m- V ? l£C DISSERT A TION CONCKRNING LIBERTY AND NECESSITY; CONTAINING REMARKS ESSAYS OF Dr. SAMUEL WEST, AND ON X K B WRITINGS OF SEVERAL OTHER AUTHORS, ON THOSE SUBJECTS. By JONATHAN EDWARDS, D. D. PRINTED AT WORCESTER, Bt l e o n a r d w o r c e s t e r. ADVERTISEMENT. I BEGAN this Dijfertation he/ore I faw Br, Wejl'sfecond edition of^Jiis Firft P^tri pub lif/ied with his Second Part : But on hearing, that he was about to publijii his fentiments on Liberty and Necejfuy more largely^ I fufpended the profecution of my defign, that I might Jee what he Jliould further publifh. Since the pub- lication of the fecond part^ I have been neceffarily though reluBantly kept back till this time, from finifJiing what I had begun. At length I fend it forth, requc/ling the candour of all whojliall read it. If ever candour to a writer be reafonably requejled, it is fo, on the deep ami dificult fubjecls brought under confideration in this Dif fertation. The quotations from the DoBors firfl: part, are made according to the pages of the frf edition, with ivhich T began. Yet wherever any variation in words, between the firf and fecond editions, has been noticed ; the fec- ond edition has been followed in that refpecl. When I quote the firfl part the page or pages only are referred to. When I quote the fecond part^ ^ fp^^fy ^^^^ P^^^ ^^ well as the pages. A 2 A ilia DISSERTATION, &c. CHAPTER I. « w OJ Natural and Moral Necejfity and Inability. 0, ^ RESIDENT Edwards, in his book r 1^"*-%^ on the Freedom of Will, diftinguiflies i^iiv^f^^^ between natural and moral ncceflity p j 1^ and inability. By moral neceffity he us, he means, " That neceffity { • c|v' " of connexion and confequence, vr .4.- ' 'r^4^' ' " which aiifes from fuch moral cauf- " e.<, as the ftrength of inch nation or motives, and the '« connexion which there is in many cafes between " thefe and certain vohtions and aBions." P. 21. "^y natural neceffity he explains himfelf to mean, " Such " neceffity as men are under, through the force of " natural caufcs, as diflinguiflied from what are call- " ed moral caufes ; fuch as habits and difpofitions of *' heart, and moral motives and inducements." Ibid, ile further holds, that " the difference between thefe ^' two kinds of neceffity, does not lie fo much in the ^' nature of the connexion, as in the two terms con- iietled ;" that in moral neceffity,'' the caufe . is " of a moral nature, either fome previous habitual dif- A 3 ^f poJiiioTtj .^^ «' pojition^ or fome motive exhibited to the underiland- " ing : And the effe61: is alfo of a moral nature <« fome inclination or volition of the foul oicvol- ^'•^tntary aHion." F. 22. Alfo he held, that natural neceffity always " has reference to fome fuppofable *« voluntary oppofition or endeavour, which is infuffi- « cient. But no fuch oppofition or contrary will and « endeavour is fuppofable in the cafe of moral necefli- «« ty, which is a certainty of the inclination and will it- «/e motives to him ; unlrfs it be fuppofed, that the ftate of the mind and every thing relating to it, be the fame. The mind of man is from various caufes exceedingly changeable, and by no means at all times fufceptible of the fame impreflions from the fame intellcftua! views and from the fame biafes. The intelleBual views may be the fame, and the biafes may be differ- ent ; and the biafes may be the fame and the intel- le6lual views may be different. It will not be deni- ed, that there is an infallible ronneftion between caule and effeft : Yet this does not imply, that the fame ef- feft always follows from the fame caufe, unlcfs by ths fame caufe be meant, all the fame things and circum- iiances, which related to tl e effeft, or may have had influence to produce it. And with the like explana- tion tmn of the word motive, it is true, that the fame mo- tive is always attended with the Came vohtion. Since then wherever there is a vohtion, there is a motive, and wherever there is a motive, or, which is Dr. Weft's explanation of motive, wherever there is the reafon and occafion of volition, there is vohtion, and alfo fince wl>:rever there is the fame motive In the I'enfe juft now explained, there is the fame voli- tion ; what is wanting to fupport the propofition, that there is an infallible connexion between motive and volition ? y\ conne6tionjuft as infallible as that between caufe and efPeft ? Since our volitions are thus entirely limited, bound- ed and deiermiiied according to motives ; wherein confifts the impropriety of faying, that our volitions are determined by motives ? \Ve mean no more by the latter exprcflion, than v;e do by the former. If all our volitions be in iliis fcnfe determined by motives,. in what fenfe can it be pretended, that they are felfdetermined ; or that we determine and caule our own volitions ? And what will become of the whole doctrine of felf-determination ? It will not be pretended, that we caufe all the ©bjecls, with which 'we are furrounded, and v;hich prefent thcmfelves to us as objeBs of choice ; nor that v/e caufe all our nat- ural bialcs, taftes and appetites, which ar^ the fources of fo many volitions. If it fliould be faid, that we determine our own motives, determine which motives we will comply with and which we will rcje6l ; Hill as this very determination is the a6]t; of the will, a motive is necefl'ary to that. Thus we fliall go round in a circle ; motive, determining, or (in the language of Dx. Weft) being previoujly necejfary to volition, and volition being neccflary to motive. It feems, that allowing what Dr. Weft does allow, no man can hold felf determination, in any other fenfe than one of thefe two ; (i) That we ourfelves deter- mine, as we ourfelves think, perceive, hear, tafte, &c. which is no more than wc all allow ; and to explain E 3 felf-determinatioji 7^ felF-determination thus, is to explain it away and give, it up J and, as has been fiiown, it is thus given up by Dr. Weft. (2) That we efficiently caufe our own vohtions, but invariably according to motives, reafons or preeftabUrhed antecedents. This cannot be con- fiftcMitly avowed by Dr. Weft, both becaufe he main- tains, that volition is no efFetl and has no caufe, there- fore we cannot be the caufe of it ; and becaufe to be the efficient caufes of our own vohtions implies, that " fdf afts on feif and produces volition ;" yhich is ex- prefsiy renounced by him. Dr. Weft, to prove, that there is no infallible con- yieclion between motive and volition fays, p. 17, 18 ; ^^ Though it is true, that the mind never aBs without " fome reafon or defign in ading ; yet there is no " need (if affigning a reafon for not aBmg." By not a^ing. Dr. Weft means, as obferved before, either I'e- Jufing and voluntary negleB, or entire inaction. If he mean the former, it is a real a£l of the mind and by his own conceffion therefore is not " vvithout a reafon ^^ and defign." If he mean the latter, his argument is juft as conclufive to difprove an infallible connexion between motive and volition, as the fame argument is to difprove the connexion between caufe and effed : Thus, though it be true, that an effi;6l never comes to pafs without a caufe ; yet there is no need of affign- ing a caufe for no ejfeB. It is undoubtedly true, that perfeft nihility requires no caufe : But no man in his fenfes would hence infer, that an efFe6t requires no caufe, or that there is not an infallible connexion be- tween caufe and effeft. In like manner " there is no « need of affigning a reafon" or motive for perfeft in- a6lion, which is pure nihility. But it cannot be hence inferred, that there is no need of a motive for a6lion, or that there is not an infallible connexion between motive and a6lion. Dr. Weft denies an infallible connexion between motive and aQion, and he en- deavours to prove it by making it out that there is no qoqnedion between motive and inaUion : And what is is. this to (he purpofe? How docs it hence follow, that there is not an infallible connc61ion between motive and a5lio}i ? Dr. Weft puts the fuppofition, that at a gentleman's table he has the offer of tea, coffee or chocolate ; that they can all be had with equal cafe, and all appear equally eligible to his mind, and ihathe determines to take coffee. He then adds, p. 18, "I believe, that it is "impoffible in tl.isanda multitude of fimilar inftances " to affign any accident or circumftance, which deter- " mines the mind to its choice among things, which ap- " pear equally fit and eligible. Conl'equently here is " an undeniable proof of the liberty for which we " contend. And this inftance will explain my idea, '' that there is always a reafon for aQingor choafing : "But that there is not always a reafon for not a61ing ; " and that things may appear eligible to us, and yet " not bechofcn; e.g. I accepted the coffee, bccaufe I " wanted fome rcfrcfliment. Coffee appeared to me '' properly .fuited toanfwermy defire. I'his was a fufB- " cient reafon for my receiving coffee. The other two "appeared equally eligible. About them 1 exerted no " ails : But this being a viere negation^ could require ^' no pofitive reafon." On this I remark, 1. If it were ever fo true, that in choofing between things perfe£lly indifferent, (if any fudi there be) the mind atls without motive, how would this prove, that it afts without motive in any other cafe ? And the inftances of its choofing things perfedly indifferent are fo rare, that with jefpetl to the main objeft of this difpute, they feem hardly worth mentioning. The great obje6l of this difpute is, to invcftigatc that liber- ty which is neceffary to virtue and vice, praife and blame. Dr. Weft, if 1 underftand him, contends, that an exemption from an infallible connexion between motive and volition is effential to that liberty. Or if J do not underftand him aright in this inftance, he is at liberty to make his choice, whether or not to main- tain, that an exemption from fuch conne6lion be ef- E 4 fential fcntial to that liberty, without which we cannot pf^c- fife virtue or vice. If he maiHiain, that thisexemp- tion is ell'ential to that liberty, I afk, Do we exercife virtue or vice in thofe inftances only, in which we choofe one of things perfeBly indifferent ; or does it follow from the fiippofition, that we aft without mo- tive in thofe inftances, in which we do choofe one of things perfeftly indifferent, that we alfo a£l without motive in other inftances ; viz. in choofmg one of things perfedly different, as virtue and vice, wifdom and folly, our eternal happinefs and eternal mifery ? If it be not true, that we exercife virtue or vice in thofe inftances only in wliich we choofe one of things perfeftly indifferent ; nor that from the fuppofition, that there are things perfeBly indifferent, and that we aB; without motive when we choofe one of fuch things, it follows that we a8; without motive in other cafeff too ; what is the great advantage of a power of choof- ing without motive in fuch a rare cafe ? And is it ■worth while todifpute about it ? If we exercife moral agency in thofe inftances only, in which we choofe one of things pcrfeflly indifferent ; our moral agency is confined to very narrow limits indeed, not extend- ing to one of ten thoufand of our rational voluntary a£tions, as, I prefume, our opponents themfelves wilt grant. If we exercife moral agency in ihofe inflanceSj in which we choofe one of things entirely different, either we are perfuaded and influenced by the differ- ence and fo are governed by motive, and then the in- fluence of motives is not inconfiftent with moral agen- cy or with liberty ; or we choofe and acl without any regard to the difference of the propofed objeds: But this mud be proved, to obtain credit. If our oppo- nents fuppofe that it follow from our aBing without motive, when (as they fay) we choofe one of things indifferent, that alfo we a£l without motive, whea we choofe one of things not indifferent ; let them fhow that it does follow. They have not as yet done li- 2. In 73 ^ i. In the paffage quoted above, Dr. Well confid- crs his choice of coffee, as a real aft of his mind a- rifing from a rearoi> or motive; but his negleft or re- fufal of tea and chocolate as a mere negation^ whicii requires no rcafon or motive. But 1 appeal to every candid reader, whether a voluntary refufdl of any ob- je6l, be not as real an a6l of the mind, as a choice. If fo, in truth ond according to Dr. Weft's conceflion, it requires a reafon and motive, as much as any other aft. I do not mean, that his rcfufal of tea and cho- colate in the cafe put, is necelTarily a diftinft aft from his choice of coffee : It may be no more a di6tin.ft: aft, than fuppofing coffee alone had been offered him, and he had accepted it rather than nothing, his ac- ceptance of it and his refufal of nothing had been two entirely diftinft afts. The truth is, that his choice of coffee is one complex comparative aft, implying a preference of coffee to tea and chocolate. I am fen- fible, that Dr. Weft holds, " that choice, when ufed *« about the determination of the mind refpefting the *' things that appear to us equally eligible, docs not »« include in it the idea o^ preference ;" p. 16. But what elfe is meant by prefer ence, than the choofing of one thing rather than another or in the negleft of that other, when both are offered ? If Dr. Weft mean by preference any thing different from this, he ought in all reafon to inform us what it is. The reafon which the Doftor gives, to fliow that a choice of one of two equally eligible things, is not a preference is, that *' they are both confidered as equally eligible :" P. 16 : i. e. they are, (if I may fo fay) equally chonfablc or equally worthy of choice. And if one cannot be preferred^ bccaufc ihey are equally worthy of choice ; let it be ftiown, that it u not equally irapoffible that one of them fhould be chofen when ihey are equally worthy of choice. If the confideration that they are equally worthy of choice, preclude the poffibility of preference, why does it not equally preclude the pol- bilitv of elision or choice ? Dr. 74 ■ Dr. Weft fays, that his acceptance of coffee, as it vas an a8, required a reafon ; but about tea and chocolate he exerted no a£l ; and this being a mere negation, could require no politive reafon. Now if coffee or nothing had been offered him, and he had accepted the coffee, he might as well have faid, that his acceptance of coffee, as it wa^ an aft, required a reafon ; but about nothing he exerted no att ; and t4iis being a mere negation, could require no pofnive reafon. The truth is, every a6i of choice is a com- parative aft, whether one or more things be offered to our choice. When only one thing is offered, the com- parifon is between that and nothing. When one of feveral things is offered, the comparifon is between thofe fevcral things. And if we accept the one thing, which alone is offered, we no more refufe or decline the alternative nothing or the abfence of that one thing, than when we accept one of fcveral things we refufe the reft. 3. If when feveral things, which Dr. Weft calls equally eligible, ar^ offered, and a man choofe one of them, it be true, that he exerts no aB: about the reft; the fame would hold, though the things were not equally eligible and the things refufed were manifeft- ly moft eligible : And thus it would be moft eafy to account for an att of preference of a moft infericnir objeft, to a moft fuperiour one. It is but faying, that about the laft " I e.xerted no aft : And this be- " inga mere negation would require nopofitive reafon." Thus fuppofe a guinea and a (hilling be oftered to a beggar: He takes the fliilling, but leaves the guinea. May not the beggar account for his conduft in the fame way that Dr. Weft accounts for his, in taking the coffee in the ncgleft of the tea and the chocolate .►* He might fay, " I accepted the fliilling, becaufe I " wanted a little money: The ftiillins appeared prop- « erly fuited to anfwer my defire. I'he guinea ap- <« peared equally" and much more «* eligible : About f that I exerted no aft. But this being a mere ne- " gat ion. n ^' gatiorij could require no pofiiive reafon." But the queftion would Hill remain unanfwered, Why did not the beggar exeit an a6t about the guinea, as well as about the (iiilling, or even in preference to it ? Or, "which comes to the fame, why did he exert an a6l about the fhilling in the neglecl of the guinea ? ]uft fo, why did \^i. Weft cxeit an aft about coffee, in the ncgled; of tea and chocolate ? Whatever be the propel' anfwer to the lalt queftion, will doubtlefs as properly anfwer the former. Nor need Dr. Weft puzzle himfelf and his readers about things equally eligi- ble. His principles are jufl; as applicable to any oth- er things, and equally prove that there is no connec- tion at all between motive and volition, as that there is not an infallible and univcrfal connexion. 4. Dr. Weft grants, that " when the mind choofes, " it always has fome reafon^ which is the occafion of '' its choofing." Therefore when he chofe coffee in the negleft of tea or chocolate, there was fome reafori for it. But I appeal to the reader, whether accord- ing to the Dotlor's own ftatemcnt of the cafe, there was any reafon why he fhould choofe coffee in the negleft of tea and chocolate, and whether there was not the very fame reafon why he fhould have chofen tea or chocolate in the negleft of coffee. He fays, they all appeared equally eligible to him. Therefore there was no reafon, according to him, why he fhould choofe one, to the negleft of the others. In his fecond part as well as in his firft the Doftor grants, that " the mind never a8s without fome rea- " fon for afting." P. 14, and 29. Yet he holds, that of things equally agreeable, it fometimes choof(Ss one and leaves the reft. Now what is the reafon of its afting in this cafe .? It is not enough to affign a rea- fon why the mind fhould take fome one of fever- ai things propofed. As all thofe things are fuppof- ed to be equally eligible, a reafon ought to be given vhy it finally takes one particular one in the negleft x>f the reft. Unlefs this be done, no reafon is given why 75 why it aBs in tliis manner, in this cafe ; and therefore for oupju that appears, it a£ls without reafon, which is contrary to the Dodor's conceffion. Therefore let -the Dodor either retract his conceffion, and hold that the mind fometimes atls without any reafon ; or re- nounce the idea, that it fometimes choofes one of fev- ■eral things equally eligible, in the negleft of the reit. The Doaor fays, p. 28, Part II, " When two ob- '<' je6ts are equally fit, if one is taken and the other ^' left ; the mind Had a purpofe to anfwer." We ihould have been greatly gratified, if the Do6lor had pointed out, what purpofe the rnind had to anfwer in taking that one which it did take, and in leaving the reft by fuppofition equally fit to anfwer the fame pur- pofe, for which the one is taken. Until he does point out the .purpofe, he muft excufe us in withholdmg our affent and denying his pvopofition. The DoBor in this repeats what he had faid in his firft pnrt, that ^^ about that which is not taken the mind exercifes no a6t at all." To this I have already anfwered, that the mind does exercife an att about it ; that the a6l of the mind is complex and comparative, having a refpefl to more objecls than one, becaufe more are fuppoled to be offered a-nd brought into the viev/ of the mind ; that the mind does as really exercife an att about the obje6l left, as if it were ever foinferiour or fuperiour to the one taken ; and that the Doctor's reafoning, if it prove any thing, proves too much, viz. that if things ever fo unequal be offered and the mind choofe the bafefl and that which is in the loweft degree fuited to anfwer its purpofe, it may be f^ill faid to have a rea- fon for the a6lion. " But about the other, which is " not taken, the mind exercifes no aft at all no '' reafon can be affigned for the nonexiflencc of that " which is not." However, perhaps lUe Do6lor will avow this lad obfervalion, though he has not cxprefsly done it a« yet : For he " denies, that men are always governed ■^9 by tlie ftrongeft motive," P. 6, Part II. To avoid rr avoid all difpute about words, let it be remembered, that by being governed by the ftrongeft motive, h meant no more than that the mind 2i\w ay ^follows, or coincides with the Ihonged motive : And by flrongejl motive Prefident Edwards has explained himfelf to mean, " that which has the greaieft degree of previous " tendency to excite choice;" p. 6. Or it is the moft perfuafive motive. Now will Dr. Weft fay, that wher^ fevcral motives are propofed to a man, he fometimes palfes by the moft perfuafive, and follows the Icaft pcrfudfive ? If fo, what is the reafon and what is th« motive of its adion in this cafe .? He allows, that there is a reafon and a motive for every aftion : Let him point out the reafon and the motive in this aftion. The Doftor, p. 31, Part II, fays, " If the mind " never a6ls without fome motive or reafon for ading, « then it follows, that the motives or reafons for a vir- " tuous conduft, and the reafons and arguments againft *' the prafticc of iniquity, ought to be fet before us in " the Jlrongejl light, to enable us to choofe virtue and " to avoid vice." 1. Are we then unable to choofe virtue and to avoid vice, unlefs the motives to the former and againd the latter, " be fet before us in the Jlrongeji light ?" It feems then, that unlefs thofe mo- tives be thus fet before us, we are uwder no obliga- tion to choofe virtue and to avoid vice, becaufe we are not ahk to do it : For it is no part of Dr. Weft's f\ ftem, that our duty extends beyond our ability. He denies the diftinOion between natural and moral ne- celfity and inability, and holds, that where neceffity or inability begins, liberty and moral agency end. Part IK p- 19- 2. Gf what advantage can it be *' to fet the motives to virtue and againft vice in the " Jlrovgcjl light," if there be no tonneftion between the JIro77gfJl 7?i0i'ives,3n6 volition ? Surely none at all. It is therefore implied in the paffage juft quoted, as in many other paftages in Dr. Weft's book, that there is a connexion between fuch motives and volition, and that fuch connexion is not incor.Gftent with liber- 78 ty. Yet as the Do6lor " denies, that we ai'e always "governed hy i\\t Jtrongejl motives^" he muft hold^ that there is x\o Jure conneclion between the ftrongeft motive and volition. Then the queflion arifes, What degree of connexion between the Itrongeft motive and volition does he grant to exift and to be confid- ent with liberty ? If the higheft degree of probability^ reaching to the ftep next to certainty, be allowed in the cafe, what fhould render the only remaining ftep fo baleful to liberty, as to be inconfiitent with it ? Or if it be allowed, that the probability, according to the degree of it, does indeed diminifli liberty j then it diminifhes moral agency too ; and therefore fuch a reprefentation of the motives to virtue, as " fets them <« in the ftrongeft light," and makes it more or lefs probable, that they will influence to a certain conduft, has in reality no tendency to perfuade to a virtuous conduft ; becaufe juft fo far as it has a tendency to lead to any particular conduft, it deftroys moral agency and precludes the poflibility of virtue. And fuch a repre- fentation is fo far from " enabling us to choofe vir- " tue," that fo far as it has any efFeft on us, it ren- ders it impoflible that we fliould choofe it morally ; and any other than a moral choice of virtue, if other there be, is no fubjeft of exhortation. The Do6lor aflerts, " that there is not an infallible " connexion between motives and volition ;" p. 80, Part II. And in the fame page, " That the infalli- " ble connexion between motives and volition can- «' not take place, till the mind has determined to e.x- " amine the feveral motives or reafons for a6ling in " any particular manner, in order that it may adopt " the beft. In that cafe the mind will certainly choofe ** that which appears the hejl" Indeed ! This is com- ing down wonderfully : This is acknowledging an in- fallible connexion between motive and volition in all cafes, in which the mind ex ainines the feveral motives er reafons for aBing : It is alio acknowledging, that in every fuch cafe the mind is governed by ihtjlrong- 19 tfi motive, as '• it will certainly choofe that which ap- " pears to be the befl," Of courfe there is an infalli- ble connexion between motives and volition in all cafes, except thofe in which the mind a6ts abruptly and without due confidcration. And is it indeed true, that when the mind ads abruptly, it does not ehoofe that which appears to be bell, but that which at the tmie appears to be worit, or at leaft lefs good and eliiJible, than fomcthing elfe, at the fame time in view of the mind ? When men a6t abruptly and with- out due Gonfideration, no wonder if they be mifled by mere appearance, which is not always well found- ed. But do they in fuch a cafe, aft without regard to any appearance well or ill founded, and even con- trary to the greateft appearance of good ? That this is generally fu6t, needs to be confirmed by fomething Itronger, than mere affertion or implication. Df. Weft, throughout his books in general oppofes the infallible connection between motive and volition, as inconfiltent with liberty and moral agency : But in the paflage on which I am now remarking, grants fuch a connexion whenever " the mind" afts with proper deliberation, and " examines the feveral mo- *' tives and reafons for a£ling in a particular manner." It feeras then, tl*at on Dr. Weft's plan, whenever the mind a6ls with proper deliberation, it is under fuch an infallible neceflity of fo afting,' as is inconfiftent with liberty and moral agency, and confcquently muft be deftituie of liberty and moral agency ; and that it poffeftes liberty and moral agency then only, when it acts abruptly and without proper deliberation. Will the Do6lor avow this conlcquence ? Or if he fhould fay, that although when " the mind has examined the ** motives and reafons, it will certainly choofe that " which appears to be the beft," and there is an infalli- ble conneclion in the cafe ; yet that conneflion is not inconfiftent with liberty and moral agency ; why does be difpuie agiinft that conne61ion at all ? If it do not infringe So infringe liberty and moral agency, why is it fo Tio lenely oppofed ? The Do6lor, in p. 85, Part II, quotes thefe lines from Prefident Edwards ; " I fuppofe none will 6c* *« ny, that it is polTible for motives to be fet before the <^ mind fo powerful — as to be invincible ;" and then he remarks on them, " If he means, that argit- " ments may be placed before the underftanding in fo " ftrong a light, as to become invincible, and iiich as " the mind cannot but yield to, it is readily granted, *' and is nothing to the purpofe ; For the underftand- «' ing is not the a6live, but the perceptive faculty of " the mind ; and liberty is placed in the will, which " is the only a6live faculty of the mind. But if the « meaning is, that motives may be fo ftrong, as necef- ^''farily to determine the rvill^ this is denied to be puf- " fible, while the mind has the free exercife of reajon. " But when the mind is fo violently agitated, as to " lofe the free exercife of reafon, as in the cafe of " running in a fright liberty is deftroyed. " Things that are not eligible in themfelves nor in « their confequences, cannot become obje6ls of choice; " which is to fay, there can be no motive to choofe " them, though we may find it difficult, and in fome « cafes imprafticable to bring our propenfities to fub- " mit to our choice. When one is convinced, that " he has contracted a wrong habit, he finds no diffi- " culty in choofing to overcome that habit ; but " he will have a vaR deal of difficulty in his en- " deavours to overcome it, becaufe in every unguard- *• ed hour, he will be liable to be led aftray by his evil " habit. And therefore fuch a perfon may fay with " the Apoftle, To -will is prefent with 7ne, but how to " perform that which is good, I find not ; for the good " that I would, I do not ; but the evil that I would not, " that I do. Here we fee, that we may have a power *« to choofe, when we find it extremely difficult and '•' in fome cafes impoffible to do the things which we " have gl <^ have chofen. This fhows the ahfolute nacjjdy of *' divine grace iojlrcngthcn us to do our duty." On this remarkable paffage, I beg leave to obfervc, 1. That Dr. Weft, according to his own principles, cannot confidently maintain, that " when the mind " loies the free excrcife of reiT/on its liberly is dcftroy- « ed." For rtajon belongs to " the underllandir.g, " the perceptive facuhy," and not " to the will, the " only aftive faculty ;" but " liberty is placed in the " will." Therefore according to him liberty is not afFe61cd by what takes place in the underOanding, as the free exercife of rcafon does. On this ground it is, that he pleads, that thofe arguments which are invin- cible to the underRanding, are nothing to the purpofe as to the quedion concerning liberty, which is placed in the will. The ground of the argument nianifellly is, that there is no certain connexion between the un- derRanding and tlie will ; and therefore that which overbears the underRanding, does not at all, on tliat account, afietl: the will. Therefore that fear, which overbears reafon, does not on that account affect the will or liberty. Otherwife if that fear which overbears reafon and the right exercife of the undtrUanding, do on that account affeQ and deRroy liberty ; why do not thofe arguments, which are invincible to the un- derRanding and overbear it, alfo afFeft and dcRroy liberty ; which is denied by Dr. WcR. 2. In this paffige. Dr. WeR, however inconfiRently with himfelf, holds, that motives necefiarily determine the will. In the firR place he declares, that it is im- poflible, that motives fhould be ^o Rrong as neccRii- rily to determine the will, while reafon remains. Yet in the fame pafTjge he afierts, that " when once wc " are convinced, that things arc for our greateR good, '• we can eafily choofe them,"' and " things that are " not eligible inthemfclves nor in their conlequenccs," and of courfe things that we do not " p'-rcnve' to be in either of thefe refpe6ls eligible, " cannot become *• objeQs of choice." In p. 93, Part 11, the Dosftor 82 lays, " The obje6l, motive or reajon for afting mull be " prior to the aftion of the mind and perceived by it, " before it can a£t." " Nothing can become an ob- «' jeft, except it appears to be eligible." Ibid. p. 95. •' There mnjl appear fome fitnefs or pleafingnefs to the " mind, antecedent to its choice." Ibid. Nothing then can be an objet^ of choice or be chofen, which is not and does not appear to be eligible. Jit and pleafing. Now all obje8s of choice are of two kinds, pofitive or neg- ative, the poffeffion or abfence of the things propofed for choice. And things which do not on the whole appear to be eligible, cannot be chofen ; then the ab- fence of them being propofed for choice, is of courfe chofen, and muft be chofen, becaufe it muft appear eligible. The poffeffion and the want, the prefence and the abfence, of the fame things cannot, upon the whole, be at the fame time eligible : This would im- ply a contradiftion. To refufe an obje6"l is to choofe the abfence or want of it. Therefore to refufe thofe things which appear to be eligible is impoilible : Of courfe fuch things muft be chofen ; there is a ne- ceffity of it, otherwife that would be chofen, which does not appear to be eligible, which Dr. Weft de- clares to be impoffible. The fame thing may be more briefly and perhaps more clearly expreffed thus ; Dr. Weft grants that nothing can be chofen which does not appear to be eligible. Therefore the abfence of that which appears eligible cannot be chofen, becaufe that cannot on the whole appear eligible while the prefence and poffef- fion of the objed appears eligible : And as the ab- fence of the obj,e6l cannot be chofen, or, which is the fame thing, the objeft cannot be refufed ; of confe- quence it muft be chofen ; and fo there is an infalli- ble connexion between motive and volition, and mo- lives neceffarily determine the will. If to this it fliould be anfwered, that though thofe things, which are not fcen to be eligible, cannot be- come c^bjeCts of choiccj and therefore we cannot refufe or J3_ or dioofe the abfence of thofc things which we perceive to bech'gible ; yet wcmay not ad at all withrefpcft lo them ; and may neither choofe nor refufe them ; 1 reply, as 1 have faid before, that is an impoffibility ; there is no medium with refpeft to any thing offered as an obje£l of choice, between choofing and refufmg ; neither to choofe nor refufe in Inch a cafe is to be block- ifhly infenfible. Or if it be faid, that we only confidcr and deliberate on the ofTer; ftill we choofe to deliberate. 3. According to this paffage, a man can never choofe vice or (in. For furely they are neither eligi- ble in themfelves, nor in their confequences, and therefore according to this paffage, " cannot become " objefts of choice," i. e. cannot be chofcn. But will Dr. Weft abide by this ? Or if to avoid this confc- quence, the Dr. lliould fay, that his meaning is, that a thing which is not fcen or veizved, as eligible in either of thofe refpeds, cannot be chofen ; 1 anfwcr, this implies, that the will in all its ads complies with the didates of the underllanding, and is neceffarily deter- mined by motive, as I have juft now endeavoured to illuftrate ; nor, as I can conceive, is there any way to avoid this confequence, but by recurring to what is denied to be poffible, a fuppofed power of the mind, to ad or not ad at all, and to be perfedly torpid, in view of whatever motives. To take this for granted is a proftrate begging of the qucftion. 