ftate, the duty and happinefs of mankind, &c. as ob- ferving how the light of nature and reafon, in the wifefl and befl of the Heathens, harmonized with, and confirms the Gofpei of Jefus Chrift. And it is very remarkable, concerning Dr. Whit- by, that although he alledges the agreement of the Sloici with us, wherein he fuppofes they maintain- ed the like do£lrine with us, as an argument againfl the truth of our do6irine ; yet, this very Dr. Whit- by alledges the agreement of the Sicic^ with the Ar-^ tninians, wherein he fuppofes they taught the fame doftrine with them, as an argument for the truth of their do6lrine."*^' So that, v/hen the Stoics agree with them, this (it feems) is a confirmation of their do6lrine, and a confutation of oars, as fliewing that our opinions are contrary to the natural fenlc and common realon of mankind : ncverthelefij, when the Stoics agree with ws, it argues no fuch thing in our favour; but, on the contrary, is a great argument againil us, and (hews our do6lrine to be heathenilh. It is obferved by fome Calviniftic writers, that the Arminians fymbolize with the Stoics, in fome of thofc dotlrines wherein they are oppoied by the Calvin^ ^V/kitby on the ave points, Edit. 3. p. 32^, 326, 327. zgG Of the Stoical Fate. Tart IV. ifts ; particularly in their denying an original, in- nate, total corruption and depravity of heart; and in what they held of man's abiHty to make himfelf truly virtuous and contormed to God ; — and in fome other doftrines. It may be further obferved, it is certainly no bet- ter objedion againll our do6lrine, that it agrees, in fome rerpe6ls, with the dndtiinc of the ancient Stoic philolophers, than it is againft theirs, wherein they differ from us, that it agrees, in fome rcfpefts, with the opinion of the very w^orfl of the heathen philof- ophers. the followers of Epicurus, that father of athcifm and licentioufnels, and with the dochine of the Sadducees and Jcfuits. I am not much concerned to know precifely, what the ancient Stoic philofophers held concerning Fate^ in order to determine what is truth ; as though it were a lure way to be in the right, to take good heed to differ from them. It feems, that they differed a- mong themfelves; and probably the do6lrine of Fate as maintained by mofl of them, was, in fome refpeds, erroneous. Eut whatever their do6lrine was, if any of them held luch a Fate, as is repugnant to any liberty, confiMing in our doing as we pieafe, 1 utterly deny fuch a Fate. If they held any fuch Fate, as is not confiflent with the common and uni- vcrlai notions that mankind have of liberty, adivity, moral agency, virtue and vice ; I difclaim any fuch thing, and thuik I have demonilraied that the (cheme I maintain is no fuch Icheme. If the Stuics, by Fate, meant any thing of fuch a nature, as can be fiippof- ed to fland in ihc way of the advantage and benefit of the ule of Means and Endeavours, or make it lefs worth the while for men todelire, and feek after any thing wherein their virtue and happincls confifls ; I hold no dodrinc that is clogged with any fuch in- convenience, any mure than any other iciiuine wiiat- Sea. VI. Of Hobbiflical Neceffiiy, 297 foever; and by no means fo much as the Arminian fcheme of contingence ; as has been fhewn. If they held any fuch do6lrine of univeifal fatality, as is in- confident with any kind of liberty, that is or can be any peife6tion, dignity, privilege or benefit, or any thing defirable, in any refpe6t, for any intelligent creature, or indeed with any liberty that is pofTible or conceivable ; I embrace no fuch do£lrine. If they held any fuch do6lrine of Fate, as is inconfifl;- ent with the world's being ia all things fubjed to the difpofal of an intelligent wife agent, that prefides, rot as the foul of the world, but as the Sovereign Zari of the Univerfe, governing all things by prop- er will, choice and defign, in the exercife of the moft perfect liberty conceivable, without fubje6lion to any conllrainr, or being properly under the power or in- fluence of any thing before, above or without him- felf ; I wholly renounce any fuch do6lrine. As to Mr. Hobbes' mainttining the fame do£lrine concerning neceffity ; I confefs, it happens I never read Mr. Hobbes. Let his opinion be what it wiil, we need not rc-jcB: all truth which is demonllrated by clear evidence, merely becaufe it was once held by fome bad man. This great truth, that Jefus is the Son of God, was not fpoiled becaufe it was once and again proclaimed with a loud voice by the devil. If truth is fo defiled, becaufe it is fpoken by the mouth, or written by the pen of fome ill minded mifchievous man, that it muft never be received, we fhall never know, when we hold any of the moft precious and evident truths by a fare tenure. And if Mr. Hobbes has made a bad ufe of this truth, that is to be lamented ; but the tiuth is not to be thought worthy of rejeftion on that account. It is common for the corruptions of the hearts of evil men to abufe the beft things to vile purpofes. 1 might alfo take notice of its having been obferv- 298 Concerning the NcceGTity Part IV. ed, that the Arininians agree with Mr. Hobbes in many mare things than the Calvinijls* As, in what he is faid to hold concerning original fin. in denying the necelTity of fupernatural iUumination, in deny- ing infufed grace, in denying the do6trine of juftifi- cation by faith alone ; and other things. Section VII. Concerning the Neceffity of the Divine Will. OoME may poflTibly objacl againfl what has been fuppofed of the abfurdity and inconfillence of a felf- determining power in the Will, and the impoffibil- ity of its being otherwife, than that the Will fhould be determined in every cafe by fome motive, and by a motive which (as it (lands in the view of the un- derftanding) is of fuperior ftrength to any appearing on the other fide; that if thefe things are true, it will follow, that not only the Will of created minds, but the Vv^ill of God HirnfelJ is ncceflfary in all its determinations. Concerning which, fays the Au- thor of the EJfay on the Freedom oj the Will in God and in the Creature (pag. 85, 86J *' What ftrange doc- *' trine is this, contrary to all our ideas of the do- *' minion of God ? Does it not deftroy the glory of ** his liberty of choice, and take away from the Cre- *' ator and Governor and Benefaftor of the world, " that moll free and Sovereign Agent, all the glory *' of this fort of freedom ? Does it not feem to make " him a kind of mechanical medium of fate, andin- ** troduce Mr. Hobbes' do6lrine of fatality and Ne- *' ceffity, into all things that God hath to do with ? * Dr. Gil), in his Anfwer to Dr. Whitby. Vol. III. p. 183, &c. Se6l. VII. of the DWint Vtlilion, 299 *^ Does it not feem to reprefent the blcflfed God, as *' a Being of vaR underflanding, as well as power *' and efficiency, but ftill to leave him withouc a *' Will to choofe among all the objeds within his *' View ? In (hort, it feems to make the blelFed God *' a fort of Almighty Minider of Fate, under its uni- ** verfal and fupreme influence ; as it was the pro- *' felled fentiment of fome of the ancients, that Fate *' was above the gods." This is declaiming, rather than arguing ; and an application to men's imaginations and prejudices, rather than to mere reafon. — But I would calmly endeavour to conhder, whether there be any reafon in this frightful reprefentation.— But before I enter upon a particular confideration cf the matter, I would obferve this : that it is reafonable to fuppofe, it fhould be much more difficult to exprefs or conceive things according to exa^l metaphyiical truth, relat- ing to the nature and manner of the exiftence of things in the Divine Underflanding and Will, and the operation of thefe faculties ^if I may fo call them) of the Divine Mind, than in the human mind; which is infinitely more within our view, and near- er to a proportion to the meafure of our compre- henfion, & more commenfurate to the ufe and import of human fpeech. Language is indeed very defi- cient, in regard of terms, to exprefs precife truth con- cerning our own minds, and their faculties and op- erations. Words were firlt formed to exprefs exter- nal things ; and thofe that are applied to exprefs things internal and fpiritual, are almoft all borrow- ed, and ufed in a fort of figurative fenfe.l Whence they are, moft of them, attended with a great deal of ambiguity and unfixednefs in their fi^nification, occafjonmg innumerable doubts, difficulties and confufions, in inquiries and controverfies, about things of this nature. But language is much lefs 300 Concerning the Neceflity, &c. Part IV, adapted to exprefs things in the mind of the incom- prehenfible Deity, precilely as they are. We find a great deal of difBculty in conceiving exadlly of the nature of our own fouls. And not- withftanding all the progrefs which has been made, in paft and prefent ages, in this kind of knowledge, whereby our metaphyfics, as it relates to thefe things, is brought to greater perfedion than once it was ; yet, here is ftill work enough left for future inquiries and refearches, and room for progrefs dill to be made, for many ages and generations. But we had need to be infinitely able metaphyficians, to con- ceive with clearnefs, according to ftntl, proper and perfe6l truth, concerning the nature of the Divine Effence, and the modes of the a6lion and operation of the powers of the Divine Mind. And it may be noted particularly, that though we are oblioed to conceive of fome things in God as confequent and dependent on others, and of fome things pertaining to the Divine Nature and Will as the foundation of others, and lo before others in the order of nature : as, we muft conceive of the knowl- edge and holinefs of God as prior, in the order of nature, to his happinefs ; the perfeftion of his un- derflanding, as the foundation of his wife purpofes and decrees ; the holinefs of his nature, as the caufe and realon of his holy determinations. And yet, when we fpeak of caufe and tffe6l, antecedent and confequent, fundamental and dependent, determin- ing and determined, in the fiift Being, who is felf- exiflent, independent, of perfett and abfolute firn- plicity and immutability, and the firft caufe of all thiiig> ; doubtlefs there mull be lefs propriety in fuch reprcfentations, that when we fpeak of derived dependent beings, who are compounded, and liable to pt-rpetual mudtion and fuccelfion. Having prcmifed this, I proceed to obferve cor^ Std:, VII. Necfjily of aUin^ mojl wifely, G?c. 301 cerning the forementioned Author's exclamation, a- bout the ncccjfary Determination of God's Will^ in all things, by what he fees to he/utcjl and beJL Ti^jat all the fceming force of luch objec"tions and exclamations mud arife from an imagination, that there is lome lort of privilege or dignity in being without fuch a moral Necefiity, as will make it im- polTible to do any other, than always choofe what is wifeft and befl ; as though there were fome dif- advantage, meannefs and fubjeclion, in fuch a Ne- ceffitv ; a thing by which the Will was confined, kept under, and held in fervitude by fomething, which, as it were, maintained a ftrong and invinci- ble power and dominion over ir, by bonds that held him faft, and that he could, by no means, deliver himfelf from. Whereas, this mull be all mere im- agination and delufion. It is no difadvantage or difhonour to a being, neceflfarily to a6l in the moll excellent: and happy manner, from the neceifary perfection of his own nature. This argues no im- perfe6liun, inferiority or dependence, nor any want: of dignity, privilege or aicendency.* It is not iii- * ** It might have been obje£led, with more plaunblenefs, *' that the Supreme Caule cannot be hee, becaufe he mutt *• needs do always what is bcft in the whole. But this would " not at ail ferve Spinoza's purpofe ; tor this is a NecefTity, *' not of nature and ot tate, but ol fitnefs and wifdom ; a Ne- *' cefTity confident with the greateii freedom, and molt per- *' \eti choice. For the only foundation of this Neceflhy is *' fuch an unalterable reflitude ot Will, and perfefction of *' wifdom, as makes it impodihle tor a wite Being to a61 fool- " iihly." Clark's Demonllration of the Being and Attri- butes of God. Edit. 6, p. 64. " Though God is a mod perfeft free Agent, yet he cannot *• but do always what is beft and wiled in the whole. The ** reaton is evident ; bccaule perte6t; wildom and goodnefs *• are as deady and certain principles of a6tion, as NecefTitv *' itfelf ; and an infinitely wife and good Being, indued with •' the mod pei[c6l liberty, can no more choofe to a^ in con- 302 Necejfiiy of aEl'mg mojl wifely, Part IV. confident with the abfolute and mod perfe6l fove- reignty of God. The fovereignty of God is his ability and authority to do whatever pleafes him ; whereby He doth according to his Will in the armies of Heaven, and among ji the inhabitants of the earih^ and none canjlay his hand, or fay unto him, zohat doji thou ? — The following things belong to the fovereignty of God ; viz, (i.) Supreme, Univerfal, and Infinite Power ; whereby he is able to do what he pleafes, without control, without any confinement of that power, without any fubjedion, in the lead meafure, to any other power ; and fo without any hinderance or reftraint, that it ftiould be either impoflible, or at all difficult, for him to accomplidi his Will ; and without any dependence of his power on any other power, from whence it fl:iould be derived, or which it fhould dand in any need of : fo far from this, that all other power is derived from him, and is ab- lolutely dependent on him. (2.) That He has fut^ ** tradi6^ion to wifdom and goodnefs, than a neceflary agent *• can a6l contrary to the NeceiTity by which it is a£led ; it *' being as great an abfurdity and impofTibiiity in choice, tor *' Infinite Wifdom to choofe to a6l unwifely, or Infinite Good- ** nefs to choofe what is not good, as it would be in nature, •' lor abfolute Neceflity to tail of producing its necefTary *' eflTeft. There was, indeed, no NecefTity in nature, that God *• fhould at firfl create fuch beings as he has created, or indeed •• any being at all ; becaufe he is, in Himfclf, infinitely happy •• and alUfiillicient. There was alto, no NecefTity in nature, *' that he fhould preferve and continue things in being, alter *' they were created ; becaufe he would be lelt-fufFicient vvith- *' out their continuance, as he was before their creation. But *' it was fit and wife and good, that Infinite Wifdom fhould *' manifef^, and Infinite Goodnefs communicate iifelf ; and *♦ therefore it was neceffary, in the fenfe of Neceflity 1 am *' now fpeaking of, that things fhould be made at fuck a time, •• and continued y^; long, and indeed with various perfeftions •* in fuch degrees, as Infinite Wifdom and Goodnefs faw it '• wifeii and befl that they fhould.'' Ibid, p. 112, 113. Se£l. VII. agreeable to mojl perfeB Liberty. 303 preme authority ; abfolute and mofl: perfe6l right to do what he Wills, without fubjedion to any fupe- rior authority, or any derivation of authority from any other, or limitation by any diftin6i; inde- pendent authority, either fuperior, equal, or in- ferior ; he being the head of all dominion, and fountain of all authority ; and alfo without reflraint by any obligation, implying either fubjeftion, deri- |\ vation, or dependence, or proper limitation. (3.) That his Wdl is fupreme, underived, and independ- ent on any thing without Himfelf ; being in every thing determined by his own couofel, having no other rule but his own wifdom ; his Will not being fubje6l to, or reflrained by the Will of any other, and other Wills being perfe6lly fubje61: to his. (4.) That his Wifdom^^which determines his Will, is fupreme, perfect, underrved, felf-fufficient and in- dependent ; fo that it may be faid, as in Ifa. xl, 14, With whom took He counfel ? And who injiruded Him *' Tis not a fault, but a perfeftlon of our nature, to defire, " will and a6^, according to the laft refult of a fair examina- " lion. — This is fo far horn being a rellraint or diminution •' of freedom, that it is the very improvement and benefit of " it : 'tis not an abridgment, 'tis the end and ufe of our lib- •' erty ; and the further we are removed from fuch a determi- *' nation, the nearer we are to mifery and flavery. A perfeft *' indifference in the mind, not determinable by its laft judg- *' ment, of the good or evil that is thought to attend its choice, *' would be fo tar from being an advantage and excellency of *' any intelle6fual nature, that it would be as great an imper- *' fedion, as the want of indifferency to a61, or not to a6f, till ** determined by the Will, would be an imperfetfion on the ** other fide. — 'Tis as much a perfe£lion, that defire or the *' power of preferring fhould be determined by good, as thit " the power of afting Ihould be determined by the Will : and " the certainer fuch determination is, the greater the perfec- *' tion. Nay, were we determined by any thing but the laft *' refult of our own minds, judging of the good or evil of any •' aftion, we were not free. This very end of our freedom *' being, that we might attain the good we choofc ; and, there- 304 Nccejily of ailing moji wifely, Part IV. and, lau(^Jit Him in the path of juSpnent. and taught Him knozvlc'd^e, and Jhexotd him the way of underjianding ? — There is no other Divine Sovereignty but this : .nnd this is properly ahfolute fovcreignty : no other is defuable ; nor would any other be honorable, or happy : and indeed, there is no other conceivable or poflible. It is the glory and greatnefs of the Di- vine Sovereign, that God's Will is determined by his own infinite all-fufTicient wifdom in every thing ; and in nothing at all is either dirc6led by any infe- rior wifdom, or bv no wifdom ; whereby it would become fenfelefs arbitrarinefs, determining and a6l- ing without reafon, defign or end. If God's Will is fteadily and furely determined in every thing by f up r erne wifdom, then it is in eve- Ty thing necelfarily determined to that which is mojl wife. And, certainly, it v/ould be a difadvantage and indignity, to be otherwife. For if the Divine *' fore, every man is brought under a Nccefllty by his confli- " lution, as an intelligent being, to be determined in willing «« by his own thought and judgment, what is beft lor him to *' do ; elle be would be under the determination of feme other *' than himfelP, which is want ot liberty. And to deny that a •' man's Will, in every determination, follows his own judg- •« mcnt, is to fay, that a man wills and a£ls for an end that he «' would not have, at the fame time that he wills and a6ls tor «' it. For if he prefers it in his prefent thoughis, before any •' other, it is plain he then thinks better of it, and would have •« it belore any other ; unle's he can have, and not have it ; «« will, and not will it, at the fame time ; a contradiction too «' manifcil to be admitted. — If we look, upon thofe fuperior •' bein;Ts above us, who enjoy perlt'tl happinefs, we fhall have •» realon to judge, that they are more fleadily determined in «' their choice ot good than we ; and yet we have no reafon »» to think they are lefs happy, or lefs free, than we are. And «♦ it it were fit tor fucli pooi Hnite creatures as we are, to pfo- •' nounce what Infinite Wifdom and Goodnefs could do, I •* think we might lav, that God lumleif cannot choofe what •' is not good. Ihe freedom of the. Ahmghty hinders not his •♦ temg dettrimned by luhal is brjl. — But to give a right view Sea. VII. agreeable to inojl perfect Liberty. 305 Will was not neccfTarily determined to that, wlilcii in every caCe is wifeft and befl, it mud be rLibje6l to fome decree of unde^lg^in^ contingence ; and fo in the fame decree liable to evil. To fuppofe the Di- vine Will liable to be carried hither and thither at random, by the uncertain wind of blind contingence, which is guided by no wifdom, no motive, no intel- ligent dittate wharfoever, (if any Inch thing were poflible) would certainly argue a great degree of im- perfedion and meannefs, infinitely unworthy of the Deity. — li it be a difadvantage for the Divine Will 1 to be attended with this mortu Neceffity, then the 1 more free from it, and the more left at random, the \ *' ol this rr/i(li.ken part o\ liberty, let me a fk. Would any one *• be a changeling, becaufe he is lefs determined by wife de- *' termination, than a wife man ? Is it worih the name oi tree- *' dom, to be at libeiiy to play the iool, and draw Ihame and " mifery upon a man's felt ? l\ to break locfe hom the con- " du6t of reafon, and to want that leihaint ol examination and *' judgment, that kepps us from doing or choofing the woile, •* be liberty, true iibei'ty, mad men and tools are the only irce •* men. Yet, I think,' no body would choofe to be rnad, tor •' the fake o[ fuch iibeny, but he that is mad aheady." Locke^ Hum. Und. Vol. I. X'dit. 7. p. 21^, 216. " Tiiis Being, having all things always neceiTarily in view. ** mutt always, and eternally will, accoiding to his infinite ** comprebenfion oi things ; that is, mult will all things that *' are v^ifefl and bed to be done. There is no getting tree of " this confequence. 11 it can will at lII, it mull will this way. ** To be capable of knowing, and not capable of willing, is ** not to be undei flood. And to be capable of willing other- " wife than what is wifeit andbeil, contiaiUtts that knov/ledge *' which is iniinite. Infinite knowledge mail direct the Will *' without error. litre then, is the ongm 0/ rnorul KeceJjiLy ; *' and that is really, of jrztdom. — Perhaps it niav be idid, " when the Divine Will is dctei mined, trom (lie confid^vutioii " of the eternal aptiiiuics of things, it is as necafldfiiy de{?ri- *' mined, as it it were phyfically impelled, it that were puiTi- *' ble. But it is unikiiiulnefs, to lappoie this an objeaion. *' The great pruiciple is once eitabiilhcd, viz. That \\vc Di- •' vine Will is determined by the elernal realbn and apuuideg R 2 30O Nccrjfdy of acting mojl wifely, Part IV. i greater dignity and advantage. And, confequently rtu be peiieclly free from the dire61ion of underlland- \ ing, and univerfally and entirely left to fenfeiefs un- ; meaning contingence, to adl abfolutcly at random, would be the fupremc glory. It no more argues any dependence of God's Will, thjt his fupremely wife volition is necelTary, than it argues a dependence of his being, that his exiftence is neceffary. If it be fomething too low, for the Supreme Being to have his Will determined by mor- al iVccclRty. fo as necelfarily, in every cafe, to Will in the highell degree hoiily and happily ; then why is it not alfo fomething too loxv, for him to have his exigence, and the infinite perfetlion of his nature, nnd his infinite happinefs determined by NeceflTity ? It is no more to God's difhonour, to be neceflTariiy wife, than to be necelTarily holy. And, if neither of them be to his di (honor, then it is not to his dif- honour neceffarily to acl holily and wifely. And if it be not difhonourable to be necelTarily holy and wife, in the highefi: poiTible degree, no more is it mean and diflionourable, necefl'arily to a6l holily and y^'\{c\y in the highefc poflfiblc degree ; or, which is the fame thing, to do that, in every cafe, which, above all other things, is wifell and beft.- " of things, inflead of being phyfically impelled ; andaftir " that, the more ftrongand ncceffary this determination is, the '• more per (eft the Deity mull be allowed to be : it is this that '• m.ikcs him an amiable and adorable Being, whofe Will and •* Power aie confUntly, immutably determined, by the con- •' fidcration o\ what is wifcft and beft ; inflead oi a furd Be- •' ing, will) power, hut without difcerning and reafon. It is " the kcanty of this NcceJJity, that itis ftrotvr as fate itfelf, with '*' all the aJiantage of reafon and goodnejs. — It is ftrange, to " t'ee men contend, that the Deity is not free, becaufc he is *' necelfarily rational, immutably good and wife ; when a man •* is allowed Rill the perfe61er bemg, the more fixedly and •• conilantly his Will is determined by reafon and truth." Enquiry into the Nature oj the Hum. Soul. Edit. 3. Vol. 11. p. 403, 404. Sc61:. VII. no Meannefs or Difadvantase. 