πολ ρα ων —_— πυνοι tela ee NN a τ adap ae DEA SASS ae ee Ν . QALY SN SANS va = "5 = 225 = = ee se αλλ τ ae dasapipeeadeladooroiy ey SS. owe ee ee ζιι χὰ wc. Sud ahspeoe avers Sawa ES Eeseareren: AN AQAA WY Ley SS WN PL) Saas Le 4 1} AZ AL Dd>>: APA AAT Ts ANAM AY wh WRN κα LARRY SL Niaseaangnawy eee WAY SSNS RS Ν Νὰ ὌΝΟΝ SS RRA LW AAS WY SSN RAGS aS SS es Fy Mtg od a 79» 7» LESLIE. 7 iy LE ᾿, “; IES SOMA 7" 72 7; »» CE Z, “5722; CASAS Ly CH, LOLS, LLL Tes . = ΝᾺ δὰ Ν δ δὰ δ AN ὲ \ AN \ ΩΣ Ww MY Ν᾿ Νὰ “72: σι, aa % VQ iy Loe, LOLI 7; 7999 ἣν 7; EEG, Z Ξσ»»»»» 7 tify YE “2 ty MME »σὨ»»» Vf YET : 7 » Le Ass , » Ly σ LE Le ;ΖΖΙΩΖΩ Ay i Ly Z Yi tye eee ΧΩ Ζ' 7 Z Se, 7; SLL GET GEE 7 CEE: EE ty patie 7, 7 ike 72: LINN ᾿ς ASS δὴ WS SS AMY WS \ WY ey Leap os, Li, SAASARASA AANA ESN a δ SSS Seance SMAOHwngyy My AMAA HANA WOOMOAMYs ANS ““ \ SOON AMARARAS AAS CANAAN SS AAAAAAAAAAAANARAAANAAA ANA LIBRARY OF THE THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY PRINCETON, N. J. ——— BE 15 4.0758 Drummond, James, 1835-1918. Studies in Christian doctrine STUDIES: IN CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE τ i a ΝΥ 4 ; 4 | ΙΝ CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE BY / Y/ JAMES DRUMMOND, M.A. (Oxon) LL.D., HON. D. LITT. (DUBLIN), D.D. (TUFTS) Ν ἴω A » N a A A ε A Ta τοῦ Θεοῦ οὐδεὶς ἔγνωκεν εἰ μὴ TO πνεῦμα τοῦ Θεοῦ. Ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐ Ν A A / 3 ΄, 3 Ν \ A \ 2 A A μ᾿ τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ κόσμου ἐλάβομεν ἀλλὰ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἵνα 9 αὶ Ν ε \ A A tf ε lal εἰδῶμεν τὰ ὑπὸ TOD Θεοῦ χαρισθέντα ἡμῖν. LONDON PHILIP GREEN, 5 ESSEX STREET, STRAND; W.C. 1908 PRINTED BY ELSOM AND CO., HULL TO THE AUTHOR’S FRIENDS AND PUPILS WHO, FREE FROM DOGMATIC RESTRICTIONS, HAVE SOUGHT WITH HIM FOR A DEEPER KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE TRUTH, AND TO THE CHURCHES OF GOD IN CHRIST JESUS WHICH HAVE STOOD FAST IN THE LIBERTY WITH WHICH CHRIST HAS MADE THEM FREE AND REFUSED TO IMPOSE CONDITIONS OF COMMUNION WHICH HE DID NOT IMPOSE, THIS VOLUME IS AFFECTIONATELY DEDICATED PREFACE THE general scheme of thought on which the contents of this volume are based was sketched out many years ago. Large portions of it have for a considerable time been delivered as lectures at Manchester College. It is only at the earnest request of friends that it is now reduced to book form, and, with various additions, given to the public. Its origin, making it a small part of a complete curriculum, may explain what would otherwise seem to be serious omissions. The philosophical discussion of the fundamental doctrines of religion, a review of the most important problems affecting the use and interpretation of the Bible, and the question of miracles as the guarantee of a dogmatic revelation, were provided for in other courses; and an exposition and criticism of modern schools of theology, and an appreciation of individual writers, however eminent, would have demanded an undue enlargement of the course, and hardly fell within its proper scope. I am well aware that even within the confessional churches many theologians consider themselves only loosely bound by their standards, and that the Catholic Church itself is feeling the effects of a wave of ‘ modernity’ ; but till the standards are altered, they hold the field, against individual opinion, as the collective expression of the Church’s Vill PREFACE thought, and it may be that the constant pressure of their dead weight will in time suppress every freer movement. Their leading ideas are still prevalent, and, in spite of dissentient voices, are seriously maintained by numbers of cultivated and earnest men. It was with these publicly recognized doctrines that I had to deal, leaving to the critical historian an estimate of the views of individual thinkers. While I have been compelled by the evidence, as it presented itself to my own mind, to reject some long-established doctrines, and to criticize them with perfect frankness, it has been my endeavour to do so in no controversial spirit. I have wished to treat every serious form of thought with sincere respect, and, where I am unable to accept it, to trace it to its spiritual roots, and to conserve some uncerlying truth, which may at once appeal to the religious sensibility and satisfy the instructed intellect. For the statement of ecclesiastical doctrines I have always resorted to established authorities, and it has been my earnest endeavour not to mis- represent views from which I dissent. In presenting adverse arguments I have used only such as have seriously affected my own judgment; and even to those who regard my denials as fallacious it may be useful to know exactly the difficulties that press upon the mind of another. I have been anxious to exhibit fairly such current arguments as appear to me unsound; and if in any instance I have failed to do so, my want of success is due to a defect of understanding, and not to any wish to weaken the effect of an argument by placing it in a false light. How far I have succeeded I must leave it to others to judge. I can only hope that in the changing thought in the midst of which we live my work may afford some help to a few seeking PREFACE ΙΧ souls, and enable them, through the imperfect forms of thought, to discern, 1f only in dim outline, the eternal Spirit of Truth. I must acknowledge, with warm thanks, the generosity and confidence with which the Committee of the British and Foreign Unitarian Association undertook to publish a work which they had not seen, and in the preparation of which they