Sectloxi Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2019 with funding from Princeton Theological Seminary Library https://archive.org/details/lecturesonhistor02nean BOHN’S STANDARD LIBRARY. NEANDER’S HISTORY OE DOGMAS IN THE MIDDLE AGES. SECOND PRINCIPAL PERIOD. FROM GREGORY THE FIRST TO THE REFORMATION. i , V,' •• ' % . L » LECTURES HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS; 1)R. AUGUSTUS NEANDER. EDITED BY UR. J. L. JACOBI. TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN ET J, E. RYLAND, M.A., EDITOR OF rOSTER’S LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE, AND OF DR. KITTO’S MEMOIR*; TRANSLATOR OF NEANDER’S PLANTING AND TRAINING of THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH, ETC., ETC IN TWO VOLUMES. YOL. II. LONDON: GEORGE BELL AND SONS, YORK STREET, COVENT GARDEN. 1878. LONDON: . PRINTED DY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, STAMFORD STIiBBT AND CHARING CROSS. A v 1 f CONTENTS. PAGR The internal Relation of Pelagian Contro¬ versies . 357—375 General grounds of the controversy, 357 ; fundamental difference in the view of the relation of the created spirit to God, 359. On the first sin and its consequences, 362—364 ; the origin of souls, 365 ; the extent of human depravity, 366; the relation of Christian and heathen virtue, 367 ; effects of Christianity on mankind, 368. Pelagius on the different stages in the education of mankind, and the office of the Redeemer, 369. Idea of Redemption, 370. Augustin’s views of divine Grace, 372. Absolute Predestination, 373. 4. The Semi-Pelagian Controversy . . . 375—394 Prosper Aquitanus and Hilary, 375. Augustin’s treatises De prce- destinatione and De d^no perseverantice . 376. Cassian, 377. The con¬ troversy continued after Augustin’s death by Prosper and Hilary. 378. Three parties in this controversy, 379. The work De vocations Gentium , 379, 380. The work Prcedestinatus and its authorship, 381. Faustus and Lucidus, 382. Gennadius, a presbyter of Marseilles— Avitus, bishop of Vienne—Csesarius, bishop of Arles, 383. The Scy¬ thian monks—Fulgentius of Ruspe—Council of Oranges, 384. Council of Valence—Gregory the Great, 385. The Eastern Church—Julian of Eclanum — Theodore of Mopsuestia, 386 — 389. Chrysostom and Augustin compared, 389—393. Nestorius, 393. d. The Doctrine of the Church .... 394—398 Unspiritualizing of the Church—Donatism, 394. The Eastern Church — Cyrill, Chrysostom, Isidore, Jovinian, 396. Rome the Cathedra Petri , 397. e. The Doctrine of the Sacraments . . . 398—413 1, Of the Sacraments in general . . . 398—402 Idea of a Sacrament—Augustin’s views, 399 ; the Donatists— Petilian, 400 ; number of the Sacraments—Augustin, 401. Dionysius the Areopagite, 402. VI CONTENTS. PAG* 2. Baptism ....... 402—405 Infant Baptism—the belief, but not the practice, prevalent in the East—recommended by the Gregories, Basil, and Chrysostom, 402. Julian of Eclanum, 403. Theodore of Mopsuestia, Caelestius, Pela- gius, 404. The notion of an intermediate state for unbaptized chil¬ dren opposed by the North African Church, 405. 3. The Doctrine of the Lord’s Supper . . 406—413 The sensuous realistic view adopted by Cyrill of Jerusalem, 406. Chrysostom, Hilary, Ambrose, 407. Theodoret, Gelasius, Gregory of Nyssa, 408. A more spiritual view held by Athanasius, 409. Augustin, 410. The purely symbolic view held by the school of Origen, 411. Infant Communion—the view of the Supper as a Sacrifice, 412. f. Eschatology ...... 413 — 417 The doctrine of an airoKaracfTaoiQ as held by Gregoiy of Nyssa, 413. The Antiochian School—Diodorus of Tarsus, Theodorus, 414; opposed by Augustin and Gregory the Great, 415. The doctrine of an ignis purgatorius —Cyrill of Jerusalem, Augustin, Gregory the Great, 416; opposed by Pelagius and Fulgentius of Ruspe, 417. SECOND PRINCIPAL PERIOD. The History of Dogmas in the Middle Ages, from Gregory I. to the Reformation . 418 — 618 First Period, from the death of Gregory I. to Gregor} 7- VTII., and the beginning of the Scholastic Theology (that is, from the be¬ ginning of the seventh to the end of the eleventh Century) . . . . . 418 — 463 General History of Dogmas . . % 418 — 433 Character of the Period - disruption of the Eastern and Western Churches — Islamism, 418. The Western Church —the Sententice Patrum, 419. Influence of Rome—reaction in Britain and Ireland— Protestant element in Germany, 420. Charlemagne—the Libri Carolini —Alcuin—Agobard—Claudius, 421. The Pseudo-Dionysian writings, 422. The Irish Monasteries—John Scotus Erigeua, 423_ 427. Ratherius of Verona, Gerbert, Ftilbert, Lanfranc, 427. Be- rengarius, 428. Eusebius Bruno—The Greek Church—Maximus, 429. John of Damascus—the Paulicians, 430. The Iconoclasts, 431. Dog¬ matic contrarieties of this Period, 432. CONTENTS. Vll PAGB The History of Special Dogmas . . . 433—463 A. The History of Introductory Dogmas . . 433—434 The doctrine of Inspiration—Fredegis, Agobard, 433. Maximus 434. B. The Dogmas of Special Dogmatic . . . 435—463 a. Theology ....... 435—437 The Controversy respecting the Procession of the Holy Spirit. Difference between the Eastern and Western Churches—John of Damascus—Scotus Erigena, 435 ; the Synods of Gentilly and Friuli— the Council of Aachen, 436 ; Alcuin, Theodulf, Photius, Nicholas I., iEneas of Paris, 437. b. The Doctrine of the Person of Christ . . 437—447 1. The Monotlieletic Controversy . . . 437—442 Renewal of the controversy between the Antiochian and Alexandrian Schools—the Emperor Heraclius — Cyrus, bishop of Phasis, 438. Imperial edict—edict of the Emperor Constans—Martinus, bishop of Rome, Theodorus, bishop of Pharan, Maximus, 439. Dyothelitism in the Western Church—Conciliatory but unsuccessful effort of the Emperor Constantine Pogonatus, 441. 2. The Adoptianist Controversy . . . 442—447 Originated in Spain by Elipandus and Felix, 442. Influence of Theodore of Mopsuestia, 443—445. Opposed by Alciun, 446. c. The Controversy respecting Predestination . 433—454 Reaction against the milder Augustinian doctrine by Gottschalk, 448. Rabanus Maurus, Archbishop of Mentz, 449. Gottschalk con¬ demned at Mentz and Chiersy—vindicated by Prudentius, Ratramnus, and Lupus, 450. Work, de tribus quaestiouibu v, 451. John Scotus Erigena, de Prcedestinatione, 452. Second synod at Chiersy, 453. Council of Valence, 454. d. The Doctrine of the Lord’s Supper, and the Controversies respecting it 455—463 The Oriental Church, 455. The Western Church—Paschasius Rad- but, 456. Ratramnus, De corpora et sanguine Domini , 457. John Scotus, De Divisione Natures— Amalrich, Odo, 459. Berengarius the representative of a spiritual tendency in the eleventh Century— opposed by Lanfranc, 460, 461. Eusebius Bruno, 462. The Second Period 463—619 vill CONTENTS. PA OB The Scholastic Age,— from Gregory the Great to the Reformation. Characteristics of the Period .... 463—465 The First Section of the Scholastic Age,— from the eleventh to the end of the twelfth Century ..... 465—537 General History of Dogmas .... 465—491 Commencement of the Scholastic Age at the end of the eleventh Century, 465. The religious movements of the Age, 466. Com¬ mentary of Boethius on the Isagoge of Porphyry, 467. Augustin, the founder of Realism, 467. Roscellin, the founder of Nominalism, 468. Raimbert of Lisle, Odo, John of Salisbury, 469. Anselm of Canter¬ bury, the father of Scholastic Theology, 472—474. Bernard of Clairvaux, 475—477. Peter Abelard, 48U—486. Robert Pulleyn, Hugo St. Victor, 486—488. Peter Lombard of Novara, 489. Walter of St. Victor, Geroch, Provost of Reichenberg, the Abbot Joachim of Floris, 490. Peter Cantor of St. Victor, Peter of Blois, 491. History of Special Dogmas .... 492—494 A. Introductory Dogma—The Doctrine of Inspi¬ ration. Abelard’s treatise Sic et Non, 492. Anselm of Canterbury—Diver¬ sity of opinions respecting the identity of religious Truth in the Old and New Testament, 493. The Dogmas of Special Dogmatics . . 495 — 573 a. Theology ....... 495—508 1. The Idea of God in general .... 495—496 Anselm’s Ontological proof of the divine existence, 495. Gaunilo, 496. 2. The Doctrine of the Trinity .... 497—500 The Nominalist doctrine as maintained by Roscellin; the Realist by Porietanus—Johannes Philoponus—Dialectic theories opposed by Abelard and Lombard, 497. Anselm, 498. Peter Lombard, Hugo of St. Victor, Abelard, 499. Alanus ab Insulis, 500. 3. Of the Divine Attributes .... 500-—508 Omnipresence, 500. Omnipotence, 501—503. Miracles, 504. Pre¬ science and Predestination—Peter Lombard, Anselm, Hugo of St, Victor, 506. CONTENTS. IX PAGE b. Anthropology ...... 1. Of Man’s Original State, the Fall, and its Con- 508—512 sequences 508—512 Augustin’s views generally held by the Schoolmen, 508. Peter Lombard’s distinction of dona natures and dona gratice, 509. Anselm and Odo on hereditary depravity Abelard—510. Opinions respecting the sinlessness of the Virgin Mary, 512. c. The Doctrine of the Person and Work of Christ 512—514 1. The Person of Christ. The sinlessness of Jesus, 512. Abelard on the indwelling of God in Christ, 513. Hugo of St. Victor, Peter Lombard, 514. 2. Of Redemption . . . . . 514—521 Augustin on the method of Redemption, 514. Anselm’s doctrine of satisfaction, 516, 517. Abelard, 518, 519. Bernard, Peter Lombard, 520. Robert Pulleyn, two opposing views of Redemption since Anselm’s time, 521. 3. The application of Redemption, Justification, and Sanctification ..... 521—524 The Schoolmen opposed to mere outward sanctity, 521. Anselm, Hugo of St. Victor, Bernard, 522. Abelard, 523. Bernard, Alanus, Pulleyn, Lombard, 524. Distinction of fides informis and fides for - mata, 525. 4. Relation of Grace and Freedom . . . 525, 526 .Anselm, Robert Pulleyn, 525. Bernard, Richard of St. Victor, Peter Lombard, 526. d. The Doctrine of the Sacraments . . . 527—537 Definition of a Sacrament by Hugo of St. Victor, Peter Lombard, 527. Pulleyn, Hugo of St. Victor, 528. The Number of the Sacra¬ ments, 529. 1. Of Baptism 530 Relation of the res sacramenti to the sacramentum —Infant Baptism rejected by the Catharists, 530 2. Of the Lord’s Supper ..... 530—536 Transubstantiation defended by Anselm, Peter Lombard, and Hugo, 530. Peter of Bruis, Abelard, Zacharias of Chrysopolis, Rupert of Deutz, 531. Anselm, 532. Hildebart, Hugo, Peter Lombard, 533. X CONTENTS. PAGE Transubstantiation declared an article of Faith by Innocent III., 533. Infant Communion continued to the twelfth century, 533. Withhold' ing of the Cup, 534. The doctrine of the concomitantia, 534, 535. The Sacrifice of the Mass—Peter Lombard, 536. 3. Penance ....... 536 Threefold division by Peter Lombard, 536. Abelard’s word Scito teipsum , 537. The Scholastic Age. Section Second (Century xiii.) . . . 538—595 The General History of Dogmas . . . 538-—552 Ascendancy of the Aristotelian Philosophy, 538—540. The Arabian Philosophy, 540. The Mendicant Friars, 541. The Franciscans, 541. The Dominicans, 542. Thomas Aquinas, 542. William of Auvergne, 543. Roger Bacon, John Duns Scotus, 544. The method of Scholastic Dialectics, 545. Rationalist reaction—Amalrich dfe Bena, David de Dinanto, 546. Doctrine of Joachim of Floris, Francis of Assissi, the Aristotelian Averrhoes, 547. Raymund Lulli, 548. Special H [story of Dogmas .... 549—595 A. The Dogmas which belong to the Introduction in Dogmatics ... ... 549—559 Treatment of Dogmatics by the Schoolmen, 549. Alexander of Hales, 550. Bonaventura, 551. Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, 552. Duns Scotus, 554. William of Paris, 556. Roger Bacon, Raymund Lulli, 557. B. The Dogmas of Special Dogmatics . . . 559—595 a. The Doctrine of God. 1. Proof of the Divine Existence. The idea of God in general. Alexander of Hales, 559. Thomas Aquinas, Amalrich and David of Dinanto, 560. Joachim of Floris, 561. 2. The Doctrine of the Trinity .... 562—564 Analogy to the Trinity in the human spirit—Albert the Great, 562. Aquinas, Raymund Lulli. 563. 3. The Doctrine of the Creation . . . 564, 565 Bonaventura on the End of Creation, 564. Thomas Aquinas, 565. CONTENTS. xi PAGB 4. Tlie Doctrines of Providence, the Government of tlie Universe, and Miracles . . . 565—568 Albertus Magnus, Alexander of Hales, 566. Thomas Aquinas, 568. 5. Predestination and Prescience . . . 568 — 573 Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas, 568. The Monism of Aquinas, 570; his views of Free Will, 571. Raymund Lulli, 572. 6. Anthropology ...... 573—579 Of Man’s original State, the Fall and its consequences, 573—579. Two-fold idea of Grace held by the Schoolmen, 574. Alexander of Hales, Bonaventura, 574, Aquinas, 575. Relation of the pura naturalia to gratia, 576. Difference between and Grace as stated by Bonaventura, Duns Scotus, 577. The Catharists on original sin— Aquinas, Duns Scotus, 587. On the immaculate conception of the Virgin Mary, 579. C. The Doctrine of the Redeemer and his Work . 580—588 1. The Objective side ..... 580—584 Duns Scotus on the sinlessness of Christ, 580. Bonaventura on Redemption, 580. Aquinas, Duns Scotus, Raymund Lulli, 581. Aquinas on the necessity of Redemption, 582. Innocent III., William of Paris, 583. Duns Scotus, 584. 2. The Subjective side—appropriation of the Work of Redemption ..... 584—588 Aquinas on Sanctification, 5H5. On assurance of the forgiveness of sins—Alexander of Hales, Aquinas, 586. On the idea of merit, 587. d. The Doctrine of the Sacraments . . . 588—595 Aquinas on the necessity of seven sacraments, 588. The Divine co-operation in the Sacraments—Alexander of Hales, Aquinas, 589. Duns Scotus, 590. Twofold effect of the Sacraments—Alexander of Hales, Aquinas, 590. 1. The Doctrine of the Lord’s Supper . . 591—593 Necessity of Transubstantiation maintained by Aquinas—not so absolutely by Duns Scotus, 591. The doctrine opposed by John of Paris, 591. Withholding of the cup established, 592. 2. Penance ....... 593 — 595 Sanction of auricular confession by Innocent III.—distinction of attritio and contritio, 593. The doctrine of Indulgences — Thesaurus meritorum, 594. Six conditions of Indulgences laid down by William of Auxerre, 595. CONTENTS. • • Xll PA/JR Third Period of the Schoolmen, from the four¬ teenth Century to the Reformation . . 595—619 General History of Dogmas .... 595—605 Characteristics of this Period, 595. Opposition of the Thomist and Scotist Schools—William of Occam, the new founder of Nominalism, 596. Wycliffe, the advocate of Realism, John Wessel, a Nominalist. Gabriel Biel the last of the Schoolmen, Nicholas of Cura, De Docta Ignorantia, 597. Raymonde de Sebonde, 598. The Parisian Theolo¬ gians—the treatise, Defensor Pads, by Marsilius of Padua and John of Sanduno — the Councils of Pisa, Constance, and Basle, 599. Wycliffe compared with Huss, 600 ; John Wessell, 601 ; Peter Pom- ponazio, 602. Revival of Platonism and the study of the Classics— Erasmus, 603. Mysticism—Master Eckard and the Beghards, 604. Ruysbrock, 605. The Special History of Dogmas . . . 605—619 A. The History of Introductory Dogmas . . 605—608 1. The Statements respecting the Essence of Theo¬ logy—Views of Durand . . . . 605 2. On Tradition and the Holy Scriptures as Sources of Knowledge .... 606—608 The formal principle of the Reformation more distinctly announced by Wycliffe, Wessel, and others, 606. Gerson’s treatise on the literal sense of Scripture, 606. Nicholas of Cusa a defender of Tradition, 607. B. The Dogmas of Special Dogmatics . . 608—619 a. The Doctrine of God . . . . . 608 1. The Doctrine of the Trinity. Wycliffe maintained that the Trinity was a necessary truth of Rea¬ son, and found traces of it in Plato, 608. 2. The Doctrine of Predestination, Grace, and Free- Will . 608—610 Bradwardine’s treatise, De Causa Dei adversus Pelagium et de Yirtute Causarum, 609. Wycliffe’s views connected with his Philosophical system, 610. b. Anthropology. The Doctrine of Original Sir 6 L CONTENTS. xi 11 PACfB c. The Doctrine of the Church . . . . 611 Reaction in the University of Paris respecting the relation of the Papacy to the Church—the Chancellor Gerson—the treatise Defensor Pads, 612. Wycliffe’s views—Treatise of Huss Be Ecclesia —Wessel’s treatise De Communione Sanctorum , d. The Doctrine of the Sacraments. 1. Of the Sacraments in general . . . 613 Increased reaction against the Catholic idea of the Sacraments— Views of Durand, 613. Peter D’Ailly—Wycliffe, 614. 2. The Doctrine of the Lord’s Supper . . 614 Doubts respecting Transubstantiation—William of Ockham, 614. Durand, Peter D’Ailly, Wycliffe, 615. Withholding of the Cup opposed by Jacobellus of Misa, 616. Resolutions of the Council of Constance against the Hussites—Council of Basle allowed communion in both kinds, 617. 3. The Doctrine of Penance and the Thesaurus Supererogationis . . . . . 617 The constitutio unigenitus issued by Clement VI., 617. Gerson on Indulgences—Wycliffe—HusS—Wessell, 618, 4. The Doctrine of Purgatory . . . . 618 The Dogma of ignis purgatorius established at the Councils of Florence and Ferrara, 618. THIRD PRINCIPAL PERIOD The Development of Doctrines since the Reformation. ..... 619—702 A. The History of Introductory Dogmas. The Doctrine of the Sources of Knowledge . . 620—637 Connexion of the acknowledgment of the paramount authority of Scripture with the religious consciousness in every renovation of a Church, 620. Illustrated by the examples of Wycliffe and Luther, 621. Difference between the Lutheran and the Reformed Churches, 622. Acts of the Council of Trent on the relation between Tradition and Scripture, 623. The Carmelite Monk Antonio Marinari, 624. The relation of the Scriptures to Tradition and to the Confessions in the Evangelical Church, 624; the Formula Concordiee, 625. CaJixtus on the Gommonitorium of Vincentius Lerinensis, 626. Reaction in A A * CONTENTS. siv PASS the Reformed Church proceeding from Arminius, and supported by Grotius, 620. Socinianism, its points of agreement and disagreement with the principles of the Reformation, 627. Its founder Loelius Socinus—character of his nephew Faustus Socinus, 628. Treatise of Faustus Socinus De Avctnritate S ’npturce Sacra —Crell—Controversy between Recarus and Calovius, 629. Wissowatius, 630. Mysticism —the Zwickau Prophets—Munzer, 631—Theobald Tharner, 632. The Quakers —George Fox, 633. Barclay—Elias Hicks—Mystic rationalism in Germany—Daniel Muller, 634. Rationalism in the Reformed Church of Holland, 635. Peter Poiret—Lewis Meier, 636. Ration¬ alism ending in Pantheism, 637. The Special History of Dogmas. A. The Introductory Dogmas. The Doctrine of Inspiration .... 637—642 Controversy between Erasmus and Eck, 637. Luther’s views of Inspiration, 638, 639. Mechanical idea of Inspiration—Socinus De Auctoritate Scriptures Sacra, 640. Grotius and Episcopius on the Historical books of Scripture, 641. Reaction in Pietism and the Unitas Fratrum, 642. B. The Dogmas of Dogmatics strictly so called . 642—702 a. Theology ....... 642—651 1. The Doctrine of God in general. Theological Dogmas omitted in the first edition of Melancthon’s Loci, 642. Inadequate conception of the divine attributes in Soci¬ nianism—the Institutiones religionis Christiance of Faustus Socinus, 643. Anxiety of Socinus to maintain man’s free agency, and to impugn the doctrine of absolute Predestination, 644 ; denied the un¬ conditional divine Prescience, 644. Views of the Remonstrants— Vorstius and Episcopius, 645. 2. The Doctrine of the Trinity. Antitrinitarian reaction, especially in Italy, 645. Campanus the Arian, Wicel, 646. Leader of the Arian party—Gentilis, Gribaldus, and Farnovius, 647. Sabellian Antitrinitarians—Hetzer, Claudius of Savoy, and Ochino, 647. Michael Servedo (Servetus), 648. Faustus Socinus, differed in some points from Servetus, agreed for the most part with Paul of Samosata, 650. The Augsburg Confession on the Trinity, and its opponents, 650. b. The Doctrine of the Person of Christ . 651 Views of Socinus, 651. Francis Davidis, 652. Controversy between the Lutherans and Calvinists on the ubiquity of Christ’s Body, 653. Controversy between the Giessen theologians, Menzer and Feuerborn, and those of Tubingen, Osiander and Thummius, 653. CONTENTS. XV PAGE c. Anthropology ...... 653 Views of humati nature in the Evangelical Church connected with the doctrine of Justification by Faith, 654. Doctrine of the Reformers on original Sin, 655. The Council of Trent on Man’s original state, 656. Cardinal Bellarmine, 656. The Council of Trent on the sinless¬ ness of the Virgin Mary, 657. Views of human nature held by Socinus, 657. Zwingli, 658. Placseus, Whitby, Episcopus, Limborch, 659. d. The Doctrine of Redemption . . . . 660 Socinus denied the doctrine of a Scitisfacth activa and passiva, 660. Views of the Remonstrants, Grotius, Episcopius, 661. e. The Doctrine of Justification . . . . 661 Subjective idea of Justification, 661. The objective idea maintained by the Reformers, especially by Luther and Melancthon, 662. Opposite views of the Council of Trent, 663. Protestant opponents of the Evan¬ gelical doctrine of Justification—Wicel. Osiander, 664. Schwenkfeld, Socinus, 665. Views of the Remonstrants—Limborch, 666. f. Grace, Free-Will, and Predestination . . 666 The Augustinian scheme held by the Reformers, 666. Luther’s Controversy with Erasmus, 667. Melancthon, Zwingli, 667. Zwingli’s views on the condemnation of the Heathen, and the extent of Re¬ demption, 668. Coelius Secundus Curio, and the Polish reformer, John Lasko, 669. Melancthon, on Predestination, in the Augsburg Confession and Apology, 670. The Synergistic Controversy, 672. Calvin maintained the earlier doctrine of absolute Predestination, 673. Opposed by Sebastian Castellio and Melancthon, 674. Disputation at Strassburg, between Zanchius and Marbach, 675. The Formula Ooncordice, 676. Samuel Huber’s controversy with AEgidius Hunnius, 677. Reactions in the Reformed Church, Arminius, Koornhert, 677. The Delft Pi*eachers and Arminius, 678. Gomarus, Uytenbogaert, Episcopius, the remonstrance to the States of Holland, in five articles, the Synod of Dort, 679. Theory of Universalismus hypotheticus, pro¬ posed by Amyraut and Testart, 680. The Synods of Alengon and Charenton, 681. The Council of Trent on Predestination, 681. The Dominican, Dominico Soto, and the Francescan, Andrea Vega, 682. Reformatory movement in the Catholic Church, Michael Bains, his seventy-nine propositions condemned by Pius V., 682. The contio- versy renewed by the Jesuit Molina, 682. The Jansenist Controversy, Jansen’s Augustinus , 683. Views of Socinus, 684. g. The Doctrine of the Church . . . 684 The Catholic doctrine, 684. Views of the Reformers as expressed in the Augsburg Confession and Apology, 685. Zwingli’s development of the doctrine in his Antibolum, 686. Calvin’s idea of the Church, 6->7. Luther and Melancthon, 687. XVI CONTENTS. PA OB h. Tlie Doctrine of the Sacraments 638 The decision of the Council of Trent, 688. Luther and Melancthom 888. Views of Zwingli, 689. Conference between Schwenkfeld and Bugenhajen, 690. Calvin’s position, 690. Luther on the numbex’ of the Sacraments, 691. Melancthon’s statement in his Apology, 691. 1. The Doctrine of Baptism 692 A re-examination of the grounds of Infant Baptism called for, owing to the Zwickau enthusiasts, who zealously opposed it, 692. Melanc¬ thon’s perplexity, 692. Luther’s determination of the question, 692. Zwingli and Calvin, 692. 2. The Doctrine of the Supper , 694 Luther at first gave prominence to the subjective element; after¬ wards to the objective, 694. Zwingli’s preference of the subjective. 695. Carlstadt and Honius, 697. Calvin’s views, 697. Melancthon’s position, 698. Views of the Socinians, 699. Doctrine of the Quakers, as stated by Barclay in his Apology, 701. THE HISTORY OE CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. THE INTERNAL RELATION OF PELAGIAN CONTROVERSIES. When Cselestius began with representing the importance of the controversy as trifling, this caution was extreme, and at least not the opinion of the Pelagians generally, who rather held the opposite opinion. This is evident from the assertion of Julian—that the God of the Traducians was not the God of the Gospels; they made either Satan to be the Author of human nature, or God to be the Author of evil. For the doctrine of hereditary depravity appeared to them contra¬ dictory to the perfection of the Creator, to his holiness and justice, and the doctrine of grace also to his love and justice; thus both seemed to be practically injurious, since moral efforts were unnecessary and impossible, and a sanction was given to immorality. Augustin on his part regarded the questions in dispute as objects of the highest importance. “The Christian faith,” he says, “ properly consists in what relates to two men, one by whom we are sold under sin, the other by whom we are redeemed from our sins,” i. e. Pela- gianism is at variance with the first principles of Christianity, since whoever denies Original sin, sets aside the need of redemption. In our investigation of the internal connexion and exact principle of the particular points of controversy, we must distinguish between what the parties themselves consciously regarded as the main point, and the deeper difference to which everything was really to be traced. The subjects of controversy were, the original state of Man, the character of the first transgression and its consequences to the human race, the present moral condition of mankind, the nature of Free Will, its relation to Grace, the method of the Redeemer’s work, the relation of the Christian and pre-Christian stand¬ points ; and in addition there was the controversy respecting the efficacy of Baptism in freeing human nature from sin¬ fulness, and making those who receive it members of the kingdom of God. Now the different views entertained of the present constitution of human nature might seem to involve the highest principle, and certainly it was a noin* of 358 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. prime importance, since according to the representations of the moral power which is still left to men, the doctrines of grace and redemption, and the influence of Christianity on human nature will be determined. But this question leads back to that respecting Original Sin and its effects, and the various opinions regarding this point are again dependent on the view taken of Man’s primeval state. If we accepted the immediate assertion of both parties we might stop here ; but does not the difference lead us to a more general ground of contrariety ? The contending parties differed also on another point which is independent of that we have just mentioned—namely, in their notions of Free Will. Pelagius understood by it the power of choosing which can at any moment decide between good and evil, whence it follows that every moment of life is like another, the operation of the earlier having no effect on the later, and consequently the differences between the primeval and the present state of Man is inconsiderable; and by this the whole point of view of the development of human nature is determined. Augustin on the contrary held that in the Free Will, the element of a self determining choice between good and evil was not at all necessary. Here then is a difference on which various views of the original and later state of mankind are founded. But we may trace the condition of human nature still further back to the relation of rational creatures generally to God. Here also the difference is founded on Free Will. Pelagius assumed that man was furnished once for all with the powers which are necessary for his development; the logical carrying out of this datum excludes the Supernatural. Augustin regarded such an Autonomy of the creature as contradicting its relation to God; it stands in continual dependence on him, and its highest destiny is to be his organ. But whatever is true of the relation of the rational Creature to the Creator, rests again on the view of the world generally whether as prepared at Creation and developing itself independently or as upheld by a continued Creation, and therefore must be considered either as only a mediate interference of God, or as an immediate operation of his power and absolute dependence upon him. And here lies the deepest ground of the whole difference. And we find some indications that this principle was not wholly concealed from the contending parties. THE PELAGIAN CONTROVERSY. 359 Innocent says; * “ Wilt thou be superior in providing for thyself, to Him who has given thee thy being ? and how is it that to whom thou thinkest thyself indebted for thy life, thou dost not think that thou art indebted for grace to enable thee to live as thou dost?” And Jerome says, These men by [their doctrine of] freedom make men not such as are depen¬ dent on their own will, but place human power on a level with the divine as being self-sufficient; yet we ought to know that we are nothing if God does not preserve what he has granted to us. He charges them with the sentiment, “If I will to bend my finger, is God’s help necessary for me ? ” In the same way Orosius remarks that God has not merely in virtue of natural Creation granted all men grace, but daily to all and each one at every moment he specially imparts his gifts. He appeals to the passages in Holy Writ which speak of the divine concursus; but perhaps thou answerest me, Nature preserves its unvariable order, and after God has once arranged it he effects through it whatever happens (therefore mediately), but certainly he who gives, gives when and where he will, either by guiding the arrangements he has made in its development, or by pouring forth his bounty in new Gifts. As to the fundamental difference in the consideration of the general relation between the created spirit and God, Augustin lays down as a principle that the Divine Spirit is alone autonomic, and the self-subsistent origin of the True and the Good; the created spirit, on the contrary, cannot possess the Good and the True, as its absolute possession, but attains to them only through communion with God ; it has only the susceptibility of appropriating that higher life, and of reveal¬ ing* it in action. Hence arises the contrariety between a life in communion with God, in which all true goodness is placed, and in Grace, and the life of human nature estranged from God.f As the eye is circumstanced to the light of the sun, so is the created Spirit to the Grace of God. He does not deduce primarily from sin the need of human nature £ for * Ep. ad Cone. Carth. § 3. + De Peccat. Mentis et Remissione, ii. § 5. X De Corrept. et Grat. § 32.—Si hoc adjutorium vel angelo vel homini, cum primum facti sunt, defuisset, quoniam non talis natura facta erat, ut sine divino adjutorio posset rnanere, si vellet, non utique sua culpa cecidissent, adjutorium quippe defuisset, sine quo rnanere non possent. 360 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. grace, in order to realize its destiny, but thinks it is princi¬ pally founded on the relation of the creature to God, though 4 lie thus affixes to the term gratia a different idea from that contained in Scripture. Even in the highest state of the spirits in heaven, and in the original state of man, the gratia justi- ficans was the source of all good, only the Spirit freely con¬ tinued in divine communion, without having to overcome an opposition. As soon as it forsakes this communion, there can be nought but evil in itself. Love to God is the source of all Good ; and, inversely, Selfishness is the principle of Evil. Pelagius, on the other hand, regarded the creature as endowed with the powers of its existence and left to itself; hence the moral nature has likewise its powers, in order to fulfil its destiny; these faculties belong to it as an inalienable possession, and can suffer no essential alteration. It depends on man himself to make use of these powers. In reference to Goodness, Pelagius distinguished a posse , a velle, and an esse * The posse comes from God ; the velle and the esse are man’s affair. That the eye can see, is a gift of God; to see ill or well depends on ourselves. Thus, God has imparted to us the ability for goodness—whether we perform it depends upon ourselves. Accordingly, the essence of virtue consists in the free application of our moral powers—in this lies the meritum of man, without which there is no virtue. With this * De Gratia Christi, iv. § 5.—Primo loco posse statuimus, secundo velle, tertio esse. Posse in natura, velle in arbitrio, eese in effectu locamus. Primum illud, id est posse; ad Deum proprie pertinet quod illud creatursc suse contulit; duo vero reliqua, hoc est velle et esse, ad hominem referenda sunt, quia de arbitrii fonte descendunt. Ergo in voluntate et opere bono laus hominis est, immo et hominis et Dei, qui ipsius voluntatis et operis possibilitatem dedit quique ipsa possibilitatem gratise suae adjuvat semper auxilio. Quad vero potest homo velle bonum atque perficere, saiuis Dei est; potest itaque illud unum esse, etiam si duo ista non fuerint; ista vero sine illo esse non possimt. Itaque liberum mihi est nec voluntatem bonam habere nec actionem ; nullo autem modo possum non habere possibilitatem boni; inest mihi etiam si voluere, nec otium sui aliquando in hoc natura recipit. Quem nobis sensum exempla facient clariorem. Quod possumus videre oculis, nostrum non est; quod vero bene aut male videmus, hoc nostrum est. Et ut generaliter universa complectar, quod possumus omne bonum facere, dicere, cogitare, illius est, qui hoc posse donavit, qui hoc posse adjuvat: quod vero bene vel agimus vel loquimur vel eogitamus, nostrum est, quia luce omnia vertere in malum etiam possumus. THE PELAGIAN CONTROVERSY. 361 also is connected the definition of Free Will*—the ability, at every moment, of doing good or evil. Augustin rejoinedf that such a state of self-determining moral indifference is inconceivable. Good and Evil cannot come from the same source.J Man lives either in communion with God, and in that state professes moral freedom, that is, the ability to determine himself according to the internal law of his moral nature, or he is estranged from God. The definition of Pelagius supposes something which does not belong to the essence of a moral nature—the temptation to Evil. Such a self-determining choice proceeds from a tendency, already existing, to Evil; in this consists the moral misery of man, that he who ought to live only in goodness is attracted by that Evil which is opposed to his nature. According to the Pelagian definition of Freedom, there was no special necessity to discuss man’s original state, since his moral nature was asserted to have been always in the same equilibrium of the will as at first. Pelagius was prompted to explanations upon it only by the Bible and the doctrine of the Church. It was otherwise with Augustin, in whose system this doctrine necessarily had a place, in order to explain the phenomena of the present, which point back to a preceding derangement, since man could not have been so created originally. “ How comes it to pass,” he asks, “ that man, who subdues lions, knows not how he ought to live?” Hence, from the first, he occupied himself with this inquiry. Both these theologians connected their views with the Bible and the Church, and understood the narrative in Genesis, for the most part, in a literal sense. But so much the greater was the internal difference. According to Pelagius, every child is in the same state as the first man before the Fall, * De Gratia Christi, § 19.—Habemus possibilitatem utriusque partis a Deo insitam, velut quandam, ut ita dicam, radicem fructiferam, quae ex voluntate hominis diversa gignat et quse possit ad proprii cultoris arbitrium, vel intere flore virtutum vel sentibus horrere vitiorum. I Opus Imperf. contr. Julianum. iii. 117.—Libra tua quam eovaris ex utraque parte per sequalia momenta suspendere, ut voluntas quantum est ad malum, tantum etiam sit ad bonum libera, &c. See Muller’s Christian Doctrine of Sin (transl. by Pulsford : Edinb. 1853), vol. ii. 37, &c. 7 De Gratia Christi, 21.—Aliud est caritas radix bonorum, alind cupiditas radix malorum, tantumque inter se differunt quantum virtus et vitium. 362 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. only that the powers of the latter were mature. Then, as now, man must have been compounded of Reason and Sensuousness, the latter ruled by the former; but he was different from what he was at a later period, because he had no experience, no practice in goodness, and no example before him. Instead of this, Augustin asserts a great difference ; that in man’s original state, there reigned uninter¬ rupted communion with God ; that Goodness was his proper element, and temptation to sin could never approach him ; he lived .in the gratia justificans, the source of all goodness, and in consequence of communion with God, all the parts of his nature were linked in harmony with one another. The Body was a willing organ of the Soul. Man was not yet an immortal nature, but he was not subject to Death, and would have been translated, without suffering it, to a higher state of existence. Augustin* ascribed great importance to the first sin, as an act by which man’s pure moral nature was separated from communion with God. Pelagius, on the contrary, lowered the moral importance of the first sin ; he could not imagine that this single act could exert so great an influence on the development of the human race. God required from the first man a proof of his obedience, since he was bound to over¬ come sensual desire. That he was allured by it, was purely natural, for God had implanted the desire in his nature, but the Evil consisted in allowing himself to be led astray, and permitting it to transgress the Divine Law.f But the transgression took place with more facility, because man was unpractised and inexperienced in virtue, and was not strengthened by any example. Augustin, on the other hand, denied that the desire for the forbidden fruit wa3 innocent. Thus the conflict was supposed to take place in the state of innocence. In the untroubled harmony of the Divine and the Human, Adam was not exposed to such a temptation, which was only possible through his own blameworthiness. The internal disobedience and opposition of the human will to the divine, must have preceded, ere Sensuousness and Reason could have been brought into collision. J * J. Muller, D. Lehre v. d. Siinde, i. 395. + Cf. Op. Imperf. contr. Julian. 4, 38. t Ibid. 5, 17. THE PELAGIAN CONTROVERSY. 363 According to the Pelagian representation, the consequences of the first sin were rendered less important for Adam himself, because he was awakened to repentance by the punishment. The Free Will remained in him as in his posterity, equipoised between Good and Evil; death was regarded by Pelagius as founded in human nature as such. He was willing, indeed, to grant, that the first man, if he had not sinned, might have been spared from suffering it, by a special privilege, but in itself it was the law of his nature. And not the less were the maladies of human nature founded on it, and could not be attributed to Adam’s transgression. On the other hand, Augustin taught that death had its origin in the discord which arose through sin between man and God, and in its consequences in human nature. Guilt and the punishment of sin, with all other evils, has passed over to the w 7 hole development of humanity. In Adam the w 7 hole human race sinned and became estranged from God, a massa perditionis. For the Scriptural confirmation of this view, which rested in the depths of the consciousness of sin, he attached great weight to the translation of Romans v. 12, in quo ( Adamo ) omnes peccciverunt. He supported it also by his philosophic Theory of general ideas, a Platonic-Aristo- telian Realism, according to which the Universal must be expressed and contained in single individuals (universcilia in re). As the human race were first of all contained and expressed in a single example, the whole race must be laden with the first sin and guilt, as common to all. The ascen¬ dancy of the selfish tendency in the conflict between Sen¬ suousness and Reason has extended itself over the whole development of humanity. He considered it important to notice in the law 7 of development, that sin punishes itself by sin. Julian explained that passage in the Epistle to the Romans correctly,* and believed that he had thus quashed the whole theory of Augustin. The assertion that sin * Contr. Julian, 6,75.—Frustra sensum alium novum atque distortum et a vero abhorrentem molius exsculpere affirmans, ea locutione dictum esse ; in quo omnes peccaverunt, ac si diceretur; propter quod omnes peccaverunt sicut dictum est : in quo covirgit junior viarn suam ut scilicet non in uno homine omnes homines peccasse intelligantur origina- liter et tanquam in massce unione communiter, sed propterea quia primus hominum ille peccavit; id est, cum imitantur ilium, non cum generantur ex illo. Ron ergo huic sensui convenit ilia locutio, ita dictum esse : in quo, velut dictum esset: propter quod. 364 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. punishes itself by sin was to him inconceivable *—that would lie a punishment by which God would multiply sin itself and drive men into the necessary commission of sin. Yet, in another passage,t he does not altogether conceal from himself the truth of the case, for he says, “ Goodness enjoys itself, Evil inflicts suffering on itself.” Augustin makes original sin to consist in that selfish tendency of desire which manifests itself in the concupiscentia. He who had so long succumbed to the power of sensuality, felt its yoke peculiarly hard, and hence was disposed to give prominence to the sensuous element in sin. His elevated soul longed after a perfect command over it, and hence cherished a partiality for asceticism; but the charge brought against him by the Pelagians was false,—that he adopted Manichean principles, and placed the ground of sin in Sensuousness itself in the Body, and thus made God the Author of Evil. The contro¬ versy ought to have led to the more exact determination of the boundary between the natural and the moral; but as each party took for granted the correctness of his own standpoint, the one did not appreciate the other; the Pelagians, es¬ pecially, could not do justice to the' profound ethical con¬ ceptions of Augustin. Julian appealed to the fact, that the sensuous tendency existed also in the brute creation, and, therefore, was founded in nature, and could not be ascribed to Sin. To this Augustin rejoined that the misery which was here in question, could not affect the brutes, but the concu- piscentia carnis was only a punishment for men; that in the inferior animals the flesh could not lust against the spirit. The example of Christ proved that this discord did not neces¬ sarily belong to human nature. For this assertion, his opponents accused him of Apollinarism and Docetism. If * Opus Imperf. 4, 35.—Quo genere ultionis multiplicaret Deus flagitia non puniret, et qui iratus erat rnalae voluntati, qua fuerat erratum, reliquam facerat peccandi necessitatem. f Contr. Julian. 5, 36.—Augustin says, iVJ eminestine, quamdiu disputio eris contra lucidissimam, quae per Apostolum deprompta est, veritatem, affirmans nullo modo esse posse aliquid, quod et peccatum sit et poena peccati ? Quid est ergo nunc quod oblitus tantae loquacitatis tuae ideo laudas altitudinem divitiarum sapientiao et scientiae Dei quia extra futuram operum retributionem ex multa pacte liberum arbitrium fermam voluit implere judicii? Justissime enim sibi, sicut definis, bonus homo malusque committitur, ut et bonus se finatur, utique in opere bono. et malus se ipse patiatur, utique in opere malo. THE PELAGIAN CONTROVERSY. 365 there had been no internal conflict in Christ, there would have been no virtue in him. Augustin defended himself by saying that he did not deny the reality of the sensuous nature in Christ, but only the contrariety arising from sin. The question respecting the Origin of Souls had already been brought into connexion with the doctrine of the propaga¬ tion of sin, by (Xelestius. But Augustin endeavoured to prove that the controversy respecting the latter could be carried independently of the former. A man like Jerome* settled the question more easily, for he inferred Creationism from the words of Christ in John v., “ My Father worketh hitherto.” Augustin did not consider this a valid proof, for even on the theory of Traducianism, the continuous agency of God must still be admitted. Godf gives the souls, even if he gives them through the medium of natural descent. But though Traducianism was favourable to his doctrine of Original Sin, he hesitated to express his approval of it, because the view taken by Jerome seems to lead to sensuous representations. It redounds to his honour, that on this point he maintained the mastery over his dialectic turn of mind, and would not decide without a warrant from Scripture. “ Where Holy Scripture,”£ he says, “does not express itself clearly on an obscure subject, human presumption must be checked. Though I do not know how all things are to be explained on this point, yet I believe that the Scripture would have been explicit if we could not have been left in ignorance without injury.” A conceited young theologian in North Africa, Vincentius Victor, treated this commendable modesty in Augustin as narrow-mindedness, and wrote a book against him in which he compared him to the “ pecoribus insensatis ,” and would have decided the question on very insufficient grounds. Augustin answered him with moderation in his work De Anima et ejus Origine. A progressive deterioration of the human race was allowed even by the Pelagians ; but they accounted for it from the power of evil habits, and held that the influence of Adam * Hieron. contr. Error. Joann. Hierosol. § 22, vol. ii. 1, 427, ed. Vallarsi. f De Anima et ejus Origine, lib. i. § 26.—Ipse quippe Deus dat, otiamsi de propagine dat. X De Peccatorum Mentis et Remissione, ii. § 59. 366 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. consisted in his bad example.* Many die by imitating Adam. Augustin, on the contrary, remarked that it was impossible for bad example to exert such an influence on a pure nature. The assertion that there had been men altogether sinless corresponded to the Pelagian standpoint, according to which the passages in the Epistle to the Romans, in which all are described as having sinned, must be limited and understood only of the majority. Although Pelagius avoided expressing his meaning distinctly, yet it may be certainly found in some passages of his work on Free Will,f in which he gives a list of sinless persons in the Old Testament, and closes with John the Baptist and the Virgin Mary. In later times, he says, when a greater number of men were living, the sins of individuals could not be reckoned ; but when Adam, Eve, Cain, and Abel lived, the Scripture has not mentioned one sin of Abel, if he ever sinned ; hence, we may infer that he was without sin, and there we must rest satisfied, and not assert what is not said in Holy Writ. In the application of his views to the Virgin Mary, he was aided by the general tendency of the Church. Even Augustin shows in his reply that he also was affected by it. “ The holy Virgin Mary excepted,”]; he says, “ of whom, out of reverence for the Lord, I do not wish to take account, when speaking of sins ; for greater grace was granted to her to overcome sin entirely; but excepting her, if we could assemble all the holy men and women, and ask them whether they were without sin, what would they answer? -Would they say what Pelagius says or what St. John says? ‘ If we say we have no sin, we deceive ourselves.’ There is still another question, Whether a regenerate person could be sinless through divine grace. * Ep. ad Demeti, c. 8.—Longa consuetudo vitiorum, quee nos infecit a parvo, paulatumque per multos corrupit annos it ita postea obligatos sibi et addictos tenet, ut vim quadammodo videatur habere natures. + De Natur. et Grab § 42, 44. J L. 1. § 42.—Excepta itaqua sancta Virgine Maria, de qua propter honorem Domini nullam prorsus, cum de peccatis agitur, haberi volo quscstionem : unde enim scimus quid ei plus gratiae collatum fuit ad vincendum ornni ex parte peccatum, buse concipere ac parere meruit, quern constat nullum habuisse peccatum ; hac ergo virgine excepta, si omnes illos sanctos et sanctas cum hie viverent„congregare possemus ct iuterrogare, utium es3ent sine peccato, quid fuisse responsuros putamus ? utium hoc, quod iste dicit, an quod Johannes apostolus ? THE PELAGIAN CONTROVERSY. 367 To maintain this would be a great error. To be sinless is the aim and effort of our wishes ; for us it is enough that no believer, whatever progress he has made, will venture to say, that it is no longer necessary for him to pray, ‘ Forgive us our sins/” With this controversy was connected a question of import¬ ance in the History of Christian morals, — the relation of Christian and heathen virtue. The Pelagians often appealed to the virtues of the heathen as evidences of the moral powers of human nature. Julian, for instance, showe-d from the bravery, chastity, and self-control of the heathen, how much could be effected by the honum naturce sine dono gratice. He confined himself to the contemplation of isolated virtues, but he was not logical, for he sometimes lost sight of the internal difference between heathen and Christian virtue, and on the other hand ascribed a meritum to Christian virtues because they were fructuose bona, and heathen virtues were steriliter bona , because they had no faith, while the others would be rewarded on account of their faith. As to what Augustin said on the difference of the two standpoints, Julian so little understood his views as to put forward the objection, “ If the chastity of the heathen were no chastity, it might as well be said their bodies were no bodies, their corn was no corn.”* In these ethical discussions, Augustin’s merits were very great, for he drew attention to the nature of the disposition and the moral unity of life, on which everything depended; the eye of the soul is the whole tendency of the inner man, from which all “goodness must proceed. The right disposition consists in love to God, by which all the cardinal virtues are determined. Whatever does not proceed from this principle is not truly good, though it may appear so to the eyes of men. He defined Sin to be an act which either does not proceed from love, or where love is not so great as it ought to be. But that ten¬ dency of the disposition which is pleasing to God can only spring out of Christianity. From the radically different views respecting the relation of the Creator to the Creature, and the present condition of Man, great contrariety would result in contemplating the effects of Christianity on mankind. The Pelagian principles would have led consequentially to a rationalist view, to the * Con. Julian. 4, 27. Neander’s Ch. Hist. iv. 366. 368 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. entire rejection of the supernatural element, and to the opinion that Mankind might be self-developed, without revela¬ tion or communication from God, in order to attain its destiny. But the Pelagians did not carry out these principles so con¬ sequentially, and what they took from the Biblical element, rested certainly not on mere accommodation, hut on the con¬ viction that a supernatural Revelation was necessary in order to realize the destiny of Humanity. Julian repudiated as a calumny the assertion that the Free Will could attain to the right worship of God without divine aid. Reason could not of itself discover the truths imparted by Divine Revelation. No rational man could maintain this.* Julian’s party did not deny the idea of grace absolutely, they felt themselves bound to it by the Scriptures, and thought they accepted it in a Christian sense, if they at the same time retained the equally necessary idea of Free Will. But under the influence of their principles, Grace became something very indefinite and superficial. Sometimes it was reckoned among the powers of human nature imparted to it by divine love, sometimes as belonging to the Revelation that was auxiliary to those powers, that is, to the Supernatural. But even in this case, Grace always remained an external communication, something foreign, and not what Augustin esteemed of the highest importance, an impartation of divine life through Christ. How they confounded things that differ appears from Julian’s statements ;f Man created by God with Free Will was aided by innumerable kinds of Grace,—by commands, blessings, sanctification, punishment, chastenings, invitations, illumination. GodJ disposes the will to believe by admonitions, miracles, examples, promises, rewards, and punish¬ ments. He thus explains the words in the Epistle to the Phillip- pians, “God worketh in us to will and to do ; ” he works because he pleases carnal men by the rewards held out to them, and by * Opus Imp. 3, 106. f Ibid.—Affirmamus a Deo fieri hominem liberi arbitrii eumque innumeris divinse gratise speciebus juvari cui possibile sit vel servare Dei mandata vel transgredi. Et hoc est, ubi liberum arbitrium esse defendemus, ut cum Deus tarn multis modis benignitatem suam asserat, i.e., prsecipiendo benedicendo, sanctificando, coercendo, provocando, illuminando unusquisque eorum, qui jam ratione utilitur liberum habeat voluntatem Dei, vel servare vel spernere. X L. c. 238. THE PELAGIAN CONTROVERSY. 369 his revelations excites their longing after God. In this sense, Pelagius also asserts that God worked by his Grace,—that he enabled men to accomplish more easily what they ought to accomplish by their free will. We place this grace* (he goes on to say) not merely in the communication of the Law, but in God’s aid by teaching and revelation—since he reveals to us the Future—makes us acquainted with the wiles of Satan, and enlightens us by the manifold gifts of his heavenly grace. Pelagius admitted various stages in the divine education of Humanity which corresponded to its progressive deterioration. As long as Nature continued better, it was left to itself, jus titia per naturam; when evil habit had increased God gave the Law ( justitia sub lege ); when Sin had mounted still higher Christ appeared ( justitia gratia). The office of the Redeemer consisted principally in the promulgation of a new and higher Moral Law, in presenting new motives to virtue, and in giving an example of perfect morality. But as there had been other sinless men, the question arose, what was his pre-eminent distinction ? Julian answered : Christ was not the first pat¬ tern of righteousness, but the greatest; as in Adam there was the forma peccati maxima in relation to Eve, non prima, inasmuch as Satan had sinned before him. He distinguished between sinlessness and moral perfection ; the latter, forma exacta, was in Christ. This gradation stood in connexion with the distinction of the standpoint of the fulfilling of the Law and of the consilia evangelica. Among the new motives to virtue Julian reckoned the Incarnation and Sacrifice of Christ, in which he showed such great love to mankind, in order that they might at last love God again ; and thus become fellow- heirs of the Only-begotten. The Pelagians not only did not deny the idea of objective Justification, but gave it special prominence, for Julian explains it as being the forgiveness of sins. It may indeed surprise us, that notwithstanding their notion of sinless men, they still spoke of the forgiveness of sins without limitation; but the controversy with Augustin, referred not to whether the justificatio was to be regarded as objective, but turned on their not admitting it in that subjective and transitive sense, which Augustin claimed for it. Yet its objective * De Gratia Christi, 8. B B 570 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. importance must have been, at all events, lessened by their pre-suppositions respecting human nature. In the consideration of redemption, it was of importance whether it was viewed in a negative sense, that is, in opposi¬ tion to the corruption of human nature, or positively as a glori¬ fication of Humanity, by which it was raised to a higher stand¬ point not attainable by its original powers. The former was prevalent in the West, the latter in the East, to which the Pelagian view which attributed the greatest effects to Redemp¬ tion without the pre-supposition of human corruption, w^as necessarily very much allied. It maintained that the work of Christ was far greater, than repairing the effects of human corruption. Adam stood as the representative of human nature in a development left to itself; Christ showed a more advanced development through divine aid. Thus Julian says, Under Adam’s name the nature of humanity is represented ; what was true of him, was true of all; but under the name of Christ, the power of Him who was the Creator, and w r ho fos¬ tered his own workmanship, that is, whatever can be deve¬ loped out of human nature by the omnipotence of the Creator.* “ Christ, who is the Redeemer of the beings whom he created, increases his benefits upon that which bears his image by his continual bounty, and those whom he formed good, he. makes still better by renovation and adoption.” Since in this man¬ ner the kingdom of Heaven was a standpoint attainable by men only through God’s grace, it serves to explain the recog¬ nition of the necessity of Infant baptism by the Pelagians, without their admitting the doctrine of original Sin. But although Grace here seems a necessary requirement, the im¬ portant difference between them and Augustin remains, that he regarded it as inwardly operative as a communication of divine life, and accordingly, understood the idea of Justifica¬ tion, not like the Pelagians, merely in an objective sense, but modified it in the manner in which it has been preserved by the Catholic Church. In common with the evangelical, he held indeed the idea of a living faith; but by justificatio he understood the making personally righteous, the internal sanctification by the communion of the divine life which is effected through Christ. Hence he says against Pelagius, after acknowledging that he taught the forgiveness of sin * Contr. Julian, iii. 8. Neander’s Ch. Hist. iv. 360. THE PELAGIAN CONTROVERSY, 371 through Christ,—The Grace of God through Christ is that in which he justifies us, not by our righteousness, but by the communication of his own. What Pelagius regarded as most important, the Revelation of doctrine, he held to be subordi¬ nate, since by that alone man does not attain salvation, but all depends on the inward enlightening and sanctifying of the Soul. Although, he says, the communication of doctrine may be called Grace, this is only allowable in the sense that no outward miracle is intended, but God, by a higher and internal manner, infuses his doctrine into the consciousness with inex¬ pressible joy. At the same time the threefold distinction of Justitia is set aside : there is only one which proceeds from com¬ munion with God through Christ. Even for the standpoint of the Old Testament there can be no other; the Revelation of the Law could not bring man to justitia, but only awaken the consciousness of sin. The letter could only kill; nothing but the Spirit of the Law which passes through Grace into the inner life can make alive. The pious men of the Old Testa¬ ment have become partakers of the promises of Grace through faith; they were not under the terrors of the Law, but on the standpoint of Grace, which communicates to man joy in good¬ ness, heals and sets at liberty the depraved Will. In his treatise de Spiritu et litera, he shows that what the Law of works enjoins with threatenings, the Law of Faith attains through faith. Under the divine guidance, through Grace man is led by degrees from Sin to Redemption. These first movements of the divine life do not proceed from human nature, but purely from grace, which operates as gratia pra- veniens seu prceparans. Then Grace leads man to Faith. Faith frees him from moral evil: the power of grace sets the will at liberty. Man now freely and joyfully performs what is good. The gratia operans is active within him. But he will always require the co-operation of Grace in order that the free Will may persist in goodness. While he thus becomes pro¬ gressively strengthened he finds himself on the stage of gratia co-operans. Augustin thus expresses it,—Grace anticipates us that we may be healed; it follows after us in order that after healing we may be full of life and vigour • it prepares the Will beforehand, and co-operates with it when prepared, effecting the work it has begun. Thus Man always requires in this life the support of divine Grace against Sin, and the B B 2 872 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. distinguishing mark of those who attain salvation is per severance unto the end through the power of Grace (donum perseverantice). If, therefore, the Pelagians attributed so much to the Free Will as to deny every idea of Grace, which in the connexion of their ideas might seem to encroach upon it, Augustin thought it most important to maintain that Grace works unconditionally, and that the Free Will can do nothing till it has been healed bv Grace. Grace, which should be conditioned by human worthiness, would he no Grace. As it precedes all movement towards Goodness, so it works irresistibly ( ; gratia irresistibilis ), not outwardly com¬ pelling, but by an internal necessity attracting the corrupted human will. The Pelagians saw in this the destruction of the Free Will, but Augustin only intended thus to maintain its freedom ; for the will is first set at liberty by Grace. In this difference concerning Grace we may perceive the influence of the difference already noticed in the idea formed of Freedom by the two parties. In accordance with their ideas of moral Atomism the Pelagians maintained only the formal idea of Freedom. This was denied by Augustin, since he regarded as the essence of freedom, the free development of the higher nature of man under the influence of Grace. In support of this view he always asserted that man felt no compulsion, that Grace operated in the form of the Free Will. God does not impart his Grace to stones, nor does he operate on rational beings as he might on wood, but as on beings endowed with reason and will, that is, in the form of rational conviction. But since, according to Augustin, Man, although he believes himself free to act, acts so only in the form which is given him by Grace, this freedom regarded as power is only a seeming freedom. Julian, on the contrary, maintained that God himself would not compel the Free Will; he appealed to the examples of undaunted constancy among the Heathen, which certainly vras nothing to the purpose. Augustin rea¬ soned inconsequentially, since in Adam he made everything depend on free self-determination, but denied this in the case of other men ; and thus made God unjust. This is certainly an inconsequence in Augustin, but one which is connected with the power of moral feeling. He was afraid of tracing back the causality of sin to God, and therefore placed the ground of it in the self-determination of Alan. THE PELAGIAN CONTROVERSY. 373 If it depends entirely on the gratia irresistibilis whether any man attains to Salvation, then the cause of the salvation of one portion of mankind, and the perdition of another, could be found only in God, in his absolute Predestination ; for nothing is left but the assumption of a hidden decree of God, according to which he leaves the majority to perdition which they have merited, bestows grace on the rest and leads them to salvation. Augustin thus laid himself open to the charge of attributing injustice to God, and the Pelagians knew how to avail themselves of it. Augustin appealed to various passages in Holy Writ, especially Rom. ix., on the mysterious expe¬ riences of human life ; the Gospel was made known to certain nations, and not to others ; one child w 7 as baptized, another not. He would more readily infer a secret decree of God, since he pre-supposed that whoever did not become acquainted with the Gospel in this life would remain under eternal con¬ demnation. To explain this, the Pelagian would find no ground in their Philosophy. I am disturbed, thou sayest, because one is lost and another is baptized; and I also am disturbed, for I am a Man. But wouldst thou not be justly angry if a beast were to reproach God and say, Why hast thou made me a beast ? Yet he felt that by such arguments alone he could not pacify the moral feelings, and added ;—We can¬ not explain the divine proceedings; we shall not understand them till we reach a higher state of existence ; let us only believe that there can be no unrighteousness with God; there we shall obtain perfect knowledge ; if thou wouldst here con¬ ceive the inconceivable, thou art already lost. Julian rejoined, that in God’s revelations there can be no contradiction; and hence the Holy Scripture cannot contradict what he has inscribed on the moral nature of man. We call the Scrip¬ tures holy, because they agree with Reason and Faith. The difficult passages to which Augustin appealed, he wished to explain by those that were clear, and by which it was necessary to abide. Paul also says, that a man makes himself a vessel of honour or of dishonour. Augustin thought, indeed, that by gaining the victory over Pelagius, his own system of absolute Predestination must be acknowledged, for on his standpoint there was no medium ; but he was mistaken. Many joined with him in rejecting the Pelagian doctrine without acknowledging his doctrine of Pre- 374 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. destination; this may be observed in Innocent of Rome, and likewise in Jerome. The latter says, indeed, “ The pride of Free Will is broken, because man is drawn, and that too, against his Will,” but this may be probably taken as one of those extravagant expressions which frequently occur in his writings, since in other passages he pre-supposes free suscepti¬ bility on the part of Man : to will and to run is mine, but this mine will not be mine without the divine aid. More plainly still in the following expressions. Where the grace and mercy of God are, there the Free Will lies in part fallow, which only consists in this, that we will and desire. Now, it is in God’s power that by his aid we are able to fulfil what we desire and strive after; it is ours to pray—God’s to give; ours to begin—God’s to complete ; ours to offer what we can —God’s to supply what we cannot. The doctrine of Absolute Predestination could not have been propounded without practically injurious consequences if it had not been handled with Augustin’s prudence and ability. Those men especially who had been brought to this doctrine through the whole development of their religious practice and thinking, obtained through their well-grounded faith inward p>eace and the assurance of their own predestination. Rut it was otherwise with those to whom this System had been brought from without, and who found themselves engaged in an internal conflict, among the monks of the cloister at Adrumetum, in the province of Byzacene, who by studying the doctrine of Predestination in Augustin’s writings, had arrived at the conclusion that the efforts of men were entirely useless since God did everything ; and that it was unjust to punish Sinners. Augustin being called upon to counteract them, composed (a.d. 427) his treatises de gratia et libero arbitrio, and de correptione et gratia. It was not in general his manner to shrink from the consequences of his System; he endeavoured to repel doubts by developing it dialectically. The doctrine of Grace did not deny Free Will, but pre-supposed it, since Grace ignored not, but took account of the human will. Here again he involved himself in the ambiguity remarked above of the idea of Free Will. In the second work he wished to explain how blame and punishment could be awarded to men on his system. In the first place, all man¬ kind sinned in Adam ; hence individuals could not excuse THE SEMI-PELAGIAN CONTROVERSY. 375 themselves on account of the general sinfulness, and must bear their sins as their own criminality; but then God had so arranged, that human means must be applied, though they are fruitless without grace. He wished to leave it undeter¬ mined, what persons belonged to the predestinated, in order to preserve men from pride. Hence there is no more certain mark of predestination to salvation, than the donum perseverantics. Since, therefore, it is uncertain, we must at all events do our part. On the presumption that sinners who are now in error, belong to the predestinated, we must yet seek to operate upon them in Christian love. But this method of removing the difficulty was not suited to satisfy all minds, as Augustin himself experienced. As far as other dogmas were treated by him in the controversy between him¬ self and Pelagius, he had on his side the general Christian consciousness, the prevailing spirit of the Church; but it was otherwise with the doctrines of unconditional Predestination and irresistible Grace. These, equally with the Pelagian doc¬ trine, were opposed to the hitherto developed consciousness of the Church teachers; and the consequence was, that a middle party was formed, which, in the vindication of the doctrines of an original moral state—of the consequences of the first trans¬ gression ; of the sinfulness of human nature, and its need of redemption ; and of Grace, as the communication of an in¬ ternal divine life, agreed with Augustin ; but could not recon¬ cile itself to his two other Dogmas. 4. THE SEMI-PELAGIAN CONTROVERSY. Watch, V. J. Geffken, Historia Semipelagianjsmi Antiquissimi. Gottg. 1826. 4 , Wiggers, Augustinismus u. Pelagianismus. Th. 2. - i;. . Two pupils of Augustin in Gaul, Prosper Aquitanus, and Hilary, gave him information by letter of the opposition to his views that had appeared in the way we have mentioned in the South of Gaul. They apprised him, that their opponents cer¬ tainly combated the Pelagians, but maintained that they could do this without admitting the doctrine of absolute Pre¬ destination ; that Augustin explained the biblical passages quoted in favour of it in a manner foreign to the doctrine of the Church ; even if the doctrine of Predestination were true, it ought not to be made public, since it could only injure; for these things could be comprehended by no man. They 876 THE HISTORY OP CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. supposed that Grace was conditioned by Free Will, though they also spoke of a gratia prceveniens. Augustin composed his treatises de prcedestinatione sanctorum, and de dono per - severantice , in which he acknowledged (which from his stand¬ point was saying a great deal) that his present opponents were different from the Pelagians, since they admitted the doctrine of original sin, gratia prceveniens , and justification and granted that no one was sufficient of himself to begin and to complete the good work. If they acted according to this truth and prayed to God, they would, after all, attain to a right knowledge of predestination. It is deserving of notice that he adduces Christ in proof of the doctrine, and designates him the prceclarissimum lumen prcedestinationis et gratice, because on the side of his humanity no such merit could be attributed to him by which he could attain to this dignity. He had previously said in his treatise de correptione et gratia, that there was no one so blind in the faith as to maintain that Christ had merited by his free will to be the Son of God. We recognise here the connexion of different views in Chris- tology and Anthropology. This is shown in Theodore of Mopsuestia, for according to his doctrine of Free Will in human nature, he represented the sinlessness of Christ as a posse non peccare, while Augustin, from his anthropological standpoint, supposed in Christ a non posse peccare. The Pelagians did not allow their anthropological ideas to influence their Christology consequentially. Yet it is worthy of notice, that Julian charged Augustin, when he denied concupiscentia m Christ, with not holding him to be a true man. More¬ over, it is remarkable that Cassian and Gennadius assert of Leporius, that he was a Pelagian. Augustin, in behalf of his assertion that according to the judgment of the Church every¬ thing depended on grace alone, appealed to the Church prayers for the conversion of Unbelievers and the strengthening of Believers. He was not of opinion that the doctrine of abso¬ lute Predestination ought not to be publicly announced ; this might be right respecting truths which only made a person more knowing, but not better; but this doctrine was very important for the Christian edification of those who rightly understood it. They would be induced by it to humble them selves, and to put their trust in God alone. If misunderstood it might indeed be attended with practical ill effects, but this THE SEMI-PELAGIAN CONTROVERSY. 377 might be said of all truths, as, for example, of the divine fore knowledge, in propounding this doctrine a person should always speak with the consciousness that he had believers, therefore predestinated persons, before him, and should speak of the reprobate only in the third person ; then this doctrine would infuse into a man so much greater confidence in his sanctification. These rejoinders were so far from satisfac¬ tory that the Semi-Pelagians came forward with greater bold ness. The re-action proceeded from some of the monks in Southern Gaul, rather owing to a practical than a speculative interest. At the head of the party stood John Cassian, an Abbot of Marseilles, and a pupil of Chrysostom, and hence biassed on this question by an Oriental influence. The prac¬ tically Christian guided him in treating the doctrines of the Faith ; he admitted nothing which was not suited to satisfy thoroughly the religious wants of men. His attention was turned to experience; he observed religious natures ; a system of mere logical speculation had no charms for him. His doc¬ trines, which are scattered through his writings, were designed to represent in its simplicity the faith of the Galilean fishermen, which had been garbled by Ciceronian eloquence. Free Will and Grace agreed, and hence there was an opposing onesided¬ ness which maintained either Grace alone, or Free Will alone. Augustin and Pelagius were each wrong in their own way. The idea of the divine justice in the determination of man’s lot after the first transgression did not preponderate in Cassian‘s writings as in Augustin’s, but the idea of a dis¬ ciplinary divine love, by the leadings of which men are to be led to repentance. He appeals also to the mysteriousness of God’s ways, but not as concerns predestination, but the variety of the leadings by which God leads different indi¬ viduals to salvation. Nor is one law applicable to all; in some cases Grace anticipates {gratia prceveniens), in others, a conflict precedes, and then divine help comes to them as Grace. In no instance can divine Grace operate independently of the free Self-determination of Man. As the husbandman must do his part, but all this avails nothing without the divine blessing, so man must do his part, yet this profits nothing without divine Grace. Augustin died about a d. 430, but even after his death the controversy was warmly carried on, for the Semi-Pelagian 378 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. party had great influence; yet it was opposed by men of emi¬ nence,— Prosper, for instance, the leader of the Augustinians, a man whose deep piety bore the impress of that system with which his whole life and thinking were closely connected. He developed the Augustinian ideas in his writings with deep feeling, acuteness, and cautious dialectic; in his poem cle ingrcttis, he vindicated unconditional Predestination and Grace against the other party, whom he termed Ungrateful. Eulo¬ gizing Augustin, he says, “ All his pleasure was the one love of Christ; as he ascribed nothing good to himself, God was all to him.” Relying on the reputation which Augustin pos¬ sessed in the Roman Church, Prosper and Hilary attempted to draw from bishop Ccelestin a declaration against the Semi- Pelagians ; they complained of the monks, who had ventured to revile the memory of Augustin, and hoped to obtain a verdict in favour of the Augustinian doctrine. But they were disappointed. Ccelestin, about a.d. 431, addressed a letter to the Gallic Bishops, and censured those who had not held Augustin’s memory in honour, and stated that his Anti- Pelagian writings were always acknowledged as correct in the Roman Church. He intimated that even bishops agreed with the opponents of Augustin ; but gave no dogmatic deci¬ sion, and left it even doubtful whether the complaints made to him were well founded. In some ancient manuscripts of eccle¬ siastical laws certain decisions of the Roman bishops and of the North African Councils, approved by them, and which were held during the Pelagian controversy, are joined with this letter of Ccelestin ; but it cannot be doubted, that these capitula do not belong to Coelestin, but were added at a later period. It is remarkable that the compiler of this collection did not venture, in precise terms, to maintain the doctrine of Predestination. For it is said, “ As to those difficult ques¬ tions with which they are occupied who oppose the Heretics— as we do not venture to despise them, so neither do we con¬ sider it necessary to meddle with them.” It is easy to per¬ ceive that Coelestin’s decision, which every one could interpret as he pleased, brought no advantage to Augustin’s party. When Prosper wrote against certain assertions of a Yincentius, it is supposed he could be no other than Vincentius Lerinenses, the author of the famous commonitorium , for he, too, was a Semi-Pelagian, since lie names Pelagius and Cselestius, but THE SEMI-PELAGIAN CONTROVERSY. 379 not the Semi-Pelagians, among the false teachers; and when he recounts the most eminent Church teachers, he never men¬ tions Augustin. He designed to show that no utterance of opinion by a Church teacher could determine any point against the unanimous doctrine of the Church. We have grounds for presuming that he had Augustin in his eye, on which account it is not improbable that this controversy induced him to com¬ pose this work. He appealed to the words of Ccelestin in his letter,— desinat, si ita res sunt, incessere novitas vetustatem, and according to his own views takes novitas to be the Augustinian, and vetustas the Church doctrine. He adds the striking remark, that certain Towns and Provinces were complained of, because they were disposed to ignore these novelties. During the conflict which was carried on in Southern Gaul, three parties might be distinguished. (1.) The adherents of absolute Predestination, in the extreme form of the doctrine. (2.) Those who, by the opposition of the Semi-Pelagians, had been induced to seek a more acceptable representation of this doctrine, and (3.) The Semi-Pelagians of various grades. The latter were gratified when Predestinarianism was presented in its harshest form, since they could then find a more ready admission for their own theory. Among those works which, by a temperate and mild representation, aimed at gaining friends to the Augustinian system, was an anonymous and very remarkable book that has come down to us, de vocatione gentium* an able attempt to place the repulsive points of the Augustinian system in the background without surrendering its main principles. The difference between mere apparent Virtue, Legality, and true Virtue, which is animated by love to God, is contrasted. In proportion to the energy of Man’s will is its liability to fall into sin, until it has submitted itself to the divine guidance. Animated by the divine will it is spiritual ( voluntas spiritalis), it contains the germ of all true virtue, but such it becomes only by divine grace. But this acts not compulsorily, but with the constant co-operation of the understanding and the heart; the operation of divine grace takes place only in the form of the natural determination of the human will. God has destined no one to perdition; he wills that all men should be saved ; Christ died for all. The * Neander’s Ch. Hist. iv. 391. 380 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. universal revelations of God serve for a proof ( dona generalia gratia), in which the means are given to all to attain to the knowledge of God. According to this, the Author appears to keep aloof from the Augustinian Particularism ; and yet again he seems to retract his opinion, and asserts that no man can attain to salvation by that general Grace, but only by that special Grace {gratia specialis), which begets the spiritual Will. Can Man do anything in order to gain this? The author denies it. He distinguishes from the general divine will which makes itself known in Creation, a special Universality (.specialis universitas) of the divine Will, according to which God predestines to salvation, all to whom he imparts his gratia specialis. The ground of the Election is hidden from us. Three principles must be maintained : God wills that all men should be saved; no one can be saved by his own merits ; every one only by God’s Grace; the human Understanding cannot penetrate into the depths of the divine councils. If the last truth be only rightly considered, and no search be made after the incomprehensible, there will be no variance between the first and the second. Here then, a gratia irre- sistibilis is admitted, but its compulsory character is concealed as far as it is represented, as operating under the form of free self-determination. Predestination is not clearly expressed, but only represented on its negative side. But there are several contradictory positions connected with it, such as, God wills that all men should be saved, and others which cannot have been seriously maintained. Since men are disposed to deceive themselves by formulas, so the able dialectic form of the book led to a wider spread of the Augustinian doctrines. The question respecting the authorship of this book is diffi¬ cult to answer. It has been ascribed to Ambrose, to Prosper, and to Leo the Great. It certainly does not belong to Ambrose, for it suits neither his times, nor his doctrine; with the doctrine of the two others, it agrees on the whole. Paschasius, Quesnel, and Griesbach, # have attempted to adduce proof of Leo’s authorship, but they have not fully established it. About this time it was asserted, that there was a sect of Predestinatians, who entirely, and even in form, denied Free Will, and made everything in man depend on divine predesti- * Abhandlungen Herausggb. Von Gabler. i. THE SEMI-PELAGIAN CONTROVERSY. 381 nation. It has been asked whether there really was any such a sect diverging in this manner from the Augustinian doctrine. 'The existence of an absolutely distinct sect we must deny. The report of it proceeds only from a Semi-Pelagian quarter. Advantage was taken of the harsher representations of the Augustinian system, in order to brand the author with heresy. In a chronicle of the fifth century, ascribed to Prosper, the heresy of the Predestinatians is dated from the year 418, and it is added,— quce ab Augustino dicitur coepisse initium. As this seemed offensive, a correction is found in another reading,— ab Augustini libris male intellectis . The most remarkable document belonging to this period, is a book which Sirmond the Jesuit published in 1643, under the title of Prcedestinatus, at the time of the controversy between the Jesuits and Jansenists. The Jesuits were readily charged with having forged it; but it bears indubitable marks of its origin in the Semi-Pelagian period. The work consists of three parts; the first gives an account of all the heresies to the times of the writer.* The second book describes the ninetieth heresy, that of the Predestinatians, in a document ascribed to them, and asserts that the author had imputed it to Augustin. The third book contains a refutation of this heresy. The author of the first and third books must have been a Semi-Pelagian, for he counts the Pelagians among the heretics, but not the Semi- Pelagians. He states his own doctrine in the third book. He admits a gratia prceveniens, but understands by it the Redemp¬ tion of men through Christ, which is presupposed objectively, as granted to all, and without w’hich the efforts to obtain eternal life would be useless. In many particular instances, God also has aroused men to believe by extraordinary leadings, but never without their free self-determination; Grace every day awakens the slumbering will. All this accords with Semi-Pelagianism. In the second book, the doctrine of absolute Predestination is represented with designed harsh¬ ness. God has predestined Man either to righteousness or to sin. The predestined may sin ever so much and resist; with¬ out his own will he will attain salvation; and inversely he who is destined to death, strives in vain. This is proved by the example of Judas. Dost thou think with thy praying and fasting to be more holy than Judas, who was a disciple of * The first book is in Corp. Hoeresiologie, ed. F. Oehler: Ber. 1856. 382 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. Christ, and yet, because he was predestined to it, sinned to eternal death? On the other hand, the Apostle Paul had committed greater sins than any man, and yet, because he was predestined to be an Apostle, he at once was set free from all his sins. Such designed harshness may fairly raise the suspicion, whether any one wrote this book from an honourable standpoint, or whether it was not forged by that Semi-Pelagian. But since he says that it was attributed to Augustin, and yet the document contains no trace of the author’s wishing to pass for Augustin, it seems to follow that the Semi-Pelagian did not write it, but met with it and held it to be really the work of a Predestinarian. This is rendered more probable by the fact that many assertions in it could not proceed from a Semi- Pelagian. And why should it be thought incredible that some one might have gone such lengths in a blind zeal for the doctrine of Predestination ? The question arises whether the author only gives a harsh representation of Augustinian doctrine, or really deviates from it. The latter may be inferred from Free Will not being acknowledged in the first man, and hence he was thought to be destined to the Fall by God’s will, which was the later Supralapsarian doctrine. This is certainly, not directly expressed in the book, but many other things show that the Author went as far. And if Augustin had sufficient tenderness of feeling to except the first Man, at least, from absolute Predestination, yet this ground would be wanting to an author who often enough set the moral feelings at defiance. Among the Semi-Pelagians who carried on the controversy against the doctrine of Predestination, Faustus of Rhegium (Rhji) is particularly distinguished. He disputed against the Presbyter Lucidus, an adherent not of the doctrine of the Prce- destinatus, but only of Augustin. First of all, he tried in a letter* to prevail upon him to recant the following positions,— that a man is destined by a decree of God to perdition ; that a baptised person or a heathen will be condemned not because he has not received grace through his own fault, but because suf¬ ficient grace has not been given him ; Christ did not die for all men. He who is a vessel of dishonour cannot make himself a vessel of honour. The true doctrine. Faustus said, is, that it depends on Man, whether he receives grace or not. Lucidus at first opposed, but was prevailed upon to recant by the * Mansi vii. p. 1008. THE SEMI-PELAGIAN CONTROVERSY. 