307 The reafon, why it is not dilhonourable to be nectlfarily mrji holy, is, becaufe holinefs in itfelf is an excellent and honourable thing. For the fame reafon, it is no difhononr to be neceiFarily rnrjl wife, and, in every cafe, to a6i niofl wifely, or do the thing which is the wifefl of all ; for wifdom is alfo in ir- fclf excellent and honourable. The foremcntioned author of the EJfc'y on the Freedom of Will, &c. as has been obferved, reprefents that doftrine of the Divine Will's being in every thing ncceffarlly determined by fuperior fitnefs, as making the blelTcd God a kind of Almighty Minifter and mechanical medium of fate : and he infiRs, p. 93, 94, that this moral Neceffity and impofiibility is, in etre6i;, the fame thing with phyiical and natural NecefFity and impofiibility : and in p. 54, 55, he lays, '* The fcheme which determines the Will al- *' ways and certainly by the underllanding, and the ^' underllanding by the appearance of things, feems *' to take away the true nature of vice and virtue. *• For the fublimefl of virtues, and the vileft of vices, " feem rather to be matters of fate and Neceffity, " flowing naturally and neceflarily from the exifl- *' ence, the circumftances, and prefcnt iituation of *' perfons and things : for this exiftence and Iituation *• neceflarily makes fuch an appearance to the mind; *' from this appearance flows a nccciFary perception " and judgment, concerning thete things ; this '•judgment, necefTarily determines the Will : and *' thus, by this chain of neceffary caufcs, virtue and *' vice would lofe their nature, and become natural *• ideas, and neceCTary thin^^s, inflead of moral and *' free a6lions/' And yet this fame author allows, p. 30, 31, That a perfectly wife being will conflantly and certainly choofewhat is moll fit ; and fays, p. 102, 103, " I *' grant, and always have granted, that wheicioever 3o8 Neceffity of God's acting wifely, Part IV. ** there is fuch antecedent fuperior fitncfs of things, " God a6ls accordinfT to it, fo as never to contradi6l *' it ; and, particularly in all his judicial proceedings " as a Governor, and Diilributer of rewards and pun- " ifhmcnts." Yea, he fays cxprefsly, p. 42, " That *' it is not poiTible for God to a6l othevwife, than ac- *' cording to this fitnefs and goodnefs in things." So that according to this author, putting thefe feveral paff^^es of this EiTay together, there is no vir- iue, nor any thing of a moral nature, in the molt fublime and glorious ads and exercifes of God's holinefs, judice, and faithfulnefs ; and he never does any thing which is in itfelf fupremely worthy, and, above all other things, fit and excellent, but only as a kind of mechanical medium of fate ;' and in what he does as the Judge and moral Governor ojthezvorld, he exercifes no moral excellency ; exerciung no freedom in thefe things, becaufe he a6is by moral Neceffity. v^^hich is, in effe8:, the fame with phyfical or natural Neceffity ; y to the fitnefs oj things ; as he fays, p. 42 — That it is not poffihle for God to acl otherzvife than according to this fitnefs, where there is any fitnefs or goodnefs in things : Yea, he fuppofes, p. 31, That if a man were perfedly wife and good, he could not do otherzoife than be conjiant' ly and certainly determined by the fitnefs of things. One thing more I would obferve, before I con- clude this fe6lion ; and that is, that if it derogates nothing from the glory of God, to be neceffarily de- termined by fuperior fitnefs in fome things, then neither does it to be thus determined in all things ; from any thing in the nature of fuch Necefliry, as at all detracting from God's freedom, independence, abfolute fuprcmacy, or any dignity or glory of his nature, (late or manner of a6ling ; or as implying any infirmity, reftraint, or fubjedion. And if the thing be fuch as well confifts with God's glory, and has nothing tending at all to detra6l from it ; then we need not be afraid of afcribing it to God in too many things, left thereby we (liould detra6l from God's glory too much. 0/ God's creating the World, Part IV. Section VIII. Some further ObjeHions againjl the 7noral NecefTity of God's Volitions cojifidered, i HE author lafl cited, as has been obferved, owns ihat God, being perfectly wife, will conftantly and certainly chooi'e what appears moft fit, where there is a fuperior fitnefs and goodnefs in things ; and that it is not pofTible for him to do otherwife. So that it is in efFe6t confefTed, that in thofe things where there is any real preferablcnefs, it is no dif- honor, nothing in any refpeft unworthy of God, for him to a6l from Neccflity ; notwiihflanding all that can be objeded from the agreement of fuch a^ Neceflity, with the fate of the Stoics, and the Ne- ceflity maintained by Mr. Hobbes. From which it will follow, that if it were fo, that in all the different things, among which God choofes, there were ever- more a fupenor fitnefs, or preferablcnefs on one fide, then it would be no difhonor, or any thmg, in any refpeft, unworthy, or unbecoming of God, for his Will to be neceffariiy determined in every thing. And if this be allowed, it is a giving up entirely the argument, from the unfuitablenefs of fach a Necef- fity to the liberty, fupremacy, independence and glory of the Divine Being ; and a rcfting the whole weight of the *ifFair on the decifion of another point wholly diverfe ; viz. Whether it be fo indeed, that in all the various poflible things, which are in God's view, and may be confidercd as capable obje£ls of his choice, there is not evermore a preferablcnefs in one thing above another. This is denied by this author ; who fuppofes, that in many in (lances, be- tween two or more poflible things, which come with- in the view of the Divine Mind, there is a perfcd^ Sc£l. Vill. at fuch a Time and Place. 311 indifFerence and equality, as to fitnefs or tendency to attain any good end which God can have in view, or to anfwerany of his defi^^ns. Now, there- fore, I would confider whether this be evident. The arguments brought to prove this, are of two kinds. (1.) It is urged, that in many inflances, we muft fuppofe there is abfolutely no dilFerence be- tween various pofTibIc objcds or choice, which God has in view : and (2.) that the difference between many things is fo inconfiderablc, or of fuch a nature, that it would be unreafonable to luppofe it to be of any confeqiience; or to fuppofe that any of God's wife defigns would not be anfwered ia one way as well as the other. Therefore, I. Tke firfl; thing to beconfidered is whether there are any inllances wherein there is a perfe6i likcnef'^', and abfolutety no difference, between different ob- je61s of choice, that are propofed to the Divine Un- derftanding ? And here, in the firfi place, it may be worthy to be confidered, whether the con'iradi^lion tlicre is in the terms of the queftion propofed, does not give reafon to fufpcft, that there is an inconfiflence in the thing fuppofed. It is enquired, whether different objects of choice may not be abfolute vjithout dffcr^ ence P If they are abfolutely 'cuithout difference, then how are they dffcrcnt obje6is of choice ? If there be abfolutely no dfference, in any refpett, then there is no variety or diflmBion : for diQinclion is only by fome difference. And if there be no variety among propofed objects of choice, then there is no opportu- nity for variety of choice, or difference of detfrmi- nntion. For that determination of a thing, which is not different in any refpcd, is not a dift^rent de- termination, but the fame. That this ii, no qiiibbje, may appear more fully anon. 312 0/ God's creating the world, &c. Part IV. Th^ arguments, to prove that the Mod High, in fome inilarices, choofes to do one thing rather than another, where the things themfelves are perfe£lly without difiPerencc, are two. 1. That the various parts of infinite time and fpace, abfolutel}' confidered, are perfetlly ahke, and do not ditFer at all one from another : and that therefore, when God determined to create the world in (uch a part of infinite duration and fpace, rather than others, he determined and preferred, among various objefls, between which there was no preferablenefs, and abfolutely no difference. Anfw. This objeftion fuppofes an infinite length of time before the world was created, diftinguilhed by fucceflive parts, properly and truly fo ; or a fuc- ccfiion of limited and unmeafurabie periods of lime, following one another, in an infinitely long feries : which mufl; needs be a groundiefs imagination. The eternal duration which was before the world, being only tlie eternity of God's exigence ; which is noth- ing clfe but his immediate, peife^i and invariable poilelhon of the whole of his unlimited life, togeth- er and at once ; Vitcc irderininahilis, tola, fimul 'and perjecia pojfeffio. Which is fo generally allowed, that I need not Hand to demonflrate it.'-" * * If all created beings were taken away, all pofTiblHty * of any mutation or fucccflion, of one thing to another, * would appear to be alfo removed. Abftracl lucccllion ia * eternity is {carce to be underftood. What is it that fuc- * cceds ? One minute to another, perhaps, vt'ut unJ^i juptr- * vcint udam. But when we imagirne this, we tariLy that the * minutes are things feparately exiiting. This is the common * notion ; and yet it is a maailcll prejudice. Time is noth- * inj; uui the exiflence of created fuccefhve bciu^'^s, and etcr- * nity i!ie ncccflary exliiencc of the Dcitv. Tlicrelore, it * this iicccHary being h;iih no change or fucccirion in his iia- * turc, his cxii*ence mulf of courle he unrncccilive. We * fcciu 10 commit a double ovc:(ighi in tiiis cuie ; Jujly we SeQ:. VIII. atfuchciTimtandPhcQ. ^lo So this obje61ion fuppoies an extent of fpace be- yond the limits of the creation, of an infinite length, breadth and depth, truly and properly didinguifhcd into diiFerent meafurable parts, limited at certair> flages, one beyond another, in an inlinite feries. Which notion of abfolute and infinite fpace is doubt- ]g[s as unreafonable, as that now mentioned, of ab- folute and infinite duration. It is: as itnproper to imagine that the immenfity and ornniprefence of God is diuinguiflied by a feries of miles and leagues, one beyond another; as that the infinite duration of God is diflinguiihed by months and years, one af» ter another. A diyerfiry and order of dfflin6l parts^ limited by certain periods, is as conceivable, and does as naiurally obtrude iifelf on our imagination, * find fucceflion in the necelTary nature and exiflence of th;^ * Deity himfelf : which is wrong, if the realbning above be * conclufive. And then we afcjibe this fuccefTioa to eternity, * confidered abflraftedly from ihe Eternal Being; and fup- * pofe it, one knows not what, a thing fubfifting by itfelf, and * flowing one rninnte after another. - This is the wjikof pure * imagination, and contrary to the reality of things. Hence * the common metaphorical ejcprefTions ; Tims rifJis a-pace, * /.;/ us lay hold on the pre/ent minute, and the like. The phi- * ioGjijhers themfelves miflead us by their illuliration. They * compare eternity to the motion oi^^ a point running on for * ever, and making a tracelefs infinite line, He-e tlie point is * iuppofed a thing actually lubfilUng, reprefenting the prefent •minute; and then they afcribe motion or fucceflion to it : * that is, they afcribe-raotion to a mere nonentity, to illaftrate . * to us a fuccefTjve eternity, made up of finite fuccefTive parts. * If once we adow an alUptrtett mind, which hath an eternal, * immutable and infinite comprchenfion of all things, always * (and allow it we mull) the diiiin6iion of pall and future van- * ifhes with lefpecl to fuch a mind. — In a word, if wc pro- * cced flep by Hep, as above, the eternity or exiflence of the ' Dciiv will appear to be VtUe inter minabllis, tota, Jimul & * perjccia po/pjjio ; how much foever iliis n).yy have been a * paradox huijerto." Enquiry into the Nature of the IIumai% Soul. Vol. II, 409, 4:0, 411. Edit 3. S2 3^4 0/ God's placing di^crently Part IV. in one cafe rs the other ; and there as equal reafon in each cafe, to fiippofe that our imagination de- ceives us. It is equally improper to talk of months andj^earsof the Divine Exiftence, and mile-fquaresof Deity : and we equally deceive ourfelves, when we talk of the world's being differently fix'd with refpecl to either of thefe forts of meafures. I think, we know not what we mean, if we fay, the world might have been differently placed from what it is, in the broad expanfe of infinity : or, that it might have been differently fixed in the long line of eternity : and all arguments and obje6lions, which are built on the imaginations we are apt to have of infinite exten- fion or duration, are buildings founded on (hadows, or caftles in the air. 2. The fecond argument, to prove that the Mod High wills one thing rather than another, without any fuperior fitnefs or preferabieneis in the thing preferred, is God's actually placing in different parts of the world, particles, or atoms of matter, that are perfeftly equal and alike. The forementioned au- thor fays, p. 78, &c. " If one would defcend to the ** minute fpecific particles, of which different bodies *' are compofed, we ffiould fee abundant reafon to *' believe, that there are thoufands of fuch little par- ** tides, or atoms of matter, which are perfectly equal ** and alike, and could give no diftin6l determina- ** tion to the Will of God, where to place them." He there inftances in particles of water, of which there are fuch immenfe numbers, which compofe the rivers and oceans of this world ; and the infinite myriads of the luminous and fierv particles, which compofe the body of the Sun ; fo many, that it would be very unreafonable to fuppofe no two of them (hould be exa6lly equal and alike. Anfzu. (1.) To this I anfwcr : tliat as we muff fup- pofe matter to be infinitely divifible, it is very un- likely, that any two, of all thefe panicles, are exa6l- Sea. VIII. ^mihr Particles. " 315 ly equal and alike ; To unl'kely, that it is a thoufand to one, yea, an infinite number to one, but it is oth- erwiCe : and that although we fhould allow a great fimilaiity between the dilTerent parricles of water and lire, as to their general nature and figure; and however fmall we fuppofe thole particles to be, it is infinitely unlikely, that any two of them fhould be exactly equal in dimenfions and quantity of matter. If we fhould fuppofe a great many globes of the fame nature with the globe of the earth, it would be very flrange, if there were any two of them that had ex- actly the fame number of particles of duft; and water in them. But infinitely lefs ftrange, than that two particles of light fhould have juft the fame quantity of matter. For a panicle of light, according to the doftrine of the infinite divifibility of matter, is com- pofed of infinitely more affignable parts, than there are particles of duft and water in the globe of the earth. And as it is infinitely unlikely, that any two of thefe particles fliould be equal; fo it is, that they Ihould be alike in other refpeds : to inftance in the configuration of their furfaces. If there were very many globes, of the nature of the earth, it would be very unlikely that any two fhould have exa6lly the fame number of particles of duft, water and ftone, in their furfaces, and ail pofiied exaftly alike, one with refpecl to another, without any difference, in any part difcernable either by the naked eye or mi- crofcope ; but infinitely lefs ftrange, than that two particles of light fiiould be perfedly of the fame figure. For there are infinitely more affignable real parts on the fuiface of a particle of light, than there are particles of duft, water and flone, on the furface of the terreftrial Globe. Anfiv, (2.) But then, fuppofmg that there are two particles, or atoms of matter, pevfedly equal and a- like, which God has placed in different parts of the creation ; as I will not deny it to be pofiible for God 3i6 0/ God's placing (I'l^erently Part IV. to make two bodies perfe6liy alike, and put them in difFerent places ; yet it will not follow, that two dif- ferent or diflintl acts or effecls of the Divine Power have exadtly the fame fitnefs for the fame ends. For thefe two different bodies are not difFerent or diftinft, in any other refpetls than thofe wherein they differ : they are two in no other refpeSls than thofe wherein there is a diffc^rence. If they are perfeQly equal and alike in thcmfclvcs, then they can be diftinguifhed, or be diflin6l;, "only in tJiofe things which are called C2?-- cumjiances ; as place, tims, reft, motion, or fome oth- er prefent or paft circumftances or relations. For it is difference only that conftitutes dillinQion. If God makes two bodies, in themfelves every way equal and alike, and agreeing perfedly in all other circum- ftances and relations, but only their place ; then in this only is their any diftinQion or duplicity. The figure is the fame, the meafure is the fame, the fo- lidity and refiflancd are the fame, and every thing the fame, but only the place. Therefore what the Will of God determines, is this, namely, that there Ihould be the fame figure, the (ame extenfion, the .fame re fi fiance, &c, in two difFerent places. And for this determination he has fome reafon. There is fome end, for which fuch a determination and a61: has a peculiar fitncfs, above all other a6ls. Here is no one thing determined without an end, and no one thing without a fitnefs for that end, fuperior to any thing elfe. If it be the pleafure of God to caufe the fame refiftance, and the fame figure, to be in two different places and fituations, we can no more jufl- ]y argue from it, that here muft be fome determina- tion or a6t of God's Will, that is v/holly without mo- tive or end, then we can argue, that whenever, in any cafe it is a man's Will to fpeak the fajiie words, or make the fame founds at two different times; there mufl be fome determination or a61 of Jns Will, ' Se6l. VIII. rimU3.r Pariicles. 317 without any motive or end. The difFcvence cf place, in the former cafe, proves no more than the dilFcr- ence of time does in the other. If any one fhould fay, v/ith regard to the former cate, that there niuft be fomething without an tud, viz. that of thofe t'.vo fimilar bodies, this in pariicuiar fhould be made ia this place, and the other in the other, and ftioaid in- quire, why the Creator did not make them in a tranf- pofition, vvheii both arc alike, and each would equal- ly have fuited either place ? The inquiry fuppofes fomething that is not true, namely, that the two bo- dies differ and are diflm*'^ in other refpeds befides their place. So that with this diflintlion, inherent in them, they might, in their fiifl creation, have been tranfpofed, and each might \\d\Q. begun its exiftence in the place of the other. Let us, for clearntfii fake, fuppofe, that God had, at the beginning, made two globes, each of an inch diameter, both pcrfe6l fpheres, and peifedly folid, without pores, and perfectly alike in every refpe6i, and placed them near one to another, one tov/ards the right hand, and the other towards the left, with- out iiny difference as to time, niofion or reil, pafl or prefent, or any circumftance, but only their place ; and the queltion (hould be afked, why God in their creation placed them fo ? Why that which is made on the right hind, v/as not made on the lefc, ancj vice verfa ? Let it be v;ell coniidered, whether there be any fcnfc in fuch a queftion ; and whether the inquiry does not fuppofe fomething falfe and ab- furd. Let it be confidered, what the Creator mufi; have done otherwife than he did, what different a61: of Will or power he mufl have exerted, in order to the thing propofed. All that could have been done, would have been to have made two fpheres, perfeCl- ]y alike, in the fame places where he has made them, wiihout any difference of the things made, cither in 3i8 0/GoDS choofmg amojig like Things, P. IV. themfelves or in any circumftance ; fo that the whole eflPeft would have been without any difference, and, therefore, juft the fame. By the fuppofition, the two fpheres are different in no other refpe6l but their place : and therefore in nso other refpeds they are the fame. Each has the fame roundnefs ; it is not a diftind rotundity, in any other refpeft but its fituation. There are, alfo, the fame dimenfions, dif- fering in nothing but their place. And fo of their refiftance, and every thing elfe that belongs to them. Here, if any choofes to fay, *'that there is a dif- ference in another refpeft, viz. that they are not NUMERICALLY the fame : that is thus with all the qualities that belong to them : that it is confeffed they are, in fome refpe6ls, the fame ; that is, they are both exa6lly alike ; but yet numerically they dif- fer. Thus the roundnefs of one is not the fame nu^ merical individual roundnefs with that of the other." Let this be fuppofed ; then the queflion about the determination of the Divine Will in the affair, is, why did God Will, that this individual roundnefs Hiould be at the right hand, and the other individual roundnefs at the left ? Why did not he make them in a contrary pofition ? Let any rational pei fon conlid- er, whether fuch queftions be not words without a meaning ; as much as if God (hould fee fit for fome ends, to caufe the fame founds to be repeated, or made at tvvo different times ; the founds being per- fe6tly the fame in every other rerpe6t, but only one was a minute after the other • and it fhould be aflced, upon it, why God caufcd thefe founds, numericallv different, to fuccecd one the other in fuch a manner ? Why he did not make that individual found, which was in tlie fiirt minute, to be in the fecond ? And the individual found of the laff minute to be in the firil ; which inquiries would be even ridiculous ; as, 1 think, every pcrfon mull fee, at once, in the cafe Sc£l. VIII. and Things o/" trivial D'lfferenu. 319 propofed of two founds, being only the fame repeat- ed, abfolutely without any difFerence, but that one circumllance of time. If the Mofl High fees it will anfwer fome good end, that the fame found fhould be made by lightning at two di[lin6i times, and therefore Wills that it fhould be lb, muft it needs therefore be, that herein there is fome a6l of God's Will without any motive or end ? God faw fit of- ten, at diflin6l times, and on different occafions, to fay the very fame words to Mofes, namely, thofe, / am Jehovah. And would it not be unreafonable to infer, as a certain confcquence, from this, that here muft be fome acl or ads of the Divine Will, in de- termining and difpofmg thefe words exaQly alike, at different times wholly without aim or induce- ment ? But it would be no more unreafonable than to fay, that there muft be an a61; of God's without any inducement, if he fees ic beft, and, for fome reafons, determines that there ftiall be the fame re- fiftance, the fame dimenfions, and the Tame figure, in feveral diftindl places. If, in the inftance of the two fpheres, perfe6lly alike, it be fuppofed poffible that God might have made them in a contrary pofition ; that which is made at the right hand, being made at the left ; then I aflc, Whether it is not evidently equally poffible, if God had made but one of them, and that in the place of the right hand globe, that he might have made that numerically different from what it is, and numerically different from what he did make it ; though perfedly alike, and in the fame place: and at the fame time, and in every refpe6l, in the fame circumftances and relations ? Namely, Whether he might not have made it numerically the fame with that which he has now made at the left hand; and fo have left that which is now created at the right hand, in a ftate of non-exiftence? And, if fo, wheth- 320 Of Gods choofing among like 7hings, P. IV. er it would not have been poffible to have made one in that place, perfe6tly like ihcfe, and yei nu- merically differing from both ? And let it be con- lidered, whether, from this notion of a numerical difference in bodies, perfe6ily equal and alike, which numerical difference is fomething inherent in the bo- dies themfelves, and diverle from the difference of place or time, or any circumffance whatfoever; it will not follow, that there is an infinite number of numerically different poilible bodies, perfe6lly alike, among which God chocfes, by a felf- determining power, when he goes about to create bodies. Therefore let us put the cafe thus : fuppofing that God, in the beginning, had created but one perfe6l- ly folid fphere, in a certain place; and it fliould be inquired, Why God created that individual fphere, in that place, at that time? And why he did not create another fphere perfc6lly like it, but numeri- cally dilFerent, in the fame place, at the fame time ? Or why he chofc to bring into being there, that ve- ry body, rather than any of the infinite number of other bodies, perfeQly like it ; either of v/hich he .could have made there as well, and would have an- fwcrcd his end as v;ell? Why he caufed to exift, at that place and time, that individual loundnefs, rath- er than any other of the infinite number of individ- ual rotundities juff like it ? Why that individual refj fiance, rather than any other of the infinite num.- . bcr of poflible refinances jull like it ? And it might \ as leafonably be adsed, Why, when God fiiR caufed \ it to thunder, he caufed that individual found then lo be made, and not another jufl like it ? W"hy did lie make choice of this very lound, and rejecl all the infinite number of other poffible founds jufl like it, but numerically differing from it, and all differing one from another ? I tliink, cveiy body mull be fen- fibl'j of the abfuidii}' and nonlenle ul v. lut is fuppof- Sc6l. VIII. and Things of trivial Bijercnce, 321 ed in fuch enquiries. Anr], if we calmly attcn';] to the matter, we (hill be convinced, thaf: all fuch kind of objetiiions as 1 am anfwering, are founded on nothing but the inipeifedion of our m;inner of con- ceiving things, and the obfcurenefs of language, and great want of cleaniefs and prccilion in the fignifica- lion of terms. If any (liall find fault with this reafoning, that it is going a great length into metaphyseal niceties and fubtihies ; I anfwer, the obje6iion which they are in reply to, is a metaphyficai fubtilty, and mud be treat- ed according to the nature of it.'