s Ml 2 1968 
 
 .C8TT 
 
REVIEW 
 
 PRESIDENT DAY'S TREATISE 
 
 WILL 
 
 y 
 
 By BENNET TYLER, D. D. 
 
 PRESIDENT Or THE THEOLOGICAL INSTITUTE OP CONNECTICUT 
 
 HARTFORD. 
 PRINTED BY ELIHU GEER, 
 
 26£ STATE-STREET. 
 
 18 3 8. 
 
REVIEW. 
 
 An Inquiry respecting the self-determining power of the Will ; or contingent volition. By 
 Jbrkmiah Day, President of Yale College. New Haven, Herrick and Noyes, 1838. pp. 
 200, ISmo. 
 
 We "have read this little volume with deep interest, and with a 
 high degree of satisfaction. President Day possesses the rare tal- 
 ent of rendering an abstruse subject remarkably plain. His habits 
 of study, and long experience as a teacher in mathematical and 
 physical science and mental philosophy, added to a mind naturally 
 clear and discriminating, have eminently fitted him for the task he 
 has undertaken. His object is not to propound any new theories 
 on the subject of moral agency. He lays claim to no new dis- 
 coveries in theological science ; nor is he disposed to follow in the 
 track of modern innovators. His views, so far as we can discover, 
 do not differ from those of Edwards ; yet he has found ample 
 scope for his peculiar talents, in elucidating and defending the prin- 
 ciples for which that illustrious divine contended. The reader, 
 therefore, must not expect to find in the work before us, any new 
 theological views, or philosophical theories ; but he will find old 
 and long established principles clearly stated, and their truth con- 
 clusively demonstrated. He will find truths which have been obscu- 
 red by the use of vague and ambiguous terms, brought out to the 
 light of day, and commended to his understanding by a force of 
 evidence which cannot be easily resisted. Many a reader, we can- 
 not doubt, who has been sorely perplexed by recent theological spec- 
 ulations, will find his mind relieved by a perusal of this volume. 
 It is a most timely production ; and we cannot but cherish the 
 hope that it will do much towards dispelling the mists which a false 
 philosophy has thrown around some of the fundamental doctrines 
 of the Gospel. 
 
 The spirit which pervades the work, is such as we should anti- 
 cipate from what we know of the candor, mildness, and Christ- 
 ian simplicity of the author. It is free from every thing like 
 acrimony, or bigotry, or dogmatism, or the spirit of party. The 
 manifest design of the writer, is to ascertain the truth, and to 
 exhibit it with plainness, whatever may be its bearing on existing 
 theological controversies. 
 
 The style is neat, simple, pure, and remarkably perspicuous. 
 
For precision of thought and language, for accuracy of definition 
 and clear explanation of ambiguous terms, and for lucid argument- 
 ation, the work is not surpassed by any metaphysical treatise 
 within our knowledge. While perusing it we were forcibly remind- 
 ed of a remark which was once made in reference to another pro- 
 duction ; '* It is like the waters of one of our northern lakes, deep 
 and clear — so clear indeed, that a careless observer might think 
 it shallow." 
 
 It may perhaps be thought by some, that the theory of a self- 
 determining power of the will, has long since been exploded — 
 that nobody now believes it, and that he who attempts to refute it 
 is only beating the air. Such, however, is not the opinion of 
 President Day. His clear and penetrating mind has traced cer- 
 tain errors of the present day, to their first principles. He has 
 discovered the starting point from which the reasoning of their 
 advocates proceeds ; and he has rightly judged, that the most 
 effectual way to destroy these errors, is, to demolish the foundation 
 on which they rest. He says, " the self-determining power of the 
 will is a subject intimately connected with many of the theological 
 discussions of the present day." We are entirely of the same 
 opinion. By this, however, we do not mean, and we presume our 
 author did not mean, that this theory is at the present day openly 
 and professedly maintained. Probably no one who has been enga- 
 ged in the recent discussions which relate to the moral agency of 
 man, and the moral government of God, would say, in so many 
 words, that " every free act of the will is determined by an antece- 
 dent free act;" or that " volitions are contingent events." Yet, 
 unless we greatly mistake, there are those who have advanced and 
 strenuously defended principles, which necessarily involve the 
 theory in one or the other of these forms. At all events, there are 
 those, (as we shall attempt to show before we have done,) who have 
 called in question the great doctrine which it is the object of Presi- 
 dent Day to defend; viz: The absolute dominion of God over the 
 moral universe ; and his entire control of the thoughts, feelings, and 
 conduct of his accountable creatures. 
 
 His object in writing the treatise, and the reasons which indu- 
 ced him to adopt this particular mode of discussion, will appear 
 from the following remarks in his "Introductory Observations." 
 
 "The momentous interest which belongs to this subject, lies in its relation 
 to the moral government of God. If nothing from without the will of the 
 agent can have any influence in determining what his volitions shall he, then 
 it must be beyond the power of the Father of our spirits to give direction to 
 the acta of the will, without interfering with the prerogatives of accounta- 
 ble agency." * * * "If the creator has filled this and other worlds 
 with living agents, whose acts of will are entirely independent of himself, he 
 can only look on, and observe the operation of their voluntary powers ; accom- 
 modating the course of his external providence to what Ihey may happen to 
 determine. On this supposition, he can punish iniquity, but can do nothing to 
 

 prevent it, without impairing the independence of moral agency. He can 
 render a reward to virtue, but can take no effectual measures to promote it, 
 except by such a determining influence, as is supposed to be inconsistent with 
 the very nature of virtue. He can rule the worlds of matter, which roll in 
 harmony and brightness through the heavens, but cannot control the heart of 
 man." * * * "On a subject so momentous, and so difficult to be thor- 
 OUghly comprehended in all its relations, it might be expected that we should 
 almost instinctively turn to the records of inspired truth for instruction. He 
 who gave to the human soul its being, and all its powers of thought and voli. 
 tion, must surely know, whether any efficacious influence from without is 
 inconsistent with accountable agency. But here we are met by an assump- 
 tion which precludes a reference to the decision of Scripture. It is claimed 
 that rcaton, and consciousness, and common sense, have already decided the 
 point ; and that God cannot contradict, in his word, what he has distinctly 
 made known to us, by the faculties which he himself has implanted in the 
 soul. Whatever passages, therefore, which seem to favor a particular doctrine, 
 may be found in the Scriptures, they are to be so interpreted, as not to signify 
 any thing which reason pronounces to be absurd. We are called upon, then, 
 to inquire, whether the position that nothing but the will itself has any influ- 
 ence in determining what its acts shall be, is so intuitively or demonstrably 
 certain, as to preclude all possibility of finding the contrary declared in the 
 word of God. So long as this position is adhered to, it is vain to think of 
 appealing to the authority of the Scriptures, on the question respecting the 
 self-determining power of the will. They will of course be so explained, as 
 to express a meaning in conformity with the principles assumed. This is my 
 apology for making an application of dry metaphysics to a subject so nearly 
 connected with one of the departments of Scriptural theology. Those who 
 are prepared to receive implicitly the divine testimony, just as they find it on 
 the sacred page, may pass over this part of the subject as being unnecessary 
 for them ; and proceed to the section in which the evidence from Scripture is 
 presented." pp.11 — 14. 
 
 It appears from these remarks, that our author regards the sub- 
 ject under discussion, as " nearly connected with one of the depart- 
 ments of Scriptural theology," where the ultimate standard of 
 appeal must be the word of God. By this criterion all our philo- 
 sophical conclusions must be tested. " To the law and to the testi- 
 mony ; if they speak not according to this word, it is because there is 
 no light in them." President Day has no sympathy with those 
 who exalt reason above revelation ; or who explain away the obvi- 
 ous meaning of the Bible, to make it accord with the decisions of 
 their philosophy. Whether God can control, at pleasure, the mor- 
 al actions of men, is a question which he who created the human 
 soul, and who endued it witli all the attributes which it possesses, 
 is certainly better able to decide than a creature of yesterday. 
 And if in the revelation which he has given to man, he has spoken 
 on this subject, it becomes us to receive his testimony with child- 
 like simplicity. That the Bible is explicit on this point, our author 
 fully believes. He considers it indeed so explicit, that " those 
 who are prepared to receive the divine testimony just as they find 
 it on the sacred page," have no need to perplex their minds with 
 metaphysical speculations. 
 
 But the objectors to this doctrine contend that it involves absurd- 
 
itics too palpable to be admitted by a rational mind ; and conse- 
 quently that those passages of Scripture which seem to teach it, 
 must not be understood in their most obvious sense, but must be so 
 interpreted as not to contradict the decisions of reason. It becomes 
 necessary therefore, to meet the objector on his own ground, to 
 examine his reasoning and test his conclusions ; to inquire whether 
 there is not some error in his philosophy ; whether his reasoning 
 is not based on false principles ; and. whether after all, there is not 
 a perfect agreement between the dictates of sound philosophy, and 
 the plain declarations of the word of God. It was this, which 
 induced Edwards to write his treatise on the will. And this is 
 President Day's apology for engaging in metaphysical discussion 
 in defence of a doctrine of revelation. 
 
 We wish the reader to keep constantly in mind the great object 
 of the treatise. It is as we have stated, to vindicate the doctrine 
 of God's absolute dominion over the hearts and conduct of his 
 accountable creatures. It is the relation which the discussion has 
 to this " department of Scriptural theology," which, in the view 
 of our author, gives to it its practical importance, and clothes it 
 with "momentous interest." He says, 
 
 " The inquiry, then, concerning contingent self-determination, involves no 
 less a question than this; ichether God can exercise ani/ determining influence 
 over the moral actions of his creatures. Are we prepared to decide this 
 momentous question in the negative? While the worlds and systems of 
 worlds in the material universe are under the perfect control of their Maker, 
 is the moral world unavoidably left to the dominion of chance ?" pp. 147, 148. 
 
