^^^OFPR/]?^ ^OGICALbl^ BR 128 .H5 B3 1859 Ballantyne, James Robert, 1813-1864. Christianity contrasted with Hirx^ 11 nhilncinnhv CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH HINDU PHILOSOPHY. / ■' •*? > CHRISTIANITY-^ 1 CONTRASTED WITH HINDU PHILOSOPHY: AN ESSAY, IN FIVE BOOKS, SANSKRIT AND ENGLISH: WITH PRACTICAL SUGGESTIONS TENDERED TO THE MISSIONARY AMONG THE HINDUS, / JAMES E. BALLANTYNE, LL.D., PROPKSSOR OF MORAL PHILOSOPHV, AND PRINCIPAL OF TIIF, GOVERNMENT COLLEGE AT BENARES. LONDON: JAMES MADDEN, LEADENHALL STREET. ^ STEPHEN AUSTIN, ~^.^ .s^-^ PRINTKB, HKBTFOnD. -'IK or ■U jui^ 1883 THSOLGGIG:SlL SYNOPTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS. PAGE ADVERTISEMENT i PREFACE iii INTRODIJCTION" vii Interference in matters of Religion requires Delicacy and Address tb. The importance of the End derogates not from the import- ance of the Means ib. Rude attacks on False Religions, why unadvisable viii The Propagation of Christianity, how to be Hoped from the Dissemination of Knowledge ib. Desirableness of Converting the Learned ix How it is Reasonable to suppose that Christianity should be Propagated otherwise now than at its First Introduction ib. Evidence of the Truth of the Christian Religion furnished by the Contrariety between the First and the Subsequent Order of its Propagation x How St. Paul dealt with the Learned ib. Hindu Philosophy to be mastered not merely for itself; and why xi The Subject, notwithstanding the Depth of the Interests Involved, why to be treated here with Scientific Unim- passionedness ib. We can most safely venture on Conciliation, where we best know the Errors which we must Avoid seeming to Countenance xii Prejudices not Needlessly to be Awakened ib. The Confutation of Hindfusm not the Primary indispensable xiii An example of Lord Bacon's to be followed ib. Bacon's example not to be Misinterpreted ib. vi CONTENTS. PAUK GENERAL VIEW OF THE HINDU SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY XV The Hindu Systems of Philosophy ii- Fundamental Agreement of the Three Great Systems ...... ih. How they Differ xvi The Nyaya Stand-point xvii The Sankhya Stand-point ih. Precise Difference between the Nyaya and the Sankhya Stand-point ib. The Vedanta Stand-point ih. Respective Subordination of the Systems xviii Corresponding Distribution of the Present Work ih. Summary of the Nyaya Philosophy xix General Character of the Nyaya System ih. Meaning of the Name ih. The Nyaya Text-book ih. Summary of the Topics xx Beatitude the Result of Knowledge ih. The Means of Right Knowledge xxi A Caution to the Missionary xxii Objects regarding which we are to have Right Knowledge xxiii Soul xxiv Mind ih. Activity xxv What the Nyaya reckons a Fault xxvi Transmigration ih. Pain and Final Emancipation xxvii Summary of the Sankhya Philosophy ih. General Character of the System ih. Meaning of the Name xxviii The Sankhya Text-book ib. The Chief End of Man ih. Nature, What xxix Liberation, What and When xxx Annihilation not Sought ib. Summary of the Vedanta System xxxi Its Great Tenet ih. CONTENTS. vii PAGE The One Eeality, how Designated xxxi Possible Course of the Vedantin's Speculations ih. Why " Ignorance" must be Admitted xxxii How " Ignorance" may have got its Various Synonymes... xxxiii * ' Ignorance, ' ' how defined in the Vedanta xxxiv "Why " Ignorance" is held to Consist of Three Qualities... xxxv The Operation of the Qualities Illustrated xxxvi Means of Emancipation according to the Vedanta xxxvii CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED with HINDU PHILOSOPHY 1 Book I. — A Partial Exposition of Cheistian Docteine ih. The Enquiry What 2 Man's Chief End ib. The Rule for Man's Direction to his Chief End 5 What the Scriptures Principally Teach 9 What we are to Believe concerning God ih. The Unity of God 13 The Trinity in Unity 14 Creation 15 Book II. — The Evidences of Cheistianity 20 Miracles the Credentials of a Religion 21 The Christian Miracles worthy of Credit 22 Sufferings of the First Christian Martyrs 26 Unlikeliness that a Story so Attested should be False 28 No Evidence of the Veracity of the Veda producible 29 The Veda, how the result of Speculation, not of Revelation 33 The Vedantic Tenet does not justify the Vedantic In- ference 38 The Eternity of Human Soids, of What Kind 52 Evidence of Christianity furnished by Prophecy 54 That the Prophecies were really such 55 Book III. — Natueal Theology 60 Evidence of a Designer ih. The Sankhya Theory of Unintelligent Design redargued ... 61 The Criterion of the Intelligent , , . 65 The Self-contradictory not Receivable on any Authority ... 66 The Argument from Design Illustrated ^ 68 CONTENTS. PAGE Book IV. — Of the Mystekious Points in Christianity 72 Mystery of the Trinity in Unity >b. The rule of " Excluded Middle " 75 Mystery Explicable were no Mystery 78 Mystery of the Incarnation 79 Mystery of the Atonement 80 The Freedom of the WiU 83 Abortive Attempt of Hinduism to clear up the Mystery of Evil 86 Mystery not Distinctive of Christianity 91 Book V. — The Analogy or Religion to the Constitution and CoTJESE of Nature 92 Origen's Statement of the Argument H. Analogy Described 94 Practical Value of Analogy 96 In default of Certainty, Probability not to be Despised 98 Belief may be the Reward of Obedience 1 00 Belief may have Degrees of Assurance 101 What the Divine Government of both Worlds implies, according to the Christian Doctrine 103 Concluding Advice to the Inquirer 112 APPENDIX OF NOTES AND DISSERTATIONS 113 A. — On the term " Matter" and its possible correspondents in the Hindu Dialects (a Dialogue) 114 B. — On the Hindu employment of the terms "Soul" and "Mind" 138 C. — On " Logic" and " Rhetoric" as regarded by the Hindus (being a Remonstrance to Sir William Hamilton on his Injustice to the Hindu Logic) 140 D. — On the "Vedas" 161 E. — On " the Eternity of Sound" (a Dogma of the Mimansa) 176 F. — On "Translation into the Languages of India" 195 ADVERTISEMENT. This Essay, slightly modified subsequently, was submitted in competition for a prize of £300, offered by a member of the Bengal Civil Service. The prize was divided, and a moiety was adjudged to this Essay, the judges being gentle- men appointed by the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Bishops of London and Oxford. In the terms of the pros- pectus, the prize was offered "for the best statement and refutation, in EngKsh, of the fundamental errors (opposed to Christian Theism) of the Vedanta, Nyaya, and Sankhya Philosophies, as set forth in the standard native authorities, in the Sanskrit language, treating of those systems; together with a demonstration (supported by such arguments, and con- veyed in such a form and manner as may be most likely to prove convincing to learned Hindus imbued with those errors), of the following fundamental j)rinciples of Christian Theism, viz. : — " First. — Of the real, and not merely apparent or illusory, distinctness of God from all other spirits, and from matter ; and of the creation (in the proper sense) of all other spirits, and of matter, by God, in opposition to the Yedanta. 1 ii ADVERTISEMENT. " Second. — Of the non-eternity of separate souls, and their creation by God, in opposition to the Nyaya and Siinkhya. " Third. — Of the creation of matter, in opposition to the. tenet of its eternity in the shape of atoms (as maintained in the Nyaya and Yaiseshika Schools), or in the shape of Prakriti (as maintained by the Sankhya). " Fourth. — Of the moral character and moral government of God ; and of the reality and perpetuity of the difference between moral good and evil with reference to such dogmas of the above systems as are opposed to these doctrines." PKEFACE. This Essay, in its present shape, is but an imper- fect sketch of what the writer would wish to offer as a help to the missionary among the learned Hindus. Many topics, which might advantageously receive full treatment, are here scarcely more than indicated. With life and health, the writer will continuously prosecute his task towards its completion. The five books '' On Christianity as contrasted with Hindi! Philosophy," which form the kernel of the fol- lowing Essay, are given also in Sanskrit, with the omission of such incidental discussions as have reference exclusively to the missionary, and not to those whom the missionary has to teach. There are some Sanskrit works, yet untranslated, which the writer must study before deciding upon his theological terminology for India. Among these works is the Aphorisms of Sdndilya. Sandilya rejects the Hindii (gnostic) theory that knowledge is the one thing needful, and contends that knowledge is only the hand- iv PREFACE. maid of faith. Hence, however defective his views may be in other respects, his work seems to promise phraseology of which a Christian missionary may ad- vantageously avail himself. This remark might form the text for an extended dissertation on the Chris- tian's right to the theological language and the theo- logical conceptions of his opponents. If the present work were completed to the writer's mind, he would next desire to be enabled to devote himself to the translation and commentation of the Bible in Sanskrit; taking book by book, not perhaps in the order of the canon — for the completion of such a work as is here intended is not to be looked for in a lifetime — but in the order in which it might seem most advisable to solicit the attention of inquirers, from whom it would scarcely be advisable to with- hold the New Testament till they should have threaded all the historical details of the Old. An occasional watchword of Protestants, and a good one in its proper place, is ^' The Bible without note or comment." This is right, when the design is to exclude such notes and comments as those of the Douay version, and to make appeal to the unbiassed judgment of Europeans, as to the Eomish and the reformed interpretations of Scripture language. But when, as in the case of the Hindii inquirer, the question is not, which (of two or PREFACE. more) is the meaniug, but simply what is the mean- ing, — notes and comments become the helps or the substitutes of a living teacher. English clergymen have commentaries to refer to, and if we may ever look forward to an efficient native Christian clergy, these native clergymen also ought to be similarly supplied. In speaking of a translation of the Bible in Sans- krit as a desideratum, the writer is very far indeed from ignoring the Sanskrit version of the Baptist mis- sionaries; but his own investigations have shown him that this version — valuable as, in many respects, it is — was made at a time when Sanskrit literature had not been sufficiently examined to make a coiTect ver- sion possible. The mere mastery of the Grammar and the Dictionary does not give one the command of a language. As well might it be expected that the study of a mineral ogical cabinet should make a geolo- gist. Words, as well as rocks, to be rightly compre- hended, must be studied in situ. A single example of our meaning will suffice, and we need go no further for it than the first verse of the first chapter of the Book of Genesis in the Sanskrit version of the Bap- tist missionaries. The Hindil is there told that, in the beginning, God created dkdsa ^ and prithiv'i? ISTow in the dictionary, dJcdsa will, no doubt, be found oppo- vi PREFACE. site the word '' heaven," and prithivl opposite the word "earth;" but if the books of the Nydya philosophy be looked into, it will be found that tiMsa is to be regarded as one of the five elements (the five hypo- thetical substrata of the five diverse qualities cognised by the five senses severally), and that prithivl is another of the five. Consequently, when the next verse pro- ceeds to speak of the waters — a third one among the five — the learned Hindu reader is staggered by the doubt whether it is to be understood that the waters were uncreated^ or whether the sacred penman had made an oversight. A Pandit once propounded this dilemma, in great triumph, to myself; and he was much surprised at finding that the perplexity could be cleared up. But it is obvious what powers of mis- chief we may place in the hands of unscrupulous oppo- nents, by leaving our versions of Scripture thus need- lessly open to cavil. INTRODUCTION. I CANNOT better prepare the reader to apprehend the design of this work than by submitting for his considera- tion the following remarks of the Eev. John Penrose, in his Bampton Lecture of the year 1808 : — ^ " There is nothing which demands not only interference in so much delicacy and address, but also so iust ulion'^^equi^ls *' > o delicacy and and liberal a knowledge of human nature, as =^'^'^^''- interference in matters of religion. It is manifest, how- ever, from past history, and I know not that the experience of present times tends in any degree to invalidate the observation, that those persons who devote themselves to the missionary office, though often men of the most heroic disinterestedness, and sometimes of an acute and active genius, yet are rarely possessed of an enlarged and comprehensive intellect. In the immediate obiect which they are desirous of attaininsr — an The impoit- " "^ *-' ance of the end object, indeed, of the highest worth and great- from^fhl ^l , 1,1 T • 1 portance of the ness — they appear somewhat too exclusively means. to concentrate all the faculties of their minds ; and, from want of an extended contemplation of human nature, to mistake the means by which that very object may be best 1 Entitled,— " An attempt to prove the truth of Christianity from the wisdom displayed in its original establishment, and from the histoiy of false and corrupted systems of religion." - viii INTRODUCTION. attained. Eager to multiply conversions, they seem naturally to fall into those imprudences which attend an unenlightened spirit of proselytism. In some cases [e.ff., that of the Jesuits], as we have seen, they accom- modate Christianity to the idolatries of those to whom they preach. In others, they forget that the same causes on^foisfreS which malvc religion necessary to mankind, fdTis'abief '"' attach men to the religion in which they have been bred, and that every rude attack serves only to bind them to it more closely. These errors seem not to imply any particular imputation of blame to individual missionaries, but naturally to result from the constitu- tional imperfection of mankind. Throughout India, and other unconverted countries, they probably will extend to all teachers of Christianity, whether of native or European extraction. We rarely can find accuracy of judgment united witli that warmth of character which is necessary to induce men to undertake the difficult and dangerous office of promulgating Christianity to idolaters ; however useful they may esteem that office to be, how- ever sublime. Those varied studies which discipline and correct the mind lessen the intensity of its application to any one pursuit. To improve reason has a tendency to diminish zeal. I speak only of what usually is the tend- ency of sucli improvement, without examining whether it is capable of being, or ought to be, counteracted. Thepropaga- " Should thcse obscrvations be admitted, al?ity°-howto they probably may lead us to infer that it is be hoped from "^ ^ J ^ ti'on'^o?kuow- not SO much to the exertions of missionaries that we must look for the future propagation of Christianity, as to the general dissemination of know- INTRODUCTION. ix ledge. The indiscretions which it can scarcely, perhaps, be hoped that missionaries will be able to avoid, im- pede the end which they propose ; but when those per- sons to whom our religion is offered shall be enabled to determine for themselves, concerning its records and evidences, they will learn to admit its truth on rational principles. When they shall add to the possession of our Scriptures, the sagacity to understand their mean- ing, and the judgment to appreciate their value, they will believe the doctrines which are taught in them. This belief, we may expect, will naturally Desirableness descend from the more intelligent to the com- theieamed?"^ paratively ignorant. Sound learning and just argument will triumph over fanaticism or error ; will first con- vince the reason of the wise, and, by this means, will, in due time, overcome the prejudices of the vulgar ; and thus Christianity will eventually be established by a progress contrary, indeed, to that which it experienced at its origin, but probably not less aptly suited to the altered circumstances of mankind. " If this, in truth, be likely to be the case, how u is •^ ' reasonable to SO extraordinary a revolution in the manner of cKiLutJ^''* . , . . , . should be pro- propa";atmor our religion deserves serious con- pagated other- ^ ^ c) ^ <-" wise now than sideration. It is an historical fact, entirely troducw^n. ™' independent of the miraculous means by which it is said to have been effected, that Christianity was introduced into the world by low and uneducated men, and that men of rank and learning were afterwards, by degrees, converted to it. This fact appears, manifestly, to be an inversion in the ordinary progress of opinions, which are usually communicated from the wise to the ignorant, X INTRODUCTION. instead of being adopted from the ignorant by the wise. It accordingly has been considered by Christians as an important argument for the belief of a Divine interfer- ence in the original establishment of the Church. And E^idence of if it appcars that things have now reverted to Christian" icii! tlicir natural order, even in the advancement gion furnished ' riety^VetweS^ of that vory religion, in the foundation of the subsequent which thls ordor was interrupted; if it is to order of its -^ ' propagation, a^jiiitios aud learning that we must now look for the extension and support of a religion which was first propagated by a few unlettered fishermen of Galilee ; we have the stronger reason to admire the peculiarity of its origin, and to conclude that none but God could ever have enabled ' the foolish things of the world to confound the wise, and the weak things of the world to confound the things which are mighty.' " Howst.paui In another place Mr. Penrose says: — dealt with the ■*■ ^ learned. ''Oncc, at Icast, in the course of his ministry, St. Paul addressed himself to a learned, to an Athenian tribimal. He wisely adapted to local circumstances the mode in which he declared the existence of the Supreme. He alluded to a received theology : he quoted a philo- sophical poet." I borrow these passages from Mr. Penrose instead of attempting to convey the same sentiments in my own words, the more readily, because the testimony thus borne to the importance of certain branches of learning, as subservient to the spread of Christianity, is not so liable as my own testimony, in respect of Hindii philo- sophy, might perhaps seem, to the suspicion of a bias received from a favourite pursuit. It is not on the INTRODUCTION. xi ground of its intrinsic value (though I may mnduphiio- have my own private opinion of its value), rSy^forlt- that I recommend the Hindii philosophy to ^"^ ''" ^ ^' the missionary among the Hindus, as a thing to be mastered, not merely to be dipped into. It is in order that he may be under no temptation splenetically to turn his back upon the learned of the land, and to act as if only the uneducated had souls to be saved. I should wish that when the Missionary has occasion to address the learned of India, he should, like St. Paul, be able "wisely to adapt to local circumstances'' the mode in which he declares his message. I should wish that here his "allusions to a received theology" should be such as tend to facilitate apprehension rather than such as are calculated to offend prejudice without alter- ing conviction. I should wish his quotations from the philosophers to be more frequently, like St. Paul's, the winning advances of conciliation. If the reader should glance at random over any part of the following work, it may perhaps seem to him that my practice differs from my precepts ; for, instead of showing always how to conciliate, I have done my best to expose the errors of Hinduism, and, moreover, I have dealt with these in the dry dispas- sionate manner of a writer on Pathology. Let us attend first to the latter branch of this remark. The feelingless character appropriate to a patho- nJ^^fthTtaifd-* logical treatise is not proposed as a model "nhtl'hitSs ... . . involved, why to the physician in his practice ; and just {,°,Xithtc"- as little is it intended that the soul-slaying pas^'ioncS" errors, here treated barely as if matters of scientific xii INTRODUCTION. examination, are to be regarded by the missionary in the calm spirit of speculation when he comes to deal with practical cases. In the fashioning and the tem- pering of a sword-blade, military ardour is not called for ; nor even when we are studying the way to wield the weapon. But as nobody would suppose that we undervalued military ardour in the field of battle, be- cause we employed caution and calmness in the pre- vious tempering and exercising of our weapon, so nobody who reflects will probably fail to see that the consistent exclusion of passionate declamation through- out the following work implies no disparagement of passionate declamation in its proper place. Then, again. We can most as to my havlug applied myself to the ex- safely venture , . . on conciliation posmo; tlic orrors of Hmduism, while at the -wliere we best 1 O 7 whTh we^Sust same time I urge the missionary more par- avoid seeming . , , i o • p to countenance, ticularly to cast about lor points of agree- ment, with a view to conciliation, there is here no real inconsistency; because he that best understands both the errors of his opponent and the means of refuting them, is the man who can most safely ven- ture on making advances in the way of conciliation. I would have the missionary know well the errors of Hinduism, and also the means of their refutation, and yet I would have him reserve this knowledge till it is unmistakeably called for ; lest, by provoking a con- prcjudiccsnot test ou grouud where he flatters himself he needlcsslv to , . „ be awakened, jg certain of a victory, he should only need- lessly awaken prejudices which had better, where pos- sible, be left sleeping till they die. Tlicrc appears to be a growing conviction — in our INTRODUCTION. xiii opinion a right one — that the confutation of Theconfma- Hinduism- is not the first step, nor even the ism "not"" the ■*• ' primary indis- necessary preliminary, to the Christianization p^^^^''''^- of India. This impression is akin to that under which Lord Bacon wrote the 35th aphorism of his Novum Organum^ where, through a historical allusion to the expedition of Charles the Eighth into Italy, he ex- plains how he seeks not contention, but a friendly hearing. "Borgia said, regarding the expe- Mr example , , ofLordBiicon's dition of the French into Italy, that they to be followed. came with chalk in their hands, that they might mark the inns, not with arms to break through. Such, in like manner, is our plan, that our doctrine may enter into fit and capacious minds ; for there is no use of confutations when we differ about principles and notions themselves, and even about the forms of proof." But some of those who entertain this just impression, are apt to draw a wrong conclusion by coupling it with another premiss, which is by no means equally just. Bacon, as his readers are aware, did not ignore ^^^^^^l^^X^ the opinions of those who differed from him. Jreted!"'"'*^''' He was thoroughly versed in the opinions of those others ; and this, while it enabled him, in pursuance of the conciliatory line of operations here adverted to, to avoid contention where contention would have been unprofitable, enabled him also to appropriate to the service of sound philosophy all the recognised truth which was not the less truth for having been embedded among the errors of an imperfect philosophy. The fact of Hindiiism's not calling for confutation, does not imply that it may be safely neglected. Though INTRODUCTION. not called upon to volunteer the confutation of Hindu errors, the missionary will do well to prepare himself to accomplish that task effectively when occasion im- poses it upon him. The following work aspires to aid him in this preparation. As invited by the suggester of this essay, we aim at refuting ^' the fundamental errors (opposed to Chris- tian theism) of the Yedanta, Nyaya, and Sankhya philosophies, as set forth in the standard native autho- rities in the Sanskrit language," etc. Let us com- mence with a general view of these Hindii systems of philosophy. A GENERAL VIEW OF THE HINDU SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY. The Hindus have six systems of philo- The mndu '' ^ systems of phi- sophy, named the Nydya^ Vaiseshika^ Sdnkhya, losophy. Yoga^ Veddnta, and Mlmdmd} The Vaiseshika being in some sort supplementary to the Nydjja^ the two are familiarly spoken of as one collective system, under the name of the Nydya ; and as the case is somewhat similar with the two other pairs, it is customary to speak of Hindii philosophy as being divisible into the Nydya^ the 8dnkhya^ and the Veddnta. These three systems, if we follow the com- Fundamental •' ' agreement of mentators, diifer more in appearance than in systems!^''"''* reality ; and hence they are, each in its degree, viewed with a certain amount of favour by orthodox Hindiis. The partisans of one system may and do impugn the dogmas of another ; but, although every one in such a contest nerves his arm to the uttermost, and fights as if his character were staked upon the issue, yet the lances are lances of courtesy, and the blows are loving ones. It is a very different affair when the denier of the Vedas is dealt with. With the Buddhist, xvi A OENERAT, VIEW OF THE for example — though his notion of the chief end of man differs in no respect from that of the others — the battle is a Voiitrance. The common bond of the others is their implicit acceptance of the Vedas, which they explain diferentlij. According to the epigrammatic remark, that theological dislikes are inversely as the amount of disagreement, some might expect that these dissentient accepters of the Yeda should be more bitter against one another than against the common enemy. But epigrams arc not always to be trusted. As Domi- nican and Franciscan are brothers in asserting the in- fallibility of Eome ; so are the Nydya^ the Sdnkhya, and the Vedcinta, in asserting the infallibility of the Yeda against the Buddhist. How they differ. Assumlug, oach of them implicitly, the truth of the Vedas, and proceeding to give, on that foundation, a comprehensive view of the totality of things, the three systems differ in their point of view. To illustrate this, suppose that three men in succession take up a cylindrical ruler: the one, viewing it with its end towards his eye, sees a circle ; the second, viewing it upright before his eye, sees a parallelo- gram ; the third, viewing it in a direction slanting away in front of his eye, sees a frustum of a cone. These three views are different, but nowise irrecon- cilcablc. So far are they from being irreconcileable, that it might be argued that all of them must be accepted in succession, before any adequate concep- tion of the form of the ruler can be arrived at. Now in somewhat such a way the three Hindu systems differ mainly in their severally regarding the universe HIXDU SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY. XVU from different points of view, — viz., as it stands in relation severally to sensation, emotion, and intellection. The Naiydyika, founding on the fact that ^^^ ^^^^^ we have various sensations, enquires what and '*™'^"P°"'*- how many are the channels through which such varied knowledge flows in. Finding that there are five very different channels, he imagines five different externals adapted to these. Hence his theory of the five elements, the aggregate of what the Ntjajja regards as the causes of affliction. The SdnJchya, struck with the fact that we ,tInd-iS'' have emotions, — with an eye to the question tvhence our impressions come, — enquires their quality. Are they pleasing, displeasing, or indifferent ? These three quali- ties constitute, for him, the external ; and to their aggre- gate he gives the name of N'ature. With the Naiydijika he agrees in wishing that he were well rid of all three ; holding that things pleasing, and things indifferent, are not less incompatible with man's chief end than things positively displeasing. Thus while the Niidna allows to the ex- Piecisedustinc- tion between ternal a substantial existence, the SdnJchya ^he^f/nkhya admits its existence only as an aggregate of ''^"' "''°'"*" qualities ; while both allow that it really (eternally and necessarily) exists. The Veddntin, rising above the question as staldtp^i^u"'"* to what is pleasing, displeasing, or indifferent, asks simply, what is, and what is not. The categories are here reduced to two — the Eeal and the Unreal. The categories of the Nydya and the SdnJchya were merely scaffolding for reaching this pinnacle of philosophy. The xviii A GENERAL VIEW OF THE implied foundation was everywhere the same, — viz., the Veda ; and this, therefore, we shall find is the field on which the battle with Hindii philosophy must ultimately be fought. Kespective Tho Niimia, it may be fathered from what subortUnation . . . . of the systems, jj^g boou Said, is conveniontly iutroductory to the Sdnkhycij and the SdnJckya to the Veddnta. Accordingly in Hindu schools, where all three are taught, it is in tliis order that the learner, who learns all three, takes them up. The Nijdija is the exoteric doctrine, the ScinJchya a step nearer what is held as the truth, and the Veddnta the esoteric doctrine, or the naked truth. Correspond- Thls vlcw of tho mattcr susr^ests the distri- ing distribu- '~^^ prclent'work!