^* II. Another thing ailedged is, that innumerable things which are determined by the Divine Will, and chofen and done by God rather than others, differ from thole that are not chofen in fo inconliderable a manner, that it would be unreafonable to fuppofe the difference to be of any conlequence, or that there is any fuperior fitnefs or goodnei's, that God can have refpecl to in the determination. To which I anfwer; it is impodible for us to de- termine, with any certainty or evidence, that becaufe the difference is very fmall, and appears to us of no confideration, therefore there is ablolutely no fupe- rior goodnefs, and no valuable end, which can be propofed by the Creator and Governor of the world, in ordering fuch a difference. The forementioned author mentions many inftances. One is, there be- ing one atom in the whole univerfe more or lefs. But, I think, it would be unreafonable to fuppofe, that God made one atom in vain, or without any end or motive. He made not one atom, but what was a woik of his Almighty Power, as much as the * •• For men to have recourfe to fubtlUies, in raifing dlffi- ** cuhies, and then complain, that they fhoiild be taken off by ** minutely examining thefe fubtihies, is a ftrange kind of *' procedure." Nature of the Human Sou!, vol. 2. p. ^'^i* T2 522 0/ God's chocfing among (mall Matters, P. IV. whole globe of the earth, and requires as much of a conftant exertion of Almighty Power to uphold it; and was made and is upheld underftandingly, and on defign, as much as if no other had been made but that. And it would be as unreafonable to fuppofe, that he m Ade it without any thing really aimed at in fo doing, as much as to fuppofe, that he made the planet Jupiter without aim or defign. It is poffib'e, that the mofl: minute efFe6ls of the Creator's power, the fmallefl aflignable difFerence be- tween the things which God has made, may be at- tended, in the whole feries of events, and the whole compafs and extent of their influence, with very greaC and important confequences. If the laws of motion and gravitation, laid down by Sir I faac Newton, hold univerfally, there is not one atom, nor the leafh af- Cgnable part of an atom, but what has influence, every moment, throughout the whole material uni- verfe, to caufe every part to be otherwife than it would be, if it were not for that particular corporeal exiftence. And however the effe£t is infenfible for the prefent, yet it may, in length of time, become great and important. To illuftrate this, let us fuppofe two bodies mov- ing the fame v/ay, in fl:raight lines, perfedly parallel one to another ; but to be diverted from this parallel courfe, and drawn one from another, as much as might be by the attra6kion of an atom, at the diftance of one of the furthefl, of the fixed fl;ars from the earth ; thefe bodies being turned out of the lines of their par- allel motion, will, by degrees, get further and further diftant, one from the other; and though the diftance may be imperceptible for a long time, yet at length it may become very great. So the revolution of a planet round the fun being retarded or accelerated, and the orbit of its revolution made greater or lefs, »nd more or lefs elliptical, and fo its periodical time 3e6l. VIII. Ncceffity confijlent with iito. Grace, 323 longer or Oiorter, no more than may be by the influ- ence of the leaft atom, might, in length of time, per- form a whole revolution fooner or later than other- ivife it would have done ; which might make a vaft alteration with regard to millions of important events. So the influence of the Icafl. particle may, for ought we know, have fuch efFe6l on fomething in the con- flitution of fome human body, as to caufe another thought to aiife in the mind at a certain time, than otherwife would have been ; v/hich, in length of time, (yea, and that not very great) might occafion a vafl; alteration through the whole world of man- kind. And fo innumerable other v/ays might be mentioned, wherein the leafl: affignable alteration may poflibly be attended with great confequences. Another argument, which the forementioned author brings againft a necelTary determination of the Di- vine Will, by a fuperior htnefs, is, that fuch doc- , trine derogates from the frtenefs of God's grace and goodnefs, in choofmg the objedls of his favour and bounty, and from the obligation upon men to thank- fulnefs for fpecial benefits. P. 89, ^c. In anfwer to this obje6lion, I would obferve, 1. That it derogates no more from the goodnefs of God, to fuppofe the exercife of the benevolence of his nature to be determined by wifdom, than to fuppofe it determined by chance^ and that his favours are beflowed altogether at random, his Will being determined by nothing but perfe6i accident, without any end or defign whatfoever ; which mufl; be the cafe, as has been demonftrated, if volition be not de- termined by a prevailing motive. That which i» owing to perfeft contingence, wherein neither pre- vious inducement, nor antecedent choice has any hand, is not owing more to goodnefs or benevolence, than that which is owing to the influence of a wife end. 324 NeCcITity confijlent with free Grace, Part IV. 2, It is acknowledgecl, that if the motive that de- termines the Will of God, in the cliuice of the obje6ls of his favours, be any moral quahty in the object:, recorninending that obje6l to his benevolence above others, his choclirig that objr6l is not fo great a man- ifeitationof the freenefsand lovereignty of his grace, as if it vveie otheruife. But there is no NeceQicy of fuppofing this, in order to oar fuppoling that he has fome wife end in view, in determining to beltovv his favours on one perfon rather than another. We are to difl-inauifh between the merit of the ohjeB of God's favour^ or a moral qualihcation of the object attraQ:- ing that favour and recommending to it, and the natural Jitnefs of fuch a determination of the aJl of God's goodntjs, to aiifwer fome wife defign of his own, fome end in the view of God's omnifcience. It is God's own a6t, that is the proper and immediate object of his volition, 3. I fuppofe that none will deny, but that, in fome initances, God 2idiS from wife defign in determining the particular fubje6^s of his favours : none wiil fay, I prefume, that when God diftinguilhes, by his boun- ty, particular focieties, or perfons, Me never, in any inRancc, exercifes any wifdom in fo doing, aiming at fome happy confequence. And, if it' be not de- nied to be fo in fome m fiances, then I would enquire, whether, in ihefe inflances, God's goodnefs is \th manifeilcd, than in thofe wherein God has no aim or end at all ? And whether the fubjeds have lefs caufe of thankfulnefs ? And if fo, who fhall be thankful for the bellowment of diflinguifliing mercy, wirh that enhancing circumftance of the diflindtion's being made without an end ? How fnail it be known when God is ii.flurnced by feme wife aim, and when not? It is very manifeft, with rcfped to the Apolfle Paul, that God had wife ends in choofing him to be a chriRian and an Apoflle, who had been a perfecutor, Se£l. VIII. Of Arminian Fatality. 325 Sec. The Apoftleliimfelf mentions one end. 1 Tim. i. 15, 16. Chrijl Jefus came into the world to Javcfin^ nets, vfwhom I am chief. Ilozvheit, for this canfe I cb- tained mercy, that in rnefiyjl, Jefus Chrift vii^ht Jhcro forth all long-fujfering, for a pattern to them who Jhould hereafter believe on Ilim to life everlajling. But yet ihe Apoille never looked on it as a diminution of the freedom and riches of Divine Grace in his election, which he fo often and lo greatly magnihes. This brings me to obferve, 4. Our fuppofing fuch a moral neceffity in the a6ls of God's Will, as has been fpoken of, is fo far from necelFarily derogating from the riches of God's grace to fuch as are the chofen objeds of his favour, that, in many inftances, this moral neceffity may arife from goodnefs, and from the great degree of it. God may choofe this objeQ rather than another, as having a fuperior fitnefs to anlwer the ends, defigns and inclinations of his goodnefs ; being more finiul, and fo more miierable and neceiTitous than others; the inclinations of Infinite Mercy and Benevolence may be more gratified, and the gracious defign of God's fending his Son into the world, may be more abundantly anfwered, in the exercifes of mercy to- wards fuch an objedl;, rather than another. One thing more I would obferve, before I finidij wbat I have to fay on the head of the Neceffity of! the a6h of God's Will ; and that is, that fomethingj much more like a fervile fubjedion of the Divine' Being to fatal Neceffity, will follow from Arr/iinia^^ principles, than from the do«^rines which they op^ pofe. For they (at lead mofl of them) fuppofe, with refpe£l to all events that happen in the moral world, depending on the volitions of moral agents, which are the mofl important events of the univerfe, to which all others are fubordinate ; I i^y, they fup- pofe, with refpe£l to thefe, that God has a certain .J26 OJ Arm'inian Fatality. Part IV. foreknowledge of them, antecedent to any purpofes or decrees of his about theni. And if fo, they have a fixed certain futurity, prior to any deiigns or vo- litions of his, and independent on them, and to which his volitions muft be fubje6t, as he would wifely accommodate his affairs to this fixed futurity of the (late of things in the moral world. So that here, inftead of a moral necefiiry of God's Will, arifing from, or confiding in, the infinite perfcv^ion and bleffednefs of the Divine Being, we have a fixed unalterable (late of things, properly di(lin6l from the perfect nature of the Divine Mind, and the ftate of the Divine Will and Defign, and entirely indepen- dent on thefe things, and which they have no hand in, becaufe they are prior to them ; and which God's Will is truly fubjed ro, being obliged to conform or accommodate himfelf to it, in all his purpofes and decrees, and in every thing he does in his difpofals and government of the world ; the moral world be- ing the end of the natural : fo that all is in vain, that is not accotnmodated to that ftate of the moral world which confifts in, or depends upon, the a6b and ftate of the wills of moral agents, which had a fixed futu- rition from eternity. Such a fubje6lion to neceflity as this, would truly argue an inferiority and fervi- tude, that would be unworthy the Supreme Being ; and is much more agreeable to the notion which many of the heathen had of Fate, as above the gods, than that moral neceflity of fitnefs and wifdom which has been fpoken of ; and is truly repugnant to the abfolute fovereignty of God, and inconfiftent with the fuprcmacy of his Will ; and really fubjeds the Will of the Moft High, to the Will of his creatures, and brings hira into dependence upon them. Sea. IX. OJ the Objeaion ahoiU, ^c. 327 Section IX. Concerning that OhjeBion againji the DoBrine which has been maintained^ that it makes GOD the Author of Sin. It is urged by Arminians, that the do6lrine of the neceffity of men's volitions, or their neceffary con- nexion v/ith antecedent events and circumllances, makes the firft caufe, and fupreme orderer of all things, the Author of Sin ; in that he has fo confli- tuted the Rate and courfe of things, that finful vo- litions become neceil^iry, in confequence of his dif- pofal. Dr. Whitby, in his Difcourfe on the Free- dom of the Will,* cites one of the antients, as on his fide, declaring that this opinion of the necelfity of the Will " abfolves Sinners, as doing nothing of ** their own accord which was evil, and would caft ** all the blame of all the wickednefs committed ia *' the world, upon God, and upon his Providence, ** if that were admitted by the affertors of this fate ; *' whether he himfelf did neceflitate them to do thefe ** things, or ordered matters fo, that they (liouid be " conftrained to do them by fome other caufeJ' And the do6tor fays, in another place, t *• In the na- ** ture of the thing, and in the opinion of philofa. ** phers, cavfa deficiens, in rebus necejfariis, ad caufam " per fe ejficientem rediicenda tjl. In things necetlary ** the deficient caufe mud be reduced to the efficient. " And in this cafe the reaion is evident ; becaufe " the not doing what is required, or not avoiding " what is forbidden, being a defeft, mufl follow fiom *' the pofifion of the neceffary caufe of that defi- ** ciency." * On the Five Points, p. 361. + Ibid, p. 486. 328 Ofth Objeaion ahout Part IV, Concerning this, I would obfervc the following things. I. If there be any difficuhy in this matter, it is noth- iniT pecuhar to this fchcme ; it is no difficuhy or difadvantage, wherein it is diftinguilhed from the Ichemeof Arminians ; and, therefore, not reafonably objc6led by them. Dr. Whitby fuppofes, that if Sin neceffarily fol- lows from God's withholding afliftance, or if that aflTiftance be not given, which is abtolately necefTdry to the avoiding of evil ; then, in the nature of the thing, God muil be as properly the Author of that evil, as if he were the elBcient caufe of it. From whence, according to what he himfelf fays of the devils and damned fpirits, God muft be the proper Author of their perfect unrellrained wickednefs : ha mull be the efficient caufe of the great pride of the devils, and of their perfc6l malignity againfl God, ChrifL, his taints, and all that is good, and of the infatiable cruelty of their difpohtion. For he allows, that God has fo forfaken them, and does fo withhold his afTidance from them, that they are incapaciated from doing good, and determined only to evil.* Our dodrine, in its confequence, makes God the Author of men's Sin in this world, no more, and in no other fenfe, than his doctrine, in its confequence, makes God the Author of the hellifli pride and mal- ice of the devils. And doubllefs the latter is as odi- ous an efFcft as the former. Aagam, if it \viU folloio at all, that God is the Author of Sin, from what has been fuppofed of a fure and infallible connexion between antecedents and conftquents, it vfiW follow becaiife oj this, viz. that for God to be the Author or Ordererof thole things which, he knows before-hand, will infallibly be at- tended with fuch a confequence, is the fame thing, « On the Five Points, p. 302, 305. SeQ. IX. How GOD is concerned, &c. 329 in e[Fe6l, as for him to be the Author of that confe- quence. But, if this be fo, this is a difficulty which equally attends thedodrineof y^rmniz^Tzs themfclves ; at leaft, of thofe of them who allow God's certain fore- knowledge of all events. For, on the fuppo- fition of fuch a fore-knowledge, this is the cafe with refpedl to every fm that is committed: God knew, that if he ordered and brought topafs fuch and fuch events, fuch fins would infallibly follow. As for inftance, God certainly foreknew, long before Judas was born, that if he ordered things fo, that there ihould be fuch a man born, at fuch a time, and at fuch a place, and that his life iliould be p'-efcrvcd, and that he lliould, in Divine Providence, be led in- to acquaintance with Jefus ; and that his heart (hould be fo influenced by God's Spirit of Provi- dence, as to be inclined to be a follovvrer of ChriO: ; and that he fhould be one of thofe twelve, which Ihould be chofen conllantly to attend him as his fam- ily ; and that his health fliould be preferved. fo that he fhould go up to Jerufalem, at thelaO: PafToverin ChriPt's life ; and it ihould be fo ordered, that Judas lliould fee Chrifl's kind treatment of the woman which anointed him at Bethany, and have that re- proof from Chrifl, which he had at that time, and fee and hear other thinas, which excited his enmity againft his Mafler, and other circumflances Oiould be ordered, as they were ordered ; it would be what would mod certainly and infallibly follow, that Ju- das would betray his Lord, and would foon after hang himfelf, and die impenitent, and be fent to hell, for his horrid wickednefs. Therefore, this fuppofed difficulty ought not to be brought as an objection againft the Icheme which has been maintained, as difagreeirg v/iih the Arminian fcheme, feeing it is no difficulty ov/ing to fuch a difagrecment ; but a difficulty wherein the Arminians V 2 330 How GOD is concerned , Part IV. fhare with us. That rnuft be unreafonably made an objc6lion agaiiift our differing from ihem, which we (liouhl not efcape or avoid at all by agrc-ing with them. And therefore I would obfeive, II. They who object, that this docirine makes God the Author of Sin, ought diRindly to explain what they mean by that phrafe, The Author of Sin, I know the phrafe, as it is commonly ufed, hgtiifies fomething very ill. If by the Author of Sin. be meant the Sinner, the Agent, or Atlor of Sin, or the Doer of a wicked thing ; fo it would be a reproach and blaf- phemy, to fuppofe God to be the Aurhor of Sin, In this fenfe, I utterly deny God to be the Aurhor of Sin ; reje6iing fuch an imputation on the Moll High, as what is infinitely to be abhorred ; and deny any (uch thing to be the confequence of what I have laid down. Bat if, by the Author of Sin, is meant the peimitter, or not a hinderer of Sin ; and, at the lame time, a difpofer of the Hate of events, in fuch a manner, for wife, holy, and moft excellent ends and purpofes, that Sin, if it be permitted or not hin- dered, will mod certainly and infallibly follow : I fay, if this be all that is meant, by being the Author of Sin, I do not deny that God is the Author of Sin, (though I diflike and reje6l the phrafe, as that which by ule and cuflom is apt to carry another fenfe) it is no reproach for the Moft Hioh to be thus the Auth- or of Sin. This is not to be the Aclor of Sin, but, on the contrary, ofholinefs. What God doth herein, is holy ; and a glorious cxercife of the infinite ex- cellency of his nature. And, I do not deny, that God's being thus the Author of Sin, follows from what I have laid down ; and, I adert, that it equally follows from the dodiine which is maintained by moll of the Arminian divines. That it is mofl certainly fo, that God is in fuch a Sc6?. IX. in the Exi fierce of Sin. 331 manner the Difpofcr and Orderer of Sin, is evidenf, ; if any credit is to be given to the Scripture ; as well as becaufe it is impoirible, in the nirnre of things, to be oihcrwifc. In luch a manner God ordered the obliinacy of Pharaoh, in his refufing to obey God's commands, to let the people go. Exod. iv. 21. / zoiil hardtn his hearty and he fnall not let the people go. Chap. vii. 2 — 5. Aaron thy brother faall [peak unto Pharaoh, that he fend the children of Ijrad out of his land. And 1 will harden Pharaoh's heart, and multi" ply myfgns and my wonders in the land of Egypt. But Pharaoh Jhall not hearken unto you ; that I may lay mint hand upon Egypt, by great judgraents. Sec, Chap. ix. a 2. And the Lord hardened the heart of Pharaoh, and he hearkened not unto ihein, as the Lord had fpoken unto Mofes. Chap. x. i, 2. And the Lord faid unto Mofes, Go in unto Pharaoh ; forL have hardened his heart and the heart of his fervants, that I might f hero thefe my figns before him, and that thou mayfl tell it in the ears of thy fon, and thy fon's fon, what things L have wrought in Egypt, and myfigns zvhich I have done amongjl them, that ye may know that I am the I^ord, Chap. xiv. 4. And I will harden Pharaoh's heart, that he f mil follow after them : and L will be honoured upon Pharaoh, and upon all his Hofl. Ver. 8. And the Lord hardened the heart of Pharaoh King of Egypt, and he purfaed after the Children of Ijrael. And it is certain, that in fuch a manner God, for wife and good ends, ordered that event, Jofeph's being fold into Egypt, by his breth- ren. Gen. xlv. 5. Now, therefore, be not grieved, nor angry with y our f elves, that ye fold me hither ; for God did fend me before you to prefer ve life. Ver. 7, 8. Goi did fend me before you to prefcrve a pofierity in the ec. iji, and to fave your lives by a great deliverance : fo that nox^ it was not you, that fent 7ne hither, but God. Pfal. cvii. 17. He fent a man before them, even Jofeph, ZL/ho was fold for ajervant. It is certain, that thus God order- 332 How GOD is conurned Part IV. ed the Sin and folly of Sihon King of the Amorites, in refufing to let the people of llrael pafs by him peaceably. Deut. ii. 30. But Sihon King of Htjhhon -would not Id us pafs by him ; for the Lord thy God hard^ cned his fpirit, and made his heart ohjlinaie, that he might deliver him into thin3 hajid. It is certain, that God thus ordered the Sin and folly of the Kings of Canaan, that they attempted not to make peace with Ifrael, but, with a ftupid boldnefs and obflinacy, fet them- felves violently to oppofe them and their God. — ]ofh. xi. 20. For it xoas of the Lord, to harden their hearts, that theyjhould come ogainji Ifrael in battle, that he might defroy them utterly, and that they weight have no favour ; but that he might deJl>oy them, as the Lord commanded Mofes. It is evident, that thus God or- dered the treacherous rebellion of Zedekiah againfl the King of Babylon. }er. lii. 3. For through the anger cf the Lord it came to pafs in Jferufale-m, and Judahy until he had caft them out from his prefcnce, that Zedekiah rebelled againf the King of Babylon. So 2 Kings xxiv. 20. And it is exceedmg manifefl;, that God thus ordered the rapine and unrighteous ravag- es of Nebuchadnezzar, in fpoiling and ruining the nations round about. [er. xxv. 9. Behold, I wilt fend and take all the families of the noith,faith the Lord, and Nebuchadnezzar, my fervant, and will bring them againf this land, and agairfl all the nations round about ; and will utterly defiroy them, and make them an afonifh- mcnt, and an hiffmg, and perpetual defolations. Chap, xliii. 10, 1 I. / will fend and take Nebuchadnezzar the king of Babylon, my fervant : and I will fet his throne upon thefe Jlones that I have hid, and he fiall fpread his royal pavillion over them. And when he comtth, hefhall fmite the land of fgypt, and deliver futh as are for death to death, and Juch as are for captivity to captivity, and fuch as are for the fword to thefzuofd. Thus God re- prefents himfclf 2is fending for Nebuchadnezzar, and Se6l. IX. in the Exiftence of Sin. 333 taking of him and his armies, and bringing him againfl: the nations, which were to be deftroyed by him, to that very end, that he might utterly dcflroy them, and make them defolate ; and as appointing the work that he fliould do, fo particularly, that the very perfons were defigned that he fhould kill with ihe Iword, and thole that fliould be killed with famine and peflilence, and thofe that (hould be carried mto captivity ; and that in doing all thefe things, he fhould a6t as his fc^rvant ; by which, lefs cannot be intended, than that he fhould ferve his purpofes and defigns. And in fer. xxvii. 4, 5, 6 ; God declares, how he would caufe him thus to ferve his dcfigns, viz. by bringing this to pafs in his fovcrcigii .^if- pofal, as the great Polfcffor and Governor of rhe Univerfe, that difpofes all things j'.jfl as pleafcc bim. Thus faith the Lord of Hvjls, the God of Ifrael ; I have made the earth, the raan and the bcaft, that are ufjon the ground, by my great power, and my jlr etched cut arm, and have givQU it uiiio ivhom it feeriied meet unto me : and now I have given all theft lands unto ihe hands of Nebu- chadnezzar, MY SERVANT, and the bcafis of chc field have I given alfo to ferve hnn. And Nebuchadnezzar is Ipoken uf as doing theie things, by having his armsflrengiJiciicdhy God, and having God's f coord put into his hands, for this end, Ezek. xxx. 24, 25, 2(3. Yea, God fpeaks of his terrible ravaj^inir and waflincr the nations, and cruelly dcflroying all ibrts, without dillindlion of (ex or age, as the weapon in God's hand, and the inftriHrient of his indignation, which God makes ufe of to fulfil his own purpofes, and ex- ecute his own vengeance. Jer. li. 20, Sec. Thou art my batik- axe, and locapons of war : For with thee will I break in pieces the, nations, and zvith thee will 1 deftroy kingdoms, and with thee will 1 break in pieces the horfe and his rider, and zvith thee zuill I break m pieces the chariot and his r:d:r ; with thee alfo zuill I break in 334 How GOD is C07icerned Part IV. pieces T/ian and woman, and with thee will I break in pieces old and young, and with thee will I break in pieces the young man and the 7naid, &c. It is repre- lented, that the defigns of Nebuchadnezzar, and tho(e that defiroyed Jerufalem. never could have been nccomphfljed, had not God determined them, as well a^ they. Lam. iii. 37. IVho is he that faith, and it Cometh to pofs, and the Lord commandeth it not ? And yet the King of Babylon's thus deftroying the nations, and efpecialiy the Jetos, is fpoken of as his great wickednefs, for which Gv')d finally deftroyed him. Ifa. xiv. 4, 5, 6, 12. Hab. ii. 5-— 12, and Jer. chap. 1. and li. It is moll nianifell. that God, to feive his own dcfigns, providentially ordered Shiniei's curfing David. 