exacted no conditions. The authorities of that Association are well aware that it is not in me to write a party manifesto, and they can have no wish to receive such at my hands. This fact proves, what it may be as well to state explicitly, that members of the Association are in no way committed to any opinions which are expressed in this volume, nor am I committed to any opinions but my own, and to these only so long as the evidence appears to me to render them certain or probable. We have no authoritative creed to which individual thought must bow. We all alike have but one aim, Truth; and truth presents itself in many partial phases to differently constituted minds. There are diversities of opinions, but one Spirit ; and all faithful souls are moving, on different sides, towards one luminous peak, where Truth stands transfigured in heavenly light, far above the fogs and doubts of earth. JAMES DRUMMOND. OXFORD, October, 1907. TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION Definition of Doctrinal Theology, 1. Distinction of Doctrinal from Dogmatic Theology, 1-5: Meaning of dogma, 1-2; of a Creed, and of a Confession, 2; dogma not necessary for religious societies, 2-3; definitions of Dog- matics, 3-4; objection to Dogmatics, 4; inevitable pre- judgments, 5. Agreement of method with that in other branches of study, 5. Aim of the work, 6. ParT I SOURCES OF DOCTRINE CHAPTER I DIVISION OF THE SUBJECT The primary question relates to sources and method, 7. Pro- testant, Roman, and Greek view, 7. A preliminary question telates to the human mind, 7-8. CHAPTER II THE HUMAN MIND 1. The Rights and Limitations of the Intellect The rights of the intellect not destroyed by an infallible dog- matic revelation, 9-12: for (1) The infallibility can be established only by reason, and (2) The evidence depends partly on the contents of the revelation, 10. Examples, 10-11. But there may be doctrines beyond the range of our faculties, II, Statement of principles, 11-12. YAGES ΧΙ TABLE OF CONTENTS Limitations of the rational and critical powers, 12-14: two kinds of temperament, and of theological questions, 12-13. Inalienable rights of the intellect, 13. Danger of one-sided intellectualism, 13-14. 2. The Moral Nature and Revelation Connexion of the moral nature with theology, 14-15. Revelation and Ethics, 15-19: (1) There might be authoritative rules before the knowledge of higher motives, 15-16. (2) There might be rules relating to a single motive, 17-18. (3) Higher motives might be made known, 18-19. But Christian Ethics not to be included in Dogmatics, 19-20. 3. The Religious Element Questions relating to it, 20. (a) The existence of the Religious Element, 20-32: Proposition, 20-21. Sense in which Religion is used, 21; Definitions to be avoided, 21-23. The evidence—rz. Our consciousness, 23-24. 2, Universality, 24-31. Objections to the argument (a) religion may be an invention, 25-26 ; (δ) it may be due to traditional beliefs, 26-27. Amswers (1) that only can be developed which exists in germ, 27; (2) our judgment of religious motives, 27-28; (3) not probable that accidental transmission could secure universality, 28-29; (4) when religion has been discarded, it has always revived, 29; distinction from religious prejudices, 29-30. (c) Religious knowledge may be derived from other knowledge, 30; but religion includes emotion, 30-31. 3. Special phenomena in the manifestation of religion, 31-32. (b) The Religious Element points to an Object or Objects answering to it, 32-37: Nature of the inquiry, 32. Religious feelings exist only in relation to an object, and tend to create a belief in the existence of the object, 33. Objections: emotions lead to delusions; but delusions are temporary, 34-35; the thing to be proved is assumed ; but there must be an ultimate assumption, 35-36. The conclusion confirmed by the whole analogy of our nature, 36-37. (c) Testimony of the Religious Element to doctrines, 37-45 : Proposition stated, 37. The satisfaction of an inward want an evidence of truth, 37-38; for (1) it follows from what has been said about the Religious Element; and (2) the proposition is supported by the facts of consciousness, 38-41. Objections: (1) beliefs maintaining themselves in this way may be mere prejudices, 41 ; but (a) they are more persistent, (b) they tend to recur, (c) they are felt to have a divine claim PAGES 12-14 14-20 20-81 TABLE OF CONTENTS Xiil PAGES upon us, (4) they are often opposed to our prejudices, 41-43; 41-81 (2) many such beliefs have been mere errors, 43; but these errors may be partially true (instance, the idea of sacrifice), 43-44; (3) We have the same tendency to believe what satisfies a prejudice; this undoubtedly shows liability to error and need of care, 44-45. (d) Nature of the Religious Element, 45-51: to be learned by an examination of facts, 45-47. It includes feeling, knowing, and doing, 47-49. Resulting classification of the kinds of religion, 49-51. (e) Catholic self-knowledge, 51-61: two modes of regarding the capacity of the religious nature, 51-54: recognition of spiritual truth, 51-53; discovery and construction, 53-54. Source of knowledge, our own consciousness, 54-55 ; difficulty arising from this, 55-56; self-knowledge must be catholic, 56-57. Lines of tendency described, 57-61. (f) Sources of error, 61-74: (1) incapacity for intellectual formulation, 61-62; (2) failures in tne religious consciousness, (a) want of proper balance in its contents, 62-64; (δὴ) absence of some of its constituents, 64-65 ; (c) reliance on a prejudice or idiosyncrasy, 65-66, nevertheless an idiosyncrasy may anticipate