*' butlou of tlio followlug work. A separate account of each of the three systems is first given ; and then a svmimary of Christian doctrine is propounded, in the shape of aphorisms, after the fashion of the Hindii philosophers, with a commentary, on each aphorism, com- bating whatever in any of the three Hindii systems is opposed to the reception of the Christian doctrine therein propounded. A systematic exposition of the dogmas of Christianity seems to furnish the likeliest means of inviting the discussion of the essential points of difference, — any points of difference in philosophy that do not emerge in the course of such an exposition being, we may reasonably assume, comparatively unim- portant to the Christian argument. HINDU SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOrHY. SUMMARY OF THE NYAYA PHILOSOPHY. The Niimia. as already remarked, offers the General cha- •J -J ^ 'J ' racter of the sensational aspect of Hindu philosophy. In ^'y^ya system. saying this, it is not meant that the Nijaya confines itself to sensation, excluding emotion and intellection ; nor, that the other two systems ignore the fact of sen- sation; but that the arrangement of this system of philosophy has a more pointed regard to the fact of the five senses than either of the others has, and treats the external more fraukly as a solid reality. The word Nijluja means ''propriety or fit- thenZ^.^ °^ ness." The system undertakes to declare the proper method of arriving at that knowledge of the truth, the fruit of which, it promises, is the chief end of man. The name is also used, in a more limited application, to denominate the proper method of setting forth an argument. This has led to the practice of calling the Nyaya the " Hindi! Logic," — a name which suggests a very inadequate conception of the scope of the system. The Nyajja system was delivered by Gau- teJt^book.^^"-^" TAMA in a set of aphorisms so very concise that they must from the first have been accompanied by a com- mentary, oral or written. The aphorisms of the several Hindu systems, in fact, appear designed not so much to communicate the doctrine of the particular schools as to aid^ by the briefest possible suggestions, the memory of him to whom the doctrine shall have been already communicated. To this end they are in general admi- XX A GENERAL VIEW OF THE rably adapted. The sixty aphorisms, for example, which constitute the first of Gautama's Five Lectures, present a methodical summary of the whole system ; while the first aphorism, again, of the sixty, presents a summary , of these sixty. The first aphorism is as fol- Summary of *' ■*■ the topics.- lows:— ''From knowledge of the truth in regard to evidence, the ascertainable, doubt, motive, example, dogma, confutation, ascertainment, disquisi- tion, controversy, cavil, fallacy, perversion, futility, and occasion for rebuke, there is the attainment of the summiim honum.''''^ Beatitude the In thc ucxt aphorism it is declared how result of know- ledge, knowledge operates mediately m producing this result. '' Pain, birth, activity,,. fa^ilt, false notions, — since on the successive departure of these in turn there is the departure of the antecedent one, there is Beatitude." - That is to say, — when knowledge of the truth is attained to, false notions depart; on their departure, the fault of concerning one's-self about any external object ceases ; thereupon the enlightened sage ceases to act ; then, there being no actions that call for either reward or punishment, there is no occasion, after his death, for his being born again to receive reward or punishment ; then, not being born again, so as to be liable to pain, there is no room for pain; — and the absence of pain is the Nyaija conception of the summum honum. ^im: II R II HINDU SYSTEMS OF rillLOSOPHY. xxi Well, have we instruments adapted to the acquisition of a knowledge of the truth ? He tells us : — The means of right kiiow- " Proofs p.^,, instruments of right knowledge], ^^'^^''• are the senses, the recognition of signs, the recognition of likeness, and speech [or testimony]." ^ As the present work is concerned with those errors only which are opposed to Christian Theism, it would be irrelevant here to discuss, at any length, the question whether the Nydya is justified in asserting, or the other systems in denying, that the determining of something by " the recognition of a likeness," is specifically different from the determining of something by the recognition of a sign ; but it may be worth while to explain the nature of the dispute, because it suggests a caution which is practically important. Let the example be the stock one of the Nyaya books. '' Some one unacquainted with the meaning of the term Bos Gavaeus is told by a forester that the Bos Gavaeus is an animal like a cow. Going thereafter to the forest, and remembering the purport of what he has been told, he sees an animal like a cow. Thereupon arises the ' cognition from likeness ' that this is what is meant by the term Bos Gavaeus J^^ 'Now it has been asked, what is there here different from the recognition of a sign ? What is here recognised, is the likeness to a cow, and this is the sign by moans of which we infer that the animal is the Bos Gavaeus. The Naiya- yika replies, that there is the following difference. In the xxii A GENERAL VIEW OF THE case of knowledge arrived at by means of a sign, we must, lie contends, have inductively ascertained that so and so is a sign ; and in the present instance there has been no induction. So much for this disputed point ; and we advert to it in order to caution A caution to r 7 thenussionury. ^j^^ missiouary not to attribute too great im- portance to this and similar real or seeming discrepancies between the several systems, when he meets with any such mutually conflicting views. The dispute is fre- quently verbal only, as in the present instance, where the dispute turns on the question whether an indicated " likeness" is or is not entitled to be called by the name of sign. And even where the difference is real, the Hindus have long ago reconciled all the discrepancies to their own entire satisfaction, so that he who warmly in- sists upon the existence of the discrepancy gains credit only for being ignorant of the recognised means of har- monious reconcilement. He is regarded very much as the confident supporter of some stale sceptical objection to Christianity is regarded in a company of orthodox Chris- tians. Whether the founders of the Hindi! systems attributed no more importance to their mutual discre- pancies than is attributed to them by their modern followers, may be open to question ; but the practical caution here suggested is not the less worthy of atten- tion. Opportunities, no doubt, may occur, where the discrepancies between the several systems may be urged with effect ; and here the missionary must use his dis- cretion, always bearing in mind the general caution not to lay too much stress on what will in most cases prac- tically go for nothing as an argument. HINDU SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY. xxiii To return to Gautama : if we have instruments for the obtaining of right knowledge, what are the objects in regard to which we have to obtain right knowledge by means of the appropriate instruments? These he enumerates as follows: — "Soul, body, sense, objects re- sense-object, knowledge, the mind, activity, ^^^^^y ^^ve fault, transmigration, fruit, pain, and beati- ^''*^''- tude, — are that regarding which we are to have right knowledge."^ Here it is to be carefully observed that the soul [dtman) is spoken of as an entirely different entity from the mind [manas). The neglect of this distinction may bring a debate with a Hiudil into inex- tricable confusion. The English reader who is accus- tomed to hear the words soul and mind {anima and mens — "^^X^ and #t;i^) employed interchangeably, must not carry this laxness of phraseology into any Indian dialect, if he desires to be understood, and if he desires to avoid such misconceptions as that of Eitter, who makes the Nahjaijilm call the soul an atom^ whereas the Naiydyilia calls the soul all-pervading^ and the mind an atom,^ — or that of Cousin, who makes out the Sdnkhi/a to be a materialist, as if he derived soul from IN'ature, whereas the Sdnkhya only derives the soul's organs — external and internal — from something other than soul.^ In the «J|ija, re- garded as substances ; whatever affects the soul being ^ Tim ^|wr ^fTTt ^fT^ ^(€j*rR: i r- -^ souPs then spontaneous mam- ^ festation of the joy which is its ^^f'^ TT^^TT^ ^ ^^ 4 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH own essence, and in its mer- '^Tgr'g 'S^rf Tf% ^nf ^^ gence in deity. Why then, -^^_^j^^^ q^^tr^^Ti disregarding this, need any- ^ thing higher than this be '^T^TW^^li^XT: tTT^- sought? If you say this, J^^^ "f^W^ I ^fif^T then hearken : — Since there is g^f|^^;^ 'fl("rft^T'SIT^- no evidence that there is such „.. r- .... _ . r:^ „.£^<^_r> , a chiei end oi man as is ima- gined by the Vedantins, the chief end of man had to be enquired after, and it is that which was stated before. Moreover, the opinion of the Vedantins shall be subjected to examination in the con- cluding section of Book II. (5) But then, it may be I H, I 'T^ ^^^^f TrR?W^- asked, where is the evidence ^j^^^ fI(^Tf%rsi^WT^T- of this, too, which vou have ^ -s c asserted, viz., that man s chief . . . ^ end is to glorify God and en- ^ ^^^ ^"^if^ ^ m^ft- joy Him for ever? We reply: f^ ^^ ?T^TT^T'I#^ "RW- Say not so ; because the evi- ^^^rT TT^T^"^^^ ^T^rT reach of his hand could enter -rf^ ^^"^ W ^^Tffq •TT'ir- by the front of his head ; but -s >^ that such knowledge really W^^s^T^g^^^TTf^cTT: did belong to the man, those ^'^^^t^^^^ ^^ fif- who candidly investigated the "^TT^T^T"^'^ <1TY'3I WT truth of his words became ^f^^^ ^^^ ^^^-^ ^tT rT assured. The application of ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ <- the illustration to the matter ^^^ ^^^^^^ ^^^Mrl ^ illustrated is obvious. ^^^ T^T^rT^ ^l^Tpfl* (3) If it be asked : But what I ^ I ^f^ ^^TrT^f^l"^- proof is there that the words "^x*ij ^-^^f ^^T^f^^- contained in the Old and New ^ r- . r f^ ^ Testament declare the truth ? ^ . * ^ —then listen. The evidence ^^^ ^ ^"^ ^^^ ^Tlf- of it is of two kinds, external "^T'^tj^rR^^f^ I rf"^ "R^TT and internal. First, the truth- ^^j , ^^^j^.^^^ .j-^.^. fulness of the Old Testament ^ ^^ t^ . rs-s is proved by the testimony ot vj ^ ^ Jesus Christ, the Son of God, WT^ffl^'^ ^Wg^^ T^T^" g CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH incarnate in human form, and fif^j^ Tf^^ ^"^^Trf^ f%- one with God. That Jesns ^^ , ^^^^^^^ ^. Christ possessed the character just stated, is proved by the -fTT^ftT^^^^ITcI, ft^- words of the New Testament, fn I ^TTT'Jftl^'iret 'HJT- That the New Testament de- ^ifMVT'l^'^ T^TT^TTO^W- clares what is true, is proved - ^^^„y^^^^^ f^^. by the testimony of the dis- .^^ ciples of Jesus, who could not "^^"^ W^ft^T^JfT ^^^: have been mistaken, and who f%^T^ I "'IW^ fl^^ f^^- could have had no reason for ^^r f^^^pJIT^ f^^"^f^- asserting what was not true. ^ f^-^^j w^t naf "=rr This point will be discussed ^ more fully in Book 11. The T^ftW^^^'TT^t ^^^T- second [the internal evidence] 1Tr^^^«TT«I^^^17(€r^T- is the tendency of the Scrip- f^^^^^^^^^^^ ^-^^ tures of the Old and New Tes- .-s r- -n -s tament to the glorifying of ^^^^^^^Tf^^^^^WT- God and to the promoting the ^ • TT'Tf^ ^^VT ^-R^^ happiness of mortals, — the f^^T7f^"5l^ I mutual consistency of all their parts, etc. This also there will be frequent occasion to advert to. ^^ . _ (4) If it be said: But, ' « » ^^3 ^^^T^^^" though the Scriptures of the ^^^"^^T^t^T^TTftf^- Old and New Testament be § sft^^ft"^VT^^ T\j^T- not inconsistent among them- ^^^^^^ ^ ^^^JlTrf selves, yet they cannot declare ^ ^ the truth, inasmuch as they "^^ ' ^^^^^ rTWt rfl^T- are inconsistent witli the Veda, ^if^^T^^c^ft^ ^j from the example of the like f^ ^T^^T^T^T^^^^- of us, that God's power of ^-^t^ ^j^ f "^T'tT^T^T^ creation also is dependent on ^. ^^^^^^^,^. an aggregate of concurrent -^ c causes, then we ought to sup- ^'TCT^^l^^l^™^ - pose, from the example of the ^^ ^^'5??! I child's walking with the sup- port of the nurse's finger [see the Raghuvansa, canto iii., v. 25], that your power also of walking [ — grown-up person as you are — ] is dependent on the support of a nurse's finger. (2) And if you say that the , ;^ , -qf^^ ^r\ T^^Tg- world could not have arisen y- t^ ,_r- <-.„^,^, from nothing, because what ^ ^^ exists must have been without V^^ rTT^T^^f^T 'fT^rft beginning, on the rule that "SI^^TTrfxT^^^ Tf^ "^^ I nothing comes of nothing ^^jf^^ f^^^ WITW- f" ex nihilo nihil fit "1, — then ^-.r. -^ we reply : Not so lor there is ^ ^ ^0 proof that there is any such Tl'^fJ^^^ ^cJf^^ HTTW- /absolute rule, and an unsup- '^^(c[Trr^| '35lfq%# ^f^ tf- (ported allegation deserves to ^^^^| ^^ ^^^^^_j^^. be met only by an unsupported -^ [or blank] negative. More- ^^^^^T^Ttt 511^:^- over, were the case as you say, ^"^T*f«T(: ^TrT^ I •fT'rlt HINDU PHILOSOPHY. Miien the feeling, whether of ^?:w^R:WT^Tlt^fTT^Tl'- Aasure or of pain, which at _,^j^^^- ^^^^ ^^^^^. / any moment arises in the mind ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ \ of a man, must have existed ^1^ '^^ R^TW^m,^- from eternity, and as such f^ rfT^TW'^'€'^«TT^^,.„_„„^ ^^„^--„<^<^ - have made all things out oi nothing, because the souls of ^^^^^ ^^T?3T^T^'TTK- men, etc., are without begin- <^Tf^f^ ^^ ! rT^lfl I ^"i- ing. To this we reply: Not so. ^f tt^^ti: ^f^r{ ^l^\- 01 all IS the One iSeli-existent we are both agreed. Such ^- » ^^ '^^ fTW^f^ft" being the case, there remains W^ ^^ifR ^"r^ ^^T^T- the consideration — whence has come the existence of any- thing apart from Him ? — and this is entirely hidden with ^T^T'i'^^^^T^^^^^- 18 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH God, and can be explained by f^ 5TT^: I TT'J ^T'^^nTT- the Self-existent alone, and by ^^^^^_jf^. ^^_^^^_ none other. But this is agreed, ^ ^ '^ ^ r alike by those who accept the »» « authority of the Vedas and by fj^^^ ^ftnsm ^rT^^TSr- those who accept the authority t^^ TTTrff ^^^ tTT^T T" of the Bible, that there is so ^^^^^^^ ^ ^^^^^.^1 ^^. much of difference between the -v^-s r^r- -^ existence of the Self-existent ^^ ^wf^f^^^T^T^^- and the existence of the ^T ^^^ ^ W^^f^- ceding Book as if already es- H f%j blished by the testimony of -s ^ "" His disciples. And all this ^^^'^^^WTT^Tf^f^^- is founded on historical infer- ^^Tt^lfil^T^^^ S^»r- cnce, so that by those can it ^^ r\j ^'^^^^^^ I be clearly understood who, by HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 21 the appropriate culture of their mental faculties, have become skilled in discriminating the reality [from the semblance] of evidence. We therefore proceed to state what valid arguments, in respect of the fact that the Christian religion came from God, are derivable from the stores of history. APHOEISM I. Miracles the credentials a religion. '„5 A religion attested ^lpJIfm'5qV ^ar*T^T«t ^^^ life to the dead; and His ^^_,^^^^f^^^^^ Himself rismg agam alive on -s _.„._r^ ^ the third day after he had T%m75rT^fi?c2[Tftft I been put to death. (2) But, it may be asked: -.«> Granting that miracles dis- ' '^ ' 'I^^TCTTT^T^^- played could besoonly through ^fTrTTpr S^^lft^^llW^ 22 CHRISTIANITY CONTEASTED WITH the power of God,— still what ^f^fj??^^??^^ m:^ TTT proof is there of this that ^ ^^.^ ^^j^^^ f^ such were performed by Christ ? To this question we 'fT^fw^T^T^Tm^ I reply— APHOEISM II. Miracles attested Tf ^^fTT^fT^f?:??^^^^!^- The Christian miracles worthy of credit. by such evidence as ^^^^^-^^^^^^^^^^^ . exists in attestation of the r^ r^ ^ Christian miracles, are to be ^ believed. f% II '^ II (1) -Attested by evidence," , ^ ^ ^^x^f^^rf^ I ^V etc. The import is this, that -w r- r- the proof which should set at ^^^^ ' TT'T^^ T^^T^TH- rest this question is this, ^^f^ ^T'^^f^ ^\ ^^^: that many men, professing ^^^^^^^j^..^^^^^^^. themselves to be original wit- :^^^_^^^^^^^^^, ^^^^^_ nesses oi the miracles per- ^ formed by Christ, voluntarily ^"^^^ ^^^ T'§^i:TrT'Tfr- underwent, as long as they ^^T^«TT^ rr|["'frT'frf%'gT- lived, toil and danger and ^^^^^^^^^ ^sj^^^^^.. suffering, in attestation of what ^ ^ s^ ^^^ ^ they had witnessed, and solely through belief in what they ^f^^lf^TlTT^fi:?!!^:^ - reported. But no such suffer- fti^^fj rrfR^i?^Tf%r[T^T- ings were ever undergone, in ^^. ^f^^f^j ^^|: ^^. the case of any other supposed -. "^ .c miracles, by men alleging ^^ themselves to be original wit- fTTT'rrft-^r^T^^ft^Tf^ HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 23 nesses thereof, in attestation -^t^xPl «T ^^T^^rT^^ of what they narrated, and f^^^^p,^_f^ ^^^^ ^ through belief in the narra- ^ tive : this also is a proof which should set the question at rest. (2) But if the voluntary I ^^ I ^^ ^fiC ^'^^T undergoing of sufferings en- ^iToT^TT^'f'i^^ q^^TTSlt titles persons to confidence, ^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ^^ then whatever is asserted by -s ?%, the Indian ascetics, who volun- '^ '^TT^^iff^T ^^^? tarily undergo the sharpest •ft^fTTT'f^ IR'STT'T^ ^"^^T- sufferings, ought also to be sfT^qf^ift sft ^^^ ^^- accepted. If this be urged, ^^ _^ r^ «^r- r-"^ we reply : Not so ; tor we . ^ , ^ do not say that the mere 'Tf^ ^^ ^^ ^^^T ^t- voluntary undergoing of suf- ^^TT^'WITrT'^ f^^T^^- ferings produces a title to con- ^^^^^^^^ ^ ^^^ fidence, but only that the en- r *^ > ^ r f" durance of suffering, inflicted ^ by others, and endured with no ^^^TpT^f^Tf%rT t^X^- view to any fruit beyond the cT^^T^fT^^ ?I^T I ^T- establishing of a particular oc- ^^^^^^^f^. ^^^^ currence, does so. But the suf- . r- -v ferings of the Indian ascetics '5 ^ S^T^^'g ^TTf^lJ- are self-inflicted, and are not ^I'JT^siT^HW^flTft rf- undergone in attestation of ^f% ^ gr^rf^TpTwf^- any particular occurrence, ^^p, ^.^^^^^^^ ^, That is to say, these ascetics _^^ "* ^ undergo sufferings, seeking, in W^^'TITT^ T^^^Tm some cases, the gratification of ^Tl'^T^fw^^'Tfw^flT - 24 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH vanity, disregarding bodily •^^: ^^if^'W ^ITT'rrr- ease and desiring more the ^^^-_j^f^^^ ^^TtTT- rapturous admiration of the ^ -^ spectators; and, in other cases, "TRTT'^KTtV ^^T^T hoping for supramundane glory ^t^Pf '^•tT I cT"^ T{'^W and enjoyment which they xj% w|fTTf?rfT^: ^ Sft imagine is thus to be obtained ^-r-S fn-gnfH ^jw nifw c^-q in another birth. In the first ^ ^ '^ ^ . case no motive is established f ^^^^T ^^^f^fT^^^^ besides vanity ; and there 'rT^THT^^TT^^^Pf " needs no proof of this vanity, ^t^"^^^ ^^^T^T'lt ^- for the vanity of these is .^^ . ^^^^ ^^^ ^_ equally clear with that oi ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ the silly women who under- ^^ #-^f%^: I f%^^r^ go the pain of tattooing ^^ ^"^Tflf^ ^t^Tf% *rr- and the boring of their |^^^g.^^^^^^^^^^. noses for the reception of a ^ .^ ^ ,"* - nose-jewel. And m the se- ^ cond case there is established ^^^ t^llm •IfJ <7T"f ^T- their belief merely in the as- 'q^"a[i;^TfT^^^^'^'TTTT^T - surances of those who incul- TOi=fn i cate that present sufferings are the causes of future en- joyment, but not likewise the veracity of those who thus inculcate. (3) But the circumstances Km^'tsrr^tll'"^^^:^- of the sufferings voluntarily ^^^-y^^^i ^^^^^^. undergone by the first be- » ^ Hevers in Christ were quite V^^^'^'^^""'^ ' different from the foregoing, ^f^^^'^ft f^^^J ^!f%n^ HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 25 And if in the present day any TfgVT^: ^^rl'^frl'Jm^ believer in Christ, when called ^^^j iTT^Tf^^I^lf^ upon to abiure his religion, -^ ^^ ^ r should prefer undergoing "• death or other sufferings, then ^W^^'Tlft^TT^ f^-s^- the sincerity of his profession xj^^ f%uffT I ^T^'^¥^- of Christianity is what would ^^ ^^^^^^^^^^_^_ be thereby proved : but suf- ^ -^ -s fermgs were undergone by ' ^ ^ the first believers in Clirist, ^g^rlTpT ^I^T^^T^TfT^ in attestation of events which ^^ ^^"^^tV ^f%^^ they had themselves beheld, ^^. ^^ ^^^^^^^^ by their giving attestation ^ ,, ^ whereofthe world was enraged ^"^^ ^Tl^^T^rT^T-^T- against them, and in respect Xf^'R^W^T^'^ft^^^T^- of which they were under no -^-^ xff^ ^^m^f^"5I^ I delusion ; whilst, on the alter- ^^__, .^. ^ ,.. ., native of their bemg deceivers, ^ ^ they could reap no fruit be- fT^^'I^T^T^^Tg^rf^^- sides the anger of God for W^t^^f^^^^^' fl^wf having obstinately borne tes- |^^^ ^^f^^^^ , |^ ^^^ timony to a wilful lie. And „ •f^,,<-,^ • _,_,__; ^ by merely reirammg irom bearing such testimony, they ^^ft 'fm^^Tlft ^"^ ^- might have remained quietly, ^t I '^ft'^TrT^^ fif^Rft clear of the sufferings which gf^^^; | ^lffqz"iXT^^- they underwent. Would men "* ^ -n in such circumstances assert ^ ^ ^ ^ that they had seen what they ^^ ^ *^^ ^^^ ^^- never saw ? would they de- affrft ^^fT^rTTf "'T^'^^fTT" Clare what they had no know- xr^^tt rf^^-Rft T^T rIT- 26 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH ledge of? and employ them- f "ST^^^If^T^^T^T^^Tf^- selves in telling lies in order to teach virtue ? Further, not only having seen Christ to be an impostor, but having UfTTH'fT: cff^ ^t I •T'll^ seen also the result of such ^^ij^frf i imposture in his being put to death, how could they have persisted in bringing upon themselves, for nothing and with a full knowledge of the consequences, enmity, con- tumely, contempt, danger, and death, by obstinately carrying out such an imposture ? It is impossible. (4) Now, in regard to the | 8 | -^^1%: Tf^HftrR- doubt as to what proof there ^^-^. ^^^^^^^ ^:^Tf% is that sufferings were under- -s ^s*^ ^. ^ gone, in the way just men- ^T^T^^??T^f%^Tilft<2TT- tioned, by the first promoters 'SIWT^T^T^ I of Christianity, we observe — APHORISM III. the fiS^ris! ^'^^* sufferings lf^l5rTT"§fT'gfT^^Tf% - *'•—>- should be undergone p^ ^.^^^^-^^^^^f^^^. by the attestors of the miracles ^ ^ -s en\.'t. v^ ^ a ^m '^N'^ ^rf^T^^TIiTT- of Christ was likely, and more- over that they were established ^'J^T^TTfTf^Uf^ II ^ II by cumulative evidence. HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 27 (1) That is to say, it is \ \\ rf^Jlf^ ^ ^t'^ITT- likely that they underwent ^-^^-f^ ^^^^^^^-j^. sufferings, because they were ^ promulgators of a religion dis- ^^^^^^'^^'T^TT^^T- tasteful both to the Jews and f^f^ ^'^^f^ I ^"^ft^T f% to the rest of the world. For ^^j: Tf^^f^ ^^^j^^^ ^^- theJewishpeople misconceiv- ^,,^,^, ^^ ^-y. mg the import oi the W ord oi ^ God in the Old Testament, »^^T^^ ^^T^TT^il^Tfi:- looked for a Eedeemer from ^ ^^T "JTrft'^T'^ft?^ iTfJ temporal bondage, and not ^^^^^^^^f^^^^^^^^ , from the spiritual bondasre of /- /-^ . ^ sin; while the Gentiles re- ^^^^^T^ ^^f'^fiT^ ^- sented the Christian scheme ft^^TT ^^^^Tfft^^^T- of salvation because of its re- W^^^fT^TT^WT^Pfg ^- quiring the entire abandon- f^^ , ^pj^ ^-^Hft: lirf ment of man's natural pride. . '^ Further, that the Christians ^-^^^^^ ^T^^'TT^T :RT- did suffer, is established by the 'TTfw^^RRTTTTWt T^l: testimony ofprofane writers of f%1jfrr I f^^^rrf^^^TR^T- good authority. Again, the ^^f^ ^^^^^^-j^_^|^ ^. writings ofthe Christians them- r- "^ ^ ^ selves furnish evidence to the ^ ' ^"^^^^ "JlTiTWTpr same effect. And these argu- ^rT^pTrfw I ^T^W¥*r#- ments are mutually independ- ^tisrTpr ^^T^?&^f^^- ent, as each separately goes to ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ _ establish the probability of the one common conclusion that ^^ the first followers of Christ underwent sufferings. (2) Now, to the question I '^ • '5m^?T^fT^T^< 28 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH whether no other miracle has ^^i:IT?T[TWf%i;ftmT^ I been established by such evi- dence, we reply — APHOKISM IV. t^rrtt I* ^^ improbable ^^^^^^-^^-^f^^^^. etoTdbefaisf that any false story _ . _ should befalse^ J J ^ ^^^^^^ should have been adopted by ^s» *'^" witnesses of this kind. (1) " Is improbable," etc. \ \\ ^ ^^W^fftf^ I TH" For no fake story of miracles ever has been adopted by wit- nesses of this kind ; and, fur- ther, no other miraculous story "^^"^^rj*^* ffS •!^T^T whatever has been seen to be ^Tf^^xq^ff=gf^fT^^T rf- adopted by such witnesses. ^^^^^^^^.^^^^ ^^. Such is the import. ^ -, ^ (2) If you say, but were not ' ^ ' ^^^ ^"SltrfT^fT- the miracles of Krishna, such ^^^^^^^^ ^^^-^^_j^_ as his lifting up the mountain ^ -s c -s <^ . of Govardhana, attested by witnesses such as attested the fTTfT^m'^^'S^^^'T^- miracles of Christ ? We re- f?r ^^ I ^^T f% ^^^q% ply : Not so. For, even sup- ^^ ^^^f^^^^^^^. ^^_ posing them to be true, we re- ^ r^, ^ ^^ quire you to tell us, by what *• persons, professing to have "tl'^Tfi'SIT ^ITTTTZJ^^f;?! witnessed them, was even the ^f^ ^lirai^ I slightest suffering undergone HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 29 in testimony of theii' belief of them ? (3) But, it may be said, I ^ I 'f^ ^TT: ^TtT TJ^ the Vedas are themselves proof if^TW^Tt^^^WTfT I ^ Sec the question of " Matter," as regards the philosophical terminology of the East and of the West, discussed in Appendix, Note A. ^ HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 33 believe that the whole creation was rather an energy than a worl:^ by which the Infinite Being, who is pre- sent at all times, in all places, exhibits to the minds of His creatures ^ set of perceptions, like a wonderful picture or piece of music, always varied yet always uniform ; so that all bodies and their qualities exist indeed to every wise and useful purpose, but exist only as far as they are perceived^ a theory no less pious than sublime, and as different from any principle of atheism as the brightest sunshine differs from the blackest mid- night."] (4) Why then am I bound | 8 | TT^T"^ ^ f^^ ^- to believe what Christians ^^^ ^^ ^^j^^^T^ ?t4 themselves acknowledge to be ^ r- r^ /- r». ^ impossible, and to abandon '^ ^ '^^^ f^f^^^ ^^^^- my belief in the Yeda, which ^- fiff^ft^ ^^f^^rlT?