2 Sam. xvi. 10, 11. The Lord hath Jaid unto him, curfe David — Let him curje^ for the Lord hath bidden him. It is certain, that God thus, for excellent, holy, gracious and glorious ends, ordered the faci: which they committed, who were concerned in Chriil's death ; and that therein they did but fulfil God's de- figns. As, 1 trull, no Chriflian v/ili deny it wi\s the defign of God, that Chrifl: Qiould^e crucijied, and that for this end, he came into the world. It is ve^ \y manifefl, by many Scriptures, that the whole af- fair of Chriil's crucifixion, with its circumftances, and the treachery of fudas, that made way for it, was ordered in God's Providence, in purfuance of Ills purpofe ; notwithftanding the violence that is ufed with thofe plain Scriptures, toobfcure and per- vert the fenfe of them, A6ls ii. 23. Hiin being de- livered, by the determinate counjel and fore knowledge of God,'* ye have taken^ and with wicked hands, have cru- * *• Grotiii*;, ?s well as Bcza, obferves, /^r^^^'-i^^yfj muft here "fjgnity decree ; and Eifner has fhewn that ii has that figni- *' fication, in approved Greek writers. And it is certain *' Ekaotos fignifi'js one given up into the hands oi an enemy." Podd. in Luc. SeOt. IX. in the Exiflcncc of Sui. 0'^< cijicd and jlain. Luke xxii. 21, 22. t But behold the hand oj him that bctraycth me, is with me on the tabic : and truly the Son of Man goeth, as it was determined, A6ls iv. 27, 28. For o/a truth, againjl the holy child JefitSy whom thou hafl anointed, both Herod, and Pontius Filate, with the Gentiles, and the people of Jfrael, vjere gathered together, for to do whatfoever thy hand and thy CGunfcl determined before to he done. A61s iii. 17, 18. And now, brethren, 1 wot that through ignorance ye did it, as did alfo your rulers : but thefe things, which God before had Jhcioed by the mouth of all hisprophrts, thct Chiifl fhuiddfvjfer, he hath fo fulfilled. So that whac thele murderers of Chrill did, is fpoken of as what God brought to pafs or ordered, and that by which lie fulfilled his own word. In Rev. xvii. 17, The agreeing of the Kings of the earth to give their kingdom to the bcajl, thou-^^h it was a very wicked thing m them, is fpokGU o^ -dn^a fu filling -God's Will, and what God had put into their hearts to da. It is manifeft, rliat God fometimes permits Sin to be committed, and at the fame time orders things (o, that if he permits the fact, it will come to pafs. be- caufe, on fome accounts, he fees it needful and of importance, that it fliould come fo pafs. Matr, xviii. 7. It mufl needs be, that offences co?/i: ; bui wo to that 7nan by whom the offence Cometh. AVith 1 Cor. xi. 19. For there r,iufl alfo be herefies among you, that thry which are approved may be made manifefi among you, f '* As this pafTage is not liable to the ambiguities, which *' fojnehave apprehended in Atls ii. 23, and iv. 1*8,' {'which •' yet fcem on the whole to be parallel to it, in tlicir rrioft na- "tuial con(hu6iion' 1 look upon it as an evident proof, that •» thele things are, in the language of Scripture, faid to be de- *' lerniined or decreed for exattly bounded and marked out ** by God, as the word (7 /-zzt? moit naturally fignifiesj which he *• fees in ia6i will happen, in confequeiice of his voliiions, " without any necclTitating agency ; as well as tk-ofe qyciw^^ *' of which he is properly the'duihor." Dodd. in Loc. 33^ ^'^ocu GOD is concerned Part IV. Tims it is certain znd demon flable, from the holy Scripnires, as well as the nature of things, and the princJoles of Aj-minians, that God permits Sin ; and at the lame time, fo orders things, in his Providence, that it certainly and infallibly will come to pafs, in confequence of his permiifion. I proceed to obfcrve in the next place, III. That there is a great difference between God's being concerned thus, by his permijfion, in an event and a;^t, which, in the inherent fubjeiSl and agent of it, is Sin, (though the event will certainly follow on hispermiflion) and his being concerned in it hy pro- ducing it and exerting the a6l of Sin ; or between his being the Orderer of its certain exiflence, by noi hindering \t^ under certain circumftances, and his be- ing the proper Aftor or Author of it, by a pofitive A^ gsncy or Efficiency, And this, notwithllanding what Dr. Whitby offers about a faying of philofophers, that caufa deficiens, in rebus neceffariis, ad caufain per fe efficientem reducenda ejl. As there is a vail dilFerence between the fun's being the caufe of the iightiomnefs and warmth of the atmoTphere, and brightnefs of gold and diamonds, by its prefence and pofitive in- fluence ; and its being the occafion of darknefs and frod, in the night, by its motion, v/hereby it dzU cends below the horizon. The motion of the fun is the occafion of the latter klad of events ; but it is not the proper c^ufe, efficient or producer of them ; though they are necefLirily confcquent on that mo- tion, under fuch circumftances : no more is any adion of the Divine Being the Caufe of the Evil of mtn's Wills. If the fun were the proper caufe of cold and darknefs, it would be ih^ fountain of thefc things, as it is ihe fountain of light and beat : and then fomething might be argued from the nature of cold and darknefs, to a likcnefs cf nature in the (an ; and it might be juflly inferred, that the fun itfeif is Sea. IX. in the Exiftence of Siju 337 dark and cold, and that his beams are black and frofty. But iiom its being the caufe no othcrwifc than by its departure, no fuch thing can be inferred, but the contrary ; it may jullly be argued, that the fun is a bright and hot body, if cold and darknefs are found 10 be the confequence of its withdraw- inent ; and the more conllantly and neceffarily thefa effetls are conneQed with, and con6ned to its ab- ience, the more ftrongly does it argue the fun to be the fountain of light and heat. So, inafmuch as Sin, is not the fruit of any pofitive agency or in- fluence of the Mod High, but, on the contrary, arif- cs from the withholding of his adion and energy, and, under certain circumilances, neceffarily follows on the want of his influence ; this is no argument that be is fmful, or his operation evil, or has any thing of the nature of evil ; but, on the contrary, that He; and his Agency, are altogether good and holy, and that He is the fountain of all Holinefs. It would be flrange arguing, indeed, becaufe men nev- er commit Sin, but only when God leaves them to ihemfelves, and neceffarily Sin, when he does fo, and therefore their Sin is not from themfdves but from God ; and fo, that God muff be a fmful Being ; as flrange as it would be to argi^e, becaufe it is always dark when the fun is gone, and never dark when the lun is prefent, that therefore all darknefs is from the fun, and that his difk and beams muff needs be black. IV. It properly belongs to the Supreme and Ab- folute Governor of the univerfe, to order all im- portant events within his dominion, by his wifdom : but the events in the moral world are of the moft important kind, fuch as the moral actions of intelli- gent creatures, and their conlequences. Thefe events will be ordered by fomething. They will either be difpofed by wifdom, or they will be W a 338 Hew GOD is concerned Pa it IV. difpofed by chance ; that is, they will be difpofed by blind and undeJigning caufes, if that v/erepoSible, and could be called a dilpofal. Is it not belter, tiiat (he good andevil which happens in God's world, ihouid be ordered, regulated, bounded and deter- mined by the good pleafure of an infinitely wife Being, who perfedly comprehends within his under- ilandmg and conftant view, the univerfality of things, in all their extent and duration, and fees all the influence of every event, with refpe6l to every individual thing and circumflance, throughout liie grind iyn:cm, and the whole of the eternal feries of confequences ; than to leave thefe things to fall out by chance, and to be determined by thofe caufes which have no underftanding or aim ? Doubtlefs, in thcfe important events, there is a better and a worfe, as to the time, fubje6f, place, manner and circum- ftances of their coming to pafs, with regard to their influence on the flate and courfe of things. And if there be, it is certainly bed that they (fiould be de- termined to that time, place, &c. which is beil. And therefore it is in its own nature fit, that wifdorn, and not chance, fhould order thefe things. So that; it belongs to the Being, who is the pofieiTor of in- finite Wildom, and is the Creator and Owner of the whole fyflern of created exillences, and has the care of all ; I fay, it belongs to him, to take care of this matter ; and he would not do what is proper for him, if he fhould negled it. And it is fo far from being unholy in him, to undertake this affair, that it would rather have been unholy to neglefl it ; as it would have been a negleding what fiily apper- tains to him ; and fo it would have been a very un- fit and unfuicable neglc6l. Therefore the fovereignty of God doubtlefs ex- tends to this matter : efpccially confidering, that if it fhould be fuppoled to be otherwife, and God Sc61. IX. in the Exiftence of Sin, 339 fliould leave men's volitions, and all moral events, to the determination and difpofition of blind un- meaning caufes, or they fiiould be left to happen perf(36tjy without a caufe ; this would be no more confident with liberty, in any notion of it, and par- ticularly not in the Arminian notion of it, than if thele events were fubjc61t to the dif'pofal of Divine Providence, and the Will of man were determined by circumdances which are ordered and difpofed by Divine wifdom ; as appears by w^hat has been alrea- dy obferved. But it is evident, that fiich a provi- dential difpofing and determining men's moral ac- tions, though it infers a moral necciTity of thofe ac- tions, yet it does not in the leafl infringe the real liberty of mankind ; the only liberty that common fenfe teaches to be neceffiry to moral agency, which, as has been demonftrated, is not inconfillent with fuch neceflitv. On the whole, it is manifeTc, that God may be, in the manner which has been defcribed, the Order- er and Difpofer of that event, which, in the inherent fubjecl and agent, is moral evil; and yet His fo doing may be no moral evil. He may Will the difpofal of fuch an event, and its coming to pafs for good ends, and his Will not be an immoral or finful Will, but a perfe6l holy Will. And he may adually, in his Providence, fo difpofe and permit: things, that the event may be certainly and infalli- bly conne£led with fuch difpofal and permifTion, and his a6l therein not be an immoral or unholy, but a perfectly holy a6l. Sin may be an evil thing, and yet that there fliould be fuch a difpofal and permiliion, as that it (liould covne to pafs, may be a good thing. This is no contradiction, or incon- fiflence. Jofepb's brethren's felling him into Egypt, confider it only as it was a£^ed by them, and with refpe6t to their views and aims which were evil. 340 OJ GOD'S fecret Part IV, was a very bad thing ; but it was a good thing, as it was ail event of God's ordering, and confidered with refpe^v to his views and aims which were good. Gen. 1. 20. As for you.ye thought Evil ogainjl me ; hut God meant it unto Good, So the crucifixion of Chrift, if we coniideronly thofe things which belong to the event as it proceeded from his murderers, and are comprehended within the compafs of the affair con- fidered as their a8:, their principles, difpcfitions, views and aims ; fo it vfdiS one of the ntoll hcnious things that ever was done ; in many refpeds the inofl: horrid of all a6ls : but confider it, as it was willed and ordered of God, in the extent of his de« figns and views, it was the rnoil admirable and glo- rious of all events ; and God's willing the event was the mofc holy volition of God, that ever \V3iS made knov/n to men ; and God's a6t in ordering it, was a divine a6l, which, above all others, manifefls the moral excellency of the Divine Being. The confideration of thefe things may help us to a fufficient anfwer to the cavils of Arminians, con- cerning what has been fuppofed by man- CalviniJIs^ .of a diiliTjdion between ;\ fecret and revealed Will of God, and their diverfity one from the other ; fup- pofing that the Calvinijls herein afcribe inconfiilent Wills to the Mofl High : which is without any foundation. God's fccrct and revealed Will, or, in other words, his difpojing and perieptivc Will, may be diverfc, and exerciied in dillimiiar a6ls, the one in difapproving and oppofing, the other in willing and determining, v/ithout any inconfi Hence. Be- caufe. although thefe dilfimilar exercifes of the Di- vine Will may, in Ibme refpcdls, relate to the {Amc things, yet, in ftritlnefs, they have different and contrary obje6ls, the one evil and the other good. Thus, for inllancc, the crucifixion of Chrift was a thing contrary to the revealed or perceptive Will of Seft. IX. and revealed Will. 341 God, becaufe, as it was vie^ved and done by his ma- lignant murderers, it was a thing infinitely contra- ry to the holy nature of God, and fo ncccfTruily con- trary to the holy inclination of his heart revealed in his law. Yet this does not at all hinder but that the crucifixion of Chrifl, confidered with all thofc glorious confcquences, which were within the view of the Divine Omnifcience, might be indeed, and therefore might appear to God to be, a glorious event ; and confcquenrly be agreeable to his Will, though this Will may be iecret, i. e. not revealed in God's law. And thus confidered, the crucifixion of Chriil was not evil but good. If the fccret ex- ercifes of God's Will were of a kind that is diffimi-' lar, and contrary to his revealed Will, refpcclirsg^ the fame, or like objecis ; if the objeds of both* were good, or both evil ; then, indeed, to afcribe contrary kinds of volition or inclination to God, rc- fpc6ling thefe objetls, would be to afcribe an incon- fiftent Will to God ; but to afcribe to him different; and oppolite exercifes of heart, refpe^ting different objeds, and objeds contrary one to another, is fo far from fuppofing God's W^ill to be inconfijlcnt with ^ itfelf, that it cannot be fuppofed confificnt with itfelf^' any other way. For any being to have a Will of choice rcfpeding good, and at the fame time, a Will of rejection and refufal refpe6ling evil, is to be very- confident : but the contrary, viz. to have the fame Will towards thefe contrary objeds, and to choofe and love both good and evil, at the fame time, is to be very inconfiltent. There is no inconfidcnce in fuppofing, that God may hate a thing as it is in itfeif, and confidered fimply as evil, and yet that it may be his Will it fhould come to pafs, confidering all confcquences. I believe, there is no pcrfon of good underftanding, who will venture to fay, he is certain that it is ira- 342 OJ GOD'S fLcret Part IV. poffible it ITiould be befl:, taking in the whole corn- pars and extent of exiilence, and all confequences in the cndlefs feries of events, that there (liould be fuch a thing as moral evil in the world.* And, if * Here are ^N'orthy to be obfcrvcrl fomc pa{raj:jcs of a late noted writer, of oar nation, that nobody ^^ ho is acquainted with him, wi!! fufpeft to be very iavourable to Calvimfm, * It is difiicult (fays he; to handle the necfjjity of evil in fuch * a manner, as not to Humble fuch as arc not above being * alarmed at propofitions which have an uncommon found. ' But if phiiolophers will but reflect calmly on the matter. * they will find, that confidently with the unlimitted power * of the Supreme Caufe, it may be faid, that in the be ft or- * dered fyflem, evils mu(f have place.' — Turnbull's Pkin. CIPLES of 7710 ral Phil ofo()hy, p. 337, 328. He is there (peak- ing of moral evils, as may be itQn. Again the fame Author, in his yZ'ca;?i t^/?/. entitled Chrifl tian Plulo[oph\\ p. 3^, has thefe words : 'If the Author and * Governor ot all thmgs be infinitely perfeCl, then whatever * is, is right ; of all poflible fyftems he hath chofen the bcft : * and coiilequently, tiiere is no abfolute evil in the univerle. — * This being the cafe, all the fecming imperjetllons or evils in * it are fuch only in a partial view ; and with refpe6l to the * whole fyiiem, thev are^^^^f.' Ibid, p. 37. * Whence then comes evil ? is the queftion that * "hath, in all ages, been reckoned the Gordian knot in philof- ' ophy. And, indeed, if we own the exiftence of evil in the * world in an ahjolute fenfe, we diametrically contradi6l what * hath been jutt now proved ot God. For if there beany * evil'm the fyilem, that is not good in refpe6l to the whole * then is the whole not good, but evil : or, at be ft, very im- * perfed ; and an Author muft be as his wurkmanflnp is ; as * is the effect, fuch is the caufe. But the folution of this * difficulty is at hand ; That there is no evil in the unive'fe. * What I Are there no pains, no imperfections ? Is there no * mifery, no vice in the world ? or are not thefe evils ? Evils * indeed they are ; that is, thofe of one fort are hurtful, and * thofe ot the other fort are equally hurtful, and abominable : * but they are not evil or mifchievous with refpeft to the * whole.' Ibid, p. 42. * But He is, at the fame time, faid to create * evil, daiknefs, confufion ; and yet to do no evil, but to be * the Authjr of good only. He is called the Father of lights. Se6l. IX. diid revealed WiiL 343 fo, it will certainly follow, that an infinitely v/ii'n Being, who always choofcs what is bed, muftchoore that there {liould be fuch a thing. And, it (o, then fuch a choice is not an evil, b-Jt a wife and holy choice. And if fo, then th?.t Providence which is agreeable to fuch a choice, is a wife and holy Prov- idence. Men do will fin as fin, and fo are the au- thors and adlors of it : they love it as fin, and for evil ends and purpofes. God does not will fin as fin, or for the fake of any thing evil; though it be his pleafure fo to order things, that He permitting, fin will come to pafs ; for the lake of the great good that by his difpofal fhall be the confequencc. His willing to order things fo that evil fhouid come to pafs, for the fake of the contrary good, is no argu- ment that He does not hate evil, as evil : and if fo, then it is no reafon why he may not reafonably for- bid evil, as evil, and punifti it as fuch. The Arminians themfelves mult be obliged, whether they v/ill or no, to allow a diilin6lion of God's Will, amounting to jud the fame thing that Calvini/i^ intend by their diftindion of a fecret and revealed Will. They muffc allow a diRindion of thofe things which God thinks bed flioaid be, con- lidering all circumftances and confequences, and fo are agreeable to his difpofing Will, and thofe things * the Author of every perfeB and good gift, zuitli whom there * is no vanabUvefs norJJiadou, of turning, who templclh no * man, huigtveth tc all max liberally, and upbraideth not. And ' * yet by the prophet ir^ias, He is introduced faying ot Hiiu- * felf, I form I'lght, and create darknej} ; I make peace, and ^ create evil : I the Lord, do all thfe things. What is the * meaning, the plain language of all this, but that the Lo:d * delighteth in goodnefs, and (as the ScripJuie fpeaksj evil * is his Jifange work ? He intends and pinfucs the iu)ive;fal * ^<9^ijf' ot his creation : and the evil which happens, is not * permitted tor its own lake, or ihroiwh any pleaiure in evil, * but becaufe it is rcquiliii; to {\\q greater good ^^uxiutdJ 344 Of GOD'S fecret Part IV. which he loves, and are aoreeable to his nature, in themfelves conlidered. vVho is there that will dare to fay, that the hcllifh pride, malice and cruelty of devils, are agreeable to God, and what He likes and approves ? and yet, I truft, there is no chrillian di- vine but ivhat will allow, that it is agreeable to God's Will To to order and difpofe things concern- ing them, To to leave them to themlelves, and give them up to their own wickednefs, that this perl^tl wickedneis fhould be a neceflfary confcquence. Be- fure Dr. Whitby's words do plainly iuppofe and allow it.* The following things may be laid down as max- ims of plain truth, and indifputable evidence. 1. That God is a perfeHly happy Being, in the moH abfolute and higheii lenfe polhble. 2. That it will follow from hence, that God is free from every thing that is contrary to happinefs ; and fo, that in (Iridl propriety of fpeech, there is no luch thing as any pain, grief, or trouble, in God. 3. When anv intelligent being is really eroded and difappointed, and things are contrary to what he truly defires, he is the Ufs pkafcd or has lefs pka- Jure, his pkafure and happinefs is diminijhcd, and he fulFers what is difagreeabie to him, or is the fubje6l of fomething that is of a nature contrary to joy and happinefs, even pain and grief.t From this lad axiom, it follows, that if no dif- tinCtion is to be admitted between God's hatred of fin, and his Will with re('pe6t to the event and the * Whitby on the five Points, Edit. 2. p. 300, 30,5, 309. + Certainly it is not Icfs abfurd and unreafonablc, to talk of God's Will and Defiies beinc^ truly and properly crolled, without his fufFering any uncafincfs, or any thing grievous or difagreeabie, than it is to tall; of foniethini^ that may be called a rcve.akd JFiU, which may, in foine rcfpttb, be different from a/t'cr/'t purpofe ; which purpofe may b-^ iulfilled, when the glIic*:" is oppolej. Sea. IX. and revealed Will, 345 exiftence of fin, as the all-wife Determiner of all events, under the view of all confcquenccs through the whole compafs and feries of things ; I fay, then it certainly follows, that the coming to pafs of eve- ry individual a6t of fin is truly, all things confider- ed, contrary to his Will, and that his Will is real- ly crofTed in it ; and this in proportion as He hates it. And as God's hatred of fin is infinite, by reafon of the infinite contrariety of his Holy Nature to fin ; fo his Will is infinitely crofTed, in every a6t of fin that happens. W^hich is as much as to fay. He endures that which is infinitely difagreeable to him, by means of every a6l of fin (hat He fees com-i mitted. And, therefore, as appears by the preced- ing pofitions. He endures truly and really, infinite grief or pain from every fin. And fo He mud be infinitely crofled, and fuiTer infinite pain, every day, in millions of millions of inftances: He mull con- tinually be the fubje6l of an immenfe number of real, and truly infinitely ^re^^i crolfes and vexations. W^hich would be to make him infinitely the moft miferable of all Beings. If any obje6lor fhould fay ; all that thefe things amount to, is, that God may do evil that good may come ; which is juftly efteemed immoral and finful in men ; and therefore may be jufl;ly efi;eemed in- confifl:ent with the moral perfections of God. I anfwer, that for God to difpofe and permit evil, in the manner that has been fpoken of, is not to do evil that good'may come ; for it is not to do evil at all. — In order to a thing's being morally evil, there mufi; be one of thefe things belonging to it : either it muft be a thing unjit and unfuiiable in its own nature ; or it mufi: have a bad tendency ; or it mufi: proceed from an evil difpofition^ and be done for an evil end. But neither of thefe things can be attributed to God's ordering and permitting fuch X 2 246 Of GOD*s fccret Part IV. events, as the immoral a6ls of creatures, for good ends, (i.j It is not unfit in its own nature^ that He fhould do To. For it is in its own narure j^^, that infinite wifdom, and not blind chance, fhould difpofe moral good and evil in the world. And it is Jit, that the Being who has infinite wijdorn, and is the IvLsker, Owner, and Supreme Governor of the world, fhould take care of that matter. And, therefore, there is no unfitnefs, or unfuiLablenefs in his doing it. It may be unlit, and fo immoral, for any other beings to go about to order this affair ; becaufe they are not pollefl'ed of a wifdom, that in any man- ner fits them for it ; and, in other refpe^s, they are not fit to be truiled wiili this afrair ; nor does it belong to them, they not being the owners and lords of the univerfe. We need not be afraid to afTirm, that if a wife and good man knew with abfolute certainty, it would be befl, all things confidered, that there fliould be fuch a thing as moral evil in the world, it would not be contrary to his wifdom and goodnefs, for him to choofe that it fhould be fo. It is no evil defire, to defire good, and to defire that which, all things confidered, is belt. And it is no unwifechoice, to choofe that that fhould be, which it is befl fhould be ; and to choofe the exiPience of that thing con- cerning which this is known, viz. that it is befl it Ihouid be, and fo is known in the whole to be moll worthy to be chofen. On the contrary, it would be a plain defe£l in wifdom and goodnefs, for him not to choofe it. And the real'bn why he might not order it, if he were able, would not be bccaufe he might not defire if, but only the ordering of that matter does not belong to h'm. But it is no harm for Him who is, by right, and in the greatefl pro- priety, the Supreme Orderer of all things, to order cvtry thing in fuch a manner, as it would be a Sea. IX. GJid revealed IVllL 347 point of wifdom in Ilim to choofe that they fliould be ordered. If it would be a plain defe6l of wif- dom and noodnefs in a Being, not to choofe that that ftiould be, which He certainly knows it would, all things confidered, be bed fliould be (as was but now obfervcd) then it mull be impoflible for a Be- ing who has no defeil of wifdom and goodnefs, to do otherwife than choofe it (hould be ; and that, for this very reafon, becaufe He is perfectly wife and good. And if it be agreeable to perfedl wif- dom and goodnefs for him to choofe that* it fhould be, and the ordering of all things fupremely and perfedly belongs to him, it mud be agreeable to in- finite wifdom and goodnefs, to order that it fliould be. If the choice is good, the ordering and difpof- ing things according to that choice mufl alfo be good. It can be no harm in one to whom it be- longs to do his Will in the armies of heave?!, and aiuongjt the inhabitants of the earth, to execute a good volition. If this Will be good, and the object ot his \Vi,ll be, all things confidered, good and bed, then the choof- ing or willing i^, is not willing evil that good may come. And if fo, then his ordering, according to that Will, is not doing evil, that good may come. 2. It is not of a bad tendency, for the Supreme Being thus to order and permit that moral evil to be, which it is bed diould come to pafs. For that it is of good tendency, is the very thing fuppofed in the point now in quedion. — Chrid's crucifixion, though a mod horrid faft in them that perpetrated it, was of mod glorious tendency as permitted and ordered of God. 3. Nor is there any need cf fuppofing it proceeds from any evil difpofiiion or aim : for by the fuppofi- tion, what is aimed at is good, and goud is the attual iifuCj in the final refult of things. 