' f/* ■ , u'.\^> j: 4, '^:: >y 5f.6. ly- 3 LIBRARY OF THE Theological Seminary, ■ PRINCETON, N. J. ' Case, i^^^^—r P.Jv'sk, SheJf, ...., jj^ Q}t .S.?<^t ' ^ ' ■' - . ^•'. .* - - . Booh ^ No,...'. -'^. ;<>" z> J/ruCcd^ A\ C laATIONAL EHOUIRYj ^c. Natural Religion Insufficient, and Revealed Necessary, to Man's Happiness in his Present State : OR, A RATIONAL INQUIRY PRINCIPLES OP THE MODERN DEISTS; IS LARGELY DISCOVERED THEIR UTTER INSUFFICIENCY TO ANSWER THE GREAT ENDS OF RELIGION, AND THE WEAKNESS OF THETR PLEADINGS FOR THE SUFFICIENCY OF NATURE'S LIGHT TO ETERNAL HAPPINESS: AND PAETICriABLY Xhe Writings of the late learned Loan Herbert, the great Patron of Deism, to wit, his Books de Vehitate, de Religione Gentilium, and Reliqio, Laici in so far as they assert Nature's Light able to conduct us to future Blessedness, are considered, and fully answered. TO WHICH IS ADDED, AN ESSAY ON THE TRUE GROUND OF FAITH. Bij the late Reverend Mr. THOMAS HALYBURTON, Professor of Divinity in the University of St. Andrews, Scotland. A scorner seeketh wisdom cuid Andeth it not : but knowledge is easy unto him that undeistantleth. Prov. xiv. 6. If any man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God, or whether I speak of myself. John vii. 17. Solis nosse Deos & coclinumina vobis, Aut solis nescircj datum. Lucan, de Druid. ALBANY: PRINTED BY H. C. SOUTHWICK, so. 73, STATE-STREET. ♦ 1812. PREFACE. The God of glory hath not left himself without a witness j all his works do, after their manner declare his o-loiy. Ask now the beastSy and they shall teach thee ; and the fowls of the air, and they shall tell thee : Or speak to the earthy and it shall teach thee ; and the Jishes of the sea shall declare unto thee. Who knoweth not in all these, that the hand of the Lord hath wrought this ? Job xii. 7, 8, 9. Moreover it hath pleased him to instamp upon the consciences of men, such deep impressions of his being and glory, that all the powers and subtilty of hell, shall never be able to eradicate them : Though, alas ! through a custom of sin, and especially against much light and conviction, the consciences of many are debauched in these dregs of time, to an obliterating of these impres- sions, which otherwise would have been strong and vi- vid* The principles of moral equity carry such an evi- dence in their nature, and are also accompanied with so much of binding force upon the conscience, that their obligation on rational creatures hath a most resplendent clearness, and fills the little world with such a strength, * and efficacy of truth, as far surpasseth the plainest the- oretical principles. That one maxim, Matth. vii. 12. Luke vi. 3. Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them ; that one max- im, I say, (to pass others) was matter of so much won- der to some of the most polite Heathens, that ttiey knew not well how to express then- sense of the truth and glo- vi PREFACE. ry of it ; they thought it worthy to be engraven with letters of gold, upon the frontispieces of their most magnificent structures ; an agreeable and speaking evi- dence of its having been imprinted in some measme up- on their hearts. Nevertheless, all these, though sweet, strong, and convincing notices of a Deity, do yet evan- ish as faint glimmerings, when compared* to that stamp of divine authority, which our great and alone Law- giver has deeply imprinted upon the scriptures of truth, Psal. xix. 7. The law of the Lord is perfecty converting the soul : the testimony of the Lord is sure, making wise the simple, &LC. I enter not upon this large theme, which great men have treated to excellent purpose ; I only represent very shortly, that the stupendous account we have in these scriptme, of moral equity in its full com- pass, comprised even in ten words, that wonderful ac- count, I say, proclaimeth its Author with so much of convincing evidence, and such strains of glory, as I can- not possibly clothe with words. The greatest men amono- the Heathen nations, have given the highest ac- counts of their accomplishments by framing laws ; but besides the passing weakness of their performances, when viewed in a true light, the choicest of them all have a great deal of iniquity inlaid with them : But all here shineth with the glory of a Deity. Every duty is plain- ly contained within these small boundaries, and all con- cerns thereof in heart and way, are set down so punc- tually, and so fully cleared in the exposition which the Lawgiver himself has given of his own laws, that no- thing is wanting. Here also are all the mysteries of ini- quity in the heart so clearly and fully detected, these evils also pursued to their most latent sources, and to the grand spring of them all, viz, the corruption of our nature, and in so very few words, with so much of shin- ing evidence and power, that no judicious and sober person can deny that the finger of God is there, unless he oiler the most daring violence to his own conscience. And what shall I say of the glorious contrivanceof sal- vation, through the Lord Jesus our only Redeemer? Should I touch at the ground work thereof in the eter- nal counsel of the adorable Trinity, and the several dis- PREFACE. Tii playe of it, until at length the complete purchase was made in the fulness of time ; and if I should but glance at the several strokes of omnipotent power, and rich mercy through Christ, by which the purchased salva- tion is effectually applied to every elect person, I would enter upon a field from w hich I could not quickly or easily get off*. All that I adventure to say is, tliat the discoveries of a Deity in each step thereof, are so relu- cent and full of glory, that the being of the material light under a meridian sun, without the interposition of a cloud, may as well be denied, as these great truths can be disowned. Beyond all manner of doubt, they con- tain matter of much higher, and more glorious evidence, upon the minds of all those Avhose eyes the god of this world hath not blinded, (2 Cor. iv. 3, 4. John i. 5. Deut. xxix. 4.) Yet ah ! mid-day clearness is midnigiit dark- ness to those who have not eyes. But not to insist : If we add to all these, the full history of the heart of man, in the depths of wickedness, contained in that great abyss, together with the several eruptions thereof, both open and violent, as also subtile and covered, together with all the engines of temptations for setting it to work, and keeping it still busy ; if, I say, the perfect account of these things which is given in the word, be seriously pondered, who can escape the conviction, that He, and He only who formed the Spirit within liim, could have given such a display. From all this, I would bewail, were it possible, with tears of blood, the blasphemous •wickedness of those, who, from the grossest darkness and ignorance, oppose, malign, and deride such great and high things. But it is enough ; wisdorv is justijiedhf all her children^ Matth. xi, ] 9. The worthy and now glorified author of this work, had a plentiful measme, beyond many, of the surest and sweetest knowledge of these matters : his soul, (may I so express it) was cast into the blessed mould of gospel truth. AVho is a teacher like unto God ! Sure an enlightening work, by his word and Spirit upon the soul, iilleth it with evidence of a more excellent nature, and attended with a penetrancy quite of another kind, than any mathematical demon- stration can amoujit to. In this case, the soul (2 Cor. vui PREFACE. iii, 3.) is an epistle of Jesus Christ, wherein these great truths are written by himself, in characters which the united force and subtilties of hell shall be so far from deleting, that theii' strongest efforts shall render the un- pressions still deeper, and more vivid. No mathematic- al demonstration can vie with this : forasmuch as the au- thority of the God of truth, that conveys his own testi- mony into the heart with a strong hand, has a glory and evidence peculiar to itself. And though well known to those who enjoy it, yet of a beauty great and mysteri- ous, such as the tongues of men and angels could not suffice to describe. The empty cavils of that execrable herd of blasphemous Atheists, or Deists, as they would be called, amount to a very small and contemptible ac- count, seeing the most subtle of them, fall veiy far short of the objections which unclean spuits propose, and urge in away of temptation, against persons exercised to godli- ness, which yet the Father of lights dispelleth merciful- ly from time to time, and maketli tlicse dark shades to evanish, as the Sun of righteousness ariseth upon the soul with a glory and evidence still upon the ascendant, Mai. iv, 2. Prov. iv, 18. Hos. vi, 3. Nevertheless, the learned and godly author hath encountered these silly creatures at their own weapons, both offensively and de- fensively, and to such excellent purpose, as needeth not my poor testimony. He hath searched into the very bot- tom of what they allege. With great and unwearied diligence did he read their writings carefully from the very first springs, and hath represented fairly their emp- ty cavils, in all the shades of strength they can be al- leged to have, and has refuted them plainly and copiously. On which, and the like accounts, I hope the work wUl be, through the divine blessing, of great use in the churches of Christ. JAMES HOG. 3^0 the Public. IT would be superfluous for the publisher to add any thing to ihe highly respectable recommendations which are subjoined, as a reason for offering a new American edition of the following work to the public, or as an inducement to the pious and reflecting portion of community to patronize the undertaking. If, unhappily, the enemies of Christianity are, at this period, uncommonly active and zealous in propagating their pernicious doctrines, it becomes the peculiar duty of every one who feels the importance of religion, to encourage the circulation of a work so well calculated as this to check the progress of infidelity, and to promote the cause of truth and virtue. "o-j:^* RECOMMENDATIONS. ^E consider Professor H ALYBURTON's celebrated work, on the Insufficiency of Natural REtiGioN, and the Necessitt OP Revelation, as on the whole, the best manual on the subject of Which it treats, now 6xtant. The author, not less illustrious for his talents and learning, than for his piety, has not contented him- self, like most modern writers on the Deistical controversy, with merely standing on the defensive ; but has " carried the war," as one of his eulogists expresses it, " into the camp of the adversa- ry ;" proving, by " unanswerable arguments," as another has pro- nounced, " the utter insufficiency of the Deist's religion for the sal- vation of them, and beating them fairly at their own weapons." We rejoice to he^r that Mr. South wick proposes to give a new 2 X RECOMMENDATIONS. American edition of this excellent work. Were its merits general- ly known, all recommendation would be mmecessary. SAMUEL MILLER, D.D. JOHN B. ROMEYN, D. D. PHILIP MILLEDOLER, GARDNER SPRING, HENRY P. STRONG, Pastors of the Preshyterian Church. JOHN SHUREMAN, CHRISTIAN BOURCKy S. N. ROWAN, JOHN BRODHEAD, Pastors of the Reformed Dutch Church. J. M. MASON, D. D. Provost of Columbia College and Pastor of the Associate Reformed Church. ALEX. McLEOD, D. D. Pastor of the Reformed Presbyterian Church. THOMAS HAMILTON, Pastor of the Associate Church. JOHN McNIECE, Pastor of the Irish Presbyterian Church. WILLIAM NETLL, Pastor of the Presbyterian Church in the City of Albany. JOHN M. BRADFORD, Minister of the Reformed Protestant Dutch Church in the City of Albany. ELIPHALET NOTT, D. D. President of Union College, Schenectady. ALEXANDER MONTEITH, Pastor of the 1st Presbyterian Church in the city of Sche- nectady. New-York, May, 1812. AccrsTOMED from my earliest years, to hear the name of Haly- BURTON mentioned with the highest respect, and his Examination OF THE Principles of the Deists of his own time, greatly ex- tolled, both by the pious and by the learned of his own Church, and RECOMMENDATIONS. xi after repeated and frequent perusals of this judicious and profound treatisefl cordially unite in the character and encomiums given above ; and with becoming deference, earnestly recommend the careful and patient study of it to all, but especially to the youth of our own country. joHN McDONALD, . ^ Paslor of the United Preshyterian Church in the City of Albany. Albany, May 26, 1812. TO THE READER, READER, WHOEVER thou art, the question agitated in the /ensuing discourse is that wherein thou hast a considera- ble concernment. If thou art a Christian, the ensuing discourse is designed to justify thy refusal of that reli^ gion which has now got a great vogue amongst those gentlemen, who set up for the only wits, and aim at monopolizing reason, as if they alone were the peoplcy and wisdom was to die with them. They cry up their religion as the only reasonable religion, and traduce all who will not join with them, as credulous and unreasonable men. Whereas, on the contrary, no man that uses his reasoi^ can close with that which they would obtrude on us as rational religion : nor can any man, w ithout being guilty of the fondest credulity, venture his salvation upon this modern Paganism, that struts abroad under the modish name of Deism^ which I hope the ensuing discourse will evince ; wherein it is made appear, that the light of na- ture is utterly insufficient to answer the great ends of reli-r gion, and that consequently we had the justest reason in the world, if there were none, to wish for a revelation from God, as what is of absolute necessity to our happi- ness ; and since there is one, with the greatest tliankful- fiess tQ embrace it, cleave to it and comply with it, xiv TO THE READER. Reader, if thou hast thy religion yet to choose, which I am afraid is too common a case in this unstable age, then it is high time thou wert bethinking thyself of reli- gion in earnest. To-morrow thou wilt lire, thou still dost say ; To-day's too late, the wise liv'd yesterday. And if after too long a delay thou mean to avoid an unhappy choice, reason advises thee to consider well, that when the choice is made, care be taken to make it so, as to prevent the necessity of either a second choice, or a too late repentance for choosing amiss. There is a set of men, who cry up at this day natural religion, and especi- ally commend it to such as have no religion. It is such as thou art that they desire to deal with, and among such it is that they are most successful. But if thou hast a mind not to be deceived in a matter of such moment, it imports thee not a little to consider what may be said against that, which it is likely may be offered thee, as a fine, modish, reasonable religion, meet for a gentleman^ a man of wit and reason, I have here offered to prove this all to be said without, yea against reason and experi- ence. Well, first hear and then judge, and after that choose or refuse as thou seest cause. As for the management of this useful inquiry, it is wholly suited to that which at first Avas only designed, viz. the satisfaction of the w liter's own mind about the question that is here proposed. I entered not upon this inquiry with a view to oppose any man, or triumph over adversaries, and so did industriously wave those catches, subtleties, and other nicities, used frequently by writers of controversy. My only design was to find the truth, and therefore I chose clearly to state the question, which I found the Deists always avoided, and plainly propose my reasons for that side of it I took, after trial, to be the truth. As to the opposite opinion, I made it my busi- ness to make a diligent inquiry into the strongest argu- ments advanced for it, candidly to propose them in their utmost force, and closely to answer them; avoiding, as much as might be, such reproaches as are unworthy of a TO THE READER. xv Christian, or an inquirer after truth, though I met with ifrequent provocation, and found sometimes how true tliat is, Difficile est non scribere satyram contra satyram,^ It was not amusement I aimed at, or to please my own fancy, or tickle the reader's ears with a gingle of words, or divert and bias the judgment by a flood of rhetoiic. I never designed to set v^ for an orator. My business lies quite another way, it is what I lay no claim to, and what I think is to be avoided in discourses of this Idiid. All I aimed at as to language, was to clothe my thougl -ts in plain and intelligible expressions. Tiie reader is to expect no more, and if he miss this I hope it will be but rarely. It is not to be expected, that a discourse which was beo-un in an inverted order, the middle part being first writ ; and that was composed in the intervals of business of a very diiferent nature, at spare liours, by one of no great experience, and an utter stranger to writings of this sort, shall be free of blemishes that may olfend nicer palates. Some few repetitions could not, at least without more pains in transcribing tlian I had either lei- sure or inclination for, well be avoided. Nor could a discourse so often intenupted by other business, and upon so very difl'erent subjects, be carried on witli that equality of style tliat were to be wislied, especially by one who was never over much an aliecter of elegancy of language. In a word, the work is long, much longer than I designed ; and yet without wronging the sub- ject, at least as I am otherwise situated and engaged, I could not easily shorten it. If he pleases to inspect the book, he may possibly find, that I had reason for insist- ing at the lengtli I have done. However, every one has not the art of him, who could enclose Homer's Iliads in a nut's shell. I am sensible, that what I have discoursed in the first chapter of the ensuing treatise, concerning the Occasions of Deism y will grate hard upon a set of men, wlio have for many years bygone carried all before them, and so have taken it ill to have any censures bestowed on them, though * *' It is difficult not to write a satire against satire." xvi I'O THE READER, they did severely animadvert upon the real or supposed faults of others. As to this I have not much to say by way of apology. That Deism has sprung up and grows apace amongst us, is on all hands confessed. Others have offered their conjectures concerning the occasions of its increase. Why I might not offer my opinion also, I know no reason. The principal subject of the ensuing treatise suffers not, though I should herein be mistaken. In pro- posing my conjecture I did not pursue the interest of any party ; but have freely blamed all parties. If the sticklers for the Arminian or Socinian divinity are touch- ed, it was because I thought fhey were to be blamed, and therefore I have withstood them to their face. As to the tendency of their principles I have been sparing, because that debate has been sufficiently agitated in the Low Countries betwixt the contending parties. The reader who would be satisfied as to this, may peruse those who have directly managed this charge, and the answers that have been made, and judge upon the whole matter as he finds cause.* But whatever may be as to tliis, the manner of their management may perhaps be found less capable of a colourable defence. And it is upon this that I have principally insisted. To oppose, especially from the pulpit, with contempt, bufibonry, banter and satire, principles, that sober persons of the same persuasion do own to have at least a very plausi- ble like foundation in the word of God, and which have been, for near sixty or seventy years after the reforma- tion, the constant doctrine of the fathers, and sons of the church of England, and have by them been inserted in- to her articles, and so become a part of her doctrine,t is a practice that I do' not well imderstand how to ex- cuse or free fiom the imputation of profanity, and which hath too manifest a tendency to Atheism, to ad- mit of any tolerable defence. The scriptures, and truths, that have any countenance in them, or opinions which they seem really to persons otherwise solder, pious and judicious, not only to teach, but to inculcate as of the * See Arcana ArnruVuiiikmi, by Videllus, and Videlius Ropsodus, with Yi- delius's Rejoinders, &c. t See Bishfip ofSaruni on the Articles, Prcrace, piige 7, 8. TO THE READER. xvii highest importance, are not a meet subject for raillery ; nor is the pulpit a meet place for it. This is that for which principally I have blamed them, and this I cannot retract. If they take this ill, I ask them. Have not otiiers as much reason to take it ill, that the doctrines of tiie church of England taught in her articles and homilies, and professed by her learned bishops, who composed them, and by her sons for so long a tract of time, as consonant to, founded in, and grounded on the word of God, should be so petulantly traduced by Avit, raillery, and declamatory invectives from the press and pulpit; and that too by those who have subscribed to these articles and homilies ? This management has been complained of by sober persons of all parties, churchmen and dis- senters, contra-remonstrants and remonstrants too, as I could make appear, if there were occasion for it : And why I might not also complain, I want yet to be inform- ed. None is charged save the guilty. Others who are innocent have no reason to be angry. And perhaps, they who will be offended at this, would scarce have been pleased if I had let it alone. In the tenth chapter of this treatise, I have opposed the opinion that asserts the Heathen world to be under a government of grace. I know it is maintained by ma- ny learned men both at home and abroad, from whose memory, if dead, or just respect, if alive, I designed not to detract. Nor did I design to list them with the Deists, whom I know to have been solidly opposed by several that were of this opinion. But yet I do tliink the opinion itself destitute of any solid foundation, with all deference to them, who think otherwise, either in scripture, reason or experience. And I am further of the mind, that the learned abettors of it, had never embraced an assertion, that exposes them to so many perplexing difficulties, and puts them upon a necessity of using so many, I had al- most said, unintelligible distinctions for its support, if they had not been driven to it by some peculiar hypo- thesis in divinity which they have seen meet to embrace. If any intend to prove what I have denied, I wish it may be done by proper arguments, directly proving it, and not by advancing an hypothesis that remotely infers it. xviii To THE READER. and which, in itself, or, at least as proposed by those whom I have met with, is so darkened by a huge mul- titude of subtile, mysterious and uncouth distinctions, that I can scarce ever project so much tune as to under- stand them. However this much I must say, that so cross does this opinion seem to scripture, reason and ex- perience, that it will go a very great way to weaken the credit of any hypothesis on which it inevitably follows. However, I hope this may be said, and different opin- ions about this point without any breach of charity may be retained. Diversum sentire duos de rebus iisdem incolumi licuit semper amicitia.^ I know the abettors of this opin- ion are hearty friends in the main to the cause I here maintain. The scheme I have in the close of that chapter offer- ed by way of digression, of God's government of the Heathen world, is not designed as a full account of that matter, which as to many of its concernments, is of those things that are not revealed, and so belong not us ; much less is it designed to be the ground of a peremptory judgment as to the eternal state of them, who are with- out the church : But only to shew, that any thing we certainly know as to God's dealings with them, in the common course of his providence, may, upon other sup- positions and principles, beside that rejected, be account- ed for. The judicious and sober reader may judge of it as he sees cause. I hope I have, in a matter of such difficulty, avoided any unbecoming curiosity, or affect- ing to be wise above what is written. If any blame me for the multitude of quotations, I an- swer, the subject I undertook rendered this unavoida- ble. I have used the utmost candor in them. Some- times out of a regard to brevity I have avoided the trans- lation of testimonies quoted from authors who writ in a different language. Tlie learned will not complain of this : And if any person of tolerable judgment, who is not learned, will be at pains to peruse the ensuing dis- course, he will find as much said, without regarding * " It was always allowed, that two persons might think differently of the same things, wtthout breach of friendship." TO THE READER. xix those quotations, as may satisfy his mind upon this sub- ject. As to what I have, in the ensuing papers ascribed, to Mr. Gildon publisher of the Oracles of Reason, I had written it before I understood his recovery from Deism. But yet I thought it not meet to alter it, because there are, no doubt, many others who entertain the same no- tions he then did maintain, and my opposition is to the principles and not the persons. As for his recovery, 1 congratulate it, and wish it may be such as may secure him from after-reckoning for the hurt he has done. If any Deists shall see meet to undertake this debate, I decline it not. If they treat my book as they have done those of others, every way my superiors, and as rats are wont to do — gnaw only the outside, advert to in- cident things that are not to the purpose, and single out rather what seems exceptionable than what is of moment, following him who did so. &, quse Desperat tractata iiitescei-e posse, relinquit,* I have somewhat else to do, than to take any notice of such impertinency. If any shall offer a solid and ra- tional confutation, wliich yet I am not much afraid of, and convince me, not by jest, bufibonry and raillery, but by solid arguments, of my being in a mistake, Cuncta recantabo maledicta, priora rependam Laudibus, & vestrum nomen in astra feram.f • And leaves out whatever he despairs of being able to ahlne in if they were touched on." I " I will recant all my reproaches, I will make amends for my former slanders by praises, and will exalt your name to the st^rs-" INDEX. PAGE. PREFACE, 3 Recommendations of the work, ..... 9 Author's address to the reader, . . . , .13 Introduction, • . .•••.. 25 [Wherein it is proved a matter of the highest import and necessity to make a right choice of religion ; and wherein it is further evinced, that no man, without the most mani- fest violence to reason, can turn Heathen, Mahometan, or acquiesce in Atheism or Scepticism, and that consequently every man must acquiesce in the Scriptures, or turn De- ist. Deism undertaken to be demonstrated false and ■ruining. — The author's inducements to this undertaking,] CHAP. I. Giving a short account of the rise, occasions, and progress of Deism, especially in England ; — the opinions of the De- ists ; — the different sorts of Deists, mortal and immortal, 41 CHAP. II. Mortal Deists who, and what judgment to be made of them and their sentiments, 54 CHAP. HI. Wherein the controversy betwixt us and the Immortal De- ists is stated and cleared, 57 CHAP. IV. Wherein the insufficiency of natural religion is proved from the insufficiency of its discoveries of a Deity, . . 64 xxii INDEX. CHAP. V. PAflE. Proving the insufficiency of natural religion from its defec- tiveness as to the worship of God, .... 79 C H A P. VI. Proving the insufficiency of natural religion from its defec- tiveness as to the discovery wherein man's happiness lies, 8& CHAP. VII. Nature's light affords not a sufficient rule of duty. — Its insuffi- ciency hence inferred, , 98 CHAP. VIII. Proving the insufficiency of natural religion from its defects as to sufficient motives for enforcing obedience, . 108 CHAP. IX. Shewing the importance of knowing the origin of sin to the world, and the defectiveness of natm"e's light as to this, . 115 CHAP. X. Proving nature's light unable to discover the means of obtain- ing pardon of sin, or to shew that it is attainable, . .128 Sect. I. The importance of this difficulty stated, 128 Sect. II. Shewing the darkness of nature's light as to pardon, - . 136 Sect. III. Wherein it is inquired whether repentance is sufficient to attone for sin? How far nature's light enables to it ? What assurance nature's light gives of pardon upon repentence ? .... 143 Objections considered, 169 Digression concerning God's government of the Hea- then world, shewing that there is nothing in it whence any design of God to pardon them may be certainly inferred, 195 INDEX. sxiii CHAP. XI. PAGE. Proving the insufficiency of natural religion to eradicate our inclinations to sin, or subdue its power, . . . 204 CHAP. XII. Wherein the proof of the insufficiency of natural religion is concluded from a general view of the experience of the world, 2in CHAP. XIII. Wherein we n^ake a transition to the Deists' pleas for their opinion, and take particular notice of the Articles to which they reduce their Catholic religion ; give some account of Baron Herbert, the first inventer of this Catholic re- ligion, his books, and particularly of that which is inscrib- ed De Religione Gentilium^ as to the matter and scope of it, and the importance of what is therein attempted to the Deists' cause, 219 CHAP. XIV. Wherein it is inquired, Whether Herbert has proved that his Five Articles did universally obtain, . . . 230 CHAP. XV. Wherein it is made appear that Herbert's Five Articles did not universally obtain, . . . - . . 253 CHAP. XVI. Wherein some general considerations are laid down for prov- ing that many of the best things, which are to be met with in the Heathens, were not the discoveries of nature's light, but came from tradition, ..... 270 CHAP. XVII. Wherein we consider what Herbert's opinion was as to the sufficiency of his Articles, and offer some reflections, show- ing how foolish, absurd and ridiculous the Deists' pre- tences to their sufficiency are, .... 276 CHAP. XVIII. Containing an answer to some of the Deists' principal argu- m^jiits ior Uie sufficiency oi naiural religion, . . 286 jouY INDEX. CHAP. XIX. rAG£> Wherein Herbert's reasons for publishing his books in de- fence of Deism are examined and found weak, . 299 CHAP. XX. Wherein the Queries offered by Herbert and Blount, for proving the sufficiency of their Five Articles are examined, 308 ESSAY OX FAITH. CHAP. I. Containing some general remarks concerning knowledge, faith, and particularly divine faith and that both as to the faculty and actings thereof, .... 335 CHAP. H. Wherein the nature of that faith, which in duty we are obliged to give to the word of God, our obligation to, and our ability for answering our duty, are inquired into, 339 CHAP. HI. The ground, or the formal reason, whereon faith assents to the scriptures is inquired after ; the Rationalist's opinon about it, and particularly as stated by Mr. Locke in his book on Human Understanding, is proposed and considered, ........ 345 INTRODUCTION, XN this sceptical age, which questions almost every thing, it is still owned as certain, that all men must die. If there were any place for disputing this, there are not a few, who would spare no pains to bring themselves into the disbelief of a truth, that gives them so much disturbance, in the courses they love and seem re- solved to follow : But the case is so clear, and the evidence of this principle so pregnant, which is every day confirmed by new expe- riments, that the most resolved infidel is forced, when it comes in his way, though unwilling, to give his assent, and moan out an Amen. The grave is the house appointed for all the living. Some arrive sooner, some later ; but all come there at length. The ol> scurity of the meanest cannot hide him, nor the power of the great- est screen him from the impartial hand of death, the executioner of fate, if I may be allowed the use of a word so much abused. As its coming is placed beyond doubt, so its aspect is hideous beyond the reach of thought, the force of expression, or the utmost eflRirts of the finest pencil in the most artful hand. It, in a moment, dash- es down a fabric, which has more of curious contrivance tlian all the celebrated pieces put together, which the most refined human wits have invented, even when carried to the greatest height, which the improvements of so many subsequent generations, after the ut- most application and diligence, could bring them to. It puts a stop to many thousand motions, which, though strangely diversified, did all concur, with wonderful exactness, to maintain, and carry on the design and intendment of the glorious and divine Artificer. How this divine and wonderful machine was first erected, set a go- ing, and has, for so long a track of time, regularly performed all its motions, could never yet be understood by the most elevated un- derstandings. Canst thou tell how the bones grow in the womb of her that is with child, is a challenge to all the sons of science, to nnfjid the mystery ? Many have accepted it, but all have been h'lhd. Something they could say ; but, in spite of it all, the thing that liiey 4 26 INTRODUCTION. fouml a mystery, they left so still. How can one then look on tiie- dissolution of so admirable a contrivance, a machine so curious, and so far surpassing human art, without the deepest and most sensible regret. It untwists that mysterious tie, whereby soul and body were so fast linked together ; breaks up that intimate and close correspondence, that entire sympathy which was founded thereon ; dislodges an old inhabitant ; and while it lingers, being unwilling to remove, deaih pulls that curious fabric, wlieiein it dwelt, down about its ears, and so forces it thence, to take up its lodgings, it can scarce tell where. And upon its removal, that curious fabric, that a little before was full of life, activity, vigour, order, warmth, and every thing else that is pleasant, is now left a dead, inactive, cold hmip, a disordeied mass of loathsome matter, full of stench and corruption. Now the body is a spectacle so hideous, that they who loved, and who embraced it before, cannot abide the sight or smell of it ; but shut it up in a coffin, and not content with that, away they carry it and lodge it amongst worms, and the vilest insects in the bowels of the earth, to be consumed, devoured, torn and rent by the most abominable vermin that lodge in the grave. Quantum mutatus ah illo.* We have all heard of the afflctions of Job. Two or three mes- sengers arrive, one after the other, and still the last is worst. Eve« ry one tells his story. The first is sad ; but those that follow aie still more melancholy. The disasters are so terrible^ that they fill the \rorld with just astonishment. And yet after all, what is this to death, which alone is able to furnish subject, more than enough, for some thousands of such melancholy messages! One might bring the dying man the melancholy tidings, that he is divested of all his beneficial, pleasant, and honorable employments : While he is yet speaking, another might be ready to bid him denude himself of all his pos- sessions : A third, to continue the tragedy, might assure him that there is a commission issued out to an impartial hand, to tear him from the embraces of his dear relations, without regarding the hide- ous outcries of a loving wife, the meltings of tender infants, the in- tercessions of dear friends : While otliers continuing still the mourn- ful scene, might assure him that he was no more to relish the fra- grancy of the spring, or taste the delights of the sons of men, or see the pleasant light of the sun, or hear the charming airs of mu- sic, or the yet more useful converse of friends. And to make the matter sadder still, if it can v. ell be so, the story might be shut up with a rueful account of the parting of soul and body, with all the horrible disasters that follow upon this parting. " How greatly changed from what it once was. INTRODUCTION. 27 Thiis the case evidently stands. Not a tittle of all this admits of debate. To every man it may be said, De te fuhula nanafur.'^ What a wo»der is it, that so grave and important a subject is so little in Jthe thoughts of men ? What apology can be made for the folly of mankind, who are at so much pains to shelter themselves against lesser inconveniences, quite overlooking this, which is of in- finitely greater consequence ? Here is the light-side of death, which every body may see. — What a rueful and astonishing prospect doth it give us? Where shall we find comfort against that dismal day, whereon all this shall be verified in us ? He is -something worse than a fool or madman, that will not look to this. And he is yet more mad that thinks, that ra- tional comfort in such a case can be maintained upon dark, slender and conjectural grounds. It is certain, that which must support, must be something on the other side of time. The one side of death affords nothing but mat- ter of terror ; if we are not enabled to look forward, and get sucli a sight of the other as may balance it, we may reasonably say, that it had been better for us never to have been born. Undoubtedly, therefore, no question is so useful, so necessary, so noble, and truly worthy the mind of man as this : What shall become of me after death ? What have I to look for on the other side of that awful change ? Those arts and sciences which exercise the industry and con- sideration of the greater part of the thinking world, are calculated for time, and aim at the pleasure or advantage of a present life. It is religion alone that directly concerns itself in the important ques- tion last mentioned, and pretends to offer comforts against the melancholy aspect of death, by securing us in an up-making for our losses on the other side of time. Men, who are not blind to their own interest, had need therefore to take care of the choice of their religion. If they neglect it altogether, as many now do, they for- feit all prospect of relief. If they chuse a wrong one, that is not able to reach the end, they are no less unhappy. The world may call them wits, or what else they please, who either wholly neglect and laugh over all inquiries after religion, or who superficially look into matters of this nature, and pass a hasty judgment : But sober reason will look on them as somewhat below the condition of the beasts that perish. It is somewhat to be regretted, that the bulk of mankind found their principles, .^s well as practice and hopes, on no better bottom than education, which gives but too just occasion for the smart re- flection of the witty, though profane poet : By education most have been misled ; So they believe, because thiy were so bred. * " It is of vou that the stow is told." 28 INTRODUCTION. The priest continues what the nurse began : And thus the child imposes on the maa.* Most part seek no better reason for their belief and practice than oustom and education. Whatever these offer in principle, they greedily swallow down, and venture all on so weak a bottom. And this sure is one of the great reasons why so many miscarry in this im- portant matter. It is true, in this inquiring age, many, especially of the better quality, scorn this way. But it is to be feared that the greater part of them, flying to one extreme, as is common in such cases, have Sghted on another and a worse one, if not to themselves, yet certainly of more pernicious consequence to the public. They set up for wits and men of sense. They pretend to have found out great mistakes in the principles of their education, the religion of their country ; and thence, without more ado, reject it in bulk, and turn sceptics in religion. And yet after all this noise, most of them neither un- derstand the religion they reject, nor know they what to substitute in its room, which is certainly an error of the worst consequence imaginable to the public ; since men once arrived at this pass, can never be depended on. Men may talk what they please. A man of no religion is a man not to be bound, and therefore is absolutely unmeet for any share in society, which cannot subsist, if the sa* cred ties of religion hold it not together. But in whatever course such persons, on the one hand or other, steer, the more considerate and better part of mankind, in matters of so high importance, will, with the nicest care, try all, that they may hold fast what is good. If a man once understands the im- portance of the case, he will find reason to look some deeper, and think more seriously of this matter, than either the unthinking generality/, who receive all in bulk, without trial, as it is given them, or, the forward ivould-he-mits, that oftentimes are guilty of as great, and much more pernicious credulity in rejecting aU, as the other in receiving all. But whereas there are so many different religions in the world, and all of them pretend to conduct us in this important inquiry ; which of them shall we chuse ? The Deists, to drive us into their religion, which consists only of five articles, agreed to, as they pre- tend, by all the world, would persuade us, that a choice is im- possible to be made of any particular religion, till we have gone through, with such a particular examination of every pretender, and all things that can be said for or against it, as no man is able to make. Blount tells us, as Herbert before had done. That " unless a man " read all authors, speak with all learned men, and know all languages, " it is impossible to come to a clear solution of all doubts."! And so * Dryd. I/i7ul and Panther. t Elounl's Religio Laid, pa^. 91. Ilei-berl's Reli^iv Laid, pag. 12 , INTRODUCTION. in effect, it is pretended impossible to be satisfied about the truth of any particular religion. If this reasoning did hold, I should not doubt to make it appear, that no truth whatever is to be received ; and in particular, that their so much boasted catholic religion^ cannot rationally be entertained by any man. If we can be satisfied upon rational grounds about no truth, till we have heard and con- sidered all, that not only has been said, but may be alleged against it ; what truth can we believe? Here it is easy tb observe that some cannot do ought, unless they overdo. The intendment of such rea- soning is obvious : Some men would cast us loose as to all religion, that we may be brought under a necessity to take up with any fan- cy they shall be pleased to offer us ; a man that is sinking will take hold of the most slender twig. The Papists have vigorously pursued this course in opposition to the Protestants, to drive them into the arms of their infallible guide. And indeed the learned Herbert's reasonings on this point, after whom the modern Deists do but copy, seem to be borrowed from the Romanists, and are urged in a design not unfavorable to the church of Rome, of which per- haps more afterwards. But to wave this thin sophistry ; any one that will, with a suita- ble application, engage in the consideration of what religion he is to chuse, will quickly find himself eased of this unmanageable task, which the Deists would set him. His inquiry will soon be brought to a narrow compass, and the pretenders, that will require any nice consideration, will be found very few. For a very cursory consideration of religion in the heathen world, will give any considerate mind ground enough to rest fully assured, that the desired satisfaction as to future happiness, andthe means of attaining it, are not thence to be expected. Here he will not find what may have the least appearance of satisfying him. The wisest of the heathens scarce ever pretended to satisfy themselves, much less others, upon these heads. All things here are dark, vain, incoherent, inconsistent, wild, and plainly ridiculous for most part ; as will further appear in our progress. Their religions were, general- ly speaking, calculated for other purpose?, and looked not so far as eternity. Nor will it be more difficult to get over any stop that the reli- gion of Mahomet may lay in our inquirer^ s way. Let a man seri- ously peruse the Alcoran, and if he has his senses about him, he cannot but there see the most pregnant evidences of the grossest, most scandalous and impudent imposture, that ever was obtruded on the world. Here he must expect no other evidence for what he has to believe, but the bare assertion of one, who was scandal- ously impious to that degree, that his own followers know not how to apologize for him. If you inquire for any other evidence, jou I yo INTRODUCTION. are doomed by the Alcoran to everlasting ruin, and his slaves are ordered to destroy you.* He forbids any inquiry into his religion, or the grounds of it, and therefore you must either admit in bulk the entire bundle of fopperies, inconsistencies, and shocking ab- surdities, that are cast together in the Alcoran, without any trial, or reject it : And in this case, no wise man will find it hard to make a choice. After one has proceeded thus far, he may easily see, that he is now inevitably cast upon one of the four conclusions : Either 1 st. He must conclude it certain that all religion is vain, that there is nothing to be expected after this life, and so commence Atheist. Or 2dly, He must conclude, that certainty is not attainable in these things, and so turn Sceptic, Or 3dly, He must pretend, that every one's reason unassisted is able to conduct him in mat- ters of religion, ascertain him of future happiness, and direct as to the means of attaining it ; and so set up for natural religion and turn Deist. Or 4thly, He must acquiesce in the revealed religion contained in the scriptures, and so turn Christian, or at least Jew. As to the first of these courses, no man will go into it, till he has abandoned reason. An atheist is a monster in nature. That there is nothing to be expected after this life, and that man's soul dies with his body, is a desperate conclusion, which ruins the foundation of all human happiness; even in the judgment of the Deists them- selves.f There are two material exceptions which are sufficient to deter any thinking man from closing with it. The one is, the hideousness of its aspect. Annihilation is so horrible to human nature, and has so frightful a visage to men who have a desire of perpetuity inlaid in their very frame, that none can look at it seriously without the utmost dread. It is true, guil- ty Atheists would fain take sanctuary here ; yet were they brought to think seriously of the case, they would not find that relief in it which they promise. I have been credibly informed that a gentle- man of no contemptible parts, who had lived as if, indeed, he were to fear or hope nothing after time, being in prison, and fearing death, (though he escaped it and yet lives) fell a thinking seriously, when alone, of annihilation : And the fears of it made so deep and horri- ble impressions on his mind, that he professed to a gentleman, who made him a visit in prison, and found him in a grievous damp, that the thoughts of annihilation were so dreadful to him, that he had ra- ther think of suffering a thousand years in hell. Guilty sinners, to ease their consciences, and screen them from the disquieting appre- hensions of an after- reckoning, retreat to this, as a refuge ; but they think no more about it, save only this and that in a cursory * Alcoran, chap. 4. •j- Letter to a Deist, pag-e 135. INTRODUCTION. 31 way, that it will free them from the punishment they dread and de- aerve. But if they would sedately view it, and take under their consideration all the horror of the case, their natures would recoil and shrink : It would create uneasiness instead of quiet, and increase the strait rather than relieve them from it. Besides, which is the other exception against it, were there never so much comfort in it, as there is none, i/et it is impossible to prove that there is nothing after this life. There is nothing that is tolera- ble can be said for it. None shall ever evince the certainty of the foul's dying with the body, till he has overthrown the being of a God, which can never be done so long as there is any thing certain among men. Further, as there is little or nothing to be said for it, so there is much to be said against it. Reason affords violent pre- sumptions, at least, for a future state. And all the arguments which conclude for the truth of Christianity, join their united force to sup- port the certainty of a state after this life. Till these are removed out of the way, there is no access for any to enjoy the imaginary comfort of this supposition. But who will undertake solidly to over- turn so many arguments, which have stood the test of ages ? They who are likely to be most forward, and favor this cause most, dare scarce allow these reasonings a fair hearing, which plead for a fu- ture state, for fear of rivetting the impression of the truth deeper on their minds, which they desire to shake themselves loose of. And how then will they overthrow them? In fine, he is a madman, who will admit a conclusion, whereof he can never be certain, and wherein, were it sure, he can have no satisfaction. The first forbids the judg- ment, the last dissuades the will and affections from resting in it. As to the second conclusion above mentioned, that sets up for scepticism in matters of religion, and bids us live at peradventures as to what is to be feared or hoped after time : it is a course that nothing can justify save absolute necessity. It lies open to the worst of inconveniences. Nothing can be imagined more melan- choly than its consequences, and the pretences for it are vain and frivolous. If it be really thus, that man can arrive at no certainty in matters of religion, and about his state after time, how deplorable is man's condition ? His case is comfortless beyond what can be well con- ceived. Nor can his enjoyments afford him any solid satisfaction, while ghastly death looks him in the face, and the sword hangs over his head, suspended by a hair. Will not the prospect of jiis rueful change (of whose dismal attendants we have given some account) em- bitter his sweetest enjoyments ? And will not the horror of the case be much increased by resolving upon a perplexing uncertainty as to what may come hereafter? In how dismal aplight is the poor man, who on the one hand is certain of the speedy arrival of death with all his frightful attendants ; and on the other, is told that he must 35 INTRODUCTION. rove in uncertainty, till the event clear him, whether he shall be entirely annihilated, and so plunge into that horrible gulf wherfe Atheists seek a sanctuary ! or if he shall not be hurried headlong into these endless torments, which the consciences of guilty sinners, when awakened, presage ; or, if he shall soar aloft into regions of endless bliss, which sinful mortals have but little reason to expect ; or, finally, whether he is not to launch out into some state reduci- ble to none of these. If here it behoves us to fix, one would not know how to evite two conclusions that are horrible to think of : " That our reason, whereby we are capable of foreseeing, and are *' affected with things at a distance, is a heavy curse ; and that the " profligate Atheist, who endeavors to mend this fault, in his consti- " tution, by a continual debauch, that never allows him to think " any more of what is certainly to come, than if he were a brute in- *' capable of forethought, is the wisest man." Beside, as was above insinuated, the pretences for this course are vain. It is true, most of those who set up for wits in this unhappy •age, are mere sceptics in religion, who admit nothing as certain, but boldly question every thing, and live at peradventures. Yet we are not obliged to think that this scepticism is the result of se- rious inquiry, and the want of certainty thereon ; but those gentle- men's way of living is inconsistent with serious religion ; they are therefore desirous to have such a set of principles as if they favor them not in the practices they have a mind to follow, yet shall not in- commode them sorely. This principle gives not absolute security of impunity ; but it seems, and but seems, to justify them in their present neglect of religion, and gives them a majj be for an escape from feared and deserved punishments ; and favors that laziness that can- not search for truth, where it lies not open to the eye, even of those who care not to see it. Their practice and course of life shew them so impatient of restialnts, that they love liberty, or ra- ther licentiousness ; and are not willing to come under any bonds. They greedily grasp at any difficulty that seems to make ever so little against religion ; — an evidence that they bear it no real good will. They neither converse much with books, nor men, that might afford them satisfaction, in reference to their real scruples, which is proof enough that they design not to be satisfied. They are light and jocular in their converse about the most serious matters ; an evidence that their desire is not to be informed. It is a good observation of the wise man, [Prov. xlv, 6.] A scorner seeketh wis- dom and findeth it not, but knowledge is easy to him that under- standeth. This is the real mj'stery of the matter with those gentle- men, whatever they may pretend. I know they want not pretences, taking enough with the unthink- ing, whereby they would justify themselves in their infidelity. The principal one is, that they find it easy to load religion with abund- INTRODUCTION. 83 ance of difficulties, not easily, if at all, capable of solution. But af- ter all, these gentlemen use those objections as the sceptics did of old, not so much to maintain any settled principle, no not their beloved one, whereof now we speak; as to create them work, and make sport with those who would seriously confute them, and to ward off blows from themselves, who have neither principles nor practice ca- pable of a rational defence. It is like indeed, that sometimes they may meet with such, who although they own religion, are yet incapable of defending it against such objections. But this is no wonder, since there are weak men of all persuasions. And their weakness is not, or ought, not to be any real prejudice to the truth they maintain. Besides, every one may know that ignorance of any subject is fertile of doubts, and will start abundance of difficulties ; whereas it requires a more full and exact acquaintance with the nature of things to solve them; and this falls not to every one's share. Further, if th s be allowed a reasonable exception against reli- gion, that it is liable to exceptions not easy to be solved, it will hold good as well against all other sorts of knowledge, as against religion ; yea, alid I may add, it concludes much stronger; for the farther any subject is above our reach, the less reason we have to expect, that we shall be capable of solving every difficulty that may be fltarted against it. There is no part of our knowledge, that is not in- cumbered with difficulties, as hard to be satisfyingly solved, as those commonly urged against religion. If this be a sjifficient reason to question religion, that there are arguments which may be urged against it, not capable of a clear, or, at least, an easy solution; I doubt not, upon the same ground, to bring the gentlemen who maintain this, if they will follow out their principle, to reject the most evi- dent truths, that we receive upon the credit of moral, metaphysical, and mathematical demonstrations ; yea, or even upon the testimony of our senses. For I know few of these truths that we receive up- on any of those grounds, against which a person of a very ordinary genius m:iy not start difficulties, which perhaps no man alive can ^ive a fair account of; and yet no man is so foolish as to call in -question those truths, because he cannot solve the difficulties which every idle head may start upon those subjects. I may give innu- merable instances of the difficulties wherewith other parts of hu- man knowledge are embarrassed : I shall only hint at a few. That^ matter is divisible into, or at least consists of indivisible particles, is with some a truth next to self-evident. That the quite contrary is tine, and matter is divisible in infinitmn, appears no less certain to many otliers.* But if either of them should pretend * Locke on Jlmnan Undenstatiding; edit. 5, page 207.—" I would fain have it instnnredinournotioiiof spivit of any thing more perplexed, or nearer aeon- 34 INTRODUCTION. theiusclves ciipiible of solving the difficulties, that He against their respective opinions, it were sufficient to make all men .of sense and learning doubt of their capacity and judgment : For the difficulties on both hands are such, that no ingenuous man that understands Ihem, will pretend himself capable of giving a fair solution of those, which press that side of the question he is incHued to. Again, whether we will, or will not, we must believe one side, and but one side, of the question is true ; that either matter is di- visible in infinitum, or not; that it consists of indivisibles, or not; these are contradictions. And it is one of the most evident propo- sitions that the mind of man is acquainted with, tliat contradictions cannot be true, or that both sides of a contradiction cannot bold. And yet agaijist this truth, ^vhereon much of our most certain know- ledge depends, insoluble difficulties may be urged : For it may be pretended, that here both sides of the contradiction are true, and this pretence may be enforced by the arguments abovementioned, which confirm the two <^posite opinions, which no mortal can an- swer. Shall we therefore believe that contradictions uiay be true? That motion is possible I am not like to doubt, nor can I, while I know that I can rise and walk; nor is he like to doubt of it, who sees me walk. And yet I doubt not the most ingenious of our athe- istical wits would find himself sufficiently straitened, were the argu- ments of Zefw Ehah'S against motion well urged, by a subtle dis-* putant. I shall offer one argument against motion, which I am fully •satisfied will puzzle the most subtle adversai'ies of religion to solve satisfyingly. Tliere are stronger arguments proving that matter is divisible in ii?^??iiiim than any mortal can solve or answer, though I perhaps believe it untrue. And it is as certain as the sun is in Ihe firmameut, tliat if matter is divisible in infinitum^ it consists of an infinite number of parts — (what some talk of indefinite is a shelter of ignorance, and if it is used any other way than as a shield to ward off difficulties for a while in a public dispute, the users can- not be excused either of gioss ignorance, rooted prejudice, or dis- ingenuity.) This being laid down as proven, and proven it may be by arguments, which none living can satisfy, that matter Is divisi- ble in infinitum, and that consequently it contains an infinite num- ber of parts. Nor is it less certain, that according to these conclu- sions laid down, if one body move upon the surface of another, as for instance, an inch in a minute's time, it must pass by au infinite number of parts; and it is undeniable, that it cannot pass one of tradiction, than the very notion of body includes in It ; the divisibility /// infinitum of any finite extension, involving us, whether we gi-ant or deny it, in consequences impossible to be explicated, or made in our apprehensions consistent; consequences that carx'y greater difficulty, and moi-e apparent absurdity than any thing that can follow from the notion of an immaterial £'.ibet;uicc." INTRODUCTION. 2j that Iiifiiiite number of parts without some portion of time. Now if so, what a vast portion of time will it require to make that little journey, which we know can be performed in a moment ! Will it not evidently require an eternity ! What difficulty can any urge, more difficult to be solved, against religion than this? And yet for all this he were a fool who would doubt of motion. As to mathematical certainty though many boasts are made of the firmness of its demonstrations ; yet these may, upon this ground, be called all in question. And I nothing doubt, that if men's inter- ests, real or pretended, lay as cross to them, as they are supposed to do to the truths of a religion, many more exceptions might be made against them, than are against those, and upon full as good, if not better reason. In justification of this assertion, I might proceed to demonstrate how trifling even the definitions of geometry, the firmest of all the mathematical sciences, are. Its difinitions might be alleged, upon no inconsiderable grounds, trlffing, nonsensical and ri- diculous. Its demands or its postulates, declared plainly impracticable. Its axioms or self-evident propositions — controvertible, and by them- selves they are controverted. Any one who would see this made <2;ood in particular instances, may consult (besides others) the learnt ed Huetms^s Demonstratio EvangelicUj where, in the Illustration of his definitions, axioms and postulates, he compares them with those of geometry, and prefers them to these, and shows they are incumbered with fewer difficulties than the otlier, though without derogating from the just worth and evidence of mathematical scien- ces. Besides what he has observed, I may add this one thing more, that those sciences deserve not any great reg-ard, save as they are applied to the use of life, and in a subserviency to man's advantage. And when thus they are applied to practice, the diffi- culty is considerably increased, and they maybe easily loaded with innumerable and insoluble inconveniences. For then, their defini- tions cease to be the definition of names, and are to be taken as the definitions of things that are actually in being. Their demands must not be practicable, but put in practice. And who sees not how many inextricable difficulties the practiser will be cast upon I The demonstration may proceed biavely so long as they hold in the theory, and mean by Punctumy id cii/jus pars nulla est ;* and the same may be said of lines and surfaces, and all their figures ; without obliging us to believe that really there are any such things. But when we come to the practice, they must go further, and take It for granted, that there are such points, lines, surfaces and figures. This turns what was before only an explication of a name, into the definition of a thing. And therefore I am now left at liberty to dispute, Avhcther there is any such thing ; or, whether indeed it is' ' " A point, is, llial. which has no parts." 3B INTRODUCTION. possible that there should be such. And who sees not now, that they are incumbered with as many difficulties as may peihaps be urged against any science whatever. It were endless to enumerate the things we must believe, without being capalilc to resolve the difficulties about them. The veriest infidel must suppose that something is eternal, or all things are eter- nal, or that they jumped into being without any cause. Whichso- ever of these positions he shall choose, he is led into a labyrinth of difficulties, from which no mortal wit can extricate him. We must all own, that either matter and motion are the principle of thought ; or, that there are immaterial substances which affect matter, and are strangely affected by what befals it. Whichsoever side any shall choose, he is cast upon inextricable difficulties. IMuch more might be said on this head ; but what has been said is more than enough to shew, that if this course is taken, it saps the foundations of all human knowledge, and there is no part of it safe. Besides, this way of questioning religion upon the pretence of difficulties lying against it, is contrary to the common sense of mankind, contradicts the practice of all wise men, and is inconsist- ent with the very nature of our faculties. For, if I have a clear tinexceptionable and convincing proof for any truth, it is against all reason to reject it, because I have not so full and comprehensive knowledge of the nature and circumstances of the object, as is ne- cessary to enable me to solve all difficulties that may occur about it: Yea, such is the nature of our faculties, that to justify in the opinion of the nicest inquirers after truth, nay, to extort an assent, clear proof is sufficient ; whereas, to untie all knots, and solve all bjections, perfect and all- comprehensive knowledge is absolutely needful ; which man's condition allows him not to expect about the meanest things. And the more remote any thing lies from com- mon observation, the less reason there is still to look for a fullness of knowledge and exemption from difficulties. If therefore men will turn sceptics in religion, to justify themselves, they must at- tempt the proofs whereon it is grounded. Sampson-like, they must grasp the pillars that support the fabric, and pull them down. If this is not done, nothing is done. And he that will undertake this, must have a full view of their force, and find where their strength lies : Now a serious view of this will be sufficient to deter any wise man from the undertaking. In a word, this scepticism can yield no ease or satisfaction to a reasonable soul. For if a man shall think rationally, his reason will suggest to him, that though all religion at present seems uncertain to him, yet upon trial perhaps he may find the grounds of religion so evident, that he cannot withhold his assent. This will at least oblige him lo a serious inquiry into the truth. Next, in uncertain- ties (supposing, after serious inquiry, he still thinks tlje truths of INTRODUCTION. 37 ^'eligiou ^ch) a prudent man will incline to what is moat probable- Finally he will choose and steer such a course of life as ^vill be safest, in case he shall in experience afterwards find, that there is a God, and a future state. All which shew the folly of our scep- tics, and, were it seriously considered, w^ould much mar their design, which is, thereby to justify a licentious life. Now we have considered, and sufficiently exposed the two first branches of the abovementioned choice : and consequently every roan must find himself cast upon a necessity of adopting one of these two — He must either betake himself to na/ It is well known that they reckon the Socinians sound in the fundamentals, and therefore think them in no hazard, pro- vided they live morally. Hence men have been emboldened to turn Socinians. And every body may see by what easy removes, one may from Socinianism arrive at Deism. For my part I can see little difference betwixt the two. The Deist indeed seems the honester man of the two ; he rejects the gospel, and owns that he does so : The other, I mean the Socinian, pretends to retain it. But I shall not insist any further in discovering the tendency of this new diviniij/ to libertinism and Detswj, since others have fully and judiciously done it from the most unquestionable arguments and documents. And more especially, since in fact it is evident, that wherever this new divinity has obtained, Socinians and deists abound, and many who embrace it daily go over to them ; which I take to be the surest evidence, if it be duly circumstantiate, of the tendency of this tk>ctrine to encourage those opinions, and least liable to any just exception. And perhaps I might add, that few, comparatively verj' few, ^ ho own the contrary doctrine, have gone into this new way, where that' divinity has not been enter- tained. But to return whence we have for a little digressed, to the state of religion in England. No sooner were they advanced to power who had tlrunk in those opinions, but presently the doctrines that are purely evangelical, by which the apostles converted the world, the reformers promoted and carried on our reformation from Pope- ry, and the pious preachers of the church of England did keep somewhat of the life and power of religion amongst their people ; these doctrines, I say, began to be decry ed ; justification by the righteousness of Christ, which Luther called Arttculus stantis aut cadentis ecc/csicE,* that redemption that is in him, even the forgive- ness of sins through faith in his blood ; the mystery of the grace, mercy and love of God manifested in Christ ; the great mystery of godliness ; the dispensation of the Spirit for conviction, renovation, sanctification, consolation and edification of the church, by a supply of spiritual gifts, and other doctrines of a like tendency, were, upon all occasions, ^)oldly exposed, and discredited in press and pulpit. The ministers who dared to avow them, from a conviction of the truth, the sense of the obligation of their promises and subscriptions to the Articles, were sure to have no preferment, nay, to be * " An article by which the Church must either stand or f;;H.'* 48 AN INQUIRY INTO THE branded with the odious names o^ Calv mists ^ Puritans^ Fa7iaticSf aiul I know not what. The doctrines of faith were not regarded as belonging to the ibundation of religion. The mo7*a/i/y of the Bible was pretended I he only thing that was necessary ; and as much of the dodriney as all, even Socinians, Quakers, and all the rest were agreed in, were Bufilcient. And if any opposed this, though in civil language and by fair arguments, they were sure to be exposed as enemies to rho^ caUiy ; although their adversaries durst not put the contest on this issue v/itli them, that he should be reckoned the greatest friend to morality who was most blameless in his walk, and shewed it the greatest practical regard. They could exercise charity, forbear-* itP.ce, and love to a Socinian that had renoiinced all the fundamen- tal truths of religion ; but none to a poor Dissenter, who sincerely believed all the doctrinal articles ; nay, even a sober churchman, who could not consent to new unauthorised ceremonies, was become uitolerable. So that men, at this time, might, with much more ere* dit and less hazard, turn Socinian, or any thing, than discover the least regard to truths contained in the articles, owned by most of the Reformed churches, and taught by our own Reformers. This is too well known to be denied by any one who knows how things were carried on at that time and since.* Further, whereas preachers formerly, in order to engage men to a compliance with the gospel, were wont to press much upon thera their guilt, the impossibility of standing before God in their own righteousness, their impotency, their misery by the fall, the necessi- ty of regeneration, illuminatioH, the power of grace to make them willing to comply, and that no man could sincerely call Christ Lord, and be subject to him practically, save by the Hob/ Ghost; care was now taken to unteach them all this, and to shew them how very little they had lo -t by the fall, if any thing was lost by it, either in jjolnt oi light to discern, or power and inclination to practice duty. They were told havf great length their oivn righteousness would go, and that it would do their business ; they might safely stand before ixod in it ; or if there was any room for Christ's righteousness, it ivas only to piece out their own, where it was wanting. In a word, the peopb ^\'cre told, what fine persons many of the Heathens were, wliD kne\>' iiothing of illumination, regeneration, or what the Bible was, and how little odds, if any at all, thers was betwixt grace and morality. • Anyone that would be satisfied in the tmth of this, must peruse the ser- mons and writing's published by that parly of old and of late, and the histories oftiiose times, particularly Rxish-wortli's Collect, the speeches of the lonjj Par- liament, and later writing's, and they wiii find documents more than enoug'h.-. And they may cuhsult also Honorii liejii's Comment, de atatii Ecclesiic jinjli- tunx. PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 49 And, whereas a veneration ofthe Lord's day was a mean to keep people under some concern about religion, and that day was spent by faithful ministers, in pressing upon the consciences of their peo- ple, those new contemned gospel truths, to the spoiling of the whole plot ; care was taken to discredit and bring it into contempt. Mi- nisters, instead of telling them on that day, that they were too much inclined to sin, levity, folly, and vanity, were commanded to deal with them as persons too much inclined to be serious ; and instead of preaching the gospel, they were required, under the highest pains, to entertain them with a profane Book of Sports. And for disobedience many were rejected. And that they might be taught by example as well as precept, a Sundaf/^s evening mask was pub- licly acted, where were present persons of no mean note.* Moreover, a state game being now to be played, the pulpit, press, religion and all wers made basely to truckle to state designs, and to the enslaving of the nations, by advancing the doctrines of passive obedience, non-resistance, and jiire-divino-ship of kings ;f whereby men of religion were wounded to see the ordinances of Christ pros- tituted to such projects, as were entirely foreign, to say no worse, to the design of thgir institution : And men of no religion, or who were not fixed about it, were drawn over to think it a mere cheat, and that the design of it was only to carry on secular interest under spe- «iious pretences. At length by those means, and some other things, which are not t)f our present consideration, concurring, confusions ripened into a civil war, whereby every one was left to speak, write, and live as he pleased. Many who intended no hurt, while they upon honest designs in- quired into, and laid open the faults of the topping clergy, did una- wares furnish loose and atheistical men with pretences against the ministry. And what in truth gave only ground for a dislike of the persons faulty, was received by many as a just ground of prejudice against the very pastoral as priest-craft, and all who are clothed with it, as a set of self-designing men. The body of the people, who had been debauched by the exam- ple of a scandalous clergtj, and hardened in sin by the intermission oi ?i}\ discipline, (which of late had only been exercised against the sober and pious who could not go into the measures that were then taken,) the neglect of painful preaching, the hook of sports and pastimes, and who had their heads filled with airy and self-elating notions of man's ability to good, free will, universal grace, and the like, and who now, when they much needed the inspection of their faithful pastors, were deprived of it, many of them, by the iniquity * Rushworth's Collect. Part 2, Vol. 1, pape 459. t Bishop of Sarum oii the .Articles, Art. 7, page 152. 7 50 AN INaUIRY INTO THE of the times, being forced to take sanctuary in foreign nations ; the people, I say, by these things turned quite giddy, and broke into numberless sects and parties. Every one who had entertained those giddy notions was zealous, even to madness, for propagating them, and thought himself authorised to plead for them, print for them, and preach them. The office of the ministry, that had before been rendered contemptible by the suppression of the best preachers, and the scandalous lives of those who were mainly en- couraged, was now made more so, by the intrusion of every bold, ignorant and assuming enthusiast. The land was filled with books of controversy, stuffed mth unsound, offensive and scandalous ten- ets, which were so multiplied, as they never have been in any na- tion of the world, in so small a compass of time. The generality of the people being, by the neglect of a scandalous ministry, and the discouragement of those who were laborious, drenched in ignorance, were easily shaken by those controversial writings that were disse- minated every where, and became an easy prey to every bold secta- rian. 3Iany of the better sort set themselves to oppose these extremes, and from a detestation of tliem were carried, some into one evil, some into another ; thereby the common enemy reaped advantage, and truth suffered even by its defenders. Ministers who desired to be faithful, by the abounding of those errors, were forced to op- pose them in public ; whereby preaching became less edifying, and disputes increased, to the great detriment of religion. The nation was thus crumbled into parties, in matters both civil and religious, the times turned cloudy and dark. Pretences of re- ligion were dreadfnlly abused on aJl hands to subserve other designs. And even the best both of ministers and people wanted not their own sad failings^ which evil men made the \\ orst use of. The rvord and providence were used in favour of so many cross opinions and practices, that not a few began to run into that same extreme, which some in France and Italy had before gone into. And about this time it was that the learned Herbert began to write in favour of Deism : Of which we shall have occasion to speak afterwards. After the restoration, things were so far from being mended, that they grew worse. Lewdness and Atheism were encouraged at the court, which now looked like a Httle Bodom. The clergy turned no less scandalous, if not more so than before. Impiety was, as it ■were, publicly and with applause acted and taught on the stage, and all serious religion was there exposed and ridiculed. Yea, the pul- pits of many became theatres, wherci.'pon men assumed the boldness to ridicule serious Godliness, and the gravest matters of religion ; such as communion with God, confession of sin, prayer by the Spi- rit, and the wliole work of converryion. Controversial writings irere multiplied, and in tlicm grave and serious truths were handled in a PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 51 jocular way. The scriptuses were burlesqued ; and the most im- portant truths, (under pretence of exposing the Dissenters, to the great grief of all good men among them, and in the church of Eng- land,) were treated with contempt and scorn. The pulpits were again prostituted to state designs and doctrines ; and the gre^it truths oftlie gospel, in reference to man^s misery, and his iccovery by Jesus Christ, were entirely neglected by many ; and discourses of morality came in their place, I mean a morality that has no respect to Christ as its end, author, and ike ground of its acceptance with God which is plain heathenism. The soberer, and the better part were traduced as enthusiastical, disloyal hypocrites, and I know not what. And sometimes they on the other hand, in their own de- fence, were constrained to lay open the impiety, atheism, and blas- phemous boldnes of their traducers in their way of management of divine things. And while matters were thus carried betwixt them, careless and indifferent men, especially of the better and most con- siderable quality, being debauched in their practice, by the licen- tiousness of the court, the immorality and looseness of the stage, •were willing to conform their principles to their practice ; for which this state of things gave them a favourable occasion and plausible pretences- Men whose walk and way looked hke any thing of a real regard to religion, they heard so often traduced as hypocrites, fanatics, and I know not what, that they were easily induced to be- lieve them to be such. They who taught them so, on the other hand, by the liberty they assumed in practice, convinced these gen- tlemen, that whatever their profession was, yet they believed no- thing about religion themselves; and therefore it was easy to infer that all was but a cheat. Besides, the Popish party, who were sufficient- ly encouraged, while the sober Dissenters of the Protestant persua- sion were cruelly persecuted, made it their business to promote this unsettledness in matters of religion. They found themselves una- ble to stand their ground in wa}^ of fair debate, and therefore they craftily set themselves rather to shake others in their faith, than di- rectly to press them to a compliance with their own sentiments. And it is well known they wrote many books full of sophistry, plaii>- ly levelling at this, to bring men to believe nothing; as well know- ing, that if they were once brought there, they would soon be brought to believe any thing in matters of religion. On these and the like occasions and pretences, arose this defec- tion from the gospel, which has been nourishsd by many of the same things which first gave it birth, till it is grown to such strength, as fills all well-wishers to the interest of religion with just fears as to the issue. Nor was it any wonder that these pretences should take, (especial- ly with persons of liberal education and parts, who only were capable of observing those faults which gaxci'cwsbii fyr them,) since the 52 AN INaUIRY INTO THE generality were prepared for, and inclined to such a defection, by s long continuance under the external dispensation of the gospel, with- out any experience of its power, the prevalent love of lust, that makes men impatient of any thing that may have the least tenden- cy to restrain them from pursuing the gratification thereof ; to which we may add the natural enmity of the mind of man against the mystery of the gospel. There was another thing which at this time had no small influ- ence — the philosophical writings of Mr. Hobbs, Spinoza, and some others of the same kidney, got, one way or other, a great vogue amongst our young gentry and students, whereby many were poi- soned with principles destructive of all true religion and morality. By those and the like means, things are now come to that pass, that not a few have been bold to avow their apostacy from the christian religion, not only in conversation, but in print. They disown the name of Christ, call themselves Deists, and glory in that name. They have published many writings reflecting on the Bcriptures, and justifying themselves in rejecting them. And we have just reason to suspect, that, besides those who do avow their principles, who are perhaps as numerous in these lands as any where else, there are many, who yet are ashamed to speak it out, who bear them good-will, and who want only a little time more to harden themselves against the odium that this way goes imder, and a fair occasion of throwing off the mask, which they yet think meet to retain. Of this vre have many indications. Many have assumed an unaccountable boldness in treating things sacred and serious too freely in writing and conversation. They make bold to jest upon the scriptures, and upon every occasion to traverse them. When once men have gone this length, the vene- ration due to that blessed book is gone, and they are in a fair way to reject it. Others have made great advances to this defection, by dissemi- nating and entertaining reproaches against a standing ministry. It is known what contempt has been cast upon this order of men, whom God hath entrusted with the gospel dispensation, and who, by of- lice, are obliged to maintain its honor. If this order of men fall un- rler that general contempt, which some do their utmost to bring them to, religion cannot long maintain its station among us. When the principal means of the Lord's appointment are laid aside, or rendered useless, no other means will avail. And hereon, further, there follows a neglect of attendance on the ministry of the word, which the Lord has appointed for the edi- fication of the church, and establishing people in the faith of the truth he has revealed to us therein. When this once begins to be neglected, men will goon turn Bceptical and unconcerned about re^ ligioa. PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 53 And further, it is very observable, that many are strengthened in this neglect, by principles calculated for this purpose ; while the whole efficacy of preaching is made to depend, not on the blessiiig of Christ, whose institution it is, or the infiiiences of his spirit, which he has promised for setting it home on the hearers for their conviction, conversion and edification — but on the abilities and ad- dress of the preachers. It is natural to conclude, that it is better to stay at home and read some book, than to go to hear a sermon, if the preacher iu not of very uncommon abilities : Which is a prin- ciple avowed by many, and their practice suits their principles. Besides, which is the true spring of the former, I am afraid igno* ranee of the nature ofrevealed religion, the design of its institutions, and all its principal concerns, is become more common than is usu- ally observed, even amongst men of liberal education and the best quality. And hence maiiy of them entertain notions inconsistent with their own religion, at first out of ignorance, aud afterwards think themselves in honor engaged to defend them, although de- structive to the religion they profess. Add to all this, that profanity in practice has, like a deluge, over- spread the lands. And where this once takes place, love to sin ne- ver fails to engage men to those principles, which may countenance them in the courses they love, and design to cleave to. This seems plainly to be the state of matters with us at present. And we see but little appearance of any redress. The infection spreads, and many are daily carried off by it, both in England and Scotland. Though it must be owned that Scotland, as yet, is less tainted with that poison : but those of this nation have no reason to be secure, since many are infected, and more are in a forwardness to it than is commonly thought. Having given this short, but I conceive, true account of the rise and growth of Deism, it now remains that we consider, what these principles are which they maintain. The Deists, although they are not perfectly one among themselves, yet do agree in two things : — 1. They all reject rei-'ea/ef? religion, and plainly maintain that all pretences to revelation are vain, cheat and imposture. 2. They all maintain thatnatwal religion is sufficient to answer all the great ends of religion, and the only rule whereby all our religious practices are to be squared. The first of tJaese assertions only tells what their religion is not, and expresses their opposition to adl revelation, particularly to Christianity ; which has been v/orthily defended and asserted against all their objections by many of late, and I shall not much insist in adding to what they have written to such excellent purpose. The second tells us what their religion is ; and it is this we chiefly design in the following papers to debate with them. — They have long been upon the offensive part, which is more easy ; we design now to put them upon the defensive. 54 AN maUIRY INTO THE They who call themselves Deists, although they thus far agree, yet are not all of one sort. I find them by one of their own num- ber, classed into two sorts, mortal and imynoital.* The immortal are they who maintain a future state. The mortal, they who demj one. It is m ith the^irsf we are principally concern- ed ; yet I shall in the subsequent chapter ofler a few things with re- spect to the mortal deists. And in what I have to say of them I ehall be very short ; because I conceive, what has already been offer* cd in the introduction, against this sort of men, might almost su- persede any further discourse about them. CHAP. II. Mortal Deists who, and what Judgment to be made of them and their sentiments. THE mortal Deists, who also are called nominal Deists, deny- ing a future state, are, in effect, mere Atheists. This perhaps some may think a harsh judgment ; but yet it is such as the Deists themselves, who are on the other side, will allow. One who owns himself a Deist, thus expresses his mind — " We " do believe, that there is an infinitely powerful, wise and good " God, who superintends the actions of mankind, in order to retri- *• bute to every one according to their deserts : Neither are we to *' boggle at this creed ; for if we do not stick to it, we ruin the foun- " dation of all human happiness, and are in effect no better thaa '• mere Atheists."t A further account of this sort of men we have given us by one, whom any may judge capable enough for it, who considers his way of writing, and the account he gives of himself " I have observed " some," says he, " who pretend themselves Deists, that they are *' men of loose and sensual lives ; and I make no wonder that they *' dislike the christian doctrine of seU-denial, and the severe threat- *' enings against wilful sinners. You may be sure they will not al- *' ledge this reason : But having read Spinoza aiul Hobbs, and be- *' ing taught to laugh at the story of Balaam's ass, and Sampson's " locks, they proceed to ridicule the reality of all miracles and reve- '< lation. I have conversed with several of this temperi.'but could *' never get any of them serious enough to debate the reality of re- *' Kgion — but a witty jest, and t'other glass, puts an end to allfur- * Oracles of Reason, page 99. i Letter to the Deists, pag-c 125. PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 55 «« ther consideration."* These are mere sceptics and practical Atheists, rather than real Deists. Now, it is to no purpose to debate with men of this temper. If they will Ksten to arguments, many have said enough, if not to convince them, (for I know it is not an easy matter to convince some men,) yet to stop their mouths ; and therefore I shall not of- fer any arguments — only I shall lay down a few clear principles, and from them draw an inference or two, which will make it evident, wliat judgment we are to make of this sort of men. The principles I take for Incontrovertible are these which follow j 1. He deserves not the name of a man who acts not rationally ; knowing what he does, and to what end. 2. No action which con- tributes not, at least in appearance, to man's happiness is worthy of him. 3. The happiness of a present Hfe, which is all that these gentlemen allow, consists in the enjoyments of things agreeable to our nature, and freedom from those that are noisome to it. 4. Man's nature is such, that his felicity depends not only on these things, which at present he has, or wants ; but likewise on what is past, and what is future. A prospect of the one, and a reflection on the other, according as they are more or less agreeable, exceedingly in- creases his pleasure or pain. 5. The hopes of obtaining hereafter the good we at present want, and of being freed from evils v/e suffer by, mightily enhances the pleasure of what we possess, and allays the trouble that arises from incumbent evils. 6. So strong is the desire every one finds in himself of a continuation in being, as can- not choose but render the tlioughts of annihilation very terrible and irksome. 7. The practice o( virtue as it is the most probable means of aUdimn^future happiness, if any such state be, so it h that which tends most to perfect and advance man's nature ; and so must give the most solid and durable pleasure, even here in this life. 8. It is malicious to do what tends to the obstructing ano- ther's happiness, when it cannot further one's oivn. Few men wUi question any of these, and if any do, it is not worth while to debate with him. Now from these we may see, 1, It would contribute much to those gentlemen's 77J'f5P??^/e/tc<7?/ to believe, (bo it true or false) that there is n future state of happi- ness, since the hopes of immutable and endless bliss would be a no- table antidote against the Hneasiness of mind that arises, not only from iucnmbcnt evils, but also from those we fear, and the incon- stancy of our short-lived enjoyments. 2. Tlie generalily of mankind, especially where Christianity ob- tains, being already possessed of the prospect o( future happiness, which supports them under present evils, arms them against the troublesome reflections on past troubles, and fears of the future; * Growth of Deism, page 5. S6 AN INaUIRY INTO THE and moreover animates them in the practice of these actiong where- by not only their own good, but that of the societies wherein they live, is signally promoted ; all attempts to rob them of this hope are highly malicious, and import no less than a conspiracy against the happiness of mankind, and the good of the society wherein they Kve : And therefore we may say assuredly, that as those mortal Deists are much incommoded by their own opinion ; so their at- tempts for its propagation, must be looked on as proceeding from BO good design to the rest of mankind. Here perliaps some of them may say, that this opinion tends to liberate a great part of mankind from the disquieting fears o{ future misery. To this I answer, 1 . I believe it true, that their fears of future misery are uneasy to them ; or they have but little hope of future felicity. Their way of living allows them none. But these fears proceed from consciousness of guilt, and are the genuine result of ac- tions, equally destructive to the actors, and the interest of the rest of mankind. 2. These fears have their use, and serve to deter from such evils as are ruining to the persons who commit them, and to human society. 3. While this opinion liberates a few of the worst of men, from these fears, which are a part of the just punish- ment of their villainies, and emboldens them to run on in those evils ivhich ruin themselves and others, it dispirits and discourages the only useful part of mankind, by filling them with dismal thoughts of Gnnihilation. 4. Nor can all that the Deists are able to do, lib- erate themselves or mankind from those fears. The utmost that they can pretend, with any shew of reason, is, that we have not ground to believe such a state. Will this make us sure that there is none ? But of this we have said enough in the introduction. By what has been said it is evident, what judgment we are to make of this sort of Deists. Their lives, writings and death, shew them to be mere Atheists. Vaninus^ when first he appeared and wrote his Aniphltheafrum Providentim Divintp, set out for such an one that believed a God. But at length spoke out plainly that he believed nonCy and was de- servedly burnt for Atheism at Thoulouse, April 9, 1619. He confessed there were twelve of them that parted in company from Naples to teach their doctrine in all the provinces of Europe.* Uriel Accost a wrote for this opinion, as himself tells us in his Examplar Vitcc Humance, which is subjoined to /iimftitr^-'s con- ference with Orobius the Jew.f His last action tells us what man he was. After he had made a vain attempt to shoot his brother, he discharged a pistol into his own breast. This fell out about the * See Great Geographical Dictionary. f Limburgi Prselatio and Bespon*. Vrileus Accosts Llbro. PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 57 twentieth or thirtieth year of the last century. So they livBy and so they die. Were this our desiji^n, or if we saw any need of it, we might give such an account of the principles, practices, and tragical exits of not a few of this sort of persons, as would be suJQScient to deter the sober from following them. But what has been said is sufficient to discover the destructive tendency of their pnme opinion. And further we shall not concern ourselves with them, but ^go on to that which is mainly intended in this discourse. ' ' CHAP. HI. Mlierein the controversy hetwixt us and the Immortal Deists is stated and cleared. THE immortal Deists who own a future state^ are the only persons with whom it is worth while to dispute this point about the siifficiency of natural religion. Before we offer any arguments on this head, it is necessary we state the question clearly ; and it is the more necessary, that none of the Deists have had the courage or honesty to do it* And here in the entry Ave shall lay down some things, which we think are not to be controverted on this occasion. And we shall, after these concessions are made, inquire what stil! remains in debate, 1. We look on it as certain, that all the world, in all ages, hatli been possessed of some notion of a God, of some power above them, on whom, in more or less, they did depend ; and to whom on this account some respect is due. This Heathens have observ- ed. Cicero^ amongst others, hath long since told us, " That *' there is no nation so barbarous that owns not some God, that has ** not some anticipations or impressions from nature, of a God."^ Nor is this any more, than what we are told, Rom. i. 19, 20, &c. that the Gentiles have some notions of truth concerning God, which they hold in unrighteotisness ; that God, partly by erecting a tri- bunal in their own breasts, which they cannot decline, though they never so much would, and partly by presenting to their eyes those visible works that bear a lively impress of his invisible power and Godhead^ hath, as it were, forced upon them the knowledge of some part of that, which the apostle calls vv«s-ov ry ica, or that which moi/ be known of God. Whence they ail in some measure knew God, though they glorified him not as God. * Cicero de Natura Deorum, Lib. 1. 58 AN INQUIRY INTO THE The stories some have told us of nations that have no notion of a God, upon search are found false. And for some lewd persons, who have pretended to a settled persuasion, they are not to be cre- dited. We have suflScient reason to look on them as liars, or at least, not admit them witnesses in this case. 2. I do think that the knowledge of some of the more obvious laws of nature, and their obligation, hath universally obtained.* — • The Gentiles, all of them, do by nature (hose things, that is, the material part of those duties, which the law of nature enjoins, which shews the work of the law, or some part of it at least, to he written in their hearts, since they - do some things it enjoins. I do not think that this writing of the latv imports innate ideas, or innate actual knowledge, which Mr. Locke hath been at so much pains to disprove,! with what success I inquire not now. Some think, that while he grants the self-evidence of a natural propensifi/ of our thoughts toward some notions, which others call innate, he grants all that the more judicious intend by that expression. Other.* think that Mr. Locke's arguments conclude only the improbability of innate ideas, and that they are to be rejected,^ rather for want of evidence for them, than for the strength of what is said against them.J But whatever there is as to this, neither the apostle's scope nor words oblige us to maintain thenio What is intended may be reduced to two assertions, viz. That men are born with such faculties, which cannot, after they are capable of exercising them, but admit the obligation and binding force of some, at least, ef the laws of nature, when they are fairly offered to their thoughts; and, that man is so stated, that he cannot miss occasions of think- ing of, or coming to the knowledge of those laws of nature. " Homines nasci cognitione aliqua Dei instrnctos, haud dicimus : *' Nullam omnino habent,. sed vi cognoseendi dicimus ; neque ita " naturaliter eognoscunt atque sentiunt, insitam potentiam Deum " cognoscendi, ad culhim ejus aliquo modo praestandiim, stimulan- " tem, sponte se in adultis rationis eompotibus, non minus certo et " necessai-fo quam ipsum ratiocinari, exerturam^ unumquemque " retinere, ratio nulla est car opinemur cum sentiamus, " says the^ learned Dr.. Osven.ll * I inquire not whether they were acquainted with the proper and true gioiinds of the oblig:ition of those laws they owned obligatory. t Locke's Fssay on Human Understanding-, Book 1, Ch 4, § 11. i Becconsall of Nat. I^elig. Gh. 6. ^ 1, 2. II Theoiogumcn. Lib. 1. Cap. 5. Par. 2. — " We do not say that men are " born with any actual knowledge of God, as they have no knowledge at all " when they are born ; but we say that tliey are born witli a capacity of know- " ing- him, and tiiut they do -not so naturally know as they feel this implanted " qapacity of knowing God, which stirs them up to worship him in some man- " ncr. And that this capacity will no less naturally and spc>ntaneously exert. "• iiself in all adults tiiai are jjossc'ssed of reason, than tli:>t of reasoning itself, " there is no reason v.hy \,x should deliver as an opiniosi, ui \vs feel it to be " the case.'' PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 59 3. It is unquestionable, and has been sufficiently attested by the nations, and even by some of the worst of them, that man has a consciencCf that sometimes drags the greatest and most obstinate of- fenders to it3 tribunal, in their own breasts, accuses them, con- demns them, and in some sort executes the sentence against them, for their counteracting known duty, how little soever they know, A Heathen poet could say, -Prima est hcBc iiltio, quod se Judice, nemo nocens absolvitiiry vAvproha quamvis Gratia fallacis prcetoris vicerit uniam.'* 4. We own that those laws of nature, which are of absolute ne» cessity to the support of government and order in the world, and the maintenance of human society, are, in a good measure, knowa- ble by the light of nature, and have been generally known. 5. We willingly admit that, what by tradition, and what by the improvement of nature's fight, many of the wiser Heathens have come to know, and express many things excellently, as to the na- ture of God, man's duty, the coiTuption of nature, a future state, &c. and some of them have Hved nearer up to the knowledge that they had than others : For which they are Iiighly to be commond-- ed, and I do not grudge them their praise. 6. I look on it as certain, that the light of nature, had it been duly improven, might have carried them In these things, and others of the like nature, further than ever any went. But after all these things are granted, the question concerning the suffiricmy of natural religion, remains untouched. For clearing this, it is further to be observed, that, when wc speak of the sufficiency of natural religion, or tltose notices of God, and the way of worshipping him, which are attainable by the mere light of nature, without revelation, we consider itasawe«« in order to some end. For by sufficiency is meant, that aptitvdv of a mean for compassing some eiid, tliat infers a nece^'sarj' connection ]>et%vixt the due use, that is, such an use of the mean, as the person to whom it is said to be sufficient, is capable to make of it, and the attain- ment of the end. Now natural religion, under tliis consideration, may be asserted sufficient or not, according as it is looked at with respect to one end, or another : For it is useful to several purposes, and Ins a re- spect to several ends. 1. It may be considered with respect to hvman socid>>, upon which religion has a considerable influence. "There could never P". * " This is the first part of the ])unis1imenl, that every guilty person is cor.