- harmonizes with the evidence ^TWlf^^^ ^"^^^^^ft which commends itself to me, ^^^j^^- -^ ^ ^^^_ and the matter of which [as ^ «, . -s in the instances just cited] "^^ "^"^ ^^^"^^ ' is accepted even by Chris- tians ? To clear up this 'prima facie view, we remark as fol- lows. APHOEISM VI. ofrevela^or that tho Ycda should have been revealed by God, because, apart from trifles, it TT t%^TT^5%^'^TTt f^- 34 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH reveals only such things as ^^TWt ^frl^^'^^^^T'^ the speculative intellect is dis- _^_ g._^-, » ^ |j posed to arrive at without the aid of God's word. [I say '' apart from trifles," because that to which I refer especially is the great tenet that only One exists, and that nothing but One ever really existed or will exist or could exist. To this conception ^ if not to this belief, every one, we think, must come, who, studying the mystery of being — ^by the bare light of his own reason — determinedly analyses and takes account of every thought and every term in the chain of his speculation. I can articulate the term creation^ and I may appear to attach a distinct idea to the term when I say that it means '' making out of nothing," which I do hold it to mean ; but is it possible for me to conceive that what is so made has in it a principle of existence which would sustain it for an instant if the creative force were withdrawn? I am not able to conceive this. I believe that, by a confusion of mind — or confusion of words — people may persuade themselves that they have a conception of it (as a child may imagine that it has a clear conception of a rou7id square) ; but I find in ray inmost thoughts that I have not. Were there a with- drawal of the support of the One, I cannot conceive otherwise than that all that appears must collapse — as the electro- magnet drops the load that it sustained the instant that it is disconnected from the source of its magnetic power. Can we call such a thing a magnet — a real magnet ? No ; it only appears to be one through the influx of an adventitious power. The illustration is HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 35 an imperfect one ; — as what illustration, of the conception here spoken of, but must be ? Now, while the speculative reason, fearlessly followed, brings us inevitably to the brink of that precipice of Pantheism over which the Yedantin would have us cast ourselves, liere^ I say, is a worthy occasion for the in- tervention of a benevolent Providence, if a benevolent Providence there be ; and here, accordingly, a benevolent Providence has interposed]. (1) The import is this. Had | <^ ( ^^ ^j^I I Ti;^^^ the tenets, that the Eeal is but ^^ , ^^^ j^^ ^^ j^_ One, — that sin, misery, etc., ^ are all illusion,-that Man ^^ " '^^ TT^^^TWlf^- himself is God, and so forth, f%^T^T^t ^f2T^ fls^TT been true, there would be no tw^^^T ^Tf% rl^^^- need of a divine revelation to r- ~x. r- r teach them, inasmuch as these ^ facts might have been ascer- ^^^ ^^^Trl^ I ^T^ tained by the unassisted in- rl^ ^^ll'^'^^^^'fl^- tellect. But, though in Him, :^^. ^^-^^^ ^^ ^ the Almisrhty, we live and >- «^. r- move and have our being, our destiny is at His disposal; ^' ' ^^T^ ^^TT^T^ ^- and so, to set at rest such en- ftr^^rfT ^"^^ ^"^ rl ^m- quiries as this, viz., what that ^y ^p^ ^^^^^^^^ pj_ destiny, alternatively, must _ ^^ ^ ^ p. ^ be, and what are the conditions ^ ^ by which that destiny is to be '^'^ t^ft'T^f^fTT T" determined, a revelation was tTT"^ ^T ^^^rTT ^^rli'S"- needed, and it has been given ^/^ by the Most High. 36 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH [Now, with regard to the declaration above quoted, of Sir William Hamilton, that creation, as usually defined, is unthinkable, we have to observe further, that "un- thinkable" is not synonymous with " impossible." As Sir William Hamilton remarks (at p. 596), " there is no ground for inferring a certain fact to be impossible, merely from our inahility to conceive it possible^ Those, then, who prefer the ordinary explanation of the term creation, are not bound to surrender their view simply on the ground of our inability to conceive the possibility of such a thing. But, on the other hand, a Christian is just as little under any obligation to adopt that view ; and a missionary among the Hindus will give himself a great deal of needless trouble if he insist on inculcating, as an essential element of Christianity, a questionable metaphysical dogma which he himself, in all probability, has only taken up by rote. St. Augustine wisely re- marks, that, " the opinions of philosophers should never be proposed as dogmas of faith, or rejected as contrary to faith, when it is not certain that they are so." He draws this general conclusion from the more special case of questions of natural philosophy. " A Christian," he says, " should beware how he speaks on questions of natural philosophy as if they were doctrines of Holy Scripture ; for an infidel who should hear him deliver his absurdities could not avoid laughing. Thus the Christian would be confused, and the infidel but little edified ; for the infidel would conclude that our authors really entertained these extravagant opinions, and therefore he would despise them, to his own eternal ruin." Moreover, those who, like the Pandits, can really brace HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 37 their minds to metaphysical speculation, are not to be overborne by those more lazy minds which cannot. Dr. Whewell somewhere acutely observes that when a dis- putant professes that he will have nothing to do with metaphysics, you may safely expect to hear him pro- pound some excessively bad metaphysics of his own, for which he arrogates an immunity from discussion. Now I have no sympathy with those (bad and most dogmatic of all metaphysicians) who profess to despise metaphysics, but great sympathy with those who would deprecate the raising of obstructions to mutual good understanding on the ground of points in metaphysical theory which are absolutely indifferent as regards prac- tical results. The thinker is not to be overridden by the talker, who insists that there is " matter" (by which he means he knows not what), because, forsooth, language implies its existence. Language implies that there is redness in the rose, though no thoughtful person in Europe now believes that colour or any other secondary quality exists, as such, apart from a percipient mind. The Idola Fori., the fictions of the Market-place, are not entitled to the implicit deference in general so arrogantly claimed for them by the indolent and impatient, who, while, justly enough, professing that they have no turn" for metaphysics, might advisably abstain from inter- meddling where a turn for metaphysics (and perhaps even more than this) is indispensable for usefulness.] (2) Now, to show how the i ^ | -^^ n^-^ f^^^TT foregoing considerations affect _^^ ^_^^_.j._ j the matter in hand, we assert that— 38 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH APHOEISM VII. Thevedantic Granting to the rf^T^^WT^^^ ^tTT tenet does not *-" Sr'i^flr: Vedantin that no- ^^^j ^T^f?I ^^TprT^- thinp' of itself exists _^^„„^r^ ^r^ .^,„,„t_ besides the One, it neither ^ follows that a man is the One, ^^ ^^^ ^^^T^n=T: ^- nor that a man's endless course ^TT« ^'TT"=WT^*f Tft ^T of existence depends upon him- »i f^-STfTf (| ■^a || self alone. [Since we here use the expression " exists of itself, ^^ it is fitting that we should consider what is meant by saying that something " exists " in a different sense of the word from that in which something else exists. To quote the words of Berkeley (Principles of Human Knowledge, § 89), " Nothing seems of more import- ance towards erecting a firm system of sound and real knowledge, which may be proof against the assaults of scepticism, than to lay the beginning in a dis- tinct explication of what is meant by t/iin^, reality, existence ; for in vain shall we dispute concerning the real existence of things, or pretend to any know- ledge thereof, so long as we have not fixed the mean- ing of those words." Now, according to the Veddnta,^ " Existence or being (sattwa) is of three kinds, — 1, Being, in its highest sense (pdramdrthika) ; 2, such as has to be dealt with {vydvahdrika) ; and, 3, merely seeming (prdtibhdsika).- ' Wc quote from the Vedanta-paribhasha, Chapter II. ' ^n^ II THTTTf^ M «*(N^ir<* II m fd ^l lfit^ II HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 39 Of these, being, in its highest sense, belongs to God {i.e. soul or spirit) ; being, such as has to be dealt with, belongs to the ether [or space], etc. ; and merely seem- ing being, belongs to the [merely seeming] silver, which is [in fact] mo ther-o' -pearl [mistaken for silver by a beholder]." The first of these is equivalent to substan- tial or independent existence, the second to phenomenal or dependent existence, and the third to deceptive appearance. Let us compare this with the views of Berkeley. In regard to the first kind of existence, Berkeley declares, " From what has been said, it follows there is not any other substance than spirit^ or that which perceives."^ Here we have independent exist- ence. But such an existence as this, Berkeley concurs with the Yedantists in denying to the objects perceived. To these (whose "esse" he holds to be "percipi") while he denies " an existence independent of a sub- stance,"^ contending that it is either a direct contra- diction, or else nothing at all, to speak of " the absolute existence of sensible objects in themselves, or without the mind;"^ yet he does not deny a real existence. He says, "I can as well doubt of my own being, as of those things which I actually perceive by sense, it being a manifest contradiction that any sensible object should be immediately perceived by sight or touch, and at the same time have no existence in nature, since the very existence of an unthinking being con- sists in being perceived^ The third degree of existence, 1 Principles of Human Knowledge, § vii. ^ Ibid, § xci. 3 Ibid, § xxiv. It must be remembered that mind and spirit, in Berkeley's language, mean the same thing. This is not the case with WT^ {manas) and '9(|(9|«|^ (F,fnm») in Sanskrit. See ante, p. 23. * Ibid, ^ Ixxxviii. 40 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH inferior to this, he assigns to dreams and creatures of the imagination ; for, in comparison with these, he says, "The ideas of sense are allowed to have more reality in them, that is, to be more strong, orderly, and coherent;"^ and these, being impressed upon the mind " according to certain rules or laws of nature, speak themselves the effects of a mind more powerful and wise than human spirits."^ While Berkeley and the Vedantists, then, agree in holding that existence differs in its degrees, and agree also in allowing the first degree — viz., that of independent or substantial existence — to spirit alone; they differ — apparently at least — in their application of the term real. In examining this part of the ques- tion, therefore, we may expect to come upon some difference of opinion, such as shall imply, on one side or the other, an error requiring to be combated. But before proceeding to investigate this, let us take account of what has been ascertained. We have seen that the Yedantins, in allowing the rank of substantial exist- ence to spirit alone, hold the opinion which one of the most pious and thoughtful of Christian bishops advo- cated, not as merely harmless, but as a grand bulwark of the truth against the assaults of a debasing mate- rialism. Verily, there seems to be anything but an obligation upon us to insist that the Yedantin should give up this philosophical belief, and accept at our hands, as something indispensable to his further pro- gress, " an unknown quiddity with an absolute exist- ence," the term designating which, Berkeley adds, ' Frinciples of Human Knoidcdgc, § xxxiii. ' Ibid, § xxxvi. HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 41 " should be never missed in common talk. And in philosophical discourses (he goes on to say) it seems the best way to leave it quite out, since there is not, perhaps, any one thing that hath more favoured and strengthened the depraved bent of the mind towards atheism, than the use of that general confused term."' With regard to the third degree of existence — that belonging to what presents itself in dreams, etc. — there is no occasion for our here remarking more than this, that the missionary is not likely to quarrel with the Vedantiu for calling such things, in general, illusions rather than realities. What we are more particularly concerned about is the second degree of existence, which some of the Vedantins professedly^ and the others too generally in fact, degrade to the level of the third. The second and third degrees are in effect reduced to much the same level by the employment of the term vastu to denote spuit, and, on the other hand, its contradictory — a-vastu — to denote all else. I^ow the word vastu means a "thing," and since a-vastu, therefore, Aeans '■^not a thing," the Yedantins are disposed to treat whatever comes under the name as being (in the familiar sense of the word) no thing, — or unreal. They are, in fact, not disinclined to own the impeachment, against which Berkeley has in his own case so repeatedly protested, 1 Third Dialogue, between Hylas and Philonous. We beg leave to remind the reader that we are not here professing ourselves a follower of Berkeley, nor urging any one to adopt his views. We are simply concerned to show which of the Vedinta tenets, by being Berkeleian, are not in any way anti- Christian, and not therefore the points against which it were wise to direct our eiForts. Hence we are at present under no engagement to satisfy the reader in regard to all the difficulties which Berkeley's theory may, at first sight, appear to give occasion for. More objections than were likely to have occurred to any single objector, Berkeley himself has antici- pated and replied to. His treatises are open to all, and are not voluminous. 42 CIimSTIANlTY CONTRASTED WITH of holding that the phenomenal universe is delusive, because phenomenal and dependent. The Yedantins — as philosophers — (for at present we are viewing them as speculative ontologists and not as assertors of a revela- tion) — would seem to have been duped by the word thing and its kindred term real. They chose to restrict the name of tiling to spirit, and then jumped to the con- clusion that all else must be nothing^ or nothing of any consequence. Waiving here the question of revelation, which does not fall within the present section of our argument, we would recommend, therefore, that, in reasoning with a Yedantin on his philosophical belief, he should be left in the undisturbed enjoyment of the opinion that there is no independent entity besides spirit, — that opinion being one which need not prevent his becoming as good a Christian as Bishop Berkeley. "We should also leave him to think, for the present, as he may choose in regard to dreams or waking misapprehensions; but we should press him with the unreasonableness of holding that the phenomena of waking existence are beneath the notice of the wise, because, forsooth, they are not entitled to the name of vastu — the name of substance or thing. If phenomena have an existence " that must be dealt with" (ygdvahdrika)^ their importance will depend upon our relation to them ; and if it so happen that our relation to them is to be eternal^ it is idle to disparage their immense importance by dubbing them " insubstantial." Whether their relation to us is to be eternal, and what relation our spirits bear to that Great Spirit whom ^Ye agree with the Yedantins in holding to be the sole independently HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 43 existent — the Self-existent — are questions to be answered only by a revelation. Confining ourselves, for the present, to the considera- tion of ontological theories and terminology, we proceed to inquire what is the Yedantic conception of the relation of the phenomenal to the real. The Vedantists are some- times charged with holding that the phenomenal is the real, — in other words, with material Pantheism. At the same time they are charged with the wildest extrava- gance, of an opposite description, in declaring that the Supreme is devoid of qualities, or, in Sanskrit, nir-guna. With regard to the relation of the real and the pheno- menal, no point appears to have occasioned more per- plexity to the European assailants of Vedantism than the employment of this term nir-guna, so frequently con- nected in the Yedantic writings with the name of the Supreme (Brahm). We find, for example, a zealous writer against Vedantism declaring that, " In any sense, within the reach of human understanding, he (Brahm) is nothing. For the mind of man can form no notion of matter or spirit apart from its properties or attributes." And the same writer calls upon his readers to admire the extravagant notion that Brahm exists " without intellect, without intelligence, without even the con- sciousness of his own existence!" Now, the reply to all this is, that the word nir-guna is a technical term, and must be understood in its technical acceptation. It means " devoid of whatever is meant by the term guna,^'' and the term guna is employed (as already explained at pp. xxxiv. xxxvi.) to denote whatever is phenomenal. In denying that anything phenomenal belongs constitu- 6 .14 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED ^yITH lively to the Supreme Being, the Yedjintin speaks very much like Bishop Berkeley, and like other good Chris- tians whom Milton's epic has not educated into a semi- conscious Anthropomorphism. Berkeley expresses him- self as follows : — " We, who are limited and dependent spirits, are liable to impressions of sense, the effects of an external agent, which, being produced against our wills, are sometimes painful and uneasy. But God, whom no external being can affect, who perceives no- thing by sense as we do, whose will is absolute and independent, causing all things, and liable to be thwarted or resisted by nothing ; it is evident such a being as this can suffer nothing, nor be affected by any painful sensa- tion, or indeed any sensation at all. We are chained to a body ; that is to say, our perceptions are connected with corporeal motions. By the law of our nature we are affected upon every alteration in the nervous parts of our sensible body; which sensible body, rightly con- sidered, is nothing but a complexion of such qualities,"^ and so on. The Yedantin, in like manner, denying that such " qualities" belong to the Supreme, declares, "We ought not to ascribe to Almighty God properties, attri- butes, or modes of being, which are the peculiar cha- racteristics of humanity, such as the faculty of vision,"^ etc. In short, the Vedantin denies that the Supreme either has or requires either senses or bodily organs; and, holding that organs of sense or motion are made up of what he calls gima^ as we Europeans in general say they are made up of what we prefer to call matter^ he •' ' Berkeley's Third Dialogue. '^ The Tathra-bodhini Putrika — the Calcuttn organ of the modern Vedantins — p. 113. HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 45 asserts that the Supreme is nir-gwia^ in very much the sense that we Europeans assert that God is immaterial. We say, guardedly, ''in very much the sense," and not simply " in the sense," because the term guna denotes strictly, not the imperceptille quiddity " matter," but what Berkeley calls the sensible, or the sum of the objects of sense. Theologically, the Vedantin, asserting that the Deity is nir-guna, and the Christian, asserting that God is immaterial, are asserting the very same fact in terms of separate theories, — ^just as two chemists might make each the same assertion in regard to some indivi- dual specimen, while the one spoke of it as destitute of chlorine, and the other spoke of it as destitute of oxymuriatic acid. To say that " the mind of man can form no notion of matter or spirit apart from its properties or attributes," is therefore no reductio ad ahsurdum of the Vedantic dogma that nothing of what is technically called guna enters into the essence of God. Take away everything of what is comprised under the name of guna, — that is to say, take away everything that is perceived through the organs of sense, and take away every sense-organ, and take away all human feelings or mental processes, such as alarm, delighted surprise, recollection, com- putation, deduction, — take away all this, and there remains to the Yedantin, not a mere empty substratum, but the One Eeality, consisting of existence, thought, and joy, in their identity as an ever-existing joy-thought. This, whatever else we may think of it, is something very different from a substratum evacuated to non- entity. We are accustomed to regard eternal existence, 46 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH wisclorrij and blessedness, as attributes of God. The Vedantin, on the other hand, instead of regarding these as attributes of God, regards them, in their eternal identity, as God himself.^ Instead of holding, as they have been so often accused of holding, that God has no attributes in our sense of the term, they hold, in fact, that He is all attribute, — sheer existence, sheer thought, sheer joy, " as a lump of salt is wholly of uniform taste within and without." So far is the conception of Brahm from being reduced to that of a non-entity by the Vedantic tenet of his being nir-guna^ that, according to one of Yyasa's aphorisms, as rendered by Mr. Colebrooke [Essays^ p. 352), '' Every attribute of a first cause (omniscience, omnipotence, etc.), exists in Bralimc^ who is devoid of qualities." It is rather strange that the occurrence of this passage in Mr. Colebrooke' s well- known essay should not have sufficed to awaken a suspicion that the term '' devoid of qualities," must be employed in a sense other than that of an empty sub- stratum — a non-entity. The Vedantin, seeing no occa- sion for any such vehicle of the joy-thought, never postulated any such. The empty substratum, the "nothing," which they are fancied to place in the room of the Supreme, is precisely what, as a nothing, does not enter into their conception of the Supreme at all. It will readily occur to the reader that the Hindu conception of thought, as the ultimate ground of all, independently of any substratum beyond it, anticipates, in its own way, Hume's extreme development of Locke. ' Compare St. John's o\pre,«Mon, " God is love." I do not suggest a parallelism, for the Vedantic eniineiation is meant literally. See avir, p. xxxvii. HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 47 The misconception to which we have now been adverting, furnishing, as it has done, seeming ground for a charge which has been reiterated against the Yedantins under all the varied forms of remonstrance, taunt, anathema, and vii'tuous indignation, has, we fear, done much harm. It has done much to confirm the modern Vedantin in his opinion that his European assailants are incompetent to appreciate his system, and in his belief that the creed pressed upon his acceptance by such assailants cannot have any solid claims on his attention. If it be asked why the Vedantin could not explain so simple a matter as this misconception to the person who blamed him unjustly, we reply, that the asker had better reflect what intense confusion of mind has been again and again occasioned, in every part of the world, by a mutual misunderstanding of a term when the two parties were not aware that they really misunderstood one another. People are always too apt to fancy that it is in regard to some opinion that they differ, when they only differ in regard to the employment of a term. Eeverting to the charge of extravagance in the notion that Brahn exists " without intellect, without intelligence, without even the consciousness of his own existence," it may be well to repeat here what the Yedantin means by the terms thus rendered. By intel- lect (or mind) he means an internal organ which, in concert with the senses, brings the human soul into cognitive relation with the external. This, of course, he denies to Brahm^ who, as Berkeley says of God, "perceives nothing by sense as we do." « By intelli- 48 CHRISTIANITY CUNTRASTED WITH gence, again, the Vedantiu means the conceptions of an intellect, as just defined, which, of course, cannot be present where an intellect, as just defined, is not. Finally, by consciousness, he means the individual- izing of one's-self by the thought of ^' ego," thereby implying an existent " non ego;" and with reference to what is the One sole existent thus to individualize Himself? The denial of Bi^aJwi's "consciousness" in this sense, does not imply unconsciousness in the sense in which we employ the term. It merely implies that the one — who is not three as consisting of existence, thought, and joy, — is an existence, which existence is in the shape of thought only, and that thought an ever existent joy, wdiich never really abandons (how- ever much it may seem to abandon) its absolute unity by shaping itself into the complex thought that ''/ am blessedness." The practically important mistake of the Yedantin, as we have argued in the aphorism, is his assuming that what seems is of no consequence. But, it may be asked, is not this system — ^Adew it as you will — one of Pantheism ? We admit that it is ; but we would recommend that it be borne in mind that there is, as urged by Sir William Jones (see ante, p. 32), a great difference between the Pantheism which, in — or rather across — all that it sees, sees God alone, and the Pantheism (more properly called Atheism) which, beyond what it sees, acknowledges no God. The condemnation due to the grovelling system last mentioned, it were idly mischievous cruelty to hurl against the Vedantin. The man who believes that his spirit is in the same category with his digestion. HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 49 that his soul is a function of his brain, as the secre- tion of bile is a function of his liver, let us not, in common justice, insult the Vedantin by mentioning in the same breath with him. If the Vedantin be a Pantheist, he must be one of the other order, — a spii-it of a far higher mood, erring though he be. Let us be cautious, too, lest we condemn him on a charge which he repudiates. Two expressions, familiar in the Veddnta, are usually cited in contending that the Ve- dantin confounds the Creator with the creature, viz., the Vedic text, " All this is God," and the illustra- tion of the spider spinning its web from its own body. The passage in the Veddnta-st'tra, where the illustration of tlie spider occurs, we render as follows : — " Thought [i.e. Deity] located in ajnana [i.e. in the aggregate of the phenomenal], which has the two powers [of obscur- ing the light and of projecting its own shadow'], is, in virtue of itself, the efficient cause, and, in virtue of what it is located in, the substantial cause ; as the spider is in itself the efficient, and in virtue of its hody [ — which body is not the agent, but the locus of the agent — ] the substantial cause, as regards that pro- duct [which we call] its threads."" N^ow, as no one charges the man who says that the spider made its web from its own stores, with saying that the web is the spider, so we think that no one is justified in de- ciding that the Vedantin says " The world is God," on the allegation that the Vedantin virtually does say, 1 See ante, p. xxxvi. 50 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED AVITH " God made the world out of stores of His own." What were those stores ? They are, in the creed of the Vedantin, just what amount to the sense of the word potver, the word saMi, the recognised syiionyme for the aggregate of the phenomenal, for the ajndna^ — i.e. for that which is not God.' \ But the reader will be ready to exclaim, how can we be said to be unfair in assuming that the Yedantin says "The world is God," when there is no dispute that a Vedanta text declares, "All this is God?" We reply, that there is a distinction between "the world" and " all this," which, however wire-drawn it may seem, yet requires to be recognized. " The world'' is the display of the phenomenal. It is not this, as we have shown from the Veddnfa-sdra, that the Yedantin regards as God. But when he looks on the phenomenal, the Yedantist feels that an unchangeable reality must underlie this changeable ; he recognizes, through the phenomenal veil, the one reality ; and if he exclaims, ^^ All is God," is the exclamation necessarily profane? Understood as we have put it, the phenomenal being ignored as a reality, we think it is not. He only says, " All that is real in this visible is the God who is invisible." I have discussed this again and again with learned Hindus, and I here state my conviction that those who condemn the Yedantins as Pantheists on this particular ground, would in like manner condemn St. Paul, if — not recognized as St. Paul — he were to reappear, declaring explicitly what was implied in his asserting of God that in Him " we live and move and have our being." > see auu, p. xxxiii. HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 51 In making these remarks, we have been regarding the system under its philosophical aspect, and we have therefore sought our data in the systematic treatises of the school. But there is in Bengal a modem sect of Vedantists — to our mind not the least interesting among the followers of the Vedas — who deny the authority of the systematic treatises, and allow of no appeal except to the Vedantic portion of the Veda itself. We cannot reasonably dispute their right to take up this position. The claim is not other than that which Protestants asserted at the Eeformation, — the privilege of having Scriptui^e as their rule of faith and not uninspired dictation. The removal of the con- test from the champ-dos of the systematic treatises to the wide and diversified region of the Upanishads^ is, indeed, inconvenient for those who would rather meet their man than hunt him. But the challenger cannot claim the choosing of the ground, and the missionary who heartily seeks the conversion of these men will seek it vainly if he shii-k the task, however irksome, of ex- ploring the field where alone the Yedantists of modem Bengal will consent to be found. He must try to take accurate account of the Upanishads ; that is to say, he must not content himself with picking out a few of the passages which are most open to ridicule, but he must endeavour candidly to understand what it is, in these treatises, that satisfies the modern thinkers of Bengal. The study, if entered upon in a mocking spirit, might at least as profitably not be entered upon at all. In the aphorism on which we have been comment- 52 CirillSTIANlTV CONTRASTED WITH ing, we affirm that, even granting that nothing of itself exists besides the One, it neither follows that a man is the One, nor that a man's eternal destiny depends upon himself alone. (1) But [the Hindii may | ^ | ^^ ^f^ ^^TW^- ask] if the identity of i\.