348 OJ Sins Erft Entrance Part IV Section X. Concerning Sin's fir ft Entrance into the World. 1 HE things, which have already been offered, may ferve to obviate or clear many of the obje61ions which might be raifed concerning Sin's firft coming into the world ; as though it would follow from the dodrine maintained, that God muft be the Auth- or of the firfl Sin, through his fo difpofing things, that it fhouid neceffarily follow from his permifTion, that the finful a6l fhouid be committed, 8cc. I need not, therefore, ftand to repeat what has been faid already, about fuch a necefTity's not proving God to be the Author of Sin, in any ill fenfe, or in any fuch fenfe as to infringe any liberty of man, concerned in his moral agency, or capacity of blame, guilt and punifhment. But, if It (hould neverthelefs be faid, fuppofing the cafe lb, that God, when he had made man, might fo order his circumftances, that from thefe circum- ilances, together with his withholding further af- fiflance and Divine Influence, his Sin would infal- libly follow, why might not God as well have firft made man with a fixed prevailing principle of Sin in his heart ? I anfwer, i. It was meet, if Sin did come into exiftence, and appear in the world, it fliould arife from the imperfedion which properly belongs to a creature, as fuch, and fliould appear fo to do, that it might appear not to be from God as the efEcient or fountain. But this could not have been, if man had been made at firft with Sin in his heart ; nor unlefs the abiding principle and habit of Sin were firft introduced by an evil atl of the creature. If Sin had not arofe from the imperfe6lion of the crea- Sea. X. into the World. g^q ture, it would not'have been fo vifible, that it did not arife from God, as the pofitive caufe, and real fource of it. — But it would require room that can- not be here allowed, fully to confider all the diffi- culties which have been ftarted, concerning the firft Entrance of Sin into the world. And therefore, 2. I would obferve, that obje6lions againfl: the do6lrine that has been laid down, in oppofition to the Arminian notion of liberty, from thefe difficul- ties, are altogether impertinent ; becaufe no addi- tional difficulty is incurred, by adhering to a fcheme in this manner difFering from theirs, and none would be removed or avoided, by agreeing with, and main- taining theirs. Nothing that the Arininians fay, about the contingence, or felf-determining power of man's will, can ferve to explain, with lefs difficulty, how the firfl finful volition of mankind could take place, and man be juftly charged with the blame of it. To fay, the Will was felf-determined, or deter- mined by free choice, in that finful volition ; which is to fay, that the firfl finful volition was determin- ed by a foregoing finful volition ; is no folution of the difficulty. It is an odd way of folvincr difficul- ties, to advance greater, in order to it. To fay, two and two makes nine; or, that a child begat his fath- er, folves no difficulty : no more does it, to fav, the firft finful a6l of choice was before the firfl finful 2^St of choice, and chofe and determined it, and brouoht it to pafs. Nor is it any better folution. to fay. the firfl finful volition chofe, determined and produced itfelf ; which is to fay, it was before it was. Nor will it go any further towards helping us over the difficulty to fay, the firfl finful volition arole acci- dentally, without any caufe at all ; any more than it will folve that difficult qucflion. How the world cculd he made out gJ nothing ? to fay, it came into being out 350 OJ the Objeaion Part IV. of nothing, without any caufe ; as has been already obferved. And if we fhould allow that that could be, that the firft evil volition fliuuld aiife by perfe6i: accident, without any caufe ; it would relieve no difficulty, about God's laying the blame of it to man. For how was man to blame for peiFe6t accident, which had no caufe, and which, therefore, he (to be jure) was not the caufe of, an}^ more than if it came by Tome external caufe ? — Such kind of folutions are no better, than if fome perfon, going about to folve fome of the ftrange mathematical paradoxes^ about infinitely great and fmall quantities ; as, that fome infinitely great quantities are infinitely greater than fome other infinitely great quantities ; and alfo that fome infinitely fmail quantities, are infinitely lefs than others, which yet are infinitely little ; in order to a folution, fhould fay, that mankind have been under a miftake, in fuppofing a greater quantity to exceed a fmaller; and that a hundred, multiplied by ten, makes but a fingle unit. Section XL OJ afuppofcd Inconfiflcnce ojthefe Principles with GOD*s moral Chara6ler. i HE things which have been already obferved, may be luflicient to anfwer mod of the objedions, and filcnce the great exclamations of Arminicins againd the Calvinifls, froui the luppofed inconliflence of Cal- vinijlic principles with the moral perfections of God, as excrcifcd in his government of mankind. The confidence of fuch a do6frine tf ncccflity as has been maintained, with the fitncfs and reafonablencfs of God's commands, promifes and threatenings, rewards Se6l. XL from God*s moral CharaQcr. 351 and punifliments, has been particularly confidered : the cavils of our opponents, as thou:;h our do6lrine of neceflTity made God the aiuhor of fin, have been anfwercd ; and aUo their ohjeftion againll thefc prin- ciples, as inconhdcnt w'vh God's iincerity, in his counfels, invitations and perfayfions, has bc;:n alrea- dy obviated, in what has been obferved, rcfpeding the confidence of what Calviriifts fuppofc, concerning the fecret and revealed Will of God ; by that it ap- pears, there is no repugnance in fuppofmg it may be the fecret Will of God, that his ordination and per- miilion of evenis fliould be fuch, that it (hall be a certain conreqi>ence, that a thing never will come to plafs ; which yet it is man's duty to do, and fo God's perceptive Will that he fliould do ; and this is the fame thing as to fay, God may fiticerely command and require him to do it. And if he may be fincere in com«manding him, he may, for the fime rcafon, be fincere in couni'eiling, inviting and ufmg perfuafions with him to do it. Counfeis and invitations are manifeflations of God's perceDtive3'v'iil, or of what God loves and what is in itfelf, and as man's a6i", agreeable to his heart ; and not of his difpohng Will, and what he choofcs as a part of his own infinite fcheme of things. It has been particularly fiiewn, Part III. Se6t. IV. that fuch a neccfhty as has been maintained, is not inconfifLent wiih the propriety and fitnefs of divine commands ; and for the fame reafon, not inconfiftcnt with the fmcerity and invitationi and counfels, in the Corollary at the end of the Sec- tion. Yea, it hath been fliewn, Part III. Sc6l. VII. Corol. 1, that this objeQion of Arminians, concern- ing the fmceiity and ufe of divine exhortations, in- vitations and counfels, is dcmonllrably againfl ihem- felvcs. NctwithRandinn:, I would fur-her obferve, that the difficulty cf reconciling the finccrity of counfels, in- 35* OJ the Objeaion Part IV. vitations and perfuafions with fuch an antecedent known (ixednefs of all events, as has been fuppofed, is not peculiar to this fcheme, as diftinguiOied from that of the generality of Arminians, which acknowl- edge the abfolute foreknowledge of God : and there- fore, it would be unreafonably brought as an objec- tion againfi; my differing from them. The main feeming difficulty in the cafe is this : that God, in counfelling, inviting and perfuading, makes a fhew of aiming at, feeking and ufing endeavours for the thing exhorted and perfuaded to ; whereas, it is im- poffible for any intelligent being truly to feek, or ufe endeavours for a thing, which he at the fame time knows, moft perfedly, will not come to pafs ; and that it is abfurd to fuppofe, he makes the obtaining of a thing his end, in his calls and counfels, which he, at the fame time, infallibly knows will not be obtained by thefe means. Now, if God knows this, in the utmoPi certainly and perfe£lion, the way by which he comes by this knowledge makes no differ- ence. If he knows it is by the necelTity which he fees in things, or by fome other means ; it alters not the cafe. But it is in efFeft allowed by Arminians themfelves, that God's inviting and perfuading men to do things, which he at the fame time,' certainly knows will not be done, is no evidence of infincerity ; becaufe they allow, that God has a certain fore- knowledge of all men's linful a6lions and omi/Iions. And as this is thus implicitly allowed by moft Armin- ians, fo all that pretends to own the Scriptures to be the word of God, muft be conflrained to allow it.-»-. God commanded and counielled Pharaoh to let his people go, and ufed arguments and perfuafions to induce him to it ; he laid before him arguments taken from his infmite Greatnefs and almighty Power, (Exod vii. 16,) and forewarned him of the fatal con- fequences of his refufal, from time to time ; (chap* Seft, XT. from God*s moral Chara6ler. 353 viii. 1, 2, 20, 2 1. chap. ix. 1, — 5, 13, — 17, and x. 3, 6,) He commanded Mofes, and the elders of Ifreal, to go and befeech Pharaoh to let the people go ; and at the fame time told them, he knew furely that he would not comply to it. Exod. iii. 18, 19. And thou Jlialt come, thou and the elders of Jfracl, unto the king of Egypt, and youjfiall fay unto him; the Lord God of the Hebrcivs hath met with us ; and now let us go. we hefeech thee, three days journey into the wildernefs, that we may facrificc unto the Lord^w God .* and, I am fur e, that the king of Egypt will not let you go. So our blcIF- ed Saviour, the evening wherein he was betrayed, knew that Peter would fhamefully deny him. before the morning ; for he declares it to him with afifever- ations, to fhew the certainty of it ; and teils the dif- ciples, that ail of them fhould be offended becaufe of him that night ; Matihew^ xxvi. 3 t — 35. John xiii. 38. Luke xxTu 31—34. [ohn xvi. 32. And yet it was their duty to avoid thefe things : they were verj finful things, which God had forbidden, and which it was their duty to watch and pray againft ; and they were obliged to do fo from the counfels and pcrfuafions Chrifl ufed with them, at that very time, fo to do ; Matthew xxvi. 41. Watch and pray, that ye enter not into temptation. So that whatever difficuhy there cant be in this matter, it can be no objeftion again H: any principles which have been maintained in oppolition to the principles of Arminians ; nor does it any more concern me to remove the difficulty, than it docs them, or indeed all, that call tliemlelves Chriftians, and acknowledge the divine authority of the Scrip- tures, — Neverthelefs, this matter may pofTibly (God allowing) be more particulaily and largely confider- ed» in fome future difcourfe, on the do^lTtiine of prC" defiination. But I would here obferve, that however the defend* ers of that notion of liberty of Will, which I have op- Ya 354 0/ the Ohjtaion, &.C. Part IV. pofed, exclaim again ft: the do£lrine of Calvinifts, as tending to bring men into doubts concerning the moral perlediions of God; it is their fchems, and not the fchemc of Ctf/t;nz2/?5, that indeed is juftly chargea- ble with this. For it is one of the mod fundamental points of their fchemc of things, that a freedom of Will/confiding infelf-determination, without all ne- cefiity, is eifcntuii to moral agency. This is the fame thing as to fiiy, that fuch a deierminationof the Will, without all neceffity, mull be in all intelligent beings, in thofe things, wherein they are vzoral agents, or in their moral ath : and from this it will follow, that God's Will is not neceffarily determined, in any thing he does, as a 7noral agent, or in any of his ath that are of a moral nature : So that in all things, wherein he a6ls hohly, jujily and trulyy he does not a6l necefl'a- rily ; or his Wiil is not neceffarily determined, to a61; bolily and juflly ; becaufe, if it were neceffarily de- termined, he would not be a moral agent in thus ail- ing : his Will would be attended with neceffity ; which, they fay, is inconfiflent wiih moral agency : '^ He can a6i: no otherwife : He is at no liberty in the *' afFair : He is determined by unavoidable invinci- " ble neceffity : therei'ore fuch agency is no moral '•' agency ; yea, no agency at all, properly fpeaking : ** A neceffary agent is no agent : He being paffive, " and (ubjfdl to neceffity, what he does is no a6t of ** his, but an efFcd^ of a neceffity prior to any a6l of *' his/* This is agreeable to their manner of argu- ing. Now then, what is become of all our proof of the moral perfections of God ? How can we prove, that God certainly will, in any one indance, do that which is judand holy ; leeing his Willis determined in ihe matter by no neceffity ? We have no other way orpioving that any thing certainly will be, but only by the necedity of the event. Where we can fee no necef- fity but that the thing may be, or may not be, there Se£l. XI. 0/Arminian Ar^iinunts, Sec, 355 we are unavoidably left at a lofs. We have no oth- er way properly and truly to demonftrate the moral perfcQions of God, but the way that Mr. Chubb proves them in p. 252, 261, 262, 263, of his Tratts, viz, that God mud ncceffaiijy perfe6l!y know, what isi mod worthy and valuable in itfelf, which, in the nature of things, is befl and fitteft to be done. And, as this is mofi. eligible in itfelf, He, being omnifcient, ninfl fee it to be To ; and being both omnifcient and felf-fufiicient, cannot have any temptation to reje6l it ; and fomufl neceffarily Will that which is bed. And thus, by this neceflity of the determination of God's Will to what is good and bell, we demondra- bly eftablifh God's moral charaQer. Coi'ol. From things v/hich have been ob[(ii'ved, it appears, that mod of the arguments from Scripture, which Arminians make ufe of to fupport their fcheme, are no other than begging the quejlion. For in thefe their arguments, they determine in the 'fird place, that without fuch a freedom of Will as they hold, men cannot be proper moral agents, nor the fubjefts of command, counfel, perfuahon, invitation, prom- ifes, threatenings, expoliulations, rewards and pun- ifhments ; and that without luch freedom it is to no purpofe for men to take any care, or ufe any dili- gence, endeavours or means, in order to their avoid- ing fin, or becoming holy, efcaping punidiment or obtaining happinefs : and having fappofed thefe things, which are grand things in quedion in the de- bate, then they heap up Scriptures, containing com- mands, counfels, calls, warnings, perfuafions, expof- tulations, promifes, and threatenings ; (as doubtlefs they may find enough fuch ; the Bible is confededly full of them, from the beginning to the end) and thea they glory, how full the Scripture is on their fide, how many more texts there are that evidently favour their fcheme, than fuch as feem to favour the con- 356 Whether thefe Principles Part IV. trary. But let thim firfl: make manifeft the things in queftion, which they fuppofe and take for granted, and fliew them to be confiltent with themfelves ; and produce clear evidence of their truth ; and they have gained their point, as all will confefs, without bring- ing one Scripture. For none denies, that there are commands, counfels, promiles, threatenings, &c. in the Bible. But unlefs they do theie things, their multiplying fuch texts of Scripture is iafignificant and vain. It may further be obferved, that fuch Scriptures, as they biing, are really againft them, and not for them. As it has been demonflrated, that it is their fcheme, and not ours, that is inconfiilent with the ul'e of motives and perfuafives, or any moral means whaf- foever, to induce men to the prattice of virtue, or ab- ftaining from wickednefs : their principles, and net ours, are repugnant to moral agency, and inconfiil- ent with moral government, with law or precept, v/ith the nature of virtue or vice, reward or punith- xnent, and with every thing whatfoever of a moral nature, either on the part of the moral governor, or in the ftate, a6lions or condu6l of the fubje6t» S E p T I o N XII. 0/ a Juppofed Tendency of thefe Principles to Atheifra and Licentioulnefs. J[f any object againfl what has been maintained, that it tends to Atheijm ; 1 know not on what grounds fuch an objeftion can be raifed, unlefs it be, that fome Atheifts have held a dodUine of neceflity which they fuppofe to be like this. But if it be fo, lam perfuaded the Arminiam would not look upon it juft, Seft. XII. tend to Athcifm. 357 that their notion of freedom and contingence (liould be charged with a tendency to all the errors that ev- er any embraced, who have held luch opinions. — The Stoic philolophers, whom the Calvinifls are charged with agreeing with, were no Athcifts, but the greated TheKts and nearell a-kin to Chriftians in their opinions concerning the unity and the perfec- tions of the Godhead, of all the heathen philofophers. And Epicurus, that chief father of Atlicifm, main- tained no fuch doQrine of necellitVj but was the greatell maintainer of contingence. The do6trine of neceffi(y, which fuppofes a necef- fary connexion of all events, on fome antecedent ground and reafon of their exiftence, is the only me- dium we have to prove the being of God. And the contrary dodirine of contingence, even as maintained by Jrmimans (which certainly implies or infers, that events may come into exillence, or begin to be, with- out dependence on any thing foregoing, as their caufe, ground or* reafon) takes av/ay all proof of the being of God; which proof is fummarily exprefied by the apoille, in Rom. i. 20. And this is a tendency to Atheijm with a witnefs. So that, indeed, it is the dodrine of Ar7ninians, and not of the Caloimjls^ that is juftly charged with a tendency to Atheijm ; it be- ing buiit on a foundation that is the utter fubverfion of every demonftrative argument for the proof of a Deity; as has been (liown, Part II. Sec. III. And whereas it has often been faid. that the CaU vinifiic doQrine of neceffuy Taps the foundations of all religion and virtue, and tends to the greateft Li- centioulnefs of practice : this obje6lion is built on the pretence, that our dodrine renders vain all means and endeavours, in order to be virtuous and reli- gious. Which pretence has been already particu- larly confidered in the 5th Scilion of this Part ; where it has been demoiiiIt\.ted, that this dodiinc has no 358 Whether thffe Principles Part IV. fuch temiency ; but that fuch a tendency is truly to be charged on the contrary do6line: inalmuch as the notion of conringence, which their do6trine implies, in its certain confequences, overthrows all connex- ion in every degree, between endeavour and event, means and end. And befides, if many other things, which have been obferved to belong to the Arminian doclrine, or to be plain confequences of it, be confidered, there will appear juft reafon to fuppofe that, it is that which mufl rather tend to Licentioufnefs. Their dodlrine cxcufes all evil inclinations, which men find to be natural ; becaufe in fuch inclinations, they are not felf- determined, as fuch inclinations are not owing to any choice or determination of their own Wills. Which leads men wholly to juHify themfelves in all their wicked anions, fo far as natural inclination has had a hand in determining their Wills, to the com- mifhon of them. Yea, thefe notions, which fuppofe moral necellity and inability to be inconfiflent with blame or moral obligation, will dire6lly lead men to juftify the vileft a6ls and pradifes, from the flrength of their wicked inclinations of all forts ; (Irong in- clinations inducing a moral necefiTity ; yea, to excufe every degree of evil inclination, fo far as this has evi- dently prevailed, and been the thing which has de- termined their Wills : becaufe, fo far as antecedent inclination determined the Will, fo far the Will was without liberty of indifference and felf-determination. Which, at laft, will come to this, that men will juf- tify themfelves in all the wickednefs they commit. It has been obferved already, that this fcheme of things does exceedingly diminifti the guilt of fin, and the difference between the greateft and fmallefl of- fences ;* and if it be purfued in its real confequences, * Part III. ScB VI. Se6l. XII. knd to Licentioufnefs. 359 it leaves room for no fuch thing, as either virtue or vice, blame or praife in the world. * And then again, howr naturally does this notion of the fovereign felf- determiningpower of the Will, in all things, virtuous or vicious, and whatfoever deferves eiiher reward 'or punifhmenc, tend to encourage men to put off the work of religion and virtue, and turning from fin to God ; it being that which they have a fovereign pow- er to determine ihemfelves to, juft when they pleafe ; or if not, they are wholly excufabie in going on in fin, becaufe of their inability to do any other. If it fhould be faid, that the tendency of this doc- trine of necelTity, to Licentioufnels, appears by the improvement many at this day a6lualiy make of it, to jullify themfelves in their dilTolute courfes ; I will not deny that fome men do unreafonably abufe this do6lrine, as they do many other things, which are true and excellent in their own nature : but I deny that this proves, the doctrine itfelf has any tendency to Licentioufnefs. I think, the tendency of doc- trines, by what now appears in the world, and in our nation in particular, may much more juftly be argu- ed, from the general effe6l which has been (ecn to attend the prevailing of the principles of Anninians, and the contrary principles ; as both have had their turn of general prevalence in our nation. If it be indeed, as is pretended, that Calvinijlic do6frines un- dermine the very foundation of all religion and mor- ality, and enervate and dilannul all rational motives to holy and virtuous pradlice ; and that the contraiy do6lrines give the inducements to virtue and goodnels their proper force, and exhibit religion in a rational light, tending to recommend it to the reafon of man- kind, and enforce it in a manner that is agreeable to their natural notions of things : I fay, if it be thus, * Part III. Sea. VI. Ibid. Sea. VII. Part IV. Sc^. I. Part 111. Se^. III. Corol. i, after the lirfl Head. 360 Of Metaphyfical Part IV. it is remarkable, that virtue and religious pradice ihould prevail mofl, when the former do£lrines. fo inconfiftent with it, prevailed aimoll univcrialjy : and that ever fince the latter doctrines, fo happily ag'^eeing with it, and of fo proper and excellent a tendency to promote it, have been gradually prevail- ing, vice, prophanenefs, luxury and vvickednefs of all forts, and contempt of all religion, and of every kind of ferioufnefs and ftriclnefs of converfation, jfhould proportionably prevail ; and that thefe things lliould thus accompany one another, and rife and prevail one v/ith another, now for a whole age togeth- er. It is remarkable, that this happy remedy (dif- covered by the free enquiiics, and fuperior fcnfe and wifdom of this age) againli the pernicious eiTecls of Calvinijm, fo inconiiftent with religion, and tending fo murh to banifii all virtue from the earth, (hould, on fo long a trial, be attended with no good effe^l ; but that the confequence fliould be the reverfe of amendment ; that in proportion as the remedy takes place, and is thoroughly applied, fo the difeafefiiould prevail ; and the very fame difmal eiTe6l take place, to the highefl: degree, which Calvinijlic do£lrines are fuppofed to have fo great a tendency to; even the banifliing of religion and virtue, and the prevailing of unbounded Licentiou fuels of manners. If thefe things are truly fo, they are very remarkable, and matter of very curious fpeculation. Section XIII. Concerning that ObjeBion againfl the reafoning, hy luhich the Calviniflic doBrine is Jupported, that it is meta- phyfical and abftrufe. It has often been objeded againfl the defenders of Calvinijlic principles, that in their reafonings, they Se£l, XIII. end abftrufe Reafoning. 