J, NacGregor Nature of the Divine Inspiration of Scripture BS480 .MI4& .^^:0^^'^^^^^^ '"] :>'^y BS.480 4^ " '■'"' DEC 171S25 BRITISH AND FOREIGN EVANGELICAL REVIEW, APRIL 188 0. 7 Art. I. — Nature of the Divine Inspiration of Scriioture. [The following Notes are to some extent an expansion of a paper read by ine to a clerical club. Members of the club expressed a desire and expectation that the paper should be laid before the public. One reason of this desire was that the notes, as submitted to the club, were so aphoristic in form that members desired to see them in print for leisurely consideration. There is nothing in the original notes which the club discussion has induced me to alter in substance. But I now reproduce the paper in the light of that discussion, which means with very important advantages beyond what I had enjoyed in solitary study.] T^HE preparation of this paper was originally occasioned by a -*- suggestion to the effect that those who dogmatise copi- ously about inspiration do not, as a class, know very well what they are dogmatising about. Not a few good and true men are at this hour persuaded that the dogma of plenary verbal inspiration of Scripture is incompetent in the present state of knowledge and comprehension in our Evangelical Churches. Under the form of discussion the paper is occupied mainly with definition rather than demonstration. In relation to the subject as regarded by intelligent advocates of a veritable divine inspiration of Scripture all through, my notes are VOL. XXIX. — NO. cxii. o 4 202 Nature of the Divine Inspiration of Scripture. intended mainly for the purpose of clearing away obscurities which at this time are working mischief, as all darkness is the advancing shadow of death. The distinction between revelation and inspiration, though continually asserted by one class of theologians, is continually ignored, or rejected as unreal and illusory, by another class. Yet the distinction is founded in the nature of things. Ee- velation is that through which rational beings come into pos- session of information ; while inspiration is that through which they come to communicate that information — no matter how obtained. Thus, in relation to a scripture or book, the record of a revelation : — while the revelation question is. What is the source of the information ? the inspiration question is. Who is the author of the book, or scripture, or record ? So Shakespeare, the " all-round " man, after describing "the poet's eye, in a fine frenzy rolling," as receiving some revelation when it glances " from heaven to earth, from earth to heaven," goes on to describe an ulterior process, in which " tlie poet's 'pen' records what his eye has seen, so as to "give to airy nothings a local habitation and a name." It is not necessary here to speak of the revelation as super- natural Of the information recorded in Scripture a large part may, by the human authors of Scripture, have been ob- tained from sources within reach of men in the natural use of their faculty of knowledge. For instance, the non-scriptural records appealed to in the Old Testament Scriptures, and the testimonies referred to in the preface of Luke's Gospel, may have been simply human records of matters patent to every human eye looking on the events of the history of God's king- dom. But the supposition that Luke obtained information from other men, who from the beginning had been eye- witnesses of the Word, does not imply that Luke was not the human author of the third Gospel, nor that what is said in that history is not said by him. The supposition that Moses and other Old Testament writers made use of previously existing documents, or unwritten traditions, does not impl}^ that certain scriptures have not Moses and other Old Testament prophets or scribes for their authors. Fronde's History of England is not the less Fronde's because he makes copious use of materials which had existed long before his time. Inspiration distinct from Revelation. 203 It thus appears that the question regarding tlie source of information recorded in a book is distinct from the question regarding the authorship of the record. And the inspiration question has reference only to the authorship of the record, while the revelation question has reference only to the source of information recorded. On the one hand, though the source of information should be simply human, the authorship of the record, the inspiration of the book, may be divine ; e.g., while the genealogies so frequently appearing in Scripture may have originally been prepared simply by men in the ordinary course of political administration, yet the authorship of the Scripture qxia recording them may be properly divine and miraculous, God choosing to place in a record which is distinctively divine materials obtainable through simply human inquiry. On the other hand, a record may be simply human in its authorship though the source of the information recorded should be truly divine and miraculous. For instance, the great facts of dis- tinctively supernatural revelation are, let us suppose, correctly recorded in the systems of Augustine and Calvin, or in the creeds and confessions of Evangelical Churches ; yet the records, in