^ ^^^^^^^^^ ^f^^^ human soul and the divine ^^ rs . . rv soul be denied, then of what ^t^^lTO^^^^^T^^- nature do you hold the human %'^^ Tf^TT^T'^T^Tim I soul to be ? In regard to this doubt we declare as fol- lows. APHOEISM VIII. Ti.c eternity Humau souls, Wt^TT^T'ft ^tIt^ S^^- of human souls, ' i « ' *i < « -^ >« -> o„«ui„.. though created, will -,^ ^^^^ „ ^ „ have no end. (1) If it be said that iu , ^ , ^^^ ^^ ^^^_ that case there is a contradic- tion to a necessary rule, viz., ^^^^^^ f^^Tft^f^f^T ft that whatever had a begin- ^^fl^V ^f^ ^ I rTTf" ning must have an end, we ^f^^^ ^T^THT^TrTJ ^- replv : Not so ; because there r^ -v *-. ^^ *-, is no proof that such is the ^ >» necessary rule, and because ^^^ ^^^T^^l ^T^TT^^- the blank assertion of it can •TTf^?TT"'2?T^ S^^T^^T"^- be set aside by a blank de- ^^^^^^j^^f.^ qg^^f<- nial, and because, as in the "* r- <- . 45thAphorismofBookI.ofthe ^^'^■^^'^'r^^^ ^^ T- Hanhhja Pravachana, so here ^^Trf^l ^ft'g ^SI tu ^- HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 53 too we may say, this [—that ^^rgif^rfT^^^ui Tf%fT^- nothing can be endless which ^t. ^ ^^^^^^^^^^^J^_ had a beginning — ] is, "a mere -s <- ♦ t -s denial on the part of unintel- ^^^^ ^^^^ ^^"^ ^^f^ ' ligent persons." Further, ^^^^g ^ T^^f^^f^T ^^- God, who is able to sustain f^ f^^-j-^^^^ ^-^ ■^■^, for one moment those whom _„^,5^^:n__^,„^^„^„^ he has created, can with equal ^ ^ ►^ ♦^^ ^ ease sustain them during an ^'^TpTT?^ V^ ^^Wmi- eternity. The question only ^if^^Wt^T'^wf^^f^Tft remains, whether or not He tjT^-^g-r^ 'Jlf^'^T "^^rf chooses to do so. To this we ^ -s -v *^ reply, that, m the book which ^ we hold to be the revelation ^T^^'^T^ f^ 'TT^ftft rj of the will of God, we are ST "JT^TI | ^^"^f^rTf^^- informed of the promise of ^j^^^^j^^ ^^^^^^^f^. God that He will sustain the ^-. .c s. ^ human soul m existence through eternity. But the ^•^' ^^^fTT^TTT^^^TWf doubt is not to be entertained ^•^^«f=g rfg^iTT^TWft^- whether there be any proof ^^.jj,. ^^f^^f^^^^, that that book reveals the ^ will of God, for we have already discussed the esta- blishment of the authority of that book by the argument from miracles, and by the tes- timony of competent persons who underwent suffering in this world solely for the piu'- pose of attesting those miracles., _ 54 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED AVITII (2) Now we bring forward | ;^ | ^^ ^#|"^^^^^- another proof that the Chris- ^^ ^^^^^_j^^^^^. tian religion is from God. ^ APHOEISM IX. Evidence of Tho Christian re- Hf%^^f^^^TJ^TW»f ^- Christianity -J & She^'. "' ligio^ i« established ^^^^: ^^^^^f^^^ H by the evidence of prophecy. ^ (1) If you say, but if pro- I ^ I ^^ ^fT ^f^^^fw: phecy be a sign of authority, ^^^^^^j^^ ^j^ TTtT^T- then why should not those -n -v e-s -s lists of kings, which were ^ ^ «\ cv drawn up in the Furdnas be- ft^i;T TT^^^T^^ f%ft- fore those kings came into fTf *i f%^T^T:iT'^ ^^fTpF existence, be worthy of our -^ ^^ ^^_^^^^^^ ^^_ belief? We reply : Not so ; ^ ^ because we see there nothing ^T^Tc^tT: q^^q^^T^- to determine whether these ^T TTrT ^tT^ ^TT^^ T\f^- lists of kings were drawn up ^^g"^ ftf%T^^^^^T ^^Tf% ^Tpfft^ prophecies regarding the ft^^flicir ^"^^^^^ITT- Messiah, to be found in the ^^^ ^4#f%a^ ^q^>€I- Old Testament, the Scripture ^ ^ . ^ of the Jews, represent the ^ ^ Anointed One under the seem- ^T^^jf f^^f^w^:f%^T- ingly irreconcileable charac- "^IT^^^f^ft ^"^ ^ftm^- ters of a conqueror and a suf- ^^ i^^^j^ ^TKTW ferer. But the Jews, casrer ^ ^. for deliverance from the ^^^^^^^^^^"^ f^^ tyranny of strange governors, ^TTJ^TTT^ITI ^^*^ ^^W looked only for a Messiah who TI'^iT^^^^Tf^^i TIVtRt- should cause the overthrow of ^^^ ^^^^^^^^ ^ ^^^ their enemies. When Christ ^ <^ r- • came on earth, to suffer, and W l^'^'^^'J "Tq^f- to conquer sin, death, and (^IT^T^ ITT^i^W »jgw- hell, then the Jews denied ^^tTO rT^T ^'^^^Tigl^ that this was the Christ's ^^f^^j^ p,j^,-q^. ^^. office ; — to this day they -^ "^ look for a temporal deliverer. ^^^ ^^ '^'^^ ''^^^ Yet when the matter is con- "Jllfl^^ | m^Tri ^^j^j^j- 56 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH sidered, it appears clearly $ ^2:^?IrT^ Tf^iT^ ^^ that the prophecies do not in ^f^^™^. ^^^,y^^^^^ every respect consist with a #-^ <-n s\ *^ -s -v merely triumphant and tern- ^^^^J^ ^^^^ T^^ poral deliverer; but they find ^ ^4-^^: ^^T^ TTT-g^pfT in every respect their fulfil- ^cf-g'-^f^^fj rfT.' ^^^^t ment in the history of Christ. %^. TTTTT^f^ I (2) The veracity of the , ;^ , ^j^^^^^^^^^. Jewish Scriptures, of which .c r^ i-v we possess volumes transcribed «v ->» several hundred years ago, as ^"^^ ^TT'^T^^^^^fTT^T- well as translations into liun- »fTWT^TW^^''iTTrT ^f^of- dreds of languages-so that, ^^^^ sfq ^^W^^ ^Z]- even if an invention, yet, like ,. ^ -^ theYedas,withtheir[volumin- ^'^^' ^^T^T^^^f%?fT%- ous and various] commentaries, ^ 'Jlflf^^lT^T^t ^W^" they could not be supposed to ^^^ii^5!n"*lt ^TV^^^TT^- be a recent invention — is cor- *- ^ roborated by iresh evidence, ^ through the discovery of cities ^^^^4 ^rfT^t ^T^ft^t ^- [such as Nineveh] which had ^^ rfT^t ^^f fSff^ftlftw- disappeared under the sands ^^^^^WrTT ^^^ ^f%^- of the desert, exactly where ____-,_^_ the manifestation, on the ful- ^ filment of the matter, that each really was a prophecy. (-1) ^"ow, it were fruitless , ^ , ^^^^^^ Tifij^- to brino; forward evidence that c _ ^ ^ a particular booK contains a revelation of the will of God, ^^Tl^^TlI^^ TTi^TWTT- if evidence have not been ^ij;^ f%'K??^fl7fft'^?^HT^ shown that there is a God; j^^-^- , ^ ^^^^^^^ so we have to consider whe- . ^ thertherebeaGod. Accord- ^T^ 1^^^ ^TT'fll^T^^T- ius to the teaching of the ^St^^g ^Mn^ ttfw 58 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH Veddnta, there is really no ^f^ f% sT^^^ll^siTfiT^- will of God; for if by the ^ ^^^ ^^ ^^^^^^^^^^ word God, is meant Brahm. ^ ^ ^ ^ then that consists oi know- ^ ^ ^ ledge only, and is what is ^^. I 'I^ M t^T^TTT- meant by the word Veda itself. ^TIT^ Tf^ ^^^frf %rrm- And the Veda cannot be the ^, , -^^^^"^^^p^^^ revealer of the will of God, », else we should find a duality ; ^ whereas, according to the creed of the Yedilntin, there is no distinction between the Veda and the Lord. (5) Again, according to the , ^ , ^^ ^^^^^^^^. SdnJchya creed, there is no ^^ <-». -s -^ .^ needofackno^yledgingaLol■d, T'S^^^t^T H^T^I^^ ^T- since everything is accounted f% "^"^fl'I^T ^^c^"^! IT- for by Nature, the unintelli- UfS^qi:!^: | ^sgcf^qf^^j- sjent maker of worlds. In __,„^^„^_,,^ . „„„ ^^„ reply to these opinions oi the ^ ^ -v ^^ Veddnta and the Sankhya we f^^^^ ^'^TR ^^^tTT- have this to say,— that if it fFfft'^^TTT^T ^^^^^^ be not agreed that there ex- ^-^^j ^j^^^^^^^^^^^. ists any thin 2r besides Brahm, . ^ ^ then there is no loundation for the employment of argu- '^'^ ^ ^f%^T^fif^ i- ments, either affirmative or ^T^ ^^fH ^TrT^rff^ ^•T negative. If there is any real ^^^^^ ^^_-^_^_^^j^^^_ Yediintin in the world, then to argue with him would bo ""^^"^^ ^^"^ ' ^^^ like arauinsr with a child or a ^TfTHW^IU^IWaiT^^fl- i?^firf^ I HINDtJ PHILOSOPHY. 59 madman. In the words of llf^^^ •TT^Vf^R^T^ ^^- the 26th Aphorism, Book I., ^ ^^^^ ^^^^_^^|-.^. of the Sdnkhya Pravachana^ " There is no acceptance of the inconsistent ; else we come to the level of children, mad- men, and the like." (6) We commence, then, a | 4 | '^si^ ^7^7gR?|^%^- separate Book, in order to e ^ . ^ #^ _^ establish that the Creator ^^ ^, ^ of the world is intelUgent : a ^ ^Tf^ff^^g^^T^ScT point acknowledged by the ^ T ^ 31 1 ^ "J^f^f^^ ^^^T- NaiydyiJca, but denied by the ^^^^j^y^^^j-j^^y.,^ I Sdnkhya Institute, which is the vestibule of the Veddnta.^ ^ See p iviii. 60 CHRISTIAXITr CONTEASTED WITH BOOK III. NATUKAL THEOLOGY. Now, following out the ar- rf"^ f%fg"f TTf^^ ^'i'm- gument already cited as cur- -^ ^^^^^^^-^-^ ^-^^^^. rent among the Naimmkas, . ^ _ ^ Yiz., that the earth, with its ^ ^ sprouts, etc., had a Maker, ^^^T^Tlf^ft^^^"^ - because it is a product, and it f%f^f^(2T*f'7T«T ^f^lf^^if- could not be made by the like ^^^^^^^^^ ^iJ^^7^. of us ; so that one different . "* ♦ /- ^ "* s^ from us, a God, must be its ^ ^^ ^^^^^ f^^'T^Tfr Maker,— we first set forth the f^^^^f^ I principle on which the argu- ment is based. APHORISM I. Evidence of It is scttlcd that rf Trf«FT^r^f%f^^fIfT - a Designer. the Cause of the _j--j.^^^^^-_j^^j^-j.^^^ world operates intelligently, r- c *.^ r^ /- V A /i ^%^^^TfT ft^fff II \ II because we see means adapted >i ^ e^ ^ ^ to the production of ends. HINDU PHILOSOPHY. Gl (1) Now, in opposition to \ \\ ^^ "Rlif^^^T^f^;- the Sdnkhyas, who say that ^^^ ^TrTWW ^^^r^T^- the world is not made by one f^ ^ -n <- '^ operatmg mtelhgentiy, be- cause Nature alone may, un- 'Tgfll^^ ^TrT^W ^-^j- consciously and spontaneously, ^ ij^-^^ ScfT ^^^ «rf^- construct the world, just as ^^^^j^f^^-^j^^ ^^^. the milk spontaneously and *^ unconsciously becomes devel- ^'^T "i^^^^ ^ oped in the udder of the cow for the sake of the calf, we declare as follows : — APHOETSM 11. TheSankhya [Wc rCJect thc f ^^''^Tft'^' ^T^ ^" Sr^' argument of the ^^^ ^^. ^^^^f^T^. 8ankhyd\ because the illus- tration is not a fact ; for it is '^^^^v" ^ " quite impossible that the milk should exert itself vspontane- ously for the sake of the calf. (1) In explanation, let this , ;^ , ^^^^^^^^^^ ^. story be heard by the atten- ^ tive: — A certam king's son, c\ ^ -^ ^ observing that, always at the ^f^f^t^WT^^'T^^^ft- time of his hunger's becom- f%^7T^ ¥f%(f%fT^fT^*J^" ing sharp, a variety of food, ^^^^^^^^^^^^^ brought by the hands of his "^ .c immediate attendants, is set \ , before him, fancied that cool'cd ^^ Tf^ ^^ ^^^ llWr\\ 62 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH food developes itself spontane- tr^fff ^ir^"^ ^fj ^T^T ously for my sake, and he ex- ^^^^^--^^ ^ pfffV- pressed himself to this effect before his attendants. But ^^"^'^^ ' ^"l ^^^"^ ^^ they, having smiled to one fTT?!^ ^^^ft^^T f^f%f1T- another, instructed him as fol- .ff f^^iTT*lt ^^f'?^'?^ lows:-" Prince! this food is ^^^^ ^z^zT^K ^- the result of arrangements es- ^ . r- r- s*^ tablished by the will of the ^^^''T^ T^f^T^ > ^^^ king, thy father ; for nothing iTli^ Sft ^W^Wt r^rf^- unintelligent, such as a jar or ^f^^f^'^T ^r^^pfT^ ^(J a web, is ever seen to exert r^^ ^r^ itself spontaneously." Just ^ ^ so, too, in the case in hand, ^^1^^ ^'^^ ^rf%^T^ does a melancholy smile come TT^^*?^ra^T1- it he in the bonds of Ignorance, irat'l^^T^ «f%<5»r?(^ HINDU I'lIILOSOniY. 63 it may recognise its divinity "^^T^^^^TT I rf^lf^ ^f%- through instruction by a fit jrj^^-% ^^^^^^ ^. person, as was the case with r^^ *-. -s -n"* tne king's son [m the story given under Aph. L, Bk. IV., r^^s^tftrTT S^^^^T T^" of the SdnMiya Pravachanci], pT^^TIT'T ^T'^ rf ^-^-^ as follows: — "A certain king's ^Ttofj ^f^^^^Trq": 3?^- son, iu consequence of his be- ^^f^ q ^^;^> j^^^^ ing born under the star of the -^ ^ "* tenth [and unlucky] portion ^^^^ > ^ ^^T ^f^c^T^ ^T" [of the twenty-seven portions '^T^TpTTTT't W^T rITf%- into which the ecliptic is di- q^ XT^HT^^^R^^^ ?:T- vided by astmlogers] having ^,^^^^^ , M^^^JfK^- been expelled irom his city, ^ ^ ^ and reared by a certain for- ^^^^s ^fT^^f^^T^WT- ester, remains under the im- ft^'^T^r^^^ rf^f'Sr T" pression that ' I am a forester.' f% ^y^|^^^^^^^^.jj^_ Ha vino- learned that he was .^^r^ _ . alive, a certain minister m- j^ formed him, ' Thou art not a "^"^^^ ^^^ ^^ ^f%- forester : thou art a king's ^^W* ^^TTt?5r^ ^^- son.' Just as he, immediately, ^^^^^^-^^^ ^^^ ^_^^. having abandoned the impres- -s . rv i- /► -s sion 01 his being an outcast, falls back on his royal condi- "^^f^ft ^rf^ I ^^T^^ I tion, saying. ' I am a king;' ?TT"?7ir^^TT[l^W ^^fg- so too it [the soul], in conse- ^^^^^^. .^^^_^^^^^_ quence of the instruction of ^ -s some kind person, to the effect that 'Thou, who didst origi- ^J ^f^ TT^J^ TT^J-^- nate from the First Soul, which ^*fxf^^rf ^pj tj^ ?;T^T:r- ^t^-j^^t^t: im^^ ^'w- 64 CHRISTIANITY CONTIIASTED WITH manifests itself merely as pure "^t^Tf^^^^ I cf^^ '^^^ Thought, art tliyself a portion ^^xR^Tpr T:rT^§^T^- thereof ' having abandoned the ^ _ -. ri. mpression of Nature [or of ^fq 1 down [in Aph. 1 oi this ±>k. ^ III.] that, through our seeing ^^TT^H^fT<^T^^TfT^ the adaptation of means to ^(^"^^Tft 3%^^^T"'^ ends, it is demonstrated that ^^^ {^.^^^^ ^^ ^^^. there is an intelligent Maker -s ^ ^^ of the world. We proceed to ^ ^ show how it is that His intel- ^^^ft^^^ftf^'T^TT: ligence [or designingness] is TT^TirT I rr^Tf% I ^rf^ f%- thus proved by our seeing in ^^ tt^oI^ W f%^ ^- the case before us the employ- ^ _cv ^^ -n . ^. , c A ^ A* 1 ^^I^^T^ f^^m^^ fo- ment of means adapted to ends. ^ ^ To explain [in words adapted ^TT^ft ^f^ ^T^^'^ftT HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 67 from those of Lord Brougham's ^j-^ ^Tsj ^"^ft"^^ r\\. Discourse, p. 32]: -A the- ^^^^^-f^^-f^^p,^ _ ologian, on seeing any pur- . ,^ . r pose manifestly accomplished, ^^^ ^^'^^'^ ^^^ ^1^- always reflects as follows :— frTlI^^^rr^T ^fTT'^- '^f I myself desired to per- ^T'TTgm^T^^ RlT^^T- form this operation, and were _^__iv^__, _r^« _-^r- acquainted with the laws on ^ which its performance de- ''' "^^J ^f^^%^^^T- pends, should I accomplish it Tt<^'Trf^T^"RiJV^^f?r^Tf- by any other means than the ^^y^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^. means here seen to be em- ,-1: ^ -s^ ^^ ployed lor its accomplishment : If not, then it is clear that ^Hf^ » some intelligent agent, pos- sessing a knowledge of what is required to be done for the production of this result, has employed those means in pro- ducing the result." (2) Having thus shown the , ;^ , ^^ ^^^-^^^^_ scientific o-round of the deci- ^ r- ^ sion that the employment 01 s» ^ «^ means with a view to an end t^^t "TTT^T^ "^^ "^"^^ presupposes intelligence, now ^f%^ rf^J^ ^il\ if?I^T- desiring to set forth a narra- ^^^^_^ ^^1^^"!^ ^^^__^ tive illustration to exemplify "^ the ground thereof popularly, ^ we state the illustration in an aphorism. 68 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH APnOEISM V. J^'^T As a boat. ^^ „ ^ „ illustrated. " '-I'l^ll A «l (1) And the narrative re- garding the boat is this, e.g., I I ' ^^^T^^ Tf^^T- When a man of the woods, ^^t^ ^W ^^T ^f%^T- having arrived at the bank of ^^^ cfftrftt ^n^I ^^- a river, beholds the branch of ^ _^ a tree carried down by the T^'' ^tWlT ^ W- stream, then perchance he ^^^^^m ff^T ^''^ reasons thns: "This tree, the -^^ ^^^"^^m * ^ the Son, and so also the Holy ^^ ^f^'^T^ft Tf^^^ T3r^ Ghost, and further that there T?;^(5j"ft tj-^^fl rf^T:jT:ipfrif is but one God ; but we are ^^ ii « n not told how this is to be ex- '^ plained. (1) If the Vedantm throws | \ | '^^ ^^^rfTT ^''3T?f?J out the doubt-how is this f^^^^^^f^^^^;^^^. possible, — to be in the shape of ^ ^ three, and yet one t this is ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ " our first reply. If the truth ^f^ m^^. wf^^fttft: HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 73 of the Christian Scriptures has if^^^i^lTT^^ 3?TTrT^ been established by the pre- fj, • ______ ^,^jn -n ceding arguments, and ii these , ^ contain statements whicli in- ^^TTt^^^T^TiTt rlf% r\- form us of a unity in trinity, ^^^'^V^XI^ S^^S Sft then, though it be not stated ^f^ ^^Tfft ^TJT^^T^^ I in the Scripture how this is to be explained, yet these statements must be in some way reconcileable. (2) Our second answer is , ;^ , f^^^ ^^^ ^|^ this. If it be hard to conceive -s ^ r- r- how the One God subsists in ^^ ^ ^ ^ Three Persons, it is as hard to %^ ^^'TTf^TTWT ^ift- conceive how the One Eternal ft;^T*I ^ft\W^^ffr ^TTT- Spirit has produced human ^^^^^^^^^^^^-^^^^ thinkins; souls personally dis- ^r *,^ ^ ^ _ tmct from Himself ; — yet this ^^ distinct personality is proved 'T'^'J^W^l^ToETTfT^ft^: I by the separate self-conscious- ness of souls severally. (3) Oar third answer is this. I ^ I ^^^^tTT ^f^ If the Vedantins say that it is ^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^-^^^ the One Sole Spirit which is r^. ^ manifested in the form of all ^ *" ^ human souls, then what stum- f'^ ^f^ ^T?:^T^^T2lf%- bling-block is there in the way ^^T'fT^ ^^T^ fii ^TV^ I of theii' acceptance of the doc- ^{^ ^ ^^ ^^^^ ^^^ ^_ trine of the Divine Trinity? -^ r>. r-'^ r^ For if the one doctrine have T^:^^^: ^3iWf% ^¥t- beeu accepted by them on the '?V'?^5?i: ^\V^^ 5!<5 g^ 74 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH authority of the r^Ja, then they Xf^•^ rjf^ Tfmf^rl^J^m:- oiight to be prepared to accept ^^^^j^ ^f^ ^: ^^^- the other doctrine, since it has been ah^eady proved that the ■^ Christian Scripture, and not the Veda, is the true autho- rity. (4) Further, it is not ne- laifif^^^^Y^^^"^^ cessary to hold that whatever ^^j^-^^|^^^^^^^^^ transcends our comprehension ^ r- r^ ^ , involves a contradiction. The ' ^* prophetic description of Christ, ^ft ^^^ ^^r{^ Sft W as a sufferer and yet trium- ^tT^ T«STT^T ^f^^^ft?- phant, as the humblest and yet ^^^_j^ _j^^^_^^^^ ^ the highest, etc., was matter ^ ,^^ of mystery until explained by ^TWrTT blishing the Divine Trinity ; PT^^'^^: ^^^^^TTr lor he, acknowledging many ■^TT^<^TTT«T>^^^^fT'^^ incarnations of the Lord, if ^tWttTT^^R ^TV^T- can find no absurdity in ac- -s knowledgmg the incarnation ^ ^ ^ of Christ ; but the only ques- ^^ ^^T^TWWWT^^T- tion open to him is, which ^"RrfTT.' ^=f»Tf^ ^ft Scriptures are they by force ^^^^ ^^ ^T^^T^: I ^- of the authority of which the ^ incarnation of the Lord is to ^^TT^^^Wm^^TOTT - be acknowledged? And to f^'aiftTTl^r^^^^^^TW- the question how an incarna- "Jff^TT"^ TJ^tT^ rf^^^T^ tion could take place? the j^ ,raf,f%^W ^tlflft counter-question — ho ware our souls linked to our bodies ? ^TVTHTWTrT^ I -^is a sufficient reply; — for. 80 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH although we are ignorant of that, this in no way invali- dates the fact in question. (3) Now, to consider the | ^ | ^^^^T^rTTTlT^- purpose of the Incarnation, ^^ ^^^^|^^ ^^ijf^ I we declare as follows . — APHOEISM V. the'Ke^ent. Thc Lord bccame ^gftjTfT^frJTT^TTT^- incarnate as the Son, to make ^^ ^^_^^^^ ^^^^ „ ^„ atonement for the sins of men. ^ (1) If it be asked, how | ^ | ^^ ^^^i ^^^T could atonement be made .^^^^f^^f^j^-^^^^ through the acting thus ? we • /-. -v r^ reply: Everywhere, eveninthe ^^^^ ^f'l^^^ ^T^t%- Veda, etc., it is seen to be the Tr^"^^fT Tf^ rTTW^ ^^- natural conviction of mankind f^-sgf^ ^^'^ J{*i'mT*\J f\f^l that sin requires atonement. „„,^<- -s IS only lent by Ilim to us tor ^ <^ ^ a few years; and thus these ^T^fT: ^^f^^^^<^T^^- HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 81 offerings can haveno efficiency ^^^ ^-^^^^^^^^ except throufijh God's favour ; s».-s -s ^ and so we are miormed, m the ^ Law, what sacrifices God gave ^"^ T^^^^^TfTfT^I rf^T"^ the Israelites to understand rTTf^^'^-T^mc^f^^'^ftr- would obtain His favour. A ^^ ^^" ^ir^^m ^^^ sacrifice, effectual in itself for rs c •% the removal of sin, can there- ^T^t^^^m^ I ^rT^^T- fore be provided by God alone ; ff^W m^ft'^Tg^^ ^- and such a sacrifice, we learn f%^Tff ^i|^^^ "JT^^ ^ from Scripture, was provided ^^^^^^^^^^^^ ^.^ ^^^^ through the Incarnation. How ^ ^ God is satisfied even with such ^'T^T^T^^^^rf I W^f- a sacrifice is a mystery, and ^mf^V^lft ^f%^T ^^ consequently not to be ex- ^^^f^ ^ ^^f^f^ ;f^^. plained; since an explanation f^^^^^^^ p^^^^ ^-^ would involve seli-stultmca- tion [on the part of him who ^T^T^^TrTJ ^^^ rj rTTT" should offer explanation of 'ai'JTT^f%TTaf^tR^^^T'ri" what, in calling it a mystery, ^^^^f^^. , he declares to be inexplicable]. But what behoves us is merely to appropriate to ourselves the benefits arising from such an atonement. (2) If it be said that the benefit of an atonement thus | s^ | *\^^^ W^^^Trl^f^- prepared by God for the re- ^^- ^^^^^ ^^^ 3^^^. moval of the sins of mankind . ,^ must be common to all men, ^^^^ ^^ J^^.^I^TVT- since there is no distinction, T^ ^T^f^IT^Tf^m "^^ 82 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH we reply : Not so, because xR^rq-ifV ^^T^T "f fj- Faith is the means of appro- _.__ . priating the benefit. (3) But then, it may be , ^ , »j^ f^f^^T ^^T said, accordinj:^ to the text, •s that " Faith without works is ^ ^ dead," good works must be ^^tTT ^^T^-^W^^T co-operative in the production f%^T ^"W^TpC^ rf^T"^ of the benefit through faith; ^^ ^^^ ^_^|^^^|^^-f^^ and so how can faith alone be ^ ^ the determining cause of the ^ 1^ mT^^T^f^^^- benefit ? We reply : Faith ^"JTlft $^^T ^1;T ^fj: alone is the means of appro- '^^T'^'^W*?? '5f:^T^T '^'^- priating the benefit of the ^^^^ ^^^ ^^TtTUTT- atonement; but good works ^ ^. are an invariable effect of ''^^^^ ^^^^ ^^T^T^ faith, and are evidence of their ^ftR^^^^§ ^^^"W?^ r\- own cause. In whatever per- f%5i ^j^f^ ^^ ^j- son these [good works] are not ^ f^_^ ^ ^^^^^^j,. found, there is m him no real ~^ faith, but only a semblance of ^^ ^^T* "^^^T 151;T faith. And thus there is no T^^ f^f^^T ^:^T ^^- conflict between the two de- ^^ ^^^^^^^^^ j^^^ clarations [of St. Paul and of J- ^: I St. James] that men are justi- fied by faith, and that faith without works is dead. (4) Now, it may be asked, , ^ , ^^ ^^^. ^^^. how can man, without free- "^ c ^ ^ ^ will, bo amenable to question ^T RlT^^^fl^>f^.,^r as to transgression of duty, ^f^^TtTffJ^»1%(5TI'9IT - HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 83 whether in the matter of faith -^i ^^ ^"^T^TI =5fT?[WT- or works? And how can __j^^-j-^^^^ ^Trl^ q- freedom of the will, in the »v^^ r- -^ r-*" shape of non-dependence on a ^^^^ ^TT'!rTt%nt'^f%- previous cause, consist with 'WT*IT^'W^l^^T*?r«T«Tlt^- the doctrine already laid down ^^ | ^Trl^^^ "^"^^T ^\- [in the commentary on Aph. 'f^^^^^^^^„^„^_ ^„ V. 01 Bk. II.J, 01 the impos- . ^ ^ ^ sibility of conceiving an un- ^ ^T^TW^^ WrTniT^fT- caused origination ? For, on f?:f^ "^I^t f^Tft^ 'W^'^ ' the alternative of freedom, the f^ j will must be in the shape of a cause which is not an effect [and this, according to your doctrine, is inconceivable] ; and if it be an effect, then there is an end of its [inde- pendence or] freedom. To re- move this doubt, we reply [following Sir Wm. Hamilton at p. 597 of his Discourses]. APHOEISM VI. The freedom HoW frCCdom of of the -will. ^ rs • the will is possible ^^'^^^TT ^^T^T ^X- in man or God, it is impos- '^■Jg?^^'^ ^^ ^T^f?f f?T- sible speculatively to under- ^^^^^^^^^ 5?2T^^f ^ stand ; but, practically, the ^ . ^ fact that our will is tree is ^ established by the conscious- '^<^T ^f^^TTtft^^^- 84 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH ness of [our moral account- ^^^^^^^{^^^g^^-^^-^j . ability, or] our deserving to ^^^f^ „^„ be asked the reason oi our ^ violation of duty. (1) In accordance with the , ^ , ^i^pqft ,;^ft indication already given |_un- ^ r- r- r der Aph. 11. of this Bk. lY.], ^^^f^ TTm^lf^mt^T that things which are incon- ^Trf^^nn^ rlT^"^ sf^^T- ceivable, may yet be possible, ^| ^^^^^^^^^| ^^^ there is not, on the theory of ^ . :n freedom, an assumption oi ^ ^ more things inconceivable than ^^'^^T^'aU^^^I T^^ f%fT those the assumption of which ^rrf^^TTTf^^'i%<5"5f ^T - is necessary on the alternative ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^-^^^ . theory of necessity. Such be- . ^ ing the case, the consciousness ^^"^^^^^^^ "^^^^ ' of our moral accountability '^^ ^f^^i^fefT ^T^ I falls into [and turns] the scale TijTTfT^^'^T^'^i?^^'^^^^ - [in favour] of the theory of ^^^^ ^^^^ ^i^T^T- freedom. On this point a cer- ^ ^ "* tain sage [Sir Wm. Hamilton, ^^' ^TrT^^ ^T^^^TI I at p. 597 of his Discussions]^ fT^Tf% I Pf^TTW^^T^- says, More things inconceiv- ?qf%^%^rTT^l^^^ ^{Tr\- able are not necessitated on -v «-^ <> -n the scheme of freedom than ' ^ on the scheme of necessity. ^^f^:^^^^^Tft^T- To explain. The scheme of "^^T?^ m'^^rf^^^ Sft"^ fj- fatalism is pressed on our ac- ^^^^^f^^^^^^^^^^^. ceptance by the dread of the ^c. -i, ^ inconceivability of a phcno- ^ '^ ^ mcnon's originating without a ^TTfT'^^Tft^K^^^^ I HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 85 cause, and it is just such ffr%^ ^TfT^mTfT^^-' origination that is the basis of ^^ j.^^^ ^^^ifw^T- the acceptance of the doctrine ^ ^ s. ofliberty; while on the scheme ^^ ^^ ^^'^ ^TrT.^- of fatality also there is an ^^ "O;^ ^^^TT WTVt^T^^ exactly equal inconceivability ^Trf'^f^^T ^rfv^TTlft- of a beginningless series of _:^ ^^ ^^ causes and eiiects, which [as- ^ sumed] beginningless series is "^^^T^TtT . I ^l^ T^ the basis of the acceptance of ^^TJ ^ifv'^TTTfrf^Ti^- the doctrine of fatality. And ^^^^^^^^^^f^^^^j^^. these two schemes, of liberty ^ •^ r- -s and necessity, are thus deter- ^^'^ ^^f^^^^^^ I mined to be theoretically balanced ; but, practically, the doctrine of freedom is the most correct, because, without free- dom, the consciousness of moral accountability could not be justified. If men are ac- countable for transgression of duty, it is quite clear that they must be free to perform their duty. [The words of Sir Wm. Hamilton, rendered in our Sanski'it version as above, are as follows : — ''The scheme of freedom is not more inconceivable than the scheme of necessity. For while fatalism is a recoil from the more obtrusive inconceivability of an absolute commencement, on the fact of which commencement the doctrine of liberty proceeds; the fatalist is shown to- overlook the 86 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH equal, but less obtrusive, inconceivability of an infinite non-commencement, on the assertion of which non-com- mencement his own doctrine of necessity must ultimately rest. As equally unthinkable, the two counter, the two one-sided, schemes are thus theoretically balanced. But, practically, our consciousness of the moral law, which? without a moral liberty in man, would be a mendacious imperative, gives a decisive preponderance to the doctrine of freedom over the doctrine of fate. We are free in act if we are accountable for our actions."] (2) But whence is the exist- | ;^ | ^^ ^cft sf%TT^^- ence, permitted by God, in ^^ ^^^^^^^^^,^^ this world, of suffering which . . ^ causes all this perplexity, and ^^'TTWrft S^^rf ^rl^T- why are we involved in this ^T^ ffTf"^^:^!"^?!^^^ suffering ? We state in an ^TTrf^wf ^TWt ^^T^T " aphorism the Christian avoid- ^^^^ qf^TTrT ^- ance of this question, as pre- ^ "^ ferable to the Hindil attempt ^^^ Tf^^^rT^ qf^- to get rid of it by the theory ^T"5( ^"^^{^ I of Transmigration. APHOEISM VII. Abortive at- tempt of Hill- The permitted ex- ^^^^^-^^^^^^^^ llnu^e mystery isteucc of cvil, siucc, ^ e"* upthomv.tery ,,'.,. ' T'^^^T^ft^T^T I ^^- as we hold, it is a ^ mystery, is inexplicable. The VTTT^T ^^Tf^^f^^KTST attempt of the Hindus to stave ^TT<^^wf ^T^T^WT^f^ty - off the said incxplicability, by f^^f^^^ff ^ ^^^ft f^- the assumption of tlie infinite . ^ w^T%^^^^^: II ^ II HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 87 non-commencement of the series of births, is in no way adequate to the explaining of the case. (1) ''By the assumption of . ^ . the innnite non-commence- ^^ ment of the series of births," ft^^^TT^f^ I ^f^ ^T- etc. [To borrow the reason- ^<\^^^^«T^T^^T*T17^t?I- ing of Paley, Nat. Theol chap. q^^. ^^-^^_j^-j-^^^^^_ ii., in reference to another -s "^ #-. /^ t-- *^ ^ case, m support of which the ^* ^ same futile attempt at expla- ^^t% I ^ T^W ^i^qT^^Tf- nation is made.] If, by going ^TT^Tf 'T \^ W^ Wi^- further and further back, there f^ ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^_ were diminution of the unac- ^ ^ -s -s countableness, then, by going f^^Tftl^^W^^'T ^^- back indefinitely, even the WT^fv^ift^TTTf^H^f?r rl- surcease of the unaccounta- %^'^T?m^^m^^^?^ - bleness were possible. This _,_,„.„t^.^^ .