383 Council, at Arles, about a.d. 472, and Lyons, a.d. 475 The first Council commissioned Faustus to draw up a representa¬ tion of the pure doctrine, which occasioned his work De Gratia Dei et Humana Mentis Libero Arbitrio.* He compares the contrast of Freedom and Grace with that of the divine and human in the person of Christ; as in that its peculiar qualities are to be attributed to each nature, so in man we must distinguish what proceeds from the grace of God and what is of Man. The Free Will must not be regarded as annihilated, but it belongs to Man to regain the divine favour by his own exertions and God’s help. A spark is placed within him which it behoves him to cherish by the help of grace. A more moderate defender of the same doctrines was Gennadi us, a Presbyter of Marseilles. In his treatise, De Dogmatibus Ecclesiasticis , he says,f God first of all warns Man and invites him to salvation ; it is in the power of Man to follow him. In his work De Viris Illustribus, cap. 38, he speaks of Augustin with commendation, yet does not hesitate to add, that by writing so much he fell into the error of which Solomon says in the 10th chapter of Proverbs, “In the multitude of words there wanteth not sin.” He makes mention of an error which had arisen from much speaking, and evidently refers to the doctrine of Absolute Predestination. This arose from carrying things to an extreme, but for all this Augustin had not fallen into heresy. Along with the Semi-Pelagians, Augustin had a considerable party who favoured his views in Southern Gaul. Among them were two men of distinguished discretion, intelligence, and personal authority, Avitus, bishop of Vienne, and Cassarius, bishop of Arles, the latter especially a man of genuine piety, eminent for practical energy, zeal, and ability in pastoral duties. Augustin’s doctrine was blended with his entire con¬ ception of Christianity, he kept close to the practical side, and avoided all extravagance and enthusiasm in his views. His development of the doctrine of Predestination is analogous to that of the treatise De Vocatione Gentium. Man can do nothing ; everything proceeds from grace, and hence the need of humility. The moderate representations made by so influential a person must have contributed greatly to the * Bibl. Patr. Lugdun. tom. viii. ■f Ed. Elmenhorst, 1614, Oehler Corp. Hseresiol. t. i. 384 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. victory of the Augustinian doctrine. Moreover, in North Africa important effects resulted from the Augustinian School. Many excellent men, who ranked among its adherents, were driven by the ravages of the Vandals to take refuge in Sardinia, Corsica, and Constantinople. By them, and, in another quarter, by a number of monks on the borders of the Black Sea; the so-called Scythian monks, who belonged to the Greek and Latin Churches, and were zealous abettors of Augustinian Orthodoxy, a new impulse was given to the con¬ troversy. The monks in Constantinople, under the reign of Justin, began the agitation, and directed their efforts especially against the works of Faustus. Through a North African bishop Possessor, who had fled to Constantinople, they applied to Hormisdas, the bishop of Rome, and requested his judgment upon it. He expressed himself with moderation. He pro¬ nounced the writings of Augustin, especially those addressed to Hilary and Prosper, to be standards of Orthodoxy, yet he would not condemn Faustus. It seems that he wished to repudiate neither party entirely. His reserve displeased the monks; either he must condemn the work of Faustus, or pro¬ nounce the Augustinian doctrine to be false. They tried to find out a contradiction in the language of Hormisdas. They next sent the works of Faustus to Fulgentius, bishop of Ruspe, in Numidia, the most distinguished of the African exiles. He wrote a work against Faustus in vindication of the Augustinian System.* Logically, indeed, but without the extravagancies of the Breed estinatus, he maintained a prcedestinatio duplex , a phrase which acquired importance in later controversies, but by which he only meant the predestination of the elect to salvation, and of the condemned to everlasting punishment. As the controversy was now renewed in Southern Gaul, a scheme of doctrine, drawn up by Caisarius, was adopted by a Council held at Oranges, a.d. 529, which maintained the Augustinian doctrines of Grace against the Semi-Pelagians. Anathemas were pronounced on all who represented the divine mercy to be conditioned in its operation by human efforts. Repentance and Faith were brought about by divine Grace, for Paul says, “ What hast thou, that thou hast not received V* and ik By the grace of God I am what I am” When we do * De Veritate Prsedestinationis et Gratise Dei, 3 libb. Bibl. Patr. Lugdun. GREGORY THE GREAT. S85 gooi, God works in us; whatever goodness Man has, proceeds from that source. But at the same time the bold assertions of the Predestinatians were contradicted. That any one is pre¬ destined to evil, that, they said, we do not believe, but con¬ demn such a doctrine with perfect abhorrence. These resolu¬ tions w r ere confirmed by the following Council of Valence, and by Boniface II. of Borne. He condemned those who main¬ tained that faith in Christ proceeded from the freedom of Nature, and that native goodness availed more than Christ. Thus the Augustinian doctrine of grace was victorious in the Western Church; but the mild manner is noticeable in which the doctrine of a gratia prceveniens, as the source of all instiga¬ tion to goodness, was expressed, instead of a gratia irresistibilis and absolute Predestination. A similar phase of the Augustinian doctrine appeared in the writings of Gregory the Great, and through him was com¬ municated to the following age. The good which we do, he says, is as much God’s as ours; it comes * from God through the gratia prceveniens, it is ours by the obedience of the Free Will. When the gratia prceveniens f operates, and the human Will follows it, we may venture to say, that we free ourselves, since through our freedom we coincide with divine Grace. In such passages the Free Will conditioning Grace is not in any instance clearly excluded. He thus describes the transforming power of Grace, |—“ Oh, how great is this Artist, the Holy Spirit, who, without any delay in learning, instructs the soul in everything he wills, as soon as he touches it; for in an instant he changes it; in an instant it renounces what it was, and becomes what it w ? as not.” But still more plainly than in this passage we find the Augustinian doctrine of Pre¬ destination in his expressions on the creative knowledge of God.§ “In God’s sight everything is present; everything w'hich God knows he knows, not because it is, but it is as it is, because he so knows it.” But liow anxious he w 7 as to separate the causality of Evil from God, is evident from his explanation of Isaiah xlv. 7, “I make peace and create evil” —which he understands of the evil which is ordained by God for good. The hardening of hearts by God, he explains in this way, that God does not vouchsafe them that Grace by * Job i. 33, § 40. f Job i. 24, § 74. 7 Horn, in Evangel, i. 2, 30, § 8. § Job i. 20, § 63. C C 366 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. which they might become softened ; but this is owing to their own fault.* The doctrine of the perdition of unbaptized children also led him to the belief of absolute Predestination. “ If we ask why some are baptized and others not, the answer is, the greater the mystery the more humbly we ought to reverence the divine councils.” t He taught with Augustin, that no one can tell before death, whether he belongs to the predestined. Hence he exhorts to work out salvation with fear and trembling.£ Where this moderate mode of expressing the Augustinian doctrine was maintained, the doctrine of absolute Predestina¬ tion was kept in the background by many as compared with the doctrine of Redemption ; but still the adherents of the harsher mode of expression kept their ground, and new conflicts were prepared between these opposite parties. THE EASTERN CHURCH. These controversies were not carried on in the Eastern Church according to their intrinsic importance; it was only agitated by them, when introduced from the West; more particularly when brought into connexion with the Nestorian disputes. Julian of Eclanum appealed to his agreement with Theo¬ dore of Mopsuestia, and paid him a visit. But according to an account given by Marius Mercator, Theodore attended and agreed with a Synod in Cilicia which condemned Julian. But this account comes from too prejudiced an opponent to be trustworthy, and even in this case it would not prove that he denied his conviction, and had rejected Pelagianism uncon¬ ditionally ; for generally in the East an unconditional con¬ demnation of this doctrine could not be effected; and it may be asked in what respect it was condemned by the Synod. It is easily understood that Theodore in many points had rejected Pelagianism. Yet he is said, according to Marius Mercator, § to have also written a work against Augustin, fragments of which have been preserved by Photius.|| Even the title— Against those who sa.y that Man sins according to a natural * Job i. 3, § 15. + Job i. 27, § 7. $ Epp. 1. viii. Ep. 25. § Ed. Garn. p. 97. || Cod. 177.—7 rpdg rovg Xeyovrag Qvcrti Kai ov yviojuij nTaiuv rove arOpioTrovg. THEODORE OF MOPSUESTIA. 387 necessity, and not according to free determination—shows a tendency against Augustin’s doctrines of original sin and Pre¬ destination. But according to Photius the book was not directed against Augustin himself, but against Jerome, whom he calls Aram, and this is in itself more probable, since Theodore could know little of Augustin. The System of Theodore is far more consequential, and far more self-consistent than the Pelagian. With him it was a fixed principle that the whole divine administration was so arranged according to an unchangeable and wise decree that its realization could be disturbed by no accidental event. This was true of the sin of the first man. God might have prevented altogether the entrance of Sin, if he had deemed it desirable, but he willed that man by his own experience should gain the consciousness of his weakness and know the difference between Good and Evil. The History of the Creation is divided into two great sections ; # the first, which reaches to the general Resurrection, is the period in which the rational Creature is left to itself, and therefore necessarily subject to change and temptation; in the second period a revelation of the divine unchangeable life will be supreme, a kingdom of unchangeable holiness in the human nature glorified and exalted above itself through communion with God. Redemp¬ tion effects the transition between the two sections under the conditions of freedom. Man by conflict raises himself from a lower to a higher state ; he assumes the most important place in the Creation because he is God’s representative in it, and even the Angels must acknowledge him as such.f Hence * Marius Mercator, p. 100, ed. Garn.—Quod placuit Deo, hoc erat in duos status dividere creaturam, unum quidem, qui prsesens est, in quo mutabilis omnia fecit, alterum autem, qui futurus est cum renovans omnia ad immutabilitatem transferet. f Philoxenus de Creatione, vi. cap. 10, 17; cf. Comment, in Epist. ad Rom. Spicilegium Romanum, iv. p. 527 ; cf. also Coloss. 1, 16, sqq. •—Propter hominum enim malitiam omnis ut ita dixerim creatura disrumpi videbatur propter propinquitatem earn, quam ad kominem cuncta habere videbantur. Avertebant enim se nobis angeli et omnes invisibiles virtutes propter indevotionem nostram, quam erga Deum exercebamus. Insuper etiam nos ipsi morte solvimur, ex qua accidebat, animam separare a corpore. Etenim et omnis connexio creaturse hinc solvebatur. Fictus enim est homo a principio quasi aliquod animal cognatioue omnibus junctum, eo quod corpus quidem generaliter ex omnibus consistebat, i e., ex quattuor elementis, aniroa C C £ 388 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. the development of the World must proceed from human nature, in which Redemption is accomplished. Everything appears to be effected through Freedom ; by it temptation to Evil entered, and by it must man return to Goodness. God gave him a command to test his obedience; he foresaw his disobedience and included it in the scheme of the World ; when it took place God pronounced the sentence of death upon man. Death was from the beginning implanted in human nature ; * but the divine tutelage presented it as the punishment of transgression, in order that the primitive deserts of Sin might be known. Although Theodore, in his doctrine of the original trans¬ gression and its consequences, might agree with Pelagius, this dogma occupied a different place in its connexion with the two standpoints of the development of the world. If, on the one hand, he derived sin from human Freedom, on the other hand, it was grounded as something necessary in the changeableness of a rational nature. But equally had Redemp¬ tion and Grace (not as with Pelagius a merely accidental, but) a necessary place in the System. Only in this point he agreed with him, that he placed Redemption, not in opposition to the ruin that proceeded from the first transgression, but rather to Nature left to itself. He contemplated it in a preponderating degree on the positive side as the glorification of human nature and the advancement of the natural powers of Adam. From this conception of human nature and its importance in the universe, it was evident how it was necessary for the vero ad invisibiles virtutes propinquitatem habere videbatur. Una vero quaedam universorum copulatio ex bine fieri videbatur, omnibus id ipsum concurrentibus, ita ut et uno consensu Deo redderent debitam culturam cum cauta solicitudine, omnis etiam illis, quse illius legibus eonsentanea erant, obtemperare prosperabant. Quia propter peccatum facti sumus mortales, anima etiam a corpore separabatur; solvebatur hinc propinquitatis copulatio ita ut nec ultra existimarent invisibiles virtutes aliquam sibi nobiscum esse communionem secundum corporis nostri diligentiam.—Unde et hi, qui insistebant visibilibus naturis et commovebant eas pro nostra utilitate secundum positum sibi terminum, nolebant ea ultra implere, si non promissione percepissent, quod omnia aspera solverentur. * Catena Nicephori, i. p. 98.— r) [itv tcX acng riroifiaaOr] r<£ Svyrqj r/ Se rrjg evroXrjg boaig icai to avTt'iovuiov 7rpotyi'|Uva<7£ icci! tCujKe ry yvwfxy rum avOaiperuiv aytovujv rqv Trpbcpaoiv icai ro ryg SvyroTyrog oufupepov v. CHRYSOSTOM AND AUGUSTIN. 389 realization of Redemption, and the second period in the his¬ tory of Creation, that the divine Logos in Christ should assume human nature, and that this should advance by degrees in free development to be the Organ of the Logos until that development was completed at the Resurrection. Redemption stands in close connexion with the Creation ; it is its consummation, the realization of its final aim, and Sin is a means to it. Accordingly he understands the forgiveness of Sins through Christ in the positive sense ; it is the imparta- tion of the avct/jjaeryiGi'a, of the divine life in communion with him, exalted above sin. Under this point of view Theodore could not contemplate the death of Christ as if he had under¬ gone it in a strict sense as a punishment for the sins of mankind; but it behoved Christ to pass through all the developments of human organism, and hence through Death, which at the same time was requisite in order to lead him on to the higher standpoint of the divine life. Chrysostom and Augustin, the most influential men in the two churches, are particularly suited to make us acquainted with the one Christian spirit that subsists under important dogmatical differences,—the same Christian sincerity which manifests itself in the greatest diversity of forms conditioned by individual character and the course of culture. Had they come in contact, a conflict might easily have arisen between them. Chrysostom was of a thoroughly practical nature. In Augustin the practical element w’as connected with a pre¬ dominance of the speculative, dialectic turn of mind; his talent was systematic; he delighted in following out logical consequences. In the former feeling and practical experience preponderated ; the interest in systematizing was less power¬ ful, and he had a natural aversion to extremes ; his spirit was more like John’s, that of Augustin like Paul’s. In both, an education by a pious mother laid the foundation of the Chris¬ tian life, but their further development was widely different. Augustin was converted to the Gospel after violent conflicts of his inner and outer life Chrysostom, on the contrary, pur¬ sued his way more quietly in his outer life; he was not at first agitated so violently, and his milder nature attained peace more easily. Like Pelagius, he had been educated in monastic life, but he far surpassed him in depth of feeling and intellect. To him who strove so longingly after true holiness, the monastic 390 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. life was a source of rich inward experience. His practical tendency did not, like that of Pelagius, accompany his reli¬ gious life, but sprang out of it. As he felt assured, that the whole life of the believer was rooted only in communion with Christ, he never acquiesced in the external moral doctrine of Pelagius. Christ was the centre of his life ; his highest aspiration was, to live entirely in him. On the other hand, an ascetic tendency was developed in him, just as he had freely developed himself from within, so he also deemed it of importance to make sanctification dependent on the free deter¬ mination of man’s will. Augustin had wandered through Manicheism, Scepticism, and Platonism, before he retraced his steps to the Hoi;? Scriptures; in Chrysostom an equable religious progress was connected with the persevering study of the Bible. Moreover, he did not read it, like Augustin, with an individual religious tendency already formed, but studied it profoundly in order to form his doctrinal belief from it; the sober prin¬ ciples of the Antiochian school guided his interpretation, and his inward Christian life furnished him with a commentary upon it. While in Augustin everything revolved round certain leading points of Christian doctrine, both his life and his thinking were formed harmoniously from Scripture; and while Augustin, in his study of the Bible, dwelt chiefly on particular portions, especially Paul’s Epistles, Chrysostom applied him¬ self to all parts equally. The great metropolis which was the scene of his labours, had a considerable influence on his views. The experience of Pelagius was confirmed by his own; the great world which wore the garb of a superficial Chris¬ tianity, exercised its vices by appealing to the power of sensuousness, to the temptations of Satan, and to a fate which determined men by necessity to good or evil. The conflict against such pretences, against the perversions of the Christian faith, confirmed him in regarding and designating Free Will as the lever of all the moral and religious development of Man. This moral interest led him to a Christian Stoicism which expressed itself in the maxims—that morally Man makes himself—that he can be forced to nothing—that nothing can injure him if he does not injure himself—that everything depends on a right use of the means of grace. Under the varied circumstances and fortunes of life which he CHRYSOSTOM AND AUGUSTIN. 391 passed through, he became more confirmed in these principles, and, supported by them, he testified in his exile of Christ, and adhered to them even to his glorious death. In Augustin’s fundamental principles, along with divine love still greater importance is given to the divine punitive justice ; from Chrysostom’s point of view, on the contrary, divine love is the most prominent; he strives on every occasion to magnify it, and to make it visible in the training of the human race. According to his doctrine the original state of Man was one of unclouded purity and happiness. Exempted in his dirdhia from all temptations to sin, he led a painless life, a type of the Immortality to which, if he lived without sin, he would be translated without a struggle.* Yet in this state he might more easily forget his dependence on God. In order that ho might retain the consciousness of it, and practise obedience, God gave him a command. Man transgressed it from moral negligence, since he did not sufficiently exert his power of will. He now became subject to punishment, but which wan intended principally to subserve his education; he was driven from Paradise, and into a world of conflict, in order to form his character. Death was necessarily connected with this state; he had a (rcofia ‘raQrirov ,t and was now exposed to sensual temptations. Chrysostom did not ignore the universal sinfulness of human nature. £ “Who can boast,” he said, “of having a holy heart?” Yet we find no very decided expression of the doctrine of Original Sin. The words in Bom. v. 19, “ By one man’s disobedience many were made sinners,” he explains metonynimially of the punishment of sin,§ and denies that anything damnable existed in children. He is still farther from believing in the transference of Adam’s guilt to his descendants; he proposes the question, how then could Death pass on all the rest? and replies—that no man is without sin, although he has not committed the same sin as Adam. Yet all these evils might serve for the advantage of man, if he makes use of his Free Will; they would then be * Horn. 17, in Genes, cap. 3, tom. iv. p. 133.—7 ravra yap iTrolym — wore to Zujov tovto to Xoyucov to i'i7r’ civtov drj/xiovpyr)6ev sv Ttaaij Tifxy rvyxaveiv icat Kara p-yS'tv tXarrovaOcu ti)q tu>v ayysXwv hayojyi]^, aXXu icai sv odofiaTi Tr)v sksivojv arraOtLav KtKTijaOai. f For the whole train of ideas, compare Horn, in Gen. 16, 17, 18. X Horn. 8, in 1 Corinth, § 2, tom. x. p. 67. § Ibid. 10, in Rom. § 2, 3, tom. ix. p. 523. 392 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. incentives to the moral conflict. Not the mortal body, but the depraved Will is the root of Evil.* From the importance which he ascribes to sin, follows an acknowledgment of the necessity of grace and redemption; hence he asserts that we obtain Justification, not by our own merits, but owe salvation to the Will of God.f It is equally clear that he considers all the divine dealings with man to be jointly determined by his free will, and that he could not approve of absolute Predesti¬ nation and Grace, acting unconditionally. “ The All-sufficient One,” he says, “ does not need us, but since he does every¬ thing on account of our salvation, he lets it depend on our will. Wherefore he employs no compulsion, for to be drawn against our will to worship him, is the same as not serving him at all. { God does not anticipate our wills with his gifts, but if we only begin, then he gives us many an opportunity for salvation. § Faith is no little thing, but requires divine Grace; yet it needs also our own wills that man may allow himself to be taught of God. || Men are not inferior to Angels because of their sensuousness, but everything depends on Free Will. Even among spiritual beings there are those who are worse than Men. Do not complain of the Creator, and say not as a sensuous Man I cannot be good.”^T He under¬ stands by Predestination the general preceding design which God formed before the Creation of the World, to redeem the world through Christ. God’s choice does not compel those who are called, but only arouses them. The manner in which he treats the history of Paul’s conversion illustrates his views on this subject.** Augustin makes the unconditionality of the divine grace and predestination conspicuous in this event; Chrysostom, on the contrary, says, “ Grace effected it through him, but yet it was his own affair, since he had made himself worthy of such extraordinary grace. Without his will grace could have effected nothing in him. Seek not after Paul’s miracles but after his love. Many who saw the greatest miracles, apostatized. Paul speaks of grace that it may not * Horn. 17, in 1 Corinth, § 4, p. 150. f Horn. 1, in 1 Corinth, § 1, pag. 3; Horn, in Rom. 7, § 1, 8. I Horn, in Joh. 10, § 1, tom viii. p. 57. • § In Joh. Horn. 18, § 3, p. 107. || Horn. 45, § 3, p. 265. H Horn. 75, § 5, p. 445. ** Horn. tom. iii. p. 98, sqq NESTORIUS. 393 seem as if he had all of himself, hut he also speahs of his own striving.”* From these premises we may infer that Chrysostom, like the other Orientals, gave a special pro¬ minence to the positive side of Redemption without altogether excluding the negative side. Annianus, a deacon of Celeda, a Pelagian, who belonged to the more resolute of the party who had resigned their offices, translated these homilies on the conversion of Paul and on Matthew into Latin, with a preface, in which he endeavoured to explain the system of Chrysostom as favourable to Pelagianism. In PHOTiusf there is a notice of a remarkable writing, in which it is said that the heresies of the Pelagians and of Nes- torius were the same ; the assertion is quoted from a letter of Cyrill to Theodosius': what the Pelagians said of the members of Christ, that Nestorius said of Christ himself. In principle this is correct; yet the connexion of the two parties in the Nestorian controversy rests not so much on this subjective ground, since the reunion of tl;e Christology and the Anthro¬ pology was not consciously carried out,—but rather on acci¬ dental causes. Nestorius was, from motives of kindness, not willing to sacrifice Julian and other bishops who had taken refuge in Constantinople, and thereby prejudiced the bishop of Rome against himself. At that time he delivered four discourses containing a representation of his Anthropology, of which we have three translated into Latin by Marius Merca¬ tor, and the fourth in Greek in Chrysostom’s works. J They show’ that he was far from agreeing with Augustin, yet by no means an adherent of Theodore of Mopsuestia. The Alex¬ andrian party at the Council of Ephesus condemned Pelagius and CiELESTius with Nestorius ; but this was hardly owing to an exact knowledge of the internal connexion of the points in dispute; it proceeded rather from deference to the Roman Church, which had declared itself against Nestorius. The Eastern Church continued to maintain the more ancient doc¬ trine of the co-operation of Grace and Freedom, without entering into a closer examination of their mutual relation. For the most part it had a leaning to Semi-Pelagianism. This also appears from the letters of Isidore, the abbot of Pelusium, who derives the corruption of human nature from Adam’s sin: * Cf. Horn. 2, in Rom. § 3, tom. x. pag. 440. + Codex 54. t Tom. x. p. 733. 394 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. it is sunk from anadacc into e/xwddstu, into passions and temptations. Evil is increased by the negligence of men; yet there is a seed of goodness left; whoever cherishes it, makes progress in goodness, but not others. Free will requires the aid of Divine grace, but the latter is never wanting if man only does his part. He denies an irresistible grace, but admits in certain cases a prevenient grace. Absolute Predestination he zealously rejects ; all communications of Grace are con¬ ditioned by Man’s Free Will. No arbitrary election exists, for otherwise the kingdom of Heaven would be no reward of conflict.* d. THE DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH. The unspiritualizing of the Church was already become general in the West; it was regarded as an outward organism, continued by the succession of Bishops, who formed the neces¬ sary medium of communication with Christ, and for partaking in the Holy Spirit and Salvation. Augustin adopted this view, (which before his time had been principally developed in North Africa), because it corresponded to his own religious life, and carried it out more systematically. In the change of his standpoints, tossed also hither and thither by Scepticism, he was led, at last, to resign himself to an outward Authority as founded by God; it is implied in his maxim jides prcecedit intellectwm. The operations of Christianity were to him one and the same with those of the Church. Thus on one side he became a pillar of the Catholic principle and standpoint, as on another side by his doctrine of a living faith and the internal divine life of Grace he presented a point of attach¬ ment for the Protestant element, and laid the foundation of a reaction against Catholicism. It was Donatism, a form of separatism resembling Nova- tianism, which developed the doctrine of the Church in opposition to Augustin. On both standpoints the visible and invisible Church were confounded, and the predicates of purity and holiness were sought in the former. Separatism is pre¬ eminently subjective ; the Catholic standpoint objective ; on the latter, the idea of the Catholic Church, and there¬ fore holiness and purity are made dependent on the objec¬ tive, on the continuation of the Church by the succession of Bishops. Therefore this controversy was deemed so * See his Epistles, lib. iii. 204, 171 ; 13, 165; ii. ep. 2. DONATISM. 395 important by Augustin, since be saw many led away by Separatism from the communion of the Church, which seemed to be the only connecting medium with Christ and Salvation. In reference to this view he says,* “ No one can attain to Sal¬ vation who has not Christ for his head ; but no one can have Christ for his head who is not a member of his Body the Church.” On the Donatist standpoint the predicate of Catho¬ licity was made to depend on the subjective of purity and holiness. A Church which allowed unworthy members to remain in it, becomes defiled and ceases to be Catholic. The Donatists said, “ Whoever is shown to be a Christian in a right and lawful manner, is to me a Catholic.f The Catholics wished to let the worthy and unworthy remain mixed together, and to defer the separation to the final Judgment. They appealed to the Parable of the wheat and the tares ; they main¬ tained that the Field mentioned in it was the visible appear¬ ance of the Church; the Donatists, on the other hand, understood by it the World in which good and evil are mixed, and therefore the tares and the wheat must remain mixed, not in the Church but in the World. The distinction in the idea of the Church as visible and invisible , might have led to an agreement. The Catholics sometimes alluded to it in their discussions, and the Donatists charged them on that account with making two Churches. The other party vindicated themselves, since they referred the distinction to the various states of the one Church in its temporal and eternal life, as Christ’s state was distinguished before and after the Kesurrec- tion. Augustin endeavoured to establish a proper distinction, but as he was afraid to follow out the idea to its full extent, his notions became obscure. He spoke of those J who are in the house of God per communionem sacramentorum, and those who are outside of the house per perversitatem morum. “ Many§ by partaking of the sacraments are vjith the Church and yet are not in the Church.” Further, “those who appear to be in the Church, and to contradict Christ, and therefore do not belong to that Church which is called the body of Christ.” * De Unitate Eccl. c. 49. fi Optatus of Mileve, De Schism. Donat, ed. Du Pin, 1700. Gesta collat. Carthag. iii. c. 99. p. 467. X De Baptismo, iv. 1—4. § De Unitate Eccl. 74.—Multi sunt in sacramentorum communione cum ecclesia et tamen jam non sunt in ecclesia. 396 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. In these expressions lies the distinction of a true Church, which is the proper body of Christ, and one which only appears to be; the former would be the invisible Church. The same assumption lies in the words—“ The unworthy are not in that communion of the Church which grows together in the members of Christ and increasetli with the increase of God ; that Church rests upon the Rock.”* He distinguishes the corpus CJiristi verum etpermixtum, and says—“That does not truly belong to the body of Christ which is not always with him. Hypocrites , are not with him, though they are in his Church.” In the Eastern Church the externalized idea of the Church certainly prevailed, but it was not moulded so systematically, and allowed many faint glimpses of a more spiritual conception. Cyrill of Jerusalem'! defined the Catholic Church as that which was scattered over the whole world, which handed down the entire circle of Christian truth, and led men without dis¬ tinction of culture to piety. Here also no reference was made to the necessity of a mediation by a succession of bishops, but the distinguishing character of Catholicism attaches to doc¬ trine and spiritual unity. Chrysostom in explaining the words, “ His praise is in the congregation of the Saints,” says,| “ Church is a name of association, and of meeting together.” “ The Church consists not in a roof and walls, but in faith and life.”§ Isidore of Pelusium|| places the Church in the com¬ munion of Saints, which consists in the right faith and the right course of conduct. The externalism of the Catholic idea of the Church called forth a reaction by a man in whom the movements of a Pro¬ testant element are discernible, Jovinian.^" In this spirit he * Contra Literas Petiliani, ii. § 247.—Nee ideo putandi sunt esse in Ckristi corpore, quod est ecclesia, quia sacramentorum ejus corporaliter participes fuint. Ilia enim et in talibus sancta sunt, et eis indigne tractantibus et sementibus ad majus judicium valebunt. Ipsi autem non sunt in ilia ecclesise compage, quae in membris Christi per con- nexum et contactum crescit in incrementum Dei. Ilia quippe ecclesia in petra est. f Catech. 18, § 23. + In Psalm 149, tom. v. p. 498.— r) aivsaiQ avrov iv tKKXrjcriq, oaiiov —kiacXrjcria -yap (rvaTUfMarog Kal ervvocov icrriv ijvopa. § Tom. iii. p. 386, Horn. De Eutropio. || Epist. lib. ii. 246. II Cf. Hieronym. coutr. Jovinian. lib. ii. Augustin, de Haeresib. 82. B. Lindner, De Joviano et Vigilantes Purioris Doctrine Antesignanis. J0VIN1AN. 397 carried on a -warfare against hypocrisy, the quantitative scale of morals, the consilia evangelica; he laid the utmost stress on the principle of a living faith and the unity of the principle of the Christian life. Not only in this respect bat in the doctrine of Grace, he agreed fundamentally with Augustin. The affinity of the two is as remarkable as their difference, Jovinian attained consequentially to a recognition of the immediate relation of the Christian consciousness to Christ, and to an idea of the Church derived from it and hence subordinated to it. He expressed this in the words, “ The Church is founded on Faith, Hope and Love.’’* Accordingly he looked upon it as a community developing itself from within. “ In this Church there is nothing impure ; every one is taught of God; no one can break into it by violence, or steal into it by artifice.” As Jovintan taught the Pauline doctrine of faith, so he did the Pauline idea of the invisible Church, while Augustin obstructed the development of his similar fundamental idea by a mixture of the Catholic idea of the Church. From the necessity of an external Church-Unity, the farther consequence was already drawn, that it must have an external representative, and it began to be sought in Rome as the Cathedra Petri. The North African Church (though it showed its independence in particular cases) and Augustin especially entertained this view. It had obtained the summit of authority because it had propagated itself from the apostolica sedes (of Peter) f through all ages by the succes¬ sion of bishops. Accordingly he founds the succession of bishops principally on their succession in the Roman Church. “ Who does not know,” he says, “ the supremacy of that Apostle which is to precede every other episcopal dignity ?’’£ * I. 2.—Seimus ecclesiam spe, fide, caritate inaccessibilem, inex- pugnabilem; non est in ea immaturus, omnes docibilis; impetu irrumpere vel arte eludere (Neander, illudere) potest nullus. II. 19.— Sponsa, soror, mater et quEecunque alia putaveris vocabula unius ecclesiae congregatio est, quse nunquam est sine sponso, fratre, filio. Unam habetfidem, nec constupratur dogmatum varietate nec heeresibus scinditur Virgo permanet. Quocunque vadit agnus sequitur ilium ; sola novit canticum Christi. f De Utilitate Credendi, 35.—Dubitavimus nos ejus ecclesise condere gremium, quse usque ad confectionem generis humani ab apostolica sede per successiones episcoporum culmen auctoritatis obtinuit ? J De Baptismo contra Donatistas ii. 2. 398 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. But in the explanation and application of those words of Christ, on which the primacy of Peter is especially grounded, Augustin is not consistent with himself. In his Retracta¬ tions * he gives close together two different explanations of the words, “ Thou art Peter,” &c., first, Peter is the rock on which the Church is founded; but he often adopted the meaning that Christ is the rock, and that Peter is so called on account of his confession, and that he in this confession represents the Church.f To the same effect he says, “ The rock is not called after Peter, but Peter is called after the rock, as Christ is not called after Christians, but Chris¬ tians after Christ.” Here again we have a mark of the Protestant element in Augusttn, for the development of this interpretation leads to the result, that all religious conscious¬ ness is immediately to be traced up to Christ and that with him the community originates which is called the Church. On the other hand in the Roman bishops, especially in Leo the Great, consequences were developed from the first inter¬ pretation of Christ’s words and from the idea of a necessary outward representation of the Church, in which the mediaeval Papacy was foreshadowed.| e. the doctrine of the sacraments. 1. OF THE SACRAMENTS IN GENERAL. The idea of a Sacrament, and the extent of its application, was as yet undefined, and was formed into distinctness by practice. The rhetorical extravagance with which the Greek Homilists described the efficacy of the Sacraments, cherished the faith in their magical virtue. Augustin first of all applied * I. 21. f Tract, in Joan. 124, § 5.— Ecclesia non cadit, quoniam fundata est super petram, unde Petrus nomen accepit. Non enim a Petro petra, sed Petrus a petra, sicut non Christus a Christiano, sed Christianus a Christo vocatur. Ideo quippe ait Dominus : super hanc peti’am sedificabo ecclesiam meam quia dixerat Petrus, tu es Christus filius Dei vivi. Super hanc ergo petram quam confessus es sedificabo eccle¬ siam meam. Petra enim erat Christus, super quod fundamentum etiam ipse sedificabus est Petrus. 1 Cor. iii. 11. X Leo, Sermo 80.—Civitas sacerdotalis et regia per sacram b. Petri sedem caput orbis effecta, latius prsesidens religione divina, quam dominatione terrena. See Perthel, Leo d. Gr. THE DOCTRINE OF THE SACRAMENTS. 399 himself to a thorough investigation respecting the ide a of a Sacrament and its relation to Christianity, and was thus led to many things which did not agree with the prevalent Church belief. He opposed to the magical notion one that was more spiritual, although he also presented elements of the Catholic mode of contemplation which were eagerly made use of by its abettors. A Sacrament, according to his definition, was nothing else than a visible sign which represented a divine fact, sacramentum or signum sacrce rei denoting the res sacra - menti;* * * § what the audible word otherwise represents is here represented by the visible word ( verba quoedam visibilia ).+ The sign is temporal and changeable ; the divine fact is unchangeable.J He developes this subject in opposition to the Manicheans, who objected against the derivation of Chris¬ tianity and Judaism from the same God. How could God, they asked, contradict himself and disannul an arrangement established by himself ? To this he replied that the Divine continues the same, only the signs for its representation must be changed. According to him, there was only one Justijicatio which was foreshadowed in the Old Testament. Sensible signs are necessary in a religious community ; but again, these can have no effect on the Spirit, they cannot impart Holiness and Justification but merely serve as the signs and vehicles of the divine grace, which is the only source of Justijicatio. Moses could not impart sanctification, for he was only an organ of the Most High ;§ it is God whose invisible grace imparts sanc¬ tification by his Spirit. This invisible grace operates through the Sacraments, but it can also operate without them. It is absurd to say that that invisible sanctification cannot profit without the visibilia sacramenta; it is only the usual arrange¬ ment appointed by God that grace should make such sacra¬ ments its organs, and if any one despises this divine arrange¬ ment, he pronounces himself thereby to be destitute of grace. * De Catechiz. Rudibus, 50.—Sacramenta signacula quidem rerum divinarum esse visibilia, sed res ipsas invisibiles in eis honorari. f Contra Faustum, 19, 16. i Ep. 138, 8. § Qusest. in Levit. lib. iii. questio 84.—Quomodo et Moses sanctificat et Dominus? Non enim Moses pro Domino, sed Moses visibilibua eacramentis per ministerium suum ; Dominus autem invisibili gratia per spiritum sanctum, ubi est totus fructus etiam visibilium sacramen- torum. 400 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. The question respecting the objectivity of the Sacraments was brought to a decision at this period on the occasion of the controversy with the Donatists. > They made an earnest effort to fix an earlier standpoint in the development of the Church. We may observe the same peculiarity in their conclusions respecting the Sacrament, as respecting the Church and State ; they were inclined to subordinate the objective to the subjec¬ tive, and accordingly kept to the older subjective standpoint in asserting that the Sacraments were only valid when they were administered by worthy members of the Catholic Church. Hence Petilian maintained* that those who received baptism from an unbeliever received not the faith (baptism) but only guilt: for in everything the root is of the chief importance, and if any one has not the right head, the act is nugatory ; he must belong to the true holy Church. In opposition to this ten¬ dency, Aug'ustin says—“ Christ alone is the true Origin, Root, and Head ; he alone can justify men. Hence the Sacraments are everywhere valid wherever his Institutions are administered. It does not signify what Man is, but what Christ is; everything proceeds from him. Anciently the Christian calling was compared to military service and bap¬ tism to entering into the service. The stigma militare was impressed on those who enlisted. Augustin wishing to give effect to the objective in baptism, says, in allusion to this custom,* “ As when any one deserts, still he always has this stigma, so also there is something indelible in the mark impressed by Baptism; though it testifies only against him who does not remain faithful to the Christian calling.” With this view the Catholic doctrine coalesced, of the character indelehilis which certain sacraments must impart. Augustin contrasts the standpoint of slavery and of freedom, that of Judaism and that of Christianity. On the latter there are only a few symbols, but there is also different relation of these to the religious consciousness; on the legal standpoint there is the dependence of the consciousness on the religious signs, and on the Christian a distinction between the sign and the divine reality, with a clear consciousness and a correct under¬ standing of the relation of the one to the other. Every Sacra- * Contra Literas Petil. i 6, 7. f Contr. Epistolam Parmeniani, ii. 29. THE NUMBER OF THE SACRAMENTb. 401 ment, he says,* leads to the contemplation of the thing signi¬ fied, and its application to the life ; the contemplation of Truth raises the soul to the love of God ; the application to the life consists in love to Man. The signs are taken from common life ; hence they cannot make the same impression as something miraculous. Only if the Sacrament is not under¬ stood it produces a certain unconscious awe, and on the other hand, if understood, it gives birth to a devout joy.f THE NUMBER OF THE SACRAMENTS. Augustin, according to his free and spiritual views of wor¬ ship, names expressly Baptism and the Lord’s Supper as the Sacraments of Christianity, though certainly adding, “ if any¬ thing else is enjoined in the New Testament.” J In other pas¬ sages, he is disposed to admit four sacraments. In the pre¬ ceding age, the beginning of a sacramental mode of viewing them had been made in reference to Confirmation, Penance, and priestly Ordination. Still more was this the case in this age ; the language used respecting Ordination implied that it made the priest into another man ; and since a sudden magical communication of the Spirit was ascribed to it which then effected everything that was necessary, many persons held a special training for the clerical office to be unnecessary. Yet this error met with a refutation both from Augustin and Gregory of Nyssa. Confirmation (confirmation (xpgaylg) was among the Greeks completed by anointing, and served as a ratification of Baptism. We may gather from the spurious * Posteaquam resurrectione Domini nostri manifestissimum indicium nostrse libertatis illuxit, nec eomm quidem signorum operatione gravi onerati sumus, sed qusedam pauca pro multis eademque factu facillima et intellectu augustissima et observatione castissima ipse Dominus et apostolica, tradidit disciplina. Quee unusquisque cum percepit, quo referantur imbutus agnoscit, ut ea non carnali servitute, sed spiritali potius libertate veneretur.—De Doctrina Christiana, iii. 13. f Nihil tarn pie terret animum, quam sacramentum non intellectum, autem gaudium pium pacit et c-elebratur libere, si opus est tempori. —Expositio Epistola? ad Galat. iii. 19 ; cf. Ep. 54 et 55, ad Januarium. £ Ep. 54, ad Januarium.—Primo tenere te volo—Dominum nostrum -—leni jugo suo nos subdidisse et sarcinse levi; unde sacramentis numero paucissimis, observatione facillimis, significatione prcestan- tissimis societatem novi populi colligavit, sicuti est baptismus trinitatis nomine consecratus, communicatio corporis et sanguinis ipsius, et si quid aliud in scripturis canonicis commendatur, exceptis iis, qua? servitutem populi veteris—onerabant. D B 402 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. writings of Dionysius the Areopagite, how strongly the mystic liturgic element of the Greek Church tended to the multiplication of the Sacraments. The liturgic elements of worship and those of the hierarchy receive in them a mystic, symbolic meaning. These writings, although not of great intrinsic value, exerted no inconsiderable influence, since they conveyed the existing spiritual tendencies to the following Period. The Sacraments which they enumerate, are the fol¬ lowing : Baptism (pwr/c^a), the Lord’s Supper (xo/vayfa avwt'ewg), Priestly Ordination (rsXsiugig hgciTixy]), Monastic Ordination (rsAs/W/s the rites used at the burial of believers (ya ini ruv /sgojv xs%o//j,7]/jt,ev6jv) . Augustin laid the foundation in the West, of a new Sacrament. Partly the term fjsjgryigtov, which is applied to Marriage in Eph. v., and partly his controversy with the Pelagians, who accused him of regarding the procreation of children as something Satanic, and against whom he urged so much the more the sanctity of Christian wedlock, determined him to call Marriage a Sacra- mentum, and to infer its indissolubility. 2. BAPTISM. In the East as well as in the West it was now the preva¬ lent belief that Infant Baptism was of apostolic Institution, but in the East especially, the Practice was not in accordance with it; on the whole, Infant Baptism was not very frequently observed, and many remained Catechumens to a late age. For the indifference towards Christianity, which again had been increased by the neglect of Infant Baptism, and the false views of the magical efficacy of Baptism, and in many a superstitious reverence for the ceremony which would not venture to apply its benefits to children, caused its postpone¬ ment. Often when any general calamities occurred, great multitudes flocked to baptism. The Church teachers Gre¬ gory Nazianzen, Gregory of Nyssa, Basil and Chrysostom, pronounced Infant baptism of apostolic origin, recommended its use, and at the same time protested against faith in its effecting a magical forgiveness of sins. But in establishing its necessity and in explaining the for¬ mula—“ for the forgiveness of sins,” which was also used at the baptism of Infants, a difference arose between the East and the West, corresponding to the difference, generally, in BAPTISM. 403 the view of the work of Redemption, just as the Positive aspect of it in the ennobling of human nature, or the Negative, the opposition against sin, was rendered most prominent. Accordingly, in the East, Baptism was regarded chiefly as indicating exaltation to a higher stage, for which the original powers of man were not sufficient. Gregory Nazianzen says,—“ It is a more divine Creation, and something higher than the original formation of Nature ; participation in the kingdom of God is communicated, which human nature of itself could not attain.* * * § This may be applied equally to children as to adults.” Hence in determining the object of baptism, Gregory goes on to say, it is a seal for infancy, the forgiveness of sins for adults, a restoration of the defaced image of God. He justifies Infant Baptism by asserting that from the first a higher element must be communicated to human nature, and the child become dedicated to the Holv Spirit.f That positive view of the Eastern Christians found a point of union with those of the West in their admission that the first Man, if he had not sinned, would have imme¬ diately attained to higher communion with God. Through Sin his body became a c^aa cra^row. Thus the Eastern Church found in this new creation also, a reference to the con¬ sequences of the first sin. Gregory of Nyssa says, “The child is by Baptism placed in the Paradise from which Adam was expelled; “ the marks of evil which were brought upon human nature, are taken away by baptism.”§ Only the Eastern Churches were opposed to giving prominence only to the negative effect of Redemption. || Julian of Eclanum appealed to a Homily of Chrysostom, addressed to the newly baptized,in which he speaks of the operations of the divine grace in baptism, and asserts against those who make the baptismal grace to consist only , in the forgiveness of sins, “ that we baptize children although they are not defiled by sin, in order that they may partake of * Orat. 40, tig to tiyiov ficnTTiGna, fol. 640, D. f vrjTriov ton aoi; fxrj \a€troj Kaipov rj KaKicC he fiptyovg ayiafjOrjro), 6vv\o)V KaOispoiQrjTU) Tip irvtvfAaTi. J \6yog 7r pog Tovg fipadvvovTctg tig to (3a7TTipa Xpicrrov, ovtu) Kai to dyiov tovto p,vpov ovk iti xpiXbv ovS ’ wg dv ti7TOL rig koivov per’ iviicXiimv, aXXa Xpicrrov xanicrpa Kai -jrvevpiaTog dyiov Trapovaiq, re avroi) SriorrjTog ivipypriKov yivoixivov. f In Joannem, Horn. 46, 3. X In 1 Cor. Horn. 24, 2. § De Trinitate, viii. 13.—Quomodo non naturaliter manere in nobis existimandus est qui et naturam carnis nostrse jam inseparabilem sibi homo natus assumsit, et naturam carnis suse ad naturam cetera i tat is sub sacramento nobis communicandce carnis admiscuit. 408 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. is changed.* * * § Yet he expresses himself not more plainly respecting the kind of change. In the controversy about the two natures of Christ, a com¬ parison was drawn between the relation of the divine nature to the human, and that of Christ’s body and blood to the bread and wine. A fragment, erroneously ascribed to Chrysostom, f yet certainly an ancient and important testi¬ mony, illustrates the doctrine of the Son of God in his two natures, which remain peculiar and distinct, by a comparison with the Lord’s Supper; the bread after the consecration loses the name of bread; as the divine and human natures remain unchangeable in their attributes, and yet we speak only of one Christ, so we speak only of one body of Christ, although the bread and wine are united with Christ’s body and blood. TheodoretJ gives an equally plain testimony against the transmutation of the bread; the bread and wine remain in their former ovalcc, and yet to the soul they seem as that which they have become, and as such are believed and reverenced. He distinguishes the /AsrafioXyi rfj yupin from the (jjzrccfiokri r$jg pvazwg, which here does not take place. Also the Roman Bishop Gelasius, at the end of the fifth century, thus expresses himself: the two natures of Christ must be thought of like his image in the Supper; just as this by the operation of the Holy Spirit passes into the divine substance, although its nature retains its peculiar attributes, &c.§ Gregory of Nyssa|| comes nearest to the doctrine of a transmutation of the bread and wine. He proposes the question, how T the one body of Christ can be divided into so many thousand, and answers : as through the divine Logos bread is changed into the nature of the body, united with the * De Mysteriis. 9. + Epistola ad C 0 esariu.n 1 , Opp. ed. Bened. t. iii. fol. 742.—Sicut enim antequam sanctificetur panis, panem nominamus; divina autem ilium sanctificante gratia, mediante sacerdote, liberatus est quidem ab appel- latione panis, dignus autem habitus dominici corporis appellatione, etiamsi natura panis in ipso permansit, et non duo corpora sed unum corpus Filii pnedicamus. X tpaviv tov ovpavov noTapov 7 rvpog tXicovrog do^ipauriKov TU 1 V av0pU)7TUJV. El TIQ xpvcnot/ £%£l TO. fpyct, Xap7rpOT£pog KlVtTaC ll rig KctXapiodr) £%£i ti)v irpa^iv icai awnooTaTov, icaraicaurai in to tov 7rvpog. f De Civit. Dei, xx. 25. Compare xxi. 13, 26. Enchirid. ad Laurent, c. 68. J Dial. iv. ESCHATOLOGY. 417 believed, that some to whom the Christian disposition has been wholly wanting, will find at death everlasting punish¬ ment to be their portion; others will attain salvation without undergoing purification, because the degree of their Christian perfection did not require it; and between these two classes, those stand who have a Christian disposition, but yet mixed with foreign elements, and requiring purification. In this manner an attempt was made to obviate practically injurious consequences ; for many would make use of the doctrine as an expedient for a light-minded acquiescence in their sins ; they indulged in a Jewish notion of faith ; everything was made to depend on Orthodoxy ; by means of it even the pro¬ fligate would attain to salvation, although they must previously pass through the fires of Purgatory. For this reason Pelagius declared himself opposed to the doctrine of Purgatory, and Augustin, in his treatise de fide et operibus, combated that abuse. In his school this opposition continued on account of its deeper views of Morality, and Fulgejstius of Ruspe, expressed himself in a similar manner.* * De Remissione Peccatorum, 1. ii. E F 418 SECOND PRINCIPAL PERIOD. THE HISTORY OF DOGMAS IN THE MIDDLE AGES, FROM GREGORY THE FIRST TO THE REFORMATION. FIRST PERIOD, FROM THE DEATH OF GREGORY I. TO GREGORY VIII., AND THE BEGINNING OF THE SCHOLASTIC THEOLOGY. (^TBAT IS, FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE SEVENTH TO THE END OF THE ELEVENTH CENTURY.) GENERAL HISTORY OF DOGMAS In the preceding period, the truths of Christianity had been moulded into a compact system, a form in which they could be more easily presented to the acceptance of uncivilized nations. The period which we have now to contemplate was a period of transition from an ancient form of culture to one that was radically new. It accomplished much for the extension of the Church among the Germanic tribes, for the rudiments of their civilization, and the preparatory steps for the transformation of their entire life; but in the same proportion was it less powerful for the development of doctrine. The opposition between the Eastern and Roman Churches was in this period carried to the length of an outward disruption. A new opponent to Christianity alto¬ gether, came forward in Islamism, # which was capable of * The Koran, ed. Maracci, Patav. 1698. Translations : Sale, Lend. 1734, 1836; Wahl, 1828; Ullmann, 1840. On the Dogmatics of Islamism; Dettinger, Zur Theologie des Koran. Tiibinger Zutsche. fur Theol. 1801 ; Umbreit. Stud. u. Krit. 1841 ; G. Weil, Mohammed der Prophet, Stuttg. 1843; Maier, Christ. Bestandtheile des Kor. Freiburg Zeitschr. f. Theol. ii.; Dollinger, Muham. Religion nach Ent- wickl. und Einfluss Regenb. 1838 ; Geiger, War hat Moh. aue den ISLAMISM. 41b extension, because Christian doctrine had lost its power by an excessive intellectualism, and no living youthful enthusiasm for Christianity was left to make head against it. In Islamism we see a revived Jewish standpoint, but a carnal Judaism severed from organic connexion with the development of God’s kingdom, and sunk to the level of Natural Religion. Even in the Church, the objective Catholic element had been the means of forming a mixture of Christianity with Judaism which during this period especially, developed its results ; but yet there was a Christian spirit under a Jewish covering. Islamism was enthusiastic for one God, whom it regarded chiefly on the side of his omnipotence. It was pre-eminently deistical, and hence its opposition to the doctrines of the Trinity, the Divinity of Christ, and Redemption. The Divine was set in opposition to the Human ; moral liberty was given up, and Fatalism introduced. The early conflicts of Chris¬ tianity with Judaism and Heathenism were important for the development of doctrines ; in the conflict with Islamism this was not the case, partly because the antagonism was too absolute, and partly because the Greek Church wanted the element of vitality requisite for. a wider development. The only traces of such an influence on doctrines is perhaps to be found in the Church of Spain.* As henceforward the Western Church comes far more into notice for the development of Christianity, than the Greek Church, which was rapidly sinking into formalism, we shall begin with a description of the first. At two points in its history the beginning of a new spiritual Creation are visible, in the Carolingian age, and at the end of the Period ; here therefore we shall have to seek for the developments that were fruitful in reference to doctrines. After the succession of the classical teachers of the Western Church had been closed in the person of Gregory the Great, a time followed, in which the department of Exegesis and Dogmatic was cultivated by means of Collections. Compen- diums were formed in which the dogmatic statements of the Fathers, especially Augustin and Gregory, were collected,— the Sentential JPatrum. Among these the most noted are the Judenthum aufgenommen ? Bonn, 1833. Gerock, Versuch einer Dar- stellung d. Christologie des Kor. Hamb. 1839 * N-eander’s Ch. Hist. v. '216. EE 2 420 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. SententicB of Isidore of Seville (Hispalis*) a man whose studies comprehended all the knowledge of his age. Rome was the Mother of Christian culture for most of the Western churches, and hence the influence of the Roman dogmas was everywhere predominant. All the elements of the Catholic Dogmatic were communicated to the newly converted nations. Yet it must be admitted that we find traces of a reaction which in its further progress might have had a most impor¬ tant influence on doctrines ; a Protestant tendency might have developed itself in opposition to the Catholic element. Its starting point was from Britain and Ireland. For although the Anglo-Saxon Church was founded by Rome, yet among the ancient Britons who probably received Christianity originally from Lesser Asia and remained in connexion with the Greek Church, a freer spirit in Church matters was preserved which was confirmed in its peculiar character by its opposition to the Anglo-Saxon Church. The Church of Ireland was not even founded by Rome, but formed indepen¬ dently by Patrick. It was more allied to the Britons, and the Greek Fathers were studied ; the authority of Roman Tradition was impugned, and the Holy Scriptures were made the sole standard. It is remarkable that even at that time this germ of a Protestant Element was found in the Germany church ; for Boniface had to dispute with Irish missionaries of this tendency, and it now became the question whether the Roman dogma which he wished to introduce, was to prevail, or the freer tendency. Yet the latter was not sufficiently power¬ ful, nor suited to these rude tribes. Boniface, on the other hand, coalesced with the general development of the Western Church. God had so ordained its course that first of all, the Catholic Element was matured to its full extent, in order that afterwards the reaction of the Christian consciousness, when the nations were prepared for it, might be so much the more powerful and efficient. The Irish spirit could not render this important reaction victorious, but receded more and more; yet the peculiar culture which emanated from the Irish monasteries always exerted an influence in the development of dogmas. After the Church among the Germans had obtained at last * Opp. ed. Faustus Arevalo. Rom. 1797; 7 vols. 4. Bahr Christ- lich-Romische Theologie, p. 455. CHARLEMAGNE. 421 a firm settlement in the seventh and eighth centuries, and sc much had been effected that what remained of a former stage of culture was surrendered in Italy, Spain, England, and Ireland, a new Epoch began under Charlemagne, in which the various elements of earlier theological production were concentrated.* * * § The peculiar constitution of the German mind was apparent in its mode of receiving Christianity ; there was a greater freedom of development,—an endeavour to go back to the original foundations of Christianity, in opposition to Roman Traditionalism; there were already prognostics of the Reformation. Although Charlemagne reverenced the Roman Church, yet the dogmatic theological culture which pro¬ ceeded from him and his theologians was more spiritual than the superstitious sensuous character of the Roman theology. A work which appeared under his name, and in which he took part, the libri Carolini, t is remarkable in this respect; it advocated the worship of God in spirit and in truth, and protested earnestly against Superstition and those apocryphal writings which promoted it. This work breathes a peculiar and pure spirit, the expression of personal inquiry; what a contrast, if we compare with it the letters of the Popes in those times! We perceive the reaction of this mental tendency in the distinguished Theologians,— Alcuin,^ who was the principal author of the above-mentioned work; Agobard of Lyons, § and Claudius of Turin, || in whom the counteraction of the Pro- * Joannes Launojus de Scholis Celebrioribus sive a Carolo Magno sive post eundem per occidentem instauratis, Par. 1672 ; re-edited by J. A. Fabricius, Harab. 1717. Bahr, Geschichte der Rom. Literatim irn Karolingischen Zeitalter, 1840. t Ed. Heumann, Hannov. 1731. Neander’s C. H. v 324—335. X Died 804; De Fide Sanctae Trinitatis, libb. 3. Controversial writings against the Adoptianists ; 232 letters. Opp. ed. Frobenius, Ratisb. 1777, 2 t. fob Alkuins Leben von F. Lorenz, Halle, 1829. § Died 840. Liber contra Judicium Dei; Epistola ad Barthol. episcopum de quorundam Illusione Signorum; De Picturis et Imagi- nibum, Opp. ed. Steph. Baluzius, Par. 1666, 2 voll. 8. Gallandi, Bibl. t. xiii. p. 404. C. B. Hundeshagen, De Agobardi vita, Gissae, 1831, 8. Bakr, p. 383. || Prefatio in Libros Informationum Literae etSpiritus super Leviticum ad Theodemirum Abbatem; Commentarii in Libros Regum ad Theode- mirum; in Bedae et Claudii Taurenensis aliorumque Opuscula a Canonicis Regularibus Sancti Salvatoris edita: Bonon 1757. Fragments in F. A. Zachariae, Bibliotheca Pistoriensis, Augusta? Taurin, 1752. Commentarius in Epistolam ad Galatas. Biblioth. Pair. Lugd. t. xiv. THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. 100 testant spirit is still more strongly exhibited. In him and Agobard these movements may be traced back to Augustin, who, in this age, on the one hand, certainly contributed much to propagate the Catholic element, and, on the other hand, counterworked superstition by the principles of a purer and more vital Christianity in his views of divine Grace. Hence, when in the doctrine respecting the Lord’s Supper the Catholic element had reached its culminating point, the opposite and more spiritual view of it found its strongest sup¬ porter in Augustin. He was also not uninfluential in stimu¬ lating the speculative and dialectic spirit, although in the theology of the Carolingian era this gave way to the historical and practical tendency which occupied itself with the Bible, Tradition and the Lathers. In the ninth century the Pseudo-Dionysian writings excited great influence. They w ? ere brought to France as a present from the Emperor Michael to Louis the Pious, who caused them to be translated into Latin bv the Abbot «/ Hilduin * of St. Denis. The authority of the book was enhanced by the Apocryphal collection of accounts respecting the .History of Dionysius, which were compiled by Hilduin. They effected the connexion between the results of New Platonism, and the mystic Theology of the East; they intro¬ duced a new element into the Western Theology, which was capable of being developed by the living spirit of the modem nations into something greater than was contained in the dead outward works of Mysticism. The most important effect of these writings on Theology consisted in their gaining an entrance for the contemplative tendency of Neo-Platonism, at a later period when the Aristotelian Philosophy was in the ascendant. p. 134. Prgefatio Expositions in Epistolam ad Ephesios, in Mabillon, Vetera Analecta, ed. ii. p. 91. Other Fragments, Spicilegium Romanum, t. iv. p. 301, t. ix. p. i. pag. 109. Scriptorum vett. nov. Coll. t. vii. p. i. 274. His Apologeticus ad Theodemirum, in Jonas of Orleans, De Cultu Imagin. libb. 3. Bibl. Patr. Ludg. t. xiv. p. 190. Fragments from the Commentary on Matthew and the Epistle to the Romans, in Claudii Taur. Episc. inedit. Opp. Specimina Prsemissa de eju3 Doctrina Scriptisque Dissertatione exh. A. Rudelbach, Haviniae, 1824, 8. Claudius of Turin, by C. Schmidt, in Illgen’s Zeitschr. f. Hist. Theol. 1S43. * Areopagitica, ed. Matth. Galenus : Colon. 1563, 8. THE IRISH MONASTERIES. 4*23 The Irish Monasteries were the spots where, first of all, a more dialectic Theology was cultivated, which spread still wider at the end of the eleventh century. Here not only Augustin but the Teachers of the Eastern Church were studied, and served to introduce Platonism. It was not impossible that the Pseudo-Dionysian writings were known at an earlier period in the Irish monasteries. The complaint of the Abbot Benedict of Aniane (in Languedoc), in the time of Louis the Pious, alludes to a peculiar theological tendency, when he speaks of the moderni scholastici apud Scotos, and charges them wdtli falsifying the simplicity of the Gospel by their syllogisticas illusiones. More accurate knowledge of this phase in the Irish Church is wanting to us, but one man may serve instead of all the rest as a representative of this Theology, J-ohn Scotus Erigena.* In order to understand the mental training of this very remarkable man, we must take into account his education, in an age, and surrounded by connexions of deep Christian piety. If he admitted principles which were contrary to Christianity, the influence of the Christian piety, which he had imbibed in the Irish monasteries, prevented their development into full consciousness; yet they remained concealed under Christian ideas, and opposite elements were blended in his mind; a Christian feeling, and a mode of thinking which, intellectually considered, was not reconcilable with the Christian Faith. Add to this the influ¬ ence of the Greek Fathers, especially Origen, Gregory of Nyssa, and Maximus, perhaps also still earlier the Pseudo- Dionysius whom he afterwards translated into Latin, whereby his mind was impregnated with a mystical and dialectic element. From those teachers he received a free speculative * De Divisione Naturae, libb. 5, ed. Thomas Gale, Ox. 1681, fol.; De Prsedestinatione Dei, Opp. ed. H. J. Floss, in the Patrologia of Migne, 1853. See the Prolegomena on the Life and Writings of Scotus. F. A. Staudenmeier, Johannes Scotus Erigena und die Wissen- schaft seiner Zeit. Thl. 1. Frankf. a. M. 1814. Nikolaus Moller, Joh. Scotus Erigena, Mainz. 1844. Fronmiiller die Lehre der Joh. Scotus Erigena vom Wesen des Bosen in the Tub. Zeitschr. f. Theol. 1830. Baur, Lehre von der Dreieinigkeit, ii. 274. Ritter, Gesch. der Christ. Philosophic, iii. 206. That he was called only Johannes Scotus by his contemporaries, and that Erigena is identical with the latter name, see ed. Floss Prooem. xix. According to Floss’s not even probable opinion, Erigena is to be derived from Jerugena, i. e., ex insulae sanctorum natus; rather from Erin, Ireland.— [Jacobi.] 424 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. tendency, though developed in a peculiar manner. He wa3 not so much the recipient of the opinions of others, but rather was indebted to them for an impulse towards the construction of a system of his own. For its leading principles we must consult his chief work de divisione natures. He distinguishes the two standpoints of fides and ratio. Fides in the order of Time is first; the religious development of Man proceeds from Authority; but in the order of ideas ratio is first, for from it everything is known as necessary. Scotus might, therefore, with Augustin, regard the standpoint of Fides as a necessary preparation for knowledge; the difference is that he allowed Ratio to exalt itself above Fides , and maintained, not merely a formal but a material destinction between them. In this respect he very much resembled the Alexandrian school, but placed yvbung still higher than they did, above nnsrig. Philo¬ sophy and Religion were one throughout; the one was the Theory, the other the Practice.* Religion supported itself on a symbolic revelation of God; Philosophy rose by itself to a knowledge of Truth; the former remained fettered by human authropopathic representations; the latter set the Truth from them. On the standpoint of Religion the human Subjective was supreme—on that of Philosophy, objective Truth. At the head of all existence he placed the Absolute, the on, and like Philo, distinguished between the Being of God in itself, and his Revelation in all existence. The Absolute v 7 as, according to him, not the idea of the living God, but a mere logical Abstraction, the idea of the highest simplicity, to which all definite attributes are to be denied. With this idea of mere absolute Being, he mingled mystical representations which proceeded from an exuberance of feeling; God revealed him¬ self to the feelings and to the intellect as this ineffable some¬ thing. Although the idea of an unpersonal Absolute, would strictly not admit of Prayer, yet in the works of Scotus we find prayers, which give evidence of Devotion. In accordance with abstract speculation, he professed to deny to the Absolute Being, everything which is attributed to Him, on the stand- * Quid est aliud, de philosophia tractare, nisi verce religionis, qua summa et principalis omnium rerum causa Deus et humiliter colitur et rationabiliter investigatur, regulas exponere ? Conficitur inde, veram esse pbilosophiam veram religionem, conversimque veram religionem esse veram philosophiam.—De Praedestinat. i. JOHN SCOTUS ERIGENA. 425 point of the religious consciousness, of scriptural Revelation, and of the Church doctrine. All the attributes ascribed to Him are only various phases under which the simple Absolute presents himself in condescension to the human consciousness, it is a subjective Phenomenology without reality, an optical refraction of the Absolute. There is therefore a twofold Theology, the ^soXoy/a xara0ar/x^ and dbropar/zCTj, the positive and the negative, that which invests the Divine Being with human (or analogous to human) attributes, and that which divests Him of all such attributes (die vermenschlichende und die entmenschlichende). Since we cannot remain fixed to the highest negative standpoint, but must have something on which our conceptions may rest, it is not an arbitrary but a necessary Symbolic by which Holy Writ represents the Absolute according to human conceptions. Not merely the simple believer, but we ourselves must be shocked, if we say, that Love on the highest standpoint cannot be affirmed of God. He deduces all existence from the Absolute, every phenomenon of the former is a necessary development of the latter; hence all existence is only a Theophany, a necessary phenomenal form of the Absolute Being. He speaks of a Creation, but only from a Cataphatic standpoint. Instead of saying, God created all things, we should say more truly, God is in all A His Pantheism is also shown by the manner in which he classifies Existence. (1.) That stage of Existence which creates and is not created, the Absolute. (2.) The Existence which is created and creates, i.e. the divine Ideas, the first and original causes of all Being. (3.) The Existence which is created but does not create, that is, the operations which take place in Creatures. (4.) The Existence which neither creates, nor is created, this stgge coincides with the hrst,t and means, God is all in all; the only true Existence in * Quum audimus, Deum omnia facere, nibil aliud debemus intelli- gere, quam Deum in omnibus esse, hoc est, essentiam subsistere. Ipse enim solus per se vere est, et omne quod vere in his, quae sunt, dicitur esse, ipse solus est.—De Divis. Nat. i. § 72, ed. Floss. + Prima et quarta forma unum sunt, quoniam de Deo solummodo intelliguntur; est enim principium omnium, quse a se condita sunt, et finis omnium quae eum appetunt, ut in eo aeternaliter immutabiliterque quiescent. Quoniam ad eandem causam omnia, quse ab ea procedunt, dum ad finem pervenient reversura sunt, propterea finis omnium dicitur et neque creare neque creari perhibetur, nam postquam in earn reversa 49,6 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. all. According to these representations of God, he says, God does not know, see, or love; but he performs all this in men ; in them he knows and loves himself,* The consciousness Oi the created spirit is therefore nothing else than a form of the consciousness of the Absolute, who, by himself, has no con sciousness. All Existence is a necessary development of the Absolute; so that we cannot speak of Evil. There can be no Evil for God, for then Evil would be something necessary ; it vanishes in the harmony of the Universe, and only when the individual is considered apart from the whole, the idea of Evil arises as the firi ov. Dr. Baur in his History of the doctrine of the Atonement, justly combats the assertion that the development of Scholasticism is to be traced to Scotus. For in this system, Knowledge stands related to Faith, and Philosophy to Christianity ancl Theology, very differently from what they do in Scotus ; it shows far more of the influence of Augustin. But Dr. Baur is w’rong in regarding Scotus as the closing point of the older development; rather, it is evident that he distinguishes himself from all former develop¬ ments of Theology; and only in regard to single elements of the Neo-Platonic kind can he be compared with the ancient ones. He presents quite a peculiar stage in Theology and Philosophy, the prognostic of a future development. Two methods of representing the relation of God to the Universe, diverging from Theism, the Dualistic and the Pantheistic, might be mingled in Christianity, and it was reserved for it, to develope Theism victoriously in opposition to them. In the first Period it had to combat Dualism, which not merely pre¬ sented itself in open antagonism, but mixed in the development of Dogmas, and found a point of connexion in the powerful contradistinction which Christianity made between Good and sunt omnia, nil ulterius ab ea per generationem loco et tempore generibus et formis procedet, quoniam in ea omnia quieta erunt et unum individuum atque immutabile manebunt.—De Div. Nat. ii. § 2, ed. Floss. * Non vos estis, qui amatis, qui videtis, qui movetis, sed spiritus patris vestri, qui loquitur in vobis veritatem de me et patre meo et seipso, ipse amat et videt me et patrem meum et seipsum in vobis, et mo vet in nobis seipsum, ut diligatis me et patrem meum. Si ergo seipsam sancta Trinitas in nobis et in seipsa amat et videt et movet, et a seipsa in seipsa et in creaturis suis amatur, videtur, movetur.—S. 1.1. i. § 76. JOHN SCOTUS ERIGENA. 427 Evil. But it was overcome, by the contradiction in which it stood to the Unity of the Christian consciousness of God. Pantheism could connect itself with Christianity exactly in the point where it was opposed to Dualism, by a one-sided Monism, which w 7 ants what there is of Truth in Dualism. It accepted the Christian doctrine of communion with God, but took away the consciousness of dependence on God, and of the contrariety between Good and Evil. In the attempt of Scotus the Period is foreshadowed, which would aim at blending Pantheism and Christianity, from which a new form of Dogmas might proceed. But this was too foreign to that Age ; it neither received this, nor was it capable of rightly understanding what was true and profound in Scotus. The part he took in some controversies exposed him to the charge of heresy; but he w r as misunder¬ stood. We perceive the influence of his system in the specu¬ lations of the thirteenth centurv. The developments of the Carolingian age were succeeded by times of devastation and barbarism which checked the unfold¬ ing of this germ of a new culture; so that it only existed in an occult state. The tenth century produced only a few men of scientific genius; among these was Batherius of Verona or Liittich,* a man who, with Augustinian views, denounced Anthropomorphism, Superstition, and Ceremonies. But about the end of the tenth, and in the eleventh century, and when the end of the world was expected, a new order of things was preparing. In France a more scientific spirit, and the re¬ action of a freer standpoint proceeded from Gerbert f against papal Absolutism. Fulbert, J the superintendent of a flourishing school at Chartres, contributed also to the establish¬ ment of anew theological development. Lanfranc,§ Abbot * Died, 974. De Contemtu Canonum ; Apologia sui ipsius; Liber Apologeticus, &c., in d’Achery, Spicelegium, i. 345. Praeloniorum, libb. vi. in Martene et Durand Ampl. coll. ix. p. 785. Opp. ed. Ballerenii fratres, Yer. 1765. Ilistoire Litteraire de la France, t. vi. Engelhardt, Kirchengesch. Abhandlungen, 1832. Neander, Deutsche Zeitschr. 1851, Nr. 36. Ratherius von Verona vom Lie. Yogel. 1854. + De Corpore et Sanguine Christi; De Rationali et Ratione uti in Pezii Thesaurus. Vol. i. p. 133. C. F. Hock, Gerbert oder Papst Silvester II. und sein Jahrhundert. Wien. 1837. £ Died, 1028. Epistoke et Sermones, ed. Villiers : Par. 1608, and Bibl. Patr. Lugd. t. xviii. § De Corpore et Sanguine Domini; Epistolse; Commentarii. Opp. ed. d’Acherv : Par. 1648. Histoire Litt. de la France, viii. 260. 4*28 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. of Bee in Normandy (a.d. 1070, Archbishop of Canterbury, died a.d. 1089), brought with him from Italy the seeds of a scientific spirit. But the traces of the new scientific life which are visible at various points, are marked by another spirit than that of the Carolingian age; it is no longer a historical and practical, but a speculative and dialectic spirit. The newly awakened understanding felt its powers, was fond of exercising itself in Dialectics, and applied itself with greater ardour in that direction, since it had been separated from the connexion with the earlier historical development. But in the eleventh Century it was still doubtful, whither this new path would lead. Augustin powerfully influenced Speculation, and the question now was, whether his maxim fides jorcecedit ■intellectum , would be strictly followed, and the Tradition of the Church be regarded as an object of faith, or whether a freer spirit of investigation would be developed. Lanfranc was the representative of dialectic Speculation which allied itself altogether to the Church. But he was met by an opponent of superior powers,— Berengarius,* trained in the school of Fulbert, superintendent of the school at Tours, and afterwards deacon at Angers. His ideas became chiefly known by the part he took in various controversies, but a more general, original, mental tendency forms the basis of his doctrines, as in that of the Lord’s Supper. He had formed his views according to Augustin, and had been stimulated by his writings to an earnest religious life, and to advocate his doctrine of grace, and of the Sacraments. He vindicated against Lanfranc, the right of free rational inquiry, and spoke against the dependence of Reason on the faith of authority. When Lanfranc charged him with not holding the doctrine of the Church, he replied, that Christ made use of logical deductions; that it belonged to a noble-minded disposition to have recourse to Dialectic, in other words, to appeal to Reason; and whoever did not adopt this method, denied his own dignity (since Man by Reason was created in the image of God), and could not be renewed day by day in the * C. F. Staudlin Berengarius von Tours, in Staudlins und Tzschirners Archiv fiir Kirchengesch. Bd. 2, H. 1. Sudendorf, Berengarius oder eine Samnilung ihn betreffender Briefe, 1850. See J. L. Jacobi in Herzogs Encyklopadie. Art. Berengarius. THE GREEK CHURCH. 429 image of God. # We see in this controversy the,germ of a more Catholic and of a more Protestant tendency. Berengarius was indeed put down by the other party, but the conflict was not decided, and the points in dispute re-appeared in the twelfth century. Among the controversies in which he was involved, a peculiar tendency was exhibited by Eusebius Bruno, Bishop of Angers, which aimed at maintaining the simple biblical character of the doctrine of faith, and was satisfied with bringing to light the simple truths of the Holy Scriptures in opposition to those who only followed the authority of the Church doctrine, and likewise to the prevalent spirit of Speculation. THE GREEK CHURCH. In the Greek Church there was more of scientific precision than in the newly-formed Latin Church, but it wanted the spiritual motive power; it had forgotten the substance of vital Christianity in one-sided dogmatizing, and in altercations about intellectual formulas. There was, in addition, the des¬ potism of the State, which checked the free development of the religious spirit in the Church. It had sunk into a state of stagnation, and while its living spirit retired into the West, it first beheld in the Future the growth of a new principle of life. The dialectic tendency was greatly fostered by the Mono- physite controversies. It sought support from Aristotle. The Pseudo-Dionysian writings operated in favour of the mys¬ tical element. They not only established the Hierarchy more firmly, by investing it with a sort of spirituality, but super¬ stition of other kinds was spiritualized to a certain degree from this standpoint, and was received into the Church System. We find a remarkable blending of these two mental elements in Maximus. t The mystic element in him attem¬ pered the dogmatic ; hence there was a less abrupt mode of conceiving the Supernatural, and an attempt to reconcile it with the Rational. He expressed ideas respecting both sides which might have been very productive in an age and com¬ munity of greater mental activity. The controversies that had been carried on, occasioned the production of one important * Ep. ad Ricardum in d’Achery Spicilegium. + Disputatio cum Pyrrho. Opp. ed. Franciscus Combesisius : Par. 1675, 2 vols. Baur, Lehre der Dreieinigk. ii. 263. 430 THF HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. work for the Greek Church, the doctrinal manual of John of Damascus, * the last original dogmatic production of the Greek Church. The various opinions of the Fathers are placed together, and an attempt is ably made to reconcile them But this work could not create a new scientific tendency, as similar dialectic works written in the Church spirit gave birth in the West to the Scholastic Theology. The combined action of the Dialectic, the Mystic, and the Ecclesiastic, only served to establish what was ancient. All the popular superstitions were only strengthened by these means, the various branches were not purified by the Dogmatic, and hence it was so much more difficult to separate the foreign elements from the Church, and to overcome them. The reactions which occurred, did not proceed from the Church Dogmatic. Some arose from the after-effect of the Gnostic sects. The original move¬ ment of these sects was a reaction of Jewish and heathen elements against the fundamental truths of Christianity; but since in the Church the Christian element had connected itself with the Jewish, the opposition took a more advan¬ tageous direction, for it combated this mixture. As Marcion had formerly taken such a position, so in the seventh Century the Paulicians appeared in the Greek Church, f offsets indeed of Marcionitism (they called themselves Xg/cYwroX/ra/), who attempted to carry out the Pauline element in a one-sided manner, and confounded it with dualistic views. They com¬ bated the mixture of Light and Darkness which they found in the Church, and wished to restore the Apostolic Christianity freed from all impurities. Yet even this sect did not make any deep impression on the Church. Another reaction which proceeded from the Church itself, combated the sensuous ten¬ dency of the religious spirit, though it was directed more against a particular branch of it, than against it as a whole. * Died, 760. Principal work, Trrjyf) yvuxrsojg : (1) ra v Kara (pvcnv 7Tpog t>)v twv Stnuv Karavopaiv tiociyovca. THE PROCESSION OF THE HOLY SPIRIT. 435 B. THE DOGMAS OF SPECIAL DOGMATIC, a. THEOLOGY. THE CONTROVERSY RESPECTING THE PROCESSION OF THE HOLY SPIRIT. While the Theology of Scotus Erigena passed away without leaving any impression, Theologians were much occupied with the difference between the Eastern and Western Churches,— whether the Holy Spirit proceeded from the Father alone, or from the Father and the Son. John of Damascus firmly held the fundamental proposition of the Greek Church, that the Father is the efficient cause of everything in the Trinity, and consequently that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father. Hence, he remarked that the Father communicates everything to the Son, and performs all things through the Son. And thus he was in favour of the harmonizing representation that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son. He makes use of an illustra tration taken from the sun, the ray of light and the illumina¬ tion it gives.