5. As this paflage holds forth, that the human mind always ads upon motive and cannot ad without it, and therefore as is illuftrated in a preceding paragraph, is always determined by motive ; fo it follows, that it is always determined by the Jlrongeft motive, that which appears the moft eligible, or has the greatcil previous tendency to induce volition. Surely there can be no motive or reafon to a6\ on a weaker mo- tive in preference to a ftronger : This can never appear eligible ; and Dr. Weft holds, that the mind never ads without fome reafon or motive ; without the ap- pearance of fomeihing as eligible. F a 6. As S4 6. As the will is the only aftive faculty, and the feat of liberty and moral agency, fo there is no moral- ity in any other faculty, aclions or impreffions, than thofe of the will ; and Dr. Weft fuppofes in this very pafTage, as well as elfcwherc, that our propenfities and habits do not belono to will. Therefore, provid- ed we choofe things, which are for our greateft good, it is of no confcquence, as to morality, whether or not « we find it difficult and impradicable to bring our " propenfities to fubmit to our choice ;" of no more confequence, than whether we can bring our under- ftandings to be as acute and comprehenfive, as we may choofe. And though we have contracted a wrong habit, if we " choofe to overcome it,", it is of no more confequence in a moral view, that we find " a vaft " deal of difficulty in our endeavours to overcome " it ■" or that we are " liable to be feduced and led *' altraybyit;" than that we find a vaft deal of difficul- ty in our endeavours to overcome our ignorance of af- tronomy, and then that vve are liable to be led aftray by falfe guides and falfe witneiTes. For fo long as our will and choice are right, all in which there is liberty and moral agency, is right, and fo long v.e canriot poffibly be led aftray from our duty. And if our wrong propenfities and habits, under thefe circum- ftances be not fubdued, it will imply no fault in us, provided, as is fuppoied by Dr. Weft, thofe pro- penfities and habits confift not in the aclive or moral faculty or depend not on it : For on this fuppofition they are not of a moral nature and imply nothing mor- ally wrong. 7. Nor is it true, as Dr. Weft here afferts, that though we eafily choofe that which is good, we ftand " in abfolute necejfity of divine grace, to ftrengihcn us " to our duty." So far as we choofe that which is good, our wills are right, and our moral part is right. So far therefore vve adually do our duty, and have no neceffity of divine grace to ftrctigthcn us, to do that which we have done already. Docs the Doctor fup- pofe. J5_ pofe, that our duty calls us beyond our flrenoth ? And that it obliges us to a6t againit ahjolute nccefjuy. ? 8. Nor if we were to be aflilled by divine power to perform any thing beyond the reach of our moral fac- ulties, would there be any grace in fuch adiilance. It is grace to enable a man to perform his duty ; but it is no grace, to enable him to perform that which is not his duty 3 c. g. to fly to the moon. The DoBor fuppofes, that Prefidcnt Edwards held, that there is always a reafon for v.ct acling. No doubt there is always a reafon for the mind's refufing an ob- je£l offered. But Prefident Edwards never held, that the mind ever fmks itfcif into perfeft ina6lion and torpor ; and of gourfe he did not hold, that there is a reafon for this. The Dodor infills, that " Tlie mind determines up- '• on motives, and is not properly determined by mo- " lives.;" p. 87. This feems to be a mere difpute about words. The Doftor might as well have faid, that veg- etables grow upon, or in confeqiunce of the rain, and rot ly the rain. And would it be worth while to dif- pute that matter with him ? " Strange fo much difference there fhculd be •* 'Tv/ixt tivcedle-dum and t-vjeidle-dee" It is confidered by the compilers of the Encyclopae- dia lately printed at Philadelphia, as an invincible ar- gument agsinfl the infallible conncBion between mo- tive and volition, that if equal motives were fet before a man to travel an eaftern road and to travel a fouth- ern road, he would, on the fuppolition of fuch a con- nection, travel in a diagonal line, to the foutheaft. But this is contrary to faCl and experience. There- fore they conclude, there h no fure connexion be- tween motive and adion. They might jufl: as conclu- lively liave proved, that there is no infallible connec- tion between evidence and the opinions of men. Thus, on the fuppofiiion that the arguments, that the world was created in the fpring and that it was creat- ed in autumn, balance each other, the conclufion F 3 muft 86 mult be, that it was created in neither of thofe feafons, but midway between them. If the arguments, that Dr. Weft wrote the Eflays on liberty and neceflity,and that fome other perfon wrote them, fhould be equal ; %ve ought to believe that neither of them wrote them ; but a middle man between them. Dr. Weft, in his fecond part, infifts more largely on ^ the fubjeB of choofing between things equally eligiWe, than in his firft part ; and puts the cafe of four equal lines, one of which is to be touched ; and he fuppofes that he dctermineo to touch one of them, and this deter- mination be luppofes to be without motive and with- out extrinfic caufe. Now in any fuch cafe there ap- pears to be no more difficulty in accounting for my determination to take or choofe one in particular, than there is in accounting for my feeing or thinking of one in particular. Though our thoughts roam freely and apparently without control, yet Dr. Weft will not pretend, that they happen by mere chance and without a caufe. Juft fo as to our volitions ; they no more happen in any cafe without a caufe, than any other events. Nor can the mind itfelf, in ■which they take place, be the efficient caufe of them, without running into an infinite feries of volitions, and implying volition before the firft volition. Therefore let the Do6lor bring as many inftances as he pleafes, of things apparently indifferent, fo long as choice among them has a caufe, and a caufe extrinfic to the mind too ; they make nothing to his purpofe. I aflc Dr. Weft, Is his determination to touch one of his equal lines, which he calls C, an uncaufed event ? He will not pretend it. Is it efficiently cauf- ed by the mind itfelf, in any other fenfe, than as the mind is the fubjeft of it, or as it is the caufe of all its own thoughts and feelings ? To anfwcr in the af- firmative, and not to clear the anfwer of the abfurdi- ties and impoffibility charged upon it, is mere dog- matizing. To all inftances, in which creatures are fuppofed to choole one of feyeral indifferent things, n}y J7__ my anfwcr is, that though we cannot point out the particular motive or accident, which is the occafioii of the choice of that particular one ; (till this choice has a caule, and a caufe cxtrinfic to the mind too, and it is as eafy to account for our choofing one of feveral indifferent things, as to account for our think- ing of one of them in particular. But perhaps the Dodor meant to evade this, by faying, that in the very a6l of determining to touch one of his equal lines, viz. C, he " voluntarily called it to mind." What does the Do£lor mean by this ? That he firft wifhed to think of C, and that in conlb- quence of this wifli, it came to his mind ? If he did mean this, it is to be prefumed, that he will not un- dertake to defend it. And as I can imagine no oth- er meaning of" voluntarily calling C to mind," I muft be excufed from further anfwer until 1 am better in- formed. If the Do61;or mean, that he wiflied to think of one of his lines, and then C came to his mind ; the queltion returns. What made C come to his mind ? But the Dodor argues, that the Creator has a felf- deiermining power, and that he does or may exert that power in creating two or more perfeftly fimilar bodies and in placing them in different fituations, or in caufing one of them to move, while the other is at rell, <&:c. As to all fuch cafes I obferve, 1. That every determination of God is as eternal, as unchangeable and neceffary, as his exiftence is, and therefore none of his a6ls are any more felf-determin- ed, than his exiltence. To fuppofe otherwife is to fuppofe that the Deity is mutable. If therefore he have determined to create ever fo many bodies per- fe6lly aJike, and to difpofe of them in different cir- cumftances, this is no proof of felf-determination in the Deity, if by that term be meant any thing oppofite to the mod abfolute and irreverfible moral neceffity : I fay moral neceffity, becaufe all neccllity of moral a6ls, is moral neceiiity. F 4 2. U 8S 2. If God have created two bodies perfe£lly aUke» and placed the\n in different fituations ; it will not follow, that he has done it without wife defign and moliv'r.'. 3. But why did he not place them in a reverfe of jTituations, that which is on the right hand, on the left, and that which is on the left hand, on the right ? And fo with refpeft to reft and motion. The anfwer has been long fince given by Prefident Edwards : 'i hefe bodies, though faid to be numerically different, are no more different than the fame found repeated at diirerent times. Thefe founds are as numerically different as the bodies, and with the fame reafon it may be aOvcd, why wa.s not the firft found made laft and the lait firft ? Or v/hy were not thefe numerically different founds interchanged ? The abfurdity of put- ling this queftion mull appear to every one, becaufe it implies, contrary to the very fuppofiiion, that the founds are different in fome other refpetl than time. So the quefiion, why the two perfectly alike bodies were not interchanged in their Situation, implies, con- trary to the fuppofition, that thofe bodies differ in fome other refpetl befide their fituation. The Do6lor fuggefls feveral confiderations to fiiow, that thefe bodies do differ in fome other refped be- fide their fituation -, as that one of them may be in motion, the other at reft. And what is motion but a change of fituation ? So the fame found may move from one place to another ; yet no body would con- clude from that merely, that it was a different found from a perfedlly fimilar found, i. e. different from a repetition of the fame found in a different place or at a different time. Alfo the Doftor infifts, that thofe fimilar bodies are numerically different ; that is, ihcy differ \\\ number, fo that you may number them, and if you pleaf--, may call that on the right hand No. 1 or A, and that on the left hand No. 2 or B. And in the fame manner you may number the founds; and you may as wel' ^fk why found Nq. 2, was not made J9_ made firft, as why No. 2 of the bodies was not phiced on the left hand. If two bodies be different numer- ically only, they differ in no other refpeft, than in iituation ; for if they did not diiler in (ituation, they would become one body. The Dodor proceeds, p. 1;;, " That they [the " bodies] are numerically different from each other, " appears from this confideration, that if the globe A, " on the right hand, fhould he removed to a far dif- " tant place, the Deity could create another jufl; like " it, and put it in the fame place from which A was " removed." So if found A fiiould be removed from the place in which it was firli made to a far dif- tant place, the Deity could caufe another found juft like it, in the fame place, from which A had been re- moved. — '■ — P. 16. " It is evident, that thefe two " globes are as really two, as though they were ever " lo diffimilar." This is no more evident, than that the two founds are as really two, as though they had been ever fo diffnnilar. Ibid. " And they were " made to anfwer different piirpofes ; and yet being '' perfectly fimilar, A could have anfwered the pur- " poles of B and B of A." So the found A may have been made to relieve Saul troubled by an evil fpirit ; and the found B may have been made to anfwer the purpofe of the temple worfhip. Yet being perfectly fimilar and indeed no more than the repetition of the fame found, A could have anfwer- ed the purpofe of B, and B of A.. Dr. Wefl fays, that Prefident Edwards, in fuppof- ing that two globes perfcQly alike, are the fame in every relpeft except their filuation, has confounded fimilar- ity with identity; p. 16, Part II. Prefident Edwards does indeed fuppofe, that two globes perfeftly alike in all refpe6ls except their fituation, arc the fame in all refpefls except their filuation ; and if they could be ali.^e in their fituation too, as they then would be in the fame place, no doubt Dr. Weft will grant, that in that cafe they would become one and the fame globe : 90 globe :' If not let him point out in what refpe6l they would not be the fame. The Do6lor dwells long on the cafe of the two globes, and yet every thing that he fays to make out, that they are two in any rerpe6l befide place, may be faid to make out, that perfeftly fimilar founds given in different times or places, are not the fame found re- peated. What he fays, p. 16, may be applied to the cafe of the founds thus ; " What fuperiourfitnefs has" the found A, to the found B, " that makes it necefla- « ry, that it fhould be" given firfl and be continued in one place ? " Or what fuperiour fitnefs has" the found B to the found A, " that makes it neceffary, " that it fliould be" given in the fecond place in point of time, and fhould be moved to another place in point of fituation ? " It is certain no reafon can be " affigned : For they being perfe6lly fimilar, one " cannot in the nature of things be more fit than the " other. So then, here are two very different effe£ls *' of the divine power, without any pofTible reafon" why found A fhould not be given in the fecond place and be moved, and found B, in the firft place and not be moved. The Do6lor conceives, p. 17, that the ideas ad- vanced imply, " that one and the fame body may be " in two different places at the fame time." No doubt they do imply, that a body which is in all re- fpeBs one and the fame with another body, except fituation, may be in a different place from that other body at the fame time ; and may be the fubjeft of effefts different and contrary to thofe, of which that other body may at the fame time be the fubjeB. All that the Doctor fays on this fubjetl, implies, that a body different from another numerically only, differs from it in feme other refpefcl befide fituation. But he will doubtlefs perceive, that this is an error, if he reficft, that provided the diverfity of fituation were removed and they were at the fame time in the fame place, they would no longer be numerically differ- ent. 9^ cnt. Yet Dr. Weft fays, p. 17, « If tlicy differed « only in place, then put A in the place of B, and it «J would become B ; and B, by changing with A, <« would become A ; which is not the cafe : For « fliould we fee A and B change places, dill we Ihould « call each by the fame name we did before." If you put A in the place of B, it would become B, in the lame and no other fenfe, than if you make the found A, in the place and time of the found B, it will become B. If we fhould fee thofe two bodies change their places with each other, Hill ibey would be all the while in different places, as much fo as two founds would be, if we fliould hear the found, which is now in this apartment, gradually move to another place, and the perfeftly fimilar found, which is now made in the adjoining apartment, gradually move into this apartment. Thofe founds being all the while thus different in place, do not become in all refpeds one found; the difference of place flill remains- And is all the difference of the bodies fuppoied to be fecn to interchange places. And if the globes fhould be annihilated and then be created anew, and that which is now on the right hand fhould be created on the left, and vice verfa ; this would be as abfurd a ^ fuppofition, as to fuppofe, that if the two perfeftly fimilar founds now exifling in this apartment and in the adjoining apartment, fhould ceaie ; that which is now in the adjoining apartment could be renewed in this apartment, and that which now exifts in this a- partment could be renewed in the adjoining, in the ftead of the one which is now there. Every one muft fee, that this implies, that the founds are differ^ ent from each other, in fomc other refpecl, than their place ; which is contrary to the fuppofiiion. The Doftor proceeds, ibid, " If one of the globes " fhould be dafhed in pieces, it would not in theleafl « afFe6l the other, but it would be as whole as it was *' before." So if one of the perfeflly fimilar founds made in different flaces, though at firft entirely me- lodious, 9^ lodious, Should become harfb and grate on the ear, it would not in the leaft aflFe6l the other. Yet Dr. Weft grants, that thefe before the alteration of one, are only the repetition of the fame found. The Do6l:or continues, " If the two globes were " one and the fame in every refpeB, except their oc- «* cupying tv/o places at the fame time, then whatever " accident fhould take place with refpeft to one, " would equally take place with refpect to the other : " Ihat is, if A be dafhed in pieces, Ji muft Ihare the " fame fate ; which we fee is not the cafe." This is faid without proof or reafon given for its fupport, and therefore a bare denial is a fufficient anfwer. If two founds in every other refpedl; one and the fame, fhould be made in two places, whatever accident fliouid take place with refpetl to one, might not in tije leaft afFett the other. The fum of my anfwer concerning the two globes, is. That they are no more two, than two perfedly fim- ilar founds made in different places or times ; that the fuppofjtion of their being interchanged, is as ab- furd as the fuppofition, that the two founds fhould be interchangv.d; that it implies, contrary to what is fup- pofed, that they are different from each other, in fome odier refpetl befide fituation ; and finally, that it is no more in- the power of the Deity to interchange them, than to interchange the two founds. If Dr. Weft Ihould reply to this, as he often has done in other cafes, that '• this is paft his pou-er to conceive :" Be it fo ; what follows ? That therefore it cannot be true ? And is Dr. Weft's fidll to conceive the ftand- aid of truth ? " To fay, that no two things can have equal de- " grces of eligibility and fitnefs in the divine mind, is " to confound the reafon of acling, with atlion itfelf ; " and to make the Deity a mere pallive being, or a *• mechanical medium of fate." Part II, p. 19. The Do6ior has not told how thjis confounds the rea- fon of a6\ing with action, and he muft not expeft. 93 tliat all his readers will receive it upon his mere af- fertion. It is to be prefumed, that many of them will liill believe, that the divine mind always a£ls accord- ing to the diftates of wifdom, and on account of fu- periour litnefs chooles whatever it does choofe, and ihi't this is not to confound the reafon of ading with aftion, but to preferve them diflinft. If for the Deity to acl always voluntarily according to the dic- tates of perfect uifdom, be what the Do£lor means by his being " a mere paflive being," we grant it ; but we appeal to the reader, whether the Do£lor be not in this cafe guilty of a perverfion of language ; or at leaft whether he be not guilty of begging the quef- tion, in fuppofing, that there is no aftion but that which is fclf-determinate ; as that is manifeftly fup- pofed in the proportion now under confideration. As to " the mechanical medium of fate," the reader will fay, whether it' be not mere rant, unworthy of a grave philofopber and divine. Dr. Weft frequently fays, and every where takes it for granted, that in the divine mind there may be innumerable things, which differ in many refpefts, which yet may have equal degrees of eligibility and fitnefs to anfwer God's particular purpofes ; and among thefe innumerable things the Deity can choofe one and not another, and, with refpect to any of them can acl or not a6l. That things thus different may be equally fit to anfwer the purpofes of God is not grant- ed and ought not to have been afiferted' without proof or inflance. It appears to be a mere conjedure ; and if mere conje£lur,&6 be admitted as truth, truth is the moft uncertain thing in the world. Befides, it is very improbable, that things differing in feveral re- fpe^ls, fliould be equally adapted to the fame pur- pofc. As to the idea that God can in any cafe attor not aclj this appears to be an impoffibility, for the rea- fons already mentioned. " if a m-^-n is led by any means or mothes or rcafoKS, « to choole that which he formerly abhorred," fays the Dodor, 94 Doftor, *• and to abhor that which he formerly loverj^ " he is flill as free as ever he was ; for nothing being " an objecl of choice, but what appears ehgible, it is « impofiible that the mind fliould choofe that which « is neither eligible in ilfelf, nor in its confequences ; /'. e, « nothing is an objeft of choice but eligible things. « When then things appear to us eligible, which fornrier- « ly we abhorred, and we abhor things, that formerly « were eligible, we have only changed the objeBs of <« our choice, but not our freedom : We are as free " now, as we were before." Part II, p. 30. The truth fo naturally obtrudes itfelf on every man, that it is difficult for him confiftently to contradi£l it.* The DoClor here grants, that when a man choofes an ob- jeft, by " whatever means, motives or reafons he is « led to the choice," « he is ftill free." Therefore to be led by motives in any cafe is not inconfiftent with freedom ; therefore to be led by them always, in an ejlablijhcd and infallible conneHion between motives and choice, is not inconfiftent with freedom. Why then does he difpute Prefident Edwards for holding fuch a conne8ion ? Befides, Dr. Weft here grants, that if a man be led by any means to choofe an objeft, ftill he is free. Then he is free, when he is led to choofe an objeB, by an extrinfic caufe. Nay, he is frecj when he is led by a divine injluence, to choofe an obje6l. It is further to be obferved, that in this paffage, Dr. Weft declares, that it is impojfible, that the mind ftiould choofe any thing, which does not ap- pear to it eligible. What then becomes of felf-deter- mination ? Has the mind a power to make things ap- pear agreeable or difagreeable at pleafure ; to control all its own views, and to create its own happinefs in any circumftances whatever .? This indeed is the thor- ough fcheme of felf-determination advocated by Arch- bifliop King, but which has been fince given up, though inconfiftently, by Dr. Clarke, and fo far as I know, by all other believers in felf-determination ; and to ♦ Naluram ex^dla furca^ tmen ufquc remrret, Hor, Ep. I, lo. 95 to be fure cannot be confiftently adopted by Dr. Weft for many reafons ; particularly this, that Dr. Weft holds that the will always follows motive j but this fcheme is, that the will always goes before motive. " Mr. Edwards and his followers," fays ipr. Weft, " fuppofe, that there muft be a particular reafon why " every determination of mind ■ ■ is in thispartic- " ular manner, rather than any other which " will imply, that there can be no two obje£ls in the " mind equally eligible. The contrary we " know to be true by our own experience." Part II, p. 14. How does Dr. Weft know what our own experience is ? He may indeed claim a right to know HIS own experience ; but I defy him to tell what my experience, or the experience of any other man, is, unlefs he have had information. Who then gave him a right to fpeak in the plural number in this cafe ? And whom does he mean, when he fpeaks of our ex- perience ? If he mean mankind in general, I call on him for proof, and wifli he had been a little more re- ferved in this inftancc. Strong aflertions are equally open to all ; and if they be good arguments, it is ea- fy to prove, that the experience of mankind is dired- iy the reverie of what Dr. Weft aflerts it to be. As to the queftion, whether any two obje£ls are, at the inftant of the choice of one of them, equally eligible in the view of the mind ; Tanfwer it in the negative ; and in my own experience never found them to appear any more equally eligible, than any two objeds, to be equally the obje£ls of my fight or of the attention of my mind. And as to the various inftances of feveral eggs, guineas and fpols on a chefs board, one of which is propofcd to be taken or touch- ed ; there is no more difficulty, as I have faid already, in aftigning a reafon, why one of them rather than any other, is taken or touched, than why one rather than any other, i« more particularly feen or attended to, by the eye or the mind. The circumftance, that one of them is more dire6Uy and particularly feen or attended 96 attended to, is a fufficient reafon, why that rather than any of the red (hould be taken or touched : And when this circumftance takes place with regard to any one of feveral guineas for inftance, they are not all, or GO not appear, equally eligible. That which is the immediate obje61; of fight or attention is, for that reafon, raoft eligible : And how that came to be more particularly the objeQ; of light or attention, I am under no more obligation to account, than Dr. Weft or any other man. It is a fcntiment entertained by forac, that we ef- ficiently caufe our own volitions, but invariably ac- cording to motives, reafons or preeflablifhed antece- dents. Dr. Clarke expreffes this in various parts of his metaphyfical works; as in the following, "The " true, proper, immediate, phyfical caufe of adion, is « the power of felf-raotion in men, which exerts itfelf ^^ freely in confequence of the laft judgment of the un- « derftanding. Butthelaftjudgmentof theunderftand- «« ing is not itfelf a phyfical efl&cient, but merely a moral " motive upon wkichihe phyfical efficient, or motive pow- «' er begins to a6l." Being and Attributes, p. 93. « The " experience of a man's ever doing what he judges rea- « fonable to do, is not at all an experience of his being *s under any necejfity fo to do. For concomiiancy in « this cafe is no evidence at all of phyfical connec- " tion. Upon fuppofition of perfeB liberty, a reafon- " able being would ftill conjlantly do what appeared ^« reafonahk it fiiould do : And its conjlantly doing fo, " is no proof at all of its wanting liberty ©r a phyfical « power of doing otherwife." Remarks on Collins, p. 25. Dr. Price entirely agrees in this fentiment with Dr. Clarke. " A felf-determining power, which *• is under no injliience of motives has never " been contended for or meant by any advocates for " liberty. E>ery being who ads at all, muft at! *' for fome end and with fome view.*' Correfpondcncc zuiih Prifjllvi p. 156. " The influe?icc of motives is ^ «« perfeftly 97 '' perfe81y confident with liberty and indeed fuppolcs " It." Reid on the Atlive Powers, p. 275. On thefe paliagcs 1 remark, 1. Dr. Clarke, as well as tlie other advocates for fclf-dctermination, abundantly contradi61ts thelc fenti- nicnts. Thus in his fccond letter to the gentleman at Cambridge^ fpeaking of the final perception of the undcrltanding and Hrll operation of the atlive faculty, he fays, " I think there is no connexion at all be- " tvveen them ; and that in their not being conneQed *' lies the difference between a8ion and pafTion, which " diflercnce is effcntial to liberty." But if a man " on the fuppofiiion of perfeCl liberty," " conftanily '• do what appears reafonable ;" then a man may in a confiftence with perfect liberty condantly acl agreea- bly to the final perception of his underftanding ; i. e. the final perception of the underftanding and aclion, or " the operation of the active faculty," may be con- ftantly conneded confidently with liberty. And is conflant connection, no connedion at all ? And if in their not being connefled lies the effence of liberty, the eflence of liberty cannot be confiftcnt with their conftant connexion. 2. That Dr. Clarke places liberty in a phficcl power to do an a6lion. His words are, " A being's " conftantly doing what appears reafonable it fiionld " do, is no proof of its wanting liberty or a phyfical " power of doing oiherwifc." He evidently ules liber- ty and p/njical p^zcer, as fynonymous expreffions. Ma- ny other pafTages might be quoted from Dr. Clarke, Dr. Price, and other principal authors of that clafs, in which they exprefsly aflcrt or evidently fuppole, that whoever has a phvfical power to do an action, is free ; and that the reafon why motives are not inconfiltent with liberty, is, that they infer not a phyfical necefli- ty or inability. But this is no inore than we all grant. Peter had the fame ph) fical or natural power to con- fefs his Lord, which he had to deny him ; and Judas, the fame phyfical power to be faithful to him, as to G betray betray him. Nor do the mofl; abfolute decrees and predi6lions deftroy ibis phyfical power. So that ab- iolute decrees and predittions are, on this plan, pcr- feftly confiftent with Uberty. 3. Thele paffages imply, that though the mind is ihe efficient caufe of its own vohtions ; yet this effi- ciency is limited to exert itfclf or to be exerted, ac- cording to motives and the diftates of the under- ftanding. But this, on the plan oP thofe who deny that volition can be free and yet be the effect of an extrinfic caufe, is no more liberty than the flave cxercifes, who moves and acls at the control of his mafter ; or than the man has, v;ho walks in a prifon and whofe liberty is bounded and determined by the walls and gates of the prifon, and by the confent of the gaoler. We might as well fay, that a flave is in poifeffion of his liberty and is not controlled by the will of his mafter, but controls himfelf ac- cording to the will of his mafter ; as that we are free with the liberty of feif-determination and contingencc,- and yet be always limited to determine ourfelves ac- cording to the influence of motives. If there be a real connexion between motive and volition, that conneSlion is as inconflftent with liberty as if motives were the efficient caufes of volition ; provided liber- ty mean coniingence or previous uncertainty of ac- tion : And if liberty mean felf-caufation of volitionj and this felf-caufation be under the control of mo- tives or any extrinflc caufe, ftill where is liberty in the fcnfe contended for by our opponents ? Volition in this cafe is equally limited and controlled, as if it were efficiently produced by motive. Such felf-determi nation as this, is not at all rncon- fiftent with efficacious grace, abfolute decrees, and the moft firm preeflablilhment of ali events and voli- tions. If felf-detcrmination exert itfelf according to motives only, let God in his providence bring the proper motives into view, and we are efficacioufly dc- i^i^miiied, or if you pleafcj it is efficacioufly brought to. 99 to pafs, that we fliall determine ovirfelvcs in a partic- ular limited manner ; and let God decree abfoluteiy that thole motives fliall come into view, and he abfo- lutely decrees and foreordains what our condutfc fhall be. So that this kind of felf-determinaiion docs not at all anfwer the purpofe of avoiding the dread- ful dodrine of ablblute decrees, the fatality implied in that do6lrine, or other do6hines conne61ed with it. 4. If a man caiife his own volitions according to motives only, and this be a univerfal rule ; doubtlefs this rule was eftabliOied by fome caufe. This rule is an eftablilhmenl ; this eftablifliment is an effefcl. and requires a caufe as much as any other eifecl:. Who or what is that caufe ? It is doubtlefs either the Firft Caufe, or fomc fubordinate caufe appointed by him. In either cafe the original caufe oF this efiabliiliment, by which intelligent creatures caufe their own voli- tions according to motives, is God. Alfo he in the courfe of his providence brings all thofe motives into our view, on which we afl. And doubtlefs both this eftablifliment and the comino; of the motives into our view were caufed by hrm, in confequence of a previ- ous determination to caufe them. Therefore this fcheme of fclf-determination not only is confident with abfolute decrees and the clficacious providence of God; but it necefTuily implies both thefe. It necef- farily implies, that God has decreed all our volitions and is either mediately or immediately the caufe of them all. Therefore it is inconfilicnt, that ihofc who cfpoufe this fcheme of liberty and feif determination according to motives, fiiould oppofe the doQrines of God's abfolute decrees and efficacious grace. 5. Bcfide this, the common abfurdiry of felf-detcr- mination equallv attends this fcheme of determinin;» ourfelves according to motives ; I mean the abfurdi ty of an infinite feries of volitions caufing one anoth- er. If all free volitions be caufed by the fubjc6f. th-u volition in which a man complies with a motive, muit have been caufed by himfelf and by a preceding vo- G 2 lition 3 tco lition ; and this laft volition, for the fame reafon, muS have been caufed by one preceding that, and lb on infinitely. 