-,<^,„ method oi accounting is ap- ^^ plicable only in such a case ^* ^^^KT I ^^rj ^^J^- as that where, accordingly ^f^^^^'RT'^TlIT rT^Tt^- as we suppose the number to ^^^^^^^^^^f^^^^^ _ be ojreater and cjreater [of the ^ ^ terms, herej oi the things to "^ be explained [viz., the cases ^^W ^ftf^^Tt^Rrf^^- of evil] and the explainers <^T^"Rfi?T^^{^^^W^?;" - [e.g., the repeated births], ^ -^-^^^-^ , ^^^^^ there is continually an ap- ^ ^ proach towards alimit. There, '"^^ "ftf^^^WTW^ - by supposing the number of ^^t^<^T l^^^T •TTTITT'T 88 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH terms to be infinite, the at- V"^ ^^T rf^^trf^f^^- tainment of the limit is con- ^^^^^^^^{^^^^ , ^. ceivable. But where there _^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^j. IS no tendency to approacn a limit, nothing is effected by Pf^'TJ ^^T^^fTT^T ^H- supposing the number of terms W^TTTT"*^ ^rT^f ^if^^- to be greater and greater. ^^^^^ ^f^ ^^_j^^^. And this applies alike to r^ ^-^ one series or another, though ^ "^^ they should differ in properties ^Trf^ I Xrrfqf f^^fw^fi:- other than the one in ques- f^^^T^I3Tl»rrV^f^^^ - tion, such as being finite or ^^^j^ ^^_^^^ ^^^^, infinite, etc. To explain, — as a chain consisting of a finite number of links cannot sup- port itself, so exactly is it with one consisting of an infinite number of links. And of this we are assured (though it has never been tried, since that would be impossible), because there is absolutely no approach towards the limit of self-sup- port, though we suppose the number of links, beginning with ten, to be a hundred, a thousand, and so on. And it is the same with all chains, however they may differ in other respects than the one in question [viz., incapacity - HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 89 of self-support], such as length, numerical difference, finite- ness, and so on. [The words of Paley are as follows: — "If the diffi- culty were diminished the further we went back, by going back indefinitely we might exhaust it. And this is the only case to which this sort of reasoning applies. Where there is a tendency, or, as we increase the num- ber of terms, a continual approach, towards a limit, there^ by supposing the number of terms to be what is called infinite, we may conceive the limit to be attained ; but where there is no such limit or approach, nothing is effected by lengthening the series. There is no difference as to the point in question (whatever there may be as to many points) between one series and another ; between a series which is finite, and a series which is infinite. A chain composed of an in- finite number of links can no more support itself than a chain composed of a finite number of links. And of this we are assured (though we never can have tried the experiment), because, by increasing the num- ber of links, from ten for instance to a hundred, from a hundred to a thousand, etc., we make not the smallest approach, we observe not the smallest tendency, towards self-support. There is no difference in this respect (yet there may be a great difference in several respects) between a chain of a greater or less length, between one chain and another, between one that is finite and one that is infinite."] (2) And thus it is impos- | ^ | tt^T^ ^Tf^TTT^fl"- sible, by the theory of trans- ^^ ^^ ^^^^ ^^^^^ ^. 90 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH migration, to account for the i\fr{ "SfTrf^T^t W^TW^ variety of evils encompassed ^^pj^^^ ^^;^^T^T[-_ with which a man is bom ^ ^ ^^^ ^ mto this Avorld, or to ex- "^ ^ ^ \.^ plain how an infant, which ^W^ntWfl^fjf^^^'T^ never exerted free will at all, al^Tn7'?:ft^T^^ ^ ^^T^- comes to experience suffer- ^ ^ ^^^^-j_j^^--j^^^. ings. As a chain does not -. ^ ^ become competent to support ^^^^ ^^^ W^^ ^Y" itself through indefinite addi- '^TWT'T V^^ 5?! ^i^T rl^^ tion of links, just as incompe- "Sf^TnTfT^T^ ^^T^"^T^- tent is the theory of transmi- ^^^^^^^^^ ^ ^^. ^ gration to account for the ^ diversity of condition in the case of human souls. (3) But, it may be said, I ^ | if^ ^:^^ ^t^ f%- such a book, professing to f^^^^^" ^^^^fn T?^- clear up doubts, can be _ ^^ _ no revelation of the will of ^Tf^^^^l^rT^^T ^^^T- God, because, since there is 'T^T ^^ t^^^TlT^T^- no clearing up of the ques- ^ytj^^r^* "R^TWT^rT^T^ ^^- tion how the existence of evil ^^^j^ ^^. ^^^^ ^_ IS permitted by the Deity, there is really no proof that ^'*^ ' we have here a revelation of God's will. To meet this doubt, we propound an aphor- ism. IIIXDTJ PHILOSOPHY. 91 APHOEISM VIII. Mystery not If VQU 161 GCt ^IT "^^^^IH ^T'HI^- distinctive of *' •' ^ ""'*"'"'"• Christianity, then ^^ y,f^ „3f g|^ ^^f^ you must reject the wodd of ^^^.^^^^^^ ^^^^. . sense also, since else your de- ^ cisions are inconsistent. Ti^TrT^II ^ II (1) :N'ow, that by such dif- I \ I ^^ ^t^^^ig^- ficulties as the Christian reli- ^x^^^^^^y.^-— ,-^-^r^ _ gion is beset by, in respect ^ ^ ^t: ^-s of the permitted existence of * ^ evil, this world also, which *f^T^ ^?TT^2|f-?|^ S^ has the same author, is beset, "Rt?"^ sft ^ifVfJ "atT^rT — that there are not more -j^^^^^^^^^f^p^ ^^_ difficulties in regard to the /* *sc. Christian religion than there ^ are in regard to the world ^^f^ ^^^m ^^ ^^f{- itself, we commence a Fifth TlT>?IT^iiTT^^ II Book on purpose to show. 92 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH BOOK Y. THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION TO THE CONSTITUTION AND COURSE OF NATURE. ' Kow, beginning an exposi- -^^ ^TRITT^^W^'^T - tion of the analogy of the ^^. ^|^^|^^^^^^^^^_ Scriptural arrangement to that . ^ of the mundane system of ^^^^^5^^^^ ^^^^^^T" cause and effect, we first pro- T^^TW ^t^ ^^f%rf^-RT- pound as an aphorism the ^^i^fefi^ ^rT^TTTa^ ^- quintessence of the doctrine ^^r^ of an ancient sage [Origen]. APHOEISM I. origon's state- Tho man who be- . ^mem.''' "" lie^eg that the Scrip- ^^^^^^T^ ^^ftft tures were given by the Ore- ^sf^T^^^^f^ ^i|tj^^^ ator of the worid, is not dis- :^^x^xf^ T^^lf^ ^^V turbed even when he sees the ^ r- -v <- same sort of difficulties in the ^ " ^T^f%^>^^m HII world and in the Scriptures. HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 93 (1) " Of the same sort," | ^ | ^TTT^T^f^ I T?;?!^- etc. To the same effect ^yf^^^T^^ sft ^fe^T another sage [Bishop Butlerl _ -s .^s^ says,-If by .uoh difficnlties ^^^^^^ ^^T^ft^ T^- as these it is proved impossi- ^^^^^^^T ^T^^T'JT^T- ble that the Scriptures should 7^^ mw^ rlH rTTf^TT^^ have been given by God, then, ^^^^^-^ jft ,^^^^. by the very same dimculties, ^ it would be also proved im- 15^^ ^T^^ m^T^TWTrlJ possible that the world should rT^^^^^^^TSR^^fJ^^- have been made by God. ■g* ^^ -jfTfafrri: 1 But the arguments for their being both alike the work of God have been already exhi- bited [in Books II. and III.] [Origen's words, as given by Butler, are these : — ^'He who believes the Scripture to have proceeded from Him who is the author of nature, may well expect to find the same sort of difificulties in it as are found in the constitution of nature." Hence, adds Butler, " He who denies the Scripture to have been from God, upon account of these difficulties, may, for the very same reason, deny the world to have been formed by Him," which, however, the reader, at this stage of the argu- ment, is supposed to have conceded.] (2) Although it would be 1^1 ^^T2T^Tf*rfT%^ proper for us to leave off here, ^^f^^^^^.^ ^^^ ^^^j^. since, to the intelligent, not a -n^ ^ ^ word more requires to be said ; yet, since all persons are not ^"^^t ^^T'ft W^^ ^ife- thoroughly intelligent, we (5f^THTW^^T^T^?i^^ - 94 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH must endeavour to make in- -^ff^ ^•^Tf^^Tf?;^!"''?!!- telligible, even to those of ^ ^^^^^ ^f^cT^^^ I rf^ lower capacity, the foregoing ^ _ words of those two great ^W^I^^^^^T^Tt ^T- teachers. With reference, ^if^^^T^^TT^^T^T^^- then, to the question how it ^^ T7"5^^"^'JTWt?T^^^ ^^ is that its analogy to the con- ^^^^^^^^ ^. ^^. stitution and course of nature proves the Scriptural scheme T^i^^^^^^^^ ^TT" to be the work of God, we TT^T-Sf^^T^^TW^^^^^ propound an aphorism, to in- ^Tf "'^T^'tV^^T ^^T^^T timate, that analogy, in the ^ ^^^^^_^^^^^ ^^^_ shape 01 likeness, produces ^ ^ only a probability of what it ftf^^ ft«¥T TTfRmfrf^ is desired to prove, and that "^"^f^TT "^"^^f?! I probability, arising from the contemplation of likeness, though it is of the nature of an inference, is yet an assur- ance lower in degree than that of inference proper. APHOEISM II. scribed"*'^ '''" Analogy, though ^Tff'aiJiq^^TIT^^T^^^ • akin to induction, is evidence falling short of an induction. (1) And, from the contem- , ^ , ^^^^^^^_j^^^^_ plating of likeness, assurance ^ ^ ^ _ of the following kind arises ^TTT TjftfrT^Tlf^rf rim^f% [—in other words, the form of ^ ^ ^^T^TW^^^^^ TZI^^T^T^^lii: m'T^^lls^ll HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 95 analogical reasoning is as fol- ^T^^^T ^^: ^f "siV rj^- Ws]: "two things resemble ^^f^^^^ ^^ f^f^: each other in one or more -n ^ ^ respecte; a certain proposi- ^t S^K^^.^'HT^fl T^l tion is true of the one, there- fore it is [probably] true of the other." (2) But [as Mr. Mill, in I ^^ I 'TT ^TX"'^^ '^^- his Logic, vol. ii., pp. 97-8, ^^^^^^^ ^i'^\^^- goes on to say, ''we have ^ .•s "^ here nothing to discriminate ^ ^ analogy from induction, since ^ TT^ "^'^T'^fT '^^^T«T this type Avill serve for all cTT^^'^^^f^T^ f'rf^- reasoning from experience," ^^^^^^^ ^^^ j^j^^. so] if it be asked, when the ^ ^ -s^ unperceived is established ^^^TcSfirmm'^^ I through perception of like- ness, as is required in all cases, in what respect is there any falling short of induction ? — we reply, that in induction are employed the ascertained invariable conjunction or non- conjunction of certain proper- ties ; but it is not so in the case of a conclusion from ana- logy [or of assurance arising from perception of likeness]. (3) But, it may be said, ^^ s^ the cause ol a srenume iiiier- ^ ^ ence is a genuine induction ; T^^TT "^fj! .WT"X"35^ <^^ 96 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH and what use is there then «??fT*IT^^^'g^*T ^lir[^ for analogy, which you ac ^ ^^^-^^ xmi^m f^X- knowledge to fell short of in- . duction ? To remove this '^^s ^"^^i^ ' doubt, we propound an aphor- APHOEISM III. oFanSy:"'" Analogy, though ^TT^^^TTT^T^tju-g^- falling short of induction, is ^^ ^^^^^^^^^^^ ^^^. universally the guide in prac- tice. ^^J' ^ " (1) The import is this. It | -^i ^^ ^T?: I ^T"f ''^ is only in the case of beings who are not omniscient that knowledge, in the shape of probability, and not consist- tTT^ ^T^^ I ^^^^ f% ^ ing of certainty, arises from f^^fq ^-^ ^ffm^^rftrf- the contemplation of likeness . r^ [or Irom analogy]. For, m the case of one omniscient, ^^^^^t ^flTm^T f% W- nothing whatever — present, ^^T^T'Tt ft^m^^ ofiT past, or future-is matter of ^f^f^^^^^^ , ^^I^T^t probability, since He knows rv . "" s^ with absolute certainty the ^^"^'^"^^ ^'^^''^ ^T- truth of what things are true ^^ ^^^TT^^R*f?r I and the falsity of what things are false. But in the case of the like of us, Avho are not omniscient, it is probability HINDI? PHILOSOrUY. 97 that pre-eminently furnishes the motives of conduct. [In the words of Bishop Butler, " Probable evidence, in its very nature, affords but an imperfect kind of information ; and it is to be considered as relative only to beings of limited capacities. For nothing which is the possible object of knowledge, whether past, present, or future, can be probable to an infinite intelligence, since it cannot but be discerned absolutely as it is in itself, certainly true or certainly false. But to us, pro- bability is the very guide of life."] (2) l!s'ow some one who, as l^l'^sr^^f^rT^^^T^^T- if he were omniscient, does not acknowledge any autho- rity in the probability which results from the contempla- WT^rT?:f%^^^f%^^^^ tion of likeness, and who is St:ii5-st?"ITT^it^^T^ S^"3^ accustomed [in the books of ^^^, ^^^^^ ^ -^ ^. Hindii philosophy] to cer- tainty in respect of a thing's being, or else not being, so and so [ — and whose language, therefore, abundantly wealthy as it is, almost grudges us terms for the discussion of probabilities], may doubt whether error must not be inevitable, if we follow evi- dence which falls short of per- fection. To this doubt we re- ply as follows. •^tR: ^^^f^ I 08 CHKISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH APHORISM IV. cJraintto- In the absence of ^m^^^TTUT^TH rT^ bability not to . . ■■ .^^ . » ~. . be despised, superior evidence, f^^-g- -JTi^TW "TT^T^TWt^ evidence comparatively infe- ^^-^^^^-^ j^_,^^^ ^. nor IS not to be despised, as a lamp in the absence of the ^^^^ '' ^ '' daylight. (1) ''Not to be despised," I ^ I 'TT^KTWt^f^ft I etc. For if the inferior ought ^f^ ^M'S ^ ^'^r{ TfH to be rejected because the su- j^^^^^^^^ -^{^^ ^^_ perior is unattainable, then, ^ ^ since they are unable to fly ^f '^^^ ^^^^^T^J^' through the air as birds do, ■^girT^^T^T'^^T^ft ^^T ^ people ought not either to -^^^i \ walk with their feet. (2) Again, the attendants | ;^ | f%^ ^^f^v^rf^T- ofa certain child whose mother ^^^ ^^^. ^f^^^^ f^. has died, seeing that he cannot . survive without milk, desiring ^^ V^ ^^ ^^^T^^m^- to procure milk, there being ^ftr-TT ■5Ti?^'TT<["^'^Tt at hand no cow, or she-buf- ^^|^-^^^^f^^^^ ^^^_ fulo, or the like, become hope- ,v less as they look around on ^ ^ stones, logs, pieces of cloth, ^f^^^lf^^ S?2r^f%W- etc, all very unlike in charac- ^T*T^^'3i?^ f^TT"5rT: ^1- ter to the cow or any other ^^ ^^^^^^^^|_^^^^^_ source of milk. Suddenly y-*^r- -s observing a lemale ot the ^ ^ ^ Bos Gavacus, an unimal of a ^^f^^^'lf ^T^f^ ^TT" HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 99 kind tliey had never seen be- f^^^T ^7^ ^^if^f^ ^- fore, on the probability that ^^^-^^^ ^| ^^^^^^^^^ she, resembling a cow in many ^ respects, even though desti- ^t ^l^^T^T^^f^ I rT^- tute of a dewlap, may per- ^T^ ¥T"^^iT^m^T^^lj- haps give milk, putting her -^j^f^ ^^J j^isiTWt ^^- to the proof, they obtain milk _^ ♦ ^^^^—-—^-, , irom her. In this instance, we see how analogy, though falling short of a perfect in- duction, instigated [and rightly too] the conduct of those per- sons. (3) But then we see that, | ^ | ^^ ^$ f^^f mf^ in mundane affairs, the cause ^^^^(--^^ ^TT^frcft of action is will, preceded by , '^ ^ .c knowledge; whereas, in the ^ ^^^T^^ ^T^T^ Christian institute, action is ^^ f%^^^ I rlHjf% I ^- enjoined with a view to know- ■?sj^ ^"^^"g ^f^"Slf?T ^ ledge. To explain. We are ^^ ^^^^ ^^ ^^^^ informed in Scripture [John -s>^ ^ . ^ vii., 17], -If any man will ^^^ ^^^^ ^^^ ^^ ' do His will, he shall know of rf^T^T^ ^^T^^^e4 ^T- the doctrine, whether it be of f% TjT^^cJfii^ ^^TVm God;" so here there is no c^ analogy between the world and the Scripture. To meet this objection, wa propound an aphorism. 100 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH APHORISM V. •s Boiief may Belief Ih tlic doc- if^^iT^^^ ^^T rTT^- bo the rpwaid „fobo,uo„ce. tribes of Christi- ^^^^^ f%5im7i^f^-gT- anity is indispensaWe ; but ^^^ ;^^^^_^^_ this may grow from doing the ^ ^^ Avill of God, and experiencing ^^^^"^ ^T ^VnT I! H, II the benefit of so doing. (1) '' May grow," etc. A \\\ ^"^rl Tft I ^f%^- sick man, though doubting ^fifgft^^TT^TfTWY^^- the skill of the physician who ^ ^^^ ^p^^T^> sft ^- attends him, yet, by obeying ^ his directions and by experi- ^^T^T^^ TTTfT^T^TW- encino; the benefit of such ^^T^H^^"^ fTftRT^ ^% obedience, may come to place ^^^ ^^^^ -j^^^ ^^f^ confidence in the physician. So is it in the case before us : such is the import. (2) Moreover, whatever | ;^ | ^ft^ ^TpT ^■g:v- proofs, establishing the truth ^^^.^^^^^^^^^^j^ ^. of the Christian Scriptures, *-.*-. rv-s -n /-v have been set forth m Book II., so long as a man does not ^ftfTTpT HWT^ft ^TW^^ also act upon these in accord- tt^^: ■?l"'gVJ?Tf^srr«T^TfT ance with the Christian Scrip- ^ ^^^^f^ rfT?^^ ^;^t tures, so long will they fail rv ^ «^ r- to confirm belief in liim. ^S^^^ 1 ^t^f^ I [As Mr. Fitzgerald remarks, at p. 6 of his edition of Butler's Analogy, "I am not sure that any one could be a fair judge of the sufficiency of the evidence HINDtJ PHILOSOPHY. 101 to determine belief, until he had allowed it to deter- ( ) ^ mine behaviour."] \ (3) But, it may be objected, , ^ , ^^^^^^^^^^_ we are told that belief results . ^ ^ from doing the will of God; ^^ ^^^^ ^^^ l^^^" but doing the will of God just "ST^T^^ :?ri:^q^^ I t" consists in believing, — for we ■g?:$f?:^ 35f:^^-g^1^T^-^^- VI., 29], " This is the work of God, that ye believe on him ^^^^^^ ^^^^ ^'^ ^^" whom he hath sent," — and ^T^f f^TT^T^ Tft ^^t the sense of the proposition p!j-^f%^ "^"^^f^ I that " belief in Christ results from belief in Chiist" is nu- gatory. With a view to re- moving this difficulty we pro- pound an aphorism. APHOEISM yi. of assmance. ^^^ ]^-j^^ attended „ -^.^f- „ . „ by doubts, or entu-ely cleared from doubts. (1) To explain,— The ex- I \ I fI^Tf% W^ ^'^- pression employed, in address- ^ -j^^^ ^ 3^^ ^^§ {^_ ing Christ [Mark ix. 24T, ^ . ^ r^^i- -Lord, I believe, help thou "^ '''^^^^^ 1^^^^^^^ mine unbelief," met with no ^"^^ ^^ ^ f^T^Kl rebuke from Christ. The im- ?r^^T ^^T f^TTT ^ ^^- port of the expression was pj ^^^ ^^-^ .^ j-^^-j |^ . 102 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH this, — ''Myfaith is not steady: ^•^^^Hf^^T^^T^'^^^f^ — help thou this weak be- liever by the bestowal of un- fT^T^T^: doubting faith. (2) And so the matter as- 1*^1 rim'^T^f^'E^^T^^ certained is this : 1st, It is fitting that, by reason of the external evidences, we should acknowledge the truth of the T^T^rT^frWfil ft^m Scriptures, as it is said in ;^^^f?[ ;mf^ ^fTfTTpI ^- Scripture [John xiv, 11], - or ^o ^^^^ ^f^^^j^^ ^^ else believe me for the very ^ ^ work's sake;" and again f^^^f^^^ ^1^^^^^ [John v., 36], " the works ^^^^^^^TrT^I '^ft^W which the father hath given ^■^J^7^J z^c^j ^^'^^Tf^ me to finish, the same works ^^ c that I do, bear witness of me, ^ that the Father hath sent me." ^^ ^xI^T ^^T ^^VT 2nd, It is fitting that the ftf5?:pT^ft TT^SI'T^^T'T- faitli thus originated, though ^f^ ^^-f^ ft^T^^^W rT" still encumbered by doubts, ^ <^•^ r^ r^ should be ingenuously carried J '^ ^ ^ out into action, as a child in ^ft^ ^f ^ft ^"s^^^TT^- many cases acts according to ^f^cf cf ^rCf^T^T : ^^T- his father's directions, trust- ^^, ^^^{^^^^^^ ^^. ingly, though not knowing ^ r^ <-. s^ tlie motives which his father '"^^^^f^^^ ^^^ 'S^' has in view. And further, 3rd, T'l m I It is fitting that thoroughly defecated faith, amounting to knowledge, should be the re- HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 103 ward of that faith which sprang up uncavillingly even while there existed causes of doubt. (3) Well, grant that all this 1^1^^ H^rj ^?f^ [or, in the words of Butler, > r- r^ - " What things are implied in ^^^^W^ \^T\^^ W^-^- the divine government of both I^ ' worlds, according to the Chris- tian doctrine?"] To meet this inquiry, we propound an aphorism. APHOEISM VII. >Miat the The divine sovern- WSV^^^STT^r^Tfr^T divine govern- woTLlpt^^ ment of both worlds ^^T^^^^rai^T VV T^ according to ^ the Christian doctrine. implies, according f^^^-^^. ^p^ , ^^^^ to the Christian doc- trine, these propositions, viz., ^^T^TT'^"=tT^^'T f^^fT- 1st, All souls are appointed f^W^* I ^4^ ^T^tTT to exist endlessly ; 2nd, It is p^^^^^^^^^^^^^l^^P^f^^ appointed that every one, after r^ r- r^ -^^ r- deatn, shall be either rewarded ^^ or punished; 3rd, The abiding f^^^T^T ^f^W^ ^T^- of souls in this world is for ^TT^wfai'^T^^T'^f^ ^- 104 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH the purpose of trial, and of 5th, The truth of this reme- -^I^^iftixW^^^ rfTY^" dial dispensation, which con- ^j^^ "RT^Tf^^^TTf rf^- sists of a special scheme car- ^ s^ ^ ^^ ^^^^ ^ _^ ried on by a divme person, the Messiah, for the benefit of 'ft^^T^ 'T ^^T^T^-Rf^ the world, is proved by mira- ^TpTrff ^ ^T ^tl^ "R^W cles; 6th, And that means of ^^j^-j^^-^^ ^|^-j^ ^^^ salvation is not revealed to all, nor proved with the strong- ^ c\ est possible evidence [with evi- "^^ "RTIT^iT^ "^iftfTt f%- dence not less strong than the ■sr^'^g^^^Flft^'^^ft ^"^- strongest good evidence] to all ^ ^'Vft^tlT 1?^ ^^^- those to whom it is revealed ; r- '^. r- -^^^ but it is revealed only to such ^Tf%W^t^rTlT^TTjrr^7(^ - a part of mankind as God has T^^^Tftrf TfH ^Ft ll"^ II chosen, and with such parti- cular evidence as God has chosen. (1) ''To exist endlessly , ^ , ^^^^^^^_jj-^. after death," etc. The import ^ r- r-~ . ... I, . ftKWTK I "^^ ^T^: I IS this. it IS unnecessary ^ here to set forth proofs that "^rTTT^f^fH^^ rl^T^- HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 105 such [endless existence] is xT'^WT'rt rfrTTcRitTjf^TfT- really the condition [of soul], ^_^^_^^^ 3^^^^^^^^_ and that this state will be in "* ^ ^ accordance with each .o^p, ^ "Tim^: ^^^TW^f^T deserts, since our dispute is ^^7 n^T^^TlT'^rr^TfT^ I not at present with him who ^TT<^^^^T'SJT"ff[lIT^TTT- denies the soul to be other ^^^^^^^_^. ^^^ ^^ than the body ; but we have ^ '^ entered on an argument with ^T^^q^T'flT^Tff:^! ^T^^- those only who accept as au- ^wf^"3rT^^^Trr,55T: yi- thoritative the Hindu Spiritual ^j^^y^^ ^ ^f%^^ *IT- Institutes. But we do not, ^^^r;£i^^^.„^„4. ^^^^.^ on the strength oi the Jdmdu Institutes, accept the theory ^T^TpTT^^TTTfT, I 5:- of transmigration, because we ^^"rq^T^fiR^^T^'^W^Tfl^ do not allow that the Hindu ^^^^^^ ^^. n^j^^ f%. Institutes have any authority ««. ^ as proof. And it must not ^ be said, moreover, that, since ^^Sf^^l^^Wtq^T^'TT- the existence of evil cannot ^IJI^^ '^^ "R^flf rT^T TT^ I be without some cause, trans- ^^{-^^^^^^^^^^^^^ misjration is established as its t"* -s -. "^ , 111 ws:^^^^ titwttr:t^- cause, because we have already shown that even by the sup- ''?rf%m*. ^^TT^^^^T'f- position thereof, the existence "^^fft^^lfwi'T^^^'^- of evil cannot be accounted for. ^^ „g^ _ . In the Christian Scripture, the ^ '^ truth of which has been esta- blished by the arguments set forth [in Book II.], it is de- clared that the endless condi- 106 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH tion after death is, in the case of some, a condition of endless happiness, and, in the case of some, a condition of endless misery. (2) '' State of trial and dis- I ^^ I ^ft^lflr^^T^^f^ I cipline," etc. The special ^-^^ TT^^^q^^^T?^- means of salvation which have ^„„T„T-r-TnTrx-T-TfrTfe been enjomed by God, consti- '*-s -s <-. v ,^rs „^rs ^^ dertaken to remove all the ob- -> ^ jectionsthathavebeenraisedor H^^T^t ^T W^^'HJ^- that maybe raised either against "R^Tfai^-sg^^l^t ^^T- the course of nature or against |- _^^_j^^^^^^^^^^^^-j. the will of God as revealed in -. " . -s . the Christian Scripture; but ^T ^^TOTgTTW^^^- [wllat we have undertaken is] "^rfn: ^ Sft (J ^T^^V" toexplainthattheworld,though ^s^'^rf^ <-^ W f^ 1 '^- established by the evidence of ^^^-^^^ ^^^^ ^^ the senses, might be disbelieved r^ r- on the ground of the very same f^^^ 3TW^f%;f'TN ^^^ objections, on the strength of ^ ^^^ ^if^f?! ^"^ rf^T- which you say that the mys- ^ j^^^^^^^^-j^^^. teries announced in the Chris- -v «. -^ ^ tian Scriptures ought not to be ^ ^ believed. And so it is fruit- ^t ^WTT!TTig:^T^5f ;RT?i^ - less to raise these same objec- ^^ | tions against the Scriptures, the truth of which is esta- blished by other unobjection- able proofs. (6) But, it may be asked, ^ since it was declared in Scrip- > ^ • ^5 ^TT'^T^ ^^ ture [Revelations, xv. 3], ''Just ^f ^W^TTT ^f^fTTt 'JWT- and true are all thy ways," ^ ^-^^ ^^^^^^^^^^ how is it acknowledged by you ^ c/^ c*" ^ who accept the Christian reli- ^^^^^^f^' gion tliat you are unable to ^WfI^lf^4'?«treTu4 ^ HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 109 justify those ways in every irf^m^fT Tf^ ^TT I '^- respect ? We reply [with Dr. ^-^^^ ^^^^ ^ ^ ^ ^_ ChalmersJ, To utter such an . expression is fitting for those ^^ ^^^l^^ ^T5T^3Tf?r ^^- onlytowhomthedayofthere- "^^^"Jr^TlT^f^it "RT^ ^- velation of hidden things has ^•\ ^^^^^ffq^T^'^T f^^- come, whose condition of hay- ^^ ^^^^f^ f^j^ .^ ^. ing the secrets of God hidden from them has ceased, or by ^^^^«^T I rTTTW W^- whom the fulfilment of God's WT ^nSfT^T^ ^^^IJif- designs has been witnessed. ^T^R^T^T: ^^^ rj S^^- But previoasly to such great ^^^^. ,p^^^ „^^^^. and final manifestation of the hidden things of God, we have ^"^^ ' T^T^^^T^^T^t only to expect with humility ; W^^'^^^lf^ T'f ^if^"^ and the mysteries which in our (g^tj^^^^ ^^^WTf% I present state we cannot com- prehend we must silently acquiesce in. [The words of Dr. Chalmers, in his Evidences, vol. i., p. 310, are these:— '' This [Eev. xv. 3] might well be said by those to whom the day of the revelation of hidden things has come, and to whom the mystery of God is finished— or who have witnessed its fulfilment. Previous to that great and final manifestation, it is our part to wait in humble expectancy, and to acquiesce in the mysteriousness of many things which at present we do not comprehend."] (7) Further, whoever says that he can now everywhere ' "^ * ^N"^ ^* ^T SN discern God's wisdom and ^T^rf ^TWrfY ^T'T ^TV- no CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH goodness, he, like one " lying r^j^ Wiif^^ ^T?5 7[#t- for God," injures with great ^j^^-^^^ ^^^rT^TrJ- effort [or unintentionally does ''. . his best to injure], though ^^T T^ ^ ^^ W^f^rJ- loving it, the very cause which f%"^rfiT rT^^ ^^fi^^^vjft he seeks [thus disingenuously] j^^i^j ^f^ ^i^^pT I to advance. (7) Let us now recapitulate | ^ | rf^T*^TftR*I^^Rr rf- the matters that have been ^^^y^ TT^TfT^t f^^'^T- laid down in the several sec- -v tions of this treatise. In Bk. ^^JT^^^^^TT: I W I ^- I. is an account of the leading ^^ S^gT^ -^l^^rr^TTt^- points in the Christian reli- fij^^iij I f%^ the present discussion of the T^T^'TTiTmil^T^f^^Tj leading points in Christianity, ^'T^llfH rff^'^T^Tf^^Tf- by indicating to those who iftm^ TT<[^^^-JT^rf ^- desire to know the whole „^.,^......!„.f^^. . „...;^ truth 01 these Scriptures, the "* method of satisfying that de- ^'*^ ' sire of knowledge. 112 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH HINDt PHILOSOPHY. APHOEISM VIII. Scriptures. ^ ^ ^TT^^T Tf^ II ^ II (1) The repetition is to in- I \ I ^WST^T'^^'TT^- dicate [as it will do to the ^ j reader of the Sdnlchya Apho- risms], that this is the con- clusion of the section. (2) '' Search," etc. That is \^\ f^^TTWt^T \^ I to say, they are to be studied ^^jf^^^ ^^'^^t ^^T" diliffently and candidly, not _^ ^ ^ . ^ with the intention of finding t%^W^^^ ^^f^^T^^T^,- objections, but with the desire ^^WT>qT^^^T T(2T^* I of finding the truth. Further, f^^ fT^Tfi[VT«}TW^T^ rT- at the time of thus studying, ^ ^.^^^^^^^ ^ . _^^^^^. let him with sincerity and hu- ^^ . mility pray to the Lord of the ^ ^'^^ t^^^H: ^m- universe, saying, "Show me '^'^ ^Tr^^^T* "JTT^^^ the truth who am seeking to -^^ ^-f^ j know it, and the way in which I ought to walk." Amen. Here ends the Fifth Book ^ ^^^^^^^^ ^^_ of the Elucidation of the Chris- . '^ ^ tianEeligion. ^> 5W^: II APPENDIX NOTES AND DISSERTATIONS. Several points involved in the preceding treatise appear to call for a fuller exposition than could have been given, where each point first presented itself, without the risk of injuriously interrupting the thread of the argument. Such points may be, perhaps, profit- ably treated in separate Notes, in which a somewhat familiar style of treatment, and an admixture of dialogue, — employed not less for the sake of perspicuity than of vivacity, — may be not displeasing to the reader. Our first dissertation is on the subject of " Matter," a most important topic where the missionary has to reason with idolaters, — much more with idolaters imbued, from the cradle, through the very language, with a system of metaphysics of such a nature that, if the missionary neglect or fail to master it and its strictly defined ter- minology, he will strive in vain to make his arguments against idolatry intelligible, even to the most candid among those whom he addresses. One missionary, for example (the case is not feigned), thinks that he has stated, with sufficient precision, the proposition that '' God is not material," when he has stated to a Hindii 114 NOTE A. that God is not dravya^ i.e. not a *' substance," which an idol certainly is; — but he omits to keep in mind that there is (as Milton says), ^'spiritual substance" as well as " material," both of them included under the head of dravija=^ ''substance;" so that his proposition conveys to the Hindii the assertion that " God is neither Matter nor Spirit." These things, though metaphysical, are not trifling. The man who thinks them such, mistakes his vocation when he ventures to become a missionary to the Hindiis. Again, the missionary may perhaps feel equally convinced that his meaning ought to be understood when he has propounded that God is no paddrtha^ — this term certainly being denotative of a "material thing," — but it denotes also whatever is meant hj any term, — so that the proposition here conveys to the Hindu the assertion that the term " God" has no meaning, denotes nothing, — not even the non-existence of anything. Another reasoner suggests — for "Matter" — the term Vastu, which, where it is a recognised and defined metaphysical term, denotes the " Supreme Spirit," to the exclusion of whatever is not spirit. But the reader who cares to see this question discussed more fully need not be longer detained from the note following. NOTE A. A DIALOGUE ON THE TERM " MATTER" AND ITS POS- SIBLE CORRESPONDENTS IN THE HINDU DIALECTS. You have frequently expressed a wish, my Theophilus, that I should explain to you clearly and concisely those opinions of my Hindu friends which, in the current ex- positions of them, appear to be so strange as to render it ON "MATTER." 