* This conciliatory representation in this form is found only in a section (cap. 12) which is wanting in the most ancient manuscripts ; but elsewhere he thus expresses himself,—the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of the Father, and from the Father; the Holy Spirit is not from the Son, but is the Spirit of the Son. Scotus Erigena, who had been trained under the influence of both churches, expressed himself in a conciliatory manner ; f though the light from a fire is through the medium of the ray, yet there are not two causes of the light, but only one,— the present power of the fire which operates in both. He also makes use of Augustin’s illustration taken from the human mind, thus : J the human spirit produces its own self- * Lib. i. cap. 7—12. f De Divis. Nat. ii. 32.—Taken strictly, he inclined more to the Greek church; cap. 31. Ex duabos namque causis unam can gam confluere, rationi non facile occurrit, prsesertim in simplici natura et plus quam simplici et, ut verius dicatur in ipsa simplicitate ornni divisione et numerositate carente.—[J acobi.] + Mens et notitiam sui gignit et a se ipsa amor sui et notitia sui procedit, quo et ipsa et notitia sui conjunguntur, et quamvis ipse amor gx mente per notitiam sui procedat, non tamen ipsa notitia causa amoris est, sed ipsa mens, ex qua amor inchoat esse, et antequam ad perfectam notitiam sui mens ipsa perveniat.—C. 32, p. 610, ed. Floss. F F 2 436 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. consciousness, and from this proceeds the knowledge of itself, and the love which connects the spirit and its self-conscious¬ ness with one another ; yet the self-consciousness is not the cause of the love, but the Spirit itself from which the love is first of all derived, before the Spirit attains its perfect self- knowledge. External influencesmhecked the operation of the conciliatory representation on the controversy between the Western and Eastern Churches. It may appear strange that exactly such a difference should be so prominent in the controversy, and that far more important points in Anthropology and Soteriology w r ere passed over. Yet these were more concealed, they were not brought forward in any Creed, and it needed a deeper examination of the two churches than the slightly cultivated dogmatic criticism of the age could effect, to discover them. The attention was first of all turned to that which lay on the surface, and an age little versed in theology attached great importance to words and phrases. The diversified recension of the Creed of Nice and Constantinople in the Greek and Latin form, excited the attention of the Synod of Gentiliaeum (Gentilly) in a.d. 767, which anathematized the Greek doctrine of the Holy Spirit. In the Council held at Forum Julium (Friuli) (a.d. 791 or 796) the Patriarch Paultnus of Aquileia defended the Western Church against the charge of falsifying that Creed ; if the creed was explained according to the meaning of its author, it could not be said that it w 7 as altered. As the Fathers of the Council at Constantinople had enlarged the Nicene Creed according to the mind of the original framer of it by the statements respecting the Holy Spirit, in the same maimer it was added by the Church that the Spirit proceeded from the Son. If, as Christ himself said, the Father is inseparably in the Son and the Son in the Father, but the Holy Spirit is of the same nature with the Father and the Son, must we not say that he proceeds from both essentially and inseparably ? The Council of Aachen (Aix-la-Chapelle) asserted this doctrine afresh against the Greek Church. Charlemagne sent its decision to Pope LeoIII. whoseadhesion he desired. The Pope had a remark¬ able conference with the deputation. He gave his assent to the dogmatic propositions, but declared that the Council of Constantinople which had followed the guidance of the Holy THE PROCESSION OF THE HOLY SPIRIT. 48 7 Spirit, had left out this position not without reason; that, therefore, it ought to be received expressly into the Creed, for all persons were not possessed of the dogmatic culture that would qualify them to understand it. Many things which belonged to dogmatic truth, were yet not necessary to Salvation ; and we ought to distinguish between what is necessary to attain it, and what is not absolutely needful to be known. Thus moderately the Pope at that time expressed himself respecting the gist of the controversy. In consequence of these transac¬ tions several Frankish theologians occupied themselves with the subjects, made compilations, and wrote treatises. Among them, Alcuin and Theodulf of Orleans are particularly to be noticed. The difference first acquired more importance, when the Patriarch Photius of Constantinople, who, from other external causes, had fallen out with Pope Nicholas 1., and had been excommunicated by him, issued in a.d. 867, a Circular, calling a Synod, in which he made use of this doctrine of the Latin Church as a handle for attacking the whole Church, and charged it with heresies, and with falsifying the ancient Creeds, After that, this Point was regarded as a more important question of Polemic. AEneas of Parts* defended the Western doctrine in the controversy of that age, a.d. 868. On the side of the Greek Church, it was main¬ tained that the Western doctrine overthrew the monarchy in the Trinity, and introduced a Dyarchy. The Western Clergy asserted, on the contrary, that the o^oolxuov between the Father and the Son could not be maintained, unless the Procession of the Spirit from the Father and the Son was taught. b. THE DOCTRINE OF THE PERSON OF CHRIST. I. THE MONOTHELETIC CONTROVERSY. Mansi x. xi. Anastasii Bibliothecarii (870) Collectanea de iis, quse spectant ad historiam Monothelitarum; ed. J. Sirmond: Par. 1620, 8vo.; also Bibl. Patr. Lugd. xii. Gallandi, xiii. Theophanis (ob. 817) Chronographia, vol. 2: Bonon. 1839, 41. F. Combesisii Historia Hseresis Monothelitarum ac Vindicise Actorum Sextae Synodi, in Novum Auctuarium Patrum Graeco-Latin.: Par. 1648, fol. t. ii. Walch, ix. Dorner, ii. 203. Neander’s Church History, v. 242. The doctrine of two natures in Christ, as it was more exactly determined in the former period, seemed legitimately to lead to the conclusion of two modes of operation, corresponding to tire tw r o natures. In the writings of Dionysius the Areopagite, * Adv. Objectiones Grsecorum, in d’Ackery Spicil. t. 1. 438 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. the phrase svspysia ^sccvdoixri was employed, and the question was suggested whether from the standpoint of the one person of Christ, in virtue of the avridotrig tujv ovofjLurwv, such language could be used, and yet the special operation of each nature be distinguished. That ancient disagreement of the Antiochian and the Alexandrian Schools, the tendency which gave prominence to the unity in the divine and human natures, and the other which strove to maintain the divine and the human in their distinct peculiarity, once more made itself felt. The Antiochian view had been set aside by the attempt at a compromise, and its main point had not met with the attention it deserved, owing to the preponderance of the Alexandrian scheme. The disagreement which had never been fully settled, came afresh into view on the point which had been left undetermined. That party who had logically adhered to the Alexandrian standpoint, took offence, whenever the purely Human in Christ was rendered at all prominent, and if everything in him was not in all cases referred to the divine Logos. To this internal ground of disagreement tffe external was also added, that the Greek Emperors had not only a religious but also a political interest for bringing the controversy between the Monophysites and the Catholics to a settlement. Often as it had been found in the Greek Church, that an outward (Henotikon) pacification called forth a counteraction, still the wish for union always made the experience of the past to be forgotten. Some theologians led Heraclius to think of a union by repre¬ senting to him that the formula of a divine-human agency of Christ might be accepted by both parties, and serve as a point of union. Cyrus, bishop of Phasis, in Lozica, allowed the Emperor to make use of him as an instrument for effecting his plans, and in a.d. 630, was made Patriarch of Alexandria, in order to gain over the Egyptian Monophysites. He put forth articles of agreement, in which it was said that the one Christ and Son of God effectuates that which is human and that which is divine, by one divine-numan agency. With many this was successful ; but there was at Alexandria, a certain monk, Sophronius, a man of logical training, who endeavoured to show that, reasoning consequentially, two natures implied two corresponding wills and modes of operation. Sergius, the Patriarch of Constantinople, exerted himself to suppress the controversy and recommended moderation For a while, THE MONOTHEISTIC CONTROVERSY. 439 Sophronius was silent, but when, in ad. 634, he was elevated to the Patriarchate of Jerusalem, he again brought forward, in his inaugural epistle,* the sentiments he had formerly advocated. At the beginning of the controversy, Sergius had sought to obtain the opinion of Honorius, bishop of Kome,+ who appears to have possessed no superior theological attain¬ ments, and treated the controversy as one of the idle questions of the schools. He wished, like Sergius, that it might be allowed to drop, but was himself inclined to the doctrine of one will, because the notion of two wills seem to put in opposition the Divinity and Humanity of Christ.^ In a d. 638, the Emperor issued a religious edict, hfctrig rfj{ ‘jrfffrsco$,§ in which, while he discountenanced controversy on the subject, he yet advocated the doctrine of one will and one mode of operation. The edict only exasperated the controversy, as the Emperor Constans found when in a.d. 646, he made a fresh attempt, by issuing a new edict, not very dogmatic, called the ruvog. He allowed each of the two opinions, but enjoined silence. But it was too late. The Homan bishop Martinus, at the first Lateran Council, pronounced Dyothe- letism to be orthodox ; but in the East this doctrine was suppressed by the iron hand of despotism. In that quarter the chief representative of Monotheletism was Theodorus, bishop of Pharan in Arabia, || and of Dyothetism the acute Maximus. In them was represented the dogmatic interest of both sides, and the deeper contrariety it involved. Theodorus acknowledged two natures in Christ, and the individuality of the human body and the human soul; he maintained that everything which the Lord said or did, took place through the instrument¬ ality of the reason and the senses ; but it was important to refer everything to the operation of the Logos, to regard Him alone as willing and acting, since He operated through the reason and body. Christ was subject to no affection of the senses by a necessity of nature, but all this was the free act of the Logos. The acting and resting, the doing and suffering of Christ were to be traced without separation to the wisdom, goodness, and power of the Logos, but were carried out through the medium of the soul and the body. The * Mansi, xi. p. 461. + lb. xi. p. 529. X Ep. ad Sergium. Mansi, xi. p. 537. § Mansi, x. 991, sqq. 11 Fragments in the Acts of the Sixth Ecumenical Council. Actio xiii. 440 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. whole and each part of the Incarnation resulted from the highest divine operation of the Logos- This view had important practical consequences, inasmuch as in the acting and suffering of Christ the conception of the purely human was confused ; for Theodorus of Pharan inferred that the human body of Christ was elevated above its natural properties, and thus approached to Docetism. But this operation could not take place upon the body through the human soul, therefore it must be traced back to the Logos, who effected everything. He appealed to the facts recorded respecting the body of Christ, his resurrection, his walking on the sea, and his entering the room through closed doors.* Maximus, on the contrary, placed Christology and Anthropology in systematic connexion. To both he applied his axiom of the universally harmonic relation between the Divine and the Human ; every¬ where the Divine operated according to the peculiar constitu¬ tion of the Human. In this manner the Holy Spirit operated on believers, and thus the Divine stood in relation to the Human in Christ. If the Monothelites maintained that two wills and two modes of operation implied a contrariety between the Divine and the Human, he rejoined that everything depended on whether this contrariety was founded in nature or was the consequence of sin. To assert the first would make Gfod the Author of Sin. This contrariety, therefore, originated in the disunion of the human and divine will which proceeded from sin. But Christ has redeemed human nature and restored it to its original condition ; and hence it follows that the Human and Divine, each in its own peculiar way, could and must be in him wdthout such contrariety. According to the view of Maximus the Logos formed Christ’s personality ; he operated through everything, but so as to allow each nature to work in its own peculiar way, in harmonious conjunction with his. Without admitting this, we could not explain certain affections in Christ’s human life. In this connexion he gave remarkable prominence to the purely Human in Christ, his feelings at the approach of death which Maximus distinguished from the feelings disturbed by sin. He finds in them the natural impulse of self-preservation (apog/xri crgoc E,ooyjv) which * ’Aoyiciog Kai olov tbrtiv acrupaTug avev SuurToXrjg irpapXQtiJ be prjTpag Kai pvr]paTog Kai Bvpbv Kai u> g £7r’ bHacpovg rrjg SraXacrarjg iTTtZ,£VGtV. THE MONOTHELETIC CONTROVERSY. 441 does not disturb tlie harmony with the Divine Will.* But certainly Maximus in holding so firmly the peculiarly human in Christ was not perfectly consequential and approximated to Theodorus, in deriving the sensuous affections and sufferings not from the necessary connexion of nature, but from voluntary accommodation. This controversy led to another remarkable disagreement. Monothelitism was the occasion of making the standpoint of perfection in the development of human nature generally to consist in this—that the human will becomes absorbed in the divine, as this was the case in Christ (v ayiiov 7 raripojv didaa- KaXiav ioaavrwg Krjpvrropev’ Kai dvo piv (pvaiKa $eXr)pa~a ovx vtts- vavria, pp yivoiro, KaOuig oi aat€eig tdpijoav aiperiKoi , aXX ’ i-rcbptvov to dvOpwmvov avrov Sr'tXiipa, Kai pi/ dvrnr~nrrov r} dvrinaXaiov [aj'7-f7ra\oj/], pdXXov piv ovv Kai viroraavopEVOv rip §tiip avrov Kai irai’oQtvti StXppan. 442 TELE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. further developed by John of Damascus, the victory of Dyotheletism was established also in the East. 2. THE ADOPTIANIST CONTROVERSY. Chr. G. F. Walchj'Historia Adoptianorum : Gotting. 1755, 8. His Ketzerhis- torie, ix. Frobenii Dissertatio Historica de Hseresi Elipandi et Felicis, in Opp. Alcuini, ed. Frobenii, i. p. ii. 925. Neander’s Church History, v. 22fi. Dorner, Lehre v. d. Person Christ. The Adoptianist controversy arose in Spain, in a district which was dissevered from a connexion with earlier develop¬ ments, and without any immediate communication with those Oriental disputes. Two persons appeared as the chief repre¬ sentatives of a peculiar Christology, the aged Elipandus, Archbishop of Toledo, and Felix, bishop of Urgellis, the former in Saracenic, the latter in Frankish Spain. Elipan¬ dus perhaps gave the first impulse to it, but Felix, who was his superior in theological training, was properly its dialectic founder, and developed it with the greatest skill. Their standpoint brings us back to a view which apparently had been relinquished ; it is strikingly similar to that of the Antiochian School, a reaction of it against the predominant view resem¬ bling the Alexandrian. It is surprising that a tendency which had commenced in a flourishing period of theological Science, should have re-appeared in an age and country which offered so many obstacles to its reception. Even the scientific culture of the Carolingian age scarcely accounts for the appearance of a view so free and original, since during that period there was in the main an adherence to the traditional element. This induces us to look more closely into the proximate causes. At one time these were traced to a peculiar phrase in the Spanish Liturgy then in use, the so-called ojficium Mozarabicum, in which the assumption of human nature by the Logos is designated adoptio. As this word was employed by Felix and Elipandus, it served also to mark their peculiar views. But such an isolated expression would not have given the impulse to the formation of a peculiar dogmatic theory, if the germ of it had not been given from another quarter. The term adoptio , and the connexion in which it is used, is only one mark of a general dogmatic tendency to which other peculiar ideas of the system are to be added. The agreement of this system in the ideas and development, in the arguments and proofs, with the doctrine THE ADOPTIANIST CONTROVERSY. 443 and method of Theodore of Mopsuestia is so striking, that we naturally arrive at the conclusion that Felix was led to his views and his opposition to the Church Doctrine by the study of Theodore’s writings. Certainly it is not improbable that Spanish theologians at that time were acquainted with the works of Theodore, since they were translated into Latin during the controversy on the Three Chapters in North Africa, and might easily have been brought over from that country. Meanwhile we do not possess enough of the writings of Theo¬ dore or of Felix,* to enable us to prove such an external connexion. However striking the agreement may be, yet it does not exclude the opinion that Felix had been led simply by a congenial tendency of the dogmatic spirit to a similar development. We may believe that the views generally received by the Church did not satisfy him, that he endea¬ voured to represent the relation of the Logos to the Humanity of Christ in a more rational manner, that he thus adhered more closely to the New r Testament, and in this way arrived at results similar to those of Theodore. We should then only infer from this fact, as from later occurrences of the same kind, that the Church doctrine had not yet satisfied * The immediate influence of the writings of Theodore on Felix is now rendered somewhat more probable. It is ascertained that the Commentaries (edited by Pitra in the Spicilegium Solesmense, i. 170) on the lesser Pauline Epistles, which he ascribes to Hilary, are no other than a translation of Theodore’s. Pitra found them in a manu¬ script which originally belonged to the monastery of Corbie, and which he dates about the ninth century. In this century also Rabanus Maurus made use of the Commentaries, and introduced the greater part of them into his own. But his Codex was not the same as that printed by Pitra, for Rabanus has many important deviations from that text; the Commentary also does not notice several Epistles, and therefore appears not to have had these in his copy. The variations of the two texts are so great, that one can scarcely be regarded as a copy of the other. There were also in the ninth century two copies at least of this Commentary in France. Now, since the writings of Theo¬ dore were known in the sixth century in North Africa, we may conclude at once that they reached France through the medium of Spain. Nor is it altogether surprising that they should be found there immediately after the Adoptianist controversy. They might spread with greater ease if Theodore’s name was not attached to them, as then Rabanus might without suspicion copy the Commentaries, and not reject the thoughts which active minds might misplace in a dogmatic agitation, and which he would have probably condemned had he found them in Felix.— [Jacobi.] 444 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. minds that were disposed to follow the teachings of Holy Writ. From a letter of Alcuin’s it appears that Felix had written a Dialogue against the Saracens. Now Islamism acknowledged Jesus as a prophet, hence Felix had no occa¬ sion to prove the divine mission of Christ; but the original doc¬ trine of Christ was regarded by Mohammedans as corrupted by the Church, especially in the dogmas of the Trinity and the Divinity of Christ. Hence the vindication of Christianity rendered it necessary to demonstrate the union of the divine Essence with the human nature in Christ. Felix therefore might easily have attempted to present this doctrine in a manner which would recommend it to rational thinkers, and obviate the objections of Mohammedans. This however is only a supposition. By the use of the term Adopt,io this School wished to mark the distinction of proper and improper in reference to the Son. They made use of the illustration that as a son cannot have two fathers, but may have one by birth and the other by adoption, so in Christ a distinction must be made between his proper sonship, and his sonship by adoption. Still they regarded as the important point the different relation in which Christ is called the Son of God according to his divine or his human nature. The former relation marked something founded in the nature of God, the second something that was founded not in his nature but in a free act of the divine will, by which God assumed human nature into connexion with himself. Accordingly Felix distinguished between how far Christ was the Son of God and God according to nature ( natura , genere), and how far he was so by virtue of grace, by an act of the divine Will {gratia, voluntate), by the divine choice and good pleasure ( electione , placito ); and the name Son of God was given to him only in consequence of his con¬ nexion with God ( nuncupative ) ; and hence the expressions for this distinction, secundum naturam and secundum adoptionem. Felix appealed to the fact that though the name of Son by adoption (e)/’ viokciag) is not applied in the Bible to Christ, yet there are other designations which express the same idea. He adduces John x. 34, when Jesus disputed with the Jew r s (xar du/QwKoi) and referred to the passage in the Old Testa¬ ment, in which men are called Elohirn, where Christ placed himself as a man in the category of those who were called THE ADOPTIANIST CONTROVERSY. 445 “ God’s” nuncupative, and not in a strict sense. Then as to the passage, “None is good save one, that is God,” from this it appears that as Man he was not to be called good in the same sense as God, and that only the divine nature in him was the source of goodness. He would allow an interchange of the divine and human predicates, only in the same manner as Theodore ; it could not be made without limitation, but the different sense must be observed, according as they were attri¬ buted to the divine or human natures. He charged his opponents with so confounding the two natures by their doc¬ trine of the singularitas persona , that they left no distinction between the suscipiens and the susceptum. Expressions that were then in common use, such as God teas born, and died, never occur in Scripture, which also never says that the Son of God, but that the Son of Man was given for us. On the latter point Alcuin could easily have confuted Felix by other passages, but both were wrong in not distinguishing the various biblical applications of the term Son of God from the Church use of it, and in taking the idea everywhere in a Church sense. Like Theodore, Felix asserted Agnoetism of Christ. It is also a point of resemblance between them, that both sought for an Analogy between the union of the Man Christ with the divine Being, and the relation of believers to God. Felix says that Christ in an improper sense (nuncu¬ pative) was called the Son of God conjointly with all who are not God according to their nature, but by the grace of God in Christ have been taken into communion with God (deificati). In this order also the Son of God is, in respect of his humanity, both according to Nature and Grace. He main¬ tained that, as far as Christ as Man is reckoned among the sons of God, all believers are his members ; considered accord¬ ing to his divine nature, believers are the Temple in which he dwells. He did not wish by that to deny the specific differ¬ ence between Christ and believers ; whatever resemblance existed between them belonged to him in a far higher sense ; he was united to God by generation, and was the medium of the communion of the rest with God. Felix also perfectly agreed with Theodore in the thought, that the communion with God into which Christ was received as a man might be represented as a revelation of the divine being according to the measure of the various stages of the development of his human 446 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. nature, and thus supposed various degrees of it up to the highest revelation after the glorification *of Christ, It might be peculiarly offensive that he should compare the baptism of Christ with the regeneration of believers ; but he certainly did not mean to say that Christ thus became partaker of com¬ munion with the divine nature, but only to point out an analogy so far, as baptism marked a distinct stage in Christ’s life, after which the operation of the divine life in Him was peculiarly conspicuous. It is therefore evident that the doctrine of Felix was alto¬ gether that of Theodore, excepting that the latter could express himself more freely in an age when the doctrines of the Church were less rigorously defined, while Felix was obliged to use a terminology which was opposed to his own system. The great importance of the antagonism in which he stood to the Church doctrine is likewise manifest; it included not merely Christology but also Anthropology ; for the doctrine of the revelation of the Divine Being in Christ, conditioned by various stages of development, was connected with one of special importance, the principle of free self-determination. It is uncertain how far Felix consciously developed his prin¬ ciples ; but there is no question that these were throughout contradictory to the prevalent Augustinian doctrine. As Felix lived in the Frankish territory, the Frankish Church was drawn into the controversy. In a.d. 792, Charlemagne con¬ voked an assembly at Begensburg, at which Felix appeared, and was induced to recant. He was then sent to Rome, where he made similar explanations.* But on being per¬ mitted to return home, he repented of the steps he had taken, took refuge in Saracenic Spain, and again promulgated his doctrine. Alcuin, who had been summoned to take a part in the controversy, endeavoured to win him over by a friendly epistle ; but Felix regarded the subject of the controversy as too important, and thus it was carried on in r his writings, f The Spanish bishops interceded for Felix with' the Emperor, and applied for a new investigation. J In consequence Charles * Alcuinus adv. Elipandum, i. c. 16. Acta Concilii Romani 799, Mansi, xiii. 1031. f Alcuini Libellus adv. Hseresin Felicis ad Abbates et Monachos Gothise Missus. Opp. Ale. i. pars. ii. 759. Ep. ad Feiicem, p. 783. + The letter is in Alcuin’s Works, ii. v. 567. THE CONTROVERSY RESPECTING PREDESTINATION. 447 called a second Synod at Frankfort-on-the-Maine, in a.d. 794, which again decided against Felix,* and since the Adop- tionists had spread themselves even as far as France, the Emperor sent a commission of three persons into those parts in order to oppose them. Felix came with them and was prevailed upon to appear before the Synod at Aachen (Aix), a.d. 799. After Alcuin had disputed with him for a long time, Felix declared himself to lie convinced. He made a recantation in Spain ;f yet he was not altogether trusted, and was placed under the oversight of Leidead, bishop of Lyons. He could not at once give up a dogmatic tendency, which was so deeply rooted ; he still was always inclined to Agnoetism, and after his death a series of questions was found which showed that he firmly adhered to his fundamental views. Agobard, Leidrad’s successor, was induced on this account to write a treatise against Adoptionism. This important controversy passed away without leaving a trace of its existence, §ince the theological life of the age was not suited for a new investigation of questions which were believed to have been decided long before. Since the reaction of so important a theological tendency could not again assert its claims, this was an omen of new reactions following. C. THE CONTROVERSY RESPECTING PREDESTINATION. Jacob. Usserii, Gottescalci et Pr®destinatian® Controversi® ab eo Mot® Histori® : Dubl. 1631, 4to. Gilberti Mauguini, Vett. Autorum, qui Seculo Nono de Praedestinatione et Gratia Scripterunt, Opp. et Fragmenta : Par. 1650, t. 2, 4to.; t. ii. Dissert. Historica et Chronica Gotteschalcan® Controversi®. Ludov. Cellotii Historia Gotteschalci Pr®destinatiani: Par. 1655. Jo. J. Hotteu- geri Diatribe Histor. Theol. qua Predestinatianam et Gotteschalci Pseudo- H®reses Commenta esse Demonstratur: Tig. 1710, 4to. The Augustinian system had so far triumphed over Pela- gianism and Seini-Pelagianism, that the doptrine of Gratia praveniens , and its anthropological presuppositions were received; but not that of Gratia irresistibilis and absolute Predestination. The consequence of this was, that in later times, and even in the ninth century, admission was found among theologians, not, indeed, for the Semi-Pelagian ten¬ dency, but for the milder construction of the Augustinian doctrine, corresponding to its development in the book de vocatione gentium. Hence we may see how it was possible * Mansi, xiii. 863. 4 Confessio Fidei Felicis, Mansi, xiii. 1035. US THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. for the more rigorous form to excite a reaction, and to descry in the milder, Pelagianism or Semi-Pelagianism. This reaction proceeded from Gottschalk, a monk, of Saxon origin, in the monastery of Orbais, in the diocese of Soissons. From his youth he had occupied himself with dogmatic speculations, especially with the Augustinian ; and had adopted this system, with all its consequences. His ideas coincided with his interest for religious truth. He could imagine no true conception of the divine will, of humility and resignation, except in the system of Augustin. He expressed himself more strongly in opposition to the milder view than even Augustin. While Augustin generally applied the term Predestination to those who were appointed to salvation ; but distinguished the rest of mankind as the prmsciti and reprobati, Gottschalk taught a prcedestinatio duplex of the good to salvation, and of the ungodly to damnation; in this phraseology he copied Fulgentius of Ruspe. He applied the idea of Predestination, both to the benejicia gratia and the judicia justifies. It was an object of prime importance with him, to maintain that the divine decrees are unchangeable, and that nothing'in them can be altered by human caprice; for in God Foreknowledge and Willing are the same. Least of all could he allow that the reprobate could alter anything in the divine decrees. Unless this were admitted, it would be unreasonable and idle to say that God had destined the reprobate to the punishment of eternal death. His language appears to lead to Supralapsarianism, and, in this case, he would have diverged from Augustin ; but his representations do not necessarily involve so much ; for when he speaks of God’s knowledge and Predestination, he refers only to what is positive : evil he regards as negative, as properly nothing. Nothing, indeed, is really altered by the view he takes ; but it is doubtful how far he clearly saw the consequences of these speculations. In fact, he always set out from the premises of Augustin, that through the first man’s trangression, all mankind fell into condemna¬ tion, and that God, in accordance with his justice, left one part of mankind to this condemnation, and predestinated them to it, and, in accordance with his mercy, predestinated the other part to eternal life. He was earnestly desirous to announce his doctrine publicly, and to procure the general GOTTSCHALK AND RABANUS. 449 acceptance of the Augustinian system, in opposition to the prevailing views of his age, which he regarded as Pelagian. On his return from a pilgrimage to Rome, a.d. 847, he met, at Count Eberhard’s of Friuli, with the newly-elected bishop Notting of Verona, and there laid before him his doctrine of the prcddestincitio duplex. This excited attention, and a person of note, Rabanus Maurus, Archbishop of Mentz,* wrote letters against it. He examined it, not with¬ out prejudice and a certain asperity, in which, perhaps, he indulged a personal feeling against Gottschalk. The latter, when a child, had been placed in the monastery of Fulda, as an oblatus, of which Rabanus was at that time Abbot. Monastic life was not agreeable to his free spirit; he wished to leave it, and obtained a favourable decision from a synod, which had been reversed, through the influence of Rabanus with the Emperor Lewis. Upon this, Gottschalk left Fulda, and betook himself to Orbais; a step which, perhaps, offended Rabanus. Yet we are not warranted to admit this statement as certainly true ; and whatever per¬ sonal feeling might exist, a Christian interest was mingled with it. He accused Gottschalk + of holding the doctrine that the divine predetermination acted compulsorily upon men, so that if any one wished to be saved, he would labour in vain, unless he were predestinated. This doctrine w'ould drive some to presumption and others to despair. But in reference to the first point, Rabanus imputed con¬ sequences to Gottschalk which he had never granted ; for, like Augustin, he had supposed the sanctifying operations of grace as a necessary intermediate link for fulfilling the decree of Predestination, and could therefore say, that wher¬ ever there was true faith and piety, it was the effect of grace. Rabanus, in reference to the wicked, distinguished between prescience and predestination ; he made assertions which were at variance with absolute predestination, that God wished the salvation of all men, and that Christ died for all. But it is not clear, that he expressed and granted the consequences, which were founded on these expressions ; for he never ventured to regard the impartation of grace and appointment to salvation as conditioned by man, but traced * Mauguin. i. 1, 3. 4 Rabani Epistola Synodalis ad Hincinarum, Mansi xiv 914. 450 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. everything to the divine causality. He inquires how it happens that some children are baptized, and others are not, and answers : Argue like Paul, or set him right when he says that God does all things in mercy and justice. He makes use of the secret decrees of God. His standpoint, therefore, is not irreconcilably opposed to that of Gotts- chalk. Gottschalk, conscious of maintaining the original and pure doctrine, appeared a.d. 848 at Mentz, before a council, over which Rabanus presided. His doctrine was condemned, and he was sent to Hinkmar, Archbishop of Rheims. This prelate allowed him to defend himself before a council at Chiersy* * * § a.d. 848. As he refused to recant, he was scourged, and condemned to imprisonment for life. In his confinement, he composed two confessions of faith,t and remained so firmly convinced of the truth of his doctrine, that he offered to submit to an ordeal, not as if he believed that he could work a miracle, but in the assurance, that if it were necessary, God would work one for his cause. On his death-bed, he desired to partake of the Lord’s Supper. Hinkmar refused his request, except on the condition of his recanting; and he died without it peacefully, after twenty years’ imprisonment. Not only sympathy at his fate, but also interest in the Augustinian doctrine, called forth vindicators of Gottschalk ; of these the most noted were Prcjdentius, Bishop of Troyes, J Ratramnus, a monk of Corby,§ and Servatus Lupus, Abbot of Ferrieres; the last was the most distinguished, clear, logical, and temperate. He had been connected at an earlier period with Gottschalk, and had endeavoured to moderate his speculations; he wrote to him not to trouble himself any further with such unprofitable questions, but to examine the Holy Scriptures with humility. He now composed his work, de tribus qu(Rstionibus ,\| namely (i.), concerning Free Will. (ii.) The twofold Predestination. (iii.) Whether Christ died for all, or onlv for the elect. He was an enthu- siastic adherent to the Augustinian doctrine, knew its im- * Mansi, xiv. 919. + Mauguin, i. 1, 7. X Prudentii Trecassini Epistola ad Hincmarum Rhemensera et Pardulum Laudunensem, in Cellot. p. 425. § De Prcedestinatione, libb. 2. Mauguin, i. 1 , 27. 1! Mauguin, i. 2. 9. SERVATUS LUPUS. 451 portance for the Christian consciousness, and pointed out the striking contrast between the peculiar Christian standpoint of humility and the ancient standpoint of self-sufficiency: the motto of the latter was sibi quisque spes; of the former, cuique Deus vera spes. He also derives the need of grace not from the Fall, but from the general relation of the creature to God. “ Must not the first man,” he asks, “ have needed the help of Him who is the life of the soul?” As he maintained, with Gottschalk, that Christ died only for the elect, he was much perplexed to explain Paul’s language: “ God willeth all men to be saved.” This could only be understood in a limited sense; it could refer only to real believers, or to all kinds of men, Jews and Heathens. In a certain sense, it might be said that Christ died for all who received the same sacraments. Since to many it seemed to detract from the dignity of the Redeemer, not to maintain the universality of Redemption, he declared that he was ready to waive the question, and would be satisfied, if it were said, that all will be redeemed whom God wills to be redeemed. Every one must adhere to the Scriptures, and to that which the Spirit reveals to him; for since we all have only one heavenly doctrine, why should we wish to find anything that is peculiar? He combats the notion of conditioning Predes¬ tination by Prescience, which was received by some who gave the dogma in this form—God predestinated those whom he foreknew would be pious. He also took notice of the practical objections against absolute Predestination. Some one might say, Why should I not give myself up to my lusts, if I am destined to perdition ? But, he rejoined, no Christian will reckon himself among the lost; far be it from him that he should doubt his own conversion, and the inexpressible grace of God. He refers to the connexion of Predestination and Sanctification, and to the Objective in the grace of Redemp¬ tion, and in baptism, which all have received. Who has ever placed all his hope in God, and not obtained the forgiveness of his sins ? If every one must condemn himself, let him take his refuge from an offended God in a reconciled God. The above objection proceeds from a love of sin, and those who are animated by it plunge into despair. Attacked by opponents of such eminence, Hinkmar sought to gain advo¬ cates, and found one in John Scotus, who was little fitted to be G G 2 452 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. a defender of orthodoxy in that age. # He wrote a treatise, de Prcedestinatione.^ The solution of the question is derived from the principles of his philosophical and theological system; but as this treatise is, in many points, not fully developed, it must be taken in connexion with his principal work. His opinion is—we can only speak in an improper or figurative sense of a divine foreknowledge and predestination; since for God there is no time; consciousness and knowledge, in a proper sense, can never be ascribed to him. All this belongs to the ^soXoyta xar^anx?]. For God there is no Evil; he is only the cause of Good.J When all things are viewed in connexion, everything is necessary for the harmony of the whole. Evil only arises through detached contempla¬ tion. It carries its own punishment along with it; hence it lies in every sin, in this life it is still hidden, but manifest in the life to come. Proper punishment consists in estrange¬ ment from God—all punishment is grounded in this. Ac¬ cordingly, in his treatise, de divisione naturae, he maintains that everything which the Bible says of Hell, is only a figurative description of spiritual suffering. In the other * Mauguin, i. 1, 103. Opp. ed. Floss, p. 347. t De Praedestin. ix. 5.—Eodem modo Deus vidit, prasvidit, scivit, praescivit omnia facienda, priusquam fierent, quo videt et scit eadem, postquam facta sunt, quoniam sicut ipse semper eeternus est, ita universitas quam fecit, semper in ipso aeterna est. 6. Quo jure potest dici praedestinatio, i. e. praeparatio in eo, qui nullo temporis intervallo praecessit, quo disponeret ea, quae facturus esset, cujus operationem non praecedit praeparatio. Non enim aliud ei est praeparare et operari. Quo modo autem facturus esset aliquid, qui omnia semel et simul fecit ?—Nec tamen in illo fuerunt, nec futura sunt, sed tantummodo sunt et omnia unum sunt. Proinde, quoniam aliter sub illo sunt ea, quae per ilium facta sunt, aliter in eo sunt ea, quae ipse est in eis quae sub illo sunt, quia locis temporibusque suis et creata et ordinata sunt, proprie hunt. verba locorum temporumque significativa, in eis vero, quae eterna liber in illo sunt, translative proferri possuDt.— [Jacobi ] J C. x. 4.—Quis non videat, nisi qui sensu caret, totum, quod dicitur peccatum, ejusque consequentias in morte atque miseria constitutas, nihil aliud esse, quam integrae vitae beataeque corruptiones ? ita ut singula singulis opponantur, integritati quidem peccatum, vitae mors, beatitudini miseria. Ilia sunt, ista penitus non sunt; ilia sursum versus appetunt unum omnium prineipium, ista deserunt, deorsumque in nihilum bona, quae corrumpunt, redere contendunt; illorum causa Deus est, utorum nulla; ilia intra terminos naturalium formarum intelliguutur, ista in eorum defectu atque privatione nesciendo utuntur. — [Jacobi.] JOHN SCOTUS. 453 work he adheres more closely to the Church doctrine ; he is willing to allow that a sensible fire is meant, but this, in itself, is not the cause of suffering ; only in virtue of the subjective character of the ungodly is it the ground of their sufferings. All Evil is a stage in the development of good, and hence the last end of the development is the return of all to God. “ If the visible fire,” he says, “ wherever it is kindled, always tends upwards, and can be kept down by nothing, how can the spiritual flame of the rational nature in man be kept down for ever?” His doctrine, therefore, leads to an universal predestination. In his doctrine of Grace, he does not deviate from the Augustinian system, to which the connexion of his own doctrine is related by a neces sary process of development. Verbally, he aims at main taining Free Will; he distinguishes for this purpose the idea of power and of freedom. As a man in the thickest darkness still retains the power of seeing, but does not really see till the light comes from without, so the Will of Man always has the power of being good, though corrupted by original sin and his own sin, and surrounded by darkness ; but he cannot attain to the exercise of this power till the light of grace cures the infirm will. He calls natural freedom the desire for hap¬ piness implanted in the rational nature ( appetitus beatitu - dinis naturaliter insitus), which can find its satisfaction in God alone. By such a development little assistance was rendered to Hinkmar. New opponents came forward and took advantage of these weak points. In order to call in the aid of ecclesias¬ tical authority he held, a.d. 853, a second synod at Chiersy, at which four propositions were drawn up against the doctrine of Gottschalk.^ Hinkmar set out from the Augustinian doctrine, that by Adam’s sin men were become a massa per - ditionis, that the ground on which some attained salvation, and others not, was simply to be sought for in the divine predestination. He maintained that God in consequence of his justice had predestined punishment to sinners, but he would not say with Gottschark that God has predestined them to punishment. So far he controverts the doctrine of the pr&destinatio duplex. The principal difference lay in his asserting that God wills that all men should be saved ;—that * Hincmar. De Prsedestinatione, c. 2. 454 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. some will be saved, is the gift of divine grace—that others are lost is owing to their demerit; Christ suffered for all; whoever does not appropriate these sufferings has himself to blame. To this milder representation the stricter Party pre¬ sented in opposition six doctrinal articles at the Council *of Yalence.* They maintained the twofold Predestination, but guarded against God’s being the author of Sin or predestinating any one to Evil The doctrine of general Redemption was rejected ; redemption, indeed, applied to all the baptized, yet only some of these attained to salvation, because through the grace of God they remained faithful in their redemption. Yet this party endeavoured to avoid what would violate the moral feelings. They might indeed have been well agreed had they not been so ready to lose sight of thoughts, while occupied about formulas, and if they had ^ot over the want of clearness, caused by defect of dialectic skill. The difference was not settled, and so both phases of doctrine passed over into the following Age. As John Scotus enlarged the extent of Redemption to the length of universal Restoration, some other isolated traces were to be found of this opinion. It was reached from two points. The thought suggested itself to Missionaries of Christianity among the Heathen, How could it consist with the love of God and Redemption that all these heathen should be lost ? That Clement, who came into Germany from an Irish monastery and was opposed bv Boniface, must have maintained, as he was charged by him, that Christ in the descensus ad inferos had redeemed not merely the Old Testament Saints, but also others.f Or the revived study of the classical authors might have led them to reflect on this question. Servatus Lupus speaks of one Probus who taught Grammar in the monastery at Fulda, and broached the opinion that Cicero, Yirgil, and all the better heathens were taken into the fellowship of the elect, since Christ had not shed his blood in vain.j; * Mansi, xv. 1. t Bonifacii, Epp. 135; Serrar. 39, Wurdtw.—Qui contra fidem sanctorum contendit dicens : quod Christus filius Dei descendens ad inferos, omnes qiios inferni career detinuit, inde liberasset, credulos et incredulos, laudatores Dei simul et cultores idolorum; et raulta alia horribilia de prsedestinatione Dei contraria fidei catholicse affirmat f Neander’s Ck. Hist. vi. 3S' THE ORIENTAL CHURCH. 455 d. THE DOCTRINE OF THE LORD’S SUPPER AND THE CONTROVERSIES RESPECTING IT. We have already remarked, that, up to this period, various shades of sentiment on the relation of the Body and Blood of Christ to the outward signs might co-exist, but that by this time the predominant sensuous realistic element operated with increasing force on the development of this doctrine. Under this influence, and because the religious consciousness directed itself only to the supernatural presence of Christ, the representation of the miracle of Transubstantiation was formed. THE ORIENTAL CHURCH. The antagonism of spiritual tendencies, which traversed one another in the controversy on Images, could also exert its in¬ fluence on the doctrine of the Supper. Had the opponents of Images proceeded to greater lengths they would have come into open collision with the doctrine of the Church. At a council held by this class of persons under Constantine Copronymus, a statement was also made regarding the Supper ; for the Image which Christ made of himself in the Supper and had instituted as a means of keeping him in remembrance, was set in oppo¬ sition to all other images. A distinction was made between the Image and the proper Body of Christ. The Image insti¬ tuted by Christ himself corresponded to the natural Body of Christ, since in virtue of its consecration it became like that, a Bearer of Divine Life. It is difficult to obtain distinct ideas from such tumid phraseology ; yet this thought appears to be at the basis of it, that as the Body of Christ had life through the indwelling fulness of the divine Logos, so a divine power is imparted to the bread by the immediate operation of the Logos. The party of the Image-worshippers opposed this representation. At the second Nicene Council,* a.d. 787, it was expressly denied that the Bread could be called an Image of the Body, for after consecration it was no mere Image, but rather in a proper sense the Body of Christ.f John of Damascus expresses himself, in agreement with them, having been guided in his views by a passage already quoted from Gregory of Nyssa. The Bread and Wine are noi * Mansi, xii., xiii. t Actio 6. 456 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. merely an Image of the Body of Christ. The Body of Christ is that which was born of the Virgin Mary ; not that it descended from Heaven, but the bread and wine were changed into the Body and Blood of Christ. The immediate miraculous operation of the Logos here produces the body of Christ in a new mode. As Christ partook of food while on earth, and nourishment by such means became changed into his body, so this now takes place in believers by an immediate miracle. He thus expresses himself—One nature is not here, but two, which may mean that there are two substances, the Bread and Wine, and the Body and Blood of Christ. But he really meant to say, that the divine Logos is connected not immediately with the Bread and Wine, but mediately through the Body of Christ.* THE WESTERN CHURCH. Here the different views held on this subject appear wit! greater decision. Paschasius Radbert, abbot of the monas¬ tery of Corbie, was an adherent of the strictest Supranaturalistn. He had already proved himself to be such in a dispute with RATRAMNUsf on the birth of Christ. His fundamental prin¬ ciple is,—that as the Will of God is the cause of the whole Creation, so also it continues to be the only cause of all the changes in it. In this light he presents the doctrine of the Supper.| He sees in it the culmination of miracles. He impugns those who say that by this Sacrament only the soul is nourished, that there is only a spiritual communion with Christ, and maintains on the contrary, that Christ comes into corporeal connexion with our Body which he has also redeemed. By means of the consecration of the Priest, God, through his all-powerful Word, creates the true body and blood of Christ out of the substance of the bread and wine. The change goes on in secret, in order not to alarm our senses, and the colour and taste of bread and wine remain, although the substance is changed. This was connected with Radbert’s scheme that he regarded the religious point of view r in the Lord’s Supper not only subjectively but also objectively as alone valid. The Natural was supposed to vanish entirely, since it was of no value for the religious feeling. Not merely internally was the * ticBtmQ, 4, 13. + D’Achery, Spicilegium, part 1. t De Sacramento Corporis et Sanguinis Christi. RADRERT AND RATRAMNUS. 457 body of Christ enjoyed, but the spiritualized senses received truly the very body of Christ. We recognise here the charac¬ ter of this view, that the outward world was altogether spirit¬ ualized by the inner world, and from this arose the idea of Transubstantiation. But the harsh representation of Paschasius did not remain without contradiction from various quarters. A monk, Frude- gard, opposed him by citing various passages from Augustin. Paschasius was obliged to allow that many persons had doubt on this subject, though he could appeal in favour of the anti¬ quity of his doctrine to legends which certainly required some 'time for their formation. Many indeed had not the spiritual views of Augustin who yet did not like the coarse expressions of Paschasius ; even Rabanus Maurus found them offensive.* As Paschasius, about a.d. 844, prepared a second edition of his book, and dedicated it to Charlemagne, this monarch was induced to ask the opinion of several eminent theologians upon it, among others, Ratramnus, who took this occasion to write his treatise de corpore et sanguine Domini .f There were tw T o ^questions which he set himself to investigate : 1st. Whether the participation of the body and blood of Christ was some¬ thing spiritual, which could only be perceived by the eye of faith, or whether the bodily senses perceived without a veil what the spiritual eye inwardly beheld. Paschasius had indeed not asserted such a visible sensuous presence, but Ratramnus w r as of opinion, that this was necessarily involved in his doctrine ; he offered him this dilemma, either the out¬ ward signs are merely for faith, are an image of Christ’s body, or if an outward change takes place this must be perceptible to the senses. Hence, if the body of Christ be really in the Supper, it must be also visible; if it be not visible, then there is not a sensible body of Christ, but only the spiritual; conse¬ quently only a spiritual participation. 2nd. Whether it is the same body of Christ in which, as Paschasius maintains, he was born, and suffered, and ascended to Heaven. The doc¬ trine of Ratramnus was as follows ; the body of Christ is not present as an object of sense, but only for faith ; it is not there in relation to the outward appearance, but only in rela¬ tion to its spiritual power. He appeals to the ancient custom * Rabani Mauri Ep. ad. Heribaldum Episo. Antissidor. c. 33. t Ed. Jac. Boileau, Par. 1712. 458 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. of mingling water and wine at the Supper. As the water was regarded as an emblem of the Church, and the wine as an emblem of Christ, he infers that if the Water is an emblem of the Church then is the Wine only an emblem of the body of Christ. Besides, he supports his view by John vi., which he explains spiritually. He thinks that only a spiritual com¬ munion with Christ can be effected by the Supper. The Word of God, which is the invisible bread, is ours in that Sacrament; he imparts himself invisibly to believers and animates their souls. Faith is the only organ by which the Spiritual and the Divine can be received. The Bread and Wine represent to faith Christ with his body and blood. A sanctifying influence proceeds from the outward signs,—for as far as the body and blood of Christ are represented to Faith will the Man be placed in communion with him by the bread and wine. Hence, Ratramnus wished properly to say : The bread and wine are the vehicle through which by means of the excite¬ ment of the religious consciousness the supernatural com¬ munion of Christ for the sanctification of men is imparted. But yet in the expression, conversio panis et vini in carnem et sanguinem Christi, he allies himself to the other party, which may be explained from his inability to separate the objective from the subjective. Since the bread and wine after consecra¬ tion produce an effect upon the soul which they could not of themselves, he transfers this to the bread and wine ; thev become something higher, he thinks, because they produce a higher effect. We have yet to notice the difference between these two writers, in the representation of the Supper as a Sacrifice. Paschasius firmly held the opinion, that though Christ had redeemed the world once by his sufferings, yet he is daily offered for us in a mystical manner, since human infirmity still continues after baptism. On the contrary, Ratramnus maintained that the bread and wine are to bring Christ to our remembrance : but when we have attained to beholding Christ himself we shall no more need such a memento of his infinite love. Paschasius defended his view in his commentary on Matt. xii. 14 : “ What would be the difference between the Jewish and Christian standpoints,” he asks, “if in the Supper all was typical and not real ?” John Scotus is also said to have written a book on this con JOHN SCOTUS ON THE LORD'S SUPPER. 459 troversy at the desire of Charles the Bald. Only these words from it are known to us by quotations in other writers : the Sacrament of the Altar is a similitude), jigura, pignus of the body and blood of the Lord. In modern times it has been questioned, particularly by Lauf, whether Scotus ever wrote such a book, and this supposition has been explained on the ground that the work of Ratramnus has been ascribed to Scotus. Lauf* has shown that this was a fact, yet it is not clear that the whole account of a treatise by Scotus on this subject, is unfounded. It is not improbable that the opinion of Scotus on this important question would be sought for, on account of his great reputation. Hinkmar of Rheims, a contemporary, who was well acquainted with the position of the different parties, ascribes to Scotus as an error respecting the doctrine of the Supper,f that it was memoria veri corporis et sanguinis Christi. What the view of Scotus really was, is after all evident from his work De divisione natures. He taught, like some of the Greek Fathers, that the glorified body of Christ by its union with the divinity was freed from the defects of a sensuous nature. He impugned those who said that the body of Christ after the Resurrection occupied a limited space somewhere, and maintained a ubiquity of the glorified body. In accordance with this opinion he denied the doctrine of Transubstantiation, and admitted a spiritual participation at the Supper. He made the presence of Christ at the Supper not a presence of a peculiar kind, but a symbol of Christ everywhere present to believers. As in the thirteenth century we can recognise the general influence of the system of Scotus in that of Amalrich, so perhaps a trace of his view of this doctrine may be found in it. In the age immediately succeeding, the spiritual view continually gave way to the power of the predominant sensuous tendency. A trace of the former is found about a.d. 950, among a number of the clergy, with whom Odo, archbishop of Canterbury, disputed, and who maintained that the Bread and Wine remained after Consecration the same substance as before, and were only an image of the body and blood of Christ, not the real body.J Gerbert on the other hand, defended the doctrine of Pascha- * Theol Stud u. Krit. 1828. + Hincmar. De Prsedestinatione, c. 31. f Mabillon Analecta Yett. t. i. p. 207. 460 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. sius, in his treatise De corpore et sanguine Domini. Between the two views was a third, which was intended to maintain the doctrine of the true body and blood of Christ without approving the harsh expressions of Paschasius. With the revival of a more spiritual tendency in the eleventh century these conflicting views were promulgated still more strongly. Berengarius is the representative of the more spiritual mode of thought. Probably the more indefinite language of his teacher Fulbert led him to further reflection. Arguments both from Scripture and. Reason appeared to him to speak against Transubstantiation. He studied Augustin and other Fathers, and found in them much that was opposed to it. Being thus confirmed in his views, he hoped to obtain a hearing from his friend Lanfranc, prior in the monastery of Bee. He expressed his surprise* that he should approve the doctrine of Paschasius, and urged him to a joint investi¬ gation of the subject. But this letter arrived when Lanfranc was absent at Rome; it was sent after him, but was opened before it reached him, and brought under the notice of Leo IX. The doctrine was discussed in a Synod at Rome, a.d. 1050; Lanfranc came forward as an opponent of Beren¬ garius, whose doctrine was condemned as heretical, and he was excommunicated. Yet Leo consented to renew the dis¬ cussion and cited him before a Synod at Vercelli, a.d. 1050. Meanwhile he had been put in prison by his enemies in France, and was thus unable to comply with. the citation. At this Synod no one dared to utter a word on his behalf, and his book was committed to the flames. Yet Berengarius obtained protection from some patrons of eminence, among whom was Eusebius Bruno, bishop of Angers. While the clamour against him was still violent, Cardinal Hildebrand came to France, conversed with Berengarius himself, and was con¬ vinced that he did not deny in every sense, that the bread and wine after consecration were the body and blood of Christ. At the Council of Tours, a.d. 1054, he succeeded in satisfying the assembly with a general confession on the subject which Berengarius made. He designed to have taken him to Rome, but was prevented at that time. Berengarius had the courage to go there of his own accord, a.d. 1059, in order to silence his opponents by the authority of Pope Nicholas II. * Letter to Lanfranc, in Mansi, xix. 768. BERENGARIUS. 461 But he found himself deceived; the party of blind zealots were too powerful there, and he did not possess the boldness to avow his convictions in the prospect of death. In a Synod held at Rome, a confession drawn up by Cardinal Gumbert was proposed to him, from which the spiritual view of the Supper was designedly expunged ; the body of Christ (it said) was touched by the hands of the Priest, and masticated by the teeth of believers. He subscribed it: but on his return to France, retracted his assent, and ventured to call the doctrine of Paschasius a vecordia vulgi. When Gregory VII. had ascended the Papal throne, and the affair was every day assuming a more important aspect, he summoned Beren¬ garius to Rome, certainly with the design to procure repose for him. First of all,* he induced him to make a confession similar to that at Tours, and used every means in his power to make persons satisfied with it. He was obliged to remain a long time at Rome, but the party opposed to him were more active than ever; they even began to cast suspicions on Gre¬ gory himself, and hence he resolved to sacrifice the cause of truth to political considerations. Berengarius, who had been previously alarmed by reports of a threatened imprisonment for life, was obliged to appear before a new Synod, and confess that he had been in error. His opponents were satisfied, and he was dismissed on friendly terms by the Pope. But he was convinced that nothing could any longer be effected by his contradiction of that doctrine. He withdrew into solitude filled with sorrow for his recantation. As to the doctrine of Berengarius, he opposed Transubstantiation on the grounds of Reason and Holy Scripture. The words of consecration showed plainly that the bread and wine were still present. If a transmutation were admitted, then he who is emphatically the Truth, must be chargeable with deception and falsehood. A transmutation, in which the outward signs of bread and wine must be left behind without the substance would be absurd and contrary to the divine laws of Nature. The words * Acta Concilii Romani ab ipso Berengario Conscripta, Mansi, xix. 761. + Lanfranci de Eucharistise Sacramento contra Berengarium Liber. Bibl. Patr. Lugd. t. xviii. 763. Berengarii De Sacra Ccena adv. Lan- francum Liber, discovered in the Wolfenbuttle Library by Lessing. Werke, xii. p. 143, ed. 1825; first published by A. F. and F. Th. Vischer, Berlin, 1834. 462 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. of consecration are to be understood figuratively ; the Bread and Wine represent the Body and Blood of Christ, as in other passages Christ is called a Rock, a Corner-stone, a Lamb. He denied the proper, bodily presence of Christ in every sense ; Christ descends not from Heaven, but believers are raised by him to Heaven. Yet he maintained that the true body of Christ is present, but in a spiritual manner, and partaken of by the inner man in a spiritual manner. His view very much resembles that of Ratramnus ; he regards the Bread and Wine as the vehicle by which the body and blood of Christ is pre¬ sented to believers, and they are placed in communion with Christ. This he transferred objectively to the Bread and Wine itself. They exert an influence which according to their natural qualities they could not effect. Their value and efficiency are augmented by the power of God, as far as virtue is imparted to them for such an operation. The expres¬ sions sacramentum, consecrare , denote a consecration which elevates what is common to something higher, but does not annihilate. He says the Bread and Wine are the true Body and Blood of Christ, for there is no other Body ; but he understood this metonymically, inasmuch as for believers the Bread and Wine is the same as the Body and Blood of Christ. He appeals to the fact that the glorified body of Christ will not be seen again on earth till his second Advent, and is now only present to faith. It would be blasphemous to assert that this body had come down to Earth. He rejected the legends of Pasohasius as derogatory from Christ’s dignity. He also did not sanction the representation of a repeated sacrifice ; he says we only commemorate the one sacrifice of Christ. The view of Berengarius is diametrically opposite to that of Lanfranc and others, who advocated Transubstantiation. In the meantime between the two there w r as another representa¬ tion which was held by Eusebius Bruno, bishop of Angers. He had seen with pleasure that Berengarius had been allowed to retire in peace, but he did not entirely agree with him. He had been appointed an arbitrator in a dispute of Beeengarius with several of the clergy, and declared him¬ self, in a remarkable letter,* against both sides. In these inquiries, he said, we ought not to appeal to the Fathers but * Compare with this letter, that of Berengarius to Eusebius Bruno. Sudendorf. Ep. 12. THE SCHOLASTIC AGE. 463 adhere to the Holy Scriptures, and abide most of all by the simple words that the Bread and Wine are the true Body and Blood of Christ. He remarks that in this respect he agreed with Hildebrand. In fact, the conduct of the latter indicated as much. Yet this view would appear more clearly if a frag¬ ment of a comment on Matthew,* which was ascribed to a Master Hildebrand, proceeded from him; but this is not quite certain. The doctrine of Transubstantiation came forth victorious from this controversy, and met with still more general acknow¬ ledgment in the following Period. THE SECOND PERIOD. THE SCHOLASTIC AGE. FROM GREGORY THE GREAT TO THE REFORMATION. Bossuet, continued by Cramer, v. 2; vi., vii. Tiedemann, Geist der Specula- tuien Philosophic, iv. v. Geschichte der Philosoph. v. Tennemann, viii. v. Ritter, vii. viii. Christliche Philos, iii. iv. v. Cousin, Ouvrages Inedits d’Abelard, Introduction, Par. 1836. The great importance which attaches to this Period in the History of Dogmas, consists in the fact, that Catholicism was the animating principle in its great developments. It was indebted chiefly to Scholasticism for the maturing of its System. The transmutation of the kingdom of God into an ecclesiastical Theocracy, after the germ had been once im¬ planted, was continually developed till it experienced its logical completion in the entire structure of the Papacy. As such a theocracy, the Church claimed the right of deter¬ mining and controlling all other culture, every department of moral and religious development. Since the Church aimed at exalting itself above the State, it required all secular culture, particularly the newly awakened philosophic mode of thought, to be subordinated to it. One of the characteristics of the * Published by Allix in the Preface to Johannis Parisiensis, Deter- minatio de Modo Existendi Corp. Christi in Sacramento Altar., London, 1686. 464 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. Age was the mixture of the theological and the philosophical interests under the predominance of the former, and as in the Middle Ages we remark many reactions of political power against the Church, so we also find philosophical reactions against Theology, till the latter gained the Victory. Exactly in this lies the peculiar nature of mediaeval culture. It is evident, of what importance was this great phase of the deve¬ lopment of Christianity, as the form in which its blessings were to be conveyed to the human race in order to train it to maturity, and in which apart of Christendom is still involved. Hence the knowledge of this period is very important for Pro¬ testant Theology. What has been expressed at a later period as the antagonism of Catholicism against Protestantism, is nothing else than what already existed in the Scholasticism of this age. The modern Catholic standpoint is easily idealized in a false manner if its formation during this period is not understood. Hence in order to discern and to combat the corruptions of pure Christianity which it contains, it is neces¬ sary to understand the utmost extent of the mediEeval develop¬ ment. Even the Reformation cannot be understood without this knowledge ; for it was the reaction of the Christian conscious¬ ness striving after freedom as opposed to the concealment of the Gospel, which was consequentially effected. The collective Polemic in the first Confessional writings of the Reformation has reference to Scholastic Dogmas, and is only to be under¬ stood along with the doctrines it impugns. Yet, in another respect, this History of the form of Christian doctrine is im¬ portant. If in the earlier ages we have seen the process of development in the form of classical Antiquity, so here we behold it in the form more akin to our own, that of German culture, the ground-work of all that has existed since. Many tendencies and contrarieties of modern times meet us in Scholasticism; many controversies which are still developing must be traced to this period for their seminal principle. In the scholastic dogmas there was not only the systematizing of the Catholic dogmas, but the Christian truth, both in dogmatics and morals, was in many points more deeply grounded and systematically built up by the great minds of this age, so that in these two departments of knowledge we may still learn much from those distinguished thinkers. Leibnitz formed a more correct estimate of them, and in THE SCHOLASTIC AGE. 465 modern times we have begun to contemplate this great intel¬ lectual Creation with greater impartiality. The Scholastic development of Dogmas forms one great whole, which is marked by the various stages of a beginning, middle, and end; the first section reaches from the end of the eleventh to the end of the twelfth Century, the time of its rise; the thirteenth, and a part of the fourteenth century, forms the time of its prime; and then it suffered a gradual decline down to the Reformation. THE FIRST SECTION OF THE SCHOLASTIC AGE. FROM THE ELEVENTH TO THE END OF THE TWELFTH CENTURY. GENERAL HISTORY OF DOGMAS. In modern times it has been debated from what point we should date the beginning of the Scholastic Age. Ritter, who deserves credit for the attention he has paid to it, sets the beginning farther back. We may easily come to an under¬ standing on this point. It is certainly true that even in the ninth century there were movements in Dialectics, which were only checked by the rudeness of the following age, and they are to be placed in connexion with the scholastic development of dogmas. But this later scholastic period differs essentially from all that preceded it. * In the Carolingian age the ten¬ dency of the dialectic spirit was far behind that of the prac¬ tical and the historical. We have already remarked that John Scotus is not to be regarded as the commencement of Scholasticism. Philosophy had not in Scholasticism the lead¬ ing position which he assigned to it, but was the cmcilla of Theology. Hence we place the commencement of Scholasti¬ cism at the end of the eleventh century. In reference to the name, Ritter decides that it is too indefinite, and that in reference to Philosophy, it should have the designation of Mediaeval. The name is not of great importance; it is cer- H H 466 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. tainly indefinite, but yet it has acquired a definiteness by his torical use. Scholasticus was in this age the designation of the learned man , the Scholar , so we find it used in a letter of Benedict of Aniane.* As the name denotes the peculiar scientific tendency of the Middle Ages, it may also serve to distinguish the corresponding form of Dogmatics. It was significant, that in the consciousness of the general want of culture, there was during the eleventh Century a wide-spread apprehension of the impending end of the world; it contained a foreboding that a new life would break forth. Manifold beginnings, and symptoms of a religious revival might be perceived, and still it was doubtful what direction they would take. The enthusiasm with which the call to the Crusades was received, the wide-spread feeling of Penitence which proceeded from the consciousness of decadence, were signs of this renovation. This state of mind prepared for the Crusades, and they reacted upon it by imparting to men’s minds a religious elevation. Contemporaneously, from the twelfth Century, the monastic orders extended themselves with fresh pow'er. The monks went about as preachers of repentance, and deeply agitated their hearers ; multitudes were seized with contrition. Under such an excitement many became inclined to a monastic life, and embraced its solitude, while others took up arms for Christianity. Every great undertaking at that time easily found persons ready to com¬ bine in its behalf; hence associations for the erection of im¬ mense Churches, and societies among the laity for the support of the Poor, and the like. To this we may add, the spread of sects who bore witness to the religious agitation of the times. Though the age was marked by no small degree of coarse sen¬ suality, yet the religious interest predominated, and the sen¬ suality received a counterpoise in one of the most important appearances of this new spiritual life, the scientific tendency. It did not take, as in the Carolingian age, the direction to the Empirical, but the Spirit which began to feel its own power, gave itself to the study of Dialectics and Speculation. This tendency did not proceed immediately from a religious source, and was not connected originally with the religious excite¬ ment, but existed independently of the Church. Indeed it is * Apud modernos Scholasticos, maxime apud Scotos iste Syllogis* mus Dclusionis. Baluz. Miscell. v. 54. THE RISE OF SCHOLASTICISM. 467 quite true that the first objects of Dialectics to which it applied itself were given from without, by the commentary of Boethius on the Isagoge of Porphyry,* through which it formed its first connexion with the Platonic and Aristotelian Philosophy, and began to treat of questions respecting the reality of universal' ideas. That such questions should occupy men's minds rested on a deep internal ground in the general tendency of thought. When dialectic schools raised discus¬ sions on whether the general ideas of the human mind had an objective reality, whether anything corresponded to them in actual Existence, whether an objective connexion was to be admitted between Thinking and Being, or whether general ideas were nothing but a subjective product of human thought, a necessary help in order to comprehend the multi¬ plicity of things, and to which there was no corresponding reality ; — when the Schools started these questions, the deepest principles of human knowledge lay at the basis— questions on the objective reality cf human Thought and Knowledge generally — on the opposition of Empiricism and Rationalism, or whether Knowledge proceeded from Experience or from human thought. With this again was connected the decision of the question, whether we must con¬ fine ourselves to the knowledge of individual things, nor ven¬ ture beyond the outward perception, or whether our mind in thinking upon the outward world follows an indwelling Law, therefore respecting Realism and Idealism. On the other side, with this inquiry was connected the discussion respecting the reality or non-reality of human knowdedge, the contrast of Dogmatism and Scepticism, of an organic systematic mode of conception or an atomistic. Hence it is evident how influen¬ tial must have been the difference of the mental tendencies which lay at their basis, though these antagonisms often lost themselves in barren subtleties. Augustin had the greatest influence in reference both to speculation and practice ; from him proceeded first of all the deeper theological investigation ; through his authority, and i * A vtikcl 7 repi ytvu>v rt iccti fioiov, to fjLtvt’ire vcpiorriicev bltb icai Iv uovaig \pi\aig imvoiaig Ktlrcu, bits icai ixpBCTTrjKOTa oiv/nara botiv rj acnofiara icai Tcortpov %wpicrrd ?) bp rolg aixrOrjTolg icai 7repi ravra icpBorutra Trapairrioopai, Xtytiv fiaOvrarrjg ovorjg rf/g TOiavnig Trpay- p.xTBias, Kai dkXrjg pti^opog hopkvrig iZeruoetoe. H H 2 468 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. owing to its connexion with religious interests, Realism, that is, the doctrine of the reality of universal ideas (universalia esse realia ) became predominant. This relation could be con¬ ceived of in a twofold manner, either the divine ideas were regarded as the original patterns of all existence, or the Uni¬ versal was regarded as expressed in the multiplicity of indi¬ vidual being, the one more Platonic, the other more Aris¬ totelian (universalia ante rem, or in re). The two were originally less clearly distinguished, the general ideas in the Universe were regarded as a representation of the divine archetypes. But at the end of the eleventh Century an opponent of Realism appeared,— Roscellin, # a Canon of Compeigne, a man of great intellectual boldness, who established a peculiar school of Dialectics, in short, the Founder of Nominalism. It is to be regretted that we have no writings of his own, but we recognise in his whole tendency the germ of a sceptical and atomistic element which might have given another tendency to the spirit of the Middle Ages could it have gained the ascendancy. He maintained that in knowing we are only made acquainted with individual objects; that general ideas are only nomina, not res. A fragment that has been pre¬ served in Abelard’s Dialectics, is peculiarly characteristic.t He oarries his opposition against the reality of Ideas so far as to maintain, that even the ideas of a whole and a part have no objective reality, for in order to think of a part as a part, we must have the idea of the whole, and the whole again presupposes the idea of the part. A fondness for logical sequences led to the use of such language, as we find in a letter among the * Victor Cousin, Introduction aux Ouvrages Inedits d’Abelard, pag. 86. Roscellin’s Letter to Abelard was published by Schmeller in the Miinchener G-elehrte Anzeigen, Dec. 1847. + Ouvrages Inedits d’Abelard, p. 471.—Fuit autem, memini, magistri nostri Roscellini tarn insana sententia ut nullam rem partibus constare vellet, sed sicut solis vocibus species, ita et partes adscribebat. Si quis autem rem illam quae domus est, rebus aliis, pariete scilicet et funda- mento constare diceret, tali ipsum argumentatione impugnabat; si res ilia, quae est paries, rei illius quae domu3 est, pars sit, eum ipsa domus nihil aliud sit, quam ipsa paries et tectum et fundamentum, profecto paries sui ipsius et caeterorum pars erit. At vero quomodo sui ipsius pars fuerit ? Amplius omnis pars naturaliter prior est suo toto. Quo¬ modo autem paries prior se et aliis dicetur, cum se nullo modo prior sit ? RAIMBERT AND ODO. 469 works of Abelard, in which it is inferred from Rqscellin's principles, that when in the Gospels it is said that Christ, after his Resurrection, eat part of a fish, as the part is only a nomen, so Christ must have eaten only a nomen . Raimbert at Lisle stood at the head of the Nominalist School. Before the Universities were established there were certain indi¬ viduals from whom the various schools proceeded. In the Cathedral and monastic schools, men distinguished for their dialectic and scientific abilities appeared, and the tenets they had sown, were propagated by their pupils. These investiga¬ tions were carried on with incredible zeal. In opposition to Raimbert, Odo, a secular clergyman of the Cathedral at Tournay, founded a Realist school among the canons. A con¬ temporary relates that the young priests flocked to him from France and Great Britain, and even from Germany and Italy. These studies spread beyond the school among the citizens. If a person walked through the streets he would see multi¬ tudes of disputants—or if he visited the school he would see Odo sometimes walking about like a Peripatetic philosopher, at other times sitting surrounded by his pupils ; ofttimes he did not leave off even at night, but disputed with them before his door.* But this enthusiasm for Dialectics not only in many instances swallowed up all other scientific interest, but even higher interests were neglected for it. Every one wanted to shine with a new 7 theory in dialectic inquiries John of Salisbury (a.d. 1150), the advocate of empirical science, describes this mania, t Poets and Historians were held in light esteem, and if any one occupied himself with the ancients, he was ridiculed; for everybody attended only to his own inventions and those of his teacher. Everything was described in scholastic language ; to call an ass an ass, or a man a man, was considered a grave offence. Even the enthusiasm for classical Antiquity took a false direction ; the more scanty the knowledge of it, so much the more was everything idealized, and Christian truth was found in single expressions of the Philosophers. The life and virtues of the Ancients were viewed unhistorically, and contrasted with the immorality of the Clergy. This tendency might even form an antagonism * Hermann He Tournay, in D’Achery’s Spicilegium, ii. 889. f Metalogicus, i. c. 3. 470 TIIE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. to Christianity, since it knew not how to distinguish its pecu¬ liarities, and weakened the distinction between Reason and Revelation. But the religious revival was too powerful, espe¬ cially in the twelfth century, not at last to lay hold of the above direction also. As it often happened that those who had hitherto led worldly lives, were brought by sudden im¬ pressions to thoughtfulness, and withdrew into the monas¬ teries, so many persons often sought satisfaction there who had busied themselves for a long time with dialectic inquiries, and in this external employment had arrived at a feeling of emptiness. In the midst of their dialectic investigations they were sometimes reminded of a higher interest, and awakened to a new and more serious life. It happened here, as is said in an old verse in the History of Bruno, the founder of the order of the Carthusians : —Ad logicam pergo quce mortis non timet ergo, that is, “ Logic which fears not the syllogistics of death.” Many, indeed, only made this change in their course of life, because it happened to be the fashion. It also was found that the old spirit revived again in the cloisters. But those who were more open to deeper considerations sought for a connecting link between their earlier and later standpoint, and resumed their former method, but in a much higher manner; and since they applied it to the examination of Christian subjects, the result was an amalgamation of Philo¬ sophy and Dogmatics. A remarkable example of this is the above-mentioned Odo of Tournay. He had already led a strict life, but it was generally said, that he lived more after one of the old Philosophers than after the Church. He once bought Augustin’s work, De libero arbitrio, but took no fur¬ ther notice of it, and laid it in a corner of his library. But it happened that as he was explaining to his pupils the treatise of Boethius, De consolatione Philosophies, and came to a pas¬ sage which treated of free Will, he recollected this work of Augustin’s ; he brought it out, and was so pleased with it, that he continued to expound it to his hearers. At last he found the passage in which Augustin contrasts a divine life with a worldly one, and speaks of the nothingness of the lat¬ ter. Odo was so affected by it, the emptiness of his inner life was so laid open, that he burst into tears, hastened to the Church, and was followed by his pupils. From that time his mind took quite another direction, he became a monk, then an ROSCELLIN. 471 abbot, and lastly Archbishop of Cambray. He now trans¬ ferred his scientific method to Dogmatics. Since philosophical and theological inquiries became thus blended, it followed that philosophical controversies were changed into theological ones. Already Roscellin had become the object of a fierce attack, from a standpoint in which the two interests were mingled. This related, first of all, to his doctrine of the Trinity. We cannot say, that he followed a different method from others in his theological inquiries ; his views of the relation of knowledge to faith, and of philosophy to Dogmatics, appeared to be those current in his time, resting on the maxim, Jides prcecedit intellectum , and a freer tendency w 7 hich came into collision with Church interests, does not appear to have been indulged by him. His design was not to subject the Church doctrine to a new examination, but he laid down as his leading maxim, that his inquiries must serve for the vindication of Christian doctrines. If Jews and Mohammedans give an account of their faith, ought not Christians to do the same ? His doctrine of universal ideas would fulfill this object chiefly, in reference to the dogma of the Trinity. But certainly, the subjective, sceptical, and atomistic, which lay at the basis of his Nominalism, were in internal opposition to the objective interests of religious per¬ sons, and hence it is not surprising that Roscellin in this age was obliged to succumb. And since both he, and his realistic opponents, applied their categories erroneously to the doctrine of the Trinity, they came to an open conflict. At the Council of Soissons (a.d. 1093) he was obliged to recant; he then went to England, and there engaged in fresh controversies as a champion of the hierarchical interest and the celibacy of the clergy, in the cause of Hildebrand’s reform movement. The persons in England who were not disposed to conform to it, induced him to return to France, where he lived in solitude and quiet. The principal opponent of Roscellin, and the first represen¬ tative of Realism, was Anselm of Canterbury.* If we look * Opp. ed. Gabriel Gerberon, Par. 1675, 1721, 2 vols. fol. Vita Anselmi, lib 2, by his pupil Eadmer. Acta SS. Aprilis, ii. 866. Mohler, Anselm von Canterbury in Dessen Schriften and Aufsatzen, b. i. G. F. Franck, Anselm v. Canterbury, Tiibg. 1842. F. R. Hasae, Anselm v. Canterbury, 1841, 1852. 