 To decide this "momentous question," he repeatedly insists, our 
 only sure and safe course is to resort to the Scriptures ; and to 
 them he makes his final appeal. After carrying his readers through 
 a course of clear and forcible argumentation, exposing the absurd- 
 ities involved in the objections to the doctrine in question, he 
 observes, 
 
 " My object has not been to lay a. philosophical foundation for religious belief; 
 but to prepare the way for simple and coniident reliance on the testimony of 
 Scripture. I have not undertaken to prove, by such arguments as must at 
 once carry conviction to every mind, that a controlling influence is exercised 
 over the will, in a way which is consistent with account aide agency. It has 
 been my aim to ascertain, whether the absurdity of the doctrine has been so 
 demonstrated, as to preclude all possibility of finding it asserted in the Scrip- 
 tures." p. 174. 
 
 Having thus prepared the way for an appeal to the oracles of 
 (rod, he brings forward in his closing section, an array of passa- 
 ges which so conclusively establish the point in debate, that their 
 force cannot be evaded, except by explanations which do violence 
 to all legitimate rules of interpretation. He shows that God 
 i- said to cause his people to walk in his statutes — to incline their 
 
hearts to obey him — (o turn the hearts of men whithersoever he 
 will — to leave men to themselves — to give them over to a repro- 
 bate mind — to make them obedient or perverse — to cause them 
 to execute his determinate counsel, and to do what bis band and 
 counsel had before determined to be done — to create in bis people 
 a clean heart, and to renew a right spirit within them — to keep 
 them from falling — and to subdue and to harden the hearts of men 
 at his pleasure. He closes bis appeal to the scriptures with the 
 following remarks. 
 
 " After attentively examining the various passages of Scripture which 
 speak of the purposes and agency of God, in relation to the hearts and actions 
 of men ; declaring that he causes righteousness to spring forth ; that he inclines 
 the hearts of his people to obey him ; that he turns them at his pleasure ; that 
 he makes them obedient or perverse ; that he directs their hearts unto the love 
 of God ; that his counsel determines before, the things to be done by human 
 agency ; that he gives a new heart and a right spirit ; that he works in his peo- 
 ple in will and to do; that he is able to keep them from falling, till he presents 
 them faultless before the presence of his glory ; and that, on the other hand, 
 he often hardens the heart and makes it obstinate : after weighing well the 
 import of these several expressions, can any one fail to admit, that according 
 to the Scriptures, God has a determining influence over human volitions ? Can 
 he escape from this conclusion, on any other ground, than that he has come 
 to the examination, with a preconceived and settled opinion, that such a doc- 
 trine cannot be true, and therefore cannot be found in the oracles of God ? 
 Arc we thus to explain away the explicit declarations of Scripture, till we 
 have brought them to coincide with our own philosophy ? Can the advocates 
 of a directing and a determining divine influence, express their opinions in 
 stronger or more definite terms, than those used by the inspired writers ?" pp. 
 193, 194. 
 
 We have referred to this part of the treatise in the first place, for 
 the purpose of keeping distinctly before the minds of our readers 
 the great point of " Scriptural theology," which the author is vin- 
 dicating against the philosophical objections by which it has been 
 assailed. The question at issue is, whether the moral world is as 
 completely under the control of God as the natural world. Not 
 whether they arc controlled in the same manner, and are subject 
 to the same laws. No one supposes that mind is subject to those 
 laws of nature "by which the motions ami positions of material 
 objects are regulated." But mind may have its laws as well as 
 matter, and may be as completely subject to its laws. The con- 
 nection between cause and effect may be as absolute in the moral, 
 as in the material universe. It was the doctrine of the Westmin- 
 ster divines, and has been the doctrine of Calvinists generally, that 
 « God's works of providence, are bis most holy, wise and powerful, 
 preserving and governing all bis creatures, and all their actions. ' 
 
 The great objection to this doctrine is, that it is inconsistent 
 \miIi that freedom of the will which is essential to moral agency. 
 This is a philosophical objection, and President Day has fairly 
 met it with a philosophical answer. That man is a free moral 
 
8 
 
 agent is admitted on both sides, and indeed cannot be questioned. 
 The decisions of each one's own conscience, and the whole 
 tenor of the Bible, make this point too plain to admit of doubt 
 for a moment. But what is essential to moral freedom ? Does it 
 imply independence of divine control 1 May not God exercise a 
 determining influence over the volitions of men, and still they be 
 free ? This brings us at once to the inquiry respecting the self- 
 determining power of the will. If. volitions are dependent on 
 some influence from without the mind, they may be controlled with- 
 out impairing the freedom of the agent. But if they are not 
 dependent they must be self-determined. 
 
 To prepare the way for the discussion of this point, President 
 Day in the first place, defines some of the terms which he has 
 occasion to use, such as cause, effect, contingence and power. 
 "A cause is an antecedent on which something depends." " An 
 effect is a consequent of something on which it depends." " An 
 effect may in many cases be produced not by a single antecedent, 
 but by the combined influence of several. All the circumstances 
 upon which the effect depends may be considered as a complex 
 cause." "Some writers speak of efficient causes as a distinct 
 class. But all causes are so far efficient or efficacious that they 
 are antecedents on which, in part at least, effects depend." Con- 
 tingence is used in two senses. In common discourse it denotes 
 that something has taken place, the immediate cause of which is 
 not known. But philosophers have used it to denote the absolute 
 negation of causation. It is used by President Day " to signify 
 the exclusion of causation or dependence in the case of volition ; 
 the denial that there is any thing preceding which determines the 
 act of the will to be what it is. According to this signification, 
 the opposite of contingence is dependence." We obtain our idea 
 of power by observing the relation between cause and effect. 
 " The efficacy of the cause, its being of such a nature as to pro- 
 duce effects, is its power. In other words, power is that belonging 
 to a cause, upon which the effects depend." " In the most extensive 
 use of the word, the power to do any thing includes all the ante- 
 cedents, the whole aggregate of circumstances upon which the 
 effect depends." "We rarely have occasion, however to speak of 
 power in this absolute sense." " In speaking of human agency 
 we are accustomed to say, that a man has power to do any thing 
 which he does whenever he will." 
 
 After some remarks on the powers of the mind, and the differ- 
 ent modes of classifying them, he comes to a consideration of the 
 will and its operations. 
 
 " There has been no settled agreement with respect to that most important 
 faculty called the will. European writers generally confine the term to the 
 power of ordering some bodily or mental act. Volition, according to them, 
 is determining to do something. A man wills to move his hand, or to think 
 
9 
 
 on a particular subject. In such cases, the act. which is willed immediately 
 follows the volition. A man determines to speak, and he speaks ; he wills to 
 walk, and he walks. We frequently resolve on a course of conduct, for the 
 sake of obtaining some distant good. A mnn determines to devote himself 
 to the acquisition of property, to gaining applause, to sensual gratification, or 
 to a life of benevolent effort. Such a resolution is called a commanding pur- 
 pose of life, predominant inclination, governing state of the will, dominant 
 preference, generic volition, &c. to distinguish it from those particular acts by 
 which these general determinations are carried into execution. In addition to 
 both these classes of volitions, the New England divines, since the days of 
 Edwards at least, have very commonly considered emotions or affections as acts 
 of the will. The elder Edwards says, ' I humbly conceive, that the affections 
 of the soul are not properly distinguished from the will ; as though they were 
 two faculties in the soul.' ' The affections arc no other than the more vigor- 
 ous and sensible exercises of the inclination and will of the soul.' But 
 although emotions, purposes and executive volitions arc, in some respects sim- 
 ilar ; yet in other respects, they are different. Emotion is directed to an 
 object ; a purpose fixes on an end ; an executive volition orders an act. Exec- 
 utive acts may depend on a predominant purpose ; and the purpose may 
 depend on antecedent emotions. A general purpose may look to some distant 
 end ; an executive volition relates to something which is immediately to fol- 
 low." pp. 38 — 40. 
 
 From this it will be seen that President Day after the example 
 of Edwards, includes in the acts of the will, all the moral feelings 
 or affections. He rightly judges, however, that emotions, purpo- 
 ses, and executive volitions are not, in all respects, alike, and that 
 they may with great propriety, be arranged into distinct classes. 
 It is important to keep this classification in mind, in order to 
 understand the subsequent discussion. 
 
 When we speak of the determination of the will, our inquiry is 
 not whether man is the agent of his' own volitions, nor why he 
 wills at all; but why he wills as he docs — why he chooses one 
 thing rather than its opposite ? What determines him thus to 
 choose ? 
 