115 scarcely credible that a thinking person should seriously entertain them. It occurs to me that I may in some measure perform what you require of me by giving you — to the best of my recollection — an account of a conversation, on the subject of " Matter," which took place the other evening. You know Eusebius, our in- defatigable missionary. He had just returned, rather wearied, from preaching all day amidst the noise and distraction of a meld^ or religious fair ; but he brightened up as he saw the inquiring young Brahman, Taradatt, approaching. Eusebius and I had been sitting on the high bank that overhangs the Ganges, where the sacred stream glides past the garden of the excellent Philoxenus. By the strangest of coincidences, Lawrence happened to be with us. You know Lawrence, with his huge quantity of reading, and his frequent, or, rather, habitual, absence of mind. Taradatt smiled as he sat down and addressed Eusebius. '' You have been labouring to en- lighten the holiday makers at the meld to-day, my dear Sir, if one may judge from your jaded look." *' You have guessed rightly," replied Eusebius; but why do you smile?" "At the amusing inexhaustibleness of your patience," replied the other. '' Surely," exclaimed Eusebius, "you do not expect that I shall ever give up labouring in my vocation from despair at the apparent ineffectualness of my efforts ? It is my part to labour ; it belongs to God to give the increase in his own good time." Taradatt — My being a Hindu does not prevent me from appreciating and honouring your perseverance in the face of difficulties. But I could not help smiling at 116 NOTE A. the thought of the discouragements to which you must have been exposed to-day. Did your audience consist entirely of the illiterate ? Eusehius. — No. There was a forward young man who interrupted me from time to time, declaring that all that was true in my account of the Deity was to be found in the books of the Hindiis, from which the Europeans had borrowed, or stolen, without understanding the real im- port of what they were appropriating. He produced a marked effect upon the people, by declaring that my views of the omniscience and the omnipresence of God were lamentably imperfect, — the true view of that subject being conveyed, he contended, in a text of the Veda, which he quoted in Sanskrit, and which, of course, not one of them understood a word of." Tdrddatt. — " Can you repeat the text ?" Eusebius declared he feared he could not, not having fully understood it himself. Only he was sure it con- tained a pointed reference to the word " all," and sounded somewhat like so and so, — reciting here certain sounds, with which, Theophilus, I cannot at this moment tax my memory. The words which had appeared of so grave import to the listeners at the meld, had quite a different effect upon the Brahman, who burst out laughing, assur- ing us, as gravely as he could, that the words were quoted from the Grammar of Fdnmi, and that they bore reference to nothing beyond the fact that in all cases the word "cow" was optionally amenable to a certain euphonic rule. Eusebius himself could not help smiling at the barefaced impudence of the trick which had been played him ; and Taradatt took advantage of the incident to ON "MATTER." II7 press a suggestion which it appears he had made more than once before. Tdradatt. — You see, my dear Sir, that you would be the better of knowing our sacred language. I do not, indeed, promise you that, even with a knowledge of the Sanskrit, you would be able to convince the illiterate. Our low-caste Hindus are too modest to think for them- selves. They commit the keeping of their consciences to the hands of us Brahmans just as, I have heard, the people on the continent of Europe make over the same trust to their own Brahmans. The Europeans are un- fortunate in this, that they are necessarily misled, their guides being blind leaders, or, at all events, guides grop- ing in the dark ; but in this more favoured land the people have reposed their implicit confidence in guides who have eyes and who have light. The people here are content with guidance ; they do not seek for light, which might possibly dazzle them. Can it be, that you, Eusebius, shrink from meeting the learned of India on their own ground, preferring, as less arduous, to defy them from a safe distance, and to come to close quarters only with the avowedly uninstructed, who afford you an easy triumph in argument, though, you will admit, they afford you little else? Eusebius, — You wish to provoke me, I perceive, to an argument with your learned self, friend Taradatt ; and you know very well that neither I nor my brother mis- sionaries are wont to shrink from a contest with you, arduous as you may choose to think it. But you are not ignorant that a characteristic difference between the Gospel and the lights which the Brahmans declare that 118 NOTE A. they possess is this, that to the poor the Gospel is preached. By the poor we understand those whom you look upon as of low caste ^ and hence unworthy, or incap- able, of enlightenment. The Gospel acknowledges no dis- tinctions among men, except to point out the lowly as the especial objects of its care. Tdradatt. — But are these to be the sole objects of its care? Eusehius. — By no means. How can you insinuate that we have made them so ? You have long had the New Testament in your loved Sanskrit, and you have more recently received the Pentateuch in the same. I wish that, to us, as large a proportion of your Veda were available, if it were only as a literary curiosity.* Tdradatt. — Your mention of the Veda reminds me that the portion of it which has been printed in Europe is accompanied by an ample commentary, without which even we could not understand the text. Now, much of the text of your Scriptures is, to us, at least not less obscure. Have you no explanatory commentary ? Eusehius. — We have, and more commentaries than one. To select from these the portions most likely to be needed by a Hindii reader, and to digest them into a separate volume in the vernacular, or to print them along with the text, would be a commendable work in one who could do no better. Tdradatt. — I should welcome such a work, though I should like it in the Sanskrit rather than in the ver- nacular. * Tbo substance of this Note appeared in the Benares Magazine some years ago, when only the first volume of the Miff Veda had Veen published by Max Miiller. ON "MATTER." 119 EuseUus. — That is to say, you would prefer keeping it to yourself and your brother Brahmans. Tdrddatt. — If I did, yet its being in Sanskrit would scarcely secure that end. But let that pass. I am not so anxious to keep all knowledge to my own class, but that I should be very well pleased if I could make you yourself understand and appreciate the sublime philosophy of the Hindi! religion. Eusehius. — "Why, Mr. Colebrooke has enabled me to do that already. But that need not prevent you from indulging in some declamation on your favourite topic. I am all attention. Lawrence, who is watching the first glimmer of the rising moon on the ripple of the stream, will not interrupt you without good reason ; and as for our other friend, he, for reasons of his own, is not likely to interrupt you at all. This last observation, my Theophilus, was designed to convey a gentle sarcasm on myself ; Eusebius holding, in spite of all my protestations to the contrary, that I am half a Hindii, because I am fonder than he is of their sacred language. You, my friend, know that the im- putation is undeserved ; but it would have been useless to remonstrate with Eusebius, so I contented myself with shrugging my shoulders in the way of protest, whilst Lawrence, removing his eyes from the moon, looked benevolently, yet mournfully, on Taradatt. The latter, instead of becoming eloquent on the theme proposed, simply stated his belief that one thing alone existed. Eusehius. — Well, what thing ? Taradatt. — Do not accuse me of trifling with you if I answer " that thing." As one of your poets makes a 120 NOTE A. lady ask, so I may ask here, " What's in a name ?" If there be but one thing, then this one thing is all, and it may be (what nothing else supposable can be) definitely named by that which you Europeans call a pronoun, and which we, the followers of Panini, call a sarva-ndma^ or " name of all or any thing." "We call the one thing, in Sanskrit, tat, i.e. '^ that." Eusehius. — Good ; — but if you, like your lady in the play, have no predilection for any name in particular, you will perhaps have no objection to give me some other name in exchange for this ''that," which does not please me. Tdrddatt. — Let the name be Brahm. Eusehius. — Has that name a meaning ? Tdrddatt. — The word being derived from the root vrih, "to increase," may signify "that from which all emanates." Eusehius. — From which all tvJiat emanates ? ' Tdrddatt. — All that which is no thing,— 'Brohm being the one only thing — the sole reality — according to the sense of that term as derived from the Latin res, a "thing," as I suppose it is. Eusehius. — Well, laying aside for the present all that is no thing, pray tell us all that you can about the one thing. Tdrddatt. — All that can be told about it, — in fact, all that it is, — may be enounced very briefly. It is exist- ence, knowledge, and joy. There you have the whole. It is not a something, of which these are the properties or qualities, — but these are it, and it these. Eusehius. — And this material world ? ON "MATTER." 121 ^^'^aradatt. — That to which you give the name of a material world is an illusion. At this moment, Theophilus, Lawrence, who had seemed previously to be wrapped in his own thoughts, broke silence and spoke as follows : — Lawrence. — " We are placed in a system in which mankind will deal with us, and we, in spite of all theories to the contrary, must deal with mankind, as if the objects of sense were real. Hence it does, I own, seem to me an unpractical philosophy which leads men to treat these things as if they were unreal." On hearing these words, Theophilus, the Brahman seemed not a little perplexed. After pondering them for some time, with his eyes fixed upon the ground, he looked up, designing apparently to reply to the speaker ; but, perceiving that the eyes of Lawrence were again bent intently on the moon, he turned to Eusebius, and re- marked as follows : — Tdrddatt — Men do deal with one another as if the objects of sense were real ; and, for aught that I can say to the contrary, they possibly must so deal with one an- other, so long as the illusion of a world continues. I, for one, am not concerned with the inquiry whether this or that philosophy is "practical" or "unpractical." I ask simply, what is true? "What you Europeans call " practical," is, I imagine, what we Hindiis call vydva- hdrika ; and we admit the importance of attending to such a consideration, so far as concerns this illusive world; but we do not see how the consideration bears upon the one reality, which is the sole object of sound philosophy. If I mistake not, your own Berkeley was 122 NOTE A. idly charged with inculcating an '^ unpractical " philo- sophy, when he questioned the existence of material substance ; but the best of your writers now-a-days acknowledge, that, while he questioned the existence of anything under the phenomena, — to be called material sub- stance from its being sub or tmder these, — he did not deny that there zvere such phenomena as required such and such actions to be practised. For example, he did not neglect to practise the action of getting out of the way of a loaded wagon, although he held that the driver of the wagon no more believed in the existence of a material substance of the wagon, over and above all its powers and properties, than he himself did, — the conception that there is any such inscrutable substratum, being, he contended, the con- ception of his metaphysical opponents, and not that either of himself — accused of over-refinement in speculation — or of the wagoner not so accused. We do not, then, treat phenomena as if they were unreal, — that is to say, as if they were not ; but we deny that they are real — that they are things. Our treatment of them is " prac- tical," our conception of them, at the same time, is correct. Eusebius. — We must look a little closer into that word real ; — but hark, Lawrence, who has seemingly been in a brown study since he last spoke, appears to be again about to speak. Lawrence. — '' And as experience is our guide, and not theory^ in practical matters ; as, further, men often entail upon themselves, and even upon others, very great misery, even in this life, by obstinately following their own theories of things, in opposition to the teaching of "ON MATTER." 123 men of experience, it becomes a very serious question for you, whether you ought not to be able to prove the Veddnta system far more demonstratively, before you let it have the least influence upon your practice. And the choice between Christianity and Brahminism is a prac- tical question, and one which you will find, the more you know of Christianity, to be materially aifected by the view you take of our relations to matter." The Brahman, Theophilus, on hearing this, became apparently more puzzled than before! He paused so long that at length Eusebius interrupted his meditations by asking what was the Sanskrit word for matter. Tdrddatf. — There is no Sanski'it word for " matter." Eiisehius, — You surprise me. Colonel Yans Kennedy, I know, denied that there was a Sanskrit word answer- ing to our philosophical term "matter;" but Sir G. Haughton immediately supplied him with a dozen. Tdrddatt. — "What were they ? Eusebius replying that he could not undertake to recollect them, I, Theophilus, being not unwilling to aid, in some subordinate manner, a discussion which interested me not a little, got up and fetched the book, which happened to be among the borrowed volumes that enrich my library, and occasionally reproach my punc- tuality. Eusebius, turning to the place [the 221st page of the (London) Asiatic Journal^ vol. xviii., new series, 1835], read out the words of Sir Graves Haughton as follows : — "I must, however, go beyond this refutation, and inform your readers of what they might reasonably have expected, namely, that the Sanskrit language con- tains many words for matter. Take the following examples : 124 NOTE A. vastUj vastly dravya^ sarira, murtti^ tatttva^ paddrtha^ prad- hdna^ mida-praJcriti ; and, with the Jainas, pudgalaP On hearing this list read, to each item in which it struck me that Lawrence nodded a mild approval, the Brahman, Theophilus, gradually opened his eyes wider and wider. At the close, he rubbed them as if in doubt whether he were awake ; and then he requested a sight of the volume. Having certified himself that the words were printed as they had seemed to strike his ear, and that he was therefore probably awake, he asked Easebius whether he was content to receive each or any one of these words as the synonyme of the term '' matter," — the t3'X7) of the Greeks. Eusehius. — I am content to hear what you have got to say against receiving them as such. Tdrddatt. — Let us look at them in succession. The word vastu (as the Veddnta Sdra will tell you) means the Divine Spirit, the one thing recognised as a reality in the Veddnta. The whole of what we talk of as the world is, according to the Veddnta, a-vastu, i.e. '' not a thing." What you speak of as the material world is what we call not vastu. And the same applies to the term vasu, the second in the list. Then the term dravya, as stated in the Tarlca Sangraha and a score of other works, is the generic name of earth, water, light, air, ether, time, space, soul, and mind. Eusehius. — Soul, do you say ? Tdrddatt. — Certainly. Soul is one of the things be- longing to the list headed dravjja. Do you hold it to be matter ? Eusehius. — Heaven forbid. "OX MATTER." 125 Tdrddatt. — Then I fear that this term will not suit ; the more so as I imagine you will object to classing time and space as varieties of matter. EuseUus. — Pray, on what principle do you class these with earth and water ? Tdrddatt. — On the principle that qualities.^ etc., belong to them, as you may see by referring to the 23rd verse of the Bhdshd-parichcJiheda^ the text-book of the Nydya^ that is in the hands of every schoolboy. Eusehius. — Then you hold time to be a substance ? Tdrddatt. — What do you mean by " substance ?" Eusehius. — Its meaning accords with its etymology. It is that which " stands under," and serves as it were for a support to the qualities which could not exist apart from it. Tdrddatt. — I like your definition, for it is my own ; and so if time has any qualities, then time is the sub- stance in which these its own qualities inhere. But tell me : — We mortals have wishes and we have fears ; we have doubts, difficulties, and, occasionally, joys. Do these exist apart and of themselves ? Eusehius. — ]^o. A wish does not exist without a wisher, nor a doubt apart from one that doubts. Why do you ask a question the answer to which is so self- evidently obvious ? Tdrddatt. — I ask it because I am curious to know whether you hold that these wishes and doubts can exist apart from matter. Is your wisher or your doubter neces- sarily material ? EuseUus. — By no means. I happen to remember that your own revered Gautama declares that " desire, aver- 126 NOTE A. sion," etc. belong to the soul. The soul is a substance, not a material substance. Tdrddatt. — You remember rightly ; you refer to the tenth aphorism of Gautama's first lecture. But you speak of spiritual substance as differing from material sub- stance ; — do you really then, in Europe, hold that there is such a twofold distinction in ''substance?" Eusehius. — Unquestionably. There are, indeed, men, calling themselves " materialists," who hold that there is only one substance ; but those who recite the creed in which the persons of the Trinity are acknowledged to be 'Hhe same in substance ^^ speak, as Milton does, oi spiritual substance, not of matter. If you will glance down the page that is before you, you will see an apposite remark of Cudworth's, which, as Sir Gr. Haughton observes. Lord Brougham, in his Discourse on Natural Theology^ page 93, quotes with applause. Pray read it aloud. Tarddatt. — Ah, here is what you refer to : — " What- ever is, or hath any kind of entity, doth either subsist by itself, or else is an attribute, affection, or mode of some- thing that doth subsist by itself." Well, I agree with Sir G. Haughton that this is obviously true. But tell me, in your opinion, does the Deity "subsist by itself," or is it " an attribute, etc. ?'' Eusehius. — Of course you know my opinion, God exists of himself. His is a spiritual substance. Tdrddatt. — This I expected you to say ; and I tho- roughly agree with you. But I must now beg you to explain the passage which had just caught my eye on the opposite page. Eusehius. — Bead out the passage. •'ON MATTER." 127 Tdrddatt. — I find Sir G. Haughton, in page 220, de- clares as follows : — " Every one conversant with these subjects must know that, in philosophical language, sub- stance , hodij^ and matter mean all one and the same thing, and, as such, are opposed to spirit P Permit me to ask you, when your creed speaks of the persons of the Trinity as being " the same in substance^'' does it mean that they consist of the same matter ? Eiisehius. — Again, I say, God forbid. But allow me to look at the book ; for the passage that you have just read makes me suspect, as you did of yourself a little while ago, that I must be dreaming. Taking the book, Theophilus, Eusebius appeared the more perplexed the more he pondered and reperused the passage asserting the identity of " substance, body, and matter." At length he exclaimed : — " Indeed it seems to me that Col. Vans Kennedy, when he assailed Mr. Colebrook's account of the Veddnta^ and Sir G. C. Haughton, when he defended it, must have been engaged in a game of cross-purposes, which the enlightened Mr. Colebrooke himself, — had he not been then, alas, upon his death-bed, — would have been able to bring to a satis- factory conclusion. Tdrddatt. — Pray explain what you refer to. EuseUiis. — I shall perhaps be the better prepared to do this, if you will first complete your detail of objections to the string of terms which Sir G. C. Haughton ofi'ered to Col. Kennedy as equivalents for the philosophical term matter ; — but see, here comes the cheerful Chrysostomus and his meek-eyed helpmate. Let us welcome them. The cheerful Chrysostomus, you must know, Theo- 128 NOTE A. philus, is a valiant polemic, — formidable in argument, for his good-humoured imperturbability, as he is attrac- tive at all times through his imperturbable good humour. With a sigh that seemed to come from a heart as light as heart could wish, he shook his head gently at Taradatt, who, receiving this not unexpected greeting with an expression of countenance blending the comic and the kindly, without fui'ther exordium addressed him. Taradatt. — We are enquiring, Chrysostomus, whe- ther there be any Indian term answering to the word "matter." " And where is the difficulty ?'' exclaimed Chrysos- tomus. " Down in the city, paddrtha is one very good word for it, and dravija is another." Taradatt recapitulated the objections to the term dravija^ which I have already recorded; and Chrysos- tomus shook his head, as if he thought that there were here a splitting of straws ; but just then Philoxenus, hearing that a lady had arrived, hastened out to say that tea was preparing; and the lady was led off, followed by her worthy spouse. The Brahman then resumed his criticism of the list, remarking that to place among the synonymes the term sarlra^ which (as rendered rightly in Wilson's Dictionary, and also in Sir G. C. Haughton's own) means only the body, looked almost like a punning design to burlesque the proposition that " substance, body, and matter, mean all one and the same thing." " The next term," he con- tinued, "viz., murtti^ which, in common language, means a form or imago (/xop^^yj), means, in philosophical language, whatever has definite limits. Earth, water, light, air, " ON MATTER." 129 and niind^ we are told/ are of this description, while the ether is a substance not of this description. If the sub- stance air extended as far as the substance ether, it would cease to bear the name in question, yet this would be very different from its ceasing to be material.'''' Eusehius. — But what do you hold to be the definite magnitude of the mind ? Tdrddatt. — In the system to which the term under discussion belongs, the mind is held to be of the size of an atom.^ Eusehius. — Well, let that pass; — but pray continue your censures. The next term that you have to deal with is tattwa. Tdrddatt. — The term tattwa belongs more peculiarly to the Sankhya school. Being, according to the ordinary etymology, an abstract derivative fi'om the pronoun tat^ ''that," it answers to the Jicecceitas of Duns Scotus; but in the Sankhya it is employed as a concrete term to de- note the eight "producers," the sixteen "productions," and "soul." Eusehius. — In such an acceptation the term certainly does not correspond with matter ; but, though the term bears a sense so extensive in the Sankhya system, may it not answer to the term matter in some of the others ? Tdrddatt. — In the IN'yaya it bears a sense founded on its supposed etymology, — it means the nature of anything as it really is, — in short, truth. Eusehius. — Its supposed etymology ? Is the etymology called in question that you have just mentioned ? i See the Blmsha-parichchheda, v. 24, and its commentary, p- 12. 2 Sec ante, p. xxiv. 130 NOTE A. Tarddatt — Certainly ; by those who know what truth is. There is but one truth that can be declared to any one ; and that one solitary truth, — obscured only by the unavoidable imperfections of language, — is conveyed in the formula tat tzvam^ " That art thou." The hearer of this truth — (from the terms of which, you perceive, truth itself takes its designation of tattwa) — when he has rightly understood and accepted it, changing the " thou" to the first person, reflects thus — " /am Brahma." This is so far well; — but he must finally get rid of the habit of making even himself an object of thought. There must be no object. The subject alone must remain — a thought, a joy, an existence, ^ — and the only one.^ Eusebius. — Take breath, I beseech you, and then let us finish the list, the next term in which is the word paddrtha^ which our friend Chrysostomus thinks a good one. Tdrddatt. — The term paddrtlia'^ means '' substance" (including soul), "quality," "action," "com ." " In short," interrupted Eusebius, "it seems to mean everything ; — is it so ?" Tdradatt.- — It means everything that is, — with the varieties of non-existence into the bargain. Eusebius. — Yery possibly it may do so in the philo- sophical systems ; but when the word recalls to the mind of the generality of hearers the idea of sticks and stones, and rivers and fruits, and so on, why is it not as good a word to use for matter, when speaking to those who are not philosophers, as any other ? 1 See anic, \>, xxxvii. " Tarhi-sani/ra/ia, p. 1. "ON MATTER.'- I31 At this question, Theophilus, the Brahman looked as if taken aback. After some reflection he replied. Tciradatt. — Let me understand you, my dear Sir. The question in hand, if I am not mistaken, was this, — viz.. Do such and such terms represent the European term " matter " so precisely, that the difference in opinion between Colonel Vans Kennedy and Sir G. C. Haughton could, so long as we employ one of those terms as the substitute for the term matter, be brought under the cognizance of learned Hindus in such a manner that the difference of opinion could be intelli- gently entertained, and rightly adjudicated upon, by these competent judges? I deny that the terms are such as to allow of this. Few more competent judges could have been found than Eammohun Eoy ; and yet he, when the dispute was laid before him,^ was so abso- lutely ignorant of the meaning of the term matter, that he thought that he had settled the question submitted to him, by pointing to a passage in his own works, fully supporting Mr. Colebrooke's inter- pretation, "that," according to the Vedanta philosophy, "God was not only the efficient but the material cause of the universe." I have been all along talking on the supposition that the enquiry is, how you are to let Indian philosophers understand what you mean by matter, — not — what words may serve when speaking to the illiterate about material products, without any reference to the philosophical conception of matter at all. EuseUus. — Well, — let it be so. I shall expect you to explain what bearing the remark of Eammohun ^ London Asiatic Journal, vol. xxxv., new series, 1835, p. 214. 