the universal, 66-68. Hence spiritual discernment has various degrees, and is susceptible of cultivation and growth, 68-74. Examples: belief in the existence of God, 68-69 ; in his attributes, 69-70; knowledge of the human soul 70-71; recognition of spiritual relations, 71-73. Two resulting facts, 73-74. (g) Confirmatory facts, 74-78 : (1) diversity of theological belief, 74-75; (2) men have a power of seeing the truth of a doctrine which they could not have discovered, 75-76 ; (3) dependence on authority, 76; (4) revolts against authority, 76-77; (5) men cling to a creed after they have ceased to believe in it literally, 77. (h) Revelation, 78-81: (1) might be given of truths which the human mind normally could not have discovered, 78-79; (2) might be given of truths which the mind normally reaches only by a tedious process, 79; (3) might be given of the spirit which is the ground of doctrinal truth, 79-81. CHAPTER III THE BIBLE 82-97 Traditional view, 82-89: Catholic dogma, 82-8 3; doctrine of the Church of England, 83-84; doctrine of the Westminster VI)” TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGES always have had an object of love, 146-149; but the 1464 146-162 of a Divine society is pure polytheism, 149-150; the discus- sion rests upon an anthropopathic conception of God, 150; a similar argument will apply to the creativeness of God, 150-153; love among infinite equals is no evidence of love towards finite beings, 153. (3) It is said that a second person is involved in the idea of eternal personality, 153-154. Objections to this view, 154-155. This kind of speculation is beyond the compass of our thought, 155-156. Objections to the doctrine from the side of reason, 156-159 :— (1) Each person must contain a trinity, 157; (2) Each person must have something besides the Divine essence, 157-158 ; (3) Each person must have something impersonal in addition to personality, 158; (4) The idea of three persons with one reason and willis unthinkable, 158. These difficulties not to be evaded by calling the doctrine a mystery, 158-159. Doctrine of the Holy Spirit, 159-162 :— Origin of the Christian belief, 159-160. Ideas attached to the word ‘spirit,’ 160-161. The diffused influence beyond comprehension, 161-162. The view suggested is consistent with the early confession of the Church, 162. CHAPTER III AGENCY AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD 163-186 God the Creator, 163-173. Question whether the universe is eternal, 165-166. Evolution and creation, 166-168. The reason for creation, 168-169. God the preserver, and destroyer, 169-170. Mediate and immediate action of God, 170-171. Doctrine of angels, 171-173. Attributes involved in our intellectual idea of God, 173-179: Question whether attributes violate the Divine unity, 173. God’s omnipresence, 173-174. His omniscience, 174-176. His omnipotence, 176-179. God as the reality of ideal good, 179-186: His holiness, 179-180. His righteousness, 180-185: nature of punishment, 181-183. Purposes of punishment: first, it is an expression of moral disapproval, 183; secondly, it opposes a barrier to the com- mission of wrongdoing, 183-184. Hence rule for the infliction or remission of punishment, 184-185. Wisdom of God, 185. His love, 185-186. TABLE OF CONTENTS XVii PAGES CHAPTER IV GOD AS THE OBJECT OF WORSHIP 187-202 First, he is an object of veneration and love on account of his spiritual perfection, 187. Secondly, he is the bounteous Giver, 187-188. Thirdly, he is the object of trust, 188-195 : Ethnic and Christian view of providence, 188-189. Distinctions made by dogmatists, 189-191. Ordinary and extraordinary providence, 191--192. The problem of evil, 192-195. Lastly, he is the receiver of prayer, 196-202: The fact on which prayer rests, 196. Division of prayer, 197. Difficulties connected with petition, 197-200. The teaching of Christ in regard to it, 200-201. Rule for the expression of desire in prayer, 201. Prayer for spiritual blessings, 202. ῬΑΞῚ ΠῚ DOCTRINE OF MAN 203-239 Man’s ideal condition, 203-204. Doctrine of original righteousness, 204-206. Problem of sin, 206-239 :— Definition of sin as an act of will, 207-213: Conditions of merit, 207-212: Implications in the idea of moral desert, 208-212: (1) The end is right actions, 208-209. (2) Con- ditions that must be fulfilled: (a) the action must be intentional, 209; (b) there must be knowledge of a better and a worse, 209-210; (c) the agent must act trom the best motive present in his mind, 210; (d) there must be some degree of difficulty in the action, 210-211 ; (e) there must be liberty of choice between conflicting motives, 211-212. Recognition of merit in the New Testament, 212-213. Sin as a perversion of our nature from its ideal end, 213-216. Reasons which justify this extended use of the word sin, 216. The essence of sin, 216-219: according to some, the dominance of the sensual nature, 217. According to cthers, self- seeking, 217-219. Sin is a positive evil, 219-220: and does not belong to the essence of man, 220—221. Sources of sin, 221-233: The misuse of free will, 221-222. Doctrine of the Fall, 222-233: Theories of the origin of souls, 222-223. Original sin, 223-226. Account of the XV1il TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGES Fall not historical, 226. Supposed Biblical references to it,226-239 226-228. Good and ill mingled in human life, 228-229. Elements of truth in the doctrine, 229-233. Doctrine of temptation, 233-239: Its inward conditions, 233-234; Its outward conditions, 234-235; Reason for liability to it, 235. Doctrine of the devil and evil spirits, 235-239: Doctrine