 " Is it a preceding act of the will ? This is undoubtedly the case in many 
 instances. Taking the will in its most enlarged acceptation, as including not 
 only executive acts, but purposes and emotions, acts of one class may be deter- 
 mined by those of another. A man purposes to go to the post-office ; every 
 step he takes on his way, is determined by this purpose. And the purpose may 
 have been determined by some strong emotion; an eager desire, perhaps, to 
 receive intelligence of the recovery of a friend from sickness, or the safe arri- 
 val of a richly freighted ship. Farther, the emotions themselves are com- 
 monly excited, either by perceptions of external realities, or by the internal 
 imaginings of our own minds. Imperative acts of the will, then, may be 
 preceded by purposes, the purposes by emotions, the emotions by perceptions 
 or the workings of imagination. But all these belong to the mind. They do 
 not reach beyond ourselves." * * "But every step cannot be dependent 
 on another within the mind. For this would involve the absurdity of at least 
 one step before the first, or else of an infinite series of steps. The first act, 
 then, must proceed from something within the mind which is not an act, or 
 from something without, or from both together, or from nothing.'' 1 * * " If 
 the first act of the series proceeds from some mental state, which is neither an 
 act nor the substance of the mind ; that stnte must have had an origin, either 
 
10 
 
 from without or from something within, which, if we trace hack the chain of 
 dependencies, and do not admit contingence, any where, to break the series, 
 will bring us to something without the mind." * * * " If it be said that 
 our mental exercises are dependent on our propensities, which are a part of 
 ourselves, still it is to be considered that our propensities are either acquired, 
 in consequence of previous states of mind in connection with external circum- 
 stances, or are a part of the original constitution of the mind, received from 
 its Creator. Or if it be supposed that a man practices iniquity or virtue, 
 because he has formed a sinful or holy purpose ; or because by his own acts, 
 he has contracted a sinful or virtuous habit; yet his first sinful or virtuous act 
 on which the others are considered as dependent, did not proceed from a pur- 
 pose or habit of his." * * * " Some writers speak of the power of will- 
 ing, as being the sole and sufficient cause why the mind wills one way, rather 
 than another." * * " But an equal power to will any way indifferently, 
 is not surely the only ground of willing one way rather than another." * * 
 " Liberty to either side does not turn the will uniformly to one side. Power to 
 the contrary, does not bind the soul in unwavering devotedness to its Maker. 
 An equal chance of doing right and doing wrong, does not secure a course of 
 uniform rectitude. If it be said that there is really no cause or reason why 
 the will turns one way rather than the contrary, this brings us to contingent 
 self-determination." pp. 43 — 48. 
 
 " The question, then, for our consideration is, whether the volitions of 
 accountable agents are contingent or dependent ; not whether they are depend- 
 ent on the mind, objects of choice, &.c. for coming into existence merely ; but 
 for being such volitions as they are, right or wrong, sinful or holy. The mind 
 it is admitted, puts forth volitions, but does it determine of what sort they 
 shall be ? Docs any thing else determine this ? Does any thing else make 
 any difference in the volitions ? Or is it a mere matter of accident, that they 
 are as they arc ? If they are not dependent they must be contingent, in the 
 absolute sense in which we are now using the term. If they are not contin- 
 gent they must be dependent." * * * "If the kind of volitions which a 
 man puts forth, is to be ascribed to accident, in what part of the series of 
 mental acts, does this prolific contingence, this wonder-working nonentity, 
 ' this effectual no-cause,' do its work ? When does it break the connection 
 between volition and all preceding influence? Arc executive acts of the will 
 independent of purposes, and emotions, and appetites ? Does the tippler resort 
 to the dram-shop without any inducement ? Or if at any time he denies 
 himself his accustomed indulgence, has he no motive for his abstinence ?" * 
 * * "Is the forming of purposes, the place where the dependence upon 
 preceding influence is broken oft"? When a man resolves to devote his powers 
 and labors to the calls of ambition, is it done independently of any love of 
 distinction ? When the Christian abandons his former pursuits, and forms a 
 purpose of devoting himself to the service of Cod, does he do it without a 
 reason ; a reason of sufficient efficacy to control his decision ? Do men form 
 resolutions for the sake of obtaining those objects to which they are perfectly 
 indifferent? If it be admitted, that our imperative volitions are influenced 
 by our purposes, and our purposes by our desires and appetites, shall we find 
 in the latter the independence which contingent self-determination implies? 
 When objects arc brought before our minds, is it altogether a matter of acci- 
 dent, whether we shall be pleased with them or not ? Is it as easy to be grat- 
 ified with contemptuous treatment as with applause ? Is it an even chance, 
 whether a miser will be most pleased with a guinea or a sixpence ?" pp. 
 49 — 52. 
 
 " But it may be asked, does not a man originate his own volitions ? They 
 undoubtedly begin with him in this sense, that they have no existence till he 
 puts them forth. But docs this imply that dependence in the case, can be 
 traced no further back than to the agent ?" * * * " If it be said that the 
 nature of his volitions depends on nothing but the nature of the man ; yet, it 
 
11 
 
 is to be considered, that this nature of his must have had an origin from 
 some cause. Or if there he a state of the mind, which is different from its 
 nature and its operations, and which is the cause of its volitions, that state is 
 not the product of chance." p. 53. 
 
 " Is man the efficient cause of his own volitions ? There surely can be no 
 reasonable doubt on this point, if by efficient cause, be meant the agent who 
 wills." * * * " But if we apply the term efficient cause to every thing, 
 which is in any way concerned in determining what a man's volitions shall 
 be, we cannot say that he is the only efficient cause of them." p. 54. 
 
 That volitions are not contingent but dependent, our author 
 proceeds to show, from the influence of motives. He defines a 
 motive to be " that which moves, inclines, induces or influences the 
 mind to will, or which has a tendency thus to move it." Motives 
 are of two kinds, external and internal. An external motive, is 
 some object contemplated by the mind, which has a tendency to 
 move the will. An internal motive, is some feeling or desire of 
 the mind, which is awakened by an object of contemplation, and 
 which prompts the purposes and executive acts of the will. 
 
 " The motive to an imperative act, may be a wish to execute some previous 
 purpose. The motive to a purpose, is the desire to obtain some object which 
 is viewed as eligible. That which immediately excites the volition in this 
 case, is an affection of the mind, an emotion, an internal motive. But that 
 which excites the emotion itself, may be an object without the mind, an exter. 
 nal motive. A tree loaded with fair and delicious fruit, excites desire in the 
 beholder. This desire may move him to pluck the fruit. The fruit itself is 
 an external motive. The desire which stimulates to the act of gathering it, 
 is an internal motive. One act of the will, therefore, in the more enlarged 
 acceptation of the term will, may be the motive to another act. The affec- 
 tions, which, by some, are considered as volitions, may be the motives to pur- 
 poses and executive volitions." pp. 56, 57. 
 
 The influence of external motives depends not merely upon the 
 object which is contemplated, but upon "the correspondence 
 between that and the state of the mind." The same object may 
 excite very different feelings in different minds, and in the same 
 mind at different times. A view of the character of God will 
 awaken complacency in a holy mind, and enmity in an unholy 
 mind. But " the same mind, or minds, in every respect alike, in 
 precisely the same state, in the same circumstances, and under the 
 same influence, will certainly choose in the same way." 
 
 To suppose that the mind may choose without motives, involves 
 the absurdity of supposing that it may choose without having any 
 thing to choose, or any reason why it does choose. But if the mind 
 in every act of choice, is influenced by some motive, then volitions 
 are not contingent but dependent. Whether we call motives 
 causes, conditions or occasions of volition ; they are antecedents 
 on which volition depends, and without which it cannot exist. It 
 is as impossible for the mind to choose without motives, as it is for 
 a man to breathe without air, or to see without light. It has been 
 
12 
 
 said, that since the power of choosing does not exist in the motives, 
 it must exist exclusively in the mind, and consequently that the 
 mind has power to choose even without motives. With the same 
 truth it might be said, that since the power of breathing does not 
 exist in the air, nor the power of seeing in the light, therefore man 
 has power to breathe without air, and to see without light. If man 
 has power to choose without motives, let us suppose him to exer- 
 cise that power. What kind of choice would that be, in which 
 nothing is chosen ? 
 
 May not the mind control the motives by which it is influenced ? 
 In other words, may it not decide among different motives by which 
 it will be governed ? But by what motive is that act governed by 
 which this decision is made 1 Is it prompted by some preceding 
 motive, and is that selected by some preceding act, and so on, ad 
 infinitum ? 
 
 "The power of the mind over the objects which it contemplates, is not 
 such that it can make them all agreeable, and in any degree, at its bidding." 
 * * " May not our volitions, however, be in opposition to our feelings ? We 
 may undoubtedly, oppose some of our desires, for the sake of gratifying oth- 
 ers. But what motive can a man have to will against all motives ? Willing, 
 at least, in the case of imperative acts, is determining to do something, and 
 that for the sake of obtaining the objects of our desire. When such objects 
 are before the mind, can we will to turn away from thorn, for the sake of 
 something which is not, on any account, desired? If objects of desire have 
 no tendency to move the will in a particular direction, they are not properly 
 speaking, motives. If they have such a tendency, they must actually move 
 the will, provided there is nothing which has a tendency to move it in a differ- 
 ent direction. When on one side there is no influence, any influence on the 
 opposite side must turn the scale. Whatever does not do this, has no influence 
 in the case." pp. G3, 64. 
 
 From the foregoing extracts it will be seen that President Day 
 has conclusively shown, that volitions are not self-determined, but 
 are dependent on some influence out of the mind. If this is con- 
 sistent with moral agency, as it must be if man is a moral agent, 
 then, moral agency does not imply independence of divine control ; 
 for whatever be the influence under which the mind acts, that 
 influence must be traced ultimately, to the will of the Creator. 
 This conclusion is thus happily expressed by our author. 
 