6. Nor is this all. The doftrine now under con- fideration is, that every volition is according to a mo- tive, and is under the perfuafive influ But it is endlefs to trace the abfurdities of the fclf-de- termining power and of the raoft acute writer that ev- er undertook the defence of it. It is indeed a bur- denfome flone, which like that of Sifyphus, will forever roll duv/n on the heads of thofe who give it a place in their buiiJing. If we have a power to a^ without motive, we have a power to a6t without end or defign ; and fuch an aftion IS as totally without morality, as the blowing of the wind, or the motion of a -cannon-ball : And a power to perform fuch an aftion, is not a power to perform any moral a£lion, nor can fuch a power be called moral liberty ; but it is a power to divert our- felves, in that aftion at leaft, of all moral agency. To choofe any thing without motive, is really a contradiction ; it is to choofe it and not choofe it, at the fame time. Whatever is chofen, is chofen as be- ing agreeable in fome refpeft or other ; and whatever is agreeable, is agreeable cither in itfelf immediately, or on account of its connexion with fomething elfe and its fubferviency to it. which fomething is immedi- ately agreeable in itfelf. Now whatever is agreeable on account of its conne8ion with fomething elfe, is chofen on account of that fomething elfe, as the mo- tive. Whatever is in itfelf agreeable to a man, is chofen from the motive of his appetite, tafte or bias, which is included in PrefidentEdwards'sfenfe of motive. And whatever is not agreeable to a man on one or G 4 other i04 other of tbefe accounts, is not agreeable at all, and therefore is not chofen. To choofe an objccl without motive, is to choofe it Tvithout any end or delign, either of immediate or re- mote gratification of any principle in him, who makes the choice : And whether this be pofiible or conceiv-^ able, 1 wifii every candid perfon to judge. An aft of choice w^ithout a motive, in the large fenfe of motive as defined by Prelident Edwards, is an event without a caufe : For every caufe of voli- tion is included in Prefident Edwards's definition of motive. '' By motive," fays he, " I mean the whole *' of that wliich Qnovcs, excites or invites the mind to «' voliLion, whether it be one thing fingly, or many " things conjunQIy ;" p. 5. Accordingly in his fur- ther explanation of his idea of motive, he mentions all agreeable obje6ls and views, all reafons and arguments, and all internal biafes and tempers, which have a ten- dency to volition ; i. e. every caufe or occafion of volition. And if an immediate divine influence or any other extrinfic influence, be the caufe of volition, it may be called a motive in the fame fenfe that a bi- as is. Now, if an aft: of choice be without motive in this fenfe, it is abfolutely without a caufe. The evafion of Doftor Clarke and others, that the mind itfelf is the caufe of its o\m volitions, has been already confidered ; befide other abfurdities, it has been found to lead to an infinite feries of volitions caufing one another ; which is as great an abfurdiiy, as an infinite feries of men begetting one another.-«— -Or if it were allowed, that a man does efficiently caufe his own volitions without motive ; ftill he mud caufe |hem without defign or end, and therefore mud caufe them in the dark and by mere chance. Archbifliop King in Law's edition, p. 394, fays, «• The will cannot be determined to good by objefts." Then all the good and evil in the univerfe cannot de- termine one aft of the will. In p. 354, he fays, 'J Jhc more free any one is and the Uh liable to ex- " ternal J2L " ternal motions, the more pcrfc^^. he is." Therefore the lefs liable a man is to be influenced by the di- vine law and its precepts, by the beauty of virtue, by right and wrong, by the divine glory, or by the re- ^vards and punifhments of virtue and vice here or hereafter ; the more perfe6l he is ! ! ! If motives have not influence on men they are not capable of moral government. The whole of moral government depends on influencing the fubjeQ by the motives of laws, precepts, penalties, rewards and punifhments. Sec. However, the Archbifliop is perhaps the mofl: con-< fiflent advocate for felf-determination, that has ever^ written. Clarke, Johnfon, Price and Reid grant too much. They grant, though they do not hold to it throughout, that the will always afts according to mo- tives, and allow the influence of motives ; yet they hold, that the will determines itfelf and caufes its own a£ls ; which is jufl: like the idea of fome concerning the power of the civil magiilraie, a power to govern the people, who have the entire government of the magiflrate. But Archbifliop King ftrikesa bold ftroke. He holds, that there is " a faculty" in human nature " naturally inclined to excrcife, and that one exercife " is more agreeable than another, not from any nat- " ural fitnefsin one rather than another ; but from the " application of the faculty itfelf : For another would " often be no lefs agreeable, if it had happened to be *' determined to that." J bid, p. 269. " It is the very " nature of an active power, to make an objeft agree- " able to itfelf, i. e. good, by its own proper a6^, *' For here the goodnefs of the objeft does not pre- '' cede the aB of eleOion, fo as to excite it, but elec- " tion makes the goodnefs in the objetl ; that is, the " thing is agreeable becaufe chofen, and not chofen " becaufe agreeable. We cannot therefore juftly in- " quire after any other caufe of ele8ion, than the " power itfelf." Ibid, p. 279, 280. It feems then, that it is the nature of a felf-detertnining power to exercife exercife itfcif, not in any particular manner, but in ■Siny manner and every pollible manner. It preffes like water in a ciftern on every fide alike, endeav- ouring lo flow out in exercife. And whenever it does in fa6l flow out in any particular exercife, there was no caufc or reafon for this exercife, more than for any other poffible exercife : The only caufe or rea- fon is the natural inclination of this power to flow out in any and all pofliblc exercifes. This is juil as good accounting for any particular exercife of this power as it would be, to account for the Arcbbiftiop's writ- ing his book, by faying, that he had a general power ^nd inclination to write fomething or other. In this fcheme of Dr. King, we fee the gen^jinc idea oi liber iy of indifference : It is an equal inclina- tion, previoufly to eieftion, to ail poflibte ele6tions and volitions, and a perfeft indifference to all con- ceivable objetls ; fo that no particular obje6l or fit- uation is more fuited to give pleafure or mifery to a man, than another ; and pleafure and pain are the confcquence and depend entirely on a man's own choice and will ; fo that it is entirely in a man's pow- er and depends entirely on his own will, to render Nebuchadnezzar's furnace more pleafant, than a bed of down perfumed with rofes. It is further obfervable, that according to this account of the fclf-determining power, whenever it does exer- cife itfelf, it does it by mere chance, or as Dr. King iiimfclf expreffes it, it happens to be determined to that exercife. Thus we have the famous liberty of contingence. or peifecl uncertainty, a liberty of blind fate or chance ! Our opponents hold, that the governing influence of motive is inconliftent with liberty and moral agen- cy ; then if a man be influenced by any motive to a compliance with the gofpel and its precepts, or by any temptation to the commiffion of any adion com- monly reputed ever fo criminal ; in reality there is no virtue in the former nor vice in the latter : Be- caufe I * 10/ caufc the influence of the motive deflroys liberty and moral agency, the man is wrought upon by an extrin- fic caufe and therefore is a mere patient and not an agent. Therefore no man needs to be at all afraid of any temptation, nor according to this fcheme ought the Lord's Prayer to remain any Ioniser without cor- reQion : The lis^ht of this improved age requires a new edition of it correcied and improved. If it be objected, that motives do indeed have an influence to perfuade men, but not a certain infallible influence ; I anfwer, jull fo far as they have influ- ence, their influence is certain and infallible, becaufe it is an influence that really exifts. That which does exift, certainly exifts, and it is an infallible truth, that it does exift. Or if it be pleaded, that the mind is flill free, be- caufe motives are not the efficient caufes of volition ; I anfwer, that the fame plea would prove, that a Weft-India Have is free, becaufe his atlions are not efficiently cauled by his maftcr or driver, and they only exhibit fuch motives as influence the Have him- felf to perform thofe aBions : And the fame plea will prove, that moral neceflity is pcrfeftly confiltent with liberty. For moral neceffiiy is a mere previous cer- tainly of a moral aftion ; and this is no more the ef- ficient caufe of the aftion, than the perfuafive motive, which is the occafion of an a8ion. I am entirely willing, that the advocates for the felf- determining power (hould take their choice of either Dr. Clarke's fcheme of conflant concomitancy of mo- tives and volitions ; or Archbifliop King's fcheme, that motives have no influence, and that previoufly to election all things are perfe611y indiflercnt to the man who makes the ele8ion. If they choofe to a- dopt the fcheme of conjlant cone ovii tan cy^ they at once allow an infallible connedion between motives and volition ; they rauft give up the power to ad or not ad, the liberty to either fide, and their favourite ar- gument frow choofing one of feveral indifferent things ; they so8 they mufl; renounce the independence and fovereign^ ty of the will, and allow that it is as really bounded, limited and controlled by motives, as the flave is by his driver, or as the will is by moral neceffity ; and there is nothing of their boafted liberty left worth contending for, nothing but the pitiful power of man- ufaduring volitions according to the mandates of mo- tives ; juft as a Weft-India negro manufaftures fug- ar under the lafh of his driver. Or if they choofe Archbifliop King's fcheme ; ab- furdities no lefs glaring will follow. If all things be- fore election be indifferent, then every ele6lion is made without motive, reafon, end, defign or any con- fideration right or wrong ; every acl of choice is an a6l of as perfe6l ftupidiiy, as the motion of a canon ball or the falling of a ilone ; every man by choice or rejeftion makes any objed either agreeable or dif- sgreeable, good or bad, to himfelf ; every man, in every fituation has the perfe6t control of his own hap- pinefs and mifery ; and it is hut for him to choofe to lie on a gridiron, which he can as eafily do, as choofe any thing elfe, and he converts it into a bed of rofes. This is feif-determination to fome purpofe. Such exclamations as the following have been made, in relation to this fubjedl ; " ]f man be gov- «' erned by motives, how is he free ? Where is free- «' dom ? What liberty has man more than a beaft ? *« All his aflions are fubjedt to a fatal chain of caufes « and effeCis ?" But fuch exclamations may juftly be retorted, on either of the forementio.ned hypothefes of determining our own volitions agreeably to motives, or without motives. If we determine them agreea- bly to motives only ; then we are limited to mo- tives, we can go in one track only, we can a£l no oth- erwife than according to the dilates of fovereign and all controlling motives. Then " how is man free ? « Where is freedom ? What liberty has man more <« than a beaft ? All his aflions arc fubjeft to a fatal " chain of motives." Or if it be faid, that we de- termine 10^ fermine our own volitions without motives, end, de- {\: any abfurdity, in faying, that motive and volition are one and the fame. There is no abfurdity in the fuppofition, that one volition ihould be a motive to another volition ; that a ftrong wifti t1^{ villi for honour fhould be a motive to determine a man to gencrofiiy, hofpitality, a general good treat- ment of his neighbours, and many fervices ufeful to the public ; and charity requires us to believe, that a defire to do good, was the motive, which made Dr. Weft willing to write and publifli his EJfays on Liber- ty and Neccjfity. The principle from which Dr. Weft endeavours to faften an abfurdity on Prefident Edwards, is that nothing can be a motive but an agree- able perception ; which is both contrary to truth and contrary to Prefident Edwards. Archbiftiop King fpeaks abundantly of " depraved elcOions." What docs he mean by depraved eke^ ticns ? Eleflions not according to truth, reafon or di- vine revelation ? But if a man were to choofe accord- ing to thefe, he muft not be perfuaded to fuch elec- tion by any regard, to truth, reafon or divine revela- tion ; this would imply, that all things were not per- fectly indifferent to him before election, and that fome things are cholcn, becaufe they are previoufly adapt- ed to excite choice, and not agreeable merely becaufe they arc cholcnj as he holds in places before quoted. Belides ; if a man choofe what is agreeable to truth, reafon or revelation, yro7?j a regard to truth, reafon or revelation, or which is the fame thing, from the mo- tive of truth, reafon or revelation, he is perfuaded, in- Jliienced and wrought vpon by thofe motives ; confe- quently he is pajjive in being the fubjeft of this influ- ence of the motives, and not free in the fenfe of free- dom, which the Archbifliop holds Again, if a man choofe what is dictated by truth, reafon or revelation, from regard to any thing elfe than truth, rcal'on or rev- elation ; as he is influenced by motive, which is the thing which he regards, he is in the fame fenfe not free. Therefore to be free in that fenfe he muft ehoofe it from no regard to any thing, but without: motive, end or defign. And in fuch a choice what tiicre is of depravity or virtue, more than there 13 112 is in the fiiining of the fun or in the blowing of ihc mndi let any man point out. Whether there be an infallible connexion between motives and volitions or not ; ftill fo far as they influ- ence and have effeQ ; fo far the fubjedl is wrought upon by an extrinfic caufe and is paffive ; and there- fore according to our opponent?., fo far his liberty and moral agency are deftroyed. Why then fliould mo- tives ever be ufed with any man ? We ought not to ufe them, wifhing that they may have no effect or in- fluence at all. Nor ought we to ufe them, to deltroy moral agency, and to turn men into machines. For what purpofe then fliould we ufe them ? We common- ly ufe them to perfuade. But to perfuade is to influ- ence a man by motive, which is an exlrinhc caufe ; and under the influence of motive, he is paffive ; and in fuch a cafe our opponents fay his liberty and mor- al agency is deftroyed. But if they be not in this way dellroyed ; an infallible connexion between motive and volition is not inconfifl:ent with liberty ; and there- fore why fhould Dr. Wefl; or any other man difpute againft it ? Moft, if not all writers in favour of felf-determina- tion allow, that men generally a6i; on motive ; and 1 pre- fume they would not deny, that whenever they do a6l on motive, they are perjuaded to a6t by the motive. Therefore on their principles, men are generally de- prived of liberty and moral agency, generally aft as mere machines and paflive inftruments ; and all their objeftions againfl; an infallible conneQion between mo- tives and volition, may be retorted, with refpeft to the general conduct of mankind : And as to the liberty and moral agency exercifed in fome rare inflances, when men ad without motive, as when they are fup- pofed to choofe between things perfeftly indifferent ; it is a mere trifle not worth difputing about. Dr. Price declares (Correfpondence with Prieftly^ p. 347,) " That by determining as we pleafe," he Hieansj '« our poffcflinga power to make cither of two " motives ^^3 '• motives the flron^efl ; /. t. to make cither of them ** the motive that liiall prevail, and the motive on " which we fhall plcafc to determine." But this a6f, by which we make one motive ihe ilrongcft, mu(l be without motive. If it be not without, but be under the infhicnce of motive, not we, but that prior motive mikes that motive Ih-ongcft, on which we pieafc to determine. And as the compHancc with that prior motive is an aft in which v;c determine as we pleafe, a ftill prior motive is neceffary to that a6^, and we muft give flrcngih to that motive too, and fo on to infinity. On the other hand, if without motive we make one motive Wronger than another, we in this cafe at leall a61; without motive ; which is contrary to what Dr. Price abundantly profefles : He fays, " A felf determining power which is under no infiu- *' encz from moiives, has never been meant by any. " advocates for liberty." But if we may and do a6l without motive in making one motive to prevail ; why may we not immediately acl widiout motive, as well as firit without motive make one" motive the ftrongeft, that we may comply with it ? Befides ; to give ftrength to a motive, that we may comply with it, is really, in the a6l of giving that Ilrength, to com- ply with the motive, and to choofe the obje£]t which it recommends. It is like giving money to a friend, that he may procure for us a certain commodity. This certainly implies, that we choofe and wi(h for that commodity. In the fame page Dr. Price puts the qucHion ; " Has a man urged by contrary inclinations, no con- " trolling power over his inclinations, to make one of ** them preferably to the other, the inclination wliich " he will follow ?" I anfwer, no ; there is a contra- diftion in it. The fuppofuion implies, that before he *' makes one of them the inclination that he wiil " follow," it is not the inclination which he choofcs to follow. But this is not true : In that he volunta- rily makes it the inclination that he will follow, it is H implied 114 implied that he is inclined to follow it. He is willing and choofes to follow it, and therefore he voluntari- ly makes it the inclination, which he will follow. Thus it is previoufly what he makes it to be ; and he is willing before he is willing. In making it the inclination, which he will follow, he does follow it. He follows it before he follows it. Dr. Price in the fame book, p. 348, fays, " I am " fenfible, that it is nonfenl'e, to deny the influence " of motives, or to maintain that there are no fixt " principles and ends, by which the will is guided." Then is it not nonfenfe, to affert, that we give ftrength to motives ? And that we make an inclination, the inclination that we will follow ? This feems to be the inevitable confequence, unlefs we give ftrength to one motive, under the influence of another, and fo run in- to the infinite feries. Dr. Clarke in his Remarks on Collins, p. 12, 13^ fuppofes, that motives have Jome influence, but not a prevailing, governing one ; and that over and above the perfuafive influence of motives, the felf determin- ing power muft by its own force exert itfelf to pro- duce volition. Thus, p. 12, he reprobates the fuppo- fition, that if a man be not determined by motives neceffarily, i. e. certainly and really ; he can in no degree be influenced by them. But to be influenced by motives, is to be really and efFe8ually influenced, juft fo far as the fubje£l is influenced by them at all : And fo far as he is influenced or perfuaded by them, fo far is he governed and determined by them : For that is what we mean by a determination by motives. On the other hand, fo far as a man is not influenced or determined by motive, he afts without motive and without regard to it. So that there is no medium between no real or perfuafive influence of motive, and a determining governing influence. Again, p. 14, he reprobates the idea, " that mo- '• lives and reafons can be of no weight and no ufc « at all to men, unlefs they necejfuate them ; and thtjt " if ^ if a perfon be not determined irrefijlihly, then he " muft be totally indifferent to all actions alike, and " can have no regard to motives and reafons of ac- « tion at all." By necejj'itating ard determinwg irre- Jijlibly^ if he mean any thing to the purpofe, he mull mean really and aQually to influence by perfuafion, fo as to give fome bias or inclination to the will. And it is plain, that if motives do not at all bias or incline the will, the man remains in a ftate of total indifference, and " has no regard to motives or rea- " fons of attion at all." Nor is there any medium between an inclination of the will and total indiffer- ence ; for this is the fame as to fay, that there is no medium between an inclination of the will and no in- clination of it. And if " motives and reafons" do rot incline men's wills and have no previous tenden- cy to ipclinc them, " they are of no weight or ufe at all " to men ;" and if a perfon be not really inclined by them, he is totally indifferent to them. In the fame page, the Doftor confiders it as need- ing proof, " that a felf-moving power is inconfiftent " with having any regard to reafons of aQinq." So far as a perfon is perfuadcd to aft, by reafons and motives ; fo far he is injlucnced by motives, in ihe fenfe, in which we hold, that any perfon is influenc- ed by them ; therefore fo far is not felf-determined or felf-moved. Or if by felf-determination be meant, that under the effeftual perfuafion of motives, wa caufe our own volitions ; (though we deny the poffi- bility of caufing our own volitions) yet as to liberty in the fenfe in which I oppofe it, it would come to the fame. The flave, who always afts by motives exhibited by his mafter, is as abfolutely controlled by his mafter, as the whip in the matter's band. Be- fidesj to be effc6lually perfuaded by motive to voli- tion, and to caufe our own volition independently of cxtrinfic influence, is a direft contradiftion. "The doing of any thing upon or after or in confc- ^ q^uencc of^ that perception" (the perception of mo- H 2 tive) ttS tive) " this is the power of felf-motion or aftion^ « which in moral agents we call libcry." If the doing be merely in confequence of motive, without any influeirj-e of the motive perfuading to the doing ; that which in this cafe is called a motive, is very improperly fo called. So a motive would be no reafon at all for the doing. If it be a reafon and properly a 7notive, it moves the agent to the doing ; confequently the doing is not /^//-motion, unlefs felf- motion and motion excited by an extrinfic caufe are one and the fame. Nor is this motion a free aBi.on in a fenfe oppofed to moral neceffity. It is not free from extrinfic caufality, nor of courfe free from a de- pendence on an extrinfic caufe. Every effedl is de- pendent on its caufe. Nor is it free with a liberty oF contingence. Thi^ implies, that fomething happens without a caufe. If it fliould be faid, that motive in this cafe is not the ejicient of the action or doing : This is granted ; but at the fame time, for reafons already given, it is denied, that the man himfelf is the efficient caufe of it. He who efiablifhed the laws of nature, fo called, is the primary caufe of all things. What is meant by efficient caufe in any cafe, in which an cffe6l is pro- duced according to eftabliflied laws ? For inftance, what is the efficient caufe of the fenfation of heat from fire ? If it be anfwered, fire is the efficient caufe ; I alfo anfwer, that the motive is the efficient caufe of the volition and doing aforcfiiid. If it be faid, that the Great Fird Caufe is the efficient of the fenfation of beat ; the fame Great Agent is the efficient caufe of volition, in the fame way, by a general lav; eftabliffi- ing a conne6lion between motives and volitions ; as there is a connexion between fire in certain filuations and the fenfation of heat. To allow, that we are free, though we always a6l in eonfequence of motites, unlefs by afting be meant an a6lion not excited or influenced by moiive, and of which the motive is no reafon, is to plead for no oth- , cs er liberty, tlian is perfeflly confillent with the moft abfolute moral neccffity and with abfolute decrees. Dodors Clarke and Price confider the man free, who efficiently caufes his own volitions according to motives, becaufe he himfelf and not the motives, is the efficient caufc. Yet as by the fuppofition he caufes ihcm according to motives, he is Hmited by them. And is a flave free, who manufa6tures a com- modity under the control and lafli of his maftcr ? Or is the convitl free, who himfelf walks around the ftake, to which he is chained ? Yet according to the fyflcm of the faid gentlemen, the ilave and not the mailer is the efficient caufe of his own volition to labour. The convict and not the flake, is the efficient caufc of his own volition to walk around the ftake. Nor is the matter the efficient caufe of the limitation of the vo- litions of his flave ; he merely exhibits the motives to their limitation : And it will not be pretended, that the flake is the efficient caufe of the limitation of the volition of the conviQ:. Dr. Price, in Correfpondcncc with Prfeflly, p. 341, fays, " that no influence of motives, which is Ihort of " making them ph) fical efficients or agents, can clafh *' with liberty." Nov/ the walls, gates and bars of a prifon are not phyjical efficients or agents ; yet they are as inconfiftent with the liberty of the prifoner, as if they were fuch efficients and agents, and flood around him with gun and bayonet, to confine him to the (pot ; or as if they had built and made themfelves for the purpofe of his confinement. So if man be limited to a6l agreeably to motives only, they are as inconfiflent with his liberty, as they would be, if they were intelli- gent agents, had created themfelves and had eflabliffi- ed the connexion between themfelves and volition. It is as to liberty, immaterial who or what has eftab- liflied the connexion between motives and volitions, provided the connexion be infallibly eftabliffied : As it is immaterial as to the liberty of a prifoner, who or what made the walls, gates and bars of the prifon, II 3 whether ii8 whether the walls, gates and bars thcmfelves, any cx- trinfic caufe, or even the prifoner himfclf. If he had built and made them all, had locked himfelf in and had flung the key through the grates, he would be as effeftualiy deprived of his liberty, as if the fame things had been done by any other agent. Thefe obfer- vations lead to a further anfwer to the plea, that we give ftrength to the motive which determines us. What if a man fliould give ftrength to a motive ? Af- ter it is thus become ftrong, it as efFetlually governs the man, and as really deprives him of his liberty, as if it had derived its ftrength from any other fource. Suppofe a man were poffeffed of creating power, and fliould create another man ftronger than himfelf, and this other man fhould bind the former hand and foot : Would he not be as effe6lually deprived of his liberty, as if he had been in the fame manner bound by any other man ? CHAPTER 11^ CHAPTER V. In which it is inquired, whether Volition be an EffeEi and have a Caufe, THE title of Dr. Weft's fccond ejfay is, « That vo- " lition is not properly an effcQ, which has a <« caufe." Whether his meaning be, that it is an ef- feft which has no caufe, or that it is not an elFeO: at all, the words do not determine ; but from the fequel I conclude, the latter is his meaning. This, as has been already noticed, is indeed contradifled by the DoSlor, as in this paffage, p. 24, " The modification in <' qucdion" (i. e. the modification which the mind gives itfelf in willing or ading, which the Do6lor explains to be volition) " is the confcqucnce or effect of the " mind willing or choofing." Then volition is an ej^ JeH ; and an etfeft of a preceding volition. I prcfume the Doftor has the merit of originality in this part of his fyl^em. Many things in the common fcheme of felf-detcrmination do indeed imply, that vo- lition has no caufe ; viz. Liberty as oppofed to all neceffity or certainty ; the fovereignty and indepen- dence of the will ; its exemption from all influence of motive or extrinfic caufe, &:c. Still 1 have not met with one writer before Dr. Weft, who had boldnefs enough cxprefsly to avow the fentiment. Dr. Clarke and all the reft hold, that volition is the efFeft of the mind itfelf in the excrcife of its felf-moving or fe!f-de- termining power. And Do6lor Price, when charged by Dr. Prieftly with holding, that volitions come to pafs without a caufe, rejeBs the imputation and takes it hardly, that ever it ftiould have been made to him or his fyftem. Correfpondence with Prieftly, p. 349. But let us examine the reafons, by which Dr. Weft endeavours to fupport this dotlrine. They are the following ; H 4 1. That 420 1. That volition is an abftrafl: terra and fignifies fomething, which cannot cxift without a fubjeft ; or voliiion is nothing but the mind wilHngor a6ting ; and therefore is not an cff'ctt ; p. 21. But Ibppofe vo- lition be nothing but tlu mind willing or aHmg ; is that ftate of the mind or the mincj in that ftate, not an efFe6t ? Dr. Weft will not deny, that the mind abfo- jutely confidered is an effeft. If then the mind will" ing or in the exercife of yoiition, is not an efFe6l ; it ieems, that the mind while without voHtion is an efFe6l or a creature ; but in the exercife of voHtion ceafe* to be an efFecl, and therefore ceafes to be a creature. Wiil Dr. Weft avow this ?- Motion is an abftrad term and fignifies fomething, which cannot exift with- out a fubjetl; ; oif motion is nothing but a body mov- ing. But will it hence follow, that motion or a body moving is not an effeft ? No more does it follow from the argument of Dr. Weft now under con fid era lion, that volition is not an effe£i; ? The DoBor grants, that volition is the modification or mode of the mind; and is not that mode an effeft ? If it be not an efFeft, be- icaufe it is a mpde of the mind, thep doubtlefs no oth- er mode of the mind is an effe6l. And ftrip the mind pf all its modes, and you will take away the mind it- felf ; becaufe fome of thofe modes are ejfential modes. If all the modes of the mind, eflential and accidental, taken fingly and colle6lively, be not efFefts ; the mind jtfelf is not an effeft.-^ — On the principle of Do£lor Weft's argument, no mode whatever is an efFeft. The principle is this, That whatever cannot fubfift of itfelf put of any fubjed, is not an efFe6l. But no mode, fo- lidity, extenfion, figure, colour or motion, can fubfift without a fubjeft. Therefore not one of them nor any other mode is an efFe6t. And if not one of thofe modes by itfelf, is an effe6l, all of them taken together are not an efFe6l ; and therefore body or matter is pot an efFeft : Yea neither matter nor fpirit is an efFeft. And as matter and fpirit with their modes, comprehend the whole creation -, it will follow, i21 tbat no creature is an effe£l ; i. e. no creature is ^ creature. 2. That volition or the mind willing, is not an ef- fed, becaufe it is an efficient cauib. Dr. Wed be- Jieves, that a carpenter is the efiicient caufe of a fhip ; And docs he therefore beheve, that the carpenter in ijuilding the fhip is not a creature ? This would fol- Jow on the principles of this argument. The princi- ple is, that whatever is an efficient caufe, cannot be an effi^ft. Therefore as a carpenter is the efficient caufe of a ftiip, he is not an efied, or not a creature. Dr. Weft and others take it for granted, that if voli- tion be an efFe6l, it cannot be a caufe. This is juft ^s abfurd as to hold, that unlefs a carpenter be un- <:aufed, he cannot build a ffiip ; and that a creature can be the caufe of nothing. 3. That if the operation or aflion, which is effen- tial to the idea of a caufe, be itlclf an efFedl ; then its caufe muft operate to produce the faid effcQ:; and confequently the laft mentioned operation being an effed, muft have another caufe to produce it, and fo on in infinitum ; and this infinite feries of caufes and effetts entirely excludes the firft caufe and any efficient caufe ; p. 22. But it is denied, that in the cafe here fuppofed, an infinite feries of caufes and effe6ls is involved. Suppofe it be true, that the ac- tion which is necefTary to conftitute a man an efficient caufe, be the efFeft of an extrinfic caufe ; how does it follow, that there muft be, in this cafe, an infinite feries of caufes ? We maintain that aftion may be the cffeO: of a divine influence ; or that it may be the ef- fe6l of one or more fecond caufes, the firft of which is immediately produced by the Deity. Here then is not an infinite feries of caufes, but a very ffiort fe- ries, which terminates in the Deity or firft caufe. I know that it is often fuppofed and ajfnttd by Dr. Weft, that volition cannot be an efFeft at all ; and that jt h fuppofed by all others, who maintain Dr. Weft's general fcheme, that it cannot be an cffeft of an ex- trinfic 122 trinfic caufe. But their Tuppofing it is a mere afiump^ tion of the thing in difpute, in this part of the argu- ment. Let ihem prove it and they will do fomething to the purpofe. Again ; the caufe or feries of caufes, which is implied in the idea, that volition is an cfFe6, is fo far from excluding the firft caufe and any efficient caufe, as Dr. Weft fays, that it inevitably leads to the firfl: caufe, and implies, that there is an efficient caufe of all volition in creatures, as well as of every thing elfe (hort of the firft caufe. 4. That volition in the Deity is no effeft, but is on- ly the Deity confidered as willing or caufing ; and therefore to affert, that volition is no effis6t, is not in itfelf an abfurdity. Why then may we not affert, that volition in the creature is no effeft ? P. 23. On this I obferve, It is granted, that volition in the Dei- ty is not an effisft ; but it no more hence follows, that volition in the creature is not an effe6l, than that ex- iftence and knowledge in the creature, are not effisfts, becaufe they are not effe6ls in the Creator. 