the shape of those utterances of individuals and of Churches, are, in the view of Evangelical Christians, simply human. The divine inspiration of Scripture means, that of the Record in our hands the autlior is God, in such a sense that the Bible is properly God's Word, — that what the Scripture says is said by Him. To say this is specifically distinct from saying that the revelation comes from Him directly or remotely. For, as we have seen, the source of the material recorded may be different from the authorship of the record. Hence, in relation to the authorship of the record, it does not suffice to speak of presentation, somehow, of truth or view to the human mind, so that this mind is able to apprehend it. After that apprehension — which may be effected through the poet's eye, or the pro- phet's, or the historian's, or the dogmatist's — there may come in a specifically different thing, the committing of the same to writing, putting the vision on paper. That is what we have now to think about in relation to the record of revelation as distinguished from the revelation recorded. ^Vhat we now say of the record, in the sense of supernatural intimation of God's mind by God, may be applicable to other 204 Nature of the Divine Inspiration of Scripture. modes of intimation of God's mind by God. For instance, the symbolism of the Tabernacle and Temple may have resulted, not simply from Divine communication of ideas to men, but from Divine determination of every detail of the symbolism ; so that Israel, in looking at the ordinary service of worship, may have been consciously receiving directly the mind of God from God, as truly as when listening to His articulate utterance of the Ten Words at Sinai. Again, when prophets spoke articulate words, it is conceivable that their spoken utterance should be so completely determined by the informing power of God as to make the utterances to be properly His word. What we thus suggest is that the Bible, the record of revelation, is properly an oracular hook. And when we speak of the Bible as an oracular book, we represent the feeling of the whole Christian world in relation to the Bible. This suggestion of theologians is anticipated by the experience of Christians. It is a matter of Christian experience that the Bible is an oracular book. Christendom reposes upon the belief that the utterances of this book are properly oracles of God ; and this has been so from the beginning of Christian Church-history. It has been imagined by some that the dogma of divine inspiration of Scripture, as distinguished from divine revelation recorded in Scripture, is of recent origin, dating, say, from the time of Clericus or Spinoza, two hundred years ago ; that at this recent period it came into being as a mere makeshift for evasion of difficulties occasioned by the discovery, then made for the first time, of " mistakes " in the Scripture record. But this imagination is a hallucination regarding the relative course of Christian thought, and feeling, and life. The sort of "mistakes" alleged by Spinoza, and employed by Clericus for subversion of the received doctrine of inspira- tion, had been alleged by another famous Jew far back in the Middle Ages. The same sort of alleged mistakes had, for the same purpose, been adduced by Theodore of Mopsuestia in the primitive " Age of the Councils." And the received doctrine of inspiration, as meaning that the Bible is a properly oracular book, so far from having been invented as a makeshift for meeting the difficulties occasioned to faith by the speculations even of Theodore, is demonstrably as old as the Christian Inspiration mid Canonicity. 205 religion. In the primitive age of that religion, the very ratio decidendi in relation to the canonical authority of this and that book, was that this and that book are properly of divine inspiration. And all down from the first century to our nineteenth century the feeling and belief of Christendom have reposed on the supposition, not simply that the Christian religion is of divine revelation, but that the Bible is a divine record of that revelation. It is quite conceivaljle that a primitive divine revelation should have been left to be recorded by simply human inspira- tion or authorship. It is of great importance to remember that the character and history of the Christian Church, and the records contained in our Scriptures, though these should be regarded as simply hiiman in their authorship, cannot be reasonably accounted for except upon the supposition of an original divine revelation, involving a miraculous intervention of God in history for the redemption of lost men. From the external apologetic point of view this is so important that Christian apologists are naturally impatient or doubtful in relation to a view received from within the heart of the Christian system. But the view received from within the heart of the Christian system is that upon which the apologists themselves, so far as they are Christian, live, and which has all along lain at the root of Christian life in God. And that view is that the record of revelation is divine. It is conceivable that the record should be so connected with the revelation that the one has genetically sprung