472 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. at the principle of the scholastic tendency, at the subordination of the philosophical interest to the religious, and at the first germ of a widely applied Dialectic, Augustin may be called the Father of the Scholastic Theology. As far as Lanfranc was the first to elaborate the dialectic form, he might not improperly be so designated; but if we look at the whole character of the scholasticism of the twelfth century, Anselm deserves this name ; in him we find the interpenetration of the two leading tendencies of the age, the religious and the ecclesiastical on the one hand, and on the other, the dialectic and scientific, that of the feelings and that of the intellect, the mystical and the speculative. Thus he established this Theology both materially and formally. Anselm was born about a.d. 1033, at Aosta, in Piedmont. He was educated under the influence of a pious mother, and the deeply religious spirit which he received, determined the whole tone of his thinking. Owing to the unkind treatment of his father, he was forced to leave the parental roof, and spent three years wandering through Italy and France till the fame of Lanfranc attracted him to the monastery of Bee in Normandy. He became his most devoted pupil ; henceforward the Dialectic Art was combined with his religious zeal. After he had risen to be the Prior of the monastery, he occupied himself chiefly with the education of his monks. He was distinguished by the spirit of love with which he guided them. He came forward as an opponent of the gloomy method of training which was practised in the strict monastic discipline.* An abbot once complained to him of his ill success in the education of boys, notwithstanding all his severity; Anselm replied, “ It is a poor compliment to your method that it turns human beings into brutes.” In a.d. 1093, he succeeded Lanfranc in the Archbishopric ol Canterbury. As the vindication of the rights of the Church was with him a matter of conscience, he w r as involved in contests with William II. and Henry I. He appealed to Rome, and spent several years there, highly esteemed by Urban II. At last, he returned to England, and died soon after in a.d. 1109. In this agitated life, occupied with the business of education, or of conducting the affairs of the Church, and involved in controversies, he maintained sufficient mental composure to devote himself to speculative inquiries, * Neander’s Ch. Hist. viii. 11. ANSELM. 473 in which he obtained great eminence. He is entirely to be distinguished from those men who, from a worldly tendency by a revolution of their inner life, turned their attention to Theology, and from those who agitated by doubts, have been led to investigate the grounds of the Christian Faith. In Anselm, the warmth and confidence of the faith of his childhood appears never to have subsided. Independent of all speculation, his faith was rendered sure by inward experi¬ ence, and his heart needed no other grounds for it. But since with the fervent religious element, he combined great speculative and dialectic power, he could not suppress the latter, and was from the first convinced, that no schism could exist between the truth of the heart and the convictions of the Reason. He was satisfied that the subject matter of Faith must verify itself to the Intellect as Truth; the dignity of the Image of God in the Reason required this. Confidence in divine truth gave him the impulse for speculation. He felt impelled to examine with his reason what was certain to his Faith. But he was very far from expecting to attain absolute knowledge, or from indulging the proud dogmatism that might be connected with it : he remained conscious of the limits of Reason, and was convinced that full satisfaction could only be attained in eternal life. He only wished to penetrate as far in the present life as was possible with the powers of Reason enlightened by God. The relation in which he places knowledge to Faith* corresponds to his setting out in his inquiries from internal religious experience. Against Roscellin, he says: The Christian may hold fast his faith, love, and live according to it, and humbly strive as far as his abilities allow, after a a rational knowledge of it; if he can attain it let him thank God, if not, let him practise reverential submission.f First of all, Faith must purify the heart; we must humble ourselves, and become as little children. He who believes not cannot experience; he who has not experienced, cannot understand. * See Hasse, Anselm v. Canterbury, ii. 34. I Nullus quippe Ckristianus debet disputare, quod catholica ecelesia corde credit et ore confitetur, quod non sit, sed semper eandem fidem indubitantur tenendo, amando et secundam illam vivendo humiliter, quantum potest, quaerere rationem, quomodo sit.—De Fide Trinitat. et Incarnatione Verbi, c. 2. 474 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. Nothing can be effected till the wings of the soul rise bj faith to God, The theoretical in its principles proceeds from the practical ; we must first renounce the flesh and live in the Spirit, for the natural man understands nothing of the Spirit of God. Two leading tendencies are observable in Anselm ; one, to maintain the operations of .Faith against a one-sided Dialectic; and the other, to exhibit the harmony of Ratio and Fides, in contradistinction to a blind faith of authority. Anselm attempted this in reference to several doctrines. Certainly, there is to be found in his writings an obscure mixture of the Philosophical and the Religious : hence he often believes that he has demonstrated something of which the certainty rests on other grounds. It is necessary to dis¬ tinguish between the idea lying at the basis as that which immediately proceeded from the depths of his contemplation, and the false dialectic medium of proof. Nominalism appeared to him a mode of thinking which never rises above the sensuous and empirical, and denies the reality of the Idea; but that which does not know the reality of the idea, can know nothing whatever. The Reason, he says, is so beclouded among the Nominalists by sensuous images, that it can never free itself from them.* He was convinced of the objectivity of Truth which lies at the basis of ideas, because thinking and being proceed from God. He derives an argument against Nominalism from the original connexion of the human Spirit with the divine. Since the Truth on which the being of things rests, is the effect of the highest Truth, so likewise it is the cause of the Truth which is in thinking. Everything comes from that light from which all truth radiates, and which also enlightens the rational Spirit. If the two leading tendencies of life, the religious and emotional on the one hand, and on the other, the scientific and dialectic, had remained harmoniously connected, the develop¬ ment would have been quiet and regular ; but fresh contra¬ rieties made their appearance. The mystic religious, and the * De Fide Trinitatis, c. 2 —Prorsus a spiritualium qusestionum disputatione sunt exsufflandi. In eorum quippe animabus ratio, quae et princeps et judex omnino omnium debet esse, quae sunt in homine, sic est imaginibus corporalibus obvoluta, ut ex eis se non possit evolvere nec ab ipsis ea quae ipsa sola et pura contemplari debet, valeat discernere. BERNARD OF CLAIRVAUX. 475 dialectic speculative tendency were represented in two great men of the twelfth century— Bernard of Clairvaux, and Abelard. The conflict in which they encountered one another, so far resembled that between Lanfranc and Beren- garius, that here also there was an antagonism between the doctrine of the Church and free inquiry. But there was still the difference, that, in reference to the depth of religious feeling, Lanfranc had no pre-eminence before Berengarius, whereas here, on the one side, there was the predominant interest of devout feeling, on the other, that of dialectic art; on the one side there was the Mystical theology, on the other, the Scholastic. The contest of these parties involves the same general antagonisms which repeat themselves in all ages* not excepting our own. Bernard* was bom (a.d. 1091) at Fontaines in Burgundy. The new excitement of the religious spirit which took place in his youth, affected his development, but especially the influence of a very pious mother. Thus he early acquired the love of monasticism and a contemplative life. But after his mother’s death his friends tried to give him a taste for a more secular life. By his enthusiasm for science, they almost succeeded in inducing him to forget Monasticism ; but this did not last long. His mother’s image was perpetually before his eyes, and the recollection that she had dedicated him to God. After some struggles, the original inclination prevailed, and once, while travelling, it so overpowered him, that he vowed to enter a monastery. In his three-and-twentieth year he entered the strictest order—that of the Cistercians, and soon was made abbot of Clairvaux. He was a monk with his whole soul; his religious life was supported by silent medi¬ tation and prayerin the hours of solitude he enjoyed the liveliest feelings and the clearest contemplations. He en¬ deavoured also to direct others to prayer and the contempla¬ tion of Christ, in order to lead them to that repose and light which he had gained. “ Thou,” he writes,t “ who occupiest * Opp. ed. Mabillon, Par. 1690, 6 t. f ; 1719, 2 t., Par. 1839, 2 t. Biographies of William de Thierry, Gaufried, and Alanus de Insulis, in Mabillon, t. i. t. vi. Neander, Der Heilig Bernhard u. sein Zeitalter, Berlin, 1813, 1848. J. Ellendorf, Bernhard und die Hierarchie, 1838, 2 bde., Ratisbonne. Histoire de St. Bernard, Paris, 1843, 2 t. + Ep. 106. 476 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. thyself with the study of the Prophets—uuderstandest thou what thou readest ? If thou understandest it, thou knowest that Christ is the sense of the Prophets, and if thou wouldst lay hold of him, thou canst do this more easily when thou followest him than when thou readest. He who hath ears to hear, let him hear him cry, ‘ Whosoever thirsteth, let him come to me and drink.’ Trust my experience ; thou wilt find more in the forests than in hooks. True science proceeds from the soul. The disposition makes men wise ; knowledge makes them learned.* The sun does not warm all on whom it shines; it is not the knowledge of divine things, but the fear of God which moves the soul, and makes it wise ; mere knowledge easily leads to pride.” He has developed in the fifth book of his treatise, De consideratione ,f his doctrine respecting the relation of faith, rational knowledge, and intui¬ tion. He distinguishes between the standpoint of rational knowledge (- intellectus ), that of faith ( fides ), and that of mere opinion {opinio). The intellectus is based on the ratio , Faith on Authority, and Opinion only on Probability. Intellectus and fides both have a certainty of Truth ; but the latter has a closed, veiled Truth, the former an unveiled conscious Truth. Faith is an anticipation of Truth not yet unveiled by the direction of the Will; the intellectus is the certain and clear knowledge of an invisible object. Opinion wants the certainty which belongs to the two others. There is nothing we would rather know than what we already know by faith. It is, therefore, peculiarly important—rightly to separate these three divisions, that the uncertainty of Opinion may not be made an object of Faith, and that the certainty of Faith may not be exchanged for doubt. It is outrageous, when the intellectus would force the sealed Sanc¬ tuary of Faith.j; He supposes an elevation of Intuition in * Sermo on the Song of Solomon. 23, § 14. f De Consideratione, lib. v. curante. C. F. Th. Schneider. Breol. 1850. X De Considerat. v. c. 3, § 5. —Intellectus rationi innititur, fides auctoritati, opinio sola verisimilitudine se tueter. Habent ilia duo certam veritatem, sed fides clausam et involutam, intelligentia nudam et manifestam; ceterum opinio certi nihil habens, verum per verisi- milia quserit potuis quam apprehendit.—6. Omnino in his cavenda confusio, ne aut incertum opinionis fides figat, aut quod firmum fixum que est fidei, opinio revocet in qusestionem. Et hoc sciendum, quia opinio si habet assertionem temeraria est, fides, si habet haesitationem, BERNARD OF CLAIRVAUX. 477 certain moments of Inspiration, which anticipates what the Intellect has not yet discovered. What is elevated above us is not taught by words, but by the Spirit; but what no discourse can reach, is sought for by prayer, and obtained by purity of of heart. Disputation does not apprehend divine things, but holiness of life and prayer. But Bernard was by no means a despiser of Science. “ I acknowledge,” he says, “ how much the Church owes to science ; but the great point is to hold fast the right measure and object. This consists not in the desire of glory or over-curiousness, but in edification Self-knowledge is the first thing, since it does not puff up. but produces Humility; the structure of the spiritual life cannot stand firmly without it.” But the highest standpoint on which man can be raised, even above the form of Faith, is, according to Bernard, religious Intuition, which is gained in these highest moments of Inspiration. Ecstatic contempla¬ tion leads man to the anticipation of that which he will see perfectly in eternal life ; it is a sudden rapture ( raptus ), by which the spirit for a time is borne to the greatest heights.* We recognise here the tendency to a renunciation of the world, which was closely connected with his monasticism. He made no effort, like Anselm, to harmonize Faith and infirma est; item intellectus, si signata ficLei tentet irrumpere, reputatur effractor, scrutata majestatis. Fides est voluntaria quaedam et certa praelibatio necdum propalatae veritatis; intellectus est rei cujuscunque invisibilis certa et manifesta notitia. Opinio est quasi pro vero habere, aliquid quod falsum esse nescias. Ergo fides ambiguum non habet, aut si habet, fides non est, sed opinio. Quid igitur distat ab intellectu ? Nempe quod etsi non habet incertum non magis quam intellectus habet tamen involucrum, quod non intellectus. Denique quod intellexisti, non est de eo, quod ultra quaeras, aut si est, non intellexisti. Nil autem malumus scire, quam quae fide jam scimus. Nil supererit ad beatitudinem, cum quae jam certa sunt nobis fide, erunt aeque et nuda. * V. § 3.—Magnus ille, qui usum sensuum, quasdam veluti civium opes expendere satugit, dispensando in suam et multorum salutem. Nec ille minor, qui hunc sibi gradum ad ilia invisibilia philosophando constituit; nisi quod hoc dulcius, illud utilius, hoc felicius, illud fortius esse constat. At omnium maximus, qui spreto ipso usu rerum et sensuum, quantum quidem humanae fragilitati fas est, non ascensoriis gradibus sed inopinater excessibus, avolare interdum contemplando ad ilia sublimia consuevit. Ad hoc ultimum genus illos pertinere reor excessus Pauli. Excessus, non ascensus, nam raptum potuis fuisse, quam ascend iter ipse se perhibet. 478 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. Knowledge; but where so much intensity of feeling waa combined with seeking after rational knowledge, he might easily have come to an understanding on the subject. But it was otherwise in the case of one of his contemporaries, who seemed to assign a much larger domain to Dialectic and Rational Knowledge than his predecessors. This man was Peter Abelard.* He was born a.d. 1079, at Palais, not far from Nantes in Brittany, and on that account frequently called P eripateticus Palatinus. His de¬ velopment was very different from that of Bernard. He prosecuted his strides at Paris and Melun, and acquired an early reputation by his talents which were combined with great self-esteem, a fault which his splendid success tended to cherish. At first he occupied himself only with philosophy : the ardour of inquiry and vanity soon brought him into col¬ lision with his teachers. By degrees, he applied himself to Theology. The fame of Anselm attracted him to Laon ; but in a short time he came forward as his rival. He declared himself desirous of showing, that without much study, a person could do more in the interpretation of Holy Writ, than an educated pedant. When he appeared in Paris, as a philosophical and theological lecturer, crowds flocked to hear him. Here he became a sacrifice to his great talents and faults, among which he afterwards acknowledged as most conspicuous in his Historia calamitatum ,,f his luxury and pride. They involved him in those heavy misfortunes which led him to alter his course of life. Through violent mental agitation and heavy trials, he was brought at last to a deeper religious interest. He rose from a state of doubt to Faith ; but the conflict in his mind never w T holly ceased between the religious element and the tendency to speculations and dia¬ lectic inquiry. His system, not completed into a harmonious development, is an image of the discordancy of his inner and outer life. Greatly depressed, he retired (a.d. 1169) to the Abbey of St. Denis, near Paris. But his wide-spread repu- * Ouvrages Inddits d’Abelard, publies par Victor Cousin, Par. 1838. Scblosser, Abiilard und Dulcin, Leben eines Schwarmers und eines Philosophen, Gotha, 1807. Goldhorn de Theologia Abselard., Lips. 1836. Franck, Beitrafzur Wurdigung Abalards, Tiibg. Zeitschrift, 1840. Ritter, der Philosophie, Thl. 7. t Abselardi et Heloisae, Opp. ed. Amboise, Par. 1616. ABELARD. 479 tation, and the multitude of young men who flocked to him, induced him to recommence his lectures. The monks were glad to be relieved from the inspection of so severe a censor, and gave him a neighbouring priory for the delivery of his lectures. Being now principally occupied with religious subjects, he applied his dialectic method to Dogmatics. But as his views became more widely known through the enthu¬ siasm of his scholars, a party in the Church was soon formed against him. At the request of his hearers, he published his Introductio ad Theologiam. But in accordance with the standpoint of theological science in that age, the idea of Theologia was confined, and embraced only Dogmatics. The w r ork was originally, and remained a mere fragment of the doctrines of religion. He agreed so far with Anselm’s prin¬ ciples, as to assert that the Intellectus can only develope what is given in the Fides; but he differs in determining the manner in which Faith is brought into existence ; nor does he recognise so readily the limits of speculation, and, in some points, he goes beyond the doctrinal belief of the Church; yet the tendency of the rational element lying at the basis, and his method of applying it, are different. The former was checked in its logical development by the limits set to it in the Creed of the Church; many things also are only put down on the spur of the moment. The work not only created a prodigious sensation, but also showed traces of a preceding hostility. We may detect this, when he charges some of his opponents with seeking consolation for their ignorance, by extolling a faith which believes before it knows. He maintained, on the contrary, that a Faith which does not rest on evidence, is so much more easily shaken, and ap¬ pealed to Sirach xix. 4 : “He who quickly believeth, is fickle- minded, and his faith stands not firm.” On the principles of his opponents, no one could gainsay idolaters, for every one might appeal to their notion, that it was only necessary to believe. It would lead to Montanism and every sort of fanaticism, for we must admit that the Apostles were only blind instruments of the Holy Spirit. There are different ways to Faith. Some are led to it by speculation ; others by miracles. Christ confuted the Jews not only by miracles, but by arguments. We are, therefore, guided by him, as those who seek after wisdom, and must be led to the Faith by 480 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. arguments ; and since miracles no longer take place, only this way is left for us, the arguments of Reason. There were at that time many, who were asserted to have worked miracles; and it is characteristic of his critical method of examination, that he called in question the narratives of these occurrences ; but it does not follow that he admitted no miracles whatever. He argued that Paul placed a higher value on Prophecy than on the gift of tongues ; for in the former was the ability to develope religious truth for the benefit of others. He, there¬ fore, considered rational inquiry as the way to Faith; he would not say that vital Faith might originate in this, but it was a preparation for it, to which Grace might afterwards be added, and Faith would arise, when inward Experience was thus added to investigation. He also ascribes to Reason the function of developing and bringing into consciousness the contents of the appropriated Faith. Two men might agree in the matter of their faith and experience, and yet one might excel the other in the gift of knowledge, because he possessed the corresponding mental constitution. A Paul was not superior to a Peter, nor an Augustin to a Martin in piety, but yet Paul and Augustin excelled in a knowledge of the Faith, because their minds were specially adapted to it. # It is evident that this view rests on a distinction between the essence and form in the representation of divine truth, and on a peculiar apprehension of the operation of the Divine Spirit; for it implies, that we must not only regard w T hat is identical in the work of the Holy Spirit, but also what is conditional in human nature, in which individual peculiarities originate. He endeavoured to show how progressive know¬ ledge reacts on the life—the more we know God, so much the more we shall also love him. Abelard, f so far, was not quite just towards his opponents, as they were not all pre¬ judiced against inquiry altogether; but many only main¬ tained, that divine things, in order to be understood, must first be matters of experience; but this again he did not * Introduct. ii. p. 1053. -f Nunc plurimi solatium suge imperitise quserunt, et quuin ea de fide docere nituntur, qua; ut etiam intelligi possint, desserere nou sufficiunt, ilium maxime fidei fervorem commendant, qui ea quge dicuntur, ante- quam intelligat, credit, et prius bis assentit ac recipit, quam quee ipsa sint videat, et an recipienda sint agnoscat, sive oro captu suo discutiat. —Introd. ii. p. 1061. ABELARD. 481 deny; and as little was he an opponent of the Supernatural, but rather stood at a distance from Rationalism. He only impugned the unqualified antagonism of Reason and Faith— of the Natural and the Supernatural. “ The Nature of things,” he said, “ which is constituted by God, cannot stand in contradiction to Faith. God himself makes use of Nature in his works of grace, since he would rather develope the Truth by images from Nature, than by language itself. Revelation and Nature depend on the same God.” He endeavoured to find a mediating tendency, the presentation of a harmonious connexion between the natural and the supernatural, History and Revelation. Thus he reached, though obstructed in the consequential development by the Church doctrine, some points of a tendency which had not appeared since the times of the Alexandrian Theologians. Abelard’s scholars, who propagated his opinions and expressed themselves with less reserve in some respects than he did; for many of them asserted that there was no mystery in the Faith, and that Abelard had taught them to know everything clearly, increased the excitement against him. He himself, indeed, said that the first attacks against him pro¬ ceeded purely from personal jealousy ; but if this had its share in the matter, it certainly was not the principal thing. The first person who appeared against him, Walter of Mortagne, in Flanders, a distinguished theologian in Paris, had sometime before been led to notice Abelard’s doctrinal deviations by the assertions of his presumptuous pupils. He was the adherent of a practical Church tendency, which aimed at combining with itself the dialectic Dogmatics, and was one of his more moderate opponents. As soon as he had obtained a copy of Abelard’s Introductio, he applied to him for an explanation. We now see how this theologian, in combating one error, fell into another. When Abelard’s scholars had adduced such a passage as that in John xvii. 3, to prove that even in this life perfect knowledge is possible, Walter com¬ mitted the mistake of referring all these expressions to the future life, and indulged in supposed emendations of biblical passages. Thus Abelard could not satisfy him on any point. On one occasion he accused him of ascribing too much to human reason ; but Abelard said that he made no absolute assertions, but only wished to give his opinion ; Walter replied i i 482 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. that he made everything uncertain, that Faith according to him was a mere opinion. Other opponents, more violent, appeared against him. It so happened that at the Council of Soissons (a.d. 1121) Abelard and his doctrines were brought under review. He was overcome far more by outward force than by the arguments of his adversaries. As the voice of the multitude was against him, he gave way, and was prevailed , upon to commit his work to the flames. He was condemned to confinement in a monastery. But the Papal legate, who was present at the Synod, is reported to have said that this attempt to crush him would turn out for his advantage, and that soon he would be triumphant. In a short time, through the intervention of some of his principal adherents, he obtained his liberty, and returned again to St. Denis. But as he here asserted that the patron saint of this abbey was not Dionysius the Areopagite, he roused a violent storm on the part of the monks against him. He left the monastery and found a refuge in the territories of the Count Theobald of Champagne. In the district of Troyes he built a small chapel of reeds and dedicated it to the Paraclete. But, in a short time, he was again surrounded by a crowd of pupils. He was obliged to begin his lectures again, his pupils shared all privations with him and built for him a handsome stone chapel. Among those who joined him, from an enthusiastic ottachment to his doctrines and led a life of privations, was probably Arnold of Brescia ; he was indeed of a more practical, ardent nature ; but, in Abelard, there was more than mere speculation, for he presented in his lectures the ideal of a truly spiritual life; and when, on such occasions, he inveighed against the secularity of the Church, and contrasted with its corruption the examples of ancient virtue,* this so inflamed Arnold that, at a later period, he came forward as a reformer, and strove to check the downward tendency of the Church to worldliness. But the attention of Abelard’s adversaries was again roused. In order to be beforehand with their persecu¬ tions, he accepted the office of Abbot at Ruits, in Brittany, a.d. 1128. Yet he could not endure this retirement longer * Constat quippe philosophos maxime, continenter vixisse, atque ad continentiam tam scriptis quam exemplis multas nobis exhortationes reliquisse. Introd. ii. 1007. Theol. Christiana in Martene et Durand Thesaur. Anecdot. v. 1210, seq. ABELARD. 483 than eight years, and began about a.d. 1136 to deliver lectures again in Paris. His school so widely spread, and his writings occasioned a fresh attack. Instead of his “ Introduction he put forth the substance of it recast, under the title of * Theologia Christiana . Even in this w T ork, he did not present a complete exposition of Christian doctrine, but proceeded no further than the doctrine of the Trinity. The book gave offence, among other things by the judgment which he expressed on the ancient philosophers. As he sought out the traces of truth in History, he believed that he could prove the agree¬ ment in morals of the Grecian Philosophy and Christianity. If in the former the love of goodness was spoken of, it referred ultimately to God, who is the original source of all good. The morality of the ancient Philosophers was more allied to Christianity than that of Judaism, since the Ethical was not mixed as in the latter, with the Ritual. The Gospel was strictly only a reformatio legis naturalis . He thus manifestly mistook the peculiarity of the Christian Life, and the essence of Christian Morals. He was misled, in part, by the stand point of the times, the ascetic tendency of the moral teaching, which aimed rather at divesting men of what belonged to humanity than at rendering the human divine. He founded the relationship of Christianity and Philosophy on the fact that Christ was the Wisdom of God. He might have arrived at a Pelagian view if his thinking on the subject had not been so isolated and without sequence. It deserves notice that he maintained the strict connexion of feeling and knowledge ; they were reciprocally conditioned by each other, and the Religious principle developes itself with advancing knowledge. His Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans is remarkable for original thoughts ; his treatise on Ethics, though only a fragment, is important on account of its plan; it bears the title Scito te ip s um f His opponents frequently mention a w r ork under the name of Sentential ; the quotations from it do not always appear in the same form. Abelard himself complained that it was flagrantly unjust, to bring forward anything against him from such a work, since he had not written it. Walter of St. Victor says it was either written * Theologise Christianse, lib. v. Martene et Durand Thesaurus Anecdotorum, t. v. 1139. f Pezii Thesaurus Anecdotorum, t. iii. P. ii. p. 627. I I 2 484 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. by him or taken from his writings, and in his other works expressions are actually found, similar to those quoted from the Sententice. Yet it is only of late that a more certain judgment has been formed in relation between them. Rhein- wald, in 1835, published a manuscript in the library of Munich, which bore the title of Epitome Theologies Abcelardi , but this does not correctly describe it; it is rather identical with those Sententiee, one of those common collections from the Fathers, which were made the basis of farther dogmatical development. Abelard could truly say that he had written no such book ; they were passages which had been taken down during the delivery of his lectures on Dogmatics. In one transcript the words are preserved with which he began a lecture: “All who thirst, come to the waters and drink, O my friends 1 drink to the full, 0 my beloved ! ” This work contains a compendium of his Dogmatics, and forms the desired completion of his Tlieologia Christiana. One other work published by Rheinwald from a manuscript in the Vienna Library, a dialogue between a Jew and a Philosopher on the highest good, manifestly contains Abelard’s Ideas. In the works of an enthusiastic pupil of Abelard, Berengarius, a fragment is found of this dialogue. His work Sic et Non , is more important and more noted, in which he has collected the expressions of the ancient Church Teachers on a variety of subjects in 157 Rubricks. He allows these contradictory opinions to stand -without attempting to reconcile them, evidently that they may be distinctly seen. He himself says, that he had collected them in order that the readers might bo stimulated to inquiry, and thus undergo a mental training: inquirendo veritatem percipimus , Christ says, “ Seek and ye shall findby questions, therefore, we ought to learn. Ho wished thus to vindicate his own standpoint; he seems also to have had in view to establish a freer tendency in opposition to that which would have impressed a complete uniformity on Dogmatics. He was not afraid to assert that the Church Teachers had erred in many things, and hence drew the conclusion: Who does not see how presumptuous it is for one man to judge respecting the intention of another, since God alone knows the heart and the thoughts, and He says, “ Judoe not, and ye shall not be judged?” The Church Teachers mav have expressed different opinions, but in doing so, they were ABELARD. 485 acting under the impulse of Love; the intentio is the oculus animi. We recognise here the germ of a new mental tendency. He wished to separate more sharply from each other the Interest of Faith and that of Dogmatics, and to point out the difficulties of finding the right expression for religious truths. He ventured also to apply a similar test to the sacred Writers. The Abbot William of St. Thierry appeared against him in a document which he addressed to Bernard of Clairvaux. This monk was easily aroused by such an appeal to take a part in the dispute, and in a Tractatus de erroribus Abcelardi pointed out the dangerous tendency of a number of Abelard’s opinions. When Abelard appealed to the passage in the Book of Sirach against Credulity, Bernard replied, that it referred not to faith in God, but to that between man and man. It was otherwise as to faith in God. Abraham’s faith was approved, because he had believed contrary to human appearances. Abelard confounded faith and opinion. In Heb. xi. it is said, “Faith is the substance of things hoped for; ” this could not be understood of an arbitrary opinion. The clamour against him on the ground of heresy had now become so violent that Abelard himself requested an investigation from the Council of Sens, a.d. 1140. He and Bernard both appeared there. The general feeling was in favour of the latter ; instead of a calm examination, all that Abelard could obtain was a disputation with his opponent, who easily obtained a condemnation of Abelard’s opinions as heretical. Abelard was firmly convinced that injustice had been done him; during these disputes he wrote to the Abbess Heloise that he was unshaken in his faith; that he despised the reputation of a philosopher, if he were denied to be a believer. “ I will be no philosopher, if I must separate myself from Paul, for there is no name under Heaven but Christ’s, whereby we can be saved. I embrace him in the arms of faith.” He appealed to the Pope, depending on the influence of his pupils at the Court of Rome; but Bernard was more powerful. As Abelard was on his way to Rome, he received the Papal decision which condemned him to confinement in a monastery. In his mis¬ fortunes he met with kindness and sympathy from a man who was distinguished by his ready acknowledgment of every good quality in others, and the firmness of his faith, the mild and 486 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. venerable Peter, Abbot of Cluny, who succeeded in recon¬ ciling him with Bernard and the Pope, and gave him a place of refuge in his monastery. Here Abelard wrote an apology in which he said, that everything, however well intended, might be misconstrued. Many things which had been attacked, he justified, and others he modified. He is said also to have composed a fuller vindication, in which he expressed himself more strongly, He lived for some years at Cluny; he there was seized with a fatal illness, during which he received the utmost attention from Peter. In a.d. 1142, he died, and Peter bore testimony to his true piety at the close of life. In the inscription on his tomb he calls him the Christian Plato, who gained the greatest victory over himself when he embraced the Christian Philosophy. Although the free dialectic tendency received a check in Abelard, yet speculation generally was too deeply rooted in the spirit of the Age, to be kept down ; it only became more sober and cautious, and more allied to the Church tendency. Hence, many distinguished men were able to treat Theology in this manner unmolested. Of this class was Robert Pulleyn,* Archdeacon of Rochester, at that time a teacher of Dogmatics at Paris, afterwards Professor at Oxford, and last of all, Cardinal and Chancellor of the Roman Church, and a friend of Bernard. He was also connected with the great Hugo of St. Victor. f Hugo was a native of Ypern, but brought up under the care of his uncle, a Canon of Hamasloben, afterwards he became Canon of the Church of St. Victor in Paris, and was one of the most powerful advocates of the Theology developed in this school. In him were blended the chief tendencies of the Church, the mystical and speculative, the ecclesiastical and the dialectic; he was distinguished by acuteness, depth, and intensity of Christian feeling; but he was more mystical than Anselm, and with a smaller proportion of dialectic subtlety. He combated in his * Died about a.d. 1150. Sententiarum, libri 8, ed. Mathoud, Par. 1655. Cramer, vi. p. 442. f Opp. ed. Rotomagi, 1648, 3 t. f. Liebner Hugo v. St. Victor u. Die Theolog. Richtungen Seiner Zeit, Leipzig, 1832. Schlosser, Vin- eentius von Beauvais, Th. 2, iiber den Gang der Studien in Frankreich und die Schule von St. Victor. Cramer vi. Ritter, vii. p. 597. ROBERT PfTLLEYN. 487 writings the one-sided speculation which neglected experimental knowledge. Whoever should attempt to make a leap, would fall into the iVbyss.* He wrote two scientific works, De Sacrctmentis Christiana fidei , libb. II., and the Summa Senten- tiarum. One part of the latter has been ascribed to Hildebept of Tours, or Mans, a pupil of Berengarius, wdio for this reason has been reckoned among the Schoolmen, But Liebner has proved that the work belongs to HuGO.f Hugo entered deeply into the question respecting the relation of knowledge to Faith, and aimed at doing justice to both. He endeavoured to connect free inquiry with the maintenance of the dignity and independence of faith. He recognised in the Creation a God both revealing and hiding himself. God designed neither to remain altogether hidden from the human spirit, nor altogether to reveal himself, in order that the value of Faith might not be lost, and yet that Faith might be developed into knowledge. He regarded the dis¬ position as that which determined Faith.J Three eyes have been given to man,—one for the world of the senses, one for the knowledge of the spirit, by which it knows itself and what is homogeneous to it, the department of the Keason, and one for what is elevated above the world—the Divine. Since, by sin, the eye of the Reason has been darkened. Faith comes in its stead, and is the organ of the knowledge of the super-terrestrial. § It is a profound thought, that divine things cannot be known by the senses, by the power of * Eruditio Didascalia, vi. c. 3. + Stud. u. Krit. 1831. 4 Tides in affectu habet substantiam, quia affectus ipse tides est, in cognitione habet materiam. quia de illo et ad illud quod, in cognitione est, tides est; credere igitur in affectu est, quod vere creditur in cognitione est. § De Sacram. i. x. c. 2.—Hos igitur oculos quamdiu anima apertos et revolutos habebat, clare videbat et recte discemebat. Postquam autem tenebrae peccati in iliam intraverunt, oculus quidem contempla- tionis extinctus est, ub nihil videret; oculus autem rationis lippus effectus, ut dubie videret; solus ille oculus carnis in sua claritate permansit. Hinc est, quod corda hominum facilius sibi consentiunt in his quae oculo carnis percipiunt, quam in his, quia acie mentis et sensu rationis attingunt; quia, ubi in videndo lion caligaut, in judicando non discrepant. Homo ergo, quia oculum carnis habet, mundum videre potest et ea quae in mundo sunt. Item quia oculum rationis ex parte habet, animum similiter ex parte videt, et ea quae in animo sunt. Quia vero oculum contemplationis non habet, Deum et quae in Deo uunt videre non valet. See Liebner’s Hugo v. Set. Viet. p. 177. 488 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOOMAS. the Imagination and the Intellect, but they have an organ for themselves, for the exercise of which the surrender of the Spirit to God, the tendency to a vital communion with Him is required. He makes Heb. xi. the basis* of his definition of faith, the divine and invisible are received into the Spirit, and become a thing of life and experience, not of mere imagination. He distinguished various stages of Faith ; when the living faith is in existence, the heart is purified by the devotion which springs from it, so that the believer antici¬ pates what he does not yet know. By experience and daily intercourse -with God the heart is so far advanced, that in meditation Gfod is realized as present.! There is a stage of Faith which no longer requires miracles, but is strong in itself. On the other hand there is a mere outward Faith, when faith does not correspond to its objects, and the name of believer is merely conventional. Its absence of doubt is owing merely to a defect of interest, and the form of faith is associated with a disposition altogether worldly. In such cases, he considered the springing up of doubt as real progress, as a transition from a dead to a living faith. He has the following striking remark: We see that doubt, although it does not show itself under the predominance of a dead faith, lies nevertheless con¬ cealed in it. Hence, we cannot wonder, if in this age there appears a reaction of unbelief; for such doubt lies not merely in any given period, but at all times in the nature of Man. But where the freer tendency of Dialectics react against a dead Faith, it may easily lead to Unbelief. Montz, Archbishop of Paris, wished, since so many educated persons had no faith in the Resurrection, to give a testimony to it at his own death, and left directions that a card should be placed on his coffin with these words, “ He died with a firm faith in the doctrine of the Resurrection.” About the middle of the twelfth century, the conflict between the two tendencies of the Age again made its appear ance; for the apprehensions of the Church party were easily roused by any new manifestation, and hence it did not require a man of Abelard’s originality, in order to give an impulse * Yoluntaria quoedam certitudo absentium supra opinionem et infra scientiam constituta. f Munda conscientia invisibilibus documentis et secreta et familiari visitatione de Deo suo quotidie eruditus. PETER LOMBARD. 489 to the controversy. Gilbert de la Porree * Archbishop of Poictiers, was a man of fine dialectic acuteness, but one in whom we do not find deep religious thought. As far as we can learn the character of his theology from his commentary on Boethius, he was inclined to dry subtleties. Abelard had forewarned him at Sens, that he was exposed to a fate similar to his own, by quoting the line, “ tua res agitur, paries quwn proximus ardet He was a Realist, and the application of his formula to the Trinity appeared dangerous to Bernard, who was easily prejudiced against Dialectics. At the Council of Rheims (a.d. 1148) he was accused by him before Eugenius III., and engaged in a disputation with him. Gilbert, certainly, could not justify his doctrinal views; but he had many friends, and Bernard was not successful in attempting to introduce a Confession in opposition to him. Gilbert was permitted to return with honour to his bishopric, so great was the power of the dialectic tendency. About this time, Peter Lombard,"}" of Novara, Teacher of Theology, and finally Bishop of Paris, made a memorable attempt to reconcile the ecclesiastical and dialectic tendency which impressed a character on the dominant theology of the following centuries. This was effected by his Quatuor libri sententiorum; or, Four Books oj Sentences .j; By making the testimonies of the Fathers the basis of his work, he gratified the ecclesiastical party ; he satisfied the requirements of the Dialecticians by the arrangement of the subjects in four sec¬ tions : God and Spirits, the Nature of Man, the Incarnation of God, and the Sacraments ; he also cited opposing senti¬ ments, and endeavoured to reconcile them by dialectic dis¬ cussion. Four Books of Sentences were published by his contemporary Bandinus, which strictly agree with those above mentioned, only in a more compendious form. Many have taken this to be the older work ; but from a comparison of the two, it is evident that a mind of Peter’s skill and origi¬ nality would have had no need of such a groundwork. Hence * Gaufredi Epistolge de Rebus Gestis iu Causa Gilberti Porretani. Mansi, xxi. 728. Otto Fusigenses, De Gestis Friderici, i. 46, 50, sqq. Cramer, vi. 530 ; Ritter, vii. 437 ; Baur, ii. 509. According to Nied- ner’s Krchgesch. p. 472, he was a Nominalist. t Died 1164, bishop of Paris. J Ed. Basil, 1507; ed. John Aleaume, 1546 ; Cramer, vi. 586; Ritter, vii. 477. 490 THE HLSTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. we have no reason for deriving his work from the shorter one. # His own became the text-hook, on which the most noted schoolmen delivered commentaries. He derived from it the name, by which he was usually known, of Magister Sen tentiarum. His school was continued by Peter of PoicTiERS,f Chancellor of the University of Paris, who signalized himself by giving a finish to the Dialectic Forms. Alan us ab Insulis (Piyssell) called the Great, wrote a dogmatic work, J after a freer method than Lombard, since he endeavoured to prove Christian doctrines without a groundwork of Sentences, and independently of all authorities. Yet he says, although these arguments lead men to the Faith, they will not be suffi¬ cient to beget true Faith; perfect knowledge will be attained first in the heavenly land. But even the moderate Dialectics of Lombard did not attain a predominant influence without a conflict. Walter of St.Victor attacked Dialectics in his work, Contra quatuor Gallice laby- rintlios, by which title he meant to designate Abelard, Peter Lombard, Peter of Poictiers, and Gilbert de la Porree.§ The Provost Geroch, of Reichenberg. in Bavaria, a zealous advocate of ecclesiastical discipline and the Hierarchy, feared that injury would arise to the Faith from Speculation. The Abbot Joachim of Floris in Calabria opposed this Theology, more from a mystical standpoint.|| As in another direction the secularization of the Church by the State, so he here combated the secularization of the Faith by Science. He longed for the independence of the Church and of Faith; in * See Retberg, Comparatio inter Magistri Baudini Libellum et Petri Lombardi Sententias, Gottg. 1834. t Sententiarum, 1. 5 , ed. Mathoud, Par. 1655 (together with Pulleyn’s works). Cramer, vi. 754. £ Died a.d. 1203.—De Arte Sive Articulis Catholicse Fidei in Pez. Thesaurus Anecdotorum, t. i. p. ii. pag. 475. Cramer, v. ii. 445. § An abstract of it is to be found in Bulaei Historia Universitatis Parisiensis, t. ii. A. Planck on the Writings of St. Victor, Stud. u. Krit. 1844. Neander identifies Walter of Mauritania and this Walter of St. Victor, but on chronological grounds they are doubtless different persons. See Planck, p. 861.— [Jacobi ] || De Concordia Utriusque Testamenti, 1. 5; Expositio Apocalypsis, ed Venet. 1519; Psalterium Decern Cordarum, Venet. 1527; Com¬ mentaries on Jeremiah, Isaiah, &c.; an Epitome in Walfii Lectiones Memorabiles t. i. 443, sqq.; Acta Sanctorum Maji, t. vii. p. 89, sqq. Engelhardt, Kirchengesch. Abhandlungen Erlg. 1832, fiber das ewigti Evangelium der Joachim v. Floris. THE ABBOT JOACHIM. 491 short, for the independence of the spiritual life in every respect. He distinguished three Periods in the History of the Kingdom of God : 1st. The Kingdom of the Father in the Old Testament, when God was acknowledged in the works of His almighty power. 2ndly. The Kingdom of the Word, the Revelation of the Son when the divine wisdom was studied in the Mysteries. But he foretold a regeneration of the Church, which would be, 3rdly, the age of the Holy Spirit or of St. John, when the Intellectual would give way to the Contemplative, and the subtle distinctions of ideas to Love. But Mysticism was not a match for the acute¬ ness of Dialectics; it gave way to Lombard, for Innocent III. decided at the Council of Lateran against Joachim. A pious man, Peter Cantor, of St. YTctor,* strove from a scriptural, practical standpoint against this scholastic Theology which aimed at the ascendancy by means of its glosses on the Scriptures. Peter of Blois complains of those who mooted questions respecting Time and Space, and the nature of Universals ( universalia) before they had learned the Elements of Science. They strove after high things, and neglected the doctrine of salvation. However much the connexion of Acuteness and Depth, the intensity of religious feeling and zeal for the Christian Faith, must be acknowledged in Scholasticism, yet by following the principle of Augustin and Anselm, that the intellectus has only to develope what is given by the jides, it was led to an erroneous endeavour, to receive everything, even the errors of Church doctrine, into the system, and to confirm them. The scholastic method certainly promoted Acuteness, but it also tended to Formalism ; wdien most profound, it spent itself in barren subtleties. It is often necessary to distinguish what belonged to the dialectic form, and what to the underlying Christian consciousness. The mystical Theology formed a wholesome counterpoise against the one-sided, hair-splitting intellectual tendency, partly where it proceeded separately from Dialectics, but chiefly in cases where they w r ere in unison. * In his Yerbum Abbreviatum, Moutib. 1634. 492 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. HISTORY OF SPECIAL DOGMAS. A. Among the introductory Dogmas we class, THE DOCTRINE OF INSPIRATION. The doctrine of Inspiration was as yet only occasionally touched upon, and nothing more than unconnected statements were made respecting it. Abelard expressed his pecu liar views (which might have been very important had they been followed out more consecutively), with great freedom in the introduction to his treatise, Sic et Non; he there asserts that everything in the Scripture did not proceed in an equal degree from Inspiration. The Pro¬ phets sometimes had not the gift of prophecy, and from the custom of prophesying, and from supposing that they had the spirit of prophecy, they uttered many things that were false, and mixed with their own conceptions. God permitted this, in order to humble them, and to make them see more distinctly what proceeded from the Divine Spirit, and what from their own. And when the holy writers of Scripture possessed this Spirit He did not grant all His gifts to every one, nor enlighten the soul respecting everything, but revealed or concealed sometimes one thing, sometimes another.* In this language was implied the idea of a successive development of divine Revelation, and of a necessary reciprocal supple¬ menting of its organs. Hence, he says, Peter might be mistaken in his opinion respecting the observance of the Law, and Paul might rightfully reprove him. But if Prophets and Apostles were not free from error, how much less would the Church’s teachers be so.f * Ed. Henke, p. 10.—Constat vero et Proplietas ipsos quandoque prophetiye gratia camisse, et nonnulla ex usu prophetandi, cum se spiritum prophetise habere crederent, per spiritum suum falsa protu- lisse ; et hoc eis ad humilitatis custodiam permissum esse, ut sic videlicet verius cognoscerent, quales per spiritum Dei et quales per suum existerent, et se eum qui mentivi veil falli nescit ex dono habere, cum haberent. Qui etiam cum habetur, sicut non omnia uni confert dona, ita nec de omnibus mentem ejus, quern replet, illuminat sed hoc, modo illud revelat, et cum unum aperit, alterum occultat. t Ibid.—Ipsum etiam apostolorum principem—post illam quoque specialem a Domino promissam sancti spiritus effusionum—lapsum in ex*rorem de cii'cumcisionis adhuc et quorundam antiquorum vitium observantia, cum a coapostolo suo Paulo graviter atque salubriter publice correctus esset, a perniciosa simulatione desistei’e non puduit THE DOCTRINE OF INSPIRATION. 493 In Anselm of Canterbury no doubts could arise about the prevalent theory of Inspiration, but he endeavoured to make this object of Faith clear to the Reason and was led to reflect on the nature of Prophecy. Eadmer relates, that once on waking, he occupied himself with meditating how to conceive of the intention of future things by the Prophets, and while he was musing with his eyes fixed on the ground, he saw through the wall, the monks rise up and set everything in readiness for the Mass. Applying this, he inferred—as here Space is annihilated for human intuition, so also the Prophets in their moments of Inspiration beheld the Divine indepen¬ dently of the separation occasioned by Time. Whether this was imagination, or a somnambulist vision which thus affected Anselm, certain it is that it was the immediate occasion of his entering on an examination of Prophecy. With the question of Inspiration was connected a diversity of views respecting the identity of religious Truth in the Old and New Testament. The point in debate was, whether all the Christian articles of Faith were already contained in the Old Testament. Those who had adopted a stricter view of the influence of the divine Spirit on the Sacred Writers maintained that all the New Testament articles of Faith must be found already developed in the Old Testament. A difference of opinion therefore arose at the same time on the question, what articles of Faith, generally, were necessary to Salvation. Some made the circle smaller, others larger; the former had a freer, the latter a more restricted, dogmatic tendency. The difference led at last to a fundamental distinc¬ tion in the relation of Dogma and Faith, according as Religion was placed more in the Intellect or the Feelings. The one¬ sided ecclesiastical dogmatism embraced a view which did not distinguish between the dogmatic idea and the element of faith, and therefore placed the essence of Religion in the former. Its advocates required in the Old Testament the same extent of developed articles of Faith, necessary for Salvation. Others like Hugo of St. Victor transferred the essence of Religion to the disposition and regarded knowledge Quid itaque mirum, cum ipsos etiam prophetas et apostolos ab errore non penitus fuisse constet alienos, si in tam multiplici sanctorum patrum scriptura nonnulla propter suprapositam causam erronee prolata atque scripta videantur ? 494 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. as secondary. He assumes that in believing, affectus and cognitio meet together; its objective is knowledge, but its subjective importance consists in affectus, and on that depends the real importance of the internal religious life. There may be agreement in the affectus, when there is a difference in the cognitio. Accordingly he impugns those who regard the articles of faith as equally necessary in order to salvation for all.* On the contrary he urges that we see how the Apostles themselves not till a late period and with difficulty recognised the necessity of the redemptive sufferings of Christ, and that this doctrine was to them for a long time a stone of stumbling; and yet this article of faith was clearly developed in the Old Testament! Christ said of John the Baptist, that he was greater than all the Prophets, and yet he was in doubt, because Christ erected no outward Messianic kingdom; how then could all the Prophets of the Old Testament have as much knowledge on this subject as believers in the New Testa¬ ment ? According to this view the Old Testament standpoint would be higher than the Christian, for there would be nothing wanting to it which Christianity has revealed ; without the outward manifestations there would have been the same certainty of Faith. By means of a pure spiritual intuition they would have attained to the same certainty, which is now reached by faith in the Gospel. According to this view God would either have been too severe on the Old Testament Standpoint, since he only vouchsafed to a few that grace which revealed to them the higher truths that were necessary to Salvation, or the Revelation must have been far more general than under the New Testament. Hence this opinion is erroneous, and we must distinguish the fundamental article of Faith. Faith in God as Creator and Redeemer which is com¬ mon to the Old and New Testament, is requisite for ail stand¬ points of piety and necessary for Salvation. But whatever besides is contained in this Faith, must be gradually developed by divine Revelation ; and to this belongs the manner in which Redemption is accomplished by God. Hence we recognise an identity in the doctrine of Salvation and yet a continued development in the knowdedge of it, which is not the same in all persons at different periods, or even at the same period. * Qui quasi quadam pietate impii in Deum efficiuntur, et dum ultra id, quod in veritate est, sentiunt, in ipsam veritatem offendunt. THE IDEA OE GOD. 495 B. THE DOGMAS OF SPECIAL DOGMATICS. THEOLOGY. 1. THE IDEA OF GOD IN GENERAL. Anselm is signalized by bis construction of the ontological proof of the Divine Existence, the foundation of which was already to he found in Augustin, but the completion of it is due to Anselm.* He laboured for a long time to find a simple argument to prove the existence of God. Though as an article of faith this stood immoveably firm, yet a proof w 7 as required for the Reason. What was matter of feeling, intui¬ tion, and religious certainty, required to be briefly put into a syllogistic form. But here was his mistake. Everything was to be demonstrated. But here the inadequate syllogistic form is to be distinguished from the fundamental law's of thought and of the religious consciousness. As in Anselm’s mmd Speculation and Religion were continually mingled, he did not keep apart the idea of the Absolute and the idea of the living God. He confounded the necessity of the thinking faculty, which cannot exist without an Absolute, and the inward necessity of the religious nature, which cannot exist without faith in a living God. As the necessary recognition of an Absolute for the thinking Reason w T as obvious to him, so he transferred it without any intermediate process to the Idea of the living God. His argument is connected with the essence of Realism ; accordingly, all thinking appeared to him as ultimately traceable to God, as the source of Truth, and as affording evidence of an immediate connexion with God. The basis of his argument was formed from these Ideas : the idea of God carries the evidence of its reality in itself; it is imme¬ diate ; deducible from nothing else, and to be assumed in all thinking. Without this assumption there could be no think¬ ing. The human mind can invent nothing and create nothing of itself : all thinking is only a taking up of what is given— a perceiving. If, generally, there is no absolute error but everywhere there is a foundation of Truth, so much the less could the human Mind invent the Idea of the Perfect. This idea is rather a Revelation of the most perfect Being himself, an evidence of the connexion of the created Reason with the * Sec bis Monologium and Proslogium. Beur, Lehre von der Dreieinigkeit, ii 372. Hasse, Anselm, ii. 233. 496 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. Eternal Atheism is therefore something which cannot be matter of thinking. Anselm # distinguishes between a think¬ ing of ideas, the thinking of that which is connected with things material and the merely formal, which consists in expressions which are uttered without real thinking. Hence, we find in the 53rd Psalm, “ The fool saith there is no God,” but this is only an utterance; he cannot really think that there is no God. He thus describes in his JProslogiumf the connexion of the Religious and the Speculative ;—“ Thou art so truth¬ ful, 0 Lord, my God, that thou canst not be conceived as non¬ existent ; for if any spirit could conceive something better than thyself, this Creature would rise above the Creator.” This thought he wished to present in a syllogism the Idea of God is the idea of the Being, quo nihil magus cogitari 'potest. But an existence is more than a thought; consequently, in the idea of the most perfect Being his existence is founded to whom this idea refers ; otherwise there would be something greater by the supposition. In this conclusion is the error of a petitio principii. Anselm concludes that if something be granted as merely thought of, it must also be granted really to exist; but existence does not belong to the completeness of the thought. The Monk Gaunilo correctly exposed this error ; he objected § that if a person gave a description of the lost Island of Atlantis it might as well be inferred that the Island was in existence. In logical acuteness he was superior to Anselm, but inferior in profundity and hence he was not able to extricate the Idea itself from the defective form. Anselm might have rejoined that there was a difference between the idea of an accidental existence, and that of God the necessary Being.|j * Proslogium, c. 2, 4. t C. 3. £ Ibid. c. 2.—Et certe id quo majus cogitari nequit, non potest esse in intellectu solo. Si enim vel in solo intellectu est, potest cogitari esse et in re, quod majus est. Si ergo id, quo majus cogitari non potest, est in solo intellectu id ipsum, quo majus cogitari non potest, est quo majus cogitari potest; sed certe hoc esse non potest. Existit ergo procul dubio aliquid, quo majus cogitari non valet, et in intellectu et in re. § Liber pro Insipiente adv. Anselmi in Proslogio Ratiocinationem in Anselm’s Works, ed. Gerberon. Hasse, ii. 241. || See Anselmi Liber Apologeticus contra Gaunilonem. THE AGE OF SCHOLASTICISM. 497 2. THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY. The dialectic differences of the Schools in reference to general Ideas, when applied to the doctrine of the Trinity, occasioned a controversy respecting it. On both sides it was mis¬ stated according to their respective assumptions ; categories were applied to the nature of God, which only suited created beings Roscellin. in accordance with his Nominalism main¬ tained that only the individual was the real thing (res). If his opponents said—That inasmuch as the three persons are only one divine Being, they might be called una res —he dis¬ puted it, because it appeared to him to follow that in God there is one real Being which has three nomina; he on the contrary regarded the Trinity as tres res ,* and thus gave a handle to the charge of Tritheism. Gilbert Porretanus laid himself open to the same imputation by the application he made of Realism.t His method somewhat resembles that of Johannes Philoponus. He wished to distinguish with pre¬ cision the various meanings of the word Deus; either it was equivalent to divinitas —that is, substantia qua est Deus , as far as there is one essence of the Divinity in three persons, or substantia quce est Deus , as far as the individual persons are considered, distinguished by their personal attributes. He held these distinctions to be necessary in order to guard against Sabellianism. Certainly it was beneficial to set aside the application of dialectic theories to this doctrine. Abelard also opposed it.J Dialectic divisions, he says, are suited only to compound beings. It was an important remark of Peter Lombard that the determinations of the Church were rather designed to exclude from the simplicity of the Divine Essence what is not in it, than to place anything in it.§ In their attempts to construct a rational view of the doc¬ trine of the Trinity, the scholastic Theologians in general fol¬ lowed the analogy with the created spirit which had been suggested by Augusttn. Anselm takes the lead in this : * Baluz Miscell. iv. 478.—Si tres personae sunt una tantum res, et non sunt tres res per se sicut tres angeli aut tres animse ita tamen. ut voluntate et potentia sint idem; ergo Pater et Spiritus Sanctus cum Filio incarnatus est. p Baur, Lehre v. d. Dreieinigkeit. ii. 508. t Introductio in Theologiarn, ii. 1073. § Sententiae, lib. i.; Distinctio 4. E E 498 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. “ We cannot know,” he says, “ the Supreme Being in himself, but only after a certain analogy with created beings, therefore most of all with the rational spirit. The more this spirit enters into itself and observes itself, the more will it succeed in raising itself to the knowledge of the Absolute Spirit.* The human spirit is a mirror in which we may see the Image of that which we do not directly behold. The Supreme Spirit presupposes his own existence, knows himself ; the Word begotten from himself, is one with his own essence. Thus the Supreme Being expressed himself. As everything which is produced by human art, was before in the idea of the formative spirit, and as this idea remains even when the work perishes, and is, in this respect, one with the art of the formative spirit itself so it is not another, but the same word by which God knows himself and all creatures. In the divine Word Crea¬ tures have a higher being than in themselves ; the ideal Being rests in the divine thoughts. The relation of the Son to the Father is something elevated above all language. The expression generation is best suited to represent the relation, but yet it is symbolical. Further, as God knows himself, he loves himself; his love to himself presupposes his being and knowing. This is also denoted by the procession of the Holy Spirit from both ; all three pass completely into one another, and thus constitute the unity of the Supreme Being.” In this manner Anselm vindicated the Western doctrines of the procession of the Spirit from the Father and the Son. During the time of his banishment, he defended this doctrine at the Council of Bari in Apulia, against the Greek Church, * Monologium, c. 64, sqq.—Patet, quia sicut sola est mens rationalis inter omnes ci’eaturas, quoe ad ejus investigationem assurgere valeat, ita nihilominus eadem sola est, per quam maxime ipsam et ad ejusdem inventionem proficere queat. Nam jam cognitum est, quia hac illi maxime per naturalis essentia) propinquat similitudinem. Quid igitur assertius, quam quia mens rationalis quanto studiosius ad sediscendum descendit, tanto efficacius ad illius cognitionem ascendit, et quanto se ipsam intueri negligit, tanto ab ejus speculatione descendit, c. 65. Aptissime logitur ipsa sibimet esse velut speculum dici potest, quo speculetur, ut ita dicam imaginem ejus, quern faciem a facie vedere nequit. Nam si mens ipsa sola ex omnibus, qua) facta sunt sui memor et intelligens et amans esse potest, non video cur negetur esse in ilia vera imago illius essentia qua) per sui memoriam et intelligentiam et femorem in Trinitate ineffabile consi&tit. THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY. 499 with such general approbation, that he was commissioned by the Pope to reduce it writing. Anselm was followed by Peter Lombard and the other theologians of this period. Hugo of St. Victor carries out the analogy in the following manner ;* * * § the Spirit,—the know¬ ledge of itself begotten from it, or Wisdom, and the Love proceeding from both, with which it embraces its wisdom. In God there are not changeable affections as in Man, but each is one with his own essence, and this higher relation is designated by the term Trinity. Abelard agreed in principle with this view, but went still further. While the above-mentioned theologians acknowledged that the doctrine of the Trinity was a mystery, and only sought an analogon to it in the human spirit, he wished to prove necessarily and a priori , that this doctrine was an ade¬ quate expression for the doctrine of God as the Supreme Being. In order to think of God as the most perfect, we must attribute to him omnipotence by which he creates what he wishes,—and the highest wisdom by virtue of which nothing is hidden from him, and according to which he arranges all things,—and the highest love and grace by which he governs and guides whatever he has created by his omnipotence and wisdom. This corresponds to the relation of the Father as begetting, of the Son as the begotten, and of the Holy Spirit as proceeding from both.f Procession ( procedere ) is a natural designation of Love, for it denotes expansion towards other beings, in order to connect them with One’s self by Love.J; In like manner he says—“ Man as the image of God represents the Father by his power over other creatures, the Son by his Pteason and the Holy Spirit by his original innocence.”§ He seeks to point out an analogy to the Trinity in the whole Crea¬ tion ; hence his comparision of the Seal; the brass, the form, and the seal, which through both is effected ; or of the Sun, light, and heat, the heat is an image of the Holy Spirit, as the love of God ; even as Christ said that he came to kindle a fire on earth, namely, a fire of love. This comparison of the Sun gave a pretext for accusing him of Sabellianism. Since * De Sacramentis, i. p. iii. c. 23. De Tribus Diebus, Opp. i. f. 21, aqq. Liebner, p. 374. + Introductio, i. pag. 985. + Ibid. ii. pag. 1085; § Ibid, i. 979. K K 2i 500 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. Abelard held the doctrine of the Trinity to be a necessary idea of Reason, he endeavoured to show traces of it in Anti¬ quity. Alanus ab Insulis says, according to the words of Hermes Trismegistus, Unity begets Unity, and reflects its glow back upon itself.* 3. OF THE DIVIDE ATTRIBUTES. Omnipresence. Abelard was charged with not acknowledging God’s essential Omnipresence. Walter understood him, as if he resolved the Omnipresence into an universal agency, like the Socinians. But we can hardly admit such a tendency in Abelard, at least from the beginning. Since he was obliged to vindicate himself from the charge of transferring ideas of Time and Space to God, how could he have thought of the relation of God to the World in so abstract a manner ? That charge rests on a misunderstanding. The essential point of his view consists in this, that he regarded the Omni¬ presence of God as efficient without separating the essence and the agency of God ; his omnipotence was to be thought of only as omnipresent, his Presence only as an efficient presence. When it is said in Holy Scripture that God came down, this cannot be understood of a movement in space, but it only denotes the visible beginning of a fresh agency of God.f God comes or goes in reference to the impartation or withdrawal of his gifts.J He, who is everywhere by his essential Presence, cannot move anywhere in relation to Space ; but that he is everywhere by virtue of his Essence, is to be thought of as his being everywhere according to his omnipotence and efficiency. All Space is present to Him ; he never ceases to operate; for all Space can only be maintained in existence by God’s omni- * Regula Theolog. ed. Mingarelli, p. ISO. f Introductio in Theol. iii. 1126. X Quum in quos dam venire vel a quibusdam recedere dicitur, juxta donorum suorum collationem vel subtractionem intelligftur, non secundum localem ejus adventum vel recessum qui ubique per pnesen- tram suae substantiae semper existens, non habet, quo moveri localiter possit. Quum itaque Deus in virginem venire dicitur secundum aliquam efficaceam, non secundum localem accessionem intelligi debet. Quid est euim aliud eum in virgenem descendisse ut incarnaretur, nisi ut nostram assumeret infirmitatem, se humillasse, ut hoec quidem humiliatio ejus videlicet intelligatur descensus ? THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES. 501 potence, and in this respect he is present therein by his sub¬ stance.* Thus in Abelard’s mind the idea of an Omnipre¬ sence not resting but active was connected with that of the divine upholding. God upholds all things in existence, or he imparts to them fresh powers. We may, indeed, in the same way, say of a King that his power extends everywhere, and speak of his long arm, but it is not true of him that by his natural and essential presence he acts everywhere in his king¬ dom, but mediately and by his representatives. Thus also in Abelard’s Sentences God is everywhere by his Essence, since he acts everywhere by himself without mediation. It is observable that he attributes to omnipresence a relation to Time as well as to Space. Some of the profoundest thinkers among his contemporaries misunderstood this doctrine of Abelard’s. Hugo of St. Victor impugns the calumniatores veritatis, who maintained that God was everywhere only by his power and not according to his essence. Certainly he quotes arguments which are not to be found in Abelard, yet some things favour the supposition that he had Abelard in his eye. He pronounces the arguments of his opponents to be partly absurd, as for example, that God may not be defiled by his essential omnipresence. The only question is, whether God according to his essence is nowhere, or everywhere, or only in some places. If we accepted the last supposition, God would be confined by the limits of Space; therefore w T e must admit that he is everywhere, and yet not enclosed in any space. Although we cannot perfectly comprehend this, yet we must necessarily believe it, since no created being can exist without Him even for an instant. Hugo, therefore, did not essentially differ from Abelard’s view ; when we separate all relation to space from God’s upholding activity, we arrive at the idea of Omnipresence. Omnipotence. The Schoolmen of the twelfth Century aimed in their discussions to guard against two rocks; on the * Quod tamen unique esse per substantiam dicitur, juxta ejus poten- tiam vel operationem dici arbitror, ac si videlicet diceretur, ita ei cuncta loca esse praesentia, ut in eis aliquid operari nunquam cesset, nec ejus potentia sit alicubi otiosa. Nam et ipsa loca et quidquid est in eis nisi per ipsum conserventur, manere non possunt et per substan¬ tiam in eis esse dicitur, ubi per propriee virtutem substantiae aliquid nunquam operari cesset, vel ea ipsa servando, vel aliquid in eis per se ipsum ministrando. 502 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. one hand, against the admission of an infinite caprice with which Omnipotence would be confounded; and on the other, of the representation of a natural necessity in God. Ansf.lm says,*—We must necessarily so understand Freedom and the Will of God that we attribute nothing to him inconsistent with his dignity. The true idea of Freedom regards only wiiat is worthy of God. Goodness is not to be considered as if it were something settled by God’s pleasure, which might have been otherwise, but it agrees with his essence. Hence if any one should say—What God wills is good, and what he does not will is not good, this is not so to be understood that if God willed something bad this would be good because he willed it; for it does not follow, that if God willed to lie, it would be right to lie, but rather that a Being who willed to lie would not be God. As truly as God is God, we cannot con¬ ceive that he would will what is bad. If we speak of necessity in God, it is only an improper expression for the unchange¬ ableness of his goodness, which he has from himself, and is not derived from some other quarter. Abelard did not always remain satisfied with these mode¬ rate views ; he lost himself in inquiries respecting the relation of God to the possible and the real, and w r as met by the diffi- * cultyf that we must allow many things to be possible to Man which we cannot attribute to God. He answers,—We cannot ascribe to God what is connected with human defect and limi¬ tation ; yet, in a certain sense, we may reasonably refer to God’s omnipotence what is done by his creatures ; for God makes use of created beings in order to accomplish what he wills; so far, therefore, we may find his agency in what they do, and say that God effects all things. But proceeding fur¬ ther, he starts the question whether God could do anything more or better than he actually does, or could leave undone what he does. The affirmative of this question, he says, has difficulties, for since God in all that he does or leaves alone has a rational cause, and the Supreme Reason cannot act against Reason, we cannot perceive how God could have acted otherwise. Upon this he brings forward the absurd sen timent, that we should owe God no thanks for his good ness, which contradicts the language of Holy Writ and of the Church-teachers; we ourselves could do many things dif- * Cui Deus Homo, i. 12. + Introductio, iii p. 1109. ABELARD AND HUGO OF ST. VICTOR. 503 ferently from the way in which we actually do; and according to this notion, God’s Omnipotence would be more limited than the ability of Man. Against this last position he says, that this belongs to our weakness; we should be better, if we could not do what is evil. He sets aside all objections by the dis¬ tinction between an absolute and a hypothetical possibility and necessity. We must not allow ourselves to think of God’s will separate from his nature, and we cannot call this com¬ pulsion. Since his goodness is so great, that he wills exactly what is good, he is so much the more to be loved. Should we love a person the less who in consequence of his great love cannot do otherwise than help us ? God, who is good in the highest sense, is so inflamed by his inexpressible goodness,* that what he wills he necessarily wills. He then again repre¬ sents the difficulties on both sides ; which shows how very much he was perplexed by this problem—“ Since I wish in all things to preserve the honour of God, X hope that he who has freed us from the snares of sin, will also free us from those of words, and guide us so that no one may be able to charge us with falsehood or arrogance m what we say of Him. He who looks more at the disposition than at the act will gra¬ ciously acknowledge our endeavour.” As he was attacked on account of these sentiments, he justified himself in his Apolo- geticus. “ I believe,” he said, “ that God can only do that which it becomes him to do, and that he can do much, which he never will do.” Hugo of St. Victor attacked Abelard’s doctrine of omni¬ potence without naming him, and without differing essentially from him. Wfi may remark the difficulties which he also found in this investigation. He argued against thosef who wished to prescribe a limit to infinite might. God could certainly make that better which he has created, not as if he could do anything bad, but he can make the good still better ; not that he does not always do what is best in and for itself, but he can cause that which has been effected by Him, to advance to a higher stage of excellence. Hugo avails himself of a dis¬ tinction which has since been frequently applied by the school¬ men ; he attributes a twofold will to God—the voluntas beneplaciti and the voluntas signi; the will of God in itself or * Theologia Christiana, Martene et Durand, v. 1337. f De Sacramentis, i. 22. 504 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. immanent, and as it appears in commands and prohibitions, in events and in the works of God. If we understand the will of God in the first sense, he can do nothing otherwise than he wills to do ; if we understand it in the second sense, everything which God has created, may be better than it is; he can make the good more perfect.* God’s omnipotence must apply to everything to effect which requires a real Power, For the theistic standpoint, his remark is important, that as Time is not commensurate with the eternity of God, so neither are the works of God commensurate with the extent of his Power.t Abelard 5 ideas of God’s omnipotence and omnipresence led him to some peculiar views of the relation of the natural and the supernatural, and consequently of the idea of miracle. On this standpoint he did not separate outwardly the imme¬ diate and mediate agency of God, but ascribed everything to his immediate operation, and hence conceived of the upholding agency of God as a continued Creation. He impugned tire miraculous narratives of his own times, not as an opponent of supernatural events generally, but only of an unmodified antagonism against the Natural; both, in his opinion, ought to be in unison, and a miracle should be regarded as a higher law of Nature, a view in which he had been anticipated by Augustin. Everything must be referred back to a divine arrangement of the universe which embraced all things. He distinguished the connexion of the order of the Universe as it was founded in the divine Reason, and its representation in actual appearance. In reference to the first, nothing can be conceived which goes beyond it; every¬ thing is settled in it without exception; the whole agency of God which was called forth in the phenomena and which was from Eternity in the divine Reason is comprised in it. In reference to the history of the Creation he calls it one con- nected Day.J The Word of the Father is the Wisdom by which God from the beginning arranges all things which become visible in his works. Here is nothing contradictory, * Summa, i. e. 13. + Sicut peternitatem non sequat tempus nec immensitatem loeus, sic nec potentiam opus. X Expositio in Hexsemeron, Martene et Durand Thesaurus, v. pag. 1372. -Diem unum vocat totam illorum operum Dei consummationem prius in i/.ente kabitam et in opere postmodum sexta die completam ABELARD ON MIRACLES. 505 nothing abrupt, nothing isolated, but everything is connected agreeably to Reason, m the divine Wisdom. It is the Platonic idea of the mundus intelligibilis. Over against this ideal order of the Universe he placed what proceeds from the powers and capabilities of the phenomenal world, in which only a part of the divine plan of the world is made known. When we would examine* the powers of Nature in anything whatever we do not look upon the original creative act of God, but upon powers and arrangements which he has founded in Nature, and which bring forth all things without miracle. Only the question arises whether the powers of Nature that have been already given are sufficient to account for certain phenomena. He does not regard a Miracle as a phenomenon which was not included in that ideal constitution of Nature, but as one which cannot be accounted for, from the powers of phenomenal Nature. We say of Miracles,f that they take place contra vel supra naturam , inasmuch as the original constitution of Nature was not sufficient for them, but new powers implanted by God were requisite. Miracles are marks of a new creature power introduced by God, which pre¬ sents itself to us as new in relation to the natural constitution of the phenomenal World. When Philosophers pronounce a miracle to be impossible, they look, no doubt, at the common course of Nature, but not at the superabundance of the divine Omnipotence, on which it depends to create a new thing beyond and above the common course of Nature. The same thing takes place as when he, first of all, created the world out of nothing. Abelard did not maintain that henceforth no more miracles can happen ; nor does he allow that miracles were merely necessary for the founding of the Church; miracles might also serve to kindle a true living Faith and to confute Heretics, Pagans, and Jews. The reason why they do not now take place is because we are not worthy of them, we * Expositio in Hexaemeron, Martene et Durand Thesaur. v. 1378. f Ibid. i. 1.—Unde ilia, quae per miracrila fiunt, magis contra vel supra naturam, quam secundum naturam fieri fatemur, cum ad illud scilicet faciendum nequaquam ilia rerum praeparatio prior sufficere possit, nisi quandam vim novam rebus ipsis Deus conferret, sicut et in illis sex diebus faciebat, ubi sola ejus voluntas vim naturae obtinebat in singulis efficiendis.—Theologia Chi’istiana,iii. 1133. Contra naturam vel praeter naturam fieri, eo quod primordialium causarum institutio ad hoc minime sufficere possit, nisi Deus praeter solitum propria volun- tate vim quandam rebus impertiret, ut hoc inde fieri posset. 506 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. desire them not for the salvation of souls, but from motives of vanity. Hence that Faith has vanished of which Christ declared that it could move mountains. Yet he did not over¬ look the subordinate position of miracles in relation to the whole religious life. He regarded spiritual miracles as of the highest order ; and this was not merely his own peculiar view; in writers who differ widely on other points we find the senti¬ ment that the true miracle and the end of all miracles is the impartation of divine life. The doctrines of Providence and the Government of the World had no special place in the dogmatic Manuals of this period, but were discussed under the chapters relating to the divine Will, Prescience and Predestination. The views of Theologians were for the most part strictly Augustinian; yet far from the extravagance of the earlier Predestinarians, they sought, at least in their language, to save human Freedom, and w r ere unwilling in any respect to refer the causality of Evil to God. Hence they made distinctions, which, indeed, testify their zeal for maintaining the purity of religion and morals, but are of little service in reference to the subject under consideration. Peter Lombard endeavoured to explain the relation of the divine Will to Evil, without touching on either the Omnipotence or the Holiness of God, and arrived at the conclusion that we cannot say, God wills that Evil should happen ; nor that he wills it should not happen, for nothing can happen against his will ; we can only say, He does not will that evil should happen.* Anselm and Hugo occupied themselves especially with these discussions. Anselm composed a treatise on the har¬ mony of prescience, Predestination and Free Will.f He endeavoured to prove that the free self-determination of Man was not at all affected by God’s infallible Prescience. God foresees the Necessary and the Free, each in its kind ; every¬ thing depends on keeping apart the two standpoints of eternal and temporal development. As there is no contradiction in this, that from the standpoint of Eternity all is one immediate Present, and yet in the development of Time there is a Past * Sententiarum i. Deit. 46, f.—Non enira Deo volente vel nolente, sed non volente fiunt mala. f De concordiae praescientiae et praedestinationes nec non gratise Dei cum libero arbitrio. See also his treatises De Libero Arbitrio and Da Casu Diaboli. ANSELM ON PREDESTINATION AND FREE-WILL. 507 and a Future, there is no difficulty in admitting that what presents itself from Eternity as unchangeable and necessary, appears in reference to its temporal development as change able and dependent on the free self-determination of the creature. The freedom of contingency appears as a necessary transition point # for the development. This distinction, by which nothing is really gained for the maintenance of free¬ dom, makes contingency a necessary appearance for the temporal development; that which in the divine plan of the world is fixed as something necessary realizes itself in the form of an apparent contingency. Anselm felt it necessary to obviate the consequences that might be drawn from this view. To the question “ if God acknowledges nothing, not even evil, as something existent, but his prescience precedes everything, must not the causality of Evil be traced back to God ?” he replies, Everything positive is to be deduced from the divine prescience, but Evil is something merely negative. On examining more closely how Evil is tc be defined, he would not regard it as a mere negative of good, but as a privation ; it is, where good ought to be and to manifest its influence, but is absent. The Evil Will cannot otherwise be explained and derived. It presupposes no cause, but is itself cause and effect, because Evil is not strictly an effect, but a defectus, a falling off from God. Anselm has merit in his statements on the justice of God ; he establishes more firmly the connexion between Sin and Punishment; he views as correlate, and con¬ siders the divine punitive justice as revealing itself in relation to them. If Sin remained unpunished there would be no difference between sinning and not sinning. Hugo of St. Victor distinguishes in Evil the subjective of the tendency of the Will, and the objective of the act coming into manifesta¬ tion. Evil consists essentially in the subjective tendency of the will opposing itself to God. Sin as subjective cannot be otherwise explained, and is an act of Freedom, but that it takes this or the other direction, does not depend merely on its subjective character, but on certain limits set by the divine arrangement of the World. Therefore, as soon as the sub¬ jective tendency of Evil would become objective, it is no * Hoc propositum secundum quod vocati sunt sancti, in seteraitate in qua non est prseteritum vel futurum, sed tantum prsesens, immuta- bile est, sed in ipsis kominibus ex libertate arbitrii aliquando est mutabile. 