5. Thatif human volition bean effedjthen man muft bepaffivein willing,butifhe bepaffive in willing, he can be aSlive in nothing elfe ; i. e. he is no agent, but a mere paffive machine. But if man be a£livc in willing, then volition cannot be the effe6t of an extrinfic caufe, and will be nothing but the mind afting or operating ; p. 23. No doubt if human volition ht an effefl, man is lb far paffive in willing, as to be the fubjefl: of the influence of that caufe which produces volition ; ftill he is aftive too in volition, is ftill an agent and not a mere paffive machine. In volition man is both paffive and adive ; paffive as he is the fubjefl of the influence of the caufe "which excites volition, and active in the cxercife of it. As the day-labourer is paffive in that he is influ- enced by the profpecb of wages, to confent to labour, and a6tive in exerting and in confenting to exert him- felf in labour. Nor does it follow from a man's being aftive in volition, that volition cannot be the effedl; of an extrinfic caufe. The idea, that it does follow, takes for 123 lor granted the very thing in queftion, viz. that an ac- tion cannot be an cffedt, clpccially of an extrinfic caufe. Dr. Well ought to have proved this. Befides ; why docs the Doctor lay, "If man be « a6livc in willing, then volition cannot be the efl'edl «« of any extrmfic caufe ?" Ibid. His dotlrine equally implies, that it is not the effeft of an intrinfic caufe. His doftrine is, that volition is, in general terms, not an efFed and has no caufe. But now, it feems the Do6lor recedes from this, and holds only, that voli- tion is not the eflPe6l of an extrivjic caufe, implicitly granting, that it is an effcB, and an eftetl of an intrin- Jic caufe. The Do6lor tells us, that " if man be paffive in " willing he is ■ a mere pajfive machine ;" p. 23. How does this appear ? A man is paffive in his intelle£lual views ; but is he in thofe views a mere paffive machine ? The human intelled is very different from what we commonly call a machine. Or if by machine the Do5tor mean any thing that is influenced by an extrinfic caufe ; I grant, that in this fenfe, both the human intelleft and human will are machines ; and in granting this, 1 grant no more than is implied in the moral neceffity for which I plead. Yet fuch an application of the word machine^ vould be a grofs perverfion of it. 6. That the Deity has not ohly a£led from all eter- nity ; but is continually a6ling upon the whole crea- tion, for the prefervation and government of it. Yet thefe operations and energies of the Deity are not ef- fefts, though they take place in time. Therefore the energies or volitions of the human mind are not ef- fe6ls, though they alfo take place in time ; p. 24. But 1 deny, that the operations or energies of the Deity begin in time, though the efFefts of thofe opera- tions do. They no more begin in time, than the di- vine exiftence does ; but human volitions all begin in time. There is no fucceffion in the divine mind ; therefore no new operations take place there. AH the the divine aSs are equally from eternit/j nor is there any time with God. " One day is with the Lord as " a thoufand years and a thoufand years as one day." The effeBs of ihofe divine a6ls do indeed ail take place in time and in a fucceffion. If it fliould be laid, that on this fuppofition the efFe£is take place not till long after the aSs, by which they are produc- ed ; 1 anfwer, they do fo in our view, but not in the view of God. With him there is no time, no before nor after with refpefl to time ; nor has time any ex- iftence either in the divine mind or in the nature of things, independently of the minds and perceptions of creatures ; but it depends on the fucceflion of thofe perceptions. So that from the confideration, that the divine energies and operations are no efFeds, it no more follows, that human volitions are no ef- fe6ls, than from the confideration that the divine cx- iftence and knowledge are no effefcls it follows, that our exiftence and knowledge are no eftedb. 7, That if volition were an efFe6l, we could not be the caufes of any effeBs : At the moli we fhould be 9nere pajfive ivjlruments ; p. 25. This wholly de- pends on the meaning of -words^ as moll of Dr. Weft's arguments do. If by caiife the Dr. mean ?i f elf .deter- minate caufe, he, as ufaalj begs what he has no right to expeft will be given him. But if by caufe he mean a rational, voluntary agent, aQing under the pcrfua- five influence of light and motives ; we may be fuch caufes, though volition is an efFe6l ; and a6ling as fuch caufes we may produce cfFe6ls. Thus Noah built the ark ; Mofes hewed two tables of ftone, &c. And if under the name of a pcfjlve inflrument the Do6lor mean to include fuch a rational, volunta- ry a^ent, as I have jufl dclctibed ; I grant, that in this fenfe we are paffive inliruments, and it is impofli- ble, that a rational creature fliould be any otiier than fuch a paffive inftrumcnt. But I reprobate the call- ing of fuch an agent a mere paffive inrtrument, as a great abufe of language. 3ut, _7^5 But fuppofe volition were not an efFeft ; fhould •^e then be caufes of effeds ? or fhould we then be leCs paflive iiiftruments ? If volition were no effeft, we ourfelves fhould no more be the caufes of it, than any extrinfic caufe. It would happen in us by mere chance. And fhould we in the exercife of that voli- tion, which is without caule and is merely accidental, be any more caufes of an effefi, than we fhould be in the exercife of a volition excited by a proper mo^ tive ? If any reafon can be given to fhow, that we fhould, let it be given. Though it may be pleaded^ that when we become the fubjetts of volition by mere chance, we arc not the fubjeds of the operation of a caufe in the production of volition, and in that fenfe are not pafTivc • yet in this cafe volition takes place in our minds equally without our caufation, our pre- vious agency or confent, as if the fame volition were can fed by fomeihing extrinfic. So that if we be nol equally xvrvught upon in thefe two cafes, we are e- quallv inaBcve^ and therefore can no more be caufei in the cue cafe, than in the other ; And there '\i nothing more favourable to liberty or felf-determina- tion in the one cafe than in the other. 8. That if volition were an effect, we could have 710 more ideas of caufe and efFe8, than a blind mart has of colours. For we being paflive in our ideas of fen rations, they Could never fuggefl to us the ideas of Caufe and efFeft ; and if volition or internal a61ion be the efft^l of an ex'.rinfic caufe, our refleBixDns could never afford an example of an ejSicient caufe, and fo we mull for ever be deflitute of the ideas of caufe and cfFett ; p. 25. On this I obfcrve, (1.) It wliolly depends on the meaning of the word" ca^fr. If as I before obferved, it mean a fclf-determin- atc caufe, which " a6ls on itfelf and produces voli- tion ;" I grant, that we have no idea of fuch a caufe, more ihnji a blind man has of colours. Nor has Dr. Wed any idea of fuch a caufe, 2s he reprobates it »id does not believe in its exiftcnce. Neither God i±6 nor creature can be fuch a caufe as this ; it is an inh- poffibility ; it is perfe6lly like the animal, which Prefident Edwards luppofed the traveller proielTed to have feen in Terra del fuego. But if caufe mean a rational, voluntary agent producing efFefls under the influence of motives ; fuch caufes we ourfelves are or may be ; and the idea of fuch a caufe we derive from every artificer, whom we fee employed at his trade, from every hufbandman, who in our view tills the ground, and from every external atlion which we perform. (2.) Though we are paffive in our ideas of fenfa- lion, yet every idea of that kind, for the very reafon that we are paffive in it, fuggefts to us the ideas of both caufe and effeft. In that we are paffive in thofe ideas both caufe and efFe6l are implied. If no caufe operated upon us to produce the effeft, fenfation, we Ihould not be paffive in fenfation. It is true, the be- coming paffively the fubje£ls of fenfation, does not fuggeft to us the idea of a felf-determinate or felf-ac- tuating caufe ; for fuch a caufe does not exift, is an impoffibility, and therefore no idea of it can be coa- ceived ; as I have already endeavoured to ffiow. (3.) This argument fuppofes, that we get the idea of an efficient caufe by the experience, that we our- felves are the efficient caufes of volition. But in the firft place we deny, that we ever do experience ourfelves to be the efficient caufes of volition : And in the fecond place, if we did, it would be entirely inconfiftent with Dr. Weft's propofition now under confideration ; it would prove, that volition is an ef- feft, and that we ourfelves are the efficient caufes of it. (4.) Be it fo that " our reflexions can never afford « us an example of an efficient caufe ;" what ab- furdity follows ? We avow that our reflexions can- not afford us an example of fuch a caufe. We nei- ther efficientty caufe our own volitions nor our own perceptions. Yet we arc not deflitute of ideas of caufe 12/ caufe and cfFe£l, as I have already fliown.- -But certainly according to Dr. Weft our reflexions do not afford us an example of an efficient caufe of vo- lition ; for volition is, according to him, no effedl and has no caufe. g. That if our volitions were the effeQs of an extrin- fic caufe, we could never have the idea of dependence and independence, and therefore could not conneft our ideas together, i. e. could not be rational beings. And as we are rational beings, it follows, that our volitions are not the effc6ts of an extrinfic caufe, but that we are felf-deternainate> and that we get the ideas of de- pendence and independence, by experiencing in our- felves, that in willing and choofing we aft independ- ently of any extrinfic caufe ; p. 25. This implies, that in volition we a£t independently, and that from fuch independent adions we derive the idea of independence. But this again is a fheer beg- ging of the queflion. How does it appear, that we ad independently ? The DoBor might as well have taken it for granted, that we a6l feif-determinately* \Vc no more grant, that we acquire the idea of inde- pendence, by experiencing it in volition, than that we acquire the idea of an efficient caufe by experiencing ourfelves to be the efficient caufes of our own voli- tions. And if any man have the idea, that any crea- ture is in volition independent of all extrinfic caufes, this idea is not allowed to be according to truth. As to the divine independence, which is indeed entire and abfolute, Dr. Weft will not pretend, that we get the idea of this by experiencing the like independ- ence in ourfelves. We no more get that idea in this way, than we get the idea of the divine omnipotence, by experiencing omnipotence in ourfelves. So that though we have the ideas of dependence and inde- pendence, can conneft our ideas together and are ra- tional beings, it by no means follows, as Dr. Well in- fers, " that our volitions are not the effcds of an ex- " trinfic caufe, and that we are felf-determinate." And 42^ And why does the DoQor continually deny voVition fo be the efFed of an extrinfic caufe ? The propofs- tioft which he has undertaken to fupport, equally im- jf)liesj that it is not the effc6l of an inirinjic caufe. 10. That volition is only the relation of the energy of a caufe in producing an effeB, and therefore is not an efFe6l, and has no proper exiftcnce of its own ; p. ijg. -If volition be only the relation of the energy of a caufe, it is not the energy itfelf or adion of a caufe ; and how then is it a part of the fubje6t of the prefent inquiry ? The prefent inquiry and difcuflion relate to the voluntary aBions of a rational being. As to the relations and external denominations of thofe anions, they may be and commonly are different in every aftion, yet the actions themfelves may be the fame. Befides ; the Do£lor will not pretend to de- ny, that volition is an aftion of the mind, or as he choofes to expre fs it, the mind aBing. And is the mind a6ting only the relation of the energy or a6lion of that mind ? And has the mind a6ling " no proper " exiftence of its own ?" If it have, it is an efFc6t doubtlefs, becaufe it is a creature. An aftion of the human mind is an event, and an event coming to pafs in time, and therefore has a caufe : And Dr. Weft fays, he " cannot be charged with holding, that events « take place without a caufe ;" p. 27. 11. That no agent can bring any effe6l to pafs, but what is confequent on his ailing. Therefore it is very abfurd to call the a6ling or a6livenefs of a being, an cfFe6l ; becaufe it introduces the utmoft abfurdity in- to language, by confounding and blending things to- gether, which are very different ; p. 28. It is an undoubted truth, that no agent can bring any effeft to pafs, but what is confequent on his aQing. But how does it hence follow, that it is very abfurd to call the aftion of a being an effeft ? And how does this confound and blend things together, which are very dif- ferent ? It will not be denied, that the prophefying of a prophet may be the a6t of that prophet ; yet a6ling by infpiraiion he is cscitcd to that aB by a divine agency. No doubt the Divine Being brings to pafs this efFefl by a previous aft or exertion of himiclf. But where is the abfurdity of calHng this prophcf\iiig an cffcQ of the divine influence ? How does the call- ing ofit fo, confound and blend the divine influence and the aB of the prophet, which arc acknowledged to be very diifcrent from each other p 12. That caufe and effeB are not fynonymous terms ; and therefore " in whatever fenfe any thing is " a caufe, in that fcnfe it is not proper to call it an " effecl ; for this realbn, that caufes confidercd as " caufes, are not effcBs." Part II, p. go. This is jufl as conclufive fcafoning as if the Dofctor had faid, the words Iree and ejfe^ are not fynonymous term?^. Therefore in whatever fenfe any thing is a f.rec, m that fenfe it is not proper to call it an ej/e^ ; for this reafbn, that trees confidered as trees are not cffe^s. Rain confidered as the caufe of the growing of grafs, is an effeB; ; a medicine confidered as the caufe of a cure, is flill an effeB ; and Dr. Welt confidered as the author of feveral effays on liberty and neccffitv, is as really a creature of God, as he is when he is confidered to be in the exercife of his favourite liber- ty or power of not aBing and is in perfed torpor. — The DoBor proceeds, " The mind aBing is the mind '' caufing ; for I conceive, whenever the mind aUs, " it produces fome effeB." Ibid. If the DoBor mean that whenever the mind is the fubjeB of an internal aB or volition, it produces fome external efFcB ; this is manifeftly a millake, and the DoBor himfelf will not avow it. If he mean, that whenever it is the fub- jeB of volition, it produces that volition as an ejfcEl ; this in the firft place is giving up what he himfelf had vritten an efifay to prove, viz. that volition is rot an effeB ; and fecondly it is a begging of the main point. In fliort, Dr. Wefl is a mofl fturdy mctaphyfical beg- gar. But as charity demands no gratuities to fuch beggars, he is to expe61 none, He adds to the; 1 lali laft quotation, it '^ Vk'ilj introdace the greateft confu- ^ fion in i.mguagc, to fpeak of the mind, confidered ^^ as cauiing, as being an efFe6i." But what confufion of language is it, to ("peak of Dr. Well confidered as the author of efiays on Hberty and neccfiitv, as being a creature ? 1 hope, when the Doclor fhall write again, he will //zoa; that it confounds language, and not mere- ly qJ/cTl; it. The Do6lor, in the page lafl quoted, fays^ " The '' queftion is, whether every afl; of the will is a new ^' effefl produced by the Deity or by fome other ^' extrinfic cauie." 1 do not allow this to be the quef- tion. /rhe Do6lor afferts in general terms, that voli- tion is not properly an effeti. The queftion is entire- ly genera!, whether volition be an effect of any caufe, extrmfic or intrinfic. When this queftion Ihall have been fettled, a lubfequent one may arifc, whether it be an effetl of extrinjic caufe. Thus I have conlidered Dr. Weft's arguments to prove, that volition is not an effect and has no caufe. Whether they do really prove it, the reader will judge. Dr. Price in his Correfpondence with Prieltly, p. 341, fays, " An agent that does not put himf^lf in mo- "" tion, is an agent that is always a6ed upon, and an « agent that never a6^s." Gn this I remark, that it is not true, that every agent, who does not put him- felf in motion, is always aded upon, by an extrinfic agent. The Deity did not at firft put himfelf in mo- tion, meaning by motion volition.- If he did, he \vas before without motion or volition. And Dr. Price would not pretend, that Qod exifted from eter- nity without any volition, and that when he came down within the limits of time, he puthimfdf into volition, i. e, he created volition in his own mind. Or if by being aBed upon. Dr. Price meant, the Deity's a8ing according to the moft wife and holy reafons, which his infinite un- derftanding can fuggeft ; no doubt in this fenfe the Dei- ty himielf is atled upon j and if this be inconfiftent with agency, inftcad of but one, as Dr. Price fays, there. tliere is noi one agent in the iiniveiTe. God no more put himfclf in motion or volition at firft, than ha put himfelf into cxillcnce. Nor has he at any time put himfelfinto any particular volition. This would nn- ply a new thing and a change in God. To fay, that an agent that is a6cd upon cannot a6>, is as groundlcfs, as lo fay tliat a hody a8ed upon, cannot move ; unlefs the main qucftion is beg;ed, by fuppofing, that atlion means fclf-determinate a6tion. The advocates for felf-determinaiion are in like manner guilty of begging the queliion, by ufing aHive power to mean a felf-determining or felf-nioving pow- er ; a power which puts iifelf into excrcife, without the agency or influence of any extrinfic caufe. We deny the exigence and poilibility of fuch a power : We hold, that it is as impofTiblC) as that an animal fhould be;:,et itfelf, or take one liep before the fird ftep. If this be meant by aHive power, we deny that any being pofTeffes it ; and our opponents ought to be afliamed to be^ it. ■o Dr. Wefl holds, that volition is no efFeft and has no caufe : He alfo holds, that volition is a modiHca- tion of the mind. Indeed it is maniff (l, that the mind ■willing, is the mind in a different mode or diiferently modified, from what it was, when not willing. Now is the event of this modification taking place in the mind, not an efPett ? And is it uncaufed ? Then not only does an event come to pafs without caufe, which Dr. Weft denies ; but it happens by mere blind, 11 -.i- pid, undefigning chance. It might as well be f^iid, that the event of a canon ball moving is not an effcB, as that the event of the mind willing is not an cffett. It is pleaded, that if volition be the effect of an ex- trinfic caufe, it is wholly paffive : Dr. Weft joins vith others in this plea, p. 23. But if volition be the efFed of an intrinjic caufe, it is equally paflive. For as Dr. Weft himlelf fays very rightly, p. 23, '• Every " effeft is wholly palTivc with regard to the cauic *« which produces it." I 2 Dr, Dr. Weft fays, volition is " a property of a mind.""" P. 21, 22. Therefore when volition exifts in the mind, it is the fubjeft of a property of which before it was deftitute. Now is not this an efFe6l ? Does not fome efficient caufe, either the mind itfelf or fome other caufe, endue it with that property, as really as if it were endued with any other property ? Or as if a body were endued with a particular colour ? He further holds, page 6 and 7, that " virtue and ^- vice are mere modes or attributes of a rational agent." But virtue and vice are voluntary a8s of the mindj or volitions. Therefore volitions are modes or attri- butes of a rational agent. But according to him thefe modes have no caufe and are no eflFefts, And if fome modes be not effe6lsj how fhall we know, that other- modes or any modes are efFeds ? If no modes be ef- fefts, fince we know nothing of fubPxances but by tlheir fenfible modes and qualities ; how fhall we knowj that fubftances themfelves are efFefts ? Volitions are afts and events : Aad if fome e- Tents be uncaufed, why may not all ? Dr. Weft contradifts and gives up his dotlrine, that volition has no caufe, in all thofe places, in which he allows, that volition is not without motive : As when he grants, " that the mind a6ls upon mo- tives" " that when the mind atls or choofes, " it always has fome end, defign or reafon, which is " the occafion of its a6\ing or choofing" that " motives are the previous circumftances which are " neceffary for adion," &c. Sec. Motives then are the reafons, the occafions, the neceftary previous cir- cumftances or antecedents of volition. And what are thefe hut fecond caufcs ? Caufes in the fenfe, in which Prefideni Edwards explains himfelf to ufe the word caufe with relation to this very fubjc^jp. 41, 42. We fay, that fire is the caufe of the fenfation of heat ; that rain and fun-ftiine are the caufcs of vegetation, (&c. Yet they are no more than the ftaled antece- (^j^iMi. In the fame fenfe motivesj according to Dr. Weft,. Weft, are caufes of volitions. Befides, all fecond caufes are the efFe6ls of the firft caufe. Therefore ultimately volitions are effefts of the Great Firll Caufe* If volition be no effeft, it is not the effe6l of the mind in which it exiils. That mind has no control over it : It comes to pafs without its wifh or confent, as fully as if it were the effctl of fome extrinfic caufe. How then is the mind any more, or in any more de- firable fenfe, free, than if volition were produced by an extrinfic caufe ? Which would a wile man choofe ? to have all volitions take place by pure accident, by blind chance and fate ? or to have them ordered by a wife and good caufe, in the application of proper motives ? And are we agents in the former of thefe cafes, more than in the latter ? On this hypothefis voli- tions are his, in whofe mind they exirt, in this fenfe only, that he is the fubje6l of them. And this is true on the fuppofition, that they are caufed by an extrinfic caufe. And how on this plan, are we more accountable for our volitions and adions, than on the fuppofition, that ihey are produced in us by an extrinfic caufe ? If volition be no effed; and have no caufe, it pro- ceeds from no power or faculty in human nature as its caufe ; not from the power of will, nor even from any f elf -determining poiver, whether it confifl in the will or in any other part of human nature. What then is the advantage of the felf determining power fo ftrenuoufly advocated ? It cannot produce one voli- tion nor one free a6l. How then does liberty confift in it ? or depend on it f.Or how does it contribute any aid toward liberty ? And what becomes of the boafted independence and fovereignty of the will ? That a volition is produced in me by fome extrin- fic caufe, is not at all oppofed to liberty, unlefs by liberty be intended contingence or an exemption from all caufality. If I could caufe a volition in myfelf, it ■would be as neccfiary, as if it were produced by fome other caufe. Dr. Weft rightly obfcrves, that "every " efFeft is wholly paflTive with regard to the caufe, I 3 " whick 134 t-i . «' which produces it." As the volition then produced by myfelf is wholly paffive, it could not be mo^e paf- fjve, if it were produced by foine extrinfic caufe. " . Dr. Weil, in p. 25, fays, " Our coafcioufnefs, that " we are fejf-active, fuggefts to us the ideas of caufe " and effcd, of dependence and independence :" i.e. Our confcioufnefs that we are* the bare fubjeQs of vo- liiions, which are no effefts at all, whether of ourfelves or of any other caufe, and therefore are not dependent on any caufe, fuggelts to us ihe ideas of caufe and ef- fetl, dependence and independence. Whether this be rational, let the reader judge. In p. 26, Dr. Weft explains himfelf to mean by vo- lition, " the relation of energy exerted by a caufe in " producing an effeft ;" and fays, " It cannot be con- s' fidered as being an effetl of any caufe whatever, or as " having any proper exiftence of its own." In fup- port of this idea he quotes Prefident Edwards, where lie fays, that a£lion and paffion are fometimes ufed to fignify the mere relations of a61ivencfs of fomething on another, and of pafiivenefs or of being aded up- on by another thing ; and that in this cafe they do not fignify any pofitive effeft or caufe or any real ex- iftences. ' Hence Dr. W^eft infers, that according to Prefident Edwards, he cannot be charged wilh hold- ing that events take place without a caufe. On this jt may be obferved, 1. Prefident Edwards tells us, that whenever the word a6lion is ufed to fignify a mere relation, it does not fignify •^?2 aSion or fome motion or exercife of body or mind. But Dr. Weft generally ufes volition to fignify an aBion or exercife of the mind : And yet in the paflage now under confideration, he gives an explanation of volition, in which he fays it fignifies " the relation of the energy of a caufe," and therefore not the energy itfclf, the exercife, exertion or a6l of that caufe. Prefident PLdwards did not fuppofe, that the word aclion generally and properly figuifies a mere relation ; but that it generally and properly fignifies a pofitive •^35 pofitive exiflence,* or an event which has as real an cxiltence, as any fact or event. As to the word vo- lition, Prefident Edwards never confidcrs that as hgni- fying a mere relation. Whereas Dr. Weil conliders this to be the proper meaning of volition. 2. As to the p.iflage, which Dr. Well quotes from Prt fident Edwards, the latter had good reafon to fay, that when the aBion is ufed to exprefs not any exer- tion, fa6t or event, but the mci'e relation of atlivity with refpett to fomething as the fubjeft ; it fignifies no efFe6l or caufe and no real exiftence. This may be illuflrated by fomc other relation ; asxfonflifp, the relation between father and fon. A father is a real exiftcnce, and every created father is an effe6l. So is a fon. Bvitfoii/Iiip is nO real exiflence ; nor is it a proper effed or caule, more than the relation between the three angles of a triangle and two right ones. No'V volition is nut fuch a meie relation : It is a real pofi- tive a6i;, motion or exercife of a mind, and Dr. W^ell abundantly grants this. 3. If volition he a mere relation of energy, it is not " an exertion of an aflive principle," " an aft of " the wilf," " an exercife of the mind," &c. as Dr. Weft afferts it to be. Bcfides, if it be a mere " lela- " tion of the energy exerted by a caufe" or mind, what is the energy, acl, exercife or exertion of which volition is the relation ? Surely an aQ or exertion, and the relation of that aft ; a thing and the relations of that thing, are not one and the fame. The fame thing may have different and oppofite relations. The fame man may fuftain the oppofite relations of a father and a fon. And if fuch a man be the lame thing with his relations, he is the fame thing widi his fonfliip, and the fame thing with his fatherhood. Thus, as two tilings which a^ree with a common meafure, agree be- tween themfclves, it will follow, that fonfhip and fa- therhood are the fame thing. I4 4-By • It will be rcmcmbcTcd, that loj'icians and ftictaphyHcians tiivide beings in- to fubdancc and mode, and contdcr modes as having as real aud peli i»e as xxillcncc, as fubllancc. 4. By volition Dr. Weft means either an a£l of the ir.ind, or not. If he do mean an adl of the mind, vo- lition with him is not a mere relation, but a proper pofitive event or fa6l ; and therefore muft; be an ef- fefcl and have a caufe ; or an event takes place with- out a caufe. If he do not by volition mean an aft of the mind, it is furely not a/ree aft; and if we do not atl freely in volition, we do not aft freely at all, i. e. ■we are not free agents. It is generally granted, and to be fure Dr. Weit's whole book implies, tliat all the moral liberty which we have is exercifed in volition. But if volition be a mere relation, and not an aft and a free aft ; we have no liberty ; and by holding, that volition is a mere relation and not an aft. Dr. Weft gives up all that liberty for which he difputes. The Doftor,in his fecond part, p. 1 2, grants that "afts *' of the will, volition, choice and determination of the *•' mind vcxdiy W\i\\ propriety be called efFefts, when they *' fignify thofe determinations or conclufions, which '• the mind makes in confequence of its comparing <' two or more things together." Therefore fome afts of the will are efFetls. How is this confident with what the Doftor holds both in his former book and in this, that volition cannot be properly called an efFeft ? Befides ; what the Doftor here fays, is applicable to all volitions, and therefore all volitions are according to his own account, efFefts. For all volitions are " de- *' terminations or conclufions, which the mind makes '^ in confequence of its comparing two or more things *' together." If two or more things be exprefsly pro- pofed, and one of them be chofen, it is the very cafe here ftated by Dr. Weft. Or if one thing only be exprefsly and pofitively propofed as the objeft of our choice, ftill there is a real competition between this thing and the abfence or negleft of it ; and the mind comes to a determination in confequence of its com- paring thefe two together. Therefore according to Dr. Weft's own account every volition " may with '' propriety be called an efFeft f and yet according to the ^37 tne fame Dr. Weft, " volition cannot be properly call- ed an effeft." " How can thcCe things be ?" Bat Dr. Well: endeavours to evade this confequcnce, hv faying, " I have uled the term volition to fignify *' the mind conjidcred as atling. In this lenfc and in ** this only, 1 lay volition is not an eJfeB." iiut the mind confidered as ading, atls in confequence of comparing two or more things together, and fach an a6l Dr. Weft allows to be an effeCl. Alfo he grants, " that the human mind and all its powers and facul- " ties are efFeds ;" p. 13. But will he fay, that the human mind with all its powers and faculties dormant and inatiive, is an effeB, but the fame mind with its powers and faculties aHing^ is not an effeft ? And docs it ceafe to be an effe6i or a creature, as foon as it begins to aft ^ " If volition he only the mind afting ; and if the ** mind ading is properly a caufc, then it is not prop- *• er to call it an efFetl." Ibid, p. 13. But what or where is the impropriety of calling it an cffe6l ? In fuch a difpute as this, to aflert fuch a novel propofi- tion without proof or illuftration, is unreafonable. 