of satanic agency accepted, but not essential in the New Testament, 236. Not easily reconciled with the doctrine of a fatherly providence, 236-237. Out- bursts of moral evil, 237. Demoniacal possession, 238-239. Part IV THE RELATION BETWEEN GOD AND MAN AS AFFECTED BY HISTORICAL CONDITIONS CHAPTER I REASONS FOR SELECTING CHRISTIANITY 240-242 Our inquiry might include all the great religions, 240-241. Christianity selected as standing at the head, 241-242; and because our own religious life has been shaped by Christianity, 242. CHAPTER II RECONCILIATION 243-251 The aim of all religions, to establish harmony between the soul and God, 243. The need of reconciliation due to sin, 243. The doctrine that Christ reconciled the Father to man, 244-249: Statements of the doctrine, 244-245. This is opposed to the teaching of the New Testament, 245-248 ; and to the highest Spiritual consciousness, 248-249. The doctrine that the purpose of Christianity is to reconcile the world to God, 249. This doctrine is essentially different from the other, 249-250. Meaning of ‘ the wrath of God,’ 250-251. CHAPTER III THE PERSON OF CHRIST 252-316 Reasons for a Christology, 252-253. Statement of the ecclesiastical dogma, 253-259. Criticism of dogma, 259-282 :—It cannot be exempt from criticism, 259-260. It makes Christianity entirely exceptional in the history TABLE OF CONTENTS X1X PAGES of the world, 260-261. Difficulties suggested, 261-282: First, 260-316 the vastness of the demand upon our faith, 262-263. Secondly, the uncertainty of the supposed Biblical proof, 263-275: The doctrine nowhere stated with completeness, 263-264. Inference from the association of Christ with God, 264-266. Argument from Christ’s self-assertiveness, 266-272. Argument from the expression ‘in Christ,’ 272-275. The birth from a virgin, 275. Thirdly, the slow growth of the dogma, 275-277. Fourthly, general considerations, 277-282: It does not fit easily into the modern knowledge of the universe, 277-279. It is not necessary for conversion, 279-281. It is unpresentable in thought, 281-282. Doctrine of Kenosis, 282-285. Doctrine based on Christian consciousness, 285-307: Nature of Christian consciousness, 285-287. Various elements in the impression which Jesus made upon Christendom, 287-295 : He was a prophet and teacher, 287-288 ; but we cannot lose the teacher in the truth which he taught, 288-290. He is an example of moral excellence, 290-291. He is ‘a quickening spirit,’ 291-293. He has brought men into a Divine com- munion, 293-295. Doctrines founded on these facts, 295-307 : Jesus was the Christ, 295-298. He was a spiritual ° Lord,’ 298-299. He was a ‘Saviour,’ 299-301. He was the ‘Son of God,’ 301-307. How is he distinguished from an ordinary man? 307-308: The question rests on a non-Christian view of man, 307. He is pre-eminent in religious character and originality, 307-308, and the man chosen to found a universal spiritual brother- hood, 308. Early Christian phrases may have been influenced by the language of the time, 308-312. The thought of God and the thought of Christ inseparable in the Christian mind, 312. Sinlessness of Christ, 312-315: Two different ways of under- standing this, 312-313. The evidence, 313-315: No trace of conversion, 314. His baptism, 314. His habit of solitary prayer, 314. He disclaimed the title ‘ good,’ 314-315. The charges made by enemies, and the impression on his followers, 315. The view here presented is consistent with our enlarged knowledge of the universe, 315-316. ΧΧ TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGES CHAPTER IV THE WORK OF CHRIST 317-366 Division of the subject, 317-318. I. The Prophetic Office 318-325 Fulfilled by his teaching, 318. Doctrine of his infallibility, 318-323. Character of his teaching and authority, 323-325. 2. Sacerdotal Office 325-363 Use of figurative terms, 325-330: Priest, 325-326. Sacrifice, 326-329. Redemption and ransom, 329-330. Problem to be solved in connexion with Christ’s death, 330-331 ; a pressing problem for the first disciples, 331-332. Doctrines of atonement, 332-347: Vagueness of early doctrine, 332-335. Anselm’s ‘Cur Deus homo,’ 335-341. Doctrines of different churches, 341-346. Changed view in modern times, 346-347. Objections to the orthodox doctrine, 347-352: First, it falls with the doctrine of the hypostatic union, 347. Secondly, it presents a false view of God’s forgiveness, 347-349. Thirdly, the comparison of sin to a debt is pushed too far, 349-350. Fourthly, the idea of meritorious work is not tenable, 350-351. Fifthly, it is unjust to punish the innocent for the guilty, 351-352. Lastly, man has some responsibility for his own destiny, 352. Those who hold the doctrine have no spiritual advantage, 352-353. True ideas involved in the doctrine, 353-359: First, the heinousness of sin, 353-354. Secondly, the impossibility of earning God’s favour, 354-355. Thirdly, the solidarity of mankind, 355-356. Fourthly, the fact that one may suffer for another, 356-357. Fifthly, value of self-sacrifice, 357-358. Lastly, Christ as representative of mankind, 358-359. Fundamental error in the doctrine, 359-361. Reason for Christ’s suffering, 361-362. The love which bore the cross was Divine, 362. Christ’s intercession, 362-363. 3. Regal Office 363-366 CHAPTER V THE CHURCH: ITS ORIGIN AND IDEA 367-398 Importance of the Church in transmitting the influence of . ΟΠ γτιβί, 367. Origin of the term, and its use in the New Testament, 367--368. Different doctrines of the Church, 368-376: Catholic, 369-372. Protestant, 373-376. TABLE OF CONTENTS ΧΧῚ PAGES Different ideas of unity, 376-377. 