508 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. longer free, but bound by the divine arrangement and must be subservient to it. This determined evil Will is in itself something evil, but it must ultimately be broken up by its own vileness, yet it cannot arbitrarily rush forth in any direction, but only where the divine Will gives it room. Thus subjective Freedom and the higher causality may be harmonized in the objective manifestation.* b. ANTHROPOLOGY. 1. OF man’s original state, the fall and its CONSEQUENCES. As in the preceding period the difference between Augustin and Pelagius was rendered most apparent in their sentiments respecting human Freedom, so the standpoint of the School¬ men is marked by the way in which they express themselves on the same subject. In this period they were the opponents of the Pelagian definition of Freedom, and take as their basis Augustin’s view. Anselm examined this doctrine in his treatise de libero arbitrio. A definition, he says, must suit everything to which the idea is applied. The definition of free Will as freedom of choice does not apply to God and the blessed Spirits; indeed, the more freely we advance in good¬ ness by moral development, so much the farther are we removed from the possibility of sinning, and so much less do we decide according to a choice between good and evil ; Goodness then becomes Nature. Hence the possibility of sinning and the choice belong not to the essence of Freedom. He definesf Freedom as the ability to preserve the received purity of the Will for its oven sake. In the first place, he presupposes the reception, since Autonomy can be ascribed only to God, but not to created Reason. God is the original source of all good: but the creature originally had the capa¬ bility of persisting in this tendency. The qualifying clause “ for its own sake ” is also important; according to Anselm the essence of the ethical consists in the disposition, and there¬ fore in love to God and Goodness for their own sake. Abe¬ lard on similar grounds agreed in rejecting the Pelagian * De Sacramentis Fidei, i. p. v. c 15, 23, 29. See Liebner, p. 391. t C. 3.—Arbitrium potens servare rectitudinem voluntatis proptex ipsam rectitudinem. man’s original state. £09 definition. He defines Freedom as the ability to do that which we have decided to be agreeable to Reason. Also Peter Lombard says, Free will in the original state of man was the ability to strive after and to perform what any one has resolved to do without any constraint, on rational grounds. Like Augustin, the Schoolmen of this period regarded the original relation of rational creatures to God as conditioned by Grace; therefore there was a dependence of Man on grace before the Fall, distinct from his dependence on grace after it; but on both Standpoints Grace was necessary for the per¬ formance of goodness. In this respect the views of Peter Lombard are very important; he divides the endowments of the first man into dona naturalia, what he had in virtue of his original natural constitution ; and the dona gratia , which were founded in communion with God and added to his original constitution. The dona natures he makes to consist in purity and vigour of all the powers of the soul. # The Free Will of Man was inclined to good, and was opposed by no inclination to Evil; but this Nature was not sufficient of itself to realize the destiny of Man. Left to himself Man could only work evil ; hence he needed grace in order to will what was good in an effective manner, and not merely as co-operans but as operans. The distinction of these classes of gifts did not in itself lead to Pelagianism, to which it was set in direct oppo¬ sition by Augustin ; but it certainly might be so applied, that the original righteousness of Man might be explained as something accidental and only given from without. Now if man lost this righteousness by Sin, no important alteration would take place in his nature, and it would follow next, that his Redemption was only something accidental. Neither could it b.e rightly viewed as a restoration of human nature, nor could moral doctrine according to these presuppositions be properly apprehended. Scholasticism did not exhibit this erroneous view in the course of this Period, yet towards the close of it some trace was noticeable, since Peter de la Celle, afterwards bishop of Chartres, protested against it.f He * Lib. ii. Dist. 24, D.—Considerandum est, quod fuerit illud adju- torium homini datum in creatione, quo poterat manere, si vellet. Illud utique fuit libertas arbitrii ab omni labe et corruptela immunis atque voluntatis rectitudo et omnium naturalium potentiarum animae sinceri- tas atque vivacitas. f Epist. 1. iii. Ep. 4. 510 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. treated respecting the difference of the ideas of tne Image and Likeness of God, the natural powers of the Soul, and what it was capable of according to its original constitution. He dis¬ puted against those who regarded the likeness of God only as an accidental gift, so that even salvation and glorification would be something contingent. It might also be inferred that even Life is only contingent for Man. As the Soul is the Life of the body, so is God the Life of the Soul, and com¬ munion with him is what belongs to the true essence of the Soul. Peter Lombard makes the consequences of the first sin to consist in the withdrawal of the dona gratuita from Man, and not the entire loss, but the corruption of the dona naturalia. If the latter had been altogether lost, there would have been no point of connexion for his amendment and for Redemption. Most of the Schoolmen explained the first sin and the pro¬ pagation of hereditary depravity according to Augustin. The whole of Humanity was contained in the first man, and hence is like him, polluted. The realist Standpoint which was sup¬ ported by the translation— in quo omnes peccaverunt— favoured this view. Anselm, in his treatise on original sin, distin¬ guishes the natura qua est homo , quomodo omnes alii, and the personality by which an individual differs from the rest. Thus the peccatum ccnnatum or natuuB is to be distinguished from the peccatum personce. Odo, who for a long time contested with Nominalism, developed this view still further from the realist standpoint in his book De peccato originali. On this point Abelard showed the contrariety between the influence of the Church doctrine and the peculiar principles of his own speculations. The latter would have led him conse¬ quentially to Pelagianism. Between him and Augustin a remarkable psychological relation existed; both had to contend with a powerful sensuousness, but Augustin was so much the more disposed to throw off the slavery of the spirit by sensual allurement; Abelard on the contrary passed a milder judg¬ ment on sensual allurement, and excused it as given by Nature. In his treatise, Scito teipsum , he says, One man has a greater * Yera quoque virtus, vera bonitas, vera justitia, immo ipsa veritas est Deus; sine his igitur, si fuerit amnia, moritur; et dicis esse acci- dentalia bona ? ABELARD ON HUMAN DEPRAVITY. 511 proneness to this sin, and another to that. This allurement is not in itself sinful, but rather serves for the exercise of Virtue ; only the conscious contempt of God is sin ; for it is sin not to do or to leave alone for God’s sake what we ought to do or to leave alone for his sake; it is precisely in conflict that Virtue* must verify its power, and Sin only is committed, when w r e sur¬ render ourselves to allurement by a sinful Will. This view consequently would lead to the conclusion that there can be virtue without conflict, that the antagonism between sensuous¬ ness and Reason was originally implanted in human nature. According to these premises, the doctrine of Redemption would assume a different shape. He denied that sins of igno¬ rance were really sins, and merely allowed wilful sins to be such; though there is a passage in his works in which he dis tinguishes between an innocent and a culpable ignorance.t It is important to observe also that in connexion with this view he maintained that everything depended on the disposition, not on the outward act, while he did not take into consideration that the strength or weakness of the intentio has a share in the realisation of the Act. In his commentary on the Epistle to the Romans he finds difficulties in the common view of the imputation of the first Sin. and the propagation of depravity, the development of virtue in relation to it, the condemnation of unbaptized children and of the Heathens, of whose virtues he was a warm admirer. The passage—“ In Adam all have sinned ”—he explains as meaning His sin has become the cause of our eternal condemnation; we mav in this sense say that in Adam his posterity has sinned, as we might say, “ A Tyrant lives in his children.” He made an approach to the doctrine which was afterwards propounded, that the effects of Redemption are retrospective on the better class among the Heathen ; but he did not give his assent to this position and even adduced it as an error of a contemporary. On the other hand, he was so far influenced by the received doctrines of the * Quid enim magnum pro Deo facimus, si nihil nostrae voluntati adversum toleramus, sed magis, quod volumus, implemus. f In Romanos, 1. i. pag. 522.—Quia opera indifferentia sunt in se, nee bona nec mala, sive remuneratione digna videntur, nesi secundum ladicem intentionis, quae est arbor oonum vel malum protereus fructum. Non quae fiant, sed quo animo fiant, pensat Deus, nec in opere, sed in intentione meritum operantis vel laus consistit. Omnia in se indif¬ ferentia nec nisi pro intentione agentis bona vel mala dicenda sunt. 512 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. Church that he asserted the perdition of unbaptized Infants. He says—Those children die unbaptized, of whom God fore¬ saw, that if they had lived longer they would have been guilty of the worst sins and deserved the heaviest punishments; he also appeals to the divine will, which he exhibited as arbitrary, in contradiction to his other views. When he was attacked on account of his doctrine of original sin, he apologized, but never expressed himself with perfect distinctness. Mankind has received guilt and the punishment of sin from Adam, in whom we al 1 have sinned, since his sin has been the origin and cause of all our sins. Although the universality of sin was admitted, yet the excessive veneration for the Virgin Mary made an exception in her case. At first there was a reference only to the com¬ mittal of actual sins, not to original sin. Pascal Radbert * maintained that Mary before the conception of Christ was freed by special grace from all sins, in order to be a worthy organ for the birth of Christ. But in the twelfth century the doctrine was broached that she was free from original sin, and the Canonicals at Lyons instituted a festum immaculatce con- ceptionis. But Bernard of Clairvaux declared himself decidedly against it—“ We ought not,” he said,+ “ to attribute to Mary what belongs only to one Being, by whom all must be purified. He alone excepted, all must say, 1 am born in sin.” Peter le le Calle also combated this new view, which had been advocated by Nicholas, an English monk. When the latter appealed to dreams and visions, Peter re¬ joined— Evangelio, non somniis credo. C. THE DOCTRINE OF THE PERSON AND WORK OF CHRIST % 1. OF THE PERSON OF CHRIST. The difference between the older Augustinian and the Antio¬ chian views whether the sinlessness of Christ was to be repre¬ sented as a non posse peccare , or a jjosse non peccare, is to be found also among the Schoolmen. Anselm touches upon it incidentally, and decides in favour of the former. “ Christ,” he says.J “could have sinned if he had so willed; but this possibility is only hypothetical ; he did not, and could not, so * De Partu Virginia, D’Achery Spicilegium, t. i. + Ep. 173. X Cen Deus Homo, ii. 10. THE PERSON OF CHRIST. 5^5 will.” But admitting this, how can we conceive of‘ moral free¬ dom and virtue in Christ ? We can conceive of no sinful willing in God ; whence we infer no necessity of nature, but it is founded in his unchangeable essence, with which Freedom coincides. We say of the Angels who persevere in goodness, that they have thereby attained to unchangeableness in good¬ ness, and are no more able or willing to sin : they have won this for themselves, and there is this analogy between them and God, that they have attained this unchangeableness from themselves. In Christ this proceeds from the connexion of the divine and human natures. Abelard instituted more general inquiries respecting the relation of the indwelling of God in Christ to the divine ope¬ ration on other holy men. In the latter, he says, # there was only a partial indwelling, in Christ a personal union. As the Body is subject to the Soul, so that no action takes place in it which does not proceed from the Soul, so the Soul of Christ was related to the divine Logos, so that no motion was im¬ parted even to the Body, which did not owe its origin to the divine Logos. He attributes to Christ a divine and a human Will. In proof of the purely human will, he adduces the prayer of Christ that the cup might pass from him. He explains this in a forced manner, that Christ said it only as the representative of believers, but adds, as Christ assumed a real Humanity, so also he was truly human in reference to weakness. Against everything bordering on Docetism, as in Augustin, f he expresses himself strongly, and maintains that sorrow and suffering imply something opposed to the inclina¬ tion and the Will; therefore Christ suffered what he did not wish : yet, since he loved the Father, and wished that through his death the salvation of mankind might be effected, on that account he was willing to suffer; just as it might be said of a sick man, who was aware that he could not save his life without undergoing a surgical operation, that speaking generally he willed it not, but yet willed it under the circum¬ stances. In reference to the possibility of sinning he remarks,]; * Sententiarum, c. 24. t C. 25.—Dicat Augustinus voluntatem suam, nos vero dieimus, quia, sicut veram humanitatem assumsit, ita liumanse infirmitatis veroa defectus habuerit X Ad Roman, i. pag. 538. L L 514 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. If Christ be regarded as a man, simple and by himself, it may be doubted whether we could say of him, nullo modo pec- care posse; for if he could not sin what meritum could he have ? He would thus appear deprived of Free Will, and a natural necessity would be ascribed to him ; nor could he be admitted to possess a real Humanity. Thus considered, therefore, we may speak of his having a posse non peccare, which was first determined by the direction of the Will. But it is different when we speak of Christ in concreto as of him who is at the same time God and Man. In this respect a non posse peccare alone is to be admitted. Hugo of St. Victor quotes the opposing expressions of the Church Teachers on the question whether Christ was afraid of death. He says, there is a fear of death which so overpowers the Soul, that Man is thereby led into sin ; but there is also a moderate fear which is innate to human nature and without sin, like hunger and thirst, and this Christ had. In the same way Peter Lombard * says, Christ had real sorrow in his human nature, but not like believers. We must distinguish passio and propassio; the latter consists of those feelings which arise from corporeal infirmity, and belong to the essence of human nature, and by which the spirit is not drawn down from the Most High and weakened ; and only this is attributable to Christ. 2. Of Redemption. Everything which in this period was developed from the Christian consciousness might be found in the former, but yet in the language of feeling ; the ideas were blended with one another without an intellectual separation. Augustin, whose views are here to be considered, first of all occupied himself with the question, whether it was possible for God to redeem men in any other way, a problem which passed over from him to the Schoolmen. His reply is,f Another way might in itself be possible, since God is Almighty, but this is the only kind of Redemption suited for healing human misery, for nothing could more revive the hopes of men, than for God to show how very much he loves us, and he could not do this more effectually than by his entering into union with Humanity. He guards nimself X against the authropopathical mistake, as if God were * Sent. iii. Dist. v, + De Trinitate, xiii. 10,13. J C. 11, 15. anselm’s views of redemption. 515 reconciled to man, in time, through the blood of Christ. We are not so to think of the Atonement as if God desired blood ; for he loved Man before the Creation of the World, and his love moved him to send his Son. By the death of Christ* we are reconciled to God, not as if God then tirst began to love us, but ice are reconciled to God, with whom we were in a state of enmity through Sin. At the beginning of this Period, the mythical view which had spread widely in the former period, was in the ascendant, that God must satisfy Satan’s claims, who had attained by sin the right of possession over mankind. But Anselm, partly in opposition to this view, first systematically presented and elaborated the doctrine of the Atonement, so that his teaching forms a period in its history. In his treatise Cur Deus Homo , which treats on the subject, he gives evidence how much it then occupied men’s minds, and how generally the spirit of religious inquiry was spread abroad. Not merely educated persons, but even the uneducated inquired respecting it, and sought for a rational confirmation of it, He strove to prove the contents of his own Christian consciousness in the objective necessity for them felt by Reason. He proposes the question. Could not God, by a mere act of his will, remit the sins of u. Men? and replies,—We must not think of the Will of God as arbitrary, but in unison with his wisdom and holiness. So if a man says, God could lie if he would, we observe in such language a contradictio in adjecto. Hence God cannot allow sin to go unpunished ; for this would be, as if he made no difference between the sinful and the righteous. Punish¬ ment belongs to the objectivity of the idea of Sin.t Anselm had a profound apprehension of sin, in opposition to the one¬ sided mode, in a former age, of contemplating the relation of the divine love to sin. Either man freely renders to God the due obedience, or God subjects him against his will, when he punishes him, and shows himself as the Lord of the Creature, so that Man against his will must acknowledge this lordship. * Tract, in Joann. 110, § 6. f Si Deo nihil majus, aut melius est, nihil justius, quam quae honorem illius servat in rerum dispositione summa justitia, quae non est aliud quam ipse Deus. Nihil ergo servat Deus justius quam suae dignitatis honorem.—Necesse est ergo, ut aut ablatus honor salvator, et poena sequator: alioquin aut sibi ipsi Deus justus non erit, aut ad utrumque impotens erit, quod nefas est vel cogitare. L L 2 516 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. Anselm recognizes, therefore, in punishment the power of the divine Law, which, when voluntary submission is not given, pro¬ duces a forced one.* He considers all punishment as ulti¬ mately ordained by God; even that which depends on human government, has only so far its real significance: for govern¬ ment is ordained by God to administer justice. Sin is nothing else, but not rendering to God what a rational creature ought to render him. Every created will ought to be subject to the divine will; only such performs works acceptable to God. Since the essence of Sin lies in the opposition of the creature’s will against God, the mere outward act in it makes no differ¬ ence. Sooner must the world sink in ruins than that the least thing should take place against God’s will. Now Man, who does not render to God what is his due, and withholds it through sin, is in debt; and not only what he has withheld, but also a satisfaction, is required from him. The law cf the divine government demands either a satisfaction for sin, or punishment. If this were not effected, confusion would be permanent in the kingdom of God. Besides, man in his impurity could not enter into the communion of the holy, whose blessedness consists in this, that all their wants have- been satisfied, and hence only the pure can hope for it. A nselm supposes some one to say from the ascetic standpoint, Do I not honour God in abstinence, labour, self-denial, and obedience ? He replies ;—Supposing Man has never committed sin, yet he owes all this ; but he cannot render it, on account of his criminal inability. But one man must render an equiva¬ lent, since sin proceeded, in the first instance, from one; and what he renders must be something exalted above the Creation : therefore no other than God himself can render it.f But * Sicut homo peccando rapit, quod Dei est, ita Deus puniendo aufert, quod hominis est. Quoniam ergo homo ita factus est, ut beati- tudinem habere posset, si non peccaret, quum propter peccatum beati- ludine et omni bono privatur, de suo, quamvis invitus solvit quod rapuit; quia licet Deus hoc ad usum sui commodi non transferat, quod *ufert, sicut homo pecuniam, quam alii aufert, in suam convertit utilitatem; hoc tamen, quod aufert, utitur in suum honorem per hoc ^uia aufert. Auferendo enim peccatorem et quee illius sunt, subjectu *ibi esse probat. *t Hoc fieri nequit, nisi sit, qui solvat Deo pro peccato hominis aliquid majus, quam omne quod prseter Deum est. Ilium quaque, qui de suo poterit Deo dare aliquid quod superet omne quod sub Deo est, majorem esse necesse est, quam omne quod non est Deus. Niliil ANSELM’S VIEWS OF REDEMPTION. 517 satisfaction must also be rendered by one who was Man, silica otherwise it could be of no service to man; accordingly it must be accomplished by a God-man. Christ was not subject to death on account of Sin, but voluntarily submitted to it. The notion is to be rejected that he arbitrarily sought to die, or that God arbitrarily doomed him ~to die; we must dis¬ tinguish what Christ did in virtue of his obedience in the discharge of his duty, and what he suffered when it came upon him in consequence of this obedience.* Death came upon him as a divine ordinance to which he surrendered himself, since he completed his obedience by suffering. Therefore the ethical and historical point of view precedes the higher dog¬ matic. Christ suffered death voluntarily, not that he was obedient in that he died, but in meeting death in the steadfast observance of obedience to God. Anselm contrasts Christ’s conflicts with the sin of the first man; the latter yielded to the enticements of pleasure, Christ conquered Evil under the severest sufferings. God owed him a recompence for this ; he could not give it to Christ himself, because he was all-suffi¬ cient ; but Christ could transfer it to others, to all who are in communion with him. The life of Christ, says Anselm, was a life of infinite loveliness, and his death contained more than was necessary for all the sins of the world. Again, although Christ endured all kind of suffering, yet he was not to be called miserable, for as mere profit ( commodum ) is not essential to happiness, so it is not to be called Misery when any one endures outward suffering, according to his own wisdom, volun¬ tarily. From the whole, it appears that Anselm affirms the necessity of a satis/actio vicaria activa. The realization of the moral Law, which was necessary for filling up the chasm between God and Man, and the satisfaction, consists in active obedience, and by it punishment is at the same time rendered superfluous. We do not find in his writings the doctrine of a satisf actio passiva; he nowhere says that Christ had endured the punishment of men. He further proposes the question, autem est supra omne quod Deus non est, nisi Deus. Non ergo potest hanc satisfactionem facere nisi Deus. Sed nec facere illam debet nisi homo alioquin non satisfacit homo. Ergo necesse est, ut eum faciat Deus homo. * Ipse sponte sustinuit mortem, non per obedientiam deserendi viam, sed propter obedientiam servandi justitiam, in qua tarn fortiter perseverant, ut inde mortem incurreret. 518 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. whether any other being than God, for example, an Angel, could have accomplished Redemption in union with human nature, and answers it in the negative, since, for the restora¬ tion of Man’s dignity it is proper that he should depend on God alone, and have to thank him alone for everything. If a creature had redeemed him, he would have been dependent on him. It also deserves notice, how he expresses the conscious¬ ness, that no intellectual development wholly corresponds to the nature of the Fact, and that the Life of Christ itself con¬ tains more. There are many other reasons, he says, wliy this method of Redemption was the most suitable, but which are more easily known by the contemplation of the Life of Christ.* For who can explain, how necessary and congruous it was to the divine Wisdom, that the Redeemer not only presented his doctrines to mankind, but also by his life showed what they ought to do ?f On comparing Abelard with Anselm, we find in the former more acuteness and clearness, rather than a development pro¬ ceeding from the depths of Christian consciousness. Many things said by the latter he did not understand, because he adhered to the outward form. On the other hand, injustice has frequently been done to him. In a remarkable manner^ he ignores Anselm’s Theory altogether; we cannot even assert, that indirectly he opposes it with conscious design, although he differs from him very much, and advocates the subjective view of tho doctrine of Satisfaction. On the other hand, he agrees with Anselm in rejecting the older mythic representa¬ tion. In his commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, he propounds many questions and difficulties, but without giving any connected development whatever. He asks, why God did not redeem men by his mere will ? why the death of Christ was necessary ? how could it be sufficient for such forgiveness ? The anger of God must be excited so much the more for the crucifixion of his Son, which was a greater sin than that of Adam. How awful it is, that God should require the death of an innocent person for his being reconciled to Man. He expresses himself in the following manner: It appears to me * Sunt et alia multa, cur valde convenit, quse facilius et clarius in ejus vita et operibus quam sola ratione monstrari possunt, ii. c. 11. t See on the whole of Anselm’s doctrine of Satisfaction, Hasse, ii. 485, and Baur’s Lehre v. d. Versohnuns., p. 155. ABELARD’S VIEWS OF REDEMPTION. 5] 9 that by the blood of Christ we are so far made righteous, and reconciled to God, as through this special grace of God’s allow¬ ing his Son to assume our nature, he has bound so much the closer in love to himself, so that we, inflamed by such divine beneficence, are no longer afraid in pure love. By the suffer¬ ings of Christ all are justified, inasmuch as they are thereby kindled to greater love. The benefit enjoyed must inflame them more than what is merely hoped for; therefore our redemption rests upon the great love of God revealed to us through the sufferings of Christ, whereby we are brought to the true freedom of the children of God ; but this is equivalent to saying that all proceeds from love, nothing from fear. Redemption, therefore, according to Abelard, consists in this, that God has in this manner assured men of his love, and then by their love in return an impulse is given to all goodness. Accordingly he explains dixcaoavvri in Rom. iii. 25, of the Love of God, and cr ugeo-ig of the forgiveness of sins; through this righteousness, i. e. the love of God, we obtain the forgiveness of sins; justificatio is therefore the consequence of the sub¬ jective appropriation of Redemption. In his Theologia Chris¬ tiana* he gives the following explanation of the design of Christ’s Advent: On this account the divine Wisdom became Man, in order that we might be enlightened by his doctrine and his life, by his sufferings and his death, and by his glori¬ fication ; since he taught us by his sufferings how very much God loves us; by his Resurrection he gives us the pledge of eternal life, and by his Ascension to Heaven he receives our souls to Heaven. Also in his Lectures, t he combated the representation of redemption from Satan’s proprietary right, and said—Christ gave himself for us as a ransom, and pure sacrifice to God, in order to deliver us from the bondage of Sin, and to prove his love unto us. In no other way could this have been adequately done, for since we were to be freed from sin, the example of true virtue must be represented in word and life. Christ died for us, in order to show how great his love was to mankind, and that Love is the essence of Christianity. In his Apology he expresses himself more indefinitely; the Son of God became Man, in order to free us from Sin, and through his death to open for us the entrance to eternal life. * Lib. ir. 1308. ■f* Sentent. c. 23. 520 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. Bernard entered the lists against Abelard,* but without advocating Anselm’s doctrine, and without examining, like these two, the subject in a dialectic manner. To Abelard’s question, Why God has redeemed us through the sufferings of Christ, since it might have been effected by his mere will ?— he replied, Ask himself; for me it is enough that so it was. In reference to the difficulty that God required the blood of an innocent person, he rejoined,—Not Death in itself, but the will of Christ in dying voluntarily, was well pleasing to God, and as this voluntary offering, his Death had its significance in God’s sight, not that he took pleasure in the death of an innocent person. The sin of man gave the occasion, and he accepted the blood, but what he longed for was the salvation of men. He does not represent Abelard’s doctrine suffi ciently in its connexion, and treats it as if he wished to limit Redemption only to Christ’s example and doctrine. What avails the instructions of Christ, he says, without our restora¬ tion ? The example of Christ’s humility and love is a great thing ; but all this we cannot firmly hold if we do not obtain objective Redemption through him. It is in vain, unless the power of sin within us is broken ; and how could Christ benefit infants by his example ? The inscrutable council of God is the precise reason why this Redemption took place. But who can say, that the Almighty could not have chosen another method ? But supposing that possible, the efficiency of this method would lose nothing of its importance; and perhaps it is the most suitable, since by the great sufferings of Christ we are reminded of the depth of our Fall. In his sermons on Solomon’s Song, he gives special prominence to the reason why this form of Redemption was the most suitable. The principal reason why God appeared in human flesh, was, that sensuous man who could not so love him, if he did not present himself to the senses, might be gradually trained through his sensible appearance to the love of his invisible Essence.f In Peter Lombard;}; we find various elements not well digested. He takes no notice of Anselm. Like Augustin, he guards the idea of Atonement against anthropopathic miscon¬ struction, as if God had hated man, and was induced by the Atonement to love him. He adopts the old mythical repre- * De Erroribus Abselardi. + Cantica Canticorum Sefmo, 20, § 6. f Lib. iii. Distinct. 20. THE APPLICATION OF REDEMPTION, ETC. 521 sentation; moreover, he terms Christ the only perfect and sufficient sacrifice: by this one sacrifice he has blotted out all the guilt of man. He bore the punishment of our sins, freed us from spiritual, eternal, and temporal punishments, and per¬ fectly fulfilled the law. But Abelard’s view is found close by the side of this, that by so great a pledge of divine love we are impelled to confidence and love towards God, and thereby to holiness. This method of relieving human misery was peculiarly fitted for the purpose; nothing could more move and revive the human heart than the thought that God allowed his Son to share our sufferings. Robert Pulleyn says,—It pleased God to connect the redemption of men from Sin with the cost of Christ. He might have redeemed us in a different way, but he chose this method in order to make us sensible of the greatness of his love, and of our sins.* Since Anselm’s time, therefore, two opposing views of Redemption were developed; the one party considered the peculiar manner in which it was accomplished as something objectively necessary, and denied its efficiency from this objective nature ; the other supposed a subjective connexion between the two, as if it had pleased God to connect the price of Redemption with the sufferings of Christ, because this was best fitted to effect the moral transformation of men. 3. THE APPLICATION OF REDEMPTION, JUSTIFICATION, AND SANCTIFICATION. Although the prevailing tendency in the Church life was to externalize, and much that favoured it was imbibed from Scholasticism, yet the leading teachers of Scholasticism are not chargeable with the reproach of setting up a mere out¬ ward sanctity. They sought to impart vitality to the outward; they wished to exhibit the inner process of the development of the Christian life, to prove how it is rooted in the disposition and is connected with Redemption and sanctification, and were very far from being satisfied with a mere faith of autho¬ rity. This is clear from what has already been said in the Introduction, and appears also in their more precise state- * Ut quantitate pretii quantitatem nobia sui innotesceret amoris et nostri peccati. 522 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. ments on the various relations of this idea. Anselm com¬ prises the whole doctrine of Faith and Morals, in the question, how Man appropriates Redemption to himself. The doctrine of the Bible throughout consists in showing how we can become partakers of divine Grace, and live under its influence. He says,—■“ The mere idea does not make Faith, although this cannot exist without an object; in order to true faith the right tendency of the will must be added, which grace im¬ parts.”* He distinguishesf between credere Deum, Christum , and credere in Deum, in Christum; the former denotes a mere outward faith which only retains the form ; the latter denotes the true, living faith, which lays hold of communion with God ( credendo tendere in divinam essentiani) : the former is valueless and dead, the latter contains the power of love, and testifies its power and its life by love. The Faith which is connected with Love, cannot be inoperative ; it proves its vitality by so operating. Hugo of St. Victor J develops the general idea of faith in connexion with the religious nature of Man. Faith marks the manner in which invisible blessings dwell within our souls ( quodam modo in nobis subsistunt ), the real vital communion with God, his true existence in the human soul. For divine things cannot be apprehended by us, through the senses, the understanding, or the imagina¬ tion, since they have nothing analogous to all these, but are exalted above all images. The only vehicle of their appro¬ priation is faith. We can have no higher argument for the reality of divine things than Faith, since all that can contri¬ bute to the consciousness of anything, must have a certain analogy to it. Now, like divine things, Faith is exalted above all. Two elements meet in it—the tendency of the disposition, and the matter of cognition. This latter is the objective of Faith, but its essence consists in the tendency of the disposition, and although this is never altogether without the former, yet it constitutes the value of faith. Bernard agrees with Hugo in his view of the nature of Faith, and as * De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, c. 6. f Monologium, 72, cf. 75.—Ergo quoniam quod aliquid operatur, in esse sibi vitam, sine qua operari non valeret, ostendit, non absurde dicitur operosa tides vivere, quia kabet rectam dilectionis sine qua non operaretur; otiosa tides non vivere quia caret vita dilectionis. £ Liebner, p. 435. ABELARD ON FAITH AND JUSTIFICATION. 523 the latter declared himself opposed to the prevalent intel¬ lectual tendency, so also did he. Even now, he says, we often find a great difference of knowledge with equal Faith; many who believe with confidence, have only scanty ideas ; thus many in the Old Testament retained a firm faith in God, expected certain redemption from him, and received salvation by this faith, although they knew not when and how Salvation would come to them. Abelard’s expressions are also important.* Faith, he says, always refers to the Invisible, never to the Visible. But how is this ? when Christ said to Thomas, “ Because thou hast seen me, thou hast believed.” What Thomas saw before him was one thing ; what he believed was another. He confessed the man whom he saw to be the Lord, in whom he believed. He saw the flesh, but he believed in the God veiled in the flesh. We have noticed, that in opposition to the quantitative valuation of good works, he strongly urged that everything depended on the disposition. Only to it he ascribed a merit before God, since the rest depended on cir¬ cumstances. When attacked on this subject, he explained himself in his apology : I confess, he said, that all who are equal in love to God and their neighbour, are equally good, and equally meritorious, and that the same merit remains although the intention of the good will is hindered in the execution. Not merely Abelard, but also most of the other Schoolmen understood by Justijicatio per jidem not objective Justification, but a subjective character of the disposition, which proceeds from Faith, the true inward sanctification in Love which arises out of Faith. But this subjective view did not satisfy many ; it gave no certainty ; it tended in part to an ascetic life, or to a one-sided state of feeling; in part it prompted to a firm attachment to the priesthood as the source of grace. Bernard, on the other hand, was led by the experiences of bis life to a more objective view,—“ No one is without Sin ;f for all righteousness it is enough for me that He is gracious to me who has redeemed me. Christ is not merely righteous,^ * Sentent. c. 4. + Sermo on Solomon’s Song, 23, § 15. f Ibid. 22, § 8.—Qufftn ob rem quisquis pro peccatis compunctua C 3 urit et sitit justitiam credat in te, qui justificas iinpium et solum 524 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. but righteousness itself. He who is justified from his sins and strives after the holiness without which no man can see th6 Lord, listens to the call, ‘ Be ye holy, for I am holy.’ The heavenly birth is the eternal Predestination by which God has loved Man.” He urges that the divine Intuition is not bounded by Time, and takes no notice of it; in it those are exhibited as sinle’ss who pass through life in a progressive purification. In other passages he mingles the Subjective and the Objective ;* Fear precedes in order that Justification may follow. Lastly, the righteous live by faith, but doubtless it is the faith that works by love. Alanus also approximates to the objective view when he raises the question,f—Why do we speak of Justification by faith, and not by love ? He an¬ swers,—because Justification proceeds from the grace to which Faith directs us. Robert Pulleyn thus develops the doc¬ trine. The righteous man living in the Lord, already sancti¬ fied by faith, receives good works as marks of his faith and righteousness, and of growth in them ; not as if his righteous¬ ness was increased by his works, but Faith begets the internal righteousness, and from this the good works proceed. But faith must always increase, so that a Christian becomes clearer in knowledge as he becomes warmer in love. A dead Faith is idle; even the wicked possess it; true Faith is always active. The Scholastic doctrine on this point received a fixed form through Peter Lombard. I He makes a threefold distinction in Faith ; Deum credere , Deo credere , and in Deum or Christum credere. The two first amount merely to holding a thing to be true ; but the last is the Faith by which we enter into communion with God. With such a faith Love is necessarily connected, and this faith alone is justifying. Love is the effect of this faith, and the ground of the whole Christian life. Applying to Faith the Aristotelian distinction between the Form as the formative principle (flhog, forma), and the inor¬ ganic material determined by it materies), Peter dis¬ tinguishes faith as the qualitas mentis inf or mis, the mere material of Faith, and the fides formata, when the vivifying power of Love is added to it, which forms and determines it. justificatus per fidem pacem habebit ad Deum. Qui ergo justificati a peccatis sectari desiderant sanctimoniam, &c. * Ep. 107, § 4. 4 Regula, 93. + Sentent. iii. Dist. 28. r THE RELATION OF GRACE AND FREEDOM. 525 The Fides formata is true Virtue, and this Faith, active through Love, alone justifies.* 4. THE RELATION OF GRACE AND FREEDOM. The Dialectics employed by the Schoolmen were capable of maintaining in form the co-operation of Grace and of Free Will, but they were too much prejudiced in favour of the Augustinian doctrine, to recognize a real importance in free Self-determination, and hence their language was not free from ambiguities. Anselm, following Aristotle f distin¬ guishes between <3uva/x/£ and svigysia, that is, potentia and actus. No capability of a created being can by itself be rendered efficient without outward influences, which allow the potentia to become actus ; but still the capability exists. The Eye sees only by virtue of the Sunlight; yet even in the dark the eye has the capability of seeing. Thus the corrupt Will always retains the capability for goodness, although they can be rendered efficient by the entrance of the gratia ejjicax. Robert Pulleyn says, As often as Grace offers itself to any one, he either acts so as to co-operate with grace, or rejecting it, he persists in doing evil. Grace is the first cause of all good ; a share also belongs to Free Will, but it is subordinate. The meritum of it is, when it ceases to withstand the divine Will. According to this we might suppose that this School¬ man ascribed some power to Free Will, and did not admit gratia irresistibilis. But everything turns on his idea of Freedom; he might conceive of it in opposition to mere outward compulsion, and make it consist in this, that a development takes place only from the internal nature of Man, so he believes himself free to act because he is wholly deter¬ mined from himself; yet this would allow of his being- determined by a higher necessity. In fact it was Pulleyn s opinion that when efficacious grace is communicated by God to Man, it so attracts his Free Will, that he follows it without opposition. Although Grace recovers him who errs, it does not force him against his will, but is so powerful, that it can convert the most perverse. Accordingly Free Will is still only * Fides quam ipsi dsemones et falsi Christiani kabent, qualitas mentis est, sed informis quia sine caritate est.—Ibid. f De Libero Arbitrio, and De Concordia Preescientiae et Praedestina- tionis, Gratiae et Liberi Arbitrii. 526 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. the form of grace operating irresistibly as stated in Augustin, and in the book, De vocatione gentium. Among the Mystics, who attach greater importance to the practical, we might expect that Free Will would be more strongly asserted ; but in Bernard of Clairvaux,* it is only the appearance of a Freedom conditioning Grace. We become attached to goodness and advanced in it by Grace. Take away Free Will, and there is nothing which can be led to salvation; take away Grace, and the cause of salvation is wanting. Deliverance cannot be effected, unless both are there. God is the Author of Salvation, Free Will is only susceptible of it; it co-operates with Grace, since it suffers itself to be saved. Hence God can only so operate on Men, because they are endowed with Free Will. Bernard contrasts freedom with the compulsion of sin and of misery ; the first kind is the freedom of Nature ; the second the freedom of Grace ; and the third the freedom of Glory. Grace aims at arousing the free will. Man is not saved against his Will; for if the Will is changed from evil to good, Freedom is not taken away ; it is only transformed. He presupposes in this, that the nature of the Will was originally a free criminality and a consequence of original Sin. Yet his representation, taken altogether, leads to the Augustinian view. Btchard of St. Victor, in his work, On the state of the inner man , says ;t How can the Will of Man be other than truly free ? and will not allow it to be called enslaved. Grace is often offered freely to the careless ; often it is suddenly withdrawn from our efforts. Free Will can win grace, and grace win it; grace may be withdrawn from it, because it is never found without fault. Notwithstanding these strong expressions, Btchard also occupies the Augustinian standpoint. Just so Peter Bombard, in whose writings besides, we first find the distinction between gratia gratis dans and gratia gratis data, which was afterwards applied in various ways by the Schoolmen. The first is the efficient principle of grace, grace as imparting, or God himself; the second is grace imparted, the divine as the animating principle of life ( qualitas informans), the disposition brought into existence by God : true internal Virtue.J * De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio. f De Statu Interioria Homiuis, P. i. Tract, i. c. 23, t Lib. ii. Dist 27. HUGO OF ST. VICTOR AND PETER LOMBARD. 527 d. THE DOCTRINE OF THE SACRAMENTS. The peculiar catholic element of the Middle Ages is very prominent in the statements which expressed the development this doctrine had attained. The Schoolmen could not but place what they found in the Church doctrine, in connexion with their fundamental principles : this was not done pur¬ posely by them, but their own religious life was determined by the spirit of the Church. But under the influence of their principles, differences were now formed among them, and especially in this earlier period of Scholasticism: hence also many traces of Christian truth may be noticed, which were at variance with the prevalent doctrine. The Schoolmen accept¬ ed the Augustinian definition of the Sacraments, but it did not fully satisfy them. The definition which they desired, needed to contain everything~which at that time was supposed to belong to the idea and to the efficiency of the Sacraments. Ift'GO of St. Victor** defines a Sacrament as materiale elementum ex similitudine repraesentans, ex institutione signi - fie am , ex sanctijwatione continents aliquam invisibilem et spiritalem gratiam. A Sacrament, therefore, is distinguished fTom all other Holy symbols by the following particulars: in file first place, it must have a close analogy with the thing represented; secondly, it must have been selected by Christ for that purpose, in order to represent this definite object, thirdly, this invisible divine operation, its magical operation, is really transferred to the outward sign, inasmuch as the outward sign acts by itself, for which purpose it was insti¬ tuted. Here we have the foundation of the whole Catholic idea of 'the-“Sacraments. In the Summci sententiorum , he says,t The Sacrament is visibHis forma, invisibilis gratice , in eo collates. Here we see the same characteristic, that the invisibilis gratia is really communicated to the outward sign. Peter Lombard expresses himself to the same effect; “ the Sacrament presents an image of Grace and the cause of it.” Hugo, in his treatise, De Sacramentis fdei, distinguishes three * De Sacram. lib. i. p. ix. 2. Compare Summa Tract, ii. 1 ; Liebner, p. 423. f Sent. iv. 1. — Sacramentum proprie dicitur, quod ita signum est gratia? Dei et invisibilis gratke forma, ut ipsius imaginem gerat et causa existat. 528 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. classes of Sacraments: the first, those on which salvation especially depends (Baptism and the Lord’s Supper) ; tire second, those which are not necessary to salvation, but yet useful for sanctification ; the number of these is indefinite; and thirdly, that which serves to qualify for the administra¬ tion of the other Sacraments,—priestly Ordination. The Schoolmen inquired on what account such signs were necessary for Christianity, and endeavoured to explain why so much efficacy was attributed to the Sacraments. Hugo alleges the following reasons—since Man had estranged himself from internal communion with God, and dissipated himself in the outward world, he must be led back through the outward to the inward. Moreover, since Man fell by Pride, he must be led back to God by self-humiliation, which consisted in his receiving from these outward things what was necessary for his inward life. Robert Pulleyn also adduced the last reason; through Pride man fell, his salvation must proceed from the opposite quarter. The rational Man who was destined to rule over Nature, must humble himself before the sensible ele¬ ments, to receive grace through them. We here recognize the lowering of the idea of Humility to an outward act. If, on the one hand, Schoolmen were led to attach too much importance to outward things, on the other hand, they were led to a reaction against this externalisation, and guarded themselves against further excesses in this respect. Hugo of St. Victor says, Man must seek his salvation in these things,** but not from them ; he derives the saving efficacy, not frojp the element as such, for the cause of it is only God, and he seeks for salvation, not from the sacraments, but from him, though he receives it in them. The external part of the Sacraments is therefore only the medium of salvation. The question was raised, what relation the operation of the Sacraments had to Faith? and on this point the principles of the Schoolmen led them to make many remarks which were at variance with the Church views. Robert Pulleyn says,— outward baptism only represents that which Faith effects at baptism ; faith blots out sins ; baptism indicates this. Hugo disputes the unconditional necessity of outward Sacraments ; as, where there is Love, the meritum of man is not lost, although the good work cannot be performed, so the operation of Salvation is not obstructed if the longing after the Sacra- THE NUMBER OF THE SACRAMENTS. 529 ment is present in the heart. Here, therefore, is the doctrine that' in such cases the votum occupies the place of the Sacra¬ ment. Unly since it is the divine appointment that this saving operation is to be received through the medium of the Sacraments, a contempt of the divine appointment tends to perdition, if it be neglected when there is a possibility of attending to it. The Number of the Sacraments. Although the applica¬ tion of the idea of a Sacrament was still undetermined, yet we fincf'"that Baptism and the Supper, Confirmation, Penance , Ordination , and also Marriage, were already universally acknow¬ ledged as Sacraments. One more was still wanting in the early ages, the unctio extrema. Yet traces are found that in anti¬ quity sick persons, while prayer was offered for them, were anointed with oil, a usage which received support from the Epistle of James v., and the Gospel of Mark xvi. . When after the irruption of the barbarous tribes, the Church was established among them, it w T as needful to counteract the heathen usages of amulets and charms, and anointing was chosen in order to substitute a Christian usage. The newly converted nations were required to adopt the Christian rite. At first the Laity were allowed to give Extreme Unction, but afterwards it was confined to the Priests. The Council of Pavia (a.d. 850), says in its eighth Canon, that holy Sacra¬ ment, enjoined by James, is to be more distinctly acknow¬ ledged by Christian communities; when desired with Faith, it effects the forgiveness of sins, and the bodily health can be restored. Thus this ceremony was added as a seventh Sacra¬ ment. Damiani, who enumerates twelve Sacraments, men¬ tions among them the Extreme Unction.* PIugo expresses himself indeterminately ; but the first who publicly taught in the Church the doctrine of Seven Sacraments, is Otto of Bamberg, the Apostle of the Pommeranians ; he mentions this number in a catechetical discourse which he delivered in Pommerania,f a.d. 1124. Peter Lombard adheres to the number of seven— baptismus, confirmatio, eucharistice, pceni- tentia, unctio extrema , ordo, conjugium.% Of the unctio extrema * Sermo, 69. t Gieseler, in kis Church History (II. ii. 453), doubts the credibility of the account, since the Discourse which the biographer communicates is scarcely genuine.— [Jacobi.] 4 lib iv. Dist. 2. M M 530 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. he says, that if the Sacrament be administered with devotion and Faith, the Man will thereby be relieved both in Body and Soul: if it do not contribute to the health of the Body, it will to that of the Soul. 1. OF BAPTISM. In defining the terms used respecting this Sacrament, much difficulty was found in settling the relation of the res sacra- menti to the sacramentum. The question was proposed, how this effect could take place in unconscious infants, in order to explain the fate of unbaptised children who were believed to be lost. The Catharist sects in their polemics,* aimed to set aside the proofs adduced from passages of Scripture ; they either impugned the Sacrament of Baptism altogether, and regarded John’s as the only Water-baptism, while they asserted that Christ’s baptism was the baptism of the Spirit, and that it consisted according to the consolamentum, + in the imparta- tion of the Holy Spirit by the laying on of hands; or they rejected Infant Baptism, and retained only the Baptism of adults. 2. OF THE lord’s SUPPER. In the Berengarian controversy the doctrine of Transubstan- tiation was victorious, yet there were not a few symptoms of a continued reaction. Anselm, Peter Lombard, and Hugo, occupied themselves with refuting the opinion that the Body was present, non re neqae vera citer, sed significatione. The Bread in the Supper was only called the body of Christ in the same manner as Christ is also called a Bock. Peter Lombard says, that the advocates of the merely spiritual Pre¬ sence appeal to the 6th chapter of John’s Gospel. The Catharists of the twelfth and thirteenth Centuries also attacked the Church doctrine; they either explained everything in the Lord’s Supper as only symbolical; that Christ by his body and blood only intended his doctrine and his words, which would be Bread and Wine for the soul; or they admitted merely a spiritual presence of Christ, and in interpreting the * Chr. U. Hahn Geschichte der Ketzer in Mittelalter beg. im. 11,12, ] 3 Jabrh. (History of the Heresies in the Middle Ages, particularly in the 11th, 12th, and 13th Centuries), 2 vols. 1845, 1847. t A Catharist, Ritual, edited by E. Kunitz, 1852, p. 23, 59. THE LORD’S SUPPER. 531 Words of the Institution gave similar explanations to those which were afterwards brought forward at the Reformation. They appealed to John vi., “ the flesh profiteth nothing,” or understood the words fouro sen as used dsrx.rix.ug, so that Christ indicated by them his own proper body. Many under¬ stood the doctrine thus, that the mode is marked out by which the Natural is sanctified through Christianity, the sanctification of our daily food by Faith and Prayer. Peter of Bruis * even maintained, that the Supper was not instituted by Christ as a rite of perpetual observation ; that he only once distributed his body and blood among his disciples. This expression is obscure; perhaps he meant to say that Christ had observed this rite once for all. The Polemics of those schoolmen were directed, perhaps, not merely against these sects, but against persons within the pale of the Church who adhered to similar opinions. Abelard says, that the important controversy whether the Bread was merely a symbol or the substance of the Body, had not yet terminated. Zacharias of Chryso- poxis remarks: there were some who can scarcely be found out who agreed with the condemned Berengarius, and yet joined the Church in censuring him, but only because he had rejected the form of the Church Terminology, and expressed himself so barely. He did not follow the usage of Holy Writ, which often puts the symbol of a thing for the thing itself. He should not have raised a discussion on this subject. Among the mystical Theologians, such as Rupert of Deutz, who otherwise were faithful to the Church doctrine, we find here a near approach to a spiritual view. He impugns those who maintained that the unworthy receive at the Lord’s Sup¬ per only the Jigura or signum corporis Christi. He speaks of a translatio and conversio —that the Bread is not merely in name the Body of Christ, but in effect. Yet he says,—It is not the method of the Holy Spirit to annihilate the substance which he appropriates for his own gifts; the substance in an invisi¬ ble manner is potentiated, so as to be what it was not before. He compares the union of the bread and wine with the Body and Blood of Christ, to the union of the divine and human natures in Christ. His remarks favour the notion that the * Petri Venerab. Abl. Cluniac. ep. ad Arelatensem, &c. Epiecop. adv, Petrobrusianos Bibl. Patr. Lugduu. xxii. 1033. Hahn, i. 408, Gieseler, Kirchenges. II. ii. 536. M M 2 532 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. substance of the bread and wine was penetrated by the body and blood of Christ connecting themselves with it. Bernard of Clairvaux, in his life of Malachias, Archbishop of Armagh, makes mention of an Irish clergyman, who would not recognise the true body of Christ in the Supper, but only a sanctifying power. It is remarkable that in many pious men of this age doubts were raised respecting Transubstan- tiation, and this was the central point of the temptations with which they had to combat. But this doctrine was connected with the whole standpoint of the age, with the one-sided pre¬ dominant supernatural element, the tendency to the Magical. The perpetual self-humiliation of Christ was contemplated as in the culminating point of grace and of miracle ; the Priest¬ hood was placed here as the organ of mediating between hea¬ ven and earth, and thus we may say, that the peculiar spirit of the Middle Ages gave objectivity to its essential charac¬ teristic in this doctrine. Hence, if a doubt arose respecting it, it proceeded in many instances, not from a reaction of a pure and Christian consciousness, but from a one-sided direc¬ tion of the Understanding, which would have extended itself by logical development to other objects of Faith. When in such conflicts, the doctrine of Transubstantiation maintained its ground, it was regarded as a victory of the Christian stand¬ point over that of the world. For one who lived in the pecu¬ liar spiritual atmosphere of the Middle Ages, as in his native element, it was necessary to conceive of the Presence of Christ in the Supper after such a mode, and the Schoolmen were completely imbued with this form of feeling and thinking. The dialectic development which they gave it, had only the merit of greater spirituality, and of purifying the representation from many monstrosities. Anselm* writes to an Abbot,—The design of the Supper is to connect the believer in body and soul with Christ. Does any one ask, how the unchangeable body of Christ can be masticated by the teeth ? I answer, that must be left to God. The Substance of the bread and wine is not left behind, but the marks of their outward appearance, and thus something might be done which did not affect that which was their substratum. In saying this, he allows the distinction of the res sacrcvmenti and jigura. After the con¬ secration the Bread and Wine might be still called figura , * Epp. lib. iv, 106, 107. INFANT COMMUNION. 533 since the eye of Faith saw one thing, and Unbelief an¬ other. Hildebart of Mans was the first who used the term Transubstantiatio; he strove to soften the coarseness of the representation. Although Christ according to his human nature is in Heaven, yet he imparts himself to us daily ; his Body is spiritual food, and operates spiritually in us. The Nature of Body itself forbids Ubiquity; but Christ’s Body is present on every Altar by a supernatural agency. Hugo says : only the sensuous man will ask, what becomes of the Body of Christ at the Supper; his bodily presence serves only for the advantage of men, and that so long as the sensible dis¬ tribution lasts, after that the spiritual Presence is experienced. # Peter Lombard brings forward various opinions without a definite decision of his own ; he rather inclines to the view that the accidentia are sine subjecto, and to this decision the Schoolmen were driven, when they maintained Transubstan- tiation and yet shunned the transference of sensuous changes and coarse expressions to the Body of Christ, or when they were not willing to admit that what was an object of the senses in the Supper was merely apparent and docetic. At the Lateran Council, a.d. 1215, Transubstantiation was declared to be an article of faith by Innocent I1I.+ The practice of Infant Communion continued in the West¬ ern Church to the twelfth century. The more palpable dis¬ tinction between the Sacraments of Baptism and the Lord’s Supper necessarily effected an alteration, and the Scholastic Age was suited to make the distinction a matter of conscious¬ ness. Yet the discontinuance of the practice was owing first of - all, not from a purely dogmatic interest, but from a super¬ stitious motive, from a fear of spilling the wine in administer¬ ing it to children. Among those who endeavoured to settle the question was Hugo of St. Victor :J he says, this Sacra¬ ment must be given to new-born children in the form of blood (in specie sanguinis) by the finger of the Priest, since they naturally suck. He quotes a passage from Augustin, in which Infant Communion is prescribed. If, he says, in pre¬ senting it to children any danger should arise, it should * De Sacram. ii. p. viii. c. 6. *t Transubstantiatur Panis in Corpus Christi, &c. potestate divina. t De Sacramentis Cseremoniis, &c. i. c, 20. Neander’s Ch. H. vii. 475. 534 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. rather be omitted; nor let us be alarmed by Augustin, for Augustin himself says that it cannot be doubted that every one who has been made a member of the Body of Christ by Baptism also has a share in his Body and Blood. Thus the practice fell into desuetude. Withholding of the Cup. —In the earlier Church no trace is found of any other than the full participation of the Lord’s Supper according to the words of the Institution. It was a mark of Manicheism if any one at the public celebra¬ tion of it refused the wine; and Leo the Great threatened such persons with Excommunication.* * * § Gelasius expressed himself likewise against it. In a passage which Gratian has preservedf he says—We have been informed that some persons wish to partake of the Body of Christ without the Cup; they ought rather to keep back from the Sacrament, since they can¬ not partake of it without committing a great Sacrilege. Only one exception appears in ancient times, when the consecrated bread was taken home for daily use, or when the wine alone was given to very young children. The superstitious anxiety not to spill any of the Wine, which was increased by the doc¬ trine of Transubstantiation, first of all led to giving the sick only bread dipped in Wine. And thus at the beginning of the twelfth century in England, it was here and there the custom to give dipped bread to the laity at the usual commu¬ nion : one Lambert opposed this practice, but Arnold, bishop of Rochester, J and Rudolph, Abbot of Cologne,§ defended it. Yet Paschal II. declared || that no human innovation should be introduced; Bread and Wine were each communicated by the Lord, and hence the custom must be retained in the Church. But now the idea of the Priesthood and of a Sacri¬ fice exerted a greater influence, and it appeared enough if only the Priests partook of it. The change, too, was pro¬ moted by the doctrine which ascribed power to the Church to make changes in the administration of the Sacraments. The Schoolmen contributed their share also to make the with¬ holding of the cup more general, since they developed the doctrine of the concomitantia corporis et sanguinis Ghristi; * Sermo. 41. t Decretum Gratiania, p. iii. De Consecratione Distinct, ii. c. 12. $ D’Achery Spicilegium. ii. p. 470. § Bona de Rebus Liturgicis. II Ep. 32. THE LORD’S SUPPER. 535 that is, the position, that in either of the two forms the other was contained. Although the Body and Blood, says Anselm,* are taken separately, yet the whole Christ is received only once, and not twice. The divided participation is not accord- ing-to-'the example of Christ, who intended to show that believers must be joined to Christ both in soul and body. Anselm, therefore, does not say that one form is not suffi¬ cient; but he would have both forms administered, because Christ so instituted it. Also Peter Lombard says—Christ is to be taken in a double form, in order to show that Re¬ demption relates to the whole Man, to the Body and to the Soul; only we are not to imagine that in the bread merely the Body is taken. The first advocate of withholding the cup is Robert Pulleyn ;f in order that Christ’s appoint¬ ment in reference to the Sacrament should not be altered, it is only necessary for the Priest to take the Body and Blood separately. According to the appointment of the Church, which might be altered at its pleasure, the Body only is given to the Laity, in order that the Blood may not be spilt. Nor do they lose anything thereby, since the Blood is given with the Body. To persons dangerously ill the Blood only might perhaps be given; they would still receive enough. Folmar, head of the monastery of Traufenstein, in Fran¬ conia, in the twelfth century, declared himself against the doctrine of the Concomitantia; he appears to have been a man disposed to free inquiry, who was disgusted with the superstitious legends, and attempted to form a different con¬ ception of the presence of Christ in the Supper; but he was hampered by reference to the Church, and never attained to clear views. After the ascension Christ appeared no longer corporeally on earth; a ubiquity of his Body is inadmissible. After its connexion with the divine nature the human still retained its natural qualities, and a human Body could not be in two places at once. This might have led him further, but he did not draw the consequences ; he only maintained that in the Bread was contained the true Body of Christ, but with¬ out the bodily members, and the Blood of Christ in the Wine, but without the Flesh. The whole Christ was indeed present in both forms, but not in all his parts (totus sed non totwn).% * Ep. 107. t Sentent. p. viii. c. 3. X Pezii Thesaurus Anecd. I. p. ii. 221. Biblioth. Patr. Lugd. t. xxv. 536 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. His distinction of the natura verbi et corporis led also to this point, and brought upon him the charge of Nestorianisn. As his opponent, Gerhoit of Reichersberg, maintained the ubiquity of the Body, he, on the other hand, was charged with Eutychianism. The Sacrifice of the Mass.—Peter Lombard calls the Sacrifice of the Mass the memoria and representatio of the Sacrifice of Christ. Christ was daily sacrificed in a Sacra- ihental manner. The Sacrifice of Christ himself was not repeated, for as there was only one Body of Christ, so there was only one Sacrifice ; but on account of the weakness of men this Sacramental offering was made.*' The doctrine of the Sacrifice of the Mass acquired a special importance from its connexion with Penance and the forgiveness of Sins commit¬ ted after Baptism. But the doctrine of Penance stands again in close connexion with that of Purgatory, f 3. PENANCE. Peter Lombard divides this Sacrament into three parts. I. The Compunctio cordis; II. The Confessio oris; III, The Satisfactio operis. The theory was founded on the prin¬ ciple that without Church penance the forgiveness of sins could be obtained only by internal contrition and the con¬ fession of Sins. The power conferred on the Priests to bind and to loose consisted only in pronouncing sentence, and this was only valid as far as it agreed with the divii t judgment. Hence Peter distinguished between forgiveness of sins by God, and Absolution in facie ecclesice. Punishment is only due, supposing a person neglects from contempt the Sacra¬ ment of Penance and Absolution when the observance is pos¬ sible. Notwithstanding the whole doctrine of a necessary confession, Church penance and absolution might be formed by certain links—so far it was firmly held that Remission of guilt was effected completely and only once by Baptism, but yet special satisfaction was required by God for sins which violated the baptismal vow. Prayers and Alms were regarded as such voluntary Church punishments and satisfaction made to the Priest. Whoever neglected to render these, would have to render, it was believed, so much additional satis¬ faction to the divine justice in the punishments of the ignis * Sent. iv. Dist. xii. q. 7. f Ibid. iv. Dist. xvi. PENANCE AND PURGATORY. 537 purgatorius. Thus the juridical view prevailed continually to a wider extent, and the Priests had the power to change the heavier punishments to lighter ones in virtue of the merits of Christ. Xet Peter added, that without any Church penance a person might be freed from purgatorial fire, if the contri¬ tion was great enough to be substituted for such punish¬ ment. The Sacrifice of the Mass and Intercession of the Church for the dead would suffice to free suffering souls from the purifying fire. But we may see into what straits these men were brought when they wanted to bring everything in actual practice into agreement with their system. Peter Lombard supposes the case, that a rich man and a poor man die ; for the latter there are only the ordinary masses and good works, hut the rich man can have more masses read for him; will the rich man have any advantage ? He answers at once, the rich has no advantage before the poor, both attain the like result; the same effect follows from different causes. But with this answer he did not satisfy the Church, for according to it, it was not necessarv to call in the Church’s aid. He therefore said in addition that the rich would obtain not a more complete, but a speedier release from Purgatory. The externalizing of Repentance called forth opposite state¬ ments. Abelard, in his work, Scito te ipsum, reproaches the Bishops, and asks, If they could impart absolution so easily, why did they not do it out of pure love, instead of taking money for it ? He disputes the application of the passage respecting the power conferred on Peter of binding and loosening; this was not said in reference to certain offices, but related to the Apostles and those who were like-minded with them. 538 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. THE SCHOLASTIC AGE. SECTION SECOND. (century XIII.) THE GENERAL HISTORY OF DOGMAS. The result of the conflict between the dialectic and Church tendency was, that although the former did not gain the vic¬ tory, it was more moderately applied. In the thirteenth century the dialectic spirit obtained a fresh impulse through the influence of the Aristotelian Philosophy, which till the twelfth century had been known only from some separate works of Aristotle, and through the medium of a Latin translation. At this period the acquaintance with Aristotle became much more complete ; bis writings of every class were known, partly from the older Latin versions, partly from Arabic versions brought from Spain, and partly from recent transla¬ tions.* The obscurity of the translations exercised the acute¬ ness of the readers. The application of this Philosophy to Dogmatics met at first with so much more violent opposition, because certain conclusions were unfairly deduced from it which seemed dangerous to Christianity. Gregory IX. in a.d. 1228 addressed an admonitory letter to the University of Paris against the extravagant use of Philosophy. A cele¬ brated professor, Simon of TouRNAY,f who made very fre¬ quent use of Aristotle, was thereby brought into disrepute, and the story connected with this fact is characteristic of the spirit of the times. He had made a transition from Phi¬ losophy to Theology and met with such success, that no hall could contain his hearers. On one occasion he brought for¬ ward all the arguments against the Trinity, and announced that on the next occasion he would refute them and prove the truth of the dogma. This excited still more attention, and * Jourdain, Recherches Critiques sur l’Age et l’Origine des Traduo tions Latines d’Aristote et sur des Commentaires Grecs ou Arabes employes par des Docteurs Scholastiques. Par. 1819, 1843. t Jo. Launoji I)e Yaria Aristotelis in Academia Parisiens. Fortuna Par. 1662; Yitemb. 1720. THE ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY. 539 crowds flocked to hear him; enraptured with his demonstra¬ tion, his hearers entreated him to commit his lecture to writing. He then arrogantly exclaimed:* “0 my dear Jesus, how many thanks are due to me for employing my acuteness in thy favour! ” Suddenly he lost his speech, remained dumb for two years, forgot all he had learned, and was obliged to begin again with the elements. This account is certainly not true to the letter. Even among his contem¬ poraries there were very different versions of it. According to one of these, he blasphemously asserted that the world had been led astray by three deceivers, Moses, Christ, and Mo¬ hammed ;t but they all agree as to the latter part of it. But according to other accounts Simon does not appear to have been a man who would make assertions of this kind. The Benedictines, who composed the Literary History of France, mention the Lecture, J and state that they had read it. Per¬ haps some matter of fact gave occasion to the formation of this legend. ^ But the Aristotelian Philosophy suited too well the spirit of the Age to render its suppression practicable, and it even obtained the protection of the Popes. Its formulas, in which might be comprised every possible subject, were suited to the most extensive application. The Platonic philosophy in the preceding age had introduced an intuitive mystical ele¬ ment into Dogmatics, and thus had served as a means of defending the doctrine of the Trinity. The Aristotelian» philosophy, on the contrary, called forth a dialectic negative tendency ; although not during this period, in which the con¬ sciousness of the Church was too strongly developed, and a too powerful religious spirit reigned, to allow the negative influence of Aristotle to become effective. No longer were such large concessions made to the philosophical standpoint generally, and to the ancient Philosophy, as had been made by Abelard, although these were better understood, and per¬ haps for that very reason, Antiquity was no longer idealised, and the ancient and Christian standpoints were more dis- * Matthfeus Paris, a. 1201. On the other side Henric. Gandavensia (1280) De Scriptorib. Ecclesiast. Fabricii, Bibl. Eccles. ii. 121, Dura vimis Aristotelem sequitur, a nonnullis modernis haereseos arguitur. t Thomas Cantipratens, Bonum Universale de Assib. ii. c. 48, 5. Gieseler, II. ii. 143. $ T. xvi. 388. 540 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. tinctly kept apart. Equally powerful as Aristotle, at this period, was Neo-Platonism, which operated directly through translations from the Neo-Platonist.s, and indirectly through the writings of Augustin and the Pseudo-Dionysius. Thus, consciously or unconsciously, two authorities exerted great influence over the age, the Church and the Aristotelian-Neo Platonic Philosophy. But now both mixed, and that not unconsciously, so that these men may be charged with trans¬ porting the Aristotelian element to that of the Church, or that of the Church to the Aristotelian ; yet men were con¬ scious of the general Antagonism existing between these views, but it was conceived of, not as an antagonism between Antiquity and Christianity, but between Reason and Revela¬ tion. Hence men could discern in Aristotle what was irreconcilable with Church doctrines, and what was insufficient, to which Revelation must add something new and higher; only there was the error of regarding Aristotle as the absolute limit of Reason, where it formed a junction with Revelation. It must certainly be granted that in particular instances the Aristotelian-Platonic element mingled itself involuntarily in the conceptions formed of Christianity, and the Antagonism to Christianity by the introduction of the ideas of Antiquity was obliterated. But this happened only in those cases in which an unconscious reaction of the ancient standpoint had taken place in the Church spirit itself, which then sought and found a support in Aristotle. In general, the influence of this Philosophy was a formal one; the material influence was that of the Church and of the strictly Catholic spirit, s x^The influence of the Arabian Philosophy* was of less importance for the development of Christian doctrines. Among the Arabians there were various shades of Philo¬ sophy ; one which held fast to the letter of religious Tra¬ dition ; another which wished to unite Aristotle with Islam ; a third, negative, which stood in direct opposition to religious belief. The latter was that which penetrated into the West, and appeared in the Church in the form of a negative reaction, and would have been more powerful had the great men of the thirteenth century acted as a counterpoise to it. * A. Schmoelders, Essai sur les Ecoles Philosophes chez les Arabes et notamment sur la Doctrine D’Algazzali. Par. 1842. Ritter, Gesch. d. Christ. Philos, iii. THE CHURCH THEOCRACY. 541 The Church Theocracy, the peculiar element of the Middle Ages, was carried to its height since the time of Innocent III., and Scholasticism governed the System. In the Church we see, on the one hand, extreme secularity; on the other hand, an entire renunciation of worldly things, which found its representation in various communities, and prin¬ cipally in the order of Mendicant Friars. They were from the first filled especially with the Church spirit of the Middle Ages, and were the support of the Papacy. But in their quiet manners and their sphere of life their thoughts became concentrated; the tendency inward to con¬ templation, speculation, and mysticism found here its nourish¬ ment. Along with the restless doings of many of the secular Clergy and bishops, the bloom of the scholastic knowledge of this age sprung from these monasteries, for the most distinguished champions of it proceeded from them, and par¬ took of this Church-theocratic spirit. But now against this tendency that of Church Freedom was aroused, which dreaded the great dependence of the Church and Science on Monkery. On the part of the Secular Clergy, and especially of the Uni¬ versity of Paris, a zealous opposition was raised against the mendicant friars; at the head of the opposite party stood the free-thinking William of St. Amour, at Paris. If w r e may judge from the few productions of his we possess, he was in his mental constitution altogether different from the great scho¬ lastic Theologians ; he had a more moderate, clear, and sober understanding. But that Spirit of Speculation in the Church was favoured by the atmosphere of the Age ; yet a far more preponderating Interest attached to the internal and super¬ natural element. Among the Franciscans the following are the most distin¬ guished : —Alexander of Hales (Doctor irrefragabilis), edu¬ cated in the monastery of Hales, in the county of Gloucester, studied at Paris, became a Professor of Theology there, and died a.d. 1245. His Summa Universae Theologice* compre¬ hends Dogmatics and Morals. Bonaventura (John of Fi- danza, Doctor seraphicus), born a.d. 1221, of a Florentine family, one of the first who embraced with enthusiasm the idea of Franziskus of Assissi ; he entered this order, became teacher of Theology at Paris, afterwards Cardinal and General of the Franciscans; he died a.d. 1274, at the Council of * Editions : Yenet. 1576; Colon. 1622 ; 4 voll. f. Cramer, vii. 161. 542 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. Lyons. In his writings* the mystical and dialectic Theo¬ logy are blended ; the leading idea of his Order, the Imitation of Christ in entire self-denial, had the greatest influence over him. Among the Dominicans, Albert Magnus was conspicuous, born at Laningen, not far from Dillingen, a.d. 1193, of an ancient noble familv. He became a Dominican in a.d. 1223, and taught at Paris and Cologne. About a.d. 1260 Alex ander IV. made him Bishop of Regensberg; but he relin¬ quished this office about a.d. 1262, and returned to the Univer¬ sity of Cologne, where he died a.d. 1280. Albert was an univer¬ sal genius, who struck out new paths in every direction, and made scientific discoveries.f One of the most influential School¬ men, a Teacher of Centuries, was Albert’s great Scholar, Thomas Aquinas (Doctor angelicus). He was born about a.d. 1225 or 1227, at Rocca Secca, near Aquino, in the Neapolitan territory. Irresistibly attracted by the life of the Order of the Dominicans, he entered as a youth about a.d. 1243. His Mother was at first not averse, but when she wished to visit him, and the Dominicans, who sacrificed all domestic feelings to their Order, refused her admission, she withheld her consent, and endeavoured, through her other Son, who was in the service of the Emperor Frederic II., to take him away from the Order. But here the originality and firmness of his great soul were made apparent. Though they tried to compel him by imprisonment, he would not swerve from his determination. In the solitude of his dun¬ geon he occupied himself with reading the Scriptures and Peter Lombard. His mother herself at last assisted him to make his escape; he let himself down by a rope from the window, and was joyfully received by the Dominicans. They sent him to Cologne, in order to study under Albert. No one suspected what there was in the silent, meditative youth, and he was called bos mutus. But when, on one occasion, he * Commentarius in 4 libros, Sententiarum, Breviloquirim (ed. C. J. Hefele, Tubg. 1845). His mystical writings : Itinerarium Mentes in Deum ; De Septem Gradibus Contemplationis, &c. Opp. ed. Romre, 1588, 8 t f. Yenet. 1751, 13 t. f. Histoire Literaire de la France, xix. 266, ff. f Commentarius in 4 libros, Sententiarum; Summa Theologiae. Commentaries on Aristotle Other philosophical or physical works: Opp. ed. Petrus Jammy Lugd. 1651, 21 t. f. Quetif et Echard Scriptoroa Ordinis Pnedicatorum, i 162. Ritter, Christl. Philosophic, Bd. -t. THOMAS AQUINAS. 543 greatly distinguished himself in a disputation, Albert said, “ This dumb ox will fill the whole w 7 orld with the sound of his voice.” About a.d. 1255 he became Professor of Theology at Paris. As Rector of the University, during a very active life, and often travelling, he wrote in twenty years the greater part of his works, which treat of a vast variety of subjects. It is said of him that he could dictate compositions on dif¬ ferent subjects at the same time. It characterises his theo¬ logical speculations that he read daily some edifying books, for, as he expressed it, we should take care that nothing one¬ sided arise in our speculations. He used to begin his lec¬ tures and writings with prayer; and when in any inquiry he could find no solution, he would fall on his knees and pray for illumination. While the originality and deep philosophy of his lectures brought a great multitude of hearers to him at Paris and Naples, his sermons were so simple, that the most uneducated could understand them. King Louis IX. of France used to ask his advice in affairs of State. On one occasion he invited him against his will to dinner, when he was occupied with a very difficult inquiry. During the meal he became quite abstracted, and all at once cried out, “ Now at last I have found it!” His Prior reminded him that he was seated at the king's table; but the king immediately allowed a secretary to come and write down his thoughts. Aquinas was distinguished among the Schoolmen for clear¬ ness of development, and the harmony between his thoughts and their expression.* William of Auvergne, born at Aurillae, and at last bishop of Paris,f was a theologian distinguished for depth and clear¬ ness, and for maintaining the balance between speculation and the fervour of the Christian life. * Commentarii in 4 libros Sententiarum; Summa Theologiae (P. i. primia secundse, secunda secundse, P. iii. unfinished). Summa Cat.ho- licse Fidei contra Gentiles, 41. Opp. ed. Antwerp, 1617,18 t.; Paris,1660, 23 t.; Venet. 1745—60, 28 t. 4 ; Vita, Acta Sanctorum Mart. i. p. 655. A. Tauron, Vie de St. Thomas D’Aquin avec un Expose de sa Doctrine et des ses Ouvrages, Par. 1737, 4. Bernardi de Rubeis Dissertatio Critica et Apologetica De Gestis et Scriptis ac Doctrina St. Thomoo Aquinatis, Venet. 1750. Quetif et Echard Scriptores Ordinis Prasdica- torum, i. p. 271. Histoire Literaire de la France, xix. 288. Jourdain, pag. 434. Ritter, Chr. Philosophic, iv. 257- t De Fide et Legibus; De Universo. Opp. ed. Paris, 1674, 2 t. f. 544 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. Roger Bacon {doctor mirabilis ) possessed higher originality; he was an English Franciscan, who pursued his studies at Paris, became a teacher at Oxford, and died there a.d. 1294. He was powerfully influenced by a man celebrated for his liberal views, Robert Grosstete, or Capito, Bishop of Lin¬ coln, to whom also many later reformers of the fourteenth century, such as Wycliffe, were warmly attached. Roger Bacon developed peculiar ideas and tendencies in every department of knowledge, which exposed him to much per¬ secution and repeated imprisonment, from which he was res¬ cued only by the intervention of powerful friends. His principal treatise is the Opus majus ,* which is occupied with the Sciences generally ; he combated the one-sided supremacy of Aristotle, and even the authority of the Fathers ; he pointed out errors in their writings, and appealed to the original sources of theological knowledge. He was distin¬ guished for his knowledge of languages, and made himself familiar with the original Scriptures. In a treatise on the advantages of Grammar, he endeavoured to prove the neces¬ sity of linguistic studies, in order better to understand the Bible, which he asserted every layman ought to study in the Original. He disputed the authority of the Vulgate, in which he detected mistakes. The Bible, according to his view, ought to be the Supreme Law, to which every depart¬ ment of Life and Knowledge must be subjected. A reforma¬ tory germ lay in this exaltation of the Bible above the authority of the Church and Tradition. Theology he placed at the head of all the Sciences ; Revelation is the completion and perfecting of human reason ; in all Knowledge, including philosophical and theological, harmony necessarily reigns.f John Duns Scotus (Doctor subtilis) forms the close of this Period ; a Franciscan, from Dunstan, in Northumberland; he became a Professor of Theology at Oxford, Paris, and Co¬ logne, and died a.d. 1308. Henry of Ghent ( Gandavensis) had already excited an opposition against Thomas Aquinas, which Duns Scotus carried still further, and thus founded the School of the Scotists, in opposition to that of the Thomists. He was not destitute of depth of thought, and his acuteness * Ed. Samuel Jebb, London, 1733, fol. f Biograpkia Brittanica, iv. 616. Histoire Litteraire de la France, xx. 227. Jourdain, p. 413. Ritter. Chr. Philosopkie, iv. 473. DUNS SCOTUS. 