- " tiemnecl by himself, although wicked interest should have overcome tiic in- " tegrityofhisjudg-e." CO AN INQTJIRT INTO THE « possibly be any government settled amongst Atheists, or those *' who pay no respect to a Deity. Remove God once out of Hea- *' ven, and there will never be any gods upon earth. If man's na- *' ture had not something of subjection in it to a Supreme Being ** above him, and inherent principles obliging him how to behave *' himself toward God, and toward the rest of the world, govern*- *' ment could have never been introduced, nor thought of. Nor *' can there be the least mutual security between governors and *' governed, where no God is admitted. For it is an acknowledging *< of God, in his supreme judgment over the world, that is the *' ground of an oath; and upon which the validity of all human en- *' gagements do depend," says an excellent person.^ And the famed Cicero expresses himself very fully to the same purpose. Speaking of religion and piety, he says — Quibiis sublatis, pertiir' halio vitae sequiturt Sc ma^na confasio, atqne hand scio^ an pietate adversus Deossuhlata, fides diam.^ 8r societas humani generis, <§• una excellentissima virtUy justitia tollatur.^ If the qnestion con- cerned this end, we might own natural religion some way sufficient to be a foundation for human society, and some order and govern- ment in the world : For it is in fact evident, that where revelation has been wanting, there have been several well-formed governments. Though still it must be said, that they wer6 obliged to tradition for many things that were of use, and to l)ave recourse to pretended re- velation, where the real was wanting. J Which shews revelation recessary, if not tothefteing*, yet to the rvell-heing oi%oc\eiy. 2. Natural religion may be considered in its subserviency to God's moral government of the world ; and with respect to this, it has several considerable uses, that I cannot enter upon the detail of. It is the measure of God's judicial proceedings, v.'ith respect to those of mankind who want revelation ; and as to this, there is one thing that is usually observed, thai it is sufficient tojustifi/ God in pun^ ishing sinners,. That God sometimes, even here in time, punishes ofTe-xlers, and, by the forebodings of their consciences, gives them dreadful presages of a progress in his severity against them, after this life, cannot well be denied. Now certainly there must be some measure, whereby God proceeds in this matter. Where there, is no law, there is no transgression. Punishments cannot be in- flicted, but for the transgression, and according to the tenor of a law. And this law, if it is holy, just, and good in its precepts, and equal * See Ch. "VVolseley's Unreas. of Atheism, pag'e 152, Sec. ■\ DeNatura Deorum, Lib. 1- mihi. page 5. — " Which being' taken away, a " threat disorder and confusion in life must follow ;. and I know not whether, *' after piety to the God's is taken away, trutli and the social affections, and "justice, the most excellent of the virtues, would riot at the same tiaie be •' tiiken away." 4 See Amyrald on Relig. Part 2. Cap. 8. PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 61 In its sajidion, is not only the measure whereby the governor pro- ceeds in punishing offenders ; but that which justifies him in the punishment of them. It is needless to speak of the grant of re^vards in this case ; because with respect to them, not only justice but grace and hounty have place, which are not restricted to any such nice measures, in the dispensation of favours, as justice is in the execution of punishments. Now, if natural religion is considered with respect to this end, we say it is sufficient to justify God, and fully clear him from any imputation of injustice or cruelty, whatever punishments he may, either in time or after time, inflict upon man- kind who want revelation. There are none of them come to age, who — 1. Have not fallen short of knowing many duties, which they might have known. 2. Who have not omitte«l many duties, which they knew themselves obliged to. And 3. Who have not done what they knew they ought not to have done, and might have for- born. If these three are made out, as no doubt they may be against all men, I do not see Avhat reason any will have to implead God ei- ther of hardship or injustice. There are I know, who think it very hard, that those natural no- tices of God and religion should be sufficient to justify God in ad- judging those, who counteract them, to future and eteriud punish- ments, while yet such an attendance to, and compliance v/ith them as men are capable of, in their present circumstances, is not suffi- cient to entitle us to eternal rewards. But if, in this matter, any injuKtice is charged upon God, who shall manage the plea ? Shall they who transgress and contravene those notices do it? But what injustice meet they with, if they are condemned for not knowing what they might have known ? not doing what they were obliged to do, and were able to do ? and for doing what they might and should have forborn ? If all these may be laid to their charge, though there were no more, what have they to say for themselves, or against God ? They surely have no reason to complain. If any have reason to complain, it mu?;t be they who have walked up to the natural notices of God. But where is there any such ? We may spare our vindication till such an one be found. Nor is it easy to prove that man's obedience thougli perfect, must necessarily entitle to eternal felicity. And he who shall undertake to implead God of injustice upon the account of such a sentence, as that we now speak of, will not find it easy to make good hla charge. Were the difficulty thus moulded, that it h hard to pretend thiit those natural notices of God are sufficient to justify God in coii- dejntiing the transgressors of them to f«iture punishments, while puiictual compliance with them is not sufilcient to save those, who yield this obedience, from those punlslimejits, which the contia- Tcners are liable to for their transgression — though it were thus moulded, it would be a hard task to make good such a charge. B:ii 62 AN INQUIRY INTO THE I am not concerned in it ; nor are any, who judge the person?, ■who have gone farthest in this compliance, liable upon other ac- counts ; because they still own their compliance so far available to them, as to save them from those degrees of wrath, which deeper guilt would have inferred. 3. Other ends there are, with respect to which natural religion may be considered, which I shall pass without naming, and shall only make mention of that which we are concerned in, and is aimed at in the present controversy, and that is, the future happiness of wan in the enjoyment of God. This certainly is the supreme and ultimate end ofretifrion Avith respect to man himself. For that the glory of God is the chi(f end absolnlely, and must, in all respect, iave the preference, I place bej^ond debate. Now it is as to this end, that the question about the sufficiency of natural religion is principally moved. And the question, in short, amounts to this, whether the notices of God and religion, which all men by the light of nature have, or at least by the mere improve- ment of their natural abilities without revelation, may have, are sufficient to direct them in the way to eternal blessedness, satisfy them that such a state is attainable, and point out the way how it is to be attained ; and whether by that practical compliance with those notices, which man in his present state is capable of, he may certainly attain to acceptance witli God, please him, and obtain tliis eternal happiness in the <^?ijoyment of him ? The Deists are for the affirmative, as we shall afterwards make appear, when we con- sider their opinions more particularly. But before we proceed to offer arziiments, it will be needful to branch this qiiestion into several particulars that are included in it, that v,e may the better conceive of, and take up the iniport of it, and hew much is included and wrapt up in tlii:i assertion. The lestion winch we have proposed in general, may be turned into ^ive subordinate queries : '" by the mere light of nature, we can discover an eterSl^^^^y^pincs,?, and know tljat this h attainable 1 Unless Ibis is donS^^Hbg in matters of religion is done. It is impossible tlwt nature's hgm can give any directions asjtep^jthe means of at- taining future happiness, if it cannot satisfy Wtlitit there is such a state. -J 2. Whether men, left to the conduct of the feere light of nature^ can certainly discover and find out the way of attaining it ? that is, whether, by the light of nature, we canknow and find out all f hat is required of us, in the way of duty, in order to our eternal felicity ? If the affirmative is chosen, it must be made appear by nature's light, what duties are absolutely necessary to this purpose ; that those which are prescril^ed are indeed dulses ; and that thr y are aft that are necessary in order to the attainment cf the end, if Uiey ar6 TRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. G3 complied withal. Although we should have it never so cleaily made out, that there is a future state of happiness, yet if we are left at an utter loss as to the means of attaining it, we are no better for the discovery. 3. Whether nature's light gives such a full and certain discovery of both these as tlie case seems to require ? Considering what a case man at present is in, to hope for an eternity of happiness, is to look ve- ry high : And any man, Avho in his present circumstances, shall enter* tain such an expectation, on mere surmises, suspicions and may-bees, may be reproached by the world, and his own heart, as a fool. To keep a man up in the steady impression, and expectation of so great thing.s, conjectures, suppositions, probabilities, and confused gene- I al hints, are not sufficient. Again, there are huge difficulties to be huiTOOunted in tlie way to this blessedness, which are obvious and certain. Sensible losses are sometimes to be sustained, sensible pains to be utsdergonc, and sensible dangers to be looked in the iacc. Now the question is, whether is there such a clear and cer- tain knowledge of these attainable, as the importance of the case, the stress that is to be laid on them, requires ? Certain it is, it will not be such notices as mt)st please themselves with, that will be able to answer this end. 4. Whether the evidence of the attainableness of a future state «f happiness, and of the way to it, is such as suits the capacities of all concerned ? Every man has a concernment in this matter. The Deists inquire after a religion that is able to save all, whereof every man, if he but please, may have the eternal advantage. Now then the question is, whether the case is so stated, as that every man, who is in earnest, if he has but the use of reason, however fthallow his capacity is, how great soever his inevitable entangle- ments and hinderances from close application are, may attain to this certainty about this end, and the Avay to it? Fori-i must be al- lowed that theye is a vast difference among men as to capacity. Men are no- more of one measure in point of the reach of one, wjiick another may easily attain to. Now, may as much be certainly known by the meanest capacity as* is necessary for him to know ? Again, ail men have not alike leisure. That may be impossible to mc, if I am a poor nrxn, obliged to work hard to earn aiy own and family's bread, which would not be so if I hail leisure and opportu- nity to follow my studies. Now^ if these discoveries^ both as to their tnrtli, certainty and suitablenes;-, are not such as the meanest, notwithstanding any inevitable hinderances he may be under, may reach, thoy will not answer the end, 5. Whether, supposing all tlie former, every man, however sur- rounded vv'ith temptations, and inveigled with corrupt inclinations,, or other hinderances, which ho cannot evitc, is yet able, without any supply of siiperaatLiral strengtli, to comply go far wilha^thoifi 64 AN mauiRY INTO "The duties, as is absolutely needful in order to obtain this eternal hap- piness ? Whatever our knowledge is, we are not the better for it, unless we are able to yield a practical compliance. The Deists have the affirmative of all these questions to make good. How they acquit themselves in this, we shall see after- wards. The task, as any one may see, is sufficiently difficult. And I do not know, that any one of them who has yet wrote, hath given any evidence that they understood the state of the question in its full exte^kp They huddle it up in the dark, that the weak- ness of their pT-oof may not appear. And perhaps they are not willing to apply their thoughts so closely to the subject, as is re- quisite, in order to take up the true state of the controversy. The more remiss and careless they have been this way, we had So much the more to do to state the question truly betwixt us and them. And having done this, we shall next proceed to make good our part of it. A negaiive is not easily proven, which puts us at some loss. It lias been denied that it can in some cases be proven. But we hope, in this case, we are able to offer such reasons as will justify us in holding the negative in this debate. And we shall see next whe- ther they are able to demonstrate the q^rmaiive, and offer as good reasons for it, as we shall give against it. And it is but reasonable they should offer better, in a matter of so great concern. CHAP. lY. Proving the insujficlmci/ of Natural BAigion^ from the insuffi- ciency of its discoveries of a Deity. THOUGH it belongs to the asscrters of the sufficiency of natu- ral religion, to justify by argument their assertion, and we are upon the negative, might supersede any further debate until such time, as we see how they can acquit themselves here ; yet truth, not triumph, being the dei'jgn of our c ngaging in the contest, that none may think we are without reason in our denial, and that we put them upon the proof, only to difficult them, we shall now by some arguments endeavor to evince the insufficiency of natural religion. The first argument I shall improve to this purpose is deduced from the insufficiency of those discoveries, which the light of na- ture is able to make of God. Nothing is more plain than this, that religion is founded upon the hionjJfdge of tlie Deity ; and that our regard for him will be answerable to the knowledge we have of him. That religion, therefore, which is defective here, is lame with a witness : And if nature's light cajinot aiTjrd such notices of the De- PRINCIPLl:S OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 65 i(y, as are sufficient or necessary to beget and maintain religion amongst men, then it can never with any rational man be allowed sufficient to direct men in religion. Now, for clearing this argument, several things are to be dis- cussed. And first of all, it is requisite, that we state such a no- tion of religion in general, as may be allowed to pass with all, who are, or can reasonably be supposed competent judges in such mat- ters. Religion then, ingeneral, may be justly said to import that veneration^ respect or regard, which is due from the ratioiml creeb- ture in his whole course or life, to the supreme super-eminentlj/ ex- cellent Being, his Creator, Preserver^ Lord or Governor and Be- nefactor. The actions of the rational creature, which may come under the notion of religion, are of two sorts : some of them do directly, pro- perly and immediately import a regard or respect to God as their md ; which ihey are immediately and properly designed to express. Such acts are called acts of worship. And religion is more emi- nently thought to consist in these, and that not without reason. Yea, by some it is wholly, and against all reason, confined to them, and circumscribed within those bounds. Again, there are other ac- tions, which, though they have other more proper, direct and im- mediate ends, on account whereof they undergo various denomi- nations, yet they also are, or may be, and certainly should be sub- ordinate to that, which, though it is not the proper, most immediate, and distinguishing end of these actions, yet is the common and ulti- mate end, at which all a man's actions should be levelled. Now all the actions of a rational creature, which are of this last sort, as re- ferred to a Deity, and importing somewhat of religion, may be termed acts of moral obedience. In so far they are religious, and come within the compass of our consideration, as they express any respect to God. And they express and import regard to God, in as far as they can quadrate with the moral law, which is the instru- ment of God's moral government of the world ; and therefore if they are right and agreeable to this rule, they may be termed acts of moral obedience, to distinguish them from these acts, which are solely and more strictly religious, and are called acts of worship. But to speak somewhat more particularly of this regard that is due to God, it is as evident as any thing can, that it must be, 1 . In its formal nature different from that respect, which we may allowably pay to any creature ; that is, it must be given on ac- counts no way common to him with any of the creatures, but on ac- count of those distinguishing excellencies, which are his incommu- nicable glory. None can reasonably deny this, since it must be al- lowed by all, that religions respect due to God, and civil respect due to creatures are different, and must be principally differenced by 00 AN INaUIllY INTO THE the grounds whereon llie respect to (lie one or other is paid. Now the grounds whereon this homage is due unto the Deity, are the su- pereminent, nay, infinite excellency of his nature and perfections, and his indisputably supreme, absolute and independent sovereignty overall his creatures, which stands eternally firm and unshaken, as being supported by that siy;er-pm/??fHCj/ q/" his excellency^ his erf a- tion^ preservation y and benefits. Now, none of these grounds are, in any degree, communicable to the creatures ; and so to talk of a religious worsliip due to the creature, is to speak nonsense with a witness. 2. This veneration we give to God must he intensively, or as to degree, not only superior to that which we give to any creature, but eren supreme. It is not enough, that we love God on accounts pe- culiar to him ; but we must love him with a love superior to that which we give any creature, and answerable to those accounts, whereon we do love him. And the like may be said as to other in- stances. There is no need of insisting in the proof of this. ^\'ould our king be pleased, if we paid him no more respect than we do his servant ? Is the distance betwixt God and the highest creature less considerable, than that which is betw ixt a king and his meanest sub- ject ? Nay, is it not infinitely more ? How can it then reasonably be expected that the same degree of respect we pay to the crea- tures, will find acceptance, or answer the duty we owe to the glori- ous and ever-blessed Lord God? 3. This veneration must be extensively superior to tljat paid to any of the creatures. Onr regard to the Deity must not be con- fined to one sort of our actions, (those, for instance, which are re- ligious in a strict sense, or more plainly, acts of 7Vorship ;) but it must run through every action of pur life, inward and outward. Every action is a dependent of God's, and ovres him homage. It is otherwise with men ; for to one sort of men, we may owe respect, in one sort of our actions, and owe them none in ap.other. A child, in filial duties, owes his fiithcr respect ; as a subject, he owes his f:;overnor reverence ; and so of other instances of a like nature : But to no one creature is he, in all respects, subject, or obliged by every action to express any regard. And the reason is plain ; he is subject to none of them in all respects wherein he is capable of acting. Bulvrllh respect to God, the matteris quite otheiwlse: what- ever lie has is from God, and to him he is in all respects subject, on Iiim he every way depends. The power your f.ither lias over you, he derives from God, and it is God tiiat binds the duties you aregot and maintained, either by profound ignorance of God, or confused notions of him, answers neither man's nature, which is rational, and requires that he proceed in aJl his actions, es- pecially those of most moment, rationally, that is, with knowledge and willingness ; nor will it obtain acceptance, as that wliich ans\vers his duty, whereby he is obliged to serve God with the best and in the highest way that his faculties admit him. The contrary sup- position of Papists is a scandalous reproach to tlie nature, both o-f God and man ; and an engine suited only unto the selfish design of the villainous priests, who, that they may have the conduct of men's souls, and so the management of their estates, have endeavored to hood-wink man, and make him brulisi), where he should be most rational ; and that they may have the best, tltey niakehim present God with the blind and the lame, which his sonl ahkors^. This, being, in general, clear, that the knowledge of God is the foundation of all acceptable religion, it is now proper to inquire what discoveries of God are requisite to bring man to si'ch a religion, as has been above described, and to keep him up in the practice of it. Now if We look seriously into this matter, I think Ave^may lay down the following position, as clear beyond rational contradic- tion. 1. That a particular knowledge of God is requisite to this pur- pose, to beget and maintain this reverence for the Deity, which i.5 his undoubted due. It is not enough that we have soma general notions, however extensive. To conceive of God in the general, that he is the best and greatest of beings, optimus maxiinus. Is not enough. Tlie reason is obvious : we nnist have in every sort of actions, nay, in each particular action, that knowledge which may influence and guide us to that respect, which is \\v.e to him, in that sort of actions, or that particular one ; but this general notion hiving no more respect to one than another, will not do. It directs us no more in one than another, unless the paitlculars that are compre- hended under that general be explained to, and understood by the actor. 2. That knowledge, which will answer the end, must be large and comprehensive. This religion is not to be confined to one particular sort of actions, but to run through all, and thpi< f.:)re there must be a knowledge, not merely of one or tv\-opeifectio;i-of the divine nature, but of all: not simply, as if God were to be com- 68 AN INaUIRY INTO THE prehended, but of those perfections and prerogatives of Go^, which require our regard in our particular actions, in so far as they are the ground of our veneration, ^s for instance, to engage me to trust God, I must know his powers his care and knowledge : to engage me to pray to him, I must be persuaded of his knorvledgCf of his rvillingness amd power to assist me in the suit I put up ; to engage me to pay him obedience, I must know his authoriiy, the laws he has stamped it on, and that he has fixed a law to these particular actions, either more general or more special. Whence it being evident, that different actions require different views of God in order to their regulation ; and all a man's actions being un- der rule, there must be a large and comprehensive knowledge of God to guide him in his whole course. 3. It being no less than an universal religion that is to be sought after, the discoveries of God wherein it must be founded, must be plain to the capacities of all mankind ; and that both as to the truth of these discoveries and their use. It is certain that all men are no more of the same measure of understanding than they are in stature. However important the discovery is, if it is above my reach, it is all one to me as if it were not discovered at all. To tell me of such a thing, but it is in the clouds, is to amuse and iwt instruct me. There may indeed, supposing an universal religion, be somewhat of difference as to knowledge allowed, as to some of the concernments of this religion, to persons of more capacity anc^ industry, and who have more time ; but if it is calculated for the good of all mankind, the discoveries must be such, as all who are concerned may reach, as to all its essentials ; for the meanest have as much concernment in them as the greatest. 4. It is most evident, that these discoveries must be certain, or rx)me recommended by such evidence as may be convincing and satisfi/ing to every mind. Conjectured discoveries, or surmises of these things, built upon airy and subtile speculations, are not firm «-nough to establish such a persuasion cf truth in the soul, as may be able to influence this universal regard, over the belly of the strongest inwi.rd bias and outward rubs. 5. The evidence of these things must be abiding ; such as may be able to keep up the soul in a constant adherence to duty. It 13 not one day that man is to obey, but aln ays ; and therefore these discoveries must lie so open to the mind at all times, as that the soul may by them be constantly kept up in its adherence to sluty. If from any external or internal cause, there may arise ancii obstructions as may for one day keep man from those discov- eries, or the advantage of (hem ; he may ruin, nay, must ruin him- self by failing in his duty ; or at least, if he is not ruined, he is hiUopcD to it. PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. €$ 6. Upon the whole it appears, that to found natural religion, or to introduce and maintain among men that regard which is due to the Deity, there is requisite such a large, comprehensive, certain, plain, and abiding discovery, as may have sitfficient force to injlu- ence to a compliance with his duty in all instances. Thus far matters seem to be carried on with sufficient evidence. We are now come to that which seems to be the principal hintrey whereon the whole controversy about the svfficienci/ of natural re- ligion turns ; in so far, at least, as it is to be determined by this aigument. Now this is, whether nature's light can indeed aflbrd such discoveries of God, as are evinced to be necessary for the support of religion? If it cannot, then it is focind insufficient ; if it can, then natural religion is thus far acquitted from the charge laidi against it. Now, to attempt the decision of this question success- fully, it is necessary that we state it right. It is not then the ques- tion, whether in nature there is sufficient objective light ? as; the schools barbarously speak ; that i.«, whether in the works of rrea- tion and providence, which lie open to our view, or are the object ofour contemplation, there are such prints of God, which, if ithey were all ftilly understood by us, are sufficient to this purpose \ for the question is not concerning the works of God without us, but concerning us. The plain question is this, " whether man can, from those works of God alone, without the help of revelation, o^>- tain such a knowledge of God, as is sufluicient to the purpose ineii- tioned.'* Now the question being concerning our power, or rather thei ex.^ fentoi our power, I know but four ways that can be thought update come to a point about it : Either, 1 1 . By divine revelation we may be informed what nature^s UfcM unassisted can do. We would willingly put the matter oh this U^ Sue : Our adversaries will not ; so we must leave it. Or, 2. Some apprehend that the way to decide this, is, to take our measures fiom the nature of God ; and to inquire, when God was^o make or did frame man, with what /jowers it was proper for him ti> endue him ? or, with what extent of power, considering the iiifinitn wisdom, goodness and power of the Creator ? Tliis w^y the Deistv Would go. Bnt 1. It seems a little presumptuous for us to pro-" scribe, or measure what was fit for God to do, by what appears to us fit to have been done. For when we have soared as high as we can, we must fall down again ; for God's counsels are too deep for ufi, and if we should think this or that fit for God, yet he ha- ving a more full view of things, may think quite the contrary ; and thus all that we can come to here in this way, is but a weak and presumptuous conjecture. 2. If in fact, what we think fit, or con- jecture fit for God to have done, it be evident that God has not done ; that he has given no such jpo.i;fr or extent of it, as we judge ro AN INQUIRY INTO THE necessary, our judgment is not only weakly founded, but plainly f.ilse ; ^-ea, and impious to boot : For if God has done otherwise, it is certain tliat the way which we prescribed was not best ; nor can ive hold by our own apprehension, whatever sheivs it is built on, without an implicit charge of folly against God. 3. Whatever we may pretend the wisdom of God requires to be done for or given to man, if by no divine act there is any evidence that he has so done, though tljere be no proof of his having done the contrary, yet it weakens the evidence of all we can say, if the thing is such in its nature, as would l>e known by experience, if existent ; because, in that case, the whole stress of our argument leans upon a supposi- tion thnt we are capable of judging of the wisdom of God, while it is certain, we have not all those circumstances under our \ieWf which may malce it really fit to act tin's way rather than that, or that way rather than thk's, which on the other hand he certainly has. This way then we cannot decide the case. IL We may immediately perhaps judge of the exleiif of man^s ^<'^€ light of naliiye, that are sufficient to this puipose. Now, none of (hem dare pretend this has been done, oi", at least, shew who has done it, or make the attempt them- selves ; and therefore we might take it as confessed, that it is not to be done. But if it is still pretended, that this has been done, though with- out telling us by w horn, or pointing to these discoveries where we may find them : I answer, How shall we know this ? May we know it by the ef- fects ef it in the lives of those who either have had no other light save that of nature^ as it wtis with the philosophers of old before Christ, or m ho own no other save that of nature, as the Deists and others who rejected Christianity I Truly, if we judge by this rule, we are sure the negative will be much confirmed 1 For it is plain that those notions of a God, which were entertained by the philo- sophers of old, influenced none of them to glorify him, as God. The vulgar Heathens were void of any respect to the true God ,-. nay, by the whole of their practice [jetrayed tlie profoundest ig- norance, and most contemptuous disregard of him. The philoso- phers, not one of them excepted, wliatever notions they had of a Deity, and W hatever length some of them went in moralifji/, upon other inducements, yet shewed nothing like to that peculiar, high and extensive respect to the one true God which we now inquire after. We may bid a defiance to the Deists, to shew us any thing like it in the practice even of a Socrates, a Plato^ a Seneca, or any othersi of them. Their virtue was plainly built upon another bottom. It has been judiciously observed by one of late, that (here was little notice taken of God in their ethicks ; and I may add, as little re- gard in their practice. Nor are the lives of our Deists, or others since, any better proof of the sufficiency/ of the natural notices of God, to beget and suj)port a due veneration for him. If the Deists decline thi^ trial cf the suffic'enq/ of those discO' veries of a God, by (heir inHuence upon practice, then we must look at them in themselves. And here we nuist have recourse, ei- ther to those wlio had no acquaintance wltii the scripture I'cvela- tion ; or to those who have given us accourits of God amongst our- selves ; who though they own not the scriptures to be from Goil, }'et have had access to them, for the impiovement of their own notions about God. The last sort might be cast, as iucomnetei:! witnesses in this ci^e, upon very revelant giouuus. Bui. wc shall 72 AN INatimY INTO THE pve our enemies all that they can desire, even as to the advantage they may have this Avay, that they may see our cause is not wanting in evidence and ctrlainty. We begin then with those who have been left to the mtre light rif nature, to spell out the letters of God's name, from the works o( creation and providence, without any acquaintance with the more plain scripture account of God. Now what we have to say as to ^em, we shall comprize in a few observations. 1. As for the attainments of the vulgar Heathens, there is no place forjudging of them otherwise than by their practice. They have consigned nothing to writing, and so we have no other way to guess at their opinions in matters of religion, but either by their practice, or by ascribing to them the principles of those, who in their respective countries, had the disposal of these matters. Whichsoever way we consider the matter, it must be owned that the vulgar Heathens were stupidly ignorant as to the truths of re- ligion. If Vie make their practice the measure of judging, which in this case is necessary, none can hesitate about it. If we make the principles and knowledge of their leaders the standard, whereby we are to judge of their attainments, and make a suitable abate- ment, because scholars must always be supposed to know less than their masters, I am sure the matter will not be much mended, aa the ensuing remarks will in part clear. 2. As to the pliilosophers, if I had time and opportunity to pre- sent in a hodi/ or system all that has been said, not by one of them, but by all the best of them put together, it would put any one that reads, to wonder, that they, " who were such giants," as an ex- cellent person speaks, " in all other kinds of literature, should *' prove such dwarfs in divinity, that they might go to school to get *' a lesson from the most ignorant of christians that know any *' thing at all."* Any one that will but give himself the trouble to peruse their opinions about God, as they lie scattered in their writings, or even w here they are proposed to more advantage by those who have collected and put them together, will soon be con- vinced of how low a stature their divinity was, and how justly the apostle Paul said, that by their wisdom they knew not Ood. All their knowledge of God was no more than plain and gross igno- rance, of which the best of them were not ignorant, and therefore, Thales, Solon, Socrates, and many others, spoke either nothing of God at all, or that which was next to nothing. And it had been well for others, if they had done so too ; what they spoke, not only falling short of a sufficient account, but presenting most abominable Cha. Wolsey's reasonableness of scripture belief. PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEII5TS. 73 and misshapen notions abont God ; of which we have a large ac- count in Cicero de Natura Deonim.^ 3. Besides that endless variety amongst different personi?, in their opinions about a Deity, which is no mean evidence of their darkness, even the very same persons, who seem to give the best accounts, are wavering and uncertain, say and unsay, seem posi- tive in one place, and immediately in the very next sentence seem to he uncertain and fluctuating. Thus it is with them all, and thus it usually is with persons who are but gioping in the dark, and know not well how to extricate themselves. 4. They who go furthest, have never adventured to give any methodical account. They wanted materials for this ; and there- fore give but dark hints here and there. Cicero^ who would make one expect such an account, while he inscribes his book De Natura Deorwn, yet establishes scarce any thing ; but spends his time in refuting the opinion of others, without daring to advance his own.-f; 5. They wlio have gone furthest, are too narrow in their ac- counts, they are manifestly defective in the most material things. They are all reserved about the number of the Gods. It is true the best do own that there is one Supreme ; but then there is scarce any of them positive that there are no more Gods save one. No not Socrates himself, who is supposed to die a martyr for this truth, durst own this plainly. And while this is undetermined, all religion is left loose and uncertain ; and mankind cannot know how to distribute their regard to the several deities. Hence another defect arises, and that is about the snper-eminenci/ of the divine ex- cellencies. Although the Supreme Being may be owned superior in order; yet the inferior Deities being supposed more immediate in their influence, this will substract from the Supreme Deity much of his respect, and bestow it elsewhere. Moreover, about God'a creating power their accounts are very uncertain, few of them owning it plainly. Nor are any of them plain enough about the special providence of God, without which it is impossible to sup- port religion in the world. * Cicero, L'lb. 1. P. 4. Qui vero Deo^ esse dixerunt, tantn sunt in varietate ac dissentione constitxiti, ntt eorum molestum sit annumerave senteniias. JVwm de figuris Dcovitm (^ dn locis alqiie sedibns W actione vita, multa dicuntvr, SJc — " But those who have affirmed that there are Gods, have j^one into r,o f^rcat a. " variety and difitrence of opinion, that it i:3 difficult to enumerate their sen- " timents, for many thing's are said by them concerning' the shapes of the " Gods, their places, habitations, and manner of life." t Dc Natura Deorum, Lib. 2. JIti, inqiiit, obUtvs es quodinHio Jixerim, facilius me talibus de rebus, qiiodnoii sentirem qiium quod sentirem diccre posse. — " Have " you forgot that I told you at the bcf^'inning', that I could mors easily tcJl *f"what I did »at think, tLan what I UjJught, of these matters !" 10 74 AN INaUlRY INTO THE 6. As theh- accounts are too narrow, so in what they do Dtm they are too general. But will this maintain religion ? No, by no means. But there must be a particular discovery of these things. Well, do they afford this ? Nay, so far are they from explaining themselves to any purpos^e here, that industriously they keep in dark generals. The divine excellencies, unless it be a few negative ones, they do seldom attempt any explication of. His providence they dare not attempt any particular account of. The extent of it to all particular actions is denied by many of their schools, owned distinctly by few, if any ; but particularly cleared up by none of them.* The laws whereby he rules men are no where declared* When some of them are insisted on in their ethicks, the authority of God in them, w^iich is the only supreme ground of obedience, and that which alone can lay any foundation for our acceptance in that obedience at God's hand, is no where taken notice of. The holiness of the divine nature, which is the great restraint from sin^ is little noticed, except where some of the more abominable evils are spoke of. The goodness of God as a rewarder, is not by any of them cleared up. And yet upon these things the whole of religion hangs, which by them are either wholly passed over, or mentioned in generals, or darkened by explications that give no light to the tjenerals ; at least, and for most part, are so far from explaining, that they obscure, nay corrupt them, by blending pernicious false- hoods with the most valuable truths. 7. The discoveries they offer are not for the most part proven. )jut merely asserted. Their notions are most of them learned from tradition, and they wCre, it would seem, at a loss about argu- ments to support them. Where the greatest certainty is required^ least is found. 8. Where they do prodlice arguments, as they do sometimes, for the being and providence of God in general, they are too dark and nice, both in matter and manner, to be of any use to the gen* crallty of mankind. To have produced particular instances for the justification of each of these observations, would have been too tedious. Any on«; that would desire to be satisfied about them, may be fully furnished With instances, if he will give himself the trouble to peruse Cicero dp Nafura Deorum, Diogenes Laertius''s Lives (if the Philoso^ phers, or Stanleys Lives ; but especially the writings of the seve- ral philosophers themselves concerning this subject. Nor will this task be very tedious, If he is but directed to the places where they ♦ T)octrinam de providentia rerum partictilarisive gratia n veteribv- Cquatemts ex eornm lihris qui extant, collect potest J rcmif;sius rredi obnervainuf'. Herbert de Verltute, pag'e 271, 272. — " We •bserve that the doctrine of uni- ♦' versal providence and particular g-racc was but faintly believed by the ar. *' cicnts, so far as ca.n be collected from their boulcs." PRINCIPLES OP THE MODERN DEISTS. 75 treat of Ood : For they insist not long on tliis subject, and the better and wiser sort of them are most sparing. When I review these observations, which occurred by my read- ing the works of the Heathens, and their opinions concerning God, I cMild not but admire the gross inadvertency, to give it no Avorsc word, of the Deists, (and more especially of the late lord Herbert, •who was a man of learning and application) who pretend that the knowledge of those general attributes of God, his greatness and goodness, vulgarly expressed by Optimus MaxbnuSy are sufficient : Si?ice it is plain from what has been said, 1. That this general knowledge is of no significancy to influence such a peculiar, high and extensive, practical regard to the Deity, as the notion of reli- gion necessarily imports. Of which even Blount was, it seems, aware, when he confesses in his Religio Laid, that there is a ne^ cessity tliat his articles must be well explained. 2. It is plain that the philosophers, and consequently the common people, did not imderstand well the meaning of those articles, or of those general notions concerning God, at least, in any degree answerable to the iiid we now have in view. I dare submit these observations, as to their truth, to any impar- tial person, who will be at pains to try them, upon the granting of a twofold reasonable demand. 1. That he will consult either the authors themselves, or those, who cannot be sus])ected of any bias, by their being Christians, which I hope Deists will think just ; sucli as Cicero, Diogenes Laertlus, &c. or those who have made largn collections, not merely of their fif^nera/ sentences concerning God -, but of their explications. In which sort Stanley excels. 2. I re- quire that, in reading the authors, that they do not lay hold on a general assertion, and so run away, without considering the whotr of what the authors speak, on that head. The reasons why I make these demands, are, first, some persons designing, for one end or other, to illustrate points in Christianity with quotations from }Ic;i then authors, take up general expressions, which seem congruous with, or may be the same, which the scripture uses, without con- sidering how far they differ, when they both descend to a particular explication of those general words. Again, some Christians, writinii, the lives of philosophers, and collecting their opinions, are misled by favour to some particular persons, of whom they have conceiv- ed a rnsf idea, and therefore either suppress or wrest what may detract from the person they design to magnify. IM. Dacier, foi- instance, has written the life of Plato : but that account is the issue of a peculiar favour for that philosopher's notions in general; and it is evidently the aim of the writer to reconcile his sentiments to the Christian religion, A work that some others have attempted be- fore. To this purpose Plato's words arc wrested, and such con- structions put on them, as can no other vray be justified, but by sup- 7er AN INQUIRY INTO IHE posing that no material points of the Christian religion could be hidf from Plato, or his master Socrates. And yet after all, Plato's gross mistakes, and that in matters of the highest import ; yea, and such of them, as are supposed, generally, to lie within the reach of na- ture's light, are so obvious and discernible, that the evidence of the thing extorts an acknowledgment. To give but one instance ; after the wiiter has made a great deal ado about Plato's knowledge ofthe Trm%,* a story which hath been oft told, but never yet proven, it is plainly acknowledged, that he speaks of the Three Persons of the Deiti/ as of three Gods, and three different jirinciples ; which is, in plain terms, to throw down all that was built before, and prove that Plato knew neither the Triniii/, nor the one true God, Finally, general sentences occur in those authors, which seem to import much more knowledge of God, than a further search into their writings will allow us to believe they had : For any one will quickly see, that in those general expressions, they spoke as chil- dren that understood not what they say, or at least, have but a very imperfect notion of it. And though this may seem a severe reflection on these great men ; yet I am sure none shall impartially read them who will not own it just. But now, to return to our subject, this sufficient discover?/ of God not being found amongst those, who were strangers to the scriptures and Christianity, let us next proceed to consider those, who have had access to the scriptures, and lived since the Christian religion obtained in the world. And here it must be owned, that since that time philosophers have much improven natural theology, and given a far better account of God, and demonstrated many of his attri- ])utes from reason, that were little known before, to the confusion of Atheists. From the excellent performances of this kind, which are many, I design not to detract. I am content that a due value be put upon them : but still I am for putting them only in their own place, and ascribing no moi-e to them than is really their due- Wherefore, notwithstanding what has been now readily granted, I think I may confidently offer the few following remarks on them. ] . We might justly refuse them, as no proper measure of the abilih/ of unassisted reason, in as much as it cannot be denied, that the light, whereby those discoveries have been made, was borrowed from the sciiptures : of which none needs any other proof than merely to consider the vast improvement of knowledge, as to those matters, immediately after the spreading of Christianity, which can- not, with any shew of reason be otherwise accounted for, than by OAvning that this light was derived from the scriptures, and the ob- servation and writings of Christians, which made even the Heathens ashamed of their former notions of God, But not to insist on this. M. Dacier's life of Plato, i^age 141. PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 77 2. Wlio have made those improvements of natural theology T Not the Heathens or Deists. It is little any of them have done this way. The accurate systems of natural theology have come from Christian philosophers, who do readily own that the scripture points them, not only to the notions of God they therein deliver, but also to many of the proofs Hkewise, and that their reason, if not thus as- sisted, would have failed them as much, as that of the old philoso- phei-s did them. 3. It is worthy our observation, that such of the Christians, who favour the Deists most, such as the Socinians and some others, do give most lame and defective accounts of God. They who lean much to reason, their reason leads them into those mistakes about the nature and knowledge of God, which tend exceedingly to weak- en the practical influence of the notion of a God. And we have reason to believe that the Deists Avill be found to join with them, in their gross notions of God, as ignorant of the free actions of men, before they are done, and as not so particularly concerned about them in his providencCy with many such-like notions, which sap the foundations of all practical regard to God. 4. But let the best of these si/sterns be condescended on, they cannot be allowed to contain sufficient discoveries of God. For it is evident beyond contradiction, that they are neither full enough in explaining, what they in the general own, nor do they extend to some of those things which are of most necessity and influence to t.up\)ort practical religion. They prove a providence, but cannot pretend to give any such account of it, as can either encourage or direct to any dependence on, trust in, or practical improvement of it. And the like might be made appear of other perfections. Again, they cannot pretend to any tolerable account of the remu- nerative bounty, the pardoning mercy and grace of God, on v/hicli the whole of religion, as things now stand, entirely hangs. Can they open these things so far as is necessary to hold up religion in the world ? They who know what religion is, and what they have done, or may do, will not say it. 5. In their proofs of these truths, there must be owned a waid of that evidence, Avhich is requisite to compose the mind in the persuasion of them, and establish it against objections. Let scrip- ture light be laid aside, which removes objections ; and let a man have no more to confirm him of those truths save these arguments, the difiiculties daily occurring from obvious providences will jumble the obseiver so, that he will find these proofs scarcely sufficient to keep him firm in his assent to the truths ; and if so, far less will they be able to influence his practice suitably against temptations to sin. Nov/ this may arise, not so much from the real n'eakness of the argument:^, which may be conclusive, as from this, that most of them are rather drawn ab absurdo, than from any clear light 78 AN INQUIRY INTO THE about the nature of the object known ; and hence there comes ngt that light alon^i;, as to difficulties, which is necessary to remove them. And though these arguments silence in dispute, and close the advei-sary's mouth ; yet they do not satisfy the mind. i>Iore- over some of no mean ^consideration, have pretended that many of these demonstrations, even as to some of the most considerable at- tributes of God, are inconclusive : Particularly they have asserted, that the nnifi/ of God was not to be proven by the light of nature^ nor special providence. But not to carry the matter thus far, it is certain that the force of these demonstrations must lie very secret, that such persons, who owned the truths, and bore them good will, yet could not find it. Much more might be said on this head, but I am not willing to invalidate these arguments, or even to shew all that might, perliaps, not ouly be said, but made appear against them. But whatever there is as to this, it is certain (hat the discoveries of God by na- ture's light being small, are easily clouded, by entangling difficulties nrising from the dark occurrences of providence, and the natural weakness and unsteadiness of our minds, which are always to be found in matters sublime, and not attended with strong evidence. — And attention in this case will increase the darkness, and force on such an acknowledgment as Simonides made to Ilieio, the tyrant of Syracuse, That " the longer he thought about God, the more •* difficulty he found to give any account of him." 6. They must, whatever be allowed as to their validity in them- selves, be owned to be of no use to the generality, nay, to the far greater part of mankind. No man who knows them, and knows the world, will pretend that the one half of mankind is alile to comprehend the force of them. And so they are still in the dark about God ; which quite everts the whole story about the sufficien- cy of the natural discoveries of a Deity. 7. It is plain, that there is no serving God, walking with or wor- shipping of him, without thouglits, and serious ones too, of Iiim. Now, his nature and excellencies are infinite, how then shall we conceive , of -'tliera ? Our darkness and weakness will not allow us to think of him as he is, and conceive those perfections as they are in him. And to conceive otherwise is dangerous. We may mistake in other things without sin ; but to frame wrong, and other conceptions of God and his excellencies, than the truth of the thing requires, is dangerous anil sinful ; for it f limes an idol. Now, though this difficulty may be easy to less attwRtve minds ; yet it will quite confound persons who are in earnestj/antl understand what tliey are doing, in their approaches to God*'. Nor can ever the i-nindsof such be satisfied in our present state, otherwise than by Ood's telling us, how we are to conceive of him, and authorising us to do it in a way of condescension to our pres£nt dark and iufirni state. PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 79 8. I cannot forbear to notice, as what wants not Its own weight in this case, though in condescension we did a little wave argument* drawn from the practical infiimice of truths, that however great the improvements, as to notions of truths concerning the nature of the Deity may of late have been, yet the effects of these notices in their highest improvement, have been far from recommending them, as sufficient to the end we have now in view. This natural fheobj- gy has rather made men more learned than more pious. Where scripture truth has not been received in its love and power, men have seldom been bettered by their improvements in natural theo- logy. But we see in experience, that they who can prove most and best in these matters, evidence least regard to the Deity in their practice. I shall add one observation more, which at once enforces the ar- gument we arc upon, against the sufficiency of natural religionf and cuts ofl' a pretended retortion of it, against the Christian reli- gion ; and it is this : The religion the Deists plead for, and are obliged to maintain, is a religion that pleads acceptance on its own account, which has no provision against guilt and escapes, as shall be demonstrated hereafter ; a religion which consequently must bo 7nore perfect, and so requires a more exarJ knorvledge of the Deity in order to its support : whereas, the Christian religion is one which is calculated for man in hh fallen state ; and the fall is every where in it supposed, and a gracious provision made agiiinst defects in knowledge^ and unhalloived practical escapes. C II A P. V. Proving the lusvfficiencr/ of Natural Religion from its defective- ness as to the worship of God. THE argument we are to improve against the sufficieno/ of na^ furnl religion in this chapter, might have been considpretl as a branch of the foregoing : But, that we nr.iy be more distinct, and to shew a regard unto the importance of the matter, we shall con- sider it as a distinct argument by itself. Now, therefore, when we arc to speak of the wenship of Gpd, it is not of that inward veneration that consists in acts of tho mind, such as esteem, fear, love, trust, and the like ; but of th(; outward, stated, and solemn way of expressing this inward veneration. That there sliould not only be an inward regard to the Deity in onr minds, intiueming the whole of our out vt^ard deportment ; but that besides, there should bo lixcd, outward, and solemn ways of exer- so AN INQUIHY INTO THE cising and expressing these inward actings, seems evident beyond any reasonable exception — 1. From the general agreement of the world in this point. All the world has owned some worship necessary. Every nation and people had their peculiar way of worship.* It is true, most of them were ridiculous, many of them plainly wicked, and all of them vain ; but this makes not against the thing in general ; only it be- speaks the darkness of nature's light, as to the way of managing in particulars, that which in general it directs to. 2. The Deists themselves own this much. Herbert in his trea- tise, de Religione Gentilium^ confesses it a second branch of the generally received religion, for which he pleads that God is to be worshipped. It is true, in his next, while he tells us that virtue and piety were owjied to be the principal means of worshipping him, he would seem to preclude us from the benefit of the former acknowledgment. But yet he dares not assert, that this which he condescends on was the onli/ ivai/, and so pretend the worship we speak of unnecessary : But being to hold forth the sujjiciency of this natural religion^ he was loth to speak any more of, that, which would lead him, if he had considered it, unto a discovery of its nakedness. But others of the Deists do own the necessity of such a worship, and pretend prayer and praise sufficient to this purpose, as he also doth in his other treatises, particularly de Veritate.f 3. The same reasons wliich plead for inward acts, peculiarly di' tected to this end, plead for outward veneration likewise. If we have minds capable of this irnvtird veneration, so are we capable of outward expressions ; and are under the same obligation to employ those latter sorts of powers to the honor of God, that binds us to the former. Nor is there more reason wliy, besides that transient regard we ought to paj' him in all our actions, there should be inward acts peculiarly designed to express our inward veneration, than that there should be outward stated acts, pecuUarly designed for the aame purpose. 4. The nature of socidy pleads loudly for this. Mankind a? united in societies, whether lesser, as families, or greater, as other societies, depend entirely on God ; and therefore owe him rever- ence, and the expression of it in some joint and fixed way. Public benefits require public acknowledgments : and this sort of depen- dence on, and subjection to the Deity, should certainly have suita-> ble returns. ' Herbert de Veritate, paj^e 271, 272. t Herbert de Vcritale, page 272. J\''os intsrea ext;\mvm ilium. Dei cultUm Csiib aligua reh'giotiis specie J ex omni sectdo regiov.e, //etite evicimus,—~" In the " mean time we have proved this external worship of God, under some sp- ** pearaBce of relig-ion, from every age, country- in-i jinti'm" PRINCIPLES OB' THE MODERN DEISTS. 8t 5. It is incontrollably evident, that many in the world do shalje «ff all regard to t}>€ Deity, and walk in an open defiance to him, and those laws which he has established. Certainly, therefore, it is the duty of such as keep firn), o|>enly to testify their dependence on and regard to the Deity, which is not suflSoienlly done by the performance of those things, which are materially according to the appointment of Gotl. For what regard to God there is, influencing ':- those outward acts, cannot be clearly discerned by on-lookers, Tvho know not but somewhat, beside any regard to the authority of the lawgiver, may be at the bottom of all. It is therefore necessary that there be public, solemn actions, directly and plainlj'^ importing; our avouchment of a regard to him, in opposition to these afTronis that are publicly offered to him. 6. This worship is necessary in order to maintain and cherish that inward vcncratiofi. It is well known, howerer, liowmuch we are bound to it, yet the sense of this obligation, and that veneration it- self to which we are obliged, is not so deeply rivetted upon our minds, but it needs to be cherished, and the habits strengthened by actings. It is not so easy for men to do this by inward meditation, who for jnost part are little accustomed to this way, and can indeecJ scarce fix their minds in this inward exercise at all, especially if they have no fixed way of exercising it, but are left at liberty to choose their own way. Religion, therefore, must go out of the world, or there must be stated and fixed ways of exercising it. This is easi- ly justifiable from experience, which shews, that where once public . worship is disregarded, any other sort of respect to the Deity quickly (lills of its own accord. 7. It is necessmy for the benejif of human society. The founda- tions of human society are laid upon the notion of a God, and the sacredness of oaths, and the fixed notions of right and wrong, which all stand and fall together. Nor is there any way of keeping that regard to tlwse things which are the props of human society, without such a worship of God, as that we plead for. This all the lawgivers of old were satisfied about, and took measures accord- ingly. 8. If religion has any valuable end, then certainly this must be one main part of it, to lead man to future happiness ; which cannot, with any shew of reason, be alledged to consist in any thing be- sides the aijof/ment of God. And it is plainly ridiculous to sup- pose, that mankind can be kept up in any fixed expectation of, or close pursuit after this, if not animated and encoui*aged by some, nay frequent experiences of commerce betwixt him and the Deity here. And it is foolish to pretend, that this is otherwise to be had, in any degree ansAverable to this end, in any other way than in the "way of designed, fixed, solemn and stated worship. 11 ^2 AN INWIRT INTO THE Now, this much being said in the general for clearing the neces- sity of such a Korship and the impertance of it in religion ; it re- mains that we prove the light of nature insufficient to direct us as to the way of it. And this we conceive may be easily made appear from the ensuing grounds. 1 . The manifest mistakes all the world fell into, who were left in this matter to the conduct of tlie mere light of nature, abundant- ly evince the incompetency of nature's light for man's direction, "with respect to the worship of God. Every nation had their own way of worship, and that stuffed with blasphemous, unworthy, ri- i(s *' him from distinguishing a God from a man ; so it is necessary, 4N, ** that he should in the first place scatter the daiicness that covers your soul, and esftenvards give you these remedies that aie neces- sary to put you in a condition of discerning good and evil ; for at J' *' present you know not hov/ to make a difference. Alcibiades %J *' says, I think i must defer my sacrifice to that tiuie. Socrates ^ ** approves — You have reason, says he ; it is more safe so to do, lhai:- Cao. 23. #^ 7! P!ato d*; Ugiiins. PRINCIPLES OB' THE MODERN DEISTS. 8i> the principal worship of God; whereby he owns, that there is in- deed another part ot, which he dare not name, because he knows not what to say about it. C H A P. VI. Proving the Insitfficienct/ of Natural Eeligion, from its Defective- ness as to the Discover^/ wherein 3Ian's Happiness lies. NEXT to the glory of God^ the indisputably supreme end of man, and of the whole creation, of which I &m not now to discourse, the happiness of man, is, past all peradventure, his chief end. Yea, perhaps, if we speak properly, except as abovesaid, it is his cnlr/ end. For whatever man is capable of designing, is compre- hended under this, being either what dotJi, or at least is judged to contain somewhat of happiness in it, or what is supposed to con- tribute to that wherein satisf;iction id understood to consist. Every thing that a man aims at, is either aimed at as good in itself, or contributing to our good. The first is a part of our happiness ; the last is not in proper speech so designed, -but the good to which it contributes, and that still is as before a part of our happiness. If religion is therefore any way useful or sufficient, it must be so with respect to this end. Ancl since religion not only claims some re- gard from man, but pleads the preference to all other things, and demands his chief concern, and his being employed about it as the main business of his life, it must eitlier contribute more toward this end, than any thing else, nay be able to lead man to this end, otherwise it deserves not that regard which it claims, and is indeed of little, if any use to mankind. If then we are able to evince that natural religion is not sufficient to lead man to that happiness, which all men seek, and is indeed the chief end of man, there will be no place left for the pretence of its sufficiency, in so far as it is the fiubject of this controversy betwixt the Deis-ts and us. And this? we conceive may be made appear many ways. But in this chapter we shall confine ourselves to one of them . If nature's light is not able to give any tolerable discovery of that wherein man's happiness lies, and that it may by him be obtained, then surf ly it can never furnish him with a religion that is able to conduct him to it. This cannot with any shew of reason be deni- ed. It remains therefore that I make appear, that nature's light iy ■not able to discover wherein man's happiness lies, and its ailaina- bleness. Now this I think ia fully made out by the following cgr- siderations : 86 AN INaUIRY INTO THE 1. They who being left to the conduct of the mere light of nature, have sought after that g"03i wherein man's happiness is to be had, could not come to any agreement or consistency among themselves. This is a point of the first importance, as being the hinge whereon the whole of a man's life musi turn ; tlie spring which must set a man a going, and give life to all his actions, and to this they must all be directed. This, if any other thing onglit to be easily known ; and if nature's light is a sufficient guide, it must give evident dis- coveries of. But, methinks, here is a great sign of a want of thi* evidence ; great men, learned men, v/ise philottophers and industri- ous seaj'chers of truth have split upon this point, into an endless variety of opinions ; insomuch that Varro pretends to reckon up no less than 288 different opinions. May I not now use the argu- ment of one of the Deists, in a case which he falsely supposes to be alike, and thus in his own words argue upon this point, (only putting in, the discoveries of nafiwe^s li^ht about happiness^ or the evidence of those discoveries, in place of the evidence of the reasons of the Christian religion^ against which he argues) : " If the dis- " covcrles of it were evident, there couUl be no longer any con- ** tention or difference about the chief good ; all men would em- " brace the same and acquiesce in it : no prejudice would prevail *• against the certainty of such a good."* '•' It is exery man's ** greatest bupinf r-s here to laboar for his happiness, and conse- " qtiently none would be backward to know it. And, if all do not " agree in it, those marks of truth in it are not visible, which are •' necessary to draw an assent."f But wiutever there is in this, it h a most certain argument of darkncs^, that tiiere is so great a dif- ference, where the seai-cher.'^ are many, it is evi^ry one's interest to find, and the business and search is plied with great applica- tion. 2. The greatest of the philosophers have been plainly mistaken itl it. They espoused opinions in thi^ matter, which are not capa- ble of any tolerable defence. Solon, the A-henian lar/giver, defin- ed them " happy who are conipetenily fin-ni^hed with, outward " things, act honestly and live temperately."i Socrates held, that tliere was but one chief good, which is knon'fcdgc, if vfe may be- lieve Diogenes Laerlius in his life. Aristotle, if we ma}'' t^ke the- same author's words for it, places it ]\\ virtne, health ^nd outward eonveniencj/, which no doubt was his opinion, since he ap»)roved Solon's definition of the chief good;\\ and herein he was followed by his numerous school. Pythagoras tells us, that the " knowledge " of the perfections of the soul is the chief good." It is true, he . * Oracles of Reason, page 206. f Jhid, page 201. i Stanley, pag-e 26. Life of Solon, Cap. 9. II Stanley, page 540. PRINCIPLES OV THE MODERN DEISTS. Si teems at other times to speak somewhat differently ; of which we may speak afterwards. Zeno tells us, that it lies in " living ac- ♦' cording; to nature. Cleanthes adds, that " accordin^!; to nature '* is according to virtue." Crysippus tells us, that it is " to live " according to expert knowledge of things which happen naturally."* It is needless to spend time in reckoning up innumerable ethers, who all run tlie same way, placing happiness in that which is not able to afford it, as being finite, of short continoance, fickle and inicertain. It is not my design to confute those several opinions. It is evident to any one, that they are all confined to time, and up- on this very account fail of what can make us happy. 3. They who seem to come some nearer the matter, and talk sometimes of copformili/ lo God being the chief good ; that it is our end to be like God, and the like ; as Pythagoras and some others ;f but especially Plato, who goes further than any of the rest ;J yet cannot justly be aljedged to have made the discovery, because wc have not any account of their opinions clearly deliver- ed by themselves, but hints here and there gathered up from their writijigs, which are veiy far from satisfying us as to their mmd.— Besides they are so variable, and express themselves so different- Jy, in different places, that it is hard to find their mind ; nay I may add, they are, industriously and of design obscure. This Alcinous the Platonic philosopher, tells us plainly enotigh in his Docirine of Plafo, which is inserted at length in Stanley's lives. He says, " that he thought the discovery of the chief good was not easy, " and if it were found out, it was not safe to be declared." And that for this reason, he did communicate his thoughts about it but to very few, and those of his most intimate acquaintance. Now the plain meaning of all this, in my opinion is, that he could not tell wherein man's happiness consists, or M'hat that is which is able to afford it : or at most, that though one way or other in his travels, by his studies or conveise, he had got some notions about it ; yet he did not sufficiently understand them, and was not able to satisfy himself or otliers about them, and that therefore, he either entirely snppress^ed, or would not plainly speak out his thoughts, least the world should see his ignorance, and that though his words differed, yci in very deed he knew no more of the matter than otliers. For to say, that, upon supposition that his discoveries had been satisfy- ing as to truth and clearness, and that he was capable to prove and explain them, they were not fit to be made known to the world, is to spc nk the grossest of nonsense ; for nothing was so necessary to be known, and known universally, as the chief good,, which every * Stanley, pajre 462. f IbiiJ, pupe 541. 4 !!>.■ ** to cleanse the demon that is in us, is to initiate ourselves Into high- ** er disciples ; which is done by music, arithmetic, astronomy and " geometry, not v.'ithout some respect of the body, by gymnastic, " whereby it is made more ready for the actions both of r/ar and ** peace." I pretend not to nnderstand him liere : But this I un- derstandfrom him, that one of three is certain, either he understood jiot himself, or had no mind that others should understand ; cr that he was the most unmeet man in the world to instruct mankind about this important point, and to explain things about which the world Tras at a loss. When men speak at this rate, we may put what meaning we please upon their words. 4. It is plain that none of them have clearly come to know them- selves, or inform others that happiness is not to he had here; that it consists in the eternal enjoyment of God after time : and that this is atiainahle. These ai*e things wlicreabout there is a deep silence, aot so much as a word of them, far less any proof. If ever we PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. «9 were to expect such a thlnj^ we might look for it from those who have not merely touched at this subject by the bye, and in dark hints, but have discoursed of moral ends, on set purpose, such as Cicero and Seneca. Cicero frequently tells, that he designed to enrich his native country with a translation of all that was valua- ble in the Greek philosophers, he had perused them for this end, and thus accomplished, he sets himself to write of moial ends^ which he does in five books. Here we may expect somewhat to the purpose : But if we do we are disappointed. The first book sets off Epicure's opinion about Mppiness with a great deal of rhet- oric The second overthrows it. The third represents the Stoic's opinion. And the fourth confutes it. The Jijth represents and asserts the Peripatetic's opinion, which had been as easily over- thrown as any of them. And this is all you are to expect here, without one word of God, the enjoi/ment of him, or any thing of that kind, which favours of a life after this. Seneca writes again, a book de Vila BeatcL, consisting of thirty-two chapters. Here we may find somewhat possibly. And indeed if one should hear him state the question, as he does in his second chapter, he would ex- pect some great matters from him. Qiiaramus quid oplime factum sit, non quid usitatissimum : Et quid nos inpossessionefelicitatis aterncR constituat,non quid vidgo, veritatis j)cssinio interprcti, pro- halum sit. Vulgus autem tarn chlumydatos, quam coronam voco.^ What may we not now expect ? But after this, I assure you, yoii are to look for no more words about eternity, nor any thing more, but a jejune discourse in pretty sentences, about the Stoic's opin- ion, representing that a man would be happy, if his passions were extinct, and he was perfectly pleased with the condition he is in, be it what it will. Now after this, who can dream that nature^'s light is sufficient to satisfy here ? Is every man able to discover that which philosophers, the greatest of them, after the greatest application, failed so signally about, that scarcely any of them came near it, and none of them reached it ? 5. Nor will it appear strange, that the Heathen philosophers of old should be so much at a loss about future happiness, to any one who considers how difficult, if not impossible, it must be for any, who rejects revelation, and betakes himself to the mere light of na- ture, to arrive at the wished for, and necessary assurance of eter- nal felicity after this life, even at this present time, after all the great improvements, which the rational proofs of a future state have obtained, since Christianity prevailed in the world. If nature's *, " l-et lis inquire what is best to be done, and not wliat is most common ; " and what puts us in possession of eternal felicity, and not wliat is approved " by the vulg-ar — the worst judges of truth. By the vulgar I mean the rich " and jpreat men, as wellaa the mob," 12 eo AN INaUIRY INTO THE light, now tiii&r its highest improvements, proves unable to affor4 full assurance, and still leaves us to fluctuate in uncertainty about future happiness ; no wonder that they should be in the dark, who were strangers to these improvements. That the arguments for a future state, since Christianity obtain- ed, have received a vast improvement from Christian divines and philc»sophers, cannot modestly be denied. The performances of Plato and Cicero, on this point, which were the best among the ancients, are, when compared with our late Christian writers, but like the trif.es of a boy at school, or the nide essays of a novice, in comparison to tlie most elaborate and complete performances of the greatest masters ; if they bear even the same proportion. He who knows not this, knows nothing in these matters. Yea, to that degree have they impreven those arguments, that it is utterly im- pofivible^ for any man, who gives all their reasons for the continu- ance of the soul after death, with their answers to the trifling pre- tences of the opposers of this conclusion, a fair hearing and due consideration, to acquiesce rationally in the contrary assertion of Atheists and mortal Deists ; or not to favour, at least this opinion, as what is highly probable, if not absolutely certain. But after all, if we are left to seek assurance of this from the vnassisted light of nature, that certainly God has provided for, and will actually bestow npon man^ and more especially man who is now a sinner, future and eternal felicity, ^ve will ftnd ourselves plunged into inextricable difficulties, out of which the light of na- ture will find it very difBcult, if not impossible to extricate us. It i.^ one thing to be persuaded of the futui'e separate subsistence of our souls after death, and another to know in what condition they shall be ; and yet more to be assured, that fffcr dvnfh our souls shall be possessed of eternal happiness. It is precisely about this lajrt point tiiat we are now to speak. The arguments drawn from na- 1 tire's light \vill scarce fix us in the steady persuasion of future and eternal felicity. There is a great odds betwixt our knovrledge of future punishments, and the grounds whereby we are led to it, and our persuasion of future and cterual rewards. Upon inquiry the like reasons will not be found for both. Our notices alxjut eternal rewards, when the promises of it contained in the scriptures are set aside, will be found liable to many objections, hardly to be solved by the mere light of nature, which do not so much aflfcct the proofs advanced for future punishments. Besides, sijice the entrance of sin, its universal prevalence in the world, and the consequences following upon it, have so long benighted man, as to any knowledge that he otherwise might have had about eternal iKipTiiness, that now it will be found a matter of the utmost ditlicult}', if not a pl;nn im- possibility, for him to reach assurance of eternal iVll'^i'^^' '>■" *he mere light of nature, however Improven. S PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 91 The pleas drawn from the holiness ariA justice of God, say much for the certain punishment, after this life< of many noli>rious offen- ders, who have wholly escaped punishment here ; especially as they are strengthened by other collateral considerations clearing and enforcing them. But whether the pleas for future and eternal rewards, from the justice and goodness of God on the one hand ; and the sufferings of persons really guihy of sin, but in comparison of others virtu- ous, on the other; will with equal firmness conclude, that God is obliged to, OT certainly will, reward their imperfect virtue, and compensate their sufferings, may, and perhaps not without reason, be questioned. That it is congruous that virtue should be rewardedl^ may per- haps easily be granted. But, what that reward is, which it may from divine justice or bounty claim, it will not be easy for us to determine, if we have no other guide than the mere Fight of na- ture. The man who perfectly performs his duty is secured against the fears of punishment, and has reason to rest fully assured of God's acceptance and approbation of what is every way agreeable to his will. He has a perfect inward cairn in his own conscience, is disturbed with no challenges, and has the satisfaction and inward complacency, resulting from his having acquitted himself accordin"; to his duty : His conscience assures him he has done r.othing to provoke God to withdraw favours already given, or to w Ithhoki further favours. And though he cannot easily see reason to think God obliged, either to continue what he freely gave, or accumu- late' further eflfects of bounty upon him, or to protract his happiness to eternity ; yet he has the satisfaction of knowing, tliat he halli. not rendered himself unworthy of any favour. This reward is the necessary and unavoidable consequence of perfect obedienre. But this comes not up to the point.. That which the light of na- ture must assure us of is, That virtuous men, on account of their virtue, may claim and expect, besides this, a further reward, and that of no less consequence than eternal felicity. Now, if I mis- take it not, when the promise of God, which cannot be knovra without revelation, is laid aside, the mere light of nature will find it: difficult to fix upon solid grounds, for any assurance as to this. Many thorny difficulties must be got through. Not a feiv per- plexing questions must be solved. If it is said, that tlie justice of God necessarily obliges him, besides that reward necessarily result- ing from perfect obedience, (of which above,) further to recom- pence, even the most exact and peifect performance of our duty, antecedently to any promise given to that effect, with future and eternal felicity ; it may be inquired, IIow it shall be mule appear that virtue, suppose it to be as perfect as you will, can be said tcx mirif, and to merit so great a reward ? May not God, without in- 92 AN INQUIRY INTO THE justice, turn to nothing an innocent creature ? Sure I am, no mean nor incompetent judges have thought so.* Where is the injustice of removing or taking away what he freely gave, "and did not pro- mise to continue ? Is it modest or safe for us, without the most con- vincing evidences of the inconsistency of the thing, to limit the power of God, or put a cannot on the Almighty. And does not the very possibility of the annihilation of an innocent creature, in a consistency with justice, though God, for other reasons, should ne- ver think fit to do it, entirely enervate this plea ? If God, Avithout injustice, may take away the being of an innocent creature, how is it possible to evince, that in justice, he must reward it with efcrnal happiness ? Again, if we may, for our virtue, claim eternal felici- ty, as due in justice, may it not be inquired, What exercise of vir* tue — for how long a time continued — ^is sufficient to give us this title to eternal rewards ? If the bounty and goodness of God is in- sisted on, as the ground of this claim, the plea of justice seems to be deserted. And here again it may be inquired. Whether the goodness of God is necessary in its egress ? Whether the bounty of God ought not to be understood to respect those things which 3.re absolutely at the giver's pleasure to grant or withhold ? Whe- ther, in such mattei^s, we can be assured that bounty will give us Ibis or that, which, though we Mant, is not injustice due, nor secur- ed to us by any promise ? Further, it may be inquired how far* must goodness extend iiielf as to rewards ? Is it not supposablc, that it may stop short of eternal felicity, and think a less rewaid sufB- cient ? Of so great weight have these, and the like difiiculties ap- peared to not a few, and those not of th.e more stupid sort of man- kind, that they have not doubted to assert boldly, that even inno- cent man, without revelation, and a positi^^e promise, could never Ibe assured of eternal rev/ards. And how the light of nature can disengage us from these difficulties, were man perfectly innocent, I do not well understand. But whatever there is of this, the entrance of sin and the con- sideration of man's case as involved in guilty has cast us upon new and yet greater difficulties. From this present condition wlierein we find all mankind without exception involved, a whole shoal of difficulties emerge, never, I am afraid, to be removed by imassis^ ed reason. Now it may be inquired, what obedience is it that can entitle us to eternal felicity ? If none save that which is perfect will serve. V. ho shall be the belter for this reward ? Who can pretend to this perfect or sinless obedience ? If imperfect obedience may, how shall we be sure of this? How shall he who deserves punishment. * See the Excellency of Theology, Sec. by T. TL R. Boil, pag-e 25, '26, 27, &c. :md Consid. about'thc Eecoii. oi" Rea'-:ca"ai)d lltl. W T. E. page 21,22. . PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 93 claim, demand and expect reward^ a great reward, yea, the greatest reward — eternal happiness ? If the goodness of God is pleaded, and it is said, that though we cannot expect in strict justice to have our imperfect obedience rewarded ; yet we may hope it from the bounty of God ? Besides, what was above moved against this, in a more plausible case, when we were speaking of innocent man, it may be further inquired, whether, though infinite bounty might deal thus graciously with man, if he were perfectly righteous, it may not yet withhold its fovours, or at least stop short of eternal felicity, with the best among sinner:? ? Again, what degree of imperfection is it that will prejudge this claim ? What may consist with it ? Who is good in that sense, which is; necessary to qualify him for this expectation ? Is there any such person existent ? What way shall we be sure of this ? Is it to be measured by outward actions only, or are inward principles and aims to come in consideration ? Who can know these save God ? If it be said, we can know our- selves to be such : I ansAver, how shall we maintain any confidence of future, nay eternal rewards, while conscience tells that we de- serve punishment ? What if by the mere light of nature vre can never be assured of forgiveness ? How sliall we then by it, be sure of eternal rewards ? If we are not rewarded here, how can Me know, but that it has been for our 'i-ins that good things have been with- held from us ? May not this be presumed to be the consequence of our knov/n sins, or more covei t evils, which self-love has made us overlook ? If we suffer, yet do we suffer more than our sins deserve, or even so much ? If we think so, will w^e be sustained competent judges of the quality of offences, and their demerit, which are done against God, especially when we are the actors ? To whom does it belong to judge ? If we meet with some part, for yc can never prove it is all, of demerit or deserved punishment of your sins here, will this conclude that ye shall be exempted from suffering what further God may in justice think due to them, and you on their account hereafter ? W hat security have ye that yc shall escape with what h indicted on you here ? And not only so, but instead of meeting with what ye fuithcr deserve, obtain rewards which ye dare scarcely say ye deserve ? If God spare at present a noted offender, who cannot without violence to reason be supposed a subject meet for pardon or for a reward, and reserve the who'e punishments due to his crimes, to the other vrorld ; but in the mean while, sees meet to inflict present punishment on thee, thojjgh less criminal, perhaps to convince the world, that even lesser offen- ders shall not escape ; if, I say, he deal thus, is there no way fl>r clearing his justice, but by conferring eternal happiness on thee T Why, if he inflict what further punishment is due to thee, in exact proportion to thy less atrocious crimes ; and punish the other with ey'ik proportioned to his more ati-ccious crimes, and make him up by 94 AN irvQUlRY INTO THE the severity of the stroke for the delay of the punishment ; if I Bay, thus he do, I challenge any man to tell lue where the injustice lies ! And may not the like be said as to any other virtuous person, or whom thou supposest to be such, who meets with sufTerings ? Nor do less perplexing difEcuIlies attend those other pleas for fu- ture happiness to man, at least, in his present coiuiiiion; which are drawn from God creating us capable of future happiness, implanting desires, and giving us gusts of it : All which would be given iii vain, if there was no happiness designed for man after time. But how by this we can be secured of eternal happiness, I do not well see. Nor do I understand how the difficulties which may be moved against this, can be resolved. It may be inquired, whe- ther this desire of happiness, said to be implanted in our natures, is really any thing distinct from that natural tendency, of the crea- ture to its own perfection and preservation, which belongs to the being of every creature, witli such difference as to degrees and the manner,- as their respective natures require ? If it is no more than this, it must be allowed essential to every rational creature : And if every rational creature has an essential attribute, which infers an obligation on God to provide for it eternal happiness, and put it in possession of this felicity, if no fault intervene, doth it not thence necessarily, follow, that God cannot possibly, without injustice, turn to nothing any innocent rational creature ; nay, nor create any one, which it is possible for him again to annihilate without injus- tice ? For if we should suppose it possible for God to do so, and thus without injustice frustrate this desire, where is the force of the argument ? And is it not a little bold to limit God thus ? I need not enter into the debate, whether there is any supposable case, vherein infinite wisdom may think it fit to do so ? That dispute is a little too nice : For on the one hand, it will be hard for us to de- termine it positively, that infinite wisdom must, in any case we can suppose, think it fit to destroy or turn to nothing an innocent crea- ture ; and on the other hand, it is no less rash to assert, that our not knowing any case, proves that really there is none such known to the only wise God. Besides, if we allow it only possible, in a consistency with justice and veracity, for God to do it, I am afraid the argument has lost its force. Further, it may be inquired, whe- ther the rational creature can in duty desire an eternal continuation in being, otherwise than with the deepest submission to the sove- reign pleasure of God, where he has given no positive promise? If submission belongs to It, all ccrtninty vanishes, and v.'e miii-i look elsewhere for assurance of eternal happiness. A desire of it, if God see meet to give it, can never prove that certainly he will give it. If it is said, that the creature without submission or f ujlt may insist upon and claim eternd happiness ; I do not see how this can ha pz'cven. PRL\Cr?LES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 95 But again, do not these desires respect the whole man, consist- ing of soul and body? Doth not death dissolve the man? Are not these desires apparently frustrated ? Ho»v will the light of nature certainly infer from those desire?, gusts, &c. that the whole man shall have eternal felicity, Avhile we see the man daily destroyed by death ? Can this be understood without revelation ? Docs the light of nature teach us that there will be a resurrection ? I grant, that without the supposal of a future existence, we cannot easily un- derstand what end there was worthy of God for making such a no- ble creature as man : But while we see man, on the other hand, daily destroyed by death, and know nothing of the resurrection of the body, which is the case of all those who reject revelation, v/e •shall not know what to conclude, but must be twssed in oar mind?, and be at lo.ture. " It is •* not enough," cortinues he, " that there were \^^ and down scat- *• tered sayings of wise men, conformable to right reason. The " law of nature was the law of conveniency loo : And it is no won- *' der these men of part?, and studious of virtue, (who had occa- " sion to thli-; of any particular part of it) should, by medilation, •* light on the right, even from the observable conveniency and PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 105 « beauty of it, without making out its obligation from the true prin- « ciples of the law of nature, and foundations of morality." More be adds judiciously to this purpose ; but this is enough. And hence it is plain, that such a system of morality would, if collected, at best be only a collection of problems, which every man is left at liberty to canvass, dispute, or reject ; nay mote, which every man is obliged to examine as to all its parts, in so far as it prescribes rules to him, and not to receive, but upon a discovery of its truth from its proper principles. 7. It is then plain, that every man is left to his own reason to find out his duty by. He is not to receive it upon any other au- thority than that of reason, if revelation is rejected. He must find out therefore, in every case, what he is to do, and deduce its obligation from the principles of the law of nature. But who sees not, that the most part of men have neither leisure nor capacity for such a work ? Men may think duty easy to be discovered now, when Christianity has cleared it up. But Mr. Locke well observes, " That the first knowledge of those truths, which have been disco- ♦' vered by Christian philosophers, or philosophers since Christi- " anity prevailed, is owing to revelation ; though as soon as they are " heard and considered, they are found to be agreeable to reason, " and such as can by no means be contradicted. Every one may " observe a great many truths which he receives at first from " others, and readily assents to, as consonant to reason, which he " would have found it hard, and perhaps beyond his strength to " have discovered himself. Native ai:d original truth, is not so " easily wrought out of the mine, as we who have it delivered " ready dug and fashioned into our hands, are apt to imagine. And " how often at fifty, and three score years old, are thinking men " told, what they wonder how they could miss thinking of? Which " yet their own contemplations did not, and possibly never would " have helped them to. Experience shews, that the knowledge of " morality, by mere natural light, (how agreeable soever it be to it,) " makes but a slow progress and little advance in the world: " Whatever was the cause, it is plain in fact, that human reason, " unassisted, failed men in its great and proper business of mo^ « rality." 8. As it is unquestionably certain, that the most part of man- kind are not able, by their own reason, to frame a complete body of morality for themselves, or find out what is their own duty in every particular instance. (I shall not speak of any man's being obliged to dii'Cover what belongs to other people's duty, lest our antagonists should suspect I designed to open a door for priests, a set of men and an office which they mortally hate.) I speak only of what h every one's duty in particular. And I say it is evident, that the most part of mankind are unable to find this, which ii not to he 14 IQS AN INQUIRY INTO THE jdone, but by such strains of reasoning, and connexion of conse- quences, which they have neither leisure to weigh, nor, for want of capacity, education and use, skill to judge of; and as I say, they are unable for this, so I fear this task will be found too hard for the ablest philosophers. Particular duties are so many, and many of them so remote from the first principles, and the connection is so subtle and fine spun, that I fear not to say that it must escape thfe piercing eyes of the most acute philosophers : and if they engage in pursuit of the discovery, through so many and so subtle conse- quences, they must either quit the unequal chace, or lose them- .selves instead of finding truth and duty. And if we allow ourselves to judge of what shall be, by what has been the success of such at- tempts, I am sure this is more than bare guess. It is further to be observed, that no tolerable progress could be made herein, were it to be done before advanced years. But it is certain that youth, as well as riper age, is under the law of naturej .and that that age needs clear discoveries of duty the more, that in it irregular passions and inclinations are more vigorous, and it is ex- posed to more temptations than any part of a man's life; and besides, it wants the advantages of experience, to fortify it against the dan- gerous influence of them, which advanced years are attended with. Now it will be to no purpose to me, to find out some years hence what was my duty before, as to obedience ; for now the season is over. The law may discover my sin^ but can never regulate my .practice, in a period of my life that is past and gone. Every man , must have the knowledge of each day's duty in its season. This is not to be had from the light of nature. K we are left at a loss in our younger years, as nature's light will have us, we may be ruined before knowledge come. Much sin must be contracted, and ill ha- bits are like to be very much strengthened before any stop come : yea, they may be so strong, that the foundation of inevitable ruin may be laid. Finally, knovrledge is requisite before acting ; at least, in order of nature it is so, and must, at least in order of time, be contempo- rary. Action gives not always time for long reasoning and weigh- ing such trains of consequences, as are requisite to clear duties from the first principles of nature's light, and enforce their obliga- tion. And therefore man left to it, is in a miserable plight, not much unlike to the case of the Romans, Diim deliberant Romani capitur Saguntmn*^ : While he is searching for duty, the season is lost ; and the discovery, if it comes, arrives too late to be of any use. It is in vain for any to pretend, that the knowledge of duty is , connate to the mind of man. Whatever may be pretended as to a * ** While the Romans were deliberating, Saguntum was taken." PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERlSf DEISTS. 107 (fev of the first principles of morality, and it is but a very feW of which these can be alledged, yet it is certain, it can never be with- out impudence extended to the thousandth part of the duties wc are bound to in particular cases. General rules may be easy ; par- ticular ones are the difficulty, and the application of generals to circumstantiated cases is a hard task. It is but with an ill grace pretended, that these duties are self-evident, and the knowledge of them innate or connate, call it what you please, to the mind of man ; which the world has never been agreed about ; which wise men, when the fairest occasions offered of thinking on them, could not discern ; which philosophers, upon application and attention, cannot make out from the principles of reason. The reason why the knowledge of any truth is said to be innate, is, because, either the mind of man is struck with the evidence of it on its first propo- sal, and must yield assent, without seeking help from any princi- ples of a clearer evidence ; or because its dependence on such prin- ciples is so obvious, that the conclusion is so plainly connected with such principles, that it is never sooner spoke of, than its con- nexion with them, and so its truth appears. Of the first sort few' duties can be said to be. And if they were of the last sort, any person of a tolerable capacity would be able to demonstrate them upon attention. Now how far it is otherwise in this case, who sees not? Upon the whole, I must conclude, that nature's light is not suffi- cient to give us such a law or rule as may be a sure guide to those who desire to go right, so that they need not lose their way or mis- take their duty, if they have a mind to know it, nor be uncertain whether they have done it. It will not relieve the Deists to pretend, that some of the excep- tions above mentioned may be retorted upon Christians, and im- proven against the scriptures : For nothing but ignorance of the true state of the question can give countenance to this pretence. The scriptures are a rule provided by sovereign grace for falleii man, and by infiniU wisdom are adjusted to God's great design of recovering man to the praise of his own grace, in such a way as may slain the pride of all glory. They are sufficient as an outward mean, and do effectually conduct man to that happiness designed for him, under the influence of the assisting grace provided for him, and in the use of the means of God's appointment. They provide a relief against any unavoidable defects in his obedience, and direct to the proper grounds of his acceptance in it : But men who pre- tend nature's light is able to guide to happiness, are obliged to shew that it affords us a rule of duty ; which of itself, without the help of any supernatural assistance, either as to outward means or inward influences, may be able to lead man to the obedience required ; and this obedience must be such, as answers our original obligation, and 108 AN INdTTIRY INTO THE upon account of its own worth, is able to support, not only a hope of acceptance but of future, nay eternal rewards. For such as are lift to nature's light, can neither pretend to any such outward means, nor inward assistance, nor any such relief against defects in know- ledge or practice, as the scriptures do furnish us with. Nature's light Ijys no other foundation for hopes of acceptance or reward, save only the worth or perfection of the obedience itself. And this, if it is duly considered, not only repels the pretended retortion, but gives additional force to the foregoing argument. CHAP. VHL Proving the Insu^dency of Natural Religion from its Defects as to sufficient Motives for enforcing Obedience. IT is warmly disputed in the schools, whether rewards and pun- ishments be not so much of the essence of a law, and so included in its notion, that nothing can properly be stiled law which wants them ? I design not to make myself a party in those disputes. But this much is certain, that laws and government are relatives ; they mutually infer and remove each other. There is no government properly so called, that wants laws, or somewhat that is the mea- sure and standard of its administration. And there are no laws where there is no authority and government to enjoin them.