 " If the volitions of accountable agents are dependent, for their nature on 
 any thing preceding ; if contingence docs not come in, to break the chain of 
 connection ; then the Creator may have a determining influence over the vo- 
 litions themselves, by the power which he possesses over the causes, condi- 
 tions, occasions, and other antecedents on which choice depends. If the nat- 
 ural constitution of the agent has any concern, in deciding the character of his 
 volitions, this constitution is moulded by the hand of God. If external motives 
 have any sway over the will, these are presented under a superintending provi- 
 dence. If internal perceptions and emotions have any influence on volition, 
 1hesc arc dependent on other antecedents which are under the regulation of 
 divine power. By either leaving his creatures to themselves, to yield to their 
 own propensities, and the various influences with which, in the natural course 
 
13 
 
 of events, they arc surrounded; or by the special interposition of his provi- 
 dence, whenever be sees tit, and by the agency of his spirit, he can exercise a 
 controlling power over the acts of the will." p. 147. 
 
 In the section on liberty and necessity, the author shows, that 
 the highest liberty of which man is capable, and of which it is 
 possible to conceive, is perfectly consistent with that dependence of 
 volitions on something preceding, for which he contends. 
 
 To the objections that this doctrine is contradicted by conscious- 
 ness and common sense ; that it makes man a machine, controlled 
 by physical agency ; that it represents man as passive ; that it 
 destroys accountability ; that it exhibits God as the author of sin ; 
 and that it runs into fatalism and pantheism, President Day has 
 made appropriate and forcible replies. Had we not already quoted 
 so much, we should be glad to present our readers with copious 
 extracts from this part of the work. As it is, we cannot refrain 
 from inserting a short extract relating to each of these topics. 
 
 Consciousness. " A man is conscious that he wills or determines. But arc 
 we conscious that our volitions are dependent on nothing preceding ? that 
 motives from without have no influence, in determining our minds to choose 
 as they do ?" * * " Arc we conscious that our affections and passions, 
 however strong they may be, have no influence upon our purposes and execu- 
 tive volitions ? Are we conscious, that neither external circumstances, nor the 
 habitual character of our minds, have any concern in determining the nature 
 of our emotions ? Are we conscious that motives are mere objects of choice, 
 to which we arc perfectly indifferent, till we have made our election ? Arc 
 we conscious that we are able to prefer chains and a dungeon, in themselves 
 considered, to liberty and the light of heaven ? Arc we conscious of ever 
 acting against all the motives which are before our minds, and that without 
 any inducement to such a determination ?" pp. Ill, 112. 
 
 Accountability. " But what is necessary to render a man accountable for 
 acts of the will itself? They must, unquestionably, be his own acts, and not 
 those of another. But must he not also have power to will the contrary ? Now 
 what can this inquiry mean ? Power over an action implies some antece- 
 dent or antecedents, on which the action depends. Volitions, if they depend upon 
 anything beside the agent himself, must depend on his feelings, his affections, 
 his dispositions, his apprehensions. When it is affirmed, that an accountable 
 agent must have power to will in opposite directions ; are we to understand 
 the meaning to be, that he has equal power to either side ; or only that he has 
 some power to the contrary ? If the latter only be intended, there is no diffi- 
 culty in seeing, that the balance of feeling may be so decisively on one side, 
 as to control the man's volitions. Is it necessary to accountable agency, that 
 the feelings for and against the decisions of the will, should be equal ? Is the 
 murderer free from guilt, unless he has as strong an inclination to spare his 
 victim, as to take his life ? Is the sinner excusable for his impenitence, unless 
 he has an equal disposition to obey God, and to disobey him ? Are the angels 
 in heaven deserving of no praise for their constancy, unless they have an equal 
 propensity to revolt?" pp. 115, 116. 
 
 Common sense. " Common sense teaches, that motives do not choose and 
 act of themselves, without an agent ; that they do not lie, or swear, or steal. 
 But is it a doctrine of common sense, that the agent acts ■without motives ; 
 or that motives are merely objects, upon which volition, put forth fortuitously, 
 may fasten ; that they have no influence whatever upon his decision ; that the 
 sparkling bowl offers no allurement to the voluptuary ; that to the thief, a 
 
14 
 
 purse of guineas presents no temptation to steal ; that external objects have 
 no effect in moving the passions ; or that the passions, when excited, have no 
 tendency to give a direction to the will ?" pp. 125, 126. 
 
 Mechanical and physical agency. " We sometimes hear it said, that if the 
 will is directed by motives, it is not a self-moving power, it is a mere machine. 
 It is easy to use words without meaning. What is a machine ? It is com- 
 monly understood to be an instrument, composed entirely of matter, having 
 certain movements, and set in operation by a material force. Has the will, or 
 its acts, any of these properties ? Is it a material substance ? Has it any 
 bodily motions ? Is it impelled by a mechanical force ? Does a machine, 
 like the mind in willing, act from choice ? Is it under the influence of 
 rational motives ? Is it moved by persuasion, by argument, by commands, 
 by hope of reward, or fear of punishment ?" * * * " Nearly allied to 
 the objection, which represents dependent volition as being mechanical, is 
 another, which considers such volition as being physical agency, rather than 
 moral. The multifarious meanings of the term physical, renders it difficult 
 to determine what is intended by this objection. It is one of those pliable 
 words, which may be made to mean one thing or another, any thing or 
 nothing, as occasion may require. Its proper signification is, according to 
 ■nature. Is it claimed that nothing can be moral agency, but that which is 
 contrary to nature, or which has no connection with nature ?" * * "Is it 
 the certain connection between cause and effect, which is considered as inad- 
 missible in the case of volition ? Is it this that is called physical causation ? 
 And is it true, that certainty belongs only to the relations of the material 
 world?" pp. 129 — 135. 
 
 Author of sin. " What is it to be the author of sin ? According to the 
 proper use of language, it is to commit sin. Will any one charge upon God, 
 the sin which his creatures commit ? He is the author of their being. He 
 may be the author of the circumstances in which they are placed. But docs 
 this make him the author of their sin ? If it docs, how is the difficulty remo- 
 ved, by considering volitions as altogether contingent ; by representing it to 
 he the very nature of a moral agent, to be liable to sin by accident ? Who 
 gave to man this nature, from which contingent volitions proceed ? Is God 
 to be considered the author of sin, if he has cither created such agents as 
 would be liable to sin, or brought before his creatures, such objects as might 
 influence them to sin ?" pp. 149, 150. 
 
 Prevention of sin. " If the volitions of moral agents are under the con- 
 trol of the Creator, the inquiry may be made, why has he not wholly prevented 
 the existence of sin ? This difficulty does not press exclusively upon the 
 opinion, that volitions are dependent upon something preceding, for being 
 what they arc. Let it be supposed that they are contingent. It is generally 
 admitted, by those who believe that this is the case, that they are forseen by God. 
 Why, then, docs he give existence to beings who he knows will sin ; and that 
 many of them will so sin, that it would have ' been good for them, if they 
 had never been born ?' Will it be said, that he could not avoid bringing them 
 into being, consistently with the best good of the universe ? And how do wc 
 know, even supposing that their volitions arc under his control, that he could 
 interpose to prevent all sin, in a way consistent with the best good of the 
 universe ? Do you say, that if he could not, it must be because he could not 
 prevent all sin ivithout destroying moral agency ? Is the destroying of moral 
 agency the only evil which could possibly result from deranging the plans of 
 infinite wisdom and benevolence ? If it be admitted, that all sin cannot be 
 prevented, in the best moral system ; docs it follow, that it could not be pre- 
 vented in any moral system ?" pp. 151, 152. 
 
 Activity and dependence. " It has been said, that a man cannot be a free 
 agent, if he is a mere passive recipient of influence from without. This is very 
 true. If he is merely passive, he is no agent at all. If he is merely passive, he is 
 not active, and therefore docs not act. But what absurdity is there in suppo- 
 
15 
 
 sing, that he may be active and passive too ; active in willing, and passive in 
 being caused to will ? If a thing is caused to be active, does it follow, that it 
 is not active ; that it is merely passive '.' If a man is made willing to act in a 
 certain way, docs it prove that he is not willing ? Is it urged, that to suppose 
 a man to be caused to act freely, is inconsistent with the definition of free 
 agency ? Would it not be more to the purpose, to endeavor to render our 
 definitions conformable to the reality of things ; rather than to take it for 
 granted, tbat facts correspond with our arbitrary definitions ?" p. 1G4. 
 
 Fatalism. " An argument in favor of independent self-determination, is 
 drawn, by some, from the consideration that it enables us to keep at a safe 
 distance from the doctrine of Fatalism. This calling in the aid of an odious 
 appellation, is a very convenient and summary mode of confuting an oppo- 
 nent. Whatever was meant by the fatalism of the ancients, it did not imply, 
 that all the changes in the world are under the guidance of a being of infi- 
 nite wisdom, and infinite goodness. This was so far from being the case, 
 that the gods themselves were represented by the doctrine as being under the 
 control of the fates." * * "Is there no way of escaping the odium of 
 fatalism, but by adopting the fortuitous contingencc of Epicurus ? Is it 
 fatalism to believe, that he who formed the soul of man, can so touch the 
 springs of its action, as to influence the will, without interfering with the 
 freedom of its choice ? Is a chain of causes, suspended from the throne of 
 nonentity, to be likened to the purposes and agency of the Omniscient Crea- 
 tor?" pp. 167 — 169. 
 
 We have given copious extracts, that we might not be accused 
 of misrepresenting our author, and that our readers might have a 
 fair opportuty of judging of the merits of the work. 
 