'E>y the fame reafoning it may be proved, that any man who makes any thing is himfclf not an eft'etl or crea- ture. Thus, If a carpenter at work be properly a caufe of a ftiip, then it is not proper to call him an ef- fe6l or creature ; and if Dr. Weft writing be proper- ly the caufe of feveral eflays on liberty and ncceflity ; then it is not proper to call him a creature. " When volition is ufed to fignify the mind a6:- " ing, in that view it is properly a caufe and not an " efFe61;;"ibid, p. 28. What if it be properly a caufe ? This docs not prevent its being properly an cft'eft too, any more than the Doftor's being properly the caufe of feveral elTays prevents his being, or proves that he is not, properly a creature of God. " Caufes as " caufes, are not effefts ;" ibid, p. 13. Then authors ai; authorsj are not the creatures of God, "The i3g The Dr. argues, ibid, p. 94, That an aQion can- not be the eflPe6l of the Deity, becaufe " an effect is '• mofl: certainly paflive in coming into being ■ '' but this will imply pojjive adwn or inactive aBion^ «« wliich is abfurd." I grant, that an cffe6"l is in this fenfe paffive, that it is produced by the agency of tlie effi- cient caufe ; and in that fenfe a volition caufed by the Deity or other efficient caufe is pafnve. If Dr. Weft mean by paffive a£lion, an a6lion which in its production is caufed by an exlrinfic caufe, I grant it; and however Dr. Weft pronounces it abfurd, he iinows, that it is as eafy for another to pronounce it not abfurd ; and the one pronunciation is juft as good proof as the odier. VoJiiion is aclion, and if the Do61or will prove to the conviction of candid inquir- ers, that fuch an aftion cannot be the cffeQ of a di- vine agency or other extrinfic caufe ; he will 'do fomething more than affirm the contrary to be ab- furd. As to the expreffion inaBive aclion, if by this he mean, that the aftion is the effis^l of an extrinfic caufe, 1 grant it, and demand proof that the idea of fuch an atlion is abfurd. If he mean an attion, which is not voluntary ; I know of no perfon who .pleads for fuch an action. What the Do6lor fays here, as well as almoft his whole book, may be eafily retorted. Suppofe voli- tion is not from an extrinfic caufe, but from the fub- je6l: as the caufe ; ftill it is as really and fuHy paffive with r6fpe£t to its caufe and in coming into exiftence, as if it were the eifettof an extrinfic caulc. It would as much be the fubjeB: of the operation of this intrinfic caufe, in order to its exiftence. Therefore in this cafe too we have pajjive aclion and inaHive aclion. The Do£lor in p. 23, Part I, fays, " IIow can he" [man] " be an agent, if volition be the effecl of «' an extrinfic caufe ?" To which 1 anfwer by aflung another queftion or two ; How can he in volition be an ^3^ an a^ent, if it be the efFeft of an intrinfic caufe ? The volition IS ftill as padive in this calc and equally pro- duced by the efficiency of its cau'c, as it is when pro- duced by an cxtrinfic caufe. And how can man be an agent, if as the Do6lor holds, volition be the etfedl of no caufe, extrinhc or intrinfic ? In that cafe, it is merely cafual or accidental, like the motion of one of Epicurus'^j atoms in the infinite void. CHAPTER 14^ CHAPTER VI. ':Qj Foreknowledge and the Certainty or Necejfity impli- ed in it, DR. Weft begins his third effay thus ; « We fhall «• endeavour to fhow, in this eflayj that infalli- " ble foreknowledge in the Deity does not prove, that «« events take place in confequence of an antecedent *' or previous neceffity ;" p. 29. Let foreknowledge prove or not prove what it will, unlefs events take place abfolutely without a caufe, they do take place in confequence of an antecedent or previous neceffi- ty. Unlefs they take place abfolutely without a caufe, they are efFe6ts ; and every efFeft necellarily follows its caufe. Dr. Weft grants, p. 23, "that every ef- ^' fe6l is wholly paffive with regard to the caufe which *^* produces it." And as it is paffive, it is brought into -exiftence by the caufing or neceffitating influence of its caufe. Its exiftence therefore " takes place in ^' confequence of an antecedent or previous neceffity ;" and this is true of all events, which happen without caufe. But Dr. Weft denies, that any events take place without a caufe. Therefore he muft concede, that all events " take place in confequence of an " antecedent neceffity." If to this it ffiould be faid, that though all &.vents are efFefts, and are neceffitated by their refpeBive caufes, and in that refpcft take place in confequence of an antecedent neceffity : Yet as volitions are the effefts of the mind, in which they exift, this caufe does not j)rGduceA\\tm or exert its producing acl, in confequence of an antecedent neceffity ; I anfwer, The n^ind, if it do efficiently caufe volitions, caufes them either in confequence of an antecedent certainty, or without that certainty. If it caufe them in confequence of antecedent certainty, it caufss them under the influ- eace ^4^ ence of moral neceflity ; for antecedent certainty of moral a61ions is all we mean by moral neceflity. If it caiife them without that certainty, it caufes them contingently and by mere chance or blind fate. Befides, if the mind caufe its own volitions, it ne- ceflStates them into cxiftence, and therefore they come into exiftence under the influence of antecedent ne- ccffity ; and the caufing a6l is an event and there- fore mu(t have a caufe, and this caufe muft nc- cclfitate this event into exiOcnce ; and fo it runs into- an infinite feries of afts caufing one another, every one of which comes into exiftence in confequence of an antecedent neceffity. That the infallible divine foreknowledge of any event does imply all that antecedent neceflity of the future exiftence of that event, for which we contend, may appear thus : The infallible or certain fore- knowledge of any event is a knowledge of the certainty or certain truth, that the event will come into exiftence ; and that certainty which is the objeQ of this knowledge, is all the neceffity, for which we contend. This is what Prefidcnt Edwards calls philofophical neceffity, which with regard to moral atlions is moral necefTity ; and it muft exirt at the time the knowledge of it exifts, and in- deed in order to be the objcfl: of knowledge : And as the knowledge is by the fuppofitiony<3rf^7zott/* is '•' is no previous or antecedent certainty in the things «• ihemfelves, upon which divine prefcicnceis founded.'* This inanifelUy implies, that God foreknows things before they are future, and fees a certainty before it is. " Bv certainty," lays the Do6lor, " in the things " themfelves, previous to the divine knowledge, mujl *' be meant fomc medium diltinCl fromlhe things them- " felves, by which they render themfelves evident ** to the divine knowledge." He here afferts, but brini^s nothing to prove what he afferts. And what fignify luch bare affertions ? Does the DoQor expeft bis readers will receive them as proofs ? May they not juftly demand evidence, that this medium which he here mentions, mull be meant by certainty in things themfelves ? By that certainty I mean no fuch thing; But pofitively I do mean what Prefident Edwards de- clares that he meant, " The firm and infallible con- '• nctlion between the fubject and predicate of the '' propofition," which affirms thetn to be conncQed ; or the real truth of the propofition. For inftance it is a real truth, that I am now writing, and the certain- ty or reality of this truth or fact, is the ground of the divine knovvledoe of it ; and this certainty confifls in th(#firm and indiffoluble connc6lion of the fubjeft and predicate of the propofition which affirms, that I am writing. This certainty or truth of the thing is no " medium didintt from the thing" or fa£l " itfelf, by " which it renders itfelf evident to the divine knowl- " edge ;" but it is the real exiltence of the very thing or fad. Again, it is to all Chriftians a real and cer- tnin futurity and truth, that Jefus Chrift will judge in righteoufnefs. But the truth and certainty of this fu- Une event is not a medium dillinft from the futu- rity of the ev^nt iifelf, by which it renders itfelf ev- i'lciu to the divine mind ; but it is the real and infal- lib'e futurity of the event itfelf and confifls in the firm and iiifallihle connexion between the fubje^l and predicate of the propofition which affirms the futurity «>f the cvcnl. Now will Dr. Well pr-etendj that there is <44 is no truth or no firm and infallible conneQiorr be*- Iween the fubjeft and predicate of the propofition, that I a?}i now writing, which is the foundation of the divine knowledge of that event ? If this were fo, real truth and fa6l would not be the foundation, rule or objeft of the divine knowledge ; but God might in- differently know truth to be falfehood and falfehood iruth. Or if by " the medium by which things render *' therafelves evident," the Dodor mean the truth and reality of things ; 1 grant that what ever is known whether to God or creatures, is known by this medium ; and this is true of the mod felf-evident propofiiions and of the moft independent and underived knowl- edge. But to call this a medium of knowledge is a perverfion of language. Surely truth is not the me- dium by which itfelf is known. Dr. Weft himfelf notwithftanding his abundant la- bour " to fhow, that infallible foreknowledge in the « Deity does not prove, that events take place in con- *' fequence of an antecedent neceffity 3" I'ully and fre- quently grants all that we maintain. Thus, p. 37. « That the Deity does perfectly difcern all connec- " tions between fubjefls and predicates • is " readily granted." Now this implies, that the faid fubjeds and predicates are really and in themfelves con- nected, and in order of nature before that connexion is difcerned. This real and certain connexion is the certainty or certain truth of things themfelves, of ■which we have been fpeaking ; and which with regard to moral events and aftions is moral neceflity. P. 41. " The future volitions of moral agents are fo infalli- «' bly and indiffolubly connefted with the divine fore- «'• knowledge, which has had exiftence from all eterni- « ty, that it is impoffible, that the Deity fliould be de- " ceived ; and therefore all thefe volitions will moft '« certainly take place." P. 46. " There may be a c« certainty that fuch a thing will take place," fpeaking of an human atlion. But certainty with re- gard _U5_ gard to moral aflions is moral neceflity? and if all vo- litions foreknown by God will certainly lake place, they will take place by moral neccflTity. P. 52. " All things from eternity to eternity being prefent to *' the divine mind, he fees all things as they are" Therefore if he fee fomc events as certainly future, they are certainly future i for he fees them as they- are. And this certain futurity is the objetl of the divine knowledL;e, and in the order of haiiire is an- tecedent to it, as really as the exiftcnce of this paper, on which I am writing, is in the order of nature antecedent to my fight of it. But this antcce(ienr certain futurity of any moral aftion, is antecedent ihoral necefTny. Therefore as all moral attions are foreknown by Go^ in confequence of an antecedent moral neceffity, much more do they come into exji- ence in confequence of fucli an antecedent necefli- ty. P. 53. " Deity would from all eternity have " infallibly foreknown this propofition, as a. certain " truth," viz. the propofition concernmg Peter and! Judas denying and betraying their Lord. It feems then that whatever propofition concerning a future event is infallibly foreknown by God, is foreknown ds a certain and infallible truth ; or which is the fame thing, it is known, as an infallible truth, that the event will come to pafs ; and therefore it is a certain and infallible truth antecedently in the order of nature to the knowledge of it ; and therefor^ the event being a moral aft, was morally necelTary antecedently to the foreknowledge, and much more antecedently to the event itfelf. P. 52. " This neceffity being only^ " a confequence founded upon the cercainty of ihc « thing foreknown." Thus notwithftanding all Dr. Weft's clamour againft Prefident Edwar is, becaufe he had fpoken of a certainty in things theinfclves, h(i himfelf here exprefsly holds the very fame. And will Dr. Weft deny, that this "certainty of the tiling foreknown" is the ground of the divine foreknowl- edge of that thing, in the fame fertfe, that my prefent K cxiftence 14G exiftence is tlie ground of the divine knowledge, that 1 exifl: ? If this be not denied, it cannot be denied, that certainty or moral necefTity is in order of nature antecedent to the foreknowledge, and much more an. tecedent to the exiftence, of a moral a£lion. Dr. Weft will not deny, that any future event foreknown by God, will certainly come to pafs. Then there is a certainty, or it is an infallible truth, that every fuch event will come to pafs, and this cer- tainty now exifts antecedendy to the exiftence of the event. But this certainty with regard to moral events, is moral neceflity. Therefore there is a neceffity of the exiftence of all events divinely foreknown, and this neceffity is antecedent to the exigence of the eyp-nts. Thus, mere foreknowledge is an infallible proof of antecedent neceffity. . " We frequently fay, It is a pity fuch a perfon did. «*. fo ; there was no occafion for it ; he might eafily « have omitted the doing of the thing in the time cf " it, if he would. Why may we not as well fay, A « man will certainly do a particular thing, though he ^^ will have power to forbear doing it ? There could •« not be the leaft appearance of abfurdity or contra- '^ diftion in fpeaking in this manner about a future «' adion, any niore than about a paft a6tion, were it " not for the great difficulty or fuppofed impoffibility *' of conceiving how a thing can be foreknown, un- *' lefs it be conne6led with fomething that now ex- « ifts ; that is, a thing cannot be foreknown, unl efs *' there is a medium, which has a prefent exiftence." P. 30. -On this pafTage I remark, 1. Here again Elr. Weil holds that certainty im things, which he fo abundandy reprobates in Prefi- dent Edwards. He fays, " a man will certainly do a particular thing ;" and he doubtlefs means, that it is a certain futurity, the event itfelf is certain, or it is a certain and infallible truth, that the man will do the thing ; and not merely that this truth is known, whether by God or creature. Truth is truth wbeih- «51f 'H7 ' £r known or not : And tliis infallible truth is the very certainty in the things themfelves, of which Pref- idcnt Edwards fpeaks. 2. What does Dr. Weft mean, when he fays, " He might eafily have omitted the doing of the thing, " if he would F" Suppofe the thing done was an in-^ Urnal aft, a volition to go to a debauch ; In what fcnfe does Dr. Weft mean, that the man could have avoided this volition, if he -would ? Does he mean, that if he had not had the volition, he would not have had it ? This is an undoubted truth, but does not difprove the neceffity of it. If God had not always fpoken the truth, he would not have fpoken the trutlv. But it does not hence follow, that God does not al- ways necefiarily fpeak the truth, when he fpeaks at all, or that he can lie. If there had been no God, there would indeed have been no God ; but does it hence follow, that the divine exiftence is not necef- fary ? — ^ — To fay, that if a man had chofen not to go to a debauch, he would indeed have chofen not to go to it, is too great trifling to be imputed to Dr. Weft. Yet to fay, that the man could have avoided the external aBion of going to the debauch, if he would, would be equal trifling ; for the queftion be- fore us is concerning the liberty of the will or mind and not of the body. On the whole, we have before us one of Dr. Weft's things hard to be under foody and wc xnuft wait for an explanation. 3. When we fay concerning any paft aftion of a man, " There was no occafion for it ; he might eafi- " ly have omitted the doing of the thing in the time " of it, if he would ;" if we mean, that there was no antecedent certainty, that he would perform that ac- tion, we mean a falfehood. That adion was as much from eternity the objeft of the divine omnifcience, as any aBion which is now future ; therefore the cer- tainty of its then future exiftence preceded its a£lual exiftence. And this certainty w is founded on the truth, that the event will come into exiftence, be the fame as to fay, " that the divine fore- 6' knowledge is founded on the divine foreknowledge," liam willing any candid pcrfon lliould judge. The-- The Do£lor fays, p. 34, " That knowledge in the *« Deity mull mean the fame thing with certainty." No douht knowledge in the Deity is the fame thing with fuhjeclive certainty or certain Unowiedge ; but it is not the fame with objcHive certainty, or the truth which is the object of the divine knowledge. The DoBor grants, p. 41, " That the future vo- *' litions of moral agents are fo infallibly and indilfo- «' lubly connefted with the divine foreknowledge^ " which has had exiftence from all eternity, that it is " impofTible, that the Deity fliould be deceived ; and «' therefore thefe volitions will moft certainly take " place. For by necejfary here he" [Prefident Ed- wards] " can ■— mean nothing di(tin6l from in- ''^ fallible certainty. But how does their being necefla- *-^ ry in this fenfe, i. e. infallibly certain, prove that the ** volitions of moral agents are efFe6ls produced by ati '• extrinfic caufe." Undoubtedly by necefTity in this cafe Prefident Edwards means nothing diftin6t from infallible certainty. This is the very thing whicli he abundantly declares himfelf to mean. " And as '■^ the divine foreknowledge," by Dr. Weft's concef- fion, " has had exiftence from eternity ;" and as " the " volitions of moral agents are indifiTolubly connefled " with that foreknowledge," and " thofe volitions will '• moft certainly take place ;" of courfe there was art infallible eternal certainty, that all human volitions ■would come into exiftence juft as they do exift, and Dr. Weft grants all that we hold'on this head. What then becomes of liberty to either fide, to act or not aEl ? For inftance, it is now divinely foreknown, that Gog and Magng will rife and compafs the camp of the fainls. Therefore when Gog and Magog fliall come into exiftence, they will no rriorc have a liberty to act or not act, as to this inftance of their condu6l, than they would have, on the fuppofition that the fame conduft were decreed. It is true, there would be this difference in the cafes, that the decree would cavfc the certain futurity of that condutl, but the- K c^ foreknowledge 1^1^ foreknowledge would not caufe it : Nor is it oF any importance as to liberty, by uhom or by what this certain futurity is caufcd, or whether it be without caufe. If a prifon when bui||, be no obftru£lion to liberty, then the agency of the mafon and carpenter who built it was nothing oppofed to liberty. So if cer ain/uturdy, when ellabHfhed, be not inconfiftent with li'">erty ; then the divine decree, by which ii is eftabliflied, is not inconfiftent with liberty. If it (hould be faid, that God forefees, that Go^and Magog will influence tbemfelves to the condudt juft now mentioned ; be it fo ; then it is now infallibly cer- tain, that Gng and Magog will influence tbemfelves to tha' condu6t. Where then is their liberty to a6t or not a6l ? It is not left loofe and undetermined, whether they fhall influence tbemfelves to that condud ; but ;t is previoiifly certain, that they will infliience tbem- felves to it. The Do6lor in the laft quotation, aflcs, "How " does their being infallibly certain, prove that the " volitions of moral agents are eflPeds produced by ' " an extrinfic caufe .?" — Suppofe they are not ef- JfeBs of an ex.rinfic caufe, but are effeded by the fubjedof thofe 'volitions, if that were poflible;yet if it be prcvioufly and from all eternity certain, that the fub- jeB will produce thefe volitions in himftlf ; ftiU there is no liberty o either fide, to aU or not aB ; but he is lim- ited to produce in himfelf thofe very definite voli- tions, which are diyinely forefeen, and therefore he is confined to one Jide, is con^ned to aH and that definitely* Or fuppofe thefe volitions are produced by np caufe whatever, then God forefees that they are a- bout to happen abfolutely without caufe and by mere chance ; flill there is in this cafe no liberty to either fide, but the volitions are wilhaut caufe confined to one fi;!e only. It is abundantly pleaded by Dr. Weft and others, that the circumftance that the divine foreknowledge is not the efficient caufe of human volitions; renders^ ilut ihat foreknowledge entirely confident ^vith their idea of liberty, even as the divine knowledge of a voiidoiji in prcfent exidcncc is confiftcnt with the liberty of that voliiion. If by liberty in this cafe they mean felf determin.tion or the cauiaiion of volition by the fubjeft himfelf j 1 grant, that the moft abfolutc forelsnowiedge is perfedly confident with this ide?i of liberty : And lb is an abfolute decree as confid- ent with it. If God were abfolutely to decree, that a particular man fhall caufe in himfelf a particu- lar volition, the man would accordingly caufe that volition in himfelf, and therefore according to the definition of liberty now given, he would be free. But if by liberty in this cafe be meant, what the writ- ers to whom I am oppofed, call a liberty to either Jul . and a power to aH or not aB, as oppofed to moral nc- ceffity ; the divine foreknowledge of a volition is utr terly inconfiftent with the liberty of that volition- For according to this definition, liberty implies, that the volition is not fixed or determined, and therefore it is uncertain what it will be, or whether it will bz at all. But divine foreknowledge implies, that it is abfolutely certain, that a volition foreknown will be, and what it will be, as Dr. Weil grants. The circumftance, that foreknowledge does not ef- ficiently caufe an event to be certainly future, is noth- ing to the prefent purpofe. We are not now inquir- ing what caufes an eyent to be certainly future, but "whether it be certainly future. -If it be certainly fu- ture it is neceflary, in the fenfe in which we ufe the word nccejjity, let what will be the caufe of that futuri- ty, or if the futurity be uncaufed. Divine prophecy is not the caufe of the futurity of the event foretold, yet no man will fay, that it does not prove the cer- tain futurity of that event. But prophecy no more implies or proves the certain futurity of the event foretold, than the divine foreknowledge implies and proves the certain futurity of the eventforeknown.— Jo fay, that a divine decree is inconfiftent wiui iibcr- I ty, becaufe it makes tfie a6lion certainly future, wfieil the certain futurity iifelf is allowed to be confiftenC with liberty, is very ftrange ! What if it does make it certainly future ? That certain futurity, when made, is not inconfirtent with liberty. So long as this is granted, to hold that the divine decree as making or producing that certain futurity is inconfiltent with liberty, is as abfurd as to grant that a free circulatiort of the fluids in the animal conftitution is confident with health ; and yet to hold, that exercife as produc- ing and merely becaufe it produces that free circula- tion, is inconfiRent with health. I grant, that divine foreknowledge is as confiftent* with liberty, as the divine knowledge of a prefent volition is. If by liberty be meant the caufation of volition by the fubjedl, God may undoubtedly as well forefee this, as lee it prefent. But if by liberty be meant a liberty to either fide, a liberty to atl or not a6t, as oppofed to moral neceflity ; fince this im- plies, with regard to an aft now in exiftence, uncer- tainty whether the a6l does exifl:, and with regard to a future aft, uncertainty in the nature of things and in the divine mind, whether it will exift ; I fay, no fuch uncertainty is or can be with regard either to an aft feen by God to be now in exiftence, or an aft divinely forefeen. As therefore the divine knowledge of the prefent exiftence of an aft, is utterly inconfilt- ent with this kind of liberty in that aft ; we need not and we do not pretend, that the divine foreknowledge of an a6t is more inconfiftent with the fame kind of liberty in the aft foreknown. There is this differ- ence however in the cafes ; knowledge of a prefent aft does not imply, that the aft was certain previ- cnjly to its exiftence. But the foreknowledge of an aft does imply this. This difference ought carefully to be noticed, or we fliall run into great errour. \^^ when it is laid, that foreknowledge no more proves a neceflity of the aft foreknown, than the knowledge ®f an aft at prefent exifting, proves the neceflity of thi* , this aQ, the meaning be, that foreknowledge no more proves, that the future aft foreknown is certainly fu- ture previoii/ly to the exiftence of it, than the knowL edge of a prefent a6t proves, that this a6t was certain- ly future prcvioufly to its exiftence ; the truth of this propolition is by no means allowed. Foreknowledge by the very term refpefts a future event ; of courfe the foreknowledge exifts before the event. Andasic is granted on all hands, that foreknowledge implies a. certainty of the event foreknown ; it follows, that there is. a certainty of thefutureexiflence of every eventfbre- known, and this certainty is previous to the exiftence of the event. But the knowledge of a prefent event may not exift before the event itfelf ; if it does, it m then foreknowledge. And as it does not, fo far as it. is the bare knowledge of a prefent event, exift before the event ; it does not imply a previous certainty 3.. that the event would come into exiftence. My feeing a man perform an a£lion does not proves that it was certain beforehand, that he could perform it. But if a prophet under infpiration fee, that a man- will tomorrow perform a certain aftion, this does prove, that it is beforehand certain, that he will per- form it. And furcly the forefight of a prophet no more proves this, than the foreknowledge of God. Suppofc the a6t foreknown by God, is about to be felf originated, ftill it is as neceffary or certain before- hand, as iF it were not to be felf-originated ; becaufe tl^ foreknowledge is from eternity and therefore pre- cedes the exiftence of the a6f out of the divine mind. For though all things are always prefent in the divins mind ; yet all things are not always in prefent exiftence outofthe divine mind,^x\y more than all creatures exifted from eternity. Be it fo, that in the divine foreknowl- edge all things are prefent ; then all human volitions are from eternity as hxed and certain, as if they exifted from eternity not only in the divine mind, but out of the divine mind, and are as incapable of not exifting, «Ls the divine mind is incauable of dclufion or crrour. " Bare ji5^ " Bare certainty^ that an agent will do fuch a thing, « does not imply in it, that he had not in himfelf ^a " potx:.cr to refrain from doing it ;" p. 45. This de- pends on the meaning of the word power to refrain, jif this mean natural power, as it has been explained, it is granted, that ever fo great certainty and even a divine abfolute decree, that an agent fhall do fuch a thing, does not imply in it, that he has not in himfelf a power to refrain from doing it. But if by power to refrain be meant moral power, or a power oppofite to m«ral neceffity, which is the bare certainty of a moral adion, it is abfurd and fclf-contradiclory to fay, that the bare certainty that an agent will do fuch .a thing, does not imply in it, that he has not a power to refrain from doing it. It is the very fame abfurd- ity and contradidion, as to fay, that a bare Certainty, that an agent will do fuch a particular thing, does not imply in it a certainty, that he will do it. In the fame page the Doctor tells us, " The only " queftion is, whether fuppofmg it to be foreknown, «« that an a.gent will conduft in fuch a manner, at c' fuch a time, it will be any contradiftion to affirm, " that the faid agent will have a power, at the fame « time, to afcVin a different manner." If it be fore- known, that an agent will a6l in a particular manner, at a particular time ; it will be granted, that there is a certainty, that he will a6l in that particular. But certainty of moral atlion is moral necejfily^ and moral inability of the contrary. And to affert, that an agent is under a moral inability to aft in a different man- ner, and yet has a moral power to a6l in a different manner, is a direft contradiction. The Doftor fays, p. 29, " That infallible fore- <^« knowledge in the Deity docs not prove, that events ^^ take place in confequence of an antecedent or pre- " vious neceffity ; that it only proves a logical necef- ^^ fity or a neceffity of conftquence ; i. ^. it being cer- ^« tain, that a thing will take place, it follows, that to ^'^ affert that it will not take place, muft be falfe and " cannot <* cannot be trlic." As the DoQor makes much of this, which he calls a logical necefliiy, or a nectili* ty of confequence, let us examine it. The foreknowledge of God is here faid to prove a logical ncceffity only, or a nectffity of confequence ; which is laid to be this, that " it being certain, that a <^ thing will take place, it follows, that to affert that: «' it will not take place, muft be falfe and cannot be " true." Here one thing is faid to follow from an* c^her, by a logical necellity or a neccflity of coirfe-i quence. L'et us take an example : It is a certain truth that the dead will rife ; and does it hence JcU low, that it is a falfehood, that the dead will not rile ? No, the latter is no more a confequence from the former, than the former is a confequence from the latter ; or than that twice two are not unequal to four, is a confequence from this propofition, that twice tv^cr are equal to four ; or than from its being true, that a thing IS, it follows as a confequence that it is not tr\ie^ ihat it is not. The one is no confequence from the other, but is precifely the fame thing exprcffed in dif* ferent words, which convey the very fame idea. You might as well fay? that if a man be kindi it follows as- a confequence, that he is benevolent ; or that if a man be bujj', it follows as a confequence, that he is- employed in bvjinefs. Thus we may argue and drav/ confequences all day long, yet make no more progrefs^ than the foldier who marches without gaining ground. Dr. Weft fays, p. 32, " No necellity is implied inr " divine prefcience, except merely a logical one ; " but this is in the nature of ih'mgs fubf qnent " to the infallible foreknowledge of the exiftence of " the thing foreknown." Lut docs Dr. Weft mean, that in foreknowledge Cod forefees an event as uncertain, and that in confequence of this forefight the event becomes cert.an ? Surely the Dodor did not well confider the fubjeft, if this be his meaning. To fore- know is certainly to forefce : And certainly to fore- fee, is to fee a future event as certainly about to be. This This certainty of its futurity is fuppofed and impHekf in foreknowledge, and is not the confequence of h. Dr. Weft fays, " It will be readily granted on all fides, *' that even the divine foreknowledge itfelf has no in- « fluence nor caufal force, with regard io the thing ^' foreknown, either to bring it into exiftence, or to ^' hinder its happening." Tiierefore it has no influ- ence to make its exillence certain or neceffary ; how fhen is the neceffKy/M^/^^z^^^z^ to foreknowledge? The certainty of its exiftence is antecedent in the order of nature to the foreknowledge, and is the ground or the objeft of it. This alfo is abundantly implied in va- lious paffages of Dr. Weft's book, as has been fhown above. In p. 53, the: Do£lor fpeaks of his logical jieceffity as " only a confequcnce founded upon the "certainty of the thing foreknown." But this cer- tainty of moral a£lions is the very moral neceflity, for 'vi'hich we plead. If the DoQor mean this by his log- ical neceffity, it, is prefumed, that the reader fees the abfurdity of faying, that this neceffity is confequent on the divine foreknowledge ; and alfo the abfurdity of iaying that it is founded on the certainty of the thing foreknown. A thing is not confequent on itfelf nor on that which is founded on itfelf, as foreknowledge is founded on the certainty of the thing foreknown. If the Do£lor mean any thing elfe by his logical ne- ceffity, I wifh to be informed how he means any thing to the purpofe of oppofing that moral neceffity of hu- man actions, which Prefident Edwards had advanced, and by which he explained himfelf to mean the certain- ty of moral aftions. A logical neceffity confequent on that certainty is a different thing from the certainty itfelf. But allowing, what Dr. Wefl holds. That fore- knowledge proves a neceffity confequential to fore- knowledge ; this neceffity would be as inconfiftent with liberty, as one that is antecedent to foreknowl- edge ; becaufe the neceffity would exift antecedently tp the aftions of creatures, as it follows immediately from foreknowledge. The. ^59 _ Ihe Do£lor, in Viis Second Part, p. 92, fays, "Mr. «f Edwards had railed a fpedre, \vhich he could not " lay. With him neccffity was ncccfTity ; and with " him it was all one, whether the neceffity was previ- *« ous to the thing in quellion, or a confcqucnce drawn « from the fuppofition of its having taken place." This is an injurious reprefentation. The neceffity for which President Edwards pleads, is " previous to «« the thing in queOioij," and he never pleads for a ne- ceffity which is "a confequence drawn from the mere *' fuppofition of its having taken place." The neceffi- ty for which he pleads, is that which is implied in di- vine foreknowledge ; and as this exifts before the event foreknown, fo the neceffity which is implied in it and proved by it, is alfo previous to that event, and does not follow or begin to exift in confequence even of that foreknowledge, and much lefs in confequence of the fuppofition, that the thing foreknown has taken place. The only thing, fo far as I know, which could give occaGon for this reprefentation by Dr. Weft is, tJiat Prcfident Edwards c?.ils this neceffity a nccpjfiiy of conjeqiunce, and lays, that a thing neccffary in its" own nature, or one that has already come into exift- ence, being fuppofed, another thing recefiariiy con- netled with either of the former, and the neceffity of whofe exiftence is in queftion, certainly follows ; i. e. the neceffity of this laft thing certainly follows from tJic exiftence or fuppofition of the exillence, of either of the former. For inftance, when the divine decree or foreknowledge of an event is fuppofed, the exift- ence of the event decreed or foreknown will certain- ly follow. But the neceffity, which Dr. Weft inju- rioufly imputes to Prefidcnt Edwards, is not the ne- ccffary exiftence o^ one things implied in the fuppofed LKxWtnzt o^ another ; but the neceflary exiftence of one and the fame thing, io long as it is fuppofed to ex- ift ; and this neceftary exiftence amounts to no more than the mere identical, trilling propofition, that zohai PJif is. Of fach trifling Prefidcnt Edwards was inca- pable. i6o pable, and the implicit imputation, that he has writ. ten an oBavo volume in fupport of a propofuion fo>^ infignificant, ought either never to have been made,' or to have been better fupported, than by mere af- fertion. In the htter part of his third eflay, the Do6lor has* fpent a number of pages to fhow, that a certainty that a man will perform particular anions does not imply that he is under a neceffity of performing them, or that he has no power to avoid them. But all this is' labour loft, and is eafily anfwered by making the dif- tinftion between natural and moral inability ; or it all depends on the ambiguity of words and is mere logomachy. Dr. Clarke endeavours to evade the airgument for moral neceffity drawn from the divine foreknowledge, by faying, that foreknowledge no more implies necef- fity, than the truth of a propofltion afferting fome fa* ture event implies neceffity. This may be granted. If a propofltion aflerting fome future event, be a re- al and abfolute truth, there is an abfolute certainty of the event ; fuch abfolute certainty is all that is impli- ed in the divine foreknowledge ; and all the moral neceffity for which we plead. And though this cer- tainty is confident with a phyfical or natural ability to* do otherwiftf, it is not confiftent with the coniingence' or uncertainty of the event. So that there is no lib- erty of contingence in the