— Whence this plainly results, that obedience, if it does no more, yet it certainly entitles to the protection of the government. And disobedience, not only deprives of any title to that, but lays open to such further severities, as the government shall have power to execute and see meet to use for its own preservation, against vio- laters of its constitutions. But further, to wave this dispute, the nature of man which proceeds not to actions save upon knowledge, makes this much certain, That whatever he may be supposed to be obliged to in strict duty, yet really in fact, he uses not to pay any great regard to laws which are not enforced by motives or in- ducements, that may be supposed to work with him, as containing discoveries of such advantages attending obedience, and disadvan- tages following disobedience, as may powerfully sway him to con- sult his duty as well as his interest, by yielding obedience. If then, natural religion is found unable to discover those things which ordinarily prevail with man to obey, and carry him over any ob- structions which lie in the way, it can never be supposed sufficient to lead man to happiness : For man is not to be driven, but led ; he is not to be led blind-folded, but upon rational views of duty and interest. That natural religion is ^u this respect exceedingly/ PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 109 d^eCtive is the design of this discourse to demonstrate. All those motives, which usually have any influence, may, I think, be brought under the following heads. 1 . A full view of the authority of the lawgiver and his laws. 2. A prospect of present benefit by obe- dience. 3. A prospect of future rewards for it. 4. Fear of pun- ishment in case of disobedience. And 5. Examples. Now, as I know no motive which may not easily without stretch be resolved into one of those, so, if I make it appear that nature's light is lame as to each of them, I think I have gone a great way to disprove its sufficiency to happiness. Well, let us essay it. 1. The great inducement to obedience is a clear discover^/ of the authority of the lawgiver, and laws thence resulting. This is not perhaps, properly speaking, a motive, as it is oft used : for in very deed this is the formal reason of obedience ; a regard where- to gives any action the denomination of obedience, and entitles to the law's protection, and other advantages ; yet certain it is, that this should have the principal influence, flora the ground just now laid down, and therefore we shall here speak of it. It will prevail far with man to obey the law of nature, if nature's light clearly discovers how much the law-giver deserves that place ; how well he is qualified for it ; how indisputable his title to the government is, and how far he has interposed his authority ; that the stamp of it is on these laws, to which we are urged to be subject ; that they bear a plain congruity to his sublime qualifications ; that he is con- cerned to have them obeyed ; observes the entertainment they meet with ; entertains a respect for the obedient, and resents diso- bedience. If we are left in the dark, as to all or most of these, it will exceedingly weaken our regard to the law. And that this is plainly the case, is now to be made appear. 1 . It goes a great way toward the recommendation of any law to be fully satisfied as to the qualifications of the framer. But how dark is nature's light here ? It discovers indeed his power and greatness : But its no- tions of his wisdom, justice, clemency and goodness are exceed- ingly darkened, by the seemingly unequal distributions of things here below, the innumerable miseries, under which the world groans, and other things of a like nature ; that truly, very few, if left mere- ly to its conduct, would reach any such discoveries of those glori- ous properties, as would influence any considerable regard to those laws he is supposed to make. I dispute not now, what may be strictly known and demonstrated of God, by a train of subtle arguments. For I would not be un- derstood so much an to insinuate the want of objective evidences of the wisdom and goodness of the Deity. Our question respects not so much these, as mail's power of discerning them. It is not ab- solutely denied, that there are many and pregnant evidences of these attributes in the works of creation and providence ; our no AN INQUIRY INTO THE question is only, Whether there is such evidence of those perfec- tions, especially in God's moral government of the world, every where appearing, as may be able effectually to influence the prac- tice, and affect the mind of man in his present state, notwithstand- ing of any obstructions arising, either from the inward weakness of his faculties, or the works of God from without, which to the dar- kened mind of man may have a contrary appearance ? And that which I contend is, That such is the state of things, so they go in the world, and so blind are men's eyes, that there is not so near and clear evidence of these things, in what is discernible by the most of men, as may strike strongly, affect powerfully, and have a lively influence to quicken tO practice. If our governor is near, if he is daily conversant with us, if we have daily indisputed evidences of bis goodness, wisdom, justice, clemency, and other qualifications fitting for government, without any actions that may seem to be capable of a contrary construction, or even of a dubious one, this enforces a regard to his commands. On the contrary, if he is little known, if his way of management is hid from us, if there are instances, which however possibly they may be just, yet have a contrary appearance to us, this weakens regard and quite con- founds. And this is plainly the case as to God, with men left to the mere conduct of nature's light, not through any defect on God's part, but through the darkness of the mind of man in his present state ; and this is the more considerable, that we use to be more sensible of what evil any is supposed to do us, than of what good we may receive from them. Now since this observation is of use to prevent mistakes, I desire it may be carried along through the rest of our remarks. 2. It works powerfully, and strongly ex- cites to obedience, if the indisputableness of the law-giver's title, and the grounds whereon it leans are clearly known. Now as to God, the giounds of his title to the legislative as well as executive power, are the super-eminent excellency of his nature, rendering him not only fit, but the only fit person for it ; his creation of all things, and thence resulting, propriety in them as his creatures, such as his preservation of them in being, his providential care and inspection, and the many benefits he bestows on them. But we have heard already, how dim the discoveries of God's super-emi- Dent excellencies are, which the light of nature affords. As to Bis creation, it was disputed among the learned and quite overlook- • ed by the vulgar, amongst those who were left to nature's light, as baron Herbert well observes and clears. As to his close influence in their preservation, it could not be noticed or known, where the other was overlooked. His providential care and inspection, which perhaps, as to its power of influencing, would go the greatest length, if it can be proven by the light of nature ; yet cannot cer- taiaJy by it be explained, and truly ia ao darkened by many obvi- PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. Ill ous occurrences in the external administration of the world, that pa3t all peradventure, }t can never suitably affect men, who have no other' discoveries of it, than the light of nature affords. As to God's benefits, thoygh they are many, yet they did not affect so much, because they were conveyed by the intervention of such second causes as did arrest, instead of helping forward the short- sighted minds of men, and detained them in contemplation of the servant who brought the favour, whereas they should have looked further, to him who sent it ; so they should have done, but so they did not. Again, some of their most valuable benefits, their vir- tues, they denied God to be the author of, as we have heard above from Seneca, Cicero and Epictetus. And finally, some of them were inclinable to think, that the benefits were more than counter- vailed by the evils we labour under. Thus were the minds of men darkened, and so they had continued, if we had been without reve- lation. 3. It is of much force to influence obedience, if we have a clear and satisfying discovery of his government in those laws ; that is, that he who is thus qualified for, and rightfully possessed of the government, has made such laws, and stamped his authority on them. However great ideas we have of his excellency and title to give laws ; yet this will have no weight, if we are not clearly satisfied that these are kis laws. Now how palpably defective nature's light is here, has been fully made out in the last chapter. 4. It will have no small force, if we had a clear knowledge, that these laws are in their matter fully congruous to the qualifications we desire in a law-giver, such as wisdom, goodness, justice, clemen- cy and the like. But as these attributes are either not known or darkly known by the light of nature ; so the impress of them on the laws of nature has not been discovered, nor is it discoverable ; for I doubt not but it might easily be made appear, that the whole frame of the laws of nature are adapted to the nature of man as innocent, and endued with sufficient power to continue so, which is not the case with him now. And, therefore, how to reconcile these laws to the notions of God and man is a speculation, as of the last consequence, so of the greatest difficulty, which had never been got through, if God had not vouchsafed us another guide than nature's light. 5. If the law-giver is certainly known to have a great regard to his laws, and to take careful inspection of the ob- servation of them ; this will be a strong inducement to regard them. But here nature's light is no less dark, than as to the rest. The whole face of things in the world seem to have so contrary an aspect, that we could never see clearly through this matter, if, without revelation, we were left to judge of God by the mere light of na- ture. The abounding of sin, prosperity of sinners, sufferings of the best, and the like, led some to deny God's providence and gov- 112 AN INaUIRY INTO THE eminent entirely ; others of the better sort doubted of it, as Clau- dian elegantly represents his own case, lib. 1. contra Rtifinum. Sape mihi dubiam traxit sententia meniextti Cuvarent superi terras, an ullus inesset Rector & incerto fluerent mortalia casu. Nam cum dispositi quzsissem fcEdera mundi. Prjcscriptosque mari fines, annisque meatus, Et lucis, notisque vices : Tunc omnia rebar Consilio firmata Dei Sed cum res hominum tanta caligine volvi Adspicerem, latosque diu florere nocentes, Vexarique pios : Rursus labefacta cadebat Religio caussaeque viam non sponte sequebar Alterius, vacuo qnz currere semina motu Affirmat magnumque novas per inane figuras Fortuna, non arte regl : quae numina sensu Ambiguo vel nulla putat, vel nescia nostri.* I know that Claudian got over this by Rujimis^s death, but such providences have not always the like issue, and I only adduce his words as a lively representation of the strait. Yea, to so great a height came these doubts, that it is to be feared that many were car- ried to the worst side. It is certain, the best of them were so con- founded with those occurrences, that they could not spare reflec- tions full of blasphemy upon Providence. The famed Cato's last words may scarcely be excused for this crime. Finally, it is cer- tain, that there was so much darkness about this matter, that none of them all paid a due regard to God. I shall now leave this head, after I have observed one or two things ; and the first of them is, That however some of these truths above mentioned may possibly be made out by a train of subtle ar- guments ; yet such arguments, however they may draw an assent from a tliinking man, not only transcend the capacity of the vulgar, but fail of exciting and affecting even the most philosophical heads. For to draw forth our active powers into action, the inducements must shine with a light, that may warm the mind as it were, not on- ly dissipating doubts about the reality of what it observed, but also * " I had often my mind distracted v/ith doubt, whether the gods took care of the world, or whether there was no governor in it, and the affairs of mor- tals fluctuated under uncertain chance. For when I had enquired into the laws of the world, as disposed into order, and the bounds that are prescribed to the sea, and the course of the year and the succession of day and night, then I thought that these things were established by the wisdom of God. But again, wlien I saw that the affairs of men were involved in so great darkness, that the wicked flourished in joy for a long time, and that the godly were harras- sed ; Religion being weakened, expired, and I against my will followed the tract of another opinion, which supposed that the seeds of things have a blind motion, and that new forms of things are directed through an immense void, by chance, and not by art, and which supposes that the deities have either an ambigvious sense or none at all, and that they know nothing of u?." PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 113 shewing its excellency. Upon this occasion I may not imperii* nentiy apply to the philosophers, what Plautus says of comic poets : Spectavi ego pridem comicos ad istum modum Sapienter dicta dicere, atqiie illis plaudier Cum illos sapientes mores monstrabant populo : Sed cum inde suum quisque ibant diversi domum, NuUusei-at illo pasto, ut illi jusserunt.* " I have often seen, that after the comic poets have said good " things, and that they have been applauded for them while they " taught good manners to the people, as soon as they were got " home, no body was the better for their advice." The other thing I observe is, that any defect as to the knowledge of the law- giver is so much the more considfiral)le than any other, that a re- gard to the law-giver is that which gives the formality of obedi- ence to any action, and therefore the less knowledge there is of him, the less of obedience, properly so called, there will be. Thus far we have cleared how little nature's light can do for enforcing obedience from the discoveries it makes of the law-giver. 2. A second head of motives to duty is present advantao'e. — Now if nature's light is able to prove, that obedience to the law of nature is like to turn to our present advantage, either as to profit or pleasure, this would be of weight : But it is needless to insist on this head ; for who sees not, that there is but little to be said as to many duties here ? Are they not to cross our present incli- nations ? And for any thing that nature's light can discover, dia- metrically opposite to our present interest and honor ; I mean ac- cording to the notions generally entertained of those things in the world ? So it is but little that it can say upon this head. How of- ten are we so situated, that in appearance nothing stands in our way to pleasure, honor or profit, but only the command ? It were easy to enlarge on this head ; but since it will not be readily con- troverted I wave it. And indeed it were of no consideration, if present losses were otherwise compensated by future advantages. 3. If nature's light can give a full view o( future rewards, then this will compensate present disadvantages, and be a strong in- ducement to obedience. But the discovery, if it is of any use, must be clear and lively, that it may affect and excite, as has been above observed. Well, what can nature's light do here ? Very lit- tle, as has been above fully dcmonstiated, when we discoursed of the chief end. It remains only now that we observe, that evils and disadvantages discouraging from duty are present, sensible, great, and so affect strongly ; wherefore, if future rewards have * Le Clerk Parrhosiana, page 52. 15 114 AN INaUIRY INTO THE not somewhat to balance these, they cannot have much influence* Now, it has been made sufScieutly evident, that all which nature's light has to put in the balance, to encourage the mind to go on in duty, against present, sensible, certain and great discouragements, is at most, but a darkj conjectural discovery of rewards, or rather suspicion about them, after time, without telling us what they are, or wherein they do consist. Will this ever prevail with men toi obey? No, it cannot. The prospect of future rewards was not that which prevailed with the most, moral amongst the Hea- thens of old. Their knowledge of these things, if they had any, was of little or no use or influence to them, as their excitement to virtue. 4. Nature's light is no less defective as to the discovery of pMn- ishments : For however the forebodings of guilty consciences, a dark tradition handed down from generation to generation, and Esome exemplary instances of divine severity, have kept some im- pressions of punishments on the minds of many in all ages ; yet it is well known, that those things were ridiculed by most of the philosophers ; the poets' fictions made them contemptible, and the daily instances of impunity of sinners here, weakened the impres- sions. Besides, evils that follow duty, and losses sustained, arc sensible, present, certain, known, and so affect strongly, and there- fore are not to be balanced by punishments, which are not, or ra- ther, at least, are rarely executed in time, and whereof there is little distinct evidence after time. For be it granted, that the justice and holiness of God render it incredible that so many trans- gressors as escape unpunished here, should get off so; yet certain it is, that nature's light can no way inform what punishment shall be inflicted. 5, Nature's light can never point us to examples which may have any influence. There are but few of those who wanted re- velation, even of the philosophers, who were not tainted with gross vices. We have strange stories told of a Socrates ; and 3-et after all, he was but a sorry example of virtue. He is fre- quently by Plato introduced swearing. He is known to have base- ly complied with the way of worship followed by his own coun- try, which was the more impious, that it is to be supposed to be against the persuasion of his conscience ; yea, we find him with his last brcTith, ordering his friend to sacrifice the cock he had vowed to Esculapius. M. Dacier's apology for him is perfectly impertinent. He is accused of impure amoure with Alcibiades, and of prostituting his wife's chastity for gain. It is evident that in the whole of his conduct, he shews but little regard to God. — Such are the examples we are to expect here. We must give full as bad account of \\\e famed Seneca, Avere it necessary to insist on this head, Hot to mention others of less consideration. PRINCIPLES OP THE MODERN DEISTS. 115 Now to conclude, how shall we by nature's light be prevailed on to obey, while it gives so unsatisfying discoveries of the law and law-giver ? Can shew so little of present or future advantage by obedience, or disadvantage by disobedience ? Nor can it offer any examples that are worth following. It is certain that the experience of the world justifies this ac- counts What means it, that instances of any thing like virtue are so rare where revelation obtains not ? Sure it must say one of two, if not both ; that either nature's light presents no inducements suf» ficient to influence practise, or that man is dreadfully corrupt : The Deists may choose which, or both, and let them avoid the conse- quences if they can. It had been easy to have said a great deal more on this head. The subject would have admitted of considerable enlargement ; but this my design will not allow. I intend to keep close to the argument, and run out no further than is of necessity for clearing the force of that. And where the case is plain, as I take it to be here, I content myself with touching at the heads which clear the truth under debate. CHAP. IX. Shewing the Importance of knowing the Origin of Sin to the World, and the Defectiveness of Nature's Light as to this. IT is not more clear that the Sun shines, than that the whole world lies in wickedness. The creation groans under the weight of this unwieldy load, which lies so heavy upon it, that it is the wonder ef all who have any right notions of the justice or holiness of God, that it is not sunk into nothing, or exquisite misery before now. The Heathens made bitter complaints of it. And indeed if their complaints had been left upon themselves, and had not been turned into accusations of the holy God, none could have wonder- ed at them, or condemned them. For it is manifest to any one who will not stop his ears, put out his eyes, stifle his conscience, forswear and abandon Ms reason, that the world' is full of sin ; what nation or place is free of idolatnes, blasphemies, the raging of pride, revenge, perjuries, rapes, adulteries, thefts, robberies, murders, and other abominable evils innumerable ? And who sees not, that all these are the effects of strong, prevailing, universal and contagious corruptions and depraved inclinations ; from a sh^e of which, no man can justly pretend himself free ? And if be should, any one who strictly observes his waj, may easily implead him, either cf gross ignorance or disingenuity. 116 AN INaUlHY INTO THE To know how things came to this pass with the world, and trace this evil to its fountain, is a business of great importance to reli- gion : Yea, of so much moment is it, that one can scarcely tell how any thing like religion is to be maintained in tlie world, with- out some competent knowledge of it. 1 . If this is not known, we can never make any right estimate of the evil of sin. If men were by their original constitution, without their own fault, made of so wicked or infirm a nature, as that either they were inclined to it, or unable to resist tempta- tions, amongst the throng of which they were placed, it is impos- sible for them to look upon sin as so detestable an evil as really it is ; or blame themselves so much for it, as yet they are bound to do. If it is quite otherwise, and man was originally upright, and fell not into this case, but by a fault justly chargeable on him, it is certain, that quite other apprehensions of sin should be main- tained. Now such as men's apprehensions are about the evil of sin, such will their care be to avoid it, prevent it, or get it re- moved. And who sees not, that the whole of religion is easily reduced to these things ? 2. If the origin of sin is not understood, man can never under- Etand what he is obliged to in the way of duty. If we derive this weakness, wickedness and depraved inclination from our first constitution, we can never look on ourselves as obliged to such an obedience, as the rectitude, holiness, and purity of the divine na- ture, seems to render necessary. And if we are uncertain as to this, we shall never know how far our duty extends. And if we know not what is required of us, how can we do it ? To say we are bound to obey as far as we can, is to speak nonsense, and what no way satisfies the difficulty : For this leaves us to judge of our own power, opens a door to man to interpret the law as he pleases, and charges God with such folly in the frame of the law, as we dare scarcely charge on any human law-giver. 3. Without the knowledge of the origin of sin, we can never know what measures to take, in subduing our corrupt inclinations. If we know not of what nature they are, how they come to be in- terwoven with our frame, and so much of a piece with ourselves, we shall not know v/here to begin attempts for reformation, or if it be practicable to eradicate them. Andi yet this must be done, otherwise we cannot with any shew of reason project happiness. But the rise of corruption being hid, we shall neither know what it is to be removed or where to begin our work, nor how far suc- cess to attempts of this kind may resaonably h,e hoped for. And cf how destructive consequence this is to all religion, is easily peen, 4. If the origin of sin is not known, we wiil.be at a loss what thoughts to entertain of God's holiness, J7isiice and goodness, yea PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 117 and his wisdom too. If our natures were originally burdened with those corrupt inclinations so twisted in with them, as now we find them ; or if we were so infirm, as not to be able to resist a throng of temptations, amons; which we were placed, we will scarcely be able to entertain such a high regard for God's holiness, goodness and wisdom in our make, or of his justice in dealing so by us.—' « And if we suppose otherwise, we will still be confounded by our darkness about any other way we can possibly think of, whereby tilings were brought to this puss, and mankind so universally pre- cipitated into so miserable a case. 5. If the origin of evil is not known, we shall never be able to j.udge what estimate God will make of sin, whether he will look oa it as so evil as to demerit any deep resentment, or otherwise. 6. Hereon it follows, that the whole state of our affairs with God, will be quite darkened and become unintelligible. We shall not know whether he shall animadvert so heavily on us for our sins, as to ruin us, or so slightly pass over them, as not to call us to an account. If the latter is supposed, obedience is mined ; consider- ing what man's inclinations and temptations are : who will obey, if no ruin or hurt is to be feared by sin ? If the former is supposed, cur hope is ruined. We shall not know what value God will put on our obedience, if this is not known ; whether he will not reject it for the sinful defects cleaving to it. Nor shall we know whether be will pardon us, or upon what terms, if we know not what thoughts he has of sin. And this we know not, nor can we possi- bly understand, unless we know how it came, and came to be so twisted in with our natures. Finally, hereon depends any tolerable account of the equity of God's proceedings^ at least of his goodness in dealing so with the world, subjecting it to such a train of miseries. If any thing of sin is chargeable justly upon man's make and first constitution, it will be much to clear his justice, but harder to acquit his goodness in plaguing the world so. If otherwise, it will be easy to justify God : but how then were men brought to this case ? Thus we have shortly hinted at those grounds that clear the im- portance of the case. An enlargement on them would have made the dullest understand, that without some satisfying account of the origin of evil, all religion is left loose. The judicious will easily see it. It now remains that we make appear the insufficiency of nature's light. To clear this point, it is evident if we consider, 1. That most of the wise men of the world have passed over this in silence, as a speculation too hard and high. The effects of it were so sensible, that they could not but notice them, as the Egyptians did the overflowing of their Nile. But when they would have traced these streams up to their source, they were forced to quit it as an unequal chace. The reason whereof is ingenuously, 118 AN INaUIRY INTO THE as well as solidly given by the judicious Dr. Stillingfleet : " The *' reason was, says he, as corruption increased in the world, so the " means of instruction and knowledge decayed ; and so as the phe- " nomena grew greater, the reason of them was less understood : " The knowledge of the history of the first ages of the world, *' through which they could alone come to the full understanding of " the true cause of evil, insensibly decajang in the several nations ; " insomuch that those who are not at all acquainted with that his- " tory of the world, which was preserved in sacred records among " the Jews, had nothing but their own uncertain conjectures to go " by, and some kind of obscure traditions, which were preserved " among them, which while they sought to rectify by their inter- " pretations, they made them more obscure and false than they « found them."* 2. Others who would needs appear more learned, but were re- ally less wise, offered accounts, or pretended to say somewhat, ra- ther to hide their own ignorance, than explain what they spoke of. So obscure are they, that nothing can be concluded from what they say, but that they were ignorant, and yet so disengenuous and proud that they would not own it. Among this sort Plato is reckoned, and with him Pythagoras, who tell us, " that the princi- " pie of good is unity, finity, quiescent, streight, even number, " square, right and splendid ; the principle of evil, binary, infinite, " crooked, uneven, long of one side, unequal, wrong, obscure. "f Plu- tarch as is noted by Dr. Stillingfleet, says, that the opinion of Pla- to is very obscure, it being his purpose to conceal it ; but he safth in his old age, in his book de Legibus, If }} 'uiviyfcu* vSi ^ f"* tfxv- T/Ain S'ti/tciupye)!- 3. Another, and perhaps the greater part, did plainly give the most absurd and ridiculous, not to say blasphemous accounts of this matter. Some pretending all the vitiosity inherent in mat- ter, which they supposed not created. The folly as well as wickedness of this opinion, is well laid open by the judicious per- son last quoted. This was what Plato aimed at, as Dr. Stilling- fleet clears from Numenius, a famous Syrian Platonic philosopher, who is thought to have lived in the second century, who giving an account of Pythagoras and Plato's opinions, says, Pythagoras ait, *' Existente providentia, mala quoque necessario substitisse prop- " terea quod sylva sit Sc eadem sit malitia pnedita : Platon&mqvt • Origines sacrx, lib. 3. cap. 3. sect. 8. t Origines, sacrx, ibid. sect. 11. PEINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 119 <* idem Nummvus lavdat, quod ditas mundi animas auhimnd ; un- " am beneficentissimam ; malignam alteram soil. Si/lvam. Igi- " tur juxta Plaionem mundo bona sua Dei, tanquam patris lib- " eralitate collata sunt ; mala vera matris sylva vitio coko- " rescunt"* The plain case is, they thought God and matter eter- nally co-existeut, and that vitiosity was inherent in matter, and that God could not mend it. To this purpose Maximus Tyrius, a Platonic philosopher, who lived in the second century, speaks, " That all the evils that are in the world, are not the works of art, " but the affections of matter."f Seneca says, " Non potest ar- *' tifex mutare materimn.^^X This way the Stoicks went. — Though they who have studied them, pretend that there was some difference betwixt Plato's opinion and theirs. They who would desire a more full account both of these opinions, and the absurdity and impiety of them, may have it from Dr. Stillingfleet, but a great many of the philosophers plainly maintained two anti- gods, the one good and the other evil. The Persians had their Oromasdes, to whom they ascribed all the good, and Arimanius, on whom they fathered all their evils. How many run this way, any one may learn from Plutarch's discourse of Isis and Osiris, and judge whether he himself was not of the same mind. What was it that drove those great men on such wild conceits, which are so absurd that they are not worth confuting ? Nothing else but their darkness about the rise of sin. And how dismal were the consequences of those notions and of this darkness ? What else drove so great a part of the world to that madness, to worship even the principle of evil I Was it not this, that they entertained per- verse notions about the origin of evils, both of sin and punish- ment ? 4. Not to insist on those absurd opinions, the latter accounts we have of this matter, by persons who reject the scriptures, after they have taken all the help from them they think meet though they are more polished, are not one whit more satisfactory. For clearing this we shall offer you the most considerable of this sort that have occurred to us. We shall begin with Siraplicius a Phrygian philo- sopher who lived in the fifth century, and was a great opposer of the scriptures. He in his commentary upon the 34th chapter of • " Although that there is a Providence, evils necessarily exist in the " world, because matter exists in it, which is naturally the cause of evil.— " And Numenius commends Plato who thought that there were two souls of " the world, the one most beneficent, and the other, viz. matter, malicious. " Therefore according to Plato, the good things that are in the world, are *' conferred on it as it were by the liberality of its father, but the bad things " that are in it, originate from the vitiosity of matter, which is its mother." t Max. Ter. Scr. 25. 4 €eneca de Provid. " The \Yorkman cannot change the nature of the mat- ** ter on wjbdch he works," 120 AN INQUmY INTO THE Epiotetus, speaks thus : " The soul of man is nexus utrimqut ** mundi, in the middle between those more excellent beings', « which remain abore (which he had taught to be incapable of ** sin) with which it partakes in the sublimity of its nature and ** understanding, and those inferior terrestrial beings, with which " it communicates through the vital union which it hath with the ** body, and by reason of that freedom and indifferency which it ** hath, it is sometimes assimilated to the one, sometimes to the ** other of those extremes. So that while it approacheth to the ** nature of the superior beings, it keeps itself free from evil ; ** but because of its freedom, it may sometimes sink down intd " those lower things, and so he calls the cause of evil in the soulj ** its voluntary descent into this lower world, and immersing itself " in the feculency of terrestrial matter," much more he adds ; but it all comes to this, " That because of the freedom of the will ^* of man, nothing else can be said to be the author of evil, but " the soul."* We have likewise an account from the Oracles of Reason much to the same purpose. A. W. a deist in a letter to Sir Charles Blount, answering an objection of Sir Charles Wolse- ley, against the sufficiency of natural religion, gives this account : This generally acknowledged lapse of nature, that it came, may be discovered by natural light ; how it came, is reasonable to conclude without revelation, namely, by a deviation from the right rule of reason implanted in us ; how he came to deviate from this rule, or lapse, proceeds from the nature of goodness^ originally given us by our Creator, which reason tells us to be an arbitrary state of goodness only ; therefore not a necessary goodness to which our natures were constrained. In short our fall proceeds from our not being able to reason rightly on every thing we act, and with such beings we were created : For all our actions are designed by us to some good which may arise to us ; but we do not always distinguish rightly of that good : we often mistake bomim apparens for the bonum reale. Der cipimur specie recti. The bonum jumndmn for want of right reasoning, is preferred to the bonum hovestnm ; and the bonum viciniim, though it be less in itself, often carries it before the bonum remotum, which is greater in its own nature. No man ever held that we could appetere malum qua malum ;f and therefore I wii! not grant him a total lapse in our natures from God. For 'we see many born with virtuous inclinations ; and ■ though all men at sometimes err, even the be&t, in their actions, it only shews that we were not created to a necessitated good- • Comment, in Epict. Cap. .34. f " An apparent g'ood for a real good. — We are deceived by the appearance of rectitude — A pleasing' g'ood is preferred to an honorable good, and a near to a distant one, but we cannot desire evil as svil.'' PRINCIPLES OP THE MODERN DEISTS. 121 « ness. It is enough to prove no fatal lapse, that many are prov- « ed, through the course of their lives, more prone to do. good " than evil, and that all men do evil, only for want of right rea- « fioning ; because the will necessarily follows the last dictate of " the understanding;.''! The next and last whom we shall men- tion, is the learned Herbert, whom the rest do but copy after. — Thus then he accounts for it : " Quod ad malum culpce spedaf, " hoc quidem non aliunde provenire, quern ah arhitrio illo omni- " bus iiisito, ingenitoque, quod tanquam bonum eximium Deus " optimus maximus nobis largitus est ; ex quo etiam a belluis " magis quam ipso intellcdu distinguimur : quum tamen ades " ancipitis sit naturce, ut in utramque partem fiedi possit sit ut *' in malum scepe propendeat Sc dilabatur ; caterum per se est be- " nejxcium plane divinum, ejusque ampliludJnis Sc pvcestantioi, ut " citra illud, neque boni esse possemu^ : ecquis enim boni ali- *' quid efficere dicitur, nisi quando in adversam partem datur op- " tio ? Hinc igitnr malum culpa accidere, quod nohilissima " animts facnltas, in nequiorem sua sponte partem^ nulloque co- •' gente traducatur detorqueaturque.^^ These three accounts, in several respects, run the same way. It were easy however to set them by the ears in some considera- ble particulars, and perhaps to shew the inconsistency of the se- veral authors with themselves, on these heads : but this is not my design to spend time on things, whereby truth will not gain much : as, perhaps, they contain the sum of what reason can say on the head, so v^'e shall now show how very far they are from satisfying in the case. The substance of them may be re- duced to these three propositions : 1 . That Man's body sways the soul, to which it is joined, to things suitable to itself, which are evil. This Simplicius more than insinuates. 2. That as reason is the guide of the will, which necessarily follows its last dictate ; so the will's inclination to evil flows from our not being able to reason rightly. This the Oracles of Rea- son give plainly as a response in the words now quoted. t Oracles of Rcison, pag. 197. • De Religione Gentilium, Cap. 13, pag". 164.—" With regard to the evil " of sin, this arises from no other source than our naturaV freedom of will, " which God the best and greatest has bestowed on us as a distinguished " blessing, and by which we are distinguished from the brutes even more " than by reason itself. But as this blessing is of so ambiguons a kind, that " it may be turned either way, it happens that it often inclines to evil and " goes astray. Yet, in itself it is certainly a divine blessing, and of such .in " extent and excellency, that without it we could not be good. For who is " ever paid to do good, unless when he had it in his choice to act in a difter- " ent manner ? The evil of sin therefore proceeds from hence, that the most '• noble faculty of the soul, of its own accord, and without any one forcing " it, is drawn away and turned to the wrong side." 16 122 AN INaUIRY INTO THE 3. The will is ancipitis naturee,'^ perfectly indifferent, equallj capable of, and swayed to evil and good. This all the three concur in. It is like a nice balance which stands even, but is easily swayed to either side. But now it is easy to multiply difficulties against this account, and show how it no way clears, but rather involves the matter more. And, 1 . I would desire to know whether that inferior part, the body, or terrestrial part of man, call it which you will, sways to any thing, not suited to its original frame and perfection, or not ? If it aims at nothing, bends or inclines to nothing, but what is per- fective of itself, I desire to know how that can be faulty ? How can this body be made a part of a composition, wherein it is faulty for it to aim at what is truly perfective of its nature ? How can it be criminal for the soul to aim at ennobling and satisfying the ca- pacities of that, which is so nearly united to itself ? How is it consistent with the wisdom of God, to unite two beings, the one whereof cannot reach its own perfection without hurt to the other ? If it is said, that it inclines to what contributes not to its own perfection ; then I desire to know how it came to be so de- praved as to have a tendency to its own detriment ? How was it consistent with the wisdom of God to make it so ? How was it consistent with the goodness of Qod to associate it when so made, with another more noble being to which it must prove a burden ; yea, which must sway to that, which proves the ruin of the whole composition ? And how can man be blamed for doing that, to which his nature inevitably must carry him ? For if he is thus compounded, his body, earthly part, or lower faculties sway to evil ; his will is equally inclinable to both ; and, in this case, how can the composition be otherwise, than depraved ? For my part I see not how it could be otherwise ; or how God can just- ly punish it for being so, upon the supposition laid down. 2. If it be asserted that Me are not, by our original constitution able to reason rightly, in what concerns our own duty, as we have heard from the Oracles of Reason ; then I desire to know if we are not necessitated by our very make and constitution to err ? If we are to believe, what the same Oracle utters, that the will must follow neccssaiily the understanding ; then I desire to know, if we are not necessitated to sin ? If things are thus and thus, we must either believe them to be, or believe that this Oracle gives a false response ; then I desire to know, how God could make us ne- cessarily evil ? How can he punish us for it ? Can this be recon- ciled with the rest of this doctrine, about the arbitrary state of man's goodness ? I might ask not a few other queries, but per- haps these will suffice. * Of a doubtful nature. PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 123 3. If the will be, in its own nature, perfectly free and indiffer- ent, then I desire to know, whether there is any thing in that com- position, whereof it is a part, or to which it is joined, or any thing in the circumstances wherein man is placed, swaying it to the worst side ? If there is any thing either in man's constitution or circumstances, swaying him wrong ; then I desire to know, is there any thing to balance them ? Whether there is or is not any thing to keep him even ? I would desire to know how any thing came to be in his constitution, to sway him wrong ? If there is any thing to balance these inducements to sin, or inclina- tions, then man is perfectly indifferent still ; and about this we ghall speak anon. If there is a will, equally capable of good and evil, and man has somewhat in his constitution or circumstances, at least swaying him to evil, then I desire to know how it was posisible for him to evite it ? If he has nothing determining him more to evil than to good, or if any thing that inclines to evil ie balanced, by other things of no less force determining and sway- ing him to good, then many things may be enquired : how comes it to pass, that though man is equally inclinable to good or evil, that almost all men choose evil ? Yea, I need not put an almost to it. It is a strange thing to supppose all men equally disposed to good or evil, and yet none choose the good. 4. I do not know how this notion of man's liberty, which is easily granted to be in itself, if the notion of it is rightly stated, a perfection, will take with considerate men, that it consists in a. perfect indifferency to good or evil ; for if this is a necessary per- fection of the rational nature, without which it cannot be called good, as Herbert clearly asserts, in his words above quoted ; then I ask, what shall become of those natures unalterably good, of which Simplicius talks ? Is it absurd to suppose, that there may be such ? Are they, if they be, less perfect, because in- capable of that which debases and depraves them ? Is God good, who has beyond dispute no such liberty as this ? Is an in- differency to commit sin or not to sin, a great perfection ? If it be, is it greater than not to be capable of sinning ? They may embrace this notion of liberty who will, and fancy themselves perfect, I •hall not for this, reckon them so. 5. This account of man as equally inclined to good or evil, is cither an account of man's case as he now is, or as at first made : If man is now otherwise, to wit, inclined more to evil than to good, how came he to be so ? This is the difficulty we desire to be satisfied about. If this be the case he was made in, and still continues in, then, I say, it is utterly false, and contradictory to the cars, eyes and conscience of all the Avorld. "Who sees not that man is plainly, strongly, and I may add universally, inclined to evil ? The wiser heathens have owned it. And it is plainly 124 AN INQUIRY INTO THE made out against the most impudent denier. Hieroclis' words, as I find them translated by an excellent person, are memorable to this purpose. " Man, says he, is of his own motion, inclined " to follow the evil and leave the good. There is a certain strife " bred in his affections ; he hath a free will which he abuseth, " binding himself wholly to encounter the laws of God. And *' this freedom itself is nothing else, but a willingness to admit *' that which is not good, rather than otherwise."* This is a true state of the matter from a heathen. 6. The supposition of man's being made perfectly indifferent is injurious to God, who cannot be supposed, without reflection on him, to have put man in such a case. The least that can be said, preserving the honor due to the divine excellencies, is that God gave a law to man, suitable to the rectitude of his own nature and to man's happiness and perfection ; that he endued him with an ability to know this law, the obligations he lay under to obey it, and the inducements that might have fortified him in his obedi- ence against the force of any temptation which he might meet with. If this be not asserted, it will not be possible to keep God from blame, which all that oAvn him, are concerned to take care of : for how could he bind man to obey a law, which he did not make known to him, or at least gave him a power to know ? If he laid him open to temptations, and made him incapable of dis- covering what might antidote their force, if he m ould use it, what shall we think of his goodness ? Further, we must own that the will of man was made inclinable, though not immutably so, to its own perfection : how else was it worthy of its author ? Finally, we must own that man had no affection or inclination in him, that was really contradictory to that law which he was subjected to, and Avhich tended to his happiness and perfection. If this is de- nied, then I ask, were not these inclinations sinful ? Was that being worthy of God, that had no tendency to its own perfection ? But on the contrary, v\'^hat was inclinable to its own ruin ? 7. This being the least, that can without manifest reproach to the wisdom, goodness and justice of the Creator, be supposed in favor of man's original constitution ; I desire to know, is this the case still or is it not ? If it is not, then how came it to be other- wise ? How comes man really to be worse now, than at first T How is this consistent with the deist's principles, that there is no lapse ? If it be asserted, we are in the same state still, how then comes all the world to be full of wickedness ? How is this reconciieahle with the experiences and consciences of men, that assurer! them of the contrary ? 8. If it be thought enough to resolve all this, as to actual fallings, * Hieroclis Carmin. Aur. Transl. Reas. of Script, Belief, png'. 146. PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 125 Into the choice of man ; yet what shall we say as to tliat darkness as to duty, which we heard the Deists confessing, in their Oracles of Reason ? How came that inability to reason rightly, which we have before demonstrated man under, and which our adversaries will own ! Again, how come we to have vicious inclinations so strongly rooted in our natures ! Strong they are ; for they trample upon our light, the penalties of laws divine and human ; yea and the smartings of our own conscience. The drunkard and unclean per- son finds his health ruined, and yet in spite of all this, his inclina- tion makes him run on in the vice that has ruined him : and the like is evident in other cases innumerable. Deeply rooted they are ; They are some way twisted in with the constitutions of our body, and no less fixed in our souls. So fixed they are, that, though our own reason condemns them, it cannot remove them. Though sometimes fear restrains them as to the outward acts ; yet it can- not eradicate the inclination. Instruction and all human endeavors cannot do it. The famed Seneca that understood so much, who un- dertook to teach others, and perhaps has spoken and writ better than most of the Heathens ; yet by all his knowledge and all his endea- vors, owns this corruption so deeply rooted in himself, that he ex- pected not to get rid of it. Non jjerveni ad sanitatem, ne perveniam quidem : delinimentia magis qnam remedia podagrce, mece compono contentus si rarius accedat, <§• si minus ierminatur.* 9. Not only so, but further, how come these inclinations to be born with us? Togrowupwith us? That they a»e so, is evident. We no sooner begin to act than to act perversely. We no sooner shew any inclinations, than we shew that our inclinations are evil. Yea, among Christians, where there are many virtuous persons, who give the best example, the best instruction, and use the best discipline for the education of their children in virtue, yet we see the children discover inclinations so strong, as are not to be restrained by all these endeavors, much less eradicated : and so early are they there, that they cannot be prevented by the most timeous care. 10. It will not help the matter to tell us, that there are some born with virtuous inclinations. Fori. If all are not so, the difficulty remains. How came these to be born otherwise, of whom we have been speaking ! How came their frame to be different from, nay, and worse than that of others ! Are they under the same law ? If so, why have they more impediments, and less power of obedi- ence ? 2. We would be glad to see the persons condescended on, that are void of vicious inclinations, that we might ask them some questions. You say you are born with virtuous inclinations. Well, but have you no ill inclinations ? If you are no drunkard, adulterer, „ * ". ^ ^^ ""* '^"'"^ ^" ^ noiind state, nor shall I ever arrive at it. I am com- posing palliatives rather than remedies for my g-out, being content if it at- tacks mo more seldom, .ind proves less violent." 126 AN maUIRY INTO THE &c. yet have you no inclination to pride, prodigality, neglect of God, covetousness, or somewhat like ? I fear the man that can an- swer plainly in the negative here, will not be easily found. And till we see him, we deny there is any such. 3. To confirm this, several persons, whom the world has looked on as virtuously inclined from their infancy, have, when seriously acquainted with Christian- ity, owned that they were as wickedly inclined as others ; only by the help of their constitution, they were not so much prompted to those evils, which are most observed and condemned in the world. And this account has been given by persons of judgment, whose capacity, nor ingenuity cannot reasonably be questioned. Finally, the ground whereon A. W. pronounces against an universal lapse, viz. That we cannot appetere malum qua malumy* is ridiculous : For this is a thing perfectly inconsistent, not only with the due ex- ercise, but the very nature of our rational faculties : And if not- withstanding this impossibility of any man's desiring evil as evil, so many are deeply corrupted, no imaginable reason can be assigned, why all men may not be so, without supposing that we can appetere malum qua malum. To conclude then, it is upon the whole evident, that reason can never trace this matter to its proper source. Our consciences condemn us indeed, and so acquit the Deity. But without reve- lation we can never understand upon what grounds we are con- demned by ourselves, nor how the Deity is to be justified ; and so this sentence of our consciences involves the matter more, and in- creases the difficulty. It is not from any distinct view of the par- ticular way how we come to be guilty, and how God comes to be free of blame, that conscience is led to this sentence. And there- fore, how to come to any satisfaction about the matter, that may liberate us from the inconveniences above mentioned, which are really subversive of all religion, and can reasonably be supposed available to us, reason can never satisfy us. Since these gentlemen, with whom we have to do, find it their interest to deny any lapse, I shall, to what has been said, add a short, but judicious and solid confirmation of this, from a person of a more than ordinary reach, I mean Dr. How : who, after he has quoted many testimonies from Heathen authors, proving this lapse, reasons for it, and confirms it further from arguments not easily to be answered : His words run thus, " If we consider, can it be so " much as imaginable to us, that the present state of man is his " primitive state, or that he is now such as he was at first made ? *' For neither is it conceivable, that the blessed God should have " made a creature with an aversion to the only important ends, « whereof it is naturally capable : Or particularly that he created • Desire evil as evil. PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 127 " man, with a disaffection to himself; or, that ever he at first, de- « signed a being of so high excellency, as the spirit of man to « trudge so meanly, and be so basely servile to terrene inclinations ; « or, since there are manifestly powers in him, of a superior and " inferior sort and order, the meaner should have been by original " institution framed to command ; and the more noble and excel- ** lent, only to obey and serve ; as every one that observes, may " see the common case with man is. " And how far he is swerved from what he was, is easily con- •' jecturable by comparing him with the measures, which shew " what he should be. For it cannot be conceived for what end " laws were ever given him ; if at least we allow them not to be " the measures of his primitive capacity, or deny him ever to " have been in a possibility to obey. Could they be intended for " his government if conformity to them were against or above his " nature ? Or were they only for his condemnation ? Or for what, " if he was never capable of obeying them ? How inconsistent were " it with the goodness of the blessed God, that the condemnation " of his creatures should be the first design of his giving them " laws .' 'And with his justice, to make his laws the rule of punish- ** ment, to whom they could never be the rule of obedience and <' duty ! Or with his wisdom, to frame a system and body of laws, " that should never serve for either purpose ! And so be upon the " whole useful for nothing. The common reason of mankind " teacheth us to estimate the wisdom and equity of law-givers, by *• the suitableness of their constitutions to the genius and temper " of the people for whom they are made ; and we commonly " reckon nothing can more slur and expose a government, than the " imposing of constitutions, most probably impracticable, and " which are never likely to obtain. How much more incongruous " must it be esteemed to enjoin such as never possibly could ! " Prudent legislators, and studious of the common good, would be " shy to impose upon men, under their power, against their ge- " nius and common usages, neither easily alterable, nor to any ad* " vantage ; much more absurd were it, with great solemnity, and " weighty sanctions, to enact statutes for bnite creatures : and " wherein were it more to purpose, to prescribe unto men strict " rules of piety and virtue, than to beasts or trees, if the former ' " had not been capable of observing them, as the latter were not."* I believe the Deists will not easily overthrow this nervous dis- course. I)r. How's Living Temple, Part 2, page 121, 122. 128 AN maUIRY INTO THE CHAP. X. Proving Nature's Light unable to discover the Means of obtain- ing Pardon of Sin, or to sheiv that it is attainable. THAT all have sinned is sufficiently clear from the foregoing discourse. That it is of importance to understand the rise of sin, and that nature's light is unable to trace its original, has been like- wise evinced. But all this were indeed of less consideration, if nature's light could assure us of pardon, or direct as to the means wherebj' it may be obtained. But here it is no less defective, than as to the former. That we are all guilty of sin even the deists do acknowledge ; the Oracles of Reason own that all men at some- times err, even the best, in their actions. And the evidence of it is such, that none can get over the truth, if he is not plainly r&- solved to deny what is most evident. Now this being the case, that we have all transgressed, it is of the highest importance to know whether God will pardon us, or upon what terms he will do it ? If he punish us, what a case are we in ? How can they who fear punishment expect rcAvards ! But because this is a difficulty of no small importance, and the Deists, since they see they cannot clear it, make their business to obscure the importance of the case, and render it more involved ; we shall, therefore, 1. State the case, and clear the importance of it. 2. Discover the weakness of nature's light about it. S. Speak fully to a particular exception about repentance. Sect. I. Wherein the Importance of the Difficnlfji/ is stated. If the Deists should allow sin to be so great an evil, as we pre- tend it is, it would exceedingly embarrass them ; therefore they labour to smooth the matter by telling us, that either it is no evil, or one of not ^o great consideration, as is commonly imagined : but the wildness and unreasonableness of this attempt will be easily shewn, by a consideration of the evil of sin. It is not my design to write largely on this head, but only to condescend on a few of those considerations, whereon we insist for proving sin to be ex- ceeding sinful : which, although they are built on rational grounds, yet we are led to them by the assistance of revealed light. 1 . Sin is a transgression of a km; the highest law, the law of the supreme and righteous Governor of the world. Where there is no larv, there is no transgression. And such as the law is, sucIj is the transgression. There is no more just \\-9y of measuring the PRINCIPLES OP THE MODERN DEISTS. 129 tvil of sin, than by considering the law it violates. The law bears the impress of the highest authority, that of the Supreme Ruler of the Universe. Every transgression must therefore import, if not a contempt, yet certainly a want of due regard to this author- ity, which, how criminal it is in man, who is as to being, preserva- tion and well-being, every way dependent, is easily understood. — Moreover, this law is not a mere arbitrary appointment, but such as is the necessary result of the nature of God and man ; and therefore the violation of it, imports no less, than an accusation of the rectitude of God's nature, whence the law results ; and charges unsuitableness thereto, upon the nature of man, as being so made, that, without wrong to itself, it cannot be subject to the rule of God's government. And who sees not how deeply this re- flects on God ? 2. Sin contradicts the great design of man's being. God made us, and not we ourselves. It is blasphemy to alledge, that infinite wisdom made so noble a creature as man without design. Nor can it reasonably be pretended, that the chief aim of God in making him was any other, than his having the self-satisfaction of having acted as became him, and having made a work every way worthy of his wisdom and holiness. And since man also Avas capable of proposing designs, it is foolish to imagine, that God either could or would allow him to make any other his chief end than the plea- sure of God ; or acting so as to make it appear that he was every way worthy of his Author. But when man sins he plainly coun- teracts what God designed, and he was obliged to design ; for he pleases not God, but himself, and this is doing what in him lies to frustrate God of the design he had in his work, and debase the being and powers given him for the honor of God by employing them against him, and using them in contradiction to his declared will. 3. Sin misrepresents God. The works of God bear an impress of God's wisdom and power. Man only was made capable of repre- senting his moral perfections, his holiness, justice, truth, and the like. But when he sins, he not only fails of his duty, but really misrepresents God his maker, as one who approves sin, that is di- rectly cross to his will, Avhich is ever congruous to the holiness of his nature ; or, at least, as one, who either wants will or power to crush the contravener; and so he is represented either as unholy, or impotent; or one, who can tamely allow his will to be counter- acted by a creature that he has made and sustains. But what hor- rid reflections are these on the holy God ? 4. Sin accuses God of want of wisdom and goodness in appoint- ing laws which were not for his creature's good, and he could not obey without detriment ; of envy, in barring the creature by a law, from that which is necessary to his happiness ; of insufficiency, to 17 V30 AN INQUIRY INTO THE satisfy the creature he has made, while he is obliged to seek for that elsewhere, which is not to be found in him, in the way of obe- dience ; and of folly, in making such a law, as cannot be expected to be obeyed, in regard the creature subjected to it, gains more by breaking than by keeping of it. Finally, to crown all, sin dethrones God, and sets the creature in his room. l^he honor of God's law and authority, and the sinner's good, are wickedly supposed to be inconsistent, and tlie latter is preferred. The will of the Creator and creature cross one another, and the creature's will is preferred. The friendship, favour, and sufficiency of Deity is laid in balance against some other imaginary good, and decision is given against God. These are a few of the many evils of sin. They are not strained ones. This is not a rhetorical declamation against sin, wherein things are unjustly aggravated to raise odium against it ; but a plain account of a few of the evils of it, which yet is infinitely short of w^hat the case would admit. But who can fully represent the evil that strikes against infinite goodness, holiness, justice, wisdom, and sjipreme authority ? Who can unfold its aggravations; save he who knows what God is, and what he is to man, and what man is, and how many ways he is dependent on, subject, obliged and indebted to God ? Well therefore may sin be said to have an infinity of evil in it. The Deists, to evade the difficulties arising from this evil of sin, take different courses. Some plainly deny any such thing as evil, or that there is any thing morally good or bad. Thomas Aiken- head, who Avas executed at Edinburgh, Januarys, 1697, for his blasphemies, in his paper he delivered from the scaffold, tells us what his thoughts were in this matter, and upon what grounds they were built. When in his rational inquiries he came to consider, whether vre were capable of offending God, he tells us, " That " after much pondering and serious consideration, he concluded " the negative." The famed Mr. Hobbs was not of a very differ- ent mind, for he plainly asserts, " That there is nothing good or *' evil in itself, nor any common laws constituting what is naturally " just or unjust : but all things are to be measured by what every " man judgeth fit, where there is no civil government ; and by the " laws of society, where there is one." And elsewhere, " Before " men entered into a state of civil government, there was not any " thing just or unjust, forasmuch as just and unjust are the rela- " tlves of human laws ; every action being in Itself indifferent." And whether Spinoza was not of the same mind, is left to those to judge, who have time and leisure to trace his meaning, in his ob- scure and designedly involved way of writing. But surely this proposition in his Atheistical ethicks looks very like it : " Si ho- " mines liberi nascerentur (liber aukm est juxta Spinozam, q\ii PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 131 « secundum dudum'vel ex ductu rationis agit) nullum boni ^ mail « formarent conceptum, quamdiu liberi essent"* Mr. Hobbs has been learnedly confuted by many, such as Dr. Cumberland, Mr. Tyrell, and almost all who write of the law of nature. Spi- noza has likewise been examined by Wittichius and many others. The first, viz. Thomas Aikenhead, his grounds I shall purpose and examine. The first in his own words runs thus, " I thought, says he, a " great part of morality, if not all, proceeded ex arbiirio homi- " num,-f as of that of a kingdom, or commonwealth, or what most *' men think convenient for such and such ends, and these ends *' are always terminated upon being congruous to the nature of " things ; now we see that according to men's fancies, things are ** congruous or incongruous to their natures, if not to the body, *' yet to the thinking faculty." The sum of this confused discourse, which probably he learned from Hobbs, amounts to this : God has fixed no law to our moral actions, by which they are to be regulated. These which are called moral laws, are only the determinations of governments, or the concurring judgment of men, concerning what they think meet to be done for their own ends. That which some judge meet and congruous, others may find unsuitable to their nature and ends, and so are not obliged to obey. But 1. Are not all these ungrounded assertions, whereof no proof is offered, but the author's deluded fancy ? Has it not been irrefragably demonstrated by as many as discourse of moral good and evil, that antecedently to any government among men, we are under a law, the law of nature, and that this is the will of God. 2. If all these had kept silence, does not the thing itself speak ? What can be more evi- dent, than that there is a law of nature, and that this is the law of God ? We are certain, that we are made of rational natures, capa- ble of laws and government. We are no less sure that God made us, and made us so. It is self-evident, that to him who made us, it belongs to govern, and dispose of us to those ends for which we were made. And we by our very beings are bound to obey, sub- mit, and subject ourselves to his will and pleasure, who made us and on whom we every way depend, and therefore his will, if he make it known, is a law, and the highest law to us. Again, it is clear that this reason, if we attend to it, tells us that some things are to be done, and ^me things left undone ; such as these, that we are to serve, love, obey and honor him that made us, upholds us, and on whom we every way depend ; that we are to carry to- • " If men were bom free (and he is free according to Spinoza, who acts " according to the gaiidance of reason) they would form no conception of " good or evil, as long as they were free." t " From the will of man." 133 AN INaUIRY INTO THE ward our fellow-creatures, as it becomes those, who have the same original with us, who are subjected to Ihe same rule, are obliged to pursue the same ends ; and that we are to dispose o four- selves as the author of our nature allows us. These are all, if not self-evident, yet next to it, and easily deducible from principles that are so. Further, the reason that is implanted in us by God, tells us so, we are to take what it leads us to, while duly used, as the will of God, and so a law to us. " For whatever judgment " God makes a man with, concerning either himself, or other " things, it is God's judgment, and whatever is his judgment is a " law to man ; nor can he neglect or oppose it without sin, being " in his existence made with a necessary subjection to God. Such " and such dictates being the natural operations of our minds, the *' being and essential constitution of which, in right reasoning, we " owe to God ; we cannot but esteem them the voice of God " within us, and consequently his law to us."* What he tells us of men's different apprehensions, about what is right or wrong makes nothing to the purpose. That only shews that in many instances we are in the dark as to what is good and evil, which is granted ; but will not infer that there is no fixed measure of good and evil. In many general truths, all who apply themselves to think, understand the terms, and have the truths proposed, do agree. And perhaps, all that is knowable of our du- ty by the light of nature, is deducible from such principles of morality, as all rational men who have them fairly proposed to them, must assent to. And deductions from laws, when duly made, are of equal authority with the principles from which they are inferred. And finally, when men, in pursuance of their per- verse natures, follow what is cross to those dictates of reason, they are condemned by their consciences, which shews them under the obligation of a law, and that acting in a congruity to their natures as corrupt, is not the standard they are obliged to walk by, since their own reason checks them for doing it. They who would de- sire to liave this matter fully discoursed, may read others who have done it designedly, of whom there is great plenty. His second reason runs thus : " Also, we do not know what is " good or evil in itself, if not thus ; whatsoever can be attributed " to God, that is good ; and M'hat cannot, is evil. And we know " not what can be attributed to God, but such things as by a de- " duction we ascribe to him, we call perfect,^ and such as we deny " to be in him, we call imperfect, and so we must ignorantly com- " mit a circle. There is no other notion of things in themselves " good or evil." Sir Charles Wolseley's Scripture Belief, page 32, 33- PRINCIPLES OF THE iMODERN DEISTS. 133 It is much harder to find the sense of these words, if they have any, than to answer the argument. The design of it is to prove that there is no standard whereby we may judge what is good ant! what is evil. The force of the argument amounts to this, that there is no way how we come to know any thing to be good, but by this, that it may be ascribed to God. But we cannot know whether it is to be ascribed to God, unless we know that it is per- fect or good. This is thin sophistry, which I might easily expose, were it to any purpose to discover the weakness of that, which its author was ashamed of and disowned. As to the first proposition, " that there is no other way to know whether any thing be good or evil, hut this, that it can or cannot be ascribed to God." 1. The com- plex proposition is false ; for there are other ways whereby we may know things to be good or evil. And this holds whether we take it in a physfcal or moral sense. We know that to be morally good which God enjoins us to do. We know the will of God in some instances, from the nature God has given us ; and from these instances our reason can infer others. As to physical good, we know things to be good or perfect, by acquaintance with the nature of things, and by the self-evident notions of perfection : for there are some things, such as dependence, subjection, and the like, which without any reasoning about the matter, we understand to be imperfect or perfect. As soon as we understand the terms, and know that a perfection is that which it is better for any being to have than to want : and then what these particular words, depen- dence, subjection, &c. signify. This alone overthrows his whole argument. 2. The maxim which he fixes as a standard, that it is good which may be ascribed to God, and that is not good which may not be ascribed to him ; if it is taken in its full extent, it is false as to moral good, of which the only question is : for it is cer- tain, that it is good for man to be a dependent, a subject, &c. which cannot be ascribed to God. If it is taken in a physical sense, it is not to the purpose ; and besides, it would even in this sense need some caution. As to his other proposition, " That Me cannot otherwise know what is to be ascribed to God, than by knowing that it is good or perfect," it can scarcely be supposed to speak of good in a moral sense ; and in any other sense it is impertinent. If it is under- stood in a moral sense it is likewise false, fur we may know that things which are not in their own nature moral perfections, belonsj to Got!, such as power, omnipresence, &c. If it be understood in any other sense, we have nothing to do with it. The next head that he adds is, " That all men will confess that " any thing may be morally evil and good also, and consequently " any thing decent or indecent, moral or immnral. Neither^ 134 AN INQUIRY INTO THE *' though there were things in themselves evil, (if we do not ap- " prehend other things instead of them) can we have any inclina*- " tion thereunto ? Otherwise the will could wish evil." But 1. Who will grant him (in any other sense that will be subservient to his purpose) that all actions are indifferent ? I know none but men of his own principles. 2. As for what he pre- tends, that we cannot incline to that which is in its own nature evil, unless it be under the notion of good, I see not what this says for him ; it is enough that we can do that action which is evil and prohibited, yea, and which we know is prohibited, to con' stitute sin and make the sinner deeply guilty. But not to insist any further on this inconsiderable trifler, whose undigested notions scarce deserve the consideration we have given them ; and much less did they become the awful gravity of the place where they were delivered. There are others of the deists who think it not safe to venture thus far : because in effect thi« overthrows all religion and establishes plain atheism : yet they may mince the matter and lessen sin as much as they can. Herbert goes this way, telling us the sinner's excuse, that *' 1 . " Homines simt natura sua fragiles peccatoque obnoxii. 2. *' Peccata hominum non tarn in Dei contumeliam, quam in pro- " priam utilitalem, sub boni alicujus apparentis obtentu fieri ple- " rumque ; ac licet in eo homines fallerentuTi nihil tamen infen- *' so in Deum animo patratum esse.'^^ That is, " Men are by " nature frail and liable to sin : and they do not sin out of con- " tempt of God, but for their own profit, while sin appears un- " der the shew of good. And although in this men are deceiv-* " ed, yet there is nothing done with any ill design against God." A. W. in his letter to Charles Blount, pleads, " That though " the offence is committed against an infinite being, we are but " finite creatures, who commit sin."f But now, as to the first of these reasons and excuses, I fear, if it plead any thing, it casts the fault over on God. Are we to ex- cuse ourselves from our frailty ? Well, either we are made so frail that we are not able to obey, or we are not ; if we are able to obey, then where is the excuse when God requires no more of us than he gave us power to perform ? If we are not able, then how came God to subject us to a law we were not able to obey ? If we have rendered ourselves unable, is not this our fault ? As to the second, " that w^e do not sin out of contempt of the Deity, but for our own advantage." I answer, 1. The princi- ple that the sinner goes on, according to this apology made for him, viz. I'hat the thing he does, though it crosses the law of God, yet makes for his own advantage, is highly injurious to, and • De Relig'. Gentilium, Cap. 5. page 199. 7 Oracles of Reason. PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 135 Wasphemous against God : for it supposes that God has barred man from what contributes to his happiness, and supposes that more advantage is to be had by disobedience, which is a high ag- gravation of the fault, 2, I will not grant him, that there is no opposition in the heart to God. What though there be not plain, declared, direct and open hostility ; yet there is an alienation of affection, aversion from converse with, and a neglect of God to be found with all in more or less, of which their actions are a suffi- cient proof. As to the third, " that an offence, though against an infinite God, is lessened by the consideration of the sinner's being finite :" I answer, 1. This excuse pleads for all sin alike : for let the sin- ner sin never so deeply, yet he is finite still. 2. If this be well considered, it is perfectly ridiculous : for the measure of sin, its greatness is not to be taken this way, but the contrary ; for provided the object against whom it is committed is infinite, the meaner the person is that commits it, the greater still is the fault. But in very deed, all these attempts to extenuate sin, as they are useless to sinners, who are not judged by man, but God, and not to be dealt with according to the estimate he makes, but that which God makes of sin ; so likewise they smell rank of the want of a due regard for the honor of the Deity, and are of the worst consequences to the world, since they tend to encourage sin, open a door to impiety, and embolden sinners to go on in courses they too much incline to. Besides, such excuses for sin do but ill become persons who make such an horrible out-cry against the doctrine of satisfaction upon all occasions, as having a tendency to make forgiveness cheap in sinner's eyes, and to em- bolden men to sin without fear. May not the charge be here re- torted ? Who gives the greatest encouragement to sin, he that asserts the necessity of a satisfaction, or he who extenuates sin to that degree as to encourage the sinner to hope he may get off without a satisfaction ? I shall, to what has been said, subjoin a few words from a late discourse. If the quotation seem long, the excellency of it will easily excuse it ; besides, it is so full to the purpose, and leads so directly to that which is the design of what has hitherto been said. " Furthermore, it is to be consid- " ered, that the rights of the divine government ; the quality and " measures of offences committed against it ; and when or upon " what terms they may be remitted ; or in what case it may be '^ congruous to the dignity of that government, to recede from such *< rights, are matters of so high a nature, that it becomes us to be " very sparing in making any estimate about them, especially a " diminishing one. Even among men, how sacred things are ma- " jcsty and the rights of government ? And how much above the 235 AN INQUIRY INTO THE " reach of a vulvar jiidprment ? Suppose a company of pea- " saiits that understand little more than what is within the com- " pass of their mattock, plough and shovel, should take upon " them to judge of the ri2;hts of their prince, and make an esti- " mate of the measure of ofieiices, committed against the majes- *' ty and dignity of government, how competent judges would we " think them ? And will we not acknowledge the most refined *' human ni:derstanding as incompetent to judge of the rights of " the divine government ? Or measure the injuriousness of the " offence done against it, as the meanest peasant to make an esti- " mate of these matters in a human government ? If only the " reputation be wronged of a person of a better quality, how " strictly is it insisted on, to have the matter tried by his peers, " or persons of an equal rank, such as are capable of understand- " ing honour and reputation ! How would it be resented, that " an affront put upon a nobleman, should be commited to the judg- " ment of smiths and coblers, especially if they were participes " criminis,^ and as well parties as judges ? " When the repraliaf of the great Ruler and Lord of heaven " and earth are invaded, his temple violated, his presence de- *' spised, his image torn down thence and defaced : Who among " the sons of men are either great, or knowing, or innocent enough " to judge of the offence and wrong ? Or how fit it is, that it be " remitted without recompence ? Or what recompence would be " proportionable ? How supposable is it, that there may be con- *' gruities in this matter, obvious to the divine understanding, " which infinitely exceed the measure of ours. "J From what has been said, it is easy to understand the import- ance cf the case. All mankind are involved in sin, lie under this dreadful guilt, and that not in one, but in many instances. Now if they are not sure that it may be removed, and know not in what way this is to be done ; they must either not take up the case, or they must be under continual disquietments, dread the issue, and fear divine resentments. They can never expect any re- ward for obedience, and consequently they must languish in it, and so all religion that can be available is lost. Sect. II. Shewing the darkness of Nature^s Light as to Pardon. THE importance of the case being thus cleared, we now pro- ceed to demonstrate the insufficiency of nature's light to help . * " Sharers in the crime." t " Royal prerogatives." i Dr. How's Living- Temple, Part 2. page "237, 238, 239- PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 137 out of this strait. And that we may without fear assert it so, is evident from the ensuing considerations : 1. That h'dit which failed men so far, as to a discovery of the otrait, is not likely to help them out of it. If we understand not where the difficulty lies, and hov/ great it is, we are never like- ly to solve it. Now it is undeniable, that a great part of the Viorld understood not the evil of sin, or of how vast a conse- quence it was to be assured about the pardon of it. The prevar !eut darkness of their minds about the nature, holiness and jus- tice of the Deity ; their own natures and relation to him ; their Ignorance of the nature of sin ; the commonness of it in the world ; their strong inclinations to it, and other things of a like nature, kept them from apprehending the difficulty of the case. But above all, the best moralists amongst the philosophers, such as Socrates and Plato, seemed utterly unconcerned. And the reason is plain, their pride blinded them so, that they idolized their own virtues, and made no reckoning of their sins. 2. They who had a little more concern about sin, saw some- what of the difficulty of this matter, but found themselves at a loss what way to relieve themselves : and therefore they had re- course, some to philosophy, music and mathematics, for the purga- tion of their souls ; and others to lustrations, sacrifices, and diverse Avashings, and I do not know what other fancies, which had no manner of foundation in reason, no suitableness -to the nature of the difficulty, no divine warrant, and therefore were never able to satisfy the conscience, as to the sinner's acceptance with God, arid the removal of the guilt. These being only the productions of their own imaginations, notwithstanding of all these, their fears continued, and they remained under apprehensions that even death should not terminate their miseries, as Lucretius himself sings : At mens sibl conscia facti, Praemetuens adhibet stimulos, lerretque flagcHis, Nee videt interea, qui terminus esse malorum Possit, nee qui sit panarum denique finis, Atque eadem mctnit magis haec in moi-te gravescant.* 3. They Avho either thought somewhat deeper of the case, or at least seemed to do so, especially at times when the impressions they had of divine justice were quickened by some terrible plagues or judgments, had recourse to things that were so far from relieving, that they really increased the guilt, I mean that abomina- * "-But the mind conseious to itself of actual guilt, by fearing' punish- " ment applies slings to itself and terrifies itself v/ith wliips : nor does it " see in the mean time how any bounds can be set to its sufferings, nor what " will at last be the end of its punisliment, and fears lest these same suifcr- " ings should grew more grievous at death." 18 138 AN INQUIRY INTO THE ble custom of human sacrifices. This cruel custom almost uni- versally obtained in the world, if we may believe either profane or sacred records ; of which Dr. Owen in his treatise of Vin- dictive Justice gives many instances. They not only sacrificed men, but even multitudes of them. The instances of this kind in the sacred records are known. As to others, Ditmarus quoted by Dr. Owen tells us : " That the Normans and Danes, every " year in the month of January did sacrifice to their gods ninety- " nine men, as many horses, doj^s and cocks."* Clemens Alex- andrianus quoted by the same author, tells what the usage of the na- tions in this matter was, and on what occasion — " Jam vero cum " civiiates (§• gentes tanquam pestes invasissent, scBva postularunt " libamina ; Sr Arisiommes quidcm Messenius, Itkometa Jovi, " trecentos mactavit, se tot 8r tales rite sacrificare cxistimans, in " quihus etiam Theopompus rex Lacedamonvm erat, prceclarcc " victima. Tauri autem populi^ qui hahitabant circa Tauri- " cam Chersonesum, quoscunque kospites apud se ceperint, Dianas " Tauriae eos statim. sacrijicant (inde inhospitalia littora.) " Hcec tua sacrijicia Euripides in scena tragice decantat.^'f Hera are no less than three hundred sacrificed at once, and among them a king. Here are strangers sacrificed. And any one that will read there Avill find how usual it was to sacrifice their children and nearest relations. The custom is barbarous, and fully speaks out the despair of me.n awakened to a serious consideration of sin, and the darkness of nature's light. If it could have pointed to any ether thing that could quiet the conscience, civilized nations, such as those among whom this custom did prevail, vrould never have had recourse to it. 4. It is no wonder tliat men should be brought to such straits ; for they wanted the knowledge of many things, that were of ab- solute necessity to make them once so much as understand what a case they were in. They knew not, nor, as: has been proved could they know the rise of sin, and therefore could not know what estimate to make of it, nor what God would make of it. — They knew neither the extent of the mercy nor justice of God, without which it was impossible to determine in the case. 5. The questions that must be resolved before the mind of a sinner, that once understands his state, can be satisfied, are so ma- * Dr. Owen de Justitia Vindicatrice, Cap. 4, page 69. f " But when, like the plague, they had over-run all states and nations, tliey required cruel ofi'erings. Aristomenes, the ISIessenian, sacrificed three hundred men to Jupiter Ithometes, among whom likewise was Theo- pompus king- of the Lacedemonians, an illustrious victim. And the Tauri, a nation in Crim Tartary, whenever they caught any strangers among them, they immediately sacrificed them to Diana Taurica, whence their shores were proverbially stiled inhospitable. Euripides relates these sacrifices of yours in a trag-ical manner on the stage." PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 139 iiy, so Intricate, and so palpably above the reach of unenlightened reason, that it is foolish to pretend that nature's light will or can satisfy the mind of any man in the case. Men may pretend what they will, who either do not. take up the case, or who are other- wise themselves satisfied by divine revelation ; but they who se- riously, and without partiality or prejudice view the case, will have other thoughts. Who will give me rational satisfaction as to those and the like questions ? Whether, considering the greatness of .sin, the justice, wisdom and holiness of God, and the honor of his government, it is consistent to pardon any sin ? If it be, whether he will pardon all, many or few sins ? What, or what degrees of sin he will forgive ? Whether he will pardon without any reparation for the honor of his laws or not ? Upon what, or what terms he will do it ? If he require reparation, what reparation, and by whom is it to be performed ? How shall we know that he has pardoned ? If he pardon, whether will he remit all punishment due to sin, or how much ? Whether will he merely pardon, or will he over and above re-admit the sinner to grace, and to as entire fa- vor as before he sitmed t Whether will he not only pardon, but reward the sinner's imperfect obedience ? Unless all of these are resolved, the difficulty is not loosed. And who Avill undertake to resolve them and give rational satisfaction that understands the case. 6. These questions are not only above the reach of man ; but they belong not to him to judge and decide them. The offence is committed against God. He alone understands what the con- tempt of hi:* authority, the disorder brought into his government by sin, and the disobedience of his creature amounts unto : what is fit to be done in the case, he alone is judge, at his tribunal it is to be tried. Man is too ignorant, too guilty and too partial in his own favor to be allowed to judge ? Now where are the decisions of God in the case to be found ? Are they legible in the works of creation or providence, or consciences of men ? In the works ©f creation it cannot be pretended. The works of providence afford innumerable instances of his justice, some of his forbear- ing sinners, even while they continue in their sin, and loading them with ontward effects of his bounty : But where irj the sinner, of whom we can say, God has forgiven him ? Or said that he will forgive ? The consciences of men read them some- times sad lectures of justice ; but never, if they be not informed from revelation, any of forgiveness. 7. All the pretences that are offered for relief in this case, are absurd, vain and insignificant. They are all reducible to this one head, That God is infinitely merciful ; but this gives not th« least relief. For, 140 AN INaUIRY INTO THE 1 . I ask, must God then of necessity exercise mercy, or is the egress and exercise of this mercy necessary ? If it is not, but still remains arbitrary, and in the pleasure of God whether he will pardon or not ; then I inquire, where is the relief pretended ? Does it not all vanish ? Are we not as much at a loss as before, whether he will pardon, or how far, or upon what terms ? If it is necessary in its egress, then I enquire, how is this reconcileable with the notion of mercy, that seems to respect voluntary and un- deserved acts of favor shown to them, to whom God was not obliged to show any ? How is this reconcileable to or consistent with justice, which is exercised in pmiishing sinners? By what arguments can this be made appear ? Whence is it that there are so many acts of justice, and no instances known to, or know- able by the light of nature, of God's having pardoned any ? 2. Mercy is either unlimited in its egress or it is not. If it is limited and cannot be exercised, but upon such and such provisos as make the exercise of it consistent with God's aversion to sin, and with the regard he has for the authority of his laws, the concern he has for the honor of his government, and his justice, wisdom and holiness, then we are where we were before : For who can tell whether it be consistent with these things to pardon ? In what case and upon what provisos : if it is not limited to any such qualifications, then I desire to know, how tliis is reconcilea- ble to his nature ? How is such mercy consistent with any exer- cise of justice at all ? What account can be given of the direful effects of justice, whereof the world is full ? By what means can it be reconciled to the holiness of God's nature to pardon impeni- tent sinners ? What need is there for any to guard against sin, since upon this supposition, all sin shall be forgiven ? 3. Is infinite mercy universal in its extent ? If it is not, then I desire to knovr, what sins, w^hat sinners shall he pardoned T How shall any know whether his sins are the sins that are to be pardon- ed ? If it is universal in its extent, and all sins must be pardoned ; then is there not a door opened for all sin ? How can this be pro- ven ? Why have we no evidence of this in God's providential dealing ? Whence have we so many evidences of the contrary ? If it is said that mercy must more or less be exercised towards all, then I inquire, who tells us so ? Hew far shall it be exercised ? Will it pardon ail cr part ? Upon what terms ? Will it not only pardon, but remunerate the guilty ? ' 4. I inquire who are the proper objects of mercy ? Or what is requisite to constitute the proper object of it ? Amongst men, the proper object of that mercy which belongs to governors, is not sin and misery. To spare and pardon upon this score only, is a plain vice in men, especially in governors. But the object of mercy is such sin and misery, as is consistent with the honor and good of PRINCIPLES OF THE xlIODERN DEISTf^!. 141 the governor, government and the governed to pardon. No-.r, if it be thus in this case, then I sec nothing, but we are where we were, and are plunged into all our difficulties ; and why it should not be thus, I see no reason. For there is no man Avho knows what God is, what sin is, what justice is, that will say it is con^sa- tent with the honor, justice, wisdom and holiness of God to par- don impenitent sinners, going on in their sins. And when they say, that his mercy only requires hira to pardon penitent sinners, then this plainly says, that the exercise of his mercy is confined to those Ti ho are its proper objects, that is, not to miserable sin- ners, for the impenitent are most so ; but to those whom he may spare, in a decorum to his government and congruity to his other perfections. And indeed this is what cannot in reason be denied : and when it is granted, then it remains a question, not yet decided, nor indeed determinable by reason, whether repentance alone is sufficient to this purpose ? 5. The case of justice and mercy are quite different as to their egress : For justice has respect to a fixed rule, an universal rule, and requires that regard be had to it, in dealing with all that are under that rule : whereas mercy only is conversant about particu- lar instances, according to the wisdom and pleasure of him in whom it resides. 6. The infiniteness of either of these attributes, neither requires nor admits, that there be infinite numbers of inr.tances of either : but that the acts of justice and mercy be such as becomes the infinite nature of God, when it is proper to exercise them, or when the wisdom, holiness, justice or mercy of God require that they be exercised. But the Deists object, 1 . " That upon supposition that God will " not pardon sin, there is no use of his mercy."* I ansAver, we do not say he will not pardon sin ; bat v,-c siiy, nature's light can- not tell whether he will pardon It or not, or whaL Is the case where- in mercy takes place. We own its use, but we say, nature's light cannot tell when and how It is proper to exercise it. Again, It is pretended, " That God Is Infmitely merciful, then " he must as the least of Its operations pardon the greatest of " sins,"f This Is plainly denied, and vre have told wherefore above. It is further pretended, " That justice has done Its business, « when It has condemned the sinner, and then mercy brings him " off :"J but this Is gross Ignorance. It belongs as much to jus- tice to take care that its sentence be executed, as to see It passed. Again, it is urged, " That though God be infinitely just as well " as merciful, yet his justice Is only as inherent, not as extenslvo * Aikenhead's Speech. t ^^''^ • ^^^'^ 142 AN INaUIRY INTO THE *' as his mercy toward us : for we are punished only according to *' our deservings, but mercy is shown us above our deservlngs."* The first part is false. The very contrary assertion, viz. that justice is more extensive, is true, as has been cleared above, if we respect the number of objects. The proof of it is a plain sophism. For 1 . It is not true that mercy bestows its effects, which in their nature are above our deservings, to more persons than justice gives its effects, which are according to desert. 2. The effects of mercy are not more above deserving, than the effects of justice are according to it. 3. The effects of justice are with infinite ex- actness proportioned to deservings. And all that can be said is, that the effects of mercy are suited to the nature of infinite mercy, not that they are given to infinite number of persons, or infinite degrees. Further, it is pretended, " That God with whom we have to *' do, is a Father who will not animadvert severely upon his peni- *' tent son."f I answer, as he is a father, so he is a righteous judge. Further, though he be a father, yet he is not such a father as men are, infirm, liable to failings, that needs his children, that may give them occasion or temptation to offend, that is of the same nature with them. And hence no firm argument can be in- ferred from any thing that is known in this matter by the light of nature. Besides, the meanest offence against God is more atro- cious, than the greatest offence against one's natural father. For which nevertheless there is no forgiveness, but punishment without mercy, by the law of nations and nature. Finally, all these are but generals, that may well raise suspi- cions in the minds of men, but can never give particular satisfac- tion to any one man, as to his case, or any one of the particular diflSculties that have been mentioned. They no more satisfy, than those notions that generally prevailed, of the placability of the Deity, which had iheir rise at first from revelation, were continued by the necessity of sinners, v/ho having challenges for sin, behoov- ed to take sanctuary some where, and handed down by tradition : But being general, and leaving men at a loss about the means of atoning the Deity, were really of no use if not to keep men from running into downright despair, and keep them up in attendance upon somewhat that looked like religion ; but whereon the minds of such as really understood any thing of the case, could never find satisfaction. There is only one thing that seems of any moment, that is ob- jected to all this ; and that is, that nature's light which discovers the sore, discovers a salve for it, to wit, repentance, to which we * A. W. in his Letter, Oracles of Reason. t Blount's Relig-. La^^ i. page 69. Herbert de Rellg. Gen. pag^e 199. PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 143 shall answer in the following section, that is peculiarly designed to consider this. Sect. III. Wherein if is inquired whether Repentance is sufficient to atone for Sin ? How far Nature^ s Light enables to it ? What assurance Dkuture's Light gives of Pardon upon Repentance. It now remains that we consider the only exception, which is of moment, and that is, that repentance is a sufficient atonement, that nature's light discovers this, and so we are not left without relief. This is tiie more considerable that several Christians, yea divines of great note, and some of them deservedly of high esteem, have seen meet, in compliance with their several hypotheses in divinity, to drop assertions that seem to favour this. We shall first pro- pose their opinions, who assert this, and then consider it. The Deists go all this way as one man. I shall offer one for all, and it is Charles Blount, who not only speaks the sense, but trans- lates the very words of the learned lord Herbert. He tells up, then, *' That repentance is the only known and public means, " which on our part is required for satisfying the divine justice, " and returning to the right way of serving God."* And for clearing this, he premises to it these ensuing considerations, " 1. That he that judgeth man is his Father, and doth look on " him as a frail creature, obnoxious to sin. 2. That he generally " finds men sin, rather out of frailly, than out of any desire to *' offend his divine Majesty. 3. That if man had been made in- " wardly prone to sin, and yet destitute of all inward means to " return to him again, he had been not only remediless in himself, " but more miserable, than it could be supposed an infinite Good- " ness did at first create, and doth still perpetuate human kind. — " 4. That man can do no more on his part, for the satisfying of " divine justice, than to be heartily sorry and repent him of In's " sins, as well as to endeavor, through his grace, to return to the " right way, from which through his transgression, he had erred : " or if this did not suffice for the making of his peace, that the " Supreme God by inflicting some temporal punishment in this " life, might satisfy his own justice. 5. That if temporal punlsh- " ment in this life, were loo little for the sin committed, he might " yet inflict a greater punishment hereafter in the other life, with- " out giving eternal damnation to those, who (if not for the love " of goodness) yet, at least, upon sense of punishment, would not " sin eternall)^ Notwithstanding, since these things may again be licligio Laici, page C8, 69, 70. 144 AN INQUIRY INTO THE " controverted, I shall insist only upon that universally acknow- " ledged proposition first laid down."