361 run into nice fcholaflic dJ{lin£lions, and abftrufe met- aphyfical fubtilties, and fet thefe in oppofitiou to common fenfe. And it is poflible, that, after the former manner, it may be alledged again ft the reafon- ing by which I have endeavoured to confute the Ar- minian fcheme of liberty and moral agency, that; it is very abftra61ed and metaphyfical. Concerning this, 1 would obferve the following things. I. If that be made an obje6lion againft the fore- going Reafoning, that it is meiaphyfical, or may prop. erly be reduced to the fcience of metaphyfics, it is a very impertinent obje6lion ; whether it be fo or no, is not worthy of any difpute or controverfy. If the Reafoning be good, it is as frivolous to enquire what fcience it is properly reduced to, as what language it is delivered in : and for a man to go about to confute the arg7iments of his opponent, by telling him, his arguments are mctaphyjical^ would be as weak as to tell him, his arguments could not be fubftantial, be- caufe they were written in French or Latin. The queftion is not, whether what is faid^^be metaphyf- ics, logic, or mathematics, Latin, French, Englijh or Mohawk ? But whether the Reafoning be good, and the arguments truly conclufive ? The foregoing argu- ments are no mor emetaphyfical, than thole which we ufe againft the Papifts, to difprove their dodrine of tranfubftantiation ; alledging, it is inconfiftent with the notion of corporeal identity, that it ftiould be in ten thoufand places at the fame time. It is by meta- phyfical arguments only we are able to prove, that the rational foul is not corporeal ; that lead or fand cannot think ; that thoughts are not fquare or round, or do not weigh a pound. The arguments by which we prove the being of God, if handled clofely and diftin^Iy, fo as to fhew their clear and demonftra- tive evidence, muft be metaphyfically trcared. It is by metaphyfics only, that we can dernonftrate, that Z2 362 QT Metaphyfical Part IV. God is not limited to a place, or is not mutable ; that he is not ignorant or forgefful ; that it is impofhble for him to lie, or be unjufi: ; and that there is one God only, and not hundreds or thoufands. /And, indeed, we have no fti i6t demonftraiion of any thing, excepting mathematical truths, but by metaphyfics.l We can have no proof, that is properly demonftra- tive, of any one propofition, relating to the being and nature of God, his creation of the world, the de- pendence of all things on him, the nature of bodies or fpirits, the nature of our own fouls, or any of the greai truths of morality and natural religion, but what is metaphyfical. I am willing my arguments Ihould be brought to the teft of the [billed and jufl- ell Reafon, and that a clear, di{lin6l and determinate meaning of the terms I ufe, fhould be infifted on; but let not the whole be reje6led, as if all were con- futed, by fixing on it the epithet, metaphyfical. 11. If the reafoning, which has been made ufe of, be in fome fenie metaphyfical, it will not follow, that therefore it muft needs be abftrufe, unintelligible, and a-kin to the jargon of the fchools. I humbly conceive, the foregoing reafoning, at leaff to thofe things which are mofl maierial belonging to it, de- pends on no abiliufe definitions or diftin6lions, or terms without a meaning, or of very ambiguous and undetermined (ignification, or any points of fuch ab- ftraQion and fubtiity, as tends to involve the atten- tive underftanding in clouds and darknefs. ' There is no high degree of refinement and abftrufe fpecu- lation, in determining, that a thing is not before it is, and fo cannot be the caufe of itfeif ; or that the firft aft of free choice, has not another a6t of free choice going before that, to excite or dirc6i it ; or in deter- mining, thit no choice is made, while the mind re- mains in a ftate of abfolute indifference ; that prefer- ence and equilibrium never co-exill; and that there- Se6l. XIII. ani abflrufe Reafoning. 363 fore no choice is made in a Rate of liberty, confiRincr in indifference : and that fo far as the Will is deter- mined by motives, exhibiting and operating previous to the ati of the Will, fo far it is not determined by the aft of the Will itfelf ; that nothing can begin to be, which before was not, without a caufe, or iome an- tecedent ground or reafon, why it then begins to be; that effetis depend on their caufes, and ar*^ connect- ed with them ; that virtue is not the worfe, nor fin the better, for the ilrength of inclination with which it is pradifed, and the difficulty which thence aiifes of doing otherwife ; that when it is already infallibly known, that the thing will be, it is not a thing con- tingent whether it will ever be or no ; or that it can be truly faid, notwithftanding, that it is not neceffary it (liould be, but it either may be, or may not be. And the like might be obferved of many other things ) which belong to the foregoing Reafoning. If any fhall ftill ftand to it, that the foregoing Reaf- oning is nothing but metaphyfical fophiftry ; and that it mull be fo, that the feeming force of the argu- ments all depends on fome fallacy, and while that is hid in the obfcurity, which always attends a great degree of metaphyfical abflraclion and refinement; and fhall be ready to fay, *' Here is indeed fomething ** that tends to confound the mind, but not to fatis- ** fy it : for who can ever be truly fatisfied in it, that " men are fitly blamed or commended, punifhed or " rewarded for thofe volitions which are not from " themfelves, and of whofe exiftence they are hot the ** caufes. Men may refine as much as they pleafe, •* and advance their abftraft notions, and make out ** a thoufand feemifig contradi6lions, to puzzle our ** underflandings ; yet there can be no fatisfadion in «' fuch doftrine as this : the natural fenfe of the mind ** of man will always refill it/'* I humbly conceive, * A certain noted Author of the prefent age fays, the argu- ments tor nccejpty are nothing but qmbblingy or logomachy^ 364 ^I Metaphyfical Part IV, that fuch an objeftor, if he has capacity and humil- ity and calmnefsof fpirit, fuHicient iitipartiality, and thoroughly to examine himfeif, will find that he knows no: really what he would be at ; and indeed, his difficulty is nothing but a mere prejudice, from an inadvertent cuflomary ufe of words, in a meaning that is not clearly undcrilood, nor carefully iefle£led Mfing words without a meaning, or begging the quejiion. I do not know what kind ot necefliiy any authors, he may have re- ference to, are advocates ior ; or whether they have managed their arguments well, or ilL As to the argjumenis 1 have made ufe ot, it they are quibbles they may be {hewn fo : fuch knots are capable ot bemg untied, and the trick and cheat may be deleted and plainly laid open. It this be fairly done, with refpecl to the grounds and reafons 1 have relied upon, I fhall have juft occafion, for the future, to be filent, if not to be afhamed of my argumentations. I am willing my proofs fliouid be thoroughly examined ; and if there be nothing but begging the queftion, or mere logomachy, or difpute of words, let it be made raanifeO, and fliewn how the feeming {Irength of the ar- gument depends on my ujuig words without a pieamng, or antes from the ambiguity of terms, or my making ufe of words in an indeterminate and unfleady manner ; and that the weight of my reafons rcH mainly on fuch a foundation : and then, I ihall either be ready to retraft what I have urged, and thank the man that has done the kind part, or Ihall be juflly expofed lor my obltinacy. The fame Author is abundant in appealing, in this afTair, from what he calls logomachy and fophijiry, to experience, A perion can experience only what palies in his own mind. But yet, as we may well fuppole, that all men have the fame hu. man faculties ; fo a man may well argue from his own ex, perience to ihat of others, in things that fliew the nature of thofe faculties, and the manner of their operation. But then one has as good right to alledge his experience, as another. As to my own experience, I find, that in innumerable things I can do as I will ; that the motions of my body, in many re- fpeBs, inftantaneoufly follow the a6is of my Will concerning thofe motions ; and that my Will has fome command of my thoughts ; and that the a6ls of my Will are my own, i. e. that they are atls of my Will, the volitions of my own mind ; or, in other words, that what X will, 1 will. Which, I prefume, Se6l. XIIL izw^ abflrufe Reafoning. ogc upon. Let the cbjeQor refleft again, if he has can- dor and patience enough, and does not fcorn to be at the trouble of clofe artention in the affair. He would have a man's volition hzjrom himjdj. Let it h^ from kimjtlj, molt primarily and originally of any way con- ceivable ; that is, from his own choice : how will that help the matter, as to his being juftly blamed or praifed, unlets that choice iifelf be blame or praife- woithy ? i\nd how is the choice itfelf (an ill choice for inftance) blame- v/orthy, according to thefe prin- ciples, unlefs that be from himfelf too, in the fame manner; that is, from his own choice ? But (lieoriT, inal and firft determining choice in the affair is not from his choice : his choice is not the caufe of it. And if it be from himfelf lome othei v/ay, and not from his choice, fui ely that will not help the matter : If it be not from himfelf of choice, then it is not from himfelf voluntarily ; and if fo, he is furcly no more to blame, than if it were not from himfelf at ail. Ic is the fum of what others experience in this afLir. But as to finding by experience, thar my Will is originally determined by itfelf; or that, my Will firft choofmg what volition there fhall be, the chofen volition accordingly follows ; and that this is the firll rife ot the determination of my Will in any affair ; or that any volition rifes in my mind contingently ; I declare 1 know nothing in myfelf, by experience, ot this nature ; and nothing that ever 1 experienced, carries the leafl appearance or fliadow of any fuch thing, or gives me any more reafon to fuppofe or fufpeti any fuch thing, than to fiippoCe that my volitions exifled twenty years before they exifted. It is true I find myfelf polTefled ol my volitions, before I can fee the ef- feftual power of any caufe to produce them, (for the power and efficacy of the caufe is not feen bu " " the eM^zk] and this, ior ought 1 know, may make fofne ima-^ \ that vohtion has no caufe, or that it produces itlelt. But 1 -e no more rea. fon from hence to determine any fuch thi, than I have to determine that I gave myfelf my own being, r that I came into being accidentally without a caufe, becaufe I firft found myfelf poffefled ot being, before I had knowledge ot a caufe of my being. 366 Of Metaphyfical Reafoning. Part IV. is a vanity, to pretend it is a fuflicient anfvver to this, to fay, that it is nothing bat metaphyfical refinement and fubiilty, and fo attended with obfcurity and un- certainty. If it be the natural fenfe of our minds, that what is blame-worthy in a man mufi: be from himfelf, then it doubtlefs is alio, that it muft be from fomething had in himfelf, a had choice, or had difpofition. Bat then our natural fenfe is, that this bad choice or dif- pofition is evil in itfelf, and the man blame- worthy for it, on its own account, without taking into our no- tion of its blame-worthinefs, another bad choice, or difpofition going before this, from whence this arifes : for that is a ridiculous abfurdity, running us into an immediate contradi6licn, which our natural fenfe of blame-worthinefs has nothing to do with, and never comes into the mind, nor is fuppofed in the judg- ment we naturally make of the affair. As was de- monftrated before, natural fenfe does not place the moral evil of volitions and difpofitions in the caufe of them, but the nature of them» An evil thing's being FROM a man, or from fomething antecedent in him, is notelfential to the original notion we have of blame-worthinefs : but it is its being the choice of the heart ; as appears by this^ that if a thing hQjro7n us, and not from our choice, it has not the nature of blame worthinefs or ill-defert, according to our natu- ral fenfe. When a thing \s,from a man, in that fenfe, that it is from his Will or choice, he is to blame for it, becaufe his Will is IN IT : fo far as the Will is in it, blame is in it, and no further. Neither do we go any further in our notion of blame, to enquire whether the bad Will be FROM a bad Will : there is no confideration of the original of that bad Will ; becaufe, according to our natural apprehenfion, blame originally coiijijls in it. Therefore a thing's hting from ?L man, 15 a tecondary confideration, in the notion of SeQ. XIIL A Fault ^Arminian Writers. 367 blame or ill defeit. Becaufe thofe things, in our ^v- ternal aQions, are mod properly faid to be from us, which Tix^jrom our choice ; and no other external ac- tions, but thofe that are from us in this fonfe, have the nature of blame ; and they indeed, not fo prop- erly becaufe they are from us, as becaufe we are in them, i. e. our Wills are in them ; not fo much be- caufe they are from {omt property oi ours, as becaufe they are our properties. However, all thefe external anions bein;; truly from us, as their c:iufe ; and we being fo ufed, ia ordinary fpeecb, and in the common affairs of life, to fpeak of men's a6lions and conda6l that we fee, and that affeCl human fociety, as deferving ill or well, as worthy of blame or praife ; hence it is come to pafs, that philofophers have incaulioufly taken all their meafures of good-and evil, praife and blame, from the dictates of common fenfe, about thefe overt aBs of men ; to the running of every thing into the mofl lamentable and dreadful confufion. And, therefore, I obferve, III. It is fo far from being true (whatever may be pretended) that the proof of the dodrine which has been maintained, depends on certain abflrufe, unintelligible, metaphylical terms and notions ; and that the .Arminian fcheme, without needing fuch clouds and darknefs for its defence, is fupponed by the plain dictates of common fenfe ; that the very reverfe is moft certainly true, and that to a great de- gree. It is fa6t, that they, and not we, have con- founded things with metaphyfical, unintelligible no- tions and phrafes, and have drawn them from the light of plain truth, into the grofs daiknefs of ab- flrufe metaphyfical propofitions, and words without a m.eaning. Their pretended demonflrations depend very much on fuch unintellible, metaphyfical phraf- es, as, JclJ- deter mmatio}}^ and foverei^nty of the Will ; 363 Arminians too MeiaphyftcaL Part IV. and the metaphyfical fenfe they put on fuch terms, as nece£it)\ contingency, aclion, agency, &c. quite di- verfefrom their meaning as ufedin common fpeech ; and which, as they ufe them, are without any con- fident meaning, or any manner of diftiutt confiftent ideas ; as far from it as any of the abdrufe terms and perplexed phrafes of the peripatetic philofo- phers or the mod uninteiligibie jargon of the fchools, or the cant of the wildefl fanatics. ^Yea, we may be bold to fay, thefe metaphyfical terms, on which they build fo much, are what they ufe without knowing what they mean themfelves ; they are pure metaphyfical founds, without any ideas whatfoever in their minds to anfwer them ; inafmuch as it has been demonflrated, that there cannot be any notion in the mind confiftent with thefe expreilions, as they pretend to explain them ; becaufe their explana- tions deftroy themfelv^es. No fuch notions as imply feIf-contradi6lion, and felf-abolition, and this a great many ways, can fubfiO. in the mind ; as there can be no idea of a ivhole which is Icfs than any of its parts, or of folid extenfion without dimenfions, or of an efFed which is before its caufe. — Arminians improve thefe terms, as terms of art, and in their metaphyfical meaning, to advance and eftablifh thofe things which are contrary to common fenfe, in a high degree. Thus, inftead of the plain vulgar notion of liberty, u^hich all mankind, in every part of the face of the earth, and in all ages, have ; confifting in op- portunity to do as one plcafes ; they have introduc- ed a new ftrange liberty, confifting in indifference, contingencc, and felf-dctermination ; by which they involve themfelves and others in great obfcurity, and manifold grofs inconfiftence. So, inftead of placing virtue and vice, as common fenfe places them ver^ much, in fixed bias and inclination, and gre ater virtue and vice in flron^er and more eftab- o Se6l. XIII. Arminians too Mttaphyfical, 369 liftied inclination ; thefe, through their refinings and abftrufe notions, fuppofe a liberty confifting in in- difFerence, to be elTential to all virtue and vice. So they have reaibned themfelvcs, not by metaphyfic- al diftinftions, but metaphyfical confufion, into many principles about moral agency, blame, praife, reward and punifhment, whicli are, as has been ftiewn, exceeding contrary to the common fenfe of mankind ; and perhaps to their own fenfe, which governs them in common life. A3 THE CONCLUSION W'^HfTHER the things which hr.ve been alledgec!, me lu^ble lO atu' t'']erabM cU.rvvcr in ^hc xv^iys of cairn, intelligible and flritt re.roriinj, I muft leave others tc judge : but I am fenfib'e they are liable lo one fort ot pnfwer. It is not unhkeiv, that fomf!. who \''alue themfclves on the Tuppofed ration :tl and gen- erous principles of the modern hfhionahle divinity, will have ihcir indignation and dildain raifed at the fight of this dircourfe. and on perceiving what things are p;e ended fo be proved in it. And if they think it worthy of bein<7 read, or of fo much notice as to fay much about it, they may probably renew the uiual exclamations, with additional vehemence and contempt about ihQ fate of th heat htn, Hobbes' AVa'/^ Jity, and making men me- e machines ; ^ccumuiarin^ rhe terrible epithets of fatal, unfrujlrable^ inevitable, irre- fijiihle^ Scr. ^nd it may be. wih theaddiion ot horrid snd blajphcmous ; and perhaps much fkili may be uled to fet forth things, which have been faid, in colours which fliall be fhockin^ to the imaginations, and movin.^; to the paffions of th )re, who nave either too little capacity, or too m:jch confjdt-nce of the opin- ions they have imbibed, and con'enspt of the con- trary, to try the matter by any Serious and circum- fpeU examination.* Or difficulties m^v be flartcd • A writer, ol the prefent age, whom I have fcveral times had octafion to menti'^n, fpc^Rs once 'dU(\ again of (hofe who holi «he do6lrine of Ntc-^ffity . as fcarcelv wr-nhy the n:me of fhihfoph?.rs>~-\ do noi .^;.<>vv, vvhcthc^r iias refj-tci to air particular notion oi ncceihiy, that fume ma) have aiamtamed ; The conclusion. 371 and infifled on. which do nor beiong to the ^ontro- ver'y ; bccaulb. itt them be more or Icfs real, and hi'.rd to be relolved they are not what are owin^ lo any thiriJ dtftingaiiluiig ot this (cheinc from that ot the Armimans, and would not be renioved nor diir.in- ifhed by rtnouncing the former, and adherin;^ to the lattt^r. Or fome" particular things may be picked out. which they may think will found harffj-itin the ears of the generality ; and thefe may be glolFod and dc'canted on, with tart and coniemp;uous words ; and (rom thence, the whoie treated with triu.nph and infult. It IS eafy to fee, bow the decifion oF moft of the points in controverfy, between CalvLmJls and Armm- ians, dtpQnds on the determin uion ot this grand ar- ticle concerning the Freedom of the Will reqmfite to mor- al agency ; and that by clearing and eftabiithing the Calvmijhc dotirine in tnis poinc, thechict argum^-nts are obviated, by which drminian dodnnes in gener- al are fupported. and the contrary dottrmes demon- llratively confirmed. Hereby it becomes mainlcll, that God's moral government over mankmd, his treating them as moral agents, making then the ob- jeds ol his commands, counlels, calls, warnings, ex- poPtulaiions, promifes, threatenmgs, rev/ards and anfl, if {o, what do61rlne oi neccdity it is that he means. — Whether 1 am worthy ot the name ot d philofoph'^r, or not, would be a quelHon little to the prcient puipole. It any, .md cvcf fo many, fhould deny it, I ihouid not think it worth the wiiile to entei into a di;puteon that qiieltiun : thou^^ti at the faaie time 1 migi)i expefct, fame betici c^uiwu ih mid .r.given to the arguments bio ght tor the truUio. the cioctnne I /nam- tain ; and I might further reaionabiy dtlne, that it mi^ht be conhc.eied, whether it does not become Uiole, wh.ae//i^/y worthy ot the name ot phiio'opheis, to tie ie:fibje, .hn, as in the affair of a finfui volition; if u'e p:.u thefe thifi:/s together, it will follow, that God's aihtlance o» infl^ience, rnafl be determining and dectfive, or mud be attended with a moral necefliU' of he event ; and fo, that God gives virrue, holinefs and convei (ion to (innvTs, by an influence which determines the effect, in fuch a man- ner, that the eff^^6l will infa'ii'H' fjllow by a moral neceffi .y ; which is what Calvmijis mean by elHca- cious and irreliflible grace. The thmgs, which h »ve b^en faid, do likewife an- fwer the chief obi- chi>ns again^ the do^^rine of God's univerfal and abfnlutc decree, and afford infalnbk proof of this do.'l'irie ; and of the doftr.ne of aoflute tU.r^ nal, perfonal elecfion in v^articuiar. The main objec- tions agaii ft iliele dottunex are, that they infer a ne- ceffi y of the volitions of moral agents, and of the future moral ftate and act. ol men ; and fo arc not conhftent with thofe eernal rewards and panKh- ments, which are connefcted with c<^ nverfi 'n ^nd im- penitence ; n<'rcan be in )de to a;ree with the le.ilon- ablenefs and finccrity of the precepts, calls, couardiJ, S76 The CONCLUSION. warnings and expoflulations of the word of God ; or with the various methods and means of grace, which God ufes with linners, to bring them to repentance; and the whole of that moral government, which God exercifes towards mankind: and that they infer an inconfiftence between the fecrct and revealed Will of God ; and make God the author of fin. But all thefe things have been obviated in the preceding difcourfe. And the certain truth of thefe doClrincs, concerning God's eternal purpofes, will follow from what was jull now obferved concerning God's univerfal Prov- idence ; how it iiifallibly follows from v/hat has been proved, that God orders all events ; and the volitions of moral agents amongfl others, by fuch a decifive difpofal, that the events are infallibly conne6ted with his difpofal. For if God difpofes all events, fo that the infallible exigence of the events is decided by his Providence, then he, doubtlefs, thus orders and de- cides things knowingly, and on defign, God does not do what he does, nor order what he orders, accident- ally or unawares ; either without, or befide his inten- tion. And if there be ^i foregoing defign of doing and ordering as be does, this is the fame with a pur^ fofe or decree. And as it has been fiiewn, that noth- ing is new to God, in any refpe6t, but all things are perfectly and equally in his view from eternity ; hence it will follow, that his defigns or purpofes are not things formed anew, founded on any new views or appearances, but are all eternal purpofes. And as it has been now ihewn, how the do6lrine of de- termining efficacious grace certainly follows from things proved in the foregoing difcourfe ; hence will necelfarily follow the dodrine of pariicidar, eternal ahfohite election. For if men are made true faints, no j othcrwife than as God makes them fo, and diflin- ! guifhes (hem from others, by an cfFicacious power and influence of his, that decides and fixes the event ; The conclusion. 377 and God thus makes fome faints, and not others, on • defign or purpofe, and (as has been now obfcrved) no defigns of God are new ; it follows, that God thus/| dillinguifhed from others, all that ever become true; faints, by his eternal defign or decree. I might alio fhew, how God's certain foreknowledge muH: fuppofo an abfolute decree, and how fuch a decree can be proved to a demonflration from it : but that this difcourfe may not be lengthened out too much, that mufl be omitted for the prefent. From thefe things it will inevitably follow, that however Chrifl; in fome fenfe may be faid to die for all, and to redeem all vifible chriflians, yea, the whole world by his death ; yet there mufl: be fome- thin g far ticuia?' in the dcfign of his death, with re- fpe^ to fuch as he intended fliould adually be faved thereby. As appears by what has been now iliewn, God has the a6lual falvation or redemp'ion of a cer- tain number in his proper abfolute defign, and of a certain number only ; and therefore fuch a defign only can be profecuted in any thing God does, in order to the falvation of men. God purfues a prop- er defign of the falvation of the elect in giving Chrifl: to die, and profecutes fuch a defign with refpeft to no other, mofl: ftridly fpeaking ; for it is impofllblc that God fhould profecute any other defign than only fuch as he has : he certainly does not, in the higiicll propriety and fl:ridnefs of fpeech, purfue a defign that he has not. And, indeed, ^fuch a partic- ularity and limitation of redemption will as infalli- bly follow, from the do6lrine of God's foreknowledge, as from that of the decree. For it is as impoffible, in flri^lnefs of fpeech, that God fliould profecute a defign, or aim at a thing, which He at the fame time moft perfe6lly knows will not be accomplifhed, as that he fliould ufe endeavours for that which is be- fide his decree. B3 378 The CONCLUSION. Bv the things which have been proved, are obvi- ated fome of the main objections againft the dothine of the infallible and necelFary perftverar.ee of faints, and Ibmc of the main fovmdalions of this do61rine r.re cflabli filed. The main prejudices of Arminians againft this uo61rine feem to be thefe ; they fuppofe fach a ntcedary, infallible perfeverance to be repug- nant to the freedom of the Will ; that it mud be ou'ing to man's own felf-determining power, that he fvjt becomes virtuous and holy ; and fo, in like man- ner, it mull be left a thing connngent, to be deter- mined by the fame freedom of Will, whether he will ferfevere in virtue and holinefs; and that otherwife hi' continuing fledfafi; in faith and obedience would not be his virtue, or at all praife-worthy and reward- able ; nor could his perfeverance be properly the matter of divine commands, counfels and promifes, nor his apoftacy be properly threatened, and men warned againft it. Whereas, we find all thefe things in Scripture : there we find ftedfallnefs and perle- verance in true chriftianity, reprefented as the virtue of the faints, fpoken of as praife-worthy in them, and glorious rewards promifed to it ; and alio find, that God makes it the fubjeO; of his commands, counfels and promifes ; and the contrary, of threat- enings and warnings. But the foundation of thele objetiions has been removed, in its being fhewn that: moral neceflity and infallible certainty ot events is not inconfillent with thefe things ; and that, ar, to freedom of W^ill lying in the power of the Will to determine itfelf, there neither is any fuch thing, nor i need of any of it, in order to virtue, reward, com- mands, counfels, Sec. And as the doQrines of efficacious grace and ab- folute eledion do certainly follow from things, which have been proved in the preceding difcourfe; lo (ome of the main foundations of the dctlrine of perievcr- The COxNfCLUSION. 