545 was extraordinary, but he was inferior to Aquinas in clearness and dexterity, and indicates a separation of the harmonious relation of the religious Life and Thought; hence we fmd a predominance of the Understanding and a fondness for frivolous distinctions ; his thinking is wanting in simplicity, and his language abstruse; his investigations lose themselves in minutiae. Hitherto Scholastic speculation had been controlled by Christian experience ; its great masters had combined warmth of feeling with depth and acuteness of Intellect; but with Duns Scotus began the intellectual formal tendency which led continually to greater barrenness and inanity ; he marks the period when Scholasticism began to decline. The peculiar method of this Dialectic consists in starting questions on all sides respecting an object, arranging the argu¬ ments pro and contra , and lastly giving a decision, the so- called conclusio or resolutio. This method was far more developed than in the former period ; it exercised acuteness in a high degree, but also promoted Sophistry. It was fos¬ tered by the desire to maintain harmony with the traditions of the Church. Instead of clearing away Errors by the free spirit of Science, and by the help of their own often purer principles, the Schoolmen only confirmed them more in the Church. In what was set up as antithetical, as contra, there was much which was again brought forward by the later oppo¬ nents of Revelation. The Schoolmen, therefore, by their own inquiries were led into doubts; but since these were combined with a cordial pious faith, these Thinkers knew also how to find the means for allaying them. It was important for the development of the Church that through it there should be effected a union of the religious and Scientific Interests, a f union arising from the free development of Reason in con¬ nexion with Faith. It had this important consequence, that a reaction of the Natural Reason against Christianity, which we have seen already germinating, was overcome at this time by the power of the religious Scientific Spirit. Many times * Quasstiones in libros 4 Sententiarum; (Opus Anglicanum sive Oxoniense) ed. Hugo Cavellus, Antwp. 1620, 2 veil. f. Quastiones Quodlibetales, xxi. Philosophical writings : Commentaries on Aristotle. Opp. ed. Lucas Wadding, Lugd. 1639, 12 t. f. Baumgarten-Crusius, DeTheologia Scoti (Progr.), 1326. Ritter, iv. 354. N N 04b THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. repulsed, the opposing tendencies of Secular Culture at last broke forth irresistibly, and led the way to a new process of development. Then the reaction followed, for the greater part in a conscious Rationalism, but partly in a Mysticism, which unconsciously contained a rationalistic Element. The former (the reaction of rationalism) was realized in the appearance of those remarkable men, Amalrich de Bena,* * * § in the district of Chartres, at the beginning of the thirteenth Century, and Davjd de Dinanto. The doctrine they taught was derived from Aristotle, but their contemporaries pointed to quite a different source. Albertus Magnus, for example, in his Summa,i names the work of David de Dinanto, De tomis , which may remind us of the treatise of John Erigena, De divisione natures. And so we find that Martinus Polo- nus (a.d. 1271), in his supplement to Marianus Scotus, quotes passages which were ascribed to Amalrich, and are found word for word in Scotus. J Another important work besides exerted an influence which was erroneously ascribed to Aristotle, the treatise De causis, which rather contains Plotinus’s System of an immanent necessity of Reason, and of the necessary development of the Universe from the Abso¬ lute down to the farthest limit, the Hyle. Although its contents contradicted the Christian views of Teleology, Free¬ dom and Evil, yet Thomas Aquinas and others strove to Christianize the ideas.§ Amalric, in the University of Paris, had proceeded from dialectic inquiries to Dogmatics ; at first nothing contrary to the Church or to Christianity in its full extent was observable ; only surprise was excited by his asserting, that as no one can be saved without believing in the sufferings and resurrection of Christ, so neither can he, without having the conviction that he himself is a member of Christ. In this sentiment we may perceive an anticipation of Protestant Ideas, and some have really thought that Amal¬ rich was a Witness of the Truth, who had expressed, only in the form of Mysticism, the immediate relation to Christ. But * Engelliardt, Kirckengesck. Abkandlungen, p. 251. C. U. Hakn, Tkebl. Stud. u. Krit. 1846. Amalrick v. Bena u. David v. Dinanto v. J. H. Kronlein, ebendas. 1847. Ritter, Gesck. d ckr. Pkilos. iii. 625. + Tractatus iv. Qusestio xx. 2 ; De Tomis, koc est, De Divisionibus. X Martini, Pol. Chronic, ed. Antvp 1574. § Tkomas Aquin. Opp. ed. Paris, 1660, t. iv. Jourdain, p. 212. PANTHEISM OF AVERRHOES. 547 he shows himself to he very different in his cast of thought. He stands on the mystic-pantheistic point of John Scotus. He regards the whole Universe as a manifestation of the divine Being, a development of God in all existence, the ov in his Theophanies. We may see in him how easily a one-sided Speculation terminates in Pantheism,—Reason will acknow¬ ledge no bounds, and derive everything from one causality, and hence will not acknowledge the relative Independence which is involved in the Freedom of the creature. The Abbot Joachim of Floria, in Calabria, had prophesied an Age of the Holy Spirit which would be distinguished by a purer development of Christianity and a more spiritual Reli¬ gious instead of Ceremonial Service; when the Religion of Intuition would be supreme, instead of an intellectual scho¬ lastic Christianity. This idea was cherished by the adherents of the Pantheistic Party. In the Old Testament God re¬ vealed himself as the Almighty, in the New Testament as the Logos. Now, instead of the Incarnation of the Logos in one subject, there is that of the Holy Spirit in all who know the Truth. Practical errors are said to have been founded on the maxim, that if men only live in the intuition of God all other things are indifferent. A strict party of the Franciscan Order likewise misinterpreted that doctrine of Joachim’s. In the writings of Francis of Assissi representations are to be met with of the relationship of Man to Nature, of a brother¬ hood of all created Beings. Among the spiritual men of his Order, one Party explained this pantheistically, and spoke of an age of the Father and the Son, and after that had passed away the Age of the everlasting Gospel w ? ould begin, in which the Spirit would abolish all Forms. A still more conscious Pantheism proceeded from the Philo¬ sophy of the Spanish Arabians, especially the Aristotelian Averrhoes, who taught that there was one spirit in all men, ignoring individuality, and denying personal Immortality. This doctrine met with no little acceptance, so that traces of it are to be found out of the circle of professed scholars. In the biography of Thomas Aquinas a licentious knight is men¬ tioned, who, on being exhorted to repentance, answered, that he was as sure of being saved as Peter, for the same Spirit was in him. Frequently the doctrines of Averrhoes were not openly expressed, but their abettors concealed their unbelief N N 2 548 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. under the garb of Orthodoxy. From this resulted the pre¬ tended contrariety between theological and philosophical Truth, which might have been made the vehicle for spread¬ ing every kind of Unbelief without correction. It was part of the merit of the Schoolmen to combat this distinction, and to point out that there can be no absolute contradiction in human nature. In these conflicts an extraordinary man held a conspicuous place, Raymund Lulli, # born at Majorca, a.d. 1226. Till his thirtieth year he had been quite a man of the world, and was known only as an author by his songs ; yet the hidden seed of Christian education was not lost, and a conflict was developed in his soul between his worldly tendencies and his new religious aspirations. One night, while composing a love- song, the image of the crucified Saviour was presented vividly to him; he sought to lose the impression, but in vain. By degrees his mental activity took quite a different direction; along with the power of Imagination, which had early shown itself, other extraordinary powers were brought into exercise ; intensity of feeling, joined with uncommon profundity and acuteness of thought. His multifarious scientific and philo¬ sophic interests still remained in close connexion with the practical religious; he was inflamed with a desire to spread the Gospel among all unbelievers, for the purpose of making Christianity the ruling religion of the World. As the Cru¬ sades had terminated so unfortunately, he thought of a differ¬ ent method than force of subjecting all heathen nations to Christianity, by the power of conviction, and hence strove to find the means of representing to all men the truth of Chris¬ tianity. This took in his mind the form of an opposition to the Arabian Philosophy. He conceived the plan of a general scientific doctrine, which would demonstrate the principles of all truth in all the Sciences, especially the Christian dogmas, and endeavoured to carry it out in his famed Ars generalis , an absolute Formula for the treatment of all the Sciences. However much he prided himself on this supposed discovery, it seems to have been one of the unfortunate attempts of a * Opp. ed. Mogunt. 1722, in ten vols., but of which the seventh and eighth seem to have been lost. His writings have not been sufficiently used, for the least important, the Ars Generalis, has been chiefly noticed. Hence his importance has not been adequately estimated even by Ritter. SPECIAL HISTORY OF DOGMAS. 549 self-confident formalistic intellectual tendency, and remarkable only for the mixture of imagination and intellect. But far more important are his other dogmatic and ethical writings, which award him a place among the profoundest and most acute of the Schoolmen. In a life full of ardent activity he was able to pursue his mystical and speculative studies, and to compose a multitude of philosophical and theological treatises. Several times he attempted to make known Christianity in North Africa, and disputed with the Arabian Philosophers; but he was cruelly persecuted, and suffered martyrdom at Bugia, a.d. 1315. It was a leading object with him to prevent the spread of the principles of Averroes in Theology, He combated, on the one hand, this contradiction between theo¬ logical and philosophical Truth, while, on the other hand, he advocated Free Inquiry in opposition to those who w T ould only admit the Faith of Authority. As Pantheistic views were so widely spread at this period, the opposition made to them will in part account for the influence gained by the Dualist views of the Catharists. SPECIAL HISTORY OF DOGMAS. A. THE DOGMAS WHICH BELONG TO THE INTRODUCTION IN DOGMATICS. The treatment of Dogmatics was cultivated by the Schoolmen of this period for the purpose of adding a section to the Pro¬ legomena of Theology, in which they occupied themselves with questions which hitherto had been so accurately investi¬ gated ; on the Sources of theological knowledge—the relation of Revelation to Reason—the necessity of Revelation—the relation of faith to knowledge,—whether Theology is a Science, and what authority it has for being one; whether it is a theo¬ retic or practical Science ; what is its chief object, and wherein its Unity consists; what relation it has to other Sciences, especially to the different parts of Philosophy. The decisions on these points were connected with the question—what is the peculiar nature and seat of Religion, whether knowledge or feeling ; what is the central point of Christianity in compa¬ rison with other Religions ? On these questions the differ¬ ences were founded which separated the Schoolmen in various 550 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. directions. But what distinguished the deepest thinkers among them was, that they agreed in sharply defining the peculiar province of theological knowledge in connexion with Religion, and did not as yet mingle Dialectics with Religion, however much it finally prevailed; they also placed the essence of Religion in the disposition, and hence in all know¬ ledge presupposed the substance of what was to be known in the religious experience of the disposition. Hence they kept in the same direction as Anselm, and adhered to the principle expressed by Augustin, Fides prcecedit Intellectum. Alexander of Hales answered the question whether Theo¬ logy is a Science, in the following manner:—He made a dis¬ tinction in the application of the idea of Science ; Science relates either to the completion of the knowledge of Truth— in which case it has to do with Knowledge as such, that is, theoretical; or the Knowledge relates to religious Experience, and of the latter kind is theological knowledge.* This Know¬ ledge can only proceed from the disposition. Theology demands the human Soul, since it rouses the affections, the tendencies of the disposition, by the principles of goodness, the fear of God, and love. The relation of Knowledge to Faith is therefore the reverse of what it is in the other Sciences, since Theology first of all produces Faith, and after the Soul has been purified through Faith working by Love, the result is the Understanding of Theology. In logical Science, on the contrary, rational Knowledgef pro¬ duces Faith. If the former have produced faith, then the internal grounds for such conviction will appear. Faith is then the light of the Soul; and the more any one is enlight¬ ened by this light, so much more will he apprehend the reasons by which his Faith is proved. There is indeed a Faith which does not rise so high as Knowledge, which satis¬ fies itself with probabilities ; but Christian Faith is different. * Certitudo speculativa and certitudo experientise; or certitudo secundum intellectum and secundum affectum, quod est per modum gustus. + In logicis ratio creat (idem, unde argumentum est ratio rei dubise faciens fidem; in theologicis vero est e converso, quia fides creat rationem, unde fides est argumentum faciens rationem. Fides, enim, qua creditur, est lumen animarum, quo, quanto quis magis illustratur, tanto magis est perspicax ad inveniendas rationes, quibus probantur credenda. ALEXANDER OF HALES AND BONAVENTURA. 551 This proceeds from Experience—appeals to the Revelation of the highest Truths, and hence stands above all Knowledge. Accordingly he distinguishes even between a speculative cer¬ tainty of an intellectual kind and that of inward Experience, of Feeling which is founded in the surrender of the Soul to Truth, or in Love. He meets the objection that if we seek proof for the objects of Faith, its value will be taken away. Nothing can be more certain to Man than his faith. In refu¬ tation of the objection he gives a threefold purpose, for which ratio is to be made use of, for the development of Faith, (i.) For the advantage of the Believer himself, in order that he may come to an understanding of the Truth believed : the grace of Faith itself enlightens our reason for that purpose, (ii.) In order to lead the simple to more perfect faith, as the less advanced are led to the love of God by temporal blessings, so they are led by rational arguments to a higher stage of faith, (iii.) In order to bring back Unbelievers to the Faith, he who would support his cause only by Reason would draw his proofs from Reason, and then certainly Faith would lose its value ; but as for him who does not support himself on Reason, but trusts to the witness of the highest Truth by itself, to him Reason serves not for proof, but he supports himself on the internal experience of divine things; here the word of the Samaritans is applicable : “ We believe now not on thy testi¬ mony, but because-we have experienced it ourselves.” Theo¬ logy was in his esteem a practical Science, for it has to do with the divine life and assimilation to the Holy Spirit. Its object is the Divine Being as made known through Christ in the work of Redemption.* He states the objection, that even in Theology mention is made of the Works of Creation, but rejoins that everything else was made in reference to that first event; the Restoration of Man cannot be treated of without discussing the Fall, which again leads to the doctrine of Creation. Secular Science has to do with the works of Creation, but Theology considers everything in connexion with the New Creation, the Restoration of Man. Bonaventura distinguished, in reference to the objects of Faith, between their relation to Reason left to itself, which acquires knowledge by its own efforts—and to Reason which by the gift of Faith is potentiated to something higher, and is * Scientia de substantia divina cognoscenda per Christum, in opers reparationis. 552 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS transformed by the influence of the new divine life. Faith raises the spirit to give assent to divine Truths; Science leads to the understanding of what is received by Faith. The Conviction attained by Faith does not proceed from rational demonstration, but from love to Him who makes the Reve¬ lation. Although the truths of faith may be compared with other objects of knowledge, yet they are distinguished by this, that they operate on the disposition and the feelings. The doctrine that Christ died for us, for example, excites the soul to love and devotion. Albert the Great defines Christianity as practical Science, for although it is occupied with the investigation of Truth, yet it refers everything to the life of the Soul, and shows how Man by the truths it reveals must be formed to a divine Life. It treats of God and his works, not in reference to abstract Truth, but to God as the supreme good, to the salvation of Men, to the production of piety in the inner and outer Man. He also distinguishes various kinds of certainty: the theo¬ retical, which merely relates to knowledge (informatio mentis ), and the certainty of immediate consciousness (informatio con- scientice). The knowledge obtained by Faith is more certain than that derived from other sources ; but we must distinguish between the fides informis and the Jides formata; the first is only a means to knowledge, but the second is an immediate consciousness. Man is attracted by the object of faith just as moral truth leads him to Morality. All Knowledge and Truth come from God, but they are imparted in different ways ; our Reason has the capacity to perceive Truth, as the Eye pos¬ sesses the faculty of sight. Natural light is one thing, and the light of grace is another. The latter is a higher stage, an assimilation between him who knows and the thing known, a participation of the divine Life. Thomas Aquinas endeavours to prove the necessity of Reve¬ lation, and to refute the objection of Rationalism, that Man, who stands at the head of the Creation, would be placed below all the rest, if he were not furnished with all the powers which are necessary for his destiny, he replies: On this very account a Revelation is necessary, because Man is exalted above all other creatures, and because he is destined for a super-terrestrial end, an end which transcends the limits of Natural Reason.* Revelation also serves to render man * Illud, quod acquirit bonitatem perfectam pluribus auxiliia et THOMAS AQUINAS. 553 humble, in opposition to that Pride to which natural Reason is prone. Kven in the knowledge of truths to which Reason can attain by its own power, Revelation has the advantage of making them generally known, for few can attain to them in the way of rational inquiry, and their knowledge would not be free from error. He denied the contradiction between philo¬ sophical and theological truth ; the truths of natural Reason cannot be at variance with those given by Revelation, since God is also the Author of Reason. What opposes Reason cannot proceed from God. # If we admit such a contradiction, it would follow that something false might be the object of faith, which would be an absurdity. In his inquiries re» specting the relation of faith to knowledge he says:—A faith of authority resting on human opinion is the weakest of all things; but it is otherwise with divine Revelation. Yet Theology makes use of human Reason, not, indeed, to prove the truths of Revelation, but to deduce other truths from it. As other Sciences obtain their principles from other sources, and then draw inferences from them, so Theology proceeds from those which are made known by a higher light. But since Grace does not nullify Nature, but perfects it, and as the natural inclinations of the Will serve the divine principle of the Christian life, so also will Reason serve the Truths of Faith.t We may dispute with opponents if they admit some of our Principles, for then they may be shown to be illogical. But when our opponents deny altogether the Authority of Revelation, the truths founded upon it cannot be proved to them. Yet there are in all Creation certain Analogies to Divine Truth which may be employed to illustrate revealed Truths, though not sufficient to understand and prove them ; hut whatever is set in opposition to those truths may be con- motibus est nobilius eo quod imperfectam bonitatem acquiret pauciori- bus vel per seipsum, et hoc modo se kabet homo respectu aliarum creaturarum, qui factus est ad ipsius divinse gloriae participationem. * Principiorum autem naturaliter notorum cognitio nobis divinitus est insita, cum ipse Deus sit auctor nostras naturae. Haec ergo principia etiam divina sapientia continet. Quicquid igitur principiis hujusmodi contrarium est, est divinae sapientiae contrarium, non igitur a JL)eo esse potest. f Cum gratia non tollat naturem, sed perficiat oportet, quod naturalia ratio subserviat fidei, sicut et natural!s inclinatio voluntatis obsequitul caritati. 651 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. tradicted as only seeming reasons, since there can be no self¬ contradictory proofs. Therefore this method must rather he applied to the instruction and comfort of believers. If through Reason we can attain only a slight knowledge of the highest things, yet it is always most delightful. He raises a doubt whether Theology is a science, since it treats of such a variety of objects, and he endeavours to determine the Unity which connects them. He makes the Unity to consist in their treating everything in relation to God and Divine Reve¬ lation. Then he asks whether it is a theoretical or practical Science, and replies that both qualities are to be found in it, but it is more speculative than practical. This assertion may seem to be inconsistent with the fact, that Aquinas held the same views on the relation of Faith to Knowledge as the Schoolmen already named. But the discrepancy vanishes if we understand the assertion in his peculiar sense. He goes upon the Aristotelian principle that the Intuition of God is the highest destiny of the Spirit, which will be first attained in everlasting life. Now, since Theology is occupied rather with divine things than with human actions, and its highest end is the contemplation of God,* on this account he calls it a speculative Science. Duns Scotus met the assertion of the necessity of Revela¬ tion, from the standpoint of Philosophy, by the principle that Man requires no supernatural knowledge, but can obtain everything necessary for fulfilling his destiny by his natural Reason. Were it not so, the work of God in his Creation would be incomplete. He refutes this objection by an acute distinction. The idea of the Supernatural may be formed in a twofold manner; supernatural either in relation to the receptive power of Reason, or to the operating cause by which certain knowledge is imparted to human Reason. In reference to the capability of knowledge implanted in Reason we can say, that no knowledge is supernatural, for Reason is so con¬ stituted as to take in all knowledge ; it has a natural inclination for imparted knowledge, and all such knowledge contributes to its perfection, it is intellectus possibilis. But it is different as to the second point, which refers to the efficient cause, and the * Quia principalius agit de rebus divinis, quam de actibus humanis, de quibus agit, secundum quod per eos ordinatur homo ad perfectam Dei cognitionem, in qua seterna beatitudo consistit. DUNS SCOTUS. 555 mode of imparting knowledge. In this respect we may say, that some knowledge may be supernatural to Reason, although Rea¬ son is naturally constituted so as to receive it, and finding satis¬ faction in it; lastly, it is supernatural so far as it must be com¬ municated by a supernatural efficient principle, and equally, whether this Revelation be internal or external. We do not, therefore, deny, that there is a certain province which Reason might be able to cultivate by its own powers, a Highest from the standpoint of human Reason, only that this would not be sufficient to attain salvation and the destiny of human nature. If it be objected that Man would then sink below the level of other creatures, since he would not have everything in himself, which belongs to his destiny,—he replies, if our happiness consisted in the possession of the highest knowledge to which we can attain by reason, we should not say that Nature was defective in the highest creature. Now, let us grant that Rea¬ son could attain so far; but beyond this there is still a higher end to which Reason cannot attain by its own natural powers. Precisely in this is shown the dignity of human Nature, that in virtue of its receptivity it is adapted to receive something more into itself than what it can reach by its own power. Its endless receptivity raises it above the whole Creation. Scotus therefore maintains something supernatural in the divine com¬ munications. The necessity of the communication is, accord¬ ing to him, grounded in this, that the blessedness to which man is destined proceeds, not from natural necessity, but from Free Will and the grace of God, and is attained by the method which the divine wisdom has appointed. Here he brings this doctrine into connexion with the divine Will. Scotus there¬ fore also belongs to those who did not regard the antagonism between the Supernatural and the Natural as absolute and irreconcilable ; but, while admitting the necessity of the for¬ mer, at the same time they tried to show the Harmony between both. Scotus also was the individual who first of all entered into a fuller inquiry respecting the Origin and Contents of the Bible. # He exhibited the evidence for its Divinity, and its sufficiency for the religious necessities of Man. As proofs of its divine origin he adduced the Prophecies, the agreement of the Bible with itself, the Authority of the * Sentent. Prolog. Qu. 2. 550 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. Writers, the conscientiousness of those who transmitted it, and the agreement of its contents with Reason. What is more reasonable than that Man should love God above all, and his Neighbour as himself? These are the fundamental Principles from which everything else is to be deduced. Also the absurdity of the errors opposed to it, speak in its favour, as well as miracles and the unchangeableness of the Church. The Articles of Faith contain nothing by which the Perfection of God is not set in a still clearer light, and what contradicts them, encroaches on its perfection. As to the other point, the Sufficiency of Scripture, he says, if everything necessary is not verbally stated in the Bible, yet everything may be deduced from its principles. He meets the objection that the Bible contains much that is superfluous, and not necessary for Salvation, and rejoins—that what appears to us superfluous, is yet important for the development of Truth. In this respect, lor example, the Historical is very important. Duns Scotus inquires what forms the essential contents of Theology. He is not disposed, like Alexander of Hales, to accept Christ as such, for not all the essential truths of the Bible are referable to him; the doctrine that the Father begat the Son, and the truths which relate to the divine Will, cannot virtualiter be contained in the doctrine of Christ, for these truths would not be the less necessary even if the Logos had not become Flesh. In his opinion, the primuvn subjection of Theology, is the doctrine of the Divine Being. At the same time he agrees with those who regard Theology as a practical Science, and shows that all the Truths which relate to the Divine Being, also tend to produce a peculiar determination of the life in reference to God. William of Paris developes in a peculiar manner the fun¬ damental ideas respecting the nature of Faith. He distin¬ guishes between the standpoint wdiere conviction proceeds from the Objective, the rational knowledge of the Objective, and where it depends on the Subjective element, the believing disposition.* The latter method is that of religious con¬ viction. Man rises by virtue of his disposition above the reaction of the Understanding. This theologian considers as belonging to the essence of Faith, boldness and power of * De Fide, c. 1; aliud est credere ex probabilitate sive ex evidentia ipsius crediti, aliud ex virtute credentis. ROGER BACON AND RAIMUND LULLI. 557 spirit, firmness of character in conflict with the reactions that tend to Unbelief. Boldness overcomes the darkness of in¬ truding doubt, and by its own inward light suppresses that which brings darkness. It is somewhat original, that in Faith he gives prominence to the practical element of a con¬ flict against the reactions of natural Reason, and discerns in it an act of spiritual bravery.* * * § Above all other operations of the mind is that of Faith, which accomplishes its object by a combative power f—a profound psychological mode of con¬ templation. Roger Bacon did not enter deeply into these inquiries, yet his discussions on the relation of Philosophy to Theology deserve consideration. Theology developes immediately the contents of Scripture; Speculation is the link between Scrip¬ ture and natural Reason. It receives what is true in earlier speculation, and connects with it those truths which Reason might indeed know of itself, but which it would never have found without the impulse which Revelation gives it. Chris¬ tian philosophy can therefore be reconciled with Faith, since it asserts rational truths which every wise man admits, although if left to himself he would not have known them.J This corresponds not only to Christian Philosophy, but also to the Christian consciousness, which must bring all truth to divine Truth, to be subordinate to it and serve it.§ Raymund Lullt maintained the agreement of Knowledge and Faith, partly from apologetic motives, and partly in oppo¬ sition to the Theory of Averrhoes. “ Elevate thy know¬ ledge,” he said, “ and thy love will be elevated. Heaven is * Manifestum, quod credere improbabilia fortitudinis est atque vigoris nostri intellectus, sicut amare molesta et ignominiosa fortitudinis est et vigoris nostri affectus. Fortitudo intellectus, qua) tenebras improbabilitatis irrumpat et vincat et luminositate propria ea, quae ilia abscondere contendit, lucida et aperta, hoc est credita faciat. + De operationibus intellectus solum credere bellum habet, omne bellum bellica virtute seu fortitudine agendum est. 7 Philosophi infideles multa ignorant in particulari de divinis, quae si proponerentur iis, ut probarentur per principia philosophise com¬ plete), hoc est per vivacitates rationes, qua) sumunt originem a philoso- phia infidelium, licet complementum a fide Christi, reciperent sine contradictione, et gaudent de proposita sibi veritate, quia avidi sunt et magis studiosa quam Christiani. § Propter conscientiam Christianam, qua) valet omnem veritatem ducere ad divinam, ut ei subjiciatur et famuletur.—Opus Majus, p. 4L, 558 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. not so high as the love of a holy man.”* * * § This language shows how intimately connected he regarded knowledge to be with the religious life of the Soul. On the question whether, Theology is a Science, he distinguishes between what lies in its nature and essence, and what it is under certain circum¬ stances. The essence of the Spirit in the strict sense is the intelligere. Only when the Spirit cannot rise to knowledge, mere Faith takes its place ; as the image of an object occupies the Fancy when the thing itself is not present. But in a strict sense Theology is Science, since the intelligere belong to the essence of the Intellectus in a strict sense. Since God is in the highest sense good and great, he imparts himself to the created Intellectus as far as it is capable of receiving his per¬ fection. The Spirit is made in order to refer itself with all its powers to God; hence it must be able to appropriate Him above all other objects.t He states the objection, How can a finite Spirit comprehend the Infinite? and answers, As he who tastes only a drop of the Ocean perceives its saltness, so the human spirit attains a sufficient knowledge of the Trinity ; but more than this it cannot attain. In a disputation between Fcdes and Intellectus , the latter says to Faith, Thou art the preparatory step by which I attain to a right state of the Soul in order that I may soar to higher things. J When the Intel¬ lect rises through Knowledge to the stage on which Faith already stands, Faith rises from this point still higher § In his treatise on the Contemplation of God,|| he carries on an * De Centum Nominibus Dei, Opp. t. vi.—Eleva tuum intelligere et elevabis tuum amare. Coelum non est tarn altum, sicut amore sancti hominis. Quo magis laborabia ad ascendendum eo magis ascendes. t Diaputatio cremitse et Raimundi super aliquibus dubiis qusestioni- bus sententiarum Petri Lombardi. Aliud objectum illi minus princi- pale esset illi magis appetibile, quam suum objectum magis principale quod esset impossibile, et idem esset suo modo de voluntate, cui theologia non esset proprium objectum ad amandum ; et sic de memoria ad recolendum quod est valde inconveniens. X Quod tu, fides, sis dispositio et praeparatio, per quam ego de Deo sum dispositus ad altas res ; nam in hoc, quod ego per te suppono credendo, per quod possum ascendere, habituo me de te et sic tu es in me et ego in te. § Quando ascendo in gradum, in que tu es intelligendo, tu ascendk credendo in altiorum gradum supra me. || Concordantiae et Contrarietates inter Fidem et Rationem. THE DOGMAS OF SPECIAL DOGMATICS. 559 inquiry on the agreement and disagreement of Faith and 'Reason. As Faith stands on a height and does not descend to rational grounds, so Reason rises to those lofty subjects which it brings down to Knowledge. If Faith stands aloft and Reason ascends to it, then they are both in harmony, because Faith elevates Reason, and by its lofty soaring, strengthens and ennobles it, so that it attempts to attain by Knowledge to that which Faith has already reached. If Reason cannot attain those heights of Faith, yet at least the more it strives, the higher will Faith rise. They reciprocally elevate each other ; hence there is harmony and good-will between them. It is the nature of Faith to ascend higher than Reason, because the activity of the latter is compounded of the Sensuous and the Intellectual; Faith, on the contrary, is simple, and stands above the loftiest height of what is known by the Intellect. No contradiction can exist between them. Faith calls Reason from mere capability into real activity,* when it embraces the law of Religion with Love. Reason confines the hitellectus within its limits, since it can¬ not pass beyond them ; but true Faith frees and enlarges the Intellectus .f B. THE DOGMAS OP SPECIAL DOGMATICS, a. THE DOCTRINE OF GOD 1. PROOF OF THE DIVINE EXISTENCE.—THE IDEA OF GOD IN GENERAL. x Arguments for the Being of God. The Schoolmen of this Period perceived the error in Anselm’s form of the Onto¬ logical argument, but they also recognised what was true in it, namely, that the idea of God is something fundamental to the Spirit of Man and undeniable, and this proof they sought to employ. In this sense Alexander of Hales says,— the idea of God is a habitus naturaliter impressus primes veritatis , and is founded on the connexion subsisting between eternal * Facit venire rationem de potentia in actum. + Sicut ratio captivat et incarcerat intellectum kominis intra terminos, intra quos est terminatus, quia non kabet, cum quo eos possit ampliare ?t extendere, ita vera tides liberat et magnificat ipsum intellectum, quia non constringit eum intra terminos, intra quos ratio habet eum terminatum. 580 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. Truth and the moral nature of Man. But we must dis¬ tinguish between a cognitio in habitu and in actu. The habitual lies at the basis of human consciousness ; the actual is the developed idea. In reference to the former, the idea of God is undeniable ; in reference to the second, a twofold ten¬ dency of the soul is possible—in proportion as it either turns to the Revelation of the highest Truth, or allows Worldliness and the lower powers of the soul to govern it. In the latter case, the consciousness of God may be wanting, and the fool will say, There is no God. This writer distinguishes also between the idea of God in general ( ratio communis) and the particular application of it ( ratio 'propria ). The former is true even in Idolatry, for that testifies of an idea of God as its foundation, though the application of it is erroneous. Thomas Aquinas says, # —The knowledge of God in a certain confused manner is implanted in all men. Since Man is so created that he finds in God his highest good, so in striving after Happiness, striving after God is at the foundation; but all men do not attain to this consciousness. As to the evi¬ dence for the being of God, he distinguishes between what is so in itself, and what is subjectively evident. In itself the idea of God is evident, for every one wdio admits it into his consciousness; but this is not the case with all men ; where¬ fore the Fool can say in his heart, There is no God. But, on the other hand, no one special proof can be given for the being of God. The design of this proof consists in bringing the undeveloped consciousness to him from the works of God in Creation ; but the effects are not adequate to their cause ; thev do not allow us to infer the Infinite. In reference to the contrarieties in the mode of apprehend¬ ing the idea of God, the peculiar standpoint of Amalrich, and I)av[d of DinantoGs to be noticed. The latter described God as the principinm materials omnium rerum , and in reference to the three departments of Existence distinguished three principlest—matter the first indivisible principle of the * Cognoscere Deum esse in aliquo communi sub quadam confusione est nobis naturaliter insertum. p Concil. Paris, a. 1209, in Martene Tkesaur. Anecdot. iv. 163. Albertus Magnus, Summa P. I. Tract, iv. Qusestio 20, Membrum ii. ed. Lugd. t. xvii. f. 76. Thomas Aquinas, in Sententias, 1. ii. Dist. xvii. qu. i. art. i. ed.Venet. t. x. p. 235. On Amalrich, see Gulielmus Armoricus AMALRIC AN1) JOACHIM OF FLORIS. 561 corporeal world ; in reference to the spiritual world—spirit the first indivisible vovg from which proceeds the Soul ; and in reference to the ideas of God—the first Indivisible in the eter¬ nal Substances. Between these three principles no distinction could exist, for otherwise they must be referred back to a higher principle of Unity. There are therefore three relations of the one divine Being to the corporeal, the spiritual, and the ideal worlds. As Thomas Aquinas states,* the school of Amalric described God as the principium formale of all things, which would indicate a more idealistic mode of conception. Accord¬ ing to their hypothesis, Grod is the one subject in all,—Nature is his body,—he alone is the true Being—all objects of the senses are only accidentia sine subjecto. Thus they explained the doctrine of Transubstantiation as a symbolical representa¬ tion of this Pantheism. The consecration of the Priest repre¬ sented symbolically what existed independently of it. In every Christian God became man ; in the whole of Humanity there was an Incarnation of God, for the consciousness of Man was a form of appearance for the Absolute ; God was conscious of himself in human consciousness. In this sense we are to understand the expression that every Christian must have the conviction that he is a member of Christ; God is in him as in Christ. From this standpoint this party adopted the division of History which had been proposed by Joachim of Floris —into the ages of the Father, the Son, and the Spirit; the Age of the Father in the Old Testament; the Age of the Son in the Christian era, which is the era of the Incarnate Logos, of positive Religion, and of a visible Cultus ; and the Age of the Spirit, when God is worshipped only in the form of the Spirit, when the consciousness is shared by all that God has become Man, and there is no more need of a positive Revelation, since the one self-sufficient reason has become self-conscious. A priest belonging to this sect, as he was led to the stake, declared, that so far as he existed, they could not burn him, because he was God himself. The Schoolmen, on the contrary, advocated the Personality De Gestis Philippi Augusti in Bouquet rer Gallic. Scriptt, continued by Brial. xvii. 83. Martinus Polonus (1271) Chronicon, ed. Antvp. 1574. * Summa, P. 1. qu. iii. art 8. O O 563 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. of God. Albertus Magnus says,* God is the causal Being, as the efficient, formal cause, and as the final cause, but not the material and essential being of things. He is the arche¬ type of all existence, which all are designed to represent; but as the Archetype he maintains his separate existence, and exists apart from created things. To the same effect, Aquinas says, God is the esse omnium effective et exemplariter, but not per essentiam. ‘2. THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY. The example of Augustin was followed in tracing an analogy to the Trinity in the human spirit, but yet it was carried out in a peculiar manner. Albert Magnus says,—there is no excellence among the Creatures which is not to be found in a much higher style, and as an archetype, in the Creator ; among created beings it exists only in foot-marks and images. This is true also of the Trinity. No artistic Spirit can accomplish his w r ork without first forming to himself an outline of it. In the Spirit, therefore, first of all, the Idea of its work is con¬ ceived which is as it were the offspring of the Spirit, in every feature resembling the Spirit, representing it in its acting.f Thus, therefore, the Spirit reveals himself in the Idea of the Spirit. Now, from the acting Spirit this idea passes into reality, and for this purpose the Spirit must find a medium in outward action. This medium must be simple, and of the same substance with him who first acted, if indeed the latter is so simple that being, nature, and activity, are one in him. From this results the idea in reference to God, of the formative Spirit, of the planned Image, and of the Spirit by which the Image is realized.J The Creation in time is a Revelation of the eternal acting of God, the eternal generation of his Son. The Revelation of God in Time • for the sanctification of Nature, is an Image of the eternal procession of the Spirit from the Father and the Son. Our love is only a reflection of the divine love ; the Archetype of all love is the Holy Spirit, * Sicut paradigma, a quo fiunt et ad quod formantur et ad quod finiuntur, cum tamen intrinsecum sit, extra facta formata et finita existens, et nihil sit de esse eorum. •f Format ex se rationem operis et speciem, quse est sicut proles ipsius intellectus, intellectui agenti similis in quantum agens est. + Spiritus rector formse. AQUINAS AND RAYMUND LULLI. 563 who, like all love, proceeds from God. The one Love spread abroad through all holy souls proceeds from the Holy Spirit/* Love in God neither diminishes nor increases, but we diminish or increase it in ourselves according as we receive this love into our souls, or withdraw from it. Aquinas distinguishes the esse intelligere, and velle or amare , in God. We cannot, he says, sufficiently prove by Reason the relation of the Persons to the Unity of the Essence in God, but if once admitted, it may be shown, that the divine Persons are derived from God as the perfect ground and cause of all things. The derivation of the creatures from God, represents but imperfectly the perfection of the Divine Essence. Hence the Revelation of God leads us back to the perfect image which the divine perfection includes in itself,—the Son, the principle and archetype of the manner in which the creatures are derived from God, and as the origin of creatures from God’s free love leads back to a principle which is the ground of all God’s free communications, so it is this principle of love under which form everything proceeds from God. But the procedere in the form of Love, is the Holy Spirit. As far as the Father and the Son are personally distinguished, they become united by love, which is the Holy Spirit. Since God knows himself, he knows all things. This, his Self- knowledge, a procedere secundum intellecturn, is the divine Word. As God the Father knows himself and all creatures, and expresses himself in the Word whom he has begotten, so far this Word represents him and all creatures in a perfect manner, and so he loves himself, and all creatures in the Holy Spirit. Raymund Lulli says: the goodness of God cannot be thought of as inoperative; God must always be represented as active in it, and communicating himself. But we must also think of Him as the All-sufficient. Without the doctrine of the Trinity, the Creation must be regarded as necessary, in order that he might communicate himself to it, and then his Perfection would be dependent on the Creation. This can only be avoided by the doctrine of the Trinity, which repre¬ sents God in his eternal self-revelation and communicative- * Una caritas diffusa per omnes animas sanctas per spiritum sanctum, ad quam sicut exempla omnis dilectio refertur et comparatione illius eto assimilatione caritas dici meretur. 0 0 2 564 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. ness. For self-communication belongs to the nature of the Supreme Good, and this, in its highest perfection, is exhibited in the doctrine of the Trinity. The Principle of all Existence is the Father, the mediating Instrument is the Son, and the Holy Spirit is the end and rest of all. # Therefore the Holy Spirit cannot again generate another Person; all that can be desired finds its accomplishment in Him. The Father and the Son refer themselves through love to the Holy Spirit, as the final aim. Inasmuch as Love in God is not a thing pro¬ duced, it is his Nature. As far as the Father knows himself as a Father he begets the Son. Since the Father and Son contemplate themselves through love they beget the Holy Spirit. The distinction of the divine Persons shows us that the divine perfections are not inactive on account of their inactivity.f Since God is equally God in acting as in being, he must have different persons in his essence. No substance can be without distinction; without distinction it would be nothing. J 3. THE DOCTRINE OF THE CREATION. The Schoolmen agitated the question whether the End of the Creation is the glory of God or the happiness of the creatures. Bonaventura gives the following opinion :—God’s highest aim must be his own glory, for it is said, God created all things for himself; not as if it was necessary for him, or in order to increase his glory, but in order to reveal and commu¬ nicate it, in which the highest well-being of his creatures consists. Thus there is no contradiction between the two Ends, but one is subordinate to the other. Should any one say that such a highest End is egoistic, the answer is, that it is one thing with God and another with the Creature ; for in * See the Liber Proverbiorum, the section on the Son of God : Quaelibet divinarum rationum est principium per patrem in filio et per filium est medium et per spiritum sanctum est quies et finis. Id, propter quod spiritus sanctus non producit personam, est, ut appetitus cujuslibet rationis in illo habeat finem et quietem. Quia pater et filius per amorem se habent ad unum finem, ille finis est Spiritus Sanctus. t Distinctio divinarum personarum est ut divinse rationes non sint otiosae de infinitate. X Quia Deus est tantum Deus per agere, quam per existere, habet in sua essentia distinctas personas. Nulla substantia potest esse sine distinctione; sine distinctione non esset quidquam. BONAVENTURA AND AQUINAS. 565 God there is no distinction between the general and the par¬ ticular good; he is the original basis of all Good and of the highest Good. If He, from whom all other goodness is derived, were not to perform all his acts on account of him¬ self, the effect that proceeded from him would not be truly good. Since the use of the creatures depends altogether on their relation to the Supreme Good, everything proceeds from the love of God, since he makes all things tend towards him¬ self. Should any one say that it belongs to all creatures to seek their own well-being, we answer, that a twofold tendency in creatures must be noted; first, there is Nature in its per¬ verted state, according to which it makes itself the centre ; secondly, there is the perfect nature of created Nature in its original State, which rises above itself to God, and seeks the honour of God more than its own private advantage. What is the highest end of Creation must also be the same for human actions. Bonaventura endeavoured to prove how this end could only be realized by rational creatures. It is true that in all creatures there is an unconscious Revelation of God, but the Image of God is only in the rational. Since God is the highest Light and the Supreme Goodness, he has created all things for the communication of Himself. A perfect Revelation would be impossible, if there were not beings who understood it. Rational creatures are requisite for all; hence all other creatures are related not immediately to God, but only through the medium of rational Beings. Thomas Aquinas regards the beginning of Creation as an object of Faith ; we cannot prove it by argument nor refute the Eternity of Creation, for even by this the divine Causality is not denied, since we might regard God’s act of Creation as not a successive act performed in time ; and the Universe, although it had always been, is not to be considered eternal like God, but as in the succession of an infinite series of moments of Time.* 4. THE DOCTRINES OF PROVIDENCE, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNIVERSE, AND MIRACLES. It was x^belard’s endeavour, which was carried on to a greater length by the Schoolmen of this age, to connect the idea of * Summa, P 1, qu. 46, art. 2.—Esse divinum est esse totum simul absque successione ; non autem sic est de rnundo. 566 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. Miracle with an all-comprehensive divine plan of the Universe, and to point out the Harmony between the Natural and the Supernatural. They noticed and refuted many things which have been brought forward in later times on the side of the Rationalists against the admission of Miracles. Albeetus Magnus says:—As in Nature it is the same power which produces the creatures and guides the development of each individual, and the influence of which extends over their whole Organism and their individual members, the Power which binds the whole and the parts together, so there is in the Creator the same power by which he created the World, which appoints each individual his place, and guides all things in due connexion, so that each corresponds to its own Stand¬ point. If we consider it as it is in God, we describe it as Providence, that is, the original forma and ratio in the divine Reason, by which all things are conducted to their proper End. But if we consider it as active in the Creation, in its pre¬ sentation in the development of the Universe, as the order of the Universe which proceeds from that Archetype, as though it were embodied in the Creation, and as active in the con¬ nexion of the development of natural objects and free agents, we call it fatum. Providence, the or do rerum in mente , is the exemplar; fatum is the exemplatum. This idea does not necessarily include that of unconditional necessity, but only states the divine order of the Universe as phenomenal. Alexander of Hales attributed to fatum the effects pro¬ ceeding from Free Will. Fate (according to him) is a higher law which guides the working together of all causes in the phenomenal world, and to it belong also the free causes, the effects of which harmonize with those of natural causes in a manner corresponding to their peculiar character. The effects of Free Will are only prevented from transgressing the bounds of Providence. On the relation of God to Evil he says, God knows the Good as well as the Evil, as if the Light which could see itself and its effects, would know that one thing is recep¬ tive of light, and another not so. God has permitted Evil in order that the beauty of Goodness might shine forth more clearly, and be so much more illustrious. This agreed with the older theory of Evil as a foil of Good. But Albert Magnus took a different view. The Will of God, he says, is in the whole arrangement of efficient causes that which leads ALBERT MAGNUS. 587 and impels all the others to effect that which he wills. With¬ out this God would not be present in all efficient causes and in all events ; but he is, potentially, present in them, and communicates to them power and form. In this connexion the doctrine of Miracles is peculiarly modified ; the question is, how anything could happen supra and contra naturam. He distinguishes the different meanings of the term Nature , which sometimes signifies the unchangeable law of Provi¬ dence, whereby everything is led to its destined end ; against Nature in this sense God can do nothing, else he would con¬ tradict himself.* But Nature also signifies the Law, by which the whole Creation is guided, in order to fulfil God’s Council, the dispositio obedientalis. Nature in this sense is related to the former, as fatum is to JProvidentia , as the copy in the phenomenal world is to the connexion of the Archetypal Order of the Universe in the Divine Mind. Nature also in this sense represents a Divine Law, against which God can do nothing without contradicting himself. But the term is also used in a third sense of the common course of Nature, which is only a part of Nature in the second sense, and in relation to this something may be admitted which is contra na¬ turam and a miracle. Further, he lays down principles which are founded in the divine Word, and are patterns for all that exists, according to which everything is framed, and which determine when and how all things must be brought into existence, the causa primordiales. Upon them rests every¬ thing which comes to pass in the works of Nature and of Grace, or in the kingdom of Glory, or according to the com¬ mon course of Nature. If we look at these original causes of the first Creation, God also in this respect has done nothing against the original course of Nature, for he has placed in them the causes of the Miracles which are to take place in the course of development.f What we call Miracle, and what Nature effects, all serve equally for the realization of the * Potentiae sive rationes give virtutes ad miracula non sunt inditae materiae mundi, nisi per potentiam obedientiae, per rationes autein causales in Deo sunt. Sicut non potest facere contra seipsum ita non potest facere contra rationes illas et contra opus suum sapienter dispositum. f Quod Deus non faciat contra legem naturae sequissimam fit naturalissimam, quam ipse naturae indidit, sed contra consuetum et nobis notum cursum naturae. 568 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. eternal divine Idea. But in the connexion in which we speak of a Miracle we must distinguish between the contra naturam , which, as to its seed and germ, is not contained in Nature ;* and the prater Naturam , which indeed does not contradict, but which, according to the course of Nature, would only follow in gradual development, and now arises suddenly through a higher operation, an accelerated process of Nature;+ and lastly, supra Naturam , the summit of the Wonderful, whereby Nature is brought to a higher stage and perfected, as. for example, in the Incarnation and Re¬ demption. J Thomas Aquinas distinguishes the ordo rerum , as far as it depends on the lirst cause, and is in the divine Reason. In relation to this God can do nothing contrary to the Order of Things, else he would contradict his own Will. But if we regard the ordo rerum as far as it depends on the qualities of subordinate causes, God can do something prater ordinem , since He is not subject to the cosmical connexion of causes, but rather the order of the Universe which depends upon it, has been appointed by his free Will, and proceeds from Him. In relation to the divine Omnipotence nothing can be called a miracle, only in relation to the powers of Nature.§ A miracle in an absolute sense is what happens prater ordinem of all created Nature. || But since we do not know all its powers we call that a miracle which happens contrary to the Order known to us, and this is a Miracle in a relative sense. 5. PREDESTINATION AND PRESCIENCE The Augustinian doctrine of Predestination had the ascend¬ ancy in this age of Scholasticism, yet a departure from it was gradually prepared by Alexander of Hales, and more was ascribed to Free Will. Yet Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas maintained more logically than Augustin an uncon¬ ditional necessity, without running into the extravagancies of * Quod seminaliter non inest in ipso. f Hoc quod secundum ordinem naturae paullatim operantis pro- dineretur, velocius et repente producitur. X Quod in potestate naturae nullo modo potest esse et tamen ad naturam se habet ut perfectio naturae. § Dicitur aliquid miraculum per comparationem ad facultatem naturae, quam excedit.—Summa, i. qu. 105, art. 8. 11 Haec proprie miracula, quasi in se ipsis et simpliciter naira. PREDESTINATION AND PRESCIENCE. 589 the Predestinations which were so injurious to the religious feelings. Their skill in Dialectics rendered it possible for them to escape the dangerous consequences. For that pur¬ pose they invented a number of distinctions which have since been generally received. They distinguished between a neces- sitas consequential and a necessitas consequents, a necessitas ordinis, and a necessitas red, that which existed on the suppo¬ sition of a certain connexion, and that which was necessary in itself, or a hypothetical and an absolute necessity. Albert says :—Whatever God knows beforehand in an immutable manner may still be mutable in its actual appearance ; at once necessary and free. We must only distinguish the necessity as far as anything is known beforehand by God, in a certain connexion, and the absolute necessity as far as w 7 e contemplate the phenomenon in itself. Nothing evil can come from God ; he, as the Supreme Good, can only be a Source of good. Everything created by God is good, and so far tends to good. The capability of turning aside and the actual aversion comes not from God, but from the Creature, and so far is created from nothing. When the Supreme Cause com¬ municates existence and the power of acting, and the Second cause by virtue of its mutability turns away from the influence of the Supreme Cause, a disturbance ensues of what was originally good, which is evil. Thus the architectonical art imparts to the hand of the workman the tendency to make a straight line ; but if his hand trembles the straight line is not drawn, although the tendency proceeded from the Art. By this definition the free Will may be considered as a certain form in which the divine Will is accomplished. But more of of Necessity is implied when he says :—The divine Will is the first in the whole succession of efficient causes, by which it moves and guides to effect w T hat, God wills and as lie wills it. Since Albert proceeds on the assumption that God’s eternal acting is not conditioned by temporal causes, he regards it as of the essence of the Catholic Faith that Pre¬ destination is founded only in the acting of the predestinating God, and not from without. The ground of it is the Divine Love, in virtue of which he chose before the Creation certain persons to Salvation ; although they were not yet brought into existence they were always present as predestinated. To the 570 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. divine act equally belongs the rejection from God’s presence (abjectio), and the drawing of divine Grace in Time. TEoJMonism of Thomas Aquinas is expressed in the most unqualified^ terms. He asks, whether God knows Evil, and affirms it. He knows Evil as he knows the Good and wills the Good ; not as if God’s knowing were the cause of Evil,* although it is the cause of the Good by which Evil is known. He has produced all things in order to communicate his Good¬ ness to created Beings, and to represent himself to them by means of it. Because he could not be represented by any one creature he has brought them forth numerous and diver¬ sified.*!" Hence the Universe has a greater share in the divine goodness than individuals. But it belongs to the complete¬ ness of divine Revelation that it must include all the stages of perfection, and hence also creatures which are good in such a way that it is possible for them to fall away from Goodness. But it is founded on the nature of things that what may possibly fall away from God, at some time actually falls away. The whole series of created Beings is better and more complete, if there are some creatures in it who really fall away from Good¬ ness.J Without this Evil, much that is good would not be realized, and therefore God did not prevent the Fall. Conse¬ quently Evil appears necessary for the exhibition of the divine harmony of the Universe. But in order not to ascribe the causality of Evil to God, Aquinas distinguishes Evil into posi¬ tive and negative. All in the evil act that belongs to existence * Unde patet, quod malum, quod est deviatur a forma et a fine, non causatur a scientia Dei.—Sentent. i. dist. 38, qu. 1, art. i. t Produxit res inesse, propter suam bonitatem commumcandam creaturis et per eas representandum, et quia per unam creaturam sufficientur preesentari non potest, produxit multas creaturas et diversas, ut quod deest uni ad representandam divinam bonitatem. suppleatur ex alia, nara bonitas quae in Deo est simpliciter et uniformiter, in creaturis est multipliciter et divisim, unde perfectuis participal divinam bonitatem et reprsesentat earn totum universum quam alia qusecunque creatura.— P. i. qu. 47, art. i. 7 Et inde est, quod ad completionem universi requiruntur diversi gradus rerum, quarum qusedam altum et qusedam infirmum locum teneant in universo. Et ut uniformitas graduum conservetur in rebus, Deus pennittit aliqua mala fieri ne multa bona impediantur.—I. 23, 5. Ipsa autem natura rerum hoc habet, ut quse deficere possunt, quando- que deficiant.—48, 2. THOMAS AQUINAS ON EVIL. 571 and acting in the proper sense of the term is to be v eferred to God as the original cause ; but the negative , the defectus, is not produced by God, but proceeds from the defect in the Second Cause,* for where many causes are arranged together the last Effect does not necessarily proceed immediately from the first, but from the nearest cause, since, according to its nature, the power of the first is received into the second. Everything is subject to Divine Providence, but not all in the same way. One part of his creatures God has so constituted, that they attain their end by a natural necessity, but to others he has added besides this principle, that of the Will. Thus the divine Providence operates through both, but in each accord¬ ing to its kind. God’s knowledge of the salvation of Men Aquinas supposes not to be conditioned by the knowledge of the quality of their works, since he does not arrive at the knowledge of effects through subordinate causes, but through himself. It corresponds with this unconditionality of the divine knowledge, not to distinguish in God between what proceeds from Free Will and what proceeds from Predesti¬ nation. Divine Providence produces its effects through the effects of subordinate causes, so that the same thing may be accomplished equally by Predestination and by Free Will. Whatever happens is not necessary in order that Predesti¬ nation may be accomplished, but because the Order which the divine Wisdom has appointed is maintained. Free Will, therefore, according to Aquinas, is not a power of self-deter¬ mination which must be traced back to the will itself, but is one of the forms in which the Divine decrees are realized. God operates in all beings, he says, hut so that every being is active according to the peculiar constitution given it at its Creation. In natural things he operates so as to give them power for action ; in Beings possessed of Free Will, so that he communicates the power for action, and at the same time where he operates the Free Will is active. + But the destiny and aim of the act remain in the divine Will. Thus God ope¬ rates in the Free Will according to its need and peculiar con- * Et similiter quidquid est entitatis et actionis in actione mala redicitur in Deum sicut in causam; sed quod est ibi defectus, non causatur a Deo, sed ex causa secunda deficiente. f Ut virtutem agendi sibi ministret et ipso operante liberum arbitrium agat. 572 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. stitution ; and even when he transforms it, it is in such a way that Man freely does that for which the tendency is given him, and suffers no compulsion.* * * § Man, therefore, believes that he is free. It would involve a contradiction to say that a man does not will that for which a direction is given to his Will. He sets aside the difficulties of Predestination by a comparison ; we can as little ask why this or that person is predestinated as in natural things any reason can be given why, since one sub¬ stance lies at the basis of everything, one portion of it exhibits itself as Fire, another as Water, since God from the beginning has ordained these things ; it depends on the divine Will, as it depends on the Will of the builder that this stone should occupy a certain place, this or that in the Wall.f He distin¬ guished a twofold mode of viewing things in reference to Necessity and Contingency. J God knows all things as pre¬ sent^ and by virtue of this presence everything is necessary in his sight. But Succession and Contingency belong to Time, and as far as we contemplate things in relation to Time they appear subject to Accident and Contingency. Raymund Lulli shows great profundity and acuteness in his treatment of this doctrine, but he also failed in tin attempt to maintain freedom in the face of his speculations He says :—The World and all its parts are from Eternitj through the ideas in the Divine Reason, and in this respect the Universe was One. Nevertheless when God created tht World, he did not place any part of the ideal Existence out of himself, else the idea would have undergone a change, which was impossible, because God himself is the Idea.|| But he willed to create out of nothing what he had with him¬ self from Eternity through the idea, God’s creating and upholding agency are only to be distinguished as immediate * Etiamsi voluntatem hominis in aliud mutet, niliilo minus tamen hoc sua omnipotentia facit, ut illud, in quod mutatur, voluntarie velit. —Sentt. i. 25, 1, 3 f Summa, i. 23, 5. X Sunt futura contingentia, suis causis proximis comparata. § Ejus intuitus fertur ab eeterni supra omnia prorit sunt in sua prsesentialitate. || Idea esset alterata et non seterna, quod est impossibile quum idea sit Deus. *f[ Sed divina voluntas voluit quod de nihilo esset creatum hoc, quod ab seterno habuit per ideam. RAYMUND LULLI. 573 and mediate agencies ; but everything is to be referred back to his creative Act, whether he operates immediately, or mediately through the Creatures.* The mediating instru¬ ment is here the vis conservativa in things themselves, which everything coming from without serves to aid and excite. He applies the distinction of immediate and mediate agency to the doctrine of Predestination. The Predestinated, he says, is God himself according to the Idea, for the Idea and God are the same.f This Predestination is, therefore, infallible and unchangeable. But as far as Predestination relates to Man created in Time, it is something new, something which has a beginning ; and although the newly-created Man is not in his essence different from the Ideal Man, yet he is different as phenomenal, as far as he stands in the Form of quantity, space, and time. Here God does not operate immediately and necessarily, but mediately through the agency of Man. He predestinated Peter by virtue of the merits of his good works, as he gives warmth by means of the Sun and fire. Raymund denies that Predestination is a compulsory thing; this would be at variance with the divine Wisdom and recti¬ tude. But yet for God everything is necessary which is developed in Time, and the possibility that it should happen otherwise is only an assumption arising from the weakness of abstract thought; thus at the basis of his System there is the same necessity as in that of Thomas Aquinas. b. ANTHROPOLOGY. OF man’s original state, the fall and its consequences. The distinction made by the earlier Schoolmen between what was founded in the original constitution of Man and what was added by Grace, so that in a certain sense grace was necessary even in the primeval state,—-was held by the Theologians of this Period. They also deduced the necessity of Grace from * Et quia creatio ita est per creare creaturam, quae conservat aliam creaturam, sicut est per creare illam creaturam conservatam, ergo sequitur, quod creatio et conservatio sint idem. Una prsedestinatio, quae est Deus, et alia prsedestinatio, quse est effectus et in novo subjecto sustentata et creata, et hoc sine mutatione divini intellectus, qui non mutatur per suum effectum, quum suus effectus non sit novus in quantum in ea, sed est novus quoad se ipsum, quum ex nihil de novo sit productus. 574 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. the general relation of Man to God. They attached a two¬ fold meaning to the idea of Grace in this relation ; they so termed the divine concursus, which relates to all creatures, generally ; from this is to be distinguished the special concur - sus, which fits Man to accomplish what he is not competent for, with only the assistance of the general concursus. When the relation of Nature to Grace is treated of, the concursus in the higher sense is intended. These theologians understood by Grace a quality imparted to the Soul, a donum infusum y and distinguished in its operations a certain communication which the grace coming from without brings, but which is limited to separate endowments, such as working miracles and Prophesying, but which does not presuppose the existence of the divine life as an animating principle—the dispositio ad saluUm is still wanting. This is the gratia gratis data. On the other hand, the communication by which a peculiar divine impress, a permanent divine life, gratia as a habitus is bestowed on Man, whereby he becomes acceptable to God, is the gratia gratum faciens, and identical with Salvation, the solus ipsa. Alexander of Hales defines the gratia gratis data as the gift which is communicated to rational Creatures, in order to make them capable, as far as depends on this gift, to labour for the eternal salvation and improvement of others. It is the more remote preparation for salvation, mere dead faith, knowledge without life. Through the gratia gratum faciens salvation itself is added. An objection was made to the views of the Schoolmen, which they did not leave unnoticed. Why, it was asked, if every other being is furnished with everything requisite for fulfilling its destiny—why must a higher grace be added to human nature ? Alexander of Hales replied,—This is owing to the higher nature and destiny of Man, which trans¬ cend the limits of Earth. He is created for assimilation to God, for an end which lies above the powers of all created beings. On this account a higher Element must be added, the divine life, which restores this assimilation. Only by the congenial the congenial can be produced. Bonaventura says :—As light is an influence which makes the bodies that assimilate themselves to it resemble the source of light, so is Grace an influence of the divine Spirit, by which Man is assimilated to this its source. He connects with this BONAVENTURA AND AQUINAS. 575 what he had assumed to be the highest end of Creation,* * * § that God had created all things for his own glorification in his self¬ revelation, which presupposes the existence of rational crea¬ tures, who would be capable of appreciating the Supreme Good, and employing all other good things for that end. The Vestigia Dei are in all Nature, but the Imago Dei only in Man. The position of Man in the Universe not only shows that he is capable of communion with God, but also that God can reveal and communicate himself to him in this manner. From his origin he carries with him the light of the divine countenance. - ! On the other hand, his Reason is in harmony with Nature; in it the whole Universe is, as it were, con¬ tained, is inscribed upon it, and so planned as to be repre¬ sented in it. As the whole Universe represents God in a sensuous totality, so rational creatures represent Him in a spiritual totality in the Form of Spirit. J Bonaventura dis¬ tinguishes between the imago and similitudo of God in Man, and makes the former consist in the intellectual qualities, § the latter in those of the disposition or the heart,|| by virtue of which only communion with God can be realized. Thomas Aquinas represents God as the primus motor , a3 the Cause from which all effects are to be derived. In one respect everything True and Good is to be derived from God, but we must distinguish what rests upon the powers im¬ parted at Creation, and what is derivable from the Grace after¬ wards added. Of this the whole World presents analogies ; everywhere we have to distinguish what lies in the structure of a Being according to its original Creation, and the ope¬ rations for which a Being is capacitated by the addition of a new Principle. There are certain actions of Water which take place according to the qualities of its nature as created; there are others which are not produced till the new power of fire is added. * Summa, ii. 16, 1. t Propter hoc fert in se a sua origine lumen vultus divina. + Quia rationalis creatura et intellectus quiddammodo est omnia, et omnia nata sunt ibi scribi et imprimi omniumque similitudines depingi, ideo, sicut totum universum reprsesentat Deum in quadarn totalitate gpirituali, nata alia in se spiritualiter continere. § Virtus cognitiva, potentia cognoscendi. || Virtus affectiva, potentia diligendi, qualitas in qua principaliter assimilatur anima Deo, est in voluntate sive affectione. 576 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. What relation do the p ur a naturalia bear to gratia? The answer to this question is important as it regards the doctrine of Man’s Original State and his Freedom. With it is con¬ nected the determination of the question whether the justitia originates is necessary for realizing the destiny of Man, or whether it is only added accidentally, for on this depend dif¬ ferent conclusions respecting Original Sin. The distinction is particularly important, whether the dona naturalia and the dona gratia are to be distinguished only in thought, so that both existed equally from the beginning in the justitia originalis, or whether Man was created at first, and first received the dona gratuita in consequence of the dona natu ralia having been employed according to his Free Will, so that the attainment of them was preceded by a meritum on Man’s part. According to such a view Alexander of Hales supposed Man to be created first in his puris naturalibus, and then the higher development of Nature follows by the informatio per gratiam. According to this view Man needed grace from the beginning, but it was to be attained by the determination of his Will The original relation of the latter to Nature is distinguished from the present in this respect, that it required Grace only for its higher culture, not for its transformation. Man in relation to Grace was informis nega¬ tive, without the higher form of life, but not informis privative, as he was after the Fall. Hence gratia is informans, not reformans. Thomas Aquinas proceeds on the general as¬ sumption that matter and the Form of things were created together, but were brought to perfection gradually in Time. Man indeed was created first of all in puris naturalibus ; but these pure natural powers could not be inoperative, but from the beginning must turn to God according to their destiny,* and thus Man acquired Grace, which was indispensably requi¬ site for the originalis justitia. Man possessed the rectitudo primistatus ; he was in every respect such as his destiny required, f Reason acted in subordination to God. But the harmonious relation to him was not founded merely in Nature, but Grace is requisite for it. Man needed from the beginning * In Sentt. ii. 29, 1, 2.—Quum homo creatus fuerit in naturalibus integris, quae otiosa esse non poterant, in primo instanti creationis ad Deum conversus, gratiam consecutus est. f Summa, i. 95, 1. BONAVENTURA AND DUNS SCOTUS. 577 Gratia as forma superaddita, in order to complete those opera¬ tions for which his own nature was not sufficient. Aquinas therefore adopted the first view, which only admitted an intel¬ lectual distinction. The difference between Nature and Grace was also ex¬ pressed by a double Standpoint of love to God. Bona- ventura thus expressed the distinction :—There is a stand¬ point of Love to God which is grounded in the original Constitution of a rational nature as far as it belongs to the Essence of all created Beings to subordinate themselves to the whole, and God is the Being to whom the whole of Creation refers itself. Hence, even on the Standpoint of pure Nature, Self-love must be subordinate to the love of God. In a fallen State the Will of the Creature has taken a direction by which Man withdraws himself from God, and substitutes himself for the Supreme Good. On the Stand¬ point of mere Nature, among the Heathen, there was a Love which tended to subordinate the interest of the individual to the general weal; but the Standpoint of Christian caritas goes still farther ; it is a Love which regards the supernatural des¬ tiny of Man. This communion with God as the Supreme Good is something supernatural; it is not founded in the powers of Nature. Huns Scotus proceeds in the track of Alexander of Hales. In order to withdraw the will of a rational creature from all sub¬ ordinate pleasure, something must be given to it which attracts it with greater power than all the pleasures of his lower Nature; and as such an object is not given in the natural Will, some¬ thing supernatural is required for the Will by which the end of its destiny is rendered more attractive for it than created things can be. This is, therefore, a donum supernaturale, and is required for justitia originalis. This view led to the statement, that lust or desire was implanted in the pur a natu- ralia , and was only checked by a power from without. Ac¬ cording to the pure Christian view, human Nature can only reach its destiny through the divine life by which it is filled; hut here the case is represented as if human Nature must be potentiated through the Divine coming to it from without, which we must regard as something supernatural and super¬ human ; the germ, therefore, of the tendency which has such important consequences in Catholicism. If the antagonism P P 578 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. cf Sensuousness against Reason were only held back by an outward restraint, jastitia originalis would also be something given from without, and the immediate consequence would be that the disposition towards Sin existed already in the pura naturalia. Hence Duns Scotus says there is no distinction between the Standpoint of the pura naturalia and the justitia originalis ; it commences with the transgression of Duty. This mode of thought is allied to the ancient distinction between human Virtue and the divine Life which exerted its influence on Dogmatics and Morals. Hence arose the ascetic tendency in the morals of the Schoolmen, the doctrine of the consilia evangelica as superhuman perfection, the contrast of the Cardinal and the Theological Virtues, while the Christian principle is nothing else than the restoration and perfection of human nature. If, as according to the view taken by Aquinas, Nature and Grace w r ere united from the beginning, and are only intellectually separated, certainly the conclusion that in consequence of the Hall pure Nature only is left, is in a great measure checked, for Aquinas also admits a deterioration of Nature by the forfeitur 6 01 Grace. The doctrine of Original Sin is conditioned by the doctrine of the Original State of Man. The Catharists maintained that a Soul of divine descent, a higher Spirit, banished by Satanael to a body, was in the first man. From this one all human souls descended, and hence came Sin. Thus the propagation of Original Sin, the Unity of Mankind, and the relation of Redemption to all may be explained. Aquinas combated the view of the Traducians, according to which Sin was transferred by propagation, for this would not explain the participation in guilt. Mankind must be regarded as an ethical person, and so far Adam’s Sin was the sin of all men. In original Sin Aquinas recognised tw T o elements, one privative, the other positive. The first was the loss of the Harmony of original righteousness ; the second consisted in an inordinata dispositio, a discordance which took place between Reason and Sensuousness, and in a languor natures. Duns Scotus, on the contrary, regarded it only as privatio ; it was the loss of that Grace which repressed the strife that is funded in man’s sensuous nature, and preserved harmony. [n connexion with the doctrine of Original Sin must be ORIGINAL SIN AND THE VIRGIN MARY. 579 noticed the relation of the Virgin Mary to the universal sin¬ fulness. Thomas Aquinas did not hold with the doctrine of her Immaculate Conception.* He says :—In the Holy Scrip¬ tures we find nothing more than that the Mother of Christ was honoured by Grace before all others. On some individuals, as Elijah and Jeremiah, the distinction was bestowed of being sanctified from their birth ; and this was true also of Mary, who was purified from her personal sin, but not from the guilt that is attached to human nature universally, for this would have encroached on the prerogative of Christ as the common Redeemer. Nor is the Feast of the immaculata conceptio a proof to the contrary, for this was only introduced because it cannot be determined at what time her Purification took place. The predisposition to sin (fomes peccati ) was indeed not extir¬ pated, but was restrained by the superabundant grace which she received in her sanctification. The habitual Original Sin did not become actual Sin, since the operations of grace repressed the evil inclinations which existed in the consti¬ tution of the Soul, and preserved her sensuousness from every irregular movement; but after the birth of Christ she became altogether freed from the fumes peccati .t Duns Scotus, on the contrary, maintained the conceptio immaculata. and established it in the following manner. J As Christ is the universal Redeemer and most perfect mediator, it follows that in reference to one person he exercises this Mediatorship in the most perfect manner; accordingly, she was not only freed from Sin, but preserved from all Sin, actual as well as original. Mary is not thereby placed on a level with Christ, but God anticipated the effect of original Sin in her, as when fire is brought near inflammable matter, and yet this is not burnt. Yet in pronouncing his judgment he expresses himself pro¬ blematically and temperately ; God could effect either that she should never, or only for an instant, or for a long time be encumbered with original Sin, and at last be freed from it. Which of these three actually came to pass only God knows. Yet his arguments paved the way for the doctrine which was afterwards expressed more strongly by Raymund Ltjllt. When * Summa, p iii. q. 27, art. 1. + Credendum tst, quod ex prole redundaverit in mat-rein totaliter fomite subtracto. I Ic Sentent. iii. dist. 3, qusest. i. § 9. P P 2 580 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. the birth of Christ took place, and it was requisite that Mary should be a worthy organ of it, she must have been born free from original Sin. # C. THE DOCTRINE OF THE REDEEMER AND HIS WORK. 1. THE OBJECTIVE SIDE. The question whether the Sinlessness of Christ consisted in -a non posse peccare or in a posse non peccare was decided by Duns Scotus in favour of the latter; but yet it was only in a certain connexion that he placed the possibility, and without mingling the actual 'weakness of Christ’s human nature, like Theodore of Mopsuestia. The human Nature of Christ, he says, could in and by itself sin (de se erat jiossibilis peccare ), since it was endowed with Free Will, aud this can incline itself to Evil or to Good; but in union with the divine nature it was at the same time so confirmed in goodness, that it became sinless. He also believed that the sensuous impulses of human nature must be admitted to exist in Christ as far as concupiscentia necessarily forms part of a sensuous nature. But it belongs to the essence of a rational nature that the concupiscentia is adjusted according to the measure and order of reason, and this we assume to be the case in Christ. Many discussions arose out of the question whether Re¬ demption was to be considered as taking place only on account of Sin, and therefore as the Restoration of the fallen human race, or whether it would have taken place had there been no sin, and hence whether this union of God with human nature was necessary for the harmony of the Universe. These ques¬ tions were variously answered according as the Work of Redemption was contemplated on the negative or the positive side, as simply a realization of the destiny of Man, or as a restoration from the Fall. Bonaventura regards the positive view as more in accordance with the judgment of Reason, the negative more in agreement with Scripture, since it regards the restoration of the human race as the cause and * Nisi beata virgo fuisset disposita, quod filius Dei de ipsa assumeret carneru, scilicet quod non est corrupta nec in aliquo peccato sive actual! sive originali, filius Dei non potuisset ab ipsa assumere camera, cum Deus et peccatum non possunt concordari in aliquo subjecto. THE DOCTRINE OF REDEMPTION. 