* This proposition, with the explications, he translates from Herbert, only has made some small additions. It is no wonder to see those speak so ; but it is a Httle more odd to hear Christians talk so. One who would seem very zealous for Christianity tells us, " That the God of patience and conso- " lation, who is rich in mercy, would forgive his frail offspring, if " they acknowledge their faults, disapproved the iniquity of their " transgressions, begged his pardon, and resolved in earnest to " conform their actions to this rule, which they owned to be just " and right : this way of reconcihation, this hope of atonement, " the light of nature revealed to them. He that made use of this " candle of the Lord, (viz. reason) so far as to find his duty, could " not miss to find also the way to reconciliation and forgiveness, '^ when he had failed of his duty."f Bluch more speaks he to the same purpose. But it is stranger to hear divines speak so. And yet we find one telling us, " That the same light of nature, which declares to " us our duty, dictates to us, when we have failed in that duty, *' to repent and turn to God with trusting to his mercy and par- *' don, if we do so and not else. We do find it legible in our '* hearts, that God is good and wisely gracious to pity our infir- " relties, to consider cur lost estate, and necessary frailty, as that •' tlicre is a God, and any worship that is at all due to lum."J To the same purpose the learned Baxter speaks in his Reasons of the Chnatian Religion, Part I. Chap. 17. Dr. Whichcote in his sermon on Acts xii. 38. and others too large to quote. But now, with all due deference to those great names, I shall take leave to ofTcr the following remarks, wherein I shall clear ijiy own mind, and offer the reasons on which I dissent from them. 1 . I observe that the Deists speak more uncertainly about this matter ; whereas these Christian writers seem more positive. The Deists seem not to want their fears that repentance may not serve the turn, and therefore they seem willing to admit of temporal punishments, and even punishments after time, only they have not %vill to think of eternal punishments ; as we heard from Her- bert and Blount, who both speak in the same words on this head. But the Christian writers are positive. And I am jealous the reason is not, that they saw farther into the light of nature than the Deists ; but that they lean more firmly to the scripture reve- lation, v/liich assures us that penitent sinners shall be forgive l — • Herbert de lielig". Gentil. page 199. f Locke's Reasonableness of Cr.ristiar.Ity, page 255, 256. + Mr. Humphrey's Peaceable Disquisitions, Chap. 14. pasjc 57- PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 145 Though I must add, the scripture no where says that penitent sinnera shall be forgiven upon their penitence, as that which is suf- ficient to atone the justice of God. And to speak phiniy, howe- ver confident those worthy persons are, that they have read ihis doctrine in the book of nature, I dare be bold to affirm that they had either failed in the discovery, or stammered a little more in reading their lesson, if they had not learned it before-hjind out of the book of the Scriptures ; though the thing seems, when Ihcy have read it there, to approve itself so much to r^asoii, that rea- son cannot but assent to it. It is well observed by one of those authors, with whom we now manage this debate, " That when truths are once known to us, though by tradition, we are apt to be favorable to our own parts, and ascribe to our oun under- standing the discovery of what, in truth, we borrowed from other?, or at least, finding we can prove, what at first we learned from others, we are forward to conclude it an obvious truth, which, if we had sought, we could not have missed. Nothing seems hard to our understandings, that is once known ; and be- cause what we see with our own eyes, we are apt to overlook, or forget the help we had from others, who first shewed and pointed it out to us, as if we were not at all beholden to th^m for that knowledge ; for knowledge being only of Ic.iawn tniths ; we conclude our faculties would have led us into it witljontany assistance ; and that we know these trutlis by the Ptre igth and native light of our own mind'?, as they did, from whom we re- ceived them by theirs, only they had the luck to be b ;fore us. — Thus the whole stock of human knowledge is claimed by everv one, as his private possession, as soon as ha (profitifig by other's discoveries) has got it into his own mind ; and so it is ; but not properly by his own single industry, nor of his own acquisition. He studies, it is true, and takes pains to make a progress in what others have delivered, but their pains were of another sort, who first brought those truths to light, which he afterwards derives from them. He that travels the roads now, appkuds his own strength and legs, that have carried him so iw, in such a scantling of time, and ascribes all to his own vigor, little con- sidering how much he owes to their pains, who cleared the woods, drained the bogs, built the bridges, and made the ways passable ; without which he might have toiled much with litde p'-ogiess. — A great many things which we have been bred in the belief of from our cradles (and are notions grown familiar, and as it were, natural tous,under the gospel) we take for untjuestionahie obvious truths and easily demoni=tiable, without considering; how long^we might have been in doubl, or in ignorance of them, had revelation been silent. It is no diminishing to revelation, thut reason gives its suffrage too to the truths revelation hath discovered. But it is 19 146 AN INQUIRY INTO THE " our mistake to think that because reason confirms them to U8, " we had the first certain knowledge of them from thence, and in " that clear evidence we now possess them."* How applicable this excellent discourse is to the case in hand, will appear from what we design to subjoin on this head. Though after all, that which the scripture delivers, and reason confirms in this case, is not, " That repentance is sufficient to atone the justice of God, " or that God will pardon a penitent sinner, merely on the account *' of his penitence," which the Deist's case requires. The scrip' tures plainly teach the contrary, and those learned persons, or some of them at least who own them, believe according to the scriptures, the contrary, which makes a considerable difference betwixt then! and the Deists ; though in this case, they seem to speak the same things. But that which the scripture asserts, is, " That peni- " tence is a qualification suitable to a sinner to be pardoned, '• and that it is not suitable to the wisdom and justice of God " to pardon one, who is not sorry for former oflfences, and resolves " to obey for the future."* Reason confirms this indeed, but it is not to the purpose. 2. But to come a little more close to the purpose ; this repen- tance, which is pretended to be sufficient, consists of two parts, sorrow for the offence, ^u^ a return to obedience. This last part, a return to obedience, what is it ? Nothing, but only a perform- ance of the duties we were antecedently bound unto by the law of creation, which only receives a new denomination from its relation to an antecedent deviation, or sin. This denomination adds no new vrorth to it, nor does the relation whereon it is founded. — Wherefore we can never reasonably suppose, that there is any great matter in this, that can atone for the transgression. It is well if it obtains approbation as a part of our duty. But no rea- sonable mo.n can pretend that it atones for any part of our sin. 8. Tiiough nature's light discovers our obligation to that duty, which now, because sin preceded, must be called a return ; yet it is a question, if nature's light is able to bring a sinner, that has once gone away, to such a return as is necessary. For 1. We have above proved that nature's light is defective as to motives to obedience, as to the discovery of particular duties, and much more is it defective as to motives to a return : because there is more re^iuired to encourage a sinner to come back, who has once offended, than to engage him to continue. There is a discourage- ment arising from fear of punishment, and falling short of any re- ward he might have expected, upon the account of his sin to be removed, and that is not easily done, as shall be shown. 2 Be- sides, not only discouragements lie in the way of a return, but cross inclinations, aversions from duty, and inclinations to sin. — * Locke's Reasonableness of Christianity, page 27^i 280, 281. PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 147 Now I am not satisfied that nature's light can remove, or direct how to remove these ; of which we may speak more fully in the next chapter. So that as for this part of repentance we neither see of what use it is as to atonement, nor do we find it clear that nature's light can bring any to it. 4. The stress of the business then must lean on this sorrow for by-gone transgressions, that is the other part of the composition. But here I am sure it will be readily granted, that every sort of sorrow for sin will not serve. If one is only grieved for the loss he has sustained, the hazard he has run himself into, and the evil he has to suffer, or fears at least for his offence ; this can be avail- able to no man. Wherefore though nature's light may bring a man to this, and has oft done it, yet this signifies nothing in the case. 5. The sorrow, that only can be pretended, is that which arises purely, or at least principally, from concern for the dishonor done to God. Now as to this sorrow, it is to be observed, that it is not any action of ours done in obedience to any command : but it is a passion, in its own nature uneasy, as all sorrow is, though suitable to a siimer, and, upon the supposition, that he is so, useful per- haps. And it results from the joint influence of prevailing love to God, his law and authority, and a clear conviction of sin's hav- ing injured his honor, and our being, on this account, obnoxious. 6. It is not easily to be granted, that nature's light can bring any man to this sorrow. Since 1. It is evident that the temper men are naturally of, is quite contrary to that which gives rise to such a sorrow. We are naturally averse from God, as shall be made appear afterwards, and are not under the influence of any such prevalent love to him, and it is not easy to prove that na- ture's light is able to remove this natural aversion of the heart from God : but of this more in the next chapter. 2. God can never appear amiable to a sinner, if he is not revealed as one ready to forgive. We cannot be sorrowful for our sin, if we are not seriously convinced that we have sinned, and see the demerit of sin. If we ?re convinced that we have sinned, and deserve punish- ment, we cannot have prevalent love to God, which is requisite to give life to this sorrow, make it run in the right channel, and pro- ceed on those accounts, which will make it acceptable to God, or available to us, unless he appear to us as ready to forgive, which nature's light doth not discover. 7. I doubt if nature's light calls us to repentance. I allow that there are several things obvious to nature's light, which may be said to drive us to repentance, because they serve to discover to us these things whereon this sorrow follows, bind the obligation on us to that duty, which, because of the preteding sin is called a return, and serve as arguments to enforce the compliance, provided we had a call or invitation to return, I mean a new call. For 148 AN INaUlRY INTO THE clearing this, we are to observe that, were man innocent, and guihy of no fault, and had his obedience no imperfection, neces- sarily c^eavina; to it, and were he under no such inconveniency as might make him dread wrath, or fear his obedience might be re- jected ; in that case a discovery of the obligation he lies under to duty, were a call and invitation sufficient as securing him, at least as to the acceptance of his duty. But where there are those things in his case, sin and imperfection cleaving to the duty, and the performer chargeable with guilt on both those accounts, in or- der to engage him to duty, there is requisite a new call or invita- tion, securing him against those grounds of fear, and giving him ground to expect acceptance. Now it is such a call as this, that only can bring the sinner to repentance. And this we deny that nature's light gives ; though we own that it discovers many things, that may be said in some sense, to lead to repentance : Because, upon supposition of such an invitation, they are improveable as ar- guments to enforce compliance with duty. Thus, If God invite me back again, his goodness discovered in the works of creation and providence, invites to go to him, and all the direful evidences of his anger against sinners persuade the same thing : and there- fore may be said to lead, or rather drive to repentance ; because they have a tendency that way in their own nature, and are capa- ble of such an improvement : But still it is only upon the forego- ing supposition. 8. To make this matter yet a little more clear, I grant that the light of nature discovers sinful man to be still under an obligation to obey God. As long as God is God, and man his creature, man is under a tie to subjection, and God has a right to man's obedi- ence. This obedience to which man is bound, after once he has sinned, must be called a return. Further the light of nature teach- es, that if man had yielded perfect obedience, he should not have done it in vain. Acceptance, at least, he should have had, and what other reward the goodness of God thought meet. And that man sustains a great loss by sin, that intervenes betwixt him and his expectations from the goodness of God, and besides, exposes riim to the hazard of his just resentment, which, if it is seen, as by nature's light in some measure it may be, will occasion sorrow. Further, nature's light will teach that the more deeply we sin, the more we have to fear, and therefore out of fear and a regard to our own interest and expectation of being freed from those sever- er judgments, which a progress in sin draw on men, may be in- duced to return. Now all th's nature's light discovers : but nei- thrr is this sor o^, which savours of some regard to ourselves, but of little or none to God ; nor this return, which is not that cheer- ful, cordial obedience that God requires and accepts, of any avail in the case. No man, that knows what he says, will pretend, that PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS, I4d such a sorrow or such a return is suflScierit to atone the justice of God for by-gones, of even obtain acceptance for itself, which has «o much of love to self, and so little of that which respects God. 9. But the repentance that is available in this case is a sorrow, flowing from prevalent love to God, and grieving, if not only, yet principally for the wrong done to God, and a cheerful following of duty upon prospect of God's being a rewarder of it. Now to call or to make up a sufHcient invitation to a sinner, to such a repent- ance, it is requisite that 1. God be represented in such a way, as a sinner that sees himself guilty, can love him, delight in him, and draw near to him. But this he can never be, if he is not repre- sented as one with whom certainly there is forgiveness. 2. It re- quires further, that God be represented as one, who will accept of sinners' obedience, notwithstanding of their desert of wrath for former disobedience, and this requires still that he be a God that forgives. 3. Further, it is requisite, that he be represented as one, that will accept of obedience, not only from one that has sinned, but that implies sin and imperfection in it. Now this can- not be, if he is not known to be one that is plenteous in mercy and mill abundantly pardon. Now I say the light of nature gives no such discovery of God : and therefore gives no call or sufficient invitation to his repentance. 10. Nor will it help out here, to say, that the light of nature doth represent God as placable, one who may be pacified : for, should I grant that it does so, yet this cannot invite to such an obedience, so long as 1. It is left a question, whether he be actu- ally reconciled, or positively determined to forgive ? 2. Especially considering, that he has not pointed to, and positively declared on what terras he will be appeased. Yea 3. Since moreover he has given no visible instance, knowable by the light of nature, that he has forgiven any particular persoa. But 4. On the contrary, the world is full of the most terrible effects of his displeasure, and these falling most heavily on the best, even those who go farthest in a compliance with duty. In a word, these dark notions of a placable God, which yet is the utmost that unenlightened reason can pretend to, are utterly insufficient to bring any of the chil- dren of men to that repentance we are now in quest of; it is so sunk, and as it were quite obscured by cross appearances. And all that can reasonably be said, is, that in the providence of God there is such a seeming contrariety of good and evil, that men know not what to make of it, but are tossed by contrary appear- ances. And of this we h.'ve a fair acknowledgment by one, who, besides that he was a person of great learning, was not only a great stickler for the natural discoveries of thifi placability, but one of the first broachers of it, being led to it by the peculiar hypothesis he maintained and advanced in divinity, I mean the learned Amy- 150 AN INQUIRY INTO THE raid. After he has asserted the natural discoveries of this placa- bility, and alleged that they lead to repentance, yet subjoins i " But there are (says he) motions in the corrupt nature of man which *' fi-ustrates the effect, if God did not provide for it in another man- *' ner (that is by revelation.) For man flies from the presence of *' God through fear of punishment, and cannot hinder the preva- « lence of it in his soul ; so that as a man affrighted beholds nor *' thing stedfastly, but always imagines new occasions of terror, and " represents hideous phantasms to himself ; so we are not able to " allow ourselves leisure to consider attentively this dispensation *' of the goodness of God towards the wicked, nor thereby to as- " sure ourselves of obtaining mercy and pardon. As a lewd " wretch, whose conscience bears him witness of many heinoua *' crimes, though he should perceive some connivance in the ma^ *' gistrate for a time, and his judge shew him some countenance, " cannot but be distrustful of him, and suspect that he does but " defer his punishment to another time, and assuredly reserves it " for him ; especially if he hath an opinion that the magistrate is " not such an one as himself, but abhors the wickednesses com- " mitted by hira. Now are wc universally thus principled, that as *' we hate those whom we fear, so we never bear good will toward *' them of whom we have some diffidence. And the distrusting " the good w ill of any one being a step to fear, is likewise by the *' same reason, a degree of hatred ; unless the distrust proceed *' to such a measure as to be an absolute fear ; for then the cold- *' ncss of affection is turned into perfect hatred. Wherefore man ** thus distrusting the good will of God towards him, consequent- *' ly can have but a very slight affection to him ; yea, he will even " become his enemy in as much as the distrust in this case will " be extremely great."* Thus far he goes. Now methinks this quite overthrows the placability he had before asserted discovera- ble by the light of nature, at least as to any use it can be supposed of for assuring sinners of pardon, or inviting them to repentance. 1 1 . But to go a step further, I cannot see that the light of na- ture is able to give us any assurance of this placability. Where is it in the book of nature that we may read this truth, that God is placable ? Is it in the works of creation ? No, this is not pre- tended. Nor can it be, they were all absolved and finished be- fore the entrance of sin, and cannot be supposed to carry on them any impressions of placability to sinners. Is it in the works of providence. Yes, here it is pretended. And what is it in the works of providence that is alleged to evince this placability ? Is it that God spares sinners for some time, and not only so, but be- stows many outward good things on them, whom he spares ? YpSj • Amyrald of Religions, Part 2- Chap. 17. page mihi, 253, 254. PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 151 this is that whereon the whole stress of the business is laid. But I cannot see the force of this to assure us that God is placable. For 1 . It is certain that the nature of the things do not infer cer- tainly any such thing. Forbearance is not forgiveness : nor does it intimate any design to forgive. It may be exercised, where there is a certain design and fixed purpose of punishing. And what relation have a few of those outward things, whereby love or hatred cannot be known, unto peace and reconciliation with God? It is, I know, pretended, that even this forbeargmce is a sort of forgiveness, and that all the world sharing in it, are in some sort forgiven. So Mr. Baxter says. If this learned person or any other has a mind to extend the notion of pardon so far as to include even reprieves under that name, we cannot hinder : but it is cer- tain, that no abatement of the punishment, far less the dissolution of the obligation, which is that ordinarily meant by pardon, do ne- cessarily follow upon, or is included in a delay of punishment. The slowness in execution, which may proceed upon many grounds, hid in the depth of divine wisdom from us, may be more than compensated by its severity when it comes. Leaden feet, as some have used the expression, way be compensated by iron, hands. And when men have seriously weighed outward good things, which are thrown in greatest plenty in the lap of the most wicked, and are full of vanity and commonly ensnare, they can see but very little of any mercy designed them thereby. And if any inference toward a placability is deducible, which I profess I cannot see, I am sure that it is far above the reach of not a few, if not most of mankind, to make the deduction and trace the argu- ment. And so it can be of no use to them. 2. All those things are consistent with a sentence standing unrepealed and never to be repealed, if either scripture, which tells us that God exercises much long suffering, and gives plenty of good things to the ves- sels of wrath ; or reason, which assures us that persons continuing obstinate to the last in sin, cannot evite judgment, may be be- lieved. 3. As there is nothing in the nature of the things that can ascertain us of God's placability, much less is there any in the condition of the person, to whom this dispensation is exercised- Were these bestowed on the most virtuous, or were there an in- crease of them, as persons proceeded in virtue, and came nearer and nearer to repentance ; or were there on the other hand a con- tinued evidence of wrath and implacability towards obstinate sin^ ners, this then would seem to say somewhat. But all things are quite contrary,^^he worst have the most of them, and the best have commonly least* of them. What will the sinner say, that God is inviting me by this goodness to virtue ? No, if I should turn vir- tuous I might rather expect to be worse dealt with. That is a bootless way for any thing I can sec in it. Does not the scrip- 152 AN INQUIRY INTO THE ture and experience tell us, that thus things go, and that such use sinners have made of this dispensation ? And so dark is it, that even they Avho had God's mind in the word to unriddle the mys- tery, have been shaken at it so far, that they have been upon the brink of apostacy, while they saw the way of sinners prosper, and that they mho hate God were exalted. How then can unenlighten- ed reason draw such inferences as these learned men pretend ? Although I have a great veneration for these learned men ; yet if it would not appear presumptuous in one so far below in all re- spects, to censure his superiors, I would take the liberty to say, that in this matter they are guilty of a double mistake : First, In that they measure men's abilities by a wrong standard. What guch men as they may trace by reason, many men are under not only a moral, but even a natural incapacity to discover. It is cer- tain, besides that vast difference which is in the capacities of men, from different education and circumstances, whence it is morally impossible for one who wants that education, and other occasions and advantages which another has, to go that same length and trace those discoveries, which the other who had education and oc- casion may do : there is likewise vast difference even in the natur- al abilities of men (whether that arises from their bodies or souls I dispute not now, nor is it to the purpose ; for if from either it is still natural) so that one has not a natural capacity to trace the truths that others may, who have better natural abilities : and so it is naturally impossible for the former to make the discoveries v/hich the other may. And I fear not to add, that if any such in- ferences may be drawn from these premises, as those learned per- sons pretend, yet many are under a natural impossibility ; and the most under insuperable moral incapacity of tracing those disco- veries. And if it be allowed that any man, without his own fault, is under an incapacity of making such deductions, about the pla- cability of God, from these dispensations of providence, which I think cannot modestly be denied, the v/hole plea about placabili- ty will prove not only unserviceable to the Deists, but, if I mistake it not, unmeet to maintain that station for which it is designed, in the hypothesis of the learned aaserters of this opinion. Another mistake I think those persons guilty of. Is, that men whose minds are not enlightened by revelation, may possibly trace those disco- veries, which they who are guided by it may read in the book of nature. 4. I add, if these things whereon they insist, as disco- veries of thi;? placability in God, serve to raise any suspicions of that sort in the minds of men, and this is the most that can be reasonably pretended, for demonstration they do not amount unto, they are quite sunk by the contrary evidences of God's severity ; which must have so much of force, in as much as they most com- monly befall the most virtuous, which heightens the suspicion. PlllNCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. lo3 And besides, as we heard Amyrald observe, the minds of sinners, vvho are convinced in any measure of sin, who are yet the only pei-sons that will think themselves concerned in this matter, are much more inclined to entertain suspicions thah i^ood thoughts of him, whom they have offended, and who, as their consciences as- sure them, hates their offences. H. That which puts the cope- stone upon our misery, and concludes us under darkness, is that nature's licht has no help to guide us over the difficulties laid ia our way, fiom any known instances of any persons led to repent- ance by these means, or pardoned on their repentance. So that upon the whole, I cannot see sufficient evidence of this placabili- ty in tlie light of natme. 12. If it is alledged here, that if God had no design of mercy in sparing the worltl, it is perfectly unintelligible why he did it. In answer to this, it is to be* observed, that we did not say that God had no design of mercy in sparing the world, but that this liis forbearance of the world is not a sufficient proof and evi- dence of this design ; and that nature's light can give no satisfy- ing account of the reason of this dispensation of God. So dark was this to sucli as had no other light but that of reason, that the most part laid aside thoughts of it as a thing above their reach ; and the more thoughtful knew not what judgment to make, but were confounded and perplexed in their thoughts. They under- stood not M'hat account was to be made of God's producing so many successive generations of men, and tossing them betwixt love and hatred, hope and fear, by such a strange mixture of good and evil — effects of his bounty and evidences of his anger. Yea so far were they confounded, that some of them came the length to set God aside from the government of the world. No less a person than Seneca introduces God, telling good men, " That he could not help their calamities." And Pliny accuses God, under the notion of nature, of no good design, " Naturam, quasi mag- '■• na ^ sava mercede contra fanta stia mvncra usum ; ita lit non '* satis sit a;stimare, parens melior homini, an fristior noverca '* flier it ;" id est, Nature has so cruelly counterbalanced its largest " gifts with horrible evils, that it is hard to say, whether it is not " a sad or cruel step-mother rather than a kind parent to man." So that in fact, men were thus spared and left in this dark condi- tion, as to the reasons of God's dispensations, is evident from ex- perience. The reasons of this conduct are to be sought in the ;d crimes to : and therefore is never extended so universally as here it is, and if it is to the purpose, must be asserted. So ihat the common reason of mankind declares against r>uch a constitution ; for what is or may be pi-etcnded of in^penitent sinners being ex- cluded, is in very deed, no restriction of the law indemnifying transgressors of v.'hatever sort, that are but willing to be indemni- fied. For impenitent sinners are they only who have no will to be pardoned, or who will not accept of favor. Now to indemnify all that are willing to be pardoned is very odd constitution. And before I ascribe this to the wisdom of the great Ruler of the world, I must see better reasons than I am ever likely to see in this case. (3.) No wise government ever enacted pardon of such an uni^ versal extent, without further security for the honor of the go-r vernment, into a perpetual and standing law. Pardon and acts of grace are a part of the sovereignty of the governor : and however he may make them very extensive sometimes ; yet he always re- serves it so in his own power, that it shall afterwards be voluntary and free to liim to forgive or not as he shall see cause. (4.) Such a constitution is especially irreconcileable with wis- dom and equity, if it h extended to transgressions not yet com- mitted ; for in that case it looks like an hivitatlon to sin. (5.) And tills binds more stiongly, if the persons arc strongly inclined to sin. (fi.) IMore especially such a constitution Is never to be reconciled with wisdom, if it is universally made known and published with- out any provision made for the securing of the honor of the law, against any abuse of such grace. Now I desire 1o know if na- ture's light discovers such an act and declaration of grace. Where is there any care talren, or any provisos Inserted in the declara- tion that can evidence the regard which God has for his laws, and r^curc againrt the abnse of such kindness 1 Indeed the scripture discovery cf mercy to penitent sinners, on account of Christ's eatisf^cliv)-.-, fauv removes all those difficulties v.hicli otherwise. \ PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 157 so far as I can see, are never to be removed : And tlierefore I can never see how such a declaration could be made without the concomitant discovery of a satisfaction to justice, and reparation of the honor of the law-giver and law, and security against abuse of grace. Remarkable to this purpose are the words of the learn- ed and judicious Dr. How : " That prince would certainly never " be so mxich magnified for his clemency and mercy, as he would " be despised by all the world, for most remarkable defects of " government, that should not only pardon whosoever of his sub- " jects had offended him, upon their being sorry for it ; but go " ai)out to provide, that a law should obtain in his dominions, thro' " all after time, that whosoever should offend against the govern- " ment, with whatsoever insolency, malignity and frequency, if " they repented they should never be punished, but be taken " forthwith into highest favor. Admit that it had been congruous " to the wisdom and righteousness of God, as well as his goodness, " to have pardoned a particular sinner, upon repentance, without " satisfaction ; yet nothing could have been more apparently un- " becoming him, than to settle an imiversal law for all future lime, " to that purpose, that let as many as would, in any age to the " world's end, affront him never so highly, invade his rights, tram- " pie on his authority, and tear the constitution of liis govern- *' ment, they should, upon their repentance, be forgiven, and not " only not be punished, but be most highly advanced, and dignifi- " ed." Thus for he. In the subsequent paragraph he learnedly and judiciously shews the difference in the gospel proposal of mer- cy to offenders, from this supposed case of forgiveness without satisfaction. 8. I inquire, whether is it possible that there may be any crime so atrocious, that it may be possible for God, in a congruity with his perfection, to punish, notwithstanding of the intervention of repentance ? If there may be any such, then certainly it is not merely on account of repentance that sin is pardoned ; and so a penitent cannot always be sure of forgiveness. Further, consi- dering how grievous and sinful every transgression of God's law is, how can I be sure what sins are pardonable upon repentance and what not ? If it is not possible for God to punish any penitent, then 1. I would inquire what so great matter is there in repentance, that can bind God up from vindicating his honor against affronts already offered ? 2. To what purpose was the penal sanction since, in the case it was designed ? For when the law is transgressed, it may not possibly take place but the execution is inconsistent with the nature of God. 3. How will this impossibility ever be proven ? Repentance hath nothing in it so great to infer it : for in repent- ance no more can be alledged but a return to duty antecedently due. And as to thi'^^, we are unprofitable servants. And Christ 158 AN INQUIR^ INTO THE has told us what reason tells us also, that we deserve no thanks for it. And as for the other pari, sorrow for by-gones, it is the ne- cessary result of that regard to the Deit j, and knowledge of our own sin, that is likewise our own duty. Now what is there, in all this, that should be supposed to be of so great worth, that it must inevitably stop the course of justice ? But here it may be objected, not only by Deists, but some, who are veiy far from favoring them, " That God cannot cast away *' from his love and felicity any soul, which truly loveth him, " above all, and v*'hich so repenteth of his sin, as to return to " God in holiness in heart and life."* I answer, 1 . The supposition that a sinner convinced of sin can repent without some security given as to pardon, can love God above all, and so repent, as te turn to holiness in heart and life, ap- pears to me impossible. Much less is it possible that an uncon- vinced sinner can repent. The reason is plain, a clear conviction of sin inevitably lays us under the deepest fear of God, and dread of punishment from him, which not only casts out that love, but draws on hatred, or at least, strong aversion ; as we heard the learned Amyrald well observe in the words before quoted. Now it is certain, that suppose one impossibility, twenty will follow.— 2, If the thing is not impossible, Avhich I think it is, yet certainly it is a case that never happened, and is never likely to happen. — 3. Supposing it possible, it is a very bold assertion, that no crime, how atrocious soever, would justify the inflicting of the penalty contained in the righteous sanction of the laAV. 4. Much less then is it hard to suppose that it would justify God's denying any reward to the sinner, that he has so sinned. And if it is granted that penitence does not necessarily restore to a prospect of re^rard, all religion and encouragement to it is lost. I cannot forbear quot- ing again the accurate and judicious Dr. How's words, who after he has shown that our offences against God incomparably transcend the measure cf any offence that can be done by one creature against another, presently subjoins, " Yea, and as it can never be " thought congruous, that such an offence against a human govern- " or, should be pardoned, without the intervening repentance of " the delinquent ; so we may easily apprehend also the case to be " such, as that it cannot be fit, it should be pardoned on that " alone, without other recompence :"t whereof if any should doubt, I would demand, is it, in any case, fit, that a penitent de- linquent against human laws and government should be punished, or a proportionable recompence be exacted for his offence not- withstanding ? Surely it will be acknowledged ordinarily fit ; and • Baxter's Eeasons of Christ. Relig-. Part 1. pajje 184, 188. f Living Temple, Fart 2. pag-e 210. PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 159 who would take upon him to be the censor of the common justice of the world in all such cases ! Or to condemn the proceedinc;s of aJI times and nations, wheresoever a penitent offender huth been made to suffer the legal punishment of his offence, notvyjthstant!- ing his repentance ? How strange a maxim of government would that be, that it is never fit that an offender, of whatsoever kind, sliould be punished, if he repent himself of his offence ! And sure- ly, if ever, in any case, somewhat else than repentance be fitly insisted on as a recompence, for the violation of the sacred riglits of government, it may well be supposed much more so in the case of man's common delinquency and revolt from God. 4. I reason against this position, from the consideration of the imperfection of this repentance, which, as it takes place amongst sinful men, is guilty of a double imperfection. Our sorrow and our return are imperfect, in respect of degrees. Our relation to God and his to us requires the highest, the most perfect love and the most cordial obedience. No less will answer our obligations. And our sorrow, if it is required, must be supposed likewise to be such as results necessarily from such a love. Now what can be more evident than this, that none of the children of men love God as they ought, and with that intention and veheraency, which an- swers their original obligation ? Aru\ consequently their sorrov/ and obedience can never come up to it : for they being the result of this love, can never go beyond the principle, which influences them. Again, our return is liable to another imperfection, even a frequent interruption. The case is not thus, that we only once, through infirmity, make an escape ; but even after our supoosed return, it must be allowed that there will be after-deviations. And hence it becomes a question, how can we expect acceptance ia our returns ? How can our repentance, which answers not the de- mands of the law, and our ties to duty be accepted for itself ? And if so, much more may it be a question, how can it be allowed sufficient to atone for other transgressions, yea, how can it be suf- ficient to atone for transgressions, which it takes no notice of? For there are such sins as by the light of nature we are never likely to reach the conviction of ; and therefore it is impossible we should sorrow for them, or repent of them ? However men may please themselves with a fancy of the sulBciency of their repent- ance ; yet a sinner, that understands his own case, will never be able to satisfy his own conscience in this matter. I know it is pleaded, *' That we have a harder province to admin- " ister than even the angels themselves ; they not huving so gross " a body as we have, nor exposed to so much evil as we are. But " God knoweth our frame, and upon that account is not ex- " treme to mark what is done amiss. A creature, as a creature, is '•' finite and fallible : and yet we arc not the most perfect of God's 160 AN INQUIRY INTO THE " creation. No^', for fallible to fail, is no more than for frail lobe " broken ; and mortal to die. Where there is finite and limited " perfect ion there is not only a possibility, but a contingency to " fail, to err, to be mistaken, not to know and to be deceived. " And where the agent is such, there is place for repentance. — " Repentance is that which makes a finite being failing, capable of " compassion. If repentance did not take effect, it would be too " hazardous for a creature to come into being. If upon a lapse, " an error, or mistake, we should be undone to eternity, without " all hope of recovery ; who would willingly enter upon this state ?"* Thus speaks Dr. Whichcote. To this plausible discourse we answer. Either this reasoning pro- ceeds upon the state of things, according to the covenant of grace, and respects them who have laid hold on it, or it does not. If it does proceed on this footing, w^e say it helps not the Deists : but if, as it seemf7, it be extended further, then I shall make the following remarks on it. 1 . Although we have here many things prettily said, yet I cannot but deeply dislike the discourse, because it aims at the extenuation of sin, and pleads its excuse from our frailty. Now, besides that this bears hard upon the author of our constitution, as if he had made it unequal to the laws he imposed on it, it is a foolish argument, because the case may be as much exaggerated on the other hand by the representing the greatness of the law-giver, the equality of the laws, and the ability of man, at least in his first make to obey. And the one will not signifj' more to give us hope of forgiveness on our repentance, than the other will to make us despair of it. 2. It seems to reflect on God's different conduct with the angels that sinned, who had no place al- lowed them for repentance : for their frame was finite, and so, frail and failablc. The little difference from the grossness of our bodies, if man is not supposed corrupt, and his body inclined to evil, makes no difference that can satisfy ; for still we were under no necessity of sinning from our constitution, if it is not supposed to be corrupt. But to pretend that man was made corrupt, carries our frailty too fir, to make it God's deed. We cannot plead in excuse, any defects in our constitution, that God put not there. 3. It condemns all human laws that spares not penitent transgressors. If it be said, that they are under a necessity to do it ; I answer, whence does this necessity arise ? Is the honor of the divine law less dear to him, and of less consideration than the honor and rights of human constitutions and governments ? But further, I desire to know, will necessity justify the punishment of the penitent ? If not, then here it doth not justify : if it doth, who will assure me that there is not * Dr. Whiclicote's select Sermons, Part 2. Sermon 2nd, on Acts xiii. 3?- pag-e 322. 323. PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 161 as great a necessity for this course in divine as human govern- ments ; at least in some instances ? And if in any instance the punishment of a penitent may take place, who will condescend to tell where it may, and where not ? How likewise can it be said that penitence secures pardon ? Further, 4. I say directly to the argu- ment, if divine laws are as much adjusted to man's power, as the constitutiong and laws of human governments are, (and that they behoved to be so, with respect to his power in his first constitution has been made appear) then it is no more hazardous to come into being, than to enter into human society, where frail man may, for a word or a deed, forfeit his own life to justice and all the advan- tages of it, and beggar hia posterity, and that without any prospect of relief by his repentance. If it be said, that the punishments are greater in this case ; I grant it : so are the laws too, and con- sequently the transgressions ; and so likewise are the advantages of obedience ; and without an injurious reflection on God, it can- not be ~^!enied that the laws are, as well at least, attempered to man's abilities wherewith he was created and subjected to them. 5. I do not see how it can be injustice to inflict a just punishment, upon transgressors, and such of necessity, that is, which is includ- ed in the sanction of the divine laws. Nor does repentance make that execution unjust ; which, without it, is allowed not only just, but indispensably necessary. This I might largely shew, but others have done it before.* 5. The falsehood of this proposition may be further evidenced from the nature of the justice of God, that seems necessarily to require that sin be punished. For clearing this, I shall make the ensuing observations : in doing which we shall aim at such a Gra- dual progression as may set the matter in the best light. (1.) Justice strictly taken, is " that virtue of the rational na- ture, whose business it is to preserve, maintain, and be a guardian of the rights of rational beings." It is commonly defined, a " con- stant and abiding or fixed will of giving to every one what is their light or due." Whence it has been debated, whether in man there is any such thing as self-justice ; because, according to this account of justice, it seems to be restricted to the rights of others. And this restriction has countenance given to it from that common maxim, that volenti nonjit injuria,f which is founded In this, that a man is supposed capable of parting, without wrong, with his own lights, and consequently is not capable of injustice towards him- self. It is true, man has no rights, which he may not deprive })imself of by his own consent. Yet since man has such rights, though they are but derived onies, aa also his being is, as he cannot * See Specimen Refutatlonis Crellii, pagfe 100, 101, 8l-s«qu. 7 " Xo injury is done Vo one who is willing " 21 162 AN INQUIRY INTO THE deprive himself of without fault, I see not but even such a thing as self-justice may take place among men : but whatever the case be as to men, there is certainly in God to be allowed such a thing as self-justice. For clearing of which I observe, (2.) That God, being the fountain of all rights, has certainly rights, which he can by no means deprive himself of. He has a Tight of dominion over the creature, and to the creature's subjec- tion, that he cannot part with. As long as there is a rational crea- ture it is, by its being, inevitably subject to its Creator, and he cannot part with that right he has to govern it. " With the su- " preme Proprietor, there cannot but be unalienable rights, inse- " parably and everlastingly inherent in him : for it cannot be, but " that he, who is the fountain of all rights must have them pri- " marily and originally in himself ; and can no more so quit theni» " as to make the creature absolute and independent, than he can " make the creature God."* Hence inevitably there must be allowed self-justice, which is nothing else, save that fixed determi nation of the divine will, not to part with what is his own unalien- able right, and consequently to maintain it. (3.) This justice, in order to maintain God's right of government, obliges him to enact penal laAvs as the measure of the creature's subjection and obedience. A subject cannot be without laws. — And where the creature is capable of transgressing, laws cannot be such without penalties. Without these, they were rather counsels or advices, than laws ; and the person to whom they are given is left at will to be subject to them or not. And if God should thus leave the creature without a penalty, then upon transgression, the transgressor has slipt entirely out under the dominion of God; for he is not actively, in that instance, subject to God. And nei- ther is he passively subject, if there is no penalty. So that by this means God has forfeited or lost his right, which is impossible. There is no other imaginable tie of subjection, but either the pre^ cept or the pena! sanction of the law, whereby rational creatures, as to their moral dependence can be bound. Now if God part with the one, by remitting the penalty, or enacting laws without it, and man cast off the other by disobedience, the creature is, at least thus far, independent. Which, how absurd it is, it is easy to see. Wherefore, in case the creature is made, we cannot but suppose a law must be made to it. And if the creature is capable of viobting that law, there must, for preserving that right, which God has to the creature's subjection, be a penalty annexed to that law. Whence it seems evident, " that God did owe it to himself " primarily, as the absolute Sovereign and Lord of all, not to suf- * Living Temple, Part 2. page 270. PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 163 « fer indignities to be offered him, without animadverting upon " them, and therefore to determine he would do so."* (4.) The creature being made, justice requires that it should be under such a law as is enacted with a penalty, and such a law be- ing now enacted, there seems to arise a double necessity for the execution of the law, in case of transgression. The one arising from the reason of the law, the other from the law itself : Since upon the grounds already laid down, the law was necessary ; the same grounds enforce the execution of the law : for when the case falls out, for which the law was provided, it is not merely the law or constitution itself, but the execution of it that secures the end. When the creature disobeys, he has in so far renounced an actual dependence on, and subjection to the law-giver and law : and therefore it seems of necessity that either as to these actions he is not subject, or he must be subject to the penalty. Again, as the reason of the law enforces the execution, so does the law it- self. For the law being once made, justice requires that its honor be secured either by obedience, or by the subjection of the trans- gressor to the punishment. (5.) To proceed yet further, if the law is not executed, the design, even the principal design of punishment in this case, \h not reached. It is not the only or main design of punishment or penal sanctions to reclaim the offender, or benefit by-standers, or secure the community. It is true, the penal sanction, or law enacting the penalty, is of use to deter from transgressing, and so is of use to the community, and all under the government ; but the execution, if the sanction is punishment after this life, is of no advantage to the offender, nor is it instructive to by-standers, or the rest of the community, who do not see it : wherefore these are not the principal ends of punishment. Though it is to be observ- ed, that any public intimation that the penalty shall not be inflict- ed, could not but be of the worst consequence to the community, as rendering it vain as to all that use, which it has of deterring persons who are under the law from sin. Yet I say, these are not the principal ends of punishment ; but the satisfaction of the law- giver. For the case is not here, as it is in human governments, where the governors and government are both constituted for the good of the governed, which therefore must be the chief aim of all laws : but on the contrary, the governed are made, and the laws made, and penalties enacted for the Governor, who made all things for himself. And consequently, the principal design of punish- ment is the securing and vindicating his honor in the government. Nor is this any such thing as answers to private revenge amongst men. " But that wherewith we must suppose the blessed God to be * Living Temple, par^e 271. 164 AN INQUIRY INTO THE " pleased in the matter of punishing, is the congruity of the thing " itself, that the sacred rights of his government over the world " be vindicated, and that it be understood how ill his nature can " comport with any thing that is impure, and what is in itself so " highly incongruous, cannot but be the matter of his detestation. *' He takes eternal pleasure in the reasonableness and fitness of his *' own determinations and actions ; and rejoices in the works of •' his own hands, as agreeing with the apt, eternal schemes and *' models, which he hath conceived in his own most wise and all- *' comprehending mind : so that though he desireth not the deatk " of sinners, and hath no delight in the sufferings of his afflicted *' creatures, which his immense goodness rather inclines him to '' behold with compassion ; yet the true ends of punishment are *' so much a greater good, than their ease and exemption from the *' sufferings they had deserved, that they must rather be chosen, " and cannot be eligible for any other reason, but for that which also *' they are to be delighted in, i. e. a real goodness, and conducible- " ness to a valuable end inherent in them." (6.) As justice in a strict sense, of which hitherto we have spo- ken, as it denotes that rectitude of the divine nature, which is con- versant about, and conservative of the divine rights, pleads for penal laws and punishment; so likewise justice in a large sense, as it comprehends all his moral perfections, holiness, wisdom, faithful- ness, &c. and answers to that which is amongst men called univer- sal justice, pleads for the same : for so taken, it comprehends his holiness and perfect detestation of all impurity ; in respect where- of he cannot but be perpetually inclined to animadvert with seve- rity upon sin ; both because of its irreconcileable contrariety to his holy nature, and the insolent affront, which it therefore direct- ly offers him ; and because of the implicit and most injurious mis- representation of him which it contains in it, as if he were either kindly or more indifferently affected towards it : upon which ac- counts, we may well suppose him to esteem it necessary for him, both to constitute a rule for punishing it, and to punish it accord- ingly ; that he may both truly act his own nature, and truly repre- sent it. Again, it includes, thus taken, his governing wisdom, which requires indispenslbly that he do every thing In his govern- ment so as he may appear like himself, and answerably to his own greatness ; so as to secure a deep regard for his government, and all the parts of the constitution. In respect whereof, it might be shown, that the punishment of sin, or the execution of the penal laws solemnly enacted is necessary. Wisdom takes care that one attribute do not quite obscure another, and will not allow that he gratify mercy to the detriment of justice. Again, it includes his faithfulness and sincerity, which seem pledged in enacting the pe- nalty for its c:sccrjjjon. How Is if: consistent v/ith them to enact PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 165 such severe penalties, if he may remit them without any repara- ion made for the wrong done ? Any one that would see more to this purpose, besides others who have discoursed of Vindictive Justice, may peruse the learned Dr. How's Living Temple, Part 2. Chap. 6 and 7, who has learnedly discoursed and improven this subject : to whom we own ourselves Indebted for much light in this matter. Thus it seems evident, that whether we take the divine justice in this last and largest notion, as it is comprehensive of all the per- fections of the Deity, or in the former and strict notion as it im- ports a virtue, whose province it is to take care of the preserva- tion of the incommunicable rights of the Deity, and vindicate their honor ; it seems necessarily to forbid the remission of sin without the punishment of the transgressor, or a reparation of the injured honor of the Deity. If it be alleged, that by repentance the sinner returns to his sub- jection, and so the honor of God's government is repaired. I an- swer, that upon supposition of the sinner's return being a suffi- cient reparation of the honour of the Deity, there would indeed be no necessity of punishment : but this is the question, and the objection begs what is in question. The principles now laid down, shew that justice, however taken, must take care to pre- serve and vindicate God's honor in case of transgression. The penal sanction of the law tells rs, that the punishment of the trans- gressor is that which wisdom and justice have fixed on, as proper for this end. There is no alternative, punishment or repentance. The law makes only mention of punishment. When therefore the objectors say that repentance is sufficient, we deny it. — They do not prove It, nor can they. God, to whom alone it belongs to determine what is necessary for the vindication of his own honour, must determine the reparation ; we cannot. Yea, it were presumption in angels to do it. God has fixed upon pun- ishment : if he allow of any thing else, the light of nature does not tell it. Nor is there any thing in the nature of repentance, as has been above cleared, that can Induce us to think it is sufficient to this purpose. The most virtuous, who must be supposed the penitents, if there are any such, meet with as heavy punishments in this life as any, which shews, at least, that God looks not upon their penitence as satisfaction. 6. Against this proposition we reason thus : Every man is en- dued with a power to repent when he pleases, or he is not. To assert the latter, were to yield the cause ; for it matters not to the sinner, whether repentance be a sufficient atonement or not, if jt be not in his power to repent. Besides, it is a question in this case of considerable difficulty, whether it is consistent with the perfections of God to give this power, till once his honor is se- 166 AN INaUIRY INTO THE cured by a suitable reparation for the injury done it by sin. If it is in the sinner's power to repent when he pleases, then again I insist, Either God w^ithout impeachment of his justice may inflict the punishment contained in the sanction of the law on the sinner, notwithstanding of his repentance, or he may not. If he may, then the Deists can never without revelation be sure that he will not inflict the punishment, which is what we say : nor will it mend the matter, to say that though God, without the impeachment of his justice, may punish the repenting sinner, yet he cannot do it with- out injuring his mercy : for what is contrary to one of God's attri- butes, is so to all. And moreover, the justice of God in any par- ticular requires that each of the divine attributes have their due. But if it be said, that God cannot in justice punish the repent- ing sinner ; then I desire to be satisfied, if this does not evacuate and make void the penal sanction of the law ? For if every man hath a power to repent when he pleases, and this repentance stops the execution of the sentence, I do not see but any may offend without hazard. All that can be said is, that God may surprize man in the very act of sinning, or so soon after it, that he shall not have time to repent, and so man's hazard is sufficient to deter him from sin. But to this I answer, that the consideration of this hazard can never have much influence on man, to make him refuse the grati- fying of his senses, in which he finds so much pleasure, so long as in the ordinary conduct of providence he sees that God very rarely takes that course of snatching away sinners in the very act of sin, or so soon after as to preclude repentance. It is not so much what God may do, as what he ordinarily does, that is of weight to determine men, especially when they have so strong mo- tives to persuade them to the contrary, as the impetuous cravings ©f unruly lusts are known to be. This argument gives us a clear view how much the Deist's no- tion of pardon upon mere repentance favours sin ; and how un- reasonable the outcries of Herbert and Blount, repeated ad nause- am, against the maintainers of satisfaction really are. They say, the doctrine of satisfaction makes sin cheap. But whether do they who say that sin cannot be pardoned without the sinner's re- pentance and satisfaction, or they who assert repentance alone Is sufficient, make sin cheapest ? 7. I further argue against this doctrine, that this constitution, grant or allowance of repentance, in case of transgression, is either cc-seval with the law, and has its rise as the law hath, in the relation betwixt God and man and their natures, as being a necessary re- sult of them ; or it is a posterior establishment, and an act of free and gracious condescension in God, to which he W'as not neces- PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 167 sarlly obliged. If this last is said, then I say, this could not be known, but by a revelation or some deed of God, expressive of his mind in this matter. The first is Denied by the deists ; ami we desire them to produce the work of providence whereon it is le- gible, that God without any reparation to his justice for the in- jury done him by sin, will pardon the sinner upon his penitence and admit him to bliss. For though we should admit, that some works of providence singly taken, without observing others which may have a contrary aspect, have somewhat like an intimation of a placability, which we see but little reason to do ; yet we deny positively that there is any that specifies the terms, or particular- ly condescends on repentance, as that whereon he will be pacified and reconciled to sinners. And if any will pretend to draw this from them, I wish they would essay it, and let us see of what form their procedure will be : perhaps they may prove, that it is not consistent with God's attributes to pardon an impenitent sin- ner : but if they think thence to infer, that therefore it is consist- ent to his attributes to pardon one merely upon his penitence, they may make good the consequence if they can ; they will find it harder than it appears. If the former is said, that this constitution is co-JBval with the kiw, and is as much a necessary result of the nature of God and man, and their mutual relation, as the law itself : besides what has been said to demonstrate the folly of it, let these three things be considered : (1.) The deists do, and are obliged to say, that man is not now from his birth more corrupt than he was at first. (2.) JMan at his original v.as, and consequently according to them, still is endued with power sufficient perfectly to know and obey the law he is subjected to. To say that he was subjected to a law, which he was not able to know or obey, is to accuse the Deity of folly and injustice ; as has been made appear. (3.) The law to which man is subjected, is exactly suited to God's great design, his own glory and man's happiness. These being granted, I conceive it evident, 1. That nothing can be said more injurious to the glorious perfections of God, than that any of them gives ground of hopes, far less assurance of impunity to man, if he break these laws, which are equciily suited to promote God's glory and his own good, and which he wanted neither power to know nor obey. 2. Such a grant would be of no less dangerous consequence to man, because it could be of no other use, than (o attempt a violation of those laws, which it is s& much his interest to obey. But some may say, it would be discouraging to man to think he were undone, if he disobeyed in the least. I answer, tliis cotild 16a AN INQUIRY INTO THE be no reasonable discouragement if he was possessed of power perfectly to know and obey the law he was subjected to. Again, it may be said, that it was necessary there should be such an encourgement to man ; because, though he was entrust- ed with sufficient power to know and obey the law of God ; yet he was for trial exposed to a great many strong and forcible temp- tations to disobedience. Foi answer to this ; suppose two men equally able to know and obey the law ; the one knows he may obtain pardon on repentance, the other believes himself irrecoverably lost if he transgress ; I desire the objector, on supposition that both were attacked with a temptation equally strong, to answer me seriously, 1 . Which of those two would in all probability soonest yield ; he that saw a probability of escape or he that saw none ? 2. Since the keep- ing of the law was highly advantageous to both, which of the two is in the best state ; he who has this strong motive to obedience, that he is ruined if he disobey, or he that hath this encouragement and enforcement of the temptation to disobedience, that he may disobey and escape ? Nor will they evade by saying, that this constitution was knowable before, but was not taken notice of till sin fell out : for if it might be known, all the inconveniences men- tioned will follow. Besides, if it was taken notice of after the first sin, it might be a temptation to all succeeding transgressions. In fine, if this allowance of repentance be said to have the same rise with the law, and be equally necessary from the nature of God and man and their mutual relation ; it is a plain dispensation with the law, and that equally made public, being notified in the same way as the law is ; which way it is consistent with the wisdom, holiness and justice of God, I know not. 8. To add no more on this head, if this story about the suffi- ciency of repentance lies so open to the light of nature, whence was it that It was so little discerned ? The name of it, in the sense and to that use we now speak of, scarce occurs among the an- cients, if we may believe Herbert, who read them all with great diligence, and with a design to find what was for his purpose. Speaking of their sins, he says : " Neque igitur mihi dubkim est, « quin eorum pcunituerit Gentiles, qua tot mala accerserunt, licet « rarius quidem i^miitentiiL verbnm inter authores, eo, quo jam « iisiirpatiir sensu, reperiatur.^^* Why does not he doubt of it ? The reason, he goes on, is, because they used sacrifices. But I suppose for this very reason some do doubt if they thought re- pentance sufficient : but of this more by and by. The philoso- • Herbert de Relig. GentH. page 198.—" Nor is it therefore a doubt with " me, that the Gentiles repented of those crimes which brought so many " evils upon them, although the word repentr.nce, in that sense which it is " now used, seldom occurs in thciv authors." PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 169 pliers neither taught nor practi-sed it. It is true, Periancler one of the wise men of Greece, had this for his saying : Af^x^Tci* fttrctfiaXcvs, " Repent of thj sin^ ;" that ia, possibly, leave them off". For who can iell us whether he had n riglit notion of repent- ance, or of what avail he thous;ht it ' Seneca say.-;. Qunn panifd pecasse pens est innoct'ns.f This is spoken wiih his usual pride (hat made him think little of r.in. P>ut vdiere is the person that taught repentance, or offered to evince it sufficient to atone tlie Deity ? Most of them contemptuously disregarded it. We fiud. nothing like it in their l)est moi'?list's practice : but on the con- trary, they were so puftcd up with their virtues, that they mode no account of their sins. The priests taught not tliis doctrine, for they inculcated sacrifices as necessary to aloue the Deity. And if we may believe no incompetent judge, bctii priests and people were pei-suaded that repentance is not sufficient to atone the Dei- ty. It is Cassar who tells us, that, " Pro vita hominis nisi vita- "• hominis reddatnr non posse deornm immorfalinm numen place-' " ri arbitmniur 6rfl///."J To which we might add many more testimonies to the same purpose. Nor do we find any thing like Ihis discovery among them ; which is very strange in a matter of importance, if it was so clearly revealed. That which is most like what they would be at, is what we find in Ovid : Saepe le\'ant poenas, ereptaque lumina redcliint Quem bene peccati penituisse vides. Et alibi, Qnamvis est ig-itur meritis indebita nostris. Magna tamen 6pes est in bonitate Dei'* But this is nothing to the purpose : how many of the poets' no- tions, and particularly this one, were traditional ? How evidently were their notions of all things about the gods suited to their own fabulous stories of the clemency of the gods. And besides, we have no assurance that he understood what we do by repentance. Nor indeed could he. But more of this anon. Objections Considered. IT remains now that we take notice of some considerable ob- jections that dxe made against what hitherto has been discoursed by diftercnt persons, on difFererit views and principles. t " He who repents of having- sinned is almost innocent." i Carsardc Bcllo Gal. Lib. 6. See Outramus de Sacrificiis, Lib. 1. Cap. 32. " The Gauls are of opinion that the ^Majesty of the immortal gods cannot het " appeased unless the life of a man be given for the life of man."' • De Ponto Lib. 1. Eleg. L 7. — " You see that he who didy i-epents of hir. "offence, often alleviates his punishment, and recovers his lost light. — Al- " though therefore it is not dvie tb our merits, yet there is great hop'' in Ttic- *' goodness of God." 22 170 AN INQUIRY INTO THE I. Hay some, if the case is so apparent thai all have sinned, and the relief is so hid, that nature's light could not discern it ; whence is it that all men run not to despair and take sanctuary here ? Whence is it that religious worship was universally continued in Ihe world ? Yea, Avhcnce is it that such a worship universally ob- tained, that seems founded on the supposition of a placable God ? To this specious argument we answer, that many things there are in nature, whereof Ave can give no satisfying account. And if there should prove something in morality too, not to be accounted for, it were not to be wondered at. But not to insist on this, I answer directly. A fair account may be given of this otherwise than by admitting what we have oveilln'own upon so many clear aigiunents. Towards which, we shall make the following attempt : 1. The natural notices of a Deity, that are inlaid in the minds of men, strongly prompted them to Avorship some one or other. From this natural obligation they could not shake themselves loose. •2. Their ignorance and darkness as to the real horror of the case, made them think little of sin, and consequently apprehend that it Avould not proA^e such an obstruction to acceptance, as really they Isad reason to apprehend it Avas. 3. All Avho allow of revelation, oAvn that the revelation of forgiv^eness, as well as the means of obtaining it, Avas tAA^ice universal in the days of Adam and Noah. 4. Though this rcA'clation was in so far lost by the generality of mankind, that it could not be useful to its proper end, yet some- AAhat of it still remained in the AA^orld, and spread itself AA'ith man- kind. 5. All sorts of men found their interest and account in keeping it up. The priests Avho engrossed the advantage of the leligion of the AAorld, found their gain in it. The politicians Avho .niraed at the good of society, found it useful to their purpose. The poets Avho aimed at pleasing, found it capable of tickling the ears of » AA'orld iuA'oIved in sin. And the people Avhose consciences AA'ere harrassed with guilt of atrocious crimes, found some sort of relief. And AA'hat all found some benefit by, was not likely quite to be lost. The philosophers seeing the strait of the case, saw that they could not make a better of it and so acquiesced. 6. Their pro- fane conceptions of the deities, as if they AA'ere persons that allow- ed or practised their evils, did help forAvard. The gods Avhich their OAvn fancy had framed, they could cast into Avhat mould they pleased, as it best suited their interest or inclinations. 7. Satan, Av ho acted a very visible part among them, and bore sway Avlthout controul, no doubt had a deep hand in the matter, and could vari- ously revive, alter and manage the tradition, natural notices and interests of men, so as to make his oavu advantage of them. Other things might be added, shewing the concernment of the holy God m tills matter, which I shall Avave for some reasons that are satis- fying to my;£elf. But what is said, I conceive sufficient to blunt PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 171 ibe edge of the objection. I shall only subjoin the words of the learned Amyrald, vvlio after lie has owned the natural discoveiies of placability ; but withal shown their uselessness, and that they had no influence nor could have, in the words formerly quoted, at length he moves this same objection that we have here proposed, and returns the answer, which we shall now transcribe, though it is somewhat long, the rather because it comes from a person not only of great learning, but one who owned placability might be demonstrated by the light of nature, and yet denies tliat it was the foundation of the religion that was to be found in the world. " But perhaps (says he) it will here be demanded, whence then " came it to pass that all nations have each of them had its reli- " gion ? And why are not all men dissociated instead of hanging " together in religious society ? To which I answer, that the •' mind of man is never agitated with the same emotions, nor con- " stant in the same thoughts ; the same passion not always pos- *' sessing him, nor the same vice. They take their turns, or suc- " ceed and mingle one with another. Two things therefore have hin- " dered that men, though possessed with fear, have not abandoned " all service of the Deity — profaneness and pride : God permitting " the profaneness of some and the presumption of others to tem- " per the terror of conscience. First, profaneness ; because not " weighing sufficiently how much God abominates vice, and how " inexorable his justice is, they often have flattered themselves " with this thought, that he scarce takes any notice of small of- " fences, and such as are in the intention and purpose only, that " is, in the aflTections of the will and not in actions really execut- " ed. Moreover, they thought he was not much incensed, but with " crimes that turn to some notable detriment to the common- " wealth, or carry some blot of infamous improbity. Although " m^^sculine lust was either justified or excused, or tolerated by " the most civilized people of Greece. And they were some- " times so besotted in their devotions, that they thought not but " crimes of the greatest turpitude with no great difficulty might " be expiated by their sacrifices, lustrations, religious processions, " mysteries and bacchanal solemnities. On the other side, pre- " sumption ; because not sufficiently acknowledging how much " tliey owed to the Deity, they imagined that their good works, " their offerings, and the exercise of that shadow of virtue, which " they pursued, might countervail the oflTences they committed : " so that were they balanced together, there might be hope not " only to avoid punishment, but moreover to obtain recompence. " Upon which groimd it was that Socrates being near his end, " and discoursing of the immortality of the soul, speaks largely of " his hope, (in case the soul be not extinguished with the body) " to CO and live with Hercules and Palamedes, and the other per- 172 AN INQUIRY INTO THE " sons of high account. But as to asking God pardon of the *' oflfences he had committed, he makes no mention at all of it ; *' because though he spoke always dissembllngly of himself, he *' had in the bottom of his soul great opinion of his own viitue, *' and made no great reckoning of his vices, from which notwith- *' standing he was no more exempt than others. And had his life *' been of such purity, that the eyes of men could not discern a *' blot in it (although some have written infamous matters of him) *' yet when the account is to be made up with God, there needs *' another perfection of virtue than that of his to satisfy so exact *' a justice. But yet further, oftentimes these two vices of pro- *' faneness and pi'csumption have met together in the same sub- *' ject, and lulled men with vain hopes into absolute supiuity. * Whence the excess of fear hath been retrenciied, which would *' otherwise have at last turned into despair, and consequently not *' only dissipated all communion in religion, but likcMise ruined all *' human society. For fear rcntraining man on the one side from *' absolutely contemning the Deity by jirofaneness, on the other ** side, profaneness and presum.ption hindered it from precipi- *' tating men into that furious despair which would have over- *' thrown all, and caused more horrible agitations in the mind of *' man, than ever the most' outrageous Bacchides were sensible of. " So that by the mixture, vicissitude and variation of these di- *' verse^ humours has religion been maintained in the world. But " it is easy to judge how sincere that devotion was, which was *' bred of fear, (a passion that is naturally terminated in hatred) " self-presumption, and misapprehension of the justice of God. *' Whereas the certain knowledge of the remission of sins, of " which the special revelation fiom heaven can only give us as- " sured hope, is a marvellous powerfully attractive to piety, out of *■' gratitude towards so inestimable a goodness."* II. Some object against what has been proven, That God is good, compassionate and kind ; and that natures of i'v.y excellency take pleasure in exercising mercy, com.passion and kindness, and "ivith difficulty are brought to acts of sevej'ity. I answer, 1 . The goodness, kindness, mercy and compassion of God are a prett}^ subject for men to declaim and nvtke harangues about. But when they are made, the}' are little to the purpose; for they aj-e easily answered by a representation of the justice ami Sioliness of God. And the difficulty is not touched, unless men can shew how these seemingly jarring attributes maybe consistent. 2. The inferences men must draw from such representations of the nature of God, are such as mil cross the experience of mankind who want revelation, and sec many effects of his bounty, goodness, Aniyi-;.ld of K-li^. Tavt 1. Chap. 7- F^o^ ^^h PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 173 forbearance and patience, but none of his pardoning mercy ; and many of his justice and holy severity. Wherefore we may leave this subject and proceed, though much might be said to clear how little all this is to the purpose. But we conceive this is apparent from what has been above discoursed. III. It is said, " That the very command of God to use his ap- " pointed means for men's recovery, doth imply that it shall not ♦' be in vain ; and doth not only shew a possibility, but so great a " hopefulness of success to the obedient, as may encourage them " cheerfully to undertake it, and carry it through.*" In ansAver to this, I have above cleared, that men are still oblig- ed to obey ; that there are many things, of which several are by him mentioned in the subsequent sections of that chapter, whence these words are quoted, which might be improven to excite man to a cordial compliance, in case there were a new, clear and plain in- vitation to a return with hope of acceptance. And I admit, that to deny this, as he says, in the words immediately proceeding those now quoted, were to make earth a hell. Yea further, so long as men are out of hell, there is still a possibility in the case : but that there is any such invitation given, or assurance of a hopeful issue, or means directly and specially instituted by God as means of re- covery, knowable by men left to the mere light of nature, I deny : because I see not the shadow, of a proof and evidence to the con- trary that has been offered. IV. It is alledgedby the same author, That God's commanding us to forgive others, encourages us to expect forgiveness at his hand. .To this I say, 1 .• The learned person owns, " That from this " it doth not follow, that God must forgive all, which he bindeth " us to foigive, for reasons he had before expressed." 2. I say, that this, the command of God to forgive others, lies not so open to the view of nature's light, as that every one can discern it. — And besides, it admits of many exceptions, for ought that unas- sisted nature can discover. 3. It is restricted to private persons, and is not to be extended to public injuries done against govern- ment. 4. When it is found to be our duty by nature's light, we are brought to see it by such reasons as these. That we need the like favour at their hands, that we are frail, &c. which gives us ground to be jealous that the like is not to be expected at his hand, with whom these things have no place, which are the reason of the law to us. So that from this, as it is discoverable by nature's light, no sure inference can be drawn. ' Baxter's Reasons of Christ. Rcliff. Part 1, Chap. 17. § 9. patje 186, 174 AN INQUIRY INTO THE V. It is objected, That sacrifices and all the religious services amongst the Heathens, were only symbolical of a good life and re- pentance.* To this I say, 1 . If this were true, Herbert and the Deists arc much in the wrong to the priests who urged the use of them, as men who neglected to inculcate repentance. For any thing 1 can see they were more commendable than the philosophers, who nei- ther taught nor practised repentance, and vilified sacrifices. But 2. This is a scandalous falsehood ; for there is nothing more evi- dent, than that by the sacrifices they designed to atone the deities, and expected that they should be accepted in place of the offerers, and their death be admitted instead of what they had deserved themselves. See abundance of testimonies given to this by him to whom we refened, when we quoted Caesars testim.ony to this pur- pose ; I mean Outram. What, I pray, meant the custom that prevailed, not only among the Jews, but Heathens, of offering their sacrifices with solemn prayers to God, that all the plagues which they or their country had deserved, might light on the head of the victim ; and so they themselves escape ? And hereupon they thought that all their sins did meet upon it, and defile it to that de- gree, that none who had touched it dared to return home till they had washed and purified themselves. Suidas reports of the Greeks, *' Quod, ei, qui mnlis overruncandis quotannis destinatus erat, sic *' imprecahanhir, sis 7repfe beginning of ver. 14. refers to and ren- liers a reason of the first clause of ver. 12. that they who had sinned without law, viz. the written law, shall perish without law, that is, not for violating the written law, Avhich they had not. [14.] Having removed these objection^';, he concludes his ac- count of the last judgment, ver. IB. wherein he gives them an ac- count, Is/, To whom it belongs originally to judge, it is God. '2dli/, Who the person is to whom the visible administration is committed, it is Jesus Christ. 3vay,^ he proceeds next directly to prove 1S4 AlV maUlRY INTO THE the same against the Jews in particular, and answers their objec- tions from chap, ii- ver. 17. to chap. iii. ver. 8. inclusive. To prove this charge against the Jews, he makes use only of' one argument, which yet is capable of bearing the weight of many conclusions or inferences. To understand this, we must take no- tice, that the apostle is dealing here with the Jews, who sought to be justified by works. And, 1. By way of Concession, he grants them several privileges above the Gentiles from ver. 17. to ver. 20. inclusive, viz. That they were called Jews ; that they had the law, on which they rested and pretended some peculiar interest in God, as being eX" ternally in covenant with him, ver. 17. of which they boasted; that they had some knowledge of the law, and pretended them- selves capable of guiding others. This he grants them in a varie- ty of expressions, ver. 18, 19, 20. By which the apostle secret- ly taxes their vanity, and insinuates, that whatever they had in point of privilege, they abused it. 2. The apostle charges them with a practical contradiction to this their knowledge, and this he makes good against them, par- ticularly against their highest pretenders, their teachers, I. By Condescending on several instances, wherein they were guilty and appealing to their consciences for the truth of them, ver. 22, 23. which I shall not insist in explaining. 2. He proves it further by a testimony of scripture, ver. 24. wherein God complains, that their provocations were such, as tempted the Gentiles to blas- pheme his name. This is the argument, the conclusion he leaves to themselves to- draw. And indeed it will bear all the conclusions formerly laid down against the Gentiles. Whatever their knowledrce was, they were not doers, but breakers of the /««', and so could not be jus- tified by it, ver» 13. but might expect to perish for their trans- gressions of it, according to ver. 12. They sinned against know- ledge, and so deserved as severe resentments as the Gentiles, chap, i. ver. S2. Tlicy could not pretend ignorance ; for they taught others tiie contrary, and so were without excuse, chap. ii. ver. 1. The apostle next proceeds to answer their objections. The first whereof is brought in, ver. 25. The short of it is this, the j-ws pretended they had circumcision, the seal of God's cove- nant, and so claimed the privileges of it. This objection is not directly proposed, bat the answer anticipating it is introdcced as a conRrmation or reason enforcing the conclusion aimed at, viz. That they could not be justified by the law : and therefore it is, that v/e find the casual particle for in the beginning of the verse. This mucjj for the manner wherein the objection is introduced. To this objection the r?po?tlc answer:-'.. PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 185 1. By a concession ; cimimcision verihj projitetk if thou keep the law, that is, if thou perfectly obey the commands, then thou niayest in justice demand the privileges of the covenant, and plead the seal of it, as a pledge of the faithfulness of God in the promises. 2. He answers directly by shewinjr, that this seal signified just nothing as to iheir claim of a legal righteousness, because they were breakers of the law. But if thou be a breaker of the law, thi/ circumcision is made uncircumrision. The short of the mat- ter is this ; this seal is only a conditional engagement of the faith- fulness of God : it does not say, thou shalt get the privileges whether thou perform the condition or not : so that by this meons, if the condition is not performed, ye have nothing to ask, and ye are as remote from a claim to the reward, as they who want the seal. 3. The apostle, to illustrate and confirm what he had said about the unprofitableness of circumcision in case of transgression, shews, that a Gentile upon supposition that it were possible, obey- ing the law, but Avanting the seal of the covenant, would have a better title to the privileges promised, than a Jew, who had the seal, but wanted the obedience, ver. 26. Therefore if the uncir- cumcision keep the righteousness of the law, that is, if a Gentile should yield that obedience the law requires, shall not his iincir- ttnncision, be counted for circvmcision ? That is, shall not he, notwithstanding he wanteth the outward sign of circumcision, be allowed to plead an interest in the blessings promised to obedi- ence, and to insist upon the faithfulness of God for the perform.- ance of the promises made to the obedient, of which circumcision is the sign ? The reason of this is plain, circumcision seals the per- formance of the promise to the obedient ; the Gentile obeying has that, which is the ground whereon the faithfulness of God is en- gaged to perform the promise, viz. obedience, and so a real title to the thing promised, though he wants the outward sign ; wherear the disobeying Jew has only the seal, which secures nothing, but upon the condition of that obedience, which he has not yielded. This is only spoken by way of supposition, not as if any of the Gentiles had yielded such obedience : for he had plainly proven the contrary before. The apostle's reason is this — circumcision is an engagement for the performance of the promise to the obedient. The disobedient Jew has therefore no title to the promise ; where- as the Gentile that obeys having that obedience to which the pro- mise is made, has a real right to it, and so might expect the per- formance of it, as if he liad the outward seal. 4. To clear yet further the unprofitableness of circumcision without o))edience, the apostle, upon the foresaid supposition, shews, that the Gentile obeying would not onlv have the better ti- 24 186 AN INQUIRY INTO THE He ; but his obedience would contribute to clearing the justice of God, in condemning the disobedient Jew, ver. 27 : And shall not imcircumcision which is by nature, if it fulfil the law, judge thee, who hy the leiler and circumcision dost transgress the law, that is, if a Gentile wanting circumcision and the security thereby giv- en, with the other advantages which the Jews have, discover the inexcusableness of your disobedience, who have the letter and circiimcision, or the written law, that is, who have a clearer rule of duty and plainer promise. 5. To remove entirely the foundation of this objection, the apostle clears the real design of circumcision, and the character of Ihe person to whom the advantages do belong, ver. 28, 29. where- in he shews negatively, that the Jew to whom the promises do be- long is not every one Avho belongs to that nation, or is outwardly a Jew ; and that the circumcision, to which the promises are ab- solutely made, is not the outward circumcision, which is in the flesh, ver. 28 ; but positively, that the Jew, to whom the promised blessings belong, is he who is a Jew inwardly, that is, who has that inward frame of heart which God requires of his people ; and the circumcision, to which blessings are absolutely promised, is that inward renovation of heart which is the princi- ple of the obedience required by, and accepted of God, ver. 29. This objection being removed out of the way, the apostle pro- ceeds to answer an instance against what he has now said in the three or four first verses of the 3d chap. The objection is pro- posed ver. 1. and is in short this. By your reasoning, would the Jews say, we have no advantage beyond the Gentiles, and cir- cumcision is utterly unprofitable. To this he answers, 1. By denying flatly Avhat is asserted in the objection, declar- ing, notwithstanding of all this, the Jews had every way the ad- vantage. 2. Lest this should appear a vain assertion, he clears it by an instance of the highest consequence, viz. that they had the oracles of God, which the Gentiles wanted, wherein that relief against transgressions, which the Gentiles were strangers to, is revealed, as he expressly teaches afterwards, ver, 21. As if the apostle had said, Though ye Jews fail of obedience, and so are cut oft' from justification by the law as a covenant of works, yet yc have a righteousness revealed to you in the law and the prophets, ver. 21. to v*'hich the sinner may betake himself for relief; this the Gentiles who want the law and the prophets know nothing of. 3. He clear?, that this is a great advantage, notwithstanding that many of the Jews were not the better for it, ver. 3. thus at once anticipating an objection that might be moved, and confirming what he had said. What if some did not believe, that is, though some have fallen short of the advantages of this revelation, shall PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 187 \re therefore say it was not in itself a privilege ? Nay, it is in itself a privilege, and they by their own fault in not believing, have forfeited the advantages of it to themselves only ; for shall their unbelief make the faith of God without effect ? That is, as- suredly believers will not be the worse dealt with for the unbelief of others ; but they will obtain the advantages of the promises. We have insisted much longer upon this context than was de- signed, but we hope that they who consider that the apostle's ar- guments and his whole purposes, are directly levelled at that which is the main scope of these papers, will not reckon this a faulty digression. And besides, we shall immediately see the use- fulness of this, in order to remove the foundation of a great many objections drawn from this context by Mi-. Humfrey : some of whose notions we shall consider after we have removed one ob- jection more, and it is this : VII. The words of the apostle Paul to the Athenians, Acts xvii. 27. are made use of for this purpose. The apostle tells them in the preceding words, that the God whom he preached, was he who made the ivorlds, hath made of one blood all nations of men, for to dwell on all the face of the earth, and hath determined the times before appointed, and the bounds of their habitation ; that they should seek the Lord, if happily they might feel after him and find him, though he be not far from every one of us : for in him we live and move and have our being. The sum of what is pleaded from this testimony amounts to this, that men left to the light of nature are in duty bound to seek the Lord ; that God is not so far from them, but that he may be found ; and that if they will feel after him, that is, trace these dark discoveries of him, in the works of creation and providence, they may happily find him. For answer to this we say, 1 . No word is here to be stretch-, fed further than the occasion and scope of the apostle requires and allows. 2. The occasion of this discourse was, that Paul being at Athens, saw that city set upon the worship of idols, and overlook- ed the one true God, which moved him with wrath, and gave oc- casion to this discourse ; the evident scope whereof is to shew, that they were to blame, that they overlooked the true God, and gave that worship to idols, which was only to be given to God. For convincing them of this, 3. He shews, that the true God, by his works of creation and providence had in so far discovered himself, that if by these works they sought after the knowledge of him, they might find him so far, or know so much, as to under- stand that he alone was the true God, to whom divine worship was due. 4. He owns, that indeed these discoveries were but dark, to wit, in comparison of the discoveries he had made of himself in tlie word ; which h sufficiently intimated by that expression of 188 AN maUIRY INTO THE ffeling after him, they might find him, so far as to deliver them from that gross idolatry and neglect of him they were involved in. Here is all that the scope holds out : but he does not say, that they might find him, so as to obtain the saving knowledge of him by these works of providence ; but on the contrary he tells us, that God winked at the times of ignorance, that is, seemed as if he did not notice men, and in his holy and sovereign justice left them to find by their own experience, which by any means they had, that they could not arrive to the saving knowledge of God ; though they might, as has been just now said, have gone so far as to dis- entangle themselves from that gross idolatry for which he now re- proves them. He does not say, that God then called them to saving repentance, gave them any discovery of his purpose of mercy, and thereon invited them to peace and acceptance : but on the contrary, he tells, that now he calls all men every where to re- pent, ver. 30. which sufficiently intimates that they had not that call before. In a word, it is not that seeking or finding of God, or that nearness to God which is here intended, that elsewhere the scripture speaks of, when it treats about men's case who are living under the gospel, and have God in Christ revealed, and the gos- pel call to turn, to seek after and find him to their own salvation ; as the scope of the place fully clears. Any one that would see this place fully considered, may find it done by the learned Dr. Owen, in that accurate, though short digression concerning uni- versal grace, inserted in his Theolog. Pantodap. page 33. There likewise is that other scripture, Acts xiv. ver. 15, 16, 17. largely considered. On which I shall not now insist, seeing there is no- thing in it that has the least appearance of opposition to what we have asserted, if not that God is there said, not to have left him- self without a witness among the nations, in as much as he did good to them, gave fruitful seasons, &c. This is granted : but these necessaries of life are no v/itness that God designed for them mercy and forgiveness, as has been made appear above, and as the Spirit of God tells us there ; for God suffered them to walk in their own way. Vni. Some alledge that there is a law of grace connatural to man in his lapsed state, and that in substance it is this, That God will pardon sinners upon their repentance : and they tell us, that this law of grace is as much written in the heart of lapsed man, as the law of nature was written in the heart of innocent man. To this purpose speaks Mr. Humfrey in his Peaceable Disquisitions,* and that with such an air of confidence, as might make one expect better proof than he has offered. * Peace. Disquls. Chap. 4. page 56. PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS- 189 We shall just now examine Mr. Humfrey's arguments. As to the notion itself of a connatural law of grace written in the hearts of all mankind in this lapsed condition, we look upon it as abso- lutely false. It contradicts scripture, reason and experience. My design excuseth me from the use of scripture arguments. Expe- rience I need not insist upon, after what has been already said. — Reason will not allow us to call any law connatural to man, save upon one of these three accounts ; either because we are born' with actual knowledge of it ; or, because it lies so open and is so suited to our rational faculties, that any man, who has the use of reason, can scarce miss thinking of it, at least, refuse his assent to it, when it is proposed to him ; or, finally, because it is nearly connected with notions and principles that are self-evident, and is easily deducible from them. Now this discovery of mercy to sini ners merely upon repentance is connatural in none of these senses. I know no truth that is connatural in the first sense. The ingenious Mr. Locke has said enough against this.* In the second sense, it is not connatural. Who will tell me, that this is a self-evident proposition, while so great a part of the more knowing and judi- cious part of mankind, not only refuse their assent to it, but reject it as a plain untruth ? Yea, I doubt if any that understands the case, and knows nothing of the satisfaction of Clirist, will give his assent to it. In this last sense it is not connatural ; for if it were so, it were easy demonstrable by these self-evident principles, to which it is nearly allied : which, when Mr. Humfrey shall have demonstrated from these principles, or any other for him, we shall then consider it ; but this I am apprehensive will never be done. In a word, all these truths, which with any tolerable propriety of speech can be called connatural, if they are not self-evident, are yet such as admit of an easy demonstration. And it is foolish to call any truth connatural, unless it is such, as either needs no proof, or is easily demonstrable. This is sufficient to overthrow this notion. Before we consider the arguments which Mr. Humfrey advan^ ces for his opinions, I shall offer to the reader a more full view of it in his own words. He then asserts, " that there is a connatu- " ral law of grace written in the heart of man, that is, that this " law of lapsed nature, this law of grace, or remedying law, is " written in the heart of man in regard of his fallen nature, no less ** than the law of pure nature itself was. The law of nature, " (says he) as I take it, is the dictates of right reason, declaring *' to us our duty to God, to ourselves and to our neighbors : and " the light of the same reason will dictate to us, when we have " failed in that duty, to repent and turn to God, with trusting to * Essny on Human Understand. Book 1. 190 AN INQUIRY INTO THE " his mercy and pardon if we do so, and not else. We do find " it legible in our hearts, that God is good and wisely gracious to " consider our lost estate, and pity our infirmities and necessary *' frailty."* After he has told us of a threefold promulgation of this law of grace under the Patriarchs, by Moses and Christ, which he calls three editions of the same law ; he subjoins, " Now I say, " that though the Heathen be not under (or have not) this law of *' grace, in the third and last setting out, or in the state under the " gospel ; yet they are under it (or have it) in the state of the *' ancients, or as they had it in the first promulgation ; and upon " supposition that any of them do, according to the light they " have, live up in sincerity to this law, I dare not be the man " that shall deny, that through the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ *' [procuring this law or covenant for them, as for us and all the *' world] they shall be saved even as we." And a little befoie he says, " These characters thus engraven in the heart of man, is *' the same law of grace in its practical contents, which is more *' largely paraphrased upon in the scriptures." Surely the apostle Paul had a very different notion of the state of the Heathen world from this gentleman, when he tells us em- phatically, that they are strangers from the covenants of promise, that they are without God, that is, without the saving knowledge of God ; for another sense the word will scarcely bear : that they are without Christ, without hope, afar off, &c. But it is not my de- sign to offer scripture arguments against this anti-scriptural divinity. I leave this to others, and proceed to his proofs : nor shall I in the consideration of them take notice of every thing that might be justly quarrelled ; but only hint at the main faults. 1 . He reasons to this effect : If there is no connatural law of grace written in the heart of man, then none of those who lived before Moses could be saved, in as much as there was then no other law by which they could be saved.f This argument he borrows from Suarez, and concludes it triumphantly thus, " which " is a truth so evident, as makes the proof of that law by that reason alone to be good." But for all this commendation, I think this argument has a dou- ble fault. 1. It proves not the point, viz. that there is a law of grace written in the heaits of all men by nature ; but only that there was such a law written in their hearts that were saved. This argument is built upon a supposition that is plainly false, viz. that there was no other way that they could be saved but by the law of grace written in their hearts. This, I say, is false ; for they were saved by the gospel discovery of Christ in the promise re- Peace, nisquis. Chap. 4, pag'e 5&, ' iViiCC. Disrjuis. page 56. PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 191 vealed to them by God, and wherein the generality of the Lord's people were more fully instructed by the patriarchs, who were preachers of righteousness. And this revelation and preaching was to them instead of the written word. Thus we see this mighty argument proves just nothing. 