132 NOTE A. Eoy has upon your spiritual Yedantism, which it seems to me to reduce to something very like simple material- ism ; but, in the first instance, pray finish your list of terms. What objection have you to pradJiana ? Tarddatt — The term pradhana belongs to the Sdnhhfja philosophy, where it is interchangeable with the next term in the list, viz., mlda-praliriti^ as Professor H. H. Wilson's translation shows.' Either term is usually translated by the term nature. Such a term — (for of the Jaina misuse of the word pudgala^ I, like other Brahmans, know nothing)— comes, perhaps, nearer to the term matter than any other in the list; but yet it will not serve as a substitute for the \}\y\. You cannot speak of the pradhdna of a jar, or the pradhdna of a web, as you speak of the v'kr\ or matter of a goblet or a statue, because pradhdna is the name of a single power, like the "Nature" of European sceptics. Further, instead of this pradhdna being a substance, you may learn from Professor Wilson,- that it is the aggregate of the three qualities, '' goodness," " foulness," and " darkness." Euschius. — Aha, my friend, — but I happen to have jotted down in my note-book an extract from the page preceding that to which I presume you mean to refer me. There ^ Professor Wilson says that, "in speaking of qualities, however, the term guna is not to be regarded as an insubstantial or accid<3ntal attribute, but as a substance discernible by soul through the 1 " Mula^ ' the root,' pralrifi ' nature,' is pradhana, ' chief,' " &c. Sec Wilson's Sunhhya Kurikn, p. IG. ■ STmlhya Karikn, p. .')3. ' Ibid, p. 52. " ON MATTER." I33 medium of the faculties." What, then, is the use of founding upon its being called a quality ? Here, Theophilus, I ventured to express my own opinion on this point. " Professor Wilson," I said, " rightly reports the opinion of the SdnkJuja when he says that what are usually spoken of as the three ' qualities,' [guna) might with propriety be termed ' In- gredients or constituents of nature.' But while it would follow logically that, if nature be substantial, these its ingredients or constituents cannot be insuh- stantial^ it also follows logically that, if these ingredients or constituents are not substances but qualities, then natm-e, the aggregate of them, cannot be substantial, but is an aggregate of qualities." Here Eusebius show- ing symptoms of impatience, I paused deferentially, and he exclaimed, as I had partly expected — '' What room is there for any such oinnion^ forsooth, when Professor Wilson cites the very words of Kapila's commentator, who tells us that Sativa and the rest are 'things,' not 'specific properties.'"' "Forgive me," I here ex- claimed in turn, "if I object to the rendering, in this present connexion, of Vaiseshikd gundh by ' specific properties,' instead of by ' the Vaiseshika gunas.'' Accord- ing to the Vmseshikas, the gunas — the things to which exclusively these philosophers allow the name of ' quality' — are twenty-four in number, and to these they deny the possession of, or the right of standing as substratum to, any of the said four-and-twenty qualities. The twenty -four 'qualities' of the VaiseshiJca philosophy,^ are - See the Tarkn-sangralia. 134 NOTE A. called gum; — and the SanJchya commentator, dreading that his own three 'qualities' might be mistaken for these, took care to warn us that they are not the Vaiseshika gimas ; — and, to make assurance doubly sure, he stated that they were spoken of by Kapila in terms which a Vaiseshika or a Naiyayika was bound to apply only to a substance, — viz., as ' themselves having qualities.'" "Well, well," interrupted Eusebius, "waiv- ing that question, let me recall friend Taradatt to the dictum of Eammohun Eoy, ' that, according to the Vedanta philosophy, God was not only the efficient but the material cause of the universe.' If God be the material cause of a material universe, then what is God but matter? Eeally I begin to doubt how I am to avoid agreeing with Colonel Kennedy that it is impossible to suppose that Mr. Colebrooke, who employs the same terms — saying of God, that ' He is both efficient and material cause of the world '^ — could be of opinion that such a system could be otherwise than material. I see, indeed, that Mr. Colebrooke, by what Sir G. C. Haughton calls 'a fortunate departure from his usual reserve,' - has left an explicit record of his opinion of the Yedanta philosophy that removes all doubt as to his conception of its nature. The Vedanta, he says, ' deduces from the text of the Indian scriptures a refined psychology, which goes to a denial of a material world.' ^ But is not this contradictory to the other assertion ? Deny a material world, and what do you mean by its material cause? Sir G. C. Haughton ' Colebrooke's Essays, vol. i., p. 371. - Asiatic Journal,, vol. xviii., p. 215. 3 Colebrooke's Essoyn, vol. i, p. 227. "ON MATTER." 135 appears to have been conscious that there was some inconsistency here, for he seeks to shift the blame from Mr. Colebrooke to the Yedantists themselves. Mr. Colebrooke held the Vedanta to be a refined psycho- logy, and ' consequently,' argues Sir G. C. Haughton, ' should it appear to be, as Colonel Kennedy asserts, a system of gross and material pantheism in the writings of Mr. Colebrooke, such an inference must be deduced from the expressions of its Indian interpreters, who are faithfully rendered by him.'' I must say, I think Sir G. C. Haughton had better have confined his defence of Mr. Colebrooke to this single assertion that the inconsistency belongs to the system itself which Mr. Colebrooke faithfully expounded. No more then needed to be said. The most marvellous thing of all is the fact that Colonel Kennedy, with the inconsistency star- ing him in the face, could speak of the Vedanta as ' the most spiritual system that ever was imagined by man.'^ Solve this riddle, friend Taradatt, if you have the power, — ^which I greatly doubt." Taradatt. — The riddle can be solved without diffi- culty. There is no such inconsistency as you imagine in the system, and neither is there in Mr. Colebrooke's exposition. Colonel Kennedy misunderstood Mr. Cole- brooke, and Sir G. C. Haughton, with his well-intended interference and his pet dogma of the co-extensive signification of the terms ''substance" and "matter," bewildered the Colonel still further. The Eajah, Eam- mohun Eoy, was right in declaring that Mr. Colebrooke was right. Had the Eajah been as thoroughly well > Asiatic Jo7crnal, vol. xviii, p. 215. - Ibid, p. 98. 136 NOTE A. versed in the technical terminology of European philo- sophy as in that of the Vedanta and the ISTyaya, he could at once have placed his finger on the misconceived term which lay at the bottom of the strange logomachy recorded in these papers of the Asiatic Journal. Mr. Colebrooke, had he been in health, could have done this ; and I can fancy the readiness with which that most candid of scholars would have given up the use of a term which was liable to such misconception. When Mr, Colebrooke, or Eammohun Eoy, speaks of the Yedantic tenet that God is the material cause of the universe, do you suppose he means a cause consisting of the matter which we have been hitherto in vain seeking to find a name for in the list offered by Sir G. C. Haughton ? Eiiselius. — If not, then what is it that he does mean ? Tdrddatt. — Why, surely, — if we have had such diffi- culty in finding — what we have not yet found — a term in the philosophic vocabulary of India answering to matter, does it not strike you as an odd circumstance that the same vocabulary should so readily supply a term for a ^'-material cause?" Eusehiiis.- — Now that you mention it, the circum- stance does seem indeed somewhat odd. But may we not turn it to good account? We want a word for "matter;" — tell me then your word for ''material,'' and I imagine that we shall only have to lop off" the adjectival termination in order to find what we were in search of. Tdrddatt. — It grieves me to disappoint you, but in the present instance your disappointment is unavoidable. " ON MATTER." I37 The Sanskrit term rendered "material cause" is sa7na- vdyi-Mrana. In the Vedanta books the term updddna- Mrana is more commonly used, but the same thing is meant. The portion of the term (viz., samavdyi) so frequently rendered, by Mr. Colebrooke and his suc- cessors, "material," is the adjectival derivative of the word samavd-ija — which Mr. Colebrooke rightly renders "intimate and constant relation."' Eusebius. — "Intimate and constant relation?" — this will never serve as an equivalent for matter. Tdrddatt. — No. But it will serve very well to denote the relation between a (substance and its quali- ties, as it is employed, in our philosophical vocabulary, to do. Hence the logomachy of Colonel Kennedy and Sir Gr. C. Haughton might have been prevented if Mr. Colebrooke had rendered samavdyi-Mrcma by " suhstantial cause" instead of '-^material cause." That Mr. Cole- brooke did not confound substance with matter, like his well-intentioned defender, is evident from his speaking of soul as a substance. "Being a substance," he says, "though immaterial, as a substratum of qualities, it is placed in Canade's arrangement as one of the nine sub- stances which are there recognized."^ T^ow, pray ob- serve, — Soul, though immaterial, is a substratum of qualities : — qualities, according to Plato and the Vedan- tists alike, have not an esse such as their substratum has: — hence, soul, the immaterial, is the only real essence ; — Mr. Colebrooke was right in saying that the Vedanta is a "refined psychology;" Colonel Kennedy, rightly entertaining the same view of the Vedanta, was 1 Colebrooke's Essays, vol. i., j). 267- * Ihid, vol. i., p. 2CS. 138 NOTE T,. to blame for boggling at Mr. Colebrooke's employment of the technical term ''material cause" for what might better have been called " substratum ;" — and Sir G. C. Haughton was to be condoled with for a confusion of ideas in regard to the co-extensiveness of matter and substance, which are no more co-extensive in meaning than cow is co-extensive with quadruped. Having heard this, Eusebius, as it appeared to me, became thoughtful. He shook his head several times, as if doubtful. At length he looked up briskly and exclaimed : — " Why do you talk of soul, as if there were but one ? I have a soul ; you have a soul ; even our friend here " " Stop, my dear sir," exclaimed the Brahman, "we have separate minds, but soul is one only — pure and unchangeable.'' But here, Theophi- lus, as you will observe, the conversation diverged from the question of matter ; — so I will not at present report the discussion that ensued. Ultimately left alone, I joined the circle at the tea-table of Philoxenus, where the conversation, cheerful and miscellaneous, bore little reference to the notions of the Hindus. ■ NOTE B. ON THE HINDIF EMPLOYMENT OF THE TERMS "SOUL" AND "MIND." You ask me, Theophilus, what the Brahman was going to say, when my last communication was abruptly brought to a close by the diverging of Eusebius from the question of the term '' matter." Eusebius, then, in reply to the Brahman's assertion of the unity of soul ON THE TERMS 'SOUL" AND "MIND." 139 and the plurality of minds, exclaimed — ''You talk most strangely, explain yourself if possible." Tdrwlatt.— You observe the moon, which Lawrence has kept gazing at, — indifferent to our conversation, on the subject of which his mind is apparently made up. IS"ow look into any of these large earthen vessels which Philoxenus keeps filled with water for the benefit of his beloved shrubs and trees. If it should seem to you that the moon is visible in every one of these, as well as in the sacred stream that ripples before us, would you conclude that there are many moons, some of them at rest, as in the water-tub, and some in agitation, as in the rippling stream ? Eusebius. — Ko ; because there is but one real moon, and the others are reflections. Tarddatt. — Good : — and if the water, to which tliese reflections are due, were removed, what would remain ? Eusehius. — Why, as regards the present question, the moon itself. Tarddatt. — True. Now, in like manner remove the ignorance or delusion, out of which men's minds are made, and then there will be no dim or disturbed re- flections of soul, but soul itself will remain alone. Eusebius. — You ought to be very sure indeed that you have good evidence for the authenticity of a revela- tion which asserts things so repugnant to reason and common sense. Tarddatt. — On the contrary, I think, we may dispense with the trouble of enquiring into the credentials of a revelation conveying a doctrine which so irresistibly approves itself to the reason. 140 NOTE C. At this declaration, Theophilus, Eusebius shrugged his shoulders, Lawrence sighed, and I myself felt moved to speak, which I proceeded to do as follows: — " That the doctrine of the Vedanta so entirely approves itself to the reason ought to lead you to doubt, Taradatt, whether the doctrine required a revelation, and was therefore likely to be the subject of one. I do not refer to those queer observances, such as inhaling the breath by one nostril and expelling it by the other, which are inculcated in the system, and which, in my opinion, are so far from approving themselves to the reason, that an unquestion- ably authenticated revelation alone could justify their being gravely considered. I refer solely to the great tenet that only One exists, and that nothing but One ever really existed, or will exist, or could exist." Here Eusebius, starting up, put on his hat, and, turning on his heel, walked off. Taradatt, who seemed to waver between the inclination to follow his friend and some curiosity to hear me out, laughingly welcomed me as a convert to Vedantism ; while, disregarding the interruption, I proceeded, — until ultimately left alone, as I mentioned before.^ NOTE C. ON "LOGIC" AND "RHETORIC," AS REGARDED BY THE HINDUS. He who undertakes to argue with a learned Hindu will be the better of knowing how a Hindu reasoner 1 See ante, p. 34. ON "LOGIC" AND " EHETORIC." HI arranges his arguments, and why. This has been generally and often mischievously misconceived. A misconcei3tion of this matter suggested {_Benares Maga- zine, 1852, vol. viii., p. 251] the following REMONSTEANCE TO SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON ON HIS INJUSTICE TO THE HINDIJS. The reader may probably recollect the notable para- dox of Dr. Campbell's, that " there is always some radical defect in a syllogism, which is not chargeable with that species of sophism known among logicians by the name ot petitio principii, or a begging of the question" {Phil, of Rhet, vol. i., p. 174). This " epigrammatic, yet unanswerable remark," as Mr. Dugald Stewart styles it, was well answered by Archbishop Whately, when he observed {Logic, bk. i. § 4) that Dr. Campbell little dreamt, "of course, that his objections, however specious, lie against the process of reasoning itself universally ; and will therefore, of course, apply to those very arguments which he is himself adducing. He should have been reminded of the story of the woodman who had mounted a tree, and was so earnestly employed in lopping the boughs, that he unconsciously cut off the bough on which he was standing.'' Sir William Hamilton (in his Discussions, p. 615) has answered this "unanswerable" epigram of Dr. Campbell's, less epigrammatically, but more searchingly, in a passage which we transcribe the more readily, as it will afford us an opportunity of vindicating what Sir William calls " the Hindii syllogism," against his undeserved disparagement of it. He says : — " Mentally 142 NOTE C. one, the categorical syllogism, according to its order of announcement, is either analytic (A), or synthetic (B). Analytic, if (what is inappropriately styled) the con- clusion be expressed first, and (what are inappropriately styled) the premises be then stated as its reasons. Synthetic, if the premises precede, and, as it were effectuate the conclusion." He then goes on, in a note, to say, " This, in the first place, relieves the syllogism of two one-sided vieivs. The Aristotelian syllogism is exclusively synthetic ; the Epicurean (or Neoclesian) syllogism was — for it has been long forgotten — ex- clusively analytic ; whilst the Hindi! syllogism is merely a clumsy agglutination of these counter forms, being nothing but an operose repetition of the same reasoning enounced, 1st, analytically, 2nd, synthetically. In thought the syllogism is organically one ; and it is only stated in an analytic or synthetic form, from the necessity of adopting the one order or the other, in accommodation to the vehicle of its expression — language. For the conditions of language require that a reasoning be distinguished into parts, and these de- tailed before and after other. The analytic and syn- thetic orders of enouncement are thus only accidents of the syllogistic process. This is, indeed, shown in practice, for our best reasonings proceed indifferently in either order. " In the second place, this central view vindicates the syllogism from the oljection of petitio principii^ which, professing logically to annul logic, or at least to reduce it to an idle tautology, defines syllogistic — the art of avowing in the conclusion what has been already con- ON "LOGIC" AND "RHETORIC." 143 fessecl iu the premises. This objection (which has at least the antiquity of three centuries and a-half) is only applicable to the synthetic or Aristotelic order of enouncementj which the objectors contemplate as alone possible. It does not hold against the syllogism, con- sidered aloof from the accident of its expression; and being proved irrelevant to this, it is easily shown in reference to the synthetic syllogism itself, that it applies only to an accident of its external form." He goes on to say, that the synthetic form of the syllogism is the "less natural. For if it be asked, 'Is C in A?' surely it is more natural to reply, ' Yes ' (or C is in A) ; for C is in B and B in A (or, for B is in A and C in B), than to reply, B is in A, and C in B (or C is in B and B in A), therefore, C is in A. ■ ' In point of fact, the analytic syllogism is not only the more natural, it is even 'presupposed by the syn- thetic. To express in words, we must first analyse in thought the organic whole — the mental simultaneity of simple reasoning, and then we may reverse in thought the process by a synthetic return. Further, we may now enounce the reasoning in either order ; but certainly, to express it in the essential, primary, or analytic order, is not only more natural, but more direct and simple, than to express it in the accidental, secondary, or synthetic. This also avoids the objection of P. P." p.^., the objection that the syllogism involves a petitio principii.^ Well, let us first consider how this debars Dr. Campbell's objection, and then we may proceed to the vindication of the Hindi! Philosophers. 144 NOTE C. The synthetic syllogism is of this form : — " All things smoking are fiery, The mountain is smoking, Therefore the mountain is fiery." This is the form of syllogism contemplated by Dr. Campbell, and he says that here the question is legged. The question is, whether the mountain be fiery or not ; and he alleges that you heg^ or take for granted^ the very question in dispute, when you lay down the pre- mise, '''■All things smoking [and among these the smok- ing mountain] are fiery." This seems plausible; but let us now look at the analytic form of the same syllo- gism, which is as follows : — " The mountain is fiery, Because it is smoking, And all things smoking are fiery." In this form of expression we do not begin by laying down anything which can be charged with taking for granted the point in dispute ; we propound affirm- atively, for discussion, the point in dispute itself, and then assign a reason, and then propound a condition in the absence of which the reason would avail nothing. The objection of "avowing in the conclusion what has been already confessed in the premises," does not apply to the argument in this analytic form ; and as the argu- ment in this form is none other than the same argu- ment in the synthetic form, neither does the objection really apply to the latter. But now, however far the Scotch Philosophers may have gone astray, we should like to be told what there is in all this that the Hindil Philosophers have failed to ox "LOGIC" AND "RHETORIC." 145 discern. Let us follow Sir William through his analysis of the syllogistic process just quoted, and see whether there be any one single step in it for which our Sanskrit books do not supply the counterpart, and no "clumsy" counterpart, but something as perfectly elaborated (at least) as ancient Greece or modern Germany (or '' modern Athens" either) can oifer us. To begin with the beginning. Sir William Hamilton, as we have seen, observes, that, " In thought, the syllogism is organically one ; and it is only stated in an analytic and synthetic form, from the necessity of adopting the one order or the other, in accommodation to the vehicle of its expression — language." Good : — and have the Hindus failed to discern this ? So far from it, that they have endeavoured, and, as far as we are aware, at least as successfully as any that ever attempted it, to embody this organic unity of the syllogism in thought in a linguistic unity of expression. When they discuss the laws of the mind syllogizing ^^ for itself ^ — i.e.^ to use Sir William's language, " in thought^'''' — they notify the organic unity of the process by wrapping the two premises in one sentence so constructed (viz., in the shape of a period), that, until the last word of the sen- tence is uttered, no demand is made — or rather no pre- tence exists — for either affirmation or negation. In reference to the stock example above quoted, the pre- mises " in thought ^^^ are propounded, in their unity, by writers on the Nyaya, thus: — "By smoke, invari- ably attended by fire, is attended this mountain." We subjoin the Sanskrit' (from the TarJca-sangraha^ ed. 2, 146 NOTE C. p. 39). Can Sir "William Hamilton point out, anteriorly to his own statement regarding the organic unity of the syllogism " in thought," any expression, in a European work, evincing a more thorough conviction of the truth in question than this periodic form of expression adopted by the Hindiis for conveying the premises in their simultaneity ? To our mind it was a noble, and far from unsuccessful, effort to emancipate their exposition of the mental process, in its unity, from those hampering " conditions of language," which, as Sir William re- marks, "require that a reasoning be distinguished into parts, and these detailed before and after other." In a 2Jeriod^ strictly, nothing is detailed " before and after other." The " yes" or the " no" can no more legitimately leave the lips of the auditors till the last word of the period has been heard, than the bullet can leave the gun before the process of loading is finished and the trigger pulled.' Let us now follow Sir William in his next step. " The analytic and synthetic orders of enouncement are, thus, only accidents of the syllogistic process. This is, indeed, shewn in practice, for our best reasonings proceed indifferently in either order." Good again ; — but have the Hindus failed to disccm this ? Not a bit of it, as we shall show. The Aristotelic syllogism may be, as Sir William observes, "exclusively synthetic," and the "long ' Some one may perhaps say— Xay ; but when you have uttered thus much of your period, viz., " by smoke invariably attended by fire," then we may legitimately interrupt you, and deny the invariable attendedness. To this Ave reply, that you have no legitimate right to do any such thing. For anything that you know, before you have heard me out, my period might have been intended to run thus — " By smoke invariably attended by fire this mountain is not attended, because [I choose to hold that] there is nn such kind of Rmoke." You have no pretence to understand me till I finish my period. ON "LOGIC" AND "IIHETORIC' 147 forgotten" Epicurean or l^eoclesian syllogism ''exclu- sively analytic;" and Dr. Campbell and Mr. Stewart, conversant only with the former, may have written (as indeed they have) most dismal nonsense on the whole subject ; but have the Hindus done so ? Again we re- ply, — not a bit of it. We have seen how the Tarka- sangraha (following hundreds of consentient writers), re- cognized, and sought to symbolize, in language guardedly periodic, the unity of {he syllogism " in thought," — the " reasoning for one's-self." ^ Let us now see how the Hindus regard "the analytic and synthetic orders of enouncement, — the mere ' accidents,' " as Sir William justly observes, "of the syllogistic process;" and let us see whether they failed to discern the fact that " our best reasonings proceed indifferently in either order." Let us turn to the Veddnta-parihhasJia^ section second. There we read as follows : — " Eeasoning is divided into that which is for one's-self, and that which is for another. Of these, that which is for one's-self has been already described ; but that which is for another is effected by a process. This process is an aggregate of parts ; and the parts are three only, in the shape of — 1st, the proposi- tion, the reason, and the example [ — making up Sir William's analytical, or more natural, form of exposi- tion] ; — or, 2nd, the example [ — equivalent to the major premiss — ], the application, and the conclusion"- [Sir William's synthetical, or less natural form]. 148 NOTE C. And here, before we go further, let us remark in passing, that Sir William's parenthetical protests against things being "inappropriately styled" the premises, or " inappropriately styled " the conclusion, do not apply at all to the language of Hindvi philosophers. When the matter in question is stated first, as in the analytical form, they style it the proposition (pratijnd) ; when it is stated last, they style it the conclusion, or issue [niga- mana). The "clumsy" instances of want of termino- logical foresight in Western speculators, thus noticed by Sir William, do not occur in the Indian scientific language, where things are not named from their sejmrahle accidents. But why did the author of the Veddnta-paribJiashd think it necessary to impress upon his readers long ago the essential equivalence of the analytic and synthetic forms of the syllogism, to which Sir William Hamilton has found it necessary to call the attention of Western sages in the year 1852 ? He tells us, when, in continu- ation of the passage last quoted, he says that the five members of what Sir William Hamilton calls the " clumsy agglutination," are not, as some Hindii learners by rote might have imagined them to be, indispensable ; " for," to quote the work itself, " since no more than three mem- bers are required to set forth the general principle and its relevancy to the subject, the other two members [of the five-membered exposition] are superfluous."^ Here, then, we see that the Hindus were just as well aware as Aristotle, that three members sufiice to contain all the essentials of a process of reasoning, and just as well ON "LOGIC" AND "RHETORIC." 149 aware as Sir William Hamilton, that these three mem- bers may be arranged indifferently in either the analytic or the synthetic order. What, then, becomes of Sir William's scornful remark that " the Hindu syllogism is merely a clumsy agglutination of these counter forms?" It is irrelevant altogether, — the five-membered exposition, which it alludes to, not being the Hindii syllogism at all, but the Hindii rhetorical exjposition. Sir William Hamil- ton might, with the same (absolutely the same) pro- priety, accuse Euclid of a " clumsy agglutination" of the analytic and synthetic syllogisms, because he begins by stating his proposition as a proposition^ and ends by re- stating it as a conclusion. Sir William very well knows that logic and rhetoric are not the same thing. At page 641 of his Discussions J he says, "Here we must not confound the logical with the rhetorical, the necessary in thought with the agreeable in expression." Good : may we, then, cherishing, as we do, the profoundest admira- tion for Sir William Hamilton, entreat that he will not^ (in imitation of those who have on this point erred before him) continue to confound the logical with the rhetorical when again writing or speaking of Hindu speculation? We have shown him that the Hindiis have the analytic syllogism of Epicurus, the synthetic syllogism of Aristotle, and an expression (not excelled in precision by any similar attempt that we are aware of) for his own syllogism " in thought," in its organic unity. Is all this to be ignored, and the error of the earlier investigators of Sanskrit literature, misrepresent- » [This was written in 1852, after a letter, the last received by me, from Sir William Hamilton. 1 150 ^'OTE C. ing the oration as the syllogism/ to be for ever perpetu- ated ? Sir William Hamilton is not unknown to living successors of the old Indian sages on the banks of the Ganges. But had the unfortunate passage on which we have animadverted been the first on which the eye of one of these readers alighted, the chance is that it would have gone some way to confirm the impression, here yet too prevalent, that the Europeans, though capital workers in brass and iron, had better leave the discus- sion of things intellectual to those whose land was the birth-place of philosophy. [In justification of the foregoing remarks, we quote from the familiar text book, the Tarka-sangraha (Benares, 1852), as follows :— ] THE CHAPTER ON INFERENCE. ^^^ Tf^ ^t^ ^x•[■^■t: \ ?f^^ q^rfr ^ftmftf?! ^t^- TRANSLATION. " An induction (anumdna) is the instrument of an inference (anumiti). An inference is knowledge that results from syllogizing (pardmarki). Syllogizing is the taking cognizance that the subject (paksha) possesses • Sec this point oxplaiuod nioic J'uUy at \i. id ^2iul Edition) of the English version of tlic Tarkc-si/v/raha. ON "LOGIC" AND "RHETORIC." 151 what is constantly accompanied [by something which is thus seen to belong to the subject]. For example, — the taking cognizance that ' This hill has smoke — whicli is constantly accompanied [at the point where it origi- nates] by fire' — is [an instance of] syllogizing \i.e.