376-398 Christ’s teaching, 377-383: His conception of the kingdom of God, 377-379. His reference to the Church in Matthew XVill. 17, 379; in Matthew xvi. 18, 379-383. The kingdom of God not identical with the Church, 384-385. Insufficient evidence that Christ constituted a Church, though he is in a true sense its founder, 385-387. Marks of the Christian Church, 387—-397:—-It must be limited to the disciples of Christ, 387-389. It is an organized body animated by the spirit of Christ, 389. The ‘notes’ of the Church, 390-397: Unity, 390-394. Holiness, 394. Catholicity, 394-395. Apostolicity, 395-397. Priority of the Church to the individual, 397-398. CHAPTER VI MEANS OF GRACE 399-462 Explanation of the term, 399. 1. The Word of God 400-403 Different views in regard to it. 2. The Sacraments 403-462 Original meaning of the term, 403. Origin and meaning of its application to Christian rites, 403-405. Catholic dogma as to the nature and number of the Sacraments, 405-411. Protestant views, 411-413. Criticism of the Catholic doctrine, 413-417. The several kinds of Sacrament, 417-462 :— Baptism, 417-433: The Catholic dogma and administration, 417-421. Protestant views, 421-422. Criticism, 422-424. The teaching of Christ, 424-429. Its use by the primitive Church, 429-431. Suggested view, and practice, 431-433. Confirmation, 433-434. The Eucharist, 435-450: Different names for it, 435. Catholic dogma and practice, 435-438. Objections to the Catholic dogma, 438-447: Biblical evidence, 439-442 ; some historical evidence, 442-447. Protestant doctrine, 447-449. Doubtful whether Christ instituted the Lord’s Supper as a permanent ordinance, 449. Its observance must be based on general practice, 449-450. Penance, 450-454: Catholic doctrine, 450-453; has some admirable features, but feeble historical foundation,45 3-454. XX11 TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGES Extreme Unction, 454-456: Doctrine, 454-455; insufficient 454-462 Scriptural authority, 455-456. Ordination, 456-461: Claims of the priesthood, 456-457. Enumeration of the orders in the Catholic Church, and mode of ordination, 457-458. Orders in the Church of England, 458-459 ; in the Presbyterian Church of Scotland, 459. Criticism of the sacramental theory, 459-461. Matrimony, 461-462. Sanctity of marriage, 462. CHAPTER VII RISE AND PROGRESS OF RELIGION IN THE INDIVIDUAL 463-514 1. Predestination 463-478 Origin of the term, 463-464. Influence of Augustine, 464. Spiritual roots of the Protestant dogmas, and supposed external facts, 464-465. Protestant views of reprobation, 465-468. Contrasts of opinion, 468. Scriptural view, 468-472. Opinions as to the salvability of those outside of the Christian religion, 472-474. Criticism of exclusive views, 474-475. Exclusive claims in the New Testament accounted for, 475-477. Christ’s teaching, 477-478. 2. Grace 478-488 Questions connected with it, 478-479. Source of extreme contrasted views, 479-480. The Lutheran dogma, 480-484: Its source in the experience of the Reformers, 480-481. The impotence of the will, 481-482. Place of the will in regenera- tion, 482-484. Catholic dogma, 484-485. Comparison of the Catholic and Protestant views, and suggested doctrine, 485-488. 3. Conversion 488-491 Its meaning, implications, and occasions, 488-489. Is it universally required ? 490. Canit come suddenly ? 490-491. 4. Justification 491-505 Its meaning, 491-492. Lutheran doctrine, 492-496. Doctrine of the Westminster Confession, 496. Catholic doctrine, 497-499. Protestant distinction between Justification and Sanctification, 499-501. Place of the will, 501. The question why some have faith, and others not, 501-502. Sanctification a slow process, 502-503. The perseverance of saints, 503-505. TABLE OF CONTENTS 5. The Consummation of the Divine Life The eternal life of Divine sonship, 505-506. Future life, 506-514: Faith in immortality, in religions generally, and in Christianity, 506-507. Examination of the objection that it is selfish to expect it, 507-508. Ofits mode we are ignorant, 509. Primitive Christian views, 509-510. The idea of retribution, 510-511. The conditions of the future life according to Catholics and Protestants, 511-512. Duration of punishment, 512-514. CHAPTER VIII ESCHATOLOGY General idea of the kingdom of God, 515-516. The doctrine of Christ’s literal return to earth, 516-523: Christ is said to have predicted his return, 516-517. The Scriptural evidence, 517-518. A fundamental dogma in the primitive gospel, 518. Its origin, 518-519. It probably had some support in the teaching of Jesus, 519-521. But there are sayings of a different kind, and he may have been misunderstood, 521-523. INDEX ΧΧΙΣ PAGES 595-514 515-523 524-536 - wa ” a eee LAI ERT ES, LS Ses TA TNE Ee ae INTRODUCTION DOocTRINAL THEOLOGY is the precise, reasoned, and articu- lated statement of the several articles of religious belief. By ‘precise’ is meant that each doctrine must be stated in a clear proposition or propositions, containing neither more nor less than the judgment which it is intended to convey. By ‘reasoned’ is meant presenting the rational grounds on which the several propositions rest, a consideration of objections or difficulties, and a criticism of adverse doctrines, or doctrines believed to be erroneous, when they are of sufficient importance to call for notice. By ‘articulated’ is meant arranged so as to form a coherent and orderly system. The above definition sufficiently distinguishes our subject from Theological Ethics, which erects a theoretical scheme of morals on the basis of the religious truths established by Doctrinal Theology. These two studies