 President Day affirms in his introductory remarks, that " the 
 self-determining power of the will, is a subject intimately con- 
 nected with many of the theological discussions of the present 
 day." To what discussions does he refer? What recent specu- 
 lations does he suppose to be based on the theory which he has 
 undertaken to refute ? Who are their authors, and in what publi- 
 cations arc they to be found ? We know not that any theological 
 disputant professes to adopt the theory in question. But that the 
 great doctrine, which it was the object of President Day to vindi- 
 cate, has been called in question, Ave have promised to show. We 
 will now endeavor to redeem our promise. The doctrine is, that 
 God can control, at pleasure, the moral actions of his accountable 
 creatures. " If," says our author, " the volitions of accountable 
 agents are dependent, for their nature, on any thing preceding ; if 
 contingencc does not come in to break the chain of connection ; 
 the Creator may have a determining influence over the volitions 
 themselves, by the power which he possesses over the causes, con- 
 ditions, occasions, and other antecedents on which choice depends." 
 But if God can control, at pleasure, the moral actions of his 
 creatures, then certainly, if it had been his pleasure, he could have 
 prevented sin, and secured universal holiness, in a moral system. 
 This doctrine, we say, has been called in question. Now for the 
 proof. 
 
 Dr. Taylor, in his Conch ad Clerum, preached in the Chapel of 
 
16 
 
 Yale College, Sept, 10, 1828, in reply to the inquiry why God per- 
 mitted man to sin, says, 
 
 " Do you know that God could have done better, better on the whole, or 
 better, it" he gave him existence at all, even for the individual himself? The 
 error lies in the gratuitous assumption, that God could have adopted a moral 
 system, and prevented all sin, or at least, the present degree of sin." p. 29. 
 
 He resumes the subject in a note,.and says, 
 
 " Would not a moral universe of perfect holiness, and of course, of perfect 
 happiness, be happier and better, than one comprising sin and its miseries ? 
 And must not infinite benevolence accomplish all the good it can ? Would 
 not a benevolent God, had it been possible to him in the nature of things, have 
 secured the existence of universal holiness in his moral kingdom ?" * * * 
 " Who does most reverence to God, he who supposes that God would have 
 prevented all sin in his moral universe, but could not ; or he who affirms that 
 he could have prevented it, but xoould not ?" * * * " Is there then the 
 least particle of evidence, that the entire prevention of sin in moral beings, is 
 possible to God in the nature of things ?" * * " The assumption therefore, 
 that God could, in a moral system, have prevented all sin, or the present 
 degree of sin, is wholly gratuitous and unauthorized, and ought never to be 
 made the basis of an objection, or an argument." pp. 32, 33. 
 
 Is not this calling in question the doctrine of God's entire con- 
 trol over the moral universe? The view which is here taken of the 
 government of God, has bsen strenuously maintained and defend- 
 ed in the pages of the Christian Spectator ever since the publica- 
 tion of the above mentioned sermon. It was the great point of 
 controversy between Dr. Taylor and Dr. Woods. It was one of 
 the points of controversy between Dr. Taylor and the writer of this 
 article, in the Spirit of the Pilgrims. Enough has been written 
 and published, on this subject, by the New Haven divines, to make 
 a volume of no inconsiderable size. We shall be able to refer to 
 only a few of their statements. 
 
 In their Review of Dr. Woods' Letters, Christian Spectator, 
 Sept. 1830, they say, " what Dr. Taylor holds, is, that the nature 
 of moral agency is such, that it may be true that God cannot pre- 
 vent sin in all instances under a moral system." Dr. Woods had 
 affirmed, what it is the great object of President Day's treatise to 
 establish, that "God has a perfect unlimited power over all the 
 springs and occasions of action inhuman beings, — over every 
 thing which has the nature of a motive or excitement to action; 
 and especially over the disposition of the heart." To this they 
 reply, " This again is mere assertion." Dr. Woods had shown 
 that Dr. Taylors's reasoning from the case of a father and his 
 children was inconclusive, because God has a power over the 
 hearts of men which parents have not over the hearts of their chil- 
 dren. « He hath mercy on whom he will have mercy. 11 The king's 
 heart is in the hand of the Lord, as the rivers of water, he turneth it 
 whithersoever he wilV But the case of the father is different. 
 
17 
 
 If he is affectionate and faithful, he does every thing he can, to 
 make his children virtuous and happy." To this, they reply : 
 
 " A benevolent God does not<io what he can, to make his creatures virtuous 
 and happy ! We think this position might be left to answer for itself. But 
 we would ask, if God can make all his accountable creatures perfectly holy, 
 why he does not do it?" p. 559. 
 
 They say again, 
 
 " If holiness consists in voluntary action, then the fact that God secures it 
 in moral agents for a time, is no proof that he can secure its continuance foi- 
 ever. The nature of free agency precludes such assenions respecting God, 
 as truly as it does respecting an earthly parent." p. 5(il. They say also. 
 
 " The question is, what could God have done to secure more holiness and 
 less sin in a moral system? This is the task, then, which devolves on Dr. 
 Woods, viz : to prove that God could have kept all sin, or the present degree of 
 sin out of a universal moral system. Now we say, that this is a task 
 which Dr. Woods cannot accomplish; and for this very obvious reason, that 
 the nature of the case absolutely precludes all proof, being one which may in- 
 volve a palpable self-contradiction. It will not be denied that free moral 
 agents can do wrong, under every possible influence to prevent it. Thepossi- 
 bility of a contradiction in supposing them to be prevented from doing 
 wrong, is therefore demonstrably certain. Free moral agents can do wrong, 
 under all possible preventing influence. Using their powers as they may 
 use them, they will sin ; and no one can show that some such agents will not 
 use their powers as they may use them. This possibility that free agents will 
 sin, remains, (suppose what else you will,) so long as moral agency remains; 
 and how can it be proved that a thing will not be, when for aught that ap- 
 pears, it may be?" pp. 502, 503. 
 
 We ask again, is not this calling in question the doctrine 
 which it is the object of President Day's treatise to defend ? The 
 reasoning in the above extracts is all based on the assumption, 
 that moral agents, so far as moral action is concerned, are in- 
 dependent: — that they not only have natural ability to do wrong, 
 (in the sense in which Edwards uses that term) but that there 
 can be no certainty, and consequently no proof that they will 
 not do wrong, whatever God may do to prevent it. " The na- 
 ture of the case," we are told, " absolutely precludes all proof." 
 " Free moral agents can do wrong under all possible preventing 
 influence. Using their powers as they may use them, they will 
 sin ; and no one can show that some such agents will not use 
 their powers as they may use them." Some such agents! 
 Why do they thus limit their conclusion? Their reasoning, 
 if it proves any thing, proves that there can be no certainty that 
 //// moral agents will not sin. Who then can show that every 
 saint and every angel will not yet apostatize? They are free 
 moral agents. " Using their powers as they may use them, they 
 will sin ; and who can prove that a thing will not be, when for 
 aught that appears, it may be?" Who then can prove that all 
 3 
 
18 
 
 the subjects of God's moral kingdom will not yet raise the 
 standard of revolt? It is no more true of some moral agents 
 that they can do wrong under all possible preventing influence, 
 than it is of all moral agents; and if this fact of itself pre- 
 cludes all possibility of proof that some such agents will not 
 sin, it equally precludes the possibility of proof that all such 
 agents will not sin. "This possibility that free agents will sin, 
 remains, (suppose what else you will.") No matter how con- 
 clusively it may be demonstrated, that volitions are depend- 
 ent upon some influence out of the mind, and that this influence 
 must be ultimately under the control of God. No matter how 
 full and how explicit may be the testimony of the Scrip- 
 tures, that God has complete dominion over the hearts of his 
 creatures ; it must all pass for nothing. It cannot be admit- 
 ted as proof, because " the nature of the case absolutely pre- 
 cludes all proof." To suppose God able to control the con- 
 duct of moral agents, may involve a contradiction. This, we 
 are told, is demonstrably certain. We should like, however, 
 to see the demonstration, before we yield our assent. 
 
 Suppose moral agents have power, that is, natural ability to 
 sin under all circumstances; but natural ability is not inconsis- 
 tent with moral necessity. Cannot God render it certain that 
 moral agents will not do what they have natural ability to do? 
 Can he not prevent sin, without destroying the power to sin? 
 Most certainly he can, if he can control the moral causes on 
 which volitions depend. And if he does possess this power, is 
 it demonstrably certain that there can be no proof of the fact? 
 The hinge on which the whole dispute turns, is the very question 
 discussed by President Day. Are volitions dependent, or con- 
 tingent ? Is there any cause or reason why free agents choose, 
 as they do, except the fact, that they do thus choose? 
 
 In the same article from which the above extracts are ta- 
 ken, we find the following declaration : 
 
 "That moral agents as such — moral agents in their very nature as moral 
 agents, should be entirely dependent on some ab extra agency for right and 
 wrong moral action, is another solecism. To say that it must be so in the na- 
 ture of tilings, is to say that God is not a free moral agent, and that he has 
 not made, and cannot make, creatures in his own image. All moral exer- 
 cise or action, is voluntary action, and all voluntary action implies power 
 in the agent to the opposite voluntary action." p. 565. 
 