581 end of the Incarnation of God. Also in this way the interests of piety are more firmly supported, for otherwise God appears dependent on the perfection of the Universe, since the neces¬ sity is assumed that without this union of God with Man God’s works cannot attain to their perfection ; but God is exalted above the Universe. An incitement to devout feeling is contained also in our knowing that God became Man, in order to free Men from Sin. Lastly, as the Incarnation of God is a transcendent fact, it presupposes a want on the other side which it has to make good. Aquinas on this question points out* that what is founded only on the will of God, inde¬ pendently of all merit on the part of the creature, is made known to us only by the Scriptures as the revelation of the divine Will. From that source alone we learn that the Incar¬ nation was designed to be a remedy for sin. Had Man not sinned he would only have needed inward illumination; but since through Sin he has sunk down into sensuousness, God must present salvation to him through a sensuous medium. For the perfection of the Universe, the natural relation of the Creation to God would be sufficient as the end of all. But the personal union of the Creature with the Creator passes beyond the limits of Nature, and transcends the perfection which belongs to its original Constitution, so that human Nature, since God makes Evil subservient to Good, is raised after Sin to a higher stage.t Duns Scotus, on the contrary, says:—The glorification of the human Nature of Christ in union with the divine Essence is supreme, and it is not pro¬ bable that this could be made to depend on anything subordi¬ nate, such as the Sin of Mankind. Therefore, apart from this, and for his own sake, was his Incarnation made a part of the scheme of Creation. Raymund Lulli likewise pointed out that from the beginning it had been the end of Creation ; the Incarnation of God can certainly be traced to no other cause than the divine Will, but it is required by the Creation. This is a work of free Love ; yet that being once granted, we recognise its highest per¬ fection to consist in God’s entering into this union with the * Summa, iii. I, 3. + Ad. perfectionein universi sufficit, quod naturali modo creatura ordineretur in Deum, sicut in finena. Hoc autem excedit limites perfectionis naturae, ut creatura uniatur Deo in persona. 582 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. Creature. On this rests at the same time his highest glorifi¬ cation, and we cannot say that it was only brought about by Sin, but rather that God owed it to himself.* After Sin the Incarnation was necessary, in order that the end for which the World was created might not be nullified, but be accomplished, in spite of the derangement, t Further, the Schoolmen discussed whether the necessity of the method in which Redemption was effected by Christ could be proved. Aquinas maintained that there was no absolute proof for it. Since Redemption proceeded from the free Will of God, it sufficed to prove that this method was not impos¬ sible, and that it was suitable. Supposing that Man had been redeemed by an Angel, his perfect restoration could not have been effected, for Man would have remained dependent on a creature. The visible appearance of God was necessary, in order that Man might be led from the visible to the knowledge and love of the invisible. Setting out from the contemplation of the divine Omnipotence, other possible modes of Redemption might be imagined, but this method must have ever been the most suitable. On the other hand, if regard be had to Man’s standpoint, no other method was possible than that which was chosen by God, since Alan by himself alone could render no satisfaction. If the relations to God and Man are combined, it must be allowed that another method of Redemption was possible, but none so suitable as this. The union of God with Man must give Alan the strongest assurance of attaining the highest happiness, which consists in immediate union with God. Aden might have easily been led to despair by the con¬ sciousness of the breach between themselves and God. But since Redemption has been effected, the longing after Salva¬ tion is far stronger, and Men have acquired a new conscious¬ ness of the dignity of their nature. Hence from this time they have desisted from the worship of all created beings. In these ends Aquinas found the importance of the work of Redemption. As he here joins his own ideas with those of Anselm, he agrees also with him in the opinion that the satisfaction rendered by Christ furnished what was requisite from its intrinsic worth. Like Anselm, he proceeds on the principle that for an injury something must be given which * Alias Deus non solveret debitum sibi ipsi et suis dignitatibus. t Ut satisfaceret illi fini, ad quem rnundus fuit creatus. INNOCENT III. AND WILLIAM OF PARIS. 583 the injured party would value as high as, or higher than, what had been lost by the injury. Christ’s Satisfaction is not only sufficiens , but superabundans. If we find elsewhere the various instrumentalities of grace scattered, such as the offices of Law¬ giver, Priest, and King, all these are united in Christ, the fountain of all Grace. He is the Mediator between God and Men, as far as he communicates what is divine to them, inter¬ cedes for them, and makes satisfaction for their sins. Christ is not like one single person, but the mystical head of the members which belong to him, inasmuch as what he has done is for their benefit. On the other hand, in Innocent III. w r e find no trace of Anselm’s views. Expressing himself popularly, he revived the ancient notion of satisfaction given to Satan. The end of Redemption he. places on the one hand in the Subjective, inas¬ much as God by the Revelation of his love moved his enemies to love, and reduced pride to humility. But he also connected with it an objective importance, and was the first who repre¬ sented the Satisfaction of Christ as a reconciliation between the divine attributes of mercy and justice. The justice of God required the adequate punishment of all, but his mercy would not permit this; hence God took upon himself the punishment which w T as due to his justice. This was the first assertion of the scitisfactio vicaria passiva among the School¬ men.* A modification of Anselm’s theory is given by William of Paris.! ^ holds good of spiritual as well as of bodily ills, that they are cured by their opposites. J In the first sin and all following sins, pride, disobedienc-e, and cupidity were con¬ tained. Pride w r as in that the most conspicuous; hence Redemption must commence with its opposite ; God the all- sufficient appeared in Christ, under the form of a servant. He submitted to the obedience which man ought to have ren¬ dered, and assumed his poverty. This alone could be an adequate remedy, and an adequate satisfaction, and could only * Modum invenit, per quern utrique satisfaceret tam misericordi?o quarn justitise; judicavit igitur, ut assumeret in se poenam pro omnibus et donaret per se gloriam universis.—Sermo, i. fol. vi. ed. Colon. 1575. f De Causis cur Deus Homo. £ Cap. 5.—Quod contraria contrariis curantur tam in spiritualibus quam in corporalibus. 564 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. be rendered by God as Man. The antagonism lias been reconciled ; through Love Man must be led to communion with God;* hence God revealed his love by partaking of Man’s nature, and of his sufferings. God must become Man, that Man may become God.f Duns Scotus differs from the above as the Representative of the more subjective view of the work of Redemption. According to this, the effects of Redemption do not stand in a necessary and adequate relation to it, so that according to its character and nature it must have this importance and pro¬ duce these effects, but they follow because it pleased God, to annex Redemption to this price. Everything which is good, is good because God has willed it. Hence that merit has so much merit as God was pleased to attribute to it. When God had accepted it, it was so far necessary. He examines, what the sufferings of Christ could effect in themselves, and what according to the divine decree. It might be said ;— Christ suffered for righteousness, for he had seen the sins of the Jews, and since he wished to convert them, and held it to be his duty, not to be silent upon it, the consequence of this was his death; he died for truth and righteousness. But in fact he really presented his sufferings to the Father for us; for if Man could have been redeemed in any other way, he was under so much greater obligations to God, since forgive¬ ness was not necessary, and for this reason God had so redeemed Men in order thereby to excite them to love Him. V According to his view, therefore, Redemption was not con¬ nected with the sufferings of Christ, ex insito valore, but because it so pleased God, ex divina acceptilatione. Possibly a good Angel or a Man begotten without sin might have served for the Redemption of Humanity, if God had been willing to adopt such a method. This difference in the doc¬ trine of Satisfaction was kept up in the succeeding age. 2 . THE SUBJECTIVE SIDE. APPROPRIATION OF THE WORK OF REDEMPTION. The essence of sanctification was everywhere regarded as * Quia amor amore convenientius accenditur, sicut ignis igne, decuit Deum amorem nostrum amore suo accendere. t Quid mirum est, Deum esse factum hominem, participatione humame natunc, ut homo etiam fieret Deus, congruenti sibi partieipa- tione deitatis. SANCTIFICATION. 585 founded in the disposition, in the inner Christian life. Aquinas gives the following summary—Christ is our Head, inasmuch as He operates upon us by his merits ; but the Head can only extend its influence to the members that are connected with it. Although Christ’s merits are sufficient to cancel Sin, yet for that purpose, connexion with the Head is presupposed. The means of this are Faith and Love. Hence, he says, the merits of Christ have a being in the Soul accord¬ ing to its different powers; in reference to the intellectns by faith ; to the affectus, the disposition, by Love ; and to the conduct by the imitation of Christ. But these are only three different relations in which Man appropriates the merits of Christ. He defines Faith to be an act of the Spirit which assents to divine truth in virtue of the tendency imparted to the Spirit through the Will influenced by Divine Grace. 1 * He distinguishes between the theological and the ethical vir¬ tues, and reckons Faith among the former, as representing the peculiar Christian principle. Man required this new principle in order to become fit for the supernatural in his destiny. The theological Virtues have their first relation to the Intellect, which receives the principles imparted by Revelation, for they can be known only in the divine light; and this is effected through Faith. If the Will directs itself to the end presented by faith as attainable, the idea of Hope arises, and as far as a spiritual communion with that which constitutes the end of Humanity is required, the idea of Love is produced.f We have remarked how the Schoolmen, after Augustin, conceived of justificatio not as objective justification, but a subjective sanctification of which faith is the instrument and which is realized in Love. Aquinas thought the infusio gratia justificantis necessary for the forgiveness of sins on the part of God, and allowed successive steps in justificatio ; first of all the communication of grace—then the tendency of the Free Will to God—then that by which it departs from Sin ; and upon this, the forgiveness of sins. In the act of faith is contained the admission that Man is made righteous by the Redemption of Christ. * Actus intellectus assentientis veritati divinte ex imperio voluntatis a Deo motce per gratiam.—Summa, ii. 2, 1, 4. t Neander, Wissenschaftliche Abhandlungen, Herausg. v. J. L. Jacobi, 1851, p. 42. 586 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. This subjective view of Justificatio had important conse¬ quences. The question arose, how could a Man have confi¬ dence that he had received the forgiveness of sins ? Alexan¬ der of Hales contended, that on this point there was a peculiar knowledge—since neither the cause nor the effect fell within the province of human knowledge ; yet a certain feeling of knowledge might be possessed upon it; * only it is not infallible, but verifies itself by experience in the feelings when these three signs concur, light, peace, and joy. God does not will either to give us complete certainty, or to leave us wholly in uncertainty. If Man experienced nothing of the sweetness of the divine life, he would not be attracted to the love of God ; if he had perfect assurance it would easily seduce him into pride. Aquinas also is of opinionf that no one can have perfect certainty on the subject; only there are signs, if proper at¬ tention be paid, such as, that a man has his joy in God, that he despises the World, and is conscious of no gross sins. A presage may thus be formed of his forgiveness. The consequence for the practical Christian life was that men were led to dwell too much on their subjective feelings ; and hence the tendency to enthusiastic feelings and visions by which assurance was sought for. On the other hand this assurance was sought for in painful ascetic efforts, and there was danger of a onesided tendency to rely on external works. Hence it is evident, how important it was for practical Christianity that the Reformation appeared as a counteractive. When the question was canvassed, what Man could do in order to be a partaker of grace, the idea of meritum was introduced. In this expression we must take account of the Latin usus loquencli which lies at its basis, and which does not always include the idea of merit. The Schoolmen distin¬ guished between a meritum de condigno and a meritum de congruo. The former affirmed merit in the strict sense ; and this cannct possibly exist in the relation of the creature to God, and for that reason the Schoolmen denied that Man * Scientia affectus per experientiam rei in affectu. f Nullus certitudinaliter potest scire se habere caritatem, sed potest e aliquibus signis probabilibus conjicere.—In libr. i. Sentt. dist. 17, qu. 1, art. 4. GRACE AND HUMAN MERIT. 587 could make himself worthy of divine Grace. But the meritum de congruo or imputativum is something different; this presupposes that God has connected the impartation of Grace with certain conditions. Here therefore is a relation of the impartation of grace which rests on the moral order of the World. When Man performs his part, on which according to this arrangement, grace depends, he earns this meritum as it may be called, though not in the proper sense of that term. Grace appears conditioned by the free susceptibility of Man. All the Schoolmen are agreed in presupposing a certain preparation, a preparatory form for the operation of grace. But the fundamental principle was carried out in various ways, and this difference forms one of the points of variance be¬ tween the Franciscan and the Dominican Theologians. Alexander of Hales introduced a real deviation from the Augustinian type of doctrine. He always presupposes that Grace cannot be merited as a debt. All men are in the same lost state, but God in his love is willing to bless them by the communication of his grace. He has only affixed the condi¬ tion that Man does what he is able to do according to the pow'er of his free Will which still remains to him. God alone can make Man capable by his Grace, but if Man does his part, the divine preparative grace will be imparted to him. This communication of God’s love surrounds him like a light, which shines everywhere, but there must be a susceptibility to receive it, and according to this its operation is determined. A rich man distributes alms,—one stretches out his hand, another does not; hence the preparatory grace is imparted to the one and not to the other. On the other hand Thomas Aquinas, supposes no such condition depending on free self-determination, as appears from his work on Providence. He has certainly an assumption, formed according to the Aristotelian categories which affirms that no effect can ensue but on susceptible materials. Thus also the effect of Grace is realized only in a definite suscep¬ tibility, but this is referred exclusively to God’s act from whom every impulse comes. Everything which is requisite to make men susceptible of Salvation, belongs also to the effects of Predestination. The consequences of his presuppositions lead further than Augustin, since according to them it neces- 688 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. sarily follows that even the Freedom of the first man before the Fall is not to be viewed in a manner different from this. d. THE DOCTRINE OF THE SACRAMENTS. The Schoolmen were not satisfied with accepting the doctrine of the Sacraments as simply ordained, bat wished to prove their necessity in the scheme of Christianity. Th ey were especially led to these discussions by their conflict with those who attributed only a symbolical meaning to the Scripture Sacraments. Thomas Aquinas regards the sufferings of Christ as the general cause of Salvation for men, but it needed special means in order to apply this universal cause to all single instances. The Sacraments are the means by which men are enabled to appropriate the blessed consequences of Christ’s sufferings. They must be connected with visible signs, since it is consonant to human nature to ascend to the Spiritual through the Sensuous. And Providence takes care of all creatures in a manner suited to their nature. Moreover, Salvation must proceed from that part which is the seat of the disease. Man through sin has turned to the things of sense; Ithe reaction must also proceed from the same quarter. Lastly, ’human activity relates peculiarly to sensuousness which easily leads to superstition ; through the Sacraments a higher employment is given to sensuousness, and thereby that seduc¬ tion is avoided. As the incarnation and sufferings of Christ took place in the sensible World, so also sensible means serve for their appropriation. Aquinas endeavours to prove the necessity of the Seven Sacraments on the principle that the whole life should be consecrated to God’s grace; its gradual development from birth to death was surrounded by the Sacraments, (i.) The birth of the spiritual life takes place in Baptism (ii.) The growth to maturity is through Confirma¬ tion (iii.) the nourishment of the spiritual life is through the Lord’s Supper. If Man were bodily and spiritually sound throughout, he needs nothing more ; but for the healing of his sickly state he requires (iv.) Penance; (v.) the promotion of his recovery by certain means is signified by Extreme Unction. Moreover it is of importance that Man should THE DOCTRINE OF THE SACRAMENTS. 589 receive religious consecration for the business of life; this for the spiritual life takes place in (vi.) Ordination, and for natural propagation (vii.) by Marriage. The question was variously handled, how the divine co¬ operation in the Sacraments is to be conceived. According to one view, a divine agency and effect inheres to the Sacraments objectively, and the New Testament Sacraments are distinguished from those of the Old by communicating the Divine while the latter only indicated it. But the difficulty must occur, how this should be communicated to the sensible element, since there was a wish to guard against the deification of the objects of sense. It rendered the decision more difficult, that the Church doctrine had connected the efficacy of the Sacrament, the objective justification, with the outward operation, ex opere operato, and that the Schoolmen were obliged to admit this prevalent notion into their system. Alexander of Hales ascribed to the outward signs, a supernatural power communicated to them, a power which was wonderfully communicated to the corporeal agens. So far they are causes of Grace through the objective working, ratione operis operati, in contradistinction to that which pro¬ ceeds from the subjective tendency of the disposition. Yet he adds the sentiment, that this effect is not to be ascribed to the outward element in itself, but to it as combined with the whole rite. A justifying power is indeed ascribed to the Sacraments in and for themselves, but yet God is the efficient cause from whom alone everything proceeds; the Priest is only the ministering Organ, and the Sacraments place Man in a condi¬ tion to receive the divine communication. Aquinas combats a remarkable representation in which we recognise the reaction of a more liberal spirit against the Church views. To many it was a stumbling-block that the Sacraments should be regarded as caused gratia; they wished only to affirm that God had connected the operation of his grace upon the soul with the condition of the rite, and that Grace accompanied the use of the Sacraments. As when a king wishes to distribute a treasure, and connects with the reception of it by each person the condition, that he should show a leaden penny, so the Sacraments stand in relation to grace. Aquinas on the contrary vindicates the view held by the Church; that in the Old Testament the Sacraments are 690 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. only symbols of gratia justificctns ; and that in the New, Goa indeed is the 'principalis causa gratia , but the Sacraments ar causa instrumental^. Duns Scotus combats the view that the Sacraments are the signs of divine Grace, of Faith, of righteousness received, and designed as marks to excite the remembrance of that Grace; yet he does not altogether agree with Aquinas. He maintains that the reception of the Sacraments cannot be called such an arrangement, to which by virtue of an inward necessity ( per formam intrinsecam ) the effect described is joined, but this effect is connected with the Sacraments by virtue of the agency of God which does not produce these effects according to an absolute but a hypothetical necessity, a relative necessity, grounded in the appointed divine power, inasmuch as God has resolved to connect his grace with this condition, and the Church is assured, that he is willing to com¬ municate it to him who receives the Sacrament. The Schoolmen ascribe a different effect to the different kinds of Sacrament. According to Alexander of Hales it is twofold; 1. Certain Sacraments distinguish the receivers from all other persons by a distinct spiritual power ; 2. Others operate by a reaction and free from indwelling sin. In reference to the first, the impressio character is proceeds from the Sacrament, a phrase attributable to Augustin who thought that the mark of the militia Christi was impressed on a Christian at Baptism. Alexander ascribes the effect of such a character to Baptism, Confirmation, and Ordination. He regarded it as an inherent power ( impressio perpetual), which he inferred from the circumstance, that these Sacra¬ ments are not to be repeated. Aquinas assigns a twofold efficiency to them, considered as being an antidote to sin, and as imparting a capability for the worship of God. With the former no com¬ munication of character is connected, but there is with the second. Character is derived from a certain assimi¬ lation to the priesthood of Christ, and on that account is indelible. But still there is a threefold relation of the Sacrament to the character spiritalis , as far as this indicates a certain spiritual power which is adapted for what belongs to the worship of God. Here we have to notice the rite itself and the ability it confers whether as an riliiSAiNUJBi. that certainly in virtue of the concomitance the Supper can be taken under one form. The Church had introduced the custom in order to guard against spilling the blood. He quotes legends to prove that in the breaking of the Bread the dish had been filled with blood. The distribution of Christ relates only to the manner in which the Supper was taken from the person who consecrated it. The reception of the Supper under the two forms was indeed more efficacious, but the usage of the Church must be followed. Albert the Great was in favour of the complete distribu¬ tion of the elements, because the Institution of Christ ought to be followed ; but Aquinas vindicated the administration in one kind. For the right administration of the Sacrament completeness was required as to the Sacrament itself, and on the part of the communicants, reverence. The former was the concern of the Priest; as to the latter, the withholding of the cup was introduced and retained by the Church, as a sea¬ sonable custom, on account of the diversity of the communi¬ cants. Bonaventura declared himself in favour of withhold¬ ing the Cup, which was constantly becoming more general. 2, Penance. The decisions given by Peter Lombard respecting the three parts of penance, were retained and confirmed by the legal sanction conferred by Innocent III. on Auricular Confession (confessio auricularis). Alexander of Hales distinguishes between Attritio and Contritio. The former is the penance which does not proceed from true love to God, but from fear, and hence can present no disposition of the soul that is accept¬ able to God, but only serves as a preparative ; contritio, on the contrary, is that true anguish for sin which proceeds from Love ; attritio is the terminus a quo, contritio is the ter¬ minus ad quem. All agree in this, to regard contritio as a necessary condition of the forgiveness of Sins and salvation; but a special satisfaction to the divine Justice is required for past sins, Penance as opera pcenalia. In substitution for the punishments inflicted by God, those voluntarily submitted to, which the Church prescribes, might serve. They can procure exemption from the severer punishments of the ignis pur- gatorius. This doctrine gave great importance to ecclesiastical punishments, and to the Priest who was authorized to prescribe Q Q 594 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. to each individual the proper acts of Penance, and to select such as were most salutary for him, as being especially opposed to his own sins. Under these views, the juridical inspection and treatment of ecclesiastical penance became more fully developed, and with it was connected,— THE DOCTRINE OF INDULGENCES. Originally an Indulgence was only a remission of certain kinds of Penance which were exchanged for a fine. In the Crusades the custom arose of a general or plenary Indulgence (indulgentia plenaria ), with which was connected the remission of all Penance, provided the Crusade was undertaken in their stead. Yet the Church did not always mean by an Indulgence, the remission of sins in the strict sense. The Schoolmen tried to prove that the Church was authorized to give such indulgences on certain grounds. At the same time they' developed the doctrine of the Treasury of merits which the Church had to dispense, and employed it for establishing the theory of Indulgences. At the foundation of this dogma was the Christian idea of fellowship in all goodness, which was brought about by the Spirit of Christ. But this idea was applied sensuously, and there was connected with it the erroneous distinction between the Standpoint of perfection, and that of fulfilling the Law. It was supposed that the saints had suffered more than was necessary for the satisfac- */ tion which they had to render to the divine justice for their own sins. Thus the representation was formed of the Thesau¬ rus meritorum or supererogationis. Robert Pulleyn, who first of all propounded it, only mentions the treasury of Christ’s merits, and adds, that the merits of the Fathers were made acceptable to God through Christ. It was further concluded that the Church as the Steward of this treasure of the merits of Christ, and of the Saints, could appropriate a portion to any one on good grounds, in substitution of the punishments of the Church which he would otherwise have to suffer. There¬ fore by virtue of the possession of this treasure, indulgence from the punishments of the Church was granted under the notion that the receiver had spiritual fellowship with the trea¬ sure. Hence true contritio was required as the condition, and regard was had at first to the help which was thereby obtained for accomplishing some pious work. But the doc- THE DOCTRINE OF INDULGENCES. 595 trine of Indulgences was not always propounded in this con¬ nexion. Many declared that the Indulgence could only for any one as much as his faith and devotion demanded, and thus the doctrine of Indulgences became very subjective and vague. William of Auxeree set forth six conditions of Indul¬ gences, but added, that if these terms were always expressed, the laity would not be so ready to purchase indulgences. The Church, indeed, sometimes conceals the six conditions; but if she deceives the faithful, she does not utter falsehoods. Thomas Aquinas vindicates the doctrine of a treasure of merits, and quotes for it Col. i. 24. He also bears testimony to the grievous unspirituality of the system of Indulgences, and quotes the opinion of some respecting the silence of the Church, that, like a mother who stimulates her children to good behaviour by showing them an apple, she makes use of a pia fraus; but he rejected this notion as palliating falsehood. We see that, however what was erroneous in connexion with the Church doctrine, might be spiritualized by the Schoolmen, yet in practice the disgraceful consequences would still mani¬ fest themselves THIRD PERIOD OF THE SCHOOLMEN, FROM THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY TO THE REFORMATION. Bossuet, Geseliichte, fortgesetzt von Cramer, vii. V91. Patter Gesch. der Christl. Philosopbie, iv. 517. GENERAL HISTORY OF DOGMAS. Scholasticism in the thirteenth century had reached its highest point, and was followed by a period of Transition. Of such periods, it is true that they are important for development on the whole, for the general tendencies which intersect one another, but not in an equal degree for the development of particular doctrines. The characteristic of this Period was on the one hand that the old Church theocratic standpoint had reached its climax, and that now corruption spread by a more rapid growth. In vain attempts were made to check it, and reactions gave rise to new tendencies called forth by antagonism. We here see in part the dawn of a new Chris- Q Q 2 596 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. tian era, witnesses of revived truth, and forerunners of the Reformation, and although they partially succumbed to the supremacy of what was old, yet they prepared the way for victory. On the other hand, middle schemes were formed which attempted to improve the old system without adopting the new. These also prepared the way for the New Creation, although by their inconsequence they were not in a condition to make head against the ruling tendency. Along with the omens of the Reformation, others also appeared of a destruc¬ tive tendency, which might have overturned the Positive in Christianity; but it was repressed by the power of the Refor¬ mation, though it again made its influence felt at a later Period. The greatest minds of the Scholastic Theology had exerted themselves in the former period. Others now followed, who repeated what the originals had said. The opposition of the schools of the Thomists and Scotists was still further deve¬ loped. But a few distinguished men still appeared among them. In the fourteenth century, Durando of St. Porciano, a Dominican, was a man of note among the Thomists. From a.d. 1313 he was Teacher of Theology at Paris, died Bishop of Meaux a.d. 1333, and had the title of Doctor resolu- tissimus.* Among the Scotists was Franciscus Matron. t But- more eminent still was the Franciscan, William of Occam, Teacher of Theology in Paris, then Provincial of his Order in England; from a.d. 1328, protected by Lewis of Bavaria, for whom he combated; and died a.d. 1347 ; he was styled doctor siugularis, invincibilis, verier abilis inceptor.% In the preceding period Realism had gained the victory, since its dogmatic positive tendency suited the confidence of con¬ viction which the age cherished. But now, when the Mediaeval Theology neared its destruction, and Scepticism gained ground, Nominalism found an entrance, which favoured it by its subjective mode of view, and of which William of Occam was the new founder. Thus, to the conflict of the Thomist and Scotist schools, that of the Nominalist and * Opus super Sententiae Lombardi, ed. Paris, 1508; Venet, 1571. t Franciscus Mayron de Digna (Digne in Provence), died a.d. 1325. In Sentent. de Univocatione entis. de Primo Principio. Venet. 1520. X Quaestiones super Quatuor Libros Sententiarum, Lugd. 1495. Centi logicum theologicum quodlibeta, traetatus de Sacramento altaris. NOMINALISTS AND REALISTS. 697 Realist was added,—an antagonism which would be very important 'in dogmatic controversies. In Wycliffe, a chief representative of the Reformatory tendency, we recognise also one of the ablest advocates of Realism. He showed himself as such, in his treatise, De imiversalibus realibus, which still remains unpublished. In the Hussite controversy, at the University of Prague, the opposition of the Realist and Nomi¬ nalist tendencies coincided with that of the reformatory and anti-reformatory. We might from thence infer that Nomi¬ nalism had connected itself with the interests of the existing Church standpoint, and Realism with that of the Refor¬ mation ; but this cannot be substantiated, as is evident from the connexion of Realism with the Church tendency in the former period. On the other hand, John Wessell, one of those who laboured most powerfully for the Reformation, was a Nominalist. It often depended on the peculiar subjective views of the Theologians, whether they were inclined to Nominalism or Realism, and introduced philosophical contro¬ versies into those of theology. Gabriel Biel of Spier (died a.d. 1495)* closes the succession of schoolmen, in whom we find many elements of an independent thinker. In proportion as Scholasticism sank, and lost itself in barren subtleties, it gave less satisfaction to the awakened, living, religious craving, and the reaction of other tendencies became stronger. Nicholas of CusAf had acquired notoriety by the part he took in the conflict of the Council of Basle against Euge- nius IV.; but, at a later period, became unfaithful to the more liberal Church standpoint. His treatise, De clocta igno- rantia, is directed against scholastic dogmatism, and shows the insufficiency of human knowledge. A peculiar reaction appeared at Toulouse, in Raymond de Sebonde. J Since * Collectorium ex Occammo ; or, Commentarii in libb. quatuor Sen- tentiarum, Tubg. 1502, 2 voll. Expositio Canonis Missae, Tubg. 1499. f Nicolaus Chryfftz (Krebs of Cues, on the Moselle, born a.d. 1401, died 1464, as Cardinal.) De Catholica Concordantia, libri 3; De Docta Ignorantia, Opp. Paris, 1414. $ Teacher of Natural Philosophy, Medicine, Philosophy, and Theo¬ logy, in Toulouse. Theologia Naturalis, ed. Francf. 1635, 61. See Niedner, Kirchengesch. p. 555. On the literary history, see Dr. C. L. Kleiber, De Raimundi quem vocant de Sabunde vita et Scriptis, Berol. 1856. Dr. Kleiber has compared the Parisian manuscripts of the 598 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. Scholasticism multiplied dogmatic questions, discussed the articles of faith in huge volumes, and the Bible was closed to the laity, he wished to present a religious system for every one. He attempted this in his Liber Creaturarum , or Theologia Naturalis, a name which he first of all used; but he under¬ stood by it, not like later writers, a certain general religious doctrine of reason, but the doctrines of the Christian religion. He spoke of human nature as-restored by Christianity, and reckoned as the religio naturalis , all the principal Christian truths, as those to which all nature points. Nature and Holy Writ are the two books of Divine Revelation, which are given to Man, and supplement each other. By sin man lost the key for understanding the Revelation in Nature; by the Revelation of Grace it is restored to him. Man is the first letter in the Alphabet of Creation, the Microcosmos, and the key for understanding the universe. But he has lost himself in outward objects, and must first be brought back to himself, in order to understand both himself and Nature. When the corruption of the Church was examined, some of its causes could not but be traced to the decay of Theological study. Scholasticism served to support the ancient canon-law; hence, men of a practical reformatory tendency, aimed at an improvement of Theology, and returned to the study of the Bible and the older Church doctrine. Among these are to be classed the celebrated Parisian Theologians of the fifteenth century: Nicholas of Clemange,* a.d. 1393, Rector of the Tkeologia Naturalis, the oldest of which gives the most exact informa¬ tion respecting the circumstances of Raymond; it calls him Raimundus Sabiende, for which another manuscript has Sebeide. Dr. Kleiber’s supposition, that by this Sabaedo in Spain is meant, and that Sabunde, or Sebonde, is a corruption, has so much more probability, as no town is known which bears the latter names. That oldest manuscript says, that the work was begun in Toulouse about 1404, and finished about 1436. Dr. Kleiber, besides, makes it probable that another work, related throughout in its contents to the Theologia Naturalis, but written in the form of a dialogue, which appeared under various names, Quaestiones Disputatae, Quodlibeta, Viola Animse, did not proceed from him, but was a popular summary of his Theologia Naturalis by another hand. Dr. Kleiber also rightly maintains that from the Apology of Montaigne for Raymond, it does not follow that the Theologia Naturalis was written in Spanish, but rather the contrary. —[Jacobi.] * Opp. ed. J. M. Lydius, Lugd. Batav. 1613. Also Hermann von der Hardt in der Gesch. desConcils von Constanz. Nicolas de Clemangis, aa Vie et ses Ecrits, par Ad. Muntz. Strasb. 1846. THE PARISIAN THEOLOGIANS. 599 University, then private secretary to Benedict XIII., died about a.d. 1440. Pierre d’Ailly,* a.d. 1575, a teacher ; a.d. 1389, Chancellor of the University; a.d. 1396, Bishop of Cambray; a.d. 1411, Cardinal; died 1425. John Charlier de GERSON,f a.d. 1381, teacher; a.d. 1395, Chancellor of the University; died a.d. 1429. These men wished, at the same time, a freer church development in the practical department, and sympathized with the kindred reactions, which had, at an earlier period, striven for emancipation from the absolutism of the Papacy, and for an independent relation of the State to the Church;—reactions which already had been active in the conflict of Lewis of Bavaria with John XXII. and his succes¬ sors. To this movement belongs the protest of the strict Fran- ciscans against the secularization of the Church, which in William of Occam especially, was connected with freer efforts, and led to new inquiries respecting the limits of ecclesiastical power, and its relation to the secular. The treatise, Defensor pacis,% by Marsilius of Padua and John of Janduno, was of service, for the development of more liberal views of this relation. Many things may be found in it which border on Protestantism. The tendency was strengthened by the reaction against the corruption of the Papal government at Avignon, and the schism which was principally active in the Councils of Pisa, Constance, and Basle. At these Councils, the principles of the above-named Parisian theologians operated against the absolutism of the Papacy, and in favour of a more moderate form; but since these men, both theo¬ retically and practically advanced only half-way, and would not attack the ancient edifice of doctrine and government, they became, at the same time, the opponents of those who attacked the evil at the root, and strove for a thorough purification of doctrine and the Church, in conformity to Holy Writ. Still the influence which they had in the spread of purer know¬ ledge, is not to be lightly estimated. * Comment, in libb. quatuor Sententiarum, ed. 1550, 4to. 4 Opp. ed. Ludov. Ellies du Pin, Antv. 1706, 5 voll. Vita in Herm. v. d. Hardt. Concil. Constantiens. i. 4, 26. Essai sur Jean Gerson par Ch. Schmidt, Strasb. 1839. 4 Defensor Pacis, sive Adversus Usurpatam Romani Pontificis Juris- dictionem Marsilii Patavini pro Invictissimo et Constantiss. Imperatore Ludivico IV. Bavarico a Tribus Rom. Pontiff. Indigna Perpesso Apo¬ logia Recens. Franc. Gomarus, Francof. 1612. 600 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. The energetic reformatory tendency was, in part, led by those who, under peculiar circumstances, continued to work unmolested in their age ; partly by those who succumbed in conflict with the reigning elements of the age, but by their very defeat prepared the way for a new development.* * * § Among the men of this pure evangelical spirit, John Wycliffe T is conspicuous, a teacher of Theology at Oxford. He made the most vigorous attacks on the prevailing Church doctrine; and his reformatory tendency was connected with his views of Christian faith, and these again with his realistic philosophy. Among his writings, which have been made known through the press, the most noted is his Trialogus, a Dialogue between the true and the false theology. J Very different from him was the Bohemian martyr, John Huss.§ Wycliffe’s peculiar excellence consisted in his speculative theological system, in the thorough systematic consequence in the theoretical, as well as practical department, which allowed this unbending man to shrink from no consequences. On the other hand, Huss’s originality lay in the Practical, which predominated far above the Speculative. He was stirred up by Wycliffe, but also may have formed himself, independently of him, by his own deep Christian feelings, and under the excitement * Ullmann, Die Reformatoren v. d. Reformation, Hamb. 1841, 2 vols. + The History of the Life and Sufferings of John Wycliffe, by John Lewis, London, 1729. The Life and Opinions of John de Wycliffe, by Rob. Yaughan, London, 1829, ed. 2, 1831, 2 vols. [This work was re¬ written and published in 1853, under the title of John de Wycliffe, D.D., a Monograph, with some account of the Wycliffe MSS. in Oxford, Cambridge, the British Museum, Lambeth Palace, and Trinity College, Dublin. By Robert Vaughan, D.D.] C. F. Jager, Joh. Wycliffe, 1854. F. Bohringer, Die Kirche Christi u. ihre Zeugen, Zurich, 1856. Heander, Kirchengesch. herausgeg. von K. F. Th. Schneider, p. 252. L. Flathe, Gesch. d. Vorlaufer der Reformation, Lpzg. 1835, 36. G. Weber, Gesch. der akatholischen Kirche u. Secten von Grossbrittamen, Lpzg. 1845. Lewald Ztschr. f. Histor. Theol. 1846, 1847. Lechler, ebendas. 1853, 54, iib. Wycl u. b. Lollharden. X Ed. L. L. Ph. Wirth, Lips. 1753. § Historia et Monumenta, Jo. Hus atque Hieronymi Pragensis, 2. t. Noremb. 1715. Hermann v. d. Hardt Concilium Constansiense Hulsit- enkrieg. darinnen Begriffen das Leben, die Lehre, der Tod Mag. Jo. Hussi, durch Zachunam Theobaldum, Nurnb. 1621, 4to. Palacky, Gesch. von Bohmen, 1845, Bd. 3. Abth. 1. Neander, Kirchengesch. vi. p. 449. WYCLIFFE AND WESSELL. COl which his official activity as a preacher gave him, in his reformatory striving against the surrounding corruption. But as he did not proceed to carry out his principles, his reforma¬ tion was less thorough than Wycliffe’s. That, moreover, Wycliffe was aware how effective practical Christianity, within the pale of the religious orders might become, for the purification of the Church, is shown by a remarkable predic¬ tion of his, which was fulfilled by the Reformation. He says : “ Let us suppose the case, that some Brother whom God con¬ descends to teach, should be converted to true Christianity, forsake false doctrine, and obtain or conquer for himself freedom from Antichrist, in order to return to the original doctrine of Christianity, then would such a man build up the Church like Paul.” In Germany and the Netherlands, many witnesses of evan¬ gelical truth laboured in a quiet manner to prepare the way for the Reformation. Among these, John Wessel of Gro¬ ningen * is distinguished, whose dogmatic tendency, like Luther’s, originated chiefly in practical grounds. The same Dialectic Art, by which the schoolmen had for¬ tified the ancient Church doctrine, was capable of taking an opposite direction, when the ecclesiastical and Christian spirit had evaporated, as we frequently find, that weapons which have served for the ingenious defence of a cause, have after¬ wards been turned against it. The distinction between a philosophical and a theological truth, had already served, in the thirteenth century, to propagate an unbelief that opposed the Church, under the guise of external authority. Scepticism and Negation now exerted themselves with increasing force; the Aristotelian Philosophy began to assume a hostile position towards Theology, and many varieties of conscious or un¬ conscious hypocrisy were practised ; arguments of Reason were put forward, which contradicted the Church doctrine, but then the insufficiency of Reason was acknowledged, and sub¬ mission was professed to the authority of the Church. There was now a want of men, who, like the profound, acute, and humble schoolmen of an earlier period, would have been able to repel the opposition. Wycliffe, on his part, zealously * Mag. Wesseli Gansfortii Opera quse inveniri potueruDt omnia, Groningpe, 1614, 4to. Joh. Wessel ein Vorganger Luthers, von Dr. C. Ullmann, Hambg. 1834. Diss. Reformatoren von der Reformation, i. 602 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. combated the distinctions of theological and philosophical truth : there were those who thought that the light of Faith was contradictory to natural light; but there could not be two lights conflicting with one another. A natural light of this sort would be darkness, and we could only speak of the oppo¬ sition of a false light of diseased reason to the light of Faith. In consequence of sin, Natural Light was subject to a defect, which God remedied by imparting his Revelation. Peter Pomponazio of Padua and Bologna, an acute Aristotelian, was a renowned representative of this tendency, died a.d. 1526. In his treatises on Immortality, Fate, Free Will, Predestination and Providence, he first of all represented as philosophical truth the doctrine of the Aristotelian Philosophy. He wished to show that no supernatural Revelation, no inter¬ ference of God could take place in the universe, but only a development according to established laws. He was not disposed, indeed, to regard all positive Religion as delusion and fancy ; but, like the modern Pantheism, to explain its appearance, as necessary from its standpoint. It was a phase in the development of the spiritual world, which preceded the scientific development. The change of Religions was an historical necessity; if a new Religion appeared, it was specially inspired by Nature, and had higher powers in itself, which were requisite to overcome the force of custom. In the Founders of the new Religions, the powers of Nature were concentrated and potentiated, and qualified to do great things which were not miracles, but operations of Nature, from which everything proceeded, therefore, they were called Sons of God. As such a Religion had peculiarly intensive and extensive power, so must the Founder be able to impart it to others, to attract them—as the loadstone attracts iron. But in all these religions, the higher powers gradually vanish, and they come to an end. Christianity is no exception ; all things belonging to it become antiquated; miracles cease ; its end seems to be impending. These things, indeed, are not to be promulgated openly, because the people are not prepared for them ; nam homines isti non philosophi sunt sicut bestice. Yet he seems afterwards to have retracted this view of Religion. If some wonders appear, which can only be ex¬ plained on supernatural grounds, then the whole system falls, since in that case, a Revelation must be acknowledged. He THE REVIVAL OF PLATONISM 003 adduces as miracles : the standing-still of the sun ; the feed¬ ing of the five thousand; the darkness at the crucifixion ;— these, and such like, cannot be explained as mere effects of the potentiated powers of Nature. Can we venture to believe that he found there a limit to explanation, and was forced to acknowledge a different system? Certainly, no one under other circumstances, could, with uprightness, maintain such a distinction of philosophical and theological truth. Such phenomena may occur in times of internal discord, and if we could find in Pomponazio only an internal necessity for his system, we might believe that he honestly represented this discord. But it is evident, that from his standpoint, he could easily have disposed of those facts; and it is not credible that any one who otherwise seems to have lacked inward necessity for the reception of Christianity, would have admitted it on these considerations. Pomponazio was a hypocrite, and philo¬ sophical truth was to him the only object of conviction. As in the first ages, so now, revived Platonism—that which found a place in the Academy at Florence, exerted an invigo¬ rating impulse on the religious sentiment. At the same time the study of the classics revived and came into collision with the Scholastic Theology. It wars adapted to exert an influence on the restoration of a purer evangelical Theology, when it supported the reaction of a biblical tendency against the ancient standpoint; but in Southern countries the interests of ^Esthetics and of the Intellect, not that of the Heart, were pursued after a one-sided manner. Thus a pagan mode of thinking spread itself with the love of Antiquity, and Christianity was regarded only as an instrument of popular restraint. It was different when classical studies began to be cultivated in Germany. The deep feeling peculiar to the Germans connected the religious Interest with the scientific; the new studies equally occupied the whole Man. From this standpoint a renovation of Theology was prepared ; it only wanted the new material principle in order to revive. Among the men who here prepared the way for the Reforma¬ tion Erasmus of Rotterdam is to be mentioned. His peculiar talent lay in the department of criticism and classical Studies ;* * See especially Enchiridion Militis Christiani, 1503 ; Morke En- corimum, 1508; Ratio Verse Theologise ; Ecclesiastes, sive de Ratione Concionandi. Opp. ed. Jo. Clericus, Lugd. Bat. 1703, sqq. 11 vols. fol 604 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. the positive dogmatic tendency was not congenial to him. The great freedom with which he passes judgment on the ancient dogmatic distinctions in the preface to his edition of Hilary of P oictiers is characteristic. His works contain the germ of many new investigations, which, even had the Reformation not come to pass, would have called forth a more critical de¬ velopment of Theology. Melancthon discerned this with great historical sagacity. Mysticism,* which at an earlier period had reconciled itself to Scholasticism, now appeared sometimes in opposition. But in the mystic Theology we must distinguish between a more speculative and a more practical tendency, one more con¬ templative, and the other more allied to historical Christianity. Throughout we find in the former the greater danger of trans¬ gressing the proper limits of the human mind ; by striving after absorption in God men easily fell into a pantheistic self-idolatry. The standpoints that had been formerly over¬ come entered afresh into Christianity; ancient ascetic Mys¬ ticism, its dreamy absorption in God, and the disposition to strip the divine Being of all personal characteristics and essential attributes. As this existed in the ancient Religion of India, in Buddhism especially, so it was revived in Master EcKARDf and the Begliards.J We recognise the marks of such aberrations in the heretical propositions of the Beghards, which were condemned about a.d. 1330 by John Compendium Vitae Erasmi, by himself; and Erasmi Vitae, by Beatus Rhenanus, in Opp. t. i. Burigny, Vie d’Erasme, 2 vols. Par. 1757. Germ. Transl. by Henke, Halle, 1782. S. Hess, Erasmus von Rotter¬ dam, Zurich, 1790. A. Muller, Leben des Erasmus von Rotterdam, 1828, * H. Schmid, Der Mysticismus des Mittelalten in seiner Enstehung Periode, Jena, 1824. Ch. Schmidt, Essai sur les Mystiques du 14me Siecle. By the same, Etudes sur la Mysticisme Allemand au I4me Siecle, Par. 1847. And his Joh. Tauler von Strassburg, 1841. Rohrich, die Gottesfreunde und Winkeler am Oberrhein Zeitschr. f. Histor. Theol. 1840. Helfferich, die Christl. Mystic. Ullmann Reformatoren vor d. Reformation, ii. F. Pfeiffer, deutsche Mystiker des 14 Jahrh. Lpz. 1845, vol. i. 4 Predigten unter Denen v. Tauler in d. Ausg. 1521, 1522. Quetif et Echard Scriptores Ord. Praedicator. i. 507. Docen, Miscellanien z. Gesch. d. deutsch Litterat. i. 138. Ch. Schmidt, Meister Eckart Theol. Stud. u. Kritik. 1839. Martenseu, Meister Eckart, e. Theol. Studie. Hamb. 1842. Ritter Gesch. d. Chr. Philosoph. iv. 498. ^ Mosheim, de Beghardis et Beguinabus, ed. Martin, Lips. 1790. THE BEGHARDS. 605 XXII. They were the adherents of the Sect of the free Spirit and of free knowledge ( libera intelligentice) ; they taught,— God is neither good nor evil, as He is neither black nor white ; God is glorified equally in Evil as in Good ; even the wicked praise God; whoever prays for anything positive commits injustice, for he prays for the negation of Goodness and of God. The predictions of the Abbot Joachim respect¬ ing the age of the Holy Spirit were received ; namely, that a pure internal Religion was to follow the age of the Revelation of the Son, in the Sacrament of the Church, during which the Holy Spirit indwells and reigns, everything proceeds from the intuition of the Divine Being, and men depend on no outward Authority. To one part of this Sect assertions of the following kind were attributed :—Every believer is Christ him¬ self ; an Incarnation of God takes place in all of them ; and the name of Christ is only the symbol of this universal fact. Each one of them created the World. Hell and Heaven are only poetical fictions ; there is no other eternal life, excepting the abdication of personality, the re-absorption into God. There were signs of phenomena, which were kept back by the intervention of the Reformation, but came forward firtt in a more distant age. On the other hand, the mild prac¬ tical mysticism combated this negative, mystic, pantheistic Rationalism, as was the case with Ruysbrock. This tendency, where the Religion of the Heart was cherished in opposition to that of the Understanding, and was impelled to a living sur¬ render to Christ, formed a laboratory in which the materials were prepared for the Reformation. THE SPECIAL HISTORY OF DOGMAS. A. THE HISTORY OF INTRODUCTORY DOGMAS. I. THE STATEMENTS RESPECTING THE ESSENCE OF THEOLOGY. Durand was distinguished by his investigations respecting the essence of Theology. The question whether Theology is a Science he answered by the distinction of a twofold view of t Theology: Theology is either a habitus , in the popular sense, when the assent is given to what the Holy Scriptures affirm, or a habitus in the sense of a Science, inasmuch as it explains and vindicates the contents of Holy Writ on rational prin¬ ciples. As the central point of Christian doctrine, lie did not 606 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. ' place God as God, but God as Redeemer. The doctrine of Redemption is, therefore, the prime article, and contains implicite all the other fundamental doctrines, such as the doctrine of the Trinity, a remark which is of importance for right views of the Trinity. It is remarkable how he expresses himself opposed to all human Authority in Religion :—“ In the things which belong to Faith we must trust the Scriptures more than Reason ; but whoever would renounce his Reason on account of a human authority would place himself on a level with the beasts ; this would be forcibly to suppress the light of Reason (incidere in insipientiam). Truth is most holy, and even Reason teaches how God the Father is to be praised. k 2. ON TRADITION AND THE HOLY SCRIPTURES AS SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE. Thus far in the course of Mediaeval development there were heard only occasional utterances, particularly of sects, against the pre-eminence which the Traditions of the Church held among the sources of the knowledge of the Christian faith, and against the dependence of the exposition of Scripture upon it. It was different in the Period before us. The formal principle of the Reformation was asserted more fre¬ quently and plainly, and the reactions of the Christian con¬ sciousness followed, which endeavoured to make the interpre¬ tation of the Bible independent of the authority of the Church. The most distinguished Reformers, Wycliffe and Wessell, emphatically announced this principle, and it was at the basis of the ideas of Huss. The great movement which originated with the latter caused also the Theologians of the opposite party in the Church to enter on the investigation of this principle, and to impugn it. A more decided impulse was given to it by the vindication of the administration of the Sacrament in both kinds to the Laitv. On this account Gerson wrote against the Hussites a treatise on the literal sense of Holy Writ. He and the other reformatory Theo¬ logians of Paris wished, on the one hand, to exalt the authority of the Bible in opposition to the Mediaeval ten¬ dency ; but, on the other hand, as they were not willing to let the principles of the old system sink into abeyance, they were necessitated to call to their aid other sources of know- GERSON AND NICOLAUS. 607 ledge besides the Scriptures. Gerson first of all asserted as a fundamental maxim that the literal sense of the Bible was the only true one—that all things necessary to salvation were plainly contained in the Bible, and that no true doctrine could be at variance with the Bible. From this we might have expected a different result from that at which he arrived ; the literal sense must be explained according to the sense of the Church, under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, and not according to the arbitrary opinion of every individual. The interpretation of the Church is made known through its repre¬ sentative, a General Council. In holding this or that Gospel to be genuine, we believe the Church. Christ and the Apostles revealed the literal sense, the Martyrs confirmed it, and the Church by its decrees, through its Councils, has collected together what has resulted from the development of doctrine. This is, therefore, a decisive rule of Interpretation. Every one must subject himself to the decision of the bishop in his own diocese, but he may appeal from this to the Pope, and farther, as the last resort, to the decision of the General Council, in which the highest authority is vested. With still greater decision, and with a sophistry remarkable for its effrontery, Nicolaus of Cusa defended the higher authority of Tradition, advancing many things which have since been expressed from a quite different standpoint. In his letter to the Bohemians he says :—The Church existed before the Holy Scriptures. Christ founded the Church without letters, and the Apostles published the Gospel before they wrote anything. The Church does not exist for the sake of the Scriptures, but the Scriptures for the sake of the Church. We might conceive of the possibility of a Tyrant’s destroying every copy of the Scriptures. But it cannot be, he concludes, that the existence of the Church and its doctrines should depend on anything so accidental as the destruction of written documents. Tho Holy Scriptures may be expounded differently by every one ; how, then, can we discover the true doctrine, if we have no rule ? But divine Truth has always been in the Church, and the agency of the Holy Spirit by whom this truth is always maintained; the Spirit giveth life, the Letter killeth. He places the two in opposition, without considering that they go together; only we must abide by the Spirit; the Church is not bound to the letter of Scripture. When the Letter, in / 608 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. consequence of the altered wants of the Age, is no longer fitted for edification, the Church takes what is most suitable; hence it explains the same passages differently at different times. How great the latitude which is thus given to the Spirit appears even more distinctly from what follows ; the r intelligence of the Church is developed with its practice ; this xS the living Spirit. When the Church apparently inter- prets differently from the literal signification, this is not an l' alteration of Christ’s commands, for the Church is Christ’s m body, and does nothing but what Christ wills; He reveals his w mysteries according to the changes of Time, as is most suit¬ able, partly by silent Tradition, partly by common examina¬ tion, or by the verbal Decrees of Councils. When the Church settles anything by them it proceeds from the same Spirit by which the Scriptures were inspired. As in the New Testa¬ ment we find Baptism only in the name of Christ, but after¬ wards we find it performed in the Church in the name of the Trinity ; and in the first age a community of goods, and thus a renunciation of worldly possessions, which at a later period was confined to the Monks; so other decisions of the Church bear a similar relation to the words of Holy Writ. B. THE DOGMAS OF SPECIAL DOGMATICS. a. THE DOCTRINE OF GOD. 1. THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY. Wycliffe^ attempts to show that the Trinity is a necessary truth of Reason, and that there are traces of it in Plato. God has the ability to know Himself and all other existences ; this potentia is the Father. As far as he can do this he knows himself in a necessary manner. This realized Self-knowledge is the Son. God cannot know himself without reposing in himself, and this inward satisfaction is the Holy Spirit, by virtue of whom he loves himself. * 2. THE DOCTRINE OF PREDESTINATION, GRACE, AND FREE-WILL. * The Controversy that from the time of Alexander of Hales had sprung up between the Franciscans and Dominicans, the Scotists and Thomists, advanced still further. The externalism in the practice of the Church was also connected * Jager, p 23. Bohringer, p. 153. PREDESTINATION, GRACE AND FREEDOM. 609 with Pelagianism and Semi-Pelagianism, and the notion of a meritum in Man was joined to this in various ways. In oppo¬ sition to it the Augustinian and Thomistic element, which traced everything to the divine Grace, reappeared, and was carried to the greatest lengths ; under its influence Pela¬ gianism was seen in every assertion which in any way affixed conditions to the operations of grace. On this standpoint the Englishman Thomas Bradwardine ( doctor 'profundus) is worthy of notice ; he was teacher of Theology at Oxford, a.d. 1325, Archbishop of Canterbury a.d. 1348, and died a.d. 1349. To combat the Pelagianism of his age he pub¬ lished his treatise De causa Dei adversus Pelagium et de virtute cans arum, in three books A' He places the whole and each part of the Universe under an unconditional Necessity. Everything which happens is a necessary fulfilment of the divine plan of the Universe. The divine will is the efficient cause, to which everything else is alike subservient; even the actions of rational beings are not exempt from this universal law. Hence he impugns the distinction of a divine will and a divine permission in reference to Evil, and endeavours to show that even this forms a necessary part of the divine Plan, but that moral Imputation is not thereby nullified, since Evil subjectively contradicts the Will of God. He strives to set aside all the subterfuges of his opponents for vindicating any meritum whatever, even a meritum de congruo; he even opposes those who admitted a gratia prceveniens, and only maintained that it depended on the receptivity of Man to accept it o.r not. From this System it strictly followed that the independence and contingency of the Free Will are only a semblance; and since this applies to the Fall, Supralapsa- rianism would be involved in it. It is remarkable that all the reactions of the Christian con¬ sciousness for the recovery of evangelical Truth from the mix¬ ture of Christian and Jewish element^ proceeded from the Augustinian standpoint. They were excited partly by the influence of Augustin, and partly determined by that oppo¬ sition which it involved against mere external good works and Pelagian principles. Thus we see here preparatory measures for that which became still more conspicuous at the * Ed. H. Savilius, Lond. 1618. R R 010 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. Reformation. If in some the Augustinian view stands in immediate connexion with its practical Christian tendency, in Wycliffe it is chiefly conditioned by his philosophical sys¬ tem.^ His doctrine of ideas is developed in opposition to the Nominalist view of the relation of Thought and Being, and of an infinite series of possibilities, and leads him accord¬ ing to his own strict logic to the admission of an unconditional Predestination. Pie maintains that God’s omnipotence con¬ sists in realizing whatever is possible ; thus God’s omnipotence and the actual Creation are counterparts of one another.! Sin cannot be included in this ; it does not follow that it was only an accident, but it is a defectus, something Negative, of which it cannot be affirmed that it was created ; God is the cause of the sinner’s punishment, but not the cause of Sin , it is a deordinatio, and hence cannot be traced back to the divine plan of the Universe. God himself is the cause of Predestination and Prescience, for all knowledge is in him not acquired or given, but internal and necessary, and therefore determined by nothing appertaining to the Creature. Every thing is founded in the divine Ideas; these are essentially the divine Essence itself. In a formal respect it is thus shown in what manner God knows all things. J God knows nothing except what really exists, and everything possible is actual, since God knows it as if it existed.§ Evil is contradictory to the divine Ideas; God therefore knows it by means of Good, that is, on account of its deviation from his ideas, as we know Darkness by means of Light. Here was an approximation to the Pantheistic scheme of a necessary development of God in the Universe. Wycliffe in vain sought to escape the ethical consequences of his speculative Ideas, which he did not con¬ ceal from himself. He even says,—“ Can, then, the wicked excuse themselves on account of their sins ?” He answers,— “ If they could, they would do it; but I know not who can— * Neander vi. herausg. v. K. F. Schneider, p. 316. Bohringer, p. 139. f SicutDeus ad intra nihil potest producere, nisi absolute necessario illud producat, sic nihil ad extra potest producere, nisi pro suo tempore illud producat. + Idea est essentialiter natura divina et formaliter ratio, secundum quam Deus intelligit creaturas. § Deus nihil intelligit nisi quod existit, dum potest existere, et sic omne quod existere potest existit. ORIGINAL SIN. 611 as I know not what man would break my head and say it is necessary. I should say to him also that he is blameable.” b. ANTHROPOLOGY. THE DOCTRINE OF ORIGINAL SIN. Disputes arose between the Scotists and Thomists on the question of the freedom of the Virgin Mary from Original Sin. In the year 1387 the Dominican, John of Montosono, put forward the assertion that it was expressly against the faith to teach that not all, Christ excepted, had been defiled with original Sin, and that it was so to teach this of the Virgin Mary. That it was equally against Holy Writ to except one human being besides Christ as to except ten. # As the dis¬ pute was prolonged, the Council of Basle, about a.d. 1439, t announced the decision that Mary, by special, prevenient, and efficient Grace, had never been subject to the actuality of original Sin ; so that she was always free from original Sin and actual Sin. This opinion was to be regarded as pious, and agreeing with the Catholic faith, Reason, and the Holy Scriptures. But the recognition of the Basle Council was a matter of dispute between the papistical and the more liberal party. In a.d. 1483 Sixtus IV. issued a command to let the controversy cease, and ordained that those who maintained that the doctrine that Mary at her conception was freed from all original Sin, was a heresy, were to be condemned, and whoever uttered it in preaching was to be excommunicated. He imposed equal silence on the other side, since nothing had been yet decided. C. THE DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH. The idea of the Church had hitherto been undisturbed in the Western Church, for the opposition of particular sects could effect nothing against it. But now the reaction of the freer Christian spirit appeared. Even on the Catholic Standpoint a difference was stirred respecting the relation of the change¬ able and unchangeable in the development of the Church; on * Chronique du Religieux de St. Denys, publiee par L. Bellaguet, Par. 1839, 4to. D’Argentr6, Collectio Judiciorum de No vis Erroribue ab Initio, xii. sec. usque ad annum 1632. Par. 1728, iii. t. f. i. ii. 61. f Sessio 36; Mansi xxix. 183. R R 2 612 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. the position of the Papacy in respect of the Church ; whether the Pope was to be regarded as its representative or Sovereign Head ; whether the general Councils or the Pope stood highest The University of Paris especially was the seat of reaction against the tendency which had prevailed since the Pseudo- Isidorian Decretals, and the Chancellor Gerson was foremost in the controversy.* He regarded the whole Hierarchical Order in general as necessary for the Organism of the Church. Agreement in this was necessary for the Unity of the Church, and this Unity he viewed simply as outward. Hence, from his point of view, the idea of the Church as a visible Institution continued by the succession of the Bishops under the primacy of the Pope is placed foremost. This out¬ wardly defined Organism effectuates communion with Christ; and out of its pale there is no communion with Christ and with the Holy Spirit, therefore no salvation. So £ar he held firmly the ancient foundation of Catholicism, but he disse¬ vered himself from the opposite party by distinguishing the essential and unessential, the unchangeable and the change¬ able in the Organism. He regarded as essential and neces¬ sary the existence of a visible Supreme Head and the Epis¬ copal system, and he pronounced the assertion that an invisible Supreme Head sufficed, to be Heresy ; but on the relation of the Roman Church to ecclesiastical government he laid down no unchangeable Law; the Papacy ought to serve for the benefit of the Church, and meet its various necessities. Gerson, indeed, acknowledged that the Church, as it had given birth to the Primate, so it must always the power tp reinstate him ; it might even exist provisionally without him, its invisible Head. The Universal Church then took its power into its own hands. But the highest representation of the Universal Church is given in a General Council, and every individual must submit his own subjective judgment to this. In Gerson’s tendency, therefore, we recognise the return to the more ancient form of Catholicism. The more spiritual view of the Church was carried out far more logically in the Defensor Pacis , which denied that an external Primacy, like that of the Pope, was necessary for it. Protestant principles were displayed most plainly in the * De Modis uniendi et reformandi Ecclesiam in Concilio Universali, 1410, in Herm. v. d. Hardt. Concil. Constantiens, t. i. P. v. THE DOCTRINE OF THE SACRAMENTS. GIB men who were in the strict sense Reformers. Wycliffe regards communion with Christ as primary, including the communion with believers, and from that the idea of a Church is first derived, as of a Body forming itself from within, from the common relation of the consciousness to Christ. He defines the true Church as the community of the redeemed or of the predestined ; only these are members of the holy Church; but many who are so called are enemies of the Church, and belong to the Synagogue of Satan. Hence a visible Head of the Church is not necessary; as long as Christ is in Heaven the Church has in Him the best Pope, and dis¬ tance cannot hinder Him from being with his Church even to the end. Huss took the same direction, but expressed him¬ self later respecting this doctrine, when he already anticipated the decision of his fate. In his treatise De Ecclesia, a.d. 1413, he declares that the Catholic Church is the Community of Saints; where two or three are united in Christ, they form with Christ the Church. He combats the idea of a necessary outward unitv of the Church. To the same effect, Wessel, in his treatise De Communione Sanctorum , says : By the true Unity of the Church all are connected who have in common one Faith, one Hope, and one Love, and are thereby connected with Christ, under whatever ecclesiastical superiors they may find themselves. The Unity of the Church under a Pope is only an accidental thing. d. THE DOCTRINE OF THE SACRAMENTS. 1. OF THE SACRAMENTS IN GENERAL. The reactions against the Catholic idea of the Sacraments increased. That the Sacraments really and literally are the cause of grace had already in the former period given offence. Durand also now declared that the Sacraments are not neces¬ sary nor sufficient in themselves for the salvation of Men, since God has not so necessarily connected with these Ele¬ ments the Power by which he upholds and redeems men in Nature and in Grace that he cannot work without them. They are the causa sine qua non Grace can be communi¬ cated, since, according to an appointment of God, every one who receives the Sacrament receives also Grace (provided he offers no impediment), but not through the Sacrament, but 614 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. from God. He makes use of the illustration that occurs else¬ where, of a King who promises to bestow an alms on condition of the receiver bringing a leaden penny. The Sacrament can impart no character spiritalis, for it is absurd to suppose that material things can effect such a communication to the spirit. Peter D’Ailly also holds the opinion that the Sacraments are not causce effectives gralive, but causes gratia sine quibus ; therefore they are only causes in a figurative sense, since this impartation of Grace in the participation of the Sacrament takes place, not by virtue of their own power, but of God’s free Will. Wycliffe departs most widely from the received doctrine. He sets out from the usual definition, and then says: According to this every visible Creature is also a Sacra¬ ment, since it is a visible form of the invisible Grace of the Creator, represents the image of his Ideas, and becomes for created Beings a cause of imitation and of knowledge. Thus, also, the publication of the divine word may be called a Sacra¬ ment as a sign of divine Grace. Hence he considers the seven¬ fold number of the Sacraments as unfounded. \ All of them cannot be proved from Scripture—for instance, Confirmation; it is an assumption on the part of the Bishop, since the Holy Spirit is previously given at Baptism. As little can be said on behalf of' Extreme Unction, since here the higher efficacy is ascribed to prayer. 2. THE DOCTRINE OF THE LORD’S SUPPER. Doubts respecting the doctrine of Tran substantiation were raised more frequently, and were only repressed because Theo¬ logians could not withdraw themselves from subjection to the doctrine of the Church. Several of the Schoolmen agreed that they could adduce for this doctrine no other reason than the authority of the Church, and that the Bible and Reason led to a different conclusion. William of Ockham endea¬ voured to show that the arguments of Thomas Aquinas for the doctrine of Transubstantiation were not sufficient. In the New Testament it was, indeed, expressly said that the body of Jesus was taken ; but the doctrine of Transubstantiation could not be inferred from that, for there were other ways of explaining the presence of Christ in the Supper. That view, for instance, was more agreeable to reason and Scripture, which supposed that one substance served as the basis of the THE DOCTRINE OF THE LORD’S SUPPER. 615 other. But since the Church, through Innocent III., decided the contrary, its sentence must proceed from a revelation. Durand remarks: It appears to be a reflection on the divine power to maintain that the Body of Christ cannot be present at the Supper otherwise than by Transubstantiation. The words of the Institution also admit the view that the Body of Chr ist was really contained in the Sacrament ( corpus Christi realiter contention esse in elemento). Yet the decision of the Church is contrary, in which we are not allowSchto suppose an errcrrr"TEus, also, Peter d’Ailly : If it is possible that one created thing, is upheld by another, it is possible that the Body of Christ is connected in this manner with the Bread. This mode of viewing the subject is permissible in itself, and more easy to apprehend ; and we should accept it, if it only agreed with the authority of the Church. This statement is memorable, since it gave rise to the first doubt in Luther’s mind respecting the doctrine of Transubstantiation, as appears from his treatise on the Babylonian Captivity. Wycl i ffe impugns the doctrine of Transubstantiation most decidedly, as contradicting “BotH Reason and Holy Writ. By the absurd doctrine of accidentia sine subjecto an altogether new order of the Universe would be introduced ; the event is not to be thought of as a Miracle, for it is an absurdity ; we cannot understand how any one can really say that the Bread is the Body of Christ, if the Bread is no longer there. He says : Satan’s cunning strove, long after the delusion, to mislead the Church into this heresy. When, through his Anti-Christ, he first brought it so far that it no longer held the Sacrament to be Bread, but a detestable accident, he could bring it to believe everything he wished ; for example, that in whatever vices a prelate may indulge, yet it can never be credited by the people, on account of the dignity of the Clergy. He declares himself against a connexion of such a kind as many of the older theologians admitted : that the two substances were connected, like the divine and human natures in Christ, since otherwise all the predicates of the Bread might be applied to the Body of Christ, and inversely, which yet is not admissible. Notwithstanding this, he would not maintain a merely symbolical importance, but admitted a signum efficax as involved in the general idea of the Sacrament as well as in this special case of the Supper. The consecration did not 616 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. mark an alteration of the nature of the bread, but a poten¬ tiating of it. Christ is everywhere present in a spiritual man¬ ner, but he is present quite in a different manner, namely, kabitudinaliter , in the Supper, When Christ called John the Baptist Elias, and yet John said that he was not Elias, both are consistent with one another, for Christ calls him so in a figurative sense, and he denies it in a literal one ; but he was Elias not in a merely symbolical sense, but in a certain real sense, as far as he represented the power of Elias. So it is also with the relation of the Bread and Wine to the Body of Christ. As Man in an Image does not think of the matter of it, but directs his thoughts to that of which it is the Image, so must believers direct their devotion, not to the material substance, but to Christ Wycliffe’s opposition to Tran- substantiation was connected with his realistic view of the objectivity of general Ideas. In this philosophic theory Huss also agreed, and Peter d’Ailly, who, at the Council of Con¬ stance, argued in favour of Transubstantiation, hence objected to him that he denied it as a Realist. But Huss would not allow it; and since he was not so deeply imbued as Wyc- liffe with the theological and the philosophical, the conse¬ quences could not be ascribed to him to which the latter was open. Huss was not the man to keep back his convictions. In his writings he contented himself with combating the ancient legends of the appearances of Christ at the Supper, and bringing forward the spiritual view; he confined himself to the practical, and did not enter on dogmatical investi¬ gations. The Withholding of the Cup. — While Huss was at Constance his friend, Jacobellus of Misa, appeared at Prague and maintained the necessity of restoring the com¬ munion in both kinds. Huss, when asked in prison re¬ specting it, frankly expressed his opinion:—Certainly, accord¬ ing to the Institution of Christ, as the Evangelists and Paul testify, and according to the usage of the most ancient Church, the participation is to be retained. Yet he laid no peculiar stress upon it, and advised the laity to ask per¬ mission of the Pope. A written controversy arose upon it between the Hussites and the Catholics. The former ap¬ pealed to John ch. vi. which they referred to the Suppei. Jacobus was not willing to admit the conclusion from the THE WITHHOLDING OF THE CUP. 617 ( concomitant!a. If it was said that the full participation was only for the Priests, he rejoined that if this assertion were correct, the same might be affirmed of the entire Supper. The desecration of the Supper was urged in case the cup was offered to unworthy laymen. He replied that there were many priests who were much more unworthy than pious lay¬ men.—-The Council of Constance passed six resolutions against the Hussites, in which it is said that Christ insti¬ tuted the Supper under two kinds; but by the custom of the Church it was established that it should be distributed, not after a meal, as at its Institution ; and just so the Church has ordained on rational grounds the communion in one kind. Let no individual oppose this ; and whoever stubbornly resists let him be punished as a heretic. Gerson, about a.d. 1417, wrote a tract to vindicate this decree, in which he supports a bad cause with ridiculous arguments: the wine may be turned to vinegar; it would foster the notion that the laity are equal to the Priests in dignity, &c. The Council of Basle came to an agreement with the Bohemians by which liberty was granted for the laity to receive the Supper in both kinds. But in order not to damage the decrees of Constance it was stated, that believing laymen were not bound by the command of the Lord to receive the Supper in both kinds; it was the Church’s business to decree how it was to be taken by the non-clerical; under each form there was the whole Christ. The commendable custom of the Church, to administer it under one form, was to be regarded as a Law 3. THE DOCTRINE OF PENANCE AND THE THESAURUS SUPERE¬ ROGATIONS. Clement VI., in a.d. 1343, issued the constitutio unigenitus, in which for the Jubilee Year 1350 he granted a large indul¬ gence, and founded it on the treasure of merits. Christ, it declared, had gained a treasure for his Church, the manage¬ ment of which he had committed to Peter and his Suc¬ cessors, in order that, for pious and rational causes, they might offer indulgence to the truly penitent, either for the total or the partial remission of temporal punishments; and this treasure could never be exhausted, on account of Christ’s infinite merits, and the constantly increasing, superabundant virtues of the righteous. The crying abuse of indulgences 618 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. called forth fresh and more numerous adversaries. Many would allow of no other treasure than the merits of Christ. Gerson, indeed, did not venture to invalidate the grant of indulgences in itself, but he wished to trace it back to its original intent, as a release from certain punishments for sins. The Church could only free from punishments which were in its power, and which it could inflict; only Christ and God could acquit from punishment and guilt. Wycliffe, on the other hand, impugned with this doctrine that of Penance in general. Every believer, on account of his communion with Christ and His spiritual Body, had a share in all good works according to the measure of bis worth¬ iness. He spoke emphatically against the traffic which worldly-minded Antichrists carried on with the forgiveness of sins, and declared that only confession of sin before God was necessary to obtain forgiveness. The Church Confession was indeed salutary, but not necessar}u Huss also controverted these points. But Wessel in this respect approaches very near Luther’s principles ; true repentance, he says, proceeds from the Love of God, not from fear. The sentence of the Priest is no judgment on Sin; God forgives it to every one who feels true penitence and sorrow. The imposition of any other penance and punishment is at variance with the merit 3 of Christ. The doctrine of making satisfaction to God by works is blasphemous, for thereby the doctrine of the High priesthood and perfect sacrifice of Christ is touched upon. Hence he particularly attacks Indulgences; everything de¬ pends on the susceptibility of Man for Grace; what man is not able of himself to appropriate can be appropriated to him by no one else ; there is, indeed, a treasure of the Church, but only for him who knows it; God and Christ are the true treasure of the Church. 4. THE DOCTRINE OF PURGATORY. The Dogma of the ignis purgatorius had not hitherto been openly established ; this took place in the conferences with the Greeks, at the Councils of Florence and Ferrara, a.d. 1438 and a.d. 1439. Only those who had practised true penitence, and had died in love to God and Christ before they had accomplished the fruits of Penitence, were, after death, cleansed by the purifying fire; and for lessening the THIRD PRINCIPAL PERIOD. 