2. He reasons from Abraham's pleading with God on behalf of the righteous men in Sodom. Here he thinks it evident, that there were righteous men. He proves, that there were none righteous then, according to the tenor of the covenant of works, and therefore concludes, that tliese righteous persons did belong to, and were dealt with according to the covenant of grace.* But now what does all this prove ? Does it prove that these men were under the covenant of grace, and that they were dealt with accord- ing to the tenor of it ? Well, I grant it. But what will he infer from this, that therefore all the world were under the covenant of grace, or shall be dealt with according to its tenor ? I would have thought that one who has read Suarez, might know that this con- clusion will not follow. If there had been any righteous men in Sodom, it is true they were under the covenant of grace ; and I add, if there be any such in the world, they are under it ; there- fore all the world are so? Who sees not that this will not follow? Again, supposing that there were righteous men in Sodom, how will Mr. Humfrey prove, that they had no other rule of their life, or ground of their hope, but his connatural law of grace ? Why might they not have revelation ? Was not Abraham, to whom God revealed himself, and made so many gracious promises, well known to some in Sodom ? Might not the fame of such a person so near easily reach them ? Was not he the deliverer of Sodom some eighteen years before, and did not Lot his friend, who was well acquainted with the revelations made to Abraham, live in Sodom ? 3. Mr. Humfrey tells us, that the law of grace was in Adam and Noah's time published to all the world, and that it never was repealed, and therefore all the world are still under it, and so in a capacity of salvation.f But 1. This, were it granted, will not prove Mr. Humfrey 's conna- tural law of grace. The gospel is revealed to all the inhabitants of England ; therefore the law of grace is written in their hearts : he must know very little of many people in England, who will admit the consequence. 2. Nor will it prove, that all the world are un- der the gospel revelation, even in its first edition, to use Mr. Hum- frey's words. Suppose God once revealed to the world, when it was comprised in the family of Noah, the covenant of grace, and 80 all this little world had the external revelation : will IMr. Hum- • Peace. Disquis. paga 60. j Ibid, pag-e6?. 192 AN iNaUIRY INTO THE frey hence infer, that all the descendants of Noah, after so long a tract of time, in so many different nations, have still the same reve- lation ? If he do, the consequence is nought. It is as sure as any thuig can be, that very quickly most of the descendants of Noah lost in so far that revelation, or at least, corrupted it with their vain additioiis to that degree, that it could be of real advantage to no man. 3. Nor will what Mr. Humfrey talks of his repeal help out his argument. To deprive a people of the advantage of an exter- nal revelation, there is no need of a formal repeal by a published statute ; it is enough that men by their wickedness lose all remem- brance of it, and suffer it to fall into desuetude, and God sees not meet to renew the revelation to them or their posterity. 4. Mr. Humfrey will prove his point by a syllogism, and it runs thus, The doers of the law are justified, Rom. ii. ver. 13. but tjie Gentiles are doers of the law; ergo, some of the Gentiles are justi- fied before God. The conclusion of this argument is the direct antithesis of that position, which the apostle makes it his business in that whole con- text to prove, as is evident from the account already given of that context. This is pretty bold. But let us see how he proves his minor. This he pretends to do from Rom. i. 14. where it is said, that the Gentiles do by nature the things contained in the law, and so are doers of the law, and consequently shall be justified. Well, is this the way this gentleman interprets scripture upon other occasions ? I hope not. He has no regard to the scope or design of the apostle's discourse. All that the apostle says here, is, that the Gentiles are in so far doers of the law, that their doing is proof that they have some knowledge of it. The persons who here are said to be doers of the law, are the very same persons of whom the apostle says, ver. 12. that they shall perish without the law. But we have fully cleared this context before, and thither I refer the reader. But Mr. Humfrey reforms his argument, and makes it run thus, He who sincerely keeps the law, shall be justified according to that of our Lord, keep the commandments if thou wilt enter into eternal life ; and that of the apostle, God. will render eternal life to every one that patiently continues in well-doing; but argues he, some Gentiles keep the law sincerely: and therefore it is according to the gospel, which requires not the rigor, but accepts of sincere obedience. As to our author's major, if the meaning of it be, that wc shall be justified before God for, or upon our sincere obedience, accord- ing to the gospel, I crave leave to differ from him ; nor will the scriptures adduced by him prove it in this sense. The first is a reference of a young man to the covenant of works, who was not seeking salvatioji, but eternal life by doing, iu order to discover to PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 193 him his own inability and his need of Christ. But as to this commentators may be consulted. The other text I have cleared above. His minor I flatly deny : well, but our author will prove it by a new syllogism, which runs thus. He who yields sucli obedience as the Jews, who are circumcised in heart, do, yields that sincere obedience, upon which the gospel accepts and justifies men ; but the Gentiles, or some of them yield such obedience. I have already entered my dissent against the last clause of the major, viz. That the gospel justifies men on sincere obedience ; but it is not my design to debate the point of justification with our author at this time, and so I let this proposition pass : yet I again deny the minor, which our author essays to prove thus, That some of the Gentiles do obey in that sense, in which the Jews, who are circumcised inwardly or in heart, do obey : this he pretends to demonstrate from the apostle's words, Rom. ii. 26, 27. Therefore if the undrcumcision keep the righteousnsss of the law, Sec. and shall not iincircumcision, which is bij nature, if it fulfil the law. But where will our author find the proof of his minor in these words ? There is nothing like it, unless he take the antecedent of a hypothetic proposition, for a plain assertion. But this antecedent needs not be allowed possible, and yet the apostle's words and his assertion would hold good, and all that he aims at be reached. Eve- ry one knows, that in such propositions, it is only the connexion that is asserted. As for the meaning of the text, I have bhewed before that it is not for our author's purpose. 5. But our author has another argument, which he thinks is clearer than all the rest, and professes himself perfectly stricken with the evidence of it, as with a beam of light never to be with- stood, or any more to be doubted. Well this mighty argument runs thus, " If this was the chief advantage the Jew had over the '• Gentile, that one had the oracles of God, and the other had " not, then was there not this diiference between them, that one " is only in a state. of nature, and the other in a state of grace ; " or that one was in a capacity, and the other under an impossi- *' bility of salvation. For this were an advantage of a far greater " nature. But this was the advantage, Rom. ili. 2. Chiefly be' " cause to them were commilled the oracles of God;^^'^^ ergo : I must confess, that I am not stricken with so much evidence upon the proposal of this argument, as it seems our author was. — To me this argument appears a plain sophism. That the Jev»'3 had the oracles of God, was a greater advantage, tlian our author seems to think it. And while the apostle calls it the chief advantage of the Jews above the Gentiles, tliat they had the oradcs of God, * Peace. Disq• accepted. But who will assure me that Cornelius was a stranger PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. m5 to the scriptures ? Did he not know them ? Did he not believe them ? How could that be ? It is plain he was a proselyte and em- braced the Jewish religion, as to its substance,-and that he did be- lieve, since he pleased God and was accepted. Now we know, that without faith it is impossible to please God. What wanted he then ? Why, he wanted to be informed that the Messiah promised was come, and that Christ Jesus was he. As to what the apostle says of God's acceptance of persons of all nations^ any one that will give himself the trouble of considering his scope, and the cir- cumstances of the place, will see, that it is nothing else but a com- ment upon the design of the vision he got to instruct him, that now God was to admit persons of all nations, Gentiles as well as Jews, to a participation of the covenant blessings. DIGRESSION. A short Digression concerning God^s Government of the Heathen World, occasioned bi/ the foregoing Objections, wherein an at- tempt is made to account for the Occurrences that have the most favorable Aspect to them, without supposing any Intention or Design of their Salvation, which is, adjected as an Appendix to the Answers given to Mr. Humfrey's Objections, wherein it is made evident, that there is no need to suppose the Heathens un- der a Law or Government of Grace. If I should here stop, the persons with whom I have to do, might possibly allege, that the main strength of their cause re- mains untouched, and the most straitening diflGculty that presses ours is not noticed. The short of the matter is, they inquire. What government are the Heathen world under ? They conceive it must be allowed a government of grace, since they are not dealt by ac- cording to the demerit of their sins. Possibly we might propose some questions that would be no less hard to satisfy, by those who talk of an xuiiversal law of grace : but this would not remove the difficulty, though it might embarrass the opposers of our senti- ments. I shall therefore open my mind in this matter, and offer what occurs on this head. If I mistake, it will plead somewhat for me, that the subject, so far as I know, is not usually spoken of by others, and I have not of choice meddled with it, but was led to it by my subject, that requires some consideration of it. If we state right thoughts in this matter, it will give light to many things, that otherwise are dark. What I have to say, I shall pro- pose in the subsequent gradation. 1. Man was originally made under a law that is holy, good, righteous, equal and just ; this law required of all subjected to it exact, punctual and perfect obedience ; and for its preservation it 19S AN maUIRY INTO THE was armed with a penal sanction, answerable to the high and tender regard, which the infinitely holy, wise and great God had for the honor of that law, that was the declaration of his will, bore the impress of his authority and representation of all his moral excel- lencies. And besides all this, he also proposed a reward, suitable to his wisdom and goodness, for which his faithfulness became pledged. It is not needful to launch out in proof of the several branches of this assertion. That man was made under a law, is questioned by none, but Atheists ; and they have their mouths suflSciently stopped of old and late by many persons of worth and learning. That this law is holy, just and good, cannot without noti'ble injury to the Deity be denied. That it exacted perfect obedience, is so evident, that no person, who thinks what he says, can deny it. A law not requiring perfect obedience, to its own precepts, is a law not requiring Avhat it requires, which is plain nonsense. A posterior law may not requii-e perfect obedience to a prior : but every law requires perfect obedience to itself. That this law was armed with a penal sanction is evident from the wis- dom of the law-oiver, who could not enact such laws, which he knew men would transgress, without providing for the honor of his own authority. Besides, if there is no penal sanction, it is not to be expected that laws could ever reach their end, especially as things have always stood with man. But were all those proofs given up, the effects of vindictive justice in the world, Avlth the fears that sinners are under, lest all these are only the beginning of sor- rows, sufficiently confirm this truth, and moreover assure us, that it is such a penalty as suits every way the offence in its nature and aggravations. But I know none of those things will be questioned by those, whom we have mainly under view at present. 2. All the children of men, in all ages and in all places of the world, have been and are guilty of violations of this law. We have heard the Deists owning this before ; and Christians will not deny it. Deists would have thought it their interest to deny it : but since, it is unquestionable that the generality offend, in instances past reckoning. If they had affirmed, that any one did, in no in- stance offend, they might have been required to make good their assertion : but this they could not do. They durst not condescend. And therefore it must be owned that the best, not in one instance, but in many, violate this law. 3. Upon account of these violations of his holy and righteous law, all mankind, every individual, and evwy generation of men, that have lived in the world, are obnoxious to justice. By those sins they have forfeited any claim they might have laid to the re- v/ard of perfect obedience, and .ire liable to the penalty in the sanc- tion of the law. And God might, at any time, have righteously inflicted it, cither upon any individna,! or any whole race of men. PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 197 1 determine not now what that punishment was. Tliey who talk that our offences are small, and extenuated thera, seem scarcely impressed with suitable notions of God, and I doubt will not be sustained judges competent of the qualities of offences and injuries done to his honor. But whatever the punishment is, eternal, or not, which I dispute not now, because we agree about it with those, whom we now have under consideration, it is certain none can prove that it is all confined to time, or that any temporal punish- ment is sufficient for the least offence that is committed against God. And it is also clear, that, upon one's sinning, the penalty might be presently inflicted, without any injustice, provided the penal sanction were suitable and just in its constitution, as of ne- cessity it must be, where God made the law and constituted the punishment. 4. Although God righteously might have cut off any generation of men, and swept the earth clean ; yet has he seen meet to spare sinners, even multitudes of them, for a long time. A piece of conduct truly astonishing ! Especially it would appeal- so, if we understood how much God hates sin. The only reason why the Heathen world hath not admired it more, and been more extensive in their inquiries into the reasons of it, is because they had but very short and imperfect notions of God's holiness, and the evil of sin. They took notice of God's forbearance of some notorious offeu- ilers. Some of them stumbled at it, and some of them en- deavored to account for it. But the wonder of God's sparing a world full of sinners, was little noticed, and though they had ob- served it, they would have quickly found themselves as much at a loss here, as any where else. The scriptures have not gratified the curiosity of men with such a full account, as our minds would have desired, that are too forward to question him particularly about his M'ays, who gives an account of none of his matters : yet some reasons of this conduct are dropped that may satisfy the humble. 1. God made a covenant with Adam, wherein his pos terity, as well as himself were concerned and included. They were to be gainers or losers as he acquitted himself well or ill. This transaction, I know, is denied by some Christians. I shall not dispute the matter with them : others have done it. I now take it for granted. And if they will not suppose it, it is but the loss of this reason. And let them if they can put a better in its room. Upon supposition, that there was such a transaction, and that it was just, as we must allow all to be, whereof God is the author, it was not only equal, but in point of wisdom, apparently necessarj', or at least, highly suitable, that all concerned in this transaction should be brought into being, to reap the fruits of it. But this was impossible if the world had not been spared. 2. God, in sparing the world, had a design of mercy upon some. And ma 198 AN INQUIRY INTO THE ny of them were to proceed from some of the worst of sinners. He designed to save some in all ages, and in most places. Their progenitors must therefore, of necessity, be kept alive. He bears with the provoicing carriage of evil men ; because out of their loins he intends to extract others, whom he will form for the glori/ of his grace. 3. God is patient toward sinners, to manifest the equity of his future justice upon them. When men are spared and continue in sin, the pleas of infirmity and mistake are cut off, and they are convicted of malice. They are silenced, and on- lookers satisfied, that severity is justly exercised on them. Qiuin- to, Dei magis judicium tardum est, tanto niagis justum.'^ As patience, while it is exercised, is the silence of his justice ; so when it is abused, it silences men's complaints against his justice. Other reasons of this conduct we might glean from the scriptures : but my design allows me not to insist. Nor indeed do they de- scend so low as to satisfy curious wits. Lo, these are parts of his ways and aims, hut how little a portion is heard, that is, even by revelation known of him ? says Job, chap. xxvi. 14. 5. The world, or sinners in it, are spared, not by a proper re- prieve, that is, a delay of punishment, after the offenders are ta- ken up, questioned, tried, convicted, and solemnly condemned ; the way, manner and time of their punishment fixed, by a judicial appHcation of the general threatening of the law in this particular case, by the judge competent, and the sentence plainly intimated ; a delay of the execution after this, if it is of the judge's proper motion, if the offender is not imprisoned, if he is employed, and if favors are conferred upon him, and obedience required of him, gives hopes of impunity and escape ; and if the persons commit not new offences, without, at least, an appearance of insincerity, they are very seldom condemned upon the first sentence : but sinners are spared by a forbearance, or wise and just connivance, if the word would not offend. The Governor of the world knows and sees the carriage of sinners, is aware of their sins, and keeps silence for a time ; but yet keeps an eye upon them, calls them not into question, puts off the trial, takes them not up, as it were, and winks at them. Now all this may be justly done for a time ; the sinners may be employed, and acts of bounty, for holy and wise ends, may be conferred on them, and exercised towards them, and that without the least injustice, without any design of par- doning ; as the sequel of this discourse will more fully clear. 6. This forbearance of God is wise, just and holy : for 1 . He is the only competent judge, as to the time of pimishing offenders. It cannot be made appear, that he may not thus delay, even where he has no thought of pardoning. 2. It implies no approbation of The slower that the jtidgment of God is, it is the more just.' PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 199 the faults formerly committed or those they may commit, during this interval of time, since he has sufficiently testified against them by the laws he has made, idiich forbid them by the penalty an- nexed to those laws, and by examples of his severity upon others, which have not been wanting in any generation. These may suffi- ciently acquit him, however for a time he keeps silent, and conceals, as it were, his knowledge of the offences of some, or his resent- ments against them, on account of them. 3. He accomplishes purposes worthy of him ; which are sufficient to justify him iu this conduct, while he keeps silence, and carries to them as if there were no offence, or lie knew none, and they go on in their rebel- lion, or secret practices against his law and government. Impu- dent offenders have no place left, either for denial or excuse of their crimes, or complaints against the severity of his resentments. Spectators are made to see that it is not infirmity or mistake, but fixed alienation or enmity that is so sharply punished. He serves himself of them, and makes them, though they mean not so, carry on the designs of his glory, either in helping or trj^ing, or bringing into being persons, whom he has designs of mercy upon. And sure iie may justly do this, since not only he has the best title to their obedience ; but he has all the reason and right in the world to use that life, while he spares it, for what purposes he pleases, Afhich they have forfeited to justice. Who can blame him, if sometimes he spares secret plotters, and lets them go on till their plots are sufficiently ripened for their conviction, and others' satis- faction. Nor is there any ground to quarrel, if he deal even with the worst, as equal judges do with the mother, guilty of some manifest crime ; they not only spare and delay the execution, till the ^hild whom they design mercy to, is brought forth ; but do not take notice of her, or intimate even a purpose of punishment, till afterwards, lest the child should suffer by the mother's despair and grief. 4. This is yet more remarkably just in God, who can on the one hand secure the criminal, so that justice shall not suffer by the delay, and on the other, that the criminal shall not run out in- to those impieties, that would cross the ends, endanger the safety, or wrong the reputation of his government, with those who are ca- pable of making an equal estimate of things. 7. It was every way suitable and necessary that the persons thus spared, should be continued under a moral government. They were not to be ruled by mere force : 1 . Because they are, while un- der such a forbearance, capable of some sort of a moral govern- ment. When a prince deals with persons, whom he knows to be on treasonable plots against this government, and conceals his re- sentment, he still manages them as subjects, and continues them under a government ; nor is he faulty in doing so. 2. They are not, while under such a forbearance, capable of any other govern- 200 AN INCIUIRY INTO THE ment ; for if once the Ruler of the world begin to deal in d way of force and justice with them, then this forbearance is at an end. 3. It were a manifest reproach to the Governor of the world, if they were supposed under no government at all. Besides, on this supposition, the ends of his forbearance could not be reached. And moreover, the moral dependence of creatures on their Crea- tor, which can only be maintained either in this way, or by putting them under the penal sanction of the law, would be dissolved, which cannot be admitted. 8. Sinners under this dispensation are still under the law of cre^ ation : it is true this law can no longer be the means of conveying a title to the great and principal reward ; but that is their own fault, and not the governor's, nor the laws'. But notwithstanding of this, they are still under it, and it continues the instrument of God's government over them. For 1. The ground of obedience still continues, although some of the motives, yea, the principal en- couragement, I mean, eternal rewards, are forfeited. The obliga- tion to obedience can never otherwise be dissolved, than by the in- flicting of a capital punishment, which puts out of all possibility of yielding any obedience. Some, I know make the power and right of obliging, to consist merely in a power of rewarding and punish- ing : but this is easily convicted of falsehood : and although the learned Mr. Gastrcl has advanced this, in his sermons at Boyle's ijecture, yet we have no reason to receive it, as Beconsal in his treatise of the Law of Nature, and othei-s have sufficiently cleared. 2. This law is sufficient to answer the designs of this forbearance^ and God's rule over them who live under it and by it. It has not lost its directive power ; but it is able sufficiently to instruct, at least in these duties, either as to God, ourselves or others, that are of absolute necessily to keep some order and decorum in the world, carr}" on regularity, the propagation of mankind, and the like. It is manifestly sufficient to be a test to try men's willingness to obey, and convince men of wilfulness in their rebellion ; and to be a stand- ing monument of God's holiness ; yea, it continues to have that force upon the consciences of the generality, as to be a check to keep them from running into enormities subversive of all order and society, and destructive to the other ends of God's patience. '2. Experience fully clears, that men still pay regard to this law» and this is the only law that men destitute of a revelation own. 9. While God saw meet to continue this forbearance, it was not necessary nor suitable, that he slionld plainly, particularly and so- lemnly intimate all the length he designed to carry his resentments asainst offijuders. 1 . There v>'as no necessity of this towards the clearing of God's holiness ; this being sufficiently done by the pro- nujlgatlou of the law, its penalty, and many particular examples. i2. This would bavo undone the dispensation whereof we have PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 201 been speaking. 3. This is utterly inconsistent with all the design^ of it. Men had been driven into despair, and so all moral go- vernment had been dissolved. 10. Yea, it was consistent with his holiness, and suitable to his wisdom, to permit men to fall into sin, very great sins, and for a time to go on in them. God can neither do any thing that is un- worthy, nor omit any thing that is worthy of him, of a moral kind. And it is certain in fact, that such sins and enormities he has per- mitted : and therefore, however strange it appears to us, that a holy God, who could have restrained, should permit those things ; yet since he, who can do no evil, has done it, we must conclude this altogether consistent with his holiness. And it is manifestly so with his wisdom, since no injury is done to his holiness. For 1 . By this means sinners give full proof, what a height their enmity against God is come to. 2. They are the fitter to exercise his own people. And 3. They are riper for the strokes he designs to inflict on them. Notwithstanding of all this, it was meet and necessary that some offenders should be remarkably punished, and some bounds set to offences ; and more especially those offences which cross the de- signs of God's forbearance, and tend to dissolve the government and order, which it was necessary God should maintain in the world. And hence it has come to pass, that not the greatest sins, such as these certainly are, which immediately strike against God, but these which strike against order and government, have been most remarkably punished in all ages, as might be made appear by innumerable instances of the remarkable punishment of murders, treasons, and undutiftilness to parents. This is congi-uous to jus- tice, not only on the abovementioned account, but on this, that the notices concerning these last sort of evils are much more clear in most instances, than those which respects the former. 12. It is every way suitable to the wisdom, sincerity and holi- ness of God ; yea, and of absolute necessity to the design of this his forbearance, that he exercise bounty in lesser things ; such as the good things of this life are : and that he vouchsafe those mental endowments to some of the spared sinners, which are necessary toward the maintenance of that government, which God was to keep up among them ; such are civil wisdom, invention, courage, &c. These he may give without the least intimation of any de- sign of special mercy. For what relation have these things to special mercy, which are heaped in abundance on the worst of men. However, that it was fit these things should be bestowed upon some in this case, is evident ; because, 1 . Eternal rewards are now forfeited, and there would have been nothing to induce to obedi- ence if this had not been done. 2. Hereby he gives a witness to his own goodness, which aggravates ofl!*enceg committed against him. 26 202 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 3. Hereby he draws on men to obedience, or rather to do those pieces of service, which are in their own nature, such as he allows and requires, although they design not his service, but their own pleasure and piofit. 4. Hereby he clears scores with sinners, while he suffers not what is even but pretended service, to pass without a reward, which is suflficient to shew what a kind rewarder he would have been, if they had indeed obeyed. 5. Hereby he cuts off all excuse for their continuance in disobedience. 6. This conduct gives them an innocent occasion of discovering latent wickedness, which otherwise they would have had no access to shew, and keeps from that utter despair which would have marred the design of God's forbearance. 13. These vouchsafements of divine bounty lead to a sort of J epeutance ; not that to which the promise of pardon is joined in the gospel. For 1 . They give eminent discoveries of the good- ness of that God whom we have offended, and consequently of the folly of offending him, which naturally leads to sorrow or regret. 2. They strengthen, as all benefits do, the original obligation to obedience. 3. They let us see, that obedience is not altogether fruitless, since they may expect less severe resentments if they return ; yea, may expect some share in this bounty, and are not under an impossibility of mercy, for any thing they can know. 14. After all, I do yet see no reason to think, that they who are merely under such a dispensation as this, which I take to be the case of the Heathen world, are under a law of grace ; which assures, that upon a return to former obedience, sins shall be en- tirely pardoned, and they have access to eternal rewards. I grant it highly probable, that if God had not intended grace to some, such a dispensation had never been granted. I admit, that this dispensa- tion is subservient to a design of grace upon some. I further al- low, that there is no absolute impossibility of the salvation of per- sons, however deeply guilty, who are not yet under the penalty : but if they are saved, it must be by some means or way revealed by God, and superadded to all the former, which I can never see to amount to any law of grace, since it is manifest, 1 . That all this may be exercised toward them whom God in the end designs everlastingly to punish. He exercises nmch long-suffering to the vessels of nrath fitted to destruction. 2. There is nothing in the whole dispensation, that in the least intimates any purpose of God to pass by former offences, either absolutely or upon condition. 3. In fact it has never been found, that ever this dispensation has led any one to that sincere repentance, which must be allowed ne- cessary, in order to pardon. And, I dare not say, that God ever did appoint means for such an end, which after so long a trial should never answer it. 4. All whom God has pardoned, or of whom we may say, that he has brought them to repentance, have been PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 203 brought by other means. So that upon the whole, I see no gi'ound for asserting an universal law of grace. As what has been above said, takes off the principal pretence for such an universal law of grace, which some seem so fond of; so if any such is asserted, it must be owned to be a law of a very universal tenor, as being that wherein all mankincH^e concerned. It must be allowed a law designed to take off the fwce of the ori- ginal law, concreated with our nature, that necessarily results from the nature of God and man, and their natural relation, at least as to one instance, I mean the penal sanction, in case of sin. It must be allowed to be a law not merely directive as to duty, but design- ed to tender undeserved favors to sinful man. Now he that can think a few, (or call them many) dubious actions, that is, actions capable of another, yea, contrary construction, a sufficient promul- gation of such a law, as is of so universal extent, as derogates, at least in one instance, of so great moment, from a law so firmly and solemnly established, without any known provision for its honor, injured by so many sins; and finally that tenders such great favors to the transgressors of it, may believe what he pleases. I must own, this one consideration is with me enough to sink that notion. But to conclude this whole matter, upon which we have dwelt so long. Upon the nicest survey of occurrences in the Heathen world, I can see nothing that savours of any acquaintance with that forgiveness that is with God ; unless it is that generally en- tertained notion of the placability of their deities. This notion, I make no doubt, had its rise from revelation^ and was continued by tradition. And several things did concur to the preservation of this, while other notices that had the same rise were lost ; the apparent necessity of it to man in his present sinful condition ; the suitableness of it to lay a foundation for that worship, to which the remaining natural notices of a Deity urged them, and which was of indispensible necessity toward the support of human go- vernment ; the darkness and blindness of men as to the exceeding sinfulness of sin ; the holiness of God's nature, and the strong in- clination all men have to be favourable, even to their faults, did contribute not a little toward its support. Finally, this placability did not so much respect the one true God, of whom they had very little knowledge, as their own fictitious deities, which they put in the room of the true God. And it is obvious, that when men took upon them to set up gods, they would be sure to frame such as might agree with their own apprehensions, and pass by their faults with as little difficulty as they committed them. Whatever there is as to this, we have no reason to think that this is a natural notice, it being neither self-evident, nor certainly deducible from principles that are such. 204 AN INaUlR¥ INTO THE CHAP. XI. Proving the Insufficient/ of Natmal Religion to eradicale our Inclinations to Sin, or to subdue its Power. I THINK we have said enough to demonstrate the insufficiency of natural religion, to satisfy us as to the way how we may obtain the removal of guilt or the pardon of sin. Let us now see whe- ther it is able to remove the corruption of nature, and subdue or eradicate our inclinations to sin. Before we enter directly on this, it will not be impertinent, if it is not plainly necessary, that we say somewhat concerning the na- ture of this corruption. We shall therefore offer the few follow- ing hints concerning it. It is most certain, that man has corrupt inclinations. I think this will scarce be denied ; since it is beyond contradiction evi- dent, that the bulk of mankind in all ages, have run headlong into those courses which reason condemns as contrary to the law, under which we are made. The law condemns, reason justifies the law, and proclaims those courses unworthy of us ; conscience checks and sometimes torments, and yet sinners run on. Can all this be without corrupt inclinations swaying, yea, as it were, forcibly driving that way ? Not surely. 2. It is certain, that not only there are such inclinations in man, but that they are exceedingly strong and forcible. Our own reason condemns those actions, and cries shame on the sinner's conscience, presages the resentments of the righteous God, the evil effects of them are visible, and they are felt to be destructive to our health, luinous to our reputation and estates, inconsistent with our inward peace ; yea, in a few instances, human law provides tenible pun- ishments : and yet, in spite of all these strong barriers, we are carried down with the stream : nor can the most rational consider- ations, from interest, honor or prudence, stop our career. Cer- tainly the force of inclination, that carries over all these, must be ■great. 3. It seems plainly natural and congenial to us. I shall not nicely inquire in what sense it is so. I am far from thinking, that our natures as at first made, were created with it. I have said enough before to prove this impossible : but I mean, that as our natures now are, however they came to be so, it is an inseparable appendage of them, cleaves to them, and proceeds not merely from custom, and is not acquired, though it is often improved by custom. Now this seems evident from many things, 1. The uni- versality of it. All men, in all age?, in all places, and in all cir- cumstances, have such vicious inclinations. I do not say that eye- PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 205 ry individual is proud, ambitious, covetous, revengeful, passionate and lustful. No, but every one has some one or other of these, or the like breaking out : which says the spring is within, and is strong ; though the constitution of our bodies, the climates we live under, our education and circumstances of life, have dammed in some of them, and cut out channels for others of them. Now it is plainly unaccountable how all men should be thus corrupt, if not naturally so. No parallel instance, in any sort, can be given, where any thing not natural and congenial, at least as to its prin- ciple and inclination, has obtained such an universal sway. 2. It waits not till we are grown and framed by education, custom, en- gagement and inventions ; but makes strong, discernible, and sen- sible eruptions in infancy and childhood. As soon as we are ca- pable, and very oft, while one would think us scarcely so, by rea- son of age, we are proud, revengeful, covetous. Sec which says this is congenial. 3. It is often seen, that these corruptions break out in our younger years, which neither education, example, circum- stances, nor any thing else but a corrupted nature, can give any en- couragement to. 4. Yea more, how strong are these inclination?, and that very early, which are discouraged, opposed, borne down, and have all outward occasions cut off from them. One is pas- sionate among calm people, though he is punished for it and sees il not. Another is ambitious and proud among sober people, in mean circumstances, where there is no example to excite ambition, no theatre to act it upon, and the beginnings are curbed by precept, instruction, reproof, chastisements and example. 5. Those things are evidently interwoven with, and strengthened by the very con- stitutions of our bodies, and climates under which we live. Hence there are domestic and national vices, which cleave to some fami- lies and nations. 6. The best, the most sober, and freest from dis- cernible eruptions of corruption, still own they find their incli- nations strong, and driving them into indiscernible acts corres- pondent to them. 7. They who deny the force and being of these inclinations, and who pretend that the will of man is able to master all these, yet cannot but own, that there are such inclina- tions ; and as for the pretended ability of the will to conquer them, they give the least proof of it who pretend most to it : for if the will is thus able, and if, as they pretend, they have sufficient moral arguments which persuade to it, why is it not done ? ^Vhat stops it ? 8. IJshall only further offer the testimonies of some few among the Heathens. Tim(zus the Locrian, who lived before Plato, tells us in his discourses, " That vitiosity comes from our parents " and first principles, rather than from negligence and disorder of public manners ; because we never part from those actions which lead us to imitate the primitive sins of our parents."* Plato tells us, • Gak's Court of the Gentiles, Part 4. Lib. 1. Cap. 4. Par. 2. 206 AN maUIRY INTO THE that, " In times past the divine nature flourished in men ; but at " length it mixed with mortal, and ivipmvivoi v'*®-, human corrup- ** tions prevailed to the ruin of mankind : and from this source there *' followed an inundation of evils on men. Hence he calls corruption " »»e-®- Twy x«7« ^vFif, the natural disease, or disease of nature, be- " cause the nature of mankind is greatly degenerated and deprav- " ed, and all manner of disorders infest human nature : and men " being impotent, are torn in pieces by their own lusts, as by so " many wild horses. Hence Democritus is said to aflSrni the dis- " eases of the soul to be so great, that if it were opened, it would " appear to be a sepulchre of all manner of evils." Aristotle tells us, " That there is in us somewhat naturally repugnant to right " reason, 7rs^vK<^ «i»7s made for this end, but barred from its attainment, by the interposition of those great hinderances and rubs which now are certainly in its way ; I mean darkness, guilt «nd corruption. These are stones in the way. How has nature's light acquitted itself as to the rolling them away ? Truly they have I'ten like F^ysiphus's stone, as fast as they have rolled them up, as fast they have recoiled and fallen back on them. As to that darkness that hfss overspread the minds of men, if we look at the generality, we find them like blind men, content to PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 215 jog on in the dart, mired every where, stumbling frequently, and falling sometimes dangerously ; yet satisfied with their. case, not looking after light : not so much because they want it not, as be- cause they have no notion of it, or its usefulness ; like blind men that never saw the sun, and therefore suffer the loss of it with less regret, than they who once saAv, but now have lost their eyes. — They follow as they are led ; are ready to take hold of any hand, though of one as blind as themselves, and are never sensible of the mistake, till sunk where they cannot get out again. The philoso- phers indeed seem a little more sensible of their case, and fancying truth to be hid in Democritus's well, dive for it, but lose their breath before they come at it, and fall into dangerous eddies or whirlpools, where they lose themselves instead of finding truth ; or trying to fetch it up, but with a line too short, they fetch up some weeds that are nourished by their nearness to the waters, and please themselves with those. After all their painful endeavors we find them groping in the dark, as to all useful and necessary knowledge of God, or the way of worshipping him ; — of ourselves, our happiness, our sins, the way of obtaining pardon, our duty or our corruption. As to guilt, if we look at the case of mankind, and their endea vors for the removal of it, we find the most part drowned in end- less despair or fatal security j like men at their wit's end, trying all ways that fear, superstition, or racked imagination can supply, and still unsatisfied with their own inventions, they are ready to try all ways that self-designing men, or even the Devil can suggest to them, sparing no cost, no travel, no pain. They stand not to give the fruit of their bod// for the sin of their soul. The philo- sophers either think, through their pride, they have no sin, be- cause they are not quite so bad as the vulgar ; or, if they still re- tain some sense of sin, they are driven into the utmost perplexity, being convinced of the wickedness of the measures taken by the vulgar, or at least of their uselessness and impertinency, and yet unable to find out better ; they try to divert their thoughts from a sore they know no plaister for. As to corruption, we find all confessing it, crying out of the dis- ease ; and indeed it is rather because it cannot be hid, — the sore runs, than because it is painful to many. The generality despair of stemming the tide, and finding it easiest to swim with the stream, are willingly carried headlong. The body of philosophers are in- deed like weak watermen on a strong stream, they look one way but are carried another. Though they pretend they aim at the ruining of vice, yet really they do it no hurt, save that they speak against it. A few of the best of them being ashamed to be found amongst the rest, swimming, or rather carried down the stream 216 AN INaUIRY INTO THE on the surface, that is, in open vice, have dived to the bottom ; but reaWy made as much way under water as the others above, 3. Let us view mankind under the goodness and forbearance of God, these helps which some think sufficient. These words are used, or rather abused, as a blind in a matter of very great import- ance ; and men Avho use them will scarce tell, if they can, even in the subject of the present discourse, in what sense they use them. But let it be as it will, some pretend the works of providence, par- ticularly God's goodness and forbearance sufficient. "Well, let us see the experience of the world in this. If we view mankind under this consideration, we may see them so tar from being led to repentance, that most part never once took notice of this conduct of God. Others, and they not a few, have abused it to the worst purposes. Because judgmtnt against an evil work, has not been speedih/ executed, therefore their hearts were wholly set in them to do evil. The more inquisitive have raised a charge against God as encouraging wickedness. And as for the favors they enjoyed themselves, they looked on them, not as calls to repentance, but as rewards for their pretended virtues, and scanty ones too, below the worth of them. Not a few of them have gone near to arraign God of injustice, for lesser afflic- tions they were visited with ; while others have been entangled and tossed to and fro by cross appearances. So that none have by this goodness of God been led to repentance. 4. Let us view man living in the place where revelation obtains, or where the Christian religion is professed and taught, but re- nouncing and rejecting it, and in profession owning only natural re- ligion : Such are the Deists among usv If we consider their words, they talk indeed that natural religion is sufficient ; and to make it indeed appear so, some of them have adorned it with jewels bor- roAved from the temple of God, ascribing to nature's light discove- ries in religion, which originally were owing to rcA^elation, and were never dreamed of where it did not obtain: though being once dis- covered, they have gained the consent of sober reason. But now M'e are not considering the speech, but the power of these men ; not what they say of the sufficiency of natural religion, but what real experience they have of it, and what evidence they give of this in their practice. If we thus consider them, we find, that although when they have a mind to impose their notion of tiie sufficiency of natural religion upon others, they pretend, that it is clear, as to a great many points or principle;?, that are confessedly of the greatest moment in religion ; yet when they begin to speak more plainly and freely their own inward sentiments, they shew that they are not fixed, no not about the very principles themselve?, even these of them which are of the greatest consequence. 3Iv. Gildon, PRINCIPLES OP THE MODERN DEISTS. 2U publisher of the Oracles of Reason, is not far from asserting two anti-gods, the one good the other evil ; and so falls in with the Persians.* Blount favours the opinion of Ocellus Lucanus, about the world's eternity, and consequently denies, or at least hesitates about creation.^ The immaterialily of the soul seems to be flatly rejected by them all. Nor do they seem very firm as to its im- niortality. In short, after they have been at so much pains to trim up natural religion, and make it look sufficient-like, they yet express a hesitation about its siifficiency to eternal /(/^-J We have heard Herbert to this purpose already. Blount, in a letter lo Dr. Sydenham, prefixed to the Deist^s Reasons, says plainly, that it is not safe to trust Deism alone, without Cliristianity joined lo it. And the Deist's hope is summed up in this, in the 4th chap, of the SummarT/ of the Deist's Reasons, That " there is more probability of his salvation, than of the credulous and ill-living Papist ;"|1 and that is just none at all. Nor does their practice give one jot of a better proof of the sufficiency of that religion which they profess : yea, it affords con- vincing evidence of its weakness, uselessness, and utter insufficien- cy. Their lives shew that they are not in earnest about any thing in religion. They are Latitudinarians in practice. Thejr words, (heir actions, have no savour of a regard to a Deity ; but they go on in all manner of impieties in practice, and perhaps in the end, put a period to a wretched life by their own hands, as Blount, Uriel, Acosta and others have done, and the survivors justify the deed, upon trifling and childish reasonings ; as not knowing but they may one day be put to use the same shift. I am not in the least deterred from asserting this, by the coramendatior.s that the publisher of the Oracles of Reason gives to Mr. Blount, as a per- son remarkable for virtue."^* If a profane, jocular, and unbecom- ing treatment of the gravest and most important truths that belong, e^'en by his own acknowledgment, to natural religion ; yea, and are 1 he principal props of it ; and if gross and palpable disingenuity be instances of that virtue that he ascribes to him, and evidences of those just and adequate notions of the Deity, in which he says Mr. Blount was bred up, I could givf; instances enough from the book itself of such virtues : But I love not to rake in the ashes of the dead. Again, others of the Deists, having wearied themselves in chaceof a phantom to no purpose, and having neither the grace nor ingenuity to return to the religion they abandoned, either laud in downright Atheism in principle and practice, or they throw themselves into the arms of the pretended infallible guide ; and » Oracles of Reason, nacre 19'k 212, 228. t Ibid, 154, 187. i Ibid, iir, i2r. I' Oracles of Kcuson, at the beginning-, account c? Bb'rnt.'g ITfe— »• tv-,,j 2« 218 AN INQUIRY INTO THE thereby give evidence how well founded the Jesuitical maxim b, Make a man once an Atheist, he will soon turn Papist. 5. Let us view men living under the gospel, embracing it in profession, but unacquainted with that Spirit that gives life and power to its doctrines, precepts, promises, threats and ordinances. They, besides that they are possessed of all the advantages of nature's light, have moreover the superadded advantages of reve- lation, and its institutions. They have ministers and parents in- structing them, and discipline to restrain them, they are trained up in the faith of future rewards, and instructed in the nature and excellency of them, for their encouragement ; they have punish- ments proposed to them to deter them from sin, which they profess to believe ; yet if we consider the practice of the generality of such persons, it gives a sufficient evidence, that all this is not enough. Who but a man blind or foolish can then dote so far as to pretend nature's light alone sufficient, when it is not so, even when helped by so many accessory improvements ? If we consider the experience of them who have received the gospel in truth, and felt its power, we find they have indeed reach- ed the ends of religion in part, and have a fair prospect as to fur- ther success. Well, what is their sense of the sufficiency of na- ture's light ? Why, if you observe them in their public devotions, you shall hear heavy out-cries of their own darkness, weakness and wickedness ; you may hear serious prayers for divine light, and life to quicken them, strengthen and incline them to follow duty, and support them in it, against the power of temptations, which they own themselves unable to master, without the poweiful aids of divine grace. If you follow them into their retirements, where the matter is managed betwixt God and them alone, where they are under none of these temptations, to maintain the credit of any received notions, and therefore must be presumed to speak out the practical sense of the state of their case, without any disguise ; there you shall find nothing but deep confessions of guilt, darkness and inability, with earnest cries, prayers and tears, for supplies of grace : and what they attain in matters of religion, you shall find them freely owning, that it was not the?/ but the gra^e of God in them that brought them to this. And the more that any is con- cerned about religion, or know and has attained in it, still you will find him the more sensible of this state of things. This is but a hint of what might have been said : but I have rather chosen to offer a general scheme of the argument from ex- perience, which every one, from his own private reading and ob- servation, may illustrate with observations and particular instances, than to insist upon it at large, which would have required a vo- lume. PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 219 CHAP. XIII. Wherein me make a transition to the DeisVs Pleas for their opin- ion^ and take particular Notice of the Articles to which they re- duce their Catholic Religion, give some Account of Baron Herbert, the first Inventor of this Catholic Religion, his Books, and particularly/ of that which is inscribed De Religione Gen- tilium, as to the Matter and Scope of it, and the Importance of what is therein attempted to the DeisVs Cause. WE hare now proposed and confirmed our own opinion ; our next business is to inquire more particularly into that of the Deists, and consider what they offer for it. The first set of Deists, so far as I can learn, did satisfy them- selves with the rejection of all supernatural revelation, and a gene- ral pretence, that natural religion was suQicient, without telling the world of what articles it did consist, what belonged thereto, or how far it went. The learned lord Herbert was the first who did cultivate this notion, and dressed Deism, and brought it to something of a form. This honor he assumes to himself, glories in it, and we see no ground to dispute this with him. I have met with nothing in any of the modern Deists that makes towards this subject, which is not advanced by him, and probably borrowed from his writings. It will not therefore be impertinent to give the reader some account of him. This Edward Herbert was a descendant from a younger brother of the family of Pembroke. He was brother to the famous George Herbert, the divine poet. His education was at Oxford, where he was for some time a fellow Commoner in University College there. After he left the University, he improved himself by travels into foreign nations, and obtained the reputation of a scholar, a states- man and a soldier. He was made Knight of the Bath at the coro- nation of king James I. in England, who afterwards sent him as ambassador to Lewis XIII. on behalf of the French Protestants : and upon his return he was created Baron of Castle-Island, in Ireland ; and by king Charles I. anno. 1 630, he was created a Baron of England, by the title of Lord Herbert of Cherbunj, and died in 1648.* This learned person having once unhappily apostatised from the religion wherein he was bred, into Deism, though, as other Deists likewise do, he did still seem to own the Church of England ; yet be set himself for the maintenance of Deism in his writings. And * See Geograph. Diction, articlea Herbert vxA Deism. See also the Life of Mr. Gcovg'e Herbert. 220 AN INaWlRY INTO THE to this purpose he published some time after the year 1640, (tor I have not the first edition of it) his book de Veritate, and shortly after another, de Causis Errorum. These two books are for the most part philosophical, and written with some singularity of notion. What is tnith in them is rather delivered in a new way than new ; and by the use of vulgar words in new and uncommon acceptations, and his obscure way of management of his notions, is scarcely in- telligible to any but metaphysical readers, nor to such, without greater application, than perhaps the matter is worth. I should not think myself concerned in either of these two books, their subject being philosophical, were it not that it is his avowed design in them, to lay a foundation for his peculiar notions in religion. There are two things at which Herbert, in these and his other writings, plainly aims at — to overthrow revelation and to establish natiiral religion in its room. It is not my design or province at present, to defend revelation against the efforts of this or any other author, though I think it were a business of no great difficulty to remove what Herbert has said against it ; .yet since I have men- tioned his attempt upon it, I cannot pass it without some short, but just remarks upon his unfair, if not disingenuous way of treating revelation. 1. On many occasions, with what candor and ingenuity himself knew, he professeth a great respect to revelation, and particularly to the scripture's, and pretends he designs nothing in prejudice of the established religion : but any one that peruses the books will soon see, that this is only like Joab''s kiss, a blind to make his reader secure, and fear no danger from the sword that he has under his garment : For notwithstanding of this, he every where insinu- ates prejudices against all revelation, as uncertain, unnecessary/, and of little or no use to any, save those to whom it was originally, or rather immediately given. 2. Upon all occasions, and sometimes Avithout any occasion given him from his subject, he makes sallies upon truths of the greatest importance in the Christian religion ; such as the doctrines of the corruption of our nature, satisfaction of Christ, and the decrees of God, &c. And having represented them disingenuously, or else ignorantly, (which 1 less suspect in a man of his learning) not in that way they are proposed in scripture, or taught by those who maintain them, but under the disguise of gross misrepresentations, mistaken notions, and strained consequences : and having thus put them in beast's skins, as the primitive persecutors did the Chris- tians, he sets his dogs upon them to worry them ; and this v/ithout any regard had unto the foundation they have in the scriptures, or the evidence of the proofs that may be advanced for tiie scriptures in general, or these doctrines in particular, and without all consi- der^ition of the inconsistency of ihh vray of treating truths plainly PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 221 taught, and inculcated as of the greatest importance in the scrip- tures, with that respect, which upon other occasions he pretends to that divine book. 3. Ife states wrong notions of the grounds whereupon revela- tion is received, and overthrows those imaginary ones he has set up, as the reasons of our belief of the scriptures, and then tri- umphs in success. How easy is it to set up a man of straw and beat him down with the finger ! 4. The Deists generally, and Herbert in particular, do grant, that the Christian revelation has manifestly the advantage of all other pretenders to revelation, as in respect of the intrinsic excel lency of the matter, so likewise in respect of the reasons that may be pleaded for its truth. "^ And so certain and evident is this, that one of their number owns, that Christianity has " the " fairest pretensions of any religion in the world," and exhorts to '' make a diligent enquiry into it ; arguing, " that if the pre- " tcnces of Christianity be well grounded, it cannot be a frivolous " and indiflferent matter;" and he grants further, that " the truth *' of the matters of fact which confirm it, is hardly possible to be " denied. "f Now notwithstanding of this manifest and acknow- ledged difference betwixt the scriptures and other pretenders lo revelation, when Herbert speaks of revelation, he jumbles all pre- tenders together without distinction, and urges the faults of the most ridiculous and obviously spurious pretenders, against revela- tion, in general, as if every particular one, and especially Chris- tianity, were chargeable with these fiiults : Is this candid and fair dealing, to insinuate into the unwary reader that these palpable evi- dences of imposture are to be found in all revelations alike, while, even they themselves being judges, the scriptures are not concerned in them ? Yet this is the way that Christianity h treated by this learned author ; and his steps have been closely traced in this piece of scandalous disingenuity, (for I can give it no milder name,) by Blount and the other writers of the party, as I could make appear by many instances, if need required. 5. Our author makes high pretences to accuracy in searching after truth, and treats all other authors with the greatest scorn and contempt imaginable, as short in that point : yet he seldom states a question fairly, but huddles all up in the dark, especially, when he speaks about revelation, and heaps together difficulties about all the concernments of revealed religion, without any regard to the distinct heads to which they belong. This is a ready way to shake the faith of his reader about all truths, but establish him in none. Other reflections I forbear, though he has given fair occasion for many : but this is not my subject. This part of his discourse lias ♦ Rcligio Laici pape 9, 10. Letter to the Deists, page 139. 222 AN INQUIRY INTO THE been animadverled on by a learned author, though the book is not come to my hand.* The other branch of our author's design, viz. His attempt to establish the svfficienct/ of natural religion, is that wherein I am directly concerned. This he only proposes in his book de Veritate at the close, with a short explication of his famed five Articles, of which more anon. And in a small treatise entitled Religio Laid, subjoined to his book dc Causis Errorum, he further explains them. The design of this last mentioned treatise is to shew, that the vulgar can never come to certainty about the truth of any partictdar revelation, or the preferableness of its pretences unto othere, and that therefore of necessity they must sit down satis- fied with the religion he offers them, consisting of five articles, agreed to, if we believe him, by all religions. The religion, consisting of five articles, which we shall exhibit immediately, he attempts to prove svfficient by some arguments in that last mentioned treatise. But the principal proof, on which our author lays the whole stress of his cause, is at lai-ge exhibited in another tieatise of our author, de Religione Gentilinm, publish- ed at Amsterdam, anno 1663, by J. Vossiiis, son to the great Ger. Joan. Vossiiis. His pleadings in these and his other writ- ings Ave shall call to an account by and bye. Herbert, in his treatise de Religione Gentilium, pretends. What- ever mistakes the Gentile world was under in matters of religion ; yet there was as much agreed to by all nations, as was necessary to their eternal happiness. Particularly, he tells us, that they were agreed about five Articles, of natural religion, which he thinks are sufficient, viz. 1. That there is one supreme God. 2. That he is to be ivorshipped, 3. That virtue is the principal part of his worship. 4. That we must repent of our sins. 5. That there are reivards and punishments both in this life and that ivhiih is to coyne.'l Charles Blount, who set himself at the head of the Deists some few years ago, in a small treatise entitled Religio Laid, printed 168^^, which in effect is only a translation of Herbert's book of the same name, inverting a little the order, but without the addi- tion of any oiie thought of moment ; in this treatise, I say, he reckons up the articles of natural religion much after the same manner. 1. T/uit there is one only supreme God. 2. Thai he chiejb/ is to be worshipped. 3. That virtue, goodness and piety, arxompanied with faith in, and love to God, are the best ways of wrivshipping him. 4. Thai we should repent of our sins from the bottom of our hearts, and turn to the right way. 5. That there is a reward and punishment after this Ufe.f * Baxter's More Reasons for the Christian Religion, and no Reason against it, in the Appendix, f De Relij^. Gcntil. page 186, 210, &;c. f Ibid. 49, 50. PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 223 Another, in a letter directed to Mr. Blount, subscribed A. W. has given us an account of them somewhat difTerent from both the former, in seven articles. 1. That there is one infinite^ and eter- nal Gody creator of all things. 2. That he governs the world by providence. 3. That it is our duty to worship and obey him as our Creator and Governor. 4. That our wor§htp consists in prayer ta him, and praise of him. 5. That our obedience consists in the rules of right I'eason, the practice whereof is moral virtue. 6. That we are to expect rewards and punishments hereafter accord- ing to our actions in this life ; which includes the soul's immor- tality, and is proved by our admitting providence. 7. That, ivhen we err from the rides of our duty, we ought to repent and trust in God's mercy for pardon.'^ To the same purpose, without any alteration of moment from what we have above quoted, Herbert reckons up and repeats the same articles in his other treatises. These other authors do but copy afler Herbert. To him the honor of this invention belongs, and he valncs himself not a little upon it. Let us hear himself. " Atque ila (sed non sine muUi- " plici accwataque religionum turn dissectione, turn inspect lone) " quinque illos articulos scepius jam adduclos deprehcndi. Qui- " bus etiam inventis me feliciorem Archimede quovis exislima- " i;t."* He acquaints us, that he consulted divines and wiiters of all parties, but in vain, for to find the universal religion hft sought after ; it is not tlierefore likely, if any had nroulded thl? universal religion, or put it into a form meet for the Deist's pur- pose before him, that it could have escaped his observation and diligence. Now we have had a sufficient view of the articles, to which the Deists reduce their religion. Let us next inquire after the proof of this religion ; the burden whereof must lean upon Herbert. The Deists since his time have added nothing that has a shew of proof that I can yet see. Well, after he has in his other treatises, as has been said, proposed and explained his rehgion he at length comes to the proof of it in his treatise de Religione Gcntilium. Here the main strength of his cause lies, and with this we shall mainly deal ; yet so as not to overlook any thing that has a shew of proof elsewhere in his writings. In this treatise de Religione Gentilium, he makes it his work to. illustrate and prove, " That the abovementioned five articles were universally believed by people of all religions." This is the pro- position at which that whole book aims, in the managemeat of t Oracles of Reason, page 19". ^^ * De Helig. Gent, page 218.—" And thus, thougli not without a nrjanifold '* and accurate dissection and inspection of religion, I have found those five " articles, that have already been often quoted, on finding which I thought * myself more happy than any Archimedes." 224 AN maUIRY INTO THE this subject our author gives great proof of diligence, vast reading, and much philological learning. He gives large accounts of the idolatry of the Heathens and their pleas for it, or rather of the pleas, which our author thought might be made for it ; which has given occasion to several conjectures, as to our author's design in that book, and his other, writings. I find a learned author who has bestowed a few short animadver- sions on this book, inclined to think it not unlikely, that Herbert's principal design was, if not to justify, yet to excuse the idolatry of the church of Rome.* And if one considers how many pleas Herbert makes for the Gentiles' idolatry, and that they aie gener- ally such as may serve for the Romanists' purpose ; and if it is further considered, that Herbert elsewhere seems, upon many oc- casions, to found the whole certainty of revelation upon the au- thority of the church, and that alone, and the vast power he gives to the church as to the appointment of rtffs, yea, and all the ordi- 7iances of worship ; if it is further considered how concerned some persons were for an accommodation with the church of Rome at that time, when our author wrote, and how far Herbert was con- cerned in that party, who were striving for this reconciliation ; if I say, all these things are laid together, this conjecture will not appear destitute of probability. I might add to this, that Herbert makes use of pleas not much unlike those which aie used by the church of Rome to ishake Protestants out of their faith, that they may at length fall in with the hifallible guide. In fine, I dare be bold to undertake the maintenance of this against any opposer, that Her- bert's method followed out, will inevitably make the vjilgar Atheists ; whether he designed by this to make them Papists, I know not, nor shall I judge. How far this conjecture will hold, 1 leave to others to judg:e. I shall only add this one thing more, that the seeming opposition of Herbert's design unto Popish principles, and his thrusts at the Romish clergy, will not be sufficient to clear him of all suspicion in this matter, with those who have seriously pe- rused the books written by Papists in disguise, on design to shake the faith of the vulgar sort of Protestants, in some of which, there is as great appearance at first view of a designed oA^erthrow of Po- pery, and as hard things said against the Romish clergy. Good watermen can look one way and row another. What there was of this, will one day be manifest. The Deists maintain, that *' their religion, consisting of the abovenamed five articles 13 sufficient." It is the avowed design of Herbert in his book, to assert this and prove it ; and yet he spends it wholly in proving this proposition, " That these five articles did universally obtain." Now it scejns of importance to inquire. Abr.1l). Hejdanus re was an undertaking worthy of our noble author's great parts, long experience, great charity to man- kind, and the great concern he professes to find in himself for the vindication of Providenccv And sure if such a man, after so much pains, has failed in the proof of this point, any that ma}'^ succeed him, may justly despair of success. He read all the Heathen authors to find this univer- sal reUgion, and he was as willing and desirous to find it as any man. And he has given in this learned book evidence enough of his reading. But since no religion was to be admitted, save that whereon all men were agreed, it was wisely done by our author, that he reduc- ed this universal creed to a few articles. For one who knew so much of the state of the world, could not but see, that they were not very many wherein they Avere agreed. Well, he undertakes and goes through with the work, and con- cludes with that memorable triumph above mentioned ; " Atque " ita (sed non sine vnultiplici, accurataque religionum turn dissec- " tione, turn inspedioiiej qiiinqiie illos articulos, scepius jam ad- *' diidos deprehendi. Qnibus etiam inventis me feliciorem quovis " Archimede existimavi." But one might possibly ask. How it could cost our author so much labor and pains to find out this religion, and to sever the ar- ticles belonging to it from others,^ with which they were intermix- ed, when every illiterate man must be supposed able to do this ? However, if our author is not belied by common fame, he re- pented, that he had spent his time so ill in contributing so far to the advancement of irreligion ; though others contradict this and tell us, that dying he left this advice to his children, — " They *• talk of trusting in Christ for salvation ; but I would have you be " virtuous, and trust to your virtue, to make- you happy." Whatever there is as to this, I shall now proceed to examine our authoi's arguments. 230 AN LNQUIRY INTO THE CHAP. XIV. Wherein it is inquired. Whether Herbert has proved that his five Articles did universally obtain ? WE have heard our author's five articles above ; he pretends to make it appear, that they were every where received ; we shall now inquire, Whether the arguments adduced by him do evince this ? and then in the next place, we shall see whether it is indeed true. And for method's sake, we shall speak of every article apart, and dissect and inspect his book, to find all that he offer*, which has the least appearance of proof. ARTICLE 1. There is One Supreme God. That which our author pretends to prove as to this article, is, that it was generally owned by all nations, that there is one Su" preme Being, and that this /Supreme Being, whom they owned^ was the same whom we adore. We are not now to dispute, whe- ther this aiticle may be known by the light of nature ; nor whe- ther some particular persons went not a great way in the acknow- ledgment of it. This we have before granted : But the question is, Whether all nations agreed in this, that there is one Supreme God, and he the very same whom we adore ? Let us hear our au- thor, " Quamvis enim de aliquibus alijs Dei, sive attributis, sive *' muneribus disceptatio inter veteres esset, uti suo loco monstra- *' bimus ; summnm tamen aliquem extare, and semper extitisse " Deiim, neque apud sapientes, neqiie apud insipientes dubium '' (puto) fuitJ'"^ And afterwards, when he thinks the first part of his article sufficiently cleared, he proceeds to the second part of it, " Reliquum est, ut Deum summum Gentilium, eundum ac nostrum esse probemus.^f Thus we see what our author pretends. Whether he has proved this, we are now to inquire. He has not digested his arguments, nor cast them into any such mould, as might make it obvious wherein the force of them lies, and there- fore we must be at pains to scrape together, whatever is uTiy where * De Relig'. Gent. pag. 158. — " For although there may have been dis- " putes among- the ancients about certain other attributes or offices of God, *' as we shall shew in its own place, yet it was never doubted, I think ei- " ther among the wise or the unwise, that some supreme God existed, and " had always existed." t Ibid, 166. " It remains to prove that the Supreme God of the Hea- " thfus was the same as ours." PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 231 through his book dropped, that may contribute in the least toward the strengthening of his cause ; and we shall not omit any thing willingly, that has the least appearance of force. The first observation our author insists on to this purpose is, « That the Gentiles did not intend the same by the name of Gorf, that we now do. We by that name design the Supreme, Eternal, Independent Being ; whereas they intend no more than any virtue or power superior to man, on which man did any way depend." Id omne Deutn vocitarurd quod vim aliquam eximiam in inferiora^ sed in homines pnccipue ederef-X This he frequently inculcates, and tells us in the first page of his book, that the observation of this, was that which inclined him to think, or presume the Gentiles not chargeable with that gross Polytheism, with which most do, and he himself had, upon a slight view of their religion, well nigh once concluded them chargeable. If the Gentiles meant the same by the word God, which we do, no doubt they stand chargeable with the most gross, unaccountable, absurd and ridiculous Polytheism imaginable : For scarcely is there any thing animate or inanimate, but by some way or other became deified. Quicquid humus, pelagus, caelum, mirabile gignunf, id dixere deos, colles, fretUy Jiumina, Jlammas.'^ But our author is not willing to admit that tliey were so absurd ; and to induce us to favorable sentiments, he hay blessed us with this observation. That when they called those creatures animate and inanimale Gods, they meant no such thing as we do by that name. Well, if we should grant that the wiser sort, at least, or per- haps even the vulgar too, did sometimes so underiiland the word, as he alleges, will that serve his purpose, and satisfy him ? Nay, by no means, unless we grant him, that they always so understood the word, save when they spoke of the One true God. But this is too much to be granted, unless he prove it ; especially if w^e are able to evince, that not a few, both wise and umvise, believed that there were more than One Eternal, Independent Being : and pos- sibly this may be made appear aftenrard. A learned authoi-, in reproach of the Grecian and Roman learning, says, " That set- " ting aside what they learned out of Egypt, they could never by " themselves determine whether there were mam/ Gods or but onf."t The next thing our author insists on to this purpose, is, " That different names do not always point out different gods, but differ- ent virtues of the same God." " Tot Dei appellationes, quot i De Rellg'. Gent. pag. 13. — " They called all that God, which produced any ** considerable effect on inferior things, but especially upon men." * Aurel. contr. Sym. Lib. I. — " Whatever wonderfvil thing the earth, the sea, or sky produced, that they called gods — hills, seas, rivers, fire." t Wolscly'-s Scripture Belief, page 110. 232 AN INQUIRY INTO THE " munera,adeoq ; si triginta milia Deum nominal quod ab CEno- " moo ^ Hesiodo in &toyoyix perhibetur supponat quispia?n, ^ " tot ejus mimera dari, fatendnm est,''* says Seneca, quoted by our author.J And consequentially to this, the same Seneca tells us, " Sapientes nequaquam Jovem eum intellexisse, qui in Capi- *' tolio aut alijs templis fulraine armatus cerneretur, sed potiua " Mentem Animunque existimasse omnium custodem, universiq ; " administratorem, qui banc rerum universalitatem condiderit, ac " eandem nutu suo gubernet, ac propterea divina quaeq ; nomina " ei convenire. Itaq ; optimo jure fatum appellari posse, ut a " quo ordo seriesve causarum inter se aptarum dependeat. Ita is " Providentiam dicit, quum ipse provideat ut omnia perpetuo ac " perenni quodam cursu, ad finera ad quem distinata sunt, currunt : " Naturam quoque nuncupari, ex eo enim cuncta nascuntur, per " eum quicquid vitae est particeps, vivet : Mundi quin etiam no- " men illi congruere. Quicquid sub aspectum cadit, ipse est, qui " seipso nititur, & omnia ambitu suo complectitur, universaque " numine suo complet."* To the same purpose speaks Servius of all the Stoicks, quoted likewise by our author.f The plain English of all is, he would persuade us that by these testimonies he has proved, that the Gentiles, when they attributed the name GOD to so many things, intended no more, but to set out so ma- ny different virtues, which all resided in the same GOD. As to this, Ave may grant, that our author has indeed proved, That different names do not always point out different gods ; for he has told us that each of their gods had many different names. But this will do him no service, if we grant not, that different names never point out different gods. But how shall we do this, when our author has shewed us, that many nations worshipped the sun, moon, and stars ; and thought them gods, yea, distinct ones too, different, in their natures as well as natncs. Each of + Seneca Lib. 5. Cap. 17. Herbert de Relig. Gent. pag. 13. — " We must " confess that there are as many names of God, as there are' offices, so that if " any one suppose that there are thirty thousand different names of god's, as " is related by Oenomaus and Hesiod in his Theogony, we must acknowledge *' that there are likewise as many offices of the Deity." * He:-b. De Rel. Gent. pag. 47- " Wise men did not mean by Jupi- " ter, that statue that is seen in the Capitol and other temples, armed with " thunderbolts ; but rather thought that that INIind and Soul was Jupiter, " which was the Guardian and Governor of the Universe, who formed this " whole v.'orld, and governs it by his nod, and that all divine names agree " to him. He may therefore be very justly called Fate, as on him the order " and series of connected causes depends. Thus too he may be called Provi- " dence, as he provides that all things should tend to tlie end for which they " were destined, in a constant and perpetual course. He may likewise be " called Nature, for all things arise from him, and he gives life to all that " lives. Nay, even the name of World may agree to him, for whatever is " visible is llimself, who depends on himself, surrounds all things v/ith his " circumference, and fills all things with his divine presence." t De llelig. Gentil. pag. ST. PRINCIPLES OP THE MODERN DEISTS. 233 them indeed had different names, nay each of them had many names, titles or eulogies heaped on them by their fond worship- pers, who no doubt fancied, that their gods were smitten with that same vanity, wherewith they themselves were tainted ; which yet as learned Rivet observes, had a dangerous effect upon the vulgar in process of time : for they were not so quick in their observa- tions as our author. " Coacervatis enim elog-iis, tituUsque conges- " tis, capi mvmen putabant, maximoque inde (iffici honore ; ita ut " tandeni qme diversn iantum iiomina superstitionis fueranty " grassanfe errore, dlversa mi7nina haberentKr.^^'^ Further, we know full well that some of the more wise and learned men, especially after the light of the gospel began to shine through the world, began to be ashamed of their religion, and es- pecially the number of their gods, and to use the same shifts to palliate the foolish and wild Polytheism, which the gospel so fully exposed : and particularly Seneca, who was contemporary with Paul, (and by some, upon what ground I now enquire not, is said to have conversed with him) and others of the Stoicks steered this course, to vindicate their religion againstt he assaults of the Chris- tians. But it is as true, this w us a foolish attempt, and its success I cannot better express, than in the words of the learned and ex- cellent Dr. Owen : " Postquam autem severius paulo inter nonnul- " los philosophari cceptum est, atque limatiores de natura divina " opiniones inter plurimos obtinuerant, sapientes pudere coeperunt " eorum deorum, quos protulerant ferrea secula, ignorantia and tene- " bris tota devoluta. Omnia ideo, quae de diis fictitis, Jove scil : *' totoque sacro Helenismi choragio, vulgo celebrata erant, res na- " turales adumbrasse apud antiques Mw^aAoyss contenderunt. " Theologium banc MvSiKijv vocant, quam nihil aliud fuisse aiunt, '* quam naturae doctrinam."f And in some passages after, he shew^ the vanity of this attempt. " Postquam enim evangelii lumen us- *' que adeo radiis suis terrarum orbem perculisset, rubeescenda '' veterls superstitionis insania apud ipsum vulgus in contemptuni *' venerit, acutiores sophistae, qoud dixi, quo stultitiam istani co- * Ad. Hos. 2. 8. Referente Owen Theolog. pag. 189.—" For they thought " ihat the Deity was charmed with encomiums and titles heaped one above " another, and received great honor from thence, so that at length those " different names, devised by superstition, by the progress of error, came to " be reckoned different deities. t Ubi supra pag. 196. — " But after philosophy began te be more seriously " cultivated, and more correct opinions concerning the divine nature had " taken place among the generality, tlie wise men began to be ashamed of " those gods, which had been invented in the iron ages, that were entirely in- " volved ill ignorance and darkness, and therefore they maintained that all " things that had been commonly reported of the fictitious gods, vi2. Jupiter " and all the hierarchy of Greece, signilled only certain natural things in the " sense of the ancient Mythologists. And they called this ^Mythological Di- " vinity, which they said was nothing else than the knowledge of nature , *' veiled bv allegory." 80 234 AN INQUIRY INTO THE " lore novo fucutam, amabilem rcdderent, figmenlo huic (N. B.) " ciii adversalur omnis historise fides, pertinacissime adhaeserunt. " Iiiio, lit obi(er dicam innovala est primis ecclesise temporibus " apud ipsos Gentiles, tota philosophandi ratio."* Any one that Tvould desire to see the folly of this observation exposed, on which our author lays so much stress, may peruse that chapter, whence these words are quoted.f Nor is this more than what Velleius speaks of Zeno a Stoick and others, "Cum Hesiodi Qcoyoviav *' interpretatur, tollit omnino, (N. B.) usitatas perceptasque, cog- " nitiones deorum."J &c. But were this true, which those quotations pretend, it will not yet come up to our author's purpose ; for these quotations tell ua not that all the world Avere of this mind, but only the wise men ; and I fear that this too needs a restriction. Now this comes not near to the point. When our author has occasion to notice some absurd practices or opinions that are against him, he rejects them with this : " Qnod a paucis soluinmodo siiperstitiose factum, non " sails in religionem asserilnr. Nos autem hand alia qiuim " qmc omnes, vel plerique saltern cohiere, sub religionis tifulo po~ " jn'mMS-ll Now let this be, as it is, the state of the question, and what some of the wiser did, is nothing at all to the purpose ; and this indeed is the point. In fine, we doubt not before we have done, from our author's own book, to demonstrate, that what he aims at in this observation, and consequently all the story of the wj/stick theology of the Heathens, is utterly inconsistent with all faith of history, which makes us as sure of this, as they can of any thing, that many nations, nay most nations, nay most wise men held a plurality of gods, even in the sense that our author would de- ny. The next observation hem akes, is a-kin to the former. He, fol- lowing Vossin??, OS he tells us, divides all the Gentiles' worship into proper, symbolical and niixt.§ Proper is, when the true God, or the sun, or the moon is worshipped as the true God, and the wor- * Ubt supva pag-. 198.^ — " For after tlie liglit of the gospel had so far en- " lightened the world with its rays, that the shameful madness of the an-. " cient siiperstilioii had fallen into contempt, even among the vulgar, the " more acute sophists, as I said before in order to render that foolery amia^ " ble, by giving- it a new colour, adhered most obstinately to this fiction, " thougii oijposite to all the faith of history, nay, we may observe in passing, " that in the first ages of the church, the manner of philosophising among " the Heathens underwent a total change." j Owen ubi supra. Lib. 3. Cap. 6. I Cicero de Xat, Door. Lib. 1. — " When he interprets the Theogony of He- " siod he entirely overturns altogether the usual and received traditions con-. "•' cei'ning the gods." II De Relig. Gentil. pag. 12. — " What was done superstltiously by a few, '■ only, cannot be said to be a part of the general religion, but we place un^ " der the title of religion no other things than those which all, or at least *' the most part practised." § Ibid, pag. 183. PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 2a> jjhip is designed ultimately to terminate in their honor : Symbolic is, when the true God is worshipped in the sun, as an image, repre- jsentation or symbol of him ; then the worship is not designed only, jior mainly to terminate on the sun, but on the true God. As for the mixt, we are not concerned to speak of it. He would every where have us to believe, that all their worship was symbolical, and as such he frequently seems to justify and avouch it as rea- sonable, which the Papists will readily thank him fqr ; and he ex- pressly asserts this, that all " their worship, save w hat was direct- ly addressed to the true God," which I believe was very little, " was symbolic." Atque cultum proprhim milium fiiisse olim pczrterquam summi Dei, videtur.'^ It is well that he expresses this position modestly, as being conscious how great ground others will see to judge otherwise. And the reason that follows, drawn from the alledged evidences of the thing, we shall have under con- sideration anon. But toward the close of this book, he calls them ignoranies, or scioli, that believe not as he believes in this matter. But it should be expected, that when he advances such a bold position, and is so hard on them that dissent from him, he would give good proof of it ; but if any expect that, he will find himself deceived. I find indeed a passage quoted with a high commenda- tion to this purpose. " Atque hie de cultu dei symholico preclar^ *' urn locum ex Maximo Tyrio, Dissert, 38. quem adducit Vos- " sius, supprimere non possum. Barbari omnes pariter Deum " esse intelligunt ; const ituere interim sibi alia atque alia signa : " Ignem Persce imaginem qiice, unum duret diem, vorax quid Sr " insatiabile, sic Maximi verba vertit Fossms."f But what is all this to the purpose ? Doth this quotation from a Platonic phi- losopher, who lived an hundred and fifty years after Christ, when the gospel had overspread the whole world, and chased the Pagan darkness away, and made them ashamed of their old opinions, and improven reason, prove any thing ? To spend time on this, after what has been said above, were to trifle with a witness. The Deists have not, nor can they ever prove the truth of this bold assertion ; the falsehood of which we may detect before we have done. But hitherto our author has only used his shield ; v,'e must next see whether his sjvord be not of better metal. All that has been Iritherto said, is only a defensative for the Heathen's opinions and * De Relip. Gent. pag. 226. — " And there seems to have been no proper " worship of old, except that of the Supreme God." t De Rel. Gent. pag. 70. — " And here I cannot suppress a famous place in ** Maximus Tyrius, Diss. 38, which is quoted by Vossius. All the barbarians *' believe equally that there is a God, but set up different signs or representa- " tions of him. For example, the Persians chuse fire, an image that lasts " but one day, something voracious and insatiable. Thus does Vossius reii- " der the words of Masimus.? 236 AN INQUIRY INTO THE practice : We must now see by what arguments he proves that his first article did universally obtain. His first argument leans upon a few quotations from some Hea- thens, who assert, that there is one Supreme Being, such as Hiero- cles, Zoroaster, and others, some of old and some of late. But all this is nothing to the purpose : For were there twenty times more who said so, this will not prove the point he is obliged to make good. He has undertaken to shew that it was not doubt- ed among wise or unAvise, that there was one supreme God, and he the same whom we adore. Now what is this to the purpose, to bring the opinions of a few learned men, without telling what were the opinions of the nations or times where they lived, or of the world at large ? It is not the question, What Seneca, Zoroaster, Plato, and twenty more, thought, nay what whole nations besides thought ? but, What the whole world thought in this matter ? This the argument touches not. His next aigument is drawn from tlie confession of several di- vines. With this he begins his fifteenth chapter, and frequently speaks of it. But this says no more for him, than other, and per- haps more considerable testimonies, do against him. Beside?, since he has not condescended on the persons who fall in with him here, nor their words, we must leave him ; as we are not concern- ed with them, nor obliged to follow them further, than they do the truth. But that Avhich he lays the most stress on, is the supposed evi- dence of the thing.* This he frequently insists on, as to all his articles : and its force amounts to this — -It is so clear that there is one only Supreme Being, and that the sun nor no other is he, that it could not escape the most dull and unthinking. But here our author puts me in mind of the companions of Christopher Columbus, who first discovered America, about the year 1592; they were one day at table with him, and began to depieciate and undervalue the discovery he had made, telling him how easily others might have done it. Well, says he, I hold you a wager, I do what none of you shall do, and presently calling for an egg, says he, none of you can make that egg stand straight on the table ; which when they had essayed to no purpose, he takes it, and crushes the end of it a little, and then it stood easily ; which, when they all said it was easy to do : Well, says he, it is very true, ye can do it aftei- I have done it. It is easy to sec things after they are discovered to our hand, whicl: we would other- wise never have thought of. All the world w«s not so discernirrg as our author was, and his followers pretended to be, and he has given us sufficient proof of that in liis book, and I truly wonder De Rcli^. Gent. pag. 38?, 166. PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 237 ■with what face any man could make use of this argument after he had read, much more after he had writ such a book, wherein it is made clear as the day, that many nations believed no other God but the sun, moon and stars, as we shall shew afterwards. And I must take the freedom to say, that our noble and learned author, with the rest of the Deists, and all the philosophers, who lived since the gospel obtained in the world, owe more to the Christian religion, than they have the ingenuity to own. What they think so clear, when revelation has not only taught them the truths, but the grounds of them, was dark not only to the vulgar, but to the wise of old. I cannot better conclude this, than by transcribing a passage of the ingenious Mr. Locke's Essay on Human Under- standing — " Had you or I, (says he, speaking about innate ideas) " been born at the bay of Seldania, possibly our thoughts and no- " tions had not exceeded these brutish ones of the Hottentots that " inhabit there ; and had the Virginian king, Apochancana been " educated in England, he had, perhaps, been as knowing a di- " vine, and as good a mathematician as any in it. The difference " between him and a more improved Englishman, Ij^lng barely in " this, that the exercise of his faculties was bounded within the " ways, and modes and notions of his own countrj-^, and was never " directed to any other or farther inquiries : And if he had not " any idea of a God as we have, it was only because he pursued " not those thoughts, that would certainly have led him to it." — Thus far Mr. Locke. If some men had Iseen born where the gos- pel light has not come, they would have learned to talk more so- berly of the sufficiency of the light of nature. The only thing that remains for him to prove as to this first ar- ticle is, That this One Supreme God, whom he thinks the Gentiles all centered in, was the sa7ne God with him whom we worship. For this he refers us to three scriptures — Rom. i. 19. Acts x. through- out, and Acts xvii. 28, &c. Our author has not drawn any argument from those passages, but barely refers to them. He was particularly unlucky in quoting the. last of them : For it obliged him to take notice of an argimient arising obviously from the passage, against the purpose he adduced it for the proof of ; and indeed that passage aflbrds several argu- ments against our author's opinion in this matter, which are not easy to be" solved, if they who follow him, were to be determined by scripture arguments. But our noble author has scarce fairly laid the objection, which he started to himself from the altar to the unknonn God. But to speak home to the purpose — There are only two things that can be drawn from these or the like passages. 1 . That some of the Gentiles knew the true God. 2. That all of them had some notions of truth concerning God, or which were only rightlj' applicable to the true God. The actincs of congcience 238 AN INaUIRY INTO THE within, and the works of God without them, enforced on them the impression of some power, superior to themselves, on which they depended ; and this was indeed a notion of truth concerning God ; for this was only justly applicable to the true God : But yet they, through their darkness and wickedness, when they came to inquire more particularly after the true God, applied these notions to crea- tures, and took them for this true God. Now this is indeed all, besides bare and repeated assertions, that I can find in our author, to prove that his first article obtained uni- versally : And how far it is from proving this, is evident from what has been said. A R T I C L E 11. This One Supreme God is to be worshipped. The second article our author has not attempted a sufficient, nay, nor any separate proof of : Wherefore we go on to the next. ARTICLE III. That Virtue and Piety are the principal parts of the worship of this one true God. This he also pretends to have universally obtained, and that the Gentiles expected not Heaven for their worship, or their sa- cred performances, but for their moral worship, that is, their vir- tues. To prove this, is the design of our author's 15th chapter, at least till page 195. The first thing he insists on to this purpose is, the high respect wliich the Heathens put on those things, while they ranked, mens, ratio, pietas, fides, padicitia, spes and felicitas,* amongst the number of their gods, and erected temples to them. This he proves at large. But what all this makes to his purpose, I am not yet satisfied. This indeed proves that they had a respect to all those things. Very true, so they had, and that because of their usefulness in imman society. Yea, this proves that they had an undue respect lo them, so as to perform acts of worship to them. But that they designed to worship God by those virtues, which they would not allow they had from him, as we shall hear afterwards, is not so ea- sily proven. Besides, this was only at Rome that these altars were erected, and so is far from concluding as to the rest of the world, where virtue, hope, &c. had no such temples. « * Mind, Reason, Piety, Faitli, Hope arid Happiness. PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 239 The next thing our author mentions for proof of the universal reception of this article, is the custom of the Heathens in deifying their heroes on account of their virtues and piety. But our author knew too much of the Gentiles' religion to believe that this proves any more, than the fulsome flattery of the blinded world that dei- fied even devils, and, as our author elsewhere well observes, men that were no better than devils ; or if there was any more in this custom, wlien at first invented, it was only some ill applied piece of gratitude to persons, who had been their benefactors, or the benefactors of mankind. And all this respect, that was put on them was not because their virtues reflected any glory on God, but because they had been useful to men. Besides, religion was old in the world before this novel Grecian invention took place. — As the Roman poet and satyrist observed, n ee turba deorum Talis, ut est hodie, contentaque sidera paucis Numinibus, miserum urgebant Atlanta minore Pondere.* Nor did this universally obtain. So that the argument con- cludes just nothing. It neither proves that all the world were agreed that virtue and piety are the principal parts of the worship of God, nor that on account of these, men get eternal happiness. What their immortality was, of which they talked, we may see un- der the fifth article. Some few quotations from Cicero, Seneca, Plato, and one or two more compose our author's last argument. Seneca speaking some- wliere of Scipio Africanus says, " Animam quidem ejus in cce- lum, ex quo erat, redisse persuadeo, non quod magnos exercitus duxit (hos enim Cambyses furiosus, & furore feliciter usus habuit) sed ob egregiam moderationem, pietatemque. Cicero Lib. de Oflic. Deos placatos facit pietas & sanctitas." And elsewhere he says, " Nee est uUa erga deos pietas, nisi honesta de numine eorum ac mente opinio : Quum expeti nihil ab lis quod sit injus- tum, ac in honestum arbitrere."f Some others he adduces from Plato and others, wherein they say, that happiness and likeness to God are obtained by virtue. * " Nor was there such a multitude of gods, as there is now, and the '• stars being content with a few deities, pressed the poor Atlas with less •' weight." f De Ilelig. Gentil. pag. 187 '* I am persuaded that his soul returned to that heaven from whence it came, not because he had great armies (for Cam- bysis who was a madman, and fortunate in his madness, had these too) but on account of his remarkable moderation and piety Piety and holiness appease the gods Nor is there any piety towards the gods, except an honorable opinion of their deity and mind, wlven one thinks that nothing un- just and dishonorable should be asked of them." 2:^0 AN INaUIRY INTO THE But to what purpose are al! these brought ? 1 . There are vrords here of gods, and their worship and piety as respecting them ; but not one word of the one true God, of whom alone we speak. 2. It is certain that this piety and sanctity according to those authors, comprehended the worship of their gods, as our author expressly confesses, " Atqiie ad pietatem consummatam plurima insuper (that is, besides virtue of which he speaks before) postulari aie- hant,sed ea prcesertim qiKBgrati in superos animi indicia essent, jnda sacrijicia, ritus ^ ceremonias 8r hujusmodi alia ; quorum far- rago ingensfuit : Cccterum sine prcedictis divis sive deabus,animam regentibus, aditum in coelum non dari.^'f This last part is only our author's say, and is not reconcileable with what he tells us of their deifying some, who were so far from being gods, that they were, says he, Ne viri quidem probi.