 By " ab extra agency," they mean all efficacious influence 
 from without the mind, which is, in any way, under the con- 
 trol of God ; and they seem to suppose that created moral agents 
 are as independent of God for their voluntary actions, as God 
 is independent of any other being. On any other supposition, 
 
19 
 
 it is impossible to understand their illustration. But are not 
 moral agents dependent on ab extra influence? Does the mind 
 ever choose without motives? that is, without having any 
 thing to choose, or any reason why it does choose? Can 
 there be any such thing as choice in which nothing is chosen? 
 But if the mind cannot choose without motives; and if the 
 will is always determined by the strongest motive, as President 
 Day, and President Edwards have both demonstrated, then a 
 moral agent is dependent on ab extra influence for right and 
 wrong moral action. The reasons why he chooses one thing 
 rather than another, must be traced back to something out of 
 the mind. It is true that executive volitions are determined 
 by purposes, and purposes by emotions or affections; but the 
 affections are excited by external motives; and "these are pre- 
 sented under a superintending providence." Thus we see 
 that all choice depends ultimately on ab extra influence. There 
 is no way to avoid this conclusion, but to plunge into all the 
 absurdities of the self-determining power of the will. 
 
 It is a favorite position of the New Haven divines, and one 
 which they have often repeated and vindicated, that " God 
 prefers, all tilings considered, holiness to sin in all instances in 
 which the latter takes iplace." Why, then, we ask, does he 
 suffer sin to exist? Why does he not prevent sin, by securing 
 holiness in its stead, in all instances? The only answer which 
 can be given to this question, is, that he is not able to do it. 
 Most certainly he must be disposed to secure, what he, on the 
 whole, prefers. Accordingly they say, " God not only pre- 
 fers, on the whole, that his creatures should forever perform 
 their duties rather than neglect them, but purposes on his part, 
 to do all in his power to promote this very object in his king- 
 dom." Ch. Spec. 1832, p. 660. If this be so, then certainly 
 God has not complete control over the hearts of his creatures. 
 It cannot be true that the king's heart is in the hand of the 
 Lord, as the rivers of water; and that he turneth it whithersoever 
 he will; for no king, nor any other human being has ever lived, 
 who has not failed to perform his duties. It cannot be true that 
 he hath mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he icill 
 he hardencth: for he would have mercy on all, if he could; and 
 so far from hardening whom he will, it is not his will that any 
 should he hardened; but he prefers, on the whole, that the 
 hearts of all should be softened, and he " purposes to do all in 
 his power to promote this very object in his kingdom." If 
 " God prefers, all things considered, holiness to sin, in all in- 
 stances," then not a single sin has ever been committed which 
 God could have prevented, by securing holiness in its stead. 
 
20 
 
 In every instance of transgression, man has been too strong for 
 his Maker. His free agency has triumphed over the utmost 
 skill and power of Jehovah to restrain and control it. If this 
 is not maintaining the self-determining power of the will in 
 its fullest extent, we know not when, or by whom it was ever 
 maintained. 
 
 We are aware, however, that the New Haven divines have 
 elsewhere admitted, though, as we think, very inconsistently, 
 that God might have secured obedience in particular instances 
 in which he has not secured it. But they contend, that had he 
 done so, it might have resulted in a vast increase of sin on the 
 whole. Thus Dr. Taylor says in the note to his Concio ad 
 Clerum. 
 
 " Had he prevented the sins of one human being to the present time, or had 
 he brought to repentance one sinner more than he has, who can prove that the 
 requisite interposition for the purpose, would not result in a vast increase of 
 sin in the system, including even ihe apostacy and augmented guilt of that 
 individual!" 
 
 We have a remark or two to make in reference to this theory. 
 
 1. It is, as we have seen, altogether inconsistent with their 
 favorite position. If in any instance in which sin exists, God 
 could, by any interposition, have secured holiness in its stead; 
 then, in that instance, he did not prefer, all things considered, 
 holiness to sin; for there was one consideration which induced 
 him to prefer sin to holiness in that instance, viz., rather than 
 exert the requisite interposition, he preferred that the sin should 
 exist instead of the holiness which he might have secured. 
 Consequently, he does not prefer, all things considered, holiness 
 to sin in all instances. There are instances, in which he per- 
 mits acts of disobedience, when he might have secured obedi- 
 ence; and if he does so, he doubtless, on the whole, prefers 
 to do so. They must, therefore, give up this theory, or aban- 
 don their favorite position. 
 
 But 2. What reason can there be to suppose that the pre- 
 vention of sin in one part of the system, will tend to promote 
 its prevalence in another part? Do these divines suppose, 
 that the empire of Jehovah is too vast for him to manage? — that 
 he cannot watch over every part of it at the same time? — that 
 in order to secure allegiance in one part of his dominions, 
 he must necessarily leave other parts unprotected, and exposed 
 to such fatal influences as will ensure revolt? Is such the char- 
 acter of the Almighty, Omniscient, and Omnipresent God? 
 
 But 3. What conceivable tendency has the prevention of sin, 
 to promote the prevalence of sin? Suppose the angels who fell, 
 
21 
 
 had been confirmed in a state of holiness; would their perseve- 
 ring and cheerful obedience, have been likely to excite discon- 
 tent and insurrection among their associates? Suppose our 
 first parents had been prevented from sinning; would this 
 have had any tendency to fill our world with rebellion, or to 
 excite rebellion in any other world? But Dr. Taylor says, 
 
 " Facts, so far as they are known to us, furnish no support to the assump- 
 tion, thai God could in a moral system prevent all sin, or even the present 
 degree of sin. For we knowof no creatures of God, whose holiness is secured 
 without that influence which results either directly or indirectly from the 
 existence of sin and its punishment. How then can it be shown from facts, 
 that God could secure any of his moral creatures in holiness, without this in- 
 fluence; or to what purpose is it 10 allege instances of the prevention of sin 
 under this influence, to prove that God could prevent it without this influence'? 
 Rather, do not all known facts furnish a strong presumption to the contrary'? 
 If God could prevent all sin without this influence, why has he not done it?" 
 Concio ad Clerum, p. 33. 
 
 And is there no influence which God can exert upon the 
 minds of perfectly holy beings, of sufficient power to preserve 
 them in a state of holiness, without the aid of sin and its pun- 
 ishment? Are they so inclined to evil, that they all would 
 rebel, if they could do it with impunity? Is it slavish fear which 
 binds them to the eternal throne? And even if the fear of pun- 
 ishment were indispensable to secure their allegiance, could 
 not God inspire them with that fear without placing before 
 them examples of sin and punishment? Could not holy beings 
 in any way be made to believe divine threatenings till they had 
 seen them executed? Is it characteristic of perfectly holy be- 
 ings, that they have little confidence in their Maker's word? Are 
 the sin and punishment of a part of God's accountable crea- 
 tures, indispensable as the means of securing any holiness in 
 a moral system? And is sin, indeed, such " a necessary means 
 of the greatest good?" 
 
 That God ever prefers sin to holiness, on its own account, no 
 one pretends. But that he does permit it to exist, when he 
 might have secured holiness in its stead, all must admit, who 
 believe that he has complete dominion over the hearts of his 
 creatures. This does not imply that he views sin with compla- 
 cency, or takes any pleasure in it, in itself considered. A thing 
 may be, in itself considered, very displeasing to God, when, all 
 things considered, it may be his pleasure that it should exist. 
 For example: — In itself considered, God has no pleasure in the 
 death of the wicked; but, all things considered, it is his pleasure 
 that the wicked should die; otherwise, he will act contrary to 
 his pleasure, when he shall doom them to the miseries of the 
 second death. In itself considered, God had no pleasure in the 
 
22 
 
 sufferings of his Son; but, all tilings considered, it was his pleas- 
 ure that his Son should suffer; for it pleased the Lord to bruise 
 him. In itself considered, God has no pleasure in the afflictions 
 of his people; for he doth not afflict loillingly; but, all things 
 considered, it is his pleasure to afflict them; for whom the Lord 
 loveth, he chasteneth. This distinction is very important, and 
 without keeping it in view, it is impossible to reconcile different 
 parts of the scriptures with each other, and the perfections of 
 God with facts. It is therefore no contradiction to say, that 
 although God does not prefer sin to holiness, in any instance, 
 for its own sake, yet he does prefer, all things considered, that 
 it should exist, to some extent, instead of holiness, in his king- 
 dom. This we must admit, or be driven to the conclusion, 
 that it is beyond the power of God to prevent a single sin 
 which ever has been committed, or which ever will be commit- 
 ted, by securing holiness in its stead. We might quote largely 
 on this subject from the writings of the New Haven divines; 
 but we will add but one extract more, and this for the purpose 
 of showing the great importance which they attach to their 
 theory, by representing the opposite theory as leading by legiti- 
 mate consequence, to the most destructive errors. 
 