619 severity of this purification the prayers of believers, masses, sacrifices, &c., avail. To support these views appeal was made to 1 Corinth, iii. 12, 13, and 2 Maccab. xii. 45. The Greeks so expressed the doctrine, that souls would be punished, because they were destitute of divine light; but they would be set at liberty by Prayers, Sacrifices, and Classes. Wessel* took a more spiritual view of this doc¬ trine ; the purifying Fire is for those who have not yet been altogether penetrated by Love, a spiritual Fire of Love, puri¬ fying the Soul from the remaining dross, and consisting in a longing after union with God; so that it is not so much a punishment as a preparatory step to Blessedness. THIRD PRINCIPAL PERIOD. « THE DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE SINCE THE REFORMATION. Herm. v. d. Hardt, Historia Litteraria Reformat. Fcf. Lpz. 1717. D. Gerdesius Introductio in Historiam Evangelii, sec. xvi. passim, per Europam Renovati Gron. 1744-52, 4 t. Serinium Antiquarium siv. Miscellanea Groningana, 1748-63. 8 t- 4. (Especially for the Reformation out of Germany.) For the German Reformation.—Luther’s Werke, Wittenberg, 1539-59 ; 12 vols German, 1545-58 ; 7 vols. Latin, Jena, 1555-58 : 8 German, 1556-58 ; 4 Latin. Two supplementary volumes by Aurifaber, Eisleb. 1564-65. The German writings in the Altenberg edition, by J. Ch. Sagittarius, 1661-64, 10 vols.; Leipzig edition. 1729-40, 22 vols. fol. J. G. Walch, Halle, 1740-50, 24 vols. 4to. Dr. M. Luther’s Briefe, Sendschreiben und Bedenken. Herausg. v. Dr. W. M. L. de Wette, Berl. 1825, 6 vols. Melanchthons Werke in Corp. Reformatorum, ed. C. G. Bretschnei- der, continued by Bindseil, 1834, especially the Loci Communes Theologici, 1521, 1535, 1543, 1559. Die Symbolischen Bucher der Lutherischen Kirche, Herausg. 1580, Dresd. A. Rechenberg, Lpz. 1677. C. M. Pfaff. Tiib. 1730, J. H. Tittman, Meiss. 1817, Hare, 1837. B. C. Loscher, Vollstandige, Reformations Acta u. Documenta (1517-19) 3 t. 4, Lpz. 1726-29. D. E. Kapp. kl. Nachlese einiger zur Erlanter, d. Refrmtgesch. wichtiger Urkunden, Lpz. 1727, 4 t. 8. Strobel, Miscel¬ lanea, Niirnberg, 1778. By the same, Beitrage zur Litterat. 1784. C. G. Neudecker, Urkunden aus d. Reformatszeit, Cass. 1836 Altenstiicke aus d. Ztalt. d. Reformat- 1838, 2 vols. L. C Forstemann, Neues Urkunderb. zur Gesch. der Kirchenreformat. Harnb. 1842, 4. V. L. a Seckendorf, Commentarius ITistoricus et Apologeticus de Lutlieranismo, libb. iii. Lpz. 1688-1694, against Maimbourg’s (the Jesuit) Histoire du Lutheranisme, Par. 1680, 4. W. C. Tentzel, Histor. Bericht. vom Aufg. u. erst Fortgang der Reformat. Lpz. 1718, 2 vols. J. G. Walch, Streitigkeiten innerh d. Luth. Kirch. 5 vols. 1730 By the same* Streitigkten Ausserh. d. Luth. Kirche, 5 vols. 1733. C. A. Salig. Gesch. der Angsb. Confess. (1517-62) Haile, 1730, 8 vols. 4. G. J. Planck, Gesch. d. Ensteh. Veranderung u. Bildung nnsres protest. Lehrbegriffs bis zur Concordfrml. 1781-1800, 6 vols. 2nd ed. Vols. 1-3, 1791-98. * De Purgatorio, quis et qualis sit ignis Purgatorius, ed. Groning. p 826 . 620 THE HISTORT OP CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. For the Swiss Reformation. —Huldreich Zwingli’s Werke, v. M. Schuler u. J. Schulthess. Ziir. 1828, 8 vols. Especially his Commeutar. de Vera et Falsa. Religione, iii. 1645. J. Calvini Opp. Amst. 1667, 9 vols. Especially his Institutio Religionis Christ, ed. Tholuek, 1884,1846, 2 t. Lettres de Jean Calvin, recueilWes pour la premiere fois, p. Jules Bonnet. Lettres Francises, t. i. Par. 1854. Die Belcenntnisschriften d. Reform. Kirche Zusammengest. v. Augusti, 1830. Niemerger, 1840. Miscellanea Tigurina, 3 vols. 1722-24. J. C. Fussli, Beitriige zur Reformatsgesch. der Schw. 1741-58, 5 parts. J. J. Simler, Sammlung alter u. neues Urkunden zur Beleuchtuug der Kircliengesch. besonders der Schweiz. 1767, 2 vols. The contemporary historians, Yal. Anshelm (1526), Bern. 1825-33, 6 vols.; H. Bullinger (1532), 1838-40, 3 vols. Biographies —Luthers Leben, v. M. Meurer, Dresd. 1843-52, 3 vols.; by R. Jiigeus Lpz. 1846, 3 vols. incomplete. Leben Melanchthon, v. Camerarius. 1566 ; ed. Strobel, 1777 F. Galle, Charakteristik Melanchthons, Halle, 1840. Zwingli’s v. Robermund, Bremen, 1828. Von Schuler, Zur. 1819. Yon Sal. Hess, Ziir. 1820. Von Hottinger, 1843. Especially for Zwingli’s Doctrine, see Zeller’s Tlieol. Zahrb. 1853, and Chr. Siegwart. Ulr. Zwingli, 1854. J. Oekolampadius v. Herzag. Bart. Haller v. Kirchofer, 1828. W. Farel, v. Kirchhofer, Leben Calvins v. Bega. P. Henry, Leben Calvins des Grossen Reformators, 1835, 3 vols. T'n. Beza, v. J. W. Baum, 1843-51, 2 vols. See Schenkel, das Wesen des Protestantismus, 3 vols. 1846-51. Schnecken- burger, Vergleichende Darstell, d. Luth. u. Ref. Systems, Herausg. von Gilder, 2 parts. A. THE HISTORY OF INTRODUCTORY DOGMAS. THE DOCTRINE OF THE SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE The question respecting the highest sources of the know¬ ledge of Christian faith and practice necessarily was first brought under fuller discussion at the Reformation. It could not maintain itself against the Catholic Church without making an attack on Tradition, and holding fast the principle that the Christian truth is to be derived from the Holy Scrip¬ tures alone. But if it is further asked whether this was the Principle which w r as first of all conceived and developed with clear consciousness, it will readily be perceived that this alone did not constitute the peculiar principle of the Reformation, since at a later period some appeared who in this respect agreed with the Protestants, and yet, like the Socinians, departed widely from the Doctrine of the Reformers, and made quite a different application of that principle. Accord¬ ingly, an originally different relation of the religious con¬ sciousness to Holy Writ is hereby pre-supposed. Generally the founding of a Church is not commenced by consciously undertaking the task of forming a new doctrine from Holy Writ; a new T Life and a new religious community do not originate from such reflections. Socinianism did proceed in this way, but it gave birth to nothing that had vitality. Where a new living Church is formed, the truth of Holy Writ operates in a peculiar manner on the religious life of the Founder; a THE SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE. m peculiar tendency is elaborated, according to which the Holy Scriptures are studied and viewed. One truth of it is not accidentally set up as a central point, but it depends on the religious consciousness how it is affected by the Holy Scrip¬ tures ; and although there are various types of doctrine in the New Testament, yet it is not accidental, whether a person feels attracted by this or that. Lastly, the acknowledgment of Tradition as a fountain of knowledge and a rule for the Christian faith, and the limitation of the authority and the peculiar Exposition of Holy Writ, first proceeded from a totally different doctrinal principle. Hence, also, the opposition against this principle led men to place Holy Writ in the right relation to the religious consciousness. That revolution of the religious consciousness to Catholicism consisted in withdrawing that consciousness from its immediate relation to Christ, and . placing the Church between. Thus the reaction of the Christian consciousness was realized at this point, for it returned from its mediated position to the immediate relation to Christ, where it enjoyed independence of the authority of the Church. We find this connexion indicated in the man¬ ner in which Wycliffe brings forward the principle of the normative dignity of Scripture. “ When we truly believe in Christ,” he says, “ the authority of Holy Writ will be greater than that of any other writing.” He makes various applica¬ tions of the idea of Scripture which were connected with the Scholastic .Theology and mode of development, but yet led to that presupposition. Holy Writ is equivalent to Jesus Christ, the Book of Life, or the truths contained in this book. Fur¬ ther, the collection of the particular writings which we call the Scriptures are signified by it. But this is not to be under¬ stood literally of this collection of writings on parchment, but of their contents, the sententia sacrce. From the view of the divine Word in Christ we first arrive at the treasures of Holy Writ. In Wycliffe, therefore, we see the acknowledg¬ ment of the divine Word derived from the immediate relation of the religious consciousness to Christ. The same was the case with Luther. His Reformation set out from the recog¬ nition of Christ as the only source of Salvation, with a rejection of all other mediation. Preparation for this deve¬ lopment was made during his residence in the monastery. His peculiar religious convictions remained at first in the 622 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. forms of the existing doctrinal type, and with a recognition of the authority of the external Church. But from this internal principle he was gradually led to adhere no longer to the decrees of the Church, hut to examine the Scriptures for himself. Yet before he had consciously developed the prin¬ ciple that the Holy Scriptures must be the highest source of knowledge his doctrine had already been formed upon it, and unconsciously he was guided by the principle to admit nothing which was at variance with the Scriptures. Controversy first brought him to carry out this principle with scientific con¬ sciousness. If we wish, therefore, to make use of these later designations, we must say that the formal principle had been formed in his mind out of the material; both are combined in the one principle, that the historical Christ is the only source of salvation and of knowledge, in opposition to the mediation of an outward Church for salvation and the knowledge of sal¬ vation. In modern times it has often been urged as a distinction between the Lutheran and Reformed Churches, that although both agree in this twofold principle, yet that one or the other has preponderated. Some truth lies at the basis of this state¬ ment, but we cannot acknowledge it as true in this form. As to the charge of a one-sided over-valuation of Holy Writ, by viewing it out of its connexion with History and the material principle, and falling into a slavish adherence to the letter, when the externalizing of the formal principle was further developed, we do not find these faults generally in the distin¬ guished men of the Reformation. But when, at a later period, the movement was checked, and the Bible was, in a one-sided manner, in opposition to Catholic principles, asserted as the source of Christian knowledge, the same defect was found equally in both Churches; neither in the one nor the other did the formal principle stand in living connexion with the material, and in both the idea of Inspiration was evidently carried to too great a length. In Luther’s Reformation it was a striking characteristic, that everything proceeded from Christ as the central point, and the reformatory development extended only so far as the connexion with the material prin¬ ciple could be shown, so that much of the ancient was left, and the dogmatic tendency remained predominant, while the application to ecclesiastical life continued proportionately sub- SCRIPTURE AND TRADITION. 023 ordinate. On the other hand, under Zwingli and Calvin the Reformatory tendency did not proceed with the same moderation from this central point, but from the beginning there was a marked effort to reform everything by means of it, and to realize the idea of the kingdom of God—to restore its original forms, and to remove everything which was at variance with it. Hence the attempt to frame the Church on the Apostolic model. As far as the idea of the kingdom of God predominated, the stronger influence of the Old Testa¬ ment found also a point of connexion. A variety of outward conditions, especially the political relations under which the Reformation was developed, thus came into consideration. While the principle of acknowledging the supreme authority of Holy Writ was in this way developed in Luther’s Reformation, it was first of all scientifically stated by Melancthon on the occasion of the Leipsig Disputation, in which Eck attacked a statement made by that reformer in one of his letters which thus acquired notoriety. He says* that it is a duty to abide by the pure and simple mean¬ ing of Holy Writ, as, indeed, heavenly truths are always the simplest; this meaning is to be found by comparing Holy Writ with itself. On this account we study Holy Writ, in order to pass judgment on all human opinions by it as an universal touchstone. As the Catholic Church made the Interpretation of Holy Writ dependent on Tradition, and could prove many doctrines only by the latter, the controversy principally turned on the doctrine of the supreme source of knowledge, and the contrary tenet especially was brought under discussion at the Council of Trent. As it was there treated, in a.d. 1546, no little perplexity arose how the relation between Tradition and Holy Writ was to be determined. A Carmelite monk, Antonio Marinari, delivered a remarkable address.f * Contra Eckium Defensio, Corpus Reformatorum, ed Brotschneider, t. i. p. 113.—Puto non temere fieri, sicuti sententiis Sancti Patres variant, quemadmodum solet (solent?) ut judice scriptura recipiantur; non (ne?) ipsorum nempe variantibus judiciis, scriptura vim patiatur. Quandoquidem unus aliquis et simplex scripturse sensus est, ut et coelestis veritas simplicissima est, quern collatis scripturis e filo ductuque orationis licet assequi. In hoc enim jubemur philosophari in scripturis divinis, ut kominum sententias decretaque ad ipsas ceu ad Lydiam lapidem exigamus. f Paul Sarpi Geschichte des Trident. Concils, Uebersetzung von Rambach, Till. i. p. 172. 624 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. There was certainly this difference, he remarked, between the Old and New Testament, that in the latter the doctrine was no longer confined to the letter, but propagated itself as a living spirit. The Church existed before the Scriptures, but yet Christ did not forbid his Apostles to commit his doctrine to writing ; and as soon as a written exposition of it existed along with the verbal annunciation, both sources of knowledge must possess equal authority. But if two sets of Articles of Faith were proposed, the greatest perplexity would arise, for then a criterion must be sought to distinguish the two ; and how could it be explained why the Apostles had written down one thing, and not another ? How could it be supposed that the Apostles were prevented from writing down anything which was truth? Hence, like the Fathers, we could hold nothing firmly respecting the relation of Scripture and Tra¬ dition, and only make use of Tradition when it was needful. This gave great offence. In the fourth Session of the Council* it was decreed that the source of knowledge for Truth relating to Faith and Discipline was contained in the Bible and the oral Tradition which was handed down from Christ’s mouth by the Apostles ; or, under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, it is come down from them to us, from hand to hand; that all things relating to Dogma and Morals are to be drawn from the Holy Scriptures and Tradition, which is evermore pre¬ served in its integrity by constant Succession. Both are to be received with equal piety. In the Evangelical Church, on the contrary. Tradition could only avail as a historical witness of the Truth, but required another criterion, the divine Word in Holy Writ, to distinguish between the True and the False. Luther expressly guarded himself against being misunderstood, as if he wished to introduce a new legislation for the Church, * Sessio iv. Decretum de Canonicis Scriptioris: hanc veritatem et disciplinam contineri in libris scriptis et sine scripto traditionibus, qu® ad ipsius Christi ore ab Apostolis acceptte aut ab ipsis Apostolis Spiritu Sancto dictante, quasi per manus traditoe, ad nos usque pervenerunt ; orthodoxorum Patrum exempla secreta, omnes libros tam veteris quam novi testamenti, cum utruisque unus Deus sit auctor, nec non tradi- tiones ipsas, turn ad fidem, turn ad mores pertinentes, tamquam vel oretenus a Christo vel a Spiritu Sancto dictatas et continua successione in Ecclesia Catholica conservata, pari pietatis affectu ac reverentia guscipit et veneratur. SCRIPTURE AND CREEDS. 625 independent of Holy Writ, with the Confessions, which always pre-supposed the importance of Holy Writ as the only normative source. Also, in the Formula Concordia , when there had been already a departure in practice from free prin¬ ciples, and too much had been ceded to Church Authority (a limitation which the Formula itself promoted), the same principle was thus expressed :* Holy Scripture is the only Rule by which all teachers and doctrines are to be tried ; all Church Symbols are only witnesses for the Faith. This principle was firmly retained in theory, though in practice it was not adhered to; but unconsciously a Catholic element again mingled with it. Only the extreme defenders of the symbolical Books went so far against the freer tendency of Pietism in the seventeenth Century, that they ascribed even to the symbolical Books a certain Inspiration, in order to deduce from it their infallibility. But yet the Catholic doctrine of Tradition contained a truth which even the Evangelical Church could admit, the acknowledgment of a continued development of the Christian consciousness, the importance of an historical witness for the development of the Truth, only that in it Christian and un- Christian Tradition went side by side. The Evangelical Church had paid too little attention to the historical con¬ nection with Antiquity. On the other hand; reactions arose, especially that of George Calixtus, - ! who wished to lead * Form. Concordiae Epitome i. 1.—Credimus, confitemur et docemus unieam regulam et normam, secundum quam omnia dogmata, omnisque Doctores aestimari et judicari aporteat, nullam omnino aiiam esse quam prophetica et apostolica scripta cum veteris turn novi Testamenti, sicut scriptum est Ps. cxix. 105; Gal. i. 8 —2. Reliqua vero sive patrum sive neotericorum scripta, quocunque veniant nomine, sacris literis nequaquam sunt aequiparanda, sed universa illis ita subjicienda sunt, ut alia ratione non recipiantur, nisi testium loco, qui doceant, quad etiam post apostolorum tempora et in quibus partibus orbis cloctrina ilia prophetarum et apostolorum sincerior conservata sit.—8. Caetera autem symbola et alia scripta, quorum paullo ante mentionem fecimus, non obtinent auctoritatem judicis ; haec etiam dignitas solis sacris literis debetur, sed dumtaxat pro religione nostra testimonium dicunt eamque explicant, &c. t De Prrecepuis Christianse Religionis Capitibus, 1613; De Causa hodierni Odii hhilosophise et Solidae Eruditionis, 1619; Epitome Theo¬ logize Positivae, 1619 ; Epitome Theologiae Moralis, 1634 ; De Auctoritate Antiquitatis Ecclesiasticae, 1639; De Universalis Primaevae Ecclesiae Auctoritate, 1640; Scripta Facientia ad Colloquium Thoruni. 1645; s s 626 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. back in the historical direction, prompted by the desire to promote pacific measures as far as the controversial spirit that had hitherto prevailed would allow. Calixtus believed that the common foundation of the Christian Truth was to be found in the Tradition of the first five Centuries, to which existing controversies might be referred. He developed his opinion in his remarks on the Commonitorium of Yincentitjs Lerinensis, edited by him in 1629, whose principles he wished to revive. These statements formed the subject of the Syncretic Controversy. Amidst the attacks made upon him, Calixtus confined himself to asserting that the Holy Scrip¬ tures alone must be regarded as the prime authority, trust¬ worthy in itself, and Tradition as subordinate. But his theory of Tradition then was something wavering and yet arbitrary, since it was illogical to limit himself to the recognition of the first five centuries. But his Statements might have led to an examination of the Idea of Tradition. In the Reformed Church a similar reaction led back to the more historical view. It proceeded from James Armi- nius,* and found its chief supporter in Hugo GROTius.f On account of his Irenical tendencies, the latter took the same path in his remarks on the Irenical opinion of the Dutch theologian, George Cassander, { and in his Via ad Habitum, 1645; De Tolerantia Reformatoram circa Qusestiones inter ipsos et Augustanam Confessionem Professos Controversas Consultatio: Desiderium et Studium Concordiee Eeclesiasticse, 1650; Henke, Georg Calixtus u. seine Zeit, 1853. Ueber die Synkretiscben Streitigkeiten Abr. Calov. Historia Syncretistica. d. i. Christ Wohlbegriindetes Bedenken lib. d. Kirchenfrieden u. Christ. Einigkeit. Gress. 1682, 85, 4to. J. G. Walch, Religionstreitigkeiten der Luther. Kirche i. p. 216. Planck, Geschichte des Protestantischen Theologie von der Concordien- formel u. s. w. p. 90. H. Schmid, Gesch. der Synkretist. Streitigkeiten, 1846. W. Gass, Calixtus u. der Synkretismus, Berlin, 1846. * Arminii Opp. Theologica, Lugd. Bat. 1629. 4to. G. Brandt. Vita Arminii, ed. Moshemius, Bonon. 1726. The Life and Death of James Arminius and Episcopius. London, 1772. Brandt, Historie der Refor- matie en Ontrendt de Nederlanden, Amsterd. 1671—1704, 4 voll. Jacob Regenborg, Historie der Remonstrantur, Amsterd. 1774, 3 Thle. Deutsch, Lemgo, 1781. f Heinr. Luden, Hugo Grotius nach semen Schicksalen und Schriften, Berlin, 1806. Opp. Theol. Amsterd. 1679. t De Articulis Religionis inter Catholicos et Protestantes Controverts ad Ferdinandum I. et Maximilianum II Consultatio, Colon. 1566, ed. H. Grotius, Lugd. Batav. 1642. SOCfNIANISM. 027 pacem ecclesiastic am. He himself declared that Tradition was a source of knowledge, but that it was more difficult and toilsome to elicit the truth from it. The essential doctrines of Salvation are no doubt contained fully in the New Testa¬ ment. Since all truth rests on the evidence of two witnesses, both are to be made use of. But all these Statements were not sufficiently certain, and did not lead to a more exact investigation. In modern times a more historical tendency has called forth doubt respecting the genuineness of certain writings of the Canon, which have had the effect, on the other side, of enhancing the authority of Tradition. But still only thus much has been the result, that though Tra¬ dition has weight as a witness, yet a higher source of know¬ ledge is required, in order to distinguish between Christian Truth and what is foreign to it. In reference to Socinianism,* the question may be pro¬ posed, whether it agrees with this formal principle of the Reformation, or whether Season does not occupy in it the place of the supreme source of Knowledge. Indeed, if we judge of this System by particular doctrines, it may seem that it rests on rationalistic principles. Yet it will appear that it does not proceed alone from such a tendency, but can be developed only on the supposition of a source given by Revelation. It is here of great importance to distinguish the principles and their application, what is consciously expressed, and what unconsciously lies at the foundation. The best explanation of this tendency will be obtained from the genetic development of the doctrine. Socinianism agreed with the Reformation in its negations, in waging war against t Church authority and Scholasticism, and likewise in its prac¬ tical interests. But in the Practical it set out from quite a different point; it sprung, not from a distinct Christian prin¬ ciple, but only from a general religious interest, and hence * Bibliotheca Fratrum Polonorum, Irenopoli (Amsterdam), 1656, 8 t. f. Catechesmus Racoviensis, ed. Oeder, Francf. 1739. J. G. Watch, der Streitigkeiten Augserhalb der Lutherischen Kirche, Th. i. 562. Rambach, Einleitung in der Religionsstreitigkeiten der Evangelischen Kirche mit den Socinianem, Koburg. 1753. Ziegler, Lehr. Begriff der Socinianer in Henkes neuem Magazin, Bd. 4, p. 201. 0. Fock der Socinianismus in der Gesammtentwicklung des Christ.. Geistes nach seinem Histor. Verlauf u. Lehrbegriff, Kiel, 1845. Baur, Lehre von der Dreieinigkeit, iii 164. Dorner, Lehre v. der Person Christi, ii. 751, s s 2 628 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. was not intimately connected with Christian doctrine; the formal principle was, therefore, not grounded in the material. All that appeared of practical importance was connected with the juridical point of view. Its founder was LjElitjs Soci- nus '* (died a.d. 1562), a priest of Sienna, from whom his nephew, Faustus SociNust (died a.d. 1604), received its fundamental doctrines. He studied the Scriptures from a juridical interest ; he wished to establish his jurisprudence firmly on the principles of divine right, as the source of all human equity. This fact is instructive in forming a judg¬ ment of his tendency, for it is evident that such an inte¬ rest was not suited to enable him to arrive at a deeper view of Christianity, When he examined the Scriptures he disco¬ vered the contradictions between the Bible and the existing Church. The prevalent Scepticism in Italy, the Deism and Atheism, had not left him untouched in personal intercourse with men who were infected with these errors ; yet the reli¬ gious faith was sufficiently powerful in him to form a counter¬ poise to the consequences of doubt. He, therefore, never fell into total Unbelief, but he became perplexed about the Faith he had hitherto held. The Church doctrine could not help him, and he endeavoured now to form a doctrinal scheme of his own. There was no distinct central point of his own religious life from which he started; he examined the Scriptures on a regular plan for the original doctrine, took journeys, and formed acquaintance with foreign Theologians. His juridical point of view and his cold intellectualism placed him in opposition to deeper speculation and the mys¬ tical Element ; what was more intensely Christian was excluded. He had no internally grounded supernatural Standpoint, but a one-sided Understanding, which outwardly submitted to Supernaturalism, and a one-sided intellectual Supernaturalism, which contained the germ of Rationalism. Hence the supernatural Element, wdiich w ? as added only from without, needed only to be set aside, and Rationalism took its * Orelli Liilius Socinus Baseler wissensch. Zeitschr. Bb. 3, Heft. 3. Trechsel Lalio Sozeni und die Antitrinitaner seiner Zeit, Heidelb. 1844. + Opp. Irenopoli, 1656, 2 t. Vita Faust Socini (by Samuel Orcipco- vius), 1636, 4to., and Opp. F. Socinii, t. i. Joshua Toulmin, Memoirs of the Life, Character, and Writings of F. Socinus, London, 1'777, 8vo. SOCINIANISM. 629 place. It was altogether an empirical standpoint, so far lrom Idealism, that it formed its exact opposite, arid the relationship to Ebionitism was much greater than to Gnos¬ ticism. In the work of Faustus Socinus, De auctoritate Scriptures, Sacra, which he w T rote in behalf of Supernatu¬ ralism, we may recognise an extravagant view of it. He here asserts with earnestness that the doctrines of Chris¬ tianity can only be derived from the Holy Scriptures ; as to what concerns human Reason, it is, in his esteem, very sub- ordinate in reference to matters which proceed from Reve¬ lation. In the second chapter he shows that Religion is in nowise a matter of Nature and Reason; that if there is a true Religion, it could only be a revealed one. Socinus did not merely distinguish between the doctrines of Religion derived from Reason, and those from Revelation, or natural and positive, but he went farther; he maintained that there was no Natural Religion whatever, and that all religious Tra¬ dition was to be traced to a divine Revelation as its basis. He appealed to the account of Missionaries in the Brazils, that tribes were found without any Religion. The denial of all Natural Religion led him to the forced interpretation of those passages in the Epistle to the Romans in which the opposite is affirmed. That nevertheless he recognised a moral Law independent of Revelation, a power of Conscience, which could even exist where men knew nothing of God, has an important bearing on the whole dogmatic standpoint of Socinianism. On this scheme the Ethical and the Religious are without any internal connexion; and as Religion comes only from without, and is met by no religious nature in Man, to which it can attach itself, that place is not to be found in the Spirit, in which all Religion must develope itself. Henc-e it is self-evident that Dogmatics are quite extraneous to human nature. The relation in which this Supernaturalism stood to Reason will be shown by the following statements. The Socinian John Creel, Preacher and Professor in Cracow (died a.d. 1633), says:* “Mysteries are indeed exalted., above Reason, but they do not overturn ( evertunt ) it; they by no means extinguish its light, but only perfect it.” Another, Martin Ruartjs, had a memorable controversy on this sub¬ ject with the Lutheran Theologian, Abraham Calovius. The * De Deo et ejus Attributis. 630 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. former combated the assertion of Reason being made cap tive to the obedience of Faith, and regarded it as founded on a false interpretation of Scripture. What must become of us, he said, if Reason were fettered ? There is no other organ but this given by God, in order to find out the meaning of Holy Writ when it has been disturbed by false exposition. Here Reason appears only as the organ of Man for Scripture Inquiry and exposition.* But if from the Socinian stand¬ point it was maintained, along with the Evangelical Church, that the Bible contained nothing contradictory to reason, its advocates went very arbitrarily to work in the application of this canon. Many axioms of a contracted Understanding were laid down by the Socinians as undeniable laws of Reason ; and since they had determined that nothing in Revelation was at variance with these axioms, they inter¬ preted the Bible in a forced manner. Among the axioms which Andrew WissowATiusf laid down in his dogmatical work, and which, as he said, nothing in Scripture could con¬ tradict, are some which would only be received as axioms from the standpoint of Socinianism. The transition to Ra¬ tionalism was already visible. Everywhere the consequences made themselves felt, that the formal principle was laid down, not under the suppositions of the corruption of human nature, of the disturbance of the Reason by Sin, the need of Re¬ demption, the consciousness that the reason is first made free by Regeneration—suppositions which are made by the Evangelical Church ; and according to the Socinian view, it required only the Understanding, not an immediate religious consciousness, in order to understand the Holy Scriptures, and to deduce from them the doctrines of the Christian Faith. Faith must here proceed only from a logical conviction, with¬ out a union of the Intellectual and the Practical., It was a one-sided subjective tendency which made its appear¬ ance in Socinianism. Here it took the path of the Under¬ standing, and led to Rationalism ; but it could also take that of the Feelings, and then assumed the form of Mysticism. In the Mysticism of the Middle Ages we already distinguish * Zeltner, Historia Crypto-Socinismi Altorphinse Academise Infesti, Lips. 1729. f (Arsenius Sophianus) Religio Rationalis sive de Rationis Judicio in Controversiis etiam Theologicis Adhibendo, 1685. MEDIA! VAL MYSTICISM. 631 between a reaction of the Christian consciousness and a certain Rationalism in the form of a pantheistic and idealistic Mys¬ ticism, the injurious effects of which were only turned aside and checked by the Reformation. It now first came forward as a power of positive religious enthusiasm. In the Reforma¬ tion we recognise, indeed, two tendencies operating in harmo¬ nious connexion, the reaction of a subjective living Chris¬ tianity, in opposition to Scholasticism, and the outward mechanism of the opus operatum , which shows itself in the doctrine of Faith; and, on the other hand, the reference to the objective of the Divine Word, which was necessarily con¬ nected with the idea of Faith ; but in the religious ferment which was excited at the Reformation, and in the strong opposition of the subjective religious consciousness against the lifeless objectivity, it happened that the subjective ten¬ dency separated itself from the objective and became one¬ sided. We find the first symptoms of it during the residence of Luther at the Wartburg, a.d. 1520, among the Zwickau Prophets, # and since that time this subjective one-sidedness has frequently made itself felt in the form of Mysticism, f Men came forward who charged the Reformers with intro¬ ducing a new Bibliolatry, who lightly esteemed the Bible, and exalted the inward Light above it. Thomas MunzerJ de- cla. M that if God had wished to convert Man by a book, he could have caused a Bible to fall from Heaven. We may even at this time see a rationalistic germ springing out of this Mysticism. Luther mentions § that about a.d. 1525, at Wit¬ tenberg, people were to be met with who maintained that the Holy Spirit was nothing but the natural Reason. This ten¬ dency is more clearly represented in Theobald Thamer,|| * Schneider, Bibliothek der Kirchengeschichte, ii., iii. Corpus Reform, i. 533. + Erbkam, Gesehichte der Protest. Sekten. im Zeitalter der Re¬ formation, 1848. + Hiatorie Thoma Munzers von Ph. Melanchthon. Luther’s Werke von Walch. xvi. 199. Leben, Schriften, und Lehren Thoma Munzers von G. Th. Strobel, 1795. L. v. Baczko in Woltwann’s Zeitschr. fur Gesehichte und Politik, 1840. § Luther’s Briefe von de Wette, ii. 641.—Novum genus prophetarum ex Antwerp!s hie habeo asserentium, Spiritum Sanctum nihil aliud esse quam ingenium et rationem naturalem. || C. A. Salig, Gesehichte der Ausburger Confession, Bd. 3. Neander G32 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. who was a native of Alsatia, ancl for a long time Professor at Marburg, where he made himself noted for his extreme Supranaturalism and polemic zeal; in the Smalcald War he accompanied the Hessian army as military chaplain. By the immorality which he discovered in his intercourse with the rude soldiery he saw that he was deceived in his ideal expecta¬ tions of the Reformation, became dissatisfied with it, and laid the blame especially on the Lutheran doctrine of Justification. Engaged in controverting this, he turned more and more against the formal principle. He now advanced in a mystical, rationalistic direction, various elements of which existed in his mind. Instead of the authority of the divine Word as the supreme source of religious Belief, he laid down three sources: the Creature, the Spiritual Conscience, and the true Holy Writ. The defect of the Lutherans was, that they had only one source; the Conscience is the Deus Revelatus , it is Christ in our hearts ; the letter without us cannot testify of the Truth within us apart from the Conscience; in the Con¬ science is the living Word, and the Divinity of Christ; all the truth of the Gospel is already founded in it. He appealed to this fact, that Christian precept: Do not to another what thou wouldst not have done to thyself, which is the chief maxim of Christian morals, is also to be derived from the Conscience. The question arises, what need is there of Revelation, if everything already exists in the Conscience ? He says : The heart of Man is like a flint, from which the hidden fire must be struck out. Nothing new is brought to it, but what is already in it is aroused. Accordingly, Historical Christianity is not to be absolutely rejected, but its special value consists in bringing to open view what exists in the human soul. Christ is only the example of the highest virtue. The inward , Word of Conscience lies already in the heart; the oral Word and the Letter only confirm it, in order that, we may be without excuse at the Last Day. To Phtlip, Landgrave of Hesse, he wrote:* “Although animals cannot speak as w T e do, yet I am sure that your Grace better understands the cry of the hounds than if some pne read Hebrew.” His oppo¬ sition against the Reformation and the rough treatment he Theob. Thamer, der Repriisentant und Vorganger Moderner Geistes* richtimg, 1842. * Th. Rommel, Philipp der Grossmuthige, 1830, Bd. 3. GEORGE FOX. 633 experienced at last led him back to Catholicism. He could easily attach himself to the Catholic Anthropology, and his hatred of the Reformation made him welcome to the Catholic party. He now represented the Tradition of the Catholic Church be to a progressive development of Christianity, which, according to his notions, was like a progressive revelation of Reason, and accused the Reformation of setting itself in oppo¬ sition to this progress. Mysticism was afterwards called forth repeatedly by the onesidedness of literal orthodoxy. It assumed in England the most systematic shape, and was embodied in a remarkable phenomenon—the sect of the Quakers.* England, during and after the Revolution in the reign of Charles I., was in the greatest religious ferment, in which the most opposite ten¬ dencies germinated, from a stiff adherence to formalism, to a completely spiritual internal tendency ; rationalistic, deistic, pantheistic, and mystic elements, were found co-existing with High Churchism. During this period lived George Fox,t a shepherd, who, while engaged in this occupation, gave himself up to religious meditation. He adopted the notion, that all controversies are only owing to men’s withdrawing from the Inward, and attending to the Outw 7 ard. The sect, of which he was the founder, developed this sentiment, and carried out, consequentially, the doctrine of the Inward Light. All other sources of knowledge were subordinate to this. All external order w 7 as excluded in the constitution of the Church. * Catechesis et Confessio, quse Continet Narrationem Dogmatum, quse Creduntur ab Ecclesiis Quacerorum, Rotterd. 1676. German, Leipzig, 1752. W. Penn, A Summary of the History, Doctrine, and Discipline of Friends, Lond. 1692. Evans, An Exposition of the Faith of the Religious Society of Friends in the Fundamental Doctrines of the Christian Religion, selected from their early Writings, Philadelphia and York, 1829. Rules of Discipline of the Religious Society of Friends, with Advices, being Extracts from the Minutes and Epistles of the early Meetings held in Loudon from its first Institution, London, 1783, 3 ed. 1834. Gurney, Observations on the Religious Peculiarities of the Society of Friends, London, 1824. Observations on the Dis¬ tinguishing Views and Practices of the Society of Friends, 7 ed. Lond. 1834. Croesii Hist. Quakeriana, Amst. 2 ed. 1696. Sewel, Gesch. vom Ursprung, Zunehmen und Fortgang der Christen so Quaker genanut werden, Holland, Amst, 1717. t Collection of Christian Epistles written by G. Fox, London, 1698, 2 vols. fol. Journal of the Life, Travels, and bufferings of G. Fox, London, 1691. 634 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. Robert Barclay* gave development to these principles. He says that highest source of knowledge—Divine Revela¬ tion and Illumination—is something internal, trustworthy, and self-evident, which necessitates well-ordered, susceptible Reason to accept it by the indwelling evidence, not less than the principles of the universal truths of Reason in earthly things.f Holy Writ is a declaratio fontis , not the original source of knowing the Truth; it is no adequate rule for doctrine and morals, though it gives a true and credible testi¬ mony to the original source of knowledge. It is subordinate to the Holy Spirit, from whom it derives its excellence.]; It is worthy of notice, that he argues for the subordination of Scripture to the Inward Light, on the same grounds as Catholicism pleads for the necessity of Tradition. He points to the many contradictory interpretations of the Bible, which require a higher criterion, and this can only be found in the inward Divine Word. The subjective tendency, if carried out to its consequences, might lead to entirely giving up the Objectivity of Divine Revelation. There are two parties among the Quakers, one of which, forming the majority, firmly holds the peculiar Christian doctrines given in Reve¬ lation ; the other, represented particularly by the American, Elias Hicks, opposes this acknowledgment as a restraint in matters of Religion, and inclines to the Deistical tendency.§ A phenomenon, which appeared in Germany, on the border of the ancient, and of a new section of the development of Theology, is deserving of notice ; it was a subjective Ra¬ tionalism, veiled in onesided Mysticism, the omen of a future Idealism, which denies the reality of History. This we find in an enthusiast, with whose character we have first become acquainted in modern times, Daniel Muller. || He was a * Theologia vere Christian;® Apologia, 1676; Latin and English. f Thesis 2.—For this Divine Revelation and Inward Illumination is that which is evident and clear of itself, forcing by its own evidence and clearness the well-disposed understanding to assent, irresistibly moving the same thereunto, even as the common principles of natural truths move and incline the mind to a natural assent. X Thesis 2. § Bennet, The History of Dissenters during the last Thirty Years, 1808—38, London, 1839. Evangel. Kirchenzeitung, 1838, p. 806; 1839, p. 782; 1840, p. 141. || Keller, Daniel Muller, Religioser Schwarmer des Achtzehut* Jahrh, Leipzig, 1834. Ilgen. Ztschr. fur Histor. Theologie, 1834. DANIEL MULLER 635 man of a low condition in life, and born a.d. 1716, in Nassau, at the time of the Pietist movements, when various indications of an inward religious life made their appearance in Germany, and many opposing circumstances excited a longing for a new development of the Church. At first he attached himself to the secondary effects of Pietism, and busied himself with Jacob Boehme, and other Mystics. For a long time also he was engaged in historical studies, and his Mysticism became connected with an historical Scepticism. At this juncture also, there was the commencement of a rationalistic reaction, especially by the appearance of the Wolfenbuttle Fragments. But neither of the two parties—neither the Church nor the Rationalistic—suited him. He wished to maintain the autho¬ rity of the Bible against the new Scepticism, and to insist on its Inspiration in the most unqualified sense. But, on the other hand, he was not satisfied with Orthodoxy; he was led to a peculiar religious Idealism, by which he wished to esta¬ blish a harmony of all religions. An original Revelation was at the basis of all of them, the symbols of which had been misunderstood. Everything in the Old Testament and the New was to be understood symbolically ; it was the garb of God’s inner Revelation, and of the eternal revelation of the divine Logos. Everything historical, as such, is untrue; it is only the clothing of ideal truth. In this view of the Life of Christ, although proceeding on quite different principles, he was the forerunner of the modern mythic school, and combated the belief in the historical miracles of Christ, on grounds very similar to those brought forward by Strauss. If such miracles, he says, as feeding the five thousand, had actually happened, all the Jews would have received Christ, and would not have crucified him. To those who wished for such miracles, Jesus said : “ This adulterous generation seek after signs and wonders, but none shall be given them, save the sign of the Prophet Jonah,” wdiich meant the three days of Christ in the literal grave. Gradually, as reason became more autonomic, it threw off the mystic and supernaturalist garb, and claimed to be the only source of the knovdedge of the Faith Thus Rationalism openly appeared. This tendency first attached itself to Theology, in the Reformed Church of Holland. It was in the seventeenth century, when the Arminian Controversy had C3(3 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. given birth to a spirit of free inquiry, in opposition to Ortho¬ doxy. To this was added the influence of Des Cartes and Spinoza, and the criticism of Bayle. But the name of Rationalism, which was employed about this time, had a dif¬ ferent sense. From the standpoint of the old dogmatic Scholasticism, everything appeared as Theologia Rationalis, which deviated from this slavish adherence to the letter. This term, moreover, was used to designate the tendency of diose who, in fact, adopted the principle, that everything must be derived from reason. Thus that profound mystic, Peter Poiret,* designates the standpoint of an Idolatry of Reason, which opposed all Revelation, and denied all inward and outward experience of it,—which made Religion to consist in knowledge, under the names of icleistce et rationalistce. A very influential work in this development was published by a physician, Lewis Meier, a scholar of Spinoza, entitled Philo- sophia script nr (B sacrce inter pres The arguments which Catholics and Quakers had employed against the supreme authority of Scripture, were here applied in favour of Reason, which was held up as the only sure criterion in Religious Controversies. Thence the tendency spread to Germany, at first, gradually; afterwards, owing to the freer religious ten¬ dency which was occasioned by the Pietist movements, and through the influence of the Wolfian philosophy, the soil was prepared, and it reached here to a more logical complete¬ ness, and now turned itself against both Orthodoxy and Pietism. In the development of Rationalism, two modifi¬ cations chiefly are to be distinguished : in the first place, empirical Rationalism, which saw in Christianity a certain temporary clothing of universal religious truths, and to which Revelation was only a training-school for the truth, an ar¬ rangement of Providence, in order to lead Reason to a know¬ ledge of it. It valued Christianity, therefore, as the most complete clothing of Natural Religion, but ignored its his¬ torical character. Only the acknowledgment of such religious truths remained, which, in this form, had become matters of * Cogitationes Rationales de Deo, Anima et Malo, 1677, 1685, 1715 ; directed againt Spinozism. On bis writings, see J. G. Walch, Einlei- tung in die Religionsstreitigkeiten Ausserkalb der Lutkeriscken Kirche, Thl. iv. p. 911. t Amst. 1666. THE DOCTRINE OF INSPIRATION. 637 consciousness only through the influence of Revelation, such as faith in a personal God, in moral freedom, and in personal Immortality. Against this standpoint, a fundamental study of History, which taught a more correct knowledge of Christi¬ anity, a deeper view of the religious nature of Man, and a deeper speculation, must equally be opposed. On the other hand, Rationalism could not fail to attain to greater consis¬ tency ; for in it there was the struggle of Reason to bring its subjectivity to its highest pitch, and everything which claimed to be acknowledged as an external authority, was a stone of stumbling to it. Hence Rationalism must reach a point where Reason would recognise only itself in all things. In its consequential development, not merely in Theology, but also in Philosophy, it overstepped the deistical form, in which the older Rationalism was confined, and became Pantheism, Thus it was the result of this process, that all existence was melted down in the crucible of a self-idolizing Reason. THE SPECIAL HISTORY OF DOGMAS. A. THE INTRODUCTORY DOGMAS. THE DOCTRINE OF INSPIRATION. As the Scholastic Theology was occupied so little with the Interpretation of the Bible, it was not led to the more exact discussion of this Dogma, which was still so undefined. But freer exegetical inquiry about the time of the Reformation led to it, in a similar manner to what had already taken place in the Antiochian School. To the germs of a new development which are to be found in Erasmus of Rotterdam, belong also his sentiments relating to Inspiration. He had been attacked by Eck, on account of certain expressions in his commentary on Matthew, respecting the defects in the language of the Apostles. Eck proceeded on the assumption of a verbal Inspiration, and charged Erasmus with heresy, when he pro fessed love and esteem for him. Erasmus justified himself in a letter, written a.d. 1528.* He did not deny the mira¬ culous gift of tongues, yet he did not admit that all their knowledge of languages proceeded from that. Why should a knowledge be granted to them in a supernatural manner, * Epp. ii. 26. * 638 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. which they could attain in a natural way ? He found marks of the latter, in their mode of speaking Greek ; we ought not to require that the Holy Ghost should teach them the purest Greek. It was not our business to prescribe in what manner the Spirit should operate on their minds. He so guided the sacred writers, that they still remained men; and we do not ascribe all things in the Apostles equally to miracle. Erasmus, therefore, would distinguish between the divine agency and human conditionality. Christ, he says, allowed his disciples to err, even after they had received the illumination of the Holy Spirit; only not to the injury of the doctrines of Faith. How do you know whether Christ did not wish to reserve for himself alone the honour of entire freedom from error ? The discussions excited at first no wider influence, for the great movement of the Reformation was too much controlled by dogmatic interests, to allow of progress in the way just indicated. But Luther, on the other hand, arrived at a freer view of the idea of Inspiration.* The positive religious interest gave him this freedom; he set out from the doctrine of Justification by Faith, and since he firmly grasped this vital principle, he formed a judgment on other points with so much greater freedom, which corresponded to his unprejudiced truthfulness. From that central point was developed not a mere intellectual, but a dogmatic tendency, of deeper vitality. He had not, indeed, leisure and time, fully to develope his idea of Inspiration, but he makes it sufficiently intelligible in many scattered expressions. In his preface to the Epistle of James, he saysif What Christ does not teach, that is not apostolic, even though Peter or Paul preach it ; and again, what Christ preaches, that is apostolic, even if Judas and Herod preached it. Therefore, the more or less anything treats of Christ himself, his doctrine or his work, so much greater or less importance has it for Christianity as doctrine, for Christ himself is the central point of doctrine, since He is the ground of salvation. The more anything refers itself to Him so much the more is the communication of the divine spirit * to be acknowledged therein.J On the same epistle, he says : Wherefore the Epistle of James is a downright strawy Epistle * Bretschneider, Luther an unsere Zeit, p. 190. + Opp. Walcli, t. xiv. p. 149. Erlanger Ausg lxiii. p. 115 and 157. X See Yorrede auf das Neue Testament, p. 105. LUTHER ON INSPIRATION. 089 (compared with John’s Gospel and the Epistles of Paul and Peter), for it has nothing evangelical in it. The Gospel of John, the Epistles of Paul, especially the Epistle to the Romans, and the first Epistle of Peter, he pronounces to be the very kernel and marrow of all the books of Holy Scrip¬ ture ; for in these there is not much of mighty deeds and miracles, but it is shown admirably how Faith in Christ over¬ comes Sin, Death, and Hell. We would not deny that from this point of view he allows himself to err in several onesided judgments on the Books of the Canon, but the significance is always important which the material principle of the Reform¬ ation had in them for the apprehension of Holy Writ. Hs also lays a stress on the Human in the Apostles, when he says of the Council of the Apostles at Jerusalem, that the Holy Spirit allowed James to make a false step in some things.* The Prophets, he says, had, without doubt, studied Moses, and the latter Prophets the earlier, and their good thoughts inspired by the Holy Spirit, were written in a book; but if hay, straw, and wood, were sometimes used by these faithful teachers and inquirers, and they did not build with pure silver, gold, and precious stones, still the Foundation remained; the fire of that day would destroy the rest, as Paul says (1 Cor. iii. 12, 13).t On the quotations from the Old Testament, in the address of Stephen, he gives his opinion that it is un¬ necessary to take so much trouble to bring the dates of Stephen into agreement with Moses. Stephen. was no historian, but rested satisfied with the fact, that this history had been given by Moses, and did not trouble himself about particular circumstances.J Also, he did not entirely overlook the irregularities of languages arising from human influences. He finds them in the Epistle to the Galatians, and says : But it pleased the Holy Spirit to retain such ; for Paul speaks with great earnestness, and a person in that state cannot pay attention to arrange all his words by the rules of art.§ If this track had been followed, a sounder idea of Inspi- * Walch, viii. p. 1042. + Vorrede zu Wenzeslaus Lenk’s Annotationes zu den fiinf Buchern Mosis. Walch. xiv. 170. Erlang, lxiii. 379. t Zu Apostelgesch. vii. Band i. 1160. £ Oommentar zum Galaterbrief, Walch, viii. 1737 040 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. ration and a corresponding system of Interpretation might have been formed. But the dogmatic development of the Protestant Church did not follow this impulse; since, in opposition to the Roman Church, they firmly held the Holy Scriptures to be the only source of the knowledge of the faith, they were wont to regard it as a rigid Code, and took no account of its mode of origination, and the peculiarities belonging to it. A onesided supranaturalism was added, and led to the mechanical idea of Inspiration, which regarded the writers as blind organs of the Holy Spirit. Grammatolatry and a more unbending Dogmatism prevailed; the Bible was treated as a dogmatical book—the Human, the Manifold, and the His¬ torical, were left misunderstood. This, again, produced a re¬ action, which proceeded to a denial of Inspiration altogether. This reaction, which occasioned fresh investigations of the idea of Inspiration, proceeded from two quarters: first, from the formal principle, since unprejudiced study and examination of Scripture effected a modification, and then from the material principle, when, from the inmost centre of religious conscious¬ ness, Holy Writ and its origination were viewed. In the one case, there was a onesided intellectual tendency; in the other, a vital religious feeling. The first was true of the Socinians. Faustus Socinus was far from lowering the authority of the Bible: he even composed, in vindication of the Scriptures, his treatise, JDe auctoritate scriptures sacrce * Only by an immediate divine Revelation could the truth, as he thought, be communicated to the Sacred Writers. He appeals to 1 Cor. vii., where Paul distinguishes what he said from what Christ said. But he believed that the operation of the Divine Spirit might not equally refer to everything. In reference to the His¬ torical, the love of Truth and the Memory of the Apostles were sufficient for faithful tradition.t He found nothing to * Opp. t. i. + Repugnantiae porro aut diversitates, seu verse, seu quae videri tantum possint, quae in rebus sunt parvi momenti, eae sunt quae perti¬ nent ad historiam. Qua in re aliud nihil est opus, nisi ea videre, quae scripsit Joannes, qui Chrysostomus est dictus, in Prooemio commenta- riorum suorum in Evang. Matthaei. Ubi —plene huic quorundam objectioni respondet, contra auctoritatem nominatiin quatuor Evange* listarum et fidera eorum narrationibus adjungendam summa est. eos nihil prorsus inter se dissentire in iis historise partibus, quae alien jus sint momenti. Et quod in quibusdam rebus minimis inter se differant HUGO GROTIUS. 641 perplex him, when the Apostles differed from one another in their account of unimportant facts. It served rather to esta¬ blish their credibility, since we may see from it, that they did not write in concert. To this side, moreover, belonged the Remonstrants, who also modified the idea of Inspiration by their distinction of essential and unessential. Hugo Grotius says that'we can* not, in a strict sense, speak of the Inspiration of the His¬ torical portions of Scripture. For the Historical there was no such need of Inspiration; it was sufficient that the memory and carefulness of the writers were vigorous. He supports his opinion by the fact that Luke, in the Introduction to his Gospel, appeals, not to Inspiration, but to the original records made use of by him, in order to establish the credibility of his narrative. The books of Luke are canonical, not as inspired, but because pious and trustworthy. He distinguishes between Inspiration, in the strict sense, and a certain pious move¬ ment of the soul, a kind of aptitude, which impelled to deliver doctrines that were salutary for the life.* Certainly, in Grotius, there is a lack of a lively intuition of the connexion between the Dogmatic and the Ethical, when he attempts to carry out these distinctions. To the same effect, Simon Epis copius says : The Spirit left the sacred writers to their liability to err, in the narrative of circumstances and facts, for which natural knowledge and memory were sufficient. He notices the objection, that if they erred in such things, they might also, in essential cases, and replies that God did not commit what was important to their weakness, but to His own constant guidance.! - On the other side there was the same reaction of a freer spirit and of the immediate religious Life against the yoke of a onesided Dogmatic which controlled the Interpretation of hoc non salum illis non minuere, seel augere etiam debere anctoritatem et fidem. Hinc enim apparere eos non scripsisse qnidpiam ad ipsis communi consensu confictum, reque vera diversos Scriptores fuisse, qni rei gestae veritate impulsi, idem re ipsa, aperte scripserunt. * Votum pro "Pace Ecclesiastica, Opp. Theol., Amsterd. 1679, t. iii. p. 672.—Vox Spiritus Sancti ambigua est, nam ant significat afilatum divinum, qualem habuere turn prophetoe ordinarii, turn interdum David et Daniel aut significat pium motum sive facultatem impellentem ad loquendum salutai'ia vivendi praecepta. d* Institutiones, :v. 4. T T 642 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. the Scriptures ; this appeared in Pietism and the Unitas Fratrum, and effected a freer movement and greater inde¬ pendence in the department of Scriptural investigation : and for the reason that Zinzendorf referred everything to the centra] point he became freer in other points., and sometimes expressed himself about them in a remarkable manner ; for instance, respecting the apparent discrepancies, and the forced Harmonies, the defects of which did not escape his notice.* The reaction against the despotism of Dogmatics led to another extreme. As before, only the Divine was sought to be known, so now, only the Human; and as before, men wished to find undeviating unity, so now they only looked for contra¬ dictions. Hence it was the function of the new development of Theology which proceeded from the reawakened Christian consciousness, to gain, if possible, a new view of the idea of Inspiration, which might equally satisfy the claims of Faith and of Science. In the departments of Apologetics, Dogmatics, and Exegesis, the object to be attained was a new creative development of theological Science. B. THE DOGMAS OF DOGMATICS STRICTLY SO CALLED. a. THEOLOGY. 1. THE DOCTRINE OF GOD IN GENERAL. That which constituted the central point of the Reformation did not lead at first to a more exact discussion of Theology in the strict sense. It is characteristic of the exhibition of the special principle of the Reformation, that Melancthon in the first edition of his Loci , gave himself full scope in Anthro¬ pology and Soteriology, but left out theological Dogmas along with many other subjects.f Melancthon gives an account of it in remarkable words which prove his sound practical interest, but at the same time show how by giving that interest a one¬ sided prominence, injustice might be done to the Scholasticism * Planck, Gesck. der Protest. Theologie von der Concordienformel An, p. 278. t Herman von der Hardt, Historia Litteraria Reformationis, P. iv. p. 30. THE LOCI OF MELANCTHON. 643 of the Middle Ages. We would rather, he says, adore these Mysteries than examine them. Men ought not to bestow too much pains on the Loci , concerning God, the Trinity, and Creation. Not without nice discrimination he marks all these as Mysteries. What have the Schoolmen, he goes on to say. gained by busying themselves with these things alone ? I could more easily overturn what they have said, than use their proofs, by which it were possible even to prove erroneous doc¬ trine. Whoever does not know the doctrines of Sin, the Law, and Grace, I cannot call him a Christian. To know Christ is to know his benefits, which is what these Schoolmen do not teach. On the other side, the reaction came against the older Standpoint, and made itself felt especially in reference to the divine attributes in Socinianism. Its juridical point of view, which rejected the depths of Christian Dogmatics as mystical, renders its conception of the doctrine of the divine Attributes very inadequate. It is not an unprejudiced examination of the doctrines of the Bible, but in an abstract manner, God is recognised as a Lawgiver, as far as it is necessary for a motive to moral life. In the Institutiones religionis Christiana of Faustus Socinus, and in the Bacovian Catechism, everything that is to be taught respecting God is comprised in the * Introduction, p. 31.—Mysteria divinitates rectuis adoraverimus, quam vestigaverimus. Imo, sine magno periculo teutari non possunt; id quod non raro sancto viri etiam sunt experti. Et carne filium Deus, Opt. M. induit, ut nos a contemplatione majestatis sute ad carnis adeoque fragilitatis nostrse contemplationem invitaret.—Proinde non est, cur multum operte ponamus in locis illis supremis, de Deo, de unitate, de trinitate Dei, de mysterio creationis, de modo incarnationis. Quseso te, quid ad secuti sunt jam tot seculis seholastici Theologista?, cum in bis locis solis versarentur ? Nonne in disceptationibus suis, ut Paulus ait (ad Rom i. 21) vani facti sunt dum tota vita nugantur de universalibus, formalitatibus, connotatis, et nescio quibus alius manibus vocabulis ! Et dissimulari eorum stultitia posset, nisi evangel ium interius et beneficia Christi obscurassent nobis illae stultse disputationes. Jam si libeat ingenioso mihi esse in re non necessaria, facile queam evertere, qusecunque pro fidei dogmatis argumenta produxerunt, et in bis quam multa rectius pro bseresibus quibusdam facere videntur, quam pro catholicis dogmatis? Reliquos vero locos, peccati vim, legem, gratiam qui ignorant; non video quomodo Christianum vocem. Nam ex his propric Christus cognoscitur. Siquidem hoc est Christum cognoscere, beneficia ejus cognoscere; non quod isti docent, ejus naturas, modos incarnationis contueri. T T 2 044 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. Dogmas of the Unity, Eternity, Omnipotence, Justice, and Wisdom, since the conviction of these divine attributes suffices, to impel to the observance of the commands of God revealed by Christ. For this object it is not necessary to know any¬ thing of the essential goodness of God, as far as by that is meant something different from the rectum and cequum of the divine government. The Catechism does not treat the doc¬ trines of God’s Infinity and Omnipresence as necessary : it is enough for the doctrines of Religion to know that God by his knowledge and agency extends Himself everywhere ; but this is already contained in his Power and Wisdom. Socinus regarded the idea of the divine Omnipresence as too mystical and questionable as far as it led to a sensuous and pantheistic filling of all things by God. Hence in an erroneous manner he kept God and the World apart, and while he endeavoured to assign ideas of Space to God, he attributed to him a limita¬ tion in reference to Space by excluding Him from the World. Hence he believed that the Scriptural expressions—“ God filletli Heaven and Earth’'—“ God is not far from any of us” —ought to be corrected. In such passages he finds only a reference to the universal agency of God. Like him, John Crell impugns the doctrine of the divine Omnipotence in his treatise De Deo et ej-us attributis. Faustus Socinus had a real practical interest in view, namely, to maintain Man’s free agency and to impugn the doc¬ trine of absolute Predestination. Rut from a horror of the latter doctrine he also denied the unconditional divine Pre¬ science ; for he could not harmonize the free agency of a created being with an unconditional foreknowledge; and since he firmly maintained the Freedom of Man, absolute Prescience must be denied. It belonged to the axioms of Reason, with which no doctrine of Revelation could be at variance. It was suf¬ ficient that God was present by His Power and his Knowledge ; that thus he knew all human operations alike at their origina¬ tion, and hence would prevent everything which was contrary to his designs. Consequently God becomes acquainted with History as events arise, and according to them forms his plan of the Universe. The doctrine of the divine Providence and Government is not thereby damaged, but rather set in a right light; for to what purpose would be the constant guidance of God, which is identical with Providence, if God had once for THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY. 045 Ail foreknown and determined everything? If it were objected that thus a certain relation to Time is attributed to God, ho admitted this ; without Succession there can be no infinite Duration ; and in reference to God there is Past, Present, and Future. The later Dogmatics of the Socinians retained this principle. They asserted that God cannot foreknow a truth that is not determined, a contingency. The Remonstrants from their practical point of view made a near approach to the Socinians on this question. Conrad Vorstius, in his treatise on the divine Attributes,* expressed himself in a similar w r ay; so did Episcopius, only with far greater modesty than Socinus. He found it difficult to admit the divine Omnipresence, because conceptions of space are not easily avoided in connexion with it. Yet he was not unaware of the difficulties on the other side. Pie preferred to determine nothing respecting it with absolute certainty. I would rather, he said, with Holy Writ observe the sks^siv, and leave the decision respecting the modus of the divine Presence to God and the future Life. 2. the doctrine of the trtnity. The spirit of inquiry once aroused by the Reformation, gra¬ dually turned to the doctrine of the Trinity, and there were indeed at first tendencies which proceeded not from Luther’s material principle, but from a speculative or onesided prac¬ tical tendency, like that of the Socinians, or which by an investigation of the ancient Church doctrine and Holy Writ, led to a reaction against the current doctrine of the Trinity. It was in part an unbridled fondness for novelty, an unsteady movement, which after the old restraints had been broken through, and the spirit of inquiry was awakened, gained the ascendancy in those who commenced their inquiries not from an immediate religious interest, and whose interest in religion was far more theoretical and intellectual, and in whom there was not the befitting moral depth and purity. This fondness for novelty was the strongest, where attempts had been made to suppress all free movements—in Italy. But the reaction was not confined to this spot. Even earnest and * Tractatus Theologicus de Deo sive de Natura et Attributis Dei, Steinfurt, 1610. A. Schweizer, C. Vorstius Theol. Jakrb. v. Baur il Z eller, 1857. 646 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. religious men indulged doubts, which the form of the doctrine of the Trinity as laid down in the Creeds might excite ; espe¬ cially would the formal principle of the Reformation require them to compare the Dogma with the Bible. At the begin¬ ning of the Reformation it had been assumed that the Symbolic doctrine of the Trinity was that of the early Church, and there was a desire to restore these dogmas again. But a more accurate study of the oldest doctrine made it evident, that that form of doctrine was not the original one, and so much the more were the ancient forms put forward in preference to those in current use. Hence also among the opponents of the Church doctrine of the Trinity appeared shades of the Semi-Arian and Arian kind: and others which revived the Samosatensian or Sabellian view, since they denied the pre¬ existence of Christ’s divine nature.* John Camp anus belonged to the Arian school:+ He was a native of Cleves ; for a long time he resided in Wittenberg as a teacher with his pupils ; he took a share in the religious movement, but endeavoured to form a system of his own. With that aim he busied himself with examining the Fathers, principally on account of the doctrine of the Trinity. This formed a special point of contact between him and Wicel,^; who also was anxious to restore the ancient doctrine of the Church. Yet in Campanus the speculative interest was far more predominant, and in Wicel the practical; and it would be unfair to class them together. The less at that time the laws of historical development were understood, the easier was it for Campanus to come forward on the ground of the ancient forms, as an opponent of the Catholic and Protestant Church * Christopheri Sandri, Bibliothecse Antitrinitariorum, Freist (Am- sterd.), 1634. F. S. Brock, Historia Antitrinitariorum maxime Socini- anismi et Socinianorum, 2 t. Regioni, Lips. 1774—84. F. Trechsel, Die Protestant. Antitrinitarier, Heidelb. 1844. + J. G. Schelhorn, Amcenitates Litterarise, Bd. xi. Book ii. p. 244. Trechsel, i-. 26. + His principal work, which aimed at uniting the Catholic and Pro¬ testant communions according to the form of the ancient apostolic church, is entitled, Via Regia sive de Controversis Religionis Capitibus Conciliandis Sententia, 1564. Strobel’s Beitrage, Bd. 2. Struck 1 und 2. Rienacker, in Vaters Kirchen Histor. Archiv. 1825 u. 26. Neander, Commentatio de G. Wicello, Berol. 1839, 4to. Neander, Das Fine u. Mannichfaltige des Christ. Lebens, Berlin, 1840. Holzhausen in Niedner’s Zeituhr, 1849, p. 382. ANTITRINITARIANS. 647 in reference to the doctrine of the Trinity, According to his view the Son of God was begotten before the Creation and Time of the essence of the Father as a subordinate Hypostasis. He denied the personality of the Holy Spirit, and regarded him as the divine Essence in general, or as the common energy of the Father and the Son. The leaders of the Arian party were* Valentine Gentilis, of Cosenza, who after moving in Switzerland, Savoy, France, and Poland, returned to Bern, were he was beheaded in 1566 ;f Matthew Gri- baldus, J Peter Gonesius, who attempted to spread Anti- trinitarianism in Poland,§ and with whom was associated Stanislaus Farnovius.|| They were warmly opposed by the strict Unitarians. Lewis Hetzer belonged to the second school (beheaded at Constance, a.d. 1529),^[ v 7 ho denied every distinction in the Trinity. Also Claudius of Savoy, ## who taught respecting Christ that he was called God, inasmuch as he had received the fulness of the divine Spirit beyond all other beings. The Father dw r elt in him through the divine Spirit, and all through him might be animated by the Father. Many persons class with him Ochino, who was first a general of the Capuchins, then an active propagator of the Reformation in Italy, and in the course of his unsettled life adopted a great variety of opinions. His Unitarian views are inferred from the nine¬ teenth and twentieth of his Dialogues,ft in which he so * Heberle, Tiibinger Zeitschr. fur Theologie, 1840. *t Walch, Streitigkeiten ausser der Luther. Kirche,'iv. 121. Valen- tini Gentilis Justo Capitis Supplicio Bernae aifec.it; Brevis Historia Auctore Benedicto Aretio Bernensis Ecclesise Dootore Theologo, Genev. 1567, 4to. Valentini Gentilis impietatum Explicatio ex Actis Publicis Senatus Genevensis Optima Fide Descripta cum Praefatione Theodori Begae in Calvini Tractatus Theologici, Amsterd. 1667, p. 568. Bock, i. 1, 369, ii. 427. Trechsel, ii. 316. X Bock, ii. 456. Walch, 124. § Lubienic, Historia Reformationis Polonicae, Freist (Amsterd.), 1685, p. 101. Walch, 139. Sandii Bibliotheca Antitrinitariorum, p. 40. il Sanclius, p. 52. Breitinger, Anecdot de Ludov. Hetzero in the Museum Helveti- c«m, 1751, t. vi. Bietrich Tiibiuger Zeitschr. 1834, 4to. Bock, ii. 231 Trechsel, i. 13. ** Trechsel, i. 55. ft XXX. Dialog!, Bant. 1563. Struve de Vita, Religione et Fatis Bernhardt Occhini Sevensis. Schilhorn. iii. M’Crie’s History ©f ths Reformation in Italy. Trechsel, ii. p. 221. 648 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. treats of the Trinity as to present the arguments against it with greater point and urgency, than those in its favour, which he is suspected to have done designedly. But we cannot from this determine with certainty his private opinion. But the most remarkable person of this class was Michael Servedo, # a Spaniard, a man of great acuteness and power of imagination, in whom were to be found many indications of a future theological development. We cannot make his doc¬ trine harmonize entirely with any of the more ancient schemes ; it was peculiar and bore the greatest analogy to the early Gnostic view. It is an important fundamental principle, that not the doctrine of the Trinity hut that of the historical Christ is the centre of the Gospel, and that Salvation depends not on a certain speculative view of the Trinity but on the acknow¬ ledgment of Christ, in whom alone God reveals himself, and by whom alone we attain to the divine life. The article respect¬ ing Christ was the original article of faith of the Apostolic Church. The deeper knowledge of the mode in which God was in Christ was not so general a thing at that time. H'e spoke against the doctrines of a mathematical invisible Son of God and the abstract knowledge of God. God in his essence is unimaginable, inconceivable. We should know nothing of him, had he not brought himself near to us, and accommodated himself to the nature of the Creature. No one knows God who does not know the w r ay in which God willed to reveal Himself to us. As a knowledge of G-od cannot be brought to us without that form, so neither can there be communion with Hod if He does not bring Himself near to us through such a form. The form for the Revelation of G-od in the World is the Logos, the form for the communication of His essence to human Spirits is the Holy Spirit.f The Holy Spirit is a * De Trinitatis Erroribus, 1532. Christianismi Restitutio, Vienna?, 1553. Rilliet, Relation clu Proces Criminel Intente a Geneve en 155? coatre M. Servet, redigee d’apres les Documens Originaux, Geneve 1844. Calvini Fidelis Expositio Errorum Serveti, 1554, in his Tractat. Tlieol. Mosheim, Gesch. des M. Servet, Helmst. 178, and Neue ISTach- l’ichten von Servet, 1750. Heberle, Servets Trinitatslehre und Ckristo- logie in der Tiibinger Zeitschr. fur Theologie, 1840, 2. Trechsel, i. Baur, iii. p. 46. Dorner, ii. 649. + Restitutio Christianismi, lib. v.—Quemadmodum Dei essentia quatenus mundo manifestatur, est verbum, ita quatenus mundo corn- municatur, est spiritus estque manifestationi annexa commuuicatio. Quemadmodum in verbo erat idea princeps creati hominis, ita in spiritu MICHAEL SERVEDO. 649 modus deitatis, as far as God communicates himself in Christ and through Christ (modus dispensationis per Christum ); he is the substantialis modus of the divine Essence as it accommo¬ dates itself to Angels and Men. tie (Servedo) speaks of God’s being in all things, without however being a Pantheist, which many were disposed to make him. Here is rather to be observed an affinity, on the one hand, to the Gnostic doctrine of Emanation, and on the other, to Sabellianism. Like Sabellius he distinguishes between the Logos in himself as a form of the Revelation of God, and the hypostatical Logos in Christ, the former the ideal, the latter the real Being. In this sense he also speaks of persons as equivalent to characters, phases, under which the divine Essence presents itself. As out of Christ God cannot be known, so can He not be wor¬ shipped except through Him. In the adoration of God in Christ consists the worship of God in spirit and in truth. In Judaism, on the other hand, God was known only through Angels, who were a type of Christ. On this point he some¬ times approaches to Gnostic Elements. In the Temple God was worshipped only in Shadows and Types ; Christ appeared as the true Temple of God; hence the worship of God in Spirit as he dwells in us through Christ, is possible. Whoever worships out of Christ, prays to him after the manner of Jews, Mohammedans, and Pagans, and Christ becomes a mere nullity. In his interpretation of the Old Testament there are many things worthy of notice, which support the historical sense, and in which he revives the standpoint of the Antio¬ chian School. Eaustus Socinus, in his opposition against all speculation and mysticism, and in his onesided Intellectualism, is the exact opposite of Seryetus. His doctrine of the Trinity, also, is not in all points like the earlier. He impugns the Arian and Nicene doctrine of the Trinity, as well as every erat ideacreati spiritus. Prodebat cum sermone spiritus; Deus loquendo epirabat. Sermonis et spiritus erat eadem substantia sed modus diversus, p. 197. Substantialis in mundo fuit Dei manifestatio, sicut substantialis communicatio; sicut Deus Logos, ita Deus Spiritus. Verbum mandat, ut res fiat, spiritu vivificat. Sicut substantia verbi manifestata et vera est in Christi corporalibus elementis. Christus est Deus, a Deo profectus et nattis; ipse primario, nos secundario per ipsum ; ab ipso ore Christi proficiscitur in nos spiritus regenerationis. See Niedner, p. 682. 650 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOGMAS. notion of a pre-existent divine nature of Christ. Respecting the Holy Spirit he teaches, like Paul of Samosata and Sabel- lius, that it was not a person distinct from God, but a certain operation of God, a power from on high for sanctification. When passages of the New Testament, in which personality is signified, were objected to him, he rejoined that they referred to God the Father, who manifested his agency through this power among men. His view of Christ agrees for the most part with that of Paul of Samosata, and differs only in his explanation of the term Logos; he understood by it not, like Paul, the Logos as a divine power, but Christ, the Logos become Man, who is called the Word of God, because God through him reveals his Will and Decree (Interpres divined voluntatis). The passages in the New Testament which speak of the Creation by the Logos, he referred to the moral Crea¬ tion effected by Christ. He allowed that Christ in many passages was called God, but asserted that this title denoted not nature, but pow r er and authority, which were committed to him in God’s name. He did not propound his antitrini- tarian doctrine as essential to salvation; a person might be saved though in error, as to the Church doctrine of three divine persons, provided he connected with it the doctrine of the Unity of God, and acknowledged the will of God revealed through Christ, and practised and evinced love towards those who thought differently. In consequence of these controversies, express declarations respecting the doctrine of the Trinity were made in the Evan¬ gelical Churches, for in the first article of the Augsburg Con¬ fession the older articles were confirmed, and the Samosateni neoterici were condemned. It has been questioned to whom this phrase referred. In point of time it would suit Servetus, but not as to doctrine; and so with Campanus ; we might rather refer it to Hetzer. Rut we cannot tell absolutely what persons Melancthon had in his eye; for among the various enthusiastic sects of that age, many similar doctrines were set forth. Induced by these controversies Melancthon admitted the doctrine of the Trinity into the edition of his Loci , a.d. 1535. It is worthy of notice that from his confidential language we learn that he was not altogether satisfied with the Church representation of this Dogma. When Servetus made his appearance he wrote about a.d. 1533 to Camerarius. “You THE DOCTRINE OF THE PERSON OF CHRIST. 651 know that in reference to the Trinity I have always feared that these things would again break out. Good God ! what disturb ances will be raised in the next age, whether the Logos and the Holy Spirit are Hypostases. I abide by those words of Holy Writ, which direct to pray to Christ, and attribute to him divine honours; but I do not feel compelled to examine more accurately the assertions respecting Hypostases.” At the end of the seventeenth Century the opposition to the Church doctrine of the Trinity reappeared from the Arian and Semi-Arian standpoint, and the great revolution in the Pro¬ testant Theology which has since taken place, brought these controversies again under discussion. b. THE DOCTRINE OF THE PERSON OF CHRIST. Although Socinus attributed to Christ no pre-existent divine Nature, yet he recognised in him a man begotten in a super¬ natural manner, animated, enlightened, and endowed with peculiar powers by God, in order to make known the divine will to men. He regarded him as the onlv Mediator between God and Man, by whom alone men can be made partakers of salvation. The passages of Scripture in which it is said that the Logos was with God before his Incarnation, and mention is made of his coming down from Heaven, and of his going where he was before, Socinus might have understood as refer¬ ring to Predestination, and to instruction imparted by God ; but he took another view. Disposed to an external suprana- turalism, he did not acknowledge the immanent indwelling of God in Christ, a connexion with the Divine Being which implied a specific relation different from that of all other men ; but he favoured the representation of an external fact, an ele¬ vation of Christ to God, in order to be instructed by Him. Moses was to him the type of Christ; as he had communion with God on Sinai, so Christ, the potentiated Moses, was honoured with higher intercourse with God; he did not ascend Sinai, but was taken up to God in Heaven. This took place several times before he made his public appearance. Thus he explained John vi. 38. When it was objected that no account is given of such events in the Gospels, he replied that this was because they were not observed by any human being. After the Piesurrection Christ was exalted to the right hand of the Father to the highest dignity next to Him; he received from him the guidance of the kingdom of God—the highest 652 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN LOOM AS. dominion over all next to God, so that he can help his people in all things. Christ, therefore, was to Socinus not God, but a deified man. He regarded the doctrine of the perfect Humanity of Christ as important in order to show what human nature had attained in him by his exaltation. He referred the name Christ principally to this highest kingly dignity to which he was raised. He must have received the ability to know the secret thoughts of believers, otherwise he could not rule over them. According to God’s command wor¬ ship was due to him. The reign of Christ will last till believers have attained eternal Salvation ; then he will give it up to the Father. The importance Socinus attached to his own doctrine is shown by his controversy with Francis Davidis, Superin¬ tendent at Clausenberg, an Unitarian : He found the doc¬ trine of Socinus to be illogical, and denied the divine worship which he ascribed to Christ. His doctrine was the strict Ebionitish. What is said in Scripture of Christ’s supremacy he referred in part to the supremacy of Christianity, and in part to the millennial reign of Christ; God alone ought to be worshipped ; on Him alone Man may venture to place con¬ fidence. Faustus Socinus was called to Siebenburg, in order to dispute with him, since it was important for the Unitarian Church not to damage their cause still farther by such start¬ ling assertions. We learn from the Disputation that Socinus decidedly repudiated the doctrine of Francis Davidis ; he calls it a Jewish and impious view of Christ, and that God would not be dishonoured but glorified most of all by the true doc¬ trine. Men who are led through Christ to God, can now apply to God with full confidence in all things which relate to Salvation. The doctrine of Christ’s delegated Power is a necessary article of Faith, from which it follows that prayer can be rightly addressed to him ; but otherwise that would not be a duty. Whoever is so strong in faith that he needs not this consolation, and can turn directly to God, has made great progress. A new reaction of the old antagonism between the Alexan¬ drian and the Antiochian Schools, in the doctrine of the person of Christ, reappeared in the controversy between the Lutheran and Reformed Churches on the Dogma of the Lord’s Supper. Luther, in disputing with Zwingli, in order to establish the presence of the Body of Christ in the Supper, had asserted the LUTHER AND ZWINGLI ON THE LORD'S SUPPER. 053 omnipresence of his human nature, but afterwards had not attached so much importance to this point. When, after the middle of the sixteenth Century, the dispute was revived, Brenz again brought forward this proposition, and the zealous Lutherans have since advocated the doctrine of the ubiquity of Christ’s body. Zwingli and Calvin asserted, on the con¬ trary, that although Christ, as to his Person, is present every¬ where, yet in his human nature he cannot be omnipresent. Melancthon and his school also declared themselves against this doctrine. In the Formula Concordice the Dogma of the Supper was determined against both parties, in the statement, to w T it, that the human nature of Christ possessed this prerogative from his generation, but that in his state of humiliation it was held in abe} T ance. It was attempted to express this doctrine as spiritually as possible, and the introduction of the idea of Space wus condemned. Meanwhile, a difference arose between its advocates. The Wiirtemberg Theologians, especially James Andrea and Brenz, inferred from the communicatio idio- matum that the ubiquity was unconditionally and necessarily perpetual ( ubiquitas perpetual). The Formula only said: Christ by his divine omnipotence can be present with his body wherever he will, and especially where he has promised to be, that is, at the Supper. This was specially confirmed in the corpus doctrines Julium (which w’as designed for Bruns¬ wick) at Helmstedt. Calixtus, in a dissertation upon it, says : We must rather be silent than assert anything certain without the warrant of Holy Writ. Analogous to this was the controversy which broke out a.d. 1019 between the Giessen Theologians, Menzer and Feuer- born,* and those of Tubingen, Luke Osiander and Thum- Mius.f Both sides agreed in acknowledging the communicatio idiomatum, but the Giessen theologians maintained that Christ exercised the divine attributes only in certain cases; those of Tiibingen, on the contrary, that he alw T ays used them, only in a hidden manner. c. ANTHROPOLOGY. The peculiarity of the doctrine of the Evangelical Church on * J. Feuerborn, icev(ocn-ypa