^ 3. As for what Cicero says, " That for virtue and piety we are advanced to heaven ;" I do not know well how to reconcile it with what he says elsewhere in his book de Amicitia, " Vult plane virtus honoreni: nee virki- iis est vlla alia merces,''^ otherwise than by thinking that by heaven, (his coclum,) he meant, that which many of them meant by their immortality y that is, an immortal fame, a good reputation after they are gone, amongst the survivors. As for Seneca, Christianity had taught him a little more, and his testimony is not much to be re- garded. 4. Were there twenty more of them, they never come near to a proof of the point : it is the sentiments of the world that we are inquiring after, and not what were the thoughts of some of the more improved philosophers. The question is not, Whe- ther men by the light of nature saw an excellency in virtue, snd that it was to be followed ? but. Whether they looked on it as a part, a principal part of the worship, not of their deities, but of the one true God : and that for which heaven, not (hat imaginary heaven which men had at their disposal ; but an eternifj/ of happi- ness in communion with God, is to be obtained ? Now our authoi- advances nothing to prove this point. A R T r C L E IV. We miist repent when we do amist!. As to this article our author confesses several things, which it will be meet to notice in the entry. 1 . He owns that the ancients. f De Itellg. Gentjl. pa.g. 185. — " And they said, that many other tlihigs besides were requisite in order to constitute perfect piety, but especially such things as were indications of a mind grateful to the gods, viz. sacrifices, rites, and ceremonies, and other things of this sort, of which there was a great number, but that there was no access to heaven without the aforesaid gods and goddesses, wlio directed the soul." ^ Ibid, pag. 195.-«" Nov even good men." PRINCIPLES OF TPIE MODERN DEISTS. 241 the wiser sort of tliem, thought not repentance a sufficient atoiie- ment for the grosser sort of sins ;* and quotes Cicero, saying, Ex- piatio scclcriim in homines nulla cst.f Where God was ofleiided they sought sanctuary in repentance, and thought it sufficient, but not where men were wronged. " Ccvtcrum licet in remedium pec- " cati,ubi Dei Summi rnajedas lccderetur,painiientiam sive dolorein. " efficacem esse crederent : Non ita tamen itbi homines injnria vet conlnmelii nffiicarenfur, de ponnilentia ilia staiuebant Gcntiles.l 2. He confesses that Ihey thought not, " Repentance alone a suf- ficient atonement." He tells us, that they had Expiationes lus- irationesriue, sine qnib}is neqite crimine nequepccna solntosscmetip- SOS arbitrabantnrW Again, 3. He confesses that the word repen- tance or penitence, was rarely used among the ancients, in that sense we use it. *^ Neqiiemihi dubiuni quineoruni (scil. peccato- " rmn)pa:nitueiitGeniiles,qu(& tot mala; arcessivcrunt; licet rarins " quidem pmdtenticr vcrbum inter atitores, eo quo jam usurpatnr " sensu reperiatiir.*^ Since then he makes all these concessions, there remains no more save this, that he pretends all the " world •' were agreed upon repentance, as that which was of use tp expiate, " at least, some lesser faults committed against God, and that we " should, when we sin, be grieved for it." To prove this, he quotes some pas-sages from Ovid, Seneca and some others. The only considerable testimony is from Periander, who was one of the seveu wise men of Greece : One of Avhose sentences, he says it was A'f*.xpTav M.£Tctf<,£Xov, oiia u/^ccpntFcti, Te mali pnniteat, nbi peccaveris. Seneca says. Quern poenitet peccasse pene est innocens. And Ovid, Saepe levant poenas, ereptaque lumlna reddunt Quem bone peccati poenitiiisse vides.§ But all these are alleged to no purpose. They do not prove that repentance was looked on as an expiation by the Gentiles. Ovid and Seneca lived too late in the world, and had too great access to learn from others, to be much regarded in this matter ; but they only speak their own mind, and we have here no argument of the • De Rel. Gen.pag. 197. f Cicero de Leg. Lib. 1- — " Tliere is no expiation of crimes against men." t De Rcl. Gent. pag. 198. — " But aUhoiig-h they thought that penitence or " sorrow was an effectual mean of taking awaj' sin, whereby the majesty of tlie " Supreme God was injured, yet they had not the same opinion of penitence, " in regard to those sins whereby men were injured and insulted." II Ibid. pag. 195.— " Expiations and lustrations, without wiiich they did '* not think themselves absolved either from crime or from punishment." *• De Rel. Gent. pag. 198.— " Nor is it a doubt with me that the Gentilea " repented of those crimes whicli brought so many evils upon them, although " the word repentance, in that sense in which it is now used seldom occurs in " their authors." § " You see that he who duly repents of his offence often alleviates his pun- " ishmcnt, and rpst,)res his lost light." 242 AN liSQUlRY INTO THE agreement of the world as to any thing about repentance. The opinions of the wise are no just measure of the knowledge or ap- prehensions of the vulgar. But that whereon our author seems to lay more stress, is their sar orifices, wliich he pretends are an evidence of their grief for sin, or repentance. Qnorsimi enim nisi interno dolore perciti, tot ritus sa- ri aqnc ad dcos placandos excogitasscnt .''J But, 1 . If the Gentiles had been as much agreed about repen- tance as our author pretends, they would indeed have spared all this pains and cost. 2. They were indeed grieved, but this grief they did not willingly entertain, nor allow themselves in as their dut7/ ; but looked upon it as their torment, and sought sanctuary in means proper for appeasing their gods, as they thought. 3. This grief, which sacrifices prove them to have had, is no more but that uneasy sense of sin in the conscience, which is a part of its pun- ishment, and no duty performed for their deliverance ; and this forced them upon all ways that they could imagine to get rid of it ; so that sacrifices were what they betook themselves to, to save themselves, or procure a deliverance from our author's penitence. 4. Further, our author, when it is for his purpose, can put another construction on their sacrifices ; while we have heard above, he makes them only absurd enough testimonies of gratitude to the gods, and to have no respect to sin at all. It is indeed true, that sometimes they were in this way used ; so Pythagoras is said to have used them when he offered Hecatombs to the gods, for a pro- position which he found out ; but for ordinary, they were designed as expiatory. 5. Do their sacrifices, which they offered to so ma- ny gods, prove that they were troubled for offending the one true God ? I believe not. Aye, but this is what our author should have proved. 6. Does our author tell us that they were so little agreed about this purgative, that no less a person than Plato discarded re- pentance, and put philosophy in its room, as that whereby only we could be purged ? And this leads me to a 7th thing, that shews of liow little signification this pretended proof is. That it is known that the more discerning philosophers made most light of those sa- crifices, yea of sin, and consequently of our author's Catholic rem- edy, repentance. As to the sufficiency of repentance for the place he assigns it, we have spoken to it above. Our author, I think, has badly proven that it universally obtained. And indeed had there been as much weight laid on it as is pretended, we could not have missed a more large account of it in the writings of the Gen- tiles. Further, 8. Our author pretends, that repentance is of no avail, as to the grosser evils, but only washes away lesser sins, and ^ " For to what purpose, unless they had been prompted by inward sorrow; "would they have contrived so many rites and sacrifices for appeasing the PRINCIPLES OP THE MODERN DEISTS. 24S we fear our author would find some difficulty to prove that gene- rally the Gentiles were so concerned for lesser sins, as he pre- tends. 9. Had they been so well agreed, as he pretends, about repentance, and had this been the design of their sacrifices, I do not well understand why our author should make such opposilion betwixt sacrifices and repentance, as elsewhere he does ; when he is speaking of several faults of the Heathen priests, he subjoins — " Sed el hoc pejus, quod quum ex vera virtufe, vel kinc nbi excide- " rint ex pcenitentia vera, pacem internam comparare debiiissent, " ad ritus <^* sacra, quce ipsi CSciL SacerdotesJ peragerent resper- " ducta est, ^c."*^ Here it would seem plain, that the people came at length, if not of their own accord, yet by the persuasion of the priests, to overlook repentance, and reject it, substituting other things in its room ; and when once this obtained in one generation, it is like it might spread and obtain in after ages, being transmitted from father to son, and the priests carrying on the cheat ; and so at least the world in all ages hath not made any accomit of repen- tance as the only expiation. Again, it would seem from our author, that sacrifices did not import, and were not evidences of repentance, but on the contrary, means invented to make people neglect it.f I do not well understand how they, who, if we may believe our au- thor, were all so fully agreed about repentance, and were so prone and inclined to it, that their minds run into it without any persua- sion, should need so much the priests' persuasion, and be easily drawn off from what they accounted so available. Let us hear our author. Speaking of man's recovery from sin, says he, " Atque " instatrrationem hanc fieri debere ex pmiitenlia, docuere turn philo- " sophi, turn sacerdotes, ita ul hanc agendam animamque purifican- " diim, sed nan sine eorum ministerio, scepius inculcarent. Bene " quidem, si pocnitentiam satis populo persuasissent, quod neuti- " quam iamem ah ill is factum fiiit ; licet adeoprona in earn sit an- " iina Humana, ut etiam nidlo suadente, inforo inlerno ex gratia " divina,conscienti(B que dictamine decernaturJ'^X Our author tells us, that the people's sacrifices were an argument of their repen- tance,as we heard above, and that the priests persuaded them to it, and that they were all agreed, that repentance was the only atone- * Del. Rel. Gent. pag^. 10.—" But this too is worse, that when they ought to "have sought inward peace by true virtue, or when they had fallen from it, " by true penitence, the matter was reduced to rites and sacrifices performed " by the priests." t Ibid. pag. 197. i " And both the philosophers and the priests taught that this recovery " must be brought about by repentance, so that they often inculcated that " this ought to be done and the soul purified, but not without their ministry, " It would have been well indeed if they had sufficiently persuaded the people " to penitence, which however was not done by them, although the human " mind is so prone to it, that even without any adviser, it is determined in the •' in^\i^rd court by Ihc divine grace and the dictates of conscience.*' 244 AN INQUIRY INTO THE jnent, and that the mind of man needs no admonisher to persuade it to repentance ; and yet he tells us likewise in the passages ad- duced, That repentance was quite laid by, sacrifices and rites put in its place, the people so ignorant of the worth of it as to let it go, and so backward as not to look after it, unless the priests had pres- sed it more, (and yet we are told they inculcated it oft) and in fine, the priests so negligent that they quite neglected their duty. How to knit all this together I know not. I do think it were easier to make these words overthrow our author's argument, than to recon- cile them with themselves, with truth, reason, or experience ; but I spare reflections that offer themselves. Before our author, or the Deists, make any thing of this argument, they must prove, " That sacrifices universally obtained — That sacrifices were every where offered to the One True GOD — That those sacrifices were sym- bolical of repentance," as another Deist has it, and several other things taken notice of above. ARTICLE v. That there are rewards and punishments after this Life. We are now come to our author's last article. He is not very constant in expressing himself about this article, and hoM' far it was agreed to. Sometimes he pretends, that these rewards were eter- nal happiness, and that this was agreed ; sometimes only it was agreed that there Avere rewards and punishments after this life ;. and sometimes»he words it yet more modestly, that they expected rewards and punishments, either in this life, or after it. So page 203, when he enters expressly to treat of this article, Et qiiidem ■prmninm bonis <^- supplicium. malis, (N. B.) vel in hac vita, vel post hanc vitam dari, statuebant Gentiles.^^'^ And indeed when he comes to tell us how far it is determinable in this matter by the light of nature, he makes this article of very little signification. " Non imperite quidem, bonos, bona, malos ma- " la, vel in feternum manere affirmabant veteres. At quis locum *' prjemii, vel poenas ostenderit? — Quis supplicii genus conjectave- " rit ?" (And the same is perfectly the case as to rewards, though our author waves that, for what cause it is not hard to conjecture.) *' Quis tandem durationis terminum posuerit ?"f * •' And indeed the Heathens were of opinion, that there would be a reward •' to the good, and a punishment to the wicked, either in this life or after " this life." t De Ilelig Gent. pag-. 210.—" The ancients indeed not unskilfully affirm- "ed that good things awaited the good, and evil the wicked, even for ever* " IJut wlio could show the place of reward or punishment ? Who could guess ^' the kind of punishment ? * * * Who at last can fix the term of their -duration 2 PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 245 All that he pretends to have been received, was barely this, " That there are rewards and punishments after this life." Let us hear himself, " Et quidem praeter solennem illam notitiam commu- '■'■ iiem, nempe, deum bonuni justumq ; esse, adeoq ; praemium vel *' poenam turn in hac vita, turn post hanc vitam, pro actionibus, imo *« & cogitationibus suis unicuique remetiri, nihil quod verisimile ma- " gis esset ab illis statui possee decernimus."* But he tells us, that by the additions they made to this, and proceeding to deter- mine further than they knew, even this came to be called in ques- tion, (which, by the way, ruins our author's cause as to this arti- cle) but let himself speak, " Dum haec philosophi, ilia sacerdotes, " alia demum poetae adjicerent, tota inclinata in c^sumq ; pronanu- " tavit veritatis fabrica. Si semet satis coercuissent Gentilium co- " riphaei, neminem, puto, dissentientem habuissent.f He asserts very little, we see, to have universally obtained as to this article, and he seems to do more than insinuate, that even, as to this Utile, at least, in process of time there were some, and even not a few dissenters : For I knoAV not what meaning else to put up- on the " whole fabric of truth nodding," and " inclining to fall :" And this is to quit the cause. We shall howcA'er notice his argu- ments, but the more shortly, because of what has been already ob- served. First then, he pretends, that the persuasion of this is innate,'^ that the reasons of it are so obvious, and the arguments leading to it are so evident, that they could not but agree as to this.|| But 1 have already shown, that every thing that is evident, or was so to our author and his companions and followers, was not so to the ancient sages. I guess that he learned most of these argu- ments he insists on from some others than the Heathen philoso- phers, or if they managed them so well, he would have done right to have pointed us to the places where they have done so. But when he has done this it will not prove an tinioersal consent : For we are concerned in some other besides philosophers. As for what he pretends of this persuasion's being innate, I think he has said much to disprove it himself ; or if it be, I think the presages of future misery in the mind of man, have been much more strong than of happiness. And in a word, he only says it was innate, but • '' And indeed besides that solemn common notice, that thei'c is a God " who is good and just, and consequently will reward and pimish every one, " both in this life and after this life, according- to his actions, and even — to " his thoughts, we think that nothing' more probable could be determined by " them." \ " While the philosophers added some things, the priests others, and the " poets others further, the whole fabric of truth was ruined and fell to tlie " ground. If the leaders of the Heathens could have restrained Uicmselves, " I think that tl>\ would have had nobody differing from them." i DcBeg. Gent, page 211. || Ibid, page 4. -246 AN INaUIRY INTO THE does not prove it. Yea, if this did not universally obtain, accord- ing to our author's own doctrine, it was not innate. Next he insists on the custom of deifying heroes, and placing them among the number of the immortal gods. This he hints at frequently. But this did not universally obtain as to time or place, and so hit not the point in the least. All were not so dignified, nay, not all that were good ; nor does it prove, that even all that people, among whom this custom prevailed, were of that opinion ; but on- ly the persons principally concerned. And indeed it were easy to shew that they were not all of this opinion, which may jK)ssibly be made appear in the next chapter. His next argument is deduced from a few testimonies of poets and philosophers asserting a future state, which he has scattered tip and down, here and there. But what is this to all the world ? I)othe poets' fancies of Eb/sian fields, Styx and the like, give us the true measure of the sentiments of the world ? Thus I have viewed our author's proofs of his five articles, and their reception in the world. I have not knowingly omitted any thing of moment, advanced by him for his opinion. I shall con- clude this chapter with a few general reflections on our author's conduct in this affair. I do not a little suspect a writer of controversy, when he huddles up, and endeavors to conceal the state of the question, and shifts it upon occasion. It is always a sign either that his judgment is naught, or that his designs are not fair and good. I do not believe that our noble author's abilities required any such mean shifts, if the bad- ness of the cause he unhappily undertook, had not obliged him : But that this is the course he steers, is evident. Now he seems to undertake to shew us, what the most universal apprehensions of men were in matters of religion ; and anon, he pretends to tell us what the more discerning persons, among the Heathens thought ; and thus shifts the scene, as it is for his purpose. It is further remarkable, that our author has crammed in a great deal of philosophical learning, which makes nothing at all to the main purpose of the book. He has writ a book of 230 pages to prove that these five articles obtained ; whereas all the arguments he adduces, scarce take up ten of them. The rest is a collection of historical and philological learning about the Heathen gods and worship. He only drops here and there (he shadow of an argu- ment ; and then when we are some pages by it, he tells us he has demonstrated this already, and we are referred back to some of the preceding argumemts ; and that is, we are bid search for a nee^ die amongst a heap of hay. This looks exceeding suspicious like.'* * Head the conclusion of our author's 8. Cap. pag. 54. and compare it ■with the Cap. PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 247 Again, I do not like frequent and repeated assertions in a dis- putant without arguments. Fewer assertions and more urgumeuls, if the cause had permitted, would have done better. It is said that some by telling a lie often over, come at length to believe it to be true. I am apt to think that the oft asserting over and over again what he undertakes to prove, might go further toward his own conviction, than all the arguments that he has advanced. Our author undertakes to give us an account what the Heathens* thoughts as to those articles were, and what led them to these ap- prehensions ; but after all, you shall find nothing but an account of some of their practices, with our author's glosses put on them, and the reason that, not they, but he thinks may be alleged in justification of their practices and opinions. If he had dealt fair- ly he would have told us in their own words, what their senti- ments were, and likewise what were their inducements that led them into those opinions ; but to obtrude, as every where he doth, his conjectures and strained interpretations, as their meaning, is perfectly intolerable. It is indeed true, that our author affords us several quotations from the Heathens ; but doth he, by this means, give us a fair representation of the point in controversy, and their sentiments about it ? No. If his reader is so simple as to take this for grant- ed, he deceives himself. I know it is the custom of some others, as well as our author, though perhaps on better designs, to quote some passages from Heathen authors, in order to shew their agree- ment with Christianity, and to what a length the mere light of na- ture brought them ; but hereby they do deceive the reader : So Cicero's testimony to the immortality of the soul, is alleged by our author, pag. 192, " Qucmadmodum igiiiir hand alius Deiis^ " hand alia virtus, ab Gcntilibus, quam ab nostris, olim celehra- " tur, ila ccrte communis utriusque spes immortal itatis fuit. Di- " sertim Cicero 2 de. Leg. ait, animi hominum sunt immortales : " Sed fortium bonorum divini et alibi in Lib. de Senectufe ail .- ^' Non est lugenda mors, quum immortalilas ronser/ui/j/r."* Now if any one should think that this testimony of Cicero gives a full account of his apprehensions about immortality, they would be very far deceived : For in his first book of Tuscukui Questions, where he discusses this point ex professo, he discovers indeed an inch nation to believe it, and a desire that it may be true ; yet such a hesitation about it, that he knows not how to persuade him- self of it, as we shall show perhaps in the next chapter. In like " ''^s therefora there was no othcf God, nor any other virtue formerly II celebrated among the Gentiles llian by our writers, so surely both of them II had a common hope of immortality ; for Cicero savs expressly, 2d de Legi- bus, that the souls of men are immortal, and those of the brave and good ^^ are divme : and elsewhere in his book on Old Age he saySj that death which imnicdiately follows, b not to be mourned for." 24S AN INaUlRY INTO THE manner Plato is cited by him, and many others 16 the same pur- pose : B^it what a sad uncertainty both Socrates and Plato were in about this point, I shall fully demonstrate in the next chapter. I shall here set down only one notable instance of the unfairness of this wa}' of procedure. Our author quotes Solon's testimony for future felicity, pag. 1 94. Let us hear our author's own words : " Pidchram distinctlonem inter felicem sive fortunatem ^ beatum " affert ex Solo7ie Herodotus Lib. 1. Ubi Craso respondent, ait " jiemhiem digmim esse qui vocetur beatus antequam rtXtvTijo-et « T«v Biav tv hoc est, vitam suam bene clauserit ; adeoque tvrvx» " sive fortunatum hac in vita, nequaqnam ^'oxfiievsivebeaium " ante obitem ejus hominum appellari posse- Huic concinit Ovi- " diu's, Diciq ; beatus Ante obitum nemo, supremaque funera, debet. " Proprie quippe loquendo, nemo beatus ante mortem : Ita ut " beati inter Gentiles vocarentur, qui in EIt/sHs campis sempiter- " no czva fruerentur.^^^ Now here we have a proof to the full of our author's conduct in Ills quotations, and the improvement of them. Was not Solon clear that there was a state of happiness after this life ? Who can doubt it, after our author has thus proved it ? But what if Solon for all this, confined happiness to this life, defining the happy man, " One who is competently furnished with outward things, acts honestly, and lives temperately;"! which definition no less a per- son than Aristotle approves. And in all Solon's speech to Cresus, there is not one word, if it were not disingenuously or ignorantly quoted, that gives us the least ground to believe that Solon once so much as dreamed of fiappiness after this life. Stanley in his life of Solon recites from Herodotus this whole speech, and the story to which it relates. J Croesus, king of Lydia, in Asia the less, sends for Solon upon the fame of his wisdom. Solon comes. The vain , king dazzled with the lustre of his own greatness, asked the wise Solon, Whether ever he saw any man happier than himself, who was possessed of so great riches and power ? Solon named sever- al, particularly Tellus the Athenian citizen, Cleobis and Bito, two * " Herodotus from Solon quotes a fine distinction betwixt a lucky or " fortunate and happy man, in his first book, when Solon answering Croesus, " says that nobody deserves to be called happy, till he has ended his life well, " and consequently that although a man may be called lucky or fortunate in " this life, but that he ought not to be called happy before his death. And " Ovid agrees with him, " Nor ought any to be called happy before his death., " and the last ceremon}' of his fmieral." For properly speaking none is hap- " py before his death. So that those were called happy among the Gentile< " who enjoyed an eternal life in the PMysian fields." \ Stanley's Life of Solon, page 26. % Ibid, page 28, 29. PRIN'CIPLES OF T'HE MODERN DEISTS. 249 brothers ; the story of whom he relates to Croesus, and gives the reasons why he looked on them as happy, without ever a hint oi* their enjoyinp; any happiness after this life. At which Cronsus was angry thinking himself undervalued ; whereupon Solon thus ad- dresses him — " Do you inquire, Croesus, concerning human affairs " of me who, know that divine providence is severe, and full of " alteration ? In process of time, we see many things we would " not ; we suffer many things we would not. Let us propose " seventy years as the term of man's life, which years consist of " 25,200 days, besides the additional month ; if we make one " year longer than another by that month, to make the time ac- " cord, the additional months belonging to those years will be " thirty-five, and' the days 1050,— whereof one is not in all things " like another. So that every man, O CroRsus, is miserable ! You " appear to me very rich, and are king over many ; but the qiies- " tion you demand I cannot resolve, until I hear you have ended " your days happily ; he that hath much wealth is not happier " than he who gets his living from day to day, unless fortune con- " tinuing all those good things to him, grant that he die well. — " There are many men very rich, yet unfortunate ; many of mo*- " derate estates, fortunate ; of whom he who abounds in wealth, " and is not happy, exceeds the fortunate only in two things, the " other him in many ; the rich is more able to satisfy his desires, *' and to overcome great Injuries ; yet the fortunate excels him. — '* He cannot indeed inflict hurt on others, and satisfy his own de- " sires ; his good fortune debars him of those : But he is free from " evils, healthful, happy in his children, and beautiful ; if to this« '" a man dies well, that is, he whom you seek, who deserves to be " called happy ; before death he cannot be stiled happy, but for- " tunate ; yet for one man to obtain all this is impossible, as one " comitry cannot furnish itself with all things : Some it hat!;, " others it wants ; that which hath most is the best, so In men not " one is perfect ; what one hath the other wants. He who hatli " constantly most, and at last quietly departs this life, in my opin- " ion, O king, deserves to bear that name. In every thing we " must have regard to the end, whither it tends ; for many to " whom God dispenseth all good fortunes, he at last utterly sub- " verts." Thus we see the whole passage, in which it is evident that Solon meant only, that to make a man happy, it is requisite he continue in the enjoyment of a competency till death, and that then he die well, that is, quietly and in good respect or credit with men. That this is the meaning of dying well according to Solon, is not only evident from the strain of the discourse, but from the stories of Tellus, ('leobis and Blto, whom he instances as happy men, because of their creditable deaths. The first he tells us died in defence of his countrv, after he had put bis enemies to flight, ^2 •250 AN INQUIRY INTO THE " he died nobly, and the Athenians buried him in the place where he fell, with much honor." The two brothers, Cleobis and Bito, drew their mother's chariot forty-five stadia, and with the stress died next morning in the temple, and so died honorably. And any that will give himself the trouble to read Ovid's story of Acteon, in his third book of his Metamorphosis will see it clear as the day, that he meant just the same. He represents how happy one might have thought Cadmus, considering how many things he had that were desirable in his lot, a kingdom, relations, and children, had not Acteon his grand-child's fate interrupted the series of his joys, and made him miserable. Whereupon the poet concludes, " Til! death a man cannot be called happy ;" that is, till a man has with- out interruption, enjoyed a tract of prosperity, and dies creditably- without any mixture of ill fortune. Jam stabant Thebae : Poteras jam Cadme, videri Exiliofelix: Soceri tibi Marsque Venusque Contigerant : Hue adde genus de conjuge tanta, Tot natos, natasque, & pignora cara nepotes. Hos quoque jamjuvenes : sed scilicet ultima semper Expectanda dies homini est, dicique beatus Ante obitum nemo, supremaque funera debet. Prima nepos inter res tot tibi, Cadme, secundas Causa fuit luctus, &c.* And thus he proceeds to tell the story of Acteon's being trans- formed into a hart. Thus we see with what candor our author quotes the Heathens. Here he has first broke off some words from their context, whereby the unwary reader is tempted to believe, that the speaker meant quite another thing than really he did ; and then obtrudes this false sense of one or two men's words, who ^vere wise men, and in their thoughts far above the vulgar, as the harmonious meaning of the Gentile world. Nor do I think it strange that our author should serve us so, see- ing he was prepossessed in favor of the Heathen's religion before he began to read tlieir books. For he tells us in the entry of his !>ook, the very first sentence of it, and more fully in the rest of the first chapter, That he was at once very concerned for the divine providence, and withal fully convinced that it could not be main- tained without there were a religion common io all men ; or, as his words formerly quoted by us express it, " unless every man Avas provided with the means that were needful for attaining future * Ovid. Metamorph. Lib. 3. — " And now Thebes was built ; now, O Cadmus, vou might seem to be happy in your banishment. Mars and Venus were your father and mother in law ; add to this, a race from so illustrious a consort, so many sons and daughters, and grand-children, dear pledges, and these too al- ready youths ; but truly a man must always look for his last day, and noliody can be called happy before his death, and last funeral rites. Amidst so much prosperity, o Cadmus, a grandson was the first cause of mourning to you." PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 251 happiness ;" so he went to the books of the Heathens under a persuasion that there was a common religion there, could he be so lucky as to light on it, and therefore no doubt he drew and strain- ed things to his purpose, both rites and words. Thus he begins his discourse about expiation : " Quosdam Gentilium ritus, qui in sensum saniorem trahi possunt, jam tractaturus,"* &c. And in- deed he draws them to a sounder sense than ever they put on them. But, after all, forced prayers are not good for the souly says the Scots proverb. And from one thus prepossessed, we can ex- pect no fair account of the Gentiles' sentiments. Which, by the way, gives me occasion to remark, that if any one desires to understand the mind of the Heathen philosophers and sages, they should read them themselves, or Heathens' accounts of their lives and actions, rather than those done by Christians ; because very often when Christians write their lives, they have some design, and they strain every thing in the philosophers to a compliance either with their designs or apprehensions. The Hea- then writers being under no influence from the scripture light, do plainly narrate things as they are, (not being so sensible of what things may reflect really upon the persons concerning whom they write ; the light of nature not representing clearly that wickedness which is in many of their actions and opinions) and scruple not to tell them out plainly : whereas Christians, being aware how odious such and such practices or principles are, dare scarce tell such things of those famous men, as they were really guilty of; because they know how deep a stain it will leave on them, by those who are taught the evil of them by the scriptures. I shall add this reflection more : If any one would conclude from our author's confidence in some places of his book, where he talks of many reasons that he has advanced, and that he has demonstrat- ed this and that ; if, I say, from this they would infer, that he was fully persuaded in his own mind, about these five articles y that they universally obtaincdy and are sufficient, he would very far mistake our author, who, throughout his book, sufficiently betrays his un- certainty about them, and that he wanted not a fear lest it should not be true, as some things afterwards to be pleaded will show But lest this should seem to be said altogether without ground, I shall single out one instance of our author's wavering in this mat- ter, reserving others to another occasion. It is page 1 9, where, after our author has discoursed of the jnore famous names of the true God, and showed that the Gentiles applied them all, save one, to the sun, he concludes thus, " Haec saltern fuere solenniora Sunimi Dei nomina inter Hebraeos extantia, quae etiam ad solera, De Rel. Gent. pag. 195. — " Being now about to treat of some rites of the ileathens, wliich may be drawn into a sound setse." 252 AN INaUlRY INTO THE Sabazio excepto, a Gentllibus reducta fuisse, ex supra-allatis con- jecturam facere licet. Adeo iit quamvis superius sole niimen sub hisce praesertim vocabulis coluerunt Hebrsei, solem neque aliud rumeR intellexerunt Gentiles, nisi fortasse in sole, tanquam prae- claro Dei Summi specimine, & sensibili ejus, ut Plato vocat, simula- cro, Deuiii summum ab illis cultum fuisse censeas : Quod non facile abnuerim, prffiseitim cum syrabolica fuerit omnis fere religio vete- rum."^ But perhaps though our author was not well confirmed in his opinion, Avhen he began his book, yet he came to some more fixedness before he got to the end of it. Well, let us hear him, in his censure of the Gentiles' religion in the last chapter of his book;' where speaking of the worshipping the heavens, the sun, &c. he gives his judgment thus : " I)e hoc quidem dogmate, idem ac de priore censeo : Nempe, nisi symbolicus fuerit, erroneum mihi prorsus videtur esse cultum ilium. Caeterum quod symbolici fuerunt dim hujnsmodi cultus, multae, quas supra adduximus, suadere vi- dentur rationes : Sed sno judicio heic quoque utatur lector."f — "What more uncertainty could any betraj^, than our author doth in these words ? And indeed here we have enough to overthrow his whole book : for if this first article fall all will fall with it, as we may see afterwards. But it is now time that we draw to a conclusion of this chapter, having sufficiently enervated our author's arguments, so far as we could discern them. If any of them seem to be omitted, I piesurae they will be found to be of no great consideration, and of an easy despatch to any that is acquainted with this contioversy. Our author's way of writing made it somewhat difficult to find his argu- ments. And indeed upon serious reflection, I can scarce under- stand at what our author aimed in this way of writing. He could never rationally expect that this would clear the subject he had imdertaken. I had almost concluded that his design behoved to be an ostentation of his krowledge of the Heathens' religion, in or der to make his authority have the more weight, and to scare peop'c * De Rel. Gent. pag-. 19. — " Those at least were the more solemn names of the Supreme God, that we find among- the Hebrews ; all whicli except Sa- bazino, we may conjecture from what has been quoted above, was applied by the Gentiles to the sun. So that although the Hebrews worshipped a deity superior to the sun, especially under those names, yet the Gentiles under- stood by them the sun and no other deity, unless perhaps in the sun, as an illustrious representation and sensible image, of the Supreme God, as Plato calls him, under which figure we may suppose that the Supreme God was worshipped by tliem. Which I would not easily contradict, especially as al- most all tlie religion of the ancients was s3-mbolical." f Ibid, pag. 223. — " Concerning this doctrine indeed, I am of the same opinion as concerning tlie former, to wit, that unless that worship was sym- bolical, it seems to me to have been quite erroneous. But the many reasons which we have adduced above, seem to persuade us to believe that worship of this kind of old was symbolical. But let the reader use his Qwn judgmeiu in this case likewise." I PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 253 from entertaining a different opinion conceniing the religion of the Heathen world, from that which one who had so industriously searched into their writings, owned. But if this was it, our au- thor has missed it. And I think instead of doing the Deists' cause any service this way, he has rather hurt it : for every one that shall peruse this work with attention, and find how great our author's learning, diligence and industry have been, and yet how little he has been able to do, they will infer the weakness of the cause he lias undertaken, and conclude, that the cause could bear no better defence, and that therefore, a weak and indefensible cause fcas baffled our author's great abilities and application. For si Pergrama dextra Defend! posscnt, efiam hac defensa fuissent.* C. Blount and they who have come after our author, as has been said before, do but copy after him, and take his notions upon trust, but others will be somewhat more M'ise, and will look whom they trust in a matter of this importance. CHAP. XV. Wherein it is made appear that Herberfs Five Articles did not univcrsaUi/ obtain. WE have in the preceeding chapter sufficiently showed how weak our noble author's proofs are of his universal religion. It now remains that we prove that what he pretends is indeed false. — Our work here is far more easy, than what our author undertook. He asserts that providence cannot be maintained, unless all man- kind are provided in the means needful for attaining future happi- ness, and he is likewise clear, that less cannot be allowed sufficient for this end than the five articles mentioned, wherefore he pretends that all the world agreed in owning these. Now to have made this last appear, it was needful it should be proven by induction of all particular nations, that they thus agreed, and that as to all times — but this would have been somewhat too laborious. We main- tain ihat all did not agree in the acknowledgment of those five arti- cles : And this is evinced, if we can show only one nation dissent- ing from any one of them. But we shall not be so nice upon the point, as only to mention one nation, or disprove one article. Let us take a separate view of each article, and see what the judgment of some nations were concerning them. * " If Troy could have been defended- by any right hand, it \yould have been defended by this one" 254 . AN INaUIRY INTO THE ARTICLE I. All the World did not agree in owning the One True Supreme GOD. I MIGHT for proof of this, only desire any person to read our author's book, and there he would find this sufficiently clear. But I shall shortly confirm it to the conviction of any, who has not a mind to shut his eyes, by the few following observations as to the sentiments of the world in this case. 1 . It is most evident to any one, who will give himself the trou- ble to read ever so little of the writings of the Gentiles, that ma- ny nations, I had almost said most nations, did hold a plurality of eterncl and independent beings, on whom they depended, and which they called gods in the properest sense of the word. Herodotus quoted by our author tells us, " That all the Africans worshiped ** the sun and moon only" — " Soli & lunse solummodo sacrificant, *' & quidem Afri universi."* And Plato quoted hkewise by our author, a few pages after, in his dialogue, which he calls Cratylus, tells us, " Qui Graeciam primi incoluere, ii videntur mihi illos so- lum deos existimasse, quos nunc etiam barbari multi, pro diis ha- bent, solem, lunam, terram, astra, ccelum."f Of this also the an- cient inscriptions mentioned by our author,^ and more particular- ly by Hornbeck in his treatise de Conversione Gentilium, is a proof. — " Soli invicto & lunae aeternje deo soli invicto Mythrae & omnipo- " tenti, deo Mythr£e."|| Mythras was a name given to the sun by the Persians, as our author proves. And if we may believe Maimo- nides, the Sabeans owned no God save the stars. " Notum est *' Abrahamum patrem nostrum educatura esse in fide Sabaeorum, *' qui statuerunt nullum esse Deum, prseter stellas.** Nor were the Egyptians of another mind. Diodorus's testimony is worth our notice to this purpose, — " Igitur primi illi homines olim in " ^gypto geniti, hinc mundi ornatum conspicientes, admirantes- " que universorum naturam, duos esse deos, & eos aeternos arbitra- " tri smit, solem & lunam : Et ilium quidem Osiridem, banc Isidim " certa nominis ratione appellarunt."tt * De Rel. Gent, page 36. t Ibid. pag. 39. — " Those who first inhabited Greece, appear to me to have *' thought that these alone were gods, which many barbarians still hold to be ** gods, to wit, the sun, the moon, the earth, the stars, the heaven." f + Ibid. pag. 26. || Hornbeck, pag. 19. •* More Nevochim, referente. Hornbec ubi supra, pag. 17. — " It is well " known that our father Abraham was educated in the ^ith of the Sabeans, " who thought that there was no God except the stars." -j-f Owen Theolog. Lib. 3. Cap. 5. Herbert pag. 39. — " Therefore those first " men that were produced in Egypt, observing from thence the beauty of the " world, and admiring the nature of the universe, concluded that there were " two gods, the sun and the moon, and they called the one Osiris, and the " other Isis, giving certain i-easons for those names." PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 255 Thus we see what the apprehensions of several nations were, and how harmonious they are in dissenting from our author's asser- tion. It had been easy to have alledged many more testimonies even from our author against himself: But we aim at brevity. 2. It is not improbable, that some nations, though they might al- low some priority of one of their gods to the rest, yet did not think that there was any such great inequality, at least amongst their more notable deities, as could infer the supremacy of one to the rest, and their dependence on, and subordination to him. We find every where equal honors paid, and equal or very little different titles of respect given to the sun or moon. So that it is very likely, though they might give the sun the preference in point of order, yet they did not apprehend any such great inequality, as seems needful betwixt one supreme being and his dependents. Ths peo- ple of Mexico in America, though they Avorship many gods, yet look on their two principal ones, whom they call Vitzilopuchlli and Tescatlipuca, as two brothers. " Mexicani primo colere solitifii- " erunt immanetn deonim iurbam, bis mille referunt, inter qno$ " duo prcBcipui Vitzilopuchtli wledgment of the True God, and whom they should own as such. It was therefore utterly impossible that they should conde- scend on this, as a principal part of the worship of God, whom they did not know to have any being. 2. So far were they from looking on virtue as Uie principal part of the worship of the gods, whom they owned, that the worship of many of their gods, was thought to consist m things that were cross to the plainest dictates of nature's light. Our author ac- quaints us frequently with the obscenities, the cruelties, and other extravagancies of their worship. The obscenities are too fulsome to be repeated. The furious extravagancies, religious, or rrther superstitious fury and madness used in the worship of Bacchus, are known to every one. And for their cruelty, who knows not that human sacrifices were almost universally used? Some offered captives, some offered strangers, some sacrificed their dearest rela- tions and children, and that in the most cruel manner.f 3. We need go no further than our author's book, to learn, that most nations were so far from looking on virtue as any part of the worship due to any of those gods they owned, that they placed it wlwlly in such other things, as our author, amongst others, has given us a large account of. * 4. They, who were most zealous for virtue, were very far from looking on it as a part of the worship of God, or directing it to his glory. I believe our author, were he alive, for all his reading would find it diflScult to find one fair testimony to this purpose. * " For good men arc rare, and "scarcely as numerous as the gates of Tli€- bes, or the mouths of tlie fertile Nilt." t Sco this fully proven in the learned and excellent Dr. Owen's treatise de ■Tuntitiavimlicutrict', frompag-. 66 to 100, by authentic testimonies, with such remarks as may be worth the reading-. 264 AN INaUiRY INTO THE They looked not on themselves as debtors to God for their vh-lue. Hence Cotta, after he has acknowledged that we are indebted to God for our riches and eternal enjoyments, adds ; " Virtutem au- tem nemo iinquam acceptam Deo retulit, nimirum recte : Propter virtutem enira laudamur, & in virtute recte gloriamur ; quod non contingeret, si id donum a Deo haberemus." Hence a little after, he adds, " Nam quis quod bonus vir esset, gratias diis egit un- quam !"* And much more to the same purpose. They thought that their virtue made them equal to their gods. " Hoc est quod philosophia mihi promittit, «t me parem Deo faciat."f Yea not only so, but they pretended their virtues placed them above their gods. " Est aliquid, quo sapiens antecedat deum, ille naturaae beneficio, non suo, sapiens est." J And again, " Deus non vincit sapientem felicitate, etiamsi vincit setate : Non enim est virtus ma- jor, quae longior."||. Hence they will not have us so much as to pray to God, either as to virtue or felicity. It is a mean thing to weary the gods. " Quid votis opus est ? facto felicem."'^* And much more to the same purpose. A R T I c L E iv.^ It did not universally obtain, that repentance is a sufficient expia- tion ; or, that me must repent for offences done against the true God. Our author has acknowledged, that there is rarely mention of this amongst the ancients ; and we have already, by quotations from him, cleared that the ancient Heathens did not think it a BufBcient expiation, and indeed that it was of no great considera- tion among them, is sufficiently evident from their not taking any notice of it, even when the fairest occasions present themselves. And finally, there can be nothing more certain, than that their re- pentance could not aim at the offence done to the true God, of whom many of them were utterly ignorant. But what has been said is sufficient to shov/ that it did not universally obtain in any sense, that can turn to any account to the Deists. M * Cic. de Nat. Deor. p. mihi. 187. Lib. 3. — '* For nobody ever confessed that he owed his virtue to God, for we are justly praised on account of our' virtue, and we justly boast of it, which would not be the case if we had our virtue as a gift from God Nor did any body ever give thanks to the gods because he was a good man." t Seneca, Epist. 48. — " This is what philosophy promises me, to make me equal to Gcd." + Idem, Epist. 53. — " There is something in which a wise man excels God, that the former is wise by his own benefit, but the latter by that of nature." II Epist. 73. — " God does not exceed a wise man in happiness, though lie exceeds him in age, for virtue is not the greater in proportion as it is older." ** Epist. 51.—" What need has he of prayers who is actually happy." PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 265 ARTICLE V. // was not universally agreed, that there are Rewards and Pxinish- menls after this life. 1. HoTivtevER many there were that maintained the immortaHty of the souls of men, it is certain, that there were very many dis- sentients, who were of a different mind, and that of all sorts of people. The fumed sects among the Indians, which they call Schaerwae- sha^ Pasenda and Tschedca, if we may believe Hornbeck in his account of them, all deny a future state.* ^«or are the wise Chinese, at least many of them, of a different mind. They are divided into three sects. Thefirst sect of their philosophers are the followers of the famed Confucius ; their mo- rals are as refined as perhaps these of the most polite parts of the world, if not more. But as to the soul, they seem to make it a part of God, which at death returns to that first Principle, whence it was broke off*. Let us hear Possevinus's account of them. As to this matter he says, they maintain, " Hominis cor esse unam & *' eandem rem cum illo primo rerum principio; cumque homo mori- " tur, cor perire prorsus & absmni, superesse tamen ex eo primuni *' priucipium, quod vitam ante conferebat." And further, they maintain, " Posse hominem in hac vita summam principii cogno- *' scendiperfectionem adipiscij&nieditando pervenire ad maximam *' vitse tranquillitatem, & hoc esse summura bonuni, quod donee *' obtineat, continuo motu agatnr, 8: de inferno uno in aliuni conji- " ciatur, usque duni contemplancio & meditando ad fastigium per- " venerit tranquillitatis, (|U£b in principio illo primo est."f These are the appiehensions of their best moralists. But there aie two other sects, that plainly declare against a fu- ture state, and the immortality of the soul, and have no pros- pect beyond tirne.J Of this same opinion were not only single persons, but many sects of the ancient philosophers, whom Cicero mentions, and con- ludes his account of them thus — " His sententiis omnibus nihil post *' mortem pertiuere ad quemquam potest : Pariter enim cum vita * Hornbeck, pag. 34, ubl supra. f Hornbeck, pag. 47, 48. — " That the heart of man is one and the same " thing' with that first Principle of things, and that when a man dies, his he.irt " quite perishes and is consumed, vet that t]ie first Principle of it remains, " which formerly gave him life. » » * That a man may in this life " attain to the higlu-st perfection of the principle of knowledge, and arrive '* by mcdiUition to the greatest tranquillity of life, and that until he obtain this, he is agitated by a perpetual motion, and thrown fi-om one hell into " anotlier, till by contemplation and meditation he arrive at the summit el" ** tranquillity wjuca is in that first Prbiciple " t Ibid. pag. 48, 49. 34 266 AN INQUIRY INTO THE " seusus amlttitiir."* And a little after, speaking of the opposition made to Plato's opinion about the immortality of the soul, he says, " Sed plurimi contra (Platonis scil. sententiam) nituntur, animosq ; " quasi capite damnatos morte niulctant." And some passages af- ter, speaking of the same opinion, he says, " Catervse veniunt con- " tradicentium, non solum Epicureorum, quos equidetn non despi- " cio, sed nescio quomodo doctissiraus quisque contemnit. Acer- " rime autem deliciae mese, dico Archias, contra banc iramortalita- " tern disi^eruit : Is enim tres llbros scripsit, qui Lesbiaci vocan- " tur, quod Metylenis sermo habetur : In quibus vult efficere ani- " imos esse mortales : Stoici autem usuram nobis tanquam corni- " cibus : Diu mansuros aiunt animos, semper negant."f Nor were they otherwise minded, many of them in Greece. When Socrates vents his opinion of the immortality of the soul that day before he died, Cebes, one of his disciples, who is the conferrer, or one of them at least that maintains the discourse with him, addresses him in these words : " Socrates, I subscribe to the " truth of all you have said. There is only one thing that men " look upon as incredible, viz. what you advanced of the soul : for " almost every body fancies, that when the soul parts from the bo- ♦' dy it is no more, it dies along with it ; in the very minute of " parting it vanishes like a vapour or smoke, which flies off and " disperses, and has no existence."^ 100. Yea, I^liny, Strabo, and many others, declare against the immor- tality of the soul ; nay, Pliny on set purpose disputes against it.ll And the poets go the same way. It were easy to multiply proofs of this from them. Seneca speaks the mind of many of them, though perhaps not his own. Trajcs, Troa, A. I. Post mortem nihil est, ipsaque mors niliil, Velocis spatll meta novissima. Qujeris quo jaceas post obitum loco ? Quo non mala jacent. Et Tempus nos avidum devorat & chaos. * Cicero, Tusc. Quest, l.pag. 329.—" From all these opinions, nothing after " death can be interesting to any one, for sensation is lost together with " life." t " Crowds of opposers come against me, not only of the Epicureans, whom " indeed I do not despise, but I know not how every most learned man despi- " ses them. For my darling, I mean Archais, has disputed very eagerly against " this immortality. He wrote three books, which are called Lesbian, because " the discourse is held at Mytelene, in which he endeavored to prove that the " souls of men are mortal. But the Stoicks only give them a long life like the " crows— they say that souls will live a long time, but they deny that they " will live for ever." + Plato's Phed67i done into English from M, Dacier's Trans, vol. 2. page 100- II Oweni Theolog. Lib. 1. C. pag. ir4. PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 267 Mors individua est, noxia corpori, Nee parcens anims.* Persius and all the poets made use of this as an encouragement to give way to themselves, in whatever lust prompted them to. Indulge genio, carpamus dulciaj nostrum est Quod vivis, cinis, & manes, & fabula fies.§ If it be said that this is an irony, and that he was not in earnest, it iB easy to multiply quotations to this purpose from Horace, Ca- tullus, and most of the poets, which are not capable of any such construction. But I forbear. And although Cicero was for the immortality of the soul ; yet in his first book of Tusciilan Questions, he plainly derides the whole business of rewards and punishments after this life ; as any one who will attentively peruse it may see. I forbear to transcribe the passage ; because I behoved to transcribe much to shew the tendency of the discourse. He plainly tells us, that he could be eloquent, if he had a mind to speak against those things ; Diser- tus esse possum, si contra ista dicer em.\\ The case is plainly this : That person to whom he discourses looks on death as an evil. Ci- cero tells him that perhaps it is because he fears those punishments after this life, which the vulgar believed ; and after he has tartly ridiculed them, he concludes, That had he a mind, he could en- large against those things, and plainly expose the whole tradition. But because some talk so much of Plato, Socrates, Cicero, and we get so many quotations from them about the immortality of the soul and a future state ; I shall here represent their own opinion somewhat more fully. As for Socrates, he has not writ any thing that is come to our hands ; all the accounts we have of him are from Plato, Xenophon and others, but especially Plato his scholar, who was with him at his death : From him then we shall learn at once, what both his master's opinion and his own were in this matter. When Socrates is making his apology before his judges, he tells them, " That to fear death, is nothing else, but to believe one's " self to be wise, when they are not ; and to fancy that they know •' what they do not know. In effect, nobody knows death ; no bo- " dy can tell, but it may be the greatest benefit of mankind ; and * " There is nothing after death, and death itself is nothing, being only the " last stage of our swift course. Do you ask in what place you are to lie af- " ter death ? In that place evils do not lie, and greedy time and chance devours " us. "Death is a divider, which hurts the body and does not spare the soul." § " Indulge your inclination, let us enjoy pleasures ; this span of life that •' we enjoy is ours, you will soon become ashes, a shade and a fable." !! Tuscul. Quest. Lib. 1. a little from the beginning, pag. mihi 312. 268 AN maUIRY INTO THE " yet men are afraid of it, as if they knew certainly that it was the " greatest of evils."* And a little after, speaking of death, " What ! should I be afraid of the punishment adjudged by Meli- " tus, a punishment I cannot possitively say whether it is good or *< evil ?"f And thus he concludes his apology. " But now, it is *' true we should all retire to our respective offices, you to live, and *' I to die. But whether you or I are going upon the better expe- ^' dition, it is known to none, but God alone." J Again, in that famed discourse on this subject, before his death, after he has produced all the arguments he can for the immortalily of the soul, he tells us pretty plainly, how things stood with him. ♦< Convincing the audience of Avhat 1 advance, is not only my aim ; *' indeed I shall be infinitely glad that it come to pass ; but my " chief scope is to persuade myself of the truth of these things ; *' for I argue thus, my dear Phedon, and you will find that this ^' way of arguing is highly useful, (very true to folk that are not *' certain and can do no better, and only to these.) If my pro- " positions prove true, it is well done to believe them, and if after *' my death they be found false, I will reap that advantage in this *' life, that I have been less afflicted by the evils Avhich commonly ^' accompany it. But I shall not remain long under this ignorance. "j[ And when he is near his close, and just about to take the poison, or a little before, having represented his thoughts about rewards and punishments after this life, which are little better than those of the poets, he concludes his account in these words ; " No man of *' sense can pretend to assure you, that all these things are just as " you have heard. But all thinking men will be positive, that the *' state of the soul, and the place of its abode, is absolutely such *' as I represent it to be, or at least very near it," — provided the soul be immortal. More might be alledged to the same purpose ; but this is suffi- cient to let us see how wavering Plato and his master Socrates were. They talk confidently sometimes ; but presently they sink again. Let us next see what Cicero's mind Avas. lie treats this subject on set purpose, in his first book of Tusculan Questions, which is wholly spent on this subject. He undertakes to shew and prove against the person whom he instructs, that death is not ttn evil, whether we are dissohed quite or not : and having, as he fancies, proven that death is not an evil, he proceeds, and gives us this account of his undertaking : — " I shall teach you, (speaking of " death) if I can, si posst//?, that it is not only not an evil , but a g-oof/."** But a little after he tells us clearly what we may expect * Dacier's Plato, Vol. ?. page 23. Soci-ates' Apolog-}' r Ibitl. pace 40. i Ibid, pag'c 47. (I Pluto's PhcdoTi.pa^c 135, 136.' '* Pag-e 3?J. PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 269 from him, when his hearer exhorts him to go on ; says he, Qeram tibi morem, Herbert de Veritate, pag. 272. 286 AN INaLIRY INTO THE reHi- quir. into moral virtue, ?ce. pag. 177. Jambili.de Vita. Pythag.Cap. 28. PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 285 « al affairs. For what was commonly taught concerning the gods, " was for the most part involved in fables, and most extravagant " absurdities. It is true, some of the learned among them have *' pretended to give some rational account concerning the nature " of the gods and the soul ; but all this in so imperfect and dubi- " ous a manner, that they themselves remained very uncertain in *' the whole matter. They agreed almost all of them in this point, " that mankind ought to apply themselves to the practice of virtue, *' but they did not propose any other fruits, but the honor and bene- " fits, which thence did accrue to civil society. For what the po- *' ets did give out concerning the rewards of virtue and the punish* *' ments of vice after death, was by these, who pretended to be " the wisest among them, looked upon as fables, invented to terri- *' fy and keep in awe the common people- The rest of the people *' lived at random, and what the Heathens called religion, did not *' contain any doctrine or certain articles concerning the knowledge " of divine matters. But the greatest part of their religious ** worship consisted in sacrifices and ceremonies, which tended " more to sports and voluptuousness, than to the contemplation of *' divine things. Wherefore the Heathen religion did neither edi- " fy in this life, nor afford any hopes or comfort at the time of " death."* Thus far he. Now methinks here is a quite differ- ent account of the Heathen world from that wiiich our author gives us, and that given by no churchman, but a statesman ; and one as learned as our author too, and that both in history and the law of nature, as his works evince ; and in my opinion it is the juster of the two accounts. The second is Varro, quoted by our author, who divides the religion of the Heathens into three sorts, Primum genus appellat ; Mythicon secundum ; Civile terthmi Physicum.f The first is that of the poets, which is altogether Ja6it?ot<5. The other which he calls natural, is tliat of the philosophers, which is wholly employed about the nature of the gods. And Varro ex- pressly says, it was not meet for, nor of any use to the vulgar. The third sort was what he calls civil, which was wholly calculated for human society, and its support ; and to this all the public wor- ship belonged, if we may believe Varro in the passage we now speak of. When he has opened the nature of each of them, he concludes with an account of the design of them. " Prima theo- " logia maxime accommodata est ad iheatrum : secunda scil, na~ turalis ad mundum : Tertia ad iirbem."^ No word here of eter- nal life, as the design of any of them. The passage itself fully ex- cludes it, and had it not been too long, had been worthy to be tran- scribed. • Introduct. Hist, of Europe, pa^. 357. Ch. 12. Par. 2. t See it also in Augiist. de Civlt. Dei, Lib. 6. Cap. 5. + " The first thcolog-y is fittest for the theatre, the second, to v/it, the nati;- " ral, for tlie world, and the third for the city." 286 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 7. To draw to a conclusion, Was it enough to the Heatliens that these things were sufficient, although they did not know them to be so ? Or was it needful that they should know them to be so ? If the last be said, how could they be sure about that, even the vul- gar sort of them, which our author, after all his application to this controversy, could not win to be sure of ? If the first be said, I would ask any Deist, Was not the end of natural religion fixed, and were they not certain ? Or might they not, at least, be fixed and certain about it ? If it was not, how could they use or chuse means, or direct them to an end which was not fixed, and they were not certain about ? If it was, then with what courage could they tise means with respect to an end and means, in the use of which they had so many difficulties to grapple with ; yet they could not be sure that they were sufficient by the least use of them to gain* the end ? Was it enough of encouragement, that they might use them at all adventures, not knowing whether they were, in them- selves, sufficient to reach the mark or not ? Methinks our author is very defective as to motives to excite to virtue. CHAP. XVIII, Containing an answer to some of the Deists^ principal arguments for the sufficiency/ of Natural Religion. WE have now considered what the Deists plead from univers- al consent ; and have sufficiently cleared that it is not by them proven, that the world was agreed as to these articles ; that in- deed the world did not agree about them ; that even they who owned them, were led to this acknowledgement, at least of some of them, rather by tradition than nature's light ; and that though they had acknowledged them, they are not sufficient. It now remains that we consider those arguments, wherein they con- ceive the great strength of their cause to lie. The first argument, which indeed is the strongest the Deists can pretend unto, is thus proposed by their admired Herbert : *' Et quidem quum media ad victum, vestitumque heic commoda *' suppeditant cunctis natura sive Providentia rerum communiSf ' suspicari non potui, eundum Deum, sive ex natura, sive ex gra- *' tia, in suppeditandis ad bentiorem hoc nostro statum, mediis, " ulli hominum deesse posse vel velle, adeo %it licet mediis illis " parum recte, vel feliciter usi si7it Gentiles, hand ita tamen per " Deum optimum maximum steterit, quo minus salvi fierent."^ For the translation, see note at bottom of page 228 of this book. PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEIBTS. 2»7 To the same purpose speaks Blount in his Religio Laiciy and A. W. in his letter to him in the Oracles of Reason, of whom after- wards. The force of all that is here pleaded will best appear, if it is put into a clear argument, and I shall be sure not to wrong it in the proposal. The argument runs thus : The goodness of God nutkcs it necessary that all men be pro^ vided in the means necessary for future bliss. But all men are provided with no other means of attaining fu- ture bliss save nature's light. Therefore no other m^ans are necessary for all men save the light of nature. The minor or second proposition needs not to be proven, since it is owned by those who maintain revelation, that it is not given to all men, and therefore that many have indeed no other light to guide them, save that of nature, in matters of religion, or in any of their other concerns. The first proposition, « That the goodness of God makes it ne- cessary that all men be provided in the means of attaining future blessedness," is that which they are concerned to prove. And the strength of what they urge for proof of it amounts in short to this : The goodness and wisdom of God seem to render it necessary that all creatures, but more especially the rational, be provided in all means necessary to obtain those ends they were made capable of, and obliged to jntrs^ie. But men are made capable of, and obliged to pursue eternal Jiappiness and felicity. Therefore the goodness and wisdom of God make it necessary that all men should be provided in the means necessary to obtaiti future and eternal bliss. Here we have the strength of their cause, and we shall there- fore consider this argument the more seriously, because some seem to be taken with it, and look upon it as having much force. Be- fore I offer any direct answer, I shall make some general reflec- tions on it. The first process is only designed to make way for this last, which indeed is the argument, and contains the force of what is pleaded by the Deists. Now concerning this argument, we offer the few following reflec- tions, which will not a little weaken its credit, and make it look suspicious like. 1. That proposition whereon its whole weight leans, viz. « That the goodness of God obliges him to provide his creatures in the means necessary for attaining their ends," is one of that sort, about which we may, in particular cases and applications of it, be as easily mistaken, and are as lit tie in fvln:-^- to he positive in our » " In safety" 288 AN INQUIRY INTO THE determination, as any where else. For, although we are surer of nothing than that God is good, and must act congruously to his goodness, in general ; yet when we come to make particular in- ferences, and determine what, in point of goodness he is obliged to do, we are upon very slippery ground, especially if we have not, as in this case it is, the means to guide us. For, besides that goodness is free in its effects, divine and not affixed to such stated rules knowable by us, as justice is, goodness, in its actings, is under the conduct and management of all-comprehending wis- dom, which in every case wherein God is to act, considers that a being not only infinitely good is to act, but also one who is infinite- ly wise, holy, just and righteous ; and therefore all-comprehend- ing wisdom takes under consideration, or rather has in its view the concernment of all those properties of the divine nature ; and withall, all the circumstances belonging to each particular case, and takes care that the case, in all its circumstances, be so managed, that not one of the divine perfections shine to the eclipsing of another ; but that all of them appear with a suitable lustre. Now, it is certain that we, who are of so narrow understandings, and so many other ways incapacitated to judge of the ways of God, can- not reach either the different interests of the divine properties, and judge, in a particular circumstantiated case, what befits a God, who is at once good, holy, Avise and righteous ; nor can we reach all that infinite variety of circumstances, which lying open to the all-comprehending view of infinite and consummate wisdom, may make it appear quite otherwise to him than to us. Hence, in fact, we see that an almost infinite number of things fall out in the government of the world, which we know not how to reconcile to divine goodness : and as many are left undone, which we would be apt to think infinite goodness would make necessary to be done. This consideration, if well weighed, would make men very sparing in determining any thing necessary to be done, in respect of di- vine goodness, which either it is evident he has not done, or of which we are not sure that he has done, which perhaps we shall make appear, if it is not from what has been already said, to be the case. 2. I observe, as to what is advanced, " That man is made ca- pable of, and obliged in duty to pursue eternal felicity," that al- though from revelation we know this to be true as to man in his original constitution, and by the remaining desires of it we may guess that possibly it was so ; yet, if we set aside divine revela- tion, and consider man in his present state, concerning which the question betwixt us and the Deists proceeds, we cannot by the help of nature's light only, with any certainty conclude, " that man is capable of and obliged to pursue eternal felicity." AYe PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 28t? see the man diss would he guilty ofut- ■lintj not only .1 bold, not to say a cruel and ai-bitnity sentence in my opinion." 294 AN INQUIRY INTO THE favor of the sufferer, and averse from the author of the torment, has a far more easy task, even though he is of weaker abilities, and employed in defence of the worst cause, than he who undertakes to defend such actions. The reason of this is obvious ; all that makes to his purpose, who designs to expose the action as cruel, lies open in its nature and horror to the thoughts of the most in- considerate ; and if to this he only sets off the representation with a little art, so as to touch the affections, which in this case is easily done, he has carried his point ; the judgment is not only deceived, but the jiffections are so deeply engaged in the quarrel, as to pre- clude the light of the most nervous and valid defence imaginable. Whereas on the other hand, all things are quite otherwise. The circumstances inducing to such actions, are usually deep, and not so easily discernible, and therefore not to be found out, without much consideration ; and when they are found out, they are not easily collected, laid together, and ranged in that order, which is necessary to set ihe atrocity of the crime in a due light, especially where the persons who are to judge are weak and biassed. Be- sides, the evil of those crimes, being for most part more spiritual, makes not so strong an impression on the affections. And this^ consideration holds more especially true, where the question is concerning the judgments of God, which proceed upon that com- prehensive view, which infinite wisdom has of all circumstances, that accent the evil, aggravate tlie fault, and enhance the guilt of sins committed against him ; many of which circumstances no mor- tal penetration can reach. And further, this more particularly holds true, where it is not God himself, but man that pleads on be- half of the actings of God. It is very observable to this purpose, that historians of all nations almost condescend upon instances, wherein the sight of severe, but just punishment of atrocious offen- ders has not only excited the compassion of the populace to the sufferers, but enraged them against the judges. Even they Mho would have been ready to reclaim against the partiality and negli- gence of the judge, if the crimes had been passed without just punishment, when they see the punishment inflicted, through a fond sort of compassion to the sufferers, complain of the cruelty of the judge, laying aside all thoughts of the atrocity of the crime. 3. Where they, who make it their business to traduce such ac- tions, as hard and cruel, and they also, whom they labor to per- suade of this, are connected by alliance, or common interest with the sufferers, are themselves in the same condemnation, or, upon the same and such like accounts, obnoxious to that justice, which adjud<}:cs those sufferers to these torments, which they study to representas cruel and barbarous, it is no wonder to see that the repre- sentation makes such deep impressions, and rivets such a persuasion, that the punishments are cruel and hard, as may not only bias a litllc PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 295 against any defence that can be made for the judge, but may even make them refuse to admit of any apology, or condescend so far as to give any that can be made a fair hearing. But all unbiassed persons must allow^, that such can never be admitted judges com- petent, as to what is just or unjust, hard or otherwise ; the case being, in effect, their own, and they by this means being made both judge and party. 4. However great, terrible and heavy any punishment that God is supposed to inflict, may in its own nature appear, or how great soever the number of the sufferers may be, yet we can never, from the severity of the punishment, or the number of the sufferers, disprove its justice, unless we can make it appear, that no circum- stances, which can possibly fall under the reach of infinite wisdom, can render such severity towards so many persons, worthy of him. Now, however easy this undertaking may appear to persons less considerate, it will have a far other aspect to such as impartially ponder, that all men are manifestly partial in favor of those of their own race, and in a case which is, or may be their own, and have no suitable apprehensions of the concernments of the divine glory in it, or no due regard for them : Besides, such is their shal- lowness, that they can neither have under view many important circumstances, that are fully exposed to all comprehending wisdom, nor can they fidly understand the weight, even of these circum- stances, that they either do, or may, in some measure know. 5. Every man who is wise and just, when either he hears of, or sees any punishment that appears very severe and terrible, must suspend his judgment as to the hardship of it, till the author of it is fully heard as to the inducements, and neither ought he to deny what his eyes see, his ears hear, or he is otherwise informed of, up- on sufficient evidences. He is neither to question the matter of fact, nor condemn the judge of cruelty, because of the seeming se- verity of the punishment. This is a piece of common justice, which every judge, even amongst men, may reasonably claim from his fellow creatures, although his actions and the reasons of them, cannot be supposed to lie so far out of their ken, as those of the divine judgments : Much more is it reasonable for men to pay this deference to God, considering how unable the most elevated capaci- ties are to penetrate iiito all the reaso)is, which an infinitely wise God may have under view ; and there is the more reason for this, since man also is naturally so very apt to be partial in his own fa- vor, and to fail of giving a due regard in his thoughts unto the con- cernments of divine glory. These observations, as they are in themselves unquestionably true, so they do fully lay open the causes of that general accep- tance, which this plea of the Deists has obtained with less attentive minds ; and how little weight is to be laid upon them.. In a word» 296 AN maUIRY INTO THE if they are well considered, they are sufScient to enervate the force of this whole plea. But lest the Deists should think their argument slighted, or that consciousness of our own weakness, makes us chuse long weapons to fight with, I shall closely consider the argument. Perhaps what makes a noise, at a distance, will be less frightful if we take a near- er view of it. We deny that the Heathen world had means suffi- cient for obtaining eternal happiness. The Deists say, this is cru- el and rash. Let us now see whence this may be proven. 1 . Doth our cruelty lie in this. That we have laid down an as- sertion, upon which it follows, that in fact, all the Heathen world are lost ? But now, do not the Deists own, that in very deed, all impenitent sinners must perish ? No doubt they do, who talk so much of the necessity of repentance. Well, are not all who want revelation, guilty of gross sins ? Is not idolatry a gross sin ? are they not all plunged in the guilt of it ? Socrates, the most consi- derable person for his virtue, that lived before Christ, cannot be excused. He denied his disowning the gods of Athens. Rejoin- ed in their worship. If this was against his conscience, the more, was his fault. And, even with his dying breath, he ordered a cock to be sacrificed to ^sculapius. Epictetus, the best perhaps among the philosophers who lived after Christ, in his Enchiridion, enjoins to worship after the mode of the country where we live ; and no doubt practised as he taught. Gentlemen, condescend, if ye can, upon one, who was not guilty of gross sins. Did they repent ? What evidence bring you of it ? That the multitude lived and died impenitent, none dare question. That there was 07ie peni- tent none can prove. That the best of them were guilty of gross sins cannot be denied, and there is no evidence of their penitence. Yea-, there is no reason to think that they looked upon repentance as a virtue ; but much to the contrary. Well, gentlemen, do not your own principles conclude, that the bulk of the Heathen world are, in fact, inevitably lost ? And that there is but little ground of hope, and great reason to fear, that it fared not much better with the few virtuosi. 2. But doth the cruelty lie in the number of persons supposed to be lost ? No. This cannot be said. For if the cause be suffi- cient, the number of the condemned makes not the condemnation the more cruel. Besides, let them go as narrowly to work as they can, they are few, very few, for whom they can plead exemption : and their pleas for that handful will be very lame. So that for any thing I see, the Deists, in this respect, are not like to be much more merciful than we. 3. But perhaps the cruelty lies in this, That we suppose them condemned without a cause, or without one that is sufficient. But this we do not. we suppose none to be condemned, who are not sin- PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 297 iiers against God, and trangressors of a law stamped with his au- thority, which they had access to know. And were not the best of them guilty of gross sins ?. What evidence have we of their re- pentance? Is it not just, even according to the Deists' pruiciples, to condL:mn impenitent sinners ? Thus we suppose none condemn- ed, but tor tlieir sins. 4. But perhaps the cruelly lies in this, That we suppose them all equally miserable ; Socrates to be in no better case than JNero. But this follows not upon our assertion. None are supposed mise- rable beyond the just demerit of their sins. 5. Well, perhaps the cruelty lies in this, That we suppose their torments after this life to be intense in degree, or ©f a longer con- tinuance than their sins deserve. This we are sure of, that their sins being offences against God, deserve a deeper punishment, than some men can well think of ; and that God is just, and will propor- tion punishments exactly to offences, and have a just regard, as well to the real alleviations as agravations of every sin. And if God has, in his word, determined that every sin committed against him, de- serves eternal punishment, no doubt his judgment is according io truth. We are not judges in the case. 6. Well, but the rashness and cruelty perhaps lies here. That by our assertion we are obliged to pass a positive and peremptory judgment about the eternal state of all the Heathen world, that they are gone to hell, and laid under everlasting punishments, leav- ing no room for the mercy of God. But to this we say, revelation lias taught us, even where there is the justest ground of fear, to speak modestly of the eternal condition of others, and to leave the judgment concerning this to the righteous God, to whom alone it belongs, and who will do no iniquitij. That ail the Heathen world deserve punishment, cannot, without impudence, be denied. That God will pass any of them without inflicting the punishment the)"^ deserve, neither revelation nor reason give us any ground to think. That none of them shall be punished beyond their deservings, scripture and reason demonstrate. But in these things our assertion of the insufficiency of natural religion is not concerned. It obli- ges us to pass no judgment further than this, " That the Heathens, *' and all who want revelation, had no means sufficient to bring them " to eternal happiness, and ihat consequently they had no reasoQ " to expect it ; and we have no reason to conclude them posses- " sed of it.'' And in this case we leave them to be disposed of, as to their state, after this life, by the wisdom and justice of God. 7. But perhaps the cruelty lies in this. That they are supposed to want the means necessary to attain eternal liappiness, while yet they are capable of, and exposed to eternal misery for their sins. But, I. How wil) the Deists' prove. That God, without a promise. 598 AN INQUIRY INTO THE is obliged to give man eternal happiness for his obedience ? 2. Since none of them are to be punished beyond the just demerit of their sins, may not God righteously inflict that punishment, whatever it is, that their sins, in strict justice, deserve, though he had never proposed a reward, which reason can never prove our best actions worthy of, even though we had continued innocent ? But, 3. That man, in his present case, has lost the knowledge of eternal feUcity, and the means of attaining it, and is unable to attain it, is owing not to any defect of bounty and goodness of God, much less of justice ; but only unto the sin of man, as has been demonstrated in our answer to the foregoing argument, by reasons drawn from nature's light. Notwithstanding of which, it must still be owned^ that nature's light .cannot acquaint us how man fell into his present lamentable condition, as we have above made appear. o. But is it not safer and more modest, may some say, to sup- pose, that God of his great mercy did, by revelation, communicate to some of the best of the Heathens, who improved nature's light to the greatest advantage, what was further necessary to their sal- vation, or, at least to bring them into a state of happiness, of some- what inferior degree to that which is prepared for Christians. I know many Christian writers of old and of late have multiplied hy- pothesis of this kind : Some have supposed apparitions of angels, saints, nay damned souls and devils ; of which stories I am told that Collins discourses at large, in the second book of his treatise De. Animabus Paganorum.^ Some tell us, " That to such of them as lived virtuously, God always, at some time or other, sent some man or angel savingly to illuminate them."t So the Areopagites. Some tell us of Christ's preaching to them in purgatory ; so Cle- mens Alexandrinus ; some will have them instructed by the Sibylls, as the same author says elsewhere ; some talk of their commerce with the Jews, in which way no doubt some of them came to sa- ving acquaintance with God ; othei-s say, that upon their worthy improvement of their naturals, God might and did reveal Christ to them and spirituals, because hahenti dahitur-X So Arminius. And of this Herbert frequently intimates his approbation, but with an evident contradiction to, and subversion of, his whole story about the sufficiency of natural religion. Besides, the bottom of this is a rotten Pelagian supposition of a merit in their good works : and that habenii dabitur, spoken of in another case, after all the pains some are to stretch it, will not reach this case ; and after all we are left in the dark, as to the way wherein they will have super- naturals communicated to them. The late ingenious author of the Conference rcilh a Theist, supposes a place provided for the sobei' De ccelesti Hierar. Ch. 9. f Strom. Lib. 6. " To him that hath shall be given." PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. i29y Pagans in another world, wherein thej shall enjoy a considerable happiness,* and wrests what our Lord says to his disciples, John xiv. 3. of the mam/ mansions that are in his Father's house, to favor his notion. But now as to all these suppositions and others of the same alloy, however their authors may please themselves in them, I think they are to be rejected. Nor is this from any de- fect of charity to the Heathens, but because they are supported by no foundation, either in scripture or reason. However, some of them are possible, yet generally speaking, none of them have the countenance so much as of a probable argument. The scripture proof, adduced by that last mentioned ingenious author, has no weight in it. There is no countenance given to it from the con- text, nor any other place of scripture, and I cannot approve of his boldness in stretching our Lord's words beyond what his scope re- quires. But these things have been considered at length by others, whom the reader may consult.f All these suppositions are at best but ingenious fancies, wherewith their authors may please them- selves, but can nev^r satisfy others. Nor can they be of any ad- vantage to the Heathens. I think I have made it sufficiently ap- pear in the foregoing discourse, that they wanted means sufficient to lead them to salvafion^ and so had no ground to support a rea- sonable hope of it. It is granted, even by those whose peculiar hypothesis in divinity lead them to be most favorable to the Hea- tliens, that the^/ had no federal certainty of salvation ; and for any uncovenanted mercy, of which some talk, I know nothing about it. Scripture is silent. Reason can determine nothing in it ; and there- fore disputes about it are to be waved. It is unwarrantable curi- osity for men to pry into the secrets of God ; things that are re- vealed do belong to us. Where revelation stops we are to stop. Even Herbert himself dare carry the matter no further than a may be ; and what may be, may not be. CHAP. XIX. Wherein Herberts Reasons for publishing his Books in Defence of Deism are examined and found neak. THE learned Herbert, toward the close of his book De Reli- gione Laid, to justify the publication of his thoughts, as to a catholic religion, common to all mankind, mentions seven supposed advantages of this opinion, or so many pleas for Deism. What weight there is in them, we shall now consider. He introduces himself with a protestation that he published not his book with any ill design against Christianity, which he * Nicol. Confer. Part 2, pat^. 80. t Sec Anth. Tuckney, Appendix to his Sermon on Acts iv. 12- iiOO AN INQUIRY INTO THE lionops with the title of optima religlo : But on the contrary says, That he aimed at establishing it, and intended to strengthen true faith, " Deniqve me animo adeo non optmuB religioni infensOf ." aiit a.vent fide al'mio fradabmi htinc edidissetestor ; ututram- " que statumhiare in animo habiierim,''^ Src. I shall not dive into his designs ; for which he has long ago ac- counted unto the only competent Judge. But of the design, or rather tendency of his books, we may safely judge. And as to this I say, that if it is granted, that the scriptures are the only standard of the Christian religion, which cannot modestly be de- nied ; I shall upon this supposition undertake to maintain against any who will defend him, That his books aim at the utter subver- sion of the Christian religion, that his principles overthrow entire- ly the authority of the scriptures, and are not only inconsistent with, but destructive to the essentials of Christianity. And I further add, that this is every where so obvious in his writings, that it will require a strange stretch of charity, to believe our author could be ignorant of it. Our author having told us what was not his design, proceeds next to condescend upon the reasons inducing him to assert this common religion. And 1. He tells us that he maintains this common religion, " Quod *' jrovidcntlam divinam" &c. Because it " vindicates the uni- " versa! Providence of God, God's principal attribute, whose dig- *' nity can never be sufficiently supported. Neither do any par- *' ticular religion, or faith (to give you our author's own words, " Fides quaniumvis laxaj maintain this, so as to represent God's •t' care of all mankind, in providing for them such common prin- ** ciples as those contained in our catholic truths." Here our author teaches two things, and I think them both false. (1.) He tells us, "That his catholic religion vindicates the ^' universal providence of God, or serves to maintain its honor." This I think false. The foundation of it we have proved to be not only precarious, but false. For we have cleared, that his five articles did not luiiversally obtain ; and further, that if they had, they were not sufficient to happiness. Yea, our author himself, after he has told urs, that the universal providence of God cannot he maintained, unless we suppose him to have provided all his creatures, in the nseans necessary for obtaining their happiness, ii^xt informs us that he has provided man in no other means, save ihesc five articics.f And he further tells us in his words above fjuoled, that he dare not positively say they arc sufficient, nor can * Tferbert Ke]ii:;-. Liiici, pajj. 28. — "In fine, I profess that I have published •' this treat jbc With ;i iniiul so fai' from beinf^ hostile to the best religion, or " averse tf.tnie faith., that I inteiiucd to have established both." ■t J> Hd. Laici^ p:ig-. 1, 4. PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 301 vre be sure of it, since it depends upon God's secret judgments, which we cannot certainly know.* And we have heard Blount above own, That Deism is not safe, unless it be pieced out by some help from Christianity .f Well, is this the way our author asserts the honor of divine universal Providence, first to tell us, that its honor cannot be maintained without supposing a sufficient religion universally to have obtained, and then to tell us that he is not sure that ever there was such a religion ? Is not this the plain way to bring the universal Providence of God in question ? Again, 2dly, Our author teaches, " That no particular religion " can support the honor of universal Providence." This I take to be also false. The Christian religion asserts and proves, that God, who has created all things, preserves them, and governs them in a way suitable to their nature and circumstances, and in so far clears the equity of God's proceedings with the Heathen world, in particular, as may satisfy sober men. It acquaints us, that God did, at first, provide man in a covenant security for eternal happi- . ness, and in means sufficient for obtaining of it ; that man, by his own fault, incapacitated himself for the use of these means, and forfeited the advantage of the covenant-security ; that God, in justice hath left the Heathen world under the disadvantage of that forfeiture ; that during the time he sees meet to spare them, he governs them, in such a way as is suitable to their lapsed state, of which we have spoken before. We confess we are not able to ex- plain all the hard chapters in the book of Providence, and solve every difficulty relating thereto ; but this affords no ground for the denial either of God's general or special providence. As the difficulties about God's omniscience, omnipresence, eternity, &c. will not justify a denial of these attributes, or the existence of a Deity vested with them ; so neither will the difficulties about Pro- vidence justify a refusal of it ; and if this vindication of Provi- dence fail of giving satisfaction, I am sure Herbert's will never satisfy. What our author adds about his fides quantumvis laxa, which he supposes some to stand up for, and maintain as a sufficient re- ligion, I do not well understand. But yet since this expression is very often used in the writings of this author, in reproach of par- ticular religions, especially the Christian, which lays the greatest stress upon faith, it cannot be passed without some remark. That wh'ch our author seems to intend by this fides quantumvis laxa, or " faith how lax soever it may be," is a faith that consists in a general assent to the truth of the doctrines, without any corres- pondent influence upon practice. And he would have us to believe that the Christian religion, or, at least, Christians, do reckon this • * De Rel. Gentil. pag. 2lr. I Oracles of Ucasoii, pag. 87. 302 AN INCIUIRY INTO THE sufficient to salvation. This is a base and disengenuous calumny. And our author could not but know it to be such, if he was ac- quainted either with the scriptures, or the writings and lives of that set of Christians against whom this calumny is particularly levelled, who unanimously teach, that the faith that is available, is that which works by love, and is to be found only in them who are created in Christ Jesus to good works. If Herbert was a stranger to the one or the other, he was the unmeetest person in the world to set up for a judge and censurer of them. 2. The next advantage that Herbert condescends on, of his catholic religion, is, Quod probam facidtatem homini insitarum conformationem, usumque doceat. Nulla enim datur Veritas ca- tholica, guce. nan in foro interna describitur, vel non illuc saltern necessario reducitur.'^ That is, " This alone teaches man the " due use and application of his faculties." But this is only our author's assertion. Christianity is no less consistent with the due «se of our faculties and their application to their proper objects, than our author's religion. It destroys none of them, lays none of them aside, and does violence to none of them ; but restores, im- ^ proves and elevates them to their most noble and proper use. Our author adds, for a confirmation of his assertion, that there is no catholic verity, but what either is inscribed in the mind, or what may be reduced to some innate truth. Whether there li any verity inscribed in the mind in our author's sense, I ques- tion. Mr. Locke has proven, that there is none such, and in par- ticular has evinced that our author's five articles are not innate truths, no not according to the description he himself gives of snch notices. He examines the characters of innate truths given by our author, and undertakes to shew them not applicable to his five articles.f S. Our author tells us, he embraced this catholic religion, quod incontroversa a controversis distinguat,X Sec It is needless to repeat all our author's words here. What he says is in short this, That " particular religion (and here he must be understood to " speak particularly of Christianity) contains austere and fright- « ful doctrines that prejudice some men of squeamish stomachs « ai all religion,'" (and is it to be wondered at, that men who have no heart to any religion, are easily disgusted ?) But our au- thor has provided them with one that will not offend the most nice and delicate palate, as consisting of principles universalhj agreed to ; which he supposes such persons will readily close with, and £o retain some religion, whereas otherwise they would have none. * Herbert Rel. Laici, pag'. 28. t Locke's Essay on Human. Under. Book 1. Ch. § 15, 16, 17, 18, 19. if " ne^use it distinguishes uncontrovertcd points from those %vhich are *' controverted." PRINCIPLES OP THE MODERN DEISTS. 30ti Here our author evidently designs a thrust at the Christian reli- gion, and insinuates that it is stuffed with austere and horrid doc- trines. I know full well what are the doctrines he particularly aims at : the doctrines concerning the corruption of mail's nature, the decrees of God, the satisfaction of Christ, are particularly in- tended. But if these doctrines are considered as delivered in the scriptures, or taught by Christians according to the scriptures, what is there offensive in them ? What horrid or frightful ? I do indeed grant, that some Christians, through their weakness, without any 1)1 design, have so represented, or rather misrepresent- ed some of these points, particularly concerning the decrees of God, as to give offence to sober persons of all persuasions. But as to this, they, and they only, are to bear the blame. As for the doctrines. What have they done ? Must the fault of the profes- sors be cast on the religion they profess ? This no reasonable man will allow to be just. I do likewise acknowledge, that whereas there are different senti- ments among Christians concerning some of these points ; and some of the contending parties have so unfairly stated, and foully misrepresented the opinions of their opposers, in the disguise of . imaglnarj^ consequences, or of consequences, at least, denied and ab- horred by the maintainers of the opinions they oppose, so as to give - some umbrage to this, startle weak men, and prejudice them against religion. This they do to expose their adversaries, and frighten ' others from the reception of their sentiments. For such I can make no excuse. The practice itself is scandalously disingenuous, and can admit of no reasonable vindication, and so fair an occasion being given, I cannot pass It without a remark. A notable instance of this sort I meet with in a book just now come to hand. The Ingenious author of the short Method with the Deists, in a letter di- rected to Charles Gildon, newly recovered from Deism, cautions him against the Dissenters ; and to enforce his caution, presents him with such an account of their opinions, as is indeed suited to frighten the reader. He tells him that they maintain, " That God •' sees no sin in the elect, let them live never so wickedly. They "^^ damn the far greater part of the world, by Irreversible decrees " of reprobation, and say, that their good works are hateful to " God ; and that it is not possibly in their power to be saved, let '•'■ them believe as they will, and live never so religiously : They *' take away free wilUn man, and make him a perfect machine. — " They make God the author of sin, to create men on purpose to " damn them ; they make his promises and threatening^ to be of " no effect, nay, to be a sort of burlesqueing, and insulting those '* whom he has made miserable, which is an hideous blasphemy."*^ ■ T-ttlcT subJQinol to the Deist's Manuel, page 22, 33. 304 AN INQUIRY INTO THE But to what purpose is all this said ? 