 " This theory, if carried out into its legitimate consequences, leads to uni- 
 versalism, to infidelity, and to atheism. Dr. Tyler maintains, that God really 
 prefers the holiness and happiness of all his moral creatures to their sin and 
 perdition. But Dr. Tyler also maintains, that God can execute this prefer- 
 ence, i. e. can secure the holiness and happiness of all his moral creatures. 
 It follows therefore, that God will secure the holiness and happiness of all 
 his moral creatures. Of course, all men will be saved. But this is not all. 
 According to this scheme, the divine authority of the Bible is subverted. 
 This book confessedly abounds in the most ur qualified declarations of the fu- 
 ture endless misery of multitudes of the human race. But how can a book, 
 which so explicitly contradicts demonstrable, known truth, be divine] Es- 
 pecially how can a book, pretend to claim an Omnipotent and a benevolent 
 God for its author, while it exhibits him as creating myriads of beings, be- 
 cause he prefers, on the whole, their sin arid everlasting misery, to their per- 
 fect holiness and happiness] As an Omnipotent Being, he can, according 
 to Dr. Tyler, prevent such a result. As a benevolent Being, he must be dispo- 
 sed to prevent it. But, according to Dr. Tyler, the Scriptures clearly teach, 
 that God will not secure the perfect holiness and happiness of his moral crea- 
 tion, when he can secure it. How then can a book, which belies every essen- 
 tial attribute of a perfect God, pretend to claim his authority] Apply, now, 
 the principles of Dr. Tyler in another form, and atheism is the consequence. 
 Dr. Tyler will admit, that God is disposed to prevent all evil, in itself con- 
 sidered, throughout his creation; and that this disposition is as real a prefer- 
 ence of the Divine Being, as any other. But Dr. Tyler maintains also, that 
 God can prevent all evil throughout his creation. The argument then for 
 atheism furnished by this theory, may be thus stated: — If there were a God, 
 that is, a being of infinite power and goodness, he could prevent, and would 
 be disposed, and therefore would in fact, prevent all evil throughout his 
 creation. But evil exists. Therefore, there is not a being of infinite power 
 and goodness — there is no God." I' We admit the fact that the foregoing 
 
23 
 
 reasoning is that of the univcrsalist, the infidel, and the atheist. But we ask, 
 who furnishes and sustains the premises'? And what conclusions, when the 
 premises are admitted, are more unanswerable?'' "We cannot but say, 
 what we believe in the integrity of our heart, that supralapsarian Calvinists 
 furnish the grand principle on which these conclusions rpst; and combining 
 their powers of argument in its defence, with ail their means of influencing the 
 faith of others, give to it and the conclusions founded on ii, a delusive and 
 fearful infallibility in the minds of thousands. The principle is, that an Om- 
 nipotent God, by the mere dint of power, can secure the universal holiness and 
 happiness oj his moral creatures." " We cannot but say, that in our honest 
 belief, the advocates of this principle, greatly, but inconsiderately, contribute 
 to the support of the most destructive errors." " Sure we are, that a very 
 limited acquaintance with facts, would show that the principle advocated by 
 Dr. Tyler and others, is the very same, which, in the hands of Voltaire and 
 other enemies of the gospel, has spread infidelity and atheism to such a fear- 
 ful extent throughout Europe, and is, in fact, the basis of all that latitudina- 
 rianism, which rejects Christianity, and calmly reposes on false and unde- 
 fined notions of the goodness and power of God." Ch. Spec. 1832. pp. 
 481—483. 
 
 According to these statements, those who hold, with Presi- 
 dent Day, that God possesses unlimited control over the moral 
 actions of his creatures, have no alternative left them, but to 
 become universalists, or give up the Bible, and take refuge in 
 atheism. They furnish the premises on which the universalist, 
 the infidel, and the atheist, have constructed unanswerable argu- 
 ments in favor of their respective systems. We are, of course, 
 to believe, that those divines who admit this doctrine, have 
 never yet fairly met the objections of these enemies of the 
 truth. The work of Edwards against Cbauncey, and Strong's 
 Benevolence and Misery, which have heretofore been consider- 
 ed triumphant refutations of the system of universalism, are to be 
 set down as utter failures. And not only so, but the great body 
 of calvinistic divines, have been co-workers with Voltaire, and 
 other enemies of the gospel, in spreading infidelity and atheism 
 to such a fearful extent throughout Europe. With these divines 
 is now to be classed, the \enerable President of Yale College, 
 together with his illustrious predecessor! 
 
 *We have been led more particularly to compare the views 
 maintained by President Day in the treatise before us, with the 
 writings of the New Haven divines, on account of the notice 
 which they have taken of the work, in a recent number of the 
 Christian Spectator. Strange as it may seem, they speak of 
 it in terms of high commendation, and hail it as " a valuable 
 auxiliary in the defence of important truth." They go so far 
 as to say, that they cannot find a syllable in it which militates 
 against "the real sentiments of Dr. Taylor. And what do they 
 mean by this? Do they mean that they are now convinced that 
 the theory which Dr. Taylor has propounded, and labored so 
 
24 
 
 hard to defend, and to the defence of which, so large a portion 
 of their periodical has been devoted for the last ten years, 
 is unfounded? Are they disposed to retract, and to caution 
 their readers against being misled by their past speculations on 
 this subject? If this were the case, it would give us unfeigned 
 joy. But nothing like this is intimated. On the contrary, the 
 whole strain of their remarks, seems intended to make the im- 
 pression that the views of President Day, are the very views 
 which they have uniformly maintained. This representation 
 would have filled us with unmingled astonishment, if we had 
 witnessed nothing of the kind before. But we have not for- 
 gotten who it was, that once charged an opponent with main- 
 taining theories which lead to the " worst of heresies," — even 
 " universalism, infidelity and atheism,'"' — theories that involve 
 the positions that " God is the responsible author of sin," — 
 that " sin is a good thing — good in its nature and tendency," — 
 that "God is a criminal tempter," — that " the divine lawgiver 
 is a deceiver," and other consequences equally shocking and 
 blasphemous; and afterwards, without retracting a syllable which 
 he had written, or attempting to show that his opponent had 
 retracted any thing, turned around and said, " we are perfectly 
 agreed." We have not forgotten the Review of Bellamy's 
 treatise on the Wisdom of God in the permission of sin, in 
 which an attempt was made to fasten upon that distinguished 
 theologian the very sentiments which it was his object to refute. 
 We have not forgotten the use which has been made of the 
 names of Edwards, Dwight, and Strong, to say nothing of living 
 men. But we will let this pass, and leave the reviewers to ac- 
 count for the above representation intheir own way. Of one 
 thing we are certain, that the great mass of readers have under- 
 stood them to maintain views utterly irreconcilable with those 
 inculcated in the treatise of President Day. If it is not his ob- 
 ject to defend the doctrine of God's entire control over the 
 moral actions of his creatures; and if it has not been their 
 ohject to call this doctrine in question, we certainly have not 
 understood either him or them. And we despair, moreover, of 
 ever ascertaining the opinions of any man, from his own writ- 
 ten statements. If they are convinced of their error, let them 
 like honest men and christians, publish their retractions. But 
 what they have written, they have written. And so long as it is 
 permitted to stand unretracted, we are compelled to believe that 
 it expresses their present real sentiments. 
 
 " But President Day," they tell us, " does not reason on 
 the theory that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good, 
 
8S 
 
 or that the present system of the universe was chosen for the 1 
 .sake of the sin which it contains.' 1 And who ever did reason 
 on this theory? "What theologian ever maintained that "the 
 present system of the universe was chosen for the sake of 
 the sin which it contains?" Or that " sin is the necessary 
 means of the greatest good," in the sense in which they have 
 interpreted this language? What is the theory that sin is the 
 necessary means of the greatest good? They tell us that " it 
 is equivalent to saying that sin is a good thing — even the best 
 thing," and that " when men sin, they do the very best thing 
 they can do." They tell us, moreover, that to maintain that 
 God overrules sin for good, by counteracting its tendencies, is 
 directly to contradict this theory. We ask then again, who 
 ever maintained this theory? We wish here to make a few re- 
 marks, for the purpose of exposing the injustice which has 
 been done to the great body of Calvinistic divines. 
 
 The position that " sin is the necessary means of the great- 
 est good," so far as we know, was first brought into use by 
 the New Haven divines themselves. Dr. Taylor, in the note to 
 his Concio ad Clerum, said that it is a common assumption 
 that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good. The lan- 
 guage was not quoted, nor have we been able to find it in the 
 writings of any of our standard divines. It was language which 
 he employed to characterize the commonly received opinion 
 in relation to the divine permission of sin. In the contro- 
 versy which followed, some of his opponents vindicated this 
 position, supposing that he meant by it what they knew to be 
 the commonly received opinion on the subject, viz., that God 
 will overrule all the sin which exists, and so counteract its 
 tendencies as to bring to pass a greater amount of good than if 
 sin had not existed. They were careful to explain the sense in 
 which they vindicated it. They stated explicitly, that sin in its 
 own niture, is evil, and infinitely hateful to God, that its 
 tendency is to evil, and evil only; and that it is never made 
 the means or occasion of good, except by being overruled and 
 counteracted in its tendencies. 
 
 But Dr. Taylor subsequently insisted, that the position 
 means, that " sin is a good thing — good in its nature and ten- 
 dency," and that " when men sin they do the best thing they 
 can do;" and he made his opponents responsible for it in this 
 odious sense, because they had vindicated it in an entirely differ- 
 ent sense; and from that time to this, the Christian Spectator 
 lias been constantly ringing changes upon this phraseology, and 
 the great body of Calvinistic divines are represented as maintain- 
 
25 
 
 inc the theory in the sense which they have attached to it; 
 when they know, that so far from maintaining it, they reject it 
 with abhorrence. Now we appeal to every unprejudiced read- 
 er, whether this is not a most unjust and slanderous imputation. 
 Let it be remembered, whence this position originated. Let 
 it also be remembered that those who vindicated it in the sense 
 in which they supposed it was intended to be understood, were 
 not pieased with the language. It was language which they 
 would not have chosen to express their own views, orthecom- 
 monly received views on the subject. The writer of this article, 
 in his controversy with Dr. Taylor, said expressly, " It is not 
 a position of my coining, nor one which I ever should have 
 coined. I have no wish to vindicate this particular phraseology. 
 I never considered it a happy mode of expression. It is the 
 language which Dr. Taylor has chosen to exhibit the views of 
 his brethren." 
 
 The question is not whether this position means what they 
 eay it means. If it does, then by saying that it is "a common 
 assumption," they have grossly misrepresented the views of 
 their brethren, and they are bound to make a full and frank 
 retraction of their statements. They have openly, and before 
 the world, charged their brethren with holding what they say is 
 equivalent to the declaration that " sin is a good thing," and 
 that " when men sin, they do the best thing they can do;' r 
 when they know that such a sentiment could not be maintained 
 without the most heaven-daring impiety. And they persist in 
 doing it. Scarcely a number of their periodical issues from 
 the- press, in which this subject is not brought into view. 
 