cafe, no liberty to cither fide, to aft or not aft, no liberty inconfiftent with" previous certainty of moral aftion, which is moral' neceffity. Dr. Weft ftrenuoufly oppofes the doflrine, that the divine decrees are the foundation of God's foreknowl- edge. As I have already obferved, this queftion' feems to be foreign from the difpute concerning lib- erty ; therefore 1 do not wiffi to bring it in here y otherwife I ffiould have no objeftion to entering on the difcuffion of it. But fuppofe the contrary were trucj that foreknowledge is the foundation of decrees ;;' 1 prcrume it would be granted, that decrees immedi- ately follow foreknowledge. Therefore all events are decreed before they come to pafs. And as de- crees eftablifii, or imply an eftablifament of the c- vents decreed, and this antecedently to their exigence ; therefore on this plan there is an abfolute certainty of all events and moral aftions, and that antecedent- ly to the exiltence of ihofe anions ; becaufe they are all abfolutely decreed by God immediately on his fore- knowledge of them and before they come into cxiil- ence. " If this does not imply, that foreknowledge is not ''an effeniial, attribute, I am under a great miftake;" p. 35. Beit fo, that Dr. Weft is under a great miftake ; what follows ? Is if impofTible, that he fnould be un- der a great miftake ? If foreknowledge be an efTen- tial attribute, it doubtlefs exifts antecedently to hu- man aOions, and therefore implies a certainty of them antecedent to their exiftence. The truth is, that the foreknowledge of any particular event is no more an eflential attribute of God, than the knowledge of any prefent or paft eveiit. Knowledge in general is an eftential attribute ; but any par- ticular perception of the divine mind is no more an clTcntial attribute, than any particular act of the di- vine will, or any one decree of God. \Vill in gener- al is an effcntial attribute; but Dr. Weft will not pre- tend, that every aQ of the divine will is an effentia! attribute. Or if it be, doubtlefs every inftance of foreknowledge is an elfential attribute. By the fame argument by which Dr. Weft proves, that accordin^r to our idea? of decrees and foreknowledge, knowledge is not an effential attribute ; it may be proved, ihdf. according to Dr. Weft's ideas of thofe iubjeds, will is not an effential attribute of God. The DotlOr, p. 36, tells us, "That the divine determinations are the Dei- ty decreeing and willing ;" i. e. ihey are the will of God. J]ut according to him the divine determioa- lionsordecrees are founded on foreknowledge. There- L fore the divine will is founded on God's foreknowl- edge and is not an eflcntial attribute of God, but is felf-created, or a creatureof the divine underftanding. The advocates for liberty to aft or not att, " pre- " tend not to be able to folve the difficulty arifmg from " divine prefcience." This is an honeft confeffion. Yet with this acki)owledged infuperable difficulty attending this favourite doftrine, they are determined to adhere to it. This confeffion Dr. Price in particular makes in the followingwords;" The foreknowledgeof a " contingent event carrying the appearanceofa contra- " diftion, is indeed a difficulty ; and I do not pretend to "be capable of removing it." Correfpondence with Prieltley, p. i -j^. If this be a fufficient apology for holding a doctrine, which cannot be reconciled with an acknowledged truth, it will beeafy to apologize for holding any dotlrine whatever ; e. g. the doftrine of tranfubftantiation. It is only neceffary to fay, "That a body fhould be turned into fleffi, and yet retain all the lenfible qualities of bread, as it carries the ap- pearance of a contradiftion, is indeed a difficulty ; and we do not pretend to be capable of removingit. Dr. Weft holds, p. 53, that what is foreknown by God, is eternal truth ; yet, p. 33, he holds, that « there " is no antecedent certainty in things themfelves, on '• which divine prefcience is founded :" i. e. God knows a propofuion to be a certam truth, before it is a certain truth, and after his knowledge of it, it becomes a certain and eternal truth ; yet the divine knowledge has no caufal influence to make it a truth. He flrenuoufly oppofes the idea, that human moral anions are certainly future antecedently to the divine fore- knowledge of them ; at the fame time, he grants, that they are not ma^c certainly future by the divine fore- knowledge ; and yet holds, that as foreknown by God, they are eternal truths. If they be eternal truths, doubtlefs the propofitions which affert them, were certainly true from eternity, and therefore in the di- vine foreknowledge of them God perceived that eter- nal nal truth and certainty, and that certainty was the ob- jeft and Co the ground of the divine foreknowledge, and therefore there was " an antecedent certainty in " things themfelves, on which the divine prefcience is «' founded." Befides, as the Doctor grants that foreknowledge has no influence to caufe that certain- ty, I afk, By what is it caufcd ? Is it caufed by noth- ing ? According to the Doflor the certain futurity of the things foreknown by God, does hot exift antece- dently to foreknowledge, and is not caufed by it ; yet it exifls from eternity ; and it is that very eternal truth which there is in ail things foreknown by God. In page 45, he grants, " that all things would take " place juft in the fame manner, if they were notfore- " known, as they do now." Then all things and all e- vents are fixed and efiablifhed independently of fore- knowledge and antecedently to it, and were indepen- dently of foreknowledge certainly about to be. With what confiftency then does Dr. Weft deny a certainty in things themfelves antecedent to foreknowledge. And on what ground can he oppofe the doctrine ofdir vine decrees, which reprefents thofe decrees as antece- dent in the order of nature to foreknowledge ? If God from all eternity knew events to be future, they were future, and future in the order of nature before foreknowledge, and were future by the divine agency or by the agency of fome other caufe, or of no caufe at all. If they were future by the agency of God, that is all that the doftrine of abfolute decrees im- plies; If they were future by the agency of any oth- er caufe, this fuppofes another eternal caufe. If they were future by no caufe, they may and will come in- to exiftence by no caufe ; which is abfurd. To im- agine, that they are from eternity future by the agen- cy ofhumian free will, is to fuppofc, thnt human free will either exifted from eternity, or could and did pro- duce effefts eternal ages before it exiflcd. It is faid, that there is properly no foreknowledge in God, that all his knowledge is prefcnt knowledge, L 2 and and that paft, prefent and future, are now all prefent in the divine mind. Still God does not view all' ^ojfibk things as prefent. The exijlence o{{omt thing* is prefent to God ; only the poffibility of other things is prefent to him. Whence arifes this difference ? What gives fome things a prefent exiftence in the di- vine mind, when other things have only a poffible ex- iftence in the fame mind ? This difference is an ef- fe6l ; otherwife all real exillences and events are ne- ceffary exiftences, or thofe which are not neceffary, become future, and finally come into exiftence, with a caufe. The difference between poffible and future volitions cannot be the effeft of the mind of the crea- ture ; becaufe it exifted before that mind exifted. By all things being prefent in the divine mind, is meant not that God now fees them to be prefent to creatures and in their view j but that his view of all things, fo far as relates to himfelf, is the fame as it will be, when they fhall have come into exiftence in the view of creatures. He fees them not to be in exift- ence as to us, but fees their exiftence to be as to us future. And this is all that we mean by foreknowledge. So that faying, that all knowledge in God is prefent knowledge, does not fliow, that there is no foreknowl- edge in him. A knowledge of things as future with re- fpeftto creatures, is foreknowledge: And the whole ob- jeftion, that the divine knowledge is all prefent knowl- edge, is founded on the ambiguity of words, or of the phrafe, all things are prefent in the divine mind^ or this, that, all the divine knowledge is prefent knowledge. If the meaning of that phrafe be, that God fees now, that certain things will at fome future time be in e.K- iftence in the view of creatures ; this is granted on all hands ; and what follows from it ? Surely not that there is no certainty previous to the exiftence of thofe things in the view of creatures, that they will thus be in exiftence ; but, that there is fuch a certainty. Therefore in thisfc^nfe of the phrafe it is not at all op- pofed to, but implies the doctrine of previous certainty and i^5 and moral neceflity, which we maintain. If that phrafe mean, that God now fees all events, which ever take place, to have a prefent exiftencein the view of crea- tures ; this is not true and will not be pretended by our opponents. Yet this is the only fenfe of the phrafe, which oppofes the doQrine of previous certain- ty as argued from the divine foreknowledge. That all things are prefent in the divine mind, can meaa no nwre, than that all things are now fcen by God, and that there is no pad nor future with him. Stjll he views fome things to be pad, and other things to be future, with refpe8; to creatures : And his view of fome things as future with refpeft to creatures, is what we mean by the divine foreknowledge ; not that he views things as future with refpeft to himfelf. If therefore God now fees, that certain volitions will hereafter take place in the minds of Gog and Ma- gog, according to prophecy, they will certainly take place, and there is a moral necelhty of it, and a moral neceility now exijling ages before thofe volitions will have an exiftcncc in the minds of thofe nien. The confideration, that all things are prefent with God, docs, as before obferved, not at all prove, that there is not now a previous certainty or moral neceflity, that thofe volitions will come into exiftence ; but ev- idently proves that there is fuch certainty, and that in two refpecls ; (i.) A certainty previous in order of time to the exiftence of thofe volitions in the minds of Gog and Magog. (2.) A certainty previous in the order of nature to the divine foreknowledge itfelf, and which is the foundation of that foreknowledge. Moft: or all the obje6lions brought againlt moral neceflity, may be brought with equal force againft di- vine foreknowledge. For example ; "If there be *' an abfolute moral neceflity, that John go on in fin, and "be finally damned, there is nopoflibiliiy that he be *' faved. Then why fliould heor any other perfon ufe " any endeavours toward his falvation ?" If there be force in this objedion, it is equally forcible againft: L 3 divine i65 divine foreknowledge : Thus, If God foreknow, tliz^t Joha will go on in fin and be finally damned, there is an abfolute certainty or moral neceffity of it. There- fore there is no poffibility of John's falvation ; and -why fliould he or any other perfon put forth any en- deavours toward it ? This and all objeBions of the kind imply, that all moral events are left in a ftate of per- feft uncertainty, till they come to pafs, that they come to pafs by mere chance, and that they are not, and can- not poffibly be, the obje£ls of foreknowledge. It has been already obferved, that though divine foreknowledge is not the efficient caufe of the certain futurity of any event ; yet it implies, that the event is certainly future, and this certainty^lct it be caufed by what it will, or though it be uncaufed, is with refpeflt to a moral event, moral neceffity, and equally confid- ent or inconfiftent with liberty^ as if it were caufed by foreknowledge. 1 now obferve further, that this cer- tain futurity undoubtedly is caufed by fomdhing. It is equally abfurd to imagine, that an event may become future without a caufe, as that it may come into exijl- ence without a caufe. Certain futurity implies, that the a£lual exillence of the event is fecurcd to take place in due time. And whatever is able thus to fe- cure the event, is able to bring it into exiftcnce. If h may be fecured without a caufe, it maybe brought into exiftence without a caufe. This certain futurity of all events from eternity is an effcQ, and cannot be the effeft of any creature, becaufe no creature exifled from eternity. It mull therefore be the efFe£l of the Creator, who alone exifted from eternity, and who alone there- fore could from eternity give futurity to any event. Therefore however frightened Dr. Well and other writers be at the idea, that moral aBions fhould be the effefl of a caufe extrinfic to the fubjeft of thofe anions, we feem to be neceffitated to give into this idea, from the confideration, that all moral a£lions of creatures were from eternity foreknown and therefore • were certainly future. This eternal futurity mufl be • " ' ' an ^6; an effefl; of a caufe extrinfic to all creatures. Thi§ exirinfic caufc fecures their cxillence, and in due time a6lua!Iy brings them into exigence. It isfaid, that God knows all things from eternity, as we know things prelcntly exilling before our eyes. Now tl-.e aftual exiltence of diings out of our minds is the foundation of our knowledge in the cafe. But it will not be faid, that all things cxiflcd from eternity out of the divine mind, and that tliis exiftence of them is the foundation of the divine eternal knowl- edge of them or of their exiflencein the divine mind. If they did eternally exift out of the divine mind, they were neceflanly exiftent in the fame fenfe in which God is ; and confequenily none of our a8ions are caufed by ourfelves or by our fclf-dctermining power : They are as uncaufed, as neccffary and as eternal, as the divine exiftence. Dr. Clarke in his remarks on Collins, p. c^g, fays, that " in the argument drawn againft liberty from the *' divine prefciencc, or power of judging infallibly con- " cerning free events, it mud be proved, that things " otherwife fuppofed free, will thereby unavoidably *' become necefiary." On this 1 remark, (i.J That if by the \fjord/ree the Do6lor mean any thing oppo- fite to the mod abfolute moral neccflity, he muii; mean comiingeni, uncertain^ net certainly j-ulure. But nothing is in this fenfe fuppofed, or allowed, to be free. (2.) Vv^e do not pretend from the divine prefcience to prove, that " thereby things unavoida- bly become ncceffary," or certainly future. But wc do pretend from prefcience to prove, that all events -were certainly future, in the order of nature, aiuecc- ' dently to the prefcience ; and that they are certainly future, in the order of time, antecedently to their cx- iflence. Dr. Clarke in his Being and Attributes^ p. 95, Va- grants, that all things are and vere certain from eter- nity, and yet fuppofes, p. 97, that an univcrial fatali- ty would be inconfiftent with monihty. But it fecms, L 4 that i68 that according to the Doflor an univerfal and eternal certainty of all things is not inconfiftent with morali- ty ; and if by fatahty he meant any thing different from certainty, he oppofes what nobody holds. Ibid, p. 98, the Dodor fays, " mere certainty of " event does not imply necefiity." But mere cer- tainty of event doubilefs implies itfelf, and that is all the necefiity, for which we plead. The Dodor's ar- gument to prove, that certainty docs not imply necef- iity, is, that foreknowledge implies no more certainty, than would exifl: without it. At the fame time he grants, that there is " the fame certainty of event in *' every one of man's adions, as if they were never fo " fatal and neceflary." Now any other certainty or ne- cefiity than this we do not pretend to be implied in foreknowledge. And as the Dodor himfelf grants this neceflTity to exift, whether there be or be not fore- knowledge ; then in either cafe all that necefiity, for which we plead, is granted to exift. Dr. Welt, in p. 20, 21, Part II, thinks Prefident Edwards inconfiftent with himfelf, in denying, that the divine decrees are founded on foreknowledge, and yet holding, that " the perfedion of his underftanding *' is the foundation of his decrees." The Dodor ar- gues, that " If foreknowledge in the Deity, is part of " the perfedion of the divine underftanding. Then is it " the foundation of his wife purpofes and decrees ; " and fo his objedion lies juft as ftrong againft him, " as againft us." Doubtlefs the perfedion of the di- vine underftanding ; i. .e God's perfed view of the iitnefs of certain things to certain ufes and ends, is the reafon why he decrees and appoints thofe things to ihofe ufes and ends. But this is very different from fuppofing that foreknowledge is the foundation of de- crees, and that God firft forefees certain events about to take place, and then decrees to permit them to take place. And the inconclufivenefs of Dr. Weft's argu- ment juft quoted, may appear thus ; If after-knowledge, or a knowledge, that events have taken place; be a part of 169 of the divine underftanding ; then it is the foundation of his wife purpofes and decrees. But it will not be pre- tended, that the confequent in this cafe juftly follows from the antecedent. Yet it follows as juftly as in the argument of the Do£lor. Not every perception which belongs to the divine underftanding is the foundation of God's decrees univerfally or generally : Befide the inftance already mentioned, I might men- tion God's perfedl knowledge of geometry, mechanics, Sec, The divine perfe6l knowledge of ihofe fciences is not the foundation of all God's decrees : No more is God's foreknowledge. CHAPTER 170 CHAPTER VIL Ohjediom confidtred* 1. TT is argued, that we are pofieffed of a felf-deter- X mining power and a liberty to either fide, be- (Caule we find, that we have a power to confider and examine an a6iion propofed to us, and to fujpend our determination upon it, till we fhall have duly confid- cred it. But as the determination to fuCpend and examine is a voluntary afl, it no more appears to be without motive or without moral neceffity than any other vohjntary aft.— Sufpenfioniseither a vol- untary a6t or not. If it be a voluntary aft, it no more appears to be without motive and moral necef- fity, than any other voluntary a6l. If it be not a volun- tary acl, it is not a/?Y(?a6l, nor is any liberty exercifed in it ; and therefore it is nothing to the prefent purpofe. To argue, that we have a power of felfdetermina* tion, becaufe we have a power to fufpend an aftion, is as groundlefs, as to argue, that we have a power of felf-determination, becaufe we have a power to choofe to ad, or becaufe we have a power of will. Sufpen- fion is a voluntary a£l ora volition, and the argument Under confideration is this ; A man has a volition, not at prefent to determine in a certain cafe ; therefore he has a power efficiently to caufe volition in him- felf. This argument is juft as conclufive as the fol- lowing ; A man has a volition at prefent to determine in a certain cafe ; therefore he has a power efficiently to caufe volition in himfelf : Or as this ; A man has a a volition, therefore he has a power efficiently to caufe volition in himfelf. But if fufpenfion be no voluntary a8, but a total fufpcnfion of all volition, it is, if poffible, flill lefs a proof of felf-determination. Self determination is a vol- untary aft, and fufpenfion is brought as ra inftance of of f jlf-detcrminaiion. But how can that, which is nq voluntary aft be an indance of a voluntary acl P I'bis is as abfurd as to argue felf-determination from any inlellc61ual pcrccpiion, or from the perfc6l infenfihil- iiy of a dead corpfe. But this mode of arguing is familiar with Dr. Weft, who conftantly ar^^ues a felf- determining power, from a power to not a^, a power to be perfeftly torpid. 2. Self-determination is argued from our own con- fcioufnefs and experience. Dr. Wefl fays, page 26, that *' we experience in ourfeives, that in willing " and choofing we a6t independently of any extrinfic caufe." Others hold, that we are coiifcious of ft;lf-de- termination and an exemption from extrinfic caufal- ity. When gentlemen fpeak of experience and con fcioufnefs, they ought to confine their obfervations to themfeives ; as no man is confcious of more than paffes in his own mind, and in fuch things a man can with certainty tell his own experience only. For my own part, I am not confcious of either felf-caufa- tion of volition, or an exemption from extrinfic cauf- ality ; and to be fure I am not confcious, that my volitions take place without caufe and by mere chance. I am confcious of volitions of various kinds ; but I never yet caught myfelf in the a6l of making a volition, if this mean any thing more than having a volition or being the fubjefl; of it. If any man be confcious, that he makes his own volitions, he is doubilefs con- fcious of two diHindl ads in this, one the act made by bimfelf, another the aH making or by which he makes the aEl made. Now will any man profefs to the world, that he is or ever has been conlcious of thefc di(lin£l afts ? If not, let him tell the world what he means by being the efficient caufe of his own volitions. If he mean, that he has volitions, this is no more than the advocates for moral neccflity are confcious of, and to grant that this is all that is meant, is to give up the argument. If it be meant, that he caufes them by the mind iffdfox bv fome power of the mind and no't by 172 by any aB of the mind or oJF tliofe powers ; I appeal to the reader, whether this be, or can be, a matter of confcioufnefs. I take it to be univerfally granted, that no man can be confcious of more than the aBs and perceptions of his own mind. The exiftence of the mind and of its powers, is inferred from the ads, and we are not properly confcious of them. Dr. Reid may be an authority with the gentlemen, with whom I am now concerned. *' Porcer," fays he, " is " not an objeft of any of our external fenfes, nor '' even an oh^tdio^ confcioufnefs. That it is not feen, <' nor heard, nor touched, nor tafted, nor fmelt, needs " no proof. That we are not confcious of it, in the *' proper fenfe of the word, will be no lefs evident, if " we reflect, that confcioufnefs is that power of the «« mind, by which it has an immediate knowledge of " its own operations. Power is not an operation of '« the mind, and therefore is no objeEt of confcioufnefs, '' Indeed every operation of the mind is the exertion '' of fome power of the mind ; but we are confcious «« of the operation only^ and the power lies behind the " fcene : And though we may juftly infer the power « from the operation, it muft be remembered, that *« inferring is not the province Q>i confcioufnefs^ but of " reafonr EJfays on ABive Powers, p. 7. If from our confcioufnefs of volitions, it follows, that we ejficiently caufe thofe volitions, let a reafon be given, why it will not equally follow from our con- fcioufnefs of any perception, e. g. the found of thun- der, that we efficiently caufe that too. If we be the efficient caufes of our own volitions, they are effeds. But an effeft is produced by a pre- vious exertion of the efficient caufe, which a£l is as diftinft from the effeft, as the divine creating aft was diflin6l from the world created. Every effisd is paf- five with regard to its caufe, and paffive in this refpeft, that the caufal a6l; of the efficient operates upon it : Therefore the volition is and muft be diftinft from the a6t of the efficient by which it is caufed. If a man be. ^73 be the efficient caufe of his own volition and he be confcious of it, he is confcious of an a6l of his own mind previous to every volition caufed by himfelf, efficiently caufing that volition, and as this caufingatl niuft be a voluntary a£l, in order to be a free one, there mud be an infinite feries of voluntary a£ls cauf- ing one another, or one a6l before the firft : And of this the man who is fubjecl, muft have a confcious experience, or elfe he cannot be confcious of felf de- termination. Whether any man will profefs to be confcious of all this, we muft wait to fee. It is to be prefumed however, that no man will profefs to have experienced an infinite feries of a£ls, or one aft before the firft aa. As to knowing by confcioufnefs and experience, that our volitions are not the cffeQ ofanextrinfic caufe ; this I conceive is an abfolute impoflibility, unlefs we know by experience and are confcious, that we ourfelves efficiently caufe them in the manner juil now defcribed, viz. in an infinite feries, or with one aft before the firft. Unlefs we be confcious, that we caufe our own firft volition by a previous a61, we can- not be confcious, that we caufe it at all. And if we be not confcious, that we caufe that, we cannot be confcious but that it was caufed extrinfically. If we do not experience that we caufe our volitions by our own previous afts, we do not experience, that we caufe them at all. All we experience is^the volitions themfelves, and we have no more evidence, that they are not the eff^efts of an extrinfic caufe, than from the experience of any of our ideas of fenfation, we have evidence that thofc ideas are not excited by an ex- trinfic caufe. Let an inftance he taken and I prcfume no man will pretend, that he is confcious, that he caufes one volition by another : e.g. di volition to give to the poor. Will any mjn pretend, that he is confcious, that he caufes in himfelf a volition to give to the poor, by a previous volition ; and that he in the firft place finds, ^74 finds, by confcioufnefs, that he choofes to have a 76- ]ition to give to the poor before he has it, and that by this previous choice he becomes willing to give to the poor ? If no man will pretend this, but every man by the bare Rating of the cafe fees, that it implies the ab- furdity that he is willing before he is willing, furely it is high time to give up this argument from experi- ence and confcioufnefs. It has been faid, that we perceive noextrinfic influ- ence producing our volitions. Nor do we perceive any extrinfic influence producing a great part of our thoughts and perceptions, which yet it will not be pre- tended, that we ourfelves caufe. It is impoflible for a man to be confcious ofa negative, otherwife than as he is either not confcious of it, oris confcious of the oppofite pofitive. Therefore when it is faid, that we are confcious, that oUr volitions are not the effe6l of an extrinfic caufe, the meaning muft be ei- therthat weare not confcions, that theyare the efFeftof an extrinfic caufe, or that we are confcious, that we do efficiently caufe them ourfelves. That we are not confcious, that our volitions are the effeft of an extrinfic caufe, is no proof, that they are in fa6l not the effe6l of fuch a caufe, becaufe if they were the effeB: of fuch ai caufe, (till we fhould not be con- fcious of it. If whether they be the effeel of fuch d caufe or not, we fliould not be confcious, that they are the cffe6l of fuch a caufe, then the circumflance that we are not confcious, that they are the efteCl of fuch a caufe, is no proof either way. Nor are we confcious, that we do efficiently caufe our own voli- tions, as it is prefumed appears by what has been al- ready faid in this and former chapters. But if we were confcious, that we do efficiently caufe our own volitions, this would be no argiiment againft the abfolute previous certainty or moral ne- ceffity of all our volitions. Such efficiency may have been from eternity the object of the divine ab- folute foreknowledge or decree. So that to a con- fcioufnefs' *7} fcioufnefs of liberty as oppofed to moral neceflity. is requifite,tbat webe confcious not only, that wc ctn- cientlycaufe our own volitions, but that we caufctbem, with the circumflance, that it was previoufly uncer- tain, whether we fhould caufe them or not. But of ft certainly and infallibly follow;" is inconfiftent with ti,e perfe£l hoiinefs of God. But in y»'hat refpeflsis it inconfiftent with his hoiinefs.? Or for what reafons are we to conclude, that it is in- confiftent with his hoiinefs ? So far as I have been able 10 coUeti the reafons from the ableft. writers on that fide of the queftion, they are thcfe : (i) That whatever is in the effcft is in the caufe, and the nature of every caufe may be known by the effe6l. Therefore if God foorder things, that fin will certainly follow, he is the caufe of fin, and therefore is finlul himfelf. If this argument be good, Go4 ' ' ' is ^99 is the fubjeft of pain, ficknefs and death, fmce he is the caufe of them : He is material and is the fubjeft of ail the properties of matter, extenfion, fohdity, mo- bility, figure, colour, Szc. becaufc he created matter and all its properties. Yea he fuffers the torments of hell, bccaufe he inflitls ihcm, This argument, though urged by men of great fame, is too weak and abfurd to bear inrpe6lion ! (2) If God difpofe things fo, that fm will certainly follow ; he doubtlefs takes pleafure in fin, and this implies fin in God himfelf. If God do take a di- redl and immediate complacency in fin, it is granted, that this would imply fin in God. But if he cboofe the exigence of fin as a mean of good only, as pain and ficknefs may be the means of good ; this implies; no fin in God. Nor does it follow from his difpofing things fo, that fin certainly takes place, that he does direftly delight in fin itlelf ab(lra6^ly confidcred, any more than it follows from his inflifting ficknefs and mifery on his creatures, that he takes a dire£t com- placency in thcfe. And we do not allow, but utterly deny, that God from a dire6l complacencey in fin difpofes things fo, that it certainly follows. If our op- ponents believe that a direfl complacency of God in lin is implied in our doftrine, it behoves them to make it out, and not to take it for granted. Dr. Weft infifts on this argument. Part II, p. 43. " If the Deity produces finful volitions then fin " is his own work and then he cannot hate fin, *' but mult love it and delight in it." It fcems the Dodor forcfaw that to this argument it would be an- fwered that God's producing fin in the manner before explained, no more implies a dirc6l complacency in it, than his producing mifery implies a dire£l compla- cency in that ; and he replies, that " the two cafc^ " are by no means parallel that the Deity is no " where reprefcnted as being angry at his creatures, " becaufe they fuflTcr pain and difirefs whereas. "with regard to moral evil, Godisalwaysreprefentcd N 4 ^' as 200 ^' as haling it, and punifhlng the impenitent." To this 1 rejoin, that the want of parallehlm does not ap- pear. P'or though God is not reprefenled to be an- gry at pain and mi/cry, as they are not the proper ob- je6ls of anger ; yet he is reprefented to be difpleafed with them j and anger is only one kind of difpleafure, (difpleafure at moral evil. And if God do produce a thing, with which he is difpleafed, why may he not produce a thing with which he is angry, and which he is difpofed to punifh as it deferves ? Let a reafon be given, why he may not do the latter, as well as the former. (3) God hates fin and doubtlefs he mufl hate to bring it into exiftence ; and therefore he will notfo dif- pofe things, that it will certainly come into exiftence. But God hates the pain, mifery and death of his crea- tures in the fame fenle, that he hates (in ; yet we fincj in faft, that he docs difpofe things fo, that they do take place among his creatures. (4) That God fhould fo difpofe of events, that .finr is the certain confcquence, is doing evil, that good may come of it ; which is contrary to fcripture, as well as reafon. -This is merely aiferting, bat not proving what is afleried. Hov/ does it appear, that for God fo to difpofe of events, that fm is the certain confequence, and this to fubferve the moft wife and holy pi{.rpofes, is dojng evil ? To do evil is to commit fin } and to fay that this is to commit fin. is to beg the queftion. Let it be proved to imply, that God commits fin, and the point is gained. We af- fert, that to fay, fuch a dtfpofal implies, that God com- miis fin, is as groundlefs a propofiiion, as to fay, that if God fo difpofe of events, that ficknefsis the certain confequence, implies, that God himfelf is fick. I prefume. it will not be denied, that God did fo dif- pofe of events, that the certain confequence would be that jofeph fiiould be fold into Fgypt, and that our Saviour Ihould be crucified. Nor will it be denied, ^hat God made this difpofition of events with a holy an4 201 and wife purpafe. And if God may do thi$ in one or two iuHanccs ; why may he not do the fame in every jn(tance, in which (in atlually exids ? (5) That God fliould make an eftabliflimenl V/heve- by any creature is laid under a moral necciluy of fin-, ning is a great injury, both lo the creature himfelf, and alfo to the fyllem ; as all fin is injurious lo the fyflem. Anlwer : What injury can be pretended to be done to the creature, who is the fubjc6lof ihe fin, in the cafe defcribed, fo long as his liberty and moral agency remain entire ? And they do remain entire by the fuppofition ; elfe he would be incapable of fin. A creature which is not, and fo long as it remains to be, not a moral agent, cannot be influenced even by God himfelf to commit fin : It would imply a contra- di£lion. So that there is no foui^dation for com- plaint, that the fubjetl is injured, by being laid un- der a moral neceffity, or previous certainty, of lin- ning. Befides; this objection in)plies, that every moral agent is injured, unlcf;; it be a matter of per- fect uncertainty, what his future atlions fhall be, un- certainty not only to himfelf and all creatures, but to God and in the nature of things ; i. e. every moral agent is injured, pnlefs he be left to a6l by puie chance. With regard (o injury lo the fyftem of intelligent beings, there is, ifpollible, Itilllefs foundation for ob- jetlion on this ground. For it is a part of the doc- trine of moral neceffity, that God never eflabliihes it, excepting when it's eliablifhment is fiibfervicni and neceffary lo the general good of that f\ fiem, in;pl\ int; the divine glory ; and to be furc, that God never fa difpofes of events, that fin certainly follows, unlefs fuch a difpenfalion is neceffary to the general good : Nor ought the contrary to be taken for granted. If God do in any infiance fo difpofe of events, that fii.i certainly follows, when the exidence of that fin is net neceflary to the general good, but injurious to it ; [ confefsj I fee not how in this cafe, the divine holinefs can 202 can be vindicated. But this is nothing peculiar to the introdudion of fin. It would alfo be inconfiftent Avith the divine perfeft holinefs and wifdom lo create matter, or to caufe holinefs, in fuch circumftances as lo differve the general good" (6) It is inquired, Where is the confidence between God's laying a man under a moral necefiity of finning, and then punifhing him for that fin ? 