^ of apprehending, in connection, an induction and an obser- vation]. The knowledge resulting therefrom, viz., that ' The hill has fire [somewhere about it],' is an inference. ' The being constantly accompanied ' (yjjdpti) is such an invariableness of association as this — that wherever there is smoke there is fire. By the ' subject's possession^ [of something that is constantly accompanied], we mean the fact that there e.Tists — in a mountain, for instance, — that which is constantly accompanied [by something else]." REMARKS. In order that we may be enabled to trace the analogy which, disguised by differences arising from diversity in the point of view or in the form of expression adopted, must yet necessarily exist between any two expositions of the reasoning process, neither of which is unsound, let us examine the terms in the foregoing passage, which we have rendered, as nearly as we could, by equivalents borrowed from the logic of Europe. The first formal difference that requires to be noticed, is the fact that, whilst the European logic employs a phraseology founded on classification, the Nijiuja goes to work with the terms on which the classification is based. The former infers that kings are mortal because they belong to the class of men. The latter arrives at the same inference by means of the consideration that mor- 152 NOTE C. tality is present wherever there is the human nature, and the human nature wherever there is that of a king. In the argumentative expression, "This hill has invariably-fire-attended smoke," there are wrapt up, in one, the major premiss, "wherever there is smoke there is fire," and the minor premiss, " this hill is smoking." The reason for preferring to regard these as two constituent parts of a single statement appears to be this, that it is only when simultaneously present to the mind that the premises compel the inference. When they are stated separately, they are no other than the premises of an Aristotelian syllogism. The term which we have rendered " the being con- stantly accompanied," viz., vyiqiti^ means, literally, " per- vadedness." In regard to the import of a proposition which the logic of Europe calls a universal afiirmative, such as " all men are mortal," the Nahjaijika would say that there is pervadedness (yijapti) of humanity by mortality ; — and he would state the proposition thus : " Where there is humanity there is mortality." In a universal affirmative, the predicate or major term con- notes the " pervader" {yyd'paka\ or constant accompanier of that, connoted by the subject or minor term, which is "pervaded" {yyajpya)^ or constantly accompanied by it. ON "LOGIC" AND •'RHETORIC." 153 TRANSLATION. " An induction is of two kinds [inasmuch as it may be employed], for one's-self and for another. That which is for one's-self is the cause of a private conclusion [in one's own mind]. For example, having repeatedly and personally observed, in the case of culinary hearths and the like, that where there is smoke there is fire, having gathered the invariable attendedness [of smoke by fire], having gone near a mountain, and being doubtful as to whether there is fire in it, having seen smoke on the mountain, a man recollects the invariable attendedness, viz., ' where there is smoke there is fire.' Thereupon the knowledge arises that ' this mountain has smoke, which is constantly accompanied by fire.' This is called [by some] the ' pondering of a sign' {linga-jmrdmarsa). Thence results the knowledge that 'the mountain is fiery,' which is the conclusion (anumiti). This is the process of inference for one's-self." TRANSLATION. " But after having, for one's-self, inferred fire from smoke, when one makes use of the five-membered form 154 >f^^TE C. of exposition, with a view to the information of another, then is the process one of ^ inference for the sake of an- other.' "For example : (1) The mountain has fire in it ; (2) because it has smoke ; (3) whatever has smoke has fire, as a culinary hearth ; (4) and so this has ; (5) there- fore it is as aforesaid. By this [exposition], in conse- quence of the sign [or token] here brought to his notice, the other also arrives at the knowledge that there is fire." TRANSLATION. " The five members [of this exposition are severally named] : (1) the proposition (prafijm), (2) the reason (hetu), (3) the example (uddharana), (4) the application {upanaya\ and (5) the conclusion (nigamcma). ^The mountain is fiery,' is the proposition ; ' because of its being smoky,' is the reason; 'whatever is smoky is fiery,' is [the general proposition or principle founded on] the example [of culinary hearths and the like] ; ' and so this [mountain] is' is the [syllogistic] application; ' therefore it [the mountain] is fiery,' is the conclusion." REMARKS. The five-membered argumentative exposition has been the object, sometimes of undeserved censure, and some- times of commendation equally undeserved. When it is commended, at the expense of the Aristotelian syllogism, ON "LOGIC" AND "RHETORIC." I55 on the allegation (see a quotation in Sir G. C. Haughton's Prodromus, p. 215), "that it exhibits a more natural mode of reasoning than is comjDatible with the compressed limits of the syllogism, and that its conclusion is as convincing as that of the syllogism," the commendation is based simply on a misconception of the syllogism thus dis- paraged. On the other hand, when it is censured as " a rude form of the syllogism," the censure is mis- applied, because what corresponds to the syllogism is the two-membered expression, which, we have already seen, comprises neither more nor less than the syllogism does ; whereas the form now under consideration is proposed as the most convenient for communicating our convictions to others. Being a matter of exposition, it is therefore a question of rhetoric whether the form be, or be not, the most convenient in which to arrange our proposition, our proofs, and our illustrations. The five-membered expres- sion, so far as its arrangement is concerned, is a summary of Kanddah views in regard to rhetoric, '' an offshoot from logic," (see Whately's Elements of Rhetoric^ p. 6), and to which, after " the ascertainment of the truth by investi- gation," belongs " the establishment of it to the satisfac- tion of another.''^ Disregarding what is called rhetorical artifice, which, in his system, would have been out of place, as it would have been out of place in Euclid's Elements of Geometry^ Kanada directs his rhetorician to commence, as Euclid does, by stating the proposition to be proved. The reason is next to be alleged, and then instances are to be cited in order to show that the reason is sufficient to establish the fact in regard to all cases of a certain given character. The auditor is then to be 156 NOTE C. reminded that there is no dispute that the case in ques- tion is of the given character, and the oration winds up with the re-introduction of the original proposition, in the new character of an established conclusion, just as Euclid's argument winds up by re-introducing the tri- umphant proposition with a flourish of trumpets in the shape of a " Quod erat demonstrandum." Thus, rhetorically considered, the five-membered ex- pression is a very suitable framework for a straight-for- ward argumentative speech, making no appeal to the passions, and not hesitating to table, without exordium, the proposition which it proceeds to establish. Logically considered, the five-membered expression is a combination of the inductive with the deductive syllogism.' The instances which led the speaker to an inductive generalization, are cited [in the shape of some one or other example, followed or not by a suggestive " etc."] for the satisfaction of the auditor, in the third division of the rhetorical address; from which circum- stance it has happened that those who suppose the in- tended function of the model oration and of the Aris- totelic syllogism to be identical, have come, either to regard the oration as an illogical monstrosity, or else to fancy that it is a great improvement upon the syllogism. The former misconception is that of those who, like Eitter [Historij of Ancient Philosophy^ vol. iv., p. 365), were familiarly conversant with the logic of the schools. The other misconception was to be looked for in the case of those whose notions of the logic of the schools were derived from Locke's Essay and Campbell's Ehetoric. ' [As well as of the Epicincnu ;inf*>TE D. juice of the moon-plant, when the juice has evaporated. Here we have chemistry itself adumbrated in poetical mythology. Then we have the poet, at a loss for anything beyond it as a climax of commendation, patting the wind and the firmament on the back, with the protestation that they are men — stout fellows both of them. There is something hearty in this ; — ^he is evidently in earnest. Lastly, the description of the sun and of the ocean as the joint bestowers of the showers that refresh the earth, is, to our mind, as beautiful as it is philosophical. " Aurum latet in hoc," as Leibnitz said of the writings of the Schoolmen. We may turn the Vedas to account, if we but eschew the lazy blunder of a lazy scorn. It is a glorious point gained when you can find any truth enwrapped in language which the man that you have to deal with has sucked in as with his mother's milk. We may further remark — (in conclusion, after the "lastly") — that their thankfulness for showers of rain goes far to prove that the Hindiis (as Professor Wilson observes at page 41 of his Introduction), were an agri- cultural people at the time when this hymn was com- posed, and not a nomadic, as has been by some contended. Nomads, though not independent of rain, are usually less anxious about it than agriculturists. The third hymn introduces us to tlie Hindil Castor and Pollux — the Aswins — " the two sons of the Sun, begotten during his metamorphosis as a horse (aswa)^ endowed with perpetual youth and beauty, and phy- sicians of the gods." The invocation of the hymn is not confined to these, — Indra, the thunderer, with his "tawny ON THE "VEDAS." 169 coursers," certain miscellaneous deities, and the goddess of eloquence, being also invoked. Hymn to the twin-boei^ of the Sinsr, and others. I. Twin-sons of heaven's bright orb, Friends of the pious, — whose far-reaching arms Avail to guard your worshippers, accept The sacrificial viands. Ye whose acts, Mighty and manifold, declare your power, Ye that direct the hearts of the devout, With favoui'ing ear attend our hymn of praise. Faithful and true, destroyers of the foe. First in the van of heroes. As' wins, come ! Come to the mixed libations that we pour On the lopped sacred grass. II. Now on Indra we caU, on the wondrously bright ; See — we press from the moon-plant the juice of delight. The juice, ever pure as enchanting, that longs' To be quaffed by thy lips ; — come and Kst to our songs. The wise understand Thee — 'tis only the wise That the knowledge of Indra full rightly can prize ; Approach and accept then the prayers of thy priest. Let thy fleet tawny steeds 'bear thee swift to the feast. III. Next the throng divine invite Of deities that guard the right, Ever watching o'er us all, — Call them to our festival. Come, ye swift-moving spirits, ye spirits that run Through the universe — swift as the rays of the sun — That preside o'er the rain-showers, accept of our cheer, Nor despise the libation we pour for you here. 1 In the prose version — " these libations, ever pure, expressed by the fing'ers (of the priests) are desirous of thee," p. 9. 170 NOTE D. Omniscient immortals, whose might is for aye, In the youth of its vigour exempt from decay, In whose souls void of malice all kindly thoughts spring, Deign to look on the gifts that your worshippers bring. IV. Now to Saras wati address the song, Saraswati to whom all gifts belong, The recorapenser of the worshipper With food and wealth, — our hymn be now to her. Joy ! — for Saraswati, whose inspiration Is theirs alone that in the truth delight. Accept our sacrifice ; — pour the libation To her, the guide of all whose hearts are right. Behold the present deity ! — the stream,^ The mighty stream named hers, — behold it roll, Bearing on its fair bosom such a gleam Of light as she alone can stream upon the soul." Some of the most graceful of the hymns are addressed to the goddess of the morning — Ushas — the Aurora of Hindu mythology. Here is a portion of one, — for the entire hymn would be rather long. Hymn to Aiteora. I. Daughter of heaven, — Aurora, dawn on us ; Diffusing light, and bringing wealth with thee, Bountiful goddess, dawn. II. Rousing the flocks and waking up the birds. Nourishing all, yet onward to decay Conducting all her transitory charge. Even as a matron to her household cares. Daily the dawn comes forth. 1 As Professor Wilson observes, Saraswati, the divinity of speech, " is here iden- tified with the river so named," p. 10. The river, we believe, is now nowhere to be mot with,— ominous, one might think, that the genius of India had run itself out, for tlie time at least. UN THE "VEDAS." 171 IIT. Shedder of dews, delay she knows not. See How her approach inspires the diligent ; The client early seeks his patron's gate, The soaring birds suspend their flight no more, Up-springing with the dawn. IV. All living things invoke her, and adore ; Bringer of good, she lighteth up the world, While the malevolent that love the dark Flee at her blest approach. These may suffice as a sample of the hymns, in which there is much sameness of character both as to style and subject. From the remaining hymns we shall now glean a few noticeable passages. In the 3rd verse of the 9th hymn, Indra is addressed as "thou, who art to be reverenced by all mankind." In a note on this passage, Professor Wilson says that the epithet viswa-charshane is literally '^ oh ! thou who art all men," or, as the commentator explains it, "who art joined with all men," — which is further qualified as " to be worshipped by all institutors of sacrifices." Pro- fessor Wilson adds — " It may be doubted if this be all that is intended." It strikes us that what is intended may be that now familiar conception of the chief ener- gising deity — uwara^ "the lord" — as being not other than the aggregate of all embodied souls, " as a forest is not other than the trees that compose it," — a concep- tion which may be seen elaborated in any work on the Yedanta, such as the Veddnta-sara. Dr. Eosen's render- ing of the epithet as "omnium hominum domine^^ is not opposed to this view. It is curious to trace, in these the 172 NOTE D. most ancient portions of the Vechj anything like the dawning of those conceptions which, gradually elaborated through the subsequent portions entitled the Ilpanishads, took at length the form which they now hold in the Vedanta philosophy. In the 3rd verse of the 6th hymn there is another passage, which appears to have puzzled the commentator, and which has to our eye a Yedantic aspect. The verse runs thus — " Mortals, you owe your (daily) birth (to such an Indra), who with the rays of the morning gives sense to the senseless, and to the formless form." Indra, according to Professor Wilson, is here " identified with the sun, whose morning rays may be said to re-animate those who have been dead in sleep through the night." This is the obvious explanation, and probably the correct one ; but there is something strange in the construction, — the word for ''mortals'' being plural, whilst the verb is in the singular. The commentator ''is of opinion that the want of concord is a Vaidik license." This it possibly is ; but the assumed indifference between the singular and the plural reminds us not only of the Yedantic tenet of the indifference between the collective and the distributive aggregate of humanity, — "as between the forest and its constituent trees," — ^but also of another tenet, viz., that, during pro- found sleep, the world actually as well as apparently ceases to exist for the sleeper, whose disembodied spirit, at that time merging in the Infinite Spirit, re-assumes, in the processes of awakening, a body with its senses and its outward form. But whether there be or not in these ancient hymns faint indications of the philosophy which was gradually ON THE "VEDAS." 173 elaborated in the Vedanta, the indications are abundantly plentifid of those myths which have supplied topics for the poets. The combats of Indra, the thunderer, espe- cially with the demons of drought, remind us of the fights of the Scandinavian Thor with the Jotuns. In the 7th verse of the 11th hymn we read : — "Thou slowest, Indra, by stratagems, the wily Sushna : the wise have known of this thy (greatness) ; bestow upon them (abundant) food." On this Professor Wilson remarks, that Sushna is described as a demon slain by Indra, but that " this is evidently a metaphorical murder. Sushna means dryer up, exsiccator .... heat or drought ; which Indra, as the rain, would put an end to." The greatest of Indra's foes is Vritra, who ought by rights to be the father of Sushna, or the drought, seeing that he repre- sents the retentive power of the clouds whereby they withhold from the earth the waters that they contain, until Indra, ''with his thunderbolt or electrical influence, divides the aggregated mass, and vent is given to the rain, which then descends upon the earth." Dr. Miiller's edition of the Sanskrit text of these hymns is a monument both of his own diligence and of the liberality of the Honourable Court, without whose patronage the publication could not have been ventured upon. The volume is a handsome quarto of nine hun- dred and ninety pages. The bulk of these is occupied by the commentary, which is a very ample one. The text of the hymns, in its translated form, does not occupy much more than the half of some three hun- dred octavo pages, the other half being devoted to the notes of the translator. Sayanacharya, the com- 174 NOTE D. mentator, makes something like an apology for the amplitude of his exegesis. This edition of the Rig-veda^ Dr. Miiller remarks, "is not intended for the general scholar, but only for those who make Sanskrit their special study," etc. To such students this massive tome presents a supply of pabulum, such as a helluo librorum may well be ex- pected to lick his lips at. And then, to think of the other volumes that are to come, this first instalment, with its thousand pages, being but the one-eighth part of one Veda out of the four ! But the other volumes are not likely to be so big; for, as the commentator Sayana remarks of his work, in some introductory verses, — "The first section of this, deduced as it is from traditional doctrine, is to be listened to. An intelligent person, perfect in thus much, can under- stand the whole." He then proceeds to explain why the Eig-veda, rather than any one of the others, is taken for commentatorial illustration first in order. To justify the selection, he brings forward various arguments, — among others, the fact that when the separate Yedas are enumerated in the Veda itself, the Eig-veda stands first in the enumeration. The objector then, acquiescing in the proposed order, falls back upon the more perilous doubt whether there is any such thing as the Veda at all! "The short and the long of it is," he insists, " there is no Veda: how, then, can there be a i?z>7-veda, — an integrant portion thereof? For there is no sign whereby one can recognise anything as being the Veda, nor is there any proof of it ; and nothing can be esta- blished when there is neither the one nor the other ON THE "VEDAS." 175 of these. For those that understand logic, hold that a thing is established by characteristic signs and by proofs." And so the hardy objector goes on, while Siiyana, calm in the consciousness of strength, abides his time. When the objector has finished, the other disposes of the objection ; whereupon our objector, con- ceding — for the sake of argument — that there may be "a certain thing called the Veda/' demurs to there being any occasion for making a commentary on it. The Veda, he argues, is no authority, some of its texts being downright nonsense. Such charges, it may be presumed, Sayana did not deck out in all the pomp of regular disputation, without feeling tolerably sure of his own power to dispose of them satisfactorily. He allows to both sides of the question ample elbow-room, and it is not till after three-and-forty of Dr. Miiller's broad quarto pages that we come to the first line of the first hymn of the Eig-veda. Four pages of com- ment on this hemistich bring us to the second line, and so the work goes on. The exegetical part of Sayana' s commentary is quite exhaustive. For example :— on the first verse, begin- ning " I laud Fii-e, the priest," etc., he remarks — " I laud Fire, i.e.^ the deity so named; laud, z'.e., praise, the verb here being Id^ ' to praise,' the letter d in which is changed to I by Vaidik license," and so on. We may mention to our Hindi! friends that this edition is intended not only for Sanskrit scholars, but also Dr. Miiller tells, " for those among the natives of India who are still able to read their own Sacred Books in the language of the original." The price of 176 NOTE E. the volume is a trifle compared with that of a good manuscript ; and no manuscript in the market can vie with it in point of accuracy. The copyists of the Veda admit their liability to error ; and, in the verses which they are in the habit of appending to a completed transcript, they frequently complain of the hardships and difficulties of their task. One of the most touch- ing of these penmen's plaints is the following, which Dr. Miiller instances : — "My back, my hips, and my neck are broken; my sight is stiff in looking down : keep this book with care, which has been written with pain." NOTE E. THE ETERNITY OF SOUND; A DOGMA OF THE MiMANSA. [This dogma being of vital importance to the Veda, he who argues against the Veda ought to understand what the dogma means. We reprint the following re- marks of ours on it from the Benares Magazine, August, 1852.] At page 305, vol. i. of Mr. Colebrooke's Collected Essays, where he is treating of Jaimini's system of philosoi)hy, the Mimdnsd, we read as follows : — " In the first chapter of the lecture occurs the noted dis- quisition of the 3Iimdnsd on the original and perpetual association of articulate sound with sense." "What this dogma means, and why the question forced itself upon ON "THE ETERNITY OF SOUND." 177 Jaimim at the opening of his work, we here propose to consider. '' The object of the 3Imdnsdj^^ to employ the words of Mr. Colebrooke, '' is the interpretation of the Vedas^ As he adds, '^Its whole scope is the ascertainment of duty." This is declared in the opening aphorism, which, interspersing an explanatory comment, we may render as follows: — "Well, then [0 student, since thou hast read the Vedas while residing in the family of thy preceptor], therefore a desire to know duty [which know- ledge, without further aid, thou wilt scarcely gather from the texts with which thy memory is stored, ought now to be entertained by thee]."^ But what do you mean by " duty ?" inquires the student. To expound the entire import of the term would be difficult, if not impossible, at the outset; so Jaimim, following the recognised method of laying down a "characteristic" {laj£shana\ by which the thing, though not fully des- cribed, may be securely recognised^ declares as follows: — "A duty is a matter which may be recognised [as a duty] by the instigatory character [of the passage of Scripture in which it is mentioned]."^ As Mr. Cole- brooke observes, " Here duty intends sacrifices and other acts of religion ordained by the Vedas. The same term {dharma) likewise signifies virtue^ or moral merit ; and grammarians have distinguished its import accord- ing to the gender of the noun. In one (the masculine), it implies virtue ; in the other (neuter), it means an act of devotion. It is in the last-mentioned sense that the term is here employed." We may add, in expla- 178 NOTE E. nation of this, that the discussion of the gender of the word was provoked by Jaimini's choosing to employ the masculine form (as may be observed in the original aphorism given in the note), instead of the neuter. To the query, why Jaimini was guilty of this grammatical solecism, one of his commentators coolly replies, " take [and be content with] as the reason thereof, the fact that he [Jaimini] is a great sanctified sage [and there- fore entitled to give the word what gender he pleases]." Arguments of this lofty Pope Hildebrand order, which were doubtless rolled out with unction, et ore rotundo^ in the palmy days of Hinduism, the Brahmans now- a-days are most amusingly ashamed of; those of them, at least, who are not prepared to join cordially in a broad grin over the "bumptiousness" of the pre- tension. Whilst Jaimini contents himself with giving, in the first instance, a "characteristic" by which duty may be recognised, his commentator supplies an account of its nature [swarupa)^ i.e.^ what constitutes that a duty to which the characteristic in question belongs. According to him, what constitutes anything a duty is " the fact of its not producing more pain than pleasure [or, in other words, its being calculated to produce more pleasure than pain]." The agreement of this with the Ben- thamite definition of the Useful is noticeable. Another thing which we wish here to take an opportunity of noticing, is a correspondence, in point of terminology, between the systems of the East and of the "West. That which constitutes anything what it is, was called by Plato its Idea. Aristotle disliked the term; and he ON "THE ETERNITY OF SOUND." 179 sought to convey the same meaning by a term which the Schoolmen rendered Form. Bacon adopted the word Form in this sense, and the exactly corresponding San- skrit word, viz., sivariipa^ is the one here employed, and generally employed, to convey the notion of what is the abiding cause of a thing's being what it is. When a Hindi! writer, at the opening of a treatise on anything, says " I shall declare the lalcsJuma and the mvariqoa of the thing in question," he means to say, that he will tell first, how we are to recognise the thing as the thing that we are talking about, and that he will next tell, all ahoiit it. The laJcshana is the mark on the sealed package, by which we recognise it among other packages ; the swariqm is the contents of the package. The reason why we think it worth while to advert to the import of the phraseology in question is this, that we ourselves once took a good deal of pains unprofitably to reconcile these two terms with the "genus" and the ''specific difference" which to- gether make up the " definition," according to European logic. The one set of terms and the other, however, belong to different aspects of thought. To return to JaiminI: — Having intimated that the cause of oui- knowing anything to be a duty was simply an instigation, in the shape of a passage of Scripture holding out the promise of a reward for the perform- ance of a given act, he next thinks proper to show how nothing else could be the evidence for it. "An examination," he says, "of the cause of [our recog- nising] it [viz., a duty, is to be made];"' and he ex- 180 NOTE E. plains, as follows, how our organs of sense cannot supply the evidence of it. " When a man's organs of sense are rightly applied to something extant, that birth of knowledge [which then takes place] is perception — [and this perception is] not the cause [of our recognising a duty], because the apprehension [by the senses] is of what is [then and there] extant, [which an act of duty is ^loty^^ Since perception is not the evidence of a thing's being a duty, it follows, according to the commentator, that inference or analogy, or anything else, "which has its root in perception," cannot be the evidence ; and, consequently, precept — express or implied — is the only evidence of a thing's being a duty. But here the doubt presents itself, whether the evidence in favour of a thing's being a duty may not be as fallacious as is the evidence of the senses. Accord- ing to the objector, — " after words and meanings have presented themselves, since the connection between the two is one devised by man, — consisting, as it does, of the conventions which man has devised ; therefore, as sense-knowledge wanders away from truth when it mis- takes mother-o' -pearl for silver, so language is liable to part company with veracity in matters of assertion, and consequently the instigatory natui-e of a passage which, being couched in words, is liable to be misun- derstood, cannot be the instrument of certain knowledge in respect of duty." Jaimini, in reply, denies that this doubt affects the evidence of Scripture. '^ But the ^^^^n