 " But President Day does not reason on the theory that sin is 
 the necessary means of the greatest good." Very true. And 
 who ever did, if the theory be what they say it is? But is any 
 thing which President Day has said, inconsistent with the com- 
 monly received views on this subject? That God could have 
 prevented all sin in a moral system, he not only admits, but 
 has conclusively shown. And why does he suppose that God 
 permitted sin to exist? Because it could not be excluded from 
 the best moral system; in other words, because the system is bet- 
 ter as it is, than it would have been if sin had been entirely ex- 
 cluded. He maintains that God will secure the greatest pos- 
 sible amount of good. But he does not suppose that sin is 
 good, or that it tends to good. On the contrary, he supposes 
 that its tendencies are all evil. And who ever denied this? — 
 Who ever maintained that sin is the direct means of good, or 
 that " the present system was chosen for the sake of the sin 
 
27 
 
 which it contains?" But does President Day deny that God can 
 overrule sin for good — that he can counteract its tendencies, 
 and thus not only present the evil to which it tends, but take 
 occasion from its existence, to make displays of his character, 
 which he could not make, if sin did not exist; and in this way, 
 secure an amount of good, which otherwise would not be real- 
 ized? He maintains that the present system is the best possible 
 system; and at the same time maintains that God might hav.e 
 had a moral system, from which sin should be entirely exclu- 
 ded. He consequently maintains that God had wise and benev- 
 olent ends to answer by the permission of sin. He permitted it 
 to exist, not because he could not prevent it in a moral system, 
 but because he saw that he could accomplish a greater good 
 by permitting it, than by preventing it. This is all, for which 
 Calvinists generally have contended. If then it is "a ccnncn 
 assumption, that sin is the necessary means of the greatest 
 good," we fear that President Day will hardly escape the im- 
 putation, his explicit declaration to the contrary notwithstanding. 
 The real point of dispute on this subject, relates to the power 
 of God over the hearts of moral agents. Are they completely 
 under his control? If they are, the theory of the New Haven 
 divines cannot stand. What President Day's views are in re- 
 lation to this point, we have already seen. To establish the 
 affirmative of this question, is the great object for which he has 
 written his book. 
 
 There is another topic touched upon by these reviewers, on 
 which we wish to make a few remarks. After referring to Pres- 
 ident Day's classification of the acts of the will into emot.ons, 
 purposes, and executive volitions, they say, 
 
 "Our readers are already familiar with this classification, which has been 
 used in our discussions for many years. They are probably aware, toe, that 
 we have suffered some reproach on this account. We have spoken of the 
 controlling disposition of unrenewed men. as a. generic volition, or governing 
 purpose of the soul; and of the change in regeneration, as a permanent 
 change in this purpose, (i. e. disposition) produced Ly the special influence 
 oTthe Holy Spirit ; and for sodoing, we have been stigmatized as heretics. We 
 shall hope, under the shelter of President Day^s authority, to escape any 
 further r?proacli for the use of these terms." p. 176. 
 
 Unpleasant as it may be to dislodge these reviewers from 
 so comfortable a shelter, a regard to truth obliges us to do it. 
 Whether this classification of the acts of the will, is one which 
 they have been in the habit of making, we shall not stop now 
 to inquire. All that we have to say on this point, is, that we 
 do not recollect to have seen it in their writings. Be this, 
 however, as it may, we are very confident that their views of 
 
28 
 
 regeneration will not at all comport with the principles laid 
 down and established by President Day. Does he believe that 
 the change in regeneration has its seat in the governing pur- 
 pose of the soul, or in the affections which lie back of this 
 purpose, and which decide its character? According to him, 
 the purposes of the mind depend on the emotions or affections. 
 When a man resolves on a course of conduct, it is to gratify 
 some feeling or desire of the mind. This constitutes the in- 
 ternal motive of the choice, and decides its character. The 
 purpose is right or wrong, sinful or holy, according to the inter- 
 nal motive which prompts it. It is with purposes, as with ex- 
 ternal actions; they derive their character solely from the motives 
 from which they flow. For not only the same external actions, 
 but the same purposes, may flow from very different motives. 
 For example: — Suppose that a man lives a strictly religious life, 
 so far as outward conduct is concerned. This he may do, either 
 because he loves God, and delights in his service, or solely for 
 the sake of obtaining everlasting happiness. If the former be 
 his motive, he is a saint; if the latter, he is a pharisee. The 
 character of his conduct depends entirely on the character of 
 the internal motive by which he is influenced. Just so with a 
 governing purpose of the mind. A man resolves to live a strict- 
 ly religious life. This he may do from either of the motives 
 above specified; and his purpose will, of course, be right or 
 wrong, according to the motive. This, if we understand 
 him, is President Day's view of the matter. According to 
 him, then, the seat of moral action is in the affections. It is 
 of these, that right and wrong are ultimately predicated. What, 
 then, is the change in regeneration ? Most evidently, if it is a 
 change of moral character, it is a change of the affections; — not 
 merely a change of the governing purpose of the mind, but a 
 change of the internal motive which prompts the purpose, and 
 decides its character. To illustrate the point: — Suppose a man 
 has, for a course of years, been devoted to the pursuit of world- 
 ly good. The motive by which he has been prompted, is the 
 desire of securing his own happiness. But he becomes con- 
 vinced that this course of conduct will lead to interminable 
 misery, and that the only way to obtain true and lasting happi- 
 ness, is, to devote himself to the service of God. Accordingly, 
 he resolves to change his course, and to become strictly a reli- 
 gious man; — all, let it be remembered, for the sake of securing 
 his own personal happiness. Here is a change of the govern- 
 ing purpose of the mind, but there is no change of motive. 
 His purpose to serve God, is prompted by precisely the same 
 
29 
 
 internal motive, as his previous purpose to serve the world. In 
 this regeneration? That it is often mistaken for regeneration, 
 we cannot doubt. Indeed, we are persuaded that this is the 
 way in which spurious conversions usually take place. Hun- 
 dreds and thousands, we fear, have thus mistaken a change of 
 purpose, without any change of motive, for a change of heart, 
 and have rested on a hope which will make ashamed when God 
 takes away the soul. 
 
 But do the writings of the New Haven divines give coun- 
 tenance to any such view of regeneration? Let the reader care- 
 fully examine the following passage, and judge for himself. 
 
 " There is no more difficulty in accounting for the fact, that the yielding 
 sinner supremely loves God, from the impulse of a regard to his own happi- 
 ness, than there is in explaining the opposite fact, of his having formerly, 
 under the influence of the same principle, when perverted, supremely loved 
 idols; which, though contrary to his reason and conscience, his heart wick- 
 edly preferred as his highest good. The self-love that was previously in ser- 
 vitude to his selfish inclinations, and perverted by their unhallowed influence, 
 now breaks away from that servitude, as his soul, under the power of light 
 and motives rendered effectual by the Holy Ghost, is made to see and feel 
 where its true interest lies. And no sooner is this duty seen and felt, through 
 the influence of the spirit, than the man who is so constituted that he must 
 have a regard to what he views as his own highest good, at once chooses 
 Christ and his service as the means of securing it." Ch. Spec. 1833. pp. 357, 
 358. 
 
 We might quote many passages which contain substantially 
 the same views. And what is the import of this language? Is 
 it not most clearly, that regeneration implies no change in the 
 internal motive by which man is influenced? — that the yielding 
 sinner acts " under the influence of the same principle" as that 
 by which he was influenced when he served his idols? This 
 we have long regarded as one of the most dangerous errors of 
 the New Haven system. We cannot refrain from expressing 
 our solemn conviction, that those who have experienced no 
 other regeneration than that which accords with the above rep- 
 resentation, have never been renewed by tire Spirit of God. 
 
 But important as this topic is, we cannot dwell longeron it 
 at present. We will only add, that nothing which President 
 Day has written, can possibly be so construed as to favor these 
 views, without grossly perverting his language. 
 
 In conclusion we would say, that we regard the treatise before 
 us, as eminently calculated to do good, at the present day. We 
 hope it will be extensively circulated and read. We could wish 
 it might find a place in the library of every minister in our 
 country; and especially, that it might be carefully studied by 
 every theological student. President Day has rendered an im- 
 
30 
 
 portant service to the Church; and our prayer is, that he may 
 live to see much fruit of his lahor. 
 
 To the wish expressed by the conductors of the Christian 
 Spectator, that the work of Fresident Day " may prove a com- 
 mon ground on which brethren who have differed, may meet in 
 peace," we respond our hearty Amen. It is the very ground on 
 which we have longed wished for union. It is the very ground 
 on which the ministers of New England were so long, and so 
 happily united, till theirranks were broken by the recent specu- 
 lations, and boasted theological improvements, if those who 
 have caused the division, are now disposed to lval the breach, 
 by returning to the ground from which they hive departed, their 
 course is plain. Let them evince their sincerity, by frankly 
 and openly renouncing their favorite theories, and doing what 
 they can to counteract their dangerous influence upon the pub- 
 lic mind. When they shall do this, they will find no obsticles 
 on the part of their brethren to a cordi 1 and happy union, hut 
 with what consistency, or sincerity, can they propose to meet 
 on the ground above specified, so long as all which thay have 
 written and published, stands unretracted, to influence the faith 
 of the present, and future generations? 
 

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