from the other by a sort of physical necessity ; so that the revelation being given, the record in its distinctive character follows as matter of course. It is conceivable, in other words, that the revelation should be energic to such an extent as to determine the very terms of the record. This however does not follow from the received doctrine of inspiration. Consistently with that doctrine the revelation and the record are not so connected by a bond of physical necessity ; God having given the revela- tion direct from Himself might conceivably have left the record to be originated by simply human authorship. Piash views of the meaning of divine inspiration are often implied when they are not expressed. It has of late been frequently represented as one problem left over to the theology 2o6 Nature of the Divine Inspiration of Scripture. of oar time, how to deliver the Church from a doctrine of mechanical inspiration ; and it has been too easily assumed that " dictation" would involve mechanism of inspiration, incompatible with the rational nature of man, and therefore not to be supposed without impiety as having been perpetrated by Him who is the Creator of man's nature. Dictation does not necessarily imply violence to man's nature as rational. I am dictating at this moment without violence to the rational [nature of the scribe. There was no violence to the nature of Moses as rational when he received the Ten Words as written by God's finger on the tables of stone. There was no violence done to the rational nature of Balaam when he was constrained to bless where he would have preferred to ban. Those who assume as matter of course that " dictation" must necessarily imply a violence to man's nature as rational thus appear to be mistaken in their assumption. But the assumption, mistaken or not, is really irrelevant. For the received doctrine of inspiration does not professedly involve mechanism in the process of divine communication through man. It may appear to require some hardihood to maintain this ; for able men are now-a-days frequently found assuming as mere matter of course that the received doctrine does involve supersession of human personality and individu- ality. Some of those able men have taken pains to prove, from the utterances of " old dogmatists," that it is the express intention of the received doctrine of inspiration to exclude human personality and individuality, i.e. reality of manhood, from the authorship of Scripture. But to contradict those able men does not necessarily imply hardihood of assertion ; all that it necessarily implies is knowledge of plain historical fact and of elementary logic. For the assumption of those able men is mistaken, and their attempted proof a demonstrable failure. There has not been much published in the way of attempted proof of the assertion that the " old dogmatists," in contending for divinity of authorship of Scripture, mean to exclude humanity of authorship. And what has been pub- lished in this way, so far as known to me, is worse than incon- clusive — is perverse or M^rong-headed. In this relation the well-known utterances about the inspired writers being " flutes" Can pens of God be Jmman pens ? 207 of God, or " pens" of God, are quite irrelevant. For a "pen" of God may be a human pen : a man whose personality and individuality are not destroyed in order that God may speak through an unmanned organism, but employed for the expres- sion of God's mind through man. Hence, merely to show that the "old dogmatists" regard man as having been employed by God, is to be far from showing that, in the estimation of those " old dogmatists," the man was destroyed when God employed him, or became a mere machine when he was made the instru- ment — " flute," or " pen," — of divine inspiration. The " old dogmatists" certainly did not mean that the man was unmanned who became the organ of inspiration truly divine. That they did mean this is maintained, e.g. by Eothe, in his work Zur Dogviatik. But Eothe, like an honest man, produces his proofs from the utterances of the old dogmatists themselves ; and even from his proofs, the utterances printed for demonstration of his view of their meaning, it is clear that his view of their meaning is mistaken. A skilled reader of Eothe's footnotes will see that the " old dogmatists" whom he quotes, so far from making it essential to their doctrine that the man through whom God speaks shall pro tanto be un- manned, really held that God employed man for the purpose of expressing His mind through man, and therefore that man was not destroyed — or unmanned— when God spoke His mind through men. Those who maintain the traditional doctrine which has been stigmatised as mechanical are in the habit of sayiug that all Scripture is the word of God, and that aU Scripture is the word of man. That way of speaking makes perfectly clear the fact that in their estimation the divine inspmation affirmed by their doctrine implies no mechanism in the process. This again shows that it is really dishonest, on the part of an opponent of their doctrine, to speak as if mechanism had been a confessed result of the inspiration it affirms. And that dis- honesty is perpetrated by every intelligent