form successive steps in a complete speculative system; but their objects are so distinct that they conveniently lend themselves to separate treatment. The study upon which we now enter generally goes under the name of Dogmatics, or Dogmatic Theology. I prefer the name Doctrinal Theology for the following reason. The word Dogma (δόγμα, placitum) was anciently used, among Greek and Roman writers, of the opinions of philo- sophers. In the New Testament it is used of decrees and precepts, but not of articles of belief. Among the Christians of Alexandria, however, the philosophical use was naturally followed ; and from the time of Clement the term is applied B 2 INTRODUCTION to the articles of the Christian faith. As these articles were more or less disputed, it came to signify the articles which were authoritatively ratified as expressing the belief of the Church; and it is now commonly used of the doctrines which have been sanctioned by the proper public authority as the binding creed of some particular church or sect. This limitation, indeed, is not universally accepted; but it is best to observe it, and thus to distinguish dogma from doctrine, the latter not implying any authoritative ratifica- tion. Thus every dogma is a doctrine; but not every doctrine is a dogma, and it is quite unwarrantable to infer that those who have no dogmas have therefore no doctrines. We may here subjoin a similar caution in regard to the word ‘ Creed.’ A Creed is not properly what any individual believes, but an authorized summary of the belief accepted by some church or sect. Accordingly the Nicene and other Greek Creeds begin, not with ‘I believe,’ but with ‘We believe.’ A neglect of these plain distinctions, in order to represent others as without convictions because they have no dogmas, belongs to the claptrap of controversy. A Creed enlarged, as was so often the case after the Reformation, into a complete conspectus of theological dogmas is called a * Confession.’ Auguste Sabatier, in a very interesting work, while recognizing that dogmas result from the decision of a com- petent authority, maintains that they are as necessary to a religious society as laws to a political society.’ In his arguments, however, he clearly confounds dogma and doc- trine. Religion undoubtedly demands intellectual expres- sion; but this expression need not be in the authoritative and exclusive form of dogma. Science cannot exist without formulated statements, but it has no dogmas; and so religion may have a body of well-established truth, and yet be without dogmas. The Congregations commonly known as Unitarian 1 Esquisse d'une Philosophie de la Religion d’aprés la Psychologie et ! Histoire, 1897, pp. 263 sq., 308. DOGMA AND DOCTRINE 3 have existed as religious societies, many of them for more than two hundred years, without any dogmas; but they have had both doctrine and worship. To this day they have no authoritative standard, and whatever agreement of opinion there is among them is the result of independent, though concurrent, thought. This allows a wide latitude ; and when controversies arise among them, the questions at issue are freely discussed, with all earnestness indeed, but with no breach of fraternal union. The teaching function is committed to men who are expected to set forth, not dogmas which are a condition of membership, but what, after conscientious study, they earnestly believe; and if a divergence of view becomes so wide as to render fruitful co- operation impossible, and so lead to a voluntary separation, this takes place without bitterness, and without the inter- vention of any kind of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Owing to this absence of dogma, theological doctrine has been able to meet inevitable changes without shocks and convulsions ; and the primary question always is, not ‘ What does the sect teach ἢ but ᾿ What is true?’ and in studying or writing, all thought of the sect, or of the expectations which it might be supposed to entertain, or of agreement with authoritative standards, is wholly absent from the mind. Sabatier claims an equal freedom and mobility for Protestant dogmas;? but cer- tainly that freedom has not existed in fact, as Sabatier himself admits ;? anda dogmatic statement, even if intended to apply only to the present time, inevitably tends to become inflexible, claims control of the future, and sets up an obstacle to progress. The difference is now apparent between dogmatic and doctrinal theology. Dogmatic theology starts with the assumption that the dogmas of some particular church or sect are true; and it is the duty of the dogmatist to present these with scientific precision, and to establish them rationally as part of the knowledge of the time. Thus Roses defines Dogmatics as a methodical exposition of the dogmas of the * pp: 251; 272, 284. 