379 ance, are thereby eftabliflied. If tlie beginniiT^ of true faiih and ho!ine{s,and a man's becoming a true lainc at fn ft, does not dt'pend on the rt:U-dcterminin»r power ol the Will, bat on the determining eliicacious gr re of God; it nny well be argued, that it is alfo wi.h refpefl to men's being continued taints, or per- fevering in faith and holiners. Tlic converfion of a linner being not owing to a man's fe!f-determination, but to Cod's determination, and eternal eleQion, which is abfolute, and depending on the fovereign Wiil of God ; and not on the free Will of man ; as is evident from what has been faid ; and it being very- evident from the Scriptures, that the eternal eleclion which there is of faints to faith and holinefs, is a!(o an eletlion of them to eternal ialvation : hence their ap- pointment to falvation mult alfo be abfolute, and not depending on their contingent, felf-determining will. P'lom all which it follows, that it is abfoiutely fixed in God's decree, that all true faints fliall perfe- vere to a6lual eternal falvation. But I muft leave ail thefe things to the confider- ation of the fair and impartial reader ; and when he has maturely weighed them, I would propofe it to his confi deration, whether many of the fiill reform- ers, and others that fucceeded tiiem, whom God in their day made the chief pillars of his church, and greateft inftruments of their deliverance from error and darknefs, and of the fapport of the caufe of pie- ty among them, have not been injured, in the con- tempt with which they have been treated by many late writers, for their teaching and maintaining fuch do6lrines as are commonly called Calvinifiic. In- deed, fome of thefe new writers, at the lame time that they have reprelented the doctrines of thefe an- cient and eminent divmes, as in the highcft; degree ridiculous, and contrary to common fenfe, in an oi- tentation of a very generous charity, have allowed 38o The CONCLUSION. that they were honeft well-meaning men : yea it may be fome of them, as though it were in great con- delcenfion and compaffion to them, have allowed, that they did pretty weil for the day which they liv- ed in, and confidering the great difadvantages they labored under : when, at the fame time, their man- ner of fpeaking has naturally and plainly fuggefled to the minds of their readers, that they were perfons, who through the iownefs of their genius, and great- nefs of the bigotry, with which their minds were fhackled,. and thouj^hts confined, living in the gloo- my caves of fuperftition, fondly embraced, and de- murely and zealouHy taught the moft abfard, filly and monflrous opinions, worthy of the greatefh con- tempt of gentlemen poffeffed of that noble and gen- erous freedom of thought, which happily prevails in this age of light and enquiry. When, indeed, fuch is the cafe, that we might, if fo difpofed, fpeak as big words as they, and on far better grounds. And real- ly all the Arminians on earth might be challenged without arrogance or vanity, to make theie principles of theirs, wherein they mainly differ from their fath- ers, whom they fo much defpife, confident with com- mon fenfe; yea, and perhaps to produce any doc- trine ever embraced by the blindeft bigot of the Church of Rome, or the moft ignorant Muffulman, or extravagant enthufiaft, that might be reduced to more demonftrable inconfiftencies, and repugnancies to common fenfe, and to thcmfelves ; though their inconfiftencies indeed may not lie fo deep, or be fo artfully veiled by a deceitful ambiguity of words, and an indeterminate fignificaiion of phrafes. — -I will not deny, that thefe gentlemen, many of them, are men of great abilities, and have been helped to higher attainments in philofophy, than thofe ancient divines, and have done great fervice to the Church of God in fome refpe6ts : but I humbly conceive, The COaXLUSION. 381 that their differing from their fathers, with fach mag- "ifterial aflurance, in theie points in divinity, mud be owing to fome other caufe than fupeiior wildom. It may alCo be worthy of confideration, whether the great aheration, which has been made in the flate of things in our nation, and fome other parts of the Proteftant world, in ihiy and the pad age, by the exploding fo generally Calvinijlic dodrincs, that is fo often Ipoken of as worthy to be greatly rejoiced in by the friends of truth, learning and virtue, as an inftance of the great increafe of li^ht m the Chriflian Church ; I fay, it may be worthy to be coniidered, whether this be indeed a happy change, owing to any fuch caufe as an increafe of true knowledge and un- derftanding in things of religion; or whether there is not reafon to fear, that it may be owing to fome worfe caufe. And I dtiire it may be confidered, whether the boldnefs of lome writers may not be Vi^orthy to be re- fledled on, who have not fcrupled to fay, that if thefe and thofe things are true (which yet appear to be the demonftrable di6tates of reafon, as well as the certain didates of the mouth of the Mofl High) then God is unjufl and cruel, and g^iihy of manifeft de- ceit and double dealing, and the like. Yea, fome have gone fo far, as confidently to aflert, that if any book which pretends to be Scripture, teaches fuch do6lrines, that alone is fufficient warrant for mankind to rejedl it, as what cannot be the Word of God. — Some, who have not gone fo far, have faid, that if the Scripture feems to teach any fuch dodrines, fo contrary to reafon, we are obliged to find out fome other interpretation of thofe texts, where I'uch doc- trines feem to be exhibited. Others exprefs them- felves yet more modeflly : they exprefs a tendernefs and religious fear, left they Ciould receive and teach any thing that (hould feem to refled on God's mor- 382 The conclusion. al chara6ler, or be a difparagement to his methods of adminiftration, in his moral government; and therefore exprefs themfelves as not daring toembrace fome do6lrines, though they feem to be delivered in Scripture, according to the more obvious and natural conilru6lion of the Vv^ords. But indeed it would fbew a truer modefty and humility, if they would more entirely rely on God's wifdom and difcerning, who knows mfinitely better than we, what is agreea- ble to his own perfe6lions, and never intended to leave thcfe matters to the decifion of the wifdom and difcerning of men ; but by his own unerring inftruc- tion, to determine for us what the truth is ; knowing h'jw little our judgment is to be depended on, and how extremely prone, vain and blind men are, to err in Inch matters. The truth of the cafe is, that if the Scripture plain- ly taught the oppofite doctrines, to thofe that are fo much itumbled at, viz. the ^rmzni<^w dodrine of free Will, and others depending thereon, it would be the greateft of all difficulties that attend the Scriptures, incomparably greater than its containing any, even the mod myflerious of thofe do6lrines of the firll reformers, which our late free thinkers have fo fuper- cilioufly exploded. — Indeed, it is a glorious argu- ment of the divinity of the holy Scriptures, that they leach Inch doQnnes, which in one age and another, through the blindnefs of men's minds, and ftrong prejudices of their hearts, are reje6led, as mofl ab- lurd and unreafonable, by the wife and great men of the world ; which yet, when they are mofl carefully and ftri6tly examined, appear to be exadly agreea- ble to the mofl demonflrable, certain, and natural dictates of reafon. ^y fuch things it appears, that ihcfoolijh'efs of God is wijer than men, and God does as is faid in 1 Cor. i. 19, 20. For it is written, I will itfiroy the wifdom oj the wife ; I zvill bring to nothing Tii£ CONCLUSION. 383 the iim-ejjiandwg of the prudent. Where is the wife ! Where is the [crib e I Where is the difputer of this zuorld f Hath not God made fooliJJi the wifdom of this zuorld ? And as it ufed lo be in time pad. fo it is probable it will be ill time to come, as it is there written, in ver. 27, 28, 29. But God hath chofen the foohfh things of the world, to confound the wife : and God hath chofen the weak things of the zuorld, to confound the things that are mighty; and bafe thuigs of the world, and things which are defpiftd, hath God chofen : yea, and things zokich are not, to bring to nought things that are ; that no Jltfh fhould glory in his prefence. Amen. ^I N THE D E X. [N. B. The capital P. fignifics the Part ; Sea. the S^xlion > Concl. the CondufLon /and the fniali p. the Page ; vvheifi the things here fpe'cified are to be iouiid.] X'JLBSTRACTED OF nhftrufc Reafoning, whether ju (11 v ob- jefted again ft Calvinijis, P. 4. 6^61. 13. p. 360. Atlion, inconliftence of the Arminian notion of it, P. 4. Se6t. 2. p. 257, and whence this arofe, ibid", p. 264, what it is in the common notion o\ it, ibid. p. 261, and how dif- tinguiihed frorh Pcjlon, ibid. p. 263. Adivity oftJu Nature 0/ the Souly whether through this, volition can arile without a caule, P. 2. Set>. 4. p. 62. Apparent Good, the great- eft, in whit (en^c it deter- rnines the Will, P. i, Scti. 2. p. 9. Arminians, obliged to talk inconfiftently, P. 2. Sett. 5. p. 69. Ibid. SeB:. 7. p. 92. Sett. 9. p. 101, where the inain Ilrengthot their pretend- ed demon itration lies, P. 4. Sect. 4. p. 284. Their ob- jefction from God's moral charatier, conftdered and re- torted, ibid Sctl. 1 1. p. 3,33,4. Arminian Dodrin^,, its ten- dency 10 fupcrcede all ufe of ' c means, and make endeavours vain, P. 4. Seft. ,5. p. p88, and, in elfetl, to exclude all virtue and vice out of the world, P. 3. Seel. 4. p. 209, 217. Ibid. Sect. 6 p. 237, b, and Se6L 7. p. 246. P. 4. Seel. 1. p. £53. ibid Se61. 12. p. Aiheifm, the fuppofed ten- dency of Calvmifcic principles to it, P. 4. Setl. 12. p. 356* How Arminian principles tend to it, ibid. p. 3,57. Attending to Motives, of lib* erty's being fuppofed to con- fifl in an ability for it, P. 2; Se6t. 9. p. 103. Atonement. See Chrifl. Author of Sin, whether it would iollow from the doc- trine here maintained, that God is lo, P. 4. Seel. 9. p. '"'■ . B.. Biame-ziwrthmcfs, wherein it confifts, according to com- mon Icnle, P. 4. Sctf. 4. p. '''• c. Caiinnifm confillent with common icafe, P. 4. ^- t ^. p. 266, 3 3S6 INDEX. Caufe, how the word is ufcd in this difcourfe, P. 2. Sed. 3. p. .54,^5. No event without one, P. 2. Sea. 3. p. 55— and ejetl, a ncceflaiy connex- ion between tlicm, P. 2. Se6l. b*. p. 96. This reTpefcU mor- aly as well as natural caufes, P. 2. Sea. 3. p. 55. Ckriji, his obedience necef- farv, yet virtuous and praife- woVthy, P. 3. Sea. 2. p. 180. Kis atonement excluded in confequence of Ar?7iinian principles, P. 3. Se6t. 3. p. 204. C/iubc^ (Mr.) the inconfiR- ence of his fcheme ol liberty^ Sec. P. 2. Sea. 10. p. 1 11 — 128. Commands, confiftent with moral neceility and inability, P. 3. Sea. 4. p. 206. P. 4. Sea. 11. p. 351. Inconfiit- ent with Ar??nniun principles, P. 3. Se6l. 4. p 209. Co7nmon Sunjc, why the principles main:aincd in this difcourfe, appear to fome con- trary to it, P. 4. Se6l. 3. p. 266. NecelTary virtue and vice agreeable to it, P. 4. Sea. 4. p. 275. — Armtman tenets oppofite to it, P. 3. '^tB.. 6. p. 230. Ibid Sea. 7. p. 243. Ccntingcnce, P. 1. Sea. 3. p. 26, the Inconfi flence of the Notion, P. 2. Sea. 3. p. 59. Whether neceflary in order to Liberty, P. 2. Se6l. 8. p. 9^5 —implied in Armtnian Lib- erty, and yet inconliflent with it, P. 2. Sed. 13. p. 172. Ep- icurus the ^reatcil maintaincr of itj P. 4. Sea. 6. p. 296. Ibid Sea. 12. p. 357. Corruption of Maris iV^- ture^ CoNCL. p. 373. Creation of the world, atfuch a particular Time and Place^ P. 4. Sea. 8. p. 312. D. Decree ahfolute, not infer- ring Neceflity, any more than certain Fore-knowledge does, P. 2. Sea. 12. p. 159. How it follows from things proved in this difcourfe, Concl. P- 37<5- Determination, See WilL Ditiates. See Underjiand- ing. E. Efea. SeeCaufe. Efficacious 6 race, CONCL, P- 874-. Eledion perfonaL Set De» crce. Endeavours, what it is for ihem to be in vain, P. 4. Se6t. 5. p. 285. Rendered vain by Armiman Principles, Ibid p. 289. But not fo by Cal- vimjni. Ibid p. 291,2. See Sincerity. Entrance oj Sin into the world, P. 4. Sea. 10. p. 348. Equilibrium, See Indijfer" tnce. Exhortation. See Invita* iion. f. Fallen Man. See Inability, Fate Jloical, P. 4. Sea. -6. p. 296. Fatality, the Principles of Arminians inferring tliat which is mofl fhocking, P. 4. Seft, 8. p. 32J. INDEX 387 Fore-knowledge of God, of Volitions of moral Agents, proved, P. 2. Se6h ii. p. 128. — Inconfiflcnt with Con- tingency P. 2. Se6l. 12. p. 153. Proves NecefTity, as much as a decree. Ibid p 139. The Teeming difficulty of re- conciling it with the fincerity i of his precepts, counfeis, &c. not peculiar to the Calvimjlic fcheme, P. 4, Se6l. n. p. G. Gody His Being how known, P, a. Sea. 3. p. 57. Part 4. Seft. 12. p. 357. His moral Excellencies necelTary, yet virtuous and praife- worthy, P. 3. Seft. 1. p. 175. Part 4. Sea. 4. p. 28.5. TheNecef- fity of his Volitions, P. 4. Seft. 7. p. aSg. Whether the principles maintained in this difcourfe are inconfillent , with his moral charafter, P. 4. Seft. II. p. 350. How Arminianifm dcftroys the evi- dence of his moral perfec- tions, Ibid p. 354. Grace of the Spirit, exclud- ed by Armiman principles, p. 3. Sea. 3. p. 206. Grace^ its Freenefs confifl- cnt with the moral NecefTity of God's Will, P. 4. Sea. 8. P'323- H. Habits, virtuous and vi- cious, inconfiftent with Ar- minian principles, P. 3. Se6l. 6. p. 234. Heathen, of their Salvation, P, 3. Sea. ^. p. 230. DoBrinc 4. Sea. 6. Hohhrs, his Neceffiiy, P 297. 1. ImpoJfibdUy, the f.nne as negative NcceUity, P. i. Sea. 3- P- 25-. Inability, how the word is ufed in common fpeech, and how by Mdaphylraans and Arminians, P. i. Sea, 3. ig, 26. P. 4. Sea. 3. p. 269. Na. tural and moral, P. i . Se6h 4. p. 27. Moral, the feveral kinds of it, P. 1. Sea. 4. p. 33. P. 3. Sea. 4. p. 213,14. — of fallen man to perform perfea obedience, P. 3. Sea. 3. p. 203. What does, and what does not excule men, P. 3, Se6l. 3. p. 200. Ibid Sea. 4. p. 217. P. 4. Sea. 3. p. 267, 8. Inclinations. See Habits, Indifference, whether liber- ty conliHs in it, P. 2 Sea. 7. p. 82. — Not necefTp.ry to vir- tue, but inconfiflcnt with it, P. 3. Sea. 6. p 233. Indifferent things, thofe which appear fo, never the objeas of volition, P. i. Sea. 2. p. 8, 9. P. 2. Sea. 6. p. 74. Whether the Will can deter- mine itfelf in choofing among fuch things, P. 2. SeCh 6. p. 74» 5', Invitations, confiftent with moral NecefTity and Inability, P. 3. Sea. 4. p. 219. P. 4. Se6t. II. p. 351. But not confiftent with Ar?jiinian prin- ciples, P. 2. Se6L9 p. 106. P. 3. Sea. 7. p. 244. P. 4. Sea. II. p. 353- INDEX. LawSy the end whereof is to bind to one fide, rendered iifelefs by Arjninian princi- ples, P. 3. Se6L 4. p. 209,10. Liberty^ the nature o\ it, P. 1. Setl. "ly. p. 36. The Ar- 7mnian Notion of it, ibid p. 38. This inconlillent with other Ar?ininan Notions, P. 2. Se61. 9. p. 100, &c. Licentioufnff], whether the Calvimjlic (iofctrine ttnds to it, P. 4. Seft. 12. p. 357-— See Endeavours. M, Machines, whether Calvin- i/fn makes men fuch, P. 4. Sea. 5. p. 293. Means. See Endfavours. Metaphyjical Rcafo n i }/g . — See Abjlratlcd.— To be juiUv objeftcd again ft the Armini- an fcheme, P. 4. Sedt. 13, p. 367- Moral Agency, its Nature, P. I. Se6h5. p. 3g. Motives, what they are, P. J. Seth 2. p. 7. The ;hon^- rft determining the Will, ib. p. ?). P. 2. Se6l. lo, p. 1 16,17. Arminian principles inconfilK cnt with their influence and life in moral attions, P. 3. Se6l. 7. p. 240. P. 4. Se6h 1 1 , p- 356. ^^ NAturnl Notions. See T^w- Necejjity, how tlie term is ufcd in common fpeerli, and how by philofophcrs, P. 1. Sc6t. 3. p. 17. P. 4. Se6}. 3. p. 267. Philolophical of' va- rious kinds. Ibid p. 271, 2, natural and moral, P. 1. Sec>. 4. p. 27. P. 4. Seft. 4. p. 282. No Liberty without moral Ne- ceflity, P. 2. SetK ^. p. 9,5. Necefhty and Contingence, both inconliilent with Armin^ mn Liberty, P. 2. Seft. 13. p. 170. Necefhty of God's Volition, P. 3. Se^7. i.p. 175. P. 4. Sea. 7. p". 29B. This coniiffcnt with the treencfs of his grace, ibid Sei:}. 8. p. 323. — Necefhty of Cbrill's Obedience, &c. P. 3. Sefl-^ 2. p. 1 80.— ^Of the fin ol fuch as are given up to hn, P. 3. Se6L 3. p. 198. --01 fallen man in general, P. 3. Seel. 3. p. 203. What Neccfiity wholly excufes men, P. 3. Setf. 4. p. 217,28. P. 4. Sett. 3. p. 267* and Se6t. 4. p. 278. Obedience. See Chiift, Com- mands, Necefjih. % Particles perjeclly alike, of the Creator's pldcing fuch dif- ferently, P. 4. Be'ti:. 8, p.3M- Perfeverance cf Saints^ CONCL. p. 378. Promijes, whether any are made to the endeavours of un- rcgenerate finncrs, P. 3. Sef>,' 5- P- 228,-9. ' . P/'ovidtnce, univerfal and dpciJlvc, Co.NjCL. p. 372. R. Redempticn particular, Co ^'- ( i.. p. 377. Rejormrrs the firjl, how treated by many ate writer? CoNCL. p. 379. I N D p: X. 389 Saints in Heaven, tbt-ir Llb- cny, P. 4. Sed. 4. p. io5. Scripture, of the Arminians ariTuments irom thence, P. 4. :sca. ij. p. 355. Self- deter m i n 1 11 g Pc xce r of the iVill, its i n con fi Hence. P. 2. StCi. 1. p. 42. Evafions ot the arguments againlt it confidered, P. 2. Seti. 2. p. 47, ftiewn to be impertinent, ibid Se6}. 5. p. 67. iS/;?. See Author, Entrance. Sincerity of Dcjires and En- deavor s,\v\\dii is no juft excule, P. 3. Set). 5. p. 220. The different forts ot Jincerit)\ ibid p. 226. Sloth, not encouraged by Calvinijin, P. 4. Se6(. ^. p. Stoic Phi!o/ophers,gr€u\ The- ills, P. 4. Sect. 12. p. 357. See Ea^e. Suspending Volition, o\ the the liberty ot the Will fuppof". ed to confiil in an ability ior it, P. 2. Seft. 7. p. 92. P. 3. Sefl.4. p. 212, 13. lb. Sett. y. p. 261. T. Tendency ot the Principles here maintained, to Atheifm and licentioufnefs, the objec- tion confidered and retoitcd, F. 4. Seel. 12. p. 240, I, V. Virtue and Vice, the Belnfr of neithei of them confiflent with Ar?nin:an principles : I Sec ArmmianDodrine. Their Ellence net lyini; in their I Caufe, but their Nature, P. 4. I Sett. 1. p. 2^9. Undcrjianduig, how it de- termines the Will, P. I. Secf. 2. p. 16. P. 2. ^ett. 9. p. 100. Di6hites of the Underftanding and Will, as fiippofed by fome, the fame, P. 2. Set). 9. p. 106. Uneafinefs, as fuppof ed to deteimine the Will, P. i.Se6t. 2.F-9- Vchtion, not witnout a caufe, P. 2. ScO. 3. p. 61. P. 2. Sect. 4. p. 66. W. rr;7/ its Nature, P. i.Sea. I. p. i,&c. Its determination, p. 1. Sect. 2. p. 6, &c. 'ihe veiy bein^ o\ fuch a faculty inconfiftent with Anniman Principles, P. 3. Sett. 7. p, 2^7.— Or Ood, Jecret and re- vcakd, P. 4. Sea. 9. p. 340, Arminians ihemfelves obliged to allow fuch a dillintiion, ibid, p. 343. WiUingncfs to Duty, what is no excufe tor the negle£'^ ot it. See Siucaity, REMARKS ON THE ESSAYS on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion, In a LETTER to a Minifter of the Church ot Scotland : By the Rev. Mr. JONATHAN EDWARDS, Pref- ident of the College of New-Jersey, and Author of the late Inquiry into the Modern Notions of the Freedom of Will. REV. SIR, 1 he intimations you have given me of theufe which has, by fome, been made of what I have written on the Freedom of the Will, &c. to vindicate what is faid on the fubjedt of liberty and neceflity, by the Author of the i'Jfuys on the Principles of Morality end Natur- al Religion, has occafioned my reading this Author's Effay on that fubjecl, with particular care and atten- tion. And I think it muft be evident to every one, that has read both his Kfjay and my Inquiry, that our fchemes are exceeding reverfe from each other. The wide difference appears particularly in the fol- lowing things. This author fuppofes, that fuch a neceffity takes place with rerpe6i; to all men's alliens, as is incon- liftent with liberty,* and plainly denies that men have any liberty in a6ling. Thus in p. 168, after he had been fpeaking of the neceflity of our deter- minations, as conneded with motives, he concludes * P. 160, 161, 164, 16^, and many other placts. ( -392 ) Wfih fayln;^^ <' In fl^crt, if motives are not under oiir povvcr ordiie^ioft, which is confeffedly the fad, we can at botrorri liAVe-^— — no LiiBEktv." M'hereas, I have abundantly exprelfed it as my mind, that man, in his moral adions, has true hberfy ; and that the inoraJ nectfllty, which univerfall)' takes plac^, ii not in the lead inconhilcnt with any thing that is prop- erly called liberty, and with the utmolt liberty tliac ican be deli red, or that can pollibly exift or be con- ceived of.* ^ I find that fome are apt to think, that in that kind xjf jtioral neceffity of men's volitions, whidh I fupi. -ppfe to be univerlal, at lead fome degree of liberty is. denied : that though it be true I allow a fort of liberty, yet thofe Vvho .maintain a felf- determining power in the Will, and a liberty of contingence and indifference, hold an higher fort of freedom tlian I do : but I think this is certainly a great millake. Liberty, as 1 have explained it, in p 38, and oth- er places, is the power, opportunity, or advantage, that any one has to do as he plcajcs, or condwjiing in any RESPi-XT, according to h-s phafure ; without confider- ing how his plcalure comes to be as it is. It is de- monflrable, and, I think, has been demonftratedj that no neccility of men's volitions that 1 maintain, is inconrin:ent with this liberty : and I think it is impoflible for any one to rife higher in his concep- tions of liberty than this : If any imagine they de- lire higher, and that they conceive of a higher. and greater liberty than this, they are deceived, and delude themfelves with confufed ambiguous words, inftead of ideas. If any onz fhould here (dy, " Yes, I con- ceive of a freedom above and beyond the liberty a man has of conducing in any refpetl as he pleal'es, * Inquiry, P. 38—43, 186, 187, 278 — 288, 3C0, 307. 326—35^. I ( 393 ) m, a liberty of chopf,ng as he plcife?;." Such nn rft-^, if he rcflcdcd, would either bltifh or huiL;h at his own inllance. For, is not choofing as he"" plcafes, concluding, in som.^ respect, according to his plcafure, and ftill without determining how he came by that plealure ? If he fays. " Yes. 1 came by that plealure by my own choice.'