1 anfwer, 1. How can God confidently make a man fick, and then apply medicines or any remedy toward his reftoration ? Punifhment is inflifted to prevent either the fubjeft of the punifiiment, or others, from falling into the fame pratlice. If there be no inconfiftence in bringing ficknefs on a man, and then healing him by medicine ; where is the inconfiftence in bringing fin, which is moral ficknefs, on a man, and whereby both he and that fyftem are fo far morally difeafed, and then by punin:iment healing him or the (yftem ? 2. There is no confiftence in the cafe, if moral neceffity be incompatible with moral agency. But if it be entirely compatible with moral agency, there is no inconfiftence in the cafe : For in la\in!J a man under a moral necefiity o^Jinning^ as he is fuppofed iiWlio fin^ nothing is done to impair his moral agency or his defert of punifhment. On this fuppofition it is immaterial as to defert of punifhment, who or what is the caufe of the moral necefliity, whether God or any other being, or whether it happen without caufe. Therefore God may as confiftently punifh a finner, whom he himfelf has laid under a moral necefi[jty of finning, as he may punifli him, provided he be laid under the fame moral necefiity by any other being, or by mere chance. ]f moral necefiity be entirely confident with defert of punifhment, it is as imper- tinent to afk bow God can confiftently lay a man un- der a moral neccfTity of finning and then punifii him for it, as to aflv bow God can confiftently make a man of a dark complexion or a low ftature and then pun- ifh him, for any fins, which he may commit. For moral 203 moral nccefCny is no more incohfiftent with fin and detVrt of punifhnicnt, than a dark complexion or a low (taturc. To lay a man under a moral necelTity of finning, is to make it certain, that he will fin : And to afk how God can confidently make it certain, that be will fin, and then punifh him for that fin, implies that previous certainty is inconfiftent with fin, and that in order to fin a man muft atl by mere chance. It is no more inconfiftent, for God to forbid men to fin, and yet h difpofe things, that they certainly will commit fin ; than it is to forbid them to fin, and yet voluntarily to fuffer other caufes to lead them into fin. Nay, fince liberty is out of the queftion, as by the very flatement of the obje8ion, it allows, that not- \vithftanding the divine difpofal, the man who is thq fubje6t of that difpofal does commit Jin ; it is no more inconfiflent for God to forbid men to fin. and yet fo difpofe things, that fin will follow, than ii i.s for him to forbid it, and yet voluntarily permit men tQ fin by felfdetermination. For in Hifpofing things fo that fin follows, when the difpofal is fuppofed to be confident with fin and moral agency, nothing can be pretended to be inconfillent with the prohibition of fin, unlefs it be the divine confept, that fin fliould come into exiftcnce ; and this equally exifts in the cafe of bare permiflTion, as in the cafe of the aforcfaid difpofal. The law of God, which forbids all fin, does not imply, that God will prevent fin, by introducmg the greater evil of defiroying moral agency. Nor docs it imply, that he will not confent in his own mind, that it be committed by men or other moral agents, rather than the faid greater evil or other as ;^rcat evil (hould take place. Tiicrefore rather than that the fame or as great an evil Ihould take plac e, the Deity may not only conferit to the exill- ence of fin, hut may confent, that fccond caufes, mo- tives, temptations, &c. fhould do whatever they can do, toward the introdu6lion of it, confidently with the freedom of ihc creature. He may do all this without inconfiftcncc 204 inconfiftence and infincerity. The prohibition of fin in the law does not imply a wifh or choice of the di- vine mind, all things conlidered, that fin fhould not be committed. It barely points out our duty, but reveals nothing of God's defign, whether or not to per- mit it, or to difpofe things fo, that it will follow. Therefore there is no inconfiftence between this pro- hibition and fuch a difpofal in providence, as will be followed by fin. A good mafter may ftridly for- bid his fervant to fteal ; yet convinced, that he does fteal, the mafter may in a particular cafe, wifh him to flea!, and even leave money expofed to him, that he may fteal, and ultimately with a defign that an advan- tage may be put into the matter's hand, to convi6l, pun- ifti and reform his fervant. There is no inconfiftence in the mafter's thus forbidding theft, and yet from the motive before meniioned wifhing to have it committed. (7) It is faid, that if God choofe that the fmiulnefs of volitions fliould come into exiftence, and if he fo difpofe events, that it will certainly come into exift- ence ; there is no difference between this, and God's being himfelf the fubjedt of fmful volitions. 1 an- fwer, there is the fame difference in this cafe, as there is between God's choofing that a man fliould be fick, and being the fubjeft of ficknefs himfelf ; as there is between creating matter, and being himfelf material ; and as there is between willing andcaufingthe damna- tion of a finner, and being himfelf the fubjeft of dam- nation. It will not be pretended, that if God difpofe events and circumftances in fuch a manner, that re- pentance, godly forrow, faith in a Redeemer, fubmif- fion and holy fear, take place in the heart of a man, God himfelf is the fubje6l of thofe exercifes. If, though human liberty be left entire, God can- not fb difpofe things, that fin will certainly follow, without being himfelf the fubje6l of a difpofition friendly to fin ; he cannot without the fame implica- tion choofe, that fin fhould take place, rather than a greater evil. But our opponents allow, that God did choofe, ^Q5 choofe, that fin fhoiild take place, rather than a great- er evil ; they allow, that he had a pcrfeft foreknowl- edge, that if he fhould create man with a felf-deter- mining power, and leave him to the free exercife of that power, the confequence would be, that he would commit fin. Therefore they allow, that God chofe, that fin fhould come into exigence, rather than hu- man liberty fhould be deflroyedjand rather than free agents fhould not be brought intoexifience. So that in the fame fenfe, in which we hold, that God chofe or was willing, that fin fhould come into exiflence, our opponents hold the fame. We hold, that God chofe that fin fhould take place, rather than a greater evil ; and therefore difpofed of events confiftently with human liberty, fo that it certainly followed. They hold, that God chofe, that fin fliould take place, rather than a greater evil, and therefore difpofed of events, confidently with human liberty, fothat it cer- cainly followed, and when God certainly forefaw, that it would follow. In that our opponents charge us with holding prin- ciples, which imply, that God is the author of fin^xhty allow, that whatever God does according to our prin- ciples toward the introdu61ion of fin, is confident with free agency in the fubjc6t of fin. This muft be con- ceded by them ; elfe their charge is perfcttly incon- fiftent and felfcontradifclory, as has been fhown. Therefore fince it is allowed, that whatever God has done toward the exiftence of fin, is confiflcnt with the creature's free agency, the only queflion remain- ing, is, whether he have adled in this affair, with a holy and wife defign, a defign to promote the gener- al good : And we arque from the effential perfeflions of God, that whatever he has done in this, as well as in every other inllance, mufl have been done with fuch a defign. If it be faid, that fin cannot even bv the Deity, be made fubfcrvient to good ; the qucliion will arife, why then did he fo dilpofe circumllanccs that it did come -o6 come into eNiftencp, and this when he forcfaw theJ conC^qirence ? To anfwer, that he could not, confift- ently with free agency, keep it out of exiltence, is on the prefent fuppofition groundlels. It is now fuppof- ed, that God did bring it into exiftence, confidently with free agency ; and therefore he could doubtlefs keep it out of exiftence, confiftently with the fame free agency. If the exiftence of fin be ultimately made fubfervi- ent to good, or if it be neceflary to the prevention of greater evil ; what reafon in the world, can be given^ why God fhould not bring it into exiftence, in a way confiftent with human free agency ? In this way it muft be brought into exiftence, if at all. Our op- ponents themlelvcs allow, as has been obferved, that the exiftence of it was neceftary to the prevention of greater evil, the evil ofdeftroying human liberty, or of the non-exiftence of free agents : And for God in this view to'confent to the exiftence of (in, as our oppo- nents grant that he did, is as inconfiftent with his moral charafter, as to give the fame confent and to put forth any exertion toward its exiftence, confiftent with human liberty. So long as the exertion is con- fiftent with liberty, it cannot be pretended, that there is any thing in it more oppofile to the moral charac- ter of God or more friendly to fin, than there is in the confent implied in that permiffion of fin, which our opponents hold. Therefore their plan is in this refpetl equally liable to the fame objeftion of being inconfiftent with the moral chara6ler of God, as our's. (8) Dr. Weft argues, that if the Deity order things io that finful volition follow, " he muft place the ob- " jecl in fuch a view before the mind, as to make it " appear the greateft good under prefent circumftan- " ces ; which implies, that he prefents the objeft in " a falfe point of light, and eftedually deceives the "mind;" and '• theapoftlewas under a great miftakc. " when heTaid, it was impoftible for God to lie ;" and to lie is fin. The Do6lor, as ufual, tells us, " I " can 20'/ " can have no idea, that the Deity can produce a fin- " ful volition in the human mind, in any other wav, " than what I have now defcribcd ;" Part II, p* 41. On this I remark ; 1. It is very imn^aterial to others, what Dr. Weft can, and what he cannot, have an idea of. Does the Dottor mean this as an argument, that no other per- fon can have an idea of it, or that it cannot be true ? 2. If when he fpeaks of God's making fin appear the greateft good, he mean, that he makes it appear fo to a man's unbiafed reafon, this is not true, nor is it pretended by any man. 3. When fin appears to any man the greateft good, it is in confequence of the influence of his cor- rupt appetites, and not by the dictates of his unbiafed reafon. How a man becomes the lubjeti of corrupt appetite, I do not undertake to fay any further than Prefident Edwards has faid already, that God has dif- pofed things fo, that it takes place as an infallible confe- quence. But if God fo difpoi'e things, that an inordi- nate appetite for ftrong drink lake place in the mind of a man, and by the itifluence of fuch appetite ftrong drink appear to him the greated good ; does it hence follow, that God is a liar ? Will Dr. Well affert it .? If not, the ground of his argument fails. The Do6tor further obfervcs, that "• if God is the "author of men's lulls, he deceives them, by caufing " them to view things through the falle medium of " their lulls ;" ibid, p. 4*, 43. The exprellion, " God is the author of men's lulls," is the Poftor's, not Prefident Edwards's. It tendsto miflead, and cannot be admitted, without explanation and qualifying. Suppofe a man by leading his neighbour, fiequenily into the immoderate ufe of ilrong drink, fliould pro- duce an appetite for it in his neighbour, fo tjiat hence- forward flrong drink fliould appear to him the greatcit good ; is the man, who does this, a liar ? Whether he be guilty of other fin, than lying, is nothing to the prefect piirpofe ; for Dr. Wcd'i argument is, that God 20S • God byproducingluft in men, deceives the man infuch a fenfe, as to difprove the words of the apoftle, that God cannot lie. l{ the man above fuppofed be not guihy of lying, neither is the Deity in fo difpofing things, that luft infallibly follows. (9) " If the Deity be the pofitive efficient caufe of " fin, then there can be no foundation for repentance : " For how can a man repent or be forry, that he is juft « fuch a creature, in every refpeft, as the Almighty has " been pleafed to make him ?" Ibid, p. 44. 'With the fame objedion to the expreffion, " pofitive efficient caufe of ^n," I obferve, that this argument is equally good with refped to pain, ficknefs and calamity j and •will prove that no manought to be forry for any calamity befalling liimfelf or others : For " how can a man be forry, that he is juft fuch a creature," juft as mifera- ble, " as God has made him ?" If the Do£tor fay, that though calamity in itfelf is an evil and therefore to be regretted ; yet as God fends it, he will overrule it for good, and that in that view it is not to be regret- ted ; the fame obfervations are applicable to the ex- iftence of fin. Sin in itfelf confidered is infinitely vile and abominable, and proper matter of forrowand repentance. But confidering that it no more came into exiftence without the defign and providence of God, than calamity did ; and confidering, thatiis ex- iftence will be certainly overruled for final good ; its exiftence is no more to be regretted, than the exift- ence of calamity and mifery, efpecially extreme and eternal mifery. The Doftor proceeds ; " What remorfe of con- "fciencecan there be, when the finner believes that " every finful volition was formed in him by the De- " ity ?" Ibid. Sinful volitions proceed from fome caufe, or no caufe. If they proceed from no caufe, what remorfe of confciencc can there be, when the finner believes and knows, that every finful volition happen- ed in him bv pure chance ? If finful volitions pro- ceed from fome caufe, that caufe is either the finner himfeif himfelf or fome extrinfic caufe. If they proceed from any other extrinfic caufe, befide the Deity, the fame difficuhy will arife, and it may be afked with the fame pertinency, as the above queftion is afked by Dr. Welt, What t-emorfe of confcience can there be, when the fmner beheves, that every finful vohtion was formed in him by an extrinfic caufe ? Ifthe effi- cient caufe be the finncr himfelf, then " felf a61s on felf and produces volition," which the Doctor denies: And if he did not deny it, it is abfurd and impoffible, as it runs into an infinite lericsof volitions propagating one another, and yet all thisferies would really amount to but one fingle volition, and this, as there would not then be a preceding caufal volition, would not be efficient- ly, voluntarily and freely caufed by the fubje6l himfelf. Befides; ifthe fubje6i: efficiently caufe his own volitions, he either caufes them under the influence of motives or not. If he caufe them under the in- fluence of motives, he caufes them neceflarily, and a6ls neceffarilyin caufingthem ; andDr. Weft fays, " Where *'neceffity begins, liberty ends ;" ibid, p. 19. There- fore if a man cfhciently caufe his own volitions io as to be free from necelfity, he mufl caufe them with- out motive, aim or end ; i. e. he muft caufe them in perfe£l flupidity, and in the exercile of Dr. WefVs torpid liberty of not ading. And then I atk, what remorfe of confcience can there be, when the (inner believes, that he himfelf caufed every finful volition in himfelf, as involuntarily as a man in a convulfion ftrikes his friend, and as flupidly and unmeaningly as a door turns on its hinges ? Remorfe of confcience is a fenfe of having done wrong J and whenever 3t perfon has done wrong, there is a foundation for remorfe of confcience; and to take it for granted, that there can be no remorfe cf confcience, unlefs we determine our own volitions, is to take it for granted, that wiiliout felf determination we can do no wrong and are no moral agents ; which is to beg the wain qucdion in this controverfv. Let it O be ato be ftiown, that without felf-determination, we are not tnoral agents, and one important Hep will be taken toward fettling this controverfy. Yet even this Hep will not be decifive : It muft be alfo fliown, that our felf-determination was not previoufly certain, but is fexercifed ^y mere chance : For if it be previoufly certain, it is morally neceflary. (lo) If God have fo difpofed of events, that fin certainly follows, it is his work ; and to be oppofed to fin is " to be oppofed to God's work, and to be op- pofed to God ;" ibid. So calamity is the work of God, and to be oppofed to that, is to be oppofed to God's work, and to be oppofed to God. And will Dr. Welt admit that every one who wiflies to efcape any calamity, is in a criminal manner oppofing God ? (ii)" If the Deity has formed finful volitions in a " man^ becaufe his glory could not be promoted '' without it ; then furely the finner, if he loves God, " muft love him becatifehe has made him a finful crea- «' ture, and ought to thank him for all the fins, which *' he has committed ;" ibid. The difficulty attend- ing moft of Dr. Weft's arguments, is, that if they prove any thing, they prove too much, and confute principles and fads, which he will not dare to deny. So with refpeft to this argument. The Do6lor will not deny, that pain and calamity are the work of God. " And if the Deity has" fent pain and calamity "on " a man, becaufe his glory could not be promoted " without them ; then furely the finner, if he loves * God, muft love him, becaufe he has made him a" miferable " creature, and ought to thank him for all" the calamity and mifery, which he fuffers, for all his ficknefs and dangers, for the death of his wife, chil- dren, &c. Sec. And if a man ought to thank God for thefe things, no doubt, " a finner ought to thank God « for damnation." If thefe confequences do not in- evitably follow from the principle of IJr. Weft's ar- gument, let the contrary be ftiown, and not merely aiferted. -Again ; " If we are to thank God for all 211 all the calamities and miferies which we do or fhall fufFer ; " this will imply, that" calamity and tnifery " are bieffings or favours ; and confequentljs^ iF the « finner is to thank God for damnation, then damna- « tion is a bleffing and favour- — Hence finners who « believe this doftrine, will be apt to conclude, that « it is a matter of no confequence, whether they be " faved or damned ; feeing upon either fuppofition, " they are fure that whatever they receive from God « will be fuch a bleffing, that they ought to be thank- *« ful for it." Ibid, p. 45.- Thus may the Dodlor's arguments be retorted againft himfelf. If theDoftor fhould anfwer, Though calamity and mifery in themfelves are no bieffings^ yet wheii they are overruled by God to the good of thofe who fuffer them, br to the general good, they become bieffings ; I acknowledge the fufficiency of the anfwer. But the fame anfwer may with equal truth and force be made to his obfervations concerning fin. The Doc- tor grants, that the wickednefs of the vicious fhall be overruled to the glory of God and the advancement of thehappinefsofthe righteous; ibid, p. 49. Though wickednefs is in itfelf no bleffing and no matter of thankfulnefs ; yet when God overrules it to good, greatergood than could have been efFe6led in any other way ; in this conne6lion it is in the fame fenfe a bleffing, and matter of thankfulnefs, as calamity and mifery are. (12) On the plan of moral neceffity, God tempts mankind to fin.- If the meaning of this be, that God eftabliffies a connexion between motives and volitions, and a previous certainty of thofe volitions; and in the courfe of his providence brings into the View of men motives which a^ually influence them to fin ; I grant, that God does in this fenfe tempt mankind to fin ; as he did our firft parents, Judas, Sec. Nor is there any ground, on which this can be denied, unlefs it be allowed, that t\'s previous cer^ tainty is eftabliffied by fome other caufethan the De- ity> or that it txiUs without caufe, or that volitions O 2 arc are not previoufly certain, but happen by chance. To hold that the previous certainty of all volitions is ef- tablifhed by fome other caufe than God, is to run in- to the Manichean fcheme of two Gods, and at the fame time to hold, that the fecond God is an involun- tary agent and is the caufe of all the volitions of the voluntary God, as well as of all creatures. If we fay, this previous certainty of all volitions is uncaufed, Ave may as well fay, that every thing elfe is uncaufed. Ifwe fay, that volitions are not previoufly certain, but happen by mere chance, we may as well fay, that every thing elfe happens by chance. But if by tempting be meant foliciting or enticing to fin, as the devil tempts men, we deny that this is implied in our doftrine. Dr* Weft makes fome remarks. Part II, p. 75, &c.on Jam. i. 13 16, which appear to be remarka- ble. 1. He tells us, that " a man is tempted, when " he confents to the gratification of his own luft ; i.e» '• when he commits fin." Indeed! Is no man tempt- ed, but he who aftually commits fin in confequence of the temptation ? The apoftle Paul declares, A6ls XX. 19, that he " ferved the Lord with all humility " of mind, and with many tears and temptations, which " befel him by the lying in wait of the Jews." And were all thefe temptations fuccefsful with the apoftle? The very text implies the contrary. Gal. iv. 14. " And my temptation, which was in my flefii, ye def- «'• pifed not nor rejeQed, but received me as an angel « of God, even as Chrift Jefus." Jam. i. 2. " Count " it all joy, when ye fall into divers temptations." V. 12. "Blefledisthe man, that endureth temptation : For when he is tried, he fhall receive the crown of life." Or if Dr. Weft fhall allow, that a man is or may be tempted without falling into fin, this will fpoil his ar- gument. His words immediately following thofe laft quoted from I iin, are, " This proves, that when it is « faid, neither tempteth he any man, the fenfe is, «' God caufeth no man to fin." But if a man may be tempted ^^3 tempted without committing fin, then God may t€mpt a man, without cauiing liim to fin. 2. He obfervcs from Leigh, that the Greek verb tret^a^cc, ufcd in the paffage in James now under con- fideration, fignifies to make trial, i. e. to try a perfon. But becaufc James fays of God, neither tempteth he any man, will Dr. Weft adventure to fay, that God never 'ries any man ? and particularly thgt he did not try Abraham? 3. Becaufe this text declares, that God does not tempt, i. e. according to the DoQor's explanation, try any man, he infers that God <' does not caufe them to " fin." This confequence follows not from the prin- ciple premifed. Whether God do or do not, try men, he may fo difpofe things that fin will be the cer- tain confequence -, and this may be done not to try any man. 4. He fays, that <' a voluntary confcnt to indulge or " gratify luft, is fin." Yet in the next fentcnce he fays, " the apoftle makes every fin to be the effe^ of '• a confent to gratify fome particular luft :" i. e. eve- ry fin is the cffe6l of fin. 5- The whole force of this text, to prove, that God does not difpofe things fo^ that fin is the cert^ain confequence, if it prove any thing to this effed, lies in thefe words, " Neither tempteth he any man." The Doftorfays," thefe muft mean. Neither caufcth he *« any man to lin ;" ibid, p. 75. But if" the Deity " infallibly and perfe6ily regulate, govern and fet *'. bounds to the a6"Hons of all rational creatures, and '« overrule all thofe aftions to accomplifli his pur- *• pofes," if he make them perform his purpofes infal- libly ; as Dr. Weft fays ; then every thing which they in faft do, and every fin which they commit, was God's purpofe and he makes them perform it. Is he then in no fenfe the caufe of their fin ? Does he not at IcaftfodifpofelhingSjthat finisthecertainconfequcnce? Dr. Weft abundantly afferts thofe things which neceflarily imply both abfolute decrees and fuch dif- O 3 pofal 2J4 pofal of God, that fin cettainly and infallibly follows, « The creature," fays he, " in every moment of its «« exiftence, is fabje6l to the divine control ; confe- f' quently no aB can take place, but what the Deity « iforefaw and determined from all eternity to overrule « to his own glory and the general good. If the Dei- « ty forefaw, that a creature — —would do that f' which could not be overruled to the divine glory '* and the general good — — —he would rejlrain him^ " from doing that ;" Part II, p. 22. " He who has ^' made all things — - does regulate and govern " all things, and y^^s bounds to the aHions oj all ration- " al creatures. The Deity, by his permiflive de- *'} zxt.t, fuper intends ar)d governs all the aHions of his f' creatures to accomplifh his own purp.ofes,in as Jlrong f Offenfe, as though he brought them to pafs by his pof- " itive efficiency ;" ibid, p. 46. " We believe, that " the lycxiy governs and overrules the aflions of thefe " beings" [rational creatures]] " to bring about his own f' purpofes and deHojns as injallibly, as though ^'they were mere pajjive beings ;"ibid, p. 47. Now if thefe things be fo ; no a9; of the creature can take place, but what God determined from all e- ternity, to overrule to his own glory. If God re- jlrain the creature from the contrary ; if he overrule all thofe aflions to accomplifh his purpofes, in as flrong a fenfe, as though he brought them to pafs by his pofit'iye efficiency, and as infallibly as though they ■were mere paffive beings ; then certainly he does difpbfe things fo, that all thofe a8ions do infallibly take place. To be fubje6l to the control of our Creator in every moment of our exiftence, fo that no aft can take place in us, but what God from eternity deter- mined -yKoht. regulated andgoverned by God mall things-, if he fet bounds to all our anions ; and if he govern and overrule all our a£lions in as ftrong a fenfe as if he brought them to pafs by his pojitive efficiency,and as infallibly as though they" were mere pajfive beings ; furely all this implies, that God does fo difpofe of e- ventSj vents, tliat fin certainly follows. And on this plan, vhere is feif-de termination ? Where is liberty to ei- ther fide ? liberty toad or notaft ? All the anions of rational creatures are limited, bounded and retrained to certain dehnitepbjefts and purpofes, which God from eternity had in view. They are therefore fhut up to aft oneway only, and cannot aft otherwife. They can a6l in fuch a manner only, as God from all eternity faw would accomplifli his glorious purpofes, i. e. his glorious decrees. Therefore all the anions of crea- tures are decreed from eternity to be precifely what they are, and all creatures are as infallibly reftraine4 from afting contrary to the decrees of God, as if he brought their aftions to pafs by his pofitive efficiency, and as though they were mere paffive beings. If it fhould be faid, that though God bounds and reftrains his creatures from ading in a manner which is oppofite to his purpofes and decrees; yet he does not neceffitate them to a6l at all, but leaves them at liberty to aft or not aft : — On this I obferve, 1. As I have already faid, whenever any thing is propofed to any intelligent being, as the objeft of his choice, it is, as Mr. Locke has long fince thought, abfolutely impoflible for that being not to aft. He may indeed either choofe or refufe the objeft. But to refufe it is to aft, equally as to choofe it. In ei- ther cafe the being afts and cannot avoid a61ing, un- lefs he be fijnk into a ftate of perfeft unfeeling ftu- pidiiy. 2. If it were poffible for a creature to aft or not aft ; ftill according to Dr. Weft he could do neither the one nor the other, unlefs it were fubferv;ient to the glorious purpofes of God. For if God will in- fallibly reftrain creatures from afting in all inftances, in which their afting is not fubfcrvient to. his pur- pofes ; will he not reftrain them from not aHing, i. e, prevent their finking into unfeeling ftupidity, and ex- cite them to aftion, in all inftances in which not aft- ing would not in Hke manner be fubfervient to his O 4 purpofes ? 2l6 purpofes ? If not, let a reafon be given ; a reafon ■why God will not prevent creatures from countera8;-- ing his purpofes by not aBing^ as well as by aEling. Surely it will not be pretended, that to excite by ra- • tional motives and confiderations, a creature to ac- tion, is more inconfiftent with liberty, than infallibly to rcftrain, whether by ipotive§ or without motives, the fame creature from action. 3. I appeal to the reader, whether the DoQor have not in the paffages above quoted, given up the vhole queftion both with refpeft to liberty as oppoled to infallible moral neceflity or certainty ofmoralaftion, and with refpect to abfolute decrees. If all men be limited and bounded by God, to a6l in all cafes according to his purpofes ; if they be fliut up to this way of aQing, and cannot voluntarily refufe to a6l in this way, as that would be to acl contrary to God's purpofe ; if they cannot abfolutcly ceafe from all aBion when an objeflis propofed to theirchoicCjbut muft either choofe or refufe, and that according to God's purpofe ; if, as DoQor Weft exprefsly declares to be according to his fentiments, " Every thing is as firmly fixed in the '' divine mind, by his permiflive decree, and fhall be " as infallibly accomplifhed, as though he was the im- " mediate author or efficient caufe of all the anions " of creatures ;" ih.id, p. 49. Let the candid reader ■judge, whether the Do6itor do not grant both abfo- lute neceffity and abfolute decrees. lie as we have fecn in his Part II, p. 22, allows, that God permits and overrules fin to his own glory and the general good ; but thinks this a demon- ilrative proof of felf-determination. Let usxonfider v;hat he fays on this fubjedt. — Ibid, p. 34; " If the « doftrinc of neceffity be true, and we are not felf- " determined, then it will follow, that we arc conftant- " ly determined by the pofiiive efficiency of the Deity." if it be true, as the Doftor holds, that God regulates «• and governs all things, ^ndfcts bounds to the anions i< of (ill ^rational crealuresj to bring about infallibly " his « his own purpofes ;*' if he " govern free agents as- ' " perfectly pnd make them perforin his purpofcs as in- '• ialiibly, as if they had no agency at all ;" 1 leave the reader to judge, whether we, in all our atlions, be not, mediately or immediately, determined by the pofi- tive efficiency of the Deity. " If God make them perform his purpofes injallihly^' it fccms he mult by his pofitive efhcienry determine them to the perform- ance ; for what is it to make men perform a purpofe, - but to put forth pofitive exertions to this end ? This is alfo by pofitive efficiency to abolifli all liberty of felf-dctermination.- If thefe things be denied, and it be affirmed, that ftill the man is at liberty to a£t in that particular manner, which is fubfervicnt to the di- vine purpofe, or not to a6l at all, and thus there is room for felf-determination ; I anfwcr, 1. It is not allowed, that a man on a propofal to a6\, can poffibly not aH cft all ; and this ought not to be taken for granted, i 2. Then God docs not infallibly make men com- ply with his purpofe, but leaves them to comply or not ; which is diredlly contrary to Dr. Weil himfclf, in the quotations made above. 