51: ΣῬΡ. 287, 207: 4 INTRODUCTION Christian religion, dogmas being the doctrines defined in Councils of the genuine Catholic and Orthodox Church of Christ.1 Hagenbach gives it a wider extension, ‘The methodical and connected exposition of Christian doctrine.” Others, like F. A. B. Nitzsch, confine themselves to ‘ Evan- gelical Dogmatics’; and Kaftan distinctly maintains that every exposition of Dogmatics must be based on the accepted views of some definite confessional Church.? There is, however, some justification for this mode of treatment. It is assumed that the work of ‘ Apologetic’ has already been done, and the aim of the dogmatist is not to convince a hostile world, but to give intellectual satisfaction to believers through a systematic exposition of the articles of their faith. But this, if it qualifies, does not remove our objection. Such a procedure seems to rest on the very questionable assumption that there is one particular church which is the custodian of Divine truth, while ali others are more or less involved in error. And further it overlooks the fact, to which attention will be called presently, that, even if this has been rendered probable by a course of reasoning, the evidence can never be so demonstrative as to exempt the several articles of belief from criticism, and possible rejection, in detail. Thus the mind loses its freedom, and moves from the first within a charmed circle which it can quit only at its peril. The most independent investigation may, no doubt, result in establishing the tenets of some particular school; but when the whole purpose of the work is to expound and defend such tenets, Greek, Roman, or Evangelical, the judgment is committed to foregone conclusions, and has some other aim than pure truth, whatever the evidence may prove that to be. But doctrinal theology has no aim but truth, and therefore seeks to construct its body of doctrine in a perfectly scientific way, and with no fear that it may transgress 1 Σύστημα Δογματικῆς τῆς ὀρθοδόξου καθολικῆς ἐκκλησίας, 1903, pp. 23 54. 2 Encyklopadie u. Methodologie der theologischen Wissenschaften, ed. 1869, ὃ 79. 3 Dogmatik, 1897, Pp. 2. PREJ UDGMENTS 5 certain limits which have been laid down beforehand, and are protected by penalties. It is of course impossible for any individual to start without some prejudgments; and our investigation necessarily begins with the religion in which we have been brought up, and which is associated with our deepest feelings and convictions. This, in the present instance, is Christianity ; but unless we find reason to the contrary, we shall treat Christianity, not as standing in exclusive contrast to all other faiths, but as the highest expression of the religious consciousness of man, and some of our principles will be found applicable, in their degree, to various forms of religion. Our inevitable prejudgments are freely open to the appropriate tests, and there is no presumption of religious faithlessness if, in the course of the inquiry, some of them come to be regarded as unsound. This agrees with the method which is pursued in all branches of study that are not under the control of some coercive authority. The historian or the astronomer starts with the supposition that there is an assured body of know- ledge, or at least of probable hypotheses, which he contentedly accepts till he sees reason for doubting it; and then the legitimate bias with which he started induces him to apply the most rigorous tests, and weigh the evidence with the most scrupulous care, before rejecting what has long been accepted by the most competent judges. Nevertheless, his object is not the maintenance of current views, but historical or scientific truth, and his mind is swayed simply by the internal laws which govern the investigation of truth. Similarly a man may have profound religious convictions, and duly honour the great theologians of the past; and nevertheless in his investigations aim simply at truth, whether or not that should ultimately prove to be in accord- ance with his present belief. He may walk in the serene light of a holy faith, and yet never be surprised to find that the realms of knowledge are wider than his thought, and the truth of God deeper than he can sound. 6 INTRODUCTION In this work, then, we aim at reaching a system of theo- logical doctrine, not at the establishment of given dogmas ; and howsoever the doctrines at which we arrive may come to be classified, the classification will result from the doctrines, and not the doctrines from a prior classification. It is mine to lay before the readers, with as fair a statement and estimate of the evidence as I can command, the results which approve themselves to my own mind; it is theirs, like merchant-men seeking goodly pearls, to weigh the evidence with caution and impartiality, and aim only at the purest truth. 1 For a fuller treatment of my view of the place and method of Doctrinal Theology I may be permitted to refer to section V. of my Introduction to the Study of Theology, pp. 165 sqq. I may also quote, as representing a long-cherished principle, the charge which Dr. John Taylor was in the habit of delivering to his pupils at Warrington, and which I sometimes read to my class at Manchester College at the beginning of the doctrinal course, to impress upon them the spirit in which I desired the lectures to be listened to :— ‘I. I do solemnly charge you, in the name of the God of truth, and of our Lord Jesus Christ, who is the Way, the Truth, and the Life, and before whose judgment-seat you must in no long time appear, that in all your studies and enquiries of a religious nature, present or future, you do constantly, carefully, impartially, and conscientiously attend to evidence, as it lies in the Holy Scriptures, or in the nature of things and the dictates of reason; cautiously guarding against the sallies of imagination and the fallacy of ill-grounded conjecture. ‘II. That you admit, embrace, or assent to no principle or sentiment by me taught or advanced, but only so far as it shall appear to you to be supported and justified by proper evidence from Revelation or the reason of things. ‘III. That if, at any time hereafter, any principle or sentiment by me taught or advanced, or by you admitted and embraced, shall, upon impartial and faithful examination, appear to you to be dubious or false, you either suspect or totally reject such principle or sentiment. ‘IV. That you keep your mind always open to evidence; that you labour to banish from your breast all prejudice, prepossession, and party- zeal; that you study to live in peace and love with all your fellow- Christians ; and that you steadily assert for yourself, and freely allow to others, the inalienable rights of judgment and conscience.’ PART I SOURCES OF DOCTRINE CHAPTER [ DIVISION OF THE SUBJECT THE primary question in Doctrinal Theology relates to the sources from which our knowledge must be derived, and the method by which we can elicit from these sources the truths of which we are in search. A claim is made on behalf of Christianity that it contains a body of dogmas supernaturally revealed. According to the Protestant position these dogmas are presented, though not in a systematic form, in the Bible, and this collection of writings is the one infallible source from which our religious know- ledge must be derived. To this source the Roman and Greek Churches add, as co-ordinate with it, the tradition which has been handed down through authorized channels from the first ; and each claims to be, when speaking through its proper organs and under certain defined conditions, the sole infallible custodian of both Bible and tradition. It will be incumbent on us, therefore, to seek for some conclusions about the Bible and the Church regarded as sources of doctrine. But prior to any inquiry into the reality and character of an alleged dogmatic revelation must logically come an inquiry into the religious competence of the mind to which the revelation is addressed; and the results of such an ὃ SOURCES OF DOCTRINE inquiry must largely affect our whole conception of the authority and value of an historical religion. We are thus led, as preliminary to all theological investigation, to a source of religious doctrine which has been recognized with more or less distinctness by widely divergent schools : namely, the human mind or soul. The authority of this source, up to a certain point, is no less emphatically admitted by John Henry than by Francis Newman. For instance, the belief in the existence of God is drawn by the great advocate of external authority from within rather than without, and in regard to certainty is placed on a par with the belief in his own existence.t And indeed most theo- logians, whether they acknowledge it or not, consult the witness within ; and their conclusions are largely influenced, far more largely than many of them are aware of, by the responses which they elicit. In short, whatever source be formally acknowledged, the mind of the interpreter inevit- ably colours the interpretation. It is therefore our first duty to bring under consideration the capacity and resources of the mind in its relation to theological doctrine, the method by which its inner witness to Divine truth may be interro- gated, and the points where some external assistance might be rendered without any infringement of its laws, or without adding a superfluous confirmation to what is already certain. In this discussion we must necessarily touch on some ques- tions which belong more properly to a philosophical treatise ; but as the end in view is different, the treatment also will be dissimilar. Our necessary limits will permit only the presentation of an outline of thought, which, however, may possibly prove suggestive where it fails to be exhaustive. 1 Apologia, pp. 59, 323, 377. CHAPTER II THE HUMAN MIND 1. The Rights and Limitations of the Intellect ΤῈ there were no external authority entitled to control belief, the mind would have the same unlimited right of investigation as in all other subjects. But when a claim is set up on behalf of an infallible dogmatic revelation, it is often said that the right of question and criticism ceases as soon as the genuineness of the revelation is proved. Free inquiry is proper up to that point, but there it 15 destroyed by its own success ; just as, on a journey, inquiry might enable us to secure the services of a trustworthy guide, but, when we had secured them, we should trust him implicitly, and never venture to call his judgment in question. itis, 1 suppose, for this reason that the treatment of evidences is so generally separated from that of doctrine. Let us assume, according to the older Protestant view, that it has pleased God to give to mankind infallible scriptures, containing, among other things, various doctrinal statements. In this case it might seem to be the logical order to prove, first of all, the reality of this divinely authorized document, and then, in the construction of a system of doctrine, to confine oneself to classification and interpretation, without seeking for further proof of the separate items of doctrine. The Divine authority being certified by rational methods, reason must not doubt in detail what it has accepted in the mass. This position appears to be untenable for the following reasons :— IO THE HUMAN MIND 1. The infallibility of the revelation confessedly can be established only by a process of reasoning from more or less certain data. Such a process may establish a very high degree of probability, but can never amount to absolute demonstration; and accordingly there is no authority which, by the completeness of its proof, commands universal assent. You therefore accept the revelation by an act of private judgment ; and if you lay it down that this judgment can never, in any circumstances, be subject to reconsideration, you are really attributing infallibility to yourself, so far as relates to that particular conclusion. 2.