* If he be a mnn of common lenfe, by this time he will fee his own ai)- lurdiry : for he mud needs fee that his nofion or conception, even of this hberty, docs not contain any judgment or conception how he comes by ihat choice, which firft determines his pleafare. or which originally fixed his own will lefpcding the affair. Or if any (hall fay. " That a man exercifes hberty ia this, even in determining hi^ own choice, bur not as he pleafes, or not in conltqnence of a:.iv choice, pre- ference, or inclination cf his own, bat by a defer- inination arifing contingcnily on' of a Rate of abfo^ lute indifference ;" this is not rifing higher in his con- ception of liberty : as fuch a determination of liie Will would not be a voluntary determination of it. Surely he that places jiberfy in a power of doing fomething not according to his own choice, or Irom bis choice, has not a higher notion of it. than jbethat places it in doing as he pleaies, or adding from his own eledion. If there were a power in the mind to determine itfelf, but not by its choice or accord- ins to its pleafure, what advantajze would it aive ? And what liberty, worth contending for. would be exercifed in it ? Therefore no Arminian, Pelagian, or Epicurean, can rife higher in his conceptions of lib- erty, than the notion of it which I have explained : which notion is apparently, peife6l]y confident with the v/hole of that neceffity of men's adions, wliich I fuppofe takes place. (And iTcruple not to fay. it is beyond all their wifs to invciU a higher nriicn. or form a hipher imagination of libeily ; ict ihcm talk D3 ( 391 ) o{ fovereignty of the Will, f elf- determining power, felj^ 'motion, Jelf-direflion, arbitrary decifion, liberty ad uf rum vis, power of choojing dijfcrerdly in, given cafes. Sec. Sec. as long as rhey will. It is apparent that thefe rnen, in their (Irenuous affirmation, and clif- pute about thefe things, aim at they know not what, fighting for fomething they have no conception of, fubftituiin^ a number of confufcd unmeaning words, inftead of things, and inftead of thoughts They may be challenged clearly to explain what they would have : thev never can anfwer the challenge. The Author of the Effuys^ through his whole ElTay on Liberty and Necefiiiy, goes on that fuppofition, that, in order to the being of real liberty, a man muft have a freedom that is oppoftd to moral necefiity : andyet he fuppofes, p. 175, ih 2it fuch a liberty mufl Jig- nify a power in the mind of aEling without and againfl motives, a powef of acling without any view^ purpofc, or defign, and even of adding in contradiction to our own de- fires and averjions, and to all our principles of aclion ; and is an abfurdity altogether inconfiflent with a rational nature. Now, who ever imagined fuch a liberty as this, a higher fort or degree of freedom, than a liber- ty of following one's own views and purpofes, and a6ting agreeable to his own inclinations and pafhons ? Who will ever reafonably fuppofe that liberty, which is an abfurdity altogether inconfifl^mt with a ration- al nature, to be a kind "f liberty above that which is confident with the nature of a rational, intelligent, defigning agent ? The Author of the EJfays (eems to fuppofe fuch a neceffity to take place, as is inconfiftem with fome luppofable Power uf arbitrary Chuicil ;* or that there is fome liberty conceivable, wheieby men's own aftions mioht be more prupkrlv in their Pow£R,i' and by which events might be more dependent on * P. 169. + P. 191, 19^, 197, 206. > ( 395 ) OURSKLVES;* con^rnry to wjiat I fappofc ^o be evi- dent in my Inquiry. -^ iVhat way can be imagined, of our aciions being more m our power ^ from oiirjtkrs, or depend on cw^ftlves, than their bein^ from our pow- er to fulfil our own choice, to aQ from our own in- clination, pujfue our own views, and execute our own defign.v ? Certainly, to be able to atl thus, is as properly having our a61ions in our power, and de- pendent on ourfelves, as a being liable to be the fub- je6ls of ads and events, contingently and fortuitouf- ly, without dffire. view purpoje or defign, or any prin- cipleoJaEiion within ourlelves ; as we muff be accord- ing to this Author's own declared fenfe, if our ac- tions aie performed with that liberty that is oppofed to moral nectlCty. This i\uthor feems every where to fuppofe, that neceffity, mofi: properly fo called, attends all men's a6lions; and that the terms neceJfary.u?iavoidable, im- pojfible. Sec. are equally applicable to the cafe of moral and natural necciTity, In p. 173, he fays. The idea of neceflary and unavoidable, equally agrees, both to moral and phyfical nccejfity. And in p. 184, All things that Jail out in the natural and 7}ioral zoorld arc alike necejjary. P. 174, This inclination and choice zs unavoidably caufed or occafioned by the prevailing mo^ live. In this lies the necejfity of our aciions, that, in fuck circumflanceSy it xvas impolfibie we could acl otherwife. He often exprelfes himfelf in like manner ellewhere, fpeaking in ftrong terms of men's actions asitnavoida' hie, what thev cannot forbear, having no power over their own anions, the order of them being unalterably fixed and infeparably linked together, ^c [f On the conrrary, 1 have largely declared, that the connexion between antecedent things and confe- quent ones, which takes place with regard to the a6ls * P. 183. + P. 305, 396. X P. i«o, 188, i93, 1^4. 195. I97« J9S» J99» 205» 206. f ( 396 ) of metj's Wills, which is called moral neceffity, is calU ed by ihe name o^ necfjfuy improperly; and that all luch revms as mvfl can>.ot. impoffible, unable, irrefijli^ lie, unavoidable. mvincibU, idc. when applied here, are not applied in their prop;:;r fij^nificarion, and are ei- ther ufv!d nonfendca'ly, and with perfe6l infignifi- cance, or in a Icfnie Cjuite divcrfe from their original and pK)p r meaning, and rheir ufe in common fpctch :* and. that fuch a neceiruy as attends the a£ts oi men'.s Wills, iii more properly called c^r/jz/z^j;, ihan ntcrjjity ; it being no other than the certain con- nexion be ween the fubjefct and predicate of the piopohtiun which affirms their exifience.t Agreeable to what is obferved in my Inquiry.^ I think it is evidently owing to a ftrong prejudice in perfons minds, arifing from an infenfible habitual perverfion and mifcipplica'ion of fuch-liketerms aswc- cejfary. iriipoJTible, unable, unavoidable, invincible, &c, thd they a»e ready to think, that to fuppole a cer- tain connexion of men's volitions, without any fore- going motives or inclinations, or any preceding mor- al influence whatloever, is truly and properly to fup- poje fuch a Itrong inefragable chain of caufes and tftedls, as (lands in the way of, and makes u'terly vain, oppoiite defires and endeavours, like immov- able and impenetrable mountains of brafs ; and im- pedes our liberty like walls of adamant, gates of brafs, and bars of iron : whereas, all fuch reprefent- ations luggeil ide-^s as far from the truth, as the Eafl is from the VVefl. No>hing that I maintain, iup- pofes that men are at all hindered by any fatal necef- ^ lity, from doing, and even willing and cho'ofing as they pleafe, with full freedom ; yea with the highefl degree of liberty that ever was thought of, or that * Inquiry,? 17— 2y, JO, 31, 32, 33. 2-1. ? »3. 267— 271, 5:74, ^i— iii^S. 367, 36b. t Inquiry, P. ax— 23, iK 267.-271. { 397 ) ever could pofTibly enter into the hc.irt of any man to conceive) I know it is in vain to endeavour to make lorne perfons believe this, or at Icafl fully and ileadily to believe it : for if it be dcmonflratcd to them, llill the old prejudice remains, which has been long fixed by the ufe of the terms nectjfary, iiiujl, can- not, impojfiblc^ &c. the aflociation with thefe terms of certain ideas, inconfiilent with liberty, is not broken ; and the judgment is powerfully warped by it; as a thing that has been long bent and grown (lifF, if it be ftraightened, will return to its former curvity again *ind again. The Author of the EJfays mofl manifeflly fuppofes that if men had the truth concerning the real necclii- ly of all their anions cleaily in view, they would not appear to thernfelves, or one another, as at all praifc- worthy or culpable, or under any moral obligation, or accountable for their a61ions :* which fuppules, that men are not to be blamed or praifed for any of their adions, and are not under any obligations, nor are truly accountable for any thing they do, by rea- fon of this necefifity ; which is very contrary to what I have endeavoured to prove, throughout the third part of my Inquiry. 1 humbly conceive it is there fhewn, that this is fo far from the truth, that the mor- al neceffity of men's a6>ions, v/hich truly take place, is requifite to the being of virtue and vice, or any thing praife-worthy or culpable : that the liberty of indifference and contingence, which is advanced in oppofirion to that neceflity, is inconfiftent with the being of thefe ; as it would iuppoie that men are not determined in what they do, by any virtuous or vi- cious principles, nor a6l from any motives, intentions or aims whaifoever ; or have any end, cither good or bad, in adling. And is it not remarkable, that this Author fhould fuppole, that, in order to men's a61ion« * P. 207, 209, ana other place*. ( 398 ) truly having any defert. they mu/lfce performed zi;zV/z- cut any view, purpofe, dtfign. or defire, or any principle of adion, or any thing agreeable to a rational nature ? As It will appear that he does, if we compare p. 206, 207, with p. 175. The Author of the Ejfays fuppofes, that God has deeply implanted in man's nature, a (Irong and in- vincible apprehenfion, or feeling, as he calls ii, of a liberty, and contingence, of his own a6lions, oppoftre to that neceflity which truly attends them ; and which in truth does not agree with real fa6l a, is not agree- able to ftrid philofophic truth h, is contradictory to the truth of things c, and which truth contradicts d, not tallying with the real plan e: and that therefore fuch feelings are deceitful^, are in reality of the de- lufive kind g. He fpeaks of them as a wife dclufion A, as nice artificial feelings, merely that confcience may have a commanding power 2: meaning plainly, that thefe feelings are a cunning artifice of the Author pf Nature, to make men believe they are free, when they are not k. He fuppofes that, by thefe feelings, the moral world has a difguifed appearance /. And <>ther things of this kind he fays. He fuppofes that all felf-approbation, and all remorfe of confcience, all commendanon or condemnation of oui (elves or oth- ers, all fenfe of defert, and all that is conneCted with this way of thinking, all the ideas, which at prefenfc are fuggefted by the words ought, Jhoidd, arife frorn this delufion and would entirely vanifh without it m. All which is very contrary to what I have abun- dantly infiftedon and endeavoured to demonflrate in xny Inquiry; where I have largely fliewn, that it is agreeable to the natural fenfe of mankind, that the jnoral necefhty or certainty that attends men's ac- aP. 200. ^P. 152. cP. 183. ^P. i86. tf P. 205. j^P. 203, 204» 21 1. ^P. 183. hP.Qog. 2 P. 211. ^ P. ^^3. /P. 214. m P. 160, 194, 199, 20^, ao6. 209. ( 399 ) tlons, is confident with praifeand binme, rcivarcl and punifliment a ; and that it is acireeable to ournntur- al notions, that moral evil, with its defcMt of diflike and abhorrence, and all its other ill-dtferving";, con- fids in a certain deformity in ihe nature of the difpo- fitions and ads of the heart, and not in the evil of fomethiniT eUe, divcrfi! from theie, fuppufcd to be their caufv^ or occafion b- I might well alk here, whether any one is to be found in the world of mankind, who is confcious to a fenfe or feeling, naturally and deeply rooted in his mind, that, in order to a man's performin!^ any action that is praife or blame-worthy, he mud exercife a liberty that implies and fignihes a power of aOing without any motive, view, defign, dehre, or princi- ple of adion ? For fuch a liberty, this Author fup- pofes, that mud be which is oppofed to moral necef- fify, as 1 have already obO-^rved once and again. — Suppofmg a man diould a6tuaily do good, indepen- dent of defire, aim, inducement, principle or end, is it a didare of invincible natural lonfe, that his a6l is more meritorious or praife-worthy, than if he had performed it for fome good end, asid had been gov- erned in it by good principles and raotives? and lb I might afk, on the contrary, with reipccl to evil ac- tions c. The Author of the It^J^^y^ fuppofcs that the liber- ty without necedity, which we have a natural feeling of, implies contrngence : and, fpeaking of this contin- gence, he fomctimes calls it by the name of chance. And it is evident, that his noiion of it, or ratlierwhat he fays about it, implies things happening loofely, a Inquiry Part IV. Sc61. 4. throughouf. b Idem, Part IV. Sect. I. ihioughour, and P. 36,5— 3^'^- ^ ^'•'^ '^^'* Matter illuftratcd in mv Inquiry, Pait IV. SctL 4. efpccially, P. 279 —£81. ( 4C0 ) foriuitoujly , by accident^ arr^ without a caufc* No'.v I conceive the flighteft refletlion may be fadicient to fatisfy any one, that fuch a contingence of men's ac- tions, according to our natural fenfe, is fo far from be- ing elTential to the morality or merit of thoTe a6lions, that it would deftroy it ; and that, on the contrary, the dependence of our a6lions on fuch caufes, as in- ward inclinations, incitements and ends, is elTential to the being of it. Natural fenfe teaches men, when they fee any thing done by others of a good or evil tendency, to inquire wh^t their intention was; what principles and views they were moved by, in order to judge how far they are to be juftified or condemn* cd i and not to determine, that, in order to their be^ ing approved or blamed at all, the a6lion mud be performed altogether fortuitoufly, proceeding from nothing, arifing from no caufe. Concerning this matter, I have fully exprelFed my mind in the In* quiyy.f If the liberty, which we have a natural fenfe of a-; neceOTary to defert, confiils in the mind's felf-deter- mination, without being determined by pre^'ious in- clination or motive, then indifference is effential to it, yea abfolute indilFerence ; as is obferved in my Inquiry.^ But men naturally have no notion of any fuch liberty as this, as elTential to the morality or demerit of their actions; but, on the contrary, fuch a liberty, if it were polTible. would be inconfiflent with our natural noiions of defert, as is largf^lv fliown in the Inquiry.^ If it be agreeable to natural [Qr\\c^ that men mud be indifferent in determining their own a6l;ions ; then, according to the fame, the more they are determined by inclmation, either good or bad, the lefs they have of defert : the more good ac- * P. 156, 137, J38. 159, 177* '7^' ^81, 183, 184, 185. + P. 039 — 241, 246, 279, 280, and other places. 4- p. 83-83. \ Efpecially in Part III. ScQ. 6, and 7. ( 401 ) i'ons are performed from good difpofitlcn, the Mi praife-worthy ; and the more evil deeds are from evil difpofitions, the lefs culpable; and, in general, the more men's a6lions are from their hearts, the Icfs they are to be commended or condemned: which all rnufl know is very contrary to natural fenfe. Moral necefiity is owing to the power and gov- ernment of the inclination of the heart, either habit- ual or occafional, excited by motive : but, accord- ing to natural and common fenfe, the more a man does any thing with fall inclination of heart, the more is it to be charged to his account for his con- demnation, if it be an ill aftion, and the more to be afcribed to him for his praife, if it be good. If the tnind were determined to evil a6iions hy contingence, from a ftate of indifference, then either there would be no fault in them, or elfe the fault would be in being fo perfe6lly indifferent, that the mind was equally liable to a bad or good determina- tion. And, if this indifference be liberty, then the very effence of the blame or fault would lie in the liberty itfelf, or the wickednefs would, primarily and fummarily, lie in being a free agent. If there were no fault in heing indifferent, then there would be no fault in the determination's being agreeable to (uch a (late of indifference : that is, there could no fault bo reafonably found with this, viz. that oppofite deter- minations adually happen to take place indifferently, fometimes good and iometimes bad, as contingence governs and decides. And if it be a fault to be in* different to good and evil, then fuch indifference is no indifference to good and evil, but is a determina- tion to evil, or to a fault; and fuch an indiffcient difpofition would be an evil, faulty difpofition, ten- dency or determination of mind. So inconfiflent are thefe notions of liberty, as effential to praiie or blame. E3 ( 4^2 ) TPie Author of the EJfays fuppofes men's natural delufxve Icnfe of a liberty of coniingence, to be, in truth, the foundation of ail the labour, care and in- duftry of mankind ;* and that if men's praUicalideas had been formed en the plan of univerfal ncccffity, the ig- liava ratio, the inaclive doclrine of the Stoics^ would have folloivcd ; and that there would have been no room for forethought about futurity, or any fort of induflry and care:f plainly implying, that, in ihis cafe, men would fee and know that all their induiby and care fignifi- ed nothing, was in vain, and to no puipofe, or of no benefit; events being fixed in an irrefragable chain, and not at all depending on their care and endeav- our; as he explains himfeif, particularly in the in- llance of men's ufe of means to prolong life: J not only very contrary to v/hat I largely maintain in my Inquiry,^ but alfo very inconfiftently with his own fcheme, in what he fuppofes of the ends for which God has fo deeply implanted this deceitful feeling in man's nature ; in which he manifeflly fuppofes men's care and induflry not to be in vain and of no benefit, but of great ufe, yea or abfolute ncceffity, in order to the obtaining the moft important ends and neceflary purpofes of human life, and to fulfil the ends of ac- tion to the BEST ADVANTAGE ; asbc largely declares. [j Now, how (hall thefe things be reconciled ? That, if men had a clear view of real truths they would fee that there was no koum for their care and induftry, be- caufe they would fee it to be in vain, and of no ben- efit ; and yet that God, by having a clear view of real truth, fees that their being excited to care and induflry, will be of excellent ufe to mankind, and gre.Jtly for the benefit of the world, yea abfolutely neceflary in order to it: and that therefore the great wildom and goodnefs of God to m.en appears, in art- * P. 184. + P. 189. + P. 184, 185. § Efpecially Part IV. ISe6L ^. II P. 188 — 192, and in many other places. ( 4^3 ) fully contriving to put them on rare and in luflry for their good, which jjood could not be obiaincd wiih- out them; and yet both thcfe things are maintained at once, and in the fame fcntences and words by this Author. The very reafon he gives, why God has put this deceitfal fec^ling into men, ontradids and dellroys itfelf; that God in his great goodncfs to men gave them luch a deceiifiil toeHng, bccanfe it was very ufeful and neccifary for them, and greatly for their benefit, or excites them to care and induHry for their own good, which care and induftty is ufe- ful and neceffaiy to that end : and yet the very thing that this great benefit of care and induilry is given as a reafon for, is God's deceiving men in this very point, in making them think their care and induflry .to be of great benefit to them, when indeed it is of none at all ; and if they faw the real truth, they would fee all their endeavours to be wholly ufelefs, that tht-re was NO ROOM for them, and that the event does not at all DEPEND upon them a. And befidcs, what this author fays, plainly implies (as appears by what has been already obferved) that it is neceCTary men (liould be deceived, by being made to believe that future events are contingent, and their own future adions free, with fuch a freedom, as fignifies that their actions are not the fruit of their own defires, or defigns, but altogether contingent, fortuitous, and without a caufe. But how fliould a notion of liberty, confiding in accident or loole chance, encourage care and induflry ? I Ihould think think it would rather entirely difcourage every thmg of this nature. For furely, if our anions do not de- pend on our endeavours, (lowing from our defires and defigns. This Author himlelf feems to fuppolc, that if men had, indeed, fuch a liberty of contin- gence, it would render all endeavours to determine flP. 188. 189, &c. f 404 ) or move men's future volitions, in vain : he fays, that, in this cafe, to exhort, to inJlruB. to promife, or to ihrtatm, would be to no purpofe.^ Why ? Becaufe, (as he himfeU gives the reafon) then our Will would beca" ^vicious and arbitrary, and wejhould be thrown lo of c alto- gether, and our arbitrary power could do us good or ill only by accident. But if fuch a loofe fortuitous (late would tender vain other endeavours upon us, for the fame realon would it make ufelefs our endeavours on our- felves : for events that are truly contingent and acci- dental, and altogether loofe from, and independent of^ ^11 foregoing caufes, ave independent on every fore* going caufe within ourfelves, as well as in others. I fuppofe that it is fo far from being true, that our minds are naturally pofleiTed with a notion of fuch liberty as this, fo ilrongly, that it is impoflible to root it out ; that indeed men have no fuch notion oif liberty at all, and that it is utterly impoffible, by any jneans whatfoever, to implant or introduce fuch a notion into the mind. Ai» no fuch notions as imply feifcontradi£l;on and felf-abolition can fubfift in the mind, as I have fhewn in my Inquiry ;t I think a mature fenfible confideration of the matter, fuflicient to fatisfy any one, that even the greateft and mofl learned advocates themfelves for liberty of indiEFer^ ence and felf-determination, have no fuch notion ; and that indeed they mean fomething wholly incon- fiflent with, and diredly fubverfive of, what they ftrenuoufly affirm, and earneiliy contend for. ^y a inan's having a power of determining his own Will, they plainly mean a power of determining his Will, as he pleafes. or as he choofes ; which fuppofes that the mmd has a choice, prior to its going about to confirm any a6lion or determination to it. And if ihey mean that they determine even the original or * P. 166, 198, 199. + P. 238. 239. See alfo P. 46, 53* ^4. 63. 7o» 73» »70-^474, 2^0, ji.()i, 8;:5--278, ( 405 ) prime choice, by their own pleafurc or choice, as the thing thrtt caults and diiefts it ; 1 fcruple not mofl boldly to affirm, that they fpeak they know not what, and that ot which they have no manner of idea ; bc- caule no i'uch contradi6lory notion can come into, or have a moment's fubhltence in, the mind of any man living, as an original or firft choice being cauf- cd, or brought into being, by choice. After all, they fay, they have no higher or other conception of lib- erty, than ihat vulgar notion of it, which I contend for, viz. a man's having power or opportunity to do as he choofes : or if they had a notion that every a6i; of choice was deterrriined by choice, yet it would def- troy their notion of the contingence of choice ; for then no one a6l of choice would arife contingently, or from a ftate of indifference, but every individual ad, in all the leries, would arife from foregoing bias or preference, and from a caufe predetermining and fixing its exiflence, which introduces at once fuch at chain of caufes and effeds, each preceding link de- cifivcly fixing the following, aa they would by all means avoid. And fuch kind of delufion and ^elf-contradidion as this, does not arife in men's minds by nature : it is not owing to any natural feeling which God has (Irongiy fixed in the mind and nature of man ; but to ialie philofophy, and iliong prejudice, from a de- ceitlul abufe of words. It \s artificial ; not in ihc fenfe of the Author of the £j/ays, luppoCng it to be a deceitful artifice of God ; but artificial as oppofed to natural, and as owing to an artificial deceitful man- agement of terms, to daiktn and confoupd the mind. Men have no fuch thing when they fnfl begin to ex- ercife reafon ; but mufl have a great deal of time to blind thcmfelvesjwith metaphyficalconluGon, before they can embrace, and leil in iu(ii(kfir:ii ions of liberty as are given, and imagine they imdeiftand them. ( 4o6 ) On the whole, I humbly conceive, that v/hofoever will give himlelf the trouble of weighing what I have oftered to confideration in my Inquiry, mufl: be fenhble, that inch a moral necellity ot rncn's attions as I maintain, is not at all inconfiftent with any lib- erty that any creature has, or can have, as a free, ac- countable, moral agent, and fubje^t of moral gov- ernment ; and that this moral necclfity is fo far from being inconliftent with praife and blame, and the benefit and ufe of men's own care and labour, that, on the contrary, it implies the very ground and rea- ft>n, why men's a6lions are to be aicribed to them as their own, in that manner as to infer defert, praife and blame, approbation and remorfe of confcience, reward and punifh:nent ; and that it eflabliQies the moral fyftem of the uuiverfe, and God's moral gov- ernment, in every rerpe6t, with the power and ufc of motives, exhortations, commands, counfels, prom- ifes, and threatenings ; and the ufe and benefit of endeavours, care and induftry : and that therefore there is no need that the ftri6t philofophic truth fhould be at all concealed from men ; no danger ia cmtemplation and profound di/covery in thefe things. So far from this, that the truth in this matter is of vaft importance, and extremely needful to be known ; and that the more clearly and perfectly the real fadl is known, and the more conflantly it is in view, the better; and particularly, that the clear and full knowledge of that, which is the true fyftem of the univerfe, in thefe refpeds, would greatly eftablilh the do6lrines which teach the true Chriftian fcheme of Divine A:lminiftration in the city of God, and the Gofpel of Jefus Chnft, in its moll important arti- cles; and that thefe things never can be well eflab- lifh^d, and the oppofite errors, lo fubverfive of the whole Gofpel, which at this day fo greatly and gen- erally prevail, be well confuted, or the arguments ( 4^7 ) by which they are maintained, anfivered, till thcfe points are fettled : while tliis is not done, it is, to me, beyond doubt, that the friends of thofe great Gofpel Truths, will but poorly maintain their con- troverfy with the adverfaries of thofc truths : they will be obliged often to dodge, fhuffle, hide, and turn their backs ; and the latter will have a (Irong fort, from^ ly hence they never can be driven, and weapons tr)ufe, which thofe whom they oppofe will find no fhield to fcreen themfelvcs from; and they Tvill always puzzle, confound, and keep under the friends of found do6lrine; and glory, and vaunt themfelves in their advantage over them; and carry their affairs with an high hand, as they have done already for a long time pad:. I conclude, Sir, with aiking your pardon for troubling you with fo much faid in vindication of tnyfelf from the imputation of advancing a fcheme of necefiity, of a like nature with that of the Author of the EJjays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion. Conhdering that what I have faid is not only in vindication of myfcif, but, as I think, of the mod important articles of moral philofophy and religion ; I trufl in what I knov7 of your candour, that you will excufe, Your obliged friaid and hr'other, J. EDWARDS. Stockt»ridge, .1^^725,1757. FINIS. Date Due m "^i r VVwr , ^"^r'M :U- 0:"^ 't'^f^ ^' -v