1 . Did not the writer know, That this is not a representation at all of the opinions maintained by the Dissenters, but of the consequences tacked to them by their adversaries ? Does he not know, that they detest and abhor these positions as much as he does, that they refuse these to be consequences of them ? Is it then candid to offer, that as their opinions, which they abhor, and which they will not allow to follow upon their opinion ? Again, 2. Doth not this gentleman know that the principles to which he has tacked these consequences, are the very doctrines taught in the articles of the Church of England^ unanimously maintained by all the great men of that church, till Bishop Laud's day ; which were preached by them in the pulpit, taught in the schools, and upon all occasions avouched as the doc- trine of the Church of England ; and, as such, to this very day are owned by no inconsiderable number of that church ? With what justice then, or ingenuity, can he call this the doctrine of the Dissenters ? H. From whom does he expect credit to this disin- genuous account of the Dissenter's opinion ? Such as know them, will believe nothing upon the reading of this passage; but that the writer either understood not the opinions he undertook to re- present, or that against his light, he misrepresented them, and so is never to be credited again, without good proof, in any thing he says of them. 4. Was it the author's design, to gain a proselyte to the opposite opinions ? This I believe it was. But this is the most unlucky way of management in the world ; for if his disciple is a man of sense, he will be shy of believing that such monstrous opinions can be received by a body of men, among whom, there must be owned by their worst enemies, to be not a few learned and sober. And if he find himself abused, upon search, may he not be tempted, not only to reject this account, but all that he receiv- ed upon the same authority ? When persons of sense, who have been abused, are undeceived, they are wont ever after to incline to favorable thoughts of the persons and principles they were pre- judiced against ; and to suspect that cause of weakness, which can- not be supported, but by such mean and unmanly shifts, as this of representing the opposite opinion. 5. If the adverse party shall take the same course, what a fine work shall we have ? And to speak modestly, they want not a colourable pretence for a retortion. — But who shall be the gainers ? Neither of the contending parties surely : For men will never be beaten frorn^ their opinions by ca- lumnies that they know to be unjust. None will gain, save they, who are lying at the catch, for pretences to countenance them in the rejection of the Christian religion. It is none of my business to debate this controversy with this author. If he has any thing new to advance upon these heads, let him ad- vance it, he will find antRSionists in the Church of England, able PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 305 perhaps to cope with him, though the Dissenters should fail. This gentleman had managed his opposition with more modesty and in- genuity, if he had attentively perused the learned Bishop of Sa- rum's discourse on the 1 7th article of the Church of England. — ■ But I hope this author, upon second thoughts, when his passion is over, will be ashamed of what he has written. But now to return to Herbert and the Deists. If we abstract from these two abuses, and consider the doctrines of Christianity as represented in the scriptures, or according to them, there is no ground to charge them with any thing frightful, or of ill conse- quence to religion. Yea, I dare be so bold as to say. That if prac- tical religion, consisting in godliness, righteousness and sobriety, is any where to be found in the world, it is to be found amongst those, as likely as any where else, and in as eminent a degree, who have been trained up in the belief, and under the influence of those very doctrines, which some, and particularly Herbert, would persuade us to be so horrid, as to frighten men at once out of their wits and religion. If it be said, that this is not owing to the influence of these principles. 1 answer, This, at least, proves those princi- ples not inconsistent with practical religion, in as much as they, who believe them, are eminent in it ; and, if we enquire of them, what has influenced their walk, they are ready to attest, that the belief of these very truths has had the principal influence upon that effect ; and to oflTer a rational account of the tendency of these doctrines to promote practical religion. Now we have wiped oflf the insinuated reproach, designed by our author, against the Christian religion. Let us next consider what there is in this plea. He tells us, his religion consists of incontroverted articles, and so will frigthen no body. But, 1. this is not true in fact, as we have demonstrated above. His articles have been controverted. The sufficiency of them has been be- lieved by very few. Again, 2. Will our author say, That nothing is necessary, to religion, which is controverted ? Will the Deists undertake this point ? If so, their religion is lost, as is evident from what has been demonstrated above. 8. This no more proves our author's five articles to be a sufficient religion, than it proves one of them alone to be such. He who owns no more in religion, but this only, there is a God, may as well plead, that religion re- tains only what is incontrovertible. But the Deists will say, there are other points necessary. Well does not this give me an answer to their argument, when I say, there are other points necessary besides their five articles. 4. Whereas he would persuade us, that no man will scruple his religion : Is not this enough to make any reasonable man shy of admitting it, that its author and inventor dare not say positively, that it is sufficient to answer the purpose, for which it is designed, and that others undertake to demonstrate, 39 300 AN INQUIRY INTO THE that if it is Inislcil to, it will prove a soul-ruining cheat ? luaworJ, it is not worth the Avhile to calculate a religion for those, who wilJ atlmit nothing in religion, but wliat is incontroverted : for, in short, they are for no rcU2;ion. And 1 think we have in particular evin- ced, that our author's five articles will be too hard in digestion for such delicate stomachs. 4. Our author tells us, that he embraced this catholic religion. Quod concordicE commimis substrudionem aged, ^r.^ That is, in short, let all the world agree to the sufficiency of our author's five article?, and leave all other things to be rejected or received as trifles, not necessary to be disputed about, and then there is an end of all the contests, then there is a foundation laid for everlasting peace, and the golden age will be retrieved, Jam redit et virgo redevnf, Sahiruia regna.-f This trifle deserves rather pity than an answer. What! will all the world agree that this religion is sufficient, while its inventor durst r.ot say so ? 5. He embraced it, "Quod atithoritalem majtstaleniq; induhiam " religioniy et hierarch'm hide poUtlcEqiie conciliat" Src. That is, " because it conciliates respect to religion, to the ecclesiastical hie- " rarchy, and civil government." Religion will be respected, when it requires nothing but what is necessary. Church and state will be respected when it punishes nothing but transgressions against incontroverted articles. But is not this to trifle with a witness? The weakness of this plea is so obvious, that I may well spare my pains in exposing it. AVill it maintain the dignity of religion to confine it to a number of articles, which for any thing we know, or the Deists know, may cheat us of our reward in the end, since they cannot positively assiu-e us of its sufficiency, and we are positively sure it is not sufficient ? Will it maintain the honor of church officers, to ad- mit a religion, which subverts the very foundation of all respect to them, vis. The divine institution of their order? As for the ad- vantage of it to the civil government, the Deists may oflTer it to the consideration of the next parliament, and they will consider whether it is proper to conciliate respect to the civil government. 6. Our author embraced his religion, Quod adeo non moliat re- ligioneiu, ut ejus severitatis siinndum addat. That is, " It is so " far from flivouring liberty in sin, that it urges harder to virtue, " (severe virtue) than revealed religion." There is no hope of pardon here upon the satisfaction of another. Men must work for their life, and when they fail, they must satisfy by their repent- ance. " Because it lays a foundation for common concord." " 'jSow Astra returns, tlie reign of Saturn returns." PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. ;i07 Well, but do they, who teach the necessity of satisfaction ex- clude repentance ? And if they make both satisfaction and repent- ance absolutely necessary, though each in its own order and place, to forgiveness, methinks they will yet have the advantage in point of severity. Again, but what if repentance will not satisfy ? If this is so, and our author seclude all other satisfaction, will not his religion lead men rather to despair than to virtue. 7. Our author's last inducement was, Qiiod sacrariim lUerarum fhi'i ultimo intentioniq qitadret, &.c. That is, " because this cath- '' olic religion ansivers the ultimate design of the scriptures. All " the doctrines taught there level at the establishment of these five "catholic verities, as we have often hinted; there is neither sa- " crament, rite or ceremony, there enjoined, but what aims (or *■' seems to aim) at the establishment of tliese five articles.'* 8. But is not this a notable jest. Our author would persuade us, That his religion answers the great end of the scrip- tures, better than religion, which the scriptures themselves teach. If our author says not this, he says nothing. If the end of the scriptures is not good, it is not for the honor of our au- thor's religion that it agrees with it: If it is good, and the religion taught in the scriptures themselves, answer their own design best, why then, I Avould chuse that religion, and leave our author to en- joy his own : If he says, his, answers it better, then I would desire- to know where the compliment lies, that he designed to tlie scrip- tures. But I desire to know further of the Deists, Whether do the scriptures teach any tiling besides these articles, to be neces- sary ? Where do the scriptures tell that these are sufficient ? Are divine institutions, sacraments, &c. necessary toward the compas- sing of the ends of religion ? If they are not, how does it commend our author's rehgion, that it quadrates with the design of these in- stitutions ? If they are necessary and useful, this catholic religion is at a loss that wants them. I am sensible our author has caution- ed against this, when he tells us, That they either do or seem to aim at this. I see that old birds are not caught with chaff. Now i have found it. This catholic religion, Avill really serve the pur- pose, that revealed truths and institutions do only seem to aim at. But after all, this is but sai/ and not irroof. And I will undertake to shew against all the Deists under heaven, that the confinement of religion to these fiv^e articcles, as taught by the light of nature, is not only not agreeable to the principal design of the scriptures, but inconsistent with it. Thus I have considered the inducements which led Herbert to embrace this catholic religion, and found them wanting. And 1 must say, if this noble author had not been straitened by a bad cause, that is not capable of a rational defence, liis learning, which is very considerable, could not but have afforded liim better pleas. Charles Blount, in the do^e of his Religio LaicI, tells rs 308 AN INQITIRY INTO THE It was for the same reasons he embraced Deism, and copies after Herbert, with some little variations. What he has, that our author has taken notice of in this place, will occur in the next chapter, %vhere they are again repeated under another form. Men that have bid little to say have need to husband it well, and make all the improvement of it that they can. CHAP. XX. Wherein the Queries offered by Herbert and Blount, for proving the sufficiency of their five Articles are examined. THE learned Herbert in an appendix to his Religio Laid, moves some objections against himself, but fearing after he has said all he can, some may remain unsatisfied still, he betakes himself to another course, and essays to dispute his opposers into a compli- ance with his sentiments by Queries. Of this sort he proposes several. Charles Blount concludes his Religio Laid in the same method, with this diflference, that he has added other seven que- ries, making in all fourteen, and prefixed this title, Queries proving the validity of the Jive Articles. The arguments couched in these queries, in so far as they tend to prove the suflSciency of this catholic religion, are not new, but materially the same, which we have formerly considered. The method is indeed different, more subtle, and better suited to their great design. Direct proofs are less deceiving, and their weak- ness is more easy discoverable by vulgar capacities. Queries con- ceal the weakness of arguments, entangle, perplex and amuse less attentive minds ; and by them, the subtle asserters of a bad cause ease themselves of the trouble of proving their ill grounded as- sertions, (which yet, by all rules of disputing, belongs to them on- ly) and turn it over upon the defender. This is enough as to the method, to let us see how suitable it was to their purpose. The Queries proposed by Blount are the same with Herbert's, and he adds others which Herbert wants. Wherefore we shall consider them as proposed by Mr. Blount. But whereas some of them are to more advantage urged by Herbert, we shall offer these in Herbert's words, that we may overlook nothing, which has the least appearance of force in this cause. Query L " Whether there can be any other true God, or whe- " ther any other can justly be called optimus maximus, the " greatest and best God, and common father of mankind, save He " who exercises universal providence, and looks so far to the good '' of all men, as to provide them in common and sufficient or cftec' PHINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 809 " tual means for obtaining the state of eternal happiness after this " life, whereof he has implanted a desire in their minds ? If the " laity or vulgar worship any other God, who does not exercise " this universal providence, are they not guilty of false worship, *' or idolatry ? And if any one deny this common providence, is " he not guilty of treason against the divine Majesty, and of a " contempt of his goodness, yea, and of Atheism itself ?" Thus Herbert.* Blount proposes the same query, but more shortly, thus, " Whether there be any true God, but he that useth uni- " versal providence concerning the means of coming to him."f The design of this query is to prove the necessity of a catho- lic religion, or a sufficient religion common to all mankind, and to fix the black note of atheism upon all who deny it. The argu- ment whereby this is evinced is the very same, which we have examined above, as the Deists' first and great argument. What is added concerning universal Providence, we did consider in our answer to Herbert's first inducement to Deism. And so we might entirely pass this query as answered already, were it not for the seeming advantage given to it by this new dress, wherein it ap- pears. This query has a direct tendency to drive men into Atheism, and tempt them to lay aside all worship through fear of falling into idolatry. It is in itself self-evident, that if God has given all mankind, or to every man, means sufficient and effectual to lead them to eternal happiness, they must know of it, or, at least, there must be easy access for them to know it. With what propriety of speech can it be said. That the means leading to eternal hap- piness, are given to every man to be by him used for that end, if they know them not, or, at least, if the knowledge of them be not easily accessible to all, who will apply themselves to an inquiry after them ? Nor is it less evident, That the suitableness, effica- cy and sufficiency of these means, for reaching this end, must be sufficiently intimated to them. If it is not so, how can men ra- tionally be obliged to use means which they do not know to be- proper for compassing the end ? With what courage or confidence can any rational man, with great application, over many difficul- ties, use, and all his life continue in the use of means, concerning which he has no assurance, that they will put him in possession of the end ? After all this pains he may miss the end he had in view. How can any reasonable soul please itself in such a coui*se ? Can it be reasonably thought worthy of the wisdom and goodness of Go^J, to give man the means of attaining eternal happiness, and means sufficient, and yet leave men in the dark as to the know- ledge of this. That they are designed for, and sufficient to reach • Herbert's Relig-. Laici, Appendix, pag. 1, 2. t Blount Rel. Laici, pag. 90. 310 AN INQUIRY INTO THE the end for which they were given ? What can rationally induct; men in this case, to give God the praise of his goodness, in afford- ing them these means, or to use them for that end, for which they were given, if this is hid from them ? It is then evident, That, if God has afforded all men sufficient means of reaching eternal hap- piness, they must know this, or, at least, have easy access to know these means, what they are, and that they are designed to, proper for, and will prove effectual to this end. And consequently, if men find not such means, after search, they have evidently reason to conclude, that God has left them without them, at least, that they want them in their present circumstances ; since after all their inquiries they cannot find them, nor can they discover that any means, they know of, will be effectual to reach this end. This is evidently the condition of man at present, left to the mere light of nature. We have proved just now. That if God had given these sufficient means, every man must, at least, upon application, have had access to know them, and to know that they are sufficient. But, upon application, they find no such matter, and therefore have reason to suspect, that God has not given them these means, if not positively to conclude that they are without them. Her- bert himself glories that he was the first who found out what these means were. They had escaped the knowledge and industry of the most learned and diligent before his time. And if so, certainly the vulgar behoved to be at a loss about them. When he has 1 found them, he dares not be positive about their sufficiency : " Qnmn " etiam oh causam, neqiie ea snfficere (ad salutem, viz. CEternam)\ '^ profemis dixerim" says he.* . Yea, he more than insinuates, that we cannot come to be positively assured of their sufficiency, and so must remain in the dark, since the determination of this de- pends upon the sentiments of God, which are known to none, as lie says. Now when a man so learned, so diligent, and so evident- ly prepossessed with a strong inclination to favor any means that ' had a shew of sufficiency, found so much difficulty to hit upon ' any such, and did so evidently hesitate about the sufficiency of these he had found ; must not the laity, for whoni, upon all occa- i sions, he pretends so much concern, liesitate more ? Yea, have ! they not reason evidently to conclude, that there are no such' means provided for them ? But Herbert here teaches them, that none is to be acknowledg- ed as the true God, nor worshipped as such, who has not provided every man, in effectual and sufficient means for attaining eternal happiness. Well may the layman say, "I neither know, nor can ' "■ I ever be satisfied, that I have such means; yea, I have the Iloi-bcrt lie Rcl. Gent. pag. 217. PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 3U ■ greatest reason to think that I want them ; if the good Goil had u;iven them, he wouhl not have mocked rae, by concealing them, and so prechiding me from the use of them ; he would have •' poljited me to them, and intimated their sufficiency, so as to " make it knowable to me, upon application, without which he " could never expect that I should use them : I have tlierefore " reason to conclude myself destitute of them, and so I will Avor- " ship no God, since there is none that has provided me in the " means necessary to eternal happiness : For if I should, 1 would " be guilty of worshipping one, who is an idol, and not the true " God." Here we see where this gentleman's. principles must in- evitably lead the poor man, either to direct Atheism, or to wor- sliip one, whom he has reason vehemently to suspect to be merely an idol, and not the true God. Having thus discovered the dangerous tendency of this query, I shall now give a direct answer to it. And to it I say, That the God, who makes man, implants in his child's mind a desire of eter- nal felicity, intimates to him that he is made for this end, obliges him in duty to pursue this end, under a penalty in case he fail of it, and yet denies or leaves his child without the means that are absolutely necessary for compassing it, antecedently to any fault upon the child's part, will scarcely obtain the titles of optimiis maximus, great and good, or of a common Father. But the God who made man perfect, in his original state, and put him in the full possession of all the means that were necessary to obtain that end, whatever it was, for which he was made, and which he was in duty obliged to pursue, loses not his interest in, and unquestionable right to the title of optunus maximiis, great and good ; nor does he cease to be a common Father, and to act the part of such an one, if, when his children contrary to their duty, have rebelled against him, by their own fault dropped the knowledge of the end, for which they were made, lost the knov, - ledge of the means, whereby it is to be obtained, put themselve^v out of a capacity of using the means, or reaching the end ; if, I say, in this case, he leaves them to smart under the effects of their own sin, and treats them no more as children, but as rebels, who can blame him ? Does he not act every way as it becomes one, who by the best of titles is not merely a father, but the sovereign ruler and governor of all his creatures, to whom of right it belongs to render a just recompcnce of reward to every transgressor ? Now, this is the case, as we have already proven. If the Deists will make their argument conclusive, they must prove that this is not .the case with man. And when we see this done, we shall then know what to say. Till then we are not nnich concerned with their finery. If they say. How can this be ? Can men by the light of' nature know how this came to pass ? I answrr, th;it it is not the 312 AN maUIRY INTO THE question, How it came to be so ? But whether, in fact, it be so ? That it really is thus, is before proven. The Heathens have con- fessed it. And though we should never come to be satisfied, how it came about, yet that it really is so, is enough to acquit God. Nor is God's universal Providence hereby everted, he still governs all mankind suitably to their condition. He rules those, ■whom of his sovereign and undeserved grace, he has seen meet to deal with, in order to return to his family, in a way of infinite mercy and grace. He governs the rest of the world, whom in his sovereign and adorable justice and wisdom, he hath left to lie un- der the dismal consequences of their own sin, in a way becoming their state. He provides them in all things, that do necessarily belong to the ends, for which they are spared. Further, he leaves himself not without a 7vitness as to his goodness, in that he does good, gives them rain from heaven, and fruitful seasons, filling their hearts 'with food and gladness. Which is suiBcient to shew his superabundant goodness, that reaches even to the unthankful and evil, and gives them ground to conclude. That their want of what is further necessary, flows not from any defect of goodness on his part ; but from their own sins, of many of which their own consciences do admonish them. If God vouchsafes the means of recovery to any, they have reason to be thankful to sovereign grace. If God gives not, what he may justly refuse, who can in justice complain of him ? They must leave their complaint upon themselves, and acquit God. And while man is continued in be- ing, it will remain his indespensible duty to worship this God, who made him, spares him, notwithstanding of his sins, for a time, punishes him less than his iniquities deserve, and confers many other undeserved favours on him. Nor is he guilty of worship- ping an idol in doing so. Thus we have answered this query : And I might now propose to the Deists a counter query, " Whether they who make that necessary to the support of the universal providence of God, his goodness, and consequently his being, of which no man can be sure that it really is, which all men have reason to believe is not, and which most men, who have made it their business to consider the case seriously, do firmly believe not to be in being, may not reasonably be suspected to design the overthrow of these attri- butes of God, and consequently of his very being ?" Thus Vani- nus endeavored to establish Atheism : he ascribes such attributes to God, and endeavored to fix such notions of his perfections, as could not be admitted, without the overthrow of other perfections, unquestionably belonging to him, or owned in any consistency with reason and experience. For he well knew, that if once hej could bring men to believe God to be such an one, if he was, theyl would be brought under a necessity of denying, that there waaj any God. PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 313 Query 11. " Whether these means appear universally other- " wise, than in the foresaid five catholic articles ?* These gentlemen think tliey have, by their first query, suffi- ciently proved, that there must be a catholic religion : Now they will prove theirs to be it. But I have undermined the foundation, and so the superstructure falls. I have evinced, that there is no such sufficient catholic religion, by reason and experience. I have proved that the pretence of its being necessary to support the no- tion of God's providence and goodness, can never possibly per- suade any considerate man, to believe against his reason and ex- perience, against the sight of his eyes, and what he feels within himself, that he really is in possession of a sufficient religion, with- out revelation ; and consequently that the urging of this pretence can serve for nothing, if not to make men question the goodness and providence of God, and so his very being, to the overthrow of all worship and religion. I have moreover made it appear, that these five articles are not catholic, and though they were so, yet are not sufficient. Query HI. " Whether any thing can be added to these five ^* articles or principles, that may tend to make a man more honest, " virtuous, or a better man ?" So Blount.f To this query Her- bert adjects a clause, viz. " Provided these articles be well ex- " plained in their full latitude. J And is not tliis the principal end of religion ? By the foregoing queries the Deists think they have proved the necessity of a catholic religion ; and that their five articles is the catholic religion. By this query they pretend to prove their religion sufficient. To this purpose they tell us. That their five articles are suffi- cient to make a man virtuous, honest and good ; that this is the principal end of religion ; and that nothing can be added to them, which can be any way helpful to this end. If by making a man virtuous, honest and good, they mean no more, than the Heathens meant by these words, who took them to intend no more, but an abstinence from the more gross outward acts of vice, contrary to the light of nature, with some regard in their dealings among men, to the common and known rules of righteousness, and usefulness : If, I say, tliis is their meaning, which I conceive it must be, then I deny that this is the principal end of religion. No man that un- deistands what religion means, will say it. The Heathens were influenced to this by other motives, than any thing of regard to the authority of the One true God. Their Ethicks, which en- joined this goodness, virtue and honesty, pressed it by considera- * Blount Rel. Laici. pag. 90. Hcib. Rel. Laici. Appendix, t Ibid. pa^. 91, i( Herb. Jbid. 40 ai4 AN INQUIRY INTO THE tions of a quite different nature. Of God, his legislature, his laws, as such, they took httle or no notice, as observed from Mr. Locke before ; and therefore, whatever usefulness among men there was to be found in their virtues, they had nothing of religion, properly so called, in them. But if by making a man honest, virtuous and good, they mean the making of him inwardly holy, and engaging him in the whole of his deportment, in bothoutward and inward acts, to carry as becomes him, toward God, his neighbor and himself, with a due eye to the glory of God as his end, and a just regard to the au- thority of God, as the formal reason of this performMice of duty in outward and inward acts : If, I say, they take their words in this sense, I do own this to be one of the principal ends of reli- gion. But then I deny that ever any man, by their five articles, as taught by the light of nature, or by any other of the like kind, known only by the mere light of nature, was in this sense, since the entrance of sin, made virtuous and good. Nay, the moral Hea- thens were not led to that shadow of virtue and goodness, which they had in the sense beforementioned, from any regard to these five articles, as they are articles of religion ; that is, as they are principles directive as to the duty, which man owes to the One on- ly True and Supreme Being. And taking virtue, goodness, and honesty in this last sense, which is that alone wherein we are concerned, I have above proven the light of nature, and particularly these five articles, as known by it, utterly insufficient to make any man virtuous, honest and good. And have demonstrated not one, but immy things besides what is contained in these five articles, however explained to the utmost advantage that can be done by mere unassisted reason, to be absolutely/ necessary to the ends of religion. Nor w ill what Herbert has adjected mend the matter, viz. That his articles must be well explained in their full latitude. These words, if they have any sense, it is this, " It is not enough to be- lieve and receive our articles, as in general proposed, this will make no man good. He must not only, for instance, agree to it, that there is one Supreme God, and that he is to be worshipped by a virtuous life, but he must be acquainted with all the attributes of this God, necessary to be known, in order to the direction of his practice, and he must understand and be fixed as to the nature, measure and all other necessary concerns of these virtues that be- long to this duty." This is undeniably the meaning of this ex- pression, and this inevitably overthrows all that our author has been building. Were these five articles, in this latitude, universally agreed to ? Our author knew to the contrary. If any man should assert it, it were enough to make him be hissed off the stage, as either brutishly ignorant of the world, or impudently disingenuous. PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 315 Well then, our catholic religion is lost. Again, since the explica- tions belong as much to our author's religion as the articles them- selves, (for without them he confesses the articles not sufficient) how shall the poor layman ever be satisfied about them ? Have there not been as many, and as intricate disputes about them, as about the articles of revealed religion ? Where is now the boasted agreement ? Where is the uncontroverted religion ? What attri- bute of God has not been questioned, disputed and denied ? Have not his creation of all things, his Providence, &c. which of all others have the most remarkable influence upon practice, by many been denied ? Have not horrid notions of them been advanced by some ? What will now become of men of squeamish stomachs, that can admit of no religion, but one that is smooth, and has no rugged controversies in it ? Why, poor gentlemen, they must part with our author's religion, and so be, as they were before, men of no religion. Upon the whole, we see that this query, designed to prove the Deists' religion sufficient, has proved it a chimera. QuerT/ IV. " Whether any things that are added to these five " principles from the doctrine of faith, be not uncertain in their ori- « ginal ?" So Blount.* Herbert to this adds, « That though God *' be true, yet the laity can never be certain about revelation : " For, (says he) how do ye know that God spake these words to " the prophets ? How do you know that they faithfully repeated or " wrote what God spoke to them, and no more ? How do ye know " that transcribers have performed their part faithfully ? How do ye " know that that particular revelation made to a particular priest, pro- " phet or lawgiver, concerns not only all other priests and lawgivers, " but also the laity? Especially, how shall ye know this, if the matter " of revelation require you to recede from reason ?"f And here we have a proof of the fourth reflection, of his unfair treatment of the Christian revelation, which we made above. Chap. 13. For either he insinuates, that the scriptures teach things contrary to reason ; and if so, where was our author's ingenuity when he called it optima religio, and upon other occasions pretended so much res- pect to it ? Does not this justify our charge of disingenuity against him, in the first reflection we have made, in the place now referred to ? If he owns, that this is not the fault of the Christian religion, but of other pretended revelations ; then he justifies our fourth re- fl,eclion, wherein we charge him with jumbling revelations, true and false together, those that have, at least, seemingly fair pretences, and these that have none; and deceitfully charges upon all in cumulo, the faults peculiar to the worst. If this is not enough to persuade you to the truth of his protestation abovementioned, vis. that he design- ed no hurt to the Christian religioUj he has an observation, with * Blount Rel. Laici, pag. 91. t Herb. Rel. Laici, Appendix, pag. 3. ^ 316 AN INaUIRY INTO THE which he concludes this query, that will beat the persuasion of it into your brains, or else of somewhat beside ; and it is this, in his own words, " I think it worthy of the layman's observatioi, that " there is this difference betwixt the pretended revelations offered *' to us, by the lawgivers, and those offered to us by priests, inter- " preters of the oracles God, of (under which notion he takes in all " prophets) whether they gave their revelations or responses for •' hire, or merely to set off their own conceits (sive venules sive " nugivcndi ;) that the revelations, which the lawgivers pretended " they had from heaven, and promulgated as such did usually make " the people more just and sociable, or agree better together ; " whereas the pretended revelations of the priest and prophets, of *' whatever sort, (or in his own words, Oraculorum interpretibus " sive venaUbus sive nngivendisj did usually make the people " more unjust or impious, and did divide them among themselves"^.'* Here is a rare observation, worth gold to the layman. He may, with more safet}", receive and use the laws which Lycurgus, Solon, and the other Heathen lawgivers pretended they had from heaven ; and I would add Moses and his writings, but that I fear our author has cost him, because he set up for an interpreter of God's mind, and, upon some extraordinary occasions, acted the part of a priest : Our author, T say, w ouid persuade hiui, that he may, with more ad- va:itage, read these writings, than those of the prophets and apostles, or any other of the sacred writers, who were not lawgivers. It is true, both are to be looked upon but as pretended revelations, and so in effect cheats : but the lawgivers beguiled the people to their advantage ; whereas these rogues of priests, and others who joined with them, offered cheats that were hurtful to justice among men, and the peace of society. If any say, I am wresting our author's words and that certainly his comparison respects oiilyt he Heathen lawgivers, and the Hea- then priests ; I answer If this is the meaning, it is altogether im- pertinent to the design of the query, which avowedly alms at t "is, " That laymen, living among us, (for I do not believe our au- thor designed to send his book to the Pagans) can never be sa- tisfied as to the truth of any particular revelation," and all his su- bordinate queries do directly thrust at the scriptures ; and then he closes with this observation, as of the greatest moment to the de- sign of the query. And therefore I cannot own, that I have done a:'y injury to our author, in the interpretation I have given of it ; but I have spoke his meaning more plainly, than he thought con- venient to do. The next query is to the same purpose, and there- fore we sh;>ll purpose it, and answer both. Qveiy V. " Supposing the originals true, whether yet they be " not uixertaln in their explications ; so that unless a man read Herb. IJel. Laici, Appendix, pag-. 3v PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 317 « all authors, speak with all learned men, and know all languages, « it be not impossible to come to a clear solution of all doubts ?'* Thus Blount.* Herbert, in his fifth query, speaks to the same purpose, he makes a huge outcry about the schisms and sects that are among us, and tells us plainly, that if we will adherie stiffly to revelation, we must of necessity get an infallible judge, to whose decisions we must submit in all things. He endeavours to prove that the scriptures will not decide the controversy ; and imperti- nently enough labours to disprove what none ever asserted ; that miracles wrought by the writers will not decide the dilTerences about the meaning of their writings. For it is evident this query only respects the meaning of the revelation, as the former did its original. However, I know who will thank our author for assert- ing the necessity of a living infallible judge. If any think I have wronged our author as to this, let them inspect his book, and they will find I have done him justice. But for the satisfaction of those who have it not, I shall subjoin his own express words : he informs the layman, that he can never be satisfied about the meaning of this revelation, about which there are so many controversies, un- less either he can " Linguas cundas ediscere, scriptores cundos " celebriores perlegere, dodiores etiam, qui non scripserunt, con- " sulere ; aut aliquis saltern controversiarmn illarum ex consensu " communi summus constitucrelnr judex."-f And then he goes on to prove, that there is no other possible way of deciding these differences, and coming to the meaning of revelation, but in these two ways pointed at in the words now quoted. The first is ridi- culous, and therefore we must be Deists or Papists. The design of these queries is obvious. They were afraid that their arguments might prove weak, which they had advanced for the sufficiency of their catholic religion; and now, in effect, they tell the laity, that if they have a mind to have a religion at all, they must close with this which the Deists present tliem. And though we cannot satisfy you, may the Deists say, in all points, about our catholic religion, yet you must rest satisfied with it : for you can never be sure about revelation, either as to its original or meaning. Men brought to such a strait, since they cannot have such a reli- gion as they would wish, must take such as they can get. These queries directly attack revelation ; and so belong not to our subject. The learned defenders of revealed religion have con- sidered those trifles, and repelled the force of them, I shall only consider them, in so fiir as they belong to our subject, and offer the few following animadversions upon them. • Blount Rcl.Laici, ubi supra, pag-. 91. + " Learn all lang-uages, read over all the most celebrated writers, consul. " the most learned men, who have not written, or at least some supreme iudgt; " of all controversies must he appointed by common consent."' 318 AN INQUIRY INTO THE 1. I say, if the layman must, for the sake of those difficulties, quit revealed religion, he must part with the Deists' catholic reli- gion upon the same account. Herbert has told us, and it were in- deed ridiculous to say the contrary, that this catholic religion is comprehensive not only of their five articles, but their explications. Now, are there not as many, and no less intricate debates about this religion, as about that which is revealed ? Is not its sufficiency disputed ? Must not the layman read all books, converse with all learned men, &c. before he can rest satisfied in it ? Are there not intricate and perplexed disputes about the authority, extent, use, matter and manner of the promulgation of the law of nature ? Where shall the layman find the notices that belong to this religion ? Shall he turn inward, and find them inscribed upon his own mind ? So our author advises. But learned men say, and pretend to prove the contrary. And if most men look into their own minds, they will either say with the latter that they are not there ; or com- plain that they are become so dim that they cannot read them un- less some charitable Deist will affijrd them his spectacles. But when they have got them, what shall they do next for the explica- tions ? Are the explications written there too ? The Deists dare not say it. But these likewise are necessary, say the Deists, as we have heard from Blount and Herbert before. Shall the laity consult the Doctors about their meaning ? But do not Doctors differ ? Do not the Magi, and not a few learned Greeks, as Zeno and Crysippus, &c. teach Sodomy to be lawful ? Was it not the judgment of others, that a wise man ought " To steal, and com- mit adultnj and sacrilege upon occasions, for none of these things are hy nature evil." So Theodorus, as Hesychius illustriously reports in his life.* Does not Aristippus and Carneades, with many others, overthrow the whole law of nature, telling us, that nothing is naturally just or unjust, good or evil, but by virtue of some arbitrary law? Has not the same opinion been revived, broached and inculcated by Hobbes and others among ourselves*? Has not Plato long since observed in his Phedon, " That if any «' one name either silver or iron, presently all men agree what it is « that is intended ; but if they speak of that which is just or good, «' presently we are at variance with others, and among ourselves." In a word, he that will cast at revelation, for its controversies, is a fool to go over to natural religion, in expectation to be free of con- troversy. Thus we are at least upon a level with the Deists. 2. If the layman, in defiance of the Deists' queries, may reach a satisfying assurance of the divine authority of the scriptures, where is then the necessity for his quitting revelation ? It will quite evan- ish. This, I say, he may have, without troubhng his head about See Dr. Owen on the Sabbath, Exercjt. 3. § IZ. PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 319 impertinent queries of this sort, if he duly attend to that one, plain and ritional direction given by our Lord, John vii. 17. If any man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God, or whether I speak of myself. The scriptures containing a full account of all the concerns of the Christian religion, are exhibited to him, and put in his hand by the church as a revelation from God, wherein all his concerns for eter- nity are wrapped up. I do not plead, that the testimony of the church is a sufficient ground for bottoming his faith. But this I say, that the testimony of the church is a sufficient ground for any man to judge and conclude firmly, that its pretensions are not con- temptible, and that it deserves the most serious consideration ima- ginable. But when I speak of the church, to whose testimony this regard is to be paid, we set aside, as of no consideration, a multitude of persons, whether of the clergy or laity, who do, in their practice visibly contradict the confessed rules of their religion. Such per- sons are scarce to be reckoned of any religion, and their testimony is of no consideration, either for or against religion. Nor do we re- strict the notion of the church to the representatives of it, much less to the Church of Rome, that mono^jolize this name. But I take it for that body of men, of whatever station or quality, who have received, and do act answerably to the Christian religion they profess, in some good measure at least. Now I say, the testimony of this church, or body of men, deserves great regard in this mat- ter. If we consider them, there are among them persons of un- tainted reputation, enemies themselves being judges. Not a few of them are of unquestionable judgment, deep discerning, solid learn- ing, and strict inquirers after truth. They are not a few but many. Nor are they confined to one nation or age, but such they have been in all ages, in all nations, where Christianity has obtained free access. Many of them are persons, whom envy itself cannot al- lege biassed, by external gain of one sort or of another. They are persons of different, nay cross civil interests, and of different out- ward conditions. Such are the persons who give this testimony. Again, if we consider their testimony, they bear witness to the Christian religion in all its concerns, its truth, sufficiency, useful- ness to all the ends of religion, with respect to time or eternity, and its efficacy for beginning, carrying on, maintaining, reviving and consummating such as sincerely receive it, in godliness towards God, righteousness towards men, sobriety with respect to ourselves; and that both as to inward principles and outward acts. Further, if we consider in what way they give in their testimony, the weight of it will appear. They bear witness to all this, not only by their words, but by their deeds, living in a conformity to it, parting with all that is dearest to them for it, cheerfully undergoing the greatest hardships, patiently bearing the most cruel torments, to the loss of 320 AN INQUIRY INTO THE life itself; and this they do neither upon mere constraint, nor on the other hand, from a rash and inadvertent neglect of a due regard to the unquestionable advantages of peace, health, life, and the other good things they part with; but they venture upon doing and suffering freely and of choice, upon a sober, rational consideration of the advantage of cleaving to their religion, and of its being such, as will do more than compensate any loss they can sustain for it. Again, they bear witness to the concerns of this religion, as to a thing that they have not received upon bare hearsay, but upon narrow scrutiny, as that whereof they have the experience. They do not only give this testimony, when it is new to them ; but after long trial, when they are most sedate and composed, and when they can expect nothing of advantage by it, and when they must lay their account with contempt, opposition and loss. They give this testi- mony in whateA^er place they are, where it is honored, or where it is opposed. They give it with the greatest concern, and recom- mend this religion to those whom they would least deceive, even with their dying breath, when they dare not dissemble, and that after a long trial, in the course of their lives, in the greatest variety of outward conditions, sufficient to have discovered the weakness of their religion, if it had any. They have made choice of this re- ligion, and adhered to it, under the greatest outward disadvantages, who were not prepossessed in its favor by education, but prejudiced against it ; and they have embraced it, Avhere they had a free choice to accept or reject it, and advantages to tempt them to a refusal. They do not require an implicit belief as Mahometans do, but pro- voke to experience and trial. Now I dare boldly say, that this tes- timony is a better, more plain, obvious, and every way more justi- fiable ground of rational assent to the divine authority, truth, effica- cy, and sufficiency of the Christian religion, than can be given for the like assent, to any other particular religion whatsoever. Nay^ there is more in this one testimony, as it is, or at least may be qua- lified with other circumstances, discernible even by the most ordi- nary layman, here for brevity's sake omitted, (the urging this in its full strength, not being my present design) than can be offered for all the other religions in the world, natural, or pretending to revela- tion, were all that can be said for them altogether put in one argument. Any reasonable man cannot but think his eternal concerns safer in following this society, than any other whatsoever : There is not such another company elsewhere to be met with, as might be de- monstrated to the conviction of the stiffest opposer. But this I plead not at present. I say not, that he should build his persua- sion of Christianity upon this testimony. All that I make of it is this. That he has reason to consider the scriptures, as thus attest- ed, as a book that has, at least, very plausible pretences to divini- ty, a book that deserves serious perusal, a book that cannot possi- PRtNCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 321 biy have any obvious and unquestionable arguments of imposture, and consequently, that it deserves to be read through, and fully heard before it is cast ; and that though there occur in it some things that he cannot presently understand, or whose use and value he cannot take up, he ought not therefore to be prejudged against the divine authority of the book upon the account of them, till, at least, it is heard to an end. For, who knows not, that things which appear incredible, unreasonable, yea ridiculous, before their causes, order and design are understood, may, upon acquaintance with these, appear convincingly credible, useful, and every way reasona- ble ? This is all I claim of the layman at present, and he deserves not the name of a reasonable man who will deny it upon such a ground. And if the Deists had considered this, we had not been troubled with the many childish and trifling prejudices, wherewith their Oracles of Reason and other books are stuffed. Nor could they have been diverted from the serious consideration of the scriptures, by such pitiful exceptions. Well, the scriptures being put into the layman's hand, thus at- tested, he sets himself to the perusal of them, and such a perusal as the case requires ; looking to God for direction, he tries the means appointed by them, for satisfaction as to their divinity. While he is seeking light from God, in such a matter, he dare not expect it, if he continue in the neglect of known duty, or the com- mission of known sin, and therefore he studies to avoid them. He is resolved to follow truth, as it is discovered, and to subscribe to the scripture pretensions, if they give sufficient evidence of them- selves. Nothing is here resolved, but what is reasonable beyond exception. In pursuance of this just resolution, he reads them, and upon his perusal, what passages he cannot understand, or reach the reason of, he passes at present and goes on, till he see further what may be the intention of them. And he finds in plain and convincing expressions, his own case, and the case of all men by nature, clearly discovered, and urged upon him by this book ; the words pierce his soul, dive into his conscience, and make manifest the secrets of his hearty (know^n to none but God) manifest his sins, in their nature and tendency, and all their concernments. His conscience tells him, all this is true to a tittle, though he did not know it before, and none other save the heart-searching God, could know what was transacted within his heart, though overlooked by himself. The discovery not only carries with it an evidence of truth, which his conscience subscribes to ; but the words wherein it is expressed, bear themselves in upon his soul with a light, au- thority and majesty formerly unknown, evidencing their meaning and truth, and filling the soul with unusual and awful impressions of the majesty and authority of the speaker. Thus being convinced and judged, and the secrets of his heart made manifest, he isi 41 322 AN INaUlRY INTO THE forced to fall down and acknowledge, that God is in the word of a truth. And lie is ready to say, Come see a book that told me all that ever I did in my life, is not this the book of God ? Thus he stands trembling under the sense of the wrath of God, due to him for his ?Ins. He reads on, and finds in the same book a dis- covery of relief, frequently proposed in plain passages. He is urged to an acceptance of it. The discovery carries along with it a full evidence of the suitableness, excellence/, and advantage of the remedy : Avid by a gust of its goodness, or inward sense, he is drawn to ?tn approbation. Upon this approbation the promised effects follow. His fears are dissipated, his hopes revived, his soul is made acquainted with formerly unknown and God-becoming ex- pressions of the nature and excellencies of God, and going still ou every day, repeated experience occur of the justness of the disco- veries tlie word makes of himself, the authority of its commands, faitbfnlness of its promises, the awfulness of its threatenings, none of wliich fall to the ground. He, in a vrord, has repeated expe- rience of the unparalleled efficacy of the whole, for the cure of his darkness, his corruption, &c. which despised other applications ; and towards his advancement to a sincere and conscientious regard lo all his duties, outward and inward, towaid God and man. Let us noYiT but suppose this to be the case with the man upon his perusal of the scriptures, though with respect to innumerable souls, it is more than a bare supposition : upon this supposition, I say, 1 . The man has the highest security he can desire, that this book is, as to its substance, the very word of God, as certainly as if it were spoken to him immediately by a voice from heaven. This cannot well be denied by any that understands this supposition. 2. I say, the man thus convinced may laugh at all Herbert's queries as im- pertinent. He finds God speaking by the word, and owning it for his. He needs not therefore trouble himself who wrote it, or whe- ther they were honest men v.ho transcribed it, or whether they performed their part, whether it was designed for him ; and the like may be said of all his other queries. He will find no occa- sion for that distinction betwixt traditional or original revelation, mentioned by Herbert, and insisted upon by Mr. Locke,=* on what design 1 leave others to judge. In this case, as to the sub- stance, it is all one to him, as if it had not come thi'ough another hand ; nor lias he reason to suspect, that God would permit to creep into, or stand in a book, which for the substance, he still owns and evinces to be from liim, any thing of a coarser alloy, at least any such corruption as might make it unworthy of him to own it, oi- unsafe to use it to the design it was given for : Yea, he has the strongest security that the perfections and providence of God * liOclit's Essay ou Hum. Understand. Book 4. Cap. 18. § 6. 7. 8. PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS!. 323 of God can afford, to rest fully assured of the contrary. He has no reason to stumble at passages that he cannot understand, or such as by others are reckoned ridiculous, but rather to say with Socrates, in another case, " What I understand I admire, and " am fully convinced to be every way worthy of its author ; and " therefore I conclude what I understand not, to be equally excel- " lent, and that it would appear so if I understood all its con- «' cerns." Finally, This supposition takes ofl' all pretence of he- sitation about the meaning of the scriptures, as to what the man is particularly concerned in. The story of the necessity of an in- fallible judge, is built upon this supposition, That the scriptures are so obscure in matters necessarily relating to the faith and prac- tice of the vulgar, that they cannot be understood by them satis- fyingly, in the use of appointed means. This supposition is pal- pably false, coiitrary to scripture, reason aiid experience, as is evinced by our writers against the Papists, who fully consider their pleas, and paiticularly those which Herbert and the Deists have borrowed from them, who may be consulted by the reader. 3. Thus far I have made appear, that the layman has the just- est reason in the world to look upon it as his dutj , or the will of God, that he should give the scriptures such a perusal. 2. That in doing his will there is a way, at least, supposable, wherein he may reach full satisfaction in his own mind, in defiance of the Deists' queries about the divinity of the scriptures, and reach the highest rational security, even that of faith, bottomed upon divine testimony, and inward sense or experience ; which Herbert him- self, upon all occasions, truly asserts to be the highest certainty. I shall now advance one step further, and assert, that this is more than a mere supposition, that it is matter of fact, that they, who do receive the scriptures in a due manner, especially among the laity or illiterate, do find and rest upon this ground in their persua- sion. Upon this ground it was alone, that multitudes did at first receive it, and for it reject the religions they were bred in; and not as the Deists imagine, upon a blind veneration to teachers, priests or preachers, whom by education, they were taught to ab- hor ; And upon this ground they still do adhere to it, and receive it as written in the scriptures. The words of Mr. Baxter, as I find them quoted by Mr. Wilson (for I have not seen Baxter's book in answer to Herbert de VerUale) are remarkable to this purpose, " I think, says he. That in the very hearing or reading, God's Spi- " rit often so concurreth as that the will itself should be touched " witli an internal gust or savour of the goodness contained in the " doctrine, and at the same time the understanding with an inter- " nal irradiation, which breeds such a sudden apprehension of the *' verity of it, as nature gives men of natiu'al principles. And I 324 AN iNaUIRY INTO THE " am persuaded, that this increased by more experience and love, " and inward gusts, doth hold most Christians faster to Christ, " than naked reasonings could do. And were it not for this, un- * * learned ignorant persons were still in danger of apostasy, by * ' every subtle caviller that assaults them. And I believe that all * ' true Christians have this kind of internal knowledge, from the ** suitableness of the truth and goodness of the gospel to their new- *' quickened, illuminated, sanctified souls."* The apostle tells us, God who commajided the light to shine out of darkiuss^ hath shined into our hearts, to give the light of the knorvledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ. — If the Deist say, How proves the layman this to me ? I answer. That is not the question. For the design of the Deists in these queries, is to prove, that the layman cannot be assured about the original and meaning of revelation in his own mind, and so must close with their catholic religion. Now in direct contradiction to this, I say, here is a ground to stand up- on. And if he has this ground, even a sober Deist must allow he has no reason to be moved from it, but must fully know that the doctrines are of God. And so I have overthrown the design of the queiy. As for the Deists' question, How he proves it to others ? it is impertinent. It is not reasonable to expect, that every com- mon man can stop the mouths of gain-sayers. It is enough for him if he can give a reason, which is good, and must be owned such in itself. If the Deist questions matters of fact, that he finds matters so and so ; I answer, A blind man may question whether I see this paper now before me ; and yet I have good reason to believe it is there, though I should fail of convincing him. If the Deist says, I have perused the scriptures, and found no such effect ; I answer, in matters of experience one affirmative proves more than twenty negatives ; unless the application is in all respects equal, and the effect depend upon a necessary cause : For where a voluntary agent is the cause of the effect, there it does not necessarily follow upon the like application. But to wave this general, which would require more room to explain, than I can allow it in this place, I say further, to the complainer, Have you given the scripture such a perusal, as I have proved in a way of duty you are obliged to do ? Have you used the means, in so far, at least, as is possible for you ? Have you sought, have you waited for God's guidance and preservation from mistake, and from unjust prejudices against him, his works, his word, (if this be such) and his ways ? Do you carefully study to avoid what may reasonably be thought, even by a considerate Heathen, to obstruct the grant of the assistance desired from God ? Do you carefully avoid known sin ? Do you endeavor the performance of what you know to be duty ? Are you resolved to follow in practice where light leads ? If * Baxter's Animad. on Herbet deVerit. pacjc 135. quoted by M. J. WilsoJi, Scriptnics iuteriweter asLcrted, Appendix page 20. PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 325 you dare not frankly answer, you have no reason to complain. For my own part, I am persuaded, that in fact, none who have done his will even thus far, have reason to table a complaint against the word. Others who take a quite contrary course, are unreasonable in the complaint. Disputes about what might be the case, upon supposition of a person's doing all, that in his present circumstan- ces he is able to do, and yet miss of satisfaction as to the divine authority of the woid, until the subject of this question be found, I think not myself concerned in, at least in a controversy with the Deists. It is unreasonable to question the scripture's authority, or the evidence of it, upon suppositions that never were in being, and I am persuaded, never shall have a being. But these things I leave. This dispute lies wholly out of our road. But I have been obliged to this digression, in pursuit of the Deist's impertinent queries. I say impertinent, because, were all granted that is aimed at in these queries, it will not avail one rush, towards the proof of the point the Deists are on, viz. the validiti/ of their religion : For were revealed religion uncertain, is it a good consequence, that therefore the Deists' religion is certain ? What I have said in defence of revealed religion, I would have to be look- ed upon only as a digression, and not as a full declaration of my opinion ; much less would I have this understood as the substance of what can be pleaded on behalf of that blessed book that has brought life and immortality to light. This is not the hundredth part of what even I could say, were this my subject. And others have said, and can plead much more than I am able. However, this I owed to the truth of God. Such as would see all these pre- tences against revelation, repelled, are desired to consult those, wiio designedly treat of this subject. There are other things in these queries now animadverted upon, that deserve rather contempt than an answer. In particular, it is supposed, as one of the principal foundations of those two queries, now under consideration, That a man cannot reach certainty in his own mind upon solid grounds, and rationally acquiesce in it as such, unless " he knows all that can be said against it, read all books, con» " verse with all learned men, &c." than which there is not a more extravagant expression in Bevis and Garagantua. Admit it, and I shall demonstrate against any that will undertake it, that nothing is certain. I cannot but admire that so learned a person as Her- bert could use such an extravagant supposition. But what will not a bad cause drive a man upon ? This confirms what is ordinarily observed, that there is no opinion, however unreasonable, but has some learned man for its patron, if not inventor. We shall now go on to the rest of the queries, which will be of more easy dispatch. That I have dwelt so long upon these two, is out of regard to revelation and its honor, and not from any weight in the queries. As for them, this alone had bceu a sufficient an- S26 AN INQUIRY INTO THE swer, which I propose in a way of a counter quer} , and conclmic with it — " If a layman that is illiterate cannot be satisfied as to the " truth of revealed religion, how doth this prove the Deists' five " articles to be a sufficient and good religion." Qneri/ 11. " Supposing all true in their originals, and in their " explications, whether yet they be so good for the instructing of " mankind, that bring pardon of sin upon such easy terms, as to " believe the business is done to our hand ?" And, Q}!erJ/ VIL " Whether this doctrine doth not derogate from vir- " tue and goodness, while our best actions are represented as im- *' perfect and sinful, and that ii is impossible to keep the ten com- " mandments, so as God will accept of our actions, doing the best *' we can ?" Thus Blount gives us Herbert's sixth query in two.* There is no material difference in Herbert, save only that he harps upon the old string, and spends himself in bitter invectives against the scripture doctrine about the decrees of God, of which we have said enough before. And therefore I think it needless to burthen this paper with his words. . The two former queries struck at scripture revelation itself; these two strike at the matter contained in the scriptures. And here there is a double charge laid against the doctrine revealed in the scriptures, as black as hell can invent, and as false as it is black. The sixth query charges it with favoring sin, by bringing pardon upon too easy terms ; and the seventh charges it with derogating from virtue. For an answer to both, I might oppose experience. Sin is no where by any so opposed, virtue no where so sincerely cultivated, as among those who sincerely receive the doctrine of satisfaction, and believe the utmost as to the inability of man in his present fal- len case, without supernatural assistance, and gracious acceptance, to please God, Dare the Deists compare with them in this respect? If they should, I know what would be the issue, if the judge had conscience or honesty. A Socrates, Seneca or Plato, deserves not to be named in the same dr,y with the meanest serious Christian, that believes these doctrines, either with respect to i^iety toward God, or dnti/ tov/ard man. But as to the first charge, I ssy the ground of it is false ; the ffuery is disingenuous and deceitful. The ground of it is a suppo- sition, that r*^velation excludes the necessity of repentance. This is manifestly false : Both Herbert and Blount knew it to be false ; and could not but do so, if ever they read the Bible. And the que- ry comparing revelation upon this known misrepresentation, with natural religion, is shamefully disingenuous. Let. the query be, Whether it is more favorable to sin, to say, it is not to be pardon- ed without a satisfaction to justice by Christ, and repentance upon * Blount Rel. Laici, pag-. 91. 9:?. PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 8^7 our part, as revelation teaches ; or, that upon our repentance mere- ly, God is obliged to pardon it, as the Deists say ? Now, 1 leave it to the Deists to answer this. As to the second charge, revelation derogates nothing from vir- tue. It teaches indeed that our best actions are imperfect, and he knows not what perfection means, or what is required thereto, that will deny it. It teaches that lh(y who are in the flesh cannot please €rod. It talks at another rate than Herbert, of the condition of sinful man, as to acceptance with God. He gives him a directkiu, " Cum bonnm pro i>irUi prceslas, mercedem a bonitate ilia supre- " ma pete, exis^e, habe; quo pado revera sapies.'^^ That is, "Man- " fully perform your duty as you can, and (whatever sin remain) " ask, demand, and have your reward. This is the way to be truly " wise." This petulent advice the scripture does not justify, and sober reason reprobates. Where sin intervenes, whatever the sin- ner does, in way of obedience, I conceive it will be as good wisdom as our author teaches him, to be very sober with his demands. But to return : Revelation, by teaching man's inability, doth not hin- der him from virtue ; but takes him off from his own strength, ^vjiich would fail him in the performance, and leads him where he may get strength,and where innumerable persons have got strength to perform duty acceptably ; and it points to the only ground, whereon sinful and imperfect obedience can be accepted with, or expect a reward from God. Quer// VIII. " Whether speaking good words, thinking good " thoughts, and doing good actions, be not the just exercise of a " man's life ? Or that without embracing the foresaid five princi- " pies or fundamentals, it be impossible to keep peace among men, " that God may be well served ?" Thus Blount.f This is Her- bert's seventh and last ((uery, and he only adds one clause to it, wanting here ; " Whether the layman may not spend his time bet- " ter in those exercises mentioned, than if he employed it in de- " ciding controversies he does not understand."J • The supposed necessity of the layman perplexing himself with controversies, at which Herbert here aims, in case he see meet to embrace revelation, we have above weighed and cast. But as to the query itself, it is utterly impertinent. For this is the question they should have proposed, " Whether their religion is sufEcient " to bring a man to these just exercises, and to maintain peace in *' society?" And not as they propose it, " Whether these exer- " cises be in themselves good?" which nobody denies: let this be the question, and we answer negatively. For this we have given sufficient reasons above. Herbert de Vcritate, pa.^. 108. f Herb. Rel. I..iici, Appendix. Blount I?cl. Laici page 9'2. 328 AN INQUIRY INTO THE Qveiy IX. " Whether the foresaid five principles do not best " agree with the precepts given in the ten commandments, and " with the two precepts of Jesus Christ, vis. To love God above " all, and our neighbour as ourselves ? as well as with the words " of St. Peter, That in every nation he that feareth God, and work- eth risihtfiousness is accepted of God."* This query is the same with Herbert's seventh and last persua- sive to Deism, which we have answered above. It is falsely sup- posed that revelation teaches, that the knowledge of the ten com- mands, or Christ's summary of them, is snflBcient to salvation. Yea, revelation teaches expressly, that no man can practice them without grace from Christ, and that there is no other way of salva- tion but by faith in him. Again, it is falsely supposed, that the agreement of these articles with (that is to say, their not contradict- ing) these commands, proves them a sufficient religion. This ar- gument, if it proves any thing, proves too much ; for it will prove any one of them alone to be suflScient. If the Deists mean that their five articles, not only are not inconsistent with, but sufficient to bring men the length required by the ten commands, our Jjord's summary of them, or to fear God and work righteousness, as Cornelius did : I answer negatively to the question, they can bring no man to this. Cornelius, of whom Peter speaks, had em- braced the Old Testament revelation. What Peter speaks of men of all 7iations being accepted with God, relates to the discovery God had made to him of his design to admit men of all nations promiscu- ously to acceptance with him through the gospel revelation : And consequently, that the opinion hitherto received by Peter and other Jews, of the continued confinement of revealed religion and its privileges to Israel, was a mistake. So that this place helps Tiot the Deists, if it is not cut off from its scope and cohesion, or in- terpreted without respect to it. This way of interpretation of scripture is not safe. I know not where Mr. Blount learned it ; but I can tell him where there is a precedent of it — Matt. iv. And if the Deists have a mind to follow that precedent, they shall not be followed by me. Query X. " Whether the doctrine of faith can by human reason " be supposed or granted to be infallible, unless we are infallibly as- " sured, that those who teach this doctrine do know the secret coun- « selsofGod."t To this I answer. That I am sufficiently secured as to the infal- lible certainty of the doctrine, if I have received the scriptures upon the ground above-mentioned, without supposing any who now teach it, to have any further acquaintance with the secret counsels of of God, than the word gives them. * Blount, ib. page 92, 93. -^ Blount, Rel. Laici, pag. 93. PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 329 Qnejy XL " Whether all things in the scriptures, (besides the " moral part, which agrees with our five principles) such as pro- " phecy, miracles and revelations, depending on the history, may « not be so far examined, as to be made appear by what authority " they are or may be received ?"* I answer, Revelation, in all its parts, is capable to stand the test of the strictest trial, provided it be just, and be managed as becomes it. But I must tell the Deists one thing in their ear. That if the scriptures once evince themselves to be from God, by sufficient evidence, they are obliged, upon their peril, to receive all that it teaches them, though they cannot prove it by reason ; nay, nor explain it. But what if any revealed doctrine be contrary to rea- son ? Upon the foregoing supposition, this query cannot be excus- ed of blasphemy, but is highly impertinent and unreasonable. Q,uery XII. " Whether in human reason any one may, or ought " to be convinced by one single testimony, so far as to believe things " contrary to, or besides reason ?"f One single testimony is writ in a different character in the que- ry, perhaps to give us to understand, that by it is meant the testi- mony of the revealer, God. And it cannot reasonably be under- stood of any other : For upon no other single testimony save that of God, is an assent to revelation demanded, or pleaded for, by those he opposes. This being premised, I say this query consists, and is made up of three as impious suppositions as can enter the thoughts of any of the sons of men ; besides that they are mutually destructive of one another. 1 . It supposes that the one single testimony of God is not a sufficient warrant for believing whatever he shall reveal. 2. It supposes that a revelation come from God may contain things really contradictory to our reason. 3. It supposes that the single testimony of God is not a sufficient ground. to believe things that are besides our reason, though they be not contrary to it, that is, truths, which we cannot prove by reason, or about which there are some difficulties that we cannot solve. Take these three impious suppositions out of the query, and it has no difficulty in it. If once we suppose a revelation to be from God, we must lay aside the se- cond supposition as impossible, viz. That it can contain any thing really contrary to reason. Set aside this, which makes the query J'elo de se, destroy itself, and let the question be proposed, Whether we may believe upon the sijigle testimony of God whatever does not really contradict our reason, though it contains some difficulties, which we cannot solve ? And then I say, it is impious to deny it. Query XIII. And lastly, " Whether, if it were granted they had " revelations, I am obliged to accept of another's revelation for the i Blount's Rel. Laici, pag-. 93. f Ibid. pag. 94 42 330 AN INQUIRY INTO THE " ground of my feiith ? Especially if it doth any way oppose these " five articles, that are grounded upon the law of nature, which is " God's universal magna charla, enacted by the All-wise and Su- " preme Being, from the beginning of the world, and therefore not " to be destroyed or altered by every whistling proclamation of an " enthusiast."* This query is of the same alloy with the former. To it we an- swer shortly, The Christian revelation, (in others we are not con- cerned) exhibits matters of universal concernment, upon evidence ©f their divinity, capable to satisfy those who now live, as well as those to whom they were originally made ; and so are impertinently called another^s revelation. And we are obliged to receive it as the ground of our faith, and rule of our practice as much as they. The supposition that is added, that it contains doctrines or precepts con- trary to the law of nature, is impious and false. What he adds further about the " whistling proclamations of enthusiasts," if it is not applied to the sacred writers, we are not concerned in it. If it is applied to them, First, It is false, that they taught any thing con- trary to the law of nature. Secondly/, It is impious to call them, in way of contempt, enthusiasts ; or, at least, it is intolerably bold for ' any man to call them such, before he has proven it ; which he ne- ver did, nor will all the Deists on earth ever be able to do. Third- ///, It was rude and un.aannerly to treat them with so much con- tempt, especially without argument proving the charge, whom the whole authority of the land, all the persons vested with it, and the body of the people, respect as men infallibly directed of God. Fourthli/, It was disingenuous to treat them thus, after such pre- tensions as our author had made of respect to them, in this and his other books. Finally, Mr. Blount, instead of a fourteenth query, concludes with the testimony of Justin Martyr, as probative of his point. His words run thus, " Finally, submitting my discourse to my im- " partial and judicious reader, I shall conclude with the saying of " Justin Martyr, Apol. cont. IViphon, page 83. " That all those " vi^ho lived according to the rule of reason, were Christians, not- " withstanding that they mJglit hax^e been accounted as Atheists ; " such as among the Greeks were Socrates, Hieraclitus, and the " like ; and among the Barbarians, Abraham and Azarias : For " all those who lived, or do now live, according to the rule of reason, " are Christians, and in an assured quiet condition."! As to the testimony of Justin Martyr, it is not probative with us ; tI:ough we honor the fathers, yet we do not think ourselves obliged to submit to all their dictates. This is said, but not pro- ven by him, eiihsr by scripture or reason. And I fear not to say, * Elounl's Rel. Laici, pag. 91. f Blount's Rel.Laici, page 94, 95. PRINCIPLES OF THE MODERN DEISTS. 331 It is more than he or any other can prove. Abraham is imperti- nently classed amongst those who wanted revelation ; Socrates and Hieraclitus, in so far as they lived according to reason, are assured- ly praise-worthy, and upon this account are not to be reckoned Atheists. That they were Christians, I flatly deny. Nor can it be proven from scripture or reason, that their condition is assiired- ly quiet. And further than this I am not concerned to pass any judgment about their state at present : What it m that day will manijest. END OP THE INftUiar. AN ESSAY, CONCERNING THE NATURE OF FAITH; OR, THE GROUND UPON WHICH FAITH MSEJVTS TO THE SCRIPTURES: THE OPINION OF THE RATIONALISTS ABOUT IT, IS PROPOSED, AND EXAMINED, ESPECIALLy AS IT IS STATED BY THE LEARNED MR. LOCKE, IN HIS BOOK ON HUMAN UNDERSTANDING. BY THE SAME AUTHOR. ALBANY : PUBLISHED BY H. C. SOUTHWICK, No, 73, STATE-STREET. 1812. AN ESSAY, 4rc. CHAP. I. Containing some general Remarks concerning Knowledge, Faithy and particularly divine Faith, and that both as to thefacvliy and actings thereof, ALL knowledge is commonly, and that not unfitly, referred to the understanding or intellectual poAver of the mind of man, which is conversant about truth. Our assent to, or persuasion of any truth is founded, eitlier 1 . LTpon the immediate perception of the agreement or disagreement of our ideas, and so is called intuitive know- ledge. Or 2. It results from a comparison of our ideas with some immediate ones, which helps us to discern their agreement or disagreement; and this goes under the name of rational knowledge. Or 3. It leans upon the information of our senses, and this is sensible knowledge. Or 4. It depends upon the testimony of credible wit- nesses. And this is faith. Faith again, if it is founded upon the testimony of an- gels, may be termed angelical; if on the testimony of men, human ; and if it is founded on the testimony of God, it is called divine faith: It is of this last we design to discourse, as what particularly belongs to our present purpose. When we speak of divine faith, we either mean the faculty or power whereby we assent unto divine testi- mony ; or the assent given by that power. Both are 336 AN ESSAY CONCERNING signified by that name, and faith is promiscuously used for the one or the other. Faith, as it denotes the faculty, power or ability of our minds to perceive the evidence of, and assent to di- vine testimony, is again either natural or supernatural, Tliat naturally we have a faculty capable of assenting in some sort to divine testimony, is denied by none, so far as I know. But that ability whereby v\e are at least habitually fitted, disposed and enabled to assent in a due manner to, and receive with a just legard, tije testimony of God, no man by nature has. This is a supernatural gift. Several questions I know are moved concerning this ability. It belongs not to my subject, neitiier doth my inclination lead me to dip much in tt'cm at present. I shall only suggest the fcAV remarks ensuing. 1. It seems unquestionably clear, that man originally had a power, ability or faculty capable of perceiving, discerning and assenting to divine revelations upon their proper evidence : For it is plain, that God did reveal himself to man in innocency, and that he made man ca- pable of converse with himself. But if such a faculty, as this we speak of, had been wanting, he had neither been capable of those revelations, nor fitted for converse with God. 2. It may most convincingly be made out, that all our faculties have suffered a dreadful shock, and are mightily impaired by the entrance of sin, and the corruption of our nature thereon ensuing; and particularly our under- standings are so far disabled, especially in things per- taining unto God, that we cannot in a due manner, per- ceive, discern or entertain divine revelations upon their proper evidence, unto the glory of God, and our own advantage, vmless our natures are supernatural ly renew- ed. But this, notwithst?.nding, the faculty of assenting to divine testimony is not quite lost, though it is impair- ed and lendered until for performing its proper work in a due manner. I know none who asserts, t^at any of THE REASON OP TRUE FAITH. 337 our faculties were entirely lost by tiie fall.* In renova- tion our faculties are renewed, but tliere is no word of implanting new ones. It is certain, unrenewed men, such as Balaam and others, have had revelations made to them, and did assent to those revelations. Nor is it less clear, that the devils believe and tremhle. 3. Whether men, in a state of natiu-e, whose minds are not renewed, may not so far discern and be affected by the characters and evidences of God impressed upon divine revelations, particularly the scriptiu'es, where those evidences shine brightly, as thereby to be obliged, and actually drawn to give some sort of assent into the testimony of God, I shall not positively determine: Though the affirmative seems probable to me. The impress of a Deity is no less evident on the scriptures than his other works. He has magnified this word above all his name. Besides, I do not see, how the very facul- ty itself can be thought to remain, if it is not capable of discerning any thing of God, where he gives the most full and convincing evidence of himself, as unquestion- ably he doth in the scriptures. Nor do I doubt but mul- titudes of sober persons, trained up within the chinch, and thereby drawn to a more attentive and less prejudi- cial perusal of tlie scripture revelation, do, upon sundry occasions, find their minds affected with the evidence of God in them, and thereby are drawn to assent to them as his word, though not in a due manner, and that even where they remain strangers unto a work of renovation. And I am sure, if it is so, it will leave the rejectors of the scriptures remarkably without excuse. 4. Whether some transient act of the Spirit of God is always necessary upon the mind, to draw forth even such an assent, as that last mentioned, I shall not deter- mine ; that in some cases it is so, is not to be doubted. The faith of temporary believers undoubtedly requhes such an action as its cause, and where any thing of this evidence affects the minds of persons, at present deep- • " We cannot conceive how reason should be prejudiced by the advance* " ment of the rational faculties of our soxils with respect unto their exercise " toward their proper objects ; vvhicli is all we assign unto the work of th^ *' Holy Spirit in ihis matter." Dr. Oisen on the Spirit, Preface, page 9, 43 3'38 AN ESSAY, &c. ly prejudiced, as they were, who were sent to apprehend Christ, and went away under a conviction, thai never man spake as he did ; there such a transient work of the Spi- rit of God seems necessary to clear their minds of pre- judices, and make them discern the evidences of a Dei- ty : But whether it is so in other cases, I shall not con- clude positively. 5. But were it granted. That faith, that is, the faculty or power of believing, which is nothing else save the mind of man considered as a subject capable of assent- ing to testimony, still remains ; and that though woful- ly impaired, weakened and disabled, it yet continues in so far able for its proper office or work, that either by the assistance of some transient operation of God's Spirit, breaking in some measure the power of its prejudices, and fixing it to the consideration of its proper object, or even without this, upon a more sedate, sober, less preju- diced observation, it may, though less perfectly, perceive the impress and evidences of God appearing in the re- velations he makes of himself, and that thereon it may be actually so afl'ected, as to give some sort of assent, and reach some conviction, that it is God who speaks r \Vere, I say, all this granted, it will amount to no great jiiatter ; since it is certain, that every sort of faith or assent to divine testimony, is not sufficient to answer our dut}% obtain acceptance with God, and turn to our sal- vation. Nor is it so much of our concernment to in- quue after that sort of faith which fails of answering these ends ; and therefore I shall dip no further into any questions about any faith of this sort, or our ability for it. 6. It is more our interest to understand what that faith is, which God requires us to give to his word, which he will accept of, and which therefore will turn to our sal- vation ; and whence we have the power and ability for this faith. Of these things therefore we shall discourse at more length in the next chapter designed to ttiat end. CHAP. n. Wherein the Nature of that Faith, which in Duty we ar& obliged to give to the Word of God, our ohUgatioa to, and our ability for answering our Duty, are inquired into. WE have above insinuated, and of itself it is plain, that every sort of faith or assent to divine testimony an- swers not our duty, nor will amount to that regard which we owe to the authority and truth of God, when he speaks, or writes his mind to us. We must therefore, in the first place, inquire into the nature of that faith which will do so. Nor is there any other way wherein this may better be cleared, than by attending to the plain scrip- ture accounts of it. Nows if we look into the scriptures, we find, 1. The apostle Paul, 1 Thess. ii. 13. when he is commending the Thessalonians, and blessing God on their behalf, gives a clear description of that faith which is due unto the word of God. For this cause also, says he, thank we God without ceasing, because ivhen ye received the word of God which ye heard of us, ye received it not as the word of men ; but (as it is truth) the word of God which effectual- ly 7Vorketh also in you that believe. If we advert to this description, we cannot but see these things in it. First, That some special sort of assent is here intended. The Thessalonians did not think it enough to give such cre- dit, or yield such an assent as is due to the word of men, even the best of men. Secondly, In particular it is plain, that such an assent is intended as some way answers the unquestionable firmness of the testimony of the God of trutli, which is the ground whereon it leans. Thirdly, It is obvious, that somewhat more is intended than a mere assent, of whatsoever sort it is : The words plainly import such an assent, or receiving of the word of God, as is attended with that reverence, (submission of soul, re- 340 AN ESSAY CONCERNING sii^natlon of will and subjection of conscience, that is due to God. This the use of the word elsewhere in scripture strong- ly pleads for, and the manner wherein the apostle ex- presses }}imself here is sufricient to convince any man tl at no less is intended. 1. Less than this would scarce have been a ground for the apostle's thanksi^iving to God, and for his doing this without ceasing. And indeed we find that this expression elsewhere used imports not only people's assent to, but their consent and approba- tion of the word of God; yea, and their embracing in piactice the gospel. Acts viii. 14. and xi. 1. 2. We are told FXeb. xi. 1. that is the evidence of things not seen, — f^iypc"^, which Ave render evidence^ signifies properly a convincing demonstrationy standing firm against, and re* pelling tlie force of contrary objections. Faith then is such an assent as this. It is a firm conviction leaning upon the strongest bottom, able to stand against, and withstand the strongest objections. 3. The apostle more particu- larly'^ describes tiie groimd whereon it rests, or what tliat demonstrative evidence is, whereon this conviction is founded, and that both negatively and positively, 1 Cor. ii. 5. It stands not in the wisdom of men, but in the power of God. That is, it neither leans upon the eloquence, nor reasonings of men, but upon the pow erfid evidence of the Spirit's demonstration, as it is in the verse before. Having given this sliort and plain account of faith from the scriptiue, we must in the next place prove, that in duty we are bound to receive the word of God w ith a faith of this soil. Nor w ill this be found a matter of any difficulty : For, 1. The scriptures hold themselves forth to us as the Oracles of God, which holy men of God spake as they were moved by the spirit of God, and w rote by divine in- spiration, and the Holy Ghost is said to speak to us by them. Now the very light of nature teaches us, that when God utters oracles, speaks and av rites his mind to us, we are in duty bound readily to assent, give entire credit to, and rely with the firmest confidence on the veracity of the speaker ; and furtlier, we are obliged to attend to wliat is spoken w^ith the deepest v(Tieiati(>n, THE REASON OF TRUE FAITH. 341 reverence and subjection of soul, and yield an unre- served practical compliance with every intimation of his . mind. 2. The scriptures were written for this very end. That jve might so believe them as to have life by them, John xx. 30. 31. And again, Rom. xvi. 25, 26. The scriptures of the projyhets according to the commandment of the everlast- ing Gody are said to be made known to all nations for the obedience of faith. Ceilainly then we are in duty obliged to yield tiiis obedience of faith, 3. The most dreadfid judgments, yea eternal ruin, and that of the most intolerable sort, are threatened against those, who do not thus receive the words of God from his servants, whether by word or writ, is no mat- ter. Whosoever shall not receive you, nor hear your words^ when ye depart out of that house or city, shake oj^ the dust of your feet. Verily I say unto you. It shall be more tolera- ble for the land of Sodom and Gomorrah than for that ci- ty , Matt. X. 14. 15. Accordingly w^e find the apostles preach the word at Antioch in Pisidia, Acts xiii. demand acceptance of it both of .lews and Gentiles, and upon their refusal, they testily against them in this way of the Lord's appointment, ver. 51. And all this severity they used witliout offering mu'acles, or any other proof for their doctrine, so far as we can learn, besides the au- thoiitative proposal of it in tlie name of God. 4. We find the apostle, in the words above quoted, commending the 7'hessalonians for receiving the word in this manner, which is proof enough, that it was then- du- ty to do so. This much being clear, it remains yet to be inquired. Whence we have power or ability for yielding such an assent, whether it is natural or supernatural ? Now if we consult the scripture upon this head, we find, 1. That this ability to believe and receive the things of God to our salvation and his glory, is expressly de- nied to unrenewed man, or man in his natural estate, 2 Tiies. iii. 2. u4ll men have not faith: 1 Cor. ii. 14. The natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God ; for they are foolishness unto him : Neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned^ Jolm viii. 47 — 342 AN ESSAY CONCERNING Ye therefore hear not God's words, because ye are not of God. -^ 2. This is expressly denied to be of our selves, and asserted to be a supernatual gift of God, Eph. ii. 8. By •grace are ye saved through faith ; and that not of your- selves, it is the gift of God. 3. The production of it is expressly ascribed unto God. He it is that fulfils in his people the work of faith with power, 2 Thes. i. 1 1. He it is that gives tliem, that is, that enables them, on the behalf of Christ to believe and siiffer for his name, Phil. i. 29. It is one of tJie fruits of the Spirit, Gal. v. 22. And of it Christ is the aidhor, Heb. xii. 2. The further proof and vindication of this truth I refer to polemical writers. But hei^ possibly some may inquire. How it can be our duty thus to believe the scriptures, since we are not of ourselves able to do so ? In answer to this, I shall on- ty say, 1. The very light of nature shews, that it is our duty to yield perfect obedience, yet certain it is we are unable to answer to our duty. 2. The scriptures plainly require us to serve God acceptably ivith reverence and god- ly fear, and with the same breath tells us, we must have grace to enable us to do it, Heb. xii. 28. 3. We have destroyed ourselves, and by our ow n fault impaired the powers God originally gave us, and brought ourselves under innumerable prejudices and other evils, wfiereby the entrance of light is obstructed : but this cannot rea- sonably prejudge God's right to demand credit to his word, on which he lias impressed sufficient objective evi- dence of himself, which any one that has not thus faulti- ly lost his eyes, may upon attention discern. 4. It is therefore our duty to justify God, blame ourselves, and wait in the way he has prescribed, for that girice which is necessary to enable us; and if thus we do his will, or at least aim at it, we have no reason to despau', but may expect in due time to be enabled to understand and linow, whether these truths are of God, or they who spoke them did it of themselves, John vii. 17. Though yet we cannot claim this as what is our due. From what has hitherto been discoiu'sed, it is evident, iliat this liiif h, whereby we assent to the scripture, is su- THE REASON OF TRUE FAITH. 343 pernatural, or may be so called upon a two-fold account: 1. Because the power or ability for it, is supernaturally given ; and 2. The evidence whereon it rests is superna- tural. In this chapter, we have directly concerned omselvest only in the proof of the first of these, viz. That our abili- ty thus to believe is supernaturally given ; and this has been tfie constant doctrine of the chinch of God, which we might confirm by testimonies of all soils, did our design- ed brevity allow.* But our modern Rationalists do resolutely oppose this. The author of a late Atheistical pamphlet, that truly subverts all religion, may be allowed to speak for all the rest ; for he says no more than what they do as- sent to : He tells us, " That when once the mystery of " Christ .Tesus was revealed, even human reason Avas " able to behold and confess it ; not that grace had al- " tered the eye sight of reason, but that it had drawn the " object nearer to it."t To the same purpose speak the Socinians ; Schlichtingius tells us, " Man endued " with understanding is no otherwise blind in divine " mysteries, than as lie who hath eyes, but sits in the " dark : remove the darkness, and bring Imn a light and " he will see. The eyes of a man are his imderstand- " ing, the light is Christ's doctrine." To the same pur- pose doth the paradoxical Bclgic Exercitator, that sets up for philosophy as the interpreter of the scriptures, express himself frequently. Nor is his pretended an- swerer Volzogius differently minded; though he is not so constant to his opinion as the other. J But these gentlemen may talk as tliey please, we are not obliged to believe them in this matter. The scrip- tures plainly teaching us, that our minds are blind, our understandings impaired and obstructed in discerning the evidence of truth, by prejudices arising from tlie en- * See iVfy. Wilson's Scripture's jjenuine Interpreter asserted. Appen. page 4, 5, &c. f Treatise on niiman Reason, page 58, published 1674, and to the credit of the church of England, with an Imprimatur, quote^l by Mr. Wilson, ubi 8Upr»ij fjagc 13. WiTsQn's ibrd, page 7; H'. 344 AN ESSAY, &c. mity of the will, and depravity of the affections. Nor were it difficult to demonstrate from sciiptuie, that no man can believe, or understand the word of God ariglit, tDl, 1. The spirit of God repair this defect of the faculty, or gives us an understandings 1 John v. 20. 2. Bi eak the power of that enmity that rises up against the truths of God as foolishness. 3. Cure the disorder of our af- fections, that blinds our minds. And 4. Fix our minds, otherwise vain and unstable, to attend to what God speaks, and the evidence he gives of himself. But tliis is not what we principally design, and therefore we shall insist no longer upon this head : Our present question is not about our ability or power to believe, but the ground whereon w^e do believe. What has been spoken of the former hitherto, is only to prepare the w ay for the con- sideration of the latter, to which we now proceed. CHAP. III. The Ground, or the formal Reason, whereon Faith assents to the Scriptures is inquired after ; the Rationalist's Opinion about it, and particularli/ as stated hy Mr, Locke in his Book on Human Under standing , is pro- posed and considered. THOUGH we have spoken somewhat concerning our ability to believe the word of God, and the super- natural rise thereof, in the preceding chapter ; wherein we have offered our thoughts of that which goes under the name of subjective light ; yet this is not the question mainly intended in these papers. That which we aim more particularly to inquire after, is the ground whereon the mind thus subjectively enlightened, or by the spirit of God disposed, fitted and enabled to discern and assent to divine revelations, builds its assent, and wlierein it rests satisfied, or acquiesces. The question then before us is this. What is th?iigrou7id whereon, or reason which moves and determines us to receive the scriptures as the word of God 1 What is the formal reason whereon our faith rests ? Or what is the proper answer to that question. Wherefore do ye believe the scriptures to be the word of God, and receive truths therein proposed as the word of God, and not of man ? It is in general owned by all, who believe the scrip- tures to be a divine revelation, that the authority, truth and veracity of God, who is truth itself, and can neither deceive, nor be deceived, is the ground whereon we re- ceive and assent to propositions of truth therein reveal- ed. But this general answer satisfies not the question : For, though it is of natural and unquestionable evi- dence, that God's testimony is true, cannot but be so, and as such must be received ; yet certain it is, that di- vine testimony abstractly considered, cannot be the 44 346 AN ESSAY CONCERNING ground of our assent unto any truth in particular : But that whereon we must rest, and whereon our faith must lean, is, " The testimony of God to it, evidencing itself, " or as it gives evidence of itself imto the mind." The knot of the question then lies heie, " What is that evi- " dence of God's speaking or giving testimony to truths " supernaturally revealed, whereby the mind is satisfied " that God is the revealer ? Or when God speaks, or in- " timates any truth to us, how, or in Avhat way doth he " evidence to us, that he is the revealer, what ground is " it whereon we are satisfied as to this precise point ?" Now whereas there are persons of three sorts, wiio may be called to assent to divine revelations, the ques- tion proposed may be considered Avith respect to each of them. 1. The question may be moved concerning those per- sons to whom the scripture revelations were originally made ; and as to them it may be inquired. When God did reveal his mind imto the prophets, what was that evi- dencCj what were those Tf xa*^/"** or certain signs, whereby they were infallibly assured, that the propositions they found impressed upon their minds, w ere from God ? 2. As to the persons to whom they did immediately reveal these truths, it may be questioned, W^hat evi- dences they had to move them to assent, and give faith to those truths which were proposed to them as divine revelations ? On what ground did they rest satisfied, that really they were so ? 