theologian who gives as the status quccstionis between him and the " old dogmatists," whether mechanical inspiration is to be affirmed of Holy Scripture ? But, some may say, it is impossible that Scripture should at once be the word of God and the word of man: if God have 2o8 Nature of the Divme Inspiration of Scripture. really employed the penmen, so that the words of Scripture are His, then the men must have in His hands become, not . human pens, but non-human pens : in a word, the process must have been mechanical if the Scripture have God for its author, in your sense. Here we have a perilous advance, downhiU. He who simply says. The word is not God's in your sense, of being spoken or written by God, may mean only to deny the reality here of the distinction between revelation and inspiration, — i.e. to deny the reality of that inspiration which makes God to be properly author of Scripture. But to say that it is impossible for God to employ men as human pens, to make them instruments in writing a word truly His, yet so that the word is truly theirs, — this is in effect to set bounds to the Omnipotence of God, while setting no bounds to the presumption of men. There is a sort of possession which cannot have place when the man is left free to the exercise of his proper individuality. Such possession seems appropriate to inspiration by heathen deities. Though at least one heretical sect of Christians are justly supposed to have maintained such possession as involved in inspiration by the true God and Saviour, Pythonic inspira- tion is a thing distinctively heathenish in conception. The possession ascribed to demons in the New Testament, and the experience ascribed there to poor tormented demoniacs, are things distinct in their nature from the afflatus, and consequent supersession of manhood, involved in the heathenish view of inspiration : — thus far, that what the latter describes as the normal and proper result of divine inspiration, the former ascribes to an abnormal condition, in which man is possessed by a malignant demon who is not God, but God's enemy and man's. Still, the Pythonic inspiration of heathenism coincides with the demoniacal possession of Scripture thus far, that in both cases alike there is set forth a possession which causes " depotentiation," repression of individuality, putting manhood into abeyance. I do not say that God may not conceivably have put man- hood into abeyance through a divine possession in full keeping with God's nature and man's. That there may be ecstasy of this sort it would be extreme presumption to deny dogmati- cally. But the ecstasy of the saint or prophet is not only of a Does possession imply depotentiation ? 209 species distinct from the non-human condition implied in properly demoniacal possession, but is as different from that possession as heaven is from hell. We are thus led back to the proposition that God has em- ployed men for the utterance of His mind through a word which is properly God's. Is it possible for God to possess and employ man so that the manhood is not destroyed ? And in relation to this proposition we say that real posses- sion may conceivably assume one of three modes or forms. In one, the possession amounts only to that sort of interest, perhaps enthusiastic interest, in the matter revealed, which leaves the man's own personality and individuality not only distinct but sole, so that the utterance is his own and only his own ; as when Dante sings of hell and heaven, or Luther teaches justification by faith, or Bunyan preaches " Grace abounding to the chief of sinners." At another extreme, represented by heathen oracles, the possession may be like that of the demoniacs, in which the human instrument, perhaps writhing and wrestling against the power possessing, is over- come, neutralised, submerged ; so that the utterance is not properly the man's own, but only an utterance through him instrumentally, as if Lucan's witches had spoken through the dead corpses of Pharsalia. But there is a third form of posses- sion at least conceivable — a form specifically distinct both, on the one hand, from that simply Pythonic inspiration through which only " the god " speaks, and, on the other hand, from that simply human inspiration through which only the man speaks. And we say, to deny the possibility of a really divine possession of this third sort, — such in effect that the resulting utterance is at once God's and man's, — is to err by presumption. Christians are well acquainted with a case in which the utterance is and must be at once completely human and truly divine. I refer to the case of the person and the words of the Lord Jesus Christ. We may without irreverence speak of even Christ's person as representing distinctively utterance : because utterance, ^10709, The Word, is a proper name of Him as the second person of the Godhead. But we now refer especially to the divine-human constitution of His person as Immanuel. Through that constitution of His person He is at once com- 210 Nature of the Divine Inspiration of Scripture. fti pletely ijik^wi) human and truly {aXrjOcos;) divine. I wish to ' detain attention to this case of a Word which combines the ©7 Te\e/a)9 (completely) with the aXr]9w