3. If the Deity by his pofitive efficiency prevent; his creature from every aftion, but that which is agreeable to his purpofe, he will prevent him by his pofitive efficiency from rcfufing to comply with that- purpofe, and this is by pofitive efficiency to deter- mine him to comply with that purpofe. And the Dottor gratits, that all the aftions of rational creatures arc agreeable to God's purpofcs. Therefore all ra- tional creatures in all their atlions are determined by the pofitive efficiency of God. And all thofe which Dr. Samuel Wefl mentions as abfurd confequcnccs of the fentimcntsofDr. Stephen Weft, may be retorted on the former, thus ; Since God infallibly makes and determines all men to perform his purpofes, in al«l their actions, " fin is as much the work of God. as " any thing that he has made. But that the Deitv « flioul'd 21 *' fhould have an infinite averfion and an immutable ** hatred to his works, is inconceivable. It is fome- " times faid, that the tendency of fin is to dethrone " the Almighty, to kill and utterly to deftroy his ex- *' iftence. But is the Deity conftantly working to " deftroy himfelf ? This will make the Deity a ftrange " contradiftion to himfelfj and will conftitute fuch a be- <« ing, as cannot exift in the univerfe. If the Deity ^' forms wicked volitions in the human mind, and *' then infinitely hates and abhors thofe very works of " his, he muft be infinitely miferable and wretched. " God is faid to rejoice in his own works If then «• fin is God's work he rejoices in it God is the " greateft lover of fin in the univerfe." Whatever abfurdities thefe be, it concerns Dr. Samuel Weft, as much as any man, to remove them. As appears, it is prefumed, by what has been faid already. Befides ; moft or all thefe obje6lions lie with equal force againft the divine efficiency of pain, mifery or death. The Doftor will not deny, that thefe are in- flifted by God. Therefore mifery and death'' are as *'muchthe works of God, as any thathehas made." Yet " he does not willingly afflift and grieve the children " of men." And " he has no pleafure in the death «' of" even " the wicked." Therefore " God has an in- "finiteaverfion and an irreconcilable hatred to his own " works :" And if this be inconceivable to Dr. Weft he will not deny it to be faB ; and therefore that a thing is inconceivable to him, is no proof, that it is not true. And that the Deity fhould hate mifery and death and yet caufe them, would equally as in the cafe ftated by Dr. Weft concerning the introdu£lion of fin, *'• make the Deity a ftrange contradi6lion to " himfelf, and would conftitute fuch a being as can- " not exift in the univerfe." " If the Deity forms" mifery and death, " and then infinitely hates and ab- «» hors thefe very works of his hands, he muft be in- " finitely miferable and wretched. God is faid to re- " joice in his own works. If then" mifery and death «« be SI 9^ « be his works, he rejoices in them, and God is the " greatcfl: lover" of all the mifery and death " in the '* univcrfe," Whenever Dr. Weft will anfwer thefc obfervaiions concerning the divine efficiency of mif- ery and death, he will furnifh himfelfwith an anfwer to his own fimilar obfervations concerning the divine agency in the introdu8ion of moral evil. If he fliall fay, that God does indeed hate mifery and death in thcmfclves confidered, and infli61s them, becaufc they are neceffary to greater good, and to the ac- complifhment of his own moft benevolent purpofcs 3 the fame may be faid concerning moral evil. The Doftor quotes the following paffage from Dr. Hopkins ; •' If God be the origin or caufe of moral evil " this is fo far from imputing moral evil to him, or " fuppofing, that there is any thing of moral evil in " him, that it neceffarily fuppofes the contrary :" On which he remarks, " Confequently, if God be the or- " igin and caufe of holinefs, this by the fame kind of ** reafoning, is fo far from imputing holinefs to him, or " fuppofing, that there is any thing of that nature in " him, that it neceffarily fuppofes the contrary ; that <• is to fay, that the Deity has no moral charafter at " all." In the above quotation, Dr. Hopkins evi- dently means, If God be the caufe of ^/Z moral evil, or of the firft which exifted in the univerfe. This the word or^g•^7^ implies ; he evidently ufes it to mean orig- ' inal caufe. Now whatever is in God, is uncaufed. Therefore if there be moral evil in him, neither he nor any other being is the caufe of that ; of courfe whatever moral evil he caufes, muft all be out of him- felf; and if he caufe all moral evil, it muft all be out of himfelf and none of it in him. So that Dr. Hop- kins's propofition on this head is manifcftly true. Suppofc theDo6lor had faid, If God be the caufe of all matter, this fo far from fuppofing matter in him, ne- ceffarily fuppofes the contrary ; no doubt Dr. Weft himfelf would have acknowledged the truth of the propofition : And let a rcafon be givenwhy the form- er 220 er propofition, in the fenfe now given of it, is not as true as the latter. As to the confequence which Dr. Weft draws from Dr. Hopkins's propofition, " that " if God be the caufe of holinefs [of all hoHnefs] this " is fo far from fuppofmg holinefs in God, that it ne- " ceffarily fuppofes the contrary ;" this is fo far from an abfurdity, as Dr. Weft imagines, that it is a man- feft truth. Holinefs in God is no more caufed or created, than the divine effence. If then there be no other holinefs, than created holinefs, there is and can be none in God, On a paflage in which Dr. Hopkins afferts, that moral evil and holinefs are equally the confequence of the divine difpofal, but whether by the fame mode of operation he could not tell ; Dr. Weft remarks, « This makes it extremely unhappy for us ; for we " feem to have no way to know a true revelation '^ from a falfe one, both equally coming from the De- «' ity ;" p. 46, Part 11. But how this confequence fol- lows from the affertionofDr. Hopkins, Dr. Weft does not illuftrate. God may fodifpofe things, that fin in- fallibly follows, and yet not be the author of a falfe revelation : And as the Do£tor merely alferts, with- out attempting to prove what he afferts, he has no right to expe£l, that his affertion fhould be received as truth. If the Do6lor take it for granted, that if God, in the way which I have explained, introduce lin, he is hirrjfclf as real a finner, as he would be, if he were to give a falfe revelation, he takes for grant- ed the very thing in queftion, which is to be fairly proved, not pitifully begged. In the fame page, he fays, " According to Dr. " Hopkins will it not follow, that many who are led « by the Spirit of God, are the children of the devil ?" This implies, that whenever God, by means of mo- tives or in any other way, fo difpofes of things, that fm inBillibly follows, the man who is the fubjeft of that fm, is in that fin led by the Spirit of God. The principle on which this argument is built, is, that 2Sfl that whenever God fo difpofes things, that an a£lion is the certain confequence, in that a6lion the man is led by the Spirit of God. But Dr. Weft will not a- vow and abide by this principle : For he grants, that men always a£t upon fome motive and never without motive. Nor will he deny, that the conftitution, that men fhould always aft upon motive and never with- out, is eftablifhed by God. Yea, the Dodor exprefs- \y aflerts, that " God overrules all the aBions of his " creatures to accomplifh his own purpofcs in as " ftrong a fenfe as though he brought them to pafs " by his pnjitive efficiency'' Yet he will not pretend, that in all thofe aftions they are led by the Spirit of God. The Doftor proceeds ; " The Deity is called the " Father of lights, from whom proceeds every good «' and perfcft gift. But according to thefe principles, " may he not, with as much propriety, be called the " Father of darknefs, from whom proceeds all ma- " lignity and wickednefs ?" Since the Do£lor holds, that " The Deity governs free agents as perfe£lly and " makes them perform his purpofe as infallibly, as if *' they had no agency at all ;" the queflion which the Do6lorhere propofes concerning the principles of Dr. Hopkins may with equal propriety be propofed on his own principles. And notwithftanding any agency ■which God exercifes toward the produtlion of moral evil, he may with the fame truth and propriety be called the Father of lights, as he is called //zg Father of mercies and the God of all covifort, although all the pains and miferies, which his creatures fuffcr, whether in this world or the future, are infjitled by him. The Doclor feems to attempt to fcreen himfelf from thofe, which he fuppofes to be abfurd confe- quences of Dr. Hopkins's fcheme, by reprefeniing, that he hcdids, that God barely permits Jin. But to fuperintendi govern atid overrule the atlions of ration- al creatures " as infallibly, as if they were mere paf- " five beings;" Part H, p. 47 ; ar\jd "in as ftrong a fenfe, "asihowgh hebrought them to pafs by hispohtive cf- " ficicncy ;" 222 " ficiency ;" ibid, p. 46. « So to fix them, that they " (hall as infallibly be accomplifhed, as though he was '• the immediate author or efficient caufe of them," ibid, p. 49. " And to govern free agents as perfe5lly and "to make them perform his purpofesas infallibly^ as " though they had no agency at all ;" ibid, p. 67 ; is more than barely to permit free agents to aO; of them- felves. Barely to permit them toafl; of themfelves, by which the Doftor explains himfelf to mean, " ordaining " things contingently, i. e. avoidably, and with a poffi- « bility of hot coming to pafs," ibid, p. 47 ; is not to govern them at all, but to leave them to govern them- felves ; it is not to overrule their aftions, but to leave them to overrule their own a6lions ; it is not to make them perform his purpofes, but to leave them loofe to perform or to omit thofe purpofes. And much lefsis it to govern and overrule their aftions as infallibly as if they xvere mere paffive beings^ and in as flrong a fenfe as though he brought them to pafs by his pofitive ef- ficiency ; to fix thofe aBions as infallibly as though he was the immediate author of them ; or to govern them as perfeBly and to make them perform his purpofes as infallibly^ as though they had no agency at all. Dr. Weft conftantly infifts, that " the Deity has " communicated to man a feif-moving or felf-a6live "principle." But what kind of a felf-moving prin- ciple is that, which is always and in all its aflions in- fallibly and perfeftly regulated, governed and over- ruled by an extrinfic caufe .? and which is made by God as infallibly to perform his purpofes, as if it were no felf-moving principle at all .? Such a felf-moving principle as this, is fo like a principle that never moves jifelf, but is always moved by an extrinfic caufe, that I requeft Dr. Weft to point out the difference. The DoBor grants, that " there is a fenfe in which " Cod hardens the hearts of men," and that this is by his " taking from them what he had granted them, as " a juft punilhment of their negleft and abufe of the « advantages which they enjoyed ;" Part II, p. 52. He grants 223 grants therefore, that God may confidently with hh holinefs harden the heart, and caufe fin in men, in fome cafes ; viz. when they deferve it as a juft pun- ifliment of their fin. But the only reafon, \i'hich renders it confiftent with the divine perfeftions, to in- flict this or any other juft punifhment, is, that the glo- ry of God and the general good of his kingdom re quire it. J^ow no one pretends, that God ever in any fenfe caufes fin to take place, unlefs its exilt- ence be fubfervient to the glory of God and the good of his kingdom. And if this reafon will in one cafe juftify his fo difpofing of things, that fin is the infalli- ble coniequence, why not jn another ? Until a reafon is given to the contrary, we may prefume, that when- ever the glory of God and the general good of the crea- tion require it, God may and does fo difpofe things, that fin is the infallible confequence. " A man's becoming a veffel to honour or difhon- "our, is in confequence of his own conduft and be- *« haviour." Part II, p. 54. If by becoming a vef- fel to diflionour the Do6lor mean, heitig puntpied, no doubt it is in confequence of aman'sown mifconduft, and to affert this is to affert nothing very great or pertinent to the queftion concerning the caufe of fin. But if he mean by it committing fin ; this is not, nor can be always in confequence of the finner'sown mif- condudl; becaufeihis like the fclf-deicrmining power, impliestheabfurdity of an infinite feries of a6tions, in confequnce of each other ; and that a man is doomed to commit fin in the firft inftance, in confequence of a prior fin committed by him. " God does not harden the hearts of men, by any " pofitive efficiency in forming or infufing any wick- " ednefs into their heart, but only taking from thcni " thofe things, which were defigned to reltrain them "from the committing of fin, and by permitting them " to walk in their own wicked ways ;" ibid, p. 55. Of all men Dr. Weft fo long as he holds, that God as perfectly and infallibly regulates, governs and over- rules 242 rules all the actions of free agents and makes thtm conform to his purpofes, as perfetlly as if they had no agency at all, fhould be ihe lad to objed to the idea of God's politive efficiency of fin '; as has been already iliiiftrated. But afide ftom this, if God by taking from men what is neceffary to reftrain them from fin, lay them under an infallible certainty or ab- folute moral neceflity of finning ; what advantage is gained by this mode of reprefenting the matter ? Is it at all more favourable either to the liberty of men, or to the holinefs of God ? To be fure this reprefenta- tion implies all that neceffity, for which Prefident Ed- wards pleads in the cafe. It is fo to difpofe things, that iin is the infallible confequence. Or if this tak- ing away of reftraints beattended with nocertain confe- quence of fm, how does God by it harden the fin- ner ? It feems, that after all he is left in a Rate of un- certainty, i. €. Dr. Weft's perfe6t liberty, whether he willfmornot. Where then is hardnefs of heart? Doesit confi [I inperfe6l liberty ? Itis further tobeobferved, that if fin, for inftance, ah aft of malice, envy or inordinate felf-love, fhould come into exiftencC) without any pof- itive caufation, whether by motive or in fome other way ; why may not any other pofitive thing, either fubilance or mode, and even the whole material uni- verfe, come into exiftence in the fame way ? Dr. Weft remarks on Ifai. Ixiii. 17. Lord, why kcijl thoib mads us to err from thy ways, and hardened our hearts from thy fear ? " Now it is certain from " the texts that have been already examined, that " nothing more is intended, than that God leaves •' men to err, and to harden their own hearts;" ibid, p. 51. This pofitive aflertion led me to review the Do6lor's remarks on thole texts, and 1 am very willing the candid fliould judge concerning the Dodor's ex- hibition of certainty, that nothing more is intended, by God's hardening the hearts ol men, than that God leaves them to hi:rden their own hearts. He fays, p. 525 in what fenfe God hardens the heart, our Saviour will 225 ivill inform us, Mat. xiii. i.], 15. " This people's "heart is waxed grofs, and their ears are dull of hcar- "ing, and their eyes they havc'clofed." In anfwcr to this it may be faid with equal force, \n whatfenfe God hardens the heart, we are informed in Joh. xii. 40. " He hath blinded their minds, and hardened their "hearts, that they Ihould not fee with their eyes,"&c. Whatever right the Do6lor has to fuppofe, and without a reafon to deliver the opinion as truth, that Joh. xii. 40, is to be explained by Mat. xiii. 15 ; any other perfon has the fame right to fuppofe and to deliver the opinion as truth, that Mat. xiii. 15, is to be ex- plained by Joh. xii. 40. The Dodor conflanily infi-ls, that" God never hard- '* ens any man or withdraws his fpirit and grace," ibid, p. 52, butin confequence ofhisabufe of them. Ifthis were ever fo true, it would not fettle the quclliori concerning the origin of moral evil. For the quef- tion is not what is the caufe or fource of fin in fome particular cafes, as in hardening the heart, in confe- quence of a former fin or fins; but what is the caufe of all fin, and particularly of the frfl fin, whether in man or in the univerfe. Now toanfwer this qucf- tion by faying, that when a man has " abufed God's fpirit and grace," God delivers him up to fin, is asab- furd as to anfwer the quefiion concerning the origin of the human race, by faying, that after Adam had lived a while, he begat a fon. Although the Do8or thinks it certain from the texts, which he had examined, that Ifai. Ixiii. 17, '• in- " tends nothing more than that God leaves men to *• err and to harden their own hearts ;" he does not choofc to reft the matter en that foundation ; but ob- ierves, that " Hebrew verbs in Hiphil often fignify only " permiffion." Ifthis were ever fo true, it would de- cide nothing concerning Ifai. Ixiii. 17. If verbs in Hiphil do often fignify or.ly permiifion, this implies, that they often do not fignify that only. Then the queftion would be, wlnt docs it fignify in this text ? P Neither 226 Neither Dr. Weft nor any other Hcbraid, wiil pretend, that a verb in Hiphil natiirally fignifies per- miiTion only. If therefore any verb in that conjuga- tion do lignify that only, it niuft be for fome other reafon. than merely hecaufc it is in that conjugation. If there be any fuch reafon in this cafe, the Doftor has not informed us of it. Nor can I conceive of any, unlels it be the fuppofed abfurdity of underftand- ing the text as it is tranfiated. But the Do6lor muft on refjedtion be fenfible of the impropriety of taking that fuppofed abfurdity for granted. Let him prove it, and he will oblige us to believe him. On 1 Sam. xvi. 14, " The fpirit of the Lord de- " parted froni Saul, and an evil fpirit from Godtroub- " led him," the Dodor remarks, " i. e. he was left " of God to his own gloomy and frightful imagina- *' tions ;" ibid, p. 57 : But who was the efficient caufe of his own gloomy imaginations ? Surely they did not happen out of nothing, like the atheilVs world. Nor will the Doftor pretend, that Saul defignedly pro- duced them in his own mind. So that he gives no account of the caufc of thofe imaginations, and no explanation of the text. " If then the Deity creates fin, in the fenfe in which " he creates darknefs, it will follow, that as darknefs is *• the confequence of God's withdrawing light, fo the " confequence of God's withdrawing his fpirit and " grace from any perfon, is fin ; which will fall in " exa6tly with our fenfe of God's hardening the heart." If fin in no inftance take place, but in confequence of God's withdrawing his fpirit and grace from a per- fon ; then God's fpirit and grace are fometimes with- drawn from a perfon, antecedently to his finning : And in thofe cafes they are not withdrawn in righteous judgment, and asa juft punifhment offin ; becaufe the perfon, by the fuppofition, has been guilty of no ante- cedent fin. Yet the Doftor every where confiders the withdrawment of God's fpirit and grace as a juft punifhment of the fin of thofe from whom it is with- drawn ; 227 drawh ; as a jiift punifhment of the ncgleft and abiifc of the advantages, which ihcy enjoyed, &c. &c. And on this ground only he attempts to juUify the with- drawnncnt. If on the other hand, fin in any inftance, do take pUice when there has been no withdfawment of the divine fpirit and grace ; then the Dodor has here given no account of the exiftence of fin in that inftance ; and fuch an inftance there was, when fm firfl catne into exiftence ; it took place without a withdrawment of grace, in the way of righteous judg- ment. It may here be added, tliat though dark nefs, a mere nonentity, will take place in confequence of the withdrawment of light ; yet malice, envy and inordi- nate fclf-love, pofitive ath of the mind, will no more take place in confequence of mere withdrawment of influence, than benevolence or fupreaie love to God. or the whole material creation, would come into ex- iftence in confequence of a mere withdrawment of the influence of God. " We fee in what fenfe God is faid to move, fti'r " up or incline men to evil ai:lions ; viz. bv permit- *• ting Satan to tempt men to evil, or by pcrtnitting " things to take place, which occnjion men to become "perverfe." Ibid.p. 64. If the Doi^oih) '■' per mil Lin i^ " things to take place," mean that God fo difpoles things that certain defintte events will infallibly fol- Jow ; this is all for which I plead, and which Preii- dent Edwards held on this head. And furely the Do£tor does not mean, that things are of their own accord and by their own native power, independently of the divine agency, endeavouring to take place, and vill effe£l the objedl of their endeavour, if they be permitted by the Deity ; as a high mettled Heed, when permitted by his rider, leaps into a race. This would favour t()o much of atheifm, to he holden by a Chriitic^-n divine. As to the human mind's making one volition by another or without another, I have nothing more to fay ; nor do I wilh to fay any more P s concerning 228 concerning ft, till an anfvver is given to what has been already faid. This text, " I will fend liim againft an hypocritical " nation, and againft the people of my wrath will I " give him a charge," Ifai. x. 6 ; Dr. Weft fays, " implies no more than that the Deity meant to pun- '• ifli the Jews, by letting loofe the King of AlTyria upon *' them ;" ibid, p. 67. Yet in the fame page he fays, that the king of Affyria " was as much under the " control of the Deity, as the a?^e and the faw are un- '' der the control of the workman." Yet this control over that king implies no more, it feems, than that God let him Joofe en the Jews. And is no more implied in the control which the workman has over the axe and the faw, than that he Ictstlievi loofe on the timber.*^ I appeal to the reader, whether if the king of Affyria " was as much under the control of the Deity, as the *'axe and the faw are under the control of the work- " man ;" a pofitive and| efficacious influence, and not a bare permijfion^ be not implied in fuch con- trol. On Rev. xvii. 17, <• For God hath put in their " hearts to fulfil his will, and to agree and giye their " kingdom untd the bcaft. until the words of God «« fiiall be fulfilled ;" the DoBor remarks," Thefe «'• ten kings are to agree in giving their kingdom " to the beaft, that by his prptedion and affiftance, *^ they may be able entirely to defiroy the whore, ^.' by whom they have been long oppreffed." Jbid, p. 68. Thus the Dodor fuppofes, that the end, for which thefe ten kings give their power to th^ beaft, is that by his afliftance they may deftroy the great whore. Bui this is a mere fuppojition, unfupported by any thing in the text or context ; nor does the DoBor give any reafon toward its fupport. Eefides, what advantiige is there in this fuppofiiion ? Is the beaft mentioned a friend to virtue and religion ^ And did thofe kings do their duty in giving their power into his hands .? If they did not ; of Gourfe they did wrong ; and £29 and then the difficuhy of God's putting it into their hearts to do this wrong ftill rcnnains. On quoting Ifai. v. 4 ; " What could have been " done more to my vineyard, that 1 have not done " in it ? Wherefore, when I looked, that it flioiild *' bring forth grapes, brought it forth wild grapes ?" the Doftor adds, "according to the fchcmc lam " oppohng, all diat the Deity has done to his vinc- " yard, was to make it biing forth wild grapes. How '• could he then appeal to the men of Judah and the '* inhabitants. of Icrulalem, to judge between him and " his vineyard?" Ibid, p. 71, &c. Now this and all the reft ihat the Do(5Ior adds in his remarks on that text, lies equally agninft the fcheme of a permiflive decree " pcrfedly and infallibly boundmg,"" reftrain- " ing," " marking out" and " fixing bounds to the ac- *' lions of men, beyond which they cannot pafs." For *• according to this fcheme" of the Dotlor, " all that " the Deiiy has done to his vineyard was" by re- training them from all other anions, by bounding them to thofe very aflions which they have perform- ed, and by fixing fuch bounds as they could not pafs, ♦' to make them bring forth \vild grapes. Plow then "could he appeal to the men of Judah and jerufalem '• to judge, between him and his vineyard ? Will ''• it be faid, that the means ufed with them ^vere fuch, *' that if they had been rightly improved they would " have enabled them to have brought forth good ^'grapes ? Theanfv:cr is very eafy ; ihefe means " could have no cfredl but fuch as the Deity defigncd <^' theratohavej'becaufe'* the Deity fixed their bounds, <• beyond which they could not pafs," " and they " muft produce either good or bad grapes, according " to the" bounds fixed by the Deity. And fo on through the fame and following page. But I need not rcpublifli Dr. Well's book by way of retortion. The Do6lor in his 4ih elfay, Part II, (and in hi« Poflfcriptj on 1 Kings xxii. 23, '• Now therefore, bc- <' hold, the Lord haih put a lying fpirit in the mouth ? 3 _» of « of all thefe thy prophets ;" fays, " The word trant '• lated put ought to have been tranflated, The Lord " hatU permitted ox fuffered a lying fpirit, &c. for the " verb here tranflated j^uif, frequently fignifies io per- *• mit orfitffer. For the truth of this I appeal to " every good Hebrician. Thus in Ezek. xx. 25, '• inftead of, 1 gave them ftatutes that were not good, *' it fliould be, I fuffered them to have flatutes that '• were not good ;" p. 66. It is always a fufficient anfwer to a mere confident affertion, as confidently to deny it. Therefore ray anfwer is, ^' The verb here " tranflated j&m/," which is :ini does not " frequently fig- nify permit or fuffer ;" and in Ezek. xx. 25, " Inftead " ofj I gave them ftatutes that were not good, it fliould" not " be, I fuff'ered them to have ftatutes that were not " good." Dr. Weft for the confirmation of his criti- cifm " appeals to every good Hebrician." Whom he would acknowledge as a good Hebrician, is very un- certain. Therefore, inftead of appealing to fo uncer- tain a judge, I call on the DoQor himfelf, or any oth- er Hebrician good or bad, to point out the inftances, whether frequent or unfrequent, in which :inj figni- fies merely to j^ermz^ or /i^e?'. Befide this, fufiBcient reafons muft be given to convince the candid and ju- dicious, that it IS ufed in this fenfe, in the text now under confideration, and reafons which do not beg the main point, that God can do nothing toward the exiftence of fin, but barely to permit it^ When thefe things fliall have been done, we fhall have better ground, on which to believe the Do6lor's criticifm> than his mere round affertion. CONCLUSION. 231 CONCLUSION. 1HAVE now finifhed my remarks on Dr. Weft's EJIays on Liberty and NeceJJity. If he fliall think proper to write again on thofe fubjefls and to reply to theie remarks, I reqiieft him to attend to thofe points only, which are material and affetl the merits of the caufe. If I have expofed myfclf by ever fo many inadvertencies, which do not aflfeft the merits of the caufe, to take up his own time andthatof his readers, to exhibit them, feems not worth while. In difputes of this kind fuch inadvertencies are frequent. Alfo fuch difputes are apt to degenerate into mifreprefenta- lions, pcrfonal reflections and logomachy. How far 1 have fallen into any ofthefe, it is not proper for me to fay. However, 1 may fay, that I have endeavour- ed to avoid ihcm. 1 hope the Dodorwiilbe fuccefs- iul in the lame endeavour. If he fi>all write again, I requelt him to inform us more clearly, what he means by fclf-determination. If he mean no more than he hitherto profefles to mean, " that we ourfelves determine ;" he will in- form us, wherein on that head he differs from Prefi- dent Edwards or any other man j and whether it be his opinion, that we determine our own volitions in any other fenfe, tlian we determine all our perceptions and feelings. If he fhall be of the opinion, that we r.fficieiuly caufe our own volitions ; 1 requeft him to inform us, how we do or can do this otherwife than by antecedent volitions. If he fhall grant, that this is the way, in which wecaule them ; he will pleafe to remove the abfurdides fuppofed to attend that fuppo- iition ; and alio decide whether or not we caufe them without any icflraint by previous certainty, i. e. wheth- er wc caulc them by mere chance, and at hap-hazard. If he fliall flill be of the opinion, that voliiion is no effect ; he will pleafe to inform us how to recon- cile ciie that with the idea, that it proceeds from an intrmr fie caufe and is originated by him who is the lubje£l of it. If volition have a caufe, whether intrinfic or extrinfic, it is of courfe an effeO:. — He will alfo be h kind as to inform us, whether every human volition cxifted from eternity, or whether it came intoexiftence wnhout caufe. If he flill maintain, that with refpeft to praife and blame, there is no difference between natural and mo- isn neceiTity ; I wifh him to informus. whether Judas lA?ere as blamelefs in betraying his Lord, becaufe it was previoufly certain and certainly foretold, that he %vould do it, as he was for being attached to the fur- face of the earlbj and not afcending to heaven as Eli- jah did. I hope the Doftor will explain himfelf concerning antecedent and confequent neceflity. If he mean, that before the exiftence of any hunnan aftion, there was no certainty, that it would exill ; he will pleafe to reconcile this both with divine foreknowledge, and with the prophecies of fcripture. If by antecedent iieceffity, he mean any thing elfethan antecedent cer*- tainty, he will pleafe to ftiow how it is tothepurpofe, or how it oppofes what we mean by antecedent ne- ceffity. I requeft him to fhow the confiftency between thefe two propofilions, that motive is neceffary to every volition ; and that men do not always a£l on the {Irongeft motive. He will of courfe fhow, what the motive is which perluades a man to pafsby theflrong- ell motive, and to a6l on a weaker. It is to be wifhed, that the Doftor would explain liis favourite power to aH or net aH. If he fhall own, that he means a power to choofe or refufe merely, it is prefumed, that his candour will lead him to own al- io, that he means nothing on this head different from Preiident Edwards, unlets by power he mean previous uncertainty^ and by a man's power to choofe or refufe, he mean, that it is in itfelf and in the divine view un- " ' ^ certain^ ^crtain^ whether he \vill choofe or rcfufe : And if he mean this, I wifh him to avow it. I hope he will not fpcnd time in difcufTing quef- tions, which are merely verbal, fuch as whether mo- tive be the canfe or the occafion of volition. All that Prefident Edwards means by cauje in this cafe, isJlaU cd cccafion or antecedent. Perhaps the Do6lor will find his book to be no lefs ufefnl, if he (hall confine himf^If more to argument^ and indulge himfclf lefs in hijlory. Narratives, how- ever true and accurate, of his own opinion without hisreafons, and of his ability or inability whether to do or to conceive, are very unintereftingto thofe who think for themfelves, and do not depend on the Doc- tor as an authority. If he had hitherto fpared all fuch narratives, his books had been confiderably fiiorter and no lefs demonllrative. 1 hope the Do£ior will be very explicit in commu- nicating his idea of liberty. I prefume he will join with me in the opinion, that the whol? controverfy turns on this. If the liberty neceffary to moral ac- tion be an exemption from all cxtrinfic influence, we hold that the certain confequence is that either we caufe one volition by another ; or that our volitions come into exigence without caufe and by mere chance. Therefore the DoBor will pleafe to fhow, that nei- ther of thefe cotifequences follow^ ; or will avow whichever he believes does follow. He fuppofes felf-determination is free aBion. Now 1 wifh him to inform us, whether felf determination, that is limited, bounded, governed and overruled, to a conformity to the divine purpofc, as he aflerts all the a£lions of rational creatures to be. is free a£lion. If it be, I requed him to inform us, why an action decreed to be conformed to the fame divme purpofe, is not alfo free. I rejoice, that this important fu!)je61: has been tak- en up by fo able an advocate as Dr. Weft. From his high chara6ler we have a right to expcB, that if the 234 the fcaufe which he has iindettaken, be capable of fupport, it will be fupported by the DoQ;or. 1 wifh the other fide of the queftion had an advocate able to doitjuftice. However, fince I have embarked in the caufe, I fhall, fo long as important matter is brought forward, do as well as I can, till 1 fhall either be con- vinced that the caufe is a bad one, or find myfelf un- able to reply : And I doubt not, that ray failure will draw forth to the fupport of the truth, fome more able advocate, who no;v through modefty or fome other caufe, does not appear lor its defence. I think it is but fair, that Dr. Weft, and all others "who write againft moral neceifity, fliould take the ex- planations, which we give of moral and natural necef- fity and inability, and all other important terms in this difquifition. And fo far as they oppofe any doQrine which we hold, they ought to oppofe it in the fenfe in which we hold it, and not in a fenfe which they may find it convenient to impute to us, becaufe they can more eafily confute it. Such a management of any queftion as the laft mentioned, will never bring it to an iffue, and befides is exceedingly difingenuous, and gives reafon to fufpeQ; the goodnefs of the caufe, in favour of which it is employed. As this queftion concerning liberty and heceflity affefts the moft important fubjefls of morality and religion ; it is to be wifhed, that the difcuffion of it may finally conduce to the more clear underftanding and the more fmcere and cheerful praQice of virtue and piety, and to the glory of our God and Redeemer. F I N 1 S. ERRATA. THE Reader is requefted tocorreft the following Errors, moft of which efcaped the Author, in preparing the Alanu- fcript for the Prefs. Page 8, line 21, for the, rezdifome. {or freedom, read pow;r. read, it does it. read, why it is as it is. for then, read than. for John/on, read Jack/on, read, which do not happen read, judge the world. 11, read, without a caufe. for this, read the. for thought, read taught. 37. 17, 50, 11, 65. 7, 84, 20, 105, M. 140, 17. 143. 31. 164, 11, x8o, 28, 21s, 23. N K