3. Whereas we, who now live, neither had these reve- lations made to us originally, nor heard them from the persons to whom they were so given ; but being com- prised and put together in the Bible, they are offered to us as a divine revelation, and we are in duty, upon pain of God's displeasure in case of refusal, called and requued to believe, and assent to whatever is therein revealed, as the word of God and not of man ; hereon it may be moved, What is that evidence which this book gives of itself, that it is of God, whereon our minds may rest assured that really it is so ? As to this question, in so far as it concerns the first soil of persons mentioned, we shall not dip much into THE REASON OF TRUE FAITH. 347 it ; all I shall say is this, ifi the words of the judicious and learned Dr. Owen, " In the inspirations of the Ho- " ly Spirit, and his actings on the minds of holy men of *' old, he gave them infallible assurance that it was him- " self alone by whom they were acted, Jer. xiii, 28. If " any shall ask by what rexfcyiptct. or infallible tokens they " might know assuredly the inspirations of the Holy " Spirit, and be satisfied with such a persuasion as was " not liable to mistake, tliat tiiey were not unposed " upon ? I must say plainly. That I cannot tell ; for " these things whereojf we have no experience."* There is one thing dropt as to this matter by the in- genious Mr. Locke, that deseives some animadversion. Though he delivers nothing positively about those evi- dences which the prophets had, yet negatively he tells us, that the prophets' assurance did not at lest solely arise from the revelations themselves, or the operation of the Spirit impressing them upon their minds, which he calls the internal light of assurance : But that beside this, to satisfy them fully that those impressions were from God, external signs were requisite ;t and this he en- deavors to prove from their desuing coiifirmatory signs, as Abraliam and others did ; and from God's giving such signs undesired. To this purpose his appearing to Moses in the bush, is by our author taken notice of. As to the opinion itself, I look on it as highly injurious to the ho- nor of divine revelation, and I take the ground whereon it is founded to be weak and inconclusive : For, 1 . neither Mr. Locke, nor any for him, shall ever be able to prove, that these divinely inspued persons always required orgot such coiifirmatory signs extrinsical to the revelation or in- spiration itself; yea, it is manifest, that for most part they neither sought them nor got them. 2. When they did seek or get them, Mr. Locke cannot prove, that ei- ther God or they found them necessary for the present assiuahce of the person's own minds ; as if that internal light of assurance, to use Mr. Locke's words, had not of * Dr. Owen on the Spirit, Book 2. Chap. 1. §. 10. pa^. 104. t Humw Uuderstandine, Book 4. Chap. 12. f. 15. page 593. Edition 5th^ 1706. 348 AN ESSAY CONCERNING itself, while it abode, been sufficient to satisfy the mind fully, that it was God who was dealing with it, or reveal- ing himself to it. It is plain, that other reasons of their dt siring such signs may be assigned. When the matters revealed were things at a distance, which requued some extraordinary out-goings of God's power to eflectuate them, in that case tliey desired, and God condescended to gi ant to them some extraordinary signs, not to assure them that God was speaking unto them, but to strength- en their convictions of the sufficiency of God's power, for enabling to do what he required of them, if it was difficult, or accomplishing what he promised to them in defiance of the greatest opposition. Sometimes divine revelations were promises of things at a distance, that were not to be ac- tually accomplisl:ed till after a long tract of time, and over many inconvenient obstructions; in this case they were obliged to believe these promises, and wait in the faith of them, even when that light, that first assured them, was gone, and such evidences or signs might be of use to them to adhere unto the assent fonnerly given upon that supernatural evidence, that at first accompa- nied the revelation. Such siffns then mioht be of use to strengthen the remembrance of tliat first evidence, which they had when the revelations were first imparted to them. These and other reasons of a like nature might sufficiently account for then- desuing these signs, and God's giving them : But as has been said, we intend not a determination or full decision of this question. We shall only consider the question with respect un- to the two last soil of persons. And as to those who heard, or had divine revelations immediately from in- spired persons, our rational divines seem positive, that the evidence whereon they assented to what they deli- vered as the mind of God, consisted in, or did result from the mu'acles they wrought, and other external signs, or proofs, which they gave of theii' mission froin God. Monsieur L'Clerk, in his Emendations and Additions to Hammond on the New Testament, gives us this gloss on 1 Cor. ii, 5. " Paul, says he, would have the Corinthians " believe liim, not as a philosopher proposing probabili- ** ties to them, but as the messenger of God, who had THE REASON OF TRUE FAITH. 349 " received commandment from him, to deliver to thera ** tliose tiutlis which he preached, and, that he thus re- ** ceived them, he did shew by the miracles he thus " vvrf Ui;iit." And a little after he adds, " He whose faith " leans upon miracles wrought by God's power, his " fajth is grounded upon the divine power, the cause of " t[.ese divine miiacles." As to this opinion itself, I shall express myself more particularly just now : But as to Monsieur L'Clerc's inference from this text, he had no manner of ground for it. Let us but look into the veise before, and there we find the apostle telling the Corinthians, tiiat in his preaching he avoided tlie en- iicing words of mail's wisdom, and delivered his message in the demonstration of the Spirit, and of power. Upon the back of this 5th verse, he tells them, his design in doing so was, that their faith might not stand in the wis- dom of men, but in the power of God, that is, on the pow- erful demonstration of the Spirit of God, mentioned in the foregoing verse. How Monsieur L'Clerc came to dream of miracles, and fetch them in here, while the scope and every circumstance of the text stood in the way of this exposition, I cannot divine; for nothing is more foreign and remote from the sense of this place. Il tlie author had followed tlie old approved interpreter of scripture, I mean the scripture itself, and had looked into tiie foregoing verse and context, he had given us a more genuine account : But philosophy now set up for an interpretei', I had almost said a perverter, did certainly lead him into this violent and ridiculous gloss. But to come to the matter itself. Miracles can be no other the groimd of any assent, than as they afford ground for, or may be made use of as the medium of an argument, whereby tlie divine mis- sion of the worker is concluded and proven. This then must be the opinion of these gentlemen. That they who heard the apostles or prophets, could not be satisfied in their mmds, that what they said was divinely revealed, until they were convinced of it by proofs drawn from miracles or signs, wrought by the preacher ; and that this is not merely my conjecture, is evident from the ac- counts we have of theii' opinions and hypothesis, where- 350 AN ESSAY CONCERNING of this is reckoned as a principal one, that the mind of man being rational, cannot be moved but by a rational impression, that is, by the force of effectual reasons.* And to the same purpose we shall find Mr. Locke ex- pressing himself by and by. Upon this hypothesis, it is evident, 1. That if a Hea- then came into a Christian assembly, and heard Paul preaching, or even Jesus Christ himself, if he had never seen them work any sign or miracle, he would not be obliged to believe their doctrine. 2. If the apostles preached to those among Avhom they wrought no mira- cles, gave no such outward signs, such persons could not be obliged to believe them, the evidence whereon such a belief is founded being denied. 3. They who heard them, and saw the miracles, could not be obliged to assent unto their doctrine, until by reasoning they would have time to satisfy themselves, how far natural causes might go towards the production of such effects, and how far these things, admitting them to be superna- tural, could go toward the proof of this — that what they delivered was from God. 4. If there was any among tliem so dull, as not to be capable to judge of these nice points, I do not see how, upon these principles, they could be obliged to believe. These and the like are not strained consequences ; for it is undeniable, that our ob- ligation to believe arises from the proposal of due ob- jective evidence ; if this is wanting no man can be obliged to believe. As to us who neither conversed with the inspued per- sons, to whom such revelations were originally given, nor saw the miracles they ^vrought, we are told by those Rationalists, That we have historical proof, that there were such persons, that they wrote these revelations which we now have, and that they WTOUght such mira- cles in confirmation of their mission and doctrine ; and upon the evidence of these proofs we must rest, they will allow us no other bottom for our faith. Hence Mon- sieur Le' Clerc tells us, " That whatever faith is this " day in the world among Christians, depends upon the " testimony of men." * Spanhem. Elench. Controversiarum, pag-. 320. Edition 1694. THE REASON OF TRUE FAITH. 351 Among many who have embraced this opinion, Mr. Locke in his Essay on Human Understandings has de- clared liimself to this purpose, and upon several accounts he deserves to be taken special notice of : I shall there- fore represent faithfully and shortly his opinion, and the grounds whereon it is founded, and make such animad- versions upon them, as may be necessary for clearing our way. His opinion you may take in the ensuing pro- positions. 1. When he is speaking of the different grounds of assent, and degrees thereof, he says, " Besides those we " have hitherto mentioned, there is one sort of proposi- " tions that challenge the highest degrees of our assent " upon bare testimony, whether the thing proposed " agree or disagree with common experience and the " ordinary course of things, or not. The reason wliere- " of is, because the testimony is of such an one, as can- " not deceive or be deceived, and that is of God him- " self. This carries with it assurance beyond doubt, evi- " dence beyond exception. This is called by a peculiar " name, revelation, and our assent to it, faith : Which as " absolutely determines our minds, and as perfectly ex- " eludes all wavering as our knowledge itself."^ 2. But notwithstanding, he tells us in the very same paragraph, " That our assurance of truths upon this tes- timony," or to give his own words, " Our assent can " be rationally no higher than the evidence of its being " a revelation, and that this is the meaning of the ex- " pressions it is delivered in." That is, as he himself explains it, "If the reasons proving it to be a revelation " are but probable, our assiu'ance amounts but unto a " probable conjecture." He distinguishes betwixt traditional and original re- velation. By the last of these, says he, " I mean that first " impression which is made immediately by God on the " mind of any man, to which we cannot set any bounds ; " and by the other, those impressions delivered over to " others in words, and the ordinary ways of conveying " our conceptions one to another."! And afterwards * Human Understand. Book 4. Cap. IS. §. 14. pag. 564, SQ3. y Ibid. §. 3. patj. 582. 352 AN ESSAY CONCERNING speaking of immediate or original revelation^ be tells us, " That no evidence of our faculties by whicli we re- " ceive such revelations, can exceed, if equal, tiie cer- " tainty of our intuitive knowledge."* And in the pre- ceding paragraph, speaking of traditional revelatioUf he tells us, " That whatsoever truth we come to the clear " discovery of, from the knowledge and contemplation of " our own ideas, will always be more certain to us, than " those, which are conveyed by traditional revelation."t 4. He tells us, " That true light in the mind can be " no other but the evidence of tlie truth of any propo- " sition," and hereon he proceeds to tell us, "That there " can be no other evidence or light in the mind, about " propositions that are not self-evident, save what arises " from the clearness and validity of those proofs upon " which it is received : And he adds, " That to talk of *' any other liglit is to put ourselves in the dark, or in ** the power of the prince of darkness."J 5. In the next paragraph he tells us plainly, That there is no way of knowing any revelation to be from God, but by " rational proofs : or some marks in which reason cannot be mistaken.") 6. In this next paragraph he tells what before we have taken notice of, Tiiat the internal light of assurance which the prophets had, was not sufficient to testify, that the truths impressed on their minds were from God, without other signs.H Thus far of Mr. Locke's opinion, which in sum amounts to this, " That even the original revelations, had not in them intrinsic evidence, sufficient to assure them on whom such uupressions were made, that they were from God ; that other signs were necessary to sa- tisfy them ; and that others who received such revela- tions at second hand, not from God immediately, but from inspired persons, have no other evidence to ground their assent on, besides that which results from argu- ments drawn from those signs, whereby they did con- firm their mission ; and that we have no evidence who * Human Understand. Book 4. Cap. IS. §• 5. paj?. 583. t Ibid. Book 4. Cap. 18. §. 4. pag". 582. 4 Ibid. Book 4. Cap. 19. §. 13. § Ibid. §. 14. II Ibid. §. 15. rut REASON OF TRUE FAITH. 353. saw not these signs, besides that of the historical proofs, whereby it is made out, tltat the persons who v/rote ttie traditional revelations we have, wrought such signs in confirmation of their mission from God." It is worth our wliile to dwell a little here, and more narrowly consider Mr. Locke's thoughts, and the grounds of his opinion .; I sliall tlierefore otfer a few observa- tions on this doctrine. I. Mr. Locke in his first proposition, speaks very ho- norably of divine faith. As to the assent or act of faiths he says, " That it is an assent of the higiiest degree ; as- •* surance without doubt." As to the ground of it, he says, " That it is such as challenges an assent of the " highest degree ;" that it is " evidence beyond e^fcep- " tion." Tiiese are goodly words. He has spoken well in all that he has said I Avisli that his meaning and leart may be found as good as his words. All is not gold that glitters. Let us then look a little more narrowly into his meaning. To find it out, we shall suppose that God, as no doubt he did, does reveal immediately to Paul this proposition, Jesus is the Son of God. Here is a revelation : By Paul it is assented to. Well here is faith. Now in his be- lieving this proposHion, he ma;y be said to assent to three things — That what God says is true — Ttiat Jesus is the Son of God — and, Tliat God says this to Paul.- Now, I ask Mr. Locke, or any of om' rationalists that are of liis mind. To which of tliese ttiree is it that Paul assents, with an assent " of the highest degree," and of which he has " evidence beyond exception?" 1. Could Mr. Locke only mean, that we have the highest assurance of this general verity, That God^s tes- timony is infallibly true ? No, sure. For the assent to tliis truth is not an act of faith, but of intuitive know-^ ledge. The truth itself is not a truth here divinely re- vealed, but of natural evidence. This is not so much in this instance expressly assented, as supposed known. 2. Doth Mr. Locke mean, tiiat we assent to this pro- position, That Jesus is the son of God ! Had Paul " as- surance be^ ond doubt" and " evidence beyond excep- 45 354 AN ESSAY CONCERNING lion," of this ? But surely Mr. Locke knew that Pauf^ on this supposition, does not at all assent to the propo- sition, Jesus is the Son of God ahsolidely, but as it is re- vealed. Well then, all the evidence that Paul has to ground his assent upon, is the evidence of this, TlmtGod says so to him. If then the evidence of God's saying so to him is not such as " challenges an assent of the high- est degree," Paul cannot have the " highest degree of assurance" of that proposition, the faith whereof leans entirely upon his assurance of this, That God has reveal- ed it. For as Mr. Locke says very truly in that same paragraph, " Our assurance of any particular truth, that " is, the matter revealed, can never rise higher in degree " than our assurance of this, that it is revealed." If then Paul has not " evidence beyond exception," that God re- veals the proposition we speak of to him, he can never have such assurance of the truth of the proposition ma- terially considered. Wherefore, 3. Did Mr. Locke think in this case, that Paul would have evidence beyond exception, challenging the high- est degree of assent, and thereon assurance beyond doubt, or of the highest degree, of this, that God did in very deed say to Paul, That Jesus is the So7i of God; or of this truth. That Jesus is the Son of God as revealed. It is the assent to this proposition that in proper speaking is faith. The assent to the general proposition above- mentioned, is not an act of faith at all. Nor is tlie as- sent to the proposition revealed, materially consideied, an act of faith. Faith in this case, is only the assent to that proposition as revealed^ or to the revelation of it. If, then, Paul has not the highest evidence for, and thereon (he highest assurance of this. That God says this to him, iiis faith can never be said to be the highest degree of assurance or assent. Thisthen Mr. Locke must mean, or he means nothing. But yet I suppose he scarce thought 60 : For, L He tells us afterwards, that we can have no evidence for receiving any truth revealed, that can ex- ceed, if equal, the evidence we have for our intuitive knowledge. If we have not then evidence, equal at least to that which we have for our intuitive knowledge, for vur belief of God's being the revealer, or that he speaks THE REASON OF TRUE FAITH. 355 to us, we cannot liave the highest degree of assurance. 2. He afterwards tells us, that we have no evidence for this, that this or that truth is revealed to us by God, but that which results from reason or arguments, drawn from marks, whereby we prove that God is the speaker ; but Mr. Locke owns, that the evidence of all our reasonings, is still short of that which we have for our intuitive knowledge. Now methinks this quite overthrows Mr. Locke's goodly concession. With what consistency with truth or himself, Mr. Locke wrote at this rate, is left to others to judge. n. Whatever there is in this concession yielded in fa- vor of faith, Mr. Locke afterwards takes care that we who now live shall not be the better for it : For after- wards he tells us plainly, " That whatsoever truth we " come to the clear discovery of, from the knoAvledge " and contemplation of our ideas, will alwaysbe more cer- " tain to us, than those which are conveyed by tradi- " tional revelation." We have no revelation at this day, but that which Mr. Locke calls traditional. And here it is plain, that Mr. Locke thinks that our certainty of any truth we have from this, is inferior in degree to any sort of natural knowledge, whether intuitive, rational or sensible. in. It is manifest, that the foundation of all is, what Mr. Locke teaches in the fourth position above mention- ed ; wherein he tells us, " That to talk of any other light " in the mind, beside that of self-evidence, reason, and " sense, is to put ourselves in the dark." I have added this last, " the light of sense," because Mr. Locke, though he mentions it not here, yet elsewhere he admits it. That we may understand Mr. Locke's assertion ex- actly, it must be observed, that writers, when they treat of tliis subject, usually take notice of a tw^o-fold light. There is subjective lights by which is meant either our ability to perceive, discern, know and judge of objects, or our actual knowledge, assent, &c. Agam there is ob- jective light, by which they mean that evidence whence our knowledge results, whereon it is founded, and w hich detennines the mind to assent or dissent. Now it is of this last that Mr. l*ocke is treating in his chapter of Eiu 356 AN ESSAY CONCERNING. thusiasm, from whence this proposition is taken. And his opinion is this. That there is a tlireefold objective light, which is a real and just ground for the mind to as- sent on. There h,Jirst, self-evidence^ which is the ground of our intuitive knowledge, resulting from the obvious agreement or disagreement of our ideas, appearing up- on first view or infuition, wlien they are compared. 6e- condly, There is rational light, or the evidence resulting from arguments, wherein the agreement or disagree- ment of our ideas is cleared by assuming intermediate ideas, by the help of which our mind is cleared, as to what judgment it is to pass. Thirdli/y There is the light pf sense, or the evidence resulting from impressions made on our minds by the intervention and means of our organs of sense. But besides these, he admits of no other objective light or evidence, that may be a just ground of assent ; and adds, " Tisat to talk of any other, is to put our- " selves in the dark ; yea, in the power of the prince of " of darkness, and tarn to enthus a ts." This grape must be pressed, tiiat we may taste its juice, hoAv it relishes. In the consideration of this doc- trine delivered by Mr. Locke, we shall not at present inquire whether it really does not preclude all place for faith, properly so called. This in the issue will be fur- ther cleared. But whatever there is as to this, if Mr. Locke's doc- trine hold, certain it is, that either faith, if there is such a thing, must be founded on one of those three grounds of assent, or sorts of objective light, or it is altogether irra- tional. For an assent not founded on, and to which we are not determined by real objective evidence, is brut- ish, irrational, and really enthusiastic, as being no reason or ground: And besides these three soils of grounds, Mr. Locke admits of none. Faith, therefore, must be founded either on one or the other of them, or it must want all reason for it. Further, it is to be observed. That Mr. Locke's taking eelf-evidence for tljat which is immediately perceptible vvithoiit the intervention of any intermediate ideas, by the natural power of our intelleclural faculties, not as- THE REASON OF TRITE FAITH. 357 sisted, renewed, elevated and influenced by any super- natural influence ; and taking sensible evidence for that wljicli is conveyed by the intervention of bodily organs, from corporeal substances, cannot be thought to make either of these the ground of faith to the testimony of God. And therefore it must have no reason save that rational evidence, which makes the middle sort of objec- tive light. But I need not spend time in proving this, since it is no more than what is taught us in the fifth proposition abovementioned. This opinion tims far explained is indeed the sum, and contains the force of what is pleaded, or, for ought I know, can be pleaded for the judgment of our Rational- ists. We shall therefore weigh the matter more serious- ly, and proceed by some plain steps in the ensuing pro- positions. 1. "If good and solid reasons can be produced for " proof of anotlier sort of objective light or evidence, " besides those three mentioned by Mr. Locke, it must ** be admitted, though we should not be able to give a " satisfying account of its nature, and other concern- " ments." (1.) This I believe was never denied in the general as to other things, by any person of judgment, adverting to, and understanding what is said, and w hy it then should be refused in this case, I can see no ground. (2.) If any has ever in general denied this in words, I am sure every man in fact admits it. Who is he that re^ ceives not many truths, that admits not the being of ma- ny things, upon good proof, from theii' causes, efliects, in- separable adjuncts, <&c. of the nature of which he can give no satisfymg account? We all own the mutual in- fluence of our souls and bodies upon one another, upon the proofs we have from the efiects : But whoever has understood the manner, how the soul operates on the bo- dy, or the body upon it ? Instances of this sort are in- numerable. (3.) Sufficient proofs must always deteriTiine our as- sent ; and if there are such in this case, it is unreasonable to refuse it. 358 AN ESSAY CONCERNING (4.) If we have sufficient reasons to convince us, that there is a fourth sort of objective light distinct from those three admitted by Mr. Locke, and only deny it because we understand not, or cannot give a clear account of its nature, I cannot tell, but on this same ground we shall re- ject, and be obliged to refuse these three sorts admitted by him, for the very same reason. Mr. Locke perhaps has done as much as any man to explain them : but were he alive, I believe he would be as ready to own as any, that he has been far from satisfying himself, or offering what may fully clear others as to the nature of these things. Wherein evidence consists ? What is it ? AVhat is self-evidence, or that evidence which is the ground of our sensible or rational knowledge ? How they operate and influence the assent ? All his accounts are only de- scriptions taken from causes, effects are the like. But what objective light or evidence is, wherein it really con- sists, (and the like may be said of the rest) is as much a mystery as it was before, when he tells us, that self-evi- dence (ex. gr.) is that which is immediately perceived without the intervention of intermediate ideas. Here I learn, that it is not rational evidence, that requires such intermediate ideas. But this is all I can learn, unless it be, that it is perceptible by the mind, that is, it is evi- dence. But what evidence is, I am yet to learn. I think this proposition is plain. 2. " A fourth sort of objective evidence, different from " those three assigned by Mr. Locke, is not impossible." (1.) If any say it is, it lies upon him to prove it. That Mr. Locke, or millions more, observed no such light in their minds, found themselves determined to assent by no other objective evidence or light, will not prove it im- possible ; yea, will not prove that actually there is no such light ; nay, will not prove, that there is no such light in their own minds. For Mr. Locke, though he observ- ed as accurately the manner of his mind, its actings, as most men, yet might not observe it so, but tliat he possi- bly overlooked somewhat that passed there. And if real- ly Mr. Locke did not assent upon other evidence to some things, though he observed it not, I doubt not but by this time he is sensible it was his loss that it was so. It THE REASON OF €RUE FAITH. 359 cannot be pretended, that it is impossible for want of a sufficient cause, while that God is in being, who is author of the three sorts of lights, that are admitted, and who is the Father of lights. Nor can it be pretended, that the members of this division stand contradictorily opposed to one another, as it is in this, Every being is dependent or independent. (2.) If any will say yet. It is impossible there should be a fourth or a fifth sort of light or objective evidence, I shall desire him only to stay a while, and consider the light of sense. It is nothing else save "that evidence " that results from impressions made on our minds by " means of our organs of sense." Well, hereon I shall ask two questions. Firsty Is it not possible for him who made those con- veyances or organs of sens«| to frame more such, quite different from tliose we already have, and by means of them impai-t to us other perceptions, and determine as to assent on the evidence of the impressions conveyed to our minds by these other senses ? If it is possible, as I see not how rationally it can be questioned, here is at least a fourth sort of objective light detennining our minds to assent, admitted 3,s possible. Secondly^ Here I would inquire. Whether may not He, who, by these bodily organs we already have, im- presses ideas upon our minds, and determines our assent to their agreement or disagreement, immediately without the intervention of such organs^ makes impressions on our minds, whereby our assent or judgment may rationally be swayed ? To deny tliis will look very odd and irra- tional to sober men, that have due thoughts of God. If it is admitted, we have here at least the possibility of an- other ground of assent, or objective light, acknowledged, different from those condescended on by Mr. Locke. (3.) We that have the benefit of sight, have in our minds a sort of objective evidence or light, diffierent from those wliich are born blind have. And why should it be then thought impossible that others may have in theii' minds an evidence that we have no experience of, and that it may ])e equally real, convincing, or more so tlian any Ihat we have. 360 AN ESSAY CONCERNING (4.) Mr. Locke grants, That there are extraordinary ways whereby tlie knowledge of truth may be imparted to men ; that God sometimes illuminates by his Spirit the minds of men, with the knowledge of truths; that there is no bounds to be set to such divine impressions. Now if all this is so, why may there not be evidence of a different sort, resulting from such extraordinary impres- sions, illuminations, &c. allowed to be also possible ? (5.) Either God can reveal his mind so to man, as to give him the highest evidence or objective light tliat he speaks to him, who gets that revelation, or he cannot. If he can, then there is possible an objective evidt nee, and that of the highest sort, diiferent from those three men- tioned by Mr. Locke : for that it must be different is evident, because Mr. Locke in this case will allow no place for self-evidence, or tliat evidence we have in our intuitive knowledge, v^bich he determines to be the highest degi'ee of these three sorts he has admitted and owned. Speaking of immediate revelation, he savs, " No evidence of our faculties, by which we receive " such revelations, can exceed, if equal, the certainty of ** our intuitive knowledge, as we heard above." Since then this evidence of the highest degree, is different from that which we have in our intuitive knowledge, (if it is at all) it must be of a different sort from any of those three : For by concession, it is not self-evidence ; and rational or sensible it is not, because these sorts of evi- dence are of a degree inferior to intuitive evidence ; — If then it is evidence of the highest degree, since Mr. Locke will not admit it to be self-evidence, it must be none of the three : and so we have a fourth sort admitted possible. But if God cannot reveal his mind, so as to give the greatest objective evidence that he speaks, or is the revealer, then I say, it is plain, and follows unavoida- bly, that God's testunony can never have from man ti,e highest degree of assent, which Mr. Locke above express- ly acknowledged to be its due. It is in vain to say flat God's testimony is infallible : for our assent to any truth upon God's testimony, as Mr. Locke truly says, can ne- ver rise higher, than tfje assurance we have of this, that really we have God's testimonyj and take its meaning. THE REASON OF TRUE FAITH. 361 If then God cannot give us the highest evidence or ob- jective light as to this, no truth he offers can have from us the highest degree of assent. To me this looks like blasphemy, to imagine, that God has made a rational creature, to whom he cannot so impart his mind as to give it such evidence as is absolutely necessary to lay a ground for entertaining his testimony with that respect, which is its unquestionable due. That his testimony is in itself infallible, will never make our assent of the highest degree, unless tlie evidence of his giving testi- mony is of the highest degree. 3. " We assert, That de facto there really is a sort of " objective evidence or light, different from that con- " descended on by Mr. Locke." (l.) The prophets to whom immediate revelations were made, had objective evidence, or light sufficient to ground the liighest assurance, that the truths impressed on their minds were from God. It is impious to deny it. But this Mr. Locke will not allow to be such evi- dence as we have in our intuitive knowledge ; and all must confess, that it did not result from their outAvard senses ; and that it was not grounded on reasonings from evidences, marks or signs, extrinsical to the revelations themselves, seems undeniable, or even from reasoning, and making inferences from w hat was intrinsical in the revelation. For, L We find not, that this persuasion came to them by such argumentation or reasoning. We can see no ground from any accounts we have in scrip- ture to think, that they took this way to assure their ow^n minds. Yea, 2. The scripture accounts of the way of their being convinced, seem all to impod, that as God impressed the truths on their minds, so that immediate- ly by that very impression, he fixed an indelible and firm conviction of his being the revealer. Again, 3. We see, that the evidence was so convincing as to bear down in them the force of the strongest reasonings and the clear- est arguments that stood against it, as we see evidently in the case of Abraham ; he is commanded to offer his son Isaac ; if this command had not been impressed on his mind Avith an evidence, that God was the revealer, beyond what any reasoning upon signs and marks, and 46 302 AN E88AY CONCERNING I knoAv not what, could pretend to, the strong plain ar- gmnents tuat lay against it, strengthened by a combina- tion of the strongest natural afiections, must have car- ried it. 4. If Abraham was convinced by such reason- ings, that God revealed this, that this command was from God, is it not strange that he makes no mention of them, when it Avas so obvious, that it was liable to be question- ed whetlier God could give such a command ? But the truth of it is, it is obvious to any one that thinks, that notiiing coidd prevail in this case, but the uncontrolable and uresistible evidence resulting from the very impres- sion, whereby the command was revealed. But we wave any further consideration of this, which noAv w^e have no experience of. (2.) Mr. Locke will admit, that the primitive Chris- tians, who embraced the gospel, did it upon sufficient objective evidence. He is not a Christian who denies it. But he will not admit intuitive evidence in this case. And I shall, I hope, afterwards make it appear, that it was not on the evidence of such reasonings, as Mr. Locke talks of, that they embraced it. (3.) The scriptures demand our assent, and offer no ervidence but this of God's authority. And argu- ments are not insisted on to prove, that it is God that speaks; God calls us not to assent without objective evidence, and yet waves the use of such arguments as Mr. Locke would have to be the foundation of our faith. Tliere must be therefore some objective light of a dif- ferent sort supposed, that must be the ground of our as- sent. And that there really is so, the scriptures teach, aS we shall see afterwards, Avhen this proposition must be proven, and explained more fully. (4.) Abstracting from w hat has been said, we have as good groimd as can be desired, and as the nature of the thing admits, for believing there is really a light distinct from that mentioned by Mr. Locke. As to the per- sons who have it, this light evidences itself in the same way as the other sorts of intellectual light do. They are conscious of it, and find it has the same effect, deter- mining the mind to assent, assuring it, and giving it rest in the full conviction of truth. As to others who w^ant THE REASON OF TRUE FAITH. 3G3 it, they have such evidence as a blind man has, that there is such a thing as visible evidence. They have the con- curring sufliage of persons sober, judicious and rational, who have given evidence of the greatest cautiousness in guarding against delusion, enthusiasm, and groundless imaginations. Besides, the effects peculiarly flowing from such a faith as leans on this foundation, gives evi- dence to it. But I cannot stay to prove this further at present. 4. " Though perhaps an account every way satisfying ^' cannot be given of the nature of this light, nor can " we so clearly see what it is, and wiierein it consists, as " to make those who are unacquainted Avith it, under- " stand it, or have as exact a notion of it as they have, " whose experience satisfies them as to its reality : Yet " such an account may be given of it, as may secure it. " against the imputation of unreasonableness, and un- " intelligibility." To this purpose, I shall only observe the few things ensuing. (1.) Tliat light or objective evidence, w'hereon we are obliged to believe, and all that are subjectively enlight- ened to believe the scriptures, and ground their assent, is such, that a more intelligible account by far may be given of it to those, who have no experience of it, than can be given of the objective evidence of visible objects to persons who have no experience of sight. To clear this, (2.) It is to be observed, that in the writings of men, especially of some, who have any peculiarity of genius, and excel in any kind, we find such characters, marks and peculiar evidences of them, not only in the matter, but in ttie manner of expression, and way of delivering their thoughts: there is such a spirit, and somewhat so peculiar to themselves to be observed, tliat such as have any notion of their writings, cannot thereon avoid a con- viction, that this or that book, though it bears not the author's name, or those otlier marks, whereon we depend as to our opinion of the authors of books, of whom wo, have no particular acquaintance, is yet written by such an author, the vestiges of w hose peculiar spirit and ge- nius run through, and are discernible in the strain of the 364 AN ESSAY CONCERNING l)ook. There are few men, who are acquainted with books, and read them with attention and judgment, who have not the experience of this. And hence we are fre- quently referred to this, as what may satisfy us, that books tliat bear such authors' names are genuine and truly theirs.'-;^ And it is found more convincing than the attestation of no incredible witnesses in many cases. Yet it must be confessed, that persons of the best judg- ment, and most capable to express their thoughts^ will find it difficult, if not impossible to express intelligibly w herein this objective evidence consists : But that real- ly it is there, that there is such a thing, is impossible for them to question. (3.) If poor men, who differ infinitely less from one another, than the most exalted created being can be sup- posed to do from God, do impart to the product of their own thoughts, and leave on their writings such peculiar and discernible characters of their oivn genius, and spirit, as, at first view, upon the least serious attention, con- vinces the reader, that they are the authors and enables him to distinguish theii* writings from others, is it not reasonable to suppose, that a book written by God, must cany on it a peculiar and distinguishing impress of its author ; and that by so much the more certainly dis- cernible, by any that has right notions of him, as the difference betwixt him and the most exalted human ge- nius is infinitely greater, than that betwixt the most con- temptible pamphlet writer and the most elevated scho- lar? Nay, is it not impossible rationally to imagine the contrary ? Can we think that he, who in all his works, even in the meanest insect, has left such objective evi- dence, and such impressions of himself, whereby he is certainly known to be the author, has not left impres- sions, more remarkable and distinguishing, on his wordy which he has magnified above all his name, that is, all the means whereby he designs to make himself known, and which he designed to be the principal means of imparting * " Though 5'ou had not named the autlior, &c. I couM 1 a^ e linoMn and " avouched Jiim. Thee is a face of a style, by which m e scholars know one ^' anoU'c", no lesi^ than our persons by a vi-ible countenance." Eiskoj* HalVf^ Pre' ace to Dr. Tjvist's doubting Cons, resolved, pag. 2. THE REASON OF TRUE FAITH. 365 the knowledge of himself to men, and that for the high- est purposes — thek salvation and his own glory. (4.) This impress, those characters, prints and vestiges of the infinite perfections of the Deity, that imavoida- bly must be allowed to be stamped on, and shine, not merely, or only, or principally, in the matter, but in that as spoken or written, and in the writings or words, in tlieir stile, the spirit runnhig through them, the scope, tendency, &c. This eeeTrpeTraa or God-be- coming hnpress of majesty, sovereignty, omniscience, independence, holiness, justice, goodness, wisdom and power, is not only a sufficient and real, but in very deed, the greatest objective light and evidence imaginable. And where one has an understanding given to know him that is truey and is made thereby to entertain any suita- ble notions of the Deity, upon intuition of this objec- tive evidence, without waiting to reason on the matter, his assent will be carried, and unavoidably determined to rest on it as the highest ground of assurance. And this assent founded on this impress of the Deity, in his own word, is indeed an assent of the highest degree. And thus far faith resembles our intuitive knowledge, with this difference, not as to the manner of the mind's acting but as to the ability whence it acts ; that in our intuitive knowledge, as Mr. Locke, and those of his opinion, restricts it, the evidence or objective light is such as not only is immediately without reasoning dis- cerned, but such as lies open to, and is discernible by our vmderstandings, without any subjective light, any work of the Spirit of God, either repairing our disabled faculties, or elevating and guiding them to the due ob- servation, or fixing their attention, or freeing their minds of the power and present influence of aversion of will, disorder of affections, and prejudices that obstruct the discerning power. Whereas this is really necessary in this case ; and thougli the objective evidence is great, and still tlie same, yet according to the greater or lesser degree of this assistance, our assent must be stronger or weaker, more fixed or wavering. (5.) When this objective evidence is actually obser- vant to, and under the view of the mind thus enabledr 366 AN ESSAV CONCERNING disposed and assisted, there doth arise from it, and there is made by it, an impression on the whole soul corres- ponding thereto. The beaming of God's sovereign au- thority awes conscience. The piercing evidence of his omniscience increases that regard, the view of his good- ness, mercy, love and grace, operates on the will, and leaves a relisli on the affections, and this truly resem- bles sensible evidence, though it is of spiritual things, and of a spiritual nature ; nor is it, as it is evidence, in- ferior to, but upon many accounts preferable to that which results from the impression made by sensible ob- jects. And this, as was observed of the former, is also greater or less, according, and in proportion , unto the view we have of that objective light abovementioned. This self-evidencing power is a resultancy from, and in degree keeps pace with that self-evidencing light. (6.) The effects wrought on the soul are such, many of them, as not only are most discernible in the time, but likewise do remain on the soul, some of them ever after, many of them for a long tract of time, and in their nature are such as evidently tend to the perfecting of our faculties, are suitable to them, and for theu- improve- ment, even according to what unprejudiced and sober reason determines, as to that wherein the defects of our faculties, and their perfection consists. And the reali- ty of those effects, w^hereof the mind is inwardly con- scious, appears to the conviction of beholders, in their influence upon the person's deportment before the world. And, (7.) Hence it is, that though our conviction neither needs, nor is founded on reasonings ; yet from those effects ground is given, and matter offered for a rational and argumentative confirmation of our assent, and the grounds thereof, and- the validity of it for our own con- firmation, when that evidence which first gave ground for our faith, and wherein it rests, is not actually under view, a'- also for tlic conviction of others. (8.) This evidence is such as indeed challenges, and is a sufiicient bottom for an assent of the highest degree. And indeed the saints of God, and that even of the mean- est condition, and who have been under the most mani- THE REASON OF TRUE FAITH. 367 fest disadvantages, both as to capacity and education, with the like occasions of improvement, upon this bot- tom have reached faith, comprising assurance without doubt, even that full assurance of faithy yea the riches of the full assurance of understanding, as lias been evident by the effects in death and life, of which Ave have nota- ble instances not a few in Heb. xi, throughout, both in adversity and prosperity, life and death. 5. " I observe, That this light or objective evidence " whereon faith is bottomed, has no affinity with, but is " at the farthest remove from enthusiastic impulses, or " hnaginations." (1.) This is not a persuasion without reason. Here is the strongest reason, and the assent hereon given leans upon the most pregnant evidence. (2.) It carries no contradiction to our faculties, but influences them, each in a way suitable to its nature and condition. (3.) Yea more, none of our faculties in their due use do contradict, or at least disprove it. Whereas enthu- siastic impressions are irrational. (4.) This is not a persuasion, nor a ground for it with- out, or contrary to the word, but it is the evidence of the word itself, that by it we are directed to attend to, and improve. (5.) Yea it is what our other faculties in their due use will give a consequential confirmation to, as we have heard. Wherefore, (6.) Mr. Locke shall be allowed to run down enthu- siasm as much as he pleaseth, and " persuasions where- " of no reason can be given, but that we are strongly " persuaded," or not to give credit to those that can say no more for themselves, " but we see or feel," &c. But these things as delivered by Locke, need some cautions. As, 1. A persuasion whereof no reason can be given, is> certainly not faith, but fancy : but a persuasion, where- of he that hath it, through weakness, cannot give an ac- count, may be solid. 2. A persuasion may be solid, of which he that hath it, cannot give another evidence of the same kind as he hath himself It is enough that proof of anotlier sort, and sufficient in its kind, is ofTer- 368 AN ESSAY CONCERNING ed. 3. If one says, he sees and be feels, this may be sa- tisfying to him, thougli he cannot give any distinct ac- count of the evidence he hath. And tiiat he cannot thus accomit for the nature of things that are within him, con- cludes not against the reality and truth of what he has the experience : but his experience is not ground of con- viction to others, unless other proofs are offered. A man of a shallow capacity, destitute of education, might be convicted of enthusiasm by a subtle blind man, to Avhom he cannot for his seeing give an evidence of the same kind, nor open the nature of visible evidence, nor give any other proof that he is not mistaken, but that he sees ; and yet notwithstanding of this he is not mistaken, assents not without reason, and has no ground to call in question what he sees, but may and will securely laugh at all the blind man's quirks, and tell him, he is blind. The case is parallel. We must not by this Atheistical scare-crow be frightened out of our faith and experi- ence. 6. " That many read the scriptures, without discern- " ing any thing of this liglit, is no argument against it.'* For, (1 .) Many want that supernatural ability, that un- derstanding whereby God is known, whereby Christ's sheep know his voice from that of a stranger, and so not be- ing of Gody they cannot hear his words. (2.) Many want, and are utterly destitute of any tol- erable notions of God: It is impossible such should dis- cern what is suitable to him. (3.) Many have perverse notions of God rivetted on their minds, and that both among the learned and un- learned ; and finding the scripture not suited to, but contrary to those false pre-conceived impressions, they look on it as foolishness. (4.) Many Avant that humble frame of sphit, which has tlie promise of divine teaching ; the meek he guides in the way. It is they who are fools in thek own eyes, who get wisdom. (5.) Many are proud and conceited deeply, and no wonder then that they know notliing. THE REASON OF TRUE FAITH. 369 (6.) Many have the vanity of their minds uncured, and so hunt after vain things, and fix not in observation of what is solid, and thereby their foolish hearts are har- dened, and theii* minds darkened and diverted. (7.) Not a few are under the power of prevailing lusts, disordered affections, and out of favor to them they are 80 far from desiring an increase of knowledge, that on the contrary, they like not to retain God in their knowledge. What they already know, is uneasy to them, because con- trary to their lusts, and therefore they would be rid of it. (8.) Many there are that despise the Spu'it of God, reject his operations, seek not after hiin, contemn him : And no wonder such as refuse the guide, lose the way. (9.) Many, for those and other sins, are judicially left of God to the god of this world, who blinds the minds of them that believe not. (10.) Many never attempt to do his will, and so no wonder they come not to a discerning whether the word spoken and written, is of God. And if all these things are considered, we shall be so far from questioning the truth, because many see not the evidence, that this very blindness will be an argument to prove the truth of it^ and a strong evidence of the need of it, and of superna- tural power to believe it. Finally, Persons sober and attentive want not some darker views of this evidence, which may and should draw them on to wait for more. And I take the honorable confessions, in favor of the scriptures, made by adversa- ries, to have proceeded from some fainter views of this sort. Thus I have considered tlie force of what I find plead-* ed by Mr. Locke ; stated the question ; cleared in some measure our opinion as it stands opposed to that of the Rationalists ; assigned an intelligible notion of the rea-' son of faith ; and shewed it to be such as the meanest are capable of, and such as is proposed to all Avho are oblig- ed to believe the scriptures; whereas these historical proofs are above the reach of thousands, and were never heard of by innumerable multitudes, who, on pain of M 370 AN ESSAY CONCERNING damnation, are obliged to receive the scriptures as the word of God. lY. Having in our third observation overthrown the ground of Mr. Locke's opinion, we are now to clear, tliat what Mr. Locke builds on, must of course fall ; particularly what he tells us. Lib. 4. Cap. 18. Par. 6. page 584. " That they who make revelation alone the sole " object of faith, cannot say, that it is a matter of faith, " and not of reason, to believe, that such or such a pro- " position, to be found in such or such a book, is of divine " inspiration ; unless it can be revealed. That that pro- " position, or that all in that book was communicated by " divine inspiration." And he goes on telling us, " That " without such a particular revelation, assuring us of this, " that this proposition is by divine inspiration, it can ne- " ver be matter of faith, but matter of reason, to assent " to it." What Mr. Locke designs by this discourse, I know not ; unless he meant to put us under a necessity to prove every proposition of the scripture to be of divine inspiration, before we believe what it exhibits. And if this is what he intends, he overthrows the Christian reli- gion entirely, at least as to its use and advantage to the generality. But waving what further might be observ- ed, I shall only animadvert a little upon that one asser- tion, " That our belief, that this or that proposition is " from God, is not an act of faith but of reason." As to which I say, 1. If Mr. Locke designed no more but this. That the mentioned assent to the scripture propositions, is an act of, and subjected in our rational, or intellectual faculty, it might well be admitted. Or, 2. If Mr. Locke meant, that this assent is agreeable to the nature of our minds, that is, that it is not really con- trary to the true principles of reason, nor such as pro- ceeds without such grounds as the nature of our under- standings requue for founding an assent, we should ad- mit, that in this sense it is an act of reason, that is, a ra- tional act, as not only being elicit by our understandings, but depending on such a reason or ground, as the nature THE REASON OP TRUE FAITH. 371 of the intellectual power requires, and which must be always consistent with our certain knowledge. But, 3. Neither of these being intended, we cannot go along with Mr. Locke in what he means by this expression. That our belief of scripture propositions, is an act of reason, that is, an assent not built upon divine testimony, but on such other arguings and reasonings, as we can find out for proving that God revealed it. Because we say, and shall afterwards prove, that the scriptures do evidence themselves to be from God, in that way above- expressed, and afterwards to be explained and confirm- ed, which we hope shall be done in such sort, as may ef- fectually repel the force of what Mr. Locke has pleaded in opposition to the scriptures, and shew that there is no reason for ranking all the truths therein delivered amongst those conjectural things that lean only on proba- bilities and reasonings from them, which Mr. Locke evi- dently does, while he sinks traditional revelation as to the point of certainty below our intuitive, rational and tiensible knowledge ; and banishes all faith, properly so called, out of the world, leaving no room for it, and sub- stituting in its place an act of reason, proceeding upon probabilities, that is, on historical proofs, which he reckons only among probabilities ; nor do I blame him for this last, though perhaps some things he has offiered on this head, might be excepted against ; but this is not my business. The question in short amounts to this, " Whereas the " scriptures, wherever they come, oblige all to whom " they are offered, to receive them not as the word of " maw, but, as indeed they are, the rvord of God ; upon " what ground or formal reason is it, that we assent " thus unto them, and receive them as the word of God, " to his glory and our salvation, in compliance with our « dutyr In answer to this important query, I shall offer what, up- on a review of former experience, upon consideration of the scriptures, and upon what others, especially that Judici- ous and profound divine Dr. Owen, in his two treatises on this subject, have written on this head, appears satisfy- ing to me : And this I shall do in the few following Pro- 372 AN ESSAY CONCERNING positimiSy which I sliall, with as much brevity and perspi- cuity as I can, lay down, and shortly confirm with some few arguments. Prop. I. " That faith whereby we assent unto, and " receive the word of God, to his glory and our salva- ^' lion, is faith divine and supernatural." 1 . There are at this day, who teach, That whatever faitli is at present to be found amongst men, is built up- on, and resolved into the testimony of men.* And therefore it will be necessary to insist a little in confirm- ing and explaining of this important truth. 2. To clear this we observe, that the understanding, or that faculty, power or ability of the soul of man, whereby we perceive, and assent unto truths upon their proper evidence, may be distinguished or branched m- to diverse subordinate powers, in respect of the difler- ent truths to which it assents, 1, We have an ability of assenting unto the self-evident maxims of reason, such as that, The same thing, at the same time, cannot be and not be, upon their own self-evidence, without any other argument, than a bare proposal of them in terms we understand. 2. We have an ability to assent unto other truths, upon conviction of their truth by ar- guments, drawn from the forementioned self-evident truths, or any other acknowledged or owned by us. 3. "We have an ability to assent unto truths, upon the evi- dence of the testimony of credible witnesses, or pei'sons w^orthy to be believed, and of deserving credit. This ability, and the assent given by it to such truths, upon such testimony, are both called by the same common name, faith. 3. Faith then is that power or ability of the mind of man, whereby he is capable of receiving, and actually assents to truths upon the evidence of the testimony of persons worthy of credit, who know what they testify, and will not deceive us. Now whereas the person giv- ing this testimony, is either God, men or nngels, good or L'Clerc in his Logic?. THE REASON OF TRUE FAITH. 373 hady faith may be considered as either divine^ human or angelical. This last, as of no consideration to our purpose, we shall lay aside. Tliat faith, or ability, whereby we assent to the testimony of men worthy of credit, is call- ed human faithy And that whereby we assent to truths upon the evidence of the testimony of God, who cannot lie, is called divine faith. 4. Divine faith is that power, or ability whereby we assent unto, and receive truths proposed to us upon evi- dence of the w ord or testimony of God, to our own sal- vation, in compliance ^^ ith our duty, to the glory of God. 5. In this account of divine faith, we add, in compli- ance with our duti/y to the glory of God, and our own sal- vatiouy because devils and men may yield some assent unto truths, upon the evidence of God's testimony, which neither answers their duty, nor turns to the glory of God in their salvation, of which we do not now design to speak, and therefore by this clause have cut it off, and laid it aside, as not belonging to that faith whereof we now speak, and whereby we conceive all, to whom the scriptures come, are obliged to receive them. 6. This faith now described may be called divine, and supernatural, and really it is so on two accounts, 1. Be- cause tliis ability is wrought in them, in whom it is found, by the divine and supernatural power of God. 2. Be- cause it builds not its persuasion of, yields not its assent unto the truths it receives upon any human authority or testimony; but upon the testimony of God, who can nei- ther be ignorant of any truth, nor be deceived, or deceive us. 7. It now remains, that we confirm this proposition that we have thus shortly explained. And this we shall do by its several parts. Firsts then we assert, "That " this faith is wrought in those, who have it, by the " power of God." Now for clearing tliis, we shall only hint at the heads of a few arguments, leaving the further proof to polemic treatises. 1. This ability to believe and receive the things of God to our salvation and his glory, is in scripture expressly denied to natural or un- renewed men. 2 Thes. iii, 2. All men have not faith. 1 Cor. ii, 14. — The natural man receiveth not the things of 374 AN ESSAY CONCERNING he Spirit of God: For they are foolishness unto him: Neither can he know theniy because they are spiritually discerned, John viii, 47. — Ye therefore hear not God's words, because ye are not of God. 2. This is expressly denied to be of ourselves, and asserted a supernatural ^i/'/ of God. Ephes. ii, 8. — By grace ye are saved through faith, and that not of yourselves, it is the gift of God. 3. The production of it is ascribed unto God. He it is that fulfils in his peo- ple the work of faith with power, 2 Thes. i, 1 1. He it is that gives them, that is, that enables them, on the behalf of Christ, to believe and suffer for his name, Pliil. i, 29. It is one oi the fruits produced by the spirit. Gal. v, 22. and of it Christ is the author. Heb. xii, 2. Secondly, We are next shortly to prove, " that this " faith builds its persuasion on the testhuony of God, " evidencing itself such unto the mind," and not on hu- man testimony. 1. It is in scripture expressly said not to stand in the wisdom of men, 1 Cor. ii, 5, that is, it leans not on the word, autliority, eloquence or reasonings of men. 2. It is expressly in that same verse, said to stand in the power of God, that is, as the foregoing words com- pared v^ ith verse 13, explain it, in the words jvhich the Ho- ly Ghost leacheth, and which he demonstrates or evidences hy his power, accompanying them, to be the word of God. 3. It is described in such a way as fully clears this ; it is held forth as a receiving of the word, not as the word of man, but as it is indeed the word of God, which ef- fectually worketh in you that believe, 1 Thes. ii, 13. Ma- ny other proofs might be added, but this is sufficient to answer our purpose. Thirdly, We shall next shortly prove, " that we are " obliged in duty thus to believe the scriptures, or to " receive them as the word of God, and not of men." 1. The scriptures are indeed, and hold themselves forth every where as the word of God. They are the oracles ©f God, which holy men of God spake by the motion of the Spirit of God, and wrote by divine inspiration, and the Holy Ghost speaks to us by them.^ Now when God ut- ters oracles, speaks, writes and utters his mind to us, we * Heb. V, 12.— 2 Pet. i, 20, 21.— 2 Tim. iii, 16.— Mark xii, 36.— Acts 5, 16— Acts xxviii, 25.— Heb. iii, 7. THE REASON OF TRUE FAITH. 375 are in duty obliged and bound to assent to what he says, and yield what obedience he requires. This the very light of nature teacheth. 2. The scriptures were written for this very end, that we might believe, and that believ- ing we might have life, John xx, 30, 31. The scriptures of the prophets (which contain the revelation of the mystery of God's will, otherwise not known) according to the com- mandment of the everlasting God, are made known unto all nations for the obedience of faith, Rom. xvi, 25, 26. Again the scriptures are tenned a more sure word of pro- phecy than the voice from heaven, and men are said to do well, to take heed to them, 2 Pet. i, toward the close. That is, it is thek duty to take heed to them, or believe them. 3. The most dreadful judgments are threatened against those who receive not the word of God from the prophets or apostles, whether by word or writ, is all one. fVhosoever shall not receive you, nor hear your words, when ye depart out of that house or city, shake off the dust of your feet. Verily I say unto you. It shall be more tolera- ble for the land of Sodom and Gomorrah, in the day of judgment, than for that city. Matt, x, 14, 15. Accordingly we find the apostles preach the word at Antioch in Pisi- dia. Acts xiii ; demand acceptance of it both of Jews and Gentiles ; and upon their refusal they testify against them in the way of the Lord's appointment, ver. 51. Though so far as we can learn, they there wrought no miracles to confinm their mission. 4. We have above heard the apostle commending the Thessalonians for receiving the word as the word of God, and not of man. 1. Thess. ii, 13, which sufficiently shews that it was their duty. Whereas some may here say, " How can it be our du- ty to believe the word of God, since it has been above proved, that we are not able of ourselves thus to do it." I answer briefly, 1. The very light of nature requires perfect obedience of us ; and yet we are not able to yield this to it. 2. The scriptures plainly require, that we serve God acceptably, with reverence and Godly fear, Heb. xii, 28, and yet we must have grace whereby to do it. 3. We have destroyed ourselves, Hos. xiii, 9, and that through this, our faith or natural ability of believing truths upon testimony, is so impaired and weakened, and 376 AN ESSAY CONCERNING by prejudices so obstructed otherwise, that we are noi able to discern the evidence of God's authority, in his word, nor assent thereon to his testimony in a due man- ner, yet this cannot reasonably prejudge God's riglit to demand credit to his word, whereon he has impiessed such prints of his authority, as are sufficiently obvious to any one's faith, that is not thus faultily depraved. 4. We have therefore no reason to question God, who gave us eyes, which we have put out, but to blame our- selves, and aim to do his will, that is, Avait on him in all the ways of his OAvn appointment ; and we have no rea- son to despair, but that in this way we may have gracious- ly given us of God's sovereign grace, an understandmg to know whether these truths are of God, or they who spoke them did it of themselves, (1 John v, 20. John vii, 1 7.) though we cannot claim this as what is our due. Thus we have in some measure cleared what that faith is, whereby the scriptures must be believed to the glory of God and our own salvation, and confirmed shortly our account of it from the scriptures of truth. We now proceed to Prop. II. " The reason, for which we are obliged in •* duty to believe or receive the scriptures as the word " of God, is not. That God has by his Spirit wrought " faith in us, or given us this ability thus to receive " them." This proposition we have offered, because some do blame Protestants for saying so ; whereas none of them really do it. Nor can any man reasonably say it. For clearing this observe, 1. It is indeed true, that we cannot believe them, un- less God give us this gracious ability or faith to believe them, and by his Holy Spuit remove our natural dark- ness, and clear our minds of those prejudices against his word, wheiewith they are naturally filled. 2. Yet this is not the reason wherefore we do assent unto, or receive the scriptures ; for it were impertinent, if any should ask. Upon what accoiuit do ye believe the scriptures to be the word of God? to aoswer, I be- THE REASON OF TRUE FAITH. 377 Vieve it because God has wrought the faith of it in me. Tliis is not to tell wherefore we do believe, but to*tell how we came to be furnished with power or . ability to believe. Prop. IH. " We are not to believe the scriptures up- ** on the authority of any man or church : or, I'he rea- " son wherefore we are in duty bound thus to assent to^ " or receive the scriptures as the word of God, is not, " that any man, or church, says so.'* This is fully demonstrated by our writers against the Papists. For confirmation of it, it is sufficient for our purpose at present to observe, 1 . That to believe, that the scriptures are the word of God, because such a man, or church says so, answers not our duty. Our duty is to believe God speaking to us, upon the account of his own veracity ; and not be- cause men say that this is his w^ord. This is not to be- lieve God and his prophets for the sake of their own testimony, but for the authority of men, (2 Chron. xx. 20.) 2. The faith that leans upon this testimony, is built not on the truth of Gody but on the testimony of me% who may be deceived and may deceive : All men are liars. 3. Vie have no where in the word this proposed as the ground whereon, in duty, we are obliged to believe the scriptures. 4. The church,, and what she says, is to be tried by the word, and her testimony is so far only to be received as the Avord consents ; and tlierefore we cannot make this the ground of our faith, without a scandalous circle, Avhich the church of Rome can never clear herself of. 5. But I need insist no further on this head. That church Avhich only clamis this regard to her testimony, is long since become so well known, and so fully con- victed of manifold falsehoods, that her testimony rather prejudges than helps to confirm whatever it is engaged for.. Prop. TV. " The rational arguments whereby the " truth of the Ciiiistian religion is evinced and demon- 48 37a AN ESSAY CONCERNING " strated against Atheists, though they are many ways " useful, yet are not the ground or reason whereon, " in a way of duty, all who have the scriptures piopos- " ed to them, are obliged to believe and receive them " as the word of God." These moral and rational considerations are, and may be many ways useful to stop the mouths of enemies, to beget in them, who yet are unacquainted with the true intrinsic worth of the Avord, some value for it, and en- gage them to consider it ; to relieve them that do be- lieve against objections, and strengthen their faith. This is allowed to them ; and is sufficient in this loose and Atheistical age, to engage persons of all sorts who value the scriptures, to study them. But yet it is not upon them that the faith requued of us, as to the divine au- thority of the scriptures, is to be founded. For, 1. These are indeed a proper foundation for a rational assent, such as is given upon moral proof or demonstra- tion. And they are able to beget a strong moral per- suasion of this truth. But this assent which they beget, cannot, in any propriety of speech, be called faith, ei- ther divine or human* For faith is an assent upon testimony. 2. The faith that is requued of us, is required to be founded not on the wisdom of meUy that is, the reason- ings or arguings of men. Now this leans only and en- tuely on these. 3. This faith is, in the way of duty, required of ma- ny. Many are in duty obliged to receive the scriptures as the word of God, to whom these arguments were never offered. The apostles never made use of them, and yet required their hearers to receive and believe their word. 4. This faith many are obliged to, who are not capa- ble of understanding or reaching the force of thesa ar- guments. Prop. V. " The faith of the scripture's divine au- " thority is not founded in this. That they by whom ff; they were written, did, by miracles, prove they were « sent of God." THE REASON OF TRUE FAITH. 379 I need not spend much time in clearing Ibis. It will sufficiently confirm it to observe, 1. That many are, and Avere in duty obliged to yield this assent to, and believe the scriptures, who saw not these miracles. ^ 2. We are no other way sure of these being wrought, than by the testimony of the word. 3. This way is not countenanced by the word: for it no where teaches us to expect miracles as the ground of our assent, but upon the contrary declares, that the word of Moses and the prophets is sufficient to lay a founda- tion for faith, without any new miracle, (Luke x. 31.) Prop. VI. " The reason whereon, in duty we are " bound to receive the scriptures as the word of God, " is not any private voice, whisper or suggestion from " the Spirit of God, separate and distinct from the writ- " ten word, saying in our ear, or suggesting to our mind, " that the scriptures are the Avord of God." There is no need to insist long in proof of this. For, 1. Many are bound to believe the word of God, to whom never any such testimony was given ; but no man is bound to receive the scriptures, to whom the ground whereon he is bound to believe them, is not proposed. 2. There is no where in the word, any ground given for any such testimony. Nor doth the experience of any of the Lord's people witness, that they are ac- quainted with any such suggestion. And besides, the question miglit again be moved concerning this sug- gestion, Wherefore do ye believe this to be the testimo- ny of God ? Prop. VII. " That whereon all, to whom the word of " God comes, are bound to receive it with the faith " above described, is not any particular word of the " scripture bearing testimony*^ to all the rest. As for " instance, it is not merely or primarily upon this ac- ^' count, that I am bound to receive all the written word " as the word of God, because the scripture says, 380 ' AN ESSAY CONCERNING ** 2 Tim. iii. 16. That all scrhyturc is s^iven hy inspiration *'ofGodr I o J J This IS very plain upon many accounts, some of wbich I shall shortly offer. 1. AVehad been obliged to believe the scriptures with faith supernatural, though these testimonies had been left out. Yea, they who had tliem not, were obliged to believe the word of God. 2. These have no more evidence of their being from God, than other places of scriptures ; and therefore we are not to believe the scriptures merely on their testi- mony ; but have the same reason to receive with faith as the word of God, every pait of the scripture as well as these testimonies. Prop. VIII. " The reason why we are bound, with " faith supernatural and divine, to receive the word of " God, is not, that the things therein therein revealed, " or the matters of the scriptures, are suitable unto the " apprehensions which men naturally have of God, " themselves and other things, and congruous to the in- " terests, necessities, desires and capacities of men." I shall not spend time in overthrowing this, which some seem so fond of ; only for confirming the proposi- tion observe, 1. This suitableness of the matter unto the apprehen- sions, or natural notions of men concerning God, them- selves and other things, &c. as discerned by men unre- newed, and made out by their reasonings, is not a ground for faith, or an assent to testimony, but for a persuasion of another sort. 2. There are many things revealed in the scripture, which are to any mere natural man no Avay capable of this character. No man receives, or can reasonably re- ceive on this account, the doctrine of the Trinity, and the like. It is true, these are not contrary to our rea- son ; but it is likewise ti ue, they have no such evident congruity to the notions our reason suggests of God, ae should engage us to receive the discovery as from God ; yea, on tlie contrary, there is a seeming inconsistency that has startled many. THE REASON OP TRUE FAITH. 381 Prop. IX. " When therefore it is inquired, Where- " fore do ye ])elieve, and by faith rest in the scriptures " as the word of God, and not of man ? We do not an- " svver, It is because God has given us an ability so to "• do ; because tl:e church says, it is the word of God ; " because tiiere are many strong moral arguments prov- " ing it so ; because they who wrote it, Avrought mira- " cles ; because God has by some voice whispered in our " ear, or secretly suggested it to us, that thib is the word " of God; or because there are particular scriptiues " whicl) bear witness to all the rest tliat they are of God ; " nor finally, because the matter therein revealed, seem " worthy of God to our reason. Tliis is the sum of what has been hitherto cleared ; and the reasons offered against all these, whether we take them separately or conjunctly. They prove, that not one of them, nor all taken together, are the formal reason whereon we are obliged to believe the word of God, or receive it with faith supernatural and di- vine. Prop. X. " The formal reason or ground whereon I " assent to, or receive the whole scriptures, and every " particular trutli in them, and am obliged in duty so to " do, is, the authority and truth of God speaking in " them, and speaking every truth they contain, evidenc- " ing itself to my faith, when duly exercised about " them, and attending to tliem, by their own divine and " distinguishing liglit and power. Or when it is inquu'ed, " Wherefore do ye believe, receive, assent to and rest " in the scriptures as indeed the Avord of God, and not " of man? I answer, I do believe them, because they " carry in them, to my faith, an evidence of God, or do " evidence themselves by their own light and power to " my faith, duly exercised about them, that they are " the word of God, and not of man." Now for explaining tliis, which is the assertion that contains the truth principally intended, I shall olfer the few following remarks : 1. However great the evidence of God in the word is, yet it cannot, nor U it requisite that it should, deter- 382 AN ESSAY CONCERNING mine any to receive and assent to it, whose faith and ability of believing is not duly disposed. Though the sun shine never so clearly, yet he that has no eyes, or whose eyes are vitiated, and under any total darkening indispo- sition, sees it not. No wonder then, that they, who have not naturally, and to whom God has not yet, by supernatural grace, given eyes to see, ears to hear, or hearts to perceive, discern not the evidence of God*s authority and truth in the word. 2. Although there really may be in any an ablility, or faith capable of discerning this evidence ; yet if that faith is not exercised, and duly applied to the consider- ation of the word, whereon this evidence is impressed, he cannot assent unto, or believe it in a due manner, to the glory of God, his own salvation and according to his duty. There is evidence sufficient in many moral meta- physical and mathematical truths ; and yet abimdance of persons, who are sufficiently capable of it, do not as- sent unto these truths, nor discern this evidence ; not be- cause it is wanting, but because they do not apply their minds to the observation of it in a due way. God has not imparted such an evidence to his word, as the light of the sun has, which forces an acknowledgment of itself upon any, whose eyes are not wilfully shut j but designing to put us to duty, he has imparted such evi- dence, as they, who have eyes to see, if according to duty they apply their minds, may discern, and be satis- fied by. 3. This light and power evidencing the divine authori- ty of the scriptures, is really impressed upon every truth, or every word which God speaks to us, especial- ly as it stands in its own place, related to, and connected with the other parts of the scripture, whereto it belongs. But of this more hereafter. 4. When to question, wherefore, or on what grounds do I assent to the scriptures as indeed the word of ^od and not of man? It is answered, I do it, because it evi- dences itself to be God's word by its own light or power, there is no place for that captious quest ion. How know ye this lio;lit and poAver to be divine, or fjom God ? For, it is of the natme of all light, external and sensible, or THE REASON OF TRUE FAITH. 383 internal and mental, (concerning which two it is hard to determine which of them is properly, and which only metaphorically, light) that it not only clears to the mind other things discernible by it, but satisfies the mind about itself, proportionably to the degiee of its clear-* ness. The light of the sun discovers sensible objects, and satisfies us so fully about itself, that we need liave recourse to no new arguments to convince that we have this light, and that it is real. In like manner the evi- dence of any mathematical truth, not only quiets us about the truth, but makes the mind rest assured about itself. And so the divine light and power of the word, not only satisfies our minds, as to those truttis tliey are designed of God to discover, but, in proportion to the degree of light in them, or conveyed by them, satisfy the mind about tliis light or power, that it is truth and is no lie. Nor is there need for any other argument to con- vince a mind affected with this, of it. It is true, if a blind man should say so to me, Hov»^ know ye that, the sun shines, and ye see it ? I would answer, I know it by tlie evidence of its own light aftecting mine eyes : And if he should further say. But how^ prove ye to me, tiiat ye are not deluded, and that really it is so? Then I would be obliged to produce otlier arguments whereof lie is capable : But then it must be allowed tliat the evidence of these arguments is not s6 great as the evidence I my- self have of it by its own light ; though they may be more convincing to him. And further, this is not to convince myself, but to satisfy him, and free my mind from the disturbance of his objections. In like mannei-, if one, that denies the scriptures, shall say. Wherefore do ye believe or rest in the scriptures, as the word of God? I answer, I do it, because they evidence themselves to my mind, by their owii light, or power, to be of God. If he shall say, I cannot discern this. I answer. It is be- cause your mind is darkened, ye want eyes, or have them shut. If he shall further mge, Ttiat my light is not real, I will prove it by arguments, which may stop his mouth, and be more convincing to lum than my as- sertion, which is all that hitherto he has ; but yet these argiuTients are not that whereon my mmd rests satisfied 384 AN ESSAY CONCERNING as to the truth ; though they may be of great use, not only to convince him, but to relieve my mind against such subtle sophisms, as he might make use of, which though they could not persuade nje out of the sight of my eyes, or the evidence shining into my mind, yet troubled me how to answer them, and at times, when, through my inadvertency, or indisposition of my eyes, or through clouds overspreading and interposing betwixt this light and me, these objections might shake me a little. 5. Considering we are but renewed in part, and our faith is imperfect, and liable to many defects, the minis- try of the church is of manifold necessity and use, to awaken us to attend to this liglit, to cure the indisposi- tions of our minds, to hold up this light to us, to point out and explain the truths it discovers, whereby our minds are made more sensible of the evidence of this light. And upon many other accounts of a like nature, are the ordinances necessary, and through the" efficacy of the divine ordination and appointment, useful for es- tablishing our minds, naturally sluggish, dark, weak and unstable, and Avhich are exposed to manifold temptations, in the faith of the scriptures. 6. In order to our holding fast our faith, and being stable in it, besides this outward ministry, and the in- ward work of the Holy Ghost, giving us an understand- ing to discern this evidence, and besides the foremen- tioned use of the moral arguments abovementioned ; besides all these, to our believing and persevering in a due manner, in the faith of the scriptures, we stand in need of the daily influences of the Spirit of God, to strengthen our faith or ability of discerning spiritual things, to clear our minds of prejudices, and incidental indispositions, to seal the truths on our minds, and give us refreshing tastes of them, and confirm us luany ways against opposition. 7. This light, whereby the written word evidences it- self unto the minds of those who have spiritual ears to hear, and apply them, is nothing else save the impress of the majesty, truth, omniscience, wisdom, holiness, justice, grace, mercy, and authority of God, stamped upon the THE REASON OF TRUE FAITH, m scriptures, by the Holy Ghost, and beaming or shining into the minds of such persons upon tijeir hearing or pe- rusal, and affecting them with a sense of these perfec- tions, both in what is spoken, and in the majestic and God-becoming way of speaking : They speak as never man spake ; the matter spoken, and the manner of speak- ing, has a greatness discernible by a spb'itual understand- ing, that fully satisfies it, that God is the speaker. And all the impressions of God's wisdom, faitlifulness, omni- science and majesty, that are stamped upon the matter contained in the scriptures, being conveyed only by tlie word, do join the impressions that are upon the word, and strengthen the evidence they give of their divine original, since these impressions do not otherwise ap- pear to our minds, or affect them, than by the word. The word, by a God-becoming manifestation of the truth, that scorns all these little and mean arts of in- smuation, by fail* and enticing Avords, and artificially dressed up argumentations, with other the like confes- sions of human weakness, that are in all human writings, commends itself to the conscience, dives into the souls of men, into all the secret recesses of their hearts, guides, teaches, directs, determines and judges in them, and up- on them, in the name, majesty and authority of God. And when it enters thus into the soul, it fills it with tiie light of the glory of the beamings of those perfections upon it, whereby it is made to cry out, The voice of God and not of man. 8. This power, whereby the w^ord evidences itself to be the word of God and not of man, is nothing else save that authority and awful efficacy, which he puts forth in and by it over the minds and consciences of men, working divinely, and leaving effects of his glori- ous and omnipotent power in them and on them. It en- teis into the conscience, a territory exempt from the auttiority of creatures, and subject only to the dominion of God, it challenges, convinces, tlireatens, awakens, sets it a roaring, and the creation cannot quiet it again. It commands a calm, and the sea, that was troubled be- fore, is smooth, and devils and men are not able to dis- turb its repose. It enters into the mind, opens its eves, 49 386 AN ESSAY CONCERNING. fills it with a glorious, clear, pure and purifying light, and sets before it wonders before unknown, undiscerned in counsel and knowledge, concerning God, ourselves, our sin, our duty, our danger, and our relief, the works, the ways, the counsels and purposes of God. It speaks to the will, converts it, and powerfully disengages it from what it was most engaged to, what it embraced, and was even glued to before, so that no art or force of elo- quence, argument, fear or hope, could make it quit its hold .; it makes it hastily quit its embraces, and turn its bent another way, the quite opposite, and with open arms embrace what nothing could make it look to be- fore, takes away its aversion, makes it willingly not on- ly go, but run after what it bore the greatest aversion to before, and obstinately refuse to close with any other thing. It enters the affections, makes them rise from the ground, gives them such a divine touch, that, though they may through their fickle nature, be carried at a time by force another way, yet they never rest, but point heavenward. It comes to the soul, sunk under the pressure of unrelievable distresses, sticking in the miry clay, refusing comfort, and in appearance capable of none, it plucks it out of the clay, raises it out of the homf3le pit, sets ii^ feet upon a rock, fills it with joy, yea makes it exceeding joyful, while even all outward pressures and tribulation continue, yea are increased. It enters into the soul, lays hold on the reigning lusts, to which all formerly had submitted, and that with delight ; it tries and condemns those powerful criminals, makes the soul throw off the yoke, and join in the execution of its sentence against, and on them. Now w here the case is thus stated, how can the soul, that feels this power- ful word, that comes from the Lord most High, do other- wise- than /a/Z dorvriy and own. That God is in it of a Iruth. 9. Whereas some may hereon object, " That many, " who have for a long time heard and perused this ^* word, have not perceived this light, nor felt this pow- " er, and, on this supposition, seem exempted from ^'^ any obligation to believe the word." I answer. THE REASON OF TRUE FAITH. 387 (1.) Many who have spent not a few years in prying into the works of God in the world, have not discerned to this day the beaming evidence, and clear declarations of his glory in them ; yet none will hereon say, that they are excusable, or tl>at want of an evidence is chargea- ble on the works of God. And why should not the case be allowed the same as to the word ? May they not have this evidence, though men do not discern it ? And may not men, even on account of this evidence be obliged to believe them ? (2.) No wonder many discern not this light, and are not affected with it, since all men have put out their own eyes, or impaired by their own fault, that faith or pow- er of discerning the voice of God, speaking either by his word or works, which our natures originally had. In many this evil is increased, and this power fmlher weak- ened by their shutting their eyes, and entertaining of prejudices manifestly unjust, againrt God's word and works. Others turn away their eyes, and will not look to, or attend to the word in that way wherein God or- dains them to attend to it, that they may discern its light, and feel its power. And God has hereon judicially given many up to the power of Satan, to be further blinded. And no wonder they, whose eyes the God of this world has blinded, should not discern the glory of the gospel of Christ, who is the image of God shining in- to their minds. (3.) No wonder they should not discern this ; for God to this day has not given them eyes to see, ears to hear, or hearts to perceive. It is an act of sovereign grace, which God owes to none, to open their eyes, which they have wil- fully blinded : and where he sees not meet to do this, it is not strange, that they are not affected with the clearest evidence. (4.) Light, however clear, cannot of itself supply the defect of the discerning power. The sun, though it shines, cannot make the blind to see. The word has this light in it, though the blind see it not ; yea I may ad- venture to say, "that the w^ord of God contained in the iicriptures, Avhich he has magnified above all his name, has in it more, and no less discernible evidences of the 388 AN ESSAY CONCERNliNG fF?^ divine perfections, and consequently of its divine origi- nal and authority, tban the works of creation, some of which are sufficient to carry in some conviction of God in it, even on the minds of those who are not savingly enlightened, if they attend but to it in the due exercise of their rational abilities, that is, in such a manner as they do, or may attend to it, without saving illumination, lay- ing aside wilful prejudice ; which though it will not be sufficient to draw such an assent, as will engage and ena- ble them to receive the scriptures, in a due manner, to the glory of God, and theii* own salvation, and comply with them, yet I conceive it will be sufficient to justify against them the word's claim to a divine original, and cut them off from any use of, or excuse from a plea of the want of sufficient evidence of the divine original of the word. I doubt not, but many of these, who upon conviction said, that Christ spake as never man spake, were strangers to saving illumination, and yet saw somewhat of a stamp and impress of divinity in what he said, and the manner of saying it, that drew this confession from them, that rendered them inexcusable, in not listening to him, and complying with his word. Yea I doubt not, that the case will be found the same as to many, with re- spect to the written word, and would be so to all, if they seriously, and without wilful prejudices, attended to it. 10. I fmlher observe. That to engage to this assent, it is not requisite, that every one feel all these, or the like particular effects at all times, but that the word have tljis power and put it forth, as occasion needs, and circum* stances requires it. Having thus explained, we are now to prove our as- sertion " That the ground whereon we are in duty bound " to believe and receive the word of God as his word, " and not the word of man, and whereon all who have- tQ " received, and believed it in a due manner, to the glory " of God and their own salvation, do receive it thus, is " the authority and veracity of God speaking in and by " the word, and evidencing themselves by that light and " power, which is conveyed into the soul in and by the ^* &cript\ires, or the written word itself," ". THE REASON OF TRUE FAITH. 389 Many arguments offer themselves for proof of this h«- portant assertion, which hitherto we have explained ; so!ne of the most considerable of them I shall shortly propose, without insisting largely on the prosecution de- signing only to liint the arguments that satisfied me, that I was not mistaken as to the grounds whereon, by the forementioned experience, I was brought to receive the scriptures as the word of God. . Arg. 1. God ordinarily in the scriptures offers his mind, requiring us to believe, obey and submit to it up- on this and no other ground, viz. the evidence of his own testimony. The only reason commonly insisted on to warrant our faith, oblige us to believe and receive, is. Thus saith the Lord. Arg. 2. When false prophets set up their pretended revelations in competition with his word, he remits them to the evidence his words gave by their own light and power, as that which was sufficient to distinguish and enable them to reject the false pretensions, and cleave to his word, Jer. xxiii, 26, 29. How long shall this be in the heart of the prophets that prophecy lies ? That are prophets of the deceit of their own hearts ; which think to cause my people to forget my name by their dreams, which they tell every man to his neighbour, as their fathers have forgotten my name for Baal. The prophet that hath a dream, let him tell a dream, and he that hath my word, let him speak my word faithfully : What is the chaff to the wheat, saith the Lord ? Is not my word like afire, saith the Lord, and like a hammer that breaketh the mountains in jdeces ? In the latter days of that church, when the people Avere mem to cry to the Lord daily for carrying on the work of faith with power, and an increase of faith to believe and live to God in a due manner; besides, I say, this habitual weakness, it is liable to various extraordi- nary incidental disorders, arising from inward and out- ward occasions, while the believer is here in this valley of tears, subject unto the miseries occasioned by the re- maining power of indwelling corruptions, which are in themselves restless, and raise many fogs, damps and mists to overcloud the soul: and by the violence of out- ward temptations, which Satan and the world throng in ujx)n them, through the w^ise permission of God, for the exercise of their faith in this state of trial, the darknes is exceedingly increased, faith weakened, or at least straiten- ed as to its exercise. And by this means this spiritual dis- cerning is sometimes more and sometimes less obstructed and darkened. Now if at such seasons, while the believer finds himself thus out of order, he cannot discern this evidence of the divine authority of the word, no not where it shines clearest, in so far as to quiet him, he has no reason to reject the word, or question it for want of evidence, but may be, and ordinarily believers are exer- cised in complaints of their own darkness, as the cause of their not discerning God in his word: Vitium est in organOy there is no fault in the word, but in the discern- ing pow er. The argument, if it be urged with respect to such a case as this, would prove that there is no light in the sun. 2. Tlie Lord's people, through the powder of corrup- tion, and force of temptation, are often negligent and in- advertent, and do not apply their minds nor incline their hearts unto the word, with the attention necessary to dis- cern the evidence of God in the word ; and as a punish- ment of this, God withdraws, and leaves their minds un- de.r the darkness theyare hereby cast into, and^lhen when 50 594 AN ESSAY CONCERNING God passes by before, or on the right or left hand, and worketli round about them, they cannot perceive him. If we turn our back to the light, or shut our eyes, or will not be at pains to remove motes, or humors that obstruct our sight, no wonder we do not discern the light. When we have idols in our hearts and eyes, no wonder we see not God. If we lay not aside the filthiness of our hearts, we cannot receive the engrafted wordy that is able to save our soids, in a due manner. 3. Although the whole scriptures come from God, and are his word, yet every proposition contained in them, as it is a proposition in itself, expressive of such a particular purpose or thouglt, is not his word : for God somethnes tells us men's word's, and the devil's words. Now though God speaks them in so far as to teach us that they are such person's words, yet the propositions in themselves are not to be received with faith ; but we are only to as- sent to this upon the authority of God, that they said so and so ; not always that these are true ; for oftcntunes in themselves they are false and pernicious. Now, evi- dence as to any more than the trutli of God in the histo- rical narration of them, is not to be expected, nor are the scriptures to be impeached for want of it. 4. Although every divine truth which God speaks, has equal authority, and sufficient evidence, yet every scripture truth has not a beaming evidence, equally great, clear and affecting. The scripture is like the heaven, another piece of divine workmanship. It is full of stars, every one of these has light sufficient to answer its own particular use for which ' it was designed, and to satisfy the discerning and attentive beholder, that it is light ; but yet every one gives not a light equally clear, great, glorious, affecting and powerful : There is one glory of the sun, another of the moon, another of the stars : and one star excelleth another in glory ; and some- times the greatest light, if it is at the greatest distance, like the fixed stars, affect us less, and shine less clear to us, than weaker lights, which, like the moon, are nearer. In the scripture there are propositions which tell us things, which though tliey are in their own place and proper circumstances, useful to them, for w hom they are particularly designed, and to their proper scppe ; yet THE REASON OF TRUE FAITH. 39?J they are comparatively of less importance to iis, as ac- quainting us with things of less considerable nature and use to us, and which lie not so far out of our reach, be- ing in some measure known, or knowable without di- vine revelation, though it was necessary, that in order to their particular use to us in our walk with God, they should be better secured, and offered us upon the faith of the divine testimony. Again, there are other proposi- tions, which hold forth to us truths in then* own nature of more importance, that lie further out of our reach, being neither known, nor indeed knowable by us, with- out divine revelation ; and which in our present cases and circumstances are more nearly suited to our case, and wherein tlierefore our present concernment doth more directly appear to be interested, and which there- fore impress us with, and leave in us effects more last- ing and discernible. Now it must be allowed, that the truths of this last sort have an evidence more bright, great, affecting and sensible, than those of the former sort. 5. Hereon sundry subordinate observations offer them- selves, which are of the greatest importance for clear- ing the diliiculty under consideration. 1. Truths in scripture, or propositions acquainting us with things, otherwise in some respect within our reach, and only vouched by God in order to the stability of our faith in them, (in so far as we are in practice obliged to lay weight on them) and to give us, not so much satisfaction as to their truth absolutely, as some additional security about them ; these cannot be supposed so discernibly to affect our minds, as truths of another nature, inasmuch as this additional evidence is more difficult to distinguish from the evidence we have otherwise for them. Besides that, God seeing that we are not so hard to be induced to a belief of them, or so liable to temptations that may shake our faith, sees it not meet to, stamp such bright, lively and affecting impressions of himself on them ; for it is unworthy of him to do any thing in vain. 2. On the other hand, these propositions which disclose the se- cret puiposes, or knowledge of God, and things hid in it, that lie within the reach of no mortal, or perhaps nd 396 AN ESSAY CONCERNING created understanding, Avithout revelation, must make ^ more vivid and lively impression on the mind, as illumi- nating it with the knowledge of things, whereto it was, and by its own reach forever must remain a stranger. 3. In like manner truths, wherein our eternal salvation, or present relief from incumbent trouble, is duectly concerned, do more forcibly afiect, and have a more powerful influence, than those which lie more remote from our present use, of how gi'eat advantage so^ ever in their proper place they may be. The moon, which points out my w ay in the night, guides me, and saves me from losing myself or my Avay, at that time affects me more than the light of the sun, which I have for- merly seen, but do not now behold ; though the moon comparatively has no light, and borrows that which it hath from the sun. In like manner, truths in themselves of less importance, and which derive all their glory from those that are more important, yet, when they suit my present case, affects me more, and their evidence appears greater. Every thing is beautiful in its season. That there is such a city as Jerusalem, or that there w as such an one, the scripture tells us. Of this we are otherwise informed, and are not likely to be tempted as to its truth ; this however is told us in the word, and therefore we are to receive it on the testimony of the word ; but the faith of it is not so difficult, on accounts mentioned ; it is not told but with respect to some particular scope, and we have otily an additional security about it. Hereon our minds are not so illuminated, influenced, and aff'ected with the discovery, as when God tells us, he was in Christ reconciling the world to hiinself. The discoveiy of this fills us with a sense of the glory of God, hitherto unknown, and that lay far out of the reach of vulgar eyes, or any mortal to discover, without divine revela- tion. And therefore the discovery aftfects the more. Again, I am perplexed about through-bearing in some particular strait ; a promise of grace to help in it, though it is of less importance than the forementioned discove- ry of reconciliation, and has no efficacy, light or glory, save what it derives from the former, yet coming in the sea?